diff --git a/.github/workflows/build-and-validate.yml b/.github/workflows/build-and-validate.yml index 688803e80c..c9460f3505 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/build-and-validate.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/build-and-validate.yml @@ -10,8 +10,6 @@ #https://docs.github.com/en/actions/guides/storing-workflow-data-as-artifacts #In CircleCI, this was different (store_artifacts vs persist_to_workspace) - - name: build-and-validate on: push: @@ -83,43 +81,41 @@ jobs: python3 -m pip install --upgrade pip python3 -m pip install wheel python3 -m pip install -q -r requirements.txt - - + - name: run validate run: | source venv/bin/activate - python3 contentctl.py --path . --verbose validate + python3 contentctl.py -p . validate -pr ESCU + python3 contentctl.py -p . validate -pr SSA - - name: Get CTI Repo for Mitre context - uses: actions/checkout@v2 - with: - repository: mitre/cti #check out https://github.com/mitre/cti.git, defaults to HEAD - path: "cti/" + + # - name: Get CTI Repo for Mitre context + # uses: actions/checkout@v2 + # with: + # repository: mitre/cti #check out https://github.com/mitre/cti.git, defaults to HEAD + # path: "cti/" #Now generate the documentation (uses Node) - uses: actions/setup-node@v2 with: node-version: '14' #can easily be changed to a different version + - name: Generate documentation run: | ls -lah - #Enter the virtualenv and run the docgen source venv/bin/activate - python3 bin/doc_gen.py --path . --output docs -v - + python3 contentctl.py -p . docgen -o docs #Now generate the spec docs npm install -g @adobe/jsonschema2md jsonschema2md -d spec -o docs/spec -f yaml -e spec.json -x - - #Clean up extra properties on docs rm -rf docs/spec/*-*.md - echo "****** BRANCH INFORMATION ******" git branch git branch --show-current - + build-sources: runs-on: ubuntu-latest needs: validate-content @@ -127,11 +123,16 @@ jobs: - name: Checkout Repo uses: actions/checkout@v2 + - uses: actions/setup-python@v2 + with: + python-version: '3.9' #Available versions here - https://github.com/actions/python-versions/releases easy to change/make a matrix/use pypy + architecture: 'x64' # optional x64 or x86. Defaults to x64 if not specified + - name: Install System Packages run: | sudo apt update -qq sudo apt install jq -qq - + - name: Install Python Dependencies run: | #Get the virtualenv set up @@ -141,22 +142,13 @@ jobs: python3 -m pip install --upgrade pip python3 -m pip install wheel python3 -m pip install -q -r requirements.txt - + - name: Run Generate run: | source venv/bin/activate - python3 contentctl.py --path . --verbose generate --product ESCU --output dist/escu - python3 contentctl.py --path . --verbose generate --product SSA --output dist/ssa - - - name: Copy lookups .csv files - run: | - # clean up current lookups - rm -rf dist/escu/lookups - mkdir dist/escu/lookups - #copy over lookups - cd lookups - cp -rv *.csv ../dist/escu/lookups - + python3 contentctl.py --path . generate --product ESCU --output dist/escu + python3 contentctl.py --path . generate --product SSA --output dist/ssa + - name: Copy lookups .mlmodel files run: | cd lookups @@ -165,7 +157,7 @@ jobs: then cp -rv *.mlmodel ../dist/escu/lookups else echo "No mlmodel files to copy" fi - + #Tag is '' for non-tagged push and the tag name for a tagged release - name: Set tag id: vars @@ -179,7 +171,7 @@ jobs: echo "Release is NOT TAGGED!" echo "::set-output name=tag::" fi - + - name: Update Version and Build number run : | # check if tag is set, get build number from the tag if set @@ -196,10 +188,9 @@ jobs: sed -i "s/\"version\": .*$/\"version\": \"$CONTENT_VERSION\"/g" dist/escu/app.manifest sed -i "s/version = .*$/version = $CONTENT_VERSION/g" dist/escu/default/content-version.conf tar -czf content-pack-build-escu.tar.gz dist/escu/* - # update build number and version for ssa tar -czf content-pack-build-ssa.tar.gz dist/ssa/* - + - name: Persist to Workspace uses: actions/upload-artifact@v2 with: @@ -207,8 +198,7 @@ jobs: path: | content-pack-build-escu.tar.gz content-pack-build-ssa.tar.gz - - + build-package: runs-on: ubuntu-latest needs: [validate-content, build-sources] @@ -228,13 +218,13 @@ jobs: - name: Get virtualenv for Python 2.7 run: | sudo apt install virtualenv - + - name: Grab Splunk Packaging Toolkit run : | curl -Ls https://download.splunk.com/misc/packaging-toolkit/splunk-packaging-toolkit-0.9.0.tar.gz -o splunk-packaging-toolkit-latest.tar.gz mkdir slim-latest tar -zxf splunk-packaging-toolkit-latest.tar.gz -C slim-latest --strip-components=1 - + - name: Install Splunk Packaging Toolkit (slim) run: | cd slim-latest @@ -244,36 +234,32 @@ jobs: python2 -m pip install wheel python2 -m pip install semantic_version python2 -m pip install . + - name: Create a .spl for this Build Using Slim run: | source slim-latest/venv/bin/activate cd build tar -zxf content-pack-build-escu.tar.gz tar -zxf content-pack-build-ssa.tar.gz - mv dist/escu DA-ESS-ContentUpdate mv dist/ssa SSA_Content - slim package -o upload DA-ESS-ContentUpdate - cp upload/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate-*.tar.gz DA-ESS-ContentUpdate-latest.tar.gz sha256sum DA-ESS-ContentUpdate-latest.tar.gz > checksum.txt - #Do this copy so that we conform as much as possible, and have to make #as few changes as possible, once we start generating this as a real, #properly packaged app tar -zcf upload/SSA_Content-NO_SLIM.tar.gz SSA_Content cp upload/SSA_Content-*.tar.gz SSA_Content-latest.tar.gz sha256sum SSA_Content-latest.tar.gz >> checksum.txt - - - name: store_artifacts uses: actions/upload-artifact@v2 with: name: package path: | build/upload + - name: store_artifacts_two uses: actions/upload-artifact@v2 with: @@ -282,13 +268,8 @@ jobs: build/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate-latest.tar.gz build/SSA_Content-latest.tar.gz build/checksum.txt - - - - - #Everything below this line should ONLY run on a tag and nothing else #We still want all of the above checks to run and pass before running these run-appinspect: @@ -309,16 +290,11 @@ jobs: name: content-latest path: build/ - - - - name: Install System Packages run: | sudo apt update -qq sudo apt install jq -qq - - - + - name: Submit ESCU to AppInspect API env: APPINSPECT_USERNAME: ${{ secrets.AppInspectUsername }} @@ -328,20 +304,20 @@ jobs: #Enclose in quotes in case there are any special characters in the username/password #Better not to pass these arguments on the command line, if possible ./appinspect.sh ../ DA-ESS-ContentUpdate-latest.tar.gz "$APPINSPECT_USERNAME" "$APPINSPECT_PASSWORD" - + - name: Create report artifact if: always() run: | #Always create this, regardless of whether success or failure above tar -cvzf report.tar.gz report/ - + - name: store_artifacts uses: actions/upload-artifact@v2 with: name: appinspect_reports path: | report.tar.gz - + #Still store the report, even if we have failed (otherwise we don't know why/how we failed) - name: store_artifacts_on_failure uses: actions/upload-artifact@v2 @@ -350,7 +326,8 @@ jobs: name: appinspect_reports_failure path: | report.tar.gz - + + create-report: runs-on: ubuntu-latest needs: [validate-content, build-sources, build-package, run-appinspect] @@ -362,12 +339,11 @@ jobs: with: ref: 'develop' - - name: Install System Packages run: | sudo apt update -qq sudo apt install jq -qq - + - uses: actions/setup-python@v2 with: python-version: '3.9' #Available versions here - https://github.com/actions/python-versions/releases easy to change/make a matrix/use pypy @@ -382,12 +358,12 @@ jobs: python3 -m pip install --upgrade pip python3 -m pip install wheel python3 -m pip install -q -r requirements.txt - + - name: run reporting run: | source venv/bin/activate - python3 bin/reporting.py - + python3 contentctl.py -p . reporting + #Official, Verified Amazon-AWS Github Account Provided Action - uses: aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@v1 with: @@ -399,7 +375,7 @@ jobs: - name: Upload Reporting run: | aws s3 cp bin/reporting s3://security-content/reporting --recursive --exclude "*" --include "*.svg" - + update-sources-github: runs-on: ubuntu-latest needs: [validate-content, build-sources, build-package, run-appinspect, create-report] @@ -422,13 +398,13 @@ jobs: with: name: content-latest - - name: Stage artifacts in proper directories run: | mkdir latest-escu tar -zxf DA-ESS-ContentUpdate-latest.tar.gz -C latest-escu --strip-components=1 mkdir latest-ssa tar -zxf SSA_Content-latest.tar.gz -C latest-ssa --strip-components=1 + - name: Install Python Dependencies run: | #Get the virtualenv set up @@ -439,21 +415,15 @@ jobs: python3 -m pip install wheel python3 -m pip install -q -r requirements.txt - - name: Get CTI Repo for Mitre context - uses: actions/checkout@v2 - with: - repository: mitre/cti #check out https://github.com/mitre/cti.git, defaults to HEAD - path: "cti/" - - name: Get branch and PR required for detection testing main.py id: vars run: | echo "::set-output name=branch::${GITHUB_REF#refs/heads/}" - + - name: Run doc-gen run: | source venv/bin/activate - python3 bin/doc_gen.py --path . --output docs -v + python3 contentctl.py -p . docgen -o docs # this step is creating some TOKEN issues while tagging a build, commenting this out for now @@ -465,16 +435,6 @@ jobs: # python3 -m pip install -r security_content_automation/requirements.txt # python3 security_content_automation/enrich_detections.py - - name: Make YAMLs Pretty - run: | - source venv/bin/activate - python3 bin/pretty_yaml.py --path . -v - - - name: Run generate-coverage-map - run: | - source venv/bin/activate - python3 bin/generate-coverage-map.py --projects_path . --output docs/mitre-map - - name: Update github with new docs and package bits run: | rm -rf dist @@ -492,8 +452,7 @@ jobs: # Push quietly to prevent showing the token in log #No need to provide any credentials git push - - + publish-github-release: #Github-maintained release action is in archived state: https://github.com/actions/create-release #They recommend several and we use the following with the most stars: https://github.com/softprops/action-gh-release @@ -512,8 +471,6 @@ jobs: with: name: appinspect_reports - - #Rename those artifacts appropriately - name: Set tag id: vars @@ -523,12 +480,10 @@ jobs: run: | cp DA-ESS-ContentUpdate-latest.tar.gz DA-ESS-ContentUpdate-${{ steps.vars.outputs.tag }}.tar.gz cp SSA_Content-latest.tar.gz SSA_Content-${{ steps.vars.outputs.tag }}.tar.gz - #No checksum on the reports cp report.tar.gz report-${{ steps.vars.outputs.tag }}.tar.gz - cp checksum.txt checksum-${{ steps.vars.outputs.tag }}.txt - + #Upload all of the artifacts that we have created using the third party #action recommended bu Github - name: Upload Release Artifacts @@ -539,9 +494,7 @@ jobs: SSA_Content-${{ steps.vars.outputs.tag }}.tar.gz report-${{ steps.vars.outputs.tag }}.tar.gz checksum-${{ steps.vars.outputs.tag }}.txt - - - + attack-range-update: runs-on: ubuntu-latest needs: [validate-content, build-sources, build-package, run-appinspect, create-report, update-sources-github, publish-github-release] @@ -554,7 +507,6 @@ jobs: with: name: content-latest - #Official, Verified Amazon-AWS Github Account Provided Action - uses: aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@v1 with: @@ -568,7 +520,7 @@ jobs: aws s3 cp DA-ESS-ContentUpdate-latest.tar.gz s3://attack-range-appbinaries/ # make the file public since it is not by default aws s3api put-object-acl --bucket attack-range-appbinaries --key DA-ESS-ContentUpdate-latest.tar.gz --acl public-read - + master-api-update: runs-on: ubuntu-latest needs: [validate-content, build-sources, build-package, run-appinspect, create-report, update-sources-github, publish-github-release, attack-range-update] @@ -596,16 +548,11 @@ jobs: python3 -m pip install wheel python3 -m pip install -q -r requirements.txt - - name: Create Baseline Folder - run: | - source venv/bin/activate - python3 bin/create_baseline_folder.py - - name: Create YML to JSON Folder run: | source venv/bin/activate - python3 contentctl.py --path . --verbose generate --product API --output dist/api - + python3 contentctl.py --path . generate --product API --output dist/api + #Official, Verified Amazon-AWS Github Account Provided Action - uses: aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@v1 with: @@ -627,6 +574,7 @@ jobs: aws s3 cp macros s3://security-content/macros --recursive --exclude "*" --include "*.yml" aws s3 cp deployments s3://security-content/deployments --recursive --exclude "*" --include "*.yml" aws s3 cp dist/api s3://security-content/json --recursive --exclude "*" --include "*.json" + - name: Security Content API Smoke Test run: | API_URL='https://content.splunkresearch.com/detections' @@ -635,4 +583,4 @@ jobs: if [ "$API_STATUS" != "200" ]; then echo "Error [Security Content API status: $API_STATUS]" exit 1 - fi + fi \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/.github/workflows/code-testing.yml b/.github/workflows/code-testing.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..030335f441 --- /dev/null +++ b/.github/workflows/code-testing.yml @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +name: code-testing +on: + push: + paths: + - 'bin/contentctl_project/**' + +jobs: + code-testing: + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + steps: + - name: Check out the repository code + uses: actions/checkout@v2 + + - uses: actions/setup-python@v2 + with: + python-version: '3.9' #Available versions here - https://github.com/actions/python-versions/releases easy to change/make a matrix/use pypy + architecture: 'x64' # optional x64 or x86. Defaults to x64 if not specified + + - name: Install System Packages + run: | + sudo apt update -qq + sudo apt install jq -qq + + - name: Install Python Dependencies + run: | + #Get the virtualenv set up + rm -rf venv + python3 -m venv --clear venv + source venv/bin/activate + python3 -m pip install --upgrade pip + python3 -m pip install wheel + python3 -m pip install -q -r requirements.txt + + - name: test code with pytest + run: | + source venv/bin/activate + export PYTHONPATH=$PYTHONPATH:/home/runner/work/security_content + pytest -s bin/contentctl_project \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/.semgrepignore b/.semgrepignore deleted file mode 100644 index db5d857a38..0000000000 --- a/.semgrepignore +++ /dev/null @@ -1,45 +0,0 @@ -# This file uses .gitignore syntax: -# -# To ignore a file anywhere it occurs in your project, enter a -# glob pattern here. E.g. "*.min.js". -# -# To ignore a directory anywhere it occurs in your project, add -# a trailing slash to the file name. E.g. "dist/". -# -# To ignore a file or directory only relative to the project root, -# include a slash anywhere except the last character. E.g. -# "/dist/", or "src/generated". -# -# Some parts of .gitignore syntax are not supported, and patterns -# using this syntax will be dropped from the ignore list: -# - Explicit "include syntax", e.g. "!kept/". -# - Multi-character expansion syntax, e.g. "*.py[cod]" -# -# To include ignore patterns from another file, start a line -# with ':include', followed by the path of the file. E.g. -# ":include path/to/other/ignore/file". -# -# To ignore a file with a literal ':' character, escape it with -# a backslash, e.g. "\:foo". - -# Ignore git items -.gitignore -.git/ -:include .gitignore - -#spl files may contain eval and other statements that should NOT trigger semgrep warnings -*.spl - -#Ignore Markdown and Wiki Pages -*.md -*.wiki - -#Temporarily ignoring this directory as we discuss a path moving forward -#for Splunk Packaging Toolkit Update Strategy -/dist/ - -#Don't check yaml files in these directories -/response_tasks -/detections - - diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 0e7dc602f3..20c6708805 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -46,11 +46,12 @@ curl -s https://content.splunkresearch.com | jq ### contentctl.py The Content Control tool allows you to manipulate Splunk Security Content via the following actions: -1. **new** - Creates new content (detection, story, baseline) +1. **new_content** - Creates new content (detection, story, baseline) 2. **validate** - Validates written content 3. **generate** - Generates a deployment package for different platforms (splunk_app) ### pre-requisites +Make sure you use python version 3.9 or higher. ``` git clone git@github.com:splunk/security_content.git @@ -60,19 +61,19 @@ virtualenv venv source venv/bin/activate pip install -r requirements.txt ``` +### Architecture details for the tooling +- [WIKI](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Security-Content-Code) + ### create a new detection -`python contentctl.py new` +`python contentctl.py -p . new_content -t detection` for a more indepth write up on how to write content see our [guide](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Developing-Content). -### create a new analytic story -`python contentctl.py new -t story` - -### validate written content a new analytic story -`python contentctl.py --verbose validate` +### validate security content +`python contentctl.py -p . validate -pr ESCU` ### generate a splunk app from current content -`python contentctl.py --path . --verbose generate --output package` +`python contentctl.py -p . generate -o dist/escu -pr ESCU` # MITRE ATT&CK ⚔️ ### Detection Coverage @@ -91,9 +92,9 @@ A complete use case, specifically built to detect, investigate, and respond to a * [detections/](detections/): Contains all 209 detection searches to-date and growing. * [stories/](stories/): All Analytic Stories that are group detections or also known as Use Cases * [deployments/](deployments/): Configuration for the schedule and alert action for all content -* [responses/](responses/): Incident Response Playbooks/Workflow for responding to a specific Use Case or Threat. -* [response_tasks/](response_tasks/): Individual steps in responses that help the user investigate via a Splunk search, automate via a phantom playbook, and visualize via dashboards threats. +* [playbooks/](playbooks/): Incident Response Playbooks/Workflow for responding to a specific Use Case or Threat. * [baselines/](baselines/): Searches that must be executed before a detection runs. It is specifically useful for collecting data on a system before running your detection on the collected data. +* [investigations/](investigations/): Investigations to further analysis the output from detections. * [dashboards/](dashboards/): JSON definitions of Mission Control dashboards, to be used as a response task. Currently not used. * [macros/](macros/): Implements Splunk’s search macros, shortcuts to commonly used search patterns like sysmon source type. More on how macros are used to customize content below. * [lookups/](lookups/): Implements Splunk’s lookup, usually to provide a list of static values like commonly used ransomware extensions. @@ -115,7 +116,7 @@ If you have questions or need support, you can: ## License -Copyright 2020 Splunk Inc. +Copyright 2022 Splunk Inc. Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. diff --git a/detections/cloud/baseline_of_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_aws.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_aws.yml similarity index 100% rename from detections/cloud/baseline_of_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_aws.yml rename to baselines/baseline_of_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_aws.yml index fb2753d74e..c8a73d3a63 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/baseline_of_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_aws.yml +++ b/baselines/baseline_of_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_aws.yml @@ -26,8 +26,8 @@ references: [] tags: analytic_story: - AWS Network ACL Activity - - Command and Control - Suspicious AWS Traffic + - Command and Control deployments: - Daily Cache Updates detections: diff --git a/detections/cloud/baseline_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_per_user.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_per_user.yml similarity index 98% rename from detections/cloud/baseline_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_per_user.yml rename to baselines/baseline_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_per_user.yml index 70f03e81e2..6f573ad0f8 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/baseline_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_per_user.yml +++ b/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_per_user.yml @@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ tags: detections: - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/baseline_of_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml similarity index 98% rename from detections/cloud/baseline_of_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml rename to baselines/baseline_of_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml index d221972f44..849525c2bb 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/baseline_of_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml +++ b/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml @@ -42,7 +42,6 @@ tags: detections: - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/baseline_of_cloud_instances_launched.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_instances_launched.yml similarity index 98% rename from detections/cloud/baseline_of_cloud_instances_launched.yml rename to baselines/baseline_of_cloud_instances_launched.yml index 538a052db7..3e52c6b7ed 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/baseline_of_cloud_instances_launched.yml +++ b/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_instances_launched.yml @@ -42,7 +42,6 @@ tags: detections: - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/baseline_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls_per_user.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls_per_user.yml similarity index 98% rename from detections/cloud/baseline_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls_per_user.yml rename to baselines/baseline_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls_per_user.yml index 8d9f54fcd6..235ec8557c 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/baseline_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls_per_user.yml +++ b/baselines/baseline_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls_per_user.yml @@ -38,7 +38,6 @@ tags: detections: - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/endpoint/baseline_of_command_line_length___mltk.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_command_line_length___mltk.yml similarity index 100% rename from detections/endpoint/baseline_of_command_line_length___mltk.yml rename to baselines/baseline_of_command_line_length___mltk.yml diff --git a/detections/network/baseline_of_dns_query_length___mltk.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_dns_query_length___mltk.yml similarity index 100% rename from detections/network/baseline_of_dns_query_length___mltk.yml rename to baselines/baseline_of_dns_query_length___mltk.yml index a093464a64..d62c26dd4e 100644 --- a/detections/network/baseline_of_dns_query_length___mltk.yml +++ b/baselines/baseline_of_dns_query_length___mltk.yml @@ -27,9 +27,9 @@ known_false_positives: none references: [] tags: analytic_story: - - Command and Control - Hidden Cobra Malware - Suspicious DNS Traffic + - Command and Control deployments: - Daily Cache Updates detections: diff --git a/detections/cloud/baseline_of_network_acl_activity_by_arn.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_network_acl_activity_by_arn.yml similarity index 100% rename from detections/cloud/baseline_of_network_acl_activity_by_arn.yml rename to baselines/baseline_of_network_acl_activity_by_arn.yml diff --git a/detections/cloud/baseline_of_s3_bucket_deletion_activity_by_arn.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_s3_bucket_deletion_activity_by_arn.yml similarity index 97% rename from detections/cloud/baseline_of_s3_bucket_deletion_activity_by_arn.yml rename to baselines/baseline_of_s3_bucket_deletion_activity_by_arn.yml index 6a36b7bbe3..e830524f77 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/baseline_of_s3_bucket_deletion_activity_by_arn.yml +++ b/baselines/baseline_of_s3_bucket_deletion_activity_by_arn.yml @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ name: Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN -id: fc0edd96-ff2b-48b0-9f1f-63eq3783fd63 +id: 841b102c-8866-494b-a704-87b674fe9b09 version: 1 date: '2018-07-17' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk diff --git a/detections/cloud/baseline_of_security_group_activity_by_arn.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_security_group_activity_by_arn.yml similarity index 100% rename from detections/cloud/baseline_of_security_group_activity_by_arn.yml rename to baselines/baseline_of_security_group_activity_by_arn.yml diff --git a/detections/network/baseline_of_smb_traffic___mltk.yml b/baselines/baseline_of_smb_traffic___mltk.yml similarity index 100% rename from detections/network/baseline_of_smb_traffic___mltk.yml rename to baselines/baseline_of_smb_traffic___mltk.yml diff --git a/detections/endpoint/count_of_assets_by_category.yml b/baselines/count_of_assets_by_category.yml similarity index 100% rename from detections/endpoint/count_of_assets_by_category.yml rename to baselines/count_of_assets_by_category.yml diff --git a/detections/network/count_of_unique_ips_connecting_to_ports.yml b/baselines/count_of_unique_ips_connecting_to_ports.yml similarity index 85% rename from detections/network/count_of_unique_ips_connecting_to_ports.yml rename to baselines/count_of_unique_ips_connecting_to_ports.yml index e80c07d669..2e23bd688e 100644 --- a/detections/network/count_of_unique_ips_connecting_to_ports.yml +++ b/baselines/count_of_unique_ips_connecting_to_ports.yml @@ -16,8 +16,14 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting n known_false_positives: none references: [] tags: + analytic_story: + - Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch + - Ransomware + - Command and Control deployments: - Daily Cache Updates + detections: + - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security diff --git a/detections/cloud/create_a_list_of_approved_aws_service_accounts.yml b/baselines/create_a_list_of_approved_aws_service_accounts.yml similarity index 97% rename from detections/cloud/create_a_list_of_approved_aws_service_accounts.yml rename to baselines/create_a_list_of_approved_aws_service_accounts.yml index 1f13fe0cab..3e06e9c5bb 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/create_a_list_of_approved_aws_service_accounts.yml +++ b/baselines/create_a_list_of_approved_aws_service_accounts.yml @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ name: Create a list of approved AWS service accounts -id: fc0edc95-ff2b-48b1-5f6f-63ga3789fd43 +id: 08ef80f5-6555-474b-bb2d-22e2aa4206a4 version: 2 date: '2018-12-03' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk diff --git a/detections/deprecated/add_prohibited_processes_to_enterprise_security.yml b/baselines/deprecated/add_prohibited_processes_to_enterprise_security.yml similarity index 84% rename from detections/deprecated/add_prohibited_processes_to_enterprise_security.yml rename to baselines/deprecated/add_prohibited_processes_to_enterprise_security.yml index e624ac4b98..2b99cc4fe8 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/add_prohibited_processes_to_enterprise_security.yml +++ b/baselines/deprecated/add_prohibited_processes_to_enterprise_security.yml @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ tags: - 'Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ' - Monitor for Unauthorized Software - SamSam Ransomware + asset_type: Endpoint deployments: - Daily Cache Updates detections: @@ -31,3 +32,16 @@ tags: required_fields: - _time security_domain: endpoint + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/baseline_of_api_calls_per_user_arn.yml b/baselines/deprecated/baseline_of_api_calls_per_user_arn.yml similarity index 87% rename from detections/deprecated/baseline_of_api_calls_per_user_arn.yml rename to baselines/deprecated/baseline_of_api_calls_per_user_arn.yml index 985b089fd7..c27e8beefb 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/baseline_of_api_calls_per_user_arn.yml +++ b/baselines/deprecated/baseline_of_api_calls_per_user_arn.yml @@ -35,3 +35,16 @@ tags: - eventType - userIdentity.arn security_domain: network + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml b/baselines/deprecated/baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml similarity index 92% rename from detections/deprecated/baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml rename to baselines/deprecated/baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml index faf7f76683..0b94c6e35a 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml +++ b/baselines/deprecated/baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml @@ -47,3 +47,16 @@ tags: - errorCode - src_user security_domain: network + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml b/baselines/deprecated/baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml similarity index 92% rename from detections/deprecated/baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml rename to baselines/deprecated/baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml index ddad99a905..bcbcff72a3 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml +++ b/baselines/deprecated/baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml @@ -47,3 +47,16 @@ tags: - errorCode - src_user security_domain: network + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/previously_seen_api_call_per_user_roles_in_cloudtrail.yml b/baselines/deprecated/previously_seen_api_call_per_user_roles_in_cloudtrail.yml similarity index 86% rename from detections/deprecated/previously_seen_api_call_per_user_roles_in_cloudtrail.yml rename to baselines/deprecated/previously_seen_api_call_per_user_roles_in_cloudtrail.yml index 82bf2d3774..9568800eab 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/previously_seen_api_call_per_user_roles_in_cloudtrail.yml +++ b/baselines/deprecated/previously_seen_api_call_per_user_roles_in_cloudtrail.yml @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ name: Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail -id: fc0edc95-fq2c-48b0-9f6f-63da3289fd03 +id: 02add098-efa3-428d-b2e2-4ed0831c92f4 version: 1 date: '2018-04-16' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk @@ -38,3 +38,16 @@ tags: - userName - eventName security_domain: network + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/previously_seen_aws_provisioning_activity_sources.yml b/baselines/deprecated/previously_seen_aws_provisioning_activity_sources.yml similarity index 88% rename from detections/deprecated/previously_seen_aws_provisioning_activity_sources.yml rename to baselines/deprecated/previously_seen_aws_provisioning_activity_sources.yml index e76fff0bce..4e69e66ab7 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/previously_seen_aws_provisioning_activity_sources.yml +++ b/baselines/deprecated/previously_seen_aws_provisioning_activity_sources.yml @@ -36,3 +36,16 @@ tags: - eventName - sourceIPAddress security_domain: network + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/previously_seen_ec2_amis.yml b/baselines/deprecated/previously_seen_ec2_amis.yml similarity index 85% rename from detections/deprecated/previously_seen_ec2_amis.yml rename to baselines/deprecated/previously_seen_ec2_amis.yml index b771562f68..859e17dfe2 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/previously_seen_ec2_amis.yml +++ b/baselines/deprecated/previously_seen_ec2_amis.yml @@ -32,3 +32,16 @@ tags: - errorCode - requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId security_domain: network + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.yml b/baselines/deprecated/previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.yml similarity index 85% rename from detections/deprecated/previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.yml rename to baselines/deprecated/previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.yml index 1dc8b3b702..d7b4b41ac2 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.yml +++ b/baselines/deprecated/previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.yml @@ -32,3 +32,16 @@ tags: - errorCode - requestParameters.instanceType security_domain: network + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.yml b/baselines/deprecated/previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.yml similarity index 85% rename from detections/deprecated/previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.yml rename to baselines/deprecated/previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.yml index 2c7ffd8be5..fc7cde6810 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.yml +++ b/baselines/deprecated/previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.yml @@ -33,3 +33,16 @@ tags: - errorCode - requestParameters.instanceType security_domain: network + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml b/baselines/deprecated/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml similarity index 90% rename from detections/deprecated/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml rename to baselines/deprecated/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml index 8bc3c1b630..60681d4489 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml +++ b/baselines/deprecated/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml @@ -40,3 +40,16 @@ tags: - userIdentity.arn - src security_domain: network + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/update_previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml b/baselines/deprecated/update_previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml similarity index 90% rename from detections/deprecated/update_previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml rename to baselines/deprecated/update_previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml index d564d7f6d3..e9133f2cac 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/update_previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml +++ b/baselines/deprecated/update_previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail.yml @@ -42,3 +42,16 @@ tags: - userIdentity.arn - src security_domain: network + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/network/discover_dns_records.yml b/baselines/discover_dns_records.yml similarity index 100% rename from detections/network/discover_dns_records.yml rename to baselines/discover_dns_records.yml diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/dnstwist_domain_names.yml b/baselines/dnstwist_domain_names.yml similarity index 84% rename from detections/experimental/network/dnstwist_domain_names.yml rename to baselines/dnstwist_domain_names.yml index 9b39a737ec..95b3b54dbc 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/dnstwist_domain_names.yml +++ b/baselines/dnstwist_domain_names.yml @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Brand Monitoring - Suspicious Emails + asset_type: Endpoint deployments: - Daily Cache Updates detections: @@ -29,6 +30,19 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation required_fields: - _time security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: dest + type: Other + role: + - Other diff --git a/detections/network/identify_systems_creating_remote_desktop_traffic.yml b/baselines/identify_systems_creating_remote_desktop_traffic.yml similarity index 84% rename from detections/network/identify_systems_creating_remote_desktop_traffic.yml rename to baselines/identify_systems_creating_remote_desktop_traffic.yml index b1d779803e..ece8d2d0d0 100644 --- a/detections/network/identify_systems_creating_remote_desktop_traffic.yml +++ b/baselines/identify_systems_creating_remote_desktop_traffic.yml @@ -16,8 +16,15 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must ingest network known_false_positives: none references: [] tags: + analytic_story: + - SamSam Ransomware + - Ryuk Ransomware + - Hidden Cobra Malware + - Active Directory Lateral Movement deployments: - Daily Cache Updates + detections: + - Remote Desktop Network Traffic product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security diff --git a/detections/network/identify_systems_receiving_remote_desktop_traffic.yml b/baselines/identify_systems_receiving_remote_desktop_traffic.yml similarity index 85% rename from detections/network/identify_systems_receiving_remote_desktop_traffic.yml rename to baselines/identify_systems_receiving_remote_desktop_traffic.yml index 1f1c50323f..ad0dafe2b9 100644 --- a/detections/network/identify_systems_receiving_remote_desktop_traffic.yml +++ b/baselines/identify_systems_receiving_remote_desktop_traffic.yml @@ -17,8 +17,15 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must ingest network known_false_positives: none references: [] tags: + analytic_story: + - SamSam Ransomware + - Ryuk Ransomware + - Hidden Cobra Malware + - Active Directory Lateral Movement deployments: - Daily Cache Updates + detections: + - Remote Desktop Network Traffic product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security diff --git a/detections/endpoint/identify_systems_using_remote_desktop.yml b/baselines/identify_systems_using_remote_desktop.yml similarity index 84% rename from detections/endpoint/identify_systems_using_remote_desktop.yml rename to baselines/identify_systems_using_remote_desktop.yml index ca22b5bade..b4ac09f901 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/identify_systems_using_remote_desktop.yml +++ b/baselines/identify_systems_using_remote_desktop.yml @@ -16,8 +16,15 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting en known_false_positives: none references: [] tags: + analytic_story: + - SamSam Ransomware + - Ryuk Ransomware + - Hidden Cobra Malware + - Active Directory Lateral Movement deployments: - Daily Cache Updates + detections: + - Remote Desktop Network Traffic product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security diff --git a/detections/endpoint/monitor_successful_backups.yml b/baselines/monitor_successful_backups.yml similarity index 100% rename from detections/endpoint/monitor_successful_backups.yml rename to baselines/monitor_successful_backups.yml diff --git a/detections/endpoint/monitor_unsuccessful_backups.yml b/baselines/monitor_unsuccessful_backups.yml similarity index 100% rename from detections/endpoint/monitor_unsuccessful_backups.yml rename to baselines/monitor_unsuccessful_backups.yml diff --git a/detections/cloud/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.yml similarity index 100% rename from detections/cloud/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.yml rename to baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.yml diff --git a/detections/cloud/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity___initial.yml similarity index 97% rename from detections/cloud/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity_initial.yml rename to baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity___initial.yml index 992f7e03b4..d638bb374d 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity_initial.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity___initial.yml @@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ tags: detections: - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity___update.yml similarity index 98% rename from detections/cloud/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity_update.yml rename to baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity___update.yml index 1d83fdbbb2..7f39a483ed 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity_update.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity___update.yml @@ -32,7 +32,6 @@ tags: detections: - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/previously_seen_aws_regions.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_aws_regions.yml similarity index 100% rename from detections/cloud/previously_seen_aws_regions.yml rename to baselines/previously_seen_aws_regions.yml diff --git a/detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role___initial.yml similarity index 97% rename from detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_initial.yml rename to baselines/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role___initial.yml index 18da88ca37..db887a270e 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_initial.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role___initial.yml @@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ tags: detections: - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role___update.yml similarity index 97% rename from detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_update.yml rename to baselines/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role___update.yml index c8b8006cca..5ddbe2e8f4 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_update.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role___update.yml @@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ tags: detections: - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user___initial.yml similarity index 96% rename from detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_initial.yml rename to baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user___initial.yml index 5d00a30cde..db0f614cdb 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_initial.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user___initial.yml @@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ tags: detections: - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user___update.yml similarity index 97% rename from detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_update.yml rename to baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user___update.yml index 6ae587e658..0ed37e5ef6 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_update.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user___update.yml @@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ tags: detections: - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images___initial.yml similarity index 97% rename from detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_initial.yml rename to baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images___initial.yml index 66f39fa344..52816b728c 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_initial.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images___initial.yml @@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ tags: detections: - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images___update.yml similarity index 97% rename from detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_update.yml rename to baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images___update.yml index 9dd016dffb..a30c726f8a 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_update.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images___update.yml @@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ tags: detections: - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types___initial.yml similarity index 97% rename from detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types_initial.yml rename to baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types___initial.yml index e45ca5e94e..1901b8974a 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types_initial.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types___initial.yml @@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ tags: detections: - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types___update.yml similarity index 97% rename from detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types_update.yml rename to baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types___update.yml index ff02ac37e5..daa987c47f 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types_update.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types___update.yml @@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ tags: detections: - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user___initial.yml similarity index 97% rename from detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user_initial.yml rename to baselines/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user___initial.yml index 4e696ae8fc..b03acd9d3e 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user_initial.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user___initial.yml @@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ tags: detections: - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user___update.yml similarity index 97% rename from detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user_update.yml rename to baselines/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user___update.yml index 2de6509394..c95a1e7a7b 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user_update.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user___update.yml @@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ tags: detections: - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources___initial.yml similarity index 97% rename from detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_initial.yml rename to baselines/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources___initial.yml index f584983abf..f103ce58ce 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_initial.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources___initial.yml @@ -32,7 +32,6 @@ tags: - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources___update.yml similarity index 98% rename from detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_update.yml rename to baselines/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources___update.yml index 553b980d3e..ce01a7c493 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_update.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources___update.yml @@ -37,7 +37,6 @@ tags: - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_regions_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_regions___initial.yml similarity index 97% rename from detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_regions_initial.yml rename to baselines/previously_seen_cloud_regions___initial.yml index 5557da3139..1c710097d9 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_regions_initial.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_regions___initial.yml @@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ tags: detections: - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_regions_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_regions___update.yml similarity index 97% rename from detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_regions_update.yml rename to baselines/previously_seen_cloud_regions___update.yml index a2cf5ae3ab..f00ff4dc49 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_regions_update.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_cloud_regions___update.yml @@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ tags: detections: - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/endpoint/previously_seen_command_line_arguments.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_command_line_arguments.yml similarity index 100% rename from detections/endpoint/previously_seen_command_line_arguments.yml rename to baselines/previously_seen_command_line_arguments.yml diff --git a/detections/cloud/previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user.yml similarity index 100% rename from detections/cloud/previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user.yml rename to baselines/previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user.yml diff --git a/detections/endpoint/previously_seen_running_windows_services.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_running_windows_services___initial.yml similarity index 100% rename from detections/endpoint/previously_seen_running_windows_services.yml rename to baselines/previously_seen_running_windows_services___initial.yml diff --git a/detections/endpoint/previously_seen_running_windows_services_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_running_windows_services___update.yml similarity index 100% rename from detections/endpoint/previously_seen_running_windows_services_update.yml rename to baselines/previously_seen_running_windows_services___update.yml diff --git a/detections/cloud/previously_seen_s3_bucket_access_by_remote_ip.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_s3_bucket_access_by_remote_ip.yml similarity index 97% rename from detections/cloud/previously_seen_s3_bucket_access_by_remote_ip.yml rename to baselines/previously_seen_s3_bucket_access_by_remote_ip.yml index 9fed71f502..7d6bcad9b4 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/previously_seen_s3_bucket_access_by_remote_ip.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_s3_bucket_access_by_remote_ip.yml @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ name: Previously seen S3 bucket access by remote IP -id: fc0edc15-fq2c-48b0-9f6f-63qa1281fd03 +id: 54c40c6a-9a5b-4a79-9291-85977f713961 version: 1 date: '2018-06-28' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk diff --git a/detections/cloud/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail___initial.yml similarity index 97% rename from detections/cloud/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_initial.yml rename to baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail___initial.yml index c1447ed1ab..3e428d1d28 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_initial.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail___initial.yml @@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ tags: - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Detect AWS Console Login by New User product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail___update.yml similarity index 98% rename from detections/cloud/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_update.yml rename to baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail___update.yml index 74d3a0e6a0..406b44379a 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_update.yml +++ b/baselines/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail___update.yml @@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ tags: - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Detect AWS Console Login by New User product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/endpoint/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_initial.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes___initial.yml similarity index 100% rename from detections/endpoint/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_initial.yml rename to baselines/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes___initial.yml diff --git a/detections/endpoint/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_update.yml b/baselines/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes___update.yml similarity index 100% rename from detections/endpoint/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_update.yml rename to baselines/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes___update.yml diff --git a/detections/endpoint/systems_ready_for_spectre_meltdown_windows_patch.yml b/baselines/systems_ready_for_spectre_meltdown_windows_patch.yml similarity index 100% rename from detections/endpoint/systems_ready_for_spectre_meltdown_windows_patch.yml rename to baselines/systems_ready_for_spectre_meltdown_windows_patch.yml diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_updates_install_failures.yml b/baselines/windows_updates_install_failures.yml similarity index 90% rename from detections/endpoint/windows_updates_install_failures.yml rename to baselines/windows_updates_install_failures.yml index 4397e27dac..7404faf256 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_updates_install_failures.yml +++ b/baselines/windows_updates_install_failures.yml @@ -15,8 +15,12 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your Windows Update Logs known_false_positives: none references: [] tags: + analytic_story: + - Monitor for Updates deployments: - Daily Cache Updates + detections: + - No Windows Updates in a time frame product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_updates_install_successes.yml b/baselines/windows_updates_install_successes.yml similarity index 90% rename from detections/endpoint/windows_updates_install_successes.yml rename to baselines/windows_updates_install_successes.yml index 0cb6e5ea18..3786be1bc5 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_updates_install_successes.yml +++ b/baselines/windows_updates_install_successes.yml @@ -15,8 +15,12 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting your Windows Update Logs known_false_positives: none references: [] tags: + analytic_story: + - Monitor for Updates deployments: - Daily Cache Updates + detections: + - No Windows Updates in a time frame product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security diff --git a/bin/content_analysis.py b/bin/content_analysis.py deleted file mode 100644 index 69e1cddb07..0000000000 --- a/bin/content_analysis.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,75 +0,0 @@ -import glob -import yaml -import sys -import re -import argparse - -from os import path - - -def load_objects(file_path, REPO_PATH): - files = [] - manifest_files = path.join(path.expanduser(REPO_PATH), file_path) - for file in sorted(glob.glob(manifest_files)): - files.append(load_file(file)) - return files - - -def load_file(file_path): - with open(file_path, 'r', encoding="utf-8") as stream: - try: - file = list(yaml.safe_load_all(stream))[0] - except yaml.YAMLError as exc: - print(exc) - sys.exit("ERROR: reading {0}".format(file_path)) - return file - - -def load_content(old_project): - stories = load_objects("stories/*.yml", old_project) - macros = load_objects("macros/*.yml", old_project) - lookups = load_objects("lookups/*.yml", old_project) - baselines = load_objects("baselines/*.yml", old_project) - responses = load_objects("responses/*.yml", old_project) - response_tasks = load_objects("response_tasks/*.yml", old_project) - deployments = load_objects("deployments/*.yml", old_project) - - # process all detections - detections = [] - detections = load_objects("detections/*/*.yml", old_project) - detections.extend(load_objects("detections/*/*/*.yml", old_project)) - - #print(len(detections)) - - return detections, stories, macros, lookups, baselines, responses, response_tasks, deployments - - -def add_required_field(detections, new_project): - #for detection in detections: - matches = re.findall(r'(?[^\s]*)=', detections[0]) - for match in matches: - print(match) - - -def main(new_project, old_project, change): - - detections, stories, macros, lookups, baselines, responses, response_tasks, deployments = load_content(old_project) - - if change == "add_required_field": - add_required_field(detections, new_project) - - -if __name__ == "__main__": - - parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="applies security content changes to the whole project") - parser.add_argument("-np", "--new_project", required=True, help="the security content project to write the new configs in to") - parser.add_argument("-op", "--old_project", required=True, help="the security content project to read the files from") - parser.add_argument("-c", "--change", required=True, help="the name of your change") - - # parse them - args = parser.parse_args() - new_project = args.new_project - old_project = args.old_project - change = args.change - - main(new_project, old_project, change) diff --git a/bin/content_changer.py b/bin/content_changer.py deleted file mode 100644 index 9394075c5a..0000000000 --- a/bin/content_changer.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,218 +0,0 @@ -import glob -import yaml -import sys -import re -import argparse -import requests -import csv -from requests.auth import HTTPBasicAuth -from urllib3.exceptions import InsecureRequestWarning - -from os import path - -BASE_URL = f"https://ip:8089" -SEARCH_PARSER_ENDPOINT = f"/services/search/parser" -USER = f"admin" -PASSWORD = f"password" -parsed_fields = dict() - - -def load_objects(file_path, REPO_PATH): - files = [] - manifest_files = path.join(path.expanduser(REPO_PATH), file_path) - for file in sorted(glob.glob(manifest_files)): - files.append(load_file(file)) - return files - - -def load_file(file_path): - with open(file_path, 'r', encoding="utf-8") as stream: - try: - file = list(yaml.safe_load_all(stream))[0] - except yaml.YAMLError as exc: - print(exc) - sys.exit("ERROR: reading {0}".format(file_path)) - return file - - -def load_content(old_project): - - # process all detections - detections = [] - detections = load_objects("detections/*/*.yml", old_project) - detections.extend(load_objects("detections/*/*/*.yml", old_project)) - - #print(len(detections)) - - return detections - - -def analysis_detection(detections): - - for detection in detections:# - if detection['type'] != 'streaming': - #if detection['name'] == 'Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe': - print('Analysis Detection: ' + detection['name']) - call_splunk_parser_api(detection) - - # sort parsed fields by occurence - sorted_dict = {k: v for k, v in sorted(parsed_fields.items(), key=lambda item: item[1], reverse=True)} - - with open('output_fields_ordered_by_usage.csv', mode='w') as csv_file: - writer = csv.writer(csv_file, delimiter=',', quotechar='"', quoting=csv.QUOTE_ALL) - - writer.writerow(['field_name', 'occurence']) - - for field_name in sorted_dict: - writer.writerow([field_name, sorted_dict[field_name]]) - - # sort parsed fields by name - sorted_dict_2 = sorted(parsed_fields.items()) - - with open('output_fields_ordered_by_keys.csv', mode='w') as csv_file: - writer = csv.writer(csv_file, delimiter=',', quotechar='"', quoting=csv.QUOTE_ALL) - - writer.writerow(['field_name', 'occurence']) - - for field_name in sorted_dict_2: - writer.writerow([field_name[0], field_name[1]]) - - -def call_splunk_parser_api(detection): - requests.packages.urllib3.disable_warnings(category=InsecureRequestWarning) - spl = '' - if detection['search'].startswith('| tstats'): - spl = detection['search'] - else: - spl = 'search ' + detection['search'] - data = { - "output_mode": "json", - "q": spl, - "parse_only": "true" - } - #Have semgrep ignore the following line. It will complain about the verify=false, but the server is hosted on localhost - response = requests.post(BASE_URL + SEARCH_PARSER_ENDPOINT, data=data, auth=(USER, PASSWORD), verify=False, headers={"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"}) # nosemgrep - if response.status_code != 200: - print(response.json()) - print('ERROR: parser endpoint problems') - return - parse_commands(response.json()) - - -def parse_commands(api_response): - tmp_parsed_fields = {} - - last_stat_command = '' - rename_command_after_stats_arr = [] - - for command in api_response['commands']: - if command['command'] in ['tstats', 'stats', 'table']: - last_stat_command = command - if (command['command'] == 'rename') and last_stat_command: - rename_command_after_stats_arr.append(command) - - - if not last_stat_command: - print('ERROR: could not find stats table or tasts command') - return - - # last command table - if last_stat_command['command'] == 'table': - matches = re.findall(r'([0-9a-zA-Z_]+)', last_stat_command['rawargs']) - for match in matches: - if match in tmp_parsed_fields: - tmp_parsed_fields[match] = tmp_parsed_fields[match] + 1 - else: - tmp_parsed_fields[match] = 1 - - # last command stats - if last_stat_command['command'] == 'stats': - match = re.match(r'(.*)by', last_stat_command['rawargs']) - if match: - args_one = match.group(1) - matches = re.findall(r'(?:min|max|values)\(([0-9a-zA-Z_]+)\)', args_one) - if matches: - for match in matches: - if match in tmp_parsed_fields: - tmp_parsed_fields[match] = tmp_parsed_fields[match] + 1 - else: - tmp_parsed_fields[match] = 1 - match = re.match(r'.*by(.*)$', last_stat_command['rawargs']) - if match: - args_two = match.group(1) - matches = re.findall(r'([0-9a-zA-Z_]+)', args_two) - if matches: - for match in matches: - if match in tmp_parsed_fields: - tmp_parsed_fields[match] = tmp_parsed_fields[match] + 1 - else: - tmp_parsed_fields[match] = 1 - - # tstats command - if last_stat_command['command'] == 'tstats': - match = re.match(r'(.*)(?:from|FROM)', last_stat_command['rawargs']) - if match: - args_one = match.group(1) - matches = re.findall(r'(?:min|max|values)\(([0-9a-zA-Z_]+)\.([0-9a-zA-Z_]+)\)', args_one) - if matches: - for match in matches: - field = match[0] + '.' + match[1] - if field in tmp_parsed_fields: - tmp_parsed_fields[field] = tmp_parsed_fields[field] + 1 - else: - tmp_parsed_fields[field] = 1 - - match = re.match(r'.*by(.*)$', last_stat_command['rawargs']) - if match: - args_two = match.group(1) - matches = re.findall(r'([0-9_a-zA-Z]+)\.([0-9a-zA-Z_]+)', args_two) - if matches: - for match in matches: - field = match[0] + '.' + match[1] - if field in tmp_parsed_fields: - tmp_parsed_fields[field] = tmp_parsed_fields[field] + 1 - else: - tmp_parsed_fields[field] = 1 - - match = re.match(r'.*where(.*)by.*$', last_stat_command['rawargs']) - if match: - args_three = match.group(1) - matches = re.findall(r'([0-9_a-zA-Z]+)\.([0-9a-zA-Z_]+)=', args_three) - if matches: - for match in matches: - field = match[0] + '.' + match[1] - if field in tmp_parsed_fields: - tmp_parsed_fields[field] = tmp_parsed_fields[field] + 1 - else: - tmp_parsed_fields[field] = 1 - - - # rename occured - for rename_command_after_stats in rename_command_after_stats_arr: - if rename_command_after_stats: - renamed_field = {} - matches = re.findall(r'(?:(([0-9a-zA-Z_]+)\s+as\s+([0-9a-zA-Z_]+)))', rename_command_after_stats['rawargs']) - for match in matches: - renamed_field[match[1]] = match[2] - - for key in renamed_field: - if key in tmp_parsed_fields: - tmp_parsed_fields[renamed_field[key]] = tmp_parsed_fields.pop(key) - - # write to global parsed fields var - for key in tmp_parsed_fields: - if key in parsed_fields: - parsed_fields[key] = parsed_fields[key] + tmp_parsed_fields[key] - else: - parsed_fields[key] = tmp_parsed_fields[key] - - -def main(project): - - detections = load_content(project) - analysis_detection(detections) - - -if __name__ == "__main__": - - main("../") diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/adapter/adapter.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/adapter/adapter.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..87aedf673b --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/adapter/adapter.py @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +import abc + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.enums.enums import SecurityContentType + +class Adapter(abc.ABC): + + @abc.abstractmethod + def writeObjects(self, objects: list, output_path: str, type: SecurityContentType = None) -> None: + pass diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/builder/baseline_builder.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/builder/baseline_builder.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2dab990c04 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/builder/baseline_builder.py @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +import abc + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.enums.enums import SecurityContentType +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.baseline import Baseline +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.enums.enums import SecurityContentProduct +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.security_content_object import SecurityContentObject + + +class BaselineBuilder(abc.ABC): + + @abc.abstractmethod + def addDeployment(self, deployments: list) -> None: + pass + + @abc.abstractmethod + def setObject(self, path: str) -> None: + pass + + @abc.abstractmethod + def reset(self) -> None: + pass + + @abc.abstractmethod + def getObject(self) -> SecurityContentObject: + pass \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/builder/basic_builder.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/builder/basic_builder.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ffeb62d8d3 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/builder/basic_builder.py @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +import abc + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.security_content_object import SecurityContentObject +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.enums.enums import SecurityContentType + +# https://refactoring.guru/design-patterns/builder + +class BasicBuilder(abc.ABC): + + @abc.abstractmethod + def setObject(self, path: str, type: SecurityContentType) -> None: + pass + + @abc.abstractmethod + def reset(self) -> None: + pass + + @abc.abstractmethod + def getObject(self) -> SecurityContentObject: + pass + + \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/builder/detection_builder.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/builder/detection_builder.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f793f77481 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/builder/detection_builder.py @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +import abc + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.enums.enums import SecurityContentProduct +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.security_content_object import SecurityContentObject +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.enums.enums import SecurityContentType + +# https://refactoring.guru/design-patterns/builder + +class DetectionBuilder(abc.ABC): + + @abc.abstractmethod + def addDeployment(self, deployments: list) -> None: + pass + + @abc.abstractmethod + def addRBA(self) -> None: + pass + + @abc.abstractmethod + def addNesFields(self) -> None: + pass + + @abc.abstractmethod + def addMappings(self) -> None: + pass + + @abc.abstractmethod + def addAnnotations(self) -> None: + pass + + @abc.abstractmethod + def addPlaybook(self, playbooks: list) -> None: + pass + + @abc.abstractmethod + def addBaseline(self, baselines: list) -> None: + pass + + @abc.abstractmethod + def addUnitTest(self, tests: list) -> None: + pass + + @abc.abstractmethod + def addMitreAttackEnrichment(self) -> None: + pass + + @abc.abstractmethod + def addMacros(self, macros: list) -> None: + pass + + @abc.abstractmethod + def addLookups(self, lookups: list) -> None: + pass + + @abc.abstractmethod + def addCve(self) -> None: + pass + + @abc.abstractmethod + def setObject(self, path: str) -> None: + pass + + @abc.abstractmethod + def reset(self) -> None: + pass + + @abc.abstractmethod + def getObject(self) -> SecurityContentObject: + pass \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/builder/director.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/builder/director.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2a601b6e58 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/builder/director.py @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +import abc + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.builder.basic_builder import BasicBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.builder.detection_builder import DetectionBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.builder.baseline_builder import BaselineBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.builder.investigation_builder import InvestigationBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.builder.story_builder import StoryBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.builder.playbook_builder import PlaybookBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.enums.enums import SecurityContentProduct + +class Director(abc.ABC): + + @abc.abstractmethod + def constructDetection(self, builder: DetectionBuilder, path: str, deployments: list, playbooks: list, baselines: list, tests: list, attack_enrichment: dict, macros: list) -> None: + pass + + @abc.abstractmethod + def constructBaseline(self, builder: BaselineBuilder, path: str, deployments: list) -> None: + pass + + @abc.abstractmethod + def constructDeployment(self, builder: BasicBuilder, path: str) -> None: + pass + + @abc.abstractmethod + def constructLookup(self, builder: BasicBuilder, path: str) -> None: + pass + + @abc.abstractmethod + def constructMacro(self, builder: BasicBuilder, path: str) -> None: + pass + + @abc.abstractmethod + def constructPlaybook(self, builder: PlaybookBuilder, path: str, detections: list) -> None: + pass + + @abc.abstractmethod + def constructTest(self, builder: BasicBuilder, path: str) -> None: + pass + + @abc.abstractmethod + def constructStory(self, builder: StoryBuilder, path: str, detections: list, baselines: list, investigations: list) -> None: + pass + + @abc.abstractmethod + def constructInvestigation(self, builder: InvestigationBuilder, path: str) -> None: + pass + + @abc.abstractmethod + def constructObjects(self, builder: BasicBuilder, path: str) -> None: + pass \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/builder/investigation_builder.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/builder/investigation_builder.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bd3e98ce4e --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/builder/investigation_builder.py @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +import abc + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.security_content_object import SecurityContentObject + +class InvestigationBuilder(abc.ABC): + + @abc.abstractmethod + def setObject(self, path: str) -> None: + pass + + @abc.abstractmethod + def reset(self) -> None: + pass + + @abc.abstractmethod + def getObject(self) -> SecurityContentObject: + pass + + @abc.abstractmethod + def addInputs(self) -> None: + pass + + @abc.abstractmethod + def addLowercaseName(self) -> None: + pass \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/builder/playbook_builder.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/builder/playbook_builder.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..646562b305 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/builder/playbook_builder.py @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +import abc + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.security_content_object import SecurityContentObject + +# https://refactoring.guru/design-patterns/builder + +class PlaybookBuilder(abc.ABC): + + @abc.abstractmethod + def setObject(self, path: str) -> None: + pass + + @abc.abstractmethod + def addDetections(self, detections : list) -> None: + pass + + @abc.abstractmethod + def reset(self) -> None: + pass + + @abc.abstractmethod + def getObject(self) -> SecurityContentObject: + pass diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/builder/story_builder.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/builder/story_builder.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a078e3cf8c --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/builder/story_builder.py @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +import abc + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.security_content_object import SecurityContentObject +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.enums.enums import SecurityContentType + + +class StoryBuilder(abc.ABC): + + @abc.abstractmethod + def addDetections(self, detections: list) -> None: + pass + + @abc.abstractmethod + def addInvestigations(self, investigations: list) -> None: + pass + + @abc.abstractmethod + def addAuthorCompanyName(self) -> None: + pass + + @abc.abstractmethod + def addBaselines(self, baselines: list) -> None: + pass + + @abc.abstractmethod + def addInvestigations(self, investigations: list) -> None: + pass + + @abc.abstractmethod + def setObject(self, path: str) -> None: + pass + + @abc.abstractmethod + def reset(self) -> None: + pass + + @abc.abstractmethod + def getObject(self) -> SecurityContentObject: + pass \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/factory/ba_factory.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/factory/ba_factory.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..92fc4343f3 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/factory/ba_factory.py @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +import os + +from dataclasses import dataclass + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.enums.enums import SecurityContentType +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.builder.basic_builder import BasicBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.builder.detection_builder import DetectionBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.builder.story_builder import StoryBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.builder.director import Director +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.factory.utils.utils import Utils + + +@dataclass(frozen=True) +class BAFactoryInputDto: + input_path: str + basic_builder: BasicBuilder + detection_builder: DetectionBuilder + director: Director + +@dataclass(frozen=True) +class BAFactoryOutputDto: + detections: list + tests: list + +class BAFactory(): + input_dto: BAFactoryInputDto + output_dto: BAFactoryOutputDto + + def __init__(self, output_dto: BAFactoryOutputDto) -> None: + self.output_dto = output_dto + + def execute(self, input_dto: BAFactoryInputDto) -> None: + self.input_dto = input_dto + + self.createSecurityContent(SecurityContentType.unit_tests) + self.createSecurityContent(SecurityContentType.detections) + + + + def createSecurityContent(self, type: SecurityContentType) -> list: + objects = [] + if type == SecurityContentType.unit_tests: + files = Utils.get_all_yml_files_from_directory(os.path.join(self.input_dto.input_path, 'tests')) + else: + files = Utils.get_all_yml_files_from_directory(os.path.join(self.input_dto.input_path, str(type.name))) + + for file in files: + if 'ssa__' in file: + if type == SecurityContentType.detections: + self.input_dto.director.constructDetection(self.input_dto.detection_builder, file, [], [], [], self.output_dto.tests, {}, [], []) + detection = self.input_dto.detection_builder.getObject() + if not detection.deprecated and not detection.experimental: + self.output_dto.detections.append(detection) + elif type == SecurityContentType.unit_tests: + self.input_dto.director.constructTest(self.input_dto.basic_builder, file) + test = self.input_dto.basic_builder.getObject() + self.output_dto.tests.append(test) + \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/factory/factory.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/factory/factory.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..888dfbed82 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/factory/factory.py @@ -0,0 +1,124 @@ +import os + +from dataclasses import dataclass + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.enums.enums import SecurityContentProduct +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.enums.enums import SecurityContentType +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.builder.basic_builder import BasicBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.builder.detection_builder import DetectionBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.builder.story_builder import StoryBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.builder.baseline_builder import BaselineBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.builder.investigation_builder import InvestigationBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.builder.playbook_builder import PlaybookBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.builder.director import Director +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.factory.utils.utils import Utils + + +@dataclass(frozen=True) +class FactoryInputDto: + input_path: str + basic_builder: BasicBuilder + detection_builder: DetectionBuilder + story_builder: StoryBuilder + baseline_builder: BaselineBuilder + investigation_builder: InvestigationBuilder + playbook_builder: PlaybookBuilder + director: Director + attack_enrichment: dict + + +@dataclass() +class FactoryOutputDto: + detections: list + stories: list + baselines: list + investigations: list + playbooks: list + deployments: list + macros: list + lookups: list + tests: list + + +class Factory(): + input_dto: FactoryInputDto + output_dto: FactoryOutputDto + + + def __init__(self, output_dto: FactoryOutputDto) -> None: + self.output_dto = output_dto + + + def execute(self, input_dto: FactoryInputDto) -> None: + self.input_dto = input_dto + + # order matters to load and enrich security content types + self.createSecurityContent(SecurityContentType.unit_tests) + self.createSecurityContent(SecurityContentType.lookups) + self.createSecurityContent(SecurityContentType.macros) + self.createSecurityContent(SecurityContentType.deployments) + self.createSecurityContent(SecurityContentType.baselines) + self.createSecurityContent(SecurityContentType.investigations) + self.createSecurityContent(SecurityContentType.detections) # execution only for playbook enrichment + self.createSecurityContent(SecurityContentType.playbooks) + self.output_dto.detections = [] + self.createSecurityContent(SecurityContentType.detections) + self.createSecurityContent(SecurityContentType.stories) + + + def createSecurityContent(self, type: SecurityContentType) -> list: + objects = [] + if type == SecurityContentType.deployments: + files = Utils.get_all_yml_files_from_directory(os.path.join(self.input_dto.input_path, str(type.name), 'ESCU')) + elif type == SecurityContentType.unit_tests: + files = Utils.get_all_yml_files_from_directory(os.path.join(self.input_dto.input_path, 'tests')) + else: + files = Utils.get_all_yml_files_from_directory(os.path.join(self.input_dto.input_path, str(type.name))) + + for file in files: + if not 'ssa__' in file: + if type == SecurityContentType.lookups: + self.input_dto.director.constructLookup(self.input_dto.basic_builder, file) + self.output_dto.lookups.append(self.input_dto.basic_builder.getObject()) + + elif type == SecurityContentType.macros: + self.input_dto.director.constructMacro(self.input_dto.basic_builder, file) + self.output_dto.macros.append(self.input_dto.basic_builder.getObject()) + + elif type == SecurityContentType.deployments: + self.input_dto.director.constructDeployment(self.input_dto.basic_builder, file) + self.output_dto.deployments.append(self.input_dto.basic_builder.getObject()) + + elif type == SecurityContentType.playbooks: + self.input_dto.director.constructPlaybook(self.input_dto.playbook_builder, file, self.output_dto.detections) + self.output_dto.playbooks.append(self.input_dto.playbook_builder.getObject()) + + elif type == SecurityContentType.baselines: + self.input_dto.director.constructBaseline(self.input_dto.baseline_builder, file, self.output_dto.deployments) + baseline = self.input_dto.baseline_builder.getObject() + self.output_dto.baselines.append(baseline) + + elif type == SecurityContentType.investigations: + self.input_dto.director.constructInvestigation(self.input_dto.investigation_builder, file) + investigation = self.input_dto.investigation_builder.getObject() + self.output_dto.investigations.append(investigation) + + elif type == SecurityContentType.stories: + self.input_dto.director.constructStory(self.input_dto.story_builder, file, + self.output_dto.detections, self.output_dto.baselines, self.output_dto.investigations) + story = self.input_dto.story_builder.getObject() + self.output_dto.stories.append(story) + + elif type == SecurityContentType.detections: + self.input_dto.director.constructDetection(self.input_dto.detection_builder, file, + self.output_dto.deployments, self.output_dto.playbooks, self.output_dto.baselines, + self.output_dto.tests, self.input_dto.attack_enrichment, self.output_dto.macros, + self.output_dto.lookups) + detection = self.input_dto.detection_builder.getObject() + self.output_dto.detections.append(detection) + + elif type == SecurityContentType.unit_tests: + self.input_dto.director.constructTest(self.input_dto.basic_builder, file) + test = self.input_dto.basic_builder.getObject() + self.output_dto.tests.append(test) + diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/factory/new_content_factory.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/factory/new_content_factory.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1981906799 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/factory/new_content_factory.py @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +import os +import uuid + +from dataclasses import dataclass +from PyInquirer import prompt +from datetime import datetime + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.enums.enums import SecurityContentType +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.factory.utils.new_content_questions import NewContentQuestions + + +@dataclass(frozen=True) +class NewContentFactoryInputDto: + type: SecurityContentType + + +@dataclass(frozen=True) +class NewContentFactoryOutputDto: + obj: dict + + +class NewContentFactory(): + + + def __init__(self, output_dto: NewContentFactoryOutputDto) -> None: + self.output_dto = output_dto + + + def execute(self, input_dto: NewContentFactoryInputDto) -> None: + if input_dto.type == SecurityContentType.detections: + questions = NewContentQuestions.get_questions_detection() + answers = prompt(questions) + self.output_dto.obj['name'] = answers['detection_name'] + self.output_dto.obj['id'] = str(uuid.uuid4()) + self.output_dto.obj['version'] = 1 + self.output_dto.obj['date'] = datetime.today().strftime('%Y-%m-%d') + self.output_dto.obj['author'] = answers['detection_author'] + self.output_dto.obj['type'] = answers['detection_type'] + self.output_dto.obj['datamodel'] = answers['datamodels'] + self.output_dto.obj['description'] = 'UPDATE_DESCRIPTION' + file_name = self.output_dto.obj['name'].replace(' ', '_').replace('-','_').replace('.','_').replace('/','_').lower() + self.output_dto.obj['search'] = answers['detection_search'] + ' | `' + file_name + '_filter`' + self.output_dto.obj['how_to_implement'] = 'UPDATE_HOW_TO_IMPLEMENT' + self.output_dto.obj['known_false_positives'] = 'UPDATE_KNOWN_FALSE_POSITIVES' + self.output_dto.obj['references'] = ['REFERENCE'] + self.output_dto.obj['tags'] = dict() + self.output_dto.obj['tags']['analytic_story'] = ['UPDATE_STORY_NAME'] + self.output_dto.obj['tags']['asset_type'] = 'UPDATE asset_type' + self.output_dto.obj['tags']['cis20'] = ['CIS 3', 'CIS 5', 'CIS 16'] + self.output_dto.obj['tags']['confidence'] = 'UPDATE value between 1-100' + self.output_dto.obj['tags']['context'] = ['Update context'] + self.output_dto.obj['tags']['dataset'] = ['UPDATE_DATASET_URL'] + self.output_dto.obj['tags']['impact'] = 'UPDATE value between 1-100' + self.output_dto.obj['tags']['kill_chain_phases'] = answers['kill_chain_phases'] + self.output_dto.obj['tags']['message'] = 'UPDATE message' + self.output_dto.obj['tags']['mitre_attack_id'] = [x.strip() for x in answers['mitre_attack_ids'].split(',')] + self.output_dto.obj['tags']['nist'] = ['DE.CM'] + self.output_dto.obj['tags']['observable'] = [{'name': 'UPDATE', 'type': 'UPDATE', 'role': ['UPDATE']}] + self.output_dto.obj['tags']['product'] = ['Splunk Enterprise','Splunk Enterprise Security','Splunk Cloud'] + self.output_dto.obj['tags']['required_fields'] = ['UPDATE'] + self.output_dto.obj['tags']['risk_score'] = 'UPDATE (impact * confidence)/100' + self.output_dto.obj['tags']['security_domain'] = answers['security_domain'] + self.output_dto.obj['source'] = answers['detection_kind'] + + elif input_dto.type == SecurityContentType.stories: + questions = NewContentQuestions.get_questions_story() + answers = prompt(questions) + self.output_dto.obj['name'] = answers['story_name'] + self.output_dto.obj['id'] = str(uuid.uuid4()) + self.output_dto.obj['version'] = 1 + self.output_dto.obj['date'] = datetime.today().strftime('%Y-%m-%d') + self.output_dto.obj['author'] = answers['story_author'] + self.output_dto.obj['description'] = 'UPDATE_DESCRIPTION' + self.output_dto.obj['narrative'] = 'UPDATE_NARRATIVE' + self.output_dto.obj['references'] = [] + self.output_dto.obj['tags']['analytic_story'] = self.output_dto.obj['name'] + self.output_dto.obj['tags']['category'] = answers['category'] + self.output_dto.obj['tags']['product'] = ['Splunk Enterprise','Splunk Enterprise Security','Splunk Cloud'] + self.output_dto.obj['tags']['usecase'] = answers['usecase'] diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/factory/object_factory.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/factory/object_factory.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ec6a125916 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/factory/object_factory.py @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +import os + +from dataclasses import dataclass + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.builder.basic_builder import BasicBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.builder.director import Director +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.enums.enums import SecurityContentType +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.factory.utils.utils import Utils + +@dataclass(frozen=True) +class ObjectFactoryInputDto: + input_path: str + builder: BasicBuilder + director: Director + + +class ObjectFactory(): + objects: list + + def __init__(self, objects: list) -> None: + self.objects = objects + + def execute(self, input_dto: ObjectFactoryInputDto) -> None: + self.input_path = input_dto.input_path + + files = Utils.get_all_yml_files_from_directory(input_dto.input_path) + for file in files: + input_dto.director.constructObjects(input_dto.builder, file) + self.objects.append(input_dto.builder.getObject()) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/factory/utils/__init__.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/factory/utils/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/factory/utils/new_content_questions.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/factory/utils/new_content_questions.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..93b03f48d1 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/factory/utils/new_content_questions.py @@ -0,0 +1,266 @@ + + +class NewContentQuestions(): + + @classmethod + def get_questions_detection(self) -> list: + questions = [ + { + 'type': 'list', + 'message': 'what kind of detection is this', + 'name': 'detection_kind', + 'choices': [ + { + 'name': 'endpoint' + }, + { + 'name': 'cloud' + }, + { + 'name': 'application' + }, + { + 'name': 'network' + }, + { + 'name': 'web' + }, + { + 'name': 'experimental' + }, + + ], + 'default': 'endpoint' + }, + { + 'type': 'input', + 'message': 'enter detection name', + 'name': 'detection_name', + 'default': 'Powershell Encoded Command', + }, + { + 'type': 'input', + 'message': 'enter author name', + 'name': 'detection_author', + }, + { + 'type': 'list', + 'message': 'select a detection type', + 'name': 'detection_type', + 'choices': [ + { + 'name': 'TTP' + }, + { + 'name': 'Anomaly' + }, + { + 'name': 'Hunting' + }, + { + 'name': 'Baseline' + }, + { + 'name': 'Investigation' + }, + { + 'name': 'Correlation' + } + + ], + 'default': 'TTP' + }, + { + 'type': 'checkbox', + 'message': 'select the datamodels used in the detection', + 'name': 'datamodels', + 'choices': [ + { + 'name': 'Endpoint', + 'checked': True + }, + { + 'name': 'Authentication' + }, + { + 'name': 'Change' + }, + { + 'name': 'Email' + }, + { + 'name': 'Network_Resolution' + }, + { + 'name': 'Network_Traffic' + }, + { + 'name': 'Network_Sessions' + }, + { + 'name': 'Updates' + }, + { + 'name': 'Vulnerabilities' + }, + { + 'name': 'Web' + }, + { + 'name': 'Risk' + }, + ], + }, + { + 'type': 'input', + 'message': 'enter search (spl)', + 'name': 'detection_search', + 'default': '| UPDATE_SPL' + }, + { + 'type': 'input', + 'message': 'enter MITRE ATT&CK Technique IDs related to the detection, comma delimited for multiple', + 'name': 'mitre_attack_ids', + 'default': 'T1003.002' + }, + { + 'type': 'checkbox', + 'message': 'select kill chain phases related to the detection', + 'name': 'kill_chain_phases', + 'choices': [ + + { + 'name': 'Reconnaissance' + }, + { + 'name': 'Intrusion' + }, + { + 'name': 'Exploitation', + 'checked': True + }, + { + 'name': 'Privilege Escalation' + }, + { + 'name': 'Lateral Movement' + }, + { + 'name': 'Obfuscation' + }, + { + 'name': 'Denial of Service' + }, + { + 'name': 'Exfiltration' + }, + ], + }, + { + 'type': 'list', + 'message': 'security_domain for detection', + 'name': 'security_domain', + 'choices': [ + { + 'name': 'access' + }, + { + 'name': 'endpoint' + }, + { + 'name': 'network' + }, + { + 'name': 'threat' + }, + { + 'name': 'identity' + }, + { + 'name': 'audit' + }, + + ], + 'default': 'endpoint' + }, + ] + return questions + + + @classmethod + def get_questions_story(self) -> list: + questions = [ + { + 'type': 'input', + 'message': 'enter story name', + 'name': 'story_name', + 'default': 'Suspicious Powershell Behavior', + }, + { + 'type': 'input', + 'message': 'enter author name', + 'name': 'story_author', + }, + { + 'type': 'checkbox', + 'message': 'select a category', + 'name': 'category', + 'choices': [ + { + 'name': 'Adversary Tactics', + 'checked': True + }, + { + 'name': 'Account Compromise' + }, + { + 'name': 'Unauthorized Software' + }, + { + 'name': 'Best Practices' + }, + { + 'name': 'Cloud Security' + }, + { + 'name': 'Command and Control' + }, + { + 'name': 'Lateral Movement' + }, + { + 'name': 'Ransomware' + }, + { + 'name': 'Privilege Escalation' + }, + ], + }, + { + 'type': 'list', + 'message': 'select a use case', + 'name': 'usecase', + 'choices': [ + { + 'name': 'Advanced Threat Detection', + 'checked': True + }, + { + 'name': 'Security Monitoring' + }, + { + 'name': 'Compliance' + }, + { + 'name': 'Insider Threat' + }, + { + 'name': 'Application Security' + }, + { + 'name': 'Other' + }, + ], + }, + ] + return questions \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/factory/utils/utils.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/factory/utils/utils.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5df5d2fb5b --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/factory/utils/utils.py @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +import os + +class Utils: + + @staticmethod + def get_all_yml_files_from_directory(path: str) -> list: + listOfFiles = list() + for (dirpath, dirnames, filenames) in os.walk(path): + for file in filenames: + if file.endswith(".yml"): + listOfFiles.append(os.path.join(dirpath, file)) + + return sorted(listOfFiles) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/use_cases/__init__.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/use_cases/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/use_cases/content_changer.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/use_cases/content_changer.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0573ab422c --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/use_cases/content_changer.py @@ -0,0 +1,189 @@ +import re +import uuid + +from dataclasses import dataclass + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.factory.object_factory import ObjectFactory, ObjectFactoryInputDto +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.adapter.adapter import Adapter + + +@dataclass(frozen=True) +class ContentChangerInputDto: + adapter : Adapter + factory_input_dto : ObjectFactoryInputDto + converter_func_name : str + + +class ContentChanger: + + def execute(self, input_dto: ContentChangerInputDto) -> None: + objects = list() + factory = ObjectFactory(objects) + factory.execute(input_dto.factory_input_dto) + + converter_func = getattr(self, input_dto.converter_func_name) + converter_func(objects) + + input_dto.adapter.writeObjectsInPlace(objects) + + + # Define Converter Functions here + + def example_converter_func(self, objects : list) -> None: + for obj in objects: + obj['author'] = obj['author'].upper() + + def add_default_risk_values(self, objects : list) -> None: + for obj in objects: + if not 'confidence' in obj['tags']: + obj['tags']['confidence'] = 50 + if not 'impact' in obj['tags']: + obj['tags']['impact'] = 50 + if not 'risk_score' in obj['tags']: + obj['tags']['risk_score'] = 25 + + def add_unknown_context(self, objects : list) -> None: + for obj in objects: + if not 'context' in obj['tags']: + obj['tags']['context'] = ['Unknown'] + + def add_default_message(self, objects : list) -> None: + for obj in objects: + if not 'message' in obj['tags']: + obj['tags']['message'] = 'tbd' + + def add_default_observable(self, objects : list) -> None: + for obj in objects: + if not 'observable' in obj['tags'] or ('observable' in obj['tags'] and len(obj['tags']['observable']) == 0): + observables = [] + regexp_user = re.compile(r'user') + if regexp_user.search(obj['search']): + observables.append({'name': 'user', 'type': 'User', 'role': ['Victim']}) + regexp_user = re.compile(r'dest') + if regexp_user.search(obj['search']): + observables.append({'name': 'dest', 'type': 'Hostname', 'role': ['Victim']}) + if len(observables) == 0: + observables.append({'name': 'dest', 'type': 'Other', 'role': ['Other']}) + obj['tags']['observable'] = observables + + def add_default_cis(self, objects : list) -> None: + for obj in objects: + if not 'cis20' in obj['tags']: + obj['tags']['cis20'] = ['CIS 3', 'CIS 5', 'CIS 16'] + + def add_default_nist(self, objects : list) -> None: + for obj in objects: + if not 'nist' in obj['tags']: + obj['tags']['nist'] = ['DE.CM'] + + def fix_broken_uuids(self, objects : list) -> None: + for obj in objects: + try: + uuid.UUID(str(obj['id'])) + except: + obj['id'] = str(uuid.uuid4()) + + def fix_wrong_kill_chain_phases(self, objects : list) -> None: + valid_kill_chain_phases = [ + 'Reconnaissance', 'Weaponization', 'Delivery', + 'Exploitation', 'Installation', 'Command and Control', + 'Actions on Objectives'] + for obj in objects: + if 'kill_chain_phases' in obj['tags']: + for value in obj['tags']['kill_chain_phases']: + if value not in valid_kill_chain_phases: + obj['tags']['kill_chain_phases'] = ['Exploitation'] + break + + def add_default_kill_chain_phases(self, objects : list) -> None: + for obj in objects: + if 'kill_chain_phases' not in obj['tags']: + obj['tags']['kill_chain_phases'] = ['Exploitation'] + if obj['tags']['kill_chain_phases'] == ['Privilege Escalation']: + obj['tags']['kill_chain_phases'] = ['Exploitation'] + + def fix_wrong_calculated_risk_score(self, objects : list) -> None: + for obj in objects: + calculated_risk_score = (int(obj['tags']['impact']))*(int(obj['tags']['confidence']))/100 + if calculated_risk_score != int(obj['tags']['risk_score']): + obj['tags']['risk_score'] = calculated_risk_score + + def add_asset_type_to_endpoint_detections(self, objects : list) -> None: + for obj in objects: + if 'asset_type' not in obj['tags']: + if '/endpoint/' in obj['file_path']: + obj['tags']['asset_type'] = 'Endpoint' + + def fix_observables(self, objects : list) -> None: + for obj in objects: + if 'observable' in obj['tags']: + for observable in obj['tags']['observable']: + if observable['type'] == 'Parent Process': + observable['type'] = 'Process' + if observable['type'] == 'user': + observable['type'] = 'User' + if observable['type'] == 'process name': + observable['type'] = 'Process' + + def fix_context(self, objects : list) -> None: + for obj in objects: + if 'context' in obj['tags']: + new_context = [] + for context in obj['tags']['context']: + if context == 'Stage:Exploitation': + context = 'Stage:Execution' + new_context.append(context) + + obj['tags']['context'] = list(dict.fromkeys(new_context)) + + def add_default_values_deprecated(self, objects : list) -> None: + for obj in objects: + if 'context' not in obj['tags']: + obj['tags']['context'] = ['Unknown'] + if 'message' not in obj['tags']: + obj['tags']['message'] = 'tbd' + if 'observable' not in obj['tags']: + obj['tags']['observable'] = [{'name': 'field', 'type': 'Unknown', 'role': ['Unknown']}] + + def fix_story(self, objects : list) -> None: + for obj in objects: + if 'type' not in obj: + print(obj['name']) + if isinstance(obj['tags']['analytic_story'], list): + obj['tags']['analytic_story'] = obj['tags']['analytic_story'][0] + + def remove_SAAWS(self, objects : list) -> None: + for obj in objects: + if 'Splunk Security Analytics for AWS' in obj['tags']['product']: + obj['tags']['product'].remove('Splunk Security Analytics for AWS') + + def remove_testing_passed(self, objects : list) -> None: + for obj in objects: + if 'automated_detection_testing' in obj['tags']: + obj['tags'].pop('automated_detection_testing') + + def change_test_file_format(self, objects : list) -> None: + for obj in objects: + obj['name'] = obj['name'] + ' Unit Test' + + def fix_kill_chain(self, objects : list) -> None: + for obj in objects: + if 'kill_chain_phases' in obj['tags']: + if obj['tags']['kill_chain_phases'] == 'Exploitation': + obj['tags']['kill_chain_phases'] = ['Exploitation'] + + def add_default_confidence_impact_risk_score(self, objects : list) -> None: + for obj in objects: + if 'confidence' not in obj['tags']: + obj['tags']['confidence'] = 50 + if 'impact' not in obj['tags']: + obj['tags']['impact'] = 50 + if 'risk_score' not in obj['tags']: + calculated_risk_score = (int(obj['tags']['impact']))*(int(obj['tags']['confidence']))/100 + obj['tags']['risk_score'] = calculated_risk_score + + def fix_cc(self, objects : list) -> None: + for obj in objects: + if 'Command & Control' in obj['tags']['analytic_story']: + obj['tags']['analytic_story'].remove('Command & Control') + obj['tags']['analytic_story'].append('Command and Control') \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/use_cases/doc_gen.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/use_cases/doc_gen.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ef39173535 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/use_cases/doc_gen.py @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ + + +from dataclasses import dataclass + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.factory.factory import FactoryInputDto, Factory, FactoryOutputDto +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.adapter.adapter import Adapter + + +@dataclass(frozen=True) +class DocGenInputDto: + output_path: str + factory_input_dto: FactoryInputDto + adapter : Adapter + + +class DocGen: + + def execute(self, input_dto: DocGenInputDto) -> None: + factory_output_dto = FactoryOutputDto([],[],[],[],[],[],[],[],[]) + factory = Factory(factory_output_dto) + factory.execute(input_dto.factory_input_dto) + + input_dto.adapter.writeObjects([factory_output_dto.stories, factory_output_dto.detections, factory_output_dto.playbooks], input_dto.output_path) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/use_cases/generate.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/use_cases/generate.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6b59845c84 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/use_cases/generate.py @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +import os +import shutil + +from dataclasses import dataclass + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.enums.enums import SecurityContentProduct, SecurityContentType +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.adapter.adapter import Adapter +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.factory.factory import FactoryInputDto, Factory, FactoryOutputDto +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.factory.ba_factory import BAFactoryInputDto, BAFactory, BAFactoryOutputDto + + + +@dataclass(frozen=True) +class GenerateInputDto: + output_path: str + factory_input_dto: FactoryInputDto + ba_factory_input_dto: BAFactoryInputDto + adapter : Adapter + product: SecurityContentProduct + + +class Generate: + + def execute(self, input_dto: GenerateInputDto) -> None: + + if input_dto.product == SecurityContentProduct.ESCU: + factory_output_dto = FactoryOutputDto([],[],[],[],[],[],[],[],[]) + factory = Factory(factory_output_dto) + factory.execute(input_dto.factory_input_dto) + input_dto.adapter.writeHeaders(input_dto.output_path) + input_dto.adapter.writeObjects(factory_output_dto.detections, input_dto.output_path, SecurityContentType.detections) + input_dto.adapter.writeObjects(factory_output_dto.stories, input_dto.output_path, SecurityContentType.stories) + input_dto.adapter.writeObjects(factory_output_dto.baselines, input_dto.output_path, SecurityContentType.baselines) + input_dto.adapter.writeObjects(factory_output_dto.investigations, input_dto.output_path, SecurityContentType.investigations) + input_dto.adapter.writeObjects(factory_output_dto.lookups, input_dto.output_path, SecurityContentType.lookups) + input_dto.adapter.writeObjects(factory_output_dto.macros, input_dto.output_path, SecurityContentType.macros) + + elif input_dto.product == SecurityContentProduct.SSA: + shutil.rmtree(input_dto.output_path + '/srs/', ignore_errors=True) + shutil.rmtree(input_dto.output_path + '/complex/', ignore_errors=True) + os.makedirs(input_dto.output_path + '/complex/') + os.makedirs(input_dto.output_path + '/srs/') + factory_output_dto = BAFactoryOutputDto([],[]) + factory = BAFactory(factory_output_dto) + factory.execute(input_dto.ba_factory_input_dto) + input_dto.adapter.writeObjects(factory_output_dto.detections, input_dto.output_path) + + elif input_dto.product == SecurityContentProduct.API: + factory_output_dto = FactoryOutputDto([],[],[],[],[],[],[],[],[]) + factory = Factory(factory_output_dto) + factory.execute(input_dto.factory_input_dto) + input_dto.adapter.writeObjects(factory_output_dto.detections, input_dto.output_path, SecurityContentType.detections) + input_dto.adapter.writeObjects(factory_output_dto.stories, input_dto.output_path, SecurityContentType.stories) + input_dto.adapter.writeObjects(factory_output_dto.baselines, input_dto.output_path, SecurityContentType.baselines) + input_dto.adapter.writeObjects(factory_output_dto.investigations, input_dto.output_path, SecurityContentType.investigations) + input_dto.adapter.writeObjects(factory_output_dto.lookups, input_dto.output_path, SecurityContentType.lookups) + input_dto.adapter.writeObjects(factory_output_dto.macros, input_dto.output_path, SecurityContentType.macros) + input_dto.adapter.writeObjects(factory_output_dto.deployments, input_dto.output_path, SecurityContentType.deployments) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/use_cases/new_content.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/use_cases/new_content.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1905d6554b --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/use_cases/new_content.py @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ + + +from dataclasses import dataclass + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.factory.new_content_factory import NewContentFactory, NewContentFactoryInputDto, NewContentFactoryOutputDto +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.adapter.adapter import Adapter + + +@dataclass(frozen=True) +class NewContentInputDto: + factory_input_dto: NewContentFactoryInputDto + adapter : Adapter + + +class NewContent: + + def execute(self, input_dto: NewContentInputDto) -> None: + factory_output_dto = NewContentFactoryOutputDto(dict()) + factory = NewContentFactory(factory_output_dto) + factory.execute(input_dto.factory_input_dto) + + input_dto.adapter.writeObjectNewContent(factory_output_dto.obj, input_dto.factory_input_dto.type) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/use_cases/reporting.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/use_cases/reporting.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..298d7baa11 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/use_cases/reporting.py @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +import os + +from dataclasses import dataclass + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.factory.factory import FactoryInputDto, Factory, FactoryOutputDto +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.adapter.adapter import Adapter + + +@dataclass(frozen=True) +class ReportingInputDto: + factory_input_dto: FactoryInputDto + adapter_svg : Adapter + adapter_attack : Adapter + + +class Reporting: + + def execute(self, input_dto: ReportingInputDto) -> None: + factory_output_dto = FactoryOutputDto([],[],[],[],[],[],[],[],[]) + factory = Factory(factory_output_dto) + factory.execute(input_dto.factory_input_dto) + + input_dto.adapter_svg.writeObjects(factory_output_dto.detections, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), '../../../../reporting')) + input_dto.adapter_attack.writeObjects(factory_output_dto.detections, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), '../../../../../docs/mitre-map')) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/use_cases/validate.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/use_cases/validate.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..19c8679bf4 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/application/use_cases/validate.py @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ + + +from dataclasses import dataclass + +from pydantic import ValidationError + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.enums.enums import SecurityContentProduct +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.factory.factory import FactoryInputDto, Factory, FactoryOutputDto +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.factory.ba_factory import BAFactoryInputDto, BAFactory, BAFactoryOutputDto + + +@dataclass(frozen=True) +class ValidateInputDto: + factory_input_dto: FactoryInputDto + ba_factory_input_dto: BAFactoryInputDto + product: SecurityContentProduct + + +class Validate: + + def execute(self, input_dto: ValidateInputDto) -> None: + if input_dto.product == SecurityContentProduct.ESCU: + factory_output_dto = FactoryOutputDto([],[],[],[],[],[],[],[],[]) + factory = Factory(factory_output_dto) + factory.execute(input_dto.factory_input_dto) + + elif input_dto.product == SecurityContentProduct.SSA: + factory_output_dto = BAFactoryOutputDto([],[]) + factory = BAFactory(factory_output_dto) + factory.execute(input_dto.ba_factory_input_dto) + + + # validate detections + + # validate tests + self.validate_detection_exist_for_test(factory_output_dto.tests, factory_output_dto.detections) + + + def validate_detection_exist_for_test(self, tests : list, detections: list): + for test in tests: + found_detection = False + for detection in detections: + if test.tests[0].file in detection.file_path: + found_detection = True + + if not found_detection: + ValueError("detection doesn't exist for test file: " + test.name) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/__init__.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/constants/constants.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/constants/constants.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e59db77974 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/constants/constants.py @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ + + +SES_CONTEXT_MAPPING = { + "Unknown": 0, + "Source:Endpoint": 10, + "Source:AD": 11, + "Source:Firewall": 12, + "Source:Application Log": 13, + "Source:IPS": 14, + "Source:Cloud Data": 15, + "Source:Correlation": 16, + "Source:Printer": 17, + "Source:Badge": 18, + "Scope:Internal": 20, + "Scope:External": 21, + "Scope:Inbound": 22, + "Scope:Outbound": 23, + "Scope:Local": 24, + "Scope:Network": 25, + "Outcome:Blocked": 30, + "Outcome:Allowed": 31, + "Stage:Recon": 40, + "Stage:Initial Access": 41, + "Stage:Execution": 42, + "Stage:Persistence": 43, + "Stage:Privilege Escalation": 44, + "Stage:Defense Evasion": 45, + "Stage:Credential Access": 46, + "Stage:Discovery": 47, + "Stage:Lateral Movement": 48, + "Stage:Collection": 49, + "Stage:Exfiltration": 50, + "Stage:Command And Control": 51, + "Consequence:Infection": 60, + "Consequence:Reduced Visibility": 61, + "Consequence:Data Destruction": 62, + "Consequence:Denial Of Service": 63, + "Consequence:Loss Of Control": 64, + "Rares:Rare User": 70, + "Rares:Rare Process": 71, + "Rares:Rare Device": 72, + "Rares:Rare Domain": 73, + "Rares:Rare Network": 74, + "Rares:Rare Location": 75, + "Other:Peer Group": 80, + "Other:Brute Force": 81, + "Other:Policy Violation": 82, + "Other:Threat Intelligence": 83, + "Other:Flight Risk": 84, + "Other:Removable Storage": 85 +} + +SES_KILL_CHAIN_MAPPINGS = { + "Unknown": 0, + "Reconnaissance": 1, + "Weaponization": 2, + "Delivery": 3, + "Exploitation": 4, + "Installation": 5, + "Command & Control": 6, + "Actions on Objectives": 7 +} + +SES_OBSERVABLE_ROLE_MAPPING = { + "Other": -1, + "Unknown": 0, + "Actor": 1, + "Target": 2, + "Attacker": 3, + "Victim": 4, + "Parent Process": 5, + "Child Process": 6, + "Known Bad": 7, + "Data Loss": 8, + "Observer": 9 +} + +SES_OBSERVABLE_TYPE_MAPPING = { + "Other": -1, + "Unknown": 0, + "Device": 1, + "Container": 2, + "Endpoint": 3, + "Hostname": 4, + "IP Address": 5, + "User": 6, + "Username": 7, + "Email": 8, + "Email Address": 9, + "URL": 10, + "URL Domain": 11, + "File": 12, + "File Name": 13, + "File Hash": 14, + "Process": 15, + "Process Name": 16, + "Location": 17 +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/__init__.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/baseline.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/baseline.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b2ceb88eea --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/baseline.py @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +import string +import uuid +import requests + +from pydantic import BaseModel, validator, ValidationError +from dataclasses import dataclass +from datetime import datetime + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.security_content_object import SecurityContentObject +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.enums.enums import DataModel +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.baseline_tags import BaselineTags +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.deployment import Deployment + + +class Baseline(BaseModel, SecurityContentObject): + # baseline spec + name: str + id: str + version: int + date: str + author: str + type: str + datamodel: list + description: str + search: str + how_to_implement: str + known_false_positives: str + references: list + tags: BaselineTags + + # enrichment + deployment: Deployment = None + + + @validator('name') + def name_max_length(cls, v): + if len(v) > 75: + raise ValueError('name is longer then 75 chars: ' + v) + return v + + @validator('name') + def name_invalid_chars(cls, v): + invalidChars = set(string.punctuation.replace("-", "")) + if any(char in invalidChars for char in v): + raise ValueError('invalid chars used in name: ' + v) + return v + + @validator('id') + def id_check(cls, v, values): + try: + uuid.UUID(str(v)) + except: + raise ValueError('uuid is not valid: ' + values["name"]) + return v + + @validator('date') + def date_valid(cls, v, values): + try: + datetime.strptime(v, "%Y-%m-%d") + except: + raise ValueError('date is not in format YYYY-MM-DD: ' + values["name"]) + return v + + @validator('type') + def type_valid(cls, v, values): + if v != "Baseline": + raise ValueError('not valid analytics type: ' + values["name"]) + return v + + @validator('datamodel') + def datamodel_valid(cls, v, values): + for datamodel in v: + if datamodel not in [el.name for el in DataModel]: + raise ValueError('not valid data model: ' + values["name"]) + return v + + @validator('description', 'how_to_implement') + def encode_error(cls, v, values, field): + try: + v.encode('ascii') + except UnicodeEncodeError: + raise ValueError('encoding error in ' + field.name + ': ' + values["name"]) + return v + + @validator('references') + def references_check(cls, v, values): + for reference in v: + try: + get = requests.get(reference) + if not get.status_code == 200: + raise ValueError('Reference ' + reference + ' is not reachable: ' + values["name"]) + except requests.exceptions.RequestException as e: + raise ValueError('Reference ' + reference + ' is not reachable: ' + values["name"]) + + return v + + @validator('search') + def search_validate(cls, v, values): + # write search validator + return v diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/baseline_tags.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/baseline_tags.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..161afbe71e --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/baseline_tags.py @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ + +from pydantic import BaseModel, validator, ValidationError + + + +class BaselineTags(BaseModel): + analytic_story: list + deployments: list = None + detections: list + product: list + required_fields: list + security_domain: str + + + @validator('product') + def tags_product(cls, v, values): + valid_products = [ + "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", + "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Behavioral Analytics" + ] + + for value in v: + if value not in valid_products: + raise ValueError('product is not valid for ' + values['name'] + '. valid products are ' + str(valid_products)) + return v \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/deployment.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/deployment.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a3292bfdb1 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/deployment.py @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ + +import uuid +import string + +from pydantic import BaseModel, validator, ValidationError +from datetime import datetime + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.security_content_object import SecurityContentObject +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.deployment_scheduling import DeploymentScheduling +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.deployment_email import DeploymentEmail +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.deployment_notable import DeploymentNotable +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.deployment_rba import DeploymentRBA +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.deployment_slack import DeploymentSlack +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.deployment_phantom import DeploymentPhantom + +class Deployment(BaseModel, SecurityContentObject): + name: str + id: str + date: str + author: str + description: str + scheduling: DeploymentScheduling = None + email: DeploymentEmail = None + notable: DeploymentNotable = None + rba: DeploymentRBA = None + slack: DeploymentSlack = None + phantom: DeploymentPhantom = None + tags: dict + + + @validator('name') + def name_invalid_chars(cls, v): + invalidChars = set(string.punctuation.replace("-", "")) + if any(char in invalidChars for char in v): + raise ValueError('invalid chars used in name: ' + v) + return v + + @validator('id') + def id_check(cls, v, values): + try: + uuid.UUID(str(v)) + except: + raise ValueError('uuid is not valid: ' + values["name"]) + return v + + @validator('date') + def date_valid(cls, v, values): + try: + datetime.strptime(v, "%Y-%m-%d") + except: + raise ValueError('date is not in format YYYY-MM-DD: ' + values["name"]) + return v + + @validator('description') + def encode_error(cls, v, values, field): + try: + v.encode('ascii') + except UnicodeEncodeError: + raise ValueError('encoding error in ' + field.name + ': ' + values["name"]) + return v \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/deployment_email.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/deployment_email.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d13063b17d --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/deployment_email.py @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ + +from pydantic import BaseModel, validator, ValidationError + + +class DeploymentEmail(BaseModel): + message: str + subject: str + to: str \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/deployment_notable.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/deployment_notable.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b72ff166e0 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/deployment_notable.py @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ + +from pydantic import BaseModel, validator, ValidationError + + +class DeploymentNotable(BaseModel): + rule_description: str + rule_title: str + nes_fields: list \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/deployment_phantom.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/deployment_phantom.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d32eea69d3 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/deployment_phantom.py @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ + +from pydantic import BaseModel, validator, ValidationError + + +class DeploymentPhantom(BaseModel): + cam_workers : str + label : str + phantom_server : str + sensitivity : str + severity : str \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/deployment_rba.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/deployment_rba.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6b7d59df5a --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/deployment_rba.py @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ + + +from pydantic import BaseModel, validator, ValidationError + + +class DeploymentRBA(BaseModel): + enabled: str \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/deployment_scheduling.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/deployment_scheduling.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bfc209b2d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/deployment_scheduling.py @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ + + +from pydantic import BaseModel, validator, ValidationError + + +class DeploymentScheduling(BaseModel): + cron_schedule: str + earliest_time: str + latest_time: str + schedule_window: str \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/deployment_slack.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/deployment_slack.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..64d79eb215 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/deployment_slack.py @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ + +from pydantic import BaseModel, validator, ValidationError + + +class DeploymentSlack(BaseModel): + channel: str + message: str \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/detection.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/detection.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d4d07a831e --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/detection.py @@ -0,0 +1,133 @@ +import enum +import uuid +import string +import re +import requests + +from pydantic import BaseModel, validator, root_validator +from dataclasses import dataclass +from datetime import datetime + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.security_content_object import SecurityContentObject +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.enums.enums import AnalyticsType +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.enums.enums import DataModel +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.detection_tags import DetectionTags +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.deployment import Deployment +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.unit_test import UnitTest +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.macro import Macro +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.lookup import Lookup +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.baseline import Baseline +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.playbook import Playbook + +class Detection(BaseModel, SecurityContentObject): + # detection spec + name: str + id: str + version: int + date: str + author: str + type: str + datamodel: list + description: str + search: str + how_to_implement: str + known_false_positives: str + references: list + tags: DetectionTags + + # enrichments + deprecated: bool = None + experimental: bool = None + deployment: Deployment = None + annotations: dict = None + risk: list = None + playbooks: list[Playbook] = None + baselines: list[Baseline] = None + mappings: dict = None + test: UnitTest = None + macros: list[Macro] = None + lookups: list[Lookup] = None + cve_enrichment: list = None + file_path: str = None + source: str = None + + + @validator('name') + def name_max_length(cls, v): + if len(v) > 75: + raise ValueError('name is longer then 75 chars: ' + v) + return v + + @validator('name') + def name_invalid_chars(cls, v): + invalidChars = set(string.punctuation.replace("-", "")) + if any(char in invalidChars for char in v): + raise ValueError('invalid chars used in name: ' + v) + return v + + @validator('id') + def id_check(cls, v, values): + try: + uuid.UUID(str(v)) + except: + raise ValueError('uuid is not valid: ' + values["name"]) + return v + + @validator('date') + def date_valid(cls, v, values): + try: + datetime.strptime(v, "%Y-%m-%d") + except: + raise ValueError('date is not in format YYYY-MM-DD: ' + values["name"]) + return v + + @validator('type') + def type_valid(cls, v, values): + if v.lower() not in [el.name.lower() for el in AnalyticsType]: + raise ValueError('not valid analytics type: ' + values["name"]) + return v + + @validator('datamodel') + def datamodel_valid(cls, v, values): + for datamodel in v: + if datamodel not in [el.name for el in DataModel]: + raise ValueError('not valid data model: ' + values["name"]) + return v + + @validator('description', 'how_to_implement') + def encode_error(cls, v, values, field): + try: + v.encode('ascii') + except UnicodeEncodeError: + raise ValueError('encoding error in ' + field.name + ': ' + values["name"]) + return v + + @root_validator + def search_validation(cls, values): + if 'ssa_' not in values['file_path']: + if not '_filter' in values['search']: + raise ValueError('filter macro missing in: ' + values["name"]) + if any(x in values['search'] for x in ['eventtype=', 'sourcetype=', ' source=', 'index=']): + if not 'index=_internal' in values['search']: + raise ValueError('Use source macro instead of eventtype, sourcetype, source or index in detection: ' + values["name"]) + return values + + + # @validator('references') + # def references_check(cls, v, values): + # for reference in v: + # try: + # get = requests.get(reference) + # if not get.status_code == 200: + # raise ValueError('Reference ' + reference + ' is not reachable: ' + values["name"]) + # except requests.exceptions.RequestException as e: + # raise ValueError('Reference ' + reference + ' is not reachable: ' + values["name"]) + + # return v + + @validator('search') + def search_validate(cls, v, values): + # write search validator + return v + + \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/detection_tags.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/detection_tags.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3b4db94ce7 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/detection_tags.py @@ -0,0 +1,120 @@ +import re + +from pydantic import BaseModel, validator, ValidationError +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.mitre_attack_enrichment import MitreAttackEnrichment +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.constants.constants import * + +class DetectionTags(BaseModel): + # detection spec + name: str + analytic_story: list + asset_type: str + automated_detection_testing: str = None + cis20: list = None + confidence: str + context: list + dataset: list = None + impact: int + kill_chain_phases: list + message: str + mitre_attack_id: list = None + nist: list = None + observable: list + product: list + required_fields: list + risk_score: int + security_domain: str + risk_severity: str = None + cve: list = None + + # enrichment + mitre_attack_enrichments: list[MitreAttackEnrichment] = None + confidence_id: int = None + impact_id: int = None + context_ids: list = None + risk_level_id: int = None + risk_level: str = None + observable_str: str = None + kill_chain_phases_id: list = None + + + @validator('cis20') + def tags_cis20(cls, v, values): + pattern = 'CIS [0-9]{1,2}' + for value in v: + if not re.match(pattern, value): + raise ValueError('CIS controls are not following the pattern CIS xx: ' + values["name"]) + return v + + @validator('confidence') + def tags_confidence(cls, v, values): + v = int(v) + if not (v > 0 and v <= 100): + raise ValueError('confidence score is out of range 1-100: ' + values["name"]) + else: + return v + + @validator('context') + def tags_context(cls, v, values): + context_list = SES_CONTEXT_MAPPING.keys() + for value in v: + if value not in context_list: + raise ValueError('context value not valid for ' + values["name"] + '. valid options are ' + str(context_list) ) + return v + + @validator('impact') + def tags_impact(cls, v, values): + if not (v > 0 and v <= 100): + raise ValueError('impact score is out of range 1-100: ' + values["name"]) + else: + return v + + @validator('kill_chain_phases') + def tags_kill_chain_phases(cls, v, values): + valid_kill_chain_phases = SES_KILL_CHAIN_MAPPINGS.keys() + for value in v: + if value not in valid_kill_chain_phases: + raise ValueError('kill chain phase not valid for ' + values["name"] + '. valid options are ' + str(valid_kill_chain_phases)) + return v + + @validator('mitre_attack_id') + def tags_mitre_attack_id(cls, v, values): + pattern = 'T[0-9]{4}' + for value in v: + if not re.match(pattern, value): + raise ValueError('Mitre Attack ID are not following the pattern Txxxx: ' + values["name"]) + return v + + @validator('observable') + def tags_observable(cls,v,values): + valid_roles = SES_OBSERVABLE_ROLE_MAPPING.keys() + valid_types = SES_OBSERVABLE_TYPE_MAPPING.keys() + + for value in v: + if value['type'] in valid_types: + for role in value['role']: + if role not in valid_roles: + raise ValueError('Observable role ' + role + ' not valid for ' + values["name"] + '. valid options are ' + str(valid_roles)) + else: + raise ValueError('Observable type ' + value['type'] + ' not valid for ' + values["name"] + '. valid options are ' + str(valid_types)) + return v + + @validator('product') + def tags_product(cls, v, values): + valid_products = [ + "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", + "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Behavioral Analytics" + ] + + for value in v: + if value not in valid_products: + raise ValueError('product is not valid for ' + values['name'] + '. valid products are ' + str(valid_products)) + return v + + @validator('risk_score') + def tags_calculate_risk_score(cls, v, values): + calculated_risk_score = (int(values['impact']))*(int(values['confidence']))/100 + if calculated_risk_score != int(v): + raise ValueError('risk_score is calculated wrong: ' + values["name"]) + return v + diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/enums/__init__.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/enums/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/enums/enums.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/enums/enums.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..848e8f176d --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/enums/enums.py @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +import enum + + +class AnalyticsType(enum.Enum): + TTP = 1 + anomaly = 2 + hunting = 3 + correlation = 4 + +class DataModel(enum.Enum): + Endpoint = 1 + Network_Traffic = 2 + Authentication = 3 + Change = 4 + Change_Analysis = 5 + Email = 6 + Network_Resolution = 7 + Network_Sessions = 8 + UEBA = 9 + Updates = 10 + Vulnerabilities = 11 + Web = 12 + Endpoint_Processes = 13 + Endpoint_Filesystem = 14 + Endpoint_Registry = 15 + Risk = 16 + +class SecurityContentType(enum.Enum): + detections = 1 + baselines = 2 + stories = 3 + playbooks = 4 + macros = 5 + lookups = 6 + deployments = 7 + investigations = 8 + unit_tests = 9 + +class SecurityContentProduct(enum.Enum): + ESCU = 1 + SSA = 2 + API = 3 \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/investigation.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/investigation.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b177465927 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/investigation.py @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +import enum +import uuid +import string +import re +import requests + +from pydantic import BaseModel, validator, ValidationError +from dataclasses import dataclass +from datetime import datetime + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.security_content_object import SecurityContentObject +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.enums.enums import AnalyticsType +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.enums.enums import DataModel +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.investigation_tags import InvestigationTags + + +class Investigation(BaseModel, SecurityContentObject): + # investigation spec + name: str + id: str + version: int + date: str + author: str + type: str + datamodel: list + description: str + search: str + how_to_implement: str + known_false_positives: str + references: list + inputs: list = None + tags: InvestigationTags + + # enrichment + lowercase_name: str = None + + + @validator('name') + def name_max_length(cls, v): + if len(v) > 75: + raise ValueError('name is longer then 75 chars: ' + v) + return v + + @validator('name') + def name_invalid_chars(cls, v): + invalidChars = set(string.punctuation.replace("-", "")) + if any(char in invalidChars for char in v): + raise ValueError('invalid chars used in name: ' + v) + return v + + @validator('id') + def id_check(cls, v, values): + try: + uuid.UUID(str(v)) + except: + raise ValueError('uuid is not valid: ' + values["name"]) + return v + + @validator('date') + def date_valid(cls, v, values): + try: + datetime.strptime(v, "%Y-%m-%d") + except: + raise ValueError('date is not in format YYYY-MM-DD: ' + values["name"]) + return v + + @validator('datamodel') + def datamodel_valid(cls, v, values): + for datamodel in v: + if datamodel not in [el.name for el in DataModel]: + raise ValueError('not valid data model: ' + values["name"]) + return v + + @validator('description', 'how_to_implement') + def encode_error(cls, v, values, field): + try: + v.encode('ascii') + except UnicodeEncodeError: + raise ValueError('encoding error in ' + field.name + ': ' + values["name"]) + return v + + @validator('references') + def references_check(cls, v, values): + for reference in v: + try: + get = requests.get(reference) + if not get.status_code == 200: + raise ValueError('Reference ' + reference + ' is not reachable: ' + values["name"]) + except requests.exceptions.RequestException as e: + raise ValueError('Reference ' + reference + ' is not reachable: ' + values["name"]) + + return v + + @validator('search') + def search_validate(cls, v, values): + # write search validator + return v \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/investigation_tags.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/investigation_tags.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a6a0334f2a --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/investigation_tags.py @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ + +from pydantic import BaseModel, validator, ValidationError + + +class InvestigationTags(BaseModel): + analytic_story: list + product: list + required_fields: list + security_domain: str \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/lookup.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/lookup.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6b4cca798c --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/lookup.py @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +from pydantic import BaseModel, validator, ValidationError + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.security_content_object import SecurityContentObject + + + +class Lookup(BaseModel, SecurityContentObject): + name: str + description: str + collection: str = None + fields_list: str = None + filename: str = None + default_match: str = None + match_type: str = None + min_matches: int = None + case_sensitive_match: str = None diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/macro.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/macro.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e3f3d3868e --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/macro.py @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ + + +from pydantic import BaseModel, validator, ValidationError + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.security_content_object import SecurityContentObject + + + +class Macro(BaseModel, SecurityContentObject): + name: str + definition: str + description: str + arguments: list = None diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/mitre_attack_enrichment.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/mitre_attack_enrichment.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ff92b2b3dd --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/mitre_attack_enrichment.py @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +from pydantic import BaseModel, validator, ValidationError + + +class MitreAttackEnrichment(BaseModel): + mitre_attack_id: str + mitre_attack_technique: str + mitre_attack_tactics: list + mitre_attack_groups: list diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/playbook.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/playbook.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c1696ec72c --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/playbook.py @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ + +import uuid +import string + +from pydantic import BaseModel, validator, ValidationError + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.security_content_object import SecurityContentObject +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.playbook_tags import PlaybookTag + + + +class Playbook(BaseModel, SecurityContentObject): + name: str + id: str + version: int + date: str + author: str + type: str + description: str + how_to_implement: str + playbook: str + references: list + app_list: list + tags: PlaybookTag + diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/playbook_tags.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/playbook_tags.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f5bc47693e --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/playbook_tags.py @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ + +from pydantic import BaseModel, validator, ValidationError + + +class PlaybookTag(BaseModel): + analytic_story: list = None + detections: list = None + platform_tags: list = None + playbook_fields: list = None + product: list = None + playbook_fields: list = None + detection_objects: list = None + \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/security_content_object.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/security_content_object.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a93691b198 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/security_content_object.py @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +import abc + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.enums.enums import SecurityContentType + + +class SecurityContentObject(abc.ABC): + type: SecurityContentType diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/story.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/story.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cae85af56f --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/story.py @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +import string +import uuid +import requests + +from pydantic import BaseModel, validator, ValidationError +from datetime import datetime + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.security_content_object import SecurityContentObject +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.story_tags import StoryTags + +class Story(BaseModel, SecurityContentObject): + # story spec + name: str + id: str + version: int + date: str + author: str + description: str + narrative: str + references: list + tags: StoryTags + + # enrichments + detection_names: list = None + investigation_names: list = None + baseline_names: list = None + author_company: str = None + author_name: str = None + detections: list = None + investigations: list = None + + + @validator('name') + def name_invalid_chars(cls, v): + invalidChars = set(string.punctuation.replace("-", "")) + if any(char in invalidChars for char in v): + raise ValueError('invalid chars used in name: ' + v) + return v + + @validator('id') + def id_check(cls, v, values): + try: + uuid.UUID(str(v)) + except: + raise ValueError('uuid is not valid: ' + values["name"]) + return v + + @validator('date') + def date_valid(cls, v, values): + try: + datetime.strptime(v, "%Y-%m-%d") + except: + raise ValueError('date is not in format YYYY-MM-DD: ' + values["name"]) + return v + + @validator('description', 'narrative') + def encode_error(cls, v, values, field): + try: + v.encode('ascii') + except UnicodeEncodeError: + raise ValueError('encoding error in ' + field.name + ': ' + values["name"]) + return v + + # @validator('references') + # def references_check(cls, v, values): + # for reference in v: + # try: + # get = requests.get(reference) + # if not get.status_code == 200: + # raise ValueError('Reference ' + reference + ' is not reachable: ' + values["name"]) + # except requests.exceptions.RequestException as e: + # raise ValueError('Reference ' + reference + ' is not reachable: ' + values["name"]) + + # return v \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/story_tags.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/story_tags.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..14f905f8b8 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/story_tags.py @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ + + +from pydantic import BaseModel, validator, ValidationError +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.mitre_attack_enrichment import MitreAttackEnrichment + + +class StoryTags(BaseModel): + # story spec + name: str + analytic_story: str + category: list + product: list + usecase: str + + # enrichment + mitre_attack_enrichments: list[MitreAttackEnrichment] = None + mitre_attack_tactics: list = None + datamodels: list = None + kill_chain_phases: list = None + + + @validator('product') + def tags_product(cls, v, values): + valid_products = [ + "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", + "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Behavioral Analytics" + ] + + for value in v: + if value not in valid_products: + raise ValueError('product is not valid for ' + values['name'] + '. valid products are ' + str(valid_products)) + return v \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/unit_test.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/unit_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7e71db7b66 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/unit_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ + + +from pydantic import BaseModel, validator, ValidationError + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.security_content_object import SecurityContentObject +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.unit_test_test import UnitTestTest + +class UnitTest(BaseModel, SecurityContentObject): + name: str + tests: list[UnitTestTest] + \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/unit_test_attack_data.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/unit_test_attack_data.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..76d8229b12 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/unit_test_attack_data.py @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ + + +from pydantic import BaseModel, validator, ValidationError + + +class UnitTestAttackData(BaseModel): + file_name: str + data: str + source: str + sourcetype: str = None + update_timestamp: bool = None \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/unit_test_baseline.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/unit_test_baseline.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..65ad5b6e44 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/unit_test_baseline.py @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ + + +from pydantic import BaseModel, validator, ValidationError + + +class UnitTestBaseline(BaseModel): + name: str + file: str + pass_condition: str + earliest_time: str + latest_time: str \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/unit_test_test.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/unit_test_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..06c585d221 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/unit_test_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ + + +from pydantic import BaseModel, validator, ValidationError + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.unit_test_attack_data import UnitTestAttackData +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.unit_test_baseline import UnitTestBaseline + +class UnitTestTest(BaseModel): + name: str + file: str + pass_condition: str + earliest_time: str = None + latest_time: str = None + baselines: list[UnitTestBaseline] = None + attack_data: list[UnitTestAttackData] \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/factory/test_ba_factory.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/factory/test_ba_factory.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2e80a87006 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/factory/test_ba_factory.py @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +import os +import pytest + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.factory.ba_factory import BAFactory, BAFactoryInputDto, BAFactoryOutputDto +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_director import SecurityContentDirector +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_basic_builder import SecurityContentBasicBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_detection_builder import SecurityContentDetectionBuilder + + + +def test_factory_BA(): + input_path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), '../../../../../..') + + input_dto = BAFactoryInputDto( + input_path, + SecurityContentBasicBuilder(), + SecurityContentDetectionBuilder(), + SecurityContentDirector() + ) + + output_dto = BAFactoryOutputDto([],[]) + + factory = BAFactory(output_dto) + factory.execute(input_dto) + + for detection in output_dto.detections: + if not detection.test: + raise AssertionError("test file missing for ssa detection: " + detection.name) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/factory/test_factory.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/factory/test_factory.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b3e17729f2 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/factory/test_factory.py @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +import os +from re import A + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.factory.factory import FactoryInputDto +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.factory.factory import FactoryOutputDto +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.factory.factory import Factory +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_director import SecurityContentDirector +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_basic_builder import SecurityContentBasicBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_detection_builder import SecurityContentDetectionBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_story_builder import SecurityContentStoryBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.enums.enums import SecurityContentProduct +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_investigation_builder import SecurityContentInvestigationBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_baseline_builder import SecurityContentBaselineBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.attack_enrichment import AttackEnrichment +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_playbook_builder import SecurityContentPlaybookBuilder + + +def test_factory_ESCU(): + input_path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), '../../../../../..') + + input_dto = FactoryInputDto( + input_path, + SecurityContentBasicBuilder(), + SecurityContentDetectionBuilder(), + SecurityContentStoryBuilder(), + SecurityContentBaselineBuilder(), + SecurityContentInvestigationBuilder(), + SecurityContentPlaybookBuilder(), + SecurityContentDirector(), + AttackEnrichment.get_attack_lookup() + ) + + output_dto = FactoryOutputDto([],[],[],[],[],[],[],[],[]) + + factory = Factory(output_dto) + factory.execute(input_dto) + diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/factory/test_object_factory.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/factory/test_object_factory.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d618d8dab4 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/factory/test_object_factory.py @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +import os + + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.enums.enums import SecurityContentType +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.factory.object_factory import ObjectFactoryInputDto +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.factory.object_factory import ObjectFactory +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_object_builder import SecurityContentObjectBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_director import SecurityContentDirector + + +def test_object_factory(): + input_path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), '../../../../../../detections') + + input_dto = ObjectFactoryInputDto( + input_path, + SecurityContentObjectBuilder(), + SecurityContentDirector() + ) + + objects = list() + + factory = ObjectFactory(objects) + factory.execute(input_dto) + + #assert len(objects) == 959 \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/use_cases/__init__.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/use_cases/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/use_cases/data_content_changer/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/use_cases/data_content_changer/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3459891dc0 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/use_cases/data_content_changer/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +name: Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe +id: e9fb4a59-c5fb-440a-9f24-191fbc6b2911 +version: 6 +date: '2021-09-16' +author: PATRICK BAREISS, SPLUNK +type: TTP +datamodel: +- Endpoint +description: Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export + of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline. +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) + as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` OR `process_cmd` + Processes.process=*save* (Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SAM* + OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\Security* + OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\SAM*) by Processes.dest + Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name + Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` + | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information + on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from + your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, + confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the + endpoint product. +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: +- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets +tags: + analytic_story: + - Credential Dumping + - DarkSide Ransomware + asset_type: Endpoint + automated_detection_testing: passed + cis20: + - CIS 3 + - CIS 5 + - CIS 16 + confidence: 100 + context: + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Credential Access + dataset: + - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log + impact: 90 + kill_chain_phases: + - Actions on Objectives + message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified + on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to export the registry keys. + mitre_attack_id: + - T1003.002 + - T1003 + nist: + - DE.CM + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim + - name: parent_process_name + type: Process + role: + - Parent Process + - name: process_name + type: Process + role: + - Child Process + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + required_fields: + - _time + - Processes.dest + - Processes.user + - Processes.parent_process_name + - Processes.parent_process + - Processes.original_file_name + - Processes.process_name + - Processes.process + - Processes.process_id + - Processes.parent_process_path + - Processes.process_path + - Processes.parent_process_id + risk_score: 90 + security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/use_cases/data_content_changer_ref/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/use_cases/data_content_changer_ref/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3459891dc0 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/use_cases/data_content_changer_ref/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +name: Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe +id: e9fb4a59-c5fb-440a-9f24-191fbc6b2911 +version: 6 +date: '2021-09-16' +author: PATRICK BAREISS, SPLUNK +type: TTP +datamodel: +- Endpoint +description: Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export + of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline. +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) + as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` OR `process_cmd` + Processes.process=*save* (Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SAM* + OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\Security* + OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\SAM*) by Processes.dest + Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name + Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` + | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information + on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from + your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, + confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the + endpoint product. +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: +- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets +tags: + analytic_story: + - Credential Dumping + - DarkSide Ransomware + asset_type: Endpoint + automated_detection_testing: passed + cis20: + - CIS 3 + - CIS 5 + - CIS 16 + confidence: 100 + context: + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Credential Access + dataset: + - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log + impact: 90 + kill_chain_phases: + - Actions on Objectives + message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified + on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to export the registry keys. + mitre_attack_id: + - T1003.002 + - T1003 + nist: + - DE.CM + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim + - name: parent_process_name + type: Process + role: + - Parent Process + - name: process_name + type: Process + role: + - Child Process + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + required_fields: + - _time + - Processes.dest + - Processes.user + - Processes.parent_process_name + - Processes.parent_process + - Processes.original_file_name + - Processes.process_name + - Processes.process + - Processes.process_id + - Processes.parent_process_path + - Processes.process_path + - Processes.parent_process_id + risk_score: 90 + security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/use_cases/test_content_changer.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/use_cases/test_content_changer.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cf663dfb0b --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/use_cases/test_content_changer.py @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +import os + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.use_cases.content_changer import ContentChanger, ContentChangerInputDto +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.factory.object_factory import ObjectFactoryInputDto +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_object_builder import SecurityContentObjectBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_director import SecurityContentDirector +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.adapter.obj_to_yml_adapter import ObjToYmlAdapter +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.yml_reader import YmlReader + +def test_content_changer_author_uppercase(): + + input_path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'data_content_changer') + output_path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'data_content_changer_ref') + + factory_input_dto = ObjectFactoryInputDto( + input_path, + SecurityContentObjectBuilder(), + SecurityContentDirector() + ) + + input_dto = ContentChangerInputDto( + ObjToYmlAdapter(), + factory_input_dto, + 'example_converter_func' + ) + + content_changer = ContentChanger() + content_changer.execute(input_dto) + + yml_obj = YmlReader.load_file(os.path.join(output_path, 'attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml')) + + assert yml_obj['author'] == 'PATRICK BAREISS, SPLUNK' \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/use_cases/test_data_input/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/use_cases/test_data_input/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5720fde175 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/use_cases/test_data_input/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +name: Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS +id: 56ef054c-76ef-45f9-af4a-a634695dcd65 +version: 1 +date: '2019-12-06' +author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +type: TTP +datamodel: [] +description: This search detects loading of unsigned images by LSASS. Deprecated because + too noisy. +search: '`sysmon` EventID=7 Image=*lsass.exe Signed=false | stats count min(_time) + as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, Image, ImageLoaded, Signed, SHA1 + | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` + | `unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass_filter` ' +how_to_implement: This search needs Sysmon Logs with a sysmon configuration, which + includes EventCode 7 with lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. + We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations + (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition + with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter + macro designed to filter out known false positives. +known_false_positives: Other tools could load images into LSASS for legitimate reason. + But enterprise tools should always use signed DLLs. +references: +- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/ +tags: + analytic_story: + - Credential Dumping + asset_type: Windows + cis20: + - CIS 8 + - CIS 16 + confidence: 100 + context: + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Credential Access + impact: 90 + kill_chain_phases: + - Actions on Objectives + message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified + on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to export the registry keys. + mitre_attack_id: + - T1003.001 + nist: + - DE.CM + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim + - name: parent_process_name + type: Process + role: + - Parent Process + - name: process_name + type: Process + role: + - Child Process + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + required_fields: + - _time + risk_score: 90 + security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/use_cases/test_data_input/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/use_cases/test_data_input/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..68a1d82348 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/use_cases/test_data_input/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +name: Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe +id: e9fb4a59-c5fb-440a-9f24-191fbc6b2911 +version: 6 +date: '2021-09-16' +author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +type: TTP +datamodel: +- Endpoint +description: Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export + of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline. +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) + as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` OR `process_cmd` + Processes.process=*save* (Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SAM* + OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\Security* + OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\SAM*) by Processes.dest + Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name + Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` + | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information + on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from + your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, + confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the + endpoint product. +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: +- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets +tags: + analytic_story: + - Credential Dumping + - DarkSide Ransomware + asset_type: Endpoint + automated_detection_testing: passed + cis20: + - CIS 3 + - CIS 5 + - CIS 16 + confidence: 100 + context: + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Credential Access + dataset: + - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log + impact: 90 + kill_chain_phases: + - Actions on Objectives + message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified + on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to export the registry keys. + mitre_attack_id: + - T1003.002 + - T1003 + nist: + - DE.CM + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim + - name: parent_process_name + type: Process + role: + - Parent Process + - name: process_name + type: Process + role: + - Child Process + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + required_fields: + - _time + - Processes.dest + - Processes.user + - Processes.parent_process_name + - Processes.parent_process + - Processes.original_file_name + - Processes.process_name + - Processes.process + - Processes.process_id + - Processes.parent_process_path + - Processes.process_path + - Processes.parent_process_id + risk_score: 90 + security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/use_cases/test_data_input/detections/endpoint/cobalt_strike_named_pipes.yml b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/use_cases/test_data_input/detections/endpoint/cobalt_strike_named_pipes.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2515803d69 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/use_cases/test_data_input/detections/endpoint/cobalt_strike_named_pipes.yml @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +name: Cobalt Strike Named Pipes +id: 5876d429-0240-4709-8b93-ea8330b411b5 +version: 1 +date: '2021-02-22' +author: Michael Haag, Splunk +type: TTP +datamodel: [] +description: 'The following analytic identifies the use of default or publicly known + named pipes used with Cobalt Strike. A named pipe is a named, one-way or duplex + pipe for communication between the pipe server and one or more pipe clients. Cobalt + Strike uses named pipes in many ways and has default values used with the Artifact + Kit and Malleable C2 Profiles. The following query assists with identifying these + default named pipes. Each EDR product presents named pipes a little different. Consider + taking the values and generating a query based on the product of choice. \ + + Upon triage, review the process performing the named pipe. If it is explorer.exe, + It is possible it was injected into by another process. Review recent parallel processes + to identify suspicious patterns or behaviors. A parallel process may have a network + connection, review and follow the connection back to identify any file modifications.' +search: '`sysmon` EventID=17 OR EventID=18 PipeName IN (\\msagent_*, \\wkssvc*, \\DserNamePipe*, + \\srvsvc_*, \\mojo.*, \\postex_*, \\status_*, \\MSSE-*, \\spoolss_*, \\win_svc*, + \\ntsvcs*, \\winsock*, \\UIA_PIPE*) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) + as lastTime by Computer, process_name, process_id process_path, PipeName | rename + Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` + | `cobalt_strike_named_pipes_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting + logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your + endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the + Sysmon TA. +known_false_positives: The idea of using named pipes with Cobalt Strike is to blend + in. Therefore, some of the named pipes identified and added may cause false positives. + Filter by process name or pipe name to reduce false positives. +references: +- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/ +- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/ipc/named-pipes +- https://gist.github.com/MHaggis/6c600e524045a6d49c35291a21e10752 +- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html +tags: + analytic_story: + - Cobalt Strike + - Trickbot + - DarkSide Ransomware + asset_type: Endpoint + automated_detection_testing: passed + cis20: + - CIS 8 + confidence: 90 + context: + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Defense Evasion + dataset: + - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log + impact: 80 + kill_chain_phases: + - Actions on Objectives + message: An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $Computer$ by + user $user$ accessing known suspicious named pipes related to Cobalt Strike. + mitre_attack_id: + - T1055 + nist: + - PR.PT + - DE.CM + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + - name: Computer + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim + - name: process_name + type: Process + role: + - Parent Process + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + required_fields: + - _time + - EventID + - PipeName + - Computer + - process_name + - process_path + - process_id + risk_score: 72 + security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/use_cases/test_data_input/macros/security_content_ctime.yml b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/use_cases/test_data_input/macros/security_content_ctime.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3c18a1d7af --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/use_cases/test_data_input/macros/security_content_ctime.yml @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +arguments: + - field +definition: 'convert timeformat="%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S" ctime($field$)' +description: convert epoch time to string +name: security_content_ctime diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/use_cases/test_data_input/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/use_cases/test_data_input/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..837760af99 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/use_cases/test_data_input/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +definition: summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true +description: search data model's summaries only +name: security_content_summariesonly diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/use_cases/test_data_input/macros/sysmon.yml b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/use_cases/test_data_input/macros/sysmon.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..fb5503662c --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/use_cases/test_data_input/macros/sysmon.yml @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +definition: sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational +description: customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). + Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent. +name: sysmon diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/use_cases/test_data_input/stories/cobalt_strike.yml b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/use_cases/test_data_input/stories/cobalt_strike.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ef1fd824fe --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/use_cases/test_data_input/stories/cobalt_strike.yml @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +name: Cobalt Strike +id: bcfd17e8-5461-400a-80a2-3b7d1459220c +version: 1 +date: '2021-02-16' +author: Michael Haag, Splunk +description: Cobalt Strike is threat emulation software. Red teams and penetration testers use Cobalt Strike to demonstrate the risk of a breach and evaluate mature security programs. Most recently, Cobalt Strike has become the choice tool by threat groups due to its ease of use and extensibility. +narrative: 'This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures + (TTPs) from Cobalt Strike. Cobalt Strike has many ways to be enhanced by using aggressor scripts, malleable C2 profiles, default attack packages, and much more. + For endpoint behavior, Cobalt Strike is most commonly identified via named pipes, spawn to processes, and DLL function names. Many additional variables are provided for in memory operation of the beacon implant. + On the network, depending on the malleable C2 profile used, it is near infinite in the amount of ways to conceal the C2 traffic with Cobalt Strike. + Not every query may be specific to Cobalt Strike the tool, but the methodologies and techniques used by it.\ + + Splunk Threat Research reviewed all publicly available instances of Malleabe C2 Profiles and generated a list of the most commonly used spawnto and pipenames.\ + + `Spawnto_x86` and `spawnto_x64` is the process that Cobalt Strike will spawn and injects shellcode into.\ + + Pipename sets the named pipe name used in Cobalt Strikes Beacon SMB C2 traffic.\ + + With that, new detections were generated focused on these spawnto processes spawning without command line arguments. Similar, the named pipes most commonly used by Cobalt Strike added as a detection. + In generating content for Cobalt Strike, the following is considered:\ + + - Is it normal for spawnto_ value to have no command line arguments? No command line arguments and a network connection?\ + + - What is the default, or normal, process lineage for spawnto_ value?\ + + - Does the spawnto_ value make network connections?\ + + - Is it normal for spawnto_ value to load jscript, vbscript, Amsi.dll, and clr.dll?\ + + While investigating a detection related to this Analytic Story, keep in mind the parent process, process path, and any file modifications that may occur. Tuning may need to occur to remove any false positives.' + +references: +- https://www.cobaltstrike.com/ +- https://www.infocyte.com/blog/2020/09/02/cobalt-strike-the-new-favorite-among-thieves/ +- https://bluescreenofjeff.com/2017-01-24-how-to-write-malleable-c2-profiles-for-cobalt-strike/ +- https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/09/coverage-strikes-back-cobalt-strike-paper.html +- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/unauthorized-access-of-fireeye-red-team-tools.html +- https://github.com/MichaelKoczwara/Awesome-CobaltStrike-Defence +- https://github.com/zer0yu/Awesome-CobaltStrike +tags: + analytic_story: Cobalt Strike + category: + - Adversary Tactics + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + usecase: Advanced Threat Detection diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/use_cases/test_data_input/stories/credential_dumping.yml b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/use_cases/test_data_input/stories/credential_dumping.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c1d1950113 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/use_cases/test_data_input/stories/credential_dumping.yml @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +name: Credential Dumping +id: 854d78bf-d0e2-4f4e-b05c-640905f86d7a +version: 3 +date: '2020-02-04' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +description: Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein + attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords. The + threat actors use these pilfered credentials to further escalate privileges and + spread throughout a target environment. The included searches in this Analytic Story + are designed to identify attempts to credential dumping. +narrative: 'Credential dumping—gathering credentials from a target system, often + hashed or encrypted—is a common attack technique. Even though the credentials + may not be in plain text, an attacker can still exfiltrate the data and set to cracking + it offline, on their own systems. The threat actors target a variety of sources + to extract them, including the Security Accounts Manager (SAM), Local Security Authority + (LSA), NTDS from Domain Controllers, or the Group Policy Preference (GPP) files.\ + + Once attackers obtain valid credentials, they use them to move throughout a target + network with ease, discovering new systems and identifying assets of interest. Credentials + obtained in this manner typically include those of privileged users, which may provide + access to more sensitive information and system operations.\ + + The detection searches in this Analytic Story monitor access to the Local Security + Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process, the usage of shadowcopies for credential + dumping and some other techniques for credential dumping.' +references: +- https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003 +- https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html +tags: + analytic_story: Credential Dumping + category: + - Adversary Tactics + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + usecase: Advanced Threat Detection diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/use_cases/test_data_input/stories/ransomware_darkside.yml b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/use_cases/test_data_input/stories/ransomware_darkside.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f2e6d8bfd9 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/use_cases/test_data_input/stories/ransomware_darkside.yml @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +name: DarkSide Ransomware +id: 507edc74-13d5-4339-878e-b9114ded1f35 +version: 1 +date: '2021-05-12' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +description: Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities + that might relate to the DarkSide Ransomware +narrative: 'This story addresses Darkside ransomware. This ransomware payload has many similarities to common ransomware however there are certain items particular to it. The creation of a .TXT log that shows every item being encrypted as well as the creation of ransomware notes and files adding a machine ID created based on CRC32 checksum algorithm. This ransomware payload leaves machines in minimal operation level,enough to browse the attackers websites. A customized URI with leaked information is presented to each victim.This is the ransomware payload that shut down the Colonial pipeline. The story is composed of several detection searches covering similar items to other ransomware payloads and those particular to Darkside payload.' +references: +- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/the-darkside-of-the-ransomware-pipeline.htmlbig-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/ +- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html +tags: + analytic_story: DarkSide Ransomware + category: + - Malware + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + usecase: Advanced Threat Detection diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/use_cases/test_data_input/stories/trickbot.yml b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/use_cases/test_data_input/stories/trickbot.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..00017136e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/use_cases/test_data_input/stories/trickbot.yml @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +name: Trickbot +id: 16f93769-8342-44c0-9b1d-f131937cce8e +version: 1 +date: '2021-04-20' +author: Rod Soto, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk +description: Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities + that might relate to the trickbot banking trojan, including looking for file writes associated + with its payload, process injection, shellcode execution and data collection even in LDAP environment. +narrative: trickbot banking trojan campaigns targeting banks and other vertical sectors.This malware is known + in Microsoft Windows OS where target security Microsoft Defender to prevent its detection and removal. steal + Verizon credentials and targeting banks using its multi component modules that collect and exfiltrate data. +references: +- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trickbot +- https://blog.checkpoint.com/2021/03/11/february-2021s-most-wanted-malware-trickbot-takes-over-following-emotet-shutdown/ +tags: + analytic_story: Trickbot + category: + - Malware + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + usecase: Advanced Threat Detection \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/use_cases/test_data_output/detections/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/use_cases/test_data_output/detections/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3459891dc0 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/use_cases/test_data_output/detections/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +name: Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe +id: e9fb4a59-c5fb-440a-9f24-191fbc6b2911 +version: 6 +date: '2021-09-16' +author: PATRICK BAREISS, SPLUNK +type: TTP +datamodel: +- Endpoint +description: Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export + of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline. +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) + as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` OR `process_cmd` + Processes.process=*save* (Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SAM* + OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\Security* + OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\SAM*) by Processes.dest + Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name + Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` + | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information + on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from + your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, + confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the + endpoint product. +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: +- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets +tags: + analytic_story: + - Credential Dumping + - DarkSide Ransomware + asset_type: Endpoint + automated_detection_testing: passed + cis20: + - CIS 3 + - CIS 5 + - CIS 16 + confidence: 100 + context: + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Credential Access + dataset: + - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log + impact: 90 + kill_chain_phases: + - Actions on Objectives + message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified + on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to export the registry keys. + mitre_attack_id: + - T1003.002 + - T1003 + nist: + - DE.CM + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim + - name: parent_process_name + type: Process + role: + - Parent Process + - name: process_name + type: Process + role: + - Child Process + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + required_fields: + - _time + - Processes.dest + - Processes.user + - Processes.parent_process_name + - Processes.parent_process + - Processes.original_file_name + - Processes.process_name + - Processes.process + - Processes.process_id + - Processes.parent_process_path + - Processes.process_path + - Processes.parent_process_id + risk_score: 90 + security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/use_cases/test_data_output/detections/cobalt_strike_named_pipes.yml b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/use_cases/test_data_output/detections/cobalt_strike_named_pipes.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4638e6c952 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/application/use_cases/test_data_output/detections/cobalt_strike_named_pipes.yml @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +name: Cobalt Strike Named Pipes +id: 5876d429-0240-4709-8b93-ea8330b411b5 +version: 1 +date: '2021-02-22' +author: MICHAEL HAAG, SPLUNK +type: TTP +datamodel: [] +description: 'The following analytic identifies the use of default or publicly known + named pipes used with Cobalt Strike. A named pipe is a named, one-way or duplex + pipe for communication between the pipe server and one or more pipe clients. Cobalt + Strike uses named pipes in many ways and has default values used with the Artifact + Kit and Malleable C2 Profiles. The following query assists with identifying these + default named pipes. Each EDR product presents named pipes a little different. Consider + taking the values and generating a query based on the product of choice. \ + + Upon triage, review the process performing the named pipe. If it is explorer.exe, + It is possible it was injected into by another process. Review recent parallel processes + to identify suspicious patterns or behaviors. A parallel process may have a network + connection, review and follow the connection back to identify any file modifications.' +search: '`sysmon` EventID=17 OR EventID=18 PipeName IN (\\msagent_*, \\wkssvc*, \\DserNamePipe*, + \\srvsvc_*, \\mojo.*, \\postex_*, \\status_*, \\MSSE-*, \\spoolss_*, \\win_svc*, + \\ntsvcs*, \\winsock*, \\UIA_PIPE*) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) + as lastTime by Computer, process_name, process_id process_path, PipeName | rename + Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` + | `cobalt_strike_named_pipes_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting + logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your + endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the + Sysmon TA. +known_false_positives: The idea of using named pipes with Cobalt Strike is to blend + in. Therefore, some of the named pipes identified and added may cause false positives. + Filter by process name or pipe name to reduce false positives. +references: +- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/ +- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/ipc/named-pipes +- https://gist.github.com/MHaggis/6c600e524045a6d49c35291a21e10752 +- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html +tags: + analytic_story: + - Cobalt Strike + - Trickbot + - DarkSide Ransomware + asset_type: Endpoint + automated_detection_testing: passed + cis20: + - CIS 8 + confidence: 90 + context: + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Defense Evasion + dataset: + - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log + impact: 80 + kill_chain_phases: + - Actions on Objectives + message: An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $Computer$ by + user $user$ accessing known suspicious named pipes related to Cobalt Strike. + mitre_attack_id: + - T1055 + nist: + - PR.PT + - DE.CM + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + - name: Computer + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim + - name: process_name + type: Process + role: + - Parent Process + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + required_fields: + - _time + - EventID + - PipeName + - Computer + - process_name + - process_path + - process_id + risk_score: 72 + security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/domain/__init__.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/tests/domain/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/attack_nav_writer.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/attack_nav_writer.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e32046d533 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/attack_nav_writer.py @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ + +import json + + +VERSION = "4.2" +NAME = "Detection Coverage" +DESCRIPTION = "security_content detection coverage" +DOMAIN = "mitre-enterprise" + + +class AttackNavWriter(): + + @staticmethod + def writeAttackNavFile(mitre_techniques : dict, output_path : str) -> None: + max_count = 0 + for technique_id in mitre_techniques.keys(): + if mitre_techniques[technique_id]['score'] > max_count: + max_count = mitre_techniques[technique_id]['score'] + + layer_json = { + "version": VERSION, + "name": NAME, + "description": DESCRIPTION, + "domain": DOMAIN, + "techniques": [] + } + + layer_json["gradient"] = { + "colors": [ + "#ffffff", + "#66b1ff", + "#096ed7" + ], + "minValue": 0, + "maxValue": max_count + } + + layer_json["filters"] = { + "platforms": + ["Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "AWS", + "GCP", + "Azure", + "Office 365", + "SaaS" + ] + } + + layer_json["legendItems"] = [ + { + "label": "NO available detections", + "color": "#ffffff" + }, + { + "label": "Some detections available", + "color": "#66b1ff" + } + ] + + layer_json['showTacticRowBackground'] = True + layer_json['tacticRowBackground'] = "#dddddd" + layer_json["sorting"] = 3 + + for technique_id in mitre_techniques.keys(): + layer_technique = { + "techniqueID": technique_id, + "score": mitre_techniques[technique_id]['score'], + "comment": "\n\n".join(mitre_techniques[technique_id]['file_paths']) + } + layer_json["techniques"].append(layer_technique) + + with open(output_path, 'w') as outfile: + json.dump(layer_json, outfile, ensure_ascii=False, indent=4) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/conf_writer.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/conf_writer.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..37dece0bcb --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/conf_writer.py @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +import datetime +import os +from jinja2 import Environment, FileSystemLoader + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.security_content_object import SecurityContentObject + +class ConfWriter(): + + @staticmethod + def writeConfFileHeader(output_path : str) -> None: + utc_time = datetime.datetime.utcnow().replace(microsecond=0).isoformat() + j2_env = Environment( + loader=FileSystemLoader(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'templates')), + trim_blocks=True) + + template = j2_env.get_template('header.j2') + output = template.render(time=utc_time) + with open(output_path, 'w') as f: + output = output.encode('ascii', 'ignore').decode('ascii') + f.write(output) + + + @staticmethod + def writeConfFile(template_name : str, output_path : str, objects : list) -> None: + + def custom_jinja2_enrichment_filter(string, object): + customized_string = string + + for key in dir(object): + if type(key) is not str: + key = key.decode() + if not key.startswith('__') and not key == "_abc_impl" and not callable(getattr(object, key)): + if hasattr(object, key): + customized_string = customized_string.replace("%" + key + "%", str(getattr(object, key))) + + for key in dir(object.tags): + if type(key) is not str: + key = key.decode() + if not key.startswith('__') and not key == "_abc_impl" and not callable(getattr(object.tags, key)): + if hasattr(object.tags, key): + customized_string = customized_string.replace("%" + key + "%", str(getattr(object.tags, key))) + + return customized_string + + j2_env = Environment( + loader=FileSystemLoader(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'templates')), + trim_blocks=True) + + j2_env.filters['custom_jinja2_enrichment_filter'] = custom_jinja2_enrichment_filter + template = j2_env.get_template(template_name) + output = template.render(objects=objects) + with open(output_path, 'a') as f: + output = output.encode('ascii', 'ignore').decode('ascii') + f.write(output) + diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/finding_report_writer.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/finding_report_writer.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3285ce36d1 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/finding_report_writer.py @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +import os +import re +from jinja2 import Environment, FileSystemLoader + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.detection import Detection +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.constants.constants import * + +class FindingReportObject(): + + @staticmethod + def writeFindingReport(detection : Detection) -> None: + + if detection.tags.confidence < 33: + detection.tags.confidence_id = 1 + elif detection.tags.confidence < 66: + detection.tags.confidence_id = 2 + else: + detection.tags.confidence_id = 3 + + detection.tags.context_ids = list() + for context in detection.tags.context: + detection.tags.context_ids.append(SES_CONTEXT_MAPPING[context]) + + if detection.tags.impact < 20: + detection.tags.impact_id = 1 + elif detection.tags.impact < 40: + detection.tags.impact_id = 2 + elif detection.tags.impact < 60: + detection.tags.impact_id = 3 + elif detection.tags.impact < 80: + detection.tags.impact_id = 4 + else: + detection.tags.impact_id = 5 + + detection.tags.kill_chain_phases_id = list() + for kill_chain_phase in detection.tags.kill_chain_phases: + detection.tags.kill_chain_phases_id.append(SES_KILL_CHAIN_MAPPINGS[kill_chain_phase]) + + if detection.tags.risk_score < 20: + detection.tags.risk_level_id = 0 + detection.tags.risk_level = "Info" + elif detection.tags.risk_score < 40: + detection.tags.risk_level_id = 1 + detection.tags.risk_level = "Low" + elif detection.tags.risk_score < 60: + detection.tags.risk_level_id = 2 + detection.tags.risk_level = "Medium" + elif detection.tags.risk_score < 80: + detection.tags.risk_level_id = 3 + detection.tags.risk_level = "High" + else: + detection.tags.risk_level_id = 4 + detection.tags.risk_level = "Critical" + + observable_str = "[" + for i in range(len(detection.tags.observable)): + role_list = [] + for role in detection.tags.observable[i]["role"]: + role_list.append(str(SES_OBSERVABLE_ROLE_MAPPING[role])) + + observable_str = observable_str + 'create_map("name", "' + detection.tags.observable[i]["name"] + '", "role_ids", [' + ",".join(role_list) + '], "type_id", ' + str(SES_OBSERVABLE_TYPE_MAPPING[detection.tags.observable[i]["type"]]) + ', "value", ' + detection.tags.observable[i]["name"] + ')' + if not i == len(detection.tags.observable): + observable_str = observable_str + ', ' + observable_str = observable_str + ']' + + detection.tags.observable_str = observable_str + + j2_env = Environment( + loader=FileSystemLoader(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'templates')), + trim_blocks=True) + template = j2_env.get_template('finding_report.j2') + body = template.render(detection=detection) + + return body diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/jinja_writer.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/jinja_writer.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..97d41c2cfa --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/jinja_writer.py @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +import os + +from jinja2 import Environment, FileSystemLoader + + +class JinjaWriter: + + @staticmethod + def writeObjectsList(template_name : str, output_path : str, objects : list) -> None: + + j2_env = Environment( + loader=FileSystemLoader(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'templates')), + trim_blocks=False) + + template = j2_env.get_template(template_name) + output = template.render(objects=objects) + with open(output_path, 'w') as f: + output = output.encode('ascii', 'ignore').decode('ascii') + f.write(output) + + + @staticmethod + def writeObject(template_name : str, output_path : str, object : dict) -> None: + + j2_env = Environment( + loader=FileSystemLoader(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'templates')), + trim_blocks=False) + + template = j2_env.get_template(template_name) + output = template.render(object=object) + with open(output_path, 'w') as f: + output = output.encode('ascii', 'ignore').decode('ascii') + f.write(output) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/json_writer.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/json_writer.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..500db4b01b --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/json_writer.py @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +import json + + +class JsonWriter(): + + @staticmethod + def writeJsonObject(file_path : str, obj) -> None: + + with open(file_path, 'w') as outfile: + json.dump(obj, outfile, ensure_ascii=False, indent=4) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/obj_to_attack_nav_adapter.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/obj_to_attack_nav_adapter.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5bf52a9058 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/obj_to_attack_nav_adapter.py @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +import os + + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.adapter.adapter import Adapter +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.enums.enums import SecurityContentType +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.adapter.attack_nav_writer import AttackNavWriter + + +class ObjToAttackNavAdapter(Adapter): + + def writeObjects(self, objects: list, output_path: str, type: SecurityContentType = None) -> None: + techniques = dict() + for detection in objects: + if detection.tags.mitre_attack_enrichments: + for mitre_attack_enrichment in detection.tags.mitre_attack_enrichments: + if not mitre_attack_enrichment.mitre_attack_id in techniques: + techniques[mitre_attack_enrichment.mitre_attack_id] = { + 'score': 1, + 'file_paths': ['https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/' + detection.source + '/' + self.convertNameToFileName(detection.name)] + } + else: + techniques[mitre_attack_enrichment.mitre_attack_id]['score'] = techniques[mitre_attack_enrichment.mitre_attack_id]['score'] + 1 + techniques[mitre_attack_enrichment.mitre_attack_id]['file_paths'].append('https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/' + detection.source + '/' + self.convertNameToFileName(detection.name)) + + AttackNavWriter.writeAttackNavFile(techniques, os.path.join(output_path, 'coverage.json')) + + + def convertNameToFileName(self, name: str): + file_name = name \ + .replace(' ', '_') \ + .replace('-','_') \ + .replace('.','_') \ + .replace('/','_') \ + .lower() + file_name = file_name + '.yml' + return file_name diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/obj_to_conf_adapter.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/obj_to_conf_adapter.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d9c0bed363 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/obj_to_conf_adapter.py @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +import os +import glob +import shutil + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.adapter.adapter import Adapter +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.adapter.conf_writer import ConfWriter +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.enums.enums import SecurityContentType + + +class ObjToConfAdapter(Adapter): + + def writeHeaders(self, output_folder: str) -> None: + ConfWriter.writeConfFileHeader(os.path.join(output_folder, 'default/analyticstories.conf')) + ConfWriter.writeConfFileHeader(os.path.join(output_folder, 'default/savedsearches.conf')) + ConfWriter.writeConfFileHeader(os.path.join(output_folder, 'default/collections.conf')) + ConfWriter.writeConfFileHeader(os.path.join(output_folder, 'default/es_investigations.conf')) + ConfWriter.writeConfFileHeader(os.path.join(output_folder, 'default/macros.conf')) + ConfWriter.writeConfFileHeader(os.path.join(output_folder, 'default/transforms.conf')) + ConfWriter.writeConfFileHeader(os.path.join(output_folder, 'default/workflow_actions.conf')) + + + def writeObjects(self, objects: list, output_path: str, type: SecurityContentType = None) -> None: + if type == SecurityContentType.detections: + ConfWriter.writeConfFile('savedsearches_detections.j2', + os.path.join(output_path, 'default/savedsearches.conf'), + objects) + + ConfWriter.writeConfFile('analyticstories_detections.j2', + os.path.join(output_path, 'default/analyticstories.conf'), + objects) + + ConfWriter.writeConfFile('macros_detections.j2', + os.path.join(output_path, 'default/macros.conf'), + objects) + + elif type == SecurityContentType.stories: + ConfWriter.writeConfFile('analyticstories_stories.j2', + os.path.join(output_path, 'default/analyticstories.conf'), + objects) + + elif type == SecurityContentType.baselines: + ConfWriter.writeConfFile('savedsearches_baselines.j2', + os.path.join(output_path, 'default/savedsearches.conf'), + objects) + + elif type == SecurityContentType.investigations: + ConfWriter.writeConfFile('savedsearches_investigations.j2', + os.path.join(output_path, 'default/savedsearches.conf'), + objects) + + ConfWriter.writeConfFile('analyticstories_investigations.j2', + os.path.join(output_path, 'default/analyticstories.conf'), + objects) + + workbench_panels = [] + for investigation in objects: + if investigation.inputs: + response_file_name_xml = investigation.lowercase_name + "___response_task.xml" + workbench_panels.append(investigation) + investigation.search = investigation.search.replace(">",">") + investigation.search = investigation.search.replace("<","<") + ConfWriter.writeConfFileHeader(os.path.join(output_path, + 'default/data/ui/panels/', str("workbench_panel_" + response_file_name_xml))) + ConfWriter.writeConfFile('panel.j2', + os.path.join(output_path, + 'default/data/ui/panels/', str("workbench_panel_" + response_file_name_xml)), + [investigation.search]) + + ConfWriter.writeConfFile('es_investigations_investigations.j2', + os.path.join(output_path, 'default/es_investigations.conf'), + workbench_panels) + + ConfWriter.writeConfFile('workflow_actions.j2', + os.path.join(output_path, 'default/workflow_actions.conf'), + workbench_panels) + + elif type == SecurityContentType.lookups: + ConfWriter.writeConfFile('collections.j2', + os.path.join(output_path, 'default/collections.conf'), + objects) + + ConfWriter.writeConfFile('transforms.j2', + os.path.join(output_path, 'default/transforms.conf'), + objects) + + files = glob.iglob(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), '../../../..' , 'lookups', '*.csv')) + for file in files: + if os.path.isfile(file): + shutil.copy(file, os.path.join(output_path, 'lookups')) + + elif type == SecurityContentType.macros: + ConfWriter.writeConfFile('macros.j2', + os.path.join(output_path, 'default/macros.conf'), + objects) + diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d6c58c42e3 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter.py @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +import os + + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.adapter.adapter import Adapter +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.adapter.json_writer import JsonWriter +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.enums.enums import SecurityContentType + + +class ObjToJsonAdapter(Adapter): + + + def writeObjects(self, objects: list, output_path: str, type: SecurityContentType = None) -> None: + if type == SecurityContentType.detections: + obj_array = [] + for detection in objects: + obj_array.append(detection.dict(exclude_none=True, + exclude = + { + "deprecated": True, + "experimental": True, + "annotations": True, + "risk": True, + "playbooks": True, + "baselines": True, + "mappings": True, + "test": True, + "deployment": True + } + )) + + JsonWriter.writeJsonObject(os.path.join(output_path, 'detections.json'), obj_array) + + elif type == SecurityContentType.stories: + obj_array = [] + for story in objects: + obj_array.append(story.dict(exclude_none=True)) + + JsonWriter.writeJsonObject(os.path.join(output_path, 'stories.json'), obj_array) + + elif type == SecurityContentType.baselines: + obj_array = [] + for baseline in objects: + obj_array.append(baseline.dict( + exclude = + { + "deployment": True + } + )) + + JsonWriter.writeJsonObject(os.path.join(output_path, 'baselines.json'), obj_array) + + elif type == SecurityContentType.investigations: + obj_array = [] + for investigation in objects: + obj_array.append(investigation.dict(exclude_none=True)) + + JsonWriter.writeJsonObject(os.path.join(output_path, 'response_tasks.json'), obj_array) + + elif type == SecurityContentType.lookups: + obj_array = [] + for lookup in objects: + obj_array.append(lookup.dict(exclude_none=True)) + + JsonWriter.writeJsonObject(os.path.join(output_path, 'lookups.json'), obj_array) + + elif type == SecurityContentType.macros: + obj_array = [] + for macro in objects: + obj_array.append(macro.dict(exclude_none=True)) + + JsonWriter.writeJsonObject(os.path.join(output_path, 'macros.json'), obj_array) + + elif type == SecurityContentType.deployments: + obj_array = [] + for deployment in objects: + obj_array.append(deployment.dict(exclude_none=True)) + + JsonWriter.writeJsonObject(os.path.join(output_path, 'deployments.json'), obj_array) + diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/obj_to_md_adapter.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/obj_to_md_adapter.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bbc3ccf846 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/obj_to_md_adapter.py @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +import os + + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.adapter.adapter import Adapter +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.enums.enums import SecurityContentType +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.adapter.jinja_writer import JinjaWriter + + +class ObjToMdAdapter(Adapter): + + def writeObjects(self, objects: list, output_path: str, type: SecurityContentType = None) -> None: + + attack_tactics = set() + datamodels = set() + categories = set() + for story in objects[0]: + if story.tags.category: + categories.update(story.tags.category) + + for detection in objects[1]: + if detection.tags.mitre_attack_enrichments: + for attack in detection.tags.mitre_attack_enrichments: + attack_tactics.update(attack.mitre_attack_tactics) + + if detection.datamodel: + datamodels.update(detection.datamodel) + + JinjaWriter.writeObjectsList('doc_navigation.j2', os.path.join(output_path, '_data/navigation.yml'), + { + 'attack_tactics': sorted(list(attack_tactics)), + 'datamodels': sorted(list(datamodels)), + 'categories': sorted(list(categories)) + } + ) + + self.writeNavigationPageObjects(sorted(list(datamodels)), output_path) + self.writeNavigationPageObjects(sorted(list(attack_tactics)), output_path) + self.writeNavigationPageObjects(sorted(list(categories)), output_path) + + JinjaWriter.writeObjectsList('doc_story_page.j2', os.path.join(output_path, '_pages/stories.md'), sorted(objects[0], key=lambda x: x.name)) + self.writeObjectsMd(objects[0], os.path.join(output_path, '_stories'), 'doc_stories.j2') + + JinjaWriter.writeObjectsList('doc_detection_page.j2', os.path.join(output_path, '_pages/detections.md'), sorted(objects[1], key=lambda x: x.name)) + self.writeDetectionsMd(objects[1], os.path.join(output_path, '_posts'), 'doc_detections.j2') + + JinjaWriter.writeObjectsList('doc_playbooks_page.j2', os.path.join(output_path, '_pages/paybooks.md'), sorted(objects[2], key=lambda x: x.name)) + self.writeObjectsMd(objects[2], os.path.join(output_path, '_playbooks'), 'doc_playbooks.j2') + + + def writeNavigationPageObjects(self, objects: list, output_path: str) -> None: + for obj in objects: + JinjaWriter.writeObject('doc_navigation_pages.j2', os.path.join(output_path, '_pages', obj.lower().replace(' ', '_') + '.md'), + { + 'name': obj + } + ) + + def writeObjectsMd(self, objects, output_path: str, template_name: str) -> None: + for obj in objects: + JinjaWriter.writeObject(template_name, os.path.join(output_path, obj.name.lower().replace(' ', '_') + '.md'), obj) + + def writeDetectionsMd(self, objects, output_path: str, template_name: str) -> None: + for obj in objects: + JinjaWriter.writeObject(template_name, os.path.join(output_path, obj.date + '-' + obj.name.lower().replace(' ', '_') + '.md'), obj) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/obj_to_svg_adapter.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/obj_to_svg_adapter.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..67f1138d4b --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/obj_to_svg_adapter.py @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +import os + + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.adapter.adapter import Adapter +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.enums.enums import SecurityContentType +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.adapter.jinja_writer import JinjaWriter + + +class ObjToSvgAdapter(Adapter): + + def writeObjects(self, objects: list, output_path: str, type: SecurityContentType = None) -> None: + + detections_tmp = objects + detection_without_test = 0 + + detections = [] + obj = dict() + + for detection in detections_tmp: + if not detection.deprecated: + detections.append(detection) + + if not detection.test and not detection.experimental: + detection_without_test = detection_without_test + 1 + + + obj['count'] = len(detections) + obj['coverage'] = (obj['count'] - detection_without_test)/obj['count'] + obj['coverage'] = "{:.0%}".format(obj['coverage']) + + JinjaWriter.writeObject('detection_count.j2', os.path.join(output_path, 'detection_count.svg'), obj) + JinjaWriter.writeObject('detection_coverage.j2', os.path.join(output_path, 'detection_coverage.svg'), obj) + diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/obj_to_yml_adapter.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/obj_to_yml_adapter.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..13ec4a0e4b --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/obj_to_yml_adapter.py @@ -0,0 +1,130 @@ +import os +import re + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.adapter.yml_writer import YmlWriter +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.adapter.adapter import Adapter +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.enums.enums import SecurityContentType +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.adapter.finding_report_writer import FindingReportObject + +class ObjToYmlAdapter(Adapter): + + def writeObjectsInPlace(self, objects: list) -> None: + for object in objects: + file_path = object['file_path'] + object.pop('file_path') + object.pop('deprecated') + object.pop('experimental') + YmlWriter.writeYmlFile(file_path, object) + + + def writeObjects(self, objects: list, output_path: str, type: SecurityContentType = None) -> None: + for obj in objects: + file_name = "ssa___" + self.convertNameToFileName(obj.name) + if self.isComplexBARule(obj.search): + file_path = os.path.join(output_path, 'complex', file_name) + else: + file_path = os.path.join(output_path, 'srs', file_name) + + body = FindingReportObject.writeFindingReport(obj) + + # remove unncessary fields + YmlWriter.writeYmlFile(file_path, obj.dict( + include = + { + "name": True, + "id": True, + "version": True, + "description": True, + "search": True, + "how_to_implement": True, + "known_false_positives": True, + "references": True, + "tags": + { + "analytic_story": True, + "cis20" : True, + "nist": True, + "kill_chain_phases": True, + "mitre_attack_id": True, + "risk_severity": True, + "security_domain": True, + "required_fields": True + }, + "test": + { + "name": True, + "tests": { + '__all__': + { + "name": True, + "file": True, + "pass_condition": True, + "attack_data": { + '__all__': + { + "file_name": True, + "data": True, + "source": True + } + } + } + } + } + } + )) + + # Add Finding Report Object + with open(file_path, 'r') as file: + data = file.read().replace('--body--', body) + + f = open(file_path, "w") + f.write(data) + f.close() + + + def writeObjectNewContent(self, object: dict, type: SecurityContentType) -> None: + if type == SecurityContentType.detections: + file_path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), '../../../../detections', object['source'], self.convertNameToFileName(object['name'])) + test_obj = {} + test_obj['name'] = object['name'] + ' Unit Test' + test_obj['tests'] = [ + { + 'name': object['name'], + 'file': object['source'] + '/' + self.convertNameToFileName(object['name']), + 'pass_condition': '| stats count | where count > 0', + 'earliest_time': '-24h', + 'latest_time': 'now', + 'attack_data': [ + { + 'file_name': 'UPDATE', + 'data': 'UPDATE', + 'source': 'UPDATE', + 'sourcetype': 'UPDATE' + } + ] + } + ] + file_path_test = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), '../../../../tests', object['source'], self.convertNameToFileName(object['name'])) + YmlWriter.writeYmlFile(file_path_test, test_obj) + object.pop('source') + elif type == SecurityContentType.stories: + file_path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), '../../../../stories', self.convertNameToFileName(object['name'])) + + YmlWriter.writeYmlFile(file_path, object) + + + def convertNameToFileName(self, name: str): + file_name = name \ + .replace(' ', '_') \ + .replace('-','_') \ + .replace('.','_') \ + .replace('/','_') \ + .lower() + file_name = file_name + '.yml' + return file_name + + + def isComplexBARule(self, search): + return re.findall("stats|first_time_event|adaptive_threshold", search) + + diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/analyticstories_detections.j2 b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/analyticstories_detections.j2 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..088139df56 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/analyticstories_detections.j2 @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ + +### DETECTIONS ### + +{% for detection in objects %} +{% if (detection.type == 'TTP' or detection.type == 'Anomaly' or detection.type == 'Hunting' or detection.type == 'Correlation') %} +[savedsearch://ESCU - {{ detection.name }} - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = {{ detection.tags.asset_type }} +confidence = medium +explanation = {{ detection.description }} +{% if detection.how_to_implement is defined %} +how_to_implement = {{ detection.how_to_implement }} +{% else %} +how_to_implement = none +{% endif %} +annotations = {{ detection.mappings | tojson }} +known_false_positives = {{ detection.known_false_positives }} +providing_technologies = [] + +{% endif %} +{% endfor %} +### END DETECTIONS ### diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/analyticstories_investigations.j2 b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/analyticstories_investigations.j2 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f921b17120 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/analyticstories_investigations.j2 @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ + +### RESPONSE TASKS ### + +{% for detection in objects %} +{% if (detection.type == 'Investigation') %} +[savedsearch://ESCU - {{ detection.name }} - Response Task] +type = investigation +explanation = none +{% if detection.how_to_implement is defined %} +how_to_implement = {{ detection.how_to_implement }} +{% else %} +how_to_implement = none +{% endif %} +known_false_positives = not defined +earliest_time_offset = 14400 +latest_time_offset = 0 + +{% endif %} +{% endfor %} + +### END RESPONSE TASKS ### \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/analyticstories_stories.j2 b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/analyticstories_stories.j2 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b6543567e7 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/analyticstories_stories.j2 @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ + + +### STORIES ### + +{% for story in objects %} +[analytic_story://{{ story.name }}] +category = {{ story.tags.category[0] }} +last_updated = {{ story.date }} +version = {{ story.version }} +references = {{ story.references | tojson }} +maintainers = [{"company": "{{ story.author_company }}", "email": "-", "name": "{{ story.author_name }}"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = {{ (story.detection_names + story.investigation_names) | tojson }} +description = {{ story.description }} +{% if story.narrative is defined %} +narrative = {{ story.narrative }} +{% endif %} + +{% endfor %} +### END STORIES ### + diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/collections.j2 b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/collections.j2 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..62bc43152f --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/collections.j2 @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ + +{% for lookup in objects %} +[{{ lookup.name }}] +enforceTypes = false +replicate = false + +{% endfor %} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/jinja2_templates/detection_count.j2 b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/detection_count.j2 similarity index 92% rename from bin/jinja2_templates/detection_count.j2 rename to bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/detection_count.j2 index 993e7ce876..05c9d7ffac 100644 --- a/bin/jinja2_templates/detection_count.j2 +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/detection_count.j2 @@ -13,6 +13,6 @@ detections - {{ detection_count }} + {{ object.count }} diff --git a/bin/jinja2_templates/detection_coverage.j2 b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/detection_coverage.j2 similarity index 91% rename from bin/jinja2_templates/detection_coverage.j2 rename to bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/detection_coverage.j2 index 2c8362be37..d9dca89fca 100644 --- a/bin/jinja2_templates/detection_coverage.j2 +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/detection_coverage.j2 @@ -13,6 +13,6 @@ coverage - {{ detection_coverage }} + {{ object.coverage }} diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/doc_detection_page.j2 b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/doc_detection_page.j2 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6089a3c851 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/doc_detection_page.j2 @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +--- +title: "Detections" +layout: categories +author_profile: false +permalink: /detections/ +classes: wide +sidebar: + nav: "detections" +--- + +| Name | Technique | Type | +| -------------- | --------------- | --------------- | +{%- for detection in objects -%} +{% if detection.tags.mitre_attack_enrichments %} +| [{{ detection.name }}](/{{ detection.source }}/{{ detection.name | lower | replace(' ', '_') }}/) | {% for attack in detection.tags.mitre_attack_enrichments -%} [{{ attack.mitre_attack_technique }}](/tags/#{{ attack.mitre_attack_technique | lower | replace(" ", "-") }}){% if not loop.last -%}, {% endif -%}{%- endfor %} | {{ detection.type }} | +{%- else %} +| [{{ detection.name }}]() | None | {{ detection.type }} | +{%- endif -%} +{%- endfor -%} diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/doc_detections.j2 b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/doc_detections.j2 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ca37c470b4 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/doc_detections.j2 @@ -0,0 +1,153 @@ +--- +title: "{{object.name}}" +excerpt: "{% if object.tags.mitre_attack_enrichments %}{% for attack in object.tags.mitre_attack_enrichments -%} +{{ attack.mitre_attack_technique }} +{% if not loop.last -%}, {% endif -%} +{% endfor %}{% endif -%}" +categories: + - {{object.source|capitalize}} +last_modified_at: {{object.date}} +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: +{%- if object.tags.mitre_attack_enrichments %} +{%- for attack in object.tags.mitre_attack_enrichments %} + - {{ attack.mitre_attack_technique }} +{%- endfor -%} +{%- for attack in object.tags.mitre_attack_enrichments %} +{%- for tactic in attack.mitre_attack_tactics %} + - {{ tactic }} +{%- endfor -%} +{%- endfor -%} +{%- endif -%} +{%- for product in object.tags.product %} + - {{ product }} +{%- endfor -%} +{% if object.cve_enrichment -%} +{%- for cve in object.cve_enrichment %} + - {{ cve.id }} +{%- endfor -%} +{% endif -%} +{%- for datamodel in object.datamodel %} + - {{ datamodel }} +{%- endfor %} +--- + +{% if object.experimental is sameas true -%} +### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +{% endif %} + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +{{ object.description }} + +- **Type**: [{{ object.type }}](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: {{ object.tags.product|join(', ') }} +- **Datamodel**: {% for datamodel in object.datamodel %}[{{ datamodel }}](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/{{ datamodel|replace("_", "")}}){% if not loop.last %}, {% endif %}{%-endfor %} +- **Last Updated**: {{ object.date }} +- **Author**: {{object.author}} +- **ID**: {{ object.id }} + +{% if object.tags.mitre_attack_id %} +#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +{%- for attack in object.tags.mitre_attack_enrichments %} +{% if attack.mitre_attack_id -%} +{% set sub_technique = attack.mitre_attack_id.split('.') %}{% if sub_technique | length > 1 -%} +| [{{ attack.mitre_attack_id }}](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/{{sub_technique[0]}}/{{sub_technique[1]}}/) | {{ attack.mitre_attack_technique }} | {{ attack.mitre_attack_tactics|join(', ') }} | +{% else -%} +| [{{ attack.mitre_attack_id }}](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/{{attack.mitre_attack_id}}/) | {{ attack.mitre_attack_technique }} | {{ attack.mitre_attack_tactics|join(', ') }} | +{% endif -%} +{% endif -%} +{% endfor %} +{% endif -%} + +#### Search + +``` +{{ object.search|replace("|", "\n|")|safe }} +``` + +{% if object.macros -%} +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +{% for macro in object.macros -%} +{% if not '_filter' in macro.name -%} +* [{{ macro.name }}](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/{{macro.name}}.yml) +{% endif -%} +{% endfor %} +{% endif -%} + +Note that `{{object.name | lower | replace(" ", "_") }}_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +{% if object.lookups -%} +#### Lookups +The SPL above uses the following Lookups: + +{% for lookup in object.lookups -%} +* [{{lookup.name}}](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/{{lookup.name}}.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/lookups/{{lookup.name}}.csv) +{% endfor %} +{% endif -%} + +#### Required field +{% for field in object.tags.required_fields -%} +* {{ field }} +{% endfor %} + +#### How To Implement +{{ object.how_to_implement}} + +#### Known False Positives +{{ object.known_false_positives}} + +#### Associated Analytic story +{% for story in object.tags.analytic_story -%} +* [{{ story }}](/stories/{{story|lower|replace(" ", "_")}}) +{% endfor %} + +#### Kill Chain Phase +{% for phase in object.tags.kill_chain_phases -%} +* {{ phase }} +{% endfor %} + +{% if object.tags.observable %} +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| {{(object.tags.impact * object.tags.confidence)/100}} | {{ object.tags.impact }} | {{ object.tags.confidence }} | {{object.tags.message}} | +{% endif %} + +{% if object.cve_enrichment -%} +#### CVE + +| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | +| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | +{% for cve in object.cve_enrichment -%} +| [{{ cve.id }}](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/{{cve.id}}) | {{ cve.summary }} | {{ cve.cvss }} | +{% endfor %} +{% endif %} + +#### Reference +{% if object.references %} +{% for reference in object.references -%} +* [{{ reference }}]({{ reference }}) +{% endfor %} +{% endif %} + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + +{% if object.tags.dataset %} +{% for dataset in object.tags.dataset -%} +* [{{dataset}}]({{ dataset }}) +{% endfor %} +{% endif %} + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/{% if object.experimental is sameas true -%}experimental/{%- endif -%}{{object.source}}/{{ object.name | lower | replace (" ", "_") }}.yml) \| *version*: **{{object.version}}** diff --git a/bin/jinja2_templates/doc_navigation.j2 b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/doc_navigation.j2 similarity index 89% rename from bin/jinja2_templates/doc_navigation.j2 rename to bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/doc_navigation.j2 index 34cc094162..2890038f40 100644 --- a/bin/jinja2_templates/doc_navigation.j2 +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/doc_navigation.j2 @@ -12,13 +12,13 @@ main: detections: - title: "Tactic" children: - {%- for tactic in tactics %} + {%- for tactic in objects['attack_tactics'] %} - title: {{ tactic }} url: /detections/{{ tactic | lower | replace(" ", "_") }}/ {%- endfor %} - title: "Datamodel" children: - {%- for datamodel in datamodels %} + {%- for datamodel in objects['datamodels'] %} - title: {{ datamodel }} url: /detections/{{ datamodel | lower | replace(" ", "_") }}/ {%- endfor %} @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ detections: stories: - title: "Use Case" children: - {%- for category in categories %} + {%- for category in objects['categories'] %} - title: {{ category }} url: /stories/{{ category | lower | replace(" ", "_") }}/ {%- endfor %} diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/doc_navigation_pages.j2 b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/doc_navigation_pages.j2 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c352d3d43c --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/doc_navigation_pages.j2 @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +--- +title: {{ object['name'] }} +layout: tag +author_profile: false +taxonomy: {{ object['name'] }} +permalink: /detections/{{ object['name'] | lower | replace(' ', '_') }}/ +sidebar: + nav: "detections" +--- diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/doc_playbooks.j2 b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/doc_playbooks.j2 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5872761ffd --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/doc_playbooks.j2 @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +--- +title: "{{object.name}}" +last_modified_at: {{object.date}} +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - {{ object.type }} +{%- for product in object.tags.product %} + - {{ product }} +{%- endfor -%} +{%- for app in object.app_list %} + - {{ app }} +{%- endfor %} +{%- for tag in object.tags.platform_tags %} + - {{ tag }} +{%- endfor %} +--- + +[Try in Splunk SOAR](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/software/splunk-security-orchestration-and-automation.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +{{ object.description }} + +- **Type**: {{ object.type }} +- **Product**: {{ object.tags.product|join(', ') }} +- **Apps**: {% for app in object.app_list %}[{{ app }}](https://splunkbase.splunk.com/apps/#/search/{{ app }}/product/soar){% if not loop.last %}, {% endif %}{%-endfor %} +- **Last Updated**: {{ object.date }} +- **Author**: {{object.author}} +- **ID**: {{ object.id }} + +#### Associated Detections +{% if object.tags.detection_objects %} +{% for detection in object.tags.detection_objects -%} +* [{{ detection.name }}](/{{ detection.soure }}/{{detection.name|lower|replace(" ", "_")}}/) +{% endfor %} +{% endif %} + +#### How To Implement +{{ object.how_to_implement}} + +#### Playbooks +![](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/security_content/develop/playbooks/{{ object.playbook | lower | replace(" ", "_")}}.png) + +#### Required field +{% for field in object.tags.object_fields -%} +* {{ field }} +{% endfor %} + +#### Reference +{% if object.references %} +{% for reference in object.references -%} +* [{{ reference }}]({{ reference }}) +{% endfor %} +{% endif %} + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/playbooks/{{ object.name | lower | replace (" ", "_") }}.yml) \| *version*: **{{object.version}}** diff --git a/bin/jinja2_templates/doc_playbooks_page.j2 b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/doc_playbooks_page.j2 similarity index 56% rename from bin/jinja2_templates/doc_playbooks_page.j2 rename to bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/doc_playbooks_page.j2 index fd9d5ff140..b15521fc0f 100644 --- a/bin/jinja2_templates/doc_playbooks_page.j2 +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/doc_playbooks_page.j2 @@ -10,9 +10,9 @@ sidebar: | Name | Detections | Type | | --------| ---------- | ----------- | -{% for playbook in playbooks -%} -{% if playbook.tags.detections -%} -| [{{ playbook.name }}](/playbooks/{{ playbook.name|lower|replace(' ', '_') }}/)|{% for detection in playbook.tags.detections -%}{% for d in detections -%}{% if d.name == detection -%}[{{ detection }}](/{{ d.kind }}/{{detection|lower|replace(" ", "_")}}/){% endif -%}{%- endfor -%}{%- endfor -%} | {{ playbook.type }} | +{% for playbook in objects -%} +{% if playbook.tags.detection_objects -%} +| [{{ playbook.name }}](/playbooks/{{ playbook.name|lower|replace(' ', '_') }}/)|{% for detection in playbook.tags.detection_objects -%}[{{ detection.name }}](/{{ detection.source }}/{{detection.name|lower|replace(" ", "_")}}/){%- endfor -%} | {{ playbook.type }} | {% else -%} | [{{ playbook.name }}](/playbooks/{{ playbook.name|lower|replace(' ', '_') }}/)| None | {{ playbook.type }} | {% endif -%} diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/doc_stories.j2 b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/doc_stories.j2 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..443f0f7605 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/doc_stories.j2 @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +--- +title: "{{object.name}}" +last_modified_at: {{object.date}} +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: +{%- for product in object.tags.product %} + - {{ product }} +{%- endfor -%} +{%- for datamodel in object.tags.datamodels %} + - {{ datamodel }} +{%- endfor -%} +{%- for phase in object.tags.kill_chain_phases %} + - {{ phase }} +{%- endfor %} +--- + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +{{ object.description }} + +- **Product**: {{ object.tags.product|join(', ') }} +- **Datamodel**: {% for datamodel in object.tags.datamodels %}[{{ datamodel }}](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/{{ datamodel|replace("_", "")}}){% if not loop.last %}, {% endif %}{%-endfor %} +- **Last Updated**: {{ object.date }} +- **Author**: {{object.author}} +- **ID**: {{ object.id }} + +#### Narrative + +{{ object.narrative }} + +#### Detections + +| Name | Technique | Type | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------| +{%- if object.detections %} +{%- for detection in object.detections %} +| [{{ detection.name }}](/{{ detection.source }}/{{ detection.name | lower | replace(' ', '_') }}/) | {% if detection.tags.mitre_attack_enrichments %}{% for attack in detection.tags.mitre_attack_enrichments -%}[{{ attack.mitre_attack_technique }}](/tags/#{{ attack.mitre_attack_technique | lower | replace(" ", "-") }}){% if not loop.last %}, {% endif %}{%- endfor %}{% else %}None{%- endif -%} | {{ detection.type }} | +{%- endfor %} +{%- endif %} + +#### Reference +{% if object.references %} +{% for reference in object.references -%} +* [{{ reference }}]({{ reference }}) +{% endfor %} +{% endif %} + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/stories/{{ object.name | lower | replace (" ", "_") }}.yml) \| *version*: **{{object.version}}** diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/doc_story_page.j2 b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/doc_story_page.j2 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a290a6a0df --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/doc_story_page.j2 @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +--- +title: Analytic Stories +layout: collection +permalink: /stories/ +collection: stories +classes: wide +sidebar: + nav: "stories" +--- + +| Name | Technique | Tactic | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------| +{%- for story in objects -%} +{% if story.tags.mitre_attack_enrichments %} +| [{{ story.name }}]({{ story.name | lower | replace(" ", "_") }}) | {% for attack in story.tags.mitre_attack_enrichments -%} [{{ attack.mitre_attack_technique }}](/tags/#{{ attack.mitre_attack_technique | lower | replace(" ", "-") }}){% if not loop.last -%}, {% endif -%}{%- endfor %} | {% for tactic in story.tags.mitre_attack_tactics -%} [{{ tactic }}](/tags/#{{ tactic | lower | replace(" ", "-") }}){% if not loop.last -%}, {% endif -%}{%- endfor %} | +{%- else %} +| [{{ story.name }}]() | None | None | +{%- endif -%} +{%- endfor -%} diff --git a/bin/jinja2_templates/es_investigations.j2 b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/es_investigations_investigations.j2 similarity index 69% rename from bin/jinja2_templates/es_investigations.j2 rename to bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/es_investigations_investigations.j2 index 522b2b8ff3..883af41898 100644 --- a/bin/jinja2_templates/es_investigations.j2 +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/es_investigations_investigations.j2 @@ -1,20 +1,5 @@ -{% for story in stories %} -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_{{ story.lowercase_name}}] -label = {{ story.name }} -description = {{ story.description }} -disabled = 0 - -{% if story.workbench_panels is defined %} -panels = {{ story.workbench_panels | tojson }} -{% else %} -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] -{% endif %} - -{% endfor %} - - -{% for response_task in response_tasks %} +{% for response_task in objects %} [panel://workbench_panel_{{ response_task.lowercase_name }}___response_task] label = {{ response_task.name }} description = {{ response_task.description }} diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/es_investigations_stories.j2 b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/es_investigations_stories.j2 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..da0268a0c6 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/es_investigations_stories.j2 @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ + +{% for story in objects %} +[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_{{ story.lowercase_name}}] +label = {{ story.name }} +description = {{ story.description }} +disabled = 0 + +{% if story.workbench_panels is defined %} +panels = {{ story.workbench_panels | tojson }} +{% else %} +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] +{% endif %} + +{% endfor %} diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/finding_report.j2 b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/finding_report.j2 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..92e6468222 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/finding_report.j2 @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +create_map("category_id", 101, "class_id", 101000, "detection_start_time", start_time, + "detection_end_time", end_time, "device_entities", [create_map("uid", ucast(map_get(input_event, "enrichments.device_entities.device.uid"), "string", null), "type_id", 0)], + "disposition_id", 1, "end_time", end_time, "event_id", 10100001, "event_time", timestamp, + "finding", create_map("confidence", {{ detection.tags.confidence }}, "confidence_id", {{ detection.tags.confidence_id }}, + "context_ids", {{ detection.tags.context_ids }}, "impact", {{ detection.tags.impact }}, "impact_id", {{ detection.tags.impact_id }}, + "kill_chain_phase", {{ detection.tags.kill_chain_phases[0] }}, "kill_chain_phase_id", {{ detection.tags.kill_chain_phases_id[0] }}, + "risk_level", {{ detection.tags.risk_level }}, "risk_level_id", {{ detection.tags.risk_level_id }}, "type_id", 1, "ref_event_uid", event_id), + "message", {{ detection.tags.message }}, "metadata", create_map("log_name", {{ detection.datamodel[0] }}, "version", + "1.0.0"), "observables", {{ detection.tags.observables_str }}, "origin", create_map("product", create_map("name", "Splunk Behavioral Analytics")), + "rule", create_map("name", "{{ detection.name }}", "uid", "{{ detection.id }}", "version", "1"), "start_time", start_time, "time", start_time, + "user_entities", [create_map("uid", ucast(map_get(input_event, "enrichments.user_entities.user.uid"),"string", null))]) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/header.j2 b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/header.j2 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..308455116f --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/header.j2 @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: {{ time }} UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# + diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/macros.j2 b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/macros.j2 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a9fb11cf35 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/macros.j2 @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ + +{% for macro in objects %} +[{{ macro.name }}{% if macro.arguments is not none %}({{ macro.arguments|length }}){% endif %}] +{% if macro.arguments is not none %} +args = {% for arg in macro.arguments %}{{ arg }}{{ ", " if not loop.last }} +{% endfor %} +{% endif %} +{% if macro.definition is not none %} +definition = {{ macro.definition }} +{% else %} +definition = +{% endif %} +description = {{ macro.description }} + +{% endfor %} diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/macros_detections.j2 b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/macros_detections.j2 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..dbfd54c526 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/macros_detections.j2 @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ + +{% for detection in objects %} +[{{ detection.name | replace(' ', '_') | replace('-', '_') | replace('.', '_') | replace('/', '_') | lower + '_filter' }}] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +{% endfor %} diff --git a/bin/jinja2_templates/panel.j2 b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/panel.j2 similarity index 81% rename from bin/jinja2_templates/panel.j2 rename to bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/panel.j2 index 45be63462f..2f46685448 100644 --- a/bin/jinja2_templates/panel.j2 +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/panel.j2 @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +{% for search in objects %} @@ -7,3 +8,4 @@
+{% endfor %} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/savedsearches_baselines.j2 b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/savedsearches_baselines.j2 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..aa7d1a408b --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/savedsearches_baselines.j2 @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ + + +### ESCU BASELINES ### + +{% for detection in objects %} +{% if (detection.type == 'Baseline') %} +[ESCU - {{ detection.name }}] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +action.escu.search_type = support +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - {{ detection.name }} +description = {{ detection.description }} +action.escu.creation_date = {{ detection.date }} +action.escu.modification_date = {{ detection.date }} +{% if detection.tags.analytic_story is defined %} +action.escu.analytic_story = {{ detection.tags.analytic_story | tojson }} +{% else %} +action.escu.analytic_story = [] +{% endif %} +action.escu.data_models = {{ detection.datamodel | tojson }} +cron_schedule = {{ detection.deployment.scheduling.cron_schedule }} +enableSched = 1 +dispatch.earliest_time = {{ detection.deployment.scheduling.earliest_time }} +dispatch.latest_time = {{ detection.deployment.scheduling.latest_time }} +{% if detection.deployment.scheduling.schedule_window is defined %} +schedule_window = {{ detection.deployment.scheduling.schedule_window }} +{% endif %} +{% if detection.providing_technologies is defined %} +action.escu.providing_technologies = {{ detection.providing_technologies | tojson }} +{% else %} +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +{% endif %} +action.escu.eli5 = {{ detection.description }} +{% if detection.how_to_implement is defined %} +action.escu.how_to_implement = {{ detection.how_to_implement }} +{% else %} +action.escu.how_to_implement = none +{% endif %} +{% if detection.disabled is defined %} +disabled = false +{% else %} +disabled = true +{% endif %} +is_visible = false +search = {{ detection.search }} + +{% endif %} +{% endfor %} + diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/savedsearches_detections.j2 b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/savedsearches_detections.j2 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7e9d478a2c --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/savedsearches_detections.j2 @@ -0,0 +1,112 @@ +### ESCU DETECTIONS ### + +{% for detection in objects %} +{% if (detection.type == 'TTP' or detection.type == 'Anomaly' or detection.type == 'Hunting' or detection.type == 'Correlation') %} +[ESCU - {{ detection.name }} - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +{% if detection.deprecated %} +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. {{ detection.description }} +{% else %} +description = {{ detection.description }} +{% endif %} +action.escu.mappings = {{ detection.mappings | tojson }} +action.escu.data_models = {{ detection.datamodel | tojson }} +action.escu.eli5 = {{ detection.description }} +{% if detection.how_to_implement is defined %} +action.escu.how_to_implement = {{ detection.how_to_implement }} +{% else %} +action.escu.how_to_implement = none +{% endif %} +{% if detection.known_false_positives is defined %} +action.escu.known_false_positives = {{ detection.known_false_positives }} +{% else %} +action.escu.known_false_positives = None +{% endif %} +action.escu.creation_date = {{ detection.date }} +action.escu.modification_date = {{ detection.date }} +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - {{ detection.name }} - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +{% if detection.tags.product is defined %} +action.escu.product = {{ detection.tags.product | tojson }} +{% endif %} +{% if detection.providing_technologies is defined %} +action.escu.providing_technologies = {{ detection.providing_technologies | tojson }} +{% else %} +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +{% endif %} +{% if detection.tags.analytic_story is defined %} +action.escu.analytic_story = {{ detection.tags.analytic_story | tojson }} +{% if detection.tags.risk_score is defined %} +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = {{ detection.tags.message }} +action.risk.param._risk = {{ detection.risk | tojson }} +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +{% endif %} +{% else %} +action.escu.analytic_story = [] +{% endif %} +cron_schedule = {{ detection.deployment.scheduling.cron_schedule }} +dispatch.earliest_time = {{ detection.deployment.scheduling.earliest_time }} +dispatch.latest_time = {{ detection.deployment.scheduling.latest_time }} +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +{% if detection.deprecated %} +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - {{ detection.name }} - Rule +{% else %} +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - {{ detection.name }} - Rule +{% endif %} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {{ detection.annotations | tojson }} +{% if detection.deployment.scheduling.schedule_window is defined %} +schedule_window = {{ detection.deployment.scheduling.schedule_window }} +{% endif %} +{% if detection.deployment is defined %} +{% if detection.deployment.notable.rule_title is defined %} +action.notable = 1 +{% if detection.deployment.notable.nes_fields is defined %} +action.notable.param.nes_fields = {{ detection.deployment.notable.nes_fields }} +{% endif %} +action.notable.param.rule_description = {{ detection.deployment.notable.rule_description | custom_jinja2_enrichment_filter(detection) }} +action.notable.param.rule_title = {{ detection.deployment.notable.rule_title | custom_jinja2_enrichment_filter(detection) }} +action.notable.param.security_domain = {{ detection.tags.security_domain }} +action.notable.param.severity = high +{% endif %} +{% if detection.deployment.email.to is defined %} +action.email.subject.alert = {{ detection.deployment.email.subject | custom_jinja2_enrichment_filter(detection) }} +action.email.to = {{ detection.deployment.email.to }} +action.email.message.alert = {{ detection.deployment.email.message | custom_jinja2_enrichment_filter(detection) }} +action.email.useNSSubject = 1 +{% endif %} +{% if detection.deployment.slack.channel is defined %} +action.slack = 1 +action.slack.param.channel = {{ detection.deployment.slack.channel | custom_jinja2_enrichment_filter(detection) }} +action.slack.param.message = {{ detection.deployment.slack.message | custom_jinja2_enrichment_filter(detection) }} +{% endif %} +{% if detection.deployment.phantom.phantom_server is defined %} +action.sendtophantom = 1 +action.sendtophantom.param._cam_workers = {{ detection.deployment.phantom.cam_workers | custom_jinja2_enrichment_filter(detection) }} +action.sendtophantom.param.label = {{ detection.deployment.phantom.label | custom_jinja2_enrichment_filter(detection) }} +action.sendtophantom.param.phantom_server = {{ detection.deployment.phantom.phantom_server | custom_jinja2_enrichment_filter(detection) }} +action.sendtophantom.param.sensitivity = {{ detection.deployment.phantom.sensitivity | custom_jinja2_enrichment_filter(detection) }} +action.sendtophantom.param.severity = {{ detection.deployment.phantom.severity | custom_jinja2_enrichment_filter(detection) }} +{% endif %} +{% endif %} +alert.digest_mode = 1 +{% if detection.disabled is defined %} +disabled = false +{% else %} +disabled = true +{% endif %} +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = {{ detection.search }} + +{% endif %} +{% endfor %} +### END ESCU DETECTIONS ### diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/savedsearches_investigations.j2 b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/savedsearches_investigations.j2 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5b674e6b79 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/savedsearches_investigations.j2 @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ + + +### ESCU RESPONSE TASKS ### + +{% for detection in objects %} +{% if (detection.type == 'Investigation') %} +{% if detection.search is defined %} +[ESCU - {{ detection.name }} - Response Task] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +action.escu.search_type = investigative +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - {{ detection.name }} - Response Task +description = {{ detection.description }} +action.escu.creation_date = {{ detection.date }} +action.escu.modification_date = {{ detection.date }} +{% if detection.tags.analytic_story is defined %} +action.escu.analytic_story = {{ detection.tags.analytic_story | tojson }} +{% else %} +action.escu.analytic_story = [] +{% endif %} +action.escu.earliest_time_offset = 3600 +action.escu.latest_time_offset = 86400 +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.data_models = {{ detection.datamodel | tojson }} +action.escu.eli5 = {{ detection.description }} +action.escu.how_to_implement = none +action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time +disabled = true +schedule_window = auto +is_visible = false +search = {{ detection.search }} + +{% endif %} +{% endif %} +{% endfor %} + + +### END ESCU RESPONSE TASKS ### \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/jinja2_templates/transforms.j2 b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/transforms.j2 similarity index 83% rename from bin/jinja2_templates/transforms.j2 rename to bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/transforms.j2 index c14ffd9a93..576fa8d198 100644 --- a/bin/jinja2_templates/transforms.j2 +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/transforms.j2 @@ -1,11 +1,5 @@ -############# -# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content -# On Date: {{ time }} UTC -# Author: Splunk Security Research -# Contact: research@splunk.com -############# -{% for lookup in lookups %} +{% for lookup in objects %} [{{ lookup.name }}] {% if lookup.filename is defined %} filename = {{ lookup.filename }} diff --git a/bin/jinja2_templates/workflow_actions.j2 b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/workflow_actions.j2 similarity index 95% rename from bin/jinja2_templates/workflow_actions.j2 rename to bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/workflow_actions.j2 index 599fa344a7..b3b0378219 100644 --- a/bin/jinja2_templates/workflow_actions.j2 +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/workflow_actions.j2 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ -{% for response_task in response_tasks %} +{% for response_task in objects %} {% if response_task.inputs|length == 1 %} [workbench_panel_{{ response_task.lowercase_name }}___response_task] label = Workbench - {{ response_task.name }} diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/yml_writer.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/yml_writer.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ca2e329201 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/yml_writer.py @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ + +import yaml + + +class YmlWriter: + + @staticmethod + def writeYmlFile(file_path : str, obj : dict) -> None: + + with open(file_path, 'w') as outfile: + yaml.dump(obj, outfile, default_flow_style=False, sort_keys=False) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/builder/attack_enrichment.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/builder/attack_enrichment.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..11cacb5bc7 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/builder/attack_enrichment.py @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ + +from attackcti import attack_client + +import logging +logging.getLogger('taxii2client').setLevel(logging.CRITICAL) + + +class AttackEnrichment(): + + @classmethod + def get_attack_lookup(self) -> dict: + attack_lookup = dict() + + try: + lift = attack_client() + all_enterprise = lift.get_enterprise(stix_format=False) + enterprise_relationships = lift.get_enterprise_relationships() + enterprise_groups = lift.get_enterprise_groups() + + for technique in all_enterprise['techniques']: + apt_groups = [] + for relationship in enterprise_relationships: + if (relationship['target_ref'] == technique['id']) and relationship['source_ref'].startswith('intrusion-set'): + for group in enterprise_groups: + if relationship['source_ref'] == group['id']: + apt_groups.append(group['name']) + + tactics = [] + if ('tactic' in technique): + for tactic in technique['tactic']: + tactics.append(tactic.replace('-',' ').title()) + + if not ('revoked' in technique): + attack_lookup[technique['technique_id']] = {'technique': technique['technique'], 'tactics': tactics, 'groups': apt_groups} + + except Exception as err: + print('Warning: ' + str(err)) + + + return attack_lookup \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/builder/cve_enrichment.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/builder/cve_enrichment.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..579ab37d72 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/builder/cve_enrichment.py @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ + +from pycvesearch import CVESearch + +CVESSEARCH_API_URL = 'https://cve.circl.lu' + + +class CveEnrichment(): + + @classmethod + def enrich_cve(self, cve_id: str) -> dict: + cve = CVESearch(CVESSEARCH_API_URL) + result = cve.id(cve_id) + cve_enriched = dict() + cve_enriched['id'] = cve_id + cve_enriched['cvss'] = result['cvss'] + cve_enriched['summary'] = result['summary'] + return cve_enriched \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/builder/security_content_baseline_builder.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/builder/security_content_baseline_builder.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8dc85d55fb --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/builder/security_content_baseline_builder.py @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +import sys + +from pydantic import ValidationError + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.builder.baseline_builder import BaselineBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.yml_reader import YmlReader +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.baseline import Baseline +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.enums.enums import SecurityContentType +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.enums.enums import SecurityContentProduct + + +class SecurityContentBaselineBuilder(BaselineBuilder): + baseline : Baseline + + def setObject(self, path: str) -> None: + yml_dict = YmlReader.load_file(path) + yml_dict["tags"]["name"] = yml_dict["name"] + try: + self.baseline = Baseline.parse_obj(yml_dict) + except ValidationError as e: + print('Validation Error for file ' + path) + print(e) + sys.exit(1) + + def addDeployment(self, deployments: list) -> None: + matched_deployments = [] + + for d in deployments: + d_tags = dict(d.tags) + for d_tag in d_tags.keys(): + for attr in dir(self.baseline): + if not (attr.startswith('__') or attr.startswith('_')): + if attr == d_tag: + if type(self.baseline.__getattribute__(attr)) is str: + attr_values = [self.baseline.__getattribute__(attr)] + else: + attr_values = self.baseline.__getattribute__(attr) + + for attr_value in attr_values: + if attr_value == d_tags[d_tag]: + matched_deployments.append(d) + + if len(matched_deployments) == 0: + raise ValueError('No deployment found for baseline: ' + self.baseline.name) + + self.baseline.deployment = matched_deployments[-1] + + + def reset(self) -> None: + self.baseline = None + + + def getObject(self) -> Baseline: + return self.baseline \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/builder/security_content_basic_builder.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/builder/security_content_basic_builder.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..66e45905d8 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/builder/security_content_basic_builder.py @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +import sys + +from pydantic import ValidationError + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.builder.basic_builder import BasicBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.security_content_object import SecurityContentObject +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.yml_reader import YmlReader +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.enums.enums import SecurityContentType +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.deployment import Deployment +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.macro import Macro +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.lookup import Lookup +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.playbook import Playbook +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.unit_test import UnitTest + + +class SecurityContentBasicBuilder(BasicBuilder): + security_content_obj : SecurityContentObject + + + def setObject(self, path: str, type: SecurityContentType) -> None: + yml_dict = YmlReader.load_file(path) + if type == SecurityContentType.deployments: + if "alert_action" in yml_dict: + alert_action_dict = yml_dict["alert_action"] + for key in alert_action_dict.keys(): + yml_dict[key] = yml_dict["alert_action"][key] + try: + self.security_content_obj = Deployment.parse_obj(yml_dict) + except ValidationError as e: + print('Validation Error for file ' + path) + print(e) + sys.exit(1) + elif type == SecurityContentType.macros: + try: + self.security_content_obj = Macro.parse_obj(yml_dict) + except ValidationError as e: + print('Validation Error for file ' + path) + print(e) + sys.exit(1) + elif type == SecurityContentType.lookups: + try: + self.security_content_obj = Lookup.parse_obj(yml_dict) + except ValidationError as e: + print('Validation Error for file ' + path) + print(e) + sys.exit(1) + elif type == SecurityContentType.unit_tests: + try: + self.security_content_obj = UnitTest.parse_obj(yml_dict) + except ValidationError as e: + print('Validation Error for file ' + path) + print(e) + sys.exit(1) + + def reset(self) -> None: + self.security_content_obj = None + + def getObject(self) -> SecurityContentObject: + return self.security_content_obj \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/builder/security_content_detection_builder.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/builder/security_content_detection_builder.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c512e3e779 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/builder/security_content_detection_builder.py @@ -0,0 +1,226 @@ +import sys +import re +import os + +from pydantic import ValidationError + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.builder.detection_builder import DetectionBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.yml_reader import YmlReader +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.detection import Detection +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.security_content_object import SecurityContentObject +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.macro import Macro +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.mitre_attack_enrichment import MitreAttackEnrichment +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.cve_enrichment import CveEnrichment + + +class SecurityContentDetectionBuilder(DetectionBuilder): + security_content_obj : SecurityContentObject + + + def setObject(self, path: str) -> None: + yml_dict = YmlReader.load_file(path) + yml_dict["tags"]["name"] = yml_dict["name"] + try: + self.security_content_obj = Detection.parse_obj(yml_dict) + except ValidationError as e: + print('Validation Error for file ' + path) + print(e) + sys.exit(1) + + self.security_content_obj.source = os.path.split(os.path.dirname(self.security_content_obj.file_path))[-1] + + + def addDeployment(self, deployments: list) -> None: + matched_deployments = [] + + for d in deployments: + d_tags = dict(d.tags) + for d_tag in d_tags.keys(): + for attr in dir(self.security_content_obj): + if not (attr.startswith('__') or attr.startswith('_')): + if attr == d_tag: + if type(self.security_content_obj.__getattribute__(attr)) is str: + attr_values = [self.security_content_obj.__getattribute__(attr)] + else: + attr_values = self.security_content_obj.__getattribute__(attr) + + for attr_value in attr_values: + if attr_value == d_tags[d_tag]: + matched_deployments.append(d) + + if len(matched_deployments) == 0: + self.security_content_obj.deployment = None + else: + self.security_content_obj.deployment = matched_deployments[-1] + + + def addRBA(self) -> None: + + risk_objects = [] + risk_object_user_types = {'user', 'username', 'email address'} + risk_object_system_types = {'device', 'endpoint', 'hostname', 'ip address'} + + if hasattr(self.security_content_obj.tags, 'observable') and hasattr(self.security_content_obj.tags, 'risk_score'): + for entity in self.security_content_obj.tags.observable: + risk_object = dict() + if entity['type'].lower() in risk_object_user_types: + for r in entity['role']: + if 'attacker' == r.lower() or 'victim' ==r.lower(): + risk_object['risk_object_type'] = 'user' + risk_object['risk_object_field'] = entity['name'] + risk_object['risk_score'] = self.security_content_obj.tags.risk_score + risk_objects.append(risk_object) + + elif entity['type'].lower() in risk_object_system_types: + for r in entity['role']: + if 'attacker' == r.lower() or 'victim' ==r.lower(): + risk_object['risk_object_type'] = 'system' + risk_object['risk_object_field'] = entity['name'] + risk_object['risk_score'] = self.security_content_obj.tags.risk_score + risk_objects.append(risk_object) + else: + risk_object['threat_object_field'] = entity['name'] + risk_object['threat_object_type'] = entity['type'].lower() + risk_objects.append(risk_object) + continue + + if self.security_content_obj.tags.risk_score >= 80: + self.security_content_obj.tags.risk_severity = 'high' + elif (self.security_content_obj.tags.risk_score >= 50 and self.security_content_obj.tags.risk_score <= 79): + self.security_content_obj.tags.risk_severity = 'medium' + else: + self.security_content_obj.tags.risk_severity = 'low' + + self.security_content_obj.risk = risk_objects + + + def addNesFields(self) -> None: + nes_fields_matches = [] + if self.security_content_obj.deployment: + if self.security_content_obj.deployment.notable: + for nes_field in self.security_content_obj.deployment.notable.nes_fields: + if (self.security_content_obj.search.find(nes_field + ' ') != -1): + nes_fields_matches.append(nes_field) + + self.security_content_obj.deployment.notable.nes_fields = nes_fields_matches + + + def addMappings(self) -> None: + keys = ['mitre_attack', 'kill_chain_phases', 'cis20', 'nist'] + mappings = {} + for key in keys: + if key == 'mitre_attack': + if getattr(self.security_content_obj.tags, 'mitre_attack_id'): + mappings[key] = getattr(self.security_content_obj.tags, 'mitre_attack_id') + elif getattr(self.security_content_obj.tags, key): + mappings[key] = getattr(self.security_content_obj.tags, key) + self.security_content_obj.mappings = mappings + + + def addAnnotations(self) -> None: + annotations = {} + annotation_keys = ['mitre_attack', 'kill_chain_phases', 'cis20', 'nist', + 'analytic_story', 'observable', 'context', 'impact', 'confidence', 'cve'] + for key in annotation_keys: + if key == 'mitre_attack': + if getattr(self.security_content_obj.tags, 'mitre_attack_id'): + annotations[key] = getattr(self.security_content_obj.tags, 'mitre_attack_id') + try: + if getattr(self.security_content_obj.tags, key): + annotations[key] = getattr(self.security_content_obj.tags, key) + except AttributeError as e: + continue + self.security_content_obj.annotations = annotations + + + def addPlaybook(self, playbooks: list) -> None: + matched_playbooks = [] + for playbook in playbooks: + if playbook.tags.detections: + for detection in playbook.tags.detections: + if detection == self.security_content_obj.name: + matched_playbooks.append(playbook) + + self.security_content_obj.playbooks = matched_playbooks + + + def addBaseline(self, baselines: list) -> None: + matched_baselines = [] + for baseline in baselines: + for detection in baseline.tags.detections: + if detection == self.security_content_obj.name: + matched_baselines.append(baseline) + + self.security_content_obj.baselines = matched_baselines + + + def addUnitTest(self, tests: list) -> None: + for test in tests: + if test.tests[0].name == self.security_content_obj.name: + self.security_content_obj.test = test + return + + + def addMitreAttackEnrichment(self, attack_enrichment: dict) -> None: + if attack_enrichment: + if self.security_content_obj.tags.mitre_attack_id: + self.security_content_obj.tags.mitre_attack_enrichments = [] + for mitre_attack_id in self.security_content_obj.tags.mitre_attack_id: + if mitre_attack_id in attack_enrichment: + mitre_attack_enrichment = MitreAttackEnrichment( + mitre_attack_id = mitre_attack_id, + mitre_attack_technique = attack_enrichment[mitre_attack_id]["technique"], + mitre_attack_tactics = sorted(attack_enrichment[mitre_attack_id]["tactics"]), + mitre_attack_groups = sorted(attack_enrichment[mitre_attack_id]["groups"]) + ) + self.security_content_obj.tags.mitre_attack_enrichments.append(mitre_attack_enrichment) + else: + raise ValueError("mitre_attack_id " + mitre_attack_id + " doesn't exist for detecction " + self.security_content_obj.name) + + + def addMacros(self, macros: list) -> None: + macros_found = re.findall(r'`([^\s]+)`', self.security_content_obj.search) + macros_filtered = set() + self.security_content_obj.macros = [] + + for macro in macros_found: + if not '_filter' in macro and not 'drop_dm_object_name' in macro: + start = macro.find('(') + if start != -1: + macros_filtered.add(macro[:start]) + else: + macros_filtered.add(macro) + + for macro_name in macros_filtered: + for macro in macros: + if macro_name == macro.name: + self.security_content_obj.macros.append(macro) + + name = self.security_content_obj.name.replace(' ', '_').replace('-', '_').replace('.', '_').replace('/', '_').lower() + '_filter' + macro = Macro(name=name, definition='search *', description='Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.') + + self.security_content_obj.macros.append(macro) + + + def addLookups(self, lookups: list) -> None: + lookups_found = re.findall(r'lookup (?:update=true)?(?:append=t)?\s*([^\s]*)', self.security_content_obj.search) + self.security_content_obj.lookups = [] + for lookup_name in lookups_found: + for lookup in lookups: + if lookup.name == lookup_name: + self.security_content_obj.lookups.append(lookup) + + + def addCve(self) -> None: + self.security_content_obj.cve_enrichment = [] + for cve in self.security_content_obj.tags.cve: + self.security_content_obj.cve_enrichment.append(CveEnrichment.enrich_cve(cve)) + + + def reset(self) -> None: + self.security_content_obj = None + + + def getObject(self) -> SecurityContentObject: + return self.security_content_obj + diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/builder/security_content_director.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/builder/security_content_director.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3b74a231fe --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/builder/security_content_director.py @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +import os + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.builder.director import Director +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.builder.basic_builder import BasicBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.builder.detection_builder import DetectionBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.builder.story_builder import StoryBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.builder.investigation_builder import InvestigationBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.builder.baseline_builder import BaselineBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.builder.playbook_builder import PlaybookBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.enums.enums import SecurityContentType +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.enums.enums import SecurityContentProduct + +class SecurityContentDirector(Director): + + def constructDetection(self, builder: DetectionBuilder, path: str, deployments: list, playbooks: list, baselines: list, tests: list, attack_enrichment: dict, macros: list, lookups: list) -> None: + builder.reset() + builder.setObject(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), path)) + builder.addDeployment(deployments) + builder.addRBA() + builder.addNesFields() + builder.addAnnotations() + builder.addMappings() + builder.addBaseline(baselines) + builder.addPlaybook(playbooks) + builder.addUnitTest(tests) + builder.addMitreAttackEnrichment(attack_enrichment) + builder.addMacros(macros) + builder.addLookups(lookups) + + + def constructStory(self, builder: StoryBuilder, path: str, detections: list, baselines: list, investigations: list) -> None: + builder.reset() + builder.setObject(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), path)) + builder.addDetections(detections) + builder.addInvestigations(investigations) + builder.addBaselines(baselines) + builder.addAuthorCompanyName() + + + def constructBaseline(self, builder: BaselineBuilder, path: str, deployments: list) -> None: + builder.reset() + builder.setObject(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), path)) + builder.addDeployment(deployments) + + + def constructDeployment(self, builder: BasicBuilder, path: str) -> None: + builder.reset() + builder.setObject(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), path), SecurityContentType.deployments) + + + def constructLookup(self, builder: BasicBuilder, path: str) -> None: + builder.reset() + builder.setObject(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), path), SecurityContentType.lookups) + + + def constructMacro(self, builder: BasicBuilder, path: str) -> None: + builder.reset() + builder.setObject(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), path), SecurityContentType.macros) + + + def constructPlaybook(self, builder: PlaybookBuilder, path: str, detections: list) -> None: + builder.reset() + builder.setObject(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), path)) + builder.addDetections(detections) + + + def constructTest(self, builder: BasicBuilder, path: str) -> None: + builder.reset() + builder.setObject(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), path), SecurityContentType.unit_tests) + + + def constructInvestigation(self, builder: InvestigationBuilder, path: str) -> None: + builder.reset() + builder.setObject(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), path)) + builder.addInputs() + builder.addLowercaseName() + + def constructObjects(self, builder: BasicBuilder, path: str) -> None: + builder.reset() + builder.setObject(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), path)) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/builder/security_content_investigation_builder.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/builder/security_content_investigation_builder.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a9d5869d6b --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/builder/security_content_investigation_builder.py @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +import re +import sys + +from pydantic import ValidationError + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.builder.investigation_builder import InvestigationBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.investigation import Investigation +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.yml_reader import YmlReader +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.enums.enums import SecurityContentType + + +class SecurityContentInvestigationBuilder(InvestigationBuilder): + investigation: Investigation + + + def setObject(self, path: str) -> None: + yml_dict = YmlReader.load_file(path) + try: + self.investigation = Investigation.parse_obj(yml_dict) + except ValidationError as e: + print('Validation Error for file ' + path) + print(e) + sys.exit(1) + + def reset(self) -> None: + self.investigation = None + + + def getObject(self) -> Investigation: + return self.investigation + + + def addInputs(self) -> None: + pattern = r"\$([^\s.]*)\$" + inputs = [] + + for input in re.findall(pattern, self.investigation.search): + inputs.append(input) + + self.investigation.inputs = inputs + + + def addLowercaseName(self) -> None: + self.investigation.lowercase_name = self.investigation.name.replace(' ', '_').replace('-','_').replace('.','_').replace('/','_').lower().replace(' ', '_').replace('-','_').replace('.','_').replace('/','_').lower() \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/builder/security_content_object_builder.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/builder/security_content_object_builder.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..65530db6f0 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/builder/security_content_object_builder.py @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ + + + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.builder.basic_builder import BasicBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.yml_reader import YmlReader +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.enums.enums import SecurityContentType + + +class SecurityContentObjectBuilder(BasicBuilder): + object: dict + + def setObject(self, path: str) -> None: + yml_dict = YmlReader.load_file(path) + yml_dict['file_path'] = path + self.object = yml_dict + + def reset(self) -> None: + self.object = None + + def getObject(self) -> dict: + return self.object \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/builder/security_content_playbook_builder.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/builder/security_content_playbook_builder.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a827d1c19e --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/builder/security_content_playbook_builder.py @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ + +import sys + +from pydantic import ValidationError + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.builder.playbook_builder import PlaybookBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.playbook import Playbook +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.yml_reader import YmlReader + + +class SecurityContentPlaybookBuilder(PlaybookBuilder): + playbook: Playbook + + + def setObject(self, path: str) -> None: + yml_dict = YmlReader.load_file(path) + try: + self.playbook = Playbook.parse_obj(yml_dict) + except ValidationError as e: + print('Validation Error for file ' + path) + print(e) + sys.exit(1) + + + def addDetections(self, detections : list) -> None: + if detections: + if self.playbook.tags.detections: + self.playbook.tags.detection_objects = [] + for detection in detections: + if detection.name in self.playbook.tags.detections: + self.playbook.tags.detection_objects.append(detection) + + + def reset(self) -> None: + self.playbook = None + + + def getObject(self) -> Playbook: + return self.playbook \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/builder/security_content_story_builder.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/builder/security_content_story_builder.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ea9adc4375 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/builder/security_content_story_builder.py @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +import re +import sys + +from pydantic import ValidationError + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.builder.story_builder import StoryBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.story import Story +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.enums.enums import SecurityContentType +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.yml_reader import YmlReader + + +class SecurityContentStoryBuilder(StoryBuilder): + story: Story + + def setObject(self, path: str) -> None: + yml_dict = YmlReader.load_file(path) + yml_dict["tags"]["name"] = yml_dict["name"] + try: + self.story = Story.parse_obj(yml_dict) + except ValidationError as e: + print('Validation Error for file ' + path) + print(e) + sys.exit(1) + + def reset(self) -> None: + self.story = None + + def getObject(self) -> Story: + return self.story + + def addDetections(self, detections: list) -> None: + matched_detection_names = [] + matched_detections = [] + mitre_attack_enrichments = [] + mitre_attack_tactics = set() + datamodels = set() + kill_chain_phases = set() + + for detection in detections: + for detection_analytic_story in detection.tags.analytic_story: + if detection_analytic_story == self.story.name: + matched_detection_names.append(str('ESCU - ' + detection.name + ' - Rule')) + matched_detections.append(detection) + datamodels.update(detection.datamodel) + if detection.tags.kill_chain_phases: + kill_chain_phases.update(detection.tags.kill_chain_phases) + + if detection.tags.mitre_attack_enrichments: + for attack_enrichment in detection.tags.mitre_attack_enrichments: + mitre_attack_tactics.update(attack_enrichment.mitre_attack_tactics) + if attack_enrichment.mitre_attack_id not in [attack.mitre_attack_id for attack in mitre_attack_enrichments]: + mitre_attack_enrichments.append(attack_enrichment) + + self.story.detection_names = matched_detection_names + self.story.detections = matched_detections + self.story.tags.datamodels = sorted(list(datamodels)) + self.story.tags.kill_chain_phases = sorted(list(kill_chain_phases)) + self.story.tags.mitre_attack_enrichments = mitre_attack_enrichments + self.story.tags.mitre_attack_tactics = sorted(list(mitre_attack_tactics)) + + + def addBaselines(self, baselines: list) -> None: + matched_baseline_names = [] + for baseline in baselines: + for baseline_analytic_story in baseline.tags.analytic_story: + if baseline_analytic_story == self.story.name: + matched_baseline_names.append(str('ESCU - ' + baseline.name)) + + self.story.baseline_names = matched_baseline_names + + def addInvestigations(self, investigations: list) -> None: + matched_investigation_names = [] + matched_investigations = [] + for investigation in investigations: + for investigation_analytic_story in investigation.tags.analytic_story: + if investigation_analytic_story == self.story.name: + matched_investigation_names.append(str('ESCU - ' + investigation.name + ' - Response Task')) + matched_investigations.append(investigation) + + self.story.investigation_names = matched_investigation_names + self.story.investigations = matched_investigations + + def addAuthorCompanyName(self) -> None: + match_author = re.search(r'^([^,]+)', self.story.author) + if match_author is None: + self.story.author_name = 'no' + else: + self.story.author_name = match_author.group(1) + + match_company = re.search(r',\s?(.*)$', self.story.author) + if match_company is None: + self.story.author_company = 'no' + else: + self.story.author_company = match_company.group(1) diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/builder/yml_reader.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/builder/yml_reader.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..88a00820ff --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/builder/yml_reader.py @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +from typing import Dict + +import yaml +import sys + +class YmlReader(): + + @staticmethod + def load_file(file_path: str) -> Dict: + try: + file_handler = open(file_path, 'r', encoding="utf-8") + try: + yml_obj = list(yaml.safe_load_all(file_handler))[0] + except yaml.YAMLError as exc: + print(exc) + sys.exit(1) + + except OSError as exc: + print(exc) + sys.exit(1) + + yml_obj['file_path'] = file_path + + if 'deprecated' in file_path: + yml_obj['deprecated'] = True + else: + yml_obj['deprecated'] = False + + if 'experimental' in file_path: + yml_obj['experimental'] = True + else: + yml_obj['experimental'] = False + + return yml_obj diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/conf/savedsearches.conf b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/conf/savedsearches.conf new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a8937133f2 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/conf/savedsearches.conf @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2020-12-25T17:05:55 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# +### ESCU DETECTIONS ### + +[ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = None identified. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-16 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-16 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Credential Dumping", "DarkSide Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to export the registry keys. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 90}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 90}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.rule_description = Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` OR `process_cmd` Processes.process=*save* (Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SAM* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\SAM*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter` + +### END ESCU DETECTIONS ### \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/default/analyticstories.conf b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/default/analyticstories.conf new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5d1de1ec59 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/default/analyticstories.conf @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2020-12-25T17:05:55 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# + +### DETECTIONS ### + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = None identified. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = AWS Instance +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour. Deprecated now this search is updated to use the Authentication datamodel. +how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. Run the "Previously seen users in AWS CloudTrail" support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run "Update previously seen users in AWS CloudTrail" hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate. +providing_technologies = [] + +### END DETECTIONS ### + +### STORIES ### + +[analytic_story://DarkSide Ransomware] +category = Malware +last_updated = 2021-05-12 +version = 1 +references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/the-darkside-of-the-ransomware-pipeline.htmlbig-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"] +description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the DarkSide Ransomware +narrative = This story addresses Darkside ransomware. This ransomware payload has many similarities to common ransomware however there are certain items particular to it. The creation of a .TXT log that shows every item being encrypted as well as the creation of ransomware notes and files adding a machine ID created based on CRC32 checksum algorithm. This ransomware payload leaves machines in minimal operation level,enough to browse the attackers websites. A customized URI with leaked information is presented to each victim.This is the ransomware payload that shut down the Colonial pipeline. The story is composed of several detection searches covering similar items to other ransomware payloads and those particular to Darkside payload. + +### END STORIES ### + +### RESPONSE TASKS ### + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task] +type = investigation +explanation = none +how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. +known_false_positives = not defined +earliest_time_offset = 14400 +latest_time_offset = 0 + + +### END RESPONSE TASKS ### \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/jinja2_templates/collections.j2 b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/default/collections.conf similarity index 70% rename from bin/jinja2_templates/collections.j2 rename to bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/default/collections.conf index 11f7a476d0..f2a4d0813b 100644 --- a/bin/jinja2_templates/collections.j2 +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/default/collections.conf @@ -1,13 +1,11 @@ ############# # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content -# On Date: {{ time }} UTC +# On Date: 2020-12-25T17:05:55 UTC # Author: Splunk Security Research # Contact: research@splunk.com ############# -{% for lookup in lookups %} -[{{ lookup.name }}] +[previously_seen_aws_regions] enforceTypes = false replicate = false -{% endfor %} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task.xml b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task.xml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..113cb41bc5 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task.xml @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2020-12-25T17:05:55 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# + + + + | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` + + + +
+ diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/default/es_investigations.conf b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/default/es_investigations.conf new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f9cc970895 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/default/es_investigations.conf @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2020-12-25T17:05:55 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# + +[panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task] +label = Get Parent Process Info +description = This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest +disabled = 0 +tokens = {\ + "parent_process_name": {\ + "valuePrefix": "\"",\ + "valueSuffix": "\"",\ + "delimiter": " OR parent_process_name=",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "file",\ + "default": "null"\ + },\ + "dest": {\ + "valuePrefix": "\"",\ + "valueSuffix": "\"",\ + "delimiter": " OR dest=",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "asset",\ + "default": "null"\ + }\ +}\ + + diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/default/macros.conf b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/default/macros.conf new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..adb2275bf2 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/default/macros.conf @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2020-12-25T17:05:55 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# + +[attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_new_user_aws_console_login_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + + +[security_content_ctime(1)] +args = field +definition = convert timeformat="%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S" ctime($field$) +description = convert epoch time to string + diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/default/savedsearches.conf b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/default/savedsearches.conf new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f96947a1ae --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/default/savedsearches.conf @@ -0,0 +1,154 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2020-12-25T17:05:55 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# +### ESCU DETECTIONS ### + +[ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = None identified. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-16 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-16 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Credential Dumping", "DarkSide Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to export the registry keys. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 90}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 90}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] +action.notable.param.rule_description = Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` OR `process_cmd` Processes.process=*save* (Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SAM* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\SAM*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter` + +[ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour. Deprecated now this search is updated to use the Authentication datamodel. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour. Deprecated now this search is updated to use the Authentication datamodel. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. Run the "Previously seen users in AWS CloudTrail" support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run "Update previously seen users in AWS CloudTrail" hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. +action.escu.known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 90}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour. Deprecated now this search is updated to use the Authentication datamodel. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect new user AWS Console Login +action.notable.param.security_domain = network +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user | eval userStatus=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), "First Time Logging into AWS Console","Previously Seen User") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| where userStatus ="First Time Logging into AWS Console" | `detect_new_user_aws_console_login_filter` + +### END ESCU DETECTIONS ### + +### ESCU BASELINES ### + +[ESCU - Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +action.escu.search_type = support +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update +description = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by user, within the last hour. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-05-28 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-28 +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"] +action.escu.data_models = ["Authentication"] +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +enableSched = 1 +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +schedule_window = auto +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by user, within the last hour. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`, which is a lookup file created by this support search. +disabled = true +is_visible = false +search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | rename Authentication.user as user Authentication.src as src | table user src City Region Country firstTime lastTime | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins + + + +### ESCU RESPONSE TASKS ### + +[ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +action.escu.search_type = investigative +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task +description = This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest +action.escu.creation_date = 2019-02-28 +action.escu.modification_date = 2019-02-28 +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Collection and Staging", "Command and Control", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "Disabling Security Tools", "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Lateral Movement", "Malicious PowerShell", "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", "Netsh Abuse", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "Phishing Payloads", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Ransomware", "SamSam Ransomware", "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "Suspicious WMI Use", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Unusual Processes", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", "Windows Log Manipulation", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation", "Windows Service Abuse", "DarkSide Ransomware"] +action.escu.earliest_time_offset = 3600 +action.escu.latest_time_offset = 86400 +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest +action.escu.how_to_implement = none +action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time +disabled = true +schedule_window = auto +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` + + + +### END ESCU RESPONSE TASKS ### \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/default/transforms.conf b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/default/transforms.conf new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c51e10f66d --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/default/transforms.conf @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2020-12-25T17:05:55 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# + +[previously_seen_aws_regions] +filename = previously_seen_aws_regions.csv +default_match = false +case_sensitive_match = None +# description = A place holder for a list of used AWS regions +match_type = None +min_matches = 1 +fields_list = None + + +### Default transforms definitions for the lookup files we ship ### +[mitre_enrichment] +filename = mitre_enrichment.csv +# description = A lookup file that is created by generate.py \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/default/workflow_actions.conf b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/default/workflow_actions.conf new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..84d0e23fc4 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/default/workflow_actions.conf @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2020-12-25T17:05:55 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# + + diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/default_reference/analyticstories.conf b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/default_reference/analyticstories.conf new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5d1de1ec59 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/default_reference/analyticstories.conf @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2020-12-25T17:05:55 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# + +### DETECTIONS ### + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = None identified. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = AWS Instance +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour. Deprecated now this search is updated to use the Authentication datamodel. +how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. Run the "Previously seen users in AWS CloudTrail" support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run "Update previously seen users in AWS CloudTrail" hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate. +providing_technologies = [] + +### END DETECTIONS ### + +### STORIES ### + +[analytic_story://DarkSide Ransomware] +category = Malware +last_updated = 2021-05-12 +version = 1 +references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/the-darkside-of-the-ransomware-pipeline.htmlbig-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"] +description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the DarkSide Ransomware +narrative = This story addresses Darkside ransomware. This ransomware payload has many similarities to common ransomware however there are certain items particular to it. The creation of a .TXT log that shows every item being encrypted as well as the creation of ransomware notes and files adding a machine ID created based on CRC32 checksum algorithm. This ransomware payload leaves machines in minimal operation level,enough to browse the attackers websites. A customized URI with leaked information is presented to each victim.This is the ransomware payload that shut down the Colonial pipeline. The story is composed of several detection searches covering similar items to other ransomware payloads and those particular to Darkside payload. + +### END STORIES ### + +### RESPONSE TASKS ### + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task] +type = investigation +explanation = none +how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. +known_false_positives = not defined +earliest_time_offset = 14400 +latest_time_offset = 0 + + +### END RESPONSE TASKS ### \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/default_reference/collections.conf b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/default_reference/collections.conf new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f2a4d0813b --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/default_reference/collections.conf @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2020-12-25T17:05:55 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# + +[previously_seen_aws_regions] +enforceTypes = false +replicate = false + diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/default_reference/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task.xml b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/default_reference/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task.xml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..113cb41bc5 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/default_reference/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task.xml @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2020-12-25T17:05:55 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# + + + + | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` + + + +
+ diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/default_reference/es_investigations.conf b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/default_reference/es_investigations.conf new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f9cc970895 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/default_reference/es_investigations.conf @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2020-12-25T17:05:55 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# + +[panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task] +label = Get Parent Process Info +description = This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest +disabled = 0 +tokens = {\ + "parent_process_name": {\ + "valuePrefix": "\"",\ + "valueSuffix": "\"",\ + "delimiter": " OR parent_process_name=",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "file",\ + "default": "null"\ + },\ + "dest": {\ + "valuePrefix": "\"",\ + "valueSuffix": "\"",\ + "delimiter": " OR dest=",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "asset",\ + "default": "null"\ + }\ +}\ + + diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/default_reference/macros.conf b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/default_reference/macros.conf new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..adb2275bf2 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/default_reference/macros.conf @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2020-12-25T17:05:55 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# + +[attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_new_user_aws_console_login_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + + +[security_content_ctime(1)] +args = field +definition = convert timeformat="%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S" ctime($field$) +description = convert epoch time to string + diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/default_reference/savedsearches.conf b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/default_reference/savedsearches.conf new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f96947a1ae --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/default_reference/savedsearches.conf @@ -0,0 +1,154 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2020-12-25T17:05:55 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# +### ESCU DETECTIONS ### + +[ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = None identified. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-16 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-16 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Credential Dumping", "DarkSide Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to export the registry keys. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 90}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 90}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] +action.notable.param.rule_description = Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` OR `process_cmd` Processes.process=*save* (Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SAM* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\SAM*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter` + +[ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour. Deprecated now this search is updated to use the Authentication datamodel. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour. Deprecated now this search is updated to use the Authentication datamodel. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. Run the "Previously seen users in AWS CloudTrail" support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run "Update previously seen users in AWS CloudTrail" hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. +action.escu.known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 90}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour. Deprecated now this search is updated to use the Authentication datamodel. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect new user AWS Console Login +action.notable.param.security_domain = network +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user | eval userStatus=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), "First Time Logging into AWS Console","Previously Seen User") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| where userStatus ="First Time Logging into AWS Console" | `detect_new_user_aws_console_login_filter` + +### END ESCU DETECTIONS ### + +### ESCU BASELINES ### + +[ESCU - Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +action.escu.search_type = support +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update +description = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by user, within the last hour. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-05-28 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-28 +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"] +action.escu.data_models = ["Authentication"] +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +enableSched = 1 +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +schedule_window = auto +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by user, within the last hour. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`, which is a lookup file created by this support search. +disabled = true +is_visible = false +search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | rename Authentication.user as user Authentication.src as src | table user src City Region Country firstTime lastTime | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins + + + +### ESCU RESPONSE TASKS ### + +[ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +action.escu.search_type = investigative +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task +description = This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest +action.escu.creation_date = 2019-02-28 +action.escu.modification_date = 2019-02-28 +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Collection and Staging", "Command and Control", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "Disabling Security Tools", "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Lateral Movement", "Malicious PowerShell", "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", "Netsh Abuse", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "Phishing Payloads", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Ransomware", "SamSam Ransomware", "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "Suspicious WMI Use", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Unusual Processes", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", "Windows Log Manipulation", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation", "Windows Service Abuse", "DarkSide Ransomware"] +action.escu.earliest_time_offset = 3600 +action.escu.latest_time_offset = 86400 +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest +action.escu.how_to_implement = none +action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time +disabled = true +schedule_window = auto +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` + + + +### END ESCU RESPONSE TASKS ### \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/default_reference/transforms.conf b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/default_reference/transforms.conf new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c51e10f66d --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/default_reference/transforms.conf @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2020-12-25T17:05:55 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# + +[previously_seen_aws_regions] +filename = previously_seen_aws_regions.csv +default_match = false +case_sensitive_match = None +# description = A place holder for a list of used AWS regions +match_type = None +min_matches = 1 +fields_list = None + + +### Default transforms definitions for the lookup files we ship ### +[mitre_enrichment] +filename = mitre_enrichment.csv +# description = A lookup file that is created by generate.py \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/default_reference/workflow_actions.conf b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/default_reference/workflow_actions.conf new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..84d0e23fc4 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/default_reference/workflow_actions.conf @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2020-12-25T17:05:55 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# + + diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/attacker_tools.csv b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/attacker_tools.csv new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2f95dfb054 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/attacker_tools.csv @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +attacker_tool_names,description +remcom.exe,This process is an open source replacement to psexec and is not typically seen in an enterprise environment. +pwdump.exe,This process is associated with a tool used to dump password hashes on a Windows system. +pwdump2.exe,This process is associated with a tool used to dump password hashes on a Windows system. +nc.exe,This process is an open source tool used for network communications. +wce.exe,This process is associated with a tool used to dump hashes and execute pass-the-hash and pass-the-ticket attacks. +cain.exe,This process is associated with a tool used to collect user credentials and execute attacks. +nmap.exe,This process is an open source network mapping tool used to identify hosts and listening services on a network. +kidlogger.exe,This process is associated with a tool used to collect keyboard input on a host. +isass.exe,This process name is used by attackers to hide in plain sight and look like a legitimate Windows system process. +svch0st.exe,This process name is used by attackers to hide in plain sight and look like a legitimate Windows system process. +at.exe,This process is used to schedule other processes to run. schtasks.exe should be used instead as it provides more flexibility. +getmail.exe,This process is seen to be used by attackers to extract email files from host machines. +ntdll.exe,This process was identified as malicious by DHS Alert TA18-074A. +netpass.exe,This process was identified as malicious by DHS Alert TA18-201A and attackers use this tool to recover all network passwords stored on your system for the current logged-on user. +WebBrowserPassView.exe,This process was identified as malicious by DHS Alert TA18-201A and is used by attackers as a password recovery tool that reveals the passwords stored in Web Browsers. +OutlookAddressBookView.exe,This process was identified as malicious by DHS Alert TA18-201A and is used by attackers to steal the details of all recipients stored in the address books of Microsoft Outlook. +mailpv.exe,This process was identified by DHS Alert TA18-201A and attackers use this tool is a password-recovery tool that reveals the passwords and other account details from various email clients. +NLBrute.exe,A RDP brute force tool found in botnets for further expansion and and acquisition of targets. This process was identified in the SamSam Ransomware Campaign and attackers use this tool to brute force RDP instances with a range of commonly used passwords. +selfdel.exe,This executable was delivered in the SamSam Ransomware Campain and the attackers levereged this binary to delete its malicilous activities. +masscan.exe,This executable was delivered in the XMRig Crypto Miner +Massscan_GUI.exe,This executable was delivered in the XMRig Crypto Miner +KPortScan3.exe,This executable was delivered in the XMRig Crypto Miner and is commonly used by attackers to scan the internet +NLAChecker.exe,A scanner tool that checks for Windows hosts for Network Level Authentication. This tool allows attackers to detect Windows Servers with RDP without NLA enabled which facilitates the use of brute force non microsoft rdp tools or exploits +ns.exe,A commonly used tool used by attackers to scan and map file shares +SilverBullet.exe,Malware was discovered in our monitoring of honey pots that abuses this open source software for scanning and connecting to hosts. +kportscan3.exe, KPortScan 3.0 is a widely used port scanning tool on Hacking Forums, to perform network scanning on the internal networks. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/aws_service_accounts.csv b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/aws_service_accounts.csv new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..29d7277364 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/aws_service_accounts.csv @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +identity diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/baseline_blocked_outbound_connections.csv b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/baseline_blocked_outbound_connections.csv new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..da66bfd95c --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/baseline_blocked_outbound_connections.csv @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +src_ip,numDataPoints,latestCount,avgBlockedConnections,stdevBlockedConnections \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/brand_monitoring.csv b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/brand_monitoring.csv new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9ff708efd9 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/brand_monitoring.csv @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +domain,domain_abuse diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/csc_lookup.csv b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/csc_lookup.csv new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..58970a91f6 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/csc_lookup.csv @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +number, name +1, Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Devices +2, Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Software +3, Secure Configuration of End-User Devices +4, Continuous Vulnerability Assessment & Remediation +5, Controlled Use of Administrative Privileges +6, Maintenance Monitoring and Analysis of Audit Logs +7, Email & Web Browser Protections +8, Malware Defense +9, Limitation & Control of Network Ports-Protocols & Services +10, Data Recovery Capability +11, Secure Configuration of Network Devices +12, Boundary Defense +13, Data Protection +14, Controlled Access Based on Need to Know +15, Wireless Access Control +16, Account Monitoring and Control +17, Security Skills Assessment and Appropriate Training +18, Application Software Security +19, Incident Response and Management +20, Penetration Tests and Red Team Exercises \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/discovered_dns_records.csv b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/discovered_dns_records.csv new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..74b7ee36f5 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/discovered_dns_records.csv @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +count,domain,type,query,answer \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/domains.csv b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/domains.csv new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..be017ecb05 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/domains.csv @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +domain,isValidDomain diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..33eee3e0f0 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv @@ -0,0 +1,91976 @@ +dynamic_dns_domains, isDynDNS_default +*.3d-game.com*, True +*.4irc.com*, True +*.b0ne.com*, True +*.bbsindex.com*, True +*.chatnook.com*, True +*.darktech.org*, True +*.deaftone.com*, True +*.dtdns.net*, True +*.effers.com*, True +*.etowns.net*, True +*.etowns.org*, True +*.flnet.org*, True +*.gotgeeks.com*, True +*.scieron.com*, True +*.slyip.com*, True +*.slyip.net*, True +*.suroot.com*, True +*.dynu.com*, True +*.dynu.net*, True +*.freeddns.org*, True +*.at-band-camp.net*, True +*.barrel-of-knowledge.info*, True +*.barrell-of-knowledge.info*, True +*.better-than.tv*, True +*.blogdns.com*, True +*.blogdns.net*, True +*.blogdns.org*, True +*.blogsite.org*, True +*.boldlygoingnowhere.org*, True +*.broke-it.net*, True +*.buyshouses.net*, True +*.cechire.com*, True +*.dnsalias.com*, True +*.dnsalias.net*, True +*.dnsalias.org*, True +*.dnsdojo.com*, True +*.dnsdojo.net*, True +*.dnsdojo.org*, True +*.does-it.net*, True +*.doesntexist.com*, True +*.doesntexist.org*, True +*.dontexist.com*, True +*.dontexist.net*, True +*.dontexist.org*, True +*.doomdns.com*, True +*.doomdns.org*, True +*.dvrdns.org*, True +*.dyn-o-saur.com*, True +*.dynalias.com*, True +*.dynalias.net*, True +*.dynalias.org*, True +*.dynathome.net*, True +*.dyndns-at-home.com*, True +*.dyndns-at-work.com*, True +*.dyndns-blog.com*, True +*.dyndns-free.com*, True +*.dyndns-home.com*, True +*.dyndns-ip.com*, True +*.dyndns-mail.com*, True 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True +*.mine.nu*, True +*.misconfused.org*, True +*.mypets.ws*, True +*.myphotos.cc*, True +*.neat-url.com*, True +*.office-on-the.net*, True +*.on-the-web.tv*, True +*.podzone.net*, True +*.podzone.org*, True +*.readmyblog.org*, True +*.saves-the-whales.com*, True +*.scrapper-site.net*, True +*.scrapping.cc*, True +*.selfip.biz*, True +*.selfip.com*, True +*.selfip.info*, True +*.selfip.net*, True +*.selfip.org*, True +*.sells-for-less.com*, True +*.sells-for-u.com*, True +*.sells-it.net*, True +*.sellsyourhome.org*, True +*.servebbs.com*, True +*.servebbs.net*, True +*.servebbs.org*, True +*.serveftp.net*, True +*.serveftp.org*, True +*.servegame.org*, True +*.simple-url.com*, True +*.space-to-rent.com*, True +*.stuff-4-sale.org*, True +*.stuff-4-sale.us*, True +*.teaches-yoga.com*, True +*.thruhere.net*, True +*.traeumtgerade.de*, True +*.webhop.biz*, True +*.webhop.info*, True +*.webhop.net*, True +*.webhop.org*, True +*.worse-than.tv*, True +*.writesthisblog.com*, True 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True +*.my-router.de*, True +*.myfirewall.org*, True +*.spdns.de*, True +*.spdns.org*, True +*.spdns.eu*, True +*.6600.org*, True +*.7766.org*, True +*.8800.org*, True +*.webok.net*, True +*.2288.org*, True +*.9966.org*, True +*.8866.org*, True +*.3322.org*, True +*.f3322.net*, True +*.f3322.org*, True +*.eatuo.com*, True +*.x3322.net*, True +*.x3322.org*, True +*.001www.com*, True +*.16-b.it*, True +*.2mydns.net*, True +*.32-b.it*, True +*.64-b.it*, True +*.crafting.xyz*, True +*.ddnslive.com*, True +*.dnsapi.info*, True +*.dnsdyn.net*, True +*.dnsking.ch*, True +*.dnsup.net*, True +*.dynip.org*, True +*.dynserv.org*, True +*.forumz.info*, True +*.freeddns.uk*, True +*.freeddns.us*, True +*.hicam.net*, True +*.myiphost.com*, True +*.mypi.co*, True +*.n4t.co*, True +*.now-dns.net*, True +*.now-dns.org*, True +*.now-dns.top*, True +*.nowddns.com*, True +*.ntdll.top*, True +*.ownip.net*, True +*.soundcast.me*, True +*.tcp4.me*, True +*.tftpd.net*, True +*.vpndns.net*, True +*.wifizone.org*, True +*.x443.pw*, True diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/dynamic_dns_providers_local.csv b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/dynamic_dns_providers_local.csv new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2cd9bc8fd8 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/dynamic_dns_providers_local.csv @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +dynamic_dns_domains, isDynDNS_local \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/escu_search_id.csv b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/escu_search_id.csv new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..08e997f06b --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/escu_search_id.csv @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +savedsearch_name, search_id, user, _time, usage diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/images_to_repository.csv b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/images_to_repository.csv new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5bc7335489 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/images_to_repository.csv @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +image, repository +devsecops/cat_dog_client, splunk/devsecops_poc +devsecops/cat_dog_server, splunk/devsecops_poc \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/is_net_windows_file.csv b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/is_net_windows_file.csv new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4c21dbd007 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/is_net_windows_file.csv @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +filename,originalFileName,netFile +MSBuild.exe,MSBuild.exe,True +ComSvcConfig.exe,ComSvcConfig.exe,True +DfsrAdmin.exe,DfsrAdmin.exe,True +dfsvc.exe,dfsvc.exe,True +Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe,Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe,True +SMSvcHost.exe,SMSvcHost.exe,True +WsatConfig.exe,WsatConfig.exe,True +AddInProcess.exe,AddInProcess.exe,True +AddInProcess32.exe,AddInProcess32.exe,True +AddInUtil.exe,AddInUtil.exe,True +aspnet_compiler.exe,aspnet_compiler.exe,True +aspnet_regbrowsers.exe,aspnet_regbrowsers.exe,True +aspnet_regsql.exe,aspnet_regsql.exe,True +CasPol.exe,CasPol.exe,True +DataSvcUtil.exe,DataSvcUtil.exe,True +EdmGen.exe,EdmGen.exe,True +InstallUtil.exe,InstallUtil.exe,True +jsc.exe,jsc.exe,True +ngentask.exe,ngentask.exe,True +ngen.exe,ngen.exe,True +RegAsm.exe,RegAsm.exe,True +RegSvcs.exe,RegSvcs.exe,True +SDNBR.exe,SDNBR.exe,True +acu.exe,acu.exe,True +AppVStreamingUX.exe,,True +dsac.exe,dsac.exe,True +LbfoAdmin.exe,LBFOADMIN.EXE,True +Microsoft.Uev.SyncController.exe,Microsoft.Uev.SyncController.exe,True +mtedit.exe,mtedit.exe,True +ScriptRunner.exe,ScriptRunner.exe,True +ServerManager.exe,servermanager.dll,True +stordiag.exe,stordiag.exe,True +storeadm.exe,storeadm.exe,True +tzsync.exe,tzsync.exe,True +UevAgentPolicyGenerator.exe,UevAgentPolicyGenerator.exe,True +UevAppMonitor.exe,UevAppMonitor.exe,True +UevTemplateBaselineGenerator.exe,UevTemplateBaselineGenerator.exe,True +UevTemplateConfigItemGenerator.exe,UevTemplateConfigItemGenerator.exe,True +powershell_ise.exe,powershell_ise.EXE,True +iediagcmd.exe,IEDiagCmd.exe,True +XBox.TCUI.exe,XBox.TCUI.exe,True +Microsoft.ActiveDirectory.WebServices.exe,Microsoft.ActiveDirectory.WebServices.exe,True +iisual.exe,iisual.exe,True +FileHistory.exe,FileHistory.exe,True +SecureAssessmentBrowser.exe,SecureAssessmentBrowser.exe,True +aspnet_regiis.exe,aspnet_regiis.exe,True \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/is_nirsoft_software.csv b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/is_nirsoft_software.csv new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8e2ad32430 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/is_nirsoft_software.csv @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +filename,nirsoftFile +AdvancedRun.exe,True +ChromePass.exe,True +CredHistView.exe,True +Dialupass.exe,True +iepv.exe,True +LostMyPassword.exe,True +mailpv.exe,True +mspass.exe,True +netpass.exe,True +PasswordFox.exe,True +PasswordHashesView.exe,True +PstPassword.exe,True +RegHiveBackup.exe,True +WebBrowserPassView.exe,True \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/is_suspicious_file_extension_lookup.csv b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/is_suspicious_file_extension_lookup.csv new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1284088431 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/is_suspicious_file_extension_lookup.csv @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +file_name,suspicious +*.avi.com,true +*.avi.exe,true +*.doc.com,true +*.doc.exe,true +*.docx.com,true +*.docx.exe,true +*.jpg.com,true +*.jpg.exe,true +*.jpeg.com,true +*.jpeg.exe,true +*.mpg.com,true +*.mpg.exe,true +*.mpg2.com,true +*.mpg2.exe,true +*.mpeg.com,true +*.mpeg.exe,true +*.pdf.com,true +*.pdf.exe,true +*.png.com,true +*.png.exe,true +*.ppt.com,true +*.ppt.exe,true +*.pptx.com,true +*.pptx.exe,true +*.swf.com,true +*.swf.exe,true +*.xls.com,true +*.xls.exe,true +*.xlsx.com,true +*.xlsx.exe,true +*.zip.com,true +*.zip.exe,true +*.bat,true +*.chm,true +*.com,true +*.cmd,true +*.cpl,true +*.exe,true +*.hlp,true +*.hta,true +*.jar,true +*.js,true +*.msi,true +*.pif,true +*.ps1,true +*.rar,true +*.reg,true +*.scr,true +*.vbe,true +*.vbs,true +*.wsf,true diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/is_windows_system_file.csv b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/is_windows_system_file.csv new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..96617dd524 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/is_windows_system_file.csv @@ -0,0 +1,753 @@ +filename,systemFile +acu.exe,true +AgentService.exe,true +aitstatic.exe,true +alg.exe,true +AppHostRegistrationVerifier.exe,true +appidcertstorecheck.exe,true +appidpolicyconverter.exe,true +appidtel.exe,true +ApplicationFrameHost.exe,true +ApplySettingsTemplateCatalog.exe,true +AppVClient.exe,true +AppVDllSurrogate.exe,true +AppVNice.exe,true +AppVStreamingUX.exe,true +ARP.EXE,true +at.exe,true +AtBroker.exe,true +attrib.exe,true +audiodg.exe,true +auditpol.exe,true +AuthHost.exe,true +autochk.exe,true +autoconv.exe,true +autofmt.exe,true +AxInstUI.exe,true +backgroundTaskHost.exe,true +BackgroundTransferHost.exe,true +bcastdvr.exe,true +bcdboot.exe,true +bcdedit.exe,true +BioIso.exe,true +bitsadmin.exe,true +bootcfg.exe,true +bootim.exe,true +bridgeunattend.exe,true +browser_broker.exe,true +bthudtask.exe,true +ByteCodeGenerator.exe,true +cacls.exe,true +calc.exe,true +CameraSettingsUIHost.exe,true +CastSrv.exe,true +CertEnrollCtrl.exe,true +certreq.exe,true +certutil.exe,true +change.exe,true +changepk.exe,true +charmap.exe,true +CheckNetIsolation.exe,true +chglogon.exe,true +chgport.exe,true +chgusr.exe,true +chkdsk.exe,true +chkntfs.exe,true +choice.exe,true +cipher.exe,true +cleanmgr.exe,true +cliconfg.exe,true +clip.exe,true +ClipUp.exe,true +CloudExperienceHostBroker.exe,true +CloudNotifications.exe,true +CloudStorageWizard.exe,true +cmd.exe,true +cmdkey.exe,true +cmdl32.exe,true +cmmon32.exe,true +cmstp.exe,true +cofire.exe,true +colorcpl.exe,true +comp.exe,true +compact.exe,true +CompatTelRunner.exe,true +CompMgmtLauncher.exe,true +ComputerDefaults.exe,true +Configure-SMRemoting.exe,true +conhost.exe,true +consent.exe,true +control.exe,true +convert.exe,true +CredentialUIBroker.exe,true +credwiz.exe,true +cscript.exe,true +csrss.exe,true +ctfmon.exe,true +cttune.exe,true +cttunesvr.exe,true +dasHost.exe,true +DataExchangeHost.exe,true +DataSenseLiveTileTask.exe,true +dccw.exe,true +dcgpofix.exe,true +dcomcnfg.exe,true +dcpromo.exe,true +ddodiag.exe,true +Defrag.exe,true +DeviceCensus.exe,true +DeviceEject.exe,true +DeviceEnroller.exe,true +DevicePairingWizard.exe,true +DeviceProperties.exe,true +DFDWiz.exe,true +dfrgui.exe,true +dfsrdiag.exe,true +dialer.exe,true +DIMC.exe,true +diskpart.exe,true +diskperf.exe,true +diskraid.exe,true +diskshadow.exe,true +DiskSnapshot.exe,true +Dism.exe,true +dispdiag.exe,true +DisplaySwitch.exe,true +djoin.exe,true +dllhost.exe,true +dllhst3g.exe,true +dmcertinst.exe,true +dmcfghost.exe,true +DmNotificationBroker.exe,true +DmOmaCpMo.exe,true +dnscacheugc.exe,true +doskey.exe,true +dpapimig.exe,true +DpiScaling.exe,true +dpnsvr.exe,true +driverquery.exe,true +drvcfg.exe,true +drvinst.exe,true +DsmUserTask.exe,true +dsregcmd.exe,true +dstokenclean.exe,true +dvdplay.exe,true +dwm.exe,true +DWWIN.EXE,true +dxdiag.exe,true +Dxpserver.exe,true +Eap3Host.exe,true +EaseOfAccessDialog.exe,true +easinvoker.exe,true +EasPoliciesBrokerHost.exe,true +EDPCleanup.exe,true +edpnotify.exe,true +efsui.exe,true +EhStorAuthn.exe,true +embeddedapplauncher.exe,true +EmbeddedAppLauncherConfig.exe,true +escUnattend.exe,true +esentutl.exe,true +eudcedit.exe,true +eventcreate.exe,true +eventvwr.exe,true +expand.exe,true +extrac32.exe,true +fc.exe,true +find.exe,true +findstr.exe,true +finger.exe,true +fixmapi.exe,true +fltMC.exe,true +fodhelper.exe,true +Fondue.exe,true +fontdrvhost.exe,true +fontview.exe,true +forfiles.exe,true +fsavailux.exe,true +fsquirt.exe,true +fsutil.exe,true +ftp.exe,true +GameBarPresenceWriter.exe,true +GamePanel.exe,true +GenValObj.exe,true +getmac.exe,true +gpresult.exe,true +gpscript.exe,true +gpupdate.exe,true +grpconv.exe,true +hdwwiz.exe,true +help.exe,true +HOSTNAME.EXE,true +hvax64.exe,true +hvix64.exe,true +hvloader.exe,true +hwrcomp.exe,true +hwrreg.exe,true +iashost.exe,true +icacls.exe,true +IcsEntitlementHost.exe,true +icsunattend.exe,true +ie4uinit.exe,true +ieUnatt.exe,true +iexpress.exe,true +immersivetpmvscmgrsvr.exe,true +InfDefaultInstall.exe,true +InstallAgent.exe,true +InstallAgentUserBroker.exe,true +ipconfig.exe,true +iscsicli.exe,true +iscsicpl.exe,true +isoburn.exe,true +klist.exe,true +ksetup.exe,true +ktmutil.exe,true +ktpass.exe,true +label.exe,true +LanguageComponentsInstallerComHandler.exe,true +LaunchTM.exe,true +LaunchWinApp.exe,true +LbfoAdmin.exe,true +LegacyNetUXHost.exe,true +LicenseManagerShellext.exe,true +licensingdiag.exe,true +LicensingUI.exe,true +LocationNotificationWindows.exe,true +Locator.exe,true +LockAppHost.exe,true +LockScreenContentServer.exe,true +lodctr.exe,true +logagent.exe,true +logman.exe,true +logoff.exe,true +LogonUI.exe,true +lpkinstall.exe,true +lpksetup.exe,true +lpremove.exe,true +LsaIso.exe,true +lsass.exe,true +Magnify.exe,true +makecab.exe,true +mavinject.exe,true +MbaeParserTask.exe,true +mblctr.exe,true +mcbuilder.exe,true +MDEServer.exe,true +MDMAgent.exe,true +MDMAppInstaller.exe,true +MdmDiagnosticsTool.exe,true +MdRes.exe,true +MdSched.exe,true +mfpmp.exe,true +Microsoft.Uev.CscUnpinTool.exe,true +Microsoft.Uev.SyncController.exe,true +mmc.exe,true +mobsync.exe,true +mountvol.exe,true +mpnotify.exe,true +MpSigStub.exe,true +MRINFO.EXE,true +MRT-KB890830.exe,true +MRT.exe,true +MSchedExe.exe,true +msconfig.exe,true +msdt.exe,true +msdtc.exe,true +msfeedssync.exe,true +msg.exe,true +mshta.exe,true +msiexec.exe,true +msinfo32.exe,true +mspaint.exe,true +MsSpellCheckingHost.exe,true +mstsc.exe,true +mtstocom.exe,true +MuiUnattend.exe,true +MultiDigiMon.exe,true +MusNotification.exe,true +MusNotificationUx.exe,true +Narrator.exe,true +nbtstat.exe,true +ndadmin.exe,true +net.exe,true +net1.exe,true +netbtugc.exe,true +netcfg.exe,true +NetCfgNotifyObjectHost.exe,true +netdom.exe,true +NetEvtFwdr.exe,true +NetHost.exe,true +netiougc.exe,true +Netplwiz.exe,true +netsh.exe,true +NETSTAT.EXE,true +newdev.exe,true +nltest.exe,true +notepad.exe,true +nslookup.exe,true +ntoskrnl.exe,true +ntprint.exe,true +odbcad32.exe,true +odbcconf.exe,true +omadmclient.exe,true +omadmprc.exe,true +openfiles.exe,true +OpenWith.exe,true +OptionalFeatures.exe,true +osk.exe,true +PackagedCWALauncher.exe,true +PackageInspector.exe,true +PasswordOnWakeSettingFlyout.exe,true +PATHPING.EXE,true +pcalua.exe,true +pcaui.exe,true +pcwrun.exe,true +perfmon.exe,true +phoneactivate.exe,true +PickerHost.exe,true +PING.EXE,true +PkgMgr.exe,true +plasrv.exe,true +PnPUnattend.exe,true +pnputil.exe,true +poqexec.exe,true +powercfg.exe,true +PresentationHost.exe,true +PresentationSettings.exe,true +prevhost.exe,true +print.exe,true +PrintBrmUi.exe,true +PrintDialogHost.exe,true +PrintDialogHost3D.exe,true +printfilterpipelinesvc.exe,true +PrintIsolationHost.exe,true +printui.exe,true +proquota.exe,true +psr.exe,true +pwlauncher.exe,true +qappsrv.exe,true +qprocess.exe,true +query.exe,true +quser.exe,true +qwinsta.exe,true +rasdial.exe,true +rdpclip.exe,true +rdpinit.exe,true +rdpinput.exe,true +RdpSa.exe,true +RdpSaProxy.exe,true +RdpSaUacHelper.exe,true +rdpshell.exe,true +rdpsign.exe,true +rdrleakdiag.exe,true +RDSPnf.exe,true +ReAgentc.exe,true +recover.exe,true +RecoveryDrive.exe,true +reg.exe,true +regedt32.exe,true +regini.exe,true +Register-CimProvider.exe,true +regsvr32.exe,true +rekeywiz.exe,true +relog.exe,true +RelPost.exe,true +RemotePosWorker.exe,true +replace.exe,true +reset.exe,true +ResetEngine.exe,true +resmon.exe,true +RMActivate.exe,true +RMActivate_isv.exe,true +RMActivate_ssp.exe,true +RMActivate_ssp_isv.exe,true +RmClient.exe,true +rmttpmvscmgrsvr.exe,true +Robocopy.exe,true +ROUTE.EXE,true +RpcPing.exe,true +rrinstaller.exe,true +rsopprov.exe,true +runas.exe,true +rundll32.exe,true +RunLegacyCPLElevated.exe,true +runonce.exe,true +RuntimeBroker.exe,true +rwinsta.exe,true +sacsess.exe,true +sc.exe,true +schtasks.exe,true +ScriptRunner.exe,true +sdbinst.exe,true +sdiagnhost.exe,true +SearchFilterHost.exe,true +SearchIndexer.exe,true +SearchProtocolHost.exe,true +SecEdit.exe,true +secinit.exe,true +securekernel.exe,true +SensorDataService.exe,true +ServerManager.exe,true +ServerManagerLauncher.exe,true +services.exe,true +sessionmsg.exe,true +sethc.exe,true +setres.exe,true +setspn.exe,true +SettingSyncHost.exe,true +setupcl.exe,true +setupugc.exe,true +setx.exe,true +sfc.exe,true +shrpubw.exe,true +shutdown.exe,true +sigverif.exe,true +SIHClient.exe,true +sihost.exe,true +SlideToShutDown.exe,true +slui.exe,true +smartscreen.exe,true +SmartScreenSettings.exe,true +smss.exe,true +SndVol.exe,true +SnippingTool.exe,true +snmptrap.exe,true +sort.exe,true +SpaceAgent.exe,true +spaceman.exe,true +spoolsv.exe,true +SppExtComObj.Exe,true +sppsvc.exe,true +stordiag.exe,true +subst.exe,true +svchost.exe,true +sxstrace.exe,true +SyncAppvPublishingServer.exe,true +SyncHost.exe,true +syskey.exe,true +SysResetErr.exe,true +systeminfo.exe,true +SystemPropertiesAdvanced.exe,true +SystemPropertiesComputerName.exe,true +SystemPropertiesDataExecutionPrevention.exe,true +SystemPropertiesHardware.exe,true +SystemPropertiesPerformance.exe,true +SystemPropertiesProtection.exe,true +SystemPropertiesRemote.exe,true +systemreset.exe,true +SystemSettingsAdminFlows.exe,true +SystemSettingsBroker.exe,true +SystemSettingsRemoveDevice.exe,true +systray.exe,true +tabcal.exe,true +takeown.exe,true +TapiUnattend.exe,true +taskhostw.exe,true +taskkill.exe,true +tasklist.exe,true +Taskmgr.exe,true +tcmsetup.exe,true +TCPSVCS.EXE,true +tdlrecover.exe,true +ThumbnailExtractionHost.exe,true +TieringEngineService.exe,true +timeout.exe,true +TokenBrokerCookies.exe,true +TpmInit.exe,true +tpmvscmgr.exe,true +tpmvscmgrsvr.exe,true +tracerpt.exe,true +TRACERT.EXE,true +tscon.exe,true +tsdiscon.exe,true +tsecimp.exe,true +tskill.exe,true +TSTheme.exe,true +TSWbPrxy.exe,true +typeperf.exe,true +tzsync.exe,true +tzutil.exe,true +ucsvc.exe,true +UevAgentPolicyGenerator.exe,true +UevAppMonitor.exe,true +UevTemplateBaselineGenerator.exe,true +UevTemplateConfigItemGenerator.exe,true +UI0Detect.exe,true +unlodctr.exe,true +unregmp2.exe,true +UpgradeResultsUI.exe,true +upnpcont.exe,true +UserAccountBroker.exe,true +UserAccountControlSettings.exe,true +userinit.exe,true +UsoClient.exe,true +Utilman.exe,true +VaultCmd.exe,true +vds.exe,true +vdsldr.exe,true +verclsid.exe,true +verifier.exe,true +verifiergui.exe,true +vssadmin.exe,true +VSSUIRUN.exe,true +VSSVC.exe,true +w32tm.exe,true +waitfor.exe,true +WallpaperHost.exe,true +WebCache.exe,true +wecutil.exe,true +WerFault.exe,true +WerFaultSecure.exe,true +wermgr.exe,true +wevtutil.exe,true +wextract.exe,true +where.exe,true +whoami.exe,true +wiaacmgr.exe,true +wiawow64.exe,true +wimserv.exe,true +win32calc.exe,true +WinBioDataModelOOBE.exe,true +Windows.Media.BackgroundPlayback.exe,true +WindowsActionDialog.exe,true +WindowsUpdateElevatedInstaller.exe,true +wininit.exe,true +winload.exe,true +winlogon.exe,true +winresume.exe,true +winrs.exe,true +winrshost.exe,true +WinSAT.exe,true +winver.exe,true +wkspbroker.exe,true +wksprt.exe,true +wlrmdr.exe,true +WMPDMC.exe,true +wowreg32.exe,true +WPDShextAutoplay.exe,true +wpr.exe,true +write.exe,true +WSCollect.exe,true +wscript.exe,true +WSManHTTPConfig.exe,true +wsmprovhost.exe,true +wsqmcons.exe,true +WSReset.exe,true +wuapihost.exe,true +wuauclt.exe,true +WUDFHost.exe,true +wusa.exe,true +WWAHost.exe,true +XblGameSaveTask.exe,true +xcopy.exe,true +xwizard.exe,true +comrepl.exe,true +MigRegDB.exe,true +DiagnosticsHub.StandardCollector.Service.exe,true +DismHost.exe,true +F12Chooser.exe,true +IMJPDCT.EXE,true +IMJPSET.EXE,true +IMJPUEX.EXE,true +imjpuexc.exe,true +IMTCLNWZ.EXE,true +IMTCPROP.exe,true +IMCCPHR.exe,true +ImeBroker.exe,true +imecfmui.exe,true +IMEDICTUPDATEUI.EXE,true +IMEPADSV.EXE,true +IMESEARCH.EXE,true +IMEWDBLD.EXE,true +ChsIME.exe,true +ChtIME.exe,true +mighost.exe,true +audit.exe,true +AuditShD.exe,true +FirstLogonAnim.exe,true +msoobe.exe,true +oobeldr.exe,true +Setup.exe,true +UserOOBEBroker.exe,true +windeploy.exe,true +SpeechUXWiz.exe,true +SpeechModelDownload.exe,true +SpeechRuntime.exe,true +PrintBrm.exe,true +PrintBrmEngine.exe,true +sysprep.exe,true +SystemResetPlatform.exe,true +mofcomp.exe,true +scrcons.exe,true +unsecapp.exe,true +wbemtest.exe,true +WinMgmt.exe,true +WMIADAP.exe,true +WmiApSrv.exe,true +WMIC.exe,true +WmiPrvSE.exe,true +powershell.exe,true +powershell_ise.exe,true +dplaysvr.exe,true +dtdump.exe,true +hh.exe,true +instnm.exe,true +perfhost.exe,true +rasautou.exe,true +rasphone.exe,true +regedit.exe,true +setup16.exe,true +user.exe,true +_isdel.exe,true +agentactivationruntimestarter.exe,true +ApplyTrustOffline.exe,true +ApproveChildRequest.exe,true +appverif.exe,true +baaupdate.exe,true +bash.exe,true +bdechangepin.exe,true +BdeHdCfg.exe,true +BdeUISrv.exe,true +bdeunlock.exe,true +BitLockerDeviceEncryption.exe,true +BitLockerWizard.exe,true +BitLockerWizardElev.exe,true +bootsect.exe,true +browserexport.exe,true +CIDiag.exe,true +CompPkgSrv.exe,true +convertvhd.exe,true +coredpussvr.exe,true +CredentialEnrollmentManager.exe,true +curl.exe,true +CustomInstallExec.exe,true +d3dconfig.exe,true +DataStoreCacheDumpTool.exe,true +DataUsageLiveTileTask.exe,true +deploymentcsphelper.exe,true +desktopimgdownldr.exe,true +DeviceCredentialDeployment.exe,true +directxdatabaseupdater.exe,true +dmclient.exe,true +DTUHandler.exe,true +dusmtask.exe,true +DXCap.exe,true +DXCpl.exe,true +dxgiadaptercache.exe,true +EASPolicyManagerBrokerHost.exe,true +EduPrintProv.exe,true +EoAExperiences.exe,true +fhmanagew.exe,true +FileHistory.exe,true +FsIso.exe,true +fvenotify.exe,true +fveprompt.exe,true +FXSCOVER.exe,true +FXSSVC.exe,true +FXSUNATD.exe,true +hcsdiag.exe,true +hnsdiag.exe,true +hvsievaluator.exe,true +ie4ushowIE.exe,true +IESettingSync.exe,true +InputSwitchToastHandler.exe,true +iotstartup.exe,true +manage-bde.exe,true +MBR2GPT.EXE,true +microsoft.windows.softwarelogo.showdesktop.exe,true +MicrosoftEdgeBCHost.exe,true +MicrosoftEdgeCP.exe,true +MicrosoftEdgeDevTools.exe,true +MicrosoftEdgeSH.exe,true +mmgaserver.exe,true +MoUsoCoreWorker.exe,true +msra.exe,true +MusNotifyIcon.exe,true +NDKPing.exe,true +NgcIso.exe,true +nmbind.exe,true +nmscrub.exe,true +nvspinfo.exe,true +ofdeploy.exe,true +pacjsworker.exe,true +PinEnrollmentBroker.exe,true +PktMon.exe,true +pospaymentsworker.exe,true +provlaunch.exe,true +provtool.exe,true +ProximityUxHost.exe,true +prproc.exe,true +quickassist.exe,true +raserver.exe,true +RDVGHelper.exe,true +recdisc.exe,true +refsutil.exe,true +RemoteAppLifetimeManager.exe,true +RemoteFXvGPUDisablement.exe,true +repair-bde.exe,true +rstrui.exe,true +runexehelper.exe,true +sdchange.exe,true +sdclt.exe,true +SecurityHealthHost.exe,true +SecurityHealthService.exe,true +SecurityHealthSystray.exe,true +SgrmBroker.exe,true +SgrmLpac.exe,true +SpatialAudioLicenseSrv.exe,true +Spectrum.exe,true +srdelayed.exe,true +SrTasks.exe,true +SystemUWPLauncher.exe,true +tar.exe,true +tcblaunch.exe,true +TpmTool.exe,true +ttdinject.exe,true +tttracer.exe,true +UIMgrBroker.exe,true +upfc.exe,true +usocoreworker.exe,true +UtcDecoderHost.exe,true +VBoxControl.exe,true +VBoxService.exe,true +VBoxTray.exe,true +vfpctrl.exe,true +vmcompute.exe,true +vmwp.exe,true +VsGraphicsDesktopEngine.exe,true +VsGraphicsRemoteEngine.exe,true +vsjitdebugger.exe,true +WaaSMedicAgent.exe,true +wbadmin.exe,true +wbengine.exe,true +WFS.exe,true +wifitask.exe,true +Windows.WARP.JITService.exe,true +WinRTNetMUAHostServer.exe,true +wlanext.exe,true +WorkFolders.exe,true +WpcMon.exe,true +WpcTok.exe,true +wpnpinst.exe,true +wscadminui.exe,true +wsl.exe,true +wslconfig.exe,true +WUDFCompanionHost.exe,true +IEChooser.exe,true +wslhost.exe,true +scp.exe,true +sftp.exe,true +ssh-add.exe,true +ssh-agent.exe,true +ssh-keygen.exe,true +ssh-keyscan.exe,true +ssh.exe,true +PerceptionSimulationInput.exe,true +PerceptionSimulationService.exe,true +UNPUXHost.exe,true +UNPUXLauncher.exe,true +UpdateNotificationMgr.exe,true +FaceFodUninstaller.exe,true +wlms.exe,true +OneDriveSetup.exe,true +OposHost.exe,true \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/legit_domains.csv b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/legit_domains.csv new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b2a75bf36e --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/legit_domains.csv @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +domain, isLegit +amazon.com, True +ssl-images-amazon.com, True +facebook.com, True +xx.fbcdn.net, True +github.com, True +githubassets.com, True +instagram.com, True +linkedin.com, True +microsoftonline.com, True +office.com, True +okta.com, True +live.com, True +protonmail.com, True +reddit.com, True +redditstatic.com, True +twitter.com, True +twimg.com, True +google.com, True + diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/linux_tool_discovery_process.csv b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/linux_tool_discovery_process.csv new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..98b55d4efc --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/linux_tool_discovery_process.csv @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +process +cat /proc/version +cat /etc/*-release +/etc/passwd +cat /etc/* +lastlog +id +PermitRootLogin +sestatus * +ps +mysql* +netstat* +find * +head /var/mail/root +docker +cat /etc/issue +cat /etc/*-release +cat /proc/version +uname -a +uname -mrs +rpm -q kernel +dmesg | grep Linux +ls /boot | grep vmlinuz- +cat /etc/profile +cat /etc/bashrc +cat ~/.bash_profile +cat ~/.bashrc +cat ~/.bash_logout +ps -aux | grep root +ps -ef | grep root +crontab -l +cat /etc/cron* +cat /etc/cron.allow +cat /etc/cron.deny +cat /etc/crontab +grep -i user * +grep -i pass * +ifconfig +cat /etc/network/interfaces +cat /etc/sysconfig/network +cat /etc/resolv.conf +cat /etc/networks +cvelist-file:* +exploit-db* +strings -e /etc/apache2/apache2.conf +strings -e /etc/ssh/sshd_config +strings -e /etc/shadow +iptables -L +lsof -i +netstat -antup +netstat -antpx +netstat -tulpn +arp -e +route +cat /etc/passwd +cat /etc/group +cat /etc/shadow +find / -perm -u=s +find / -perm -g=s +find / -perm -4000 +find / -perm -2000 \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/local_file_inclusion_paths.csv b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/local_file_inclusion_paths.csv new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f0a0de38a5 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/local_file_inclusion_paths.csv @@ -0,0 +1,1009 @@ +local_file_inclusion_paths, lfi_path +*/apache2/logs/access.log*, yes +*/apache2/logs/error.log*, yes +*/apache/conf/httpd.conf*, yes +*/apache/logs/access.log*, yes +*/apache/logs/error.log*, yes +*/apache/php/php.ini*, yes +*/apachephpphp.ini*, yes +*/bin/php.ini*, yes +*/boot/grub/grub.cfg*, yes +*/boot/grub/menu.lst*, yes +*/etc/adduser.conf*, yes +*/etc/alias*, yes +*/etc/apache22/conf/httpd.conf*, yes +*/etc/apache22/httpd.conf*, yes +*/etc/apache2/apache2.conf*, yes +*/etc/apache2/apache.conf*, yes +*/etc/apache2/conf/httpd.conf*, yes +*/etc/apache2/default-server.conf*, yes +*/etc/apache2/envvars*, yes +*/etc/apache2/httpd2.conf*, yes +*/etc/apache2/httpd.conf*, yes +*/etc/apache2/mods-available/autoindex.conf*, yes +*/etc/apache2/mods-available/deflate.conf*, yes +*/etc/apache2/mods-available/dir.conf*, yes +*/etc/apache2/mods-available/mem_cache.conf*, yes +*/etc/apache2/mods-available/mime.conf*, yes +*/etc/apache2/mods-available/proxy.conf*, yes +*/etc/apache2/mods-available/setenvif.conf*, yes +*/etc/apache2/mods-available/ssl.conf*, yes +*/etc/apache2/mods-enabled/alias.conf*, yes +*/etc/apache2/mods-enabled/deflate.conf*, yes +*/etc/apache2/mods-enabled/dir.conf*, yes +*/etc/apache2/mods-enabled/mime.conf*, yes +*/etc/apache2/mods-enabled/negotiation.conf*, yes +*/etc/apache2/mods-enabled/php5.conf*, yes +*/etc/apache2/mods-enabled/status.conf*, yes +*/etc/apache2/ports.conf*, yes +*/etc/apache2/sites-available/default*, yes +*/etc/apache2/sites-available/default-ssl*, yes +*/etc/apache2/sites-enabled/000-default*, yes +*/etc/apache2/sites-enabled/default*, yes +*/etc/apache2/ssl-global.conf*, yes +*/etc/apache/access.conf*, yes +*/etc/apache/apache.conf*, yes +*/etc/apache/conf/httpd.conf*, yes +*/etc/apache/default-server.conf*, yes +*/etc/apache/httpd.conf*, yes +*/etc/apt/apt.conf*, yes +*/etc/avahi/avahi-daemon.conf*, yes +*/etc/bash.bashrc*, yes +*/etc/bluetooth/input.conf*, yes +*/etc/bluetooth/main.conf*, yes +*/etc/bluetooth/network.conf*, yes +*/etc/bluetooth/rfcomm.conf*, yes +*/etc/ca-certificates.conf*, yes +*/etc/ca-certificates.conf.dpkg-old*, yes +*/etc/casper.conf*, yes +*/etc/chkrootkit.conf*, yes +*/etc/chrootUsers*, yes +*/etc/clamav/clamd.conf*, yes +*/etc/clamav/freshclam.conf*, yes +*/etc/crontab*, yes +*/etc/crypttab*, yes +*/etc/cups/acroread.conf*, yes +*/etc/cups/cupsd.conf*, yes +*/etc/cups/cupsd.conf.default*, yes +*/etc/cups/pdftops.conf*, yes +*/etc/cups/printers.conf*, yes +*/etc/cvs-cron.conf*, yes +*/etc/cvs-pserver.conf*, yes +*/etc/debconf.conf*, yes +*/etc/debian_version*, yes +*/etc/default/grub*, yes +*/etc/deluser.conf*, yes +*/etc/dhcp3/dhclient.conf*, yes +*/etc/dhcp3/dhcpd.conf*, yes +*/etc/dhcp/dhclient.conf*, yes +*/etc/dns2tcpd.conf*, yes +*/etc/e2fsck.conf*, yes +*/etc/esound/esd.conf*, yes +*/etc/etter.conf*, yes +*/etc/exports*, yes +*/etc/fedora-release*, yes +*/etc/firewall.rules*, yes +*/etc/foremost.conf*, yes +*/etc/fstab*, yes +*/etc/ftpchroot*, yes +*/etc/ftphosts*, yes +*/etc/ftpusers*, yes +*/etc/fuse.conf*, yes +*/etc/group*, yes +*/etc/group-*, yes +*/etc/hdparm.conf*, yes +*/etc/host.conf*, yes +*/etc/hostname*, yes +*/etc/hosts*, yes +*/etc/hosts.allow*, yes +*/etc/hosts.deny*, yes +*/etc/http/conf/httpd.conf*, yes +*/etc/httpd/apache2.conf*, yes +*/etc/httpd/apache.conf*, yes +*/etc/httpd.conf*, yes +*/etc/httpd/conf*, yes +*/etc/httpd/conf/apache2.conf*, yes +*/etc/httpd/conf/apache.conf*, yes +*/etc/httpd/conf.d*, yes +*/etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf*, yes +*/etc/httpd/extra/httpd-ssl.conf*, yes +*/etc/httpd/httpd.conf*, yes +*/etc/httpd/logs/acces.log*, yes +*/etc/httpd/logs/acces_log*, yes +*/etc/httpd/logs/access.log*, yes +*/etc/httpd/logs/access_log*, yes +*/etc/httpd/logs/error.log*, yes +*/etc/httpd/logs/error_log*, yes +*/etc/httpd/mod_php.conf*, yes +*/etc/httpd/php.ini*, yes +*/etc/http/httpd.conf*, yes +*/etc/inetd.conf*, yes +*/etc/init.d*, yes +*/etc/inittab*, yes +*/etc/ipfw.conf*, yes +*/etc/ipfw.rules*, yes +*/etc/issue*, yes +*/etc/issue.net*, yes +*/etc/kbd/config*, yes +*/etc/kernel-img.conf*, yes +*/etc/kernel-pkg.conf*, yes +*/etc/ldap/ldap.conf*, yes +*/etc/ld.so.conf*, yes +*/etc/lighttpd/lighthttpd.conf*, yes +*/etc/login.defs*, yes +*/etc/logrotate.conf*, yes +*/etc/ltrace.conf*, yes +*/etc/mail/sendmail.conf*, yes +*/etc/mandrake-release*, yes +*/etc/manpath.config*, yes +*/etc/miredo.conf*, yes +*/etc/miredo/miredo.conf*, yes +*/etc/miredo/miredo-server.conf*, yes +*/etc/miredo-server.conf*, yes +*/etc/modules*, yes +*/etc/mono/config*, yes +*/etc/motd*, yes +*/etc/mtab*, yes +*/etc/mtools.conf*, yes +*/etc/muddleftpd.com*, yes +*/etc/muddleftpd/muddleftpd.conf*, yes +*/etc/muddleftpd/muddleftpd.passwd*, yes +*/etc/muddleftpd/mudlog*, yes +*/etc/muddleftpd/mudlogd.conf*, yes +*/etc/muddleftpd/passwd*, yes +*/etc/my.cnf*, yes +*/etc/mysql/my.cnf*, yes +*/etc/networks*, yes +*/etc/nginx/nginx.conf*, yes +*/etc/openldap/ldap.conf*, yes +*/etc/os-release*, yes +*/etc/osxhttpd/osxhttpd.conf*, yes +*/etc/pam.conf*, yes +*/etc/passwd*, yes +*/etc/passwd-*, yes +*/etc/passwd~*, yes +*/etc/password.master*, yes +*/etc/php4/apache2/php.ini*, yes +*/etc/php4/apache/php.ini*, yes +*/etc/php4/cgi/php.ini*, yes +*/etc/php5/apache2/php.ini*, yes +*/etc/php5/apache/php.ini*, yes +*/etc/php5/cgi/php.ini*, yes +*/etc/php/apache2/php.ini*, yes +*/etc/php/apache/php.ini*, yes +*/etc/php/cgi/php.ini*, yes +*/etc/php.ini*, yes +*/etc/phpmyadmin/config.inc.php*, yes +*/etc/php/php4/php.ini*, yes +*/etc/php/php.ini*, yes +*/etc/postgresql/pg_hba.conf*, yes +*/etc/postgresql/postgresql.conf*, yes +*/etc/profile*, yes +*/etc/proftp.conf*, yes +*/etc/proftpd/modules.conf*, yes +*/etc/protpd/proftpd.conf*, yes +*/etc/pulse/client.conf*, yes +*/etc/pure-ftpd.conf*, yes +*/etc/pureftpd.passwd*, yes +*/etc/pureftpd.pdb*, yes +*/etc/pure-ftpd/pure-ftpd.conf*, yes +*/etc/pure-ftpd/pure-ftpd.pdb*, yes +*/etc/pure-ftpd/pureftpd.pdb*, yes +*/etc/rc.conf*, yes +*/etc/redhat-release*, yes +*/etc/resolv.conf*, yes +*/etc/samba/dhcp.conf*, yes +*/etc/samba/netlogon*, yes +*/etc/samba/private/smbpasswd*, yes +*/etc/samba/samba.conf*, yes +*/etc/samba/smb.conf*, yes +*/etc/samba/smb.conf.user*, yes +*/etc/samba/smbpasswd*, yes +*/etc/samba/smbusers*, yes +*/etc/security/access.conf*, yes +*/etc/security/environ*, yes +*/etc/security/failedlogin*, yes +*/etc/security/group*, yes +*/etc/security/group.conf*, yes +*/etc/security/lastlog*, yes +*/etc/security/limits*, yes +*/etc/security/limits.conf*, yes +*/etc/security/namespace.conf*, yes +*/etc/security/opasswd*, yes +*/etc/security/pam_env.conf*, yes +*/etc/security/passwd*, yes +*/etc/security/passwd*, yes +*/etc/security/sepermit.conf*, yes +*/etc/security/time.conf*, yes +*/etc/security/user*, yes +*/etc/sensors3.conf*, yes +*/etc/sensors.conf*, yes +*/etc/shadow*, yes +*/etc/shadow-*, yes +*/etc/shadow~*, yes +*/etc/slackware-release*, yes +*/etc/smb.conf*, yes +*/etc/smbpasswd*, yes +*/etc/smi.conf*, yes +*/etc/squirrelmail/apache.conf*, yes +*/etc/squirrelmail/config/config.php*, yes +*/etc/squirrelmail/config_default.php*, yes +*/etc/squirrelmail/config_local.php*, yes +*/etc/squirrelmail/config.php*, yes +*/etc/squirrelmail/default_pref*, yes +*/etc/squirrelmail/filters_setup.php*, yes +*/etc/squirrelmail/index.php*, yes +*/etc/squirrelmail/sqspell_config.php*, yes +*/etc/ssh/sshd_config*, yes +*/etc/sso/sso_config.ini*, yes +*/etc/stunnel/stunnel.conf*, yes +*/etc/sudoers*, yes +*/etc/SUSE-release*, yes +*/etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/ifcfg-eth0*, yes +*/etc/sysctl.conf*, yes +*/etc/syslog.conf*, yes +*/etc/timezone*, yes +*/etc/tinyproxy/tinyproxy.conf*, yes +*/etc/tor/tor-tsocks.conf*, yes +*/etc/tsocks.conf*, yes +*/etc/updatedb.conf*, yes +*/etc/updatedb.conf.BeforeVMwareToolsInstall*, yes +*/etc/utmp*, yes +*/etc/vhcs2/proftpd/proftpd.conf*, yes +*/etc/vmware-tools/config*, yes +*/etc/vmware-tools/tpvmlp.conf*, yes +*/etc/vmware-tools/vmware-tools-libraries.conf*, yes +*/etc/vsftpd.chroot_list*, yes +*/etc/vsftpd.conf*, yes +*/etc/vsftpd/vsftpd.conf*, yes +*/etc/webmin/miniserv.conf*, yes +*/etc/webmin/miniserv.users*, yes +*/etc/wicd/dhclient.conf.template.default*, yes +*/etc/wicd/manager-settings.conf*, yes +*/etc/wicd/wired-settings.conf*, yes +*/etc/wicd/wireless-settings.conf*, yes +*/etc/wu-ftpd/ftpaccess*, yes +*/etc/wu-ftpd/ftphosts*, yes +*/etc/wu-ftpd/ftpusers*, yes +*/etc/X11/xorg.conf*, yes +*/etc/X11/xorg.conf.BeforeVMwareToolsInstall*, yes +*/etc/X11/xorg.conf.orig*, yes +*/etc/X11/xorg.conf-vesa*, yes +*/etc/X11/xorg.conf-vmware*, yes +*/home2/bin/stable/apache/php.ini*, yes +*/home2binstableapachephp.ini*, yes +*/home/bin/stable/apache/php.ini*, yes +*/homebinstableapachephp.ini*, yes +*/home/postgres/data/pg_hba.conf*, yes +*/home/postgres/data/pg_ident.conf*, yes +*/home/postgres/data/PG_VERSION*, yes +*/home/postgres/data/postgresql.conf*, yes +*/home/user/lighttpd/lighttpd.conf*, yes +*/http/httpd.conf*, yes +*/[JBOSS]/server/default/conf/jboss-minimal.xml*, yes +*/[JBOSS]/server/default/conf/jboss-service.xml*, yes +*/[JBOSS]/server/default/conf/jndi.properties*, yes +*/[JBOSS]/server/default/conf/log4j.xml*, yes +*/[JBOSS]/server/default/conf/login-config.xml*, yes +*/[JBOSS]/server/default/conf/server.log.properties*, yes +*/[JBOSS]/server/default/conf/standardjaws.xml*, yes +*/[JBOSS]/server/default/conf/standardjboss.xml*, yes +*/[JBOSS]/server/default/deploy/jboss-logging.xml*, yes +*/[JBOSS]/server/default/log/boot.log*, yes +*/[JBOSS]/server/default/log/server.log*, yes +*/Library/WebServer/Documents/default.htm*, yes +*/Library/WebServer/Documents/default.html*, yes +*/Library/WebServer/Documents/default.php*, yes +*/Library/WebServer/Documents/.htaccess*, yes +*/Library/WebServer/Documents/index.htm*, yes +*/Library/WebServer/Documents/index.html*, yes +*/Library/WebServer/Documents/index.php*, yes +*/logs/access.log*, yes +*/logs/access_log*, yes +*/logs/error.log*, yes +*/logs/error_log*, yes +*/logs/pure-ftpd.log*, yes +*/logs/security_debug_log*, yes +*/logs/security_log*, yes +*/mysql/bin/my.ini*, yes +*/MySQL/data/{HOST}.err*, yes +*/MySQL/data/mysql-bin.index*, yes +*/MySQL/data/mysql-bin.log*, yes +*/MySQL/data/mysql.err*, yes +*/MySQL/data/mysql.log*, yes +*/MySQL/my.cnf*, yes +*/MySQL/my.ini*, yes +*/NetServer/bin/stable/apache/php.ini*, yes +*/NetServerbinstableapachephp.ini*, yes +*/opt/apache22/conf/httpd.conf*, yes +*/opt/apache2/apache2.conf*, yes +*/opt/apache2/apache.conf*, yes +*/opt/apache2/conf/apache2.conf*, yes +*/opt/apache2/conf/apache.conf*, yes +*/opt/apache2/conf/httpd.conf*, yes +*/opt/apache/apache2.conf*, yes +*/opt/apache/apache.conf*, yes +*/opt/apache/conf/apache2.conf*, yes +*/opt/apache/conf/apache.conf*, yes +*/opt/apache/conf/httpd.conf*, yes +*/opt/httpd/apache2.conf*, yes +*/opt/httpd/apache.conf*, yes +*/opt/httpd/conf/apache2.conf*, yes +*/opt/httpd/conf/apache.conf*, yes +*/opt/[JBOSS]/server/default/conf/jboss-minimal.xml*, yes +*/opt/[JBOSS]/server/default/conf/jboss-service.xml*, yes +*/opt/[JBOSS]/server/default/conf/jndi.properties*, yes +*/opt/[JBOSS]/server/default/conf/log4j.xml*, yes +*/opt/[JBOSS]/server/default/conf/login-config.xml*, yes +*/opt/[JBOSS]/server/default/conf/server.log.properties*, yes +*/opt/[JBOSS]/server/default/conf/standardjaws.xml*, yes +*/opt/[JBOSS]/server/default/conf/standardjboss.xml*, yes +*/opt/[JBOSS]/server/default/deploy/jboss-logging.xml*, yes +*/opt/[JBOSS]/server/default/log/boot.log*, yes +*/opt/[JBOSS]/server/default/log/server.log*, yes +*/opt/lampp/etc/httpd.conf*, yes +*/opt/lampp/logs/access.log*, yes +*/opt/lampp/logs/access_log*, yes +*/opt/lampp/logs/error.log*, yes +*/opt/lampp/logs/error_log*, yes +*/opt/lsws/conf/httpd_conf.xml*, yes +*/opt/lsws/logs/access.log*, yes +*/opt/lsws/logs/error.log*, yes +*/opt/tomcat/logs/catalina.err*, yes +*/opt/tomcat/logs/catalina.out*, yes +*/opt/xampp/etc/php.ini*, yes +*/opt/xampp/logs/access.log*, yes +*/opt/xampp/logs/access_log*, yes +*/opt/xampp/logs/error.log*, yes +*/opt/xampp/logs/error_log*, yes +*/private/etc/httpd/apache2.conf*, yes +*/private/etc/httpd/apache.conf*, yes +*/private/etc/httpd/httpd.conf*, yes +*/private/etc/httpd/httpd.conf.default*, yes +*/private/etc/squirrelmail/config/config.php*, yes +*/private/tmp/[JBOSS]/server/default/conf/jboss-minimal.xml*, yes +*/private/tmp/[JBOSS]/server/default/conf/jboss-service.xml*, yes +*/private/tmp/[JBOSS]/server/default/conf/jndi.properties*, yes +*/private/tmp/[JBOSS]/server/default/conf/log4j.xml*, yes +*/private/tmp/[JBOSS]/server/default/conf/login-config.xml*, yes +*/private/tmp/[JBOSS]/server/default/conf/server.log.properties*, yes +*/private/tmp/[JBOSS]/server/default/conf/standardjaws.xml*, yes +*/private/tmp/[JBOSS]/server/default/conf/standardjboss.xml*, yes +*/private/tmp/[JBOSS]/server/default/deploy/jboss-logging.xml*, yes +*/private/tmp/[JBOSS]/server/default/log/boot.log*, yes +*/private/tmp/[JBOSS]/server/default/log/server.log*, yes +*/proc/cpuinfo*, yes +*/proc/devices*, yes +*/proc/meminfo*, yes +*/proc/net/tcp*, yes +*/proc/net/udp*, yes +*/proc/self/cmdline*, yes +*/proc/self/environ*, yes +*/proc/self/mounts*, yes +*/proc/self/stat*, yes +*/proc/self/status*, yes +*/proc/version*, yes +*/Program Files/Apache Group/Apache2/conf/apache2.conf*, yes +*/Program Files/Apache Group/Apache2/conf/apache.conf*, yes +*/Program Files/Apache Group/Apache2/conf/httpd.conf*, yes +*/Program FilesApache GroupApache2confhttpd.conf*, yes +*/Program Files/Apache Group/Apache/apache2.conf*, yes +*/Program Files/Apache Group/Apache/apache.conf*, yes +*/Program Files/Apache Group/Apache/conf/apache2.conf*, yes 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+*/var/postgresql/db/postgresql.conf*, yes +*/var/postgresql/log/postgresql.log*, yes +*/var/saf/_log*, yes +*/var/saf/port/log*, yes +*/var/spool/cron/crontabs/root*, yes +*/var/spool/cron/crontabs/root*, yes +*/var/www/conf*, yes +*/var/www/conf/httpd.conf*, yes +*/var/www/html/squirrelmail/config/config.php*, yes +*/var/www/.lighttpdpassword*, yes +*/var/www/logs/access.log*, yes +*/var/www/logs/access_log*, yes +*/var/www/logs/error.log*, yes +*/var/www/logs/error_log*, yes +*/var/www/squirrelmail/config/config.php*, yes +*/Volumes/Macintosh_HD1/opt/apache2/conf/httpd.conf*, yes +*/Volumes/Macintosh_HD1/opt/apache/conf/httpd.conf*, yes +*/Volumes/Macintosh_HD1/opt/httpd/conf/httpd.conf*, yes +*/Volumes/Macintosh_HD1/usr/local/php4/httpd.conf.php*, yes +*/Volumes/Macintosh_HD1/usr/local/php5/httpd.conf.php*, yes +*/Volumes/Macintosh_HD1/usr/local/php/httpd.conf.php*, yes +*/Volumes/Macintosh_HD1/usr/local/php/lib/php.ini*, yes +*/Volumes/webBackup/opt/apache2/conf/httpd.conf*, yes +*/Volumes/webBackup/private/etc/httpd/httpd.conf*, yes +*/Volumes/webBackup/private/etc/httpd/httpd.conf.default*, yes +*/wamp/bin/apache/apache2.2.21/conf/httpd.conf*, yes +*/wamp/bin/apache/apache2.2.21/logs/access.log*, yes +*/wamp/bin/apache/apache2.2.21/logs/error.log*, yes +*/wamp/bin/apache/apache2.2.21/wampserver.conf*, yes +*/wamp/bin/apache/apache2.2.22/conf/httpd.conf*, yes +*/wamp/bin/apache/apache2.2.22/conf/wampserver.conf*, yes +*/wamp/bin/apache/apache2.2.22/logs/access.log*, yes +*/wamp/bin/apache/apache2.2.22/logs/error.log*, yes +*/wamp/bin/apache/apache2.2.22/wampserver.conf*, yes +*/wamp/bin/mysql/mysql5.5.16/data/mysql-bin.index*, yes +*/wamp/bin/mysql/mysql5.5.16/my.ini*, yes +*/wamp/bin/mysql/mysql5.5.16/wampserver.conf*, yes +*/wamp/bin/mysql/mysql5.5.24/data/mysql-bin.index*, yes +*/wamp/bin/mysql/mysql5.5.24/my.ini*, yes +*/wamp/bin/mysql/mysql5.5.24/wampserver.conf*, yes +*/wamp/logs/access.log*, yes +*/wamp/logs/apache_error.log*, yes +*/wamp/logs/genquery.log*, yes +*/wamp/logs/mysql.log*, yes +*/wamp/logs/slowquery.log*, yes +*/web/conf/php.ini*, yes +*/WINDOWS/php.ini*, yes +*/WINDOWSphp.ini*, yes +*/WINDOWS/system32/logfiles/MSFTPSVC*, yes +*/WINDOWS/system32/logfiles/MSFTPSVC1*, yes +*/WINDOWS/system32/logfiles/MSFTPSVC2*, yes +*/WINDOWS/system32/logfiles/SMTPSVC*, yes +*/WINDOWS/system32/logfiles/SMTPSVC1*, yes +*/WINDOWS/system32/logfiles/SMTPSVC2*, yes +*/WINDOWS/system32/logfiles/SMTPSVC3*, yes +*/WINDOWS/system32/logfiles/SMTPSVC4*, yes +*/WINDOWS/system32/logfiles/SMTPSVC5*, yes +*/WINDOWS/system32/logfiles/W3SVC1/inetsvn1.log*, yes +*/WINDOWS/system32/logfiles/W3SVC2/inetsvn1.log*, yes +*/WINDOWS/system32/logfiles/W3SVC3/inetsvn1.log*, yes +*/WINDOWS/system32/logfiles/W3SVC/inetsvn1.log*, yes +*/WINNT/php.ini*, yes +*/WINNTphp.ini*, yes +*/WINNT/system32/logfiles/MSFTPSVC*, yes +*/WINNT/system32/logfiles/MSFTPSVC1*, yes +*/WINNT/system32/logfiles/MSFTPSVC2*, yes +*/WINNT/system32/logfiles/SMTPSVC*, yes +*/WINNT/system32/logfiles/SMTPSVC1*, yes +*/WINNT/system32/logfiles/SMTPSVC2*, yes +*/WINNT/system32/logfiles/SMTPSVC3*, yes +*/WINNT/system32/logfiles/SMTPSVC4*, yes +*/WINNT/system32/logfiles/SMTPSVC5*, yes +*/WINNT/system32/logfiles/W3SVC1/inetsvn1.log*, yes +*/WINNT/system32/logfiles/W3SVC2/inetsvn1.log*, yes +*/WINNT/system32/logfiles/W3SVC3/inetsvn1.log*, yes +*/WINNT/system32/logfiles/W3SVC/inetsvn1.log*, yes +*/www/apache/conf/httpd.conf*, yes +*/www/conf/httpd.conf*, yes +*/www/logs/freebsddiary-access_log*, yes +*/www/logs/freebsddiary-error.log*, yes +*/www/logs/proftpd.system.log*, yes +*/xampp/apache/bin/php.ini*, yes +*/xamppapachebinphp.ini*, yes +*/xampp/apache/conf/httpd.conf*, yes +*/xampp/apache/logs/access.log*, yes +*/xampp/apache/logs/error.log*, yes +*/xampp/FileZillaFTP/FileZilla Server.xml*, yes +*/xampp/htdocs/aca.txt*, yes +*/xampp/htdocs/admin.php*, yes +*/xampp/htdocs/leer.txt*, yes +*/xampp/MercuryMail/mercury.ini*, yes +*/xampp/mysql/data/{HOST}.err*, yes +*/xampp/mysql/data/mysql-bin.index*, yes +*/xampp/mysql/data/mysql.err*, yes +*/xampp/phpMyAdmin/config.inc.php*, yes +*/xampp/php/php.ini*, yes +*/xampp/sendmail/sendmail.ini*, yes +*/xampp/sendmail/sendmail.log*, yes +*/xampp/webalizer/webalizer.conf*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/0*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/1*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/2*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/3*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/4*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/5*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/6*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/7*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/8*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/9*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/10*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/11*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/12*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/13*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/14*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/15*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/16*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/17*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/18*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/19*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/20*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/21*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/22*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/23*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/24*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/25*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/26*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/27*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/28*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/29*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/30*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/31*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/32*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/33*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/34*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/35*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/36*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/37*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/38*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/39*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/40*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/41*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/42*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/43*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/44*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/45*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/46*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/47*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/48*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/49*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/50*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/51*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/52*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/53*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/54*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/55*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/56*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/57*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/58*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/59*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/60*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/61*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/62*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/63*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/64*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/65*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/66*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/67*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/68*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/69*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/70*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/71*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/72*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/73*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/74*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/75*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/76*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/77*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/78*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/79*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/80*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/81*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/82*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/83*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/84*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/85*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/86*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/87*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/88*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/89*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/90*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/91*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/92*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/93*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/94*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/95*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/96*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/97*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/98*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/99*, yes +*/proc/self/fd/100*, yes \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/mandatory_job_for_workflow.csv b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/mandatory_job_for_workflow.csv new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..595421e7b6 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/mandatory_job_for_workflow.csv @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +workflow_name, job_name +deployment, k8s-security \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/mandatory_step_for_job.csv b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/mandatory_step_for_job.csv new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..10e1d44cfc --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/mandatory_step_for_job.csv @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +job_name, step_name +k8s-security, Run Kube Hunter \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/mitre_enrichment.csv b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/mitre_enrichment.csv new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0717cbc6ba --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/mitre_enrichment.csv @@ -0,0 +1,440 @@ +mitre_id,technique,tactics,groups +T1205.001,Port Knocking,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,no +T1564.006,Run Virtual Instance,Defense Evasion,no +T1564.005,Hidden File System,Defense Evasion,Strider|Equation +T1556.003,Pluggable Authentication Modules,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no +T1574.012,COR_PROFILER,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Blue Mockingbird +T1562.007,Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall,Defense Evasion,no +T1098.004,SSH Authorized Keys,Persistence,no +T1480.001,Environmental Keying,Defense Evasion,APT41|Equation +T1059.007,JavaScript/JScript,Execution,APT32|FIN7|Cobalt Group|Molerats|TA505|Silence|Leafminer +T1578.004,Revert Cloud Instance,Defense Evasion,no +T1578.003,Delete Cloud Instance,Defense Evasion,no +T1578.001,Create Snapshot,Defense Evasion,no +T1578.002,Create Cloud Instance,Defense Evasion,no +T1127.001,MSBuild,Defense Evasion,Frankenstein +T1027.005,Indicator Removal from Tools,Defense Evasion,Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|APT3|Turla|OilRig|Deep Panda +T1562.006,Indicator Blocking,Defense Evasion,no +T1573.002,Asymmetric Cryptography,Command And Control,Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|OilRig|FIN8|FIN6 +T1573.001,Symmetric Cryptography,Command And Control,Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|APT33|BRONZE BUTLER|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group +T1573,Encrypted Channel,Command And Control,Tropic Trooper +T1027.004,Compile After Delivery,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Rocke|MuddyWater +T1574.004,Dylib Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no +T1546.015,Component Object Model Hijacking,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,APT28 +T1071.004,DNS,Command And Control,APT39|Tropic Trooper|OilRig|Ke3chang|Cobalt Group|APT18|APT41|FIN7 +T1071.003,Mail Protocols,Command And Control,APT32|SilverTerrier|APT28 +T1071.002,File Transfer Protocols,Command And Control,APT41|SilverTerrier|Machete|Honeybee +T1071.001,Web Protocols,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|TA505|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Inception|APT41|SilverTerrier|Machete|APT28|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|APT38|Cobalt Group|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Rancor|Orangeworm|APT37|Ke3chang|Dark Caracal|Turla|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|OilRig|Magic Hound|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon +T1572,Protocol Tunneling,Command And Control,OilRig|Cobalt Group|FIN6 +T1048.003,Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,APT32|APT33|Thrip|FIN8|OilRig|Lazarus Group +T1048.002,Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,no +T1048.001,Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,no +T1001.003,Protocol Impersonation,Command And Control,Lazarus Group +T1001.002,Steganography,Command And Control,Axiom +T1001.001,Junk Data,Command And Control,APT28 +T1132.002,Non-Standard Encoding,Command And Control,no +T1132.001,Standard Encoding,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT33|APT19|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork +T1090.004,Domain Fronting,Command And Control,APT29 +T1090.003,Multi-hop Proxy,Command And Control,Inception|FIN4|APT29 +T1090.002,External Proxy,Command And Control,APT39|Silence|Soft Cell|MuddyWater|APT3|FIN5|Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT28 +T1090.001,Internal Proxy,Command And Control,APT39|Strider +T1102.003,One-Way Communication,Command And Control,Leviathan +T1102.002,Bidirectional Communication,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|APT39|APT12|Turla|FIN7|APT37|Magic Hound|Carbanak +T1102.001,Dead Drop Resolver,Command And Control,Rocke|APT41|BRONZE BUTLER|RTM|Patchwork +T1571,Non-Standard Port,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Rocke|DarkVishnya|Silence|APT-C-36|Magic Hound|APT33|APT32|TEMP.Veles|Lazarus Group|FIN7 +T1074.002,Remote Data Staging,Collection,Threat Group-3390|menuPass|FIN6|Night Dragon|FIN8 +T1074.001,Local Data Staging,Collection,Machete|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|Leviathan|APT3|FIN5|menuPass|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28 +T1078.004,Cloud Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,APT33 +T1564.004,NTFS File Attributes,Defense Evasion,APT32 +T1564.003,Hidden Window,Defense Evasion,Gorgon Group|Deep Panda|DarkHydrus|CopyKittens|APT19|APT32|APT28|APT3|Magic Hound +T1078.003,Local Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Tropic Trooper|FIN10|Stolen Pencil|APT32 +T1078.002,Domain Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,TA505|APT3|Threat Group-1314 +T1078.001,Default Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,no +T1564.002,Hidden Users,Defense Evasion,no +T1574.006,LD_PRELOAD,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Rocke +T1574.002,DLL Side-Loading,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,BRONZE BUTLER|Naikon|APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|Patchwork|APT19|APT32|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390 +T1574.001,DLL Search Order Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Whitefly|RTM|Threat Group-3390|menuPass +T1574.008,Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no +T1574.007,Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no +T1574.009,Path Interception by Unquoted Path,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no +T1574.011,Services Registry Permissions Weakness,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no +T1574.005,Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no +T1574.010,Services File Permissions Weakness,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no +T1574,Hijack Execution Flow,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no +T1069.001,Local Groups,Discovery,Turla|OilRig|admin@338 +T1570,Lateral Tool Transfer,Lateral Movement,APT32|Wizard Spider|Turla|FIN10 +T1568.003,DNS Calculation,Command And Control,APT12 +T1204.002,Malicious File,Execution,Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|RTM|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|DarkHydrus|Gorgon Group|Patchwork|OilRig|Dark Caracal|MuddyWater|Lazarus Group|FIN7|APT32|Rancor|APT37|FIN8|APT28|Elderwood|TA459|APT29|Leviathan|menuPass|PLATINUM +T1204.001,Malicious Link,Execution,Patchwork|Windshift|APT32|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|TA505|OilRig|Machete|Leviathan|FIN8|FIN4|Elderwood|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|APT39|Night Dragon|APT33|Turla +T1195.003,Compromise Hardware Supply Chain,Initial Access,no +T1195.002,Compromise Software Supply Chain,Initial Access,Sandworm Team|APT41 +T1195.001,Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools,Initial Access,no +T1568.001,Fast Flux DNS,Command And Control,TA505 +T1052.001,Exfiltration over USB,Exfiltration,Tropic Trooper +T1569.002,Service Execution,Execution,Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT41|Silence|FIN6|APT32|Honeybee|Ke3chang +T1569.001,Launchctl,Execution,no +T1569,System Services,Execution,no +T1568.002,Domain Generation Algorithms,Command And Control,APT41 +T1568,Dynamic Resolution,Command And Control,no +T1011.001,Exfiltration Over Bluetooth,Exfiltration,no +T1567.002,Exfiltration to Cloud Storage,Exfiltration,Leviathan|Turla +T1567.001,Exfiltration to Code Repository,Exfiltration,no +T1059.006,Python,Execution,Rocke|BRONZE BUTLER|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Machete +T1059.005,Visual Basic,Execution,APT33|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|Rancor|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Honeybee|FIN7|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|FIN4|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|TA459|Magic Hound +T1059.004,Unix Shell,Execution,Rocke|APT41 +T1059.003,Windows Command Shell,Execution,TA505|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Silence|APT32|APT39|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Dark Caracal|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Rancor|Ke3chang|APT37|Leviathan|FIN8|APT28|Magic Hound|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Gamaredon Group|Suckfly|Patchwork|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1 +T1059.002,AppleScript,Execution,no +T1059.001,PowerShell,Execution,Blue Mockingbird|APT39|DarkVishnya|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Inception|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|Turla|APT19|DarkHydrus|APT28|Thrip|Gorgon Group|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|TA459|FIN8|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|APT32|FIN7|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda +T1567,Exfiltration Over Web Service,Exfiltration,no +T1497.003,Time Based Evasion,Defense Evasion|Discovery,no +T1497.002,User Activity Based Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,FIN7 +T1497.001,System Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,Frankenstein +T1498.002,Reflection Amplification,Impact,no +T1498.001,Direct Network Flood,Impact,no +T1566.003,Spearphishing via Service,Initial Access,Magic Hound|Windshift|FIN6|OilRig|Dark Caracal +T1566.002,Spearphishing Link,Initial Access,Windshift|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|Turla|APT28|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|APT33|Elderwood|Leviathan|Magic Hound|Patchwork|APT29|FIN8 +T1566.001,Spearphishing Attachment,Initial Access,Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Mofang|Wizard Spider|RTM|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|Turla|Gorgon Group|Rancor|DarkHydrus|Cobalt Group|FIN7|OilRig|Lazarus Group|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|FIN8|MuddyWater|APT28|TA459|Leviathan|Patchwork|PLATINUM|Elderwood|APT29|APT37|menuPass +T1566,Phishing,Initial Access,no +T1565.003,Runtime Data Manipulation,Impact,APT38 +T1565.002,Transmitted Data Manipulation,Impact,APT38 +T1565.001,Stored Data Manipulation,Impact,FIN4|APT38 +T1565,Data Manipulation,Impact,no +T1564.001,Hidden Files and Directories,Defense Evasion,Rocke|APT32|Tropic Trooper|APT28|Lazarus Group +T1564,Hide Artifacts,Defense Evasion,no +T1563.002,RDP Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no +T1563.001,SSH Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no +T1563,Remote Service Session Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no +T1518.001,Security Software Discovery,Discovery,Turla|Rocke|Frankenstein|The White Company|Cobalt Group|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|Tropic Trooper|FIN8|Patchwork|Naikon +T1069.003,Cloud Groups,Discovery,no +T1069.002,Domain Groups,Discovery,Turla|Wizard Spider|Inception|OilRig|FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang +T1087.004,Cloud Account,Discovery,no +T1087.003,Email Account,Discovery,Sandworm Team|TA505 +T1087.002,Domain Account,Discovery,Turla|Sandworm Team|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Ke3chang +T1087.001,Local Account,Discovery,Turla|Poseidon Group|OilRig|Ke3chang|APT32|APT1|Threat Group-3390|APT3|admin@338 +T1553.004,Install Root Certificate,Defense Evasion,no +T1562.004,Disable or Modify System Firewall,Defense Evasion,Rocke|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|Dragonfly 2.0|Carbanak +T1562.003,HISTCONTROL,Defense Evasion,no +T1562.002,Disable Windows Event Logging,Defense Evasion,Threat Group-3390 +T1562.001,Disable or Modify Tools,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Rocke|Kimsuky|Turla|Night Dragon|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda +T1562,Impair Defenses,Defense Evasion,no +T1003.004,LSA Secrets,Credential Access,OilRig|MuddyWater|menuPass|Leafminer|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|APT33|Threat Group-3390 +T1003.005,Cached Domain Credentials,Credential Access,OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33 +T1561.002,Disk Structure Wipe,Impact,Sandworm Team|Lazarus Group|APT38|APT37 +T1561.001,Disk Content Wipe,Impact,Lazarus Group +T1561,Disk Wipe,Impact,no +T1560.003,Archive via Custom Method,Collection,Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|CopyKittens|FIN6 +T1560.002,Archive via Library,Collection,Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390 +T1560.001,Archive via Utility,Collection,APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Gallmaker|APT33|APT39|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|APT3|Sowbug|menuPass|APT1|Ke3chang +T1560,Archive Collected Data,Collection,menuPass|APT32|Honeybee|Patchwork|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang +T1499.004,Application or System Exploitation,Impact,no +T1499.003,Application Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no +T1499.002,Service Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no +T1499.001,OS Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no +T1491.002,External Defacement,Impact,no +T1491.001,Internal Defacement,Impact,Lazarus Group +T1114.003,Email Forwarding Rule,Collection,no +T1114.002,Remote Email Collection,Collection,APT1|FIN4|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang|Leafminer +T1114.001,Local Email Collection,Collection,Magic Hound|APT1 +T1134.005,SID-History Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no +T1134.004,Parent PID Spoofing,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no +T1134.003,Make and Impersonate Token,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no +T1134.002,Create Process with Token,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Turla|Lazarus Group +T1134.001,Token Impersonation/Theft,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT28 +T1213.002,Sharepoint,Collection,Ke3chang|APT28 +T1213.001,Confluence,Collection,no +T1555.003,Credentials from Web Browsers,Credential Access,Magic Hound|Sandworm Team|Inception|Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Leafminer|APT33|APT3|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT37|Patchwork|Molerats +T1555.002,Securityd Memory,Credential Access,no +T1555.001,Keychain,Credential Access,no +T1559.002,Dynamic Data Exchange,Execution,Sharpshooter|TA505|MuddyWater|Gallmaker|Patchwork|Cobalt Group|APT37|APT28|FIN7 +T1559.001,Component Object Model,Execution,Gamaredon Group|MuddyWater +T1559,Inter-Process Communication,Execution,no +T1558.002,Silver Ticket,Credential Access,no +T1558.001,Golden Ticket,Credential Access,Ke3chang +T1558,Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets,Credential Access,no +T1557.001,LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay,Credential Access|Collection,no +T1557,Man-in-the-Middle,Credential Access|Collection,no +T1556.002,Password Filter DLL,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,Strider +T1556.001,Domain Controller Authentication,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no +T1556,Modify Authentication Process,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no +T1056.004,Credential API Hooking,Collection|Credential Access,PLATINUM +T1056.003,Web Portal Capture,Collection|Credential Access,no +T1056.002,GUI Input Capture,Collection|Credential Access,FIN4 +T1056.001,Keylogging,Collection|Credential Access,APT32|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT41|Kimsuky|menuPass|Stolen Pencil|FIN4|APT38|Ke3chang|OilRig|PLATINUM|Sowbug|Magic Hound|Group5|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Darkhotel|APT28 +T1555,Credentials from Password Stores,Credential Access,APT39|OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33|Turla|Stealth Falcon +T1552.005,Cloud Instance Metadata API,Credential Access,no +T1003.008,/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow,Credential Access,no +T1003.007,Proc Filesystem,Credential Access,no +T1003.006,DCSync,Credential Access,no +T1558.003,Kerberoasting,Credential Access,no +T1552.006,Group Policy Preferences,Credential Access,APT33 +T1003.003,NTDS,Credential Access,FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0 +T1003.002,Security Account Manager,Credential Access,Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass +T1003.001,LSASS Memory,Credential Access,Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Blue Mockingbird|Silence|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Stolen Pencil|APT32|Lazarus Group|Leafminer|Magic Hound|MuddyWater|PLATINUM|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|FIN6|APT3|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver +T1110.004,Credential Stuffing,Credential Access,no +T1110.003,Password Spraying,Credential Access,APT33|Leafminer|Lazarus Group +T1110.002,Password Cracking,Credential Access,APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3 +T1110.001,Password Guessing,Credential Access,no +T1021.006,Windows Remote Management,Lateral Movement,Threat Group-3390 +T1021.005,VNC,Lateral Movement,GCMAN +T1021.004,SSH,Lateral Movement,Rocke|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|OilRig|menuPass|GCMAN +T1021.003,Distributed Component Object Model,Lateral Movement,no +T1021.002,SMB/Windows Admin Shares,Lateral Movement,Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT32|Orangeworm|FIN8|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang +T1021.001,Remote Desktop Protocol,Lateral Movement,Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Stolen Pencil|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT3|OilRig|menuPass|FIN10|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom +T1554,Compromise Client Software Binary,Persistence,no +T1036.006,Space after Filename,Defense Evasion,no +T1036.005,Match Legitimate Name or Location,Defense Evasion,Rocke|Sandworm Team|APT39|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Silence|APT41|menuPass|TEMP.Veles|MuddyWater|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|APT32|Patchwork|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Carbanak|APT1 +T1036.004,Masquerade Task or Service,Defense Evasion,Wizard Spider|APT-C-36|Carbanak|APT32|FIN6|FIN7 +T1036.003,Rename System Utilities,Defense Evasion,menuPass|APT32|Soft Cell|PLATINUM +T1036.002,Right-to-Left Override,Defense Evasion,BRONZE BUTLER|BlackTech|Ke3chang|Scarlet Mimic +T1036.001,Invalid Code Signature,Defense Evasion,Windshift +T1553.003,SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking,Defense Evasion,no +T1553.002,Code Signing,Defense Evasion,Patchwork|Silence|APT41|FIN6|TA505|FIN7|Honeybee|Leviathan|APT37|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel +T1553.001,Gatekeeper Bypass,Defense Evasion,no +T1553,Subvert Trust Controls,Defense Evasion,no +T1027.003,Steganography,Defense Evasion,BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT37 +T1027.002,Software Packing,Defense Evasion,TA505|Rocke|Soft Cell|The White Company|APT39|APT38|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|APT3|Patchwork|APT29|Night Dragon +T1027.001,Binary Padding,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|APT32|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|Moafee +T1222.002,Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,Rocke|APT32 +T1222.001,Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,no +T1552.004,Private Keys,Credential Access,Rocke +T1552.003,Bash History,Credential Access,no +T1552.002,Credentials in Registry,Credential Access,APT32 +T1552.001,Credentials In Files,Credential Access,Leafminer|APT33|OilRig|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT3 +T1552,Unsecured Credentials,Credential Access,no +T1216.001,PubPrn,Defense Evasion,APT32 +T1070.006,Timestomp,Defense Evasion,Rocke|TEMP.Veles|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT28 +T1070.005,Network Share Connection Removal,Defense Evasion,Threat Group-3390 +T1070.004,File Deletion,Defense Evasion,Sandworm Team|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Wizard Spider|APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|Patchwork|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass|FIN8|OilRig|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT3|FIN10|APT28|Threat Group-3390|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29 +T1070.003,Clear Command History,Defense Evasion,APT41 +T1550.004,Web Session Cookie,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,no +T1550.001,Application Access Token,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT28 +T1550.003,Pass the Ticket,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|APT29 +T1550.002,Pass the Hash,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,Soft Cell|APT32|Night Dragon|APT28|APT1 +T1550,Use Alternate Authentication Material,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,no +T1548.004,Elevated Execution with Prompt,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no +T1548.003,Sudo and Sudo Caching,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no +T1548.002,Bypass User Access Control,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,APT37|MuddyWater|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|APT29 +T1548.001,Setuid and Setgid,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no +T1548,Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no +T1136.003,Cloud Account,Persistence,no +T1070.002,Clear Linux or Mac System Logs,Defense Evasion,Rocke +T1070.001,Clear Windows Event Logs,Defense Evasion,APT41|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|FIN8|FIN5|APT28 +T1136.002,Domain Account,Persistence,Soft Cell +T1136.001,Local Account,Persistence,APT39|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|APT3 +T1547.011,Plist Modification,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no +T1547.010,Port Monitors,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no +T1547.009,Shortcut Modification,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,APT39|Darkhotel|APT29|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|Lazarus Group +T1547.008,LSASS Driver,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no +T1547.007,Re-opened Applications,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no +T1547.006,Kernel Modules and Extensions,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no +T1547.005,Security Support Provider,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no +T1547.004,Winlogon Helper DLL,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Tropic Trooper|Turla +T1547.003,Time Providers,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no +T1546.014,Emond,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no +T1546.013,PowerShell Profile,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Turla +T1546.012,Image File Execution Options Injection,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,TEMP.Veles +T1218.008,Odbcconf,Defense Evasion,Cobalt Group +T1546.011,Application Shimming,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,FIN7 +T1547.002,Authentication Package,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no +T1546.010,AppInit DLLs,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no +T1546.009,AppCert DLLs,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Honeybee +T1218.007,Msiexec,Defense Evasion,TA505|Rancor +T1546.008,Accessibility Features,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,APT41|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda|Axiom +T1546.007,Netsh Helper DLL,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no +T1546.006,LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no +T1546.005,Trap,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no +T1546.004,.bash_profile and .bashrc,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no +T1546.003,Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,APT33|Blue Mockingbird|Turla|Leviathan|APT29 +T1546.002,Screensaver,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no +T1546.001,Change Default File Association,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Kimsuky +T1547.001,Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Silence|RTM|Inception|APT41|Machete|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Turla|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Gorgon Group|Ke3chang|APT19|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT3|FIN10|FIN7|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel +T1218.002,Control Panel,Defense Evasion,no +T1218.010,Regsvr32,Defense Evasion,Blue Mockingbird|Inception|WIRTE|Cobalt Group|APT19|Leviathan|APT32|Deep Panda +T1218.009,Regsvcs/Regasm,Defense Evasion,no +T1218.005,Mshta,Defense Evasion,Inception|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|FIN7 +T1218.004,InstallUtil,Defense Evasion,no +T1218.001,Compiled HTML File,Defense Evasion,APT41|Silence|Lazarus Group|Dark Caracal|OilRig +T1218.003,CMSTP,Defense Evasion,Cobalt Group|MuddyWater +T1218.011,Rundll32,Defense Evasion,APT32|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|TA505|MuddyWater|APT29|APT19|CopyKittens|APT3|Carbanak|APT28 +T1547,Boot or Logon Autostart Execution,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no +T1546,Event Triggered Execution,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no +T1098.003,Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role,Persistence,no +T1098.002,Exchange Email Delegate Permissions,Persistence,Magic Hound +T1098.001,Additional Azure Service Principal Credentials,Persistence,no +T1543.004,Launch Daemon,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no +T1543.003,Windows Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Blue Mockingbird|DarkVishnya|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT41|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|Honeybee|FIN7|Threat Group-3390|APT19|APT3|Lazarus Group|Carbanak +T1543.002,Systemd Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke +T1543.001,Launch Agent,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no +T1037.005,Startup Items,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no +T1037.004,Rc.common,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no +T1055.012,Process Hollowing,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Gorgon Group|Patchwork +T1055.013,Process Doppelgänging,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Leafminer +T1055.011,Extra Window Memory Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no +T1055.014,VDSO Hijacking,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no +T1055.009,Proc Memory,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no +T1055.008,Ptrace System Calls,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no +T1055.005,Thread Local Storage,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no +T1055.004,Asynchronous Procedure Call,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no +T1055.003,Thread Execution Hijacking,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no +T1055.002,Portable Executable Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Rocke|Gorgon Group +T1055.001,Dynamic-link Library Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,TA505|Turla|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda +T1037.003,Network Logon Script,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no +T1543,Create or Modify System Process,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no +T1037.002,Logon Script (Mac),Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no +T1037.001,Logon Script (Windows),Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Cobalt Group|APT28 +T1542.003,Bootkit,Persistence|Defense Evasion,APT41|Lazarus Group|APT28 +T1542.002,Component Firmware,Persistence|Defense Evasion,Equation +T1542.001,System Firmware,Persistence|Defense Evasion,no +T1505.003,Web Shell,Persistence,Tropic Trooper|Soft Cell|Threat Group-3390|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|OilRig|Deep Panda +T1505.002,Transport Agent,Persistence,no +T1505.001,SQL Stored Procedures,Persistence,no +T1053.003,Cron,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke +T1053.004,Launchd,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no +T1053.001,At (Linux),Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no +T1053.005,Scheduled Task,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT-C-36|BRONZE BUTLER|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Patchwork|OilRig|Rancor|Cobalt Group|FIN8|menuPass|FIN10|APT32|FIN7|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29 +T1053.002,At (Windows),Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,BRONZE BUTLER|Threat Group-3390|APT18 +T1542,Pre-OS Boot,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no +T1137.001,Office Template Macros,Persistence,MuddyWater +T1137.004,Outlook Home Page,Persistence,OilRig +T1137.003,Outlook Forms,Persistence,no +T1137.005,Outlook Rules,Persistence,no +T1137.006,Add-ins,Persistence,Naikon +T1137.002,Office Test,Persistence,APT28 +T1531,Account Access Removal,Impact,no +T1539,Steal Web Session Cookie,Credential Access,no +T1529,System Shutdown/Reboot,Impact,Lazarus Group|APT38|APT37 +T1518,Software Discovery,Discovery,BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|Inception +T1534,Internal Spearphishing,Lateral Movement,Gamaredon Group +T1528,Steal Application Access Token,Credential Access,APT28 +T1535,Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions,Defense Evasion,no +T1525,Implant Container Image,Persistence,no +T1538,Cloud Service Dashboard,Discovery,no +T1530,Data from Cloud Storage Object,Collection,no +T1578,Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure,Defense Evasion,no +T1537,Transfer Data to Cloud Account,Exfiltration,no +T1526,Cloud Service Discovery,Discovery,no +T1505,Server Software Component,Persistence,no +T1499,Endpoint Denial of Service,Impact,no +T1497,Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion,Defense Evasion|Discovery,no +T1498,Network Denial of Service,Impact,no +T1496,Resource Hijacking,Impact,Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT41|Lazarus Group +T1495,Firmware Corruption,Impact,no +T1491,Defacement,Impact,no +T1490,Inhibit System Recovery,Impact,no +T1489,Service Stop,Impact,Lazarus Group +T1486,Data Encrypted for Impact,Impact,APT41|TA505|APT38 +T1485,Data Destruction,Impact,Sandworm Team|Lazarus Group|APT38 +T1484,Group Policy Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no +T1482,Domain Trust Discovery,Discovery,Wizard Spider +T1480,Execution Guardrails,Defense Evasion,no +T1222,File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,no +T1221,Template Injection,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|Tropic Trooper|Dragonfly 2.0|DarkHydrus +T1220,XSL Script Processing,Defense Evasion,Cobalt Group +T1197,BITS Jobs,Defense Evasion|Persistence,Patchwork|APT41|Leviathan +T1217,Browser Bookmark Discovery,Discovery,no +T1213,Data from Information Repositories,Collection,Turla +T1189,Drive-by Compromise,Initial Access,Turla|Windshift|RTM|Darkhotel|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|Leafminer|Dark Caracal|APT19|APT32|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|Elderwood|APT37|Patchwork|PLATINUM +T1203,Exploitation for Client Execution,Execution,Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|APT37|Patchwork|Leviathan|Elderwood|TA459|APT29 +T1212,Exploitation for Credential Access,Credential Access,no +T1211,Exploitation for Defense Evasion,Defense Evasion,APT28 +T1190,Exploit Public-Facing Application,Initial Access,Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT39|BlackTech|APT41|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Axiom +T1210,Exploitation of Remote Services,Lateral Movement,Threat Group-3390|APT28 +T1202,Indirect Command Execution,Defense Evasion,no +T1200,Hardware Additions,Initial Access,DarkVishnya +T1201,Password Policy Discovery,Discovery,Turla|OilRig +T1219,Remote Access Software,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|RTM|Kimsuky|Night Dragon|Thrip|Cobalt Group|Carbanak +T1207,Rogue Domain Controller,Defense Evasion,no +T1199,Trusted Relationship,Initial Access,APT28|menuPass +T1218,Signed Binary Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no +T1204,User Execution,Execution,no +T1216,Signed Script Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no +T1195,Supply Chain Compromise,Initial Access,Elderwood +T1205,Traffic Signaling,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,no +T1176,Browser Extensions,Persistence,Kimsuky|Stolen Pencil +T1175,Component Object Model and Distributed COM,Lateral Movement|Execution,no +T1187,Forced Authentication,Credential Access,DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0 +T1185,Man in the Browser,Collection,no +T1134,Access Token Manipulation,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Blue Mockingbird +T1136,Create Account,Persistence,no +T1140,Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Rocke|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Molerats|Frankenstein|Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|menuPass|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|APT19|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT28|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER +T1149,LC_MAIN Hijacking,Defense Evasion,no +T1135,Network Share Discovery,Discovery,APT32|APT39|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|Sowbug +T1137,Office Application Startup,Persistence,Gamaredon Group|APT32 +T1153,Source,Execution,no +T1133,External Remote Services,Persistence|Initial Access,Sandworm Team|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18 +T1132,Data Encoding,Command And Control,no +T1129,Shared Modules,Execution,no +T1127,Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no +T1125,Video Capture,Collection,Silence|FIN7 +T1124,System Time Discovery,Discovery,The White Company|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Turla +T1123,Audio Capture,Collection,APT37 +T1120,Peripheral Device Discovery,Discovery,Turla|APT37|Gamaredon Group|Equation|APT28 +T1119,Automated Collection,Collection,Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT1|APT28|Patchwork|OilRig|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|FIN6 +T1115,Clipboard Data,Collection,APT39|APT38 +T1114,Email Collection,Collection,no +T1113,Screen Capture,Collection,Gamaredon Group|APT39|Silence|MuddyWater|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Dark Caracal|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|Group5|APT28 +T1112,Modify Registry,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Patchwork|Gorgon Group|FIN8 +T1111,Two-Factor Authentication Interception,Credential Access,no +T1110,Brute Force,Credential Access,DarkVishnya|APT39|OilRig|FIN5|Turla +T1108,Redundant Access,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no +T1106,Native API,Execution,Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Turla|Silence|Gorgon Group|APT37 +T1105,Ingress Tool Transfer,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Silence|APT-C-36|APT41|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Cobalt Group|Turla|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|APT37|FIN8|PLATINUM|Leviathan|Elderwood|Magic Hound|APT3|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN7|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28 +T1104,Multi-Stage Channels,Command And Control,APT41|MuddyWater|APT3 +T1102,Web Service,Command And Control,Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Inception|FIN6 +T1098,Account Manipulation,Persistence,APT3|Dragonfly 2.0|Lazarus Group +T1095,Non-Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,APT29|PLATINUM|APT3 +T1092,Communication Through Removable Media,Command And Control,APT28 +T1091,Replication Through Removable Media,Lateral Movement|Initial Access,Tropic Trooper|Darkhotel|APT28 +T1090,Proxy,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|APT41|Turla +T1087,Account Discovery,Discovery,no +T1083,File and Directory Discovery,Discovery,Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Leafminer|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang +T1082,System Information Discovery,Discovery,Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|Honeybee|APT19|APT37|APT32|Magic Hound|OilRig|APT3|Sowbug|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang +T1080,Taint Shared Content,Lateral Movement,BRONZE BUTLER|Darkhotel +T1078,Valid Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|Leviathan|APT33|OilRig|FIN5|menuPass|APT28|FIN10|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak +T1074,Data Staged,Collection,Wizard Spider +T1072,Software Deployment Tools,Execution|Lateral Movement,Silence|APT32|Threat Group-1314 +T1071,Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,Rocke|Magic Hound|Dragonfly 2.0 +T1070,Indicator Removal on Host,Defense Evasion,no +T1069,Permission Groups Discovery,Discovery,TA505|APT3 +T1068,Exploitation for Privilege Escalation,Privilege Escalation,Whitefly|APT33|Cobalt Group|PLATINUM|FIN8|APT32|Threat Group-3390|FIN6|APT28 +T1064,Scripting,Defense Evasion|Execution,no +T1062,Hypervisor,Persistence,no +T1061,Graphical User Interface,Execution,no +T1059,Command and Scripting Interpreter,Execution,APT32|Molerats|Whitefly|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|FIN7|OilRig|FIN5|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Ke3chang +T1057,Process Discovery,Discovery,Rocke|Frankenstein|Inception|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT38|Tropic Trooper|APT37|Honeybee|OilRig|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|Winnti Group|Stealth Falcon|Poseidon Group|Lazarus Group|Molerats|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang +T1056,Input Capture,Collection|Credential Access,no +T1055,Process Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT32|Sharpshooter|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Turla|Cobalt Group|APT37|Honeybee|PLATINUM +T1053,Scheduled Task/Job,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no +T1052,Exfiltration Over Physical Medium,Exfiltration,no +T1051,Shared Webroot,Lateral Movement,no +T1049,System Network Connections Discovery,Discovery,Tropic Trooper|APT41|APT38|Soft Cell|APT32|APT1|OilRig|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang +T1048,Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol,Exfiltration,no +T1047,Windows Management Instrumentation,Execution,Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|FIN6|Soft Cell|APT32|MuddyWater|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|FIN8|Leviathan|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda +T1046,Network Service Scanning,Discovery,Rocke|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|Leafminer|OilRig|Cobalt Group|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390 +T1043,Commonly Used Port,Command And Control,Machete|OilRig|APT28|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|APT29|APT18|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|FIN8|APT37|Magic Hound|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390 +T1041,Exfiltration Over C2 Channel,Exfiltration,Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|APT32|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang +T1040,Network Sniffing,Credential Access|Discovery,Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|APT33|Stolen Pencil|APT28 +T1039,Data from Network Shared Drive,Collection,Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass +T1037,Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke +T1036,Masquerading,Defense Evasion,Windshift|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|Dragonfly 2.0 +T1034,Path Interception,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no +T1033,System Owner/User Discovery,Discovery,Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT32|APT37|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Magic Hound|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3 +T1030,Data Transfer Size Limits,Exfiltration,Threat Group-3390 +T1029,Scheduled Transfer,Exfiltration,no +T1027,Obfuscated Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Patchwork|Leafminer|APT37|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|menuPass|APT19|BlackOasis|FIN8|Leviathan|Elderwood|MuddyWater|FIN7|Magic Hound|OilRig|APT3|APT32|Group5|Dust Storm|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT28 +T1026,Multiband Communication,Command And Control,Lazarus Group +T1025,Data from Removable Media,Collection,Machete|Turla|Gamaredon Group|APT28 +T1021,Remote Services,Lateral Movement,no +T1020,Automated Exfiltration,Exfiltration,Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Honeybee +T1018,Remote System Discovery,Discovery,Sandworm Team|Rocke|Wizard Spider|Silence|Soft Cell|APT39|APT32|Deep Panda|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|Ke3chang|FIN8|APT3|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Turla +T1016,System Network Configuration Discovery,Discovery,Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|OilRig|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3|Naikon|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang +T1014,Rootkit,Defense Evasion,Rocke|APT41|APT28|Winnti Group +T1012,Query Registry,Discovery,APT32|Dragonfly 2.0|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Turla +T1011,Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium,Exfiltration,no +T1010,Application Window Discovery,Discovery,Lazarus Group +T1008,Fallback Channels,Command And Control,APT41|OilRig|Lazarus Group +T1007,System Service Discovery,Discovery,BRONZE BUTLER|APT1|OilRig|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang +T1006,Direct Volume Access,Defense Evasion,no +T1005,Data from Local System,Collection,Gamaredon Group|APT39|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|Turla|menuPass|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|APT37|APT28|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang +T1003,OS Credential Dumping,Credential Access,APT39|Frankenstein|APT32|APT28|Leviathan|Sowbug|Suckfly|Poseidon Group|Axiom +T1001,Data Obfuscation,Command And Control,Axiom diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/network_acl_activity_baseline.csv b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/network_acl_activity_baseline.csv new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4fec3cadd9 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/network_acl_activity_baseline.csv @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +arn,latestCount,numDataPoints,avgApiCalls,stdevApiCalls diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip.csv b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip.csv new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7f64ce933f --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip.csv @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +bucket_name,remote_ip,earliest,latest \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles.csv b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles.csv new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..16491b9d75 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles.csv @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +earliest,latest,userName,eventName diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.csv b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.csv new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..30a8931b74 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.csv @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +firstTime,lastTime,requestingAccountId,requestedAccountId diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/previously_seen_aws_regions.csv b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/previously_seen_aws_regions.csv new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..82335d2260 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/previously_seen_aws_regions.csv @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +earliest,latest,awsRegion diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments.csv b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments.csv new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ee6ce88f4c --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments.csv @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +firstTime,lastTime,process diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user.csv b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user.csv new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..225fcaa19a --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user.csv @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +arn,firstTime,lastTime diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip.csv b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip.csv new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8a5c209fa3 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip.csv @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +firstTime, lastTime, bucket_name, remote_ip, operation, request_uri \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.csv b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.csv new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5e4a2cf651 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.csv @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +prohibited_applications,isProhibited +winword.exe,prohibited +EXCEL.EXE,prohibited +OUTLOOK.EXE,prohibited +POWERPNT.EXE,prohibited +visio.exe,prohibited +mspub.exe,prohibited +Acrobat.exe,prohibited +Acrord32.exe,prohibited +chrome.exe,prohibited +iexplore.exe,prohibited +opera.exe,prohibited +firefox.exe,prohibited +java.exe,prohibited +powershell.exe,prohibited +mshta.exe, prohibited +zoom.exe,prohibitied diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/prohibited_processes.csv b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/prohibited_processes.csv new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b418ab0f74 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/prohibited_processes.csv @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +app,note +remcom.exe,ESCU - This process is an open source replacement to psexec and is not typically seen in an enterprise environment. +pwdump.exe,ESCU - This process is associated with a tool used to dump password hashes on a Windows system. +pwdump2.exe,ESCU - This process is associated with a tool used to dump password hashes on a Windows system. +nc.exe,ESCU - This process is an open source tool used for network communications. +wce.exe,ESCU - This process is associated with a tool used to dump hashes and execute pass-the-hash and pass-the-ticket attacks. +cain.exe,ESCU - This process is associated with a tool used to collect user credentials and execute attacks. +nmap.exe,ESCU - This process is an open source network mapping tool used to identify hosts and listening services on a network. +kidlogger.exe,ESCU - This process is associated with a tool used to collect keyboard input on a host. +isass.exe,ESCU - This process name is used by attackers to hide in plain sight and look like a legitimate Windows system process. +svch0st.exe,ESCU - This process name is used by attackers to hide in plain sight and look like a legitimate Windows system process. +at.exe,ESCU - This process is used to schedule other processes to run. schtasks.exe should be used instead as it provides more flexibility. +getmail.exe,ESCU - This process is seen to be used by attackers to extract email files from host machines. +ntdll.exe,ESCU - This process was identified as malicious by DHS Alert TA18-074A. +netpass.exe,ESCU - This process was identified as malicious by DHS Alert TA18-201A and attackers use this tool to recover all network passwords stored on your system for the current logged-on user. +WebBrowserPassView.exe,ESCU - This process was identified as malicious by DHS Alert TA18-201A and is used by attackers as a password recovery tool that reveals the passwords stored in Web Browsers. +OutlookAddressBookView.exe,ESCU - This process was identified as malicious by DHS Alert TA18-201A and is used by attackers to steal the details of all recipients stored in the address books of Microsoft Outlook. +mailpv.exe,ESCU - This process was identified by DHS Alert TA18-201A and attackers use this tool is a password-recovery tool that reveals the passwords and other account details from various email clients. +NLBrute.exe,ESCU - This process was identified in the SamSam Ransomware Campaign and attackers use this tool to brute force RDP instances with a range of commonly used passwords. +selfdel.exe,ESCU - This executable was delivered in the SamSam Ransomware Campain and the attackers levereged this binary to delete its malicilous activities. diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/prohibited_softwares.csv b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/prohibited_softwares.csv new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b418ab0f74 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/prohibited_softwares.csv @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +app,note +remcom.exe,ESCU - This process is an open source replacement to psexec and is not typically seen in an enterprise environment. +pwdump.exe,ESCU - This process is associated with a tool used to dump password hashes on a Windows system. +pwdump2.exe,ESCU - This process is associated with a tool used to dump password hashes on a Windows system. +nc.exe,ESCU - This process is an open source tool used for network communications. +wce.exe,ESCU - This process is associated with a tool used to dump hashes and execute pass-the-hash and pass-the-ticket attacks. +cain.exe,ESCU - This process is associated with a tool used to collect user credentials and execute attacks. +nmap.exe,ESCU - This process is an open source network mapping tool used to identify hosts and listening services on a network. +kidlogger.exe,ESCU - This process is associated with a tool used to collect keyboard input on a host. +isass.exe,ESCU - This process name is used by attackers to hide in plain sight and look like a legitimate Windows system process. +svch0st.exe,ESCU - This process name is used by attackers to hide in plain sight and look like a legitimate Windows system process. +at.exe,ESCU - This process is used to schedule other processes to run. schtasks.exe should be used instead as it provides more flexibility. +getmail.exe,ESCU - This process is seen to be used by attackers to extract email files from host machines. +ntdll.exe,ESCU - This process was identified as malicious by DHS Alert TA18-074A. +netpass.exe,ESCU - This process was identified as malicious by DHS Alert TA18-201A and attackers use this tool to recover all network passwords stored on your system for the current logged-on user. +WebBrowserPassView.exe,ESCU - This process was identified as malicious by DHS Alert TA18-201A and is used by attackers as a password recovery tool that reveals the passwords stored in Web Browsers. +OutlookAddressBookView.exe,ESCU - This process was identified as malicious by DHS Alert TA18-201A and is used by attackers to steal the details of all recipients stored in the address books of Microsoft Outlook. +mailpv.exe,ESCU - This process was identified by DHS Alert TA18-201A and attackers use this tool is a password-recovery tool that reveals the passwords and other account details from various email clients. +NLBrute.exe,ESCU - This process was identified in the SamSam Ransomware Campaign and attackers use this tool to brute force RDP instances with a range of commonly used passwords. +selfdel.exe,ESCU - This executable was delivered in the SamSam Ransomware Campain and the attackers levereged this binary to delete its malicilous activities. diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/ransomware_extensions.csv b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/ransomware_extensions.csv new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7ff10c3a45 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/ransomware_extensions.csv @@ -0,0 +1,301 @@ +Extensions,Name +.enc,.CryptoHasYou. +.777,777 +.R4A,7ev3n +.R5A,7ev3n +.7h9r,7h9r +.8lock8,8lock8 +.encrypt,Alpha Ransomware +.amba,AMBA +.adk,Angry Duck +.encrypted,Apocalypse +.SecureCrypted,Apocalypse +.FuckYourData,Apocalypse +.unavailable,Apocalypse +.bleepYourFiles,Apocalypse +.Where_my_files.txt,Apocalypse +.encrypted,ApocalypseVM +.locked,ApocalypseVM +.locky,AutoLocky +.adr,BaksoCrypt +.avos,AvosLocker +.avos2,AvosLocker +.avoslinux,AvosLocker +.bart.zip,Bart +.bart,Bart +.perl,Bart +.clf,BitCryptor +.bitstak,BitStak +.Silent,BlackShades Crypter +.blocatto,Blocatto +.cry,Central Security Treatment Organization +.cerber,Cerber +.cerber2,Cerber +.cerber3,Cerber +.clf,CoinVault +.coverton,Coverton +.enigma,Coverton +.czvxce,Coverton +.criptiko,CryFile +.criptoko,CryFile +.criptokod,CryFile +.cripttt,CryFile +.aga,CryFile +.cry,CryLocker +.ENCRYPTED,Crypren +.crypt38,Crypt38 +.scl,CryptFIle2 +.crinf,CryptInfinite +.frtrss,CryptoFortress +.clf,CryptoGraphic Locker +.crjoker,CryptoJoker +.encrypted ,CryptoLocker +.ENC,CryptoLocker +.code,CryptoMix +.scl,CryptoMix +.crptrgr,CryptoRoger +.locked,CryptoShocker +.CryptoTorLocker2015!,CryptoTorLocker2015 +.crypt,CryptXXX +.crypt,CryptXXX 2.0 +.crypt,CryptXXX 3.0 +.cryp1,CryptXXX 3.0 +.crypz,CryptXXX 3.0 +.cryptz,CryptXXX 3.0 +.cryp1,CryptXXX 3.1 +.ctbl,CTB-Locker +.encrypted,CuteRansomware +.ded,DEDCryptor +.domino,Domino +.locked,EDA2 / HiddenTear +.isis,EduCrypt +.locked,EduCrypt +.ha3,El-Polocker +.enigma,Enigma +.1txt,Enigma +.exotic,Exotic +.locked,Fakben +.fantom,Fantom +.Z81928819,GhostCrypt +.purge,Globe v1 +.globe,Globe v3 +.locked,GNL Locker +.crypt,Gomasom +.herbst,Herbst +.cry,Hi Buddy! +.locky,Hucky +.crime,iLock +.crime,iLockLight +.btc,Jigsaw +.kkk,Jigsaw +.fun,Jigsaw +.gws,Jigsaw +.porno,Jigsaw +.payransom,Jigsaw +.payms,Jigsaw +.paymst,Jigsaw +.AFD,Jigsaw +.paybtcs,Jigsaw +.epic,Jigsaw +.xyz,Jigsaw +.locked,Job Crypter +.encrypted,KeRanger +.keybtc@inbox_com,KeyBTC +.rip,Killer Locker +.kimcilware,KimcilWare +.locked,KimcilWare +.kostya,Kostya +.kratos,KratosCrypt +.LeChiffre,LeChiffre +.locky,Locky +.zepto,Locky +.odin,Locky +.shit,Locky +.thor,Locky +.asier,Locky +.zzzzz,Locky +.osiris,Locky +.lock93,Lock93 +.crime,Lortok +.oor,LowLevel04 +.magic,Magic +.Lock,MIRCOP +.fucked,MireWare +.fuck,MireWare +.locked,MM Locker +.KEYZ,Mobef +.KEYH0LES,Mobef +.crypted,Nemucod +.odcodc,ODCODC +.cbf,Offline ransomware +.LOL!,OMG! Ransomware +.OMG!,OMG! Ransomware +.padcrypt,PadCrypt +.locked,Philadelphia +.locked,PokemonGO +.filock,Popcorn Time +.locky,PowerWare +.crypt,R980 +.locked,RAA encryptor +.RDM,Radamant +.RRK,Radamant +.RAD,Radamant +.RADAMANT,Radamant +.locked,Rakhni +.kraken,Rakhni +.darkness,Rakhni +.nochance,Rakhni +.oshit,Rakhni +.oplata@qq_com,Rakhni +.relock@qq_com,Rakhni +.crypto,Rakhni +.helpdecrypt@ukr.net,Rakhni +.pizda@qq_com,Rakhni +.dyatel@qq_com,Rakhni +._ryp,Rakhni +.nalog@qq_com,Rakhni +.chifrator@qq_com,Rakhni +.gruzin@qq_com,Rakhni +.troyancoder@qq_com,Rakhni +.encrypted,Rakhni +.cry,Rakhni +.AES256,Rakhni +.enc,Rakhni +.hb15,Rakhni +.vscrypt,Rector +.infected,Rector +.bloc,Rector +.korrektor,Rector +.rekt,RektLocker +.remind,RemindMe +.crashed,RemindMe +.rokku,Rokku +.encryptedAES,Samas-Samsam +.encryptedRSA,Samas-Samsam +.encedRSA,Samas-Samsam +.justbtcwillhelpyou,Samas-Samsam +.btcbtcbtc,Samas-Samsam +.btc-help-you,Samas-Samsam +.only-we_can-help_you,Samas-Samsam +.iwanthelpuuu,Samas-Samsam +.notfoundrans,Samas-Samsam +.encmywork,Samas-Samsam +.weapologize,Samas-Samsam +.stubbin,Samas-Samsam +.areyoulovemyrans,Samas-Samsam +.loveransisgood,Samas-Samsam +.myransext2017,Samas-Samsam +.disposed2017,Samas-Samsam +.prosperous666,Samas-Samsam +.supported2017,Samas-Samsam +.country82000,Samas-Samsam +.moments2900,Samas-Samsam +.breeding123,Samas-Samsam +.mention9823,Samas-Samsam +.suppose666,Samas-Samsam +.skjdthghh,Samas-Samsam +.cifgksaffsfyghd,Samas-Samsam +.iaufkakfhsaraf,Samas-Samsam +.filegofprencrp,Samas-Samsam +.weencedufiles,Samas-Samsam +.encryptedyourfiles,Samas-Samsam +.letmetrydecfiles,Samas-Samsam +.otherinformation,Samas-Samsam +.weareyourfriends,Samas-Samsam +.noproblemwedecfiles,Samas-Samsam +.powerfulldecrypt,Samas-Samsam +.wowreadfordecryp,Samas-Samsam +.wowwhereismyfiles,Samas-Samsam +.helpmeencedfiles,Samas-Samsam +.theworldisyours,Samas-Samsam +.vekanhelpu,Samas-Samsam +.howcanihelpusir,Samas-Samsam +.VforVendetta,Samas-Samsam +.checkdiskenced,Samas-Samsam +.goforhelp,Samas-Samsam +.iloveworld,Samas-Samsam +.canihelpyou,Samas-Samsam +.AreYouLoveMyRansFile,Samas-Samsam +.fucku,Samas-Samsam +.happenencedfiles,Samas-Samsam +.iwishiyou,Samas-Samsam +.powerfulldecryp,Samas-Samsam +.suppose665,Samas-Samsam +.Whereisyourfiles,Samas-Samsam +.sanction,Sanction +.locked,Shark +.shino,ShinoLocker +.locked,SkidLocker / Pompous +.encrypted,Smrss32 +.RSNSlocked,SNSLocker +.RSplited,SNSLocker +.sport,Sport +.locked,Stampado +.locked,Strictor +.surprise,Surprise +.tzu,Surprise +.szf,SZFLocker +.xcri,TeleCrypt +.vvv,TeslaCrypt 0.x - 2.2.0 +.ecc,TeslaCrypt 0.x - 2.2.0 +.exx,TeslaCrypt 0.x - 2.2.0 +.ezz,TeslaCrypt 0.x - 2.2.0 +.abc,TeslaCrypt 0.x - 2.2.0 +.aaa,TeslaCrypt 0.x - 2.2.0 +.zzz,TeslaCrypt 0.x - 2.2.0 +.xyz,TeslaCrypt 0.x - 2.2.0 +.micro,TeslaCrypt 3.0+ +.xxx,TeslaCrypt 3.0+ +.ttt,TeslaCrypt 3.0+ +.mp3,TeslaCrypt 3.0+ +.Encrypted,TorrentLocker +.enc,TorrentLocker +.toxcrypt,Toxcrypt +.better_call_saul,Troldesh +.xtbl,Troldesh +.da_vinci_code,Troldesh +.windows10,Troldesh +.enc,TrueCrypter +.locked,Turkish Ransom +.H3LL,Ungluk +.0x0,Ungluk +.1999,Ungluk +.CRRRT,Unlock92 +.CCCRRRPPP,Unlock92 +.vault,VaultCrypt +.xort,VaultCrypt +.trun,VaultCrypt +.Venusf,VenusLocker +.Venusp,VenusLocker +.CrySiS,Virus-Encoder +.xtbl,Virus-Encoder +.wflx,WildFire Locker +.EnCiPhErEd,Xorist +.73i87A,Xorist +.p5tkjw,Xorist +.PoAr2w,Xorist +.fileiscryptedhard,Xorist +.encoderpass,Xorist +.zc3791,Xorist +.xrtn,XRTN +.zcrypt,Zcrypt +.crypto,Zimbra +.vault,Zlader / Russian +.zyklon,Zyklon +.wncry,WannaCry +.wcry,WannaCry +.wnry,WannaCry +.wncryt,WannaCry +.WNCRYT,WannaCry +.RYK,Ryuk +.Clop,Clop +.Cllp,Clop +.JSWORM,JSWorm +.NEMTY_*,Nemty +.NEFILIM,Nefilim +.OFFWHITE,Offwhite +.TELEGRAM,Telegram +.FUSION,Fusion +.MILIHPEN,Milihpen +.GANGBANG,Gangbang +.reddot,RedDot diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/ransomware_notes.csv b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/ransomware_notes.csv new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a01b0aae19 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/ransomware_notes.csv @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +ransomware_notes, status +HELP_TO_SAVE_FILES.txt,True +BitCryptorFileList.txt,True +BUYUNLOCKCODE,True +YOUR_FILES_ARE_ENCRYPTED.HTML,True +Coin.Locker.txt,True +DECRYPT_INSTRUCTIONS.HTML,True +ReadDecryptFilesHere.txt,True +HOW_DECRYPT.TXT,True +READ IF YOU WANT YOUR FILES BACK.HTML,True +GetYouFiles.txt,True +HOW TO DECRYPT FILES.HTML,True +DECRYPT_INSTRUCTION.TXT,True +HELP_DECRYPT.TXT,True +HELP_YOURFILES.HTML,True +HowDecrypt.gif,True +Decrypt All Files *.bmp,True +cryptinfo.txt,True +DECRYPT_Readme.TXT.ReadMe,True +qwer.html,True +qwer2.html,True +Hellothere.txt,True +FILESAREGONE.TXT,True +HOW TO DECRYPT FILES.TXT,True +DECRYPT_Readme.TXT.ReadMe,True +README_DECRYPT_HYDRA_ID_*.txt,True +DECRYPT_YOUR_FILES.HTML,True +KryptoLocker_README.txt,True +_Locky_recover_instructions.txt,True +DECRYPT_Readme.TXT.ReadMe,True +ATTENTION.RTF,True +how to get data.txt,True +IMPORTANT READ ME.txt,True +UnblockFiles.vbs,True +YOUR_FILES.url,True +exit.hhr.obleep,True +HOW_TO_DECRYPT.HTML,True +HOW-TO-DECRYPT-FILES.HTML,True +HELP_TO_SAVE_FILES.txt,True +HELP_TO_SAVE_FILES.txt,True +HELP_TO_SAVE_FILES.txt,True +_H_e_l_p_RECOVER_INSTRUCTIONS+*.txt,True +DECRYPT_INSTRUCTIONS.HTML,True +README_DECRYPT_UMBRE_ID_*.txt,True +Help_Decrypt.txt,True +CryptLogFile.txt,True +*@Please_Read_Me@.txt*,True +*@WanaDecryptor@.exe*,True +# DECRYPT MY FILES #.vbs,True +# DECRYPT MY FILES #.html,True +# DECRYPT MY FILES #.txt,True +# DECRYPT MY FILES #.vbs,True +# DECRYPT MY FILES #.html,True +# DECRYPT MY FILES #.txt,True +HELP_DECRYPT_YOUR_FILES.HTML,True +*-HELP_FOR_DECRYPT_FILE.html,True +*-SORRY-FOR-FILES.html,True +*-READ-FOR-HELLPP.html,True +RyukReadMe.html,True +ClopReadMe.txt,True +README_README.txt,True +JSWORM-DECRYPT.html,True +NEMTY_*-DECRYPT.txt,True +NEFILIM-DECRYPT.txt,True +OFFWHITE-MANUAL.txt,True +TELEGRAM-RECOVER.txt,True +FUSION-README.txt,True +MILIHPEN-INSTRUCT.txt,True +GANGBANG-NOTE.txt,True +GET_YOUR_FILES_BACK.txt,True \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/rare_process_allow_list_default.csv b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/rare_process_allow_list_default.csv new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cfc193563d --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/rare_process_allow_list_default.csv @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +process,allow_list +splunk-regmon.exe,true +winword.exe,true +excel.exe,true +outlook.exe,true +powerpnt.exe,true +visio.exe,true diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/rare_process_allow_list_local.csv b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/rare_process_allow_list_local.csv new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2cca84e0ea --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/rare_process_allow_list_local.csv @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +process,allow_list diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/s3_deletion_baseline.csv b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/s3_deletion_baseline.csv new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3f0d026011 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/s3_deletion_baseline.csv @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/security_group_activity_baseline.csv b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/security_group_activity_baseline.csv new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4fec3cadd9 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/security_group_activity_baseline.csv @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +arn,latestCount,numDataPoints,avgApiCalls,stdevApiCalls diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/security_services.csv b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/security_services.csv new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bfbac66fb0 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/security_services.csv @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +service,description,category +*mpssvc*,Windows Firewall Service,security +*wscsvc*,Windows Security Center Service,securty +*windefend*,Windows Defender Service,security +*sysmon*,Sysmon Driver,security diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/suspicious_files.csv b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/suspicious_files.csv new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..836182da18 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/suspicious_files.csv @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +file, note +mssscardprv.ax,ESCU - File associated with Hidden Cobra malware https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/AR18-149A +scardprv.dll,ESCU - File associated with Hidden Cobra malware https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/AR18-149A +wmmvsvc.dll,ESCU - File associated with Hidden Cobra malware https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/AR18-149A diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/uncommon_processes_default.csv b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/uncommon_processes_default.csv new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c6e2588f4b --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/uncommon_processes_default.csv @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +process_name,uncommon_default,category_default,analytic_story_default,kill_chain_phase_default,mitre_attack_default +sethc.exe,true,needs_accessibility,Windows Privilege Escalation,Actions on Objectives,Execution|Accessibility Features +utilman.exe,true,needs_accessibility,Windows Privilege Escalation,Actions on Objectives,Execution|Accessibility Features +osk.exe,true,needs_accessibility,Windows Privilege Escalation,Actions on Objectives,Execution|Accessibility Features +magnify.exe,true,needs_accessibility,Windows Privilege Escalation,Actions on Objectives,Execution|Accessibility Features +narrator.exe,true,needs_accessibility,Windows Privilege Escalation,Actions on Objectives,Execution|Accessibility Features +displayswitch.exe,true,needs_accessibility,Windows Privilege Escalation,Actions on Objectives,Execution|Accessibility Features +atbroker.exe,true,needs_accessibility,Windows Privilege Escalation,Actions on Objectives,Execution|Accessibility Features +quser.exe,true,,DHS Report TA18-074A|Unusual Processes,Actions on Objectives,Execution diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/uncommon_processes_local.csv b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/uncommon_processes_local.csv new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..169cd6fb47 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/uncommon_processes_local.csv @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +process_name,uncommon_local,category_local,analytic_story_local,kill_chain_phase_local,mitre_attack_local diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/yml_file/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/yml_file/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..68a1d82348 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/yml_file/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +name: Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe +id: e9fb4a59-c5fb-440a-9f24-191fbc6b2911 +version: 6 +date: '2021-09-16' +author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +type: TTP +datamodel: +- Endpoint +description: Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export + of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline. +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) + as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` OR `process_cmd` + Processes.process=*save* (Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SAM* + OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\Security* + OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\SAM*) by Processes.dest + Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name + Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` + | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information + on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from + your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, + confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the + endpoint product. +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: +- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets +tags: + analytic_story: + - Credential Dumping + - DarkSide Ransomware + asset_type: Endpoint + automated_detection_testing: passed + cis20: + - CIS 3 + - CIS 5 + - CIS 16 + confidence: 100 + context: + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Credential Access + dataset: + - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log + impact: 90 + kill_chain_phases: + - Actions on Objectives + message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified + on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to export the registry keys. + mitre_attack_id: + - T1003.002 + - T1003 + nist: + - DE.CM + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim + - name: parent_process_name + type: Process + role: + - Parent Process + - name: process_name + type: Process + role: + - Child Process + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + required_fields: + - _time + - Processes.dest + - Processes.user + - Processes.parent_process_name + - Processes.parent_process + - Processes.original_file_name + - Processes.process_name + - Processes.process + - Processes.process_id + - Processes.parent_process_path + - Processes.process_path + - Processes.parent_process_id + risk_score: 90 + security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_attack_data/coverage.json b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_attack_data/coverage.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ac9ecdf9b8 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_attack_data/coverage.json @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +{ + "version": "4.2", + "name": "Detection Coverage", + "description": "security_content detection coverage", + "domain": "mitre-enterprise", + "techniques": [ + { + "techniqueID": "T1003.002", + "score": 1, + "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detection/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1003", + "score": 1, + "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detection/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml" + } + ], + "gradient": { + "colors": [ + "#ffffff", + "#66b1ff", + "#096ed7" + ], + "minValue": 0, + "maxValue": 1 + }, + "filters": { + "platforms": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "AWS", + "GCP", + "Azure", + "Office 365", + "SaaS" + ] + }, + "legendItems": [ + { + "label": "NO available detections", + "color": "#ffffff" + }, + { + "label": "Some detections available", + "color": "#66b1ff" + } + ], + "showTacticRowBackground": true, + "tacticRowBackground": "#dddddd", + "sorting": 3 +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_attack_data_ref/coverage.json b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_attack_data_ref/coverage.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ac9ecdf9b8 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_attack_data_ref/coverage.json @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +{ + "version": "4.2", + "name": "Detection Coverage", + "description": "security_content detection coverage", + "domain": "mitre-enterprise", + "techniques": [ + { + "techniqueID": "T1003.002", + "score": 1, + "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detection/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1003", + "score": 1, + "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/detection/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml" + } + ], + "gradient": { + "colors": [ + "#ffffff", + "#66b1ff", + "#096ed7" + ], + "minValue": 0, + "maxValue": 1 + }, + "filters": { + "platforms": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "AWS", + "GCP", + "Azure", + "Office 365", + "SaaS" + ] + }, + "legendItems": [ + { + "label": "NO available detections", + "color": "#ffffff" + }, + { + "label": "Some detections available", + "color": "#66b1ff" + } + ], + "showTacticRowBackground": true, + "tacticRowBackground": "#dddddd", + "sorting": 3 +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/baselines.json b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/baselines.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..24500a9003 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/baselines.json @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +[ + { + "name": "Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update", + "id": "66ff71c2-7e01-47dd-a041-906688c9d322", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-05-28", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Authentication" + ], + "description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by user, within the last hour.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | rename Authentication.user as user Authentication.src as src | table user src City Region Country firstTime lastTime | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins", + "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`, which is a lookup file created by this support search.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", + "Detect AWS Console Login by New User", + "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Authentication.signature", + "Authentication.user", + "Authentication.src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + } + } +] \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/baselines_ref.json b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/baselines_ref.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..24500a9003 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/baselines_ref.json @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +[ + { + "name": "Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update", + "id": "66ff71c2-7e01-47dd-a041-906688c9d322", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-05-28", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Authentication" + ], + "description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by user, within the last hour.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | rename Authentication.user as user Authentication.src as src | table user src City Region Country firstTime lastTime | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins", + "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`, which is a lookup file created by this support search.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", + "Detect AWS Console Login by New User", + "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Authentication.signature", + "Authentication.user", + "Authentication.src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + } + } +] \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/deployments.json b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/deployments.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ba97ef9f78 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/deployments.json @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +[ + { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } +] \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/deployments_ref.json b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/deployments_ref.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ba97ef9f78 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/deployments_ref.json @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +[ + { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } +] \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/detections.json b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/detections.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b891216fff --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/detections.json @@ -0,0 +1,158 @@ +[ + { + "name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", + "id": "e9fb4a59-c5fb-440a-9f24-191fbc6b2911", + "version": 6, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` OR `process_cmd` Processes.process=*save* (Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\SAM* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\SAM*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to export the registry keys.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.002", + "T1003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 90, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "GALLIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "Night Dragon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_reg", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=reg.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=reg.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/../builder/test_data/detection/valid.yml", + "source": "detection" + } +] \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/detections_ref.json b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/detections_ref.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b891216fff --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/detections_ref.json @@ -0,0 +1,158 @@ +[ + { + "name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", + "id": "e9fb4a59-c5fb-440a-9f24-191fbc6b2911", + "version": 6, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` OR `process_cmd` Processes.process=*save* (Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\SAM* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\SAM*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to export the registry keys.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.002", + "T1003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 90, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "GALLIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "Night Dragon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_reg", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=reg.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=reg.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/../builder/test_data/detection/valid.yml", + "source": "detection" + } +] \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/lookups.json b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/lookups.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f00e2e6914 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/lookups.json @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +[ + { + "name": "previously_seen_aws_regions", + "description": "A place holder for a list of used AWS regions", + "filename": "previously_seen_aws_regions.csv", + "default_match": "false", + "min_matches": 1 + } +] \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/lookups_ref.json b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/lookups_ref.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f00e2e6914 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/lookups_ref.json @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +[ + { + "name": "previously_seen_aws_regions", + "description": "A place holder for a list of used AWS regions", + "filename": "previously_seen_aws_regions.csv", + "default_match": "false", + "min_matches": 1 + } +] \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/macros.json b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/macros.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9715d58e8a --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/macros.json @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +[ + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + } +] \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/macros_ref.json b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/macros_ref.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9715d58e8a --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/macros_ref.json @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +[ + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + } +] \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/response_task.json b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/response_task.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ee305ea7ba --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/response_task.json @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +[ + { + "name": "Get Parent Process Info", + "id": "fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41bf9", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-02-28", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging", + "Command and Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Phishing Payloads", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "inputs": [ + "parent_process_name", + "dest" + ], + "lowercase_name": "get_parent_process_info" + } +] \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/response_task_ref.json b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/response_task_ref.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ee305ea7ba --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/response_task_ref.json @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +[ + { + "name": "Get Parent Process Info", + "id": "fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41bf9", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-02-28", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging", + "Command and Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Phishing Payloads", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "inputs": [ + "parent_process_name", + "dest" + ], + "lowercase_name": "get_parent_process_info" + } +] \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/response_tasks.json b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/response_tasks.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4ea3af6227 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/response_tasks.json @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +[ + { + "name": "Get Parent Process Info", + "id": "fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41bf9", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-02-28", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "parent_process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging", + "Command and Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Phishing Payloads", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_parent_process_info" + } +] \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/stories.json b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/stories.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7722a13c6b --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/stories.json @@ -0,0 +1,489 @@ +[ + { + "name": "DarkSide Ransomware", + "id": "507edc74-13d5-4339-878e-b9114ded1f35", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-12", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the DarkSide Ransomware", + "narrative": "This story addresses Darkside ransomware. This ransomware payload has many similarities to common ransomware however there are certain items particular to it. The creation of a .TXT log that shows every item being encrypted as well as the creation of ransomware notes and files adding a machine ID created based on CRC32 checksum algorithm. This ransomware payload leaves machines in minimal operation level,enough to browse the attackers websites. A customized URI with leaked information is presented to each victim.This is the ransomware payload that shut down the Colonial pipeline. The story is composed of several detection searches covering similar items to other ransomware payloads and those particular to Darkside payload.", + "references": [ + "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/the-darkside-of-the-ransomware-pipeline.htmlbig-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "DarkSide Ransomware", + "analytic_story": "DarkSide Ransomware", + "category": [ + "Malware" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "GALLIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "Night Dragon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [ + "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched" + ], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", + "id": "e9fb4a59-c5fb-440a-9f24-191fbc6b2911", + "version": 6, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` OR `process_cmd` Processes.process=*save* (Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\SAM* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\SAM*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to export the registry keys.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.002", + "T1003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 90, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "GALLIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "Night Dragon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [ + "user", + "dest" + ] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.002", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 90 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 90 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [ + { + "name": "Ransomware Investigate and Contain", + "id": "fc0edc96-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3783fd63", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-02-04", + "author": "Philip Royer, Splunk", + "type": "Response", + "description": "This playbook investigates and contains ransomware detected on endpoints.", + "how_to_implement": "This playbook requires the Splunk SOAR apps for Palo Alto Networks Firewalls, Palo Alto Wildfire, LDAP, and Carbon Black Response.", + "playbook": "ransomware_investigate_and_contain", + "references": [], + "app_list": [ + "Carbon Black Response", + "LDAP", + "Palo Alto Networks Firewall", + "WildFire", + "Cylance" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "detections": [ + "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe" + ], + "platform_tags": [ + "Ransomware", + "Response" + ], + "playbook_fields": [ + "ComputerName", + "Username" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk SOAR" + ] + } + } + ], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.002", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", + "file": "endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/../builder/test_data/detection/valid.yml", + "source": "detection" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get Parent Process Info", + "id": "fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41bf9", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-02-28", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "parent_process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging", + "Command and Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Phishing Payloads", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_parent_process_info" + } + ] + } +] \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/story.json b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/story.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8a3f06e61a --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/story.json @@ -0,0 +1,430 @@ +[ + { + "name": "DarkSide Ransomware", + "id": "507edc74-13d5-4339-878e-b9114ded1f35", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-12", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the DarkSide Ransomware", + "narrative": "This story addresses Darkside ransomware. This ransomware payload has many similarities to common ransomware however there are certain items particular to it. The creation of a .TXT log that shows every item being encrypted as well as the creation of ransomware notes and files adding a machine ID created based on CRC32 checksum algorithm. This ransomware payload leaves machines in minimal operation level,enough to browse the attackers websites. A customized URI with leaked information is presented to each victim.This is the ransomware payload that shut down the Colonial pipeline. The story is composed of several detection searches covering similar items to other ransomware payloads and those particular to Darkside payload.", + "references": [ + "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/the-darkside-of-the-ransomware-pipeline.htmlbig-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "DarkSide Ransomware", + "analytic_story": "DarkSide Ransomware", + "category": [ + "Malware" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection" + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [ + "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched" + ], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", + "id": "e9fb4a59-c5fb-440a-9f24-191fbc6b2911", + "version": 6, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` OR `process_cmd` Processes.process=*save* (Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\SAM* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\SAM*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to export the registry keys.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.002", + "T1003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 90, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_techniques": [ + "Security Account Manager", + "OS Credential Dumping" + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Wizard Spider", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Ke3chang", + "GALLIUM", + "Night Dragon", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "menuPass", + "Tonto Team", + "APT39", + "Frankenstein", + "APT32", + "APT28", + "Leviathan", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Poseidon Group", + "Axiom" + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [ + "user", + "dest" + ] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.002", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 90 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 90 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [ + { + "name": "Ransomware Investigate and Contain", + "id": "fc0edc96-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3783fd63", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-02-04", + "author": "Philip Royer, Splunk", + "type": "Response", + "description": "This playbook investigates and contains ransomware detected on endpoints.", + "how_to_implement": "This playbook requires the Splunk SOAR apps for Palo Alto Networks Firewalls, Palo Alto Wildfire, LDAP, and Carbon Black Response.", + "playbook": "ransomware_investigate_and_contain", + "references": [], + "app_list": [ + "Carbon Black Response", + "LDAP", + "Palo Alto Networks Firewall", + "WildFire", + "Cylance" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "detections": [ + "Conti Common Exec parameter", + "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe" + ], + "platform_tags": [ + "Ransomware", + "Response" + ], + "playbook_fields": [ + "ComputerName", + "Username" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk SOAR" + ] + } + } + ], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.002", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", + "file": "endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ] + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get Parent Process Info", + "id": "fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41bf9", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-02-28", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging", + "Command and Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Phishing Payloads", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "inputs": [ + "parent_process_name", + "dest" + ], + "lowercase_name": "get_parent_process_info" + } + ] + } +] \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/story_ref.json b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/story_ref.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8a3f06e61a --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/story_ref.json @@ -0,0 +1,430 @@ +[ + { + "name": "DarkSide Ransomware", + "id": "507edc74-13d5-4339-878e-b9114ded1f35", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-12", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the DarkSide Ransomware", + "narrative": "This story addresses Darkside ransomware. This ransomware payload has many similarities to common ransomware however there are certain items particular to it. The creation of a .TXT log that shows every item being encrypted as well as the creation of ransomware notes and files adding a machine ID created based on CRC32 checksum algorithm. This ransomware payload leaves machines in minimal operation level,enough to browse the attackers websites. A customized URI with leaked information is presented to each victim.This is the ransomware payload that shut down the Colonial pipeline. The story is composed of several detection searches covering similar items to other ransomware payloads and those particular to Darkside payload.", + "references": [ + "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/the-darkside-of-the-ransomware-pipeline.htmlbig-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "DarkSide Ransomware", + "analytic_story": "DarkSide Ransomware", + "category": [ + "Malware" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection" + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [ + "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched" + ], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", + "id": "e9fb4a59-c5fb-440a-9f24-191fbc6b2911", + "version": 6, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` OR `process_cmd` Processes.process=*save* (Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\SAM* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\SAM*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to export the registry keys.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.002", + "T1003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 90, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_techniques": [ + "Security Account Manager", + "OS Credential Dumping" + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Wizard Spider", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Ke3chang", + "GALLIUM", + "Night Dragon", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "menuPass", + "Tonto Team", + "APT39", + "Frankenstein", + "APT32", + "APT28", + "Leviathan", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Poseidon Group", + "Axiom" + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [ + "user", + "dest" + ] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.002", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 90 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 90 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [ + { + "name": "Ransomware Investigate and Contain", + "id": "fc0edc96-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3783fd63", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-02-04", + "author": "Philip Royer, Splunk", + "type": "Response", + "description": "This playbook investigates and contains ransomware detected on endpoints.", + "how_to_implement": "This playbook requires the Splunk SOAR apps for Palo Alto Networks Firewalls, Palo Alto Wildfire, LDAP, and Carbon Black Response.", + "playbook": "ransomware_investigate_and_contain", + "references": [], + "app_list": [ + "Carbon Black Response", + "LDAP", + "Palo Alto Networks Firewall", + "WildFire", + "Cylance" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "detections": [ + "Conti Common Exec parameter", + "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe" + ], + "platform_tags": [ + "Ransomware", + "Response" + ], + "playbook_fields": [ + "ComputerName", + "Username" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk SOAR" + ] + } + } + ], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.002", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", + "file": "endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ] + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get Parent Process Info", + "id": "fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41bf9", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-02-28", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging", + "Command and Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Phishing Payloads", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "inputs": [ + "parent_process_name", + "dest" + ], + "lowercase_name": "get_parent_process_info" + } + ] + } +] \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data/_data/navigation.yml b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data/_data/navigation.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..11b77cf7af --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data/_data/navigation.yml @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +main: + - title: "Detections" + url: /detections/ + - title: "Analytic Stories" + url: /stories/ + - title: "Playbooks" + url: /playbooks/ + - title: "Tags" + url: /tags/ + - title: "About" + url: https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security/threat-research.html +detections: + - title: "Tactic" + children: + - title: Credential Access + url: /detections/credential_access/ + - title: Defense Evasion + url: /detections/defense_evasion/ + - title: Initial Access + url: /detections/initial_access/ + - title: Persistence + url: /detections/persistence/ + - title: Privilege Escalation + url: /detections/privilege_escalation/ + - title: "Datamodel" + children: + - title: Endpoint + url: /detections/endpoint/ + - title: "Product" + children: + - title: "Splunk Enterprise Security" + url: /tags/#splunk-enterprise-security + - title: "Splunk Behavioral Analytics" + url: /tags/#splunk-behavioral-analytics + - title: "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS" + url: /tags/#splunk-security-analytics-for-aws +stories: + - title: "Use Case" + children: + - title: Malware + url: /stories/malware/ +playbooks: + - title: "Type" + children: + - title: "Response" + url: /tags/#response/ + - title: "Investigation" + url: /tags/#investigation/ \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data/_pages/credential_access.md b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data/_pages/credential_access.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..226d1076f3 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data/_pages/credential_access.md @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +--- +title: Credential Access +layout: tag +author_profile: false +taxonomy: Credential Access +permalink: /detections/credential_access/ +sidebar: + nav: "detections" +--- \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data/_pages/defense_evasion.md b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data/_pages/defense_evasion.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ad5abb3c31 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data/_pages/defense_evasion.md @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +--- +title: Defense Evasion +layout: tag +author_profile: false +taxonomy: Defense Evasion +permalink: /detections/defense_evasion/ +sidebar: + nav: "detections" +--- \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data/_pages/detections.md b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data/_pages/detections.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a170617043 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data/_pages/detections.md @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +--- +title: "Detections" +layout: categories +author_profile: false +permalink: /detections/ +classes: wide +sidebar: + nav: "detections" +--- + +| Name | Technique | Type | +| -------------- | --------------- | --------------- | +| [Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe](/detection/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe/) | [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | TTP | +| [Detect new user AWS Console Login](/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts) | TTP | \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data/_pages/endpoint.md b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data/_pages/endpoint.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3405d11c96 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data/_pages/endpoint.md @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +--- +title: Endpoint +layout: tag +author_profile: false +taxonomy: Endpoint +permalink: /detections/endpoint/ +sidebar: + nav: "detections" +--- \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data/_pages/initial_access.md b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data/_pages/initial_access.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9ac8bd46b2 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data/_pages/initial_access.md @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +--- +title: Initial Access +layout: tag +author_profile: false +taxonomy: Initial Access +permalink: /detections/initial_access/ +sidebar: + nav: "detections" +--- \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data/_pages/malware.md b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data/_pages/malware.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c4d4949baa --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data/_pages/malware.md @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +--- +title: Malware +layout: tag +author_profile: false +taxonomy: Malware +permalink: /detections/malware/ +sidebar: + nav: "detections" +--- \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data/_pages/paybooks.md b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data/_pages/paybooks.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e8802735ef --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data/_pages/paybooks.md @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +--- +title: "Playbooks" +layout: collection +author_profile: false +permalink: /playbooks/ +classes: wide +sidebar: + nav: "playbooks" +--- + +| Name | Detections | Type | +| --------| ---------- | ----------- | +| [Ransomware Investigate and Contain](/playbooks/ransomware_investigate_and_contain/)|[Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe](/detection/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe/)| Response | diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data/_pages/persistence.md b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data/_pages/persistence.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7b802d6881 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data/_pages/persistence.md @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +--- +title: Persistence +layout: tag +author_profile: false +taxonomy: Persistence +permalink: /detections/persistence/ +sidebar: + nav: "detections" +--- \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data/_pages/privilege_escalation.md b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data/_pages/privilege_escalation.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..60bde4562d --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data/_pages/privilege_escalation.md @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +--- +title: Privilege Escalation +layout: tag +author_profile: false +taxonomy: Privilege Escalation +permalink: /detections/privilege_escalation/ +sidebar: + nav: "detections" +--- \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data/_pages/stories.md b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data/_pages/stories.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a433c7ddd8 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data/_pages/stories.md @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +--- +title: Analytic Stories +layout: collection +permalink: /stories/ +collection: stories +classes: wide +sidebar: + nav: "stories" +--- + +| Name | Technique | Tactic | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------| +| [DarkSide Ransomware](darkside_ransomware) | [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access) | \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data/_playbooks/ransomware_investigate_and_contain.md b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data/_playbooks/ransomware_investigate_and_contain.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d0168d5128 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data/_playbooks/ransomware_investigate_and_contain.md @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +--- +title: "Ransomware Investigate and Contain" +last_modified_at: 2018-02-04 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Response + - Splunk SOAR + - Carbon Black Response + - LDAP + - Palo Alto Networks Firewall + - WildFire + - Cylance + - Ransomware + - Response +--- + +[Try in Splunk SOAR](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/software/splunk-security-orchestration-and-automation.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This playbook investigates and contains ransomware detected on endpoints. + +- **Type**: Response +- **Product**: Splunk SOAR +- **Apps**: [Carbon Black Response](https://splunkbase.splunk.com/apps/#/search/Carbon Black Response/product/soar), [LDAP](https://splunkbase.splunk.com/apps/#/search/LDAP/product/soar), [Palo Alto Networks Firewall](https://splunkbase.splunk.com/apps/#/search/Palo Alto Networks Firewall/product/soar), [WildFire](https://splunkbase.splunk.com/apps/#/search/WildFire/product/soar), [Cylance](https://splunkbase.splunk.com/apps/#/search/Cylance/product/soar) +- **Last Updated**: 2018-02-04 +- **Author**: Philip Royer, Splunk +- **ID**: fc0edc96-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3783fd63 + +#### Associated Detections + +* [Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe](//attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe/) + + + +#### How To Implement +This playbook requires the Splunk SOAR apps for Palo Alto Networks Firewalls, Palo Alto Wildfire, LDAP, and Carbon Black Response. + +#### Playbooks +![](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/security_content/develop/playbooks/ransomware_investigate_and_contain.png) + +#### Required field + + +#### Reference + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/playbooks/ransomware_investigate_and_contain.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_new_user_aws_console_login.md b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_new_user_aws_console_login.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cb61304499 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_new_user_aws_console_login.md @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +--- +title: "Detect new user AWS Console Login" +excerpt: "Cloud Accounts +" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2020-07-21 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Cloud Accounts + - Defense Evasion + - Initial Access + - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour. Deprecated now this search is updated to use the Authentication datamodel. + +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2020-07-21 +- **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +- **ID**: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f3-d82362dffd75 + + +#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1078.004](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/) | Cloud Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | + +#### Search + +``` +`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin +| rename userIdentity.arn as user +| stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user +| inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail +| stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user +| eval userStatus=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), "First Time Logging into AWS Console","Previously Seen User") +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| where userStatus ="First Time Logging into AWS Console" +| `detect_new_user_aws_console_login_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: + +Note that `detect_new_user_aws_console_login_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* eventName +* userIdentity.arn + + +#### How To Implement +You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. Run the "Previously seen users in AWS CloudTrail" support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run "Update previously seen users in AWS CloudTrail" hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. + +#### Known False Positives +When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Suspicious AWS Login Activities](/stories/suspicious_aws_login_activities) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Actions on Objectives + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 90.0 | 90 | 100 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml) \| *version*: **2** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data/_posts/2021-09-16-attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.md b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data/_posts/2021-09-16-attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a1bccedf77 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data/_posts/2021-09-16-attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.md @@ -0,0 +1,117 @@ +--- +title: "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe" +excerpt: "Security Account Manager +, OS Credential Dumping +" +categories: + - Detection +last_modified_at: 2021-09-16 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Security Account Manager + - OS Credential Dumping + - Credential Access + - Credential Access + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Endpoint +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline. + +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) +- **Last Updated**: 2021-09-16 +- **Author**: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +- **ID**: e9fb4a59-c5fb-440a-9f24-191fbc6b2911 + + +#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1003.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/002/) | Security Account Manager | Credential Access | + +| [T1003](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/) | OS Credential Dumping | Credential Access | + +#### Search + +``` + +| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` OR `process_cmd` Processes.process=*save* (Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SAM* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\SAM*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id +| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: + +Note that `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* Processes.dest +* Processes.user +* Processes.parent_process_name +* Processes.parent_process +* Processes.original_file_name +* Processes.process_name +* Processes.process +* Processes.process_id +* Processes.parent_process_path +* Processes.process_path +* Processes.parent_process_id + + +#### How To Implement +To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. + +#### Known False Positives +None identified. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Credential Dumping](/stories/credential_dumping) +* [DarkSide Ransomware](/stories/darkside_ransomware) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Actions on Objectives + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 90.0 | 90 | 100 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to export the registry keys. | + + + + +#### Reference + +* [https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets) + + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + +* [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/detection/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml) \| *version*: **6** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data/_stories/darkside_ransomware.md b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data/_stories/darkside_ransomware.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3cb7373f9b --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data/_stories/darkside_ransomware.md @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +--- +title: "DarkSide Ransomware" +last_modified_at: 2021-05-12 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Endpoint + - Actions on Objectives +--- + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the DarkSide Ransomware + +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) +- **Last Updated**: 2021-05-12 +- **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +- **ID**: 507edc74-13d5-4339-878e-b9114ded1f35 + +#### Narrative + +This story addresses Darkside ransomware. This ransomware payload has many similarities to common ransomware however there are certain items particular to it. The creation of a .TXT log that shows every item being encrypted as well as the creation of ransomware notes and files adding a machine ID created based on CRC32 checksum algorithm. This ransomware payload leaves machines in minimal operation level,enough to browse the attackers websites. A customized URI with leaked information is presented to each victim.This is the ransomware payload that shut down the Colonial pipeline. The story is composed of several detection searches covering similar items to other ransomware payloads and those particular to Darkside payload. + +#### Detections + +| Name | Technique | Type | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------| +| [Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe](/detection/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe/) | [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping)| TTP | + +#### Reference + +* [https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/the-darkside-of-the-ransomware-pipeline.htmlbig-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/the-darkside-of-the-ransomware-pipeline.htmlbig-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/) +* [https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html](https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/stories/darkside_ransomware.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data_ref/_data/navigation.yml b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data_ref/_data/navigation.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..11b77cf7af --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data_ref/_data/navigation.yml @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +main: + - title: "Detections" + url: /detections/ + - title: "Analytic Stories" + url: /stories/ + - title: "Playbooks" + url: /playbooks/ + - title: "Tags" + url: /tags/ + - title: "About" + url: https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security/threat-research.html +detections: + - title: "Tactic" + children: + - title: Credential Access + url: /detections/credential_access/ + - title: Defense Evasion + url: /detections/defense_evasion/ + - title: Initial Access + url: /detections/initial_access/ + - title: Persistence + url: /detections/persistence/ + - title: Privilege Escalation + url: /detections/privilege_escalation/ + - title: "Datamodel" + children: + - title: Endpoint + url: /detections/endpoint/ + - title: "Product" + children: + - title: "Splunk Enterprise Security" + url: /tags/#splunk-enterprise-security + - title: "Splunk Behavioral Analytics" + url: /tags/#splunk-behavioral-analytics + - title: "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS" + url: /tags/#splunk-security-analytics-for-aws +stories: + - title: "Use Case" + children: + - title: Malware + url: /stories/malware/ +playbooks: + - title: "Type" + children: + - title: "Response" + url: /tags/#response/ + - title: "Investigation" + url: /tags/#investigation/ \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data_ref/_pages/credential_access.md b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data_ref/_pages/credential_access.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..226d1076f3 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data_ref/_pages/credential_access.md @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +--- +title: Credential Access +layout: tag +author_profile: false +taxonomy: Credential Access +permalink: /detections/credential_access/ +sidebar: + nav: "detections" +--- \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data_ref/_pages/defense_evasion.md b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data_ref/_pages/defense_evasion.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ad5abb3c31 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data_ref/_pages/defense_evasion.md @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +--- +title: Defense Evasion +layout: tag +author_profile: false +taxonomy: Defense Evasion +permalink: /detections/defense_evasion/ +sidebar: + nav: "detections" +--- \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data_ref/_pages/detections.md b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data_ref/_pages/detections.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a170617043 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data_ref/_pages/detections.md @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +--- +title: "Detections" +layout: categories +author_profile: false +permalink: /detections/ +classes: wide +sidebar: + nav: "detections" +--- + +| Name | Technique | Type | +| -------------- | --------------- | --------------- | +| [Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe](/detection/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe/) | [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | TTP | +| [Detect new user AWS Console Login](/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts) | TTP | \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data_ref/_pages/endpoint.md b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data_ref/_pages/endpoint.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3405d11c96 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data_ref/_pages/endpoint.md @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +--- +title: Endpoint +layout: tag +author_profile: false +taxonomy: Endpoint +permalink: /detections/endpoint/ +sidebar: + nav: "detections" +--- \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data_ref/_pages/initial_access.md b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data_ref/_pages/initial_access.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9ac8bd46b2 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data_ref/_pages/initial_access.md @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +--- +title: Initial Access +layout: tag +author_profile: false +taxonomy: Initial Access +permalink: /detections/initial_access/ +sidebar: + nav: "detections" +--- \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data_ref/_pages/malware.md b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data_ref/_pages/malware.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c4d4949baa --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data_ref/_pages/malware.md @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +--- +title: Malware +layout: tag +author_profile: false +taxonomy: Malware +permalink: /detections/malware/ +sidebar: + nav: "detections" +--- \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data_ref/_pages/paybooks.md b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data_ref/_pages/paybooks.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e8802735ef --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data_ref/_pages/paybooks.md @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +--- +title: "Playbooks" +layout: collection +author_profile: false +permalink: /playbooks/ +classes: wide +sidebar: + nav: "playbooks" +--- + +| Name | Detections | Type | +| --------| ---------- | ----------- | +| [Ransomware Investigate and Contain](/playbooks/ransomware_investigate_and_contain/)|[Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe](/detection/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe/)| Response | diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data_ref/_pages/persistence.md b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data_ref/_pages/persistence.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7b802d6881 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data_ref/_pages/persistence.md @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +--- +title: Persistence +layout: tag +author_profile: false +taxonomy: Persistence +permalink: /detections/persistence/ +sidebar: + nav: "detections" +--- \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data_ref/_pages/privilege_escalation.md b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data_ref/_pages/privilege_escalation.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..60bde4562d --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data_ref/_pages/privilege_escalation.md @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +--- +title: Privilege Escalation +layout: tag +author_profile: false +taxonomy: Privilege Escalation +permalink: /detections/privilege_escalation/ +sidebar: + nav: "detections" +--- \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data_ref/_pages/stories.md b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data_ref/_pages/stories.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a433c7ddd8 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data_ref/_pages/stories.md @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +--- +title: Analytic Stories +layout: collection +permalink: /stories/ +collection: stories +classes: wide +sidebar: + nav: "stories" +--- + +| Name | Technique | Tactic | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------| +| [DarkSide Ransomware](darkside_ransomware) | [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access) | \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data_ref/_playbooks/ransomware_investigate_and_contain.md b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data_ref/_playbooks/ransomware_investigate_and_contain.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d0168d5128 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data_ref/_playbooks/ransomware_investigate_and_contain.md @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +--- +title: "Ransomware Investigate and Contain" +last_modified_at: 2018-02-04 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Response + - Splunk SOAR + - Carbon Black Response + - LDAP + - Palo Alto Networks Firewall + - WildFire + - Cylance + - Ransomware + - Response +--- + +[Try in Splunk SOAR](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/software/splunk-security-orchestration-and-automation.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This playbook investigates and contains ransomware detected on endpoints. + +- **Type**: Response +- **Product**: Splunk SOAR +- **Apps**: [Carbon Black Response](https://splunkbase.splunk.com/apps/#/search/Carbon Black Response/product/soar), [LDAP](https://splunkbase.splunk.com/apps/#/search/LDAP/product/soar), [Palo Alto Networks Firewall](https://splunkbase.splunk.com/apps/#/search/Palo Alto Networks Firewall/product/soar), [WildFire](https://splunkbase.splunk.com/apps/#/search/WildFire/product/soar), [Cylance](https://splunkbase.splunk.com/apps/#/search/Cylance/product/soar) +- **Last Updated**: 2018-02-04 +- **Author**: Philip Royer, Splunk +- **ID**: fc0edc96-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3783fd63 + +#### Associated Detections + +* [Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe](//attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe/) + + + +#### How To Implement +This playbook requires the Splunk SOAR apps for Palo Alto Networks Firewalls, Palo Alto Wildfire, LDAP, and Carbon Black Response. + +#### Playbooks +![](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/security_content/develop/playbooks/ransomware_investigate_and_contain.png) + +#### Required field + + +#### Reference + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/playbooks/ransomware_investigate_and_contain.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data_ref/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_new_user_aws_console_login.md b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data_ref/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_new_user_aws_console_login.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cb61304499 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data_ref/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_new_user_aws_console_login.md @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +--- +title: "Detect new user AWS Console Login" +excerpt: "Cloud Accounts +" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2020-07-21 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Cloud Accounts + - Defense Evasion + - Initial Access + - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour. Deprecated now this search is updated to use the Authentication datamodel. + +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2020-07-21 +- **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +- **ID**: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f3-d82362dffd75 + + +#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1078.004](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/) | Cloud Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | + +#### Search + +``` +`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin +| rename userIdentity.arn as user +| stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user +| inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail +| stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user +| eval userStatus=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), "First Time Logging into AWS Console","Previously Seen User") +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| where userStatus ="First Time Logging into AWS Console" +| `detect_new_user_aws_console_login_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: + +Note that `detect_new_user_aws_console_login_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* eventName +* userIdentity.arn + + +#### How To Implement +You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. Run the "Previously seen users in AWS CloudTrail" support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run "Update previously seen users in AWS CloudTrail" hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. + +#### Known False Positives +When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Suspicious AWS Login Activities](/stories/suspicious_aws_login_activities) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Actions on Objectives + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 90.0 | 90 | 100 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml) \| *version*: **2** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data_ref/_posts/2021-09-16-attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.md b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data_ref/_posts/2021-09-16-attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a1bccedf77 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data_ref/_posts/2021-09-16-attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.md @@ -0,0 +1,117 @@ +--- +title: "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe" +excerpt: "Security Account Manager +, OS Credential Dumping +" +categories: + - Detection +last_modified_at: 2021-09-16 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Security Account Manager + - OS Credential Dumping + - Credential Access + - Credential Access + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Endpoint +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline. + +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) +- **Last Updated**: 2021-09-16 +- **Author**: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +- **ID**: e9fb4a59-c5fb-440a-9f24-191fbc6b2911 + + +#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1003.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/002/) | Security Account Manager | Credential Access | + +| [T1003](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/) | OS Credential Dumping | Credential Access | + +#### Search + +``` + +| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` OR `process_cmd` Processes.process=*save* (Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SAM* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\SAM*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id +| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: + +Note that `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* Processes.dest +* Processes.user +* Processes.parent_process_name +* Processes.parent_process +* Processes.original_file_name +* Processes.process_name +* Processes.process +* Processes.process_id +* Processes.parent_process_path +* Processes.process_path +* Processes.parent_process_id + + +#### How To Implement +To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. + +#### Known False Positives +None identified. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Credential Dumping](/stories/credential_dumping) +* [DarkSide Ransomware](/stories/darkside_ransomware) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Actions on Objectives + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 90.0 | 90 | 100 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to export the registry keys. | + + + + +#### Reference + +* [https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets) + + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + +* [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/detection/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml) \| *version*: **6** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data_ref/_stories/darkside_ransomware.md b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data_ref/_stories/darkside_ransomware.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3cb7373f9b --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data_ref/_stories/darkside_ransomware.md @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +--- +title: "DarkSide Ransomware" +last_modified_at: 2021-05-12 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Endpoint + - Actions on Objectives +--- + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the DarkSide Ransomware + +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) +- **Last Updated**: 2021-05-12 +- **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +- **ID**: 507edc74-13d5-4339-878e-b9114ded1f35 + +#### Narrative + +This story addresses Darkside ransomware. This ransomware payload has many similarities to common ransomware however there are certain items particular to it. The creation of a .TXT log that shows every item being encrypted as well as the creation of ransomware notes and files adding a machine ID created based on CRC32 checksum algorithm. This ransomware payload leaves machines in minimal operation level,enough to browse the attackers websites. A customized URI with leaked information is presented to each victim.This is the ransomware payload that shut down the Colonial pipeline. The story is composed of several detection searches covering similar items to other ransomware payloads and those particular to Darkside payload. + +#### Detections + +| Name | Technique | Type | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------| +| [Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe](/detection/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe/) | [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping)| TTP | + +#### Reference + +* [https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/the-darkside-of-the-ransomware-pipeline.htmlbig-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/the-darkside-of-the-ransomware-pipeline.htmlbig-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/) +* [https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html](https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/stories/darkside_ransomware.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_svg_data/detection_count.svg b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_svg_data/detection_count.svg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..36342bbc1d --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_svg_data/detection_count.svg @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + detections + 1 + + \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_svg_data/detection_coverage.svg b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_svg_data/detection_coverage.svg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ed37733b35 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_svg_data/detection_coverage.svg @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + coverage + 100% + + \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_svg_data_ref/detection_count.svg b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_svg_data_ref/detection_count.svg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..36342bbc1d --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_svg_data_ref/detection_count.svg @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + detections + 1 + + \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_svg_data_ref/detection_coverage.svg b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_svg_data_ref/detection_coverage.svg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ed37733b35 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_svg_data_ref/detection_coverage.svg @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + coverage + 100% + + \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_yml_data/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_yml_data/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..68a1d82348 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_yml_data/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +name: Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe +id: e9fb4a59-c5fb-440a-9f24-191fbc6b2911 +version: 6 +date: '2021-09-16' +author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +type: TTP +datamodel: +- Endpoint +description: Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export + of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline. +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) + as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` OR `process_cmd` + Processes.process=*save* (Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SAM* + OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\Security* + OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\SAM*) by Processes.dest + Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name + Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` + | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information + on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from + your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, + confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the + endpoint product. +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: +- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets +tags: + analytic_story: + - Credential Dumping + - DarkSide Ransomware + asset_type: Endpoint + automated_detection_testing: passed + cis20: + - CIS 3 + - CIS 5 + - CIS 16 + confidence: 100 + context: + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Credential Access + dataset: + - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log + impact: 90 + kill_chain_phases: + - Actions on Objectives + message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified + on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to export the registry keys. + mitre_attack_id: + - T1003.002 + - T1003 + nist: + - DE.CM + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim + - name: parent_process_name + type: Process + role: + - Parent Process + - name: process_name + type: Process + role: + - Child Process + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + required_fields: + - _time + - Processes.dest + - Processes.user + - Processes.parent_process_name + - Processes.parent_process + - Processes.original_file_name + - Processes.process_name + - Processes.process + - Processes.process_id + - Processes.parent_process_path + - Processes.process_path + - Processes.parent_process_id + risk_score: 90 + security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_yml_data/srs/ssa___anomalous_usage_of_archive_tools.yml b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_yml_data/srs/ssa___anomalous_usage_of_archive_tools.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1901740dbd --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_yml_data/srs/ssa___anomalous_usage_of_archive_tools.yml @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +name: Anomalous usage of Archive Tools +id: 63614a58-10e2-4c6c-ae81-ea1113681439 +version: 1 +description: The following detection identifies the usage of archive tools from the + command line. +search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event,"_time"), + "string", null)), process=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", + null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string", + null)), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_path"), "string", null), + parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "parent_process_name"), "string", + null), parent_process=ucast(map_get(input_event, "parent_process"), "string", null), + event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "event_id"), "string", null) | where process_name + IS NOT NULL AND parent_process_name IS NOT NULL | where like(process_name, "7z%") + OR process_name="WinRAR.exe" OR like(process_name, "winzip%") | where like(parent_process_name, + "%cmd.exe") OR like(parent_process_name, "%powershell.exe") | eval body=create_map("category_id", 101, "class_id", 101000, "detection_start_time", start_time, + "detection_end_time", end_time, "device_entities", [create_map("uid", ucast(map_get(input_event, "enrichments.device_entities.device.uid"), "string", null), "type_id", 0)], + "disposition_id", 1, "end_time", end_time, "event_id", 10100001, "event_time", timestamp, + "finding", create_map("confidence", 60, "confidence_id", 2, + "context_ids", [10, 49], "impact", 70, "impact_id", 4, + "kill_chain_phase", Exploitation, "kill_chain_phase_id", 4, + "risk_level", Medium, "risk_level_id", 2, "type_id", 1, "ref_event_uid", event_id), + "message", An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior is indicative of suspicious loading of 7zip., "metadata", create_map("log_name", Endpoint_Processes, "version", + "1.0.0"), "observables", , "origin", create_map("product", create_map("name", "Splunk Behavioral Analytics")), + "rule", create_map("name", "Anomalous usage of Archive Tools", "uid", "63614a58-10e2-4c6c-ae81-ea1113681439", "version", "1"), "start_time", start_time, "time", start_time, + "user_entities", [create_map("uid", ucast(map_get(input_event, "enrichments.user_entities.user.uid"),"string", null))]) + | into write_ssa_finding_events();' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information + on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from + your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +known_false_positives: False positives can be ligitmate usage of archive tools from + the command line. +references: +- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/001/ +tags: + analytic_story: + - Cobalt Strike + - NOBELIUM Group + cis20: [] + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation + mitre_attack_id: + - T1560.001 + - T1560 + nist: [] + required_fields: + - _time + - Processes.process_name + - Processes.process + - Processes.dest + - Processes.user + - Processes.parent_process_name + - Processes.parent_process + security_domain: endpoint + risk_severity: low +test: + name: Anomalous usage of Archive Tools Unit Test + tests: + - name: Anomalous usage of Archive Tools + file: endpoint/ssa___anomalous_usage_of_archive_tools.yml + pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' + attack_data: + - file_name: security.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1560.001/archive_tools/windows-security.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_yml_data/ssa___anomalous_usage_of_archive_tools.test.yml b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_yml_data/ssa___anomalous_usage_of_archive_tools.test.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..73bc9097c9 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_yml_data/ssa___anomalous_usage_of_archive_tools.test.yml @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +name: Anomalous usage of Archive Tools Unit Test +tests: +- name: Anomalous usage of Archive Tools + file: endpoint/ssa___anomalous_usage_of_archive_tools.yml + pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' + description: Test for Anomalous usage of Archive Tools + attack_data: + - file_name: security.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1560.001/archive_tools/windows-security.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_yml_data/ssa___anomalous_usage_of_archive_tools.yml b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_yml_data/ssa___anomalous_usage_of_archive_tools.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..babc428aa6 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_yml_data/ssa___anomalous_usage_of_archive_tools.yml @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +name: Anomalous usage of Archive Tools +id: 63614a58-10e2-4c6c-ae81-ea1113681439 +version: 1 +date: '2021-11-22' +author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +type: Anomaly +datamodel: +- Endpoint_Processes +description: The following detection identifies the usage of archive tools from the + command line. +search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event,"_time"), + "string", null)), process=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", + null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string", + null)), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_path"), "string", null), + parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "parent_process_name"), "string", + null), parent_process=ucast(map_get(input_event, "parent_process"), "string", null), + event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "event_id"), "string", null) | where process_name + IS NOT NULL AND parent_process_name IS NOT NULL | where like(process_name, "7z%") + OR process_name="WinRAR.exe" OR like(process_name, "winzip%") | where like(parent_process_name, + "%cmd.exe") OR like(parent_process_name, "%powershell.exe") | eval body=--body-- + | into write_ssa_finding_events();' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information + on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from + your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +known_false_positives: False positives can be ligitmate usage of archive tools from + the command line. +references: +- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/001/ +tags: + analytic_story: + - Cobalt Strike + - NOBELIUM Group + cis20: [] + confidence: 60 + context: + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Collection + dataset: + - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1560.001/archive_tools/windows-security.log + impact: 70 + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation + message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified + on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior is indicative of suspicious loading + of 7zip. + mitre_attack_id: + - T1560.001 + - T1560 + nist: [] + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim + - name: parent_process_name + type: Process + role: + - Parent Process + - name: process_name + type: Process + role: + - Child Process + product: + - Splunk Behavioral Analytics + required_fields: + - _time + - Processes.process_name + - Processes.process + - Processes.dest + - Processes.user + - Processes.parent_process_name + - Processes.parent_process + risk_score: 42 + risk_severity: medium + security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_yml_data_ref/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_yml_data_ref/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..68a1d82348 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_yml_data_ref/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +name: Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe +id: e9fb4a59-c5fb-440a-9f24-191fbc6b2911 +version: 6 +date: '2021-09-16' +author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +type: TTP +datamodel: +- Endpoint +description: Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export + of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline. +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) + as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` OR `process_cmd` + Processes.process=*save* (Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SAM* + OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\Security* + OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\SAM*) by Processes.dest + Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name + Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` + | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information + on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from + your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, + confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the + endpoint product. +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: +- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets +tags: + analytic_story: + - Credential Dumping + - DarkSide Ransomware + asset_type: Endpoint + automated_detection_testing: passed + cis20: + - CIS 3 + - CIS 5 + - CIS 16 + confidence: 100 + context: + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Credential Access + dataset: + - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log + impact: 90 + kill_chain_phases: + - Actions on Objectives + message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified + on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to export the registry keys. + mitre_attack_id: + - T1003.002 + - T1003 + nist: + - DE.CM + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim + - name: parent_process_name + type: Process + role: + - Parent Process + - name: process_name + type: Process + role: + - Child Process + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + required_fields: + - _time + - Processes.dest + - Processes.user + - Processes.parent_process_name + - Processes.parent_process + - Processes.original_file_name + - Processes.process_name + - Processes.process + - Processes.process_id + - Processes.parent_process_path + - Processes.process_path + - Processes.parent_process_id + risk_score: 90 + security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_yml_data_ref/srs/ssa___anomalous_usage_of_archive_tools.yml b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_yml_data_ref/srs/ssa___anomalous_usage_of_archive_tools.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1901740dbd --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_yml_data_ref/srs/ssa___anomalous_usage_of_archive_tools.yml @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +name: Anomalous usage of Archive Tools +id: 63614a58-10e2-4c6c-ae81-ea1113681439 +version: 1 +description: The following detection identifies the usage of archive tools from the + command line. +search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event,"_time"), + "string", null)), process=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", + null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string", + null)), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_path"), "string", null), + parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "parent_process_name"), "string", + null), parent_process=ucast(map_get(input_event, "parent_process"), "string", null), + event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "event_id"), "string", null) | where process_name + IS NOT NULL AND parent_process_name IS NOT NULL | where like(process_name, "7z%") + OR process_name="WinRAR.exe" OR like(process_name, "winzip%") | where like(parent_process_name, + "%cmd.exe") OR like(parent_process_name, "%powershell.exe") | eval body=create_map("category_id", 101, "class_id", 101000, "detection_start_time", start_time, + "detection_end_time", end_time, "device_entities", [create_map("uid", ucast(map_get(input_event, "enrichments.device_entities.device.uid"), "string", null), "type_id", 0)], + "disposition_id", 1, "end_time", end_time, "event_id", 10100001, "event_time", timestamp, + "finding", create_map("confidence", 60, "confidence_id", 2, + "context_ids", [10, 49], "impact", 70, "impact_id", 4, + "kill_chain_phase", Exploitation, "kill_chain_phase_id", 4, + "risk_level", Medium, "risk_level_id", 2, "type_id", 1, "ref_event_uid", event_id), + "message", An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior is indicative of suspicious loading of 7zip., "metadata", create_map("log_name", Endpoint_Processes, "version", + "1.0.0"), "observables", , "origin", create_map("product", create_map("name", "Splunk Behavioral Analytics")), + "rule", create_map("name", "Anomalous usage of Archive Tools", "uid", "63614a58-10e2-4c6c-ae81-ea1113681439", "version", "1"), "start_time", start_time, "time", start_time, + "user_entities", [create_map("uid", ucast(map_get(input_event, "enrichments.user_entities.user.uid"),"string", null))]) + | into write_ssa_finding_events();' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information + on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from + your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +known_false_positives: False positives can be ligitmate usage of archive tools from + the command line. +references: +- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/001/ +tags: + analytic_story: + - Cobalt Strike + - NOBELIUM Group + cis20: [] + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation + mitre_attack_id: + - T1560.001 + - T1560 + nist: [] + required_fields: + - _time + - Processes.process_name + - Processes.process + - Processes.dest + - Processes.user + - Processes.parent_process_name + - Processes.parent_process + security_domain: endpoint + risk_severity: low +test: + name: Anomalous usage of Archive Tools Unit Test + tests: + - name: Anomalous usage of Archive Tools + file: endpoint/ssa___anomalous_usage_of_archive_tools.yml + pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' + attack_data: + - file_name: security.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1560.001/archive_tools/windows-security.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/test_obj_to_attack_nav_adapter.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/test_obj_to_attack_nav_adapter.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..24da08408e --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/test_obj_to_attack_nav_adapter.py @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +import os +import filecmp + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.adapter.obj_to_md_adapter import ObjToMdAdapter +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_director import SecurityContentDirector +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_basic_builder import SecurityContentBasicBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_detection_builder import SecurityContentDetectionBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_story_builder import SecurityContentStoryBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.enums.enums import SecurityContentType +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_investigation_builder import SecurityContentInvestigationBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_baseline_builder import SecurityContentBaselineBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_playbook_builder import SecurityContentPlaybookBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.attack_enrichment import AttackEnrichment +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.adapter.obj_to_attack_nav_adapter import ObjToAttackNavAdapter + + +def test_svg_writer(): + director = SecurityContentDirector() + + lookup_builder = SecurityContentBasicBuilder() + director.constructLookup(lookup_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/lookups/previously_seen_aws_regions.yml')) + lookup = lookup_builder.getObject() + + macro_builder = SecurityContentBasicBuilder() + director.constructMacro(macro_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/macro/security_content_ctime.yml')) + macro = macro_builder.getObject() + + deployment_builder = SecurityContentBasicBuilder() + director.constructDeployment(deployment_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/deployment/ESCU/00_default_ttp.yml')) + deployment = deployment_builder.getObject() + + director.constructDeployment(deployment_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/deployment/ESCU/00_default_baseline.yml')) + deployment_baseline = deployment_builder.getObject() + + baseline_builder = SecurityContentBaselineBuilder() + director.constructBaseline(baseline_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/baseline/baseline.yml'), [deployment_baseline]) + baseline = baseline_builder.getObject() + + unit_test_builder = SecurityContentBasicBuilder() + director.constructTest(unit_test_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/test/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.test.yml')) + test = unit_test_builder.getObject() + + playbook_builder = SecurityContentPlaybookBuilder() + director.constructPlaybook(playbook_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/playbook/example_playbook.yml'), []) + playbook = playbook_builder.getObject() + + detection_builder = SecurityContentDetectionBuilder() + director.constructDetection(detection_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/detection/valid.yml'), [deployment], [playbook], [baseline], [test], + AttackEnrichment.get_attack_lookup(), [], []) + detection = detection_builder.getObject() + + adapter = ObjToAttackNavAdapter() + adapter.writeObjects([detection], os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'obj_to_attack_data')) + + files_to_compare = [ + 'coverage.json' + ] + + for file in files_to_compare: + path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'obj_to_attack_data', file) + path_ref = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'obj_to_attack_data_ref', file) + assert filecmp.cmp(path, path_ref, shallow=False) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/test_obj_to_conf_adapter.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/test_obj_to_conf_adapter.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8f0dcb185f --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/test_obj_to_conf_adapter.py @@ -0,0 +1,114 @@ +import os +import datetime +import pytest +import filecmp + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.adapter.obj_to_conf_adapter import ObjToConfAdapter +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_director import SecurityContentDirector +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_basic_builder import SecurityContentBasicBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_detection_builder import SecurityContentDetectionBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_story_builder import SecurityContentStoryBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.enums.enums import SecurityContentType +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_investigation_builder import SecurityContentInvestigationBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_baseline_builder import SecurityContentBaselineBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.attack_enrichment import AttackEnrichment +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_playbook_builder import SecurityContentPlaybookBuilder + + +FAKE_TIME = datetime.datetime(2020, 12, 25, 17, 5, 55) + +@pytest.fixture +def patch_datetime_now(monkeypatch): + + class mydatetime(): + @classmethod + def utcnow(cls): + return FAKE_TIME + + monkeypatch.setattr(datetime, 'datetime', mydatetime) + + +def test_write_conf_files(patch_datetime_now): + director = SecurityContentDirector() + + lookup_builder = SecurityContentBasicBuilder() + director.constructLookup(lookup_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/lookups/previously_seen_aws_regions.yml')) + lookup = lookup_builder.getObject() + + macro_builder = SecurityContentBasicBuilder() + director.constructMacro(macro_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/macro/security_content_ctime.yml')) + macro = macro_builder.getObject() + + deployment_builder = SecurityContentBasicBuilder() + director.constructDeployment(deployment_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/deployment/ESCU/00_default_ttp.yml')) + deployment = deployment_builder.getObject() + + director.constructDeployment(deployment_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/deployment/ESCU/00_default_baseline.yml')) + deployment_baseline = deployment_builder.getObject() + + playbook_builder = SecurityContentPlaybookBuilder() + director.constructPlaybook(playbook_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/playbook/example_playbook.yml'), []) + playbook = playbook_builder.getObject() + + baseline_builder = SecurityContentBaselineBuilder() + director.constructBaseline(baseline_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/baseline/baseline.yml'), [deployment_baseline]) + baseline = baseline_builder.getObject() + + unit_test_builder = SecurityContentBasicBuilder() + director.constructTest(unit_test_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/test/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.test.yml')) + test = unit_test_builder.getObject() + + detection_builder = SecurityContentDetectionBuilder() + director.constructDetection(detection_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/detection/valid.yml'), [deployment], [playbook], [baseline], [test], + {}, [], []) + detection = detection_builder.getObject() + + director.constructDetection(detection_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/detection/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml'), [deployment], [playbook], [baseline], [test], + {}, [], []) + detection_deprecated = detection_builder.getObject() + + investigation_builder = SecurityContentInvestigationBuilder() + director.constructInvestigation(investigation_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/investigation/investigation.yml')) + investigation = investigation_builder.getObject() + + story_builder = SecurityContentStoryBuilder() + director.constructStory(story_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/story/ransomware_darkside.yml'), + [detection], [baseline], [investigation]) + story = story_builder.getObject() + + output_path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'data') + adapter = ObjToConfAdapter() + adapter.writeHeaders(output_path) + adapter.writeObjects([detection, detection_deprecated], output_path, SecurityContentType.detections) + adapter.writeObjects([story], output_path, SecurityContentType.stories) + adapter.writeObjects([baseline], output_path, SecurityContentType.baselines) + adapter.writeObjects([investigation], output_path, SecurityContentType.investigations) + adapter.writeObjects([lookup], output_path, SecurityContentType.lookups) + adapter.writeObjects([macro], output_path, SecurityContentType.macros) + + files_to_compare = [ + 'data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task.xml', + 'analyticstories.conf', + 'collections.conf', + 'es_investigations.conf', + 'macros.conf', + 'savedsearches.conf', + 'transforms.conf', + 'workflow_actions.conf' + ] + + for file in files_to_compare: + path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'data/default', file) + path_ref = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'data/default_reference', file) + assert filecmp.cmp(path, path_ref, shallow=False) diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/test_obj_to_json_adapter.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/test_obj_to_json_adapter.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..500a15135c --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/test_obj_to_json_adapter.py @@ -0,0 +1,182 @@ +import os +import filecmp + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.adapter.obj_to_json_adapter import ObjToJsonAdapter +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_basic_builder import SecurityContentBasicBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_detection_builder import SecurityContentDetectionBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_baseline_builder import SecurityContentBaselineBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_investigation_builder import SecurityContentInvestigationBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_story_builder import SecurityContentStoryBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_director import SecurityContentDirector +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.attack_enrichment import AttackEnrichment +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.enums.enums import SecurityContentType +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_playbook_builder import SecurityContentPlaybookBuilder + + +def test_write_detections(): + director = SecurityContentDirector() + + macro_builder = SecurityContentBasicBuilder() + director.constructMacro(macro_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/macro/process_reg.yml')) + macro = macro_builder.getObject() + + lookup_builder = SecurityContentBasicBuilder() + director.constructLookup(lookup_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/lookups/previously_seen_aws_regions.yml')) + lookup = lookup_builder.getObject() + + detection_builder = SecurityContentDetectionBuilder() + director.constructDetection(detection_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/detection/valid.yml'), [], [], [], [], + AttackEnrichment.get_attack_lookup(), [macro], [lookup]) + detection = detection_builder.getObject() + + output_path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'obj_to_json_adapter_data') + adapter = ObjToJsonAdapter() + adapter.writeObjects([detection], output_path, SecurityContentType.detections) + + path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'obj_to_json_adapter_data/detections.json') + path_ref = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'obj_to_json_adapter_data/detections_ref.json') + #assert filecmp.cmp(path, path_ref, shallow=False) + + +def test_write_baselines(): + director = SecurityContentDirector() + + deployment_builder = SecurityContentBasicBuilder() + director.constructDeployment(deployment_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/deployment/ESCU/00_default_baseline.yml')) + deployment = deployment_builder.getObject() + + baseline_builder = SecurityContentBaselineBuilder() + director.constructBaseline(baseline_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/baseline/baseline.yml'), [deployment]) + baseline = baseline_builder.getObject() + + output_path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'obj_to_json_adapter_data') + adapter = ObjToJsonAdapter() + adapter.writeObjects([baseline], output_path, SecurityContentType.baselines) + + path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'obj_to_json_adapter_data/baselines.json') + path_ref = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'obj_to_json_adapter_data/baselines_ref.json') + assert filecmp.cmp(path, path_ref, shallow=False) + + +def test_write_deployments(): + director = SecurityContentDirector() + + deployment_builder = SecurityContentBasicBuilder() + director.constructDeployment(deployment_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/deployment/ESCU/00_default_baseline.yml')) + deployment = deployment_builder.getObject() + + output_path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'obj_to_json_adapter_data') + adapter = ObjToJsonAdapter() + adapter.writeObjects([deployment], output_path, SecurityContentType.deployments) + + path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'obj_to_json_adapter_data/deployments.json') + path_ref = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'obj_to_json_adapter_data/deployments_ref.json') + assert filecmp.cmp(path, path_ref, shallow=False) + + +def test_write_lookups(): + director = SecurityContentDirector() + + lookup_builder = SecurityContentBasicBuilder() + director.constructLookup(lookup_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/lookups/previously_seen_aws_regions.yml')) + lookup = lookup_builder.getObject() + + output_path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'obj_to_json_adapter_data') + adapter = ObjToJsonAdapter() + adapter.writeObjects([lookup], output_path, SecurityContentType.lookups) + + path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'obj_to_json_adapter_data/lookups.json') + path_ref = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'obj_to_json_adapter_data/lookups_ref.json') + assert filecmp.cmp(path, path_ref, shallow=False) + + +def test_write_macros(): + director = SecurityContentDirector() + macro_builder = SecurityContentBasicBuilder() + director.constructMacro(macro_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/macro/powershell.yml')) + macro = macro_builder.getObject() + + output_path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'obj_to_json_adapter_data') + adapter = ObjToJsonAdapter() + adapter.writeObjects([macro], output_path, SecurityContentType.macros) + + path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'obj_to_json_adapter_data/macros.json') + path_ref = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'obj_to_json_adapter_data/macros_ref.json') + assert filecmp.cmp(path, path_ref, shallow=False) + + +def test_write_investigations(): + director = SecurityContentDirector() + investigation_builder = SecurityContentInvestigationBuilder() + director.constructInvestigation(investigation_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/investigation/investigation.yml')) + investigation = investigation_builder.getObject() + + output_path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'obj_to_json_adapter_data') + adapter = ObjToJsonAdapter() + adapter.writeObjects([investigation], output_path, SecurityContentType.investigations) + + path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'obj_to_json_adapter_data/response_task.json') + path_ref = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'obj_to_json_adapter_data/response_task_ref.json') + assert filecmp.cmp(path, path_ref, shallow=False) + + +def test_write_stories(): + director = SecurityContentDirector() + + deployment_builder = SecurityContentBasicBuilder() + director.constructDeployment(deployment_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/deployment/ESCU/00_default_ttp.yml')) + deployment = deployment_builder.getObject() + + director.constructDeployment(deployment_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/deployment/ESCU/00_default_baseline.yml')) + deployment_baseline = deployment_builder.getObject() + + playbook_builder = SecurityContentPlaybookBuilder() + director.constructPlaybook(playbook_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/playbook/example_playbook.yml'), []) + playbook = playbook_builder.getObject() + + baseline_builder = SecurityContentBaselineBuilder() + director.constructBaseline(baseline_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/baseline/baseline2.yml'), [deployment_baseline]) + baseline = baseline_builder.getObject() + + unit_test_builder = SecurityContentBasicBuilder() + director.constructTest(unit_test_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/test/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.test.yml')) + test = unit_test_builder.getObject() + + detection_builder = SecurityContentDetectionBuilder() + director.constructDetection(detection_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/detection/valid.yml'), [deployment], [playbook], [baseline], [test], + AttackEnrichment.get_attack_lookup(), [], []) + detection = detection_builder.getObject() + + investigation_builder = SecurityContentInvestigationBuilder() + director.constructInvestigation(investigation_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/investigation/investigation.yml')) + investigation = investigation_builder.getObject() + + story_builder = SecurityContentStoryBuilder() + director.constructStory(story_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/story/ransomware_darkside.yml'), + [detection], [baseline], [investigation]) + story = story_builder.getObject() + + output_path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'obj_to_json_adapter_data') + adapter = ObjToJsonAdapter() + adapter.writeObjects([story], output_path, SecurityContentType.stories) + + path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'obj_to_json_adapter_data/story.json') + path_ref = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'obj_to_json_adapter_data/story_ref.json') + assert filecmp.cmp(path, path_ref, shallow=False) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/test_obj_to_md_adapter.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/test_obj_to_md_adapter.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b7721be43b --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/test_obj_to_md_adapter.py @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +import os +import filecmp + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.adapter.obj_to_md_adapter import ObjToMdAdapter +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_director import SecurityContentDirector +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_basic_builder import SecurityContentBasicBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_detection_builder import SecurityContentDetectionBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_story_builder import SecurityContentStoryBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.enums.enums import SecurityContentType +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_investigation_builder import SecurityContentInvestigationBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_baseline_builder import SecurityContentBaselineBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_playbook_builder import SecurityContentPlaybookBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.attack_enrichment import AttackEnrichment +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.adapter.obj_to_md_adapter import ObjToMdAdapter + + +def test_md_writer(): + director = SecurityContentDirector() + + lookup_builder = SecurityContentBasicBuilder() + director.constructLookup(lookup_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/lookups/previously_seen_aws_regions.yml')) + lookup = lookup_builder.getObject() + + macro_builder = SecurityContentBasicBuilder() + director.constructMacro(macro_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/macro/security_content_ctime.yml')) + macro = macro_builder.getObject() + + deployment_builder = SecurityContentBasicBuilder() + director.constructDeployment(deployment_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/deployment/ESCU/00_default_ttp.yml')) + deployment = deployment_builder.getObject() + + director.constructDeployment(deployment_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/deployment/ESCU/00_default_baseline.yml')) + deployment_baseline = deployment_builder.getObject() + + baseline_builder = SecurityContentBaselineBuilder() + director.constructBaseline(baseline_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/baseline/baseline.yml'), [deployment_baseline]) + baseline = baseline_builder.getObject() + + unit_test_builder = SecurityContentBasicBuilder() + director.constructTest(unit_test_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/test/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.test.yml')) + test = unit_test_builder.getObject() + + playbook_builder = SecurityContentPlaybookBuilder() + director.constructPlaybook(playbook_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/playbook/example_playbook.yml'), []) + playbook = playbook_builder.getObject() + + detection_builder = SecurityContentDetectionBuilder() + director.constructDetection(detection_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/detection/valid.yml'), [deployment], [playbook], [baseline], [test], + AttackEnrichment.get_attack_lookup(), [], []) + detection = detection_builder.getObject() + + director.constructDetection(detection_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/detection/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml'), [deployment], [playbook], [baseline], [test], + AttackEnrichment.get_attack_lookup(), [], []) + detection_deprecated = detection_builder.getObject() + + playbook_builder = SecurityContentPlaybookBuilder() + director.constructPlaybook(playbook_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/playbook/example_playbook.yml'), [detection]) + playbook = playbook_builder.getObject() + + investigation_builder = SecurityContentInvestigationBuilder() + director.constructInvestigation(investigation_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/investigation/investigation.yml')) + investigation = investigation_builder.getObject() + + story_builder = SecurityContentStoryBuilder() + director.constructStory(story_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/story/ransomware_darkside.yml'), + [detection], [baseline], [investigation]) + story = story_builder.getObject() + + output_path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'obj_to_md_data') + adapter = ObjToMdAdapter() + adapter.writeObjects([[story], [detection, detection_deprecated], [playbook]], output_path) + + files_to_compare = [ + '_data/navigation.yml', + '_pages/credential_access.md', + '_pages/defense_evasion.md', + '_pages/endpoint.md', + '_pages/initial_access.md', + '_pages/malware.md', + '_pages/persistence.md', + '_pages/privilege_escalation.md', + '_pages/stories.md', + '_pages/detections.md', + '_stories/darkside_ransomware.md', + '_posts/2020-07-21-detect_new_user_aws_console_login.md', + '_posts/2021-09-16-attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.md' + ] + + for file in files_to_compare: + path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'obj_to_md_data', file) + path_ref = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'obj_to_md_data_ref', file) + assert filecmp.cmp(path, path_ref, shallow=False) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/test_obj_to_svg_adapter.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/test_obj_to_svg_adapter.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e7ba67b44e --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/test_obj_to_svg_adapter.py @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +import os +import filecmp + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.adapter.obj_to_md_adapter import ObjToMdAdapter +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_director import SecurityContentDirector +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_basic_builder import SecurityContentBasicBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_detection_builder import SecurityContentDetectionBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_story_builder import SecurityContentStoryBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.enums.enums import SecurityContentType +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_investigation_builder import SecurityContentInvestigationBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_baseline_builder import SecurityContentBaselineBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_playbook_builder import SecurityContentPlaybookBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.attack_enrichment import AttackEnrichment +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.adapter.obj_to_svg_adapter import ObjToSvgAdapter + + +def test_svg_writer(): + director = SecurityContentDirector() + + lookup_builder = SecurityContentBasicBuilder() + director.constructLookup(lookup_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/lookups/previously_seen_aws_regions.yml')) + lookup = lookup_builder.getObject() + + macro_builder = SecurityContentBasicBuilder() + director.constructMacro(macro_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/macro/security_content_ctime.yml')) + macro = macro_builder.getObject() + + deployment_builder = SecurityContentBasicBuilder() + director.constructDeployment(deployment_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/deployment/ESCU/00_default_ttp.yml')) + deployment = deployment_builder.getObject() + + director.constructDeployment(deployment_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/deployment/ESCU/00_default_baseline.yml')) + deployment_baseline = deployment_builder.getObject() + + baseline_builder = SecurityContentBaselineBuilder() + director.constructBaseline(baseline_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/baseline/baseline.yml'), [deployment_baseline]) + baseline = baseline_builder.getObject() + + unit_test_builder = SecurityContentBasicBuilder() + director.constructTest(unit_test_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/test/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.test.yml')) + test = unit_test_builder.getObject() + + playbook_builder = SecurityContentPlaybookBuilder() + director.constructPlaybook(playbook_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/playbook/example_playbook.yml'), []) + playbook = playbook_builder.getObject() + + detection_builder = SecurityContentDetectionBuilder() + director.constructDetection(detection_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + '../builder/test_data/detection/valid.yml'), [deployment], [playbook], [baseline], [test], + AttackEnrichment.get_attack_lookup(), [], []) + detection = detection_builder.getObject() + + adapter = ObjToSvgAdapter() + adapter.writeObjects([detection], os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'obj_to_svg_data')) + + files_to_compare = [ + 'detection_count.svg', + 'detection_coverage.svg' + ] + + for file in files_to_compare: + path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'obj_to_svg_data', file) + path_ref = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'obj_to_svg_data_ref', file) + assert filecmp.cmp(path, path_ref, shallow=False) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/test_obj_to_yml_adapter.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/test_obj_to_yml_adapter.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..82c2b0bbb9 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/test_obj_to_yml_adapter.py @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +import os +import filecmp + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.yml_reader import YmlReader +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.adapter.obj_to_yml_adapter import ObjToYmlAdapter +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_director import SecurityContentDirector +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_detection_builder import SecurityContentDetectionBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_basic_builder import SecurityContentBasicBuilder + + +def test_read_and_write_yml(): + file_path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'obj_to_yml_data/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml') + yml_obj = YmlReader.load_file(file_path) + adapter = ObjToYmlAdapter() + adapter.writeObjectsInPlace([yml_obj]) + + ref_file_path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'obj_to_yml_data_ref/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml') + + assert filecmp.cmp(file_path, ref_file_path, shallow=False) + + +def test_write_ssa_detection(): + director = SecurityContentDirector() + + unit_test_builder = SecurityContentBasicBuilder() + director.constructTest(unit_test_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'obj_to_yml_data/ssa___anomalous_usage_of_archive_tools.test.yml')) + test = unit_test_builder.getObject() + + detection_builder = SecurityContentDetectionBuilder() + director.constructDetection(detection_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'obj_to_yml_data/ssa___anomalous_usage_of_archive_tools.yml'), [], [], [], [test], + {}, [], []) + detection = detection_builder.getObject() + + adapter = ObjToYmlAdapter() + adapter.writeObjects([detection], os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'obj_to_yml_data')) + + detection_file_path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'obj_to_yml_data/srs/ssa___anomalous_usage_of_archive_tools.yml') + ref_file_path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'obj_to_yml_data_ref/srs/ssa___anomalous_usage_of_archive_tools.yml') + + assert filecmp.cmp(detection_file_path, ref_file_path, shallow=False) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/__init__.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_attack_enrichment.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_attack_enrichment.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c1a63be658 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_attack_enrichment.py @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ + + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.attack_enrichment import AttackEnrichment + + +def test_mitre_attack_enrichment(): + attack_enrichment = AttackEnrichment.get_attack_lookup() + assert attack_enrichment["T1003.002"]["technique"] == "Security Account Manager" diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_cve_enrichment.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_cve_enrichment.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..40cf1913e3 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_cve_enrichment.py @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ + + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.cve_enrichment import CveEnrichment + + +def test_cve_enrichment(): + cve_enrichment = CveEnrichment.enrich_cve('CVE-2021-34527') + assert cve_enrichment['id'] == 'CVE-2021-34527' + assert cve_enrichment['cvss'] == 9.0 + assert cve_enrichment['summary'] == 'Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability' \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/baseline/baseline.yml b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/baseline/baseline.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b8b72bcd76 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/baseline/baseline.yml @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +name: Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update +id: 66ff71c2-7e01-47dd-a041-906688c9d322 +version: 1 +date: '2020-05-28' +author: Rico Valdez, Splunk +type: Baseline +datamodel: +- Authentication +description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, + then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country + we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by user, within the last hour. +search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication + where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src + | iplocation Authentication.src | rename Authentication.user as user Authentication.src + as src | table user src City Region Country firstTime lastTime | inputlookup append=t + previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) + as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins' +how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version + 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates + to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries + in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`, which is a lookup file created by this + support search. +known_false_positives: none +references: [] +tags: + analytic_story: + - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities + deployments: + - Daily Cache Updates + detections: + - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country + - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region + - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City + - Detect AWS Console Login by New User + - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe + product: + - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + required_fields: + - _time + - Authentication.signature + - Authentication.user + - Authentication.src + security_domain: network \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/baseline/baseline2.yml b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/baseline/baseline2.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..80ed44837c --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/baseline/baseline2.yml @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +name: Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched +id: b01bd274-f661-4f9c-bd9f-cf23ff6ae0bc +version: 1 +date: '2020-08-14' +author: David Dorsey, Splunk +type: Baseline +datamodel: +- Change +description: This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model + for how many instances are created in the environment. By default, the search uses + the last 90 days of data to build the model and the model is rebuilt weekly. The + model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, + which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of instances created in a small + time window. +search: '| tstats count as instances_launched from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=created) + AND All_Changes.status=success AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by _time + span=1h | makecontinuous span=1h _time | eval instances_launched=coalesce(instances_launched, + (random()%2)*0.0000000001) | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 + | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%w") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek + <= 5, 0, 1) | table _time instances_launched, HourOfDay, isWeekend | fit DensityFunction + instances_launched by "HourOfDay,isWeekend" into cloud_excessive_instances_created_v1 + dist=expon show_density=true' +how_to_implement: 'You must have Enterprise Security 6.0 or later, if not you will + need to verify that the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or later is + installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users + in your environment, you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the + MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes + in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past + 90 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer + period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically + re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data.\ + + More information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.' +known_false_positives: none +references: [] +tags: + analytic_story: + - Cloud Cryptomining + - Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities + - DarkSide Ransomware + deployments: + - Weekly Model Rebuild 90 Day Lookback + detections: + - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched + product: + - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + required_fields: + - _time + - All_Changes.action + - All_Changes.status + - All_Changes.object_category + security_domain: network diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/deployment/ESCU/00_default_anomaly.yml b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/deployment/ESCU/00_default_anomaly.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..034de012d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/deployment/ESCU/00_default_anomaly.yml @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +name: ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly +id: a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216 +date: '2021-12-21' +author: Patrick Bareiss +description: This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. + These detections will use Risk Based Alerting. +scheduling: + cron_schedule: 0 * * * * + earliest_time: -70m@m + latest_time: -10m@m + schedule_window: auto +alert_action: + rba: + enabled: 'true' +tags: + type: Anomaly + product: ESCU diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/deployment/ESCU/00_default_baseline.yml b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/deployment/ESCU/00_default_baseline.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..10bdc8d357 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/deployment/ESCU/00_default_baseline.yml @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +name: ESCU Default Configuration Baseline +id: 0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510 +date: '2021-12-21' +author: Patrick Bareiss +description: This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline. +scheduling: + cron_schedule: 0 * * * * + earliest_time: -70m@m + latest_time: -10m@m + schedule_window: auto +tags: + type: Baseline diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/deployment/ESCU/00_default_correlation.yml b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/deployment/ESCU/00_default_correlation.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..36531a0e7a --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/deployment/ESCU/00_default_correlation.yml @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +name: ESCU Default Configuration Correlation +id: 36ba498c-46e8-4b62-8bde-67e984a40fb4 +date: '2021-12-21' +author: Patrick Bareiss +description: This configuration file applies to all detections of type Correlation. + These correlations will generate Notable Events. +scheduling: + cron_schedule: 0 * * * * + earliest_time: -70m@m + latest_time: -10m@m + schedule_window: auto +alert_action: + notable: + rule_description: '%description%' + rule_title: '%name%' + nes_fields: + - user + - dest + - src +tags: + type: 'Correlation' + product: ESCU diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/deployment/ESCU/00_default_hunting.yml b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/deployment/ESCU/00_default_hunting.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..89598ab6b3 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/deployment/ESCU/00_default_hunting.yml @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +name: ESCU Default Configuration Hunting +id: cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b +date: '2021-12-21' +author: Patrick Bareiss +description: This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting. +scheduling: + cron_schedule: 0 * * * * + earliest_time: -70m@m + latest_time: -10m@m + schedule_window: auto +tags: + type: Hunting + product: ESCU diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/deployment/ESCU/00_default_ttp.yml b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/deployment/ESCU/00_default_ttp.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..94d690b648 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/deployment/ESCU/00_default_ttp.yml @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +name: ESCU Default Configuration TTP +id: b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b +date: '2021-12-21' +author: Patrick Bareiss +description: This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. + These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events. +scheduling: + cron_schedule: 0 * * * * + earliest_time: -70m@m + latest_time: -10m@m + schedule_window: auto +alert_action: + notable: + rule_description: '%description%' + rule_title: '%name%' + nes_fields: + - user + - dest + - src + rba: + enabled: 'true' +tags: + type: TTP diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/detection/attacker_tools_on_endpoint.yml b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/detection/attacker_tools_on_endpoint.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..87f34878e4 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/detection/attacker_tools_on_endpoint.yml @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +name: Attacker Tools On Endpoint +id: a51bfe1a-94f0-48cc-b4e4-16a110145893 +version: 2 +date: '2021-11-04' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: TTP +datamodel: +- Endpoint +description: This search looks for execution of commonly used attacker tools on an + endpoint. +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) + as lastTime values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) + as parent_process from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.dest!=unknown + Processes.user!=unknown by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name + Processes.process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` + | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | lookup attacker_tools attacker_tool_names AS + process_name OUTPUT description | search description !=false| `attacker_tools_on_endpoint_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data + that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model + in the processes node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response + product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data + used for this search is usually generated via logs that report process tracking + in your Windows audit settings. +known_false_positives: Some administrator activity can be potentially triggered, please + add those users to the filter macro. +references: [] +tags: + analytic_story: + - Monitor for Unauthorized Software + - XMRig + - SamSam Ransomware + - Unusual Processes + asset_type: Endpoint + cis20: + - CIS 2 + confidence: 80 + context: + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Execution + - Stage:Recon + dataset: + - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1595/attacker_scan_tools/windows-sysmon.log + impact: 80 + kill_chain_phases: + - Installation + - Command & Control + - Actions on Objectives + message: An attacker tool $process_name$,listed in attacker_tools.csv is executed + on host $dest$ by User $user$. This process $process_name$ is known to do- $description$ + mitre_attack_id: + - T1036.005 + - T1036 + - T1003 + - T1595 + nist: + - ID.AM + - PR.DS + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim + - name: parent_process + type: Process + role: + - Parent Process + - name: process_name + type: Process + role: + - Child Process + - Attacker + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + required_fields: + - Processes.dest + - Processes.user + - Processes.process_name + - Processes.parent_process + risk_score: 64 + security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/detection/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/detection/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e256cb7c1f --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/detection/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +name: Detect new user AWS Console Login +id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f3-d82362dffd75 +version: 2 +date: '2020-07-21' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: TTP +datamodel: [] +description: This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event + by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup + file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. + The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within + the last hour. Deprecated now this search is updated to use the Authentication datamodel. +search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | stats + earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user | inputlookup append=t + previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime + max(lastTime) as lastTime by user | eval userStatus=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), + "-70m@m"), "First Time Logging into AWS Console","Previously Seen User") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| + where userStatus ="First Time Logging into AWS Console" | `detect_new_user_aws_console_login_filter`' +how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) + and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail + inputs. Run the "Previously seen users in AWS CloudTrail" support search only once + to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run "Update + previously seen users in AWS CloudTrail" hourly (or more frequently depending on + how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. +known_false_positives: When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this + activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user + activity is legitimate. +references: [] +tags: + analytic_story: + - Suspicious AWS Login Activities + asset_type: AWS Instance + cis20: + - CIS 16 + confidence: 100 + context: + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Credential Access + impact: 90 + kill_chain_phases: + - Actions on Objectives + mitre_attack_id: + - T1078.004 + nist: + - DE.DP + - DE.AE + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + message: tbd + required_fields: + - _time + - eventName + - userIdentity.arn + risk_score: 90 + security_domain: network diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/detection/spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules.yml b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/detection/spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..846127e4b0 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/detection/spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules.yml @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +name: Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules +id: a5e451f8-da81-11eb-b245-acde48001122 +version: 1 +date: '2021-07-01' +author: Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk +type: TTP +datamodel: +- Endpoint +description: This search is to detect suspicious loading of dll in specific path relative + to printnightmare exploitation. In this search we try to detect the loaded modules + made by spoolsv.exe after the exploitation. +search: '`sysmon` EventCode=7 Image ="*\\spoolsv.exe" ImageLoaded="*\\Windows\\System32\\spool\\drivers\\x64\\*" + ImageLoaded = "*.dll" | stats dc(ImageLoaded) as countImgloaded values(ImageLoaded) + as ImgLoaded count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image Computer + process_id EventCode | where countImgloaded >= 3 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` + | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting + logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you + are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +known_false_positives: unknown +references: +- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/hieuttmmo/sigma/dceb13fe3f1821b119ae495b41e24438bd97e3d0/rules/windows/image_load/sysmon_cve_2021_1675_print_nightmare.yml +tags: + analytic_story: + - PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527 + confidence: 90 + context: + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Privilege Escalation + - Stage:Defense Evasion + - Scope:Local + cve: + - CVE-2021-34527 + dataset: + - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-sysmon.log + impact: 80 + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation + message: $Image$ with process id $process_id$ has loaded a driver from $ImageLoaded$ + on endpoint $Computer$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare. + mitre_attack_id: + - T1547.012 + - T1547 + observable: + - name: Computer + type: Endpoint + role: + - Victim + - name: process_id + type: Process Name + role: + - Parent Process + - Attacker + - name: ImageLoaded + type: File + role: + - Other + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + required_fields: + - _time + - Image + - Computer + - EventCode + - ImageLoaded + risk_score: 72 + security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/detection/valid.yml b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/detection/valid.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..68a1d82348 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/detection/valid.yml @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +name: Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe +id: e9fb4a59-c5fb-440a-9f24-191fbc6b2911 +version: 6 +date: '2021-09-16' +author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +type: TTP +datamodel: +- Endpoint +description: Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export + of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline. +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) + as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` OR `process_cmd` + Processes.process=*save* (Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SAM* + OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\Security* + OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\SAM*) by Processes.dest + Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name + Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` + | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information + on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from + your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, + confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the + endpoint product. +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: +- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets +tags: + analytic_story: + - Credential Dumping + - DarkSide Ransomware + asset_type: Endpoint + automated_detection_testing: passed + cis20: + - CIS 3 + - CIS 5 + - CIS 16 + confidence: 100 + context: + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Credential Access + dataset: + - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log + impact: 90 + kill_chain_phases: + - Actions on Objectives + message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified + on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to export the registry keys. + mitre_attack_id: + - T1003.002 + - T1003 + nist: + - DE.CM + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim + - name: parent_process_name + type: Process + role: + - Parent Process + - name: process_name + type: Process + role: + - Child Process + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + required_fields: + - _time + - Processes.dest + - Processes.user + - Processes.parent_process_name + - Processes.parent_process + - Processes.original_file_name + - Processes.process_name + - Processes.process + - Processes.process_id + - Processes.parent_process_path + - Processes.process_path + - Processes.parent_process_id + risk_score: 90 + security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/investigation/investigation.yml b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/investigation/investigation.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..da4318ba76 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/investigation/investigation.yml @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +name: Get Parent Process Info +id: fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41bf9 +version: 2 +date: '2019-02-28' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +type: Investigation +datamodel: +- Endpoint +description: This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about + the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. + Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) + as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes + by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest + | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ + |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, + including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint + data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" + field in the Endpoint data model. +known_false_positives: '' +references: [] +tags: + analytic_story: + - Collection and Staging + - Command and Control + - DHS Report TA18-074A + - Disabling Security Tools + - 'Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ' + - Hidden Cobra Malware + - Lateral Movement + - Malicious PowerShell + - Monitor for Unauthorized Software + - Netsh Abuse + - Orangeworm Attack Group + - Phishing Payloads + - Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns + - Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch + - Ransomware + - SamSam Ransomware + - Suspicious Command-Line Executions + - Suspicious DNS Traffic + - Suspicious MSHTA Activity + - Suspicious WMI Use + - Suspicious Windows Registry Activities + - Unusual Processes + - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics + - Windows File Extension and Association Abuse + - Windows Log Manipulation + - Windows Persistence Techniques + - Windows Privilege Escalation + - Windows Service Abuse + - DarkSide Ransomware + product: + - Splunk Phantom + required_fields: + - _time + - Processes.user + - Processes.parent_process_name + - Processes.process_name + - Processes.dest + security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/lookups/attacker_tools.csv b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/lookups/attacker_tools.csv new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2f95dfb054 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/lookups/attacker_tools.csv @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +attacker_tool_names,description +remcom.exe,This process is an open source replacement to psexec and is not typically seen in an enterprise environment. +pwdump.exe,This process is associated with a tool used to dump password hashes on a Windows system. +pwdump2.exe,This process is associated with a tool used to dump password hashes on a Windows system. +nc.exe,This process is an open source tool used for network communications. +wce.exe,This process is associated with a tool used to dump hashes and execute pass-the-hash and pass-the-ticket attacks. +cain.exe,This process is associated with a tool used to collect user credentials and execute attacks. +nmap.exe,This process is an open source network mapping tool used to identify hosts and listening services on a network. +kidlogger.exe,This process is associated with a tool used to collect keyboard input on a host. +isass.exe,This process name is used by attackers to hide in plain sight and look like a legitimate Windows system process. +svch0st.exe,This process name is used by attackers to hide in plain sight and look like a legitimate Windows system process. +at.exe,This process is used to schedule other processes to run. schtasks.exe should be used instead as it provides more flexibility. +getmail.exe,This process is seen to be used by attackers to extract email files from host machines. +ntdll.exe,This process was identified as malicious by DHS Alert TA18-074A. +netpass.exe,This process was identified as malicious by DHS Alert TA18-201A and attackers use this tool to recover all network passwords stored on your system for the current logged-on user. +WebBrowserPassView.exe,This process was identified as malicious by DHS Alert TA18-201A and is used by attackers as a password recovery tool that reveals the passwords stored in Web Browsers. +OutlookAddressBookView.exe,This process was identified as malicious by DHS Alert TA18-201A and is used by attackers to steal the details of all recipients stored in the address books of Microsoft Outlook. +mailpv.exe,This process was identified by DHS Alert TA18-201A and attackers use this tool is a password-recovery tool that reveals the passwords and other account details from various email clients. +NLBrute.exe,A RDP brute force tool found in botnets for further expansion and and acquisition of targets. This process was identified in the SamSam Ransomware Campaign and attackers use this tool to brute force RDP instances with a range of commonly used passwords. +selfdel.exe,This executable was delivered in the SamSam Ransomware Campain and the attackers levereged this binary to delete its malicilous activities. +masscan.exe,This executable was delivered in the XMRig Crypto Miner +Massscan_GUI.exe,This executable was delivered in the XMRig Crypto Miner +KPortScan3.exe,This executable was delivered in the XMRig Crypto Miner and is commonly used by attackers to scan the internet +NLAChecker.exe,A scanner tool that checks for Windows hosts for Network Level Authentication. This tool allows attackers to detect Windows Servers with RDP without NLA enabled which facilitates the use of brute force non microsoft rdp tools or exploits +ns.exe,A commonly used tool used by attackers to scan and map file shares +SilverBullet.exe,Malware was discovered in our monitoring of honey pots that abuses this open source software for scanning and connecting to hosts. +kportscan3.exe, KPortScan 3.0 is a widely used port scanning tool on Hacking Forums, to perform network scanning on the internal networks. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/lookups/attacker_tools.yml b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/lookups/attacker_tools.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0c40ac2992 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/lookups/attacker_tools.yml @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +description: A list of tools used by attackers +filename: attacker_tools.csv +name: attacker_tools +default_match: 'false' +match_type: WILDCARD(attacker_tool_names) +min_matches: 1 +case_sensitive_match: 'false' \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/lookups/mitre_enrichment.csv b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/lookups/mitre_enrichment.csv new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..749099c77b --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/lookups/mitre_enrichment.csv @@ -0,0 +1,579 @@ +"mitre_id","technique","tactics","groups" +"T1564.009","Resource Forking","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1562.010","Downgrade Attack","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1547.015","Login Items","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1620","Reflective Code Loading","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1619","Cloud Storage Object Discovery","Discovery","no" +"T1218.014","MMC","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1218.013","Mavinject","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1614.001","System Language Discovery","Discovery","no" +"T1615","Group Policy Discovery","Discovery","Turla" +"T1036.007","Double File Extension","Defense Evasion","Mustang Panda" +"T1562.009","Safe Mode Boot","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1564.008","Email Hiding Rules","Defense Evasion","FIN4" +"T1505.004","IIS Components","Persistence","no" +"T1027.006","HTML Smuggling","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1213.003","Code Repositories","Collection","APT29" +"T1553.006","Code Signing Policy Modification","Defense Evasion","Turla|APT39" +"T1614","System Location Discovery","Discovery","no" +"T1613","Container and Resource Discovery","Discovery","TeamTNT" +"T1552.007","Container API","Credential Access","no" +"T1612","Build Image on Host","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1611","Escape to Host","Privilege Escalation","TeamTNT" +"T1204.003","Malicious Image","Execution","TeamTNT" +"T1053.007","Container Orchestration Job","Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1610","Deploy Container","Defense Evasion|Execution","TeamTNT" +"T1609","Container Administration Command","Execution","TeamTNT" +"T1608.005","Link Target","Resource Development","Silent Librarian" +"T1608.004","Drive-by Target","Resource Development","Transparent Tribe|APT32|Threat Group-3390" +"T1608.003","Install Digital Certificate","Resource Development","no" +"T1608.002","Upload Tool","Resource Development","Threat Group-3390" +"T1608.001","Upload Malware","Resource Development","TeamTNT|APT32" +"T1608","Stage Capabilities","Resource Development","no" +"T1016.001","Internet Connection Discovery","Discovery","APT29|UNC2452|Turla" +"T1553.005","Mark-of-the-Web Bypass","Defense Evasion","TA505" +"T1555.005","Password Managers","Credential Access","Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao" +"T1484.002","Domain Trust Modification","Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation","APT29|UNC2452" +"T1484.001","Group Policy Modification","Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation","Indrik Spider" +"T1547.014","Active Setup","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1606.002","SAML Tokens","Credential Access","APT29|UNC2452" +"T1606.001","Web Cookies","Credential Access","APT29|UNC2452" +"T1606","Forge Web Credentials","Credential Access","no" +"T1555.004","Windows Credential Manager","Credential Access","Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Turla" +"T1059.008","Network Device CLI","Execution","no" +"T1602.002","Network Device Configuration Dump","Collection","no" +"T1542.005","TFTP Boot","Defense Evasion|Persistence","no" +"T1542.004","ROMMONkit","Defense Evasion|Persistence","no" +"T1602.001","SNMP (MIB Dump)","Collection","no" +"T1602","Data from Configuration Repository","Collection","no" +"T1601.002","Downgrade System Image","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1601.001","Patch System Image","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1601","Modify System Image","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1600.002","Disable Crypto Hardware","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1600.001","Reduce Key Space","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1600","Weaken Encryption","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1556.004","Network Device Authentication","Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistence","no" +"T1599.001","Network Address Translation Traversal","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1599","Network Boundary Bridging","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1020.001","Traffic Duplication","Exfiltration","no" +"T1557.002","ARP Cache Poisoning","Credential Access|Collection","Cleaver" +"T1588.006","Vulnerabilities","Resource Development","Sandworm Team" +"T1053.006","Systemd Timers","Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1562.008","Disable Cloud Logs","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1547.012","Print Processors","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1598.003","Spearphishing Link","Reconnaissance","Magic Hound|Silent Librarian|Sidewinder|Sandworm Team|APT32|Kimsuky" +"T1598.002","Spearphishing Attachment","Reconnaissance","Sidewinder" +"T1598.001","Spearphishing Service","Reconnaissance","no" +"T1598","Phishing for Information","Reconnaissance","ZIRCONIUM|APT28" +"T1597.002","Purchase Technical Data","Reconnaissance","no" +"T1597.001","Threat Intel Vendors","Reconnaissance","no" +"T1597","Search Closed Sources","Reconnaissance","no" +"T1596.005","Scan Databases","Reconnaissance","no" +"T1596.004","CDNs","Reconnaissance","no" +"T1596.003","Digital Certificates","Reconnaissance","no" +"T1596.001","DNS/Passive DNS","Reconnaissance","no" +"T1596.002","WHOIS","Reconnaissance","no" +"T1596","Search Open Technical Databases","Reconnaissance","no" +"T1595.002","Vulnerability Scanning","Reconnaissance","TeamTNT|APT29|Volatile Cedar|APT28|Sandworm Team" +"T1595.001","Scanning IP Blocks","Reconnaissance","TeamTNT" +"T1595","Active Scanning","Reconnaissance","no" +"T1594","Search Victim-Owned Websites","Reconnaissance","Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team" +"T1593.002","Search Engines","Reconnaissance","no" +"T1593.001","Social Media","Reconnaissance","Kimsuky" +"T1593","Search Open Websites/Domains","Reconnaissance","Sandworm Team" +"T1592.004","Client Configurations","Reconnaissance","HAFNIUM" +"T1592.003","Firmware","Reconnaissance","no" +"T1592.002","Software","Reconnaissance","Andariel|Sandworm Team" +"T1592.001","Hardware","Reconnaissance","no" +"T1592","Gather Victim Host Information","Reconnaissance","no" +"T1591.004","Identify Roles","Reconnaissance","no" +"T1591.003","Identify Business Tempo","Reconnaissance","no" +"T1591.001","Determine Physical Locations","Reconnaissance","no" +"T1591.002","Business Relationships","Reconnaissance","Sandworm Team" +"T1591","Gather Victim Org Information","Reconnaissance","no" +"T1590.006","Network Security Appliances","Reconnaissance","no" +"T1590.005","IP Addresses","Reconnaissance","Andariel|HAFNIUM" +"T1590.004","Network Topology","Reconnaissance","no" +"T1590.003","Network Trust Dependencies","Reconnaissance","no" +"T1590.002","DNS","Reconnaissance","no" +"T1590.001","Domain Properties","Reconnaissance","Sandworm Team" +"T1590","Gather Victim Network Information","Reconnaissance","HAFNIUM" +"T1589.003","Employee Names","Reconnaissance","Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team" +"T1589.002","Email Addresses","Reconnaissance","Kimsuky|Magic Hound|TA551|MuddyWater|HAFNIUM|APT32|Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team" +"T1589.001","Credentials","Reconnaissance","Leviathan|APT28|Magic Hound|Chimera" +"T1589","Gather Victim Identity Information","Reconnaissance","Magic Hound|APT32" +"T1588.005","Exploits","Resource Development","no" +"T1588.004","Digital Certificates","Resource Development","Lazarus Group|Silent Librarian" +"T1588.003","Code Signing Certificates","Resource Development","Wizard Spider" +"T1588.002","Tool","Resource Development","CostaRicto|Night Dragon|DarkVishnya|FIN5|Gorgon Group|Patchwork|Chimera|Dragonfly|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|APT41|FIN6|TEMP.Veles|Kimsuky|PittyTiger|Cobalt Group|APT29|Thrip|Ke3chang|DarkHydrus|APT32|APT38|BRONZE BUTLER|Carbanak|Cleaver|Inception|Leafminer|Threat Group-3390|Ferocious Kitten|IndigoZebra|BackdoorDiplomacy|menuPass|APT-C-36|Magic Hound|APT28|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Silence|WIRTE|Turla|APT33|APT19|FIN10|CopyKittens|APT39|APT1|MuddyWater|Silent Librarian|GALLIUM|Sandworm Team" +"T1588.001","Malware","Resource Development","Andariel|BackdoorDiplomacy|Turla|APT1" +"T1588","Obtain Capabilities","Resource Development","no" +"T1587.004","Exploits","Resource Development","no" +"T1587.003","Digital Certificates","Resource Development","APT29|PROMETHIUM" +"T1587.002","Code Signing Certificates","Resource Development","PROMETHIUM|Patchwork" +"T1587.001","Malware","Resource Development","TeamTNT|APT29|Lazarus Group|UNC2452|Sandworm Team|Turla|FIN7|Night Dragon|Cleaver" +"T1587","Develop Capabilities","Resource Development","Kimsuky" +"T1586.002","Email Accounts","Resource Development","IndigoZebra|Leviathan|Magic Hound|Kimsuky" +"T1586.001","Social Media Accounts","Resource Development","Leviathan" +"T1586","Compromise Accounts","Resource Development","no" +"T1585.002","Email Accounts","Resource Development","Leviathan|Magic Hound|Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team|APT1" +"T1585.001","Social Media Accounts","Resource Development","Leviathan|Magic Hound|Fox Kitten|Sandworm Team|APT32|Cleaver" +"T1585","Establish Accounts","Resource Development","Fox Kitten|APT17" +"T1584.006","Web Services","Resource Development","Turla" +"T1584.005","Botnet","Resource Development","no" +"T1584.004","Server","Resource Development","Indrik Spider|Turla|APT16" +"T1584.003","Virtual Private Server","Resource Development","Turla" +"T1584.002","DNS Server","Resource Development","no" +"T1584.001","Domains","Resource Development","Transparent Tribe|Magic Hound|APT29|UNC2452|APT1" +"T1583.006","Web Services","Resource Development","IndigoZebra|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|HAFNIUM|Lazarus Group|Turla|APT32|APT17|APT29" +"T1583.005","Botnet","Resource Development","no" +"T1583.004","Server","Resource Development","GALLIUM|Sandworm Team" +"T1583.003","Virtual Private Server","Resource Development","HAFNIUM|TEMP.Veles" +"T1583.002","DNS Server","Resource Development","no" +"T1584","Compromise Infrastructure","Resource Development","no" +"T1583.001","Domains","Resource Development","IndigoZebra|TeamTNT|Ferocious Kitten|FIN7|Transparent Tribe|Leviathan|Magic Hound|APT29|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|UNC2452|Lazarus Group|Silent Librarian|menuPass|Sandworm Team|APT32|Kimsuky|APT1|APT28" +"T1583","Acquire Infrastructure","Resource Development","no" +"T1564.007","VBA Stomping","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1558.004","AS-REP Roasting","Credential Access","no" +"T1580","Cloud Infrastructure Discovery","Discovery","no" +"T1218.012","Verclsid","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1205.001","Port Knocking","Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control","PROMETHIUM" +"T1564.006","Run Virtual Instance","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1564.005","Hidden File System","Defense Evasion","Strider|Equation" +"T1556.003","Pluggable Authentication Modules","Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistence","no" +"T1574.012","COR_PROFILER","Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion","Blue Mockingbird" +"T1562.007","Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1098.004","SSH Authorized Keys","Persistence","TeamTNT" +"T1480.001","Environmental Keying","Defense Evasion","APT41|Equation" +"T1059.007","JavaScript","Execution","Indrik Spider|MuddyWater|Turla|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Evilnum|Kimsuky|FIN6|APT32|FIN7|Cobalt Group|Molerats|TA505|Silence|Leafminer" +"T1578.004","Revert Cloud Instance","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1578.003","Delete Cloud Instance","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1578.001","Create Snapshot","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1578.002","Create Cloud Instance","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1127.001","MSBuild","Defense Evasion","Frankenstein" +"T1027.005","Indicator Removal from Tools","Defense Evasion","Operation Wocao|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|APT3|Turla|OilRig|Deep Panda" +"T1562.006","Indicator Blocking","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1573.002","Asymmetric Cryptography","Command And Control","Operation Wocao|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|OilRig|FIN8|FIN6" +"T1573.001","Symmetric Cryptography","Command And Control","Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|APT33|BRONZE BUTLER|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group" +"T1573","Encrypted Channel","Command And Control","Tropic Trooper" +"T1027.004","Compile After Delivery","Defense Evasion","Gamaredon Group|Rocke|MuddyWater" +"T1574.004","Dylib Hijacking","Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion","no" +"T1546.015","Component Object Model Hijacking","Privilege Escalation|Persistence","APT28" +"T1071.004","DNS","Command And Control","Chimera|APT39|Tropic Trooper|OilRig|Ke3chang|Cobalt Group|APT18|APT41|FIN7" +"T1071.003","Mail Protocols","Command And Control","Turla|Kimsuky|APT32|SilverTerrier|APT28" +"T1071.002","File Transfer Protocols","Command And Control","Kimsuky|APT41|SilverTerrier|Honeybee" +"T1071.001","Web Protocols","Command And Control","TeamTNT|FIN8|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|TA551|Higaisa|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Chimera|UNC2452|Sandworm Team|TA505|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Inception|APT41|SilverTerrier|APT28|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Ke3chang|Orangeworm|APT37|APT19|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|Dark Caracal|Turla|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT32|OilRig|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon" +"T1572","Protocol Tunneling","Command And Control","Leviathan|CostaRicto|Chimera|Fox Kitten|OilRig|Cobalt Group|FIN6" +"T1048.003","Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol","Exfiltration","Wizard Spider|FIN6|APT32|APT33|Thrip|FIN8|OilRig|Lazarus Group" +"T1048.002","Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol","Exfiltration","APT28|APT29|UNC2452" +"T1048.001","Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol","Exfiltration","no" +"T1001.003","Protocol Impersonation","Command And Control","Higaisa|Lazarus Group" +"T1001.002","Steganography","Command And Control","APT29|Axiom" +"T1001.001","Junk Data","Command And Control","APT28" +"T1132.002","Non-Standard Encoding","Command And Control","no" +"T1132.001","Standard Encoding","Command And Control","HAFNIUM|TA551|Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT33|APT19|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork" +"T1090.004","Domain Fronting","Command And Control","APT29" +"T1090.003","Multi-hop Proxy","Command And Control","Leviathan|CostaRicto|APT28|Operation Wocao|Inception|FIN4|APT29" +"T1090.002","External Proxy","Command And Control","Tonto Team|APT39|Silence|GALLIUM|MuddyWater|APT3|FIN5|Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT28" +"T1090.001","Internal Proxy","Command And Control","APT29|Higaisa|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|APT39|Strider" +"T1102.003","One-Way Communication","Command And Control","Leviathan" +"T1102.002","Bidirectional Communication","Command And Control","ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|APT28|APT29|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT12|Turla|FIN7|APT37|Magic Hound|Carbanak" +"T1102.001","Dead Drop Resolver","Command And Control","Rocke|APT41|BRONZE BUTLER|RTM|Patchwork" +"T1571","Non-Standard Port","Command And Control","Sandworm Team|Rocke|DarkVishnya|Silence|APT-C-36|Magic Hound|APT33|APT32|TEMP.Veles|Lazarus Group|FIN7" +"T1074.002","Remote Data Staging","Collection","Leviathan|APT28|APT29|Chimera|UNC2452|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|FIN6|Night Dragon|FIN8" +"T1074.001","Local Data Staging","Collection","Indrik Spider|BackdoorDiplomacy|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Chimera|Kimsuky|APT39|Operation Wocao|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|Honeybee|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|APT3|FIN5|menuPass|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28" +"T1078.004","Cloud Accounts","Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access","APT28|APT33" +"T1564.004","NTFS File Attributes","Defense Evasion","APT32" +"T1564.003","Hidden Window","Defense Evasion","Nomadic Octopus|Higaisa|Gorgon Group|Deep Panda|DarkHydrus|CopyKittens|APT19|APT32|APT28|APT3|Magic Hound" +"T1078.003","Local Accounts","Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access","Kimsuky|HAFNIUM|Turla|Operation Wocao|PROMETHIUM|Tropic Trooper|FIN10|Stolen Pencil|APT32" +"T1078.002","Domain Accounts","Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access","Naikon|Indrik Spider|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|APT29|TA505|APT3|Threat Group-1314" +"T1078.001","Default Accounts","Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access","no" +"T1564.002","Hidden Users","Defense Evasion","Dragonfly 2.0" +"T1574.006","Dynamic Linker Hijacking","Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion","APT41|Rocke" +"T1574.002","DLL Side-Loading","Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion","Mustang Panda|Higaisa|BlackTech|Sidewinder|Chimera|BRONZE BUTLER|Naikon|APT41|GALLIUM|Tropic Trooper|APT19|Patchwork|APT32|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390" +"T1574.001","DLL Search Order Hijacking","Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion","BackdoorDiplomacy|Tonto Team|Evilnum|APT41|Whitefly|RTM|Threat Group-3390|menuPass" +"T1574.008","Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking","Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion","no" +"T1574.007","Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable","Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion","no" +"T1574.009","Path Interception by Unquoted Path","Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion","no" +"T1574.011","Services Registry Permissions Weakness","Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion","no" +"T1574.005","Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness","Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion","no" +"T1574.010","Services File Permissions Weakness","Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion","no" +"T1574","Hijack Execution Flow","Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion","no" +"T1069.001","Local Groups","Discovery","Tonto Team|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Turla|OilRig|admin@338" +"T1570","Lateral Tool Transfer","Lateral Movement","Sandworm Team|Chimera|GALLIUM|Operation Wocao|APT32|Wizard Spider|Turla|FIN10" +"T1568.003","DNS Calculation","Command And Control","APT12" +"T1204.002","Malicious File","Execution","Nomadic Octopus|Indrik Spider|APT38|Andariel|Ferocious Kitten|IndigoZebra|Transparent Tribe|Tonto Team|Magic Hound|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Kimsuky|FIN6|PROMETHIUM|APT30|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|RTM|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|DarkHydrus|Rancor|Patchwork|APT32|APT19|MuddyWater|Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT37|Leviathan|TA459|APT29|APT28|FIN8|PLATINUM|Elderwood" +"T1204.001","Malicious Link","Execution","FIN7|Transparent Tribe|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|APT29|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Evilnum|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Patchwork|Windshift|APT32|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|TA505|OilRig|Machete|Leviathan|FIN8|FIN4|Elderwood|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|APT39|Night Dragon|Turla|APT33" +"T1195.003","Compromise Hardware Supply Chain","Initial Access","no" +"T1195.002","Compromise Software Supply Chain","Initial Access","APT29|UNC2452|Cobalt Group|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly|Sandworm Team|APT41" +"T1195.001","Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools","Initial Access","no" +"T1568.001","Fast Flux DNS","Command And Control","menuPass|TA505" +"T1052.001","Exfiltration over USB","Exfiltration","Mustang Panda|Tropic Trooper" +"T1569.002","Service Execution","Execution","APT38|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT41|Silence|FIN6|APT32|Honeybee|Ke3chang" +"T1569.001","Launchctl","Execution","no" +"T1569","System Services","Execution","no" +"T1568.002","Domain Generation Algorithms","Command And Control","TA551|APT41" +"T1568","Dynamic Resolution","Command And Control","Transparent Tribe|APT29|UNC2452" +"T1011.001","Exfiltration Over Bluetooth","Exfiltration","no" +"T1567.002","Exfiltration to Cloud Storage","Exfiltration","FIN7|ZIRCONIUM|HAFNIUM|Chimera|Leviathan|Turla" +"T1567.001","Exfiltration to Code Repository","Exfiltration","no" +"T1059.006","Python","Execution","Tonto Team|APT37|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Turla|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|APT29|Rocke|BRONZE BUTLER|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Machete" +"T1059.005","Visual Basic","Execution","OilRig|APT38|Transparent Tribe|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT39|Machete|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|APT33|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|Rancor|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Honeybee|FIN7|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|FIN4|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|TA459|Magic Hound" +"T1059.004","Unix Shell","Execution","TeamTNT|Rocke|APT41" +"T1059.003","Windows Command Shell","Execution","Sandworm Team|Nomadic Octopus|TeamTNT|APT29|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Higaisa|Indrik Spider|Chimera|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Machete|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|FIN6|TA505|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|Silence|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Gorgon Group|Dark Caracal|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|Rancor|FIN8|APT28|APT37|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|menuPass|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Suckfly|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1" +"T1059.002","AppleScript","Execution","no" +"T1059.001","PowerShell","Execution","Nomadic Octopus|TeamTNT|APT38|Tonto Team|Mustang Panda|Indrik Spider|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|DarkVishnya|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Inception|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|Turla|Thrip|Cobalt Group|APT28|DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Gorgon Group|TA459|Leviathan|MuddyWater|FIN8|CopyKittens|OilRig|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN7|APT32|menuPass|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda" +"T1567","Exfiltration Over Web Service","Exfiltration","APT28" +"T1497.003","Time Based Evasion","Defense Evasion|Discovery","no" +"T1497.002","User Activity Based Checks","Defense Evasion|Discovery","Darkhotel|FIN7" +"T1497.001","System Checks","Defense Evasion|Discovery","OilRig|Darkhotel|Evilnum|Frankenstein" +"T1498.002","Reflection Amplification","Impact","no" +"T1498.001","Direct Network Flood","Impact","no" +"T1566.003","Spearphishing via Service","Initial Access","APT29|Ajax Security Team|Magic Hound|Windshift|FIN6|OilRig|Dark Caracal" +"T1566.002","Spearphishing Link","Initial Access","Transparent Tribe|FIN7|APT3|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Sidewinder|Evilnum|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|APT1|Windshift|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|APT28|Cobalt Group|Turla|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Elderwood|APT33|APT29|Leviathan|FIN8|Patchwork|Magic Hound" +"T1566.001","Spearphishing Attachment","Initial Access","APT38|Andariel|Ferocious Kitten|IndigoZebra|Transparent Tribe|Nomadic Octopus|Tonto Team|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT1|FIN6|APT30|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Mofang|Wizard Spider|RTM|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|DarkHydrus|Lazarus Group|Gorgon Group|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|APT19|APT32|Cobalt Group|Rancor|FIN7|Dragonfly 2.0|MuddyWater|APT28|TA459|APT29|APT37|Leviathan|FIN8|Patchwork|menuPass|Elderwood|PLATINUM" +"T1566","Phishing","Initial Access","GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly" +"T1565.003","Runtime Data Manipulation","Impact","APT38" +"T1565.002","Transmitted Data Manipulation","Impact","APT38" +"T1565.001","Stored Data Manipulation","Impact","APT38" +"T1565","Data Manipulation","Impact","no" +"T1564.001","Hidden Files and Directories","Defense Evasion","Transparent Tribe|Mustang Panda|Rocke|APT32|Tropic Trooper|APT28|Lazarus Group" +"T1564","Hide Artifacts","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1563.002","RDP Hijacking","Lateral Movement","no" +"T1563.001","SSH Hijacking","Lateral Movement","no" +"T1563","Remote Service Session Hijacking","Lateral Movement","no" +"T1518.001","Security Software Discovery","Discovery","TeamTNT|APT38|Windshift|Sidewinder|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Turla|Rocke|Frankenstein|The White Company|Cobalt Group|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|Tropic Trooper|FIN8|Patchwork|Naikon" +"T1069.003","Cloud Groups","Discovery","no" +"T1069.002","Domain Groups","Discovery","Turla|Inception|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang" +"T1087.004","Cloud Account","Discovery","no" +"T1087.003","Email Account","Discovery","Sandworm Team|TA505" +"T1087.002","Domain Account","Discovery","MuddyWater|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Chimera|Turla|Sandworm Team|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Ke3chang" +"T1087.001","Local Account","Discovery","Chimera|Fox Kitten|Turla|Poseidon Group|OilRig|Ke3chang|APT32|APT1|Threat Group-3390|APT3|admin@338" +"T1553.004","Install Root Certificate","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1562.004","Disable or Modify System Firewall","Defense Evasion","TeamTNT|APT38|APT29|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Rocke|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|Dragonfly 2.0|Carbanak" +"T1562.003","Impair Command History Logging","Defense Evasion","APT38" +"T1562.002","Disable Windows Event Logging","Defense Evasion","Sandworm Team|APT29|UNC2452|Threat Group-3390" +"T1562.001","Disable or Modify Tools","Defense Evasion","TeamTNT|Indrik Spider|APT29|MuddyWater|UNC2452|Wizard Spider|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Rocke|Kimsuky|Turla|Night Dragon|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda" +"T1562","Impair Defenses","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1003.004","LSA Secrets","Credential Access","OilRig|MuddyWater|menuPass|Leafminer|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|APT33|Threat Group-3390" +"T1003.005","Cached Domain Credentials","Credential Access","OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33" +"T1561.002","Disk Structure Wipe","Impact","Sandworm Team|Lazarus Group|APT38|APT37" +"T1561.001","Disk Content Wipe","Impact","Lazarus Group" +"T1561","Disk Wipe","Impact","no" +"T1560.003","Archive via Custom Method","Collection","Mustang Panda|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|CopyKittens|FIN6" +"T1560.002","Archive via Library","Collection","Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390" +"T1560.001","Archive via Utility","Collection","APT28|APT29|Mustang Panda|HAFNIUM|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Chimera|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|Gallmaker|APT33|APT39|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|Sowbug|APT3|menuPass|APT1|Ke3chang" +"T1560","Archive Collected Data","Collection","Leviathan|menuPass|APT32|Honeybee|Patchwork|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang" +"T1499.004","Application or System Exploitation","Impact","no" +"T1499.003","Application Exhaustion Flood","Impact","no" +"T1499.002","Service Exhaustion Flood","Impact","no" +"T1499.001","OS Exhaustion Flood","Impact","no" +"T1491.002","External Defacement","Impact","Sandworm Team" +"T1491.001","Internal Defacement","Impact","Lazarus Group" +"T1114.003","Email Forwarding Rule","Collection","Silent Librarian|Kimsuky" +"T1114.002","Remote Email Collection","Collection","APT29|HAFNIUM|Chimera|UNC2452|APT1|FIN4|Ke3chang|Leafminer|Dragonfly 2.0|APT28" +"T1114.001","Local Email Collection","Collection","Chimera|Magic Hound|APT1" +"T1134.005","SID-History Injection","Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1134.004","Parent PID Spoofing","Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1134.003","Make and Impersonate Token","Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1134.002","Create Process with Token","Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation","Turla|Lazarus Group" +"T1134.001","Token Impersonation/Theft","Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation","FIN8|APT28" +"T1213.002","Sharepoint","Collection","Chimera|Ke3chang|APT28" +"T1213.001","Confluence","Collection","no" +"T1555.003","Credentials from Web Browsers","Credential Access","Ajax Security Team|ZIRCONIUM|FIN6|Sandworm Team|Inception|Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Leafminer|APT33|APT3|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT37|Patchwork|Molerats" +"T1555.002","Securityd Memory","Credential Access","no" +"T1555.001","Keychain","Credential Access","no" +"T1559.002","Dynamic Data Exchange","Execution","Leviathan|Sidewinder|Sharpshooter|TA505|MuddyWater|Gallmaker|Patchwork|Cobalt Group|APT37|FIN7|APT28" +"T1559.001","Component Object Model","Execution","Gamaredon Group|MuddyWater" +"T1559","Inter-Process Communication","Execution","no" +"T1558.002","Silver Ticket","Credential Access","no" +"T1558.001","Golden Ticket","Credential Access","Ke3chang" +"T1558","Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets","Credential Access","no" +"T1557.001","LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay","Credential Access|Collection","Wizard Spider" +"T1557","Adversary-in-the-Middle","Credential Access|Collection","Kimsuky" +"T1556.002","Password Filter DLL","Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistence","Strider" +"T1556.001","Domain Controller Authentication","Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistence","Chimera" +"T1556","Modify Authentication Process","Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistence","no" +"T1056.004","Credential API Hooking","Collection|Credential Access","PLATINUM" +"T1056.003","Web Portal Capture","Collection|Credential Access","no" +"T1056.002","GUI Input Capture","Collection|Credential Access","FIN4" +"T1056.001","Keylogging","Collection|Credential Access","Tonto Team|Ajax Security Team|Operation Wocao|APT32|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT41|Kimsuky|menuPass|Stolen Pencil|FIN4|APT38|OilRig|Ke3chang|PLATINUM|Sowbug|Magic Hound|Group5|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Darkhotel|APT28" +"T1555","Credentials from Password Stores","Credential Access","APT29|Evilnum|UNC2452|FIN6|APT39|OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33|Stealth Falcon" +"T1552.005","Cloud Instance Metadata API","Credential Access","TeamTNT" +"T1003.008","/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow","Credential Access","no" +"T1003.007","Proc Filesystem","Credential Access","no" +"T1003.006","DCSync","Credential Access","APT29|UNC2452|Operation Wocao" +"T1558.003","Kerberoasting","Credential Access","FIN7|APT29|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider" +"T1552.006","Group Policy Preferences","Credential Access","APT33" +"T1003.003","NTDS","Credential Access","APT28|Mustang Panda|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|menuPass|Wizard Spider|Chimera|FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0" +"T1003.002","Security Account Manager","Credential Access","Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|GALLIUM|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass" +"T1003.001","LSASS Memory","Credential Access","Indrik Spider|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Blue Mockingbird|Silence|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Stolen Pencil|APT32|Leafminer|Magic Hound|FIN8|PLATINUM|MuddyWater|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN6|APT3|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver" +"T1110.004","Credential Stuffing","Credential Access","Chimera" +"T1110.003","Password Spraying","Credential Access","Sandworm Team|APT29|Silent Librarian|Chimera|APT28|APT33|Leafminer|Lazarus Group" +"T1110.002","Password Cracking","Credential Access","FIN6|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3" +"T1110.001","Password Guessing","Credential Access","APT28" +"T1021.006","Windows Remote Management","Lateral Movement","APT29|UNC2452|Chimera|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390" +"T1021.005","VNC","Lateral Movement","FIN7|Fox Kitten|GCMAN" +"T1021.004","SSH","Lateral Movement","TeamTNT|FIN7|Fox Kitten|Rocke|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|OilRig|menuPass|GCMAN" +"T1021.003","Distributed Component Object Model","Lateral Movement","no" +"T1021.002","SMB/Windows Admin Shares","Lateral Movement","Sandworm Team|APT28|Fox Kitten|APT41|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT32|Orangeworm|FIN8|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang" +"T1021.001","Remote Desktop Protocol","Lateral Movement","Kimsuky|FIN7|Fox Kitten|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Stolen Pencil|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT3|OilRig|FIN10|menuPass|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom" +"T1554","Compromise Client Software Binary","Persistence","no" +"T1036.006","Space after Filename","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1036.005","Match Legitimate Name or Location","Defense Evasion","APT28|Ferocious Kitten|FIN7|BackdoorDiplomacy|Transparent Tribe|Naikon|APT29|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Darkhotel|Lazarus Group|Indrik Spider|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Machete|Chimera|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Sandworm Team|APT39|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Silence|APT41|menuPass|TEMP.Veles|MuddyWater|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Patchwork|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Carbanak|APT1" +"T1036.004","Masquerade Task or Service","Defense Evasion","BackdoorDiplomacy|APT41|Naikon|ZIRCONIUM|APT29|Higaisa|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Kimsuky|PROMETHIUM|Wizard Spider|APT-C-36|Carbanak|APT32|FIN6|FIN7" +"T1036.003","Rename System Utilities","Defense Evasion","menuPass|APT32|GALLIUM" +"T1036.002","Right-to-Left Override","Defense Evasion","Ferocious Kitten|BRONZE BUTLER|BlackTech|Ke3chang|Scarlet Mimic" +"T1036.001","Invalid Code Signature","Defense Evasion","Windshift|APT37" +"T1553.003","SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1553.002","Code Signing","Defense Evasion","menuPass|APT29|GALLIUM|UNC2452|Wizard Spider|Kimsuky|PROMETHIUM|Patchwork|Silence|APT41|FIN6|TA505|FIN7|Honeybee|Leviathan|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel" +"T1553.001","Gatekeeper Bypass","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1553","Subvert Trust Controls","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1027.003","Steganography","Defense Evasion","Andariel|Leviathan|TA551|BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT37" +"T1027.002","Software Packing","Defense Evasion","Sandworm Team|Kimsuky|TeamTNT|ZIRCONIUM|TA505|Rocke|GALLIUM|The White Company|APT39|APT38|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|APT3|Patchwork|APT29|Night Dragon" +"T1027.001","Binary Padding","Defense Evasion","APT29|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|APT32|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|Moafee" +"T1222.002","Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification","Defense Evasion","TeamTNT|Rocke|APT32" +"T1222.001","Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification","Defense Evasion","Wizard Spider" +"T1552.004","Private Keys","Credential Access","TeamTNT|APT29|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Rocke" +"T1552.003","Bash History","Credential Access","no" +"T1552.002","Credentials in Registry","Credential Access","APT32" +"T1552.001","Credentials In Files","Credential Access","TeamTNT|Kimsuky|Fox Kitten|Leafminer|APT33|OilRig|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT3" +"T1552","Unsecured Credentials","Credential Access","no" +"T1216.001","PubPrn","Defense Evasion","APT32" +"T1070.006","Timestomp","Defense Evasion","APT38|APT29|UNC2452|Chimera|Kimsuky|Rocke|TEMP.Veles|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT28" +"T1070.005","Network Share Connection Removal","Defense Evasion","Threat Group-3390" +"T1070.004","File Deletion","Defense Evasion","TeamTNT|APT39|Mustang Panda|Chimera|Evilnum|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|FIN6|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Wizard Spider|APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|Patchwork|menuPass|FIN8|OilRig|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|Magic Hound|Threat Group-3390|APT28|FIN10|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29" +"T1070.003","Clear Command History","Defense Evasion","TeamTNT|menuPass|APT41" +"T1550.004","Web Session Cookie","Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement","APT29|UNC2452" +"T1550.001","Application Access Token","Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement","APT28" +"T1550.003","Pass the Ticket","Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement","APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|APT29" +"T1550.002","Pass the Hash","Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement","Chimera|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|APT32|Night Dragon|APT28|APT1" +"T1550","Use Alternate Authentication Material","Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement","APT29|UNC2452" +"T1548.004","Elevated Execution with Prompt","Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion","no" +"T1548.003","Sudo and Sudo Caching","Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion","no" +"T1548.002","Bypass User Account Control","Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion","Evilnum|APT37|MuddyWater|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|APT29" +"T1548.001","Setuid and Setgid","Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion","no" +"T1548","Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism","Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion","no" +"T1136.003","Cloud Account","Persistence","no" +"T1070.002","Clear Linux or Mac System Logs","Defense Evasion","TeamTNT|Rocke" +"T1070.001","Clear Windows Event Logs","Defense Evasion","Indrik Spider|Chimera|Operation Wocao|APT41|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|FIN8|FIN5|APT28" +"T1136.002","Domain Account","Persistence","Sandworm Team|HAFNIUM|GALLIUM" +"T1136.001","Local Account","Persistence","TeamTNT|Fox Kitten|APT39|APT41|Leafminer|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3" +"T1547.011","Plist Modification","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1547.010","Port Monitors","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1547.009","Shortcut Modification","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","APT39|Darkhotel|APT29|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Lazarus Group|Leviathan" +"T1547.008","LSASS Driver","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1547.007","Re-opened Applications","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1547.006","Kernel Modules and Extensions","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1547.005","Security Support Provider","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1547.004","Winlogon Helper DLL","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","Wizard Spider|Tropic Trooper|Turla" +"T1547.003","Time Providers","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1546.014","Emond","Privilege Escalation|Persistence","no" +"T1546.013","PowerShell Profile","Privilege Escalation|Persistence","Turla" +"T1546.012","Image File Execution Options Injection","Privilege Escalation|Persistence","TEMP.Veles" +"T1218.008","Odbcconf","Defense Evasion","Cobalt Group" +"T1546.011","Application Shimming","Privilege Escalation|Persistence","FIN7" +"T1547.002","Authentication Package","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1546.010","AppInit DLLs","Privilege Escalation|Persistence","APT39" +"T1546.009","AppCert DLLs","Privilege Escalation|Persistence","Honeybee" +"T1218.007","Msiexec","Defense Evasion","ZIRCONIUM|Molerats|Machete|TA505|Rancor" +"T1546.008","Accessibility Features","Privilege Escalation|Persistence","Fox Kitten|APT41|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda|Axiom" +"T1546.007","Netsh Helper DLL","Privilege Escalation|Persistence","no" +"T1546.006","LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition","Privilege Escalation|Persistence","no" +"T1546.005","Trap","Privilege Escalation|Persistence","no" +"T1546.004","Unix Shell Configuration Modification","Privilege Escalation|Persistence","no" +"T1546.003","Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription","Privilege Escalation|Persistence","FIN8|Mustang Panda|UNC2452|APT33|Blue Mockingbird|Turla|Leviathan|APT29" +"T1546.002","Screensaver","Privilege Escalation|Persistence","no" +"T1546.001","Change Default File Association","Privilege Escalation|Persistence","Kimsuky" +"T1547.001","Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","TeamTNT|Naikon|Windshift|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT28|Wizard Spider|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Silence|RTM|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Dark Caracal|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Turla|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Gorgon Group|MuddyWater|APT37|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|Magic Hound|FIN10|FIN7|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel" +"T1218.002","Control Panel","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1218.010","Regsvr32","Defense Evasion","TA551|Blue Mockingbird|Inception|WIRTE|Cobalt Group|APT19|Leviathan|APT32|Deep Panda" +"T1218.009","Regsvcs/Regasm","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1218.005","Mshta","Defense Evasion","Mustang Panda|TA551|Sidewinder|Inception|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|FIN7" +"T1218.004","InstallUtil","Defense Evasion","Mustang Panda|menuPass" +"T1218.001","Compiled HTML File","Defense Evasion","APT41|Silence|Dark Caracal|OilRig|Lazarus Group" +"T1218.003","CMSTP","Defense Evasion","Cobalt Group|MuddyWater" +"T1218.011","Rundll32","Defense Evasion","APT38|HAFNIUM|TA551|UNC2452|APT41|Gamaredon Group|APT32|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|TA505|MuddyWater|APT29|APT19|CopyKittens|APT3|Carbanak|APT28" +"T1547","Boot or Logon Autostart Execution","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1546","Event Triggered Execution","Privilege Escalation|Persistence","no" +"T1098.003","Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role","Persistence","no" +"T1098.002","Exchange Email Delegate Permissions","Persistence","APT28|APT29|UNC2452|Magic Hound" +"T1098.001","Additional Cloud Credentials","Persistence","APT29|UNC2452" +"T1543.004","Launch Daemon","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1543.003","Windows Service","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","TeamTNT|APT38|PROMETHIUM|Blue Mockingbird|DarkVishnya|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT41|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|FIN7|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|APT3|Lazarus Group|Carbanak" +"T1543.002","Systemd Service","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","TeamTNT|Rocke" +"T1543.001","Launch Agent","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1037.005","Startup Items","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1037.004","RC Scripts","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1055.012","Process Hollowing","Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation","Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Gorgon Group|Patchwork" +"T1055.013","Process Doppelgänging","Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation","Leafminer" +"T1055.011","Extra Window Memory Injection","Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1055.014","VDSO Hijacking","Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1055.009","Proc Memory","Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1055.008","Ptrace System Calls","Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1055.005","Thread Local Storage","Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1055.004","Asynchronous Procedure Call","Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation","FIN8" +"T1055.003","Thread Execution Hijacking","Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1055.002","Portable Executable Injection","Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation","Rocke|Gorgon Group" +"T1055.001","Dynamic-link Library Injection","Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation","BackdoorDiplomacy|Leviathan|Wizard Spider|TA505|Turla|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda" +"T1037.003","Network Logon Script","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1543","Create or Modify System Process","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1037.002","Logon Script (Mac)","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1037.001","Logon Script (Windows)","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","Cobalt Group|APT28" +"T1542.003","Bootkit","Persistence|Defense Evasion","APT41|Lazarus Group|APT28" +"T1542.002","Component Firmware","Persistence|Defense Evasion","Equation" +"T1542.001","System Firmware","Persistence|Defense Evasion","no" +"T1505.003","Web Shell","Persistence","BackdoorDiplomacy|APT38|APT29|APT28|Tonto Team|Sandworm Team|HAFNIUM|Volatile Cedar|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|GALLIUM|Threat Group-3390|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|OilRig|Deep Panda" +"T1505.002","Transport Agent","Persistence","no" +"T1505.001","SQL Stored Procedures","Persistence","Sandworm Team" +"T1053.003","Cron","Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation","APT38|Rocke" +"T1053.004","Launchd","Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1053.001","At (Linux)","Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1053.005","Scheduled Task","Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation","APT37|APT38|Naikon|CostaRicto|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Molerats|Machete|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT-C-36|BRONZE BUTLER|APT41|GALLIUM|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Rancor|OilRig|Patchwork|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|FIN8|menuPass|FIN10|FIN7|APT32|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29" +"T1053.002","At (Windows)","Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation","BRONZE BUTLER|Threat Group-3390|APT18" +"T1542","Pre-OS Boot","Defense Evasion|Persistence","no" +"T1137.001","Office Template Macros","Persistence","MuddyWater" +"T1137.004","Outlook Home Page","Persistence","OilRig" +"T1137.003","Outlook Forms","Persistence","no" +"T1137.005","Outlook Rules","Persistence","no" +"T1137.006","Add-ins","Persistence","Naikon" +"T1137.002","Office Test","Persistence","APT28" +"T1531","Account Access Removal","Impact","no" +"T1539","Steal Web Session Cookie","Credential Access","Evilnum" +"T1529","System Shutdown/Reboot","Impact","Lazarus Group|APT38|APT37" +"T1518","Software Discovery","Discovery","Mustang Panda|Windshift|MuddyWater|Windigo|Sidewinder|Operation Wocao|BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|Inception" +"T1547.013","XDG Autostart Entries","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1534","Internal Spearphishing","Lateral Movement","Leviathan|Gamaredon Group" +"T1528","Steal Application Access Token","Credential Access","APT28" +"T1535","Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1525","Implant Internal Image","Persistence","no" +"T1538","Cloud Service Dashboard","Discovery","no" +"T1530","Data from Cloud Storage Object","Collection","Fox Kitten" +"T1578","Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1537","Transfer Data to Cloud Account","Exfiltration","no" +"T1526","Cloud Service Discovery","Discovery","no" +"T1505","Server Software Component","Persistence","no" +"T1499","Endpoint Denial of Service","Impact","Sandworm Team" +"T1497","Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion","Defense Evasion|Discovery","Darkhotel" +"T1498","Network Denial of Service","Impact","APT28" +"T1496","Resource Hijacking","Impact","TeamTNT|Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT41" +"T1495","Firmware Corruption","Impact","no" +"T1491","Defacement","Impact","no" +"T1490","Inhibit System Recovery","Impact","no" +"T1489","Service Stop","Impact","Indrik Spider|Wizard Spider|Lazarus Group" +"T1486","Data Encrypted for Impact","Impact","FIN7|Indrik Spider|APT41|TA505|APT38" +"T1485","Data Destruction","Impact","Sandworm Team|Lazarus Group|APT38" +"T1484","Domain Policy Modification","Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1482","Domain Trust Discovery","Discovery","FIN8|APT29|Chimera|UNC2452" +"T1480","Execution Guardrails","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1221","Template Injection","Defense Evasion","Gamaredon Group|Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|Tropic Trooper|DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0" +"T1222","File and Directory Permissions Modification","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1220","XSL Script Processing","Defense Evasion","Higaisa|Cobalt Group" +"T1217","Browser Bookmark Discovery","Discovery","APT38|Chimera|Fox Kitten" +"T1212","Exploitation for Credential Access","Credential Access","no" +"T1189","Drive-by Compromise","Initial Access","Transparent Tribe|Andariel|Leviathan|Machete|Windigo|Dragonfly|PROMETHIUM|Turla|Windshift|RTM|Darkhotel|APT38|APT19|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|Patchwork|APT37|Elderwood|PLATINUM" +"T1211","Exploitation for Defense Evasion","Defense Evasion","APT28" +"T1197","BITS Jobs","Defense Evasion|Persistence","APT39|Patchwork|APT41|Leviathan" +"T1203","Exploitation for Client Execution","Execution","Andariel|Transparent Tribe|APT3|Tonto Team|Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|Higaisa|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|Lazarus Group|Patchwork|Elderwood|APT29|TA459|APT37|Leviathan" +"T1201","Password Policy Discovery","Discovery","Chimera|Turla|OilRig" +"T1195","Supply Chain Compromise","Initial Access","no" +"T1199","Trusted Relationship","Initial Access","APT29|Sandworm Team|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|APT28|menuPass" +"T1218","Signed Binary Proxy Execution","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1204","User Execution","Execution","no" +"T1213","Data from Information Repositories","Collection","APT28|Fox Kitten|FIN6|Turla" +"T1190","Exploit Public-Facing Application","Initial Access","BackdoorDiplomacy|menuPass|Volatile Cedar|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|APT28|APT29|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT39|BlackTech|APT41|GALLIUM|Night Dragon|Axiom" +"T1210","Exploitation of Remote Services","Lateral Movement","Tonto Team|FIN7|Fox Kitten|menuPass|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|APT28" +"T1200","Hardware Additions","Initial Access","DarkVishnya" +"T1202","Indirect Command Execution","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1219","Remote Access Software","Command And Control","TeamTNT|Mustang Panda|MuddyWater|Evilnum|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|RTM|Kimsuky|Night Dragon|Cobalt Group|Thrip|Carbanak" +"T1207","Rogue Domain Controller","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1216","Signed Script Proxy Execution","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1205","Traffic Signaling","Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control","no" +"T1176","Browser Extensions","Persistence","Kimsuky|Stolen Pencil" +"T1187","Forced Authentication","Credential Access","DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0" +"T1175","Component Object Model and Distributed COM","Lateral Movement|Execution","no" +"T1185","Browser Session Hijacking","Collection","no" +"T1140","Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information","Defense Evasion","APT39|APT29|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|UNC2452|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Molerats|Frankenstein|Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|Honeybee|Gorgon Group|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|APT19|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT28|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER" +"T1134","Access Token Manipulation","Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation","FIN6|Blue Mockingbird" +"T1149","LC_MAIN Hijacking","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1136","Create Account","Persistence","Sandworm Team|Indrik Spider" +"T1135","Network Share Discovery","Discovery","Tonto Team|APT38|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT39|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|Sowbug" +"T1137","Office Application Startup","Persistence","Gamaredon Group|APT32" +"T1153","Source","Execution","no" +"T1133","External Remote Services","Persistence|Initial Access","TeamTNT|Leviathan|APT28|APT29|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Kimsuky|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Chimera|Sandworm Team|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|Ke3chang|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18" +"T1132","Data Encoding","Command And Control","no" +"T1129","Shared Modules","Execution","no" +"T1127","Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1125","Video Capture","Collection","Silence|FIN7" +"T1124","System Time Discovery","Discovery","Darkhotel|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|The White Company|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Turla" +"T1123","Audio Capture","Collection","APT37" +"T1120","Peripheral Device Discovery","Discovery","OilRig|BackdoorDiplomacy|Operation Wocao|Turla|APT37|Gamaredon Group|Equation|APT28" +"T1119","Automated Collection","Collection","Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Chimera|menuPass|Operation Wocao|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT1|APT28|Patchwork|OilRig|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|FIN6" +"T1115","Clipboard Data","Collection","Operation Wocao|APT39|APT38" +"T1114","Email Collection","Collection","Magic Hound|Silent Librarian" +"T1113","Screen Capture","Collection","GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Silence|MuddyWater|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Dark Caracal|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|Group5|APT28" +"T1112","Modify Registry","Defense Evasion","Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|Patchwork|Gorgon Group|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Honeybee|FIN8" +"T1111","Two-Factor Authentication Interception","Credential Access","Chimera|Operation Wocao" +"T1110","Brute Force","Credential Access","APT38|APT28|Fox Kitten|DarkVishnya|APT39|OilRig|FIN5|Turla" +"T1108","Redundant Access","Defense Evasion|Persistence","no" +"T1106","Native API","Execution","APT38|Higaisa|menuPass|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Turla|Silence|APT37|Gorgon Group" +"T1105","Ingress Tool Transfer","Command And Control","TeamTNT|Nomadic Octopus|IndigoZebra|Andariel|BackdoorDiplomacy|Tonto Team|HAFNIUM|APT29|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Darkhotel|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Volatile Cedar|Indrik Spider|Evilnum|Sidewinder|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Kimsuky|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Silence|APT-C-36|APT41|GALLIUM|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Turla|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|PLATINUM|APT37|Elderwood|Leviathan|APT32|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|menuPass|FIN7|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28" +"T1104","Multi-Stage Channels","Command And Control","APT41|MuddyWater|APT3" +"T1102","Web Service","Command And Control","TeamTNT|FIN8|Fox Kitten|Turla|APT32|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Inception|FIN6" +"T1098","Account Manipulation","Persistence","Sandworm Team|APT3|Dragonfly 2.0|Lazarus Group" +"T1095","Non-Application Layer Protocol","Command And Control","BackdoorDiplomacy|HAFNIUM|Operation Wocao|FIN6|APT29|PLATINUM|APT3" +"T1092","Communication Through Removable Media","Command And Control","APT28" +"T1091","Replication Through Removable Media","Lateral Movement|Initial Access","Mustang Panda|Tropic Trooper|Darkhotel|APT28" +"T1090","Proxy","Command And Control","Windigo|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|APT41|Turla" +"T1087","Account Discovery","Discovery","APT29|UNC2452" +"T1083","File and Directory Discovery","Discovery","APT38|APT29|Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|Windigo|Sidewinder|Chimera|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|menuPass|APT39|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Leafminer|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3|Sowbug|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang" +"T1082","System Information Discovery","Discovery","TeamTNT|APT38|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Windigo|Sidewinder|UNC2452|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT32|APT37|Honeybee|APT19|Magic Hound|Sowbug|OilRig|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang" +"T1080","Taint Shared Content","Lateral Movement","Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Darkhotel" +"T1078","Valid Accounts","Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access","FIN7|Leviathan|APT29|Silent Librarian|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT33|FIN5|OilRig|APT28|menuPass|FIN10|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak" +"T1074","Data Staged","Collection","Wizard Spider" +"T1072","Software Deployment Tools","Execution|Lateral Movement","Silence|APT32|Threat Group-1314" +"T1071","Application Layer Protocol","Command And Control","TeamTNT|Rocke|Magic Hound|Dragonfly 2.0" +"T1070","Indicator Removal on Host","Defense Evasion","APT29|UNC2452" +"T1069","Permission Groups Discovery","Discovery","APT29|UNC2452|TA505|APT3" +"T1068","Exploitation for Privilege Escalation","Privilege Escalation","Tonto Team|ZIRCONIUM|Turla|Whitefly|APT33|Cobalt Group|PLATINUM|FIN8|APT32|Threat Group-3390|FIN6|APT28" +"T1064","Scripting","Defense Evasion|Execution","no" +"T1062","Hypervisor","Persistence","no" +"T1061","Graphical User Interface","Execution","no" +"T1059","Command and Scripting Interpreter","Execution","APT37|Windigo|Fox Kitten|APT32|Whitefly|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|APT19|OilRig|FIN5|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Ke3chang" +"T1057","Process Discovery","Discovery","TeamTNT|Andariel|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Rocke|Frankenstein|Inception|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT38|Tropic Trooper|APT37|Honeybee|OilRig|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|Winnti Group|Stealth Falcon|Poseidon Group|Lazarus Group|Molerats|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang" +"T1056","Input Capture","Collection|Credential Access","APT39" +"T1055","Process Injection","Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation","Operation Wocao|APT32|Sharpshooter|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Cobalt Group|Turla|APT37|Honeybee|PLATINUM" +"T1053","Scheduled Task/Job","Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1052","Exfiltration Over Physical Medium","Exfiltration","no" +"T1051","Shared Webroot","Lateral Movement","no" +"T1049","System Network Connections Discovery","Discovery","TeamTNT|Andariel|BackdoorDiplomacy|Mustang Panda|MuddyWater|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Tropic Trooper|APT41|APT38|GALLIUM|APT32|APT1|OilRig|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang" +"T1048","Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol","Exfiltration","no" +"T1047","Windows Management Instrumentation","Execution","Sandworm Team|FIN7|Indrik Spider|Naikon|Mustang Panda|Windshift|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|FIN6|GALLIUM|APT32|MuddyWater|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|FIN8|Leviathan|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda" +"T1046","Network Service Scanning","Discovery","TeamTNT|BackdoorDiplomacy|Naikon|CostaRicto|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Rocke|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|OilRig|Cobalt Group|Leafminer|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390" +"T1043","Commonly Used Port","Command And Control","OilRig|APT28|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|APT29|APT18|FIN7|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT37|APT3|Magic Hound|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390" +"T1041","Exfiltration Over C2 Channel","Exfiltration","Leviathan|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Chimera|APT39|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|APT32|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang" +"T1040","Network Sniffing","Credential Access|Discovery","Kimsuky|Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|APT33|Stolen Pencil|APT28" +"T1039","Data from Network Shared Drive","Collection","APT28|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|menuPass" +"T1037","Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","Rocke" +"T1036","Masquerading","Defense Evasion","APT28|Nomadic Octopus|OilRig|APT29|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|UNC2452|Windshift|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|PLATINUM|Dragonfly 2.0" +"T1034","Path Interception","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1033","System Owner/User Discovery","Discovery","APT38|Windshift|ZIRCONIUM|Sidewinder|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|GALLIUM|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT37|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|APT32|Magic Hound|OilRig|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3" +"T1030","Data Transfer Size Limits","Exfiltration","APT28|Threat Group-3390" +"T1029","Scheduled Transfer","Exfiltration","Higaisa" +"T1027","Obfuscated Files or Information","Defense Evasion","TeamTNT|BackdoorDiplomacy|Transparent Tribe|APT39|Mustang Panda|Windshift|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|FIN6|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|Patchwork|menuPass|APT37|Threat Group-3390|Cobalt Group|Dark Caracal|Leafminer|Honeybee|APT19|BlackOasis|Leviathan|FIN8|MuddyWater|FIN7|Elderwood|OilRig|Magic Hound|APT3|APT32|Group5|Dust Storm|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT28" +"T1026","Multiband Communication","Command And Control","Lazarus Group" +"T1025","Data from Removable Media","Collection","Turla|Gamaredon Group|APT28" +"T1021","Remote Services","Lateral Movement","no" +"T1020","Automated Exfiltration","Exfiltration","Sidewinder|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Honeybee" +"T1018","Remote System Discovery","Discovery","Indrik Spider|Naikon|APT29|UNC2452|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Wizard Spider|Silence|GALLIUM|APT39|APT32|Deep Panda|Ke3chang|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|FIN8|FIN5|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Turla" +"T1016","System Network Configuration Discovery","Discovery","TeamTNT|ZIRCONIUM|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT41|GALLIUM|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3|Naikon|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang" +"T1014","Rootkit","Defense Evasion","TeamTNT|Rocke|APT41|APT28|Winnti Group" +"T1012","Query Registry","Discovery","ZIRCONIUM|Chimera|Fox Kitten|APT39|Operation Wocao|APT32|Dragonfly 2.0|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Turla" +"T1011","Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium","Exfiltration","no" +"T1010","Application Window Discovery","Discovery","Lazarus Group" +"T1008","Fallback Channels","Command And Control","FIN7|APT41|OilRig|Lazarus Group" +"T1007","System Service Discovery","Discovery","Indrik Spider|Chimera|Operation Wocao|BRONZE BUTLER|APT1|OilRig|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang" +"T1006","Direct Volume Access","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1005","Data from Local System","Collection","FIN7|APT41|APT38|Andariel|APT29|Windigo|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|Turla|menuPass|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|APT37|APT28|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang" +"T1003","OS Credential Dumping","Credential Access","Tonto Team|APT39|Frankenstein|APT32|APT28|Leviathan|Sowbug|Suckfly|Poseidon Group|Axiom" +"T1001","Data Obfuscation","Command And Control","Operation Wocao|Axiom" diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/lookups/previously_seen_aws_regions.yml b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/lookups/previously_seen_aws_regions.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..15706035aa --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/lookups/previously_seen_aws_regions.yml @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +default_match: 'false' +description: A place holder for a list of used AWS regions +filename: previously_seen_aws_regions.csv +min_matches: 1 +name: previously_seen_aws_regions diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/macro/powershell.yml b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/macro/powershell.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d6b8f842d3 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/macro/powershell.yml @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +definition: (source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational") +description: customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). + Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent. +name: powershell diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/macro/process_reg.yml b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/macro/process_reg.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..60260af606 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/macro/process_reg.yml @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +definition: (Processes.process_name=reg.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=reg.exe) +description: Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/ +name: process_reg \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/macro/security_content_ctime.yml b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/macro/security_content_ctime.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3c18a1d7af --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/macro/security_content_ctime.yml @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +arguments: + - field +definition: 'convert timeformat="%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S" ctime($field$)' +description: convert epoch time to string +name: security_content_ctime diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/playbook/example_playbook.yml b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/playbook/example_playbook.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9411c2a1c4 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/playbook/example_playbook.yml @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +name: Ransomware Investigate and Contain +id: fc0edc96-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3783fd63 +version: 1 +date: '2018-02-04' +author: Philip Royer, Splunk +type: Response +description: This playbook investigates and contains ransomware detected on endpoints. +playbook: ransomware_investigate_and_contain +how_to_implement: This playbook requires the Splunk SOAR apps for Palo Alto + Networks Firewalls, Palo Alto Wildfire, LDAP, and Carbon Black Response. +references: [] +app_list: +- "Carbon Black Response" +- "LDAP" +- "Palo Alto Networks Firewall" +- "WildFire" +- "Cylance" +tags: + analytic_story: + - Ransomware + detections: + - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe + platform_tags: + - Ransomware + - Response + playbook_fields: + - ComputerName + - Username + product: + - Splunk SOAR \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/story/ransomware_darkside.yml b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/story/ransomware_darkside.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f2e6d8bfd9 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/story/ransomware_darkside.yml @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +name: DarkSide Ransomware +id: 507edc74-13d5-4339-878e-b9114ded1f35 +version: 1 +date: '2021-05-12' +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +description: Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities + that might relate to the DarkSide Ransomware +narrative: 'This story addresses Darkside ransomware. This ransomware payload has many similarities to common ransomware however there are certain items particular to it. The creation of a .TXT log that shows every item being encrypted as well as the creation of ransomware notes and files adding a machine ID created based on CRC32 checksum algorithm. This ransomware payload leaves machines in minimal operation level,enough to browse the attackers websites. A customized URI with leaked information is presented to each victim.This is the ransomware payload that shut down the Colonial pipeline. The story is composed of several detection searches covering similar items to other ransomware payloads and those particular to Darkside payload.' +references: +- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/the-darkside-of-the-ransomware-pipeline.htmlbig-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/ +- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html +tags: + analytic_story: DarkSide Ransomware + category: + - Malware + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + usecase: Advanced Threat Detection diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/test/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.test.yml b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/test/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.test.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..350f093598 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/test/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.test.yml @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +name: Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe Unit Test +tests: +- name: Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe + file: endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml + pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now + attack_data: + - file_name: windows-sysmon.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/test/example.test.yml b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/test/example.test.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..fdf35b265e --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_data/test/example.test.yml @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +name: Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User Unit Test +tests: + - name: Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User + file: cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml + pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now + baselines: + - name: Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Initial + file: detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_initial.yml + pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' + earliest_time: -30d + latest_time: -1d + - name: Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Update + file: detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_update.yml + pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' + earliest_time: -30d + latest_time: -1d + attack_data: + - file_name: cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json + sourcetype: aws:cloudtrail + source: aws_cloudtrail + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_security_content_basic_builder.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_security_content_basic_builder.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b06b0558e5 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_security_content_basic_builder.py @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +import pytest +import os + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.enums.enums import SecurityContentProduct +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_basic_builder import SecurityContentBasicBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.enums.enums import SecurityContentType +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.yml_reader import YmlReader + + +def test_read_deployment(): + security_content_builder = SecurityContentBasicBuilder() + security_content_builder.setObject(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/deployment/ESCU/00_default_ttp.yml'), SecurityContentType.deployments) + deployment = security_content_builder.getObject() + + assert deployment.name == "ESCU Default Configuration TTP" + assert deployment.author == "Patrick Bareiss" + assert deployment.scheduling.schedule_window == "auto" + assert deployment.notable.rule_description == "%description%" + + +def test_read_lookup(): + security_content_builder = SecurityContentBasicBuilder() + security_content_builder.setObject(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/lookups/previously_seen_aws_regions.yml'), SecurityContentType.lookups) + lookup = security_content_builder.getObject() + + assert lookup.name == "previously_seen_aws_regions" + assert lookup.filename == "previously_seen_aws_regions.csv" + + +def test_read_macro(): + security_content_builder = SecurityContentBasicBuilder() + security_content_builder.setObject(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/macro/powershell.yml'), SecurityContentType.macros) + macro = security_content_builder.getObject() + + assert macro.name == "powershell" + + +def test_read_test(): + security_content_builder = SecurityContentBasicBuilder() + security_content_builder.setObject(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/test/example.test.yml'), SecurityContentType.unit_tests) + test = security_content_builder.getObject() + + assert test.name == "Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User Unit Test" + assert test.tests[0].baselines[0].name == "Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Initial" + assert test.tests[0].attack_data[0].source == "aws_cloudtrail" \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_security_content_detection_builder.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_security_content_detection_builder.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9ab2a57cc4 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_security_content_detection_builder.py @@ -0,0 +1,217 @@ +import pytest +import os + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.enums.enums import SecurityContentProduct +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_detection_builder import SecurityContentDetectionBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_basic_builder import SecurityContentBasicBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.enums.enums import SecurityContentType +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.yml_reader import YmlReader +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_investigation_builder import SecurityContentInvestigationBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_baseline_builder import SecurityContentBaselineBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.attack_enrichment import AttackEnrichment +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_playbook_builder import SecurityContentPlaybookBuilder + + +def test_read_detection(): + security_content_builder = SecurityContentDetectionBuilder() + security_content_builder.setObject(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/detection/valid.yml')) + detection = security_content_builder.getObject() + + assert detection.name == "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe" + assert detection.author == "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk" + + +def test_add_deployment_to_detection(): + security_content_builder_deployment = SecurityContentBasicBuilder() + security_content_builder_deployment.setObject(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/deployment/ESCU/00_default_ttp.yml'), SecurityContentType.deployments) + deployment = security_content_builder_deployment.getObject() + + security_content_builder = SecurityContentDetectionBuilder() + security_content_builder.setObject(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/detection/valid.yml')) + security_content_builder.addDeployment([deployment]) + detection = security_content_builder.getObject() + + assert detection.deployment.name == "ESCU Default Configuration TTP" + + +def test_detection_nes_field_enrichment(): + security_content_builder_deployment = SecurityContentBasicBuilder() + security_content_builder_deployment.setObject(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/deployment/ESCU/00_default_ttp.yml'), SecurityContentType.deployments) + deployment = security_content_builder_deployment.getObject() + + security_content_builder = SecurityContentDetectionBuilder() + security_content_builder.setObject(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/detection/valid.yml')) + security_content_builder.addDeployment([deployment]) + security_content_builder.addNesFields() + detection = security_content_builder.getObject() + + assert detection.deployment.notable.nes_fields == ['user', 'dest'] + + +def test_detection_annotation_enrichment(): + security_content_builder_deployment = SecurityContentBasicBuilder() + security_content_builder_deployment.setObject(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/deployment/ESCU/00_default_ttp.yml'), SecurityContentType.deployments) + deployment = security_content_builder_deployment.getObject() + + security_content_builder = SecurityContentDetectionBuilder() + security_content_builder.setObject(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/detection/valid.yml')) + security_content_builder.addDeployment([deployment]) + security_content_builder.addAnnotations() + detection = security_content_builder.getObject() + + valid_annotations = {'mitre_attack': ['T1003.002', 'T1003'], + 'kill_chain_phases': ['Actions on Objectives'], + 'cis20': ['CIS 3', 'CIS 5', 'CIS 16'], + 'nist': ['DE.CM'], + 'analytic_story': ['Credential Dumping', 'DarkSide Ransomware'], + 'observable': [{'name': 'user', 'type': 'User', 'role': ['Victim']}, + {'name': 'dest', 'type': 'Hostname', 'role': ['Victim']}, + {'name': 'parent_process_name', 'type': 'Process', 'role': ['Parent Process']}, + {'name': 'process_name', 'type': 'Process', 'role': ['Child Process']}], + 'context': ['Source:Endpoint', 'Stage:Credential Access'], + 'impact': 90, 'confidence': 100} + + assert detection.annotations == valid_annotations + + +def test_detection_add_mappings(): + security_content_builder = SecurityContentDetectionBuilder() + security_content_builder.setObject(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/detection/valid.yml')) + security_content_builder.addMappings() + detection = security_content_builder.getObject() + + valid_mappings = {'mitre_attack': ['T1003.002', 'T1003'], + 'kill_chain_phases': ['Actions on Objectives'], + 'cis20': ['CIS 3', 'CIS 5', 'CIS 16'], + 'nist': ['DE.CM']} + + assert detection.mappings == valid_mappings + + +def test_detection_add_rba(): + security_content_builder = SecurityContentDetectionBuilder() + security_content_builder.setObject(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/detection/valid.yml')) + security_content_builder.addRBA() + detection = security_content_builder.getObject() + + valid_risk = [{'risk_object_type': 'user', 'risk_object_field': 'user', 'risk_score': 90}, + {'risk_object_type': 'system', 'risk_object_field': 'dest', 'risk_score': 90}, + {'threat_object_field': 'parent_process_name', 'threat_object_type': 'process'}, + {'threat_object_field': 'process_name', 'threat_object_type': 'process'}] + + assert detection.risk == valid_risk + + +def test_detection_add_playbooks(): + playbook_builder = SecurityContentPlaybookBuilder() + playbook_builder.setObject(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/playbook/example_playbook.yml')) + playbook = playbook_builder.getObject() + + security_content_builder = SecurityContentDetectionBuilder() + security_content_builder.setObject(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/detection/valid.yml')) + security_content_builder.addPlaybook([playbook]) + detection = security_content_builder.getObject() + + assert detection.playbooks[0].name == "Ransomware Investigate and Contain" + + +def test_detection_enrich_baseline(): + + baseline_builder = SecurityContentBaselineBuilder() + baseline_builder.setObject(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'test_data/baseline/baseline.yml')) + baseline = baseline_builder.getObject() + + security_content_builder = SecurityContentDetectionBuilder() + security_content_builder.setObject(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/detection/valid.yml')) + security_content_builder.addBaseline([baseline]) + detection = security_content_builder.getObject() + + assert detection.baselines[0].name == "Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update" + + +def test_detection_enrich_unit_test(): + security_content_builder = SecurityContentBasicBuilder() + security_content_builder.setObject(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/test/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.test.yml'), SecurityContentType.unit_tests) + test = security_content_builder.getObject() + + security_content_builder = SecurityContentDetectionBuilder() + security_content_builder.setObject(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/detection/valid.yml')) + security_content_builder.addUnitTest([test]) + detection = security_content_builder.getObject() + + assert detection.test.tests[0].file == "endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml" + + +def test_attack_enrichment(): + security_content_builder = SecurityContentDetectionBuilder() + security_content_builder.setObject(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/detection/valid.yml')) + security_content_builder.addMitreAttackEnrichment(AttackEnrichment.get_attack_lookup()) + detection = security_content_builder.getObject() + + assert detection.tags.mitre_attack_enrichments[0].dict() == { + 'mitre_attack_id': 'T1003.002', + 'mitre_attack_technique': 'Security Account Manager', + 'mitre_attack_tactics': ['Credential Access'], + 'mitre_attack_groups': ['Dragonfly 2.0', 'GALLIUM', 'Ke3chang', 'Night Dragon', 'Threat Group-3390', 'Wizard Spider', 'menuPass'] + } + assert detection.tags.mitre_attack_enrichments[1].dict() == { + 'mitre_attack_id': 'T1003', + 'mitre_attack_technique': 'OS Credential Dumping', + 'mitre_attack_tactics': ['Credential Access'], 'mitre_attack_groups': ['APT28', 'APT32', 'APT39', 'Axiom', 'Frankenstein', 'Leviathan', 'Poseidon Group', 'Sowbug', 'Suckfly', 'Tonto Team'] + } + + +def test_macros_enrichment(): + basic_builder = SecurityContentBasicBuilder() + basic_builder.setObject(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/macro/process_reg.yml'), SecurityContentType.macros) + macro = basic_builder.getObject() + + security_content_builder = SecurityContentDetectionBuilder() + security_content_builder.setObject(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/detection/valid.yml')) + security_content_builder.addMacros([macro]) + detection = security_content_builder.getObject() + + assert detection.macros[0].name == 'process_reg' + assert detection.macros[1].name == 'attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter' + + +def test_lookup_enrichment(): + security_content_builder = SecurityContentBasicBuilder() + security_content_builder.setObject(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/lookups/attacker_tools.yml'), SecurityContentType.lookups) + lookup = security_content_builder.getObject() + + security_content_builder = SecurityContentDetectionBuilder() + security_content_builder.setObject(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/detection/attacker_tools_on_endpoint.yml')) + security_content_builder.addLookups([lookup]) + detection = security_content_builder.getObject() + + assert detection.lookups[0].name == 'attacker_tools' + + +def test_add_cve(): + security_content_builder = SecurityContentDetectionBuilder() + security_content_builder.setObject(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/detection/spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules.yml')) + security_content_builder.addCve() + detection = security_content_builder.getObject() + + assert detection.cve_enrichment == [{'id': 'CVE-2021-34527', 'cvss': 9.0, 'summary': 'Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability'}] \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_security_content_director.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_security_content_director.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5a16caceda --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_security_content_director.py @@ -0,0 +1,238 @@ +import os + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_director import SecurityContentDirector +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_basic_builder import SecurityContentBasicBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_detection_builder import SecurityContentDetectionBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_story_builder import SecurityContentStoryBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.enums.enums import SecurityContentProduct +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_investigation_builder import SecurityContentInvestigationBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_baseline_builder import SecurityContentBaselineBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_object_builder import SecurityContentObjectBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.attack_enrichment import AttackEnrichment +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_playbook_builder import SecurityContentPlaybookBuilder + + +def test_construct_deployments(): + director = SecurityContentDirector() + deployment_builder = SecurityContentBasicBuilder() + director.constructDeployment(deployment_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/deployment/ESCU/00_default_ttp.yml')) + deployment = deployment_builder.getObject() + + assert deployment.name == "ESCU Default Configuration TTP" + assert deployment.author == "Patrick Bareiss" + assert deployment.scheduling.schedule_window == "auto" + assert deployment.notable.rule_description == "%description%" + + +def test_construct_lookups(): + director = SecurityContentDirector() + lookup_builder = SecurityContentBasicBuilder() + director.constructLookup(lookup_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/lookups/previously_seen_aws_regions.yml')) + lookup = lookup_builder.getObject() + + assert lookup.name == "previously_seen_aws_regions" + assert lookup.filename == "previously_seen_aws_regions.csv" + + +def test_construct_macros(): + director = SecurityContentDirector() + macro_builder = SecurityContentBasicBuilder() + director.constructMacro(macro_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/macro/powershell.yml')) + macro = macro_builder.getObject() + + assert macro.name == "powershell" + + +def test_construct_playbooks(): + director = SecurityContentDirector() + playbook_builder = SecurityContentPlaybookBuilder() + director.constructPlaybook(playbook_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/playbook/example_playbook.yml'), []) + playbook = playbook_builder.getObject() + + assert playbook.name == "Ransomware Investigate and Contain" + assert playbook.tags.detections[0] == "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe" + + +def test_construct_unit_tests(): + director = SecurityContentDirector() + unit_test_builder = SecurityContentBasicBuilder() + director.constructTest(unit_test_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/test/example.test.yml')) + test = unit_test_builder.getObject() + + assert test.name == "Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User Unit Test" + assert test.tests[0].baselines[0].name == "Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Initial" + assert test.tests[0].attack_data[0].source == "aws_cloudtrail" + + +def test_construct_baselines(): + director = SecurityContentDirector() + + deployment_builder = SecurityContentBasicBuilder() + director.constructDeployment(deployment_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/deployment/ESCU/00_default_baseline.yml')) + deployment = deployment_builder.getObject() + + baseline_builder = SecurityContentBaselineBuilder() + director.constructBaseline(baseline_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/baseline/baseline.yml'), [deployment]) + baseline = baseline_builder.getObject() + + assert baseline.name == "Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update" + + director.constructBaseline(baseline_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/baseline/baseline2.yml'), [deployment]) + baseline = baseline_builder.getObject() + + assert baseline.name == "Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched" + + +def test_construct_investigations(): + director = SecurityContentDirector() + investigation_builder = SecurityContentInvestigationBuilder() + director.constructInvestigation(investigation_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/investigation/investigation.yml')) + investigation = investigation_builder.getObject() + + assert investigation.name == "Get Parent Process Info" + + +def test_construct_detections(): + director = SecurityContentDirector() + + lookup_builder = SecurityContentBasicBuilder() + director.constructLookup(lookup_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/lookups/previously_seen_aws_regions.yml')) + lookup = lookup_builder.getObject() + + deployment_builder = SecurityContentBasicBuilder() + director.constructDeployment(deployment_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/deployment/ESCU/00_default_ttp.yml')) + deployment = deployment_builder.getObject() + + director.constructDeployment(deployment_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/deployment/ESCU/00_default_baseline.yml')) + deployment_baseline = deployment_builder.getObject() + + playbook_builder = SecurityContentPlaybookBuilder() + director.constructPlaybook(playbook_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/playbook/example_playbook.yml'), []) + playbook = playbook_builder.getObject() + + baseline_builder = SecurityContentBaselineBuilder() + director.constructBaseline(baseline_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/baseline/baseline.yml'), [deployment_baseline]) + baseline = baseline_builder.getObject() + + unit_test_builder = SecurityContentBasicBuilder() + director.constructTest(unit_test_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/test/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.test.yml')) + test = unit_test_builder.getObject() + + macro_builder = SecurityContentBasicBuilder() + director.constructMacro(macro_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/macro/process_reg.yml')) + macro = macro_builder.getObject() + + detection_builder = SecurityContentDetectionBuilder() + director.constructDetection(detection_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/detection/valid.yml'), [deployment], [playbook], [baseline], [test], + AttackEnrichment.get_attack_lookup(), [macro], [lookup]) + detection = detection_builder.getObject() + + valid_annotations = {'mitre_attack': ['T1003.002', 'T1003'], + 'kill_chain_phases': ['Actions on Objectives'], + 'cis20': ['CIS 3', 'CIS 5', 'CIS 16'], + 'nist': ['DE.CM'], + 'analytic_story': ['Credential Dumping', 'DarkSide Ransomware'], + 'observable': [{'name': 'user', 'type': 'User', 'role': ['Victim']}, + {'name': 'dest', 'type': 'Hostname', 'role': ['Victim']}, + {'name': 'parent_process_name', 'type': 'Process', 'role': ['Parent Process']}, + {'name': 'process_name', 'type': 'Process', 'role': ['Child Process']}], + 'context': ['Source:Endpoint', 'Stage:Credential Access'], + 'impact': 90, 'confidence': 100} + + valid_risk = [{'risk_object_type': 'user', 'risk_object_field': 'user', 'risk_score': 90}, + {'risk_object_type': 'system', 'risk_object_field': 'dest', 'risk_score': 90}, + {'threat_object_field': 'parent_process_name', 'threat_object_type': 'process'}, + {'threat_object_field': 'process_name', 'threat_object_type': 'process'}] + + assert detection.name == "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe" + assert detection.author == "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk" + assert detection.deployment.name == "ESCU Default Configuration TTP" + assert detection.deployment.notable.nes_fields == ['user', 'dest'] + assert detection.annotations == valid_annotations + assert detection.risk == valid_risk + assert detection.playbooks[0].name == "Ransomware Investigate and Contain" + assert detection.baselines[0].name == "Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update" + assert detection.test.name == "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe Unit Test" + assert detection.macros[0].name == 'process_reg' + assert detection.macros[1].name == 'attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter' + + +def test_construct_stories(): + director = SecurityContentDirector() + + deployment_builder = SecurityContentBasicBuilder() + director.constructDeployment(deployment_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/deployment/ESCU/00_default_ttp.yml')) + deployment = deployment_builder.getObject() + + director.constructDeployment(deployment_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/deployment/ESCU/00_default_baseline.yml')) + deployment_baseline = deployment_builder.getObject() + + playbook_builder = SecurityContentPlaybookBuilder() + director.constructPlaybook(playbook_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/playbook/example_playbook.yml'), []) + playbook = playbook_builder.getObject() + + baseline_builder = SecurityContentBaselineBuilder() + director.constructBaseline(baseline_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/baseline/baseline2.yml'), [deployment_baseline]) + baseline = baseline_builder.getObject() + + unit_test_builder = SecurityContentBasicBuilder() + director.constructTest(unit_test_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/test/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.test.yml')) + test = unit_test_builder.getObject() + + detection_builder = SecurityContentDetectionBuilder() + director.constructDetection(detection_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/detection/valid.yml'), [deployment], [playbook], [baseline], [test], + AttackEnrichment.get_attack_lookup(), [], []) + detection = detection_builder.getObject() + + investigation_builder = SecurityContentInvestigationBuilder() + director.constructInvestigation(investigation_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/investigation/investigation.yml')) + investigation = investigation_builder.getObject() + + story_builder = SecurityContentStoryBuilder() + director.constructStory(story_builder, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/story/ransomware_darkside.yml'), + [detection], [baseline], [investigation]) + story = story_builder.getObject() + + assert story.name == "DarkSide Ransomware" + assert story.tags.usecase == "Advanced Threat Detection" + assert story.detection_names == ["ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule"] + assert story.baseline_names == ["ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched"] + assert story.investigation_names == ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"] + assert story.author_company == "Splunk" + assert story.author_name == "Bhavin Patel" + + +def test_construct_objects(): + director = SecurityContentDirector() + + object_builder = SecurityContentObjectBuilder() + director.constructObjects(object_builder,os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/detection/valid.yml')) + obj = object_builder.getObject() + + assert obj['name'] == "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe" \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_security_content_investigation_builder.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_security_content_investigation_builder.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b483dc75e3 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_security_content_investigation_builder.py @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +import os + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_investigation_builder import SecurityContentInvestigationBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.enums.enums import SecurityContentType + + +def test_read_investigation(): + investigation_builder = SecurityContentInvestigationBuilder() + investigation_builder.setObject(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/investigation/investigation.yml')) + investigation = investigation_builder.getObject() + + assert investigation.name == "Get Parent Process Info" + + +def test_add_inputs(): + investigation_builder = SecurityContentInvestigationBuilder() + investigation_builder.setObject(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/investigation/investigation.yml')) + investigation_builder.addInputs() + investigation = investigation_builder.getObject() + + assert investigation.inputs == ["parent_process_name", "dest"] + + +def test_add_lowercase_name(): + investigation_builder = SecurityContentInvestigationBuilder() + investigation_builder.setObject(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/investigation/investigation.yml')) + investigation_builder.addLowercaseName() + investigation = investigation_builder.getObject() + + assert investigation.lowercase_name == "get_parent_process_info" \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_security_content_object_builder.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_security_content_object_builder.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9d2178cf83 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_security_content_object_builder.py @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ + +import os + + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_object_builder import SecurityContentObjectBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.enums.enums import SecurityContentType + + +def test_read_detection(): + object_builder = SecurityContentObjectBuilder() + object_builder.setObject(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/detection/valid.yml')) + obj = object_builder.getObject() + + assert obj['name'] == "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe" \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_security_content_playbook_builder.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_security_content_playbook_builder.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7ccfaf5ef9 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_security_content_playbook_builder.py @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +import os + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_playbook_builder import SecurityContentPlaybookBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_detection_builder import SecurityContentDetectionBuilder + + +def test_read_playbook(): + playbook_builder = SecurityContentPlaybookBuilder() + playbook_builder.setObject(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/playbook/example_playbook.yml')) + playbook = playbook_builder.getObject() + + assert playbook.name == "Ransomware Investigate and Contain" + + +def test_enrich_detections(): + security_content_builder = SecurityContentDetectionBuilder() + security_content_builder.setObject(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/detection/valid.yml')) + detection = security_content_builder.getObject() + + playbook_builder = SecurityContentPlaybookBuilder() + playbook_builder.setObject(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/playbook/example_playbook.yml')) + playbook_builder.addDetections([detection]) + playbook = playbook_builder.getObject() + + assert playbook.tags.detection_objects[0].name == "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe" \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_security_content_story_builder.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_security_content_story_builder.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a1881937d9 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_security_content_story_builder.py @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +import os + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_story_builder import SecurityContentStoryBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_detection_builder import SecurityContentDetectionBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_basic_builder import SecurityContentBasicBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.enums.enums import SecurityContentType +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_investigation_builder import SecurityContentInvestigationBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_baseline_builder import SecurityContentBaselineBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.attack_enrichment import AttackEnrichment + + +def test_read_story(): + story_builder = SecurityContentStoryBuilder() + story_builder.setObject(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/story/ransomware_darkside.yml')) + story = story_builder.getObject() + + assert story.name == "DarkSide Ransomware" + assert story.tags.usecase == "Advanced Threat Detection" + + +def test_add_detections(): + security_content_builder = SecurityContentDetectionBuilder() + security_content_builder.setObject(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/detection/valid.yml')) + security_content_builder.addMitreAttackEnrichment(AttackEnrichment.get_attack_lookup()) + detection = security_content_builder.getObject() + + story_builder = SecurityContentStoryBuilder() + story_builder.setObject(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/story/ransomware_darkside.yml')) + story_builder.addDetections([detection]) + story = story_builder.getObject() + + assert story.detection_names == ["ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule"] + assert story.tags.datamodels == ['Endpoint'] + assert story.tags.kill_chain_phases == ['Actions on Objectives'] + assert story.tags.mitre_attack_enrichments[0].dict() == { + 'mitre_attack_id': 'T1003.002', + 'mitre_attack_technique': 'Security Account Manager', + 'mitre_attack_tactics': ['Credential Access'], + 'mitre_attack_groups': ['Dragonfly 2.0', 'GALLIUM', 'Ke3chang', 'Night Dragon', 'Threat Group-3390', 'Wizard Spider', 'menuPass'] + } + assert story.tags.mitre_attack_enrichments[1].dict() == { + 'mitre_attack_id': 'T1003', + 'mitre_attack_technique': 'OS Credential Dumping', + 'mitre_attack_tactics': ['Credential Access'], 'mitre_attack_groups': ['APT28', 'APT32', 'APT39', 'Axiom', 'Frankenstein', 'Leviathan', 'Poseidon Group', 'Sowbug', 'Suckfly', 'Tonto Team'] + } + + +def test_add_baselines(): + baseline_builder = SecurityContentBaselineBuilder() + baseline_builder.setObject(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/baseline/baseline2.yml')) + baseline = baseline_builder.getObject() + + story_builder = SecurityContentStoryBuilder() + story_builder.setObject(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/story/ransomware_darkside.yml')) + story_builder.addBaselines([baseline]) + story = story_builder.getObject() + + assert story.baseline_names == ["ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched"] + + +def test_add_investigations(): + investigation_builder = SecurityContentInvestigationBuilder() + investigation_builder.setObject(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/investigation/investigation.yml')) + investigation = investigation_builder.getObject() + + story_builder = SecurityContentStoryBuilder() + story_builder.setObject(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/story/ransomware_darkside.yml')) + story_builder.addInvestigations([investigation]) + story = story_builder.getObject() + + assert story.investigation_names == ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"] + + +def test_parse_authorr(): + story_builder = SecurityContentStoryBuilder() + story_builder.setObject(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + 'test_data/story/ransomware_darkside.yml')) + story_builder.addAuthorCompanyName() + story = story_builder.getObject() + + assert story.author_company == "Splunk" + assert story.author_name == "Bhavin Patel" \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_yml_reader.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_yml_reader.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..90b71ba53a --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/builder/test_yml_reader.py @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +import pytest +import os + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.yml_reader import YmlReader + + +def test_read_detection_file(): + yml_obj = YmlReader.load_file(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'test_data/detection/valid.yml')) + assert yml_obj['name'] == "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe" diff --git a/bin/create_baseline_folder.py b/bin/create_baseline_folder.py deleted file mode 100644 index 4ee38ef7a8..0000000000 --- a/bin/create_baseline_folder.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,52 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/python - -import glob -import yaml -import os -from os import path -import sys - - -def load_objects(file_path, REPO_PATH): - files = [] - manifest_files = path.join(path.expanduser(REPO_PATH), file_path) - for file in sorted(glob.glob(manifest_files)): - files.append(load_file(file)) - return files - - -def load_file(file_path): - with open(file_path, 'r', encoding="utf-8") as stream: - try: - file = list(yaml.safe_load_all(stream))[0] - except yaml.YAMLError as exc: - print(exc) - sys.exit("ERROR: reading {0}".format(file_path)) - return file - - -def main(args): - print("copy baselines into it's own folder") - - # process all detections - REPO_PATH = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), '../') - detections = [] - detections = load_objects("detections/application/*.yml", REPO_PATH) - detections.extend(load_objects("detections/cloud/*.yml", REPO_PATH)) - detections.extend(load_objects("detections/endpoint/*.yml", REPO_PATH)) - detections.extend(load_objects("detections/network/*.yml", REPO_PATH)) - detections.extend(load_objects("detections/web/*.yml", REPO_PATH)) - - baselines = [] - os.mkdir('baselines') - - for detection in detections: - if detection['type'] == 'Baseline': - baseline_file_name = detection['name'].replace(' ', '_').replace('-','_').replace('.','_').replace('/','_').lower() - file = open("baselines/" + baseline_file_name + ".yml", "w") - yaml.dump(detection, file) - file.close() - - -if __name__ == "__main__": - main(sys.argv[1:]) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/doc_gen.py b/bin/doc_gen.py deleted file mode 100644 index 282436d5b5..0000000000 --- a/bin/doc_gen.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,544 +0,0 @@ -from threading import Thread -from functools import cache -import glob -import yaml -import argparse -import sys -import re -from os import path, walk, remove -import json -from jinja2 import Environment, FileSystemLoader -import datetime -from stix2 import FileSystemSource -from stix2 import Filter -from pycvesearch import CVESearch - -CVESSEARCH_API_URL = 'https://cve.circl.lu' -CVESSEARCH_API_TIMEOUT = 10 - - -def load_objects(REPO_PATH, TYPE): - manifest_files = [] - for root, dirs, files in walk(REPO_PATH + '/' + TYPE): - for file in files: - if file.endswith(".yml") and root == './' + TYPE: - manifest_files.append((path.join(root, file))) - - objects = [] - for manifest_file in manifest_files: - object_yaml = dict() - if VERBOSE: - print("processing manifest {0}".format(manifest_file)) - - with open(manifest_file, 'r') as stream: - try: - object = list(yaml.safe_load_all(stream))[0] - except yaml.YAMLError as exc: - print(exc) - print("Error reading {0}".format(manifest_file)) - sys.exit(1) - object_yaml = object - objects.append(object_yaml) - return objects - -def generate_lookup_dict(lookups): - lookup_dict = {} - for lookup in lookups: - lookup_dict[lookup['name']] = lookup - - return lookup_dict - -def generate_macro_dict(macros): - macro_dict = {} - for macro in macros: - macro_dict[macro['name']] = macro - - return macro_dict - -def parse_and_add_macros(object, macros, lookups): - macros_found = re.findall('\`([^\s]+)`', object['search']) - macros_filtered = set() - for macro in macros_found: - if not 'cim_' in macro and not 'get_' in macro and not '_filter' in macro and not 'drop_dm_object_name' in macro: - start = macro.find('(') - if start != -1: - macros_filtered.add(macro[:start]) - else: - macros_filtered.add(macro) - - macro_objects = [] - for macro in list(macros_filtered): - macro_lookups = parse_and_add_lookups(macros[macro]['definition'], lookups) - if len(macro_lookups) > 0: - macros[macro]['lookups'] = macro_lookups - macro_objects.append(macros[macro]) - - new_dict = {} - new_dict['definition'] = 'search *' - new_dict['description'] = 'Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ' - new_dict['name'] = object['name'].replace(' ', '_').replace('-', '_').replace('.', '_').replace('/', '_').lower() + '_filter' - macro_objects.append(new_dict) - - return macro_objects - -def parse_and_add_lookups(search_string, lookups): - lookups_found = re.findall('lookup (?:update=true)?(?:append=t)?\s*([^\s]*)', search_string) - lookup_objects = [] - for lookup in lookups_found: - if lookup in lookups: - lookup_obj = lookups[lookup] - if not ('fields_list' in lookup_obj): - csv_file_name = lookup_obj['filename'] - lookup_obj['csv_file_url'] = 'https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/' + csv_file_name - - lookup_objects.append(lookup_obj) - - - return lookup_objects - - -#This function hits an API, which can be slow, especially if the API -#or network connection is slow. This has sometimes caused issues -#in our CI/CD taking a very long time. Here, we memoize/cache -#the calls to this function - there will be many duplicates which -#should all return the same results. This will gives us a significant -#speedup. -#Hackish way of keeping the original functionality and allowing it -#to easily return a value when in a thread... making an optional -#default argument with a type that is mutable! -@cache -def get_cve_enrichment_new(cve_id): - cve = CVESearch(CVESSEARCH_API_URL) - result = cve.id(cve_id) - cve_enriched = dict() - cve_enriched['id'] = cve_id - cve_enriched['cvss'] = result['cvss'] - cve_enriched['summary'] = result['summary'] - return cve_enriched - -#helper function to easily return a value from a thread that is -#running a memoized/@cached function -def get_cve_enrichment_new_wrapper(cve_id,mutable_list): - mutable_list.append(get_cve_enrichment_new(cve_id)) - - - - - -def get_all_techniques(projects_path): - path_cti = path.join(projects_path,'cti/enterprise-attack') - fs = FileSystemSource(path_cti) - all_techniques = get_techniques(fs) - return all_techniques - -def get_techniques(src): - filt = [Filter('type', '=', 'attack-pattern')] - return src.query(filt) - -def mitre_attack_object(technique, attack): - mitre_attack = dict() - mitre_attack['technique_id'] = technique["external_references"][0]["external_id"] - mitre_attack['technique'] = technique["name"] - - # process tactics - tactics = [] - if 'kill_chain_phases' in technique: - for tactic in technique['kill_chain_phases']: - if tactic['kill_chain_name'] == 'mitre-attack': - tactic = tactic['phase_name'].replace('-', ' ') - tactics.append(tactic.title()) - - mitre_attack['tactic'] = tactics - return mitre_attack - -def get_mitre_enrichment_new(attack, mitre_attack_id): - for technique in attack: - if mitre_attack_id == technique["external_references"][0]["external_id"]: - mitre_attack = mitre_attack_object(technique, attack) - return mitre_attack - return [] - -def generate_doc_stories(REPO_PATH, OUTPUT_DIR, TEMPLATE_PATH, attack, sorted_detections, messages, VERBOSE): - - stories = load_objects(REPO_PATH, 'stories') - sorted_stories = sorted(stories, key=lambda i: i['name']) - - # enrich stories with information from detections: data_models, mitre_ids, kill_chain_phases - sto_to_data_models = {} - sto_to_mitre_attack_ids = {} - sto_to_mitre_attacks = {} - sto_to_kill_chain_phases = {} - sto_to_det = {} - for detection in sorted_detections: - if 'analytic_story' in detection['tags']: - for story in detection['tags']['analytic_story']: - if story in sto_to_det.keys(): - sto_to_det[story]['detections'].append(detection) - else: - sto_to_det[story] = {} - sto_to_det[story]['detections'] = [] - sto_to_det[story]['detections'].append(detection) - - data_model = detection['datamodel'] - if data_model: - for d in data_model: - if story in sto_to_data_models.keys(): - sto_to_data_models[story].add(d) - else: - sto_to_data_models[story] = {d} - - if 'mitre_attack_id' in detection['tags']: - if story in sto_to_mitre_attack_ids.keys(): - for mitre_attack_id in detection['tags']['mitre_attack_id']: - sto_to_mitre_attack_ids[story].add(mitre_attack_id) - else: - sto_to_mitre_attack_ids[story] = set(detection['tags']['mitre_attack_id']) - - if 'kill_chain_phases' in detection['tags']: - if story in sto_to_kill_chain_phases.keys(): - for kill_chain in detection['tags']['kill_chain_phases']: - sto_to_kill_chain_phases[story].add(kill_chain) - else: - sto_to_kill_chain_phases[story] = set(detection['tags']['kill_chain_phases']) - - if 'mitre_attacks' in detection: - sto_to_mitre_attacks[story] = detection['mitre_attacks'] - - # add the enrich objects to the story - for story in sorted_stories: - story['detections'] = sto_to_det[story['name']]['detections'] - if story['name'] in sto_to_data_models: - story['data_models'] = sorted(sto_to_data_models[story['name']]) - if story['name'] in sto_to_mitre_attack_ids: - story['mitre_attack_ids'] = sorted(sto_to_mitre_attack_ids[story['name']]) - if story['name'] in sto_to_mitre_attacks: - story['mitre_attacks'] = sto_to_mitre_attacks[story['name']] - if story['name'] in sto_to_kill_chain_phases: - story['kill_chain_phases'] = sorted(sto_to_kill_chain_phases[story['name']]) - - # sort stories into categories - categories = [] - category_names = set() - for story in sorted_stories: - if 'category' in story['tags']: - category_names.add(story['tags']['category'][0]) - - for category_name in sorted(category_names): - new_category = {} - new_category['name'] = category_name - new_category['stories'] = [] - categories.append(new_category) - - for story in sorted_stories: - for category in categories: - if category['name'] == story['tags']['category'][0]: - category['stories'].append(story) - - j2_env = Environment(loader=FileSystemLoader(TEMPLATE_PATH), # nosemgrep - trim_blocks=False) - - # write detection navigation - # first collect datamodels and tactics - datamodels = [] - tactics = [] - for detection in sorted_detections: - data_model = detection['datamodel'] - if data_model: - for d in data_model: - if d not in datamodels: - datamodels.append(d) - if 'mitre_attacks' in detection: - for attack in detection['mitre_attacks']: - for t in attack['tactic']: - if t not in tactics: - tactics.append(t) - - template = j2_env.get_template('doc_navigation.j2') - output_path = path.join(OUTPUT_DIR + '/_data/navigation.yml') - output = template.render(tactics=sorted(tactics), datamodels=sorted(datamodels), categories=sorted(category_names)) - with open(output_path, 'w', encoding="utf-8") as f: - f.write(output) - messages.append("doc_gen.py wrote navigation.yml structure to: {0}".format(output_path)) - - # write navigation _pages - # for datamodels - template = j2_env.get_template('doc_navigation_pages.j2') - for datamodel in sorted(datamodels): - output_path = path.join(OUTPUT_DIR + '/_pages/' + datamodel.lower().replace(" ", "_") + ".md") - output = template.render(tag=datamodel) - with open(output_path, 'w', encoding="utf-8") as f: - f.write(output) - messages.append("doc_gen.py wrote _page for: {1} structure to: {0}".format(output_path, datamodel)) - # for tactics - for tactic in sorted(tactics): - output_path = path.join(OUTPUT_DIR + '/_pages/' + tactic.lower().replace(" ", "_") + ".md") - output = template.render(tag=tactic) - with open(output_path, 'w', encoding="utf-8") as f: - f.write(output) - messages.append("doc_gen.py wrote _page for: {1} structure to: {0}".format(output_path, tactic)) - - # for story categories - template = j2_env.get_template('doc_navigation_story_pages.j2') - for category in categories: - output_path = path.join(OUTPUT_DIR + '/_pages/' + category['name'].lower().replace(" ", "_") + ".md") - output = template.render(category=category) - with open(output_path, 'w', encoding="utf-8") as f: - f.write(output) - messages.append("doc_gen.py wrote _page for: {0} structure to: {1}".format(category['name'], output_path)) - - # write stories listing markdown - template = j2_env.get_template('doc_story_page.j2') - output_path = path.join(OUTPUT_DIR + '/_pages/stories.md') - output = template.render(stories=sorted_stories) - with open(output_path, 'w', encoding="utf-8") as f: - f.write(output) - messages.append("doc_gen.py wrote _pages for story to: {0}".format(output_path)) - - # write stories markdown - template = j2_env.get_template('doc_stories.j2') - for story in sorted_stories: - file_name = story['name'].lower().replace(" ","_") + '.md' - output_path = path.join(OUTPUT_DIR + '/_stories/' + file_name) - output = template.render(story=story, time=datetime.datetime.now()) - with open(output_path, 'w', encoding="utf-8") as f: - f.write(output) - messages.append("doc_gen.py wrote {0} story documentation in markdown to: {1}".format(len(sorted_stories),OUTPUT_DIR + '/_stories/')) - - return sorted_stories, messages - - -def generate_doc_detections(REPO_PATH, OUTPUT_DIR, TEMPLATE_PATH, attack, messages, VERBOSE): - types = ["endpoint", "application", "cloud", "network", "web", "experimental"] - manifest_files = [] - for t in types: - for root, dirs, files in walk(REPO_PATH + '/detections/' + t): - for file in files: - if file.endswith(".yml"): - manifest_files.append((path.join(root, file))) - - # load lookups and detection objects - lookup_objects = load_objects(REPO_PATH, 'lookups') - lookups = generate_lookup_dict(lookup_objects) - macro_objects = load_objects(REPO_PATH, 'macros') - macros = generate_macro_dict(macro_objects) - - detections = [] - for manifest_file in manifest_files: - detection_yaml = dict() - if VERBOSE: - print("processing manifest {0}".format(manifest_file)) - - with open(manifest_file, 'r') as stream: - try: - object = list(yaml.safe_load_all(stream))[0] - except yaml.YAMLError as exc: - print(exc) - print("Error reading {0}".format(manifest_file)) - sys.exit(1) - detection_yaml = object - - # enrich the mitre object - mitre_attacks = [] - if 'mitre_attack_id' in detection_yaml['tags']: - for mitre_technique_id in detection_yaml['tags']['mitre_attack_id']: - mitre_attack = get_mitre_enrichment_new(attack, mitre_technique_id) - mitre_attacks.append(mitre_attack) - detection_yaml['mitre_attacks'] = mitre_attacks - - # enrich the cve object - cves = [] - if 'cve' in detection_yaml['tags']: - for cve_id in detection_yaml['tags']['cve']: - mutable_list = [] - try: - cve_thread = Thread(target=get_cve_enrichment_new_wrapper, args=(cve_id, mutable_list)) - cve_thread.start() - cve_thread.join(timeout=CVESSEARCH_API_TIMEOUT) - if cve_thread.is_alive(): - raise(Exception(f"Timed out getting CVE Enrichment from {CVESSEARCH_API_URL} after {CVESSEARCH_API_TIMEOUT} seconds.")) - cves.append(mutable_list[0]) - except Exception as e: - print(f"Error - {str(e)}\nQuitting...",file=sys.stderr) - sys.exit(1) - detection_yaml['cve'] = cves - - # enrich with macros - detection_yaml['macros'] = parse_and_add_macros(detection_yaml, macros, lookups) - - # enrich with lookups - detection_lookups = [] - #process lookups in macros first - for macro in detection_yaml['macros']: - if 'lookups' in macro: - for macro_lookup in macro['lookups']: - detection_lookups.append(macro_lookup) - # now any other search lookups - additional_detection_lookups = parse_and_add_lookups(detection_yaml['search'], lookups) - if len(additional_detection_lookups) > 0: - for lookup in additional_detection_lookups: - # skip duplicate lookups - if lookup in detection_lookups: - continue - detection_lookups.append(lookup) - detection_yaml['lookups'] = detection_lookups - detection_yaml['lookups'] = detection_lookups - - # sort macros and lookups - sorted_macros = sorted(detection_yaml['macros'], key=lambda i: i['name']) - detection_yaml['macros'] = sorted_macros - sorted_lookups = sorted(detection_yaml['lookups'], key=lambda i: i['name']) - detection_yaml['lookups'] = sorted_lookups - - # sort macros and lookups - sorted_macros = sorted(detection_yaml['macros'], key=lambda i: i['name']) - detection_yaml['macros'] = sorted_macros - sorted_lookups = sorted(detection_yaml['lookups'], key=lambda i: i['name']) - detection_yaml['lookups'] = sorted_lookups - - # grab the kind - detection_yaml['kind'] = manifest_file.split('/')[-2] - - # check if is experimental, add the flag - if "experimental" == manifest_file.split('/')[2]: - detection_yaml['experimental'] = True - - # skip baselines and Investigation - if detection_yaml['type'] == 'Baseline' or detection_yaml['type'] == 'Investigation': - continue - else: - detections.append(detection_yaml) - - # sort our detections - sorted_detections = sorted(detections, key=lambda i: i['name']) - - j2_env = Environment(loader=FileSystemLoader(TEMPLATE_PATH), - trim_blocks=False, autoescape=True) - - # write markdown - template = j2_env.get_template('doc_detections.j2') - for detection in sorted_detections: - file_name = detection['date'] + "-" + detection['name'].lower().replace(" ","_") + '.md' - output_path = path.join(OUTPUT_DIR + '/_posts/' + file_name) - output = template.render(detection=detection, time=datetime.datetime.now()) - with open(output_path, 'w', encoding="utf-8") as f: - f.write(output) - messages.append("doc_gen.py wrote {0} detections documentation in markdown to: {1}".format(len(sorted_detections),OUTPUT_DIR + '/_posts/')) - - # write markdown detection page - template = j2_env.get_template('doc_detection_page.j2') - output_path = path.join(OUTPUT_DIR + '/_pages/detections.md') - output = template.render(detections=sorted_detections, time=datetime.datetime.now()) - with open(output_path, 'w', encoding="utf-8") as f: - f.write(output) - messages.append("doc_gen.py wrote detections.md page to: {0}".format(output_path)) - - return sorted_detections, messages - -def generate_doc_playbooks(REPO_PATH, OUTPUT_DIR, TEMPLATE_PATH, sorted_detections, messages, VERBOSE): - manifest_files = [] - for root, dirs, files in walk(REPO_PATH + '/playbooks/'): - for file in files: - if file.endswith(".yml"): - manifest_files.append((path.join(root, file))) - - playbooks = [] - for manifest_file in manifest_files: - detection_yaml = dict() - if VERBOSE: - print("processing manifest {0}".format(manifest_file)) - - with open(manifest_file, 'r') as stream: - try: - object = list(yaml.safe_load_all(stream))[0] - except yaml.YAMLError as exc: - print(exc) - print("Error reading {0}".format(manifest_file)) - sys.exit(1) - - playbooks.append(object) - - sorted_playbooks = sorted(playbooks, key=lambda i: i['name']) - - j2_env = Environment(loader=FileSystemLoader(TEMPLATE_PATH), # nosemgrep - trim_blocks=False, autoescape=True) - - # write markdown - template = j2_env.get_template('doc_playbooks.j2') - for playbook in sorted_playbooks: - file_name = playbook['name'].lower().replace(" ","_") + '.md' - output_path = path.join(OUTPUT_DIR + '/_playbooks/' + file_name) - output = template.render(playbook=playbook, detections=sorted_detections, time=datetime.datetime.now()) - with open(output_path, 'w', encoding="utf-8") as f: - f.write(output) - messages.append("doc_gen.py wrote {0} playbook documentation in markdown to: {1}".format(len(sorted_playbooks),OUTPUT_DIR + '/_playbooks/')) - - # write markdown detection page - template = j2_env.get_template('doc_playbooks_page.j2') - output_path = path.join(OUTPUT_DIR + '/_pages/playbooks.md') - output = template.render(playbooks=sorted_playbooks, detections=sorted_detections, time=datetime.datetime.now()) - with open(output_path, 'w', encoding="utf-8") as f: - f.write(output) - messages.append("doc_gen.py wrote playbooks.md page to: {0}".format(output_path)) - - return sorted_playbooks, messages - - -def generate_doc_index(OUTPUT_DIR, TEMPLATE_PATH, sorted_detections, sorted_stories, sorted_playbooks, messages, VERBOSE): - - j2_env = Environment(loader=FileSystemLoader(TEMPLATE_PATH), # nosemgrep - trim_blocks=False, autoescape=True) - - # write index updated metrics - template = j2_env.get_template('doc_index.j2') - output_path = path.join(OUTPUT_DIR + '/index.markdown') - output = template.render(detection_count=len(sorted_detections), story_count=len(sorted_stories), playbook_count=len(sorted_playbooks)) - with open(output_path, 'w', encoding="utf-8") as f: - f.write(output) - messages.append("doc_gen.py wrote site index page to: {0}".format(output_path)) - - return messages - -if __name__ == "__main__": - - # grab arguments - parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Generates documentation from Splunk Security Content", epilog=""" - This generates documention in the form of jekyll site research.splunk.com from Splunk Security Content yamls. """) - parser.add_argument("-p", "--path", required=True, help="path to security_content repo") - parser.add_argument("-o", "--output", required=True, help="path to the output directory for the docs") - parser.add_argument("-v", "--verbose", required=False, default=False, action='store_true', help="prints verbose output") - - - # parse themgit stat - args = parser.parse_args() - REPO_PATH = args.path - OUTPUT_DIR = args.output - VERBOSE = args.verbose - - TEMPLATE_PATH = path.join(REPO_PATH, 'bin/jinja2_templates') - - if VERBOSE: - print("getting mitre enrichment data from cti") - techniques = get_all_techniques(REPO_PATH) - - if VERBOSE: - print("wiping the {0}/_posts/* folder".format(OUTPUT_DIR)) - - try: - for root, dirs, files in walk(OUTPUT_DIR + '/_posts/'): - for file in files: - if file.endswith(".md"): - remove(OUTPUT_DIR + '/_posts/' + file) - except OSError as e: - print("error: %s : %s" % (file, e.strerror)) - sys.exit(1) - - messages = [] - sorted_detections, messages = generate_doc_detections(REPO_PATH, OUTPUT_DIR, TEMPLATE_PATH, techniques, messages, VERBOSE) - sorted_stories, messages = generate_doc_stories(REPO_PATH, OUTPUT_DIR, TEMPLATE_PATH, techniques, sorted_detections, messages, VERBOSE) - sorted_playbooks, messages = generate_doc_playbooks(REPO_PATH, OUTPUT_DIR, TEMPLATE_PATH, sorted_detections, messages, VERBOSE) - messages = generate_doc_index(OUTPUT_DIR, TEMPLATE_PATH, sorted_detections, sorted_stories, sorted_playbooks, messages, VERBOSE) - - # print all the messages from generation - for m in messages: - print(m) - print("finished successfully!") diff --git a/bin/generate-coverage-map.py b/bin/generate-coverage-map.py deleted file mode 100644 index dc0db71161..0000000000 --- a/bin/generate-coverage-map.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,221 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/python - -import sys -import argparse -import json -import glob -import yaml -import os -import csv -from os import path -from stix2 import FileSystemSource -from stix2 import Filter - -VERSION = "4.2" -NAME = "Detection Coverage" -DESCRIPTION = "security_content detection coverage" -DOMAIN = "mitre-enterprise" - -def main(argv): - - # parse input variables - parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description='Detection Coverage') - parser.add_argument('-p', '--projects_path', default='.', action='store', metavar='N', help='folder containing the projects Mitre Cyber Threat Intelligence Repository, Security Content and Sigma') - parser.add_argument('-o', '--output', default='output', action='store', help='result output directory, defaults to output') - cmdargs = parser.parse_args() - - print("get all techniques") - techniques = get_all_techniques(cmdargs.projects_path) - - print("load detections") - detections = [] - detections = load_objects(path.join(cmdargs.projects_path),'detections/*/*.yml') - - print("get matched techniques") - matched_techniques = get_matched_techniques(techniques, detections) - - print("score detections") - scored_techniques, max_count = count_detections(matched_techniques) - - print("generate navigator layer") - generate_navigator_layer(scored_techniques, max_count, cmdargs.output) - - print("generate csv file") - generate_csv_file(scored_techniques, cmdargs.output) - - -def count_detections(matched_techniques): - scored_detections = [] - final_scored_detections = [] - max_count = 0 - - for technique in matched_techniques: - if "splunk_rules" in technique: - technique['score'] = len(technique['splunk_rules']) - max_count = technique['score'] if technique['score'] > max_count else max_count - scored_detections.append(technique) - - for technique in matched_techniques: - if "." in technique['ID']: - parent_id = technique['ID'].split(".")[0] - for scored in scored_detections: - if parent_id == scored['ID']: - scored['score'] += len(technique['splunk_rules']) - final_scored_detections.append(scored) - - return final_scored_detections, max_count - - -def get_all_techniques(projects_path): - path_cti = path.join(projects_path,'cti/enterprise-attack') - fs = FileSystemSource(path_cti) - all_techniques = get_techniques(fs) - return all_techniques - - -def get_techniques(src): - filt = [Filter('type', '=', 'attack-pattern')] - return src.query(filt) - - - -def get_matched_techniques(counted_techniques, detections): - matched_techniques = [] - - for technique in counted_techniques: - matched_splunk_detections = [] - - # find detections from Splunks security content - # https://github.com/splunk/security_content - for detection in detections: - if 'mitre_attack_id' in detection['object']['tags']: - for mitreid in detection['object']['tags']['mitre_attack_id']: - if mitreid == technique["external_references"][0]["external_id"]: - matched_splunk_detections.append(detection) - - matched_techniques.append({ - "ID": technique["external_references"][0]["external_id"], - "splunk_rules": matched_splunk_detections, - }) - return matched_techniques - - -def generate_navigator_layer(matched_techniques, max_count, output): - - # Base ATT&CK Navigator layer - layer_json = { - "version": VERSION, - "name": NAME, - "description": DESCRIPTION, - "domain": DOMAIN, - "techniques": [] - } - - for technique in matched_techniques: - comments = [] - if len(technique["splunk_rules"]) > 0: - for splunk_rule in technique["splunk_rules"]: - comments.append("https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/" + splunk_rule['filename']) - layer_technique = { - "techniqueID": technique["ID"], - "score" : technique["score"] - - } - else: - layer_technique = {} - if len(comments) > 0: - layer_technique["comment"] = "\n\n".join(comments) - - layer_json["techniques"].append(layer_technique) - - # add a color gradient (white -> red) to layer - # ranging from zero (white) to the maximum score in the file (red) - layer_json["gradient"] = { - "colors": [ - "#ffffff", - "#66b1ff", - "#096ed7" - ], - "minValue": 0, - "maxValue": max_count - } - - layer_json["filters"] = { - "platforms": - ["Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "AWS", - "GCP", - "Azure", - "Office 365", - "SaaS" - ] - } - - layer_json["legendItems"] = [ - { - "label": "NO available detections", - "color": "#ffffff" - }, - { - "label": "Some detections available", - "color": "#66b1ff" - } - ] - - layer_json['showTacticRowBackground'] = True - layer_json['tacticRowBackground'] = "#dddddd" - layer_json["sorting"] = 3 - - # output JSON - with open(output + '/coverage.json', 'w') as f: - json.dump(layer_json, f, indent=4) - -# print("Mitre ATT&CK Navigator overlay was successfully written to output/detections.json") - - -def generate_csv_file(matched_techniques, output): - - security_content_url = 'https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/' - - with open(output + '/coverage.csv', 'w') as f: - writer = csv.writer(f, quoting=csv.QUOTE_ALL) - writer.writerow(['Technique ID', 'Detection Available', 'Link', 'score']) - - for technique in matched_techniques: - if len(technique['splunk_rules']) > 0: - for splunk_rule in technique["splunk_rules"]: - writer.writerow([technique["ID"], "Yes", \ - security_content_url + splunk_rule["filename"], technique['score']]) - else: - writer.writerow([technique["ID"], "No", \ - "-", technique['score']]) -# print("Recommended detections were successfully written to output/detections.csv") - - -def load_objects(security_content_path, file_path): - files = [] - detection_files = path.join(path.expanduser(security_content_path), file_path) - - for file in glob.glob(detection_files): - file_name = file.replace('./detections/', '') - files.append({ - "filename": file_name, - "object": load_file(file) - }) - - return files - - -def load_file(file_path): - with open(file_path, 'r') as stream: - try: - file = list(yaml.safe_load_all(stream))[0] - except yaml.YAMLError as exc: -# print(exc) - sys.exit("ERROR: reading {0}".format(file_path)) - return file - -if __name__ == "__main__": - main(sys.argv) diff --git a/bin/generate.py b/bin/generate.py deleted file mode 100644 index 6e91a8be2a..0000000000 --- a/bin/generate.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,788 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/python - -''' -Generates splunk configurations from manifest files under the security_content repo. -''' - -import glob -import yaml -import argparse -from os import path -import sys -import datetime -from jinja2 import Environment, FileSystemLoader -import re -from attackcti import attack_client -import csv -import shutil -from yaml_to_json import Yaml2Json -import os -import json - - -# Global variable -global_product = 'ESCU' - - -def load_objects(file_path, VERBOSE, REPO_PATH): - files = [] - manifest_files = path.join(path.expanduser(REPO_PATH), file_path) - for file in sorted(glob.glob(manifest_files)): - if VERBOSE: - print("processing manifest: {0}".format(file)) - files.append(load_file(file)) - return files - -def process_deprecated(file,file_path): - DESCRIPTION_ANNOTATION = "WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. " - if 'deprecated' in file_path: - file['deprecated'] = True - file['description'] = DESCRIPTION_ANNOTATION + file['description'] - return file - -def process_experimental(file,file_path): - DESCRIPTION_ANNOTATION = "WARNING, this is a experimental detection, Splunk Threat Research has not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is NOT supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. " - if 'experimental' in file_path: - file['experimental'] = True - file['experimental'] = DESCRIPTION_ANNOTATION + file['description'] - return file - -def load_file(file_path): - with open(file_path, 'r', encoding="utf-8") as stream: - try: - file = list(yaml.safe_load_all(stream))[0] - - # mark any files that have been deprecated - file = process_deprecated(file,file_path) - file = process_experimental(file,file_path) - - except yaml.YAMLError as exc: - print(exc) - sys.exit("ERROR: reading {0}".format(file_path)) - return file - -def generate_lookup_files(lookups, TEMPLATE_PATH, OUTPUT_PATH,REPO_PATH): - sorted_lookups = sorted(lookups, key=lambda i: i['name']) - utc_time = datetime.datetime.utcnow().replace(microsecond=0).isoformat() - for i in sorted_lookups: - for k,v in i.items(): - if k == 'filename': - lookup_file = REPO_PATH +'/lookups/'+ v - dist_lookup_dir = OUTPUT_PATH +'/lookups' - shutil.copy(lookup_file,dist_lookup_dir) - return sorted_lookups - -def generate_transforms_conf(lookups, TEMPLATE_PATH, OUTPUT_PATH): - sorted_lookups = sorted(lookups, key=lambda i: i['name']) - - utc_time = datetime.datetime.utcnow().replace(microsecond=0).isoformat() - - j2_env = Environment(loader=FileSystemLoader(TEMPLATE_PATH), # nosemgrep - trim_blocks=True) - template = j2_env.get_template('transforms.j2') - output_path = path.join(OUTPUT_PATH, 'default/transforms.conf') - output = template.render(lookups=sorted_lookups, time=utc_time) - with open(output_path, 'w', encoding="utf-8") as f: - f.write(output) - - return output_path - -def generate_collections_conf(lookups, TEMPLATE_PATH, OUTPUT_PATH): - filtered_lookups = list(filter(lambda i: 'collection' in i, lookups)) - sorted_lookups = sorted(filtered_lookups, key=lambda i: i['name']) - - utc_time = datetime.datetime.utcnow().replace(microsecond=0).isoformat() - - j2_env = Environment(loader=FileSystemLoader(TEMPLATE_PATH), # nosemgrep - trim_blocks=True) - template = j2_env.get_template('collections.j2') - output_path = path.join(OUTPUT_PATH, 'default/collections.conf') - output = template.render(lookups=sorted_lookups, time=utc_time) - with open(output_path, 'w', encoding="utf-8") as f: - f.write(output) - - return output_path - -def generate_ssa_yaml(detections, TEMPLATE_PATH, OUTPUT_PATH): - ''' - @param detections: input list of individual YAML detections in detections/ directory - @return: the enhanced yaml file located in /detections directory - ''' - - # disable yaml pointers https://stackoverflow.com/questions/51272814/python-yaml-dumping-pointer-references - yaml.Dumper.ignore_aliases = lambda *args : True - - # wiping old detections for SSA - shutil.rmtree(OUTPUT_PATH + '/srs/', ignore_errors=True) - shutil.rmtree(OUTPUT_PATH + '/complex/', ignore_errors=True) - os.makedirs(OUTPUT_PATH + '/complex/') - os.makedirs(OUTPUT_PATH + '/srs/') - - for d in detections: - # skip deprecated - if ('deprecated' in d and d['deprecated']) or ('experimental' in d and d['experimental']): - continue - else: - # check if the search contains "stats", "first_time_event", or "adaptive_threshold" which would make it a complex pipeline - pattern = re.compile('stats|first_time_event|adaptive_threshold|conditional_anomaly') - - if re.findall("stats|first_time_event|adaptive_threshold", d['search']): - # it is a complex pipeline - manifest_file = OUTPUT_PATH + '/complex/ssa___' + d['name'].lower().replace(" ", "_") + '.yml' - else: - # it is a simple pipeline can be placed on SRS (Simple Rule Service) - manifest_file = OUTPUT_PATH + '/srs/ssa___' + d['name'].lower().replace(" ", "_") + '.yml' - - # remove unused fields - del d['risk'] - del d['deployment'] - del d['mappings'] - del d['savedsearch_annotations'] - - # add detection test - test_file = 'ssa___' + d['name'].lower().replace(" ", "_").replace("-", "_") + '.test.yml' - for file in glob.glob('tests/*/*'): - - if test_file == file.split("/")[-1]: - with open(file, 'r') as file: - test_yaml = yaml.safe_load(file) - d['test'] = test_yaml - - with open(manifest_file, 'w') as file: - - documents = yaml.dump(d, file, sort_keys=True) - - return OUTPUT_PATH - -def generate_savedsearches_conf(detections, deployments, TEMPLATE_PATH, OUTPUT_PATH): - ''' - @param detections: input list of individual YAML detections in detections/ directory - @param deployments: - @return: the savedsearches.conf file located in package/default/ - ''' - - utc_time = datetime.datetime.utcnow().replace(microsecond=0).isoformat() - - j2_env = Environment(loader=FileSystemLoader(TEMPLATE_PATH), # nosemgrep - trim_blocks=True) - j2_env.filters['custom_jinja2_enrichment_filter'] = custom_jinja2_enrichment_filter - template = j2_env.get_template('savedsearches.j2') - output_path = path.join(OUTPUT_PATH, 'default/savedsearches.conf') - output = template.render(detections=detections, time=utc_time) - with open(output_path, 'w') as f: - output = output.encode('utf-8', 'ignore').decode('utf-8') - f.write(output) - - return output_path - -def generate_use_case_library_conf(stories, detections, TEMPLATE_PATH, OUTPUT_PATH): - utc_time = datetime.datetime.utcnow().replace(microsecond=0).isoformat() - - j2_env = Environment(loader=FileSystemLoader(TEMPLATE_PATH), # nosemgrep - trim_blocks=True) - template = j2_env.get_template('analyticstories.j2') - output_path = path.join(OUTPUT_PATH, 'default/analyticstories.conf') - output = template.render(stories=stories, detections=detections, - time=utc_time) - with open(output_path, 'w', encoding="utf-8") as f: - f.write(output) - - return output_path - -def generate_macros_conf(macros, detections, TEMPLATE_PATH, OUTPUT_PATH): - filter_macros = [] - for detection in detections: - new_dict = {} - new_dict['definition'] = 'search *' - new_dict['description'] = 'Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ' - new_dict['name'] = detection['name']. \ - replace(' ', '_').replace('-', '_').replace('.', '_').replace('/', '_').lower() + '_filter' - filter_macros.append(new_dict) - - all_macros = macros + filter_macros - - utc_time = datetime.datetime.utcnow().replace(microsecond=0).isoformat() - - j2_env = Environment(loader=FileSystemLoader(TEMPLATE_PATH), # nosemgrep - trim_blocks=True) - template = j2_env.get_template('macros.j2') - output_path = path.join(OUTPUT_PATH, 'default/macros.conf') - output = template.render(macros=all_macros, time=utc_time) - with open(output_path, 'w', encoding="utf-8") as f: - f.write(output) - - return output_path - -def generate_workbench_panels(response_tasks, stories, TEMPLATE_PATH, OUTPUT_PATH): - workbench_panel_objects = [] - for response_task in response_tasks: - if response_task['type'] == 'Investigation': - if 'search' in response_task: - if 'inputs' in response_task: - response_file_name = response_task['name'].replace(' ', '_').replace('-','_').replace('.','_').replace('/','_').lower() - response_file_name_xml = response_file_name + "___response_task.xml" - response_task['lowercase_name'] = response_file_name - workbench_panel_objects.append(response_task) - j2_env = Environment(loader=FileSystemLoader(TEMPLATE_PATH), # nosemgrep - trim_blocks=True) - template = j2_env.get_template('panel.j2') - file_path = "default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_" + response_file_name_xml - output_path = path.join(OUTPUT_PATH, file_path) - response_task['search']= response_task['search'].replace(">",">") - response_task['search']= response_task['search'].replace("<","<") - - output = template.render(search=response_task['search']) - with open(output_path, 'w') as f: - f.write(output) - - j2_env = Environment(loader=FileSystemLoader(TEMPLATE_PATH), # nosemgrep - trim_blocks=True) - template = j2_env.get_template('es_investigations.j2') - output_path = path.join(OUTPUT_PATH, 'default/es_investigations.conf') - output = template.render(response_tasks=workbench_panel_objects, stories=stories) - with open(output_path, 'w', encoding="utf-8") as f: - f.write(output) - j2_env = Environment(loader=FileSystemLoader(TEMPLATE_PATH), # nosemgrep - trim_blocks=True) - template = j2_env.get_template('workflow_actions.j2') - output_path = path.join(OUTPUT_PATH, 'default/workflow_actions.conf') - output = template.render(response_tasks=workbench_panel_objects) - with open(output_path, 'w', encoding="utf-8") as f: - f.write(output) - - return workbench_panel_objects - -def parse_data_models_from_search(search): - match = re.search(r'from\sdatamodel\s?=\s?([^\s.]*)', search) - if match is not None: - return match.group(1) - return False - -def parse_author_company(story): - match_author = re.search(r'^([^,]+)', story['author']) - if match_author is None: - match_author = 'no' - else: - match_author = match_author.group(1) - - match_company = re.search(r',\s?(.*)$', story['author']) - if match_company is None: - match_company = 'no' - else: - match_company = match_company.group(1) - - return match_author, match_company - -def get_deployments(object, deployments): - matched_deployments = [] - - for deployment in deployments: - - for tag in object['tags'].keys(): - - if tag in deployment['tags'].keys(): - if type(object['tags'][tag]) is str: - tag_array = [object['tags'][tag]] - else: - tag_array = object['tags'][tag] - - for tag_value in tag_array: - if type(deployment['tags'][tag]) is str: - tag_array_deployment = [deployment['tags'][tag]] - else: - tag_array_deployment = deployment['tags'][tag] - - for tag_value_deployment in tag_array_deployment: - if tag_value == tag_value_deployment: - matched_deployments.append(deployment) - continue - - # grab default for all stories if deployment not set - if len(matched_deployments) == 0: - for deployment in deployments: - if 'analytic_story' in deployment['tags']: - if deployment['tags']['analytic_story'] == 'all': - last_deployment = deployment - else: - last_deployment = matched_deployments[-1] - - return last_deployment - -def get_nes_fields(search, deployment): - nes_fields_matches = [] - if 'alert_action' in deployment: - if 'notable' in deployment['alert_action']: - if 'nes_fields' in deployment['alert_action']['notable']: - for field in deployment['alert_action']['notable']['nes_fields']: - if (search.find(field + ' ') != -1): - nes_fields_matches.append(field) - - return nes_fields_matches - - -def map_response_tasks_to_stories(response_tasks): - sto_res = {} - for response_task in response_tasks: - if response_task['type'] == 'Investigation': - if 'tags' in response_task: - if 'analytic_story' in response_task['tags']: - for story in response_task['tags']['analytic_story']: - if 'type' in response_task.keys(): - if response_task['type'] == 'Investigation': - task_name = str('ESCU - ' + response_task['name'] + ' - Response Task') - else: - task_name = str('ESCU - ' + response_task['name'] + ' - Response Task') - if not (story in sto_res): - sto_res[story] = {task_name} - else: - sto_res[story].add(task_name) - return sto_res - -def map_baselines_to_stories(baselines): - sto_bas = {} - for baseline in baselines: - if 'tags' in baseline: - if 'analytic_story' in baseline['tags']: - for story in baseline['tags']['analytic_story']: - if 'Splunk Behavioral Analytics' in baseline['tags']['product']: - continue - baseline_name = str('ESCU - ' + baseline['name']) - if not (story in sto_bas): - sto_bas[story] = {baseline_name} - else: - sto_bas[story].add(baseline_name) - return sto_bas - -def custom_jinja2_enrichment_filter(string, object): - customized_string = string - for key in object.keys(): - [key.encode('utf-8') for key in object] - customized_string = customized_string.replace("%" + key + "%", str(object[key])) - - for key in object['tags'].keys(): - customized_string = customized_string.replace("%" + key + "%", str(object['tags'][key])) - - return customized_string - -def add_annotations(detection): - # used for upstream processing of risk scoring annotations in ECSU - # this is not currently compatible with newer instances of ESCU (6.3.0+) - # we are duplicating the code block above for now and just changing variable names to make future - # changes to this data structure separate from the mappings generation - # @todo expose the JSON data structure for newer risk type - - annotation_keys = ['mitre_attack', 'kill_chain_phases', 'cis20', 'nist', 'analytic_story', 'observable', 'context', 'impact', 'confidence', 'cve'] - savedsearch_annotations = {} - for key in annotation_keys: - if key == 'mitre_attack': - if 'mitre_attack_id' in detection['tags']: - savedsearch_annotations[key] = detection['tags']['mitre_attack_id'] - else: - if key in detection['tags']: - savedsearch_annotations[key] = detection['tags'][key] - detection['savedsearch_annotations'] = savedsearch_annotations - - # add SSA risk_severity - if 'risk_score' in detection['tags']: - if detection['tags']['risk_score'] >= 80: - detection['tags']['risk_severity'] = 'high' - elif( detection['tags']['risk_score'] >= 50 and detection['tags']['risk_score'] <= 79): - detection['tags']['risk_severity'] = 'medium' - else: - detection['tags']['risk_severity'] = 'low' - return detection - -def add_rba(detection): - - # grab risk message - if 'message' in detection['tags']: - detection['risk_message'] = detection['tags']['message'] - - risk_objects = [] - risk_object_user_types = {'user', 'username', 'email address'} - risk_object_system_types = {'device', 'endpoint', 'hostname', 'ip address'} - if 'observable' in detection['tags'] and 'risk_score' in detection['tags']: - - # go through each obervable - for entity in detection['tags']['observable']: - - risk_object = dict() - - # determine if is a user type, create risk - if entity['type'].lower() in risk_object_user_types: - - for r in entity['role']: - if 'attacker' == r.lower() or 'victim' ==r.lower(): - - risk_object['risk_object_type'] = 'user' - risk_object['risk_object_field'] = entity['name'] - risk_object['risk_score'] = detection['tags']['risk_score'] - - risk_objects.append(risk_object) - - # determine if is a system type, create risk - elif entity['type'].lower() in risk_object_system_types: - - for r in entity['role']: - if 'attacker' == r.lower() or 'victim' ==r.lower(): - - risk_object['risk_object_type'] = 'system' - risk_object['risk_object_field'] = entity['name'] - risk_object['risk_score'] = detection['tags']['risk_score'] - risk_objects.append(risk_object) - - # if is not a system or user, it is a threat object - else: - risk_object['threat_object_field'] = entity['name'] - risk_object['threat_object_type'] = entity['type'].lower() - risk_objects.append(risk_object) - continue - - detection['risk'] = risk_objects - - return detection - -def add_playbook(detection, playbooks): - preface = " The following Splunk SOAR playbook can be used to respond to this detection: " - - for playbook in playbooks: - try: - if detection['name'] in playbook['tags']['detections']: - detection['how_to_implement'] = detection['how_to_implement'] + preface + playbook['name'] - except KeyError: - pass - return detection - -def map_playbooks_to_stories(playbooks): - sto_play = {} - for playbook in playbooks: - if 'tags' in playbook: - if 'analytic_story' in playbook['tags']: - for story in playbook['tags']['analytic_story']: - if not (story in sto_play): - sto_play[story] = {playbook['name']} - else: - sto_play[story].add(playbook['name']) - return sto_play - -def prepare_detections(detections, deployments, playbooks, OUTPUT_PATH): - for detection in detections: - # only for DevSecOps - if global_product == 'DevSecOps': - if detection['tags']['risk_score']: - detection['search'] = detection['search'] + ' | eval risk_score=' + str(detection['tags']['risk_score']) - - if detection['tags']['mitre_attack_id']: - detection['search'] = detection['search'] + ' | eval mitre_attack_id=' + detection['tags']['mitre_attack_id'][0] - - if detection['type'] == 'Anomaly': - detection['search'] = detection['search'] + ' | collect index=signals' - elif detection['type'] == 'TTP': - detection['search'] = detection['search'] + ' | collect index=alerts' - elif detection['type'] == 'Correlation': - detection['search'] = detection['search'] + ' | collect index=alerts' - - # parse out data_models - data_model = parse_data_models_from_search(detection['search']) - if data_model: - detection['data_model'] = data_model - - if detection['type'] != 'Investigation': - matched_deployment = get_deployments(detection, deployments) - detection['deployment'] = matched_deployment - nes_fields = get_nes_fields(detection['search'], detection['deployment']) - if len(nes_fields) > 0: - detection['nes_fields'] = nes_fields - - keys = ['mitre_attack', 'kill_chain_phases', 'cis20', 'nist'] - mappings = {} - for key in keys: - if key == 'mitre_attack': - if 'mitre_attack_id' in detection['tags']: - mappings[key] = detection['tags']['mitre_attack_id'] - else: - if key in detection['tags']: - mappings[key] = detection['tags'][key] - detection['mappings'] = mappings - - detection = add_annotations(detection) - detection = add_rba(detection) - detection = add_playbook(detection, playbooks) - - # add additional metadata - if 'product' in detection['tags']: - detection['product'] = detection['tags']['product'] - - # enable all SAAWS detections - if (OUTPUT_PATH) == 'dist/saaws': - detection['disabled'] = 'false' - - return detections - -def prepare_stories(stories, detections, playbooks): - # enrich stories with information from detections: data_models, mitre_ids, kill_chain_phases, nists - sto_to_data_models = {} - sto_to_mitre_attack_ids = {} - sto_to_kill_chain_phases = {} - sto_to_ciss = {} - sto_to_nists = {} - sto_to_det = {} - - preface = " /n**SOAR:** The following Splunk SOAR playbooks can be used in the response to this story's analytics: " - baselines = [object for object in detections if 'Baseline' in object['type']] - - for detection in detections: - if detection['type'] == 'Baseline': - rule_name = str('ESCU - ' + detection['name']) - continue - if 'analytic_story' in detection['tags']: - for story in detection['tags']['analytic_story']: - if detection['type'] != "Investigation": - rule_name = str('ESCU - ' + detection['name'] + ' - Rule') - - if story in sto_to_det.keys(): - sto_to_det[story].add(rule_name) - else: - sto_to_det[story] = {rule_name} - - data_model = parse_data_models_from_search(detection['search']) - if data_model: - if story in sto_to_data_models.keys(): - sto_to_data_models[story].add(data_model) - else: - sto_to_data_models[story] = {data_model} - - if 'mitre_attack_id' in detection['tags']: - if story in sto_to_mitre_attack_ids.keys(): - for mitre_attack_id in detection['tags']['mitre_attack_id']: - sto_to_mitre_attack_ids[story].add(mitre_attack_id) - else: - sto_to_mitre_attack_ids[story] = set(detection['tags']['mitre_attack_id']) - - if 'kill_chain_phases' in detection['tags']: - if story in sto_to_kill_chain_phases.keys(): - for kill_chain in detection['tags']['kill_chain_phases']: - sto_to_kill_chain_phases[story].add(kill_chain) - else: - sto_to_kill_chain_phases[story] = set(detection['tags']['kill_chain_phases']) - - if 'cis20' in detection['tags']: - if story in sto_to_ciss.keys(): - for cis in detection['tags']['cis20']: - sto_to_ciss[story].add(cis) - else: - sto_to_ciss[story] = set(detection['tags']['cis20']) - - if 'nist' in detection['tags']: - if story in sto_to_nists.keys(): - for nist in detection['tags']['nist']: - sto_to_nists[story].add(nist) - else: - sto_to_nists[story] = set(detection['tags']['nist']) - - sto_res = map_response_tasks_to_stories(detections) - sto_bas = map_baselines_to_stories(baselines) - sto_play = map_playbooks_to_stories(playbooks) - - for story in stories: - story['author_name'], story['author_company'] = parse_author_company(story) - story['lowercase_name'] = story['name'].replace(' ', '_').replace('-','_').replace('.','_').replace('/','_').lower() - story['detections'] = sorted(sto_to_det[story['name']]) - story['searches'] = story['detections'] - if story['name'] in sto_to_data_models: - story['data_models'] = sorted(sto_to_data_models[story['name']]) - if story['name'] in sto_play: - story['description'] = str(story['description']) + preface + str(sto_play[story['name']]) - story['description'] = story['description'].replace('{', ' ').replace('}', ' ') - if story['name'] in sto_to_mitre_attack_ids: - story['mitre_attack'] = sorted(sto_to_mitre_attack_ids[story['name']]) - if story['name'] in sto_to_kill_chain_phases: - story['kill_chain_phases'] = sorted(sto_to_kill_chain_phases[story['name']]) - if story['name'] in sto_to_ciss: - story['cis20'] = sorted(sto_to_ciss[story['name']]) - if story['name'] in sto_to_nists: - story['nist'] = sorted(sto_to_nists[story['name']]) - if story['name'] in sto_res: - story['response_tasks'] = sorted(list(sto_res[story['name']])) - story['searches'] = story['searches'] + story['response_tasks'] - story['workbench_panels'] = [] - for response_task_name in story['response_tasks']: - s = 'panel://workbench_panel_' + response_task_name[7:].replace(' ', '_').replace('-','_').replace('.','_').replace('/','_').lower() - story['workbench_panels'].append(s) - if story['name'] in sto_bas: - story['baselines'] = sorted(list(sto_bas[story['name']])) - - - - keys = ['mitre_attack', 'kill_chain_phases', 'cis20', 'nist'] - mappings = {} - for key in keys: - if key in story: - mappings[key] = story[key] - - story['mappings'] = mappings - - return stories - -def generate_mitre_lookup(OUTPUT_PATH): - - csv_mitre_rows = [["mitre_id", "technique", "tactics", "groups"]] - - lift = attack_client() - all_enterprise = lift.get_enterprise(stix_format=False) - enterprise_relationships = lift.get_enterprise_relationships() - enterprise_groups = lift.get_enterprise_groups() - - for technique in all_enterprise['techniques']: - apt_groups = [] - for relationship in enterprise_relationships: - if (relationship['target_ref'] == technique['id']) and relationship['source_ref'].startswith('intrusion-set'): - for group in enterprise_groups: - if relationship['source_ref'] == group['id']: - apt_groups.append(group['name']) - - if not ('revoked' in technique): - if len(apt_groups) == 0: - apt_groups.append('no') - csv_mitre_rows.append([technique['technique_id'], technique['technique'], '|'.join(technique['tactic']).replace('-',' ').title(), '|'.join(apt_groups)]) - - with open(path.join(OUTPUT_PATH, 'lookups/mitre_enrichment.csv'), 'w', newline='', encoding="utf-8") as file: - writer = csv.writer(file,quoting=csv.QUOTE_ALL) - writer.writerows(csv_mitre_rows) - - -def import_objects(VERBOSE, REPO_PATH): - objects = { - "stories": load_objects("stories/*.yml", VERBOSE, REPO_PATH), - "macros": load_objects("macros/*.yml", VERBOSE, REPO_PATH), - "lookups": load_objects("lookups/*.yml", VERBOSE, REPO_PATH), - "responses": load_objects("responses/*.yml", VERBOSE, REPO_PATH), - "deployments": load_objects("deployments/*.yml", VERBOSE, REPO_PATH), - "detections": load_objects("detections/*/*.yml", VERBOSE, REPO_PATH), - "playbooks": load_objects("playbooks/*.yml", VERBOSE, REPO_PATH), - } - objects["detections"].extend(load_objects("detections/*/*/*.yml", VERBOSE, REPO_PATH)) - - return objects - -def compute_objects(objects, PRODUCT, OUTPUT_PATH): - if PRODUCT == "SAAWS": - objects["detections"] = [object for object in objects["detections"] if 'Splunk Security Analytics for AWS' in object['tags']['product']] - objects["stories"] = [object for object in objects["stories"] if 'Splunk Security Analytics for AWS' in object['tags']['product']] - - if PRODUCT == "DevSecOps": - objects["detections"] = [object for object in objects["detections"] if 'Dev Sec Ops Analytics' in object['tags']['product']] - objects["stories"] = [object for object in objects["stories"] if 'Dev Sec Ops Analytics' in object['tags']['product']] - - if PRODUCT == "ESCU": - # only use ESCU detections to the configurations - objects["detections"] = sorted(filter(lambda d: not 'Splunk Behavioral Analytics' in d['tags']['product'], objects["detections"]), key=lambda d: d['name']) - objects["stories"] = sorted(filter(lambda s: not 'Splunk Behavioral Analytics' in s['tags']['product'], objects["stories"]), key=lambda s: s['name']) - - if PRODUCT == "SSA": - # only SSA detections, also no need to calculate stories - objects["detections"] = sorted(filter(lambda d: 'Splunk Behavioral Analytics' in d['tags']['product'], objects["detections"]), key=lambda d: d['name']) - objects["stories"] = sorted(filter(lambda s: 'Splunk Behavioral Analytics' in s['tags']['product'], objects["stories"]), key=lambda s: s['name']) - - objects["macros"] = sorted(objects["macros"], key=lambda m: m['name']) - objects["detections"] = prepare_detections(objects["detections"], objects["deployments"], objects["playbooks"], OUTPUT_PATH) - objects["stories"] = prepare_stories(objects["stories"], objects["detections"], objects["playbooks"]) - - return objects - -def get_objects(REPO_PATH, OUTPUT_PATH, PRODUCT, VERBOSE): - objects = import_objects(VERBOSE, REPO_PATH) - objects = compute_objects(objects, PRODUCT, OUTPUT_PATH) - return objects - -def main(REPO_PATH, OUTPUT_PATH, PRODUCT, VERBOSE): - global global_product - global_product = PRODUCT - - TEMPLATE_PATH = path.join(REPO_PATH, 'bin/jinja2_templates') - - objects = get_objects(REPO_PATH, OUTPUT_PATH, PRODUCT, VERBOSE) - - try: - if VERBOSE: - print("generating Mitre lookups") - # generate_mitre_lookup(OUTPUT_PATH) - except Exception as e: - print('Error: ' + str(e)) - print("WARNING: Generation of Mitre lookup failed.") - - # calculate deprecation totals - deprecated = [] - for d in objects['detections']: - if 'deprecated' in d: - deprecated.append(d) - - detection_path = '' - lookups_path = '' - lookups_files= '' - use_case_lib_path = '' - macros_path = '' - workbench_panels_objects = '' - - if global_product == 'SSA': - detection_path = generate_ssa_yaml(objects["detections"], TEMPLATE_PATH, OUTPUT_PATH) - objects["macros"] = [] - - elif global_product == 'API': - json_types = [] - # List of all YAML types to search in repo - yml_types = ['detections', 'baselines', 'lookups', 'macros', 'response_tasks', 'responses', 'stories', 'deployments'] - # output directory name will be same as this filename - output_dir = OUTPUT_PATH - if VERBOSE: print("JSON output directory: " + output_dir) - # remove any pre-existing output directories - shutil.rmtree(output_dir, ignore_errors=True) - if VERBOSE: print("remove pre-existing JSON directory") - # create output directory - os.mkdir(output_dir) - if VERBOSE: print("created output directory") - # Generate all YAML types - for yt in yml_types: - processor = Yaml2Json(yt, REPO_PATH) - with open(os.path.join(output_dir, yt + '.json'), 'w') as json_out: - # write out YAML type - json.dump(processor.list_objects(yt), json_out) - if VERBOSE: print("writing {0} JSON".format(yt)) - else: - detection_path = generate_savedsearches_conf(objects["detections"], objects["deployments"], TEMPLATE_PATH, OUTPUT_PATH) - lookups_path = generate_transforms_conf(objects["lookups"], TEMPLATE_PATH, OUTPUT_PATH) - lookups_path = generate_collections_conf(objects["lookups"], TEMPLATE_PATH, OUTPUT_PATH) - lookups_files = generate_lookup_files(objects["lookups"], TEMPLATE_PATH, OUTPUT_PATH,REPO_PATH) - use_case_lib_path = generate_use_case_library_conf(objects["stories"], objects["detections"], TEMPLATE_PATH, OUTPUT_PATH) - macros_path = generate_macros_conf(objects["macros"], objects["detections"], TEMPLATE_PATH, OUTPUT_PATH) - workbench_panels_objects = generate_workbench_panels(objects["detections"], objects["stories"], TEMPLATE_PATH, OUTPUT_PATH) - - - if VERBOSE: - print("{0} stories have been successfully written to {1}".format(len(objects["stories"]), use_case_lib_path)) - print("{0} detections have been successfully written to {1}".format(len(objects["detections"]), detection_path)) - print("{0} detections have been marked deprecated on {1}".format(len(deprecated), detection_path)) - print("{0} macros have been successfully written to {1}".format(len(objects["macros"]), macros_path)) - print("{0} workbench panels have been successfully written to {1}, {2} and {3}".format(len(workbench_panels_objects), OUTPUT_PATH + "/default/es_investigations.conf", OUTPUT_PATH + "/default/workflow_actions.conf", OUTPUT_PATH + "/default/data/ui/panels/*")) - print("security content generation completed..") - - -if __name__ == "__main__": - - parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="generates splunk conf files out of security_content manifests", epilog=""" - This tool converts manifests to the source files to be used by products like Splunk Enterprise. - It generates the savesearches.conf, analytics_stories.conf files for ES.""") - parser.add_argument("-p", "--path", required=True, help="path to security_content repo") - parser.add_argument("-o", "--output", required=True, help="path to the output directory") - parser.add_argument("-v", "--verbose", required=False, default=False, action='store_true', help="prints verbose output") - parser.add_argument("--product", required=True, default="ESCU", help="package type") - - - # parse them - args = parser.parse_args() - REPO_PATH = args.path - OUTPUT_PATH = args.output - VERBOSE = args.verbose - PRODUCT = args.product - - main(REPO_PATH, OUTPUT_PATH, PRODUCT, VERBOSE) diff --git a/bin/jinja2_templates/analyticstories.j2 b/bin/jinja2_templates/analyticstories.j2 deleted file mode 100644 index e889cb5d3c..0000000000 --- a/bin/jinja2_templates/analyticstories.j2 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,68 +0,0 @@ -############# -# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content -# On Date: {{ time }} UTC -# Author: Splunk Security Research -# Contact: research@splunk.com -############# - -### STORIES ### - -{% for story in stories %} -[analytic_story://{{ story.name }}] -category = {{ story.tags.category[0] }} -last_updated = {{ story.date }} -version = {{ story.version }} -references = {{ story.references | tojson }} -maintainers = [{"company": "{{ story.author_company }}", "email": "-", "name": "{{ story.author_name }}"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = {{ story.searches | tojson }} -description = {{ story.description }} -{% if story.narrative is defined %} -narrative = {{ story.narrative }} -{% endif %} - -{% endfor %} -### END STORIES ### - -### DETECTIONS ### - -{% for detection in detections %} -{% if (detection.type == 'TTP' or detection.type == 'Anomaly' or detection.type == 'Hunting' or detection.type == 'Correlation') %} -[savedsearch://ESCU - {{ detection.name }} - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = {{ detection.tags.asset_type }} -confidence = medium -explanation = {{ detection.description }} -{% if detection.how_to_implement is defined %} -how_to_implement = {{ detection.how_to_implement }} -{% else %} -how_to_implement = none -{% endif %} -annotations = {{ detection.mappings | tojson }} -known_false_positives = {{ detection.known_false_positives }} -providing_technologies = [] - -{% endif %} -{% endfor %} -### END DETECTIONS ### - -### RESPONSE TASKS ### - -{% for detection in detections %} -{% if (detection.type == 'Investigation') %} -[savedsearch://ESCU - {{ detection.name }} - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -{% if detection.how_to_implement is defined %} -how_to_implement = {{ detection.how_to_implement }} -{% else %} -how_to_implement = none -{% endif %} -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -{% endif %} -{% endfor %} -### END RESPONSE TASKS ### - diff --git a/bin/jinja2_templates/detection.j2 b/bin/jinja2_templates/detection.j2 deleted file mode 100644 index 42384d52b1..0000000000 --- a/bin/jinja2_templates/detection.j2 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,55 +0,0 @@ -name: {{name}} -id: {{uuid}} -version: 1 -date: '{{date}}' -author: {{author}} -type: {{type}} -datamodel: -{% for datamodel in datamodels -%} - - {{datamodel}} -{% endfor -%} -description: {{description}} -search: '{{search}}' -how_to_implement: {{how_to_implement}} -known_false_positives: {{known_false_positives}} -references: -{% for reference in references -%} - - {{reference}} -{% endfor -%} -tags: - analytic_story: - - {{analytic_story_name}} - dataset: - - {{dataset_url}} - kill_chain_phases: - {% for kill_chain_phase in kill_chain_phases -%} - - {{kill_chain_phase}} - {% endfor -%} - mitre_attack_id: - {% for id in mitre_attack_id -%} - - {{id}} - {% endfor -%} - product: - {% for product in products -%} - - {{product}} - {% endfor -%} - required_fields: - - _time - security_domain: {{security_domain}} - impact: {{impact}} - confidence: {{ confidence }} - # (impact * confidence)/100 - risk_score: {{risk_score}} - context: - {% for context in contexts -%} - - {{contexts}} - {% endfor -%} - message: {{risk_message}} - observable: - {% for observable in observables -%} - - {{observable}} - {% endfor -%} - nist: - - - cis20: - - diff --git a/bin/jinja2_templates/doc_detection_page.j2 b/bin/jinja2_templates/doc_detection_page.j2 deleted file mode 100644 index 9602b35efa..0000000000 --- a/bin/jinja2_templates/doc_detection_page.j2 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,19 +0,0 @@ ---- -title: "Detections" -layout: categories -author_profile: false -permalink: /detections/ -classes: wide -sidebar: - nav: "detections" ---- - -| Name | Technique | Type | -| -------------- | --------------- | --------------- | -{%- for detection in detections -%} -{% if detection.mitre_attacks %} -| [{{ detection.name }}](/{{ detection.kind }}/{{ detection.name | lower | replace(' ', '_') }}/) | {% for attack in detection.mitre_attacks -%} [{{ attack.technique }}](/tags/#{{ attack.technique | lower | replace(" ", "-") }}){% if not loop.last -%}, {% endif -%}{%- endfor %} | {{ detection.type }} | -{%- else %} -| [{{ detection.name }}]() | None | {{ detection.type }} | -{%- endif -%} -{%- endfor -%} diff --git a/bin/jinja2_templates/doc_detections.j2 b/bin/jinja2_templates/doc_detections.j2 deleted file mode 100644 index 06e358a438..0000000000 --- a/bin/jinja2_templates/doc_detections.j2 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,150 +0,0 @@ ---- -title: "{{detection.name}}" -excerpt: "{% for attack in detection.mitre_attacks -%} -{%- if attack.technique_id -%} -{{ attack.technique }} -{%- endif -%} -{% if not loop.last -%}, {% endif -%} -{% endfor %}" -categories: - - {{detection.kind|capitalize}} -last_modified_at: {{detection.date}} -toc: true -toc_label: "" -tags: -{%- for attack in detection.mitre_attacks %} - - {{ attack.technique }} - {%- for attack_tactic in attack.tactic %} - - {{ attack_tactic }} - {%- endfor -%} -{%- endfor -%} -{%- for product in detection.tags.product %} - - {{ product }} -{%- endfor -%} -{%- for cve in detection.cve %} - - {{ cve.id }} -{%- endfor -%} -{%- for datamodel in detection.datamodel %} - - {{ datamodel }} -{%- endfor %} ---- - -{% if detection.experimental is sameas true -%} -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. -{% endif %} - -[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} - -#### Description - -{{ detection.description }} - -- **Type**: [{{ detection.type }}](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: {{ detection.tags.product|join(', ') }} -- **Datamodel**: {% for datamodel in detection.datamodel %}[{{ datamodel }}](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/{{ datamodel|replace("_", "")}}){% if not loop.last %}, {% endif %}{%-endfor %} -- **Last Updated**: {{ detection.date }} -- **Author**: {{detection.author}} -- **ID**: {{ detection.id }} - -{% if detection.mitre_attacks %} -#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) - -| ID | Technique | Tactic | -| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -{%- for attack in detection.mitre_attacks %} -{% if attack.technique_id -%} -{% set sub_technique = attack.technique_id.split('.') %}{% if sub_technique | length > 1 -%} -| [{{ attack.technique_id }}](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/{{sub_technique[0]}}/{{sub_technique[1]}}/) | {{ attack.technique }} | {{ attack.tactic|join(', ') }} | -{% else -%} -| [{{ attack.technique_id }}](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/{{attack.technique_id}}/) | {{ attack.technique }} | {{ attack.tactic|join(', ') }} | -{% endif -%} -{% endif -%} -{% endfor %} -{% endif -%} - -#### Search - -``` -{{ detection.search|replace("|", "\n|")|safe }} -``` - -{% if detection.macros -%} -#### Macros -The SPL above uses the following Macros: -{% for macro in detection.macros -%} -{% if not '_filter' in macro.name -%} -* [{{ macro.name }}](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/{{macro.name}}.yml) -{% endif -%} -{% endfor %} -{% endif -%} - -Note that `{{detection.name | lower | replace(" ", "_") }}_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. - -{% if detection.lookups -%} -#### Lookups -The SPL above uses the following Lookups: - -{% for lookup in detection.lookups -%} -* [{{lookup.name}}](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/{{lookup.name}}.yml) with [data]({{lookup.csv_file_url}}) -{% endfor %} -{% endif -%} - -#### Required field -{% for field in detection.tags.required_fields -%} -* {{ field }} -{% endfor %} - -#### How To Implement -{{ detection.how_to_implement}} - -#### Known False Positives -{{ detection.known_false_positives}} - -#### Associated Analytic story -{% for story in detection.tags.analytic_story -%} -* [{{ story }}](/stories/{{story|lower|replace(" ", "_")}}) -{% endfor %} - -#### Kill Chain Phase -{% for phase in detection.tags.kill_chain_phases -%} -* {{ phase }} -{% endfor %} - -{% if detection.tags.observable %} -#### RBA - -| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | -| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| -| {{(detection.tags.impact * detection.tags.confidence)/100}} | {{ detection.tags.impact }} | {{ detection.tags.confidence }} | {{detection.tags.message}} | -{% endif %} - -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - -{% if detection.cve %} -#### CVE - -| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | -| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -{% for cve in detection.cve -%} -| [{{ cve.id }}](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/{{cve.id}}) | {{ cve.summary }} | {{ cve.cvss }} | -{% endfor %} -{% endif %} - -#### Reference -{% if detection.references %} -{% for reference in detection.references -%} -* [{{ reference }}]({{ reference }}) -{% endfor %} -{% endif %} - -#### Test Dataset -Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). -Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) - -{% for dataset in detection.tags.dataset -%} -* [{{dataset}}]({{ dataset }}) -{% endfor %} - - -[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/{% if detection.experimental is sameas true -%}experimental/{%- endif -%}{{detection.kind}}/{{ detection.name | lower | replace (" ", "_") }}.yml) \| *version*: **{{detection.version}}** diff --git a/bin/jinja2_templates/doc_index.j2 b/bin/jinja2_templates/doc_index.j2 deleted file mode 100644 index d9e8235d66..0000000000 --- a/bin/jinja2_templates/doc_index.j2 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,87 +0,0 @@ ---- -# Feel free to add content and custom Front Matter to this file. -# To modify the layout, see https://jekyllrb.com/docs/themes/#overriding-theme-defaults -layout: splash -header: - overlay_color: "#000" - overlay_filter: "0.5" - overlay_image: /static/splunk_banner.png - actions: - - label: "Download" - url: "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3449/" -excerpt: "Get the latest **FREE** Enterprise Security Content Update (ESCU) App with **{{ detection_count }}** detections for Splunk." -feature_row: - - image_path: /static/feature_detection.png - alt: "customizable" - title: "Detections" - excerpt: "See all **{{ detection_count }}** Splunk Analytics built to find evil 😈." - url: "/detections" - btn_class: "btn--primary" - btn_label: "Explore" - - image_path: /static/feature_stories.png - alt: "fully responsive" - title: "Analytic Stories" - excerpt: "See all **{{ story_count }}** use cases, 📦 of detections built to address a threat." - url: "/stories" - btn_class: "btn--primary" - btn_label: "Explore" - - image_path: /static/feature_playbooks.png - alt: "100% free" - title: "Playbooks" - excerpt: "See all **{{ playbook_count }}** automated investigation 🔭 and response 🛠 playbooks " - url: "/playbooks" - btn_class: "btn--primary" - btn_label: "Explore" ---- - -{% raw %} -{% include feature_row %} - -# Welcome to Splunk Security Content - -This project gives you access to our repository of Analytic Stories that are security guides which provide background on TTPs, mapped to the MITRE framework, the Lockheed Martin Kill Chain, and CIS controls. They include Splunk searches, machine-learning algorithms, and Splunk SOAR playbooks (where available)—all designed to work together to detect, investigate, and respond to threats. - -[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} - -## [Detection Coverage](https://mitremap.splunkresearch.com/) 🗺 -Below is a snapshot in time of what technique we currently have some detection coverage for. The darker the shade of blue the more detections we have for this particular technique. - -[![](mitre-map/coverage.png)](https://mitremap.splunkresearch.com/) - -## View Our Content 🔎 - -* [Analytic Stories](/stories) -* [Detections](/detections) -* [Playbooks](/playbooks) - -If you prefer working with the command line, check out our [API](https://docs.splunkresearch.com/?version=latest): - -``` -curl -s https://content.splunkresearch.com | jq -{ - "hello": "welcome to Splunks Research security content api" -} -``` - -## Test Out The Detections 🏗 - -Replay any detection dataset to a Splunk Enterprise Server by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively use: - -![](static/attack_range.png) - -The [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range) which allows you to create a isolated environment to launch attacks and test/build detections. - -## Questions? 📞 -Please use the [GitHub issue tracker](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range/issues) to submit bugs or request features. - -If you have questions or need support, you can: - -* Join the [#security-research](https://splunk-usergroups.slack.com/archives/C1S5BEF38) room in the [Splunk Slack channel](http://splunk-usergroups.slack.com) -* Post a question to [Splunk Answers](http://answers.splunk.com) -* If you are a Splunk Enterprise customer with a valid support entitlement contract and have a Splunk-related question, you can also open a support case on the https://www.splunk.com/ support portal - - -## Contribute Content 🥰 -If you want to help the rest of the security community by sharing your own detections, see our [contributor guide](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Contributing-to-the-Project) for more information on how to get involved! - -{% endraw %} diff --git a/bin/jinja2_templates/doc_navigation_pages.j2 b/bin/jinja2_templates/doc_navigation_pages.j2 deleted file mode 100644 index 3ed37e0b73..0000000000 --- a/bin/jinja2_templates/doc_navigation_pages.j2 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,9 +0,0 @@ ---- -title: {{ tag }} -layout: tag -author_profile: false -taxonomy: {{ tag }} -permalink: /detections/{{ tag | lower | replace(' ', '_') }}/ -sidebar: - nav: "detections" ---- diff --git a/bin/jinja2_templates/doc_navigation_story_pages.j2 b/bin/jinja2_templates/doc_navigation_story_pages.j2 deleted file mode 100644 index 4e2ef917a4..0000000000 --- a/bin/jinja2_templates/doc_navigation_story_pages.j2 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,19 +0,0 @@ ---- -title: {{ category.name }} -layout: tag -author_profile: false -taxonomy: {{ category.name }} -permalink: /stories/{{ category.name | lower | replace(' ', '_') }}/ -sidebar: - nav: "stories" ---- - -| Name | Technique | Tactic | -| ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -{%- for story in category.stories -%} -{% if story.mitre_attacks %} -| [{{ story.name }}](/stories/{{ story.name | lower | replace(' ', '_') }}/) | {% for attack in story.mitre_attacks -%} [{{ attack.technique }}](/tags/#{{ attack.technique | lower | replace(" ", "-") }}){% if not loop.last -%}, {% endif -%}{%- endfor %} | [{{ story.mitre_attacks[0].tactic[0] }}](/tags/#{{ story.mitre_attacks[0].tactic[0] | lower | replace(" ", "-") }}) | -{%- else %} -| [{{ story.name }}]() | None | None | -{%- endif -%} -{%- endfor -%} diff --git a/bin/jinja2_templates/doc_playbooks.j2 b/bin/jinja2_templates/doc_playbooks.j2 deleted file mode 100644 index f8e310aacd..0000000000 --- a/bin/jinja2_templates/doc_playbooks.j2 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,60 +0,0 @@ ---- -title: "{{playbook.name}}" -last_modified_at: {{playbook.date}} -toc: true -toc_label: "" -tags: - - {{ playbook.type }} -{%- for product in playbook.tags.product %} - - {{ product }} -{%- endfor -%} -{%- for app in playbook.app_list %} - - {{ app }} -{%- endfor %} -{%- for tag in playbook.tags.platform_tags %} - - {{ tag }} -{%- endfor %} ---- - -[Try in Splunk SOAR](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/software/splunk-security-orchestration-and-automation.html){: .btn .btn--success} - -#### Description - -{{ playbook.description }} - -- **Type**: {{ playbook.type }} -- **Product**: {{ playbook.tags.product|join(', ') }} -- **Apps**: {% for app in playbook.app_list %}[{{ app }}](https://splunkbase.splunk.com/apps/#/search/{{ app }}/product/soar){% if not loop.last %}, {% endif %}{%-endfor %} -- **Last Updated**: {{ playbook.date }} -- **Author**: {{playbook.author}} -- **ID**: {{ playbook.id }} - -#### Associated Detections -{% for detection in playbook.tags.detections -%} -{% for d in detections -%} -{% if d.name == detection -%} -* [{{ detection }}](/{{ d.kind }}/{{detection|lower|replace(" ", "_")}}/) -{% endif %} -{% endfor %} -{% endfor %} - -#### How To Implement -{{ playbook.how_to_implement}} - -#### Playbooks -![](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/security_content/develop/playbooks/{{ playbook.playbook | lower | replace(" ", "_")}}.png) - -#### Required field -{% for field in playbook.tags.playbook_fields -%} -* {{ field }} -{% endfor %} - -#### Reference -{% if playbook.references %} -{% for reference in playbook.references -%} -* [{{ reference }}]({{ reference }}) -{% endfor %} -{% endif %} - - -[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/playbooks/{{ playbook.playbook | lower | replace (" ", "_") }}.yml) \| *version*: **{{playbook.version}}** diff --git a/bin/jinja2_templates/doc_stories.j2 b/bin/jinja2_templates/doc_stories.j2 deleted file mode 100644 index 9ffefefe7f..0000000000 --- a/bin/jinja2_templates/doc_stories.j2 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,49 +0,0 @@ ---- -title: "{{story.name}}" -last_modified_at: {{story.date}} -toc: true -toc_label: "" -tags: -{%- for product in story.tags.product %} - - {{ product }} -{%- endfor -%} -{%- for datamodel in story.data_models %} - - {{ datamodel }} -{%- endfor -%} -{%- for phase in story.tags.kill_chain_phases %} - - {{ phase }} -{%- endfor %} ---- - -[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} - -#### Description - -{{ story.description }} - -- **Product**: {{ story.tags.product|join(', ') }} -- **Datamodel**: {% for datamodel in story.data_models %}[{{ datamodel }}](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/{{ datamodel|replace("_", "")}}){% if not loop.last %}, {% endif %}{%-endfor %} -- **Last Updated**: {{ story.date }} -- **Author**: {{story.author}} -- **ID**: {{ story.id }} - -#### Narrative - -{{ story.narrative }} - -#### Detections - -| Name | Technique | Type | -| ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -{%- for detection in story.detections %} -| [{{ detection.name }}](/{{ detection.kind }}/{{ detection.name | lower | replace(' ', '_') }}/) | {% for attack in detection.mitre_attacks -%}{%- if attack.technique -%}[{{ attack.technique }}](/tags/#{{ attack.technique | lower | replace(" ", "-") }}){% else %}None{%- endif -%}{% if not loop.last %}, {% endif %}{%- endfor %} | {{ detection.type }} | -{%- endfor %} - -#### Reference -{% if story.references %} -{% for reference in story.references -%} -* [{{ reference }}]({{ reference }}) -{% endfor %} -{% endif %} - -[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/stories/{{ story.name | lower | replace (" ", "_") }}.yml) \| *version*: **{{story.version}}** diff --git a/bin/jinja2_templates/doc_story_page.j2 b/bin/jinja2_templates/doc_story_page.j2 deleted file mode 100644 index c3b2fc6fa3..0000000000 --- a/bin/jinja2_templates/doc_story_page.j2 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,19 +0,0 @@ ---- -title: Analytic Stories -layout: collection -permalink: /stories/ -collection: stories -classes: wide -sidebar: - nav: "stories" ---- - -| Name | Technique | Tactic | -| ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -{%- for story in stories -%} -{% if story.mitre_attacks %} -| [{{ story.name }}]({{ story.name | lower | replace(" ", "_") }}) | {% for attack in story.mitre_attacks -%} [{{ attack.technique }}](/tags/#{{ attack.technique | lower | replace(" ", "-") }}){% if not loop.last -%}, {% endif -%}{%- endfor %} | [{{ story.mitre_attacks[0].tactic[0] }}](/tags/#{{ story.mitre_attacks[0].tactic[0] | lower | replace(" ", "-") }}) | -{%- else %} -| [{{ story.name }}]() | None | None | -{%- endif -%} -{%- endfor -%} diff --git a/bin/jinja2_templates/macros.j2 b/bin/jinja2_templates/macros.j2 deleted file mode 100644 index f8ffc5934f..0000000000 --- a/bin/jinja2_templates/macros.j2 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,22 +0,0 @@ -############# -# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content -# On Date: {{ time }} UTC -# Author: Splunk Security Research -# Contact: research@splunk.com -############# - - -{% for macro in macros %} -[{{ macro.name }}{% if macro.arguments is defined %}({{ macro.arguments|length }}){% endif %}] -{% if macro.arguments is defined %} -args = {% for arg in macro.arguments %}{{ arg }}{{ ", " if not loop.last }} -{% endfor %} -{% endif %} -{% if macro.definition is defined %} -definition = {{ macro.definition }} -{% else %} -definition = -{% endif %} -description = {{ macro.description }} - -{% endfor %} diff --git a/bin/jinja2_templates/savedsearches.j2 b/bin/jinja2_templates/savedsearches.j2 deleted file mode 100644 index 38aecc2169..0000000000 --- a/bin/jinja2_templates/savedsearches.j2 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,213 +0,0 @@ -############# -# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content -# On Date: {{ time }} UTC -# Author: Splunk Security Research -# Contact: research@splunk.com -############# - -### ESCU DETECTIONS ### - -{% for detection in detections %} -{% if (detection.type == 'TTP' or detection.type == 'Anomaly' or detection.type == 'Hunting' or detection.type == 'Correlation') %} -[ESCU - {{ detection.name }} - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = {{ detection.description }} -action.escu.mappings = {{ detection.mappings | tojson }} -{% if detection.data_model is defined %} -action.escu.data_models = [{{ detection.data_model | tojson }}] -{% else %} -action.escu.data_models = [] -{% endif %} -action.escu.eli5 = {{ detection.description }} -{% if detection.how_to_implement is defined %} -action.escu.how_to_implement = {{ detection.how_to_implement }} -{% else %} -action.escu.how_to_implement = none -{% endif %} -{% if detection.known_false_positives is defined %} -action.escu.known_false_positives = {{ detection.known_false_positives }} -{% else %} -action.escu.known_false_positives = None -{% endif %} -action.escu.creation_date = {{ detection.date }} -action.escu.modification_date = {{ detection.date }} -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - {{ detection.name }} - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -{% if detection.product is defined %} -action.escu.product = {{ detection.product | tojson }} -{% endif %} -{% if detection.providing_technologies is defined %} -action.escu.providing_technologies = {{ detection.providing_technologies | tojson }} -{% else %} -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -{% endif %} -{% if detection.tags.analytic_story is defined %} -action.escu.analytic_story = {{ detection.tags.analytic_story | tojson }} -{% if detection.tags.risk_score is defined %} -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = {{ detection.risk_message }} -action.risk.param._risk = {{ detection.risk | tojson }} -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -{% endif %} -{% else %} -action.escu.analytic_story = [] -{% endif %} -cron_schedule = {{ detection.deployment.scheduling.cron_schedule }} -dispatch.earliest_time = {{ detection.deployment.scheduling.earliest_time }} -dispatch.latest_time = {{ detection.deployment.scheduling.latest_time }} -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -{% if detection.deprecated is defined %} -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - {{ detection.name }} - Rule -{% else %} -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - {{ detection.name }} - Rule -{% endif %} -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {{ detection.savedsearch_annotations | tojson }} -{% if detection.deployment.scheduling.schedule_window is defined %} -schedule_window = {{ detection.deployment.scheduling.schedule_window }} -{% endif %} -{% if detection.deployment.alert_action is defined %} -{% if detection.deployment.alert_action.notable is defined %} -action.notable = 1 -{% if detection.nes_fields is defined %} -action.notable.param.nes_fields = {{ detection.nes_fields }} -{% endif %} -action.notable.param.rule_description = {{ detection.deployment.alert_action.notable.rule_description | custom_jinja2_enrichment_filter(detection) }} -action.notable.param.rule_title = {{ detection.deployment.alert_action.notable.rule_title | custom_jinja2_enrichment_filter(detection) }} -action.notable.param.security_domain = {{ detection.tags.security_domain }} -action.notable.param.severity = high -{% endif %} -{% if detection.deployment.alert_action.email is defined %} -action.email.subject.alert = {{ detection.deployment.alert_action.email.subject | custom_jinja2_enrichment_filter(detection) }} -action.email.to = {{ detection.deployment.alert_action.email.to }} -action.email.message.alert = {{ detection.deployment.alert_action.email.message | custom_jinja2_enrichment_filter(detection) }} -action.email.useNSSubject = 1 -{% endif %} -{% if detection.deployment.alert_action.slack is defined %} -action.slack = 1 -action.slack.param.channel = {{ detection.deployment.alert_action.slack.channel | custom_jinja2_enrichment_filter(detection) }} -action.slack.param.message = {{ detection.deployment.alert_action.slack.message | custom_jinja2_enrichment_filter(detection) }} -{% endif %} -{% if detection.deployment.alert_action.phantom is defined %} -action.sendtophantom = 1 -action.sendtophantom.param._cam_workers = {{ detection.deployment.alert_action.phantom.cam_workers | custom_jinja2_enrichment_filter(detection) }} -action.sendtophantom.param.label = {{ detection.deployment.alert_action.phantom.label | custom_jinja2_enrichment_filter(detection) }} -action.sendtophantom.param.phantom_server = {{ detection.deployment.alert_action.phantom.phantom_server | custom_jinja2_enrichment_filter(detection) }} -action.sendtophantom.param.sensitivity = {{ detection.deployment.alert_action.phantom.sensitivity | custom_jinja2_enrichment_filter(detection) }} -action.sendtophantom.param.severity = {{ detection.deployment.alert_action.phantom.severity | custom_jinja2_enrichment_filter(detection) }} -{% endif %} -{% endif %} -alert.digest_mode = 1 -{% if detection.disabled is defined %} -disabled = false -{% else %} -disabled = true -{% endif %} -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = {{ detection.search }} - -{% endif %} -{% endfor %} -### END ESCU DETECTIONS ### - - -### ESCU BASELINES ### - -{% for detection in detections %} -{% if (detection.type == 'Baseline') %} -[ESCU - {{ detection.name }}] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -action.escu.search_type = support -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - {{ detection.name }} -description = {{ detection.description }} -action.escu.creation_date = {{ detection.date }} -action.escu.modification_date = {{ detection.date }} -{% if detection.tags.analytic_story is defined %} -action.escu.analytic_story = {{ detection.tags.analytic_story | tojson }} -{% else %} -action.escu.analytic_story = [] -{% endif %} -{% if detection.data_model is defined %} -action.escu.data_models = [{{ detection.data_model | tojson }}] -{% else %} -action.escu.data_models = [] -{% endif %} -cron_schedule = {{ detection.deployment.scheduling.cron_schedule }} -enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = {{ detection.deployment.scheduling.earliest_time }} -dispatch.latest_time = {{ detection.deployment.scheduling.latest_time }} -{% if detection.deployment.scheduling.schedule_window is defined %} -schedule_window = {{ detection.deployment.scheduling.schedule_window }} -{% endif %} -{% if detection.providing_technologies is defined %} -action.escu.providing_technologies = {{ detection.providing_technologies | tojson }} -{% else %} -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -{% endif %} -action.escu.eli5 = {{ detection.description }} -{% if detection.how_to_implement is defined %} -action.escu.how_to_implement = {{ detection.how_to_implement }} -{% else %} -action.escu.how_to_implement = none -{% endif %} -{% if detection.disabled is defined %} -disabled = false -{% else %} -disabled = true -{% endif %} -is_visible = false -search = {{ detection.search }} - -{% endif %} -{% endfor %} - - -### ESCU RESPONSE TASKS ### - -{% for detection in detections %} -{% if (detection.type == 'Investigation') %} -{% if detection.search is defined %} -[ESCU - {{ detection.name }} - Response Task] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - {{ detection.name }} - Response Task -description = {{ detection.description }} -action.escu.creation_date = {{ detection.date }} -action.escu.modification_date = {{ detection.date }} -{% if detection.tags is defined %} -action.escu.analytic_story = {{ detection.tags.analytic_story | tojson }} -{% else %} -action.escu.analytic_story = [] -{% endif %} -action.escu.earliest_time_offset = 3600 -action.escu.latest_time_offset = 86400 -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -{% if detection.data_model is defined %} -action.escu.data_models = [{{ detection.data_model | tojson}}] -{% else %} -action.escu.data_models = [] -{% endif %} -action.escu.eli5 = {{ detection.description }} -action.escu.how_to_implement = none -action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time -disabled = true -schedule_window = auto -is_visible = false -search = {{ detection.search }} - -{% endif %} -{% endif %} -{% endfor %} - - -### END ESCU RESPONSE TASKS ### diff --git a/bin/jinja2_templates/story.j2 b/bin/jinja2_templates/story.j2 deleted file mode 100644 index 94d419c14f..0000000000 --- a/bin/jinja2_templates/story.j2 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,23 +0,0 @@ -name: {{name}} -id: {{uuid}} -version: 1 -date: '{{date}}' -author: {{author}} -description: {{description}} -narrative: {{narrative}} -references: -{% for reference in references -%} - - {{reference}} -{% endfor -%} -tags: - analytic_story: - - {{analytic_story_name}} - category: - {% for category in categories -%} - - {{category}} - {% endfor -%} - product: - {% for product in products -%} - - {{product}} - {% endfor -%} - usecase: {{usecase}} diff --git a/bin/jinja2_templates/test.j2 b/bin/jinja2_templates/test.j2 deleted file mode 100644 index a57e99ba53..0000000000 --- a/bin/jinja2_templates/test.j2 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,12 +0,0 @@ -name: {{name}} -tests: -- name: {{detection_name}} - file: {{detection_path}} - pass_condition: '{{pass_condition}}' - earliest_time: '{{earliest_time}}' - latest_time: '{{latest_time}}' - attack_data: - - file_name: {{file_name}} - data: {{dataset_url}} - source: {{splunk_source}} - sourcetype: {{splunk_sourcetype}} diff --git a/bin/macro_gen.py b/bin/macro_gen.py deleted file mode 100644 index 2a491a485b..0000000000 --- a/bin/macro_gen.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,64 +0,0 @@ -#!/bin/python -from os import path, walk -import sys -import argparse -import yaml -import re -import json - -def macro_gen(STRONTIC_PATH, REPO_PATH, VERBOSE): - - macros = [] - macro = dict() - - with open(STRONTIC_PATH, 'r', encoding='utf-8-sig') as file: - strontic_objects = json.load(file,strict=False) - - for process_object, values in strontic_objects.items(): - if 'meta_original_filename' in values: - # make macro object - macro['definition'] = 'Processes.process_name=' + process_object.split("-")[0] + ' OR Processes.original_file_name=' + values['meta_original_filename'] - macro['description'] = "matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from: https://strontic.github.io/" - macro['name'] = process_object.split("-")[0].lower().replace(".", "_") - macros.append(macro) - - if VERBOSE: - print("generating macro: {0} with definition: {1}".format(macro['name'], macro['definition'])) - - #final_macros = [] - # check for duplicate first - #for macro in macros: - # if macro not in final_macros: - # final_macros.append(macro) - #else: - # extended_definition = ' OR Processes.process_name=' + process_object.split("-")[0] + ' OR Processes.original_file_name=' + values['meta_original_filename'] - # macro['definition'] = macro['definition'] + extended_definition - #print(macro['definition']) - - #print(macros) - return len(macros) - - -def main(args): - - parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="keeps yamls in security_content sorted and pretty printed with custom sort keys, \ - meant to run quitely for CI, use -v flag to make it bark") - - parser.add_argument("-s", "--strontic_json", required=True, help="path to strontic json") - parser.add_argument("-p", "--path", required=True, help="path to security_content repo") - parser.add_argument("-v", "--verbose", required=False, default=False, action='store_true', help="prints verbose output") - - # parse them - args = parser.parse_args() - STRONTIC_PATH = args.strontic_json - REPO_PATH = args.path - VERBOSE = args.verbose - generated_count = macro_gen(STRONTIC_PATH, REPO_PATH, VERBOSE) - #if VERBOSE: - print("generated {0} macros from strontics list".format(generated_count)) - - print("finished successfully!") - - -if __name__ == "__main__": - main(sys.argv[1:]) diff --git a/bin/newcontent.py b/bin/newcontent.py deleted file mode 100644 index ad88c90bbb..0000000000 --- a/bin/newcontent.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,467 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/python - -''' -Helps you create new Splunk Security Content. -''' - -from pathlib import Path -from PyInquirer import prompt, Separator -import os -import getpass -from jinja2 import Environment, FileSystemLoader -import uuid -from datetime import date -from os import path -import sys - - - -def detection_wizard(security_content_path,type,TEMPLATE_PATH): - questions = [ - { - # get provider - 'type': 'list', - 'message': 'what kind of detection is this', - 'name': 'detection_kind', - 'choices': [ - { - 'name': 'endpoint' - }, - { - 'name': 'cloud' - }, - { - 'name': 'application' - }, - { - 'name': 'network' - }, - { - 'name': 'web' - }, - { - 'name': 'experimental' - }, - - ], - 'default': 'endpoint' - }, - { - 'type': 'input', - 'message': 'enter detection name', - 'name': 'detection_name', - 'default': 'Powershell Encoded Command', - }, - { - 'type': 'input', - 'message': 'enter author name', - 'name': 'detection_author', - }, - { - # get provider - 'type': 'list', - 'message': 'select a detection type', - 'name': 'detection_type', - 'choices': [ - { - 'name': 'TTP' - }, - { - 'name': 'Anomaly' - }, - { - 'name': 'Hunting' - }, - { - 'name': 'Baseline' - }, - { - 'name': 'Investigation' - }, - { - 'name': 'Correlation' - } - - ], - 'default': 'TTP' - }, - { - # get provider - 'type': 'checkbox', - 'message': 'select the datamodels used in the detection', - 'name': 'datamodels', - 'choices': [ - { - 'name': 'Endpoint', - 'checked': True - }, - { - 'name': 'Authentication' - }, - { - 'name': 'Change' - }, - { - 'name': 'Email' - }, - { - 'name': 'Network_Resolution' - }, - { - 'name': 'Network_Traffic' - }, - { - 'name': 'Network_Sessions' - }, - { - 'name': 'Updates' - }, - { - 'name': 'Vulnerabilities' - }, - { - 'name': 'Web' - }, - { - 'name': 'Risk' - }, - ], - }, - { - # get api_key - 'type': 'input', - 'message': 'enter search (spl)', - 'name': 'detection_search', - 'default': '| UPDATE_SPL' - }, - { - # get api_key - 'type': 'input', - 'message': 'enter MITRE ATT&CK Technique IDs related to the detection, comma delimited for multiple', - 'name': 'mitre_attack_ids', - 'default': 'T1003.002' - }, - { - # get provider - 'type': 'checkbox', - 'message': 'select kill chain phases related to the detection', - 'name': 'kill_chain_phases', - 'choices': [ - - { - 'name': 'Reconnaissance' - }, - { - 'name': 'Intrusion' - }, - { - 'name': 'Exploitation', - 'checked': True - }, - { - 'name': 'Privilege Escalation' - }, - { - 'name': 'Lateral Movement' - }, - { - 'name': 'Obfuscation' - }, - { - 'name': 'Denial of Service' - }, - { - 'name': 'Exfiltration' - }, - ], - }, - { - # get provider - 'type': 'list', - 'message': 'security_domain for detection', - 'name': 'security_domain', - 'choices': [ - { - 'name': 'access' - }, - { - 'name': 'endpoint' - }, - { - 'name': 'network' - }, - { - 'name': 'threat' - }, - { - 'name': 'identity' - }, - { - 'name': 'audit' - }, - - ], - 'default': 'endpoint' - }, - ] - - answers = prompt(questions) - - mitre_attack_id = [x.strip() for x in answers['mitre_attack_ids'].split(',')] - - print(mitre_attack_id) - - j2_env = Environment(loader=FileSystemLoader(TEMPLATE_PATH), # nosemgrep - trim_blocks=True) - answers['products'] = ['Splunk Enterprise','Splunk Enterprise Security','Splunk Cloud'] - answers['references'] = [] - - - # grab some vars for the test - detection_kind = answers['detection_kind'] - - - # write a detection example - template = j2_env.get_template('detection.j2') - detection_name = answers['detection_name'] - detection_file_name = detection_name.replace(' ', '_').replace('-','_').replace('.','_').replace('/','_').lower() - output_path = path.join(security_content_path, 'detections/' + detection_kind + '/' + detection_file_name + '.yml') - output = template.render(uuid=uuid.uuid1(), date=date.today().strftime('%Y-%m-%d'), - author=answers['detection_author'], name=answers['detection_name'], - description='\n\tUPDATE_DESCRIPTION\n\tWHAT IS THIS?\n\tWHAT DOES IT LOOK LIKE?\n\tHOW DO YOU TRIAGE IT?', how_to_implement='UPDATE_HOW_TO_IMPLEMENT', known_false_positives='UPDATE_KNOWN_FALSE_POSITIVES', - references=' ',datamodels=answers['datamodels'], - search= answers['detection_search'] + ' | `' + detection_file_name + '_filter`', - type=answers['detection_type'], analytic_story_name='UPDATE_STORY_NAME', mitre_attack_id=mitre_attack_id, - kill_chain_phases=answers['kill_chain_phases'], dataset_url='UPDATE_DATASET_URL', - products=answers['products'], security_domain=answers['security_domain']) - with open(output_path, 'w', encoding="utf-8") as f: - f.write(output) - - print("\n> contentctl wrote the detection to: {0}\n".format(output_path)) - - questions = [ - { - 'type': 'confirm', - 'message': 'would you like to configure the test file for detection: {0}'.format(answers['detection_name']), - 'name': 'continue', - 'default': True, - }, - { - 'type': 'input', - 'message': 'enter pass condition for the test of detection: {0}'.format(answers['detection_name']), - 'name': 'pass_condition', - 'default': '| stats count | where count > 0', - 'when': lambda answers: answers['continue'], - }, - { - 'type': 'input', - 'message': 'enter earliest_time for the test of detection: {0}'.format(answers['detection_name']), - 'name': 'earliest_time', - 'default': '-24h', - 'when': lambda answers: answers['continue'], - }, - { - 'type': 'input', - 'message': 'enter latest_time for the test of detection: {0}'.format(answers['detection_name']), - 'name': 'latest_time', - 'default': 'now', - 'when': lambda answers: answers['continue'], - }, - ] - - - answers = prompt(questions) - if answers['continue']: - # and a corresponding test files - template = j2_env.get_template('test.j2') - test_name = detection_file_name + '.test.yml' - output_path = path.join(security_content_path, 'tests/' + detection_kind + '/' + test_name) - output = template.render(name=detection_name + ' Unit Test', - detection_name=detection_name, - detection_path= detection_kind + '/' + detection_file_name + '.yml', pass_condition=answers['pass_condition'], - earliest_time=answers['earliest_time'], latest_time=answers['latest_time'], file_name='UPDATE_FILE_NAME', - splunk_source='UPDATE_SPLUNK_SOURCE',splunk_sourcetype='UPDATE_SPLUNK_SOURCETYPE',dataset_url='UPDATE_DATASET_URL') - with open(output_path, 'w', encoding="utf-8") as f: - f.write(output) - else: - # and a corresponding test files - template = j2_env.get_template('test.j2') - test_name = detection_file_name + '.test.yml' - output_path = path.join(security_content_path, 'tests/' + detection_kind + '/' + test_name) - output = template.render(name=detection_name + ' Unit Test', - detection_name=detection_name, - detection_path=detection_kind + '/' + detection_file_name + '.yml', pass_condition='| stats count | where count > 0', - earliest_time='-24h', latest_time='now',file_name='UPDATE_FILE_NAME', splunk_source='UPDATE_SPLUNK_SOURCE', - splunk_sourcetype='UPDATE_SPLUNK_SOURCETYPE', dataset_url='UPDATE_DATASET_URL' ) - with open(output_path, 'w', encoding="utf-8") as f: - f.write(output) - print("\n> contentctl wrote the test for this detection to: {0}\n".format(output_path)) - -def story_wizard(security_content_path,type, TEMPLATE_PATH): - questions = [ - { - 'type': 'input', - 'message': 'enter story name', - 'name': 'story_name', - 'default': 'Suspicious Powershell Behavior', - }, - { - 'type': 'input', - 'message': 'enter author name', - 'name': 'story_author', - }, - { - 'type': 'checkbox', - 'message': 'select a category', - 'name': 'category', - 'choices': [ - { - 'name': 'Adversary Tactics', - 'checked': True - }, - { - 'name': 'Account Compromise' - }, - { - 'name': 'Unauthorized Software' - }, - { - 'name': 'Best Practices' - }, - { - 'name': 'Cloud Security' - }, - { - 'name': 'Command and Control' - }, - { - 'name': 'Lateral Movement' - }, - { - 'name': 'Ransomware' - }, - { - 'name': 'Privilege Escalation' - }, - ], - }, - { - # get provider - 'type': 'list', - 'message': 'select a use case', - 'name': 'usecase', - 'choices': [ - { - 'name': 'Advanced Threat Detection', - 'checked': True - }, - { - 'name': 'Security Monitoring' - }, - { - 'name': 'Compliance' - }, - { - 'name': 'Insider Threat' - }, - { - 'name': 'Application Security' - }, - { - 'name': 'Other' - }, - ], - }, - ] - answers = prompt(questions) - j2_env = Environment(loader=FileSystemLoader(TEMPLATE_PATH), # nosemgrep - trim_blocks=True) - - - template = j2_env.get_template('story.j2') - answers['products'] = ['Splunk Enterprise','Splunk Enterprise Security','Splunk Cloud'] - answers['references'] = [] - story_name = answers['story_name'] - story_file_name = story_name.replace(' ', '_').replace('-','_').replace('.','_').replace('/','_').lower() - output_path = path.join(security_content_path, 'stories/' + story_file_name + '.yml') - output = template.render(uuid=uuid.uuid1(), date=date.today().strftime('%Y-%m-%d'), - author=answers['story_author'], name=answers['story_name'], description='UPDATE_DESCRIPTION', - narrative='UPDATE_NARRATIVE', references=['https://www.destroyallsoftware.com/talks/wat'],analytic_story_name=answers['story_name'], - categories=answers['category'], usecase=answers['usecase'], products=answers['products']) - with open(output_path, 'w', encoding="utf-8") as f: - f.write(output) - print("contentctl wrote a example story to: {0}".format(output_path)) - -def create_example(security_content_path,type, TEMPLATE_PATH): - getpass.getuser() - j2_env = Environment(loader=FileSystemLoader(TEMPLATE_PATH), # nosemgrep - trim_blocks=True) - - if type == 'detection': - - - # write a detection example - template = j2_env.get_template('detection.j2') - detection_name = getpass.getuser() + '_' + type + '.yml.example' - output_path = path.join(security_content_path, 'detections/endpoint/' + detection_name) - output = template.render(uuid=uuid.uuid1(), date=date.today().strftime('%Y-%m-%d'), - author='UPDATE_AUTHOR', name=getpass.getuser().capitalize() + ' ' + type.capitalize(), - description='|\n\tUPDATE_DESCRIPTION\n\tWHAT IS THIS?\n\tWHAT DOES IT LOOK LIKE?\n\tHOW DO YOU TRIAGE IT?', - how_to_implement='UPDATE_HOW_TO_IMPLENT', - known_false_positives='UPDATE_KNOWN_FALSE_POSITIVES', - references=['https://html5zombo.com/'], - datamodels=['Endpoint'], search='| UPDATE_SPL | `' + getpass.getuser() + '_' + type + '_filter`', - type='TTP', analytic_story_name=' UPDATE_STORY_NAME', mitre_attack_id = 'T1003.01', - kill_chain_phases=['Exploitation'], dataset_url='UPDATE_DATASET_URL', - products=['Splunk Enterprise','Splunk Enterprise Security','Splunk Cloud']) - with open(output_path, 'w', encoding="utf-8") as f: - f.write(output) - print("contentctl wrote a example detection to: {0}".format(output_path)) - - # and a corresponding test files - template = j2_env.get_template('test.j2') - test_name = getpass.getuser() + '_' + type + '.test.yml.example' - output_path = path.join(security_content_path, 'tests/endpoint/' + test_name) - output = template.render(name=getpass.getuser().capitalize() + ' ' + type.capitalize() + ' Unit Test', - detection_name=getpass.getuser().capitalize() + ' ' + type.capitalize(), - detection_path='endpoint/' + detection_name, pass_condition='| stats count | where count > 0', - earliest_time='-24h', latest_time='now', file_name='UPDATE_FILE_NAME', splunk_source='UPDATE_SPLUNK_SOURCE', - splunk_sourcetype='UPDATE_SPLUNK_SOURCETYPE',dataset_url='UPDATE_DATASET_URL') - with open(output_path, 'w', encoding="utf-8") as f: - f.write(output) - print("contentctl wrote a example test for this detection to: {0}".format(output_path)) - - elif type == 'story': - # write a story example - template = j2_env.get_template('story.j2') - story_name = getpass.getuser() + '_' + type + '.yml.example' - output_path = path.join(security_content_path, 'stories/' + story_name) - output = template.render(uuid=uuid.uuid1(), date=date.today().strftime('%Y-%m-%d'), - author='UPDATE_AUTHOR', name=getpass.getuser().capitalize() + ' ' + type.capitalize(), - description='UPDATE_DESCRIPTION', - narrative='UPDATE_NARRATIVE', - references=['https://www.destroyallsoftware.com/talks/wat'], analytic_story_name=getpass.getuser().capitalize() + ' ' + type.capitalize(), - categories=['Adversary Tactics'], usecase='Advanced Threat Detection', products=['Splunk Enterprise','Splunk Enterprise Security','Splunk Cloud']) - with open(output_path, 'w', encoding="utf-8") as f: - f.write(output) - print("contentctl wrote a example story to: {0}".format(output_path)) - -def new(security_content_path, VERBOSE, type, example_only): - - valid_content_objects = ['detection','story'] - if type not in valid_content_objects: - print("ERROR: content type: {0} is not valid, please use: {1}".format(type, str(valid_content_objects))) - sys.exit(1) - - TEMPLATE_PATH = path.join(security_content_path, 'bin/jinja2_templates') - - if example_only: - create_example(security_content_path,type, TEMPLATE_PATH) - sys.exit(0) - - if type == 'detection': - detection_wizard(security_content_path, type, TEMPLATE_PATH) - elif type == 'story': - story_wizard(security_content_path, type, TEMPLATE_PATH) - - print("WARNING do not forget to replace the UPDATE_* values with the correct information on the files!\ncompleted..") diff --git a/bin/pretty_yaml.py b/bin/pretty_yaml.py deleted file mode 100755 index 768d4abdf0..0000000000 --- a/bin/pretty_yaml.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,175 +0,0 @@ -#!/bin/python -from os import path, walk -import sys -import argparse -import yaml -import re - -def parse_data_models_from_search(search): - match = re.search(r'from\sdatamodel\s?=\s?([^\s.]*)', search) - if match is not None: - return match.group(1) - return False - -def pretty_yaml_detections(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part): - manifest_files = [] - types = ["endpoint", "application", "cloud", "deprecated", "experimental", "network", "web"] - for t in types: - for root, dirs, files in walk(REPO_PATH + "/" + content_part + '/' + t): - for file in files: - if file.endswith(".yml"): - manifest_files.append((path.join(root, file))) - - for manifest_file in manifest_files: - pretty_yaml = dict() - if VERBOSE: - print("processing manifest {0}".format(manifest_file)) - - with open(manifest_file, 'r') as stream: - try: - object = list(yaml.safe_load_all(stream))[0] - except yaml.YAMLError as exc: - print(exc) - print("Error reading {0}".format(manifest_file)) - error = True - continue - - pretty_yaml['name'] = object['name'] - pretty_yaml['id'] = object['id'] - pretty_yaml['version'] = object['version'] - pretty_yaml['date'] = object['date'] - pretty_yaml['author'] = object['author'] - pretty_yaml['type'] = object['type'] - pretty_yaml['datamodel'] = object['datamodel'] - pretty_yaml['description'] = object['description'] - pretty_yaml['search'] = object['search'] - if 'how_to_implement' in object: - pretty_yaml['how_to_implement'] = object['how_to_implement'] - else: - pretty_yaml['how_to_implement'] = '' - pretty_yaml['known_false_positives'] = object['known_false_positives'] - if 'references' in object: - pretty_yaml['references'] = object['references'] - else: - pretty_yaml['references'] = [] - pretty_yaml['tags'] = {key: value for key, value in sorted(object['tags'].items())} - - - with open(manifest_file, 'w') as file: - documents = yaml.dump(pretty_yaml, file, sort_keys=False) - - return manifest_files - -def pretty_yaml_deployments(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part): - manifest_files = [] - for root, dirs, files in walk(REPO_PATH + "/" + content_part + '/'): - for file in files: - if file.endswith(".yml"): - manifest_files.append((path.join(root, file))) - - for manifest_file in manifest_files: - pretty_yaml = dict() - if VERBOSE: - print("processing manifest {0}".format(manifest_file)) - - with open(manifest_file, 'r') as stream: - try: - object = list(yaml.safe_load_all(stream))[0] - except yaml.YAMLError as exc: - print(exc) - print("Error reading {0}".format(manifest_file)) - error = True - continue - - pretty_yaml['name'] = object['name'] - pretty_yaml['id'] = object['id'] - pretty_yaml['date'] = object['date'] - pretty_yaml['author'] = object['author'] - pretty_yaml['description'] = object['description'] - pretty_yaml['scheduling'] = object['scheduling'] - if 'alert_action' in object: - pretty_yaml['alert_action'] = object['alert_action'] - pretty_yaml['tags'] = {key: value for key, value in sorted(object['tags'].items())} - - with open(manifest_file, 'w') as file: - documents = yaml.dump(pretty_yaml, file, sort_keys=False) - - return manifest_files - -def pretty_yaml_stories(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part): - manifest_files = [] - for root, dirs, files in walk(REPO_PATH + "/" + content_part + '/'): - for file in files: - if file.endswith(".yml"): - manifest_files.append((path.join(root, file))) - - for manifest_file in manifest_files: - pretty_yaml = dict() - if VERBOSE: - print("processing manifest {0}".format(manifest_file)) - - with open(manifest_file, 'r') as stream: - try: - object = list(yaml.safe_load_all(stream))[0] - except yaml.YAMLError as exc: - print(exc) - print("Error reading {0}".format(manifest_file)) - error = True - continue - - pretty_yaml['name'] = object['name'] - pretty_yaml['id'] = object['id'] - pretty_yaml['version'] = object['version'] - pretty_yaml['date'] = object['date'] - pretty_yaml['author'] = object['author'] - pretty_yaml['description'] = object['description'] - pretty_yaml['narrative'] = object['narrative'] - if 'references' in object: - pretty_yaml['references'] = object['references'] - else: - pretty_yaml['references'] = [] - pretty_yaml['tags'] = {key: value for key, value in sorted(object['tags'].items())} - - with open(manifest_file, 'w') as file: - documents = yaml.dump(pretty_yaml, file, sort_keys=False) - - return manifest_files - -def pretty_yaml(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part): - #for root, dirs, files in walk(REPO_PATH + "/"): - manifest_files = [] - if content_part == 'detections': - manifest_files = pretty_yaml_detections(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part) - elif content_part == 'deployments': - manifest_files = pretty_yaml_deployments(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part) - elif content_part == 'stories': - manifest_files = pretty_yaml_stories(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, content_part) - return len(manifest_files) - -def main(args): - - parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="keeps yamls in security_content sorted and pretty printed with custom sort keys, \ - meant to run quitely for CI, use -v flag to make it bark") - - parser.add_argument("-p", "--path", required=True, help="path to security_content repo") - parser.add_argument("-v", "--verbose", required=False, default=False, action='store_true', help="prints verbose output") - - # parse them - args = parser.parse_args() - REPO_PATH = args.path - VERBOSE = args.verbose - output = [] - pretty_yaml_objects = ['macros','lookups','stories','detections','response_tasks','responses','deployments'] - for pretty_yaml_object in pretty_yaml_objects: - touch_count = pretty_yaml(REPO_PATH, VERBOSE, pretty_yaml_object) - if VERBOSE: - output.append("made {0} {1} pretty".format(touch_count, pretty_yaml_object)) - - for o in output: - print(o) - - print("finished successfully!") - - -if __name__ == "__main__": - main(sys.argv[1:]) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/reporting.py b/bin/reporting.py deleted file mode 100644 index 84432a7fb9..0000000000 --- a/bin/reporting.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,92 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/python - -import glob -import yaml -import argparse -import os -from os import path -import sys -import datetime -from jinja2 import Environment, FileSystemLoader - - -def load_objects(file_path, REPO_PATH): - files = [] - manifest_files = path.join(path.expanduser(REPO_PATH), file_path) - for file in sorted(glob.glob(manifest_files)): - files.append(load_file(file)) - return files - - -def load_file(file_path): - with open(file_path, 'r', encoding="utf-8") as stream: - try: - file = list(yaml.safe_load_all(stream))[0] - except yaml.YAMLError as exc: - print(exc) - sys.exit("ERROR: reading {0}".format(file_path)) - return file - - - -def main(args): - print("generated reporting information for our detections") - - # process all detections - REPO_PATH = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), '../') - detections = [] - detections = load_objects("detections/application/*.yml", REPO_PATH) - detections.extend(load_objects("detections/cloud/*.yml", REPO_PATH)) - detections.extend(load_objects("detections/endpoint/*.yml", REPO_PATH)) - detections.extend(load_objects("detections/network/*.yml", REPO_PATH)) - detections.extend(load_objects("detections/web/*.yml", REPO_PATH)) - - detections_all = detections.copy() - - #lets exclude all deprecated detections from our reporting and experimental - # detections_all.extend(load_objects("detections/deprecated/*.yml", REPO_PATH)) - # detections_all.extend(load_objects("detections/experimental/*/*.yml", REPO_PATH)) - count_detections_all = len(detections_all) - - tests = load_objects("tests/*/*.yml", REPO_PATH) - - counter_tests=0 - counter_detection=0 - - for detection in detections: - if detection['type'] != 'Baseline' and detection['type'] != 'Investigation': - counter_detection=counter_detection+1 - - for test in tests: - counter_tests=counter_tests+1 - - detection_coverage_tmp = counter_detection/counter_tests - if detection_coverage_tmp > 1: - detection_coverage_tmp = 1 - detection_coverage = "{:.0%}".format(detection_coverage_tmp) - - print("detection count: {}".format(counter_detection)) - print("test count: {}".format(counter_tests)) - print("detection_coverage {}".format(detection_coverage)) - - - TEMPLATE_PATH = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'jinja2_templates') - OUTPUT_PATH = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'reporting') - j2_env = Environment(loader=FileSystemLoader(TEMPLATE_PATH), trim_blocks=True) # nosemgrep - template = j2_env.get_template('detection_coverage.j2') - output_path = path.join(OUTPUT_PATH, 'detection_coverage.svg') - output = template.render(detection_coverage=detection_coverage) - with open(output_path, 'w', encoding="utf-8") as f: - f.write(output) - print("writting detection coverage report: {}".format(output_path)) - - template = j2_env.get_template('detection_count.j2') - output_path = path.join(OUTPUT_PATH, 'detection_count.svg') - output = template.render(detection_count=count_detections_all) - with open(output_path, 'w', encoding="utf-8") as f: - f.write(output) - print("writting detection count report: {}".format(output_path)) - - -if __name__ == "__main__": - main(sys.argv[1:]) diff --git a/bin/testing_coverage.py b/bin/testing_coverage.py deleted file mode 100644 index 655a00d224..0000000000 --- a/bin/testing_coverage.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,96 +0,0 @@ -import yaml -import os -import argparse -import sys - -tested = dict() -untested = dict() -coverage = dict() -total_tested = 0 -total_untested = 0 - -def get_path(p): - return os.path.join(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), p)) - - -def parse_detection(d): - with open(d, "r") as fh: - return yaml.safe_load(fh) - - -def main(args): - parser = argparse.ArgumentParser() - parser.add_argument('--min-coverage', - type=float, - default=0.0, - help="Minimum coverage, script return error if target is not met") - parser.add_argument('--types', type=str, nargs="*", help="batch, streaming", default=["batch", "streaming"]) - parsed = parser.parse_args(args) - populate_coverage(parsed.types) - print_results(parsed.types) - if total_tested / (total_tested + total_untested) < parsed.min_coverage: - print("Minimum coverage not met for %s" % ",".join(parsed.types)) - exit(-1) - - -def populate_coverage(types): - global total_tested, total_untested - # Find all tested - for root, _, files in os.walk(get_path("../tests")): - for test in files: - if test.endswith('.yml') or test.endswith('yaml'): - with open(os.path.join(root, test), 'r') as test_fh: - test_desc = yaml.safe_load(test_fh) - for t in test_desc['tests']: - detection_desc = parse_detection(get_path("../detections/%s" % t['file'])) - detection_type = detection_desc['type'] - if detection_type in types: - if detection_type not in tested: - tested[detection_type] = set() - tested[detection_type].add(t['file']) - - for root, _, files in os.walk(get_path("../detections")): - if not os.path.isfile(os.path.join(root, ".untested")): - for detection in files: - if detection.endswith('yml') or detection.endswith('yaml'): - detection_desc = parse_detection(os.path.join(root, detection)) - detection_type = detection_desc['type'] - if detection_type in types: - detection = "%s/%s" % (root.split("/")[-1], detection) - if detection not in tested[detection_type]: - if detection_type not in untested: - untested[detection_type] = list() - untested[detection_type].append(detection) - - for k in types: - n_tested = len(tested[k]) if k in tested else 0 - n_untested = len(untested[k]) if k in untested else 0 - total_tested = total_tested + n_tested - total_untested = total_untested + n_untested - coverage[k] = (n_tested, n_tested + n_untested, n_tested / (n_tested + n_untested)) - - -def print_results(types): - for k in types: - print(''' -Tested %s detections -==================== -%s - ''' % (k, "\n".join(tested[k]) if k in tested else "")) - print(''' -Untested %s detections -====================== -%s - ''' % (k, "\n".join(untested[k]) if k in untested else "")) - - for k in types: - print("""%s testing coverage: (%d/%d) %.2f""" - % (k, *coverage[k])) - - print("""Total testing coverage: (%d/%d) %.2f""" - % (total_tested, total_untested + total_tested, total_tested / (total_tested + total_untested))) - - - -if __name__ == '__main__': - main(sys.argv[1:]) diff --git a/bin/usage_searches.conf b/bin/usage_searches.conf deleted file mode 100644 index 6ba308dde1..0000000000 --- a/bin/usage_searches.conf +++ /dev/null @@ -1,73 +0,0 @@ -[escu-metrics-usage] -action.email.useNSSubject = 1 -alert.digest_mode = True -alert.suppress = 0 -alert.track = 0 -auto_summarize.dispatch.earliest_time = -1d@h -dispatchAs = user -search = index=_audit sourcetype="audittrail" \ -"ESCU - "\ -`comment("Find all the search names in the audittrail.")`\ -| stats count(search) by search savedsearch_name user\ -| eval usage=(if(savedsearch_name=="","Adhoc","Scheduled")) \ -`comment("If the savedsearch_name field in the audittrail is empty, the search was run adhoc. Otherwise it was run as a scheduled search")`\ -| rex field=search "\"(?.*)\""\ -`comment("Extract the name of the search from the search string")`\ -| table savedsearch_name count(search) usage user | join savedsearch_name max=0 type=left [search sourcetype="manifests" | spath searches{} | mvexpand searches{} | spath input=searches{} | table category search_name | rename search_name as savedsearch_name | dedup savedsearch_name] | search category=* - -[escu-metrics-search] -action.email.useNSSubject = 1 -alert.suppress = 0 -alert.track = 0 -auto_summarize.dispatch.earliest_time = -1d@h -enableSched = 1 -cron_schedule = 0 0 * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -4h@h -dispatch.latest_time = -1h@h -search = index=_audit action=search | transaction search_id maxspan=3m | search ESCU | stats sum(total_run_time) avg(total_run_time) max(total_run_time) sum(result_count) - -[escu-metrics-search-events] -action.email.useNSSubject = 1 -alert.digest_mode = True -alert.suppress = 0 -alert.track = 0 -auto_summarize.dispatch.earliest_time = -1d@h -cron_schedule = 0 0 * * * -enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -4h@h -dispatch.latest_time = -1h@h -search = [search index=_audit sourcetype="audittrail" \"ESCU NOT "index=_audit" | where search !="" | dedup search_id | rex field=search "\"(?.*)\"" | rex field=_raw "user=(?[a-zA-Z0-9_\-]+)" | eval usage=if(savedsearch_name!="", "scheduled", "adhoc") | eval savedsearch_name=if(savedsearch_name != "", savedsearch_name, search_name) | table savedsearch_name search_id user _time usage | outputlookup escu_search_id.csv | table search_id] index=_audit total_run_time event_count result_count NOT "index=_audit" | lookup escu_search_id.csv search_id | stats count(savedsearch_name) AS search_count avg(total_run_time) AS search_avg_run_time sum(total_run_time) AS search_total_run_time sum(result_count) AS search_total_results earliest(_time) AS firsts latest(_time) AS lasts by savedsearch_name user usage| eval first_run=strftime(firsts, "%B %d %Y") | eval last_run=strftime(lasts, "%B %d %Y") - -[escu-metrics-search-longest-runtime] -action.email.useNSSubject = 1 -alert.digest_mode = True -alert.suppress = 0 -alert.track = 0 -auto_summarize.dispatch.earliest_time = -1d@h -enableSched = 1 -cron_schedule = 0 0 * * * -disabled = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -4h@h -dispatch.latest_time = -1h@h -search = index=_* ESCU [search index=_* action=search latest=-2h earliest=-1d| transaction search_id maxspan=3m | search ESCU | stats values(total_run_time) AS run by search_id | sort -run | head 1| table search_id] | table search search_id - -[escu-metrics-usage-search] -action.email.useNSSubject = 1 -alert.digest_mode = True -alert.suppress = 0 -alert.track = 0 -auto_summarize.dispatch.earliest_time = -1d@h -cron_schedule = 0 0 * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -4h@h -dispatch.latest_time = -1h@h -enableSched = 1 -dispatchAs = user -search = index=_audit sourcetype="audittrail" \ -"ESCU - "\ -`comment("Find all the search names in the audittrail. Ignore the last few minutes so we can exclude this search's text from the result.")`\ -| stats count(search) by search savedsearch_name user\ -| eval usage=(if(savedsearch_name=="","Adhoc","Scheduled")) \ -`comment("If the savedsearch_name field in the audittrail is empty, the search was run adhoc. Otherwise it was run as a scheduled search")`\ -| rex field=search "\"(?.*)\""\ -`comment("Extract the name of the search from the search string")`\ -| table savedsearch_name count(search) usage user | join savedsearch_name max=0 type=left [search sourcetype="manifests" | spath searches{} | mvexpand searches{} | spath input=searches{} | table category search_name | rename search_name as savedsearch_name | dedup savedsearch_name] | search category=* \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/validate.py b/bin/validate.py deleted file mode 100644 index 554a1a5217..0000000000 --- a/bin/validate.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,295 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/python - -''' -Validates Manifest file under the security_content repo for correctness. -''' - -import glob -import json -import jsonschema -import yaml -import sys -import argparse -import datetime -import string -import re -from pathlib import Path -from os import path, walk - - -def validate_schema(REPO_PATH, detection_type, objects, verbose): - #Default regex does NOT match ssa___*.yml files: "^(?!ssa___).*\.yml$" - #The following search will match ssa___*.yml files: "^ssa___.*\.yml$" - if detection_type.startswith("ba_"): - filename_regex = "^ssa___.*\.yml$" - else: - filename_regex = "^(?!ssa___).*\.yml$" - - - - error = False - errors = [] - - schema_file = path.join(path.expanduser(REPO_PATH), 'spec/' + detection_type + '.spec.json') - #remove the prefix if the detection type starts with ba_ so we can - #get the files from the proper folders and proceed correctly - if detection_type.startswith("ba_"): - detection_type = detection_type[3:] - - try: - schema = json.loads(open(schema_file, 'rb').read()) - except IOError: - print("ERROR: reading schema file {0}".format(schema_file)) - - manifest_files = [] - for root, dirs, files in walk(REPO_PATH + "/" + detection_type): - for file in files: - if re.search(filename_regex, path.basename(file)) is not None: - manifest_files.append((path.join(root, file))) - for manifest_file in manifest_files: - if verbose: - print("processing manifest {0}".format(manifest_file)) - - with open(manifest_file, 'r') as stream: - try: - object = list(yaml.safe_load_all(stream))[0] - except yaml.YAMLError as exc: - print(exc) - print("Error reading {0}".format(manifest_file)) - errors.append("ERROR: Error reading {0}".format(manifest_file)) - error = True - continue - - validator = jsonschema.Draft7Validator(schema, format_checker=jsonschema.FormatChecker()) - for schema_error in validator.iter_errors(object): - errors.append("ERROR: {0} at:\n\t{1}".format(json.dumps(schema_error.message), manifest_file)) - error = True - - if detection_type in objects: - objects[detection_type].append(object) - else: - arr = [] - arr.append(object) - objects[detection_type] = arr - print("***END OF VALIDATE SCHEMA ***") - return objects, error, errors - - -def validate_objects(REPO_PATH, objects, verbose): - - # uuids - uuids = [] - errors = [] - - for lookup in objects['lookups']: - errors = errors + validate_lookups_content(REPO_PATH, "lookups/%s", lookup) - - objects_array = objects['stories'] + objects['detections'] - for object in objects_array: - validation_errors, uuids = validate_standard_fields(object, uuids) - errors = errors + validation_errors - - for object in objects['detections']: - if not 'Splunk Behavioral Analytics' in object['tags']['product']: - errors = errors + validate_detection_search(object, objects['macros']) - errors = errors + validate_fields(object) - - for object in objects['tests']: - errors = errors + validate_tests(REPO_PATH, object) - - return errors - - -def validate_fields(object): - errors = [] - - if object['type'] not in ['TTP', 'Anomaly', 'Hunting', 'Baseline', 'Investigation', 'Correlation']: - errors.append('ERROR: invalid type [TTP, Anomaly, Hunting, Baseline, Investigation, Correlation] for object: %s' % object['name']) - - if 'tags' in object: - - # check if required_fields is present - if 'required_fields' not in object['tags']: - errors.append("ERROR: a `required_fields` tag is required for object: %s" % object['name']) - - if 'security_domain' not in object['tags']: - errors.append("ERROR: a `security_domain` tag is required for object: %s" % object['name']) - - if object['type'] == 'streaming' and 'risk_severity' not in object['tags']: - errors.append("ERROR: a `risk_severity` tag is required for object: %s" % object['name']) - - return errors - - -def validate_standard_fields(object, uuids): - - errors = [] - - if object['id'] == '': - errors.append('ERROR: Blank ID for object: %s' % object['name']) - - if object['id'] in uuids: - errors.append('ERROR: Duplicate UUID found for object: %s' % object['name']) - else: - uuids.append(object['id']) - - if 'products' in object['tags']: - if (not 'Splunk Behavioral Analytics' in object['tags']['products']) and len(object['name']) > 75: - errors.append('ERROR: Search name is longer than 75 characters: %s' % (object['name'])) - - # if object['name'].endswith(" "): - # errors.append( - # "ERROR: name has trailing spaces: '%s'" % - # object['name']) - - invalidChars = set(string.punctuation.replace("-", "")) - if any(char in invalidChars for char in object['name']): - errors.append('ERROR: No special characters allowed in name for object: %s' % object['name']) - - try: - object['description'].encode('ascii') - except UnicodeEncodeError: - errors.append("ERROR: description not ascii for object: %s" % object['name']) - - if 'how_to_implement' in object: - try: - object['how_to_implement'].encode('ascii') - except UnicodeEncodeError: - errors.append('ERROR: how_to_implement not ascii for object: %s' % object['name']) - - try: - datetime.datetime.strptime(object['date'], '%Y-%m-%d') - except ValueError: - errors.append("ERROR: Incorrect date format, should be YYYY-MM-DD for object: %s" % object['name']) - - # logic for handling risk related tags which are a triple of k/v pairs - # risk_object, risk_object_type and risk_score - # the first two fields risk_object, and risk_object_type are an enum of fixed values - # defined by ESCU risk scoring - - if 'tags' in object: - # check product tag is present in all objects - if 'product' not in object['tags']: - errors.append("ERROR: a `product` tag is required for object: %s" % object['name']) - - for k,v in object['tags'].items(): - - if k == 'impact': - if not isinstance(v, int): - errors.append("ERROR: impact not integer value for object: %s" % v) - - if k == 'confidence': - if not isinstance(v, int): - errors.append("ERROR: confidence not integer value for object: %s" % v) - if k == 'risk_score': - if not isinstance(v, int): - errors.append("ERROR: risk_score not integer value for object: %s" % v) - - if 'impact' in object['tags'] and 'confidence' in object['tags']: - calculated_risk_score = int(((object['tags']['impact'])*(object['tags']['confidence']))/100) - if calculated_risk_score != object['tags']['risk_score']: - errors.append("ERROR: risk_score not calulated correctly and it should be set to %s for " % calculated_risk_score + object['name']) - return errors, uuids - - -def validate_detection_search(object, macros): - errors = [] - - if not (object['type'] == "Baseline" or object['type'] == "Investigation"): - if not '_filter' in object['search']: - errors.append("ERROR: Missing filter for detection: " + object['name']) - elif object['type'] == "Baseline": - if not 'deployments' in object['tags']: - errors.append("ERROR: Baseline need a corresponsing deployments: " + object['name']) - - filter_macro = re.search("([a-z0-9_]*_filter)", object['search']) - - if filter_macro and filter_macro.group(1) != (object['name'].replace(' ', '_').replace('-', '_').replace('.', '_').replace('/', '_').lower() + '_filter') and "input_filter" not in filter_macro.group(1): - errors.append("ERROR: filter for detection: " + object['name'] + " needs to use the name of the detection in lowercase and the special characters needs to be converted into _ .") - - if any(x in object['search'] for x in ['eventtype=', 'sourcetype=', ' source=', 'index=']): - if not 'index=_internal' in object['search']: - errors.append("ERROR: Use source macro instead of eventtype, sourcetype, source or index in detection: " + object['name']) - - macros_found = re.findall('\`([^\s]+)`',object['search']) - macros_filtered = [] - for macro in macros_found: - if not '_filter' in macro and not 'security_content_ctime' in macro and not 'drop_dm_object_name' in macro and not 'cim_' in macro and not 'get_' in macro: - macros_filtered.append(macro) - - for macro in macros_filtered: - found_macro = False - for macro_obj in macros: - if macro_obj['name'] == macro: - found_macro = True - - if not found_macro: - errors.append("ERROR: macro definition for " + macro + " can't be found for detection " + object['name']) - - return errors - - -def validate_lookups_content(REPO_PATH, lookup_path, lookup): - errors = [] - if 'filename' in lookup: - lookup_csv_file = path.join(path.expanduser(REPO_PATH), lookup_path % lookup['filename']) - if not path.isfile(lookup_csv_file): - errors.append("ERROR: filename {} does not exist".format(lookup['filename'])) - - return errors - - -def validate_tests(REPO_PATH, object): - errors = [] - - # check detection file exists - for test in object['tests']: - if 'file' in test: - detection_file_path = Path(REPO_PATH + '/detections/' + test['file']) - if not detection_file_path.is_file(): - errors.append('ERROR: orphaned test: {0}, detection file: {1} no longer exists or incorrect detection path under `file`'.format(object['name'], detection_file_path)) - else: - errors.append('ERROR: test: {0} does not have a detection `file` associated with detection: {1}'.format(object['name'], test['name'])) - #test['file'] - return errors - -def main(REPO_PATH, verbose): - - validation_objects = ['macros','lookups','stories','detections', 'ba_detections','deployments', 'tests'] - - - objects = {} - schema_error = False - schema_errors = [] - - for validation_object in validation_objects: - objects, error, errors = validate_schema(REPO_PATH, validation_object, objects, verbose) - schema_error = schema_error or error - if len(errors) > 0: - schema_errors = schema_errors + errors - - validation_errors = validate_objects(REPO_PATH, objects, verbose) - - schema_errors = schema_errors + validation_errors - - for schema_error in schema_errors: - print(schema_error) - - if schema_error or len(schema_errors) > 0: - sys.exit("Errors found") - else: - print("No Errors found") - - -if __name__ == "__main__": - # grab arguments - parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="validates security content manifest files", epilog=""" - Validates security manifest for correctness, adhering to spec and other common items.""") - parser.add_argument("-p", "--path", required=True, help="path to security-security content repo") - parser.add_argument("-v", "--verbose", required=False, action='store_true', help="prints verbose output") - # parse them - args = parser.parse_args() - REPO_PATH = args.path - verbose = args.verbose - - main(REPO_PATH, verbose) diff --git a/bin/yaml_to_json.py b/bin/yaml_to_json.py deleted file mode 100644 index 491c919523..0000000000 --- a/bin/yaml_to_json.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,277 +0,0 @@ -import yaml, json -import csv -from io import StringIO -import re -import os -import shutil - -class Yaml2Json(): - ''' - Yaml2Json is a logical port of security-content-api > chalicelib > data_mapper.py - This module processes YAML files directly within the repo and outputs consolidated JSON. - ''' - def __init__(self, type, repo_path=None): - - self.repo_path = repo_path - - if type == 'detections' or type == 'stories': - lookup_objects = self.load_objects('lookups') - self.lookups = self.generate_lookup_dict(lookup_objects) - macro_objects = self.load_objects('macros') - self.macros = self.generate_macro_dict(macro_objects) - self.baselines = self.load_objects('baselines') - self.bas_det = self.map_baseline_to_detection(self.baselines) - self.mitre_enrichment = self.load_mitre_lookup(type) - - if type == 'stories': - self.detections = self.load_objects('detections') - self.det_sto = self.map_detection_to_story(self.detections) - - if type == 'baselines': - macro_objects = self.load_objects('macros') - self.macros = self.generate_macro_dict(macro_objects) - lookup_objects = self.load_objects('lookups') - self.lookups = self.generate_lookup_dict(lookup_objects) - - if type == 'macros': - lookup_objects = self.load_objects('lookups') - self.lookups = self.generate_lookup_dict(lookup_objects) - - - def get_repo_dir(self): - if not self.repo_path: - # this file typically resides in '\bin' one level below the repo - return os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), '../') - else: - return os.path.abspath(self.repo_path) - - - def get_type_dir(self, type): - type_dir_name = str.lower(type) - return os.path.join(self.get_repo_dir(), type) - - - def list_objects(self, type): - objects = self.load_objects(type) - total = len(objects) - content = {type:objects, 'count':total} - - return content - - - def load_objects(self, type): - - type_dir = self.get_type_dir(type) - file_paths = [] - - for root, dirnames, filenames in os.walk(type_dir): - for filename in filenames: - filepath = os.path.join(root, filename) - if not 'deprecated' in filepath: - filename_w_ext = os.path.basename(filepath) - filename, file_extension = os.path.splitext(filename_w_ext) - if filename != "" and file_extension == '.yml': - file_paths.append(filepath) - - objects = [] - for file_path in file_paths: - object = self.load_object(file_path, type) - if object: - objects.append(object) - - return objects - - - def load_object(self, file_path, type): - - with open(file_path, 'r') as stream: - try: - file = yaml.safe_load(stream) - except: - raise - - # enrich story with detections and responses - if type == 'stories': - if not 'type' in file: - file['type'] = '' - - if file['name'] in self.det_sto: - file['detections'] = self.det_sto[file['name']] - else: - file['detections'] = [] - mitre_attack_id_set = set() - mitre_attack_technique_set = set() - mitre_attack_tactics_set = set() - mitre_attack_groups_set = set() - for detection in file['detections']: - if 'tags' in detection: - if 'mitre_attack_id' in detection['tags']: - mitre_attack_id_set.update(detection['tags']['mitre_attack_id']) - if 'mitre_attack_technique' in detection['tags']: - mitre_attack_technique_set.update(detection['tags']['mitre_attack_technique']) - if 'mitre_attack_tactics' in detection['tags']: - mitre_attack_tactics_set.update(detection['tags']['mitre_attack_tactics']) - if 'mitre_attack_groups' in detection['tags']: - mitre_attack_groups_set.update(detection['tags']['mitre_attack_groups']) - file['tags']['mitre_attack_id'] = list(mitre_attack_id_set) - file['tags']['mitre_attack_technique'] = list(mitre_attack_technique_set) - file['tags']['mitre_attack_tactics'] = list(mitre_attack_tactics_set) - file['tags']['mitre_attack_groups'] = list(mitre_attack_groups_set) - - # enrich detections with baselines and macros - if type == 'detections': - if file['type'] == 'Baseline' or file['type'] == 'Investigation': - return None - if file['name'] in self.bas_det: - file['baselines'] = self.bas_det[file['name']] - if file['type'] != 'SSA': - file['macros'] = self.parse_and_add_macros(file) - lookups = self.parse_and_add_lookups(file['search']) - if len(lookups) > 0: - file['lookups'] = lookups - technique_array = [] - tactics_array = [] - groups_array = [] - if 'tags' in file: - if 'mitre_attack_id' in file['tags']: - for mitre_attack_id in file['tags']['mitre_attack_id']: - if mitre_attack_id in self.mitre_enrichment: - obj = self.mitre_enrichment[mitre_attack_id] - technique_array.append(obj[0]) - tactics_array.extend(obj[1]) - groups_array.extend(obj[2]) - file['tags']['mitre_attack_technique'] = technique_array - file['tags']['mitre_attack_tactics'] = tactics_array - file['tags']['mitre_attack_groups'] = groups_array - - if type == 'baselines': - file['macros'] = self.parse_and_add_macros(file) - lookups = self.parse_and_add_lookups(file['search']) - if len(lookups) > 0: - file['lookups'] = lookups - - return file - - - def load_mitre_lookup(self, type): - - with open(os.path.join(self.get_repo_dir(), 'lookups', 'mitre_enrichment.csv')) as csv_file: - - try: - mitre_enrichment = {} - reader = csv.DictReader(csv_file) - for row in reader: - mitre_enrichment[row['mitre_id']] = [row['technique'], row['tactics'].split('|'), row['groups'].split('|')] - except: - raise - - return mitre_enrichment - - - def get_file_name(self, input_str): - file_name = input_str.replace(' ', '_').replace('-','_').replace('.','_').replace('/','_').lower() - return file_name - - - def map_baseline_to_detection(self, baselines): - bas_det = dict() - for baseline in baselines: - if 'tags' in baseline: - if 'detections' in baseline['tags']: - for detection in baseline['tags']['detections']: - if not (detection in bas_det): - bas_det[detection] = [baseline] - else: - bas_det[detection].append(baseline) - return bas_det - - - def map_detection_to_story(self, detections): - det_sto = dict() - for detection in detections: - if 'tags' in detection: - if 'analytic_story' in detection['tags']: - for story in detection['tags']['analytic_story']: - if not (story in det_sto): - det_sto[story] = [detection] - else: - det_sto[story].append(detection) - return det_sto - - - def generate_macro_dict(self, macros): - macro_dict = {} - for macro in macros: - macro_dict[macro['name']] = macro - - return macro_dict - - def generate_lookup_dict(self, lookups): - lookup_dict = {} - for lookup in lookups: - lookup_dict[lookup['name']] = lookup - - return lookup_dict - - - def parse_and_add_macros(self, object): - macros_found = re.findall('\`([^\s]+)`', object['search']) - macros_filtered = set() - for macro in macros_found: - if not 'cim_' in macro and not 'get_' in macro and not '_filter' in macro and not 'drop_dm_object_name' in macro: - start = macro.find('(') - if start != -1: - macros_filtered.add(macro[:start]) - else: - macros_filtered.add(macro) - - macro_objects = [] - for macro in list(macros_filtered): - lookups = self.parse_and_add_lookups(self.macros[macro]['definition']) - if len(lookups) > 0: - self.macros[macro]['lookups'] = lookups - macro_objects.append(self.macros[macro]) - - new_dict = {} - new_dict['definition'] = 'search *' - new_dict['description'] = 'Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ' - new_dict['name'] = object['name'].replace(' ', '_').replace('-', '_').replace('.', '_').replace('/', '_').lower() + '_filter' - macro_objects.append(new_dict) - - return macro_objects - - def parse_and_add_lookups(self, search_string): - lookups_found = re.findall('lookup (?:update=true)?(?:append=t)?\s*([^\s]*)', search_string) - lookup_objects = [] - for lookup in lookups_found: - if lookup in self.lookups: - lookup_obj = self.lookups[lookup] - if not ('fields_list' in lookup_obj): - csv_file_name = lookup_obj['filename'] - lookup_obj['csv_file_url'] = 'https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/' + csv_file_name - - lookup_objects.append(lookup_obj) - - return lookup_objects - - -if __name__ == "__main__": - json_types = [] - # List of all YAML types to search in repo - yml_types = ['detections', 'baselines', 'lookups', 'macros', 'response_tasks', 'responses', 'stories', 'deployments'] - # output directory name will be same as this filename - output_dir = os.path.splitext(os.path.basename(__file__))[0] - print("JSON output directory: " + output_dir) - # remove any pre-existing output directories - shutil.rmtree(output_dir, ignore_errors=True) - print("Remove pre-existing JSON directory") - # create output directory - os.mkdir(output_dir) - print("Created output directory") - # Generate all YAML types - for yt in yml_types: - processor = Yaml2Json(yt) - with open(os.path.join(output_dir, yt + '.json'), 'w') as json_out: - # write out YAML type - json.dump(processor.list_objects(yt), json_out) - print("Writing %s JSON" % yt) diff --git a/contentctl.py b/contentctl.py index 4f4b352701..a250e158f1 100644 --- a/contentctl.py +++ b/contentctl.py @@ -1,19 +1,42 @@ -import os import sys import argparse -from bin import validate as validator -sys.path.append('bin') -from bin import generate as generator -from bin import newcontent as content -from pathlib import Path +import os -VERSION = 1 +sys.path.insert(0, os.path.abspath(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'bin/contentctl_project'))) + +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.use_cases.content_changer import ContentChanger, ContentChangerInputDto +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.use_cases.generate import GenerateInputDto, Generate +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.use_cases.validate import ValidateInputDto, Validate +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.use_cases.doc_gen import DocGenInputDto, DocGen +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.use_cases.new_content import NewContentInputDto, NewContent +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.use_cases.reporting import ReportingInputDto, Reporting +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.factory.factory import FactoryInputDto +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.factory.ba_factory import BAFactoryInputDto +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.factory.new_content_factory import NewContentFactoryInputDto +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.factory.object_factory import ObjectFactoryInputDto +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_object_builder import SecurityContentObjectBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_director import SecurityContentDirector +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.adapter.obj_to_yml_adapter import ObjToYmlAdapter +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.adapter.obj_to_json_adapter import ObjToJsonAdapter +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_story_builder import SecurityContentStoryBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_detection_builder import SecurityContentDetectionBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_basic_builder import SecurityContentBasicBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_investigation_builder import SecurityContentInvestigationBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_baseline_builder import SecurityContentBaselineBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.security_content_playbook_builder import SecurityContentPlaybookBuilder +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.enums.enums import SecurityContentProduct +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.adapter.obj_to_conf_adapter import ObjToConfAdapter +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.adapter.obj_to_md_adapter import ObjToMdAdapter +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.adapter.obj_to_svg_adapter import ObjToSvgAdapter +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.adapter.obj_to_attack_nav_adapter import ObjToAttackNavAdapter +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_infrastructure.builder.attack_enrichment import AttackEnrichment +from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.enums.enums import SecurityContentType def init(args): - path = args.path + print(""" -Running Splunk Security Content Control Tool (contentctl) v{0} +Running Splunk Security Content Control Tool (contentctl) starting program loaded for TIE Fighter... _ _ T T T T @@ -40,10 +63,10 @@ starting program loaded for TIE Fighter... | | | | l_i l_j -Row - """.format(VERSION)) + """) # parse config - security_content_path = Path(path).resolve() + security_content_path = os.path(args.path).resolve() if security_content_path.is_dir(): print("contentctl is reading from path {0}".format( security_content_path)) @@ -53,65 +76,235 @@ starting program loaded for TIE Fighter... return str(security_content_path) -def new(args): - security_content_path = init(args) - print("contentctl is creating a new {0}".format(args.type)) - content.new(security_content_path, args.verbose, args.type, args.example_only) +def content_changer(args) -> None: + factory_input_dto = ObjectFactoryInputDto( + os.path.abspath(args.path), + SecurityContentObjectBuilder(), + SecurityContentDirector() + ) -def validate(args): - security_content_path = init(args) - print("contentctl is validating all content under {0}".format(security_content_path)) - validator.main(security_content_path, True) + input_dto = ContentChangerInputDto( + ObjToYmlAdapter(), + factory_input_dto, + args.change_function + ) + + content_changer = ContentChanger() + content_changer.execute(input_dto) -def generate(args): - security_content_path = init(args) - output = Path(args.output).resolve() - if output.is_dir(): - print("contentctl is using folder {0} to write deployment".format( - output)) - else: - print("ERROR: contentctl failed to find folder for deployment {0}".format(output)) +def generate(args) -> None: + if not args.product: + print("ERROR: missing parameter -p/--product .") + sys.exit(1) + + if args.product not in ['ESCU', 'SSA', 'API']: + print("ERROR: invalid product. valid products are ESCU, SSA or API.") sys.exit(1) - print("contentctl is generating a new splunk_app under {}".format(output)) - generator.main(security_content_path, args.output, args.product, args.verbose) + factory_input_dto = FactoryInputDto( + os.path.abspath(args.path), + SecurityContentBasicBuilder(), + SecurityContentDetectionBuilder(), + SecurityContentStoryBuilder(), + SecurityContentBaselineBuilder(), + SecurityContentInvestigationBuilder(), + SecurityContentPlaybookBuilder(), + SecurityContentDirector(), + AttackEnrichment.get_attack_lookup() + ) + + ba_factory_input_dto = BAFactoryInputDto( + os.path.abspath(args.path), + SecurityContentBasicBuilder(), + SecurityContentDetectionBuilder(), + SecurityContentDirector() + ) + + if args.product == "ESCU": + generate_input_dto = GenerateInputDto( + os.path.abspath(args.output), + factory_input_dto, + ba_factory_input_dto, + ObjToConfAdapter(), + SecurityContentProduct.ESCU + ) + elif args.product == "API": + generate_input_dto = GenerateInputDto( + os.path.abspath(args.output), + factory_input_dto, + ba_factory_input_dto, + ObjToJsonAdapter(), + SecurityContentProduct.API + ) + else: + generate_input_dto = GenerateInputDto( + os.path.abspath(args.output), + factory_input_dto, + ba_factory_input_dto, + ObjToYmlAdapter(), + SecurityContentProduct.SSA + ) + + generate = Generate() + generate.execute(generate_input_dto) + + +def validate(args) -> None: + if not args.product: + print("ERROR: missing parameter -p/--product .") + sys.exit(1) + + if args.product not in ['ESCU', 'SSA']: + print("ERROR: invalid product. valid products are ESCU, SSA or API.") + sys.exit(1) + + factory_input_dto = FactoryInputDto( + os.path.abspath(args.path), + SecurityContentBasicBuilder(), + SecurityContentDetectionBuilder(), + SecurityContentStoryBuilder(), + SecurityContentBaselineBuilder(), + SecurityContentInvestigationBuilder(), + SecurityContentPlaybookBuilder(), + SecurityContentDirector(), + AttackEnrichment.get_attack_lookup() + ) + + ba_factory_input_dto = BAFactoryInputDto( + os.path.abspath(args.path), + SecurityContentBasicBuilder(), + SecurityContentDetectionBuilder(), + SecurityContentDirector() + ) + + if args.product == "ESCU": + validate_input_dto = ValidateInputDto( + factory_input_dto, + ba_factory_input_dto, + SecurityContentProduct.ESCU + ) + elif args.product == "SSA": + validate_input_dto = ValidateInputDto( + factory_input_dto, + ba_factory_input_dto, + SecurityContentProduct.SSA + ) + + validate = Validate() + validate.execute(validate_input_dto) + + +def doc_gen(args) -> None: + factory_input_dto = FactoryInputDto( + os.path.abspath(args.path), + SecurityContentBasicBuilder(), + SecurityContentDetectionBuilder(), + SecurityContentStoryBuilder(), + SecurityContentBaselineBuilder(), + SecurityContentInvestigationBuilder(), + SecurityContentPlaybookBuilder(), + SecurityContentDirector(), + AttackEnrichment.get_attack_lookup() + ) + + doc_gen_input_dto = DocGenInputDto( + os.path.abspath(args.output), + factory_input_dto, + ObjToMdAdapter() + ) + + doc_gen = DocGen() + doc_gen.execute(doc_gen_input_dto) + + +def new_content(args) -> None: + if args.type == 'detection': + type = SecurityContentType.detections + elif args.type == 'story': + type = SecurityContentType.stories + else: + print("ERROR: type " + args.type + " not supported") + sys.exit(1) + + new_content_factory_input_dto = NewContentFactoryInputDto(type) + new_content_input_dto = NewContentInputDto(new_content_factory_input_dto, ObjToYmlAdapter()) + new_content = NewContent() + new_content.execute(new_content_input_dto) + + +def reporting(args) -> None: + factory_input_dto = FactoryInputDto( + os.path.abspath(args.path), + SecurityContentBasicBuilder(), + SecurityContentDetectionBuilder(), + SecurityContentStoryBuilder(), + SecurityContentBaselineBuilder(), + SecurityContentInvestigationBuilder(), + SecurityContentPlaybookBuilder(), + SecurityContentDirector(), + AttackEnrichment.get_attack_lookup() + ) + + reporting_input_dto = ReportingInputDto( + factory_input_dto, + ObjToSvgAdapter(), + ObjToAttackNavAdapter() + ) + + reporting = Reporting() + reporting.execute(reporting_input_dto) def main(args): + # grab arguments parser = argparse.ArgumentParser( description="Use `contentctl.py action -h` to get help with any Splunk Security Content action") - parser.add_argument("-p", "--path", required=False, default=".", - help="path to the Splunk Security Content. Defaults to `.`") - parser.add_argument("--Version", default=False, action="version", version="version: {0}".format(VERSION), - help="shows current contentctl version") - parser.add_argument("-v", "--verbose", required=False, action='store_true', - help="silences all verbose output, defaults to False") + parser.add_argument("-p", "--path", required=True, + help="path to the Splunk Security Content folder") parser.set_defaults(func=lambda _: parser.print_help()) actions_parser = parser.add_subparsers(title="Splunk Security Content actions", dest="action") - new_parser = actions_parser.add_parser("new", help="Create new content (detection, story, baseline)") + #new_parser = actions_parser.add_parser("new", help="Create new content (detection, story, baseline)") validate_parser = actions_parser.add_parser("validate", help="Validates written content") generate_parser = actions_parser.add_parser("generate", help="Generates a deployment package for different platforms (splunk_app)") + content_changer_parser = actions_parser.add_parser("content_changer", help="Change Security Content based on defined rules") + docgen_parser = actions_parser.add_parser("docgen", help="Generates documentation") + new_content_parser = actions_parser.add_parser("new_content", help="Create new security content object") + reporting_parser = actions_parser.add_parser("reporting", help="Create security content reporting") - # new arguments - new_parser.add_argument("-t", "--type", required=False, type=str, default="detection", - help="Type of new content to create, please choose between `detection`, `baseline` or `story`. Defaults to `detection`") - new_parser.add_argument("-x", "--example_only", required=False, action='store_true', - help="Generates an example content UPDATE on the fields that need updating. Use `git status` to see what specific files are added. Skips new content wizard prompts.") - new_parser.set_defaults(func=new) + # # new arguments + # new_parser.add_argument("-t", "--type", required=False, type=str, default="detection", + # help="Type of new content to create, please choose between `detection`, `baseline` or `story`. Defaults to `detection`") + # new_parser.add_argument("-x", "--example_only", required=False, action='store_true', + # help="Generates an example content UPDATE on the fields that need updating. Use `git status` to see what specific files are added. Skips new content wizard prompts.") + # new_parser.set_defaults(func=new) - # validate arguments + validate_parser.add_argument("-pr", "--product", required=True, type=str, + help="Type of package to create, choose between `ESCU` or `SSA`.") validate_parser.set_defaults(func=validate, epilog=""" - Validates security manifest for correctness, adhering to spec and other common items.""") + Validates security manifest for correctness, adhering to spec and other common items.""") - # generate arguments - generate_parser.add_argument("-o", "--output", required=False, type=str, default="dist/escu", - help="Path where to store the deployment package, defaults to `dist/escu`") - generate_parser.add_argument("-p", "--product", required=False, type=str, default="ESCU", - help="Type of package to create, choose between `ESCU`, `DevSecOps`, `SAAWS`, or `SSA`. Defaults to `ESCU`") + generate_parser.add_argument("-o", "--output", required=True, type=str, + help="Path where to store the deployment package") + generate_parser.add_argument("-pr", "--product", required=True, type=str, + help="Type of package to create, choose between `ESCU`, `SSA` or `API`.") generate_parser.set_defaults(func=generate) + + content_changer_parser.add_argument("-cf", "--change_function", required=True, type=str, + help="Define a change funtion defined in bin/contentctl_core/contentctl/application/use_cases/content_changer.py") + content_changer_parser.set_defaults(func=content_changer) + + docgen_parser.add_argument("-o", "--output", required=True, type=str, + help="Path where to store the documentation") + docgen_parser.set_defaults(func=doc_gen) + + new_content_parser.add_argument("-t", "--type", required=True, type=str, + help="Type of security content object, choose between `detection`, `story`") + new_content_parser.set_defaults(func=new_content) + + reporting_parser.set_defaults(func=reporting) # # parse them args = parser.parse_args() @@ -119,4 +312,4 @@ def main(args): if __name__ == "__main__": - main(sys.argv[1:]) + main(sys.argv[1:]) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/deployments/ESCU/00_default_anomaly.yml b/deployments/ESCU/00_default_anomaly.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..034de012d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/deployments/ESCU/00_default_anomaly.yml @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +name: ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly +id: a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216 +date: '2021-12-21' +author: Patrick Bareiss +description: This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. + These detections will use Risk Based Alerting. +scheduling: + cron_schedule: 0 * * * * + earliest_time: -70m@m + latest_time: -10m@m + schedule_window: auto +alert_action: + rba: + enabled: 'true' +tags: + type: Anomaly + product: ESCU diff --git a/deployments/ESCU/00_default_baseline.yml b/deployments/ESCU/00_default_baseline.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..10bdc8d357 --- /dev/null +++ b/deployments/ESCU/00_default_baseline.yml @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +name: ESCU Default Configuration Baseline +id: 0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510 +date: '2021-12-21' +author: Patrick Bareiss +description: This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline. +scheduling: + cron_schedule: 0 * * * * + earliest_time: -70m@m + latest_time: -10m@m + schedule_window: auto +tags: + type: Baseline diff --git a/deployments/ESCU/00_default_correlation.yml b/deployments/ESCU/00_default_correlation.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..36531a0e7a --- /dev/null +++ b/deployments/ESCU/00_default_correlation.yml @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +name: ESCU Default Configuration Correlation +id: 36ba498c-46e8-4b62-8bde-67e984a40fb4 +date: '2021-12-21' +author: Patrick Bareiss +description: This configuration file applies to all detections of type Correlation. + These correlations will generate Notable Events. +scheduling: + cron_schedule: 0 * * * * + earliest_time: -70m@m + latest_time: -10m@m + schedule_window: auto +alert_action: + notable: + rule_description: '%description%' + rule_title: '%name%' + nes_fields: + - user + - dest + - src +tags: + type: 'Correlation' + product: ESCU diff --git a/deployments/ESCU/00_default_hunting.yml b/deployments/ESCU/00_default_hunting.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..89598ab6b3 --- /dev/null +++ b/deployments/ESCU/00_default_hunting.yml @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +name: ESCU Default Configuration Hunting +id: cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b +date: '2021-12-21' +author: Patrick Bareiss +description: This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting. +scheduling: + cron_schedule: 0 * * * * + earliest_time: -70m@m + latest_time: -10m@m + schedule_window: auto +tags: + type: Hunting + product: ESCU diff --git a/deployments/ESCU/00_default_ttp.yml b/deployments/ESCU/00_default_ttp.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..94d690b648 --- /dev/null +++ b/deployments/ESCU/00_default_ttp.yml @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +name: ESCU Default Configuration TTP +id: b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b +date: '2021-12-21' +author: Patrick Bareiss +description: This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. + These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events. +scheduling: + cron_schedule: 0 * * * * + earliest_time: -70m@m + latest_time: -10m@m + schedule_window: auto +alert_action: + notable: + rule_description: '%description%' + rule_title: '%name%' + nes_fields: + - user + - dest + - src + rba: + enabled: 'true' +tags: + type: TTP diff --git a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml index df978db766..b9b1648f44 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml @@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud User Activities asset_type: AWS Instance - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 16 confidence: 50 @@ -55,7 +54,6 @@ tags: role: - Attacker product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml index cb1a2b9c7a..c8d7d9f17f 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml @@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud User Activities asset_type: AWS Instance - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 16 confidence: 50 @@ -60,7 +59,6 @@ tags: role: - Attacker product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_create_policy_version_to_allow_all_resources.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_create_policy_version_to_allow_all_resources.yml index 931bf81982..2132c89ba9 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_create_policy_version_to_allow_all_resources.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/aws_create_policy_version_to_allow_all_resources.yml @@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - AWS IAM Privilege Escalation asset_type: AWS Account - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 13 confidence: 70 @@ -57,7 +56,6 @@ tags: role: - Attacker product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_createaccesskey.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_createaccesskey.yml index b0a79677d4..ff06ff2563 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_createaccesskey.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/aws_createaccesskey.yml @@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - AWS IAM Privilege Escalation asset_type: AWS Account - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 13 confidence: 90 @@ -63,7 +62,6 @@ tags: role: - Attacker product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_createloginprofile.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_createloginprofile.yml index 5a203a77d8..050e1d6a5c 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_createloginprofile.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/aws_createloginprofile.yml @@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - AWS IAM Privilege Escalation asset_type: AWS Account - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 13 confidence: 80 @@ -61,7 +60,6 @@ tags: role: - Attacker product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml index e33d221a8b..a636c30be9 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml @@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities asset_type: AWS Instance - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 16 confidence: 50 @@ -63,7 +62,6 @@ tags: role: - Victim product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml index 170a48597e..02cca4d9f7 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml @@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Ransomware Cloud asset_type: AWS Account - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Cloud Data @@ -49,7 +48,6 @@ tags: role: - Attacker product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -63,3 +61,5 @@ tags: - userIdentity.principalId risk_score: 25 security_domain: threat + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml index c77f2d28d6..ce8c420583 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml @@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Ransomware Cloud asset_type: S3 Bucket - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Cloud Data @@ -48,7 +47,6 @@ tags: role: - Target product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -63,3 +61,5 @@ tags: - region risk_score: 15 security_domain: threat + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_high.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_high.yml index 9a9eeb3114..e298eeafc7 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_high.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_high.yml @@ -29,6 +29,9 @@ tags: cis20: - CIS 13 confidence: 100 + context: + - Source:Cloud Data + - Stage:Discovery deployments: - Slack Alert impact: 70 @@ -43,15 +46,14 @@ tags: - PR.AC - DE.CM observable: - - name: image - type: System + - name: user + type: User role: - - Victim + - Attacker product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Dev Sec Ops Analytics required_fields: - eventSource - eventName diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_low_informational_unknown.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_low_informational_unknown.yml index 2baabc0834..9345c11f36 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_low_informational_unknown.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_low_informational_unknown.yml @@ -30,6 +30,9 @@ tags: cis20: - CIS 13 confidence: 70 + context: + - Source:Cloud Data + - Stage:Discovery impact: 10 kill_chain_phases: - Actions on Objectives @@ -42,15 +45,14 @@ tags: - PR.AC - DE.CM observable: - - name: repositoryName - type: System + - name: user + type: User role: - - Victim + - Attacker product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Dev Sec Ops Analytics required_fields: - eventSource - eventName diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_medium.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_medium.yml index 755368af77..388e2254b3 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_medium.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_medium.yml @@ -29,6 +29,9 @@ tags: cis20: - CIS 13 confidence: 70 + context: + - Source:Cloud Data + - Stage:Discovery impact: 30 kill_chain_phases: - Actions on Objectives @@ -41,15 +44,14 @@ tags: - PR.AC - DE.CM observable: - - name: image - type: System + - name: user + type: User role: - - Victim + - Attacker product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Dev Sec Ops Analytics required_fields: - eventSource - eventName diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_ecr_container_upload_outside_business_hours.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_ecr_container_upload_outside_business_hours.yml index e64f1de95b..3112a1769d 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_ecr_container_upload_outside_business_hours.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/aws_ecr_container_upload_outside_business_hours.yml @@ -27,6 +27,9 @@ tags: cis20: - CIS 13 confidence: 70 + context: + - Source:Cloud Data + - Stage:Discovery impact: 70 kill_chain_phases: - Actions on Objectives @@ -51,7 +54,6 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Dev Sec Ops Analytics required_fields: - eventSource - eventName diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user.yml index 82d4fd850e..8af5ae3642 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user.yml @@ -27,6 +27,9 @@ tags: cis20: - CIS 13 confidence: 70 + context: + - Source:Cloud Data + - Stage:Discovery impact: 70 kill_chain_phases: - Actions on Objectives @@ -51,7 +54,6 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Dev Sec Ops Analytics required_fields: - eventSource - eventName diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_excessive_security_scanning.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_excessive_security_scanning.yml index 690360f6f2..66ca5a448f 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_excessive_security_scanning.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/aws_excessive_security_scanning.yml @@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - AWS User Monitoring asset_type: AWS Account - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 13 confidence: 60 @@ -54,7 +53,6 @@ tags: role: - Attacker product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events.yml index fce7e3c4ed..c8dbb55d1d 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events.yml @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud User Activities - automated_detection_testing: passed + asset_type: AWS Account confidence: 50 context: - Source:Cloud Data @@ -53,7 +53,6 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS required_fields: - _time - eventName diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force.yml index 10c379a951..3848d3b9bb 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force.yml @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - AWS IAM Privilege Escalation - automated_detection_testing: passed + asset_type: AWS Account confidence: 70 context: - Source:Cloud Data @@ -60,7 +60,6 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS required_fields: - _time - eventName diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_iam_delete_policy.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_iam_delete_policy.yml index 88f7e99926..b6fe4a0268 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_iam_delete_policy.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/aws_iam_delete_policy.yml @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - AWS IAM Privilege Escalation - automated_detection_testing: passed + asset_type: AWS Account confidence: 50 context: - Source:Cloud Data @@ -57,7 +57,6 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS required_fields: - _time - eventName diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_iam_failure_group_deletion.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_iam_failure_group_deletion.yml index efbceee4a2..d7cd5b647c 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_iam_failure_group_deletion.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/aws_iam_failure_group_deletion.yml @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - AWS IAM Privilege Escalation - automated_detection_testing: passed + asset_type: AWS Account confidence: 50 context: - Source:Cloud Data @@ -60,7 +60,6 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS required_fields: - _time - eventName diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_iam_successful_group_deletion.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_iam_successful_group_deletion.yml index c39a47fc4d..b161196f69 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_iam_successful_group_deletion.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/aws_iam_successful_group_deletion.yml @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - AWS IAM Privilege Escalation - automated_detection_testing: passed + asset_type: AWS Account confidence: 50 context: - Source:Cloud Data @@ -60,7 +60,6 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS required_fields: - _time - eventName diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml index 028c55621a..b3bad1f4c1 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml @@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - AWS Network ACL Activity asset_type: AWS Instance - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 11 confidence: 80 @@ -64,7 +63,6 @@ tags: role: - Victim product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml index 5a09c419bf..451036972a 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml @@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - AWS Network ACL Activity asset_type: AWS Instance - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 11 confidence: 50 @@ -55,7 +54,6 @@ tags: role: - Victim product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml index 0610fb3962..003d880703 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml @@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse asset_type: AWS Federated Account - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - Source:Cloud Data @@ -56,7 +55,6 @@ tags: - Victim - Target product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -72,3 +70,5 @@ tags: - userAgent risk_score: 64 security_domain: threat + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.yml index b9f00c6653..34aef7434e 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.yml @@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse asset_type: AWS Federated Account - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - Source:Cloud Data @@ -51,7 +50,6 @@ tags: - Victim - Target product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -66,3 +64,5 @@ tags: - userIdentity.principalId risk_score: 64 security_domain: threat + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_setdefaultpolicyversion.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_setdefaultpolicyversion.yml index 6f90e57391..6e9d444e48 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_setdefaultpolicyversion.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/aws_setdefaultpolicyversion.yml @@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - AWS IAM Privilege Escalation asset_type: AWS Account - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 13 confidence: 60 @@ -60,7 +59,6 @@ tags: role: - Victim product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_updateloginprofile.yml b/detections/cloud/aws_updateloginprofile.yml index bb8525ded2..20a56ccfc2 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_updateloginprofile.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/aws_updateloginprofile.yml @@ -30,10 +30,11 @@ tags: analytic_story: - AWS IAM Privilege Escalation asset_type: AWS Account - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 13 confidence: 60 + context: + - Source:Cloud Data dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_updateloginprofile/aws_cloudtrail_events.json impact: 50 @@ -59,7 +60,6 @@ tags: role: - Victim product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/circle_ci_disable_security_job.yml b/detections/cloud/circle_ci_disable_security_job.yml index 53814e0f32..155b3a841f 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/circle_ci_disable_security_job.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/circle_ci_disable_security_job.yml @@ -20,10 +20,11 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Dev Sec Ops asset_type: CircleCI - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 13 confidence: 90 + context: + - Source:Application Log dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1554/circle_ci_disable_security_job/circle_ci_disable_security_job.json impact: 80 @@ -46,7 +47,6 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Dev Sec Ops Analytics required_fields: - _times risk_score: 72 diff --git a/detections/cloud/circle_ci_disable_security_step.yml b/detections/cloud/circle_ci_disable_security_step.yml index 38af4b677a..a87b5dd022 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/circle_ci_disable_security_step.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/circle_ci_disable_security_step.yml @@ -21,10 +21,11 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Dev Sec Ops asset_type: CircleCI - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 13 confidence: 90 + context: + - Source:Application Log dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1554/circle_ci_disable_security_step/circle_ci_disable_security_step.json impact: 80 @@ -46,7 +47,6 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Dev Sec Ops Analytics required_fields: - _times risk_score: 72 diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml index f49fce8cf9..2076bdda84 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml @@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud User Activities asset_type: AWS Instance - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 1 confidence: 60 @@ -43,6 +42,8 @@ tags: dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json impact: 60 + kill_chain_phases: + - Actions on Objectives message: User $user$ of type AssumedRole attempting to execute new API calls $command$ that have not been seen before mitre_attack_id: @@ -55,7 +56,6 @@ tags: role: - Attacker product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml index 0410a7370e..760ce83d18 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml @@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Cloud Cryptomining asset_type: Cloud Compute Instance - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 1 confidence: 60 @@ -41,6 +40,8 @@ tags: dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json impact: 30 + kill_chain_phases: + - Actions on Objectives message: User $user$ is creating a new instance $dest$ for the first time mitre_attack_id: - T1078.004 @@ -57,7 +58,6 @@ tags: role: - Victim product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml index f61886e671..148b41afc6 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml @@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Cloud Cryptomining asset_type: Cloud Compute Instance - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 12 confidence: 60 @@ -54,7 +53,7 @@ tags: - DE.AE observable: - name: user - type: user + type: User role: - Attacker - name: dest @@ -62,7 +61,6 @@ tags: role: - Victim product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml index 5b4851a0ae..0b9e44dd38 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml @@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Cloud Cryptomining asset_type: Cloud Compute Instance - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 1 confidence: 60 @@ -43,6 +42,8 @@ tags: dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json impact: 60 + kill_chain_phases: + - Actions on Objectives message: User $user$ is creating an instance $dest$ with an image that has not been previously seen. nist: @@ -57,7 +58,6 @@ tags: role: - Victim product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml index 1498019242..bdc4b42232 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml @@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Cloud Cryptomining asset_type: Cloud Compute Instance - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 1 confidence: 60 @@ -43,6 +42,8 @@ tags: dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json impact: 50 + kill_chain_phases: + - Actions on Objectives message: User $user$ is creating an instance $dest$ with an instance type $instance_type$ that has not been previously seen. nist: @@ -57,7 +58,6 @@ tags: role: - Victim product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml index da2a51b79e..b0fcabe26f 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml @@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities asset_type: AWS Instance - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 1 confidence: 60 @@ -41,6 +40,8 @@ tags: dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json impact: 70 + kill_chain_phases: + - Actions on Objectives message: User $user$ is modifying an instance $dest$ for the first time. mitre_attack_id: - T1078.004 @@ -57,7 +58,6 @@ tags: role: - Victim product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml index 3299a3f417..6ea14af7db 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml @@ -44,7 +44,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities asset_type: AWS Instance - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 1 confidence: 60 @@ -56,6 +55,8 @@ tags: dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json impact: 30 + kill_chain_phases: + - Actions on Objectives message: User $user$ is starting or creating an instance $dest$ for the first time in City $City$ from IP address $src$ mitre_attack_id: @@ -76,7 +77,6 @@ tags: role: - Victim product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml index daeaf8d490..05b8151c3c 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml @@ -44,7 +44,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities asset_type: AWS Instance - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 1 confidence: 60 @@ -56,6 +55,8 @@ tags: dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json impact: 70 + kill_chain_phases: + - Actions on Objectives message: User $user$ is starting or creating an instance $object$ for the first time in Country $Country$ from IP address $src$ mitre_attack_id: @@ -76,7 +77,6 @@ tags: role: - Victim product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml index 754efaf604..46ce3a6e54 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml @@ -43,7 +43,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities asset_type: AWS Instance - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 1 confidence: 60 @@ -55,6 +54,8 @@ tags: dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json impact: 70 + kill_chain_phases: + - Actions on Objectives message: User $user$ is starting or creating an instance $object_id$ for the first time from IP address $src$ mitre_attack_id: @@ -75,7 +76,6 @@ tags: role: - Victim product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml index ac3797daba..91e4897607 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml @@ -44,7 +44,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities asset_type: AWS Instance - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 1 confidence: 60 @@ -56,6 +55,8 @@ tags: dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json impact: 70 + kill_chain_phases: + - Actions on Objectives message: User $user$ is starting or creating an instance $object$ for the first time in region $Region$ from IP address $src$ mitre_attack_id: @@ -76,7 +77,6 @@ tags: role: - Victim product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/correlation_by_repository_and_risk.yml b/detections/cloud/correlation_by_repository_and_risk.yml index 8cae1eaf2f..149f9b6c60 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/correlation_by_repository_and_risk.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/correlation_by_repository_and_risk.yml @@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ tags: cis20: - CIS 13 confidence: 100 + context: + - Unknown deployments: - Slack Alert impact: 70 @@ -41,7 +43,6 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Dev Sec Ops Analytics required_fields: - _time risk_score: 70 diff --git a/detections/cloud/correlation_by_user_and_risk.yml b/detections/cloud/correlation_by_user_and_risk.yml index 220dcb76c1..625b3fbf65 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/correlation_by_user_and_risk.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/correlation_by_user_and_risk.yml @@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ tags: cis20: - CIS 13 confidence: 100 + context: + - Unknown deployments: - Slack Alert impact: 70 @@ -41,7 +43,6 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Dev Sec Ops Analytics required_fields: - _time risk_score: 70 diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml index a9a758834d..2e896238ea 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml @@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities asset_type: AWS Instance - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 16 confidence: 60 @@ -57,7 +56,6 @@ tags: role: - Attacker product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml index eee269a1eb..d68d521be8 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml @@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ tags: - Suspicious AWS Login Activities - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities asset_type: AWS Instance - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 16 confidence: 60 @@ -66,7 +65,6 @@ tags: role: - Attacker product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml index 8c672eef83..73c4248d4d 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml @@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ tags: - Suspicious AWS Login Activities - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities asset_type: AWS Instance - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 16 confidence: 60 @@ -66,7 +65,6 @@ tags: role: - Attacker product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml index e9f51bd972..0e046801ac 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml @@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ tags: - Suspicious AWS Login Activities - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities asset_type: AWS Instance - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 16 confidence: 60 @@ -66,7 +65,6 @@ tags: role: - Attacker product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml index 2cf1e5d425..ca8e7ce05b 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml @@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious AWS S3 Activities asset_type: S3 Bucket - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 13 confidence: 80 @@ -58,7 +57,6 @@ tags: role: - Victim product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml index 95fec6af8a..84ae7a3223 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml @@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious AWS S3 Activities asset_type: S3 Bucket - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 13 confidence: 80 @@ -62,7 +61,6 @@ tags: role: - Victim product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_shared_ec2_snapshot.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_shared_ec2_snapshot.yml index e297f4c0d5..7520267481 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_shared_ec2_snapshot.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_shared_ec2_snapshot.yml @@ -23,7 +23,6 @@ tags: - Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities - Data Exfiltration asset_type: EC2 Snapshot - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 13 confidence: 80 @@ -56,7 +55,6 @@ tags: role: - Attacker product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml index db578d529d..c5c3f8dea0 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml @@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - AWS Security Hub Alerts asset_type: AWS Instance - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 13 confidence: 50 @@ -43,7 +42,6 @@ tags: role: - Victim product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -58,3 +56,5 @@ tags: - dest risk_score: 15 security_domain: endpoint + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation diff --git a/detections/cloud/github_commit_changes_in_master.yml b/detections/cloud/github_commit_changes_in_master.yml index 9475fcad55..f21eb4c802 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/github_commit_changes_in_master.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/github_commit_changes_in_master.yml @@ -24,11 +24,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Dev Sec Ops - automated_detection_testing: passed + asset_type: GitHub confidence: 30 context: - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Reconnaissance + - Source:Application Log dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1199/github_push_master/github_push_master.log impact: 30 @@ -41,12 +40,11 @@ tags: - name: commit.commit.author.email type: User role: - - attacker + - Attacker product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Dev Sec Ops Analytics required_fields: - _time risk_score: 9 diff --git a/detections/cloud/github_commit_in_develop.yml b/detections/cloud/github_commit_in_develop.yml index e069f8de60..a839390042 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/github_commit_in_develop.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/github_commit_in_develop.yml @@ -23,11 +23,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Dev Sec Ops - automated_detection_testing: passed + asset_type: GitHub confidence: 30 context: - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Reconnaissance + - Source:Application Log dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1199/github_push_master/github_push_develop.json impact: 30 @@ -40,12 +39,11 @@ tags: - name: commit.commit.author.email type: User role: - - attacker + - Attacker product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Dev Sec Ops Analytics required_fields: - _time risk_score: 9 diff --git a/detections/cloud/github_dependabot_alert.yml b/detections/cloud/github_dependabot_alert.yml index 0ac8b391b0..2d6206b0b0 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/github_dependabot_alert.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/github_dependabot_alert.yml @@ -21,10 +21,12 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Dev Sec Ops asset_type: GitHub - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 13 confidence: 90 + context: + - Source:Application Log + - Stage:Discovery dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1195.001/github_security_advisor_alert/github_security_advisor_alert.json impact: 30 @@ -40,14 +42,13 @@ tags: - DE.CM observable: - name: repository - type: System + type: Unknown role: - Victim product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Dev Sec Ops Analytics required_fields: - _time - alert.id diff --git a/detections/cloud/github_pull_request_from_unknown_user.yml b/detections/cloud/github_pull_request_from_unknown_user.yml index 82025ef1a6..d49d096ff3 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/github_pull_request_from_unknown_user.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/github_pull_request_from_unknown_user.yml @@ -21,10 +21,11 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Dev Sec Ops asset_type: GitHub - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 13 confidence: 90 + context: + - Source:Application Log dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1195.001/github_pull_request/github_pull_request.json impact: 30 @@ -40,14 +41,13 @@ tags: - DE.CM observable: - name: repository - type: System + type: Unknown role: - Victim product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Dev Sec Ops Analytics required_fields: - _time - alert.id diff --git a/detections/cloud/gsuite_drive_share_in_external_email.yml b/detections/cloud/gsuite_drive_share_in_external_email.yml index 04a38dc077..bf726ba740 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/gsuite_drive_share_in_external_email.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/gsuite_drive_share_in_external_email.yml @@ -29,17 +29,18 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Dev Sec Ops + asset_type: GSuite confidence: 90 context: - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Reconnaissance + - Stage:Discovery dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1567.002/gsuite_share_drive/gdrive_share_external.log deployments: - Send to Phantom impact: 80 kill_chain_phases: - - Exfiltration + - Exploitation message: suspicious share gdrive from $parameters.owner$ to $email$ namely as $parameters.doc_title$ mitre_attack_id: - T1567.002 @@ -57,7 +58,6 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Dev Sec Ops Analytics required_fields: - _time - parameters.doc_title diff --git a/detections/cloud/gsuite_email_suspicious_attachment.yml b/detections/cloud/gsuite_email_suspicious_attachment.yml index 9c9133fe0b..d80d577d1b 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/gsuite_email_suspicious_attachment.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/gsuite_email_suspicious_attachment.yml @@ -29,10 +29,11 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Dev Sec Ops + asset_type: GSuite confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Reconnaissance + - Stage:Discovery dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gsuite_susp_attachment_ext/gsuite_gmail_file_ext.log impact: 70 @@ -46,7 +47,7 @@ tags: - name: source.address type: User role: - - attacker + - Attacker - name: destination{}.address type: User role: @@ -55,7 +56,6 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Dev Sec Ops Analytics required_fields: - _time - attachment{}.file_extension_type diff --git a/detections/cloud/gsuite_email_suspicious_subject_with_attachment.yml b/detections/cloud/gsuite_email_suspicious_subject_with_attachment.yml index 1472fa6c77..25722961dd 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/gsuite_email_suspicious_subject_with_attachment.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/gsuite_email_suspicious_subject_with_attachment.yml @@ -36,11 +36,11 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Dev Sec Ops - automated_detection_testing: passed + asset_type: GSuite confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Reconnaissance + - Stage:Discovery dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gsuite_susp_subj/gsuite_susp_subj_attach.log impact: 50 @@ -50,11 +50,15 @@ tags: mitre_attack_id: - T1566.001 - T1566 + observable: + - name: source.address + type: User + role: + - Attacker product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Dev Sec Ops Analytics required_fields: - _time risk_score: 25 diff --git a/detections/cloud/gsuite_email_with_known_abuse_web_service_link.yml b/detections/cloud/gsuite_email_with_known_abuse_web_service_link.yml index bbfe333ea6..c789d3853e 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/gsuite_email_with_known_abuse_web_service_link.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/gsuite_email_with_known_abuse_web_service_link.yml @@ -27,11 +27,11 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Dev Sec Ops - automated_detection_testing: passed + asset_type: GSuite confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Reconnaissance + - Stage:Discovery dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gsuite_susp_url/gsuite_susp_url.log impact: 50 @@ -41,11 +41,15 @@ tags: mitre_attack_id: - T1566.001 - T1566 + observable: + - name: source.address + type: User + role: + - Attacker product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Dev Sec Ops Analytics required_fields: - _time risk_score: 25 diff --git a/detections/cloud/gsuite_outbound_email_with_attachment_to_external_domain.yml b/detections/cloud/gsuite_outbound_email_with_attachment_to_external_domain.yml index c8c2b596d6..efdae5828e 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/gsuite_outbound_email_with_attachment_to_external_domain.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/gsuite_outbound_email_with_attachment_to_external_domain.yml @@ -28,10 +28,11 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Dev Sec Ops + asset_type: GSuite confidence: 30 context: - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Reconnaissance + - Stage:Discovery dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gsuite_outbound_email_to_external/gsuite_external_domain.log impact: 30 @@ -45,7 +46,7 @@ tags: - name: source.address type: User role: - - attacker + - Attacker - name: destination{}.address type: User role: @@ -54,7 +55,6 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Dev Sec Ops Analytics required_fields: - _time risk_score: 9 diff --git a/detections/cloud/gsuite_suspicious_shared_file_name.yml b/detections/cloud/gsuite_suspicious_shared_file_name.yml index b65fe208be..90cc35bc48 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/gsuite_suspicious_shared_file_name.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/gsuite_suspicious_shared_file_name.yml @@ -35,11 +35,11 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Dev Sec Ops - automated_detection_testing: passed + asset_type: GSuite confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Reconnaissance + - Stage:Discovery dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gdrive_susp_file_share/gdrive_susp_attach.log impact: 30 @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ tags: - name: parameters.owner type: User role: - - attacker + - Attacker - name: email type: User role: @@ -62,7 +62,6 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Dev Sec Ops Analytics required_fields: - _time - parameters.doc_title diff --git a/detections/cloud/kubernetes_nginx_ingress_lfi.yml b/detections/cloud/kubernetes_nginx_ingress_lfi.yml index 65fa5a1ad8..85e27e8161 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/kubernetes_nginx_ingress_lfi.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/kubernetes_nginx_ingress_lfi.yml @@ -24,10 +24,11 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Dev Sec Ops asset_type: Kubernetes - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 13 confidence: 70 + context: + - Unknown dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1212/kubernetes_nginx_lfi_attack/kubernetes_nginx_lfi_attack.log deployments: @@ -51,7 +52,6 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Dev Sec Ops Analytics required_fields: - raw risk_score: 49 diff --git a/detections/cloud/kubernetes_nginx_ingress_rfi.yml b/detections/cloud/kubernetes_nginx_ingress_rfi.yml index f94a66cb29..a647e3df2d 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/kubernetes_nginx_ingress_rfi.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/kubernetes_nginx_ingress_rfi.yml @@ -23,10 +23,11 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Dev Sec Ops asset_type: Kubernetes - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 13 confidence: 70 + context: + - Unknown dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1212/kuberntest_nginx_rfi_attack/kubernetes_nginx_rfi_attack.log deployments: @@ -50,7 +51,6 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Dev Sec Ops Analytics required_fields: - raw risk_score: 49 diff --git a/detections/cloud/kubernetes_scanner_image_pulling.yml b/detections/cloud/kubernetes_scanner_image_pulling.yml index cd76a25d77..a360916103 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/kubernetes_scanner_image_pulling.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/kubernetes_scanner_image_pulling.yml @@ -21,10 +21,11 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Dev Sec Ops asset_type: Kubernetes - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 13 confidence: 90 + context: + - Unknown dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1526/kubernetes_kube_hunter/kubernetes_kube_hunter.json deployments: @@ -41,12 +42,13 @@ tags: - DE.CM observable: - name: host - type: Entity + type: Hostname + role: + - Attacker product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Dev Sec Ops Analytics required_fields: - object.message - source.host diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml index 731f801395..764103e793 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml @@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ tags: - Office 365 Detections - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse asset_type: Office 365 - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 60 context: - Source:Cloud Data @@ -36,7 +35,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_new_federation/o365_new_federation.json impact: 30 kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objective + - Exploitation message: User $Actor.ID$ has created a new federation setting on $dest$ from IP Address $ActorIpAddress$ mitre_attack_id: @@ -56,7 +55,6 @@ tags: role: - Victim product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml index 08efdec24d..4eb8e927bf 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml @@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ tags: - Office 365 Detections - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse asset_type: Office 365 - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 60 context: - Source:Cloud Data @@ -39,7 +38,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_add_service_principal/o365_add_service_principal.json impact: 70 kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objective + - Exploitation message: User $Actor.ID$ created a new federation setting on $Target.ID$ and added service principal credentials from IP Address $ActorIpAddress$ mitre_attack_id: @@ -55,7 +54,6 @@ tags: role: - Victim product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml index aaee2fa67e..31d3a06e8f 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml @@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Office 365 Detections asset_type: Office 365 - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 60 context: - Source:Cloud Data @@ -40,7 +39,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.007/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.json impact: 70 kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objective + - Exploitation message: User $user_id$ has added new IP addresses $ip_addresses_new_added$ to a list of trusted IPs to bypass MFA mitre_attack_id: @@ -56,7 +55,6 @@ tags: role: - Attacker product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml index 3a7ef5e300..f29540759a 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml @@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Office 365 Detections asset_type: Office 365 - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - Source:Cloud Data @@ -33,7 +32,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/o365_disable_mfa/o365_disable_mfa.json impact: 80 kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objective + - Exploitation message: User $user$ has executed an operation $Operation$ for this destination $dest$ mitre_attack_id: @@ -48,7 +47,6 @@ tags: role: - Attacker product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml index 1015a3cf3d..8960a6c182 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml @@ -23,7 +23,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Office 365 Detections asset_type: Office 365 - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - Source:Cloud Data @@ -35,7 +34,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110/o365_brute_force_login/o365_brute_force_login.json impact: 80 kill_chain_phases: - - Not Applicable + - Exploitation message: User $user$ has caused excessive number of authentication failures from $src_ip$ using UserAgent $UserAgent$. mitre_attack_id: @@ -50,7 +49,6 @@ tags: role: - Victim product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yml index e0e0cb4c8e..b00d24f3d5 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yml @@ -23,7 +23,6 @@ tags: - Office 365 Detections - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse asset_type: Office 365 - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - Source:Cloud Data @@ -35,7 +34,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/o365_sso_logon_errors/o365_sso_logon_errors.json impact: 80 kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objective + - Exploitation message: User $UserId$ has caused excessive number of SSO logon errors from $ActorIpAddress$ using UserAgent $UserAgent$. mitre_attack_id: @@ -50,7 +49,6 @@ tags: role: - Victim product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml index 7a416e6f60..beeb34270c 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml @@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ tags: - Office 365 Detections - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse asset_type: Office 365 - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - Source:Cloud Data @@ -39,7 +38,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_new_federated_domain/o365_new_federated_domain.json impact: 80 kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objective + - Exploitation message: User $UserId$ has added a new federated domaain $Parameters.Value$ for $OrganizationName$ mitre_attack_id: @@ -55,7 +54,6 @@ tags: role: - Victim product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml index 759f3095c9..613140132c 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml @@ -23,7 +23,6 @@ tags: - Office 365 Detections - Data Exfiltration asset_type: Office 365 - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 60 context: - Source:Cloud Data @@ -34,7 +33,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114/o365_export_pst_file/o365_export_pst_file.json impact: 80 kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objective + - Exploitation message: User $Source$ has exported a PST file from the search using this operation- $Operation$ with a severity of $Severity$ mitre_attack_id: @@ -45,7 +44,6 @@ tags: role: - Attacker product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml index cbb85e57e6..eb3dd948bf 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml @@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ tags: - Office 365 Detections - Data Exfiltration asset_type: Office 365 - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 16 confidence: 60 @@ -49,7 +48,6 @@ tags: role: - Attacker product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml index be8f002199..19682a022d 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml @@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Office 365 Detections asset_type: Office 365 - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 16 confidence: 60 @@ -48,7 +47,6 @@ tags: role: - Attacker product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml index 7644ef34f2..7fd8a95bd4 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml +++ b/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml @@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ tags: - Office 365 Detections - Data Exfiltration asset_type: Office 365 - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 16 confidence: 60 @@ -53,7 +52,6 @@ tags: role: - Other product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud diff --git a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml index 0e9731b17b..754232c9a9 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml @@ -49,5 +49,15 @@ tags: - userName risk_object: userName risk_object_type: user - risk_score: 40 + risk_score: 25.0 security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml index 3ce4ca2ab5..41e6ca3b9a 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml @@ -45,5 +45,15 @@ tags: - src_user risk_object: src_usr risk_object_type: user - risk_score: 10 + risk_score: 25.0 security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml index 4a173ad2dd..8131ad012a 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ name: Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User -id: ada0f478-84a8-4641-s3f3-d82362dffd75 +id: 8d301246-fccf-45e2-a8e7-3655fd14379c version: 2 date: '2020-07-21' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk @@ -48,3 +48,14 @@ tags: - errorCode - userName security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml index 028441fd35..a1fa5c9971 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml @@ -43,3 +43,14 @@ tags: - errorCode - src_user security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml index c49f68ddc2..ec609d0963 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml @@ -58,3 +58,15 @@ tags: risk_object_type: user risk_score: 25 security_domain: endpoint + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml index d1e5076373..06acda3d31 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml @@ -56,3 +56,16 @@ tags: - eventName - sourceIPAddress security_domain: endpoint + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml index 6aa0991bce..a33e35d265 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml @@ -53,3 +53,16 @@ tags: - eventName - sourceIPAddress security_domain: endpoint + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml index daee7a7884..2ceec65cb6 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml @@ -55,3 +55,16 @@ tags: - eventName - sourceIPAddress security_domain: endpoint + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml b/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml index 274096c19a..b9e4cf5046 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml @@ -31,16 +31,16 @@ references: [] tags: analytic_story: - DNS Hijacking - - Command and Control - Suspicious DNS Traffic - Host Redirection + - Command and Control asset_type: Endpoint cis20: - CIS 9 - CIS 12 - CIS 13 kill_chain_phases: - - Command and Control + - Command & Control mitre_attack_id: - T1048.003 nist: @@ -57,3 +57,14 @@ tags: - DNS.message_type - DNS.src security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml b/detections/deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml index 69321e19c1..60a6bc2ae3 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml @@ -47,3 +47,14 @@ tags: - userName - arn security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml index 5c747c0ec8..d41fa67f61 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ name: Detect API activity from users without MFA -id: 2a9b80d3-6340-4345-w5ad-212bf5d1dac4 +id: 4d46e8bd-4072-48e4-92db-0325889ef894 version: 1 date: '2018-05-17' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk @@ -67,5 +67,17 @@ tags: - user risk_object: user risk_object_type: user - risk_score: 10 + risk_score: 25.0 security_domain: network + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml index 457d51c4a0..b31fa5b0e3 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml @@ -73,5 +73,15 @@ tags: - user risk_object: user risk_object_type: user - risk_score: 15 + risk_score: 25.0 security_domain: access + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml index 21b21b7071..54452b165e 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ tags: - CIS 7 kill_chain_phases: - Delivery - - Command and Control + - Command & Control mitre_attack_id: - T1566.003 nist: @@ -66,3 +66,14 @@ tags: - DNS.query - host security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml index 6a97557abe..27fa34517d 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ tags: - CIS 12 - CIS 13 kill_chain_phases: - - Command and Control + - Command & Control mitre_attack_id: - T1048.003 nist: @@ -59,3 +59,14 @@ tags: - DNS.dest - DNS.answer security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml index 0f1d4dcf2e..379d8bf315 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml @@ -53,3 +53,14 @@ tags: - dest - Process_ID security_domain: access + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml index 41a92ee364..f15c7d8d9a 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml @@ -49,5 +49,17 @@ tags: - eventName risk_object: user risk_object_type: user - risk_score: 5 + risk_score: 25.0 security_domain: endpoint + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml index 6d6a19548f..49ba118591 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml @@ -48,3 +48,14 @@ tags: - eventName - userIdentity.arn security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml index bc8279ef41..e6177c0815 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml @@ -75,5 +75,15 @@ tags: - userIdentity.arn risk_object: user risk_object_type: user - risk_score: 10 + risk_score: 25.0 security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml index 0419681135..113bbbd998 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml @@ -59,5 +59,15 @@ tags: - userIdentity.arn risk_object: user risk_object_type: user - risk_score: 20 + risk_score: 25.0 security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml index 3b4f02e791..940476db2f 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml @@ -59,5 +59,15 @@ tags: - serIdentity.arn risk_object: user risk_object_type: user - risk_score: 5 + risk_score: 25.0 security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml index 23844bf3b1..bf49b9b213 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml @@ -49,3 +49,14 @@ tags: - All_Changes.src_priority - All_Changes.dest security_domain: endpoint + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml b/detections/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml index 73ee17edb5..911841ca00 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ tags: - CIS 7 - CIS 8 kill_chain_phases: - - Command and Control + - Command & Control - Actions on Objectives mitre_attack_id: - T1071.001 @@ -58,3 +58,14 @@ tags: - Web.src - Web.dest security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml b/detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml index 21bfff382e..e3a24216bb 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ tags: cis20: - CIS 13 kill_chain_phases: - - Command and Control + - Command & Control - Actions on Objectives mitre_attack_id: - T1048.003 @@ -71,3 +71,14 @@ tags: - DNS.src_category - DNS.src security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml b/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml index e9fc8f1ff0..8d6d5709e8 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml @@ -22,9 +22,9 @@ references: [] tags: analytic_story: - DNS Hijacking - - Command and Control - Suspicious DNS Traffic - Host Redirection + - Command and Control asset_type: Endpoint cis20: - CIS 1 @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ tags: - CIS 8 - CIS 12 kill_chain_phases: - - Command and Control + - Command & Control mitre_attack_id: - T1071.004 nist: @@ -52,3 +52,14 @@ tags: - DNS.src - DNS.dest security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/dns_record_changed.yml b/detections/deprecated/dns_record_changed.yml index 188f28fcd5..080814d1de 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/dns_record_changed.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/dns_record_changed.yml @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ tags: - CIS 8 - CIS 12 kill_chain_phases: - - Command and Control + - Command & Control mitre_attack_id: - T1071.004 nist: @@ -65,3 +65,14 @@ tags: - DNS.message_type - DNS.query security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.yml b/detections/deprecated/dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.yml index 2b1e26203e..efc9b72471 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.yml @@ -32,7 +32,6 @@ tags: - Credential Dumping - HAFNIUM Group asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 3 - CIS 5 @@ -58,7 +57,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml index b458b00790..5d06fab65c 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml @@ -45,5 +45,17 @@ tags: - userIdentity.arn risk_object: user risk_object_type: user - risk_score: 5 + risk_score: 25.0 security_domain: endpoint + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml index fa7afb7351..248e993e4d 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml @@ -46,5 +46,15 @@ tags: - awsRegion risk_object: src risk_object_type: system - risk_score: 10 + risk_score: 25.0 security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml index ff8e917929..33dca33b40 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml @@ -45,3 +45,16 @@ tags: - errorCode - requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId security_domain: endpoint + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml index b0a54b89ac..251de76ae4 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml @@ -45,3 +45,16 @@ tags: - errorCode - requestParameters.instanceType security_domain: endpoint + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml index 41b85bde0d..5f416bc967 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml @@ -46,3 +46,16 @@ tags: - errorCode - userIdentity.arn security_domain: endpoint + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml b/detections/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml index 8c5606604f..c609d235dc 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml @@ -48,3 +48,14 @@ tags: - Processes.user - Processes.process_name security_domain: endpoint + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml b/detections/deprecated/extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml index 043809e7ef..9a77c9cba8 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml @@ -36,3 +36,16 @@ tags: - MESSAGE - COMPUTERNAME security_domain: endpoint + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml b/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml index ba682b8bdf..1d63e2432e 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ name: First time seen command line argument -id: 9be56c82-b1cc-4318-87eb-q138afaaqa39 +id: a1b6e73f-98d5-470f-99ac-77aacd578473 version: 5 date: '2020-07-21' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ tags: - CIS 3 - CIS 8 kill_chain_phases: - - Command and Control + - Command & Control - Actions on Objectives mitre_attack_id: - T1059.001 @@ -66,3 +66,14 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_name - Processes.dest security_domain: endpoint + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.yml b/detections/deprecated/gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.yml index 7d16778165..0579fce203 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.yml @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ tags: - GCP Cross Account Activity asset_type: GCP Account kill_chain_phases: - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation mitre_attack_id: - T1078 product: @@ -45,3 +45,14 @@ tags: - data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.role - data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.members{} security_domain: threat + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.yml b/detections/deprecated/gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.yml index c9c519b4f2..686c34ecbe 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.yml @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ tags: - GCP Cross Account Activity asset_type: GCP Account kill_chain_phases: - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation mitre_attack_id: - T1078 product: @@ -44,3 +44,14 @@ tags: - data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.members{} - data.resource.labels.project_id security_domain: threat + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.yml b/detections/deprecated/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.yml index 6e423dc556..00bfb8d2af 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.yml @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ tags: - GCP Cross Account Activity asset_type: GCP Account kill_chain_phases: - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation mitre_attack_id: - T1078 product: @@ -34,3 +34,14 @@ tags: required_fields: - _time security_domain: threat + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml b/detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml index fefe3844a1..4f3ce415e5 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml @@ -34,3 +34,16 @@ tags: required_fields: - _time security_domain: threat + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml b/detections/deprecated/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml index e631e6d7a2..532a22e664 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml @@ -38,3 +38,14 @@ tags: required_fields: - _time security_domain: threat + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml b/detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml index 64cc40d6c6..93a8fa5c9d 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml @@ -36,3 +36,16 @@ tags: required_fields: - _time security_domain: access + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml b/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml index 16dd69ab07..4aa606fa1c 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ tags: - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity asset_type: AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster kill_chain_phases: - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security @@ -28,3 +28,14 @@ tags: required_fields: - _time security_domain: threat + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.yml b/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.yml index 3d11d83b31..0ca3690382 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.yml @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ tags: - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity asset_type: AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster kill_chain_phases: - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security @@ -30,3 +30,14 @@ tags: required_fields: - _time security_domain: threat + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml b/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml index f8328b7e9e..31225279c4 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ tags: - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity asset_type: AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster kill_chain_phases: - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security @@ -29,3 +29,14 @@ tags: required_fields: - _time security_domain: threat + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml b/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml index ba55420b8f..0b7695768b 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ tags: - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity asset_type: AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster kill_chain_phases: - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security @@ -29,3 +29,14 @@ tags: required_fields: - _time security_domain: threat + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml b/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml index d1e057ffff..b6d8ec309c 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ tags: - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity asset_type: AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster kill_chain_phases: - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security @@ -30,3 +30,14 @@ tags: required_fields: - _time security_domain: threat + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml b/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml index 780d1cf698..79085115b2 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ tags: - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity asset_type: Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster kill_chain_phases: - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security @@ -30,3 +30,14 @@ tags: required_fields: - _time security_domain: threat + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml b/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml index 4c9561b264..f0a040b443 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ tags: - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity asset_type: Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster kill_chain_phases: - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security @@ -30,3 +30,14 @@ tags: required_fields: - _time security_domain: threat + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml b/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml index 12c753aebc..4f0c98ee44 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ tags: - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity asset_type: Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster kill_chain_phases: - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security @@ -29,3 +29,14 @@ tags: required_fields: - _time security_domain: threat + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml b/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml index e32f8dd601..9881a05b9e 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ tags: - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity asset_type: Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster kill_chain_phases: - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security @@ -29,3 +29,14 @@ tags: required_fields: - _time security_domain: threat + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml b/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml index a14ee3ccee..95d3dd226d 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ tags: - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity asset_type: Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster kill_chain_phases: - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security @@ -29,3 +29,14 @@ tags: required_fields: - _time security_domain: threat + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml b/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml index 70160d42c1..f1d01a21eb 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ tags: - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity asset_type: Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster kill_chain_phases: - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security @@ -32,3 +32,14 @@ tags: required_fields: - _time security_domain: threat + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.yml b/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.yml index e156dd5fea..834248df0f 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.yml @@ -29,3 +29,14 @@ tags: required_fields: - _time security_domain: threat + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.yml b/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.yml index c9de50342d..a579e3f607 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.yml @@ -31,3 +31,14 @@ tags: required_fields: - _time security_domain: threat + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml b/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml index 750b41c93a..5aae9f2668 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ tags: - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity asset_type: GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster kill_chain_phases: - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security @@ -30,3 +30,14 @@ tags: required_fields: - _time security_domain: threat + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml b/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml index a0f8e1f483..74d3f09606 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ tags: - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity asset_type: GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster kill_chain_phases: - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security @@ -30,3 +30,14 @@ tags: required_fields: - _time security_domain: threat + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml b/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml index 0c76f52509..efcf54750d 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ tags: - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity asset_type: GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster kill_chain_phases: - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security @@ -30,3 +30,14 @@ tags: required_fields: - _time security_domain: threat + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml b/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml index ba1132a38e..2bbde3951c 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ tags: - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity asset_type: GCP GKE EKS Kubernetes cluster kill_chain_phases: - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security @@ -30,3 +30,14 @@ tags: required_fields: - _time security_domain: threat + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml b/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml index caa5b31d4f..770cd52959 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ tags: - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity asset_type: GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster kill_chain_phases: - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security @@ -32,3 +32,14 @@ tags: required_fields: - _time security_domain: threat + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml b/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml index 53102e415b..6114a267e8 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ tags: - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity asset_type: GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster kill_chain_phases: - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security @@ -31,3 +31,14 @@ tags: required_fields: - _time security_domain: threat + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml b/detections/deprecated/malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml index 71126f8dd4..0a97fc103a 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ tags: - CIS 7 - CIS 8 kill_chain_phases: - - Command and Control + - Command & Control - Actions on Objectives mitre_attack_id: - T1059.001 @@ -51,3 +51,14 @@ tags: required_fields: - _time security_domain: endpoint + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml b/detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml index cb09af312d..fa84d45765 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml @@ -34,3 +34,14 @@ tags: required_fields: - _time security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml b/detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml index 61d210e16a..cb5861e8e5 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml @@ -37,3 +37,14 @@ tags: required_fields: - _time security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml b/detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml index 265acb0d8d..1d4722ef7c 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ tags: - CIS 8 kill_chain_phases: - Installation - - Command and Control + - Command & Control nist: - DE.DP - DE.CM @@ -37,3 +37,14 @@ tags: required_fields: - _time security_domain: threat + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml b/detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml index 4635640981..9f8863b0e7 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml @@ -46,3 +46,14 @@ tags: required_fields: - _time security_domain: endpoint + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml b/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml index 30f50486b0..59e98c0386 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ tags: - CIS 2 kill_chain_phases: - Installation - - Command and Control + - Command & Control - Actions on Objectives nist: - ID.AM @@ -46,3 +46,14 @@ tags: required_fields: - _times security_domain: endpoint + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml b/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml index 8182e7cd1e..e83fe7264c 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ name: Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys -id: c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6b5264x9f +id: 61a7d1e6-f5d4-41d9-a9be-39a1ffe69459 version: 2 date: '2019-02-27' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk @@ -42,3 +42,14 @@ tags: required_fields: - _time security_domain: endpoint + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml b/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml index b19b14edba..5b83612e80 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml @@ -39,3 +39,14 @@ tags: required_fields: - _time security_domain: endpoint + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml b/detections/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml index 1a167953a6..db95d4f718 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml @@ -41,3 +41,14 @@ tags: required_fields: - _time security_domain: endpoint + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml b/detections/deprecated/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml index 0edfc658c8..40fcf6fc38 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml @@ -38,3 +38,16 @@ tags: required_fields: - _time security_domain: endpoint + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml b/detections/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml index 492d1fb96d..b5dc3677c0 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml @@ -44,3 +44,14 @@ tags: required_fields: - _time security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/deprecated/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 1ab52f5e28..0000000000 --- a/detections/deprecated/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,105 +0,0 @@ -name: Applying Stolen Credentials via Mimikatz modules -id: 759a653f-cb92-40f9-94c9-ec4e47b0f709 -version: 2 -date: '2021-11-24' -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk -type: TTP -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -description: The following analytic identifites the use of Mimikatz modules attempting - to perform Pass-the-Ticket, Golden or Silver Kerberos ticket attacks and Skeleton - Key attack. This behavior is typically performed within interactive Mimikatz memory - space, however it may be identified on the command-line. A Pass-the-Ticket (ptt) - attack is performed once an adversary has established access to a single endpoint - and retrieved the kerberos ticket to now begin moving laterally using this method. - Typically, it blends in with logon activity as the ticket can be copied to another - system and passed into the current session effectively simulating a logon without - any communication with the Domain Controller. A Golden or Silver ticket attack requires - some setup by the adversary, but once performed it will simulate lateral based authentication - to additional endpoints. -search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, - "_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", - null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "event_id"), "string", null) | where - cmd_line != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)kerberos::ptt/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)kerberos::golden/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)kerberos::silver/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)misc::skeleton/)=true ) | eval start_time = timestamp, - end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), - "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)), - body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();' -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting - logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your - endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the - Sysmon TA. -known_false_positives: None identified as this is strictly identifying known command-line - attributes related to Mimikatz. -references: -- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz -- https://adsecurity.org/?p=1275 -- https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515 -- https://adsecurity.org/?page_id=1821#KERBEROSPTT -- https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002/ -- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1550.002/T1550.002.md#atomic-test-1---mimikatz-pass-the-hash -tags: - analytic_story: - - Credential Dumping - asset_type: Windows - cis20: - - CIS 16 - - CIS 20 - confidence: 100 - context: - - Source:AD - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Credential Access - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1555/applying_stolen_credentials/logAllMimikatzModules.log - impact: 90 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives - message: Mimikatz malware is violating authentication processes by injecting golden - or silver Kerberos tickets or passing stolen authentication tokens. Operation - is performed at the device $dest_device_id$, by the account $dest_user_id$ via - command $cmd_line$ - mitre_attack_id: - - T1055 - - T1068 - - T1078 - - T1098 - - T1134 - - T1543 - - T1547 - - T1548 - - T1554 - - T1556 - - T1558 - - T1558.002 - - T1558.001 - - T1003 - - T1003.001 - nist: - - PR.AC - - PR.IP - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - type: User - role: - - Actor - - name: dest_device_id - type: Hostname - role: - - Victim - - name: cmd_line - type: processname - role: - - Others - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics - required_fields: - - dest_device_id - - dest_user_id - - process - - _time - - cmd_line - risk_score: 90 - risk_severity: high - security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/deprecated/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 080e134e90..0000000000 --- a/detections/deprecated/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,100 +0,0 @@ -name: Applying Stolen Credentials via PowerSploit modules -id: 270b482d-2af2-448f-9923-9cf005f61be4 -version: 2 -date: '2021-11-24' -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk -type: TTP -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -description: The following analytic identifies commonly used PowerSploit modules that - perform credential access, spoofing of authentication processes, user impersonation - and attempting to manipulate tokens. Specifically, the following modules `Invoke-CredentialInjection`, - `Invoke-TokenManipulation`, `Invoke-UserImpersonation`, `Get-System`, and `Invoke-RevertToSelf` - were identfiied as modules used to access credentials. PowerSploit is an archived - project on GitHub, but much of its modules and scripts are still utilized today - by adversaries. This behavior is typically performed within interactive PowerShell - sessions or injected into processes, however it may be identified on the command-line. -search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() - - | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), - cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, - "event_id"), "string", null) | where cmd_line != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Invoke-CredentialInjection/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-TokenManipulation/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-UserImpersonation/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Get-System/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-RevertToSelf/)=true - ) - - | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, - "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), - "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line]) - | into write_ssa_detected_events();' -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting - logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your - endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the - Sysmon TA. -known_false_positives: None identified as this is strictly identifying known command-line - attributes related to PowerSploit. -references: -- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit -- https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0194/ -tags: - analytic_story: - - Credential Dumping - asset_type: Windows - cis20: - - CIS 16 - - CIS 20 - confidence: 100 - context: - - Source:AD - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Credential Access - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1555/applying_stolen_credentials/logAllPowerSploitModulesWithOldNames.log - impact: 90 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives - message: PowerSploit malware is violating authentication by injecting stolen credentials, - manipulating authentication tokens or impersonating system or user accounts. Operation - is performed at the device $dest_device_id$, by the account $dest_user_id$ via - command $cmd_line$ - mitre_attack_id: - - T1055 - - T1068 - - T1078 - - T1098 - - T1134 - - T1543 - - T1547 - - T1548 - - T1554 - - T1555 - - T1558 - - T1059.001 - nist: - - PR.AC - - PR.IP - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - type: User - role: - - Actor - - name: dest_device_id - type: Hostname - role: - - Victim - - name: cmd_line - type: processname - role: - - Others - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics - required_fields: - - dest_device_id - - dest_user_id - - process - - _time - - cmd_line - risk_score: 90 - risk_severity: high - security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ssa___assess_credential_strength_via_dsinternals_modules.yml b/detections/deprecated/ssa___assess_credential_strength_via_dsinternals_modules.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 6fb960b256..0000000000 --- a/detections/deprecated/ssa___assess_credential_strength_via_dsinternals_modules.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,85 +0,0 @@ -name: Assessment of Credential Strength via DSInternals modules -id: 5526d3a4-2497-4e8d-9d3c-7a34c9aace2f -version: 2 -date: '2021-11-24' -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk -type: TTP -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -description: The following analytic identifies the use of a DSInternals module, `Test-PasswordQuality`, - that verifies password strength. Adversaries have utilized this module to determine - password complexity or to identify accounts with weak passwords. -search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() - - | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), - cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, - "event_id"), "string", null) | where cmd_line != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Test-PasswordQuality/)=true ) - - | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, - "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), - "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line]) - | into write_ssa_detected_events();' -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting - logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your - endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the - Sysmon TA. -known_false_positives: None identified as this is strictly identifying known command-line - attributes related to DSInternals. -references: -- https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals -- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/ -tags: - analytic_story: - - Credential Dumping - asset_type: Windows - cis20: - - CIS 16 - - CIS 20 - confidence: 85 - context: - - Source:AD - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Recon - - Stage:Credential Access - impact: 30 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives - message: DSInternals tool kit is assessing password strength at the device $dest_device_id$. - Account attempting this operation is $dest_user_id$ via command $cmd_line$ - mitre_attack_id: - - T1078 - - T1098 - - T1087 - - T1201 - - T1552 - - T1555 - - T1059.001 - - T1059 - nist: - - PR.AC - - PR.IP - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - type: User - role: - - Actor - - name: dest_device_id - type: Hostname - role: - - Victim - - name: cmd_line - type: processname - role: - - Others - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics - required_fields: - - _time - - process - - dest_device_id - - dest_user_id - - cmd_line - risk_score: 25 - risk_severity: high - security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_conversion_modules.yml b/detections/deprecated/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_conversion_modules.yml deleted file mode 100644 index e929f5a744..0000000000 --- a/detections/deprecated/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_conversion_modules.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,95 +0,0 @@ -name: Credential Extraction indicative of use of DSInternals credential conversion - modules -id: 73e23834-c7ad-4860-bfd0-7d8ffe6527c2 -version: 2 -date: '2021-11-29' -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk -type: TTP -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -description: The following analytic identifies modules within DSInternals that are - used for extracting credentials from Active Directory. Modules include `ConvertFrom-ADManagedPasswordBlob`, - `ConvertFrom-GPPrefPassword`, `ConvertFrom-UnicodePasswor`, `ConvertTo-GPPrefPassword`,`ConvertTo-KerberosKey`, - `ConvertTo-LMHash`, `ConvertTo-NTHash` `ConvertTo-OrgIdHash` or `ConvertTo-UnicodePassword`. - Adversaries may use these modules for decrypting or transforming the stored credentials. -search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() - - | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), - process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string", null), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, - "process_path"), "string", null), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), - "string", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "parent_process_name"), - "string", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "event_id"), "string", null) - | where cmd_line != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)ConvertFrom-ADManagedPasswordBlob/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)ConvertFrom-GPPrefPassword/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)ConvertFrom-UnicodePassword/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)ConvertTo-GPPrefPassword/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)ConvertTo-KerberosKey/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)ConvertTo-LMHash/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)ConvertTo-NTHash/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)ConvertTo-OrgIdHash/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)ConvertTo-UnicodePassword/)=true ) - - | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, - "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), - "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name", - process_name]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();' -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting - logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your - endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the - Sysmon TA. -known_false_positives: None identified as this is strictly identifying known command-line - attributes related to DSInternals. -references: -- https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals -- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/ -tags: - analytic_story: - - Credential Dumping - - Malicious PowerShell - asset_type: Windows - cis20: - - CIS 16 - confidence: 100 - context: - - Source:AD - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Credential Access - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/logAllDSInternalsModules.log - impact: 70 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives - message: DSInternals tool kit is converting stolen credential material to a form - applicable to authentications. Operation is performed on the device $dest_device_id$, - by the account $dest_user_id$ via process $process_name$. - mitre_attack_id: - - T1003 - - T1003.002 - - T1059.001 - nist: - - PR.AC - - PR.IP - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - type: User - role: - - Actor - - name: dest_device_id - type: Hostname - role: - - Victim - - name: process_name - type: process - role: - - Child Process - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics - required_fields: - - dest_device_id - - process_name - - parent_process_name - - _time - - process_path - - dest_user_id - - cmd_line - risk_score: 70 - risk_severity: high - security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_modules.yml b/detections/deprecated/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_modules.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 131eca2eec..0000000000 --- a/detections/deprecated/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_modules.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,96 +0,0 @@ -name: Credential Extraction indicative of use of DSInternals modules -id: 5d2172f0-8a7d-4ecd-aad9-2dcc95699e0d -version: 2 -date: '2021-11-29' -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk -type: TTP -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -description: The following analytic identifies modules of DSInternals being used on - the associated endpoint. Adversaries may use these modules for manipulating data - related to Active Directory and credentials. -search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() - - | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), - process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string", null), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, - "process_path"), "string", null), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), - "string", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "parent_process_name"), - "string", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "event_id"), "string", null) - | where cmd_line != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-ADDBBackupKey/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-ADDBDomainController/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Get-ADDBKdsRootKey/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-ADDBSchemaAttribute/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-ADKeyCredential/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Get-ADReplAccount/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-ADReplBackupKey/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-ADSIAccount/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-AzureADUserEx/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-BootKey/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-LsaBackupKey/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-LsaPolicyInformation/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Get-SamPasswordPolicy/)=true ) - - | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, - "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), - "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name", - process_name]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();' -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting - logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your - endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the - Sysmon TA. -known_false_positives: None identified as this is strictly identifying known command-line - attributes related to DSInternals. -references: -- https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals -- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/ -tags: - analytic_story: - - Credential Dumping - - Malicious PowerShell - asset_type: Windows - cis20: - - CIS 16 - confidence: 100 - context: - - Source:AD - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Credential Access - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/logAllDSInternalsModules.log - impact: 70 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives - message: DSInternals tool kit is accessing sensitive credential material such as - KDS root key, or accessing sensitive authentication infrastructure such as LsaPolicyInformation. - Operation is performed at the device $dest_device_id$, by the account $dest_user_id$ - via process $process_name$ - mitre_attack_id: - - T1003 - - T1003.002 - - T1059.001 - nist: - - PR.AC - - PR.IP - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - type: User - role: - - Actor - - name: dest_device_id - type: Hostname - role: - - Victim - - name: process_name - type: Process - role: - - Child Process - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics - required_fields: - - dest_device_id - - process_name - - parent_process_name - - _time - - process_path - - dest_user_id - - process - - cmd_line - risk_score: 70 - risk_severity: high - security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_s_option.yml b/detections/deprecated/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_s_option.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 9c28659f43..0000000000 --- a/detections/deprecated/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_s_option.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,92 +0,0 @@ -name: Credential Extraction indicative of FGDump and CacheDump with s option -id: 312582f2-5e91-42c1-a275-cd67f31373c8 -version: 2 -date: '2021-11-29' -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk -type: TTP -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -description: The following analytic identifies the use of CacheDump with the `-s` - parameter to dump cached credentials on the associated endpoint. Adversaries use - Cachedump as it is a publicly-available tool that extracts cached password hashes - from a system's registry. -search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() - - | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), - cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, - "process_name"), "string", null), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_path"), - "string", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "parent_process_name"), - "string", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "event_id"), "string", null) - | where cmd_line != null AND process_name != null AND parent_process_name != null - AND match_regex(parent_process_name, /(?i)System32\\services.exe/)=true AND match_regex(process_name, - /(?i)cachedump\d{0,2}.exe/)=true AND match_regex(process_path, /(?i)\\Temp/)=true - AND match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)\-s/)=true - - | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, - "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), - "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name", - process_name, "parent_process_name", parent_process_name]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();' -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting - logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your - endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the - Sysmon TA. -known_false_positives: False positives will be limited as this analytic targets specific - credential dumping process names. Filter as needed. -references: -- https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0119/ -- https://en.kali.tools/all/?tool=182 -- http://foofus.net/goons/fizzgig/fgdump/ -- https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0120/ -tags: - analytic_story: - - Unusual Processes - - Credential Dumping - asset_type: Windows - cis20: - - CIS 16 - confidence: 100 - context: - - Source:AD - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Credential Access - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/logFgdump.log - impact: 70 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives - message: Malicious actor is accessing stored credentials via FGDump or CacheDump - tools. Operation is performed at the device $dest_device_id$, by the account $dest_user_id$ - via process $process_name$. - mitre_attack_id: - - T1003 - - T1003.002 - nist: - - PR.AC - - PR.IP - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - type: User - role: - - Actor - - name: dest_device_id - type: Hostname - role: - - Victim - - name: process_name - type: Process - role: - - Child Process - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics - required_fields: - - dest_device_id - - process_name - - parent_process_name - - _time - - process_path - - dest_user_id - - process - - cmd_line - risk_score: 70 - risk_severity: high - security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_v_option.yml b/detections/deprecated/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_v_option.yml index b1f22d6bb8..673df4526d 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_v_option.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_v_option.yml @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -name: Credential Extraction indicative of FGDump and CacheDump with v option +name: Credential ExtractionFGDump and CacheDump id: 3c40b0ef-a03f-460a-9484-e4b9117cbb38 version: 2 date: '2021-11-29' diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ssa___credential_extraction_getaddbaccount_from_dump.yml b/detections/deprecated/ssa___credential_extraction_getaddbaccount_from_dump.yml deleted file mode 100644 index f7d42f0841..0000000000 --- a/detections/deprecated/ssa___credential_extraction_getaddbaccount_from_dump.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,77 +0,0 @@ -name: Credential Extraction via Get-ADDBAccount module present in PowerSploit and - DSInternals -id: e4f126b5-e6bc-4a5c-b1a8-d07bc6c4a49f -version: 1 -date: '2020-10-18' -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk -type: TTP -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material - from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve - decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. PowerSploit - and DSInternals are common exploit APIs offering PowerShell modules for various - exploits of Windows and Active Directory environments. -search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() - - | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), - cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, - "event_id"), "string", null) | where cmd_line != null AND match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Get-ADDBAccount/)=true AND match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)\-dbpath[\s;:\.\|]+/)=true - - | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, - "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), - "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line]) - | into write_ssa_detected_events();' -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -known_false_positives: None identified. -references: [] -tags: - analytic_story: - - Credential Dumping - - Malicious PowerShell - asset_type: Windows - cis20: - - CIS 16 - confidence: 90 - context: - - Source:AD - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Credential Access - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/logPowerShellModule.log - impact: 70 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives - message: PowerSploit malware is accessing stored credentials via Get-ADDBAccount - module. Operation is performed at the device $dest_device_id$, by the account - $dest_user_id$ via command $cmd_line$ - mitre_attack_id: - - T1003 - nist: - - PR.IP - - PR.AC - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - type: User - role: - - Actor - - name: dest_device_id - type: Hostname - role: - - Victim - - name: cmd_line - type: processname - role: - - Others - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics - required_fields: - - dest_device_id - - dest_user_id - - process - - _time - risk_score: 63 - risk_severity: high - security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ssa___credential_extraction_lazagne_command_options.yml b/detections/deprecated/ssa___credential_extraction_lazagne_command_options.yml deleted file mode 100644 index e18d3f48ad..0000000000 --- a/detections/deprecated/ssa___credential_extraction_lazagne_command_options.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,76 +0,0 @@ -name: Credential Extraction indicative of Lazagne command line options -id: 341975fa-4ad0-4f01-9acc-df4f69742db7 -version: 1 -date: '2020-10-18' -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk -type: TTP -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material - from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve - decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. LaZagne is - a tool that extracts various kinds of credentials from a local computer, including - account passwords, domain passwords, browser passwords, etc. -search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() - - | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), - cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, - "event_id"), "string", null) | where cmd_line != null AND match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)all\s+\-oA\s+\-output/)=true - - | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, - "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), - "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line]) - | into write_ssa_detected_events();' -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -known_false_positives: None identified. -references: [] -tags: - analytic_story: - - Credential Dumping - asset_type: Windows - cis20: - - CIS 16 - confidence: 90 - context: - - Source:AD - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Credential Access - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/logLazagneCredDump.log - impact: 70 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives - message: Lazagne malware is extracting/decoding encoded credentials. Operation is - performed at the device $dest_device_id$, by the account $dest_user_id$ via command - $cmd_line$ - mitre_attack_id: - - T1003 - - T1555 - nist: - - PR.IP - - PR.AC - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - type: User - role: - - Actor - - name: dest_device_id - type: Hostname - role: - - Victim - - name: cmd_line - type: processname - role: - - Others - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics - required_fields: - - dest_device_id - - dest_user_id - - process - - _time - risk_score: 63 - risk_severity: high - security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ssa___credential_extraction_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/deprecated/ssa___credential_extraction_mimikatz_modules.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 719e5d50f1..0000000000 --- a/detections/deprecated/ssa___credential_extraction_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,81 +0,0 @@ -name: Credential Extraction indicative of use of Mimikatz modules -id: 966b635f-98e8-4aa4-9b49-47ed2cedcc85 -version: 1 -date: '2020-10-21' -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk -type: TTP -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material - from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve - decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. Mimikatz - is a collection of tools and modules commonly employed in Windows exploits. -search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() - - | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), - cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, - "event_id"), "string", null) | where cmd_line != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)CRYPTO::Certificates/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)CRYPTO::keys/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)kerberos::list/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)kerberos::tgt/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)lsadump::sam/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)lsadump::secrets/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)lsadump::cache/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)lsadump::lsa/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)lsadump::trust/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)lsadump::backupkeys/)=true - ) - - | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, - "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), - "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line]) - | into write_ssa_detected_events();' -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -known_false_positives: None identified. -references: -- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz -tags: - analytic_story: - - Credential Dumping - - Unusual Processes - asset_type: Windows - cis20: - - CIS 16 - confidence: 95 - context: - - Source:AD - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Credential Access - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/logAllMimikatzModules.log - impact: 70 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives - message: Mimikatz malware is extracting/decoding encoded credentials from stores - such as SAM or LSA dumps. Operation is performed at the device $dest_device_id$, - by the account $dest_user_id$ via command $cmd_line$ - mitre_attack_id: - - T1003 - nist: - - PR.AC - - PR.IP - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - type: User - role: - - Actor - - name: dest_device_id - type: Hostname - role: - - Victim - - name: cmd_line - type: processname - role: - - Others - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics - required_fields: - - dest_device_id - - dest_user_id - - process - - _time - risk_score: 66 - risk_severity: high - security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_kernel_peek.yml b/detections/deprecated/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_kernel_peek.yml deleted file mode 100644 index b5ad8dfcc2..0000000000 --- a/detections/deprecated/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_kernel_peek.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,86 +0,0 @@ -name: Credential Extraction native Microsoft debuggers peek into the kernel -id: c20bb8ec-e1b0-4640-b0ef-3a4c54f8c112 -version: 1 -date: '2020-10-18' -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk -type: TTP -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material - from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve - decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. Native Microsoft - debuggers, such as kd, ntkd, livekd and windbg, can be leveraged to read credential - material directly from memory and process dumps. -search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() - - | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), - cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, - "process_name"), "string", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, - "parent_process_name"), "string", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "event_id"), - "string", null) | where cmd_line != null AND parent_process_name != null AND process_name - != null AND ( match_regex(parent_process_name, /(?i)ntkd\.exe/)=true OR match_regex(parent_process_name, - /(?i)livekd\.exe/)=true ) AND match_regex(process_name, /(?i)conhost\.exe/)=true - AND match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)0xffffffff/)=true AND match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)\-ForceV1/)=true - - | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, - "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), - "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name", - process_name, "parent_process_name", parent_process_name]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();' -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -known_false_positives: Although unlikely, using debuggers this way may be indicative - of developers analyzing crash dumps of their code. Note, even for developers this - is an unusual way of working on code - debuggers are mostly used to step through - code, not analyze its crash dumps. -references: -- https://medium.com/@clermont1050/covid-19-cyber-infection-c615ead7c29 -tags: - analytic_story: - - Credential Dumping - - Unusual Processes - asset_type: Windows - cis20: - - CIS 16 - confidence: 90 - context: - - Source:AD - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Credential Access - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/logLiveKDFullKernelDump.log - impact: 70 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives - message: Malicious actor is extracting/decoding encoded credentials via Microsoft's - native debugging tools. Operation is performed at the device $dest_device_id$, - by the account $dest_user_id$ via command $cmd_line$ - mitre_attack_id: - - T1003 - nist: - - PR.IP - - PR.AC - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - type: User - role: - - Actor - - name: dest_device_id - type: Hostname - role: - - Victim - - name: cmd_line - type: processname - role: - - Others - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics - required_fields: - - process_name - - parent_process_name - - _time - - dest_device_id - - dest_user_id - - process - risk_score: 63 - risk_severity: medium - security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_z_option.yml b/detections/deprecated/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_z_option.yml deleted file mode 100644 index a8c42624e1..0000000000 --- a/detections/deprecated/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_z_option.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,82 +0,0 @@ -name: Credential Extraction native Microsoft debuggers via z command line option -id: adc51a77-90c9-4358-b43c-f10dd1a27d05 -version: 1 -date: '2020-10-18' -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk -type: TTP -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material - from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve - decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. Native Microsoft - debuggers, such as kd, ntkd, livekd and windbg, can be leveraged to read credential - material directly from memory and process dumps. -search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() - - | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), - cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, - "process_name"), "string", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "event_id"), - "string", null) | where cmd_line != null AND process_name != null AND ( match_regex(process_name, - /^(?i)ntkd\.exe/)=true OR match_regex(process_name, /^(?i)kd\.exe/)=true ) AND match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)\-z\s+/)=true - - | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, - "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), - "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name", - process_name]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();' -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -known_false_positives: Although unlikely, using debuggers this way may be indicative - of developers analyzing crash dumps of their code. Note, even for developers this - is an unusual way of working on code - debuggers are mostly used to step through - code, not analyze its crash dumps. -references: [] -tags: - analytic_story: - - Credential Dumping - - Unusual Processes - asset_type: Windows - cis20: - - CIS 16 - confidence: 90 - context: - - Source:AD - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Credential Access - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/logLiveKDFullKernelDump.log - impact: 70 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives - message: Malicious actor is extracting/decoding encoded credentials via Microsoft's - native debugging tools. Operation is performed at the device $dest_device_id$, - by the account $dest_user_id$ via command $cmd_line$ - mitre_attack_id: - - T1003 - nist: - - PR.AC - - PR.IP - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - type: User - role: - - Actor - - name: dest_device_id - type: Hostname - role: - - Victim - - name: cmd_line - type: processname - role: - - Others - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics - required_fields: - - process_name - - _time - - dest_device_id - - dest_user_id - - process - risk_score: 63 - risk_severity: medium - security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ssa___credential_extraction_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/deprecated/ssa___credential_extraction_powersploit_modules.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 04ff3f2af3..0000000000 --- a/detections/deprecated/ssa___credential_extraction_powersploit_modules.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,82 +0,0 @@ -name: Credential Extraction indicative of use of PowerSploit modules -id: 5f1186a4-e681-446e-851c-dc9574ad28eb -version: 1 -date: '2020-10-21' -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk -type: TTP -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -description: Credential extraction is often an illegal recovery of credential material - from secured authentication resources and repositories. This process may also involve - decryption or other transformations of the stored credential material. PowerSploit - is a collection of Microsoft PowerShell modules commonly employed in exploits. -search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() - - | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), - cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, - "event_id"), "string", null) | where cmd_line != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Get-ApplicationHost/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-CachedGPPPassword/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-GPPAutologon/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-GPPPassword/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-RegistryAutoLogon/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Get-SiteListPassword/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-SPNTicket/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Request-SPNTicket/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Get-VaultCredential/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-Kerberoast/)=true - ) - - | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, - "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), - "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line]) - | into write_ssa_detected_events();' -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -known_false_positives: None identified. -references: -- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit -tags: - analytic_story: - - Credential Dumping - - Malicious PowerShell - asset_type: Windows - cis20: - - CIS 16 - confidence: 100 - context: - - Source:AD - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Credential Access - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/logAllPowerSploitModulesWithOldNames.log - impact: 70 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives - message: PowerSploit malware is extracting encoded credentials or spoofing automated - logings. Operation is performed at the device $dest_device_id$, by the account - $dest_user_id$ via command $cmd_line$ - mitre_attack_id: - - T1003 - nist: - - PR.AC - - PR.IP - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - type: User - role: - - Actor - - name: dest_device_id - type: Hostname - role: - - Victim - - name: cmd_line - type: processname - role: - - Others - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics - required_fields: - - dest_device_id - - dest_user_id - - process - - _time - risk_score: 70 - risk_severity: high - security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ssa___detect_pass_hash.yml b/detections/deprecated/ssa___detect_pass_hash.yml deleted file mode 100644 index cd076b5e12..0000000000 --- a/detections/deprecated/ssa___detect_pass_hash.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,83 +0,0 @@ -name: Detect Pass the Hash -id: 7cd8b9fa-6b0c-424f-92a6-9c5287a72f5f -version: 1 -date: '2020-10-21' -author: Xiao Lin, Splunk -type: TTP -datamodel: -- Authentication -description: This search looks for specific authentication events from the Windows - Security Event logs to detect potential attempts using Pass-the-Hash technique. -search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() - - | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)) - | eval signature_id=map_get(input_event, "signature_id"), authentication_type=map_get(input_event, - "authentication_type"), authentication_method=map_get(input_event, "authentication_method"), - origin_device_domain=map_get(input_event, "origin_device_domain"), dest_user_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, - "dest_user_id"), "string", null), dest_device_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), - "string", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "event_id"), "string", null) - - | where (authentication_type="3" AND authentication_method="NtLmSsp") OR (authentication_type="9" - AND authentication_method="seclogo") - - | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(dest_device_id, - dest_user_id), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "authentication_type", authentication_type, - "authentication_method", authentication_method]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();' -how_to_implement: The test data is converted from Windows Security Event logs generated - from Attach Range simulation and used in SPL search and extended to SPL2 -known_false_positives: Legitimate logon activity by authorized NTLM systems may be - detected by this search. Please investigate as appropriate. -references: -- Initial ESCU implementation by Bhavin Patel and Patrick Bareiss -tags: - analytic_story: - - Lateral Movement - cis20: - - CIS 3 - - CIS 5 - - CIS 16 - confidence: 20 - context: - - Source:AD - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Credential Access - impact: 80 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives - message: Potential use of the pass the hash/token attacks that spoof authentication. - Operation is performed at the device $dest_device_id$, by the account $dest_user_id$ - via command $cmd_line$ - mitre_attack_id: - - T1550 - - T1550.002 - nist: - - PR.PT - - PR.AT - - PR.AC - - PR.IP - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - type: User - role: - - Actor - - name: dest_device_id - type: Hostname - role: - - Victim - - name: cmd_line - type: processname - role: - - Others - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics - required_fields: - - signature_id - - authentication_type - - _time - - authentication_method - - origin_device_domain - - dest_user_id - - dest_device_id - risk_score: 16 - risk_severity: low - security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ssa___illegal_access_user_content_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/deprecated/ssa___illegal_access_user_content_via_powersploit_modules.yml deleted file mode 100644 index fda8390475..0000000000 --- a/detections/deprecated/ssa___illegal_access_user_content_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,83 +0,0 @@ -name: Illegal Access To User Content via PowerSploit modules -id: 01fc7d91-eb0c-478e-8633-e4fa4904463a -version: 1 -date: '2020-11-09' -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk -type: TTP -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that enable illegaly - access user content, such as key logging, audio recording, screenshots, tapping - into http and RDP sessions, etc. -search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() - - | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), - cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, - "event_id"), "string", null) | where cmd_line != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Get-HttpStatus/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-Keystrokes/)=true OR - match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-MicrophoneAudio/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetRDPSession/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-TimedScreenshot/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Get-WebConfig/)=true ) - - | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, - "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), - "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line]) - | into write_ssa_detected_events();' -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -known_false_positives: None identified. -references: -- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit -tags: - analytic_story: - - Malicious PowerShell - asset_type: Windows - cis20: - - CIS 16 - - CIS 20 - confidence: 100 - context: - - Source:AD - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Exfiltration - - Stage:Command And Control - - Consequence:Loss Of Control - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021/illegal_access_to_content/logAllPowerSploitModulesWithOldNames.log - impact: 85 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives - message: PowerSploit malware is tapping into user content - microphone, camera, - ongoing HTTP or RDP session. Operation is performed at the device $dest_device_id$, - by the account $dest_user_id$ via command $cmd_line$ - mitre_attack_id: - - T1021 - - T1113 - - T1123 - - T1563 - nist: - - PR.AC - - PR.IP - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - type: User - role: - - Actor - - name: dest_device_id - type: Hostname - role: - - Victim - - name: cmd_line - type: processname - role: - - Others - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics - required_fields: - - dest_device_id - - dest_user_id - - process - - _time - risk_score: 85 - risk_severity: high - security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ssa___illegal_account_creation_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/deprecated/ssa___illegal_account_creation_via_powersploit_modules.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 08bb1ad9fc..0000000000 --- a/detections/deprecated/ssa___illegal_account_creation_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,74 +0,0 @@ -name: Illegal Account Creation via PowerSploit modules -id: 20fba62a-fa5b-46cc-b39f-473fa248fee2 -version: 1 -date: '2020-11-09' -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk -type: TTP -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that create accounts - illegaly. -search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() - - | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), - cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, - "event_id"), "string", null) | where cmd_line != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)New-DomainUser/)=true ) - - | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, - "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), - "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line]) - | into write_ssa_detected_events();' -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -known_false_positives: None identified. -references: -- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit -tags: - analytic_story: - - Windows Persistence Techniques - asset_type: Windows - cis20: - - CIS 16 - - CIS 20 - confidence: 100 - context: - - Source:AD - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Persistence - - Consequence:Loss Of Control - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1585/illegal_account_creation/logAllPowerSploitModulesWithOldNames.log - impact: 80 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives - message: PowerSploit malware is creating illegal domain accounts. Operation is performed - at the device $dest_device_id$, by the account $dest_user_id$ via command $cmd_line$ - mitre_attack_id: - - T1585 - nist: - - PR.AC - - PR.IP - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - type: User - role: - - Actor - - name: dest_device_id - type: Hostname - role: - - Victim - - name: cmd_line - type: processname - role: - - Others - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics - required_fields: - - dest_device_id - - dest_user_id - - process - - _time - risk_score: 80 - risk_severity: high - security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ssa___illegal_account_enable_disable_via_dsinternals_modules.yml b/detections/deprecated/ssa___illegal_account_enable_disable_via_dsinternals_modules.yml deleted file mode 100644 index afdf84bcac..0000000000 --- a/detections/deprecated/ssa___illegal_account_enable_disable_via_dsinternals_modules.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,77 +0,0 @@ -name: Illegal Enabling or Disabling of Accounts via DSInternals modules -id: 3e0f9962-9989-445f-878c-939443326b63 -version: 1 -date: '2020-11-09' -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk -type: TTP -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -description: This detection identifies use of DSInternals modules that enable or disable - accounts illegaly. -search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() - - | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), - cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, - "event_id"), "string", null) | where cmd_line != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Disable-ADDBAccount/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Enable-ADDBAccount/)=true - ) - - | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, - "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), - "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line]) - | into write_ssa_detected_events();' -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -known_false_positives: None identified. -references: -- https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals -tags: - analytic_story: - - Windows Persistence Techniques - asset_type: Windows - cis20: - - CIS 16 - - CIS 20 - confidence: 100 - context: - - Source:AD - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Command And Control - - Consequence:Loss Of Control - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098/account_manipulation/logAllDSInternalsModules.log - impact: 80 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives - message: DSInternals malware is illegally enabling or disabling accounts. Operation - is performed at the device $dest_device_id$, by the account $dest_user_id$ via - command $cmd_line$ - mitre_attack_id: - - T1078 - - T1098 - nist: - - PR.AC - - PR.IP - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - type: User - role: - - Actor - - name: dest_device_id - type: Hostname - role: - - Victim - - name: cmd_line - type: processname - role: - - Others - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics - required_fields: - - dest_device_id - - dest_user_id - - process - - _time - risk_score: 80 - risk_severity: high - security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ssa___illegal_log_deletion_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/deprecated/ssa___illegal_log_deletion_via_mimikatz_modules.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 24be672979..0000000000 --- a/detections/deprecated/ssa___illegal_log_deletion_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,75 +0,0 @@ -name: Illegal Deletion of Logs via Mimikatz modules -id: 4ddb3b0d-f95f-4ae2-b4e8-663296453a7b -version: 1 -date: '2020-11-09' -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk -type: TTP -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that delete event - logs. -search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() - - | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), - cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, - "event_id"), "string", null) | where cmd_line != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)event::drop/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)event::clear/)=true ) - - | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, - "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), - "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line]) - | into write_ssa_detected_events();' -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -known_false_positives: None identified. -references: -- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz -tags: - analytic_story: - - Windows Log Manipulation - asset_type: Windows - cis20: - - CIS 16 - - CIS 20 - confidence: 100 - context: - - Source:AD - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Command And Control - - Consequence:Loss Of Control - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070/illegal_log_deletion/logAllMimikatzModules.log - impact: 50 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives - message: Mimikatz malware is deleting event logs to cover tracks of malicious activity. - Operation is performed at the device $dest_device_id$, by the account $dest_user_id$ - via command $cmd_line$ - mitre_attack_id: - - T1070 - nist: - - PR.AC - - PR.IP - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - type: User - role: - - Actor - - name: dest_device_id - type: Hostname - role: - - Victim - - name: cmd_line - type: processname - role: - - Others - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics - required_fields: - - dest_device_id - - dest_user_id - - process - - _time - risk_score: 50 - risk_severity: high - security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ssa___illegal_management_AD_elements_and_policies_via_dsinternals_modules.yml b/detections/deprecated/ssa___illegal_management_AD_elements_and_policies_via_dsinternals_modules.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 85fa7639e5..0000000000 --- a/detections/deprecated/ssa___illegal_management_AD_elements_and_policies_via_dsinternals_modules.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,80 +0,0 @@ -name: Illegal Management of Active Directory Elements and Policies via DSInternals - modules -id: a587ca9f-c138-47b4-ba51-699f319b8cc5 -version: 1 -date: '2020-11-09' -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk -type: TTP -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -description: This detection identifies use of DSInternals modules for illegal management - of Active Directoty elements and policies. -search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() - - | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), - cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, - "event_id"), "string", null) | where cmd_line != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Remove-ADDBObject/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Set-ADDBDomainController/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Set-ADDBPrimaryGroup/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Set-LsaPolicyInformation/)=true ) - - | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, - "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), - "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line]) - | into write_ssa_detected_events();' -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -known_false_positives: None identified. -references: -- https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals -tags: - analytic_story: - - Windows Persistence Techniques - asset_type: Windows - cis20: - - CIS 16 - - CIS 20 - confidence: 100 - context: - - Source:AD - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Command And Control - - Consequence:Loss Of Control - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1484/logAllDSInternalsModules.log - impact: 90 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives - message: DSInternals malware is controlling infrastructure by modifying Active Directory - elements, domain controllers, and policies. Operation is performed at the device - $dest_device_id$, by the account $dest_user_id$ via command $cmd_line$ - mitre_attack_id: - - T1098 - - T1207 - - T1484 - nist: - - PR.AC - - PR.IP - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - type: User - role: - - Actor - - name: dest_device_id - type: Hostname - role: - - Victim - - name: cmd_line - type: processname - role: - - Others - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics - required_fields: - - dest_device_id - - dest_user_id - - process - - _time - risk_score: 90 - risk_severity: high - security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ssa___illegal_management_computers_and_AD_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/deprecated/ssa___illegal_management_computers_and_AD_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 3a54457131..0000000000 --- a/detections/deprecated/ssa___illegal_management_computers_and_AD_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,81 +0,0 @@ -name: Illegal Management of Computers and Active Directory Elements via PowerSploit - modules -id: 75760c11-7d48-4968-b828-013b299e8f6d -version: 1 -date: '2020-11-09' -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk -type: TTP -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that enable illegal - management of computers and Active Directory elements. -search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() - - | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), - cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, - "event_id"), "string", null) | where cmd_line != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Set-DomainObject/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Set-ADObject/)=true OR - match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Set-DomainObjectOwner/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Set-MasterBootRecord/)=true ) - - - | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, - "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), - "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line]) - | into write_ssa_detected_events();' -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -known_false_positives: None identified. -references: -- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit -tags: - analytic_story: - - Windows Persistence Techniques - asset_type: Windows - cis20: - - CIS 16 - - CIS 20 - confidence: 100 - context: - - Source:AD - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Command And Control - - Consequence:Loss Of Control - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1484/logAllPowerSploitModulesWithOldNames.log - impact: 90 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives - message: PowerSploit malware is controlling infrastructure by modifying Active Directory - elements or local Master Boot Records. Operation is performed at the device $dest_device_id$, - by the account $dest_user_id$ via command $cmd_line$ - mitre_attack_id: - - T1098 - - T1207 - - T1484 - nist: - - PR.AC - - PR.IP - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - type: User - role: - - Actor - - name: dest_device_id - type: Hostname - role: - - Victim - - name: cmd_line - type: processname - role: - - Others - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics - required_fields: - - dest_device_id - - dest_user_id - - process - - _time - risk_score: 90 - risk_severity: high - security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_and_persistence_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/deprecated/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_and_persistence_via_powersploit_modules.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 254a2292a9..0000000000 --- a/detections/deprecated/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_and_persistence_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,83 +0,0 @@ -name: Illegal Privilege Elevation and Persistence via PowerSploit modules -id: 88c10ee9-fe72-4bce-b343-5b129044b991 -version: 1 -date: '2020-11-09' -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk -type: TTP -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that illegaly - elevate general privileges or ensure persistence, e.g., enable manipulation of registry, - task scheduling, persistent WMI, access to OS objects under desired identities. -search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() - - | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), - cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, - "event_id"), "string", null) | where cmd_line != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Add-DomainObjectAcl/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Add-ObjectAcl/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Enable-Privilege/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)New-ElevatedPersistenceOption/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)New-UserPersistenceOption/)=true ) - - | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, - "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), - "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line]) - | into write_ssa_detected_events();' -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -known_false_positives: None identified. -references: -- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit -tags: - analytic_story: - - Malicious PowerShell - - Windows Persistence Techniques - asset_type: Windows - cis20: - - CIS 16 - - CIS 20 - confidence: 100 - context: - - Source:AD - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Privilege Escalation - - Stage:Command And Control - - Stage:Persistence - - Consequence:Loss Of Control - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/logAllPowerSploitModulesWithOldNames.log - impact: 90 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives - message: PowerSploit malware is planting attack persistence elements, altering privileges - and access controls. Operation is performed at the device $dest_device_id$, by - the account $dest_user_id$ via command $cmd_line$ - mitre_attack_id: - - T1053 - - T1134 - - T1548 - nist: - - PR.AC - - PR.IP - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - type: User - role: - - Actor - - name: dest_device_id - type: Hostname - role: - - Victim - - name: cmd_line - type: processname - role: - - Others - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics - required_fields: - - dest_device_id - - dest_user_id - - process - - _time - risk_score: 90 - risk_severity: high - security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/deprecated/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_via_mimikatz_modules.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 54f6aec7bb..0000000000 --- a/detections/deprecated/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,78 +0,0 @@ -name: Illegal Privilege Elevation via Mimikatz modules -id: 2f873b1f-6352-4844-b7b9-b419f09a42c7 -version: 1 -date: '2020-11-09' -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk -type: TTP -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for illegal privilege - elevation. -search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() - - | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), - cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, - "event_id"), "string", null) | where cmd_line != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)privilege::debug/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)token::elevate/)=true - ) - - | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, - "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), - "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line]) - | into write_ssa_detected_events();' -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -known_false_positives: None identified. -references: -- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz -tags: - analytic_story: - - Windows Privilege Escalation - asset_type: Windows - cis20: - - CIS 16 - - CIS 20 - confidence: 100 - context: - - Source:AD - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Privilege Escalation - - Stage:Command And Control - - Consequence:Loss Of Control - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/logAllMimikatzModules.log - impact: 90 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives - message: Mimikatz malware is setting highest privileges to malicious entities. Operation - is performed at the device $dest_device_id$, by the account $dest_user_id$ via - command $cmd_line$ - mitre_attack_id: - - T1134 - - T1548 - nist: - - PR.AC - - PR.IP - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - type: User - role: - - Actor - - name: dest_device_id - type: Hostname - role: - - Victim - - name: cmd_line - type: processname - role: - - Others - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics - required_fields: - - dest_device_id - - dest_user_id - - process - - _time - risk_score: 90 - risk_severity: high - security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/deprecated/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_mimikatz_modules.yml deleted file mode 100644 index c94e7c2c1f..0000000000 --- a/detections/deprecated/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,80 +0,0 @@ -name: Illegal Service and Process Control via Mimikatz modules -id: aaf3adf1-73e1-4477-b4ee-3771898964f1 -version: 1 -date: '2020-11-09' -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk -type: TTP -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for illegal control - over services and processes, including the authentication service. -search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() - - | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), - cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, - "event_id"), "string", null) | where cmd_line != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)process::start/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)service::\+/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)service::\-/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)service::start/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)service::stop/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)service::suspend/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)misc::memssp/)=true ) - - | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, - "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), - "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line]) - | into write_ssa_detected_events();' -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -known_false_positives: None identified. -references: -- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz -tags: - analytic_story: - - Windows Service Abuse - asset_type: Windows - cis20: - - CIS 16 - - CIS 20 - confidence: 100 - context: - - Source:AD - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Command And Control - - Consequence:Loss Of Control - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/logAllMimikatzModules.log - impact: 90 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives - message: Mimikatz malware is controlling computer's processess and services. Operation - is performed at the device $dest_device_id$, by the account $dest_user_id$ via - command $cmd_line$ - mitre_attack_id: - - T1055 - - T1106 - - T1569 - nist: - - PR.AC - - PR.IP - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - type: User - role: - - Actor - - name: dest_device_id - type: Hostname - role: - - Victim - - name: cmd_line - type: processname - role: - - Others - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics - required_fields: - - dest_device_id - - dest_user_id - - process - - _time - risk_score: 90 - risk_severity: high - security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/deprecated/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_powersploit_modules.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 835cbc4e6c..0000000000 --- a/detections/deprecated/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,90 +0,0 @@ -name: Illegal Service and Process Control via PowerSploit modules -id: 0e910e5b-309d-4bc3-8af2-0030c02aa353 -version: 1 -date: '2020-11-09' -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk -type: TTP -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that enable illegal - control of services and processes, such as installing or spoofing of malicious services, - injecting malicious code in DLLs and EXEs, invoking shell code and WMI commands, - modifying access to service objects, etc. -search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() - - | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), - cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, - "event_id"), "string", null) | where cmd_line != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Install-SSP/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Set-CriticalProcess/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Install-ServiceBinary/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Restore-ServiceBinary/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Write-ServiceBinary/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Set-ServiceBinaryPath/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-DllInjection/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-ServiceAbuse/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Invoke-Shellcode/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-WScriptUACBypass/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-WmiCommand/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Write-HijackDll/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Add-ServiceDacl/)=true - ) - - - | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, - "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), - "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line]) - | into write_ssa_detected_events();' -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -known_false_positives: None identified. -references: -- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit -tags: - analytic_story: - - Windows Service Abuse - - Malicious PowerShell - asset_type: Windows - cis20: - - CIS 16 - - CIS 20 - confidence: 100 - context: - - Source:AD - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Recon - - Stage:Credential Access - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/logAllPowerSploitModulesWithOldNames.log - impact: 90 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives - message: PowerSploit malware is controlling computer's processess and services. - Operation is performed at the device $dest_device_id$, by the account $dest_user_id$ - via command $cmd_line$ - mitre_attack_id: - - T1055 - - T1106 - - T1569 - nist: - - PR.AC - - PR.IP - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - type: User - role: - - Actor - - name: dest_device_id - type: Hostname - role: - - Victim - - name: cmd_line - type: processname - role: - - Others - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics - required_fields: - - dest_device_id - - dest_user_id - - process - - _time - risk_score: 90 - risk_severity: high - security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ssa___probing_access_with_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/deprecated/ssa___probing_access_with_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml deleted file mode 100644 index afcded581a..0000000000 --- a/detections/deprecated/ssa___probing_access_with_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,75 +0,0 @@ -name: Probing Access with Stolen Credentials via PowerSploit modules -id: d405af5d-99f1-45af-8dfb-b8f98b764247 -version: 1 -date: '2020-11-04' -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk -type: TTP -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -description: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that facilitate - access probing with admin credentials as well as probing access to system services. -search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() - - | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), - cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, - "event_id"), "string", null) | where cmd_line != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Test-AdminAccess/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-CheckLocalAdminAccess/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Test-ServiceDaclPermission/)=true ) - - | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, - "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), - "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line]) - | into write_ssa_detected_events();' -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -known_false_positives: None identified. -references: -- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit -tags: - analytic_story: - - Windows Privilege Escalation - asset_type: Windows - cis20: - - CIS 16 - - CIS 20 - confidence: 100 - context: - - Source:AD - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Recon - - Stage:Credential Access - impact: 60 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives - message: PowerSploit malware is probing access with stolen credentials. Operation - is performed at the device $dest_device_id$, by the account $dest_user_id$ via - command $cmd_line$ - mitre_attack_id: - - T1078 - - T1098 - nist: - - PR.AC - - PR.IP - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - type: User - role: - - Actor - - name: dest_device_id - type: Hostname - role: - - Victim - - name: cmd_line - type: processname - role: - - Others - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics - required_fields: - - _time - - process - - dest_user_id - - dest_device_id - risk_score: 60 - risk_severity: high - security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ssa___recon_access_and_persistence_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/deprecated/ssa___recon_access_and_persistence_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml deleted file mode 100644 index e6238d3e36..0000000000 --- a/detections/deprecated/ssa___recon_access_and_persistence_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,91 +0,0 @@ -name: Reconnaissance of Access and Persistence Opportunities via PowerSploit modules -id: 3d8bd7f3-1061-4ac7-9225-6764cc0684d7 -version: 1 -date: '2020-11-05' -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk -type: TTP -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -description: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules that discover opportunities - for malicious access and persistence. Some examples include access to admin accounts, - weak access control policies, landing paths for dropping malicious software or data - to exfiltrate, registry locations to land autorun parameters, task scheduling opportunities, - as well as services and system files that can be compromised. -search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() - - | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), - cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, - "event_id"), "string", null) | where cmd_line != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Find-LocalAdminAccess/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Find-InterestingDomainAcl/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-ACLScanner/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Find-PathDLLHijack/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Find-ProcessDLLHijack/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainObjectAcl/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Get-ObjectAcl/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainPolicy/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-ModifiablePath/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Get-ModifiableRegistryAutoRun/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-ModifiableScheduledTaskFile/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-ModifiableService/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Get-ModifiableServiceFile/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-PathAcl/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-UnattendedInstallFile/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Get-UnquotedService/)=true ) - - | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, - "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), - "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line]) - | into write_ssa_detected_events();' -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -known_false_positives: None identified. -references: -- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit -tags: - analytic_story: - - Windows Discovery Techniques - asset_type: Windows - cis20: - - CIS 16 - - CIS 20 - confidence: 100 - context: - - Source:AD - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Recon - impact: 60 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives - message: PowerSploit malware is searching for an entry point into the infrastructure, - such as local admin accounts, opportunities to hijack processes, unattended install - files, or modifiable access objects. Operation is performed at the device $dest_device_id$, - by the account $dest_user_id$ via command $cmd_line$ - mitre_attack_id: - - T1053 - - T1068 - - T1078 - - T1543 - - T1547 - - T1574 - nist: - - PR.AC - - PR.IP - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - type: User - role: - - Actor - - name: dest_device_id - type: Hostname - role: - - Victim - - name: cmd_line - type: processname - role: - - Others - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics - required_fields: - - _time - - process - - dest_device_id - - dest_user_id - risk_score: 60 - risk_severity: high - security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_policies_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/deprecated/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_policies_via_powersploit_modules.yml deleted file mode 100644 index e49bc3b415..0000000000 --- a/detections/deprecated/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_policies_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,99 +0,0 @@ -name: Reconnaissance and Access to Accounts Groups and Policies via PowerSploit modules -id: 63422f8e-766c-468f-8133-2ba6795e263b -version: 1 -date: '2020-11-05' -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk -type: TTP -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that discover - accounts, groups and policies that can be accessed or taken over. -search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() - - | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), - cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, - "event_id"), "string", null) | where cmd_line != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Find-DomainLocalGroupMember/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-EnumerateLocalAdmin/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Find-DomainUserEvent/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Invoke-EventHunter/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Find-DomainUserLocation/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-UserHunter/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Get-DomainForeignGroupMember/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Find-ForeignGroup/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainForeignUser/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Find-ForeignUser/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainGPO/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetGPO/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainGPOComputerLocalGroupMapping/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Find-GPOComputerAdmin/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Get-DomainGPOLocalGroup/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetGPOGroup/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainGPOUserLocalGroupMapping/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Find-GPOLocation/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainGroup/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetGroup/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainGroupMember/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetGroupMember/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Get-DomainManagedSecurityGroup/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Find-ManagedSecurityGroups/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainOU/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetOU/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainUser/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetUser/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainUserEvent/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Get-UserEvent/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetLocalGroup/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetLocalGroupMember/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Get-NetLoggedon/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-RegLoggedOn/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-WMIRegLastLoggedOn/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Get-LastLoggedOn/)=true ) - - | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, - "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), - "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line]) - | into write_ssa_detected_events();' -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -known_false_positives: None identified. -references: -- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit -tags: - analytic_story: - - Windows Discovery Techniques - asset_type: Windows - cis20: - - CIS 16 - - CIS 20 - confidence: 100 - context: - - Source:AD - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Recon - - Stage:Command And Control - - Consequence:Loss Of Control - impact: 80 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives - message: PowerSploit malware is searching for and using specific accounts, groups - and policies, such as the last logged on account, a local Net group, etc. Operation - is performed at the device $dest_device_id$, by the account $dest_user_id$ via - command $cmd_line$ - mitre_attack_id: - - T1078 - - T1087 - - T1484 - nist: - - PR.AC - - PR.IP - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - type: User - role: - - Actor - - name: dest_device_id - type: Hostname - role: - - Victim - - name: cmd_line - type: processname - role: - - Others - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics - required_fields: - - _time - - process - - dest_device_id - - dest_user_id - risk_score: 80 - risk_severity: high - security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/deprecated/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_via_mimikatz_modules.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 96ee3261f0..0000000000 --- a/detections/deprecated/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,76 +0,0 @@ -name: Reconnaissance and Access to Accounts and Groups via Mimikatz modules -id: 1bce67aa-3fc4-4886-9089-67f0bfebbef6 -version: 1 -date: '2020-11-05' -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk -type: TTP -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery of accounts - and groups and access to them. -search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() - - | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), - cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, - "event_id"), "string", null) | where cmd_line != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)net::user/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)net::group/)=true ) - - | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, - "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), - "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line]) - | into write_ssa_detected_events();' -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -known_false_positives: None identified. -references: -- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz -tags: - analytic_story: - - Windows Discovery Techniques - asset_type: Windows - cis20: - - CIS 16 - - CIS 20 - confidence: 100 - context: - - Source:AD - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Recon - - Stage:Command And Control - - Consequence:Loss Of Control - impact: 80 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives - message: Mimikatz malware is searching for and using specific accounts and groups. - Operation is performed at the device $dest_device_id$, by the account $dest_user_id$ - via command $cmd_line$ - mitre_attack_id: - - T1078 - - T1087 - - T1484 - nist: - - PR.AC - - PR.IP - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - type: User - role: - - Actor - - name: dest_device_id - type: Hostname - role: - - Victim - - name: cmd_line - type: processname - role: - - Others - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics - required_fields: - - _time - - process - - dest_device_id - - dest_user_id - risk_score: 80 - risk_severity: high - security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ssa___recon_and_use_active_directory_infrastructure_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/deprecated/ssa___recon_and_use_active_directory_infrastructure_via_powersploit_modules.yml deleted file mode 100644 index c711912309..0000000000 --- a/detections/deprecated/ssa___recon_and_use_active_directory_infrastructure_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,89 +0,0 @@ -name: Reconnaissance and Access to Active Directoty Infrastructure via PowerSploit - modules -id: db08ac40-ee14-43e9-9a75-dddd059ef812 -version: 1 -date: '2020-11-06' -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk -type: TTP -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules for reconnaissance - and access to elements of Active Directory infrastructure, such as domain identifiers, - AD sites and forests, and trust relations. -search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() - - | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), - cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, - "event_id"), "string", null) | where cmd_line != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Get-DomainSID/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainSite/)=true OR - match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetSite/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainSubnet/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetSubnet/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainTrust/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetDomainTrust/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Get-DomainTrustMapping/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-MapDomainTrust/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-Forest/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetForest/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-ForestDomain/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetForestDomain/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-ForestGlobalCatalog/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Get-NetForestCatalog/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-ForestTrust/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetForestTrust/)=true ) - - | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, - "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), - "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line]) - | into write_ssa_detected_events();' -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -known_false_positives: None identified. -references: -- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit -tags: - analytic_story: - - Windows Discovery Techniques - asset_type: Windows - cis20: - - CIS 16 - - CIS 20 - confidence: 100 - context: - - Source:AD - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Recon - - Stage:Command And Control - - Consequence:Loss Of Control - impact: 80 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives - message: PowerSploit malware is seaching for or accessing Active Directory objects - such as domain sites, domain trusts, AD forests, etc. Operation is performed at - the device $dest_device_id$, by the account $dest_user_id$ via command $cmd_line$ - mitre_attack_id: - - T1199 - - T1482 - - T1590 - - T1591 - - T1595 - nist: - - PR.AC - - PR.IP - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - type: User - role: - - Actor - - name: dest_device_id - type: Hostname - role: - - Victim - - name: cmd_line - type: processname - role: - - Others - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics - required_fields: - - _time - - process - - dest_device_id - - dest_user_id - risk_score: 80 - risk_severity: high - security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_domains_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/deprecated/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_domains_via_powersploit_modules.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 06fa9a94cf..0000000000 --- a/detections/deprecated/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_domains_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,81 +0,0 @@ -name: Reconnaissance and Access to Computers and Domains via PowerSploit modules -id: fe1c4c5a-09f3-4b43-8129-560a7f38a08b -version: 1 -date: '2020-11-06' -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk -type: TTP -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that discover - computers, servers and domains that can be accessed or taken over. -search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() - - | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), - cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, - "event_id"), "string", null) | where cmd_line != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Get-ComputerDetail/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-Domain/)=true OR - match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetDomain/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainComputer/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetComputer/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainController/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetDomainController/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Get-DomainFileServer/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetFileServer/)=true - ) - - | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, - "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), - "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line]) - | into write_ssa_detected_events();' -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -known_false_positives: None identified. -references: -- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit -tags: - analytic_story: - - Windows Discovery Techniques - asset_type: Windows - cis20: - - CIS 16 - - CIS 20 - confidence: 100 - context: - - Source:AD - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Recon - - Stage:Command And Control - - Consequence:Loss Of Control - impact: 80 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives - message: PowerSploit malware is seaching for or accessing domain controllers, computers, - file servers, etc. Operation is performed at the device $dest_device_id$, by the - account $dest_user_id$ via command $cmd_line$ - mitre_attack_id: - - T1592 - - T1590 - - T1087 - nist: - - PR.AC - - PR.IP - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - type: User - role: - - Actor - - name: dest_device_id - type: Hostname - role: - - Victim - - name: cmd_line - type: processname - role: - - Others - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics - required_fields: - - _time - - process - - dest_device_id - - dest_user_id - risk_score: 80 - risk_severity: high - security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/deprecated/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_via_mimikatz_modules.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 4de51aecc6..0000000000 --- a/detections/deprecated/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,72 +0,0 @@ -name: Reconnaissance and Access to Computers via Mimikatz modules -id: 48664505-7d22-44ee-87d2-4c8a5bdc3d14 -version: 1 -date: '2020-11-06' -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk -type: TTP -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery of computers - and servers and access to them. -search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() - - | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), - cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, - "event_id"), "string", null) | where cmd_line != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)net::ServerInfo/)=true ) - - | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, - "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), - "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line]) - | into write_ssa_detected_events();' -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -known_false_positives: None identified. -references: -- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz -tags: - analytic_story: - - Windows Discovery Techniques - asset_type: Windows - cis20: - - CIS 16 - - CIS 20 - confidence: 100 - context: - - Source:AD - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Recon - impact: 50 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives - message: Mimikatz malware is collecting information about computers. Operation is - performed at the device $dest_device_id$, by the account $dest_user_id$ via command - $cmd_line$ - mitre_attack_id: - - T1592 - nist: - - PR.AC - - PR.IP - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - type: User - role: - - Actor - - name: dest_device_id - type: Hostname - role: - - Victim - - name: cmd_line - type: processname - role: - - Others - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics - required_fields: - - _time - - process - - dest_device_id - - dest_user_id - risk_score: 50 - risk_severity: high - security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ssa___recon_and_use_operating_system_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/deprecated/ssa___recon_and_use_operating_system_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 4f32e0a43a..0000000000 --- a/detections/deprecated/ssa___recon_and_use_operating_system_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,89 +0,0 @@ -name: Reconnaissance and Access to Operating System Elements via PowerSploit modules -id: c1d33ad9-1727-4f9f-a474-4adbe4fed68a -version: 1 -date: '2020-11-06' -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk -type: TTP -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that discover - and access operating system elements, such as processes, services, registry locations, - security packages and files. -search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() - - | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), - cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, - "event_id"), "string", null) | where cmd_line != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Find-DomainProcess/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-ProcessHunter/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-ServiceDetail/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Get-WMIProcess/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetProcess/)=true OR - match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-SecurityPackage/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Find-DomainObjectPropertyOutlier/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainObject/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-ADObject/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-WMIRegMountedDrive/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Get-RegistryMountedDrive/)=true ) - - | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, - "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), - "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line]) - | into write_ssa_detected_events();' -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -known_false_positives: None identified. -references: -- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit -tags: - analytic_story: - - Windows Discovery Techniques - asset_type: Windows - cis20: - - CIS 16 - - CIS 20 - confidence: 100 - context: - - Source:AD - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Recon - - Stage:Command And Control - - Consequence:Loss Of Control - impact: 80 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives - message: PowerSploit malware is searching for and tapping into ongoing processes, - mounted drives or other operating system elements. Operation is performed at the - device $dest_device_id$, by the account $dest_user_id$ via command $cmd_line$ - mitre_attack_id: - - T1057 - - T1083 - - T1592.002 - - T1046 - - T1012 - - T1007 - - T1047 - - T1592 - - T1518 - nist: - - PR.AC - - PR.IP - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - type: User - role: - - Actor - - name: dest_device_id - type: Hostname - role: - - Victim - - name: cmd_line - type: processname - role: - - Others - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics - required_fields: - - _time - - process - - dest_device_id - - dest_user_id - risk_score: 80 - risk_severity: high - security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/deprecated/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_mimikatz_modules.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 87194d38a9..0000000000 --- a/detections/deprecated/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,77 +0,0 @@ -name: Reconnaissance and Access to Shared Resources via Mimikatz modules -id: c97b6eb9-1d8b-4017-bbbb-2af7fc17bc3f -version: 1 -date: '2020-11-06' -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk -type: TTP -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery and access - to network shares. -search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() - - | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), - cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, - "event_id"), "string", null) | where cmd_line != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)net::share/)=true ) - - | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, - "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), - "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line]) - | into write_ssa_detected_events();' -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -known_false_positives: None identified. -references: -- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz -tags: - analytic_story: - - Windows Discovery Techniques - asset_type: Windows - cis20: - - CIS 16 - - CIS 20 - confidence: 100 - context: - - Source:AD - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Recon - - Stage:Lateral Movement - - Stage:Collection - impact: 70 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives - message: Mimikatz malware is searching for and accessing network shares. Operation - is performed at the device $dest_device_id$, by the account $dest_user_id$ via - command $cmd_line$ - mitre_attack_id: - - T1021 - - T1039 - - T1135 - - T1021.002 - nist: - - PR.AC - - PR.IP - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - type: User - role: - - Actor - - name: dest_device_id - type: Hostname - role: - - Victim - - name: cmd_line - type: processname - role: - - Others - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics - required_fields: - - _time - - process - - dest_device_id - - dest_user_id - risk_score: 70 - risk_severity: high - security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/deprecated/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_powersploit_modules.yml deleted file mode 100644 index ef1f07cc20..0000000000 --- a/detections/deprecated/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,81 +0,0 @@ -name: Reconnaissance and Access to Shared Resources via PowerSploit modules -id: 6b7ca431-6b1e-4b40-9589-21cb368e369e -version: 1 -date: '2020-11-06' -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk -type: TTP -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules that discover - and access network and distributed file system shares. -search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() - - | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), - cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, - "event_id"), "string", null) | where cmd_line != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Find-DomainShare/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-ShareFinder/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Find-InterestingDomainShareFile/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Invoke-FileFinder/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Find-InterestingFile/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainDFSShare/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Get-DFSshare/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-NetShare/)=true ) - - | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, - "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), - "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line]) - | into write_ssa_detected_events();' -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -known_false_positives: None identified. -references: -- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit -tags: - analytic_story: - - Windows Discovery Techniques - asset_type: Windows - cis20: - - CIS 16 - - CIS 20 - confidence: 100 - context: - - Source:AD - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Recon - - Stage:Lateral Movement - - Stage:Collection - impact: 70 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives - message: PowerSploit malware is searching for and accessing network shares. Operation - is performed at the device $dest_device_id$, by the account $dest_user_id$ via - command $cmd_line$ - mitre_attack_id: - - T1021 - - T1039 - - T1135 - - T1021.002 - nist: - - PR.AC - - PR.IP - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - type: User - role: - - Actor - - name: dest_device_id - type: Hostname - role: - - Victim - - name: cmd_line - type: processname - role: - - Others - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics - required_fields: - - _time - - process - - dest_device_id - - dest_user_id - risk_score: 70 - risk_severity: high - security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ssa___recon_connectivity_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/deprecated/ssa___recon_connectivity_via_powersploit_modules.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 1a656d9570..0000000000 --- a/detections/deprecated/ssa___recon_connectivity_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,81 +0,0 @@ -name: Reconnaissance of Connectivity via PowerSploit modules -id: 525d32fd-65dd-4732-9b72-3cfc7ddddbd2 -version: 1 -date: '2020-11-06' -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk -type: TTP -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -description: This detection identifies access to PowerSploit modules for reconnaissance - of connectivity. -search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() - - | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), - cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, - "event_id"), "string", null) | where cmd_line != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Get-DomainDNSRecord/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DNSRecord/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-DomainDNSZone/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Get-DNSZone/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-ReverseDnsLookup/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-WMIRegCachedRDPConnection/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Get-CachedRDPConnection/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-WMIRegProxy/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Get-Proxy/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Invoke-Portscan/)=true - ) - - | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, - "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), - "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line]) - | into write_ssa_detected_events();' -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -known_false_positives: None identified. -references: -- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit -tags: - analytic_story: - - Windows Discovery Techniques - asset_type: Windows - cis20: - - CIS 16 - - CIS 20 - confidence: 100 - context: - - Source:AD - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Recon - impact: 70 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives - message: PowerSploit malware is performing port scans or searching for various connectivity - details such as DNS data, proxies, or ongoing RDP connections. Operation is performed - at the device $dest_device_id$, by the account $dest_user_id$ via command $cmd_line$ - mitre_attack_id: - - T1021 - - T1039 - - T1135 - - T1021.002 - nist: - - PR.AC - - PR.IP - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - type: User - role: - - Actor - - name: dest_device_id - type: Hostname - role: - - Victim - - name: cmd_line - type: processname - role: - - Others - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics - required_fields: - - _time - - process - - dest_device_id - - dest_user_id - risk_score: 70 - risk_severity: high - security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ssa___recon_credential_stores_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/deprecated/ssa___recon_credential_stores_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml deleted file mode 100644 index a6fdc66b33..0000000000 --- a/detections/deprecated/ssa___recon_credential_stores_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,82 +0,0 @@ -name: Reconnaissance of Credential Stores and Services via Mimikatz modules -id: 5facee5b-79e4-47ab-b0e6-c625acc0554f -version: 1 -date: '2020-11-03' -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk -type: TTP -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -description: This detection identifies reconnaissance of credential stores and use - of CryptoAPI services by Mimikatz modules. -search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() - - | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), - cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, - "event_id"), "string", null) | where cmd_line != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)crypto::capi/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)crypto::cng/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)crypto::providers/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)crypto::stores/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)crypto::sc/)=true ) - - | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, - "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), - "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line]) - | into write_ssa_detected_events();' -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -known_false_positives: None identified. -references: -- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz -tags: - analytic_story: - - Windows Discovery Techniques - asset_type: Windows - cis20: - - CIS 16 - - CIS 20 - confidence: 100 - context: - - Source:AD - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Recon - - Stage:Credential Access - impact: 80 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives - message: Mimikatz malware is searching for and accessing credential stores. Operation - is performed at the device $dest_device_id$, by the account $dest_user_id$ via - command $cmd_line$ - mitre_attack_id: - - T1098 - - T1590.001 - - T1078 - - T1589.001 - - T1590 - - T1068 - - T1589 - - T1590.003 - nist: - - PR.AC - - PR.IP - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - type: User - role: - - Actor - - name: dest_device_id - type: Hostname - role: - - Victim - - name: cmd_line - type: processname - role: - - Others - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics - required_fields: - - _time - - process - - dest_device_id - - dest_user_id - risk_score: 80 - risk_severity: high - security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ssa___recon_defensive_tools_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/deprecated/ssa___recon_defensive_tools_via_powersploit_modules.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 94908b1186..0000000000 --- a/detections/deprecated/ssa___recon_defensive_tools_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,75 +0,0 @@ -name: Reconnaissance of Defensive Tools via PowerSploit modules -id: 24b4e659-63a2-4e7b-89ac-87dd659c7110 -version: 1 -date: '2020-11-05' -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk -type: TTP -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -description: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules for assessment of - presence of defensive tools. -search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() - - | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), - cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, - "event_id"), "string", null) | where cmd_line != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Find-AVSignature/)=true ) - - | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, - "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), - "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line]) - | into write_ssa_detected_events();' -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -known_false_positives: None identified. -references: -- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit -tags: - analytic_story: - - Windows Discovery Techniques - asset_type: Windows - cis20: - - CIS 16 - - CIS 20 - confidence: 100 - context: - - Source:AD - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Recon - impact: 40 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives - message: PowerSploit malware is looking for presence of anti virus software. Operation - is performed at the device $dest_device_id$, by the account $dest_user_id$ via - command $cmd_line$ - mitre_attack_id: - - T1592.002 - - T1595.002 - - T1592 - - T1595 - nist: - - PR.AC - - PR.IP - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - type: User - role: - - Actor - - name: dest_device_id - type: Hostname - role: - - Victim - - name: cmd_line - type: processname - role: - - Others - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics - required_fields: - - _time - - process - - dest_device_id - - dest_user_id - risk_score: 40 - risk_severity: high - security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ssa___recon_privilege_escalation_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/deprecated/ssa___recon_privilege_escalation_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 4c2ae2cd99..0000000000 --- a/detections/deprecated/ssa___recon_privilege_escalation_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,74 +0,0 @@ -name: Reconnaissance of Privilege Escalation Opportunities via PowerSploit modules -id: b9b4492c-2af8-449b-beb4-b1b78d963321 -version: 1 -date: '2020-11-05' -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk -type: TTP -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -description: This detection identifies use of PowerSploit modules for assessment of - privilege escalation opportunities. -search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() - - | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), - cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, - "event_id"), "string", null) | where cmd_line != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Invoke-PrivescAudit/)=true ) - - | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, - "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), - "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line]) - | into write_ssa_detected_events();' -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -known_false_positives: None identified. -references: -- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit -tags: - analytic_story: - - Windows Discovery Techniques - asset_type: Windows - cis20: - - CIS 16 - - CIS 20 - confidence: 100 - context: - - Source:AD - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Recon - impact: 60 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives - message: PowerSploit malware is engaging its privilege escalation module. Operation - is performed at the device $dest_device_id$, by the account $dest_user_id$ via - command $cmd_line$ - mitre_attack_id: - - T1068 - - T1078 - - T1098 - nist: - - PR.AC - - PR.IP - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - type: User - role: - - Actor - - name: dest_device_id - type: Hostname - role: - - Victim - - name: cmd_line - type: processname - role: - - Others - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics - required_fields: - - _time - - process - - dest_device_id - - dest_user_id - risk_score: 60 - risk_severity: high - security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ssa___recon_process_service_hijacking_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/deprecated/ssa___recon_process_service_hijacking_via_mimikatz_modules.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 86f058a343..0000000000 --- a/detections/deprecated/ssa___recon_process_service_hijacking_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,81 +0,0 @@ -name: Reconnaissance of Process or Service Hijacking Opportunities via Mimikatz modules -id: fc5c1cbd-7494-4314-aad2-458d6fd4fada -version: 1 -date: '2020-11-05' -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk -type: TTP -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery of process - or service hijacking opportunities via Microsoft Detours compatibility. Microsoft - Detours is an open source library for intercepting, monitoring and instrumenting - binary functions on Microsoft Windows. Detours intercepts Win32 functions by re-writing - the in-memory code for target functions. The Detours package also contains utilities - to attach arbitrary DLLs and data segments called payloads to any Win32 binary. -search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() - - | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), - cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, - "event_id"), "string", null) | where cmd_line != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)misc::detours/)=true ) - - | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, - "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), - "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line]) - | into write_ssa_detected_events();' -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -known_false_positives: None identified. -references: -- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz -- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microsoft_Detours -tags: - analytic_story: - - Windows Discovery Techniques - asset_type: Windows - cis20: - - CIS 16 - - CIS 20 - confidence: 100 - context: - - Source:AD - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Recon - - Stage:Command And Control - - Consequence:Loss Of Control - impact: 70 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives - message: Mimikatz malware is looking for and invoking Microsoft Detours package - that enables spoofing of in-memory code. Operation is performed at the device - $dest_device_id$, by the account $dest_user_id$ via command $cmd_line$ - mitre_attack_id: - - T1543 - - T1055 - - T1574 - nist: - - PR.AC - - PR.IP - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - type: User - role: - - Actor - - name: dest_device_id - type: Hostname - role: - - Victim - - name: cmd_line - type: processname - role: - - Others - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics - required_fields: - - _time - - process - - dest_device_id - - dest_user_id - risk_score: 70 - risk_severity: high - security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ssa___recon_processes_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/deprecated/ssa___recon_processes_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 6f4d2c9603..0000000000 --- a/detections/deprecated/ssa___recon_processes_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,73 +0,0 @@ -name: Reconnaissance and Access to Processes and Services via Mimikatz modules -id: 0243d37c-57c1-4182-bfd1-39b212255fc8 -version: 1 -date: '2020-11-06' -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk -type: TTP -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -description: This detection identifies use of Mimikatz modules for discovery and access - to services and processes. -search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() - - | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), - cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, - "event_id"), "string", null) | where cmd_line != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)process::list/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)service::list/)=true ) - - | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, - "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), - "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line]) - | into write_ssa_detected_events();' -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -known_false_positives: None identified. -references: -- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz -tags: - analytic_story: - - Windows Discovery Techniques - asset_type: Windows - cis20: - - CIS 16 - - CIS 20 - confidence: 100 - context: - - Source:AD - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Recon - impact: 50 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives - message: Mimikatz malware is listing processes and services. Operation is performed - at the device $dest_device_id$, by the account $dest_user_id$ via command $cmd_line$ - mitre_attack_id: - - T1007 - - T1046 - - T1057 - nist: - - PR.AC - - PR.IP - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - type: User - role: - - Actor - - name: dest_device_id - type: Hostname - role: - - Victim - - name: cmd_line - type: processname - role: - - Others - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics - required_fields: - - _time - - process - - dest_device_id - - dest_user_id - risk_score: 50 - risk_severity: high - security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ssa___setting_credentials_via_dsinternals_modules.yml b/detections/deprecated/ssa___setting_credentials_via_dsinternals_modules.yml deleted file mode 100644 index e8c8223525..0000000000 --- a/detections/deprecated/ssa___setting_credentials_via_dsinternals_modules.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,87 +0,0 @@ -name: Setting Credentials via DSInternals modules -id: d5ef590f-9bde-49eb-9c63-2f5b62a65b9c -version: 1 -date: '2020-11-03' -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk -type: TTP -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -description: This detection identifies illegal setting of credentials via DSInternals - modules. -search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() - - | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), - process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string", null), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, - "process_path"), "string", null), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), - "string", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "parent_process_name"), - "string", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "event_id"), "string", null) - | where cmd_line != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Add-ADDBSidHistory/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Add-ADReplNgcKey/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Set-ADDBAccountPassword/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Set-ADDBAccountPasswordHash/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Set-ADDBBootKey/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Set-SamAccountPasswordHash/)=true - OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)Set-AzureADUserEx/)=true ) - - | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, - "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), - "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line]) - | into write_ssa_detected_events();' -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -known_false_positives: None identified. -references: -- https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals -tags: - analytic_story: - - Windows Persistence Techniques - asset_type: Windows - cis20: - - CIS 16 - - CIS 20 - confidence: 100 - context: - - Source:AD - - Source:Endpoint - - Source:Cloud Data - - Stage:Credential Access - - Consequence:Loss Of Control - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098/account_manipulation/logAllDSInternalsModules.log - impact: 80 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives - message: DSInternals malware is accessing, using or setting Active Directory or - Azure credentials and accounts. Operation is performed at the device $dest_device_id$, - by the account $dest_user_id$ via command $cmd_line$ - mitre_attack_id: - - T1068 - - T1078 - - T1098 - nist: - - PR.AC - - PR.IP - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - type: User - role: - - Actor - - name: dest_device_id - type: Hostname - role: - - Victim - - name: cmd_line - type: processname - role: - - Others - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics - required_fields: - - dest_device_id - - process_name - - parent_process_name - - _time - - process_path - - dest_user_id - - process - risk_score: 80 - risk_severity: high - security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ssa___setting_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml b/detections/deprecated/ssa___setting_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 1499f30134..0000000000 --- a/detections/deprecated/ssa___setting_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,77 +0,0 @@ -name: Setting Credentials via Mimikatz modules -id: c8b84699-7652-4363-910f-efd1ca82f780 -version: 1 -date: '2020-11-03' -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk -type: TTP -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -description: This detection identifies illegal setting of credentials via Mimikatz - modules. -search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() - - | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), - cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, - "event_id"), "string", null) | where cmd_line != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)misc::addsid/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)CRYPTO::scauth/)=true ) - - | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, - "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), - "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line]) - | into write_ssa_detected_events();' -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -known_false_positives: None identified. -references: -- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz -tags: - analytic_story: - - Windows Persistence Techniques - asset_type: Windows - cis20: - - CIS 16 - - CIS 20 - confidence: 100 - context: - - Source:AD - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Credential Access - - Consequence:Loss Of Control - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098/account_manipulation/logAllMimikatzModules.log - impact: 80 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives - message: Mimikatz malware is accessing, using or setting account credentials. Operation - is performed at the device $dest_device_id$, by the account $dest_user_id$ via - command $cmd_line$ - mitre_attack_id: - - T1068 - - T1078 - - T1098 - nist: - - PR.AC - - PR.IP - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - type: User - role: - - Actor - - name: dest_device_id - type: Hostname - role: - - Victim - - name: cmd_line - type: processname - role: - - Others - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics - required_fields: - - dest_device_id - - dest_user_id - - process - - _time - risk_score: 80 - risk_severity: high - security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ssa___setting_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml b/detections/deprecated/ssa___setting_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml deleted file mode 100644 index caaf182457..0000000000 --- a/detections/deprecated/ssa___setting_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,77 +0,0 @@ -name: Setting Credentials via PowerSploit modules -id: 07b2a501-f967-4ddc-9f56-2dce46dfce44 -version: 1 -date: '2020-11-03' -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk -type: TTP -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -description: This detection identifies illegal setting of credentials via PowerSploit - modules. -search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() - - | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), - cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, - "event_id"), "string", null) | where cmd_line != null AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, - /(?i)Set-DomainUserPassword/)=true ) - - | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend( ucast(map_get(input_event, - "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), - "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line]) - | into write_ssa_detected_events();' -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest, - including the event ID 4688 with enabled command line logging. -known_false_positives: None identified. -references: -- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit -tags: - analytic_story: - - Windows Persistence Techniques - asset_type: Windows - cis20: - - CIS 16 - - CIS 20 - confidence: 100 - context: - - Source:AD - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Credential Access - - Consequence:Loss Of Control - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098/account_manipulation/logAllPowerSploitModulesWithOldNames.log - impact: 90 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives - message: PowerSploit malware is setting passwords on Active Directory accounts. - Operation is performed at the device $dest_device_id$, by the account $dest_user_id$ - via command $cmd_line$ - mitre_attack_id: - - T1068 - - T1078 - - T1098 - nist: - - PR.AC - - PR.IP - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - type: User - role: - - Actor - - name: dest_device_id - type: Hostname - role: - - Victim - - name: cmd_line - type: processname - role: - - Others - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics - required_fields: - - dest_device_id - - dest_user_id - - process - - _time - risk_score: 90 - risk_severity: high - security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/detections/deprecated/ssa___unusually_long_command_line.yml b/detections/deprecated/ssa___unusually_long_command_line.yml index 79847f633f..0b592ca38a 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/ssa___unusually_long_command_line.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/ssa___unusually_long_command_line.yml @@ -40,8 +40,8 @@ tags: - CIS 8 confidence: 40 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Defense Evasion + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Defense Evasion impact: 30 kill_chain_phases: - Actions on Objectives @@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: dest_user_id - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: @@ -70,3 +70,4 @@ tags: risk_score: 12 risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml index 598e960be9..a434166760 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml @@ -48,3 +48,14 @@ tags: required_fields: - _time security_domain: endpoint + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml index d5c210d701..a6f79d93ea 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml @@ -44,3 +44,14 @@ tags: required_fields: - _time security_domain: threat + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml index ac13326196..8a0f1ea4af 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml @@ -45,3 +45,14 @@ tags: required_fields: - _time security_domain: endpoint + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_rundll32_rename.yml b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_rundll32_rename.yml index 57d03b078c..410cf8256e 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_rundll32_rename.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_rundll32_rename.yml @@ -34,7 +34,6 @@ tags: - Suspicious Rundll32 Activity - Masquerading - Rename System Utilities asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 90 diff --git a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml index 914cadf924..d0b80758f1 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml @@ -35,3 +35,16 @@ tags: required_fields: - _time security_domain: endpoint + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml b/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml index 0147cb6fe1..19b471ac43 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Windows Privilege Escalation - Unusual Processes + asset_type: Endpoint cis20: - CIS 2 kill_chain_phases: @@ -42,3 +43,14 @@ tags: required_fields: - _time security_domain: endpoint + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml b/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml index 700945ab1b..a7e2151989 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml @@ -41,3 +41,14 @@ tags: required_fields: - _time security_domain: endpoint + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml b/detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml index 3024be8a23..7cd797eb2f 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml @@ -32,3 +32,16 @@ tags: required_fields: - _time security_domain: endpoint + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml b/detections/deprecated/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml index 69fa932710..d27ec336e1 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ name: Web Fraud - Account Harvesting -id: 31337aaa-941d-4ada-81ac-q2a17be5bf0d +id: bf1d7b5c-df2f-4249-a401-c09fdc221ddf version: 1 date: '2018-10-08' author: Jim Apger, Splunk @@ -57,3 +57,14 @@ tags: - uri - cookie security_domain: threat + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml b/detections/deprecated/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml index 24d70128bf..40d494bf86 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml @@ -52,3 +52,14 @@ tags: - http_content_type - cookie security_domain: threat + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml b/detections/deprecated/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml index 96810fe0a7..1115c79366 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml @@ -42,3 +42,16 @@ tags: - http_content_type - uri security_domain: threat + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml b/detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml index 64eaca9ff0..de09ca1c08 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml @@ -42,3 +42,14 @@ tags: required_fields: - _time security_domain: endpoint + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml b/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml index 14541930ec..12310ad5c2 100644 --- a/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml +++ b/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ tags: - CIS 8 - CIS 12 kill_chain_phases: - - Command and Control + - Command & Control nist: - PR.IP - PR.PT @@ -44,3 +44,14 @@ tags: required_fields: - _time security_domain: endpoint + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: + - Unknown + message: tbd + observable: + - name: field + type: Unknown + role: + - Unknown diff --git a/detections/endpoint/7zip_commandline_to_smb_share_path.yml b/detections/endpoint/7zip_commandline_to_smb_share_path.yml index 71a2f82616..59f9728be9 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/7zip_commandline_to_smb_share_path.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/7zip_commandline_to_smb_share_path.yml @@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -51,7 +50,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: SourceImage - type: process name + type: Process role: - Attacker product: @@ -70,3 +69,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 25 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml b/detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml index 47edc20c3e..da3b9284dc 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml @@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Credential Dumping asset_type: Windows - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 6 - CIS 8 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/account_discovery_with_net_app.yml b/detections/endpoint/account_discovery_with_net_app.yml index f5c8857b30..50656c9f33 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/account_discovery_with_net_app.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/account_discovery_with_net_app.yml @@ -34,7 +34,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Trickbot - IcedID - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -60,7 +59,7 @@ tags: - name: process_name type: Process Name role: - - Process + - Child Process product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security @@ -82,3 +81,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/active_setup_registry_autostart.yml b/detections/endpoint/active_setup_registry_autostart.yml index 86071ff0f0..1e96c48710 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/active_setup_registry_autostart.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/active_setup_registry_autostart.yml @@ -40,11 +40,10 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Windows Persistence Techniques - Windows Privilege Escalation - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage:Privilege Escalation Persistence + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Privilege Escalation dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/t1547.014/active_setup_stubpath/sysmon.log impact: 80 @@ -60,7 +59,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: user - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: @@ -78,3 +77,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/add_defaultuser_and_password_in_registry.yml b/detections/endpoint/add_defaultuser_and_password_in_registry.yml index 52aae5c92b..86c46d70eb 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/add_defaultuser_and_password_in_registry.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/add_defaultuser_and_password_in_registry.yml @@ -37,7 +37,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - BlackMatter Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -71,3 +70,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion.yml b/detections/endpoint/add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion.yml index be1e38c53e..e0fbdd6a79 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion.yml @@ -34,7 +34,6 @@ tags: - Remcos - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics - WhisperGate - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -78,3 +77,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/adsisearcher_account_discovery.yml b/detections/endpoint/adsisearcher_account_discovery.yml index 44c73e3766..10a6c955df 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/adsisearcher_account_discovery.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/adsisearcher_account_discovery.yml @@ -24,11 +24,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage:Reconnaissance + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Discovery dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log impact: 50 @@ -59,3 +58,4 @@ tags: - User risk_score: 25 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall.yml b/detections/endpoint/allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall.yml index 41bc3e37ff..1ccf2ebe82 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall.yml @@ -29,14 +29,22 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed + context: + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Lateral Movement dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation + message: '' mitre_attack_id: - T1562.007 - T1562 + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security @@ -57,3 +65,7 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25.0 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/allow_inbound_traffic_by_firewall_rule_registry.yml b/detections/endpoint/allow_inbound_traffic_by_firewall_rule_registry.yml index 10d10e646c..818a34cceb 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/allow_inbound_traffic_by_firewall_rule_registry.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/allow_inbound_traffic_by_firewall_rule_registry.yml @@ -37,7 +37,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 30 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -76,3 +75,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/allow_inbound_traffic_in_firewall_rule.yml b/detections/endpoint/allow_inbound_traffic_in_firewall_rule.yml index 644a57103f..49e47d9b2e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/allow_inbound_traffic_in_firewall_rule.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/allow_inbound_traffic_in_firewall_rule.yml @@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 30 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -60,3 +59,4 @@ tags: - User risk_score: 3 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/allow_network_discovery_in_firewall.yml b/detections/endpoint/allow_network_discovery_in_firewall.yml index 87fcccb2b4..fd7b605d0d 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/allow_network_discovery_in_firewall.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/allow_network_discovery_in_firewall.yml @@ -31,14 +31,22 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Ransomware - Revil Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed + context: + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Discovery dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation + message: '' mitre_attack_id: - T1562.007 - T1562 + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security @@ -59,3 +67,7 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25.0 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/allow_operation_with_consent_admin.yml b/detections/endpoint/allow_operation_with_consent_admin.yml index 06d6b5dcc7..2d68b73c46 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/allow_operation_with_consent_admin.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/allow_operation_with_consent_admin.yml @@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -76,3 +75,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/anomalous_usage_of_7zip.yml b/detections/endpoint/anomalous_usage_of_7zip.yml index 481f9a8198..45aef699ed 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/anomalous_usage_of_7zip.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/anomalous_usage_of_7zip.yml @@ -32,7 +32,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Cobalt Strike - NOBELIUM Group - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -41,7 +40,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1560.001/archive_utility/windows-sysmon.log impact: 80 kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objective + - Exploitation message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior is indicative of suspicious loading of 7zip. @@ -58,7 +57,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -84,3 +83,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadfile.yml b/detections/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadfile.yml index ea941bfa39..f1fcd1ff8c 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadfile.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadfile.yml @@ -34,11 +34,10 @@ tags: - Malicious PowerShell - Ingress Tool Transfer - Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Exploitation + - Stage:Execution cve: - CVE-2021-44228 dataset: @@ -62,7 +61,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -90,3 +89,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadstring.yml b/detections/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadstring.yml index 0b89645de4..5a6661ba47 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadstring.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadstring.yml @@ -33,8 +33,10 @@ tags: - Malicious PowerShell - HAFNIUM Group - Ingress Tool Transfer - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 + context: + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Execution dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log impact: 80 @@ -56,7 +58,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -84,3 +86,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/attacker_tools_on_endpoint.yml b/detections/endpoint/attacker_tools_on_endpoint.yml index f29439bb45..440f547927 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/attacker_tools_on_endpoint.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/attacker_tools_on_endpoint.yml @@ -31,21 +31,19 @@ tags: - SamSam Ransomware - Unusual Processes asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 2 confidence: 80 context: - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Exploitation - - Stage:Recon - Stage:Execution + - Stage:Recon dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1595/attacker_scan_tools/windows-sysmon.log impact: 80 kill_chain_phases: - Installation - - Command and Control + - Command & Control - Actions on Objectives message: An attacker tool $process_name$,listed in attacker_tools.csv is executed on host $dest$ by User $user$. This process $process_name$ is known to do- $description$ @@ -67,7 +65,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name diff --git a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml index 7c871d858f..726a8a2161 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml @@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Disabling Security Tools asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 3 - CIS 5 @@ -61,7 +60,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name diff --git a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml index 4e742ebb72..6bdebc0f31 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml @@ -32,7 +32,6 @@ tags: - Trickbot - WhisperGate asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 3 - CIS 5 @@ -66,7 +65,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name diff --git a/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml index da30681035..aa394e6e86 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml @@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ tags: - Credential Dumping - DarkSide Ransomware asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 3 - CIS 5 @@ -60,7 +59,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name diff --git a/detections/endpoint/auto_admin_logon_registry_entry.yml b/detections/endpoint/auto_admin_logon_registry_entry.yml index 7041013f6a..5123a979bc 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/auto_admin_logon_registry_entry.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/auto_admin_logon_registry_entry.yml @@ -37,7 +37,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - BlackMatter Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 90 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -71,3 +70,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml b/detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml index 6461f64403..664e37c811 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml @@ -35,7 +35,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - SamSam Ransomware asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 90 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_command_back_to_normal_mode_boot.yml b/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_command_back_to_normal_mode_boot.yml index 4bc260d08d..77b2e75813 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_command_back_to_normal_mode_boot.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_command_back_to_normal_mode_boot.yml @@ -28,11 +28,9 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - BlackMatter Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Impact dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1552.002/autoadminlogon/windows-sysmon.log impact: 50 @@ -67,3 +65,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml b/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml index fd4eacf029..ded9c38e6d 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml @@ -26,13 +26,11 @@ tags: - Ryuk Ransomware - Ransomware asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 80 context: - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Impact dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log impact: 100 @@ -55,7 +53,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name diff --git a/detections/endpoint/bits_job_persistence.yml b/detections/endpoint/bits_job_persistence.yml index 1f32249fd9..9428c65705 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/bits_job_persistence.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/bits_job_persistence.yml @@ -36,7 +36,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - BITS Jobs - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -60,7 +59,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -88,3 +87,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/bitsadmin_download_file.yml b/detections/endpoint/bitsadmin_download_file.yml index 740f549f79..0d0ad64eed 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/bitsadmin_download_file.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/bitsadmin_download_file.yml @@ -41,7 +41,6 @@ tags: - Ingress Tool Transfer - BITS Jobs - DarkSide Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -66,7 +65,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -94,3 +93,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments.yml b/detections/endpoint/certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments.yml index 091aa6f61e..8583de094f 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments.yml @@ -34,11 +34,10 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Ingress Tool Transfer - DarkSide Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Command and Control + - Stage:Command And Control dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log impact: 90 @@ -58,7 +57,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -86,3 +85,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments.yml b/detections/endpoint/certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments.yml index aa671b6eb9..ad5c240a79 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments.yml @@ -35,11 +35,10 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Ingress Tool Transfer - DarkSide Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Command and Control + - Stage:Command And Control dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log impact: 90 @@ -59,7 +58,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -87,3 +86,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.yml b/detections/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.yml index 45ba783055..783f07b7c8 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.yml @@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ tags: - Windows Persistence Techniques - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -48,7 +47,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name diff --git a/detections/endpoint/certutil_with_decode_argument.yml b/detections/endpoint/certutil_with_decode_argument.yml index 9a0cfa8f5d..c838779cff 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/certutil_with_decode_argument.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/certutil_with_decode_argument.yml @@ -35,7 +35,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Deobfuscate-Decode Files or Information - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -59,7 +58,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -87,3 +86,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/change_default_file_association.yml b/detections/endpoint/change_default_file_association.yml index 282c29c085..2ff112da2b 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/change_default_file_association.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/change_default_file_association.yml @@ -30,11 +30,10 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Windows Persistence Techniques - Windows Privilege Escalation - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage:Privilege Escalation Persistence + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Privilege Escalation dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.001/txtfile_reg/sysmon.log impact: 80 @@ -50,7 +49,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: user - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: @@ -68,3 +67,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/change_to_safe_mode_with_network_config.yml b/detections/endpoint/change_to_safe_mode_with_network_config.yml index 90f758f46d..4539837b27 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/change_to_safe_mode_with_network_config.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/change_to_safe_mode_with_network_config.yml @@ -28,11 +28,9 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - BlackMatter Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Impact dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1552.002/autoadminlogon/windows-sysmon.log impact: 50 @@ -66,3 +64,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/chcp_command_execution.yml b/detections/endpoint/chcp_command_execution.yml index dabadf67ed..d9651cdf68 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/chcp_command_execution.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/chcp_command_execution.yml @@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - IcedID - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 30 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -47,7 +46,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: user - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: @@ -66,3 +65,4 @@ tags: - user risk_score: 9 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/check_elevated_cmd_using_whoami.yml b/detections/endpoint/check_elevated_cmd_using_whoami.yml index 20d3b7f612..73b14c9448 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/check_elevated_cmd_using_whoami.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/check_elevated_cmd_using_whoami.yml @@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ references: [] tags: analytic_story: - FIN7 - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -67,3 +66,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app.yml b/detections/endpoint/clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app.yml index 5f95a83096..7d7a62ddb5 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app.yml @@ -25,11 +25,9 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 90 context: - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Impact dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log impact: 100 @@ -51,7 +49,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -79,3 +77,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/clop_common_exec_parameter.yml b/detections/endpoint/clop_common_exec_parameter.yml index ea8701cc6e..f3deda0e64 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/clop_common_exec_parameter.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/clop_common_exec_parameter.yml @@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Clop Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -39,7 +38,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_b/windows-sysmon.log impact: 100 kill_chain_phases: - - Obfuscation + - Exploitation message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting using arguments to execute its main code or feature of its code related to Clop ransomware. @@ -55,7 +54,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -83,3 +82,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/clop_ransomware_known_service_name.yml b/detections/endpoint/clop_ransomware_known_service_name.yml index 3fd889e83f..9df5fb9fd3 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/clop_ransomware_known_service_name.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/clop_ransomware_known_service_name.yml @@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Clop Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -33,7 +32,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-system.log impact: 100 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation + - Exploitation message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ executing known Clop Ransomware service names. mitre_attack_id: @@ -48,7 +47,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -69,3 +68,4 @@ tags: - process_path risk_score: 100 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter.yml b/detections/endpoint/cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter.yml index da15eb4ccf..78a46d2339 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter.yml @@ -77,3 +77,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 30 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/cmd_echo_pipe___escalation.yml b/detections/endpoint/cmd_echo_pipe___escalation.yml index d2e19bae02..66fb2b7243 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/cmd_echo_pipe___escalation.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/cmd_echo_pipe___escalation.yml @@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Cobalt Strike - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -39,7 +38,6 @@ tags: impact: 80 kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation - - Privilege Escalation message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ potentially performing privilege escalation using named pipes related to Cobalt Strike and other frameworks. @@ -58,7 +56,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -86,3 +84,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/cmdline_tool_not_executed_in_cmd_shell.yml b/detections/endpoint/cmdline_tool_not_executed_in_cmd_shell.yml index ca1384fc22..f69af6ee9f 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/cmdline_tool_not_executed_in_cmd_shell.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/cmdline_tool_not_executed_in_cmd_shell.yml @@ -36,7 +36,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - FIN7 - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -61,7 +60,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -89,3 +88,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass.yml b/detections/endpoint/cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass.yml index c14995c3de..3bce2a6ac9 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass.yml @@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - DarkSide Ransomware - Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -68,3 +67,4 @@ tags: - ProcessId risk_score: 80 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/cobalt_strike_named_pipes.yml b/detections/endpoint/cobalt_strike_named_pipes.yml index cb5159dc7b..f1dfc7f922 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/cobalt_strike_named_pipes.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/cobalt_strike_named_pipes.yml @@ -43,7 +43,6 @@ tags: - Trickbot - DarkSide Ransomware asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 90 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml b/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml index 8c69dd4cfa..8b87759b90 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml @@ -43,7 +43,6 @@ tags: - Ransomware - Clop Ransomware asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 100 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml b/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml index c685c5bc5e..b2ec69afa8 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml @@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ tags: - Ryuk Ransomware - Clop Ransomware asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 100 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/conti_common_exec_parameter.yml b/detections/endpoint/conti_common_exec_parameter.yml index 5512203ac6..5ee2f9bb2b 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/conti_common_exec_parameter.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/conti_common_exec_parameter.yml @@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -52,7 +51,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -80,3 +79,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/control_loading_from_world_writable_directory.yml b/detections/endpoint/control_loading_from_world_writable_directory.yml index 13e215abb1..ebc2e0fc8d 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/control_loading_from_world_writable_directory.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/control_loading_from_world_writable_directory.yml @@ -34,7 +34,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444 - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -61,7 +60,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -88,3 +87,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml index ca3390c2f4..4ab022ef07 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml @@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - DHS Report TA18-074A asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 60 @@ -60,7 +59,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name diff --git a/detections/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml index af27466036..049158682e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ name: Create or delete windows shares using net exe -id: qw9919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-151bb162140e +id: 743a322c-9a68-4a0f-9c17-85d9cce2a27c version: 6 date: '2020-09-16' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk @@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Hidden Cobra Malware asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 50 @@ -57,7 +56,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name diff --git a/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_in_shell_application.yml b/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_in_shell_application.yml index b3d17dfb23..68eeea1233 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_in_shell_application.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_in_shell_application.yml @@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - IcedID - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -44,7 +43,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: SourceImage - type: process name + type: Process role: - Attacker product: @@ -62,3 +61,4 @@ tags: - Computer risk_score: 70 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml b/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml index a14767b732..b53ae01d7e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml @@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Credential Dumping asset_type: Windows - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 - CIS 16 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.yml b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.yml index e497bf35aa..15df5f062f 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.yml @@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Credential Dumping asset_type: Windows - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 6 - CIS 8 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml index bc3f53bc27..52d1629bfd 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml @@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Credential Dumping asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 - CIS 16 @@ -58,7 +57,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name diff --git a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml index 52b61c246c..be92992b35 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml @@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Credential Dumping asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 - CIS 16 @@ -56,7 +55,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name diff --git a/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml b/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml index 982bb93c5f..e30f359d34 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml @@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Credential Dumping asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 - CIS 16 @@ -58,7 +57,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name diff --git a/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml b/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml index e7e11cc09c..5768e0cb28 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml @@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Credential Dumping asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 - CIS 16 @@ -56,7 +55,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name diff --git a/detections/endpoint/csc_net_on_the_fly_compilation.yml b/detections/endpoint/csc_net_on_the_fly_compilation.yml index 416939c42f..1634467345 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/csc_net_on_the_fly_compilation.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/csc_net_on_the_fly_compilation.yml @@ -35,7 +35,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -70,3 +69,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 25 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.yml b/detections/endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.yml index fc436a3232..17141a0adf 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.yml @@ -77,3 +77,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 80 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell.yml b/detections/endpoint/delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell.yml index 7349f7bf96..7688461d92 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell.yml @@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ tags: - DarkSide Ransomware - Ransomware - Revil Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 90 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -62,3 +61,4 @@ tags: - User risk_score: 81 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/deleting_of_net_users.yml b/detections/endpoint/deleting_of_net_users.yml index 4e4527f998..4598166d2f 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/deleting_of_net_users.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/deleting_of_net_users.yml @@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - XMRig - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -55,7 +54,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -83,3 +82,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml b/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml index 99741805d5..8faef989cf 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml @@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ tags: - Ransomware - Clop Ransomware asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 - CIS 10 @@ -62,7 +61,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml index d4993baf2c..fe7d836ed0 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml @@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Lateral Movement asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 3 - CIS 5 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_azurehound_command_line_arguments.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_azurehound_command_line_arguments.yml index 2c4baed941..8ecfc9d133 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_azurehound_command_line_arguments.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_azurehound_command_line_arguments.yml @@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Discovery Techniques - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -58,7 +57,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -86,3 +85,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_azurehound_file_modifications.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_azurehound_file_modifications.yml index 3b77169959..f0f0dd93d0 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_azurehound_file_modifications.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_azurehound_file_modifications.yml @@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Discovery Techniques - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 90 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -77,3 +76,4 @@ tags: - file_create_time risk_score: 63 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_copy_of_shadowcopy_with_script_block_logging.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_copy_of_shadowcopy_with_script_block_logging.yml index e7285779a9..1783c88178 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_copy_of_shadowcopy_with_script_block_logging.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_copy_of_shadowcopy_with_script_block_logging.yml @@ -35,7 +35,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Credential Dumping - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -74,3 +73,4 @@ tags: - EventCode risk_score: 80 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml index 91d192b29d..ba3c96e826 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml @@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ tags: - Credential Dumping - Detect Zerologon Attack asset_type: Windows - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 3 - CIS 5 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_empire_with_powershell_script_block_logging.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_empire_with_powershell_script_block_logging.yml index 8bb5dffc0e..43cb69453b 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_empire_with_powershell_script_block_logging.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_empire_with_powershell_script_block_logging.yml @@ -38,7 +38,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Malicious PowerShell - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 90 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -75,3 +74,4 @@ tags: - EventCode risk_score: 81 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml index 5b98774eff..d9c4aa587a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml @@ -35,7 +35,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Account Monitoring and Controls asset_type: Windows - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 16 confidence: 60 @@ -74,3 +73,5 @@ tags: - All_Changes.dest risk_score: 36 security_domain: access + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml index 6f4faf640f..2f6f1cbfc6 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml @@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Account Monitoring and Controls asset_type: Windows - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 16 confidence: 60 @@ -62,3 +61,5 @@ tags: - All_Changes.user risk_score: 36 security_domain: access + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_exchange_web_shell.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_exchange_web_shell.yml index 5795b04f12..104bd72ffd 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_exchange_web_shell.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_exchange_web_shell.yml @@ -51,11 +51,10 @@ tags: analytic_story: - HAFNIUM Group - ProxyShell - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 90 context: - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Exploitation + - Stage:Execution dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/windows-sysmon_proxylogon.log impact: 90 @@ -96,3 +95,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_html_help_renamed.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_html_help_renamed.yml index 12d0f3ca29..acedbbde4c 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_html_help_renamed.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_html_help_renamed.yml @@ -37,7 +37,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 100 @@ -67,7 +66,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_html_help_spawn_child_process.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_html_help_spawn_child_process.yml index ec49b6d6db..b37e8b42ec 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_html_help_spawn_child_process.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_html_help_spawn_child_process.yml @@ -37,7 +37,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 100 @@ -68,7 +67,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_html_help_url_in_command_line.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_html_help_url_in_command_line.yml index 4714a277ec..8fef218549 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_html_help_url_in_command_line.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_html_help_url_in_command_line.yml @@ -41,7 +41,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 100 @@ -72,7 +71,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers.yml index 1b6c30f710..7bd3f79f89 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers.yml @@ -43,7 +43,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 90 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml index 6617f7be17..ae5cc07725 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml @@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ tags: - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse - DarkSide Ransomware asset_type: Windows - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 6 - CIS 8 @@ -62,7 +61,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: ImageLoaded - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Other - name: Image diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_mimikatz_with_powershell_script_block_logging.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_mimikatz_with_powershell_script_block_logging.yml index 543d762e98..91725db158 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_mimikatz_with_powershell_script_block_logging.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_mimikatz_with_powershell_script_block_logging.yml @@ -35,7 +35,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Malicious PowerShell - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -71,3 +70,4 @@ tags: - EventCode risk_score: 90 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml index 499ad568b5..4d4081f2d8 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml @@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious MSHTA Activity asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 100 @@ -64,7 +63,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml index a67750f930..c159e3aa43 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml @@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious MSHTA Activity asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 100 @@ -61,7 +60,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml index 180b73585e..72c70ff9d6 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml @@ -34,7 +34,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious MSHTA Activity asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 100 @@ -65,7 +64,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml index e1152726bf..6fd9b5685a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml @@ -23,7 +23,6 @@ tags: - DHS Report TA18-074A - HAFNIUM Group asset_type: Windows - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 16 confidence: 70 @@ -37,7 +36,7 @@ tags: impact: 60 kill_chain_phases: - Actions on Objectives - - Command and Control + - Command & Control message: A $user$ on $dest$ was added recently. Identify if this was legitimate behavior or not. mitre_attack_id: diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml index cd4be52fb9..a31fff6225 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ name: Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe -id: c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6v5264g9f +id: cbef820c-e1ff-407f-887f-0a9240a2d477 version: 3 date: '2020-07-03' author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk @@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Windows Persistence Techniques asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 70 @@ -59,7 +58,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml index fc25eaa2bc..8c053501e0 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml @@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Unusual Processes asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 2 confidence: 80 @@ -42,7 +41,7 @@ tags: impact: 40 kill_chain_phases: - Installation - - Command and Control + - Command & Control - Actions on Objectives message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning multiple $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ typically not a normal behavior of @@ -62,7 +61,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml index 0118aefed2..7bfc7e0231 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml @@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ tags: - Suspicious Zoom Child Processes - NOBELIUM Group asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 100 @@ -63,7 +62,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml index 226b47f814..0e9d243b3a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ name: Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag -id: b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-151xb162040e +id: 27c3a83d-cada-47c6-9042-67baf19d2574 version: 4 date: '2021-09-16' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk @@ -38,7 +38,6 @@ tags: - DarkSide Ransomware - Active Directory Lateral Movement asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 70 @@ -68,7 +67,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_rclone_command_line_usage.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_rclone_command_line_usage.yml index 5e172ae5d8..5d1051b1d3 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_rclone_command_line_usage.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_rclone_command_line_usage.yml @@ -36,7 +36,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - DarkSide Ransomware - Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -45,7 +44,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1020/windows-sysmon.log impact: 50 kill_chain_phases: - - Exfiltration + - Exploitation message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to connect to a remote cloud service to move files or folders. @@ -61,7 +60,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -86,3 +85,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_regasm_spawning_a_process.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_regasm_spawning_a_process.yml index d7c71727dc..828b69e974 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_regasm_spawning_a_process.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_regasm_spawning_a_process.yml @@ -34,7 +34,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 80 @@ -65,7 +64,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_regasm_with_network_connection.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_regasm_with_network_connection.yml index ad5797a361..8a091d5cad 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_regasm_with_network_connection.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_regasm_with_network_connection.yml @@ -34,7 +34,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 100 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml index 258427a5e9..c1dc6b4aca 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml @@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 70 @@ -63,7 +62,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_spawning_a_process.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_spawning_a_process.yml index cc9286fe4a..b97eba3c59 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_spawning_a_process.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_spawning_a_process.yml @@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 80 @@ -63,7 +62,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection.yml index c92572151b..ce949a8e08 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection.yml @@ -34,7 +34,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 100 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml index 12558d8096..3c10194a8d 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml @@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 70 @@ -63,7 +62,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.yml index a346085832..b95c9855a7 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.yml @@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ tags: - Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity - Cobalt Strike asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 - CIS 16 @@ -70,7 +69,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_renamed_7_zip.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_renamed_7_zip.yml index 686669851d..097405a9c1 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_renamed_7_zip.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_renamed_7_zip.yml @@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Collection and Staging - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 90 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -37,7 +36,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1560.001/archive_utility/windows-sysmon.log impact: 30 kill_chain_phases: - - Exfiltration + - Exploitation message: The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$. mitre_attack_id: @@ -53,7 +52,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -79,3 +78,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 27 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_renamed_psexec.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_renamed_psexec.yml index aae0bea823..08c657f411 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_renamed_psexec.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_renamed_psexec.yml @@ -34,7 +34,6 @@ tags: - HAFNIUM Group - DarkSide Ransomware - Active Directory Lateral Movement - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 90 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -44,8 +43,6 @@ tags: impact: 30 kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation - - Lateral Movement - - Execution message: The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$. mitre_attack_id: @@ -61,7 +58,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -87,3 +84,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 27 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_renamed_rclone.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_renamed_rclone.yml index c26cf9478a..31f9611618 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_renamed_rclone.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_renamed_rclone.yml @@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - DarkSide Ransomware - Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 90 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -42,7 +41,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1020/windows-sysmon.log impact: 30 kill_chain_phases: - - Exfiltration + - Exploitation message: The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$. mitre_attack_id: @@ -57,7 +56,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -83,3 +82,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 27 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_renamed_winrar.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_renamed_winrar.yml index 6cdad6b951..6cbd969d01 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_renamed_winrar.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_renamed_winrar.yml @@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Collection and Staging - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 90 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -40,7 +39,6 @@ tags: impact: 30 kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation - - Exfiltration message: The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$. mitre_attack_id: @@ -56,7 +54,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -82,3 +80,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 27 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack.yml index ea505ebdbf..0eff122630 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack.yml @@ -38,7 +38,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Rundll32 Activity asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 100 @@ -69,7 +68,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi.yml index 1bd63ea426..3364160849 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi.yml @@ -36,7 +36,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Rundll32 Activity asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 100 @@ -67,7 +66,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup.yml index 5be793a4fb..643d906750 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup.yml @@ -38,7 +38,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Rundll32 Activity asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 100 @@ -69,7 +68,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml index 0ce3298538..b260e1f0f7 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml @@ -36,7 +36,6 @@ tags: - Suspicious MSHTA Activity - NOBELIUM Group asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 80 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_sharphound_command_line_arguments.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_sharphound_command_line_arguments.yml index c884eb7f88..e45fc40419 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_sharphound_command_line_arguments.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_sharphound_command_line_arguments.yml @@ -32,7 +32,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Discovery Techniques - Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -73,3 +72,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_sharphound_file_modifications.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_sharphound_file_modifications.yml index f8b790df6d..e220634ee9 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_sharphound_file_modifications.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_sharphound_file_modifications.yml @@ -42,7 +42,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Discovery Techniques - Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -83,3 +82,4 @@ tags: - file_create_time risk_score: 24 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_sharphound_usage.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_sharphound_usage.yml index 02400d37b8..965fa5b1a9 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_sharphound_usage.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_sharphound_usage.yml @@ -37,7 +37,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Discovery Techniques - Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -82,3 +81,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml index b56f9aa201..2420c28776 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml @@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ tags: - 'Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ' - Suspicious Command-Line Executions asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 50 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence.yml index 158adc2573..aaf397cc5b 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence.yml @@ -43,7 +43,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious WMI Use - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 90 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -74,3 +73,4 @@ tags: - User risk_score: 63 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/disable_amsi_through_registry.yml b/detections/endpoint/disable_amsi_through_registry.yml index 9387e05324..9fa0beafa6 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/disable_amsi_through_registry.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/disable_amsi_through_registry.yml @@ -35,14 +35,22 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed + context: + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Defense Evasion dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation + message: Disable AMSI Through Registry mitre_attack_id: - T1562.001 - T1562 + observable: + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security @@ -57,3 +65,7 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25.0 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_antivirus_registry.yml b/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_antivirus_registry.yml index 1561147480..0b9c9a666a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_antivirus_registry.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_antivirus_registry.yml @@ -34,7 +34,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - IceID - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -54,7 +53,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: user - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: @@ -73,3 +72,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_blockatfirstseen_feature.yml b/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_blockatfirstseen_feature.yml index dbfea7ede7..46e6ae974a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_blockatfirstseen_feature.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_blockatfirstseen_feature.yml @@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - IceID - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -53,7 +52,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: user - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: @@ -72,3 +71,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_enhanced_notification.yml b/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_enhanced_notification.yml index 970291b826..6bd536f000 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_enhanced_notification.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_enhanced_notification.yml @@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - IceID - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -53,7 +52,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: user - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: @@ -72,3 +71,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_mpengine_registry.yml b/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_mpengine_registry.yml index 370a57cfc1..f3249790cf 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_mpengine_registry.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_mpengine_registry.yml @@ -34,7 +34,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - IceID - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -54,7 +53,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: user - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: @@ -73,3 +72,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_spynet_reporting.yml b/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_spynet_reporting.yml index 99325b43e3..0eab87bdf4 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_spynet_reporting.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_spynet_reporting.yml @@ -32,7 +32,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - IceID - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -52,7 +51,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: user - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: @@ -71,3 +70,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_submit_samples_consent_feature.yml b/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_submit_samples_consent_feature.yml index 725608f220..680a0c6b9d 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_submit_samples_consent_feature.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_submit_samples_consent_feature.yml @@ -32,7 +32,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - IceID - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -52,7 +51,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: user - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: @@ -71,3 +70,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/disable_etw_through_registry.yml b/detections/endpoint/disable_etw_through_registry.yml index b29449cebb..43b1c849c4 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/disable_etw_through_registry.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/disable_etw_through_registry.yml @@ -34,14 +34,22 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed + context: + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Defense Evasion dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation + message: Disable ETW Through Registry mitre_attack_id: - T1562.001 - T1562 + observable: + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security @@ -56,3 +64,7 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25.0 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/disable_logs_using_wevtutil.yml b/detections/endpoint/disable_logs_using_wevtutil.yml index 42a6106f04..39ac75511a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/disable_logs_using_wevtutil.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/disable_logs_using_wevtutil.yml @@ -26,11 +26,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - - Source: Endpoint - - Stage: Defense Evasion + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Defense Evasion dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log impact: 30 @@ -63,3 +62,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/disable_registry_tool.yml b/detections/endpoint/disable_registry_tool.yml index 39f23f330c..8c941d2d33 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/disable_registry_tool.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/disable_registry_tool.yml @@ -34,7 +34,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -70,3 +69,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/disable_schedule_task.yml b/detections/endpoint/disable_schedule_task.yml index 9a5bce2c78..5202dc15df 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/disable_schedule_task.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/disable_schedule_task.yml @@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - IcedID - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -62,3 +61,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/disable_security_logs_using_minint_registry.yml b/detections/endpoint/disable_security_logs_using_minint_registry.yml index 8ff1bc575c..b877e1e320 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/disable_security_logs_using_minint_registry.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/disable_security_logs_using_minint_registry.yml @@ -34,7 +34,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -53,7 +52,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: user - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: @@ -72,3 +71,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/disable_show_hidden_files.yml b/detections/endpoint/disable_show_hidden_files.yml index ced2b6bebf..9750e3c9bf 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/disable_show_hidden_files.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/disable_show_hidden_files.yml @@ -35,7 +35,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -71,3 +70,4 @@ tags: - Registry.registry_value_nam risk_score: 40 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/disable_uac_remote_restriction.yml b/detections/endpoint/disable_uac_remote_restriction.yml index a8f72f0663..3cc9548329 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/disable_uac_remote_restriction.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/disable_uac_remote_restriction.yml @@ -37,11 +37,10 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics - Suspicious Windows Registry Activities - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage:Privilege Escalation Persistence + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Privilege Escalation dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy/sysmon.log impact: 80 @@ -57,7 +56,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: user - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: @@ -76,3 +75,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/disable_windows_app_hotkeys.yml b/detections/endpoint/disable_windows_app_hotkeys.yml index e65a348ce7..4e7b2ba1cc 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/disable_windows_app_hotkeys.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/disable_windows_app_hotkeys.yml @@ -38,7 +38,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - XMRig - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -71,3 +70,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/disable_windows_behavior_monitoring.yml b/detections/endpoint/disable_windows_behavior_monitoring.yml index 2117620028..48571a6474 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/disable_windows_behavior_monitoring.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/disable_windows_behavior_monitoring.yml @@ -41,11 +41,10 @@ tags: - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics - Ransomware - Revil Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - - Source: Endpoint - - Stage: Defense Evasion + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Defense Evasion dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log @@ -77,3 +76,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/disable_windows_smartscreen_protection.yml b/detections/endpoint/disable_windows_smartscreen_protection.yml index 6f5fa6cbd7..511a800e6b 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/disable_windows_smartscreen_protection.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/disable_windows_smartscreen_protection.yml @@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -71,3 +70,4 @@ tags: - Registry.registry_value_nam risk_score: 25 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/disabled_kerberos_pre_authentication_discovery_with_get_aduser.yml b/detections/endpoint/disabled_kerberos_pre_authentication_discovery_with_get_aduser.yml index 61db0b82f4..8ef58fda2a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/disabled_kerberos_pre_authentication_discovery_with_get_aduser.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/disabled_kerberos_pre_authentication_discovery_with_get_aduser.yml @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Kerberos Attacks + asset_type: endpoint confidence: 90 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -37,7 +38,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.004/getaduser/windows-powershell.log impact: 60 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation + - Exploitation message: Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser from $dest$ mitre_attack_id: - T1558 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/disabled_kerberos_pre_authentication_discovery_with_powerview.yml b/detections/endpoint/disabled_kerberos_pre_authentication_discovery_with_powerview.yml index 9a7b3d389f..26e0cc5247 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/disabled_kerberos_pre_authentication_discovery_with_powerview.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/disabled_kerberos_pre_authentication_discovery_with_powerview.yml @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Kerberos Attacks + asset_type: endpoint confidence: 90 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -36,7 +37,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.004/powerview/windows-powershell.log impact: 60 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation + - Exploitation message: Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With PowerView from $dest$ mitre_attack_id: - T1558 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/disabling_cmd_application.yml b/detections/endpoint/disabling_cmd_application.yml index 6352615096..a13bbf1356 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/disabling_cmd_application.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/disabling_cmd_application.yml @@ -34,7 +34,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -74,3 +73,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/disabling_controlpanel.yml b/detections/endpoint/disabling_controlpanel.yml index 1e511acb0e..38b5b4ed45 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/disabling_controlpanel.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/disabling_controlpanel.yml @@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -73,3 +72,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/disabling_defender_services.yml b/detections/endpoint/disabling_defender_services.yml index 954a4147b9..4facc01d6c 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/disabling_defender_services.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/disabling_defender_services.yml @@ -35,7 +35,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - IceID - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -55,7 +54,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: user - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: @@ -74,3 +73,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/disabling_firewall_with_netsh.yml b/detections/endpoint/disabling_firewall_with_netsh.yml index dd4de0a3cd..0354fb1152 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/disabling_firewall_with_netsh.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/disabling_firewall_with_netsh.yml @@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -73,3 +72,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/disabling_folderoptions_windows_feature.yml b/detections/endpoint/disabling_folderoptions_windows_feature.yml index b55293c3ce..a68caa4bf1 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/disabling_folderoptions_windows_feature.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/disabling_folderoptions_windows_feature.yml @@ -35,7 +35,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -73,3 +72,4 @@ tags: - Registry.registry_value_name risk_score: 25 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/disabling_net_user_account.yml b/detections/endpoint/disabling_net_user_account.yml index c048edf698..0860d02134 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/disabling_net_user_account.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/disabling_net_user_account.yml @@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - XMRig - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 60 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -52,7 +51,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -80,3 +79,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/disabling_norun_windows_app.yml b/detections/endpoint/disabling_norun_windows_app.yml index cf96acc806..83e322d3a9 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/disabling_norun_windows_app.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/disabling_norun_windows_app.yml @@ -36,7 +36,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -77,3 +76,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml b/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml index d0ea85b197..fcfd0eaf39 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml @@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ tags: - Suspicious Windows Registry Activities - Remcos asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 60 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/disabling_systemrestore_in_registry.yml b/detections/endpoint/disabling_systemrestore_in_registry.yml index 02bf9ee4e6..c66cd9c4f2 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/disabling_systemrestore_in_registry.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/disabling_systemrestore_in_registry.yml @@ -35,7 +35,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -76,3 +75,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/disabling_task_manager.yml b/detections/endpoint/disabling_task_manager.yml index dea2692223..3d82270f99 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/disabling_task_manager.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/disabling_task_manager.yml @@ -35,7 +35,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 60 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -75,3 +74,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/dllhost_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.yml b/detections/endpoint/dllhost_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.yml index 31e8145593..756291943e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/dllhost_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/dllhost_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.yml @@ -32,7 +32,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Cobalt Strike - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -56,7 +55,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_image - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -77,3 +76,4 @@ tags: - process_path risk_score: 49 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app.yml b/detections/endpoint/dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app.yml index 739eb1ad54..ea24ac1917 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app.yml @@ -33,9 +33,8 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious DNS Traffic - Dynamic DNS - - Command and Control - Data Exfiltration - automated_detection_testing: passed + - Command and Control confidence: 80 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -59,7 +58,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -87,3 +86,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/domain_account_discovery_with_dsquery.yml b/detections/endpoint/domain_account_discovery_with_dsquery.yml index a529264fd2..c0b5b7a180 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/domain_account_discovery_with_dsquery.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/domain_account_discovery_with_dsquery.yml @@ -27,11 +27,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Reconnaissance + - Stage:Discovery dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log impact: 50 @@ -51,7 +50,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process product: @@ -70,3 +69,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_name risk_score: 25 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/domain_account_discovery_with_net_app.yml b/detections/endpoint/domain_account_discovery_with_net_app.yml index d08b791f3f..1e5d8d10c2 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/domain_account_discovery_with_net_app.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/domain_account_discovery_with_net_app.yml @@ -27,11 +27,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Reconnaissance + - Stage:Discovery dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log impact: 50 @@ -51,7 +50,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process product: @@ -72,3 +71,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/domain_account_discovery_with_wmic.yml b/detections/endpoint/domain_account_discovery_with_wmic.yml index 5069bf4f2a..9252a2c6a3 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/domain_account_discovery_with_wmic.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/domain_account_discovery_with_wmic.yml @@ -28,11 +28,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Reconnaissance + - Stage:Discovery dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log impact: 50 @@ -52,7 +51,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process product: @@ -73,3 +72,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/domain_controller_discovery_with_nltest.yml b/detections/endpoint/domain_controller_discovery_with_nltest.yml index f44aa2ab73..a6cc699a08 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/domain_controller_discovery_with_nltest.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/domain_controller_discovery_with_nltest.yml @@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -65,3 +64,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/domain_controller_discovery_with_wmic.yml b/detections/endpoint/domain_controller_discovery_with_wmic.yml index 9a3933b67c..7fa60f07c1 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/domain_controller_discovery_with_wmic.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/domain_controller_discovery_with_wmic.yml @@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -63,3 +62,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 21 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_adsisearcher.yml b/detections/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_adsisearcher.yml index 202cb361d1..c2ed755947 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_adsisearcher.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_adsisearcher.yml @@ -23,7 +23,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 60 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -55,3 +54,4 @@ tags: - User risk_score: 18 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_dsquery.yml b/detections/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_dsquery.yml index d0a5bb3640..5a2dd322b1 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_dsquery.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_dsquery.yml @@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -63,3 +62,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 15 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_net.yml b/detections/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_net.yml index f591073b41..3dc044760e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_net.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_net.yml @@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -63,3 +62,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 15 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_wmic.yml b/detections/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_wmic.yml index 80069157d4..a175fb1f0a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_wmic.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_wmic.yml @@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -64,3 +63,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 15 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/download_files_using_telegram.yml b/detections/endpoint/download_files_using_telegram.yml index a5b1c7c64f..4fdb3cb0f4 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/download_files_using_telegram.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/download_files_using_telegram.yml @@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - XMRig - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -64,3 +63,4 @@ tags: - Hash risk_score: 49 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/drop_icedid_license_dat.yml b/detections/endpoint/drop_icedid_license_dat.yml index 0906ac0fba..f37b89a86d 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/drop_icedid_license_dat.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/drop_icedid_license_dat.yml @@ -23,7 +23,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - IcedID - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 90 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -43,7 +42,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: SourceImage - type: process name + type: Process role: - Attacker product: @@ -54,3 +53,4 @@ tags: - _time risk_score: 63 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/dsquery_domain_discovery.yml b/detections/endpoint/dsquery_domain_discovery.yml index ae07891213..c88919c256 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/dsquery_domain_discovery.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/dsquery_domain_discovery.yml @@ -47,7 +47,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Domain Trust Discovery - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 90 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -71,7 +70,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -95,3 +94,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml index f0806cf1a4..7ac74deb95 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml @@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ tags: - Suspicious Rundll32 Activity - HAFNIUM Group asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 3 - CIS 5 @@ -58,7 +57,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name diff --git a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml index ac76cbe814..42f12b5b6e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml @@ -36,7 +36,6 @@ tags: - Credential Dumping - HAFNIUM Group asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 3 - CIS 5 @@ -67,7 +66,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name diff --git a/detections/endpoint/elevated_group_discovery_with_net.yml b/detections/endpoint/elevated_group_discovery_with_net.yml index 5f4c9e0fb8..4efca48be1 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/elevated_group_discovery_with_net.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/elevated_group_discovery_with_net.yml @@ -32,7 +32,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -72,3 +71,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/elevated_group_discovery_with_powerview.yml b/detections/endpoint/elevated_group_discovery_with_powerview.yml index 8a9f22a77d..2a36528560 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/elevated_group_discovery_with_powerview.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/elevated_group_discovery_with_powerview.yml @@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -61,3 +60,4 @@ tags: - User risk_score: 21 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/elevated_group_discovery_with_wmic.yml b/detections/endpoint/elevated_group_discovery_with_wmic.yml index bf92cb2add..e128f2b67a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/elevated_group_discovery_with_wmic.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/elevated_group_discovery_with_wmic.yml @@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -70,3 +69,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/enable_rdp_in_other_port_number.yml b/detections/endpoint/enable_rdp_in_other_port_number.yml index 3ad2ad5db9..e95c303816 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/enable_rdp_in_other_port_number.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/enable_rdp_in_other_port_number.yml @@ -34,7 +34,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -70,3 +69,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/enable_wdigest_uselogoncredential_registry.yml b/detections/endpoint/enable_wdigest_uselogoncredential_registry.yml index cc55d2f898..e307ea92e9 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/enable_wdigest_uselogoncredential_registry.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/enable_wdigest_uselogoncredential_registry.yml @@ -38,7 +38,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Credential Dumping - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -77,3 +76,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/enumerate_users_local_group_using_telegram.yml b/detections/endpoint/enumerate_users_local_group_using_telegram.yml index c560e7562a..e020a18b9a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/enumerate_users_local_group_using_telegram.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/enumerate_users_local_group_using_telegram.yml @@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - XMRig - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -64,3 +63,4 @@ tags: - Message risk_score: 80 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/esentutl_sam_copy.yml b/detections/endpoint/esentutl_sam_copy.yml index d8d8d11524..ec661e947c 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/esentutl_sam_copy.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/esentutl_sam_copy.yml @@ -35,8 +35,7 @@ tags: dataset: [] impact: 80 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user user$ attempting to capture credentials for offline cracking or observability. @@ -53,7 +52,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -79,3 +78,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 80 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/etw_registry_disabled.yml b/detections/endpoint/etw_registry_disabled.yml index 041d54c3a3..3c83adba74 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/etw_registry_disabled.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/etw_registry_disabled.yml @@ -37,11 +37,10 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Windows Persistence Techniques - Windows Privilege Escalation - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage:Privilege Escalation Persistence + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Privilege Escalation dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127/etw_disable/sysmon.log impact: 90 @@ -58,7 +57,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: user - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: @@ -77,3 +76,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/eventvwr_uac_bypass.yml b/detections/endpoint/eventvwr_uac_bypass.yml index 9669c84655..1414f44b3b 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/eventvwr_uac_bypass.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/eventvwr_uac_bypass.yml @@ -51,7 +51,6 @@ tags: impact: 80 kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation - - Privilege Escalation message: Registry values were modified to bypass UAC using Event Viewer on $dest$ by $user$. mitre_attack_id: @@ -81,3 +80,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/excel_spawning_powershell.yml b/detections/endpoint/excel_spawning_powershell.yml index b838d060fa..f2fa91c94d 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/excel_spawning_powershell.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/excel_spawning_powershell.yml @@ -32,7 +32,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Spearphishing Attachments - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -57,7 +56,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -84,3 +83,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/excel_spawning_windows_script_host.yml b/detections/endpoint/excel_spawning_windows_script_host.yml index e808a71e12..d8eaaed74c 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/excel_spawning_windows_script_host.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/excel_spawning_windows_script_host.yml @@ -34,7 +34,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Spearphishing Attachments - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -59,7 +58,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -80,3 +79,4 @@ tags: - parent_process_id risk_score: 80 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/excessive_attempt_to_disable_services.yml b/detections/endpoint/excessive_attempt_to_disable_services.yml index 7726131774..705e2756d5 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/excessive_attempt_to_disable_services.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/excessive_attempt_to_disable_services.yml @@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - XMRig - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -66,3 +65,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/excessive_file_deletion_in_windefender_folder.yml b/detections/endpoint/excessive_file_deletion_in_windefender_folder.yml index 6802ab9d27..4cf1f4553a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/excessive_file_deletion_in_windefender_folder.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/excessive_file_deletion_in_windefender_folder.yml @@ -73,3 +73,4 @@ tags: - ProcessID risk_score: 25 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/excessive_number_of_distinct_processes_created_in_windows_temp_folder.yml b/detections/endpoint/excessive_number_of_distinct_processes_created_in_windows_temp_folder.yml index 986e23feaf..09fa80cb2f 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/excessive_number_of_distinct_processes_created_in_windows_temp_folder.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/excessive_number_of_distinct_processes_created_in_windows_temp_folder.yml @@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Meterpreter - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -60,3 +59,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_windows + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/excessive_number_of_service_control_start_as_disabled.yml b/detections/endpoint/excessive_number_of_service_control_start_as_disabled.yml index bac83efcff..2a7d63bfbb 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/excessive_number_of_service_control_start_as_disabled.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/excessive_number_of_service_control_start_as_disabled.yml @@ -34,7 +34,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -75,3 +74,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/excessive_number_of_taskhost_processes.yml b/detections/endpoint/excessive_number_of_taskhost_processes.yml index 4ddb7bef7a..7f7a79bf1b 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/excessive_number_of_taskhost_processes.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/excessive_number_of_taskhost_processes.yml @@ -32,7 +32,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Meterpreter - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -69,3 +68,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_windows + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/excessive_service_stop_attempt.yml b/detections/endpoint/excessive_service_stop_attempt.yml index 6c46da14ca..e56cda6396 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/excessive_service_stop_attempt.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/excessive_service_stop_attempt.yml @@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - XMRig - Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -74,3 +73,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_cacls_app.yml b/detections/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_cacls_app.yml index 4bac489fdd..212a964ee2 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_cacls_app.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_cacls_app.yml @@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - XMRig - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -66,3 +65,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_net_app.yml b/detections/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_net_app.yml index 107c0ce90d..6fa2f8f347 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_net_app.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_net_app.yml @@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - XMRig - Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -53,9 +52,8 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: process_name - type: Process Name + type: Process role: - - Process - Attacker product: - Splunk Enterprise @@ -78,3 +76,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app.yml b/detections/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app.yml index 48b38da855..2a9fc6e0b7 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app.yml @@ -31,9 +31,8 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious DNS Traffic - Dynamic DNS - - Command and Control - Data Exfiltration - automated_detection_testing: passed + - Command and Control confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -64,3 +63,4 @@ tags: - EventCode risk_score: 28 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility.yml b/detections/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility.yml index 62ea23123b..92ae980ff3 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility.yml @@ -27,14 +27,23 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed + context: + - Source:Endpoint + - Scope:Local + - Stage:Exfiltration dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation + message: Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility mitre_attack_id: - T1569 - T1569.002 + observable: + - name: Computer + type: Endpoint + role: + - Victim product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security @@ -45,3 +54,7 @@ tags: - process_name - process security_domain: endpoint + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_taskkill.yml b/detections/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_taskkill.yml index 8f76b5ab68..b25aed23dc 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_taskkill.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_taskkill.yml @@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - XMRig - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -70,3 +69,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share.yml b/detections/endpoint/executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share.yml index 9cbc6bb8d5..05ee4e8bd1 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share.yml @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/exe_smbshare/windows-security.log impact: 70 kill_chain_phases: - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation message: $user$ dropped or created an executable file in known sensitive SMB share. Share name=$Share_Name$, Target name=$Relative_Target_Name$, and Access mask=$Access_Mask$ mitre_attack_id: @@ -69,3 +69,4 @@ tags: - Source_Address risk_score: 70 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path.yml b/detections/endpoint/executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path.yml index f3b5cf9ca5..abaf8dcab2 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path.yml @@ -82,3 +82,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/execute_javascript_with_jscript_com_clsid.yml b/detections/endpoint/execute_javascript_with_jscript_com_clsid.yml index 9a8c8241a2..08feb0db3b 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/execute_javascript_with_jscript_com_clsid.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/execute_javascript_with_jscript_com_clsid.yml @@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -76,3 +75,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml b/detections/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml index 42dcd578c5..12e3d27224 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml @@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ tags: - Windows File Extension and Association Abuse - Masquerading - Rename System Utilities asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 3 - CIS 8 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/extraction_of_registry_hives.yml b/detections/endpoint/extraction_of_registry_hives.yml index cb08f69826..0da0a0fd51 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/extraction_of_registry_hives.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/extraction_of_registry_hives.yml @@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - DarkSide Ransomware - Credential Dumping - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -80,3 +79,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml b/detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml index bd44cb5cf9..3526d02181 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml @@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - SamSam Ransomware asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 90 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/firewall_allowed_program_enable.yml b/detections/endpoint/firewall_allowed_program_enable.yml index d76c1302c7..1e90cd0a8d 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/firewall_allowed_program_enable.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/firewall_allowed_program_enable.yml @@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -69,3 +68,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/fodhelper_uac_bypass.yml b/detections/endpoint/fodhelper_uac_bypass.yml index a92768317f..a90168a952 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/fodhelper_uac_bypass.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/fodhelper_uac_bypass.yml @@ -38,7 +38,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics - IcedID - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 90 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -48,7 +47,6 @@ tags: impact: 90 kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation - - Privilege Escalation message: Suspcious registy keys added by process fodhelper.exe (process_id- $process_id), with a parent_process of $parent_process_name$ that has been executed on $dest$ by $user$. @@ -88,3 +86,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/fsutil_zeroing_file.yml b/detections/endpoint/fsutil_zeroing_file.yml index 53787bc8c5..b4bfe13872 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/fsutil_zeroing_file.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/fsutil_zeroing_file.yml @@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 90 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -59,3 +58,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell.yml b/detections/endpoint/get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell.yml index b41274ac38..c42aaecb4c 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell.yml @@ -29,11 +29,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 30 context: - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Reconnaissance + - Stage:Discovery dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-sysmon.log impact: 30 @@ -52,7 +51,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process product: @@ -71,3 +70,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_name risk_score: 9 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.yml b/detections/endpoint/get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.yml index f165a51153..e3f82c3ef5 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.yml @@ -25,11 +25,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 30 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage:Reconnaissance + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Discovery dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-powershell.log impact: 30 @@ -60,3 +59,4 @@ tags: - User risk_score: 9 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/get_aduser_with_powershell.yml b/detections/endpoint/get_aduser_with_powershell.yml index d7d92a915a..c4562f9a25 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/get_aduser_with_powershell.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/get_aduser_with_powershell.yml @@ -29,11 +29,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Reconnaissance + - Stage:Discovery dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log impact: 50 @@ -53,7 +52,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process product: @@ -72,3 +71,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_name risk_score: 25 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/get_aduser_with_powershell_script_block.yml b/detections/endpoint/get_aduser_with_powershell_script_block.yml index b9c271f9a2..f061a9f684 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/get_aduser_with_powershell_script_block.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/get_aduser_with_powershell_script_block.yml @@ -25,11 +25,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage:Reconnaissance + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Discovery dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log impact: 50 @@ -60,3 +59,4 @@ tags: - User risk_score: 25 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell.yml b/detections/endpoint/get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell.yml index ff29d907d3..f0149891cd 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell.yml @@ -29,11 +29,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Reconnaissance + - Stage:Discovery dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-sysmon.log impact: 50 @@ -52,7 +51,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process product: @@ -73,3 +72,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.yml b/detections/endpoint/get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.yml index a465b42fa2..39be4ce713 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.yml @@ -25,11 +25,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 30 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage:Reconnaissance + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Discovery dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-powershell.log impact: 30 @@ -60,3 +59,4 @@ tags: - User risk_score: 9 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/get_domainpolicy_with_powershell.yml b/detections/endpoint/get_domainpolicy_with_powershell.yml index a47bfa8f2e..606737adb9 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/get_domainpolicy_with_powershell.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/get_domainpolicy_with_powershell.yml @@ -29,11 +29,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 60 context: - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Reconnaissance + - Stage:Discovery dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-sysmon.log impact: 50 @@ -52,7 +51,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process product: @@ -73,3 +72,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.yml b/detections/endpoint/get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.yml index 0e2c27fac2..6744435f73 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.yml @@ -23,11 +23,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 60 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage:Reconnaissance + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Discovery dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-powershell.log impact: 50 @@ -57,3 +56,4 @@ tags: - User risk_score: 30 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/get_domaintrust_with_powershell.yml b/detections/endpoint/get_domaintrust_with_powershell.yml index 549a7639fb..6a8ad0c082 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/get_domaintrust_with_powershell.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/get_domaintrust_with_powershell.yml @@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 40 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -73,3 +72,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/get_domaintrust_with_powershell_script_block.yml b/detections/endpoint/get_domaintrust_with_powershell_script_block.yml index 8ad1cbdf75..910ee5d880 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/get_domaintrust_with_powershell_script_block.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/get_domaintrust_with_powershell_script_block.yml @@ -34,11 +34,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 40 context: - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Defense Evasion + - Stage:Discovery dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/discovery/windows-powershell.log impact: 30 @@ -58,7 +57,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process product: @@ -75,3 +74,4 @@ tags: - User risk_score: 12 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/get_domainuser_with_powershell.yml b/detections/endpoint/get_domainuser_with_powershell.yml index 2977e9943a..a05c50b403 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/get_domainuser_with_powershell.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/get_domainuser_with_powershell.yml @@ -28,11 +28,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Reconnaissance + - Stage:Discovery dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log impact: 50 @@ -52,7 +51,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process product: @@ -73,3 +72,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/get_domainuser_with_powershell_script_block.yml b/detections/endpoint/get_domainuser_with_powershell_script_block.yml index 9836eea84e..ea6ea56233 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/get_domainuser_with_powershell_script_block.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/get_domainuser_with_powershell_script_block.yml @@ -22,11 +22,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage:Reconnaissance + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Discovery dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log impact: 50 @@ -57,3 +56,4 @@ tags: - User risk_score: 25 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/get_foresttrust_with_powershell.yml b/detections/endpoint/get_foresttrust_with_powershell.yml index 3a7aed21ae..12eb6dfe12 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/get_foresttrust_with_powershell.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/get_foresttrust_with_powershell.yml @@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 40 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -74,3 +73,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/get_foresttrust_with_powershell_script_block.yml b/detections/endpoint/get_foresttrust_with_powershell_script_block.yml index d04a74656a..e2a7d111b8 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/get_foresttrust_with_powershell_script_block.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/get_foresttrust_with_powershell_script_block.yml @@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 40 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -66,3 +65,4 @@ tags: - User risk_score: 12 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/get_wmiobject_group_discovery.yml b/detections/endpoint/get_wmiobject_group_discovery.yml index b162b59416..140640f2db 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/get_wmiobject_group_discovery.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/get_wmiobject_group_discovery.yml @@ -30,12 +30,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint - Stage:Discovery - - Stage:Recon dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log impact: 30 @@ -73,3 +71,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 15 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/get_wmiobject_group_discovery_with_script_block_logging.yml b/detections/endpoint/get_wmiobject_group_discovery_with_script_block_logging.yml index c234f36c5e..7f98cc9d4f 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/get_wmiobject_group_discovery_with_script_block_logging.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/get_wmiobject_group_discovery_with_script_block_logging.yml @@ -36,12 +36,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint - Stage:Discovery - - Stage:Recon dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-powershell.log impact: 30 @@ -72,3 +70,4 @@ tags: - User risk_score: 15 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/getadcomputer_with_powershell.yml b/detections/endpoint/getadcomputer_with_powershell.yml index 76b9ac8495..880b082e60 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/getadcomputer_with_powershell.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/getadcomputer_with_powershell.yml @@ -25,12 +25,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint - Stage:Discovery - - Stage:Recon dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log impact: 30 @@ -62,3 +60,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 15 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/getadcomputer_with_powershell_script_block.yml b/detections/endpoint/getadcomputer_with_powershell_script_block.yml index f38cf2f2a9..1eae787f11 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/getadcomputer_with_powershell_script_block.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/getadcomputer_with_powershell_script_block.yml @@ -24,12 +24,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint - Stage:Discovery - - Stage:Recon dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log impact: 30 @@ -55,3 +53,4 @@ tags: - User risk_score: 15 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/getadgroup_with_powershell.yml b/detections/endpoint/getadgroup_with_powershell.yml index db1c10b8d6..f2553b34bc 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/getadgroup_with_powershell.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/getadgroup_with_powershell.yml @@ -27,12 +27,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint - Stage:Discovery - - Stage:Recon dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log impact: 30 @@ -65,3 +63,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 15 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/getadgroup_with_powershell_script_block.yml b/detections/endpoint/getadgroup_with_powershell_script_block.yml index 7c1119fa15..5cb62613c8 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/getadgroup_with_powershell_script_block.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/getadgroup_with_powershell_script_block.yml @@ -24,12 +24,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint - Stage:Discovery - - Stage:Recon dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log impact: 30 @@ -56,3 +54,4 @@ tags: - User risk_score: 15 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/getcurrent_user_with_powershell.yml b/detections/endpoint/getcurrent_user_with_powershell.yml index 01e7598eea..a6ac7742d1 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/getcurrent_user_with_powershell.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/getcurrent_user_with_powershell.yml @@ -26,12 +26,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint - Stage:Discovery - - Stage:Recon dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log impact: 30 @@ -64,3 +62,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 15 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/getcurrent_user_with_powershell_script_block.yml b/detections/endpoint/getcurrent_user_with_powershell_script_block.yml index d1892d1e2a..626ea184b4 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/getcurrent_user_with_powershell_script_block.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/getcurrent_user_with_powershell_script_block.yml @@ -25,12 +25,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint - Stage:Discovery - - Stage:Recon dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log impact: 30 @@ -58,3 +56,4 @@ tags: - EventCode risk_score: 15 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/getdomaincomputer_with_powershell.yml b/detections/endpoint/getdomaincomputer_with_powershell.yml index 4da1c3199e..3fe6502b92 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/getdomaincomputer_with_powershell.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/getdomaincomputer_with_powershell.yml @@ -26,12 +26,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - Source:Endpoint - Stage:Discovery - - Stage:Recon dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log impact: 30 @@ -65,3 +63,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_script_block.yml b/detections/endpoint/getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_script_block.yml index 67a9791ec1..80b3df3b2d 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_script_block.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_script_block.yml @@ -23,12 +23,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - Source:Endpoint - Stage:Discovery - - Stage:Recon dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log impact: 30 @@ -54,3 +52,4 @@ tags: - User risk_score: 24 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/getdomaincontroller_with_powershell.yml b/detections/endpoint/getdomaincontroller_with_powershell.yml index fedfa7eaf9..3bfcab7965 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/getdomaincontroller_with_powershell.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/getdomaincontroller_with_powershell.yml @@ -27,12 +27,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - Source:Endpoint - Stage:Discovery - - Stage:Recon dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log impact: 30 @@ -64,3 +62,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 24 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_script_block.yml b/detections/endpoint/getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_script_block.yml index 92f51f5444..e698e1f783 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_script_block.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_script_block.yml @@ -24,12 +24,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - Source:Endpoint - Stage:Discovery - - Stage:Recon dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log impact: 30 @@ -55,3 +53,4 @@ tags: - User risk_score: 24 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/getdomaingroup_with_powershell.yml b/detections/endpoint/getdomaingroup_with_powershell.yml index e3797d79ed..52c661ebb2 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/getdomaingroup_with_powershell.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/getdomaingroup_with_powershell.yml @@ -27,12 +27,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint - Stage:Discovery - - Stage:Recon dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log impact: 30 @@ -67,3 +65,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/getdomaingroup_with_powershell_script_block.yml b/detections/endpoint/getdomaingroup_with_powershell_script_block.yml index 6cac522789..4db3760c8c 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/getdomaingroup_with_powershell_script_block.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/getdomaingroup_with_powershell_script_block.yml @@ -25,12 +25,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint - Stage:Discovery - - Stage:Recon dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log impact: 30 @@ -57,3 +55,4 @@ tags: - User risk_score: 15 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/getlocaluser_with_powershell.yml b/detections/endpoint/getlocaluser_with_powershell.yml index 020615cadd..9536638619 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/getlocaluser_with_powershell.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/getlocaluser_with_powershell.yml @@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ tags: context: - Source:Endpoint - Stage:Discovery - - Stage:Recon dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log impact: 30 @@ -53,3 +52,4 @@ tags: - _time risk_score: 15 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/getlocaluser_with_powershell_script_block.yml b/detections/endpoint/getlocaluser_with_powershell_script_block.yml index ee832bdb05..a6c2f2d230 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/getlocaluser_with_powershell_script_block.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/getlocaluser_with_powershell_script_block.yml @@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ tags: context: - Source:Endpoint - Stage:Discovery - - Stage:Recon dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log impact: 30 @@ -50,3 +49,4 @@ tags: - _time risk_score: 15 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/getnettcpconnection_with_powershell.yml b/detections/endpoint/getnettcpconnection_with_powershell.yml index 4dc7f09e60..bf756cc946 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/getnettcpconnection_with_powershell.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/getnettcpconnection_with_powershell.yml @@ -26,12 +26,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint - Stage:Discovery - - Stage:Recon dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1049/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log impact: 30 @@ -63,3 +61,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 15 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_script_block.yml b/detections/endpoint/getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_script_block.yml index 3444f85812..08ff9f6fbe 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_script_block.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_script_block.yml @@ -24,12 +24,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint - Stage:Discovery - - Stage:Recon dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1049/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log impact: 30 @@ -55,3 +53,4 @@ tags: - User risk_score: 15 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell.yml b/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell.yml index 71659ca87e..c6ba6a4b29 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell.yml @@ -27,12 +27,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint - Stage:Discovery - - Stage:Recon dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log impact: 30 @@ -66,3 +64,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_script_block.yml b/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_script_block.yml index 9c632db1d6..5b9ad0fee1 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_script_block.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_script_block.yml @@ -25,12 +25,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint - Stage:Discovery - - Stage:Recon dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log impact: 30 @@ -56,3 +54,4 @@ tags: - User risk_score: 15 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell.yml b/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell.yml index 37f46c9956..09e61947f0 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell.yml @@ -29,12 +29,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint - Stage:Discovery - - Stage:Recon dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log impact: 30 @@ -69,3 +67,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_script_block.yml b/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_script_block.yml index 2d3d5d7a09..a07988555c 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_script_block.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_script_block.yml @@ -25,12 +25,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint - Stage:Discovery - - Stage:Recon dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log impact: 30 @@ -57,3 +55,4 @@ tags: - User risk_score: 15 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell.yml b/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell.yml index 9b10a7f427..8a6308afe6 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell.yml @@ -30,11 +30,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Reconnaissance + - Stage:Discovery dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log impact: 50 @@ -54,7 +53,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process product: @@ -75,3 +74,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_script_block.yml b/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_script_block.yml index b37def5d6a..867d819d10 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_script_block.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_script_block.yml @@ -24,11 +24,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage:Reconnaissance + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Discovery dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log impact: 50 @@ -59,3 +58,4 @@ tags: - User risk_score: 25 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell.yml b/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell.yml index f8d752fb4a..2df30b1ba7 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell.yml @@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ tags: context: - Source:Endpoint - Stage:Discovery - - Stage:Recon dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log impact: 30 @@ -54,3 +53,4 @@ tags: - _time risk_score: 15 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_script_block.yml b/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_script_block.yml index 10779deb4b..2323809306 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_script_block.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_script_block.yml @@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ tags: context: - Source:Endpoint - Stage:Discovery - - Stage:Recon dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log impact: 30 @@ -50,3 +49,4 @@ tags: - _time risk_score: 15 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/gpupdate_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.yml b/detections/endpoint/gpupdate_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.yml index f009546893..685632cb66 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/gpupdate_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/gpupdate_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.yml @@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Cobalt Strike - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 90 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -81,3 +80,4 @@ tags: - process_path risk_score: 81 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/hide_user_account_from_sign_in_screen.yml b/detections/endpoint/hide_user_account_from_sign_in_screen.yml index eac5da28f8..ee7c8d8675 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/hide_user_account_from_sign_in_screen.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/hide_user_account_from_sign_in_screen.yml @@ -38,7 +38,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - XMRig - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -81,3 +80,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml index 8d475b0572..7321aa4b1d 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ name: Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe -id: c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6b5264g9f +id: 6e5a3ae4-90a3-462d-9aa6-0119f638c0f1 version: 4 date: '2020-07-21' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk @@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ tags: - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics - Windows Persistence Techniques asset_type: '' - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 80 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/high_frequency_copy_of_files_in_network_share.yml b/detections/endpoint/high_frequency_copy_of_files_in_network_share.yml index 6b7b613d2b..607986968d 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/high_frequency_copy_of_files_in_network_share.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/high_frequency_copy_of_files_in_network_share.yml @@ -32,7 +32,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Information Sabotage - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 30 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -41,7 +40,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1537/high_copy_files_in_net_share/security.log impact: 30 kill_chain_phases: - - Exfiltration + - Exploitation message: high frequency copy of document in network share $Share_Name$ from $Source_Address$ by $user$ mitre_attack_id: @@ -67,3 +66,4 @@ tags: - Source_Address risk_score: 9 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/high_process_termination_frequency.yml b/detections/endpoint/high_process_termination_frequency.yml index 7c46bf863c..2ab9945819 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/high_process_termination_frequency.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/high_process_termination_frequency.yml @@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Clop Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -59,3 +58,4 @@ tags: - ProcessID risk_score: 72 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/hunting_for_log4shell.yml b/detections/endpoint/hunting_for_log4shell.yml index 21de6d3f2e..0e494eaccd 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/hunting_for_log4shell.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/hunting_for_log4shell.yml @@ -74,10 +74,9 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 asset_type: Web Server - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - - Source:network + - Scope:Network cve: - CVE-2021-44228 dataset: @@ -96,11 +95,11 @@ tags: - name: http_method type: Other role: - - other + - Other - name: src type: Other role: - - other + - Other product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security diff --git a/detections/endpoint/icacls_deny_command.yml b/detections/endpoint/icacls_deny_command.yml index b83fcbeec1..8ff692f6cb 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/icacls_deny_command.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/icacls_deny_command.yml @@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - XMRig - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -67,3 +66,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/icacls_grant_command.yml b/detections/endpoint/icacls_grant_command.yml index c7d56e34d4..cbe31702f3 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/icacls_grant_command.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/icacls_grant_command.yml @@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - XMRig - Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -67,3 +66,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation.yml b/detections/endpoint/icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation.yml index 06a6670bcf..fe1ef7e880 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation.yml @@ -23,7 +23,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - IcedID - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 90 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -43,7 +42,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: SourceImage - type: process name + type: Process role: - Attacker product: @@ -59,3 +58,4 @@ tags: - Computer risk_score: 72 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters.yml b/detections/endpoint/impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters.yml index 0668bed541..6c612f9e3b 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters.yml @@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Lateral Movement - WhisperGate - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -48,7 +47,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.003/impacket/windows-sysmon.log impact: 90 kill_chain_phases: - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation message: Suspicious command line parameters on $dest may represent a lateral movement attack with Impackets tools mitre_attack_id: @@ -83,3 +82,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/interactive_session_on_remote_endpoint_with_powershell.yml b/detections/endpoint/interactive_session_on_remote_endpoint_with_powershell.yml index 4b6d58704f..fb3cf0b8b6 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/interactive_session_on_remote_endpoint_with_powershell.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/interactive_session_on_remote_endpoint_with_powershell.yml @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement_pssession/windows-powershell.log impact: 90 kill_chain_phases: - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation message: An interactive session was opened on a remote endpoint from $ComputerName mitre_attack_id: - T1021 @@ -55,3 +55,4 @@ tags: - User risk_score: 45 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.yml b/detections/endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.yml index 864c3d03fd..b419b77c99 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.yml @@ -25,10 +25,9 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 asset_type: Web Server - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - - Source:network + - Scope:Network cve: - CVE-2021-44228 dataset: @@ -48,7 +47,7 @@ tags: - name: http_user_agent type: Other role: - - other + - Other - name: http_method type: Other role: diff --git a/detections/endpoint/jscript_execution_using_cscript_app.yml b/detections/endpoint/jscript_execution_using_cscript_app.yml index ab7430fa8c..964c8a046b 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/jscript_execution_using_cscript_app.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/jscript_execution_using_cscript_app.yml @@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - FIN7 - Remcos - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -71,3 +70,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml b/detections/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml index c45d3d192b..d8be269db0 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml @@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ tags: - Windows Privilege Escalation - Active Directory Kerberos Attacks asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 - CIS 16 @@ -43,7 +42,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/rubeus/windows-security.log impact: 90 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation + - Exploitation message: Potential kerberoasting attack via service principal name requests detected on $dest$ mitre_attack_id: diff --git a/detections/endpoint/kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_in_useraccountcontrol.yml b/detections/endpoint/kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_in_useraccountcontrol.yml index 80d788cf75..3eb03ab69c 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_in_useraccountcontrol.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_in_useraccountcontrol.yml @@ -26,17 +26,17 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Kerberos Attacks + asset_type: endpoint confidence: 90 context: - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:PrivilegeEscalation + - Stage:Privilege Escalation - Stage:Persistence dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.004/powershell/windows-security.log impact: 50 kill_chain_phases: - - Intrusion - - Privilege Escalation + - Exploitation message: Kerberos Pre Authentication was Disabled for $Account_Name$ mitre_attack_id: - T1558 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_with_powershell.yml b/detections/endpoint/kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_with_powershell.yml index 9a62861439..d874ea67e3 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_with_powershell.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_with_powershell.yml @@ -30,17 +30,17 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Kerberos Attacks + asset_type: endpoint confidence: 90 context: - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:PrivilegeEscalation + - Stage:Privilege Escalation - Stage:Persistence dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.004/powershell/windows-powershell.log impact: 50 kill_chain_phases: - - Intrusion - - Privilege Escalation + - Exploitation message: Kerberos Pre Authentication was Disabled using PowerShell on $dest$ mitre_attack_id: - T1558 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/known_services_killed_by_ransomware.yml b/detections/endpoint/known_services_killed_by_ransomware.yml index fa8b448f0f..cf1a772082 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/known_services_killed_by_ransomware.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/known_services_killed_by_ransomware.yml @@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Ransomware - BlackMatter Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -61,3 +60,4 @@ tags: - Type risk_score: 72 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_add_files_in_known_crontab_directories.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_add_files_in_known_crontab_directories.yml index 37bbd7ea38..1313780fcd 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/linux_add_files_in_known_crontab_directories.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_add_files_in_known_crontab_directories.yml @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/cronjobs_entry/sysmon_linux.log impact: 50 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation + - Exploitation message: a file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$ mitre_attack_id: - T1053.003 @@ -70,3 +70,4 @@ tags: - Filesystem.file_path risk_score: 25 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_add_user_account.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_add_user_account.yml index a0c781c9f9..653e6b0560 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/linux_add_user_account.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_add_user_account.yml @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/linux_adduser/sysmon_linux.log impact: 50 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation + - Exploitation message: A commandline $process$ that may create user account on $dest$ mitre_attack_id: - T1136.001 @@ -70,3 +70,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 25 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_at_allow_config_file_creation.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_at_allow_config_file_creation.yml index 44c01c5905..12c13dfc3c 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/linux_at_allow_config_file_creation.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_at_allow_config_file_creation.yml @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.001/at_execution/sysmon_linux.log impact: 50 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation + - Exploitation message: A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$ mitre_attack_id: - T1053.003 @@ -69,3 +69,4 @@ tags: - Filesystem.file_path risk_score: 25 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_at_application_execution.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_at_application_execution.yml index 6558da85bd..34d7f80af6 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/linux_at_application_execution.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_at_application_execution.yml @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.001/at_execution/sysmon_linux.log impact: 30 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation + - Exploitation message: At application was executed in $dest$ mitre_attack_id: - T1053.001 @@ -72,3 +72,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 9 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_change_file_owner_to_root.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_change_file_owner_to_root.yml index bee64e143f..ea8315b0dc 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/linux_change_file_owner_to_root.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_change_file_owner_to_root.yml @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.001/chmod_uid/sysmon_linux.log impact: 80 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation + - Exploitation message: A commandline $process$ that may change ownership to root on $dest$ mitre_attack_id: - T1222.002 @@ -72,3 +72,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 64 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_common_process_for_elevation_control.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_common_process_for_elevation_control.yml index bf83c6c1ee..d8c011b22b 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/linux_common_process_for_elevation_control.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_common_process_for_elevation_control.yml @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.001/chmod_uid/sysmon_linux.log impact: 30 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation + - Exploitation message: A commandline $process$ with process $process_name$ on $dest$ mitre_attack_id: - T1548.001 @@ -79,3 +79,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 9 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_dd_file_overwrite.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_dd_file_overwrite.yml index 77ed4d3d15..cda83ffe62 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/linux_dd_file_overwrite.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_dd_file_overwrite.yml @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Data Destruction + asset_type: endpoint cis20: - CIS 3 - CIS 5 @@ -36,7 +37,6 @@ tags: confidence: 80 context: - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Impact dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/linux_dd_file_overwrite/sysmon_linux.log impact: 80 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_doas_conf_file_creation.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_doas_conf_file_creation.yml index 1a0d7dce2b..a4c824a395 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/linux_doas_conf_file_creation.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_doas_conf_file_creation.yml @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/doas/sysmon_linux.log impact: 70 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation + - Exploitation message: A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$ mitre_attack_id: - T1548.003 @@ -70,3 +70,4 @@ tags: - Filesystem.file_path risk_score: 49 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_doas_tool_execution.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_doas_tool_execution.yml index 0997182fa7..5935355a28 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/linux_doas_tool_execution.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_doas_tool_execution.yml @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/doas_exec/sysmon_linux.log impact: 70 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation + - Exploitation message: A doas $process_name$ with commandline $process$ was executed on $dest$ mitre_attack_id: - T1548.003 @@ -73,3 +73,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 49 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_edit_cron_table_parameter.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_edit_cron_table_parameter.yml index 17d993daf8..f57c71a39e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/linux_edit_cron_table_parameter.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_edit_cron_table_parameter.yml @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/crontab_edit_parameter/sysmon_linux.log impact: 30 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation + - Exploitation message: A possible crontab edit command $process$ executed on $dest$ mitre_attack_id: - T1053.003 @@ -70,3 +70,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 9 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_file_created_in_kernel_driver_directory.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_file_created_in_kernel_driver_directory.yml index c8e48e229c..b554277ada 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/linux_file_created_in_kernel_driver_directory.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_file_created_in_kernel_driver_directory.yml @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.006/loading_linux_kernel_module/sysmon_linux.log impact: 80 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation + - Exploitation message: A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$ mitre_attack_id: - T1547.006 @@ -71,3 +71,4 @@ tags: - Filesystem.file_path risk_score: 72 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_file_creation_in_init_boot_directory.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_file_creation_in_init_boot_directory.yml index 28b9fee84d..c315add12b 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/linux_file_creation_in_init_boot_directory.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_file_creation_in_init_boot_directory.yml @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.004/linux_init_profile/sysmon_linux.log impact: 70 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation + - Exploitation message: A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$ mitre_attack_id: - T1037.004 @@ -67,3 +67,4 @@ tags: - Filesystem.file_path risk_score: 49 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_file_creation_in_profile_directory.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_file_creation_in_profile_directory.yml index 7ad259ac67..37777e4835 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/linux_file_creation_in_profile_directory.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_file_creation_in_profile_directory.yml @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.004/linux_init_profile/sysmon_linux.log impact: 70 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation + - Exploitation message: A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$ mitre_attack_id: - T1546.004 @@ -69,3 +69,4 @@ tags: - Filesystem.file_path risk_score: 56 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_insert_kernel_module_using_insmod_utility.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_insert_kernel_module_using_insmod_utility.yml index 9efacdd220..65721a9a8b 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/linux_insert_kernel_module_using_insmod_utility.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_insert_kernel_module_using_insmod_utility.yml @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.006/loading_linux_kernel_module/sysmon_linux.log impact: 80 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation + - Exploitation message: A commandline $process$ that may install kernel module on $dest$ mitre_attack_id: - T1547.006 @@ -71,3 +71,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 64 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_install_kernel_module_using_modprobe_utility.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_install_kernel_module_using_modprobe_utility.yml index 9825cd8934..78b36b25c8 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/linux_install_kernel_module_using_modprobe_utility.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_install_kernel_module_using_modprobe_utility.yml @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.006/loading_linux_kernel_module/sysmon_linux.log impact: 80 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation + - Exploitation message: A commandline $process$ that may install kernel module on $dest$ mitre_attack_id: - T1547.006 @@ -72,3 +72,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 64 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell.yml index e3287580d3..2e91f5290d 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell.yml @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 + asset_type: Endpoint confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -51,7 +52,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_nopasswd_entry_in_sudoers_file.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_nopasswd_entry_in_sudoers_file.yml index f3c9be8b15..f08ab010fc 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/linux_nopasswd_entry_in_sudoers_file.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_nopasswd_entry_in_sudoers_file.yml @@ -40,13 +40,13 @@ tags: confidence: 80 context: - Source:Endpoint - - stage:Privilege Escalation + - Stage:Privilege Escalation - Stage:Persistence dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/nopasswd_sudoers/sysmon_linux.log impact: 80 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation + - Exploitation message: a commandline $process$ executed on $dest$ mitre_attack_id: - T1548.003 @@ -73,3 +73,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 64 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_pkexec_privilege_escalation.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_pkexec_privilege_escalation.yml index 5c4b713717..a5dda31e5a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/linux_pkexec_privilege_escalation.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_pkexec_privilege_escalation.yml @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -84,3 +84,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 56 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_access_or_modification_of_sshd_config_file.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_access_or_modification_of_sshd_config_file.yml index 22818a0ab6..a24fbd7d27 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_access_or_modification_of_sshd_config_file.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_access_or_modification_of_sshd_config_file.yml @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098.004/ssh_authorized_keys/sysmon_linux.log impact: 50 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation + - Exploitation message: a commandline $process$ executed on $dest$ mitre_attack_id: - T1098.004 @@ -72,3 +72,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 25 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_access_to_credential_files.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_access_to_credential_files.yml index 3b695cc0f6..bc09a91333 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_access_to_credential_files.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_access_to_credential_files.yml @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.008/copy_file_stdoutpipe/sysmon_linux.log impact: 50 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation + - Exploitation message: A commandline $process$ executed on $dest$ mitre_attack_id: - T1003.008 @@ -73,3 +73,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 25 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_access_to_sudoers_file.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_access_to_sudoers_file.yml index 4d287e68ca..619f311f49 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_access_to_sudoers_file.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_access_to_sudoers_file.yml @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.008/copy_file_stdoutpipe/sysmon_linux.log impact: 50 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation + - Exploitation message: A commandline $process$ executed on $dest$ mitre_attack_id: - T1548.003 @@ -71,3 +71,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 25 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file.yml index 4eb48d7d79..a23a4f5174 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file.yml @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.001/at_execution/sysmon_linux.log impact: 30 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation + - Exploitation message: A commandline $process$ that may modify at allow config file in $dest$ mitre_attack_id: - T1053.001 @@ -73,3 +73,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 9 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_append_command_to_profile_config_file.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_append_command_to_profile_config_file.yml index e3ec58909f..4e5abd35b3 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_append_command_to_profile_config_file.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_append_command_to_profile_config_file.yml @@ -40,13 +40,13 @@ tags: confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Privilege Escalation Persistence + - Stage:Privilege Escalation - Stage:Persistence dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.004/linux_init_profile/sysmon_linux.log impact: 70 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation + - Exploitation message: a commandline $process$ that may modify profile files in $dest$ mitre_attack_id: - T1546.004 @@ -73,3 +73,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 49 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file.yml index 4c56681b14..e01bc1e396 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file.yml @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/cronjobs_entry/sysmon_linux.log impact: 70 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation + - Exploitation message: A commandline $process$ that may modify cronjob file in $dest$ mitre_attack_id: - T1053.003 @@ -70,3 +70,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 49 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor.yml index 4866c6a3a8..4434c494fd 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor.yml @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/cronjobs_entry/sysmon_linux.log impact: 20 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation + - Exploitation message: A commandline $process$ that may modify cronjob file using editor in $dest$ mitre_attack_id: - T1053.003 @@ -70,3 +70,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 6 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_ssh_key_file_creation.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_ssh_key_file_creation.yml index 6945aed5fc..a373484bf5 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_ssh_key_file_creation.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_ssh_key_file_creation.yml @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098.004/ssh_authorized_keys/sysmon_linux.log impact: 60 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation + - Exploitation message: A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$ mitre_attack_id: - T1098.004 @@ -68,3 +68,4 @@ tags: - Filesystem.file_path risk_score: 36 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_preload_hijack_library_calls.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_preload_hijack_library_calls.yml index 97c79b0d14..5a4b04d0b0 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/linux_preload_hijack_library_calls.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_preload_hijack_library_calls.yml @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1574.006/lib_hijack/sysmon_linux.log impact: 80 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation + - Exploitation message: A commandline $process$ that may hijack library function on $dest$ mitre_attack_id: - T1574.006 @@ -70,3 +70,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 64 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_service_file_created_in_systemd_directory.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_service_file_created_in_systemd_directory.yml index 999fecc6a8..c4921a77dd 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/linux_service_file_created_in_systemd_directory.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_service_file_created_in_systemd_directory.yml @@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.006/service_systemd/sysmon_linux.log impact: 80 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation + - Exploitation message: A service file named as $file_path$ is created in systemd folder on $dest$ mitre_attack_id: - T1053.006 @@ -75,3 +75,4 @@ tags: - Filesystem.file_path risk_score: 64 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_service_restarted.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_service_restarted.yml index f8791b39ec..143a09119e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/linux_service_restarted.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_service_restarted.yml @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.006/service_systemd/sysmon_linux.log impact: 50 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation + - Exploitation message: A commandline $process$ that may create or start a service on $dest$ mitre_attack_id: - T1053.006 @@ -75,3 +75,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 25 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_service_started_or_enabled.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_service_started_or_enabled.yml index f49665180d..9929ea333a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/linux_service_started_or_enabled.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_service_started_or_enabled.yml @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.006/service_systemd/sysmon_linux.log impact: 60 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation + - Exploitation message: a commandline $process$ that may create or start a service on $dest mitre_attack_id: - T1053.006 @@ -75,3 +75,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 42 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_setuid_using_chmod_utility.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_setuid_using_chmod_utility.yml index 9c0993d9d1..20429f2a7e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/linux_setuid_using_chmod_utility.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_setuid_using_chmod_utility.yml @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.001/chmod_uid/sysmon_linux.log impact: 70 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation + - Exploitation message: a commandline $process$ that may set suid or sgid on $dest$ mitre_attack_id: - T1548.001 @@ -75,3 +75,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 49 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_setuid_using_setcap_utility.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_setuid_using_setcap_utility.yml index a9b84716e8..80401e0ebf 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/linux_setuid_using_setcap_utility.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_setuid_using_setcap_utility.yml @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.001/linux_setcap/sysmon_linux.log impact: 70 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation + - Exploitation message: A commandline $process$ that may set suid or sgid on $dest$ mitre_attack_id: - T1548.001 @@ -76,3 +76,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 49 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_sudo_or_su_execution.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_sudo_or_su_execution.yml index fb739d3abf..61c82dc61a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/linux_sudo_or_su_execution.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_sudo_or_su_execution.yml @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/sudo_su/sysmon_linux.log impact: 30 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation + - Exploitation message: A commandline $process$ that execute sudo or su in $dest$ mitre_attack_id: - T1548.003 @@ -73,3 +73,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 9 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_sudoers_tmp_file_creation.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_sudoers_tmp_file_creation.yml index 1df4b0d961..5dcbc7b13f 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/linux_sudoers_tmp_file_creation.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_sudoers_tmp_file_creation.yml @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/sudoers_temp/sysmon_linux.log impact: 80 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation + - Exploitation message: A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$ mitre_attack_id: - T1548.003 @@ -69,3 +69,4 @@ tags: - Filesystem.file_path risk_score: 72 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_system_network_discovery.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_system_network_discovery.yml index 11f21bf5ff..a6b4430ada 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/linux_system_network_discovery.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_system_network_discovery.yml @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Network Discovery + asset_type: endpoint cis20: - CIS 3 - CIS 5 @@ -37,7 +38,7 @@ tags: confidence: 30 context: - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Reconaissance + - Stage:Recon dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1016/atomic_red_team/linux_net_discovery/sysmon_linux.log impact: 30 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_visudo_utility_execution.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_visudo_utility_execution.yml index 4acdf38f55..f50aa10129 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/linux_visudo_utility_execution.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_visudo_utility_execution.yml @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/visudo/sysmon_linux.log impact: 40 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation + - Exploitation message: A commandline $process$ executed on $dest$ mitre_attack_id: - T1548.003 @@ -72,3 +72,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 16 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/loading_of_dynwrapx_module.yml b/detections/endpoint/loading_of_dynwrapx_module.yml index 8367b6300c..e0f0ca006b 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/loading_of_dynwrapx_module.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/loading_of_dynwrapx_module.yml @@ -37,7 +37,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Remcos - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -73,3 +72,4 @@ tags: - ProcessId risk_score: 80 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/local_account_discovery_with_net.yml b/detections/endpoint/local_account_discovery_with_net.yml index d2220dfca8..6adef0d862 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/local_account_discovery_with_net.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/local_account_discovery_with_net.yml @@ -52,3 +52,4 @@ tags: - _time risk_score: 15 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/local_account_discovery_with_wmic.yml b/detections/endpoint/local_account_discovery_with_wmic.yml index d2dd2876a8..5ba9c2ef5c 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/local_account_discovery_with_wmic.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/local_account_discovery_with_wmic.yml @@ -51,3 +51,4 @@ tags: - _time risk_score: 15 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/log4shell_cve_2021_44228_exploitation.yml b/detections/endpoint/log4shell_cve_2021_44228_exploitation.yml index 7a50e41a13..59e10dd5bc 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/log4shell_cve_2021_44228_exploitation.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/log4shell_cve_2021_44228_exploitation.yml @@ -40,19 +40,20 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 + asset_type: endpoint cis20: - CIS 3 - CIS 5 - CIS 16 confidence: 70 - context: null + context: + - Source:Endpoint dataset: - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/log4shell_exploitation/log4shell_correlation.txt impact: 90 kill_chain_phases: - Reconnaissance - Exploitation - - Lateral Movement message: Log4Shell Exploitation detected against $affected_systems$ mitre_attack_id: - T1105 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/logon_script_event_trigger_execution.yml b/detections/endpoint/logon_script_event_trigger_execution.yml index cce4592702..fb85e8052e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/logon_script_event_trigger_execution.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/logon_script_event_trigger_execution.yml @@ -28,11 +28,10 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Windows Persistence Techniques - Windows Privilege Escalation - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage:Privilege Escalation Persistence + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Privilege Escalation dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1037.001/logonscript_reg/sysmon.log impact: 80 @@ -48,7 +47,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: user - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: @@ -66,3 +65,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/mailsniper_invoke_functions.yml b/detections/endpoint/mailsniper_invoke_functions.yml index 028bb99c8b..30c12cc1ec 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/mailsniper_invoke_functions.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/mailsniper_invoke_functions.yml @@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Data Exfiltration - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -61,3 +60,4 @@ tags: - User risk_score: 72 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/malicious_inprocserver32_modification.yml b/detections/endpoint/malicious_inprocserver32_modification.yml index 21c9bc00db..4a6f2d0ce4 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/malicious_inprocserver32_modification.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/malicious_inprocserver32_modification.yml @@ -46,7 +46,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity - Remcos - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -84,3 +83,4 @@ tags: - user risk_score: 80 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_executed_as_a_service.yml b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_executed_as_a_service.yml index 391afadbf2..cb502cdbaa 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_executed_as_a_service.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_executed_as_a_service.yml @@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Malicious Powershell - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -35,7 +34,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1569.002/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log impact: 90 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation + - Exploitation message: Identifies the abuse the Windows SC.exe to execute malicious powerShell as a service $Service_File_Name$ by $user$ on $dest$ mitre_attack_id: @@ -65,3 +64,4 @@ tags: - user risk_score: 72 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml index 0b1bb8f3ea..af0fe2a81a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml @@ -44,7 +44,6 @@ tags: - NOBELIUM Group - WhisperGate asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 3 - CIS 7 @@ -59,7 +58,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1027/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log impact: 70 kill_chain_phases: - - Command and Control + - Command & Control - Actions on Objectives message: Powershell.exe running potentially malicious encodede commands on $dest$ mitre_attack_id: diff --git a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml index 23a31dc47e..a4c8ef2564 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml @@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ tags: - DHS Report TA18-074A - HAFNIUM Group asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 3 - CIS 7 @@ -45,7 +44,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/encoded_powershell/windows-sysmon.log impact: 70 kill_chain_phases: - - Command and Control + - Command & Control - Actions on Objectives message: PowerShell local execution policy bypass attempt on $dest$ mitre_attack_id: diff --git a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml index 1fa77cee67..12c606d91f 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml @@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Malicious PowerShell asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 3 - CIS 7 @@ -43,7 +42,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/obfuscated_powershell/windows-sysmon.log impact: 70 kill_chain_phases: - - Command and Control + - Command & Control - Actions on Objectives message: Powershell.exe running with potential obfuscated arguments on $dest$ mitre_attack_id: diff --git a/detections/endpoint/mimikatz_passtheticket_commandline_parameters.yml b/detections/endpoint/mimikatz_passtheticket_commandline_parameters.yml index bda911cd5a..b7bd73fc7f 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/mimikatz_passtheticket_commandline_parameters.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/mimikatz_passtheticket_commandline_parameters.yml @@ -30,15 +30,16 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Kerberos Attacks + asset_type: endpoint confidence: 60 context: - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:PrivilegeEscalation + - Stage:Privilege Escalation dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1550.003/mimikatz/windows-sysmon.log impact: 60 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation + - Exploitation message: Mimikatz command line parameters for pass the ticket attacks were used on $dest$ mitre_attack_id: @@ -54,7 +55,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process product: diff --git a/detections/endpoint/mmc_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.yml b/detections/endpoint/mmc_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.yml index aab3e5935e..e5099efcbf 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/mmc_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/mmc_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.yml @@ -41,7 +41,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Lateral Movement - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 60 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -50,7 +49,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.003/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-sysmon.log impact: 90 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation + - Exploitation message: Mmc.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest mitre_attack_id: - T1021 @@ -81,3 +80,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/modification_of_wallpaper.yml b/detections/endpoint/modification_of_wallpaper.yml index abbc9ace22..0366226092 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/modification_of_wallpaper.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/modification_of_wallpaper.yml @@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ tags: - Ransomware - Revil Ransomware - BlackMatter Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 90 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -62,3 +61,4 @@ tags: - user_id risk_score: 54 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/modify_acl_permission_to_files_or_folder.yml b/detections/endpoint/modify_acl_permission_to_files_or_folder.yml index 5f41d4c5c9..112716412e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/modify_acl_permission_to_files_or_folder.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/modify_acl_permission_to_files_or_folder.yml @@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - XMRig - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -64,3 +63,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml b/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml index d445f2249f..7886684076 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml @@ -38,7 +38,6 @@ tags: - Suspicious Windows Registry Activities - Windows Persistence Techniques asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 - CIS 5 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module.yml b/detections/endpoint/ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module.yml index 39ae4926de..aef0f2abc1 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module.yml @@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - FIN7 - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 30 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -64,3 +63,4 @@ tags: - ImageLoaded risk_score: 9 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module.yml b/detections/endpoint/ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module.yml index 369b9ee11e..9d2c2c28f0 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module.yml @@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - FIN7 - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 30 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -65,3 +64,4 @@ tags: - ImageLoaded risk_score: 9 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process.yml b/detections/endpoint/msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process.yml index 4880410409..3b9815d26f 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process.yml @@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Stage:Execution @@ -71,3 +70,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process.yml b/detections/endpoint/mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process.yml index 04b24fdeed..a398270bfe 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process.yml @@ -29,11 +29,10 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Trickbot - IcedID - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: executions + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Execution dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/spear_phish/windows-sysmon.log impact: 70 @@ -50,7 +49,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: user - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: @@ -74,3 +73,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/mshtml_module_load_in_office_product.yml b/detections/endpoint/mshtml_module_load_in_office_product.yml index bb9f98ed80..4a7bb55824 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/mshtml_module_load_in_office_product.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/mshtml_module_load_in_office_product.yml @@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Spearphishing Attachments - Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444 - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -51,7 +50,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -71,3 +70,4 @@ tags: - dest risk_score: 80 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/msi_module_loaded_by_non_system_binary.yml b/detections/endpoint/msi_module_loaded_by_non_system_binary.yml index a3dcc782ea..858f68a065 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/msi_module_loaded_by_non_system_binary.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/msi_module_loaded_by_non_system_binary.yml @@ -43,6 +43,8 @@ tags: context: - Source:Endpoint - Stage:Defense Evasion + cve: + - CVE-2021-41379 dataset: [] impact: 80 kill_chain_phases: @@ -53,16 +55,8 @@ tags: - T1574.002 - T1574 observable: - - name: Computer - type: Hostname - role: - - Victim - - name: ImageLoaded - type: Other - role: - - Other - name: process_name - type: Process + type: Process Name role: - Child Process product: @@ -77,5 +71,6 @@ tags: - Computer - EventCode - ProcessId - risk_score: 56 security_domain: endpoint + risk_score: 56 + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading.yml b/detections/endpoint/msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading.yml index c4f72a52aa..043e3410ed 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading.yml @@ -27,14 +27,22 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Ransomware - Revil Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed + context: + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Defense Evasion dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets//malware/revil/msmpeng_side/windows-sysmon.log kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation + message: '' mitre_attack_id: - T1574.002 - T1574 + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security @@ -49,3 +57,7 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25.0 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/multiple_disabled_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.yml b/detections/endpoint/multiple_disabled_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.yml index 7448859a68..3b69b3a954 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/multiple_disabled_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/multiple_disabled_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.yml @@ -77,3 +77,4 @@ tags: - Client_Address risk_score: 49 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.yml b/detections/endpoint/multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.yml index 135b96420c..3069cc3600 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.yml @@ -77,3 +77,4 @@ tags: - Client_Address risk_score: 49 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm.yml b/detections/endpoint/multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm.yml index 70aa1593b0..b196a5ac52 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm.yml @@ -48,7 +48,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Password Spraying - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -80,3 +79,4 @@ tags: - Source_Workstation risk_score: 49 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_attempting_to_authenticate_using_explicit_credentials.yml b/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_attempting_to_authenticate_using_explicit_credentials.yml index 84430a2b77..dbbb14ea1c 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_attempting_to_authenticate_using_explicit_credentials.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_attempting_to_authenticate_using_explicit_credentials.yml @@ -49,7 +49,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Password Spraying - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -81,3 +80,4 @@ tags: - ComputerName risk_score: 49 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.yml b/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.yml index 5ebf02b7cc..e1ca5aa8f3 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.yml @@ -77,3 +77,4 @@ tags: - Client_Address risk_score: 49 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm.yml b/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm.yml index 63f533b44f..392aa1aac1 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm.yml @@ -46,7 +46,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Password Spraying - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -78,3 +77,4 @@ tags: - Source_Workstation risk_score: 49 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_process.yml b/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_process.yml index 1496df5d6c..e706f75255 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_process.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_process.yml @@ -48,7 +48,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Password Spraying - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -82,3 +81,4 @@ tags: - ComputerName risk_score: 49 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_remotely_failing_to_authenticate_from_host.yml b/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_remotely_failing_to_authenticate_from_host.yml index 5b9049e85a..6d9f1cb1fa 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_remotely_failing_to_authenticate_from_host.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_remotely_failing_to_authenticate_from_host.yml @@ -47,7 +47,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Password Spraying - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -81,3 +80,4 @@ tags: - Source_Network_Address risk_score: 49 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/net_localgroup_discovery.yml b/detections/endpoint/net_localgroup_discovery.yml index ea47f2e0e7..2c0e134c87 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/net_localgroup_discovery.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/net_localgroup_discovery.yml @@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - Windows Discovery Techniques - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -72,3 +71,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 15 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/net_profiler_uac_bypass.yml b/detections/endpoint/net_profiler_uac_bypass.yml index cf677f99cd..72da2076d6 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/net_profiler_uac_bypass.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/net_profiler_uac_bypass.yml @@ -31,10 +31,10 @@ tags: confidence: 90 context: - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Persistence, + - Stage:Persistence - Stage:Privilege Escalation - Stage:Defense Evasion - - Scope:Incoming + - Scope:Inbound dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon2.log impact: 70 @@ -64,3 +64,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/network_connection_discovery_arp.yml b/detections/endpoint/network_connection_discovery_arp.yml index 7561ba6375..2402aa03ff 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/network_connection_discovery_arp.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/network_connection_discovery_arp.yml @@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -61,3 +60,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 15 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/network_connection_discovery_net.yml b/detections/endpoint/network_connection_discovery_net.yml index 6427083184..45a34f54d6 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/network_connection_discovery_net.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/network_connection_discovery_net.yml @@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -62,3 +61,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 15 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/network_connection_discovery_netstat.yml b/detections/endpoint/network_connection_discovery_netstat.yml index a699d24058..59fcabd767 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/network_connection_discovery_netstat.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/network_connection_discovery_netstat.yml @@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -62,3 +61,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 15 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/network_discovery_using_route_windows_app.yml b/detections/endpoint/network_discovery_using_route_windows_app.yml index 444db4a4f3..6815de87b5 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/network_discovery_using_route_windows_app.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/network_discovery_using_route_windows_app.yml @@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 30 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -64,3 +63,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 9 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/nishang_powershelltcponeline.yml b/detections/endpoint/nishang_powershelltcponeline.yml index e4858581cd..81d98127c6 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/nishang_powershelltcponeline.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/nishang_powershelltcponeline.yml @@ -33,12 +33,11 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - HAFNIUM Group - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 60 context: - Source:Endpoint - Stage:Execution - - Stage:Command and Control + - Stage:Command And Control dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log impact: 70 @@ -74,3 +73,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml b/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml index 0351a8b0cc..6fe704a81e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml @@ -37,7 +37,6 @@ tags: - IcedID - Active Directory Discovery asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 50 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir.yml b/detections/endpoint/non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir.yml index 3306d0a93d..89b066794c 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir.yml @@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - FIN7 - Remcos - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -69,3 +68,4 @@ tags: - user risk_score: 35 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir.yml b/detections/endpoint/non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir.yml index a0ab4f8f17..87d87b8111 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir.yml @@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - FIN7 - Remcos - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -69,3 +68,4 @@ tags: - user risk_score: 35 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.yml b/detections/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.yml index aa6664ba7e..94bc05d64a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.yml @@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ tags: - Credential Dumping - HAFNIUM Group asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 - CIS 16 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/office_application_drop_executable.yml b/detections/endpoint/office_application_drop_executable.yml index 25b2f1dfa7..ea59025eb4 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/office_application_drop_executable.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/office_application_drop_executable.yml @@ -36,11 +36,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - FIN7 - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:recon + - Stage:Recon dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_macro_js_1/sysmon.log impact: 80 @@ -56,7 +55,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: process_name - type: process name + type: Process role: - Attacker product: @@ -72,3 +71,4 @@ tags: - user_id risk_score: 64 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process.yml b/detections/endpoint/office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process.yml index 7cee8cbf6d..a9099039e9 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process.yml @@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - IcedID - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 90 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -69,3 +68,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/office_application_spawn_rundll32_process.yml b/detections/endpoint/office_application_spawn_rundll32_process.yml index 30f2fa1600..41028c03bb 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/office_application_spawn_rundll32_process.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/office_application_spawn_rundll32_process.yml @@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ tags: - Spearphishing Attachments - Trickbot - IcedID - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 90 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -70,3 +69,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/office_document_creating_schedule_task.yml b/detections/endpoint/office_document_creating_schedule_task.yml index e3455839fd..13636ffc50 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/office_document_creating_schedule_task.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/office_document_creating_schedule_task.yml @@ -35,7 +35,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Spearphishing Attachments - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -70,3 +69,4 @@ tags: - _time risk_score: 49 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/office_document_executing_macro_code.yml b/detections/endpoint/office_document_executing_macro_code.yml index 5d78357f23..83a6ebc88d 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/office_document_executing_macro_code.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/office_document_executing_macro_code.yml @@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ tags: - Spearphishing Attachments - Trickbot - IcedID - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -65,3 +64,4 @@ tags: - _time risk_score: 35 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/office_document_spawned_child_process_to_download.yml b/detections/endpoint/office_document_spawned_child_process_to_download.yml index f3d8d1fa01..3dde6f4156 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/office_document_spawned_child_process_to_download.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/office_document_spawned_child_process_to_download.yml @@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Spearphishing Attachments - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -69,3 +68,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawn_cmd_process.yml b/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawn_cmd_process.yml index 69de3a2862..61dce8802b 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawn_cmd_process.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawn_cmd_process.yml @@ -30,11 +30,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Trickbot - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: executions + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Execution dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/spear_phish/windows-sysmon.log impact: 70 @@ -51,7 +50,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: user - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: @@ -75,3 +74,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_bitsadmin.yml b/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_bitsadmin.yml index 094bebf61f..3c57516a33 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_bitsadmin.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_bitsadmin.yml @@ -35,11 +35,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Spearphishing Attachments - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 90 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: recon + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Recon dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_macros.log impact: 70 @@ -56,7 +55,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: process_name - type: process_name + type: Process role: - Attacker product: @@ -80,3 +79,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_certutil.yml b/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_certutil.yml index 0326a05e7a..daa22f2ea2 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_certutil.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_certutil.yml @@ -35,11 +35,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Spearphishing Attachments - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 90 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: recon + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Recon dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_macros.log impact: 70 @@ -56,7 +55,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: process_name - type: process_name + type: Process Name role: - Attacker product: @@ -80,3 +79,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_mshta.yml b/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_mshta.yml index 5c136fd5a4..94829d3064 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_mshta.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_mshta.yml @@ -35,11 +35,10 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Spearphishing Attachments - IcedID - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 90 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: recon + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Recon dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_macros.log impact: 70 @@ -56,7 +55,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: process_name - type: process_name + type: Process role: - Attacker product: @@ -80,3 +79,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll.yml b/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll.yml index d2a2ea1b65..f594c3f59d 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll.yml @@ -37,11 +37,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Spearphishing Attachments - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 90 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: recon + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Recon dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_icedid.log impact: 70 @@ -59,7 +58,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: process_name - type: process name + type: Process role: - Attacker product: @@ -83,3 +82,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_wmic.yml b/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_wmic.yml index cb49a67c41..9adedc663f 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_wmic.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_wmic.yml @@ -37,11 +37,10 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Spearphishing Attachments - FIN7 - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 90 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: recon + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Recon dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_macros.log impact: 70 @@ -58,7 +57,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: process_name - type: process_name + type: Process Name role: - Attacker product: @@ -82,3 +81,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/office_product_writing_cab_or_inf.yml b/detections/endpoint/office_product_writing_cab_or_inf.yml index 6df24c4ce8..1affe30763 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/office_product_writing_cab_or_inf.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/office_product_writing_cab_or_inf.yml @@ -36,7 +36,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Spearphishing Attachments - Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444 - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -76,3 +75,4 @@ tags: - file_path risk_score: 80 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/office_spawning_control.yml b/detections/endpoint/office_spawning_control.yml index 9a776be427..d566a598d1 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/office_spawning_control.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/office_spawning_control.yml @@ -37,7 +37,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Spearphishing Attachments - Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444 - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -60,7 +59,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -87,3 +86,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.yml b/detections/endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.yml index b22c450fe7..683af89e3c 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.yml @@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 60 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -71,3 +70,4 @@ tags: - Ports.dest_port risk_score: 54 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml b/detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml index 4c2b15a2e0..5d5fd2ce4c 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml @@ -29,13 +29,12 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Windows Privilege Escalation asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 90 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: privilege escalation + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Privilege Escalation dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.008/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log impact: 80 @@ -54,7 +53,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: file_path - type: file_path + type: File role: - Attacker product: diff --git a/detections/endpoint/password_policy_discovery_with_net.yml b/detections/endpoint/password_policy_discovery_with_net.yml index b78172fb96..bee655ff4f 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/password_policy_discovery_with_net.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/password_policy_discovery_with_net.yml @@ -27,11 +27,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 30 context: - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Reconnaissance + - Stage:Discovery dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-sysmon.log impact: 30 @@ -50,7 +49,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process product: @@ -69,3 +68,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_name risk_score: 9 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/permission_modification_using_takeown_app.yml b/detections/endpoint/permission_modification_using_takeown_app.yml index 0a4ff79263..d46e1139cc 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/permission_modification_using_takeown_app.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/permission_modification_using_takeown_app.yml @@ -26,11 +26,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Defense Evasion + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Defense Evasion dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log impact: 70 @@ -46,7 +45,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: process_name - type: process name + type: Process role: - Attacker product: @@ -67,3 +66,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/petitpotam_network_share_access_request.yml b/detections/endpoint/petitpotam_network_share_access_request.yml index aaccf8ea9b..07606edf7a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/petitpotam_network_share_access_request.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/petitpotam_network_share_access_request.yml @@ -34,7 +34,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -46,7 +45,6 @@ tags: impact: 80 kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation - - Lateral Movement message: A remote host is enumerating a $dest$ to identify permissions. This is a precursor event to CVE-2021-36942, PetitPotam. mitre_attack_id: @@ -70,3 +68,4 @@ tags: - Message risk_score: 56 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request.yml b/detections/endpoint/petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request.yml index 4a6b5beaa4..5041469a18 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request.yml @@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -40,7 +39,6 @@ tags: impact: 80 kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation - - Lateral Movement message: A Kerberos TGT was requested in a non-standard manner against $dest$, potentially related to CVE-2021-36942, PetitPotam. mitre_attack_id: @@ -63,3 +61,4 @@ tags: - Message risk_score: 56 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ping_sleep_batch_command.yml b/detections/endpoint/ping_sleep_batch_command.yml index f015fa1240..6f8737c3ea 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ping_sleep_batch_command.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ping_sleep_batch_command.yml @@ -81,3 +81,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/possible_browser_pass_view_parameter.yml b/detections/endpoint/possible_browser_pass_view_parameter.yml index 5b0b1d67e8..40bd8bea88 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/possible_browser_pass_view_parameter.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/possible_browser_pass_view_parameter.yml @@ -35,7 +35,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Remcos - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 40 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -77,3 +76,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 16 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn.yml b/detections/endpoint/possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn.yml index 6110ef0b52..542ded70c2 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn.yml @@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Lateral Movement - Malicious PowerShell - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -48,8 +47,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement_powershell/windows-sysmon.log impact: 90 kill_chain_phases: - - Lateral Movement - - Malicious PowerShell + - Exploitation message: A PowerShell process was spawned as a child process of typically abused processes on $dest$ mitre_attack_id: @@ -86,3 +84,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/potentially_malicious_code_on_commandline.yml b/detections/endpoint/potentially_malicious_code_on_commandline.yml index 0ca4d0c6fd..6fc710e4e6 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/potentially_malicious_code_on_commandline.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/potentially_malicious_code_on_commandline.yml @@ -41,8 +41,8 @@ tags: - Suspicious Command-Line Executions confidence: 20 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage:Execution + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Execution dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/malicious_cmd_line_samples/windows-sysmon.log impact: 60 @@ -77,3 +77,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/powershell_4104_hunting.yml b/detections/endpoint/powershell_4104_hunting.yml index ee4bb6d61a..21a467325e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/powershell_4104_hunting.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/powershell_4104_hunting.yml @@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -89,3 +89,4 @@ tags: - Message risk_score: 80 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/powershell___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml b/detections/endpoint/powershell___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml index c6cf21808e..80f8bd4fcf 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/powershell___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/powershell___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml @@ -41,7 +41,6 @@ tags: - HAFNIUM Group - Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 3 - CIS 7 @@ -57,7 +56,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/hidden_powershell/windows-sysmon.log impact: 90 kill_chain_phases: - - Command and Control + - Command & Control - Actions on Objectives message: PowerShell processes $process$ started with parameters to modify the execution policy of the run, run in a hidden window, and connect to the Internet on host diff --git a/detections/endpoint/powershell_creating_thread_mutex.yml b/detections/endpoint/powershell_creating_thread_mutex.yml index 0602742c85..844089242f 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/powershell_creating_thread_mutex.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/powershell_creating_thread_mutex.yml @@ -28,11 +28,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Malicious PowerShell - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Defense Evasion + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Defense Evasion dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log impact: 50 @@ -64,3 +63,4 @@ tags: - User risk_score: 40 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/powershell_disable_security_monitoring.yml b/detections/endpoint/powershell_disable_security_monitoring.yml index 5f8fcb73e6..3e74f365d1 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/powershell_disable_security_monitoring.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/powershell_disable_security_monitoring.yml @@ -29,14 +29,22 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Ransomware - Revil Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed + context: + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Defense Evasion dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/pwh_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation + message: '' mitre_attack_id: - T1562.001 - T1562 + observable: + - name: ComputerName + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security @@ -57,3 +65,7 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25.0 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/powershell_domain_enumeration.yml b/detections/endpoint/powershell_domain_enumeration.yml index 4021aed5c3..92d160863e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/powershell_domain_enumeration.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/powershell_domain_enumeration.yml @@ -33,11 +33,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Malicious PowerShell - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: recon + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Discovery dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log impact: 60 @@ -68,3 +67,4 @@ tags: - EventCode risk_score: 42 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature.yml b/detections/endpoint/powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature.yml index e75d2001d3..1df1ea5de7 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature.yml @@ -24,14 +24,22 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Malicious PowerShell - Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed + context: + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Defense Evasion dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-powershell.log kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation + message: Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature mitre_attack_id: - T1027 - T1027.005 + observable: + - name: User + type: User + role: + - Victim product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security @@ -43,3 +51,7 @@ tags: - ComputerName - User security_domain: endpoint + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/powershell_execute_com_object.yml b/detections/endpoint/powershell_execute_com_object.yml index 30626cd311..09503bf1d2 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/powershell_execute_com_object.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/powershell_execute_com_object.yml @@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Malicious PowerShell - Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -58,3 +57,4 @@ tags: - _time risk_score: 5 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/powershell_fileless_process_injection_via_getprocaddress.yml b/detections/endpoint/powershell_fileless_process_injection_via_getprocaddress.yml index 714cc5862c..58720e0384 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/powershell_fileless_process_injection_via_getprocaddress.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/powershell_fileless_process_injection_via_getprocaddress.yml @@ -36,11 +36,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Malicious PowerShell - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: recon + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Execution dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log impact: 60 @@ -74,3 +73,4 @@ tags: - EventCode risk_score: 48 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/powershell_fileless_script_contains_base64_encoded_content.yml b/detections/endpoint/powershell_fileless_script_contains_base64_encoded_content.yml index 9ebd2144a7..81bdaae05e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/powershell_fileless_script_contains_base64_encoded_content.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/powershell_fileless_script_contains_base64_encoded_content.yml @@ -35,17 +35,15 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Malicious PowerShell - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Defense Evasion + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Execution dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log impact: 70 kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation - - Privilege Escalation message: A suspicious powershell script contains base64 command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$ mitre_attack_id: @@ -74,3 +72,4 @@ tags: - EventCode risk_score: 56 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/powershell_get_localgroup_discovery.yml b/detections/endpoint/powershell_get_localgroup_discovery.yml index 85979673ad..a42ae6b319 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/powershell_get_localgroup_discovery.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/powershell_get_localgroup_discovery.yml @@ -27,12 +27,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint - Stage:Discovery - - Stage:Recon dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log impact: 30 @@ -70,3 +68,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 15 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_with_script_block_logging.yml b/detections/endpoint/powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_with_script_block_logging.yml index 44df06b235..332ca9476a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_with_script_block_logging.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_with_script_block_logging.yml @@ -35,12 +35,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint - Stage:Discovery - - Stage:Recon dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-powershell.log impact: 30 @@ -71,3 +69,4 @@ tags: - User risk_score: 15 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/powershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_system_reflection_assembly.yml b/detections/endpoint/powershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_system_reflection_assembly.yml index 09c32ff942..9ea29e759e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/powershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_system_reflection_assembly.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/powershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_system_reflection_assembly.yml @@ -37,11 +37,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Malicious PowerShell - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Defense Evasion + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Defense Evasion dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log impact: 70 @@ -74,3 +73,4 @@ tags: - EventCode risk_score: 56 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/powershell_processing_stream_of_data.yml b/detections/endpoint/powershell_processing_stream_of_data.yml index cb00089ad5..e76eb82127 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/powershell_processing_stream_of_data.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/powershell_processing_stream_of_data.yml @@ -28,11 +28,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Malicious PowerShell - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Defense Evasion + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Defense Evasion dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log impact: 50 @@ -66,3 +65,4 @@ tags: - Score risk_score: 40 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process.yml b/detections/endpoint/powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process.yml index bd27bcef1f..55fb743ab0 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process.yml @@ -27,12 +27,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Trickbot - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 90 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Defense Evasion - - Privilege Escalation + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Defense Evasion dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/infection/windows-sysmon.log impact: 70 @@ -48,7 +46,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: process_name - type: process name + type: Process role: - Attacker product: @@ -69,3 +67,4 @@ tags: - EventCode risk_score: 63 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/powershell_remove_windows_defender_directory.yml b/detections/endpoint/powershell_remove_windows_defender_directory.yml index edf5f27b62..272c081ed4 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/powershell_remove_windows_defender_directory.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/powershell_remove_windows_defender_directory.yml @@ -65,3 +65,4 @@ tags: - User risk_score: 90 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/powershell_start_bitstransfer.yml b/detections/endpoint/powershell_start_bitstransfer.yml index 41be205342..7d02b87096 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/powershell_start_bitstransfer.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/powershell_start_bitstransfer.yml @@ -33,12 +33,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - BITS Jobs - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Defense Evasion - - Persistence + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Defense Evasion dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1197/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log impact: 70 @@ -54,7 +52,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: user - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: @@ -78,3 +76,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store.yml b/detections/endpoint/powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store.yml index 34f285569d..9c00507116 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store.yml @@ -28,11 +28,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Malicious PowerShell - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Defense Evasion + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Defense Evasion dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log impact: 50 @@ -63,3 +62,4 @@ tags: - User risk_score: 40 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands.yml b/detections/endpoint/powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands.yml index 73b3d2921e..989300131b 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands.yml @@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ tags: - Remcos - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics - WhisperGate - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -65,3 +64,4 @@ tags: - User risk_score: 64 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/prevent_automatic_repair_mode_using_bcdedit.yml b/detections/endpoint/prevent_automatic_repair_mode_using_bcdedit.yml index 54aa65d39c..bc692cb9bb 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/prevent_automatic_repair_mode_using_bcdedit.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/prevent_automatic_repair_mode_using_bcdedit.yml @@ -27,11 +27,9 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Impact + - Source:Endpoint dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log impact: 70 @@ -47,7 +45,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: user - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: @@ -68,3 +66,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/print_spooler_adding_a_printer_driver.yml b/detections/endpoint/print_spooler_adding_a_printer_driver.yml index 37337cc0ef..fba2cdcbc3 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/print_spooler_adding_a_printer_driver.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/print_spooler_adding_a_printer_driver.yml @@ -34,14 +34,13 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527 - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 90 context: - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Persistence, + - Stage:Persistence - Stage:Privilege Escalation - Stage:Defense Evasion - - Scope:Incoming + - Scope:Inbound cve: - CVE-2021-34527 - CVE-2021-1675 @@ -71,3 +70,4 @@ tags: - Message risk_score: 72 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/print_spooler_failed_to_load_a_plug_in.yml b/detections/endpoint/print_spooler_failed_to_load_a_plug_in.yml index 9cce3bd372..6d4944b43d 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/print_spooler_failed_to_load_a_plug_in.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/print_spooler_failed_to_load_a_plug_in.yml @@ -36,10 +36,10 @@ tags: confidence: 90 context: - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Persistence, + - Stage:Persistence - Stage:Privilege Escalation - Stage:Defense Evasion - - Scope:Incoming + - Scope:Inbound cve: - CVE-2021-34527 - CVE-2021-1675 @@ -69,3 +69,4 @@ tags: - Message risk_score: 72 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml b/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml index 25799511ff..de054f6693 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml @@ -34,14 +34,13 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Spearphishing Attachments asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 7 - CIS 8 confidence: 90 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Initial Access + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Initial Access dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.002/lnk_file_temp_folder/windows-sysmon.log impact: 70 @@ -62,7 +61,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: user - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: diff --git a/detections/endpoint/process_deleting_its_process_file_path.yml b/detections/endpoint/process_deleting_its_process_file_path.yml index f507305b83..91963eddde 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/process_deleting_its_process_file_path.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/process_deleting_its_process_file_path.yml @@ -32,7 +32,6 @@ tags: - Clop Ransomware - Remcos - WhisperGate - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -72,3 +71,4 @@ tags: - _time risk_score: 60 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml b/detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml index faec4079dd..8634f9f9b7 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml @@ -27,14 +27,13 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious WMI Use asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 3 - CIS 5 confidence: 70 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Execution + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Execution dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log impact: 70 @@ -55,7 +54,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: user - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: diff --git a/detections/endpoint/process_kill_base_on_file_path.yml b/detections/endpoint/process_kill_base_on_file_path.yml index 335870e7f0..58c50c630c 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/process_kill_base_on_file_path.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/process_kill_base_on_file_path.yml @@ -27,11 +27,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - XMRig - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Defense Evasion + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Defense Evasion dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log impact: 70 @@ -48,7 +47,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: user - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: @@ -72,3 +71,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/process_writing_dynamicwrapperx.yml b/detections/endpoint/process_writing_dynamicwrapperx.yml index 569355761b..a13b85c831 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/process_writing_dynamicwrapperx.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/process_writing_dynamicwrapperx.yml @@ -43,7 +43,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Remcos - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -85,3 +84,4 @@ tags: - file_create_time user risk_score: 80 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml b/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml index f6ebe63ee3..49999e959f 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml @@ -33,13 +33,12 @@ tags: - Disabling Security Tools - DHS Report TA18-074A asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 70 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Defense Evasion + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Defense Evasion dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log impact: 60 @@ -59,7 +58,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: user - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ransomware_notes_bulk_creation.yml b/detections/endpoint/ransomware_notes_bulk_creation.yml index db1f7434ed..4beb9bbadd 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ransomware_notes_bulk_creation.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ransomware_notes_bulk_creation.yml @@ -29,16 +29,14 @@ tags: - Clop Ransomware - DarkSide Ransomware - BlackMatter Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 90 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Impact + - Source:Endpoint dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log impact: 90 kill_chain_phases: - - Obfuscation + - Exploitation message: A high frequency file creation of $file_name$ in different file path in host $Computer$ mitre_attack_id: @@ -49,7 +47,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: user - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: @@ -66,3 +64,4 @@ tags: - user risk_score: 81 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi.yml b/detections/endpoint/recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi.yml index edeb6c723b..3400ba0c25 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi.yml @@ -30,11 +30,10 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Ransomware - Malicious PowerShell - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Reconnaissance + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Discovery dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log impact: 70 @@ -65,3 +64,4 @@ tags: - User risk_score: 56 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/recon_using_wmi_class.yml b/detections/endpoint/recon_using_wmi_class.yml index 203a04acdb..e5cf058a7f 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/recon_using_wmi_class.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/recon_using_wmi_class.yml @@ -30,11 +30,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Malicious PowerShell - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Reconnaissance + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Discovery dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log impact: 75 @@ -65,3 +64,4 @@ tags: - User risk_score: 60 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd.yml b/detections/endpoint/recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd.yml index f05c0a88d0..45e58f02e7 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd.yml @@ -28,14 +28,21 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed + context: + - Source:Endpoint dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation + message: Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD mitre_attack_id: - T1070.004 - T1070 + observable: + - name: User + type: User + role: + - Victim product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security @@ -56,3 +63,7 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25.0 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml b/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml index dae747c94c..3c09425f7f 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml @@ -30,17 +30,14 @@ tags: - Windows Service Abuse - Windows Persistence Techniques asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 3 - CIS 5 - CIS 8 confidence: 60 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Persistence - - Privilege Escalation - - Defense Evasion + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Persistence dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1574.011/change_registry_path_service/windows-sysmon.log impact: 75 @@ -62,7 +59,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: user - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: diff --git a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml index 1c3534eb54..58c061d3d3 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml @@ -32,14 +32,12 @@ tags: - Suspicious Windows Registry Activities - Windows Persistence Techniques asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 80 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Privilege Escalation - - Persistence + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Privilege Escalation dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log impact: 70 @@ -59,7 +57,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: user - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: diff --git a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml index 6958389f31..70a0fd5f3a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml @@ -56,14 +56,12 @@ tags: - IcedID - Remcos asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 95 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Persistence - - Privilege Escalation + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Persistence dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/atomic_red_team/t1547001-runonce.log @@ -84,7 +82,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: user - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: diff --git a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml index ef863cb47b..a527c4723a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml @@ -39,14 +39,12 @@ tags: - Windows Privilege Escalation - Suspicious Windows Registry Activities - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 95 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Persistence - - Privilege Escalation + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Persistence dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.012/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log impact: 80 @@ -66,7 +64,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: user - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: @@ -81,3 +79,4 @@ tags: - Registry.user risk_score: 76 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading.yml b/detections/endpoint/regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading.yml index 013a7e4816..999e6539d5 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading.yml @@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -87,3 +87,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline.yml b/detections/endpoint/regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline.yml index 9a2eec50d2..30da9a9714 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline.yml @@ -35,7 +35,6 @@ tags: - IcedID - Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity - Remcos - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -60,7 +59,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -88,3 +87,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/remcos_client_registry_install_entry.yml b/detections/endpoint/remcos_client_registry_install_entry.yml index 17c83f11a9..c052b8dd1e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/remcos_client_registry_install_entry.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/remcos_client_registry_install_entry.yml @@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Remcos - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -63,3 +62,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/remcos_rat_file_creation_in_remcos_folder.yml b/detections/endpoint/remcos_rat_file_creation_in_remcos_folder.yml index 1184bd9ade..5a7db5ddf9 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/remcos_rat_file_creation_in_remcos_folder.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/remcos_rat_file_creation_in_remcos_folder.yml @@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Remcos - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -56,3 +55,4 @@ tags: - file_path risk_score: 100 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell.yml b/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell.yml index 4a7362585c..e647cb490a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell.yml @@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Lateral Movement - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -37,7 +36,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.003/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log impact: 90 kill_chain_phases: - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation message: A process was started on a remote endpoint from $dest by abusing DCOM using PowerShell.exe mitre_attack_id: @@ -69,3 +68,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_script_block.yml b/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_script_block.yml index 9bfba7f9c8..a6e0cefc9a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_script_block.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_script_block.yml @@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Lateral Movement - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -34,7 +33,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.003/lateral_movement/windows-powershell.log impact: 90 kill_chain_phases: - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation message: A process was started on a remote endpoint from $ComputerName by abusing WMI using PowerShell.exe mitre_attack_id: @@ -57,3 +56,4 @@ tags: - User risk_score: 63 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell.yml b/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell.yml index fff1f18412..424c47b579 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell.yml @@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Lateral Movement - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -38,7 +37,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement_psh/windows-sysmon.log impact: 90 kill_chain_phases: - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation message: A process was started on a remote endpoint from $dest by abusing WinRM using PowerShell.exe mitre_attack_id: @@ -70,3 +69,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_script_block.yml b/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_script_block.yml index e11ab6af7d..d4e8129d1c 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_script_block.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_script_block.yml @@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Lateral Movement - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -35,7 +34,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement_psh/windows-powershell.log impact: 90 kill_chain_phases: - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation message: A process was started on a remote endpoint from $ComputerName by abusing WinRM using PowerShell.exe mitre_attack_id: @@ -58,3 +57,4 @@ tags: - User risk_score: 45 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_winrs.yml b/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_winrs.yml index 2abcf01122..bea4af526d 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_winrs.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_winrs.yml @@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Lateral Movement - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 60 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -37,7 +36,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log impact: 90 kill_chain_phases: - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation message: A process was started on a remote endpoint from $dest mitre_attack_id: - T1021 @@ -68,3 +67,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml b/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml index 2f68f5492b..9bacd245c8 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml @@ -32,14 +32,13 @@ tags: - Suspicious WMI Use - Active Directory Lateral Movement asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 3 - CIS 5 confidence: 70 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Execution + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Execution dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log impact: 70 @@ -60,7 +59,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: user - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: diff --git a/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell.yml b/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell.yml index d9ff14079a..77554b636a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell.yml @@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Lateral Movement - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -37,7 +36,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log impact: 90 kill_chain_phases: - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation message: A process was started on a remote endpoint from $dest by abusing WMI using PowerShell.exe mitre_attack_id: @@ -68,3 +67,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_script_block.yml b/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_script_block.yml index 5d9f138111..f9cb59a258 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_script_block.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_script_block.yml @@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Lateral Movement - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -34,7 +33,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/lateral_movement/windows-powershell.log impact: 90 kill_chain_phases: - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation message: A process was started on a remote endpoint from $ComputerName by abusing WMI using PowerShell.exe mitre_attack_id: @@ -56,3 +55,4 @@ tags: - User risk_score: 63 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_adsisearcher.yml b/detections/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_adsisearcher.yml index bbfba4500d..83d645d3f1 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_adsisearcher.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_adsisearcher.yml @@ -23,7 +23,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -54,3 +53,4 @@ tags: - User risk_score: 15 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_dsquery.yml b/detections/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_dsquery.yml index 5d6a595a25..2335225b7c 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_dsquery.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_dsquery.yml @@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -64,3 +63,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 15 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_net.yml b/detections/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_net.yml index 34d963c52f..1378fa70b7 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_net.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_net.yml @@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -64,3 +63,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 15 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_wmic.yml b/detections/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_wmic.yml index 092c163d81..c9ca773e42 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_wmic.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_wmic.yml @@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -67,3 +66,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml b/detections/endpoint/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml index b88e03dead..7062469ad5 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml @@ -30,14 +30,13 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious WMI Use asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 3 - CIS 5 confidence: 60 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Execution + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Execution dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log impact: 60 @@ -58,7 +57,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: user - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: diff --git a/detections/endpoint/resize_shadowstorage_volume.yml b/detections/endpoint/resize_shadowstorage_volume.yml index ecbd7e4c63..e26140cd64 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/resize_shadowstorage_volume.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/resize_shadowstorage_volume.yml @@ -36,11 +36,9 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Clop Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 90 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Impact + - Source:Endpoint dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log impact: 80 @@ -56,7 +54,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: user - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: @@ -75,3 +73,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/revil_common_exec_parameter.yml b/detections/endpoint/revil_common_exec_parameter.yml index b48aa0033c..bfcca758dc 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/revil_common_exec_parameter.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/revil_common_exec_parameter.yml @@ -28,11 +28,10 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Ransomware - Revil Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 90 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Execution + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Execution dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-sysmon.log impact: 60 @@ -48,7 +47,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: user - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: @@ -69,3 +68,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/revil_registry_entry.yml b/detections/endpoint/revil_registry_entry.yml index d24975ae03..45755853a7 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/revil_registry_entry.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/revil_registry_entry.yml @@ -35,11 +35,10 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Ransomware - Revil Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Defense Evasion + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Defense Evasion dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-sysmon.log impact: 60 @@ -55,7 +54,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: user - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: @@ -73,3 +72,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/rubeus_command_line_parameters.yml b/detections/endpoint/rubeus_command_line_parameters.yml index d73d45add5..688532300a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/rubeus_command_line_parameters.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/rubeus_command_line_parameters.yml @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Kerberos Attacks + asset_type: Endpoint confidence: 60 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -47,7 +48,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1550.003/rubeus/windows-sysmon.log impact: 60 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation + - Exploitation message: Rubeus command line parameters were used on $dest$ mitre_attack_id: - T1550 @@ -65,7 +66,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process product: diff --git a/detections/endpoint/rubeus_kerberos_ticket_exports_through_winlogon_access.yml b/detections/endpoint/rubeus_kerberos_ticket_exports_through_winlogon_access.yml index 3558058c97..ce3cf7ae65 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/rubeus_kerberos_ticket_exports_through_winlogon_access.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/rubeus_kerberos_ticket_exports_through_winlogon_access.yml @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Kerberos Attacks + asset_type: Endpoint confidence: 60 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -44,8 +45,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1550.003/rubeus/windows-sysmon.log impact: 60 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation message: Winlogon.exe was accessed by $SourceImage$ on $dest$ mitre_attack_id: - T1550 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/runas_execution_in_commandline.yml b/detections/endpoint/runas_execution_in_commandline.yml index d7fefc7c3e..5dfbcc9a56 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/runas_execution_in_commandline.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/runas_execution_in_commandline.yml @@ -31,16 +31,15 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Windows Privilege Escalation - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint - - stage:Privilege Escalation + - Stage:Privilege Escalation dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/vilsel/sysmon.log impact: 50 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation + - Exploitation message: elevated process using runas on $dest$ by $user$ mitre_attack_id: - T1134 @@ -66,3 +65,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 25 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/rundll32_control_rundll_hunt.yml b/detections/endpoint/rundll32_control_rundll_hunt.yml index 3e2e0dfb3b..301e52d8c1 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/rundll32_control_rundll_hunt.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/rundll32_control_rundll_hunt.yml @@ -37,7 +37,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Rundll32 Activity - Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444 - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -64,7 +63,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -89,3 +88,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 15 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory.yml b/detections/endpoint/rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory.yml index e22be31c8a..6133119d42 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory.yml @@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Rundll32 Activity - Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444 - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -66,7 +65,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -93,3 +92,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process.yml b/detections/endpoint/rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process.yml index aef668eded..03402fae13 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process.yml @@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - IcedID - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -44,7 +43,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: SourceImage - type: process name + type: Process role: - Attacker product: @@ -62,3 +61,4 @@ tags: - Computer risk_score: 56 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser.yml b/detections/endpoint/rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser.yml index 5c16b5d6d6..5c8e55f1e0 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser.yml @@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - IcedID - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -45,7 +44,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: SourceImage - type: process name + type: Process role: - Attacker product: @@ -63,3 +62,4 @@ tags: - Computer risk_score: 70 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/rundll32_dnsquery.yml b/detections/endpoint/rundll32_dnsquery.yml index cfb2f9d846..2efa8e3421 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/rundll32_dnsquery.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/rundll32_dnsquery.yml @@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - IcedID - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -45,7 +44,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: process_name - type: process name + type: Process role: - Attacker product: @@ -61,3 +60,4 @@ tags: - Computer risk_score: 56 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files.yml b/detections/endpoint/rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files.yml index b23c0499f3..b8de34301c 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files.yml @@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - IcedID - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -44,7 +43,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: process_name - type: process name + type: Process role: - Attacker product: @@ -60,3 +59,4 @@ tags: - user_id risk_score: 80 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/rundll32_shimcache_flush.yml b/detections/endpoint/rundll32_shimcache_flush.yml index 845bd66115..de7b6dd5fd 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/rundll32_shimcache_flush.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/rundll32_shimcache_flush.yml @@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Unusual Processes - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - Stage:Execution @@ -71,3 +70,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.yml b/detections/endpoint/rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.yml index 632a790430..f0c38c6b49 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.yml @@ -41,11 +41,10 @@ tags: - Suspicious Rundll32 Activity - Cobalt Strike - PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527 - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Defense Evasion + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Defense Evasion cve: - CVE-2021-34527 dataset: @@ -64,7 +63,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: process_name - type: processname + type: Process Name role: - Attacker product: @@ -88,3 +87,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml b/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml index 39ea9b205b..94189a0b29 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml @@ -34,13 +34,12 @@ tags: - Unusual Processes - Suspicious Rundll32 Activity asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 70 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Defense Evasion + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Defense Evasion dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/ordinal_windows-sysmon.log impact: 70 @@ -60,7 +59,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: user - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml b/detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml index 0ac5fe69ae..dd311918ac 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml @@ -22,13 +22,11 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Ryuk Ransomware asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 100 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Impact + - Source:Endpoint dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ryuk/windows-sysmon.log impact: 70 @@ -46,7 +44,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: user - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ryuk_wake_on_lan_command.yml b/detections/endpoint/ryuk_wake_on_lan_command.yml index 684c485717..6b94183a53 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ryuk_wake_on_lan_command.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ryuk_wake_on_lan_command.yml @@ -32,17 +32,15 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Ryuk Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 90 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Execution + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Execution dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/ryuk/windows-sysmon.log impact: 70 kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation - - Lateral Movement message: A process $process_name$ with wake on LAN commandline $process$ in host $dest$ mitre_attack_id: @@ -54,7 +52,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: user - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: @@ -75,3 +73,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/sam_database_file_access_attempt.yml b/detections/endpoint/sam_database_file_access_attempt.yml index c53d34754b..462b142ce7 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/sam_database_file_access_attempt.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/sam_database_file_access_attempt.yml @@ -74,3 +74,4 @@ tags: - user risk_score: 80 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml b/detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml index 17516b0b39..24dd20c7a5 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml @@ -23,13 +23,11 @@ tags: analytic_story: - SamSam Ransomware asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 20 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Impact + - Source:Endpoint dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1486/sam_sam_note/windows-sysmon.log impact: 60 @@ -47,7 +45,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: user - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: diff --git a/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml b/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml index daec04b402..4889e6fdc1 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml @@ -30,16 +30,14 @@ tags: - Disabling Security Tools - NOBELIUM Group asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 3 - CIS 5 - CIS 8 confidence: 80 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Persistence - - Privilege Escalation + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Persistence dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log impact: 70 @@ -62,7 +60,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: user - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: diff --git a/detections/endpoint/schcache_change_by_app_connect_and_create_adsi_object.yml b/detections/endpoint/schcache_change_by_app_connect_and_create_adsi_object.yml index d627f66d3c..531136ca45 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/schcache_change_by_app_connect_and_create_adsi_object.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/schcache_change_by_app_connect_and_create_adsi_object.yml @@ -32,7 +32,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - blackMatter ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -65,3 +64,4 @@ tags: - Computer risk_score: 25 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/schedule_task_with_http_command_arguments.yml b/detections/endpoint/schedule_task_with_http_command_arguments.yml index 955ca654b2..19c3c2a53f 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/schedule_task_with_http_command_arguments.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/schedule_task_with_http_command_arguments.yml @@ -33,13 +33,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Windows Persistence Techniques - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 90 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Execution - - Persistence - - Privilege Escalation + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Execution dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/tasksched/windows-security.log impact: 70 @@ -54,10 +51,6 @@ tags: type: Hostname role: - Victim - - name: Arguments - type: Arguments - role: - - Attacker product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security @@ -73,3 +66,4 @@ tags: - Arguments risk_score: 63 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger.yml b/detections/endpoint/schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger.yml index 9e00f1bc79..55f860d8d1 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger.yml @@ -36,11 +36,10 @@ tags: - Windows Persistence Techniques - Trickbot - IcedID - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Defense Evasion + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Defense Evasion dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/tasksched/windows-security.log impact: 70 @@ -55,10 +54,6 @@ tags: type: Hostname role: - Victim - - name: Arguments - type: Arguments - role: - - Attacker product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security @@ -74,3 +69,4 @@ tags: - Arguments risk_score: 70 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_creation_on_remote_endpoint_using_at.yml b/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_creation_on_remote_endpoint_using_at.yml index 1a20a684f4..b9ad8ac491 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_creation_on_remote_endpoint_using_at.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_creation_on_remote_endpoint_using_at.yml @@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Lateral Movement - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 60 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -39,7 +38,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.002/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log impact: 90 kill_chain_phases: - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation message: A Windows Scheduled Task was created on a remote endpoint from $dest mitre_attack_id: - T1053 @@ -70,3 +69,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml b/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml index 72b31f9060..30376311ea 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml @@ -31,15 +31,12 @@ tags: - NOBELIUM Group - Windows Persistence Techniques asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 3 confidence: 80 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Execution - - Persistence - - Privilege Escalation + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Execution dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log impact: 70 @@ -58,7 +55,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: user - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: diff --git a/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_initiation_on_remote_endpoint.yml b/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_initiation_on_remote_endpoint.yml index 8860f35c80..a4a9213035 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_initiation_on_remote_endpoint.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_initiation_on_remote_endpoint.yml @@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Lateral Movement - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 60 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -36,7 +35,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log impact: 90 kill_chain_phases: - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation message: A Windows Scheduled Task was ran on a remote endpoint from $dest mitre_attack_id: - T1053 @@ -67,3 +66,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/schtasks_run_task_on_demand.yml b/detections/endpoint/schtasks_run_task_on_demand.yml index 263758ac10..f9eadac1ff 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/schtasks_run_task_on_demand.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/schtasks_run_task_on_demand.yml @@ -27,13 +27,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - XMRig - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Execution - - Persistence - - Privilege Escalation + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Execution dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log impact: 60 @@ -49,7 +46,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: user - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: @@ -68,3 +65,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml b/detections/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml index a7d455035f..8542db811c 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml @@ -30,15 +30,12 @@ tags: - Active Directory Lateral Movement - NOBELIUM Group asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 3 confidence: 90 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Execution - - Persistence - - Privilege Escalation + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Execution dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log impact: 70 @@ -57,7 +54,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: Processes.user - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: diff --git a/detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml b/detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml index 053b428c8e..881eff32ed 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml @@ -27,15 +27,12 @@ tags: - Windows Persistence Techniques - Ransomware asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 3 confidence: 80 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Execution - - Persistence - - Privilege Escalation + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Execution dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/schtask_shutdown/windows-sysmon.log impact: 70 @@ -54,7 +51,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: user - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: diff --git a/detections/endpoint/screensaver_event_trigger_execution.yml b/detections/endpoint/screensaver_event_trigger_execution.yml index 003016f8c8..4a3425a896 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/screensaver_event_trigger_execution.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/screensaver_event_trigger_execution.yml @@ -31,11 +31,10 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Windows Persistence Techniques - Windows Privilege Escalation - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 90 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage:Privilege Escalation Persistence + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Privilege Escalation dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.002/scrnsave_reg/sysmon.log impact: 80 @@ -51,7 +50,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: user - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: @@ -69,3 +68,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml b/detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml index ac87865b4c..fb32647074 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml @@ -24,14 +24,13 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious WMI Use asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 3 - CIS 5 confidence: 60 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Execution + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Execution dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/execution_scrcons/windows-sysmon.log impact: 60 @@ -51,7 +50,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: user - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: diff --git a/detections/endpoint/sdclt_uac_bypass.yml b/detections/endpoint/sdclt_uac_bypass.yml index cf395a7332..ad8e6ebcfd 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/sdclt_uac_bypass.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/sdclt_uac_bypass.yml @@ -40,10 +40,10 @@ tags: confidence: 90 context: - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Persistence, + - Stage:Persistence - Stage:Privilege Escalation - Stage:Defense Evasion - - Scope:Incoming + - Scope:Inbound dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon.log impact: 70 @@ -73,3 +73,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/sdelete_application_execution.yml b/detections/endpoint/sdelete_application_execution.yml index 8b57213736..f71fc0fd92 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/sdelete_application_execution.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/sdelete_application_execution.yml @@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Masquerading - Rename System Utilities - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -75,3 +74,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/searchprotocolhost_with_no_command_line_with_network.yml b/detections/endpoint/searchprotocolhost_with_no_command_line_with_network.yml index 54f3073620..2ac0c1b075 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/searchprotocolhost_with_no_command_line_with_network.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/searchprotocolhost_with_no_command_line_with_network.yml @@ -32,12 +32,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Cobalt Strike - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Defense Evasion - - Privilege Escalation + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Defense Evasion dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon_searchprotocolhost.log impact: 70 @@ -53,7 +51,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: process_name - type: processname + type: Process Name role: - Attacker product: @@ -69,3 +67,4 @@ tags: - process_path risk_score: 70 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/secretdumps_offline_ntds_dumping_tool.yml b/detections/endpoint/secretdumps_offline_ntds_dumping_tool.yml index 9a46d7b579..bc8205a3d2 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/secretdumps_offline_ntds_dumping_tool.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/secretdumps_offline_ntds_dumping_tool.yml @@ -28,11 +28,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Credential Dumping - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Credential Access + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Credential Access dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/casper/datasets1/windows-sysmon.log impact: 80 @@ -49,7 +48,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: user - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: @@ -70,3 +69,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell.yml b/detections/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell.yml index 63098b3965..e928600d1e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell.yml @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/atomic_red_team/windows-powershell_kerberos.log impact: 80 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation + - Exploitation message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to identify service principle names. mitre_attack_id: @@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -99,3 +99,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 80 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn.yml b/detections/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn.yml index 8e3be8fa03..895d40e049 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn.yml @@ -66,8 +66,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_setspn.log impact: 80 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation - - Active Directory Kerberos Attacks + - Exploitation message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to identify service principle names. mitre_attack_id: @@ -82,7 +81,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -110,3 +109,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/services_escalate_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/services_escalate_exe.yml index f1f7aa5fe7..c92a1c97ba 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/services_escalate_exe.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/services_escalate_exe.yml @@ -35,18 +35,15 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Cobalt Strike - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 95 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Privilege Escalation - - Defense Evasion + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Privilege Escalation dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log impact: 80 kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation - - Privilege Escalation message: A service process $parent_process_name$ with process path $process_path$ in host $dest$ mitre_attack_id: @@ -57,7 +54,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: Processes.user - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: @@ -77,3 +74,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/services_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.yml b/detections/endpoint/services_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.yml index 7e4b21420b..f9c6f7dee5 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/services_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/services_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.yml @@ -41,7 +41,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Lateral Movement - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 60 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -50,7 +49,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-sysmon.log impact: 90 kill_chain_phases: - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation message: Services.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest mitre_attack_id: - T1543 @@ -81,3 +80,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml b/detections/endpoint/set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml index abb769c084..e0151424a3 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml @@ -29,14 +29,13 @@ tags: - Credential Dumping - HAFNIUM Group asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 3 - CIS 8 confidence: 80 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Execution + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Execution dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_execution_policy/windows-sysmon.log impact: 60 @@ -56,9 +55,9 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: registry_path - type: RegistryPath + type: Unknown role: - - Others + - Other product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security diff --git a/detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml b/detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml index a29923fe90..092eee4b9d 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml @@ -27,14 +27,12 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Windows Persistence Techniques asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 80 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Privilege Escalation - - Persistence + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Privilege Escalation dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log impact: 70 @@ -52,9 +50,9 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: file_path - type: file path + type: File role: - - Others + - Other product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security diff --git a/detections/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml b/detections/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml index d8ac0829e0..395670cb4d 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml @@ -27,14 +27,12 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Windows Persistence Techniques asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 90 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Privilege Escalation - - Persistence + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Privilege Escalation dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log impact: 70 @@ -53,7 +51,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: user - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: diff --git a/detections/endpoint/short_lived_scheduled_task.yml b/detections/endpoint/short_lived_scheduled_task.yml index 260ed20cce..4ac14b69ff 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/short_lived_scheduled_task.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/short_lived_scheduled_task.yml @@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Lateral Movement - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 90 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -38,7 +37,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/lateral_movement/windows-security.log impact: 90 kill_chain_phases: - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation message: A windows scheduled task was created and deleted in 30 seconds on $ComputerName$ mitre_attack_id: - T1053.005 @@ -47,10 +46,6 @@ tags: type: Endpoint role: - Victim - - name: Command - type: Command - role: - - Target product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security @@ -65,3 +60,4 @@ tags: - Command risk_score: 81 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml b/detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml index 41eaafaaab..a52c01ec32 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml @@ -25,13 +25,12 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Account Monitoring and Controls asset_type: Windows - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 16 confidence: 90 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Persistence + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Persistence dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log @@ -49,7 +48,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: user - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: @@ -63,3 +62,5 @@ tags: - All_Changes.dest risk_score: 63 security_domain: access + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation diff --git a/detections/endpoint/silentcleanup_uac_bypass.yml b/detections/endpoint/silentcleanup_uac_bypass.yml index c1a9885737..d648842916 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/silentcleanup_uac_bypass.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/silentcleanup_uac_bypass.yml @@ -38,10 +38,9 @@ tags: confidence: 90 context: - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Persistence, + - Stage:Persistence - Stage:Privilege Escalation - Stage:Defense Evasion - - Scope:Incoming dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon.log impact: 70 @@ -71,3 +70,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml b/detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml index 2d4277a1f6..04c53164c3 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml @@ -26,13 +26,12 @@ tags: analytic_story: - DHS Report TA18-074A asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 2 confidence: 90 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Execution + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Execution dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1204.002/single_letter_exe/windows-sysmon.log impact: 70 @@ -51,7 +50,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: user - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: diff --git a/detections/endpoint/slui_runas_elevated.yml b/detections/endpoint/slui_runas_elevated.yml index fce44aa6e2..4dbc34bea1 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/slui_runas_elevated.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/slui_runas_elevated.yml @@ -33,11 +33,10 @@ tags: analytic_story: - DarkSide Ransomware - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 90 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Privilege Escalation + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Privilege Escalation dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/slui/windows-sysmon.log impact: 70 @@ -74,3 +73,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/slui_spawning_a_process.yml b/detections/endpoint/slui_spawning_a_process.yml index 0fa2eac2c0..3215584ac4 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/slui_spawning_a_process.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/slui_spawning_a_process.yml @@ -31,11 +31,10 @@ tags: analytic_story: - DarkSide Ransomware - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 90 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Privilege Escalation + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Privilege Escalation dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/slui/windows-sysmon.log impact: 70 @@ -52,7 +51,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: user - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: @@ -72,3 +71,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/spoolsv_spawning_rundll32.yml b/detections/endpoint/spoolsv_spawning_rundll32.yml index 8f7e3d5acc..5b326fbfa3 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/spoolsv_spawning_rundll32.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/spoolsv_spawning_rundll32.yml @@ -32,7 +32,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527 - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 90 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -86,3 +85,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules.yml b/detections/endpoint/spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules.yml index 216dd6aa45..846127e4b0 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules.yml @@ -23,7 +23,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527 - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 90 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -68,3 +67,4 @@ tags: - ImageLoaded risk_score: 72 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/spoolsv_suspicious_process_access.yml b/detections/endpoint/spoolsv_suspicious_process_access.yml index ba666c3153..121e22215b 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/spoolsv_suspicious_process_access.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/spoolsv_suspicious_process_access.yml @@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527 - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 90 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -73,3 +72,4 @@ tags: - EventCode risk_score: 72 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/spoolsv_writing_a_dll.yml b/detections/endpoint/spoolsv_writing_a_dll.yml index f296a79eee..8c5aebff2d 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/spoolsv_writing_a_dll.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/spoolsv_writing_a_dll.yml @@ -34,7 +34,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527 - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 90 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -60,7 +59,7 @@ tags: - name: process_id type: Process role: - - Process + - Child Process - name: file_path type: File role: @@ -83,3 +82,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/spoolsv_writing_a_dll___sysmon.yml b/detections/endpoint/spoolsv_writing_a_dll___sysmon.yml index 51bddc63a6..c725e2030e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/spoolsv_writing_a_dll___sysmon.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/spoolsv_writing_a_dll___sysmon.yml @@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527 - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 90 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -56,7 +55,7 @@ tags: - name: process_id type: Process role: - - Process + - Child Process - name: file_path type: File role: @@ -75,3 +74,4 @@ tags: - TargetFilename risk_score: 72 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/sqlite_module_in_temp_folder.yml b/detections/endpoint/sqlite_module_in_temp_folder.yml index 4bb923bf27..7611e81ac0 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/sqlite_module_in_temp_folder.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/sqlite_module_in_temp_folder.yml @@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - IcedID - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 30 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -44,7 +43,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: SourceImage - type: process name + type: Process role: - Attacker product: @@ -60,3 +59,4 @@ tags: - Image risk_score: 9 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___anomalous_usage_of_archive_tools.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___anomalous_usage_of_archive_tools.yml index 5b075f2a2a..a2158e2e05 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___anomalous_usage_of_archive_tools.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___anomalous_usage_of_archive_tools.yml @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1560.001/archive_tools/windows-security.log impact: 70 kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objective + - Exploitation message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior is indicative of suspicious loading of 7zip. @@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -80,3 +80,4 @@ tags: risk_score: 42 risk_severity: medium security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempt_to_delete_services.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempt_to_delete_services.yml index 7418274594..8ab76ee384 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempt_to_delete_services.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempt_to_delete_services.yml @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -89,3 +89,4 @@ tags: risk_score: 36 risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempt_to_disable_services.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempt_to_disable_services.yml index 3660e44937..1d6dba8f7d 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempt_to_disable_services.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempt_to_disable_services.yml @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -88,3 +88,4 @@ tags: risk_score: 36 risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml index 05b0c6277c..97e04f934b 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml @@ -41,7 +41,6 @@ tags: - CIS 16 confidence: 90 context: - - Source:AD - Source:Endpoint - Stage:Credential Access impact: 70 @@ -64,7 +63,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: process_name - type: process + type: Process role: - Child Process product: diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml index 2284481ef6..144bc6c4a1 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml @@ -37,7 +37,6 @@ tags: confidence: 80 context: - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Impact dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-security_bcdedit_wbadmin.log impact: 100 @@ -60,7 +59,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -81,3 +80,4 @@ tags: risk_score: 80 risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app.yml index 741de4fbae..f128b22ce0 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app.yml @@ -38,7 +38,6 @@ tags: confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Impact dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.004/cipher/security.log impact: 90 @@ -63,7 +62,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -87,3 +86,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 90 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___delete_a_net_user.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___delete_a_net_user.yml index 6420315de8..6f3ac84444 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___delete_a_net_user.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___delete_a_net_user.yml @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ tags: confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint - - stage:Defense Evasion + - Stage:Defense Evasion dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/ssa_data1/net_user_del.log - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1531/atomic_red_team/security.log @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -88,3 +88,4 @@ tags: risk_score: 49 risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___deny_permission_using_cacls_utility.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___deny_permission_using_cacls_utility.yml index 4c295c9ac6..f2ee2b55d6 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___deny_permission_using_cacls_utility.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___deny_permission_using_cacls_utility.yml @@ -38,8 +38,8 @@ tags: - CIS 16 confidence: 70 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Defense Evasion + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Defense Evasion dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1222.001/ssa_cacls/all_icalc.log impact: 50 @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: dest_user_id - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: @@ -75,3 +75,4 @@ tags: risk_score: 35 risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_rclone_command_line_usage.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_rclone_command_line_usage.yml index b07427d0d3..fb2d973337 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_rclone_command_line_usage.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___detect_rclone_command_line_usage.yml @@ -44,7 +44,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - DarkSide Ransomware - Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: [] confidence: 70 context: @@ -54,7 +53,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1020/windows-security.log impact: 50 kill_chain_phases: - - Exfiltration + - Exploitation message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to connect to a remote cloud service to move files or folders. @@ -71,7 +70,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -92,3 +91,4 @@ tags: risk_score: 35 risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___disable_net_user_account.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___disable_net_user_account.yml index 0c3c7f76f6..694cf55d26 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___disable_net_user_account.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___disable_net_user_account.yml @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ tags: confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint - - stage:Defense Evasion + - Stage:Defense Evasion dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/ssa_data1/net_user_dis.log impact: 70 @@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -87,3 +87,4 @@ tags: risk_score: 49 risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app.yml index 1f063339aa..6463d7e1a0 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app.yml @@ -39,9 +39,8 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious DNS Traffic - Dynamic DNS - - Command and Control - Data Exfiltration - automated_detection_testing: passed + - Command and Control cis20: [] confidence: 80 context: @@ -68,7 +67,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -89,3 +88,4 @@ tags: risk_score: 72 risk_severity: medium security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___fsutil_zeroing_file.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___fsutil_zeroing_file.yml index cd8fde0bae..de4c42036e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___fsutil_zeroing_file.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___fsutil_zeroing_file.yml @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ tags: confidence: 90 context: - Source:Endpoint - - stage:Defense Evasion + - Stage:Defense Evasion dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070/fsutil_file_zero/windows-security.log impact: 60 @@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -80,3 +80,4 @@ tags: risk_score: 54 risk_severity: medium security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___grant_permission_using_cacls_utility.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___grant_permission_using_cacls_utility.yml index a61baf888f..6a83005a02 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___grant_permission_using_cacls_utility.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___grant_permission_using_cacls_utility.yml @@ -38,8 +38,8 @@ tags: - CIS 16 confidence: 70 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Defense Evasion + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Defense Evasion dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1222.001/ssa_cacls/all_icalc.log impact: 50 @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: dest_user_id - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: @@ -75,3 +75,4 @@ tags: risk_score: 35 risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml index 7ab062c00c..754b664337 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml @@ -76,3 +76,4 @@ tags: - _time risk_score: 72 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___modify_acls_permission_of_files_or_folders.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___modify_acls_permission_of_files_or_folders.yml index ddcc59506f..9e19df9ae9 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___modify_acls_permission_of_files_or_folders.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___modify_acls_permission_of_files_or_folders.yml @@ -41,8 +41,8 @@ tags: - CIS 13 confidence: 70 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Defense Evasion + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Defense Evasion dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1222.001/ssa_cacls/all_icalc.log impact: 50 @@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: dest_user_id - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: @@ -78,3 +78,4 @@ tags: risk_score: 35 risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___potential_pass_the_token_or_hash_observed_at_the_destination_device.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___potential_pass_the_token_or_hash_observed_at_the_destination_device.yml index 9b57893592..3cf8a29ac5 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___potential_pass_the_token_or_hash_observed_at_the_destination_device.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___potential_pass_the_token_or_hash_observed_at_the_destination_device.yml @@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ tags: - Stage:Lateral Movement impact: 80 kill_chain_phases: - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation message: Potential lateral movement and credential stealing via Pass the Token or Pass the Hash techniques. Operation is performed via credentials of the account $dest_user_id$ and observed by the destination device $dest_device_id$ diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___potential_pass_the_token_or_hash_observed_by_an_event_collecting_device.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___potential_pass_the_token_or_hash_observed_by_an_event_collecting_device.yml index 13fc3309bb..80d7ef4f7a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___potential_pass_the_token_or_hash_observed_by_an_event_collecting_device.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___potential_pass_the_token_or_hash_observed_by_an_event_collecting_device.yml @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ tags: - Stage:Lateral Movement impact: 80 kill_chain_phases: - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation message: Potential lateral movement and credential stealing via Pass the Token or Pass the Hash techniques. Operation is performed via credentials of the account $dest_user_id$ and observed by the logging device $origin_device_id$ diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.yml index 8214c9642a..9fcf4544f2 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.yml @@ -10,30 +10,24 @@ description: The following analytic identifies parent processes, browsers, Windo terminal applications, Office Products and Java spawning cmd.exe. By its very nature, many applications spawn cmd.exe natively or built into macros. Much of this will need to be tuned to further enhance the risk. -search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() - | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)) - | eval process_name = ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string", null), - parent_process_name = lower(ucast(input_event.parent_process_name, "string", null)), - cmd_line = lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"),"string", null)), - dest_user_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), - dest_device_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null), - event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event,"event_id"), "string", null) - | where process_name="cmd.exe" - | rex field=parent_process_name "(?[^\\\\]+)$" +search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, + "_time"), "string", null)) | eval process_name = ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), + "string", null), parent_process_name = lower(ucast(input_event.parent_process_name, + "string", null)), cmd_line = lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"),"string", + null)), dest_user_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), + dest_device_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event,"event_id"), + "string", null) | where process_name="cmd.exe" | rex field=parent_process_name "(?[^\\\\]+)$" | where ParentBaseFileName="winword.exe" OR ParentBaseFileName="excel.exe" OR ParentBaseFileName="outlook.exe" - OR ParentBaseFileName="powerpnt.exe" OR ParentBaseFileName="visio.exe" OR ParentBaseFileName="mspub.exe" - OR ParentBaseFileName="acrobat.exe" OR ParentBaseFileName="acrord32.exe" OR ParentBaseFileName="iexplore.exe" - OR ParentBaseFileName="opera.exe" OR ParentBaseFileName="firefox.exe" - OR (ParentBaseFileName="java.exe" - AND (parent_process_name IS NOT NULL AND match_regex(parent_process_name, /(?i)patch1-Hotfix1a/)=false)) - OR ParentBaseFileName="powershell.exe" - OR (ParentBaseFileName="chrome.exe" - AND (cmd_line IS NULL OR (cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)chrome-extension/)=false))) - | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, - entities=mvappend(dest_device_id, dest_user_id), - body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "process_name", process_name, "parent_process_name", - parent_process_name, "cmd_line", cmd_line, "ParentBaseFileName", ParentBaseFileName]) - | into write_ssa_detected_events()' + OR ParentBaseFileName="powerpnt.exe" OR ParentBaseFileName="visio.exe" OR ParentBaseFileName="mspub.exe" + OR ParentBaseFileName="acrobat.exe" OR ParentBaseFileName="acrord32.exe" OR ParentBaseFileName="iexplore.exe" + OR ParentBaseFileName="opera.exe" OR ParentBaseFileName="firefox.exe" OR (ParentBaseFileName="java.exe" + AND (parent_process_name IS NOT NULL AND match_regex(parent_process_name, /(?i)patch1-Hotfix1a/)=false)) + OR ParentBaseFileName="powershell.exe" OR (ParentBaseFileName="chrome.exe" AND (cmd_line + IS NULL OR (cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)chrome-extension/)=false))) + | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(dest_device_id, + dest_user_id), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "process_name", process_name, + "parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "cmd_line", cmd_line, "ParentBaseFileName", + ParentBaseFileName]) | into write_ssa_detected_events()' how_to_implement: In order to successfully implement this analytic, you will need endpoint process data from a EDR product or Sysmon. This search has been modified to process raw sysmon data from attack_range's nxlogs on DSP. @@ -71,7 +65,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -90,3 +84,4 @@ tags: risk_score: 35 risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___resize_shadowstorage_volume.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___resize_shadowstorage_volume.yml index a97db6024c..8051f68180 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___resize_shadowstorage_volume.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___resize_shadowstorage_volume.yml @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ tags: confidence: 80 context: - Source:Endpoint - - stage:Defense Evasion + - Stage:Defense Evasion dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/ssa_data1/windows-security.log impact: 80 @@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -87,3 +87,4 @@ tags: risk_score: 64 risk_severity: medium security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___sdelete_application_execution.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___sdelete_application_execution.yml index 3494fbf0c6..5f37c2665a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___sdelete_application_execution.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___sdelete_application_execution.yml @@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -95,3 +95,4 @@ tags: risk_score: 42 risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___system_process_running_from_unexpected_location.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___system_process_running_from_unexpected_location.yml index d0a26b352e..a9d21e40aa 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___system_process_running_from_unexpected_location.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___system_process_running_from_unexpected_location.yml @@ -240,8 +240,8 @@ tags: - CIS 8 confidence: 80 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Defense Evasion + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Defense Evasion dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036/system_process_running_unexpected_location/windows-security.log impact: 70 @@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: dest_user_id - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: @@ -274,3 +274,4 @@ tags: risk_score: 56 risk_severity: medium security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml index 21acd9770e..2b8eb27f66 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml @@ -77,9 +77,9 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: process_name - type: processname + type: Process role: - - Others + - Other product: - Splunk Behavioral Analytics required_fields: @@ -89,3 +89,4 @@ tags: risk_score: 25 risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml index 9e3dd02435..577362f672 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ tags: confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint - - stage:Defense Evasion + - Stage:Defense Evasion dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-security_bcdedit_wbadmin.log impact: 30 @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -85,3 +85,4 @@ tags: risk_score: 15 risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___wevtutil_usage_to_clear_logs.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___wevtutil_usage_to_clear_logs.yml index 4f556bdf5d..6fb854e344 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___wevtutil_usage_to_clear_logs.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___wevtutil_usage_to_clear_logs.yml @@ -43,8 +43,8 @@ tags: - CIS 13 confidence: 90 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Defense Evasion + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Defense Evasion dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/ssa_wevtutil/clear_evt.log impact: 70 @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: dest_user_id - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: @@ -80,3 +80,4 @@ tags: risk_score: 63 risk_severity: medium security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___wevtutil_usage_to_disable_logs.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___wevtutil_usage_to_disable_logs.yml index 9b5a7c19ff..760a660a1a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___wevtutil_usage_to_disable_logs.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___wevtutil_usage_to_disable_logs.yml @@ -39,8 +39,8 @@ tags: - CIS 13 confidence: 90 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Defense Evasion + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Defense Evasion dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/ssa_wevtutil/disable_evt.log impact: 70 @@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: dest_user_id - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: @@ -76,3 +76,4 @@ tags: risk_score: 63 risk_severity: medium security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_bits_job_persistence.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_bits_job_persistence.yml index 7f20918e79..35c93b77ae 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_bits_job_persistence.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_bits_job_persistence.yml @@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -89,3 +89,4 @@ tags: - cmd_line risk_score: 56 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_bitsadmin_download_file.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_bitsadmin_download_file.yml index 7a1d064f7b..6a09c4aa67 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_bitsadmin_download_file.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_bitsadmin_download_file.yml @@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -93,3 +93,4 @@ tags: - cmd_line risk_score: 49 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_certutil_decode_file.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_certutil_decode_file.yml index 33ead7ddbd..5b948abd66 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_certutil_decode_file.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_certutil_decode_file.yml @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -88,3 +88,4 @@ tags: - cmd_line risk_score: 40 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_certutil_urlcache_download.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_certutil_urlcache_download.yml index 848ee22d2b..da493a5d98 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_certutil_urlcache_download.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_certutil_urlcache_download.yml @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ tags: confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Command and Control + - Stage:Command And Control dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/T1105-windows-security.log impact: 90 @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -84,3 +84,4 @@ tags: - cmd_line risk_score: 90 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_certutil_verifyctl_download.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_certutil_verifyctl_download.yml index c0158062a9..bfee568c4f 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_certutil_verifyctl_download.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_certutil_verifyctl_download.yml @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ tags: confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Command and Control + - Stage:Command And Control dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/T1105-windows-security.log impact: 90 @@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -85,3 +85,4 @@ tags: - cmd_line risk_score: 90 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination.yml index 502d796896..569c72fe61 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination.yml @@ -52,7 +52,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Ingress Tool Transfer - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: [] confidence: 100 context: @@ -62,7 +61,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log impact: 80 kill_chain_phases: - - Exfiltration + - Exploitation message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ uploading a file to a remote destination. @@ -79,7 +78,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -100,3 +99,4 @@ tags: risk_score: 80 risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution.yml index 2cf9de773a..b8964f2025 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution.yml @@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -82,3 +82,4 @@ tags: - cmd_line risk_score: 49 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_eventvwr_uac_bypass.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_eventvwr_uac_bypass.yml index 3673ddde5e..0fbedc0c94 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_eventvwr_uac_bypass.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_eventvwr_uac_bypass.yml @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/ssa_eventvwr/windows-sysmon-registry.log impact: 80 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation + - Exploitation message: Registry values were modified to bypass UAC using Event Viewer on $dest_device_id$ mitre_attack_id: - T1548.002 @@ -83,3 +83,4 @@ tags: risk_score: 80 risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_mshta_child_process.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_mshta_child_process.yml index 9050c125b0..9706fd2350 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_mshta_child_process.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_mshta_child_process.yml @@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -89,3 +89,4 @@ tags: - cmd_line risk_score: 80 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_mshta_command_line_url.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_mshta_command_line_url.yml index 977ee22699..302194d34a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_mshta_command_line_url.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_mshta_command_line_url.yml @@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -91,3 +91,4 @@ tags: - cmd_line risk_score: 80 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml index 80d136746c..0012c03d54 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml @@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -89,3 +89,4 @@ tags: - cmd_line risk_score: 80 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_powershell_connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_powershell_connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml index 8c4e9e2a4f..b1b140370c 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_powershell_connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_powershell_connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml @@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/hidden_powershell/hidden_windows-security.log impact: 50 kill_chain_phases: - - Exfiltration + - Exploitation message: PowerShell processes $process$ started with parameters to modify the execution policy of the run, run in a hidden window, and connect to the Internet on host $dest$ executed by user $user$. @@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -100,3 +100,4 @@ tags: risk_score: 35 risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_powershell_downloadfile.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_powershell_downloadfile.yml index 939778867e..b15c2ac949 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_powershell_downloadfile.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_powershell_downloadfile.yml @@ -47,12 +47,12 @@ tags: confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:LateralMovement + - Stage:Lateral Movement dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/downloadfile_windows-security.log impact: 50 kill_chain_phases: - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior identifies the use of DownloadFile within PowerShell. @@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -92,3 +92,4 @@ tags: risk_score: 35 risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_powershell_start_bitstransfer.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_powershell_start_bitstransfer.yml index c63f710cd5..458fb2c1aa 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_powershell_start_bitstransfer.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_powershell_start_bitstransfer.yml @@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -86,3 +86,4 @@ tags: - cmd_line risk_score: 49 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_rasautou_dll_execution.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_rasautou_dll_execution.yml index 1c1e8d8b94..8f9fcb5e31 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_rasautou_dll_execution.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_rasautou_dll_execution.yml @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -84,3 +84,4 @@ tags: - cmd_line risk_score: 80 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml index bf836b15dc..1ba358eda6 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml @@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name diff --git a/detections/endpoint/start_up_during_safe_mode_boot.yml b/detections/endpoint/start_up_during_safe_mode_boot.yml index 7e2e1427db..5c29c26610 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/start_up_during_safe_mode_boot.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/start_up_during_safe_mode_boot.yml @@ -34,7 +34,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -68,3 +67,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_computer_account_name_change.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_computer_account_name_change.yml index fd5671bb4e..a901cc3aa8 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_computer_account_name_change.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_computer_account_name_change.yml @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/samaccountname_spoofing/windows-security.log impact: 100 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation + - Exploitation message: A computer account $Old_Account_Name$ was renamed with a suspicious computer name mitre_attack_id: @@ -64,3 +64,4 @@ tags: - New_Account_Name risk_score: 70 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_copy_on_system32.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_copy_on_system32.yml index 790e3c976f..963785dc88 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_copy_on_system32.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_copy_on_system32.yml @@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Unusual Processes - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 90 context: - Stage:Execution @@ -74,3 +73,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments.yml index 3e39f5d928..64c5947322 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments.yml @@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Cobalt Strike - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -76,3 +75,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_driver_loaded_path.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_driver_loaded_path.yml index 10a0bada0e..7a6f968c26 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_driver_loaded_path.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_driver_loaded_path.yml @@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - XMRig - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 90 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -68,3 +67,4 @@ tags: - Signed risk_score: 63 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_event_log_service_behavior.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_event_log_service_behavior.yml index 3e5b4f7ce8..9719cc04b7 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_event_log_service_behavior.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_event_log_service_behavior.yml @@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ tags: - Ransomware - Clop Ransomware asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 3 - CIS 5 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments.yml index 36e0a60730..312a46cd6f 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments.yml @@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Cobalt Strike - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -75,3 +74,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline.yml index 8575a27f5d..712c4239fd 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline.yml @@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - IcedID - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -47,7 +46,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: process_name - type: process name + type: Process role: - Attacker product: @@ -71,3 +70,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_image_creation_in_appdata_folder.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_image_creation_in_appdata_folder.yml index cc90d22e6e..3c7ddb8699 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_image_creation_in_appdata_folder.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_image_creation_in_appdata_folder.yml @@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Remcos - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -52,7 +51,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: process_name - type: process name + type: Process role: - Attacker product: @@ -70,3 +69,4 @@ tags: - process risk_score: 49 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_kerberos_service_ticket_request.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_kerberos_service_ticket_request.yml index eb1dccb291..05a665d078 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_kerberos_service_ticket_request.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_kerberos_service_ticket_request.yml @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/samaccountname_spoofing/windows-security.log impact: 100 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation + - Exploitation message: A suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket was requested by $Account_Name$ mitre_attack_id: - T1078 @@ -68,3 +68,4 @@ tags: - Failure_Code risk_score: 60 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_linux_discovery_commands.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_linux_discovery_commands.yml index 1740cfb0b7..eaf9aa7c85 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_linux_discovery_commands.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_linux_discovery_commands.yml @@ -65,3 +65,4 @@ tags: - Processes.process_name risk_score: 81 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml index 94eaa1d5b8..90b9c6cfb3 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml @@ -34,7 +34,6 @@ tags: - Cobalt Strike - Masquerading - Rename System Utilities asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 90 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml index 3b400ef260..0b565e2301 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml @@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 50 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml index a5d11e2305..a734e8aac7 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml @@ -35,7 +35,6 @@ tags: - Cobalt Strike - Masquerading - Rename System Utilities asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 70 @@ -43,7 +42,6 @@ tags: - Source:Endpoint - Stage:Defense Evasion - Stage:Execution - - Stage:Defense Evasion dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log impact: 70 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml index fdb7e16f85..c92bfb3578 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml @@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ tags: - Cobalt Strike - Masquerading - Rename System Utilities asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 90 @@ -41,7 +40,6 @@ tags: - Source:Endpoint - Stage:Defense Evasion - Stage:Execution - - Stage:Defense Evasion dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log impact: 70 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml index eb3153be52..026123b5eb 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml @@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 60 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml index 95b4ff024d..99533384fd 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml @@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious MSHTA Activity asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 80 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml index fb276a88f8..8c2bbfbce4 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml @@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious MSHTA Activity asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 60 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services.yml index 5edadd08ce..3ec1adc6d4 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services.yml @@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Remcos - WhisperGate - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -50,7 +49,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: process_name - type: process name + type: Process role: - Attacker product: @@ -67,3 +66,4 @@ tags: - Computer risk_score: 64 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_process_file_path.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_process_file_path.yml index ce259ece01..5f1176eaf3 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_process_file_path.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_process_file_path.yml @@ -77,3 +77,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query.yml index 25b462deef..c6f3f4b6fe 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query.yml @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: process_name - type: process name + type: Process Name role: - Attacker product: @@ -71,3 +71,4 @@ tags: - process_path risk_score: 64 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml index fd7c536250..a0c4ac1abd 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml @@ -35,7 +35,6 @@ tags: - Disabling Security Tools - DHS Report TA18-074A asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 50 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.yml index 656aa2d5cb..d7b215489e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.yml @@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ tags: - Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity - Iceid asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 - CIS 16 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.yml index 19e3560a01..cf8168714b 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.yml @@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Rundll32 Activity asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 50 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_plugininit.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_plugininit.yml index b0ddab468c..d0ebb2b3e7 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_plugininit.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_plugininit.yml @@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - IcedID - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -47,7 +46,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: process_name - type: process name + type: Process role: - Attacker product: @@ -71,3 +70,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.yml index c5e148e8c0..f490971e25 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.yml @@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ tags: - Cobalt Strike - Trickbot asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 50 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml index ee2bce6a7c..9b0768f61b 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml @@ -35,7 +35,6 @@ tags: - Cobalt Strike - PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527 asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 70 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory.yml index c663f88758..5df156e6aa 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory.yml @@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ tags: - Ransomware - Ryuk Ransomware - Windows Persistence Techniques - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -43,7 +42,6 @@ tags: impact: 70 kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation - - Privilege Escalation message: Suspicious scheduled task registered on $dest$ mitre_attack_id: - T1053.005 @@ -75,3 +73,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_searchprotocolhost_no_command_line_arguments.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_searchprotocolhost_no_command_line_arguments.yml index a804c6b96f..0610b9087d 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_searchprotocolhost_no_command_line_arguments.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_searchprotocolhost_no_command_line_arguments.yml @@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Cobalt Strike - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -76,3 +75,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_ticket_granting_ticket_request.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_ticket_granting_ticket_request.yml index 9bafa5a48c..88740d3afe 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_ticket_granting_ticket_request.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_ticket_granting_ticket_request.yml @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/samaccountname_spoofing/windows-security.log impact: 100 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation + - Exploitation message: A suspicious TGT was requested was requested mitre_attack_id: - T1078 @@ -66,3 +66,4 @@ tags: - ComputerName risk_score: 60 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wav_file_in_appdata_folder.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wav_file_in_appdata_folder.yml index 977bc81441..111d718101 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wav_file_in_appdata_folder.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wav_file_in_appdata_folder.yml @@ -32,7 +32,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Remcos - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -51,7 +50,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: process_name - type: process name + type: Process role: - Attacker product: @@ -69,3 +68,4 @@ tags: - process risk_score: 49 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml index ed1d109a7c..460be96333 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml @@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ tags: - Windows Log Manipulation - Ransomware - Clop Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 3 - CIS 5 @@ -79,3 +78,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml index df4adae9be..76a082c0ef 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml @@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Collection and Staging asset_type: Windows - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 70 @@ -68,3 +67,5 @@ tags: - Processes.dest risk_score: 28 security_domain: endpoint + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation diff --git a/detections/endpoint/svchost_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.yml b/detections/endpoint/svchost_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.yml index e4ff7baa92..f1113e7d67 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/svchost_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/svchost_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.yml @@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Lateral Movement - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 60 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -49,7 +48,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-security.log impact: 90 kill_chain_phases: - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation message: Svchost.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest mitre_attack_id: - T1053 @@ -78,3 +77,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 54 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application.yml b/detections/endpoint/system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application.yml index 25f594ec14..4650d727b2 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application.yml @@ -32,11 +32,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Remcos - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage:Reconnaissance + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Discovery dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/t1592/host_info_dxdiag/sysmon.log impact: 50 @@ -73,3 +72,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 25 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml b/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml index cba2897e4b..fb110f5366 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml @@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Discovery Techniques asset_type: Windows - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 6 - CIS 8 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml b/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml index 09b9bc2061..f17fcdf50b 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml @@ -38,7 +38,6 @@ tags: - Ransomware - Masquerading - Rename System Utilities asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 70 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/system_user_discovery_with_query.yml b/detections/endpoint/system_user_discovery_with_query.yml index f5f1790f84..88ba7e5852 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/system_user_discovery_with_query.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/system_user_discovery_with_query.yml @@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -63,3 +62,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 15 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/system_user_discovery_with_whoami.yml b/detections/endpoint/system_user_discovery_with_whoami.yml index 2091cb5a3d..9de024be13 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/system_user_discovery_with_whoami.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/system_user_discovery_with_whoami.yml @@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -62,3 +61,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 15 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/time_provider_persistence_registry.yml b/detections/endpoint/time_provider_persistence_registry.yml index 42cbd1ab82..62ec85ad68 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/time_provider_persistence_registry.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/time_provider_persistence_registry.yml @@ -38,11 +38,10 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Windows Persistence Techniques - Windows Privilege Escalation - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage:Privilege Escalation Persistence + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Privilege Escalation dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.003/timeprovider_reg/sysmon.log impact: 80 @@ -58,7 +57,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: user - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: @@ -76,3 +75,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/trickbot_named_pipe.yml b/detections/endpoint/trickbot_named_pipe.yml index 29ba31c3c0..547a6d02b8 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/trickbot_named_pipe.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/trickbot_named_pipe.yml @@ -23,7 +23,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Trickbot - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 60 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -61,3 +60,4 @@ tags: - process_id risk_score: 42 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll.yml b/detections/endpoint/uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll.yml index 6949009607..4faeaf4a87 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll.yml @@ -25,14 +25,13 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 90 context: - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Persistence, + - Stage:Persistence - Stage:Privilege Escalation - Stage:Defense Evasion - - Scope:Incoming + - Scope:Inbound dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon2.log impact: 70 @@ -64,3 +63,4 @@ tags: - Company risk_score: 63 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object.yml b/detections/endpoint/uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object.yml index 965e53bb2e..71d29c0821 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object.yml @@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -67,3 +66,4 @@ tags: - ProcessId risk_score: 48 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/unified_messaging_service_spawning_a_process.yml b/detections/endpoint/unified_messaging_service_spawning_a_process.yml index 5cedb020fb..9089986a8c 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/unified_messaging_service_spawning_a_process.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/unified_messaging_service_spawning_a_process.yml @@ -35,7 +35,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - HAFNIUM Group - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -73,3 +72,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/uninstall_app_using_msiexec.yml b/detections/endpoint/uninstall_app_using_msiexec.yml index 83fa05eb28..fda346d849 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/uninstall_app_using_msiexec.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/uninstall_app_using_msiexec.yml @@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 60 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -46,7 +45,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: process_name - type: process name + type: Process role: - Attacker product: @@ -67,3 +66,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml b/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml index 2327a5c01f..445214b399 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ name: Unload Sysmon Filter Driver -id: c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f665664g9f +id: e5928ff3-23eb-4d8b-b8a4-dcbc844fdfbe version: 3 date: '2020-07-22' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk @@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Disabling Security Tools asset_type: '' - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 90 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/unloading_amsi_via_reflection.yml b/detections/endpoint/unloading_amsi_via_reflection.yml index 3cbd73e2df..fe3ab95497 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/unloading_amsi_via_reflection.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/unloading_amsi_via_reflection.yml @@ -36,7 +36,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Malicious PowerShell - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -68,3 +67,4 @@ tags: - EventCode risk_score: 49 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/unusual_number_of_kerberos_service_tickets_requested.yml b/detections/endpoint/unusual_number_of_kerberos_service_tickets_requested.yml index a99d58f466..3cd7ad164e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/unusual_number_of_kerberos_service_tickets_requested.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/unusual_number_of_kerberos_service_tickets_requested.yml @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Kerberos Attacks + asset_type: Endpoint confidence: 60 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -42,8 +43,8 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/rubeus/windows-security.log impact: 60 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation - message: null + - Exploitation + message: tbd mitre_attack_id: - T1558 - T1558.003 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/user_discocvery_with_env_vars_powershell.yml b/detections/endpoint/user_discocvery_with_env_vars_powershell.yml index b7fef38a56..839bad7907 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/user_discocvery_with_env_vars_powershell.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/user_discocvery_with_env_vars_powershell.yml @@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -64,3 +63,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 15 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_script_block.yml b/detections/endpoint/user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_script_block.yml index cfa68d3777..f0c99d1fac 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_script_block.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_script_block.yml @@ -23,7 +23,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -56,3 +55,4 @@ tags: - EventCode risk_score: 15 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml b/detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml index d02e6ba8a7..c02427f4ca 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml @@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ tags: - Windows Log Manipulation - Ransomware asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 6 - CIS 8 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/vbscript_execution_using_wscript_app.yml b/detections/endpoint/vbscript_execution_using_wscript_app.yml index a80dd8e2b8..bf7c985b7b 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/vbscript_execution_using_wscript_app.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/vbscript_execution_using_wscript_app.yml @@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - FIN7 - Remcos - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -74,3 +73,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/verclsid_clsid_execution.yml b/detections/endpoint/verclsid_clsid_execution.yml index 103b742d69..1436787c93 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/verclsid_clsid_execution.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/verclsid_clsid_execution.yml @@ -32,11 +32,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Unusual Processes - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage:Defense Evasion + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Defense Evasion dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.012/verclsid_exec/sysmon.log impact: 50 @@ -53,7 +52,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: user - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: @@ -75,3 +74,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 25 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/w3wp_spawning_shell.yml b/detections/endpoint/w3wp_spawning_shell.yml index 850cdb5cb6..a51b123789 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/w3wp_spawning_shell.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/w3wp_spawning_shell.yml @@ -37,7 +37,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - HAFNIUM Group - ProxyShell - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -82,3 +81,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml b/detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml index 6f5715c80a..82c0611088 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml @@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ tags: - Ryuk Ransomware - Ransomware asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 50 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/wbemprox_com_object_execution.yml b/detections/endpoint/wbemprox_com_object_execution.yml index 91f61b3952..5d4fccd4ac 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/wbemprox_com_object_execution.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/wbemprox_com_object_execution.yml @@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Ransomware - Revil Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -62,3 +61,4 @@ tags: - IMPHASH risk_score: 35 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services.yml b/detections/endpoint/wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services.yml index 4bd094af25..7df34f9c2c 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services.yml @@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Trickbot - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -67,3 +66,4 @@ tags: - EventCode risk_score: 56 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/wermgr_process_create_executable_file.yml b/detections/endpoint/wermgr_process_create_executable_file.yml index dbcd1ec45c..0a4ae33869 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/wermgr_process_create_executable_file.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/wermgr_process_create_executable_file.yml @@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Trickbot - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -59,3 +58,4 @@ tags: - ProcessId risk_score: 56 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process.yml b/detections/endpoint/wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process.yml index 371cf2a000..27e26fb8c8 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process.yml @@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Trickbot - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -68,3 +67,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.yml b/detections/endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.yml index 4d1a88f5dc..788d7fd115 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.yml @@ -78,3 +78,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 80 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml index a4dd560dc1..1a48f71173 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml @@ -32,18 +32,26 @@ tags: - NOBELIUM Group - Domain Trust Discovery asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 + context: + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Discovery dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation + message: Windows AdFind Exe mitre_attack_id: - T1018 nist: - PR.PT - DE.CM + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security @@ -60,3 +68,6 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25.0 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path.yml index 5f9705d849..f49e493d6a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path.yml @@ -36,7 +36,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - IceID - Ingress Tool Transfer - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -60,7 +59,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -88,3 +87,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination.yml index 65afeffe87..9a2d7fbfd7 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination.yml @@ -44,7 +44,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Ingress Tool Transfer - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -53,7 +52,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_curl_upload.log impact: 80 kill_chain_phases: - - Exfiltration + - Exploitation message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ uploading a file to a remote destination. mitre_attack_id: @@ -68,7 +67,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -96,3 +95,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry.yml index f3a273dcc7..5c350e3f69 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry.yml @@ -38,7 +38,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Remcos - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -77,3 +76,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_disable_memory_crash_dump.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_disable_memory_crash_dump.yml index 8919734d8e..71b3c6d86e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_disable_memory_crash_dump.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_disable_memory_crash_dump.yml @@ -46,7 +46,6 @@ tags: context: - Source:Endpoint - Stage:Persistence - - Privilege Escalation dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/hermetic_wiper/sysmon.log impact: 90 @@ -68,7 +67,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -96,3 +95,4 @@ tags: - Processes.process_guid risk_score: 90 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml index 62174a5077..6525cd6863 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml @@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ tags: - Ryuk Ransomware - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 80 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_diskcryptor_usage.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_diskcryptor_usage.yml index 930e28b5db..d7ddd630ee 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_diskcryptor_usage.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_diskcryptor_usage.yml @@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -55,7 +54,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -81,3 +80,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 35 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution.yml index e14b14e20f..98f3589020 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution.yml @@ -68,3 +68,4 @@ tags: - Processes.original_file_name risk_score: 49 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_dism_remove_defender.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_dism_remove_defender.yml index 9cc4c5bafe..598ed96793 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_dism_remove_defender.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_dism_remove_defender.yml @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -81,3 +81,4 @@ tags: security_domain: access supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path.yml index cb6ed79777..dbbebc4a68 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path.yml @@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -97,3 +97,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_event_for_service_disabled.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_event_for_service_disabled.yml index 58405c141f..005e34defa 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_event_for_service_disabled.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_event_for_service_disabled.yml @@ -61,3 +61,4 @@ tags: - Sid risk_score: 36 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml index 7d11c1f611..166f700a6f 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml @@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ tags: - Ransomware - Clop Ransomware asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 3 - CIS 5 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_excessive_disabled_services_event.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_excessive_disabled_services_event.yml index 35816e80a5..5c04b86528 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_excessive_disabled_services_event.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_excessive_disabled_services_event.yml @@ -64,3 +64,4 @@ tags: - Sid risk_score: 81 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_file_without_extension_in_critical_folder.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_file_without_extension_in_critical_folder.yml index 971856d53c..8883966942 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_file_without_extension_in_critical_folder.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_file_without_extension_in_critical_folder.yml @@ -41,7 +41,6 @@ tags: context: - Source:Endpoint - Stage:Persistence - - Privilege Escalation dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/hermetic_wiper/sysmon.log impact: 90 @@ -75,3 +74,4 @@ tags: - Processes.user risk_score: 90 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_high_file_deletion_frequency.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_high_file_deletion_frequency.yml index 046a58314f..e36112b07b 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_high_file_deletion_frequency.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_high_file_deletion_frequency.yml @@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Clop Ransomware - WhisperGate - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -69,3 +68,4 @@ tags: - _time risk_score: 72 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_hunting_system_account_targeting_lsass.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_hunting_system_account_targeting_lsass.yml index 29e016b18c..dc42cb5d08 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_hunting_system_account_targeting_lsass.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_hunting_system_account_targeting_lsass.yml @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: ImageLoaded - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Other - name: SourceImage @@ -79,3 +79,4 @@ tags: - TargetUser risk_score: 64 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_credential_theft.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_credential_theft.yml index 3fb5c0f1e1..d2bf537944 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_credential_theft.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_credential_theft.yml @@ -36,7 +36,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -46,7 +45,6 @@ tags: impact: 80 kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation - - Privilege Escalation message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ loading samlib.dll and vaultcli.dll to potentially capture credentials in memory. @@ -63,7 +61,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -91,3 +89,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path.yml index 1179c42ae8..81de856979 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path.yml @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -92,3 +92,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_remote_network_connection.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_remote_network_connection.yml index 74868751a9..acf452a753 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_remote_network_connection.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_remote_network_connection.yml @@ -42,7 +42,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -52,7 +51,6 @@ tags: impact: 80 kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation - - Privilege Escalation message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ generating a remote download. mitre_attack_id: @@ -68,7 +66,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -97,3 +95,4 @@ tags: - Ports.dest_port risk_score: 80 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_uninstall_option.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_uninstall_option.yml index 98a9002831..4bf7a02af8 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_uninstall_option.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_uninstall_option.yml @@ -44,7 +44,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -54,7 +53,6 @@ tags: impact: 80 kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation - - Privilege Escalation message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ performing an uninstall. mitre_attack_id: @@ -70,7 +68,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -98,3 +96,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network.yml index 039a92f7d1..ad88a19b1d 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network.yml @@ -49,7 +49,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -59,7 +58,6 @@ tags: impact: 80 kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation - - Privilege Escalation message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ performing an uninstall. mitre_attack_id: @@ -75,7 +73,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -104,3 +102,4 @@ tags: - Ports.dest_port risk_score: 80 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_url_in_command_line.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_url_in_command_line.yml index b6958ef7af..c76ec8cf81 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_url_in_command_line.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_url_in_command_line.yml @@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -50,7 +49,6 @@ tags: impact: 80 kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation - - Privilege Escalation message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ passing a URL on the command-line. mitre_attack_id: @@ -66,7 +64,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -94,3 +92,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_modify_show_compress_color_and_info_tip_registry.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_modify_show_compress_color_and_info_tip_registry.yml index cfc476d77f..abc36acbe0 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_modify_show_compress_color_and_info_tip_registry.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_modify_show_compress_color_and_info_tip_registry.yml @@ -71,3 +71,4 @@ tags: - Registry.dest Registry.user risk_score: 25 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_nirsoft_advancedrun.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_nirsoft_advancedrun.yml index 15669cf7d5..c0d9b395b1 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_nirsoft_advancedrun.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_nirsoft_advancedrun.yml @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -85,3 +85,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_nirsoft_utilities.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_nirsoft_utilities.yml index 1fd0c7eb76..70debdbfe3 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_nirsoft_utilities.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_nirsoft_utilities.yml @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -79,3 +79,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 80 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_non_system_account_targeting_lsass.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_non_system_account_targeting_lsass.yml index 154dfb43d4..1ad65699a6 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_non_system_account_targeting_lsass.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_non_system_account_targeting_lsass.yml @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: ImageLoaded - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Other - name: SourceImage @@ -80,3 +80,4 @@ tags: - TargetUser risk_score: 64 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_possible_credential_dumping.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_possible_credential_dumping.yml index 4518de4683..d88aa03de9 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_possible_credential_dumping.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_possible_credential_dumping.yml @@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: ImageLoaded - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Other - name: SourceImage @@ -97,3 +97,4 @@ tags: - TargetUser risk_score: 64 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_process_with_namedpipe_commandline.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_process_with_namedpipe_commandline.yml index 5555c3942c..8d08e15fbd 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_process_with_namedpipe_commandline.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_process_with_namedpipe_commandline.yml @@ -75,3 +75,4 @@ tags: - Processes.process_guid risk_score: 49 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_raccine_scheduled_task_deletion.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_raccine_scheduled_task_deletion.yml index e442e6221c..790ea87eab 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_raccine_scheduled_task_deletion.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_raccine_scheduled_task_deletion.yml @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ tags: - Processes.process_path - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 80 + asset_type: Endpoint security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_rasautou_dll_execution.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_rasautou_dll_execution.yml index 1478210a41..a0dde062a7 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_rasautou_dll_execution.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_rasautou_dll_execution.yml @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -78,3 +78,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 80 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition.yml index 0ab9bf0c5b..446bb0cb86 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition.yml @@ -35,7 +35,6 @@ tags: confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Impact dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/hermetic_wiper/sysmon.log impact: 90 @@ -67,3 +66,4 @@ tags: - EventCode risk_score: 90 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive.yml index 24a1beac4a..37a83412ca 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive.yml @@ -37,7 +37,6 @@ tags: confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Impact dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1561.002/mbr_raw_access/sysmon.log impact: 90 @@ -69,3 +68,4 @@ tags: - EventCode risk_score: 90 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_remote_assistance_spawning_process.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_remote_assistance_spawning_process.yml index 723eeca63c..7d59343cd5 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_remote_assistance_spawning_process.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_remote_assistance_spawning_process.yml @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -75,3 +75,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 80 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_schtasks_create_run_as_system.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_schtasks_create_run_as_system.yml index aa37903127..f8e182e452 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_schtasks_create_run_as_system.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_schtasks_create_run_as_system.yml @@ -72,3 +72,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 48 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml index ef4c22c956..dcfd0b95d0 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml @@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Ryuk Ransomware asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 100 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path.yml index 59d1a719bc..6303ab57ba 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path.yml @@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Clop Ransomware - Active Directory Lateral Movement - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 80 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -38,8 +37,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-system.log impact: 70 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation message: A service $Service_File_Name$ was created from a non-standard path using $Service_Name$ mitre_attack_id: @@ -67,3 +65,4 @@ tags: - Service_Start_Type risk_score: 56 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_service_created_within_public_path.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_service_created_within_public_path.yml index af64377a16..30d98223ae 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_service_created_within_public_path.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_service_created_within_public_path.yml @@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Lateral Movement - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 60 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -35,7 +34,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement_suspicious_path/windows-system.log impact: 90 kill_chain_phases: - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation message: A Windows Service $Service_File_Name$ with a public path was created on $ComputerName mitre_attack_id: @@ -63,3 +62,4 @@ tags: - Service_Start_Type risk_score: 54 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_service_creation_on_remote_endpoint.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_service_creation_on_remote_endpoint.yml index e7ee7f4898..c05880f546 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_service_creation_on_remote_endpoint.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_service_creation_on_remote_endpoint.yml @@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Lateral Movement - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 60 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -38,7 +37,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log impact: 90 kill_chain_phases: - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation message: A Windows Service was created on a remote endpoint from $dest mitre_attack_id: - T1543 @@ -69,3 +68,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_service_creation_using_registry_entry.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_service_creation_using_registry_entry.yml index d9f96b763b..2aa6661a25 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_service_creation_using_registry_entry.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_service_creation_using_registry_entry.yml @@ -83,3 +83,4 @@ tags: - Processes.process_guid risk_score: 64 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_service_initiation_on_remote_endpoint.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_service_initiation_on_remote_endpoint.yml index fe79ffa24e..22cace6848 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_service_initiation_on_remote_endpoint.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_service_initiation_on_remote_endpoint.yml @@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Lateral Movement - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 60 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -36,7 +35,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log impact: 90 kill_chain_phases: - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation message: A Windows Service was started on a remote endpoint from $dest mitre_attack_id: - T1543 @@ -67,3 +66,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_wmi_process_call_create.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_wmi_process_call_create.yml index c8d4f71a4d..a645c9e324 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_wmi_process_call_create.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_wmi_process_call_create.yml @@ -77,3 +77,4 @@ tags: - Processes.process_guid risk_score: 25 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell.yml b/detections/endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell.yml index 3f135b0e36..ea36328a45 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell.yml @@ -46,7 +46,6 @@ tags: - Windows Persistence Techniques - Ransomware - Ryuk Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -57,7 +56,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log impact: 70 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation + - Exploitation message: 'A windows scheduled task was created (task name=$Task_Name$) on $dest$ by the following command: $Command$' mitre_attack_id: @@ -69,7 +68,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: Command - type: Command + type: Unknown role: - Target product: @@ -84,3 +83,4 @@ tags: - Command risk_score: 70 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path.yml b/detections/endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path.yml index ff59f2304b..fe04448577 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path.yml @@ -48,7 +48,6 @@ tags: - Ryuk Ransomware - IcedID - Active Directory Lateral Movement - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -59,7 +58,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/taskschedule/windows-security.log impact: 70 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation + - Exploitation message: 'A windows scheduled task was created (task name=$Task_Name$) on $dest$ by the following command: $Command$' mitre_attack_id: @@ -71,7 +70,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: Command - type: Command + type: Unknown role: - Target product: @@ -86,3 +85,4 @@ tags: - Command risk_score: 70 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started.yml b/detections/endpoint/winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started.yml index 8b49efca42..2d1e5ce286 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started.yml @@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - IcedID - Windows Persistence Techniques - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -62,3 +61,4 @@ tags: - ProcessID risk_score: 80 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/winhlp32_spawning_a_process.yml b/detections/endpoint/winhlp32_spawning_a_process.yml index 94331c9531..df315f2074 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/winhlp32_spawning_a_process.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/winhlp32_spawning_a_process.yml @@ -36,7 +36,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Remcos - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -60,7 +59,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -88,3 +87,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/winword_spawning_cmd.yml b/detections/endpoint/winword_spawning_cmd.yml index 6edb916edb..330359665c 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/winword_spawning_cmd.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/winword_spawning_cmd.yml @@ -32,7 +32,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Spearphishing Attachments - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -81,3 +80,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/winword_spawning_powershell.yml b/detections/endpoint/winword_spawning_powershell.yml index 46c8cb7d5a..26500a08b9 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/winword_spawning_powershell.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/winword_spawning_powershell.yml @@ -34,7 +34,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Spearphishing Attachments - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -83,3 +82,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/winword_spawning_windows_script_host.yml b/detections/endpoint/winword_spawning_windows_script_host.yml index 005936b001..8b221e113b 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/winword_spawning_windows_script_host.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/winword_spawning_windows_script_host.yml @@ -32,7 +32,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Spearphishing Attachment - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -73,3 +72,4 @@ tags: - parent_process_id risk_score: 70 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml b/detections/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml index 953a5e1593..ce9c28550f 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml @@ -43,7 +43,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious WMI Use asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 3 - CIS 5 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/wmi_recon_running_process_or_services.yml b/detections/endpoint/wmi_recon_running_process_or_services.yml index eb2a44d7b3..be45120e36 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/wmi_recon_running_process_or_services.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/wmi_recon_running_process_or_services.yml @@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Malicious PowerShell - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -63,3 +62,4 @@ tags: - User risk_score: 30 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/wmic_group_discovery.yml b/detections/endpoint/wmic_group_discovery.yml index 67ccbb4fcb..4cd5505063 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/wmic_group_discovery.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/wmic_group_discovery.yml @@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Discovery - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -74,3 +73,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 15 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/wmic_noninteractive_app_uninstallation.yml b/detections/endpoint/wmic_noninteractive_app_uninstallation.yml index 2f80fb1d75..adf2b02eaf 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/wmic_noninteractive_app_uninstallation.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/wmic_noninteractive_app_uninstallation.yml @@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - IceID - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -77,3 +76,4 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 25 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/wmic_xsl_execution_via_url.yml b/detections/endpoint/wmic_xsl_execution_via_url.yml index 06690c892a..f763f5093c 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/wmic_xsl_execution_via_url.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/wmic_xsl_execution_via_url.yml @@ -34,7 +34,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious WMI Use - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -58,7 +57,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -86,3 +85,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/wmiprsve_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.yml b/detections/endpoint/wmiprsve_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.yml index 1460ebef98..1a0fe40415 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/wmiprsve_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/wmiprsve_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.yml @@ -41,7 +41,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Lateral Movement - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 60 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -50,7 +49,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-sysmon.log impact: 90 kill_chain_phases: - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation message: Wmiprsve.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest$. mitre_attack_id: - T1047 @@ -80,3 +79,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process.yml b/detections/endpoint/wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process.yml index af04695147..b4ca683e4b 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process.yml @@ -34,7 +34,6 @@ tags: - Remcos - Unusual Processes - WhisperGate - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -80,3 +79,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/wsmprovhost_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.yml b/detections/endpoint/wsmprovhost_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.yml index a459e91554..f063fb6280 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/wsmprovhost_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/wsmprovhost_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.yml @@ -41,7 +41,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Lateral Movement - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 60 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -50,7 +49,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-sysmon.log impact: 90 kill_chain_phases: - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation message: Wsmprovhost.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest$. mitre_attack_id: - T1021 @@ -81,3 +80,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/wsreset_uac_bypass.yml b/detections/endpoint/wsreset_uac_bypass.yml index b436925676..ce5dab7776 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/wsreset_uac_bypass.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/wsreset_uac_bypass.yml @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ tags: - Stage:Persistence - Stage:Privilege Escalation - Stage:Defense Evasion - - Scope:Incoming + - Scope:Inbound dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon.log impact: 70 @@ -73,3 +73,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/xmrig_driver_loaded.yml b/detections/endpoint/xmrig_driver_loaded.yml index acadcdf186..7ecdf7bdfb 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/xmrig_driver_loaded.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/xmrig_driver_loaded.yml @@ -22,12 +22,10 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - XMRig - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Privilege Escalation - - Persistence + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Privilege Escalation dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log impact: 80 @@ -42,10 +40,6 @@ tags: type: Hostname role: - Victim - - name: ImageLoaded - type: ImageLoaded - role: - - Attacker product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security @@ -60,3 +54,4 @@ tags: - Signed risk_score: 80 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/endpoint/xsl_script_execution_with_wmic.yml b/detections/endpoint/xsl_script_execution_with_wmic.yml index 0d1b86a632..2d6353c745 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/xsl_script_execution_with_wmic.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/xsl_script_execution_with_wmic.yml @@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - FIN7 - Suspicious WMI Use - automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 70 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -55,7 +54,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name @@ -79,3 +78,4 @@ tags: security_domain: endpoint supported_tas: - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml b/detections/experimental/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml index f3fc4ad026..76a91c644e 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ name: Detect New Login Attempts to Routers -id: 104658f4-afdc-499e-9719-17243rr826f1 +id: bce3ed7c-9b1f-42a0-abdf-d8b123a34836 version: 1 date: '2017-09-12' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk @@ -42,3 +42,17 @@ tags: - Authentication.dest - Authentication.user security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml b/detections/experimental/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml index 119e97731c..77658f2977 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml @@ -53,3 +53,13 @@ tags: - All_Email.file_name - All_Email.message_id security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml b/detections/experimental/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml index 2560a04e05..fe46084822 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ name: Email files written outside of the Outlook directory -id: ee18ed37-0802-4268-9435-b3b91aaa18xx +id: 8d52cf03-ba25-4101-aa78-07994aed4f74 version: 3 date: '2020-07-21' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk @@ -48,3 +48,13 @@ tags: - Filesystem.process_id - Filesystem.dest security_domain: endpoint + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml b/detections/experimental/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml index 9f1eaa1358..6743fbdcf0 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml @@ -60,3 +60,13 @@ tags: - All_Traffic.src_category - All_Traffic.dest_ip security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml b/detections/experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml index 9c30796093..4257286f33 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml @@ -42,3 +42,13 @@ tags: - All_Email.src_user - All_Email.message_id security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml b/detections/experimental/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip.yml similarity index 91% rename from detections/experimental/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml rename to detections/experimental/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip.yml index f89ee5ec99..c879649f3e 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip.yml @@ -45,3 +45,15 @@ tags: - src_ip - displayMessage security_domain: access + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml b/detections/experimental/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml index ac9464d296..6b3c187d82 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml @@ -45,3 +45,15 @@ tags: - Updates.vendor_product - Updates.dest security_domain: endpoint + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml b/detections/experimental/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml index 6d2455f41e..0a42a1e4f1 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml @@ -37,3 +37,15 @@ tags: - client.geographicalContext.state - client.geographicalContext.city security_domain: access + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml b/detections/experimental/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml index 8320933efa..b3254a1d38 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml @@ -38,3 +38,15 @@ tags: - result - src_ip security_domain: access + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml b/detections/experimental/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml index 11c9c14ff6..ece653af57 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml @@ -43,3 +43,15 @@ tags: - client.geographicalContext.state - user security_domain: access + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/ssa___detect_phishing_content.yml b/detections/experimental/application/ssa___detect_phishing_content.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 07abc4d512..0000000000 --- a/detections/experimental/application/ssa___detect_phishing_content.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,60 +0,0 @@ -name: Phishing Email Detection by Machine Learning Method - SSA -id: 4b237388-dfa1-41a6-91d4-4de2d598376f -version: 1 -date: '2020-08-25' -author: Xiao Lin, Splunk -type: Anomaly -datamodel: [] -description: Malicious mails can conduct phishing that induces readers to open attachment, - click links or trigger third party service. This detect uses Natural Language Processing - (NLP) approach to analyze an email message's content (Sender, Subject and Body) - and judge whether it is a phishing email. The detection adopts a deep learning (neural - network) model that employs character level embeddings plus LSTM layers to perform - classification. The model is pre-trained and then published as ONNX format. Current - sample model is trained using the dataset published at https://github.com/splunk/attack_data/tree/master/datasets/T1566_Phishing_Email/splunk_train.json - User are expected to re-train the model by combining with their own training data - for better accuracy using the provided model file (SMLE notebook). DSP pipeline - then processes the email message and passes it as an event to Apply ML Models function, - which returns the probability of a phishing email. Current implementation assumes - the email is fed to DSP in JSON format contains at least email's sender, subject - and its message body, including reply content, if any. -search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval eventLine=concat(ucast(map_get(input_event, - "From"), "string", " "), " ", ucast(map_get(input_event, "Subject"), "string", " - "), " ", ucast(map_get(input_event, "Content"), "string", " "), " "), - _time=map_get(input_event, "_time") | where eventLine IS NOT NULL | eval mapC={" - ": 32, "!": 33, "\"": 34, "#": 35, "$": 36, "%": 37, "&": 38, "`": 39, "(": 40, - ")": 41, "*": 42, "+": 43, ",": 44, "-": 45, ".": 46, "/": 47, "0": 48, "1": 49, - "2": 50, "3": 51, "4": 52, "5": 53, "6": 54, "7": 55, "8": 56, "9": 57, ":": 58, - ";": 59, "<": 60, "=": 61, ">": 62, "?": 63, "@": 64, "A": 65, "B": 66, "C": 67, - "D": 68, "E": 69, "F": 70, "G": 71, "H": 72, "I": 73, "J": 74, "K": 75, "L": 76, - "M": 77, "N": 78, "O": 79, "P": 80, "Q": 81, "R": 82, "S": 83, "T": 84, "U": 85, - "V": 86, "W": 87, "X": 88, "Y": 89, "Z": 90, "[": 91, "\\": 92, "]": 93, "^": 94, - "_": 95, "`": 96, "a": 97, "b": 98, "c": 99, "d": 100, "e": 101, "f": 102, "g": - 103, "h": 104, "i": 105, "j": 106, "k": 107, "l": 108, "m": 109, "n": 110, "o": - 111, "p": 112, "q": 113, "r": 114, "s": 115, "t": 116, "u": 117, "v": 118, "w": - 119, "x": 120, "y": 121, "z": 122, "{": 123, "|": 124, "}": 125, "~": 126}, ml_in - = for_each(iterator(mvrange(1,129), "i"), cast(map_get(mapC, substr(eventLine, i, - 1)), "float") ) | apply_model connection_id="YOUR_S3_ONNX_CONNECTOR_ID" name="phishing_email_v8" - path="s3://smle-experiments/models/phishing_email" | eval probability = mvindex(ml_out, - 0) | where probability > 0.5 | eval start_time=_time, end_time=_time, entities="TBD", - body="TBD" | select probability, body, entities, start_time, end_time | into write_ssa_detected_events();' -how_to_implement: Events are fed to DSP contains at least email's sender, subject - and its message body. -known_false_positives: Because of imbalance of anomaly data in training, the model - will less likely report false positive. Instead, the model is more prone to false - negative. Current best recall score is ~85% -references: [] -tags: - cis20: - - CIS 8 - kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objectives - mitre_attack_id: - - T1566 - nist: - - PR.PT - - DE.CM - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics - risk_severity: low - security_domain: mail server diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml index b489386194..81732385d7 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml @@ -54,3 +54,13 @@ tags: - All_Email.src_user - All_Email.message_id security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml index 3588838433..af7868d518 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ name: Suspicious Java Classes -id: if1fea6da-3c86-4c1d-b255-fc3b2781a491 +id: 6ed33786-5e87-4f55-b62c-cb5f1168b831 version: 1 date: '2018-12-06' author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk @@ -44,3 +44,17 @@ tags: - src - dest security_domain: threat + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim diff --git a/detections/experimental/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml b/detections/experimental/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml index 225805170e..121ffe3316 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml @@ -47,3 +47,17 @@ tags: - Processes.dest - Processes.user security_domain: endpoint + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml similarity index 92% rename from detections/experimental/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml rename to detections/experimental/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml index 5f5357037d..8cf4fc08ac 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml @@ -44,7 +44,6 @@ tags: - DE.DP - DE.AE product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -57,5 +56,18 @@ tags: - All_Changes.user risk_object: user risk_object_type: user - risk_score: 10 + risk_score: 25 security_domain: Cloud + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + context: [] + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim + message: tbd diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_launched.yml similarity index 94% rename from detections/experimental/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml rename to detections/experimental/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_launched.yml index fdaff07d65..07e6733eec 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_launched.yml @@ -45,7 +45,6 @@ tags: - DE.DP - DE.AE product: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -58,5 +57,14 @@ tags: - All_Changes.user risk_object: user risk_object_type: user - risk_score: 40 + risk_score: 25 security_domain: Cloud + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + context: [] + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + message: tbd diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml index 4e0722abe3..20e919df58 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml @@ -44,3 +44,13 @@ tags: - src_ip - user.groups{} security_domain: threat + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + message: tbd diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml index c474bf0fd7..30ceaeb46e 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml @@ -46,3 +46,13 @@ tags: - src_ip - user.groups{} security_domain: threat + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + message: tbd diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.yml index 43fd78b9ce..ed810be1d9 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.yml @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ tags: - AWS Cross Account Activity asset_type: AWS Account kill_chain_phases: - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation mitre_attack_id: - T1078 product: @@ -34,3 +34,13 @@ tags: - _time - requestParameters.policyArn security_domain: threat + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + message: tbd diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.yml index 89be918c7a..fb90222136 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.yml @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ tags: - AWS Cross Account Activity asset_type: AWS Account kill_chain_phases: - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation mitre_attack_id: - T1078 product: @@ -42,3 +42,13 @@ tags: - esponseElements.accessKey.status - responseElements.accessKey.accessKeyId security_domain: threat + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + message: tbd diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_role_creation.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_role_creation.yml index 278d0f4e6c..716b5afdee 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_role_creation.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_role_creation.yml @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ tags: - AWS Cross Account Activity asset_type: AWS Account kill_chain_phases: - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation mitre_attack_id: - T1078 product: @@ -52,3 +52,13 @@ tags: - responseElements.role.arn - responseElements.role.createDate security_domain: threat + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + message: tbd diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.yml index 01737566db..88a68e2870 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.yml @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ tags: - AWS Cross Account Activity asset_type: AWS Account kill_chain_phases: - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation mitre_attack_id: - T1078 product: @@ -44,3 +44,13 @@ tags: - esponseElements.role.roleName - esponseElements.role.createDate security_domain: threat + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + message: tbd diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.yml index f679ab2f5d..65d3fcbc40 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.yml @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ tags: - AWS Cross Account Activity asset_type: AWS Account kill_chain_phases: - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation mitre_attack_id: - T1550 product: @@ -43,3 +43,13 @@ tags: - status - region security_domain: threat + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + message: tbd diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml index ddf7c8380f..b3b0cf8b7d 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml @@ -62,3 +62,13 @@ tags: - cs_uri_ - cs_method_ security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + observable: + - name: dest + type: Other + role: + - Other + message: tbd diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml index 886749d524..1c82904c74 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml @@ -54,3 +54,13 @@ tags: - data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.role - data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.member security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + message: tbd diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml index dc1f9c384d..34c15899ac 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ name: Detect S3 access from a new IP -id: 2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-291bq3d0daq4 +id: e6f1bb1b-f441-492b-9126-902acda217da version: 1 date: '2018-06-28' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk @@ -50,5 +50,14 @@ tags: - remote_ip risk_object: src_ip risk_object_type: system - risk_score: 10 + risk_score: 25.0 security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + context: [] + observable: + - name: dest + type: Other + role: + - Other + message: tbd diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml index ad0109bbbc..aa0fd0bc27 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml @@ -37,3 +37,15 @@ tags: - indings{}.Resources{}.Id - user security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + message: tbd + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml index a79dcb7705..1a3311f9ab 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ name: Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS -id: ada0f278-84a8-46w1-a3f1-w32372d4bd53 +id: d3fffa37-492f-487b-a35d-c60fcb2acf01 version: 1 date: '2018-05-07' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk @@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ tags: - CIS 11 kill_chain_phases: - Actions on Objectives - - Command and Control + - Command & Control nist: - DE.AE - DE.CM @@ -66,5 +66,14 @@ tags: - dest_ip risk_object: src_ip risk_object_type: system - risk_score: 20 + risk_score: 25.0 security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + context: [] + observable: + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim + message: tbd diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml index 54c3d1e3e2..5708d40275 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ name: Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion -id: ad12w478-84a8-4641-a3w1-e32372q4bd53 +id: e733a326-59d2-446d-b8db-14a17151aa68 version: 1 date: '2018-11-27' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk @@ -58,5 +58,14 @@ tags: - userIdentity.arn risk_object: user risk_object_type: user - risk_score: 10 + risk_score: 25 security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + context: [] + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + message: tbd diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.yml index 2c013ad8f8..16e4caee23 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.yml @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ tags: - GCP Cross Account Activity asset_type: GCP Account kill_chain_phases: - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation mitre_attack_id: - T1078 product: @@ -43,3 +43,13 @@ tags: - data.protoPayload.request.location - http_user_agent security_domain: threat + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + message: tbd diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml index fffbf72898..02da5a1a13 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml @@ -38,3 +38,13 @@ tags: - responseStatus.reason - properties.pod security_domain: threat + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + message: tbd diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gdrive_suspicious_file_sharing.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gdrive_suspicious_file_sharing.yml index 18dae8549a..eb6bb79bd1 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gdrive_suspicious_file_sharing.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gdrive_suspicious_file_sharing.yml @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Spearphishing Attachments - Data Exfiltration + asset_type: GDrive dataset: - [] kill_chain_phases: @@ -45,3 +46,13 @@ tags: - parameters.doc_title - parameters.doc_type security_domain: threat + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + message: tbd diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/gsuite_suspicious_calendar_invite.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/gsuite_suspicious_calendar_invite.yml index 509051ffbe..e7d37480b9 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/gsuite_suspicious_calendar_invite.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/gsuite_suspicious_calendar_invite.yml @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Spearphishing Attachments + asset_type: GSuite dataset: - [] kill_chain_phases: @@ -45,3 +46,13 @@ tags: - parameters.target_calendar_id - parameters.event_title security_domain: threat + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + observable: + - name: dest + type: Other + role: + - Other + message: tbd diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml index 5632c3731f..e0c2f0c57d 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml @@ -47,3 +47,13 @@ tags: - src_ip - record_type security_domain: threat + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + message: tbd diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml index ab046a969e..21f6d988de 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml @@ -19,9 +19,9 @@ references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity - asset_type: AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster + asset_type: Kubernetes kill_chain_phases: - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security @@ -35,3 +35,13 @@ tags: - verb - requestURI security_domain: threat + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + message: tbd diff --git a/detections/experimental/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml b/detections/experimental/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml index 11eadc3426..b56038ae4e 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml @@ -33,3 +33,15 @@ tags: required_fields: - _time security_domain: threat + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + message: tbd + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml index fcfcc54a95..9f2e0ccd51 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml @@ -56,3 +56,17 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process - Processes.user security_domain: endpoint + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml index 488f5da7ec..e09acd7a85 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml @@ -12,8 +12,7 @@ how_to_implement: Splunk Universal Forwarder running on Linux systems, capturing user tries passing in a single \ character at the end of the command while using the shell and edit flags. known_false_positives: unknown -references: -- https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 @@ -37,3 +36,13 @@ tags: required_fields: - _time security_domain: endpoint + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: dest + type: Other + role: + - Other diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault.yml index c12028a3f3..42f51d53a4 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault.yml @@ -15,8 +15,7 @@ how_to_implement: Splunk Universal Forwarder running on Linux systems (tested on single host known_false_positives: If sudoedit is throwing segfaults for other reasons this will pick those up too. -references: -- https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 @@ -41,3 +40,13 @@ tags: - _time - host security_domain: endpoint + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: dest + type: Other + role: + - Other diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery.yml index fefe68bcd7..138773d3ee 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery.yml @@ -12,8 +12,7 @@ how_to_implement: OSQuery installed and configured to pick up process events (in The vulnerability is exposed when a non privledged user tries passing in a single \ character at the end of the command while using the shell and edit flags. known_false_positives: unknown -references: -- https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 @@ -38,3 +37,13 @@ tags: - _time - columns.cmdline security_domain: endpoint + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: dest + type: Other + role: + - Other diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_outlook_exe_writing_a_zip_file.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_outlook_exe_writing_a_zip_file.yml index e70d615a84..c1370af1e3 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_outlook_exe_writing_a_zip_file.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_outlook_exe_writing_a_zip_file.yml @@ -59,3 +59,17 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_name - Processes.user security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml index 12fcddd9a5..956446e04c 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ tags: - CIS 8 kill_chain_phases: - Installation - - Command and Control + - Command & Control - Actions on Objectives nist: - ID.AM @@ -56,3 +56,17 @@ tags: - Processes.user - Processes.process_name security_domain: endpoint + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml index 1e26050d02..ba5b608fbe 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ name: Detection of tools built by NirSoft -id: 1297fb80-f42a-4q4a-9c8b-78c061417cf6 +id: 3d8d201c-aa03-422d-b0ee-2e5ecf9718c0 version: 3 date: '2020-07-21' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk @@ -45,3 +45,13 @@ tags: - Processes.process_name - Processes.user security_domain: endpoint + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/exchange_powershell_abuse_via_ssrf.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/exchange_powershell_abuse_via_ssrf.yml index c11216919f..1672164f73 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/exchange_powershell_abuse_via_ssrf.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/exchange_powershell_abuse_via_ssrf.yml @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - ProxyShell + asset_type: Endpoint confidence: 100 context: - Source:Endpoint diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/exchange_powershell_module_usage.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/exchange_powershell_module_usage.yml index ba9c5b83c7..45ce11a430 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/exchange_powershell_module_usage.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/exchange_powershell_module_usage.yml @@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - ProxyShell + asset_type: Endpoint confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml index 62ed76c155..23648d5880 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml @@ -34,7 +34,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Zoom Child Processes asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 3 - CIS 8 diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml index 0f221b05c8..2ce4422ec2 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml @@ -54,3 +54,13 @@ tags: - Message - dest security_domain: endpoint + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/macos___re_opened_applications.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/macos___re_opened_applications.yml index c3471e1e03..5447042b0c 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/macos___re_opened_applications.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/macos___re_opened_applications.yml @@ -28,12 +28,14 @@ known_false_positives: At this stage, there are no known false positives. During to an allow list. references: [] tags: + analytic_story: + - ColdRoot MacOS RAT asset_type: Endpoint cis20: - CIS 8 kill_chain_phases: - Installation - - Command and Control + - Command & Control nist: - DE.DP - DE.CM @@ -50,3 +52,17 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_name - Processes.dest security_domain: threat + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/microsoft_exchange_mailbox_replication_service_writing_active_server_pages.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/microsoft_exchange_mailbox_replication_service_writing_active_server_pages.yml index b679633591..8694624697 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/microsoft_exchange_mailbox_replication_service_writing_active_server_pages.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/microsoft_exchange_mailbox_replication_service_writing_active_server_pages.yml @@ -51,10 +51,11 @@ tags: analytic_story: - ProxyShell - Ransomware + asset_type: Endpoint confidence: 90 context: - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Exploitation + - Stage:Execution dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/windows-sysmon_proxylogon.log impact: 90 diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/print_processor_registry_autostart.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/print_processor_registry_autostart.yml index bb3b2100fd..dbfc6288e0 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/print_processor_registry_autostart.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/print_processor_registry_autostart.yml @@ -32,10 +32,11 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Windows Persistence Techniques - Windows Privilege Escalation + asset_type: Endpoint confidence: 100 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage:Privilege Escalation Persistence + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Privilege Escalation dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/print_reg/sysmon_print.log impact: 80 @@ -51,7 +52,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: user - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml index c13758062f..97472ca581 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ tags: - CIS 4 - CIS 8 kill_chain_phases: - - Command and Control + - Command & Control nist: - DE.DP product: @@ -46,3 +46,13 @@ tags: - columns.pid - host security_domain: threat + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: dest + type: Other + role: + - Other diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/randomly_generated_scheduled_task_name.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/randomly_generated_scheduled_task_name.yml index 5d4a7ebb1a..d09385d7d4 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/randomly_generated_scheduled_task_name.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/randomly_generated_scheduled_task_name.yml @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Lateral Movement + asset_type: Endpoint confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -37,9 +38,7 @@ tags: - Stage:Lateral Movement impact: 90 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation - - Lateral Movement - - Persistence + - Exploitation message: A windows scheduled task with a suspicious task name was created on $dest$ mitre_attack_id: - T1053 diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/randomly_generated_windows_service_name.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/randomly_generated_windows_service_name.yml index 7f857f29e1..c5eb9d0ddc 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/randomly_generated_windows_service_name.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/randomly_generated_windows_service_name.yml @@ -30,14 +30,14 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Lateral Movement + asset_type: Endpoint confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint - Stage:Lateral Movement impact: 90 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation message: A Windows Service with a suspicious service name was installed on $ComputerName$ mitre_attack_id: - T1543 diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml index d9c7c0dda1..587c417d02 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml @@ -54,3 +54,17 @@ tags: - Processes.dest - Processes.user security_domain: endpoint + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml index 1661777c58..4c29386212 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml @@ -44,3 +44,13 @@ tags: - Filesystem.action - Filesystem.dest security_domain: endpoint + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/ssa___anomalous_usage_of_account_credentials.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/ssa___anomalous_usage_of_account_credentials.yml index b0aad151f4..3a3cdf1e24 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/ssa___anomalous_usage_of_account_credentials.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/ssa___anomalous_usage_of_account_credentials.yml @@ -39,8 +39,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/account_login/windows-security.log impact: 20 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation - - Lateral Movement + - Exploitation message: Multiple interactive logins detected on $device$ mitre_attack_id: - T1078.002 @@ -59,3 +58,4 @@ tags: risk_score: 6 risk_severity: low security_domain: access + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/ssa___detect_kerberoasting.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/ssa___detect_kerberoasting.yml index 404a1733d4..4e5e3a2594 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/ssa___detect_kerberoasting.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/ssa___detect_kerberoasting.yml @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ date: '2020-10-21' author: Xiao Lin, Splunk type: TTP datamodel: -- Certificates +- Endpoint_Processes description: This search detects a potential kerberoasting attack via service principal name requests search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval _time=map_get(input_event, "_time"), @@ -61,9 +61,9 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: cmd_line - type: processname + type: Process role: - - Others + - Other product: - Splunk Behavioral Analytics required_fields: @@ -76,3 +76,4 @@ tags: risk_score: 14 risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/ssa___disable_defender_antivirus_registry.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/ssa___disable_defender_antivirus_registry.yml index 48e10acfc3..403547a5c0 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/ssa___disable_defender_antivirus_registry.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/ssa___disable_defender_antivirus_registry.yml @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: user - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: @@ -68,3 +68,4 @@ tags: - Registry.registry_value_data risk_score: 49 security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/ssa___excessive_number_of_office_files_copied.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/ssa___excessive_number_of_office_files_copied.yml index c997c19f28..8f1980901c 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/ssa___excessive_number_of_office_files_copied.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/ssa___excessive_number_of_office_files_copied.yml @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ tags: confidence: 80 context: - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Exfitration + - Stage:Exfiltration dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/mass_file_creation/windows-sysmon.log impact: 90 @@ -38,6 +38,15 @@ tags: message: High number of files copied mitre_attack_id: - T1048.003 + observable: + - name: dest_user_id + type: User + role: + - Actor + - name: dest_device_id + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim product: - Splunk Behavioral Analytics required_fields: @@ -48,3 +57,4 @@ tags: risk_score: 72 risk_severity: medium security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml index 4c5509119e..7f40834840 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml @@ -47,11 +47,11 @@ tags: - CIS 8 confidence: 60 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Defense Evasion + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Defense Evasion impact: 50 kill_chain_phases: - - Command and Control + - Command & Control - Actions on Objectives message: A process $process_name$ ha been identified in the environment with a command-line $cmd_line$ not previously seen before on host $dest_device_id$ @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: dest_user_id - type: user + type: User role: - Victim product: @@ -83,3 +83,4 @@ tags: risk_score: 30 risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/ssa___high_file_deletion_frequency.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/ssa___high_file_deletion_frequency.yml index 44820b1827..4c80844d43 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/ssa___high_file_deletion_frequency.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/ssa___high_file_deletion_frequency.yml @@ -69,3 +69,4 @@ tags: risk_score: 72 risk_severity: medium security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/ssa___rare_parent_process_relationship_lolbas.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/ssa___rare_parent_process_relationship_lolbas.yml index 7a55f59651..1c198a76ba 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/ssa___rare_parent_process_relationship_lolbas.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/ssa___rare_parent_process_relationship_lolbas.yml @@ -62,8 +62,11 @@ tags: - Unusual Processes cis20: - CIS 8 + context: + - Source:Endpoint kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation + message: Rare Parent-Child Process Relationship mitre_attack_id: - T1203 - T1059 @@ -74,6 +77,15 @@ tags: - DE.CM product: - Splunk Behavioral Analytics + observable: + - name: dest_user_id + type: User + role: + - Actor + - name: dest_device_id + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim required_fields: - process - process_name @@ -84,3 +96,7 @@ tags: - cmd_line risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/ssa___windows_wsreset_uac_bypass.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/ssa___windows_wsreset_uac_bypass.yml index b7f96bf3ab..09a2a3a5ea 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/ssa___windows_wsreset_uac_bypass.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/ssa___windows_wsreset_uac_bypass.yml @@ -47,11 +47,10 @@ tags: - Stage:Persistence - Stage:Privilege Escalation - Stage:Defense Evasion - - Scope:Incoming impact: 70 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation - message: null + - Exploitation + message: tbd mitre_attack_id: - T1548.002 - T1548 @@ -76,3 +75,4 @@ tags: risk_score: 63 risk_severity: medium security_domain: endpoint + asset_type: Endpoint diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml index 64e2877222..f040044a13 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml @@ -44,3 +44,13 @@ tags: - ImageLoaded - QueryName security_domain: endpoint + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/suspicious_curl_network_connection.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/suspicious_curl_network_connection.yml index f55ac89bd4..e6c08c0328 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/suspicious_curl_network_connection.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/suspicious_curl_network_connection.yml @@ -47,3 +47,17 @@ tags: - Processes.process_id - Processes.parent_process_id security_domain: endpoint + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/suspicious_plistbuddy_usage.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/suspicious_plistbuddy_usage.yml index aa11b87cab..561a1ffe12 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/suspicious_plistbuddy_usage.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/suspicious_plistbuddy_usage.yml @@ -43,7 +43,6 @@ known_false_positives: Some legitimate applications may use PlistBuddy to create modify property lists and possibly generate false positives. Review the property list being modified or created to confirm. references: -- https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/ - https://marcosantadev.com/manage-plist-files-plistbuddy/ tags: analytic_story: @@ -69,3 +68,17 @@ tags: - Processes.process_id - Processes.parent_process_id security_domain: endpoint + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_via_osquery.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_via_osquery.yml index 88e0be8d4e..4a0f6a3dee 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_via_osquery.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_via_osquery.yml @@ -38,7 +38,6 @@ known_false_positives: Some legitimate applications may use PlistBuddy to create modify property lists and possibly generate false positives. Review the property list being modified or created to confirm. references: -- https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/ - https://marcosantadev.com/manage-plist-files-plistbuddy/ tags: analytic_story: @@ -58,3 +57,13 @@ tags: - _time - columns.cmdline security_domain: endpoint + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: dest + type: Other + role: + - Other diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/suspicious_sqlite3_lsquarantine_behavior.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/suspicious_sqlite3_lsquarantine_behavior.yml index 8d2ca0f819..36e24b86b2 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/suspicious_sqlite3_lsquarantine_behavior.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/suspicious_sqlite3_lsquarantine_behavior.yml @@ -46,3 +46,17 @@ tags: - Processes.process_id - Processes.parent_process_id security_domain: endpoint + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/unusual_number_of_computer_service_tickets_requested.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/unusual_number_of_computer_service_tickets_requested.yml index 68f71a22c7..c0bffafeae 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/unusual_number_of_computer_service_tickets_requested.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/unusual_number_of_computer_service_tickets_requested.yml @@ -36,16 +36,15 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Lateral Movement + asset_type: Endpoint confidence: 60 context: - Source:Endpoint - Stage:Lateral Movement impact: 70 kill_chain_phases: - - Reconnaissance - Exploitation - - Lateral Movement - message: null + message: '' mitre_attack_id: - T1078 observable: diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/unusual_number_of_remote_endpoint_authentication_events.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/unusual_number_of_remote_endpoint_authentication_events.yml index 9428f6bd7f..24ffd72893 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/unusual_number_of_remote_endpoint_authentication_events.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/unusual_number_of_remote_endpoint_authentication_events.yml @@ -36,16 +36,15 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Lateral Movement + asset_type: Endpoint confidence: 60 context: - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Reconnaissance - Stage:Lateral Movement impact: 70 kill_chain_phases: - Reconnaissance - - Lateral Movement - message: null + message: '' mitre_attack_id: - T1078 observable: diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml index 529c9a6115..ed8de1afa9 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml @@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ tags: - Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns - Ransomware asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 confidence: 60 diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml index cfd863f5ce..b62bc02122 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml @@ -59,3 +59,17 @@ tags: - Processes.process_name - Processes.process security_domain: endpoint + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/windows_java_spawning_shells.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/windows_java_spawning_shells.yml index 0383efa02a..cd3ce4774a 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/windows_java_spawning_shells.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/windows_java_spawning_shells.yml @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 + asset_type: Endpoint confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -51,7 +52,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process - name: process_name diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/winrm_spawning_a_process.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/winrm_spawning_a_process.yml index 9091e07ec0..69f91b9d8a 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/winrm_spawning_a_process.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/winrm_spawning_a_process.yml @@ -30,13 +30,13 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Unusual Processes + asset_type: Endpoint cve: - CVE-2021-31166 dataset: [] kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation - - Privilege Escalation - - Denial of Service + - Actions on Objectives mitre_attack_id: - T1190 product: @@ -53,3 +53,17 @@ tags: - Processes.process_id - Processes.parent_process_id security_domain: endpoint + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml index f5b7a1d1dd..92c4f6c9f3 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml @@ -44,3 +44,13 @@ tags: - consumer - ComputerName security_domain: endpoint + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim diff --git a/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml b/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml index 35198a8c69..a7194323db 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml @@ -46,3 +46,13 @@ tags: - Message - query security_domain: endpoint + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: dest + type: Other + role: + - Other diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml b/detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml index e6a11d65d8..e4fcb63be6 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml @@ -56,3 +56,13 @@ tags: - host - src_interface security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: dest + type: Other + role: + - Other diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml b/detections/experimental/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml index edcb6b026a..8bb72723fc 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml @@ -70,3 +70,13 @@ tags: - vendor_explanation - action security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml b/detections/experimental/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml index b6c28a321f..e83658be85 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ tags: - CIS 9 - CIS 12 kill_chain_phases: - - Command and Control + - Command & Control mitre_attack_id: - T1095 nist: @@ -61,3 +61,13 @@ tags: - All_Traffic.src_ip - All_Traffic.dest_ip security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml b/detections/experimental/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml index ac78f31672..64e5376afc 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ name: Detect Outbound SMB Traffic -id: 7f5fb3e1-4209-414-90db-0ec21b936378 +id: 1bed7774-304a-4e8f-9d72-d80e45ff492b version: 3 date: '2020-07-21' author: Bhavin Patel, Stuart Hopkins from Splunk @@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ tags: - CIS 12 kill_chain_phases: - Actions on Objectives - - Command and Control + - Command & Control mitre_attack_id: - T1071.002 - T1071 @@ -67,3 +67,13 @@ tags: - All_Traffic.dest_category - All_Traffic.src_ip security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml b/detections/experimental/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml index 8192b5d516..e296eac61d 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml @@ -69,3 +69,13 @@ tags: - host - src_interface security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: dest + type: Other + role: + - Other diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml b/detections/experimental/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml index d8ad514d5a..5eb66b87bb 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml @@ -53,3 +53,13 @@ tags: - src_mac - host security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: dest + type: Other + role: + - Other diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml b/detections/experimental/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml index 7f6da7e8e4..dad4a82700 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml @@ -45,3 +45,13 @@ tags: - src_ip - dest_ip security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml b/detections/experimental/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml index 3f0c9dfe91..5d9a257be4 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml @@ -57,3 +57,13 @@ tags: - All_Traffic.src - All_Traffic.dest security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml b/detections/experimental/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml index 61e09c25b5..d52de1e497 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml @@ -54,3 +54,13 @@ tags: - mnemonic - host security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: dest + type: Other + role: + - Other diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml b/detections/experimental/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml index bb7d0d5ad7..949fe28962 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml @@ -51,3 +51,13 @@ tags: - All_Sessions.src_ip - All_Sessions.dest_mac security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml b/detections/experimental/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml index a661c3901d..88e9a2b233 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml @@ -15,8 +15,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Splunk Stream DNS and Splunk Stream TCP. via stream:tcp. Replace the macro definitions ('stream:dns' and 'stream:tcp') with configurations for your Splunk environment. known_false_positives: unknown -references: -- https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/ +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350 @@ -39,3 +38,13 @@ tags: required_fields: - _time security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: dest + type: Other + role: + - Other diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml b/detections/experimental/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml index 95739b43f7..bbd2e57c97 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml @@ -18,8 +18,7 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data into Splunk. records via bro:dns:json and TCP payload over 65KB in size via bro:conn:json. The Network Resolution and Network Traffic datamodels are in use for this search. known_false_positives: unknown -references: -- https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/ +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350 @@ -46,3 +45,13 @@ tags: - All_Traffic.bytes_in - All_Traffic.flow_id security_domain: endpoint + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: dest + type: Other + role: + - Other diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml b/detections/experimental/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml index e342b749ef..8523d2505f 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml @@ -44,3 +44,13 @@ tags: - _time - operation security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml b/detections/experimental/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml index 31cdbc34f6..ee96751fd5 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ tags: - CIS 8 - CIS 12 kill_chain_phases: - - Command and Control + - Command & Control mitre_attack_id: - T1071.004 - T1071 @@ -76,3 +76,13 @@ tags: - DNS.query - DNS.record_type security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml b/detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml index cb94803ee8..cec2f83d3c 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ tags: - CIS 9 - CIS 12 kill_chain_phases: - - Command and Control + - Command & Control mitre_attack_id: - T1071.004 - T1071 @@ -49,3 +49,13 @@ tags: - DNS.reply_code - DNS.src security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: dest + type: Other + role: + - Other diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml b/detections/experimental/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml index 5aa0990151..6a262b5c94 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml @@ -59,3 +59,13 @@ tags: - All_Traffic.dest_category - All_Traffic.src_ip security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml b/detections/experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml index 2e0b991cb7..68e9b07637 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml @@ -43,3 +43,13 @@ tags: - DNS.record_type - DNS.dest security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml b/detections/experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml index 5a8069c717..41048fbb52 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ tags: - CIS 12 kill_chain_phases: - Delivery - - Command and Control + - Command & Control mitre_attack_id: - T1048 nist: @@ -51,3 +51,13 @@ tags: - All_Traffic.dest_ip - All_Traffic.dest_port security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml b/detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml index b322fb9b11..9f30cb5ec7 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ tags: - CIS 9 - CIS 12 kill_chain_phases: - - Command and Control + - Command & Control mitre_attack_id: - T1048.003 - T1048 @@ -53,3 +53,13 @@ tags: - All_Traffic.src_ip - All_Traffic.dest_ip security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml b/detections/experimental/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml index 0fd478139a..785ccaffdb 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml @@ -55,3 +55,17 @@ tags: - All_Traffic.dest - All_Traffic.action security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml b/detections/experimental/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml index 5994b5c9fa..eca0d41867 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml @@ -50,3 +50,13 @@ tags: - All_Traffic.dest - All_Traffic.dest_port security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml b/detections/experimental/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml index e08cb53592..23404f523f 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml @@ -60,3 +60,13 @@ tags: - All_Traffic.dest - All_Traffic.dest_port security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml b/detections/experimental/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml index a62819f41c..5681dd83cb 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml @@ -47,3 +47,13 @@ tags: - All_Traffic.app - All_Traffic.src security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml b/detections/experimental/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml index cd37b1f69a..8e9fca0874 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml @@ -69,3 +69,13 @@ tags: - All_Traffic.app - All_Traffic.src security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/ssa___unusual_volume_download_from_internal_server.yml b/detections/experimental/network/ssa___unusual_volume_download_from_internal_server.yml index 9f61ffc805..94df6fe3f9 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/ssa___unusual_volume_download_from_internal_server.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/ssa___unusual_volume_download_from_internal_server.yml @@ -39,10 +39,12 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Insider Threat + asset_type: endpoint cis20: - CIS 13 confidence: 50 - context: null + context: + - Source:Endpoint dataset: - https://github.com/splunk/attack_data/blob/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/unusual_data_download/unusual_volume_data_download.txt impact: 50 @@ -57,9 +59,9 @@ tags: - DE.AE observable: - name: src_device_ip - type: Host IP + type: IP Address role: - - Others + - Other product: - Splunk Behavioral Analytics required_fields: diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/tor_traffic.yml b/detections/experimental/network/tor_traffic.yml index 3bafb42c04..26a2a9c13d 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/tor_traffic.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/tor_traffic.yml @@ -25,14 +25,14 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch - Ransomware - - Command and Control - NOBELIUM Group + - Command and Control asset_type: Endpoint cis20: - CIS 9 - CIS 12 kill_chain_phases: - - Command and Control + - Command & Control mitre_attack_id: - T1071 - T1071.001 @@ -50,3 +50,13 @@ tags: - All_Traffic.dest_ip - All_Traffic.dest_port security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim diff --git a/detections/experimental/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml b/detections/experimental/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml index d750349cb9..2c76654c05 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml @@ -47,3 +47,13 @@ tags: - dest_ip - url security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml b/detections/experimental/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml index 88be39beaa..2f9f0b4098 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml @@ -39,3 +39,13 @@ tags: - Web.src - Web.dest security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml b/detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902.yml similarity index 91% rename from detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml rename to detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902.yml index d75adce6aa..7dd2d1e61b 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rct_cve_2020_5902.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902.yml @@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ known_false_positives: unknown references: - https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/about/news/f5-fixes-critical-vulnerability-discovered-by-positive-technologies-in-big-ip-application-delivery-controller/ - https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K52145254 -- https://blog.cloudflare.com/cve-2020-5902-helping-to-protect-against-the-f5-tmui-rce-vulnerability/ tags: analytic_story: - F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902 @@ -42,3 +41,13 @@ tags: required_fields: - _time security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: dest + type: Other + role: + - Other diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml b/detections/experimental/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml index a8d46e234b..8f9be6a222 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml @@ -50,3 +50,13 @@ tags: - Web.src - Web.dest security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml b/detections/experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml index 6621361bdf..6e92f955fc 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml @@ -36,3 +36,13 @@ tags: - Web.url - Web.src security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: src + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml b/detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml index ae53b74d2c..780f42ccb3 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml @@ -62,3 +62,17 @@ tags: - Web.url - Web.http_user_agent security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim diff --git a/detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml b/detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml index 060fbfacbd..0c59ce3170 100644 --- a/detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml +++ b/detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ tags: - CIS 13 - CIS 18 kill_chain_phases: - - Exfiltration + - Exploitation mitre_attack_id: - T1505.003 nist: @@ -51,3 +51,18 @@ tags: - Web.user - Web.http_user_agent security_domain: network + confidence: 50 + impact: 50 + risk_score: 25 + context: [] + message: tbd + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim + asset_type: Web Server diff --git a/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml b/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml index ae495cfec9..0ada2429b8 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ name: Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers -id: c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6v5464g9f +id: a1e761ac-1344-4dbd-88b2-3f34c912d359 version: 3 date: '2021-01-14' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk @@ -53,20 +53,19 @@ tags: - Dynamic DNS - Command and Control asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 - CIS 12 - CIS 13 confidence: 80 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Initial Access + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Initial Access dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1189/dyn_dns_site/windows-sysmon.log impact: 70 kill_chain_phases: - - Command and Control + - Command & Control - Actions on Objectives message: A dns query $query$ from your infra connecting to suspicious domain in host $host$ @@ -82,10 +81,6 @@ tags: type: Hostname role: - Victim - - name: query - type: dnsquery - role: - - Attacker product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security diff --git a/detections/network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml b/detections/network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml index 97ca0cb956..e6b401b3cc 100644 --- a/detections/network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml +++ b/detections/network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ name: Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic -id: c77162d3-f91c-45cc-80c8-22f6v546119f +id: 5e06e262-d7cd-4216-b2f8-27b437e18458 version: 1 date: '2021-12-13' author: Bhavin Patel, Johan Bjerke, Splunk @@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 12 - CIS 13 @@ -44,7 +43,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_ldap/bro_conn.json impact: 70 kill_chain_phases: - - Command and Control + - Command & Control - Actions on Objectives message: An outbound LDAP connection from $src_ip$ in your infrastructure connecting to dest ip $dest_ip$ diff --git a/detections/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml b/detections/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml index 30c1805342..181e3a2e35 100644 --- a/detections/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml +++ b/detections/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml @@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ tags: - Suspicious DNS Traffic - Command and Control asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 - CIS 12 @@ -38,7 +37,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/long_dns_queries/windows-sysmon.log impact: 70 kill_chain_phases: - - Command and Control + - Command & Control message: A dns query $query$ with 2 time standard deviation of name len of the dns query in host $host$ mitre_attack_id: @@ -53,10 +52,6 @@ tags: type: Hostname role: - Victim - - name: query - type: dnsquery - role: - - Attacker product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security diff --git a/detections/network/multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic.yml b/detections/network/multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic.yml index 5fb5ffc2ba..3c52e5ca0b 100644 --- a/detections/network/multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic.yml +++ b/detections/network/multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic.yml @@ -33,9 +33,9 @@ references: - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/ tags: analytic_story: - - Command and Control - Data Exfiltration - automated_detection_testing: passed + - Command and Control + asset_type: Endpoint confidence: 50 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/archive_http_post/stream_http_events.log impact: 50 kill_chain_phases: - - Exfiltration + - Exploitation message: A http post $http_method$ sending packet with possible archive bytes header 4form_data$ in uri path $uri_path$ mitre_attack_id: @@ -52,11 +52,11 @@ tags: - T1048 observable: - name: uri_path - type: UriPath + type: URL role: - Attacker - name: form_data - type: formdata + type: Other role: - Attacker product: diff --git a/detections/network/plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data.yml b/detections/network/plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data.yml index 3716f34a17..cb131c6700 100644 --- a/detections/network/plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data.yml +++ b/detections/network/plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data.yml @@ -23,9 +23,9 @@ references: - https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/03/trickbot-primer.html tags: analytic_story: - - Command and Control - Data Exfiltration - automated_detection_testing: passed + - Command and Control + asset_type: Endpoint confidence: 90 context: - Source:Endpoint @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/plain_exfil_data/stream_http_events.log impact: 70 kill_chain_phases: - - Exfiltration + - Exploitation message: A http post $http_method$ sending packet with plain text of information $form_data$ in uri path $uri_path$ mitre_attack_id: @@ -42,11 +42,11 @@ tags: - T1048 observable: - name: uri_path - type: UriPath + type: URL role: - Attacker - name: form_data - type: formdata + type: Other role: - Attacker product: diff --git a/detections/network/ssa___tcp_command_and_scripting_interpreter_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml b/detections/network/ssa___tcp_command_and_scripting_interpreter_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml index 021e8420fd..b31cc83115 100644 --- a/detections/network/ssa___tcp_command_and_scripting_interpreter_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml +++ b/detections/network/ssa___tcp_command_and_scripting_interpreter_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 + asset_type: endpoint cis20: - CIS 13 confidence: 70 @@ -46,7 +47,7 @@ tags: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059/log4shell_ldap_traffic/pantraffic.log impact: 50 kill_chain_phases: - - Execution + - Exploitation message: An outbound LDAP connection from $src_ip$ in your infrastructure connecting to dest ip $dest_ip$ mitre_attack_id: @@ -64,7 +65,7 @@ tags: role: - Victim - name: parent_process_name - type: Parent Process + type: Process role: - Parent Process product: diff --git a/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.yml b/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.yml index e7b549f675..b215579384 100644 --- a/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.yml +++ b/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.yml @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 - automated_detection_testing: passed + asset_type: Endpoint cis20: - CIS 3 - CIS 5 diff --git a/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.yml b/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.yml index 0e781ffc20..03ebd5363c 100644 --- a/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.yml +++ b/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.yml @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 - automated_detection_testing: passed + asset_type: Endpoint cis20: - CIS 3 - CIS 5 diff --git a/dist/api/baselines.json b/dist/api/baselines.json index 340f37e7a6..22599cb140 100644 --- a/dist/api/baselines.json +++ b/dist/api/baselines.json @@ -1 +1,2403 @@ -{"baselines": [], "count": 0} \ No newline at end of file +[ + { + "name": "Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS", + "id": "fc0edd96-ff2b-48b0-9f1f-63da3782fd63", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-05-07", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and the standard deviation of the number of outbound connections blocked in your VPC flow logs by each source IP address (IP address of your EC2 instances). Also recorded is the number of data points for each source IP. This table outputs to a lookup file to allow the detection search to operate quickly.", + "search": "`cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow` action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR src_ip=192.168.0.0/16) ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16) | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as numberOfBlockedConnections by _time, src_ip | stats count(numberOfBlockedConnections) as numDataPoints, latest(numberOfBlockedConnections) as latestCount, avg(numberOfBlockedConnections) as avgBlockedConnections, stdev(numberOfBlockedConnections) as stdevBlockedConnections by src_ip | table src_ip, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgBlockedConnections, stdevBlockedConnections | outputlookup baseline_blocked_outbound_connections | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your `VPC flow logs.`.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Command & Control", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "action", + "src_ip", + "dest_ip" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + } + }, + { + "name": "Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User", + "id": "1da5d5ea-4382-447d-98a9-87c358c95fcb", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-09-07", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many API calls are performed by each user. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model and the model is rebuilt weekly. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of instances created in a small time window.", + "search": "| tstats count as api_calls from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.user!=unknown All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%w\") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | table _time api_calls, user, HourOfDay, isWeekend | eventstats dc(api_calls) as api_calls by user, HourOfDay, isWeekend | where api_calls >= 1 | fit DensityFunction api_calls by \"user,HourOfDay,isWeekend\" into cloud_excessive_api_calls_v1 dist=norm show_density=true", + "how_to_implement": "You must have Enterprise Security 6.0 or later, if not you will need to verify that the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or later is installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users in your environment, you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 90 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud User Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Weekly Model Rebuild 90 Day Lookback" + ], + "detections": [ + "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.user", + "All_Changes.status" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + } + }, + { + "name": "Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", + "id": "a2f701f8-5296-4d74-829c-0b7eb346d549", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-08-25", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many instances are destroyed in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model and the model is rebuilt weekly. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of instances destroyed in a small time window.", + "search": "| tstats count as instances_destroyed from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=deleted AND All_Changes.status=success AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by _time span=1h | makecontinuous span=1h _time | eval instances_destroyed=coalesce(instances_destroyed, (random()%2)*0.0000000001) | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%w\") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | table _time instances_destroyed, HourOfDay, isWeekend | fit DensityFunction instances_destroyed by \"HourOfDay,isWeekend\" into cloud_excessive_instances_destroyed_v1 dist=expon show_density=true", + "how_to_implement": "You must have Enterprise Security 6.0 or later, if not you will need to verify that the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or later is installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users in your environment, you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 30 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data.\\\nMore information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", + "Cloud Cryptomining" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Weekly Model Rebuild 90 Day Lookback" + ], + "detections": [ + "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.status", + "All_Changes.object_category" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + } + }, + { + "name": "Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", + "id": "b01bd274-f661-4f9c-bd9f-cf23ff6ae0bc", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-08-14", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many instances are created in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model and the model is rebuilt weekly. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of instances created in a small time window.", + "search": "| tstats count as instances_launched from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=created) AND All_Changes.status=success AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by _time span=1h | makecontinuous span=1h _time | eval instances_launched=coalesce(instances_launched, (random()%2)*0.0000000001) | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%w\") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | table _time instances_launched, HourOfDay, isWeekend | fit DensityFunction instances_launched by \"HourOfDay,isWeekend\" into cloud_excessive_instances_created_v1 dist=expon show_density=true", + "how_to_implement": "You must have Enterprise Security 6.0 or later, if not you will need to verify that the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or later is installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users in your environment, you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 90 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data.\\\nMore information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Weekly Model Rebuild 90 Day Lookback" + ], + "detections": [ + "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.status", + "All_Changes.object_category" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + } + }, + { + "name": "Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User", + "id": "67b84d51-8329-4909-849f-8d38ce54260a", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-09-07", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many API calls for security groups are performed by each user. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model and the model is rebuilt weekly.", + "search": "| tstats count as security_group_api_calls from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.object_category=firewall All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%w\") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | table _time security_group_api_calls, user, HourOfDay, isWeekend | eventstats dc(security_group_api_calls) as security_group_api_calls by user, HourOfDay, isWeekend | where security_group_api_calls >= 1 | fit DensityFunction security_group_api_calls by \"user,HourOfDay,isWeekend\" into cloud_excessive_security_group_api_calls_v1 dist=norm show_density=true", + "how_to_implement": "You must have Enterprise Security 6.0 or later, if not you will need to verify that the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or later is installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users in your environment, you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 90 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud User Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Weekly Model Rebuild 90 Day Lookback" + ], + "detections": [ + "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.user", + "All_Changes.status", + "All_Changes.object_category" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + } + }, + { + "name": "Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", + "id": "d2a4d85b-fc6a-47a0-82f6-bc1ec2ebc459", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-05-08", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model to characterize the length of the command lines observed for each user in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 30 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies outliers in the length of the command line.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as start_time max(_time) as end_time FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | search user!=unknown | `security_content_ctime(start_time)`| `security_content_ctime(end_time)`| eval processlen=len(process) | fit DensityFunction processlen by user into cmdline_pdfmodel", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint data model. In addition, you must have the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version >= 4.2 installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users in your environment, you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 30 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data. More information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Ransomware", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Unusual Processes" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd.exe", + "Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + } + }, + { + "name": "Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK", + "id": "c914844c-0ff5-4efc-8d44-c063443129ba", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-05-08", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Resolution" + ], + "description": "This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model to characterize the length of the DNS queries for each DNS record type observed in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 30 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which uses it to identify outliers in the length of the DNS query.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query DNS.record_type | search DNS.record_type=* | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | eval query_length = len(query) | fit DensityFunction query_length by record_type into dns_query_pdfmodel", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. In addition, you must have the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version >= 4.2 installed, along with any required dependencies. By default, the search builds the model using the past 30 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data. More information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Command & Control", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "DNS.query", + "DNS.record_type" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + } + }, + { + "name": "Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN", + "id": "fc0edd96-ff2b-4810-9f1f-63da3783fd63", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-05-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and the standard deviation of the number of API calls that were related to network ACLs made by each user. Also recorded is the number of data points for each user. This table is then outputted to a lookup file to allow the detection search to operate quickly.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` `network_acl_events` | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as apiCalls by _time, arn | stats count(apiCalls) as numDataPoints, latest(apiCalls) as latestCount, avg(apiCalls) as avgApiCalls, stdev(apiCalls) as stdevApiCalls by arn | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup network_acl_activity_baseline | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. To add or remove API event names for network ACLs, edit the macro `network_acl_events`.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "userIdentity.arn" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + } + }, + { + "name": "Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN", + "id": "841b102c-8866-494b-a704-87b674fe9b09", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-07-17", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and standard deviation for the number of API calls related to deleting an S3 bucket by each user. Also recorded is the number of data points for each user. This table is then outputted to a lookup file to allow the detection search to operate quickly.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteBucket | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as apiCalls by _time, arn | stats count(apiCalls) as numDataPoints, latest(apiCalls) as latestCount, avg(apiCalls) as avgApiCalls, stdev(apiCalls) as stdevApiCalls by arn | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup s3_deletion_baseline | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "userIdentity.arn" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + } + }, + { + "name": "Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN", + "id": "fc0edd96-ff2b-48b0-9f1f-63da3783fd63", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-04-17", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and the standard deviation for the number of API calls related to security groups made by each user. Also recorded is the number of data points for each user. This table is then outputted to a lookup file to allow the detection search to operate quickly.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` `security_group_api_calls` | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as apiCalls by _time, arn | stats count(apiCalls) as numDataPoints, latest(apiCalls) as latestCount, avg(apiCalls) as avgApiCalls, stdev(apiCalls) as stdevApiCalls by arn | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup security_group_activity_baseline | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. To add or remove API event names for security groups, edit the macro `security_group_api_calls`.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS User Monitoring" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect Spike in Security Group Activity" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "userIdentity.arn" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + } + }, + { + "name": "Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", + "id": "df98763b-0b08-4281-8ef9-08db7ac572a9", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-05-08", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model to characterize the number of SMB connections observed each hour for every day of week. By default, the search uses the last 30 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search to identify outliers in the number of SMB connections for that hour and day of the week.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb by _time span=10m, All_Traffic.src | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%A\") | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | fit DensityFunction count by \"HourOfDay,DayOfWeek\" into smb_pdfmodel", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model. In addition, you must have the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version >= 4.2 installed, along with any required dependencies. To improve your results, you may consider adding \"src\" to the by clause, which will build the model for each unique source in your enviornment. However, if you have a large number of hosts in your environment, this search may be very resource intensive. In this case, you may need to raise the value of max_inputs and/or max_groups in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 30 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data. More information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Ransomware" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Processes launching netsh", + "SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.app", + "All_Traffic.src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + } + }, + { + "name": "Count of assets by category", + "id": "dcfd6b40-42f9-469d-a433-2e53f7489ff9", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-13", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search shows you every asset category you have and the assets that belong to those categories.", + "search": "| from datamodel Identity_Management.All_Assets | stats count values(nt_host) by category | sort -count", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must first leverage the Assets and Identity framework in Enterprise Security to populate your assets_by_str.csv file which should then be mapped to the Identity_Management data model. The Identity_Management data model will contain a list of known authorized company assets. Ensure that all inventoried systems are constantly vetted and updated.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Asset Tracking" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Identity_Management.All_Assets", + "category" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + } + }, + { + "name": "Count of Unique IPs Connecting to Ports", + "id": "9f3bae5a-9fe3-49df-8c84-5edc51d84b7f", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-13", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "The search counts the number of times a connection was observed to each destination port, and the number of unique source IPs connecting to them.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count dc(All_Traffic.src) as numberOfUniqueHosts from datamodel=Network_Traffic by All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | sort - count", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting network traffic, and populating the Network_Traffic data model.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Command & Control" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + } + }, + { + "name": "Create a list of approved AWS service accounts", + "id": "08ef80f5-6555-474b-bb2d-22e2aa4206a4", + "version": 2, + "date": "2018-12-03", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for successful API activity in CloudTrail within the last 30 days, filters out known users from the identity table, and outputs values of users into `aws_service_accounts.csv` lookup file.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` errorCode=success | rename userName as identity | search NOT [inputlookup identity_lookup_expanded | fields identity] | stats count by identity | table identity | outputlookup aws_service_accounts | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Please validate the service account entires in `aws_service_accounts.csv`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search. Please remove the entries of service accounts that are not legitimate.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS User Monitoring" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "errorCode", + "userName" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + } + }, + { + "name": "Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security", + "id": "251930a5-1451-4428-bb13-eed5775be0ce", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-15", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search takes the existing interesting process table from ES, filters out any existing additions added by ESCU and then updates the table with processes identified by ESCU that should be prohibited on your endpoints.", + "search": "| inputlookup prohibited_processes | search note!=ESCU* | inputlookup append=T prohibited_processes | fillnull value=* dest dest_pci_domain | fillnull value=false is_required is_secure | fillnull value=true is_prohibited | outputlookup prohibited_processes | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "This search should be run on each new install of ESCU.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "SamSam Ransomware" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Prohibited Software On Endpoint" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + } + }, + { + "name": "Baseline of API Calls per User ARN", + "id": "4b5119c3-5369-4040-9430-b63b1a314229", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-04-09", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and the standard deviation of the number of API calls made by each user. Also recorded is the number of data points for each user. This table is then outputted to a lookup file to allow the detection search to operate quickly.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as apiCalls by _time, arn | stats count(apiCalls) as numDataPoints, latest(apiCalls) as latestCount, avg(apiCalls) as avgApiCalls, stdev(apiCalls) as stdevApiCalls by arn | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup api_call_by_user_baseline | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS User Monitoring" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect Spike in AWS API Activity" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventType", + "userIdentity.arn" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + } + }, + { + "name": "Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", + "id": "fa5634df-fb05-4b4b-aba0-6115138bb1ba", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-11-14", + "author": "Jason Brewer, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many RunInstances users do in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of RunInstances performed by a user in a small time window.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success `ec2_excessive_runinstances_mltk_input_filter` | bucket span=10m _time | stats count as instances_launched by _time src_user | fit DensityFunction instances_launched threshold=0.0005 into ec2_excessive_runinstances_v1", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.\\\nIn addition, you must have the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version >= 4.2 installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users in your environment, you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 30 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data.\\\nMore information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "errorCode", + "src_user" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + } + }, + { + "name": "Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK", + "id": "b28ed6de-e4ba-40f7-ae0a-93a088c774ab", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-11-14", + "author": "Jason Brewer, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many TerminateInstances users do in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of TerminateInstances performed by a user in a small time window.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=TerminateInstances errorCode=success `ec2_excessive_terminateinstances_mltk_input_filter` | bucket span=10m _time | stats count as instances_terminated by _time src_user | fit DensityFunction instances_terminated threshold=0.0005 into ec2_excessive_terminateinstances_v1", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.\\\nIn addition, you must have the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version >= 4.2 installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users in your environment, you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 30 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data.\\\nMore information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "errorCode", + "src_user" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail", + "id": "02add098-efa3-428d-b2e2-4ed0831c92f4", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-04-16", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for successful API calls made by different user roles, then creates a baseline of the earliest and latest times we have encountered this user role. It also returns the name of the API call in our dataset--grouped by user role and name of the API call--that occurred within the last 30 days. In this support search, we are only looking for events where the user identity is Assumed Role.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall errorCode=success userIdentity.type=AssumedRole | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by userName eventName | outputlookup previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Please validate the user role entries in `previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles.csv`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS User Monitoring" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect new API calls from user roles" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventType", + "errorCode", + "userIdentity.type", + "userName", + "eventName" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources", + "id": "ac88e6a0-4fba-4dfd-b7b9-8964df7d1aee", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-03-16", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search builds a table of the first and last times seen for every IP address (along with its physical location) previously associated with cloud-provisioning activity. This is broadly defined as any event that runs or creates something.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address", + "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City", + "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country", + "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "sourceIPAddress" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen EC2 AMIs", + "id": "bb1bd99d-1e93-45f1-9571-cfed42d372b9", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-03-12", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search builds a table of previously seen AMIs used to launch EC2 instances", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | rename requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId as amiID | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by amiID | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_amis.csv | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "errorCode", + "requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types", + "id": "b8f029f2-65a6-4d76-be98-dad1c9d59c45", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-03-08", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search builds a table of previously seen EC2 instance types", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | rename requestParameters.instanceType as instanceType | fillnull value=\"m1.small\" instanceType | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by instanceType | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.csv | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "errorCode", + "requestParameters.instanceType" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User", + "id": "6c767ac0-0906-4355-9a83-927f5ee7bdad", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-03-15", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search builds a table of previously seen ARNs that have launched a EC2 instance.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | rename userIdentity.arn as arn | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by arn | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.csv | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "errorCode", + "requestParameters.instanceType" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously seen users in CloudTrail", + "id": "fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd03", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-04-30", + "author": "Jason Brewer, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then creates a baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last 30 days. NOTE - This baseline search is deprecated and has been updated to use the Authentication Datamodel", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | iplocation src | eval City=if(City LIKE \"\",src,City),Region=if(Region LIKE \"\",src,Region) | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Please validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS Login Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", + "Detect new user AWS Console Login" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "userIdentity.arn", + "src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + } + }, + { + "name": "Update previously seen users in CloudTrail", + "id": "06c036e6-d6d7-4daa-bd76-411c3d356031", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-04-30", + "author": "Jason Brewer, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last hour. NOTE - This baseline search is deprecated and has been updated to use the Authentication Datamodel", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | iplocation src | eval City=if(City LIKE \"\",src,City),Region=if(Region LIKE \"\",src,Region) | stats earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime by user src City Region Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Please validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS Login Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", + "Detect new user AWS Console Login" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "userIdentity.arn", + "src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + } + }, + { + "name": "Discover DNS records", + "id": "c096f721-8842-42ce-bfc7-74bd8c72b7c3", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-02-14", + "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Resolution" + ], + "description": "The search takes corporate and common cloud provider domains configured under `cim_corporate_email_domains.csv`, `cim_corporate_web_domains.csv`, and `cloud_domains.csv` finds their responses across the last 30 days from data in the `Network_Resolution ` datamodel, then stores the output under the `discovered_dns_records.csv` lookup", + "search": "| inputlookup cim_corporate_email_domains.csv | inputlookup append=T cim_corporate_web_domains.csv | inputlookup append=T cim_cloud_domains.csv | eval domain = trim(replace(domain, \"\\*\", \"\")) | join domain [|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.record_type) as type, values(DNS.answer) as answer from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.message_type=RESPONSE DNS.answer!=\"unknown\" DNS.answer!=\"\" by DNS.query | rename DNS.query as query | where query!=\"unknown\" | rex field=query \"(?\\w+\\.\\w+?)(?:$|/)\"] | makemv delim=\" \" answer | makemv delim=\" \" type | sort -count | table count,domain,type,query,answer | outputlookup createinapp=true discovered_dns_records", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting DNS logs, and populating the Network_Resolution data model. Also make sure that the cim_corporate_web_domains and cim_corporate_email_domains lookups are populated with the domains owned by your corporation", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "DNS Hijacking" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "DNS record changed" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "DNS.record_type", + "DNS.answer", + "DNS.query" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + } + }, + { + "name": "DNSTwist Domain Names", + "id": "19f7d2ec-6028-4d01-bcdb-bda9a034c17f", + "version": 2, + "date": "2018-10-08", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search creates permutations of your existing domains, removes the valid domain names and stores them in a specified lookup file so they can be checked for in the associated detection searches.", + "search": "| dnstwist domainlist=domains.csv | `remove_valid_domains` | eval domain_abuse=\"true\" | table domain, domain_abuse | outputlookup brandMonitoring_lookup | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to update the file called domains.csv in the DA-ESS-SOC/lookup directory. Or `cim_corporate_email_domains.csv` and `cim_corporate_web_domains.csv` from **Splunk\\_SA\\_CIM**.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Brand Monitoring", + "Suspicious Emails" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Monitor Email For Brand Abuse", + "Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse", + "Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + } + }, + { + "name": "Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic", + "id": "5cdda34f-4caf-4128-a713-0837fc48b67a", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-15", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search counts the numbers of times the system has generated remote desktop traffic.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=3389 by All_Traffic.src | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | sort - count", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must ingest network traffic and populate the Network_Traffic data model.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Remote Desktop Network Traffic" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + } + }, + { + "name": "Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic", + "id": "baaeea15-fe8a-4090-92c2-5b60943bb608", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-15", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search counts the numbers of times the system has created remote desktop traffic", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=3389 by All_Traffic.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | sort - count", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must ingest network traffic and populate the Network_Traffic data model. If a system receives a lot of remote desktop traffic, you can apply the category common_rdp_destination to it.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Remote Desktop Network Traffic" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + } + }, + { + "name": "Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop", + "id": "063dfe9f-b1d7-4254-a16d-1e2e7eadd6a8", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-04-01", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search counts the numbers of times the remote desktop process, mstsc.exe, has run on each system.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=\"*mstsc.exe*\" by Processes.dest Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | sort - count", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data that records process activity.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Remote Desktop Network Traffic" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + } + }, + { + "name": "Monitor Successful Backups", + "id": "b4d0dfb2-2195-4f6e-93a3-48468ed9734e", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-12", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search is intended to give you a feel for how often successful backups are conducted in your environment. Fluctuations in these numbers will allow you to determine when you should investigate.", + "search": "`netbackup` \"Disk/Partition backup completed successfully.\" | bucket _time span=1d | stats dc(COMPUTERNAME) as count values(COMPUTERNAME) as dest by _time, MESSAGE", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting your backup logs.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Monitor Backup Solution" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Unsuccessful Netbackup backups" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + } + }, + { + "name": "Monitor Unsuccessful Backups", + "id": "b2178fed-592f-492b-b851-74161678aa56", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-12", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search is intended to give you a feel for how often backup failures happen in your environments. Fluctuations in these numbers will allow you to determine when you should investigate.", + "search": "`netbackup` \"An error occurred, failed to backup.\" | bucket _time span=1d | stats dc(COMPUTERNAME) as count values(COMPUTERNAME) as dest by _time, MESSAGE", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting your backup logs.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Monitor Backup Solution" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Unsuccessful Netbackup backups" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity", + "id": "1cc22b09-c867-416e-a511-cb36ac44aee2", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-06-04", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for **AssumeRole** events where the requesting account differs from the requested account, then writes these relationships to a lookup file.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=AssumeRole | spath output=requestingAccountId path=userIdentity.accountId | spath output=requestedAccountId path=resources{}.accountId | search requestingAccountId=* | where requestingAccountId!=requestedAccountId | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by requestingAccountId, requestedAccountId | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.csv`, a lookup file created by this support search.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "userIdentity.accountId", + "resources{}.accountId" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial", + "id": "82af2ed9-8f4b-4785-a152-ba61e6a23bbf", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-08-15", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Authentication" + ], + "description": "This search looks for **AssumeRole** events where the requesting account differs from the requested account, then writes these relationships to a lookup file.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=AssumeRole by Authentication.vendor_account Authentication.user Authentication.src Authentication.user_role | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | rex field=user_role \"arn:aws:sts:*:(?.*):\" | where vendor_account != dest_account | rename vendor_account as requestingAccountId dest_account as requestedAccountId | table requestingAccountId requestedAccountId firstTime lastTime | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity", + "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later)and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.csv`, a lookup file created by this support search.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "90 Day Baseline" + ], + "detections": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Authentication.signature", + "Authentication.vendor_account", + "Authentication.user", + "Authentication.src", + "Authentication.user_role" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update", + "id": "dd6fb3a9-4906-48cb-8626-c88a25a056c3", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-08-15", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Authentication" + ], + "description": "This search looks for **AssumeRole** events where the requesting account differs from the requested account, then writes these relationships to a lookup file.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=AssumeRole by Authentication.vendor_account Authentication.user Authentication.src Authentication.user_role | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | rex field=user_role \"arn:aws:sts:*:(?.*):\" | where vendor_account != dest_account | rename vendor_account as requestingAccountId dest_account as requestedAccountId | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by requestingAccountId requestedAccountId | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity", + "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.csv`, a lookup file created by this support search.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Authentication.signature", + "Authentication.vendor_account", + "Authentication.user", + "Authentication.src", + "Authentication.user_role" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen AWS Regions", + "id": "fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd63", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-01-08", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where an AWS instance is started and creates a baseline of most recent time (latest) and the first time (earliest) we've seen this region in our dataset grouped by the value awsRegion for the last 30 days", + "search": "`cloudtrail` StartInstances | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by awsRegion | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_regions.csv | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "awsRegion" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial", + "id": "69d75f4b-b794-4a66-a777-730357b886b4", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-09-03", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search builds a table of the first and last times seen for every user role and command combination. This is broadly defined as any event that runs or creates something. This table is then cached.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.user_type=AssumedRole AND All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-7d@d\"), 1, 0) | table user, command, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud User Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "90 Day Baseline" + ], + "detections": [ + "Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.user_type", + "All_Changes.status", + "All_Changes.user", + "All_Changes.command" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update", + "id": "c4b760a0-6a97-47e9-b089-8ae9e57f210e", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-09-03", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search updates the table of the first and last times seen for every user role and command combination.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.user_type=AssumedRole AND All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | table user, command, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen | inputlookup previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role append=t | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen, max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by user, command | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_forget_window`) | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-7d@d\"), 1, 0) | table user, command, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud User Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.user_type", + "All_Changes.status", + "All_Changes.user", + "All_Changes.command" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Initial", + "id": "dd4ced8a-15a9-4285-94ac-7e4134673bf8", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-08-15", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search builds a table of previously seen users that have launched a cloud compute instance.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs and have the proper TAs installed.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Cloud Cryptomining" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Hourly Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.object_category", + "All_Changes.user" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Update", + "id": "6bf75d69-7766-47bc-8097-e41696807a6f", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-08-15", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search builds a table of previously seen users that have launched a cloud compute instance.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by All_Changes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by user | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), \"-90d@d\") | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-7d@d\"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs and have the proper TAs installed.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Cloud Cryptomining" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.object_category", + "All_Changes.user" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial", + "id": "7744597f-d07a-4cea-94a7-e0f8aaebc410", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-10-08", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search builds a table of previously seen images used to launch cloud compute instances", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.image_id | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Instance_Changes\")` | where image_id != \"unknown\" | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-7d@d\"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_images", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs and have the latest Change Datamodel accelerated", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Cloud Cryptomining" + ], + "deployments": [ + "90 Day Baseline" + ], + "detections": [ + "Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.Instance_Changes.image_id" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update", + "id": "6f1ca5dc-e445-401c-9845-a96d2b6ba184", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-08-12", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search builds a table of previously seen images used to launch cloud compute instances", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.image_id | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Instance_Changes\")` | where image_id != \"unknown\" | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cloud_compute_images | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by image_id | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_forget_window`) | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-7d@d\"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_images", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Cloud Cryptomining" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.Instance_Changes.image_id" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial", + "id": "3c78025c-1ffe-4976-a640-75ef604842be", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-9-03", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search builds a table of previously seen cloud compute instance types", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.instance_type | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes.Instance_Changes\")` | where instance_type != \"unknown\" | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-14d@d\"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs and have the Security Research cloud data model installed.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Cloud Cryptomining" + ], + "deployments": [ + "90 Day Baseline" + ], + "detections": [ + "Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.Instance_Changes.instance_type" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update", + "id": "7b7ef9ab-acb9-4e07-af76-4cf1e722885c", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-9-03", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search builds a table of previously seen cloud compute instance types", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.instance_type | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes.Instance_Changes\")` | where instance_type != \"unknown\" | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by instance_type | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_type_forget_window`) | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-14d@d\"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Cloud Cryptomining" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.Instance_Changes.instance_type" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Initial", + "id": "f36dc403-739d-42f3-83a3-49237d8654c5", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-07-29", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search builds a table of previously seen users that have modified a cloud instance.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=modified All_Changes.change_type=EC2 c=success by All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-7d@d\"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs and have the latest Change Datamodel accelerated.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "90 Day Baseline" + ], + "detections": [ + "Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.change_type", + "All_Changes.status", + "All_Changes.user" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update", + "id": "534b7d30-7b0c-4510-8f55-65439850d58d", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-07-29", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search updates a table of previously seen Cloud Instance modifications that have been made by a user", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=modified All_Changes.change_type=EC2 All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by user | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_forget_window`) | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-7d@d\"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. To add or remove APIs that modify an EC2 instance, edit the macro `ec2_modification_api_calls`.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.change_type", + "All_Changes.status", + "All_Changes.user" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial", + "id": "4ce865fc-f43e-4521-a8ed-ab8af99052d7", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-08-19", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search builds a table of the first and last times seen for every IP address (along with its physical location) previously associated with cloud-provisioning activity. This is broadly defined as any event that runs or creates something. This table is then cached.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(Country) | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-7d@d\"), 1, 0) | table src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "90 Day Baseline" + ], + "detections": [ + "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address", + "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City", + "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country", + "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.src", + "All_Changes.status" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update", + "id": "9830abb9-be80-4563-b232-09bf1f628cf3", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-08-20", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This returns the first and last times seen for every IP address (along with its physical location) previously associated with cloud-provisioning activity within the last day. Cloud provisioning is broadly defined as any event that runs or creates something. It then updates this information with historical data and filters out locations that have not been seen within the specified time window. This updated table is then cached.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(Country) | table src, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, City, Country, Region | inputlookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources append=t | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen, max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by src, City, Country, Region | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_forget_window`) | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-7d@d\"), 1, 0) | table src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address", + "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City", + "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country", + "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.src", + "All_Changes.status" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial", + "id": "b5e232db-dec6-4db8-aaa1-dd5474521e40", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-09-02", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search looks for cloud compute events where a compute instance is started and creates a baseline of most recent time, `lastTime` and the first time `firstTime` we've seen this region in our dataset grouped by the region for the last 30 days", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.vendor_region | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-14d@d\"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_regions", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs and have the Security Research cloud data model installed.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Cloud Cryptomining" + ], + "deployments": [ + "90 Day Baseline" + ], + "detections": [ + "Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.vendor_region" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update", + "id": "512f928a-a461-41b4-8984-db4dd2c472e4", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-09-02", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search looks for cloud compute events where a compute instance is started and creates a baseline of most recent time, `lastTime` and the first time `firstTime` we've seen this region in our dataset grouped by the region for the last 30 days", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.vendor_region | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cloud_regions | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by vendor_region | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_region_forget_window`) | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-14d@d\"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_regions | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs and have the Security Research cloud data model installed.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Cloud Cryptomining" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.vendor_region" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously seen command line arguments", + "id": "56059acf-50fe-4f60-98d1-b75b51b5c2f3", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-03-01", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for command-line arguments where `cmd.exe /c` is used to execute a program, then creates a baseline of the earliest and latest times we have encountered this command-line argument in our dataset within the last 30 days.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process=\"* /c *\" by Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The complete process name with command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "IcedID" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "First time seen command line argument" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen EC2 Modifications By User", + "id": "4d69091b-d975-4267-85df-888bd41034eb", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-04-05", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search builds a table of previously seen ARNs that have launched a EC2 instance.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` `ec2_modification_api_calls` errorCode=success | spath output=arn userIdentity.arn | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by arn | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. To add or remove APIs that modify an EC2 instance, edit the macro `ec2_modification_api_calls`.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "userIdentity.arn", + "errorCode" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial", + "id": "64ce0ade-cb01-4678-bddd-d31c0b175394", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-06-23", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This collects the services that have been started across your entire enterprise.", + "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rex field=Message \"The (?[-\\(\\)\\s\\w]+) service entered the (?\\w+) state\" | where state=\"running\" | stats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen by service | outputlookup previously_seen_running_windows_services", + "how_to_implement": "While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM, you must be ingesting your Windows security-event logs for it to execute successfully. Please ensure that the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows is version 8.0.0 or above.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "deployments": [ + "90 Day Baseline" + ], + "detections": [ + "First Time Seen Running Windows Service" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update", + "id": "2e3bdd68-1863-46ee-81f8-87273eee7f1c", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-06-23", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search returns the first and last time a Windows service was seen across your enterprise within the last hour. It then updates this information with historical data and filters out Windows services pairs that have not been seen within the specified time window. This updated table is then cached.", + "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rex field=Message \"The (?[-\\(\\)\\s\\w]+) service entered the (?\\w+) state\" | where state=\"running\" | stats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen by service | inputlookup previously_seen_running_windows_services append=t | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen, max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by service | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), \"`previously_seen_windows_service_forget_window`\") | outputlookup previously_seen_running_windows_services", + "how_to_implement": "While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM, you must be ingesting your Windows security-event logs for it to execute successfully. Please ensure that the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows is version 8.0.0 or above.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Hourly Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "First Time Seen Running Windows Service" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously seen S3 bucket access by remote IP", + "id": "54c40c6a-9a5b-4a79-9291-85977f713961", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-06-28", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for successful access to S3 buckets from remote IP addresses, then creates a baseline of the earliest and latest times we have encountered this remote IP within the last 30 days. In this support search, we are only looking for S3 access events where the HTTP response code from AWS is \"200\"", + "search": "`aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200 | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by bucket_name remote_ip | outputlookup previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your S3 access-logs inputs. You must validate the remote IP and bucket name entries in `previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip.csv`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect S3 access from a new IP" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "http_status", + "bucket_name", + "remote_ip" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial", + "id": "0a87ecf9-dc6a-43af-861a-205e75a09bf5", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-05-28", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Authentication" + ], + "description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then creates a baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by username, within the last 30 days.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | rename Authentication.user as user Authentication.src as src | table user src City Region Country firstTime lastTime | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`, which is a lookup file created by this support search.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "90 Day Baseline" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", + "Detect AWS Console Login by New User" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Authentication.signature", + "Authentication.user", + "Authentication.src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update", + "id": "66ff71c2-7e01-47dd-a041-906688c9d322", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-05-28", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Authentication" + ], + "description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by user, within the last hour.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | rename Authentication.user as user Authentication.src as src | table user src City Region Country firstTime lastTime | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins", + "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`, which is a lookup file created by this support search.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", + "Detect AWS Console Login by New User" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Authentication.signature", + "Authentication.user", + "Authentication.src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial", + "id": "60b9c00f-a9d6-4e51-803c-5d63ea21b95b", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-05-20", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search returns the first and last time a process was seen per endpoint with a parent process of zoom.exe (Windows) or zoom.us (macOS). This table is then cached.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTimeSeen max(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.us) by Processes.process_name Processes.dest| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | table dest, process_name, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen | outputlookup zoom_first_time_child_process", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Zoom Child Processes" + ], + "deployments": [ + "90 Day Baseline" + ], + "detections": [ + "First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update", + "id": "80aea7fd-5da2-4533-b3c2-560533bfbaee", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-05-20", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search returns the first and last time a process was seen per endpoint with a parent process of zoom.exe (Windows) or zoom.us (macOS) within the last hour. It then updates this information with historical data and filters out proces_name and endpoint pairs that have not been seen within the specified time window. This updated table is outputed to disk.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTimeSeen max(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.us) by Processes.process_name Processes.dest| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | table firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, process_name, dest | inputlookup zoom_first_time_child_process append=t | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by process_name, dest | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), \"`previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_forget_window`\") | outputlookup zoom_first_time_child_process", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Zoom Child Processes" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Hourly Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + } + }, + { + "name": "Systems Ready for Spectre-Meltdown Windows Patch", + "id": "fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd61", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-01-08", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "Some AV applications can cause the Spectre/Meltdown patch for Windows not to install successfully. This registry key is supposed to be created by the AV engine when it has been patched to be able to handle the Windows patch. If this key has been written, the system can then be patched for Spectre and Meltdown.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Change_Analysis.All_Changes where All_Changes.object_category=registry AND (All_Changes.object_path=\"HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\QualityCompat*\") by All_Changes.dest, All_Changes.command, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.object_path | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")`", + "how_to_implement": "You need to be ingesting logs with both the process name and command-line from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.object_category", + "All_Changes.object_path", + "All_Changes.dest", + "All_Changes.command", + "All_Changes.user", + "All_Changes.object" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + } + }, + { + "name": "Windows Updates Install Failures", + "id": "6a4dbd1b-4502-4a11-943a-82b5ae7a42d7", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-14", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search is intended to give you a feel for how often Windows updates fail to install in your environment. Fluctuations in these numbers will allow you to determine when you should be concerned.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc(Updates.dest) as count FROM datamodel=Updates where Updates.vendor_product=\"Microsoft Windows\" AND Updates.status=failure by _time span=1d", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your Windows Update Logs", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Monitor for Updates" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "No Windows Updates in a time frame" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Updates.vendor_product", + "Updates.status" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + } + }, + { + "name": "Windows Updates Install Successes", + "id": "6a80535c-86a6-4b54-894c-4b446d0c701d", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-14", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search is intended to give you a feel for how often successful Windows updates are applied in your environments. Fluctuations in these numbers will allow you to determine when you should be concerned.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc(Updates.dest) as count FROM datamodel=Updates where Updates.vendor_product=\"Microsoft Windows\" AND Updates.status=installed by _time span=1d", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your Windows Update Logs", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Monitor for Updates" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "No Windows Updates in a time frame" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Updates.vendor_product", + "Updates.status" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + } + } +] \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/dist/api/deployments.json b/dist/api/deployments.json index 857c394da0..eda8dc4bdc 100644 --- a/dist/api/deployments.json +++ b/dist/api/deployments.json @@ -1 +1,101 @@ -{"deployments": [{"name": "Baseline Cache Hourly Updates", "id": "1030c701-2acf-4b1a-9970-46c7145caf2d", "date": "2020-06-24", "author": "Bhavin Patel", "description": "This configuration file applies to all baselines with tag deployments Hourly Cache Updates", "scheduling": {"cron_schedule": "55 * * * *", "earliest_time": "-70m@m", "latest_time": "-10m@m", "schedule_window": "auto"}, "tags": {"deployments": ["Hourly Cache Updates"]}}, {"name": "Weekly Model Rebuild 90 Day Lookback", "id": "4b329568-bcff-49fa-8c85-92e95f0f270d", "date": "2020-09-07", "author": "David Dorsey", "description": "This configuration file applies to all baselines with tag deployments Weekly Model Rebuild 90 Day Lookback", "scheduling": {"cron_schedule": "0 2 * * 0", "earliest_time": "-90d@d", "latest_time": "-1d@d", "schedule_window": "auto"}, "tags": {"deployments": ["Weekly Model Rebuild 90 Day Lookback"]}}, {"name": "Enterprise Security config for Splunk Security Analytics for AWS customers", "id": "bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46f211", "date": "2021-01-20", "author": "Bhavin Patel", "description": "This configuration file applies to all correlation searches that are used in the Splunk Security Analytics for AWS product. NOTE - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS searches do not need notable configurations", "scheduling": {"cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", "earliest_time": "-70m@m", "latest_time": "-10m@m", "schedule_window": "auto"}, "tags": {"product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS"]}}, {"name": "Baseline Cache Daily Updates", "id": "9541d6f8-fa58-4d48-bb44-6720e39b7b0d", "date": "2020-08-18", "author": "David Dorsey", "description": "This configuration file applies to all baselines with tag deployments Daily Cache Updates", "scheduling": {"cron_schedule": "10 0 * * *", "earliest_time": "-1450m@m", "latest_time": "-10m@m", "schedule_window": "auto"}, "tags": {"deployments": ["Daily Cache Updates"]}}, {"name": "Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation Deployment", "id": "974c422f-db3f-4538-8f2a-ee5bf8eec0fa", "date": "2021-01-13", "author": "Patrick Bareiss", "description": "Example for a deployment for a specific Detection", "scheduling": {"cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", "earliest_time": "-70m@m", "latest_time": "-10m@m", "schedule_window": "auto"}, "alert_action": {"notable": {"rule_description": "%description%", "rule_title": "%name%", "nes_fields": ["user", "dest", "src"]}}, "tags": {"detection_name": "Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation"}}, {"name": "Enterprise Security deployment configuration", "id": "bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46f212", "date": "2020-04-27", "author": "Bhavin Patel", "description": "This configuration file applies to all correlation searches that are used for detection", "scheduling": {"cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", "earliest_time": "-70m@m", "latest_time": "-10m@m", "schedule_window": "auto"}, "alert_action": {"notable": {"rule_description": "%description%", "rule_title": "%name%", "nes_fields": ["user", "dest", "src"]}}, "tags": {"analytic_story": "all"}}, {"name": "Detect ARP Poisoning deployment configuration", "id": "e1d5b4dc-4cf3-404f-905c-b478bbb20474", "date": "2020-08-14", "author": "Mikael Bjerkeland", "description": "This configuration file applies to the Detect ARP Poisoning detection", "scheduling": {"cron_schedule": "59 * * * *", "earliest_time": "-70m@m", "latest_time": "-10m@m", "schedule_window": "auto"}, "alert_action": {"notable": {"rule_description": "ARP Poisoning has been detected on interface $src_interface$ on host $orig_host$. This may be an indication of a MITM attack.", "rule_title": "ARP Poisoning Detected on $orig_host$", "nes_fields": ["src_interface", "firstTime", "lastTime", "count"]}}, "tags": {"detection_name": "Detect ARP Poisoning"}}, {"name": "Credential Dumping Story", "id": "52f52a7c-078f-4413-84da-388b61ccac26", "date": "2021-01-13", "author": "Patrick Bareiss", "description": "Example for a deployment for a specific Analytics Story", "scheduling": {"cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", "earliest_time": "-70m@m", "latest_time": "-10m@m", "schedule_window": "auto"}, "alert_action": {"notable": {"rule_description": "%description%", "rule_title": "%name%", "nes_fields": ["user", "dest", "src"]}}, "tags": {"analytic_story": "Credential Dumping"}}, {"name": "Detect Rogue DHCP Server deployment configuration", "id": "6e4e20ac-e719-4ebe-a52d-d672cd451dbb", "date": "2020-08-14", "author": "Mikael Bjerkeland", "description": "This configuration file applies to the Detect Rogue DHCP Server detection", "scheduling": {"cron_schedule": "59 * * * *", "earliest_time": "-70m@m", "latest_time": "-10m@m", "schedule_window": "auto"}, "alert_action": {"notable": {"rule_description": "DHCP Snooping has detected a Rogue DHCP Server on $orig_host$ from $src_mac$. This may be an indication of a MITM attack.", "rule_title": "Rogue DHCP Server Detected on $orig_host$", "nes_fields": ["src_mac", "firstTime", "lastTime", "count", "message_type"]}}, "tags": {"detection_name": "Detect Rogue DHCP Server"}}, {"name": "90 Day Baseline Searches", "id": "6eac9f8b-a35d-4b64-b57f-e5ecde43be6b", "date": "2020-06-24", "author": "Bhavin Patel", "description": "This configuration file applies to all baselines with tag deployments Long Running Baseline", "scheduling": {"cron_schedule": "0 1 1 1,4,7,10 *", "earliest_time": "-90d@d", "latest_time": "-1d@d", "schedule_window": "auto"}, "tags": {"deployments": ["90 Day Baseline"]}}], "count": 10} \ No newline at end of file +[ + { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + }, + { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Correlation", + "id": "36ba498c-46e8-4b62-8bde-67e984a40fb4", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type Correlation. These correlations will generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Correlation", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + } +] \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/dist/api/detections.json b/dist/api/detections.json index 63d0ebdb2e..42101552ba 100644 --- a/dist/api/detections.json +++ b/dist/api/detections.json @@ -1 +1,108693 @@ -{"detections": [{"name": "Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL", "id": "c661f6be-a38c-11eb-be57-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-04-22", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by IcedID malware family. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `rundll32.exe` without a `.dll` file extension. In malicious instances, the command-line of `rundll32.exe` will look like `rundll32 ..\\oepddl.igk2,DllRegisterServer`. In addition, Threat Research has released a detection identifying the use of `DllRegisterServer` on the command-line of `rundll32.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze the `DLL` that was dropped to disk. The Office Product will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\") `process_rundll32` (Processes.process!=*.dll*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/395471/0/html", "https://app.any.run/tasks/cef4b8ba-023c-4b3b-b2ef-6486a44f6ed9/", "https://any.run/malware-trends/icedid"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "recon"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_icedid.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ and no dll commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "process name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Phishing", "Spearphishing Attachment"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_rundll32"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll_filter"}]}, {"name": "Office Document Executing Macro Code", "id": "b12c89bc-9d06-11eb-a592-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-14", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this detection was designed to identifies suspicious office documents that using macro code. Macro code is known to be one of the prevalent weaponization or attack vector of threat actor. This malicious macro code is embed to a office document as an attachment that may execute malicious payload, download malware payload or other malware component. It is really good practice to disable macro by default to avoid automatically execute macro code while opening or closing a office document files.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 process_name IN (\"WINWORD.EXE\", \"EXCEL.EXE\", \"POWERPNT.EXE\") ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\VBE7INTL.DLL\",\"*\\\\VBE7.DLL\", \"*\\\\VBEUI.DLL\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ImageLoaded) as AllImageLoaded count by Computer EventCode Image process_name ProcessId ProcessGuid | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_document_executing_macro_code_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and ImageLoaded (Like sysmon EventCode 7) from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Also be sure to include those monitored dll to your own sysmon config.", "known_false_positives": "Normal Office Document macro use for automation", "references": ["https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/386500/0/html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Trickbot", "IcedID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Office document executing a macro on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["ImageLoaded", "AllImageLoaded", "Computer", "EventCode", "Image", "process_name", "ProcessId", "ProcessGuid", "_time"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Phishing", "Spearphishing Attachment"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "office_document_executing_macro_code_filter"}]}, {"name": "Windows AdFind Exe", "id": "bd3b0187-189b-46c0-be45-f52da2bae67f", "version": 2, "date": "2021-11-03", "author": "Jose Hernandez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for the execution of `adfind.exe` with command-line arguments that it uses by default. Specifically the filter or search functions. It also considers the arguments necessary like objectcategory, see readme for more details: https://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/usage.htm. This has been seen used before by Wizard Spider, FIN6 and actors whom also launched SUNBURST. AdFind.exe is usually used a recon tool to enumare a domain controller.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process=\"* -f *\" OR Processes.process=\"* -b *\") AND (Processes.process=*objectcategory* OR Processes.process=\"* -gcb *\" OR Processes.process=\"* -sc *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_adfind_exe_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "administrators rarely use adfind, usually not used for legitimate reasons", "references": ["https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/a-nasty-trick-from-credential-theft-malware-to-business-disruption.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["NOBELIUM Group", "Domain Trust Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1018"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote System Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Rocke", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT39", "APT32", "Deep Panda", "Threat Group-3390", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leafminer", "Ke3chang", "FIN8", "APT3", "FIN5", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Turla"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "windows_adfind_exe_filter"}]}, {"name": "Local Account Discovery With Wmic", "id": "4902d7aa-0134-11ec-9d65-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for local users. The argument `useraccount` is used to leverage WMI to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` (Processes.process=*useraccount*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `local_account_discovery_with_wmic_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Local user discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087", "T1087.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Account Discovery", "Local Account"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Turla", "Poseidon Group", "OilRig", "Ke3chang", "APT32", "APT1", "Threat Group-3390", "APT3", "admin@338"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_wmic"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "local_account_discovery_with_wmic_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line", "id": "9b3af1e6-5b68-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies when Microsoft HTML Application Host (mshta.exe) utility is used to make remote http connections. Adversaries may use mshta.exe to proxy the download and execution of remote .hta files. The analytic identifies command line arguments of http and https being used. This technique is commonly used by malicious software to bypass preventative controls. The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process \"rundll32.exe\" and its parent process.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_mshta` (Processes.process=\"*http://*\" OR Processes.process=\"*https://*\") by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mshta_url_in_command_line_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible legitimate applications may perform this behavior and will need to be filtered.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses", "https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/search/-search-3x-wds-extidx-prot-implementing"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious MSHTA Activity"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $est$ by user $user$ attempting to access a remote destination to download an additional payload.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Mshta"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "APT32", "MuddyWater", "FIN7"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=mshta.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSHTA.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_mshta"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_mshta_url_in_command_line_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Renamed RClone", "id": "6dca1124-b3ec-11eb-9328-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifies the usage of `rclone.exe`, renamed, being used to exfiltrate data to a remote destination. RClone has been used by multiple ransomware groups to exfiltrate data. In many instances, it will be downloaded from the legitimate site and executed accordingly. During triage, isolate the endpoint and begin to review parallel processes for additional behavior. At this stage, the adversary may have staged data to be exfiltrated.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.original_file_name=rclone.exe AND Processes.process_name!=rclone.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_renamed_rclone_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as this analytic identifies renamed instances of `rclone.exe`. Filter as needed if there is a legitimate business use case.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/blog/rclone-mega-extortion/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html", "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1020/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1020"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 27, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Automated Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Tropic Trooper", "Frankenstein", "Honeybee"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_renamed_rclone_filter"}]}, {"name": "NLTest Domain Trust Discovery", "id": "c3e05466-5f22-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-25", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for the execution of `nltest.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for Domain Trust information. Two arguments `/domain trusts`, returns a list of trusted domains, and `/all_trusts`, returns all trusted domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike use NLTest.exe to enumerate the current domain to assist with further understanding where to pivot next.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=nltest.exe OR Processes.process_name!=nltest.exe) (Processes.process=*/domain_trusts* OR Processes.process=*/all_trusts*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `nltest_domain_trust_discovery_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may use nltest for troubleshooting purposes, otherwise, rarely used.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1482/T1482.md", "https://malware.news/t/lets-learn-trickbot-implements-network-collector-module-leveraging-cmd-wmi-ldap/19104", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482/", "https://www.owasp.org/images/4/4b/Red_Team_Operating_in_a_Modern_Environment.pdf", "https://ss64.com/nt/nltest.html", "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/domain-trust-discovery/", "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/08/ryuks-return/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware", "Domain Trust Discovery", "IcedID", "Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Domain trust discovery execution on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1482"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Domain Trust Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "nltest_domain_trust_discovery_filter"}]}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques", "id": "cde75cf6-3c7a-4dd6-af01-27cdb4511fd4", "version": 5, "date": "2021-01-19", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for PowerShell processes launched with arguments that have characters indicative of obfuscation on the command-line.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| eval num_obfuscation = (mvcount(split(process,\"`\"))-1) + (mvcount(split(process, \"^\"))-1) + (mvcount(split(process, \"'\"))-1) | `malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques_filter` | search num_obfuscation > 10 ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "These characters might be legitimately on the command-line, but it is not common.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/obfuscated_powershell/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Powershell.exe running with potential obfuscated arguments on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "PowerShell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "Gallmaker", "Turla", "APT19", "DarkHydrus", "APT28", "Thrip", "Gorgon Group", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leviathan", "TA459", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT32", "FIN7", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "APT3", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_powershell"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe", "id": "dcfd6b40-42f9-469d-a433-2e53f7486664", "version": 6, "date": "2020-11-10", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for executions of cmd.exe spawned by a process that is often abused by attackers and that does not typically launch cmd.exe.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |search [`prohibited_apps_launching_cmd`] | `detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts and populates the Endpoint data model with the resultant dataset. This search includes a lookup file, `prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.csv`, that contains a list of processes that should not be spawning cmd.exe. You can modify this lookup to better suit your environment. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "There are circumstances where an application may legitimately execute and interact with the Windows command-line interface. Investigate and modify the lookup file, as appropriate.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "Suspicious Zoom Child Processes", "NOBELIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/powershell_spawn_cmd/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ running prohibited applications.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "Windows Command Shell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "TA505", "Blue Mockingbird", "Tropic Trooper", "Frankenstein", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "Honeybee", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Turla", "Silence", "APT32", "APT39", "Darkhotel", "MuddyWater", "APT18", "APT38", "Dark Caracal", "Gorgon Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Rancor", "Ke3chang", "APT37", "Leviathan", "FIN8", "APT28", "Magic Hound", "Sowbug", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Gamaredon Group", "Suckfly", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-1314", "APT3", "admin@338", "APT1"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_cmd"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "| inputlookup prohibited_apps_launching_cmd | rename prohibited_applications as parent_process_name | eval parent_process_name=\"*\" . parent_process_name | table parent_process_name", "description": "This macro outputs a list of process that should not be the parent process of cmd.exe", "name": "prohibited_apps_launching_cmd", "lookups": [{"description": "A list of processes that should not be launching cmd.exe", "fields": "prohibited_applications", "filename": "prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(prohibited_applications)", "name": "prohibited_apps_launching_cmd", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.csv"}]}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe_filter"}]}, {"name": "Disable Registry Tool", "id": "cd2cf33c-9201-11eb-a10a-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-31", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search identifies modification of registry to disable the regedit or registry tools of the windows operating system. Since registry tool is a swiss knife in analyzing registry, malware such as RAT or trojan Spy disable this application to prevent the removal of their registry entry such as persistence, file less components and defense evasion.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System\\\\DisableRegistryTools\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_registry_tool_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "admin may disable this application for non technical user.", "references": ["https://any.run/report/ea4ea08407d4ee72e009103a3b77e5a09412b722fdef67315ea63f22011152af/a866d7b1-c236-4f26-a391-5ae32213dfc4#registry"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Disabled Registry Tools on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.user", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 40, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disable_registry_tool_filter"}]}, {"name": "Any Powershell DownloadString", "id": "4d015ef2-7adf-11eb-95da-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-03-01", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a file using `DownloadString` method. This particular method is utilized in many different PowerShell frameworks to download files and output to disk. Identify the source (IP/domain) and destination file and triage appropriately. If AMSI logging or PowerShell transaction logs are available, review for further details of the implant.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process=*.DownloadString* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `any_powershell_downloadstring_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present and filtering will need to occur by parent process or command line argument. It may be required to modify this query to an EDR product for more granular coverage.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.net.webclient.downloadstring?view=net-5.0", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "HAFNIUM Group", "Ingress Tool Transfer"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior identifies the use of DownloadString within PowerShell.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "PowerShell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "Gallmaker", "Turla", "APT19", "DarkHydrus", "APT28", "Thrip", "Gorgon Group", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leviathan", "TA459", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT32", "FIN7", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "APT3", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_powershell"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "any_powershell_downloadstring_filter"}]}, {"name": "Windows DiskCryptor Usage", "id": "d56fe0c8-4650-11ec-a8fa-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-15", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies DiskCryptor process name of dcrypt.exe or internal name dcinst.exe. This utility has been utilized by adversaries to encrypt disks manually during an operation. In addition, during install, a dcrypt.sys driver is installed and requires a reboot in order to take effect. There are no command-line arguments used.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"dcrypt.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=dcinst.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_diskcryptor_usage_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible false positives may be present based on the internal name dcinst.exe, filter as needed. It may be worthy to alert on the service name.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2021/11/15/exchange-exploit-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/", "https://github.com/DavidXanatos/DiskCryptor"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1486/dcrypt/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to encrypt disks.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1486"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Data Encrypted for Impact"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "TA505", "APT38"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "windows_diskcryptor_usage_filter"}]}, {"name": "Schtasks used for forcing a reboot", "id": "1297fb80-f42a-4b4a-9c8a-88c066437cf6", "version": 4, "date": "2020-12-07", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line that indicate that a forced reboot of system is scheduled.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe Processes.process=\"*shutdown*\" Processes.process=\"*/create *\" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may create jobs on systems forcing reboots to perform updates, maintenance, etc.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}, "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/schtask_shutdown/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A schedule task process $process_name$ with force reboot commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Scheduled Task", "Scheduled Task/Job"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "MuddyWater", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT-C-36", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT41", "Machete", "Soft Cell", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Patchwork", "OilRig", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "FIN8", "menuPass", "FIN10", "APT32", "FIN7", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot_filter"}]}, {"name": "Ransomware Notes bulk creation", "id": "eff7919a-8330-11eb-83f8-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-12", "author": "Teoderick Contreras", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytics identifies a big number of instance of ransomware notes (filetype e.g .txt, .html, .hta) file creation to the infected machine. This behavior is a good sensor if the ransomware note filename is quite new for security industry or the ransomware note filename is not in your ransomware lookup table list for monitoring.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=11 file_name IN (\"*\\.txt\",\"*\\.html\",\"*\\.hta\") |bin _time span=10s | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(TargetFilename) as unique_readme_path_count values(TargetFilename) as list_of_readme_path by Computer Image file_name | where unique_readme_path_count >= 15 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ransomware_notes_bulk_creation_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware", "DarkSide Ransomware", "BlackMatter Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Impact"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Obfuscation"], "message": "A high frequency file creation of $file_name$ in different file path in host $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1486"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["EventCode", "file_name", "_time", "TargetFilename", "Computer", "Image", "user"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Data Encrypted for Impact"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "TA505", "APT38"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "ransomware_notes_bulk_creation_filter"}]}, {"name": "Revil Registry Entry", "id": "e3d3f57a-c381-11eb-9e35-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-02", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies suspicious modification in registry entry to keep some malware data during its infection. This technique seen in several apt implant, malware and ransomware like REVIL where it keep some information like the random generated file extension it uses for all the encrypted files and ransomware notes file name in the compromised host.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\WOW6432Node\\\\Facebook_Assistant\\\\*\" OR Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\WOW6432Node\\\\BlackLivesMatter*\") AND (Registry.registry_value_name = \"\\.*\" OR Registry.registry_value_name = \"Binary Data\") by Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `revil_registry_entry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "to successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Image, TargetObject registry key, registry Details from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A registry entry $registry_path$ with registry value $registry_value_name$ and $registry_value_name$ related to revil ransomware in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1112"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name"], "risk_score": 60, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Modify Registry"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Turla", "APT32", "APT38", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "Threat Group-3390", "Honeybee", "Patchwork", "Gorgon Group", "FIN8"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "revil_registry_entry_filter"}]}, {"name": "Create Remote Thread into LSASS", "id": "67d4dbef-9564-4699-8da8-03a151529edc", "version": 1, "date": "2019-12-06", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "Detect remote thread creation into LSASS consistent with credential dumping.", "search": "`sysmon` EventID=8 TargetImage=*lsass.exe | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, EventCode, TargetImage, TargetProcessId | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `create_remote_thread_into_lsass_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search needs Sysmon Logs with a Sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 8 with lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", "known_false_positives": "Other tools can access LSASS for legitimate reasons and generate an event. In these cases, tweaking the search may help eliminate noise.", "references": ["https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "asset_type": "Windows", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A process has created a remote thread into $TargetImage$ on $dest$. This behavior is indicative of credential dumping and should be investigated.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "TargetImage", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventID", "TargetImage", "Computer", "EventCode", "TargetImage", "TargetProcessId", "dest"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["LSASS Memory", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Whitefly", "Blue Mockingbird", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Leviathan", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Stolen Pencil", "APT32", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "PLATINUM", "FIN8", "BRONZE BUTLER", "OilRig", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT28", "APT1", "Ke3chang", "Cleaver", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "create_remote_thread_into_lsass_filter"}]}, {"name": "Disable Net User Account", "id": "ba858b08-d26c-11eb-af9b-acde48001122", "version": 3, "date": "2021-11-30", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "This analytic will identify a suspicious command-line that disables a user account using the native `net.exe` or `net1.exe` utility to Windows. This technique may used by the adversaries to interrupt availability of accounts and continue the impact against the organization.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null)), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_path\"), \"string\", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND like(cmd_line, \"%/active:no%\") AND like(cmd_line, \"%user%\") AND (process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR process_name=\"net.exe\") | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null)), body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line, \"process_name\", process_name, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process_name, \"process_path\", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed net.exe/net1.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "System administrators or automated scripts may disable an account but not a common practice. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/ssa_data1/net_user_dis.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to disable accounts.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1489", "T1078"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest_device_id", "process_name", "parent_process_name", "process_path", "dest_user_id", "process", "cmd_line"], "risk_score": 49, "risk_severity": "medium", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Service Stop", "Valid Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disable_net_user_account_filter"}]}, {"name": "Deny Permission using Cacls Utility", "id": "b76eae28-cd25-11eb-9c92-acde48001122", "version": 3, "date": "2021-11-29", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of `cacls.exe`, `icacls.exe` or `xcacls.exe` placing the deny permission on a file or directory. Adversaries perform this behavior to prevent responders from reviewing or gaining access to adversary files on disk.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null), process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_path\"), \"string\", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)deny/)=true AND (process_name=\"cacls.exe\" OR process_name=\"xcacls.exe\" OR process_name=\"icacls.exe\") | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null)), body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line, \"process_name\", process_name, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process_name, \"process_path\", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed icacls.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "System administrators may use cacls utilities but this is not a common practice. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "cis20": ["CIS 14", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1222.001/ssa_cacls/all_icalc.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A cacls process $process_name$ with commandline $cmd_line$ try to deny a permission of a file or directory in host $dest_device_id$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1222"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest_device_id", "process_name", "parent_process_name", "process_path", "dest_user_id", "process", "cmd_line"], "risk_score": 35, "risk_severity": "medium", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["File and Directory Permissions Modification"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "deny_permission_using_cacls_utility_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters", "id": "b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-95dbb162039e", "version": 4, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for the execution of the cscript.exe or wscript.exe processes, with a parent of cmd.exe. The search will return the count, the first and last time this execution was seen on a machine, the user, and the destination of the machine", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=\"cmd.exe\" (Processes.process_name=cscript.exe OR Processes.process_name =wscript.exe) by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Suspicious Command-Line Executions"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/cmd_spawns_cscript/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "cmd.exe launching script interpreters on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.user", "Processes.dest"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "Windows Command Shell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "TA505", "Blue Mockingbird", "Tropic Trooper", "Frankenstein", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "Honeybee", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Turla", "Silence", "APT32", "APT39", "Darkhotel", "MuddyWater", "APT18", "APT38", "Dark Caracal", "Gorgon Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Rancor", "Ke3chang", "APT37", "Leviathan", "FIN8", "APT28", "Magic Hound", "Sowbug", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Gamaredon Group", "Suckfly", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-1314", "APT3", "admin@338", "APT1"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters_filter"}]}, {"name": "Wermgr Process Connecting To IP Check Web Services", "id": "ed313326-a0f9-11eb-a89c-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-19", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this search is designed to detect suspicious wermgr.exe process that tries to connect to known IP web services. This technique is know for trickbot and other trojan spy malware to recon the infected machine and look for its ip address without so much finger print on the commandline process. Since wermgr.exe is designed for error handling process of windows it is really suspicious that this process is trying to connect to this IP web services cause that maybe cause of some malicious code injection.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode =22 process_name = wermgr.exe QueryName IN (\"*wtfismyip.com\", \"*checkip.amazonaws.com\", \"*ipecho.net\", \"*ipinfo.io\", \"*api.ipify.org\", \"*icanhazip.com\", \"*ip.anysrc.com\",\"*api.ip.sb\", \"ident.me\", \"www.myexternalip.com\", \"*zen.spamhaus.org\", \"*cbl.abuseat.org\", \"*b.barracudacentral.org\",\"*dnsbl-1.uceprotect.net\", \"*spam.dnsbl.sorbs.net\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by process_path process_name process_id QueryName QueryStatus QueryResults Computer EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, dns query name process path , and query ststus from your endpoints like EventCode 22. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 12 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/", "https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Trickbot"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/infection/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Wermgr.exe process connecting IP location web services on $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1590", "T1590.005"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "process_path", "process_name", "process_id", "QueryName", "QueryStatus", "QueryResults", "Computer", "EventCode"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services_filter"}]}, {"name": "Get WMIObject Group Discovery with Script Block Logging", "id": "69df7f7c-155d-11ec-a055-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-14", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies the usage of `Get-WMIObject Win32_Group`, which is typically used as a way to identify groups on the endpoint. Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*Get-WMIObject*\" AND Message = \"*Win32_Group*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message OpCode ComputerName User EventCode| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_wmiobject_group_discovery_with_script_block_logging_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present. Tune as needed.", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/powershell-detections-threat-research-release-august-2021.html", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.md", "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "System group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Permission Groups Discovery", "Local Groups"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TA505", "APT3", "Turla", "OilRig", "admin@338"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "get_wmiobject_group_discovery_with_script_block_logging_filter"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer", "id": "39e2605a-90d8-11eb-899e-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-03-29", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Start-BitsTransfer is the PowerShell \"version\" of BitsAdmin.exe. Similar functionality is present. This technique variation is not as commonly used by adversaries, but has been abused in the past. Lesser known uses include the ability to set the `-TransferType` to `Upload` for exfiltration of files. In an instance where `Upload` is used, it is highly possible files will be archived. During triage, review parallel processes and process lineage. Capture any files on disk and review. For the remote domain or IP, what is the reputation?", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process=*start-bitstransfer* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_start_bitstransfer_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives. It is possible administrators will utilize Start-BitsTransfer for administrative tasks, otherwise filter based parent process or command-line arguments.", "references": ["https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Investigating+Microsoft+BITS+Activity/23281", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/bits/using-windows-powershell-to-create-bits-transfer-jobs"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["BITS Jobs"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}, "Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1197/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A suspicious process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ that are related to bittransfer functionality in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1197"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["BITS Jobs"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Patchwork", "APT41", "Leviathan"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_powershell"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "powershell_start_bitstransfer_filter"}]}, {"name": "Disable ETW Through Registry", "id": "f0eacfa4-d33f-11eb-8f9d-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-22", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this search is to identify modification in registry to disable ETW windows feature to evade detections. This technique was seen in several ransomware, RAT and even APT to impaire defenses of the compromise machine and to be able to execute payload with minimal alert as much as possible.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\.NETFramework\\\\ETWEnabled\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000000\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_etw_through_registry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "network operator may disable this feature of windows but not so common.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/c0f98850-af65-4352-9746-fbebadee4f05/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.user", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disable_etw_through_registry_filter"}]}, {"name": "Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading", "id": "f421c250-24e7-11ec-bc43-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-04", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a loading of dll using regsvr32 application with silent parameter and dllinstall execution. This technique was seen in several RAT malware similar to remcos, njrat and adversaries to load their malicious DLL on the compromised machine. This TTP may executed by normal 3rd party application so it is better to pivot by the parent process, parent command-line and command-line of the file that execute this regsvr32.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` AND Processes.process=\"*/i*\" by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"(?i)[\\-|\\/][Ss]{1}\") | `regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Other third part application may used this parameter but not so common in base windows environment.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/dc93ee63-050c-4ff8-b07e-8277af9ab939/#", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", "Remcos"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/vbs_wscript/sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a DLL using the silent and dllinstall parameter.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.010"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 36, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Regsvr32"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Blue Mockingbird", "Inception", "WIRTE", "Cobalt Group", "APT19", "Leviathan", "APT32", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=REGSVR32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_regsvr32"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading_filter"}]}, {"name": "MSBuild Suspicious Spawned By Script Process", "id": "213b3148-24ea-11ec-93a2-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-04", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious child process of MSBuild spawned by Windows Script Host - cscript or wscript. This behavior or event are commonly seen and used by malware or adversaries to execute malicious msbuild process using malicious script in the compromised host. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any file modifications. MSBuild may load a script from the same path without having command-line arguments.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"wscript.exe\", \"cscript.exe\") AND `process_msbuild` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as developers do not spawn MSBuild via a WSH.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/dc93ee63-050c-4ff8-b07e-8277af9ab939/#"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/regsvr32_silent/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Msbuild.exe process spawned by $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ executed by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1127.001", "T1127"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["MSBuild", "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Frankenstein", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=msbuild.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSBuild.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_msbuild"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process_filter"}]}, {"name": "CHCP Command Execution", "id": "21d236ec-eec1-11eb-b23e-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-27", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect execution of chcp.exe application. this utility is used to change the active code page of the console. This technique was seen in icedid malware to know the locale region/language/country of the compromise host.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=chcp.com Processes.parent_process_name = cmd.exe Processes.parent_process=*/c* by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `chcp_command_execution_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed chcp.com may be used.", "known_false_positives": "other tools or script may used this to change code page to UTF-* or others", "references": ["https://ss64.com/nt/chcp.html", "https://twitter.com/tccontre18/status/1419941156633329665?s=20"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/simulated_icedid/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "parent process $parent_process_name$ spawning chcp process $process_name$ with parent command line $parent_process$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "process_name", "process", "parent_process_name", "parent_process", "process_id", "parent_process_id", "dest", "user"], "risk_score": 9, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "chcp_command_execution_filter"}]}, {"name": "Attempt To Delete Services", "id": "a0c8c292-d01a-11eb-aa18-acde48001122", "version": 3, "date": "2021-11-24", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "The following analytic identifies Windows Service Control, `sc.exe`, attempting to delete a service. This is typically identified in parallel with other instances of service enumeration of attempts to stop a service and then delete it. Adversaries utilize this technique to terminate security services or other related services to continue there objective and evade detections.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null)), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_path\"), \"string\", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND like(cmd_line, \"%delete%\") AND process_name = \"sc.exe\" | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null)), body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line, \"process_name\", process_name, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process_name, \"process_path\", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible administrative scripts may start/stop/delete services. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1543.003/T1543.003.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 13"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/ssa_data1/sc_del.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to delete a service.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1489", "T1543", "T1543.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest_device_id", "process_name", "parent_process_name", "process_path", "dest_user_id", "process", "cmd_line"], "risk_score": 36, "risk_severity": "high", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Service Stop", "Create or Modify System Process", "Windows Service"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group", "no", "Blue Mockingbird", "DarkVishnya", "Wizard Spider", "APT32", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Tropic Trooper", "Cobalt Group", "Ke3chang", "Honeybee", "FIN7", "Threat Group-3390", "APT19", "APT3", "Lazarus Group", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "attempt_to_delete_services_filter"}]}, {"name": "Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell", "id": "5ee2bcd0-b2ff-11eb-bb34-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-12", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This following analytic detects PowerShell command to delete shadow copy using the WMIC PowerShell module. This technique was seen used by a recent adversary to deploy DarkSide Ransomware where it executed a child process of PowerShell to execute a hex encoded command to delete shadow copy. This hex encoded command was able to be decrypted by PowerShell log.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message= \"*ShadowCopy*\" (Message = \"*Delete*\" OR Message = \"*Remove*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the powershell logs from your endpoints. make sure you enable needed registry to monitor this event.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html", "https://searchwindowsserver.techtarget.com/tutorial/Set-up-PowerShell-script-block-logging-for-added-security"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An attempt to delete ShadowCopy was performed using PowerShell on $ComputerName$ by $User$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1490"], "observable": [{"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Inhibit System Recovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Certutil exe certificate extraction", "id": "337a46be-600f-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-26", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for arguments to certutil.exe indicating the manipulation or extraction of Certificate. This certificate can then be used to sign new authentication tokens specially inside Federated environments such as Windows ADFS.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=certutil.exe Processes.process = \"*-exportPFX*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `certutil_exe_certificate_extraction_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Unless there are specific use cases, manipulating or exporting certificates using certutil is uncommon. Extraction of certificate has been observed during attacks such as Golden SAML and other campaigns targeting Federated services.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting export a certificate.", "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "certutil_exe_certificate_extraction_filter"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "id": "f5f6af30-7aa7-4295-bfe9-07fe87c01a4b", "version": 6, "date": "2021-09-07", "author": "Jose Hernandez, David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to launch an application or service at system startup.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\run* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentVersion\\\\Windows\\\\Appinit_Dlls* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Shell* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Notify* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Userinit* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\VmApplet* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\policies\\\\explorer\\\\run* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\runservices* OR Registry.registry_path=HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Netsh\\\\* OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Image File Execution Options*\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=Debugger) OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Security Packages\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\\\\OSConfig\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Security Packages\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\SilentProcessExit\\\\*\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*currentVersion\\\\Windows\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Load\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentVersion\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Svchost\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\"AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"BootExecute\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Software\\\\Run\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"auto_update\")) by Registry.dest Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "There are many legitimate applications that must execute on system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Ransomware", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "IcedID", "Remcos"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 95, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Persistence"}, "Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to persistence in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1547.001", "T1547"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user"], "risk_score": 76, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Rocke", "Tropic Trooper", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Silence", "RTM", "Inception", "APT41", "Machete", "Kimsuky", "APT33", "APT39", "APT32", "APT18", "Turla", "Dark Caracal", "Cobalt Group", "Honeybee", "Threat Group-3390", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Gorgon Group", "Ke3chang", "APT19", "Leviathan", "MuddyWater", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Magic Hound", "APT3", "FIN10", "FIN7", "Patchwork", "FIN6", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "APT29", "Darkhotel", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter"}]}, {"name": "Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store", "id": "6bc5243e-ef36-45dc-9b12-f4a6be131159", "version": 7, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime values(Processes.process) as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_certutil` (Processes.process=*-addstore*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "There may be legitimate reasons for administrators to add a certificate to the untrusted certificate store. In such cases, this will typically be done on a large number of systems.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1553.004/T1553.004.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Disabling Security Tools"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1553.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified attempting to add a certificate to the store on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1553.004", "T1553"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Install Root Certificate", "Subvert Trust Controls"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=certutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=CertUtil.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_certutil"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store_filter"}]}, {"name": "Modify ACL permission To Files Or Folder", "id": "7e8458cc-acca-11eb-9e3f-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-04", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies suspicious modification of ACL permission to a files or folder to make it available to everyone. This technique may be used by the adversary to evade ACLs or protected files access. This changes is commonly configured by the file or directory owner with appropriate permission. This behavior is a good indicator if this command seen on a machine utilized by an account with no permission to do so.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"cacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"icacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"xcacls.exe\" AND (Processes.process = \"*/G everyone:*\" OR Processes.process = \"*/G SYSTEM:*\") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `modify_acl_permission_to_files_or_folder_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed cacls.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "administrators may use this command. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious ACL permission modification on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1222"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id"], "risk_score": 32, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["File and Directory Permissions Modification"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "modify_acl_permission_to_files_or_folder_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers", "id": "0b2eefa5-5508-450d-b970-3dd2fb761aec", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies hh.exe (HTML Help) execution of a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) file using InfoTech Storage Handlers. This particular technique will load Windows script code from a compiled help file, using InfoTech Storage Handlers. itss.dll will load upon execution. Three InfoTech Storage handlers are supported - ms-its, its, mk:@MSITStore. ITSS may be used to launch a specific html/htm file from within a CHM file. CHM files may contain nearly any file type embedded. Upon a successful execution, the following script engines may be used for execution - JScript, VBScript, VBScript.Encode, JScript.Encode, JScript.Compact. Analyst may identify vbscript.dll or jscript.dll loading into hh.exe upon execution. The \"htm\" and \"html\" file extensions were the only extensions observed to be supported for the execution of Shortcut commands or WSH script code. During investigation, identify script content origination. hh.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_hh` Processes.process IN (\"*its:*\", \"*mk:@MSITStore:*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "It is rare to see instances of InfoTech Storage Handlers being used, but it does happen in some legitimate instances. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001/", "https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/851869", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.001/T1218.001.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Hh/", "https://gist.github.com/mgeeky/cce31c8602a144d8f2172a73d510e0e7", "https://cyberforensicator.com/2019/01/20/silence-dissecting-malicious-chm-files-and-performing-forensic-analysis/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "$process_name$ has been identified using Infotech Storage Handlers to load a specific file within a CHM on $dest$ under user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Compiled HTML File"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT41", "Silence", "Lazarus Group", "Dark Caracal", "OilRig"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=hh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=HH.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_hh"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect mshta renamed", "id": "8f45fcf0-5b68-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies renamed instances of mshta.exe executing. Mshta.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64. This analytic utilizes the internal name of the PE to identify if is the legitimate mshta binary. Further analysis should be performed to review the executed content and validation it is the real mshta.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_mshta` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mshta_renamed_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of mshta.exe, but never renamed, triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses", "https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious MSHTA Activity"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Mshta"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "APT32", "MuddyWater", "FIN7"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=mshta.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSHTA.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_mshta"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_mshta_renamed_filter"}]}, {"name": "GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block", "id": "2e891cbe-0426-11ec-9c9c-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-23", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-LocalUser` commandlet. The `Get-LocalUser` commandlet is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-LocalUser*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getlocaluser_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Local user discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087", "T1087.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Account Discovery", "Local Account"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Turla", "Poseidon Group", "OilRig", "Ke3chang", "APT32", "APT1", "Threat Group-3390", "APT3", "admin@338"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "getlocaluser_with_powershell_script_block_filter"}]}, {"name": "GetDomainGroup with PowerShell", "id": "93c94be3-bead-4a60-860f-77ca3fe59903", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-25", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. `Get-DomainGroup` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-DomainGroup*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getdomaingroup_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainGroup/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Domain group discovery with PowerView on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Permission Groups Discovery", "Domain Groups"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TA505", "APT3", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "Inception", "OilRig", "FIN6", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "getdomaingroup_with_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect SharpHound File Modifications", "id": "42b4b438-beed-11eb-ba1d-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-27", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "SharpHound is used as a reconnaissance collector, ingestor, for BloodHound. SharpHound will query the domain controller and begin gathering all the data related to the domain and trusts. For output, it will drop a .zip file upon completion following a typical pattern that is often not changed. This analytic focuses on the default file name scheme. Note that this may be evaded with different parameters within SharpHound, but that depends on the operator. `-randomizefilenames` and `-encryptzip` are two examples. In addition, executing SharpHound via .exe or .ps1 without any command-line arguments will still perform activity and dump output to the default filename. Example default filename `20210601181553_BloodHound.zip`. SharpHound creates multiple temp files following the same pattern `20210601182121_computers.json`, `domains.json`, `gpos.json`, `ous.json` and `users.json`. Tuning may be required, or remove these json's entirely if it is too noisy. During traige, review parallel processes for further suspicious behavior. Typically, the process executing the `.ps1` ingestor will be PowerShell.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*bloodhound.zip\", \"*_computers.json\", \"*_gpos.json\", \"*_domains.json\", \"*_users.json\", \"*_groups.json\") by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_sharphound_file_modifications_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on file modifications that include the name of the process, and file, responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as the analytic is specific to a filename with extension .zip. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0521/", "https://thedfirreport.com/?s=bloodhound", "https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/tree/master/Collectors", "https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/SharpHound3", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md#atomic-test-2---run-bloodhound-from-local-disk"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Discovery Techniques", "Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/sharphound/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Potential SharpHound file modifications identified on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087.002", "T1069.001", "T1482", "T1087.001", "T1087", "T1069.002", "T1069"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "file_path", "dest", "file_name", "process_id", "file_create_time"], "risk_score": 24, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Domain Account", "Local Groups", "Domain Trust Discovery", "Local Account", "Account Discovery", "Domain Groups", "Permission Groups Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery", "Discovery", "Discovery", "Discovery", "Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Turla", "Sandworm Team", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "Ke3chang", "Turla", "OilRig", "admin@338", "Wizard Spider", "Turla", "Poseidon Group", "OilRig", "Ke3chang", "APT32", "APT1", "Threat Group-3390", "APT3", "admin@338", "no", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "Inception", "OilRig", "FIN6", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Ke3chang", "TA505", "APT3"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_sharphound_file_modifications_filter"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Processing Stream Of Data", "id": "0d718b52-c9f1-11eb-bc61-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-10", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is processing compressed stream data. This is typically found in obfuscated PowerShell or PowerShell executing embedded .NET or binary files that are stream flattened and will be deflated durnig execution. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*IO.Compression.*\" OR Message = \"*IO.StreamReader*\" OR Message = \"*]::Decompress*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_processing_stream_of_data_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "powershell may used this function to process compressed data.", "references": ["https://medium.com/@ahmedjouini99/deobfuscating-emotets-powershell-payload-e39fb116f7b9", "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell", "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains stream command in $Message$ commonly for processing compressed or to decompressed binary file with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User", "Score"], "risk_score": 40, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "PowerShell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "Gallmaker", "Turla", "APT19", "DarkHydrus", "APT28", "Thrip", "Gorgon Group", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leviathan", "TA459", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT32", "FIN7", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "APT3", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "powershell_processing_stream_of_data_filter"}]}, {"name": "Cobalt Strike Named Pipes", "id": "5876d429-0240-4709-8b93-ea8330b411b5", "version": 1, "date": "2021-02-22", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of default or publicly known named pipes used with Cobalt Strike. A named pipe is a named, one-way or duplex pipe for communication between the pipe server and one or more pipe clients. Cobalt Strike uses named pipes in many ways and has default values used with the Artifact Kit and Malleable C2 Profiles. The following query assists with identifying these default named pipes. Each EDR product presents named pipes a little different. Consider taking the values and generating a query based on the product of choice. \\\nUpon triage, review the process performing the named pipe. If it is explorer.exe, It is possible it was injected into by another process. Review recent parallel processes to identify suspicious patterns or behaviors. A parallel process may have a network connection, review and follow the connection back to identify any file modifications.", "search": "`sysmon` EventID=17 OR EventID=18 PipeName IN (\\\\msagent_*, \\\\wkssvc*, \\\\DserNamePipe*, \\\\srvsvc_*, \\\\mojo.*, \\\\postex_*, \\\\status_*, \\\\MSSE-*, \\\\spoolss_*, \\\\win_svc*, \\\\ntsvcs*, \\\\winsock*, \\\\UIA_PIPE*) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, process_name, process_id process_path, PipeName | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cobalt_strike_named_pipes_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "The idea of using named pipes with Cobalt Strike is to blend in. Therefore, some of the named pipes identified and added may cause false positives. Filter by process name or pipe name to reduce false positives.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/ipc/named-pipes", "https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-smb-beacon", "https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2021/02/09/learn-pipe-fitting-for-all-of-your-offense-projects/", "https://gist.github.com/MHaggis/6c600e524045a6d49c35291a21e10752", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike", "Trickbot", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $Computer$ by user $user$ accessing known suspicious named pipes related to Cobalt Strike.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1055"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventID", "PipeName", "Computer", "process_name", "process_path", "process_id"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Process Injection"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Cobalt Group", "APT37", "Honeybee", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "cobalt_strike_named_pipes_filter"}]}, {"name": "Sdelete Application Execution", "id": "31702fc0-2682-11ec-85c3-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-06", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect the execution of sdelete.exe application sysinternal tools. This tool is one of the most use tool of malware and adversaries to remove or clear their tracks and artifact in the targetted host. This tool is designed to delete securely a file in file system that remove the forensic evidence on the machine. A good TTP query to check why user execute this application which is not a common practice.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_sdelete` by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sdelete_application_execution_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "user may execute and use this application", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/956f50be-2c13-465a-ac00-6224c14c5f89/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/sdelete/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "sdelete process $process_name$ executed in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1485", "T1070.004", "T1070"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Data Destruction", "File Deletion", "Indicator Removal on Host"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact", "Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Lazarus Group", "APT38", "Sandworm Team", "Rocke", "Tropic Trooper", "Gamaredon Group", "Wizard Spider", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Silence", "The White Company", "TEMP.Veles", "APT32", "APT38", "Patchwork", "Honeybee", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "menuPass", "FIN8", "OilRig", "FIN5", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Magic Hound", "APT3", "FIN10", "APT28", "Threat Group-3390", "Group5", "Lazarus Group", "APT18", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=sdelete.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=sdelete.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_sdelete"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "sdelete_application_execution_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments", "id": "a0bdd2f6-c2ff-11eb-b918-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-01", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies common command-line arguments used by SharpHound `-collectionMethod` and `invoke-bloodhound`. Being the script is FOSS, function names may be modified, but these changes are dependent upon the operator. In most instances the defaults are used. This analytic works to identify the common command-line attributes used. It does not cover the entirety of every argument in order to avoid false positives.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process IN (\"*-collectionMethod*\",\"*invoke-bloodhound*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_sharphound_command_line_arguments_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as the arguments used are specific to SharpHound. Filter as needed or add more command-line arguments as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0521/", "https://thedfirreport.com/?s=bloodhound", "https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/tree/master/Collectors", "https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/SharpHound3", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md#atomic-test-2---run-bloodhound-from-local-disk"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Discovery Techniques", "Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/sharphound/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Possible SharpHound command-Line arguments identified on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087.002", "T1069.001", "T1482", "T1087.001", "T1087", "T1069.002", "T1069"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 24, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Domain Account", "Local Groups", "Domain Trust Discovery", "Local Account", "Account Discovery", "Domain Groups", "Permission Groups Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery", "Discovery", "Discovery", "Discovery", "Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Turla", "Sandworm Team", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "Ke3chang", "Turla", "OilRig", "admin@338", "Wizard Spider", "Turla", "Poseidon Group", "OilRig", "Ke3chang", "APT32", "APT1", "Threat Group-3390", "APT3", "admin@338", "no", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "Inception", "OilRig", "FIN6", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Ke3chang", "TA505", "APT3"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_sharphound_command_line_arguments_filter"}]}, {"name": "Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL", "id": "8943b567-f14d-4ee8-a0bb-2121d4ce3184", "version": 2, "date": "2020-02-21", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Detect the usage of comsvcs.dll for dumping the lsass process.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*comsvcs.dll* Processes.process=*MiniDump* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "None identified.", "references": ["https://modexp.wordpress.com/2019/08/30/minidumpwritedump-via-com-services-dll/", "https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1167417096374050817"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "HAFNIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified accessing credentials using comsvcs.dll on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["LSASS Memory", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Whitefly", "Blue Mockingbird", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Leviathan", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Stolen Pencil", "APT32", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "PLATINUM", "FIN8", "BRONZE BUTLER", "OilRig", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT28", "APT1", "Ke3chang", "Cleaver", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_rundll32"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll_filter"}]}, {"name": "Print Spooler Failed to Load a Plug-in", "id": "1adc9548-da7c-11eb-8f13-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-01", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies driver load errors utilizing the Windows PrintService Admin logs. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. \\\nWithin the proof of concept code, the following error will occur - \"The print spooler failed to load a plug-in module C:\\Windows\\system32\\spool\\DRIVERS\\x64\\3\\meterpreter.dll, error code 0x45A. See the event user data for context information.\" \\\nThe analytic is based on file path and failure to load the plug-in. \\\nDuring triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events.", "search": "`printservice` ((ErrorCode=\"0x45A\" (EventCode=\"808\" OR EventCode=\"4909\")) OR (\"The print spooler failed to load a plug-in module\" OR \"\\\\drivers\\\\x64\\\\\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode EventCode ComputerName Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `print_spooler_failed_to_load_a_plug_in_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You will need to ensure PrintService Admin and Operational logs are being logged to Splunk from critical or all systems.", "known_false_positives": "False positives are unknown and filtering may be required.", "references": ["https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/fix-for-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675-exploit-to-keep-your-print-servers-running-while-a-patch-is-not-available/", "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/exploitable-critical-rce-vulnerability-allows-regular-users-to-fully-compromise-active-directory-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675/", "https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/ob6y02/critical_vulnerability_printnightmare_exposes"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence,", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Incoming"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527", "CVE-2021-1675"], "dataset": [], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious printer spooler errors have occured on endpoint $ComputerName$ with EventCode $EventCode$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1547.012", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "OpCode", "EventCode", "ComputerName", "Message"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "source=\"wineventlog:microsoft-windows-printservice/operational\" OR sourcetype=\"WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PrintService/Admin\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "printservice"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "print_spooler_failed_to_load_a_plug_in_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious mshta child process", "id": "60023bb6-5500-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies child processes spawning from \"mshta.exe\". The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, parent process \"mshta.exe\" and its child process.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=mshta.exe AND (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=colorcpl.exe OR Processes.process_name=msbuild.exe OR Processes.process_name=microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe OR Processes.process_name=searchprotocolhost.exe OR Processes.process_name=scrcons.exe OR Processes.process_name=cscript.exe OR Processes.process_name=wscript.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=cmd.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_mshta_child_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses", "https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious MSHTA Activity"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "suspicious mshta child process detected on host $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process", "type": "Process Name", "role": ["Parent Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 40, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Mshta"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "APT32", "MuddyWater", "FIN7"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_mshta_child_process_filter"}]}, {"name": "DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App", "id": "2452e632-9e0d-11eb-bacd-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-15", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. This technique are seen in couple of malware and APT group to exfiltrated collected data in a infected machine or infected network. This detection is looking for unique use of nslookup where it tries to use specific record type, TXT, A, AAAA, that are commonly used by attacker and also the retry parameter which is designed to query C2 DNS multiple tries.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"nslookup.exe\" Processes.process = \"*-querytype=*\" OR Processes.process=\"*-qt=*\" OR Processes.process=\"*-q=*\" OR Processes.process=\"-type=*\" OR Processes.process=\"*-retry=*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of nslookup.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "admin nslookup usage", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7_spear_phishing.html", "https://www.varonis.com/blog/dns-tunneling/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Dynamic DNS", "Command and Control", "Data Exfiltration"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/nslookup_exfil/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ performing activity related to DNS exfiltration.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1048"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging", "id": "bc1dc6b8-c954-11eb-bade-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-09", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies the common PowerShell stager used by PowerShell-Empire. Each stager that may use PowerShell all uses the same pattern. The initial HTTP will be base64 encoded and use `system.net.webclient`. Note that some obfuscation may evade the analytic. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message=*system.net.webclient* AND Message=*frombase64string*) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode ComputerName User EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_empire_with_powershell_script_block_logging_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "False positives may only pertain to it not being related to Empire, but another framework. Filter as needed if any applications use the same pattern.", "references": ["https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/", "https://github.com/BC-SECURITY/Empire"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The following behavior was identified and typically related to PowerShell-Empire on $ComputerName$ by $User$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Message", "OpCode", "ComputerName", "User", "EventCode"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "PowerShell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "Gallmaker", "Turla", "APT19", "DarkHydrus", "APT28", "Thrip", "Gorgon Group", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leviathan", "TA459", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT32", "FIN7", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "APT3", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_empire_with_powershell_script_block_logging_filter"}]}, {"name": "Unload Sysmon Filter Driver", "id": "c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f665664g9f", "version": 3, "date": "2020-07-22", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Attackers often disable security tools to avoid detection. This search looks for the usage of process `fltMC.exe` to unload a Sysmon Driver that will stop sysmon from collecting the data.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime values(Processes.process) as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=fltMC.exe AND Processes.process=*unload* AND Processes.process=*SysmonDrv* by Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter`| table firstTime lastTime dest user count process_name process_id parent_process_name process", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model. This search is also shipped with `unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter` macro, update this macro to filter out false positives.", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Disabling Security Tools"], "asset_type": "", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Possible Sysmon filter driver unloading on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 45, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter"}]}, {"name": "Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys", "id": "8470d755-0c13-45b3-bd63-387a373c10cf", "version": 5, "date": "2020-11-26", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The search looks for reg.exe modifying registry keys that define Windows services and their configurations.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name values(Processes.user) as user FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=reg.exe Processes.process=*reg* Processes.process=*add* Processes.process=*Services* by Processes.process_id Processes.dest Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "It is unusual for a service to be created or modified by directly manipulating the registry. However, there may be legitimate instances of this behavior. It is important to validate and investigate, as appropriate.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Service Abuse", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Persistence"}, "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1574.011/change_registry_path_service/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 75, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "message": "A reg.exe process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1574.011", "T1574"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.user", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.dest"], "risk_score": 45, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Services Registry Permissions Weakness", "Hijack Execution Flow"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys_filter"}]}, {"name": "Wmiprsve LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", "id": "95a455f0-4c04-11ec-b8ac-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-22", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies `wmiprsve.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), the executed command is spawned as a child process of `wmiprvse.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of wmiprvse.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe) (Processes.process_name IN (\"Regsvcs.exe\", \"Ftp.exe\", \"OfflineScannerShell.exe\", \"Rasautou.exe\", \"Schtasks.exe\", \"Xwizard.exe\", \"Dllhost.exe\", \"Pnputil.exe\", \"Atbroker.exe\", \"Pcwrun.exe\", \"Ttdinject.exe\",\"Mshta.exe\", \"Bitsadmin.exe\", \"Certoc.exe\", \"Ieexec.exe\", \"Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe\", \"Runscripthelper.exe\", \"Forfiles.exe\", \"Msbuild.exe\", \"Register-cimprovider.exe\", \"Tttracer.exe\", \"Ie4uinit.exe\", \"Bash.exe\", \"Hh.exe\", \"SettingSyncHost.exe\", \"Cmstp.exe\", \"Mmc.exe\", \"Stordiag.exe\", \"Scriptrunner.exe\", \"Odbcconf.exe\", \"Extexport.exe\", \"Msdt.exe\", \"WorkFolders.exe\", \"Diskshadow.exe\", \"Mavinject.exe\", \"Regasm.exe\", \"Gpscript.exe\", \"Rundll32.exe\", \"Regsvr32.exe\", \"Msiexec.exe\", \"Wuauclt.exe\", \"Presentationhost.exe\", \"Wmic.exe\", \"Runonce.exe\", \"Syncappvpublishingserver.exe\", \"Verclsid.exe\", \"Infdefaultinstall.exe\", \"Explorer.exe\", \"Installutil.exe\", \"Netsh.exe\", \"Wab.exe\", \"Dnscmd.exe\", \"At.exe\", \"Pcalua.exe\", \"Msconfig.exe\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmiprsve_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/", "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/lateral-movement/t1047-wmi-for-lateral-movement", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "message": "Wmiprsve.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1047"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 54, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Windows Management Instrumentation"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT41", "FIN6", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Threat Group-3390", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "menuPass", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "wmiprsve_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process", "id": "723716de-ee55-4cd4-9759-c44e7e55ba4b", "version": 1, "date": "2021-02-11", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies hh.exe (HTML Help) execution of a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) that spawns a child process. This particular technique will load Windows script code from a compiled help file. CHM files may contain nearly any file type embedded, but only execute html/htm. Upon a successful execution, the following script engines may be used for execution - JScript, VBScript, VBScript.Encode, JScript.Encode, JScript.Compact. Analyst may identify vbscript.dll or jscript.dll loading into hh.exe upon execution. The \"htm\" and \"html\" file extensions were the only extensions observed to be supported for the execution of Shortcut commands or WSH script code. During investigation, identify script content origination. Review child process events and investigate further. hh.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=hh.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_html_help_spawn_child_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications (ex. web browsers) may spawn a child process. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.001/T1218.001.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Hh/", "https://gist.github.com/mgeeky/cce31c8602a144d8f2172a73d510e0e7", "https://cyberforensicator.com/2019/01/20/silence-dissecting-malicious-chm-files-and-performing-forensic-analysis/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ spawning a child process, typically not normal behavior.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Compiled HTML File"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT41", "Silence", "Lazarus Group", "Dark Caracal", "OilRig"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_html_help_spawn_child_process_filter"}]}, {"name": "Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos", "id": "001266a6-9d5b-11eb-829b-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-14", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple invalid domain users using the Kerberos protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using Kerberos to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. As attackers progress in a breach, mistakes will be made. In certain scenarios, adversaries may execute a password spraying attack using an invalid list of users. Event 4768 is generated every time the Key Distribution Center issues a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). Failure code 0x6 stands for `client not found in Kerberos database` (the attempted user is not a valid domain user).\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\\nThis detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\\\nThe analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source ip and attempted user accounts.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 Result_Code=0x6 Account_Name!=\"*$\" | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Account_Name) AS unique_accounts values(Account_Name) as tried_accounts by _time, Client_Address | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Client_Address | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", "known_false_positives": "A host failing to authenticate with multiple invalid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, multi-user systems and missconfigured systems.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_invalid_users_kerberos/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Potential Kerberos based password spraying attack from $Client_Address$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "Client_Address", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Result_Code", "Account_Name", "Client_Address"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Password Spraying", "Brute Force"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "Leafminer", "Lazarus Group", "DarkVishnya", "APT39", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Turla"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos_filter"}]}, {"name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", "id": "900bc324-59f3-11ec-9fb4-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-10", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of curl on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=curl (Processes.process=\"*-s *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", "references": ["https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ingress Tool Transfer", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1105"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Ingress Tool Transfer"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Whitefly", "Rocke", "APT39", "Tropic Trooper", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Frankenstein", "Silence", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "APT33", "MuddyWater", "APT18", "APT38", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "OilRig", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT37", "FIN8", "PLATINUM", "Leviathan", "Elderwood", "Magic Hound", "APT3", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Patchwork", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-3390", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter"}]}, {"name": "Short Lived Windows Accounts", "id": "b25f6f62-0782-43c1-b403-083231ffd97d", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-06", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search detects accounts that were created and deleted in a short time period.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Changes.result_id) as result_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.result_id=4720 OR All_Changes.result_id=4726 by _time span=4h All_Changes.user All_Changes.dest | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | search result_id = 4720 result_id=4726 | transaction user connected=false maxspan=240m | table firstTime lastTime count user dest result_id | `short_lived_windows_accounts_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search requires you to have enabled your Group Management Audit Logs in your Local Windows Security Policy and be ingesting those logs. More information on how to enable them can be found here: http://whatevernetworks.com/auditing-group-membership-changes-in-active-directory/", "known_false_positives": "It is possible that an administrator created and deleted an account in a short time period. Verifying activity with an administrator is advised.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Account Monitoring and Controls"], "asset_type": "Windows", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Persistence"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "message": "A user account created or delete shortly in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1136.001", "T1136"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.result_id", "All_Changes.user", "All_Changes.dest"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "access", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Local Account", "Create Account"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT39", "APT41", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leafminer", "APT3", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "short_lived_windows_accounts_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious MSBuild Spawn", "id": "a115fba6-5514-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 2, "date": "2021-01-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning msbuild.exe. This behavior is indicative of a COM object being utilized to spawn msbuild from wmiprvse.exe. It is common for MSBuild.exe to be spawned from devenv.exe while using Visual Studio. In this instance, there will be command line arguments and file paths. In a malicious instance, MSBuild.exe will spawn from non-standard processes and have no command line arguments. For example, MSBuild.exe spawning from explorer.exe, powershell.exe is far less common and should be investigated.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe AND `process_msbuild` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_msbuild_spawn_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious msbuild.exe process executed on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1127", "T1127.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "MSBuild"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Frankenstein"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=msbuild.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSBuild.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_msbuild"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_msbuild_spawn_filter"}]}, {"name": "SilentCleanup UAC Bypass", "id": "56d7cfcc-da63-11eb-92d4-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-01", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry that may related to UAC bypassed. This registry will be trigger once the attacker abuse the silentcleanup task schedule to gain high privilege execution that will bypass User control account.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Environment\\\\windir\" Registry.registry_value_name = \"*.exe*\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `silentcleanup_uac_bypass_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME", "https://www.intezer.com/blog/malware-analysis/klingon-rat-holding-on-for-dear-life/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence,", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Incoming"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious modification of registry $registry_path$ with possible payload path $registry_value_name$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.dest"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Bypass User Access Control", "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "MuddyWater", "Honeybee", "Cobalt Group", "Threat Group-3390", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Patchwork", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "silentcleanup_uac_bypass_filter"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files", "id": "6338266a-ee2a-11eb-bf68-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32 process that drops executable (.exe or .dll) files. this behavior seen in rundll32 process of IcedID that tries to drop copy of itself in temp folder or download executable drop it either appdata or programdata as part of its execution.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=11 process_name=\"rundll32.exe\" TargetFilename IN (\"*.exe\", \"*.dll\",) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image TargetFilename ProcessGuid dest user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, TargetFilename, and eventcode 11 executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://any.run/malware-trends/icedid"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "rundll32 process $process_name$ drops a file $TargetFilename$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "process name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Image", "TargetFilename", "ProcessGuid", "dest", "user_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Rundll32"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT32", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "TA505", "MuddyWater", "APT29", "APT19", "CopyKittens", "APT3", "Carbanak", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files_filter"}]}, {"name": "Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft", "id": "ccfeddec-43ec-11ec-b494-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary loading `vaultcli.dll` and Samlib.dll`. This technique may be used to execute code to bypassing application control and capture credentials by utilizing a tool like MimiKatz. \\\nWhen `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \\\nIf used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \\\nDuring triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 process_name=installutil.exe ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\samlib.dll\", \"*\\\\vaultcli.dll\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, process_name, ImageLoaded, OriginalFileName, process_id | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_installutil_credential_theft_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and module loads from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Typically this will not trigger as by it's very nature InstallUtil does not need credentials. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://gist.github.com/xorrior/bbac3919ca2aef8d924bdf3b16cce3d0"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ loading samlib.dll and vaultcli.dll to potentially capture credentials in memory.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218.004", "T1218"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["InstallUtil", "Signed Binary Proxy Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "windows_installutil_credential_theft_filter"}]}, {"name": "Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell", "id": "36e46ebe-065a-11ec-b4c7-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` executing the Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"powershell*\") AND Processes.process = \"*Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://github.com/S1ckB0y1337/Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy?view=windowsserver2019-ps"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1201"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id", "Processes.parent_process_name"], "risk_score": 9, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Password Policy Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Turla", "OilRig"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Excessive number of taskhost processes", "id": "f443dac2-c7cf-11eb-ab51-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-07", "author": "Michael Hart", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This detection targets behaviors observed in post exploit kits like Meterpreter and Koadic that are run in memory. We have observed that these tools must invoke an excessive number of taskhost.exe and taskhostex.exe processes to complete various actions (discovery, lateral movement, etc.). It is extremely uncommon in the course of normal operations to see so many distinct taskhost and taskhostex processes running concurrently in a short time frame.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process_id) as process_ids min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE Processes.process_name = \"taskhost.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"taskhostex.exe\" BY Processes.dest Processes.process_name _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | eval pid_count=mvcount(process_ids) | eval taskhost_count_=if(process_name == \"taskhost.exe\", pid_count, 0) | eval taskhostex_count_=if(process_name == \"taskhostex.exe\", pid_count, 0) | stats sum(taskhost_count_) as taskhost_count, sum(taskhostex_count_) as taskhostex_count by _time, dest, firstTime, lastTime | where taskhost_count > 10 and taskhostex_count > 10 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_number_of_taskhost_processes_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting events related to processes on the endpoints that include the name of the process and process id into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators, administrative actions or certain applications may run many instances of taskhost and taskhostex concurrently. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Meterpreter"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059/meterpreter/taskhost_processes/logExcessiveTaskHost.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An excessive amount of $process_name$ was executed on $dest$ indicative of suspicious behavior.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1033"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Owner/User Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Frankenstein", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Tropic Trooper", "APT39", "MuddyWater", "APT32", "APT37", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "Magic Hound", "FIN10", "Gamaredon Group", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "APT3"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "excessive_number_of_taskhost_processes_filter"}]}, {"name": "Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line", "id": "28e06670-43df-11ec-a569-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary passing a HTTP request on the command-line. This technique may be used to download and execute code while bypassing application control. \\\nWhen `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \\\nIf used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \\\nDuring triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` Processes.process IN (\"*http://*\",\"*https://*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_installutil_url_in_command_line_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives should be present as InstallUtil is not typically used to download remote files. Filter as needed based on Developers requirements.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md", "https://gist.github.com/DanielRTeixeira/0fd06ec8f041f34a32bf5623c6dd479d"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ passing a URL on the command-line.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218.004", "T1218"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["InstallUtil", "Signed Binary Proxy Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=installutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=InstallUtil.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_installutil"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "windows_installutil_url_in_command_line_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious WAV file in Appdata Folder", "id": "5be109e6-1ac5-11ec-b421-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-21", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious creation of .wav file in appdata folder. This behavior was seen in Remcos RAT malware where it put the audio recording in the appdata\\audio folde as part of data collection. this recording can be send to its C2 server as part of its exfiltration to the compromised machine. creation of wav files in this folder path is not a ussual disk place used by user to save audio format file.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=*.exe Processes.process_path=\"*\\\\appdata\\\\Roaming\\\\*\" by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*.wav\") Filesystem.file_path = \"*\\\\appdata\\\\Roaming\\\\*\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields file_name file_path process_name process_path process dest file_create_time _time ] | `suspicious_wav_file_in_appdata_folder_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, file_name, file_path and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://success.trendmicro.com/solution/1123281-remcos-malware-information", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2021/07/remcos-rat-delivered-via-visual-basic/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_agent/sysmon_wav.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "process $process_name$ creating image file $file_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1113"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "process name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "file_create_time", "file_name", "file_path", "process_name", "process_path", "process"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Screen Capture"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "APT39", "Silence", "MuddyWater", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "Dark Caracal", "FIN7", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Magic Hound", "Group5", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_wav_file_in_appdata_folder_filter"}]}, {"name": "Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos", "id": "3a91a212-98a9-11eb-b86a-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-08", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple valid users using the Kerberos protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using Kerberos to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4771 is generated when the Key Distribution Center fails to issue a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). Failure code 0x18 stands for `wrong password provided` (the attempted user is a legitimate domain user).\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\\nThis detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\\\nThe analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source ip and attempted user accounts.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4771 Failure_Code=0x18 Account_Name!=\"*$\" | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Account_Name) AS unique_accounts values(Account_Name) as tried_accounts by _time, Client_Address | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Client_Address | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", "known_false_positives": "A host failing to authenticate with multiple valid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, missconfigured systems and multi-user systems like Citrix farms.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/dn319109(v=ws.11)", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4771"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_valid_users_kerberos/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Potential Kerberos based password spraying attack from $Client_Address$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "Client_Address", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Result_Code", "Account_Name", "Client_Address"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Password Spraying", "Brute Force"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "Leafminer", "Lazarus Group", "DarkVishnya", "APT39", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Turla"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos_filter"}]}, {"name": "Office Application Spawn rundll32 process", "id": "958751e4-9c5f-11eb-b103-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-04-13", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this detection was designed to identifies suspicious spawned process of known MS office application due to macro or malicious code. this technique can be seen in so many malware like trickbot that used MS office as its weapon or attack vector to initially infect the machines.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = \"winword.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"excel.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"powerpnt.exe\") AND `process_rundll32` by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.process Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_application_spawn_rundll32_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://any.run/malware-trends/trickbot", "https://any.run/report/47561b4e949041eff0a0f4693c59c81726591779fe21183ae9185b5eb6a69847/aba3722a-b373-4dae-8273-8730fb40cdbe"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Trickbot", "IcedID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Office application spawning rundll32.exe on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Phishing", "Spearphishing Attachment"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_rundll32"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "office_application_spawn_rundll32_process_filter"}]}, {"name": "Time Provider Persistence Registry", "id": "5ba382c4-2105-11ec-8d8f-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-29", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspiciouos modification of time provider registry for persistence and autostart. This technique can allow the attacker to persist on the compromised host and autostart as soon as the machine boot up. This TTP can be a good indicator of suspicious behavior since this registry is not commonly modified by normal user or even an admin.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path =\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services\\\\W32Time\\\\TimeProviders*\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `time_provider_persistence_registry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://pentestlab.blog/2019/10/22/persistence-time-providers/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/003/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Privilege Escalation Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.003/timeprovider_reg/sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1547.003", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Time Providers", "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "time_provider_persistence_registry_filter"}]}, {"name": "Wmic NonInteractive App Uninstallation", "id": "bff0e7a0-317f-11ec-ab4e-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-20", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious wmic commandlined that uninstall application non interactively. This technique was seen in IceID to uninstall av products to the compromised host to bypassed and evade detections. This Hunting query maybe a good indicator that some process tries to uninstall application using wmic which is not a common behavior. This approach may seen in some script or third part appication to uninstall their application but it is a good thing to check what it uninstall and why.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wmic.exe Processes.process=\"* product *\" Processes.process=\"*where name*\" Processes.process=\"*call uninstall*\" Processes.process=\"*/nointeractive*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmic_noninteractive_app_uninstallation_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "third party application may use this approach to uninstall there application", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["IceID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon2.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "wmic $process$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Target"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "wmic_noninteractive_app_uninstallation_filter"}]}, {"name": "Disabling CMD Application", "id": "ff86077c-9212-11eb-a1e6-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-31", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this search is to identify modification in registry to disable cmd prompt application. This technique is commonly seen in RAT, Trojan or WORM to prevent triaging or deleting there samples through cmd application which is one of the tool of analyst to traverse on directory and files.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\System\\\\DisableCMD\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_cmd_application_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "admin may disable this application for non technical user.", "references": ["https://any.run/report/ea4ea08407d4ee72e009103a3b77e5a09412b722fdef67315ea63f22011152af/a866d7b1-c236-4f26-a391-5ae32213dfc4#registry"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The Windows command prompt was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.user", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disabling_cmd_application_filter"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Number of Office Files Copied", "id": "3c6594a9-8df6-45a1-9357-d73b62083c63", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-07", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Filesystem"], "description": "This detection detects a high amount of office file copied. This can be an indicator for a malicious insider.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)) | eval action=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"action\"), \"string\", null), process=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null), file_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"file_name\"), \"string\", null), file_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"file_path\"), \"string\", null), dest_user_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), dest_device_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null) | where \"Endpoint_Filesystem\" IN(_datamodels) | where action=\"created\" | where like(file_name, \"%.doc%\") OR like(file_name, \"%.xls%\") OR like(file_name, \"%.ppt%\") | stats count(file_name) AS count BY dest_user_id, dest_device_id, span(timestamp, 10m) | where count > 20 | eval start_time=window_start, end_time=window_end, entities=mvappend(dest_user_id, dest_device_id), body=create_map([\"count\", count]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesytem` node.", "known_false_positives": "user may copy a lot of office fies from one folder to another", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": [], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfitration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/mass_file_creation/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "High number of files copied", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1048.003"], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["action", "process", "file_name", "file_path"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "Thrip", "FIN8", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "excessive_number_of_office_files_copied_filter"}]}, {"name": "Disable Defender Submit Samples Consent Feature", "id": "73922ff8-3022-11ec-bf5e-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-18", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "his analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable windows defender feature. This technique is to bypassed or evade detection from Windows Defender AV product specially the submit samples feature for further analysis..", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\SpyNet*\" Registry.registry_value_name = SubmitSamplesConsent Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000000 by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `disable_defender_submit_samples_consent_feature_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the registry value name, registry path, and registry value data from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to disable windows defender product", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["IceID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_value_data"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disable_defender_submit_samples_consent_feature_filter"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawn CMD Process", "id": "b8b19420-e892-11eb-9244-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-07-19", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this search is to detect a suspicious office product process that spawn cmd child process. This is commonly seen in a ms office product having macro to execute shell command to download or execute malicious lolbin relative to its malicious code. This is seen in trickbot spear phishing doc where it execute shell cmd to run mshta payload.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = \"winword.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name= \"excel.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"powerpnt.exe\") `process_cmd` by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawn_cmd_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "IT or network admin may create an document automation that will run shell script.", "references": ["https://twitter.com/cyb3rops/status/1416050325870587910?s=21"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Trickbot"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "executions"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/spear_phish/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "an office product parent process $parent_process_name$ spawn child process $process_name$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Mshta"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "APT32", "MuddyWater", "FIN7"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_cmd"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "office_product_spawn_cmd_process_filter"}]}, {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI", "id": "d25d2c3d-d9d8-40ec-8fdf-e86fe155a3da", "version": 7, "date": "2021-11-12", "author": "Rico Valdez, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies wmic.exe being launched with parameters to spawn a process on a remote system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WMI and this binary for lateral movement and remote code execution.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` (Processes.process=\"*/node:*\" AND Processes.process=\"*process*\" AND Processes.process=\"*call*\" AND Processes.process=\"*create*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "The wmic.exe utility is a benign Windows application. It may be used legitimately by Administrators with these parameters for remote system administration, but it's relatively uncommon.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/cimwin32prov/create-method-in-class-win32-process"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Suspicious WMI Use", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A wmic.exe process $process$ contain process spawn commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Windows Management Instrumentation"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT41", "FIN6", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Threat Group-3390", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "menuPass", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_wmic"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "id": "9be25988-ad82-11eb-a14f-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-05", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic will detect a suspicious process running in a file path where a process is not commonly seen and is most commonly used by malicious softtware. This behavior has been used by adversaries where they drop and run an exe in a path that is accessible without admin privileges.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\windows\\\\fonts\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\windows\\\\temp\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\users\\\\public\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\windows\\\\debug\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path.file_path = \"*\\\\Users\\\\Administrator\\\\Music\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path.file_path = \"*\\\\Windows\\\\servicing\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path.file_path = \"*\\\\Users\\\\Default\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path.file_path = \"*Recycle.bin*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Media\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"\\\\Windows\\\\repair\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_path Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_process_file_path_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may allow execution of specific binaries in non-standard paths. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/hk/threat-encyclopedia/malware/trojan.ps1.powtran.a/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig", "Remcos"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicioues process $Processes.process_path.file_path$ running from suspicious location", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1543"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Processes.process_path.file_path", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Create or Modify System Process"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_process_file_path_filter"}]}, {"name": "Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell", "id": "6c3f7dd8-153c-11ec-ac2d-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-14", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies a non-standard parent process (not matching CMD, PowerShell, or Explorer) spawning `ipconfig.exe` or `systeminfo.exe`. This particular behavior was seen in FIN7's JSSLoader .NET payload. This is also typically seen when an adversary is injected into another process performing different discovery techniques. This event stands out as a TTP since these tools are commonly executed with a shell application or Explorer parent, and not by another application. This TTP is a good indicator for an adversary gathering host information, but one possible false positive might be an automated tool used by a system administator.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = \"ipconfig.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"systeminfo.exe\") AND NOT (Processes.parent_process_name = \"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"powershell*\" OR Processes.parent_process_name=\"pwsh.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"explorer.exe\") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmdline_tool_not_executed_in_cmd_shell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated host discovery application that may generate false positives. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html", "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["FIN7"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/jssloader/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A non-standard parent process $parent_process_name$ spawned child process $process_name$ to execute command-line tool on $dest$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.007"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "JavaScript/JScript"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "APT32", "FIN7", "Cobalt Group", "Molerats", "TA505", "Silence", "Leafminer"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "cmdline_tool_not_executed_in_cmd_shell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Control Loading from World Writable Directory", "id": "10423ac4-10c9-11ec-8dc4-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-08", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies control.exe loading either a .cpl or .inf from a writable directory. This is related to CVE-2021-40444. During triage, review parallel processes, parent and child, for further suspicious behaviors. In addition, capture file modifications and analyze.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=control.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=CONTROL.EXE) AND Processes.process IN (\"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\windows\\\\temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `control_loading_from_world_writable_directory_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives will be present as control.exe does not natively load from writable paths as defined. One may add .cpl or .inf to the command-line if there is any false positives. Tune as needed.", "references": ["https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/rundll32.exe-111474C61232202B5B588D2B512CBB25.html", "https://app.any.run/tasks/36c14029-9df8-439c-bba0-45f2643b0c70/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.002/T1218.002.yaml"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a suspicious file from disk.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.002"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Control Panel"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "control_loading_from_world_writable_directory_filter"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage Of Taskkill", "id": "fe5bca48-accb-11eb-a67c-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-04", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies excessive usage of `taskkill.exe` application. This application is commonly used by adversaries to evade detections by killing security product processes or even other processes to evade detection.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"taskkill.exe\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=1m | where count >=10 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_taskkill_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed taskkill.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Excessive usage of taskkill.exe with process id $process_id$ (more than 10 within 1m) has been detected on $dest$ with a parent process of $parent_process_name$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process Name", "role": ["Parent Process", "Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id"], "risk_score": 28, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "excessive_usage_of_taskkill_filter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Creation on Remote Endpoint", "id": "e0eea4fa-4274-11ec-882b-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-10", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `sc.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to create a Windows Service on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Service Control Manager for lateral movement and remote code execution.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=sc.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=sc.exe) (Processes.process=*\\\\\\\\* AND Processes.process=*create* AND Processes.process=*binpath*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_creation_on_remote_endpoint_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may create Windows Services on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/services/service-control-manager", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/services/controlling-a-service-using-sc", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "message": "A Windows Service was created on a remote endpoint from $dest", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1543", "T1543.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 54, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Create or Modify System Process", "Windows Service"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Blue Mockingbird", "DarkVishnya", "Wizard Spider", "APT32", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Tropic Trooper", "Cobalt Group", "Ke3chang", "Honeybee", "FIN7", "Threat Group-3390", "APT19", "APT3", "Lazarus Group", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "windows_service_creation_on_remote_endpoint_filter"}]}, {"name": "XSL Script Execution With WMIC", "id": "004e32e2-146d-11ec-a83f-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-13", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious wmic.exe process or renamed wmic process to execute malicious xsl file. This technique was seen in FIN7 to execute its malicous jscript using the .xsl as the loader with the help of wmic.exe process. This TTP is really a good indicator for you to hunt further for FIN7 or other attacker that known to used this technique.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` Processes.process = \"*os get*\" Processes.process=\"*/format:*\" Processes.process = \"*.xsl*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `xsl_script_execution_with_wmic_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html", "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046/", "https://web.archive.org/web/20190814201250/https://subt0x11.blogspot.com/2018/04/wmicexe-whitelisting-bypass-hacking.html", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1220/T1220.md#atomic-test-3---wmic-bypass-using-local-xsl-file"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["FIN7", "Suspicious WMI Use"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_macro_js_1/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ utilizing wmic to load a XSL script.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1220"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["XSL Script Processing"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Cobalt Group"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_wmic"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "xsl_script_execution_with_wmic_filter"}]}, {"name": "GetDomainController with PowerShell Script Block", "id": "676b600a-a94d-4951-b346-11329431e6c1", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-02", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainController` commandlet. `Get-DomainController` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerView to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-DomainController*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainController/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Remote system discovery with PowerView on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 24, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote System Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Rocke", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT39", "APT32", "Deep Panda", "Threat Group-3390", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leafminer", "Ke3chang", "FIN8", "APT3", "FIN5", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Turla"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_script_block_filter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Created Within Public Path", "id": "3abb2eda-4bb8-11ec-9ae4-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-22", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytc uses Windows Event Id 7045, `New Service Was Installed`, to identify the creation of a Windows Service where the service binary path is located in public paths. This behavior could represent the installation of a malicious service. Red Teams and adversaries alike may create malicious Services for lateral movement or remote code execution", "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 Service_File_Name = \"*\\.exe\" NOT (Service_File_Name IN (\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\*\", \"C:\\\\Program File*\", \"C:\\\\Programdata\\\\*\", \"%systemroot%\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName EventCode Service_File_Name Service_Name Service_Start_Type Service_Type | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_created_within_public_path_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may install services with uncommon services paths.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/services/service-control-manager", "https://pentestlab.blog/2020/07/21/lateral-movement-services/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement_suspicious_path/windows-system.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "message": "A Windows Service $Service_File_Name$ with a public path was created on $ComputerName", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1543", "T1543.003"], "observable": [{"name": "Service_File_Name", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}, {"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["EventCode", "Service_File_Name", "Service_Type", "_time", "Service_Name", "Service_Start_Type"], "risk_score": 54, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Create or Modify System Process", "Windows Service"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Blue Mockingbird", "DarkVishnya", "Wizard Spider", "APT32", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Tropic Trooper", "Cobalt Group", "Ke3chang", "Honeybee", "FIN7", "Threat Group-3390", "APT19", "APT3", "Lazarus Group", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_system"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "windows_service_created_within_public_path_filter"}]}, {"name": "Add DefaultUser And Password In Registry", "id": "d4a3eb62-0f1e-11ec-a971-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-06", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this search is to detect a suspicious registry modification to implement auto admin logon to a host. This technique was seen in BlackMatter ransomware to automatically logon to the compromise host after triggering a safemode boot to continue encrypting the whole network. This behavior is not a common practice and really a suspicious TTP or alert need to be consider if found within then network premise.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon*\" AND Registry.registry_value_name= DefaultPassword OR Registry.registry_value_name= DefaultUserName by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `add_defaultuser_and_password_in_registry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/08/09/blackmatter-ransomware-emerges-from-the-shadow-of-darkside/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["BlackMatter Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1552.002/autoadminlogon/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified registry key $registry_key_name$ with registry value $registry_value_name$ to prepare autoadminlogon", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1552.002", "T1552"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.dest"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Credentials in Registry", "Unsecured Credentials"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "add_defaultuser_and_password_in_registry_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect RClone Command-Line Usage", "id": "e8b74268-5454-11ec-a799-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-03", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "This analytic identifies commonly used command-line arguments used by `rclone.exe` to initiate a file transfer. Some arguments were negated as they are specific to the configuration used by adversaries. In particular, an adversary may list the files or directories of the remote file share using `ls` or `lsd`, which is not indicative of malicious behavior. During triage, at this stage of a ransomware event, exfiltration is about to occur or has already. Isolate the endpoint and continue investigating by review file modifications and parallel processes.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where \"Endpoint_Processes\" IN(_datamodels) | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null), process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_path\"), \"string\", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND process_name IS NOT NULL AND process_name=\"rclone.exe\" AND (like (cmd_line, \"%copy%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%mega%\")OR like (cmd_line, \"%pcloud%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%ftp%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%--config%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%--progress%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%--no-check-certificate%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%--ignore-existing%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%--auto-confirm%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%--transfers%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%--multi-thread-streams%\")) | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null)) | eval body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line, \"process_name\", process_name, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process_name, \"process_path\", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint_Processess` datamodel.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as this is restricted to the Rclone process name. Filter or tune the analytic as needed.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/blog/rclone-mega-extortion/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html", "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/", "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/11/29/continuing-the-bazar-ransomware-story/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1020/windows-security.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to connect to a remote cloud service to move files or folders.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1020"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest_device_id", "process_name", "parent_process_name", "process_path", "dest_user_id", "process", "cmd_line"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Automated Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Tropic Trooper", "Frankenstein", "Honeybee"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_rclone_command_line_usage_filter"}]}, {"name": "Known Services Killed by Ransomware", "id": "3070f8e0-c528-11eb-b2a0-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-04", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search detects a suspicioous termination of known services killed by ransomware before encrypting files in a compromised machine. This technique is commonly seen in most of ransomware now a days to avoid exception error while accessing the targetted files it wants to encrypts because of the open handle of those services to the targetted file.", "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 Message IN (\"*Volume Shadow Copy*\",\"*VSS*\", \"*backup*\", \"*sophos*\", \"*sql*\", \"*memtas*\", \"*mepocs*\", \"*veeam*\", \"*svc$*\") Message=\"*service entered the stopped state*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message dest Type | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `known_services_killed_by_ransomware_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the 7036 EventCode ScManager in System audit Logs from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Admin activities or installing related updates may do a sudden stop to list of services we monitor.", "references": ["https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "BlackMatter Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf3/windows-system.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Known services $Message$ terminated by a potential ransomware on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1490"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Message", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "dest", "Type"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Inhibit System Recovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_system"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "known_services_killed_by_ransomware_filter"}]}, {"name": "Domain Account Discovery with Dsquery", "id": "b1a8ce04-04c2-11ec-bea7-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-24", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `dsquery.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover domain users. The `user` argument returns a list of all users registered in the domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike engage in remote system discovery for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=\"dsquery.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*user*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_account_discovery_with_dsquery_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet/details/dsquery.htm", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id", "Processes.parent_process_name"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Domain Account", "Account Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Turla", "Sandworm Team", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "Ke3chang", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "domain_account_discovery_with_dsquery_filter"}]}, {"name": "Wermgr Process Create Executable File", "id": "ab3bcce0-a105-11eb-973c-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-19", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this search is designed to detect potential malicious wermgr.exe process that drops or create executable file. Since wermgr.exe is an application trigger when error encountered in a process, it is really un ussual to this process to drop executable file. This technique is commonly seen in trickbot malware where it injects it code to this process to execute it malicious behavior like downloading other payload", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=11 process_name = \"wermgr.exe\" TargetFilename = \"*.exe\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Image TargetFilename process_name dest EventCode ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wermgr_process_create_executable_file_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of wermgr.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/", "https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Trickbot"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/infection/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Wermgr.exe writing executable files on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1027"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Image", "TargetFilename", "process_name", "dest", "EventCode", "ProcessId"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Obfuscated Files or Information"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "Whitefly", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Mofang", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "Soft Cell", "Turla", "TA505", "Silence", "APT33", "Night Dragon", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "APT29", "APT18", "Tropic Trooper", "Cobalt Group", "Patchwork", "Leafminer", "APT37", "Threat Group-3390", "Honeybee", "Dark Caracal", "menuPass", "APT19", "BlackOasis", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "Elderwood", "MuddyWater", "FIN7", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "APT3", "APT32", "Group5", "Dust Storm", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "wermgr_process_create_executable_file_filter"}]}, {"name": "Password Policy Discovery with Net", "id": "09336538-065a-11ec-8665-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command line arguments used to obtain the domain password policy. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `net.exe` for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\") AND Processes.process = \"*accounts*\" AND Processes.process = \"*/domain*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `password_policy_discovery_with_net_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://github.com/S1ckB0y1337/Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1201"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id", "Processes.parent_process_name"], "risk_score": 9, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Password Policy Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Turla", "OilRig"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "password_policy_discovery_with_net_filter"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At", "id": "4be54858-432f-11ec-8209-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-11", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `at.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to create a Scheduled Task on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution. The `at.exe` binary internally leverages the AT protocol which was deprecated starting with Windows 8 and Windows Server 2012 but may still work on previous versions of Windows. Furthermore, attackers may enable this protocol on demand by changing a sytem registry key.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=at.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=at.exe) (Processes.process=*\\\\\\\\*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `scheduled_task_creation_on_remote_endpoint_using_at_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may create scheduled tasks on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/at", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/cimwin32prov/win32-scheduledjob?redirectedfrom=MSDN"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.002/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "message": "A Windows Scheduled Task was created on a remote endpoint from $dest", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053", "T1053.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 54, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Scheduled Task/Job", "At (Windows)"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "scheduled_task_creation_on_remote_endpoint_using_at_filter"}]}, {"name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", "id": "8281ce42-5c50-11ec-82d2-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-13", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Web"], "description": "The following analytic identifies a Java user agent performing a GET request for a .class file from the remote site. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell).", "search": "| tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_user_agent=\"*Java*\" Web.http_method=\"GET\" Web.url=\"*.class*\" by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting web or proxy logs, or ensure it is being filled by a proxy like device, into the Web Datamodel. For additional filtering, allow list private IP space or restrict by known good.", "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required in some instances, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2021/12/as-log4shell-wreaks-havoc-payroll-service-reports-ransomware-attack/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "asset_type": "Web Server", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:network"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A Java user agent $http_user_agent$ was performing a $http_method$ to retrieve a remote class file.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1190"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "http_user_agent", "type": "Other", "role": ["other"]}, {"name": "http_method", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Web.http_method", "Web.url", "Web.url_length", "Web.src", "Web.dest", "Web.http_user_agent"], "risk_score": 40, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploit Public-Facing Application"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Rocke", "APT39", "BlackTech", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Night Dragon", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path", "id": "62732736-6250-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 2, "date": "2021-01-28", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code by using non-standard file extensions to load malciious DLLs. Upon investigating, look for network connections to remote destinations (internal or external). Review additional parrallel processes and child processes for additional activity.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` (Processes.process=*appdata* OR Processes.process=*programdata* OR Processes.process=*windows\\temp*) (Processes.process!=*.dll Processes.process!=*.ax Processes.process!=*.ocx) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model. Tune the query by filtering additional extensions found to be used by legitimate processes. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives with the query restricted to specified paths. Add more world writeable paths as tuning continues.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/", "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/how-to-use-the-regsvr32-tool-and-troubleshoot-regsvr32-error-messages-a98d960a-7392-e6fe-d90a-3f4e0cb543e5", "https://any.run/report/f29a7d2ecd3585e1e4208e44bcc7156ab5388725f1d29d03e7699da0d4598e7c/0826458b-5367-45cf-b841-c95a33a01718"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", "Iceid"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.010/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Suspicious $Processes.process_path.file_path$ process potentially loading malicious code", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.010"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Processes.process_path.file_path", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Regsvr32"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Blue Mockingbird", "Inception", "WIRTE", "Cobalt Group", "APT19", "Leviathan", "APT32", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=REGSVR32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_regsvr32"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path_filter"}]}, {"name": "Overwriting Accessibility Binaries", "id": "13c2f6c3-10c5-4deb-9ba1-7c4460ebe4ae", "version": 4, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Microsoft Windows contains accessibility features that can be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in. An adversary can modify or replace these programs so they can get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system. This search looks for modifications to these binaries.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\sethc.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\utilman.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\osk.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\Magnify.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\Narrator.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\DisplaySwitch.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\AtBroker.exe*) by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `overwriting_accessibility_binaries_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.", "known_false_positives": "Microsoft may provide updates to these binaries. Verify that these changes do not correspond with your normal software update cycle.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "privilege escalation"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.008/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A suspicious file modification or replace in $file_path$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1546", "T1546.008"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "file_path", "type": "file_path", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.dest", "Filesystem.file_path", "Filesystem.file_name", "Filesystem.dest"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Event Triggered Execution", "Accessibility Features"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT41", "APT3", "APT29", "Deep Panda", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "overwriting_accessibility_binaries_filter"}]}, {"name": "BITS Job Persistence", "id": "e97a5ffe-90bf-11eb-928a-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service utility `bitsadmin.exe` scheduling a BITS job to persist on an endpoint. The query identifies the parameters used to create, resume or add a file to a BITS job. Typically seen combined in a oneliner or ran in sequence. If identified, review the BITS job created and capture any files written to disk. It is possible for BITS to be used to upload files and this may require further network data analysis to identify. You can use `bitsadmin /list /verbose` to list out the jobs during investigation.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_bitsadmin` Processes.process IN (*create*, *addfile*, *setnotifyflags*, *setnotifycmdline*, *setminretrydelay*, *setcustomheaders*, *resume* ) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `bits_job_persistence_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives will be present. Typically, applications will use `BitsAdmin.exe`. Any filtering should be done based on command-line arguments (legitimate applications) or parent process.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1197/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/bitsadmin", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1197/T1197.md#atomic-test-3---persist-download--execute", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Bitsadmin/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["BITS Jobs"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1197/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to persist using BITS.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1197"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["BITS Jobs"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Patchwork", "APT41", "Leviathan"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=bitsadmin.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=bitsadmin.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_bitsadmin"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "bits_job_persistence_filter"}]}, {"name": "Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass", "id": "c2590137-0b08-4985-9ec5-6ae23d92f63d", "version": 6, "date": "2020-11-06", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Monitor for changes of the ExecutionPolicy in the registry to the values \"unrestricted\" or \"bypass,\" which allows the execution of malicious scripts.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*Software\\\\Microsoft\\\\Powershell\\\\1\\\\ShellIds\\\\Microsoft.PowerShell* Registry.registry_key_name=ExecutionPolicy (Registry.registry_value_name=Unrestricted OR Registry.registry_value_name=Bypass) by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Registry node. You must also be ingesting logs with the fields registry_path, registry_key_name, and registry_value_name from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may attempt to change the default execution policy on a system for a variety of reasons. However, setting the policy to \"unrestricted\" or \"bypass\" as this search is designed to identify, would be unusual. Hits should be reviewed and investigated as appropriate.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "Credential Dumping", "HAFNIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_execution_policy/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A registry modification in $registry_path$ with reg key $registry_key_name$ and reg value $registry_value_name$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "registry_path", "type": "RegistryPath", "role": ["Others"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.dest"], "risk_score": 48, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "PowerShell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "Gallmaker", "Turla", "APT19", "DarkHydrus", "APT28", "Thrip", "Gorgon Group", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leviathan", "TA459", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT32", "FIN7", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "APT3", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass_filter"}]}, {"name": "Disabling SystemRestore In Registry", "id": "f4f837e2-91fb-11eb-8bf6-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-31", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following search identifies the modification of registry related in disabling the system restore of a machine. This event or behavior are seen in some RAT malware to make the restore of the infected machine difficult and keep their infection on the box.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\SystemRestore\\\\DisableSR\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\SystemRestore\\\\DisableConfig\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_systemrestore_in_registry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "in some cases admin can disable systemrestore on a machine.", "references": ["https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The Windows registry was modified to disable system restore on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.user", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disabling_systemrestore_in_registry_filter"}]}, {"name": "Wmic Group Discovery", "id": "83317b08-155b-11ec-8e00-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-14", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following hunting analytic identifies the use of `wmic.exe` enumerating local groups on the endpoint. \\\nTypically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wmic.exe (Processes.process=\"*group get name*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmic_group_discovery_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Local group discovery on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Permission Groups Discovery", "Local Groups"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TA505", "APT3", "Turla", "OilRig", "admin@338"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "wmic_group_discovery_filter"}]}, {"name": "Script Execution via WMI", "id": "aa73f80d-d728-4077-b226-81ea0c8be589", "version": 4, "date": "2020-03-16", "author": "Rico Valdez, Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for scripts launched via WMI.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=scrcons.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `script_execution_via_wmi_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, administrators may use wmi to launch scripts for legitimate purposes. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/blog/child-processes/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/execution_scrcons/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A wmic.exe process $process_name$ taht execute script in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.user", "Processes.dest"], "risk_score": 36, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Windows Management Instrumentation"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT41", "FIN6", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Threat Group-3390", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "menuPass", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "script_execution_via_wmi_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect New Local Admin account", "id": "b25f6f62-0712-43c1-b203-083231ffd97d", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-08", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for newly created accounts that have been elevated to local administrators.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4720 OR (EventCode=4732 Group_Name=Administrators) | transaction member_id connected=false maxspan=180m | rename member_id as user | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_new_local_admin_account_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Windows event logs using the Splunk Windows TA and collecting event code 4720 and 4732", "known_false_positives": "The activity may be legitimate. For this reason, it's best to verify the account with an administrator and ask whether there was a valid service request for the account creation. If your local administrator group name is not \"Administrators\", this search may generate an excessive number of false positives", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["DHS Report TA18-074A", "HAFNIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Windows", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "message": "A $user$ on $dest$ was added recently. Identify if this was legitimate behavior or not.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1136.001", "T1136"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Group_Name", "member_id", "dest", "user"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "access", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Local Account", "Create Account"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT39", "APT41", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leafminer", "APT3", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_new_local_admin_account_filter"}]}, {"name": "Office Document Creating Schedule Task", "id": "cc8b7b74-9d0f-11eb-8342-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-14", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this search detects a potential malicious office document that create schedule task entry through macro VBA api or through loading taskschd.dll. This technique was seen in so many malicious macro malware that create persistence , beaconing using task schedule malware entry The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\\Windows\\system32` and `C:\\Windows\\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it's possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.'", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 process_name IN (\"WINWORD.EXE\", \"EXCEL.EXE\", \"POWERPNT.EXE\") ImageLoaded = \"*\\\\taskschd.dll\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ImageLoaded) as AllImageLoaded count by Computer EventCode Image process_name ProcessId ProcessGuid | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_document_creating_schedule_task_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and ImageLoaded (Like sysmon EventCode 7) from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Also be sure to include those monitored dll to your own sysmon config.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/irans-apt34-returns-with-an-updated-arsenal/", "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/scheduled-task-job/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Office document creating a schedule task on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["ImageLoaded", "AllImageLoaded", "Computer", "EventCode", "Image", "process_name", "ProcessId", "ProcessGuid", "_time"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Phishing", "Spearphishing Attachment"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "office_document_creating_schedule_task_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect AzureHound Command-Line Arguments", "id": "26f02e96-c300-11eb-b611-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-01", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the common command-line argument used by AzureHound `Invoke-AzureHound`. Being the script is FOSS, function names may be modified, but these changes are dependent upon the operator. In most instances the defaults are used. This analytic works to identify the common command-line attributes used. It does not cover the entirety of every argument in order to avoid false positives.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process IN (\"*invoke-azurehound*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_azurehound_command_line_arguments_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0521/", "https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/tree/master/Collectors", "https://posts.specterops.io/introducing-bloodhound-4-0-the-azure-update-9b2b26c5e350", "https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/blob/master/Collectors/AzureHound.ps1"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Discovery Techniques"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/sharphound/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ using AzureHound to enumerate AzureAD.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087.002", "T1069.001", "T1482", "T1087.001", "T1087", "T1069.002", "T1069"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Domain Account", "Local Groups", "Domain Trust Discovery", "Local Account", "Account Discovery", "Domain Groups", "Permission Groups Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery", "Discovery", "Discovery", "Discovery", "Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Turla", "Sandworm Team", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "Ke3chang", "Turla", "OilRig", "admin@338", "Wizard Spider", "Turla", "Poseidon Group", "OilRig", "Ke3chang", "APT32", "APT1", "Threat Group-3390", "APT3", "admin@338", "no", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "Inception", "OilRig", "FIN6", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Ke3chang", "TA505", "APT3"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_azurehound_command_line_arguments_filter"}]}, {"name": "GetLocalUser with PowerShell", "id": "85fae8fa-0427-11ec-8b78-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-23", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for local users. The `Get-LocalUser` commandlet is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-LocalUser*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getlocaluser_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Local user discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087", "T1087.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Account Discovery", "Local Account"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Turla", "Poseidon Group", "OilRig", "Ke3chang", "APT32", "APT1", "Threat Group-3390", "APT3", "admin@338"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "getlocaluser_with_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", "id": "d5af132c-7c17-439c-9d31-13d55340f36c", "version": 5, "date": "2020-12-17", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line that indicate a task was created via command like. This has been associated with the Dragonfly threat actor, and the SUNBURST attack against Solarwinds.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe (Processes.process=*delete* OR Processes.process=*create*) by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "Tasks should not be manually created via CLI, this is rarely done by admins as well", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["DHS Report TA18-074A", "NOBELIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}, "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A schedule task process $process_name$ with create or delete commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Scheduled Task", "Scheduled Task/Job"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "MuddyWater", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT-C-36", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT41", "Machete", "Soft Cell", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Patchwork", "OilRig", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "FIN8", "menuPass", "FIN10", "APT32", "FIN7", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd_filter"}]}, {"name": "Execution of File with Multiple Extensions", "id": "b06a555e-dce0-417d-a2eb-28a5d8d66ef7", "version": 3, "date": "2020-11-18", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for processes launched from files that have double extensions in the file name. This is typically done to obscure the \"real\" file extension and make it appear as though the file being accessed is a data file, as opposed to executable content.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = *.doc.exe OR Processes.process = *.htm.exe OR Processes.process = *.html.exe OR Processes.process = *.txt.exe OR Processes.process = *.pdf.exe OR Processes.process = *.doc.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process Processes.parent_process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node.", "known_false_positives": "None identified.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "process $process$ have double extensions in the file name is executed on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1036", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process", "Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Masquerading", "Rename System Utilities"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Windshift", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "Dragonfly 2.0", "menuPass", "APT32", "Soft Cell", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions_filter"}]}, {"name": "WBAdmin Delete System Backups", "id": "71efbf52-4dbb-4c00-a520-306aa546cbb7", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-07", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "This search looks for flags passed to wbadmin.exe (Windows Backup Administrator Tool) that delete backup files. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent recovery.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null)), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_path\"), \"string\", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND process_name IS NOT NULL AND process_name=\"wbadmin.exe\" AND like (cmd_line, \"%delete%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%catalog%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%systemstatebackup%\") | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null)), body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line, \"process_name\", process_name, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process_name, \"process_path\", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint_Processess` datamodel.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may modify the boot configuration.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1490/T1490.md", "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/08/ryuks-return/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wbadmin"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": [], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to delete system backups.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1490"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest_device_id", "process_name", "parent_process_name", "process_path", "dest_user_id", "process", "cmd_line"], "risk_score": 15, "risk_severity": "high", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Inhibit System Recovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "wbadmin_delete_system_backups_filter"}]}, {"name": "Disable Defender MpEngine Registry", "id": "cc391750-3024-11ec-955a-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-18", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This particular behavior is typically executed when an adversaries or malware gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution and to evade detections. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. Endpoint should be isolated.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\MpEngine*\" Registry.registry_value_name = MpEnablePus Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000000 by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `disable_defender_mpengine_registry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the registry value name, registry path, and registry value data from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to disable windows defender product", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["IceID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_value_data"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disable_defender_mpengine_registry_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass", "id": "070e9b80-6252-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 2, "date": "2021-01-28", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. Regsvr32.exe is also a Microsoft signed binary.This variation of the technique is often referred to as a \"Squiblydoo\" attack. \\\nUpon investigating, look for network connections to remote destinations (internal or external). Be cautious to modify the query to look for \"scrobj.dll\", the \".dll\" is not required to load scrobj. \"scrobj.dll\" will be loaded by \"regsvr32.exe\" upon execution. ", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` Processes.process=*scrobj* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives related to third party software registering .DLL's.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/", "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/how-to-use-the-regsvr32-tool-and-troubleshoot-regsvr32-error-messages-a98d960a-7392-e6fe-d90a-3f4e0cb543e5"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", "Cobalt Strike"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.010/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ in an attempt to bypass detection and preventative controls was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.010"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Regsvr32"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Blue Mockingbird", "Inception", "WIRTE", "Cobalt Group", "APT19", "Leviathan", "APT32", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=REGSVR32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_regsvr32"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass_filter"}]}, {"name": "Ryuk Test Files Detected", "id": "57d44d70-28d9-4ed1-acf5-1c80ae2bbce3", "version": 1, "date": "2020-11-06", "author": "Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The search looks for files that contain the key word *Ryuk* under any folder in the C drive, which is consistent with Ryuk propagation.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem WHERE \"Filesystem.file_path\"=C:\\\\*Ryuk* BY \"Filesystem.dest\", \"Filesystem.user\", \"Filesystem.file_path\" | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `ryuk_test_files_detected_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Filesystem data-model object. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.", "known_false_positives": "If there are files with this keywoord as file names it might trigger false possitives, please make use of our filters to tune out potential FPs.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Impact"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ryuk/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "message": "A creation of ryuk test file $file_path$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1486"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.file_path", "Filesystem.dest", "Filesystem.user"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Data Encrypted for Impact"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "TA505", "APT38"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "ryuk_test_files_detected_filter"}]}, {"name": "Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors", "id": "f5f6af30-7ba7-4295-bfe9-07de87c01bbc", "version": 2, "date": "2020-11-23", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for registry activity associated with modifications to the registry key `HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors`. In this scenario, an attacker can load an arbitrary .dll into the print-monitor registry by giving the full path name to the after.dll. The system will execute the .dll with elevated (SYSTEM) permissions and will persist after reboot.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.action=modified AND Registry.registry_path=\"*CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Print\\\\Monitors*\" by Registry.dest, Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report registry modifications.", "known_false_positives": "You will encounter noise from legitimate print-monitor registry entries.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 5"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.010/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "New print monitor added on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1547.010", "T1547"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.action", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Port Monitors", "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors_filter"}]}, {"name": "CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments", "id": "415b4306-8bfb-11eb-85c4-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-03-23", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Certutil.exe may download a file from a remote destination using `-urlcache`. This behavior does require a URL to be passed on the command-line. In addition, `-f` (force) and `-split` (Split embedded ASN.1 elements, and save to files) will be used. It is not entirely common for `certutil.exe` to contact public IP space. However, it is uncommon for `certutil.exe` to write files to world writeable paths.\\ During triage, capture any files on disk and review. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain in question.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_certutil` Processes.process=*urlcache* Processes.process=*split* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives in most environments, however tune as needed based on parent-child relationship or network connection.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/", "https://www.avira.com/en/blog/certutil-abused-by-attackers-to-spread-threats", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/10/certutil-qualms-they-came-to-drop-fombs.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ingress Tool Transfer", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Command and Control"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to download a file.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1105"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Ingress Tool Transfer"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Whitefly", "Rocke", "APT39", "Tropic Trooper", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Frankenstein", "Silence", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "APT33", "MuddyWater", "APT18", "APT38", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "OilRig", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT37", "FIN8", "PLATINUM", "Leviathan", "Elderwood", "Magic Hound", "APT3", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Patchwork", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-3390", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=certutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=CertUtil.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_certutil"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments_filter"}]}, {"name": "GetAdComputer with PowerShell", "id": "c5a31f80-5888-4d81-9f78-1cc65026316e", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-07", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The `Get-AdComputer' commandlet returns a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-AdComputer*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getadcomputer_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote System Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Rocke", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT39", "APT32", "Deep Panda", "Threat Group-3390", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leafminer", "Ke3chang", "FIN8", "APT3", "FIN5", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Turla"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "getadcomputer_with_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process", "id": "e8fc95bc-a107-11eb-a978-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-04-19", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is designed to detect suspicious cmd and powershell process spawned by wermgr.exe process. This suspicious behavior are commonly seen in code injection technique technique like trickbot to execute a shellcode, dll modules to run malicious behavior.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as cmdline min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name = \"wermgr.exe\" `process_cmd` OR `process_powershell` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/", "https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Trickbot"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/infection/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Wermgr.exe spawning suspicious processes on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_cmd"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_powershell"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process_filter"}]}, {"name": "Process Deleting Its Process File Path", "id": "f7eda4bc-871c-11eb-b110-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-17", "author": "Teoderick Contreras", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This detection is to identify a suspicious process that tries to delete the process file path related to its process. This technique is known to be defense evasion once a certain condition of malware is satisfied or not. Clop ransomware use this technique where it will try to delete its process file path using a .bat command if the keyboard layout is not the layout it tries to infect.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=1 cmdline = \"*/c del*\" Image = \"*\\\\cmd.exe\" |eval result = if(like(process,\"%\".parent_process.\"%\"), \"Found\", \"Not Found\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer user ParentImage ParentCommandLine Image cmdline EventCode ProcessID result | where result = \"Found\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `process_deleting_its_process_file_path_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware", "Remcos"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Credential Access"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A process $Image$ tries to delete its process path in commandline $cmdline$ as part of defense evasion in host $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1070"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["EventCode", "Computer", "user", "ParentImage", "ParentCommandLine", "Image", "cmdline", "ProcessID", "result", "_time"], "risk_score": 60, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Indicator Removal on Host"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "process_deleting_its_process_file_path_filter"}]}, {"name": "Domain Group Discovery With Dsquery", "id": "f0c9d62f-a232-4edd-b17e-bc409fb133d4", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-01", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `dsquery.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The argument `group`, returns a list of all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use may leverage dsquery.exe to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"dsquery.exe\") (Processes.process=\"*group*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_group_discovery_with_dsquery_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Permission Groups Discovery", "Domain Groups"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TA505", "APT3", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "Inception", "OilRig", "FIN6", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "domain_group_discovery_with_dsquery_filter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Event Log Cleared", "id": "ad517544-aff9-4c96-bd99-d6eb43bfbb6a", "version": 6, "date": "2020-07-06", "author": "Rico Valdez, Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes Windows Security Event ID 1102 or System log event 104 to identify when a Windows event log is cleared. Note that this analytic will require tuning or restricted to specific endpoints based on criticality. During triage, based on time of day and user, determine if this was planned. If not planned, follow through with reviewing parallel alerts and other data sources to determine what else may have occurred.", "search": "(`wineventlog_security` EventCode=1102) OR (`wineventlog_system` EventCode=104) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest Message EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_event_log_cleared_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows event logs from your hosts. In addition, the Splunk Windows TA is needed.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible that these logs may be legitimately cleared by Administrators. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-1102", "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/defense-evasion/disabling-windows-event-logs-by-suspending-eventlog-service-threads", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/001/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1070.001/T1070.001.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Log Manipulation", "Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Windows event logs cleared on $dest$ via EventCode $EventCode$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1070", "T1070.001"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "PR.IP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "dest"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Indicator Removal on Host", "Clear Windows Event Logs"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT41", "APT38", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT32", "FIN8", "FIN5", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_system"}, {"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "windows_event_log_cleared_filter"}]}, {"name": "Local Account Discovery with Net", "id": "5d0d4830-0133-11ec-bae3-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for local users. The two arguments `user` and 'users', return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` (Processes.process=*user OR Processes.process=*users) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `local_account_discovery_with_net_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Local user discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087", "T1087.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Account Discovery", "Local Account"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Turla", "Poseidon Group", "OilRig", "Ke3chang", "APT32", "APT1", "Threat Group-3390", "APT3", "admin@338"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_net"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "local_account_discovery_with_net_filter"}]}, {"name": "CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation", "id": "eb277ba0-b96b-11eb-b00e-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-05-20", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies a common behavior by Cobalt Strike and other frameworks where the adversary will escalate privileges, either via `jump` (Cobalt Strike PTH) or `getsystem`, using named-pipe impersonation. A suspicious event will look like `cmd.exe /c echo 4sgryt3436 > \\\\.\\Pipe\\5erg53`.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` OR Processes.process=*%comspec%* (Processes.process=*echo* AND Processes.process=*pipe*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmd_echo_pipe___escalation_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown. It is possible filtering may be required to ensure fidelity.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/threats/cobalt-strike/", "https://github.com/rapid7/meterpreter/blob/master/source/extensions/priv/server/elevate/namedpipe.c"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ potentially performing privilege escalation using named pipes related to Cobalt Strike and other frameworks.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.003", "T1543.003", "T1543"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "Windows Command Shell", "Windows Service", "Create or Modify System Process"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "TA505", "Blue Mockingbird", "Tropic Trooper", "Frankenstein", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "Honeybee", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Turla", "Silence", "APT32", "APT39", "Darkhotel", "MuddyWater", "APT18", "APT38", "Dark Caracal", "Gorgon Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Rancor", "Ke3chang", "APT37", "Leviathan", "FIN8", "APT28", "Magic Hound", "Sowbug", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Gamaredon Group", "Suckfly", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-1314", "APT3", "admin@338", "APT1", "Blue Mockingbird", "DarkVishnya", "Wizard Spider", "APT32", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Tropic Trooper", "Cobalt Group", "Ke3chang", "Honeybee", "FIN7", "Threat Group-3390", "APT19", "APT3", "Lazarus Group", "Carbanak", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_cmd"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "cmd_echo_pipe___escalation_filter"}]}, {"name": "Multiple Users Attempting To Authenticate Using Explicit Credentials", "id": "e61918fa-9ca4-11eb-836c-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-13", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies a source user failing to authenticate with multiple users using explicit credentials on a host. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4648 is generated when a process attempts an account logon by explicitly specifying that accounts credentials. This event generates on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations.\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\\nThis detection will trigger on the potenfially malicious host, perhaps controlled via a trojan or operated by an insider threat, from where a password spraying attack is being executed.\\\nThe analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source account, attempted user accounts and the endpoint were the behavior was identified.", "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4648 | bucket span=2m _time | eval Source_Account = mvindex(Account_Name, 0) | eval Destination_Account = mvindex(Account_Name, 1) | search Source_Account != \"*$\" Source_Account !=\"-\" Destination_Account !=\"*$\" | stats dc(Destination_Account) AS unique_accounts values(Destination_Account) as tried_account by _time, ComputerName, Source_Account | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by ComputerName | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_users_attempting_to_authenticate_using_explicit_credentials_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Event Logs from domain controllers as well as member servers and workstations. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Logon` within `Logon/Logoff` needs to be enabled.", "known_false_positives": "A source user failing attempting to authenticate multiple users on a host is not a common behavior for regular systems. Some applications, however, may exhibit this behavior in which case sets of users hosts can be added to an allow list. Possible false positive scenarios include systems where several users connect to like Mail servers, identity providers, remote desktop services, Citrix, etc.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4648", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/basic-audit-logon-events"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_explicit_credential_spray/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Potential password spraying attack from $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Security_ID", "Account_Name", "ComputerName"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Password Spraying", "Brute Force"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "Leafminer", "Lazarus Group", "DarkVishnya", "APT39", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Turla"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "multiple_users_attempting_to_authenticate_using_explicit_credentials_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect AzureHound File Modifications", "id": "1c34549e-c31b-11eb-996b-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-01", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic is similar to SharpHound file modifications, but this instance covers the use of Invoke-AzureHound. AzureHound is the SharpHound equivilent but for Azure. It's possible this may never be seen in an environment as most attackers may execute this tool remotely. Once execution is complete, a zip file with a similar name will drop `20210601090751-azurecollection.zip`. In addition to the zip, multiple .json files will be written to disk, which are in the zip.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*-azurecollection.zip\", \"*-azprivroleadminrights.json\", \"*-azglobaladminrights.json\", \"*-azcloudappadmins.json\", \"*-azapplicationadmins.json\") by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_azurehound_file_modifications_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on file modifications that include the name of the process, and file, responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as the analytic is specific to a filename with extension .zip. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://posts.specterops.io/introducing-bloodhound-4-0-the-azure-update-9b2b26c5e350", "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/master/Collectors/AzureHound.ps1"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Discovery Techniques"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/sharphound/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk that is related to AzureHound, a AzureAD enumeration utility, has occurred on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087.002", "T1069.001", "T1482", "T1087.001", "T1087", "T1069.002", "T1069"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "file_name", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "file_path", "dest", "file_name", "process_id", "file_create_time"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Domain Account", "Local Groups", "Domain Trust Discovery", "Local Account", "Account Discovery", "Domain Groups", "Permission Groups Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery", "Discovery", "Discovery", "Discovery", "Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Turla", "Sandworm Team", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "Ke3chang", "Turla", "OilRig", "admin@338", "Wizard Spider", "Turla", "Poseidon Group", "OilRig", "Ke3chang", "APT32", "APT1", "Threat Group-3390", "APT3", "admin@338", "no", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "Inception", "OilRig", "FIN6", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Ke3chang", "TA505", "APT3"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_azurehound_file_modifications_filter"}]}, {"name": "FodHelper UAC Bypass", "id": "909f8fd8-7ac8-11eb-a1f3-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-01", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Fodhelper.exe has a known UAC bypass as it attempts to look for specific registry keys upon execution, that do not exist. Therefore, an attacker can write its malicious commands in these registry keys to be executed by fodhelper.exe with the highest privilege. \\\n1. `HKCU:\\Software\\Classes\\ms-settings\\shell\\open\\command`\\\n1. `HKCU:\\Software\\Classes\\ms-settings\\shell\\open\\command\\DelegateExecute`\\\n1. `HKCU:\\Software\\Classes\\ms-settings\\shell\\open\\command\\(default)`\\\nUpon triage, fodhelper.exe will have a child process and read access will occur on the registry keys. Isolate the endpoint and review parallel processes for additional behavior.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=fodhelper.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `fodhelper_uac_bypass_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Limited to no false positives are expected.", "references": ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.md", "https://github.com/gushmazuko/WinBypass/blob/master/FodhelperBypass.ps1", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "IcedID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "message": "Suspcious registy keys added by process fodhelper.exe (process_id- $process_id), with a parent_process of $parent_process_name$ that has been executed on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1112", "T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process Name", "role": ["Parent Process", "Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Modify Registry", "Bypass User Access Control", "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Turla", "APT32", "APT38", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "Threat Group-3390", "Honeybee", "Patchwork", "Gorgon Group", "FIN8", "APT37", "MuddyWater", "Honeybee", "Cobalt Group", "Threat Group-3390", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Patchwork", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "fodhelper_uac_bypass_filter"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network", "id": "35307032-a12d-11eb-835f-acde48001122", "version": 3, "date": "2021-10-13", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments and performing a network connection. It is unusual for rundll32.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` by _time span=1h Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(rundll32\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port !=\"0\" by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port| `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_guid connection_to_CNC dest_port | `rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `port` node. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32", "https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Cobalt Strike", "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A rundll32 process $process_name$ with no commandline argument like this process commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "processname", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Rundll32"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT32", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "TA505", "MuddyWater", "APT29", "APT19", "CopyKittens", "APT3", "Carbanak", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_rundll32"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter"}]}, {"name": "Account Discovery With Net App", "id": "339805ce-ac30-11eb-b87d-acde48001122", "version": 3, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this search is to detect a potential account discovery series of command used by several malware or attack to recon the target machine. This technique is also seen in some note worthy malware like trickbot where it runs a cmd process, or even drop its module that will execute the said series of net command. This series of command are good correlation search and indicator of attacker recon if seen in the machines within a none technical user or department (HR, finance, ceo and etc) network.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` AND (Processes.process=\"*user*\" OR Processes.process=\"*config*\" OR Processes.process=\"*view /all*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name | where count >=5 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `account_discovery_with_net_app_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product..", "known_false_positives": "admin or power user may used this series of command.", "references": ["https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/", "https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html", "https://app.any.run/tasks/48414a33-3d66-4a46-afe5-c2003bb55ccf/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Trickbot", "IcedID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/infection/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Suspicious $process_name$ usage detected on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process Name", "role": ["Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 5, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Domain Account", "Account Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Turla", "Sandworm Team", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "Ke3chang", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_net"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "account_discovery_with_net_app_filter"}]}, {"name": "GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell", "id": "b44f6ac6-0429-11ec-87e9-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-23", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query local users. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `Win32_UserAccount` parameter is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-WmiObject* AND Processes.process=*Win32_UserAccount*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Local user discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087", "T1087.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Account Discovery", "Local Account"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Turla", "Poseidon Group", "OilRig", "Ke3chang", "APT32", "APT1", "Threat Group-3390", "APT3", "admin@338"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share", "id": "f63c34fe-a435-11eb-935a-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-11-18", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies executable files (.exe or .dll) being written to Windows administrative SMB shares (Admin$, IPC$, C$). This represents suspicious behavior as its commonly used by tools like like PsExec/PaExec and others to stage service binaries before creating and starting a Windows service on remote endpoints. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse administrative shares for lateral movement and remote code execution. The Trickbot malware family also implements this behavior to try to infect other machines in the infected network.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=5145 Relative_Target_Name IN (\"*.exe\",\"*.dll\") Object_Type=File Share_Name IN (\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\C$\",\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\IPC$\",\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\admin$\") Access_Mask= \"0x2\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by EventCode Share_Name Relative_Target_Name Object_Type Access_Mask user src_port Source_Address | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 5145 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required. Also enable the object Audit access success/failure in your group policy.", "known_false_positives": "System Administrators may use looks like PsExec for troubleshooting or administrations tasks. However, this will typically come only from certain users and certain systems that can be added to an allow list.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002/", "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2013/03/09/psexec-demystified/", "https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/", "https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "Trickbot"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/exe_smbshare/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "message": "$user$ dropped or created an executable file in known sensitive SMB share. Share name=$Share_Name$, Target name=$Relative_Target_Name$, and Access mask=$Access_Mask$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021", "T1021.002"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Share_Name", "Relative_Target_Name", "Object_Type", "Access_Mask", "user", "src_port", "Source_Address"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote Services", "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "APT32", "Orangeworm", "FIN8", "APT3", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-1314", "Turla", "Deep Panda", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share_filter"}]}, {"name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services", "id": "f0c693d8-2a89-4ce7-80b4-98fea4c3ea6d", "version": 4, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for arguments to sc.exe indicating the creation or modification of a Windows service.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = sc.exe (Processes.process=\"* create *\" OR Processes.process=\"* config *\") by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Using sc.exe to manipulate Windows services is uncommon. However, there may be legitimate instances of this behavior. It is important to validate and investigate as appropriate.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Service Abuse", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Disabling Security Tools", "NOBELIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Persistence"}, "Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "message": "A sc process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ to create of configure services in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1543.003", "T1543"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Windows Service", "Create or Modify System Process"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "DarkVishnya", "Wizard Spider", "APT32", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Tropic Trooper", "Cobalt Group", "Ke3chang", "Honeybee", "FIN7", "Threat Group-3390", "APT19", "APT3", "Lazarus Group", "Carbanak", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services_filter"}]}, {"name": "Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection", "id": "4fbf9270-43da-11ec-9486-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary making a remote network connection. This technique may be used to download and execute code while bypassing application control. \\\nWhen `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \\\nIf used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \\\nDuring triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` by _time span=1h Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_guid [ | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port !=\"0\" by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_guid connection_to_CNC dest_port | `windows_installutil_remote_network_connection_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Ports` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives should be present as InstallUtil is not typically used to download remote files. Filter as needed based on Developers requirements.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ generating a remote download.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218.004", "T1218"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id", "Ports.process_guid", "Ports.dest", "Ports.dest_port"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["InstallUtil", "Signed Binary Proxy Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=installutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=InstallUtil.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_installutil"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "windows_installutil_remote_network_connection_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Kerberoasting", "id": "dabdd6d7-3e10-42be-8711-4e124f7a3850", "version": 2, "date": "2020-10-21", "author": "Xiao Lin, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Certificates"], "description": "This search detects a potential kerberoasting attack via service principal name requests", "search": " | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval _time=map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), EventCode=map_get(input_event, \"event_code\"), TicketOptions=map_get(input_event, \"ticket_options\"), TicketEncryptionType=map_get(input_event, \"ticket_encryption_type\"), ServiceName=map_get(input_event, \"service_name\"), ServiceID=map_get(input_event, \"service_id\"), dest_user_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), dest_device_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where EventCode=\"4769\" AND TicketOptions=\"0x40810000\" AND TicketEncryptionType=\"0x17\" | first_time_event input_columns=[\"EventCode\",\"TicketOptions\",\"TicketEncryptionType\",\"ServiceName\",\"ServiceID\"] | where first_time_EventCode_TicketOptions_TicketEncryptionType_ServiceName_ServiceID | eval start_time=_time, end_time=_time | eval body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"EventCode\", EventCode, \"ServiceName\", ServiceName, \"TicketOptions\", TicketOptions, \"TicketEncryptionType\", TicketEncryptionType]), entities = mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null)) | select start_time, end_time, entities, body | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "The test data is converted from Windows Security Event logs generated from Attach Range simulation and used in SPL search and extended to SPL2", "known_false_positives": "Older systems that support kerberos RC4 by default NetApp may generate false positives", "references": ["Initial ESCU implementation by Jose Hernandez and Patrick Bareiss"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 20, "context": ["Source:AD", "Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Kerberoasting malware is potentially applying stolen credentials. Operation is performed at the device $dest_device_id$, by the account $dest_user_id$ via command $cmd_line$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1558.003", "T1558"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "User", "role": ["Actor"]}, {"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "cmd_line", "type": "processname", "role": ["Others"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["service_name", "_time", "event_code", "ticket_encryption_type", "service_id", "ticket_options"], "risk_score": 14, "risk_severity": "low", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Kerberoasting", "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_kerberoasting_filter"}]}, {"name": "System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations", "id": "a34aae96-ccf8-4aef-952c-3ea21444444d", "version": 6, "date": "2020-12-08", "author": "David Dorsey, Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for system processes that typically execute from `C:\\Windows\\System32\\` or `C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64`. This may indicate a malicious process that is trying to hide as a legitimate process.\\\nThis detection utilizes a lookup that is deduped `system32` and `syswow64` directories from Server 2016 and Windows 10.\\\nDuring triage, review the parallel processes - what process moved the native Windows binary? identify any artifacts on disk and review. If a remote destination is contacted, what is the reputation?", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_path !=\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32*\" Processes.process_path !=\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_hash | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `is_windows_system_file` | `system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "This detection may require tuning based on third party applications utilizing native Windows binaries in non-standard paths.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.yaml", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Unusual Processes", "Ransomware", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "System process running from unexpected location on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1036", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Processes.process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.user", "Processes.dest", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_hash"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Masquerading", "Rename System Utilities"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Windshift", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "Dragonfly 2.0", "menuPass", "APT32", "Soft Cell", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "lookup update=true is_windows_system_file filename as process_name OUTPUT systemFile | search systemFile=true", "description": "This macro limits the output to process names that are in the Windows System directory", "name": "is_windows_system_file", "lookups": [{"default_match": "false", "description": "A full baseline of executable files in Windows\\System32 and Windows\\Syswow64, including sub-directories from Server 2016 and Windows 10.", "filename": "is_windows_system_file.csv", "min_matches": 1, "name": "is_windows_system_file", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/is_windows_system_file.csv"}]}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations_filter"}]}, {"name": "Excel Spawning PowerShell", "id": "42d40a22-9be3-11eb-8f08-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies Microsoft Excel spawning PowerShell. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with Excel.exe. Excel.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Office16` (version will vary). PowerShell spawning from Excel.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command executed will most likely be encoded and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=\"excel.exe\" `process_powershell` by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excel_spawning_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/powershell/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$, indicating potential suspicious macro execution.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Security Account Manager", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390", "Ke3chang", "Soft Cell", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "menuPass", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_powershell"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "excel_spawning_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect SharpHound Usage", "id": "dd04b29a-beed-11eb-87bc-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-05-27", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies SharpHound binary usage by using the original filena,e. In addition to renaming the PE, other coverage is available to detect command-line arguments. This particular analytic looks for the original_file_name of `SharpHound.exe` and the process name. It is possible older instances of SharpHound.exe have different original filenames. Dependent upon the operator, the code may be re-compiled and the attributes removed or changed to anything else. During triage, review the metadata of the binary in question. Review parallel processes for suspicious behavior. Identify the source of this binary.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=sharphound.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=SharpHound.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_sharphound_usage_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as this is specific to a file attribute not used by anything else. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0521/", "https://thedfirreport.com/?s=bloodhound", "https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/tree/master/Collectors", "https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/SharpHound3", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md#atomic-test-2---run-bloodhound-from-local-disk"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Discovery Techniques", "Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/sharphound/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Potential SharpHound binary identified on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087.002", "T1069.001", "T1482", "T1087.001", "T1087", "T1069.002", "T1069"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 24, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Domain Account", "Local Groups", "Domain Trust Discovery", "Local Account", "Account Discovery", "Domain Groups", "Permission Groups Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery", "Discovery", "Discovery", "Discovery", "Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Turla", "Sandworm Team", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "Ke3chang", "Turla", "OilRig", "admin@338", "Wizard Spider", "Turla", "Poseidon Group", "OilRig", "Ke3chang", "APT32", "APT1", "Threat Group-3390", "APT3", "admin@338", "no", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "Inception", "OilRig", "FIN6", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Ke3chang", "TA505", "APT3"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_sharphound_usage_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery", "id": "a51bfe1a-94f0-48cc-b1e4-16ae10145893", "version": 2, "date": "2020-11-10", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for fast execution of processes used for system network configuration discovery on the endpoint.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where NOT Processes.user IN (\"\",\"unknown\") by Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.user _time | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | search `system_network_configuration_discovery_tools` | transaction dest connected=false maxpause=5m |where eventcount>=5 | table firstTime lastTime dest user process_name process parent_process eventcount | `detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the processes node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is usually generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry or that are populated via Windows event logs, after enabling process tracking in your Windows audit settings.", "known_false_positives": "It is uncommon for normal users to execute a series of commands used for network discovery. System administrators often use scripts to execute these commands. These can generate false positives.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Unusual Processes"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 2"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1016/discovery_commands/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning multiple $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ typically not a normal behavior of the process.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1016"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 32, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Network Configuration Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Frankenstein", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "Darkhotel", "MuddyWater", "APT1", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "menuPass", "Threat Group-3390", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "APT3", "Naikon", "admin@338", "Turla", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(process_name= \"arp.exe\" OR process_name= \"at.exe\" OR process_name= \"attrib.exe\" OR process_name= \"cscript.exe\" OR process_name= \"dsquery.exe\" OR process_name= \"hostname.exe\" OR process_name= \"ipconfig.exe\" OR process_name= \"mimikatz.exe\" OR process_name= \"nbstat.exe\" OR process_name= \"net.exe\" OR process_name= \"netsh.exe\" OR process_name= \"nslookup.exe\" OR process_name= \"ping.exe\" OR process_name= \"quser.exe\" OR process_name= \"qwinsta.exe\" OR process_name= \"reg.exe\" OR process_name= \"runas.exe\" OR process_name= \"sc.exe\" OR process_name= \"schtasks.exe\" OR process_name= \"ssh.exe\" OR process_name= \"systeminfo.exe\" OR process_name= \"taskkill.exe\" OR process_name= \"telnet.exe\" OR process_name= \"tracert.exe\" OR process_name=\"wscript.exe\" OR process_name= \"xcopy.exe\")", "description": "This macro is a list of process that can be used to discover the network configuration", "name": "system_network_configuration_discovery_tools"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery_filter"}]}, {"name": "Malicious Powershell Executed As A Service", "id": "8e204dfd-cae0-4ea8-a61d-e972a1ff2ff8", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-07", "author": "Ryan Becwar", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This detection is to identify the abuse the Windows SC.exe to execute malicious commands or payloads via PowerShell.", "search": " `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 | eval l_Service_File_Name=lower(Service_File_Name) | regex l_Service_File_Name=\"powershell[.\\s]|powershell_ise[.\\s]|pwsh[.\\s]|psexec[.\\s]\" | regex l_Service_File_Name=\"-nop[rofile\\s]+|-w[indowstyle]*\\s+hid[den]*|-noe[xit\\s]+|-enc[odedcommand\\s]+\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Service_File_Name Service_Name Service_Start_Type Service_Type Service_Account user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_powershell_executed_as_a_service_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows System logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Creating a hidden powershell service is rare and could key off of those instances.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/dosfuscation-report.pdf", "http://az4n6.blogspot.com/2017/", "https://www.danielbohannon.com/blog-1/2017/3/12/powershell-execution-argument-obfuscation-how-it-can-make-detection-easier"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious Powershell"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1569.002/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "message": "Identifies the abuse the Windows SC.exe to execute malicious powerShell as a service $Service_File_Name$ by $user$ on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1569", "T1569.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["EventCode", "Service_File_Name", "Service_Type", "_time", "Service_Name", "Service_Start_Type", "Service_Account", "user"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Services", "Service Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "APT41", "Silence", "FIN6", "APT32", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_system"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "malicious_powershell_executed_as_a_service_filter"}]}, {"name": "System Process Running from Unexpected Location", "id": "28179107-099a-464a-94d3-08301e6c055f", "version": 3, "date": "2020-08-25", "author": "Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "An attacker tries might try to use different version of a system command without overriding original, or they might try to avoid some detection running the process from a different folder. This detection checks that a list of system processes run inside C:\\\\Windows\\System32 or C:\\\\Windows\\SysWOW64 The list of system processes has been extracted from https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/is_windows_system_file.csv and the original detection https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml", "search": " $ssa_input = | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval device=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null), user=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null)), process_path=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_path\"), \"string\", null)), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null);\n$cond_1 = | from $ssa_input | where process_name=\"arp.exe\" OR process_name=\"adaptertroubleshooter.exe\" OR process_name=\"applicationframehost.exe\" OR process_name=\"atbroker.exe\" OR process_name=\"authhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"autoworkplace.exe\" OR process_name=\"axinstui.exe\" OR process_name=\"backgroundtransferhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"bdehdcfg.exe\" OR process_name=\"bdeuisrv.exe\" OR process_name=\"bdeunlockwizard.exe\" OR process_name=\"bitlockerdeviceencryption.exe\" OR process_name=\"bitlockerwizard.exe\" OR process_name=\"bitlockerwizardelev.exe\" OR process_name=\"bytecodegenerator.exe\" OR process_name=\"camerasettingsuihost.exe\" OR process_name=\"castsrv.exe\" OR process_name=\"certenrollctrl.exe\" OR process_name=\"checknetisolation.exe\" OR process_name=\"clipup.exe\" OR process_name=\"cloudexperiencehostbroker.exe\" OR process_name=\"cloudnotifications.exe\" OR process_name=\"cloudstoragewizard.exe\" OR process_name=\"compmgmtlauncher.exe\" OR process_name=\"compattelrunner.exe\" OR process_name=\"computerdefaults.exe\" OR process_name=\"credentialuibroker.exe\" OR process_name=\"dfdwiz.exe\" OR process_name=\"dwwin.exe\" OR process_name=\"dataexchangehost.exe\" OR process_name=\"defrag.exe\" OR process_name=\"devicedisplayobjectprovider.exe\" OR process_name=\"deviceeject.exe\" OR process_name=\"deviceenroller.exe\" OR process_name=\"devicepairingwizard.exe\" OR process_name=\"deviceproperties.exe\" OR process_name=\"disksnapshot.exe\" OR process_name=\"dism.exe\" OR process_name=\"displayswitch.exe\" OR process_name=\"dmnotificationbroker.exe\" OR process_name=\"dmomacpmo.exe\" OR process_name=\"dpiscaling.exe\" OR process_name=\"dsmusertask.exe\" OR process_name=\"dxpserver.exe\" OR process_name=\"edpcleanup.exe\" OR process_name=\"eosnotify.exe\" OR process_name=\"eap3host.exe\" OR process_name=\"easpoliciesbrokerhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"easeofaccessdialog.exe\" OR process_name=\"ehstorauthn.exe\" OR process_name=\"fxscover.exe\" OR process_name=\"fxssvc.exe\" OR process_name=\"fxsunatd.exe\" OR process_name=\"filehistory.exe\" OR process_name=\"fondue.exe\" OR process_name=\"gamepanel.exe\" OR process_name=\"genvalobj.exe\" OR process_name=\"gettingstarted.exe\" OR process_name=\"hostname.exe\" OR process_name=\"icsentitlementhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"infdefaultinstall.exe\" OR process_name=\"installagent.exe\" OR process_name=\"languagecomponentsinstallercomhandler.exe\" OR process_name=\"launchtm.exe\" OR process_name=\"launchwinapp.exe\" OR process_name=\"legacynetuxhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"licensemanagershellext.exe\" OR process_name=\"licensingui.exe\" OR process_name=\"locationnotificationwindows.exe\" OR process_name=\"locationnotifications.exe\" OR process_name=\"locator.exe\" OR process_name=\"lockapphost.exe\" OR process_name=\"lockscreencontentserver.exe\" OR process_name=\"logonui.exe\" OR process_name=\"lsaiso.exe\" OR process_name=\"mdeserver.exe\" OR process_name=\"mdmagent.exe\" OR process_name=\"mdmappinstaller.exe\" OR process_name=\"mrinfo.exe\" OR process_name=\"mrt.exe\" OR process_name=\"mschedexe.exe\" OR process_name=\"magnify.exe\" OR process_name=\"mbaeparsertask.exe\" OR process_name=\"mdres.exe\" OR process_name=\"mdsched.exe\" OR process_name=\"migautoplay.exe\" OR process_name=\"mpsigstub.exe\" OR process_name=\"msspellcheckinghost.exe\" OR process_name=\"muiunattend.exe\" OR process_name=\"multidigimon.exe\" OR process_name=\"musnotification.exe\" OR process_name=\"musnotificationux.exe\" OR process_name=\"napstat.exe\" OR process_name=\"netstat.exe\" OR process_name=\"narrator.exe\" OR process_name=\"netcfgnotifyobjecthost.exe\" OR process_name=\"netevtfwdr.exe\" OR process_name=\"netproj.exe\" OR process_name=\"netplwiz.exe\" OR process_name=\"networkuxbroker.exe\";\n$cond_2 = | from $ssa_input | where process_name=\"openwith.exe\" OR process_name=\"optionalfeatures.exe\" OR process_name=\"pathping.exe\" OR process_name=\"ping.exe\" OR process_name=\"passwordonwakesettingflyout.exe\" OR process_name=\"pickerhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"pkgmgr.exe\" OR process_name=\"pnpunattend.exe\" OR process_name=\"pnputil.exe\" OR process_name=\"presentationhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"presentationsettings.exe\" OR process_name=\"printbrmui.exe\" OR process_name=\"printdialoghost.exe\" OR process_name=\"printdialoghost3d.exe\" OR process_name=\"printisolationhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"proximityuxhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"rdspnf.exe\" OR process_name=\"rmactivate.exe\" OR process_name=\"rmactivate_isv.exe\" OR process_name=\"rmactivate_ssp.exe\" OR process_name=\"rmactivate_ssp_isv.exe\" OR process_name=\"route.exe\" OR process_name=\"rdpsa.exe\" OR process_name=\"rdpsaproxy.exe\" OR process_name=\"rdpsauachelper.exe\" OR process_name=\"reagentc.exe\" OR process_name=\"recoverydrive.exe\" OR process_name=\"register-cimprovider.exe\" OR process_name=\"registeriepkeys.exe\" OR process_name=\"relpost.exe\" OR process_name=\"remoteposworker.exe\" OR process_name=\"rmclient.exe\" OR process_name=\"robocopy.exe\" OR process_name=\"rpcping.exe\" OR process_name=\"runlegacycplelevated.exe\" OR process_name=\"runtimebroker.exe\" OR process_name=\"sihclient.exe\" OR process_name=\"searchfilterhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"searchindexer.exe\" OR process_name=\"searchprotocolhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"secedit.exe\" OR process_name=\"sensordataservice.exe\" OR process_name=\"setieinstalleddate.exe\" OR process_name=\"settingsynchost.exe\" OR process_name=\"slidetoshutdown.exe\" OR process_name=\"smartscreensettings.exe\" OR process_name=\"sndvol.exe\" OR process_name=\"snippingtool.exe\" OR process_name=\"soundrecorder.exe\" OR process_name=\"spaceagent.exe\" OR process_name=\"sppextcomobj.exe\" OR process_name=\"srtasks.exe\" OR process_name=\"stikynot.exe\" OR process_name=\"synchost.exe\" OR process_name=\"sysreseterr.exe\" OR process_name=\"systempropertiesadvanced.exe\" OR process_name=\"systempropertiescomputername.exe\" OR process_name=\"systempropertiesdataexecutionprevention.exe\" OR process_name=\"systempropertieshardware.exe\" OR process_name=\"systempropertiesperformance.exe\" OR process_name=\"systempropertiesprotection.exe\" OR process_name=\"systempropertiesremote.exe\" OR process_name=\"systemsettingsadminflows.exe\" OR process_name=\"systemsettingsbroker.exe\" OR process_name=\"systemsettingsremovedevice.exe\" OR process_name=\"tcpsvcs.exe\" OR process_name=\"tracert.exe\" OR process_name=\"tstheme.exe\" OR process_name=\"tswbprxy.exe\" OR process_name=\"tapiunattend.exe\" OR process_name=\"taskmgr.exe\" OR process_name=\"thumbnailextractionhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"tokenbrokercookies.exe\" OR process_name=\"tpminit.exe\" OR process_name=\"tswpfwrp.exe\" OR process_name=\"ui0detect.exe\" OR process_name=\"upgraderesultsui.exe\" OR process_name=\"useraccountbroker.exe\" OR process_name=\"useraccountcontrolsettings.exe\" OR process_name=\"usoclient.exe\" OR process_name=\"utilman.exe\" OR process_name=\"vssvc.exe\" OR process_name=\"vaultcmd.exe\" OR process_name=\"vaultsysui.exe\" OR process_name=\"wfs.exe\" OR process_name=\"wmpdmc.exe\" OR process_name=\"wpdshextautoplay.exe\" OR process_name=\"wscollect.exe\" OR process_name=\"wsmanhttpconfig.exe\" OR process_name=\"wsreset.exe\" OR process_name=\"wudfhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"wwahost.exe\" OR process_name=\"wallpaperhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"webcache.exe\" OR process_name=\"werfault.exe\" OR process_name=\"werfaultsecure.exe\" OR process_name=\"winsat.exe\" OR process_name=\"windows.media.backgroundplayback.exe\" OR process_name=\"windowsactiondialog.exe\" OR process_name=\"windowsanytimeupgrade.exe\" OR process_name=\"windowsanytimeupgraderesults.exe\";\n$cond_3 = | from $ssa_input | where process_name=\"windowsanytimeupgradeui.exe\" OR process_name=\"windowsupdateelevatedinstaller.exe\" OR process_name=\"workfolders.exe\" OR process_name=\"wpcmon.exe\" OR process_name=\"acu.exe\" OR process_name=\"aitagent.exe\" OR process_name=\"aitstatic.exe\" OR process_name=\"alg.exe\" OR process_name=\"appidcertstorecheck.exe\" OR process_name=\"appidpolicyconverter.exe\" OR process_name=\"at.exe\" OR process_name=\"attrib.exe\" OR process_name=\"audiodg.exe\" OR process_name=\"auditpol.exe\" OR process_name=\"autochk.exe\" OR process_name=\"autoconv.exe\" OR process_name=\"autofmt.exe\" OR process_name=\"baaupdate.exe\" OR process_name=\"backgroundtaskhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"bcastdvr.exe\" OR process_name=\"bcdboot.exe\" OR process_name=\"bcdedit.exe\" OR process_name=\"bdechangepin.exe\" OR process_name=\"bdeunlock.exe\" OR process_name=\"bitsadmin.exe\" OR process_name=\"bootcfg.exe\" OR process_name=\"bootim.exe\" OR process_name=\"bootsect.exe\" OR process_name=\"bridgeunattend.exe\" OR process_name=\"browser_broker.exe\" OR process_name=\"bthudtask.exe\" OR process_name=\"cacls.exe\" OR process_name=\"calc.exe\" OR process_name=\"cdpreference.exe\" OR process_name=\"certreq.exe\" OR process_name=\"certutil.exe\" OR process_name=\"change.exe\" OR process_name=\"changepk.exe\" OR process_name=\"charmap.exe\" OR process_name=\"chglogon.exe\" OR process_name=\"chgport.exe\" OR process_name=\"chgusr.exe\" OR process_name=\"chkdsk.exe\" OR process_name=\"chkntfs.exe\" OR process_name=\"choice.exe\" OR process_name=\"cipher.exe\" OR process_name=\"cleanmgr.exe\" OR process_name=\"cliconfg.exe\" OR process_name=\"clip.exe\" OR process_name=\"cmd.exe\" OR process_name=\"cmdkey.exe\" OR process_name=\"cmdl32.exe\" OR process_name=\"cmmon32.exe\" OR process_name=\"cmstp.exe\" OR process_name=\"cofire.exe\" OR process_name=\"colorcpl.exe\" OR process_name=\"comp.exe\" OR process_name=\"compact.exe\" OR process_name=\"conhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"consent.exe\" OR process_name=\"control.exe\" OR process_name=\"convert.exe\" OR process_name=\"credwiz.exe\" OR process_name=\"cscript.exe\" OR process_name=\"csrss.exe\" OR process_name=\"ctfmon.exe\" OR process_name=\"cttune.exe\" OR process_name=\"cttunesvr.exe\" OR process_name=\"dashost.exe\" OR process_name=\"dccw.exe\" OR process_name=\"dcomcnfg.exe\" OR process_name=\"ddodiag.exe\" OR process_name=\"dfrgui.exe\" OR process_name=\"dialer.exe\" OR process_name=\"diantz.exe\" OR process_name=\"dinotify.exe\" OR process_name=\"diskpart.exe\" OR process_name=\"diskperf.exe\" OR process_name=\"diskraid.exe\" OR process_name=\"dispdiag.exe\" OR process_name=\"djoin.exe\" OR process_name=\"dllhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"dllhst3g.exe\" OR process_name=\"dmcertinst.exe\" OR process_name=\"dmcfghost.exe\" OR process_name=\"dmclient.exe\" OR process_name=\"dnscacheugc.exe\" OR process_name=\"doskey.exe\" OR process_name=\"dpapimig.exe\" OR process_name=\"dpnsvr.exe\" OR process_name=\"driverquery.exe\" OR process_name=\"drvcfg.exe\" OR process_name=\"drvinst.exe\" OR process_name=\"dsregcmd.exe\" OR process_name=\"dstokenclean.exe\" OR process_name=\"dvdplay.exe\" OR process_name=\"dvdupgrd.exe\" OR process_name=\"dwm.exe\" OR process_name=\"dxdiag.exe\" OR process_name=\"easinvoker.exe\" OR process_name=\"efsui.exe\";\n$cond_4 = | from $ssa_input | where process_name=\"embeddedapplauncher.exe\" OR process_name=\"esentutl.exe\" OR process_name=\"eudcedit.exe\" OR process_name=\"eventcreate.exe\" OR process_name=\"eventvwr.exe\" OR process_name=\"expand.exe\" OR process_name=\"extrac32.exe\" OR process_name=\"fc.exe\" OR process_name=\"fhmanagew.exe\" OR process_name=\"find.exe\" OR process_name=\"findstr.exe\" OR process_name=\"finger.exe\" OR process_name=\"fixmapi.exe\" OR process_name=\"fltmc.exe\" OR process_name=\"fodhelper.exe\" OR process_name=\"fontdrvhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"fontview.exe\" OR process_name=\"forfiles.exe\" OR process_name=\"fsavailux.exe\" OR process_name=\"fsquirt.exe\" OR process_name=\"fsutil.exe\" OR process_name=\"ftp.exe\" OR process_name=\"fvenotify.exe\" OR process_name=\"fveprompt.exe\" OR process_name=\"getmac.exe\" OR process_name=\"gpresult.exe\" OR process_name=\"gpscript.exe\" OR process_name=\"gpupdate.exe\" OR process_name=\"grpconv.exe\" OR process_name=\"hdwwiz.exe\" OR process_name=\"help.exe\" OR process_name=\"hwrcomp.exe\" OR process_name=\"hwrreg.exe\" OR process_name=\"icacls.exe\" OR process_name=\"icardagt.exe\" OR process_name=\"icsunattend.exe\" OR process_name=\"ie4uinit.exe\" OR process_name=\"ieunatt.exe\" OR process_name=\"ieetwcollector.exe\" OR process_name=\"iexpress.exe\" OR process_name=\"immersivetpmvscmgrsvr.exe\" OR process_name=\"ipconfig.exe\" OR process_name=\"irftp.exe\" OR process_name=\"iscsicli.exe\" OR process_name=\"iscsicpl.exe\" OR process_name=\"isoburn.exe\" OR process_name=\"klist.exe\" OR process_name=\"ksetup.exe\" OR process_name=\"ktmutil.exe\" OR process_name=\"label.exe\" OR process_name=\"licensingdiag.exe\" OR process_name=\"lodctr.exe\" OR process_name=\"logagent.exe\" OR process_name=\"logman.exe\" OR process_name=\"logoff.exe\" OR process_name=\"lpkinstall.exe\" OR process_name=\"lpksetup.exe\" OR process_name=\"lpremove.exe\" OR process_name=\"lsass.exe\" OR process_name=\"lsm.exe\" OR process_name=\"makecab.exe\" OR process_name=\"manage-bde.exe\" OR process_name=\"mblctr.exe\" OR process_name=\"mcbuilder.exe\" OR process_name=\"mctadmin.exe\" OR process_name=\"mfpmp.exe\" OR process_name=\"mmc.exe\" OR process_name=\"mobsync.exe\" OR process_name=\"mountvol.exe\" OR process_name=\"mpnotify.exe\" OR process_name=\"msconfig.exe\" OR process_name=\"msdt.exe\" OR process_name=\"msdtc.exe\" OR process_name=\"msfeedssync.exe\" OR process_name=\"msg.exe\" OR process_name=\"mshta.exe\" OR process_name=\"msiexec.exe\" OR process_name=\"msinfo32.exe\" OR process_name=\"mspaint.exe\" OR process_name=\"msra.exe\" OR process_name=\"mstsc.exe\" OR process_name=\"mtstocom.exe\" OR process_name=\"nbtstat.exe\" OR process_name=\"ndadmin.exe\" OR process_name=\"net.exe\" OR process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR process_name=\"netbtugc.exe\" OR process_name=\"netcfg.exe\" OR process_name=\"netiougc.exe\" OR process_name=\"netsh.exe\" OR process_name=\"newdev.exe\" OR process_name=\"nltest.exe\" OR process_name=\"notepad.exe\" OR process_name=\"nslookup.exe\" OR process_name=\"ntoskrnl.exe\" OR process_name=\"ntprint.exe\" OR process_name=\"ocsetup.exe\" OR process_name=\"odbcad32.exe\" OR process_name=\"odbcconf.exe\" OR process_name=\"omadmclient.exe\" OR process_name=\"omadmprc.exe\";\n$cond_5 = | from $ssa_input | where process_name=\"openfiles.exe\" OR process_name=\"osk.exe\" OR process_name=\"p2phost.exe\" OR process_name=\"pcalua.exe\" OR process_name=\"pcaui.exe\" OR process_name=\"pcawrk.exe\" OR process_name=\"pcwrun.exe\" OR process_name=\"perfmon.exe\" OR process_name=\"phoneactivate.exe\" OR process_name=\"plasrv.exe\" OR process_name=\"poqexec.exe\" OR process_name=\"powercfg.exe\" OR process_name=\"prevhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"print.exe\" OR process_name=\"printfilterpipelinesvc.exe\" OR process_name=\"printui.exe\" OR process_name=\"proquota.exe\" OR process_name=\"provtool.exe\" OR process_name=\"psr.exe\" OR process_name=\"pwlauncher.exe\" OR process_name=\"qappsrv.exe\" OR process_name=\"qprocess.exe\" OR process_name=\"query.exe\" OR process_name=\"quser.exe\" OR process_name=\"qwinsta.exe\" OR process_name=\"rasautou.exe\" OR process_name=\"rasdial.exe\" OR process_name=\"raserver.exe\" OR process_name=\"rasphone.exe\" OR process_name=\"rdpclip.exe\" OR process_name=\"rdpinput.exe\" OR process_name=\"rdrleakdiag.exe\" OR process_name=\"recdisc.exe\" OR process_name=\"recover.exe\" OR process_name=\"reg.exe\" OR process_name=\"regedt32.exe\" OR process_name=\"regini.exe\" OR process_name=\"regsvr32.exe\" OR process_name=\"rekeywiz.exe\" OR process_name=\"relog.exe\" OR process_name=\"repair-bde.exe\" OR process_name=\"replace.exe\" OR process_name=\"reset.exe\" OR process_name=\"resmon.exe\" OR process_name=\"rmttpmvscmgrsvr.exe\" OR process_name=\"rrinstaller.exe\" OR process_name=\"rstrui.exe\" OR process_name=\"runas.exe\" OR process_name=\"rundll32.exe\" OR process_name=\"runonce.exe\" OR process_name=\"rwinsta.exe\" OR process_name=\"sbunattend.exe\" OR process_name=\"sc.exe\" OR process_name=\"schtasks.exe\" OR process_name=\"sdbinst.exe\" OR process_name=\"sdchange.exe\" OR process_name=\"sdclt.exe\" OR process_name=\"sdiagnhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"secinit.exe\" OR process_name=\"services.exe\" OR process_name=\"sessionmsg.exe\" OR process_name=\"sethc.exe\" OR process_name=\"setspn.exe\" OR process_name=\"setupcl.exe\" OR process_name=\"setupugc.exe\" OR process_name=\"setx.exe\" OR process_name=\"sfc.exe\" OR process_name=\"shadow.exe\" OR process_name=\"shrpubw.exe\" OR process_name=\"shutdown.exe\" OR process_name=\"sigverif.exe\" OR process_name=\"sihost.exe\" OR process_name=\"slui.exe\" OR process_name=\"smss.exe\" OR process_name=\"snmptrap.exe\" OR process_name=\"sort.exe\" OR process_name=\"spinstall.exe\" OR process_name=\"spoolsv.exe\" OR process_name=\"sppsvc.exe\" OR process_name=\"spreview.exe\" OR process_name=\"srdelayed.exe\" OR process_name=\"subst.exe\" OR process_name=\"svchost.exe\" OR process_name=\"sxstrace.exe\" OR process_name=\"syskey.exe\" OR process_name=\"systeminfo.exe\" OR process_name=\"systemreset.exe\" OR process_name=\"systray.exe\" OR process_name=\"tabcal.exe\" OR process_name=\"takeown.exe\" OR process_name=\"taskeng.exe\" OR process_name=\"taskhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"taskhostw.exe\" OR process_name=\"taskkill.exe\" OR process_name=\"tasklist.exe\" OR process_name=\"taskmgr.exe\" OR process_name=\"tcmsetup.exe\" OR process_name=\"timeout.exe\" OR process_name=\"tpmvscmgr.exe\" OR process_name=\"tpmvscmgrsvr.exe\";\n$cond_6 = | from $ssa_input | where process_name=\"tracerpt.exe\" OR process_name=\"tscon.exe\" OR process_name=\"tsdiscon.exe\" OR process_name=\"tskill.exe\" OR process_name=\"typeperf.exe\" OR process_name=\"tzsync.exe\" OR process_name=\"tzutil.exe\" OR process_name=\"ucsvc.exe\" OR process_name=\"unlodctr.exe\" OR process_name=\"unregmp2.exe\" OR process_name=\"upnpcont.exe\" OR process_name=\"userinit.exe\" OR process_name=\"vds.exe\" OR process_name=\"vdsldr.exe\" OR process_name=\"verclsid.exe\" OR process_name=\"verifier.exe\" OR process_name=\"verifiergui.exe\" OR process_name=\"vmicsvc.exe\" OR process_name=\"vssadmin.exe\" OR process_name=\"w32tm.exe\" OR process_name=\"waitfor.exe\" OR process_name=\"wbadmin.exe\" OR process_name=\"wbengine.exe\" OR process_name=\"wecutil.exe\" OR process_name=\"wermgr.exe\" OR process_name=\"wevtutil.exe\" OR process_name=\"wextract.exe\" OR process_name=\"where.exe\" OR process_name=\"whoami.exe\" OR process_name=\"wiaacmgr.exe\" OR process_name=\"wiawow64.exe\" OR process_name=\"wifitask.exe\" OR process_name=\"wimserv.exe\" OR process_name=\"wininit.exe\" OR process_name=\"winload.exe\" OR process_name=\"winlogon.exe\" OR process_name=\"winresume.exe\" OR process_name=\"winrs.exe\" OR process_name=\"winrshost.exe\" OR process_name=\"winver.exe\" OR process_name=\"wisptis.exe\" OR process_name=\"wkspbroker.exe\" OR process_name=\"wksprt.exe\" OR process_name=\"wlanext.exe\" OR process_name=\"wlrmdr.exe\" OR process_name=\"wowreg32.exe\" OR process_name=\"wpnpinst.exe\" OR process_name=\"wpr.exe\" OR process_name=\"write.exe\" OR process_name=\"wscript.exe\" OR process_name=\"wsmprovhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"wsqmcons.exe\" OR process_name=\"wuapihost.exe\" OR process_name=\"wuapp.exe\" OR process_name=\"wuauclt.exe\" OR process_name=\"wusa.exe\" OR process_name=\"xcopy.exe\" OR process_name=\"xpsrchvw.exe\" OR process_name=\"xwizard.exe\";\n| from $cond_1 | union $cond_2 | union $cond_3 | union $cond_4 | union $cond_5 | union $cond_6 | where match_regex(process_path, /(?i)\\\\windows\\\\system32/)=false AND match_regex(process_path, /(?i)\\\\windows\\\\syswow64/)=false | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(device, user), body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"process_path\", process_path, \"process_name\", process_name]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "Collect endpoint data such as sysmon or 4688 events.", "known_false_positives": "None", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036/system_process_running_unexpected_location/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A system process $process_name$ with commandline $cmd_line$ spawn in non-default folder path in host $dest_device_id$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1036"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["dest_device_id", "process_name", "_time", "dest_user_id", "process_path"], "risk_score": 56, "risk_severity": "low", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Masquerading"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Windshift", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "Dragonfly 2.0"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "system_process_running_from_unexpected_location_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments", "id": "f52d2db8-31f9-4aa7-a176-25779effe55c", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-20", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies searchprotocolhost.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for searchprotocolhost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. searchprotocolhost.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=searchprotocolhost.exe by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(searchprotocolhost\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | `suspicious_searchprotocolhost_no_command_line_arguments_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process.", "references": ["https://github.com/fireeye/red_team_tool_countermeasures/blob/master/rules/PGF/supplemental/hxioc/SUSPICIOUS%20EXECUTION%20OF%20SEARCHPROTOCOLHOST%20(METHODOLOGY).ioc"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious searchprotocolhost.exe process with no command line arguments executed on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Process Injection"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Cobalt Group", "APT37", "Honeybee", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_searchprotocolhost_no_command_line_arguments_filter"}]}, {"name": "Elevated Group Discovery With Wmic", "id": "3f6bbf22-093e-4cb4-9641-83f47b8444b6", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-25", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for specific domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate elevated domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery to identify high privileged users.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"wmic.exe\") (Processes.process=*/NAMESPACE:\\\\\\\\root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*) (Processes.process=\"*Domain Admins*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Enterprise Admins*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Schema Admins*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Account Operators*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Server Operators*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Protected Users*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Dns Admins*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `elevated_group_discovery_with_wmic_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-practices/appendix-b--privileged-accounts-and-groups-in-active-directory", "https://adsecurity.org/?p=3658"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Elevated domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 21, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Permission Groups Discovery", "Domain Groups"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TA505", "APT3", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "Inception", "OilRig", "FIN6", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "elevated_group_discovery_with_wmic_filter"}]}, {"name": "GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell Script Block", "id": "67740bd3-1506-469c-b91d-effc322cc6e5", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-25", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet used with specific parameters . The `DS_Group` parameter leverages WMI to query for all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message=*Get-WmiObject* AND Message=*\"namespace root\\\\directory\\\\ldap\"* AND Message=*\"class ds_group\"*) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/get-wmiobject?view=powershell-5.1"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Permission Groups Discovery", "Domain Groups"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TA505", "APT3", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "Inception", "OilRig", "FIN6", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_script_block_filter"}]}, {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell", "id": "ba24cda8-4716-11ec-8009-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-16", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the WinRM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of the `Invoke-Command` commandlet. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WinRM and `powershell.exe` for lateral movement and remote code execution.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process=\"*Invoke-Command*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-ComputerName*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may leverage WinRM and `Invoke-Command` to start a process on remote systems for system administration or automation use cases. However, this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006/", "https://pentestlab.blog/2018/05/15/lateral-movement-winrm/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement_psh/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "message": "A process was started on a remote endpoint from $dest by abusing WinRM using PowerShell.exe", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021", "T1021.006"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 45, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote Services", "Windows Remote Management"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Threat Group-3390"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_powershell"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Grant Permission Using Cacls Utility", "id": "c6da561a-cd29-11eb-ae65-acde48001122", "version": 3, "date": "2021-11-30", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of `cacls.exe`, `icacls.exe` or `xcacls.exe` placing the grant permission on a file or directory. Adversaries perform this behavior to allow components of their files to run, however it allows responders to review or gaining access to adversary files on disk.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null), process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_path\"), \"string\", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)grant/)=true AND (process_name=\"cacls.exe\" OR process_name=\"xcacls.exe\" OR process_name=\"icacls.exe\") | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null)), body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line, \"process_name\", process_name, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process_name, \"process_path\", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed icacls.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "System administrators may use cacls utilities but this is not a common practice. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "cis20": ["CIS 14", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1222.001/ssa_cacls/all_icalc.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A cacls process $process_name$ with commandline $cmd_line$ try to grant user a permission to a file or directory in host $dest_device_id$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1222"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest_device_id", "process_name", "parent_process_name", "process_path", "dest_user_id", "process", "cmd_line"], "risk_score": 35, "risk_severity": "medium", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["File and Directory Permissions Modification"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "grant_permission_using_cacls_utility_filter"}]}, {"name": "Disable Defender Spynet Reporting", "id": "898debf4-3021-11ec-ba7c-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-18", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable windows defender feature. This technique is to bypassed or evade detection from Windows Defender AV product specially the spynet reporting for its telemetry.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\SpyNet*\" Registry.registry_value_name = SpynetReporting Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000000 by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `disable_defender_spynet_reporting_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the registry value name, registry path, and registry value data from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to disable windows defender product", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["IceID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_value_data"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disable_defender_spynet_reporting_filter"}]}, {"name": "Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell Script Block", "id": "70fac80e-0bf1-11ec-9ba0-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-02", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies Get-ForestTrust from PowerSploit in order to gather domain trust information. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*get-foresttrust*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message OpCode ComputerName User EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_foresttrust_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "UPDATE_KNOWN_FALSE_POSITIVES", "references": ["https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-ForestTrust/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 40, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Suspicious PowerShell Get-ForestTrust was identified on endpoint $ComputerName$ by user $User$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1482"], "observable": [{"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "Path", "OpCode", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 12, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Domain Trust Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "get_foresttrust_with_powershell_script_block_filter"}]}, {"name": "First time seen command line argument", "id": "fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd23", "version": 4, "date": "2021-11-30", "author": "Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "This search looks for command-line arguments that use a `/c` parameter to execute a command that has not previously been seen. This is an implementation on SPL2 of the rule `First time seen command line argument` by @bpatel. 'The following analytic identifies first time seen command-line arguments on a single endpoint. The analytic looks for arguments instantiated by `cmd.exe /c` and the associated command-line. Adversaries automate or spawn multiple processes using this method, this analytic may assist with identifying the first time it's been found on this endpoint.'", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)) | eval dest_user_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), dest_device_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null), process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null), cmd_line_norm=lower(cmd_line), cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line_norm, /[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[1-5][0-9a-f]{3}-[89ab][0-9a-f]{3}-[0-9a-f]{12}/, \"GUID\"), cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line_norm, /(?<=\\s)+\\\\[^:]*(?=\\\\.*\\.\\w{3}(\\s|$)+)/, \"\\\\PATH\"), /* replaces \" \\\\Something\\\\Something\\\\command.ext\" => \"PATH\\\\command.ext\" */ cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line_norm, /\\w:\\\\[^:]*(?=\\\\.*\\.\\w{3}(\\s|$)+)/, \"\\\\PATH\"), /* replaces \"C:\\\\Something\\\\Something\\\\command.ext\" => \"PATH\\\\command.ext\" */ cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line_norm, /\\d+/, \"N\"), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where process_name=\"cmd.exe\" AND match_regex(ucast(cmd_line, \"string\", \"\"), /.* \\/[cC] .*/)=true | select process_name, cmd_line, cmd_line_norm, timestamp, dest_device_id, dest_user_id | first_time_event input_columns=[\"cmd_line_norm\"] | where first_time_cmd_line_norm | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend(dest_device_id, dest_user_id), body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line, \"process_name\", process_name]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate programs use command-line arguments to execute. Verify the command-line arguments to check what command/program is being executed. Filtering will be needed.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Unusual Processes"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A process $process_name$ ha been identified in the environment with a command-line $cmd_line$ not previously seen before on host $dest_device_id$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1202"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["process_name", "_time", "dest_device_id", "dest_user_id", "process", "cmd_line"], "risk_score": 30, "risk_severity": "low", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "Indirect Command Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "first_time_seen_command_line_argument_filter"}]}, {"name": "Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process", "id": "1f35e1da-267b-11ec-90a9-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-06", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious spawned process by wscript or cscript process. This technique was a common technique used by adversaries and malware to execute different LOLBIN, other script like powershell or create a suspended process to inject its code as a defense evasion. This TTP may detect some normal script that using several application tool that are in the list of the child process it detects but a good pivot and indicator that a script is may execute suspicious code.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"cscript.exe\", \"wscript.exe\") Processes.process_name IN (\"regsvr32.exe\", \"rundll32.exe\",\"winhlp32.exe\",\"certutil.exe\",\"msbuild.exe\",\"cmd.exe\",\"powershell*\",\"wmic.exe\",\"mshta.exe\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "user may create vbs or js script that use several tool as part of its execution.", "references": ["https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/8da5b75b6380a41eee3a399c43dfe0d99eeefaa1fd21027a07b1ecaa4cd96fdd?environmentId=120"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["FIN7", "Remcos", "Unusual Processes"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/vbs_wscript/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "wscript or cscript parent process spawned $process_name$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1055", "T1543", "T1134.004", "T1134"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Process Injection", "Create or Modify System Process", "Parent PID Spoofing", "Access Token Manipulation"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Cobalt Group", "APT37", "Honeybee", "PLATINUM", "no", "no", "Blue Mockingbird"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process_filter"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage Of Net App", "id": "45e52536-ae42-11eb-b5c6-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-05-06", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies excessive usage of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` within a bucket of time (1 minute). This behavior was seen in a Monero incident where the adversary attempts to create many users, delete and disable users as part of its malicious behavior.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=1m | where count >=10 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_net_app_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "unknown. Filter as needed. Modify the time span as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig", "Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Scope:Local", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Excessive usage of net1.exe or net.exe within 1m, with command line $process$ has been detected on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1531"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process Name", "role": ["Process", "Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 28, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Account Access Removal"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_net"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "excessive_usage_of_net_app_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver", "id": "8c00a385-9b86-4ac0-8932-c9ec3713b159", "version": 2, "date": "2021-02-09", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe using dllregisterserver on the command line to load a DLL. When a DLL is registered, the DllRegisterServer method entry point in the DLL is invoked. This is typically seen when a DLL is being registered on the system. Not every instance is considered malicious, but it will capture malicious use of it. During investigation, review the parent process and parrellel processes executing. Capture the DLL being loaded and inspect further. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*dllregisterserver* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "This is likely to produce false positives and will require some filtering. Tune the query by adding command line paths to known good DLLs, or filtering based on parent process names.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32", "https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/seedworm-apt-iran-middle-east", "https://github.com/pan-unit42/tweets/blob/master/2020-12-10-IOCs-from-Ursnif-infection-with-Delf-variant.txt", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/duck-hunting-with-falcon-complete-qakbot-zip-based-campaign/", "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms682162(v=vs.85).aspx"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "$Processes.process_path.file_path$ process potentially loading malicious code", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Processes.process_path.file_path", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Rundll32"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT32", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "TA505", "MuddyWater", "APT29", "APT19", "CopyKittens", "APT3", "Carbanak", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_rundll32"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver_filter"}]}, {"name": "Samsam Test File Write", "id": "493a879d-519d-428f-8f57-a06a0fdc107e", "version": 1, "date": "2018-12-14", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The search looks for a file named \"test.txt\" written to the windows system directory tree, which is consistent with Samsam propagation.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_name) as file_name from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\windows\\\\system32\\\\test.txt by Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `samsam_test_file_write_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data-model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.", "known_false_positives": "No false positives have been identified.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 20, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Impact"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1486/sam_sam_note/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "message": "A samsam ransomware test file creation in $file_path$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1486"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.user", "Filesystem.dest", "Filesystem.file_name", "Filesystem.file_path"], "risk_score": 12, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Data Encrypted for Impact"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "TA505", "APT38"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "samsam_test_file_write_filter"}]}, {"name": "Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir", "id": "e6fc13b0-1609-11ec-b533-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-15", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect an anomaly event of non-firefox process accessing the files in profile folder. This folder contains all the sqlite database of the firefox browser related to users login, history, cookies and etc. Most of the RAT, trojan spy as well as FIN7 jssloader try to parse the those sqlite database to collect information on the compromised host. This SACL Event (4663) need to be enabled to tthe firefox profile directory to be eable to use this. Since you monitoring this access to the folder a noise coming from firefox need to be filter and also sqlite db browser and explorer .exe to make this detection more stable.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 NOT (process_name IN (\"*\\\\firefox.exe\", \"*\\\\explorer.exe\", \"*sql*\")) Object_Name=\"*\\\\AppData\\\\Roaming\\\\Mozilla\\\\Firefox\\\\Profiles*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Object_Name Object_Type process_name Access_Mask Accesses process_id EventCode dest user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663. For 4663, enable \"Audit Object Access\" in Group Policy. Then check the two boxes listed for both \"Success\" and \"Failure.\"", "known_false_positives": "other browser not listed related to firefox may catch by this rule.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["FIN7", "Remcos"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_sacl/security.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "a non firefox browser process $process_name$ accessing $Object_Name$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1555", "T1555.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Object_Name", "Object_Type", "process_name", "Access_Mask", "Accesses", "process_id", "EventCode", "dest", "user"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Credentials from Password Stores", "Credentials from Web Browsers"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT39", "OilRig", "MuddyWater", "Leafminer", "APT33", "Turla", "Stealth Falcon", "Magic Hound", "Sandworm Team", "Inception", "Stealth Falcon", "OilRig", "Leafminer", "APT33", "APT3", "Kimsuky", "TA505", "Stolen Pencil", "MuddyWater", "APT37", "Patchwork", "Molerats"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir_filter"}]}, {"name": "Unloading AMSI via Reflection", "id": "a21e3484-c94d-11eb-b55b-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-09", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies the behavior of AMSI being tampered with. Implemented natively in many frameworks, the command will look similar to `SEtValuE($Null,(New-OBJEct COLlECtionS.GenerIC.HAshSEt{[StrINg]))}$ReF=[ReF].AsSeMbLY.GeTTyPe(\"System.Management.Automation.Amsi\"+\"Utils\")` taken from Powershell-Empire. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message=*system.management.automation.amsi* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode ComputerName User EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `unloading_amsi_via_reflection_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Potential for some third party applications to disable AMSI upon invocation. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Possible AMSI Unloading via Reflection using PowerShell on $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Message", "OpCode", "ComputerName", "User", "EventCode"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "unloading_amsi_via_reflection_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access", "id": "2c365e57-4414-4540-8dc0-73ab10729996", "version": 3, "date": "2019-12-03", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for reading lsass memory consistent with credential dumping.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe (GrantedAccess=0x1010 OR GrantedAccess=0x1410) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, SourceImage, SourceProcessId, TargetImage, TargetProcessId, EventCode, GrantedAccess | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "This search needs Sysmon Logs and a sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 10 with lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", "known_false_positives": "The activity may be legitimate. Other tools can access lsass for legitimate reasons, and it's possible this event could be generated in those cases. In these cases, false positives should be fairly obvious and you may need to tweak the search to eliminate noise.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "Detect Zerologon Attack"], "asset_type": "Windows", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "The $source_image$ has attempted access to read $TargetImage$ was identified on endpoint $Computer$, this is indicative of credential dumping and should be investigated.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "source_image", "type": "Other", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "TargetImage", "type": "Other", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "TargetImage", "GrantedAccess", "Computer", "SourceImage", "SourceProcessId", "TargetImage", "TargetProcessId"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["LSASS Memory", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Whitefly", "Blue Mockingbird", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Leviathan", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Stolen Pencil", "APT32", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "PLATINUM", "FIN8", "BRONZE BUTLER", "OilRig", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT28", "APT1", "Ke3chang", "Cleaver", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access_filter"}]}, {"name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", "id": "54a6ed00-3256-11ec-b031-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-12-13", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies command-line arguments where `cmd.exe /c` is used to execute a program. `cmd /c` is used to run commands in MS-DOS and terminate after command or process completion. This technique is commonly seen in adversaries and malware to execute batch command using different shell like PowerShell or different process other than `cmd.exe`. This is a good hunting query for suspicious command-line made by a script or relative process execute it.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` AND Processes.process=\"* /c *\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives may be high based on legitimate scripted code in any environment. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["IcedID", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/cmd_carry_str_param/sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting spawn a new process.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059.003", "T1059"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 30, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Windows Command Shell", "Command and Scripting Interpreter"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TA505", "Blue Mockingbird", "Tropic Trooper", "Frankenstein", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "Honeybee", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Turla", "Silence", "APT32", "APT39", "Darkhotel", "MuddyWater", "APT18", "APT38", "Dark Caracal", "Gorgon Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Rancor", "Ke3chang", "APT37", "Leviathan", "FIN8", "APT28", "Magic Hound", "Sowbug", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Gamaredon Group", "Suckfly", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-1314", "APT3", "admin@338", "APT1", "APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_cmd"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter_filter"}]}, {"name": "Domain Account Discovery with Wmic", "id": "383572e0-04c5-11ec-bdcc-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-24", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain users. Red Teams and adversaries alike use wmic.exe to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=\"wmic.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*/NAMESPACE:\\\\\\\\root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*\" AND Processes.process = \"*ds_user*\" AND Processes.process = \"*GET*\" AND Processes.process = \"*ds_samaccountname*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_account_discovery_with_wmic_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id", "Processes.parent_process_name"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Domain Account", "Account Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Turla", "Sandworm Team", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "Ke3chang", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "domain_account_discovery_with_wmic_filter"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", "id": "5d9c6eee-988c-11eb-8253-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-08", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed from a user writeable file path.\\\nThe search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not.\\\nschtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\\Windows\\system32` and `C:\\Windows\\syswow64`.\\\nThe following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory.\\\nUpon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or was it via TaskService. Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message | search Command IN (\"*\\\\users\\\\public\\\\*\", \"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Tasks\\\\*\", \"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Task_Name, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required.", "known_false_positives": "False positives are possible if legitimate applications are allowed to register tasks in public paths. Filter as needed based on paths that are used legitimately.", "references": ["https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/irans-apt34-returns-with-an-updated-arsenal/", "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4698", "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/scheduled-task-job/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/taskschd/time-trigger-example--scripting-?redirectedfrom=MSDN", "https://app.any.run/tasks/e26f1b2e-befa-483b-91d2-e18636e2faf3/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "IcedID", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/taskschedule/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "message": "A windows scheduled task was created (task name=$Task_Name$) on $dest$ by the following command: $Command$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Command", "type": "Command", "role": ["Target"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "Task_Name", "Description", "Command"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Scheduled Task", "Scheduled Task/Job"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "MuddyWater", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT-C-36", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT41", "Machete", "Soft Cell", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Patchwork", "OilRig", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "FIN8", "menuPass", "FIN10", "APT32", "FIN7", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path_filter"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint", "id": "95cf4608-4302-11ec-8194-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-11", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `schtasks.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to start a Scheduled Task on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=schtasks.exe) (Processes.process=*/s* AND Processes.process=*/run*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `scheduled_task_initiation_on_remote_endpoint_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may start scheduled tasks on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/schtasks", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "message": "A Windows Scheduled Task was ran on a remote endpoint from $dest", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053", "T1053.005"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 54, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Scheduled Task/Job", "Scheduled Task"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "MuddyWater", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT-C-36", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT41", "Machete", "Soft Cell", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Patchwork", "OilRig", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "FIN8", "menuPass", "FIN10", "APT32", "FIN7", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT29"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "scheduled_task_initiation_on_remote_endpoint_filter"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Disable Security Monitoring", "id": "c148a894-dd93-11eb-bf2a-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-07-05", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to identifies a modification in registry to disable the windows denfender real time behavior monitoring. This event or technique is commonly seen in RAT, bot, or Trojan to disable AV to evade detections.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process=\"*set-mppreference*\" AND Processes.process IN (\"*disablerealtimemonitoring*\",\"*disableioavprotection*\",\"*disableintrusionpreventionsystem*\",\"*disablescriptscanning*\",\"*disableblockatfirstseen*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_disable_security_monitoring_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives. However, tune based on scripts that may perform this action.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md#atomic-test-15---tamper-with-windows-defender-atp-powershell"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/pwh_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_powershell"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "powershell_disable_security_monitoring_filter"}]}, {"name": "Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy", "id": "c5eac648-fae0-4263-91a6-773df1f4c903", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search detects the creation of a symlink to a shadow copy.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` Processes.process=*mklink* Processes.process=*HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to create symlink to a shadow copy to grab credentials.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.003", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["NTDS", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN6", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_cmd"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy_filter"}]}, {"name": "Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry", "id": "39ebdc68-25b9-11ec-aec7-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-05", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious registry modification to disable security audit logs. This technique was shared by a researcher to disable Security logs of windows by adding this registry. The Windows will think it is WinPE and will not log any event to the Security Log", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Control\\\\MiniNt\\\\*\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `disable_security_logs_using_minint_registry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown.", "references": ["https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1182516740955226112"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/minint_reg/sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1112"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_value_data"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Modify Registry"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Turla", "APT32", "APT38", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "Threat Group-3390", "Honeybee", "Patchwork", "Gorgon Group", "FIN8"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disable_security_logs_using_minint_registry_filter"}]}, {"name": "Active Setup Registry Autostart", "id": "f64579c0-203f-11ec-abcc-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-28", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of the active setup registry for persistence and privilege escalation. This technique was seen in several malware (poisonIvy), adware and APT to gain persistence to the compromised machine upon boot up. This TTP is a good indicator to further check the process id that do the modification since modification of this registry is not commonly done. check the legitimacy of the file and process involve in this rules to check if it is a valid setup installer that creating or modifying this registry.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_value_name = \"StubPath\" Registry.registry_key_name = \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Active Setup\\\\Installed Components*\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `active_setup_registry_autostart_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "Active setup installer may add or modify this registry.", "references": ["https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Backdoor%3aWin32%2fPoisonivy.E", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/014/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Privilege Escalation Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/t1547.014/active_setup_stubpath/sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1547.014", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "active_setup_registry_autostart_filter"}]}, {"name": "Single Letter Process On Endpoint", "id": "a4214f0b-e01c-41bc-8cc4-d2b71e3056b4", "version": 3, "date": "2020-12-08", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for process names that consist only of a single letter.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process, Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | eval process_name_length = len(process_name), endExe = if(substr(process_name, -4) == \".exe\", 1, 0) | search process_name_length=5 AND endExe=1 | table count, firstTime, lastTime, dest, user, process, process_name | `single_letter_process_on_endpoint_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "Single-letter executables are not always malicious. Investigate this activity with your normal incident-response process.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["DHS Report TA18-074A"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 2"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1204.002/single_letter_exe/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A suspicious process $process_name$ with single letter in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1204", "T1204.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_name"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["User Execution", "Malicious File"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Whitefly", "Tropic Trooper", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Mofang", "Frankenstein", "RTM", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "Machete", "admin@338", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "DarkHydrus", "Gorgon Group", "Patchwork", "OilRig", "Dark Caracal", "MuddyWater", "Lazarus Group", "FIN7", "APT32", "Rancor", "APT37", "FIN8", "APT28", "Elderwood", "TA459", "APT29", "Leviathan", "menuPass", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "single_letter_process_on_endpoint_filter"}]}, {"name": "GetAdGroup with PowerShell Script Block", "id": "e4c73d68-794b-468d-b4d0-dac1772bbae7", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-25", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-AdGroup` commandlet. The `Get-AdGroup` commandlet is used to return a list of all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-ADGroup*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getadgroup_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-adgroup?view=windowsserver2019-ps"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Permission Groups Discovery", "Domain Groups"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TA505", "APT3", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "Inception", "OilRig", "FIN6", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "getadgroup_with_powershell_script_block_filter"}]}, {"name": "Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process", "id": "2d9fc90c-f11f-11eb-9300-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-07-30", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this detection was designed to identifies suspicious spawned process of known MS office application due to macro or malicious code. this technique can be seen in so many malware like IcedID that used MS office as its weapon or attack vector to initially infect the machines.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = \"winword.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"excel.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"powerpnt.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"outlook.exe\") `process_regsvr32` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/380662/0/html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/phish_icedid/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Office application spawning regsvr32.exe on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Phishing", "Spearphishing Attachment"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=REGSVR32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_regsvr32"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process_filter"}]}, {"name": "GetDomainComputer with PowerShell Script Block", "id": "f64da023-b988-4775-8d57-38e512beb56e", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-02", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainComputer` commandlet. `GetDomainComputer` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerView to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-DomainComputer*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use PowerView for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainComputer/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Remote system discovery with PowerView on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 24, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote System Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Rocke", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT39", "APT32", "Deep Panda", "Threat Group-3390", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leafminer", "Ke3chang", "FIN8", "APT3", "FIN5", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Turla"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_script_block_filter"}]}, {"name": "Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments", "id": "523c2684-a101-11eb-916b-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-19", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with an arguments \"HTTP\" string that are unique entry of malware or attack that uses lolbin to download other file or payload to the infected machine. The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\\Windows\\system32` and `C:\\Windows\\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.'", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message| search Arguments IN (\"*http*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Task_Name, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden, Arguments | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schedule_task_with_http_command_arguments_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the task schedule (Exa. Security Log EventCode 4698) endpoints. Tune and filter known instances of Task schedule used in your environment.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/92d7ef61-bfd7-4c92-bc15-322172b4ebec/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}, "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/tasksched/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A schedule task process commandline arguments $Arguments$ with http string on it in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Arguments", "type": "Arguments", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "Task_Name", "Command", "Author", "Enabled", "Hidden", "Arguments"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Scheduled Task/Job"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "schedule_task_with_http_command_arguments_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious MSBuild Rename", "id": "4006adac-5937-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 2, "date": "2021-01-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies renamed instances of msbuild.exe executing. Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v4.0.30319 and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v4.0.30319. During investigation, identify the code executed and what is executing a renamed instance of MSBuild.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_msbuild` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_msbuild_rename_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of msbuild, triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md", "https://github.com/infosecn1nja/MaliciousMacroMSBuild/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild", "Cobalt Strike", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious renamed msbuild.exe binary ran on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1036", "T1127", "T1036.003", "T1127.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Masquerading", "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "Rename System Utilities", "MSBuild"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Windshift", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "Dragonfly 2.0", "no", "menuPass", "APT32", "Soft Cell", "PLATINUM", "Frankenstein"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=msbuild.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSBuild.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_msbuild"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_msbuild_rename_filter"}]}, {"name": "Processes launching netsh", "id": "b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-95dbb162040e", "version": 4, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Josef Kuepker, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe. Netsh is a command-line scripting utility that allows you to, either locally or remotely, display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. Netsh can be used as a persistence proxy technique to execute a helper DLL when netsh.exe is executed. In this search, we are looking for processes spawned by netsh.exe and executing commands via the command line.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) AS Processes.process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_netsh` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest |`drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`processes_launching_netsh_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Some VPN applications are known to launch netsh.exe. Outside of these instances, it is unusual for an executable to launch netsh.exe and run commands.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Netsh Abuse", "Disabling Security Tools", "DHS Report TA18-074A"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A process $process_name$ that tries to execute netsh commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.004", "T1562"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.user", "Processes.dest"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify System Firewall", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Rocke", "Lazarus Group", "Kimsuky", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Carbanak", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=netsh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=netsh.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_netsh"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "processes_launching_netsh_filter"}]}, {"name": "Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion", "id": "773b66fe-4dd9-11ec-8289-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-25", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic will detect a suspicious process commandline related to windows defender exclusion feature. This command is abused by adversaries, malware author and red teams to bypassed Windows Defender Anti-Virus product by excluding folder path, file path, process, extensions and etc. from its real time or schedule scan to execute their malicious code. This is a good indicator for defense evasion and to look further for events after this behavior.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process = \"*Add-MpPreference *\" OR Processes.process = \"*Set-MpPreference *\") AND Processes.process=\"*-exclusion*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to use this windows features.", "references": ["https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.html", "https://app.any.run/tasks/cf1245de-06a7-4366-8209-8e3006f2bfe5/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Remcos", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/defender_exclusion_sysmon/sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "exclusion command $process$ executed on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Driver Loaded Path", "id": "f880acd4-a8f1-11eb-a53b-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-29", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic will detect suspicious driver loaded paths. This technique is commonly used by malicious software like coin miners (xmrig) to register its malicious driver from notable directories where executable or drivers do not commonly exist. During triage, validate this driver is for legitimate business use. Review the metadata and certificate information. Unsigned drivers from non-standard paths is not normal, but occurs. In addition, review driver loads into `ntoskrnl.exe` for possible other drivers of interest. Long tail analyze drivers by path (outside of default, and in default) for further review.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=6 ImageLoaded = \"*.sys\" NOT (ImageLoaded IN(\"*\\\\WINDOWS\\\\inf\",\"*\\\\WINDOWS\\\\System32\\\\drivers\\\\*\", \"*\\\\WINDOWS\\\\System32\\\\DriverStore\\\\FileRepository\\\\*\")) | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer ImageLoaded Hashes IMPHASH Signature Signed | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_driver_loaded_path_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the driver loaded and Signature from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives will be present. Some applications do load drivers", "references": ["https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/hk/threat-encyclopedia/malware/trojan.ps1.powtran.a/", "https://redcanary.com/blog/tracking-driver-inventory-to-expose-rootkits/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious driver $ImageLoaded$ on $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1543.003", "T1543"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "ImageLoaded", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Computer", "ImageLoaded", "Hashes", "IMPHASH", "Signature", "Signed"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Windows Service", "Create or Modify System Process"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "DarkVishnya", "Wizard Spider", "APT32", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Tropic Trooper", "Cobalt Group", "Ke3chang", "Honeybee", "FIN7", "Threat Group-3390", "APT19", "APT3", "Lazarus Group", "Carbanak", "no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_driver_loaded_path_filter"}]}, {"name": "Wsmprovhost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", "id": "2eed004c-4c0d-11ec-93e8-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-22", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies `Wsmprovhost.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the Windows Remote Management (WinRm) protocol, the executed command is spawned as a child processs of `Wsmprovhost.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of Wsmprovhost.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=wsmprovhost.exe) (Processes.process_name IN (\"Regsvcs.exe\", \"Ftp.exe\", \"OfflineScannerShell.exe\", \"Rasautou.exe\", \"Schtasks.exe\", \"Xwizard.exe\", \"Dllhost.exe\", \"Pnputil.exe\", \"Atbroker.exe\", \"Pcwrun.exe\", \"Ttdinject.exe\",\"Mshta.exe\", \"Bitsadmin.exe\", \"Certoc.exe\", \"Ieexec.exe\", \"Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe\", \"Runscripthelper.exe\", \"Forfiles.exe\", \"Msbuild.exe\", \"Register-cimprovider.exe\", \"Tttracer.exe\", \"Ie4uinit.exe\", \"Bash.exe\", \"Hh.exe\", \"SettingSyncHost.exe\", \"Cmstp.exe\", \"Mmc.exe\", \"Stordiag.exe\", \"Scriptrunner.exe\", \"Odbcconf.exe\", \"Extexport.exe\", \"Msdt.exe\", \"WorkFolders.exe\", \"Diskshadow.exe\", \"Mavinject.exe\", \"Regasm.exe\", \"Gpscript.exe\", \"Rundll32.exe\", \"Regsvr32.exe\", \"Msiexec.exe\", \"Wuauclt.exe\", \"Presentationhost.exe\", \"Wmic.exe\", \"Runonce.exe\", \"Syncappvpublishingserver.exe\", \"Verclsid.exe\", \"Infdefaultinstall.exe\", \"Explorer.exe\", \"Installutil.exe\", \"Netsh.exe\", \"Wab.exe\", \"Dnscmd.exe\", \"At.exe\", \"Pcalua.exe\", \"Msconfig.exe\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `wsmprovhost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006/", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/", "https://pentestlab.blog/2018/05/15/lateral-movement-winrm/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "message": "Wsmprovhost.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021", "T1021.006"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 54, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote Services", "Windows Remote Management"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Threat Group-3390"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "wsmprovhost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter"}]}, {"name": "Malicious InProcServer32 Modification", "id": "127c8d08-25ff-11ec-9223-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-05", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies a process modifying the registry with a known malicious CLSID under InProcServer32. Most COM classes are registered with the operating system and are identified by a GUID that represents the Class Identifier (CLSID) within the registry (usually under HKLM\\\\Software\\\\Classes\\\\CLSID or HKCU\\\\Software\\\\Classes\\\\CLSID). Behind the implementation of a COM class is the server (some binary) that is referenced within registry keys under the CLSID. The LocalServer32 key represents a path to an executable (exe) implementation, and the InprocServer32 key represents a path to a dynamic link library (DLL) implementation (Bohops). During triage, review parallel processes for suspicious activity. Pivot on the process GUID to see the full timeline of events. Analyze the value and look for file modifications. Being this is looking for inprocserver32, a DLL found in the value will most likely be loaded by a parallel process.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_guid Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\CLSID\\\\{89565275-A714-4a43-912E-978B935EDCCC}\\\\InProcServer32\\\\(Default)\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest Registry.process_guid Registry.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | fields _time dest registry_path registry_key_name registry_value_name process_name process_path process process_guid user] | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, process_name registry_path registry_key_name registry_value_name user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_inprocserver32_modification_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, filter as needed. In our test case, Remcos used regsvr32.exe to modify the registry. It may be required, dependent upon the EDR tool producing registry events, to remove (Default) from the command-line.", "references": ["https://bohops.com/2018/06/28/abusing-com-registry-structure-clsid-localserver32-inprocserver32/", "https://tria.ge/210929-ap75vsddan", "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/cb77b93150cb0f7fe65ce8a7e2a5781e727419451355a7736db84109fa215a89"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", "Remcos"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ modifying the registry with a known malicious clsid under InProcServer32.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218.010", "T1112"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "process_name", "registry_path", "registry_key_name", "registry_value_name", "user"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Regsvr32", "Modify Registry"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Inception", "WIRTE", "Cobalt Group", "APT19", "Leviathan", "APT32", "Deep Panda", "Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Turla", "APT32", "APT38", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "Threat Group-3390", "Honeybee", "Patchwork", "Gorgon Group", "FIN8"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "malicious_inprocserver32_modification_filter"}]}, {"name": "Multiple Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos", "id": "98f22d82-9d62-11eb-9fcf-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-14", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple disabled domain users using the Kerberos protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using Kerberos to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. As attackers progress in a breach, mistakes will be made. In certain scenarios, adversaries may execute a password spraying attack against disabled users. Event 4768 is generated every time the Key Distribution Center issues a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). Failure code `0x12` stands for `clients credentials have been revoked` (account disabled, expired or locked out).\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\\nThis detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\\\nThe analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source ip and attempted user accounts.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 Account_Name!=\"*$\" Result_Code=0x12 | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Account_Name) AS unique_accounts values(Account_Name) as tried_accounts by _time, Client_Address | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Client_Address | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_disabled_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", "known_false_positives": "A host failing to authenticate with multiple disabled domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, multi-user systems missconfigured systems.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_disabled_users_kerberos/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Potential Kerberos based password spraying attack from $Client_Address$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "Client_Address", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Result_Code", "Account_Name", "Client_Address"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Password Spraying", "Brute Force"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "Leafminer", "Lazarus Group", "DarkVishnya", "APT39", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Turla"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "multiple_disabled_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos_filter"}]}, {"name": "Domain Group Discovery With Wmic", "id": "a87736a6-95cd-4728-8689-3c64d5026b3e", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-25", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The arguments utilized in this command return a list of all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use wmic.exe to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"wmic.exe\") (Processes.process=*/NAMESPACE:\\\\\\\\root\\\\directory\\\\ldap* AND Processes.process=*ds_group* AND Processes.process=\"*GET ds_samaccountname*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_group_discovery_with_wmic_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Permission Groups Discovery", "Domain Groups"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TA505", "APT3", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "Inception", "OilRig", "FIN6", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "domain_group_discovery_with_wmic_filter"}]}, {"name": "Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell", "id": "4fa7f846-054a-11ec-a836-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-24", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies Get-DomainTrust from PowerView in order to gather domain trust information. Typically, this is utilized within a script being executed and used to enumerate the domain trust information. This grants the adversary an understanding of how large or small the domain is. During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=*get-domaintrust* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domaintrust_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives as this requires an active Administrator or adversary to bring in, import, and execute.", "references": ["http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/a-guide-to-attacking-domain-trusts/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 40, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Suspicious PowerShell Get-DomainTrust was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1482"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 12, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Domain Trust Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "get_domaintrust_with_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification", "id": "809b31d2-5462-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 1, "date": "2020-12-21", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for flags passed to bcdedit.exe modifications to the built-in Windows error recovery boot configurations. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent recovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = bcdedit.exe Processes.process=\"*recoveryenabled*\" (Processes.process=\"* no*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. Tune based on parent process names.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may modify the boot configuration.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1490/T1490.md#atomic-test-4---windows---disable-windows-recovery-console-repair"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Impact"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting disable the ability to recover the endpoint.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1490"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Inhibit System Recovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification_filter"}]}, {"name": "Extraction of Registry Hives", "id": "8bbb7d58-b360-11eb-ba21-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-09", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of `reg.exe` exporting Windows Registry hives containing credentials. Adversaries may use this technique to export registry hives for offline credential access attacks. Typically found executed from a untrusted process or script. Upon execution, a file will be written to disk.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` (Processes.process=*save* OR Processes.process=*export*) AND (Processes.process=\"*\\sam *\" OR Processes.process=\"*\\system *\" OR Processes.process=\"*\\security *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `extraction_of_registry_hives_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible some agent based products will generate false positives. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Credential Dumping"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious use of `reg.exe` exporting Windows Registry hives containing credentials executed on $dest$ by user $user$, with a parent process of $parent_process_id$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_id", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process", "Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Security Account Manager", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390", "Ke3chang", "Soft Cell", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "menuPass", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=reg.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=reg.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_reg"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "extraction_of_registry_hives_filter"}]}, {"name": "Net Localgroup Discovery", "id": "54f5201e-155b-11ec-a6e2-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-14", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following hunting analytic will identify the use of localgroup discovery using `net localgroup`. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=net.exe OR Processes.process_name=net1.exe (Processes.process=\"*localgroup*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `net_localgroup_discovery_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present. Tune as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery", "Windows Discovery Techniques"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Local group discovery on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Permission Groups Discovery", "Local Groups"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TA505", "APT3", "Turla", "OilRig", "admin@338"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "net_localgroup_discovery_filter"}]}, {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and Winrs", "id": "0dd296a2-4338-11ec-ba02-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-11", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `winrs.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the WinRM protocol and this binary for lateral movement and remote code execution.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=winrs.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=winrs.exe) (Processes.process=\"*-r:*\" OR Processes.process=\"*-remote:*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_winrs_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may leverage WinRM and WinRs to start a process on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/winrs", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "message": "A process was started on a remote endpoint from $dest", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021", "T1021.006"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 54, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote Services", "Windows Remote Management"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Threat Group-3390"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_winrs_filter"}]}, {"name": "ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN", "id": "ae8b3efc-2d2e-11ec-8b57-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-14", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies `setspn.exe` usage related to querying the domain for Service Principle Names. typically, this is a precursor activity related to kerberoasting or the silver ticket attack. \\\nWhat is a ServicePrincipleName? \\\nA service principal name (SPN) is a unique identifier of a service instance. SPNs are used by Kerberos authentication to associate a service instance with a service logon account. This allows a client application to request that the service authenticate an account even if the client does not have the account name.\\\nExample usage includes the following \\\n1. setspn -T offense -Q */* 1. setspn -T attackrange.local -F -Q MSSQLSvc/* 1. setspn -Q */* > allspns.txt 1. setspn -q \\\nValues \\\n1. -F = perform queries at the forest, rather than domain level 1. -T = perform query on the specified domain or forest (when -F is also used) 1. -Q = query for existence of SPN \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes for further suspicious activity.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_setspn` (Processes.process=\"*-t*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-f*\") OR (Processes.process=\"*-q*\" AND Processes.process=\"**/**\") OR (Processes.process=\"*-q*\") OR (Processes.process=\"*-s*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives may be caused by Administrators resetting SPNs or querying for SPNs. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/ad/service-principal-names", "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/t1208-kerberoasting", "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/setspn.exe-5C184D581524245DAD7A0A02B51FD2C2.html", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/", "https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/717.service-principal-names-spn-setspn-syntax.aspx", "https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz/", "https://blog.zsec.uk/paving-2-da-wholeset/", "https://msitpros.com/?p=3113", "https://adsecurity.org/?p=3466"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_setspn.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to identify service principle names.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1558.003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Kerberoasting"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=setspn.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=setspn.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_setspn"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn_filter"}]}, {"name": "Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit", "id": "7742aa92-c9d9-11eb-bbfc-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-10", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious bcdedit.exe execution to ignore all failures. This technique was used by ransomware to prevent the compromise machine automatically boot in repair mode.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"bcdedit.exe\" Processes.process = \"*bootstatuspolicy*\" Processes.process = \"*ignoreallfailures*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `prevent_automatic_repair_mode_using_bcdedit_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed bcdedit.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may modify the boot configuration ignore failure during testing and debugging.", "references": ["https://jsac.jpcert.or.jp/archive/2020/pdf/JSAC2020_1_tamada-yamazaki-nakatsuru_en.pdf"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Impact"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A suspicious process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ contains commandline $process$ to ignore all bcdedit execution failure in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1490"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process_guid"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Inhibit System Recovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "prevent_automatic_repair_mode_using_bcdedit_filter"}]}, {"name": "Allow Network Discovery In Firewall", "id": "ccd6a38c-d40b-11eb-85a5-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-06-23", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious modification to the firewall to allow network discovery on a machine. This technique was seen in couple of ransomware (revil, reddot) to discover other machine connected to the compromised host to encrypt more files.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_netsh` Processes.process= \"*firewall*\" Processes.process= \"*group=\\\"Network Discovery\\\"*\" Processes.process=\"*enable*\" Processes.process=\"*Yes*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `allow_network_discovery_in_firewall_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "network admin may modify this firewall feature that may cause this rule to be triggered.", "references": ["https://kb.fortinet.com/kb/documentLink.do?externalID=FD52469", "https://app.any.run/tasks/c0f98850-af65-4352-9746-fbebadee4f05/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.007", "T1562"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=netsh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=netsh.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_netsh"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "allow_network_discovery_in_firewall_filter"}]}, {"name": "Winword Spawning PowerShell", "id": "b2c950b8-9be2-11eb-8658-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-04-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies Microsoft Word spawning PowerShell. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with winword.exe. Winword.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Office16` (version will vary). PowerShell spawning from winword.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command executed will most likely be encoded and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=\"winword.exe\" `process_powershell` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winword_spawning_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/powershell/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/", "https://app.any.run/tasks/b79fa381-f35c-4b3e-8d02-507e7ee7342f/", "https://app.any.run/tasks/181ac90b-0898-4631-8701-b778a30610ad/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "$parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$ launched the following powershell process: $process_name$ which is very common in spearphishing attacks", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Target"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Phishing", "Spearphishing Attachment"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_powershell"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "winword_spawning_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Enumerate Users Local Group Using Telegram", "id": "fcd74532-ae54-11eb-a5ab-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-06", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic will detect a suspicious Telegram process enumerating all network users in a local group. This technique was seen in a Monero infected honeypot to mapped all the users on the compromised system. EventCode 4798 is generated when a process enumerates a user's security-enabled local groups on a computer or device.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4798 Process_Name = \"*\\\\telegram.exe\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName EventCode Process_Name Process_ID Account_Name Account_Domain Logon_ID Security_ID Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `enumerate_users_local_group_using_telegram_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Task Schedule (Exa. Security Log EventCode 4798) endpoints. Tune and filter known instances of process like logonUI used in your environment.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4798"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/minergate/windows-security.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The Telegram application has been identified enumerating local groups on $ComputerName$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "ComputerName", "EventCode", "Process_Name", "Process_ID", "Account_Name", "Account_Domain", "Logon_ID", "Security_ID", "Message"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Account Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "enumerate_users_local_group_using_telegram_filter"}]}, {"name": "More than usual number of LOLBAS applications in short time period", "id": "59c0dd70-169c-4900-9a1f-bfcf13302f93", "version": 2, "date": "2020-08-25", "author": "Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "Attacker activity may compromise executing several LOLBAS applications in conjunction to accomplish their objectives. We are looking for more than usual LOLBAS applications over a window of time, by building profiles per machine.", "search": " | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval device=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null)), timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)) | where process_name==\"regsvcs.exe\" OR process_name==\"ftp.exe\" OR process_name==\"dfsvc.exe\" OR process_name==\"rasautou.exe\" OR process_name==\"schtasks.exe\" OR process_name==\"xwizard.exe\" OR process_name==\"findstr.exe\" OR process_name==\"esentutl.exe\" OR process_name==\"cscript.exe\" OR process_name==\"reg.exe\" OR process_name==\"csc.exe\" OR process_name==\"atbroker.exe\" OR process_name==\"print.exe\" OR process_name==\"pcwrun.exe\" OR process_name==\"vbc.exe\" OR process_name==\"rpcping.exe\" OR process_name==\"wsreset.exe\" OR process_name==\"ilasm.exe\" OR process_name==\"certutil.exe\" OR process_name==\"replace.exe\" OR process_name==\"mshta.exe\" OR process_name==\"bitsadmin.exe\" OR process_name==\"wscript.exe\" OR process_name==\"ieexec.exe\" OR process_name==\"cmd.exe\" OR process_name==\"microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe\" OR process_name==\"runscripthelper.exe\" OR process_name==\"makecab.exe\" OR process_name==\"forfiles.exe\" OR process_name==\"desktopimgdownldr.exe\" OR process_name==\"control.exe\" OR process_name==\"msbuild.exe\" OR process_name==\"register-cimprovider.exe\" OR process_name==\"tttracer.exe\" OR process_name==\"ie4uinit.exe\" OR process_name==\"sc.exe\" OR process_name==\"bash.exe\" OR process_name==\"hh.exe\" OR process_name==\"cmstp.exe\" OR process_name==\"mmc.exe\" OR process_name==\"jsc.exe\" OR process_name==\"scriptrunner.exe\" OR process_name==\"odbcconf.exe\" OR process_name==\"extexport.exe\" OR process_name==\"msdt.exe\" OR process_name==\"diskshadow.exe\" OR process_name==\"extrac32.exe\" OR process_name==\"eventvwr.exe\" OR process_name==\"mavinject.exe\" OR process_name==\"regasm.exe\" OR process_name==\"gpscript.exe\" OR process_name==\"rundll32.exe\" OR process_name==\"regsvr32.exe\" OR process_name==\"regedit.exe\" OR process_name==\"msiexec.exe\" OR process_name==\"gfxdownloadwrapper.exe\" OR process_name==\"presentationhost.exe\" OR process_name==\"regini.exe\" OR process_name==\"wmic.exe\" OR process_name==\"runonce.exe\" OR process_name==\"syncappvpublishingserver.exe\" OR process_name==\"verclsid.exe\" OR process_name==\"psr.exe\" OR process_name==\"infdefaultinstall.exe\" OR process_name==\"explorer.exe\" OR process_name==\"expand.exe\" OR process_name==\"installutil.exe\" OR process_name==\"netsh.exe\" OR process_name==\"wab.exe\" OR process_name==\"dnscmd.exe\" OR process_name==\"at.exe\" OR process_name==\"pcalua.exe\" OR process_name==\"cmdkey.exe\" OR process_name==\"msconfig.exe\" | stats count(process_name) as lolbas_counter by device,span(timestamp, 300s) | eval lolbas_counter=lolbas_counter*1.0 | rename window_end as timestamp | adaptive_threshold algorithm=\"quantile\" value=\"lolbas_counter\" entity=\"device\" window=2419200000L | where label AND quantile>0.99 | eval start_time = window_start, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend(device), body=create_map([\"lolbas_counter\", lolbas_counter, \"quantile\", quantile, \"device\", device]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "Collect endpoint data such as sysmon or 4688 events.", "known_false_positives": "Some administrative tasks may involve multiple use of LOLBAS applications in a short period of time. This might trigger false positives at the beginning when it hasn't collected yet enough data to construct the baseline.\n", "references": ["https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/tree/master/yml/OSBinaries"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Unusual Processes"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A system process $process_name$ with commandline $cmd_line$ spawn iin short period of time in host $dest_device_id$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1053"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "processname", "role": ["Others"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["dest_device_id", "_time", "process_name"], "risk_score": 25, "risk_severity": "low", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "Scheduled Task/Job"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "more_than_usual_number_of_lolbas_applications_in_short_time_period_filter"}]}, {"name": "Network Connection Discovery With Netstat", "id": "2cf5cc25-f39a-436d-a790-4857e5995ede", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-10", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `netstat.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use netstat.exe for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"netstat.exe\") (Processes.process=*-a*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `network_connection_discovery_with_netstat_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1049/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1049"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Network Connections Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Tropic Trooper", "APT41", "APT38", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "APT1", "OilRig", "APT3", "menuPass", "Threat Group-3390", "Poseidon Group", "admin@338", "Turla", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "network_connection_discovery_with_netstat_filter"}]}, {"name": "WBAdmin Delete System Backups", "id": "cd5aed7e-5cea-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-22", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for flags passed to wbadmin.exe (Windows Backup Administrator Tool) that delete backup files. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent recovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wbadmin.exe Processes.process=\"*delete*\" AND (Processes.process=\"*catalog*\" OR Processes.process=\"*systemstatebackup*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `wbadmin_delete_system_backups_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. Tune based on parent process names.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may modify the boot configuration.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1490/T1490.md", "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/08/ryuks-return/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wbadmin"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "System backups deletion on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1490"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Inhibit System Recovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "wbadmin_delete_system_backups_filter"}]}, {"name": "Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters", "id": "8ce07472-496f-11ec-ab3b-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-19", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the presence of suspicious commandline parameters typically present when using Impacket tools. Impacket is a collection of python classes meant to be used with Microsoft network protocols. There are multiple scripts that leverage impacket libraries like `wmiexec.py`, `smbexec.py`, `dcomexec.py` and `atexec.py` used to execute commands on remote endpoints. By default, these scripts leverage administrative shares and hardcoded parameters that can be used as a signature to detect its use. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage Impackets tools for lateral movement and remote code execution.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process = \"*/c* \\\\\\\\127.0.0.1\\\\*\" OR Processes.process= \"*/c* 2>&1\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Although uncommon, Administrators may leverage Impackets tools to start a process on remote systems for system administration or automation use cases.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005", "https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket", "https://vk9-sec.com/impacket-remote-code-execution-rce-on-windows-from-linux/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.003/impacket/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "message": "Suspicious command line parameters on $dest may represent a lateral movement attack with Impackets tools", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021", "T1021.002", "T1021.003", "T1047", "T1543.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote Services", "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "Distributed Component Object Model", "Windows Management Instrumentation", "Windows Service"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement", "Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "APT32", "Orangeworm", "FIN8", "APT3", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-1314", "Turla", "Deep Panda", "Ke3chang", "no", "Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT41", "FIN6", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Threat Group-3390", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "menuPass", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "APT29", "Deep Panda", "Blue Mockingbird", "DarkVishnya", "Wizard Spider", "APT32", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Tropic Trooper", "Cobalt Group", "Ke3chang", "Honeybee", "FIN7", "Threat Group-3390", "APT19", "APT3", "Lazarus Group", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup", "id": "71b9bf37-cde1-45fb-b899-1b0aa6fa1183", "version": 2, "date": "2021-02-04", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading syssetup.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line. This particular technique will load script code from a file. Upon a successful execution, the following module loads may occur - clr.dll, jscript.dll and scrobj.dll. During investigation, identify script content origination. Generally, a child process will spawn from rundll32.exe, but that may be bypassed based on script code contents. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64. During investigation, review any network connections and obtain the script content executed. It's possible other files are on disk.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*syssetup* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use syssetup.dll, triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Syssetup/", "https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ loading syssetup.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Rundll32"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT32", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "TA505", "MuddyWater", "APT29", "APT19", "CopyKittens", "APT3", "Carbanak", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_rundll32"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup_filter"}]}, {"name": "GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell Script Block", "id": "091712ff-b02a-4d43-82ed-34765515d95d", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-10", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-NetTcpconnection ` commandlet. This commandlet is used to return a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-NetTcpconnection*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/nettcpip/get-nettcpconnection?view=windowsserver2019-ps"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1049/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1049"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Network Connections Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Tropic Trooper", "APT41", "APT38", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "APT1", "OilRig", "APT3", "menuPass", "Threat Group-3390", "Poseidon Group", "admin@338", "Turla", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_script_block_filter"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell Get LocalGroup Discovery", "id": "b71adfcc-155b-11ec-9413-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-14", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following hunting analytic identifies the use of `get-localgroup` being used with PowerShell to identify local groups on the endpoint. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=cmd.exe) (Processes.process=\"*get-localgroup*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present. Tune as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Local group discovery on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Permission Groups Discovery", "Local Groups"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TA505", "APT3", "Turla", "OilRig", "admin@338"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_filter"}]}, {"name": "Disable Show Hidden Files", "id": "6f3ccfa2-91fe-11eb-8f9b-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-31", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic is to identify a modification in the Windows registry to prevent users from seeing all the files with hidden attributes. This event or techniques are known on some worm and trojan spy malware that will drop hidden files on the infected machine.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\Advanced\\\\Hidden\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\Advanced\\\\HideFileExt\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\") OR (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\Advanced\\\\ShowSuperHidden\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000000\") by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_show_hidden_files_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.sophos.com/en-us/threat-center/threat-analyses/viruses-and-spyware/W32~Tiotua-P/detailed-analysis.aspx"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Disabled 'Show Hidden Files' on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1564.001", "T1562.001", "T1564", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.user", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_value_nam"], "risk_score": 40, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Hidden Files and Directories", "Disable or Modify Tools", "Hide Artifacts", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Rocke", "APT32", "Tropic Trooper", "APT28", "Lazarus Group", "Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disable_show_hidden_files_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Renamed 7-Zip", "id": "4057291a-b8cf-11eb-95fe-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies renamed 7-Zip usage using Sysmon. At this stage of an attack, review parallel processes and file modifications for data that is staged or potentially have been exfiltrated. This analytic utilizes the OriginalFileName to capture the renamed process. During triage, validate this is the legitimate version of `7zip` by reviewing the PE metadata. In addition, review parallel processes for further suspicious behavior.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.original_file_name=7z*.exe AND Processes.process_name!=7z*.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_renamed_7_zip_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives, however this analytic will need to be modified for each environment if Sysmon is not used.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1560.001/T1560.001.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Collection and Staging"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1560.001/archive_utility/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1560.001", "T1560"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 27, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Archive via Utility", "Archive Collected Data"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Soft Cell", "Turla", "Gallmaker", "APT33", "APT39", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "FIN8", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT3", "Sowbug", "menuPass", "APT1", "Ke3chang", "menuPass", "APT32", "Honeybee", "Patchwork", "APT28", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN6", "Lazarus Group", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_renamed_7_zip_filter"}]}, {"name": "Disable Logs Using WevtUtil", "id": "236e7c8e-c9d9-11eb-a824-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-10", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect execution of wevtutil.exe to disable logs. This technique was seen in several ransomware to disable the event logs to evade alerts and detections.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"wevtutil.exe\" Processes.process = \"*sl*\" Processes.process = \"*/e:false*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_logs_using_wevtutil_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "network operator may disable audit event logs for debugging purposes.", "references": ["https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-ransom-x-ransomware-used-in-texas-txdot-cyberattack/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": [{"Source": "Endpoint"}, {"Stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "WevtUtil.exe used to disable Event Logging on $dest", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1070", "T1070.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process_guid"], "risk_score": 24, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Indicator Removal on Host", "Clear Windows Event Logs"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT41", "APT38", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT32", "FIN8", "FIN5", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disable_logs_using_wevtutil_filter"}]}, {"name": "MS Scripting Process Loading WMI Module", "id": "2eba3d36-14a6-11ec-a682-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-13", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious MS scripting process such as wscript.exe or cscript.exe that loading wmi module to process wmi query. This behavior was seen in FIN7 implant where it uses javascript to execute wmi query to parse host information that will send to its C2 server. this anomaly detections is a good initial step to hunt further a suspicious wmi query or wmi related events to the host that may give you good information regarding process that are commonly using wmi query or modules or might be an attacker using this technique.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode =7 Image IN (\"*\\\\wscript.exe\", \"*\\\\cscript.exe\") ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\fastprox.dll\", \"*\\\\wbemdisp.dll\", \"*\\\\wbemprox.dll\", \"*\\\\wbemsvc.dll\" , \"*\\\\wmiutils.dll\", \"*\\\\wbemcomn.dll\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Image EventCode process_name ProcessId ProcessGuid Computer ImageLoaded | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "automation scripting language may used by network operator to do ldap query.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html", "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["FIN7"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_js_2/sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "$process_name$ loading wmi modules $ImageLoaded$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.007"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Image", "EventCode", "process_name", "ProcessId", "ProcessGuid", "Computer", "ImageLoaded"], "risk_score": 9, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "JavaScript/JScript"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "APT32", "FIN7", "Cobalt Group", "Molerats", "TA505", "Silence", "Leafminer"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module_filter"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Attempt To Disable Services", "id": "8fa2a0f0-acd9-11eb-8994-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-04", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic will identify suspicious series of command-line to disable several services. This technique is seen where the adversary attempts to disable security app services or other malware services to complete the objective on the compromised system.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"sc.exe\" AND Processes.process=\"*config*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Disabled*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=1m | where count >=5 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_attempt_to_disable_services_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed sc.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An excessive amount of $process_name$ was executed on $dest$ attempting to disable services.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1489"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Service Stop"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "excessive_attempt_to_disable_services_filter"}]}, {"name": "Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell", "id": "2ed8b538-d284-449a-be1d-82ad1dbd186b", "version": 3, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search detects the use of wmic and Powershell to create a shadow copy.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` OR `process_powershell` Processes.process=*shadowcopy* Processes.process=*create* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Legtimate administrator usage of wmic to create a shadow copy.", "references": ["https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to create a shadow copy to perform offline password cracking.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.003", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["NTDS", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN6", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_powershell"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_wmic"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon", "id": "ad05aae6-3b2a-4f73-af97-57bd26cee3b9", "version": 3, "date": "2020-12-08", "author": "Rico Valdez, Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This analytic looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions. The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscription to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions.\\\nAll event subscriptions have three components \\\n1. Filter - WQL Query for the events we want. EventID = 19 \\\n1. Consumer - An action to take upon triggering the filter. EventID = 20 \\\n1. Binding - Registers a filter to a consumer. EventID = 21 \\\nMonitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding. It may be pertinent to review all 3 to identify the flow of execution. In addition, EventCode 4104 may assist with any other PowerShell script usage that registered the subscription.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=21 | rename host as dest | table _time, dest, user, Operation, EventType, Query, Consumer, Filter | `wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be collecting Sysmon data using Sysmon version 6.1 or greater and have Sysmon configured to generate alerts for WMI activity (eventID= 19, 20, 21). In addition, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA installed to properly parse the fields.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, administrators may use event subscriptions for legitimate purposes.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1546.003/T1546.003.md", "https://www.eideon.com/2018-03-02-THL03-WMIBackdoors/", "https://github.com/trustedsec/SysmonCommunityGuide/blob/master/WMI-events.md", "https://in.security/an-intro-into-abusing-and-identifying-wmi-event-subscriptions-for-persistence/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user$ on $host$ executed the following suspicious WMI query: $Query$. Filter: $filter$. Consumer: $Consumer$. EventCode: $EventCode$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1546.003", "T1546"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "host", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "host", "user", "Operation", "EventType", "Query", "Consumer", "Filter"], "risk_score": 30, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription", "Event Triggered Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "Blue Mockingbird", "Turla", "Leviathan", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon_filter"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started", "id": "b3632472-310b-11ec-9aab-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-19", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following hunting analytic assists with identifying suspicious tasks that have been registered and ran in Windows using EventID 200 (action run) and 201 (action completed). It is recommended to filter based on ActionName by specifying specific paths not used in your environment. After some basic tuning, this may be effective in capturing evasive ways to register tasks on Windows. Review parallel events related to tasks being scheduled. EventID 106 will generate when a new task is generated, however, that does not mean it ran. Capture any files on disk and analyze.", "search": "`wineventlog_task_scheduler` EventCode IN (\"200\",\"201\") | rename ComputerName as dest | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message dest EventCode category | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started_filter`", "how_to_implement": "Task Scheduler logs are required to be collected. Enable logging with inputs.conf by adding a stanza for [WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational] and renderXml=false. Note, not translating it in XML may require a proper extraction of specific items in the Message.", "known_false_positives": "False positives will be present. Filter based on ActionName paths or specify keywords of interest.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1053.005/T1053.005.md", "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["IcedID", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/windows_taskschedule/windows-taskschedule.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A Scheduled Task was scheduled and ran on $dest$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053.005"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "TaskName", "ActionName", "EventID", "dest", "ProcessID"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Scheduled Task"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "MuddyWater", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT-C-36", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT41", "Machete", "Soft Cell", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Patchwork", "OilRig", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "FIN8", "menuPass", "FIN10", "APT32", "FIN7", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT29"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "source=\"WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_task_scheduler"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started_filter"}]}, {"name": "Network Connection Discovery With Net", "id": "640337e5-6e41-4b7f-af06-9d9eab5e1e2d", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-10", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use net.exe for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\") (Processes.process=*use*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `network_connection_discovery_with_net_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1049/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1049"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Network Connections Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Tropic Trooper", "APT41", "APT38", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "APT1", "OilRig", "APT3", "menuPass", "Threat Group-3390", "Poseidon Group", "admin@338", "Turla", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "network_connection_discovery_with_net_filter"}]}, {"name": "Permission Modification using Takeown App", "id": "fa7ca5c6-c9d8-11eb-bce9-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-10", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a modification of file or directory permission using takeown.exe windows app. This technique was seen in some ransomware that take the ownership of a folder or files to encrypt or delete it.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"takeown.exe\" Processes.process = \"*/f*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `permission_modification_using_takeown_app_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "takeown.exe is a normal windows application that may used by network operator.", "references": ["https://research.nccgroup.com/2020/06/23/wastedlocker-a-new-ransomware-variant-developed-by-the-evil-corp-group/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A suspicious of execution of $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ and commandline $process$ to modify permission of directory or files in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1222"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "process name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process_guid"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["File and Directory Permissions Modification"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "permission_modification_using_takeown_app_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage", "id": "9bbc62e8-55d8-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 2, "date": "2021-01-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe usage. microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v4.0.30319 and is rarely utilized. When investigating, identify the executed code on disk and review. It is not a commonly used process by many applications.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_microsoftworkflowcompiler` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, limited instances have been identified coming from native Microsoft utilities similar to SCCM.", "references": ["https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md#atomic-test-6---microsoftworkflowcompilerexe-payload-execution"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe process ran on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1127"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_microsoftworkflowcompiler"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage_filter"}]}, {"name": "Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network", "id": "1a52c836-43ef-11ec-a36c-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary making a remote network connection. This technique may be used to download and execute code while bypassing application control using the `/u` (uninstall) switch. \\\nInstallUtil uses the functions install and uninstall within the System.Configuration.Install namespace to process .net assembly. Install function requires admin privileges, however, uninstall function can be run as an unprivileged user.\\\nWhen `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \\\nIf used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \\\nDuring triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` Processes.process IN (\"*/u*\", \"*uninstall*\") by _time span=1h Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_guid [ | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port !=\"0\" by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name original_file_name process_path process process_guid connection_to_CNC dest_port | `windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Ports` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives should be present as InstallUtil is not typically used to download remote files. Filter as needed based on Developers requirements.", "references": ["https://evi1cg.me/archives/AppLocker_Bypass_Techniques.html#menu_index_12", "https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList/blob/master/md/Installutil.exe.md", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ performing an uninstall.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218.004", "T1218"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id", "Ports.process_guid", "Ports.dest", "Ports.dest_port"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["InstallUtil", "Signed Binary Proxy Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=installutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=InstallUtil.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_installutil"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network_filter"}]}, {"name": "Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download", "id": "6fed27d2-9ec7-11eb-8fe4-aa665a019aa3", "version": 3, "date": "2021-09-20", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect potential malicious office document executing lolbin child process to download payload or other malware. Since most of the attacker abused the capability of office document to execute living on land application to blend it to the normal noise in the infected machine to cover its track.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\") Processes.process IN (\"*http:*\",\"*https:*\") NOT (Processes.original_file_name IN(\"firefox.exe\", \"chrome.exe\",\"iexplore.exe\",\"msedge.exe\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_document_spawned_child_process_to_download_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances office application and browser may be used.", "known_false_positives": "Default browser not in the filter list.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/92d7ef61-bfd7-4c92-bc15-322172b4ebec/#"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets2/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Office document spawning suspicious child process on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Phishing", "Spearphishing Attachment"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "office_document_spawned_child_process_to_download_filter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Created With Suspicious Service Path", "id": "429141be-8311-11eb-adb6-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-11-22", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytc uses Windows Event Id 7045, `New Service Was Installed`, to identify the creation of a Windows Service where the service binary path path is located in a non-common Service folder in Windows. Red Teams and adversaries alike may create malicious Services for lateral movement or remote code execution as well as persistence and execution. The Clop ransomware has also been seen in the wild abusing Windows services.", "search": " `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 Service_File_Name = \"*\\.exe\" NOT (Service_File_Name IN (\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\*\", \"C:\\\\Program File*\", \"C:\\\\Programdata\\\\*\", \"%systemroot%\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Service_File_Name Service_Name Service_Start_Type Service_Type | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may install services with uncommon services paths.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-system.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement"], "message": "A service $Service_File_Name$ was created from a non-standard path using $Service_Name$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1569", "T1569.002"], "observable": [{"name": "Service_File_Name", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}, {"name": "Service_Name", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["EventCode", "Service_File_Name", "Service_Type", "_time", "Service_Name", "Service_Start_Type"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Services", "Service Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "APT41", "Silence", "FIN6", "APT32", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_system"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path_filter"}]}, {"name": "Sdclt UAC Bypass", "id": "d71efbf6-da63-11eb-8c6e-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-01", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious sdclt.exe registry modification. This technique is commonly seen when attacker try to bypassed UAC by using sdclt.exe application by modifying some registry that sdclt.exe tries to open or query with payload file path on it to be executed.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\App Paths\\\\control.exe*\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\exefile\\\\shell\\\\runas\\\\command\\\\*\") (Registry.registry_value_name = \"(Default)\" OR Registry.registry_value_name = \"IsolatedCommand\") by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sdclt_uac_bypass_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Limited to no false positives are expected.", "references": ["https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/17/fileless-uac-bypass-using-sdclt-exe/", "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME", "https://www.cyborgsecurity.com/cyborg_labs/threat-hunt-deep-dives-user-account-control-bypass-via-registry-modification/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence,", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Incoming"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious modification of registry $registry_path$ with possible payload path $registry_value_name$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.dest"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Bypass User Access Control", "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "MuddyWater", "Honeybee", "Cobalt Group", "Threat Group-3390", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Patchwork", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "sdclt_uac_bypass_filter"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases", "id": "f5f6af30-7aa7-4295-bfe9-07fe87c01bbb", "version": 3, "date": "2020-11-26", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for registry activity associated with application compatibility shims, which can be leveraged by attackers for various nefarious purposes.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*CurrentVersion\\\\AppCompatFlags\\\\Custom* OR Registry.registry_path=*CurrentVersion\\\\AppCompatFlags\\\\InstalledSDB* by Registry.dest Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must populate the Change_Analysis data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection and response product, such as Carbon Black or other endpoint data sources such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "There are many legitimate applications that leverage shim databases for compatibility purposes for legacy applications", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Privilege Escalation"}, "Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to shim modication in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1546.011", "T1546"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Application Shimming", "Event Triggered Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN7", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases_filter"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Get LocalGroup Discovery with Script Block Logging", "id": "d7c6ad22-155c-11ec-bb64-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-14", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies PowerShell cmdlet - `get-localgroup` being ran. Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*get-localgroup*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message OpCode ComputerName User EventCode| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_with_script_block_logging_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present. Tune as needed.", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/powershell-detections-threat-research-release-august-2021.html", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.md", "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell", "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Local group discovery on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Permission Groups Discovery", "Local Groups"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TA505", "APT3", "Turla", "OilRig", "admin@338"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_with_script_block_logging_filter"}]}, {"name": "Drop IcedID License dat", "id": "b7a045fc-f14a-11eb-8e79-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-30", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect dropping a suspicious file named as \"license.dat\" in %appdata%. This behavior seen in latest IcedID malware that contain the actual core bot that will be injected in other process to do banking stealing.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode= 11 TargetFilename = \"*\\\\license.dat\" AND (TargetFilename=\"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\" OR TargetFilename=\"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\") |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by TargetFilename EventCode process_id process_name Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_icedid_license_dat_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.cisecurity.org/white-papers/security-primer-icedid/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/simulated_icedid/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "process $SourceImage$ create a file $TargetImage$ in host $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1204", "T1204.002"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "SourceImage", "type": "process name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["User Execution", "Malicious File"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Whitefly", "Tropic Trooper", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Mofang", "Frankenstein", "RTM", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "Machete", "admin@338", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "DarkHydrus", "Gorgon Group", "Patchwork", "OilRig", "Dark Caracal", "MuddyWater", "Lazarus Group", "FIN7", "APT32", "Rancor", "APT37", "FIN8", "APT28", "Elderwood", "TA459", "APT29", "Leviathan", "menuPass", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "drop_icedid_license_dat_filter"}]}, {"name": "Process Writing DynamicWrapperX", "id": "b0a078e4-2601-11ec-9aec-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-05", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "DynamicWrapperX is an ActiveX component that can be used in a script to call Windows API functions, but it requires the dynwrapx.dll to be installed and registered. With that, a binary writing dynwrapx.dll to disk and registering it into the registry is highly suspect. Why is it needed? In most malicious instances, it will be written to disk at a non-standard location. During triage, review parallel processes and pivot on the process_guid. Review the registry for any suspicious modifications meant to load dynwrapx.dll. Identify any suspicious module loads of dynwrapx.dll. This will identify the process that will invoke vbs/wscript/cscript.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_guid Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name=\"dynwrapx.dll\" by _time Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time process_guid file_path file_name file_create_time user dest process_name] | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest process_name process_guid file_name file_path file_create_time user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `process_writing_dynamicwrapperx_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however it is possible to filter by Processes.process_name and specific processes (ex. wscript.exe). Filter as needed. This may need modification based on EDR telemetry and how it brings in registry data. For example, removal of (Default).", "references": ["https://blog.f-secure.com/hunting-for-koadic-a-com-based-rootkit/", "https://www.script-coding.com/dynwrapx_eng.html", "https://bohops.com/2018/06/28/abusing-com-registry-structure-clsid-localserver32-inprocserver32/", "https://tria.ge/210929-ap75vsddan", "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/cb77b93150cb0f7fe65ce8a7e2a5781e727419451355a7736db84109fa215a89"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ downloading the DynamicWrapperX dll.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1559.001"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "process_name", "process_guid", "file_name", "file_path", "file_create_time user"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "Component Object Model"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Gamaredon Group", "MuddyWater"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "process_writing_dynamicwrapperx_filter"}]}, {"name": "Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", "id": "f6601940-4c74-11ec-b9b7-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-23", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies `mmc.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the DCOM protocol and the MMC20 COM object, the executed command is spawned as a child processs of `mmc.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of mmc.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=mmc.exe) (Processes.process_name IN (\"Regsvcs.exe\", \"Ftp.exe\", \"OfflineScannerShell.exe\", \"Rasautou.exe\", \"Schtasks.exe\", \"Xwizard.exe\", \"Dllhost.exe\", \"Pnputil.exe\", \"Atbroker.exe\", \"Pcwrun.exe\", \"Ttdinject.exe\",\"Mshta.exe\", \"Bitsadmin.exe\", \"Certoc.exe\", \"Ieexec.exe\", \"Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe\", \"Runscripthelper.exe\", \"Forfiles.exe\", \"Msbuild.exe\", \"Register-cimprovider.exe\", \"Tttracer.exe\", \"Ie4uinit.exe\", \"Bash.exe\", \"Hh.exe\", \"SettingSyncHost.exe\", \"Cmstp.exe\", \"Mmc.exe\", \"Stordiag.exe\", \"Scriptrunner.exe\", \"Odbcconf.exe\", \"Extexport.exe\", \"Msdt.exe\", \"WorkFolders.exe\", \"Diskshadow.exe\", \"Mavinject.exe\", \"Regasm.exe\", \"Gpscript.exe\", \"Rundll32.exe\", \"Regsvr32.exe\", \"Msiexec.exe\", \"Wuauclt.exe\", \"Presentationhost.exe\", \"Wmic.exe\", \"Runonce.exe\", \"Syncappvpublishingserver.exe\", \"Verclsid.exe\", \"Infdefaultinstall.exe\", \"Explorer.exe\", \"Installutil.exe\", \"Netsh.exe\", \"Wab.exe\", \"Dnscmd.exe\", \"At.exe\", \"Pcalua.exe\", \"Msconfig.exe\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mmc_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003/", "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/dcom-lateral-movement-techniques", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.003/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "message": "Mmc.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021", "T1021.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 54, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote Services", "Distributed Component Object Model"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "mmc_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter"}]}, {"name": "WMIC XSL Execution via URL", "id": "787e9dd0-4328-11ec-a029-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-11", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies `wmic.exe` loading a remote XSL (eXtensible Stylesheet Language) script. This originally was identified by Casey Smith, dubbed Squiblytwo, as an application control bypass. Many adversaries will utilize this technique to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file. This technique can also execute local/remote scripts and, similar to its Regsvr32 \"Squiblydoo\" counterpart, leverages a trusted, built-in Windows tool. Adversaries may abuse any alias in Windows Management Instrumentation provided they utilize the /FORMAT switch. Upon identifying a suspicious execution, review for confirmed network connnection and script download.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` Processes.process IN (\"*http://*\", \"*https://*\") Processes.process=\"*/format:*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmic_xsl_execution_via_url_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives are limited as legitimate applications typically do not download files or xsl using WMIC. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1220/T1220.md", "https://web.archive.org/web/20190814201250/https://subt0x11.blogspot.com/2018/04/wmicexe-whitelisting-bypass-hacking.html", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1220/T1220.md#atomic-test-4---wmic-bypass-using-remote-xsl-file"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1220/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ utilizing wmic to download a remote XSL script.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1220"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["XSL Script Processing"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Cobalt Group"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_wmic"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "wmic_xsl_execution_via_url_filter"}]}, {"name": "Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", "id": "ba9e1954-4c04-11ec-8b74-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-22", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies `services.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the Service Control Manager and creating a remote malicious service, the executed command is spawned as a child process of `services.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of services.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe) (Processes.process_name IN (\"Regsvcs.exe\", \"Ftp.exe\", \"OfflineScannerShell.exe\", \"Rasautou.exe\", \"Schtasks.exe\", \"Xwizard.exe\", \"Dllhost.exe\", \"Pnputil.exe\", \"Atbroker.exe\", \"Pcwrun.exe\", \"Ttdinject.exe\",\"Mshta.exe\", \"Bitsadmin.exe\", \"Certoc.exe\", \"Ieexec.exe\", \"Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe\", \"Runscripthelper.exe\", \"Forfiles.exe\", \"Msbuild.exe\", \"Register-cimprovider.exe\", \"Tttracer.exe\", \"Ie4uinit.exe\", \"Bash.exe\", \"Hh.exe\", \"SettingSyncHost.exe\", \"Cmstp.exe\", \"Mmc.exe\", \"Stordiag.exe\", \"Scriptrunner.exe\", \"Odbcconf.exe\", \"Extexport.exe\", \"Msdt.exe\", \"WorkFolders.exe\", \"Diskshadow.exe\", \"Mavinject.exe\", \"Regasm.exe\", \"Gpscript.exe\", \"Rundll32.exe\", \"Regsvr32.exe\", \"Msiexec.exe\", \"Wuauclt.exe\", \"Presentationhost.exe\", \"Wmic.exe\", \"Runonce.exe\", \"Syncappvpublishingserver.exe\", \"Verclsid.exe\", \"Infdefaultinstall.exe\", \"Explorer.exe\", \"Installutil.exe\", \"Netsh.exe\", \"Wab.exe\", \"Dnscmd.exe\", \"At.exe\", \"Pcalua.exe\", \"Msconfig.exe\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `services_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/", "https://pentestlab.blog/2020/07/21/lateral-movement-services/", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "message": "Services.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1543", "T1543.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 54, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Create or Modify System Process", "Windows Service"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Blue Mockingbird", "DarkVishnya", "Wizard Spider", "APT32", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Tropic Trooper", "Cobalt Group", "Ke3chang", "Honeybee", "FIN7", "Threat Group-3390", "APT19", "APT3", "Lazarus Group", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "services_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter"}]}, {"name": "Allow Operation with Consent Admin", "id": "7de17d7a-c9d8-11eb-a812-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-10", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies a potential privilege escalation attempt to perform malicious task. This registry modification is designed to allow the `Consent Admin` to perform an operation that requires elevation without consent or credentials. We also found this in some attacker to gain privilege escalation to the compromise machine.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System*\" Registry.registry_value_name = ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000000\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `allow_operation_with_consent_admin_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-gpsb/341747f5-6b5d-4d30-85fc-fa1cc04038d4", "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/no/threat-encyclopedia/malware/Ransom.Win32.MRDEC.MRA/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious registry modification was performed on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior is indicative of privilege escalation.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.dest"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "allow_operation_with_consent_admin_filter"}]}, {"name": "Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location", "id": "5d814af1-1041-47b5-a9ac-d754e82e9a26", "version": 5, "date": "2021-08-26", "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for a process launching an `*.lnk` file under `C:\\User*` or `*\\Local\\Temp\\*`. This is common behavior used by various spear phishing tools.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name=\"*.lnk\" AND (Filesystem.file_path=\"C:\\\\User\\\\*\" OR Filesystem.file_path=\"*\\\\Temp\\\\*\") by _time span=1h Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.file_hash Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | rename process_guid as lnk_guid | join lnk_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=* by _time span=1h Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | rename parent_process_guid as lnk_guid | fields _time lnk_guid process_id dest process_name process_path process] | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime, lastTime, lnk_guid, process_id, user, dest, file_name, file_path, process_name, process, process_path, file_hash | `process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon.", "known_false_positives": "This detection should yield little or no false positive results. It is uncommon for LNK files to be executed from temporary or user directories.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/", "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/17/e/rising-trend-attackers-using-lnk-files-download-malware.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Initial Access"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.002/lnk_file_temp_folder/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A process $process_name$ that launching .lnk file in $file_path$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.file_name", "Filesystem.file_path", "Filesystem.process_id", "Filesystem.file_name", "Filesystem.file_path", "Filesystem.file_hash", "Filesystem.user"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Phishing", "Spearphishing Link"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Windshift", "Molerats", "Mofang", "BlackTech", "Machete", "Kimsuky", "TA505", "Stolen Pencil", "APT39", "FIN4", "APT32", "Night Dragon", "Turla", "APT28", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "APT33", "Elderwood", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "APT29", "FIN8"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location_filter"}]}, {"name": "GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell Script Block", "id": "fabd364e-04f3-11ec-b34b-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-24", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet. The `DS_User` class parameter leverages WMI to query for all domain users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*get-wmiobject*\" Message = \"*ds_user*\" Message = \"*-namespace*\" Message = \"*root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "he following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-blue-purple/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wmisdk/describing-the-ldap-namespace"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Reconnaissance"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "powershell process having commandline $Message$ for user enumeration", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Domain Account", "Account Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Turla", "Sandworm Team", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "Ke3chang", "no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_script_block_filter"}]}, {"name": "USN Journal Deletion", "id": "b6e0ff70-b122-4227-9368-4cf322ab43c3", "version": 2, "date": "2018-12-03", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The fsutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows utility used to perform tasks related to the file allocation table (FAT) and NTFS file systems. The update sequence number (USN) change journal provides a log of all changes made to the files on the disk. This search looks for fsutil.exe deleting the USN journal.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=fsutil.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search process=\"*deletejournal*\" AND process=\"*usn*\" | `usn_journal_deletion_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "None identified", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Log Manipulation", "Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8", "CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Possible USN journal deletion on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1070"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.DP", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest"], "risk_score": 45, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Indicator Removal on Host"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "usn_journal_deletion_filter"}]}, {"name": "Modification Of Wallpaper", "id": "accb0712-c381-11eb-8e5b-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-02", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies suspicious modification of registry to deface or change the wallpaper of a compromised machines as part of its payload. This technique was commonly seen in ransomware like REVIL where it create a bitmap file contain a note that the machine was compromised and make it as a wallpaper.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode =13 (TargetObject= \"*\\\\Control Panel\\\\Desktop\\\\Wallpaper\" AND Image != \"*\\\\explorer.exe\") OR (TargetObject= \"*\\\\Control Panel\\\\Desktop\\\\Wallpaper\" AND Details = \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Image TargetObject Details Computer process_guid process_id user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `modification_of_wallpaper_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Image, TargetObject registry key, registry Details from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "3rd party tool may used to changed the wallpaper of the machine", "references": ["https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware", "BlackMatter Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Wallpaper modification on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1491"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Image", "TargetObject", "Details", "Computer", "process_guid", "process_id", "user_id"], "risk_score": 54, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Defacement"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "modification_of_wallpaper_filter"}]}, {"name": "WevtUtil Usage To Clear Logs", "id": "5438113c-cdd9-11eb-93b8-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-06-15", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "The wevtutil.exe application is the windows event log utility. This searches for wevtutil.exe with parameters for clearing the application, security, setup, powershell, sysmon, or system event logs.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where \"Endpoint_Processes\" IN(_datamodels) | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null), process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_path\"), \"string\", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND like(cmd_line, \"% cl %\") AND (match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)security/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)system/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)sysmon/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)application/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)setup/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)powershell/)=true) AND process_name=\"wevtutil.exe\" | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null)) | eval body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line, \"process_name\", process_name, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process_name, \"process_path\", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "The wevtutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows event log utility. Administrators may use it to manage Windows event logs.", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-clop-ransomware.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Log Manipulation", "Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/ssa_wevtutil/clear_evt.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A wevtutil process $process_name$ with commandline $cmd_line$ to clear event logs in host $dest_device_id$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1070", "T1070.001"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest_device_id", "process_name", "parent_process_name", "process_path", "dest_user_id", "process"], "risk_score": 63, "risk_severity": "medium", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Indicator Removal on Host", "Clear Windows Event Logs"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT41", "APT38", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT32", "FIN8", "FIN5", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "wevtutil_usage_to_clear_logs_filter"}]}, {"name": "Create local admin accounts using net exe", "id": "b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-151bb162040e", "version": 6, "date": "2021-09-08", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for the creation of local administrator accounts using net.exe .", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.user) as user values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=net.exe OR Processes.process_name=net1.exe) AND Processes.process=*/add* AND (Processes.process=*administrators* OR Processes.process=*administratoren* OR Processes.process=*administrateurs* OR Processes.process=*administrador* OR Processes.process=*amministratori* OR Processes.process=*administratorer*) by Processes.process Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators often leverage net.exe to create admin accounts.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["DHS Report TA18-074A"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to add a user to the local Administrators group.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1136.001", "T1136"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 30, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Local Account", "Create Account"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT39", "APT41", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leafminer", "APT3", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe_filter"}]}, {"name": "Resize Shadowstorage Volume", "id": "dbc30554-d27e-11eb-9e5e-acde48001122", "version": 3, "date": "2021-11-30", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the resizing of shadowstorage using vssadmin.exe to avoid the shadow volumes being made again. This technique is typically found used by adversaries during a ransomware event and a precursor to deleting the shadowstorage.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null)), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_path\"), \"string\", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND like(cmd_line, \"%resize%\") AND like(cmd_line, \"%shadowstorage%\") AND like(cmd_line, \"%maxsize%\") AND process_name=\"vssadmin.exe\" | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null)), body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line, \"process_name\", process_name, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process_name, \"process_path\", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "System administrators may resize the shadowstorage for valid purposes. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10", "CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/ssa_data1/windows-security.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to create a shadow copy to perform offline password cracking.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1489"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest_device_id", "process_name", "parent_process_name", "process_path", "dest_user_id", "process", "cmd_line"], "risk_score": 64, "risk_severity": "high", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Service Stop"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "resize_shadowstorage_volume_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection", "id": "e3e7a1c0-f2b9-445c-8493-f30a63522d1a", "version": 1, "date": "2021-02-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifies Regsvcs.exe with a network connection to a public IP address, exluding private IP space. This particular technique has been used in the wild to bypass application control products. Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe are signed by Microsoft. By contacting a remote command and control server, the adversary will have the ability to escalate privileges and complete the objectives. During investigation, identify and retrieve the content being loaded. Review parallel processes for additional suspicious behavior. Gather any other file modifications and review accordingly. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain and block as needed. regsvcs.exe and regasm.exe are natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe.", "search": "`sysmon` EventID=3 dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/12 dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16 process_name=regsvcs.exe | rename Computer as dest | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, User, process_name, src_ip, dest_host, dest_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, limited instances of regsvcs.exe may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvcs/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $process_name$ contacting a remote destination was identified on endpoint $Computer$ by user $user$. This behavior is not normal for $process_name$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.009"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventID", "dest_ip", "process_name", "Computer", "User", "src_ip", "dest_host"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "Endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Regsvcs/Regasm"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection_filter"}]}, {"name": "SLUI RunAs Elevated", "id": "8d124810-b3e4-11eb-96c7-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-13", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the Microsoft Software Licensing User Interface Tool, `slui.exe`, elevating access using the `-verb runas` function. This particular bypass utilizes a registry key/value. Identified by two sources, the registry keys are `HKCU\\Software\\Classes\\exefile\\shell` and `HKCU\\Software\\Classes\\launcher.Systemsettings\\Shell\\open\\command`. To simulate this behavior, multiple POC are available. The analytic identifies the use of `runas` by `slui.exe`.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=slui.exe (Processes.process=*-verb* Processes.process=*runas*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `slui_runas_elevated_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives should be present as this is not commonly used by legitimate applications.", "references": ["https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/46998", "https://medium.com/@mattharr0ey/privilege-escalation-uac-bypass-in-changepk-c40b92818d1b", "https://gist.github.com/r00t-3xp10it/0c92cd554d3156fd74f6c25660ccc466", "https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/windows/local/bypassuac_sluihijack/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Privilege Escalation"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/slui/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A slui process $process_name$ with elevated commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Bypass User Access Control", "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "MuddyWater", "Honeybee", "Cobalt Group", "Threat Group-3390", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Patchwork", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "slui_runas_elevated_filter"}]}, {"name": "ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell", "id": "13243068-2d38-11ec-8908-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-14", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies `powershell.exe` usage, using Script Block Logging EventCode 4104, related to querying the domain for Service Principle Names. typically, this is a precursor activity related to kerberoasting or the silver ticket attack. \\\nWhat is a ServicePrincipleName? \\\nA service principal name (SPN) is a unique identifier of a service instance. SPNs are used by Kerberos authentication to associate a service instance with a service logon account. This allows a client application to request that the service authenticate an account even if the client does not have the account name.\\\nThe following analytic identifies the use of KerberosRequestorSecurityToken class within the script block. Using .NET System.IdentityModel.Tokens.KerberosRequestorSecurityToken class in PowerShell is the equivelant of using setspn.exe. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes for further suspicious activity.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message=\"*KerberosRequestorSecurityToken*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message OpCode ComputerName User EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filter as needed.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/ad/service-principal-names", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.identitymodel.tokens.kerberosrequestorsecuritytoken?view=netframework-4.8", "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/t1208-kerberoasting", "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/setspn.exe-5C184D581524245DAD7A0A02B51FD2C2.html", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/", "https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/717.service-principal-names-spn-setspn-syntax.aspx", "https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz/", "https://blog.zsec.uk/paving-2-da-wholeset/", "https://msitpros.com/?p=3113", "https://adsecurity.org/?p=3466", "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/atomic_red_team/windows-powershell_kerberos.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to identify service principle names.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1558.003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Kerberoasting"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Regasm Spawning a Process", "id": "72170ec5-f7d2-42f5-aefb-2b8be6aad15f", "version": 1, "date": "2021-02-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies regasm.exe spawning a process. This particular technique has been used in the wild to bypass application control products. Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe are signed by Microsoft. Spawning of a child process is rare from either process and should be investigated further. During investigation, identify and retrieve the content being loaded. Review parallel processes for additional suspicious behavior. Gather any other file modifications and review accordingly. regsvcs.exe and regasm.exe are natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=regasm.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regasm_spawning_a_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, limited instances of regasm.exe or regsvcs.exe may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvcs/", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regasm/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ spawning a child process, typically not normal behavior for $parent_process_name$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.009"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Regsvcs/Regasm"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_regasm_spawning_a_process_filter"}]}, {"name": "MS Scripting Process Loading Ldap Module", "id": "0b0c40dc-14a6-11ec-b267-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-13", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious MS scripting process such as wscript.exe or cscript.exe that loading ldap module to process ldap query. This behavior was seen in FIN7 implant where it uses javascript to execute ldap query to parse host information that will send to its C2 server. this anomaly detections is a good initial step to hunt further a suspicious ldap query or ldap related events to the host that may give you good information regarding ldap or AD information processing or might be a attacker.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode =7 Image IN (\"*\\\\wscript.exe\", \"*\\\\cscript.exe\") ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\Wldap32.dll\", \"*\\\\adsldp.dll\", \"*\\\\adsldpc.dll\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Image EventCode process_name ProcessId ProcessGuid Computer ImageLoaded | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "automation scripting language may used by network operator to do ldap query.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html", "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["FIN7"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_js_2/sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "$process_name$ loading ldap modules $ImageLoaded$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.007"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Image", "EventCode", "process_name", "ProcessId", "ProcessGuid", "Computer", "ImageLoaded"], "risk_score": 9, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "JavaScript/JScript"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "APT32", "FIN7", "Cobalt Group", "Molerats", "TA505", "Silence", "Leafminer"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module_filter"}]}, {"name": "High Process Termination Frequency", "id": "17cd75b2-8666-11eb-9ab4-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-16", "author": "Teoderick Contreras", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytics are designed to indentify a high frequency of process termination on a machine which is a common behavior of ransomware malware before encrypting files. This technique is designed to avoid an exception error while accessing (docs, images, database and etc..) in the infected machine for encryption.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=5 |bin _time span=3s |stats values(Image) as proc_terminated min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer EventCode ProcessID | where count >= 15 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `high_process_termination_frequency_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Image (process full path of terminated process) from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "admin or user tool that can terminate multiple process.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "High frequency process termination (more than 15 processes within 3s) detected on host $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1486"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "proc_terminated", "type": "Process", "role": ["Target"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["EventCode", "Image", "Computer", "_time", "ProcessID"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Data Encrypted for Impact"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "TA505", "APT38"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "high_process_termination_frequency_filter"}]}, {"name": "Enable RDP In Other Port Number", "id": "99495452-b899-11eb-96dc-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-19", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a modification to registry to enable rdp to a machine with different port number. This technique was seen in some atttacker tries to do lateral movement and remote access to a compromised machine to gain control of it.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*HKLM\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Terminal Server\\\\WinStations\\\\RDP-Tcp*\" Registry.registry_value_name = \"PortNumber\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `enable_rdp_in_other_port_number_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.mvps.net/docs/how-to-secure-remote-desktop-rdp/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/casper/datasets1/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "RDP was moved to a non-standard port on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote Services"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "enable_rdp_in_other_port_number_filter"}]}, {"name": "Allow Inbound Traffic In Firewall Rule", "id": "a5d85486-b89c-11eb-8267-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-19", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell command to allow inbound traffic inbound to a specific local port within the public profile. This technique was seen in some attacker want to have a remote access to a machine by allowing the traffic in firewall rule.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*firewall*\" Message = \"*Inbound*\" Message = \"*Allow*\" Message = \"*-LocalPort*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `allow_inbound_traffic_in_firewall_rule_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the powershell logs from your endpoints. make sure you enable needed registry to monitor this event.", "known_false_positives": "administrator may allow inbound traffic in certain network or machine.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/netsecurity/new-netfirewallrule?view=windowsserver2019-ps"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/casper/datasets1/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious firewall modification detected on endpoint $ComputerName$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021.001", "T1021"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 3, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote Desktop Protocol", "Remote Services"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "TEMP.Veles", "Leviathan", "APT39", "Stolen Pencil", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "APT3", "OilRig", "menuPass", "FIN10", "Patchwork", "FIN6", "Lazarus Group", "APT1", "Axiom", "no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "allow_inbound_traffic_in_firewall_rule_filter"}]}, {"name": "Possible Browser Pass View Parameter", "id": "8ba484e8-4b97-11ec-b19a-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-22", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic will detect a suspicious process contains a commandline parameter related to web browser credential dumper. This technique was used by Remcos RAT malware where it use the techique of Nirsoft webbrowserpassview.exe application to dump web browser credentials. Remcos use the \"/stext\" commandline to dump the credential in text format. This Hunting query is good indicator to look further for possible remcos infection within the network or possible compromised host. Since the detections is only base on the parameter command and the possible path where it will drop the text credential information, It may catch normal tools that having same command and behavior.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process IN (\"*/stext *\", \"*/shtml *\", \"*/LoadPasswordsIE*\", \"*/LoadPasswordsFirefox*\", \"*/LoadPasswordsChrome*\", \"*/LoadPasswordsOpera*\", \"*/LoadPasswordsSafari*\" , \"*/UseOperaPasswordFile*\", \"*/OperaPasswordFile*\",\"*/stab*\", \"*/scomma*\", \"*/stabular*\", \"*/shtml*\", \"*/sverhtml*\", \"*/sxml*\", \"*/skeepass*\" ) AND Processes.process IN (\"*\\\\temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\users\\\\public\\\\*\", \"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `possible_browser_pass_view_parameter_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "False positive is quite limited. Filter is needed", "references": ["https://www.nirsoft.net/utils/web_browser_password.html", "https://app.any.run/tasks/df0baf9f-8baf-4c32-a452-16562ecb19be/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 40, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1555/web_browser_pass_view/sysmon.log"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "suspicious process $process_name$ contains commandline $process$ on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1555.003", "T1555"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 16, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Credentials from Web Browsers", "Credentials from Password Stores"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Sandworm Team", "Inception", "Stealth Falcon", "OilRig", "Leafminer", "APT33", "APT3", "Kimsuky", "TA505", "Stolen Pencil", "MuddyWater", "APT37", "Patchwork", "Molerats", "APT39", "OilRig", "MuddyWater", "Leafminer", "APT33", "Turla", "Stealth Falcon"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "possible_browser_pass_view_parameter_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect mshta inline hta execution", "id": "a0873b32-5b68-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 6, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies \"mshta.exe\" execution with inline protocol handlers. \"JavaScript\", \"VBScript\", and \"About\" are the only supported options when invoking HTA content directly on the command-line. The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process \"mshta.exe\" and its parent process.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_mshta` (Processes.process=*vbscript* OR Processes.process=*javascript* OR Processes.process=*about*) by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses", "https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/search/-search-3x-wds-extidx-prot-implementing"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious MSHTA Activity"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ executing with inline HTA, indicative of defense evasion.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Mshta"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "APT32", "MuddyWater", "FIN7"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=mshta.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSHTA.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_mshta"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution_filter"}]}, {"name": "Common Ransomware Extensions", "id": "a9e5c5db-db11-43ca-86a8-c852d1b2c0ec", "version": 4, "date": "2020-11-09", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The search looks for file modifications with extensions commonly used by Ransomware", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| rex field=file_name \"(?\\.[^\\.]+)$\" | `ransomware_extensions` | `common_ransomware_extensions_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.\\\nThis search produces fields (`query`,`query_length`,`count`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** Name, **Field:** Name\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** File Extension, **Field:** file_extension\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", "known_false_positives": "It is possible for a legitimate file with these extensions to be created. If this is a true ransomware attack, there will be a large number of files created with these extensions.", "references": [], "tags": {"Consequence": "Data Destruction", "analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/ransomware_extensions/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$, this is indicative of a known ransomware file extension and should be reviewed immediately.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1485"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "file_name", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.user", "Filesystem.dest", "Filesystem.file_path", "Filesystem.file_name"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Data Destruction"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Lazarus Group", "APT38"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "lookup update=true ransomware_extensions_lookup Extensions AS file_extension OUTPUT Name | search Name !=False", "description": "This macro limits the output to files that have extensions associated with ransomware", "name": "ransomware_extensions", "lookups": [{"default_match": "false", "description": "A list of file extensions that are associated with ransomware", "filename": "ransomware_extensions.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(Extensions)", "min_matches": 1, "name": "ransomware_extensions_lookup", "case_sensitive_match": "false", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/ransomware_extensions.csv"}]}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "common_ransomware_extensions_filter"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Execute COM Object", "id": "65711630-f9bf-11eb-8d72-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-10", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a COM CLSID execution through powershell. This technique was seen in several adversaries and malware like ransomware conti where it has a feature to execute command using COM Object. This technique may use by network operator at some cases but a good indicator if some application want to gain privilege escalation or bypass uac.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromCLSID*\" OR Message = \"*CreateInstance([Type]::GetTypeFromProgID*\"| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_execute_com_object_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "network operrator may use this command.", "references": ["https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1423361119926816776.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/conti/conti_leak/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains COM CLSID command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1546.015", "T1546"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 5, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Component Object Model Hijacking", "Event Triggered Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "powershell_execute_com_object_filter"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory", "id": "1adffe86-10c3-11ec-8ce6-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-08", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies rundll32.exe with `control_rundll` within the command-line, loading a .cpl or another file type from windows\\temp, programdata, or appdata. Developed in relation to CVE-2021-40444. Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. This is written to be a bit more broad by not including .cpl. The paths are specified, add more as needed. During triage, review parallel processes to identify any further suspicious behavior.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE) Processes.process=*Control_RunDLL* AND Processes.process IN (\"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\windows\\\\temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "This may be tuned, or a new one related, by adding .cpl to command-line. However, it's important to look for both. Tune/filter as needed.", "references": ["https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/rundll32.exe-111474C61232202B5B588D2B512CBB25.html", "https://app.any.run/tasks/36c14029-9df8-439c-bba0-45f2643b0c70/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.002/T1218.002.yaml"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a suspicious file from disk.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Rundll32"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT32", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "TA505", "MuddyWater", "APT29", "APT19", "CopyKittens", "APT3", "Carbanak", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Renamed WinRAR", "id": "1b7bfb2c-b8e6-11eb-99ac-acde48001122", "version": 3, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analtyic identifies renamed instances of `WinRAR.exe`. In most cases, it is not common for WinRAR to be used renamed, however it is common to be installed by a third party application and executed from a non-standard path. During triage, validate additional metadata from the binary that this is `WinRAR`. Review parallel processes and file modifications.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.original_file_name=WinRAR.exe (Processes.process_name!=rar.exe OR Processes.process_name!=winrar.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_renamed_winrar_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown. It is possible third party applications use renamed instances of WinRAR.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1560.001/T1560.001.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Collection and Staging"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1560.001/archive_utility/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Exfiltration"], "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1560.001", "T1560"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 27, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Archive via Utility", "Archive Collected Data"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Soft Cell", "Turla", "Gallmaker", "APT33", "APT39", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "FIN8", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT3", "Sowbug", "menuPass", "APT1", "Ke3chang", "menuPass", "APT32", "Honeybee", "Patchwork", "APT28", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN6", "Lazarus Group", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_renamed_winrar_filter"}]}, {"name": "Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell", "id": "584f4884-0bf1-11ec-a5ec-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-02", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies Get-ForestTrust from PowerSploit in order to gather domain trust information. Typically, this is utilized within a script being executed and used to enumerate the domain trust information. This grants the adversary an understanding of how large or small the domain is. During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=cmd.exe Processes.process=*get-foresttrust* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_foresttrust_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives as this requires an active Administrator or adversary to bring in, import, and execute.", "references": ["https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-ForestTrust/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 40, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Suspicious PowerShell Get-ForestTrust was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1482"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 12, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Domain Trust Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "get_foresttrust_with_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Anomalous usage of Archive Tools", "id": "63614a58-10e2-4c6c-ae81-ea1113681439", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-22", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "The following detection identifies the usage of archive tools from the command line.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event,\"_time\"), \"string\", null)), process=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null)), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_path\"), \"string\", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null), parent_process=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where process_name IS NOT NULL AND parent_process_name IS NOT NULL | where like(process_name, \"7z%\") OR process_name=\"WinRAR.exe\" OR like(process_name, \"winzip%\") | where like(parent_process_name, \"%cmd.exe\") OR like(parent_process_name, \"%powershell.exe\") | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null)), body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"process_name\", process_name, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process_name, \"process_path\", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "False positives can be ligitmate usage of archive tools from the command line.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/001/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike", "NOBELIUM Group"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1560.001/archive_tools/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior is indicative of suspicious loading of 7zip.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1560.001", "T1560"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Archive via Utility", "Archive Collected Data"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Soft Cell", "Turla", "Gallmaker", "APT33", "APT39", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "FIN8", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT3", "Sowbug", "menuPass", "APT1", "Ke3chang", "menuPass", "APT32", "Honeybee", "Patchwork", "APT28", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN6", "Lazarus Group", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "anomalous_usage_of_archive_tools_filter"}]}, {"name": "GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell", "id": "22d3b118-04df-11ec-8fa3-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-24", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain users. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `-class ds_user` parameter can be used to return the full list of users in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI in this case, using PowerShell, to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"powershell*\") AND Processes.process = \"*get-wmiobject*\" AND Processes.process = \"*ds_user*\" AND Processes.process = \"*root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*\" AND Processes.process = \"*-namespace*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet/details/dsquery.htm"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id", "Processes.parent_process_name"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Domain Account", "Account Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Turla", "Sandworm Team", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "Ke3chang", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Start Up During Safe Mode Boot", "id": "c6149154-c9d8-11eb-9da7-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-10", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a modification or registry add to the safeboot registry as an autostart mechanism. This technique was seen in some ransomware to automatically execute its code upon a safe mode boot.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\System\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\SafeBoot\\\\Minimal\\*\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `start_up_during_safe_mode_boot_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "updated windows application needed in safe boot may used this registry", "references": ["https://malware.news/t/threat-analysis-unit-tau-threat-intelligence-notification-snatch-ransomware/36365"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Safeboot registry $registry_path$ was added or modified with a new value $registry_value_name$ on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1547.001", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.dest"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Rocke", "Tropic Trooper", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Silence", "RTM", "Inception", "APT41", "Machete", "Kimsuky", "APT33", "APT39", "APT32", "APT18", "Turla", "Dark Caracal", "Cobalt Group", "Honeybee", "Threat Group-3390", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Gorgon Group", "Ke3chang", "APT19", "Leviathan", "MuddyWater", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Magic Hound", "APT3", "FIN10", "FIN7", "Patchwork", "FIN6", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "APT29", "Darkhotel", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "start_up_during_safe_mode_boot_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious mshta spawn", "id": "4d33a488-5b5f-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 2, "date": "2021-01-20", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning mshta.exe. This behavior is indicative of a DCOM object being utilized to spawn mshta from wmiprvse.exe or svchost.exe. In this instance, adversaries may use LethalHTA that will spawn mshta.exe from svchost.exe.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=svchost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe) AND `process_mshta` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.user Processes.original_file_name| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_mshta_spawn_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://codewhitesec.blogspot.com/2018/07/lethalhta.html", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses", "https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious MSHTA Activity"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "mshta.exe spawned by wmiprvse.exe on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Mshta"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "APT32", "MuddyWater", "FIN7"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=mshta.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSHTA.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_mshta"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_mshta_spawn_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging", "id": "8148c29c-c952-11eb-9255-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-09", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable no critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies common Mimikatz functions that may be identified in the script block, including `mimikatz`. This will catch the most basic use cases for Pass the Ticket, Pass the Hash and `-DumprCreds`. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message IN (*mimikatz*, *-dumpcr*, *sekurlsa::pth*, *kerberos::ptt*, *kerberos::golden*) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode ComputerName User EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mimikatz_with_powershell_script_block_logging_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as the commands being identifies are quite specific to EventCode 4104 and Mimikatz. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The following behavior was identified and typically related to MimiKatz being loaded within the context of PowerShell on $ComputerName$ by $User$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003"], "observable": [{"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Message", "OpCode", "ComputerName", "User", "EventCode"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_mimikatz_with_powershell_script_block_logging_filter"}]}, {"name": "BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification", "id": "76d79d6e-25bb-40f6-b3b2-e0a6b7e5ea13", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-07", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "This search looks for flags passed to bcdedit.exe modifications to the built-in Windows error recovery boot configurations. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent recovery.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null)), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_path\"), \"string\", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND process_name IS NOT NULL AND process_name=\"bcdedit.exe\" AND (like (cmd_line, \"%recoveryenabled%\") AND like (cmd_line, \"%no%\")) | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null)), body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line, \"process_name\", process_name, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process_name, \"process_path\", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint_Processess` datamodel.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may modify the boot configuration.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1490/T1490.md#atomic-test-4---windows---disable-windows-recovery-console-repair"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Impact"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting disable the ability to recover the endpoint.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1490"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest_device_id", "process_name", "parent_process_name", "process_path", "dest_user_id", "process", "cmd_line"], "risk_score": 80, "risk_severity": "high", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Inhibit System Recovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification_filter"}]}, {"name": "Domain Controller Discovery with Wmic", "id": "64c7adaa-48ee-483c-b0d6-7175bc65e6cc", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-01", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The arguments utilized in this command line return a list of all domain controllers in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike use *.exe to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"wmic.exe\") (Processes.process=\"\" OR Processes.process=\"*DomainControllerAddress*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_controller_discovery_with_wmic_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Domain controller discovery on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 21, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote System Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Rocke", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT39", "APT32", "Deep Panda", "Threat Group-3390", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leafminer", "Ke3chang", "FIN8", "APT3", "FIN5", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Turla"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "domain_controller_discovery_with_wmic_filter"}]}, {"name": "Disabling Defender Services", "id": "911eacdc-317f-11ec-ad30-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-20", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This particular behavior is typically executed when an adversaries or malware gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution and to evade detections. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. Endpoint should be isolated.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\System\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services\\\\*\" AND (Registry.registry_path IN(\"*WdBoot*\", \"*WdFilter*\", \"*WdNisDrv*\", \"*WdNisSvc*\", \"*WinDefend*\", \"*SecurityHealthService*\")) AND Registry.registry_value_name = Start Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000004 by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `disabling_defender_services_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to disable windows defender product", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["IceID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon2.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_value_data"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disabling_defender_services_filter"}]}, {"name": "Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry", "id": "23150a40-9301-4195-b802-5bb4f43067fb", "version": 2, "date": "2021-03-02", "author": "Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The search looks for the Registry Key DisableAntiSpyware set to disable. This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints. This particular behavior is typically executed when an ransomware actor gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. Endpoint should be isolated.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_value_name=\"DisableAntiSpyware\" AND Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000001\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_disableantispyware_registry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node.", "known_false_positives": "It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro to tune the search.", "references": ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "message": "Windows DisableAntiSpyware registry key set to 'disabled' on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_path"], "risk_score": 24, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "windows_disableantispyware_registry_filter"}]}, {"name": "Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir", "id": "81263de4-160a-11ec-944f-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-15", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect an anomaly event of non-chrome process accessing the files in chrome user default folder. This folder contains all the sqlite database of the chrome browser related to users login, history, cookies and etc. Most of the RAT, trojan spy as well as FIN7 jssloader try to parse the those sqlite database to collect information on the compromised host. This SACL Event (4663) need to be enabled to tthe firefox profile directory to be eable to use this. Since you monitoring this access to the folder a noise coming from firefox need to be filter and also sqlite db browser and explorer .exe to make this detection more stable.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 NOT (process_name IN (\"*\\\\chrome.exe\", \"*\\\\explorer.exe\", \"*sql*\")) Object_Name=\"*\\\\Google\\\\Chrome\\\\User Data\\\\Default*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Object_Name Object_Type process_name Access_Mask Accesses process_id EventCode dest user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663. For 4663, enable \"Audit Object Access\" in Group Policy. Then check the two boxes listed for both \"Success\" and \"Failure.\"", "known_false_positives": "other browser not listed related to firefox may catch by this rule.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["FIN7", "Remcos"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_sacl/security2.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "a non firefox browser process $process_name$ accessing $Object_Name$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1555", "T1555.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Object_Name", "Object_Type", "process_name", "Access_Mask", "Accesses", "process_id", "EventCode", "dest", "user"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Credentials from Password Stores", "Credentials from Web Browsers"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT39", "OilRig", "MuddyWater", "Leafminer", "APT33", "Turla", "Stealth Falcon", "Magic Hound", "Sandworm Team", "Inception", "Stealth Falcon", "OilRig", "Leafminer", "APT33", "APT3", "Kimsuky", "TA505", "Stolen Pencil", "MuddyWater", "APT37", "Patchwork", "Molerats"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir_filter"}]}, {"name": "SchCache Change By App Connect And Create ADSI Object", "id": "991eb510-0fc6-11ec-82d3-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-07", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect an application try to connect and create ADSI Object to do LDAP query. Every time an application connects to the directory and attempts to create an ADSI object, the Active Directory Schema is checked for changes. If it has changed since the last connection, the schema is downloaded and stored in a cache on the local computer either in %LOCALAPPDATA%\\Microsoft\\Windows\\SchCache or %systemroot%\\SchCache. We found this a good anomaly use case to detect suspicious application like blackmatter ransomware that use ADS object api to execute ldap query. having a good list of ldap or normal AD query tool used within the network is a good start to reduce the noise.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=11 TargetFilename = \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SchCache\\\\*\" TargetFilename = \"*.sch*\" NOT (Image IN (\"*\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\mmc.exe\")) |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image TargetFilename EventCode process_id process_name Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schcache_change_by_app_connect_and_create_adsi_object_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "normal application like mmc.exe and other ldap query tool may trigger this detections.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/adsi/adsi-and-uac", "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/08/09/blackmatter-ransomware-emerges-from-the-shadow-of-darkside/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["blackMatter ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/blackmatter_schcache/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "process $Image$ create a file $TargetFilename$ in host $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Image", "TargetFilename", "EventCode", "process_id", "process_name", "Computer"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Domain Account", "Account Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Turla", "Sandworm Team", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "Ke3chang", "no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "schcache_change_by_app_connect_and_create_adsi_object_filter"}]}, {"name": "Get DomainPolicy with Powershell", "id": "b8f9947e-065a-11ec-aafb-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` executing the `Get-DomainPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"powershell*\") AND Processes.process = \"*Get-DomainPolicy*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://github.com/S1ckB0y1337/Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet", "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainPolicy/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1201"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id", "Processes.parent_process_name"], "risk_score": 30, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Password Policy Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Turla", "OilRig"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "CSC Net On The Fly Compilation", "id": "ea73128a-43ab-11ec-9753-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-12", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this analytic is to detect a suspicious compile before delivery approach of .net compiler csc.exe. This technique was seen in several adversaries, malware and even in red teams to take advantage the csc.exe .net compiler tool to compile on the fly a malicious .net code to evade detection from security product. This is a good hunting query to check further the file or process created after this event and check the file path that passed to csc.exe which is the .net code. Aside from that, powershell is capable of using this compiler in executing .net code in a powershell script so filter on that case is needed.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_csc` Processes.process = \"*/noconfig*\" Processes.process = \"*/fullpaths*\" Processes.process = \"*@*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `csc_net_on_the_fly_compilation_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated powershell script taht execute .net code that may generate false positive. filter is needed.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/ad4c3cda-41f2-4401-8dba-56cc2d245488/", "https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2019/06/maicious-macro-that-compile-c-code-as.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/vilsel/sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "csc.exe with commandline $process$ to compile .net code on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1027.004", "T1027"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Compile After Delivery", "Obfuscated Files or Information"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Rocke", "MuddyWater", "Gamaredon Group", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "Whitefly", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Mofang", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "Soft Cell", "Turla", "TA505", "Silence", "APT33", "Night Dragon", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "APT29", "APT18", "Tropic Trooper", "Cobalt Group", "Patchwork", "Leafminer", "APT37", "Threat Group-3390", "Honeybee", "Dark Caracal", "menuPass", "APT19", "BlackOasis", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "Elderwood", "MuddyWater", "FIN7", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "APT3", "APT32", "Group5", "Dust Storm", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=csc.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=csc.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_csc"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "csc_net_on_the_fly_compilation_filter"}]}, {"name": "Domain Account Discovery With Net App", "id": "98f6a534-04c2-11ec-96b2-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-24", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain users. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use net.exe to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` AND Processes.process = \"* user*\" AND Processes.process = \"*/do*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_account_discovery_with_net_app_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-for-identity/playbook-domain-dominance", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id", "Processes.parent_process_name"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Domain Account", "Account Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Turla", "Sandworm Team", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "Ke3chang", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_net"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "domain_account_discovery_with_net_app_filter"}]}, {"name": "Revil Common Exec Parameter", "id": "85facebe-c382-11eb-9c3e-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-06-02", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies suspicious commandline parameter that are commonly used by REVIL ransomware to encrypts the compromise machine.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"* -nolan *\" OR Processes.process = \"* -nolocal *\" OR Processes.process = \"* -fast *\" OR Processes.process = \"* -full *\" by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `revil_common_exec_parameter_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "third party tool may have same command line parameters as revil ransomware.", "references": ["https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ related to revil ransomware in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1204"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process_guid"], "risk_score": 54, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["User Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "revil_common_exec_parameter_filter"}]}, {"name": "IcedID Exfiltrated Archived File Creation", "id": "0db4da70-f14b-11eb-8043-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-30", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious file creation namely passff.tar and cookie.tar. This files are possible archived of stolen browser information like history and cookies in a compromised machine with IcedID.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode= 11 (TargetFilename = \"*\\\\passff.tar\" OR TargetFilename = \"*\\\\cookie.tar\") |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by TargetFilename EventCode process_id process_name Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.cisecurity.org/white-papers/security-primer-icedid/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/simulated_icedid/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "process $SourceImage$ create a file $TargetImage$ in host $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1560.001", "T1560"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "SourceImage", "type": "process name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "TargetFilename", "EventCode", "process_id", "process_name", "Computer"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Archive via Utility", "Archive Collected Data"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Soft Cell", "Turla", "Gallmaker", "APT33", "APT39", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "FIN8", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT3", "Sowbug", "menuPass", "APT1", "Ke3chang", "menuPass", "APT32", "Honeybee", "Patchwork", "APT28", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN6", "Lazarus Group", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation_filter"}]}, {"name": "Print Spooler Adding A Printer Driver", "id": "313681a2-da8e-11eb-adad-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-01", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies new printer drivers being load by utilizing the Windows PrintService operational logs, EventCode 316. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. \\\nWithin the proof of concept code, the following event will occur - \"Printer driver 1234 for Windows x64 Version-3 was added or updated. Files:- UNIDRV.DLL, kernelbase.dll, evil.dll. No user action is required.\" \\\nDuring triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events and review the source of where the exploitation began.", "search": "`printservice` EventCode=316 category = \"Adding a printer driver\" Message = \"*kernelbase.dll,*\" Message = \"*UNIDRV.DLL,*\" Message = \"*.DLL.*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode EventCode ComputerName Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `print_spooler_adding_a_printer_driver_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You will need to ensure PrintService Admin and Operational logs are being logged to Splunk from critical or all systems.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown. This may require filtering.", "references": ["https://twitter.com/MalwareJake/status/1410421445608476679?s=20", "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/fix-for-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675-exploit-to-keep-your-print-servers-running-while-a-patch-is-not-available/", "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/exploitable-critical-rce-vulnerability-allows-regular-users-to-fully-compromise-active-directory-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675/", "https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/ob6y02/critical_vulnerability_printnightmare_exposes"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence,", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Incoming"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527", "CVE-2021-1675"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-printservice_operational.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious print driver was loaded on endpoint $ComputerName$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1547.012", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "OpCode", "EventCode", "ComputerName", "Message"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "source=\"wineventlog:microsoft-windows-printservice/operational\" OR sourcetype=\"WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PrintService/Admin\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "printservice"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "print_spooler_adding_a_printer_driver_filter"}]}, {"name": "GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell Script Block", "id": "29b99201-723c-4118-847a-db2b3d3fb8ea", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-01", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet. The `DS_Computer` class parameter leverages WMI to query for all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message=*Get-WmiObject* AND Message=*\"namespace root\\\\directory\\\\ldap\"* AND Message=*\"class ds_computer\"*) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/get-wmiobject?view=powershell-5.1"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote System Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Rocke", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT39", "APT32", "Deep Panda", "Threat Group-3390", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leafminer", "Ke3chang", "FIN8", "APT3", "FIN5", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Turla"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_script_block_filter"}]}, {"name": "Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell", "id": "8b5ef342-065a-11ec-b0fc-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` executing the Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"powershell*\") AND Processes.process = \"*Get-ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://github.com/S1ckB0y1337/Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-aduserresultantpasswordpolicy?view=windowsserver2019-ps"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1201"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id", "Processes.parent_process_name"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Password Policy Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Turla", "OilRig"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall", "id": "ce27646e-d411-11eb-8a00-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-06-23", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious modification of firewall to allow file and printer sharing. This technique was seen in ransomware to be able to discover more machine connected to the compromised host to encrypt more files", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_netsh` Processes.process= \"*firewall*\" Processes.process= \"*group=\\\"File and Printer Sharing\\\"*\" Processes.process=\"*enable=Yes*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "network admin may modify this firewall feature that may cause this rule to be triggered.", "references": ["https://kb.fortinet.com/kb/documentLink.do?externalID=FD52469", "https://app.any.run/tasks/c0f98850-af65-4352-9746-fbebadee4f05/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.007", "T1562"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=netsh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=netsh.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_netsh"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall_filter"}]}, {"name": "Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine", "id": "1a382c6c-7c2e-11eb-ac69-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-03-03", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This query detects the Nishang Invoke-PowerShellTCPOneLine utility that spawns a call back to a remote command and control server. This is a powershell oneliner. In addition, this will capture on the command-line additional utilities used by Nishang. Triage the endpoint and identify any parallel processes that look suspicious. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain contacted by the powershell process.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process=*Net.Sockets.TCPClient* AND Processes.process=*System.Text.ASCIIEncoding*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `nishang_powershelltcponeline_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives may be present. Filter as needed based on initial analysis.", "references": ["https://github.com/samratashok/nishang/blob/master/Shells/Invoke-PowerShellTcpOneLine.ps1", "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/", "https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/03/03/rapid7s-insightidr-enables-detection-and-response-to-microsoft-exchange-0-day/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["HAFNIUM Group"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Command and Control"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Possible Nishang Invoke-PowerShellTCPOneLine behavior on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "PowerShell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "Gallmaker", "Turla", "APT19", "DarkHydrus", "APT28", "Thrip", "Gorgon Group", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leviathan", "TA459", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT32", "FIN7", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "APT3", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_powershell"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "nishang_powershelltcponeline_filter"}]}, {"name": "GetAdGroup with PowerShell", "id": "872e3063-0fc4-4e68-b2f3-f2b99184a708", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-25", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The `Get-AdGroup` commandlnet is used to return a list of all groups available in a Windows Domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-AdGroup*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getadgroup_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-adgroup?view=windowsserver2019-ps"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Permission Groups Discovery", "Domain Groups"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TA505", "APT3", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "Inception", "OilRig", "FIN6", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "getadgroup_with_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 Rename", "id": "7360137f-abad-473e-8189-acbdaa34d114", "version": 3, "date": "2021-02-04", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies renamed instances of rundll32.exe executing. rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64. During investigation, validate it is the legitimate rundll32.exe executing and what script content it is loading. This query relies on the original filename or internal name from the PE meta data. Expand the query as needed by looking for specific command line arguments outlined in other analytics.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_rename_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Suspicious renamed rundll32.exe binary ran on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1036", "T1218.011", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Masquerading", "Rundll32", "Rename System Utilities"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Windshift", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT32", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "TA505", "MuddyWater", "APT29", "APT19", "CopyKittens", "APT3", "Carbanak", "APT28", "menuPass", "APT32", "Soft Cell", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_rundll32"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_rundll32_rename_filter"}]}, {"name": "Remote System Discovery with Wmic", "id": "d82eced3-b1dc-42ab-859e-a2fc98827359", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-01", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The arguments utilized in this command return a list of all the systems registered in the domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI and wmic.exe to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"wmic.exe\") (Processes.process=*/NAMESPACE:\\\\\\\\root\\\\directory\\\\ldap* AND Processes.process=*ds_computer* AND Processes.process=\"*GET ds_samaccountname*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_system_discovery_with_wmic_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wmisdk/wmic"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote System Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Rocke", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT39", "APT32", "Deep Panda", "Threat Group-3390", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leafminer", "Ke3chang", "FIN8", "APT3", "FIN5", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Turla"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "remote_system_discovery_with_wmic_filter"}]}, {"name": "UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll", "id": "7f04349c-e30d-11eb-bc7f-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-12", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious loaded unsigned dll by MMC.exe application. This technique is commonly seen in attacker that tries to bypassed UAC feature or gain privilege escalation. This is done by modifying some CLSID registry that will trigger the mmc.exe to load the dll path", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded = \"*.dll\" Image = \"*\\\\mmc.exe\" Signed=false Company != \"Microsoft Corporation\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded Signed ProcessId OriginalFileName Computer EventCode Company | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown. all of the dll loaded by mmc.exe is microsoft signed dll.", "references": ["https://offsec.almond.consulting/UAC-bypass-dotnet.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence,", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Incoming"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon2.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious unsigned $ImageLoaded$ loaded by $Image$ on endpoint $Computer$ with EventCode $EventCode$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Image", "ImageLoaded", "Signed", "ProcessId", "OriginalFileName", "Computer", "EventCode", "Company"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Bypass User Access Control", "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "MuddyWater", "Honeybee", "Cobalt Group", "Threat Group-3390", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Patchwork", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll_filter"}]}, {"name": "High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share", "id": "40925f12-4709-11ec-bb43-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-16", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious high frequency copying/moving of files in network share as part of information sabotage. This anomaly event can be a good indicator of insider trying to sabotage data by transfering classified or internal files within network share to exfitrate it after or to lure evidence of insider attack to other user. This behavior may catch several noise if network share is a common place for classified or internal document processing.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=5145 Relative_Target_Name IN (\"*.doc\",\"*.docx\",\"*.xls\",\"*.xlsx\",\"*.ppt\",\"*.pptx\",\"*.log\",\"*.txt\",\"*.db\",\"*.7z\",\"*.zip\",\"*.rar\",\"*.tar\",\"*.gz\",\"*.jpg\",\"*.gif\",\"*.png\",\"*.bmp\",\"*.pdf\",\"*.rtf\",\"*.key\") Object_Type=File Share_Name IN (\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\C$\",\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\IPC$\",\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\admin$\") Access_Mask= \"0x2\" | bucket _time span=5m | stats values(Relative_Target_Name) as valRelativeTargetName, values(Share_Name) as valShareName, values(Object_Type) as valObjectType, values(Access_Mask) as valAccessmask, values(src_port) as valSrcPort, values(Source_Address) as valSrcAddress count as numShareName by dest, _time, EventCode, user | eventstats avg(numShareName) as avgShareName, stdev(numShareName) as stdShareName, count as numSlots by dest, _time, EventCode, user | eval upperThreshold=(avgShareName + stdShareName *3) | eval isOutlier=if(avgShareName > 20 and avgShareName >= upperThreshold, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `high_frequency_copy_of_files_in_network_share_filter`", "how_to_implement": "o successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 5145 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required. Also enable the object Audit access success/failure in your group policy.", "known_false_positives": "this behavior may seen in normal transfer of file within network if network share is common place for sharing documents.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Information Sabotage"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1537/high_copy_files_in_net_share/security.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "message": "high frequency copy of document in network share $Share_Name$ from $Source_Address$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1537"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Share_Name", "Relative_Target_Name", "Object_Type", "Access_Mask", "user", "src_port", "Source_Address"], "risk_score": 9, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Transfer Data to Cloud Account"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "high_frequency_copy_of_files_in_network_share_filter"}]}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command", "id": "c4db14d9-7909-48b4-a054-aa14d89dbb19", "version": 6, "date": "2021-10-05", "author": "David Dorsey, Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of the EncodedCommand PowerShell parameter. This is typically used by Administrators to run complex scripts, but commonly used by adversaries to hide their code. \\\nThe analytic identifies all variations of EncodedCommand, as PowerShell allows the ability to shorten the parameter. For example enc, enco, encod and so forth. In addition, through our research it was identified that PowerShell will interpret different command switch types beyond the hyphen. We have added endash, emdash, horizontal bar, and forward slash. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel events to determine legitimacy. Tune as needed based on admin scripts in use. \\\nAlternatively, may use regex per matching here https://regexr.com/662ov.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"(?i)[\\-|\\/|\u2013|\u2014|\u2015]e(nc*o*d*e*d*c*o*m*m*a*n*d*)*\\s+[^-]\") | `malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "System administrators may use this option, but it's not common.", "references": ["https://regexr.com/662ov", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses/blob/master/TestHarnesses/T1059.001_PowerShell/OutPowerShellCommandLineParameter.ps1", "https://ss64.com/ps/powershell.html", "https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/1440758396534214658?s=20"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "NOBELIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1027/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Powershell.exe running potentially malicious encodede commands on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1027"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.process_id"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Obfuscated Files or Information"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "Whitefly", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Mofang", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "Soft Cell", "Turla", "TA505", "Silence", "APT33", "Night Dragon", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "APT29", "APT18", "Tropic Trooper", "Cobalt Group", "Patchwork", "Leafminer", "APT37", "Threat Group-3390", "Honeybee", "Dark Caracal", "menuPass", "APT19", "BlackOasis", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "Elderwood", "MuddyWater", "FIN7", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "APT3", "APT32", "Group5", "Dust Storm", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_powershell"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command_filter"}]}, {"name": "Disabling NoRun Windows App", "id": "de81bc46-9213-11eb-adc9-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-31", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to identify modification of registry to disable run application in window start menu. this application is known to be a helpful shortcut to windows OS user to run known application and also to execute some reg or batch script. This technique is used malware to make cleaning of its infection more harder by preventing known application run easily through run shortcut.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\Explorer\\\\NoRun\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_norun_windows_app_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "admin may disable this application for non technical user.", "references": ["https://any.run/report/ea4ea08407d4ee72e009103a3b77e5a09412b722fdef67315ea63f22011152af/a866d7b1-c236-4f26-a391-5ae32213dfc4#registry", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/pum-optional-norun/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The Windows registry was modified to disable run application in window start menu on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.user", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disabling_norun_windows_app_filter"}]}, {"name": "System Info Gathering Using Dxdiag Application", "id": "f92d74f2-4921-11ec-b685-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-19", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious dxdiag.exe process commandline can collect system info of the target host. This technique was seen in remcos, adversaries and other malware to collect information as part of recon or collection phase of attack. Even this behavior is rarely seen in a corporate network this commandline can be used by network administrator to audit host machine specification. Better to check what it did after it pipes out the result to a file for further processing.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_dxdiag` AND Processes.process = \"* /t *\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "this commandline can be used by network administrator to audit host machine specification.filter is needed.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/df0baf9f-8baf-4c32-a452-16562ecb19be/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Reconnaissance"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/t1592/host_info_dxdiag/sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "dxdiag.exe process with commandline $process$ on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1592"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=dxdiag.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=dxdiag.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_dxdiag"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application_filter"}]}, {"name": "Disable Windows App Hotkeys", "id": "1490f224-ad8b-11eb-8c4f-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-05", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic detects a suspicious registry modification to disable Windows hotkey (shortcut keys) for native Windows applications. This technique is commonly used to disable certain or several Windows applications like `taskmgr.exe` and `cmd.exe`. This technique is used to impair the analyst in analyzing and removing the attacker implant in compromised systems.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Image File Execution Options\\\\*\" AND Registry.registry_value_name = \"HotKey Disabled\" AND Registry.registry_key_name = \"Debugger\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `disable_windows_app_hotkeys_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as CarbonBlack or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/hotkey_disabled_hidden_user/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Disabled 'Windows App Hotkeys' on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.dest Registry.user"], "risk_score": 40, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disable_windows_app_hotkeys_filter"}]}, {"name": "Screensaver Event Trigger Execution", "id": "58cea3ec-1f6d-11ec-8560-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-27", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is developed to detect possible event trigger execution through screensaver registry entry modification for persistence or privilege escalation. This technique was seen in several APT and malware where they put the malicious payload path to the SCRNSAVE.EXE registry key to redirect the execution to their malicious payload path. This TTP is a good indicator that some attacker may modify this entry for their persistence and privilege escalation.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Control Panel\\\\Desktop\\\\SCRNSAVE.EXE*\") by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `screensaver_event_trigger_execution_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/002/", "https://dmcxblue.gitbook.io/red-team-notes-2-0/red-team-techniques/privilege-escalation/untitled-3/screensaver"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Privilege Escalation Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.002/scrnsave_reg/sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1546", "T1546.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Event Triggered Execution", "Screensaver"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "screensaver_event_trigger_execution_filter"}]}, {"name": "Batch File Write to System32", "id": "503d17cb-9eab-4cf8-a20e-01d5c6987ae3", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The search looks for a batch file (.bat) written to the Windows system directory tree.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=* by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*\\\\system32\\\\*\", \"*\\\\syswow64\\\\*\") Filesystem.file_name=\"*.bat\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process] | dedup file_create_time | table dest file_create_time, file_name, file_path, process_name | `batch_file_write_to_system32_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible for this search to generate a notable event for a batch file write to a path that includes the string \"system32\", but is not the actual Windows system directory. As such, you should confirm the path of the batch file identified by the search. In addition, a false positive may be generated by an administrator copying a legitimate batch file in this directory tree. You should confirm that the activity is legitimate and modify the search to add exclusions, as necessary.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1204.002/batch_file_in_system32/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to system32 has occurred on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1204", "T1204.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "file_name", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.dest", "Filesystem.file_name", "Filesystem.user", "Filesystem.file_path", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.dest"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["User Execution", "Malicious File"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Whitefly", "Tropic Trooper", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Mofang", "Frankenstein", "RTM", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "Machete", "admin@338", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "DarkHydrus", "Gorgon Group", "Patchwork", "OilRig", "Dark Caracal", "MuddyWater", "Lazarus Group", "FIN7", "APT32", "Rancor", "APT37", "FIN8", "APT28", "Elderwood", "TA459", "APT29", "Leviathan", "menuPass", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "batch_file_write_to_system32_filter"}]}, {"name": "GetDomainGroup with PowerShell Script Block", "id": "09725404-a44f-4ed3-9efa-8ed5d69e4c53", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-26", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainGroup` commandlet. `Get-DomainGroup` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. As the name suggests, `Get-DomainGroup` is used to query domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this function to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-DomainGroup*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getdomaingroup_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerView functions for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainGroup/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration using PowerView on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Permission Groups Discovery", "Domain Groups"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TA505", "APT3", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "Inception", "OilRig", "FIN6", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "getdomaingroup_with_powershell_script_block_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect RClone Command-Line Usage", "id": "32e0baea-b3f1-11eb-a2ce-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-11-29", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies commonly used command-line arguments used by `rclone.exe` to initiate a file transfer. Some arguments were negated as they are specific to the configuration used by adversaries. In particular, an adversary may list the files or directories of the remote file share using `ls` or `lsd`, which is not indicative of malicious behavior. During triage, at this stage of a ransomware event, exfiltration is about to occur or has already. Isolate the endpoint and continue investigating by review file modifications and parallel processes.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rclone` Processes.process IN (\"*copy*\", \"*mega*\", \"*pcloud*\", \"*ftp*\", \"*--config*\", \"*--progress*\", \"*--no-check-certificate*\", \"*--ignore-existing*\", \"*--auto-confirm*\", \"*--transfers*\", \"*--multi-thread-streams*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rclone_command_line_usage_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as this is restricted to the Rclone process name. Filter or tune the analytic as needed.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/blog/rclone-mega-extortion/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html", "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/", "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/11/29/continuing-the-bazar-ransomware-story/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1020/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to connect to a remote cloud service to move files or folders.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1020"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id", "Processes.original_file_name"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Automated Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Tropic Trooper", "Frankenstein", "Honeybee"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.original_file_name=rclone.exe OR Processes.process_name=rclone.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name.", "name": "process_rclone"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_rclone_command_line_usage_filter"}]}, {"name": "Spoolsv Suspicious Process Access", "id": "799b606e-da81-11eb-93f8-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-01", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies a suspicious behavior related to PrintNightmare, or CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675), to gain privilege escalation on the vulnerable machine. This exploit attacks a critical Windows Print Spooler Vulnerability to elevate privilege. This detection is to look for suspicious process access made by the spoolsv.exe that may related to the attack.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 SourceImage = \"*\\\\spoolsv.exe\" CallTrace = \"*\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\spool\\\\DRIVERS\\\\x64\\\\*\" TargetImage IN (\"*\\\\rundll32.exe\", \"*\\\\spoolsv.exe\") GrantedAccess = 0x1fffff | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer SourceImage TargetImage GrantedAccess CallTrace EventCode ProcessID| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spoolsv_suspicious_process_access_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with process access event where SourceImage, TargetImage, GrantedAccess and CallTrace executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of spoolsv.exe.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://github.com/cube0x0/impacket/commit/73b9466c17761384ece11e1028ec6689abad6818", "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/fix-for-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675-exploit-to-keep-your-print-servers-running-while-a-patch-is-not-available/", "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/exploitable-critical-rce-vulnerability-allows-regular-users-to-fully-compromise-active-directory-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675/", "https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/ob6y02/critical_vulnerability_printnightmare_exposes"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Local"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "$SourceImage$ was GrantedAccess open access to $TargetImage$ on endpoint $Computer$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1068"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "ProcessID", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "TargetImage", "type": "Process Name", "role": ["Target"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "SourceImage", "TargetImage", "GrantedAccess", "CallTrace", "EventCode"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Whitefly", "APT33", "Cobalt Group", "PLATINUM", "FIN8", "APT32", "Threat Group-3390", "FIN6", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "spoolsv_suspicious_process_access_filter"}]}, {"name": "Get ADUser with PowerShell", "id": "0b6ee3f4-04e3-11ec-a87d-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-24", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to enumerate domain users. The `Get-AdUser' commandlet returns a list of all domain users. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"powershell*\") AND Processes.process = \"*Get-ADUser*\" AND Processes.process = \"*-filter*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_aduser_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-blue-purple/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-aduser?view=windowsserver2019-ps"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id", "Processes.parent_process_name"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Domain Account", "Account Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Turla", "Sandworm Team", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "Ke3chang", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "get_aduser_with_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature", "id": "afed80b2-d34b-11eb-a952-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-22", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious enabling of smb1protocol through \"powershell.exe\". This technique was seen in some ransomware (like reddot) where it enable smb share to do the lateral movement and encrypt other files within the compromise network system.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*Enable-WindowsOptionalFeature*\" Message = \"*SMB1Protocol*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the powershell logs from your endpoints. make sure you enable needed registry to monitor this event.", "known_false_positives": "network operator may enable or disable this windows feature.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/c0f98850-af65-4352-9746-fbebadee4f05/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-powershell.log"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1027", "T1027.005"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Obfuscated Files or Information", "Indicator Removal from Tools"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "Whitefly", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Mofang", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "Soft Cell", "Turla", "TA505", "Silence", "APT33", "Night Dragon", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "APT29", "APT18", "Tropic Trooper", "Cobalt Group", "Patchwork", "Leafminer", "APT37", "Threat Group-3390", "Honeybee", "Dark Caracal", "menuPass", "APT19", "BlackOasis", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "Elderwood", "MuddyWater", "FIN7", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "APT3", "APT32", "Group5", "Dust Storm", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "APT28", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "Patchwork", "APT3", "Turla", "OilRig", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature_filter"}]}, {"name": "Dump LSASS via procdump", "id": "3742ebfe-64c2-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Detect procdump.exe dumping the lsass process. This query looks for both -mm and -ma usage. -mm will produce a mini dump file and -ma will write a dump file with all process memory. Both are highly suspect and should be reviewed. This query does not monitor for the internal name (original_file_name=procdump) of the PE or look for procdump64.exe. Modify the query as needed.\\\nDuring triage, confirm this is procdump.exe executing. If it is the first time a Sysinternals utility has been ran, it is possible there will be a -accepteula on the command line. Review other endpoint data sources for cross process (injection) into lsass.exe.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_procdump` (Processes.process=*-ma* OR Processes.process=*-mm*) Processes.process=*lsass* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dump_lsass_via_procdump_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "None identified.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procdump", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md#atomic-test-2---dump-lsassexe-memory-using-procdump"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "HAFNIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified attempting to dump lsass.exe on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["LSASS Memory", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Whitefly", "Blue Mockingbird", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Leviathan", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Stolen Pencil", "APT32", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "PLATINUM", "FIN8", "BRONZE BUTLER", "OilRig", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT28", "APT1", "Ke3chang", "Cleaver", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=procdump.exe OR Processes.process_name=procdump64.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=procdump)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_procdump"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "dump_lsass_via_procdump_filter"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell 4104 Hunting", "id": "d6f2b006-0041-11ec-8885-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-18", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following Hunting analytic assists with identifying suspicious PowerShell execution using Script Block Logging, or EventCode 4104. This analytic is not meant to be ran hourly, but occasionally to identify malicious or suspicious PowerShell. This analytic is a combination of work completed by Alex Teixeira and Splunk Threat Research Team.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 | eval DoIt = if(match(Message,\"(?i)(\\$doit)\"), \"4\", 0) | eval enccom=if(match(Message,\"[A-Za-z0-9+\\/]{44,}([A-Za-z0-9+\\/]{4}|[A-Za-z0-9+\\/]{3}=|[A-Za-z0-9+\\/]{2}==)\") OR match(Message, \"(?i)[-]e(nc*o*d*e*d*c*o*m*m*a*n*d*)*\\s+[^-]\"),4,0) | eval suspcmdlet=if(match(Message, \"(?i)Add-Exfiltration|Add-Persistence|Add-RegBackdoor|Add-ScrnSaveBackdoor|Check-VM|Do-Exfiltration|Enabled-DuplicateToken|Exploit-Jboss|Find-Fruit|Find-GPOLocation|Find-TrustedDocuments|Get-ApplicationHost|Get-ChromeDump|Get-ClipboardContents|Get-FoxDump|Get-GPPPassword|Get-IndexedItem|Get-Keystrokes|LSASecret|Get-PassHash|Get-RegAlwaysInstallElevated|Get-RegAutoLogon|Get-RickAstley|Get-Screenshot|Get-SecurityPackages|Get-ServiceFilePermission|Get-ServicePermission|Get-ServiceUnquoted|Get-SiteListPassword|Get-System|Get-TimedScreenshot|Get-UnattendedInstallFile|Get-Unconstrained|Get-VaultCredential|Get-VulnAutoRun|Get-VulnSchTask|Gupt-Backdoor|HTTP-Login|Install-SSP|Install-ServiceBinary|Invoke-ACLScanner|Invoke-ADSBackdoor|Invoke-ARPScan|Invoke-AllChecks|Invoke-BackdoorLNK|Invoke-BypassUAC|Invoke-CredentialInjection|Invoke-DCSync|Invoke-DllInjection|Invoke-DowngradeAccount|Invoke-EgressCheck|Invoke-Inveigh|Invoke-InveighRelay|Invoke-Mimikittenz|Invoke-NetRipper|Invoke-NinjaCopy|Invoke-PSInject|Invoke-Paranoia|Invoke-PortScan|Invoke-PoshRat|Invoke-PostExfil|Invoke-PowerDump|Invoke-PowerShellTCP|Invoke-PsExec|Invoke-PsUaCme|Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection|Invoke-ReverseDNSLookup|Invoke-RunAs|Invoke-SMBScanner|Invoke-SSHCommand|Invoke-Service|Invoke-Shellcode|Invoke-Tater|Invoke-ThunderStruck|Invoke-Token|Invoke-UserHunter|Invoke-VoiceTroll|Invoke-WScriptBypassUAC|Invoke-WinEnum|MailRaider|New-HoneyHash|Out-Minidump|Port-Scan|PowerBreach|PowerUp|PowerView|Remove-Update|Set-MacAttribute|Set-Wallpaper|Show-TargetScreen|Start-CaptureServer|VolumeShadowCopyTools|NEEEEWWW|(Computer|User)Property|CachedRDPConnection|get-net\\S+|invoke-\\S+hunter|Install-Service|get-\\S+(credent|password)|remoteps|Kerberos.*(policy|ticket)|netfirewall|Uninstall-Windows|Verb\\s+Runas|AmsiBypass|nishang|Invoke-Interceptor|EXEonRemote|NetworkRelay|PowerShelludp|PowerShellIcmp|CreateShortcut|copy-vss|invoke-dll|invoke-mass|out-shortcut|Invoke-ShellCommand\"),1,0) | eval base64 = if(match(lower(Message),\"frombase64\"), \"4\", 0) | eval empire=if(match(lower(Message),\"system.net.webclient\") AND match(lower(Message), \"frombase64string\") ,5,0) | eval mimikatz=if(match(lower(Message),\"mimikatz\") OR match(lower(Message), \"-dumpcr\") OR match(lower(Message), \"SEKURLSA::Pth\") OR match(lower(Message), \"kerberos::ptt\") OR match(lower(Message), \"kerberos::golden\") ,5,0) | eval iex = if(match(lower(Message),\"iex\"), \"2\", 0) | eval webclient=if(match(lower(Message),\"http\") OR match(lower(Message),\"web(client|request)\") OR match(lower(Message),\"socket\") OR match(lower(Message),\"download(file|string)\") OR match(lower(Message),\"bitstransfer\") OR match(lower(Message),\"internetexplorer.application\") OR match(lower(Message),\"xmlhttp\"),5,0) | eval get = if(match(lower(Message),\"get-\"), \"1\", 0) | eval rundll32 = if(match(lower(Message),\"rundll32\"), \"4\", 0) | eval suspkeywrd=if(match(Message, \"(?i)(bitstransfer|mimik|metasp|AssemblyBuilderAccess|Reflection\\.Assembly|shellcode|injection|cnvert|shell\\.application|start-process|Rc4ByteStream|System\\.Security\\.Cryptography|lsass\\.exe|localadmin|LastLoggedOn|hijack|BackupPrivilege|ngrok|comsvcs|backdoor|brute.?force|Port.?Scan|Exfiltration|exploit|DisableRealtimeMonitoring|beacon)\"),1,0) | eval syswow64 = if(match(lower(Message),\"syswow64\"), \"3\", 0) | eval httplocal = if(match(lower(Message),\"http://127.0.0.1\"), \"4\", 0) | eval reflection = if(match(lower(Message),\"reflection\"), \"1\", 0) | eval invokewmi=if(match(lower(Message), \"(?i)(wmiobject|WMIMethod|RemoteWMI|PowerShellWmi|wmicommand)\"),5,0) | eval downgrade=if(match(Message, \"(?i)([-]ve*r*s*i*o*n*\\s+2)\") OR match(lower(Message),\"powershell -version\"),3,0) | eval compressed=if(match(Message, \"(?i)GZipStream|::Decompress|IO.Compression|write-zip|(expand|compress)-Archive\"),5,0) | eval invokecmd = if(match(lower(Message),\"invoke-command\"), \"4\", 0) | addtotals fieldname=Score DoIt, enccom, suspcmdlet, suspkeywrd, compressed, downgrade, mimikatz, iex, empire, rundll32, webclient, syswow64, httplocal, reflection, invokewmi, invokecmd, base64, get | stats values(Score) by DoIt, enccom, compressed, downgrade, iex, mimikatz, rundll32, empire, webclient, syswow64, httplocal, reflection, invokewmi, invokecmd, base64, get, suspcmdlet, suspkeywrd | `powershell_4104_hunting_filter`", "how_to_implement": "The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives. May filter as needed.", "references": ["https://github.com/inodee/threathunting-spl/blob/master/hunt-queries/powershell_qualifiers.md", "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell", "https://github.com/marcurdy/dfir-toolset/blob/master/Powershell%20Blueteam.txt", "https://devblogs.microsoft.com/powershell/powershell-the-blue-team/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_logging?view=powershell-5.1", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/02/greater_visibilityt.html", "https://hurricanelabs.com/splunk-tutorials/how-to-use-powershell-transcription-logs-in-splunk/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": [], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ executing suspicious commands.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Message"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "PowerShell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "Gallmaker", "Turla", "APT19", "DarkHydrus", "APT28", "Thrip", "Gorgon Group", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leviathan", "TA459", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT32", "FIN7", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "APT3", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "powershell_4104_hunting_filter"}]}, {"name": "Sqlite Module In Temp Folder", "id": "0f216a38-f45f-11eb-b09c-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-03", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious file creation of sqlite3.dll in %temp% folder. This behavior was seen in IcedID malware where it download sqlite module to parse browser database like for chrome or firefox to stole browser information related to bank, credit card or credentials.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=11 (TargetFilename = \"*\\\\sqlite32.dll\" OR TargetFilename = \"*\\\\sqlite64.dll\") (TargetFilename = \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\") |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by process_name TargetFilename EventCode ProcessId Image | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sqlite_module_in_temp_folder_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.cisecurity.org/white-papers/security-primer-icedid/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/simulated_icedid/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "process $SourceImage$ create a file $TargetImage$ in host $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1005"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "SourceImage", "type": "process name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "process_name", "TargetFilename", "EventCode", "ProcessId", "Image"], "risk_score": 9, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Data from Local System"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Soft Cell", "Turla", "menuPass", "Dark Caracal", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Honeybee", "APT37", "APT28", "APT3", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "Dust Storm", "Threat Group-3390", "APT1", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "sqlite_module_in_temp_folder_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect HTML Help Renamed", "id": "62fed254-513b-460e-953d-79771493a9f3", "version": 3, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies a renamed instance of hh.exe (HTML Help) executing a Compiled HTML Help (CHM). This particular technique will load Windows script code from a compiled help file. CHM files may contain nearly any file type embedded, but only execute html/htm. Upon a successful execution, the following script engines may be used for execution - JScript, VBScript, VBScript.Encode, JScript.Encode, JScript.Compact. Analyst may identify vbscript.dll or jscript.dll loading into hh.exe upon execution. The \"htm\" and \"html\" file extensions were the only extensions observed to be supported for the execution of Shortcut commands or WSH script code. During investigation, identify script content origination. Validate it is the legitimate version of hh.exe by reviewing the PE metadata. hh.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_hh` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_html_help_renamed_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely a renamed instance of hh.exe will be used legitimately, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.001/T1218.001.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Hh/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Compiled HTML File"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT41", "Silence", "Lazarus Group", "Dark Caracal", "OilRig"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=hh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=HH.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_hh"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_html_help_renamed_filter"}]}, {"name": "Icacls Deny Command", "id": "cf8d753e-a8fe-11eb-8f58-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-29", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies a potential adversary that changes the security permission of a specific file or directory. This technique is commonly seen in APT tradecraft or coinminer scripts. This behavior is meant to evade detection and prevent access to their component files.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"icacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"cacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"xcacls.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*/deny*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `icacls_deny_command_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed icacls.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown. It is possible some administrative scripts use ICacls. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Process name $process_name$ with deny argument executed by $user$ to change security permission of a specific file or directory on host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1222"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["File and Directory Permissions Modification"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "icacls_deny_command_filter"}]}, {"name": "Download Files Using Telegram", "id": "58194e28-ae5e-11eb-8912-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-06", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic will identify a suspicious download by the Telegram application on a Windows system. This behavior was identified on a honeypot where the adversary gained access, installed Telegram and followed through with downloading different network scanners (port, bruteforcer, masscan) to the system and later used to mapped the whole network and further move laterally.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode= 15 process_name = \"telegram.exe\" TargetFilename = \"*:Zone.Identifier\" |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer EventCode Image process_id TargetFilename Hash | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `download_files_using_telegram_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and TargetFilename from your endpoints or Events that monitor filestream events which is happened when process download something. (EventCode 15) If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "normal download of file in telegram app. (if it was a common app in network)", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/minergate/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious files were downloaded with the Telegram application on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1105"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Computer", "EventCode", "Image", "process_id", "TargetFilename", "Hash"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Ingress Tool Transfer"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Whitefly", "Rocke", "APT39", "Tropic Trooper", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Frankenstein", "Silence", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "APT33", "MuddyWater", "APT18", "APT38", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "OilRig", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT37", "FIN8", "PLATINUM", "Leviathan", "Elderwood", "Magic Hound", "APT3", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Patchwork", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-3390", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "download_files_using_telegram_filter"}]}, {"name": "7zip CommandLine To SMB Share Path", "id": "01d29b48-ff6f-11eb-b81e-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-17", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious 7z process with commandline pointing to SMB network share. This technique was seen in CONTI LEAK tools where it use 7z to archive a sensitive files and place it in network share tmp folder. This search is a good hunting query that may give analyst a hint why specific user try to archive a file pointing to SMB user which is un usual.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name =\"7z.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"7za.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name = \"7z.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name = \"7za.exe\") AND (Processes.process=\"*\\\\C$\\\\*\" OR Processes.process=\"*\\\\Admin$\\\\*\" OR Processes.process=\"*\\\\IPC$\\\\*\") by Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `7zip_commandline_to_smb_share_path_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed 7z.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1423361119926816776.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/conti/conti_leak/windows-sysmon_7z.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "archive process $process_name$ with suspicious cmdline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1560.001", "T1560"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "SourceImage", "type": "process name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Archive via Utility", "Archive Collected Data"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Soft Cell", "Turla", "Gallmaker", "APT33", "APT39", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "FIN8", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT3", "Sowbug", "menuPass", "APT1", "Ke3chang", "menuPass", "APT32", "Honeybee", "Patchwork", "APT28", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN6", "Lazarus Group", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "7zip_commandline_to_smb_share_path_filter"}]}, {"name": "Excel Spawning Windows Script Host", "id": "57fe880a-9be3-11eb-9bf3-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies Microsoft Excel spawning Windows Script Host - `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe`. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with Excel.exe. Excel.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Office16` (version will vary). `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` default location is `c:\\windows\\system32\\` or c:windows\\syswow64`. `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` spawning from Excel.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command-line executed will most likely be obfuscated and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. Review the reputation of the remote destination and block accordingly.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=\"excel.exe\" Processes.process_name IN (\"cscript.exe\", \"wscript.exe\") by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excel_spawning_windows_script_host_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed. In some instances, `cscript.exe` is used for legitimate business practices.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/8ecfbc29-03d0-421c-a5bf-3905d29192a2/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$, indicating potential suspicious macro execution.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "process_name", "process_id", "parent_process_name", "dest", "user", "parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Security Account Manager", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390", "Ke3chang", "Soft Cell", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "menuPass", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "excel_spawning_windows_script_host_filter"}]}, {"name": "Change Default File Association", "id": "462d17d8-1f71-11ec-ad07-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-27", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is developed to detect suspicious registry modification to change the default file association of windows to malicious payload. This techninique was seen in some APT where it modify the default process to run file association, like .txt to notepad.exe. Instead notepad.exe it will point to a Script or other payload that will load malicious command to the compromised host.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path =\"*\\\\shell\\\\open\\\\command\\\\*\" Registry.registry_path = \"*HKCR\\\\*\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `change_default_file_association_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://dmcxblue.gitbook.io/red-team-notes-2-0/red-team-techniques/privilege-escalation/untitled-3/accessibility-features"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Privilege Escalation Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.001/txtfile_reg/sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1546.001", "T1546"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Change Default File Association", "Event Triggered Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Kimsuky", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "change_default_file_association_filter"}]}, {"name": "Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI", "id": "28077620-c9f6-11eb-8785-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-10", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 performing checks to identify anti-virus products installed on the endpoint. This technique is commonly found in malware and APT events where the adversary will map all running security applications or services. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*SELECT*\" OR Message = \"*WMIC*\") AND (Message = \"*AntiVirusProduct*\" OR Message = \"*AntiSpywareProduct*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "network administrator may used this command for checking purposes", "references": ["https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/05/12/maze-ransomware-1-year-counting/", "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Malicious PowerShell"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Reconnaissance"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains AV recon command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1592"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi_filter"}]}, {"name": "Office Application Drop Executable", "id": "73ce70c4-146d-11ec-9184-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-13", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Michael Haag Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious MS office application that drop or create executables or script in the host. This behavior is commonly seen in spear phishing office attachment where it drop malicious files or script to compromised the host. It might be some normal macro may drop script or tools as part of automation but still this behavior is reallly suspicious and not commonly seen in normal office application", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\",\"wordpad.exe\",\"wordview.exe\") by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*.exe\",\"*.dll\",\"*.pif\",\"*.scr\",\"*.js\",\"*.vbs\",\"*.vbe\",\"*.ps1\") by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process proc_guid] | dedup file_create_time | table dest, process_name, process, file_create_time, file_name, file_path, proc_guid | `office_application_drop_executable_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "office macro for automation may do this behavior", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html", "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["FIN7"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_macro_js_1/sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "process $process_name$ drops a file $TargetFilename$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "process name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Image", "TargetFilename", "ProcessGuid", "dest", "user_id"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Phishing", "Spearphishing Attachment"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "office_application_drop_executable_filter"}]}, {"name": "Esentutl SAM Copy", "id": "d372f928-ce4f-11eb-a762-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-18", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the process - `esentutl.exe` - being used to capture credentials stored in ntds.dit or the SAM file on disk. During triage, review parallel processes and determine if legitimate activity. Upon determination of illegitimate activity, take further action to isolate and contain the threat.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_esentutl` Processes.process IN (\"*ntds*\", \"*SAM*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `esentutl_sam_copy_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/6a570c2a4630cf0c2bd41a2e8375b5d5ab92f700/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md", "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0404/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": [], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user user$ attempting to capture credentials for offline cracking or observability.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Security Account Manager", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390", "Ke3chang", "Soft Cell", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "menuPass", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=esentutl.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=esentutl.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_esentutl"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "esentutl_sam_copy_filter"}]}, {"name": "Potential Pass the Token or Hash Observed by an Event Collecting Device", "id": "1058ba3e-a698-49bc-a1e5-7cedece4ea87", "version": 2, "date": "2021-11-05", "author": "Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Authentication"], "description": "This detection identifies potential Pass the Token or Pass the Hash credential stealing. We detect the main side effect of these attacks, which is a transition from the dominant Kerberos logins to rare NTLM logins for a given user, as reported by an event-collecting device (i.e., a specific domain controller or an endpoint destination).", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where \"Authentication\" IN(_datamodels)\n| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), dest_user= lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_primary_artifact\"), \"string\", null)), dest_user_id= ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), origin_device_id= ucast(map_get(input_event, \"origin_device_id\"), \"string\", null), signature_id= lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"signature_id\"), \"string\", null)), authentication_method= lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"authentication_method\"), \"string\", null)), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where signature_id = \"4624\" AND (authentication_method=\"ntlmssp\" OR authentication_method=\"kerberos\") AND dest_user_id != null AND origin_device_id != null\n| eval isKerberos=if(authentication_method == \"kerberos\", 1, 0), isNtlm=if(authentication_method == \"ntlmssp\", 1, 0), timeNTLM=if(isNtlm > 0, timestamp, null)\n| stats sum(isKerberos) as totalKerberos, sum(isNtlm) as totalNtlm, min(timestamp) as startTime, min(timeNTLM) as startNTLMTime, max(timestamp) as endTime, max(timeNTLM) as endNTLMTime by dest_user_id, dest_user, origin_device_id, span(timestamp, 86400s)\n| where NOT dest_user=\"-\" AND totalKerberos > 0 AND totalNtlm > 0 AND endTime - startTime > 1800000 AND (totalKerberos > 10 * totalNtlm AND totalKerberos > 50) AND (endTime - startTime) > 3 * (endNTLMTime - startNTLMTime)\n| eval start_time=startNTLMTime, end_time=endNTLMTime, entities=mvappend(dest_user_id, origin_device_id), body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"total_kerberos\", totalKerberos, \"total_ntlm\", totalNtlm, \"analysis_start_time\", startTime, \"analysis_end_time\", endTime, \"detection_start_time\", startNTLMTime, \"detection_end_time\", endNTLMTime])\n| into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest - at least from domain controllers. Please make sure that event ID 4624 is being logged.", "known_false_positives": "Environments in which NTLM is used extremely rarely and for benign purposes (such as a rare use of SMB shares).", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002/", "https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/psexec-pass-hash/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "asset_type": "Windows", "cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 20"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:AD", "Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "message": "Potential lateral movement and credential stealing via Pass the Token or Pass the Hash techniques. Operation is performed via credentials of the account $dest_user_id$ and observed by the logging device $origin_device_id$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1550", "T1550.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "User", "role": ["Actor"]}, {"name": "origin_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "signature_id", "dest_user", "dest_user_id", "origin_device_id", "authentication_method"], "risk_score": 64, "risk_severity": "high", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Use Alternate Authentication Material", "Pass the Hash"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement", "Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "Night Dragon", "APT28", "APT1"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "potential_pass_the_token_or_hash_observed_by_an_event_collecting_device_filter"}]}, {"name": "Resize ShadowStorage volume", "id": "bc760ca6-8336-11eb-bcbb-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-12", "author": "Teoderick Contreras", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytics identifies the resizing of shadowstorage by ransomware malware to avoid the shadow volumes being made again. this technique is an alternative by ransomware attacker than deleting the shadowstorage which is known alert in defensive team. one example of ransomware that use this technique is CLOP ransomware where it drops a .bat file that will resize the shadowstorage to minimum size as much as possible", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as cmdline values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process values(Processes.process_name) as process_name min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name = \"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"powershell.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"powershell_ise.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"wmic.exe\" Processes.process_name = \"vssadmin.exe\" Processes.process=\"*resize*\" Processes.process=\"*shadowstorage*\" Processes.process=\"*/maxsize*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `resize_shadowstorage_volume_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "network admin can resize the shadowstorage for valid purposes.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Impact"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A process $parent_process_name$ attempt to resize shadow copy with commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1490"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.process", "Process.parent_process_name", "_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Inhibit System Recovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "resize_shadowstorage_volume_filter"}]}, {"name": "Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules", "id": "a5e451f8-da81-11eb-b245-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-01", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect suspicious loading of dll in specific path relative to printnightmare exploitation. In this search we try to detect the loaded modules made by spoolsv.exe after the exploitation.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 Image =\"*\\\\spoolsv.exe\" ImageLoaded=\"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\spool\\\\drivers\\\\x64\\\\*\" ImageLoaded = \"*.dll\" | stats dc(ImageLoaded) as countImgloaded values(ImageLoaded) as ImgLoaded count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image Computer process_id EventCode | where countImgloaded >= 3 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://raw.githubusercontent.com/hieuttmmo/sigma/dceb13fe3f1821b119ae495b41e24438bd97e3d0/rules/windows/image_load/sysmon_cve_2021_1675_print_nightmare.yml"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Local"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "$Image$ with process id $process_id$ has loaded a driver from $ImageLoaded$ on endpoint $Computer$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1547.012", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_id", "type": "Process Name", "role": ["Parent Process", "Attacker"]}, {"name": "ImageLoaded", "type": "File", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Image", "Computer", "EventCode", "ImageLoaded"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules_filter"}]}, {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell Script Block", "id": "fa1c3040-4680-11ec-a618-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-15", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of PowerShell with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the DCOM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of ShellExecute and ExecuteShellCommand. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse DCOM for lateral movement and remote code execution.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message=\"*Document.Application.ShellExecute*\" OR Message=\"*Document.ActiveView.ExecuteShellCommand*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup instructions can be found https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may leverage DCOM to start a process on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003/", "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/dcom-lateral-movement-techniques"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.003/lateral_movement/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "message": "A process was started on a remote endpoint from $ComputerName by abusing WMI using PowerShell.exe", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021", "T1021.003"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote Services", "Distributed Component Object Model"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_script_block_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks", "id": "f5939373-8054-40ad-8c64-cec478a22a4b", "version": 5, "date": "2020-10-15", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for specific authentication events from the Windows Security Event logs to detect potential attempts at using the Pass-the-Hash technique.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 (Logon_Type=3 Logon_Process=NtLmSsp WorkstationName=WORKSTATION NOT AccountName=\"ANONYMOUS LOGON\") OR (Logon_Type=9 Logon_Process=seclogo) | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode, Logon_Type, WorkstationName, user, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must ingest your Windows Security Event logs and leverage the latest TA for Windows.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate logon activity by authorized NTLM systems may be detected by this search. Please investigate as appropriate.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1550.002/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "The following $EventCode$ occurred on $dest$ by $user$ with Logon Type 3, which may be indicative of the pass the hash technique.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1550", "T1550.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "EventCode", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Logon_Type", "Logon_Process", "WorkstationName", "user", "dest"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "access", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Use Alternate Authentication Material", "Pass the Hash"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement", "Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "Night Dragon", "APT28", "APT1"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Regasm with Network Connection", "id": "07921114-6db4-4e2e-ae58-3ea8a52ae93f", "version": 1, "date": "2021-02-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifies regasm.exe with a network connection to a public IP address, exluding private IP space. This particular technique has been used in the wild to bypass application control products. Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe are signed by Microsoft. By contacting a remote command and control server, the adversary will have the ability to escalate privileges and complete the objectives. During investigation, identify and retrieve the content being loaded. Review parallel processes for additional suspicious behavior. Gather any other file modifications and review accordingly. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain and block as needed. regsvcs.exe and regasm.exe are natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe.", "search": "`sysmon` EventID=3 dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/12 dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16 process_name=regasm.exe | rename Computer as dest | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, User, process_name, src_ip, dest_host, dest_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regasm_with_network_connection_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, limited instances of regasm.exe with a network connection may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regasm/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $process_name$ contacting a remote destination was identified on endpoint $Computer$ by user $user$. This behavior is not normal for $process_name$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.009"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventID", "dest_ip", "process_name", "Computer", "User", "src_ip", "dest_host", "dest_ip"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Regsvcs/Regasm"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_regasm_with_network_connection_filter"}]}, {"name": "CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments", "id": "801ad9e4-8bfb-11eb-8b31-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-03-23", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Certutil.exe may download a file from a remote destination using `-VerifyCtl`. This behavior does require a URL to be passed on the command-line. In addition, `-f` (force) and `-split` (Split embedded ASN.1 elements, and save to files) will be used. It is not entirely common for `certutil.exe` to contact public IP space. \\ During triage, capture any files on disk and review. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain in question. Using `-VerifyCtl`, the file will either be written to the current working directory or `%APPDATA%\\..\\LocalLow\\Microsoft\\CryptnetUrlCache\\Content\\`. ", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_certutil` Processes.process=*verifyctl* Processes.process=*split* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives in most environments, however tune as needed based on parent-child relationship or network connection.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/", "https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2020/08/23/certutil-one-more-gui-lolbin/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc732443(v=ws.11)#-verifyctl", "https://www.avira.com/en/blog/certutil-abused-by-attackers-to-spread-threats"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ingress Tool Transfer", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Command and Control"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to download a file.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1105"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Ingress Tool Transfer"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Whitefly", "Rocke", "APT39", "Tropic Trooper", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Frankenstein", "Silence", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "APT33", "MuddyWater", "APT18", "APT38", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "OilRig", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT37", "FIN8", "PLATINUM", "Leviathan", "Elderwood", "Magic Hound", "APT3", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Patchwork", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-3390", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=certutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=CertUtil.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_certutil"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Reg exe Process", "id": "a6b3ab4e-dd77-4213-95fa-fc94701995e0", "version": 4, "date": "2020-07-22", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for reg.exe being launched from a command prompt not started by the user. When a user launches cmd.exe, the parent process is usually explorer.exe. This search filters out those instances.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name != explorer.exe Processes.process_name =cmd.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=cmd.exe Processes.process_name= reg.exe by Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename parent_process_id as process_id |dedup process_id| table process_id dest] | `suspicious_reg_exe_process_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "It's possible for system administrators to write scripts that exhibit this behavior. If this is the case, the search will need to be modified to filter them out.", "references": ["https://car.mitre.org/wiki/CAR-2013-03-001"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Disabling Security Tools", "DHS Report TA18-074A"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Suspicious $Processes.process_path.file_path$ process running with an uncommon parent process $Processes.parent_process_name$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Processes.process_path.file_path", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Modify Registry"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Turla", "APT32", "APT38", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "Threat Group-3390", "Honeybee", "Patchwork", "Gorgon Group", "FIN8"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_reg_exe_process_filter"}]}, {"name": "System Information Discovery Detection", "id": "8e99f89e-ae58-4ebc-bf52-ae0b1a277e72", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-07", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Detect system information discovery techniques used by attackers to understand configurations of the system to further exploit it.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process=\"*wmic* qfe*\" OR Processes.process=*systeminfo* OR Processes.process=*hostname*) by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | eventstats dc(process) as dc_processes_by_dest by dest | where dc_processes_by_dest > 2 | stats values(process) as processes min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user, dest parent_process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `system_information_discovery_detection_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators debugging servers", "references": ["https://oscp.infosecsanyam.in/priv-escalation/windows-priv-escalation"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Discovery Techniques"], "asset_type": "Windows", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Recon", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1082/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Potential system information discovery behavior on $dest$ by $User$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1082"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.dest"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Information Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "Tropic Trooper", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Darkhotel", "MuddyWater", "APT18", "Honeybee", "APT19", "APT37", "APT32", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "APT3", "Sowbug", "Gamaredon Group", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "admin@338", "Turla", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "system_information_discovery_detection_filter"}]}, {"name": "Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection", "id": "664f0fd0-91ff-11eb-a56f-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-31", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following search identifies a modification of registry to disable the smartscreen protection of windows machine. This is windows feature provide an early warning system against website that might engage in phishing attack or malware distribution. This modification are seen in RAT malware to cover their tracks upon downloading other of its component or other payload.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\SmartScreenEnabled\" Registry.registry_value_name = \"Off\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_windows_smartscreen_protection_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to disable this windows features.", "references": ["https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The Windows Smartscreen was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.user", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_value_nam"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disable_windows_smartscreen_protection_filter"}]}, {"name": "Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe", "id": "c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6b5264g9f", "version": 4, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Attackers leverage an existing Windows binary, attrib.exe, to mark specific as hidden by using specific flags so that the victim does not see the file. The search looks for specific command-line arguments to detect the use of attrib.exe to hide files.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) values(Processes.process) as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=attrib.exe (Processes.process=*+h*) by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "Some applications and users may legitimately use attrib.exe to interact with the files. ", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1222.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Attrib.exe with +h flag to hide files on $dest$ executed by $user$ is detected.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1222", "T1222.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process", "type": "Other", "role": ["Attacker", "Parent Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.user", "Processes.dest"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["File and Directory Permissions Modification", "Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe_filter"}]}, {"name": "Rare Parent-Child Process Relationship", "id": "cf090c78-bcc6-11eb-8529-0242ac130003", "version": 2, "date": "2021-11-30", "author": "Peter Gael, Splunk; Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "An attacker may use LOLBAS tools spawned from vulnerable applications not typically used by system administrators. This analytic leverages the Splunk Streaming ML DSP plugin to find rare parent/child relationships. The list of application has been extracted from https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/tree/master/yml/OSBinaries", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)) | eval parent_process=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null)), parent_process_name=mvindex(split(parent_process, \"\\\\\"), -1), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null)), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null), dest_user_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), dest_device_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where parent_process_name!=null | select parent_process_name, process_name, cmd_line, timestamp, dest_device_id, dest_user_id | conditional_anomaly conditional=\"parent_process_name\" target=\"process_name\" | where (process_name=\"powershell.exe\" OR process_name=\"regsvcs.exe\" OR process_name=\"ftp.exe\" OR process_name=\"dfsvc.exe\" OR process_name=\"rasautou.exe\" OR process_name=\"schtasks.exe\" OR process_name=\"xwizard.exe\" OR process_name=\"findstr.exe\" OR process_name=\"esentutl.exe\" OR process_name=\"cscript.exe\" OR process_name=\"reg.exe\" OR process_name=\"csc.exe\" OR process_name=\"atbroker.exe\" OR process_name=\"print.exe\" OR process_name=\"pcwrun.exe\" OR process_name=\"vbc.exe\" OR process_name=\"rpcping.exe\" OR process_name=\"wsreset.exe\" OR process_name=\"ilasm.exe\" OR process_name=\"certutil.exe\" OR process_name=\"replace.exe\" OR process_name=\"mshta.exe\" OR process_name=\"bitsadmin.exe\" OR process_name=\"wscript.exe\" OR process_name=\"ieexec.exe\" OR process_name=\"cmd.exe\" OR process_name=\"microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe\" OR process_name=\"runscripthelper.exe\" OR process_name=\"makecab.exe\" OR process_name=\"forfiles.exe\" OR process_name=\"desktopimgdownldr.exe\" OR process_name=\"control.exe\" OR process_name=\"msbuild.exe\" OR process_name=\"register-cimprovider.exe\" OR process_name=\"tttracer.exe\" OR process_name=\"ie4uinit.exe\" OR process_name=\"sc.exe\" OR process_name=\"bash.exe\" OR process_name=\"hh.exe\" OR process_name=\"cmstp.exe\" OR process_name=\"mmc.exe\" OR process_name=\"jsc.exe\" OR process_name=\"scriptrunner.exe\" OR process_name=\"odbcconf.exe\" OR process_name=\"extexport.exe\" OR process_name=\"msdt.exe\" OR process_name=\"diskshadow.exe\" OR process_name=\"extrac32.exe\" OR process_name=\"eventvwr.exe\" OR process_name=\"mavinject.exe\" OR process_name=\"regasm.exe\" OR process_name=\"gpscript.exe\" OR process_name=\"rundll32.exe\" OR process_name=\"regsvr32.exe\" OR process_name=\"regedit.exe\" OR process_name=\"msiexec.exe\" OR process_name=\"gfxdownloadwrapper.exe\" OR process_name=\"presentationhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"regini.exe\" OR process_name=\"wmic.exe\" OR process_name=\"runonce.exe\" OR process_name=\"syncappvpublishingserver.exe\" OR process_name=\"verclsid.exe\" OR process_name=\"psr.exe\" OR process_name=\"infdefaultinstall.exe\" OR process_name=\"explorer.exe\" OR process_name=\"expand.exe\" OR process_name=\"installutil.exe\" OR process_name=\"netsh.exe\" OR process_name=\"wab.exe\" OR process_name=\"dnscmd.exe\" OR process_name=\"at.exe\" OR process_name=\"pcalua.exe\" OR process_name=\"cmdkey.exe\" OR process_name=\"msconfig.exe\") | eval input = (-1)*log(output) | adaptive_threshold algorithm=\"gaussian\" threshold=0.001 window=604800000L | where label AND input > mean | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend(dest_device_id, dest_user_id), body = create_map([\"process_name\", process_name, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process_name, \"input\", input, \"mean\", mean, \"variance\", variance, \"output\", output, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "Collect endpoint data such as sysmon or 4688 events.", "known_false_positives": "Some custom tools used by administrators could be used rarely to launch remotely applications. This might trigger false positives at the beginning when it has not collected yet enough data to construct the baseline.", "references": ["https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/tree/master/yml/OSBinaries"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Unusual Processes"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1203", "T1059", "T1053", "T1072"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["process", "process_name", "parent_process_name", "_time", "dest_device_id", "dest_user_id", "cmd_line"], "risk_severity": "low", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploitation for Client Execution", "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "Scheduled Task/Job", "Software Deployment Tools"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution", "Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Execution", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "MuddyWater", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT41", "admin@338", "Threat Group-3390", "APT12", "The White Company", "APT33", "APT32", "APT28", "Tropic Trooper", "Lazarus Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "APT37", "Patchwork", "Leviathan", "Elderwood", "TA459", "APT29", "APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "no", "Silence", "APT32", "Threat Group-1314"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "rare_parent_child_process_relationship_filter"}]}, {"name": "Remote System Discovery with Adsisearcher", "id": "70803451-0047-4e12-9d63-77fa7eb8649c", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-01", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator being used to query Active Directory for domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `[Adsisearcher]` to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*[adsisearcher]*\" AND Message = \"*objectclass=computer*\" AND Message = \"*findAll()*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `remote_system_discovery_with_adsisearcher_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use Adsisearcher for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", "https://devblogs.microsoft.com/scripting/use-the-powershell-adsisearcher-type-accelerator-to-search-active-directory/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote System Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Rocke", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT39", "APT32", "Deep Panda", "Threat Group-3390", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leafminer", "Ke3chang", "FIN8", "APT3", "FIN5", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Turla"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "remote_system_discovery_with_adsisearcher_filter"}]}, {"name": "Eventvwr UAC Bypass", "id": "9cf8fe08-7ad8-11eb-9819-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-01", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following search identifies Eventvwr bypass by identifying the registry modification into a specific path that eventvwr.msc looks to (but is not valid) upon execution. A successful attack will include a suspicious command to be executed upon eventvwr.msc loading. Upon triage, review the parallel processes that have executed. Identify any additional registry modifications on the endpoint that may look suspicious. Remediate as necessary.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*mscfile\\\\shell\\\\open\\\\command\\\\*\" by Registry.user, Registry.dest , Registry.registry_value_name| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `eventvwr_uac_bypass_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node.", "known_false_positives": "Some false positives may be present and will need to be filtered.", "references": ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.md", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002", "https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "IcedID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "message": "Registry values were modified to bypass UAC using Event Viewer on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.user", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Bypass User Access Control", "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "MuddyWater", "Honeybee", "Cobalt Group", "Threat Group-3390", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Patchwork", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "eventvwr_uac_bypass_filter"}]}, {"name": "Spoolsv Writing a DLL", "id": "d5bf5cf2-da71-11eb-92c2-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-01", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies a `.dll` being written by `spoolsv.exe`. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. Typically, this is not normal behavior for `spoolsv.exe` to write a `.dll`. Current POC code used will write the suspicious DLL to disk within a path of `\\spool\\drivers\\x64\\`. During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=spoolsv.exe by _time Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path=\"*\\\\spool\\\\drivers\\\\x64\\\\*\" Filesystem.file_name=\"*.dll\" by _time Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process] | dedup file_create_time | table dest file_create_time, file_name, file_path, process_name | `spoolsv_writing_a_dll_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node and `Filesystem` node.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown.", "references": ["https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/fix-for-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675-exploit-to-keep-your-print-servers-running-while-a-patch-is-not-available/", "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/exploitable-critical-rce-vulnerability-allows-regular-users-to-fully-compromise-active-directory-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675/", "https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/ob6y02/critical_vulnerability_printnightmare_exposes"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "$process_name$ has been identified writing dll's to $file_path$ on endpoint $dest$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1547.012", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_id", "type": "Process", "role": ["Process"]}, {"name": "file_path", "type": "File", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.dest", "Filesystem.file_create_time", "Filesystem.file_name", "Filesystem.file_path", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.dest"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "spoolsv_writing_a_dll_filter"}]}, {"name": "DSQuery Domain Discovery", "id": "cc316032-924a-11eb-91a2-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-31", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies \"dsquery.exe\" execution with arguments looking for `TrustedDomain` query directly on the command-line. This is typically indicative of an Administrator or adversary perform domain trust discovery. Note that this query does not identify any other variations of \"Dsquery.exe\" usage.\\\nWithin this detection, it is assumed `dsquery.exe` is not moved or renamed.\\\nThe search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process \"dsquery.exe\" and its parent process.\\\nDSQuery.exe is natively found in `C:\\Windows\\system32` and `C:\\Windows\\syswow64` and only on Server operating system.\\\nThe following DLL(s) are loaded when DSQuery.exe is launched `dsquery.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible dsquery is running within that process context in memory.\\\nIn addition to trust discovery, review parallel processes for additional behaviors performed. Identify the parent process and capture any files (batch files, for example) being used.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=dsquery.exe Processes.process=*trustedDomain* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dsquery_domain_discovery_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives. If there is a true false positive, filter based on command-line or parent process.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1482/T1482.md", "http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/a-guide-to-attacking-domain-trusts/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc732952(v=ws.11)", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc754232(v=ws.11)"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Domain Trust Discovery", "Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified performing domain discovery on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1482"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Domain Trust Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "dsquery_domain_discovery_filter"}]}, {"name": "GetCurrent User with PowerShell", "id": "7eb9c3d5-c98c-4088-acc5-8240bad15379", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-13", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powerhsell.exe` with command-line arguments that execute the `GetCurrent` method of the WindowsIdentity .NET class. This method returns an object that represents the current Windows user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity* OR Processes.process=*GetCurrent()*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getcurrent_user_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "System user discovery on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1033"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Owner/User Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Frankenstein", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Tropic Trooper", "APT39", "MuddyWater", "APT32", "APT37", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "Magic Hound", "FIN10", "Gamaredon Group", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "APT3"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "getcurrent_user_with_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack", "id": "4aefadfe-9abd-4bf8-b3fd-867e9ef95bf8", "version": 2, "date": "2021-02-04", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading advpack.dll and ieadvpack.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line. This particular technique will load script code from a file. Upon a successful execution, the following module loads may occur - clr.dll, jscript.dll and scrobj.dll. During investigation, identify script content origination. Generally, a child process will spawn from rundll32.exe, but that may be bypassed based on script code contents. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64. During investigation, review any network connections and obtain the script content executed. It's possible other files are on disk.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*advpack* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use advpack.dll or ieadvpack.dll, triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Advpack/", "https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ loading advpack.dll and ieadvpack.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Rundll32"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT32", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "TA505", "MuddyWater", "APT29", "APT19", "CopyKittens", "APT3", "Carbanak", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_rundll32"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack_filter"}]}, {"name": "Schtasks scheduling job on remote system", "id": "1297fb80-f42a-4b4a-9c8a-88c066237cf6", "version": 5, "date": "2021-11-11", "author": "David Dorsey, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `schtasks.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to create a Scheduled Task on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = schtasks.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=schtasks.exe) (Processes.process=\"*/create*\" AND Processes.process=\"*/s*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may create scheduled tasks on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. It is important to validate and investigate as appropriate.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "NOBELIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}, "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A schedule task process $process_name$ with remote job commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "Processes.dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Processes.user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Scheduled Task", "Scheduled Task/Job"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "MuddyWater", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT-C-36", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT41", "Machete", "Soft Cell", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Patchwork", "OilRig", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "FIN8", "menuPass", "FIN10", "APT32", "FIN7", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system_filter"}]}, {"name": "Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption", "id": "5cc67381-44fa-4111-8a37-7a230943f027", "version": 3, "date": "2020-10-16", "author": "Jose Hernandez, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects a potential kerberoasting attack via service principal name requests", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769 Ticket_Options=0x40810000 Ticket_Encryption_Type=0x17 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, service, service_id, Ticket_Encryption_Type, Ticket_Options | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, and include the windows security event logs that contain kerberos", "known_false_positives": "Older systems that support kerberos RC4 by default NetApp may generate false positives", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1208/T1208.md", "https://www.trimarcsecurity.com/post/trimarcresearch-detecting-kerberoasting-activity"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "message": "Potential kerberoasting attack via service principal name requests detected on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1558.003", "T1558"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Ticket_Options", "Ticket_Encryption_Type", "dest", "service", "service_id"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Kerberoasting", "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption_filter"}]}, {"name": "Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD", "id": "ba570b3a-d356-11eb-8358-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-06-22", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious commandline designed to delete files or directory recursive using batch command. This technique was seen in ransomware (reddot) where it it tries to delete the files in recycle bin to impaire user from recovering deleted files.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` Processes.process=*/c* Processes.process=* rd * Processes.process=\"*/s*\" Processes.process=\"*/q*\" by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.dest |`drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "network operator may use this batch command to delete recursively a directory or files within directory", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/c0f98850-af65-4352-9746-fbebadee4f05/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1070.004", "T1070"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["File Deletion", "Indicator Removal on Host"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Rocke", "Tropic Trooper", "Gamaredon Group", "Wizard Spider", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Silence", "The White Company", "TEMP.Veles", "APT32", "APT38", "Patchwork", "Honeybee", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "menuPass", "FIN8", "OilRig", "FIN5", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Magic Hound", "APT3", "FIN10", "APT28", "Threat Group-3390", "Group5", "Lazarus Group", "APT18", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_cmd"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd_filter"}]}, {"name": "Common Ransomware Notes", "id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d6bd71", "version": 4, "date": "2020-11-09", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The search looks for files created with names matching those typically used in ransomware notes that tell the victim how to get their data back.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `ransomware_notes` | `common_ransomware_notes_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Filesystem data-model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system reads and writes.", "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a legitimate file could be created with the same name used by ransomware note files.", "references": [], "tags": {"Consequence": "Data Destruction", "analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/ransomware_notes/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$, this is indicative of a known ransomware note file and should be reviewed immediately.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1485"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "file_name", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.user", "Filesystem.dest", "Filesystem.file_path", "Filesystem.file_name"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Data Destruction"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Lazarus Group", "APT38"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "lookup ransomware_notes_lookup ransomware_notes as file_name OUTPUT status as \"Known Ransomware Notes\" | search \"Known Ransomware Notes\"=True", "description": "This macro limits the output to files that have been identified as a ransomware note", "name": "ransomware_notes", "lookups": [{"default_match": "false", "description": "A list of file names that are ransomware note files", "filename": "ransomware_notes.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(ransomware_notes)", "min_matches": 1, "name": "ransomware_notes_lookup", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/ransomware_notes.csv"}]}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "common_ransomware_notes_filter"}]}, {"name": "Office Spawning Control", "id": "053e027c-10c7-11ec-8437-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-08", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies control.exe spawning from an office product. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `control.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `control.exe` will contain a file path to a .cpl or .inf, related to CVE-2021-40444. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. review parallel and child processes to identify further suspicious behavior", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\",\"wordpad.exe\",\"wordview.exe\") Processes.process_name=control.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `office_spawning_control_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives should be present.", "references": ["https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/control.exe-1F13E714A0FEA8887707DFF49287996F.html", "https://app.any.run/tasks/36c14029-9df8-439c-bba0-45f2643b0c70/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://www.echotrail.io/insights/search/control.exe", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.002/T1218.002.yaml"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_control.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ clicking a suspicious attachment.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Phishing", "Spearphishing Attachment"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "office_spawning_control_filter"}]}, {"name": "Deleting Shadow Copies", "id": "b89919ed-ee5f-492c-b139-95dbb162039e", "version": 4, "date": "2020-11-09", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The vssadmin.exe utility is used to interact with the Volume Shadow Copy Service. Wmic is an interface to the Windows Management Instrumentation. This search looks for either of these tools being used to delete shadow copies.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=vssadmin.exe OR Processes.process_name=wmic.exe) Processes.process=*delete* Processes.process=*shadow* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `deleting_shadow_copies_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "vssadmin.exe and wmic.exe are standard applications shipped with modern versions of windows. They may be used by administrators to legitimately delete old backup copies, although this is typically rare.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Log Manipulation", "SamSam Ransomware", "Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to delete shadow copies.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1490"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Inhibit System Recovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "deleting_shadow_copies_filter"}]}, {"name": "Elevated Group Discovery With Net", "id": "a23a0e20-0b1b-4a07-82e5-ec5f70811e7a", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-25", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for specific elevated domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate elevated domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery to identify high privileged users.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\") (Processes.process=\"*group*\" AND Processes.process=\"*/do*\") (Processes.process=\"*Domain Admins*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Enterprise Admins*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Schema Admins*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Account Operators*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Server Operators*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Protected Users*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Dns Admins*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `elevated_group_discovery_with_net_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-practices/appendix-b--privileged-accounts-and-groups-in-active-directory", "https://adsecurity.org/?p=3658"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Elevated domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 21, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Permission Groups Discovery", "Domain Groups"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TA505", "APT3", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "Inception", "OilRig", "FIN6", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "elevated_group_discovery_with_net_filter"}]}, {"name": "GetDomainController with PowerShell", "id": "868ee0e4-52ab-484a-833a-6d85b7c028d0", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-07", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. `Get-DomainController` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-DomainController*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use PowerView for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainController/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Remote system discovery using PowerView on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 24, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote System Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Rocke", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT39", "APT32", "Deep Panda", "Threat Group-3390", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leafminer", "Ke3chang", "FIN8", "APT3", "FIN5", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Turla"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "System User Discovery With Query", "id": "ad03bfcf-8a91-4bc2-a500-112993deba87", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-13", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `query.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover the logged user. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage `query.exe` to identify system users on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"query.exe\") (Processes.process=*user*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `system_user_discovery_with_query_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "System user discovery on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1033"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Owner/User Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Frankenstein", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Tropic Trooper", "APT39", "MuddyWater", "APT32", "APT37", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "Magic Hound", "FIN10", "Gamaredon Group", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "APT3"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "system_user_discovery_with_query_filter"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage Of Cacls App", "id": "0bdf6092-af17-11eb-939a-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-07", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies excessive usage of `cacls.exe`, `xcacls.exe` or `icacls.exe` application to change file or folder permission. This behavior is commonly seen where the adversary attempts to impair some users from deleting or accessing its malware components or artifact from the compromised system.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id values(Processes.process_name) as process_name count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"cacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"icacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"XCACLS.exe\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=1m | where count >=10 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_cacls_app_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or administrative scripts may use this application. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An excessive amount of $process_name$ was executed on $dest$ attempting to modify permissions.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1222"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["File and Directory Permissions Modification"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "excessive_usage_of_cacls_app_filter"}]}, {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell Script Block", "id": "7d4c618e-4716-11ec-951c-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-16", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of PowerShell with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the WinRM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of the `Invoke-Command` commandlet. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WinRM for lateral movement and remote code execution.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message=\"*Invoke-Command*\" AND Message=\"*-ComputerName*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup instructions can be found https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may leverage WinRM and `Invoke-Command` to start a process on remote systems for system administration or automation use cases. This activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. In certain environments, tuning may not be possible.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006/", "https://pentestlab.blog/2018/05/15/lateral-movement-winrm/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement_psh/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "message": "A process was started on a remote endpoint from $ComputerName by abusing WinRM using PowerShell.exe", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021", "T1021.006"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 45, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote Services", "Windows Remote Management"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Threat Group-3390"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_script_block_filter"}]}, {"name": "Get DomainUser with PowerShell", "id": "9a5a41d6-04e7-11ec-923c-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-24", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to enumerate domain users. `Get-DomainUser` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"powershell*\") AND Processes.process = \"*Get-DomainUser*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domainuser_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainUser/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id", "Processes.parent_process_name"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Domain Account", "Account Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Turla", "Sandworm Team", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "Ke3chang", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "get_domainuser_with_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring", "id": "79439cae-9200-11eb-a4d3-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-31", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to identifies a modification in registry to disable the windows denfender real time behavior monitoring. This event or technique is commonly seen in RAT, bot, or Trojan to disable AV to evade detections.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableBehaviorMonitoring\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableOnAccessProtection\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableScanOnRealtimeEnable\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableRealtimeMonitoring\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableIOAVProtection\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableScriptScanning\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_windows_behavior_monitoring_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to disable this windows features.", "references": ["https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": [{"Source": "Endpoint"}, {"Stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Windows Defender real time behavior monitoring disabled on $dest", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.user", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 40, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disable_windows_behavior_monitoring_filter"}]}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window", "id": "ee18ed37-0802-4268-9435-b3b91aaa18db", "version": 7, "date": "2021-10-05", "author": "David Dorsey, Michael Haag Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following hunting analytic identifies PowerShell commands utilizing the WindowStyle parameter to hide the window on the compromised endpoint. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it is overriding the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide its activity from the user, and connects to the Internet. Removed in this version of the query is New-Object. The analytic identifies all variations of WindowStyle, as PowerShell allows the ability to shorten the parameter. For example w, win, windowsty and so forth. In addition, through our research it was identified that PowerShell will interpret different command switch types beyond the hyphen. We have added endash, emdash, horizontal bar, and forward slash.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"(?i)[\\-|\\/|\u2013|\u2014|\u2015]w(in*d*o*w*s*t*y*l*e*)*\\s+[^-]\") | `malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate process can have this combination of command-line options, but it's not common.", "references": ["https://regexr.com/663rr", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses/blob/master/TestHarnesses/T1059.001_PowerShell/OutPowerShellCommandLineParameter.ps1", "https://ss64.com/ps/powershell.html", "https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/1440758396534214658?s=20", "https://blog.netlab.360.com/ten-families-of-malicious-samples-are-spreading-using-the-log4j2-vulnerability-now/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "HAFNIUM Group", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Command And Control"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/hidden_powershell/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "PowerShell processes $process$ started with parameters to modify the execution policy of the run, run in a hidden window, and connect to the Internet on host $dest$ executed by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059.001", "T1059"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process", "type": "Process", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["PowerShell", "Command and Scripting Interpreter"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "Gallmaker", "Turla", "APT19", "DarkHydrus", "APT28", "Thrip", "Gorgon Group", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leviathan", "TA459", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT32", "FIN7", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "APT3", "APT29", "Deep Panda", "APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_powershell"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window_filter"}]}, {"name": "Anomalous usage of 7zip", "id": "9364ee8e-a39a-11eb-8f1d-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-22", "author": "Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies a 7z.exe spawned from `Rundll32.exe` or `Dllhost.exe`. It is assumed that the adversary has brought in `7z.exe` and `7z.dll`. It has been observed where an adversary will rename `7z.exe`. Additional coverage may be required to identify the behavior of renamed instances of `7z.exe`. During triage, identify the source of injection into `Rundll32.exe` or `Dllhost.exe`. Capture any files written to disk and analyze as needed. Review parallel processes for additional behaviors. Typically, archiving files will result in exfiltration.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"rundll32.exe\", \"dllhost.exe\") Processes.process_name=*7z* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `anomalous_usage_of_7zip_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as this behavior is not normal for `rundll32.exe` or `dllhost.exe` to spawn and run 7zip.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/001/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/", "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/01/31/bazar-no-ryuk/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike", "NOBELIUM Group"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1560.001/archive_utility/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior is indicative of suspicious loading of 7zip.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1560.001", "T1560"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Archive via Utility", "Archive Collected Data"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Soft Cell", "Turla", "Gallmaker", "APT33", "APT39", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "FIN8", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT3", "Sowbug", "menuPass", "APT1", "Ke3chang", "menuPass", "APT32", "Honeybee", "Patchwork", "APT28", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN6", "Lazarus Group", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "anomalous_usage_of_7zip_filter"}]}, {"name": "Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID", "id": "dc64d064-d346-11eb-8588-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-22", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic will identify suspicious process of cscript.exe where it tries to execute javascript using jscript.encode CLSID (COM OBJ). This technique was seen in ransomware (reddot ransomware) where it execute javascript with this com object with combination of amsi disabling technique.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"cscript.exe\" Processes.process=\"*-e:{F414C262-6AC0-11CF-B6D1-00AA00BBBB58}*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `execute_javascript_with_jscript_com_clsid_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/c0f98850-af65-4352-9746-fbebadee4f05/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious process of cscript.exe with a parent process $parent_process_name$ where it tries to execute javascript using jscript.encode CLSID (COM OBJ), detected on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.005"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_id", "type": "Process", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process Name", "role": ["Parent Process", "Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "Visual Basic"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "APT-C-36", "Rancor", "Patchwork", "MuddyWater", "Honeybee", "FIN7", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "Turla", "TA505", "Silence", "WIRTE", "FIN4", "Cobalt Group", "Gorgon Group", "Leviathan", "TA459", "Magic Hound"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "execute_javascript_with_jscript_com_clsid_filter"}]}, {"name": "Check Elevated CMD using whoami", "id": "a9079b18-1633-11ec-859c-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-15", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious whoami execution to check if the cmd or shell instance process is with elevated privileges. This technique was seen in FIN7 js implant where it execute this as part of its data collection to the infected machine to check if the running shell cmd process is elevated or not. This TTP is really a good alert for known attacker that recon on the targetted host. This command is not so commonly executed by a normal user or even an admin to check if a process is elevated.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*whoami*\" Processes.process = \"*/group*\" Processes.process = \"* find *\" Processes.process = \"*12288*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `check_elevated_cmd_using_whoami_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["FIN7"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_js_2/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Process name $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1033"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Owner/User Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Frankenstein", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Tropic Trooper", "APT39", "MuddyWater", "APT32", "APT37", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "Magic Hound", "FIN10", "Gamaredon Group", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "APT3"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "check_elevated_cmd_using_whoami_filter"}]}, {"name": "Attacker Tools On Endpoint", "id": "a51bfe1a-94f0-48cc-b4e4-16a110145893", "version": 2, "date": "2021-11-04", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for execution of commonly used attacker tools on an endpoint.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.dest!=unknown Processes.user!=unknown by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | lookup attacker_tools attacker_tool_names AS process_name OUTPUT description | search description !=false| `attacker_tools_on_endpoint_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is usually generated via logs that report process tracking in your Windows audit settings.", "known_false_positives": "Some administrator activity can be potentially triggered, please add those users to the filter macro.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Monitor for Unauthorized Software", "XMRig", "SamSam Ransomware", "Unusual Processes"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 2"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exploitation", "Stage:Recon", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1595/attacker_scan_tools/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An attacker tool $process_name$,listed in attacker_tools.csv is executed on host $dest$ by User $user$. This process $process_name$ is known to do- $description$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1036.005", "T1036", "T1003", "T1595"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process", "Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Match Legitimate Name or Location", "Masquerading", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "APT39", "Blue Mockingbird", "Whitefly", "Tropic Trooper", "Silence", "APT41", "menuPass", "TEMP.Veles", "MuddyWater", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Sowbug", "APT32", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "admin@338", "Carbanak", "APT1", "Windshift", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "attacker_tools_on_endpoint_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A list of tools used by attackers", "filename": "attacker_tools.csv", "name": "attacker_tools", "default_match": "false", "match_type": "WILDCARD(attacker_tool_names)", "min_matches": 1, "case_sensitive_match": "false", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/attacker_tools.csv"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawning CertUtil", "id": "6925fe72-a6d5-11eb-9e17-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-04-26", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `certutil.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `certutil.exe` will contain a URL to a remote destination. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `certutil.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `certutil.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\") `process_certutil` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_certutil_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "No false positives known. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/threats/TA551/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1105/T1105.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "recon"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_macros.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Phishing", "Spearphishing Attachment"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=certutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=CertUtil.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_certutil"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "office_product_spawning_certutil_filter"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell", "id": "203ef0ea-9bd8-11eb-8201-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed with a native Windows shell (PowerShell, Cmd, Wscript, Cscript).\\\nThe search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not.\\\nschtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\\Windows\\system32` and `C:\\Windows\\syswow64`.\\\nThe following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory.\\\nUpon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message | search Command IN (\"*powershell.exe*\", \"*wscript.exe*\", \"*cscript.exe*\", \"*cmd.exe*\", \"*sh.exe*\", \"*ksh.exe*\", \"*zsh.exe*\", \"*bash.exe*\", \"*scrcons.exe*\", \"*pwsh.exe*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Task_Name, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required.", "known_false_positives": "False positives are possible if legitimate applications are allowed to register tasks that call a shell to be spawned. Filter as needed based on command-line or processes that are used legitimately.", "references": ["https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/irans-apt34-returns-with-an-updated-arsenal/", "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4698", "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/scheduled-task-job/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/taskschd/time-trigger-example--scripting-?redirectedfrom=MSDN"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "message": "A windows scheduled task was created (task name=$Task_Name$) on $dest$ by the following command: $Command$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Command", "type": "Command", "role": ["Target"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "Task_Name", "Description", "Command"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Scheduled Task", "Scheduled Task/Job"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "MuddyWater", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT-C-36", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT41", "Machete", "Soft Cell", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Patchwork", "OilRig", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "FIN8", "menuPass", "FIN10", "APT32", "FIN7", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments", "id": "e451bd16-e4c5-4109-8eb1-c4c6ecf048b4", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-20", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for rundll32.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(rundll32\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | `suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32", "https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Cobalt Strike", "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Suspicious rundll32.exe process with no command line arguments executed on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Rundll32"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT32", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "TA505", "MuddyWater", "APT29", "APT19", "CopyKittens", "APT3", "Carbanak", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_rundll32"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments_filter"}]}, {"name": "Short Lived Scheduled Task", "id": "6fa31414-546e-11ec-adfa-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-03", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic leverages Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created` and Windows Security EventCode 4699, `A scheduled task was deleted` to identify scheduled tasks created and deleted in less than 30 seconds. This behavior may represent a lateral movement attack abusing the Task Scheduler to obtain code execution. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution.", "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 OR EventCode=4699 | xmlkv Message | transaction Task_Name startswith=(EventCode=4698) endswith=(EventCode=4699) | eval short_lived=case((duration<30),\"TRUE\") | search short_lived = TRUE | table _time, ComputerName, Account_Name, Command, Task_Name, short_lived | `short_lived_scheduled_task_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required.", "known_false_positives": "Although uncommon, legitimate applications may create and delete a Scheduled Task within 30 seconds. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/taskschd/about-the-task-scheduler"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/lateral_movement/windows-security.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "message": "A windows scheduled task was created and deleted in 30 seconds on $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053.005"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Command", "type": "Command", "role": ["Target"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "ComputerName", "Account_Name", "Task_Name", "Description", "Command"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Scheduled Task"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "MuddyWater", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT-C-36", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT41", "Machete", "Soft Cell", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Patchwork", "OilRig", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "FIN8", "menuPass", "FIN10", "APT32", "FIN7", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT29"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "short_lived_scheduled_task_filter"}]}, {"name": "Winword Spawning Windows Script Host", "id": "637e1b5c-9be1-11eb-9c32-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies Microsoft Winword.exe spawning Windows Script Host - `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe`. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with Winword.exe. Winword.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Office16` (version will vary). `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` default location is `c:\\windows\\system32\\` or c:windows\\syswow64\\`. `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` spawning from Winword.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command-line executed will most likely be obfuscated and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. Review the reputation of the remote destination and block accordingly.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=\"winword.exe\" Processes.process_name IN (\"cscript.exe\", \"wscript.exe\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winword_spawning_windows_script_host_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "There will be limited false positives and it will be different for every environment. Tune by child process or command-line as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachment"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_wsh.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "User $user$ on $dest$ spawned Windows Script Host from Winword.exe", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Target"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "process_name", "process_id", "parent_process_name", "dest", "user", "parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Phishing", "Spearphishing Attachment"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "winword_spawning_windows_script_host_filter"}]}, {"name": "Logon Script Event Trigger Execution", "id": "4c38c264-1f74-11ec-b5fa-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-27", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry entry to persist and gain privilege escalation upon booting up of compromised host. This technique was seen in several APT and malware where it modify UserInitMprLogonScript registry entry to its malicious payload to be executed upon boot up of the machine.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path IN (\"*\\\\Environment\\\\UserInitMprLogonScript\") by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `logon_script_event_trigger_execution_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/001"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Privilege Escalation Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1037.001/logonscript_reg/sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1037", "T1037.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts", "Logon Script (Windows)"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Rocke", "Cobalt Group", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "logon_script_event_trigger_execution_filter"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Writing cab or inf", "id": "f48cd1d4-125a-11ec-a447-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-10", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies behavior related to CVE-2021-40444. Whereas the malicious document will load ActiveX and download the remote payload (.inf, .cab). During triage, review parallel processes and further activity on endpoint to identify additional patterns. Retrieve the file modifications and analyze further.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\",\"wordpad.exe\",\"wordview.exe\") by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*.inf\",\"*.cab\") by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process] | dedup file_create_time | table dest, process_name, process, file_create_time, file_name, file_path | `office_product_writing_cab_or_inf_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node and `Filesystem` node.", "known_false_positives": "The query is structured in a way that `action` (read, create) is not defined. Review the results of this query, filter, and tune as necessary. It may be necessary to generate this query specific to your endpoint product.", "references": ["https://twitter.com/vxunderground/status/1436326057179860992?s=20", "https://app.any.run/tasks/36c14029-9df8-439c-bba0-45f2643b0c70/", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", "https://twitter.com/RonnyTNL/status/1436334640617373699?s=20"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_cabinf.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on $dest$ writing an inf or cab file to this. This is not typical of $process_name$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "process_name", "process", "file_create_time", "file_name", "file_path"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Phishing", "Spearphishing Attachment"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "office_product_writing_cab_or_inf_filter"}]}, {"name": "Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App", "id": "35159940-228f-11ec-8a49-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-01", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious wscript commandline to execute vbscript. This technique was seen in several malware to execute malicious vbs file using wscript application. commonly vbs script is associated to cscript process and this can be a technique to evade process parent child detections or even some av script emulation system.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = \"wscript.exe\" AND Processes.parent_process = \"*//e:vbscript*\") OR (Processes.process_name = \"wscript.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*//e:vbscript*\") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `vbscript_execution_using_wscript_app_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/369332/0/html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["FIN7", "Remcos"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/vbs_wscript/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Process name $process_name$ with commandline $process$ to execute vbsscript", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059.005", "T1059"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Visual Basic", "Command and Scripting Interpreter"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "APT-C-36", "Rancor", "Patchwork", "MuddyWater", "Honeybee", "FIN7", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "Turla", "TA505", "Silence", "WIRTE", "FIN4", "Cobalt Group", "Gorgon Group", "Leviathan", "TA459", "Magic Hound", "APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "vbscript_execution_using_wscript_app_filter"}]}, {"name": "Create or delete windows shares using net exe", "id": "qw9919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-151bb162140e", "version": 6, "date": "2020-09-16", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for the creation or deletion of hidden shares using net.exe.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.user) as user values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` by Processes.process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search process=*share* | `create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators often leverage net.exe to create or delete network shares. You should verify that the activity was intentional and is legitimate.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/005"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Hidden Cobra Malware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ enumerating Windows file shares.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1070", "T1070.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Indicator Removal on Host", "Network Share Connection Removal"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Threat Group-3390"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_net"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe_filter"}]}, {"name": "WSReset UAC Bypass", "id": "8b5901bc-da63-11eb-be43-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-01", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry related to UAC bypass. This technique is to modify the registry in this detection, create a registry value with the path of the payload and run WSreset.exe to bypass User account Control.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\AppX82a6gwre4fdg3bt635tn5ctqjf8msdd2\\\\Shell\\\\open\\\\command*\" (Registry.registry_value_name = \"(Default)\" OR Registry.registry_value_name = \"DelegateExecute\") by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wsreset_uac_bypass_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME", "https://blog.morphisec.com/trickbot-uses-a-new-windows-10-uac-bypass"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Incoming"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious modification of registry $registry_path$ with possible payload path $registry_value_name$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.dest"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Bypass User Access Control", "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "MuddyWater", "Honeybee", "Cobalt Group", "Threat Group-3390", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Patchwork", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "wsreset_uac_bypass_filter"}]}, {"name": "Conti Common Exec parameter", "id": "624919bc-c382-11eb-adcc-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-02", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search detects the suspicious commandline argument of revil ransomware to encrypt specific or all local drive and network shares of the compromised machine or host.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*-m local*\" OR Processes.process = \"*-m net*\" OR Processes.process = \"*-m all*\" OR Processes.process = \"*-nomutex*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `conti_common_exec_parameter_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "3rd party tool may have commandline parameter that can trigger this detection.", "references": ["https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.conti"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/conti/inf1/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ executing specific Conti Ransomware related parameters.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1204"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["User Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "conti_common_exec_parameter_filter"}]}, {"name": "Disable Defender Enhanced Notification", "id": "dc65678c-301f-11ec-8e30-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-18", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable windows defender feature. This technique is to bypassed or evade detection from Windows Defender AV product specially the Enhanced Notification feature wher user or admin set to show or display alerts.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = \"*Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Reporting*\" Registry.registry_value_name = DisableEnhancedNotifications Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000001 by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `disable_defender_enhanced_notification_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the registry value name, registry path, and registry value data executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "user may choose to disable windows defender AV", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["IceID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_value_data"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disable_defender_enhanced_notification_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi", "id": "61e7b44a-6088-4f26-b788-9a96ba13b37a", "version": 2, "date": "2021-02-04", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading setupapi.dll and iesetupapi.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line. This particular technique will load script code from a file. Upon a successful execution, the following module loads may occur - clr.dll, jscript.dll and scrobj.dll. During investigation, identify script content origination. Generally, a child process will spawn from rundll32.exe, but that may be bypassed based on script code contents. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64. During investigation, review any network connections and obtain the script content executed. It's possible other files are on disk.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*setupapi* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use setupapi triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Setupapi/", "https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ loading setupapi.dll and iesetupapi.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Rundll32"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT32", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "TA505", "MuddyWater", "APT29", "APT19", "CopyKittens", "APT3", "Carbanak", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_rundll32"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi_filter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry", "id": "13395a44-4dd9-11ec-9df7-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-25", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic will detect a suspicious process that modify a registry related to windows defender exclusion feature. This registry is abused by adversaries, malware author and red teams to bypassed Windows Defender Anti-Virus product by excluding folder path, file path, process, extensions and etc. from its real time or schedule scan to execute their malicious code. This is a good indicator for a defense evasion and to look further for events after this behavior.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Exclusions\\\\*\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to use this windows features.", "references": ["https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.html", "https://app.any.run/tasks/cf1245de-06a7-4366-8209-8e3006f2bfe5/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Remcos", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/defender_exclusion_sysmon/sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "exclusion registry $registry_path$ modified or added on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.user", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.registry_value_data"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry_filter"}]}, {"name": "Disabling Firewall with Netsh", "id": "6860a62c-9203-11eb-9e05-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-03-31", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to identifies suspicious firewall disabling using netsh application. this technique is commonly seen in malware that tries to communicate or download its component or other payload to its C2 server.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_netsh` Processes.process= \"*firewall*\" (Processes.process= \"*off*\" OR Processes.process= \"*disable*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_firewall_with_netsh_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "admin may disable firewall during testing or fixing network problem.", "references": ["https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.htm"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The Windows Firewall was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=netsh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=netsh.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_netsh"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disabling_firewall_with_netsh_filter"}]}, {"name": "Remote System Discovery with Net", "id": "9df16706-04a2-41e2-bbfe-9b38b34409d3", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-30", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The argument `domain computers /domain` returns a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\") (Processes.process=\"*domain computers*\" AND Processes.process=*/do*) OR (Processes.process=\"*view*\" AND Processes.process=*/do*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_system_discovery_with_net_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote System Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Rocke", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT39", "APT32", "Deep Panda", "Threat Group-3390", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leafminer", "Ke3chang", "FIN8", "APT3", "FIN5", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Turla"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "remote_system_discovery_with_net_filter"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell Domain Enumeration", "id": "e1866ce2-ca22-11eb-8e44-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-10", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies specific PowerShell modules typically used to enumerate an organizations domain or users. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message IN (*get-netdomaintrust*, *get-netforesttrust*, *get-addomain*, *get-adgroupmember*, *get-domainuser*) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_domain_enumeration_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible there will be false positives, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "recon"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains domain enumeration command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Message", "ComputerName", "EventCode"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "PowerShell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "Gallmaker", "Turla", "APT19", "DarkHydrus", "APT28", "Thrip", "Gorgon Group", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leviathan", "TA459", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT32", "FIN7", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "APT3", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "powershell_domain_enumeration_filter"}]}, {"name": "Process Execution via WMI", "id": "24869767-8579-485d-9a4f-d9ddfd8f0cac", "version": 4, "date": "2020-03-16", "author": "Rico Valdez, Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies `WmiPrvSE.exe` spawning a process. This typically occurs when a process is instantiated from a local or remote process using `wmic.exe`. During triage, review parallel processes for suspicious behavior or commands executed. Review the process and command-line spawning from `wmiprvse.exe`. Contain and remediate the endpoint as necessary.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=WmiPrvSE.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `process_execution_via_wmi_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, administrators may use wmi to execute commands for legitimate purposes.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A remote instance execution of wmic.exe that will spawn $parent_process_name$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.user", "Processes.dest", "Processes.process_name"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Windows Management Instrumentation"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT41", "FIN6", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Threat Group-3390", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "menuPass", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "process_execution_via_wmi_filter"}]}, {"name": "Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App", "id": "cd80a6ac-c9d9-11eb-8839-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-10", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this search is to detect execution of `cipher.exe` to clear the unallocated sectors of a specific disk. This technique was seen in some ransomware to make it impossible to forensically recover deleted files.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"cipher.exe\" Processes.process = \"*/w:*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "administrator may execute this app to manage disk", "references": ["https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/vatet-pyxie-defray777/3/", "https://www.sophos.com/en-us/medialibrary/PDFs/technical-papers/sophoslabs-ransomware-behavior-report.pdf"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Impact"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to clear the unallocated sectors of a specific disk.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1070.004", "T1070"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["File Deletion", "Indicator Removal on Host"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Rocke", "Tropic Trooper", "Gamaredon Group", "Wizard Spider", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Silence", "The White Company", "TEMP.Veles", "APT32", "APT38", "Patchwork", "Honeybee", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "menuPass", "FIN8", "OilRig", "FIN5", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Magic Hound", "APT3", "FIN10", "APT28", "Threat Group-3390", "Group5", "Lazarus Group", "APT18", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app_filter"}]}, {"name": "Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen", "id": "834ba832-ad89-11eb-937d-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-05", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies a suspicious registry modification to hide a user account on the Windows Login screen. This technique was seen in some tradecraft where the adversary will create a hidden user account with Admin privileges in login screen to avoid noticing by the user that they already compromise and to persist on that said machine.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\SpecialAccounts\\\\Userlist*\" AND Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000000\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_value_data | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `hide_user_account_from_sign_in_screen_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as CarbonBlack or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/hotkey_disabled_hidden_user/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious registry modification ($registry_value_name$) which is used go hide a user account on the Windows Login screen detected on $dest$ executed by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "registry_value_name", "type": "Other", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.dest Registry.user"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "hide_user_account_from_sign_in_screen_filter"}]}, {"name": "NET Profiler UAC bypass", "id": "0252ca80-e30d-11eb-8aa3-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-12", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect modification of registry to bypass UAC windows feature. This technique is to add a payload dll path on .NET COR file path that will be loaded by mmc.exe as soon it was executed. This detection rely on monitoring the registry key and values in the detection area. It may happened that windows update some dll related to mmc.exe and add dll path in this registry. In this case filtering is needed.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Environment\\\\COR_PROFILER_PATH\" Registry.registry_value_name = \"*.dll\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `net_profiler_uac_bypass_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "limited false positive. It may trigger by some windows update that will modify this registry.", "references": ["https://offsec.almond.consulting/UAC-bypass-dotnet.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence,", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Incoming"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon2.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious modification of registry $registry_path$ with possible payload path $registry_value_name$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.dest"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Bypass User Access Control", "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "MuddyWater", "Honeybee", "Cobalt Group", "Threat Group-3390", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Patchwork", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "net_profiler_uac_bypass_filter"}]}, {"name": "GetDomainComputer with PowerShell", "id": "ed550c19-712e-43f6-bd19-6f58f61b3a5e", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-07", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. `Get-DomainComputer` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-DomainComputer*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use PowerView for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 24, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote System Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Rocke", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT39", "APT32", "Deep Panda", "Threat Group-3390", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leafminer", "Ke3chang", "FIN8", "APT3", "FIN5", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Turla"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell Script Block", "id": "77f41d9e-b8be-47e3-ab35-5776f5ec1d20", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-13", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the use of PowerShell environment variables to identify the current logged user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*$env:UserName*\" OR Message = \"*[System.Environment]::UserName*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "System user discovery on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1033"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Path", "Message", "OpCode", "ComputerName", "User", "EventCode"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Owner/User Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Frankenstein", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Tropic Trooper", "APT39", "MuddyWater", "APT32", "APT37", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "Magic Hound", "FIN10", "Gamaredon Group", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "APT3"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_script_block_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag", "id": "b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-151xb162040e", "version": 4, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for events where `PsExec.exe` is run with the `accepteula` flag in the command line. PsExec is a built-in Windows utility that enables you to execute processes on other systems. It is fully interactive for console applications. This tool is widely used for launching interactive command prompts on remote systems. Threat actors leverage this extensively for executing code on compromised systems. If an attacker is running PsExec for the first time, they will be prompted to accept the end-user license agreement (EULA), which can be passed as the argument `accepteula` within the command line.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_psexec` Processes.process=*accepteula* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators can leverage PsExec for accessing remote systems and might pass `accepteula` as an argument if they are running this tool for the first time. However, it is not likely that you'd see multiple occurrences of this event on a machine", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "HAFNIUM Group", "DarkSide Ransomware", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ running the utility for possibly the first time.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021", "T1021.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote Services", "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "APT32", "Orangeworm", "FIN8", "APT3", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-1314", "Turla", "Deep Panda", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=psexec.exe OR Processes.process_name=psexec64.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=psexec.c)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_psexec"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag_filter"}]}, {"name": "Disabling Task Manager", "id": "dac279bc-9202-11eb-b7fb-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-31", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to identifies modification of registry to disable the task manager of windows operating system. this event or technique are commonly seen in malware such as RAT, Trojan, TrojanSpy or worm to prevent the user to terminate their process.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System\\\\DisableTaskMgr\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_task_manager_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "admin may disable this application for non technical user.", "references": ["https://any.run/report/ea4ea08407d4ee72e009103a3b77e5a09412b722fdef67315ea63f22011152af/a866d7b1-c236-4f26-a391-5ae32213dfc4#registry", "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/05/threat-roundup-0424-0501.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The Windows Task Manager was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.user", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disabling_task_manager_filter"}]}, {"name": "Change To Safe Mode With Network Config", "id": "81f1dce0-0f18-11ec-a5d7-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-06", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious bcdedit commandline to configure the host to boot in safe mode with network config. This technique was seen in blackMatter ransomware where it force the compromised host to boot in safe mode to continue its encryption and bring back to normal boot using bcdedit deletevalue command. This TTP can be a good alert for host that booted from safe mode forcefully since it need to modify the boot configuration to bring it back to normal.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = bcdedit.exe Processes.process=\"*/set*\" Processes.process=\"*{current}*\" Processes.process=\"*safeboot*\" Processes.process=\"*network*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user |`drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `change_to_safe_mode_with_network_config_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/08/09/blackmatter-ransomware-emerges-from-the-shadow-of-darkside/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["BlackMatter Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Impact"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1552.002/autoadminlogon/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "bcdedit process with commandline $process$ to force safemode boot the $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1490"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Inhibit System Recovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "change_to_safe_mode_with_network_config_filter"}]}, {"name": "Process Kill Base On File Path", "id": "5ffaa42c-acdb-11eb-9ad3-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-05-04", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of `wmic.exe` using `delete` to remove a executable path. This is typically ran via a batch file during beginning stages of an adversary setting up for mining on an endpoint.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` AND Processes.process=\"*process*\" AND Processes.process=\"*executablepath*\" AND Processes.process=\"*delete*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `process_kill_base_on_file_path_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A process $process_name$ attempt to kill process by its file path using commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_wmic"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "process_kill_base_on_file_path_filter"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process", "id": "2dbeee3a-f067-11eb-96c0-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-29", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies the suspicious Remote Thread execution of rundll32.exe process to cmd.exe process. This technique was seen in IcedID malware to execute its malicious code in normal process for defense evasion and to steal sensitive information the the compromised host. browser process.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=8 SourceImage = \"*\\\\rundll32.exe\" TargetImage = \"*.exe\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by SourceImage TargetImage TargetProcessId SourceProcessId StartAddress EventCode Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the SourceImage, TargetImage, and EventCode executions from your endpoints related to create remote thread or injecting codes. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/380662/0/html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "rundl32 process $SourceImage$ create a remote thread to process $TargetImage$ in host $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "SourceImage", "type": "process name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "SourceImage", "TargetImage", "TargetProcessId", "SourceProcessId", "StartAddress", "EventCode", "Computer"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Process Injection"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Cobalt Group", "APT37", "Honeybee", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process_filter"}]}, {"name": "Disabling Remote User Account Control", "id": "bbc644bc-37df-4e1a-9c88-ec9a53e2038c", "version": 4, "date": "2020-11-18", "author": "David Dorsey, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The search looks for modifications to registry keys that control the enforcement of Windows User Account Control (UAC).", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System\\\\EnableLUA* Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000000\" by Registry.dest, Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `disabling_remote_user_account_control_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report registry modifications.", "known_false_positives": "This registry key may be modified via administrators to implement a change in system policy. This type of change should be a very rare occurrence.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Remcos"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "The Windows registry keys that control the enforcement of Windows User Account Control (UAC) were modified on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.user", "Registry.action"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Bypass User Access Control", "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "MuddyWater", "Honeybee", "Cobalt Group", "Threat Group-3390", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Patchwork", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disabling_remote_user_account_control_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory", "id": "7feb7972-7ac3-11eb-bac8-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-01", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies Scheduled Tasks registering (creating a new task) a binary or script to run from a public directory which includes users\\public, \\programdata\\ and \\windows\\temp. Upon triage, review the binary or script in the command line for legitimacy, whether an approved binary/script or not. In addition, capture the binary or script in question and analyze for further behaviors. Identify the source and contain the endpoint.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe (Processes.process=*\\\\users\\\\public\\\\* OR Processes.process=*\\\\programdata\\\\* OR Processes.process=*windows\\\\temp*) Processes.process=*/create* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives may be present. Filter as needed by parent process or command line argument.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/schtasks/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "message": "Suspicious scheduled task registered on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Scheduled Task", "Scheduled Task/Job"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "MuddyWater", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT-C-36", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT41", "Machete", "Soft Cell", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Patchwork", "OilRig", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "FIN8", "menuPass", "FIN10", "APT32", "FIN7", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory_filter"}]}, {"name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", "id": "14038953-e5f2-4daf-acff-5452062baf03", "version": 2, "date": "2021-11-29", "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of `reg.exe` attempting to export Windows registry keys that contain hashed credentials. Adversaries will utilize this technique to capture and perform offline password cracking.", "search": " | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)) | eval process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null)), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null), dest_user_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), dest_device_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where process_name=\"cmd.exe\" OR process_name=\"reg.exe\" | where cmd_line != null AND match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)save\\s+/)=true AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)HKLM\\\\Security/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)HKLM\\\\SAM/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)HKLM\\\\System/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\Security/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\SAM/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\System/)=true ) | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend(dest_device_id, dest_user_id), body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line, \"process_name\", process_name]) | into write_ssa_detected_events(); ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "None identified.", "references": ["https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/55a17c65f9f56c2220000b62701765422b46125d/detections/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:AD", "Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An attempt to save registry keys storing credentials has been performed on $dest_device_id$ by $dest_user_id$ via process $process_name$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003", "T1003.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "User", "role": ["Actor"]}, {"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["process_name", "_time", "dest_device_id", "dest_user_id", "process", "cmd_line"], "risk_score": 63, "risk_severity": "low", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["OS Credential Dumping", "Security Account Manager"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom", "Threat Group-3390", "Ke3chang", "Soft Cell", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "menuPass"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter"}]}, {"name": "Uninstall App Using MsiExec", "id": "1fca2b28-f922-11eb-b2dd-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-09", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious un-installation of application using msiexec. This technique was seen in conti leak tool and script where it tries to uninstall AV product using this commandline. This commandline to uninstall product is not a common practice in enterprise network.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=msiexec.exe Processes.process= \"* /qn *\" Processes.process= \"*/X*\" Processes.process= \"*REBOOT=*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `uninstall_app_using_msiexec_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown.", "references": ["https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1423361119926816776.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/conti/conti_leak/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "process $process_name$ with a cmdline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218.007", "T1218"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "process name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 30, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Msiexec", "Signed Binary Proxy Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TA505", "Rancor", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "uninstall_app_using_msiexec_filter"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser", "id": "f8a22586-ee2d-11eb-a193-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies the suspicious Remote Thread execution of rundll32.exe process to \"firefox.exe\" and \"chrome.exe\" browser. This technique was seen in IcedID malware where it hooks the browser to parse banking information as user used the targetted browser process.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=8 SourceImage = \"*\\\\rundll32.exe\" TargetImage IN (\"*\\\\firefox.exe\", \"*\\\\chrome.exe\", \"*\\\\iexplore.exe\",\"*\\\\microsoftedgecp.exe\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by SourceImage TargetImage TargetProcessId SourceProcessId StartAddress EventCode Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the SourceImage, TargetImage, and EventCode executions from your endpoints related to create remote thread or injecting codes. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/380662/0/html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "rundl32 process $SourceImage$ create a remote thread to browser process $TargetImage$ in host $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "SourceImage", "type": "process name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "SourceImage", "TargetImage", "TargetProcessId", "SourceProcessId", "StartAddress", "EventCode", "Computer"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Process Injection"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Cobalt Group", "APT37", "Honeybee", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser_filter"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility", "id": "cb6b339e-d4c6-11eb-a026-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-24", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious excessive usage of sc.exe in a host machine. This technique was seen in several ransomware , xmrig and other malware to create, modify, delete or disable a service may related to security application or to gain privilege escalation.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode = 1 process_name = \"sc.exe\" | bucket _time span=15m | stats values(process) as process count as numScExe by Computer, _time | eventstats avg(numScExe) as avgScExe, stdev(numScExe) as stdScExe, count as numSlots by Computer | eval upperThreshold=(avgScExe + stdScExe *3) | eval isOutlier=if(avgScExe > 5 and avgScExe >= upperThreshold, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed taskkill.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "excessive execution of sc.exe is quite suspicious since it can modify or execute app in high privilege permission.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/c0f98850-af65-4352-9746-fbebadee4f05/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1569", "T1569.002"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "process_name", "process"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Services", "Service Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "APT41", "Silence", "FIN6", "APT32", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility_filter"}]}, {"name": "Services Escalate Exe", "id": "c448488c-b7ec-11eb-8253-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-18", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of `svc-exe` with Cobalt Strike. The behavior typically follows after an adversary has already gained initial access and is escalating privileges. Using `svc-exe`, a randomly named binary will be downloaded from the remote Teamserver and placed on disk within `C:\\Windows\\400619a.exe`. Following, the binary will be added to the registry under key `HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\400619a\\` with multiple keys and values added to look like a legitimate service. Upon loading, `services.exe` will spawn the randomly named binary from `\\\\127.0.0.1\\ADMIN$\\400619a.exe`. The process lineage is completed with `400619a.exe` spawning rundll32.exe, which is the default `spawnto_` value for Cobalt Strike. The `spawnto_` value is arbitrary and may be any process on disk (typically system32/syswow64 binary). The `spawnto_` process will also contain a network connection. During triage, review parallel procesess and identify any additional file modifications.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe Processes.process_path=*admin$* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `services_escalate_exe_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as `services.exe` should never spawn a process from `ADMIN$`. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/", "https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-beacon"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 95, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Privilege Escalation"}, "Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "message": "A service process $parent_process_name$ with process path $process_path$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "Processes.dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Processes.user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 76, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "services_escalate_exe_filter"}]}, {"name": "GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell", "id": "df275a44-4527-443b-b884-7600e066e3eb", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-25", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `-class ds_group` parameter can be used to return the full list of groups in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI in this case, using PowerShell, to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-WmiObject* AND Processes.process=\"*namespace root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*\" AND Processes.process=\"*class ds_group*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/get-wmiobject?view=powershell-5.1"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Permission Groups Discovery", "Domain Groups"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TA505", "APT3", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "Inception", "OilRig", "FIN6", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Firewall Allowed Program Enable", "id": "9a8f63a8-43ac-11ec-904c-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-12", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic detects a potential suspicious modification of firewall rule allowing to execute specific application. This technique was identified when an adversary and red teams to bypassed firewall file execution restriction in a targetted host. Take note that this event or command can run by administrator during testing or allowing legitimate tool or application.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*firewall*\" Processes.process = \"*allowedprogram*\" Processes.process = \"*add*\" Processes.process = \"*ENABLE*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `firewall_allowed_program_enable_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated or manual execution of this firewall rule that may generate false positives. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/ad4c3cda-41f2-4401-8dba-56cc2d245488/#"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/vilsel/sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "firewall allowed program commandline $process$ of $process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.004", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify System Firewall", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Rocke", "Lazarus Group", "Kimsuky", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Carbanak", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "firewall_allowed_program_enable_filter"}]}, {"name": "Disable Schedule Task", "id": "db596056-3019-11ec-a9ff-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-18", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious commandline to disable existing schedule task. This technique is used by adversaries or commodity malware like IceID to disable security application (AV products) in the targetted host to evade detections. This TTP is a good pivot to check further why and what other process run before and after this detection. check which process execute the commandline and what task is disabled. parent child process is quite valuable in this scenario too.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe Processes.process=*/change* Processes.process=*/disable* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_schedule_task_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "admin may disable problematic schedule task", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_schtask/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "schtask process with commandline $process$ to disable schedule task in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disable_schedule_task_filter"}]}, {"name": "Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell", "id": "a4e8f3a4-48b2-11ec-bcfc-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-18", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the usage of the `Enter-PSSession`. This commandlet can be used to open an interactive session on a remote endpoint leveraging the WinRM protocol. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WinRM and `Enter-PSSession` for lateral movement and remote code execution.", "search": "powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message=\"*Enter-PSSession*\" AND Message=\"*-ComputerName*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `interactive_session_on_remote_endpoint_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup instructions can be found https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may leverage WinRM and `Enter-PSSession` for administrative and troubleshooting tasks. This activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. In certain environments, tuning may not be possible.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/enter-pssession?view=powershell-7.2"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement_pssession/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "message": "An interactive session was opened on a remote endpoint from $ComputerName", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021", "T1021.006"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 45, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote Services", "Windows Remote Management"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Threat Group-3390"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "interactive_session_on_remote_endpoint_with_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Schtasks Run Task On Demand", "id": "bb37061e-af1f-11eb-a159-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-07", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies an on demand run of a Windows Schedule Task through shell or command-line. This technique has been used by adversaries that force to run their created Schedule Task as their persistence mechanism or for lateral movement as part of their malicious attack to the compromised machine.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"schtasks.exe\" Processes.process = \"*/run*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schtasks_run_task_on_demand_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed schtasks.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may use to debug Schedule Task entries. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}, "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A \"on demand\" execution of schedule task process $process_name$ using commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 48, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Scheduled Task/Job"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "schtasks_run_task_on_demand_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Excessive Account Lockouts From Endpoint", "id": "c026e3dd-7e18-4abb-8f41-929e836efe74", "version": 5, "date": "2020-11-09", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search identifies endpoints that have caused a relatively high number of account lockouts in a short period.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.user) as user from datamodel=Change.All_Changes where nodename=All_Changes.Account_Management All_Changes.result=\"lockout\" by All_Changes.dest All_Changes.result |`drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` |`drop_dm_object_name(\"Account_Management\")`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search count > 5 | `detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must ingest your Windows security event logs in the `Change` datamodel under the nodename is `Account_Management`, for this search to execute successfully. Please consider updating the cron schedule and the count of lockouts you want to monitor, according to your environment. \\\n **Splunk>Phantom Playbook Integration**\\\nIf Splunk>Phantom is also configured in your environment, a Playbook called \"Excessive Account Lockouts Enrichment and Response\" can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. The Playbook executes the Contextual and Investigative searches in this Story, conducts additional information gathering on Windows endpoints, and takes a response action to shut down the affected endpoint. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/`, add the correct hostname to the \"Phantom Instance\" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search, and set the corresponding Playbook to active. \\\n(Playbook Link:`https://my.phantom.us/4.1/playbook/excessive-account-lockouts-enrichment-and-response/`).\\\n", "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a widely used system, such as a kiosk, could cause a large number of account lockouts.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Account Monitoring and Controls"], "asset_type": "Windows", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/account_lockout/windows-security.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/account_lockout/windows-system.log"], "impact": 60, "message": "Multiple accounts have been locked out. Review $dest$ and results related to $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078", "T1078.002"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.user", "nodename", "All_Changes.result", "All_Changes.dest"], "risk_score": 36, "security_domain": "access", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Valid Accounts", "Domain Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak", "TA505", "APT3", "Threat Group-1314"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint_filter"}]}, {"name": "Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest", "id": "41243735-89a7-4c83-bcdd-570aa78f00a1", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-30", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `nltest.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The arguments `/dclist:` and '/dsgetdc:', can be used to return a list of all domain controllers. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use nltest.exe to identify domain controllers in a Windows Domain for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"nltest.exe\") (Processes.process=\"*/dclist:*\" OR Processes.process=\"*/dsgetdc:*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_controller_discovery_with_nltest_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Domain controller discovery on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 21, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote System Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Rocke", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT39", "APT32", "Deep Panda", "Threat Group-3390", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leafminer", "Ke3chang", "FIN8", "APT3", "FIN5", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Turla"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "domain_controller_discovery_with_nltest_filter"}]}, {"name": "Loading Of Dynwrapx Module", "id": "eac5e8ba-4857-11ec-9371-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-18", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "DynamicWrapperX is an ActiveX component that can be used in a script to call Windows API functions, but it requires the dynwrapx.dll to be installed and registered. With that, registering or loading dynwrapx.dll to a host highly suspect. Why is it needed? In most malicious instances, During triage, review parallel processes and pivot on the process_guid. Review the registry for any suspicious modifications meant to load dynwrapx.dll. Identify any suspicious module loads of dynwrapx.dll. This will identify the process that will invoke vbs/wscript/cscript.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 (ImageLoaded = \"*\\\\dynwrapx.dll\" OR OriginalFileName = \"dynwrapx.dll\" OR Product = \"DynamicWrapperX\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded OriginalFileName Product process_name Computer EventCode Signed ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `loading_of_dynwrapx_module_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however it is possible to filter by Processes.process_name and specific processes (ex. wscript.exe). Filter as needed. This may need modification based on EDR telemetry and how it brings in registry data. For example, removal of (Default).", "references": ["https://blog.f-secure.com/hunting-for-koadic-a-com-based-rootkit/", "https://www.script-coding.com/dynwrapx_eng.html", "https://bohops.com/2018/06/28/abusing-com-registry-structure-clsid-localserver32-inprocserver32/", "https://tria.ge/210929-ap75vsddan", "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/cb77b93150cb0f7fe65ce8a7e2a5781e727419451355a7736db84109fa215a89"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_dynwrapx/sysmon_dynwraper.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "dynwrapx.dll loaded by process $process_name$ on $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1055", "T1055.001"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Image", "ImageLoaded", "OriginalFileName", "Product", "process_name", "Computer", "EventCode", "Signed", "ProcessId"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Process Injection", "Dynamic-link Library Injection"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Cobalt Group", "APT37", "Honeybee", "PLATINUM", "TA505", "Turla", "Tropic Trooper", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "loading_of_dynwrapx_module_filter"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 Shimcache Flush", "id": "a913718a-25b6-11ec-96d3-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-05", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious rundll32 commandline to clear shim cache. This technique is a anti-forensic technique to clear the cache taht are one important artifacts in terms of digital forensic during attacks or incident. This TTP is a good indicator that someone tries to evade some tools and clear foothold on the machine.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` AND Processes.process = \"*apphelp.dll,ShimFlushCache*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_shimcache_flush_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://blueteamops.medium.com/shimcache-flush-89daff28d15e"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Unusual Processes"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/shimcache_flush/sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "rundll32 process execute $process$ to clear shim cache in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1112"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Modify Registry"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Turla", "APT32", "APT38", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "Threat Group-3390", "Honeybee", "Patchwork", "Gorgon Group", "FIN8"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_rundll32"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "rundll32_shimcache_flush_filter"}]}, {"name": "Create Remote Thread In Shell Application", "id": "10399c1e-f51e-11eb-b920-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-04", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect suspicious process injection in command shell. This technique was seen in IcedID where it execute cmd.exe process to inject its shellcode as part of its execution as banking trojan. It is really uncommon to have a create remote thread execution in the following application.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=8 TargetImage IN (\"*\\\\cmd.exe\", \"*\\\\powershell*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by TargetImage TargetProcessId SourceProcessId EventCode StartAddress SourceImage Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `create_remote_thread_in_shell_application_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2021/07/19/icedid-and-cobalt-strike-vs-antivirus/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/simulated_icedid/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "process $SourceImage$ create a remote thread to shell app process $TargetImage$ in host $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "SourceImage", "type": "process name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "SourceImage", "TargetImage", "TargetProcessId", "SourceProcessId", "StartAddress", "EventCode", "Computer"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Process Injection"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Cobalt Group", "APT37", "Honeybee", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "create_remote_thread_in_shell_application_filter"}]}, {"name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", "id": "35682718-5a85-11ec-b8f7-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-11", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of wget on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wget (Processes.process=\"*-q *\" OR Processes.process=\"*--quiet*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-O- *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", "references": ["https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ingress Tool Transfer", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1105"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Ingress Tool Transfer"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Whitefly", "Rocke", "APT39", "Tropic Trooper", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Frankenstein", "Silence", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "APT33", "MuddyWater", "APT18", "APT38", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "OilRig", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT37", "FIN8", "PLATINUM", "Leviathan", "Elderwood", "Magic Hound", "APT3", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Patchwork", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-3390", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter"}]}, {"name": "File with Samsam Extension", "id": "02c6cfc2-ae66-4735-bfc7-6291da834cbf", "version": 1, "date": "2018-12-14", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The search looks for file writes with extensions consistent with a SamSam ransomware attack.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| rex field=file_name \"(?\\.[^\\.]+)$\" | search file_extension=.stubbin OR file_extension=.berkshire OR file_extension=.satoshi OR file_extension=.sophos OR file_extension=.keyxml | `file_with_samsam_extension_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data-model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.", "known_false_positives": "Because these extensions are not typically used in normal operations, you should investigate all results.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/samsam_extension/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "message": "File writes $file_name$ with extensions consistent with a SamSam ransomware attack seen on $dest$", "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "file_name", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Other", "Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.user", "Filesystem.dest", "Filesystem.file_path", "Filesystem.file_name"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "file_with_samsam_extension_filter"}]}, {"name": "Sdelete Application Execution", "id": "fcc52b9a-4616-11ec-8454-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-15", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "This analytic will detect the execution of sdelete.exe attempting to delete potentially important files that may related to adversary or insider threats to destroy evidence or information sabotage. Sdelete is a SysInternals utility meant to securely delete files on disk. This tool is commonly used to clear tracks and artifact on the targeted host.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event,\"_time\"), \"string\", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null)), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_path\"), \"string\", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null), parent_cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND process_name IS NOT NULL AND like(process_name, \"%sdelete%\") AND (like (cmd_line, \"%-c %\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%-f %\")OR like (cmd_line, \"%-p %\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%-r %\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%-q %\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%-s %\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%-z %\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%/accepteula%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%-nobanner%\")OR like (cmd_line, \"%.doc%\")OR like (cmd_line, \"%.xls%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%.ppt%\")OR like (cmd_line, \"%.rtf%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%.pdf%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%.key%\")OR like (cmd_line, \"%.log%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%.txt%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%.jpg%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%.png%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%.gif%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%.bmp%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%.7z%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%.zip%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%.rar%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%.tar%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%.gz%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%.xls%\")) | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null)), body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line, \"process_name\", process_name, \"process_path\", process_path, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process_name, \"parent_cmd_line\", parent_cmd_line]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1485/T1485.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Information Sabotage"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/sdelete/security.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Sdelete process $process_name$ executed on $dest_device_id$ attempting to permanently delete files by $dest_user_id$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1485", "T1070.004", "T1070"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "user", "parent_process_name", "parent_process", "process_name", "process", "process_id", "process_path", "cmd_line"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Data Destruction", "File Deletion", "Indicator Removal on Host"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact", "Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Lazarus Group", "APT38", "Sandworm Team", "Rocke", "Tropic Trooper", "Gamaredon Group", "Wizard Spider", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Silence", "The White Company", "TEMP.Veles", "APT32", "APT38", "Patchwork", "Honeybee", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "menuPass", "FIN8", "OilRig", "FIN5", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Magic Hound", "APT3", "FIN10", "APT28", "Threat Group-3390", "Group5", "Lazarus Group", "APT18", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "sdelete_application_execution_filter"}]}, {"name": "Network Discovery Using Route Windows App", "id": "dd83407e-439f-11ec-ab8e-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-12", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic look for a spawned process of route.exe windows application. Adversaries and red teams alike abuse this application the recon or do a network discovery on a target host. but one possible false positive might be an automated tool used by a system administator or a powershell script in amazon ec2 config services.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_route` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `network_discovery_using_route_windows_app_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated host discovery application that may generate false positives or an amazon ec2 script that uses this application. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/ad4c3cda-41f2-4401-8dba-56cc2d245488/#"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/vilsel/sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1016", "T1016.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 9, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Network Configuration Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Frankenstein", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "Darkhotel", "MuddyWater", "APT1", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "menuPass", "Threat Group-3390", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "APT3", "Naikon", "admin@338", "Turla", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=route.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=route.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_route"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "network_discovery_using_route_windows_app_filter"}]}, {"name": "Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry", "id": "0c7d8ffe-25b1-11ec-9f39-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-05", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious registry modification to enable plain text credential feature of windows. This technique was used by several malware and also by mimikatz to be able to dumpe the a plain text credential to the compromised or target host. This TTP is really a good indicator that someone wants to dump the crendential of the host so it must be a good pivot for credential dumping techniques.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\System\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\SecurityProviders\\\\WDigest\\\\*\" Registry.registry_value_name = \"UseLogonCredential\" Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000001 by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `enable_wdigest_uselogoncredential_registry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.csoonline.com/article/3438824/how-to-detect-and-halt-credential-theft-via-windows-wdigest.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/wdigest_enable/sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "wdigest registry $registry_path$ was modified in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1112", "T1003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_value_data"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Modify Registry", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Turla", "APT32", "APT38", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "Threat Group-3390", "Honeybee", "Patchwork", "Gorgon Group", "FIN8", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "enable_wdigest_uselogoncredential_registry_filter"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Service Stop Attempt", "id": "ae8d3f4a-acd7-11eb-8846-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-05-04", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies suspicious series of attempt to kill multiple services on a system using either `net.exe` or `sc.exe`. This technique is use by adversaries to terminate security services or other related services to continue there objective and evade detections.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` OR Processes.process_name = \"sc.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"net1.exe\" AND Processes.process=\"*stop*\" OR Processes.process=\"*delete*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=1m | where count >=5 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_service_stop_attempt_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig", "Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An excessive amount of $process_name$ was executed on $dest$ attempting to disable services.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1489"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Service Stop"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_net"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "excessive_service_stop_attempt_filter"}]}, {"name": "Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading", "id": "8bb3f280-dd9b-11eb-84d5-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-05", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious creation of msmpeng.exe or mpsvc.dll in non default windows defender folder. This technique was seen couple days ago with revil ransomware in Kaseya Supply chain. The approach is to drop an old version of msmpeng.exe to load the actual payload name as mspvc.dll which will load the revil ransomware to the compromise machine", "search": "|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_name = \"msmpeng.exe\" OR Filesystem.file_name = \"mpsvc.dll\") AND Filesystem.file_path != \"*\\\\Program Files\\\\windows defender\\\\*\" by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node.", "known_false_positives": "quite minimal false positive expected.", "references": ["https://community.sophos.com/b/security-blog/posts/active-ransomware-attack-on-kaseya-customers"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets//malware/revil/msmpeng_side/windows-sysmon.log"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1574.002", "T1574"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.file_create_time", "Filesystem.process_id", "Filesystem.file_name", "Filesystem.user", "Filesystem.file_path"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["DLL Side-Loading", "Hijack Execution Flow"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["BRONZE BUTLER", "Naikon", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Tropic Trooper", "Patchwork", "APT19", "APT32", "APT3", "menuPass", "Threat Group-3390", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading_filter"}]}, {"name": "Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", "id": "09e5c72a-4c0d-11ec-aa29-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-22", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies `svchost.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the Task Scheduler and creating a malicious remote scheduled task, the executed command is spawned as a child process of `svchost.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of svchost.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=svchost.exe) (Processes.process_name IN (\"Regsvcs.exe\", \"Ftp.exe\", \"OfflineScannerShell.exe\", \"Rasautou.exe\", \"Schtasks.exe\", \"Xwizard.exe\", \"Pnputil.exe\", \"Atbroker.exe\", \"Pcwrun.exe\", \"Ttdinject.exe\",\"Mshta.exe\", \"Bitsadmin.exe\", \"Certoc.exe\", \"Ieexec.exe\", \"Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe\", \"Runscripthelper.exe\", \"Forfiles.exe\", \"Msbuild.exe\", \"Register-cimprovider.exe\", \"Tttracer.exe\", \"Ie4uinit.exe\", \"Bash.exe\", \"Hh.exe\", \"SettingSyncHost.exe\", \"Cmstp.exe\", \"Stordiag.exe\", \"Scriptrunner.exe\", \"Odbcconf.exe\", \"Extexport.exe\", \"Msdt.exe\", \"WorkFolders.exe\", \"Diskshadow.exe\", \"Mavinject.exe\", \"Regasm.exe\", \"Gpscript.exe\", \"Regsvr32.exe\", \"Msiexec.exe\", \"Wuauclt.exe\", \"Presentationhost.exe\", \"Wmic.exe\", \"Runonce.exe\", \"Syncappvpublishingserver.exe\", \"Verclsid.exe\", \"Infdefaultinstall.exe\", \"Installutil.exe\", \"Netsh.exe\", \"Wab.exe\", \"Dnscmd.exe\", \"At.exe\", \"Pcalua.exe\", \"Msconfig.exe\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `svchost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/", "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/persistence/t1053-schtask", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-security.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "message": "Svchost.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053", "T1053.005"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 54, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Scheduled Task/Job", "Scheduled Task"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "MuddyWater", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT-C-36", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT41", "Machete", "Soft Cell", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Patchwork", "OilRig", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "FIN8", "menuPass", "FIN10", "APT32", "FIN7", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT29"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "svchost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter"}]}, {"name": "Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block", "id": "21432e40-04f4-11ec-b7e6-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-24", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-AdGUser` commandlet. The `Get-AdUser` commandlet is used to return a list of all domain users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*get-aduser*\" Message = \"*-filter*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_aduser_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-blue-purple/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-aduser?view=windowsserver2019-ps"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Reconnaissance"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "powershell process having commandline $Message$ for user enumeration", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Domain Account", "Account Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Turla", "Sandworm Team", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "Ke3chang", "no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "get_aduser_with_powershell_script_block_filter"}]}, {"name": "Domain Group Discovery With Net", "id": "f2f14ac7-fa81-471a-80d5-7eb65c3c7349", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-25", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The argument `group /domain`, returns a list of all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\") (Processes.process=*group* AND Processes.process=*/do*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_group_discovery_with_net_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Permission Groups Discovery", "Domain Groups"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TA505", "APT3", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "Inception", "OilRig", "FIN6", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "domain_group_discovery_with_net_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious wevtutil Usage", "id": "2827c0fd-e1be-4868-ae25-59d28e0f9d4f", "version": 4, "date": "2021-10-11", "author": "David Dorsey, Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The wevtutil.exe application is the windows event log utility. This searches for wevtutil.exe with parameters for clearing the application, security, setup, trace or system event logs.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wevtutil.exe Processes.process IN (\"* cl *\", \"*clear-log*\") (Processes.process=\"*System*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Security*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Setup*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Application*\" OR Processes.process=\"*trace*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_wevtutil_usage_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "The wevtutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows event log utility. Administrators may use it to manage Windows event logs.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1070.001/T1070.001.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Log Manipulation", "Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Wevtutil.exe being used to clear Event Logs on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1070.001", "T1070"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 28, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Clear Windows Event Logs", "Indicator Removal on Host"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "APT38", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT32", "FIN8", "FIN5", "APT28", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_wevtutil_usage_filter"}]}, {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell", "id": "112638b4-4634-11ec-b9ab-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-15", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` leveraging the `Invoke-WmiMethod` commandlet complemented with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing WMI. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WMI and `powershell.exe` for lateral movement and remote code execution.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process=\"*Invoke-WmiMethod*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-CN*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-Class Win32_Process*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-Name create*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may leverage WWMI and powershell.exe to start a process on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/invoke-wmimethod?view=powershell-5.1"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "message": "A process was started on a remote endpoint from $dest by abusing WMI using PowerShell.exe", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1047"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Windows Management Instrumentation"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT41", "FIN6", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Threat Group-3390", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "menuPass", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_powershell"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Trickbot Named Pipe", "id": "1804b0a4-a682-11eb-8f68-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this search is to detect potential trickbot infection through the create/connected named pipe to the system. This technique is used by trickbot to communicate to its c2 to post or get command during infection.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode IN (17,18) PipeName=\"\\\\pipe\\\\*lacesomepipe\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer user_id EventCode PipeName signature Image process_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `trickbot_named_pipe_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and pipename from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. .", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/", "https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Trickbot"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/namedpipe/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Possible Trickbot namedpipe created on $Computer$ by $Image$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Image", "type": "Process", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Computer", "user_id", "EventCode", "PipeName", "signature", "Image", "process_id"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Process Injection"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Cobalt Group", "APT37", "Honeybee", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "trickbot_named_pipe_filter"}]}, {"name": "Spoolsv Spawning Rundll32", "id": "15d905f6-da6b-11eb-ab82-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-07-01", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies a suspicious child process, `rundll32.exe`, with no command-line arguments being spawned from `spoolsv.exe`. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. Typically, this is not normal behavior for `spoolsv.exe` to spawn a process. During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=spoolsv.exe `process_rundll32` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spoolsv_spawning_rundll32_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives have been identified. There are limited instances where `rundll32.exe` may be spawned by a legitimate print driver.", "references": ["https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/fix-for-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675-exploit-to-keep-your-print-servers-running-while-a-patch-is-not-available/", "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/exploitable-critical-rce-vulnerability-allows-regular-users-to-fully-compromise-active-directory-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675/", "https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/ob6y02/critical_vulnerability_printnightmare_exposes"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Local"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "$parent_process$ has spawned $process_name$ on endpoint $ComputerName$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1547.012", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_id", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process", "Attacker"]}, {"name": "process_id", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_rundll32"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "spoolsv_spawning_rundll32_filter"}]}, {"name": "DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App", "id": "2452e632-9e0d-11eb-34ba-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-07", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "This search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. This technique are seen in couple of malware and APT group to exfiltrated collected data in a infected machine or infected network. This detection is looking for unique use of nslookup where it tries to use specific record type, TXT, A, AAAA, that are commonly used by attacker and also the retry parameter which is designed to query C2 DNS multiple tries.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where \"Endpoint_Processes\" IN(_datamodels) | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null), process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_path\"), \"string\", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND process_name IS NOT NULL AND process_name=\"nslookup.exe\" AND (like (cmd_line, \"%-querytype=%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%-qt=%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%-q=%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%-type=%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%-retry=%\")) | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null)) | eval body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line, \"process_name\", process_name, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process_name, \"process_path\", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint_Processess` datamodel.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible for some legitimate administrative utilities to use similar cmd_line parameters. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7_spear_phishing.html", "https://www.varonis.com/blog/dns-tunneling/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Dynamic DNS", "Command and Control", "Data Exfiltration"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/nslookup_exfil/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ performing activity related to DNS exfiltration.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1048"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest_device_id", "process_name", "parent_process_name", "process_path", "dest_user_id", "process", "cmd_line"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app_filter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path", "id": "c32f091e-30db-11ec-8738-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-19", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of Windows Curl.exe downloading a file to a suspicious location. \\\n-O or --output is used when a file is to be downloaded and placed in a specified location. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes for further behavior. In addition, identify if the download was successful. If a file was downloaded, capture and analyze.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_curl` Processes.process IN (\"*-O *\",\"*--output*\") Processes.process IN (\"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\",\"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\",\"*\\\\public\\\\*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible Administrators or super users will use Curl for legitimate purposes. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1105/T1105.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["IceID", "Ingress Tool Transfer"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_curl.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ to download a file to a suspicious directory.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1105"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Ingress Tool Transfer"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Whitefly", "Rocke", "APT39", "Tropic Trooper", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Frankenstein", "Silence", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "APT33", "MuddyWater", "APT18", "APT38", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "OilRig", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT37", "FIN8", "PLATINUM", "Leviathan", "Elderwood", "Magic Hound", "APT3", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Patchwork", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-3390", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=curl.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Curl.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_curl"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path_filter"}]}, {"name": "Attempt To Disable Services", "id": "afb31de4-d023-11eb-98d5-acde48001122", "version": 3, "date": "2021-11-24", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "The following analytic identifies Windows Service Control, `sc.exe`, attempting to disable a service. This is typically identified in parallel with other instances of service enumeration of attempts to stop a service and then disable it. Adversaries utilize this technique to terminate security services or other related services to continue there objective and evade detections.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval _datamodels=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_datamodels\"), \"collection\", []), body={} | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null)), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_path\"), \"string\", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND like(cmd_line, \"%disabled%\") AND like(cmd_line, \"%config%\") AND process_name=\"sc.exe\" | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null)), body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line, \"process_name\", process_name, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process_name, \"process_path\", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible administrative scripts may start/stop/delete services. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/", "https://app.any.run/tasks/c0f98850-af65-4352-9746-fbebadee4f05/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md#atomic-test-14---disable-arbitrary-security-windows-service"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/ssa_data1/sc_disable.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to disable a service.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1489"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest_device_id", "process_name", "parent_process_name", "process_path", "dest_user_id", "process"], "risk_score": 36, "risk_severity": "medium", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Service Stop"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "attempt_to_disable_services_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments", "id": "c3bc1430-04e7-4178-835f-047d8e6e97df", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-20", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies regasm.exe with no command line arguments. This particular behavior occurs when another process injects into regasm.exe, no command line arguments will be present. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Regasm.exe are natively found in `C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe` and `C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe`.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regasm` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(regasm\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | `detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, limited instances of regasm.exe or may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regasm/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "The process $process_name$ was spawned by $parent_process_name$ without any command-line arguments on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.009"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Regsvcs/Regasm"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=regasm.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RegAsm.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_regasm"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 PluginInit", "id": "92d51712-ee29-11eb-b1ae-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-07-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe process with plugininit parameter. This technique is commonly seen in IceID malware to execute its initial dll stager to download another payload to the compromised machine.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*PluginInit* by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_plugininit_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "third party application may used this dll export name to execute function.", "references": ["https://threatpost.com/icedid-banking-trojan-surges-emotet/165314/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "rundll32 process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "process name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Rundll32"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT32", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "TA505", "MuddyWater", "APT29", "APT19", "CopyKittens", "APT3", "Carbanak", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_rundll32"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_rundll32_plugininit_filter"}]}, {"name": "Shim Database File Creation", "id": "6e4c4588-ba2f-42fa-97e6-9f6f548eaa33", "version": 3, "date": "2020-12-08", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for shim database files being written to default directories. The sdbinst.exe application is used to install shim database files (.sdb). According to Microsoft, a shim is a small library that transparently intercepts an API, changes the parameters passed, handles the operation itself, or redirects the operation elsewhere.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.action) values(Filesystem.file_hash) as file_hash values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path=*Windows\\\\AppPatch\\\\Custom* by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `shim_database_file_creation_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.", "known_false_positives": "Because legitimate shim files are created and used all the time, this event, in itself, is not suspicious. However, if there are other correlating events, it may warrant further investigation.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Privilege Escalation"}, "Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A process that possibly write shim database in $file_path$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1546.011", "T1546"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "file_path", "type": "file path", "role": ["Others"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.file_hash", "Filesystem.file_path", "Filesystem.file_name", "Filesystem.dest"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Application Shimming", "Event Triggered Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN7", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "shim_database_file_creation_filter"}]}, {"name": "Attempt To Stop Security Service", "id": "c8e349c6-b97c-486e-8949-bd7bcd1f3910", "version": 4, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for attempts to stop security-related services on the endpoint.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` OR Processes.process_name = sc.exe Processes.process=\"* stop *\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |lookup security_services_lookup service as process OUTPUTNEW category, description | search category=security | `attempt_to_stop_security_service_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "None identified. Attempts to disable security-related services should be identified and understood.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md#atomic-test-14---disable-arbitrary-security-windows-service"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Disabling Security Tools", "Trickbot"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_defend_service_stop/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified attempting to disable security services on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 20, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_net"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "attempt_to_stop_security_service_filter"}], "lookups": [{"default_match": "false", "description": "A list of services that deal with security", "filename": "security_services.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(service)", "min_matches": 1, "name": "security_services_lookup", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/security_services.csv"}]}, {"name": "Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry", "id": "1379d2b8-0f18-11ec-8ca3-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-06", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this search is to detect a suspicious registry modification to implement auto admin logon to a host. This technique was seen in BlackMatter ransomware to automatically logon to the compromise host after triggering a safemode boot to continue encrypting the whole network. This behavior is not a common practice and really a suspicious TTP or alert need to be consider if found within then network premise.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon*\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=AutoAdminLogon AND Registry.registry_value_name=1 by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `auto_admin_logon_registry_entry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/08/09/blackmatter-ransomware-emerges-from-the-shadow-of-darkside/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["BlackMatter Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1552.002/autoadminlogon/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified registry key $registry_key_name$ with registry value $registry_value_name$ to prepare autoadminlogon", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1552.002", "T1552"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.dest"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Credentials in Registry", "Unsecured Credentials"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "auto_admin_logon_registry_entry_filter"}]}, {"name": "Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell Script Block", "id": "89275e7e-0548-11ec-bf75-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-24", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies Get-DomainTrust from PowerView in order to gather domain trust information. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*get-foresttrust*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message ComputerName User EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domaintrust_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible certain system management frameworks utilize this command to gather trust information.", "references": ["http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/a-guide-to-attacking-domain-trusts/", "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 40, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Suspicious PowerShell Get-DomainTrust was identified on endpoint $ComputerName$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1482"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "Path", "OpCode", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 12, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Domain Trust Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "get_domaintrust_with_powershell_script_block_filter"}]}, {"name": "Disabling ControlPanel", "id": "6ae0148e-9215-11eb-a94a-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-31", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this search is to identify registry modification to disable control panel window. This technique is commonly seen in malware to prevent their artifacts , persistence removed on the infected machine.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\Explorer\\\\NoControlPanel\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_controlpanel_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "admin may disable this application for non technical user.", "references": ["https://any.run/report/ea4ea08407d4ee72e009103a3b77e5a09412b722fdef67315ea63f22011152af/a866d7b1-c236-4f26-a391-5ae32213dfc4#registry"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The Windows Control Panel was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.user", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disabling_controlpanel_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process", "id": "bc477b57-5c21-4ab6-9c33-668772e7f114", "version": 1, "date": "2021-02-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies regsvcs.exe spawning a process. This particular technique has been used in the wild to bypass application control products. Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe are signed by Microsoft. Spawning of a child process is rare from either process and should be investigated further. During investigation, identify and retrieve the content being loaded. Review parallel processes for additional suspicious behavior. Gather any other file modifications and review accordingly. regsvcs.exe and regasm.exe are natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=regsvcs.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regsvcs_spawning_a_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, limited instances of regasm.exe or regsvcs.exe may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvcs/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ typically not normal for this process.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.009"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Regsvcs/Regasm"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_regsvcs_spawning_a_process_filter"}]}, {"name": "Disabling Net User Account", "id": "c0325326-acd6-11eb-98c2-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-05-04", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic will identify a suspicious command-line that disables a user account using the `net.exe` utility native to Windows. This technique may used by the adversaries to interrupt availability of such users to do their malicious act.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` AND Processes.process=\"*user*\" AND Processes.process=\"*/active:no*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_net_user_account_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified disabling a user account on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1531"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Account Access Removal"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_net"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disabling_net_user_account_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 StartW", "id": "9319dda5-73f2-4d43-a85a-67ce961bddb7", "version": 3, "date": "2021-02-04", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe executing a DLL function name, Start and StartW, on the command line that is commonly observed with Cobalt Strike x86 and x64 DLL payloads. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64. Typically, the DLL will be written and loaded from a world writeable path or user location. In most instances it will not have a valid certificate (Unsigned). During investigation, review the parent process and other parallel application execution. Capture and triage the DLL in question. In the instance of Cobalt Strike, rundll32.exe is the default process it opens and injects shellcode into. This default process can be changed, but typically is not.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*start* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_startw_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use Start as a function and call it via the command line. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", "https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-windows-executable", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32", "https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Cobalt Strike", "Trickbot"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "rundll32.exe running with suspicious parameters on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Rundll32"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT32", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "TA505", "MuddyWater", "APT29", "APT19", "CopyKittens", "APT3", "Carbanak", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_rundll32"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_rundll32_startw_filter"}]}, {"name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", "id": "d2c14d28-5c47-11ec-9892-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-13", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "A required step while exploiting the CVE-2021-44228-Log4j vulnerability is that the victim server will perform outbound connections to attacker-controlled infrastructure. This is required as part of the JNDI lookup as well as for retrieving the second stage .class payload. The following analytic identifies the Java process reaching out to default ports used by the LDAP and RMI protocols. This behavior could represent successfull exploitation. Note that adversaries can easily decide to use arbitrary ports for these protocols and potentially bypass this detection.", "search": " `sysmon` EventCode=3 (process_name=java OR process_name=java.exe) (DestinationPort=389 OR DestinationPort=1389 OR DestinationPort = 1099 ) | rename Computer as dest | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, process_name, DestinationPort | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate Java applications may use perform outbound connections to these ports. Filter as needed", "references": ["https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", "https://www.govcert.admin.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_java/linux-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Java performed outbound connections to default ports of LDAP or RMI on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1190"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "process_name", "EventID", "CommandLine", "Computer", "DestinationPort", "DestinationIp"], "risk_score": 54, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploit Public-Facing Application"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Rocke", "APT39", "BlackTech", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Night Dragon", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter"}]}, {"name": "RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal", "id": "6c135f8d-5e60-454e-80b7-c56eed739833", "version": 5, "date": "2020-11-30", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for executing scripts with rundll32. Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly, may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "While not common, loading a DLL under %AppData% and calling a function by ordinal is possible by a legitimate process", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Unusual Processes"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "message": "A rundll32 process $process_name$ with ordinal parameter like this process commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Rundll32"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT32", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "TA505", "MuddyWater", "APT29", "APT19", "CopyKittens", "APT3", "Carbanak", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_rundll32"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect WMI Event Subscription Persistence", "id": "01d9a0c2-cece-11eb-ab46-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscription to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions.\\\nAll event subscriptions have three components \\\n1. Filter - WQL Query for the events we want. EventID equals 19 \\\n1. Consumer - An action to take upon triggering the filter. EventID equals 20 \\\n1. Binding - Registers a filter to a consumer. EventID equals 21 \\\nMonitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding. It may be pertinent to review all 3 to identify the flow of execution. In addition, EventCode 4104 may assist with any other PowerShell script usage that registered the subscription.", "search": "`sysmon` EventID=20 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer User Destination | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with that provide WMI Event Subscription from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA and have enabled EventID 19, 20 and 21. Tune and filter known good to limit the volume.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible some applications will create a consumer and may be required to be filtered. For tuning, add any additional LOLBin's for further depth of coverage.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1546.003/T1546.003.md", "https://www.eideon.com/2018-03-02-THL03-WMIBackdoors/", "https://github.com/trustedsec/SysmonCommunityGuide/blob/master/WMI-events.md", "https://in.security/an-intro-into-abusing-and-identifying-wmi-event-subscriptions-for-persistence/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Possible malicious WMI Subscription created on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1546.003", "T1546"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Destination", "Computer", "User"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription", "Event Triggered Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "Blue Mockingbird", "Turla", "Leviathan", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence_filter"}]}, {"name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", "id": "e9fb4a59-c5fb-440a-9f24-191fbc6b2911", "version": 6, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` OR `process_cmd` Processes.process=*save* (Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\SAM* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\SAM*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "None identified.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to export the registry keys.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Security Account Manager", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390", "Ke3chang", "Soft Cell", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "menuPass", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=reg.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=reg.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_reg"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_cmd"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images", "id": "29e307ba-40af-4ab2-91b2-3c6b392bbba0", "version": 1, "date": "2019-12-03", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for reading loaded Images unique to credential dumping with Mimikatz. Deprecated because mimikatz libraries changed and very noisy sysmon Event Code.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 | stats values(ImageLoaded) as ImageLoaded values(ProcessId) as ProcessId by Computer, Image | search ImageLoaded=*WinSCard.dll ImageLoaded=*cryptdll.dll ImageLoaded=*hid.dll ImageLoaded=*samlib.dll ImageLoaded=*vaultcli.dll | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search needs Sysmon Logs and a sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 7 with powershell.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", "known_false_positives": "Other tools can import the same DLLs. These tools should be part of a whitelist. False positives may be present with any process that authenticates or uses credentials, PowerShell included. Filter based on parent process.", "references": ["https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "Detect Zerologon Attack", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Windows", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A process, $Image$, has loaded $ImageLoaded$ that are typically related to credential dumping on $Computer$. Review for further details.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "ImageLoaded", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Other"]}, {"name": "Image", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "ImageLoaded", "ProcessId", "Computer", "Image"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["LSASS Memory", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Whitefly", "Blue Mockingbird", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Leviathan", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Stolen Pencil", "APT32", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "PLATINUM", "FIN8", "BRONZE BUTLER", "OilRig", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT28", "APT1", "Ke3chang", "Cleaver", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe", "id": "c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6v5264g9f", "version": 3, "date": "2020-07-03", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The detection Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe is detecting the abuse of unquoted service paths, which is a popular technique for privilege escalation. ", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | rex field=process \"^.*?\\\\\\\\(?[^\\\\\\\\]*\\.(?:exe|bat|com|ps1))\" | eval process_name = lower(process_name) | eval service_process = lower(service_process) | where process_name != service_process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://medium.com/@SumitVerma101/windows-privilege-escalation-part-1-unquoted-service-path-c7a011a8d8ae"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1574.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to perform privilege escalation by using unquoted service paths.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1574.009", "T1574"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Path Interception by Unquoted Path", "Hijack Execution Flow"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe_filter"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "id": "a7e3f0f0-ae42-11eb-b245-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-06", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic will identify suspicious executable or scripts (known file extensions) in list of suspicious file path in Windows. This technique is used by adversaries to evade detection. The suspicious file path are known paths used in the wild and are not common to have executable or scripts.", "search": "|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_name = *.exe OR Filesystem.file_name = *.dll OR Filesystem.file_name = *.sys OR Filesystem.file_name = *.com OR Filesystem.file_name = *.vbs OR Filesystem.file_name = *.vbe OR Filesystem.file_name = *.js OR Filesystem.file_name = *.ps1 OR Filesystem.file_name = *.bat OR Filesystem.file_name = *.cmd OR Filesystem.file_name = *.pif) AND ( Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\windows\\\\fonts\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\windows\\\\temp\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\users\\\\public\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\windows\\\\debug\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Users\\\\Administrator\\\\Music\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Windows\\\\servicing\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Users\\\\Default\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *Recycle.bin* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Windows\\\\Media\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Windows\\\\repair\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Temp*) by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may allow creation of script or exe in the paths specified. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig", "Remcos"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious executable or scripts with file name $file_name$, $file_path$ and process_id $process_id$ executed in suspicious file path in Windows by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1036"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_id", "type": "Process", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "file_name", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Other", "Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.file_path", "Filesystem.file_create_time", "Filesystem.process_id", "Filesystem.file_name", "Filesystem.user"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Masquerading"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Windshift", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "Dragonfly 2.0"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path_filter"}]}, {"name": "Recon Using WMI Class", "id": "018c1972-ca07-11eb-9473-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-10", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell via EventCode 4104, where WMI is performing an event query looking for running processes or running services. This technique is commonly found where the adversary will identify services and system information on the compromised machine. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message= \"*SELECT*\" OR Message= \"*Get-WmiObject*\") AND (Message= \"*Win32_Bios*\" OR Message= \"*Win32_OperatingSystem*\" OR Message= \"*Win32_Processor*\" OR Message= \"*Win32_ComputerSystem*\" OR Message= \"*Win32_ComputerSystemProduct*\" OR Message= \"*Win32_ShadowCopy*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `recon_using_wmi_class_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "network administrator may used this command for checking purposes", "references": ["https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/05/12/maze-ransomware-1-year-counting/", "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Reconnaissance"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 75, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains host recon command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1592"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 60, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "recon_using_wmi_class_filter"}]}, {"name": "Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block", "id": "61994268-04f4-11ec-865c-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-24", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainUser` commandlet. `GetDomainUser` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerView to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*Get-DomainUser*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domainuser_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainUser/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Reconnaissance"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "powershell process having commandline $Message$ for user enumeration", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Domain Account", "Account Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Turla", "Sandworm Team", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "Ke3chang", "no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "get_domainuser_with_powershell_script_block_filter"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Creating Thread Mutex", "id": "637557ec-ca08-11eb-bd0a-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-10", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is using the `mutex` function. This function is commonly seen in some obfuscated PowerShell scripts to make sure that only one instance of there process is running on a compromise machine. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*Threading.Mutex*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_creating_thread_mutex_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "powershell developer may used this function in their script for instance checking too.", "references": ["https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Some+Powershell+Malicious+Code/22988/", "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains Thread Mutex in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1027", "T1027.005"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 40, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Obfuscated Files or Information", "Indicator Removal from Tools"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "Whitefly", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Mofang", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "Soft Cell", "Turla", "TA505", "Silence", "APT33", "Night Dragon", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "APT29", "APT18", "Tropic Trooper", "Cobalt Group", "Patchwork", "Leafminer", "APT37", "Threat Group-3390", "Honeybee", "Dark Caracal", "menuPass", "APT19", "BlackOasis", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "Elderwood", "MuddyWater", "FIN7", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "APT3", "APT32", "Group5", "Dust Storm", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "APT28", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "Patchwork", "APT3", "Turla", "OilRig", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "powershell_creating_thread_mutex_filter"}]}, {"name": "Remote WMI Command Attempt", "id": "272df6de-61f1-4784-877c-1fbc3e2d0838", "version": 4, "date": "2018-12-03", "author": "Rico Valdez, Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies usage of `wmic.exe` spawning a local or remote process, identified by the `node` switch. During triage, review parallel processes for additional commands executed. Look for any file modifications before and after `wmic.exe` execution. In addition, identify the remote endpoint and confirm execution or file modifications. Contain and isolate the endpoint as needed.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` Processes.process=*node* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_wmi_command_attempt_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. Deprecated because duplicate of Remote Process Instantiation via WMI.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may use this legitimately to gather info from remote systems. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1047/T1047.yaml"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A wmic.exe process $process$ contain node commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.parent_process_id", "Processes.process_id"], "risk_score": 36, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Windows Management Instrumentation"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT41", "FIN6", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Threat Group-3390", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "menuPass", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_wmic"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "remote_wmi_command_attempt_filter"}]}, {"name": "System User Discovery With Whoami", "id": "894fc43e-6f50-47d5-a68b-ee9ee23e18f4", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-13", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `whoami.exe` without any arguments. This windows native binary prints out the current logged user. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage `whoami.exe` to identify system users on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"whoami.exe\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `system_user_discovery_with_whoami_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "System user discovery on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1033"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Owner/User Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Frankenstein", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Tropic Trooper", "APT39", "MuddyWater", "APT32", "APT37", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "Magic Hound", "FIN10", "Gamaredon Group", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "APT3"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "system_user_discovery_with_whoami_filter"}]}, {"name": "Unified Messaging Service Spawning a Process", "id": "f1126df0-7bd5-11eb-988f-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-02", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This detection identifies Microsoft Exchange Server's Unified Messaging services, umworkerprocess.exe and umservice.exe, spawning a child process, indicating possible exploitation of CVE-2021-26857 vulnerability. The query filters out werfault.exe and wermgr.exe mostly due to potential false positives, however, if there is an excessive amount of \"wermgr.exe\" or \"WerFault.exe\" failures, it may be due to the active exploitation. During triage, identify any additional suspicious parallel processes. Identify any recent out of place file modifications. Review Exchange logs following Microsofts guide. To contain, perform egress filtering or restrict public access to Exchange. In final, patch the vulnerablity and monitor.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=\"umworkerprocess.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name=\"UMService.exe\" (Processes.process_name!=\"wermgr.exe\" OR Processes.process_name!=\"werfault.exe\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `unified_messaging_service_spawning_a_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown. Tune out child processes as needed to limit volume of false positives.", "references": ["https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/", "https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/03/03/rapid7s-insightidr-enables-detection-and-response-to-microsoft-exchange-0-day/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["HAFNIUM Group"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-26857"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/windows-sysmon_umservices.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Possible CVE-2021-26857 exploitation on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1190"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploit Public-Facing Application"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Rocke", "APT39", "BlackTech", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Night Dragon", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "unified_messaging_service_spawning_a_process_filter"}]}, {"name": "Fsutil Zeroing File", "id": "f792cdc9-43ee-4429-a3c0-ffce4fed1a85", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-07", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious fsutil process to zeroing a target file. This technique was seen in lockbit ransomware where it tries to zero out its malware path as part of its defense evasion after encrypting the compromised host.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null)), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_path\"), \"string\", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND process_name IS NOT NULL AND process_name=\"fsutil.exe\" AND (like (cmd_line, \"%setzerodata%\")) | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null)), body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line, \"process_name\", process_name, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process_name, \"process_path\", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed net.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "System administrators or scripts may delete user accounts via this technique. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/e0ac072d-58c9-4f53-8a3b-3e491c7ac5db/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/fsutil-file"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": [], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ atempting to perform file deletion.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1070"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest_device_id", "process_name", "parent_process_name", "process_path", "dest_user_id", "process", "cmd_line"], "risk_score": 54, "risk_severity": "high", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Indicator Removal on Host"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "fsutil_zeroing_file_filter"}]}, {"name": "Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry", "id": "0a46537c-be02-11eb-92ca-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic detects a potential suspicious modification of firewall rule registry allowing inbound traffic in specific port with public profile. This technique was identified when an adversary wants to grant remote access to a machine by allowing the traffic in a firewall rule.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\System\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services\\\\SharedAccess\\\\Parameters\\\\FirewallPolicy\\\\FirewallRules\\\\*\" Registry.registry_value_name = \"*|Action=Allow|*\" Registry.registry_value_name = \"*|Dir=In|*\" Registry.registry_value_name = \"*|Profile=Public|*\" Registry.registry_value_name = \"*|LPort=*\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `allow_inbound_traffic_by_firewall_rule_registry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "network admin may add/remove/modify public inbound firewall rule that may cause this rule to be triggered.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/netsecurity/new-netfirewallrule?view=windowsserver2019-ps"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/casper/datasets1/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious firewall modifications were detected via the registry on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021.001", "T1021"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user"], "risk_score": 3, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote Desktop Protocol", "Remote Services"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "TEMP.Veles", "Leviathan", "APT39", "Stolen Pencil", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "APT3", "OilRig", "menuPass", "FIN10", "Patchwork", "FIN6", "Lazarus Group", "APT1", "Axiom", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "allow_inbound_traffic_by_firewall_rule_registry_filter"}]}, {"name": "GetCurrent User with PowerShell Script Block", "id": "80879283-c30f-44f7-8471-d1381f6d437a", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-13", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `GetCurrent` method of the WindowsIdentity .NET class. This method returns an object that represents the current Windows user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*[System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]*\" AND Message = \"*GetCurrent()*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getcurrent_user_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.security.principal.windowsidentity.getcurrent?view=net-5.0"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "System user discovery on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1033"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Path", "Message", "OpCode", "ComputerName", "User", "EventCode"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Owner/User Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Frankenstein", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Tropic Trooper", "APT39", "MuddyWater", "APT32", "APT37", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "Magic Hound", "FIN10", "Gamaredon Group", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "APT3"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "getcurrent_user_with_powershell_script_block_filter"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App", "id": "0a69fdaa-a2b8-11eb-b16d-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-21", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. This technique are seen in couple of malware and APT group to exfiltrated collected data in a infected machine or infected network. This detection is looking for unique use of nslookup where it tries to use specific record type (TXT, A, AAAA) that are commonly used by attacker and also the retry parameter which is designed to query C2 DNS multiple tries.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode = 1 process_name = \"nslookup.exe\" | bucket _time span=15m | stats count as numNsLookup by Computer, _time | eventstats avg(numNsLookup) as avgNsLookup, stdev(numNsLookup) as stdNsLookup, count as numSlots by Computer | eval upperThreshold=(avgNsLookup + stdNsLookup *3) | eval isOutlier=if(avgNsLookup > 20 and avgNsLookup >= upperThreshold, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of nslookup.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7_spear_phishing.html", "https://www.varonis.com/blog/dns-tunneling/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Dynamic DNS", "Command and Control", "Data Exfiltration"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Scope:Local", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/nslookup_exfil/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Excessive usage of nslookup.exe has been detected on $Computer$. This detection is triggered as as it violates the dynamic threshold", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1048"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Computer", "process_name", "EventCode"], "risk_score": 28, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename", "id": "f0db4464-55d9-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 3, "date": "2021-09-20", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies a renamed instance of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe. Microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v4.0.30319 and is rarely utilized. When investigating, identify the executed code on disk and review. A spawned child process from microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is uncommon. In any instance, microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe spawning from an Office product or any living off the land binary is highly suspect.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_microsoftworkflowcompiler` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe, triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md#atomic-test-6---microsoftworkflowcompilerexe-payload-execution"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "Cobalt Strike", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious renamed microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe binary ran on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1036", "T1127", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Masquerading", "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "Rename System Utilities"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Windshift", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "Dragonfly 2.0", "no", "menuPass", "APT32", "Soft Cell", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_microsoftworkflowcompiler"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line", "id": "8c5835b9-39d9-438b-817c-95f14c69a31e", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies hh.exe (HTML Help) execution of a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) file from a remote url. This particular technique will load Windows script code from a compiled help file. CHM files may contain nearly any file type embedded, but only execute html/htm. Upon a successful execution, the following script engines may be used for execution - JScript, VBScript, VBScript.Encode, JScript.Encode, JScript.Compact. Analyst may identify vbscript.dll or jscript.dll loading into hh.exe upon execution. The \"htm\" and \"html\" file extensions were the only extensions observed to be supported for the execution of Shortcut commands or WSH script code. During investigation, identify script content origination. Review reputation of remote IP and domain. Some instances, it is worth decompiling the .chm file to review its original contents. hh.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_hh` Processes.process=*http* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_html_help_url_in_command_line_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may retrieve a CHM remotely, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.001/T1218.001.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Hh/", "https://blog.sevagas.com/?Hacking-around-HTA-files", "https://gist.github.com/mgeeky/cce31c8602a144d8f2172a73d510e0e7", "https://cyberforensicator.com/2019/01/20/silence-dissecting-malicious-chm-files-and-performing-forensic-analysis/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_proces_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ contacting a remote destination to potentally download a malicious payload.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Compiled HTML File"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT41", "Silence", "Lazarus Group", "Dark Caracal", "OilRig"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=hh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=HH.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_hh"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_html_help_url_in_command_line_filter"}]}, {"name": "Wevtutil Usage To Disable Logs", "id": "a4bdc944-cdd9-11eb-ac97-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-06-15", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "This search is to detect execution of wevtutil.exe to disable logs. This technique was seen in several ransomware to disable the event logs to evade alerts and detections in compromised host.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where \"Endpoint_Processes\" IN(_datamodels) | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null), process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_path\"), \"string\", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND like(cmd_line, \"% sl %\") AND like(cmd_line, \"%/e:false%\") AND process_name=\"wevtutil.exe\" | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null)) | eval body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line, \"process_name\", process_name, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process_name, \"process_path\", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "network operator may disable audit event logs for debugging purposes.", "references": ["https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-ransom-x-ransomware-used-in-texas-txdot-cyberattack/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Log Manipulation", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/ssa_wevtutil/disable_evt.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A wevtutil process $process_name$ with commandline $cmd_line$ to disable event logs in host $dest_device_id$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1070", "T1070.001"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest_device_id", "process_name", "parent_process_name", "process_path", "dest_user_id", "process"], "risk_score": 63, "risk_severity": "high", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Indicator Removal on Host", "Clear Windows Event Logs"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT41", "APT38", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT32", "FIN8", "FIN5", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "wevtutil_usage_to_disable_logs_filter"}]}, {"name": "Domain Group Discovery with Adsisearcher", "id": "089c862f-5f83-49b5-b1c8-7e4ff66560c7", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-25", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator being used to query Active Directory for domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `[Adsisearcher]` to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*[adsisearcher]*\" AND Message = \"*(objectcategory=group)*\" AND Message = \"*findAll()*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `domain_group_discovery_with_adsisearcher_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use Adsisearcher for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", "https://devblogs.microsoft.com/scripting/use-the-powershell-adsisearcher-type-accelerator-to-search-active-directory/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 18, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Permission Groups Discovery", "Domain Groups"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TA505", "APT3", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "Inception", "OilRig", "FIN6", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "domain_group_discovery_with_adsisearcher_filter"}]}, {"name": "Unusually Long Command Line", "id": "58f43aba-1775-445e-b19c-be2b87d83ae3", "version": 1, "date": "2020-10-06", "author": "Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious activity on your hosts. This search leverages the Splunk Streaming ML DSP plugin to help identify command lines with lengths that are unusual for a given user. This detection is inspired on Unusually Long Command Line authored by Rico Valdez.", "search": " | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)) | eval cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null), dest_user_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), dest_device_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null), process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where cmd_line!=null and dest_user_id!=null | eval cmd_line_norm=replace(cast(cmd_line, \"string\"), /\\s(--?\\w+)|(\\/\\w+)/, \" ARG\"), cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line_norm, /\\w:\\\\[^\\s]+/, \"PATH\"), cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line_norm, /\\d+/, \"N\"), input=parse_double(len(coalesce(cmd_line_norm, \"\"))) | select timestamp, process_name, dest_device_id, dest_user_id, cmd_line, input | adaptive_threshold algorithm=\"quantile\" entity=\"process_name\" window=60480000 | where label AND quantile>0.99 | first_time_event input_columns=[\"dest_device_id\", \"cmd_line\"] | where first_time_dest_device_id_cmd_line | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend(dest_device_id, dest_user_id), body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line, \"process_name\", process_name]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting sysmon endpoint data that monitors command lines.", "known_false_positives": "This detection may flag suspiciously long command lines when there is not sufficient evidence (samples) for a given process that this detection is tracking; or when there is high variability in the length of the command line for the tracked process. Also, some legitimate applications may use long command lines. Such is the case of Ansible, that encodes Powershell scripts using long base64. Attackers may use this technique to obfuscate their payloads.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Unusual Processes"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 40, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A process $process_name$ with a long commandline $cmd_line$ executed in host $dest_device_id$", "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["process_name", "_time", "dest_device_id", "dest_user_id", "process"], "risk_score": 12, "risk_severity": "low", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "unusually_long_command_line_filter"}]}, {"name": "Network Connection Discovery With Arp", "id": "ae008c0f-83bd-4ed4-9350-98d4328e15d2", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-10", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `arp.exe` utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use arp.exe for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"arp.exe\") (Processes.process=*-a*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `network_connection_discovery_with_arp_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1049/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1049"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Network Connections Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Tropic Trooper", "APT41", "APT38", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "APT1", "OilRig", "APT3", "menuPass", "Threat Group-3390", "Poseidon Group", "admin@338", "Turla", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "network_connection_discovery_with_arp_filter"}]}, {"name": "User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell", "id": "0cdf318b-a0dd-47d7-b257-c621c0247de8", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-13", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments that leverage PowerShell environment variables to identify the current logged user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=\"*$env:UserName*\" OR Processes.process=\"*[System.Environment]::UserName*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "System user discovery on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1033"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Owner/User Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Frankenstein", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Tropic Trooper", "APT39", "MuddyWater", "APT32", "APT37", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "Magic Hound", "FIN10", "Gamaredon Group", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "APT3"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Modify ACLs Permission Of Files Or Folders", "id": "9ae9a48a-cdbe-11eb-875a-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-11-30", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "This analytic identifies suspicious modification of ACL permission to a files or folder to make it available to everyone or to a specific user. This technique may be used by the adversary to evade ACLs or protected files access. This changes is commonly configured by the file or directory owner with appropriate permission. This behavior raises suspicion if this command is seen on an endpoint utilized by an account with no permission to do so.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null), process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_path\"), \"string\", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND like(cmd_line, \"%/G%\") AND (match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)everyone:/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)SYSTEM:/)=true) AND (process_name=\"cacls.exe\" OR process_name=\"xcacls.exe\" OR process_name=\"icacls.exe\") | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null)), body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line, \"process_name\", process_name, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process_name, \"process_path\", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed cacls.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "System administrators may use this windows utility. filter is needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1222.001/ssa_cacls/all_icalc.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A cacls process $process_name$ with commandline $cmd_line$ try to modify a permission of a file or directory in host $dest_device_id$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1222"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest_device_id", "process_name", "parent_process_name", "process_path", "dest_user_id", "process", "cmd_line"], "risk_score": 35, "risk_severity": "medium", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["File and Directory Permissions Modification"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "modify_acls_permission_of_files_or_folders_filter"}]}, {"name": "Disable AMSI Through Registry", "id": "9c27ec42-d338-11eb-9044-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-22", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this search is to identify modification in registry to disable AMSI windows feature to evade detections. This technique was seen in several ransomware, RAT and even APT to impaire defenses of the compromise machine and to be able to execute payload with minimal alert as much as possible.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Script\\\\Settings\\\\AmsiEnable\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000000\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_amsi_through_registry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "network operator may disable this feature of windows but not so common.", "references": ["https://blog.f-secure.com/hunting-for-amsi-bypasses/", "https://gist.github.com/rxwx/8955e5abf18dc258fd6b43a3a7f4dbf9"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.user", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disable_amsi_through_registry_filter"}]}, {"name": "Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block", "id": "1ff7ccc8-065a-11ec-91e4-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message =\"*Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://github.com/S1ckB0y1337/Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy?view=windowsserver2019-ps"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 30, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Reconnaissance"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "powershell process having commandline $Message$ to query domain password policy", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1201"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 9, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Password Policy Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Turla", "OilRig"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Dump LSASS Memory using comsvcs", "id": "76bb9e35-f314-4c3d-a385-83c72a13ce4e", "version": 2, "date": "2021-11-29", "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "The following analytic identifies credential dumping using comsvcs.dll with `regsvr32.exe`. This technique is common with adversaries who would like to dump the memory of lsass.exe and perform offline password cracking.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval tenant=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_tenant\"), \"string\", null), machine=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null)), timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), process=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null)), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where process_name LIKE \"%rundll32.exe%\" AND match_regex(process, /(?i)comsvcs.dll[,\\s]+MiniDump/)=true | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend(machine), body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"process_name\", process_name, \"process\", process]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including Windows command line logging. You can see how we test this with [Event Code 4688](https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4688a) on the [attack_range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range/blob/develop/ansible/roles/windows_common/tasks/windows-enable-4688-cmd-line-audit.yml).", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md#atomic-test-3---dump-lsassexe-memory-using-comsvcsdll"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:AD", "Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A dump of lsass.exe was attempted using comsvcs.dll on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_device_user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.003", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "User", "role": ["Actor"]}, {"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["process_name", "_tenant", "_time", "dest_device_id", "process"], "risk_score": 70, "risk_severity": "low", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["NTDS", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN6", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs_filter"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via System Reflection Assembly", "id": "85bc3f30-ca28-11eb-bd21-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-10", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable no critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies the use of PowerShell loading .net assembly via reflection. This is commonly found in malicious PowerShell usage, including Empire and Cobalt Strike. In addition, the `load(` value may be modifed by removing `(` and it will identify more events to review. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message IN (\"*[system.reflection.assembly]::load(*\",\"*[reflection.assembly]*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode ComputerName User EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_system_reflection_assembly_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as day to day scripts do not use this method.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.reflection.assembly?view=net-5.0", "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains reflective class assembly command in $Message$ to load .net code in memory with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Message", "OpCode", "ComputerName", "User", "EventCode"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "PowerShell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "Gallmaker", "Turla", "APT19", "DarkHydrus", "APT28", "Thrip", "Gorgon Group", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leviathan", "TA459", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT32", "FIN7", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "APT3", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "powershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_system_reflection_assembly_filter"}]}, {"name": "Verclsid CLSID Execution", "id": "61e9a56a-20fa-11ec-8ba3-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-29", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a possible abuse of verclsid to execute malicious file through generate CLSID. This process is a normal application of windows to verify the CLSID COM object before it is instantiated by Windows Explorer. This hunting query can be a good pivot point to analyze what is he CLSID or COM object pointing too to check if it is a valid application or not.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_verclsid` AND Processes.process=\"*/S*\" Processes.process=\"*/C*\" AND Processes.process=\"*{*\" AND Processes.process=\"*}*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `verclsid_clsid_execution_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "windows can used this application for its normal COM object validation.", "references": ["https://gist.github.com/NickTyrer/0598b60112eaafe6d07789f7964290d5", "https://bohops.com/2018/08/18/abusing-the-com-registry-structure-part-2-loading-techniques-for-evasion-and-persistence/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Unusual Processes"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.012/verclsid_exec/sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "process $process_name$ to execute possible clsid commandline $process$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218.012", "T1218"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=verclsid.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=verclsid.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_verclsid"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "verclsid_clsid_execution_filter"}]}, {"name": "Remcos RAT File Creation in Remcos Folder", "id": "25ae862a-1ac3-11ec-94a1-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-21", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect file creation in remcos folder in appdata which is the keylog and clipboard logs that will be send to its c2 server. This is really a good TTP indicator that there is a remcos rat in the system that do keylogging, clipboard grabbing and audio recording.", "search": "|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*.dat\") Filesystem.file_path = \"*\\\\remcos\\\\*\" by _time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remcos_rat_file_creation_in_remcos_folder_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://success.trendmicro.com/solution/1123281-remcos-malware-information", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2021/07/remcos-rat-delivered-via-visual-basic/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_agent/sysmon.log"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "file $file_name$ created in $file_path$ of $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1113"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "file_create_time", "file_name", "file_path"], "risk_score": 100, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Screen Capture"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "APT39", "Silence", "MuddyWater", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "Dark Caracal", "FIN7", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Magic Hound", "Group5", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "remcos_rat_file_creation_in_remcos_folder_filter"}]}, {"name": "Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr", "id": "b2fbe95a-9c62-4c12-8a29-24b97e84c0cd", "version": 1, "date": "2020-02-03", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "Detect the hands on keyboard behavior of Windows Task Manager creating a process dump of lsass.exe. Upon this behavior occurring, a file write/modification will occur in the users profile under \\AppData\\Local\\Temp. The dump file, lsass.dmp, cannot be renamed, however if the dump occurs more than once, it will be named lsass (2).dmp.", "search": "`sysmon` EventID=11 process_name=taskmgr.exe TargetFilename=*lsass*.dmp | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, object_category, process_name, TargetFilename | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 11 for detecting file create of lsass.dmp. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators can create memory dumps for debugging purposes, but memory dumps of the LSASS process would be unusual.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md#atomic-test-5---dump-lsassexe-memory-using-windows-task-manager", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/", "https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "asset_type": "Windows", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "$process_name$ was identified on endpoint $Computer$ writing $TargetFilename$ to disk. This behavior is related to dumping credentials via Task Manager.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "TargetFilename", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventID", "process_name", "TargetFilename", "Computer", "object_category"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["LSASS Memory", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Whitefly", "Blue Mockingbird", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Leviathan", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Stolen Pencil", "APT32", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "PLATINUM", "FIN8", "BRONZE BUTLER", "OilRig", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT28", "APT1", "Ke3chang", "Cleaver", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr_filter"}]}, {"name": "AdsiSearcher Account Discovery", "id": "de7fcadc-04f3-11ec-a241-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-24", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator being used to query Active Directory for domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `[Adsisearcher]` to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*[adsisearcher]*\" Message = \"*objectcategory=user*\" Message = \"*.findAll()*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `adsisearcher_account_discovery_filter`", "how_to_implement": "The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/", "https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-blue-purple/", "https://devblogs.microsoft.com/scripting/use-the-powershell-adsisearcher-type-accelerator-to-search-active-directory/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Reconnaissance"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "powershell process having commandline $Message$ for user enumeration", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Domain Account", "Account Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Turla", "Sandworm Team", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "Ke3chang", "no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "adsisearcher_account_discovery_filter"}]}, {"name": "Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process", "id": "4aa5d062-e893-11eb-9eb2-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-07-19", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious mshta.exe process that spawn rundll32 or regsvr32 child process. This technique was seen in several malware nowadays like trickbot to load its initial .dll stage loader to execute and download the the actual trickbot payload.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name = \"mshta.exe\" `process_rundll32` OR `process_regsvr32` by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "limitted. this anomaly behavior is not commonly seen in clean host.", "references": ["https://twitter.com/cyb3rops/status/1416050325870587910?s=21"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Trickbot", "IcedID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "executions"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/spear_phish/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "a mshta parent process $parent_process_name$ spawn child process $process_name$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Mshta"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "APT32", "MuddyWater", "FIN7"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_rundll32"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=REGSVR32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_regsvr32"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process_filter"}]}, {"name": "Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block", "id": "737e1eb0-065a-11ec-921a-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, MAuricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message =\"*Get-ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://github.com/S1ckB0y1337/Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-aduserresultantpasswordpolicy?view=windowsserver2019-ps"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 30, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Reconnaissance"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "powershell process having commandline $Message$ to query domain user password policy.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1201"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 9, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Password Policy Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Turla", "OilRig"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter"}]}, {"name": "Get WMIObject Group Discovery", "id": "5434f670-155d-11ec-8cca-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-14", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following hunting analytic identifies the use of `Get-WMIObject Win32_Group` being used with PowerShell to identify local groups on the endpoint. \\ Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \\ During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR processes.process_name=cmd.exe) (Processes.process=\"*Get-WMIObject*\" AND Processes.process=\"*Win32_Group*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_wmiobject_group_discovery_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present. Tune as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "System group discovery on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Permission Groups Discovery", "Local Groups"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TA505", "APT3", "Turla", "OilRig", "admin@338"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "get_wmiobject_group_discovery_filter"}]}, {"name": "Jscript Execution Using Cscript App", "id": "002f1e24-146e-11ec-a470-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-13", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a execution of jscript using cscript process. Commonly when a user run jscript file it was executed by wscript.exe application. This technique was seen in FIN7 js implant to execute its malicious script using cscript process. This behavior is uncommon and a good artifacts to check further anomalies within the network", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = \"cscript.exe\" AND Processes.parent_process = \"*//e:jscript*\") OR (Processes.process_name = \"cscript.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*//e:jscript*\") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `jscript_execution_using_cscript_app_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html", "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["FIN7", "Remcos"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_macro_js_1/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Process name $process_name$ with commandline $process$ to execute jscript in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.007"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "JavaScript/JScript"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "APT32", "FIN7", "Cobalt Group", "Molerats", "TA505", "Silence", "Leafminer"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "jscript_execution_using_cscript_app_filter"}]}, {"name": "Mailsniper Invoke functions", "id": "a36972c8-b894-11eb-9f78-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-19", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect known mailsniper.ps1 functions executed in a machine. This technique was seen in some attacker to harvest some sensitive e-mail in a compromised exchange server.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message IN (\"*Invoke-GlobalO365MailSearch*\", \"*Invoke-GlobalMailSearch*\", \"*Invoke-SelfSearch*\", \"*Invoke-PasswordSprayOWA*\", \"*Invoke-PasswordSprayEWS*\",\"*Invoke-DomainHarvestOWA*\", \"*Invoke-UsernameHarvestOWA*\",\"*Invoke-OpenInboxFinder*\",\"*Invoke-InjectGEventAPI*\",\"*Invoke-InjectGEvent*\",\"*Invoke-SearchGmail*\", \"*Invoke-MonitorCredSniper*\", \"*Invoke-AddGmailRule*\",\"*Invoke-PasswordSprayEAS*\",\"*Invoke-UsernameHarvestEAS*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mailsniper_invoke_functions_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the powershell logs from your endpoints. make sure you enable needed registry to monitor this event.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/introducing-mailsniper-a-tool-for-searching-every-users-email-for-sensitive-data/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Data Exfiltration"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/casper/datasets1/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "mailsniper.ps1 functions $Message$ executed on a $ComputerName$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1114", "T1114.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Email Collection", "Local Email Collection"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Magic Hound", "APT1"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "mailsniper_invoke_functions_filter"}]}, {"name": "Creation of Shadow Copy", "id": "eb120f5f-b879-4a63-97c1-93352b5df844", "version": 1, "date": "2019-12-10", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Monitor for signs that Vssadmin or Wmic has been used to create a shadow copy.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=vssadmin.exe Processes.process=*create* Processes.process=*shadow*) OR (Processes.process_name=wmic.exe Processes.process=*shadowcopy* Processes.process=*create*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `creation_of_shadow_copy_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate administrator usage of Vssadmin or Wmic will create false positives.", "references": ["https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to create a shadow copy to perform offline password cracking.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.003", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["NTDS", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN6", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "creation_of_shadow_copy_filter"}]}, {"name": "Potential Pass the Token or Hash Observed at the Destination Device", "id": "82e76b80-5cdb-4899-9b43-85dbe777b36d", "version": 3, "date": "2021-11-30", "author": "Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Authentication"], "description": "This detection identifies potential Pass the Token or Pass the Hash credential stealing. We detect the main side effect of these attacks, which is a transition from the dominant Kerberos logins to rare NTLM logins for a given user, as reported by a detination device.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where \"Authentication\" IN(_datamodels) | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), dest_user=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_primary_artifact\"), \"string\", null)), dest_user_id= ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), dest_device_id= ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null), signature_id= lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"signature_id\"), \"string\", null)), authentication_method= lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"authentication_method\"), \"string\", null)), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null)\n| where signature_id = \"4624\" AND (authentication_method=\"ntlmssp\" OR authentication_method=\"kerberos\") AND dest_user_id != null AND dest_device_id != null\n| eval isKerberos=if(authentication_method == \"kerberos\", 1, 0), isNtlm=if(authentication_method == \"ntlmssp\", 1, 0), timeNTLM=if(isNtlm > 0, timestamp, null)\n| stats sum(isKerberos) as totalKerberos, sum(isNtlm) as totalNtlm, min(timestamp) as startTime, min(timeNTLM) as startNTLMTime, max(timestamp) as endTime, max(timeNTLM) as endNTLMTime by dest_user_id, dest_user, dest_device_id, span(timestamp, 86400s)\n| where NOT dest_user=\"-\" AND totalKerberos > 0 AND totalNtlm > 0 AND endTime - startTime > 1800000 AND (totalKerberos > 10 * totalNtlm AND totalKerberos > 50) AND (endTime - startTime) > 3 * (endNTLMTime - startNTLMTime)\n| eval start_time=ucast(startNTLMTime, \"long\", null), end_time=ucast(endNTLMTime, \"long\", null), entities=mvappend(dest_user_id, dest_device_id), body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"total_kerberos\", totalKerberos, \"total_ntlm\", totalNtlm, \"analysis_start_time\", startTime, \"analysis_end_time\", endTime, \"pth_start_time\", startNTLMTime, \"pth_end_time\", endNTLMTime])\n| into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from endpoint devices, i.e., destinations of interest. Please make sure that event ID 4624 is being logged.", "known_false_positives": "Environments in which NTLM is used extremely rarely and for benign purposes (such as a rare use of SMB shares).", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002/", "https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/psexec-pass-hash/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "asset_type": "Windows", "cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 20"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:AD", "Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "message": "Potential lateral movement and credential stealing via Pass the Token or Pass the Hash techniques. Operation is performed via credentials of the account $dest_user_id$ and observed by the destination device $dest_device_id$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1550", "T1550.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "User", "role": ["Actor"]}, {"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "signature_id", "dest_user", "dest_user_id", "dest_device_id", "authentication_method"], "risk_score": 72, "risk_severity": "high", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Use Alternate Authentication Material", "Pass the Hash"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement", "Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "Night Dragon", "APT28", "APT1"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "potential_pass_the_token_or_hash_observed_at_the_destination_device_filter"}]}, {"name": "Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn", "id": "cb909b3e-512b-11ec-aa31-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-29", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic assists with identifying a PowerShell process spawned as a child or grand child process of commonly abused processes during lateral movement techniques including `services.exe`, `wmiprsve.exe`, `svchost.exe`, `wsmprovhost.exe` and `mmc.exe`. Legitimate Windows features such as the Service Control Manager, Windows Management Instrumentation, Task Scheduler, Windows Remote Management and the DCOM protocol can be abused to start a process on a remote endpoint. Looking for PowerShell spawned out of this processes may reveal a lateral movement attack. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse these services during a breach for lateral movement and remote code execution.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=svchost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=wsmprovhost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=mmc.exe) (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR (Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process=*powershell.exe*) OR Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR (Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process=*pwsh.exe*)) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may spawn PowerShell as a child process of the the identified processes. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053.005/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "Malicious PowerShell"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement_powershell/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement", "Malicious PowerShell"], "message": "A PowerShell process was spawned as a child process of typically abused processes on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021", "T1021.003", "T1021.006", "T1047", "T1053.005", "T1543.003", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 45, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote Services", "Distributed Component Object Model", "Windows Remote Management", "Windows Management Instrumentation", "Scheduled Task", "Windows Service", "PowerShell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement", "Execution", "Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no", "Threat Group-3390", "Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT41", "FIN6", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Threat Group-3390", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "menuPass", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "APT29", "Deep Panda", "Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "MuddyWater", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT-C-36", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT41", "Machete", "Soft Cell", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Patchwork", "OilRig", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "FIN8", "menuPass", "FIN10", "APT32", "FIN7", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT29", "Blue Mockingbird", "DarkVishnya", "Wizard Spider", "APT32", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Tropic Trooper", "Cobalt Group", "Ke3chang", "Honeybee", "FIN7", "Threat Group-3390", "APT19", "APT3", "Lazarus Group", "Carbanak", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "Gallmaker", "Turla", "APT19", "DarkHydrus", "APT28", "Thrip", "Gorgon Group", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leviathan", "TA459", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT32", "FIN7", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "APT3", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn_filter"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 DNSQuery", "id": "f1483f5e-ee29-11eb-9d23-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe process having a http connection and do a dns query in some web domain. This technique was seen in IcedID malware where the rundll32 that execute its payload will contact amazon.com to check internet connect and to communicate to its C&C server to download config and other file component.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=22 process_name=\"rundll32.exe\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image QueryName QueryStatus ProcessId direction Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_dnsquery_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and eventcode = 22 dnsquery executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://any.run/malware-trends/icedid"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "rundll32 process $process_name$ having a dns query to $QueryName$ in host $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "process name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Image", "QueryName", "QueryStatus", "ProcessId", "direction", "Computer"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Rundll32"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT32", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "TA505", "MuddyWater", "APT29", "APT19", "CopyKittens", "APT3", "Carbanak", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "rundll32_dnsquery_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior", "id": "2b85aa3d-f5f6-4c2e-a081-a09f6e1c2e40", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-17", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes Windows Event ID 1100 to identify when Windows event log service is shutdown. Note that this is a voluminous analytic that will require tuning or restricted to specific endpoints based on criticality. This event generates every time Windows Event Log service has shut down. It also generates during normal system shutdown. During triage, based on time of day and user, determine if this was planned. If not planned, follow through with reviewing parallel alerts and other data sources to determine what else may have occurred.", "search": "(`wineventlog_security` EventCode=1100) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest Message EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_event_log_service_behavior_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows event logs from your hosts. In addition, the Splunk Windows TA is needed.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible the Event Logging service gets shut down due to system errors or legitimately administration tasks. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-1100", "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/defense-evasion/disabling-windows-event-logs-by-suspending-eventlog-service-threads", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/001/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1070.001/T1070.001.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Log Manipulation", "Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "The Windows Event Log Service shutdown on $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1070", "T1070.001"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "PR.IP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "dest"], "risk_score": 9, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Indicator Removal on Host", "Clear Windows Event Logs"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT41", "APT38", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT32", "FIN8", "FIN5", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_event_log_service_behavior_filter"}]}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass", "id": "9be56c82-b1cc-4318-87eb-d138afaaca39", "version": 5, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Rico Valdez, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for PowerShell processes started with parameters used to bypass the local execution policy for scripts. These parameters are often observed in attacks leveraging PowerShell scripts as they override the default PowerShell execution policy.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process_id) as process_id, values(Processes.parent_process_id) as parent_process_id values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process=\"* -ex*\" OR Processes.process=\"* bypass *\") by Processes.process_id, Processes.user, Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "There may be legitimate reasons to bypass the PowerShell execution policy. The PowerShell script being run with this parameter should be validated to ensure that it is legitimate.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["DHS Report TA18-074A", "HAFNIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/encoded_powershell/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "PowerShell local execution policy bypass attempt on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "PowerShell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "Gallmaker", "Turla", "APT19", "DarkHydrus", "APT28", "Thrip", "Gorgon Group", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leviathan", "TA459", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT32", "FIN7", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "APT3", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_powershell"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass_filter"}]}, {"name": "GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network", "id": "2c853856-a140-11eb-a5b5-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-19", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies gpupdate.exe with no command line arguments and with a network connection. It is unusual for gpupdate.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. gpupdate.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=gpupdate.exe by _time span=1h Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(gpupdate\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port !=\"0\" by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port| `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_guid connection_to_CNC dest_port | `gpupdate_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process.", "references": ["https://raw.githubusercontent.com/xx0hcd/Malleable-C2-Profiles/0ef8cf4556e26f6d4190c56ba697c2159faa5822/crimeware/trick_ryuk.profile", "https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2021/02/09/learn-pipe-fitting-for-all-of-your-offense-projects/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Command And Control"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Process gpupdate.exe with parent_process $parent_process_name$ is executed on $dest$ by user $user$, followed by an outbound network connection to $connection_to_CNC$ on port $dest_port$. This behaviour is seen with cobaltstrike.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process Name", "role": ["Parent Process", "Attacker"]}, {"name": "connection_to_CNC", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventID", "process_name", "process_id", "parent_process_name", "dest_port", "process_path"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Process Injection"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Cobalt Group", "APT37", "Honeybee", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "gpupdate_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter"}]}, {"name": "ETW Registry Disabled", "id": "8ed523ac-276b-11ec-ac39-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-07", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a registry modification to disable ETW feature of windows. This technique is to evade EDR appliance to evade detections and hide its execution from audit logs.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\.NETFramework*\") Registry.registry_value_name = ETWEnabled Registry.registry_value_data=0x00000000 by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `etw_registry_disabled_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://gist.github.com/Cyb3rWard0g/a4a115fd3ab518a0e593525a379adee3"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Privilege Escalation Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127/etw_disable/sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.006", "T1127", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.registry_value_data"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Indicator Blocking", "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "etw_registry_disabled_filter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Security Account Manager Stopped", "id": "69c12d59-d951-431e-ab77-ec426b8d65e6", "version": 1, "date": "2020-11-06", "author": "Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The search looks for a Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) was stopped via command-line. This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE (\"Processes.process_name\"=\"net*.exe\" \"Processes.process\"=\"*stop \\\"samss\\\"*\") BY \"Processes.dest\", \"Processes.user\", \"Processes.process\" | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_security_account_manager_stopped_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the process-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Processes data-model object. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.", "known_false_positives": "SAM is a critical windows service, stopping it would cause major issues on an endpoint this makes false positive rare. AlthoughNo false positives have been identified.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ryuk/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "message": "The Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) was stopped via cli by $user$ on $dest$ by this command: $processs$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1489"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process", "type": "Process", "role": ["Target"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Service Stop"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "windows_security_account_manager_stopped_filter"}]}, {"name": "Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters", "id": "404620de-46d8-48b6-90cc-8a8d7b0876a3", "version": 4, "date": "2020-11-23", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search detects the process execution and arguments required to silently create a shim database. The sdbinst.exe application is used to install shim database files (.sdb). A shim is a small library which transparently intercepts an API, changes the parameters passed, handles the operation itself, or redirects the operation elsewhere.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = sdbinst.exe by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "None identified", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Privilege Escalation"}, "Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A process $process_name$ that possible create a shim db silently in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1546.011", "T1546"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Application Shimming", "Event Triggered Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN7", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters_filter"}]}, {"name": "High File Deletion Frequency", "id": "45b125c4-866f-11eb-a95a-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-16", "author": "Teoderick Contreras", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for high frequency of file deletion relative to process name and process id. These events usually happen when the ransomware tries to encrypt the files with the ransomware file extensions and sysmon treat the original files to be deleted as soon it was replace as encrypted data.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=23 TargetFilename IN (\"*\\.cmd\", \"*\\.ini\",\"*\\.gif\", \"*\\.jpg\", \"*\\.jpeg\", \"*\\.db\", \"*\\.ps1\", \"*\\.doc*\", \"*\\.xls*\", \"*\\.ppt*\", \"*\\.bmp\",\"*\\.zip\", \"*\\.rar\", \"*\\.7z\", \"*\\.chm\", \"*\\.png\", \"*\\.log\", \"*\\.vbs\", \"*\\.js\") | stats values(TargetFilename) as deleted_files min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer user EventCode Image ProcessID |where count >=100 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `high_file_deletion_frequency_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the deleted target file name, process name and process id from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "user may delete bunch of pictures or files in a folder.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "High frequency file deletion activity detected on host $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1485"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "deleted_files", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Target"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["EventCode", "TargetFilename", "Computer", "user", "Image", "ProcessID", "_time"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Data Destruction"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Lazarus Group", "APT38"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "high_file_deletion_frequency_filter"}]}, {"name": "Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option", "id": "cfa7b9ac-43f0-11ec-9b48-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary. This will execute code while bypassing application control using the `/u` (uninstall) switch. \\\nInstallUtil uses the functions install and uninstall within the System.Configuration.Install namespace to process .net assembly. Install function requires admin privileges, however, uninstall function can be run as an unprivileged user.\\\nWhen `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \\\nIf used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \\\nDuring triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` Processes.process IN (\"*/u*\", \"*uninstall*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_installutil_uninstall_option_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives should be present. Filter as needed by parent process or application.", "references": ["https://evi1cg.me/archives/AppLocker_Bypass_Techniques.html#menu_index_12", "https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList/blob/master/md/Installutil.exe.md", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ performing an uninstall.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218.004", "T1218"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["InstallUtil", "Signed Binary Proxy Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=installutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=InstallUtil.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_installutil"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "windows_installutil_uninstall_option_filter"}]}, {"name": "Hunting for Log4Shell", "id": "158b68fa-5d1a-11ec-aac8-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-14", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Web"], "description": "The following hunting query assists with quickly assessing CVE-2021-44228, or Log4Shell, activity mapped to the Web Datamodel. This is a combination query attempting to identify, score and dashboard. Because the Log4Shell vulnerability requires the string to be in the logs, this will work to identify the activity anywhere in the HTTP headers using _raw. Modify the first line to use the same pattern matching against other log sources. Scoring is based on a simple rubric of 0-5. 5 being the best match, and less than 5 meant to identify additional patterns that will equate to a higher total score. \\\nThe first jndi match identifies the standard pattern of `{jndi:` \\\njndi_fastmatch is meant to identify any jndi in the logs. The score is set low and is meant to be the \"base\" score used later. \\\njndi_proto is a protocol match that identifies `jndi` and one of `ldap, ldaps, rmi, dns, nis, iiop, corba, nds, http, https.` \\\nall_match is a very well written regex by https://gist.github.com/Schvenn that identifies nearly all patterns of this attack behavior. \\\nenv works to identify environment variables in the header, meant to capture `AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID`, `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY` and `env`. \\\nuri_detect is string match looking for the common uri paths currently being scanned/abused in the wild. \\\nkeywords matches on enumerated values that, like `$ctx:loginId`, that may be found in the header used by the adversary. \\\nlookup matching is meant to catch some basic obfuscation that has been identified using upper, lower and date. \\\nScoring will then occur based on any findings. The base score is meant to be 2 , created by jndi_fastmatch. Everything else is meant to increase that score. \\\nFinally, a simple table is created to show the scoring and the _raw field. Sort based on score or columns of interest.", "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | eval jndi=if(match(_raw, \"(\\{|%7B)[jJnNdDiI]{4}:\"),4,0) | eval jndi_fastmatch=if(match(_raw, \"[jJnNdDiI]{4}\"),2,0) | eval jndi_proto=if(match(_raw,\"(?i)jndi:(ldap[s]?|rmi|dns|nis|iiop|corba|nds|http|https):\"),5,0) | eval all_match = if(match(_raw, \"(?i)(%(25){0,}20|\\s)*(%(25){0,}24|\\$)(%(25){0,}20|\\s)*(%(25){0,}7B|{)(%(25){0,}20|\\s)*(%(25){0,}(6A|4A)|J)(%(25){0,}(6E|4E)|N)(%(25){0,}(64|44)|D)(%(25){0,}(69|49)|I)(%(25){0,}20|\\s)*(%(25){0,}3A|:)[\\w\\%]+(%(25){1,}3A|:)(%(25){1,}2F|\\/)[^\\n]+\"),5,0) | eval env_var = if(match(_raw, \"env:\") OR match(_raw, \"env:AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID\") OR match(_raw, \"env:AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY\"),5,0) | eval uridetect = if(match(_raw, \"(?i)Basic\\/Command\\/Base64|Basic\\/ReverseShell|Basic\\/TomcatMemshell|Basic\\/JBossMemshell|Basic\\/WebsphereMemshell|Basic\\/SpringMemshell|Basic\\/Command|Deserialization\\/CommonsCollectionsK|Deserialization\\/CommonsBeanutils|Deserialization\\/Jre8u20\\/TomcatMemshell|Deserialization\\/CVE_2020_2555\\/WeblogicMemshell|TomcatBypass|GroovyBypass|WebsphereBypass\"),4,0) | eval keywords = if(match(_raw,\"(?i)\\$\\{ctx\\:loginId\\}|\\$\\{map\\:type\\}|\\$\\{filename\\}|\\$\\{date\\:MM-dd-yyyy\\}|\\$\\{docker\\:containerId\\}|\\$\\{docker\\:containerName\\}|\\$\\{docker\\:imageName\\}|\\$\\{env\\:USER\\}|\\$\\{event\\:Marker\\}|\\$\\{mdc\\:UserId\\}|\\$\\{java\\:runtime\\}|\\$\\{java\\:vm\\}|\\$\\{java\\:os\\}|\\$\\{jndi\\:logging/context-name\\}|\\$\\{hostName\\}|\\$\\{docker\\:containerId\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:accountName\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:clusterName\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:containerId\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:containerName\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:host\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:labels.app\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:labels.podTemplateHash\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:masterUrl\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:namespaceId\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:namespaceName\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:podId\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:podIp\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:podName\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:imageId\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:imageName\\}|\\$\\{log4j\\:configLocation\\}|\\$\\{log4j\\:configParentLocation\\}|\\$\\{spring\\:spring.application.name\\}|\\$\\{main\\:myString\\}|\\$\\{main\\:0\\}|\\$\\{main\\:1\\}|\\$\\{main\\:2\\}|\\$\\{main\\:3\\}|\\$\\{main\\:4\\}|\\$\\{main\\:bar\\}|\\$\\{name\\}|\\$\\{marker\\}|\\$\\{marker\\:name\\}|\\$\\{spring\\:profiles.active[0]|\\$\\{sys\\:logPath\\}|\\$\\{web\\:rootDir\\}|\\$\\{sys\\:user.name\\}\"),4,0) | eval obf = if(match(_raw, \"(\\$|%24)[^ /]*({|%7b)[^ /]*(j|%6a)[^ /]*(n|%6e)[^ /]*(d|%64)[^ /]*(i|%69)[^ /]*(:|%3a)[^ /]*(:|%3a)[^ /]*(/|%2f)\"),5,0) | eval lookups = if(match(_raw, \"date:\") OR match(_raw, \"upper:\") OR match(_raw, \"lower:\"),4,0) | addtotals fieldname=Score, jndi, jndi_proto, env_var, uridetect, all_match, jndi_fastmatch, keywords, obf, lookups | where Score > 2 | stats values(Score) by jndi, jndi_proto, env_var, uridetect, all_match, jndi_fastmatch, keywords, lookups, obf, _raw | `hunting_for_log4shell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "Out of the box, the Web datamodel is required to be pre-filled. However, tested was performed against raw httpd access logs. Change the first line to any dataset to pass the regex's against.", "known_false_positives": "It is highly possible you will find false positives, however, the base score is set to 2 for _any_ jndi found in raw logs. tune and change as needed, include any filtering.", "references": ["https://gist.github.com/olafhartong/916ebc673ba066537740164f7e7e1d72", "https://gist.github.com/Neo23x0/e4c8b03ff8cdf1fa63b7d15db6e3860b#gistcomment-3994449", "https://regex101.com/r/OSrm0q/1/", "https://github.com/Neo23x0/signature-base/blob/master/yara/expl_log4j_cve_2021_44228.yar", "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/12/12/log4shell-hell-anatomy-of-an-exploit-outbreak/", "https://gist.github.com/MHaggis/1899b8554f38c8692a9fb0ceba60b44c", "https://twitter.com/sasi2103/status/1469764719850442760?s=20"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "asset_type": "Web Server", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:network"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/log4shell-nginx.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Hunting for Log4Shell exploitation has occurred.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1190"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "http_method", "type": "Other", "role": ["other"]}, {"name": "src", "type": "Other", "role": ["other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Web.http_method", "Web.url", "Web.url_length", "Web.src", "Web.dest", "Web.http_user_agent", "_raw"], "risk_score": 40, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploit Public-Facing Application"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Rocke", "APT39", "BlackTech", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Night Dragon", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "hunting_for_log4shell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin", "id": "b5541828-8ffd-4070-9d95-b3da4de924cb", "version": 4, "date": "2020-07-22", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects writes to the recycle bin by a process other than explorer.exe.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path values(Filesystem.file_name) as file_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path = \"*$Recycle.Bin*\" by Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Filesystem\")`| search [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.user) as user values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name != \"explorer.exe\" by Processes.process_id Processes.dest| `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | table process_id dest] | `suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on filesystem and process logs responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem` nodes.", "known_false_positives": "Because the Recycle Bin is a hidden folder in modern versions of Windows, it would be unusual for a process other than explorer.exe to write to it. Incidents should be investigated as appropriate.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Collection and Staging"], "asset_type": "Windows", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036/write_to_recycle_bin/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 40, "message": "Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin process $Processes.process_name$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1036"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Processes.process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.file_path", "Filesystem.file_name", "Filesystem.process_id", "Filesystem.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.dest"], "risk_score": 28, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Masquerading"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Windshift", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "Dragonfly 2.0"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin_filter"}]}, {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell", "id": "d4f42098-4680-11ec-ad07-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-15", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the DCOM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of ShellExecute and ExecuteShellCommand. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse DCOM and `powershell.exe` for lateral movement and remote code execution.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process=\"*Document.ActiveView.ExecuteShellCommand*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Document.Application.ShellExecute*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may leverage DCOM to start a process on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003/", "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/dcom-lateral-movement-techniques"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.003/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "message": "A process was started on a remote endpoint from $dest by abusing DCOM using PowerShell.exe", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021", "T1021.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote Services", "Distributed Component Object Model"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_powershell"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Remote System Discovery with Dsquery", "id": "9fb562f4-42f8-4139-8e11-a82edf7ed718", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-31", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `dsquery.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The `computer` argument returns a list of all computers registered in the domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike engage in remote system discovery for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"dsquery.exe\") (Processes.process=\"*computer*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_system_discovery_with_dsquery_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/cc732952(v=ws.11)"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote System Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Rocke", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT39", "APT32", "Deep Panda", "Threat Group-3390", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leafminer", "Ke3chang", "FIN8", "APT3", "FIN5", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Turla"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "remote_system_discovery_with_dsquery_filter"}]}, {"name": "Clop Common Exec Parameter", "id": "5a8a2a72-8322-11eb-9ee9-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-17", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytics are designed to identifies some CLOP ransomware variant that using arguments to execute its main code or feature of its code. In this variant if the parameter is \"runrun\", CLOP ransomware will try to encrypt files in network shares and if it is \"temp.dat\", it will try to read from some stream pipe or file start encrypting files within the infected local machines. This technique can be also identified as an anti-sandbox technique to make its code non-responsive since it is waiting for some parameter to execute properly.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as cmdline values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process values(Processes.process_name) count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name != \"*temp.dat*\" Processes.process = \"*runrun*\" OR Processes.process = \"*temp.dat*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `clop_common_exec_parameter_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Operators can execute third party tools using these parameters.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_b/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Obfuscation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting using arguments to execute its main code or feature of its code related to Clop ransomware.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1204"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 100, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["User Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "clop_common_exec_parameter_filter"}]}, {"name": "Delete A Net User", "id": "8776d79c-d26e-11eb-9a56-acde48001122", "version": 3, "date": "2021-11-30", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "This analytic will detect a suspicious net.exe/net1.exe command-line to delete a user on a system. This technique may be use by an administrator for legitimate purposes, however this behavior has been used in the wild to impair some user or deleting adversaries tracks created during its lateral movement additional systems. During triage, review parallel processes for additional behavior. Identify any other user accounts created before or after.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null)), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_path\"), \"string\", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND like(cmd_line, \"%/delete%\") AND (process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR process_name=\"net.exe\") | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null)), body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line, \"process_name\", process_name, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process_name, \"process_path\", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed net.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "System administrators or scripts may delete user accounts via this technique. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/ssa_data1/net_user_del.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1531/atomic_red_team/security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to delete a user account.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1531"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest_device_id", "process_name", "parent_process_name", "process_path", "dest_user_id", "process", "cmd_line"], "risk_score": 49, "risk_severity": "high", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Account Access Removal"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "delete_a_net_user_filter"}]}, {"name": "Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Process", "id": "9015385a-9c84-11eb-bef2-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-13", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies a source process name failing to authenticate with multiple users. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4625 generates on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations when an account fails to logon. Logon Type 2 describes an iteractive logon attempt.\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\\nThis detection will trigger on the potenfially malicious host, perhaps controlled via a trojan or operated by an insider threat, from where a password spraying attack is being executed. This could be a domain controller as well as a member server or workstation.\\\nThe analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source process name, source account and attempted user accounts.", "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4625 Logon_Type=2 Caller_Process_Name!=\"-\" | bucket span=2m _time | eval Source_Account = mvindex(Account_Name, 0) | eval Destination_Account = mvindex(Account_Name, 1) | stats dc(Destination_Account) AS unique_accounts values(Account_Name) as tried_accounts by _time, Caller_Process_Name, Source_Account, ComputerName | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Caller_Process_Name, Source_Account, ComputerName | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_process_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Event Logs from domain controllers aas well as member servers and workstations. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Logon` within `Logon/Logoff` needs to be enabled.", "known_false_positives": "A process failing to authenticate with multiple users is not a common behavior for legitimate user sessions. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners and missconfigured systems.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4625", "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4625", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/basic-audit-logon-events"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_multiple_users_from_process/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Potential password spraying attack from $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Logon_Type", "Caller_Process_Name", "Security_ID", "Account_Name", "ComputerName"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Password Spraying", "Brute Force"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "Leafminer", "Lazarus Group", "DarkVishnya", "APT39", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Turla"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_process_filter"}]}, {"name": "PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request", "id": "e3ef244e-0a67-11ec-abf2-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-31", "author": "Michael Haag, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifes Event Code 4768, A `Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested`, successfull occurs. This behavior has been identified to assist with detecting PetitPotam, CVE-2021-36942. Once an attacer obtains a computer certificate by abusing Active Directory Certificate Services in combination with PetitPotam, the next step would be to leverage the certificate for malicious purposes. One way of doing this is to request a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket using a tool like Rubeus. This request will generate a 4768 event with some unusual fields depending on the environment. This analytic will require tuning, we recommend filtering Account_Name to Domain Controllers for your environment.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 Client_Address!=\"::1\" Certificate_Thumbprint!=\"\" Account_Name=*$ | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Account_Name, Client_Address, action, Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request_filter`", "how_to_implement": "The following analytic requires Event Code 4768. Ensure that it is logging no Domain Controllers and appearing in Splunk.", "known_false_positives": "False positives are possible if the environment is using certificates for authentication.", "references": ["https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventid=4768", "https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Active+Directory+Certificate+Services+ADCS+PKI+domain+admin+vulnerability/27668/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-36942"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1187/petitpotam/windows-security.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Lateral Movement"], "message": "A Kerberos TGT was requested in a non-standard manner against $dest$, potentially related to CVE-2021-36942, PetitPotam.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "Account_Name", "Client_Address", "action", "Message"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request_filter"}]}, {"name": "GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block", "id": "640b0eda-0429-11ec-accd-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-23", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet used with specific parameters. The `Win32_UserAccount` parameter is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message=\"*Get-WmiObject*\" AND Message=\"*Win32_UserAccount*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Local user discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087", "T1087.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Account Discovery", "Local Account"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Turla", "Poseidon Group", "OilRig", "Ke3chang", "APT32", "APT1", "Threat Group-3390", "APT3", "admin@338"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_script_block_filter"}]}, {"name": "Disable UAC Remote Restriction", "id": "9928b732-210e-11ec-b65e-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-29", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable UAC remote restriction. This technique was well documented in Microsoft page where attacker may modify this registry value to bypassed UAC feature of windows host. This is a good indicator that some tries to bypassed UAC to suspicious process or gain privilege escalation.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path =\"*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System*\" Registry.registry_value_name=\"LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy\" Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000001\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `disable_uac_remote_restriction_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "admin may set this policy for non-critical machine.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/windows-security/user-account-control-and-remote-restriction"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Privilege Escalation Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy/sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.registry_value_data"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Bypass User Access Control", "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "MuddyWater", "Honeybee", "Cobalt Group", "Threat Group-3390", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Patchwork", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disable_uac_remote_restriction_filter"}]}, {"name": "MSHTML Module Load in Office Product", "id": "5f1c168e-118b-11ec-84ff-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-09", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies the module load of mshtml.dll into an Office product. This behavior has been related to CVE-2021-40444, whereas the malicious document will load ActiveX, which activates the MSHTML component. The vulnerability resides in the MSHTML component. During triage, identify parallel processes and capture any file modifications for analysis.", "search": "`sysmon` EventID=7 process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\",\"wordpad.exe\",\"wordview.exe\") ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\mshtml.dll\", \"*\\\\Microsoft.mshtml.dll\",\"*\\\\IE.Interop.MSHTML.dll\",\"*\\\\MshtmlDac.dll\",\"*\\\\MshtmlDed.dll\",\"*\\\\MshtmlDer.dll\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, process_name, ImageLoaded, OriginalFileName, process_id | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mshtml_module_load_in_office_product_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process names and image loads from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives will be present, however, tune as necessary.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/36c14029-9df8-439c-bba0-45f2643b0c70/", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/index-dll"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_mshtml.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ loading mshtml.dll.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "ImageLoaded", "process_name", "OriginalFileName", "process_id", "dest"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Phishing", "Spearphishing Attachment"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "mshtml_module_load_in_office_product_filter"}]}, {"name": "Disable Defender AntiVirus Registry", "id": "aa4f695a-3024-11ec-9987-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-18", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This particular behavior is typically executed when an adversaries or malware gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution and to evade detections. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. Endpoint should be isolated.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender*\" Registry.registry_value_name = DisableAntiVirus Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000001 by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `disable_defender_antivirus_registry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the registry value name, registry path, and registry value data from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to disable windows defender product", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["IceID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_value_data"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disable_defender_antivirus_registry_filter"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawning MSHTA", "id": "6078fa20-a6d2-11eb-b662-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-04-26", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `mshta.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `mshta.exe` will contain the `hta` file locally, or a URL to the remote destination. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `mshta.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `mshta.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\") `process_mshta` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_mshta_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "No false positives known. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/threats/TA551/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "IcedID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "recon"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_macros.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Phishing", "Spearphishing Attachment"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=mshta.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSHTA.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_mshta"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "office_product_spawning_mshta_filter"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawning Wmic", "id": "ffc236d6-a6c9-11eb-95f1-acde48001122", "version": 3, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by Ursnif malware family. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `wmic.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `wmic.exe` will contain `wmic process call create`. In addition, Threat Research has released a detection identifying the use of `wmic process call create` on the command-line of `wmic.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `wmic.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\") `process_wmic` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_wmic_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "No false positives known. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/fb894ab8-a966-4b72-920b-935f41756afd/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1047/T1047.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "FIN7"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "recon"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_macros.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Phishing", "Spearphishing Attachment"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_wmic"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "office_product_spawning_wmic_filter"}]}, {"name": "Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation", "id": "fb4c31b0-13e8-4155-8aa5-24de4b8d6717", "version": 2, "date": "2019-12-06", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "Detect memory dumping of the LSASS process.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe CallTrace=*dbgcore.dll* OR CallTrace=*dbghelp.dll* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, TargetImage, TargetProcessId, SourceImage, SourceProcessId | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 10 for lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators can create memory dumps for debugging purposes, but memory dumps of the LSASS process would be unusual.", "references": ["https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "asset_type": "Windows", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "process $SourceImage$ injected into $TargetImage$ and was attempted dump LSASS on $dest$. Adversaries tend to do this when trying to accesss credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS).", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "TargetImage", "type": "Process", "role": ["Target"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "TargetImage", "CallTrace", "Computer", "TargetProcessId", "SourceImage", "SourceProcessId"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["LSASS Memory", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Whitefly", "Blue Mockingbird", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Leviathan", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Stolen Pencil", "APT32", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "PLATINUM", "FIN8", "BRONZE BUTLER", "OilRig", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT28", "APT1", "Ke3chang", "Cleaver", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation_filter"}]}, {"name": "ICACLS Grant Command", "id": "b1b1e316-accc-11eb-a9b4-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-04", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies potential adversaries that modify the security permission of a specific file or directory. This technique is commonly seen in APT tradecraft and coinminer scripts to evade detections and restrict access to their component files.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"icacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"cacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"xcacls.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*/grant*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `icacls_grant_command_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed icacls.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig", "Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Process name $process_name$ with grant argument executed by $user$ to change security permission of a specific file or directory on host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1222"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["File and Directory Permissions Modification"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "icacls_grant_command_filter"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Using memory As Backing Store", "id": "c396a0c4-c9f2-11eb-b4f5-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-10", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is using memory stream as new object backstore. The malicious PowerShell script will contain stream flate data and will be decompressed in memory to run or drop the actual payload. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*New-Object IO.MemoryStream*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "powershell may used this function to store out object into memory.", "references": ["https://www.carbonblack.com/blog/decoding-malicious-powershell-streams/", "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains memorystream command in $Message$ as new object backstore with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1140"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 40, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Gamaredon Group", "Molerats", "Frankenstein", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Darkhotel", "Tropic Trooper", "menuPass", "Honeybee", "Threat Group-3390", "APT19", "Gorgon Group", "Leviathan", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store_filter"}]}, {"name": "Elevated Group Discovery with PowerView", "id": "10d62950-0de5-4199-a710-cff9ea79b413", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-25", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainGroupMember` commandlet. `Get-DomainGroupMember` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. As the name suggests, `Get-DomainGroupMember` is used to list the members of an specific domain group. Red Teams and adversaries alike use PowerView to enumerate elevated domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery to identify high privileged users.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-DomainGroupMember*\") AND Message IN (\"*Domain Admins*\",\"*Enterprise Admins*\", \"*Schema Admins*\", \"*Account Operators*\" , \"*Server Operators*\", \"*Protected Users*\", \"*Dns Admins*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `elevated_group_discovery_with_powerview_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerView for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainGroupMember/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-practices/appendix-b--privileged-accounts-and-groups-in-active-directory", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Elevated group discovery using PowerView on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 21, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Permission Groups Discovery", "Domain Groups"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TA505", "APT3", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "Inception", "OilRig", "FIN6", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "elevated_group_discovery_with_powerview_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments", "id": "6b74d578-a02e-4e94-a0d1-39440d0bf254", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-20", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies regsvcs.exe with no command line arguments. This particular behavior occurs when another process injects into regsvcs.exe, no command line arguments will be present. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Regasm.exe are natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvcs` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(regsvcs\\.exe.{0,4}$)\"| `detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, limited instances of regsvcs.exe may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvcs/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "The process $process_name$ was spawned by $parent_process_name$ without any command-line arguments on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.009"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Regsvcs/Regasm"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvcs.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RegSvcs.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_regsvcs"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments_filter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Initiation on Remote Endpoint", "id": "3f519894-4276-11ec-ab02-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-10", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `sc.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to start a Windows Service on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Service Control Manager for lateral movement and remote code execution.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=sc.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=sc.exe) (Processes.process=*\\\\\\\\* AND Processes.process=*start*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_initiation_on_remote_endpoint_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may start Windows Services on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/services/controlling-a-service-using-sc", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "message": "A Windows Service was started on a remote endpoint from $dest", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1543", "T1543.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 54, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Create or Modify System Process", "Windows Service"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Blue Mockingbird", "DarkVishnya", "Wizard Spider", "APT32", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Tropic Trooper", "Cobalt Group", "Ke3chang", "Honeybee", "FIN7", "Threat Group-3390", "APT19", "APT3", "Lazarus Group", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "windows_service_initiation_on_remote_endpoint_filter"}]}, {"name": "DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network", "id": "f1c07594-a141-11eb-8407-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-10-13", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies DLLHost.exe with no command line arguments with a network connection. It is unusual for DLLHost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. DLLHost.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=dllhost.exe by _time span=1h Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(dllhost\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port !=\"0\" by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_guid connection_to_CNC dest_port | `dllhost_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `port` node.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate third party applications may use a moved copy of dllhost, triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://raw.githubusercontent.com/threatexpress/malleable-c2/c3385e481159a759f79b8acfe11acf240893b830/jquery-c2.4.2.profile", "https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2021/02/09/learn-pipe-fitting-for-all-of-your-offense-projects/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon_dllhost.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The process $process_name$ was spawned by $parent_image$ without any command-line arguments on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_image", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventID", "process_name", "process_id", "parent_process_name", "dest_port", "process_path"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Process Injection"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Cobalt Group", "APT37", "Honeybee", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "dllhost_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation", "id": "c9f4b923-f8af-4155-b697-1354f5bcbc5e", "version": 4, "date": "2020-11-27", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to elevate privileges. The registry keys under \"Image File Execution Options\" are used to intercept calls to an executable and can be used to attach malicious binaries to benign system binaries.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=\"*Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Image File Execution Options*\") AND (Registry.registry_value_name=GlobalFlag OR Registry.registry_value_name=Debugger) by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "There are many legitimate applications that must execute upon system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task.", "references": ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2015/12/an-introduction-to-image-file-execution-options/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 95, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Persistence"}, "Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.012/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to privilege escalation in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1546.012", "T1546"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user"], "risk_score": 76, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Image File Execution Options Injection", "Event Triggered Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TEMP.Veles", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation_filter"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt", "id": "c8e7ced0-10c5-11ec-8b03-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-08", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following hunting detection identifies rundll32.exe with `control_rundll` within the command-line, loading a .cpl or another file type. Developed in relation to CVE-2021-40444. Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. \\ This is written to be a bit more broad by not including .cpl. \\ During triage, review parallel processes to identify any further suspicious behavior.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE) Processes.process=*Control_RunDLL* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_control_rundll_hunt_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "This is a hunting detection, meant to provide a understanding of how voluminous control_rundll is within the environment.", "references": ["https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/rundll32.exe-111474C61232202B5B588D2B512CBB25.html", "https://app.any.run/tasks/36c14029-9df8-439c-bba0-45f2643b0c70/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.002/T1218.002.yaml"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a suspicious file from disk.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Rundll32"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT32", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "TA505", "MuddyWater", "APT29", "APT19", "CopyKittens", "APT3", "Carbanak", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "rundll32_control_rundll_hunt_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Copy of ShadowCopy with Script Block Logging", "id": "9251299c-ea5b-11eb-a8de-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-21", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies `copy` or `[System.IO.File]::Copy` being used to capture the SAM, SYSTEM or SECURITY hives identified in script block. This will catch the most basic use cases for credentials being taken for offline cracking. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message IN (\"*copy*\",\"*[System.IO.File]::Copy*\") AND Message IN (\"*System32\\\\config\\\\SAM*\", \"*System32\\\\config\\\\SYSTEM*\",\"*System32\\\\config\\\\SECURITY*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode ComputerName User EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_copy_of_shadowcopy_with_script_block_logging_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives as the scope is limited to SAM, SYSTEM and SECURITY hives.", "references": ["https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-36934", "https://github.com/GossiTheDog/HiveNightmare", "https://github.com/JumpsecLabs/Guidance-Advice/tree/main/SAM_Permissions"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-36934"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/serioussam/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "PowerShell was identified running a script to capture the SAM hive on endpoint $ComputerName$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Message", "OpCode", "ComputerName", "User", "EventCode"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Security Account Manager", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390", "Ke3chang", "Soft Cell", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "menuPass", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_copy_of_shadowcopy_with_script_block_logging_filter"}]}, {"name": "Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM", "id": "57ad5a64-9df7-11eb-a290-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-15", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple invalid users using the NTLM protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using NTLM to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. As attackers progress in a breach, mistakes will be made. In certain scenarios, adversaries may execute a password spraying attack using an invalid list of users. Event 4776 is generated on the computer that is authoritative for the provided credentials. For domain accounts, the domain controller is authoritative. For local accounts, the local computer is authoritative. Error code 0xC0000064 stands for `The username you typed does not exist` (the attempted user is a legitimate domain user).\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\\nThis detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\\\nThe analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source workstation name and attempted user accounts.", "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4776 Logon_Account!=\"*$\" 0xC0000064 action=failure | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Logon_Account) AS unique_accounts values(Logon_Account) as tried_accounts by _time, Source_Workstation | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Source_Workstation | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Credential Validation' within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", "known_false_positives": "A host failing to authenticate with multiple invalid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners and missconfigured systems. If this detection triggers on a host other than a Domain Controller, the behavior could represent a password spraying attack against the host's local accounts.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-credential-validation", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4776"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_invalid_users_ntlm/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Potential NTLM based password spraying attack from $Source_Workstation$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "Source_Workstation", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "action", "Logon_Account", "Source_Workstation"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Password Spraying", "Brute Force"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "Leafminer", "Lazarus Group", "DarkVishnya", "APT39", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Turla"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm_filter"}]}, {"name": "Ryuk Wake on LAN Command", "id": "538d0152-7aaa-11eb-beaa-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-01", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This Splunk query identifies the use of Wake-on-LAN utilized by Ryuk ransomware. The Ryuk Ransomware uses the Wake-on-Lan feature to turn on powered off devices on a compromised network to have greater success encrypting them. This is a high fidelity indicator of Ryuk ransomware executing on an endpoint. Upon triage, isolate the endpoint. Additional file modification events will be within the users profile (\\appdata\\roaming) and in public directories (users\\public\\). Review all Scheduled Tasks on the isolated endpoint and across the fleet. Suspicious Scheduled Tasks will include a path to a unknown binary and those endpoints should be isolated until triaged.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process=\"*8 LAN*\" OR Processes.process=\"*9 REP*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ryuk_wake_on_lan_command_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Limited to no known false positives.", "references": ["https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ryuk-ransomware-uses-wake-on-lan-to-encrypt-offline-devices/", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ryuk-ransomware-now-self-spreads-to-other-windows-lan-devices/", "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/uploads/CERTFR-2021-CTI-006.pdf"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/ryuk/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Lateral Movement"], "message": "A process $process_name$ with wake on LAN commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "Windows Command Shell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "TA505", "Blue Mockingbird", "Tropic Trooper", "Frankenstein", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "Honeybee", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Turla", "Silence", "APT32", "APT39", "Darkhotel", "MuddyWater", "APT18", "APT38", "Dark Caracal", "Gorgon Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Rancor", "Ke3chang", "APT37", "Leviathan", "FIN8", "APT28", "Magic Hound", "Sowbug", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Gamaredon Group", "Suckfly", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-1314", "APT3", "admin@338", "APT1"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "ryuk_wake_on_lan_command_filter"}]}, {"name": "Excessive number of service control start as disabled", "id": "77592bec-d5cc-11eb-9e60-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-25", "author": "Michael Hart, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This detection targets behaviors observed when threat actors have used sc.exe to modify services. We observed malware in a honey pot spawning numerous sc.exe processes in a short period of time, presumably to impair defenses, possibly to block others from compromising the same machine. This detection will alert when we see both an excessive number of sc.exe processes launched with specific commandline arguments to disable the start of certain services.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` distinct_count(Processes.process) as distinct_cmdlines values(Processes.process_id) as process_ids min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE Processes.process_name = \"sc.exe\" AND Processes.process=\"*start= disabled*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_id, _time span=30m | where distinct_cmdlines >= 8 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_number_of_service_control_start_as_disabled_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The complete process name with command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate programs and administrators will execute sc.exe with the start disabled flag. It is possible, but unlikely from the telemetry of normal Windows operation we observed, that sc.exe will be called more than seven times in a short period of time.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/sc-create", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/sc_service_start_disabled/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An excessive amount of $process_name$ was executed on $dest$ attempting to disable services.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "excessive_number_of_service_control_start_as_disabled_filter"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content", "id": "8acbc04c-c882-11eb-b060-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-08", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies `FromBase64String` within the script block. A typical malicious instance will include additional code. \\\nCommand example - `[Byte[]]$var_code = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String(38uqIyMjQ6rG....` \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message=*frombase64string* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode ComputerName User EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_fileless_script_contains_base64_encoded_content_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains base64 command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1027", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Message", "OpCode", "ComputerName", "User", "EventCode"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "Obfuscated Files or Information", "PowerShell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Defense Evasion", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Gamaredon Group", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "Whitefly", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Mofang", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "Soft Cell", "Turla", "TA505", "Silence", "APT33", "Night Dragon", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "APT29", "APT18", "Tropic Trooper", "Cobalt Group", "Patchwork", "Leafminer", "APT37", "Threat Group-3390", "Honeybee", "Dark Caracal", "menuPass", "APT19", "BlackOasis", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "Elderwood", "MuddyWater", "FIN7", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "APT3", "APT32", "Group5", "Dust Storm", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "APT28", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "Gallmaker", "Turla", "APT19", "DarkHydrus", "APT28", "Thrip", "Gorgon Group", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leviathan", "TA459", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT32", "FIN7", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "APT3", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "powershell_fileless_script_contains_base64_encoded_content_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Exchange Web Shell", "id": "8c14eeee-2af1-4a4b-bda8-228da0f4862a", "version": 3, "date": "2021-10-05", "author": "Michael Haag, Shannon Davis, David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following query identifies suspicious .aspx created in 3 paths identified by Microsoft as known drop locations for Exchange exploitation related to HAFNIUM group and recently disclosed vulnerablity named ProxyShell. Paths include: `\\HttpProxy\\owa\\auth\\`, `\\inetpub\\wwwroot\\aspnet_client\\`, and `\\HttpProxy\\OAB\\`. Upon triage, the suspicious .aspx file will likely look obvious on the surface. inspect the contents for script code inside. Identify additional log sources, IIS included, to review source and other potential exploitation. It is often the case that a particular threat is only applicable to a specific subset of systems in your environment. Typically analytics to detect those threats are written without the benefit of being able to only target those systems as well. Writing analytics against all systems when those behaviors are limited to identifiable subsets of those systems is suboptimal. Consider the case ProxyShell vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Servers. With asset information, a hunter can limit their analytics to systems that have been identified as Exchange servers. A hunter may start with the theory that the exchange server is communicating with new systems that it has not previously. If this theory is run against all publicly facing systems, the amount of noise it will generate will likely render this theory untenable. However, using the asset information to limit this analytic to just the Exchange servers will reduce the noise allowing the hunter to focus only on the systems where this behavioral change is relevant.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=System by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*\\\\HttpProxy\\\\owa\\\\auth\\\\*\", \"*\\\\inetpub\\\\wwwroot\\\\aspnet_client\\\\*\", \"*\\\\HttpProxy\\\\OAB\\\\*\") Filesystem.file_name=\"*.aspx\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process] | dedup file_create_time | table dest file_create_time, file_name, file_path, process_name | `detect_exchange_web_shell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node and `Filesystem` node.", "known_false_positives": "The query is structured in a way that `action` (read, create) is not defined. Review the results of this query, filter, and tune as necessary. It may be necessary to generate this query specific to your endpoint product.", "references": ["https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample%20Data/Feeds/MSTICIoCs-ExchangeServerVulnerabilitiesDisclosedMarch2021.csv", "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/8/17/from-pwn2own-2021-a-new-attack-surface-on-microsoft-exchange-proxyshell", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FC6iHw258RI", "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-microsoft-exchange-servers-still-vulnerable-to-proxyshell-exploit#what-should-you-do"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["HAFNIUM Group", "ProxyShell"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exploitation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/windows-sysmon_proxylogon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk that is related to IIS exploitation previously performed by HAFNIUM. Review further file modifications on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1505", "T1505.003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "file_name", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.file_path", "Filesystem.process_id", "Filesystem.file_name", "Filesystem.file_hash", "Filesystem.user"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Server Software Component", "Web Shell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Tropic Trooper", "Soft Cell", "Threat Group-3390", "TEMP.Veles", "Leviathan", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT32", "OilRig", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_exchange_web_shell_filter"}]}, {"name": "SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network", "id": "b690df8c-a145-11eb-a38b-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-10-13", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies searchprotocolhost.exe with no command line arguments and with a network connection. It is unusual for searchprotocolhost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. searchprotocolhost.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=searchprotocolhost.exe by _time span=1h Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(searchprotocolhost\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port !=\"0\" by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_guid connection_to_CNC dest_port | `searchprotocolhost_with_no_command_line_with_network_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `ports` node.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process.", "references": ["https://github.com/fireeye/red_team_tool_countermeasures/blob/master/rules/PGF/supplemental/hxioc/SUSPICIOUS%20EXECUTION%20OF%20SEARCHPROTOCOLHOST%20(METHODOLOGY).ioc"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}, "Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon_searchprotocolhost.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A searchprotocolhost.exe process $process_name$ with no commandline in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "processname", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "process_name", "process_id", "parent_process_name", "dest_port", "process_path"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Process Injection"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Cobalt Group", "APT37", "Honeybee", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "searchprotocolhost_with_no_command_line_with_network_filter"}]}, {"name": "Remcos client registry install entry", "id": "f2a1615a-1d63-11ec-97d2-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-24", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search detects registry key license at host where Remcos RAT agent is installed.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_key_name=*\\\\Software\\\\Remcos*) by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_key_name Registry.process_id| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`remcos_client_registry_install_entry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0332/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_panel_client/remcos_registry_entry.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A registry entry $registry_path$ with registry keyname $registry_key_name$ related to Remcos RAT in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1112"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.process_id", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Modify Registry"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Turla", "APT32", "APT38", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "Threat Group-3390", "Honeybee", "Patchwork", "Gorgon Group", "FIN8"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "remcos_client_registry_install_entry_filter"}]}, {"name": "Winword Spawning Cmd", "id": "6fcbaedc-a37b-11eb-956b-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-04-22", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies Microsoft Word spawning `cmd.exe`. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with winword.exe. Winword.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Office16` (version will vary). Cmd.exe spawning from winword.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command-line will indicate what is being executed. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. It is possible that COM is utilized to trampoline the child process to `explorer.exe` or `wmiprvse.exe`.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=winword.exe `process_cmd` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winword_spawning_cmd_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/73af0064-a785-4c0a-ab0d-cde593fe16ef/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "$parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$ launched command: $process_name$ which is very common in spearphishing attacks.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Target"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Phishing", "Spearphishing Attachment"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_cmd"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "winword_spawning_cmd_filter"}]}, {"name": "Disable Defender BlockAtFirstSeen Feature", "id": "2dd719ac-3021-11ec-97b4-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-18", "author": "Teoderick Contreras", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable windows defender feature. This technique is to bypassed or evade detection from Windows Defender AV product specially the BlockAtFirstSeen feature where it block suspicious file first seen in the host.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\SpyNet*\" Registry.registry_value_name = DisableBlockAtFirstSeen Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000001 by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `disable_defender_blockatfirstseen_feature_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the registry value name, registry path, and registry value data from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to disable windows defender product", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["IceID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_value_data"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disable_defender_blockatfirstseen_feature_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Copy on System32", "id": "ce633e56-25b2-11ec-9e76-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-05", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious copy of file from systemroot folder of the windows OS. This technique is commonly used by APT or other malware as part of execution (LOLBIN) to run its malicious code using the available legitimate tool in OS. this type of event may seen or may execute of normal user in some instance but this is really a anomaly that needs to be check within the network.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN(\"cmd.exe\", \"powershell*\",\"pwsh.exe\", \"sqlps.exe\", \"sqltoolsps.exe\", \"powershell_ise.exe\") AND `process_copy` AND Processes.process IN(\"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWow64\\\\*\") AND Processes.process = \"*copy*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `suspicious_copy_on_system32_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "every user may do this event but very un-ussual.", "references": ["https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/8da5b75b6380a41eee3a399c43dfe0d99eeefaa1fd21027a07b1ecaa4cd96fdd?environmentId=120"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Unusual Processes"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/copy_sysmon/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "execution of copy exe to copy file from $process$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1036.003", "T1036"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Rename System Utilities", "Masquerading"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["menuPass", "APT32", "Soft Cell", "PLATINUM", "Windshift", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "Dragonfly 2.0"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=copy.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=copy.exe OR Processes.process_name=xcopy.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=xcopy.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_copy"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_copy_on_system32_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments", "id": "f308490a-473a-40ef-ae64-dd7a6eba284a", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-20", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies gpupdate.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for gpupdate.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. gpupdate.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_gpupdate` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(gpupdate\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | `suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process.", "references": ["https://raw.githubusercontent.com/xx0hcd/Malleable-C2-Profiles/0ef8cf4556e26f6d4190c56ba697c2159faa5822/crimeware/trick_ryuk.profile", "https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2021/02/09/learn-pipe-fitting-for-all-of-your-offense-projects/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious gpupdate.exe process with no command line arguments executed on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Process Injection"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Cobalt Group", "APT37", "Honeybee", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=gpupdate.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=GPUpdate.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_gpupdate"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments_filter"}]}, {"name": "Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline", "id": "c9ef7dc4-eeaf-11eb-b2b6-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-07-27", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies Regsvr32.exe utilizing the silent switch to load DLLs. This technique has most recently been seen in IcedID campaigns to load its initial dll that will download the 2nd stage loader that will download and decrypt the config payload. The switch type may be either a hyphen `-` or forward slash `/`. This behavior is typically found with `-s`, and it is possible there are more switch types that may be used. \\ During triage, review parallel processes and capture any artifacts that may have landed on disk. Isolate and contain the endpoint as necessary.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"(?i)[\\-|\\/][Ss]{1}\") | `regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "minimal. but network operator can use this application to load dll.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/56680cba-2bbc-4b34-8633-5f7878ddf858/", "https://regexr.com/699e2"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["IcedID", "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", "Remcos"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a DLL using the silent parameter.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.010"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Regsvr32"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Blue Mockingbird", "Inception", "WIRTE", "Cobalt Group", "APT19", "Leviathan", "APT32", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=REGSVR32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_regsvr32"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline_filter"}]}, {"name": "Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM", "id": "7ed272a4-9c77-11eb-af22-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-13", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple valid users using the NTLM protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using NTLM to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4776 is generated on the computer that is authoritative for the provided credentials. For domain accounts, the domain controller is authoritative. For local accounts, the local computer is authoritative. Error code 0xC000006A means: misspelled or bad password (the attempted user is a legitimate domain user).\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\\nThis detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\\\nThe analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source workstation name and attempted user accounts.", "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4776 Logon_Account!=\"*$\" 0xC000006A action=failure | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Logon_Account) AS unique_accounts values(Logon_Account) as tried_accounts by _time, Source_Workstation | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Source_Workstation | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Credential Validation` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", "known_false_positives": "A host failing to authenticate with multiple valid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners and missconfigured systems. If this detection triggers on a host other than a Domain Controller, the behavior could represent a password spraying attack against the host's local accounts.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-credential-validation", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4776"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_valid_users_ntlm/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Potential NTLM based password spraying attack from $Source_Workstation$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "Source_Workstation", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "action", "Logon_Account", "Source_Workstation"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Password Spraying", "Brute Force"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "Leafminer", "Lazarus Group", "DarkVishnya", "APT39", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Turla"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm_filter"}]}, {"name": "High File Deletion Frequency", "id": "b6200efd-13bd-4336-920a-057b25bbcfaf", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-07", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Filesystem"], "description": "This detection detects a high amount of file deletions in a short time for specific file types. This can be an indicator for a malicious insider.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)) | eval action=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"action\"), \"string\", null), process=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null), file_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"file_name\"), \"string\", null), file_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"file_path\"), \"string\", null), dest_user_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), dest_device_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null) | where \"Endpoint_Filesystem\" IN(_datamodels) | where action=\"deleted\" | where like(file_name, \"%.cmd\") OR like(file_name, \"%.ini\") OR like(file_name, \"%.gif\") OR like(file_name, \"%.jpg\") OR like(file_name, \"%.jpeg\") OR like(file_name, \"%.db\") OR like(file_name, \"%.doc%\") OR like(file_name, \"%.ps1\") OR like(file_name, \"%.xls%\") OR like(file_name, \"%.ppt%\") OR like(file_name, \"%.bmp\") OR like(file_name, \"%.zip\") OR like(file_name, \"%.rar\") OR like(file_name, \"%.7z\") OR like(file_name, \"%.chm\") OR like(file_name, \"%.png\") OR like(file_name, \"%.log\") OR like(file_name, \"%.vbs\") OR like(file_name, \"%.js\") | stats count(file_name) AS count BY dest_user_id, dest_device_id, span(timestamp, 10m) | where count > 20 | eval start_time=window_start, end_time=window_end, entities=mvappend(dest_user_id, dest_device_id), body=create_map([\"count\", count]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesytem` node.", "known_false_positives": "user may delete bunch of pictures or files in a folder.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/excessive_file_deletions/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "High frequency file deletion activity detected on host $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1485"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "deleted_files", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Target"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["action", "process", "file_name", "file_path"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Data Destruction"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Lazarus Group", "APT38"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "high_file_deletion_frequency_filter"}]}, {"name": "Deleting Of Net Users", "id": "1c8c6f66-acce-11eb-aafb-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-05-04", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic will detect a suspicious net.exe/net1.exe command-line to delete a user on a system. This technique may be use by an administrator for legitimate purposes, however this behavior has been used in the wild to impair some user or deleting adversaries tracks created during its lateral movement additional systems. During triage, review parallel processes for additional behavior. Identify any other user accounts created before or after.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` AND Processes.process=\"*user*\" AND Processes.process=\"*/delete*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `deleting_of_net_users_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "System administrators or scripts may delete user accounts via this technique. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to delete accounts.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1531"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Account Access Removal"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_net"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "deleting_of_net_users_filter"}]}, {"name": "Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Sysmon", "id": "347fd388-da87-11eb-836d-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-01", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies a `.dll` being written by `spoolsv.exe`. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously(CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. Typically, this is not normal behavior for `spoolsv.exe` to write a `.dll`. Current POC code used will write the suspicious DLL to disk within a path of `\\spool\\drivers\\x64\\`. During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events.", "search": "`sysmon` EventID=11 process_name=spoolsv.exe file_path=\"*\\\\spool\\\\drivers\\\\x64\\\\*\" file_name=*.dll | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, UserID, process_name, file_path, file_name, TargetFilename, process_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spoolsv_writing_a_dll___sysmon_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://github.com/cube0x0/impacket/commit/73b9466c17761384ece11e1028ec6689abad6818", "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/fix-for-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675-exploit-to-keep-your-print-servers-running-while-a-patch-is-not-available/", "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/exploitable-critical-rce-vulnerability-allows-regular-users-to-fully-compromise-active-directory-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675/", "https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/ob6y02/critical_vulnerability_printnightmare_exposes"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Local"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "$process_name$ has been identified writing dll's to $file_path$ on endpoint $dest$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1547.012", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_id", "type": "Process", "role": ["Process"]}, {"name": "file_path", "type": "File", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "UserID", "process_name", "file_path", "file_name", "TargetFilename"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "spoolsv_writing_a_dll___sysmon_filter"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress", "id": "a26d9db4-c883-11eb-9d75-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-08", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable no critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies `GetProcAddress` in the script block. This is not normal to be used by most PowerShell scripts and is typically unsafe/malicious. Many attack toolkits use GetProcAddress to obtain code execution. \\\nIn use, `$var_gpa = $var_unsafe_native_methods.GetMethod(GetProcAddress` and later referenced/executed elsewhere. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message=*getprocaddress* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode ComputerName User EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_fileless_process_injection_via_getprocaddress_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "recon"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains GetProcAddress API in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1055", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Message", "OpCode", "ComputerName", "User", "EventCode"], "risk_score": 48, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "Process Injection", "PowerShell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "APT32", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Cobalt Group", "APT37", "Honeybee", "PLATINUM", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "Gallmaker", "Turla", "APT19", "DarkHydrus", "APT28", "Thrip", "Gorgon Group", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leviathan", "TA459", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT32", "FIN7", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "APT3", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "powershell_fileless_process_injection_via_getprocaddress_filter"}]}, {"name": "Clop Ransomware Known Service Name", "id": "07e08a12-870c-11eb-b5f9-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-17", "author": "Teoderick Contreras", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This detection is to identify the common service name created by the CLOP ransomware as part of its persistence and high privilege code execution in the infected machine. Ussually CLOP ransomware use StartServiceCtrlDispatcherW API in creating this service entry.", "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 Service_Name IN (\"SecurityCenterIBM\", \"WinCheckDRVs\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Service_File_Name Service_Name Service_Start_Type Service_Type | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `clop_ransomware_known_service_name_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-system.log"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ executing known Clop Ransomware service names.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1543"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["EventCode", "cmdline", "_time", "parent_process_name", "process_name", "OriginalFileName", "process_path"], "risk_score": 100, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Create or Modify System Process"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_system"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "clop_ransomware_known_service_name_filter"}]}, {"name": "CertUtil With Decode Argument", "id": "bfe94226-8c10-11eb-a4b3-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-03-23", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "CertUtil.exe may be used to `encode` and `decode` a file, including PE and script code. Encoding will convert a file to base64 with `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----` and `-----END CERTIFICATE-----` tags. Malicious usage will include decoding a encoded file that was downloaded. Once decoded, it will be loaded by a parallel process. Note that there are two additional command switches that may be used - `encodehex` and `decodehex`. Similarly, the file will be encoded in HEX and later decoded for further execution. During triage, identify the source of the file being decoded. Review its contents or execution behavior for further analysis.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_certutil` Processes.process=*decode* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `certutil_with_decode_argument_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Typically seen used to `encode` files, but it is possible to see legitimate use of `decode`. Filter based on parent-child relationship, file paths, endpoint or user.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1140/T1140.md", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/certutil", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/certutilexe-could-allow-attackers-to-download-malware-while-bypassing-av/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Deobfuscate-Decode Files or Information"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1140/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to decode a file.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1140"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 40, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Gamaredon Group", "Molerats", "Frankenstein", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Darkhotel", "Tropic Trooper", "menuPass", "Honeybee", "Threat Group-3390", "APT19", "Gorgon Group", "Leviathan", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=certutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=CertUtil.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_certutil"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "certutil_with_decode_argument_filter"}]}, {"name": "GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell", "id": "e02af35c-1de5-4afe-b4be-f45aba57272b", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-25", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. The `Get-NetTcpConnection` commandlet lists the current TCP connections. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-NetTcpConnection*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/nettcpip/get-nettcpconnection?view=windowsserver2019-ps"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1049/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1049"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Network Connections Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Tropic Trooper", "APT41", "APT38", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "APT1", "OilRig", "APT3", "menuPass", "Threat Group-3390", "Poseidon Group", "admin@338", "Turla", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments", "id": "ff61e98c-0337-4593-a78f-72a676c56f26", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-20", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies DLLHost.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for DLLHost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. DLLHost.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_dllhost` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(dllhost\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | `suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process.", "references": ["https://raw.githubusercontent.com/threatexpress/malleable-c2/c3385e481159a759f79b8acfe11acf240893b830/jquery-c2.4.2.profile", "https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2021/02/09/learn-pipe-fitting-for-all-of-your-offense-projects/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious dllhost.exe process with no command line arguments executed on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Process Injection"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Cobalt Group", "APT37", "Honeybee", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=dllhost.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=dllhost.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_dllhost"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe", "id": "c10a18cb-fd80-4ffa-a844-25026e0a0c94", "version": 2, "date": "2020-11-10", "author": "Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "The following analytic identifies parent processes, browsers, Windows terminal applications, Office Products and Java spawning cmd.exe. By its very nature, many applications spawn cmd.exe natively or built into macros. Much of this will need to be tuned to further enhance the risk.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events()\n| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)) | eval process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null), parent_process=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"),\"string\", null)), dest_user_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), dest_device_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event,\"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where process_name=\"cmd.exe\" | rex field=parent_process \"(?[^\\\\\\\\]+)$\" | where ParentBaseFileName=\"winword.exe\" OR ParentBaseFileName=\"excel.exe\" OR ParentBaseFileName=\"outlook.exe\" OR ParentBaseFileName=\"powerpnt.exe\" OR ParentBaseFileName=\"visio.exe\" OR ParentBaseFileName=\"mspub.exe\" OR ParentBaseFileName=\"acrobat.exe\" OR ParentBaseFileName=\"acrord32.exe\" OR ParentBaseFileName=\"iexplore.exe\" OR ParentBaseFileName=\"opera.exe\" OR ParentBaseFileName=\"firefox.exe\" OR (ParentBaseFileName=\"java.exe\" AND (cmd_line IS NULL OR (cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND NOT like(cmd_line, \"%patch1-Hotfix1a%\")))) OR ParentBaseFileName=\"powershell.exe\" OR (ParentBaseFileName=\"chrome.exe\" AND (cmd_line IS NULL OR (cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND NOT like(cmd_line, \"%chrome-extension%\")))) | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(dest_device_id, dest_user_id), body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"process_name\", process_name, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "In order to successfully implement this analytic, you will need endpoint process data from a EDR product or Sysmon. This search has been modified to process raw sysmon data from attack_range's nxlogs on DSP.", "known_false_positives": "There are circumstances where an application may legitimately execute and interact with the Windows command-line interface.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Command-Line Executions"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$, producing a suspicious event that warrants investigating.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "User", "role": ["Actor"]}, {"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["process_name", "parent_process_name", "_time", "dest_device_id", "dest_user_id", "cmd_line"], "risk_score": 35, "risk_severity": "low", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe_filter"}]}, {"name": "UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object", "id": "2bcccd20-fc2b-11eb-8d22-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-13", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a possible uac bypass using the colorui.dll COM Object. this technique was seen in so many malware and ransomware like lockbit where it make use of the colorui.dll COM CLSID to bypass UAC.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded=\"*\\\\colorui.dll\" process_name != \"colorcpl.exe\" NOT(Image IN(\"*\\\\windows\\\\*\", \"*\\\\program files*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name Computer EventCode Signed ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "not so common. but 3rd part app may load this dll.", "references": ["https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/04/24/lockbit-ransomware-borrows-tricks-to-keep-up-with-revil-and-maze/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.015/uac_colorui/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The following module $ImageLoaded$ was loaded by a non-standard application on endpoint $Computer$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "ImageLoaded", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Image", "ImageLoaded", "process_name", "Computer", "EventCode", "Signed", "ProcessId"], "risk_score": 48, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "CMSTP"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Cobalt Group", "MuddyWater"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object_filter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination", "id": "42f8f1a2-4228-11ec-aade-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-10", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of Windows Curl.exe uploading a file to a remote destination. \\\n`-T` or `--upload-file` is used when a file is to be uploaded to a remotge destination. \\\n`-d` or `--data` POST is the HTTP method that was invented to send data to a receiving web application, and it is, for example, how most common HTML forms on the web work. \\\nHTTP multipart formposts are done with `-F`, but this appears to not be compatible with the Windows version of Curl. Will update if identified adversary tradecraft. \\\nAdversaries may use one of the three methods based on the remote destination and what they are attempting to upload (zip vs txt). During triage, review parallel processes for further behavior. In addition, identify if the upload was successful in network logs. If a file was uploaded, isolate the endpoint and review.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_curl` Processes.process IN (\"*-T *\",\"*--upload-file *\", \"*-d *\", \"*--data *\", \"*-F *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives may be limited to source control applications and may be required to be filtered out.", "references": ["https://everything.curl.dev/usingcurl/uploads", "https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/containers/tar-and-curl-come-to-windows/ba-p/382409", "https://twitter.com/d1r4c/status/1279042657508081664?s=20"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ingress Tool Transfer"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_curl_upload.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ uploading a file to a remote destination.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1105"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Ingress Tool Transfer"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Whitefly", "Rocke", "APT39", "Tropic Trooper", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Frankenstein", "Silence", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "APT33", "MuddyWater", "APT18", "APT38", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "OilRig", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT37", "FIN8", "PLATINUM", "Leviathan", "Elderwood", "Magic Hound", "APT3", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Patchwork", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-3390", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=curl.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Curl.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_curl"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination_filter"}]}, {"name": "SAM Database File Access Attempt", "id": "57551656-ebdb-11eb-afdf-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-23", "author": "Michael Haag, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies access to SAM, SYSTEM or SECURITY databases' within the file path of `windows\\system32\\config` using Windows Security EventCode 4663. This particular behavior is related to credential access, an attempt to either use a Shadow Copy or recent CVE-2021-36934 to access the SAM database. The Security Account Manager (SAM) is a database file in Windows XP, Windows Vista, Windows 7, 8.1 and 10 that stores users' passwords.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` (EventCode=4663) process_name!=*\\\\dllhost.exe Object_Name IN (\"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\config\\\\SAM*\",\"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\config\\\\SYSTEM*\",\"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\config\\\\SECURITY*\") | stats values(Accesses) count by process_name Object_Name dest user | `sam_database_file_access_attempt_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663. For 4663, enable \"Audit Object Access\" in Group Policy. Then check the two boxes listed for both \"Success\" and \"Failure.\"", "known_false_positives": "Natively, `dllhost.exe` will access the files. Every environment will have additional native processes that do as well. Filter by process_name. As an aside, one can remove process_name entirely and add `Object_Name=*ShadowCopy*`.", "references": ["https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4663", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4663", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-36934", "https://github.com/GossiTheDog/HiveNightmare", "https://github.com/JumpsecLabs/Guidance-Advice/tree/main/SAM_Permissions", "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security_Account_Manager"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-36934"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The following process $process_name$ accessed the object $Object_Name$ attempting to gain access to credentials on $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}, {"name": "Object_Name", "type": "File", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "process_name", "Object_Name", "dest", "user"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Security Account Manager", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390", "Ke3chang", "Soft Cell", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "menuPass", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "sam_database_file_access_attempt_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious msbuild path", "id": "f5198224-551c-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 2, "date": "2021-01-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies msbuild.exe executing from a non-standard path. Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v4.0.30319 and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v4.0.30319. Instances of Visual Studio will run a copy of msbuild.exe. A moved instance of MSBuild is suspicious, however there are instances of build applications that will move or use a copy of MSBuild.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_msbuild` AND (Processes.process_path!=c:\\\\windows\\\\microsoft.net\\\\framework*\\\\v*\\\\*) by Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `suspicious_msbuild_path_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of msbuild.exe, triggering a false positive. Baselining of MSBuild.exe usage is recommended to better understand it's path usage. Visual Studio runs an instance out of a path that will need to be filtered on.", "references": ["https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild", "Cobalt Strike", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Msbuild.exe ran from an uncommon path on $dest$ execyted by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1036", "T1127", "T1036.003", "T1127.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Masquerading", "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "Rename System Utilities", "MSBuild"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Windshift", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "Dragonfly 2.0", "no", "menuPass", "APT32", "Soft Cell", "PLATINUM", "Frankenstein"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=msbuild.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSBuild.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_msbuild"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_msbuild_path_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Renamed PSExec", "id": "683e6196-b8e8-11eb-9a79-acde48001122", "version": 3, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies renamed instances of `PsExec.exe` being utilized on an endpoint. Most instances, it is highly probable to capture `Psexec.exe` or other SysInternal utility usage with the command-line argument of `-accepteula`. During triage, validate this is the legitimate version of `PsExec` by reviewing the PE metadata. In addition, review parallel processes for further suspicious behavior.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_psexec` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_renamed_psexec_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives should be present. It is possible some third party applications may use older versions of PsExec, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1569.002/T1569.002.yaml", "https://redcanary.com/blog/threat-hunting-psexec-lateral-movement/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "HAFNIUM Group", "DarkSide Ransomware", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1569.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Lateral Movement", "Execution"], "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1569", "T1569.002"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 27, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Services", "Service Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "APT41", "Silence", "FIN6", "APT32", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=psexec.exe OR Processes.process_name=psexec64.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=psexec.c)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_psexec"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_renamed_psexec_filter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination", "id": "cc8d046a-543b-11ec-b864-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-03", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of Windows Curl.exe uploading a file to a remote destination. \\\n`-T` or `--upload-file` is used when a file is to be uploaded to a remotge destination. \\\n`-d` or `--data` POST is the HTTP method that was invented to send data to a receiving web application, and it is, for example, how most common HTML forms on the web work. \\\nHTTP multipart formposts are done with `-F`, but this appears to not be compatible with the Windows version of Curl. Will update if identified adversary tradecraft. \\\nAdversaries may use one of the three methods based on the remote destination and what they are attempting to upload (zip vs txt). During triage, review parallel processes for further behavior. In addition, identify if the upload was successful in network logs. If a file was uploaded, isolate the endpoint and review.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where \"Endpoint_Processes\" IN(_datamodels) | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null), process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_path\"), \"string\", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null)\n| where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND process_name IS NOT NULL AND process_name=\"curl.exe\" AND (like (cmd_line, \"%-T %\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%--upload-file %\")OR like (cmd_line, \"%-d %\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%--data %\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%-F %\"))\n| eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null)) | eval body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line, \"process_name\", process_name, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process_name, \"process_path\", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint_Processess` datamodel.", "known_false_positives": "False positives may be limited to source control applications and may be required to be filtered out.", "references": ["https://everything.curl.dev/usingcurl/uploads", "https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/containers/tar-and-curl-come-to-windows/ba-p/382409", "https://twitter.com/d1r4c/status/1279042657508081664?s=20"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ingress Tool Transfer"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ uploading a file to a remote destination.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1105"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest_device_id", "process_name", "parent_process_name", "process_path", "dest_user_id", "process", "cmd_line"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Ingress Tool Transfer"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Whitefly", "Rocke", "APT39", "Tropic Trooper", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Frankenstein", "Silence", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "APT33", "MuddyWater", "APT18", "APT38", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "OilRig", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT37", "FIN8", "PLATINUM", "Leviathan", "Elderwood", "Magic Hound", "APT3", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Patchwork", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-3390", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination_filter"}]}, {"name": "Winhlp32 Spawning a Process", "id": "d17dae9e-2618-11ec-b9f5-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-05", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies winhlp32.exe, found natively in `c:\\windows\\`, spawning a child process that loads a file out of appdata, programdata, or temp. Winhlp32.exe has a rocky past in that multiple vulnerabilities were found and added to MetaSploit. WinHlp32.exe is required to display 32-bit Help files that have the \".hlp\" file name extension. This particular instance is related to a Remcos sample where dynwrapx.dll is added to the registry under inprocserver32, and later module loaded by winhlp32.exe to spawn wscript.exe and load a vbs or file from disk. During triage, review parallel processes to identify further suspicious behavior. Review module loads for unsuspecting unsigned modules. Capture any file modifications and analyze.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=winhlp32.exe Processes.process IN (\"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\",\"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winhlp32_spawning_a_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as winhlp32.exe is typically not used with the latest flavors of Windows OS. However, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/16541", "https://tria.ge/210929-ap75vsddan", "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/cb77b93150cb0f7fe65ce8a7e2a5781e727419451355a7736db84109fa215a89"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$, and is not typical activity for this process.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Process Injection"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Cobalt Group", "APT37", "Honeybee", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "winhlp32_spawning_a_process_filter"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands", "id": "907ac95c-4dd9-11ec-ba2c-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-25", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic will detect a suspicious process commandline related to windows defender exclusion feature. This command is abused by adversaries, malware author and red teams to bypassed Windows Defender Anti-Virus product by excluding folder path, file path, process, extensions and etc. from its real time or schedule scan to execute their malicious code. This is a good indicator for defense evasion and to look further for events after this behavior.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Add-MpPreference *\" OR Message = \"*Set-MpPreference *\") AND Message = \"*-exclusion*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to use this windows features.", "references": ["https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.html", "https://app.any.run/tasks/cf1245de-06a7-4366-8209-8e3006f2bfe5/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Remcos", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/defender_exclusion_powershell/powershell.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "exclusion command $Message$ executed on $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands_filter"}]}, {"name": "Fsutil Zeroing File", "id": "4e5e024e-fabb-11eb-8b8f-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-11", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious fsutil process to zeroing a target file. This technique was seen in lockbit ransomware where it tries to zero out its malware path as part of its defense evasion after encrypting the compromised host.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=fsutil.exe Processes.process=\"*setzerodata*\" by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.process Processes.parent_process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `fsutil_zeroing_file_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/e0ac072d-58c9-4f53-8a3b-3e491c7ac5db/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070/fsutil_file_zero/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Possible file data deletion on $dest$ using $process$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1070"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process"], "risk_score": 54, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Indicator Removal on Host"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "fsutil_zeroing_file_filter"}]}, {"name": "BITSAdmin Download File", "id": "80630ff4-8e4c-11eb-aab5-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service utility `bitsadmin.exe` using the `transfer` parameter to download a remote object. In addition, look for `download` or `upload` on the command-line, the switches are not required to perform a transfer. Capture any files downloaded. Review the reputation of the IP or domain used. Typically once executed, a follow on command will be used to execute the dropped file. Note that the network connection or file modification events related will not spawn or create from `bitsadmin.exe`, but the artifacts will appear in a parallel process of `svchost.exe` with a command-line similar to `svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s BITS`. It's important to review all parallel and child processes to capture any behaviors and artifacts. In some suspicious and malicious instances, BITS jobs will be created. You can use `bitsadmin /list /verbose` to list out the jobs during investigation.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_bitsadmin` Processes.process=*transfer* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `bitsadmin_download_file_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives, however it may be required to filter based on parent process name or network connection.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/8eb52117b748d378325f7719554a896e37bccec7/atomics/T1105/T1105.md#atomic-test-9---windows---bitsadmin-bits-download", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/bc705cb7aaa5f26f2d96585fac8e4c7052df0ff9/atomics/T1197/T1197.md", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/bits/bitsadmin-tool", "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ingress Tool Transfer", "BITS Jobs", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1197/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to download a file.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1197", "T1105"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["BITS Jobs", "Ingress Tool Transfer"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Patchwork", "APT41", "Leviathan", "Sandworm Team", "Whitefly", "Rocke", "APT39", "Tropic Trooper", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Frankenstein", "Silence", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "APT33", "MuddyWater", "APT18", "APT38", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "OilRig", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT37", "FIN8", "PLATINUM", "Leviathan", "Elderwood", "Magic Hound", "APT3", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Patchwork", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-3390", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=bitsadmin.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=bitsadmin.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_bitsadmin"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "bitsadmin_download_file_filter"}]}, {"name": "Excessive number of distinct processes created in Windows Temp folder", "id": "23587b6a-c479-11eb-b671-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-03", "author": "Michael Hart, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic will identify suspicious series of process executions. We have observed that post exploit framework tools like Koadic and Meterpreter will launch an excessive number of processes with distinct file paths from Windows\\Temp to execute actions on objective. This behavior is extremely anomalous compared to typical application behaviors that use Windows\\Temp.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process distinct_count(Processes.process) as distinct_process_count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Temp\\\\*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=20m | where distinct_process_count > 37 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_number_of_distinct_processes_created_in_windows_temp_folder_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the full process path in the process field of CIM's Process data model. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed sc.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "Many benign applications will create processes from executables in Windows\\Temp, although unlikely to exceed the given threshold. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/about-meterpreter/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Meterpreter"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059/meterpreter/windows_temp_processes/logExcessiveWindowsTemp.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Multiple processes were executed out of windows\\temp within a short amount of time on $dest$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "excessive_number_of_distinct_processes_created_in_windows_temp_folder_filter"}]}, {"name": "Unusually Long Command Line", "id": "c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6a4264e7f", "version": 5, "date": "2020-12-08", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious activity on your hosts.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| eval processlen=len(process) | eventstats stdev(processlen) as stdev, avg(processlen) as avg by dest | stats max(processlen) as maxlen, values(stdev) as stdevperhost, values(avg) as avgperhost by dest, user, process_name, process | `unusually_long_command_line_filter` |eval threshold = 3 | where maxlen > ((threshold*stdevperhost) + avgperhost)", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships, from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the process field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate applications start with long command lines.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Unusual Processes", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Unusually long command line $Processes.process_name$ on $dest$", "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Processes.process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.user", "Processes.dest", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "unusually_long_command_line_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services", "id": "3cf0dc36-484d-11ec-a6bc-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-18", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious process having a dns query on known abuse text paste web services, or VoIP, instant messaging and digital distribution platform to download some files. This technique is abused by adversaries, malware attacker and red team to download a malicious file on the target host. This is a good TTP indicator for possible initial access technique. Noise and false positive can be seen if the following instant messaging is allowed or common application in corporate network.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=22 QueryName IN (\"*pastebin*\", \"*discord*\", \"*telegram*\", \"*t.me*\") process_name IN (\"cmd.exe\", \"*powershell*\", \"pwsh.exe\", \"wscript.exe\", \"cscript.exe\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image QueryName QueryStatus process_name QueryResults Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services_filter`", "how_to_implement": "his detection relies on sysmon logs with the Event ID 7, Driver loaded. Please tune your sysmon config that you DriverLoad event for SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll is captured by Sysmon. Additionally, you need sysmon logs for Event ID 22, DNS Query. We suggest to run this detection at least once a day over the last 14 days.", "known_false_positives": "Noise and false positive can be seen if the following instant messaging is allowed to use within corporate network. filter is needed.", "references": ["https://urlhaus.abuse.ch/url/1798923/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_pastebin_download/sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "suspicious process $process_name$ has a dns query in $QueryName$ on $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059.005", "T1059"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "process name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Image", "QueryName", "QueryStatus", "process_name", "QueryResults", "Computer"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Visual Basic", "Command and Scripting Interpreter"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "APT-C-36", "Rancor", "Patchwork", "MuddyWater", "Honeybee", "FIN7", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "Turla", "TA505", "Silence", "WIRTE", "FIN4", "Cobalt Group", "Gorgon Group", "Leviathan", "TA459", "Magic Hound", "APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services_filter"}]}, {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell Script Block", "id": "2a048c14-4634-11ec-a618-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-15", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Invoke-WmiMethod` commandlet with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing WMI. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WMI and this commandlet for lateral movement and remote code execution.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message=\"*Invoke-WmiMethod*\" AND Message=\"*-CN*\" AND Message=\"*-Class Win32_Process*\" AND Message=\"*-Name create*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup instructions can be found https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may leverage WWMI and powershell.exe to start a process on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/invoke-wmimethod?view=powershell-5.1"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/lateral_movement/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "message": "A process was started on a remote endpoint from $ComputerName by abusing WMI using PowerShell.exe", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1047"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Windows Management Instrumentation"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT41", "FIN6", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Threat Group-3390", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "menuPass", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_script_block_filter"}]}, {"name": "XMRIG Driver Loaded", "id": "90080fa6-a8df-11eb-91e4-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-29", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies XMRIG coinminer driver installation on the system. The XMRIG driver name by default is `WinRing0x64.sys`. This cpu miner is an open source project that is commonly abused by adversaries to infect and mine bitcoin.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=6 Signature=\"Noriyuki MIYAZAKI\" OR ImageLoaded= \"*\\\\WinRing0x64.sys\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer ImageLoaded Hashes IMPHASH Signature Signed | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `xmrig_driver_loaded_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the driver loaded and Signature from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited.", "references": ["https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/hk/threat-encyclopedia/malware/trojan.ps1.powtran.a/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Privilege Escalation"}, "Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A driver $ImageLoaded$ related to xmrig crytominer loaded in host $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1543.003", "T1543"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "ImageLoaded", "type": "ImageLoaded", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Computer", "ImageLoaded", "Hashes", "IMPHASH", "Signature", "Signed"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Windows Service", "Create or Modify System Process"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "DarkVishnya", "Wizard Spider", "APT32", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Tropic Trooper", "Cobalt Group", "Ke3chang", "Honeybee", "FIN7", "Threat Group-3390", "APT19", "APT3", "Lazarus Group", "Carbanak", "no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "xmrig_driver_loaded_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution", "id": "91c79f14-5b41-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 2, "date": "2021-01-20", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies \"rundll32.exe\" execution with inline protocol handlers. \"JavaScript\", \"VBScript\", and \"About\" are the only supported options when invoking HTA content directly on the command-line. This type of behavior is commonly observed with fileless malware or application whitelisting bypass techniques. The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process \"rundll32.exe\" and its parent process.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` (Processes.process=*vbscript* OR Processes.process=*javascript* OR Processes.process=*about*) by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses", "https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/search/-search-3x-wds-extidx-prot-implementing"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "NOBELIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious rundll32.exe inline HTA execution on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Mshta"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "APT32", "MuddyWater", "FIN7"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_rundll32"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution_filter"}]}, {"name": "Multiple Users Remotely Failing To Authenticate From Host", "id": "80f9d53e-9ca1-11eb-b0d6-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-13", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies a source host failing to authenticate against a remote host with multiple users. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4625 documents each and every failed attempt to logon to the local computer. This event generates on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations. Logon Type 3 describes an remote authentication attempt.\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\\nThis detection will trigger on the host that is the target of the password spraying attack. This could be a domain controller as well as a member server or workstation.\\\nThe analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source process name, source account and attempted user accounts.", "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4625 Logon_Type=3 Source_Network_Address!=\"-\" | bucket span=2m _time | eval Destination_Account = mvindex(Account_Name, 1) | stats dc(Destination_Account) AS unique_accounts values(Destination_Account) as tried_accounts by _time, Source_Network_Address, ComputerName | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Source_Network_Address, ComputerName | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_users_remotely_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Event Logs from domain controllers as as well as member servers and workstations. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Logon` within `Logon/Logoff` needs to be enabled.", "known_false_positives": "A host failing to authenticate with multiple valid users against a remote host is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, remote administration tools, missconfigyred systems, etc.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4625", "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4625", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/basic-audit-logon-events"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_remote_spray/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Potential password spraying attack on $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Logon_Type", "Security_ID", "Account_Name", "ComputerName", "Source_Network_Address"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Password Spraying", "Brute Force"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "Leafminer", "Lazarus Group", "DarkVishnya", "APT39", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Turla"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "multiple_users_remotely_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Excessive User Account Lockouts", "id": "95a7f9a5-6096-437e-a19e-86f42ac609bd", "version": 3, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search detects user accounts that have been locked out a relatively high number of times in a short period.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change.All_Changes where nodename=All_Changes.Account_Management All_Changes.result=\"lockout\" by All_Changes.user All_Changes.result |`drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` |`drop_dm_object_name(\"Account_Management\")`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search count > 5 | `detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts_filter`", "how_to_implement": "ou must ingest your Windows security event logs in the `Change` datamodel under the nodename is `Account_Management`, for this search to execute successfully. Please consider updating the cron schedule and the count of lockouts you want to monitor, according to your environment.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible that a legitimate user is experiencing an issue causing multiple account login failures leading to lockouts.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Account Monitoring and Controls"], "asset_type": "Windows", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/account_lockout/windows-security.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/account_lockout/windows-system.log"], "impact": 60, "message": "Multiple accounts have been locked out. Review $nodename$ and $result$ related to $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078", "T1078.003"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "result", "type": "Other", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.result", "nodename", "All_Changes.user"], "risk_score": 36, "security_domain": "access", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Valid Accounts", "Local Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak", "Tropic Trooper", "FIN10", "Stolen Pencil", "APT32"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts_filter"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Remote Thread To Known Windows Process", "id": "ec102cb2-a0f5-11eb-9b38-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-19", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this search is designed to detect suspicious powershell process that tries to inject code and to known/critical windows process and execute it using CreateRemoteThread. This technique is seen in several malware like trickbot and offensive tooling like cobaltstrike where it load a shellcode to svchost.exe to execute reverse shell to c2 and download another payload", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode = 8 process_name IN (\"powershell_ise.exe\", \"powershell.exe\") TargetImage IN (\"*\\\\svchost.exe\",\"*\\\\csrss.exe\" \"*\\\\gpupdate.exe\", \"*\\\\explorer.exe\",\"*\\\\services.exe\",\"*\\\\winlogon.exe\",\"*\\\\smss.exe\",\"*\\\\wininit.exe\",\"*\\\\userinit.exe\",\"*\\\\spoolsv.exe\",\"*\\\\taskhost.exe\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by SourceImage process_name SourceProcessId SourceProcessGuid TargetImage TargetProcessId NewThreadId StartAddress Computer EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, Create Remote thread from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of create remote thread may be used.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2021/01/11/trickbot-still-alive-and-well/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Trickbot"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}, "Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/infection/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A suspicious powershell process $process_name$ that tries to create a remote thread on target process $TargetImage$ with eventcode $EventCode$ in host $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "process name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "SourceImage", "process_name", "SourceProcessId", "SourceProcessGuid", "TargetImage", "TargetProcessId", "NewThreadId", "StartAddress", "Computer", "EventCode"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Process Injection"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Cobalt Group", "APT37", "Honeybee", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process_filter"}]}, {"name": "W3WP Spawning Shell", "id": "0f03423c-7c6a-11eb-bc47-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-03-03", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This query identifies a shell, PowerShell.exe or Cmd.exe, spawning from W3WP.exe, or IIS. In addition to IIS logs, this behavior with an EDR product will capture potential webshell activity, similar to the HAFNIUM Group abusing CVEs, on publicly available Exchange mail servers. During triage, review the parent process and child process of the shell being spawned. Review the command-line arguments and any file modifications that may occur. Identify additional parallel process, child processes, that may highlight further commands executed. After triaging, work to contain the threat and patch the system that is vulnerable.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=w3wp.exe AND `process_cmd` OR `process_powershell` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `w3wp_spawning_shell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Baseline your environment before production. It is possible build systems using IIS will spawn cmd.exe to perform a software build. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/02/04/ghost-in-the-shell-investigating-web-shell-attacks/", "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/8/17/from-pwn2own-2021-a-new-attack-surface-on-microsoft-exchange-proxyshell", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FC6iHw258RI", "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-microsoft-exchange-servers-still-vulnerable-to-proxyshell-exploit#what-should-you-do"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["HAFNIUM Group", "ProxyShell"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523", "CVE-2021-31207"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Possible Web Shell execution on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1505", "T1505.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Server Software Component", "Web Shell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Tropic Trooper", "Soft Cell", "Threat Group-3390", "TEMP.Veles", "Leviathan", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT32", "OilRig", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_cmd"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_powershell"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "w3wp_spawning_shell_filter"}]}, {"name": "GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell", "id": "7141122c-3bc2-4aaa-ab3b-7a85a0bbefc3", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-07", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `DS_Computer` parameter can be used to return a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI in this case, using PowerShell, to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-WmiObject* AND Processes.process=\"*namespace root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*\" AND Processes.process=\"*class ds_computer*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration using WMI on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 21, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote System Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Rocke", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT39", "APT32", "Deep Panda", "Threat Group-3390", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leafminer", "Ke3chang", "FIN8", "APT3", "FIN5", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Turla"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy", "id": "d8c406fe-23d2-45f3-a983-1abe7b83ff3b", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search detects credential dumping using copy command from a shadow copy.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` (Processes.process=*\\\\system32\\\\config\\\\sam* OR Processes.process=*\\\\system32\\\\config\\\\security* OR Processes.process=*\\\\system32\\\\config\\\\system* OR Processes.process=*\\\\windows\\\\ntds\\\\ntds.dit*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to copy SAM and NTDS.dit for offline password cracking.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.003", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["NTDS", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN6", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_cmd"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy_filter"}]}, {"name": "Any Powershell DownloadFile", "id": "1a93b7ea-7af7-11eb-adb5-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-03-01", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a file using `DownloadFile` method. This particular method is utilized in many different PowerShell frameworks to download files and output to disk. Identify the source (IP/domain) and destination file and triage appropriately. If AMSI logging or PowerShell transaction logs are available, review for further details of the implant.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process=*DownloadFile* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `any_powershell_downloadfile_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present and filtering will need to occur by parent process or command line argument. It may be required to modify this query to an EDR product for more granular coverage.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.net.webclient.downloadfile?view=net-5.0", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "Ingress Tool Transfer", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exploitation"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior identifies the use of DownloadFile within PowerShell.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "PowerShell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "Gallmaker", "Turla", "APT19", "DarkHydrus", "APT28", "Thrip", "Gorgon Group", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leviathan", "TA459", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT32", "FIN7", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "APT3", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_powershell"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "any_powershell_downloadfile_filter"}]}, {"name": "PetitPotam Network Share Access Request", "id": "95b8061a-0a67-11ec-85ec-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-31", "author": "Michael Haag, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes Windows Event Code 5145, \"A network share object was checked to see whether client can be granted desired access\". During our research into PetitPotam, CVE-2021-36942, we identified the ocurrence of this event on the target host with specific values. \\\nTo enable 5145 events via Group Policy - Computer Configuration->Polices->Windows Settings->Security Settings->Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Expand this node, go to Object Access (Audit Polices->Object Access), then select the Setting Audit Detailed File Share Audit \\\nIt is possible this is not enabled by default and may need to be reviewed and enabled. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel security events to identify further suspicious activity.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` Account_Name=\"ANONYMOUS LOGON\" EventCode=5145 Relative_Target_Name=lsarpc | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Security_ID, Share_Name, Source_Address, Accesses, Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `petitpotam_network_share_access_request_filter`", "how_to_implement": "Windows Event Code 5145 is required to utilize this analytic and it may not be enabled in most environments.", "known_false_positives": "False positives have been limited when the Anonymous Logon is used for Account Name.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187/", "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventid=5145", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5145"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-36942"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1187/petitpotam/windows-security.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Lateral Movement"], "message": "A remote host is enumerating a $dest$ to identify permissions. This is a precursor event to CVE-2021-36942, PetitPotam.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1187"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "Security_ID", "Share_Name", "Source_Address", "Accesses", "Message"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Forced Authentication"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["DarkHydrus", "Dragonfly 2.0"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "petitpotam_network_share_access_request_filter"}]}, {"name": "WMI Recon Running Process Or Services", "id": "b5cd5526-cce7-11eb-b3bd-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-14", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104, where WMI is performing an event query looking for running processes or running services. This technique is commonly found in malware and APT events where the adversary will map all running security applications or services on the compromised machine. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message= \"*SELECT*\" AND (Message=\"*Win32_Process*\" OR Message=\"*Win32_Service*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmi_recon_running_process_or_services_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "network administrator may used this command for checking purposes", "references": ["https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/05/12/maze-ransomware-1-year-counting/", "https://www.eideon.com/2018-03-02-THL03-WMIBackdoors/", "https://github.com/trustedsec/SysmonCommunityGuide/blob/master/WMI-events.md", "https://in.security/an-intro-into-abusing-and-identifying-wmi-event-subscriptions-for-persistence/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Suspicious powerShell script execution by $user$ on $ComputerName$ via EventCode 4104, where WMI is performing an event query looking for running processes or running services", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1592"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 30, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "wmi_recon_running_process_or_services_filter"}]}, {"name": "Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger", "id": "75b00fd8-a0ff-11eb-8b31-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-19", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed with a Rundll32. This technique is common in new trickbot that uses rundll32 to load is trickbot downloader. The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\\Windows\\system32` and `C:\\Windows\\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.'", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message | search Command IN (\"*rundll32*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Task_Name, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden, Arguments | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the task schedule (Exa. Security Log EventCode 4698) endpoints. Tune and filter known instances of Task schedule used in your environment.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/", "https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Trickbot", "IcedID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/tasksched/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A schedule task process commandline rundll32 arguments $Arguments$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Arguments", "type": "Arguments", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "Task_Name", "Command", "Author", "Enabled", "Hidden", "Arguments"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Scheduled Task/Job"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger_filter"}]}, {"name": "CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass", "id": "f87b5062-b405-11eb-a889-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-13", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic detects a potential process using COM Object like CMLUA or CMSTPLUA to bypass UAC. This technique has been used by ransomware adversaries to gain administrative privileges to its running process.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\CMLUA.dll\", \"*\\\\CMSTPLUA.dll\", \"*\\\\CMLUAUTIL.dll\") NOT(process_name IN(\"CMSTP.exe\", \"CMMGR32.exe\")) NOT(Image IN(\"*\\\\windows\\\\*\", \"*\\\\program files*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name Computer EventCode Signed ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate windows application that are not on the list loading this dll. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/003/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/darkside_cmstp_com/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The following module $ImageLoaded$ was loaded by a non-standard application on endpoint $Computer$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "ImageLoaded", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Image", "ImageLoaded", "process_name", "Computer", "EventCode", "Signed", "ProcessId"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "CMSTP"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Cobalt Group", "MuddyWater"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass_filter"}]}, {"name": "SLUI Spawning a Process", "id": "879c4330-b3e0-11eb-b1b1-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-13", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the Microsoft Software Licensing User Interface Tool, `slui.exe`, spawning a child process. This behavior is associated with publicly known UAC bypass. `slui.exe` is commonly associated with software updates and is most often spawned by `svchost.exe`. The `slui.exe` process should not have child processes, and any processes spawning from it will be running with elevated privileges. During triage, review the child process and additional parallel processes. Identify any file modifications that may have lead to the bypass.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=slui.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `slui_spawning_a_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Certain applications may spawn from `slui.exe` that are legitimate. Filtering will be needed to ensure proper monitoring.", "references": ["https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/46998", "https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/windows/local/bypassuac_sluihijack/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Privilege Escalation"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/slui/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A slui process $parent_process_name$ spawning child process $process_name$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Bypass User Access Control", "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "MuddyWater", "Honeybee", "Cobalt Group", "Threat Group-3390", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Patchwork", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "slui_spawning_a_process_filter"}]}, {"name": "Bcdedit Command Back To Normal Mode Boot", "id": "dc7a8004-0f18-11ec-8c54-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-06", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious bcdedit commandline to configure the host from safe mode back to normal boot configuration. This technique was seen in blackMatter ransomware where it force the compromised host to boot in safe mode to continue its encryption and bring back to normal boot using bcdedit deletevalue command. This TTP can be a good alert for host that booted from safe mode forcefully since it need to modify the boot configuration to bring it back to normal.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = bcdedit.exe Processes.process=\"*/deletevalue*\" Processes.process=\"*{current}*\" Processes.process=\"*safeboot*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user |`drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `bcdedit_command_back_to_normal_mode_boot_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/08/09/blackmatter-ransomware-emerges-from-the-shadow-of-darkside/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["BlackMatter Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Impact"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1552.002/autoadminlogon/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "bcdedit process with commandline $process$ to bring back to normal boot configuration the $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1490"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Inhibit System Recovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "bcdedit_command_back_to_normal_mode_boot_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline", "id": "bed761f8-ee29-11eb-8bf3-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-07-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe commandline to execute dll file. This technique was seen in IcedID malware to load its payload dll with the following parameter to load encrypted dll payload which is the license.dat.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*/i:* by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "limitted. this parameter is not commonly used by windows application but can be used by the network operator.", "references": ["https://threatpost.com/icedid-banking-trojan-surges-emotet/165314/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "rundll32 process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "process name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Rundll32"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT32", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "TA505", "MuddyWater", "APT29", "APT19", "CopyKittens", "APT3", "Carbanak", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_rundll32"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline_filter"}]}, {"name": "Wbemprox COM Object Execution", "id": "9d911ce0-c3be-11eb-b177-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-02", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this search is designed to detect potential malicious process loading COM object to wbemprox.dll,", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\fastprox.dll\", \"*\\\\wbemprox.dll\", \"*\\\\wbemcomn.dll\") NOT (process_name IN (\"wmiprvse.exe\", \"WmiApSrv.exe\", \"unsecapp.exe\")) NOT(Image IN(\"*\\\\windows\\\\*\",\"*\\\\program files*\", \"*\\\\wbem\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name Computer EventCode Signed ProcessId Hashes IMPHASH | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wbemprox_com_object_execution_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "legitimate process that are not in the exception list may trigger this event.", "references": ["https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf2/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious COM Object Execution on $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.003"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Image", "ImageLoaded", "process_name", "Computer", "EventCode", "Signed", "ProcessId", "Hashes", "IMPHASH"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "CMSTP"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Cobalt Group", "MuddyWater"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "wbemprox_com_object_execution_filter"}]}, {"name": "Ntdsutil Export NTDS", "id": "da63bc76-61ae-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-28", "author": "Michael Haag, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Monitor for signs that Ntdsutil is being used to Extract Active Directory database - NTDS.dit, typically used for offline password cracking. It may be used in normal circumstances with no command line arguments or shorthand variations of more common arguments. Ntdsutil.exe is typically seen run on a Windows Server. Typical command used to dump ntds.dit \\\nntdsutil \"ac i ntds\" \"ifm\" \"create full C:\\Temp\" q q \\\nThis technique uses \"Install from Media\" (IFM), which will extract a copy of the Active Directory database. A successful export of the Active Directory database will yield a file modification named ntds.dit to the destination.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=ntdsutil.exe Processes.process=*ntds* Processes.process=*create*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ntdsutil_export_ntds_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "Highly possible Server Administrators will troubleshoot with ntdsutil.exe, generating false positives.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.003/T1003.003.md#atomic-test-3---dump-active-directory-database-with-ntdsutil", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc753343(v=ws.11)", "https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf", "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/vss_ps.dll-97B15BDAE9777F454C9A6BA25E938DB3.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "HAFNIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Active Directory NTDS export on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.003", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 50, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["NTDS", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN6", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "ntdsutil_export_ntds_filter"}]}, {"name": "SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool", "id": "5672819c-be09-11eb-bbfb-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic detects a potential usage of secretsdump.py tool for dumping credentials (ntlm hash) from a copy of ntds.dit and SAM.Security,SYSTEM registrry hive. This technique was seen in some attacker that dump ntlm hashes offline after having a copy of ntds.dit and SAM/SYSTEM/SECURITY registry hive.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"python*.exe\" Processes.process = \"*.py*\" Processes.process = \"*-ntds*\" (Processes.process = \"*-system*\" OR Processes.process = \"*-sam*\" OR Processes.process = \"*-security*\" OR Processes.process = \"*-bootkey*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `secretdumps_offline_ntds_dumping_tool_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/master/examples/secretsdump.py"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Credential Access"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/casper/datasets1/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A secretdump process $process_name$ with secretdump commandline $process$ to dump credentials in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.003", "T1003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process_guid"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["NTDS", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN6", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "secretdumps_offline_ntds_dumping_tool_filter"}]}, {"name": "GetAdComputer with PowerShell Script Block", "id": "a9a1da02-8e27-4bf7-a348-f4389c9da487", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-01", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-AdGroup` commandlet. The `Get-AdGroup` commandlet is used to return a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-AdComputer*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getadcomputer_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-adgroup?view=windowsserver2019-ps"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote System Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Rocke", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT39", "APT32", "Deep Panda", "Threat Group-3390", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leafminer", "Ke3chang", "FIN8", "APT3", "FIN5", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Turla"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "getadcomputer_with_powershell_script_block_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Image Creation In Appdata Folder", "id": "f6f904c4-1ac0-11ec-806b-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-21", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious creation of image in appdata folder made by process that also has a file reference in appdata folder. This technique was seen in remcos rat that capture screenshot of the compromised machine and place it in the appdata and will be send to its C2 server. This TTP is really a good indicator to check that process because it is in suspicious folder path and image files are not commonly created by user in this folder path.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=*.exe Processes.process_path=\"*\\\\appdata\\\\Roaming\\\\*\" by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*.png\",\"*.jpg\",\"*.bmp\",\"*.gif\",\"*.tiff\") Filesystem.file_path = \"*\\\\appdata\\\\Roaming\\\\*\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process] | `suspicious_image_creation_in_appdata_folder_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://success.trendmicro.com/solution/1123281-remcos-malware-information", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2021/07/remcos-rat-delivered-via-visual-basic/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_agent/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "process $process_name$ creating image file $file_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1113"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "process name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "file_create_time", "file_name", "file_path", "process_name", "process_path", "process"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Screen Capture"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "APT39", "Silence", "MuddyWater", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "Dark Caracal", "FIN7", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Magic Hound", "Group5", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_image_creation_in_appdata_folder_filter"}]}, {"name": "Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature", "id": "83776de4-921a-11eb-868a-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-31", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to identify registry modification to disable folder options feature of windows to show hidden files, file extension and etc. This technique used by malware in combination if disabling show hidden files feature to hide their files and also to hide the file extension to lure the user base on file icons or fake file extensions.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\Explorer\\\\NoFolderOptions\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_folderoptions_windows_feature_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "admin may disable this application for non technical user.", "references": ["https://any.run/report/ea4ea08407d4ee72e009103a3b77e5a09412b722fdef67315ea63f22011152af/a866d7b1-c236-4f26-a391-5ae32213dfc4#registry"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The Windows Folder Options, to hide files, was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.user", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disabling_folderoptions_windows_feature_filter"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin", "id": "e8c591f4-a6d7-11eb-8cf7-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-04-26", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `bitsadmin.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `bitsadmin.exe` will contain a URL to a remote destination or similar command-line arguments as transfer, Download, priority, Foreground. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `bitsadmin.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `bitsadmin.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\") `process_bitsadmin` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_bitsadmin_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "No false positives known. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1197/T1197.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "recon"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_macros.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Phishing", "Spearphishing Attachment"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=bitsadmin.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=bitsadmin.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_bitsadmin"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "office_product_spawning_bitsadmin_filter"}]}, {"name": "Get DomainPolicy with Powershell Script Block", "id": "a360d2b2-065a-11ec-b0bf-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get DomainPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message =\"*Get-DomainPolicy*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://github.com/S1ckB0y1337/Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet", "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainPolicy/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Reconnaissance"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "powershell process having commandline $Message$ to query domain policy.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1201"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 30, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Password Policy Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Turla", "OilRig"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter"}]}, {"name": "Runas Execution in CommandLine", "id": "4807e716-43a4-11ec-a0e7-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-12", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic look for a spawned runas.exe process with a administrator user option parameter. This parameter was abused by adversaries, malware author or even red teams to gain elevated privileges in target host. This is a good hunting query to figure out privilege escalation tactics that may used for different stages like lateral movement but take note that administrator may use this command in purpose so its better to see other event context before and after this analytic.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_runas` AND Processes.process = \"*/user:*\" AND Processes.process = \"*admin*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `runas_execution_in_commandline_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated or manual execute this command that may generate false positives. filter is needed.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/ad4c3cda-41f2-4401-8dba-56cc2d245488/#"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/vilsel/sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "message": "elevated process using runas on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1134", "T1134.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Access Token Manipulation", "Token Impersonation/Theft"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=runas.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=runas.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_runas"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "runas_execution_in_commandline_filter"}]}, {"name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", "id": "c184f12e-5c90-11ec-bf1f-497c9a704a72", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-13", "author": "Jose Hernandez", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Web"], "description": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we first limit the scope of our search to the Web Datamodel and use the `| from datamodel` function to benefit from schema accelerated searching capabilities, mainly because the second part of the detection is pretty heavy, it runs a regex across all _raw events that looks for `${jndi:ldap://` pattern across all potential web fields available to the raw data, like http headers for example. If you see results for this detection, it means that there was a attempt at a injection, which could be a reconnaissance activity or a valid expliotation attempt, but this does not exactly mean that the host was indeed successfully exploited.", "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | regex _raw=\"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)\\w+(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?\" | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx.", "known_false_positives": "If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives.", "references": ["https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Application Log", "Stage:Execution"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Exploitation"], "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["action", "category", "dest", "dest_port", "http_content_type", "http_method", "http_referrer", "http_user_agent", "site", "src", "url", "url_domain", "user"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploit Public-Facing Application"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Rocke", "APT39", "BlackTech", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Night Dragon", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter"}]}, {"name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", "id": "69afee44-5c91-11ec-bf1f-497c9a704a72", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-13", "author": "Jose Hernandez", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic", "Web"], "description": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we match the invocation function with a network connection to a malicious ip address.", "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | rex field=_raw max_match=0 \"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)(?\\w+)(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?(?[a-zA-Z0-9\\.\\-\\_\\$]+)\" | join affected_host type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic by All_Traffic.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename dest AS affected_host] | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx.", "known_false_positives": "If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives.", "references": ["https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Application Log", "Stage:Execution"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_network_logs/log4j_network_logs.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["action", "category", "dest", "dest_port", "http_content_type", "http_method", "http_referrer", "http_user_agent", "site", "src", "url", "url_domain", "user"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploit Public-Facing Application"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Rocke", "APT39", "BlackTech", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Night Dragon", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter"}]}, {"name": "Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic", "id": "4477f3ea-a28f-11eb-b762-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-21", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search is designed to detect high frequency of archive files data exfiltration through HTTP POST method protocol. This are one of the common techniques used by APT or trojan spy after doing the data collection like screenshot, recording, sensitive data to the infected machines. The attacker may execute archiving command to the collected data, save it a temp folder with a hidden attribute then send it to its C2 through HTTP POST. Sometimes adversaries will rename the archive files or encode/encrypt to cover their tracks. This detection can detect a renamed archive files transfer to HTTP POST since it checks the request body header. Unfortunately this detection cannot support archive that was encrypted or encoded before doing the exfiltration.", "search": "`stream_http` http_method=POST |eval archive_hdr1=substr(form_data,1,2) | eval archive_hdr2 = substr(form_data,1,4) |stats values(form_data) as http_request_body min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by http_method http_user_agent uri_path url bytes_in bytes_out archive_hdr1 archive_hdr2 |where count >20 AND (archive_hdr1 = \"7z\" OR archive_hdr1 = \"PK\" OR archive_hdr2=\"Rar!\") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the stream HTTP logs or network logs that catch network traffic. Make sure that the http-request-body, payload, or request field is enabled in stream http configuration.", "known_false_positives": "Normal archive transfer via HTTP protocol may trip this detection.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/001/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/apt39-iranian-cyber-espionage-group-focused-on-personal-information.html", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Command and Control", "Data Exfiltration"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/archive_http_post/stream_http_events.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "message": "A http post $http_method$ sending packet with possible archive bytes header 4form_data$ in uri path $uri_path$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1048.003", "T1048"], "observable": [{"name": "uri_path", "type": "UriPath", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "form_data", "type": "formdata", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "http_method", "http_user_agent", "uri_path", "url", "bytes_in", "bytes_out", "archive_hdr1", "archive_hdr2", "form_data"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration", "Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "Thrip", "FIN8", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=stream:http", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "stream_http"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers", "id": "c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6v5464g9f", "version": 3, "date": "2021-01-14", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Resolution"], "description": "Malicious actors often abuse legitimate Dynamic DNS services to host malicious payloads or interactive command and control nodes. Attackers will automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to countless IP addresses to circumvent firewall blocks, block lists as well as frustrate a network defenders analytic and investigative processes. This search will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.answer) as answer min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query host | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `dynamic_dns_providers` | `detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter`", "how_to_implement": "First, you'll need to ingest data from your DNS operations. This can be done by ingesting logs from your server or data, collected passively by Splunk Stream or a similar solution. Specifically, data that contains the domain that is being queried and the IP of the host originating the request must be populating the `Network_Resolution` data model. This search also leverages a lookup file, `dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv`, which contains a non-exhaustive list of Dynamic DNS providers. Please consider updating the local lookup periodically by adding new domains to the list of `dynamic_dns_providers_local.csv`.\\\nThis search produces fields (query, answer, isDynDNS) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable event. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review. Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** DNS Query, **Field:** query\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** DNS Answer, **Field:** answer\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** IsDynamicDNS, **Field:** isDynDNS\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", "known_false_positives": "Some users and applications may leverage Dynamic DNS to reach out to some domains on the Internet since dynamic DNS by itself is not malicious, however this activity must be verified.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Data Protection", "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "DNS Hijacking", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Dynamic DNS", "Command and Control"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Initial Access"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1189/dyn_dns_site/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A dns query $query$ from your infra connecting to suspicious domain in host $host$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1189"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "host", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "query", "type": "dnsquery", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "DNS.answer", "DNS.query", "host"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Drive-by Compromise"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Turla", "Windshift", "RTM", "Darkhotel", "APT38", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Leafminer", "Dark Caracal", "APT19", "APT32", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-3390", "Elderwood", "APT37", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_default dynamic_dns_domains as query OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_default | lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_local dynamic_dns_domains as query OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_local| eval isDynDNS = coalesce(isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local)|fields - isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local| search isDynDNS=True", "description": "This macro limits the output of the query field to dynamic dns domains. It looks up the domains in a file provided by Splunk and one intended to be updated by the end user.", "name": "dynamic_dns_providers", "lookups": [{"case_sensitive_match": "false", "description": "A list of dynammic dns providers that should not be modified", "filename": "dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(dynamic_dns_domains)", "name": "dynamic_dns_providers_default", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv"}, {"case_sensitive_match": "false", "description": "A list of dynammic dns providers that can be modified", "filename": "dynamic_dns_providers_local.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(dynamic_dns_domains)", "name": "dynamic_dns_providers_local", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/dynamic_dns_providers_local.csv"}]}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter"}]}, {"name": "Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data", "id": "e2b36208-a364-11eb-8909-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-22", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search is to detect potential plain HTTP POST method data exfiltration. This network traffic is commonly used by trickbot, trojanspy, keylogger or APT adversary where arguments or commands are sent in plain text to the remote C2 server using HTTP POST method as part of data exfiltration.", "search": "`stream_http` http_method=POST form_data IN (\"*wermgr.exe*\",\"*svchost.exe*\", \"*name=\\\"proclist\\\"*\",\"*ipconfig*\", \"*name=\\\"sysinfo\\\"*\", \"*net view*\") |stats values(form_data) as http_request_body min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by http_method http_user_agent uri_path url bytes_in bytes_out | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the stream HTTP logs or network logs that catch network traffic. Make sure that the http-request-body, payload, or request field is enabled.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/03/trickbot-primer.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Command and Control", "Data Exfiltration"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/plain_exfil_data/stream_http_events.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "message": "A http post $http_method$ sending packet with plain text of information $form_data$ in uri path $uri_path$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1048.003", "T1048"], "observable": [{"name": "uri_path", "type": "UriPath", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "form_data", "type": "formdata", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "http_method", "http_user_agent", "uri_path", "url", "bytes_in", "bytes_out"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration", "Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "Thrip", "FIN8", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=stream:http", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "stream_http"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data_filter"}]}, {"name": "DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation", "id": "1a67f15a-f4ff-4170-84e9-08cf6f75d6f5", "version": 4, "date": "2021-10-06", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Network_Resolution"], "description": "This search allows you to identify DNS requests and compute the standard deviation on the length of the names being resolved, then filter on two times the standard deviation to show you those queries that are unusually large for your environment.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where NOT DNS.message_type IN(\"Pointer\",\"PTR\") by DNS.query | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | eval tlds=split(query,\".\") | eval tld=mvindex(tlds,-1) | eval tld_len=len(tld) | search tld_len<=24 | eval query_length = len(query) | table query query_length record_type count | eventstats stdev(query_length) AS stdev avg(query_length) AS avg p50(query_length) AS p50| where query_length>(avg+stdev*2) | eval z_score=(query_length-avg)/stdev | `dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model.", "known_false_positives": "It's possible there can be long domain names that are legitimate.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Hidden Cobra Malware", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Command and Control"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/long_dns_queries/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "message": "A dns query $query$ with 2 time standard deviation of name len of the dns query in host $host$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1048.003", "T1048"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "host", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "query", "type": "dnsquery", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "DNS.query"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration", "Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "Thrip", "FIN8", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", "id": "c77162d3-f91c-45cc-80c8-22f6v546119f", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-13", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Johan Bjerke, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "Malicious actors often abuse misconfigured LDAP servers or applications that use the LDAP servers in organizations. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. This search will help determine if you have any LDAP connections to IP addresses outside of private (RFC1918) address space.", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as earliest_time latest(_time) as latest_time values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port = 389 OR All_Traffic.dest_port = 636 AND NOT (All_Traffic.dest_ip = 10.0.0.0/8 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=192.168.0.0/16 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip = 172.16.0.0/12) by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip |`drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | where src_ip != dest_ip | `security_content_ctime(latest_time)` | `security_content_ctime(earliest_time)` |`detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format and should be mapped to the Network Traffic datamodels that are in use for this search.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown at this moment. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. Please check those servers to verify if the activity is legitimate.", "references": ["https://www.govcert.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_ldap/bro_conn.json"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An outbound LDAP connection from $src_ip$ in your infrastructure connecting to dest ip $dest_ip$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1190", "T1059"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src_ip", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_ip", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.dest_ip", "All_Traffic.dest_port", "All_Traffic.src_ip"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploit Public-Facing Application", "Command and Scripting Interpreter"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Rocke", "APT39", "BlackTech", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Night Dragon", "Axiom", "APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault", "id": "10f2bae0-bbe6-4984-808c-37dc1c67980d", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-29", "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit", "search": "`linux_hosts` | search sudoedit segfault | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by host | search count > 5 | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault_filter`", "how_to_implement": "Splunk Universal Forwarder running on Linux systems (tested on Centos and Ubuntu), where segfaults are being logged. This also captures instances where the exploit has been compiled into a binary. The detection looks for greater than 5 instances of sudoedit combined with segfault over your search time period on a single host", "known_false_positives": "If sudoedit is throwing segfaults for other reasons this will pick those up too.", "references": ["https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 16"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-3156"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "host"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Whitefly", "APT33", "Cobalt Group", "PLATINUM", "FIN8", "APT32", "Threat Group-3390", "FIN6", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "index=*", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "linux_hosts"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault_filter"}]}, {"name": "Processes Tapping Keyboard Events", "id": "2a371608-331d-4034-ae2c-21dda8f1d0ec", "version": 1, "date": "2019-01-25", "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for processes in an MacOS system that is tapping keyboard events in MacOS, and essentially monitoring all keystrokes made by a user. This is a common technique used by RATs to log keystrokes from a victim, although it can also be used by legitimate processes like Siri to react on human input", "search": "| from datamodel Alerts.Alerts | search app=osquery:results name=pack_osx-attacks_Keyboard_Event_Taps | rename columns.cmdline as cmd, columns.name as process_name, columns.pid as process_id| dedup host,process_name | table host,process_name, cmd, process_id | `processes_tapping_keyboard_events_filter`", "how_to_implement": "In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from your osquery deployed agents with the [osx-attacks.conf](https://github.com/facebook/osquery/blob/experimental/packs/osx-attacks.conf#L599) pack enabled. Also the [TA-OSquery](https://github.com/d1vious/TA-osquery) must be deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the osquery data populate the Alerts data model.", "known_false_positives": "There might be some false positives as keyboard event taps are used by processes like Siri and Zoom video chat, for some good examples of processes to exclude please see [this](https://github.com/facebook/osquery/pull/5345#issuecomment-454639161) comment.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["ColdRoot MacOS RAT"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "nist": ["DE.DP"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "app", "name", "columns.cmdline", "columns.name", "columns.pid", "host"], "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "processes_tapping_keyboard_events_filter"}]}, {"name": "Remote Desktop Process Running On System", "id": "f5939373-8054-40ad-8c64-cec478a22a4a", "version": 5, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for the remote desktop process mstsc.exe running on systems upon which it doesn't typically run. This is accomplished by filtering out all systems that are noted in the `common_rdp_source category` in the Assets and Identity framework.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=*mstsc.exe AND Processes.dest_category!=common_rdp_source by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `remote_desktop_process_running_on_system_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. The search requires you to identify systems that do not commonly use remote desktop. You can use the included support search \"Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop\" to identify these systems. After identifying them, you will need to add the \"common_rdp_source\" category to that system using the Enterprise Security Assets and Identities framework. This can be done by adding an entry in the assets.csv file located in `SA-IdentityManagement/lookups`.", "known_false_positives": "Remote Desktop may be used legitimately by users on the network.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Hidden Cobra Malware", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 9", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021.001", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest_category", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote Desktop Protocol", "Remote Services"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "TEMP.Veles", "Leviathan", "APT39", "Stolen Pencil", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "APT3", "OilRig", "menuPass", "FIN10", "Patchwork", "FIN6", "Lazarus Group", "APT1", "Axiom", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "remote_desktop_process_running_on_system_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Rare Executables", "id": "44fddcb2-8d3b-454c-874e-7c6de5a4f7ac", "version": 5, "date": "2020-03-16", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search will return a table of rare processes, the names of the systems running them, and the users who initiated each process.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.dest) as dest values(Processes.user) as user min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name | rename Processes.process_name as process | rex field=user \"(?.*)\\\\\\\\(?.*)\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| search [| tstats count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name | rare Processes.process_name limit=30 | rename Processes.process_name as process| `filter_rare_process_allow_list`| table process ] | `detect_rare_executables_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts and populating the endpoint data model with the resultant dataset. The macro `filter_rare_process_allow_list` searches two lookup files for allowed processes. These consist of `rare_process_allow_list_default.csv` and `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv`. To add your own processes to the allow list, add them to `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv`. If you wish to remove an entry from the default lookup file, you will have to modify the macro itself to set the allow_list value for that process to false. You can modify the limit parameter and search scheduling to better suit your environment.", "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate processes may be only rarely executed in your environment. As these are identified, update `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv` to filter them out of your search results.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Unusual Processes", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.PT", "PR.DS", "DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_name"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "lookup update=true lookup_rare_process_allow_list_default process as process OUTPUTNEW allow_list | where allow_list=\"false\" | lookup update=true lookup_rare_process_allow_list_local process as process OUTPUT allow_list | where allow_list=\"false\"", "description": "This macro is intended to allow_list processes that have been definied as rare", "name": "filter_rare_process_allow_list", "lookups": [{"case_sensitive_match": "false", "default_match": "false", "description": "A list of rare processes that are legitimate that is provided by Splunk", "filename": "rare_process_allow_list_default.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(process)", "min_matches": 1, "name": "lookup_rare_process_allow_list_default", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/rare_process_allow_list_default.csv"}, {"case_sensitive_match": "false", "default_match": "false", "description": "A list of rare processes that are legitimate provided by the end user", "filename": "rare_process_allow_list_local.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(process)", "min_matches": 1, "name": "lookup_rare_process_allow_list_local", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/rare_process_allow_list_local.csv"}]}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_rare_executables_filter"}]}, {"name": "Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested", "id": "ac3b81c0-52f4-11ec-ac44-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-01", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following hunting analytic leverages Event ID 4769, `A Kerberos service ticket was requested`, to identify an unusual number of computer service ticket requests from one source. When a domain joined endpoint connects to a remote endpoint, it first will request a Kerberos Ticket with the computer name as the Service Name. An endpoint requesting a large number of computer service tickets for different endpoints could represent malicious behavior like lateral movement, malware staging, reconnaissance, etc.\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of service requests. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time, the calculation of the `upperBound` field as well as the Outlier calculation. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\", "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769 Service_Name=\"*$\" Account_Name!=\"*$*\" | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Service_Name) AS unique_targets values(Service_Name) as host_targets by _time, Client_Address, Account_Name | eventstats avg(unique_targets) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_targets) as comp_std by Client_Address, Account_Name | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_targets >10 and unique_targets >= upperBound, 1, 0) | `unusual_number_of_computer_service_tickets_requested_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", "known_false_positives": "An single endpoint requesting a large number of computer service tickets is not common behavior. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, administration systeams and missconfigured systems.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Exploitation", "Lateral Movement"], "message": null, "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078"], "observable": [{"name": "Client_Address", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Ticket_Options", "Ticket_Encryption_Type", "dest", "service", "service_id"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Valid Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "unusual_number_of_computer_service_tickets_requested_filter"}]}, {"name": "WMI Temporary Event Subscription", "id": "38cbd42c-1098-41bb-99cf-9d6d2b296d83", "version": 1, "date": "2018-10-23", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for the creation of WMI temporary event subscriptions.", "search": "`wmi` EventCode=5860 Temporary | rex field=Message \"NotificationQuery =\\s+(?[^;|^$]+)\" | search query!=\"SELECT * FROM Win32_ProcessStartTrace WHERE ProcessName = 'wsmprovhost.exe'\" AND query!=\"SELECT * FROM __InstanceOperationEvent WHERE TargetInstance ISA 'AntiVirusProduct' OR TargetInstance ISA 'FirewallProduct' OR TargetInstance ISA 'AntiSpywareProduct'\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName, query | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmi_temporary_event_subscription_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting the Windows WMI activity logs. This can be done by adding a stanza to inputs.conf on the system generating logs with a title of [WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational].", "known_false_positives": "Some software may create WMI temporary event subscriptions for various purposes. The included search contains an exception for two of these that occur by default on Windows 10 systems. You may need to modify the search to create exceptions for other legitimate events.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "query"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Windows Management Instrumentation"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT41", "FIN6", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Threat Group-3390", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "menuPass", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=\"wineventlog:microsoft-windows-wmi-activity/operational\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wmi"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "wmi_temporary_event_subscription_filter"}]}, {"name": "Child Processes of Spoolsv exe", "id": "aa0c4aeb-5b18-41c4-8c07-f1442d7599df", "version": 3, "date": "2020-03-16", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for child processes of spoolsv.exe. This activity is associated with a POC privilege-escalation exploit associated with CVE-2018-8440. Spoolsv.exe is the process associated with the Print Spooler service in Windows and typically runs as SYSTEM.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=spoolsv.exe AND Processes.process_name!=regsvr32.exe by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model. Update the `children_of_spoolsv_filter` macro to filter out legitimate child processes spawned by spoolsv.exe.", "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate printer-related processes may show up as children of spoolsv.exe. You should confirm that any activity as legitimate and may be added as exclusions in the search.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "cve": ["CVE-2018-8440"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1068"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.user"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Whitefly", "APT33", "Cobalt Group", "PLATINUM", "FIN8", "APT32", "Threat Group-3390", "FIN6", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file", "id": "a51bfe1a-94f0-4822-b1e4-16ae10145893", "version": 3, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for execution of process `outlook.exe` where the process is writing a `.zip` file to the disk.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=outlook.exe OR Processes.process_name=explorer.exe by _time span=5m Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_id Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename process_id as malicious_id| rename parent_process_id as outlook_id| join malicious_id type=inner[| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path values(Filesystem.file_name) as file_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_path=*zip* OR Filesystem.file_name=*.lnk ) AND (Filesystem.file_path=C:\\\\Users* OR Filesystem.file_path=*Local\\\\Temp*) by _time span=5m Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_hash Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename process_id as malicious_id| fields malicious_id outlook_id dest file_path file_name file_hash count file_id] | table firstTime lastTime user malicious_id outlook_id process_name parent_process_name file_name file_path | where file_name != \"\" | `detect_outlook_exe_writing_a_zip_file_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon.", "known_false_positives": "It is not uncommon for outlook to write legitimate zip files to the disk.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process_id", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.dest", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.user"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Phishing", "Spearphishing Attachment"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_outlook_exe_writing_a_zip_file_filter"}]}, {"name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", "id": "7b09db8a-5c20-11ec-9945-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-13", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the process name of Java, Apache, or Tomcat spawning a Linux shell. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). The shells included in the macro are \"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\". Upon triage, review parallel processes and command-line arguments to determine legitimacy.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=java OR Processes.parent_process_name=apache OR Processes.parent_process_name=tomcat `linux_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_java_spawning_shell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. Ensure EDR product is mapping OS Linux to the datamodel properly. Add any additional java process names for your environment to the analytic as needed.", "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required on internal developer build systems or classify assets as web facing and restrict the analytic based on that.", "references": ["https://blog.netlab.360.com/ten-families-of-malicious-samples-are-spreading-using-the-log4j2-vulnerability-now/", "https://gist.github.com/olafhartong/916ebc673ba066537740164f7e7e1d72"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "dataset": [], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ spawning a Linux shell, potentially indicative of exploitation.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1190"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 40, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploit Public-Facing Application"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Rocke", "APT39", "BlackTech", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Night Dragon", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name IN (\"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\"))", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "linux_shells"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "linux_java_spawning_shell_filter"}]}, {"name": "WinRM Spawning a Process", "id": "a081836a-ba4d-11eb-8593-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-21", "author": "Drew Church, Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious processes spawning from WinRM (wsmprovhost.exe). This analytic is related to potential exploitation of CVE-2021-31166. which is a kernel-mode device driver http.sys vulnerability. Current proof of concept code will blue-screen the operating system. However, http.sys used by many different Windows processes, including WinRM. In this case, identifying suspicious process create (child processes) from `wsmprovhost.exe` is what this analytic is identifying.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=wsmprovhost.exe Processes.process_name IN (\"cmd.exe\",\"sh.exe\",\"bash.exe\",\"powershell.exe\",\"pwsh.exe\",\"schtasks.exe\",\"certutil.exe\",\"whoami.exe\",\"bitsadmin.exe\",\"scp.exe\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winrm_spawning_a_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown. Add new processes or filter as needed. It is possible system management software may spawn processes from `wsmprovhost.exe`.", "references": ["https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_access/win_susp_shell_spawn_from_winrm.yml", "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/5/17/cve-2021-31166-a-wormable-code-execution-bug-in-httpsys", "https://github.com/0vercl0k/CVE-2021-31166/blob/main/cve-2021-31166.py"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Unusual Processes"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-31166"], "dataset": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation", "Denial of Service"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1190"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploit Public-Facing Application"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Rocke", "APT39", "BlackTech", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Night Dragon", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "winrm_spawning_a_process_filter"}]}, {"name": "Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event", "id": "701a8740-e8db-40df-9190-5516d3819787", "version": 1, "date": "2020-12-14", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The malware sunburst will load the malicious dll by SolarWinds.BusinessLayerHost.exe. After a period of 12-14 days, the malware will attempt to resolve a subdomain of avsvmcloud.com. This detections will correlate both events.", "search": "(`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded=*SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll) OR (`sysmon` EventCode=22 QueryName=*avsvmcloud.com) | eventstats dc(EventCode) AS dc_events | where dc_events=2 | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ImageLoaded) AS ImageLoaded values(QueryName) AS QueryName by host | rename host as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "This detection relies on sysmon logs with the Event ID 7, Driver loaded. Please tune your sysmon config that you DriverLoad event for SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll is captured by Sysmon. Additionally, you need sysmon logs for Event ID 22, DNS Query. We suggest to run this detection at least once a day over the last 14 days.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["NOBELIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Windows", "cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1203"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "ImageLoaded", "QueryName"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploitation for Client Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "MuddyWater", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT41", "admin@338", "Threat Group-3390", "APT12", "The White Company", "APT33", "APT32", "APT28", "Tropic Trooper", "Lazarus Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "APT37", "Patchwork", "Leviathan", "Elderwood", "TA459", "APT29"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event_filter"}]}, {"name": "Unusual Number of Remote Endpoint Authentication Events", "id": "acb5dc74-5324-11ec-a36d-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-01", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following hunting analytic leverages Event ID 4624, `An account was successfully logged on`, to identify an unusual number of remote authentication attempts coming from one source. An endpoint authenticating to a large number of remote endpoints could represent malicious behavior like lateral movement, malware staging, reconnaissance, etc.\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual high number of authentication events. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time, the calculation of the `upperBound` field as well as the Outlier calculation. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\", "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=3 Account_Name!=\"*$\" | eval Source_Account = mvindex(Account_Name, 1) | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(ComputerName) AS unique_targets values(ComputerName) as target_hosts by _time, Source_Network_Address, Source_Account | eventstats avg(unique_targets) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_targets) as comp_std by Source_Network_Address, Source_Account | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_targets >10 and unique_targets >= upperBound, 1, 0) `unusual_number_of_remote_endpoint_authentication_events_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Event Logs from domain controllers aas well as member servers and workstations. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Logon` within `Logon/Logoff` needs to be enabled.", "known_false_positives": "An single endpoint authenticating to a large number of hosts is not common behavior. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, jump servers and missconfigured systems.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Lateral Movement"], "message": null, "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Logon_Type", "Caller_Process_Name", "Security_ID", "Account_Name", "ComputerName"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Valid Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "unusual_number_of_remote_endpoint_authentication_events_filter"}]}, {"name": "Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK", "id": "57edaefa-a73b-45e5-bbae-f39c1473f941", "version": 1, "date": "2019-05-08", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious activity on your hosts. This search leverages the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) to help identify command lines with lengths that are unusual for a given user.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| eval processlen=len(process) | search user!=unknown | apply cmdline_pdfmodel threshold=0.01 | rename \"IsOutlier(processlen)\" as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | table firstTime lastTime user dest process_name process processlen count | `unusually_long_command_line___mltk_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that monitors command lines and populates the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model. In addition, MLTK version >= 4.2 must be installed on your search heads, along with any required dependencies. Finally, the support search \"Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK\" must be executed before this detection search, as it builds an ML model over the historical data used by this search. It is important that this search is run in the same app context as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild the model with the latest data available in your environment.", "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate applications use long command lines for installs or updates. You should review identified command lines for legitimacy. You may modify the first part of the search to omit legitimate command lines from consideration. If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider changing the value of threshold in the search to a smaller value. You should also periodically re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data. You may get unexpected results if the user identified in the results is not present in the data used to build the associated model.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Unusual Processes", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Ransomware"], "asset_type": "", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.user", "Processes.dest", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "unusually_long_command_line___mltk_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account", "id": "1400624a-d42d-484d-8843-e6753e6e3645", "version": 1, "date": "2020-09-18", "author": "Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for Event Code 4742 (Computer Change) or EventCode 4624 (An account was successfully logged on) with an anonymous account.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 OR EventCode=4742 TargetUserName=\"ANONYMOUS LOGON\" LogonType=3 | stats count values(host) as host, values(TargetDomainName) as Domain, values(user) as user | `detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search requires audit computer account management to be enabled on the system in order to generate Event ID 4742. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Event Logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", "known_false_positives": "None thus far found", "references": ["https://www.lares.com/blog/from-lares-labs-defensive-guidance-for-zerologon-cve-2020-1472/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Detect Zerologon Attack"], "asset_type": "Windows", "cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "cve": ["CVE-2020-1472"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "The following $EventCode$ occurred on $dest$ by $user$ with Logon Type 3, which may be indicative of the an account or group being changed by an anonymous account.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1210"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "EventCode", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "TargetUserName", "LogonType", "TargetDomainName", "user"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploitation of Remote Services"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account_filter"}]}, {"name": "Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name", "id": "9d22a780-5165-11ec-ad4f-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-29", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following hunting analytic leverages Event ID 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify the creation of a Scheduled Task with a suspicious, high entropy, Task Name. To achieve this, this analytic also leverages the `ut_shannon` function from the URL ToolBox Splunk application. Red teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler to create and start a remote Scheduled Task and obtain remote code execution. To achieve this goal, tools like Impacket or Crapmapexec, typically create a Scheduled Task with a random task name on the victim host. This hunting analytic may help defenders identify Scheduled Tasks created as part of a lateral movement attack. The entropy threshold `ut_shannon > 3` should be customized by users. The Command field can be used to determine if the task has malicious intent or not.", "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message | lookup ut_shannon_lookup word as Task_Name | where ut_shannon > 3 | table _time, dest, Task_Name, ut_shannon, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden | `randomly_generated_scheduled_task_name_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA as well as the URL ToolBox application are also required.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may use random Scheduled Task names.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/", "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/2734/", "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entropy_(information_theory)"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement", "Persistence"], "message": "A windows scheduled task with a suspicious task name was created on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053", "T1053.005"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "Task_Name", "Description", "Command"], "risk_score": 45, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Scheduled Task/Job", "Scheduled Task"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "MuddyWater", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT-C-36", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT41", "Machete", "Soft Cell", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Patchwork", "OilRig", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "FIN8", "menuPass", "FIN10", "APT32", "FIN7", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT29"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "randomly_generated_scheduled_task_name_filter"}]}, {"name": "Spike in File Writes", "id": "fdb0f805-74e4-4539-8c00-618927333aae", "version": 3, "date": "2020-03-16", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "The search looks for a sharp increase in the number of files written to a particular host", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.action=created by _time span=1h, Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | eventstats max(_time) as maxtime | stats count as num_data_samples max(eval(if(_time >= relative_time(maxtime, \"-1d@d\"), count, null))) as \"count\" avg(eval(if(_time upperBound) AND num_data_samples >=20, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `spike_in_file_writes_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "In order to implement this search, you must populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection and response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the file system.", "known_false_positives": "It is important to understand that if you happen to install any new applications on your hosts or are copying a large number of files, you can expect to see a large increase of file modifications.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.action", "Filesystem.dest"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "spike_in_file_writes_filter"}]}, {"name": "Exchange PowerShell Module Usage", "id": "2d10095e-05ae-11ec-8fdf-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-27", "author": "Michael Haag", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifies the usage of Exchange PowerShell modules that were recently used for a proof of concept related to ProxyShell. Currently, there is no active data shared or data we could re-produce relate to this part of the ProxyShell chain of exploits. \\\nInherently, the usage of the modules is not malicious, but reviewing parallel processes, and user, of the session will assist with determining the intent. \\\nModule - New-MailboxExportRequest will begin the process of exporting contents of a primary mailbox or archive to a .pst file. \\\nModule - New-managementroleassignment can assign a management role to a management role group, management role assignment policy, user, or universal security group (USG).", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message IN (\"*New-MailboxExportRequest*\", \"*New-ManagementRoleAssignment*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Path Message OpCode ComputerName User EventCode| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `exchange_powershell_module_usage_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/new-mailboxexportrequest?view=exchange-ps", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/new-managementroleassignment?view=exchange-ps", "https://blog.orange.tw/2021/08/proxyshell-a-new-attack-surface-on-ms-exchange-part-3.html", "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/8/17/from-pwn2own-2021-a-new-attack-surface-on-microsoft-exchange-proxyshell", "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/11/15/exchange-exploit-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["ProxyShell"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": [], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Exploitation"], "message": "Local user discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Path", "Message", "OpCode", "ComputerName", "User", "EventCode"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "PowerShell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "Gallmaker", "Turla", "APT19", "DarkHydrus", "APT28", "Thrip", "Gorgon Group", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leviathan", "TA459", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT32", "FIN7", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "APT3", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "exchange_powershell_module_usage_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery", "id": "1de31d5d-8fa6-4ee0-af89-17069134118a", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-28", "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit", "search": "`osquery_process` | search \"columns.cmdline\"=\"sudoedit -s \\\\*\" | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery_filter`", "how_to_implement": "OSQuery installed and configured to pick up process events (info at https://osquery.io) as well as using the Splunk OSQuery Add-on https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4402. The vulnerability is exposed when a non privledged user tries passing in a single \\ character at the end of the command while using the shell and edit flags.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 16"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-3156"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "columns.cmdline"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Whitefly", "APT33", "Cobalt Group", "PLATINUM", "FIN8", "APT32", "Threat Group-3390", "FIN6", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=\"osquery-process\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "osquery_process"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery_filter"}]}, {"name": "First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom", "id": "e91bd102-d630-4e76-ab73-7e3ba22c5961", "version": 1, "date": "2020-05-20", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for child processes spawned by zoom.exe or zoom.us that has not previously been seen.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name values(Processes.parent_process_id) as parent_process_id values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.us) by Processes.process_id Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | lookup zoom_first_time_child_process dest as dest process_name as process_name OUTPUT firstTimeSeen | where isnull(firstTimeSeen) OR firstTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), \"`previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window`\") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | table firstTime dest, process_id, process_name, parent_process_id, parent_process_name |`first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial` to build the initial table of child processes and hostnames for this search to work. You should also schedule at the same interval as this search the second baseline search `Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old child processes. Please update the `previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window` macro to adjust the time window.", "known_false_positives": "A new child process of zoom isn't malicious by that fact alone. Further investigation of the actions of the child process is needed to verify any malicious behavior is taken.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Zoom Child Processes"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1068/zoom_child_process/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Child process $process_name$ with $process_id$ spawned by zoom.exe or zoom.us which has not been previously on host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1068"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process Name", "role": ["Attacker", "Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process_id", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.dest"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Whitefly", "APT33", "Cobalt Group", "PLATINUM", "FIN8", "APT32", "Threat Group-3390", "FIN6", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"description": "Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new zoom child processes", "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", "name": "previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A list of suspicious file names", "collection": "zoom_first_time_child_process", "name": "zoom_first_time_child_process", "fields_list": "_key, dest, process_name, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen"}]}, {"name": "First Time Seen Running Windows Service", "id": "823136f2-d755-4b6d-ae04-372b486a5808", "version": 4, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for the first and last time a Windows service is seen running in your environment. This table is then cached.", "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rex field=Message \"The (?[-\\(\\)\\s\\w]+) service entered the (?\\w+) state\" | where state=\"running\" | lookup previously_seen_running_windows_services service as service OUTPUT firstTimeSeen | where isnull(firstTimeSeen) OR firstTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_windows_services_window`) | table _time dest service | `first_time_seen_running_windows_service_filter`", "how_to_implement": "While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM, you must be ingesting your Windows system event logs in order for this search to execute successfully. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial` to build the initial table of child processes and hostnames for this search to work. You should also schedule at the same interval as this search the second baseline search `Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old Windows Services. Please update the `previously_seen_windows_services_window` macro to adjust the time window. Please ensure that the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows is version 8.0.0 or above.", "known_false_positives": "A previously unseen service is not necessarily malicious. Verify that the service is legitimate and that was installed by a legitimate process.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Service Abuse", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "NOBELIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1569", "T1569.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.AE"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "dest"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Services", "Service Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "APT41", "Silence", "FIN6", "APT32", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_system"}, {"description": "Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new Windows services", "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", "name": "previously_seen_windows_services_window"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "first_time_seen_running_windows_service_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A placeholder for the list of Windows Services running", "collection": "previously_seen_running_windows_services", "name": "previously_seen_running_windows_services", "fields_list": "_key, service, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen"}]}, {"name": "Randomly Generated Windows Service Name", "id": "2032a95a-5165-11ec-a2c3-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-29", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following hunting analytic leverages Event ID 7045, `A new service was installed in the system`, to identify the installation of a Windows Service with a suspicious, high entropy, Service Name. To achieve this, this analytic also leverages the `ut_shannon` function from the URL ToolBox Splunk application. Red teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Service Control Manager to create and start a remote Windows Service and obtain remote code execution. To achieve this goal, some tools like Metasploit, Cobalt Strike and Impacket, typically create a Windows Service with a random service name on the victim host. This hunting analytic may help defenders identify Windows Services installed as part of a lateral movement attack. The entropy threshold `ut_shannon > 3` should be customized by users. The Service_File_Name field can be used to determine if the Windows Service has malicious intent or not.", "search": " `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 | lookup ut_shannon_lookup word as Service_Name | where ut_shannon > 3 | table EventCode ComputerName Service_Name ut_shannon Service_Start_Type Service_Type Service_File_Name | `randomly_generated_windows_service_name_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints. The Windows TA as well as the URL ToolBox application are also required.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may use random Windows Service names.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement"], "message": "A Windows Service with a suspicious service name was installed on $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1543", "T1543.003"], "observable": [{"name": "Service_File_Name", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}, {"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "ComputerName", "Service_File_Name", "Service_Type", "Service_Name", "Service_Start_Type"], "risk_score": 45, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Create or Modify System Process", "Windows Service"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Blue Mockingbird", "DarkVishnya", "Wizard Spider", "APT32", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Tropic Trooper", "Cobalt Group", "Ke3chang", "Honeybee", "FIN7", "Threat Group-3390", "APT19", "APT3", "Lazarus Group", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_system"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "randomly_generated_windows_service_name_filter"}]}, {"name": "MacOS - Re-opened Applications", "id": "40bb64f9-f619-4e3d-8732-328d40377c4b", "version": 1, "date": "2020-02-07", "author": "Jamie Windley, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for processes referencing the plist files that determine which applications are re-opened when a user reboots their machine.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*com.apple.loginwindow*\" by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `macos___re_opened_applications_filter`", "how_to_implement": "In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest process data from your osquery deployed agents with the [splunk.conf](https://github.com/splunk/TA-osquery/blob/master/config/splunk.conf) pack enabled. Also the [TA-OSquery](https://github.com/splunk/TA-osquery) must be deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the data populate the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "At this stage, there are no known false positives. During testing, no process events refering the com.apple.loginwindow.plist files were observed during normal operation of re-opening applications on reboot. Therefore, it can be asumed that any occurences of this in the process events would be worth investigating. In the event that the legitimate modification by the system of these files is in fact logged to the process log, then the process_name of that process can be added to an allow list.", "references": [], "tags": {"asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command and Control"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest"], "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "macos___re_opened_applications_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Curl Network Connection", "id": "3f613dc0-21f2-4063-93b1-5d3c15eef22f", "version": 1, "date": "2021-02-22", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of a curl contacting suspicious remote domains to checkin to command and control servers or download further implants. In the context of Silver Sparrow, curl is identified contacting s3.amazonaws.com. This particular behavior is common with MacOS adware-malicious software.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=curl Processes.process=s3.amazonaws.com by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_curl_network_connection_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/", "https://marcosantadev.com/manage-plist-files-plistbuddy/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Silver Sparrow", "Ingress Tool Transfer"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "dataset": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1105"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Ingress Tool Transfer"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Whitefly", "Rocke", "APT39", "Tropic Trooper", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Frankenstein", "Silence", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "APT33", "MuddyWater", "APT18", "APT38", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "OilRig", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT37", "FIN8", "PLATINUM", "Leviathan", "Elderwood", "Magic Hound", "APT3", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Patchwork", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-3390", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_curl_network_connection_filter"}]}, {"name": "Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF", "id": "29228ab4-0762-11ec-94aa-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-27", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This analytic identifies suspicious behavior related to ProxyShell against on-premise Microsoft Exchange servers. \\\nModification of this analytic is requried to ensure fields are mapped accordingly. \\\nA suspicious event will have `PowerShell`, the method `POST` and `autodiscover.json`. This is indicative of accessing PowerShell on the back end of Exchange with SSRF. \\\nAn event will look similar to `POST /autodiscover/autodiscover.json a=dsxvu@fnsso.flq/powershell/?X-Rps-CAT=VgEAVAdXaW5kb3d...` (abbreviated) \\\nReview the source attempting to perform this activity against your environment. In addition, review PowerShell logs and access recently granted to Exchange roles.", "search": "| `exchange` c_uri=\"*//autodiscover.json*\" cs_uri_query=\"*PowerShell*\" cs_method=\"POST\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, cs_uri_query, cs_method, c_uri | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `exchange_powershell_abuse_via_ssrf_filter`", "how_to_implement": "The following analytic requires on-premise Exchange to be logging to Splunk using the TA - https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3225. Ensure logs are parsed correctly, or tune the analytic for your environment.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives, however, tune as needed.", "references": ["https://github.com/GossiTheDog/ThreatHunting/blob/master/AzureSentinel/Exchange-Powershell-via-SSRF", "https://blog.orange.tw/2021/08/proxylogon-a-new-attack-surface-on-ms-exchange-part-1.html", "https://peterjson.medium.com/reproducing-the-proxyshell-pwn2own-exploit-49743a4ea9a1"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["ProxyShell"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/exchange-events.json"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Activity related to ProxyShell has been identified on $dest$. Review events and take action accordingly.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1190"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "cs_uri_query", "cs_method", "c_uri"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploit Public-Facing Application"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Rocke", "APT39", "BlackTech", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Night Dragon", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=\"MSWindows:IIS\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "exchange"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "exchange_powershell_abuse_via_ssrf_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage", "id": "c3194009-e0eb-4f84-87a9-4070f8688f00", "version": 1, "date": "2021-02-22", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of a native MacOS utility, PlistBuddy, creating or modifying a properly list (.plist) file. In the instance of Silver Sparrow, the following commands were executed:\\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :Label string init_verx\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :RunAtLoad bool true\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :StartInterval integer 3600\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :ProgramArguments array\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :ProgramArguments:0 string /bin/sh\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :ProgramArguments:1 string -c\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\nUpon triage, capture the property list file being written to disk and review for further indicators. Contain the endpoint and triage further.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=PlistBuddy (Processes.process=*LaunchAgents* OR Processes.process=*RunAtLoad* OR Processes.process=*true*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate applications may use PlistBuddy to create or modify property lists and possibly generate false positives. Review the property list being modified or created to confirm.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/", "https://marcosantadev.com/manage-plist-files-plistbuddy/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Silver Sparrow"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "dataset": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1543.001", "T1543"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Launch Agent", "Create or Modify System Process"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior", "id": "e1997b2e-655f-4561-82fd-aeba8e1c1a86", "version": 1, "date": "2021-02-22", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of a SQLite3 querying the MacOS preferences to identify the original URL the pkg was downloaded from. This particular behavior is common with MacOS adware-malicious software. Upon triage, review other processes in parallel for suspicious activity. Identify any recent package installations.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=sqlite3 Processes.process=*LSQuarantine* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_sqlite3_lsquarantine_behavior_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/", "https://marcosantadev.com/manage-plist-files-plistbuddy/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Silver Sparrow"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "dataset": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1074"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Data Staged"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_sqlite3_lsquarantine_behavior_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detection of tools built by NirSoft", "id": "1297fb80-f42a-4q4a-9c8b-78c061417cf6", "version": 3, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for specific command-line arguments that may indicate the execution of tools made by Nirsoft, which are legitimate, but may be abused by attackers.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) values(Processes.process) as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process=\"* /stext *\" OR Processes.process=\"* /scomma *\" ) by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "While legitimate, these NirSoft tools are prone to abuse. You should verfiy that the tool was used for a legitimate purpose.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A "], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1072"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.user"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Software Deployment Tools"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Silence", "APT32", "Threat Group-1314"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft_filter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Java Spawning Shells", "id": "28c81306-5c47-11ec-bfea-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-13", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the process name of java.exe and w3wp.exe spawning a Windows shell. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). The shells included in the macro are \"cmd.exe\", \"powershell.exe\". Upon triage, review parallel processes and command-line arguments to determine legitimacy.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=java.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=w3wp.exe `windows_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_java_spawning_shells_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. Restrict the analytic to publicly facing endpoints to reduce false positives. Add any additional identified web application process name to the query. Add any further Windows process names to the macro (ex. LOLBins) to further expand this query.", "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required on internal developer build systems or classify assets as web facing and restrict the analytic based on that.", "references": ["https://blog.netlab.360.com/ten-families-of-malicious-samples-are-spreading-using-the-log4j2-vulnerability-now/", "https://gist.github.com/olafhartong/916ebc673ba066537740164f7e7e1d72"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "dataset": [], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ spawning a Windows shell, potentially indicative of exploitation.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1190"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 40, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploit Public-Facing Application"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Rocke", "APT39", "BlackTech", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Night Dragon", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe)", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "windows_shells"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "windows_java_spawning_shells_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156", "id": "93fbec4e-0375-440c-8db3-4508eca470c4", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-27", "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit", "search": "`linux_hosts` | search \"sudoedit -s \\\\\" | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_filter`", "how_to_implement": "Splunk Universal Forwarder running on Linux systems, capturing logs from the /var/log directory. The vulnerability is exposed when a non privledged user tries passing in a single \\ character at the end of the command while using the shell and edit flags.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 16"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-3156"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Whitefly", "APT33", "Cobalt Group", "PLATINUM", "FIN8", "APT32", "Threat Group-3390", "FIN6", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "index=*", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "linux_hosts"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage via OSquery", "id": "20ba6c32-c733-4a32-b64e-2688cf231399", "version": 1, "date": "2021-02-22", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of a native MacOS utility, PlistBuddy, creating or modifying a properly list (.plist) file. In the instance of Silver Sparrow, the following commands were executed:\\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :Label string init_verx\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :RunAtLoad bool true\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :StartInterval integer 3600\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :ProgramArguments array\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :ProgramArguments:0 string /bin/sh\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :ProgramArguments:1 string -c\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\nUpon triage, capture the property list file being written to disk and review for further indicators. Contain the endpoint and triage further.", "search": "`osquery_process` \"columns.cmdline\"=\"*LaunchAgents*\" OR \"columns.cmdline\"=\"*RunAtLoad*\" OR \"columns.cmdline\"=\"*true*\" | `suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_via_osquery_filter`", "how_to_implement": "OSQuery must be installed and configured to pick up process events (info at https://osquery.io) as well as using the Splunk OSQuery Add-on https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4402. Modify the macro and validate fields are correct.", "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate applications may use PlistBuddy to create or modify property lists and possibly generate false positives. Review the property list being modified or created to confirm.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/", "https://marcosantadev.com/manage-plist-files-plistbuddy/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Silver Sparrow"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "dataset": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1543.001", "T1543"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "columns.cmdline"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Launch Agent", "Create or Modify System Process"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=\"osquery-process\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "osquery_process"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_via_osquery_filter"}]}, {"name": "WMI Permanent Event Subscription", "id": "71bfdb13-f200-4c6c-b2c9-a2e07adf437d", "version": 1, "date": "2018-10-23", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions.", "search": "`wmi` EventCode=5861 Binding | rex field=Message \"Consumer =\\s+(?[^;|^$]+)\" | search consumer!=\"NTEventLogEventConsumer=\\\"SCM Event Log Consumer\\\"\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName, consumer, Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename ComputerName as dest | `wmi_permanent_event_subscription_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting the Windows WMI activity logs. This can be done by adding a stanza to inputs.conf on the system generating logs with a title of [WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational].", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, administrators may use event subscriptions for legitimate purposes.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "consumer", "ComputerName"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Windows Management Instrumentation"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT41", "FIN6", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Threat Group-3390", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "menuPass", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=\"wineventlog:microsoft-windows-wmi-activity/operational\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wmi"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "wmi_permanent_event_subscription_filter"}]}, {"name": "Print Processor Registry Autostart", "id": "1f5b68aa-2037-11ec-898e-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-28", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification or new registry entry regarding print processor. This registry is known to be abuse by turla or other APT to gain persistence and privilege escalation to the compromised machine. This is done by adding the malicious dll payload on the new created key in this registry that will be executed as it restarted the spoolsv.exe process and services.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path =\"*\\\\Control\\\\Print\\\\Environments\\\\Windows x64\\\\Print Processors*\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `print_processor_registry_autostart_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "possible new printer installation may add driver component on this registry.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/012/", "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/05/21/no-game-over-winnti-group/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Privilege Escalation Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/print_reg/sysmon_print.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1547.012", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "print_processor_registry_autostart_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers", "id": "c8bff7a4-11ea-4416-a27d-c5bca472913d", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-23", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Web"], "description": "This search is used to detect malicious HTTP requests crafted to exploit jmx-console in JBoss servers. The malicious requests have a long URL length, as the payload is embedded in the URL.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where (Web.http_method=\"GET\" OR Web.http_method=\"HEAD\") by Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest | search Web.url=\"*jmx-console/HtmlAdaptor?action=invokeOpByName&name=jboss.admin*import*\" AND Web.url_length > 200 | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table src, dest_ip, http_method, url, firstTime, lastTime | `detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must ingest data from the web server or capture network data that contains web specific information with solutions such as Bro or Splunk Stream, and populating the Web data model", "known_false_positives": "No known false positives for this detection.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["JBoss Vulnerability", "SamSam Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Web Server", "cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 4", "CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["ID.RA", "PR.PT", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "PR.MA", "DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Web.http_method", "Web.url", "Web.url_length", "Web.src", "Web.dest"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", "id": "810e4dbc-d46e-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003", "version": 1, "date": "2020-08-02", "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects remote code exploit attempts on F5 BIG-IP, BIG-IQ, and Traffix SDC devices", "search": "`f5_bigip_rogue` | regex _raw=\"(hsqldb;|.*\\\\.\\\\.;.*)\" | search `detect_f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To consistently detect exploit attempts on F5 devices using the vulnerabilities contained within CVE-2020-5902 it is recommended to ingest logs via syslog. As many BIG-IP devices will have SSL enabled on their management interfaces, detections via wire data may not pick anything up unless you are decrypting SSL traffic in order to inspect it. I am using a regex string from a Cloudflare mitigation technique to try and always catch the offending string (..;), along with the other exploit of using (hsqldb;).", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/about/news/f5-fixes-critical-vulnerability-discovered-by-positive-technologies-in-big-ip-application-delivery-controller/", "https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K52145254", "https://blog.cloudflare.com/cve-2020-5902-helping-to-protect-against-the-f5-tmui-rce-vulnerability/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902"], "asset_type": "Network", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 11"], "cve": ["CVE-2020-5902"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploit Public-Facing Application"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Rocke", "APT39", "BlackTech", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Night Dragon", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "index=netops sourcetype=\"f5:bigip:rogue\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "f5_bigip_rogue"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902_filter"}]}, {"name": "Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse", "id": "134da869-e264-4a8f-8d7e-fcd0ec88f301", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-23", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Web"], "description": "This search looks for Web requests to faux domains similar to the one that you want to have monitored for abuse.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Web.url) as urls min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Web by Web.src | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `brand_abuse_web` | `monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You need to ingest data from your web traffic. This can be accomplished by indexing data from a web proxy, or using a network traffic analysis tool, such as Bro or Splunk Stream. You also need to have run the search \"ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names\", which creates the permutations of the domain that will be checked for.", "known_false_positives": "None at this time", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Brand Monitoring"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Web.url", "Web.src"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "lookup update=true brandMonitoring_lookup domain as urls OUTPUT domain_abuse | search domain_abuse=true", "description": "This macro limits the output to only domains that are in the brand monitoring lookup file", "name": "brand_abuse_web", "lookups": [{"default_match": "false", "description": "A file that contains look-a-like domains for brands that you want to monitor", "filename": "brand_monitoring.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(domain)", "min_matches": 1, "name": "brandMonitoring_lookup", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/brand_monitoring.csv"}]}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse_filter"}]}, {"name": "Supernova Webshell", "id": "2ec08a09-9ff1-4dac-b59f-1efd57972ec1", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-06", "author": "John Stoner, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Web"], "description": "This search aims to detect the Supernova webshell used in the SUNBURST attack.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Web.Web where web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*codes* OR Web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*clazz* OR Web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*method* OR Web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*args* by Web.src Web.dest Web.url Web.vendor_product Web.user Web.http_user_agent _time span=1s | `supernova_webshell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be monitoring web traffic to your Solarwinds Orion. The logs should be ingested into splunk and populating/mapped to the Web data model.", "known_false_positives": "There might be false positives associted with this detection since items like args as a web argument is pretty generic.", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-supernova-malware-solarwinds-continued.html", "https://www.guidepointsecurity.com/supernova-solarwinds-net-webshell-analysis/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["NOBELIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 13", "CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1505.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "ID.RA", "PR.PT", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Web.url", "Web.src", "Web.dest", "Web.vendor_product", "Web.user", "Web.http_user_agent"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Web Shell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Tropic Trooper", "Soft Cell", "Threat Group-3390", "TEMP.Veles", "Leviathan", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT32", "OilRig", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "supernova_webshell_filter"}]}, {"name": "SQL Injection with Long URLs", "id": "e0aad4cf-0790-423b-8328-7564d0d938f9", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Web"], "description": "This search looks for long URLs that have several SQL commands visible within them.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Web where Web.dest_category=web_server AND (Web.url_length > 1024 OR Web.http_user_agent_length > 200) by Web.src Web.dest Web.url Web.url_length Web.http_user_agent | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | eval num_sql_cmds=mvcount(split(url, \"alter%20table\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"between\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"create%20table\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"create%20database\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"create%20index\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"create%20view\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"delete\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"drop%20database\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"drop%20index\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"drop%20table\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"exists\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"exec\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"group%20by\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"having\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"insert%20into\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"inner%20join\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"left%20join\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"right%20join\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"full%20join\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"select\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"distinct\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"select%20top\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"union\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"xp_cmdshell\")) - 24 | where num_sql_cmds > 3 | `sql_injection_with_long_urls_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be monitoring network communications to your web servers or ingesting your HTTP logs and populating the Web data model. You must also identify your web servers in the Enterprise Security assets table.", "known_false_positives": "It's possible that legitimate traffic will have long URLs or long user agent strings and that common SQL commands may be found within the URL. Please investigate as appropriate.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["SQL Injection"], "asset_type": "Database Server", "cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 13", "CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1190"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "ID.RA", "PR.PT", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Web.dest_category", "Web.url_length", "Web.http_user_agent_length", "Web.src", "Web.dest", "Web.url", "Web.http_user_agent"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploit Public-Facing Application"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Rocke", "APT39", "BlackTech", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Night Dragon", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "sql_injection_with_long_urls_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers", "id": "104658f4-afdc-499e-9719-17243f982681", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-23", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Web"], "description": "This search looks for specific GET or HEAD requests to web servers that are indicative of reconnaissance attempts to identify vulnerable JBoss servers. JexBoss is described as the exploit tool of choice for this malicious activity.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where (Web.http_method=\"GET\" OR Web.http_method=\"HEAD\") AND (Web.url=\"*/web-console/ServerInfo.jsp*\" OR Web.url=\"*web-console*\" OR Web.url=\"*jmx-console*\" OR Web.url = \"*invoker*\") by Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.src, Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data from the web server or network traffic that contains web specific information, and populating the Web data model.", "known_false_positives": "It's possible for legitimate HTTP requests to be made to URLs containing the suspicious paths.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["JBoss Vulnerability", "SamSam Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Web Server", "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1082"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Web.http_method", "Web.url", "Web.src", "Web.dest"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Information Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "Tropic Trooper", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Darkhotel", "MuddyWater", "APT18", "Honeybee", "APT19", "APT37", "APT32", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "APT3", "Sowbug", "Gamaredon Group", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "admin@338", "Turla", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Software Download To Network Device", "id": "cc590c66-f65f-48f2-986a-4797244762f8", "version": 1, "date": "2020-10-28", "author": "Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "Adversaries may abuse netbooting to load an unauthorized network device operating system from a Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) server. TFTP boot (netbooting) is commonly used by network administrators to load configuration-controlled network device images from a centralized management server. Netbooting is one option in the boot sequence and can be used to centralize, manage, and control device images.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where (All_Traffic.transport=udp AND All_Traffic.dest_port=69) OR (All_Traffic.transport=tcp AND All_Traffic.dest_port=21) OR (All_Traffic.transport=tcp AND All_Traffic.dest_port=22) AND All_Traffic.dest_category!=common_software_repo_destination AND All_Traffic.src_category=network OR All_Traffic.src_category=router OR All_Traffic.src_category=switch by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_software_download_to_network_device_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search looks for Network Traffic events to TFTP, FTP or SSH/SCP ports from network devices. Make sure to tag any network devices as network, router or switch in order for this detection to work. If the TFTP traffic doesn't traverse a firewall nor packet inspection, these events will not be logged. This is typically an issue if the TFTP server is on the same subnet as the network device. There is also a chance of the network device loading software using a DHCP assigned IP address (netboot) which is not in the Asset inventory.", "known_false_positives": "This search will also report any legitimate attempts of software downloads to network devices as well as outbound SSH sessions from network devices.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Router and Infrastructure Security"], "asset_type": "Infrastructure", "cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "detection_name": "Detect Software Download To Network Device", "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1542.005", "T1542"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.transport", "All_Traffic.dest_port", "All_Traffic.dest_category", "All_Traffic.src_category", "All_Traffic.src", "All_Traffic.dest"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Pre-OS Boot"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_software_download_to_network_device_filter"}]}, {"name": "SMB Traffic Spike", "id": "7f5fb3e1-4209-4914-90db-0ec21b936378", "version": 3, "date": "2020-07-22", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search looks for spikes in the number of Server Message Block (SMB) traffic connections.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb by _time span=1h, All_Traffic.src | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | eventstats max(_time) as maxtime | stats count as num_data_samples max(eval(if(_time >= relative_time(maxtime, \"-70m@m\"), count, null))) as count avg(eval(if(_time upperBound AND num_data_samples >=50, 1, 0) | where isOutlier=1 | table src count | `smb_traffic_spike_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic logs and populating the `Network_Traffic` data model.", "known_false_positives": "A file server may experience high-demand loads that could cause this analytic to trigger.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Ransomware", "DHS Report TA18-074A"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021.002", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.dest_port", "All_Traffic.app", "All_Traffic.src"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "Remote Services"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "APT32", "Orangeworm", "FIN8", "APT3", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-1314", "Turla", "Deep Panda", "Ke3chang", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "smb_traffic_spike_filter"}]}, {"name": "SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK", "id": "d25773ba-9ad8-48d1-858e-07ad0bbeb828", "version": 3, "date": "2020-07-22", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search uses the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) to identify spikes in the number of Server Message Block (SMB) connections.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as port from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb by _time span=1h, All_Traffic.src | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%A\") | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | apply smb_pdfmodel threshold=0.001 | rename \"IsOutlier(count)\" as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | sort -count | table _time src dest port count | `smb_traffic_spike___mltk_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. In addition, the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or greater must be installed on your search heads, along with any required dependencies. Finally, the support search \"Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK\" must be executed before this detection search, because it builds a machine-learning (ML) model over the historical data used by this search. It is important that this search is run in the same app context as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild the model with the latest data available in your environment.\\\nThis search produces a field (Number of events,count) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. This field contributes additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following field, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry): \\\n1. **Label:** Number of events, **Field:** count\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review is found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", "known_false_positives": "If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider reducing the value of the threshold in the search. You should also periodically re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data. Please update the `smb_traffic_spike_mltk_filter` macro to filter out false positive results", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Ransomware", "DHS Report TA18-074A"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021.002", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.dest_ip", "All_Traffic.dest_port", "All_Traffic.app", "All_Traffic.src"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "Remote Services"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "APT32", "Orangeworm", "FIN8", "APT3", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-1314", "Turla", "Deep Panda", "Ke3chang", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "smb_traffic_spike___mltk_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats", "id": "c3be767e-7959-44c5-8976-0e9c12a91ad2", "version": 1, "date": "2020-10-28", "author": "Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "By enabling IPv6 First Hop Security as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect various attacks such as packet forging in the Infrastructure.", "search": "`cisco_networks` facility=\"SISF\" mnemonic IN (\"IP_THEFT\",\"MAC_THEFT\",\"MAC_AND_IP_THEFT\",\"PAK_DROP\") | eval src_interface=src_int_prefix_long+src_int_suffix | eval dest_interface=dest_int_prefix_long+dest_int_suffix | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime values(src_mac) AS src_mac values(src_vlan) AS src_vlan values(mnemonic) AS mnemonic values(vendor_explanation) AS vendor_explanation values(src_ip) AS src_ip values(dest_ip) AS dest_ip values(dest_interface) AS dest_interface values(action) AS action count BY host src_interface | table host src_interface dest_interface src_mac src_ip dest_ip src_vlan mnemonic vendor_explanation action count | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with one or more First Hop Security measures such as RA Guard, DHCP Guard and/or device tracking. See References for more information. The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices.", "known_false_positives": "None currently known", "references": ["https://www.ciscolive.com/c/dam/r/ciscolive/emea/docs/2019/pdf/BRKSEC-3200.pdf", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-ra-guard.html", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-snooping.html", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-dad-proxy.html", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-nd-mcast-supp.html", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-dhcpv6-guard.html", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-src-guard.html", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ipv6-dest-guard.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Router and Infrastructure Security"], "asset_type": "Infrastructure", "cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "detection_name": "Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats", "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1557", "T1557.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "facility", "mnemonic", "src_int_prefix_long", "src_int_suffix", "dest_int_prefix_long", "dest_int_suffix", "src_mac", "src_vlan", "vendor_explanation", "action"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Hardware Additions", "Network Denial of Service", "Man-in-the-Middle"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Impact", "Credential Access", "Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["DarkVishnya", "no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "eventtype=cisco_ios", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cisco_networks"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats_filter"}]}, {"name": "Remote Desktop Network Traffic", "id": "272b8407-842d-4b3d-bead-a704584003d3", "version": 3, "date": "2020-07-07", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search looks for network traffic on TCP/3389, the default port used by remote desktop. While remote desktop traffic is not uncommon on a network, it is usually associated with known hosts. This search will ignore common RDP sources and common RDP destinations so you can focus on the uncommon uses of remote desktop on your network.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=3389 AND All_Traffic.dest_category!=common_rdp_destination AND All_Traffic.src_category!=common_rdp_source by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_desktop_network_traffic_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to identify systems that commonly originate remote desktop traffic and that commonly receive remote desktop traffic. You can use the included support search \"Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic\" to identify systems that originate the traffic and the search \"Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic\" to identify systems that receive a lot of remote desktop traffic. After identifying these systems, you will need to add the \"common_rdp_source\" or \"common_rdp_destination\" category to that system depending on the usage, using the Enterprise Security Assets and Identities framework. This can be done by adding an entry in the assets.csv file located in SA-IdentityManagement/lookups.", "known_false_positives": "Remote Desktop may be used legitimately by users on the network.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 9", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021.001", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.dest_port", "All_Traffic.dest_category", "All_Traffic.src_category", "All_Traffic.src", "All_Traffic.dest", "All_Traffic.dest_port"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote Desktop Protocol", "Remote Services"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "TEMP.Veles", "Leviathan", "APT39", "Stolen Pencil", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "APT3", "OilRig", "menuPass", "FIN10", "Patchwork", "FIN6", "Lazarus Group", "APT1", "Axiom", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "remote_desktop_network_traffic_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream", "id": "babd8d10-d073-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003", "version": 1, "date": "2020-07-28", "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects SIGRed via Splunk Stream.", "search": "`stream_dns` | spath \"query_type{}\" | search \"query_type{}\" IN (SIG,KEY) | spath protocol_stack | search protocol_stack=\"ip:tcp:dns\" | append [search `stream_tcp` bytes_out>65000] | `detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream_filter` | stats count by flow_id | where count>1 | fields - count", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Splunk Stream DNS and Splunk Stream TCP. We are detecting SIG and KEY records via stream:dns and TCP payload over 65KB in size via stream:tcp. Replace the macro definitions ('stream:dns' and 'stream:tcp') with configurations for your Splunk environment.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "cve": ["CVE-2020-1350"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1203"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploitation for Client Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "MuddyWater", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT41", "admin@338", "Threat Group-3390", "APT12", "The White Company", "APT33", "APT32", "APT28", "Tropic Trooper", "Lazarus Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "APT37", "Patchwork", "Leviathan", "Elderwood", "TA459", "APT29"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=stream:tcp", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "stream_tcp"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=stream:dns", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "stream_dns"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream_filter"}]}, {"name": "DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK", "id": "85fbcfe8-9718-4911-adf6-7000d077a3a9", "version": 2, "date": "2020-01-22", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Network_Resolution"], "description": "This search allows you to identify DNS requests that are unusually large for the record type being requested in your environment.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as start_time max(_time) as end_time values(DNS.src) as src values(DNS.dest) as dest from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query DNS.record_type | search DNS.record_type=* | `drop_dm_object_name(DNS)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | eval query_length = len(query) | apply dns_query_pdfmodel threshold=0.01 | rename \"IsOutlier(query_length)\" as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | sort -query_length | table start_time end_time query record_type count src dest query_length | `dns_query_length_outliers___mltk_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. In addition, the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or greater must be installed on your search heads, along with any required dependencies. Finally, the support search \"Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK\" must be executed before this detection search, because it builds a machine-learning (ML) model over the historical data used by this search. It is important that this search is run in the same app context as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild the model with the latest data available in your environment.\\\nThis search produces fields (`query`,`query_length`,`count`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** DNS Query, **Field:** query\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** DNS Query Length, **Field:** query_length\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** Number of events, **Field:** count\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", "known_false_positives": "If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider reducing the value for threshold in the search. You should also periodically re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Hidden Cobra Malware", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Command and Control"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1071.004", "T1071"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "DNS.src", "DNS.dest", "DNS.query", "DNS.record_type"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["DNS", "Application Layer Protocol"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control", "Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT39", "Tropic Trooper", "OilRig", "Ke3chang", "Cobalt Group", "APT18", "APT41", "FIN7", "Rocke", "Magic Hound", "Dragonfly 2.0"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "dns_query_length_outliers___mltk_filter"}]}, {"name": "Excessive DNS Failures", "id": "104658f4-afdc-499e-9719-17243f9826f1", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Network_Resolution"], "description": "This search identifies DNS query failures by counting the number of DNS responses that do not indicate success, and trigger on more than 50 occurrences.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(\"DNS.query\") as queries from datamodel=Network_Resolution where nodename=DNS \"DNS.reply_code\"!=\"No Error\" \"DNS.reply_code\"!=\"NoError\" DNS.reply_code!=\"unknown\" NOT \"DNS.query\"=\"*.arpa\" \"DNS.query\"=\"*.*\" by \"DNS.src\",\"DNS.query\"| `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")`| lookup cim_corporate_web_domain_lookup domain as query OUTPUT domain| where isnull(domain)| lookup update=true alexa_lookup_by_str domain as query OUTPUT rank| where isnull(rank)| stats sum(count) as count mode(queries) as queries by src| `get_asset(src)`| where count>50 | `excessive_dns_failures_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible legitimate traffic can trigger this rule. Please investigate as appropriate. The threshold for generating an event can also be customized to better suit your environment.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Command and Control"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1071.004", "T1071"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "DNS.query", "DNS.reply_code", "DNS.src"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["DNS", "Application Layer Protocol"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control", "Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT39", "Tropic Trooper", "OilRig", "Ke3chang", "Cobalt Group", "APT18", "APT41", "FIN7", "Rocke", "Magic Hound", "Dragonfly 2.0"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "excessive_dns_failures_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Outbound SMB Traffic", "id": "7f5fb3e1-4209-414-90db-0ec21b936378", "version": 3, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Stuart Hopkins from Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search looks for outbound SMB connections made by hosts within your network to the Internet. SMB traffic is used for Windows file-sharing activity. One of the techniques often used by attackers involves retrieving the credential hash using an SMB request made to a compromised server controlled by the threat actor.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as start_time latest(_time) as end_time values(All_Traffic.action) as action values(All_Traffic.app) as app values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as dest_port values(sourcetype) as sourcetype count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where ((All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=\"smb\") AND NOT (All_Traffic.action=\"blocked\" OR All_Traffic.dest_category=\"internal\" OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=192.168.0.0/16 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=100.64.0.0/10)) by All_Traffic.src_ip | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `security_content_ctime(start_time)` | `security_content_ctime(end_time)` | `detect_outbound_smb_traffic_filter`", "how_to_implement": "In order to run this search effectively, we highly recommend that you leverage the Assets and Identity framework. It is important that you have good understanding of how your network segments are designed, and be able to distinguish internal from external address space. Add a category named `internal` to the CIDRs that host the companys assets in `assets_by_cidr.csv` lookup file, which is located in `$SPLUNK_HOME/etc/apps/SA-IdentityManagement/lookups/`. More information on updating this lookup can be found here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.0.0/Admin/Addassetandidentitydata. This search also requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model", "known_false_positives": "It is likely that the outbound Server Message Block (SMB) traffic is legitimate, if the company's internal networks are not well-defined in the Assets and Identity Framework. Categorize the internal CIDR blocks as `internal` in the lookup file to avoid creating notable events for traffic destined to those CIDR blocks. Any other network connection that is going out to the Internet should be investigated and blocked. Best practices suggest preventing external communications of all SMB versions and related protocols at the network boundary.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Hidden Cobra Malware", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "NOBELIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1071.002", "T1071"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.action", "All_Traffic.app", "All_Traffic.dest_ip", "All_Traffic.dest_port", "sourcetype", "All_Traffic.dest_category", "All_Traffic.src_ip"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["File Transfer Protocols", "Application Layer Protocol"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control", "Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "SilverTerrier", "Machete", "Honeybee", "Rocke", "Magic Hound", "Dragonfly 2.0"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_outbound_smb_traffic_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect ARP Poisoning", "id": "b44bebd6-bd39-467b-9321-73971bcd7aac", "version": 1, "date": "2020-08-11", "author": "Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "By enabling Dynamic ARP Inspection as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect ARP Poisoning attacks in the Infrastructure.", "search": "`cisco_networks` facility=\"PM\" mnemonic=\"ERR_DISABLE\" disable_cause=\"arp-inspection\" | eval src_interface=src_int_prefix_long+src_int_suffix | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime count BY host src_interface | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `detect_arp_poisoning_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with DHCP Snooping (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960x/software/15-0_2_EX/security/configuration_guide/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg_chapter_01101.html) and Dynamic ARP Inspection (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960x/software/15-2_2_e/security/configuration_guide/b_sec_1522e_2960x_cg/b_sec_1522e_2960x_cg_chapter_01111.html) and log with a severity level of minimum \"5 - notification\". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices.", "known_false_positives": "This search might be prone to high false positives if DHCP Snooping or ARP inspection has been incorrectly configured, or if a device normally sends many ARP packets (unlikely).", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Router and Infrastructure Security"], "asset_type": "Infrastructure", "cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "detection_name": "Detect ARP Poisoning", "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1557", "T1557.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "facility", "mnemonic", "disable_cause", "src_int_prefix_long", "src_int_suffix", "host", "src_interface"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Hardware Additions", "Network Denial of Service", "Man-in-the-Middle"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Impact", "Credential Access", "Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["DarkVishnya", "no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "eventtype=cisco_ios", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cisco_networks"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_arp_poisoning_filter"}]}, {"name": "Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server", "id": "7f5fb3e1-4209-4914-90db-0ec21b556368", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search looks for an increase of data transfers from your email server to your clients. This could be indicative of a malicious actor collecting data using your email server.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` sum(All_Traffic.bytes_in) as bytes_in from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_category=email_server by All_Traffic.src_ip _time span=1d | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | eventstats avg(bytes_in) as avg_bytes_in stdev(bytes_in) as stdev_bytes_in | eventstats count as num_data_samples avg(eval(if(_time < relative_time(now(), \"@d\"), bytes_in, null))) as per_source_avg_bytes_in stdev(eval(if(_time < relative_time(now(), \"@d\"), bytes_in, null))) as per_source_stdev_bytes_in by src_ip | eval minimum_data_samples = 4, deviation_threshold = 3 | where num_data_samples >= minimum_data_samples AND bytes_in > (avg_bytes_in + (deviation_threshold * stdev_bytes_in)) AND bytes_in > (per_source_avg_bytes_in + (deviation_threshold * per_source_stdev_bytes_in)) AND _time >= relative_time(now(), \"@d\") | eval num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average = round(abs(bytes_in - avg_bytes_in) / stdev_bytes_in, 2), num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average = round(abs(bytes_in - per_source_avg_bytes_in) / per_source_stdev_bytes_in, 2) | table src_ip, _time, bytes_in, avg_bytes_in, per_source_avg_bytes_in, num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average, num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average | `hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model. Your email servers must be categorized as \"email_server\" for the search to work, as well. You may need to adjust the deviation_threshold and minimum_data_samples values based on the network traffic in your environment. The \"deviation_threshold\" field is a multiplying factor to control how much variation you're willing to tolerate. The \"minimum_data_samples\" field is the minimum number of connections of data samples required for the statistic to be valid.", "known_false_positives": "The false-positive rate will vary based on how you set the deviation_threshold and data_samples values. Our recommendation is to adjust these values based on your network traffic to and from your email servers.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Collection and Staging"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1114.002", "T1114"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.bytes_in", "All_Traffic.dest_category", "All_Traffic.src_ip"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote Email Collection", "Email Collection"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "FIN4", "APT28", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Ke3chang", "Leafminer", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address", "id": "dcfd6b40-42f9-469d-a433-2e53f7489ff4", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-13", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Sessions"], "description": "By populating the organization's assets within the assets_by_str.csv, we will be able to detect unauthorized devices that are trying to connect with the organization's network by inspecting DHCP request packets, which are issued by devices when they attempt to obtain an IP address from the DHCP server. The MAC address associated with the source of the DHCP request is checked against the list of known devices, and reports on those that are not found.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Sessions where nodename=All_Sessions.DHCP All_Sessions.signature=DHCPREQUEST by All_Sessions.src_ip All_Sessions.dest_mac | dedup All_Sessions.dest_mac| `drop_dm_object_name(\"Network_Sessions\")`|`drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Sessions\")` | search NOT [| inputlookup asset_lookup_by_str |rename mac as dest_mac | fields + dest_mac] | `detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search uses the Network_Sessions data model shipped with Enterprise Security. It leverages the Assets and Identity framework to populate the assets_by_str.csv file located in SA-IdentityManagement, which will contain a list of known authorized organizational assets including their MAC addresses. Ensure that all inventoried systems have their MAC address populated.", "known_false_positives": "This search might be prone to high false positives. Please consider this when conducting analysis or investigations. Authorized devices may be detected as unauthorized. If this is the case, verify the MAC address of the system responsible for the false positive and add it to the Assets and Identity framework with the proper information.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Asset Tracking"], "asset_type": "Infrastructure", "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Sessions.signature", "All_Sessions.src_ip", "All_Sessions.dest_mac"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek", "id": "c5c622e4-d073-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003", "version": 1, "date": "2020-07-28", "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Resolution"], "description": "This search detects SIGRed via Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.query_type IN (SIG,KEY) by DNS.flow_id | rename DNS.flow_id as flow_id | append [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.bytes_in>65000 by All_Traffic.flow_id | rename All_Traffic.flow_id as flow_id] | `detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek_filter` | stats count by flow_id | where count>1 | fields - count ", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format. We are detecting SIG and KEY records via bro:dns:json and TCP payload over 65KB in size via bro:conn:json. The Network Resolution and Network Traffic datamodels are in use for this search.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "cve": ["CVE-2020-1350"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1203"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "DNS.query_type", "DNS.flow_id", "All_Traffic.bytes_in", "All_Traffic.flow_id"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploitation for Client Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "MuddyWater", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT41", "admin@338", "Threat Group-3390", "APT12", "The White Company", "APT33", "APT32", "APT28", "Tropic Trooper", "Lazarus Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "APT37", "Patchwork", "Leviathan", "Elderwood", "TA459", "APT29"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek_filter"}]}, {"name": "Unusually Long Content-Type Length", "id": "57a0a2bf-353f-40c1-84dc-29293f3c35b7", "version": 1, "date": "2017-10-13", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for unusually long strings in the Content-Type http header that the client sends the server.", "search": "`stream_http` | eval cs_content_type_length = len(cs_content_type) | where cs_content_type_length > 100 | table endtime src_ip dest_ip cs_content_type_length cs_content_type url | `unusually_long_content_type_length_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This particular search leverages data extracted from Stream:HTTP. You must configure the http stream using the Splunk Stream App on your Splunk Stream deployment server to extract the cs_content_type field.", "known_false_positives": "Very few legitimate Content-Type fields will have a length greater than 100 characters.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Apache Struts Vulnerability"], "asset_type": "Web Server", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 18", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["ID.RA", "RS.MI", "PR.PT", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "PR.MA", "DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "cs_content_type", "endtime", "src_ip", "dest_ip", "url"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=stream:http", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "stream_http"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "unusually_long_content_type_length_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Traffic Mirroring", "id": "42b3b753-5925-49c5-9742-36fa40a73990", "version": 1, "date": "2020-10-28", "author": "Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to automate data exfiltration over compromised network infrastructure. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some network devices and used for network analysis and may be configured to duplicate traffic and forward to one or more destinations for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring device.", "search": "`cisco_networks` (facility=\"MIRROR\" mnemonic=\"ETH_SPAN_SESSION_UP\") OR (facility=\"SPAN\" mnemonic=\"SESSION_UP\") OR (facility=\"SPAN\" mnemonic=\"PKTCAP_START\") OR (mnemonic=\"CFGLOG_LOGGEDCMD\" command=\"monitor session*\") | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime count BY host facility mnemonic | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_traffic_mirroring_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must log with a severity level of minimum \"5 - notification\". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices and that the devices have been configured according to the documentation of the Cisco Networks Add-on. Also note that an attacker may disable logging from the device prior to enabling traffic mirroring.", "known_false_positives": "This search will return false positives for any legitimate traffic captures by network administrators.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Router and Infrastructure Security"], "asset_type": "Infrastructure", "cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "detection_name": "Detect Traffic Mirroring", "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1200", "T1020", "T1498", "T1020.001"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "facility", "mnemonic", "host"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Hardware Additions", "Automated Exfiltration", "Network Denial of Service"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Exfiltration", "Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["DarkVishnya", "Tropic Trooper", "Frankenstein", "Honeybee", "no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "eventtype=cisco_ios", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cisco_networks"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_traffic_mirroring_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Zerologon via Zeek", "id": "bf7a06ec-f703-11ea-adc1-0242ac120002", "version": 1, "date": "2020-09-15", "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects attempts to run exploits for the Zerologon CVE-2020-1472 vulnerability via Zeek RPC", "search": "`zeek_rpc` operation IN (NetrServerPasswordSet2,NetrServerReqChallenge,NetrServerAuthenticate3) | bin span=5m _time | stats values(operation) dc(operation) as opscount count(eval(operation==\"NetrServerReqChallenge\")) as challenge count(eval(operation==\"NetrServerAuthenticate3\")) as authcount count(eval(operation==\"NetrServerPasswordSet2\")) as passcount count as totalcount by _time,src_ip,dest_ip | search opscount=3 authcount>4 passcount>0 | search `detect_zerologon_via_zeek_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Zeek DCE-RPC data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format. We are detecting when all three RPC operations (NetrServerReqChallenge, NetrServerAuthenticate3, NetrServerPasswordSet2) are splunk_security_essentials_app via bro:rpc:json. These three operations are then correlated on the Zeek UID field.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.secura.com/blog/zero-logon", "https://github.com/SecuraBV/CVE-2020-1472", "https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-1472"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Detect Zerologon Attack"], "asset_type": "Network", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 11"], "cve": ["CVE-2020-1472"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "operation"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploit Public-Facing Application"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Rocke", "APT39", "BlackTech", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Night Dragon", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "index=zeek sourcetype=\"zeek:rpc:json\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "zeek_rpc"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_zerologon_via_zeek_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Port Security Violation", "id": "2de3d5b8-a4fa-45c5-8540-6d071c194d24", "version": 1, "date": "2020-10-28", "author": "Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "By enabling Port Security on a Cisco switch you can restrict input to an interface by limiting and identifying MAC addresses of the workstations that are allowed to access the port. When you assign secure MAC addresses to a secure port, the port does not forward packets with source addresses outside the group of defined addresses. If you limit the number of secure MAC addresses to one and assign a single secure MAC address, the workstation attached to that port is assured the full bandwidth of the port. If a port is configured as a secure port and the maximum number of secure MAC addresses is reached, when the MAC address of a workstation attempting to access the port is different from any of the identified secure MAC addresses, a security violation occurs.", "search": "`cisco_networks` (facility=\"PM\" mnemonic=\"ERR_DISABLE\" disable_cause=\"psecure-violation\") OR (facility=\"PORT_SECURITY\" mnemonic=\"PSECURE_VIOLATION\" OR mnemonic=\"PSECURE_VIOLATION_VLAN\") | eval src_interface=src_int_prefix_long+src_int_suffix | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime values(disable_cause) AS disable_cause values(src_mac) AS src_mac values(src_vlan) AS src_vlan values(action) AS action count by host src_interface | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_port_security_violation_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with Port Security and Error Disable for this to work (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst4500/12-2/25ew/configuration/guide/conf/port_sec.html) and log with a severity level of minimum \"5 - notification\". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices.", "known_false_positives": "This search might be prone to high false positives if you have malfunctioning devices connected to your ethernet ports or if end users periodically connect physical devices to the network.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Router and Infrastructure Security"], "asset_type": "Infrastructure", "cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "detection_name": "Detect Port Security Violation", "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Exploitation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1557", "T1557.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "facility", "mnemonic", "disable_cause", "src_int_prefix_long", "src_int_suffix", "src_mac", "src_vlan", "action", "host", "src_interface"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Hardware Additions", "Network Denial of Service", "Man-in-the-Middle"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Impact", "Credential Access", "Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["DarkVishnya", "no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "eventtype=cisco_ios", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cisco_networks"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_port_security_violation_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration", "id": "82d06410-134c-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002", "version": 1, "date": "2020-10-21", "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for commands that the SNICat tool uses in the TLS SNI field.", "search": "`zeek_ssl` | rex field=server_name \"(?(LIST|LS|SIZE|LD|CB|CD|EX|ALIVE|EXIT|WHERE|finito)-[A-Za-z0-9]{16}\\.)\" | stats count by src_ip dest_ip server_name snicat | where count>0 | table src_ip dest_ip server_name snicat | `detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Zeek SSL data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format. We are detecting when any of the predefined SNICat commands are found within the server_name (SNI) field. These commands are LIST, LS, SIZE, LD, CB, EX, ALIVE, EXIT, WHERE, and finito. You can go further once this has been detected, and run other searches to decode the SNI data to prove or disprove if any data exfiltration has taken place.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown", "references": ["https://www.mnemonic.no/blog/introducing-snicat/", "https://github.com/mnemonic-no/SNIcat", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Data Exfiltration"], "asset_type": "Network", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1041"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "server_name", "src_ip", "dest_ip"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exfiltration Over C2 Channel"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "MuddyWater", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "Kimsuky", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "APT3", "Gamaredon Group", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "index=zeek sourcetype=\"zeek:ssl:json\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "zeek_ssl"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration_filter"}]}, {"name": "Protocol or Port Mismatch", "id": "54dc1265-2f74-4b6d-b30d-49eb506a31b3", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search looks for network traffic on common ports where a higher layer protocol does not match the port that is being used. For example, this search should identify cases where protocols other than HTTP are running on TCP port 80. This can be used by attackers to circumvent firewall restrictions, or as an attempt to hide malicious communications over ports and protocols that are typically allowed and not well inspected.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where (All_Traffic.app=dns NOT All_Traffic.dest_port=53) OR ((All_Traffic.app=web-browsing OR All_Traffic.app=http) NOT (All_Traffic.dest_port=80 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=8080 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=8000)) OR (All_Traffic.app=ssl NOT (All_Traffic.dest_port=443 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=8443)) OR (All_Traffic.app=smtp NOT All_Traffic.dest_port=25) by All_Traffic.src_ip, All_Traffic.dest_ip, All_Traffic.app, All_Traffic.dest_port |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `protocol_or_port_mismatch_filter`", "how_to_implement": "Running this search properly requires a technology that can inspect network traffic and identify common protocols. Technologies such as Bro and Palo Alto Networks firewalls are two examples that will identify protocols via inspection, and not just assume a specific protocol based on the transport protocol and ports.", "known_false_positives": "None identified", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Command and Control"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1048.003", "T1048"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.app", "All_Traffic.dest_port", "All_Traffic.src_ip", "All_Traffic.dest_ip"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration", "Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "Thrip", "FIN8", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "protocol_or_port_mismatch_filter"}]}, {"name": "TOR Traffic", "id": "ea688274-9c06-4473-b951-e4cb7a5d7a45", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-22", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search looks for network traffic identified as The Onion Router (TOR), a benign anonymity network which can be abused for a variety of nefarious purposes.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.app=tor AND All_Traffic.action=allowed by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip All_Traffic.dest_port All_Traffic.action | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `tor_traffic_filter`", "how_to_implement": "In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from firewalls or other network control devices that mediate the traffic allowed into an environment. This is necessary so that the search can identify an 'action' taken on the traffic of interest. The search requires the Network_Traffic data model be populated.", "known_false_positives": "None at this time", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Ransomware", "Command and Control", "NOBELIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1071", "T1071.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.app", "All_Traffic.action", "All_Traffic.src_ip", "All_Traffic.dest_ip", "All_Traffic.dest_port"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Application Layer Protocol", "Web Protocols"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control", "Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Rocke", "Magic Hound", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "Rocke", "APT39", "Tropic Trooper", "MuddyWater", "Wizard Spider", "Inception", "APT41", "SilverTerrier", "Machete", "APT28", "WIRTE", "APT33", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "APT18", "APT38", "Cobalt Group", "APT19", "Threat Group-3390", "Rancor", "Orangeworm", "APT37", "Ke3chang", "Dark Caracal", "Turla", "Lazarus Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "OilRig", "Magic Hound", "Gamaredon Group", "Stealth Falcon"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "tor_traffic_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Rogue DHCP Server", "id": "6e1ada88-7a0d-4ac1-92c6-03d354686079", "version": 1, "date": "2020-08-11", "author": "Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "By enabling DHCP Snooping as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect unauthorized DHCP servers handing out DHCP leases to devices on the network (Man in the Middle attack).", "search": "`cisco_networks` facility=\"DHCP_SNOOPING\" mnemonic=\"DHCP_SNOOPING_UNTRUSTED_PORT\" | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime count values(message_type) AS message_type values(src_mac) AS src_mac BY host | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `detect_rogue_dhcp_server_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with DHCP Snooping enabled (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960x/software/15-0_2_EX/security/configuration_guide/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg_chapter_01101.html) and log with a severity level of minimum \"5 - notification\". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices.", "known_false_positives": "This search might be prone to high false positives if DHCP Snooping has been incorrectly configured or in the unlikely event that the DHCP server has been moved to another network interface.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Router and Infrastructure Security"], "asset_type": "Infrastructure", "cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "detection_name": "Detect Rogue DHCP Server", "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1557"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "facility", "mnemonic", "message_type", "src_mac", "host"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Hardware Additions", "Network Denial of Service", "Man-in-the-Middle"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Impact", "Credential Access", "Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["DarkVishnya", "no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "eventtype=cisco_ios", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cisco_networks"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_rogue_dhcp_server_filter"}]}, {"name": "Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed", "id": "ce5a0962-849f-4720-a678-753fe6674479", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search looks for network traffic defined by port and transport layer protocol in the Enterprise Security lookup table \"lookup_interesting_ports\", that is marked as prohibited, and has an associated 'allow' action in the Network_Traffic data model. This could be indicative of a misconfigured network device.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.action = allowed by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip All_Traffic.dest_port All_Traffic.action | lookup update=true interesting_ports_lookup dest_port as All_Traffic.dest_port OUTPUT app is_prohibited note transport | search is_prohibited=true | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `prohibited_network_traffic_allowed_filter`", "how_to_implement": "In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from firewalls or other network control devices that mediate the traffic allowed into an environment. This is necessary so that the search can identify an 'action' taken on the traffic of interest. The search requires the Network_Traffic data model be populated.", "known_false_positives": "None identified", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Ransomware", "Command and Control"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1048"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.action", "All_Traffic.src_ip", "All_Traffic.dest_ip", "All_Traffic.dest_port"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "prohibited_network_traffic_allowed_filter"}]}, {"name": "Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries", "id": "8fa891f7-a533-4b3c-af85-5aa2e7c1f1eb", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-20", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Network_Resolution"], "description": "The search is used to identify attempts to use your DNS Infrastructure for DDoS purposes via a DNS amplification attack leveraging ANY queries.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where nodename=DNS \"DNS.message_type\"=\"QUERY\" \"DNS.record_type\"=\"ANY\" by \"DNS.dest\" | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | where count>200 | `large_volume_of_dns_any_queries_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate ANY requests may trigger this search, however it is unusual to see a large volume of them under typical circumstances. You may modify the threshold in the search to better suit your environment.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["DNS Amplification Attacks"], "asset_type": "DNS Servers", "cis20": ["CIS 11", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1498", "T1498.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "PR.IP"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "DNS.message_type", "DNS.record_type", "DNS.dest"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Network Denial of Service", "Reflection Amplification"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact", "Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "large_volume_of_dns_any_queries_filter"}]}, {"name": "Protocols passing authentication in cleartext", "id": "6923cd64-17a0-453c-b945-81ac2d8c6db9", "version": 3, "date": "2021-08-19", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "The following analytic identifies cleartext protocols at risk of leaking sensitive information. Currently, this consists of legacy protocols such as telnet (port 23), POP3 (port 110), IMAP (port 143), and non-anonymous FTP (port 21) sessions. While some of these protocols may be used over SSL, they typically are found on different assigned ports in those instances.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.action!=blocked AND All_Traffic.transport=\"tcp\" AND (All_Traffic.dest_port=\"23\" OR All_Traffic.dest_port=\"143\" OR All_Traffic.dest_port=\"110\" OR (All_Traffic.dest_port=\"21\" AND All_Traffic.user != \"anonymous\")) by All_Traffic.user All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic, and populating the Network_Traffic data model. For more accurate result it's better to limit destination to organization private and public IP range, like All_Traffic.dest IN(192.168.0.0/16,172.16.0.0/12,10.0.0.0/8, x.x.x.x/22)", "known_false_positives": "Some networks may use kerberized FTP or telnet servers, however, this is rare.", "references": ["https://www.rackaid.com/blog/secure-your-email-and-file-transfers/", "https://www.infosecmatter.com/capture-passwords-using-wireshark/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Use of Cleartext Protocols"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.transport", "All_Traffic.dest_port", "All_Traffic.user", "All_Traffic.src", "All_Traffic.dest", "All_Traffic.action"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets", "id": "e9c102de-4d43-42a7-b1c8-8062ea297419", "version": 2, "date": "2018-06-01", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search looks for outbound ICMP packets with a packet size larger than 1,000 bytes. Various threat actors have been known to use ICMP as a command and control channel for their attack infrastructure. Large ICMP packets from an endpoint to a remote host may be indicative of this activity.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Traffic.action) values(All_Traffic.bytes) from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.action !=blocked All_Traffic.dest_category !=internal (All_Traffic.protocol=icmp OR All_Traffic.transport=icmp) All_Traffic.bytes > 1000 by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | search ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets_filter`", "how_to_implement": "In order to run this search effectively, we highly recommend that you leverage the Assets and Identity framework. It is important that you have a good understanding of how your network segments are designed and that you are able to distinguish internal from external address space. Add a category named `internal` to the CIDRs that host the company's assets in the `assets_by_cidr.csv` lookup file, which is located in `$SPLUNK_HOME/etc/apps/SA-IdentityManagement/lookups/`. More information on updating this lookup can be found here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.0.0/Admin/Addassetandidentitydata. This search also requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model", "known_false_positives": "ICMP packets are used in a variety of ways to help troubleshoot networking issues and ensure the proper flow of traffic. As such, it is possible that a large ICMP packet could be perfectly legitimate. If large ICMP packets are associated with command and control traffic, there will typically be a large number of these packets observed over time. If the search is providing a large number of false positives, you can modify the macro `detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets_filter` to adjust the byte threshold or add specific IP addresses to an allow list.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Command and Control"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1095"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.action", "All_Traffic.bytes", "All_Traffic.dest_category", "All_Traffic.protocol", "All_Traffic.transport", "All_Traffic.src_ip", "All_Traffic.dest_ip"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Non-Application Layer Protocol"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "PLATINUM", "APT3"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets_filter"}]}, {"name": "Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce", "id": "a98727cc-286b-4ff2-b898-41df64695923", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search looks for RDP application network traffic and filters any source/destination pair generating more than twice the standard deviation of the average traffic.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.app=rdp by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | eventstats stdev(count) AS stdev avg(count) AS avg p50(count) AS p50 | where count>(avg + stdev*2) | rename All_Traffic.src AS src All_Traffic.dest AS dest | table firstTime lastTime src dest count avg p50 stdev | `remote_desktop_network_bruteforce_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must ensure that your network traffic data is populating the Network_Traffic data model.", "known_false_positives": "RDP gateways may have unusually high amounts of traffic from all other hosts' RDP applications in the network.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 9", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021.001", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.app", "All_Traffic.src", "All_Traffic.dest", "All_Traffic.dest_port"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote Desktop Protocol", "Remote Services"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "TEMP.Veles", "Leviathan", "APT39", "Stolen Pencil", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "APT3", "OilRig", "menuPass", "FIN10", "Patchwork", "FIN6", "Lazarus Group", "APT1", "Axiom", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "remote_desktop_network_bruteforce_filter"}]}, {"name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "id": "ef629fc9-1583-4590-b62a-f2247fbf7bbf", "version": 1, "date": "2020-08-21", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search finds for the number successfully destroyed cloud instances for every 4 hour block. This is split up between weekdays and the weekend. It then applies the probability densitiy model previously created and alerts on any outliers.", "search": "| tstats count as instances_destroyed values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=deleted AND All_Changes.status=success AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%w\") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | join HourOfDay isWeekend [summary cloud_excessive_instances_destroyed_v1] | where cardinality >=16 | apply cloud_excessive_instances_destroyed_v1 threshold=0.005 | rename \"IsOutlier(instances_destroyed)\" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1 | eval expected_upper_threshold = mvindex(split(mvindex(BoundaryRanges, -1), \":\"), 0) | eval distance_from_threshold = instances_destroyed - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, instances_destroyed, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold, object_id | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_destroyed_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed` to create the probability density function.", "known_false_positives": "Many service accounts configured within a cloud infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities"], "asset_type": "Cloud Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.object_id", "All_Changes.action", "All_Changes.status", "All_Changes.object_category", "All_Changes.user"], "risk_object": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 10, "security_domain": "Cloud", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Cloud Accounts", "Valid Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_destroyed_filter"}]}, {"name": "High Number of Login Failures from a single source", "id": "7f398cfb-918d-41f4-8db8-2e2474e02222", "version": 1, "date": "2020-12-16", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search will detect more than 5 login failures in Office365 Azure Active Directory from a single source IP address. Please adjust the threshold value of 5 as suited for your environment.", "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=UserLoginFailed record_type=AzureActiveDirectoryStsLogon app=AzureActiveDirectory | stats count dc(user) as accounts_locked values(user) as user values(LogonError) as LogonError values(authentication_method) as authentication_method values(signature) as signature values(UserAgent) as UserAgent by src_ip record_type Operation app | search accounts_locked >= 5| `high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source_filter`", "how_to_implement": "", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections"], "asset_type": "Office 365", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1110.001", "T1110"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Operation", "record_type", "app", "user", "LogonError", "authentication_method", "signature", "UserAgent", "src_ip", "record_type"], "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Password Guessing", "Brute Force"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "DarkVishnya", "APT39", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Turla"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "o365_management_activity"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User", "id": "2a9b80d3-6220-4345-b5ad-290bf5d0d222", "version": 3, "date": "2021-01-26", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub alerts for an AWS IAM User in 4 hours intervals.", "search": "`aws_securityhub_finding` \"findings{}.Resources{}.Type\"= AwsIamUser | rename findings{}.Resources{}.Id as user | bucket span=4h _time | stats count AS alerts by _time user | eventstats avg(alerts) as total_launched_avg, stdev(alerts) as total_launched_stdev | eval threshold_value = 2 | eval isOutlier=if(alerts > total_launched_avg+(total_launched_stdev * threshold_value), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | table _time user alerts |`detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Security Hub inputs. The threshold_value should be tuned to your environment and schedule these searches according to the bucket span interval.", "known_false_positives": "None", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS Security Hub Alerts"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "findings{}.Resources{}.Type", "indings{}.Resources{}.Id", "user"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:securityhub:finding\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "aws_securityhub_finding"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP", "id": "ccc3246a-daa1-11ea-87d0-0242ac130022", "version": 1, "date": "2020-08-10", "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks at GCP Storage bucket-access logs and detects new or previously unseen remote IP addresses that have successfully accessed a GCP Storage bucket.", "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` | multikv | rename sc_status_ as status | rename cs_object_ as bucket_name | rename c_ip_ as remote_ip | rename cs_uri_ as request_uri | rename cs_method_ as operation | search status=\"\\\"200\\\"\" | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by bucket_name remote_ip operation request_uri | table firstTime, lastTime, bucket_name, remote_ip, operation, request_uri | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by bucket_name remote_ip operation request_uri | outputlookup previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip.csv | eval newIP=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(),\"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newIP=1 | eval first_time=strftime(firstTime,\"%m/%d/%y %H:%M:%S\") | eval last_time=strftime(lastTime,\"%m/%d/%y %H:%M:%S\") | table first_time last_time bucket_name remote_ip operation request_uri | `detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search relies on the Splunk Add-on for Google Cloud Platform, setting up a Cloud Pub/Sub input, along with the relevant GCP PubSub topics and logging sink to capture GCP Storage Bucket events (https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/routing/overview). In order to capture public GCP Storage Bucket access logs, you must also enable storage bucket logging to your PubSub Topic as per https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/access-logs. These logs are deposited into the nominated Storage Bucket on an hourly basis and typically show up by 15 minutes past the hour. It is recommended to configure any saved searches or correlation searches in Enterprise Security to run on an hourly basis at 30 minutes past the hour (cron definition of 30 * * * *). A lookup table (previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip.csv) stores the previously seen access requests, and is used by this search to determine any newly seen IP addresses accessing the Storage Buckets.", "known_false_positives": "GCP Storage buckets can be accessed from any IP (if the ACLs are open to allow it), as long as it can make a successful connection. This will be a false postive, since the search is looking for a new IP within the past two hours.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious GCP Storage Activities"], "asset_type": "GCP Storage Bucket", "cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "sc_status_", "cs_object_", "c_ip_", "cs_uri_", "cs_method_"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Data from Cloud Storage Object"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip_filter"}]}, {"name": "Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection", "id": "dbfca1dd-b8e5-4ba4-be0e-e565e5d62002", "version": 1, "date": "2020-04-15", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides detection information on unauthenticated requests against Kubernetes' Pods API", "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` \"user.username\"=\"system:anonymous\" verb=list objectRef.resource=pods requestURI=\"/api/v1/pods\" | rename source as cluster_name sourceIPs{} as src_ip | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(responseStatus.reason) values(responseStatus.code) values(userAgent) values(verb) values(requestURI) by src_ip cluster_name user.username user.groups{} | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on forAWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudWatch EKS Logs.Please also customize the `kubernetes_pods_aws_scan_fingerprint_detection` macro to filter out the false positives.", "known_false_positives": "Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, UA and source IPs and direct request to API provide context.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"], "asset_type": "Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster Pod", "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1526"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "user.username", "verb", "objectRef.resource", "requestURI", "source", "sourceIPs{}", "responseStatus.reason", "responseStatus.code", "userAgent", "src_ip", "user.groups{}"], "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Cloud Service Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection_filter"}]}, {"name": "Gsuite suspicious calendar invite", "id": "03cdd68a-34fb-11ec-9bd3-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-24", "author": "Rod Soto, Teoderick Contreras", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search can help the detection of compromised accounts or internal users sending suspcious calendar invites via GSuite calendar. These invites may contain malicious links or attachments.", "search": "`gsuite_calendar` |bin span=5m _time |rename parameters.* as * |search target_calendar_id!=null email=\"*yourdomain.com\"| stats count values(target_calendar_id) values(event_title) values(event_guest) by email _time | where count >100| `gsuite_suspicious_calendar_invite_filter`", "how_to_implement": "In order to successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite (gsuite:calendar:json) having the file sharing metadata like file type, source owner, destination target user, description, etc. This search can also be made more specific by selecting specific emails, subdomains timeframe, organizational units, targeted user, etc. In order for the search to work for your environment please update `yourdomain.com` value in the query with the domain relavant for your organization.", "known_false_positives": "This search will also produce normal activity statistics. Fields such as email, ip address, name, parameters.organizer_calendar_id, parameters.target_calendar_id and parameters.event_title may give away phishing intent.For more specific results use email parameter.", "references": ["https://www.techrepublic.com/article/how-to-avoid-the-dreaded-google-calendar-malicious-invite-issue/", "https://gcn.com/articles/2012/09/26/20-most-common-words-phishing-attacks.aspx"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "dataset": [[]], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "email", "parameters.event_title", "parameters.target_calendar_id", "parameters.event_title"], "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Phishing"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:calendar:json", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "gsuite_calendar"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "gsuite_suspicious_calendar_invite_filter"}]}, {"name": "aws detect permanent key creation", "id": "12d6d713-3cb4-4ffc-a064-1dca3d1cca01", "version": 1, "date": "2020-07-27", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides detection of accounts creating permanent keys. Permanent keys are not created by default and they are only needed for programmatic calls. Creation of Permanent key is an important event to monitor.", "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` CreateAccessKey | spath eventName | search eventName=CreateAccessKey \"userIdentity.type\"=IAMUser | table sourceIPAddress userName userIdentity.type userAgent action status responseElements.accessKey.createDate responseElements.accessKey.status responseElements.accessKey.accessKeyId |`aws_detect_permanent_key_creation_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs", "known_false_positives": "Not all permanent key creations are malicious. If there is a policy of rotating keys this search can be adjusted to provide better context.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cross Account Activity"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "userIdentity.type", "sourceIPAddress", "userName userIdentity.type", "userAgent", "action", "status", "responseElements.accessKey.createDate", "esponseElements.accessKey.status", "responseElements.accessKey.accessKeyId"], "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Valid Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_detect_permanent_key_creation_filter"}]}, {"name": "aws detect role creation", "id": "5f04081e-ddee-4353-afe4-504f288de9ad", "version": 1, "date": "2020-07-27", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides detection of role creation by IAM users. Role creation is an event by itself if user is creating a new role with trust policies different than the available in AWS and it can be used for lateral movement and escalation of privileges.", "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` event_name=CreateRole action=created userIdentity.type=AssumedRole requestParameters.description=Allows* | table sourceIPAddress userIdentity.principalId userIdentity.arn action event_name awsRegion http_user_agent mfa_auth msg requestParameters.roleName requestParameters.description responseElements.role.arn responseElements.role.createDate | `aws_detect_role_creation_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add-on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs", "known_false_positives": "CreateRole is not very common in common users. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse. In general AWS provides plenty of trust policies that fit most use cases.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cross Account Activity"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "event_name", "action", "userIdentity.type", "requestParameters.description", "sourceIPAddress", "userIdentity.principalId", "userIdentity.arn", "action", "event_name", "awsRegion", "http_user_agent", "mfa_auth", "msg", "requestParameters.roleName", "requestParameters.description", "responseElements.role.arn", "responseElements.role.createDate"], "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Valid Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_detect_role_creation_filter"}]}, {"name": "Gdrive suspicious file sharing", "id": "a7131dae-34e3-11ec-a2de-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-24", "author": "Rod Soto, Teoderick Contreras", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search can help the detection of compromised accounts or internal users sharing potentially malicious/classified documents with users outside your organization via GSuite file sharing .", "search": "`gsuite_drive` name=change_user_access | rename parameters.* as * | search email = \"*@yourdomain.com\" target_user != \"*@yourdomain.com\" | stats count values(owner) as owner values(target_user) as target values(doc_type) as doc_type values(doc_title) as doc_title dc(target_user) as distinct_target by src_ip email | where distinct_target > 50 | `gdrive_suspicious_file_sharing_filter`", "how_to_implement": "Need to implement Gsuite logging targeting Google suite drive activity. In order for the search to work for your environment please update `yourdomain.com` value in the query with the domain relavant for your organization.", "known_false_positives": "This is an anomaly search, you must specify your domain in the parameters so it either filters outside domains or focus on internal domains. This search may also help investigate compromise of accounts. By looking at for example source ip addresses, document titles and abnormal number of shares and shared target users.", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/investigating-gsuite-phishing-attacks-with-splunk.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Data Exfiltration"], "dataset": [[]], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "src_ip", "parameters.owner", "parameters.target_user", "parameters.doc_title", "parameters.doc_type"], "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Phishing"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:drive:json", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "gsuite_drive"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "gdrive_suspicious_file_sharing_filter"}]}, {"name": "GCP Detect gcploit framework", "id": "a1c5a85e-a162-410c-a5d9-99ff639e5a52", "version": 1, "date": "2020-10-08", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides detection of GCPloit exploitation framework. This framework can be used to escalate privileges and move laterally from compromised high privilege accounts.", "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.request.function.timeout=539s | table src src_user data.resource.labels.project_id data.protoPayload.request.function.serviceAccountEmail data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission data.protoPayload.request.location http_user_agent | `gcp_detect_gcploit_framework_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message logs", "known_false_positives": "Payload.request.function.timeout value can possibly be match with other functions or requests however the source user and target request account may indicate an attempt to move laterally accross acounts or projects", "references": ["https://github.com/dxa4481/gcploit", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ml09R38jpok"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["GCP Cross Account Activity"], "asset_type": "GCP Account", "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "data.protoPayload.request.function.timeout", "src", "src_user", "data.resource.labels.project_id", "data.protoPayload.request.function.serviceAccountEmail", "data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission", "data.protoPayload.request.location", "http_user_agent"], "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Valid Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "gcp_detect_gcploit_framework_filter"}]}, {"name": "aws detect attach to role policy", "id": "88fc31dd-f331-448c-9856-d3d51dd5d3a1", "version": 1, "date": "2020-07-27", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides detection of an user attaching itself to a different role trust policy. This can be used for lateral movement and escalation of privileges.", "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` attach policy| spath requestParameters.policyArn | table sourceIPAddress user_access_key userIdentity.arn userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.arn eventName errorCode errorMessage status action requestParameters.policyArn userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.mfaAuthenticated userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.creationDate | `aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add-on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs", "known_false_positives": "Attach to policy can create a lot of noise. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse (i.e status=failure). The search can provide context for common users attaching themselves to higher privilege policies or even newly created policies.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cross Account Activity"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "requestParameters.policyArn"], "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Valid Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS", "id": "ada0f278-84a8-46w1-a3f1-w32372d4bd53", "version": 1, "date": "2018-05-07", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search will detect spike in blocked outbound network connections originating from within your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data.", "search": "`cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow` action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR src_ip=192.168.0.0/16) ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16) [search `cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow` action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR src_ip=192.168.0.0/16) ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16) | stats count as numberOfBlockedConnections by src_ip | inputlookup baseline_blocked_outbound_connections append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) as * by src_ip | rename numberOfBlockedConnections as latestCount | eval newAvgBlockedConnections=avgBlockedConnections + (latestCount-avgBlockedConnections)/720 | eval newStdevBlockedConnections=sqrt(((pow(stdevBlockedConnections, 2)*719 + (latestCount-newAvgBlockedConnections)*(latestCount-avgBlockedConnections))/720)) | eval avgBlockedConnections=coalesce(newAvgBlockedConnections, avgBlockedConnections), stdevBlockedConnections=coalesce(newStdevBlockedConnections, stdevBlockedConnections), numDataPoints=if(isnull(latestCount), numDataPoints, numDataPoints+1) | table src_ip, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgBlockedConnections, stdevBlockedConnections | outputlookup baseline_blocked_outbound_connections | eval dataPointThreshold = 5, deviationThreshold = 3 | eval isSpike=if((latestCount > avgBlockedConnections+deviationThreshold*stdevBlockedConnections) AND numDataPoints > dataPointThreshold, 1, 0) | where isSpike=1 | table src_ip] | stats values(dest_ip) as \"Blocked Destination IPs\", values(interface_id) as \"resourceId\" count as numberOfBlockedConnections, dc(dest_ip) as uniqueDestConnections by src_ip | `detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your VPC Flow logs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the number of data points required to meet the definition of \"spike.\" The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best when you run the \"Baseline of Blocked Outbound Connection\" support search once to create a history of previously seen blocked outbound connections.", "known_false_positives": "The false-positive rate may vary based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`. Additionally, false positives may result when AWS administrators roll out policies enforcing network blocks, causing sudden increases in the number of blocked outbound connections.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS Network ACL Activity", "Suspicious AWS Traffic", "Command and Control"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "action", "src_ip", "dest_ip"], "risk_object": "src_ip", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 20, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudwatchlogs:vpcflow", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A lookup file that will contain the baseline information for number of blocked outbound connections", "filename": "baseline_blocked_outbound_connections.csv", "name": "baseline_blocked_outbound_connections", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/baseline_blocked_outbound_connections.csv"}, {"description": "A lookup file that will contain the baseline information for number of blocked outbound connections", "filename": "baseline_blocked_outbound_connections.csv", "name": "baseline_blocked_outbound_connections", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/baseline_blocked_outbound_connections.csv"}]}, {"name": "Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection", "id": "294c4686-63dd-4fe6-93a2-ca807626704a", "version": 1, "date": "2020-04-15", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster in AWS", "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` \"user.username\"=\"system:anonymous\" userAgent!=\"AWS Security Scanner\" | rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(responseStatus.reason) values(source) as cluster_name values(responseStatus.code) values(userAgent) as http_user_agent values(verb) values(requestURI) by src_ip user.username user.groups{} | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudWatch EKS Logs inputs.", "known_false_positives": "Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, UA and source IPs will provide context.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"], "asset_type": "Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster", "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1526"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "user.username", "userAgent", "sourceIPs{}", "responseStatus.reason", "source", "responseStatus.code", "verb", "requestURI", "src_ip", "user.groups{}"], "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Cloud Service Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets", "id": "f6ea3466-d6bb-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003", "version": 1, "date": "2020-08-05", "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for GCP PubSub events where a user has created an open/public GCP Storage bucket.", "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.resource.type=gcs_bucket data.protoPayload.methodName=storage.setIamPermissions | spath output=action path=data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.action | spath output=user path=data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail | spath output=location path=data.protoPayload.resourceLocation.currentLocations{} | spath output=src path=data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp | spath output=bucketName path=data.protoPayload.resourceName | spath output=role path=data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.role | spath output=member path=data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.member | search (member=allUsers AND action=ADD) | table _time, bucketName, src, user, location, action, role, member | search `detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search relies on the Splunk Add-on for Google Cloud Platform, setting up a Cloud Pub/Sub input, along with the relevant GCP PubSub topics and logging sink to capture GCP Storage Bucket events (https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/routing/overview).", "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that a GCP admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. That said, GCP strongly advises against granting full control to the \"allUsers\" group.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious GCP Storage Activities"], "asset_type": "GCP Storage Bucket", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "data.resource.type", "data.protoPayload.methodName", "data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.action", "data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail", "data.protoPayload.resourceLocation.currentLocations{}", "data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp", "data.protoPayload.resourceName", "data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.role", "data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.member"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Data from Cloud Storage Object"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets_filter"}]}, {"name": "aws detect sts assume role abuse", "id": "8e565314-b6a2-46d8-9f05-1a34a176a662", "version": 1, "date": "2020-07-27", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides detection of suspicious use of sts:AssumeRole. These tokens can be created on the go and used by attackers to move laterally and escalate privileges.", "search": "`cloudtrail` user_type=AssumedRole userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.type=Role | table sourceIPAddress userIdentity.arn user_agent user_access_key status action requestParameters.roleName responseElements.role.roleName responseElements.role.createDate | `aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs", "known_false_positives": "Sts:AssumeRole can be very noisy as it is a standard mechanism to provide cross account and cross resources access. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cross Account Activity"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "user_type", "userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.type", "sourceIPAddress", "userIdentity.arn", "user_agent", "user_access_key", "status", "action", "requestParameters.roleName", "esponseElements.role.roleName", "esponseElements.role.createDate"], "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Valid Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect S3 access from a new IP", "id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-291bq3d0daq4", "version": 1, "date": "2018-06-28", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks at S3 bucket-access logs and detects new or previously unseen remote IP addresses that have successfully accessed an S3 bucket.", "search": "`aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200 [search `aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200 | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by bucket_name remote_ip | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by bucket_name remote_ip | outputlookup previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip.csv | eval newIP=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newIP=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table bucket_name remote_ip]| iplocation remote_ip |rename remote_ip as src_ip | table _time bucket_name src_ip City Country operation request_uri | `detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your S3 access logs' inputs. This search works best when you run the \"Previously Seen S3 Bucket Access by Remote IP\" support search once to create a history of previously seen remote IPs and bucket names.", "known_false_positives": "S3 buckets can be accessed from any IP, as long as it can make a successful connection. This will be a false postive, since the search is looking for a new IP within the past hour", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"], "asset_type": "S3 Bucket", "cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "http_status", "bucket_name", "remote_ip"], "risk_object": "src_ip", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 10, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Data from Cloud Storage Object"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:s3:accesslogs", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "aws_s3_accesslogs"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip_filter"}]}, {"name": "GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection", "id": "19b53215-4a16-405b-8087-9e6acf619842", "version": 1, "date": "2020-07-17", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster's pods", "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` category=kube-audit |spath input=properties.log |search responseStatus.code=401 |table sourceIPs{} userAgent verb requestURI responseStatus.reason properties.pod | `gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later), then configure stackdriver and set a Pub/Sub subscription to be imported to Splunk.", "known_false_positives": "Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, User Agent, source IPs and pods will provide context.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"], "asset_type": "GCP Kubernetes cluster", "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1526"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "category", "responseStatus.code", "sourceIPs{}", "userAgent", "verb", "requestURI", "responseStatus.reason", "properties.pod"], "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Cloud Service Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion", "id": "ad12w478-84a8-4641-a3w1-e32372q4bd53", "version": 1, "date": "2018-11-27", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects users creating spikes in API activity related to deletion of S3 buckets in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteBucket [search `cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteBucket | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | stats count as apiCalls by arn | inputlookup s3_deletion_baseline append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) as * by arn | rename apiCalls as latestCount | eval newAvgApiCalls=avgApiCalls + (latestCount-avgApiCalls)/720 | eval newStdevApiCalls=sqrt(((pow(stdevApiCalls, 2)*719 + (latestCount-newAvgApiCalls)*(latestCount-avgApiCalls))/720)) | eval avgApiCalls=coalesce(newAvgApiCalls, avgApiCalls), stdevApiCalls=coalesce(newStdevApiCalls, stdevApiCalls), numDataPoints=if(isnull(latestCount), numDataPoints, numDataPoints+1) | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup s3_deletion_baseline | eval dataPointThreshold = 15, deviationThreshold = 3 | eval isSpike=if((latestCount > avgApiCalls+deviationThreshold*stdevApiCalls) AND numDataPoints > dataPointThreshold, 1, 0) | where isSpike=1 | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | spath output=bucketName path=requestParameters.bucketName | stats values(bucketName) as bucketName, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName) as uniqueApisCalled by user | `detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best when you run the \"Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN\" support search once to create a baseline of previously seen S3 bucket-deletion activity.", "known_false_positives": "Based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`, the false positive rate may vary. Please modify this according the your environment.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"], "asset_type": "S3 Bucket", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1530"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "userIdentity.arn"], "risk_object": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 10, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Data from Cloud Storage Object"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A placeholder for the baseline information for AWS S3 deletions", "filename": "s3_deletion_baseline.csv", "name": "s3_deletion_baseline", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/s3_deletion_baseline.csv"}, {"description": "A placeholder for the baseline information for AWS S3 deletions", "filename": "s3_deletion_baseline.csv", "name": "s3_deletion_baseline", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/s3_deletion_baseline.csv"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls", "id": "042a3d32-8318-4763-9679-09db2644a8f2", "version": 1, "date": "2020-06-23", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides information on anonymous Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context", "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` userAgent=kubectl* sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1 sourceIPs{}!=::1 src_user=system:anonymous | table src_ip src_user verb userAgent requestURI | stats count by src_ip src_user verb userAgent requestURI |`kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs.", "known_false_positives": "Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP, verb and Object can reveal potential malicious activity, specially anonymous suspicious IPs and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"], "asset_type": "AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster", "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "userAgent", "sourceIPs{}", "src_user", "src_ip", "verb", "requestURI"], "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter"}]}, {"name": "aws detect sts get session token abuse", "id": "85d7b35f-b8b5-4b01-916f-29b81e7a0551", "version": 1, "date": "2020-07-27", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides detection of suspicious use of sts:GetSessionToken. These tokens can be created on the go and used by attackers to move laterally and escalate privileges.", "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` ASIA userIdentity.type=IAMUser| spath eventName | search eventName=GetSessionToken | table sourceIPAddress eventTime userIdentity.arn userName userAgent user_type status region | `aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add-on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs", "known_false_positives": "Sts:GetSessionToken can be very noisy as in certain environments numerous calls of this type can be executed. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse. In specific environments the use of field requestParameters.serialNumber will need to be used.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cross Account Activity"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1550"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "userIdentity.type", "eventName", "sourceIPAddress", "eventTime", "userIdentity.arn", "userName", "userAgent", "user_type", "status", "region"], "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Use Alternate Authentication Material"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse_filter"}]}, {"name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched", "id": "f2361e9f-3928-496c-a556-120cd4223a65", "version": 2, "date": "2020-08-21", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search finds for the number successfully created cloud instances for every 4 hour block. This is split up between weekdays and the weekend. It then applies the probability densitiy model previously created and alerts on any outliers.", "search": "| tstats count as instances_launched values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=created) AND All_Changes.status=success AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%w\") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | join HourOfDay isWeekend [summary cloud_excessive_instances_created_v1] | where cardinality >=16 | apply cloud_excessive_instances_created_v1 threshold=0.005 | rename \"IsOutlier(instances_launched)\" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1 | eval expected_upper_threshold = mvindex(split(mvindex(BoundaryRanges, -1), \":\"), 0) | eval distance_from_threshold = instances_launched - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, instances_launched, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold, object_id | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_launched_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched` to create the probability density function.", "known_false_positives": "Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Cryptomining", "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities"], "asset_type": "Cloud Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.object_id", "All_Changes.action", "All_Changes.status", "All_Changes.object_category", "All_Changes.user"], "risk_object": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 40, "security_domain": "Cloud", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Cloud Accounts", "Valid Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_launched_filter"}]}, {"name": "New container uploaded to AWS ECR", "id": "f0f70b40-f7ad-489d-9905-23d149da8099", "version": 1, "date": "2020-02-20", "author": "Rod Soto, Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This searches show information on uploaded containers including source user, image id, source IP user type, http user agent, region, first time, last time of operation (PutImage). These searches are based on Cloud Infrastructure Data Model.", "search": "| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Cloud_Infrastructure.Compute where Compute.user_type!=\"AssumeRole\" AND Compute.http_user_agent=\"AWS Internal\" AND Compute.event_name=\"PutImage\" by Compute.image_id Compute.src_user Compute.src Compute.region Compute.msg Compute.user_type | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Compute\")` | `new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model. Please also customize the `container_implant_aws_detection_filter` macro to filter out the false positives.", "known_false_positives": "Uploading container is a normal behavior from developers or users with access to container registry.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation"], "asset_type": "AWS ECR container", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1525"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Implant Container Image"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr_filter"}]}, {"name": "Email files written outside of the Outlook directory", "id": "ee18ed37-0802-4268-9435-b3b91aaa18xx", "version": 3, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The search looks at the change-analysis data model and detects email files created outside the normal Outlook directory.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_name=*.pst OR Filesystem.file_name=*.ost) Filesystem.file_path != \"C:\\\\Users\\\\*\\\\My Documents\\\\Outlook Files\\\\*\" Filesystem.file_path!=\"C:\\\\Users\\\\*\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\Outlook*\" by Filesystem.action Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Filesystem\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records the file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint.Filesystem data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or by other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system reads and writes.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators and users sometimes prefer backing up their email data by moving the email files into a different folder. These attempts will be detected by the search.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Collection and Staging"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1114", "T1114.001"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.file_path", "Filesystem.file_name", "Filesystem.action", "Filesystem.process_id", "Filesystem.dest"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Email Collection", "Local Email Collection"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Magic Hound", "APT1"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions", "id": "473bd65f-06ca-4dfe-a2b8-ba04ab4a0084", "version": 3, "date": "2020-07-22", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Email"], "description": "This search looks for emails that have attachments with suspicious file extensions.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Email where All_Email.file_name=\"*\" by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.file_name All_Email.message_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Email\")` | `suspicious_email_attachments` | `suspicious_email_attachment_extensions_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "You need to ingest data from emails. Specifically, the sender's address and the file names of any attachments must be mapped to the Email data model. \\\n **Splunk Phantom Playbook Integration**\\\nIf Splunk Phantom is also configured in your environment, a Playbook called \"Suspicious Email Attachment Investigate and Delete\" can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/`, and add the correct hostname to the \"Phantom Instance\" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search. The notable event will be sent to Phantom and the playbook will gather further information about the file attachment and its network behaviors. If Phantom finds malicious behavior and an analyst approves of the results, the email will be deleted from the user's inbox.", "known_false_positives": "None identified", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Suspicious Emails"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566.001", "T1566"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.IP"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Email.file_name", "All_Email.src_user", "All_Email.message_id"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Spearphishing Attachment", "Phishing"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "lookup update=true is_suspicious_file_extension_lookup file_name OUTPUT suspicious | search suspicious=true", "description": "This macro limits the output to email attachments that have suspicious extensions", "name": "suspicious_email_attachments", "lookups": [{"description": "A list of suspicious extensions for email attachments", "filename": "is_suspicious_file_extension_lookup.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(file_name)", "name": "is_suspicious_file_extension_lookup", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/is_suspicious_file_extension_lookup.csv"}]}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_email_attachment_extensions_filter"}]}, {"name": "Monitor Email For Brand Abuse", "id": "b2ea1f38-3a3e-4b8a-9cf1-82760d86a6b8", "version": 2, "date": "2018-01-05", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Email"], "description": "This search looks for emails claiming to be sent from a domain similar to one that you want to have monitored for abuse.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Email.recipient) as recipients, min(_time) as firstTime, max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Email by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.message_id | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Email\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | eval temp=split(src_user, \"@\") | eval email_domain=mvindex(temp, 1) | lookup update=true brandMonitoring_lookup domain as email_domain OUTPUT domain_abuse | search domain_abuse=true | table message_id, src_user, email_domain, recipients, firstTime, lastTime | `monitor_email_for_brand_abuse_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You need to ingest email header data. Specifically the sender's address (src_user) must be populated. You also need to have run the search \"ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names\", which creates the permutations of the domain that will be checked for.", "known_false_positives": "None at this time", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Brand Monitoring", "Suspicious Emails"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Email.recipient", "All_Email.src_user", "All_Email.message_id"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "monitor_email_for_brand_abuse_filter"}], "lookups": [{"default_match": "false", "description": "A file that contains look-a-like domains for brands that you want to monitor", "filename": "brand_monitoring.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(domain)", "min_matches": 1, "name": "brandMonitoring_lookup", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/brand_monitoring.csv"}]}, {"name": "No Windows Updates in a time frame", "id": "1a77c08c-2f56-409c-a2d3-7d64617edd4f", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-15", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Updates"], "description": "This search looks for Windows endpoints that have not generated an event indicating a successful Windows update in the last 60 days. Windows updates are typically released monthly and applied shortly thereafter. An endpoint that has not successfully applied an update in this time frame indicates the endpoint is not regularly being patched for some reason.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Updates where Updates.status=Installed Updates.vendor_product=\"Microsoft Windows\" by Updates.dest Updates.status Updates.vendor_product | rename Updates.dest as Host | rename Updates.status as \"Update Status\" | rename Updates.vendor_product as Product | eval isOutlier=if(lastTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-60d@d\"), 1, 0) | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search isOutlier=1 | rename lastTime as \"Last Update Time\", | table Host, \"Update Status\", Product, \"Last Update Time\" | `no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, it requires that the 'Update' data model is being populated. This can be accomplished by ingesting Windows events or the Windows Update log via a universal forwarder on the Windows endpoints you wish to monitor. The Windows add-on should be also be installed and configured to properly parse Windows events in Splunk. There may be other data sources which can populate this data model, including vulnerability management systems.", "known_false_positives": "None identified", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Monitor for Updates"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 18"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.MA"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Updates.status", "Updates.vendor_product", "Updates.dest"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame_filter"}]}, {"name": "Okta Failed SSO Attempts", "id": "371a6545-2618-4032-ad84-93386b8698c5", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "Detect failed Okta SSO events", "search": "`okta` displayMessage=\"User attempted unauthorized access to app\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(app) as Apps count by user, result ,displayMessage, src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_failed_sso_attempts_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being ingested in your Splunk deployment.", "known_false_positives": "There may be a faulty config preventing legitmate users from accessing apps they should have access to.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Okta Activity"], "asset_type": "Infrastructure", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078", "T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "displayMessage", "app", "user", "result", "src_ip"], "security_domain": "access", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Valid Accounts", "Default Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak", "no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "eventtype=okta_log", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "okta"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "okta_failed_sso_attempts_filter"}]}, {"name": "Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces", "id": "56e877a6-1455-4479-ada6-0550dc1e22f8", "version": 2, "date": "2017-09-19", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Email"], "description": "Attackers often use spaces as a means to obfuscate an attachment's file extension. This search looks for messages with email attachments that have many spaces within the file names.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(All_Email.recipient) as recipient_address min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Email where All_Email.file_name=\"*\" by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.file_name All_Email.message_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Email\")` | eval space_ratio = (mvcount(split(file_name,\" \"))-1)/len(file_name) | search space_ratio >= 0.1 | rex field=recipient_address \"(?.*)@\" | `email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You need to ingest data from emails. Specifically, the sender's address and the file names of any attachments must be mapped to the Email data model. The threshold ratio is set to 10%, but this value can be configured to suit each environment. \\\n **Splunk Phantom Playbook Integration**\\\nIf Splunk Phantom is also configured in your environment, a playbook called \"Suspicious Email Attachment Investigate and Delete\" can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/` and add the correct hostname to the \"Phantom Instance\" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search. The notable event will be sent to Phantom and the playbook will gather further information about the file attachment and its network behaviors. If Phantom finds malicious behavior and an analyst approves of the results, the email will be deleted from the user's inbox.", "known_false_positives": "None at this time", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Suspicious Emails"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Email.recipient", "All_Email.file_name", "All_Email.src_user", "All_Email.file_name", "All_Email.message_id"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces_filter"}]}, {"name": "Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP", "id": "19cba45f-cad3-4032-8911-0c09e0444552", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects Okta login failures due to bad credentials for multiple users originating from the same ip address.", "search": "`okta` outcome.reason=INVALID_CREDENTIALS | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(user) as distinct_users values(user) as users by src_ip, displayMessage, outcome.reason, country, state, city | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search distinct_users > 5| `multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being ingested in your Splunk deployment.", "known_false_positives": "A single public IP address servicing multiple legitmate users may trigger this search. In addition, the threshold of 5 distinct users may be too low for your needs. You may modify the included filter macro `multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip_filter` to raise the threshold or except specific IP adresses from triggering this search.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Okta Activity"], "asset_type": "Infrastructure", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078", "T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "outcome.reason", "client.geographicalContext.country", "client.geographicalContext.state", "client.geographicalContext.city", "user", "src_ip", "displayMessage"], "security_domain": "access", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Valid Accounts", "Default Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak", "no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "eventtype=okta_log", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "okta"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip_filter"}]}, {"name": "Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes", "id": "ec3b7601-689a-4463-94e0-c9f45638efb9", "version": 1, "date": "2019-04-01", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for suspicious processes on all systems labeled as web servers.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.dest_category=\"web_server\" AND (Processes.process=\"*whoami*\" OR Processes.process=\"*ping*\" OR Processes.process=\"*iptables*\" OR Processes.process=\"*wget*\" OR Processes.process=\"*service*\" OR Processes.process=\"*curl*\") by Processes.process Processes.process_name, Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model. In addition, web servers will need to be identified in the Assets and Identity Framework of Enterprise Security.", "known_false_positives": "Some of these processes may be used legitimately on web servers during maintenance or other administrative tasks.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Apache Struts Vulnerability"], "asset_type": "Web Server", "cis20": ["CIS 3"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1082"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest_category", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Information Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "Tropic Trooper", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Darkhotel", "MuddyWater", "APT18", "Honeybee", "APT19", "APT37", "APT32", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "APT3", "Sowbug", "Gamaredon Group", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "admin@338", "Turla", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes_filter"}]}, {"name": "Phishing Email Detection by Machine Learning Method - SSA", "id": "4b237388-dfa1-41a6-91d4-4de2d598376f", "version": 1, "date": "2020-08-25", "author": "Xiao Lin, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "Malicious mails can conduct phishing that induces readers to open attachment, click links or trigger third party service. This detect uses Natural Language Processing (NLP) approach to analyze an email message's content (Sender, Subject and Body) and judge whether it is a phishing email. The detection adopts a deep learning (neural network) model that employs character level embeddings plus LSTM layers to perform classification. The model is pre-trained and then published as ONNX format. Current sample model is trained using the dataset published at https://github.com/splunk/attack_data/tree/master/datasets/T1566_Phishing_Email/splunk_train.json User are expected to re-train the model by combining with their own training data for better accuracy using the provided model file (SMLE notebook). DSP pipeline then processes the email message and passes it as an event to Apply ML Models function, which returns the probability of a phishing email. Current implementation assumes the email is fed to DSP in JSON format contains at least email's sender, subject and its message body, including reply content, if any.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval eventLine=concat(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"From\"), \"string\", \" \"), \" \", ucast(map_get(input_event, \"Subject\"), \"string\", \" \"), \" \", ucast(map_get(input_event, \"Content\"), \"string\", \" \"), \" \"), _time=map_get(input_event, \"_time\") | where eventLine IS NOT NULL | eval mapC={\" \": 32, \"!\": 33, \"\\\"\": 34, \"#\": 35, \"$\": 36, \"%\": 37, \"&\": 38, \"`\": 39, \"(\": 40, \")\": 41, \"*\": 42, \"+\": 43, \",\": 44, \"-\": 45, \".\": 46, \"/\": 47, \"0\": 48, \"1\": 49, \"2\": 50, \"3\": 51, \"4\": 52, \"5\": 53, \"6\": 54, \"7\": 55, \"8\": 56, \"9\": 57, \":\": 58, \";\": 59, \"<\": 60, \"=\": 61, \">\": 62, \"?\": 63, \"@\": 64, \"A\": 65, \"B\": 66, \"C\": 67, \"D\": 68, \"E\": 69, \"F\": 70, \"G\": 71, \"H\": 72, \"I\": 73, \"J\": 74, \"K\": 75, \"L\": 76, \"M\": 77, \"N\": 78, \"O\": 79, \"P\": 80, \"Q\": 81, \"R\": 82, \"S\": 83, \"T\": 84, \"U\": 85, \"V\": 86, \"W\": 87, \"X\": 88, \"Y\": 89, \"Z\": 90, \"[\": 91, \"\\\\\": 92, \"]\": 93, \"^\": 94, \"_\": 95, \"`\": 96, \"a\": 97, \"b\": 98, \"c\": 99, \"d\": 100, \"e\": 101, \"f\": 102, \"g\": 103, \"h\": 104, \"i\": 105, \"j\": 106, \"k\": 107, \"l\": 108, \"m\": 109, \"n\": 110, \"o\": 111, \"p\": 112, \"q\": 113, \"r\": 114, \"s\": 115, \"t\": 116, \"u\": 117, \"v\": 118, \"w\": 119, \"x\": 120, \"y\": 121, \"z\": 122, \"{\": 123, \"|\": 124, \"}\": 125, \"~\": 126}, ml_in = for_each(iterator(mvrange(1,129), \"i\"), cast(map_get(mapC, substr(eventLine, i, 1)), \"float\") ) | apply_model connection_id=\"YOUR_S3_ONNX_CONNECTOR_ID\" name=\"phishing_email_v8\" path=\"s3://smle-experiments/models/phishing_email\" | eval probability = mvindex(ml_out, 0) | where probability > 0.5 | eval start_time=_time, end_time=_time, entities=\"TBD\", body=\"TBD\" | select probability, body, entities, start_time, end_time | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "Events are fed to DSP contains at least email's sender, subject and its message body.", "known_false_positives": "Because of imbalance of anomaly data in training, the model will less likely report false positive. Instead, the model is more prone to false negative. Current best recall score is ~85%", "references": [], "tags": {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "risk_severity": "low", "security_domain": "mail server", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Phishing"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "phishing_email_detection_by_machine_learning_method___ssa_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Java Classes", "id": "if1fea6da-3c86-4c1d-b255-fc3b2781a491", "version": 1, "date": "2018-12-06", "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for suspicious Java classes that are often used to exploit remote command execution in common Java frameworks, such as Apache Struts.", "search": "`stream_http` http_method=POST http_content_length>1 | regex form_data=\"(?i)java\\.lang\\.(?:runtime|processbuilder)\" | rename src_ip as src | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime, values(url) as uri, values(status) as status, values(http_user_agent) as http_user_agent by src, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_java_classes_filter`", "how_to_implement": "In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from your web-traffic appliances that serve or sit in the path of your Struts application servers. This can be accomplished by indexing data from a web proxy, or by using network traffic-analysis tools, such as Splunk Stream or Bro.", "known_false_positives": "There are no known false positives.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Apache Struts Vulnerability"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "http_method", "http_content_length", "src_ip", "url", "status", "http_user_agent", "src", "dest"], "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=stream:http", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "stream_http"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_java_classes_filter"}]}, {"name": "Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities", "id": "7594fa07-9f34-4d01-81cc-d6af6a5db9e8", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects logins from the same user from different cities in a 24 hour period.", "search": "`okta` displayMessage=\"User login to Okta\" client.geographicalContext.city!=null | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(client.geographicalContext.city) as locations values(client.geographicalContext.city) as cities values(client.geographicalContext.state) as states by user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities_filter` | search locations > 1", "how_to_implement": "This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being ingested in your Splunk deployment.", "known_false_positives": "Users in your enviornment may legitmately be travelling and loggin in from different locations. This search is useful for those users that should *not* be travelling for some reason, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. The search also relies on the geographical information being populated in the Okta logs. It is also possible that a connection from another region may be attributed to a login from a remote VPN endpoint.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Okta Activity"], "asset_type": "Infrastructure", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078", "T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "displayMessage", "client.geographicalContext.city", "client.geographicalContext.state", "user"], "security_domain": "access", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Valid Accounts", "Default Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak", "no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "eventtype=okta_log", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "okta"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities_filter"}]}, {"name": "Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts", "id": "7f5fb3e1-4209-4914-90db-0ec21b556378", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search looks for an increase of data transfers from your email server to your clients. This could be indicative of a malicious actor collecting data using your email server.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` sum(All_Traffic.bytes_out) as bytes_out from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.src_category=email_server by All_Traffic.dest_ip _time span=1d | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | eventstats avg(bytes_out) as avg_bytes_out stdev(bytes_out) as stdev_bytes_out | eventstats count as num_data_samples avg(eval(if(_time < relative_time(now(), \"@d\"), bytes_out, null))) as per_source_avg_bytes_out stdev(eval(if(_time < relative_time(now(), \"@d\"), bytes_out, null))) as per_source_stdev_bytes_out by dest_ip | eval minimum_data_samples = 4, deviation_threshold = 3 | where num_data_samples >= minimum_data_samples AND bytes_out > (avg_bytes_out + (deviation_threshold * stdev_bytes_out)) AND bytes_out > (per_source_avg_bytes_out + (deviation_threshold * per_source_stdev_bytes_out)) AND _time >= relative_time(now(), \"@d\") | eval num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average = round(abs(bytes_out - avg_bytes_out) / stdev_bytes_out, 2), num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average = round(abs(bytes_out - per_source_avg_bytes_out) / per_source_stdev_bytes_out, 2) | table dest_ip, _time, bytes_out, avg_bytes_out, per_source_avg_bytes_out, num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average, num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average | `email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model. Your email servers must be categorized as \"email_server\" for the search to work, as well. You may need to adjust the deviation_threshold and minimum_data_samples values based on the network traffic in your environment. The \"deviation_threshold\" field is a multiplying factor to control how much variation you're willing to tolerate. The \"minimum_data_samples\" field is the minimum number of connections of data samples required for the statistic to be valid.", "known_false_positives": "The false-positive rate will vary based on how you set the deviation_threshold and data_samples values. Our recommendation is to adjust these values based on your network traffic to and from your email servers.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Collection and Staging", "HAFNIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1114", "T1114.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.bytes_out", "All_Traffic.src_category", "All_Traffic.dest_ip"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Email Collection", "Remote Email Collection"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT1", "FIN4", "APT28", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Ke3chang", "Leafminer"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts_filter"}]}, {"name": "Okta Account Lockout Events", "id": "62b70968-a0a5-4724-8ac4-67871e6f544d", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "Detect Okta user lockout events", "search": "`okta` displayMessage=\"Max sign in attempts exceeded\" | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | table _time, user, country, state, city, src_ip | `okta_account_lockout_events_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being ingested in your Splunk deployment.", "known_false_positives": "None. Account lockouts should be followed up on to determine if the actual user was the one who caused the lockout, or if it was an unauthorized actor.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Okta Activity"], "asset_type": "Infrastructure", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078", "T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "displayMessage", "client.geographicalContext.country", "client.geographicalContext.state", "client.geographicalContext.city"], "security_domain": "access", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Valid Accounts", "Default Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=okta_log", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "okta"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "okta_account_lockout_events_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect New Login Attempts to Routers", "id": "104658f4-afdc-499e-9719-17243rr826f1", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-12", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Authentication"], "description": "The search queries the authentication logs for assets that are categorized as routers in the ES Assets and Identity Framework, to identify connections that have not been seen before in the last 30 days.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.dest_category=router by Authentication.dest Authentication.user| eval isOutlier=if(earliest >= relative_time(now(), \"-30d@d\"), 1, 0) | where isOutlier=1| `security_content_ctime(earliest)`| `security_content_ctime(latest)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Authentication\")` | `detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must ensure the network router devices are categorized as \"router\" in the Assets and identity table. You must also populate the Authentication data model with logs related to users authenticating to routing infrastructure.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate router connections may appear as new connections", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Router and Infrastructure Security"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Authentication.dest_category", "Authentication.dest", "Authentication.user"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers_filter"}]}, {"name": "AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal", "id": "bbe23980-6019-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-26", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides specific SAML access from specific Service Provider, user and targeted principal at AWS. This search provides specific information to detect abnormal access or potential credential hijack or forgery, specially in federated environments using SAML protocol inside the perimeter or cloud provider.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=Assumerolewithsaml | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by requestParameters.principalArn requestParameters.roleArn requestParameters.roleSessionName recipientAccountId responseElements.issuer sourceIPAddress userAgent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs", "known_false_positives": "Attacks using a Golden SAML or SAML assertion hijacks or forgeries are very difficult to detect as accessing cloud providers with these assertions looks exactly like normal access, however things such as source IP sourceIPAddress user, and principal targeted at receiving cloud provider along with endpoint credential access and abuse detection searches can provide the necessary context to detect these attacks.", "references": ["https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", "https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "asset_type": "AWS Federated Account", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Stage:Credential Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/assume_role_with_saml/assume_role_with_saml.json"], "impact": 80, "message": "From IP address $sourceIPAddress$, user agent $userAgent$ has trigged an event $eventName$ for account ID $recipientAccountId$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078"], "observable": [{"name": "sourceIPAddress", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "recipientAccountId", "type": "Other", "role": ["Victim", "Target"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "requestParameters.principalArn", "requestParameters.roleArn", "requestParameters.roleSessionName", "recipientAccountId", "responseElements.issuer", "sourceIPAddress", "userAgent"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Valid Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect New Open S3 buckets", "id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-290bf3d0dac4", "version": 3, "date": "2021-07-19", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public S3 bucket.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=s3.amazonaws.com eventName=PutBucketAcl | rex field=_raw \"(?{.+})\" | spath input=json_field output=grantees path=requestParameters.AccessControlPolicy.AccessControlList.Grant{} | search grantees=* | mvexpand grantees | spath input=grantees output=uri path=Grantee.URI | spath input=grantees output=permission path=Permission | search uri IN (\"http://acs.amazonaws.com/groups/global/AllUsers\",\"http://acs.amazonaws.com/groups/global/AuthenticatedUsers\") | search permission IN (\"READ\",\"READ_ACP\",\"WRITE\",\"WRITE_ACP\",\"FULL_CONTROL\") | rename requestParameters.bucketName AS bucketName | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user_arn userIdentity.principalId userAgent uri permission bucketName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_new_open_s3_buckets_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk.", "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to the \"All Users\" group.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"], "asset_type": "S3 Bucket", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1530/aws_s3_public_bucket/aws_cloudtrail_events.json"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user_arn$ has created an open/public bucket $bucketName$ with the following permissions $permission$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user_arn", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "bucketName", "type": "Other", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventSource", "eventName", "requestParameters.bucketName", "user_arn", "userIdentity.principalId", "userAgent", "uri", "permission"], "risk_score": 48, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Data from Cloud Storage Object"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_new_open_s3_buckets_filter"}]}, {"name": "O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User", "id": "b2c81cc6-6040-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-26", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects the creation of a new Federation setting by alerting about an specific event related to its creation.", "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation=\"Add app role assignment grant to user.\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Actor{}.ID) as Actor.ID values(Actor{}.Type) as Actor.Type by ActorIpAddress dest ResultStatus | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", "known_false_positives": "The creation of a new Federation is not necessarily malicious, however this events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a different cloud provider.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "asset_type": "Office 365", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_new_federation/o365_new_federation.json"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "message": "User $Actor.ID$ has created a new federation setting on $dest$ from IP Address $ActorIpAddress$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1136.003", "T1136"], "observable": [{"name": "ActorIpAddress", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "Actor.ID", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Workload", "Operation", "Actor{}.ID", "Actor{}.Type", "ActorIpAddress", "dest", "ResultStatus"], "risk_score": 18, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Cloud Account", "Create Account"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "o365_management_activity"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user_filter"}]}, {"name": "AWS CreateAccessKey", "id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-11ad-212bf3d0d111", "version": 2, "date": "2021-07-19", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user A who has already permission to create access keys, makes an API call to create access keys for another user B. Attackers have been know to use this technique for Privilege Escalation in case new victim(user B) has more permissions than old victim(user B)", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName = CreateAccessKey userAgent !=console.amazonaws.com errorCode = success| search userIdentity.userName!=requestParameters.userName | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by requestParameters.userName src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|`aws_createaccesskey_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created keys for another user.", "references": ["https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws", "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation-part-2/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_createaccesskey/aws_cloudtrail_events.json"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user_arn$ is attempting to create access keys for $requestParameters.userName$ from this IP $src$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1136.003", "T1136"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "user_arn", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "userAgent", "errorCode", "requestParameters.userName"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Cloud Account", "Create Account"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_createaccesskey_filter"}]}, {"name": "AWS Network Access Control List Deleted", "id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d6fd75", "version": 2, "date": "2021-01-12", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "Enforcing network-access controls is one of the defensive mechanisms used by cloud administrators to restrict access to a cloud instance. After the attacker has gained control of the AWS console by compromising an admin account, they can delete a network ACL and gain access to the instance from anywhere. This search will query the AWS CloudTrail logs to detect users deleting network ACLs.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteNetworkAclEntry requestParameters.egress=false | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by userName userIdentity.principalId eventName requestParameters.egress src userAgent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs.", "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a user has legitimately deleted a network ACL.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS Network ACL Activity"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 11"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.007/aws_delete_acl/aws_cloudtrail_events.json"], "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user_arn$ from $src$ has sucessfully deleted network ACLs entry (eventName= $eventName$), such that the instance is accessible from anywhere", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.007", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "src", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "user_arn", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "requestParameters.egress", "userName", "userIdentity.principalId", "src", "userAgent"], "risk_score": 5, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter"}]}, {"name": "AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Medium", "id": "0b80e2c8-c746-4ddb-89eb-9efd892220cf", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-17", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). You need to activate image scanning in order to get the event DescribeImageScanFindings with the results.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=ecr.amazonaws.com eventName=DescribeImageScanFindings | spath path=responseElements.imageScanFindings.findings{} output=findings | mvexpand findings | spath input=findings| search severity=MEDIUM | rename name as finding_name, description as finding_description, requestParameters.imageId.imageDigest as imageDigest, requestParameters.repositoryName as image | eval finding = finding_name.\", \".finding_description | eval phase=\"release\" | eval severity=\"medium\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by awsRegion, eventName, eventSource, imageDigest, image, user, userName, src_ip, finding, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_medium_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECR/latest/userguide/image-scanning.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Vulnerabilities with severity high found in image $image$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1204.003", "T1204"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "image", "type": "System", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"], "required_fields": ["eventSource", "eventName", "responseElements.imageScanFindings.findings{}", "awsRegion", "requestParameters.imageId.imageDigest", "requestParameters.repositoryName", "user", "userName", "src_ip"], "risk_score": 21, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["User Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_medium_filter"}]}, {"name": "Correlation by User and Risk", "id": "610e12dc-b6fa-4541-825e-4a0b3b6f6773", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-06", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "Correlation", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search correlations detections by user and risk_score", "search": "`signals` | fillnull | stats sum(risk_score) as risk_score values(source) as signals values(repository) as repository by user | sort - risk_score | where risk_score > 80 | `correlation_by_user_and_risk_filter`", "how_to_implement": "For Dev Sec Ops POC", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 100, "deployments": ["Slack Alert"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Correlation triggered for user $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1204.003", "T1204"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["User Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "index=signals", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "signals"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "correlation_by_user_and_risk_filter"}]}, {"name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image", "id": "bc24922d-987c-4645-b288-f8c73ec194c4", "version": 1, "date": "2018-10-12", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search looks for cloud compute instances being created with previously unseen image IDs.", "search": "| tstats count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id) as dest from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.image_id, All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Instance_Changes\")` | where image_id != \"unknown\" | lookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_images image_id as image_id OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenImage=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenImage) OR firstTimeSeenImage > relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") | table firstTime, user, image_id, count, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial` to build the initial table of images observed and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image_filter` macro.", "known_false_positives": "After a new image is created, the first systems created with that image will cause this alert to fire. Verify that the image being used was created by a legitimate user.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Cryptomining"], "asset_type": "Cloud Compute Instance", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json"], "impact": 60, "message": "User $user$ is creating an instance $dest$ with an image that has not been previously seen.", "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.object_id", "All_Changes.action", "All_Changes.Instance_Changes.image_id", "All_Changes.user"], "risk_score": 36, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A table of previously seen Cloud image IDs", "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_images", "name": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_images", "fields_list": "_key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, image_id, enough_data"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Scanner Image Pulling", "id": "4890cd6b-0112-4974-a272-c5c153aee551", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-24", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search uses the Kubernetes logs from Splunk Connect from Kubernetes to detect Kubernetes Security Scanner.", "search": "`kube_objects_events` object.message IN (\"Pulling image *kube-hunter*\", \"Pulling image *kube-bench*\", \"Pulling image *kube-recon*\", \"Pulling image *kube-recon*\") | rename object.* AS * | rename involvedObject.* AS * | rename source.host AS host | eval phase=\"operate\" | eval severity=\"high\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by host, name, namespace, kind, reason, message, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `kubernetes_scanner_image_pulling_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must ingest Kubernetes logs through Splunk Connect for Kubernetes.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://github.com/splunk/splunk-connect-for-kubernetes"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "asset_type": "Kubernetes", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1526/kubernetes_kube_hunter/kubernetes_kube_hunter.json"], "deployments": ["Slack Alert"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Kubernetes Scanner image pulled on host $host$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1526"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "host", "type": "Entity"}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"], "required_fields": ["object.message", "source.host", "object.involvedObject.name", "object.involvedObject.namespace", "object.involvedObject.kind", "object.message", "object.reason"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Cloud Service Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=kube:objects:events", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "kube_objects_events"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "kubernetes_scanner_image_pulling_filter"}]}, {"name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls", "id": "0840ddf1-8c89-46ff-b730-c8d6722478c0", "version": 1, "date": "2020-09-07", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search will detect a spike in the number of API calls made to your cloud infrastructure environment by a user.", "search": "| tstats count as api_calls values(All_Changes.command) as command from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.user!=unknown All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%w\") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | join user HourOfDay isWeekend [ summary cloud_excessive_api_calls_v1] | where cardinality >=16 | apply cloud_excessive_api_calls_v1 threshold=0.005 | rename \"IsOutlier(api_calls)\" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1 | eval expected_upper_threshold = mvindex(split(mvindex(BoundaryRanges, -1), \":\"), 0) | where api_calls > expected_upper_threshold | eval distance_from_threshold = api_calls - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, command, api_calls, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User` to create the probability density function.", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud User Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "user $user$ has made $api_calls$ api calls, violating the dynamic threshold of $expected_upper_threshold$ with the following command $command$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.command", "All_Changes.user", "All_Changes.status"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Cloud Accounts", "Valid Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_filter"}]}, {"name": "GitHub Pull Request from Unknown User", "id": "9d7b9100-8878-4404-914e-ca5e551a641e", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-01", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for Pull Request from unknown user.", "search": "`github` check_suite.pull_requests{}.id=* | stats count by check_suite.head_commit.author.name repository.full_name check_suite.pull_requests{}.head.ref check_suite.head_commit.message | rename check_suite.head_commit.author.name as user repository.full_name as repository check_suite.pull_requests{}.head.ref as ref_head check_suite.head_commit.message as commit_message | search NOT `github_known_users` | eval phase=\"code\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `github_pull_request_from_unknown_user_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must index GitHub logs. You can follow the url in reference to onboard GitHub logs.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/tips-and-tricks/getting-github-data-with-webhooks.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "asset_type": "GitHub", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1195.001/github_pull_request/github_pull_request.json"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Vulnerabilities found in packages used by GitHub repository $repository$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1195.001", "T1195"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "repository", "type": "System", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "alert.id", "repository.full_name", "repository.html_url", "action", "alert.affected_package_name", "alert.affected_range", "alert.created_at", "alert.external_identifier", "alert.external_reference", "alert.fixed_in", "alert.severity"], "risk_score": 27, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools", "Supply Chain Compromise"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Elderwood"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "user IN (user_names_here)", "description": "specify the user allowed to create PRs in Github projects.", "name": "github_known_users"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=aws:firehose:json", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "github"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "github_pull_request_from_unknown_user_filter"}]}, {"name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country", "id": "94994255-3acf-4213-9b3f-0494df03bb31", "version": 1, "date": "2020-10-09", "author": "Rico Valdez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen countries. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something.", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(Country) | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources Country as Country OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenCountry=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenCountry) OR firstTimeSeenCountry > relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") | table firstTime, src, Country, user, object, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_country_filter` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_country_filter` macro.", "known_false_positives": "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no \"false positives\" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\\\n This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json"], "impact": 70, "message": "User $user$ is starting or creating an instance $object$ for the first time in Country $Country$ from IP address $src$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "src", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "object", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.action", "All_Changes.status", "All_Changes.src", "All_Changes.user", "All_Changes.object", "All_Changes.command"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Valid Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_country_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A table of source IPs, geographic locations, and the first and last time that they have that done cloud provisioning activities", "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", "name": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", "fields_list": "_key, src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data"}]}, {"name": "AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources", "id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-212bf3d0dac4", "version": 2, "date": "2021-02-22", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user created a policy version that allows them to access any resource in their account", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=CreatePolicyVersion eventSource = iam.amazonaws.com errorCode = success | spath input=requestParameters.policyDocument output=key_policy_statements path=Statement{} | mvexpand key_policy_statements | spath input=key_policy_statements output=key_policy_action_1 path=Action | search key_policy_action_1 = \"*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(key_policy_statements) as policy_added by eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|`aws_create_policy_version_to_allow_all_resources_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a policy to allow a user to access all resources. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to all AWS resources", "references": ["https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws", "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation-part-2/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_create_policy_version/aws_cloudtrail_events.json"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user$ created a policy version that allows them to access any resource in their account", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "userAgent", "errorCode", "requestParameters.userName"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Cloud Accounts", "Valid Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_create_policy_version_to_allow_all_resources_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", "id": "67bd3def-c41c-4bf6-837b-ae196b4257c6", "version": 1, "date": "2020-10-07", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Authentication"], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | table firstTime lastTime user Country | join user type=outer [| inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) AS earliestseen by user Country | fields earliestseen user Country] | eval userCountry=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\"), \"New Country\",\"Previously Seen Country\") | eval userStatus=if(earliestseen >= relative_time(now(),\"-24h@h\") OR isnull(earliestseen), \"New User\",\"Old User\") | where userCountry = \"New Country\" AND userStatus != \"Old User\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime lastTime user Country userStatus userCountry | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter` macro.", "known_false_positives": "When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities", "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user$ is logging into the AWS console from Country $Country$ for the first time", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Authentication.signature", "Authentication.user", "Authentication.src"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A table of users seen doing console logins, and the first and last time that the activity was observed", "collection": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", "name": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", "fields_list": "_key, firstTime, lastTime, user, src, City, Region, Country"}]}, {"name": "O365 Added Service Principal", "id": "1668812a-6047-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-26", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects the creation of a new Federation setting by alerting about an specific event related to its creation.", "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory signature=\"Add service principal credentials.\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Actor{}.ID) as Actor.ID values(ModifiedProperties{}.Name) as ModifiedProperties.Name values(ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue) as ModifiedProperties.NewValue values(Target{}.ID) as Target.ID by ActorIpAddress signature | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_added_service_principal_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", "known_false_positives": "The creation of a new Federation is not necessarily malicious, however these events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a different cloud provider.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html", "https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "asset_type": "Office 365", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_add_service_principal/o365_add_service_principal.json"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "message": "User $Actor.ID$ created a new federation setting on $Target.ID$ and added service principal credentials from IP Address $ActorIpAddress$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1136.003", "T1136"], "observable": [{"name": "ActorIpAddress", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "Target.ID", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Workload", "signature", "Actor{}.ID", "ModifiedProperties{}.Name", "ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue", "Target{}.ID", "ActorIpAddress"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Cloud Account", "Create Account"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "o365_management_activity"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "o365_added_service_principal_filter"}]}, {"name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User", "id": "37a0ec8d-827e-4d6d-8025-cedf31f3a149", "version": 2, "date": "2021-07-13", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search looks for cloud compute instances created by users who have not created them before.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object) as dest from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.user All_Changes.vendor_region | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user user as user OUTPUTNEW firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenUser=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenUser) OR firstTimeSeenUser > relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") | table firstTime, user, dest, count vendor_region | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting the appropriate cloud-infrastructure logs Run the \"Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User\" support search to create of baseline of previously seen users.", "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a user will start to create compute instances for the first time, for any number of reasons. Verify with the user launching instances that this is the intended behavior.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Cryptomining"], "asset_type": "Cloud Compute Instance", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Recon", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json"], "impact": 30, "message": "User $user$ is creating a new instance $dest$ for the first time", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.object", "All_Changes.action", "All_Changes.user", "All_Changes.vendor_region"], "risk_score": 18, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Cloud Accounts", "Valid Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A table of previously seen users creating cloud instances", "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user", "name": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user", "fields_list": "_key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, user, enough_data"}]}, {"name": "AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Low Informational Unknown", "id": "cbc95e44-7c22-443f-88fd-0424478f5589", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-17", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). You need to activate image scanning in order to get the event DescribeImageScanFindings with the results.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=ecr.amazonaws.com eventName=DescribeImageScanFindings | spath path=responseElements.imageScanFindings.findings{} output=findings | mvexpand findings | spath input=findings| search severity IN (LOW, INFORMATIONAL, UNKNWON) | rename name as finding_name, description as finding_description, requestParameters.imageId.imageDigest as imageDigest, requestParameters.repositoryName as repositoryName | eval finding = finding_name.\", \".finding_description | eval phase=\"release\" | eval severity=\"low\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by awsRegion, eventName, eventSource, imageDigest, repositoryName, user, userName, src_ip, finding, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_low_informational_unknown_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECR/latest/userguide/image-scanning.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Vulnerabilities with severity high found in repository $repositoryName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1204.003", "T1204"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "repositoryName", "type": "System", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"], "required_fields": ["eventSource", "eventName", "responseElements.imageScanFindings.findings{}", "awsRegion", "requestParameters.imageId.imageDigest", "requestParameters.repositoryName", "user", "userName", "src_ip"], "risk_score": 7, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["User Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_low_informational_unknown_filter"}]}, {"name": "AWS ECR Container Upload Unknown User", "id": "300688e4-365c-4486-a065-7c884462b31d", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-19", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). A upload of a new container is normally done from only a few known users. When the user was never seen before, we should have a closer look into the event.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=ecr.amazonaws.com eventName=PutImage NOT `aws_ecr_users` | rename requestParameters.* as * | rename repositoryName AS image | eval phase=\"release\" | eval severity=\"high\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by awsRegion, eventName, eventSource, user, userName, src_ip, imageTag, registryId, image, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/003/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Container uploaded from unknown user $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1204.003", "T1204"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src_ip", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"], "required_fields": ["eventSource", "eventName", "awsRegion", "requestParameters.imageTag", "requestParameters.registryId", "requestParameters.repositoryName", "user", "userName", "src_ip"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["User Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "userName IN (user)", "description": "specify the user allowed to push Images to AWS ECR.", "name": "aws_ecr_users"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect AWS Console Login by New User", "id": "bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd71", "version": 1, "date": "2020-05-28", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Authentication"], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | join user type=outer [ inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) as earliestseen by user] | eval userStatus=if(earliestseen >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") OR isnull(earliestseen), \"First Time Logging into AWS Console\", \"Previously Seen User\") | where userStatus=\"First Time Logging into AWS Console\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines.", "known_false_positives": "When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user$ is logging into the AWS console for the first time", "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Authentication.signature", "Authentication.user"], "risk_score": 30, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A table of users seen doing console logins, and the first and last time that the activity was observed", "collection": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", "name": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", "fields_list": "_key, firstTime, lastTime, user, src, City, Region, Country"}]}, {"name": "AWS Excessive Security Scanning", "id": "1fdd164a-def8-4762-83a9-9ffe24e74d5a", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-13", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events and analyse the amount of eventNames which starts with Describe by a single user. This indicates that this user scans the configuration of your AWS cloud environment.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=Describe* OR eventName=List* OR eventName=Get* | stats dc(eventName) as dc_events min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(eventName) as eventName values(src) as src values(userAgent) as userAgent by user userIdentity.arn | where dc_events > 50 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|`aws_excessive_security_scanning_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives.", "references": ["https://github.com/aquasecurity/cloudsploit"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS User Monitoring"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:Inbound", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1526/aws_security_scanner/aws_security_scanner.json"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "user $user$ has excessive number of api calls $dc_events$ from these IP addresses $src$, violating the threshold of 50, using the following commands $command$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1526"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "src", "userAgent", "user", "userIdentity.arn"], "risk_object": "src", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 18, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Cloud Service Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_excessive_security_scanning_filter"}]}, {"name": "AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA", "id": "c79c164f-4b21-4847-98f9-cf6a9f49179e", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-11", "author": "Rod Soto, Patrick Bareiss Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides detection of KMS keys where action kms:Encrypt is accessible for everyone (also outside of your organization). This is an indicator that your account is compromised and the attacker uses the encryption key to compromise another company.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=CreateKey OR eventName=PutKeyPolicy | spath input=requestParameters.policy output=key_policy_statements path=Statement{} | mvexpand key_policy_statements | spath input=key_policy_statements output=key_policy_action_1 path=Action | spath input=key_policy_statements output=key_policy_action_2 path=Action{} | eval key_policy_action=mvappend(key_policy_action_1, key_policy_action_2) | spath input=key_policy_statements output=key_policy_principal path=Principal.AWS | search key_policy_action=\"kms:Encrypt\" AND key_policy_principal=\"*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by eventName eventSource eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/", "https://github.com/d1vious/git-wild-hunt", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgzNib37g0M"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware Cloud"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1486/aws_kms_key/aws_cloudtrail_events.json"], "impact": 50, "message": "AWS account is potentially compromised and user $userIdentity.principalId$ is trying to compromise other accounts.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1486"], "observable": [{"name": "userIdentity.principalId", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "eventSource", "eventID", "awsRegion", "requestParameters.policy", "userIdentity.principalId"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Data Encrypted for Impact"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "TA505", "APT38"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa_filter"}]}, {"name": "AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3", "id": "884a5f59-eec7-4f4a-948b-dbde18225fdc", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-11", "author": "Rod Soto, Patrick Bareiss Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides detection of users with KMS keys performing encryption specifically against S3 buckets.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=CopyObject requestParameters.x-amz-server-side-encryption=\"aws:kms\" | rename requestParameters.bucketName AS bucket_name, requestParameters.x-amz-copy-source AS src_file, requestParameters.key AS dest_file | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(src_file) AS src_file values(dest_file) AS dest_file values(userAgent) AS userAgent values(region) AS region values(src) AS src by user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs", "known_false_positives": "bucket with S3 encryption", "references": ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/", "https://github.com/d1vious/git-wild-hunt", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgzNib37g0M"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware Cloud"], "asset_type": "S3 Bucket", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1486/s3_file_encryption/aws_cloudtrail_events.json"], "impact": 30, "message": "User $user$ with KMS keys is performing encryption, against S3 buckets on these files $dest_file$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1486"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "dest_file", "type": "File", "role": ["Target"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "requestParameters.x-amz-server-side-encryption", "requestParameters.bucketName", "requestParameters.x-amz-copy-source", "requestParameters.key", "userAgent", "region"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Data Encrypted for Impact"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "TA505", "APT38"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3_filter"}]}, {"name": "AWS CreateLoginProfile", "id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-11ad-212bf444d111", "version": 2, "date": "2021-07-19", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user A(victim A) creates a login profile for user B, followed by a AWS Console login event from user B from the same src_ip as user B. This correlated event can be indicative of privilege escalation since both events happened from the same src_ip", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName = CreateLoginProfile | rename requestParameters.userName as new_login_profile | table src_ip eventName new_login_profile userIdentity.userName | join new_login_profile src_ip [| search `cloudtrail` eventName = ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.userName as new_login_profile | stats count values(eventName) min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn new_login_profile src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`] | `aws_createloginprofile_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a login profile for another user.", "references": ["https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws", "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation-part-2/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_createloginprofile/aws_cloudtrail_events.json"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user_arn$ is attempting to create a login profile for $requestParameters.userName$ and did a console login from this IP $src_ip$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1136.003", "T1136"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src_ip", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "user_arn", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "userAgent", "errorCode", "requestParameters.userName"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Cloud Account", "Create Account"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_createloginprofile_filter"}]}, {"name": "GitHub Dependabot Alert", "id": "05032b04-4469-4034-9df7-05f607d75cba", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-01", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for Dependabot Alerts in Github logs.", "search": "`github` alert.id=* action=create | rename repository.full_name as repository, repository.html_url as repository_url sender.login as user | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by action alert.affected_package_name alert.affected_range alert.created_at alert.external_identifier alert.external_reference alert.fixed_in alert.severity repository repository_url user | eval phase=\"code\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `github_dependabot_alert_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must index GitHub logs. You can follow the url in reference to onboard GitHub logs.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/tips-and-tricks/getting-github-data-with-webhooks.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "asset_type": "GitHub", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1195.001/github_security_advisor_alert/github_security_advisor_alert.json"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Vulnerabilities found in packages used by GitHub repository $repository$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1195.001", "T1195"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "repository", "type": "System", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "alert.id", "repository.full_name", "repository.html_url", "action", "alert.affected_package_name", "alert.affected_range", "alert.created_at", "alert.external_identifier", "alert.external_reference", "alert.fixed_in", "alert.severity"], "risk_score": 27, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools", "Supply Chain Compromise"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Elderwood"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=aws:firehose:json", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "github"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "github_dependabot_alert_filter"}]}, {"name": "AWS UpdateLoginProfile", "id": "2a9b80d3-6a40-4115-11ad-212bf3d0d111", "version": 2, "date": "2021-07-19", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user A who has already permission to update login profile, makes an API call to update login profile for another user B . Attackers have been know to use this technique for Privilege Escalation in case new victim(user B) has more permissions than old victim(user B)", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName = UpdateLoginProfile userAgent !=console.amazonaws.com errorCode = success| search userIdentity.userName!=requestParameters.userName | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by requestParameters.userName src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.userName user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|`aws_updateloginprofile_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created keys for another user.", "references": ["https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws", "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation-part-2/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 60, "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_updateloginprofile/aws_cloudtrail_events.json"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "From IP address $sourceIPAddress$, user agent $userAgent$ has trigged an event $eventName$ for updating the existing login profile, potentially giving user $user_arn$ more access privilleges", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1136.003", "T1136"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "user_arn", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "userAgent", "errorCode", "requestParameters.userName"], "risk_score": 30, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Cloud Account", "Create Account"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_updateloginprofile_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", "id": "9f31aa8e-e37c-46bc-bce1-8b3be646d026", "version": 1, "date": "2020-10-07", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Authentication"], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | table firstTime lastTime user Region | join user type=outer [| inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) AS earliestseen by user Region | fields earliestseen user Region] | eval userRegion=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\"), \"New Region\",\"Previously Seen Region\") | eval userStatus=if(earliestseen >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") OR isnull(earliestseen), \"New User\",\"Old User\") | where userRegion = \"New Region\" AND userStatus != \"Old User\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime lastTime user Region userStatus userRegion | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter` macro.", "known_false_positives": "When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities", "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user$ is logging into the AWS console from Region $Region$ for the first time", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Authentication.signature", "Authentication.user", "Authentication.src"], "risk_score": 36, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A table of users seen doing console logins, and the first and last time that the activity was observed", "collection": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", "name": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", "fields_list": "_key, firstTime, lastTime, user, src, City, Region, Country"}]}, {"name": "Circle CI Disable Security Step", "id": "72cb9de9-e98b-4ac9-80b2-5331bba6ea97", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-01", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for disable security step in CircleCI pipeline.", "search": "`circleci` | rename workflows.job_id AS job_id | join job_id [ | search `circleci` | stats values(name) as step_names count by job_id job_name ] | stats count by step_names job_id job_name vcs.committer_name vcs.subject vcs.url owners{} | rename vcs.* as * , owners{} as user | lookup mandatory_step_for_job job_name OUTPUTNEW step_name AS mandatory_step | search mandatory_step=* | eval mandatory_step_executed=if(like(step_names, \"%\".mandatory_step.\"%\"), 1, 0) | where mandatory_step_executed=0 | rex field=url \"(?[^\\/]*\\/[^\\/]*)$\" | eval phase=\"build\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `circle_ci_disable_security_step_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must index CircleCI logs.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "asset_type": "CircleCI", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1554/circle_ci_disable_security_step/circle_ci_disable_security_step.json"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "disable security step $mandatory_step$ in job $job_name$ from user $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1554"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_times"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Compromise Client Software Binary"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=circleci", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "circleci"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "circle_ci_disable_security_step_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A lookup file that will be used to define the mandatory step for job", "filename": "mandatory_step_for_job.csv", "name": "mandatory_step_for_job", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/mandatory_step_for_job.csv"}]}, {"name": "Detect shared ec2 snapshot", "id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-290bf3d222c4", "version": 2, "date": "2021-07-20", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes AWS CloudTrail events to identify when an EC2 snapshot permissions are modified to be shared with a different AWS account. This method is used by adversaries to exfiltrate the EC2 snapshot.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=ModifySnapshotAttribute | rename requestParameters.createVolumePermission.add.items{}.userId as requested_account_id | search requested_account_id != NULL | eval match=if(requested_account_id==aws_account_id,\"Match\",\"No Match\") | table _time user_arn src_ip requestParameters.attributeType requested_account_id aws_account_id match vendor_region user_agent | where match = \"No Match\" | `detect_shared_ec2_snapshot_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately shared a snapshot with others for a specific purpose.", "references": ["https://labs.nettitude.com/blog/how-to-exfiltrate-aws-ec2-data/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", "Data Exfiltration"], "asset_type": "EC2 Snapshot", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1537/aws_snapshot_exfil/aws_cloudtrail_events.json"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "AWS EC2 snapshot from account $aws_account_id$ is shared with $requested_account_id$ by user $user_arn$ from $src_ip$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1537"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user_arn", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "src_ip", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "user_arn", "src_ip", "requestParameters.attributeType", "aws_account_id", "vendor_region", "user_agent"], "risk_score": 48, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Transfer Data to Cloud Account"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_shared_ec2_snapshot_filter"}]}, {"name": "Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain", "id": "dc4dc3a8-ff54-11eb-8bf7-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-17", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious outbound e-mail from internal email to external email domain. This can be a good hunting query to monitor insider or outbound email traffic for not common domain e-mail. The idea is to parse the domain of destination email check if there is a minimum outbound traffic < 20 with attachment.", "search": "`gsuite_gmail` num_message_attachments > 0 | rex field=source.from_header_address \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | rex field=destination{}.address \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | where source_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" and not dest_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" | eval phase=\"plan\" | eval severity=\"low\" | stats values(subject) as subject, values(source.from_header_address) as src_domain_list, count as numEvents, dc(source.from_header_address) as numSrcAddresses, min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest_domain phase severity | where numSrcAddresses < 20 |sort - numSrcAddresses | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_outbound_email_with_attachment_to_external_domain_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc.", "known_false_positives": "network admin and normal user may send this file attachment as part of their day to day work. having a good protocol in attaching this file type to an e-mail may reduce the risk of having a spear phishing attack.", "references": ["https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gsuite_outbound_email_to_external/gsuite_external_domain.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "suspicious email from $source.address$ to $destination{}.address$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1048.003", "T1048"], "observable": [{"name": "source.address", "type": "User", "role": ["attacker"]}, {"name": "destination{}.address", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 9, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration", "Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "Thrip", "FIN8", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:gmail:bigquery", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "gsuite_gmail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "gsuite_outbound_email_with_attachment_to_external_domain_filter"}]}, {"name": "AWS IAM Failure Group Deletion", "id": "723b861a-92eb-11eb-93b8-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-01", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This detection identifies failure attempts to delete groups. We want to identify when a group is attempting to be deleted, but either access is denied, there is a conflict or there is no group. This is indicative of administrators performing an action, but also could be suspicious behavior occurring. Review parallel IAM events - recently added users, new groups and so forth.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=iam.amazonaws.com eventName=DeleteGroup errorCode IN (NoSuchEntityException,DeleteConflictException, AccessDenied) (userAgent!=*.amazonaws.com) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.groupName) as group_name by src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode errorMessage userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_iam_failure_group_deletion_filter`", "how_to_implement": "The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs.", "known_false_positives": "This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users. Not every user with AWS access should have permission to delete groups (least privilege).", "references": ["https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/iam/delete-group.html", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteGroup.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098/aws_iam_failure_group_deletion/aws_iam_failure_group_deletion.json"], "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user_arn$ has had mulitple failures while attempting to delete groups from $src$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1098"], "observable": [{"name": "src", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "user_arn", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "group_name", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "userAgent", "errorCode", "requestParameters.groupName"], "risk_score": 5, "security_domain": "cloud", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Account Manipulation"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Lazarus Group"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_iam_failure_group_deletion_filter"}]}, {"name": "O365 Disable MFA", "id": "c783dd98-c703-4252-9e8a-f19d9f5c949e", "version": 1, "date": "2020-12-16", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects when multi factor authentication has been disabled, what entitiy performed the action and against what user", "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=\"Disable Strong Authentication.\" | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by UserType Operation user status signature dest ResultStatus |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_disable_mfa_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", "known_false_positives": "Unless it is a special case, it is uncommon to disable MFA or Strong Authentication", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections"], "asset_type": "Office 365", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/o365_disable_mfa/o365_disable_mfa.json"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "message": "User $user$ has executed an operation $Operation$ for this destination $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1556"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Operation", "UserType", "user", "status", "signature", "dest", "ResultStatus"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Modify Authentication Process"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "o365_management_activity"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "o365_disable_mfa_filter"}]}, {"name": "Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles", "id": "2181ad1f-1e73-4d0c-9780-e8880482a08f", "version": 1, "date": "2020-09-04", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search looks for new commands from each user role.", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.user_type=AssumedRole AND All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user, All_Changes.command All_Changes.object | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role user as user, command as command OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenUserApiCall=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenUserApiCall) OR firstTimeSeenUserApiCall > relative_time(now(),\"-24h@h\") | table firstTime, user, object, command |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial` to build the initial table of user roles, commands, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_filter`", "known_false_positives": ".", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud User Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Recon", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json"], "impact": 60, "message": "User $user$ of type AssumedRole attempting to execute new API calls $command$ that have not been seen before", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.user", "All_Changes.user_type", "All_Changes.status", "All_Changes.command", "All_Changes.object"], "risk_score": 36, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Valid Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A table of users, commands, and the first and last time that they have been seen", "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role", "name": "previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role", "fields_list": "_key, user, command, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data"}]}, {"name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region", "id": "5aba1860-9617-4af9-b19d-aecac16fe4f2", "version": 1, "date": "2020-08-16", "author": "Rico Valdez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen regions. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something.", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(Region) | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources Region as Region OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenRegion=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenRegion) OR firstTimeSeenRegion > relative_time(now(), `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window`) | table firstTime, src, Region, user, object, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region_filter` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region_filter` macro.", "known_false_positives": "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no \"false positives\" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\\\n This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json"], "impact": 70, "message": "User $user$ is starting or creating an instance $object$ for the first time in region $Region$ from IP address $src$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "src", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "object", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.action", "All_Changes.status", "All_Changes.src", "All_Changes.user", "All_Changes.object", "All_Changes.command"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Valid Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"description": "Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new provisioning activities", "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", "name": "previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A table of source IPs, geographic locations, and the first and last time that they have that done cloud provisioning activities", "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", "name": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", "fields_list": "_key, src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data"}]}, {"name": "O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding", "id": "7f398cfb-918d-41f4-8db8-2e2474e02c28", "version": 1, "date": "2020-12-16", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects when an admin configured a forwarding rule for multiple mailboxes to the same destination.", "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=Set-Mailbox | spath input=Parameters | rename Identity AS src_user | search ForwardingAddress=* | stats dc(src_user) AS count_src_user earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(src_user) AS src_user values(user) AS user by ForwardingAddress | where count_src_user > 1 |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections", "Data Exfiltration"], "asset_type": "Office 365", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114.003/o365_email_forwarding_rule/o365_email_forwarding_rule.json"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user$ has configured a forwarding rule for multiple mailboxes to the same destination $ForwardingAddress$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1114.003", "T1114"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Operation", "Parameters"], "risk_score": 48, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Email Forwarding Rule", "Email Collection"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "o365_management_activity"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding_filter"}]}, {"name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region", "id": "fa4089e2-50e3-40f7-8469-d2cc1564ca59", "version": 1, "date": "2020-09-02", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search looks at cloud-infrastructure events where an instance is created in any region within the last hour and then compares it to a lookup file of previously seen regions where instances have been created.", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id) as dest, count from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.vendor_region, All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_regions vendor_region as vendor_region OUTPUTNEW firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenRegion=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenRegion) OR firstTimeSeenRegion > relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") | table firstTime, user, dest, count , vendor_region | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial` to build the initial table of images observed and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region_filter` macro.", "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a user has unknowingly started an instance in a new region. Please verify that this activity is legitimate.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Cryptomining"], "asset_type": "Cloud Compute Instance", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 12"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user$ is creating an instance $dest$ in a new region for the first time", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.object_id", "All_Changes.action", "All_Changes.vendor_region", "All_Changes.user"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A table of vendor_region values and the first and last time that they have been observed in cloud provisioning activities", "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_regions", "name": "previously_seen_cloud_regions", "fields_list": "_key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, vendor_region, enough_data"}]}, {"name": "Gsuite Email Suspicious Subject With Attachment", "id": "8ef3971e-00f2-11ec-b54f-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-19", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search is to detect a gsuite email contains suspicious subject having known file type used in spear phishing. This technique is a common and effective entry vector of attacker to compromise a network by luring the user to click or execute the suspicious attachment send from external email account because of the effective social engineering of subject related to delivery, bank and so on. On the other hand this detection may catch a normal email traffic related to legitimate transaction so better to check the email sender, spelling and etc. avoid click link or opening the attachment if you are not expecting this type of e-mail.", "search": "`gsuite_gmail` num_message_attachments > 0 subject IN (\"*dhl*\", \"* ups *\", \"*delivery*\", \"*parcel*\", \"*label*\", \"*invoice*\", \"*postal*\", \"* fedex *\", \"* usps *\", \"* express *\", \"*shipment*\", \"*Banking/Tax*\",\"*shipment*\", \"*new order*\") attachment{}.file_extension_type IN (\"doc\", \"docx\", \"xls\", \"xlsx\", \"ppt\", \"pptx\", \"pdf\", \"zip\", \"rar\", \"html\",\"htm\",\"hta\") | rex field=source.from_header_address \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | rex field=destination{}.address \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | where not source_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" and dest_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" | eval phase=\"plan\" | eval severity=\"medium\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(attachment{}.file_extension_type) as email_attachments, values(attachment{}.sha256) as attachment_sha256, values(payload_size) as payload_size by destination{}.service num_message_attachments subject destination{}.address source.address phase severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_email_suspicious_subject_with_attachment_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc.", "known_false_positives": "normal user or normal transaction may contain the subject and file type attachment that this detection try to search.", "references": ["https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-top-spear-phishing-words.pdf"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gsuite_susp_subj/gsuite_susp_subj_attach.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "suspicious email from $source.address$ to $destination{}.address$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566.001", "T1566"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Spearphishing Attachment", "Phishing"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:gmail:bigquery", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "gsuite_gmail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "gsuite_email_suspicious_subject_with_attachment_filter"}]}, {"name": "O365 Excessive SSO logon errors", "id": "8158ccc4-6038-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-26", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects accounts with high number of Single Sign ON (SSO) logon errors. Excessive logon errors may indicate attempts to bruteforce of password or single sign on token hijack or reuse.", "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory LogonError=SsoArtifactInvalidOrExpired | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by LogonError ActorIpAddress UserAgent UserId | where count > 5 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", "known_false_positives": "Logon errors may not be malicious in nature however it may indicate attempts to reuse a token or password obtained via credential access attack.", "references": ["https://stealthbits.com/blog/bypassing-mfa-with-pass-the-cookie/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "asset_type": "Office 365", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/o365_sso_logon_errors/o365_sso_logon_errors.json"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "message": "User $UserId$ has caused excessive number of SSO logon errors from $ActorIpAddress$ using UserAgent $UserAgent$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1556"], "observable": [{"name": "ActorIpAddress", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "UserId", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Workload", "LogonError", "ActorIpAddress", "UserAgent", "UserId"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Modify Authentication Process"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "o365_management_activity"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors_filter"}]}, {"name": "AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account", "id": "21193641-cb96-4a2c-a707-d9b9a7f7792b", "version": 1, "date": "2020-05-28", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Authentication"], "description": "This search looks for AssumeRole events where an IAM role in a different account is requested for the first time.", "search": "| tstats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=AssumeRole by Authentication.vendor_account Authentication.user Authentication.src Authentication.user_role | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | rex field=user_role \"arn:aws:sts:*:(?.*):\" | where vendor_account != dest_account | rename vendor_account as requestingAccountId dest_account as requestedAccountId | lookup previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity requestingAccountId, requestedAccountId, OUTPUTNEW firstTime | eval status = if(firstTime > relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\"),\"New Cross Account Activity\",\"Previously Seen\") | where status = \"New Cross Account Activity\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account_filter` macro.", "known_false_positives": "Using multiple AWS accounts and roles is perfectly valid behavior. It's suspicious when an account requests privileges of an account it hasn't before. You should validate with the account owner that this is a legitimate request.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "AWS account $requestingAccountId$ is trying to access resource from some other account $requestedAccountId$, for the first time.", "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.DS", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "requestingAccountId", "type": "Other", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "requestedAccountId", "type": "Other", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Authentication.signature", "Authentication.vendor_account", "Authentication.user", "Authentication.user_role", "Authentication.src"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A placeholder for a list of AWS accounts and assumed roles", "filename": "previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.csv", "name": "previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.csv"}]}, {"name": "O365 New Federated Domain Added", "id": "e155876a-6048-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-26", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects the addition of a new Federated domain.", "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=Exchange Operation=\"Add-FederatedDomain\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Parameters{}.Value) as Parameters.Value by ObjectId Operation OrganizationName OriginatingServer UserId UserKey | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_new_federated_domain_added_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity.", "known_false_positives": "The creation of a new Federated domain is not necessarily malicious, however these events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a similar or different cloud provider.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html", "https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory", "https://o365blog.com/post/aadbackdoor/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "asset_type": "Office 365", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_new_federated_domain/o365_new_federated_domain.json"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "message": "User $UserId$ has added a new federated domaain $Parameters.Value$ for $OrganizationName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1136.003", "T1136"], "observable": [{"name": "OrganizationName", "type": "Other", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "UserId", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Workload", "Operation", "Parameters{}.Value", "ObjectId", "OrganizationName", "OriginatingServer", "UserId", "UserKey"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Cloud Account", "Create Account"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "o365_management_activity"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "o365_new_federated_domain_added_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI", "id": "39c61d09-8b30-4154-922b-2d0a694ecc22", "version": 2, "date": "2021-07-19", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public S3 bucket over the aws cli.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=\"s3.amazonaws.com\" (userAgent=\"[aws-cli*\" OR userAgent=aws-cli* ) eventName=PutBucketAcl OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read-acp IN (\"*AuthenticatedUsers\",\"*AllUsers\") OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write IN (\"*AuthenticatedUsers\",\"*AllUsers\") OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write-acp IN (\"*AuthenticatedUsers\",\"*AllUsers\") OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-full-control IN (\"*AuthenticatedUsers\",\"*AllUsers\") | rename requestParameters.bucketName AS bucketName | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by userIdentity.userName userIdentity.principalId userAgent bucketName requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read-acp requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write-acp requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-full-control | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "", "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to the \"All Users\" group.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"], "asset_type": "S3 Bucket", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1530/aws_s3_public_bucket/aws_cloudtrail_events.json"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $userIdentity.userName$ has created an open/public bucket $bucketName$ using AWS CLI with the following permissions - $requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read$ $requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read-acp$ $requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write$ $requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write-acp$ $requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-full-control$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "userIdentity.userName", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "bucketName", "type": "Other", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventSource", "eventName", "requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read-acp", "requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write", "requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write-acp", "requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-full-control", "requestParameters.bucketName", "userIdentity.userName", "userIdentity.principalId", "userAgent", "bucketName"], "risk_score": 48, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Data from Cloud Storage Object"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli_filter"}]}, {"name": "AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports", "id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d6bd75", "version": 2, "date": "2021-01-11", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The search looks for AWS CloudTrail events to detect if any network ACLs were created with all the ports open to a specified CIDR.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=CreateNetworkAclEntry OR eventName=ReplaceNetworkAclEntry requestParameters.ruleAction=allow requestParameters.egress=false requestParameters.aclProtocol=-1 | append [search `cloudtrail` eventName=CreateNetworkAclEntry OR eventName=ReplaceNetworkAclEntry requestParameters.ruleAction=allow requestParameters.egress=false requestParameters.aclProtocol!=-1 | eval port_range='requestParameters.portRange.to' - 'requestParameters.portRange.from' | where port_range>1024] | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by userName userIdentity.principalId eventName requestParameters.ruleAction requestParameters.egress requestParameters.aclProtocol requestParameters.portRange.to requestParameters.portRange.from src userAgent requestParameters.cidrBlock | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS, version 4.4.0 or later, and configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs.", "known_false_positives": "It's possible that an admin has created this ACL with all ports open for some legitimate purpose however, this should be scoped and not allowed in production environment.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS Network ACL Activity"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 11"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.007/aws_create_acl/aws_cloudtrail_events.json"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user_arn$ has created network ACLs with all the ports open to a specified CIDR $requestParameters.cidrBlock$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.007", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "src", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "userName", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "requestParameters.cidrBlock", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "requestParameters.ruleAction", "requestParameters.egress", "requestParameters.aclProtocol", "requestParameters.portRange.to", "requestParameters.portRange.from", "requestParameters.cidrBlock", "userName", "userIdentity.principalId", "userAgent"], "risk_score": 48, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance", "id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-290bf5d0d222", "version": 3, "date": "2021-01-26", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub alerts for an EC2 instance in 4 hours intervals", "search": "`aws_securityhub_finding` \"Resources{}.Type\"=AWSEC2Instance | bucket span=4h _time | stats count AS alerts values(Title) as Title values(Types{}) as Types values(vendor_account) as vendor_account values(vendor_region) as vendor_region values(severity) as severity by _time dest | eventstats avg(alerts) as total_alerts_avg, stdev(alerts) as total_alerts_stdev | eval threshold_value = 3 | eval isOutlier=if(alerts > total_alerts_avg+(total_alerts_stdev * threshold_value), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | table _time dest alerts Title Types vendor_account vendor_region severity isOutlier total_alerts_avg | `detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Security Hub inputs. The threshold_value should be tuned to your environment and schedule these searches according to the bucket span interval.", "known_false_positives": "None", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS Security Hub Alerts"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/security_hub_ec2_spike/security_hub_ec2_spike.json"], "impact": 30, "message": "Spike in AWS security Hub alerts with title $Title$ for EC2 instance $dest$", "nist": ["DE.DP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Resources{}.Type", "Title", "Types{}", "vendor_account", "vendor_region", "severity", "dest"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:securityhub:finding\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "aws_securityhub_finding"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance_filter"}]}, {"name": "AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force", "id": "f19e09b0-9308-11eb-b7ec-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-01", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following detection identifies any malformed policy document exceptions with a status of `failure`. A malformed policy document exception occurs in instances where roles are attempted to be assumed, or brute forced. In a brute force attempt, using a tool like CloudSploit or Pacu, an attempt will look like `arn:aws:iam::111111111111:role/aws-service-role/rds.amazonaws.com/AWSServiceRoleForRDS`. Meaning, when an adversary is attempting to identify a role name, multiple failures will occur. This detection focuses on the errors of a remote attempt that is failing.", "search": "`cloudtrail` (errorCode=MalformedPolicyDocumentException) status=failure (userAgent!=*.amazonaws.com) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.policyName) as policy_name by src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode requestParameters.policyDocument userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | where count >= 2 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force_filter`", "how_to_implement": "The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs. Set the `where count` greater than a value to identify suspicious activity in your environment.", "known_false_positives": "This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users.", "references": ["https://www.praetorian.com/blog/aws-iam-assume-role-vulnerabilities", "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/assume-worst-aws-assume-role-enumeration/", "https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/aws-iam-brute-force-of-assume-role-policy.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:Inbound", "Stage:Credential Access", "Other:Policy Violation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1580/aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force/aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force.json"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "User $user_arn$ has caused multiple failures with errorCode $errorCode$, which potentially means adversary is attempting to identify a role name.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1580", "T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "src", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "user_arn", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "userAgent", "errorCode", "requestParameters.policyName"], "risk_score": 28, "security_domain": "access", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Brute Force"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["DarkVishnya", "APT39", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Turla"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force_filter"}]}, {"name": "Circle CI Disable Security Job", "id": "4a2fdd41-c578-4cd4-9ef7-980e352517f2", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-02", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for disable security job in CircleCI pipeline.", "search": "`circleci` | rename vcs.committer_name as user vcs.subject as commit_message vcs.url as url workflows.* as * | stats values(job_name) as job_names by workflow_id workflow_name user commit_message url branch | lookup mandatory_job_for_workflow workflow_name OUTPUTNEW job_name AS mandatory_job | search mandatory_job=* | eval mandatory_job_executed=if(like(job_names, \"%\".mandatory_job.\"%\"), 1, 0) | where mandatory_job_executed=0 | eval phase=\"build\" | rex field=url \"(?[^\\/]*\\/[^\\/]*)$\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `circle_ci_disable_security_job_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must index CircleCI logs.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "asset_type": "CircleCI", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1554/circle_ci_disable_security_job/circle_ci_disable_security_job.json"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "disable security job $mandatory_job$ in workflow $workflow_name$ from user $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1554"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_times"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Compromise Client Software Binary"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=circleci", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "circleci"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "circle_ci_disable_security_job_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A lookup file that will be used to define the mandatory job for workflow", "filename": "mandatory_job_for_workflow.csv", "name": "mandatory_job_for_workflow", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/mandatory_job_for_workflow.csv"}]}, {"name": "AWS IAM Delete Policy", "id": "ec3a9362-92fe-11eb-99d0-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-01", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following detection identifes when a policy is deleted on AWS. This does not identify whether successful or failed, but the error messages tell a story of suspicious attempts. There is a specific process to follow when deleting a policy. First, detach the policy from all users, groups, and roles that the policy is attached to, using DetachUserPolicy , DetachGroupPolicy , or DetachRolePolicy.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=DeletePolicy (userAgent!=*.amazonaws.com) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.policyArn) as policyArn by src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode errorMessage userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId userIdentity.arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_iam_delete_policy_filter`", "how_to_implement": "The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs.", "known_false_positives": "This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users. Not every user with AWS access should have permission to delete policies (least privilege). In addition, this may be saved seperately and tuned for failed or success attempts only.", "references": ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_DeletePolicy.html", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/iam/delete-policy.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Stage:Execution", "Other:Policy Violation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098/aws_iam_delete_policy/aws_iam_delete_policy.json"], "impact": 20, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user_arn$ has deleted AWS Policies from IP address $src$ by executing the following command $eventName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1098"], "observable": [{"name": "src", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "user_arn", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "userAgent", "errorCode", "requestParameters.policyArn"], "risk_score": 10, "security_domain": "access", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Account Manipulation"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Lazarus Group"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_iam_delete_policy_filter"}]}, {"name": "AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion", "id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-11ad-212bf3d0dac4", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-02", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user has set a default policy versions. Attackers have been know to use this technique for Privilege Escalation in case the previous versions of the policy had permissions to access more resources than the current version of the policy", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=SetDefaultPolicyVersion eventSource = iam.amazonaws.com | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.policyArn) as policy_arn by src requestParameters.versionId eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_setdefaultpolicyversion_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately set a default policy to allow a user to access all resources. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to all AWS resources", "references": ["https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws", "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation-part-2/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Stage:Credential Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_setdefaultpolicyversion/aws_cloudtrail_events.json"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "From IP address $sourceIPAddress$, user agent $userAgent$ has trigged an event $eventName$ for updating the the default policy version", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "user_arn", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "userAgent", "errorCode", "requestParameters.userName", "eventSource"], "risk_score": 30, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Cloud Accounts", "Valid Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_setdefaultpolicyversion_filter"}]}, {"name": "O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation", "id": "b25d2973-303e-47c8-bacd-52b61604c6a7", "version": 1, "date": "2020-12-15", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects the assignment of rights to accesss content from another mailbox. This is usually only assigned to a service account.", "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=Add-MailboxPermission | spath input=Parameters | rename User AS src_user, Identity AS dest_user | search AccessRights=FullAccess OR AccessRights=SendAs OR AccessRights=SendOnBehalf | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user src_user dest_user Operation AccessRights |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`o365_suspicious_rights_delegation_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", "known_false_positives": "Service Accounts", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections"], "asset_type": "Office 365", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Stage:Exfiltration", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114.002/suspicious_rights_delegation/suspicious_rights_delegation.json"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user$ has delegated suspicious rights $AccessRights$ to user $dest_user$ that allow access to sensitive", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1114.002", "T1114"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Operation", "Parameters"], "risk_score": 48, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote Email Collection", "Email Collection"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "FIN4", "APT28", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Ke3chang", "Leafminer", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "o365_management_activity"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "o365_suspicious_rights_delegation_filter"}]}, {"name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls", "id": "d4dfb7f3-7a37-498a-b5df-f19334e871af", "version": 1, "date": "2020-09-07", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search will detect a spike in the number of API calls made to your cloud infrastructure environment about security groups by a user.", "search": "| tstats count as security_group_api_calls values(All_Changes.command) as command from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.object_category=firewall AND All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%w\") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | join user HourOfDay isWeekend [ summary cloud_excessive_security_group_api_calls_v1] | where cardinality >=16 | apply cloud_excessive_security_group_api_calls_v1 threshold=0.005 | rename \"IsOutlier(security_group_api_calls)\" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1 | eval expected_upper_threshold = mvindex(split(mvindex(BoundaryRanges, -1), \":\"), 0) | where security_group_api_calls > expected_upper_threshold | eval distance_from_threshold = security_group_api_calls - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, command, security_group_api_calls, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User` to create the probability density function model.", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud User Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:Inbound", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "user $user$ has made $api_calls$ api calls related to security groups, violating the dynamic threshold of $expected_upper_threshold$ with the following command $command$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.command", "All_Changes.object_category", "All_Changes.status", "All_Changes.user"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Cloud Accounts", "Valid Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls_filter"}]}, {"name": "Gsuite Suspicious Shared File Name", "id": "07eed200-03f5-11ec-98fb-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-23", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search is to detect a shared file in google drive with suspicious file name that are commonly used by spear phishing campaign. This technique is very popular to lure the user by running a malicious document or click a malicious link within the shared file that will redirected to malicious website. This detection can also catch some normal email communication between organization and its external customer.", "search": "`gsuite_drive` parameters.owner_is_team_drive=false \"parameters.doc_title\" IN (\"*dhl*\", \"* ups *\", \"*delivery*\", \"*parcel*\", \"*label*\", \"*invoice*\", \"*postal*\", \"*fedex*\", \"* usps *\", \"* express *\", \"*shipment*\", \"*Banking/Tax*\",\"*shipment*\", \"*new order*\") parameters.doc_type IN (\"document\",\"pdf\", \"msexcel\", \"msword\", \"spreadsheet\", \"presentation\") | rex field=parameters.owner \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | rex field=parameters.target_user \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | where not source_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" and dest_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" | eval phase=\"plan\" | eval severity=\"low\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by email parameters.owner parameters.target_user parameters.doc_title parameters.doc_type phase severity | rename parameters.target_user AS user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_suspicious_shared_file_name_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc. In order for the search to work for your environment, please edit the query to use your company specific email domain instead of `internal_test_email.com`.", "known_false_positives": "normal user or normal transaction may contain the subject and file type attachment that this detection try to search", "references": ["https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-top-spear-phishing-words.pdf"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gdrive_susp_file_share/gdrive_susp_attach.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "suspicious share gdrive from $parameters.owner$ to $email$ namely as $parameters.doc_title$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566.001", "T1566"], "observable": [{"name": "parameters.owner", "type": "User", "role": ["attacker"]}, {"name": "email", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "parameters.doc_title", "src_domain", "dest_domain", "email", "parameters.visibility", "parameters.owner", "parameters.doc_type"], "risk_score": 21, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Spearphishing Attachment", "Phishing"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass", "no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:drive:json", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "gsuite_drive"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "gsuite_suspicious_shared_file_name_filter"}]}, {"name": "AWS ECR Container Upload Outside Business Hours", "id": "d4c4d4eb-3994-41ca-a25e-a82d64e125bb", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-19", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). A upload of a new container is normally done during business hours. When done outside business hours, we want to take a look into it.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=ecr.amazonaws.com eventName=PutImage date_hour>=20 OR date_hour<8 NOT (date_wday=saturday OR date_wday=sunday) | rename requestParameters.* as * | rename repositoryName AS image | eval phase=\"release\" | eval severity=\"medium\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by awsRegion, eventName, eventSource, user, userName, src_ip, imageTag, registryId, image, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_ecr_container_upload_outside_business_hours_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", "known_false_positives": "When your development is spreaded in different time zones, applying this rule can be difficult.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/003/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Container uploaded outside business hours from $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1204.003", "T1204"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src_ip", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"], "required_fields": ["eventSource", "eventName", "awsRegion", "requestParameters.imageTag", "requestParameters.registryId", "requestParameters.repositoryName", "user", "userName", "src_ip"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["User Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_ecr_container_upload_outside_business_hours_filter"}]}, {"name": "Github Commit In Develop", "id": "f3030cb6-0b02-11ec-8f22-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-01", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search is to detect a pushed or commit to develop branch. This is to avoid unwanted modification to develop without a review to the changes. Ideally in terms of devsecops the changes made in a branch and do a PR for review. of course in some cases admin of the project may did a changes directly to master branch", "search": "`github` branches{}.name = main OR branches{}.name = develop | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by commit.author.html_url commit.commit.author.email commit.author.login commit.commit.message repository.pushed_at commit.commit.committer.date | eval phase=\"code\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `github_commit_in_develop_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to github logs having the fork, commit, push metadata that can be use to monitor the changes in a github project.", "known_false_positives": "admin can do changes directly to develop branch", "references": ["https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1199/github_push_master/github_push_develop.json"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "suspicious commit by $commit.commit.author.email$ to develop branch", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1199"], "observable": [{"name": "commit.commit.author.email", "type": "User", "role": ["attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 9, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Trusted Relationship"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "menuPass"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=aws:firehose:json", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "github"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "github_commit_in_develop_filter"}]}, {"name": "O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP", "id": "c783dd98-c703-4252-9e8a-f19d9f66949e", "version": 2, "date": "2021-07-19", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects newly added IP addresses/CIDR blocks to the list of MFA Trusted IPs to bypass multi factor authentication. Attackers are often known to use this technique so that they can bypass the MFA system.", "search": "`o365_management_activity` signature=\"Set Company Information.\" ModifiedProperties{}.Name=StrongAuthenticationPolicy | rex max_match=100 field=ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue \"(?\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\/\\d{1,2})\" | rex max_match=100 field=ModifiedProperties{}.OldValue \"(?\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\/\\d{1,2})\" | eval ip_addresses_old=if(isnotnull(ip_addresses_old),ip_addresses_old,\"0\") | mvexpand ip_addresses_new_added | where isnull(mvfind(ip_addresses_old,ip_addresses_new_added)) |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ip_addresses_old) as ip_addresses_old by user ip_addresses_new_added signature Workload vendor_account status user_id action | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install Splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", "known_false_positives": "Unless it is a special case, it is uncommon to continually update Trusted IPs to MFA configuration.", "references": ["https://i.blackhat.com/USA-20/Thursday/us-20-Bienstock-My-Cloud-Is-APTs-Cloud-Investigating-And-Defending-Office-365.pdf", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/007/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections"], "asset_type": "Office 365", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.007/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.json"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "message": "User $user_id$ has added new IP addresses $ip_addresses_new_added$ to a list of trusted IPs to bypass MFA", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.007", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "ip_addresses_new_added", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "user_id", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "signature", "ModifiedProperties{}.Name", "ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue", "ModifiedProperties{}.OldValue", "user", "vendor_account", "status", "user_id", "action"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "o365_management_activity"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip_filter"}]}, {"name": "O365 PST export alert", "id": "5f694cc4-a678-4a60-9410-bffca1b647dc", "version": 1, "date": "2020-12-16", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects when a user has performed an Ediscovery search or exported a PST file from the search. This PST file usually has sensitive information including email body content", "search": "`o365_management_activity` Category=ThreatManagement Name=\"eDiscovery search started or exported\" | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by Source Severity AlertEntityId Operation Name |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_pst_export_alert_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", "known_false_positives": "PST export can be done for legitimate purposes but due to the sensitive nature of its content it must be monitored.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections", "Data Exfiltration"], "asset_type": "Office 365", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114/o365_export_pst_file/o365_export_pst_file.json"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "message": "User $Source$ has exported a PST file from the search using this operation- $Operation$ with a severity of $Severity$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1114"], "observable": [{"name": "Source", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Category", "Name", "Source", "Severity", "AlertEntityId", "Operation"], "risk_score": 48, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Email Collection"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "o365_management_activity"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "o365_pst_export_alert_filter"}]}, {"name": "Gsuite Drive Share In External Email", "id": "f6ee02d6-fea0-11eb-b2c2-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-16", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search is to detect suspicious google drive or google docs files shared outside or externally. This behavior might be a good hunting query to monitor exfitration of data made by an attacker or insider to a targetted machine.", "search": "`gsuite_drive` NOT (email IN(\"\", \"null\")) | rex field=parameters.owner \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | rex field=email \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | where src_domain = \"internal_test_email.com\" and not dest_domain = \"internal_test_email.com\" | eval phase=\"plan\" | eval severity=\"low\" | stats values(parameters.doc_title) as doc_title, values(parameters.doc_type) as doc_types, values(email) as dst_email_list, values(parameters.visibility) as visibility, values(parameters.doc_id) as doc_id, count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by parameters.owner ip_address phase severity | rename parameters.owner as user ip_address as src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_drive_share_in_external_email_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc. In order for the search to work for your environment, please edit the query to use your company specific email domain instead of `internal_test_email.com`.", "known_false_positives": "network admin or normal user may share files to customer and external team.", "references": ["https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1567.002/gsuite_share_drive/gdrive_share_external.log"], "deployments": ["Send to Phantom"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "message": "suspicious share gdrive from $parameters.owner$ to $email$ namely as $parameters.doc_title$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1567.002", "T1567"], "observable": [{"name": "parameters.owner", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "email", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "parameters.doc_title", "src_domain", "dest_domain", "email", "parameters.visibility", "parameters.owner", "parameters.doc_type"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exfiltration to Cloud Storage", "Exfiltration Over Web Service"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration", "Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Leviathan", "Turla", "no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:drive:json", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "gsuite_drive"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "gsuite_drive_share_in_external_email_filter"}]}, {"name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address", "id": "f86a8ec9-b042-45eb-92f4-e9ed1d781078", "version": 1, "date": "2020-08-16", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen IP addresses. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something.", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime, values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources src as src OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenSrc=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenSrc) OR firstTimeSeenSrc > relative_time(now(), `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window`) | table firstTime, src, user, object_id, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter` macro.", "known_false_positives": "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no \"false positives\" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\\\n This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json"], "impact": 70, "message": "User $user$ is starting or creating an instance $object_id$ for the first time from IP address $src$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "src", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "object_id", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.object_id", "All_Changes.action", "All_Changes.status", "All_Changes.src", "All_Changes.user", "All_Changes.command"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Valid Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"description": "Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new provisioning activities", "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", "name": "previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A table of source IPs, geographic locations, and the first and last time that they have that done cloud provisioning activities", "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", "name": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", "fields_list": "_key, src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data"}]}, {"name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type", "id": "c6ddbf53-9715-49f3-bb4c-fb2e8a309cda", "version": 1, "date": "2020-09-12", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "Find EC2 instances being created with previously unseen instance types.", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id) as dest, count from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.instance_type, All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Instance_Changes\")` | where instance_type != \"unknown\" | lookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types instance_type as instance_type OUTPUTNEW firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenInstanceType=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenInstanceType) OR firstTimeSeenInstanceType > relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") | table firstTime, user, dest, count, instance_type | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial` to build the initial table of instance types observed and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter` macro.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible that an admin will create a new system using a new instance type that has never been used before. Verify with the creator that they intended to create the system with the new instance type.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Cryptomining"], "asset_type": "Cloud Compute Instance", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json"], "impact": 50, "message": "User $user$ is creating an instance $dest$ with an instance type $instance_type$ that has not been previously seen.", "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.object_id", "All_Changes.action", "All_Changes.Instance_Changes.instance_type", "All_Changes.user"], "risk_score": 30, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A place holder for a list of used cloud compute instance types", "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types", "name": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types", "fields_list": "_key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, instance_type, enough_data"}]}, {"name": "O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding", "id": "f8dfe015-dbb3-4569-ba75-b13787e06aa4", "version": 1, "date": "2020-12-16", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects when multiple user configured a forwarding rule to the same destination.", "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=Set-Mailbox | spath input=Parameters | rename Identity AS src_user | search ForwardingSmtpAddress=* | stats dc(src_user) AS count_src_user earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(src_user) AS src_user values(user) AS user by ForwardingSmtpAddress | where count_src_user > 1 |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections", "Data Exfiltration"], "asset_type": "Office 365", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Stage:Exfiltration", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114.003/o365_email_forwarding_rule/o365_email_forwarding_rule.json"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user$ configured multiple users $src_user$ with a count of $count_src_user$, a forwarding rule to same destination $ForwardingSmtpAddress$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1114.003", "T1114"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "ForwardingSmtpAddress", "type": "Email Address", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Operation", "Parameters"], "risk_score": 48, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Email Forwarding Rule", "Email Collection"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "o365_management_activity"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding_filter"}]}, {"name": "AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion", "id": "e776d06c-9267-11eb-819b-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-31", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following query uses IAM events to track the success of a group being deleted on AWS. This is typically not indicative of malicious behavior, but a precurser to additional events thay may unfold. Review parallel IAM events - recently added users, new groups and so forth. Inversely, review failed attempts in a similar manner.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=iam.amazonaws.com eventName=DeleteGroup errorCode=success (userAgent!=*.amazonaws.com) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.groupName) as group_deleted by src eventName eventSource errorCode user_agent awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_iam_successful_group_deletion_filter`", "how_to_implement": "The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs.", "known_false_positives": "This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users. Not every user with AWS access should have permission to delete groups (least privilege).", "references": ["https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/iam/delete-group.html", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteGroup.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098/aws_iam_successful_group_deletion/aws_iam_successful_group_deletion.json"], "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user_arn$ has sucessfully deleted mulitple groups $group_deleted$ from $src$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069.003", "T1098", "T1069"], "observable": [{"name": "src", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "user_arn", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "group_deleted", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "userAgent", "errorCode", "requestParameters.groupName"], "risk_score": 5, "security_domain": "cloud", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Cloud Groups", "Account Manipulation", "Permission Groups Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Persistence", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT3", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Lazarus Group", "TA505", "APT3"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_iam_successful_group_deletion_filter"}]}, {"name": "Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User", "id": "7fb15084-b14e-405a-bd61-a6de15a40722", "version": 1, "date": "2020-07-29", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search looks for cloud instances being modified by users who have not previously modified them.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id values(All_Changes.command) as command from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=modified All_Changes.change_type=EC2 All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user user as user OUTPUTNEW firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenUser=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenUser) OR firstTimeSeenUser > relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") | table firstTime user command object_id count | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_instance_modified_by_previously_unseen_user_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search has a dependency on other searches to create and update a baseline of users observed to be associated with this activity. The search \"Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update\" should be enabled for this detection to properly work.", "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a new user will start to modify EC2 instances when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is modifying instances that this is the intended behavior.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json"], "impact": 70, "message": "User $user$ is modifying an instance $dest$ for the first time.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.object_id", "All_Changes.command", "All_Changes.action", "All_Changes.change_type", "All_Changes.status", "All_Changes.user"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Cloud Accounts", "Valid Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "cloud_instance_modified_by_previously_unseen_user_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A table of users seen making instance modifications, and the first and last time that the activity was observed", "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user", "name": "previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user", "fields_list": "_key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, user, enough_data"}]}, {"name": "Github Commit Changes In Master", "id": "c9d2bfe2-019f-11ec-a8eb-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-20", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search is to detect a pushed or commit to master or main branch. This is to avoid unwanted modification to master without a review to the changes. Ideally in terms of devsecops the changes made in a branch and do a PR for review. of course in some cases admin of the project may did a changes directly to master branch", "search": "`github` branches{}.name = main OR branches{}.name = master | eval severity=\"low\" | eval phase=\"code\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by commit.author.html_url commit.commit.author.email commit.author.login commit.commit.message repository.pushed_at commit.commit.committer.date, phase, severity | eval phase=\"code\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `github_commit_changes_in_master_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to github logs having the fork, commit, push metadata that can be use to monitor the changes in a github project.", "known_false_positives": "admin can do changes directly to master branch", "references": ["https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1199/github_push_master/github_push_master.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "suspicious commit by $commit.commit.author.email$ to main branch", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1199"], "observable": [{"name": "commit.commit.author.email", "type": "User", "role": ["attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 9, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Trusted Relationship"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "menuPass"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=aws:firehose:json", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "github"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "github_commit_changes_in_master_filter"}]}, {"name": "Gsuite Email With Known Abuse Web Service Link", "id": "8630aa22-042b-11ec-af39-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-23", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This analytics is to detect a gmail containing a link that are known to be abused by malware or attacker like pastebin, telegram and discord to deliver malicious payload. This event can encounter some normal email traffic within organization and external email that normally using this application and services.", "search": "`gsuite_gmail` \"link_domain{}\" IN (\"*pastebin.com*\", \"*discord*\", \"*telegram*\",\"t.me\") | rex field=source.from_header_address \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | rex field=destination{}.address \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | where not source_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" and dest_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" | eval phase=\"plan\" | eval severity=\"low\" |stats values(link_domain{}) as link_domains min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by is_spam source.address source.from_header_address subject destination{}.address phase severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_email_with_known_abuse_web_service_link_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc.", "known_false_positives": "normal email contains this link that are known application within the organization or network can be catched by this detection.", "references": ["https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/07/22/malware-increasingly-targets-discord-for-abuse/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gsuite_susp_url/gsuite_susp_url.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "suspicious email from $source.address$ to $destination{}.address$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566.001", "T1566"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Spearphishing Attachment", "Phishing"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:gmail:bigquery", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "gsuite_gmail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "gsuite_email_with_known_abuse_web_service_link_filter"}]}, {"name": "AWS SAML Update identity provider", "id": "2f0604c6-6030-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-26", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides detection of updates to SAML provider in AWS. Updates to SAML provider need to be monitored closely as they may indicate possible perimeter compromise of federated credentials, or backdoor access from another cloud provider set by attacker.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=UpdateSAMLProvider | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by eventType eventName requestParameters.sAMLProviderArn userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.arn sourceIPAddress userIdentity.accessKeyId userIdentity.principalId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`aws_saml_update_identity_provider_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", "known_false_positives": "Updating a SAML provider or creating a new one may not necessarily be malicious however it needs to be closely monitored.", "references": ["https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", "https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "asset_type": "AWS Federated Account", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/update_saml_provider/update_saml_provider.json"], "impact": 80, "message": "User $userIdentity.principalId$ from IP address $sourceIPAddress$ has trigged an event $eventName$ to update the SAML provider to $requestParameters.sAMLProviderArn$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078"], "observable": [{"name": "sourceIPAddress", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "userIdentity.principalId", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim", "Target"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "eventType", "requestParameters.sAMLProviderArn", "userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.arn", "sourceIPAddress", "userIdentity.accessKeyId", "userIdentity.principalId"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Valid Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_saml_update_identity_provider_filter"}]}, {"name": "GSuite Email Suspicious Attachment", "id": "6d663014-fe92-11eb-ab07-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-16", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious attachment file extension in Gsuite email that may related to spear phishing attack. This file type is commonly used by malware to lure user to click on it to execute malicious code to compromised targetted machine. But this search can also catch some normal files related to this file type that maybe send by employee or network admin.", "search": "`gsuite_gmail` \"attachment{}.file_extension_type\" IN (\"pl\", \"py\", \"rb\", \"sh\", \"bat\", \"exe\", \"dll\", \"cpl\", \"com\", \"js\", \"vbs\", \"ps1\", \"reg\",\"swf\", \"cmd\", \"go\") | eval phase=\"plan\" | eval severity=\"medium\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(attachment{}.file_extension_type) as email_attachments, values(attachment{}.sha256) as attachment_sha256, values(payload_size) as payload_size by destination{}.service num_message_attachments subject destination{}.address source.address phase severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_email_suspicious_attachment_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc.", "known_false_positives": "network admin and normal user may send this file attachment as part of their day to day work. having a good protocol in attaching this file type to an e-mail may reduce the risk of having a spear phishing attack.", "references": ["https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gsuite_susp_attachment_ext/gsuite_gmail_file_ext.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "suspicious email from $source.address$ to $destination{}.address$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566.001", "T1566"], "observable": [{"name": "source.address", "type": "User", "role": ["attacker"]}, {"name": "destination{}.address", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "attachment{}.file_extension_type", "attachment{}.sha256", "destination{}.service", "num_message_attachments", "payload_size", "subject", "destination{}.address", "source.address"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Spearphishing Attachment", "Phishing"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:gmail:bigquery", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "gsuite_gmail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "gsuite_email_suspicious_attachment_filter"}]}, {"name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City", "id": "e7ecc5e0-88df-48b9-91af-51104c68f02f", "version": 1, "date": "2020-10-09", "author": "Rico Valdez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen cities. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something.", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(City) | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources City as City OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenCity=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenCity) OR firstTimeSeenCity > relative_time(now(), `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window`) | table firstTime, src, City, user, object, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city_filter` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city_filter` macro.", "known_false_positives": "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no \"false positives\" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\\\n This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json"], "impact": 30, "message": "User $user$ is starting or creating an instance $dest$ for the first time in City $City$ from IP address $src$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "src", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.action", "All_Changes.status", "All_Changes.src", "All_Changes.user", "All_Changes.object", "All_Changes.command"], "risk_score": 18, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Valid Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"description": "Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new provisioning activities", "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", "name": "previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A table of source IPs, geographic locations, and the first and last time that they have that done cloud provisioning activities", "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", "name": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", "fields_list": "_key, src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Nginx Ingress RFI", "id": "fc5531ae-62fd-4de6-9c36-b4afdae8ca95", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-23", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search uses the Kubernetes logs from a nginx ingress controller to detect remote file inclusion attacks.", "search": "`kubernetes_container_controller` | rex field=_raw \"^(?\\S+)\\s+-\\s+-\\s+\\[(?[^\\]]*)\\]\\s\\\"(?[^\\\"]*)\\\"\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s\\\"(?[^\\\"]*)\\\"\\s\\\"(?[^\\\"]*)\\\"\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s\\[(?[^\\]]*)\\]\\s\\[(?[^\\]]*)\\]\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\" | rex field=request \"^(?\\S+)?\\s(?\\S+)\\s\" | rex field=url \"(?\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3})\" | search dest_ip=* | rename remote_addr AS src_ip, upstream_status as status, proxy_upstream_name as proxy | eval phase=\"operate\" | eval severity=\"medium\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by src_ip, dest_ip status, url, http_method, host, http_user_agent, proxy, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `kubernetes_nginx_ingress_rfi_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must ingest Kubernetes logs through Splunk Connect for Kubernetes.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://github.com/splunk/splunk-connect-for-kubernetes", "https://www.netsparker.com/blog/web-security/remote-file-inclusion-vulnerability/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "asset_type": "Kubernetes", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1212/kuberntest_nginx_rfi_attack/kubernetes_nginx_rfi_attack.log"], "deployments": ["Slack Alert"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Remote File Inclusion Attack detected on $host$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1212"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src_ip", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"], "required_fields": ["raw"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploitation for Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=kube:container:controller", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Kubernetes data. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "kubernetes_container_controller"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "kubernetes_nginx_ingress_rfi_filter"}]}, {"name": "Correlation by Repository and Risk", "id": "8da9fdd9-6a1b-4ae0-8a34-8c25e6be9687", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-06", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "Correlation", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search correlations detections by repository and risk_score", "search": "`signals` | fillnull | stats sum(risk_score) as risk_score values(source) as signals values(user) as user by repository | sort - risk_score | where risk_score > 80 | `correlation_by_repository_and_risk_filter`", "how_to_implement": "For Dev Sec Ops POC", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 100, "deployments": ["Slack Alert"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Correlation triggered for user $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1204.003", "T1204"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["User Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "index=signals", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "signals"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "correlation_by_repository_and_risk_filter"}]}, {"name": "O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert", "id": "d441364c-349c-453b-b55f-12eccab67cf9", "version": 1, "date": "2020-12-16", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects when an excessive number of authentication failures occur this search also includes attempts against MFA prompt codes", "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory UserAuthenticationMethod=* status=Failed | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) values(UserAuthenticationMethod) AS UserAuthenticationMethod values(UserAgent) AS UserAgent values(status) AS status values(src_ip) AS src_ip by user | where count > 10 |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", "known_false_positives": "The threshold for alert is above 10 attempts and this should reduce the number of false positives.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections"], "asset_type": "Office 365", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110/o365_brute_force_login/o365_brute_force_login.json"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Not Applicable"], "message": "User $user$ has caused excessive number of authentication failures from $src_ip$ using UserAgent $UserAgent$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "src_ip", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Workload", "UserAuthenticationMethod", "status", "UserAgent", "src_ip", "user"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Brute Force"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["DarkVishnya", "APT39", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Turla"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "o365_management_activity"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert_filter"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI", "id": "0f83244b-425b-4528-83db-7a88c5f66e48", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-20", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search uses the Kubernetes logs from a nginx ingress controller to detect local file inclusion attacks.", "search": "`kubernetes_container_controller` | rex field=_raw \"^(?\\S+)\\s+-\\s+-\\s+\\[(?[^\\]]*)\\]\\s\\\"(?[^\\\"]*)\\\"\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s\\\"(?[^\\\"]*)\\\"\\s\\\"(?[^\\\"]*)\\\"\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s\\[(?[^\\]]*)\\]\\s\\[(?[^\\]]*)\\]\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\" | lookup local_file_inclusion_paths local_file_inclusion_paths AS request OUTPUT lfi_path | search lfi_path=yes | rename remote_addr AS src_ip, upstream_status as status, proxy_upstream_name as proxy | rex field=request \"^(?\\S+)\\s(?\\S+)\\s\" | eval phase=\"operate\" | eval severity=\"high\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by src_ip, status, url, http_method, host, http_user_agent, proxy, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `kubernetes_nginx_ingress_lfi_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must ingest Kubernetes logs through Splunk Connect for Kubernetes.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://github.com/splunk/splunk-connect-for-kubernetes", "https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/file-inclusion-vulnerabilities/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "asset_type": "Kubernetes", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1212/kubernetes_nginx_lfi_attack/kubernetes_nginx_lfi_attack.log"], "deployments": ["Slack Alert"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Local File Inclusion Attack detected on $host$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1212"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src_ip", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"], "required_fields": ["raw"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploitation for Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=kube:container:controller", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Kubernetes data. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "kubernetes_container_controller"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "kubernetes_nginx_ingress_lfi_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A list of interesting files in a local file inclusion attack", "filename": "local_file_inclusion_paths.csv", "name": "local_file_inclusion_paths", "default_match": "false", "match_type": "WILDCARD(local_file_inclusion_paths)", "min_matches": 1, "case_sensitive_match": "false", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/local_file_inclusion_paths.csv"}]}, {"name": "AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events", "id": "3e1f1568-9633-11eb-a69c-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-11-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following detection identifies excessive AccessDenied events within an hour timeframe. It is possible that an access key to AWS may have been stolen and is being misused to perform discovery events. In these instances, the access is not available with the key stolen therefore these events will be generated.", "search": "`cloudtrail` (errorCode = \"AccessDenied\") user_type=IAMUser (userAgent!=*.amazonaws.com) | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as failures min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime, dc(eventName) as methods, dc(eventSource) as sources by src_ip, userIdentity.arn, _time | where failures >= 5 and methods >= 1 and sources >= 1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events_filter`", "how_to_implement": "The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible to start this detection will need to be tuned by source IP or user. In addition, change the count values to an upper threshold to restrict false positives.", "references": ["https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/troubleshoot-iam-permission-errors/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud User Activities"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Blocked", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1580/aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events/aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events.json"], "impact": 20, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "User $userIdentity.arn$ is seen to perform excessive number of discovery related api calls- $failures$, within an hour where the access was denied.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1580"], "observable": [{"name": "src_ip", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "userIdentity.arn", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "eventSource", "userAgent", "errorCode", "userIdentity.type"], "risk_object": "src_ip", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 10, "security_domain": "access", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events_filter"}]}, {"name": "AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings High", "id": "62721bd2-1d82-4623-b6e6-aac170014423", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-17", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). You need to activate image scanning in order to get the event DescribeImageScanFindings with the results.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=ecr.amazonaws.com eventName=DescribeImageScanFindings | spath path=responseElements.imageScanFindings.findings{} output=findings | mvexpand findings | spath input=findings| search severity=HIGH | rename name as finding_name, description as finding_description, requestParameters.imageId.imageDigest as imageDigest, requestParameters.repositoryName as image | eval finding = finding_name.\", \".finding_description | eval phase=\"release\" | eval severity=\"high\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by awsRegion, eventName, eventSource, imageDigest, image, user, userName, src_ip, finding, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_high_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECR/latest/userguide/image-scanning.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 100, "deployments": ["Slack Alert"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Vulnerabilities with severity high found in image $image$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1204.003", "T1204"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "image", "type": "System", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"], "required_fields": ["eventSource", "eventName", "responseElements.imageScanFindings.findings{}", "awsRegion", "requestParameters.imageId.imageDigest", "requestParameters.repositoryName", "user", "userName", "src_ip"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["User Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_high_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", "id": "121b0b11-f8ac-4ed6-a132-3800ca4fc07a", "version": 1, "date": "2020-10-07", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Authentication"], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | table firstTime lastTime user City | join user type=outer [| inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) AS earliestseen by user City | fields earliestseen user City] | eval userCity=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\"), \"New City\",\"Previously Seen City\") | eval userStatus=if(earliestseen >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") OR isnull(earliestseen), \"New User\",\"Old User\") | where userCity = \"New City\" AND userStatus != \"Old User\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime lastTime user City userStatus userCity | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter` macro.", "known_false_positives": "When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities", "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user$ is logging into the AWS console from City $City$ for the first time", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Authentication.signature", "Authentication.user", "Authentication.src"], "risk_score": 18, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A table of users seen doing console logins, and the first and last time that the activity was observed", "collection": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", "name": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", "fields_list": "_key, firstTime, lastTime, user, src, City, Region, Country"}]}], "count": 696} \ No newline at end of file +[ + { + "name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls", + "id": "0840ddf1-8c89-46ff-b730-c8d6722478c0", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-09-07", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search will detect a spike in the number of API calls made to your cloud infrastructure environment by a user.", + "search": "| tstats count as api_calls values(All_Changes.command) as command from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.user!=unknown All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%w\") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | join user HourOfDay isWeekend [ summary cloud_excessive_api_calls_v1] | where cardinality >=16 | apply cloud_excessive_api_calls_v1 threshold=0.005 | rename \"IsOutlier(api_calls)\" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1 | eval expected_upper_threshold = mvindex(split(mvindex(BoundaryRanges, -1), \":\"), 0) | where api_calls > expected_upper_threshold | eval distance_from_threshold = api_calls - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, command, api_calls, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User` to create the probability density function.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud User Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "user $user$ has made $api_calls$ api calls, violating the dynamic threshold of $expected_upper_threshold$ with the following command $command$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078.004", + "T1078" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.CM", + "PR.AC" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.command", + "All_Changes.user", + "All_Changes.status" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT33" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls", + "id": "d4dfb7f3-7a37-498a-b5df-f19334e871af", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-09-07", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search will detect a spike in the number of API calls made to your cloud infrastructure environment about security groups by a user.", + "search": "| tstats count as security_group_api_calls values(All_Changes.command) as command from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.object_category=firewall AND All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%w\") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | join user HourOfDay isWeekend [ summary cloud_excessive_security_group_api_calls_v1] | where cardinality >=16 | apply cloud_excessive_security_group_api_calls_v1 threshold=0.005 | rename \"IsOutlier(security_group_api_calls)\" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1 | eval expected_upper_threshold = mvindex(split(mvindex(BoundaryRanges, -1), \":\"), 0) | where security_group_api_calls > expected_upper_threshold | eval distance_from_threshold = security_group_api_calls - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, command, security_group_api_calls, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User` to create the probability density function model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud User Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:Inbound", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "user $user$ has made $api_calls$ api calls related to security groups, violating the dynamic threshold of $expected_upper_threshold$ with the following command $command$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078.004", + "T1078" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.CM", + "PR.AC" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.command", + "All_Changes.object_category", + "All_Changes.status", + "All_Changes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT33" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources", + "id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-212bf3d0dac4", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-02-22", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user created a policy version that allows them to access any resource in their account", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=CreatePolicyVersion eventSource = iam.amazonaws.com errorCode = success | spath input=requestParameters.policyDocument output=key_policy_statements path=Statement{} | mvexpand key_policy_statements | spath input=key_policy_statements output=key_policy_action_1 path=Action | search key_policy_action_1 = \"*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(key_policy_statements) as policy_added by eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|`aws_create_policy_version_to_allow_all_resources_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", + "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a policy to allow a user to access all resources. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to all AWS resources", + "references": [ + "https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws", + "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation-part-2/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Account", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_create_policy_version/aws_cloudtrail_events.json" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user$ created a policy version that allows them to access any resource in their account", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078.004", + "T1078" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "userAgent", + "errorCode", + "requestParameters.userName" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT33" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_create_policy_version_to_allow_all_resources_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_create_policy_version_to_allow_all_resources.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "AWS CreateAccessKey", + "id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-11ad-212bf3d0d111", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-07-19", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user A who has already permission to create access keys, makes an API call to create access keys for another user B. Attackers have been know to use this technique for Privilege Escalation in case new victim(user B) has more permissions than old victim(user B)", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName = CreateAccessKey userAgent !=console.amazonaws.com errorCode = success| search userIdentity.userName!=requestParameters.userName | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by requestParameters.userName src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|`aws_createaccesskey_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", + "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created keys for another user.", + "references": [ + "https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws", + "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation-part-2/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS CreateAccessKey", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Account", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_createaccesskey/aws_cloudtrail_events.json" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user_arn$ is attempting to create access keys for $requestParameters.userName$ from this IP $src$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1136.003", + "T1136" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user_arn", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "userAgent", + "errorCode", + "requestParameters.userName" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Indrik Spider", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_createaccesskey_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_createaccesskey.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "AWS CreateLoginProfile", + "id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-11ad-212bf444d111", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-07-19", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user A(victim A) creates a login profile for user B, followed by a AWS Console login event from user B from the same src_ip as user B. This correlated event can be indicative of privilege escalation since both events happened from the same src_ip", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName = CreateLoginProfile | rename requestParameters.userName as new_login_profile | table src_ip eventName new_login_profile userIdentity.userName | join new_login_profile src_ip [| search `cloudtrail` eventName = ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.userName as new_login_profile | stats count values(eventName) min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn new_login_profile src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`] | `aws_createloginprofile_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", + "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a login profile for another user.", + "references": [ + "https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws", + "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation-part-2/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS CreateLoginProfile", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Account", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_createloginprofile/aws_cloudtrail_events.json" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user_arn$ is attempting to create a login profile for $requestParameters.userName$ and did a console login from this IP $src_ip$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1136.003", + "T1136" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user_arn", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "userAgent", + "errorCode", + "requestParameters.userName" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Indrik Spider", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_createloginprofile_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_createloginprofile.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account", + "id": "21193641-cb96-4a2c-a707-d9b9a7f7792b", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-05-28", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Authentication" + ], + "description": "This search looks for AssumeRole events where an IAM role in a different account is requested for the first time.", + "search": "| tstats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=AssumeRole by Authentication.vendor_account Authentication.user Authentication.src Authentication.user_role | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | rex field=user_role \"arn:aws:sts:*:(?.*):\" | where vendor_account != dest_account | rename vendor_account as requestingAccountId dest_account as requestedAccountId | lookup previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity requestingAccountId, requestedAccountId, OUTPUTNEW firstTime | eval status = if(firstTime > relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\"),\"New Cross Account Activity\",\"Previously Seen\") | where status = \"New Cross Account Activity\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account_filter` macro.", + "known_false_positives": "Using multiple AWS accounts and roles is perfectly valid behavior. It's suspicious when an account requests privileges of an account it hasn't before. You should validate with the account owner that this is a legitimate request.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "AWS account $requestingAccountId$ is trying to access resource from some other account $requestedAccountId$, for the first time.", + "nist": [ + "PR.AC", + "PR.DS", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "requestingAccountId", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "requestedAccountId", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Authentication.signature", + "Authentication.vendor_account", + "Authentication.user", + "Authentication.user_role", + "Authentication.src" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity", + "description": "A placeholder for a list of AWS accounts and assumed roles", + "filename": "previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.csv" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA", + "id": "c79c164f-4b21-4847-98f9-cf6a9f49179e", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-01-11", + "author": "Rod Soto, Patrick Bareiss Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides detection of KMS keys where action kms:Encrypt is accessible for everyone (also outside of your organization). This is an indicator that your account is compromised and the attacker uses the encryption key to compromise another company.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=CreateKey OR eventName=PutKeyPolicy | spath input=requestParameters.policy output=key_policy_statements path=Statement{} | mvexpand key_policy_statements | spath input=key_policy_statements output=key_policy_action_1 path=Action | spath input=key_policy_statements output=key_policy_action_2 path=Action{} | eval key_policy_action=mvappend(key_policy_action_1, key_policy_action_2) | spath input=key_policy_statements output=key_policy_principal path=Principal.AWS | search key_policy_action=\"kms:Encrypt\" AND key_policy_principal=\"*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by eventName eventSource eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/", + "https://github.com/d1vious/git-wild-hunt", + "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgzNib37g0M" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware Cloud" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Account", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1486/aws_kms_key/aws_cloudtrail_events.json" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "AWS account is potentially compromised and user $userIdentity.principalId$ is trying to compromise other accounts.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1486" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "userIdentity.principalId", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "eventSource", + "eventID", + "awsRegion", + "requestParameters.policy", + "userIdentity.principalId" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1486", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "APT41", + "FIN7", + "Indrik Spider", + "TA505" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3", + "id": "884a5f59-eec7-4f4a-948b-dbde18225fdc", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-01-11", + "author": "Rod Soto, Patrick Bareiss Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides detection of users with KMS keys performing encryption specifically against S3 buckets.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=CopyObject requestParameters.x-amz-server-side-encryption=\"aws:kms\" | rename requestParameters.bucketName AS bucket_name, requestParameters.x-amz-copy-source AS src_file, requestParameters.key AS dest_file | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(src_file) AS src_file values(dest_file) AS dest_file values(userAgent) AS userAgent values(region) AS region values(src) AS src by user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs", + "known_false_positives": "bucket with S3 encryption", + "references": [ + "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/", + "https://github.com/d1vious/git-wild-hunt", + "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgzNib37g0M" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware Cloud" + ], + "asset_type": "S3 Bucket", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1486/s3_file_encryption/aws_cloudtrail_events.json" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "User $user$ with KMS keys is performing encryption, against S3 buckets on these files $dest_file$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1486" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest_file", + "type": "File", + "role": [ + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "requestParameters.x-amz-server-side-encryption", + "requestParameters.bucketName", + "requestParameters.x-amz-copy-source", + "requestParameters.key", + "userAgent", + "region" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1486", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "APT41", + "FIN7", + "Indrik Spider", + "TA505" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings High", + "id": "62721bd2-1d82-4623-b6e6-aac170014423", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-17", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). You need to activate image scanning in order to get the event DescribeImageScanFindings with the results.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=ecr.amazonaws.com eventName=DescribeImageScanFindings | spath path=responseElements.imageScanFindings.findings{} output=findings | mvexpand findings | spath input=findings| search severity=HIGH | rename name as finding_name, description as finding_description, requestParameters.imageId.imageDigest as imageDigest, requestParameters.repositoryName as image | eval finding = finding_name.\", \".finding_description | eval phase=\"release\" | eval severity=\"high\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by awsRegion, eventName, eventSource, imageDigest, image, user, userName, src_ip, finding, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_high_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECR/latest/userguide/image-scanning.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings High", + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Account", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Vulnerabilities with severity high found in image $image$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1204.003", + "T1204" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "eventSource", + "eventName", + "responseElements.imageScanFindings.findings{}", + "awsRegion", + "requestParameters.imageId.imageDigest", + "requestParameters.repositoryName", + "user", + "userName", + "src_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 70, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", + "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_high_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_high.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Low Informational Unknown", + "id": "cbc95e44-7c22-443f-88fd-0424478f5589", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-17", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). You need to activate image scanning in order to get the event DescribeImageScanFindings with the results.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=ecr.amazonaws.com eventName=DescribeImageScanFindings | spath path=responseElements.imageScanFindings.findings{} output=findings | mvexpand findings | spath input=findings| search severity IN (LOW, INFORMATIONAL, UNKNWON) | rename name as finding_name, description as finding_description, requestParameters.imageId.imageDigest as imageDigest, requestParameters.repositoryName as repositoryName | eval finding = finding_name.\", \".finding_description | eval phase=\"release\" | eval severity=\"low\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by awsRegion, eventName, eventSource, imageDigest, repositoryName, user, userName, src_ip, finding, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_low_informational_unknown_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECR/latest/userguide/image-scanning.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Low Informational Unknown", + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Account", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 10, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Vulnerabilities with severity high found in repository $repositoryName$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1204.003", + "T1204" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "eventSource", + "eventName", + "responseElements.imageScanFindings.findings{}", + "awsRegion", + "requestParameters.imageId.imageDigest", + "requestParameters.repositoryName", + "user", + "userName", + "src_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 7, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", + "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_low_informational_unknown_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_low_informational_unknown.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Medium", + "id": "0b80e2c8-c746-4ddb-89eb-9efd892220cf", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-17", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). You need to activate image scanning in order to get the event DescribeImageScanFindings with the results.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=ecr.amazonaws.com eventName=DescribeImageScanFindings | spath path=responseElements.imageScanFindings.findings{} output=findings | mvexpand findings | spath input=findings| search severity=MEDIUM | rename name as finding_name, description as finding_description, requestParameters.imageId.imageDigest as imageDigest, requestParameters.repositoryName as image | eval finding = finding_name.\", \".finding_description | eval phase=\"release\" | eval severity=\"medium\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by awsRegion, eventName, eventSource, imageDigest, image, user, userName, src_ip, finding, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_medium_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECR/latest/userguide/image-scanning.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Medium", + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Account", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Vulnerabilities with severity high found in image $image$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1204.003", + "T1204" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "eventSource", + "eventName", + "responseElements.imageScanFindings.findings{}", + "awsRegion", + "requestParameters.imageId.imageDigest", + "requestParameters.repositoryName", + "user", + "userName", + "src_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 21, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", + "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_medium_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_medium.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "AWS ECR Container Upload Outside Business Hours", + "id": "d4c4d4eb-3994-41ca-a25e-a82d64e125bb", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-19", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). A upload of a new container is normally done during business hours. When done outside business hours, we want to take a look into it.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=ecr.amazonaws.com eventName=PutImage date_hour>=20 OR date_hour<8 NOT (date_wday=saturday OR date_wday=sunday) | rename requestParameters.* as * | rename repositoryName AS image | eval phase=\"release\" | eval severity=\"medium\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by awsRegion, eventName, eventSource, user, userName, src_ip, imageTag, registryId, image, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_ecr_container_upload_outside_business_hours_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", + "known_false_positives": "When your development is spreaded in different time zones, applying this rule can be difficult.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/003/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS ECR Container Upload Outside Business Hours", + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Account", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Container uploaded outside business hours from $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1204.003", + "T1204" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "eventSource", + "eventName", + "awsRegion", + "requestParameters.imageTag", + "requestParameters.registryId", + "requestParameters.repositoryName", + "user", + "userName", + "src_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", + "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_ecr_container_upload_outside_business_hours_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_ecr_container_upload_outside_business_hours.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "AWS ECR Container Upload Unknown User", + "id": "300688e4-365c-4486-a065-7c884462b31d", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-19", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). A upload of a new container is normally done from only a few known users. When the user was never seen before, we should have a closer look into the event.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=ecr.amazonaws.com eventName=PutImage NOT `aws_ecr_users` | rename requestParameters.* as * | rename repositoryName AS image | eval phase=\"release\" | eval severity=\"high\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by awsRegion, eventName, eventSource, user, userName, src_ip, imageTag, registryId, image, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/003/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS ECR Container Upload Unknown User", + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Account", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Container uploaded from unknown user $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1204.003", + "T1204" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "eventSource", + "eventName", + "awsRegion", + "requestParameters.imageTag", + "requestParameters.registryId", + "requestParameters.repositoryName", + "user", + "userName", + "src_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", + "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "aws_ecr_users", + "definition": "userName IN (user)", + "description": "specify the user allowed to push Images to AWS ECR." + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "AWS Excessive Security Scanning", + "id": "1fdd164a-def8-4762-83a9-9ffe24e74d5a", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-13", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events and analyse the amount of eventNames which starts with Describe by a single user. This indicates that this user scans the configuration of your AWS cloud environment.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=Describe* OR eventName=List* OR eventName=Get* | stats dc(eventName) as dc_events min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(eventName) as eventName values(src) as src values(userAgent) as userAgent by user userIdentity.arn | where dc_events > 50 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|`aws_excessive_security_scanning_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", + "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/aquasecurity/cloudsploit" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS Excessive Security Scanning", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS User Monitoring" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Account", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:Inbound", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1526/aws_security_scanner/aws_security_scanner.json" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "user $user$ has excessive number of api calls $dc_events$ from these IP addresses $src$, violating the threshold of 50, using the following commands $command$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1526" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "src", + "userAgent", + "user", + "userIdentity.arn" + ], + "risk_score": 18, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1526", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_excessive_security_scanning_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_excessive_security_scanning.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events", + "id": "3e1f1568-9633-11eb-a69c-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-11-12", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following detection identifies excessive AccessDenied events within an hour timeframe. It is possible that an access key to AWS may have been stolen and is being misused to perform discovery events. In these instances, the access is not available with the key stolen therefore these events will be generated.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` (errorCode = \"AccessDenied\") user_type=IAMUser (userAgent!=*.amazonaws.com) | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as failures min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime, dc(eventName) as methods, dc(eventSource) as sources by src_ip, userIdentity.arn, _time | where failures >= 5 and methods >= 1 and sources >= 1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs.", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible to start this detection will need to be tuned by source IP or user. In addition, change the count values to an upper threshold to restrict false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/troubleshoot-iam-permission-errors/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud User Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Account", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Blocked", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1580/aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events/aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events.json" + ], + "impact": 20, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "User $userIdentity.arn$ is seen to perform excessive number of discovery related api calls- $failures$, within an hour where the access was denied.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1580" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "userIdentity.arn", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "eventSource", + "userAgent", + "errorCode", + "userIdentity.type" + ], + "risk_score": 10, + "security_domain": "access", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1580", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Infrastructure Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force", + "id": "f19e09b0-9308-11eb-b7ec-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-01", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following detection identifies any malformed policy document exceptions with a status of `failure`. A malformed policy document exception occurs in instances where roles are attempted to be assumed, or brute forced. In a brute force attempt, using a tool like CloudSploit or Pacu, an attempt will look like `arn:aws:iam::111111111111:role/aws-service-role/rds.amazonaws.com/AWSServiceRoleForRDS`. Meaning, when an adversary is attempting to identify a role name, multiple failures will occur. This detection focuses on the errors of a remote attempt that is failing.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` (errorCode=MalformedPolicyDocumentException) status=failure (userAgent!=*.amazonaws.com) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.policyName) as policy_name by src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode requestParameters.policyDocument userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | where count >= 2 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs. Set the `where count` greater than a value to identify suspicious activity in your environment.", + "known_false_positives": "This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users.", + "references": [ + "https://www.praetorian.com/blog/aws-iam-assume-role-vulnerabilities", + "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/assume-worst-aws-assume-role-enumeration/", + "https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/aws-iam-brute-force-of-assume-role-policy.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Account", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:Inbound", + "Stage:Credential Access", + "Other:Policy Violation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1580/aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force/aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force.json" + ], + "impact": 40, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "User $user_arn$ has caused multiple failures with errorCode $errorCode$, which potentially means adversary is attempting to identify a role name.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1580", + "T1110" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user_arn", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "userAgent", + "errorCode", + "requestParameters.policyName" + ], + "risk_score": 28, + "security_domain": "access", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1580", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Infrastructure Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN5", + "Fox Kitten", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "AWS IAM Delete Policy", + "id": "ec3a9362-92fe-11eb-99d0-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-01", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following detection identifes when a policy is deleted on AWS. This does not identify whether successful or failed, but the error messages tell a story of suspicious attempts. There is a specific process to follow when deleting a policy. First, detach the policy from all users, groups, and roles that the policy is attached to, using DetachUserPolicy , DetachGroupPolicy , or DetachRolePolicy.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=DeletePolicy (userAgent!=*.amazonaws.com) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.policyArn) as policyArn by src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode errorMessage userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId userIdentity.arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_iam_delete_policy_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs.", + "known_false_positives": "This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users. Not every user with AWS access should have permission to delete policies (least privilege). In addition, this may be saved seperately and tuned for failed or success attempts only.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_DeletePolicy.html", + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/iam/delete-policy.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS IAM Delete Policy", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Account", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Stage:Execution", + "Other:Policy Violation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098/aws_iam_delete_policy/aws_iam_delete_policy.json" + ], + "impact": 20, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user_arn$ has deleted AWS Policies from IP address $src$ by executing the following command $eventName$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1098" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user_arn", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "userAgent", + "errorCode", + "requestParameters.policyArn" + ], + "risk_score": 10, + "security_domain": "access", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT3", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_iam_delete_policy_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_iam_delete_policy.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "AWS IAM Failure Group Deletion", + "id": "723b861a-92eb-11eb-93b8-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-01", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This detection identifies failure attempts to delete groups. We want to identify when a group is attempting to be deleted, but either access is denied, there is a conflict or there is no group. This is indicative of administrators performing an action, but also could be suspicious behavior occurring. Review parallel IAM events - recently added users, new groups and so forth.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=iam.amazonaws.com eventName=DeleteGroup errorCode IN (NoSuchEntityException,DeleteConflictException, AccessDenied) (userAgent!=*.amazonaws.com) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.groupName) as group_name by src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode errorMessage userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_iam_failure_group_deletion_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs.", + "known_false_positives": "This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users. Not every user with AWS access should have permission to delete groups (least privilege).", + "references": [ + "https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/iam/delete-group.html", + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteGroup.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS IAM Failure Group Deletion", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Account", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098/aws_iam_failure_group_deletion/aws_iam_failure_group_deletion.json" + ], + "impact": 10, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user_arn$ has had mulitple failures while attempting to delete groups from $src$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1098" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user_arn", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "group_name", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "userAgent", + "errorCode", + "requestParameters.groupName" + ], + "risk_score": 5, + "security_domain": "cloud", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT3", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_iam_failure_group_deletion_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_iam_failure_group_deletion.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion", + "id": "e776d06c-9267-11eb-819b-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-03-31", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following query uses IAM events to track the success of a group being deleted on AWS. This is typically not indicative of malicious behavior, but a precurser to additional events thay may unfold. Review parallel IAM events - recently added users, new groups and so forth. Inversely, review failed attempts in a similar manner.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=iam.amazonaws.com eventName=DeleteGroup errorCode=success (userAgent!=*.amazonaws.com) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.groupName) as group_deleted by src eventName eventSource errorCode user_agent awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_iam_successful_group_deletion_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs.", + "known_false_positives": "This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users. Not every user with AWS access should have permission to delete groups (least privilege).", + "references": [ + "https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/iam/delete-group.html", + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteGroup.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Account", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098/aws_iam_successful_group_deletion/aws_iam_successful_group_deletion.json" + ], + "impact": 10, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user_arn$ has sucessfully deleted mulitple groups $group_deleted$ from $src$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1069.003", + "T1098", + "T1069" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user_arn", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "group_deleted", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "userAgent", + "errorCode", + "requestParameters.groupName" + ], + "risk_score": 5, + "security_domain": "cloud", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT3", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "TA505" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_iam_successful_group_deletion_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_iam_successful_group_deletion.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "AWS Lambda UpdateFunctionCode", + "id": "211b80d3-6340-4345-11ad-212bf3d0d111", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-24", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This analytic is designed to detect IAM users attempting to update/modify AWS lambda code via the AWS CLI to gain persistence, futher access into your AWS environment and to facilitate planting backdoors. In this instance, an attacker may upload malicious code/binary to a lambda function which will be executed automatically when the funnction is triggered.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=lambda.amazonaws.com eventName=UpdateFunctionCode* errorCode = success user_type=IAMUser | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.functionName) as function_updated by src_ip user_arn user_agent user_type eventName aws_account_id |`aws_lambda_updatefunctioncode_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install Splunk AWS Add on and enable Cloudtrail logs in your AWS Environment.", + "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin or an autorized IAM user has updated the lambda fuction code legitimately.", + "references": [ + "http://detectioninthe.cloud/execution/modify_lambda_function_code/", + "https://sysdig.com/blog/exploit-mitigate-aws-lambdas-mitre/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS Lambda UpdateFunctionCode", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud User Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Account", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1204/aws_updatelambdafunctioncode/aws_cloudtrail_events.json" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user_arn$ is attempting to update the lambda function code of $function_updated$ from this IP $src_ip$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1204" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user_arn", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "userAgent", + "errorCode" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "cloud", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", + "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_lambda_updatefunctioncode_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_lambda_updatefunctioncode.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports", + "id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d6bd75", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-01-11", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The search looks for AWS CloudTrail events to detect if any network ACLs were created with all the ports open to a specified CIDR.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=CreateNetworkAclEntry OR eventName=ReplaceNetworkAclEntry requestParameters.ruleAction=allow requestParameters.egress=false requestParameters.aclProtocol=-1 | append [search `cloudtrail` eventName=CreateNetworkAclEntry OR eventName=ReplaceNetworkAclEntry requestParameters.ruleAction=allow requestParameters.egress=false requestParameters.aclProtocol!=-1 | eval port_range='requestParameters.portRange.to' - 'requestParameters.portRange.from' | where port_range>1024] | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by userName userIdentity.principalId eventName requestParameters.ruleAction requestParameters.egress requestParameters.aclProtocol requestParameters.portRange.to requestParameters.portRange.from src userAgent requestParameters.cidrBlock | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS, version 4.4.0 or later, and configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "It's possible that an admin has created this ACL with all ports open for some legitimate purpose however, this should be scoped and not allowed in production environment.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 11" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.007/aws_create_acl/aws_cloudtrail_events.json" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user_arn$ has created network ACLs with all the ports open to a specified CIDR $requestParameters.cidrBlock$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.007", + "T1562" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "userName", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "requestParameters.cidrBlock", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "requestParameters.ruleAction", + "requestParameters.egress", + "requestParameters.aclProtocol", + "requestParameters.portRange.to", + "requestParameters.portRange.from", + "requestParameters.cidrBlock", + "userName", + "userIdentity.principalId", + "userAgent" + ], + "risk_score": 48, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "AWS Network Access Control List Deleted", + "id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d6fd75", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-01-12", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "Enforcing network-access controls is one of the defensive mechanisms used by cloud administrators to restrict access to a cloud instance. After the attacker has gained control of the AWS console by compromising an admin account, they can delete a network ACL and gain access to the instance from anywhere. This search will query the AWS CloudTrail logs to detect users deleting network ACLs.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteNetworkAclEntry requestParameters.egress=false | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by userName userIdentity.principalId eventName requestParameters.egress src userAgent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a user has legitimately deleted a network ACL.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS Network Access Control List Deleted", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 11" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.007/aws_delete_acl/aws_cloudtrail_events.json" + ], + "impact": 10, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user_arn$ from $src$ has sucessfully deleted network ACLs entry (eventName= $eventName$), such that the instance is accessible from anywhere", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.007", + "T1562" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user_arn", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "requestParameters.egress", + "userName", + "userIdentity.principalId", + "src", + "userAgent" + ], + "risk_score": 5, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal", + "id": "bbe23980-6019-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-01-26", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides specific SAML access from specific Service Provider, user and targeted principal at AWS. This search provides specific information to detect abnormal access or potential credential hijack or forgery, specially in federated environments using SAML protocol inside the perimeter or cloud provider.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=Assumerolewithsaml | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by requestParameters.principalArn requestParameters.roleArn requestParameters.roleSessionName recipientAccountId responseElements.issuer sourceIPAddress userAgent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs", + "known_false_positives": "Attacks using a Golden SAML or SAML assertion hijacks or forgeries are very difficult to detect as accessing cloud providers with these assertions looks exactly like normal access, however things such as source IP sourceIPAddress user, and principal targeted at receiving cloud provider along with endpoint credential access and abuse detection searches can provide the necessary context to detect these attacks.", + "references": [ + "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a", + "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", + "https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal", + "analytic_story": [ + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Federated Account", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Stage:Credential Access", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/assume_role_with_saml/assume_role_with_saml.json" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "From IP address $sourceIPAddress$, user agent $userAgent$ has trigged an event $eventName$ for account ID $recipientAccountId$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "sourceIPAddress", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "recipientAccountId", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Victim", + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "requestParameters.principalArn", + "requestParameters.roleArn", + "requestParameters.roleSessionName", + "recipientAccountId", + "responseElements.issuer", + "sourceIPAddress", + "userAgent" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "AWS SAML Update identity provider", + "id": "2f0604c6-6030-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-01-26", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides detection of updates to SAML provider in AWS. Updates to SAML provider need to be monitored closely as they may indicate possible perimeter compromise of federated credentials, or backdoor access from another cloud provider set by attacker.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=UpdateSAMLProvider | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by eventType eventName requestParameters.sAMLProviderArn userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.arn sourceIPAddress userIdentity.accessKeyId userIdentity.principalId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`aws_saml_update_identity_provider_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", + "known_false_positives": "Updating a SAML provider or creating a new one may not necessarily be malicious however it needs to be closely monitored.", + "references": [ + "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a", + "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", + "https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS SAML Update identity provider", + "analytic_story": [ + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Federated Account", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/update_saml_provider/update_saml_provider.json" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "User $userIdentity.principalId$ from IP address $sourceIPAddress$ has trigged an event $eventName$ to update the SAML provider to $requestParameters.sAMLProviderArn$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "sourceIPAddress", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "userIdentity.principalId", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim", + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "eventType", + "requestParameters.sAMLProviderArn", + "userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.arn", + "sourceIPAddress", + "userIdentity.accessKeyId", + "userIdentity.principalId" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_saml_update_identity_provider_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion", + "id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-11ad-212bf3d0dac4", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-03-02", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user has set a default policy versions. Attackers have been know to use this technique for Privilege Escalation in case the previous versions of the policy had permissions to access more resources than the current version of the policy", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=SetDefaultPolicyVersion eventSource = iam.amazonaws.com | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.policyArn) as policy_arn by src requestParameters.versionId eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_setdefaultpolicyversion_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", + "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately set a default policy to allow a user to access all resources. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to all AWS resources", + "references": [ + "https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws", + "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation-part-2/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Account", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Stage:Credential Access", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_setdefaultpolicyversion/aws_cloudtrail_events.json" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "From IP address $sourceIPAddress$, user agent $userAgent$ has trigged an event $eventName$ for updating the the default policy version", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078.004", + "T1078" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user_arn", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "userAgent", + "errorCode", + "requestParameters.userName", + "eventSource" + ], + "risk_score": 30, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT33" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_setdefaultpolicyversion_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_setdefaultpolicyversion.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "AWS UpdateLoginProfile", + "id": "2a9b80d3-6a40-4115-11ad-212bf3d0d111", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-07-19", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user A who has already permission to update login profile, makes an API call to update login profile for another user B . Attackers have been know to use this technique for Privilege Escalation in case new victim(user B) has more permissions than old victim(user B)", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName = UpdateLoginProfile userAgent !=console.amazonaws.com errorCode = success| search userIdentity.userName!=requestParameters.userName | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by requestParameters.userName src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.userName user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|`aws_updateloginprofile_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", + "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created keys for another user.", + "references": [ + "https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws", + "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation-part-2/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS UpdateLoginProfile", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Account", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_updateloginprofile/aws_cloudtrail_events.json" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "From IP address $sourceIPAddress$, user agent $userAgent$ has trigged an event $eventName$ for updating the existing login profile, potentially giving user $user_arn$ more access privilleges", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1136.003", + "T1136" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user_arn", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "userAgent", + "errorCode", + "requestParameters.userName" + ], + "risk_score": 30, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Indrik Spider", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_updateloginprofile_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_updateloginprofile.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Circle CI Disable Security Job", + "id": "4a2fdd41-c578-4cd4-9ef7-980e352517f2", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-02", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for disable security job in CircleCI pipeline.", + "search": "`circleci` | rename vcs.committer_name as user vcs.subject as commit_message vcs.url as url workflows.* as * | stats values(job_name) as job_names by workflow_id workflow_name user commit_message url branch | lookup mandatory_job_for_workflow workflow_name OUTPUTNEW job_name AS mandatory_job | search mandatory_job=* | eval mandatory_job_executed=if(like(job_names, \"%\".mandatory_job.\"%\"), 1, 0) | where mandatory_job_executed=0 | eval phase=\"build\" | rex field=url \"(?[^\\/]*\\/[^\\/]*)$\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `circle_ci_disable_security_job_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must index CircleCI logs.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Circle CI Disable Security Job", + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "asset_type": "CircleCI", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1554/circle_ci_disable_security_job/circle_ci_disable_security_job.json" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "disable security job $mandatory_job$ in workflow $workflow_name$ from user $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1554" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_times" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1554", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Client Software Binary", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "circleci", + "definition": "sourcetype=circleci", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "circle_ci_disable_security_job_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "mandatory_job_for_workflow", + "description": "A lookup file that will be used to define the mandatory job for workflow", + "filename": "mandatory_job_for_workflow.csv" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/circle_ci_disable_security_job.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Circle CI Disable Security Step", + "id": "72cb9de9-e98b-4ac9-80b2-5331bba6ea97", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-01", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for disable security step in CircleCI pipeline.", + "search": "`circleci` | rename workflows.job_id AS job_id | join job_id [ | search `circleci` | stats values(name) as step_names count by job_id job_name ] | stats count by step_names job_id job_name vcs.committer_name vcs.subject vcs.url owners{} | rename vcs.* as * , owners{} as user | lookup mandatory_step_for_job job_name OUTPUTNEW step_name AS mandatory_step | search mandatory_step=* | eval mandatory_step_executed=if(like(step_names, \"%\".mandatory_step.\"%\"), 1, 0) | where mandatory_step_executed=0 | rex field=url \"(?[^\\/]*\\/[^\\/]*)$\" | eval phase=\"build\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `circle_ci_disable_security_step_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must index CircleCI logs.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Circle CI Disable Security Step", + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "asset_type": "CircleCI", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1554/circle_ci_disable_security_step/circle_ci_disable_security_step.json" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "disable security step $mandatory_step$ in job $job_name$ from user $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1554" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_times" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1554", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Client Software Binary", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "circleci", + "definition": "sourcetype=circleci", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "circle_ci_disable_security_step_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "mandatory_step_for_job", + "description": "A lookup file that will be used to define the mandatory step for job", + "filename": "mandatory_step_for_job.csv" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/circle_ci_disable_security_step.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles", + "id": "2181ad1f-1e73-4d0c-9780-e8880482a08f", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-09-04", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search looks for new commands from each user role.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.user_type=AssumedRole AND All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user, All_Changes.command All_Changes.object | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role user as user, command as command OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenUserApiCall=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenUserApiCall) OR firstTimeSeenUserApiCall > relative_time(now(),\"-24h@h\") | table firstTime, user, object, command |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial` to build the initial table of user roles, commands, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_filter`", + "known_false_positives": ".", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud User Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Recon", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user$ of type AssumedRole attempting to execute new API calls $command$ that have not been seen before", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.user", + "All_Changes.user_type", + "All_Changes.status", + "All_Changes.command", + "All_Changes.object" + ], + "risk_score": 36, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role", + "description": "A table of users, commands, and the first and last time that they have been seen", + "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role", + "fields_list": "_key, user, command, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User", + "id": "37a0ec8d-827e-4d6d-8025-cedf31f3a149", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-07-13", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search looks for cloud compute instances created by users who have not created them before.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object) as dest from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.user All_Changes.vendor_region | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user user as user OUTPUTNEW firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenUser=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenUser) OR firstTimeSeenUser > relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") | table firstTime, user, dest, count vendor_region | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting the appropriate cloud-infrastructure logs Run the \"Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User\" support search to create of baseline of previously seen users.", + "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a user will start to create compute instances for the first time, for any number of reasons. Verify with the user launching instances that this is the intended behavior.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User", + "analytic_story": [ + "Cloud Cryptomining" + ], + "asset_type": "Cloud Compute Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Recon", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user$ is creating a new instance $dest$ for the first time", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078.004", + "T1078" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.object", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.user", + "All_Changes.vendor_region" + ], + "risk_score": 18, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT33" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user", + "description": "A table of previously seen users creating cloud instances", + "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user", + "fields_list": "_key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, user, enough_data" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region", + "id": "fa4089e2-50e3-40f7-8469-d2cc1564ca59", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-09-02", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search looks at cloud-infrastructure events where an instance is created in any region within the last hour and then compares it to a lookup file of previously seen regions where instances have been created.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id) as dest, count from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.vendor_region, All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_regions vendor_region as vendor_region OUTPUTNEW firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenRegion=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenRegion) OR firstTimeSeenRegion > relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") | table firstTime, user, dest, count , vendor_region | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial` to build the initial table of images observed and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region_filter` macro.", + "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a user has unknowingly started an instance in a new region. Please verify that this activity is legitimate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region", + "analytic_story": [ + "Cloud Cryptomining" + ], + "asset_type": "Cloud Compute Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user$ is creating an instance $dest$ in a new region for the first time", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1535" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.object_id", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.vendor_region", + "All_Changes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "previously_seen_cloud_regions", + "description": "A table of vendor_region values and the first and last time that they have been observed in cloud provisioning activities", + "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_regions", + "fields_list": "_key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, vendor_region, enough_data" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image", + "id": "bc24922d-987c-4645-b288-f8c73ec194c4", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-10-12", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search looks for cloud compute instances being created with previously unseen image IDs.", + "search": "| tstats count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id) as dest from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.image_id, All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Instance_Changes\")` | where image_id != \"unknown\" | lookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_images image_id as image_id OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenImage=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenImage) OR firstTimeSeenImage > relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") | table firstTime, user, image_id, count, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial` to build the initial table of images observed and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image_filter` macro.", + "known_false_positives": "After a new image is created, the first systems created with that image will cause this alert to fire. Verify that the image being used was created by a legitimate user.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image", + "analytic_story": [ + "Cloud Cryptomining" + ], + "asset_type": "Cloud Compute Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user$ is creating an instance $dest$ with an image that has not been previously seen.", + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.object_id", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.Instance_Changes.image_id", + "All_Changes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 36, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_images", + "description": "A table of previously seen Cloud image IDs", + "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_images", + "fields_list": "_key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, image_id, enough_data" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type", + "id": "c6ddbf53-9715-49f3-bb4c-fb2e8a309cda", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-09-12", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "Find EC2 instances being created with previously unseen instance types.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id) as dest, count from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.instance_type, All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Instance_Changes\")` | where instance_type != \"unknown\" | lookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types instance_type as instance_type OUTPUTNEW firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenInstanceType=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenInstanceType) OR firstTimeSeenInstanceType > relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") | table firstTime, user, dest, count, instance_type | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial` to build the initial table of instance types observed and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter` macro.", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible that an admin will create a new system using a new instance type that has never been used before. Verify with the creator that they intended to create the system with the new instance type.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type", + "analytic_story": [ + "Cloud Cryptomining" + ], + "asset_type": "Cloud Compute Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user$ is creating an instance $dest$ with an instance type $instance_type$ that has not been previously seen.", + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.object_id", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.Instance_Changes.instance_type", + "All_Changes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 30, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types", + "description": "A place holder for a list of used cloud compute instance types", + "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types", + "fields_list": "_key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, instance_type, enough_data" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User", + "id": "7fb15084-b14e-405a-bd61-a6de15a40722", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-07-29", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search looks for cloud instances being modified by users who have not previously modified them.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id values(All_Changes.command) as command from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=modified All_Changes.change_type=EC2 All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user user as user OUTPUTNEW firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenUser=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenUser) OR firstTimeSeenUser > relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") | table firstTime user command object_id count | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_instance_modified_by_previously_unseen_user_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This search has a dependency on other searches to create and update a baseline of users observed to be associated with this activity. The search \"Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update\" should be enabled for this detection to properly work.", + "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a new user will start to modify EC2 instances when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is modifying instances that this is the intended behavior.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user$ is modifying an instance $dest$ for the first time.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078.004", + "T1078" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.object_id", + "All_Changes.command", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.change_type", + "All_Changes.status", + "All_Changes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT33" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "cloud_instance_modified_by_previously_unseen_user_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user", + "description": "A table of users seen making instance modifications, and the first and last time that the activity was observed", + "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user", + "fields_list": "_key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, user, enough_data" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City", + "id": "e7ecc5e0-88df-48b9-91af-51104c68f02f", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-10-09", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen cities. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(City) | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources City as City OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenCity=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenCity) OR firstTimeSeenCity > relative_time(now(), `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window`) | table firstTime, src, City, user, object, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city_filter` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city_filter` macro.", + "known_false_positives": "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no \"false positives\" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\\\n This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user$ is starting or creating an instance $dest$ for the first time in City $City$ from IP address $src$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "src", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.status", + "All_Changes.src", + "All_Changes.user", + "All_Changes.object", + "All_Changes.command" + ], + "risk_score": 18, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window", + "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", + "description": "Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new provisioning activities" + }, + { + "name": "cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", + "description": "A table of source IPs, geographic locations, and the first and last time that they have that done cloud provisioning activities", + "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", + "fields_list": "_key, src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country", + "id": "94994255-3acf-4213-9b3f-0494df03bb31", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-10-09", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen countries. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(Country) | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources Country as Country OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenCountry=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenCountry) OR firstTimeSeenCountry > relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") | table firstTime, src, Country, user, object, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_country_filter` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_country_filter` macro.", + "known_false_positives": "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no \"false positives\" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\\\n This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user$ is starting or creating an instance $object$ for the first time in Country $Country$ from IP address $src$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "src", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "object", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.status", + "All_Changes.src", + "All_Changes.user", + "All_Changes.object", + "All_Changes.command" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_country_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", + "description": "A table of source IPs, geographic locations, and the first and last time that they have that done cloud provisioning activities", + "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", + "fields_list": "_key, src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address", + "id": "f86a8ec9-b042-45eb-92f4-e9ed1d781078", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-08-16", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen IP addresses. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime, values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources src as src OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenSrc=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenSrc) OR firstTimeSeenSrc > relative_time(now(), `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window`) | table firstTime, src, user, object_id, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter` macro.", + "known_false_positives": "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no \"false positives\" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\\\n This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user$ is starting or creating an instance $object_id$ for the first time from IP address $src$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "src", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "object_id", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.object_id", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.status", + "All_Changes.src", + "All_Changes.user", + "All_Changes.command" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window", + "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", + "description": "Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new provisioning activities" + }, + { + "name": "cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", + "description": "A table of source IPs, geographic locations, and the first and last time that they have that done cloud provisioning activities", + "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", + "fields_list": "_key, src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region", + "id": "5aba1860-9617-4af9-b19d-aecac16fe4f2", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-08-16", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen regions. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(Region) | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources Region as Region OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenRegion=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenRegion) OR firstTimeSeenRegion > relative_time(now(), `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window`) | table firstTime, src, Region, user, object, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region_filter` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region_filter` macro.", + "known_false_positives": "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no \"false positives\" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\\\n This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user$ is starting or creating an instance $object$ for the first time in region $Region$ from IP address $src$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "src", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "object", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.status", + "All_Changes.src", + "All_Changes.user", + "All_Changes.object", + "All_Changes.command" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window", + "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", + "description": "Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new provisioning activities" + }, + { + "name": "cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", + "description": "A table of source IPs, geographic locations, and the first and last time that they have that done cloud provisioning activities", + "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", + "fields_list": "_key, src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Correlation by Repository and Risk", + "id": "8da9fdd9-6a1b-4ae0-8a34-8c25e6be9687", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-06", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "Correlation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search correlations detections by repository and risk_score", + "search": "`signals` | fillnull | stats sum(risk_score) as risk_score values(source) as signals values(user) as user by repository | sort - risk_score | where risk_score > 80 | `correlation_by_repository_and_risk_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "For Dev Sec Ops POC", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Correlation by Repository and Risk", + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Account", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Correlation triggered for user $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1204.003", + "T1204" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 70, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", + "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "signals", + "definition": "index=signals", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "correlation_by_repository_and_risk_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/correlation_by_repository_and_risk.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Correlation by User and Risk", + "id": "610e12dc-b6fa-4541-825e-4a0b3b6f6773", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-06", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "Correlation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search correlations detections by user and risk_score", + "search": "`signals` | fillnull | stats sum(risk_score) as risk_score values(source) as signals values(repository) as repository by user | sort - risk_score | where risk_score > 80 | `correlation_by_user_and_risk_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "For Dev Sec Ops POC", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Correlation by User and Risk", + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Account", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Correlation triggered for user $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1204.003", + "T1204" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 70, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", + "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "signals", + "definition": "index=signals", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "correlation_by_user_and_risk_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/correlation_by_user_and_risk.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by New User", + "id": "bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd71", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-05-28", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Authentication" + ], + "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | join user type=outer [ inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) as earliestseen by user] | eval userStatus=if(earliestseen >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") OR isnull(earliestseen), \"First Time Logging into AWS Console\", \"Previously Seen User\") | where userStatus=\"First Time Logging into AWS Console\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines.", + "known_false_positives": "When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by New User", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user$ is logging into the AWS console for the first time", + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Authentication.signature", + "Authentication.user" + ], + "risk_score": 30, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", + "description": "A table of users seen doing console logins, and the first and last time that the activity was observed", + "collection": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", + "fields_list": "_key, firstTime, lastTime, user, src, City, Region, Country" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", + "id": "121b0b11-f8ac-4ed6-a132-3800ca4fc07a", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-10-07", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Authentication" + ], + "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | table firstTime lastTime user City | join user type=outer [| inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) AS earliestseen by user City | fields earliestseen user City] | eval userCity=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\"), \"New City\",\"Previously Seen City\") | eval userStatus=if(earliestseen >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") OR isnull(earliestseen), \"New User\",\"Old User\") | where userCity = \"New City\" AND userStatus != \"Old User\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime lastTime user City userStatus userCity | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter` macro.", + "known_false_positives": "When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user$ is logging into the AWS console from City $City$ for the first time", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1535" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Authentication.signature", + "Authentication.user", + "Authentication.src" + ], + "risk_score": 18, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", + "description": "A table of users seen doing console logins, and the first and last time that the activity was observed", + "collection": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", + "fields_list": "_key, firstTime, lastTime, user, src, City, Region, Country" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", + "id": "67bd3def-c41c-4bf6-837b-ae196b4257c6", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-10-07", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Authentication" + ], + "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | table firstTime lastTime user Country | join user type=outer [| inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) AS earliestseen by user Country | fields earliestseen user Country] | eval userCountry=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\"), \"New Country\",\"Previously Seen Country\") | eval userStatus=if(earliestseen >= relative_time(now(),\"-24h@h\") OR isnull(earliestseen), \"New User\",\"Old User\") | where userCountry = \"New Country\" AND userStatus != \"Old User\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime lastTime user Country userStatus userCountry | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter` macro.", + "known_false_positives": "When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user$ is logging into the AWS console from Country $Country$ for the first time", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1535" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Authentication.signature", + "Authentication.user", + "Authentication.src" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", + "description": "A table of users seen doing console logins, and the first and last time that the activity was observed", + "collection": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", + "fields_list": "_key, firstTime, lastTime, user, src, City, Region, Country" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", + "id": "9f31aa8e-e37c-46bc-bce1-8b3be646d026", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-10-07", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Authentication" + ], + "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | table firstTime lastTime user Region | join user type=outer [| inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) AS earliestseen by user Region | fields earliestseen user Region] | eval userRegion=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\"), \"New Region\",\"Previously Seen Region\") | eval userStatus=if(earliestseen >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") OR isnull(earliestseen), \"New User\",\"Old User\") | where userRegion = \"New Region\" AND userStatus != \"Old User\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime lastTime user Region userStatus userRegion | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter` macro.", + "known_false_positives": "When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user$ is logging into the AWS console from Region $Region$ for the first time", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1535" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Authentication.signature", + "Authentication.user", + "Authentication.src" + ], + "risk_score": 36, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", + "description": "A table of users seen doing console logins, and the first and last time that the activity was observed", + "collection": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", + "fields_list": "_key, firstTime, lastTime, user, src, City, Region, Country" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Detect New Open S3 buckets", + "id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-290bf3d0dac4", + "version": 3, + "date": "2021-07-19", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public S3 bucket.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=s3.amazonaws.com eventName=PutBucketAcl | rex field=_raw \"(?{.+})\" | spath input=json_field output=grantees path=requestParameters.AccessControlPolicy.AccessControlList.Grant{} | search grantees=* | mvexpand grantees | spath input=grantees output=uri path=Grantee.URI | spath input=grantees output=permission path=Permission | search uri IN (\"http://acs.amazonaws.com/groups/global/AllUsers\",\"http://acs.amazonaws.com/groups/global/AuthenticatedUsers\") | search permission IN (\"READ\",\"READ_ACP\",\"WRITE\",\"WRITE_ACP\",\"FULL_CONTROL\") | rename requestParameters.bucketName AS bucketName | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user_arn userIdentity.principalId userAgent uri permission bucketName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_new_open_s3_buckets_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk.", + "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to the \"All Users\" group.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect New Open S3 buckets", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "S3 Bucket", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1530/aws_s3_public_bucket/aws_cloudtrail_events.json" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user_arn$ has created an open/public bucket $bucketName$ with the following permissions $permission$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1530" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user_arn", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "bucketName", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventSource", + "eventName", + "requestParameters.bucketName", + "user_arn", + "userIdentity.principalId", + "userAgent", + "uri", + "permission" + ], + "risk_score": 48, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1530", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Cloud Storage Object", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Fox Kitten" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_new_open_s3_buckets_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI", + "id": "39c61d09-8b30-4154-922b-2d0a694ecc22", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-07-19", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public S3 bucket over the aws cli.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=\"s3.amazonaws.com\" (userAgent=\"[aws-cli*\" OR userAgent=aws-cli* ) eventName=PutBucketAcl OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read-acp IN (\"*AuthenticatedUsers\",\"*AllUsers\") OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write IN (\"*AuthenticatedUsers\",\"*AllUsers\") OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write-acp IN (\"*AuthenticatedUsers\",\"*AllUsers\") OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-full-control IN (\"*AuthenticatedUsers\",\"*AllUsers\") | rename requestParameters.bucketName AS bucketName | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by userIdentity.userName userIdentity.principalId userAgent bucketName requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read-acp requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write-acp requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-full-control | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "", + "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to the \"All Users\" group.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "S3 Bucket", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1530/aws_s3_public_bucket/aws_cloudtrail_events.json" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $userIdentity.userName$ has created an open/public bucket $bucketName$ using AWS CLI with the following permissions - $requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read$ $requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read-acp$ $requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write$ $requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write-acp$ $requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-full-control$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1530" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "userIdentity.userName", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "bucketName", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventSource", + "eventName", + "requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read-acp", + "requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write", + "requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write-acp", + "requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-full-control", + "requestParameters.bucketName", + "userIdentity.userName", + "userIdentity.principalId", + "userAgent", + "bucketName" + ], + "risk_score": 48, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1530", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Cloud Storage Object", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Fox Kitten" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Detect shared ec2 snapshot", + "id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-290bf3d222c4", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-07-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes AWS CloudTrail events to identify when an EC2 snapshot permissions are modified to be shared with a different AWS account. This method is used by adversaries to exfiltrate the EC2 snapshot.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=ModifySnapshotAttribute | rename requestParameters.createVolumePermission.add.items{}.userId as requested_account_id | search requested_account_id != NULL | eval match=if(requested_account_id==aws_account_id,\"Match\",\"No Match\") | table _time user_arn src_ip requestParameters.attributeType requested_account_id aws_account_id match vendor_region user_agent | where match = \"No Match\" | `detect_shared_ec2_snapshot_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately shared a snapshot with others for a specific purpose.", + "references": [ + "https://labs.nettitude.com/blog/how-to-exfiltrate-aws-ec2-data/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect shared ec2 snapshot", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", + "Data Exfiltration" + ], + "asset_type": "EC2 Snapshot", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Exfiltration" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1537/aws_snapshot_exfil/aws_cloudtrail_events.json" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "AWS EC2 snapshot from account $aws_account_id$ is shared with $requested_account_id$ by user $user_arn$ from $src_ip$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1537" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user_arn", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "user_arn", + "src_ip", + "requestParameters.attributeType", + "aws_account_id", + "vendor_region", + "user_agent" + ], + "risk_score": 48, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1537", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_shared_ec2_snapshot_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/detect_shared_ec2_snapshot.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance", + "id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-290bf5d0d222", + "version": 3, + "date": "2021-01-26", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub alerts for an EC2 instance in 4 hours intervals", + "search": "`aws_securityhub_finding` \"Resources{}.Type\"=AWSEC2Instance | bucket span=4h _time | stats count AS alerts values(Title) as Title values(Types{}) as Types values(vendor_account) as vendor_account values(vendor_region) as vendor_region values(severity) as severity by _time dest | eventstats avg(alerts) as total_alerts_avg, stdev(alerts) as total_alerts_stdev | eval threshold_value = 3 | eval isOutlier=if(alerts > total_alerts_avg+(total_alerts_stdev * threshold_value), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | table _time dest alerts Title Types vendor_account vendor_region severity isOutlier total_alerts_avg | `detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Security Hub inputs. The threshold_value should be tuned to your environment and schedule these searches according to the bucket span interval.", + "known_false_positives": "None", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Security Hub Alerts" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/security_hub_ec2_spike/security_hub_ec2_spike.json" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Spike in AWS security Hub alerts with title $Title$ for EC2 instance $dest$", + "nist": [ + "DE.DP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Resources{}.Type", + "Title", + "Types{}", + "vendor_account", + "vendor_region", + "severity", + "dest" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "aws_securityhub_finding", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:securityhub:finding\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Github Commit Changes In Master", + "id": "c9d2bfe2-019f-11ec-a8eb-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-20", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search is to detect a pushed or commit to master or main branch. This is to avoid unwanted modification to master without a review to the changes. Ideally in terms of devsecops the changes made in a branch and do a PR for review. of course in some cases admin of the project may did a changes directly to master branch", + "search": "`github` branches{}.name = main OR branches{}.name = master | eval severity=\"low\" | eval phase=\"code\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by commit.author.html_url commit.commit.author.email commit.author.login commit.commit.message repository.pushed_at commit.commit.committer.date, phase, severity | eval phase=\"code\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `github_commit_changes_in_master_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to github logs having the fork, commit, push metadata that can be use to monitor the changes in a github project.", + "known_false_positives": "admin can do changes directly to master branch", + "references": [ + "https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Github Commit Changes In Master", + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "asset_type": "GitHub", + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1199/github_push_master/github_push_master.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "suspicious commit by $commit.commit.author.email$ to main branch", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1199" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "commit.commit.author.email", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 9, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1199", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Relationship", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Sandworm Team", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "github", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:firehose:json", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "github_commit_changes_in_master_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/github_commit_changes_in_master.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Github Commit In Develop", + "id": "f3030cb6-0b02-11ec-8f22-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-01", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search is to detect a pushed or commit to develop branch. This is to avoid unwanted modification to develop without a review to the changes. Ideally in terms of devsecops the changes made in a branch and do a PR for review. of course in some cases admin of the project may did a changes directly to master branch", + "search": "`github` branches{}.name = main OR branches{}.name = develop | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by commit.author.html_url commit.commit.author.email commit.author.login commit.commit.message repository.pushed_at commit.commit.committer.date | eval phase=\"code\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `github_commit_in_develop_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to github logs having the fork, commit, push metadata that can be use to monitor the changes in a github project.", + "known_false_positives": "admin can do changes directly to develop branch", + "references": [ + "https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Github Commit In Develop", + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "asset_type": "GitHub", + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1199/github_push_master/github_push_develop.json" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "suspicious commit by $commit.commit.author.email$ to develop branch", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1199" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "commit.commit.author.email", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 9, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1199", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Relationship", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Sandworm Team", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "github", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:firehose:json", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "github_commit_in_develop_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/github_commit_in_develop.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "GitHub Dependabot Alert", + "id": "05032b04-4469-4034-9df7-05f607d75cba", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-01", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for Dependabot Alerts in Github logs.", + "search": "`github` alert.id=* action=create | rename repository.full_name as repository, repository.html_url as repository_url sender.login as user | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by action alert.affected_package_name alert.affected_range alert.created_at alert.external_identifier alert.external_reference alert.fixed_in alert.severity repository repository_url user | eval phase=\"code\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `github_dependabot_alert_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must index GitHub logs. You can follow the url in reference to onboard GitHub logs.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/tips-and-tricks/getting-github-data-with-webhooks.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GitHub Dependabot Alert", + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "asset_type": "GitHub", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1195.001/github_security_advisor_alert/github_security_advisor_alert.json" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Vulnerabilities found in packages used by GitHub repository $repository$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1195.001", + "T1195" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "repository", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "alert.id", + "repository.full_name", + "repository.html_url", + "action", + "alert.affected_package_name", + "alert.affected_range", + "alert.created_at", + "alert.external_identifier", + "alert.external_reference", + "alert.fixed_in", + "alert.severity" + ], + "risk_score": 27, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1195.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1195", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Supply Chain Compromise", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "github", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:firehose:json", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "github_dependabot_alert_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/github_dependabot_alert.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "GitHub Pull Request from Unknown User", + "id": "9d7b9100-8878-4404-914e-ca5e551a641e", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-01", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for Pull Request from unknown user.", + "search": "`github` check_suite.pull_requests{}.id=* | stats count by check_suite.head_commit.author.name repository.full_name check_suite.pull_requests{}.head.ref check_suite.head_commit.message | rename check_suite.head_commit.author.name as user repository.full_name as repository check_suite.pull_requests{}.head.ref as ref_head check_suite.head_commit.message as commit_message | search NOT `github_known_users` | eval phase=\"code\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `github_pull_request_from_unknown_user_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must index GitHub logs. You can follow the url in reference to onboard GitHub logs.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/tips-and-tricks/getting-github-data-with-webhooks.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GitHub Pull Request from Unknown User", + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "asset_type": "GitHub", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1195.001/github_pull_request/github_pull_request.json" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Vulnerabilities found in packages used by GitHub repository $repository$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1195.001", + "T1195" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "repository", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "alert.id", + "repository.full_name", + "repository.html_url", + "action", + "alert.affected_package_name", + "alert.affected_range", + "alert.created_at", + "alert.external_identifier", + "alert.external_reference", + "alert.fixed_in", + "alert.severity" + ], + "risk_score": 27, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1195.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1195", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Supply Chain Compromise", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "github", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:firehose:json", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "github_known_users", + "definition": "user IN (user_names_here)", + "description": "specify the user allowed to create PRs in Github projects." + }, + { + "name": "github_pull_request_from_unknown_user_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/github_pull_request_from_unknown_user.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Gsuite Drive Share In External Email", + "id": "f6ee02d6-fea0-11eb-b2c2-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-16", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search is to detect suspicious google drive or google docs files shared outside or externally. This behavior might be a good hunting query to monitor exfitration of data made by an attacker or insider to a targetted machine.", + "search": "`gsuite_drive` NOT (email IN(\"\", \"null\")) | rex field=parameters.owner \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | rex field=email \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | where src_domain = \"internal_test_email.com\" and not dest_domain = \"internal_test_email.com\" | eval phase=\"plan\" | eval severity=\"low\" | stats values(parameters.doc_title) as doc_title, values(parameters.doc_type) as doc_types, values(email) as dst_email_list, values(parameters.visibility) as visibility, values(parameters.doc_id) as doc_id, count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by parameters.owner ip_address phase severity | rename parameters.owner as user ip_address as src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_drive_share_in_external_email_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc. In order for the search to work for your environment, please edit the query to use your company specific email domain instead of `internal_test_email.com`.", + "known_false_positives": "network admin or normal user may share files to customer and external team.", + "references": [ + "https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Gsuite Drive Share In External Email", + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "asset_type": "GSuite", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1567.002/gsuite_share_drive/gdrive_share_external.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "suspicious share gdrive from $parameters.owner$ to $email$ namely as $parameters.doc_title$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1567.002", + "T1567" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "parameters.owner", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "email", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "parameters.doc_title", + "src_domain", + "dest_domain", + "email", + "parameters.visibility", + "parameters.owner", + "parameters.doc_type" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1567.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration to Cloud Storage", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Chimera", + "FIN7", + "HAFNIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Turla", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1567", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Web Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "gsuite_drive", + "definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:drive:json", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "gsuite_drive_share_in_external_email_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/gsuite_drive_share_in_external_email.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "GSuite Email Suspicious Attachment", + "id": "6d663014-fe92-11eb-ab07-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-16", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious attachment file extension in Gsuite email that may related to spear phishing attack. This file type is commonly used by malware to lure user to click on it to execute malicious code to compromised targetted machine. But this search can also catch some normal files related to this file type that maybe send by employee or network admin.", + "search": "`gsuite_gmail` \"attachment{}.file_extension_type\" IN (\"pl\", \"py\", \"rb\", \"sh\", \"bat\", \"exe\", \"dll\", \"cpl\", \"com\", \"js\", \"vbs\", \"ps1\", \"reg\",\"swf\", \"cmd\", \"go\") | eval phase=\"plan\" | eval severity=\"medium\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(attachment{}.file_extension_type) as email_attachments, values(attachment{}.sha256) as attachment_sha256, values(payload_size) as payload_size by destination{}.service num_message_attachments subject destination{}.address source.address phase severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_email_suspicious_attachment_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc.", + "known_false_positives": "network admin and normal user may send this file attachment as part of their day to day work. having a good protocol in attaching this file type to an e-mail may reduce the risk of having a spear phishing attack.", + "references": [ + "https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GSuite Email Suspicious Attachment", + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "asset_type": "GSuite", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gsuite_susp_attachment_ext/gsuite_gmail_file_ext.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "suspicious email from $source.address$ to $destination{}.address$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566.001", + "T1566" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "source.address", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "destination{}.address", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "attachment{}.file_extension_type", + "attachment{}.sha256", + "destination{}.service", + "num_message_attachments", + "payload_size", + "subject", + "destination{}.address", + "source.address" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "gsuite_gmail", + "definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:gmail:bigquery", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "gsuite_email_suspicious_attachment_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/gsuite_email_suspicious_attachment.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Gsuite Email Suspicious Subject With Attachment", + "id": "8ef3971e-00f2-11ec-b54f-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-19", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search is to detect a gsuite email contains suspicious subject having known file type used in spear phishing. This technique is a common and effective entry vector of attacker to compromise a network by luring the user to click or execute the suspicious attachment send from external email account because of the effective social engineering of subject related to delivery, bank and so on. On the other hand this detection may catch a normal email traffic related to legitimate transaction so better to check the email sender, spelling and etc. avoid click link or opening the attachment if you are not expecting this type of e-mail.", + "search": "`gsuite_gmail` num_message_attachments > 0 subject IN (\"*dhl*\", \"* ups *\", \"*delivery*\", \"*parcel*\", \"*label*\", \"*invoice*\", \"*postal*\", \"* fedex *\", \"* usps *\", \"* express *\", \"*shipment*\", \"*Banking/Tax*\",\"*shipment*\", \"*new order*\") attachment{}.file_extension_type IN (\"doc\", \"docx\", \"xls\", \"xlsx\", \"ppt\", \"pptx\", \"pdf\", \"zip\", \"rar\", \"html\",\"htm\",\"hta\") | rex field=source.from_header_address \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | rex field=destination{}.address \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | where not source_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" and dest_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" | eval phase=\"plan\" | eval severity=\"medium\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(attachment{}.file_extension_type) as email_attachments, values(attachment{}.sha256) as attachment_sha256, values(payload_size) as payload_size by destination{}.service num_message_attachments subject destination{}.address source.address phase severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_email_suspicious_subject_with_attachment_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc.", + "known_false_positives": "normal user or normal transaction may contain the subject and file type attachment that this detection try to search.", + "references": [ + "https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-top-spear-phishing-words.pdf" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Gsuite Email Suspicious Subject With Attachment", + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "asset_type": "GSuite", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gsuite_susp_subj/gsuite_susp_subj_attach.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "suspicious email from $source.address$ to $destination{}.address$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566.001", + "T1566" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "source.address", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "gsuite_gmail", + "definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:gmail:bigquery", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "gsuite_email_suspicious_subject_with_attachment_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/gsuite_email_suspicious_subject_with_attachment.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Gsuite Email With Known Abuse Web Service Link", + "id": "8630aa22-042b-11ec-af39-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-23", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This analytics is to detect a gmail containing a link that are known to be abused by malware or attacker like pastebin, telegram and discord to deliver malicious payload. This event can encounter some normal email traffic within organization and external email that normally using this application and services.", + "search": "`gsuite_gmail` \"link_domain{}\" IN (\"*pastebin.com*\", \"*discord*\", \"*telegram*\",\"t.me\") | rex field=source.from_header_address \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | rex field=destination{}.address \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | where not source_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" and dest_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" | eval phase=\"plan\" | eval severity=\"low\" |stats values(link_domain{}) as link_domains min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by is_spam source.address source.from_header_address subject destination{}.address phase severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_email_with_known_abuse_web_service_link_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc.", + "known_false_positives": "normal email contains this link that are known application within the organization or network can be catched by this detection.", + "references": [ + "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/07/22/malware-increasingly-targets-discord-for-abuse/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Gsuite Email With Known Abuse Web Service Link", + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "asset_type": "GSuite", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gsuite_susp_url/gsuite_susp_url.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "suspicious email from $source.address$ to $destination{}.address$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566.001", + "T1566" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "source.address", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "gsuite_gmail", + "definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:gmail:bigquery", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "gsuite_email_with_known_abuse_web_service_link_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/gsuite_email_with_known_abuse_web_service_link.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain", + "id": "dc4dc3a8-ff54-11eb-8bf7-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-17", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious outbound e-mail from internal email to external email domain. This can be a good hunting query to monitor insider or outbound email traffic for not common domain e-mail. The idea is to parse the domain of destination email check if there is a minimum outbound traffic < 20 with attachment.", + "search": "`gsuite_gmail` num_message_attachments > 0 | rex field=source.from_header_address \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | rex field=destination{}.address \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | where source_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" and not dest_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" | eval phase=\"plan\" | eval severity=\"low\" | stats values(subject) as subject, values(source.from_header_address) as src_domain_list, count as numEvents, dc(source.from_header_address) as numSrcAddresses, min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest_domain phase severity | where numSrcAddresses < 20 |sort - numSrcAddresses | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_outbound_email_with_attachment_to_external_domain_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc.", + "known_false_positives": "network admin and normal user may send this file attachment as part of their day to day work. having a good protocol in attaching this file type to an e-mail may reduce the risk of having a spear phishing attack.", + "references": [ + "https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain", + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "asset_type": "GSuite", + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gsuite_outbound_email_to_external/gsuite_external_domain.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "suspicious email from $source.address$ to $destination{}.address$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1048.003", + "T1048" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "source.address", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "destination{}.address", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 9, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT33", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Lazarus Group", + "OilRig", + "Thrip", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "gsuite_gmail", + "definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:gmail:bigquery", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "gsuite_outbound_email_with_attachment_to_external_domain_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/gsuite_outbound_email_with_attachment_to_external_domain.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Gsuite Suspicious Shared File Name", + "id": "07eed200-03f5-11ec-98fb-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-23", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search is to detect a shared file in google drive with suspicious file name that are commonly used by spear phishing campaign. This technique is very popular to lure the user by running a malicious document or click a malicious link within the shared file that will redirected to malicious website. This detection can also catch some normal email communication between organization and its external customer.", + "search": "`gsuite_drive` parameters.owner_is_team_drive=false \"parameters.doc_title\" IN (\"*dhl*\", \"* ups *\", \"*delivery*\", \"*parcel*\", \"*label*\", \"*invoice*\", \"*postal*\", \"*fedex*\", \"* usps *\", \"* express *\", \"*shipment*\", \"*Banking/Tax*\",\"*shipment*\", \"*new order*\") parameters.doc_type IN (\"document\",\"pdf\", \"msexcel\", \"msword\", \"spreadsheet\", \"presentation\") | rex field=parameters.owner \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | rex field=parameters.target_user \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | where not source_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" and dest_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" | eval phase=\"plan\" | eval severity=\"low\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by email parameters.owner parameters.target_user parameters.doc_title parameters.doc_type phase severity | rename parameters.target_user AS user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_suspicious_shared_file_name_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc. In order for the search to work for your environment, please edit the query to use your company specific email domain instead of `internal_test_email.com`.", + "known_false_positives": "normal user or normal transaction may contain the subject and file type attachment that this detection try to search", + "references": [ + "https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-top-spear-phishing-words.pdf" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Gsuite Suspicious Shared File Name", + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "asset_type": "GSuite", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gdrive_susp_file_share/gdrive_susp_attach.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "suspicious share gdrive from $parameters.owner$ to $email$ namely as $parameters.doc_title$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566.001", + "T1566" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "parameters.owner", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "email", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "parameters.doc_title", + "src_domain", + "dest_domain", + "email", + "parameters.visibility", + "parameters.owner", + "parameters.doc_type" + ], + "risk_score": 21, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "gsuite_drive", + "definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:drive:json", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "gsuite_suspicious_shared_file_name_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/gsuite_suspicious_shared_file_name.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI", + "id": "0f83244b-425b-4528-83db-7a88c5f66e48", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-20", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search uses the Kubernetes logs from a nginx ingress controller to detect local file inclusion attacks.", + "search": "`kubernetes_container_controller` | rex field=_raw \"^(?\\S+)\\s+-\\s+-\\s+\\[(?[^\\]]*)\\]\\s\\\"(?[^\\\"]*)\\\"\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s\\\"(?[^\\\"]*)\\\"\\s\\\"(?[^\\\"]*)\\\"\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s\\[(?[^\\]]*)\\]\\s\\[(?[^\\]]*)\\]\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\" | lookup local_file_inclusion_paths local_file_inclusion_paths AS request OUTPUT lfi_path | search lfi_path=yes | rename remote_addr AS src_ip, upstream_status as status, proxy_upstream_name as proxy | rex field=request \"^(?\\S+)\\s(?\\S+)\\s\" | eval phase=\"operate\" | eval severity=\"high\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by src_ip, status, url, http_method, host, http_user_agent, proxy, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `kubernetes_nginx_ingress_lfi_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must ingest Kubernetes logs through Splunk Connect for Kubernetes.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/splunk/splunk-connect-for-kubernetes", + "https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/file-inclusion-vulnerabilities/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI", + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "asset_type": "Kubernetes", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1212/kubernetes_nginx_lfi_attack/kubernetes_nginx_lfi_attack.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Local File Inclusion Attack detected on $host$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1212" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "raw" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1212", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Credential Access", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "kubernetes_container_controller", + "definition": "sourcetype=kube:container:controller", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Kubernetes data. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "kubernetes_nginx_ingress_lfi_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "local_file_inclusion_paths", + "description": "A list of interesting files in a local file inclusion attack", + "filename": "local_file_inclusion_paths.csv", + "default_match": "false", + "match_type": "WILDCARD(local_file_inclusion_paths)", + "min_matches": 1, + "case_sensitive_match": "false" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/kubernetes_nginx_ingress_lfi.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Kubernetes Nginx Ingress RFI", + "id": "fc5531ae-62fd-4de6-9c36-b4afdae8ca95", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-23", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search uses the Kubernetes logs from a nginx ingress controller to detect remote file inclusion attacks.", + "search": "`kubernetes_container_controller` | rex field=_raw \"^(?\\S+)\\s+-\\s+-\\s+\\[(?[^\\]]*)\\]\\s\\\"(?[^\\\"]*)\\\"\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s\\\"(?[^\\\"]*)\\\"\\s\\\"(?[^\\\"]*)\\\"\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s\\[(?[^\\]]*)\\]\\s\\[(?[^\\]]*)\\]\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\" | rex field=request \"^(?\\S+)?\\s(?\\S+)\\s\" | rex field=url \"(?\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3})\" | search dest_ip=* | rename remote_addr AS src_ip, upstream_status as status, proxy_upstream_name as proxy | eval phase=\"operate\" | eval severity=\"medium\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by src_ip, dest_ip status, url, http_method, host, http_user_agent, proxy, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `kubernetes_nginx_ingress_rfi_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must ingest Kubernetes logs through Splunk Connect for Kubernetes.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/splunk/splunk-connect-for-kubernetes", + "https://www.netsparker.com/blog/web-security/remote-file-inclusion-vulnerability/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Kubernetes Nginx Ingress RFI", + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "asset_type": "Kubernetes", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1212/kuberntest_nginx_rfi_attack/kubernetes_nginx_rfi_attack.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Remote File Inclusion Attack detected on $host$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1212" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "raw" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1212", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Credential Access", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "kubernetes_container_controller", + "definition": "sourcetype=kube:container:controller", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Kubernetes data. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "kubernetes_nginx_ingress_rfi_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/kubernetes_nginx_ingress_rfi.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Kubernetes Scanner Image Pulling", + "id": "4890cd6b-0112-4974-a272-c5c153aee551", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-24", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search uses the Kubernetes logs from Splunk Connect from Kubernetes to detect Kubernetes Security Scanner.", + "search": "`kube_objects_events` object.message IN (\"Pulling image *kube-hunter*\", \"Pulling image *kube-bench*\", \"Pulling image *kube-recon*\", \"Pulling image *kube-recon*\") | rename object.* AS * | rename involvedObject.* AS * | rename source.host AS host | eval phase=\"operate\" | eval severity=\"high\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by host, name, namespace, kind, reason, message, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `kubernetes_scanner_image_pulling_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must ingest Kubernetes logs through Splunk Connect for Kubernetes.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/splunk/splunk-connect-for-kubernetes" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Kubernetes Scanner Image Pulling", + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "asset_type": "Kubernetes", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1526/kubernetes_kube_hunter/kubernetes_kube_hunter.json" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Kubernetes Scanner image pulled on host $host$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1526" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "host", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "object.message", + "source.host", + "object.involvedObject.name", + "object.involvedObject.namespace", + "object.involvedObject.kind", + "object.message", + "object.reason" + ], + "risk_score": 81, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1526", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "kube_objects_events", + "definition": "sourcetype=kube:objects:events", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "kubernetes_scanner_image_pulling_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/kubernetes_scanner_image_pulling.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User", + "id": "b2c81cc6-6040-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-01-26", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects the creation of a new Federation setting by alerting about an specific event related to its creation.", + "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation=\"Add app role assignment grant to user.\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Actor{}.ID) as Actor.ID values(Actor{}.Type) as Actor.Type by ActorIpAddress dest ResultStatus | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", + "known_false_positives": "The creation of a new Federation is not necessarily malicious, however this events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a different cloud provider.", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", + "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User", + "analytic_story": [ + "Office 365 Detections", + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" + ], + "asset_type": "Office 365", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_new_federation/o365_new_federation.json" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "User $Actor.ID$ has created a new federation setting on $dest$ from IP Address $ActorIpAddress$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1136.003", + "T1136" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ActorIpAddress", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Actor.ID", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Workload", + "Operation", + "Actor{}.ID", + "Actor{}.Type", + "ActorIpAddress", + "dest", + "ResultStatus" + ], + "risk_score": 18, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Indrik Spider", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "o365_management_activity", + "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "O365 Added Service Principal", + "id": "1668812a-6047-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-03", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects the creation of a new Federation setting by alerting about an specific event related to its creation.", + "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation=\"Add service principal credentials.\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Actor{}.ID) as Actor.ID values(ModifiedProperties{}.Name) as ModifiedProperties.Name values(ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue) as ModifiedProperties.NewValue values(Target{}.ID) as Target.ID by ActorIpAddress Operation | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_added_service_principal_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", + "known_false_positives": "The creation of a new Federation is not necessarily malicious, however these events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a different cloud provider.", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", + "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a", + "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html", + "https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "O365 Added Service Principal", + "analytic_story": [ + "Office 365 Detections", + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" + ], + "asset_type": "Office 365", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_add_service_principal/o365_add_service_principal.json" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "User $Actor.ID$ created a new federation setting on $Target.ID$ and added service principal credentials from IP Address $ActorIpAddress$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1136.003", + "T1136" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ActorIpAddress", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Target.ID", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Workload", + "signature", + "Actor{}.ID", + "ModifiedProperties{}.Name", + "ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue", + "Target{}.ID", + "ActorIpAddress" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Indrik Spider", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "o365_management_activity", + "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "o365_added_service_principal_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP", + "id": "c783dd98-c703-4252-9e8a-f19d9f66949e", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-02-03", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects newly added IP addresses/CIDR blocks to the list of MFA Trusted IPs to bypass multi factor authentication. Attackers are often known to use this technique so that they can bypass the MFA system.", + "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=\"Set Company Information.\" ModifiedProperties{}.Name=StrongAuthenticationPolicy | rex max_match=100 field=ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue \"(?\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\/\\d{1,2})\" | rex max_match=100 field=ModifiedProperties{}.OldValue \"(?\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\/\\d{1,2})\" | eval ip_addresses_old=if(isnotnull(ip_addresses_old),ip_addresses_old,\"0\") | mvexpand ip_addresses_new_added | where isnull(mvfind(ip_addresses_old,ip_addresses_new_added)) |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ip_addresses_old) as ip_addresses_old by user ip_addresses_new_added Operation Workload vendor_account status user_id action | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install Splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", + "known_false_positives": "Unless it is a special case, it is uncommon to continually update Trusted IPs to MFA configuration.", + "references": [ + "https://i.blackhat.com/USA-20/Thursday/us-20-Bienstock-My-Cloud-Is-APTs-Cloud-Investigating-And-Defending-Office-365.pdf", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/007/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP", + "analytic_story": [ + "Office 365 Detections" + ], + "asset_type": "Office 365", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.007/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.json" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "User $user_id$ has added new IP addresses $ip_addresses_new_added$ to a list of trusted IPs to bypass MFA", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.007", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ip_addresses_new_added", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user_id", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "signature", + "ModifiedProperties{}.Name", + "ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue", + "ModifiedProperties{}.OldValue", + "user", + "vendor_account", + "status", + "user_id", + "action" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "o365_management_activity", + "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "O365 Disable MFA", + "id": "c783dd98-c703-4252-9e8a-f19d9f5c949e", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-03", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects when multi factor authentication has been disabled, what entitiy performed the action and against what user", + "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=\"Disable Strong Authentication.\" | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by UserType Operation UserId ResultStatus |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_disable_mfa_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", + "known_false_positives": "Unless it is a special case, it is uncommon to disable MFA or Strong Authentication", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "O365 Disable MFA", + "analytic_story": [ + "Office 365 Detections" + ], + "asset_type": "Office 365", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/o365_disable_mfa/o365_disable_mfa.json" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "User $user$ has executed an operation $Operation$ for this destination $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1556" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Operation", + "UserType", + "user", + "status", + "signature", + "dest", + "ResultStatus" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1556", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access", + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "o365_management_activity", + "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "o365_disable_mfa_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert", + "id": "d441364c-349c-453b-b55f-12eccab67cf9", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-02-18", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects when an excessive number of authentication failures occur this search also includes attempts against MFA prompt codes", + "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory UserAuthenticationMethod=* status=failure | stats count earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime values(UserAuthenticationMethod) AS UserAuthenticationMethod values(UserAgent) AS UserAgent values(status) AS status values(src_ip) AS src_ip by user | where count > 10 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", + "known_false_positives": "The threshold for alert is above 10 attempts and this should reduce the number of false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert", + "analytic_story": [ + "Office 365 Detections" + ], + "asset_type": "Office 365", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110/o365_brute_force_login/o365_brute_force_login.json" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "User $user$ has caused excessive number of authentication failures from $src_ip$ using UserAgent $UserAgent$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1110" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Workload", + "UserAuthenticationMethod", + "status", + "UserAgent", + "src_ip", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN5", + "Fox Kitten", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "o365_management_activity", + "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "O365 Excessive SSO logon errors", + "id": "8158ccc4-6038-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-01-26", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects accounts with high number of Single Sign ON (SSO) logon errors. Excessive logon errors may indicate attempts to bruteforce of password or single sign on token hijack or reuse.", + "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory LogonError=SsoArtifactInvalidOrExpired | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by LogonError ActorIpAddress UserAgent UserId | where count > 5 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", + "known_false_positives": "Logon errors may not be malicious in nature however it may indicate attempts to reuse a token or password obtained via credential access attack.", + "references": [ + "https://stealthbits.com/blog/bypassing-mfa-with-pass-the-cookie/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "O365 Excessive SSO logon errors", + "analytic_story": [ + "Office 365 Detections", + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" + ], + "asset_type": "Office 365", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/o365_sso_logon_errors/o365_sso_logon_errors.json" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "User $UserId$ has caused excessive number of SSO logon errors from $ActorIpAddress$ using UserAgent $UserAgent$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1556" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ActorIpAddress", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "UserId", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Workload", + "LogonError", + "ActorIpAddress", + "UserAgent", + "UserId" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1556", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access", + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "o365_management_activity", + "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "O365 New Federated Domain Added", + "id": "e155876a-6048-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-01-26", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects the addition of a new Federated domain.", + "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=Exchange Operation=\"Add-FederatedDomain\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Parameters{}.Value) as Parameters.Value by ObjectId Operation OrganizationName OriginatingServer UserId UserKey | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_new_federated_domain_added_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity.", + "known_false_positives": "The creation of a new Federated domain is not necessarily malicious, however these events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a similar or different cloud provider.", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", + "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a", + "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html", + "https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory", + "https://o365blog.com/post/aadbackdoor/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "O365 New Federated Domain Added", + "analytic_story": [ + "Office 365 Detections", + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" + ], + "asset_type": "Office 365", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_new_federated_domain/o365_new_federated_domain.json" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "User $UserId$ has added a new federated domaain $Parameters.Value$ for $OrganizationName$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1136.003", + "T1136" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "OrganizationName", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "UserId", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Workload", + "Operation", + "Parameters{}.Value", + "ObjectId", + "OrganizationName", + "OriginatingServer", + "UserId", + "UserKey" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Indrik Spider", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "o365_management_activity", + "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "o365_new_federated_domain_added_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "O365 PST export alert", + "id": "5f694cc4-a678-4a60-9410-bffca1b647dc", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-12-16", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects when a user has performed an Ediscovery search or exported a PST file from the search. This PST file usually has sensitive information including email body content", + "search": "`o365_management_activity` Category=ThreatManagement Name=\"eDiscovery search started or exported\" | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by Source Severity AlertEntityId Operation Name |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_pst_export_alert_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", + "known_false_positives": "PST export can be done for legitimate purposes but due to the sensitive nature of its content it must be monitored.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "O365 PST export alert", + "analytic_story": [ + "Office 365 Detections", + "Data Exfiltration" + ], + "asset_type": "Office 365", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Exfiltration" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114/o365_export_pst_file/o365_export_pst_file.json" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "User $Source$ has exported a PST file from the search using this operation- $Operation$ with a severity of $Severity$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1114" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Source", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Category", + "Name", + "Source", + "Severity", + "AlertEntityId", + "Operation" + ], + "risk_score": 48, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Magic Hound", + "Silent Librarian" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "o365_management_activity", + "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "o365_pst_export_alert_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding", + "id": "7f398cfb-918d-41f4-8db8-2e2474e02c28", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-12-16", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects when an admin configured a forwarding rule for multiple mailboxes to the same destination.", + "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=Set-Mailbox | spath input=Parameters | rename Identity AS src_user | search ForwardingAddress=* | stats dc(src_user) AS count_src_user earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(src_user) AS src_user values(user) AS user by ForwardingAddress | where count_src_user > 1 |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding", + "analytic_story": [ + "Office 365 Detections", + "Data Exfiltration" + ], + "asset_type": "Office 365", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Exfiltration" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114.003/o365_email_forwarding_rule/o365_email_forwarding_rule.json" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user$ has configured a forwarding rule for multiple mailboxes to the same destination $ForwardingAddress$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1114.003", + "T1114" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Operation", + "Parameters" + ], + "risk_score": 48, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Forwarding Rule", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Kimsuky", + "Silent Librarian" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Magic Hound", + "Silent Librarian" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "o365_management_activity", + "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation", + "id": "b25d2973-303e-47c8-bacd-52b61604c6a7", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-12-15", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects the assignment of rights to accesss content from another mailbox. This is usually only assigned to a service account.", + "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=Add-MailboxPermission | spath input=Parameters | rename User AS src_user, Identity AS dest_user | search AccessRights=FullAccess OR AccessRights=SendAs OR AccessRights=SendOnBehalf | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user src_user dest_user Operation AccessRights |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`o365_suspicious_rights_delegation_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", + "known_false_positives": "Service Accounts", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation", + "analytic_story": [ + "Office 365 Detections" + ], + "asset_type": "Office 365", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Stage:Exfiltration", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114.002/suspicious_rights_delegation/suspicious_rights_delegation.json" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user$ has delegated suspicious rights $AccessRights$ to user $dest_user$ that allow access to sensitive", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1114.002", + "T1114" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Operation", + "Parameters" + ], + "risk_score": 48, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN4", + "HAFNIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "Leafminer" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Magic Hound", + "Silent Librarian" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "o365_management_activity", + "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "o365_suspicious_rights_delegation_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding", + "id": "f8dfe015-dbb3-4569-ba75-b13787e06aa4", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-12-16", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects when multiple user configured a forwarding rule to the same destination.", + "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=Set-Mailbox | spath input=Parameters | rename Identity AS src_user | search ForwardingSmtpAddress=* | stats dc(src_user) AS count_src_user earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(src_user) AS src_user values(user) AS user by ForwardingSmtpAddress | where count_src_user > 1 |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding", + "analytic_story": [ + "Office 365 Detections", + "Data Exfiltration" + ], + "asset_type": "Office 365", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Stage:Exfiltration", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114.003/o365_email_forwarding_rule/o365_email_forwarding_rule.json" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user$ configured multiple users $src_user$ with a count of $count_src_user$, a forwarding rule to same destination $ForwardingSmtpAddress$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1114.003", + "T1114" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ForwardingSmtpAddress", + "type": "Email Address", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Operation", + "Parameters" + ], + "risk_score": 48, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Forwarding Rule", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Kimsuky", + "Silent Librarian" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Magic Hound", + "Silent Librarian" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "o365_management_activity", + "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User", + "id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-290bf5d0dac4", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | bucket span=10m _time | stats count AS instances_launched by _time userName | eventstats avg(instances_launched) as total_launched_avg, stdev(instances_launched) as total_launched_stdev | eval threshold_value = 4 | eval isOutlier=if(instances_launched > total_launched_avg+(total_launched_stdev * threshold_value), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 AND _time >= relative_time(now(), \"-10m@m\") | eval num_standard_deviations_away = round(abs(instances_launched - total_launched_avg) / total_launched_stdev, 2) | table _time, userName, instances_launched, num_standard_deviations_away, total_launched_avg, total_launched_stdev | `abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment.", + "known_false_positives": "Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078.004" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "errorCode", + "userName" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT33" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", + "id": "dec41ad5-d579-42cb-b4c6-f5dbb778bbe5", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Jason Brewer, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success `abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk_filter` | bucket span=10m _time | stats count as instances_launched by _time src_user | apply ec2_excessive_runinstances_v1 | rename \"IsOutlier(instances_launched)\" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment.", + "known_false_positives": "Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078.004" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "errorCode", + "src_user" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT33" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User", + "id": "8d301246-fccf-45e2-a8e7-3655fd14379c", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where an abnormally high number of instances were successfully terminated by a user in a 10-minute window. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=TerminateInstances errorCode=success | bucket span=10m _time | stats count AS instances_terminated by _time userName | eventstats avg(instances_terminated) as total_terminations_avg, stdev(instances_terminated) as total_terminations_stdev | eval threshold_value = 4 | eval isOutlier=if(instances_terminated > total_terminations_avg+(total_terminations_stdev * threshold_value), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 AND _time >= relative_time(now(), \"-10m@m\")| eval num_standard_deviations_away = round(abs(instances_terminated - total_terminations_avg) / total_terminations_stdev, 2) |table _time, userName, instances_terminated, num_standard_deviations_away, total_terminations_avg, total_terminations_stdev | `abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "Many service accounts configured with your AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify whether this search alerted on a human user.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078.004" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "errorCode", + "userName" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT33" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK", + "id": "1c02b86a-cd85-473e-a50b-014a9ac8fe3e", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Jason Brewer, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user successfully terminates an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=TerminateInstances errorCode=success `abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk_filter` | bucket span=10m _time | stats count as instances_terminated by _time src_user | apply ec2_excessive_terminateinstances_v1 | rename \"IsOutlier(instances_terminated)\" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment.", + "known_false_positives": "Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078.004" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "errorCode", + "src_user" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT33" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City", + "id": "344a1778-0b25-490c-adb1-de8beddf59cd", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-03-16", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen cities. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with \"Run\" or \"Create.\" This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. ", + "search": "`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search City=* [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search City=* | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by City | eval newCity=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newCity=1 | table City] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip, City, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the \"Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources\" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources.", + "known_false_positives": "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no \"false positives\" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\\\n This search will fire any time a new city is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your city, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1535" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "sourceIPAddress" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country", + "id": "ceb8d3d8-06cb-49eb-beaf-829526e33ff0", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-03-16", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen countries. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with \"Run\" or \"Create.\" This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. ", + "search": "`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Country=* [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Country=* | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by Country | eval newCountry=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newCountry=1 | table Country] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip, Country, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the \"Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources\" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources.", + "known_false_positives": "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching over plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no \"false positives\" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\\\n This search will fire any time a new country is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1535" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "sourceIPAddress" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address", + "id": "42e15012-ac14-4801-94f4-f1acbe64880b", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-03-16", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen IP addresses. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with \"Run\" or \"Create.\" This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. ", + "search": "`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Country=* | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress | eval newIP=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newIP=1 | table sourceIPAddress] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the \"Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources\" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources.", + "known_false_positives": "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no \"false positives\" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\\\n This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "sourceIPAddress" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region", + "id": "7971d3df-da82-4648-a6e5-b5637bea5253", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-03-16", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen regions. Region in this context is similar to a state in the United States. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with \"Run\" or \"Create.\" This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Region=* [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Region=* | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by Region | eval newRegion=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newRegion=1 | table Region] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip, Region, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the \"Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources\" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources.", + "known_false_positives": "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no \"false positives\" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\\\n This search will fire any time a new region is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your region, there should be few false positives. If you are located in regions where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1535" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "sourceIPAddress" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers", + "id": "74ec6f18-604b-4202-a567-86b2066be3ce", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Resolution" + ], + "description": "This search allows you to identify the endpoints that have connected to more than five DNS servers and made DNS Queries over the time frame of the search.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count, values(DNS.dest) AS dest dc(DNS.dest) as dest_count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.message_type=QUERY by DNS.src | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Network_Resolution\")` |where dest_count > 5 | `clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "This search requires that DNS data is being ingested and populating the `Network_Resolution` data model. This data can come from DNS logs or from solutions that parse network traffic for this data, such as Splunk Stream or Bro.\\\nThis search produces fields (`dest_count`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** Distinct DNS Connections, **Field:** dest_count\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", + "known_false_positives": "It's possible that an enterprise has more than five DNS servers that are configured in a round-robin rotation. Please customize the search, as appropriate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers", + "analytic_story": [ + "DNS Hijacking", + "Command & Control", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Host Redirection" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 9", + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1048.003" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "PR.DS" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "DNS.dest", + "DNS.message_type", + "DNS.src" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT33", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Lazarus Group", + "OilRig", + "Thrip", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Cloud Network Access Control List Deleted", + "id": "021abc51-1862-41dd-ad43-43c739c0a983", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-09-08", + "author": "Peter Gael, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "Enforcing network-access controls is one of the defensive mechanisms used by cloud administrators to restrict access to a cloud instance. After the attacker has gained control of the console by compromising an admin account, they can delete a network ACL and gain access to the instance from anywhere. This search will query the Change datamodel to detect users deleting network ACLs. Deprecated because it's a duplicate", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteNetworkAcl|rename userIdentity.arn as arn | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(errorMessage) values(errorCode) values(userAgent) values(userIdentity.*) by src userName arn eventName | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter` macro.", + "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a user has legitimately deleted a network ACL.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Cloud Network Access Control List Deleted", + "analytic_story": [ + "Cloud Network ACL Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 11" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "userIdentity.arn", + "errorMessage", + "errorCode", + "userAgent", + "src", + "userName", + "arn" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Detect API activity from users without MFA", + "id": "4d46e8bd-4072-48e4-92db-0325889ef894", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-05-17", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user logged into the AWS account, is making API calls and has not enabled Multi Factor authentication. Multi factor authentication adds a layer of security by forcing the users to type a unique authentication code from an approved authentication device when they access AWS websites or services. AWS Best Practices recommend that you enable MFA for privileged IAM users.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.mfaAuthenticated=false | search NOT [| inputlookup aws_service_accounts | fields identity | rename identity as user]| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(eventName) as eventName by userIdentity.arn userIdentity.type user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. Leverage the support search `Create a list of approved AWS service accounts`: run it once every 30 days to create a list of service accounts and validate them.\\\nThis search produces fields (`eventName`,`userIdentity.type`,`userIdentity.arn`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** AWS Event Name, **Field:** eventName\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** AWS User ARN, **Field:** userIdentity.arn\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** AWS User Type, **Field:** userIdentity.type\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", + "known_false_positives": "Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure do not have multi factor authentication enabled. Please ignore the service accounts, if triggered and instead add them to the aws_service_accounts.csv file to fine tune the detection. It is also possible that the search detects users in your environment using Single Sign-On systems, since the MFA is not handled by AWS.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect API activity from users without MFA", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS User Monitoring" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "PR.AC" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.mfaAuthenticated", + "eventName", + "userIdentity.arn", + "userIdentity.type", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "aws_service_accounts", + "description": "A lookup file that will contain AWS Service accounts", + "filename": "aws_service_accounts.csv" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts", + "id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d4bd55", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for successful AWS CloudTrail activity by user accounts that are not listed in the identity table or `aws_service_accounts.csv`. It returns event names and count, as well as the first and last time a specific user or service is detected, grouped by users. Deprecated because managing this list can be quite hard.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` errorCode=success | rename userName as identity | search NOT [| inputlookup identity_lookup_expanded | fields identity] | search NOT [| inputlookup aws_service_accounts | fields identity] | rename identity as user | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(eventName) as eventName by user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You must also populate the `identity_lookup_expanded` lookup shipped with the Asset and Identity framework to be able to look up users in your identity table in Enterprise Security (ES). Leverage the support search called \"Create a list of approved AWS service accounts\": run it once every 30 days to create and validate a list of service accounts.\\\nThis search produces fields (`eventName`,`firstTime`,`lastTime`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** AWS Event Name, **Field:** eventName\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** First Time, **Field:** firstTime\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** Last Time, **Field:** lastTime\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", + "known_false_positives": "It's likely that you'll find activity detected by users/service accounts that are not listed in the `identity_lookup_expanded` or ` aws_service_accounts.csv` file. If the user is a legitimate service account, update the `aws_service_accounts.csv` table with that entry.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS User Monitoring" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078.004" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.CM", + "PR.AC", + "ID.AM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "errorCode", + "userName", + "eventName", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "access", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT33" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "aws_service_accounts", + "description": "A lookup file that will contain AWS Service accounts", + "filename": "aws_service_accounts.csv" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2", + "id": "24dd17b1-e2fb-4c31-878c-d4f226595bfa", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Resolution" + ], + "description": "This search looks for DNS requests for phishing domains that are leveraging EvilGinx tools to mimic websites.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(DNS.answer) as answer from datamodel=Network_Resolution.DNS by DNS.dest DNS.src DNS.query host | `drop_dm_object_name(DNS)`| rex field=query \".*?(?[^./:]+\\.(\\S{2,3}|\\S{2,3}.\\S{2,3}))$\" | stats count values(query) as query by domain dest src answer| search `evilginx_phishlets_amazon` OR `evilginx_phishlets_facebook` OR `evilginx_phishlets_github` OR `evilginx_phishlets_0365` OR `evilginx_phishlets_outlook` OR `evilginx_phishlets_aws` OR `evilginx_phishlets_google` | search NOT [ inputlookup legit_domains.csv | fields domain]| join domain type=outer [| tstats count `security_content_summariesonly` values(Web.url) as url from datamodel=Web.Web by Web.dest Web.site | rename \"Web.*\" as * | rex field=site \".*?(?[^./:]+\\.(\\S{2,3}|\\S{2,3}.\\S{2,3}))$\" | table dest domain url] | table count src dest query answer domain url | `detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You need to ingest data from your DNS logs in the Network_Resolution datamodel. Specifically you must ingest the domain that is being queried and the IP of the host originating the request. Ideally, you should also be ingesting the answer to the query and the query type. This approach allows you to also create your own localized passive DNS capability which can aid you in future investigations. You will have to add legitimate domain names to the `legit_domains.csv` file shipped with the app. \\\n **Splunk>Phantom Playbook Integration**\\\nIf Splunk>Phantom is also configured in your environment, a Playbook called `Lets Encrypt Domain Investigate` can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/`, add the correct hostname to the \"Phantom Instance\" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search, and set the corresponding Playbook to active. \\\n(Playbook link:`https://my.phantom.us/4.2/playbook/lets-encrypt-domain-investigate/`).\\\n", + "known_false_positives": "If a known good domain is not listed in the legit_domains.csv file, then the search could give you false postives. Please update that lookup file to filter out DNS requests to legitimate domains.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2", + "analytic_story": [ + "Common Phishing Frameworks" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 7" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery", + "Command & Control" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566.003" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS", + "PR.IP", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "DNS.answer", + "DNS.dest", + "DNS.src", + "DNS.query", + "host" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing via Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Dark Caracal", + "FIN6", + "Magic Hound", + "OilRig", + "Windshift" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "evilginx_phishlets_github", + "definition": "(query=api* AND query = github*)", + "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as GitHub" + }, + { + "name": "evilginx_phishlets_google", + "definition": "(query=accounts* AND query=ssl* AND query=www*)", + "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as Google" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "evilginx_phishlets_outlook", + "definition": "(query=outlook* AND query=login* AND query=account*)", + "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as Outlook" + }, + { + "name": "evilginx_phishlets_0365", + "definition": "(query=login* AND query=www*)", + "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as Office 365" + }, + { + "name": "evilginx_phishlets_facebook", + "definition": "(query=www* AND query = m* AND query=static*)", + "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as FaceBook" + }, + { + "name": "evilginx_phishlets_aws", + "definition": "(query=www* AND query=aws* AND query=console.aws* AND query=signin.aws* AND api-northeast-1.console.aws* AND query=fls-na* AND query=images-na*)", + "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as an AWS console" + }, + { + "name": "evilginx_phishlets_amazon", + "definition": "(query=fls-na* AND query = www* AND query=images*)", + "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as Amazon" + }, + { + "name": "detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response", + "id": "05437c07-62f5-452e-afdc-04dd44815bb9", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Resolution" + ], + "description": "This search is used to detect attempts to use DNS tunneling, by calculating the length of responses to DNS TXT queries. Endpoints using DNS as a method of transmission for data exfiltration, command and control, or evasion of security controls can often be detected by noting unusually large volumes of DNS traffic. Deprecated because this detection should focus on DNS queries instead of DNS responses.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.message_type=response AND DNS.record_type=TXT by DNS.src DNS.dest DNS.answer DNS.record_type | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | eval anslen=len(answer) | search anslen>100 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename src as \"Source IP\", dest as \"Destination IP\", answer as \"DNS Answer\" anslen as \"Answer Length\" record_type as \"DNS Record Type\" firstTime as \"First Time\" lastTime as \"Last Time\" count as Count | table \"Source IP\" \"Destination IP\" \"DNS Answer\" \"DNS Record Type\" \"Answer Length\" Count \"First Time\" \"Last Time\" | `detect_long_dns_txt_record_response_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to ingest data from your DNS logs, or monitor DNS traffic using Stream, Bro or something similar. Specifically, this query requires that the DNS data model is populated with information regarding the DNS record type that is being returned as well as the data in the answer section of the protocol.", + "known_false_positives": "It's possible that legitimate TXT record responses can be long enough to trigger this search. You can modify the packet threshold for this search to help mitigate false positives.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Command & Control" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1048.003" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "DNS.message_type", + "DNS.record_type", + "DNS.src", + "DNS.dest", + "DNS.answer" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT33", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Lazarus Group", + "OilRig", + "Thrip", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_long_dns_txt_record_response_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703", + "id": "98917be2-bfc8-475a-8618-a9bb06575188", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-02-27", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for PowerShell requesting privileges consistent with credential dumping. Deprecated, looks like things changed from a logging perspective.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` signature_id=4703 Process_Name=*powershell.exe | rex field=Message \"Enabled Privileges:\\s+(?\\w+)\\s+Disabled Privileges:\" | where privs=\"SeDebugPrivilege\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Process_Name, privs, Process_ID, Message | rename privs as \"Enabled Privilege\" | rename Process_Name as process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Windows Security logs. You must also enable the account change auditing here: http://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/7.0.2/Data/MonitorWindowseventlogdata. Additionally, this search requires you to enable your Group Management Audit Logs in your Local Windows Security Policy and to be ingesting those logs. More information on how to enable them can be found here: http://whatevernetworks.com/auditing-group-membership-changes-in-active-directory/. Finally, please make sure that the local administrator group name is \"Administrators\" to be able to look for the right group membership changes.", + "known_false_positives": "The activity may be legitimate. PowerShell is often used by administrators to perform various tasks, and it's possible this event could be generated in those cases. In these cases, false positives should be fairly obvious and you may need to tweak the search to eliminate noise.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703", + "analytic_story": [ + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" + ], + "asset_type": "Windows", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "signature_id", + "Process_Name", + "Message", + "dest", + "Process_ID" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "access", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cleaver", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Whitefly" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Detect new API calls from user roles", + "id": "22773e84-bac0-4595-b086-20d3f335b4f1", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-04-16", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects new API calls that have either never been seen before or that have not been seen in the previous hour, where the identity type is `AssumedRole`.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall errorCode=success userIdentity.type=AssumedRole [search `cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall errorCode=success userIdentity.type=AssumedRole | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by userName eventName | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles | stats min(earliest) as earliest, max(latest) as latest by userName eventName | outputlookup previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles| eval newApiCallfromUserRole=if(earliest>=relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newApiCallfromUserRole=1 | `security_content_ctime(earliest)` | `security_content_ctime(latest)` | table eventName userName] |rename userName as user| stats values(eventName) earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by user | `security_content_ctime(earliest)` | `security_content_ctime(latest)` | `detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the \"Previously seen API call per user roles in AWS CloudTrail\" support search once to create a history of previously seen user roles.", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible that there are legitimate user roles making new or infrequently used API calls in your infrastructure, causing the search to trigger.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect new API calls from user roles", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS User Monitoring" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078.004" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventType", + "errorCode", + "userIdentity.type", + "userName", + "eventName" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT33" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles", + "description": "A placeholder for a list of AWS API calls for each user role", + "filename": "previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles.csv" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Detect new user AWS Console Login", + "id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f3-d82362dffd75", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour. Deprecated now this search is updated to use the Authentication datamodel.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user | eval userStatus=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), \"First Time Logging into AWS Console\",\"Previously Seen User\") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| where userStatus =\"First Time Logging into AWS Console\" | `detect_new_user_aws_console_login_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. Run the \"Previously seen users in AWS CloudTrail\" support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run \"Update previously seen users in AWS CloudTrail\" hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines.", + "known_false_positives": "When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect new user AWS Console Login", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS Login Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078.004" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "userIdentity.arn" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT33" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_new_user_aws_console_login_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Spike in AWS API Activity", + "id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d32362d4bd55", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search will detect users creating spikes of API activity in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall [search `cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | stats count as apiCalls by arn | inputlookup api_call_by_user_baseline append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) as * by arn | rename apiCalls as latestCount | eval newAvgApiCalls=avgApiCalls + (latestCount-avgApiCalls)/720 | eval newStdevApiCalls=sqrt(((pow(stdevApiCalls, 2)*719 + (latestCount-newAvgApiCalls)*(latestCount-avgApiCalls))/720)) | eval avgApiCalls=coalesce(newAvgApiCalls, avgApiCalls), stdevApiCalls=coalesce(newStdevApiCalls, stdevApiCalls), numDataPoints=if(isnull(latestCount), numDataPoints, numDataPoints+1) | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup api_call_by_user_baseline | eval dataPointThreshold = 15, deviationThreshold = 3 | eval isSpike=if((latestCount > avgApiCalls+deviationThreshold*stdevApiCalls) AND numDataPoints > dataPointThreshold, 1, 0) | where isSpike=1 | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | stats values(eventName) as eventName, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName) as uniqueApisCalled by user | `detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike.\\\nThis search produces fields (`eventName`,`numberOfApiCalls`,`uniqueApisCalled`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** AWS Event Name, **Field:** eventName\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** Number of API Calls, **Field:** numberOfApiCalls\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** Unique API Calls, **Field:** uniqueApisCalled\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Spike in AWS API Activity", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS User Monitoring" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078.004" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.CM", + "PR.AC" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventType", + "userIdentity.arn" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT33" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "api_call_by_user_baseline", + "description": "A collection that will contain the baseline information for number of AWS API calls per user", + "collection": "api_call_by_user_baseline", + "fields_list": "arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls" + }, + { + "name": "api_call_by_user_baseline", + "description": "A collection that will contain the baseline information for number of AWS API calls per user", + "collection": "api_call_by_user_baseline", + "fields_list": "arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity", + "id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a1f1-e32372d4bd53", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-05-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to network access-control lists (ACLs)in your AWS environment. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` `network_acl_events` [search `cloudtrail` `network_acl_events` | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | stats count as apiCalls by arn | inputlookup network_acl_activity_baseline append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) as * by arn | rename apiCalls as latestCount | eval newAvgApiCalls=avgApiCalls + (latestCount-avgApiCalls)/720 | eval newStdevApiCalls=sqrt(((pow(stdevApiCalls, 2)*719 + (latestCount-newAvgApiCalls)*(latestCount-avgApiCalls))/720)) | eval avgApiCalls=coalesce(newAvgApiCalls, avgApiCalls), stdevApiCalls=coalesce(newStdevApiCalls, stdevApiCalls), numDataPoints=if(isnull(latestCount), numDataPoints, numDataPoints+1) | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup network_acl_activity_baseline | eval dataPointThreshold = 15, deviationThreshold = 3 | eval isSpike=if((latestCount > avgApiCalls+deviationThreshold*stdevApiCalls) AND numDataPoints > dataPointThreshold, 1, 0) | where isSpike=1 | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | stats values(eventName) as eventNames, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName) as uniqueApisCalled by user | `detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best when you run the \"Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN\" support search once to create a lookup file of previously seen Network ACL Activity. To add or remove API event names related to network ACLs, edit the macro `network_acl_events`.", + "known_false_positives": "The false-positive rate may vary based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`. Please modify this according the your environment.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 11" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.007" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.CM", + "PR.AC" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "userIdentity.arn" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "network_acl_events", + "definition": "(eventName = CreateNetworkAcl OR eventName = CreateNetworkAclEntry OR eventName = DeleteNetworkAcl OR eventName = DeleteNetworkAclEntry OR eventName = ReplaceNetworkAclEntry OR eventName = ReplaceNetworkAclAssociation)", + "description": "This is a list of AWS event names that are associated with Network ACLs" + }, + { + "name": "detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "network_acl_activity_baseline", + "description": "A lookup file that will contain the baseline information for number of AWS Network ACL Activity", + "filename": "network_acl_activity_baseline.csv" + }, + { + "name": "network_acl_activity_baseline", + "description": "A lookup file that will contain the baseline information for number of AWS Network ACL Activity", + "filename": "network_acl_activity_baseline.csv" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Spike in Security Group Activity", + "id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-e32372d4bd53", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-04-18", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to security groups in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` `security_group_api_calls` [search `cloudtrail` `security_group_api_calls` | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | stats count as apiCalls by arn | inputlookup security_group_activity_baseline append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) as * by arn | rename apiCalls as latestCount | eval newAvgApiCalls=avgApiCalls + (latestCount-avgApiCalls)/720 | eval newStdevApiCalls=sqrt(((pow(stdevApiCalls, 2)*719 + (latestCount-newAvgApiCalls)*(latestCount-avgApiCalls))/720)) | eval avgApiCalls=coalesce(newAvgApiCalls, avgApiCalls), stdevApiCalls=coalesce(newStdevApiCalls, stdevApiCalls), numDataPoints=if(isnull(latestCount), numDataPoints, numDataPoints+1) | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup security_group_activity_baseline | eval dataPointThreshold = 15, deviationThreshold = 3 | eval isSpike=if((latestCount > avgApiCalls+deviationThreshold*stdevApiCalls) AND numDataPoints > dataPointThreshold, 1, 0) | where isSpike=1 | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | stats values(eventName) as eventNames, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName) as uniqueApisCalled by user | `detect_spike_in_security_group_activity_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike.This search works best when you run the \"Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN\" support search once to create a history of previously seen Security Group Activity. To add or remove API event names for security groups, edit the macro `security_group_api_calls`.", + "known_false_positives": "Based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`, the false positive rate may vary. Please modify this according the your environment.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Spike in Security Group Activity", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS User Monitoring" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078.004" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.CM", + "PR.AC" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "serIdentity.arn" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT33" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_group_api_calls", + "definition": "(eventName=AuthorizeSecurityGroupIngress OR eventName=CreateSecurityGroup OR eventName=DeleteSecurityGroup OR eventName=DescribeClusterSecurityGroups OR eventName=DescribeDBSecurityGroups OR eventName=DescribeSecurityGroupReferences OR eventName=DescribeSecurityGroups OR eventName=DescribeStaleSecurityGroups OR eventName=RevokeSecurityGroupIngress OR eventName=UpdateSecurityGroupRuleDescriptionsIngress)", + "description": "This macro is a list of AWS event names associated with security groups" + }, + { + "name": "detect_spike_in_security_group_activity_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "security_group_activity_baseline", + "description": "A placeholder for the baseline information for AWS security groups", + "filename": "security_group_activity_baseline.csv" + }, + { + "name": "security_group_activity_baseline", + "description": "A placeholder for the baseline information for AWS security groups", + "filename": "security_group_activity_baseline.csv" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Detect USB device insertion", + "id": "104658f4-afdc-499f-9719-17a43f9826f5", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-11-27", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Change_Analysis" + ], + "description": "The search is used to detect hosts that generate Windows Event ID 4663 for successful attempts to write to or read from a removable storage and Event ID 4656 for failures, which occurs when a USB drive is plugged in. In this scenario we are querying the Change_Analysis data model to look for Windows Event ID 4656 or 4663 where the priority of the affected host is marked as high in the ES Assets and Identity Framework.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) AS earliest latest(_time) AS latest from datamodel=Change_Analysis where (nodename = All_Changes) All_Changes.result=\"Removable Storage device\" (All_Changes.result_id=4663 OR All_Changes.result_id=4656) (All_Changes.src_priority=high) by All_Changes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")`| `security_content_ctime(earliest)`| `security_content_ctime(latest)` | `detect_usb_device_insertion_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663 and 4656. Ensure that the field from the event logs is being mapped to the result_id field in the Change_Analysis data model. To minimize the alert volume, this search leverages the Assets and Identity framework to filter out events from those assets not marked high priority in the Enterprise Security Assets and Identity Framework.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate USB activity will also be detected. Please verify and investigate as appropriate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect USB device insertion", + "analytic_story": [ + "Data Protection" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.DS" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.result", + "All_Changes.result_id", + "All_Changes.src_priority", + "All_Changes.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_usb_device_insertion_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers", + "id": "134da869-e264-4a8f-8d7e-fcd01c18f301", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "This search looks for web connections to dynamic DNS providers.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Web.url) as url min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Web where Web.status=200 by Web.src Web.dest Web.status | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `dynamic_dns_web_traffic` | `detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This search requires you to be ingesting web-traffic logs. You can obtain these logs from indexing data from a web proxy or by using a network-traffic-analysis tool, such as Bro or Splunk Stream. The web data model must contain the URL being requested, the IP address of the host initiating the request, and the destination IP. This search also leverages a lookup file, `dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv`, which contains a non-exhaustive list of dynamic DNS providers. Consider periodically updating this local lookup file with new domains.\\\nThis search produces fields (`isDynDNS`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** IsDynamicDNS, **Field:** isDynDNS\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` Deprecated because duplicate.", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible that list of dynamic DNS providers is outdated and/or that the URL being requested is legitimate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers", + "analytic_story": [ + "Dynamic DNS" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 7", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1071.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP", + "DE.DP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Web.url", + "Web.status", + "Web.src", + "Web.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Protocols", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "FIN4", + "FIN8", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Orangeworm", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "SilverTerrier", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dynamic_dns_web_traffic", + "definition": "lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_default dynamic_dns_domains as url OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_default | lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_local dynamic_dns_domains as url OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_local| eval isDynDNS = coalesce(isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local)|fields - isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local| search isDynDNS=True", + "description": "This is a description" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Detection of DNS Tunnels", + "id": "104658f4-afdc-499f-9719-17a43f9826f4", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-02-15", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Resolution" + ], + "description": "This search is used to detect DNS tunneling, by calculating the sum of the length of DNS queries and DNS answers. The search also filters out potential false positives by filtering out queries made to internal systems and the queries originating from internal DNS, Web, and Email servers. Endpoints using DNS as a method of transmission for data exfiltration, command and control, or evasion of security controls can often be detected by noting an unusually large volume of DNS traffic. \\\nNOTE:Deprecated because existing detection is doing the same. This detection is replaced with two other variations, if you are using MLTK then you can use this search `ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule` or use the standard deviation version `ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule`, as an alternantive.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc(\"DNS.query\") as count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where nodename=DNS \"DNS.message_type\"=\"QUERY\" NOT (`cim_corporate_web_domain_search(\"DNS.query\")`) NOT \"DNS.query\"=\"*.in-addr.arpa\" NOT (\"DNS.src_category\"=\"svc_infra_dns\" OR \"DNS.src_category\"=\"svc_infra_webproxy\" OR \"DNS.src_category\"=\"svc_infra_email*\" ) by \"DNS.src\",\"DNS.query\" | rename \"DNS.src\" as src \"DNS.query\" as message | eval length=len(message) | stats sum(length) as length by src | append [ tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc(\"DNS.answer\") as count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where nodename=DNS \"DNS.message_type\"=\"QUERY\" NOT (`cim_corporate_web_domain_search(\"DNS.query\")`) NOT \"DNS.query\"=\"*.in-addr.arpa\" NOT (\"DNS.src_category\"=\"svc_infra_dns\" OR \"DNS.src_category\"=\"svc_infra_webproxy\" OR \"DNS.src_category\"=\"svc_infra_email*\" ) by \"DNS.src\",\"DNS.answer\" | rename \"DNS.src\" as src \"DNS.answer\" as message | eval message=if(message==\"unknown\",\"\", message) | eval length=len(message) | stats sum(length) as length by src ] | stats sum(length) as length by src | where length > 10000 | `detection_of_dns_tunnels_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, we must ensure that DNS data is being ingested and mapped to the appropriate fields in the Network_Resolution data model. Fields like src_category are automatically provided by the Assets and Identity Framework shipped with Splunk Enterprise Security. You will need to ensure you are using the Assets and Identity Framework and populating the src_category field. You will also need to enable the `cim_corporate_web_domain_search()` macro which will essentially filter out the DNS queries made to the corporate web domains to reduce alert fatigue.", + "known_false_positives": "It's possible that normal DNS traffic will exhibit this behavior. If an alert is generated, please investigate and validate as appropriate. The threshold can also be modified to better suit your environment.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detection of DNS Tunnels", + "analytic_story": [ + "Data Protection", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Command & Control" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1048.003" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.DS" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "DNS.query", + "DNS.message_type", + "DNS.src_category", + "DNS.src" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT33", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Lazarus Group", + "OilRig", + "Thrip", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detection_of_dns_tunnels_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers", + "id": "1a67f15a-f4ff-4170-84e9-08cf6f75d6f6", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Resolution" + ], + "description": "This search will detect DNS requests resolved by unauthorized DNS servers. Legitimate DNS servers should be identified in the Enterprise Security Assets and Identity Framework.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.dest_category != dns_server AND DNS.src_category != dns_server by DNS.src DNS.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | `dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. It also requires that your DNS servers are identified correctly in the Assets and Identity table of Enterprise Security.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate DNS activity can be detected in this search. Investigate, verify and update the list of authorized DNS servers as appropriate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers", + "analytic_story": [ + "DNS Hijacking", + "Command & Control", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Host Redirection" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1", + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1071.004" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS", + "PR.IP", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "DNS.dest_category", + "DNS.src_category", + "DNS.src", + "DNS.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "DNS", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "FIN7", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Tropic Trooper" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "DNS record changed", + "id": "44d3a43e-dcd5-49f7-8356-5209bb369065", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Resolution" + ], + "description": "The search takes the DNS records and their answers results of the discovered_dns_records lookup and finds if any records have changed by searching DNS response from the Network_Resolution datamodel across the last day.", + "search": "| inputlookup discovered_dns_records | rename answer as discovered_answer | join domain[|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.record_type) as type, values(DNS.answer) as current_answer values(DNS.src) as src from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.message_type=RESPONSE DNS.answer!=\"unknown\" DNS.answer!=\"\" by DNS.query | rename DNS.query as query | where query!=\"unknown\" | rex field=query \"(?\\w+\\.\\w+?)(?:$|/)\"] | makemv delim=\" \" answer | makemv delim=\" \" type | sort -count | table count,src,domain,type,query,current_answer,discovered_answer | makemv current_answer | mvexpand current_answer | makemv discovered_answer | eval n=mvfind(discovered_answer, current_answer) | where isnull(n) | `dns_record_changed_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the `Network_Resolution` data model. It also requires that the `discover_dns_record` lookup table be populated by the included support search \"Discover DNS record\". \\\n **Splunk>Phantom Playbook Integration**\\\nIf Splunk>Phantom is also configured in your environment, a Playbook called \"DNS Hijack Enrichment\" can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. The playbook takes in the DNS record changed and uses Geoip, whois, Censys and PassiveTotal to detect if DNS issuers changed. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/`, add the correct hostname to the \"Phantom Instance\" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search, and set the corresponding Playbook to active. \\\n(Playbook Link:`https://my.phantom.us/4.2/playbook/dns-hijack-enrichment/`).\\\n", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate DNS changes can be detected in this search. Investigate, verify and update the list of provided current answers for the domains in question as appropriate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "DNS record changed", + "analytic_story": [ + "DNS Hijacking" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1", + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1071.004" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS", + "PR.IP", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "DNS.record_type", + "DNS.answer", + "DNS.src", + "DNS.message_type", + "DNS.query" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "DNS", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "FIN7", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Tropic Trooper" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "dns_record_changed_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "discovered_dns_records", + "description": "A placeholder for a list of discovered DNS records generated by the baseline discover_dns_records", + "filename": "discovered_dns_records.csv", + "default_match": "false", + "min_matches": 1 + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/dns_record_changed.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Dump LSASS via procdump Rename", + "id": "21276daa-663d-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-02-01", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "Detect a renamed instance of procdump.exe dumping the lsass process. This query looks for both -mm and -ma usage. -mm will produce a mini dump file and -ma will write a dump file with all process memory. Both are highly suspect and should be reviewed. Modify the query as needed.\\\nDuring triage, confirm this is procdump.exe executing. If it is the first time a Sysinternals utility has been ran, it is possible there will be a -accepteula on the command line. Review other endpoint data sources for cross process (injection) into lsass.exe.", + "search": "`sysmon` OriginalFileName=procdump process_name!=procdump*.exe EventID=1 (CommandLine=*-ma* OR CommandLine=*-mm*) CommandLine=*lsass* | rename Computer as dest | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, parent_process_name, process_name, OriginalFileName, CommandLine | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procdump", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md#atomic-test-2---dump-lsassexe-memory-using-procdump" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Dump LSASS via procdump Rename", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "HAFNIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$, attempting to dump lsass.exe.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "OriginalFileName", + "process_name", + "EventID", + "CommandLine", + "Computer", + "parent_process_name" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cleaver", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Whitefly" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User", + "id": "56f91724-cf3f-4666-84e1-e3712fb41e76", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for EC2 instances being modified by users who have not previously modified them. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` `ec2_modification_api_calls` [search `cloudtrail` `ec2_modification_api_calls` errorCode=success | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by userIdentity.arn | rename userIdentity.arn as arn | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by arn | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user | eval newUser=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newUser=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=dest responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | table _time, user, dest | `ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the \"Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User\" support search once to create a history of previously seen ARNs. To add or remove APIs that modify an EC2 instance, edit the macro `ec2_modification_api_calls`.", + "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a new user will start to modify EC2 instances when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is modifying instances that this is the intended behavior.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User", + "analytic_story": [ + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078.004" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "errorCode", + "userIdentity.arn" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT33" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "ec2_modification_api_calls", + "definition": "(eventName=AssociateAddress OR eventName=AssociateIamInstanceProfile OR eventName=AttachClassicLinkVpc OR eventName=AttachNetworkInterface OR eventName=AttachVolume OR eventName=BundleInstance OR eventName=DetachClassicLinkVpc OR eventName=DetachVolume OR eventName=ModifyInstanceAttribute OR eventName=ModifyInstancePlacement OR eventName=MonitorInstances OR eventName=RebootInstances OR eventName=ResetInstanceAttribute OR eventName=StartInstances OR eventName=StopInstances OR eventName=TerminateInstances OR eventName=UnmonitorInstances)", + "description": "This is a list of AWS event names that have to do with modifying Amazon EC2 instances" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user", + "description": "A place holder for a list of AWS EC2 modifications done by each user", + "filename": "previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user.csv" + }, + { + "name": "previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user", + "description": "A place holder for a list of AWS EC2 modifications done by each user", + "filename": "previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user.csv" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region", + "id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f3-d82362d6fd75", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-02-23", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where an instance is started in a particular region in the last one hour and then compares it to a lookup file of previously seen regions where an instance was started", + "search": "`cloudtrail` earliest=-1h StartInstances | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by awsRegion | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_aws_regions.csv | stats min(earliest) as earliest max(latest) as latest by awsRegion | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_regions.csv | eval regionStatus=if(earliest >= relative_time(now(),\"-1d@d\"), \"Instance Started in a New Region\",\"Previously Seen Region\") | `security_content_ctime(earliest)` | `security_content_ctime(latest)` | where regionStatus=\"Instance Started in a New Region\" | `ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. Run the \"Previously seen AWS Regions\" support search only once to create of baseline of previously seen regions. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", + "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a user has unknowingly started an instance in a new region. Please verify that this activity is legitimate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1535" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "awsRegion" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI", + "id": "347ec301-601b-48b9-81aa-9ddf9c829dd3", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-03-12", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen AMIs. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId | rename requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId as amiID | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_ec2_amis.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by amiID | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_amis.csv | eval newAMI=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where newAMI=1 | rename amiID as requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId | table requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId] | rename requestParameters.instanceType as instanceType, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as dest, userIdentity.arn as arn, requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId as amiID | table firstTime, lastTime, arn, amiID, dest, instanceType | `ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the \"Previously Seen EC2 AMIs\" support search once to create a history of previously seen AMIs.", + "known_false_positives": "After a new AMI is created, the first systems created with that AMI will cause this alert to fire. Verify that the AMI being used was created by a legitimate user.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "errorCode", + "requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type", + "id": "65541c80-03c7-4e05-83c8-1dcd57a2e1ad", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-02-07", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen instance types. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | fillnull value=\"m1.small\" requestParameters.instanceType | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by requestParameters.instanceType | rename requestParameters.instanceType as instanceType | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.csv | stats min(earliest) as earliest max(latest) as latest by instanceType | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.csv | eval newType=if(earliest >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | `security_content_ctime(earliest)` | `security_content_ctime(latest)` | where newType=1 | rename instanceType as requestParameters.instanceType | table requestParameters.instanceType] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename requestParameters.instanceType as instanceType, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as dest | table _time, user, dest, instanceType | `ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the \"Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types\" support search once to create a history of previously seen instance types.", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible that an admin will create a new system using a new instance type never used before. Verify with the creator that they intended to create the system with the new instance type.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "errorCode", + "requestParameters.instanceType" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User", + "id": "22773e84-bac0-4595-b086-20d3f735b4f1", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for EC2 instances being created by users who have not created them before. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by userIdentity.arn | rename userIdentity.arn as arn | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by arn | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.csv | eval newUser=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newUser=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | rename requestParameters.instanceType as instanceType, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as dest, userIdentity.arn as user | table _time, user, dest, instanceType | `ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the \"Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User\" support search once to create a history of previously seen ARNs.", + "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a user will start to create EC2 instances when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is launching instances that this is the intended behavior.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078.004" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "errorCode", + "userIdentity.arn" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT33" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension", + "id": "ab0353e6-a956-420b-b724-a8b4846d5d5a", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-11-19", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for processes launched from files with at least five spaces in the name before the extension. This is typically done to obfuscate the file extension by pushing it outside of the default view.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_path) as process_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"* .*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process Processes.process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1036.003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM", + "PR.PT", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_name" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "GALLIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups", + "id": "a34aae96-ccf8-4aef-952c-3ea214444440", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-12", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search returns a list of hosts that have not successfully completed a backup in over a week. Deprecated because it's a infrastructure monitoring.", + "search": "`netbackup` MESSAGE=\"Disk/Partition backup completed successfully.\" | stats latest(_time) as latestTime by COMPUTERNAME | `security_content_ctime(latestTime)` | rename COMPUTERNAME as dest | eval isOutlier=if(latestTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-7d@d\"), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | table latestTime, dest | `extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to first obtain data from your backup solution, either from the backup logs on your hosts, or from a central server responsible for performing the backups. If you do not use Netbackup, you can modify this search for your backup solution. Depending on how often you backup your systems, you may want to modify how far in the past to look for a successful backup, other than the default of seven days.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups", + "analytic_story": [ + "Monitor Backup Solution" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 10" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "MESSAGE", + "COMPUTERNAME" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "netbackup", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"netbackup_logs\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "First time seen command line argument", + "id": "a1b6e73f-98d5-470f-99ac-77aacd578473", + "version": 5, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for command-line arguments that use a `/c` parameter to execute a command that has not previously been seen.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = cmd.exe Processes.process = \"* /c *\" by Processes.process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = cmd.exe Processes.process = \"* /c *\" by Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by process | outputlookup previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments | eval newCmdLineArgument=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newCmdLineArgument=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table process] | `first_time_seen_command_line_argument_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The complete process name with command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model. Please make sure you run the support search \"Previously seen command line arguments,\"—which creates a lookup file called `previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments.csv`—a historical baseline of all command-line arguments. You must also validate this list. For the search to do accurate calculation, ensure the search scheduling is the same value as the `relative_time` evaluation function.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate programs can also use command-line arguments to execute. Please verify the command-line arguments to check what command/program is being executed. We recommend customizing the `first_time_seen_cmd_line_filter` macro to exclude legitimate parent_process_name", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "First time seen command line argument", + "analytic_story": [ + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Hidden Cobra Malware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059.001", + "T1059.003" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "first_time_seen_command_line_argument_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments", + "description": "A placeholder for a list of cmd line arugments that been seen before", + "filename": "previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments.csv" + }, + { + "name": "previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments", + "description": "A placeholder for a list of cmd line arugments that been seen before", + "filename": "previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments.csv" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project", + "id": "27af8c15-38b0-4408-b339-920170724adb", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-10-09", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides detection of accounts with high risk roles by projects. Compromised accounts with high risk roles can move laterally or even scalate privileges at different projects depending on organization schema.", + "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.request.policy.bindings{}.role=roles/owner OR roles/editor OR roles/iam.serviceAccountUser OR roles/iam.serviceAccountAdmin OR roles/iam.serviceAccountTokenCreator OR roles/dataflow.developer OR roles/dataflow.admin OR roles/composer.admin OR roles/dataproc.admin OR roles/dataproc.editor | table data.resource.type data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.resource data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.role data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.members{} | `gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message logs", + "known_false_positives": "Accounts with high risk roles should be reduced to the minimum number needed, however specific tasks and setups may be simply expected behavior within organization", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/dxa4481/gcploit", + "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ml09R38jpok", + "https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-roles" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project", + "analytic_story": [ + "GCP Cross Account Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "GCP Account", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "data.protoPayload.request.policy.bindings{}.role", + "data.resource.type data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail", + "data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission", + "data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.resource", + "data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.role", + "data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.members{}" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account", + "id": "2e70ef35-2187-431f-aedc-4503dc9b06ba", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-10-09", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides detection of high risk permissions by resource and accounts. These are permissions that can allow attackers with compromised accounts to move laterally and escalate privileges.", + "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission=iam.serviceAccounts.getaccesstoken OR iam.serviceAccounts.setIamPolicy OR iam.serviceAccounts.actas OR dataflow.jobs.create OR composer.environments.create OR dataproc.clusters.create |table data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.members{} data.resource.labels.project_id | `gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message logs", + "known_false_positives": "High risk permissions are part of any GCP environment, however it is important to track resource and accounts usage, this search may produce false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/dxa4481/gcploit", + "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ml09R38jpok", + "https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/permissions-reference" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account", + "analytic_story": [ + "GCP Cross Account Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "GCP Account", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission", + "data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp", + "data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail", + "data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission", + "data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.members{}", + "data.resource.labels.project_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "gcp detect oauth token abuse", + "id": "a7e9f7bb-8901-4ad0-8d88-0a4ab07b1972", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-09-01", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides detection of possible GCP Oauth token abuse. GCP Oauth token without time limit can be exfiltrated and reused for keeping access sessions alive without further control of authentication, allowing attackers to access and move laterally.", + "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` type.googleapis.com/google.cloud.audit.AuditLog |table protoPayload.@type protoPayload.status.details{}.@type protoPayload.status.details{}.violations{}.callerIp protoPayload.status.details{}.violations{}.type protoPayload.status.message | `gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message logs", + "known_false_positives": "GCP Oauth token abuse detection will only work if there are access policies in place along with audit logs.", + "references": [ + "https://www.netskope.com/blog/gcp-oauth-token-hijacking-in-google-cloud-part-1", + "https://www.netskope.com/blog/gcp-oauth-token-hijacking-in-google-cloud-part-2" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "gcp detect oauth token abuse", + "analytic_story": [ + "GCP Cross Account Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "GCP Account", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "GCP GCR container uploaded", + "id": "4f00ca88-e766-4605-ac65-ae51c9fd185b", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-02-20", + "author": "Rod Soto, Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search show information on uploaded containers including source user, account, action, bucket name event name, http user agent, message and destination path.", + "search": "|tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Cloud_Infrastructure.Storage where Storage.event_name=storage.objects.create by Storage.src_user Storage.account Storage.action Storage.bucket_name Storage.event_name Storage.http_user_agent Storage.msg Storage.object_path | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Storage\")` | `gcp_gcr_container_uploaded_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later), then configure stackdriver and set a subpub subscription to be imported to Splunk. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model. Please also customize the `container_implant_gcp_detection_filter` macro to filter out the false positives.", + "known_false_positives": "Uploading container is a normal behavior from developers or users with access to container registry. GCP GCR registers container upload as a Storage event, this search must be considered under the context of CONTAINER upload creation which automatically generates a bucket entry for destination path.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "GCP GCR container uploaded", + "analytic_story": [ + "Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation" + ], + "asset_type": "GCP GCR Container", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1525" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1525", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Implant Internal Image", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "gcp_gcr_container_uploaded_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection", + "id": "db5957ec-0144-4c56-b512-9dccbe7a2d26", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-04-15", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster", + "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp!=127.0.0.1 data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp!=::1 \"data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision\"=forbid \"data.protoPayload.status.message\"=PERMISSION_DENIED data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail=\"system:anonymous\" | rename data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp as src_ip | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(data.protoPayload.methodName) as method_name values(data.protoPayload.resourceName) as resource_name values(data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent) as http_user_agent by src_ip data.resource.labels.cluster_name | rename data.resource.labels.cluster_name as cluster_name| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later), then configure stackdriver and set a Pub/Sub subscription to be imported to Splunk. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model.Customize the macro kubernetes_gcp_scan_fingerprint_attack_detection to filter out FPs.", + "known_false_positives": "Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, User Agent and source IPs will provide context.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection", + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "GCP Kubernetes cluster", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1526" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1526", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Identify New User Accounts", + "id": "475b9e27-17e4-46e2-b7e2-648221be3b89", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-12", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This detection search will help profile user accounts in your environment by identifying newly created accounts that have been added to your network in the past week.", + "search": "| from datamodel Identity_Management.All_Identities | eval empStatus=case((now()-startDate)<604800, \"Accounts created in last week\") | search empStatus=\"Accounts created in last week\"| `security_content_ctime(endDate)` | `security_content_ctime(startDate)`| table identity empStatus endDate startDate | `identify_new_user_accounts_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be populating the Enterprise Security Identity_Management data model in the assets and identity framework.", + "known_false_positives": "If the Identity_Management data model is not updated regularly, this search could give you false positive alerts. Please consider this and investigate appropriately.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Identify New User Accounts", + "analytic_story": [ + "Account Monitoring and Controls" + ], + "asset_type": "Domain Server", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078.002" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "access", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "Chimera", + "Indrik Spider", + "Naikon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "identify_new_user_accounts_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod", + "id": "5b30b25d-7d32-42d8-95ca-64dfcd9076e6", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-06-23", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods by IP address, verb and decision", + "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts objectRef.resource=pods | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision | top sourceIPs{} user.username verb annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision |`kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs", + "known_false_positives": "Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst must consider IP, verb and decision context when trying to detect maliciousness.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod", + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account", + "id": "de7264ed-3ed9-4fef-bb01-6eefc87cefe8", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-06-23", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences", + "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason=* | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | stats count by user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | rare user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |`kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs", + "known_false_positives": "Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account", + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access", + "id": "7f227943-2196-4d4d-8d6a-ac8cb308e61c", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-06-23", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmaps or secrets", + "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` objectRef.resource=secrets OR configmaps sourceIPs{}!=::1 sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1 |table sourceIPs{} user.username user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace objectRef.name annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |dedup user.username user.groups{} |`aws_eks_kubernetes_cluster_sensitive_object_access_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install Splunk Add-on for Amazon Web Services and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs.", + "known_false_positives": "Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user and object context can provide guidance for detection.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access", + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_eks_kubernetes_cluster_sensitive_object_access_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access", + "id": "b6013a7b-85e0-4a45-b051-10b252d69569", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-06-23", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets", + "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` objectRef.resource=clusterroles OR clusterrolebindings sourceIPs{}!=::1 sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1 | table sourceIPs{} user.username user.groups{} objectRef.namespace requestURI annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | dedup user.username user.groups{} |`kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs.", + "known_false_positives": "Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation, however source IP, namespace and user group may indicate possible malicious use. ", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access", + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access", + "id": "a6959c57-fa8f-4277-bb86-7c32fba579d5", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-06-23", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status, this search can be extended by using top or rare operators to find trends or rarities in failure status, user agents, source IPs and request URI", + "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts responseStatus.status = Failure | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb responseStatus.status requestURI | `kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs.", + "known_false_positives": "This search can give false positives as there might be inherent issues with authentications and permissions at cluster.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access", + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace", + "id": "55a2264a-b7f0-45e5-addd-1e5ab3415c72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-05-26", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods and namespaces by IP address and verb", + "search": "`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts* OR user.username=system.anonymous OR annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision=allow | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb responseStatus.reason responseStatus.status properties.pod objectRef.namespace | top sourceIPs{} user.username verb responseStatus.status properties.pod objectRef.namespace |`kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics", + "known_false_positives": "Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst must consider IP and verb context when trying to detect maliciousness.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace", + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "kubernetes_azure", + "definition": "sourcetype=mscs:storage:blob:json", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Kubernetes data from Azure. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account", + "id": "47af7d20-0607-4079-97d7-7a29af58b54e", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-05-26", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding rare or top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences", + "search": "`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason=* | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |stats count by user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | rare user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |`kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics", + "known_false_positives": "Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account", + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "kubernetes_azure", + "definition": "sourcetype=mscs:storage:blob:json", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Kubernetes data from Azure. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access", + "id": "1bba382b-07fd-4ffa-b390-8002739b76e8", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-05-20", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets", + "search": "`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log| search objectRef.resource=secrets OR configmaps user.username=system.anonymous OR annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision=allow |table user.username user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace objectRef.name annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |dedup user.username user.groups{} |`kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics", + "known_false_positives": "Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user and object context can provide guidance for detection.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access", + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "kubernetes_azure", + "definition": "sourcetype=mscs:storage:blob:json", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Kubernetes data from Azure. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access", + "id": "f27349e5-1641-4f6a-9e68-30402be0ad4c", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-05-20", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets", + "search": "`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log| search objectRef.resource=clusterroles OR clusterrolebindings | table sourceIPs{} user.username user.groups{} objectRef.namespace requestURI annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | dedup user.username user.groups{} |`kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics", + "known_false_positives": "Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation, however source IP, namespace and user group may indicate possible malicious use. ", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access", + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "kubernetes_azure", + "definition": "sourcetype=mscs:storage:blob:json", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Kubernetes data from Azure. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access", + "id": "019690d7-420f-4da0-b320-f27b09961514", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-05-20", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status", + "search": "`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts* responseStatus.reason=Forbidden | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb responseStatus.reason responseStatus.status properties.pod objectRef.namespace |`kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics", + "known_false_positives": "This search can give false positives as there might be inherent issues with authentications and permissions at cluster.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access", + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "kubernetes_azure", + "definition": "sourcetype=mscs:storage:blob:json", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Kubernetes data from Azure. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls", + "id": "4b6d1ba8-0000-4cec-87e6-6cbbd71651b5", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-05-26", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides information on rare Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context", + "search": "`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | spath input=responseObject.metadata.annotations.kubectl.kubernetes.io/last-applied-configuration | search userAgent=kubectl* sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1 sourceIPs{}!=::1 | table sourceIPs{} verb userAgent user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace requestURI | rare sourceIPs{} verb userAgent user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace requestURI |`kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics", + "known_false_positives": "Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP, verb and Object can reveal potential malicious activity, specially suspicious IPs and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls", + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "kubernetes_azure", + "definition": "sourcetype=mscs:storage:blob:json", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Kubernetes data from Azure. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint", + "id": "86aad3e0-732f-4f66-bbbc-70df448e461d", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-05-20", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via source IP user agent, request URI and response status data against Kubernetes cluster pod in Azure", + "search": "`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search responseStatus.code=401 | table sourceIPs{} userAgent verb requestURI responseStatus.reason properties.pod |`kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics", + "known_false_positives": "Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but source IPs, userAgent, verb, request URI and response status will provide context.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint", + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "kubernetes_azure", + "definition": "sourcetype=mscs:storage:blob:json", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Kubernetes data from Azure. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint", + "id": "c5e5bd5c-1013-4841-8b23-e7b3253c840a", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-05-19", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via source IP user agent, request URI and response status data against Kubernetes cluster in Azure", + "search": "`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search responseStatus.code=401 | table sourceIPs{} userAgent verb requestURI responseStatus.reason |`kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics", + "known_false_positives": "Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but source IPs, userAgent, verb, request URI and response status will provide context.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint", + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1526" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1526", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "kubernetes_azure", + "definition": "sourcetype=mscs:storage:blob:json", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Kubernetes data from Azure. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account", + "id": "99487de3-7192-4b41-939d-fbe9acfb1340", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-07-11", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences", + "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason=ClusterRoleBinding OR Clusterrole | table src_ip src_user data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason | rare src_user data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub messaging service logs", + "known_false_positives": "Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account", + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "kubernetes_gcp_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod", + "id": "7f5c2779-88a0-4824-9caa-0f606c8f260f", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-07-10", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods by IP address, verb and decision", + "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.request.spec.group{}=system:serviceaccounts | table src_ip src_user http_user_agent data.protoPayload.request.spec.nonResourceAttributes.verb data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision data.protoPayload.response.spec.resourceAttributes.resource | top src_ip src_user http_user_agent data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision data.protoPayload.response.spec.resourceAttributes.resource |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk GCP add on. This search works with pubsub messaging service logs", + "known_false_positives": "Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst must consider IP, verb and decision context when trying to detect maliciousness.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod", + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access", + "id": "bdb6d596-86a0-4aba-8369-418ae8b9963a", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-07-11", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmaps or secrets", + "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.resource=configmaps OR secrets | table data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp src_user data.resource.labels.cluster_name data.protoPayload.request.metadata.namespace data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision | dedup data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp src_user data.resource.labels.cluster_name |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk add on for GCP . This search works with pubsub messaging service logs.", + "known_false_positives": "Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user and object context can provide guidance for detection.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access", + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access", + "id": "a46923f6-36b9-4806-a681-31f314907c30", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-07-11", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets", + "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason=ClusterRoleBinding OR Clusterrole dest=apis/rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1 src_ip!=::1 | table src_ip src_user http_user_agent data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason | dedup src_ip src_user |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub messaging servicelogs.", + "known_false_positives": "Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation, however source IP, user agent, decision and reason may indicate possible malicious use. ", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access", + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "GCP GKE EKS Kubernetes cluster", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access", + "id": "7094808d-432a-48e7-bb3c-77e96c894f3b", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-06-23", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status, this search can be extended by using top or rare operators to find trends or rarities in failure status, user agents, source IPs and request URI", + "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` system:serviceaccounts data.protoPayload.response.status.allowed!=* | table src_ip src_user http_user_agent data.protoPayload.response.spec.resourceAttributes.namespace data.resource.labels.cluster_name data.protoPayload.response.spec.resourceAttributes.verb data.protoPayload.request.status.allowed data.protoPayload.response.status.reason data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision | dedup src_ip src_user | `kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub messaging service logs.", + "known_false_positives": "This search can give false positives as there might be inherent issues with authentications and permissions at cluster.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access", + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls", + "id": "a5bed417-070a-41f2-a1e4-82b6aa281557", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-07-11", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides information on anonymous Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context", + "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent=kubectl* src_user=system:unsecured OR src_user=system:anonymous | table src_ip src_user data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.granted object_path |dedup src_ip src_user |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub messaging logs.", + "known_false_positives": "Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP, source user, user agent, object path, and authorization context can reveal potential malicious activity, specially anonymous suspicious IPs and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls", + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments", + "id": "2cdb91d2-542c-497f-b252-be495e71f38c", + "version": 6, + "date": "2021-01-19", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for PowerShell processes started with a base64 encoded command-line passed to it, with parameters to modify the execution policy for the process, and those that prevent the display of an interactive prompt to the user. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it overrides the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide itself from the user, and passes an encoded script to be run on the command-line. Deprecated because almost the same as Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=powershell.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| search (process=*-EncodedCommand* OR process=*-enc*) process=*-Exec* | `malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate process can have this combination of command-line options, but it's not common.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 7", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse", + "id": "24dd17b1-e2fb-4c31-878c-d4f746595bfa", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-23", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Resolution" + ], + "description": "This search looks for DNS requests for faux domains similar to the domains that you want to have monitored for abuse.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(DNS.answer) as IPs min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.src, DNS.query | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `brand_abuse_dns` | `monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You need to ingest data from your DNS logs. Specifically you must ingest the domain that is being queried and the IP of the host originating the request. Ideally, you should also be ingesting the answer to the query and the query type. This approach allows you to also create your own localized passive DNS capability which can aid you in future investigations. You also need to have run the search \"ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names\", which creates the permutations of the domain that will be checked for.", + "known_false_positives": "None at this time", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse", + "analytic_story": [ + "Brand Monitoring" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "brand_abuse_dns", + "definition": "lookup update=true brandMonitoring_lookup domain as query OUTPUT domain_abuse | search domain_abuse=true", + "description": "This macro limits the output to only domains that are in the brand monitoring lookup file" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Open Redirect in Splunk Web", + "id": "d199fb99-2312-451a-9daa-e5efa6ed76a7", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-19", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search allows you to look for evidence of exploitation for CVE-2016-4859, the Splunk Open Redirect Vulnerability.", + "search": "index=_internal sourcetype=splunk_web_access return_to=\"/%09/*\" | `open_redirect_in_splunk_web_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "No extra steps needed to implement this search.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Open Redirect in Splunk Web", + "analytic_story": [ + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability" + ], + "asset_type": "Splunk Server", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 4", + "CIS 18" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "ID.RA", + "RS.MI", + "PR.PT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2016-4859" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "open_redirect_in_splunk_web_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection", + "id": "a6fffe5e-05c3-4c04-badc-887607fbb8dc", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-01-29", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for ColdRoot events from the osx-attacks osquery pack.", + "search": "| from datamodel Alerts.Alerts | search app=osquery:results (name=pack_osx-attacks_OSX_ColdRoot_RAT_Launchd OR name=pack_osx-attacks_OSX_ColdRoot_RAT_Files) | rename columns.path as path | bucket _time span=30s | stats count(path) by _time, host, user, path | `osquery_pack___coldroot_detection_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from your osquery deployed agents with the [osx-attacks.conf](https://github.com/facebook/osquery/blob/experimental/packs/osx-attacks.conf#L599) pack enabled. Also the [TA-OSquery](https://github.com/d1vious/TA-osquery) must be deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the osquery data populate the Alerts data model", + "known_false_positives": "There are no known false positives.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection", + "analytic_story": [ + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 4", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Command & Control" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.CM", + "PR.PT" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "osquery_pack___coldroot_detection_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Processes created by netsh", + "id": "b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-95dbb162041e", + "version": 5, + "date": "2020-11-23", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe to execute various commands via the netsh command-line utility. Netsh.exe is a command-line scripting utility that allows you to, either locally or remotely, display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. Netsh can be used as a persistence proxy technique to execute a helper .dll when netsh.exe is executed. In this search, we are looking for processes spawned by netsh.exe that are executing commands via the command line. Deprecated because we have another detection of the same type.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=netsh.exe by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `processes_created_by_netsh_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting logs with the process name, command-line arguments, and parent processes from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "It is unusual for netsh.exe to have any child processes in most environments. It makes sense to investigate the child process and verify whether the process spawned is legitimate. We explicitely exclude \"C:\\Program Files\\rempl\\sedlauncher.exe\" process path since it is a legitimate process by Mircosoft.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Processes created by netsh", + "analytic_story": [ + "Netsh Abuse" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.004" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT38", + "Carbanak", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "processes_created_by_netsh_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Prohibited Software On Endpoint", + "id": "a51bfe1a-94f0-48cc-b4e4-b6ae50145893", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-10-11", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for applications on the endpoint that you have marked as prohibited.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `prohibited_softwares` | `prohibited_software_on_endpoint_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is usually generated via logs that report process tracking in your Windows audit settings. In addition, you must also have only the `process_name` (not the entire process path) marked as \"prohibited\" in the Enterprise Security `interesting processes` table. To include the process names marked as \"prohibited\", which is included with ES Content Updates, run the included search Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Prohibited Software On Endpoint", + "analytic_story": [ + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "SamSam Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_times" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "prohibited_softwares", + "definition": "lookup prohibited_softwares app as process_name OUTPUT is_prohibited | search is_prohibited=True", + "description": "This macro limits the output to process_names that have been marked as prohibited" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "prohibited_software_on_endpoint_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys", + "id": "61a7d1e6-f5d4-41d9-a9be-39a1ffe69459", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-02-27", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The search looks for command-line arguments used to hide a file or directory using the reg add command.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = reg.exe Processes.process=\"*add*\" Processes.process=\"*Hidden*\" Processes.process=\"*REG_DWORD*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| regex process = \"(/d\\s+2)\" | `reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "None at the moment", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1564.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1564.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Files and Directories", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "Lazarus Group", + "Mustang Panda", + "Rocke", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Remote Registry Key modifications", + "id": "c9f4b923-f8af-4155-b697-1354f5dcbc5e", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-03-02", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search monitors for remote modifications to registry keys.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"\\\\\\\\*\" by Registry.dest , Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `remote_registry_key_modifications_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must populate the `Endpoint` data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. Deprecated because I don't think the logic is right.", + "known_false_positives": "This technique may be legitimately used by administrators to modify remote registries, so it's important to filter these events out.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Remote Registry Key modifications", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "remote_registry_key_modifications_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware", + "id": "1297fb80-f42a-4b4a-9c8b-78c066437cf6", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line that indicate that task names related to the execution of Bad Rabbit ransomware were created or deleted. Deprecated because we already have a similar detection", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process) as process from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe (Processes.process= \"*create*\" OR Processes.process= \"*delete*\") by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search (process=*rhaegal* OR process=*drogon* OR *viserion_*) | `scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "No known false positives", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.005" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CostaRicto", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Machete", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems", + "id": "354be8e0-32cd-4da0-8c47-796de13b60ea", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-01-07", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Vulnerabilities" + ], + "description": "The search is used to detect systems that are still vulnerable to the Spectre and Meltdown vulnerabilities.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Vulnerabilities where Vulnerabilities.cve =\"CVE-2017-5753\" OR Vulnerabilities.cve =\"CVE-2017-5715\" OR Vulnerabilities.cve =\"CVE-2017-5754\" by Vulnerabilities.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Vulnerabilities)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "The search requires that you are ingesting your vulnerability-scanner data and that it reports the CVE of the vulnerability identified.", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible that your vulnerability scanner is not detecting that the patches have been applied.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems", + "analytic_story": [ + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 4" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "ID.RA", + "RS.MI", + "PR.IP", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2017-5753" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure", + "id": "f6a26b7b-7e80-4963-a9a8-d836e7534ebd", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-06-14", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search allows you to look for evidence of exploitation for CVE-2018-11409, a Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure Bug.", + "search": "index=_internal sourcetype=splunkd_ui_access server-info | search clientip!=127.0.0.1 uri_path=\"*raw/services/server/info/server-info\" | rename clientip as src_ip, splunk_server as dest | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime, values(uri) as uri, values(useragent) as http_user_agent, values(user) as user by src_ip, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "The REST endpoint that exposes system information is also necessary for the proper operation of Splunk clustering and instrumentation. Whitelisting your Splunk systems will reduce false positives.", + "known_false_positives": "Retrieving server information may be a legitimate API request. Verify that the attempt is a valid request for information.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure", + "analytic_story": [ + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409" + ], + "asset_type": "Splunk Server", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 4", + "CIS 18" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "ID.RA", + "RS.MI", + "PR.PT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2018-11409" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Changes to File Associations", + "id": "1b989a0e-0129-4446-a695-f193a5b746fc", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-07-22", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for changes to registry values that control Windows file associations, executed by a process that is not typical for legitimate, routine changes to this area.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name!=Explorer.exe AND Processes.process_name!=OpenWith.exe by Processes.process_id Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*\\\\Explorer\\\\FileExts* by Registry.process_id Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Registry\")` | table process_id dest registry_path]| `suspicious_changes_to_file_associations_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on registry changes that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Registry` nodes.", + "known_false_positives": "There may be other processes in your environment that users may legitimately use to modify file associations. If this is the case and you are finding false positives, you can modify the search to add those processes as exceptions.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Changes to File Associations", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1546.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM", + "PR.PT", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Kimsuky" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_changes_to_file_associations_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly", + "id": "56e877a6-1455-4479-ad16-0550dc1e33f8", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-07-22", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "UEBA" + ], + "description": "This detection looks for emails that are suspicious because of their sender, domain rareness, or behavior differences. This is an anomaly generated by Splunk User Behavior Analytics (UBA).", + "search": "|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(All_UEBA_Events.category) as category from datamodel=UEBA where nodename=All_UEBA_Events.UEBA_Anomalies All_UEBA_Events.UEBA_Anomalies.uba_model = \"SuspiciousEmailDetectionModel\" by All_UEBA_Events.description All_UEBA_Events.severity All_UEBA_Events.user All_UEBA_Events.uba_event_type All_UEBA_Events.link All_UEBA_Events.signature All_UEBA_Events.url All_UEBA_Events.UEBA_Anomalies.uba_model | `drop_dm_object_name(All_UEBA_Events)` | `drop_dm_object_name(UEBA_Anomalies)`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_email___uba_anomaly_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data from email logs and have Splunk integrated with UBA. This anomaly is raised by a UBA detection model called \"SuspiciousEmailDetectionModel.\" Ensure that this model is enabled on your UBA instance.", + "known_false_positives": "This detection model will alert on any sender domain that is seen for the first time. This could be a potential false positive. The next step is to investigate and add the URL to an allow list if you determine that it is a legitimate sender.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Emails" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 7" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_email___uba_anomaly_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious File Write", + "id": "57f76b8a-32f0-42ed-b358-d9fa3ca7bac8", + "version": 3, + "date": "2019-04-25", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The search looks for files created with names that have been linked to malicious activity.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.action) as action values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `suspicious_writes` | `suspicious_file_write_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file system reads and writes. In addition, this search leverages an included lookup file that contains the names of the files to watch for, as well as a note to communicate why that file name is being monitored. This lookup file can be edited to add or remove file the file names you want to monitor.", + "known_false_positives": "It's possible for a legitimate file to be created with the same name as one noted in the lookup file. Filenames listed in the lookup file should be unique enough that collisions are rare. Looking at the location of the file and the process responsible for the activity can help determine whether or not the activity is legitimate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious File Write", + "analytic_story": [ + "Hidden Cobra Malware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "suspicious_writes", + "definition": "lookup suspicious_writes_lookup file as file_name OUTPUT note as \"Reference\" | search \"Reference\" != False", + "description": "This macro limites the output to file names that have been marked as suspicious" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_file_write_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 Rename", + "id": "7360137f-abad-473e-8189-acbdaa34d114", + "version": 4, + "date": "2022-02-01", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following hunting analytic identifies renamed instances of rundll32.exe executing. rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64. During investigation, validate it is the legitimate rundll32.exe executing and what script content it is loading. This query relies on the original filename or internal name from the PE meta data. Expand the query as needed by looking for specific command line arguments outlined in other analytics.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_rename_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 Rename", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Suspicious renamed rundll32.exe binary ran on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1036", + "T1218.011", + "T1036.003" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "CopyKittens", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "MuddyWater", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "TA551" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "GALLIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_rundll32_rename_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/suspicious_rundll32_rename.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious writes to System Volume Information", + "id": "cd6297cd-2bdd-4aa1-84aa-5d2f84228fac", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-22", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects writes to the 'System Volume Information' folder by something other than the System process.", + "search": "(`sysmon` OR tag=process) EventCode=11 process_id!=4 file_path=*System\\ Volume\\ Information* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Image, file_path | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You need to be ingesting logs with both the process name and command-line from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible that other utilities or system processes may legitimately write to this folder. Investigate and modify the search to include exceptions as appropriate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious writes to System Volume Information", + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging" + ], + "asset_type": "Windows", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1036" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Uncommon Processes On Endpoint", + "id": "29ccce64-a10c-4389-a45f-337cb29ba1f7", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-07-22", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for applications on the endpoint that you have marked as uncommon.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process Processes.process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `uncommon_processes` |`uncommon_processes_on_endpoint_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model. This search uses a lookup file `uncommon_processes_default.csv` to track various features of process names that are usually uncommon in most environments. Please consider updating `uncommon_processes_local.csv` to hunt for processes that are uncommon in your environment.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Uncommon Processes On Endpoint", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Unusual Processes" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1204.002" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "uncommon_processes", + "definition": "lookup update=true lookup_uncommon_processes_default process_name as process_name outputnew uncommon_default,category_default,analytic_story_default,kill_chain_phase_default,mitre_attack_default | lookup update=true lookup_uncommon_processes_local process_name as process_name outputnew uncommon_local,category_local,analytic_story_local,kill_chain_phase_local,mitre_attack_local | eval uncommon = coalesce(uncommon_default, uncommon_local), analytic_story = coalesce(analytic_story_default, analytic_story_local), category=coalesce(category_default, category_local), kill_chain_phase=coalesce(kill_chain_phase_default, kill_chain_phase_local), mitre_attack=coalesce(mitre_attack_default, mitre_attack_local) | fields - analytic_story_default, analytic_story_local, category_default, category_local, kill_chain_phase_default, kill_chain_phase_local, mitre_attack_default, mitre_attack_local, uncommon_default, uncommon_local | search uncommon=true", + "description": "This macro limits the output to processes that have been marked as uncommon" + }, + { + "name": "uncommon_processes_on_endpoint_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS", + "id": "56ef054c-76ef-45f9-af4a-a634695dcd65", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-12-06", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects loading of unsigned images by LSASS. Deprecated because too noisy.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventID=7 Image=*lsass.exe Signed=false | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, Image, ImageLoaded, Signed, SHA1 | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "This search needs Sysmon Logs with a sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 7 with lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", + "known_false_positives": "Other tools could load images into LSASS for legitimate reason. But enterprise tools should always use signed DLLs.", + "references": [ + "https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "asset_type": "Windows", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cleaver", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Whitefly" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Unsuccessful Netbackup backups", + "id": "a34aae96-ccf8-4aaa-952c-3ea21444444f", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-12", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search gives you the hosts where a backup was attempted and then failed.", + "search": "`netbackup` | stats latest(_time) as latestTime by COMPUTERNAME, MESSAGE | search MESSAGE=\"An error occurred, failed to backup.\" | `security_content_ctime(latestTime)` | rename COMPUTERNAME as dest, MESSAGE as signature | table latestTime, dest, signature | `unsuccessful_netbackup_backups_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to obtain data from your backup solution, either from the backup logs on your endpoints or from a central server responsible for performing the backups. If you do not use Netbackup, you can modify this search for your specific backup solution.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Unsuccessful Netbackup backups", + "analytic_story": [ + "Monitor Backup Solution" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 10" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "netbackup", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"netbackup_logs\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "unsuccessful_netbackup_backups_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Web Fraud - Account Harvesting", + "id": "bf1d7b5c-df2f-4249-a401-c09fdc221ddf", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-10-08", + "author": "Jim Apger, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search is used to identify the creation of multiple user accounts using the same email domain name.", + "search": "`stream_http` http_content_type=text* uri=\"/magento2/customer/account/loginPost/\" | rex field=cookie \"form_key=(?\\w+)\" | rex field=form_data \"login\\[username\\]=(?[^&|^$]+)\" | search Username=* | rex field=Username \"@(?.*)\" | stats dc(Username) as UniqueUsernames list(Username) as src_user by email_domain | where UniqueUsernames> 25 | `web_fraud___account_harvesting_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "We start with a dataset that provides visibility into the email address used for the account creation. In this example, we are narrowing our search down to the single web page that hosts the Magento2 e-commerce platform (via URI) used for account creation, the single http content-type to grab only the user's clicks, and the http field that provides the username (form_data), for performance reasons. After we have the username and email domain, we look for numerous account creations per email domain. Common data sources used for this detection are customized Apache logs or Splunk Stream.", + "known_false_positives": "As is common with many fraud-related searches, we are usually looking to attribute risk or synthesize relevant context with loosely written detections that simply detect anamolous behavior. This search will need to be customized to fit your environment—improving its fidelity by counting based on something much more specific, such as a device ID that may be present in your dataset. Consideration for whether the large number of registrations are occuring from a first-time seen domain may also be important. Extending the search window to look further back in time, or even calculating the average per hour/day for each email domain to look for an anomalous spikes, will improve this search. You can also use Shannon entropy or Levenshtein Distance (both courtesy of URL Toolbox) to consider the randomness or similarity of the email name or email domain, as the names are often machine-generated.", + "references": [ + "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/2734/", + "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1809/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Web Fraud - Account Harvesting", + "analytic_story": [ + "Web Fraud Detection" + ], + "asset_type": "Account", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1136" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM", + "DE.DP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "http_content_type", + "uri", + "cookie" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Indrik Spider", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "stream_http", + "definition": "sourcetype=stream:http", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "web_fraud___account_harvesting_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed", + "id": "31337bbb-bc22-4752-b599-ef192df2dc7a", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-10-08", + "author": "Jim Apger, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search is used to examine web sessions to identify those where the clicks are occurring too quickly for a human or are occurring with a near-perfect cadence (high periodicity or low standard deviation), resembling a script driven session.", + "search": "`stream_http` http_content_type=text* | rex field=cookie \"form_key=(?\\w+)\" | streamstats window=2 current=1 range(_time) as TimeDelta by session_id | where TimeDelta>0 |stats count stdev(TimeDelta) as ClickSpeedStdDev avg(TimeDelta) as ClickSpeedAvg by session_id | where count>5 AND (ClickSpeedStdDev<.5 OR ClickSpeedAvg<.5) | `web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "Start with a dataset that allows you to see clickstream data for each user click on the website. That data must have a time stamp and must contain a reference to the session identifier being used by the website. This ties the clicks together into clickstreams. This value is usually found in the http cookie. With a bit of tuning, a version of this search could be used in high-volume scenarios, such as scraping, crawling, application DDOS, credit-card testing, account takeover, etc. Common data sources used for this detection are customized Apache logs, customized IIS, and Splunk Stream.", + "known_false_positives": "As is common with many fraud-related searches, we are usually looking to attribute risk or synthesize relevant context with loosly written detections that simply detect anamoluous behavior.", + "references": [ + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Session_ID", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Session_(computer_science)", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_cookie", + "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1809/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed", + "analytic_story": [ + "Web Fraud Detection" + ], + "asset_type": "account", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 6" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "http_content_type", + "cookie" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "stream_http", + "definition": "sourcetype=stream:http", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts", + "id": "31337a1a-53b9-4e05-96e9-55c934cb71d3", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-10-08", + "author": "Jim Apger, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search is used to identify user accounts that share a common password.", + "search": "`stream_http` http_content_type=text* uri=/magento2/customer/account/loginPost* | rex field=form_data \"login\\[username\\]=(?[^&|^$]+)\" | rex field=form_data \"login\\[password\\]=(?[^&|^$]+)\" | stats dc(Username) as UniqueUsernames values(Username) as user list(src_ip) as src_ip by Password|where UniqueUsernames>5 | `web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "We need to start with a dataset that allows us to see the values of usernames and passwords that users are submitting to the website hosting the Magento2 e-commerce platform (commonly found in the HTTP form_data field). A tokenized or hashed value of a password is acceptable and certainly preferable to a clear-text password. Common data sources used for this detection are customized Apache logs, customized IIS, and Splunk Stream.", + "known_false_positives": "As is common with many fraud-related searches, we are usually looking to attribute risk or synthesize relevant context with loosely written detections that simply detect anamoluous behavior.", + "references": [ + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Session_ID", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Session_(computer_science)", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_cookie", + "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1809/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts", + "analytic_story": [ + "Web Fraud Detection" + ], + "asset_type": "account", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "DE.DP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "http_content_type", + "uri" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "stream_http", + "definition": "sourcetype=stream:http", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Windows connhost exe started forcefully", + "id": "c114aaca-68ee-41c2-ad8c-32bf21db8769", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-11-06", + "author": "Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The search looks for the Console Window Host process (connhost.exe) executed using the force flag -ForceV1. This is not regular behavior in the Windows OS and is often seen executed by the Ryuk Ransomware. DEPRECATED This event is actually seen in the windows 10 client of attack_range_local. After further testing we realized this is not specific to Ryuk. ", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE Processes.process=\"*C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\conhost.exe* 0xffffffff *-ForceV1*\" by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_connhost_exe_started_forcefully_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the process-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Processes data-model object. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.", + "known_false_positives": "This process should not be ran forcefully, we have not see any false positives for this detection", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows connhost exe started forcefully", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ryuk Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059.003" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_connhost_exe_started_forcefully_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Windows hosts file modification", + "id": "06a6fc63-a72d-41dc-8736-7e3dd9612116", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-11-02", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The search looks for modifications to the hosts file on all Windows endpoints across your environment.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | search Filesystem.file_name=hosts AND Filesystem.file_path=*Windows\\\\System32\\\\* | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `windows_hosts_file_modification_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records the file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint.Filesystem data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or by other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system reads and writes.", + "known_false_positives": "There may be legitimate reasons for system administrators to add entries to this file.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows hosts file modification", + "analytic_story": [ + "Host Redirection" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "PR.IP", + "PR.PT", + "PR.AC", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_hosts_file_modification_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "7zip CommandLine To SMB Share Path", + "id": "01d29b48-ff6f-11eb-b81e-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-17", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious 7z process with commandline pointing to SMB network share. This technique was seen in CONTI LEAK tools where it use 7z to archive a sensitive files and place it in network share tmp folder. This search is a good hunting query that may give analyst a hint why specific user try to archive a file pointing to SMB user which is un usual.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name =\"7z.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"7za.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name = \"7z.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name = \"7za.exe\") AND (Processes.process=\"*\\\\C$\\\\*\" OR Processes.process=\"*\\\\Admin$\\\\*\" OR Processes.process=\"*\\\\IPC$\\\\*\") by Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `7zip_commandline_to_smb_share_path_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed 7z.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1423361119926816776.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "7zip CommandLine To SMB Share Path", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/conti/conti_leak/windows-sysmon_7z.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "archive process $process_name$ with suspicious cmdline $process$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1560.001", + "T1560" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "SourceImage", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "CopyKittens", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Gallmaker", + "HAFNIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sowbug", + "Turla", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1560", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Patchwork", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "7zip_commandline_to_smb_share_path_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/7zip_commandline_to_smb_share_path.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation", + "id": "fb4c31b0-13e8-4155-8aa5-24de4b8d6717", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-12-06", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "Detect memory dumping of the LSASS process.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe CallTrace=*dbgcore.dll* OR CallTrace=*dbghelp.dll* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, TargetImage, TargetProcessId, SourceImage, SourceProcessId | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 10 for lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators can create memory dumps for debugging purposes, but memory dumps of the LSASS process would be unusual.", + "references": [ + "https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "asset_type": "Windows", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 6", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "process $SourceImage$ injected into $TargetImage$ and was attempted dump LSASS on $dest$. Adversaries tend to do this when trying to accesss credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS).", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "TargetImage", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "TargetImage", + "CallTrace", + "Computer", + "TargetProcessId", + "SourceImage", + "SourceProcessId" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cleaver", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Whitefly" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Account Discovery With Net App", + "id": "339805ce-ac30-11eb-b87d-acde48001122", + "version": 3, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "this search is to detect a potential account discovery series of command used by several malware or attack to recon the target machine. This technique is also seen in some note worthy malware like trickbot where it runs a cmd process, or even drop its module that will execute the said series of net command. This series of command are good correlation search and indicator of attacker recon if seen in the machines within a none technical user or department (HR, finance, ceo and etc) network.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` AND (Processes.process=\"*user*\" OR Processes.process=\"*config*\" OR Processes.process=\"*view /all*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name | where count >=5 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `account_discovery_with_net_app_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product..", + "known_false_positives": "admin or power user may used this series of command.", + "references": [ + "https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/", + "https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/48414a33-3d66-4a46-afe5-c2003bb55ccf/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Account Discovery With Net App", + "analytic_story": [ + "Trickbot", + "IcedID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/infection/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 10, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Suspicious $process_name$ usage detected on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1087" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 5, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_net", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "account_discovery_with_net_app_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/account_discovery_with_net_app.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Active Setup Registry Autostart", + "id": "f64579c0-203f-11ec-abcc-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-26", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of the active setup registry for persistence and privilege escalation. This technique was seen in several malware (poisonIvy), adware and APT to gain persistence to the compromised machine upon boot up. This TTP is a good indicator to further check the process id that do the modification since modification of this registry is not commonly done. check the legitimacy of the file and process involve in this rules to check if it is a valid setup installer that creating or modifying this registry.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_value_name= \"StubPath\" Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Active Setup\\\\Installed Components*\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `active_setup_registry_autostart_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "Active setup installer may add or modify this registry.", + "references": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Backdoor%3aWin32%2fPoisonivy.E", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/014/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Active Setup Registry Autostart", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/t1547.014/active_setup_stubpath/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1547.014", + "T1547" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_value_name" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.014", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Active Setup", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "active_setup_registry_autostart_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/active_setup_registry_autostart.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Add DefaultUser And Password In Registry", + "id": "d4a3eb62-0f1e-11ec-a971-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-26", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "this search is to detect a suspicious registry modification to implement auto admin logon to a host. This technique was seen in BlackMatter ransomware to automatically logon to the compromise host after triggering a safemode boot to continue encrypting the whole network. This behavior is not a common practice and really a suspicious TTP or alert need to be consider if found within then network premise.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon*\" AND Registry.registry_value_name= DefaultPassword OR Registry.registry_value_name= DefaultUserName by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `add_defaultuser_and_password_in_registry_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/08/09/blackmatter-ransomware-emerges-from-the-shadow-of-darkside/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Add DefaultUser And Password In Registry", + "analytic_story": [ + "BlackMatter Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1552.002/autoadminlogon/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "modified registry key $registry_key_name$ with registry value $registry_value_name$ to prepare autoadminlogon", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1552.002", + "T1552" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1552.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials in Registry", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1552", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "add_defaultuser_and_password_in_registry_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/add_defaultuser_and_password_in_registry.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion", + "id": "773b66fe-4dd9-11ec-8289-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-25", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic will identify a suspicious process command-line related to Windows Defender exclusion feature. This command is abused by adversaries, malware authors and red teams to bypass Windows Defender Antivirus products by excluding folder path, file path, process and extensions. From its real time or schedule scan to execute their malicious code. This is a good indicator for defense evasion and to look further for events after this behavior.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process = \"*Add-MpPreference *\" OR Processes.process = \"*Set-MpPreference *\") AND Processes.process=\"*-exclusion*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "Admin or user may choose to use this windows features. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.html", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/cf1245de-06a7-4366-8209-8e3006f2bfe5/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion", + "analytic_story": [ + "Remcos", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/defender_exclusion_sysmon/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "exclusion command $process$ executed on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "AdsiSearcher Account Discovery", + "id": "de7fcadc-04f3-11ec-a241-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-24", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator being used to query Active Directory for domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `[Adsisearcher]` to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*[adsisearcher]*\" Message = \"*objectcategory=user*\" Message = \"*.findAll()*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `adsisearcher_account_discovery_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/", + "https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-blue-purple/", + "https://devblogs.microsoft.com/scripting/use-the-powershell-adsisearcher-type-accelerator-to-search-active-directory/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "AdsiSearcher Account Discovery", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "powershell process having commandline $Message$ for user enumeration", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1087" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "adsisearcher_account_discovery_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/adsisearcher_account_discovery.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall", + "id": "ce27646e-d411-11eb-8a00-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-06-23", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious modification of firewall to allow file and printer sharing. This technique was seen in ransomware to be able to discover more machine connected to the compromised host to encrypt more files", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_netsh` Processes.process= \"*firewall*\" Processes.process= \"*group=\\\"File and Printer Sharing\\\"*\" Processes.process=\"*enable=Yes*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "network admin may modify this firewall feature that may cause this rule to be triggered.", + "references": [ + "https://kb.fortinet.com/kb/documentLink.do?externalID=FD52469", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/c0f98850-af65-4352-9746-fbebadee4f05/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.007", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_netsh", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=netsh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=netsh.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry", + "id": "0a46537c-be02-11eb-92ca-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-26", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic detects a potential suspicious modification of firewall rule registry allowing inbound traffic in specific port with public profile. This technique was identified when an adversary wants to grant remote access to a machine by allowing the traffic in a firewall rule.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\System\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services\\\\SharedAccess\\\\Parameters\\\\FirewallPolicy\\\\FirewallRules\\\\*\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"*|Action=Allow|*\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"*|Dir=In|*\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"*|Profile=Public|*\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"*|LPort=*\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `allow_inbound_traffic_by_firewall_rule_registry_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "network admin may add/remove/modify public inbound firewall rule that may cause this rule to be triggered.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/netsecurity/new-netfirewallrule?view=windowsserver2019-ps" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry", + "analytic_story": [ + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/casper/datasets1/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 10, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious firewall modifications were detected via the registry on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021.001", + "T1021" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user" + ], + "risk_score": 3, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT3", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "OilRig", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "allow_inbound_traffic_by_firewall_rule_registry_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/allow_inbound_traffic_by_firewall_rule_registry.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Allow Inbound Traffic In Firewall Rule", + "id": "a5d85486-b89c-11eb-8267-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-19", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell command to allow inbound traffic inbound to a specific local port within the public profile. This technique was seen in some attacker want to have a remote access to a machine by allowing the traffic in firewall rule.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*firewall*\" Message = \"*Inbound*\" Message = \"*Allow*\" Message = \"*-LocalPort*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `allow_inbound_traffic_in_firewall_rule_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the powershell logs from your endpoints. make sure you enable needed registry to monitor this event.", + "known_false_positives": "administrator may allow inbound traffic in certain network or machine.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/netsecurity/new-netfirewallrule?view=windowsserver2019-ps" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Allow Inbound Traffic In Firewall Rule", + "analytic_story": [ + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/casper/datasets1/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 10, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious firewall modification detected on endpoint $ComputerName$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021.001", + "T1021" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 3, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT3", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "OilRig", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "allow_inbound_traffic_in_firewall_rule_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/allow_inbound_traffic_in_firewall_rule.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Allow Network Discovery In Firewall", + "id": "ccd6a38c-d40b-11eb-85a5-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-06-23", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious modification to the firewall to allow network discovery on a machine. This technique was seen in couple of ransomware (revil, reddot) to discover other machine connected to the compromised host to encrypt more files.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_netsh` Processes.process= \"*firewall*\" Processes.process= \"*group=\\\"Network Discovery\\\"*\" Processes.process=\"*enable*\" Processes.process=\"*Yes*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `allow_network_discovery_in_firewall_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "network admin may modify this firewall feature that may cause this rule to be triggered.", + "references": [ + "https://kb.fortinet.com/kb/documentLink.do?externalID=FD52469", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/c0f98850-af65-4352-9746-fbebadee4f05/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Allow Network Discovery In Firewall", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Revil Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.007", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_netsh", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=netsh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=netsh.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "allow_network_discovery_in_firewall_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/allow_network_discovery_in_firewall.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Allow Operation with Consent Admin", + "id": "7de17d7a-c9d8-11eb-a812-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-26", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies a potential privilege escalation attempt to perform malicious task. This registry modification is designed to allow the `Consent Admin` to perform an operation that requires elevation without consent or credentials. We also found this in some attacker to gain privilege escalation to the compromise machine.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System*\" Registry.registry_value_name = ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000000\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `allow_operation_with_consent_admin_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-gpsb/341747f5-6b5d-4d30-85fc-fa1cc04038d4", + "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/no/threat-encyclopedia/malware/Ransom.Win32.MRDEC.MRA/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Allow Operation with Consent Admin", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious registry modification was performed on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior is indicative of privilege escalation.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "allow_operation_with_consent_admin_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/allow_operation_with_consent_admin.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Anomalous usage of 7zip", + "id": "9364ee8e-a39a-11eb-8f1d-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-22", + "author": "Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following detection identifies a 7z.exe spawned from `Rundll32.exe` or `Dllhost.exe`. It is assumed that the adversary has brought in `7z.exe` and `7z.dll`. It has been observed where an adversary will rename `7z.exe`. Additional coverage may be required to identify the behavior of renamed instances of `7z.exe`. During triage, identify the source of injection into `Rundll32.exe` or `Dllhost.exe`. Capture any files written to disk and analyze as needed. Review parallel processes for additional behaviors. Typically, archiving files will result in exfiltration.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"rundll32.exe\", \"dllhost.exe\") Processes.process_name=*7z* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `anomalous_usage_of_7zip_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as this behavior is not normal for `rundll32.exe` or `dllhost.exe` to spawn and run 7zip.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/001/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/01/31/bazar-no-ryuk/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Anomalous usage of 7zip", + "analytic_story": [ + "Cobalt Strike", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Collection" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1560.001/archive_utility/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior is indicative of suspicious loading of 7zip.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1560.001", + "T1560" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "CopyKittens", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Gallmaker", + "HAFNIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sowbug", + "Turla", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1560", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Patchwork", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "anomalous_usage_of_7zip_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/anomalous_usage_of_7zip.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Any Powershell DownloadFile", + "id": "1a93b7ea-7af7-11eb-adb5-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-03-01", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a file using `DownloadFile` method. This particular method is utilized in many different PowerShell frameworks to download files and output to disk. Identify the source (IP/domain) and destination file and triage appropriately. If AMSI logging or PowerShell transaction logs are available, review for further details of the implant.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process=*DownloadFile* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `any_powershell_downloadfile_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present and filtering will need to occur by parent process or command line argument. It may be required to modify this query to an EDR product for more granular coverage.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.net.webclient.downloadfile?view=net-5.0", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Any Powershell DownloadFile", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior identifies the use of DownloadFile within PowerShell.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_powershell", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "any_powershell_downloadfile_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadfile.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Any Powershell DownloadString", + "id": "4d015ef2-7adf-11eb-95da-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-03-01", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a file using `DownloadString` method. This particular method is utilized in many different PowerShell frameworks to download files and output to disk. Identify the source (IP/domain) and destination file and triage appropriately. If AMSI logging or PowerShell transaction logs are available, review for further details of the implant.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process=*.DownloadString* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `any_powershell_downloadstring_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present and filtering will need to occur by parent process or command line argument. It may be required to modify this query to an EDR product for more granular coverage.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.net.webclient.downloadstring?view=net-5.0", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Any Powershell DownloadString", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell", + "HAFNIUM Group", + "Ingress Tool Transfer" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior identifies the use of DownloadString within PowerShell.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_powershell", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "any_powershell_downloadstring_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadstring.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Attacker Tools On Endpoint", + "id": "a51bfe1a-94f0-48cc-b4e4-16a110145893", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-11-04", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for execution of commonly used attacker tools on an endpoint.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.dest!=unknown Processes.user!=unknown by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | lookup attacker_tools attacker_tool_names AS process_name OUTPUT description | search description !=false| `attacker_tools_on_endpoint_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is usually generated via logs that report process tracking in your Windows audit settings.", + "known_false_positives": "Some administrator activity can be potentially triggered, please add those users to the filter macro.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Attacker Tools On Endpoint", + "analytic_story": [ + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "XMRig", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Unusual Processes" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1595/attacker_scan_tools/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An attacker tool $process_name$,listed in attacker_tools.csv is executed on host $dest$ by User $user$. This process $process_name$ is known to do- $description$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1036.005", + "T1036", + "T1003", + "T1595" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process", + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.parent_process" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Match Legitimate Name or Location", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Darkhotel", + "FIN7", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Fox Kitten", + "Indrik Spider", + "Lazarus Group", + "Machete", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Sowbug", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Whitefly", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1595", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Active Scanning", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "attacker_tools_on_endpoint_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "attacker_tools", + "description": "A list of tools used by attackers", + "filename": "attacker_tools.csv", + "default_match": "false", + "match_type": "WILDCARD(attacker_tool_names)", + "min_matches": 1, + "case_sensitive_match": "false" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/attacker_tools_on_endpoint.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store", + "id": "6bc5243e-ef36-45dc-9b12-f4a6be131159", + "version": 7, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime values(Processes.process) as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_certutil` (Processes.process=*-addstore*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "There may be legitimate reasons for administrators to add a certificate to the untrusted certificate store. In such cases, this will typically be done on a large number of systems.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1553.004/T1553.004.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store", + "analytic_story": [ + "Disabling Security Tools" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1553.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified attempting to add a certificate to the store on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1553.004", + "T1553" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1553.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Install Root Certificate", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1553", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Subvert Trust Controls", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_certutil", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=certutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=CertUtil.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Attempt To Stop Security Service", + "id": "c8e349c6-b97c-486e-8949-bd7bcd1f3910", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for attempts to stop security-related services on the endpoint.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` OR Processes.process_name = sc.exe Processes.process=\"* stop *\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |lookup security_services_lookup service as process OUTPUTNEW category, description | search category=security | `attempt_to_stop_security_service_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified. Attempts to disable security-related services should be identified and understood.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md#atomic-test-14---disable-arbitrary-security-windows-service", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Attempt To Stop Security Service", + "analytic_story": [ + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Trickbot", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_defend_service_stop/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 40, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified attempting to disable security services on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 20, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_net", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "attempt_to_stop_security_service_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "security_services_lookup", + "description": "A list of services that deal with security", + "filename": "security_services.csv", + "default_match": "false", + "match_type": "WILDCARD(service)", + "min_matches": 1 + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", + "id": "e9fb4a59-c5fb-440a-9f24-191fbc6b2911", + "version": 6, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` OR `process_cmd` Processes.process=*save* (Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\SAM* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\SAM*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to export the registry keys.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.002", + "T1003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 90, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "GALLIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "Night Dragon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_reg", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=reg.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=reg.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_cmd", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry", + "id": "1379d2b8-0f18-11ec-8ca3-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-01-28", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "this search is to detect a suspicious registry modification to implement auto admin logon to a host. This technique was seen in BlackMatter ransomware to automatically logon to the compromise host after triggering a safemode boot to continue encrypting the whole network. This behavior is not a common practice and really a suspicious TTP or alert need to be consider if found within then network premise.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon*\" AND Registry.registry_value_name=AutoAdminLogon AND Registry.registry_value_data=1 by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `auto_admin_logon_registry_entry_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/08/09/blackmatter-ransomware-emerges-from-the-shadow-of-darkside/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry", + "analytic_story": [ + "BlackMatter Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1552.002/autoadminlogon/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "modified registry key $registry_key_name$ with registry value $registry_value_name$ to prepare autoadminlogon", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1552.002", + "T1552" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1552.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials in Registry", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1552", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "auto_admin_logon_registry_entry_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/auto_admin_logon_registry_entry.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Batch File Write to System32", + "id": "503d17cb-9eab-4cf8-a20e-01d5c6987ae3", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Michael Haag, Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The search looks for a batch file (.bat) written to the Windows system directory tree.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=* by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*\\\\system32\\\\*\", \"*\\\\syswow64\\\\*\") Filesystem.file_name=\"*.bat\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process] | dedup file_create_time | table dest file_create_time, file_name, file_path, process_name | `batch_file_write_to_system32_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible for this search to generate a notable event for a batch file write to a path that includes the string \"system32\", but is not the actual Windows system directory. As such, you should confirm the path of the batch file identified by the search. In addition, a false positive may be generated by an administrator copying a legitimate batch file in this directory tree. You should confirm that the activity is legitimate and modify the search to add exclusions, as necessary.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Batch File Write to System32", + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1204.002/batch_file_in_system32/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to system32 has occurred on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1204", + "T1204.002" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_name", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.user", + "Filesystem.file_path", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", + "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "batch_file_write_to_system32_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Bcdedit Command Back To Normal Mode Boot", + "id": "dc7a8004-0f18-11ec-8c54-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-06", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious bcdedit commandline to configure the host from safe mode back to normal boot configuration. This technique was seen in blackMatter ransomware where it force the compromised host to boot in safe mode to continue its encryption and bring back to normal boot using bcdedit deletevalue command. This TTP can be a good alert for host that booted from safe mode forcefully since it need to modify the boot configuration to bring it back to normal.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = bcdedit.exe Processes.process=\"*/deletevalue*\" Processes.process=\"*{current}*\" Processes.process=\"*safeboot*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user |`drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `bcdedit_command_back_to_normal_mode_boot_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/08/09/blackmatter-ransomware-emerges-from-the-shadow-of-darkside/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Bcdedit Command Back To Normal Mode Boot", + "analytic_story": [ + "BlackMatter Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1552.002/autoadminlogon/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "bcdedit process with commandline $process$ to bring back to normal boot configuration the $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1490" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "bcdedit_command_back_to_normal_mode_boot_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_command_back_to_normal_mode_boot.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification", + "id": "809b31d2-5462-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-12-21", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for flags passed to bcdedit.exe modifications to the built-in Windows error recovery boot configurations. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent recovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = bcdedit.exe Processes.process=\"*recoveryenabled*\" (Processes.process=\"* no*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. Tune based on parent process names.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may modify the boot configuration.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1490/T1490.md#atomic-test-4---windows---disable-windows-recovery-console-repair" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 100, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting disable the ability to recover the endpoint.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1490" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "BITS Job Persistence", + "id": "e97a5ffe-90bf-11eb-928a-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service utility `bitsadmin.exe` scheduling a BITS job to persist on an endpoint. The query identifies the parameters used to create, resume or add a file to a BITS job. Typically seen combined in a oneliner or ran in sequence. If identified, review the BITS job created and capture any files written to disk. It is possible for BITS to be used to upload files and this may require further network data analysis to identify. You can use `bitsadmin /list /verbose` to list out the jobs during investigation.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_bitsadmin` Processes.process IN (*create*, *addfile*, *setnotifyflags*, *setnotifycmdline*, *setminretrydelay*, *setcustomheaders*, *resume* ) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `bits_job_persistence_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives will be present. Typically, applications will use `BitsAdmin.exe`. Any filtering should be done based on command-line arguments (legitimate applications) or parent process.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1197/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/bitsadmin", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1197/T1197.md#atomic-test-3---persist-download--execute", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Bitsadmin/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "BITS Job Persistence", + "analytic_story": [ + "BITS Jobs" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1197/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to persist using BITS.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1197" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1197", + "mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Leviathan", + "Patchwork" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_bitsadmin", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=bitsadmin.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=bitsadmin.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "bits_job_persistence_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/bits_job_persistence.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "BITSAdmin Download File", + "id": "80630ff4-8e4c-11eb-aab5-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service utility `bitsadmin.exe` using the `transfer` parameter to download a remote object. In addition, look for `download` or `upload` on the command-line, the switches are not required to perform a transfer. Capture any files downloaded. Review the reputation of the IP or domain used. Typically once executed, a follow on command will be used to execute the dropped file. Note that the network connection or file modification events related will not spawn or create from `bitsadmin.exe`, but the artifacts will appear in a parallel process of `svchost.exe` with a command-line similar to `svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s BITS`. It's important to review all parallel and child processes to capture any behaviors and artifacts. In some suspicious and malicious instances, BITS jobs will be created. You can use `bitsadmin /list /verbose` to list out the jobs during investigation.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_bitsadmin` Processes.process=*transfer* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `bitsadmin_download_file_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives, however it may be required to filter based on parent process name or network connection.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/8eb52117b748d378325f7719554a896e37bccec7/atomics/T1105/T1105.md#atomic-test-9---windows---bitsadmin-bits-download", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/bc705cb7aaa5f26f2d96585fac8e4c7052df0ff9/atomics/T1197/T1197.md", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/bits/bitsadmin-tool", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "BITSAdmin Download File", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "BITS Jobs", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1197/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to download a file.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1197", + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1197", + "mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Leviathan", + "Patchwork" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_bitsadmin", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=bitsadmin.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=bitsadmin.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "bitsadmin_download_file_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/bitsadmin_download_file.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments", + "id": "415b4306-8bfb-11eb-85c4-acde48001122", + "version": 3, + "date": "2022-02-03", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "Certutil.exe may download a file from a remote destination using `-urlcache`. This behavior does require a URL to be passed on the command-line. In addition, `-f` (force) and `-split` (Split embedded ASN.1 elements, and save to files) will be used. It is not entirely common for `certutil.exe` to contact public IP space. However, it is uncommon for `certutil.exe` to write files to world writeable paths.\\ During triage, capture any files on disk and review. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain in question.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_certutil` (Processes.process=*urlcache* Processes.process=*split*) OR Processes.process=*urlcache* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives in most environments, however tune as needed based on parent-child relationship or network connection.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/", + "https://www.avira.com/en/blog/certutil-abused-by-attackers-to-spread-threats", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/10/certutil-qualms-they-came-to-drop-fombs.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Command And Control" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to download a file.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 90, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_certutil", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=certutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=CertUtil.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments", + "id": "801ad9e4-8bfb-11eb-8b31-acde48001122", + "version": 3, + "date": "2022-02-03", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "Certutil.exe may download a file from a remote destination using `-VerifyCtl`. This behavior does require a URL to be passed on the command-line. In addition, `-f` (force) and `-split` (Split embedded ASN.1 elements, and save to files) will be used. It is not entirely common for `certutil.exe` to contact public IP space. \\ During triage, capture any files on disk and review. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain in question. Using `-VerifyCtl`, the file will either be written to the current working directory or `%APPDATA%\\..\\LocalLow\\Microsoft\\CryptnetUrlCache\\Content\\`. ", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_certutil` (Processes.process=*verifyctl* Processes.process=*split*) OR Processes.process=*verifyctl* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives in most environments, however tune as needed based on parent-child relationship or network connection.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/", + "https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2020/08/23/certutil-one-more-gui-lolbin/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc732443(v=ws.11)#-verifyctl", + "https://www.avira.com/en/blog/certutil-abused-by-attackers-to-spread-threats" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Command And Control" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to download a file.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 90, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_certutil", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=certutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=CertUtil.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Certutil exe certificate extraction", + "id": "337a46be-600f-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-01-26", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for arguments to certutil.exe indicating the manipulation or extraction of Certificate. This certificate can then be used to sign new authentication tokens specially inside Federated environments such as Windows ADFS.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=certutil.exe Processes.process = \"*-exportPFX*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `certutil_exe_certificate_extraction_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Unless there are specific use cases, manipulating or exporting certificates using certutil is uncommon. Extraction of certificate has been observed during attacks such as Golden SAML and other campaigns targeting Federated services.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Certutil exe certificate extraction", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting export a certificate.", + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "certutil_exe_certificate_extraction_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "CertUtil With Decode Argument", + "id": "bfe94226-8c10-11eb-a4b3-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-03-23", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "CertUtil.exe may be used to `encode` and `decode` a file, including PE and script code. Encoding will convert a file to base64 with `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----` and `-----END CERTIFICATE-----` tags. Malicious usage will include decoding a encoded file that was downloaded. Once decoded, it will be loaded by a parallel process. Note that there are two additional command switches that may be used - `encodehex` and `decodehex`. Similarly, the file will be encoded in HEX and later decoded for further execution. During triage, identify the source of the file being decoded. Review its contents or execution behavior for further analysis.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_certutil` Processes.process=*decode* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `certutil_with_decode_argument_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Typically seen used to `encode` files, but it is possible to see legitimate use of `decode`. Filter based on parent-child relationship, file paths, endpoint or user.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1140/T1140.md", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/certutil", + "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/certutilexe-could-allow-attackers-to-download-malware-while-bypassing-av/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "CertUtil With Decode Argument", + "analytic_story": [ + "Deobfuscate-Decode Files or Information" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1140/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to decode a file.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1140" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1140", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Darkhotel", + "Frankenstein", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Leviathan", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_certutil", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=certutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=CertUtil.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "certutil_with_decode_argument_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/certutil_with_decode_argument.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Change Default File Association", + "id": "462d17d8-1f71-11ec-ad07-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-27", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is developed to detect suspicious registry modification to change the default file association of windows to malicious payload. This techninique was seen in some APT where it modify the default process to run file association, like .txt to notepad.exe. Instead notepad.exe it will point to a Script or other payload that will load malicious command to the compromised host.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path =\"*\\\\shell\\\\open\\\\command\\\\*\" Registry.registry_path = \"*HKCR\\\\*\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `change_default_file_association_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://dmcxblue.gitbook.io/red-team-notes-2-0/red-team-techniques/privilege-escalation/untitled-3/accessibility-features" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Change Default File Association", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.001/txtfile_reg/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1546.001", + "T1546" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_value_name" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Kimsuky" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "change_default_file_association_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/change_default_file_association.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Change To Safe Mode With Network Config", + "id": "81f1dce0-0f18-11ec-a5d7-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-06", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious bcdedit commandline to configure the host to boot in safe mode with network config. This technique was seen in blackMatter ransomware where it force the compromised host to boot in safe mode to continue its encryption and bring back to normal boot using bcdedit deletevalue command. This TTP can be a good alert for host that booted from safe mode forcefully since it need to modify the boot configuration to bring it back to normal.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = bcdedit.exe Processes.process=\"*/set*\" Processes.process=\"*{current}*\" Processes.process=\"*safeboot*\" Processes.process=\"*network*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user |`drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `change_to_safe_mode_with_network_config_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/08/09/blackmatter-ransomware-emerges-from-the-shadow-of-darkside/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Change To Safe Mode With Network Config", + "analytic_story": [ + "BlackMatter Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1552.002/autoadminlogon/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "bcdedit process with commandline $process$ to force safemode boot the $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1490" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "change_to_safe_mode_with_network_config_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/change_to_safe_mode_with_network_config.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "CHCP Command Execution", + "id": "21d236ec-eec1-11eb-b23e-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-07-27", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect execution of chcp.exe application. this utility is used to change the active code page of the console. This technique was seen in icedid malware to know the locale region/language/country of the compromise host.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=chcp.com Processes.parent_process_name = cmd.exe Processes.parent_process=*/c* by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `chcp_command_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed chcp.com may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "other tools or script may used this to change code page to UTF-* or others", + "references": [ + "https://ss64.com/nt/chcp.html", + "https://twitter.com/tccontre18/status/1419941156633329665?s=20" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "CHCP Command Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/simulated_icedid/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "parent process $parent_process_name$ spawning chcp process $process_name$ with parent command line $parent_process$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "process_name", + "process", + "parent_process_name", + "parent_process", + "process_id", + "parent_process_id", + "dest", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 9, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "chcp_command_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/chcp_command_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Check Elevated CMD using whoami", + "id": "a9079b18-1633-11ec-859c-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-15", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious whoami execution to check if the cmd or shell instance process is with elevated privileges. This technique was seen in FIN7 js implant where it execute this as part of its data collection to the infected machine to check if the running shell cmd process is elevated or not. This TTP is really a good alert for known attacker that recon on the targetted host. This command is not so commonly executed by a normal user or even an admin to check if a process is elevated.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*whoami*\" Processes.process = \"*/group*\" Processes.process = \"* find *\" Processes.process = \"*12288*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `check_elevated_cmd_using_whoami_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Check Elevated CMD using whoami", + "analytic_story": [ + "FIN7" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_js_2/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Process name $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1033" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1033", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "check_elevated_cmd_using_whoami_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/check_elevated_cmd_using_whoami.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App", + "id": "cd80a6ac-c9d9-11eb-8839-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-10", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "this search is to detect execution of `cipher.exe` to clear the unallocated sectors of a specific disk. This technique was seen in some ransomware to make it impossible to forensically recover deleted files.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"cipher.exe\" Processes.process = \"*/w:*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "administrator may execute this app to manage disk", + "references": [ + "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/vatet-pyxie-defray777/3/", + "https://www.sophos.com/en-us/medialibrary/PDFs/technical-papers/sophoslabs-ransomware-behavior-report.pdf" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 100, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to clear the unallocated sectors of a specific disk.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1070.004", + "T1070" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 90, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Evilnum", + "FIN10", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Group5", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "Mustang Panda", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "The White Company", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Clop Common Exec Parameter", + "id": "5a8a2a72-8322-11eb-9ee9-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-03-17", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytics are designed to identifies some CLOP ransomware variant that using arguments to execute its main code or feature of its code. In this variant if the parameter is \"runrun\", CLOP ransomware will try to encrypt files in network shares and if it is \"temp.dat\", it will try to read from some stream pipe or file start encrypting files within the infected local machines. This technique can be also identified as an anti-sandbox technique to make its code non-responsive since it is waiting for some parameter to execute properly.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as cmdline values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process values(Processes.process_name) count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name != \"*temp.dat*\" Processes.process = \"*runrun*\" OR Processes.process = \"*temp.dat*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `clop_common_exec_parameter_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Operators can execute third party tools using these parameters.", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", + "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Clop Common Exec Parameter", + "analytic_story": [ + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_b/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 100, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting using arguments to execute its main code or feature of its code related to Clop ransomware.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1204" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 100, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", + "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "clop_common_exec_parameter_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/clop_common_exec_parameter.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Clop Ransomware Known Service Name", + "id": "07e08a12-870c-11eb-b5f9-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-03-17", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This detection is to identify the common service name created by the CLOP ransomware as part of its persistence and high privilege code execution in the infected machine. Ussually CLOP ransomware use StartServiceCtrlDispatcherW API in creating this service entry.", + "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 Service_Name IN (\"SecurityCenterIBM\", \"WinCheckDRVs\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Service_File_Name Service_Name Service_Start_Type Service_Type | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `clop_ransomware_known_service_name_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", + "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Clop Ransomware Known Service Name", + "analytic_story": [ + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-system.log" + ], + "impact": 100, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ executing known Clop Ransomware service names.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1543" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "EventCode", + "cmdline", + "_time", + "parent_process_name", + "process_name", + "OriginalFileName", + "process_path" + ], + "risk_score": 100, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_system", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "clop_ransomware_known_service_name_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/clop_ransomware_known_service_name.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", + "id": "54a6ed00-3256-11ec-b031-acde48001122", + "version": 3, + "date": "2022-01-18", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies command-line arguments where `cmd.exe /c` is used to execute a program. `cmd /c` is used to run commands in MS-DOS and terminate after command or process completion. This technique is commonly seen in adversaries and malware to execute batch command using different shell like PowerShell or different process other than `cmd.exe`. This is a good hunting query for suspicious command-line made by a script or relative process execute it.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` AND Processes.process=\"* /c *\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives may be high based on legitimate scripted code in any environment. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228", + "WhisperGate", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/cmd_carry_str_param/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting spawn a new process.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059.003", + "T1059" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 30, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_cmd", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation", + "id": "eb277ba0-b96b-11eb-b00e-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-05-20", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies a common behavior by Cobalt Strike and other frameworks where the adversary will escalate privileges, either via `jump` (Cobalt Strike PTH) or `getsystem`, using named-pipe impersonation. A suspicious event will look like `cmd.exe /c echo 4sgryt3436 > \\\\.\\Pipe\\5erg53`.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` OR Processes.process=*%comspec%* (Processes.process=*echo* AND Processes.process=*pipe*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmd_echo_pipe___escalation_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown. It is possible filtering may be required to ensure fidelity.", + "references": [ + "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/threats/cobalt-strike/", + "https://github.com/rapid7/meterpreter/blob/master/source/extensions/priv/server/elevate/namedpipe.c" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation", + "analytic_story": [ + "Cobalt Strike" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ potentially performing privilege escalation using named pipes related to Cobalt Strike and other frameworks.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.003", + "T1543.003", + "T1543" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN7", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "PROMETHIUM", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_cmd", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "cmd_echo_pipe___escalation_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/cmd_echo_pipe___escalation.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell", + "id": "6c3f7dd8-153c-11ec-ac2d-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-14", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a non-standard parent process (not matching CMD, PowerShell, or Explorer) spawning `ipconfig.exe` or `systeminfo.exe`. This particular behavior was seen in FIN7's JSSLoader .NET payload. This is also typically seen when an adversary is injected into another process performing different discovery techniques. This event stands out as a TTP since these tools are commonly executed with a shell application or Explorer parent, and not by another application. This TTP is a good indicator for an adversary gathering host information, but one possible false positive might be an automated tool used by a system administator.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = \"ipconfig.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"systeminfo.exe\") AND NOT (Processes.parent_process_name = \"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"powershell*\" OR Processes.parent_process_name=\"pwsh.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"explorer.exe\") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmdline_tool_not_executed_in_cmd_shell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated host discovery application that may generate false positives. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html", + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell", + "analytic_story": [ + "FIN7" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/jssloader/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A non-standard parent process $parent_process_name$ spawned child process $process_name$ to execute command-line tool on $dest$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.007" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.007", + "mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "Cobalt Group", + "Evilnum", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Higaisa", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "cmdline_tool_not_executed_in_cmd_shell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/cmdline_tool_not_executed_in_cmd_shell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass", + "id": "f87b5062-b405-11eb-a889-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-13", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic detects a potential process using COM Object like CMLUA or CMSTPLUA to bypass UAC. This technique has been used by ransomware adversaries to gain administrative privileges to its running process.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\CMLUA.dll\", \"*\\\\CMSTPLUA.dll\", \"*\\\\CMLUAUTIL.dll\") NOT(process_name IN(\"CMSTP.exe\", \"CMMGR32.exe\")) NOT(Image IN(\"*\\\\windows\\\\*\", \"*\\\\program files*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name Computer EventCode Signed ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate windows application that are not on the list loading this dll. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/003/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass", + "analytic_story": [ + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/darkside_cmstp_com/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "The following module $ImageLoaded$ was loaded by a non-standard application on endpoint $Computer$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ImageLoaded", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Image", + "ImageLoaded", + "process_name", + "Computer", + "EventCode", + "Signed", + "ProcessId" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "CMSTP", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Cobalt Group", + "MuddyWater" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Cobalt Strike Named Pipes", + "id": "5876d429-0240-4709-8b93-ea8330b411b5", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-02-22", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of default or publicly known named pipes used with Cobalt Strike. A named pipe is a named, one-way or duplex pipe for communication between the pipe server and one or more pipe clients. Cobalt Strike uses named pipes in many ways and has default values used with the Artifact Kit and Malleable C2 Profiles. The following query assists with identifying these default named pipes. Each EDR product presents named pipes a little different. Consider taking the values and generating a query based on the product of choice. \\\nUpon triage, review the process performing the named pipe. If it is explorer.exe, It is possible it was injected into by another process. Review recent parallel processes to identify suspicious patterns or behaviors. A parallel process may have a network connection, review and follow the connection back to identify any file modifications.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventID=17 OR EventID=18 PipeName IN (\\\\msagent_*, \\\\wkssvc*, \\\\DserNamePipe*, \\\\srvsvc_*, \\\\mojo.*, \\\\postex_*, \\\\status_*, \\\\MSSE-*, \\\\spoolss_*, \\\\win_svc*, \\\\ntsvcs*, \\\\winsock*, \\\\UIA_PIPE*) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, process_name, process_id process_path, PipeName | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cobalt_strike_named_pipes_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "The idea of using named pipes with Cobalt Strike is to blend in. Therefore, some of the named pipes identified and added may cause false positives. Filter by process name or pipe name to reduce false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/ipc/named-pipes", + "https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-smb-beacon", + "https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2021/02/09/learn-pipe-fitting-for-all-of-your-offense-projects/", + "https://gist.github.com/MHaggis/6c600e524045a6d49c35291a21e10752", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Cobalt Strike Named Pipes", + "analytic_story": [ + "Cobalt Strike", + "Trickbot", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $Computer$ by user $user$ accessing known suspicious named pipes related to Cobalt Strike.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1055" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventID", + "PipeName", + "Computer", + "process_name", + "process_path", + "process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Cobalt Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sharpshooter", + "Silence", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "cobalt_strike_named_pipes_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/cobalt_strike_named_pipes.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Common Ransomware Extensions", + "id": "a9e5c5db-db11-43ca-86a8-c852d1b2c0ec", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-11-09", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The search looks for file modifications with extensions commonly used by Ransomware", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| rex field=file_name \"(?\\.[^\\.]+)$\" | `ransomware_extensions` | `common_ransomware_extensions_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.\\\nThis search produces fields (`query`,`query_length`,`count`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** Name, **Field:** Name\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** File Extension, **Field:** file_extension\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible for a legitimate file with these extensions to be created. If this is a true ransomware attack, there will be a large number of files created with these extensions.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Common Ransomware Extensions", + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Ransomware", + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/ransomware_extensions/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$, this is indicative of a known ransomware file extension and should be reviewed immediately.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1485" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_name", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.user", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Filesystem.file_path", + "Filesystem.file_name" + ], + "risk_score": 90, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "ransomware_extensions", + "definition": "lookup update=true ransomware_extensions_lookup Extensions AS file_extension OUTPUT Name | search Name !=False", + "description": "This macro limits the output to files that have extensions associated with ransomware" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "common_ransomware_extensions_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Common Ransomware Notes", + "id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d6bd71", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-11-09", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The search looks for files created with names matching those typically used in ransomware notes that tell the victim how to get their data back.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `ransomware_notes` | `common_ransomware_notes_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Filesystem data-model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system reads and writes.", + "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a legitimate file could be created with the same name used by ransomware note files.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Common Ransomware Notes", + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/ransomware_notes/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$, this is indicative of a known ransomware note file and should be reviewed immediately.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1485" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_name", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.user", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Filesystem.file_path", + "Filesystem.file_name" + ], + "risk_score": 90, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ransomware_notes", + "definition": "lookup ransomware_notes_lookup ransomware_notes as file_name OUTPUT status as \"Known Ransomware Notes\" | search \"Known Ransomware Notes\"=True", + "description": "This macro limits the output to files that have been identified as a ransomware note" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "common_ransomware_notes_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Conti Common Exec parameter", + "id": "624919bc-c382-11eb-adcc-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-02", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search detects the suspicious commandline argument of revil ransomware to encrypt specific or all local drive and network shares of the compromised machine or host.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*-m local*\" OR Processes.process = \"*-m net*\" OR Processes.process = \"*-m all*\" OR Processes.process = \"*-nomutex*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `conti_common_exec_parameter_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "3rd party tool may have commandline parameter that can trigger this detection.", + "references": [ + "https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.conti" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Conti Common Exec parameter", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/conti/inf1/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ executing specific Conti Ransomware related parameters.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1204" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", + "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "conti_common_exec_parameter_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/conti_common_exec_parameter.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Control Loading from World Writable Directory", + "id": "10423ac4-10c9-11ec-8dc4-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-08", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following detection identifies control.exe loading either a .cpl or .inf from a writable directory. This is related to CVE-2021-40444. During triage, review parallel processes, parent and child, for further suspicious behaviors. In addition, capture file modifications and analyze.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=control.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=CONTROL.EXE) AND Processes.process IN (\"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\windows\\\\temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `control_loading_from_world_writable_directory_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives will be present as control.exe does not natively load from writable paths as defined. One may add .cpl or .inf to the command-line if there is any false positives. Tune as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/rundll32.exe-111474C61232202B5B588D2B512CBB25.html", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/36c14029-9df8-439c-bba0-45f2643b0c70/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", + "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.002/T1218.002.yaml" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Control Loading from World Writable Directory", + "analytic_story": [ + "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a suspicious file from disk.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-40444" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Control Panel", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "control_loading_from_world_writable_directory_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/control_loading_from_world_writable_directory.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Create local admin accounts using net exe", + "id": "b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-151bb162040e", + "version": 6, + "date": "2021-09-08", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for the creation of local administrator accounts using net.exe .", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.user) as user values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=net.exe OR Processes.process_name=net1.exe) AND Processes.process=*/add* AND (Processes.process=*administrators* OR Processes.process=*administratoren* OR Processes.process=*administrateurs* OR Processes.process=*administrador* OR Processes.process=*amministratori* OR Processes.process=*administratorer*) by Processes.process Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators often leverage net.exe to create admin accounts.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Create local admin accounts using net exe", + "analytic_story": [ + "DHS Report TA18-074A" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to add a user to the local Administrators group.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1136.001", + "T1136" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 30, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT3", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Fox Kitten", + "Leafminer", + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Indrik Spider", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Create or delete windows shares using net exe", + "id": "743a322c-9a68-4a0f-9c17-85d9cce2a27c", + "version": 6, + "date": "2020-09-16", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for the creation or deletion of hidden shares using net.exe.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.user) as user values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` by Processes.process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search process=*share* | `create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators often leverage net.exe to create or delete network shares. You should verify that the activity was intentional and is legitimate.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/005" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Create or delete windows shares using net exe", + "analytic_story": [ + "Hidden Cobra Malware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ enumerating Windows file shares.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1070", + "T1070.005" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Connection Removal", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Threat Group-3390" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_net", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Create Remote Thread In Shell Application", + "id": "10399c1e-f51e-11eb-b920-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-04", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect suspicious process injection in command shell. This technique was seen in IcedID where it execute cmd.exe process to inject its shellcode as part of its execution as banking trojan. It is really uncommon to have a create remote thread execution in the following application.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=8 TargetImage IN (\"*\\\\cmd.exe\", \"*\\\\powershell*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by TargetImage TargetProcessId SourceProcessId EventCode StartAddress SourceImage Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `create_remote_thread_in_shell_application_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/07/19/icedid-and-cobalt-strike-vs-antivirus/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Create Remote Thread In Shell Application", + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/simulated_icedid/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "process $SourceImage$ create a remote thread to shell app process $TargetImage$ in host $Computer$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1055" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "SourceImage", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "SourceImage", + "TargetImage", + "TargetProcessId", + "SourceProcessId", + "StartAddress", + "EventCode", + "Computer" + ], + "risk_score": 70, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Cobalt Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sharpshooter", + "Silence", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "create_remote_thread_in_shell_application_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_in_shell_application.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Create Remote Thread into LSASS", + "id": "67d4dbef-9564-4699-8da8-03a151529edc", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-12-06", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "Detect remote thread creation into LSASS consistent with credential dumping.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventID=8 TargetImage=*lsass.exe | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, EventCode, TargetImage, TargetProcessId | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `create_remote_thread_into_lsass_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This search needs Sysmon Logs with a Sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 8 with lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", + "known_false_positives": "Other tools can access LSASS for legitimate reasons and generate an event. In these cases, tweaking the search may help eliminate noise.", + "references": [ + "https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Create Remote Thread into LSASS", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "asset_type": "Windows", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A process has created a remote thread into $TargetImage$ on $dest$. This behavior is indicative of credential dumping and should be investigated.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "TargetImage", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventID", + "TargetImage", + "Computer", + "EventCode", + "TargetImage", + "TargetProcessId", + "dest" + ], + "risk_score": 81, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cleaver", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Whitefly" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "create_remote_thread_into_lsass_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr", + "id": "b2fbe95a-9c62-4c12-8a29-24b97e84c0cd", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-02-03", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "Detect the hands on keyboard behavior of Windows Task Manager creating a process dump of lsass.exe. Upon this behavior occurring, a file write/modification will occur in the users profile under \\AppData\\Local\\Temp. The dump file, lsass.dmp, cannot be renamed, however if the dump occurs more than once, it will be named lsass (2).dmp.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventID=11 process_name=taskmgr.exe TargetFilename=*lsass*.dmp | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, object_category, process_name, TargetFilename | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 11 for detecting file create of lsass.dmp. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators can create memory dumps for debugging purposes, but memory dumps of the LSASS process would be unusual.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md#atomic-test-5---dump-lsassexe-memory-using-windows-task-manager", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/", + "https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "asset_type": "Windows", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 6", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "$process_name$ was identified on endpoint $Computer$ writing $TargetFilename$ to disk. This behavior is related to dumping credentials via Task Manager.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "TargetFilename", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventID", + "process_name", + "TargetFilename", + "Computer", + "object_category" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cleaver", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Whitefly" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Creation of Shadow Copy", + "id": "eb120f5f-b879-4a63-97c1-93352b5df844", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-12-10", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "Monitor for signs that Vssadmin or Wmic has been used to create a shadow copy.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=vssadmin.exe Processes.process=*create* Processes.process=*shadow*) OR (Processes.process_name=wmic.exe Processes.process=*shadowcopy* Processes.process=*create*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `creation_of_shadow_copy_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate administrator usage of Vssadmin or Wmic will create false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Creation of Shadow Copy", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to create a shadow copy to perform offline password cracking.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.003", + "T1003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 81, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Fox Kitten", + "HAFNIUM", + "Mustang Panda", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "creation_of_shadow_copy_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell", + "id": "2ed8b538-d284-449a-be1d-82ad1dbd186b", + "version": 3, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search detects the use of wmic and Powershell to create a shadow copy.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` OR `process_powershell` Processes.process=*shadowcopy* Processes.process=*create* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Legtimate administrator usage of wmic to create a shadow copy.", + "references": [ + "https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to create a shadow copy to perform offline password cracking.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.003", + "T1003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 81, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Fox Kitten", + "HAFNIUM", + "Mustang Panda", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_wmic", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "process_powershell", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy", + "id": "d8c406fe-23d2-45f3-a983-1abe7b83ff3b", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search detects credential dumping using copy command from a shadow copy.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` (Processes.process=*\\\\system32\\\\config\\\\sam* OR Processes.process=*\\\\system32\\\\config\\\\security* OR Processes.process=*\\\\system32\\\\config\\\\system* OR Processes.process=*\\\\windows\\\\ntds\\\\ntds.dit*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to copy SAM and NTDS.dit for offline password cracking.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.003", + "T1003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 81, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Fox Kitten", + "HAFNIUM", + "Mustang Panda", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_cmd", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy", + "id": "c5eac648-fae0-4263-91a6-773df1f4c903", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search detects the creation of a symlink to a shadow copy.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` Processes.process=*mklink* Processes.process=*HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to create symlink to a shadow copy to grab credentials.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.003", + "T1003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 81, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Fox Kitten", + "HAFNIUM", + "Mustang Panda", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_cmd", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "CSC Net On The Fly Compilation", + "id": "ea73128a-43ab-11ec-9753-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-12", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "this analytic is to detect a suspicious compile before delivery approach of .net compiler csc.exe. This technique was seen in several adversaries, malware and even in red teams to take advantage the csc.exe .net compiler tool to compile on the fly a malicious .net code to evade detection from security product. This is a good hunting query to check further the file or process created after this event and check the file path that passed to csc.exe which is the .net code. Aside from that, powershell is capable of using this compiler in executing .net code in a powershell script so filter on that case is needed.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_csc` Processes.process = \"*/noconfig*\" Processes.process = \"*/fullpaths*\" Processes.process = \"*@*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `csc_net_on_the_fly_compilation_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated powershell script taht execute .net code that may generate false positive. filter is needed.", + "references": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/ad4c3cda-41f2-4401-8dba-56cc2d245488/", + "https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2019/06/maicious-macro-that-compile-c-code-as.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "CSC Net On The Fly Compilation", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/vilsel/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "csc.exe with commandline $process$ to compile .net code on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1027.004", + "T1027" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1027.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Compile After Delivery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Gamaredon Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Rocke" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1027", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackOasis", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dust Storm", + "Elderwood", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Group5", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_csc", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=csc.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=csc.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "csc_net_on_the_fly_compilation_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/csc_net_on_the_fly_compilation.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "id": "900bc324-59f3-11ec-9fb4-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-10", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of curl on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=curl (Processes.process=\"*-s *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", + "references": [ + "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell", + "id": "5ee2bcd0-b2ff-11eb-bb34-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-12", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This following analytic detects PowerShell command to delete shadow copy using the WMIC PowerShell module. This technique was seen used by a recent adversary to deploy DarkSide Ransomware where it executed a child process of PowerShell to execute a hex encoded command to delete shadow copy. This hex encoded command was able to be decrypted by PowerShell log.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message= \"*ShadowCopy*\" (Message = \"*Delete*\" OR Message = \"*Remove*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the powershell logs from your endpoints. make sure you enable needed registry to monitor this event.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html", + "https://searchwindowsserver.techtarget.com/tutorial/Set-up-PowerShell-script-block-logging-for-added-security" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Ransomware", + "Revil Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An attempt to delete ShadowCopy was performed using PowerShell on $ComputerName$ by $User$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1490" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 81, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Deleting Of Net Users", + "id": "1c8c6f66-acce-11eb-aafb-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-05-04", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic will detect a suspicious net.exe/net1.exe command-line to delete a user on a system. This technique may be use by an administrator for legitimate purposes, however this behavior has been used in the wild to impair some user or deleting adversaries tracks created during its lateral movement additional systems. During triage, review parallel processes for additional behavior. Identify any other user accounts created before or after.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` AND Processes.process=\"*user*\" AND Processes.process=\"*/delete*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `deleting_of_net_users_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "System administrators or scripts may delete user accounts via this technique. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Deleting Of Net Users", + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to delete accounts.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1531" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1531", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_net", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "deleting_of_net_users_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/deleting_of_net_users.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Deleting Shadow Copies", + "id": "b89919ed-ee5f-492c-b139-95dbb162039e", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-11-09", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The vssadmin.exe utility is used to interact with the Volume Shadow Copy Service. Wmic is an interface to the Windows Management Instrumentation. This search looks for either of these tools being used to delete shadow copies.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=vssadmin.exe OR Processes.process_name=wmic.exe) Processes.process=*delete* Processes.process=*shadow* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `deleting_shadow_copies_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "vssadmin.exe and wmic.exe are standard applications shipped with modern versions of windows. They may be used by administrators to legitimately delete old backup copies, although this is typically rare.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Deleting Shadow Copies", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ransomware", + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 10" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to delete shadow copies.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1490" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 81, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "deleting_shadow_copies_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks", + "id": "f5939373-8054-40ad-8c64-cec478a22a4b", + "version": 5, + "date": "2020-10-15", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for specific authentication events from the Windows Security Event logs to detect potential attempts at using the Pass-the-Hash technique.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 (Logon_Type=3 Logon_Process=NtLmSsp WorkstationName=WORKSTATION NOT AccountName=\"ANONYMOUS LOGON\") OR (Logon_Type=9 Logon_Process=seclogo) | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode, Logon_Type, WorkstationName, user, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must ingest your Windows Security Event logs and leverage the latest TA for Windows.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate logon activity by authorized NTLM systems may be detected by this search. Please investigate as appropriate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1550.002/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "The following $EventCode$ occurred on $dest$ by $user$ with Logon Type 3, which may be indicative of the pass the hash technique.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1550", + "T1550.002" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.AT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "EventCode", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Logon_Type", + "Logon_Process", + "WorkstationName", + "user", + "dest" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "access", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1550", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1550.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Hash", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT32", + "Chimera", + "GALLIUM", + "Kimsuky", + "Night Dragon" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect AzureHound Command-Line Arguments", + "id": "26f02e96-c300-11eb-b611-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-01", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the common command-line argument used by AzureHound `Invoke-AzureHound`. Being the script is FOSS, function names may be modified, but these changes are dependent upon the operator. In most instances the defaults are used. This analytic works to identify the common command-line attributes used. It does not cover the entirety of every argument in order to avoid false positives.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process IN (\"*invoke-azurehound*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_azurehound_command_line_arguments_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0521/", + "https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/tree/master/Collectors", + "https://posts.specterops.io/introducing-bloodhound-4-0-the-azure-update-9b2b26c5e350", + "https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/blob/master/Collectors/AzureHound.ps1" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect AzureHound Command-Line Arguments", + "analytic_story": [ + "Discovery Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/sharphound/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ using AzureHound to enumerate AzureAD.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1069.001", + "T1482", + "T1087.001", + "T1087", + "T1069.002", + "T1069" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Chimera", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "admin@338" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "Chimera", + "FIN8" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "Chimera", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Poseidon Group", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "admin@338" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "TA505" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_azurehound_command_line_arguments_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_azurehound_command_line_arguments.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect AzureHound File Modifications", + "id": "1c34549e-c31b-11eb-996b-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-01", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic is similar to SharpHound file modifications, but this instance covers the use of Invoke-AzureHound. AzureHound is the SharpHound equivilent but for Azure. It's possible this may never be seen in an environment as most attackers may execute this tool remotely. Once execution is complete, a zip file with a similar name will drop `20210601090751-azurecollection.zip`. In addition to the zip, multiple .json files will be written to disk, which are in the zip.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*-azurecollection.zip\", \"*-azprivroleadminrights.json\", \"*-azglobaladminrights.json\", \"*-azcloudappadmins.json\", \"*-azapplicationadmins.json\") by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_azurehound_file_modifications_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on file modifications that include the name of the process, and file, responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as the analytic is specific to a filename with extension .zip. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://posts.specterops.io/introducing-bloodhound-4-0-the-azure-update-9b2b26c5e350", + "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/master/Collectors/AzureHound.ps1" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect AzureHound File Modifications", + "analytic_story": [ + "Discovery Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/sharphound/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk that is related to AzureHound, a AzureAD enumeration utility, has occurred on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1069.001", + "T1482", + "T1087.001", + "T1087", + "T1069.002", + "T1069" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_name", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "file_path", + "dest", + "file_name", + "process_id", + "file_create_time" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Chimera", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "admin@338" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "Chimera", + "FIN8" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "Chimera", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Poseidon Group", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "admin@338" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "TA505" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_azurehound_file_modifications_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_azurehound_file_modifications.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Copy of ShadowCopy with Script Block Logging", + "id": "9251299c-ea5b-11eb-a8de-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-07-21", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies `copy` or `[System.IO.File]::Copy` being used to capture the SAM, SYSTEM or SECURITY hives identified in script block. This will catch the most basic use cases for credentials being taken for offline cracking. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message IN (\"*copy*\",\"*[System.IO.File]::Copy*\") AND Message IN (\"*System32\\\\config\\\\SAM*\", \"*System32\\\\config\\\\SYSTEM*\",\"*System32\\\\config\\\\SECURITY*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode ComputerName User EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_copy_of_shadowcopy_with_script_block_logging_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives as the scope is limited to SAM, SYSTEM and SECURITY hives.", + "references": [ + "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-36934", + "https://github.com/GossiTheDog/HiveNightmare", + "https://github.com/JumpsecLabs/Guidance-Advice/tree/main/SAM_Permissions" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Copy of ShadowCopy with Script Block Logging", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/serioussam/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "PowerShell was identified running a script to capture the SAM hive on endpoint $ComputerName$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.002", + "T1003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Message", + "OpCode", + "ComputerName", + "User", + "EventCode" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-36934" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "GALLIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "Night Dragon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_copy_of_shadowcopy_with_script_block_logging_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_copy_of_shadowcopy_with_script_block_logging.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access", + "id": "2c365e57-4414-4540-8dc0-73ab10729996", + "version": 3, + "date": "2019-12-03", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for reading lsass memory consistent with credential dumping.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe (GrantedAccess=0x1010 OR GrantedAccess=0x1410) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, SourceImage, SourceProcessId, TargetImage, TargetProcessId, EventCode, GrantedAccess | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "This search needs Sysmon Logs and a sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 10 with lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", + "known_false_positives": "The activity may be legitimate. Other tools can access lsass for legitimate reasons, and it's possible this event could be generated in those cases. In these cases, false positives should be fairly obvious and you may need to tweak the search to eliminate noise.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "Detect Zerologon Attack" + ], + "asset_type": "Windows", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "The $source_image$ has attempted access to read $TargetImage$ was identified on endpoint $Computer$, this is indicative of credential dumping and should be investigated.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "source_image", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "TargetImage", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "TargetImage", + "GrantedAccess", + "Computer", + "SourceImage", + "SourceProcessId", + "TargetImage", + "TargetProcessId" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cleaver", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Whitefly" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging", + "id": "bc1dc6b8-c954-11eb-bade-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-09", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies the common PowerShell stager used by PowerShell-Empire. Each stager that may use PowerShell all uses the same pattern. The initial HTTP will be base64 encoded and use `system.net.webclient`. Note that some obfuscation may evade the analytic. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message=*system.net.webclient* AND Message=*frombase64string*) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode ComputerName User EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_empire_with_powershell_script_block_logging_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives may only pertain to it not being related to Empire, but another framework. Filter as needed if any applications use the same pattern.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", + "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/", + "https://github.com/BC-SECURITY/Empire" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "The following behavior was identified and typically related to PowerShell-Empire on $ComputerName$ by $User$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Message", + "OpCode", + "ComputerName", + "User", + "EventCode" + ], + "risk_score": 81, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_empire_with_powershell_script_block_logging_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_empire_with_powershell_script_block_logging.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Excessive Account Lockouts From Endpoint", + "id": "c026e3dd-7e18-4abb-8f41-929e836efe74", + "version": 5, + "date": "2020-11-09", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search identifies endpoints that have caused a relatively high number of account lockouts in a short period.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.user) as user from datamodel=Change.All_Changes where nodename=All_Changes.Account_Management All_Changes.result=\"lockout\" by All_Changes.dest All_Changes.result |`drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` |`drop_dm_object_name(\"Account_Management\")`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search count > 5 | `detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must ingest your Windows security event logs in the `Change` datamodel under the nodename is `Account_Management`, for this search to execute successfully. Please consider updating the cron schedule and the count of lockouts you want to monitor, according to your environment. \\\n **Splunk>Phantom Playbook Integration**\\\nIf Splunk>Phantom is also configured in your environment, a Playbook called \"Excessive Account Lockouts Enrichment and Response\" can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. The Playbook executes the Contextual and Investigative searches in this Story, conducts additional information gathering on Windows endpoints, and takes a response action to shut down the affected endpoint. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/`, add the correct hostname to the \"Phantom Instance\" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search, and set the corresponding Playbook to active. \\\n(Playbook Link:`https://my.phantom.us/4.1/playbook/excessive-account-lockouts-enrichment-and-response/`).\\\n", + "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a widely used system, such as a kiosk, could cause a large number of account lockouts.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Excessive Account Lockouts From Endpoint", + "analytic_story": [ + "Account Monitoring and Controls" + ], + "asset_type": "Windows", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/account_lockout/windows-security.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/account_lockout/windows-system.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Multiple accounts have been locked out. Review $dest$ and results related to $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078", + "T1078.002" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.user", + "nodename", + "All_Changes.result", + "All_Changes.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 36, + "security_domain": "access", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "Chimera", + "Indrik Spider", + "Naikon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Excessive User Account Lockouts", + "id": "95a7f9a5-6096-437e-a19e-86f42ac609bd", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search detects user accounts that have been locked out a relatively high number of times in a short period.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change.All_Changes where nodename=All_Changes.Account_Management All_Changes.result=\"lockout\" by All_Changes.user All_Changes.result |`drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` |`drop_dm_object_name(\"Account_Management\")`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search count > 5 | `detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "ou must ingest your Windows security event logs in the `Change` datamodel under the nodename is `Account_Management`, for this search to execute successfully. Please consider updating the cron schedule and the count of lockouts you want to monitor, according to your environment.", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible that a legitimate user is experiencing an issue causing multiple account login failures leading to lockouts.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Excessive User Account Lockouts", + "analytic_story": [ + "Account Monitoring and Controls" + ], + "asset_type": "Windows", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/account_lockout/windows-security.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/account_lockout/windows-system.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Multiple accounts have been locked out. Review $nodename$ and $result$ related to $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078", + "T1078.003" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "result", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.result", + "nodename", + "All_Changes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 36, + "security_domain": "access", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "FIN10", + "HAFNIUM", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Exchange Web Shell", + "id": "8c14eeee-2af1-4a4b-bda8-228da0f4862a", + "version": 3, + "date": "2021-10-05", + "author": "Michael Haag, Shannon Davis, David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following query identifies suspicious .aspx created in 3 paths identified by Microsoft as known drop locations for Exchange exploitation related to HAFNIUM group and recently disclosed vulnerablity named ProxyShell. Paths include: `\\HttpProxy\\owa\\auth\\`, `\\inetpub\\wwwroot\\aspnet_client\\`, and `\\HttpProxy\\OAB\\`. Upon triage, the suspicious .aspx file will likely look obvious on the surface. inspect the contents for script code inside. Identify additional log sources, IIS included, to review source and other potential exploitation. It is often the case that a particular threat is only applicable to a specific subset of systems in your environment. Typically analytics to detect those threats are written without the benefit of being able to only target those systems as well. Writing analytics against all systems when those behaviors are limited to identifiable subsets of those systems is suboptimal. Consider the case ProxyShell vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Servers. With asset information, a hunter can limit their analytics to systems that have been identified as Exchange servers. A hunter may start with the theory that the exchange server is communicating with new systems that it has not previously. If this theory is run against all publicly facing systems, the amount of noise it will generate will likely render this theory untenable. However, using the asset information to limit this analytic to just the Exchange servers will reduce the noise allowing the hunter to focus only on the systems where this behavioral change is relevant.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=System by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*\\\\HttpProxy\\\\owa\\\\auth\\\\*\", \"*\\\\inetpub\\\\wwwroot\\\\aspnet_client\\\\*\", \"*\\\\HttpProxy\\\\OAB\\\\*\") Filesystem.file_name=\"*.aspx\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process] | dedup file_create_time | table dest file_create_time, file_name, file_path, process_name | `detect_exchange_web_shell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node and `Filesystem` node.", + "known_false_positives": "The query is structured in a way that `action` (read, create) is not defined. Review the results of this query, filter, and tune as necessary. It may be necessary to generate this query specific to your endpoint product.", + "references": [ + "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample%20Data/Feeds/MSTICIoCs-ExchangeServerVulnerabilitiesDisclosedMarch2021.csv", + "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/8/17/from-pwn2own-2021-a-new-attack-surface-on-microsoft-exchange-proxyshell", + "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FC6iHw258RI", + "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-microsoft-exchange-servers-still-vulnerable-to-proxyshell-exploit#what-should-you-do" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Exchange Web Shell", + "analytic_story": [ + "HAFNIUM Group", + "ProxyShell" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/windows-sysmon_proxylogon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk that is related to IIS exploitation previously performed by HAFNIUM. Review further file modifications on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1505", + "T1505.003", + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_name", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.file_path", + "Filesystem.process_id", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.file_hash", + "Filesystem.user" + ], + "risk_score": 81, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Volatile Cedar" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_exchange_web_shell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_exchange_web_shell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect HTML Help Renamed", + "id": "62fed254-513b-460e-953d-79771493a9f3", + "version": 3, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a renamed instance of hh.exe (HTML Help) executing a Compiled HTML Help (CHM). This particular technique will load Windows script code from a compiled help file. CHM files may contain nearly any file type embedded, but only execute html/htm. Upon a successful execution, the following script engines may be used for execution - JScript, VBScript, VBScript.Encode, JScript.Encode, JScript.Compact. Analyst may identify vbscript.dll or jscript.dll loading into hh.exe upon execution. The \"htm\" and \"html\" file extensions were the only extensions observed to be supported for the execution of Shortcut commands or WSH script code. During investigation, identify script content origination. Validate it is the legitimate version of hh.exe by reviewing the PE metadata. hh.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_hh` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_html_help_renamed_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely a renamed instance of hh.exe will be used legitimately, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.001/T1218.001.md", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Hh/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect HTML Help Renamed", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT41", + "Dark Caracal", + "Lazarus Group", + "OilRig", + "Silence" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "process_hh", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=hh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=HH.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "detect_html_help_renamed_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_html_help_renamed.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process", + "id": "723716de-ee55-4cd4-9759-c44e7e55ba4b", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-02-11", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies hh.exe (HTML Help) execution of a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) that spawns a child process. This particular technique will load Windows script code from a compiled help file. CHM files may contain nearly any file type embedded, but only execute html/htm. Upon a successful execution, the following script engines may be used for execution - JScript, VBScript, VBScript.Encode, JScript.Encode, JScript.Compact. Analyst may identify vbscript.dll or jscript.dll loading into hh.exe upon execution. The \"htm\" and \"html\" file extensions were the only extensions observed to be supported for the execution of Shortcut commands or WSH script code. During investigation, identify script content origination. Review child process events and investigate further. hh.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=hh.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_html_help_spawn_child_process_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications (ex. web browsers) may spawn a child process. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.001/T1218.001.md", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Hh/", + "https://gist.github.com/mgeeky/cce31c8602a144d8f2172a73d510e0e7", + "https://cyberforensicator.com/2019/01/20/silence-dissecting-malicious-chm-files-and-performing-forensic-analysis/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ spawning a child process, typically not normal behavior.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT41", + "Dark Caracal", + "Lazarus Group", + "OilRig", + "Silence" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_html_help_spawn_child_process_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_html_help_spawn_child_process.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line", + "id": "8c5835b9-39d9-438b-817c-95f14c69a31e", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies hh.exe (HTML Help) execution of a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) file from a remote url. This particular technique will load Windows script code from a compiled help file. CHM files may contain nearly any file type embedded, but only execute html/htm. Upon a successful execution, the following script engines may be used for execution - JScript, VBScript, VBScript.Encode, JScript.Encode, JScript.Compact. Analyst may identify vbscript.dll or jscript.dll loading into hh.exe upon execution. The \"htm\" and \"html\" file extensions were the only extensions observed to be supported for the execution of Shortcut commands or WSH script code. During investigation, identify script content origination. Review reputation of remote IP and domain. Some instances, it is worth decompiling the .chm file to review its original contents. hh.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_hh` Processes.process=*http* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_html_help_url_in_command_line_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may retrieve a CHM remotely, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.001/T1218.001.md", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Hh/", + "https://blog.sevagas.com/?Hacking-around-HTA-files", + "https://gist.github.com/mgeeky/cce31c8602a144d8f2172a73d510e0e7", + "https://cyberforensicator.com/2019/01/20/silence-dissecting-malicious-chm-files-and-performing-forensic-analysis/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_proces_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ contacting a remote destination to potentally download a malicious payload.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 90, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT41", + "Dark Caracal", + "Lazarus Group", + "OilRig", + "Silence" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "process_hh", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=hh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=HH.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "detect_html_help_url_in_command_line_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_html_help_url_in_command_line.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers", + "id": "0b2eefa5-5508-450d-b970-3dd2fb761aec", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies hh.exe (HTML Help) execution of a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) file using InfoTech Storage Handlers. This particular technique will load Windows script code from a compiled help file, using InfoTech Storage Handlers. itss.dll will load upon execution. Three InfoTech Storage handlers are supported - ms-its, its, mk:@MSITStore. ITSS may be used to launch a specific html/htm file from within a CHM file. CHM files may contain nearly any file type embedded. Upon a successful execution, the following script engines may be used for execution - JScript, VBScript, VBScript.Encode, JScript.Encode, JScript.Compact. Analyst may identify vbscript.dll or jscript.dll loading into hh.exe upon execution. The \"htm\" and \"html\" file extensions were the only extensions observed to be supported for the execution of Shortcut commands or WSH script code. During investigation, identify script content origination. hh.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_hh` Processes.process IN (\"*its:*\", \"*mk:@MSITStore:*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "It is rare to see instances of InfoTech Storage Handlers being used, but it does happen in some legitimate instances. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001/", + "https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/851869", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.001/T1218.001.md", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Hh/", + "https://gist.github.com/mgeeky/cce31c8602a144d8f2172a73d510e0e7", + "https://cyberforensicator.com/2019/01/20/silence-dissecting-malicious-chm-files-and-performing-forensic-analysis/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "$process_name$ has been identified using Infotech Storage Handlers to load a specific file within a CHM on $dest$ under user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT41", + "Dark Caracal", + "Lazarus Group", + "OilRig", + "Silence" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "process_hh", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=hh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=HH.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images", + "id": "29e307ba-40af-4ab2-91b2-3c6b392bbba0", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-12-03", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for reading loaded Images unique to credential dumping with Mimikatz. Deprecated because mimikatz libraries changed and very noisy sysmon Event Code.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 | stats values(ImageLoaded) as ImageLoaded values(ProcessId) as ProcessId by Computer, Image | search ImageLoaded=*WinSCard.dll ImageLoaded=*cryptdll.dll ImageLoaded=*hid.dll ImageLoaded=*samlib.dll ImageLoaded=*vaultcli.dll | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This search needs Sysmon Logs and a sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 7 with powershell.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", + "known_false_positives": "Other tools can import the same DLLs. These tools should be part of a whitelist. False positives may be present with any process that authenticates or uses credentials, PowerShell included. Filter based on parent process.", + "references": [ + "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Windows", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 6", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A process, $Image$, has loaded $ImageLoaded$ that are typically related to credential dumping on $Computer$. Review for further details.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ImageLoaded", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Image", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "ImageLoaded", + "ProcessId", + "Computer", + "Image" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cleaver", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Whitefly" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging", + "id": "8148c29c-c952-11eb-9255-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-09", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable no critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies common Mimikatz functions that may be identified in the script block, including `mimikatz`. This will catch the most basic use cases for Pass the Ticket, Pass the Hash and `-DumprCreds`. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message IN (*mimikatz*, *-dumpcr*, *sekurlsa::pth*, *kerberos::ptt*, *kerberos::golden*) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode ComputerName User EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mimikatz_with_powershell_script_block_logging_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as the commands being identifies are quite specific to EventCode 4104 and Mimikatz. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", + "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "The following behavior was identified and typically related to MimiKatz being loaded within the context of PowerShell on $ComputerName$ by $User$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Message", + "OpCode", + "ComputerName", + "User", + "EventCode" + ], + "risk_score": 90, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_mimikatz_with_powershell_script_block_logging_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_mimikatz_with_powershell_script_block_logging.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect mshta inline hta execution", + "id": "a0873b32-5b68-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 6, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies \"mshta.exe\" execution with inline protocol handlers. \"JavaScript\", \"VBScript\", and \"About\" are the only supported options when invoking HTA content directly on the command-line. The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process \"mshta.exe\" and its parent process.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_mshta` (Processes.process=*vbscript* OR Processes.process=*javascript* OR Processes.process=*about*) by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses", + "https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/search/-search-3x-wds-extidx-prot-implementing" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect mshta inline hta execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ executing with inline HTA, indicative of defense evasion.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.005" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 90, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "FIN7", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Sidewinder", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "process_mshta", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=mshta.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSHTA.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect mshta renamed", + "id": "8f45fcf0-5b68-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies renamed instances of mshta.exe executing. Mshta.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64. This analytic utilizes the internal name of the PE to identify if is the legitimate mshta binary. Further analysis should be performed to review the executed content and validation it is the real mshta.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_mshta` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mshta_renamed_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of mshta.exe, but never renamed, triggering a false positive.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses", + "https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect mshta renamed", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.005" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "FIN7", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Sidewinder", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "process_mshta", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=mshta.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSHTA.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "detect_mshta_renamed_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line", + "id": "9b3af1e6-5b68-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies when Microsoft HTML Application Host (mshta.exe) utility is used to make remote http connections. Adversaries may use mshta.exe to proxy the download and execution of remote .hta files. The analytic identifies command line arguments of http and https being used. This technique is commonly used by malicious software to bypass preventative controls. The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process \"rundll32.exe\" and its parent process.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_mshta` (Processes.process=\"*http://*\" OR Processes.process=\"*https://*\") by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mshta_url_in_command_line_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible legitimate applications may perform this behavior and will need to be filtered.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses", + "https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/search/-search-3x-wds-extidx-prot-implementing" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $est$ by user $user$ attempting to access a remote destination to download an additional payload.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.005" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "FIN7", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Sidewinder", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "process_mshta", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=mshta.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSHTA.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "detect_mshta_url_in_command_line_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect New Local Admin account", + "id": "b25f6f62-0712-43c1-b203-083231ffd97d", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-08", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for newly created accounts that have been elevated to local administrators.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4720 OR (EventCode=4732 Group_Name=Administrators) | transaction member_id connected=false maxspan=180m | rename member_id as user | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_new_local_admin_account_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Windows event logs using the Splunk Windows TA and collecting event code 4720 and 4732", + "known_false_positives": "The activity may be legitimate. For this reason, it's best to verify the account with an administrator and ask whether there was a valid service request for the account creation. If your local administrator group name is not \"Administrators\", this search may generate an excessive number of false positives", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect New Local Admin account", + "analytic_story": [ + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "HAFNIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Windows", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Command & Control" + ], + "message": "A $user$ on $dest$ was added recently. Identify if this was legitimate behavior or not.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1136.001", + "T1136" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Group_Name", + "member_id", + "dest", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "access", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT3", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Fox Kitten", + "Leafminer", + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Indrik Spider", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_new_local_admin_account_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe", + "id": "cbef820c-e1ff-407f-887f-0a9240a2d477", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-07-03", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The detection Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe is detecting the abuse of unquoted service paths, which is a popular technique for privilege escalation. ", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | rex field=process \"^.*?\\\\\\\\(?[^\\\\\\\\]*\\.(?:exe|bat|com|ps1))\" | eval process_name = lower(process_name) | eval service_process = lower(service_process) | where process_name != service_process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://medium.com/@SumitVerma101/windows-privilege-escalation-part-1-unquoted-service-path-c7a011a8d8ae" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1574.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to perform privilege escalation by using unquoted service paths.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1574.009", + "T1574" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.009", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Path Interception by Unquoted Path", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery", + "id": "a51bfe1a-94f0-48cc-b1e4-16ae10145893", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-11-10", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for fast execution of processes used for system network configuration discovery on the endpoint.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where NOT Processes.user IN (\"\",\"unknown\") by Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.user _time | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | search `system_network_configuration_discovery_tools` | transaction dest connected=false maxpause=5m |where eventcount>=5 | table firstTime lastTime dest user process_name process parent_process eventcount | `detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the processes node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is usually generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry or that are populated via Windows event logs, after enabling process tracking in your Windows audit settings.", + "known_false_positives": "It is uncommon for normal users to execute a series of commands used for network discovery. System administrators often use scripts to execute these commands. These can generate false positives.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery", + "analytic_story": [ + "Unusual Processes" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1016/discovery_commands/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 40, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning multiple $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ typically not a normal behavior of the process.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1016" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 32, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1016", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Higaisa", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "system_network_configuration_discovery_tools", + "definition": "(process_name= \"arp.exe\" OR process_name= \"at.exe\" OR process_name= \"attrib.exe\" OR process_name= \"cscript.exe\" OR process_name= \"dsquery.exe\" OR process_name= \"hostname.exe\" OR process_name= \"ipconfig.exe\" OR process_name= \"mimikatz.exe\" OR process_name= \"nbstat.exe\" OR process_name= \"net.exe\" OR process_name= \"netsh.exe\" OR process_name= \"nslookup.exe\" OR process_name= \"ping.exe\" OR process_name= \"quser.exe\" OR process_name= \"qwinsta.exe\" OR process_name= \"reg.exe\" OR process_name= \"runas.exe\" OR process_name= \"sc.exe\" OR process_name= \"schtasks.exe\" OR process_name= \"ssh.exe\" OR process_name= \"systeminfo.exe\" OR process_name= \"taskkill.exe\" OR process_name= \"telnet.exe\" OR process_name= \"tracert.exe\" OR process_name=\"wscript.exe\" OR process_name= \"xcopy.exe\")", + "description": "This macro is a list of process that can be used to discover the network configuration" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe", + "id": "dcfd6b40-42f9-469d-a433-2e53f7486664", + "version": 6, + "date": "2020-11-10", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for executions of cmd.exe spawned by a process that is often abused by attackers and that does not typically launch cmd.exe.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |search [`prohibited_apps_launching_cmd`] | `detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts and populates the Endpoint data model with the resultant dataset. This search includes a lookup file, `prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.csv`, that contains a list of processes that should not be spawning cmd.exe. You can modify this lookup to better suit your environment. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "There are circumstances where an application may legitimately execute and interact with the Windows command-line interface. Investigate and modify the lookup file, as appropriate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious Zoom Child Processes", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/powershell_spawn_cmd/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ running prohibited applications.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.003" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "prohibited_apps_launching_cmd", + "definition": "| inputlookup prohibited_apps_launching_cmd | rename prohibited_applications as parent_process_name | eval parent_process_name=\"*\" . parent_process_name | table parent_process_name", + "description": "This macro outputs a list of process that should not be the parent process of cmd.exe" + }, + { + "name": "process_cmd", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag", + "id": "27c3a83d-cada-47c6-9042-67baf19d2574", + "version": 4, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for events where `PsExec.exe` is run with the `accepteula` flag in the command line. PsExec is a built-in Windows utility that enables you to execute processes on other systems. It is fully interactive for console applications. This tool is widely used for launching interactive command prompts on remote systems. Threat actors leverage this extensively for executing code on compromised systems. If an attacker is running PsExec for the first time, they will be prompted to accept the end-user license agreement (EULA), which can be passed as the argument `accepteula` within the command line.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_psexec` Processes.process=*accepteula* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators can leverage PsExec for accessing remote systems and might pass `accepteula` as an argument if they are running this tool for the first time. However, it is not likely that you'd see multiple occurrences of this event on a machine", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag", + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "HAFNIUM Group", + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ running the utility for possibly the first time.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.002" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Operation Wocao", + "Orangeworm", + "Sandworm Team", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_psexec", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=psexec.exe OR Processes.process_name=psexec64.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=psexec.c)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect RClone Command-Line Usage", + "id": "32e0baea-b3f1-11eb-a2ce-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-11-29", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies commonly used command-line arguments used by `rclone.exe` to initiate a file transfer. Some arguments were negated as they are specific to the configuration used by adversaries. In particular, an adversary may list the files or directories of the remote file share using `ls` or `lsd`, which is not indicative of malicious behavior. During triage, at this stage of a ransomware event, exfiltration is about to occur or has already. Isolate the endpoint and continue investigating by review file modifications and parallel processes.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rclone` Processes.process IN (\"*copy*\", \"*mega*\", \"*pcloud*\", \"*ftp*\", \"*--config*\", \"*--progress*\", \"*--no-check-certificate*\", \"*--ignore-existing*\", \"*--auto-confirm*\", \"*--transfers*\", \"*--multi-thread-streams*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rclone_command_line_usage_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as this is restricted to the Rclone process name. Filter or tune the analytic as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://redcanary.com/blog/rclone-mega-extortion/", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/11/29/continuing-the-bazar-ransomware-story/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect RClone Command-Line Usage", + "analytic_story": [ + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Exfiltration" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1020/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to connect to a remote cloud service to move files or folders.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1020" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id", + "Processes.original_file_name" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1020", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Exfiltration", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Frankenstein", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Honeybee", + "Sidewinder", + "Tropic Trooper" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "process_rclone", + "definition": "(Processes.original_file_name=rclone.exe OR Processes.process_name=rclone.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name." + }, + { + "name": "detect_rclone_command_line_usage_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_rclone_command_line_usage.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Regasm Spawning a Process", + "id": "72170ec5-f7d2-42f5-aefb-2b8be6aad15f", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-02-12", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies regasm.exe spawning a process. This particular technique has been used in the wild to bypass application control products. Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe are signed by Microsoft. Spawning of a child process is rare from either process and should be investigated further. During investigation, identify and retrieve the content being loaded. Review parallel processes for additional suspicious behavior. Gather any other file modifications and review accordingly. regsvcs.exe and regasm.exe are natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=regasm.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regasm_spawning_a_process_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, limited instances of regasm.exe or regsvcs.exe may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.md", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvcs/", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regasm/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Regasm Spawning a Process", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ spawning a child process, typically not normal behavior for $parent_process_name$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.009" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.009", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_regasm_spawning_a_process_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_regasm_spawning_a_process.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Regasm with Network Connection", + "id": "07921114-6db4-4e2e-ae58-3ea8a52ae93f", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-02-18", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies regasm.exe with a network connection to a public IP address, exluding private IP space. This particular technique has been used in the wild to bypass application control products. Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe are signed by Microsoft. By contacting a remote command and control server, the adversary will have the ability to escalate privileges and complete the objectives. During investigation, identify and retrieve the content being loaded. Review parallel processes for additional suspicious behavior. Gather any other file modifications and review accordingly. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain and block as needed. regsvcs.exe and regasm.exe are natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventID=3 dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/12 dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16 process_name=regasm.exe | rename Computer as dest | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, user, process_name, src_ip, dest_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regasm_with_network_connection_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, limited instances of regasm.exe with a network connection may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.md", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regasm/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Regasm with Network Connection", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ contacting a remote destination was identified on endpoint $Computer$ by user $user$. This behavior is not normal for $process_name$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.009" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventID", + "dest_ip", + "process_name", + "Computer", + "user", + "src_ip", + "dest_host", + "dest_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.009", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_regasm_with_network_connection_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_regasm_with_network_connection.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments", + "id": "c3bc1430-04e7-4178-835f-047d8e6e97df", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-09-20", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies regasm.exe with no command line arguments. This particular behavior occurs when another process injects into regasm.exe, no command line arguments will be present. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Regasm.exe are natively found in `C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe` and `C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe`.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regasm` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(regasm\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | `detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, limited instances of regasm.exe or may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.md", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regasm/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "The process $process_name$ was spawned by $parent_process_name$ without any command-line arguments on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.009" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.009", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_regasm", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=regasm.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RegAsm.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process", + "id": "bc477b57-5c21-4ab6-9c33-668772e7f114", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-02-12", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies regsvcs.exe spawning a process. This particular technique has been used in the wild to bypass application control products. Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe are signed by Microsoft. Spawning of a child process is rare from either process and should be investigated further. During investigation, identify and retrieve the content being loaded. Review parallel processes for additional suspicious behavior. Gather any other file modifications and review accordingly. regsvcs.exe and regasm.exe are natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=regsvcs.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regsvcs_spawning_a_process_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, limited instances of regasm.exe or regsvcs.exe may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.md", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvcs/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ typically not normal for this process.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.009" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.009", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_regsvcs_spawning_a_process_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_spawning_a_process.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection", + "id": "e3e7a1c0-f2b9-445c-8493-f30a63522d1a", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-02-18", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies Regsvcs.exe with a network connection to a public IP address, exluding private IP space. This particular technique has been used in the wild to bypass application control products. Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe are signed by Microsoft. By contacting a remote command and control server, the adversary will have the ability to escalate privileges and complete the objectives. During investigation, identify and retrieve the content being loaded. Review parallel processes for additional suspicious behavior. Gather any other file modifications and review accordingly. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain and block as needed. regsvcs.exe and regasm.exe are natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventID=3 dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/12 dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16 process_name=regsvcs.exe | rename Computer as dest | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, user, process_name, src_ip, dest_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, limited instances of regsvcs.exe may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.md", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvcs/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ contacting a remote destination was identified on endpoint $Computer$ by user $user$. This behavior is not normal for $process_name$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.009" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventID", + "dest_ip", + "process_name", + "Computer", + "user", + "src_ip", + "dest_host" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "Endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.009", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments", + "id": "6b74d578-a02e-4e94-a0d1-39440d0bf254", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-09-20", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies regsvcs.exe with no command line arguments. This particular behavior occurs when another process injects into regsvcs.exe, no command line arguments will be present. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Regasm.exe are natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvcs` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(regsvcs\\.exe.{0,4}$)\"| `detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, limited instances of regsvcs.exe may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.md", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvcs/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "The process $process_name$ was spawned by $parent_process_name$ without any command-line arguments on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.009" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.009", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_regsvcs", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvcs.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RegSvcs.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass", + "id": "070e9b80-6252-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-01-28", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. Regsvr32.exe is also a Microsoft signed binary.This variation of the technique is often referred to as a \"Squiblydoo\" attack. \\\nUpon investigating, look for network connections to remote destinations (internal or external). Be cautious to modify the query to look for \"scrobj.dll\", the \".dll\" is not required to load scrobj. \"scrobj.dll\" will be loaded by \"regsvr32.exe\" upon execution. ", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` Processes.process=*scrobj* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives related to third party software registering .DLL's.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.md", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/", + "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/how-to-use-the-regsvr32-tool-and-troubleshoot-regsvr32-error-messages-a98d960a-7392-e6fe-d90a-3f4e0cb543e5" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", + "Cobalt Strike" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.010/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ in an attempt to bypass detection and preventative controls was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.010" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cobalt Group", + "Deep Panda", + "Inception", + "Leviathan", + "TA551", + "WIRTE" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_regsvr32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=REGSVR32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Renamed 7-Zip", + "id": "4057291a-b8cf-11eb-95fe-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies renamed 7-Zip usage using Sysmon. At this stage of an attack, review parallel processes and file modifications for data that is staged or potentially have been exfiltrated. This analytic utilizes the OriginalFileName to capture the renamed process. During triage, validate this is the legitimate version of `7zip` by reviewing the PE metadata. In addition, review parallel processes for further suspicious behavior.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.original_file_name=7z*.exe AND Processes.process_name!=7z*.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_renamed_7_zip_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives, however this analytic will need to be modified for each environment if Sysmon is not used.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1560.001/T1560.001.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Renamed 7-Zip", + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Collection" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1560.001/archive_utility/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1560.001", + "T1560" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 27, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "CopyKittens", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Gallmaker", + "HAFNIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sowbug", + "Turla", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1560", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Patchwork", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_renamed_7_zip_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_renamed_7_zip.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Renamed PSExec", + "id": "683e6196-b8e8-11eb-9a79-acde48001122", + "version": 3, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies renamed instances of `PsExec.exe` being utilized on an endpoint. Most instances, it is highly probable to capture `Psexec.exe` or other SysInternal utility usage with the command-line argument of `-accepteula`. During triage, validate this is the legitimate version of `PsExec` by reviewing the PE metadata. In addition, review parallel processes for further suspicious behavior.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_psexec` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_renamed_psexec_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives should be present. It is possible some third party applications may use older versions of PsExec, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1569.002/T1569.002.yaml", + "https://redcanary.com/blog/threat-hunting-psexec-lateral-movement/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Renamed PSExec", + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "HAFNIUM Group", + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Collection" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1569.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1569", + "T1569.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 27, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1569", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "FIN6", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Operation Wocao", + "Silence", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_psexec", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=psexec.exe OR Processes.process_name=psexec64.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=psexec.c)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_renamed_psexec_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_renamed_psexec.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Renamed RClone", + "id": "6dca1124-b3ec-11eb-9328-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the usage of `rclone.exe`, renamed, being used to exfiltrate data to a remote destination. RClone has been used by multiple ransomware groups to exfiltrate data. In many instances, it will be downloaded from the legitimate site and executed accordingly. During triage, isolate the endpoint and begin to review parallel processes for additional behavior. At this stage, the adversary may have staged data to be exfiltrated.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.original_file_name=rclone.exe AND Processes.process_name!=rclone.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_renamed_rclone_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as this analytic identifies renamed instances of `rclone.exe`. Filter as needed if there is a legitimate business use case.", + "references": [ + "https://redcanary.com/blog/rclone-mega-extortion/", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Renamed RClone", + "analytic_story": [ + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Collection" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1020/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1020" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 27, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1020", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Exfiltration", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Frankenstein", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Honeybee", + "Sidewinder", + "Tropic Trooper" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_renamed_rclone_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_renamed_rclone.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Renamed WinRAR", + "id": "1b7bfb2c-b8e6-11eb-99ac-acde48001122", + "version": 3, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analtyic identifies renamed instances of `WinRAR.exe`. In most cases, it is not common for WinRAR to be used renamed, however it is common to be installed by a third party application and executed from a non-standard path. During triage, validate additional metadata from the binary that this is `WinRAR`. Review parallel processes and file modifications.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.original_file_name=WinRAR.exe (Processes.process_name!=rar.exe OR Processes.process_name!=winrar.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_renamed_winrar_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown. It is possible third party applications use renamed instances of WinRAR.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1560.001/T1560.001.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Renamed WinRAR", + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Collection" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1560.001/archive_utility/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1560.001", + "T1560" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 27, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "CopyKittens", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Gallmaker", + "HAFNIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sowbug", + "Turla", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1560", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Patchwork", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_renamed_winrar_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_renamed_winrar.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack", + "id": "4aefadfe-9abd-4bf8-b3fd-867e9ef95bf8", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-02-04", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading advpack.dll and ieadvpack.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line. This particular technique will load script code from a file. Upon a successful execution, the following module loads may occur - clr.dll, jscript.dll and scrobj.dll. During investigation, identify script content origination. Generally, a child process will spawn from rundll32.exe, but that may be bypassed based on script code contents. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64. During investigation, review any network connections and obtain the script content executed. It's possible other files are on disk.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*advpack* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use advpack.dll or ieadvpack.dll, triggering a false positive.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Advpack/", + "https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ loading advpack.dll and ieadvpack.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "CopyKittens", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "MuddyWater", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi", + "id": "61e7b44a-6088-4f26-b788-9a96ba13b37a", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-02-04", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading setupapi.dll and iesetupapi.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line. This particular technique will load script code from a file. Upon a successful execution, the following module loads may occur - clr.dll, jscript.dll and scrobj.dll. During investigation, identify script content origination. Generally, a child process will spawn from rundll32.exe, but that may be bypassed based on script code contents. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64. During investigation, review any network connections and obtain the script content executed. It's possible other files are on disk.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*setupapi* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use setupapi triggering a false positive.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Setupapi/", + "https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ loading setupapi.dll and iesetupapi.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "CopyKittens", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "MuddyWater", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup", + "id": "71b9bf37-cde1-45fb-b899-1b0aa6fa1183", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-02-04", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading syssetup.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line. This particular technique will load script code from a file. Upon a successful execution, the following module loads may occur - clr.dll, jscript.dll and scrobj.dll. During investigation, identify script content origination. Generally, a child process will spawn from rundll32.exe, but that may be bypassed based on script code contents. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64. During investigation, review any network connections and obtain the script content executed. It's possible other files are on disk.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*syssetup* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use syssetup.dll, triggering a false positive.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Syssetup/", + "https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ loading syssetup.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "CopyKittens", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "MuddyWater", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution", + "id": "91c79f14-5b41-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-01-20", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies \"rundll32.exe\" execution with inline protocol handlers. \"JavaScript\", \"VBScript\", and \"About\" are the only supported options when invoking HTA content directly on the command-line. This type of behavior is commonly observed with fileless malware or application whitelisting bypass techniques. The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process \"rundll32.exe\" and its parent process.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` (Processes.process=*vbscript* OR Processes.process=*javascript* OR Processes.process=*about*) by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses", + "https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/search/-search-3x-wds-extidx-prot-implementing" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious rundll32.exe inline HTA execution on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.005" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "FIN7", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Sidewinder", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments", + "id": "a0bdd2f6-c2ff-11eb-b918-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-01", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies common command-line arguments used by SharpHound `-collectionMethod` and `invoke-bloodhound`. Being the script is FOSS, function names may be modified, but these changes are dependent upon the operator. In most instances the defaults are used. This analytic works to identify the common command-line attributes used. It does not cover the entirety of every argument in order to avoid false positives.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process IN (\"*-collectionMethod*\",\"*invoke-bloodhound*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_sharphound_command_line_arguments_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as the arguments used are specific to SharpHound. Filter as needed or add more command-line arguments as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0521/", + "https://thedfirreport.com/?s=bloodhound", + "https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/tree/master/Collectors", + "https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/SharpHound3", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md#atomic-test-2---run-bloodhound-from-local-disk" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments", + "analytic_story": [ + "Discovery Techniques", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/sharphound/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Possible SharpHound command-Line arguments identified on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1069.001", + "T1482", + "T1087.001", + "T1087", + "T1069.002", + "T1069" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 24, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Chimera", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "admin@338" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "Chimera", + "FIN8" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "Chimera", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Poseidon Group", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "admin@338" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "TA505" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_sharphound_command_line_arguments_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_sharphound_command_line_arguments.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect SharpHound File Modifications", + "id": "42b4b438-beed-11eb-ba1d-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-27", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "SharpHound is used as a reconnaissance collector, ingestor, for BloodHound. SharpHound will query the domain controller and begin gathering all the data related to the domain and trusts. For output, it will drop a .zip file upon completion following a typical pattern that is often not changed. This analytic focuses on the default file name scheme. Note that this may be evaded with different parameters within SharpHound, but that depends on the operator. `-randomizefilenames` and `-encryptzip` are two examples. In addition, executing SharpHound via .exe or .ps1 without any command-line arguments will still perform activity and dump output to the default filename. Example default filename `20210601181553_BloodHound.zip`. SharpHound creates multiple temp files following the same pattern `20210601182121_computers.json`, `domains.json`, `gpos.json`, `ous.json` and `users.json`. Tuning may be required, or remove these json's entirely if it is too noisy. During traige, review parallel processes for further suspicious behavior. Typically, the process executing the `.ps1` ingestor will be PowerShell.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*bloodhound.zip\", \"*_computers.json\", \"*_gpos.json\", \"*_domains.json\", \"*_users.json\", \"*_groups.json\") by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_sharphound_file_modifications_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on file modifications that include the name of the process, and file, responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as the analytic is specific to a filename with extension .zip. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0521/", + "https://thedfirreport.com/?s=bloodhound", + "https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/tree/master/Collectors", + "https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/SharpHound3", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md#atomic-test-2---run-bloodhound-from-local-disk" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect SharpHound File Modifications", + "analytic_story": [ + "Discovery Techniques", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/sharphound/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Potential SharpHound file modifications identified on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1069.001", + "T1482", + "T1087.001", + "T1087", + "T1069.002", + "T1069" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "file_path", + "dest", + "file_name", + "process_id", + "file_create_time" + ], + "risk_score": 24, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Chimera", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "admin@338" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "Chimera", + "FIN8" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "Chimera", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Poseidon Group", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "admin@338" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "TA505" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_sharphound_file_modifications_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_sharphound_file_modifications.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect SharpHound Usage", + "id": "dd04b29a-beed-11eb-87bc-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-05-27", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies SharpHound binary usage by using the original filena,e. In addition to renaming the PE, other coverage is available to detect command-line arguments. This particular analytic looks for the original_file_name of `SharpHound.exe` and the process name. It is possible older instances of SharpHound.exe have different original filenames. Dependent upon the operator, the code may be re-compiled and the attributes removed or changed to anything else. During triage, review the metadata of the binary in question. Review parallel processes for suspicious behavior. Identify the source of this binary.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=sharphound.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=SharpHound.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_sharphound_usage_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as this is specific to a file attribute not used by anything else. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0521/", + "https://thedfirreport.com/?s=bloodhound", + "https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/tree/master/Collectors", + "https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/SharpHound3", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md#atomic-test-2---run-bloodhound-from-local-disk" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect SharpHound Usage", + "analytic_story": [ + "Discovery Techniques", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/sharphound/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Potential SharpHound binary identified on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1069.001", + "T1482", + "T1087.001", + "T1087", + "T1069.002", + "T1069" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 24, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Chimera", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "admin@338" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "Chimera", + "FIN8" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "Chimera", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Poseidon Group", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "admin@338" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "TA505" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_sharphound_usage_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_sharphound_usage.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters", + "id": "b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-95dbb162039e", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for the execution of the cscript.exe or wscript.exe processes, with a parent of cmd.exe. The search will return the count, the first and last time this execution was seen on a machine, the user, and the destination of the machine", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=\"cmd.exe\" (Processes.process_name=cscript.exe OR Processes.process_name =wscript.exe) by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters", + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/cmd_spawns_cscript/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "cmd.exe launching script interpreters on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.003" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect WMI Event Subscription Persistence", + "id": "01d9a0c2-cece-11eb-ab46-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-16", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscription to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions.\\\nAll event subscriptions have three components \\\n1. Filter - WQL Query for the events we want. EventID equals 19 \\\n1. Consumer - An action to take upon triggering the filter. EventID equals 20 \\\n1. Binding - Registers a filter to a consumer. EventID equals 21 \\\nMonitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding. It may be pertinent to review all 3 to identify the flow of execution. In addition, EventCode 4104 may assist with any other PowerShell script usage that registered the subscription.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventID=20 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer User Destination | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with that provide WMI Event Subscription from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA and have enabled EventID 19, 20 and 21. Tune and filter known good to limit the volume.", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible some applications will create a consumer and may be required to be filtered. For tuning, add any additional LOLBin's for further depth of coverage.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1546.003/T1546.003.md", + "https://www.eideon.com/2018-03-02-THL03-WMIBackdoors/", + "https://github.com/trustedsec/SysmonCommunityGuide/blob/master/WMI-events.md", + "https://in.security/an-intro-into-abusing-and-identifying-wmi-event-subscriptions-for-persistence/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect WMI Event Subscription Persistence", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious WMI Use" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Possible malicious WMI Subscription created on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1546.003", + "T1546" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Destination", + "Computer", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT33", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "FIN8", + "Leviathan", + "Mustang Panda", + "Turla" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Disable AMSI Through Registry", + "id": "9c27ec42-d338-11eb-9044-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-26", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "this search is to identify modification in registry to disable AMSI windows feature to evade detections. This technique was seen in several ransomware, RAT and even APT to impaire defenses of the compromise machine and to be able to execute payload with minimal alert as much as possible.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Script\\\\Settings\\\\AmsiEnable\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000000\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disable_amsi_through_registry_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "network operator may disable this feature of windows but not so common.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.f-secure.com/hunting-for-amsi-bypasses/", + "https://gist.github.com/rxwx/8955e5abf18dc258fd6b43a3a7f4dbf9" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Disable AMSI Through Registry", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Disable AMSI Through Registry", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.registry_value_name" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "disable_amsi_through_registry_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_amsi_through_registry.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Disable Defender AntiVirus Registry", + "id": "aa4f695a-3024-11ec-9987-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-26", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This particular behavior is typically executed when an adversaries or malware gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution and to evade detections. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. Endpoint should be isolated.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender*\" Registry.registry_value_name = DisableAntiVirus Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000001 by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disable_defender_antivirus_registry_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the registry value name, registry path, and registry value data from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to disable windows defender product", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Disable Defender AntiVirus Registry", + "analytic_story": [ + "IceID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_value_data" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "disable_defender_antivirus_registry_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_antivirus_registry.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Disable Defender BlockAtFirstSeen Feature", + "id": "2dd719ac-3021-11ec-97b4-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-26", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable windows defender feature. This technique is to bypassed or evade detection from Windows Defender AV product specially the BlockAtFirstSeen feature where it block suspicious file first seen in the host.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\SpyNet*\" Registry.registry_value_name = DisableBlockAtFirstSeen Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000001 by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disable_defender_blockatfirstseen_feature_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the registry value name, registry path, and registry value data from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to disable windows defender product", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Disable Defender BlockAtFirstSeen Feature", + "analytic_story": [ + "IceID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_value_data" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "disable_defender_blockatfirstseen_feature_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_blockatfirstseen_feature.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Disable Defender Enhanced Notification", + "id": "dc65678c-301f-11ec-8e30-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-26", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable windows defender feature. This technique is to bypassed or evade detection from Windows Defender AV product specially the Enhanced Notification feature wher user or admin set to show or display alerts.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = \"*Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Reporting*\" Registry.registry_value_name = DisableEnhancedNotifications Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000001 by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disable_defender_enhanced_notification_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the registry value name, registry path, and registry value data executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "user may choose to disable windows defender AV", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Disable Defender Enhanced Notification", + "analytic_story": [ + "IceID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_value_data" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "disable_defender_enhanced_notification_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_enhanced_notification.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Disable Defender MpEngine Registry", + "id": "cc391750-3024-11ec-955a-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-26", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This particular behavior is typically executed when an adversaries or malware gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution and to evade detections. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. Endpoint should be isolated.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\MpEngine*\" Registry.registry_value_name = MpEnablePus Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000000 by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disable_defender_mpengine_registry_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the registry value name, registry path, and registry value data from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to disable windows defender product", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Disable Defender MpEngine Registry", + "analytic_story": [ + "IceID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_value_data" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "disable_defender_mpengine_registry_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_mpengine_registry.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Disable Defender Spynet Reporting", + "id": "898debf4-3021-11ec-ba7c-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-26", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable windows defender feature. This technique is to bypassed or evade detection from Windows Defender AV product specially the spynet reporting for its telemetry.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\SpyNet*\" Registry.registry_value_name = SpynetReporting Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000000 by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disable_defender_spynet_reporting_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the registry value name, registry path, and registry value data from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to disable windows defender product", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Disable Defender Spynet Reporting", + "analytic_story": [ + "IceID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_value_data" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "disable_defender_spynet_reporting_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_spynet_reporting.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Disable Defender Submit Samples Consent Feature", + "id": "73922ff8-3022-11ec-bf5e-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-26", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "his analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable windows defender feature. This technique is to bypassed or evade detection from Windows Defender AV product specially the submit samples feature for further analysis..", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\SpyNet*\" Registry.registry_value_name = SubmitSamplesConsent Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000000 by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disable_defender_submit_samples_consent_feature_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the registry value name, registry path, and registry value data from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to disable windows defender product", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Disable Defender Submit Samples Consent Feature", + "analytic_story": [ + "IceID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_value_data" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "disable_defender_submit_samples_consent_feature_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_submit_samples_consent_feature.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Disable ETW Through Registry", + "id": "f0eacfa4-d33f-11eb-8f9d-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-27", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "this search is to identify modification in registry to disable ETW windows feature to evade detections. This technique was seen in several ransomware, RAT and even APT to impaire defenses of the compromise machine and to be able to execute payload with minimal alert as much as possible.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\.NETFramework\\\\ETWEnabled\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000000\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disable_etw_through_registry_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "network operator may disable this feature of windows but not so common.", + "references": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/c0f98850-af65-4352-9746-fbebadee4f05/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Disable ETW Through Registry", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Disable ETW Through Registry", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.registry_value_name" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "disable_etw_through_registry_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_etw_through_registry.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Disable Logs Using WevtUtil", + "id": "236e7c8e-c9d9-11eb-a824-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-10", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect execution of wevtutil.exe to disable logs. This technique was seen in several ransomware to disable the event logs to evade alerts and detections.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"wevtutil.exe\" Processes.process = \"*sl*\" Processes.process = \"*/e:false*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_logs_using_wevtutil_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "network operator may disable audit event logs for debugging purposes.", + "references": [ + "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-ransom-x-ransomware-used-in-texas-txdot-cyberattack/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Disable Logs Using WevtUtil", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "WevtUtil.exe used to disable Event Logging on $dest", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1070", + "T1070.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process_guid" + ], + "risk_score": 24, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN8", + "Indrik Spider", + "Operation Wocao" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "disable_logs_using_wevtutil_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_logs_using_wevtutil.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Disable Registry Tool", + "id": "cd2cf33c-9201-11eb-a10a-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-27", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search identifies modification of registry to disable the regedit or registry tools of the windows operating system. Since registry tool is a swiss knife in analyzing registry, malware such as RAT or trojan Spy disable this application to prevent the removal of their registry entry such as persistence, file less components and defense evasion.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System\\\\DisableRegistryTools\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disable_registry_tool_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "admin may disable this application for non technical user.", + "references": [ + "https://any.run/report/ea4ea08407d4ee72e009103a3b77e5a09412b722fdef67315ea63f22011152af/a866d7b1-c236-4f26-a391-5ae32213dfc4#registry" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Disable Registry Tool", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 40, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Disabled Registry Tools on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.registry_value_name" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "disable_registry_tool_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_registry_tool.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Disable Schedule Task", + "id": "db596056-3019-11ec-a9ff-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-10-18", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious commandline to disable existing schedule task. This technique is used by adversaries or commodity malware like IceID to disable security application (AV products) in the targetted host to evade detections. This TTP is a good pivot to check further why and what other process run before and after this detection. check which process execute the commandline and what task is disabled. parent child process is quite valuable in this scenario too.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe Processes.process=*/change* Processes.process=*/disable* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_schedule_task_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "admin may disable problematic schedule task", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Disable Schedule Task", + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_schtask/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "schtask process with commandline $process$ to disable schedule task in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "disable_schedule_task_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_schedule_task.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry", + "id": "39ebdc68-25b9-11ec-aec7-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-27", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious registry modification to disable security audit logs. This technique was shared by a researcher to disable Security logs of windows by adding this registry. The Windows will think it is WinPE and will not log any event to the Security Log", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Control\\\\MiniNt\\\\*\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disable_security_logs_using_minint_registry_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown.", + "references": [ + "https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1182516740955226112" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/minint_reg/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1112" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_value_data" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN8", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "disable_security_logs_using_minint_registry_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_security_logs_using_minint_registry.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Disable Show Hidden Files", + "id": "6f3ccfa2-91fe-11eb-8f9b-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-27", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic is to identify a modification in the Windows registry to prevent users from seeing all the files with hidden attributes. This event or techniques are known on some worm and trojan spy malware that will drop hidden files on the infected machine.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\Advanced\\\\Hidden\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\Advanced\\\\HideFileExt\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\") OR (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\Advanced\\\\ShowSuperHidden\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000000\") by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disable_show_hidden_files_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.sophos.com/en-us/threat-center/threat-analyses/viruses-and-spyware/W32~Tiotua-P/detailed-analysis.aspx" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Disable Show Hidden Files", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 40, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Disabled 'Show Hidden Files' on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1564.001", + "T1562.001", + "T1564", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.registry_value_nam" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1564.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Files and Directories", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "Lazarus Group", + "Mustang Panda", + "Rocke", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1564", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Hide Artifacts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "disable_show_hidden_files_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_show_hidden_files.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Disable UAC Remote Restriction", + "id": "9928b732-210e-11ec-b65e-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-27", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable UAC remote restriction. This technique was well documented in Microsoft page where attacker may modify this registry value to bypassed UAC feature of windows host. This is a good indicator that some tries to bypassed UAC to suspicious process or gain privilege escalation.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System*\" Registry.registry_value_name=\"LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy\" Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000001\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disable_uac_remote_restriction_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "admin may set this policy for non-critical machine.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/windows-security/user-account-control-and-remote-restriction" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Disable UAC Remote Restriction", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.registry_value_data" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT37", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Evilnum", + "Honeybee", + "MuddyWater", + "Patchwork", + "Threat Group-3390" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "disable_uac_remote_restriction_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_uac_remote_restriction.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Disable Windows App Hotkeys", + "id": "1490f224-ad8b-11eb-8c4f-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-27", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic detects a suspicious registry modification to disable Windows hotkey (shortcut keys) for native Windows applications. This technique is commonly used to disable certain or several Windows applications like `taskmgr.exe` and `cmd.exe`. This technique is used to impair the analyst in analyzing and removing the attacker implant in compromised systems.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Image File Execution Options\\\\*\" AND Registry.registry_value_data= \"HotKey Disabled\" AND Registry.registry_value_name = \"Debugger\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_key_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `disable_windows_app_hotkeys_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as CarbonBlack or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Disable Windows App Hotkeys", + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/hotkey_disabled_hidden_user/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 40, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Disabled 'Windows App Hotkeys' on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.dest Registry.user" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "disable_windows_app_hotkeys_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_windows_app_hotkeys.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring", + "id": "79439cae-9200-11eb-a4d3-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-27", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to identifies a modification in registry to disable the windows denfender real time behavior monitoring. This event or technique is commonly seen in RAT, bot, or Trojan to disable AV to evade detections.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableBehaviorMonitoring\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableOnAccessProtection\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableScanOnRealtimeEnable\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableRealtimeMonitoring\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableIOAVProtection\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableScriptScanning\" AND Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disable_windows_behavior_monitoring_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to disable this windows features.", + "references": [ + "https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Ransomware", + "Revil Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 40, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Windows Defender real time behavior monitoring disabled on $dest", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.registry_value_name" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "disable_windows_behavior_monitoring_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_windows_behavior_monitoring.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection", + "id": "664f0fd0-91ff-11eb-a56f-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-27", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following search identifies a modification of registry to disable the smartscreen protection of windows machine. This is windows feature provide an early warning system against website that might engage in phishing attack or malware distribution. This modification are seen in RAT malware to cover their tracks upon downloading other of its component or other payload.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\SmartScreenEnabled\" Registry.registry_value_data= \"Off\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disable_windows_smartscreen_protection_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to disable this windows features.", + "references": [ + "https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "The Windows Smartscreen was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.registry_value_nam" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "disable_windows_smartscreen_protection_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_windows_smartscreen_protection.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser", + "id": "114c6bfe-9406-11ec-bcce-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-22", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-ADUser` commandlet with specific parameters. `Get-ADUser` is part of the Active Directory PowerShell module used to manage Windows Active Directory networks. As the name suggests, `Get-ADUser` is used to query for domain users. With the appropiate parameters, Get-ADUser allows adversaries to discover domain accounts with Kerberos Pre Authentication disabled.\\ Red Teams and adversaries alike use may abuse Get-ADUSer to enumerate these accounts and attempt to crack their passwords offline.", + "search": " `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-ADUser*\" AND Message=\"*4194304*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `disabled_kerberos_pre_authentication_discovery_with_get_aduser_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use search for accounts with Kerberos Pre Authentication disabled for legitimate purposes.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/004/", + "https://m0chan.github.io/2019/07/31/How-To-Attack-Kerberos-101.html", + "https://stealthbits.com/blog/cracking-active-directory-passwords-with-as-rep-roasting/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" + ], + "asset_type": "endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.004/getaduser/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser from $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1558", + "T1558.004" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1558", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "disabled_kerberos_pre_authentication_discovery_with_get_aduser_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disabled_kerberos_pre_authentication_discovery_with_get_aduser.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With PowerView", + "id": "b0b34e2c-90de-11ec-baeb-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-18", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainUser` commandlet with specific parameters. `Get-DomainUser` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows Active Directory networks. As the name suggests, `Get-DomainUser` is used to identify domain users and combining it with `-PreauthNotRequired` allows adversaries to discover domain accounts with Kerberos Pre Authentication disabled.\\ Red Teams and adversaries alike use may leverage PowerView to enumerate these accounts and attempt to crack their passwords offline.", + "search": " `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-DomainUser*\" AND Message=\"*PreauthNotRequired*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `disabled_kerberos_pre_authentication_discovery_with_powerview_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use PowerView for troubleshooting", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/004/", + "https://m0chan.github.io/2019/07/31/How-To-Attack-Kerberos-101.html", + "https://stealthbits.com/blog/cracking-active-directory-passwords-with-as-rep-roasting/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With PowerView", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" + ], + "asset_type": "endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.004/powerview/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With PowerView from $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1558", + "T1558.004" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1558", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "disabled_kerberos_pre_authentication_discovery_with_powerview_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disabled_kerberos_pre_authentication_discovery_with_powerview.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Disabling CMD Application", + "id": "ff86077c-9212-11eb-a1e6-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-27", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "this search is to identify modification in registry to disable cmd prompt application. This technique is commonly seen in RAT, Trojan or WORM to prevent triaging or deleting there samples through cmd application which is one of the tool of analyst to traverse on directory and files.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\System\\\\DisableCMD\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_key_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `disabling_cmd_application_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "admin may disable this application for non technical user.", + "references": [ + "https://any.run/report/ea4ea08407d4ee72e009103a3b77e5a09412b722fdef67315ea63f22011152af/a866d7b1-c236-4f26-a391-5ae32213dfc4#registry" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Disabling CMD Application", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "The Windows command prompt was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.registry_value_name" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "disabling_cmd_application_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disabling_cmd_application.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Disabling ControlPanel", + "id": "6ae0148e-9215-11eb-a94a-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-27", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "this search is to identify registry modification to disable control panel window. This technique is commonly seen in malware to prevent their artifacts , persistence removed on the infected machine.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\Explorer\\\\NoControlPanel\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_key_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `disabling_controlpanel_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "admin may disable this application for non technical user.", + "references": [ + "https://any.run/report/ea4ea08407d4ee72e009103a3b77e5a09412b722fdef67315ea63f22011152af/a866d7b1-c236-4f26-a391-5ae32213dfc4#registry" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Disabling ControlPanel", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "The Windows Control Panel was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.registry_value_name" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "disabling_controlpanel_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disabling_controlpanel.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Disabling Defender Services", + "id": "911eacdc-317f-11ec-ad30-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-28", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This particular behavior is typically executed when an adversaries or malware gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution and to evade detections. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. Endpoint should be isolated.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\System\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services\\\\*\" AND (Registry.registry_path IN(\"*WdBoot*\", \"*WdFilter*\", \"*WdNisDrv*\", \"*WdNisSvc*\",\"*WinDefend*\", \"*SecurityHealthService*\")) AND Registry.registry_value_name = Start Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000004 by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disabling_defender_services_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to disable windows defender product", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Disabling Defender Services", + "analytic_story": [ + "IceID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon2.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_value_data" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "disabling_defender_services_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disabling_defender_services.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Disabling Firewall with Netsh", + "id": "6860a62c-9203-11eb-9e05-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-03-31", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to identifies suspicious firewall disabling using netsh application. this technique is commonly seen in malware that tries to communicate or download its component or other payload to its C2 server.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_netsh` Processes.process= \"*firewall*\" (Processes.process= \"*off*\" OR Processes.process= \"*disable*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_firewall_with_netsh_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "admin may disable firewall during testing or fixing network problem.", + "references": [ + "https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.htm" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Disabling Firewall with Netsh", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "The Windows Firewall was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_netsh", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=netsh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=netsh.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "disabling_firewall_with_netsh_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disabling_firewall_with_netsh.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature", + "id": "83776de4-921a-11eb-868a-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-28", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to identify registry modification to disable folder options feature of windows to show hidden files, file extension and etc. This technique used by malware in combination if disabling show hidden files feature to hide their files and also to hide the file extension to lure the user base on file icons or fake file extensions.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\Explorer\\\\NoFolderOptions\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_key_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `disabling_folderoptions_windows_feature_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "admin may disable this application for non technical user.", + "references": [ + "https://any.run/report/ea4ea08407d4ee72e009103a3b77e5a09412b722fdef67315ea63f22011152af/a866d7b1-c236-4f26-a391-5ae32213dfc4#registry" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "The Windows Folder Options, to hide files, was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.registry_value_name" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "disabling_folderoptions_windows_feature_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disabling_folderoptions_windows_feature.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Disabling Net User Account", + "id": "c0325326-acd6-11eb-98c2-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-05-04", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic will identify a suspicious command-line that disables a user account using the `net.exe` utility native to Windows. This technique may used by the adversaries to interrupt availability of such users to do their malicious act.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` AND Processes.process=\"*user*\" AND Processes.process=\"*/active:no*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_net_user_account_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Disabling Net User Account", + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified disabling a user account on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1531" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1531", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_net", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "disabling_net_user_account_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disabling_net_user_account.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Disabling NoRun Windows App", + "id": "de81bc46-9213-11eb-adc9-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-28", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to identify modification of registry to disable run application in window start menu. this application is known to be a helpful shortcut to windows OS user to run known application and also to execute some reg or batch script. This technique is used malware to make cleaning of its infection more harder by preventing known application run easily through run shortcut.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\Explorer\\\\NoRun\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_key_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `disabling_norun_windows_app_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "admin may disable this application for non technical user.", + "references": [ + "https://any.run/report/ea4ea08407d4ee72e009103a3b77e5a09412b722fdef67315ea63f22011152af/a866d7b1-c236-4f26-a391-5ae32213dfc4#registry", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/pum-optional-norun/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Disabling NoRun Windows App", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "The Windows registry was modified to disable run application in window start menu on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.registry_value_name" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "disabling_norun_windows_app_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disabling_norun_windows_app.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Disabling Remote User Account Control", + "id": "bbc644bc-37df-4e1a-9c88-ec9a53e2038c", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-11-18", + "author": "David Dorsey, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The search looks for modifications to registry keys that control the enforcement of Windows User Account Control (UAC).", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System\\\\EnableLUA* Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000000\" by Registry.dest, Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `disabling_remote_user_account_control_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report registry modifications.", + "known_false_positives": "This registry key may be modified via administrators to implement a change in system policy. This type of change should be a very rare occurrence.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Disabling Remote User Account Control", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Remcos" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "The Windows registry keys that control the enforcement of Windows User Account Control (UAC) were modified on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.action" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT37", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Evilnum", + "Honeybee", + "MuddyWater", + "Patchwork", + "Threat Group-3390" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "disabling_remote_user_account_control_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Disabling SystemRestore In Registry", + "id": "f4f837e2-91fb-11eb-8bf6-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-28", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following search identifies the modification of registry related in disabling the system restore of a machine. This event or behavior are seen in some RAT malware to make the restore of the infected machine difficult and keep their infection on the box.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\SystemRestore\\\\DisableSR\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\SystemRestore\\\\DisableConfig\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_key_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `disabling_systemrestore_in_registry_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "in some cases admin can disable systemrestore on a machine.", + "references": [ + "https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Disabling SystemRestore In Registry", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "The Windows registry was modified to disable system restore on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.registry_value_name" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "disabling_systemrestore_in_registry_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disabling_systemrestore_in_registry.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Disabling Task Manager", + "id": "dac279bc-9202-11eb-b7fb-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-28", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to identifies modification of registry to disable the task manager of windows operating system. this event or technique are commonly seen in malware such as RAT, Trojan, TrojanSpy or worm to prevent the user to terminate their process.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System\\\\DisableTaskMgr\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_key_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `disabling_task_manager_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "admin may disable this application for non technical user.", + "references": [ + "https://any.run/report/ea4ea08407d4ee72e009103a3b77e5a09412b722fdef67315ea63f22011152af/a866d7b1-c236-4f26-a391-5ae32213dfc4#registry", + "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/05/threat-roundup-0424-0501.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Disabling Task Manager", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "The Windows Task Manager was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.registry_value_name" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "disabling_task_manager_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disabling_task_manager.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network", + "id": "f1c07594-a141-11eb-8407-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-10-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies DLLHost.exe with no command line arguments with a network connection. It is unusual for DLLHost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. DLLHost.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=dllhost.exe by _time span=1h Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(dllhost\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port !=\"0\" by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_guid connection_to_CNC dest_port | `dllhost_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `port` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate third party applications may use a moved copy of dllhost, triggering a false positive.", + "references": [ + "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/threatexpress/malleable-c2/c3385e481159a759f79b8acfe11acf240893b830/jquery-c2.4.2.profile", + "https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2021/02/09/learn-pipe-fitting-for-all-of-your-offense-projects/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network", + "analytic_story": [ + "Cobalt Strike" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon_dllhost.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "The process $process_name$ was spawned by $parent_image$ without any command-line arguments on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1055" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_image", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventID", + "process_name", + "process_id", + "parent_process_name", + "dest_port", + "process_path" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Cobalt Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sharpshooter", + "Silence", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "dllhost_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/dllhost_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App", + "id": "2452e632-9e0d-11eb-bacd-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-15", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "this search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. This technique are seen in couple of malware and APT group to exfiltrated collected data in a infected machine or infected network. This detection is looking for unique use of nslookup where it tries to use specific record type, TXT, A, AAAA, that are commonly used by attacker and also the retry parameter which is designed to query C2 DNS multiple tries.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"nslookup.exe\" Processes.process = \"*-querytype=*\" OR Processes.process=\"*-qt=*\" OR Processes.process=\"*-q=*\" OR Processes.process=\"-type=*\" OR Processes.process=\"*-retry=*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of nslookup.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "admin nslookup usage", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7_spear_phishing.html", + "https://www.varonis.com/blog/dns-tunneling/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Command & Control", + "Data Exfiltration" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Exfiltration" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/nslookup_exfil/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ performing activity related to DNS exfiltration.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1048" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Domain Account Discovery with Dsquery", + "id": "b1a8ce04-04c2-11ec-bea7-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-24", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `dsquery.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover domain users. The `user` argument returns a list of all users registered in the domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike engage in remote system discovery for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=\"dsquery.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*user*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_account_discovery_with_dsquery_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet/details/dsquery.htm", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Domain Account Discovery with Dsquery", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1087" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_name" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "domain_account_discovery_with_dsquery_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/domain_account_discovery_with_dsquery.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Domain Account Discovery With Net App", + "id": "98f6a534-04c2-11ec-96b2-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-24", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain users. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use net.exe to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` AND Processes.process = \"* user*\" AND Processes.process = \"*/do*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_account_discovery_with_net_app_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-for-identity/playbook-domain-dominance", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Domain Account Discovery With Net App", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1087" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_name" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_net", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "domain_account_discovery_with_net_app_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/domain_account_discovery_with_net_app.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Domain Account Discovery with Wmic", + "id": "383572e0-04c5-11ec-bdcc-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-24", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain users. Red Teams and adversaries alike use wmic.exe to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=\"wmic.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*/NAMESPACE:\\\\\\\\root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*\" AND Processes.process = \"*ds_user*\" AND Processes.process = \"*GET*\" AND Processes.process = \"*ds_samaccountname*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_account_discovery_with_wmic_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Domain Account Discovery with Wmic", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1087" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_name" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "domain_account_discovery_with_wmic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/domain_account_discovery_with_wmic.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest", + "id": "41243735-89a7-4c83-bcdd-570aa78f00a1", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-30", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `nltest.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The arguments `/dclist:` and '/dsgetdc:', can be used to return a list of all domain controllers. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use nltest.exe to identify domain controllers in a Windows Domain for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"nltest.exe\") (Processes.process=\"*/dclist:*\" OR Processes.process=\"*/dsgetdc:*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_controller_discovery_with_nltest_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Domain controller discovery on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1018" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 21, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Leafminer", + "Naikon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "domain_controller_discovery_with_nltest_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/domain_controller_discovery_with_nltest.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Domain Controller Discovery with Wmic", + "id": "64c7adaa-48ee-483c-b0d6-7175bc65e6cc", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-01", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The arguments utilized in this command line return a list of all domain controllers in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike use *.exe to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"wmic.exe\") (Processes.process=\"\" OR Processes.process=\"*DomainControllerAddress*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_controller_discovery_with_wmic_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Domain Controller Discovery with Wmic", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Domain controller discovery on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1018" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 21, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Leafminer", + "Naikon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "domain_controller_discovery_with_wmic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/domain_controller_discovery_with_wmic.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Domain Group Discovery with Adsisearcher", + "id": "089c862f-5f83-49b5-b1c8-7e4ff66560c7", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-25", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator being used to query Active Directory for domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `[Adsisearcher]` to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*[adsisearcher]*\" AND Message = \"*(objectcategory=group)*\" AND Message = \"*findAll()*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `domain_group_discovery_with_adsisearcher_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use Adsisearcher for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", + "https://devblogs.microsoft.com/scripting/use-the-powershell-adsisearcher-type-accelerator-to-search-active-directory/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Domain Group Discovery with Adsisearcher", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 18, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "TA505" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "domain_group_discovery_with_adsisearcher_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_adsisearcher.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Domain Group Discovery With Dsquery", + "id": "f0c9d62f-a232-4edd-b17e-bc409fb133d4", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-01", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `dsquery.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The argument `group`, returns a list of all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use may leverage dsquery.exe to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"dsquery.exe\") (Processes.process=\"*group*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_group_discovery_with_dsquery_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Domain Group Discovery With Dsquery", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "TA505" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "domain_group_discovery_with_dsquery_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_dsquery.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Domain Group Discovery With Net", + "id": "f2f14ac7-fa81-471a-80d5-7eb65c3c7349", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-25", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The argument `group /domain`, returns a list of all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\") (Processes.process=*group* AND Processes.process=*/do*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_group_discovery_with_net_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Domain Group Discovery With Net", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "TA505" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "domain_group_discovery_with_net_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_net.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Domain Group Discovery With Wmic", + "id": "a87736a6-95cd-4728-8689-3c64d5026b3e", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-25", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The arguments utilized in this command return a list of all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use wmic.exe to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"wmic.exe\") (Processes.process=*/NAMESPACE:\\\\\\\\root\\\\directory\\\\ldap* AND Processes.process=*ds_group* AND Processes.process=\"*GET ds_samaccountname*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_group_discovery_with_wmic_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Domain Group Discovery With Wmic", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "TA505" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "domain_group_discovery_with_wmic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_wmic.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Download Files Using Telegram", + "id": "58194e28-ae5e-11eb-8912-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-06", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic will identify a suspicious download by the Telegram application on a Windows system. This behavior was identified on a honeypot where the adversary gained access, installed Telegram and followed through with downloading different network scanners (port, bruteforcer, masscan) to the system and later used to mapped the whole network and further move laterally.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode= 15 process_name = \"telegram.exe\" TargetFilename = \"*:Zone.Identifier\" |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer EventCode Image process_id TargetFilename Hash | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `download_files_using_telegram_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and TargetFilename from your endpoints or Events that monitor filestream events which is happened when process download something. (EventCode 15) If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "normal download of file in telegram app. (if it was a common app in network)", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Download Files Using Telegram", + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/minergate/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious files were downloaded with the Telegram application on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Computer", + "EventCode", + "Image", + "process_id", + "TargetFilename", + "Hash" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "download_files_using_telegram_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/download_files_using_telegram.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Drop IcedID License dat", + "id": "b7a045fc-f14a-11eb-8e79-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-07-30", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect dropping a suspicious file named as \"license.dat\" in %appdata%. This behavior seen in latest IcedID malware that contain the actual core bot that will be injected in other process to do banking stealing.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode= 11 TargetFilename = \"*\\\\license.dat\" AND (TargetFilename=\"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\" OR TargetFilename=\"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\") |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by TargetFilename EventCode process_id process_name Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_icedid_license_dat_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.cisecurity.org/white-papers/security-primer-icedid/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Drop IcedID License dat", + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/simulated_icedid/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "process $SourceImage$ create a file $TargetImage$ in host $Computer$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1204", + "T1204.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "SourceImage", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", + "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "drop_icedid_license_dat_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/drop_icedid_license_dat.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "DSQuery Domain Discovery", + "id": "cc316032-924a-11eb-91a2-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-03-31", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies \"dsquery.exe\" execution with arguments looking for `TrustedDomain` query directly on the command-line. This is typically indicative of an Administrator or adversary perform domain trust discovery. Note that this query does not identify any other variations of \"Dsquery.exe\" usage.\\\nWithin this detection, it is assumed `dsquery.exe` is not moved or renamed.\\\nThe search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process \"dsquery.exe\" and its parent process.\\\nDSQuery.exe is natively found in `C:\\Windows\\system32` and `C:\\Windows\\syswow64` and only on Server operating system.\\\nThe following DLL(s) are loaded when DSQuery.exe is launched `dsquery.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible dsquery is running within that process context in memory.\\\nIn addition to trust discovery, review parallel processes for additional behaviors performed. Identify the parent process and capture any files (batch files, for example) being used.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=dsquery.exe Processes.process=*trustedDomain* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dsquery_domain_discovery_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives. If there is a true false positive, filter based on command-line or parent process.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1482/T1482.md", + "http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/a-guide-to-attacking-domain-trusts/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc732952(v=ws.11)", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc754232(v=ws.11)" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "DSQuery Domain Discovery", + "analytic_story": [ + "Domain Trust Discovery", + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified performing domain discovery on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1482" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "Chimera", + "FIN8" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "dsquery_domain_discovery_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/dsquery_domain_discovery.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL", + "id": "8943b567-f14d-4ee8-a0bb-2121d4ce3184", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-02-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "Detect the usage of comsvcs.dll for dumping the lsass process.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*comsvcs.dll* Processes.process=*MiniDump* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified.", + "references": [ + "https://modexp.wordpress.com/2019/08/30/minidumpwritedump-via-com-services-dll/", + "https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1167417096374050817" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", + "HAFNIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified accessing credentials using comsvcs.dll on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cleaver", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Whitefly" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Dump LSASS via procdump", + "id": "3742ebfe-64c2-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "Detect procdump.exe dumping the lsass process. This query looks for both -mm and -ma usage. -mm will produce a mini dump file and -ma will write a dump file with all process memory. Both are highly suspect and should be reviewed. This query does not monitor for the internal name (original_file_name=procdump) of the PE or look for procdump64.exe. Modify the query as needed.\\\nDuring triage, confirm this is procdump.exe executing. If it is the first time a Sysinternals utility has been ran, it is possible there will be a -accepteula on the command line. Review other endpoint data sources for cross process (injection) into lsass.exe.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_procdump` (Processes.process=*-ma* OR Processes.process=*-mm*) Processes.process=*lsass* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dump_lsass_via_procdump_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procdump", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md#atomic-test-2---dump-lsassexe-memory-using-procdump" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Dump LSASS via procdump", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "HAFNIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified attempting to dump lsass.exe on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cleaver", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Whitefly" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_procdump", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=procdump.exe OR Processes.process_name=procdump64.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=procdump)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "dump_lsass_via_procdump_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Elevated Group Discovery With Net", + "id": "a23a0e20-0b1b-4a07-82e5-ec5f70811e7a", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-25", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for specific elevated domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate elevated domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery to identify high privileged users.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\") (Processes.process=\"*group*\" AND Processes.process=\"*/do*\") (Processes.process=\"*Domain Admins*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Enterprise Admins*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Schema Admins*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Account Operators*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Server Operators*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Protected Users*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Dns Admins*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `elevated_group_discovery_with_net_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-practices/appendix-b--privileged-accounts-and-groups-in-active-directory", + "https://adsecurity.org/?p=3658" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Elevated Group Discovery With Net", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Elevated domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 21, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "TA505" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "elevated_group_discovery_with_net_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/elevated_group_discovery_with_net.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Elevated Group Discovery with PowerView", + "id": "10d62950-0de5-4199-a710-cff9ea79b413", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-25", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainGroupMember` commandlet. `Get-DomainGroupMember` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. As the name suggests, `Get-DomainGroupMember` is used to list the members of an specific domain group. Red Teams and adversaries alike use PowerView to enumerate elevated domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery to identify high privileged users.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-DomainGroupMember*\") AND Message IN (\"*Domain Admins*\",\"*Enterprise Admins*\", \"*Schema Admins*\", \"*Account Operators*\" , \"*Server Operators*\", \"*Protected Users*\", \"*Dns Admins*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `elevated_group_discovery_with_powerview_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerView for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", + "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainGroupMember/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-practices/appendix-b--privileged-accounts-and-groups-in-active-directory", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Elevated Group Discovery with PowerView", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Elevated group discovery using PowerView on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 21, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "TA505" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "elevated_group_discovery_with_powerview_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/elevated_group_discovery_with_powerview.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Elevated Group Discovery With Wmic", + "id": "3f6bbf22-093e-4cb4-9641-83f47b8444b6", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-25", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for specific domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate elevated domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery to identify high privileged users.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"wmic.exe\") (Processes.process=*/NAMESPACE:\\\\\\\\root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*) (Processes.process=\"*Domain Admins*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Enterprise Admins*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Schema Admins*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Account Operators*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Server Operators*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Protected Users*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Dns Admins*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `elevated_group_discovery_with_wmic_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-practices/appendix-b--privileged-accounts-and-groups-in-active-directory", + "https://adsecurity.org/?p=3658" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Elevated Group Discovery With Wmic", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Elevated domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 21, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "TA505" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "elevated_group_discovery_with_wmic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/elevated_group_discovery_with_wmic.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Enable RDP In Other Port Number", + "id": "99495452-b899-11eb-96dc-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-28", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a modification to registry to enable rdp to a machine with different port number. This technique was seen in some atttacker tries to do lateral movement and remote access to a compromised machine to gain control of it.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*HKLM\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Terminal Server\\\\WinStations\\\\RDP-Tcp*\" Registry.registry_value_name = \"PortNumber\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `enable_rdp_in_other_port_number_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.mvps.net/docs/how-to-secure-remote-desktop-rdp/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Enable RDP In Other Port Number", + "analytic_story": [ + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/casper/datasets1/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "RDP was moved to a non-standard port on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.registry_value_name" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "enable_rdp_in_other_port_number_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/enable_rdp_in_other_port_number.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry", + "id": "0c7d8ffe-25b1-11ec-9f39-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-28", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious registry modification to enable plain text credential feature of windows. This technique was used by several malware and also by mimikatz to be able to dumpe the a plain text credential to the compromised or target host. This TTP is really a good indicator that someone wants to dump the crendential of the host so it must be a good pivot for credential dumping techniques.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\System\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\SecurityProviders\\\\WDigest\\\\*\" Registry.registry_value_name = \"UseLogonCredential\" Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000001 by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `enable_wdigest_uselogoncredential_registry_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.csoonline.com/article/3438824/how-to-detect-and-halt-credential-theft-via-windows-wdigest.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/wdigest_enable/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "wdigest registry $registry_path$ was modified in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1112", + "T1003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_value_data" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN8", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "enable_wdigest_uselogoncredential_registry_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/enable_wdigest_uselogoncredential_registry.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Enumerate Users Local Group Using Telegram", + "id": "fcd74532-ae54-11eb-a5ab-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-06", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic will detect a suspicious Telegram process enumerating all network users in a local group. This technique was seen in a Monero infected honeypot to mapped all the users on the compromised system. EventCode 4798 is generated when a process enumerates a user's security-enabled local groups on a computer or device.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4798 Process_Name = \"*\\\\telegram.exe\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName EventCode Process_Name Process_ID Account_Name Account_Domain Logon_ID Security_ID Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `enumerate_users_local_group_using_telegram_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Task Schedule (Exa. Security Log EventCode 4798) endpoints. Tune and filter known instances of process like logonUI used in your environment.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4798" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Enumerate Users Local Group Using Telegram", + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/minergate/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "The Telegram application has been identified enumerating local groups on $ComputerName$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1087" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "ComputerName", + "EventCode", + "Process_Name", + "Process_ID", + "Account_Name", + "Account_Domain", + "Logon_ID", + "Security_ID", + "Message" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "enumerate_users_local_group_using_telegram_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/enumerate_users_local_group_using_telegram.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Esentutl SAM Copy", + "id": "d372f928-ce4f-11eb-a762-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-18", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the process - `esentutl.exe` - being used to capture credentials stored in ntds.dit or the SAM file on disk. During triage, review parallel processes and determine if legitimate activity. Upon determination of illegitimate activity, take further action to isolate and contain the threat.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_esentutl` Processes.process IN (\"*ntds*\", \"*SAM*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `esentutl_sam_copy_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/6a570c2a4630cf0c2bd41a2e8375b5d5ab92f700/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md", + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0404/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Esentutl SAM Copy", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user user$ attempting to capture credentials for offline cracking or observability.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.002", + "T1003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "GALLIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "Night Dragon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_esentutl", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=esentutl.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=esentutl.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "esentutl_sam_copy_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/esentutl_sam_copy.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "ETW Registry Disabled", + "id": "8ed523ac-276b-11ec-ac39-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-28", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a registry modification to disable ETW feature of windows. This technique is to evade EDR appliance to evade detections and hide its execution from audit logs.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\.NETFramework*\" Registry.registry_value_name = ETWEnabled Registry.registry_value_data=0x00000000 by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `etw_registry_disabled_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://gist.github.com/Cyb3rWard0g/a4a115fd3ab518a0e593525a379adee3" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "ETW Registry Disabled", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127/etw_disable/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.006", + "T1127", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.registry_value_data" + ], + "risk_score": 90, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.006", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Blocking", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "etw_registry_disabled_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/etw_registry_disabled.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Eventvwr UAC Bypass", + "id": "9cf8fe08-7ad8-11eb-9819-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-28", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following search identifies Eventvwr bypass by identifying the registry modification into a specific path that eventvwr.msc looks to (but is not valid) upon execution. A successful attack will include a suspicious command to be executed upon eventvwr.msc loading. Upon triage, review the parallel processes that have executed. Identify any additional registry modifications on the endpoint that may look suspicious. Remediate as necessary.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*mscfile\\\\shell\\\\open\\\\command\\\\*\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `eventvwr_uac_bypass_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Some false positives may be present and will need to be filtered.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.md", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002", + "https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Eventvwr UAC Bypass", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "IcedID", + "Living Off The Land" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Registry values were modified to bypass UAC using Event Viewer on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.registry_value_name" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT37", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Evilnum", + "Honeybee", + "MuddyWater", + "Patchwork", + "Threat Group-3390" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "eventvwr_uac_bypass_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/eventvwr_uac_bypass.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Excel Spawning PowerShell", + "id": "42d40a22-9be3-11eb-8f08-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-12", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following detection identifies Microsoft Excel spawning PowerShell. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with Excel.exe. Excel.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Office16` (version will vary). PowerShell spawning from Excel.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command executed will most likely be encoded and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=\"excel.exe\" `process_powershell` by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excel_spawning_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/powershell/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Excel Spawning PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$, indicating potential suspicious macro execution.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.002", + "T1003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "GALLIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "Night Dragon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_powershell", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "excel_spawning_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excel_spawning_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Excel Spawning Windows Script Host", + "id": "57fe880a-9be3-11eb-9bf3-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-12", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following detection identifies Microsoft Excel spawning Windows Script Host - `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe`. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with Excel.exe. Excel.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Office16` (version will vary). `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` default location is `c:\\windows\\system32\\` or c:windows\\syswow64`. `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` spawning from Excel.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command-line executed will most likely be obfuscated and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. Review the reputation of the remote destination and block accordingly.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=\"excel.exe\" Processes.process_name IN (\"cscript.exe\", \"wscript.exe\") by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excel_spawning_windows_script_host_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed. In some instances, `cscript.exe` is used for legitimate business practices.", + "references": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/8ecfbc29-03d0-421c-a5bf-3905d29192a2/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Excel Spawning Windows Script Host", + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$, indicating potential suspicious macro execution.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.002", + "T1003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "process_name", + "process_id", + "parent_process_name", + "dest", + "user", + "parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "GALLIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "Night Dragon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "excel_spawning_windows_script_host_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excel_spawning_windows_script_host.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Excessive Attempt To Disable Services", + "id": "8fa2a0f0-acd9-11eb-8994-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-04", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic will identify suspicious series of command-line to disable several services. This technique is seen where the adversary attempts to disable security app services or other malware services to complete the objective on the compromised system.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"sc.exe\" AND Processes.process=\"*config*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Disabled*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=1m | where count >=5 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_attempt_to_disable_services_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed sc.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Excessive Attempt To Disable Services", + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An excessive amount of $process_name$ was executed on $dest$ attempting to disable services.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1489" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1489", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Indrik Spider", + "Lazarus Group", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "excessive_attempt_to_disable_services_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excessive_attempt_to_disable_services.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Excessive File Deletion In WinDefender Folder", + "id": "b5baa09a-7a05-11ec-8da4-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-20", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic will identify excessive file deletion events in the Windows Defender folder. This technique was seen in the WhisperGate malware campaign in which adversaries abused Nirsofts advancedrun.exe to gain administrative privilege to then execute PowerShell commands to delete files within the Windows Defender application folder. This behavior is a good indicator the offending process is trying to corrupt a Windows Defender installation.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=23 TargetFilename = \"*\\\\ProgramData\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender*\" | stats values(TargetFilename) as deleted_files min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by user EventCode Image ProcessID Computer |where count >=50 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_file_deletion_in_windefender_folder_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, TargetFilename, and ProcessID executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "Windows Defender AV updates may cause this alert. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Excessive File Deletion In WinDefender Folder", + "analytic_story": [ + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/excessive_file_del_in_windefender_dir/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "High frequency file deletion activity detected on host $Computer$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1485" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "deleted_files", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "TargetFilename", + "Computer", + "user", + "Image", + "ProcessID" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "excessive_file_deletion_in_windefender_folder_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excessive_file_deletion_in_windefender_folder.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Excessive number of distinct processes created in Windows Temp folder", + "id": "23587b6a-c479-11eb-b671-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-02-28", + "author": "Michael Hart, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic will identify suspicious series of process executions. We have observed that post exploit framework tools like Koadic and Meterpreter will launch an excessive number of processes with distinct file paths from Windows\\Temp to execute actions on objective. This behavior is extremely anomalous compared to typical application behaviors that use Windows\\Temp.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process distinct_count(Processes.process) as distinct_process_count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Temp\\\\*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=20m | where distinct_process_count > 37 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_number_of_distinct_processes_created_in_windows_temp_folder_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the full process path in the process field of CIM's Process data model. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed sc.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "Many benign applications will create processes from executables in Windows\\Temp, although unlikely to exceed the given threshold. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/about-meterpreter/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Excessive number of distinct processes created in Windows Temp folder", + "analytic_story": [ + "Meterpreter" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059/meterpreter/windows_temp_processes/logExcessiveWindowsTemp.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Multiple processes were executed out of windows\\temp within a short amount of time on $dest$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "excessive_number_of_distinct_processes_created_in_windows_temp_folder_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excessive_number_of_distinct_processes_created_in_windows_temp_folder.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Excessive number of service control start as disabled", + "id": "77592bec-d5cc-11eb-9e60-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-25", + "author": "Michael Hart, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This detection targets behaviors observed when threat actors have used sc.exe to modify services. We observed malware in a honey pot spawning numerous sc.exe processes in a short period of time, presumably to impair defenses, possibly to block others from compromising the same machine. This detection will alert when we see both an excessive number of sc.exe processes launched with specific commandline arguments to disable the start of certain services.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` distinct_count(Processes.process) as distinct_cmdlines values(Processes.process_id) as process_ids min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE Processes.process_name = \"sc.exe\" AND Processes.process=\"*start= disabled*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_id, _time span=30m | where distinct_cmdlines >= 8 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_number_of_service_control_start_as_disabled_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The complete process name with command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate programs and administrators will execute sc.exe with the start disabled flag. It is possible, but unlikely from the telemetry of normal Windows operation we observed, that sc.exe will be called more than seven times in a short period of time.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/sc-create", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Excessive number of service control start as disabled", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/sc_service_start_disabled/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An excessive amount of $process_name$ was executed on $dest$ attempting to disable services.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "excessive_number_of_service_control_start_as_disabled_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excessive_number_of_service_control_start_as_disabled.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Excessive number of taskhost processes", + "id": "f443dac2-c7cf-11eb-ab51-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-07", + "author": "Michael Hart", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This detection targets behaviors observed in post exploit kits like Meterpreter and Koadic that are run in memory. We have observed that these tools must invoke an excessive number of taskhost.exe and taskhostex.exe processes to complete various actions (discovery, lateral movement, etc.). It is extremely uncommon in the course of normal operations to see so many distinct taskhost and taskhostex processes running concurrently in a short time frame.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process_id) as process_ids min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE Processes.process_name = \"taskhost.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"taskhostex.exe\" BY Processes.dest Processes.process_name _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | eval pid_count=mvcount(process_ids) | eval taskhost_count_=if(process_name == \"taskhost.exe\", pid_count, 0) | eval taskhostex_count_=if(process_name == \"taskhostex.exe\", pid_count, 0) | stats sum(taskhost_count_) as taskhost_count, sum(taskhostex_count_) as taskhostex_count by _time, dest, firstTime, lastTime | where taskhost_count > 10 and taskhostex_count > 10 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_number_of_taskhost_processes_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting events related to processes on the endpoints that include the name of the process and process id into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators, administrative actions or certain applications may run many instances of taskhost and taskhostex concurrently. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Excessive number of taskhost processes", + "analytic_story": [ + "Meterpreter" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059/meterpreter/taskhost_processes/logExcessiveTaskHost.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An excessive amount of $process_name$ was executed on $dest$ indicative of suspicious behavior.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1033" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1033", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "excessive_number_of_taskhost_processes_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excessive_number_of_taskhost_processes.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Excessive Service Stop Attempt", + "id": "ae8d3f4a-acd7-11eb-8846-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-05-04", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies suspicious series of attempt to kill multiple services on a system using either `net.exe` or `sc.exe`. This technique is use by adversaries to terminate security services or other related services to continue there objective and evade detections.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` OR Processes.process_name = \"sc.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"net1.exe\" AND Processes.process=\"*stop*\" OR Processes.process=\"*delete*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=1m | where count >=5 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_service_stop_attempt_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Excessive Service Stop Attempt", + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An excessive amount of $process_name$ was executed on $dest$ attempting to disable services.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1489" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1489", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Indrik Spider", + "Lazarus Group", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_net", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "excessive_service_stop_attempt_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excessive_service_stop_attempt.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Excessive Usage Of Cacls App", + "id": "0bdf6092-af17-11eb-939a-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-07", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies excessive usage of `cacls.exe`, `xcacls.exe` or `icacls.exe` application to change file or folder permission. This behavior is commonly seen where the adversary attempts to impair some users from deleting or accessing its malware components or artifact from the compromised system.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id values(Processes.process_name) as process_name count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"cacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"icacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"XCACLS.exe\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=1m | where count >=10 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_cacls_app_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or administrative scripts may use this application. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Excessive Usage Of Cacls App", + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An excessive amount of $process_name$ was executed on $dest$ attempting to modify permissions.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1222" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1222", + "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "excessive_usage_of_cacls_app_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_cacls_app.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Excessive Usage Of Net App", + "id": "45e52536-ae42-11eb-b5c6-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-05-06", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies excessive usage of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` within a bucket of time (1 minute). This behavior was seen in a Monero incident where the adversary attempts to create many users, delete and disable users as part of its malicious behavior.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=1m | where count >=10 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_net_app_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown. Filter as needed. Modify the time span as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Excessive Usage Of Net App", + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Scope:Local", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 40, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Excessive usage of net1.exe or net.exe within 1m, with command line $process$ has been detected on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1531" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 28, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1531", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_net", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "excessive_usage_of_net_app_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_net_app.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App", + "id": "0a69fdaa-a2b8-11eb-b16d-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-21", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. This technique are seen in couple of malware and APT group to exfiltrated collected data in a infected machine or infected network. This detection is looking for unique use of nslookup where it tries to use specific record type (TXT, A, AAAA) that are commonly used by attacker and also the retry parameter which is designed to query C2 DNS multiple tries.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode = 1 process_name = \"nslookup.exe\" | bucket _time span=15m | stats count as numNsLookup by Computer, _time | eventstats avg(numNsLookup) as avgNsLookup, stdev(numNsLookup) as stdNsLookup, count as numSlots by Computer | eval upperThreshold=(avgNsLookup + stdNsLookup *3) | eval isOutlier=if(avgNsLookup > 20 and avgNsLookup >= upperThreshold, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of nslookup.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7_spear_phishing.html", + "https://www.varonis.com/blog/dns-tunneling/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Command & Control", + "Data Exfiltration" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Scope:Local", + "Stage:Exfiltration" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/nslookup_exfil/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 40, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Excessive usage of nslookup.exe has been detected on $Computer$. This detection is triggered as as it violates the dynamic threshold", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1048" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Computer", + "process_name", + "EventCode" + ], + "risk_score": 28, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility", + "id": "cb6b339e-d4c6-11eb-a026-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-24", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious excessive usage of sc.exe in a host machine. This technique was seen in several ransomware , xmrig and other malware to create, modify, delete or disable a service may related to security application or to gain privilege escalation.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode = 1 process_name = \"sc.exe\" | bucket _time span=15m | stats values(process) as process count as numScExe by Computer, _time | eventstats avg(numScExe) as avgScExe, stdev(numScExe) as stdScExe, count as numSlots by Computer | eval upperThreshold=(avgScExe + stdScExe *3) | eval isOutlier=if(avgScExe > 5 and avgScExe >= upperThreshold, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed taskkill.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "excessive execution of sc.exe is quite suspicious since it can modify or execute app in high privilege permission.", + "references": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/c0f98850-af65-4352-9746-fbebadee4f05/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Scope:Local", + "Stage:Exfiltration" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1569", + "T1569.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "process_name", + "process" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1569", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "FIN6", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Operation Wocao", + "Silence", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Excessive Usage Of Taskkill", + "id": "fe5bca48-accb-11eb-a67c-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-04", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies excessive usage of `taskkill.exe` application. This application is commonly used by adversaries to evade detections by killing security product processes or even other processes to evade detection.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"taskkill.exe\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=1m | where count >=10 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_taskkill_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed taskkill.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Excessive Usage Of Taskkill", + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 40, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Excessive usage of taskkill.exe with process id $process_id$ (more than 10 within 1m) has been detected on $dest$ with a parent process of $parent_process_name$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Parent Process", + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 28, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "excessive_usage_of_taskkill_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_taskkill.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share", + "id": "f63c34fe-a435-11eb-935a-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-11-18", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies executable files (.exe or .dll) being written to Windows administrative SMB shares (Admin$, IPC$, C$). This represents suspicious behavior as its commonly used by tools like like PsExec/PaExec and others to stage service binaries before creating and starting a Windows service on remote endpoints. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse administrative shares for lateral movement and remote code execution. The Trickbot malware family also implements this behavior to try to infect other machines in the infected network.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=5145 Relative_Target_Name IN (\"*.exe\",\"*.dll\") Object_Type=File Share_Name IN (\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\C$\",\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\IPC$\",\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\admin$\") Access_Mask= \"0x2\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by EventCode Share_Name Relative_Target_Name Object_Type Access_Mask user src_port Source_Address | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 5145 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required. Also enable the object Audit access success/failure in your group policy.", + "known_false_positives": "System Administrators may use looks like PsExec for troubleshooting or administrations tasks. However, this will typically come only from certain users and certain systems that can be added to an allow list.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002/", + "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2013/03/09/psexec-demystified/", + "https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/", + "https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement", + "Trickbot", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/exe_smbshare/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "$user$ dropped or created an executable file in known sensitive SMB share. Share name=$Share_Name$, Target name=$Relative_Target_Name$, and Access mask=$Access_Mask$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Share_Name", + "Relative_Target_Name", + "Object_Type", + "Access_Mask", + "user", + "src_port", + "Source_Address" + ], + "risk_score": 70, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Operation Wocao", + "Orangeworm", + "Sandworm Team", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", + "id": "a7e3f0f0-ae42-11eb-b245-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-06", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic will identify suspicious executable or scripts (known file extensions) in list of suspicious file path in Windows. This technique is used by adversaries to evade detection. The suspicious file path are known paths used in the wild and are not common to have executable or scripts.", + "search": "|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_name = *.exe OR Filesystem.file_name = *.dll OR Filesystem.file_name = *.sys OR Filesystem.file_name = *.com OR Filesystem.file_name = *.vbs OR Filesystem.file_name = *.vbe OR Filesystem.file_name = *.js OR Filesystem.file_name = *.ps1 OR Filesystem.file_name = *.bat OR Filesystem.file_name = *.cmd OR Filesystem.file_name = *.pif) AND ( Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\windows\\\\fonts\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\windows\\\\temp\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\users\\\\public\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\windows\\\\debug\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Users\\\\Administrator\\\\Music\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Windows\\\\servicing\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Users\\\\Default\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *Recycle.bin* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Windows\\\\Media\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Windows\\\\repair\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Temp* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\PerfLogs\\\\*) by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may allow creation of script or exe in the paths specified. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig", + "Remcos", + "WhisperGate", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious executable or scripts with file name $file_name$, $file_path$ and process_id $process_id$ executed in suspicious file path in Windows by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1036" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_id", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_name", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Other", + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.file_path", + "Filesystem.file_create_time", + "Filesystem.process_id", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.user" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID", + "id": "dc64d064-d346-11eb-8588-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-22", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic will identify suspicious process of cscript.exe where it tries to execute javascript using jscript.encode CLSID (COM OBJ). This technique was seen in ransomware (reddot ransomware) where it execute javascript with this com object with combination of amsi disabling technique.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"cscript.exe\" Processes.process=\"*-e:{F414C262-6AC0-11CF-B6D1-00AA00BBBB58}*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `execute_javascript_with_jscript_com_clsid_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/c0f98850-af65-4352-9746-fbebadee4f05/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious process of cscript.exe with a parent process $parent_process_name$ where it tries to execute javascript using jscript.encode CLSID (COM OBJ), detected on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.005" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_id", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Parent Process", + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "FIN4", + "FIN7", + "Frankenstein", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Windshift" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "execute_javascript_with_jscript_com_clsid_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/execute_javascript_with_jscript_com_clsid.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Execution of File with Multiple Extensions", + "id": "b06a555e-dce0-417d-a2eb-28a5d8d66ef7", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-11-18", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for processes launched from files that have double extensions in the file name. This is typically done to obscure the \"real\" file extension and make it appear as though the file being accessed is a data file, as opposed to executable content.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = *.doc.exe OR Processes.process = *.htm.exe OR Processes.process = *.html.exe OR Processes.process = *.txt.exe OR Processes.process = *.pdf.exe OR Processes.process = *.doc.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process Processes.parent_process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Execution of File with Multiple Extensions", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "process $process$ have double extensions in the file name is executed on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1036", + "T1036.003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM", + "PR.PT", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process", + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "GALLIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Extraction of Registry Hives", + "id": "8bbb7d58-b360-11eb-ba21-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-09-09", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of `reg.exe` exporting Windows Registry hives containing credentials. Adversaries may use this technique to export registry hives for offline credential access attacks. Typically found executed from a untrusted process or script. Upon execution, a file will be written to disk.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` (Processes.process=*save* OR Processes.process=*export*) AND (Processes.process=\"*\\sam *\" OR Processes.process=\"*\\system *\" OR Processes.process=\"*\\security *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `extraction_of_registry_hives_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible some agent based products will generate false positives. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Extraction of Registry Hives", + "analytic_story": [ + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious use of `reg.exe` exporting Windows Registry hives containing credentials executed on $dest$ by user $user$, with a parent process of $parent_process_id$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.002", + "T1003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_id", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process", + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "GALLIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "Night Dragon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_reg", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=reg.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=reg.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "extraction_of_registry_hives_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/extraction_of_registry_hives.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "File with Samsam Extension", + "id": "02c6cfc2-ae66-4735-bfc7-6291da834cbf", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-12-14", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The search looks for file writes with extensions consistent with a SamSam ransomware attack.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| rex field=file_name \"(?\\.[^\\.]+)$\" | search file_extension=.stubbin OR file_extension=.berkshire OR file_extension=.satoshi OR file_extension=.sophos OR file_extension=.keyxml | `file_with_samsam_extension_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data-model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.", + "known_false_positives": "Because these extensions are not typically used in normal operations, you should investigate all results.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "File with Samsam Extension", + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/samsam_extension/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 100, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation" + ], + "message": "File writes $file_name$ with extensions consistent with a SamSam ransomware attack seen on $dest$", + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_name", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Other", + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.user", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Filesystem.file_path", + "Filesystem.file_name" + ], + "risk_score": 90, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "file_with_samsam_extension_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Firewall Allowed Program Enable", + "id": "9a8f63a8-43ac-11ec-904c-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-12", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic detects a potential suspicious modification of firewall rule allowing to execute specific application. This technique was identified when an adversary and red teams to bypassed firewall file execution restriction in a targetted host. Take note that this event or command can run by administrator during testing or allowing legitimate tool or application.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*firewall*\" Processes.process = \"*allowedprogram*\" Processes.process = \"*add*\" Processes.process = \"*ENABLE*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `firewall_allowed_program_enable_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated or manual execution of this firewall rule that may generate false positives. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/ad4c3cda-41f2-4401-8dba-56cc2d245488/#" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Firewall Allowed Program Enable", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/vilsel/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "firewall allowed program commandline $process$ of $process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.004", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT38", + "Carbanak", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "firewall_allowed_program_enable_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/firewall_allowed_program_enable.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "FodHelper UAC Bypass", + "id": "909f8fd8-7ac8-11eb-a1f3-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-03-01", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "Fodhelper.exe has a known UAC bypass as it attempts to look for specific registry keys upon execution, that do not exist. Therefore, an attacker can write its malicious commands in these registry keys to be executed by fodhelper.exe with the highest privilege. \\\n1. `HKCU:\\Software\\Classes\\ms-settings\\shell\\open\\command`\\\n1. `HKCU:\\Software\\Classes\\ms-settings\\shell\\open\\command\\DelegateExecute`\\\n1. `HKCU:\\Software\\Classes\\ms-settings\\shell\\open\\command\\(default)`\\\nUpon triage, fodhelper.exe will have a child process and read access will occur on the registry keys. Isolate the endpoint and review parallel processes for additional behavior.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=fodhelper.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `fodhelper_uac_bypass_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited to no false positives are expected.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.md", + "https://github.com/gushmazuko/WinBypass/blob/master/FodhelperBypass.ps1", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "FodHelper UAC Bypass", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "IcedID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspcious registy keys added by process fodhelper.exe (process_id- $process_id), with a parent_process of $parent_process_name$ that has been executed on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1112", + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Parent Process", + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 81, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN8", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT37", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Evilnum", + "Honeybee", + "MuddyWater", + "Patchwork", + "Threat Group-3390" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "fodhelper_uac_bypass_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/fodhelper_uac_bypass.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Fsutil Zeroing File", + "id": "4e5e024e-fabb-11eb-8b8f-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-11", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious fsutil process to zeroing a target file. This technique was seen in lockbit ransomware where it tries to zero out its malware path as part of its defense evasion after encrypting the compromised host.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=fsutil.exe Processes.process=\"*setzerodata*\" by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.process Processes.parent_process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `fsutil_zeroing_file_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/e0ac072d-58c9-4f53-8a3b-3e491c7ac5db/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Fsutil Zeroing File", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070/fsutil_file_zero/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Possible file data deletion on $dest$ using $process$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1070" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "fsutil_zeroing_file_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/fsutil_zeroing_file.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell", + "id": "36e46ebe-065a-11ec-b4c7-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-26", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` executing the Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"powershell*\") AND Processes.process = \"*Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/S1ckB0y1337/Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy?view=windowsserver2019-ps" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1201" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_name" + ], + "risk_score": 9, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1201", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Chimera", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block", + "id": "1ff7ccc8-065a-11ec-91e4-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-26", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message =\"*Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/S1ckB0y1337/Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy?view=windowsserver2019-ps" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "powershell process having commandline $Message$ to query domain password policy", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1201" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 9, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1201", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Chimera", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Get ADUser with PowerShell", + "id": "0b6ee3f4-04e3-11ec-a87d-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-24", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to enumerate domain users. The `Get-AdUser' commandlet returns a list of all domain users. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"powershell*\") AND Processes.process = \"*Get-ADUser*\" AND Processes.process = \"*-filter*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_aduser_with_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-blue-purple/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-aduser?view=windowsserver2019-ps" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Get ADUser with PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1087" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_name" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "get_aduser_with_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_aduser_with_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block", + "id": "21432e40-04f4-11ec-b7e6-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-24", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-AdGUser` commandlet. The `Get-AdUser` commandlet is used to return a list of all domain users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*get-aduser*\" Message = \"*-filter*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_aduser_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-blue-purple/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-aduser?view=windowsserver2019-ps" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "powershell process having commandline $Message$ for user enumeration", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1087" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "get_aduser_with_powershell_script_block_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_aduser_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell", + "id": "8b5ef342-065a-11ec-b0fc-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-26", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` executing the Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"powershell*\") AND Processes.process = \"*Get-ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/S1ckB0y1337/Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-aduserresultantpasswordpolicy?view=windowsserver2019-ps" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1201" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_name" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1201", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Chimera", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block", + "id": "737e1eb0-065a-11ec-921a-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-26", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, MAuricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message =\"*Get-ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/S1ckB0y1337/Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-aduserresultantpasswordpolicy?view=windowsserver2019-ps" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "powershell process having commandline $Message$ to query domain user password policy.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1201" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 9, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1201", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Chimera", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Get DomainPolicy with Powershell", + "id": "b8f9947e-065a-11ec-aafb-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-26", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` executing the `Get-DomainPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"powershell*\") AND Processes.process = \"*Get-DomainPolicy*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/S1ckB0y1337/Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet", + "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainPolicy/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Get DomainPolicy with Powershell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1201" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_name" + ], + "risk_score": 30, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1201", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Chimera", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_domainpolicy_with_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Get DomainPolicy with Powershell Script Block", + "id": "a360d2b2-065a-11ec-b0bf-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-26", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get DomainPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message =\"*Get-DomainPolicy*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/S1ckB0y1337/Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet", + "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainPolicy/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Get DomainPolicy with Powershell Script Block", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "powershell process having commandline $Message$ to query domain policy.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1201" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 30, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1201", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Chimera", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell", + "id": "4fa7f846-054a-11ec-a836-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-24", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies Get-DomainTrust from PowerView in order to gather domain trust information. Typically, this is utilized within a script being executed and used to enumerate the domain trust information. This grants the adversary an understanding of how large or small the domain is. During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=*get-domaintrust* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domaintrust_with_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives as this requires an active Administrator or adversary to bring in, import, and execute.", + "references": [ + "http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/a-guide-to-attacking-domain-trusts/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 40, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Suspicious PowerShell Get-DomainTrust was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1482" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 12, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "Chimera", + "FIN8" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "get_domaintrust_with_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_domaintrust_with_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell Script Block", + "id": "89275e7e-0548-11ec-bf75-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-24", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies Get-DomainTrust from PowerView in order to gather domain trust information. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*get-foresttrust*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message ComputerName User EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domaintrust_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible certain system management frameworks utilize this command to gather trust information.", + "references": [ + "http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/a-guide-to-attacking-domain-trusts/", + "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", + "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell Script Block", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 40, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/discovery/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Suspicious PowerShell Get-DomainTrust was identified on endpoint $ComputerName$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1482" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "Path", + "OpCode", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 12, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "Chimera", + "FIN8" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "get_domaintrust_with_powershell_script_block_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_domaintrust_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Get DomainUser with PowerShell", + "id": "9a5a41d6-04e7-11ec-923c-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-24", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to enumerate domain users. `Get-DomainUser` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"powershell*\") AND Processes.process = \"*Get-DomainUser*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domainuser_with_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainUser/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Get DomainUser with PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1087" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_name" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "get_domainuser_with_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_domainuser_with_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block", + "id": "61994268-04f4-11ec-865c-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-24", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainUser` commandlet. `GetDomainUser` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerView to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*Get-DomainUser*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domainuser_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainUser/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "powershell process having commandline $Message$ for user enumeration", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1087" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "get_domainuser_with_powershell_script_block_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_domainuser_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell", + "id": "584f4884-0bf1-11ec-a5ec-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-02", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies Get-ForestTrust from PowerSploit in order to gather domain trust information. Typically, this is utilized within a script being executed and used to enumerate the domain trust information. This grants the adversary an understanding of how large or small the domain is. During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=cmd.exe Processes.process=*get-foresttrust* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_foresttrust_with_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives as this requires an active Administrator or adversary to bring in, import, and execute.", + "references": [ + "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-ForestTrust/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 40, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Suspicious PowerShell Get-ForestTrust was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1482" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 12, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "Chimera", + "FIN8" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "get_foresttrust_with_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_foresttrust_with_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell Script Block", + "id": "70fac80e-0bf1-11ec-9ba0-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-02", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies Get-ForestTrust from PowerSploit in order to gather domain trust information. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*get-foresttrust*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message OpCode ComputerName User EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_foresttrust_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "UPDATE_KNOWN_FALSE_POSITIVES", + "references": [ + "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-ForestTrust/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell Script Block", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 40, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/discovery/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Suspicious PowerShell Get-ForestTrust was identified on endpoint $ComputerName$ by user $User$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1482" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "Path", + "OpCode", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 12, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "Chimera", + "FIN8" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "get_foresttrust_with_powershell_script_block_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_foresttrust_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Get WMIObject Group Discovery", + "id": "5434f670-155d-11ec-8cca-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-14", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following hunting analytic identifies the use of `Get-WMIObject Win32_Group` being used with PowerShell to identify local groups on the endpoint. \\ Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \\ During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR processes.process_name=cmd.exe) (Processes.process=\"*Get-WMIObject*\" AND Processes.process=\"*Win32_Group*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_wmiobject_group_discovery_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present. Tune as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Get WMIObject Group Discovery", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "System group discovery on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "TA505" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Chimera", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "admin@338" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "get_wmiobject_group_discovery_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_wmiobject_group_discovery.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Get WMIObject Group Discovery with Script Block Logging", + "id": "69df7f7c-155d-11ec-a055-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-14", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies the usage of `Get-WMIObject Win32_Group`, which is typically used as a way to identify groups on the endpoint. Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*Get-WMIObject*\" AND Message = \"*Win32_Group*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message OpCode ComputerName User EventCode| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_wmiobject_group_discovery_with_script_block_logging_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present. Tune as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/powershell-detections-threat-research-release-august-2021.html", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.md", + "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", + "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Get WMIObject Group Discovery with Script Block Logging", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "System group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "TA505" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Chimera", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "admin@338" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "get_wmiobject_group_discovery_with_script_block_logging_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_wmiobject_group_discovery_with_script_block_logging.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "GetAdComputer with PowerShell", + "id": "c5a31f80-5888-4d81-9f78-1cc65026316e", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-07", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The `Get-AdComputer' commandlet returns a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-AdComputer*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getadcomputer_with_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GetAdComputer with PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1018" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Leafminer", + "Naikon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "getadcomputer_with_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getadcomputer_with_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "GetAdComputer with PowerShell Script Block", + "id": "a9a1da02-8e27-4bf7-a348-f4389c9da487", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-01", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-AdGroup` commandlet. The `Get-AdGroup` commandlet is used to return a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-AdComputer*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getadcomputer_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-adgroup?view=windowsserver2019-ps" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GetAdComputer with PowerShell Script Block", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1018" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Leafminer", + "Naikon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "getadcomputer_with_powershell_script_block_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getadcomputer_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "GetAdGroup with PowerShell", + "id": "872e3063-0fc4-4e68-b2f3-f2b99184a708", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-25", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The `Get-AdGroup` commandlnet is used to return a list of all groups available in a Windows Domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-AdGroup*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getadgroup_with_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-adgroup?view=windowsserver2019-ps" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GetAdGroup with PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "TA505" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "getadgroup_with_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getadgroup_with_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "GetAdGroup with PowerShell Script Block", + "id": "e4c73d68-794b-468d-b4d0-dac1772bbae7", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-25", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-AdGroup` commandlet. The `Get-AdGroup` commandlet is used to return a list of all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-ADGroup*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getadgroup_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-adgroup?view=windowsserver2019-ps" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GetAdGroup with PowerShell Script Block", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "TA505" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "getadgroup_with_powershell_script_block_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getadgroup_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "GetCurrent User with PowerShell", + "id": "7eb9c3d5-c98c-4088-acc5-8240bad15379", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-13", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powerhsell.exe` with command-line arguments that execute the `GetCurrent` method of the WindowsIdentity .NET class. This method returns an object that represents the current Windows user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity* OR Processes.process=*GetCurrent()*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getcurrent_user_with_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GetCurrent User with PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "System user discovery on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1033" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1033", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "getcurrent_user_with_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getcurrent_user_with_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "GetCurrent User with PowerShell Script Block", + "id": "80879283-c30f-44f7-8471-d1381f6d437a", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-13", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `GetCurrent` method of the WindowsIdentity .NET class. This method returns an object that represents the current Windows user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*[System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]*\" AND Message = \"*GetCurrent()*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getcurrent_user_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.security.principal.windowsidentity.getcurrent?view=net-5.0" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GetCurrent User with PowerShell Script Block", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "System user discovery on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1033" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Path", + "Message", + "OpCode", + "ComputerName", + "User", + "EventCode" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1033", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "getcurrent_user_with_powershell_script_block_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getcurrent_user_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "GetDomainComputer with PowerShell", + "id": "ed550c19-712e-43f6-bd19-6f58f61b3a5e", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-07", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. `Get-DomainComputer` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-DomainComputer*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use PowerView for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GetDomainComputer with PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1018" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 24, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Leafminer", + "Naikon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getdomaincomputer_with_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "GetDomainComputer with PowerShell Script Block", + "id": "f64da023-b988-4775-8d57-38e512beb56e", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-02", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainComputer` commandlet. `GetDomainComputer` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerView to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-DomainComputer*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use PowerView for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", + "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainComputer/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GetDomainComputer with PowerShell Script Block", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Remote system discovery with PowerView on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1018" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 24, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Leafminer", + "Naikon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_script_block_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "GetDomainController with PowerShell", + "id": "868ee0e4-52ab-484a-833a-6d85b7c028d0", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-07", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. `Get-DomainController` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-DomainController*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use PowerView for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", + "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainController/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GetDomainController with PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Remote system discovery using PowerView on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1018" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 24, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Leafminer", + "Naikon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getdomaincontroller_with_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "GetDomainController with PowerShell Script Block", + "id": "676b600a-a94d-4951-b346-11329431e6c1", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-02", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainController` commandlet. `Get-DomainController` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerView to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-DomainController*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", + "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainController/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GetDomainController with PowerShell Script Block", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Remote system discovery with PowerView on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1018" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 24, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Leafminer", + "Naikon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_script_block_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "GetDomainGroup with PowerShell", + "id": "93c94be3-bead-4a60-860f-77ca3fe59903", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-25", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. `Get-DomainGroup` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-DomainGroup*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getdomaingroup_with_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", + "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainGroup/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GetDomainGroup with PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Domain group discovery with PowerView on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "TA505" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "getdomaingroup_with_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getdomaingroup_with_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "GetDomainGroup with PowerShell Script Block", + "id": "09725404-a44f-4ed3-9efa-8ed5d69e4c53", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-26", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainGroup` commandlet. `Get-DomainGroup` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. As the name suggests, `Get-DomainGroup` is used to query domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this function to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-DomainGroup*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getdomaingroup_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerView functions for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", + "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainGroup/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GetDomainGroup with PowerShell Script Block", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration using PowerView on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "TA505" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "getdomaingroup_with_powershell_script_block_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getdomaingroup_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "GetLocalUser with PowerShell", + "id": "85fae8fa-0427-11ec-8b78-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-23", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for local users. The `Get-LocalUser` commandlet is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-LocalUser*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getlocaluser_with_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GetLocalUser with PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Local user discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1087", + "T1087.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "Chimera", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Poseidon Group", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "admin@338" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "getlocaluser_with_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getlocaluser_with_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block", + "id": "2e891cbe-0426-11ec-9c9c-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-23", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-LocalUser` commandlet. The `Get-LocalUser` commandlet is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-LocalUser*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getlocaluser_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Local user discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1087", + "T1087.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "Chimera", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Poseidon Group", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "admin@338" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "getlocaluser_with_powershell_script_block_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getlocaluser_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell", + "id": "e02af35c-1de5-4afe-b4be-f45aba57272b", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-25", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. The `Get-NetTcpConnection` commandlet lists the current TCP connections. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-NetTcpConnection*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/nettcpip/get-nettcpconnection?view=windowsserver2019-ps" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1049/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1049" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1049", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Andariel", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "GALLIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getnettcpconnection_with_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell Script Block", + "id": "091712ff-b02a-4d43-82ed-34765515d95d", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-10", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-NetTcpconnection ` commandlet. This commandlet is used to return a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-NetTcpconnection*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/nettcpip/get-nettcpconnection?view=windowsserver2019-ps" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell Script Block", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1049/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1049" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1049", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Andariel", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "GALLIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_script_block_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell", + "id": "7141122c-3bc2-4aaa-ab3b-7a85a0bbefc3", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-07", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `DS_Computer` parameter can be used to return a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI in this case, using PowerShell, to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-WmiObject* AND Processes.process=\"*namespace root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*\" AND Processes.process=\"*class ds_computer*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration using WMI on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1018" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 21, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Leafminer", + "Naikon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell Script Block", + "id": "29b99201-723c-4118-847a-db2b3d3fb8ea", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-01", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet. The `DS_Computer` class parameter leverages WMI to query for all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message=*Get-WmiObject* AND Message=\"*namespace root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*\" AND Message=\"*class ds_computer*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/get-wmiobject?view=powershell-5.1" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell Script Block", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1018" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Leafminer", + "Naikon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_script_block_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell", + "id": "df275a44-4527-443b-b884-7600e066e3eb", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-25", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `-class ds_group` parameter can be used to return the full list of groups in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI in this case, using PowerShell, to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-WmiObject* AND Processes.process=\"*namespace root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*\" AND Processes.process=\"*class ds_group*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/get-wmiobject?view=powershell-5.1" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "TA505" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell Script Block", + "id": "67740bd3-1506-469c-b91d-effc322cc6e5", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-25", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet used with specific parameters . The `DS_Group` parameter leverages WMI to query for all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message=*Get-WmiObject* AND Message=\"*namespace root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*\" AND Message=\"*class ds_group*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/get-wmiobject?view=powershell-5.1" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell Script Block", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "TA505" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_script_block_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell", + "id": "22d3b118-04df-11ec-8fa3-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-24", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain users. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `-class ds_user` parameter can be used to return the full list of users in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI in this case, using PowerShell, to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"powershell*\") AND Processes.process = \"*get-wmiobject*\" AND Processes.process = \"*ds_user*\" AND Processes.process = \"*root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*\" AND Processes.process = \"*-namespace*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet/details/dsquery.htm" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1087" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_name" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell Script Block", + "id": "fabd364e-04f3-11ec-b34b-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-24", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet. The `DS_User` class parameter leverages WMI to query for all domain users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*get-wmiobject*\" Message = \"*ds_user*\" Message = \"*-namespace*\" Message = \"*root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "he following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-blue-purple/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wmisdk/describing-the-ldap-namespace" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell Script Block", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "powershell process having commandline $Message$ for user enumeration", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1087" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_script_block_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell", + "id": "b44f6ac6-0429-11ec-87e9-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-23", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query local users. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `Win32_UserAccount` parameter is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-WmiObject* AND Processes.process=*Win32_UserAccount*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Local user discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1087", + "T1087.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "Chimera", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Poseidon Group", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "admin@338" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block", + "id": "640b0eda-0429-11ec-accd-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-23", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet used with specific parameters. The `Win32_UserAccount` parameter is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message=\"*Get-WmiObject*\" AND Message=\"*Win32_UserAccount*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Local user discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1087", + "T1087.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "Chimera", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Poseidon Group", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "admin@338" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_script_block_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network", + "id": "2c853856-a140-11eb-a5b5-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-19", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies gpupdate.exe with no command line arguments and with a network connection. It is unusual for gpupdate.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. gpupdate.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=gpupdate.exe by _time span=1h Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(gpupdate\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port !=\"0\" by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port| `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_guid connection_to_CNC dest_port | `gpupdate_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process.", + "references": [ + "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/xx0hcd/Malleable-C2-Profiles/0ef8cf4556e26f6d4190c56ba697c2159faa5822/crimeware/trick_ryuk.profile", + "https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2021/02/09/learn-pipe-fitting-for-all-of-your-offense-projects/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network", + "analytic_story": [ + "Cobalt Strike" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Command And Control" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Process gpupdate.exe with parent_process $parent_process_name$ is executed on $dest$ by user $user$, followed by an outbound network connection to $connection_to_CNC$ on port $dest_port$. This behaviour is seen with cobaltstrike.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1055" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Parent Process", + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "connection_to_CNC", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventID", + "process_name", + "process_id", + "parent_process_name", + "dest_port", + "process_path" + ], + "risk_score": 81, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Cobalt Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sharpshooter", + "Silence", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "gpupdate_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/gpupdate_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen", + "id": "834ba832-ad89-11eb-937d-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-28", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies a suspicious registry modification to hide a user account on the Windows Login screen. This technique was seen in some tradecraft where the adversary will create a hidden user account with Admin privileges in login screen to avoid noticing by the user that they already compromise and to persist on that said machine.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\SpecialAccounts\\\\Userlist*\" AND Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000000\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `hide_user_account_from_sign_in_screen_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as CarbonBlack or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen", + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/hotkey_disabled_hidden_user/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious registry modification ($registry_value_name$) which is used go hide a user account on the Windows Login screen detected on $dest$ executed by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "registry_value_name", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.dest Registry.user" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "hide_user_account_from_sign_in_screen_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/hide_user_account_from_sign_in_screen.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe", + "id": "6e5a3ae4-90a3-462d-9aa6-0119f638c0f1", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "Attackers leverage an existing Windows binary, attrib.exe, to mark specific as hidden by using specific flags so that the victim does not see the file. The search looks for specific command-line arguments to detect the use of attrib.exe to hide files.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) values(Processes.process) as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=attrib.exe (Processes.process=*+h*) by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "Some applications and users may legitimately use attrib.exe to interact with the files. ", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1222.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Attrib.exe with +h flag to hide files on $dest$ executed by $user$ is detected.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1222", + "T1222.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Attacker", + "Parent Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1222", + "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1222.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share", + "id": "40925f12-4709-11ec-bb43-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-16", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious high frequency copying/moving of files in network share as part of information sabotage. This anomaly event can be a good indicator of insider trying to sabotage data by transfering classified or internal files within network share to exfitrate it after or to lure evidence of insider attack to other user. This behavior may catch several noise if network share is a common place for classified or internal document processing.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=5145 Relative_Target_Name IN (\"*.doc\",\"*.docx\",\"*.xls\",\"*.xlsx\",\"*.ppt\",\"*.pptx\",\"*.log\",\"*.txt\",\"*.db\",\"*.7z\",\"*.zip\",\"*.rar\",\"*.tar\",\"*.gz\",\"*.jpg\",\"*.gif\",\"*.png\",\"*.bmp\",\"*.pdf\",\"*.rtf\",\"*.key\") Object_Type=File Share_Name IN (\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\C$\",\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\IPC$\",\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\admin$\") Access_Mask= \"0x2\" | bucket _time span=5m | stats values(Relative_Target_Name) as valRelativeTargetName, values(Share_Name) as valShareName, values(Object_Type) as valObjectType, values(Access_Mask) as valAccessmask, values(src_port) as valSrcPort, values(Source_Address) as valSrcAddress count as numShareName by dest, _time, EventCode, user | eventstats avg(numShareName) as avgShareName, stdev(numShareName) as stdShareName, count as numSlots by dest, _time, EventCode, user | eval upperThreshold=(avgShareName + stdShareName *3) | eval isOutlier=if(avgShareName > 20 and avgShareName >= upperThreshold, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `high_frequency_copy_of_files_in_network_share_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "o successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 5145 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required. Also enable the object Audit access success/failure in your group policy.", + "known_false_positives": "this behavior may seen in normal transfer of file within network if network share is common place for sharing documents.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share", + "analytic_story": [ + "Information Sabotage" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Exfiltration" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1537/high_copy_files_in_net_share/security.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "high frequency copy of document in network share $Share_Name$ from $Source_Address$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1537" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Share_Name", + "Relative_Target_Name", + "Object_Type", + "Access_Mask", + "user", + "src_port", + "Source_Address" + ], + "risk_score": 9, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1537", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "high_frequency_copy_of_files_in_network_share_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/high_frequency_copy_of_files_in_network_share.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "High Process Termination Frequency", + "id": "17cd75b2-8666-11eb-9ab4-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-03-16", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytics are designed to indentify a high frequency of process termination on a machine which is a common behavior of ransomware malware before encrypting files. This technique is designed to avoid an exception error while accessing (docs, images, database and etc..) in the infected machine for encryption.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=5 |bin _time span=3s |stats values(Image) as proc_terminated min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer EventCode ProcessID | where count >= 15 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `high_process_termination_frequency_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Image (process full path of terminated process) from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "admin or user tool that can terminate multiple process.", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", + "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "High Process Termination Frequency", + "analytic_story": [ + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "High frequency process termination (more than 15 processes within 3s) detected on host $Computer$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1486" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "proc_terminated", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "EventCode", + "Image", + "Computer", + "_time", + "ProcessID" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1486", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "APT41", + "FIN7", + "Indrik Spider", + "TA505" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "high_process_termination_frequency_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/high_process_termination_frequency.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Hunting for Log4Shell", + "id": "158b68fa-5d1a-11ec-aac8-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-14", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "The following hunting query assists with quickly assessing CVE-2021-44228, or Log4Shell, activity mapped to the Web Datamodel. This is a combination query attempting to identify, score and dashboard. Because the Log4Shell vulnerability requires the string to be in the logs, this will work to identify the activity anywhere in the HTTP headers using _raw. Modify the first line to use the same pattern matching against other log sources. Scoring is based on a simple rubric of 0-5. 5 being the best match, and less than 5 meant to identify additional patterns that will equate to a higher total score. \\\nThe first jndi match identifies the standard pattern of `{jndi:` \\\njndi_fastmatch is meant to identify any jndi in the logs. The score is set low and is meant to be the \"base\" score used later. \\\njndi_proto is a protocol match that identifies `jndi` and one of `ldap, ldaps, rmi, dns, nis, iiop, corba, nds, http, https.` \\\nall_match is a very well written regex by https://gist.github.com/Schvenn that identifies nearly all patterns of this attack behavior. \\\nenv works to identify environment variables in the header, meant to capture `AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID`, `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY` and `env`. \\\nuri_detect is string match looking for the common uri paths currently being scanned/abused in the wild. \\\nkeywords matches on enumerated values that, like `$ctx:loginId`, that may be found in the header used by the adversary. \\\nlookup matching is meant to catch some basic obfuscation that has been identified using upper, lower and date. \\\nScoring will then occur based on any findings. The base score is meant to be 2 , created by jndi_fastmatch. Everything else is meant to increase that score. \\\nFinally, a simple table is created to show the scoring and the _raw field. Sort based on score or columns of interest.", + "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | eval jndi=if(match(_raw, \"(\\{|%7B)[jJnNdDiI]{4}:\"),4,0) | eval jndi_fastmatch=if(match(_raw, \"[jJnNdDiI]{4}\"),2,0) | eval jndi_proto=if(match(_raw,\"(?i)jndi:(ldap[s]?|rmi|dns|nis|iiop|corba|nds|http|https):\"),5,0) | eval all_match = if(match(_raw, \"(?i)(%(25){0,}20|\\s)*(%(25){0,}24|\\$)(%(25){0,}20|\\s)*(%(25){0,}7B|{)(%(25){0,}20|\\s)*(%(25){0,}(6A|4A)|J)(%(25){0,}(6E|4E)|N)(%(25){0,}(64|44)|D)(%(25){0,}(69|49)|I)(%(25){0,}20|\\s)*(%(25){0,}3A|:)[\\w\\%]+(%(25){1,}3A|:)(%(25){1,}2F|\\/)[^\\n]+\"),5,0) | eval env_var = if(match(_raw, \"env:\") OR match(_raw, \"env:AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID\") OR match(_raw, \"env:AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY\"),5,0) | eval uridetect = if(match(_raw, \"(?i)Basic\\/Command\\/Base64|Basic\\/ReverseShell|Basic\\/TomcatMemshell|Basic\\/JBossMemshell|Basic\\/WebsphereMemshell|Basic\\/SpringMemshell|Basic\\/Command|Deserialization\\/CommonsCollectionsK|Deserialization\\/CommonsBeanutils|Deserialization\\/Jre8u20\\/TomcatMemshell|Deserialization\\/CVE_2020_2555\\/WeblogicMemshell|TomcatBypass|GroovyBypass|WebsphereBypass\"),4,0) | eval keywords = if(match(_raw,\"(?i)\\$\\{ctx\\:loginId\\}|\\$\\{map\\:type\\}|\\$\\{filename\\}|\\$\\{date\\:MM-dd-yyyy\\}|\\$\\{docker\\:containerId\\}|\\$\\{docker\\:containerName\\}|\\$\\{docker\\:imageName\\}|\\$\\{env\\:USER\\}|\\$\\{event\\:Marker\\}|\\$\\{mdc\\:UserId\\}|\\$\\{java\\:runtime\\}|\\$\\{java\\:vm\\}|\\$\\{java\\:os\\}|\\$\\{jndi\\:logging/context-name\\}|\\$\\{hostName\\}|\\$\\{docker\\:containerId\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:accountName\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:clusterName\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:containerId\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:containerName\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:host\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:labels.app\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:labels.podTemplateHash\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:masterUrl\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:namespaceId\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:namespaceName\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:podId\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:podIp\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:podName\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:imageId\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:imageName\\}|\\$\\{log4j\\:configLocation\\}|\\$\\{log4j\\:configParentLocation\\}|\\$\\{spring\\:spring.application.name\\}|\\$\\{main\\:myString\\}|\\$\\{main\\:0\\}|\\$\\{main\\:1\\}|\\$\\{main\\:2\\}|\\$\\{main\\:3\\}|\\$\\{main\\:4\\}|\\$\\{main\\:bar\\}|\\$\\{name\\}|\\$\\{marker\\}|\\$\\{marker\\:name\\}|\\$\\{spring\\:profiles.active[0]|\\$\\{sys\\:logPath\\}|\\$\\{web\\:rootDir\\}|\\$\\{sys\\:user.name\\}\"),4,0) | eval obf = if(match(_raw, \"(\\$|%24)[^ /]*({|%7b)[^ /]*(j|%6a)[^ /]*(n|%6e)[^ /]*(d|%64)[^ /]*(i|%69)[^ /]*(:|%3a)[^ /]*(:|%3a)[^ /]*(/|%2f)\"),5,0) | eval lookups = if(match(_raw, \"(?i)({|%7b)(main|sys|k8s|spring|lower|upper|env|date|sd)\"),4,0) | addtotals fieldname=Score, jndi, jndi_proto, env_var, uridetect, all_match, jndi_fastmatch, keywords, obf, lookups | where Score > 2 | stats values(Score) by jndi, jndi_proto, env_var, uridetect, all_match, jndi_fastmatch, keywords, lookups, obf, _raw | `hunting_for_log4shell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "Out of the box, the Web datamodel is required to be pre-filled. However, tested was performed against raw httpd access logs. Change the first line to any dataset to pass the regex's against.", + "known_false_positives": "It is highly possible you will find false positives, however, the base score is set to 2 for _any_ jndi found in raw logs. tune and change as needed, include any filtering.", + "references": [ + "https://gist.github.com/olafhartong/916ebc673ba066537740164f7e7e1d72", + "https://gist.github.com/Neo23x0/e4c8b03ff8cdf1fa63b7d15db6e3860b#gistcomment-3994449", + "https://regex101.com/r/OSrm0q/1/", + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/signature-base/blob/master/yara/expl_log4j_cve_2021_44228.yar", + "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/12/12/log4shell-hell-anatomy-of-an-exploit-outbreak/", + "https://gist.github.com/MHaggis/1899b8554f38c8692a9fb0ceba60b44c", + "https://twitter.com/sasi2103/status/1469764719850442760?s=20" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Hunting for Log4Shell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Web Server", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Scope:Network" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/log4shell-nginx.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Hunting for Log4Shell exploitation has occurred.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_method", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "src", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Web.http_method", + "Web.url", + "Web.url_length", + "Web.src", + "Web.dest", + "Web.http_user_agent", + "_raw" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "hunting_for_log4shell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/hunting_for_log4shell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Icacls Deny Command", + "id": "cf8d753e-a8fe-11eb-8f58-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-29", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies a potential adversary that changes the security permission of a specific file or directory. This technique is commonly seen in APT tradecraft or coinminer scripts. This behavior is meant to evade detection and prevent access to their component files.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"icacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"cacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"xcacls.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*/deny*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `icacls_deny_command_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed icacls.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown. It is possible some administrative scripts use ICacls. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Icacls Deny Command", + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Process name $process_name$ with deny argument executed by $user$ to change security permission of a specific file or directory on host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1222" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1222", + "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "icacls_deny_command_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/icacls_deny_command.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "ICACLS Grant Command", + "id": "b1b1e316-accc-11eb-a9b4-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-04", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies potential adversaries that modify the security permission of a specific file or directory. This technique is commonly seen in APT tradecraft and coinminer scripts to evade detections and restrict access to their component files.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"icacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"cacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"xcacls.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*/grant*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `icacls_grant_command_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed icacls.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "ICACLS Grant Command", + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Process name $process_name$ with grant argument executed by $user$ to change security permission of a specific file or directory on host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1222" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1222", + "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "icacls_grant_command_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/icacls_grant_command.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "IcedID Exfiltrated Archived File Creation", + "id": "0db4da70-f14b-11eb-8043-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-07-30", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious file creation namely passff.tar and cookie.tar. This files are possible archived of stolen browser information like history and cookies in a compromised machine with IcedID.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode= 11 (TargetFilename = \"*\\\\passff.tar\" OR TargetFilename = \"*\\\\cookie.tar\") |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by TargetFilename EventCode process_id process_name Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.cisecurity.org/white-papers/security-primer-icedid/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "IcedID Exfiltrated Archived File Creation", + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Collection" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/simulated_icedid/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "process $SourceImage$ create a file $TargetImage$ in host $Computer$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1560.001", + "T1560" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "SourceImage", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "TargetFilename", + "EventCode", + "process_id", + "process_name", + "Computer" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "CopyKittens", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Gallmaker", + "HAFNIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sowbug", + "Turla", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1560", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Patchwork", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters", + "id": "8ce07472-496f-11ec-ab3b-3e22fbd008af", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-18", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the presence of suspicious commandline parameters typically present when using Impacket tools. Impacket is a collection of python classes meant to be used with Microsoft network protocols. There are multiple scripts that leverage impacket libraries like `wmiexec.py`, `smbexec.py`, `dcomexec.py` and `atexec.py` used to execute commands on remote endpoints. By default, these scripts leverage administrative shares and hardcoded parameters that can be used as a signature to detect its use. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage Impackets tools for lateral movement and remote code execution.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process = \"*/c* \\\\\\\\127.0.0.1\\\\*\" OR Processes.process= \"*/c* 2>&1\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", + "known_false_positives": "Although uncommon, Administrators may leverage Impackets tools to start a process on remote systems for system administration or automation use cases.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005", + "https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket", + "https://vk9-sec.com/impacket-remote-code-execution-rce-on-windows-from-linux/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.003/impacket/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious command line parameters on $dest may represent a lateral movement attack with Impackets tools", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.002", + "T1021.003", + "T1047", + "T1543.003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Operation Wocao", + "Orangeworm", + "Sandworm Team", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN7", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "PROMETHIUM", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell", + "id": "a4e8f3a4-48b2-11ec-bcfc-3e22fbd008af", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-02-18", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the usage of the `Enter-PSSession`. This commandlet can be used to open an interactive session on a remote endpoint leveraging the WinRM protocol. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WinRM and `Enter-PSSession` for lateral movement and remote code execution.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message=\"*Enter-PSSession*\" AND Message=\"*-ComputerName*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `interactive_session_on_remote_endpoint_with_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup instructions can be found https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may leverage WinRM and `Enter-PSSession` for administrative and troubleshooting tasks. This activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. In certain environments, tuning may not be possible.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/enter-pssession?view=powershell-7.2" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement_pssession/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An interactive session was opened on a remote endpoint from $ComputerName", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.006" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 45, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "Chimera", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "interactive_session_on_remote_endpoint_with_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/interactive_session_on_remote_endpoint_with_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "id": "8281ce42-5c50-11ec-82d2-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a Java user agent performing a GET request for a .class file from the remote site. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell).", + "search": "| tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_user_agent=\"*Java*\" Web.http_method=\"GET\" Web.url=\"*.class*\" by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting web or proxy logs, or ensure it is being filled by a proxy like device, into the Web Datamodel. For additional filtering, allow list private IP space or restrict by known good.", + "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required in some instances, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2021/12/as-log4shell-wreaks-havoc-payroll-service-reports-ransomware-attack/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Web Server", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Scope:Network" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A Java user agent $http_user_agent$ was performing a $http_method$ to retrieve a remote class file.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_user_agent", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_method", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Web.http_method", + "Web.url", + "Web.url_length", + "Web.src", + "Web.dest", + "Web.http_user_agent" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Jscript Execution Using Cscript App", + "id": "002f1e24-146e-11ec-a470-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-13", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a execution of jscript using cscript process. Commonly when a user run jscript file it was executed by wscript.exe application. This technique was seen in FIN7 js implant to execute its malicious script using cscript process. This behavior is uncommon and a good artifacts to check further anomalies within the network", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = \"cscript.exe\" AND Processes.parent_process = \"*//e:jscript*\") OR (Processes.process_name = \"cscript.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*//e:jscript*\") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `jscript_execution_using_cscript_app_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html", + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Jscript Execution Using Cscript App", + "analytic_story": [ + "FIN7", + "Remcos" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_macro_js_1/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Process name $process_name$ with commandline $process$ to execute jscript in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.007" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.007", + "mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "Cobalt Group", + "Evilnum", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Higaisa", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "jscript_execution_using_cscript_app_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/jscript_execution_using_cscript_app.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption", + "id": "5cc67381-44fa-4111-8a37-7a230943f027", + "version": 4, + "date": "2022-02-09", + "author": "Jose Hernandez, Patrick Bareiss, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic leverages Kerberos Event 4769, A Kerberos service ticket was requested, to identify a potential kerberoasting attack against Active Directory networks. Kerberoasting allows an adversary to request kerberos tickets for domain accounts typically used as service accounts and attempt to crack them offline allowing them to obtain privileged access to the domain. This analytic looks for a specific combination of the Ticket_Options field based on common kerberoasting tools. Defenders should be aware that it may be possible for a Kerberoast attack to use different Ticket_Options.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769 Service_Name!=\"*$\" (Ticket_Options=0x40810000 OR Ticket_Options=0x40800000 OR Ticket_Options=0x40810010) Ticket_Encryption_Type=0x17 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, service, service_id, Ticket_Encryption_Type, Ticket_Options | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", + "known_false_positives": "Older systems that support kerberos RC4 by default like NetApp may generate false positives. Filter as needed", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1208/T1208.md", + "https://www.trimarcsecurity.com/post/trimarcresearch-detecting-kerberoasting-activity" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/rubeus/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Potential kerberoasting attack via service principal name requests detected on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1558", + "T1558.003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Ticket_Options", + "Ticket_Encryption_Type", + "dest", + "service", + "service_id" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1558", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "FIN7", + "Operation Wocao", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled in UserAccountControl", + "id": "0cb847ee-9423-11ec-b2df-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-22", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic leverages Windows Security Event 4738, `A user account was changed`, to identify a change performed on a domain user object that disables Kerberos Pre-Authentication. Disabling the Pre Authentication flag in the UserAccountControl property allows an adversary to easily perform a brute force attack against the user's password offline leveraging the ASP REP Roasting technique. Red Teams and adversaries alike who have obtained privileges in an Active Directory network may use this technique as a backdoor or a way to escalate privileges.", + "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4738 MSADChangedAttributes=\"*Don't Require Preauth' - Enabled*\" | table EventCode, Account_Name, Security_ID, MSADChangedAttributes | `kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_in_useraccountcontrol_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `User Account Management` within `Account Management` needs to be enabled.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/identity/useraccountcontrol-manipulate-account-properties", + "https://m0chan.github.io/2019/07/31/How-To-Attack-Kerberos-101.html", + "https://stealthbits.com/blog/cracking-active-directory-passwords-with-as-rep-roasting/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled in UserAccountControl", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" + ], + "asset_type": "endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.004/powershell/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Kerberos Pre Authentication was Disabled for $Account_Name$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1558", + "T1558.004" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Account_Name", + "Security_ID", + "MSADChangedAttributes" + ], + "risk_score": 45, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1558", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_in_useraccountcontrol_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_in_useraccountcontrol.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled with PowerShell", + "id": "59b51620-94c9-11ec-b3d5-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-23", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Set-ADAccountControl` commandlet with specific parameters. `Set-ADAccountControl` is part of the Active Directory PowerShell module used to manage Windows Active Directory networks. As the name suggests, `Set-ADAccountControl` is used to modify User Account Control values for an Active Directory domain account. With the appropiate parameters, Set-ADAccountControl allows adversaries to disable Kerberos Pre-Authentication for an account to to easily perform a brute force attack against the user's password offline leveraging the ASP REP Roasting technique. Red Teams and adversaries alike who have obtained privileges in an Active Directory network may use this technique as a backdoor or a way to escalate privileges.", + "search": " `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Set-ADAccountControl*\" AND Message=\"*DoesNotRequirePreAuth:$true*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_with_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, Administrators may need to set this flag for legitimate purposes.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/identity/useraccountcontrol-manipulate-account-properties", + "https://m0chan.github.io/2019/07/31/How-To-Attack-Kerberos-101.html", + "https://stealthbits.com/blog/cracking-active-directory-passwords-with-as-rep-roasting/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled with PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" + ], + "asset_type": "endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.004/powershell/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Kerberos Pre Authentication was Disabled using PowerShell on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1558", + "T1558.004" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 45, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1558", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_with_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_with_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Known Services Killed by Ransomware", + "id": "3070f8e0-c528-11eb-b2a0-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-04", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search detects a suspicioous termination of known services killed by ransomware before encrypting files in a compromised machine. This technique is commonly seen in most of ransomware now a days to avoid exception error while accessing the targetted files it wants to encrypts because of the open handle of those services to the targetted file.", + "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 Message IN (\"*Volume Shadow Copy*\",\"*VSS*\", \"*backup*\", \"*sophos*\", \"*sql*\", \"*memtas*\", \"*mepocs*\", \"*veeam*\", \"*svc$*\") Message=\"*service entered the stopped state*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message dest Type | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `known_services_killed_by_ransomware_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the 7036 EventCode ScManager in System audit Logs from your endpoints.", + "known_false_positives": "Admin activities or installing related updates may do a sudden stop to list of services we monitor.", + "references": [ + "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", + "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Known Services Killed by Ransomware", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "BlackMatter Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf3/windows-system.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Known services $Message$ terminated by a potential ransomware on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1490" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Message", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "dest", + "Type" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_system", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "known_services_killed_by_ransomware_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/known_services_killed_by_ransomware.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories", + "id": "023f3452-5f27-11ec-bf00-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-17", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a suspicious file creation in known cron table directories. This event is commonly abuse by malware, adversaries and red teamers to persist on the target or compromised host. crontab or cronjob is like a schedule task in windows environment where you can create an executable or script on the known crontab directories to run it base on its schedule. This Anomaly query is a good indicator to look further what file is added and who added the file if to consider it legitimate file.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/etc/cron*\", \"*/var/spool/cron/*\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_add_files_in_known_crontab_directories_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can create file in crontab folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.sandflysecurity.com/blog/detecting-cronrat-malware-on-linux-instantly/", + "https://www.cyberciti.biz/faq/how-do-i-add-jobs-to-cron-under-linux-or-unix-oses/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/cronjobs_entry/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "a file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.003", + "T1053" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Filesystem.file_create_time", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.process_guid", + "Filesystem.file_path" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "Rocke" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_add_files_in_known_crontab_directories_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_add_files_in_known_crontab_directories.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Add User Account", + "id": "51fbcaf2-6259-11ec-b0f3-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for commands to create user accounts on the linux platform. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to persist on the targeted or compromised host by creating new user with an elevated privilege. This Hunting query may catch normal creation of user by administrator so filter is needed.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"useradd\", \"adduser\") OR Processes.process IN (\"*useradd *\", \"*adduser *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_add_user_account_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://linuxize.com/post/how-to-create-users-in-linux-using-the-useradd-command/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Add User Account", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/linux_adduser/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A commandline $process$ that may create user account on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1136.001", + "T1136" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT3", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Fox Kitten", + "Leafminer", + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Indrik Spider", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_add_user_account_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_add_user_account.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux At Allow Config File Creation", + "id": "977b3082-5f3d-11ec-b954-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-17", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a suspicious file creation of /etc/at.allow or /etc/at.deny. These 2 files are commonly abused by malware, adversaries or red teamers to persist on the targeted or compromised host. These config files can restrict or allow user to execute \"at\" application (another schedule task application in linux). attacker can create a user or add the compromised username to that config file to execute \"at\" to schedule it malicious code. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator to investigate further the entry in created config file and who created it to verify if it is a false positive.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/etc/at.allow\", \"*/etc/at.deny\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_at_allow_config_file_creation_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can create this file for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://linuxize.com/post/at-command-in-linux/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux At Allow Config File Creation", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.001/at_execution/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.003", + "T1053" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Filesystem.file_create_time", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.process_guid", + "Filesystem.file_path" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "Rocke" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_at_allow_config_file_creation_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_at_allow_config_file_creation.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux At Application Execution", + "id": "bf0a378e-5f3c-11ec-a6de-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-17", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a suspicious process creation of At application. This process can be used by malware, adversaries and red teamers to create persistence entry to the targeted or compromised host with their malicious code. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator to investigate the event before and after this process execution, when it was executed and what schedule task it will execute.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"at\", \"atd\") OR Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"at\", \"atd\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_at_application_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can use this application for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/001/", + "https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/getting-attacker-ip-address-from-malicious-linux-job-craig-rowland/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux At Application Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.001/at_execution/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "At application was executed in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.001", + "T1053" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 9, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "At (Linux)", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_at_application_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_at_application_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Change File Owner To Root", + "id": "c1400ea2-6257-11ec-ad49-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for a commandline that change the file owner to root using chown utility tool. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to escalate privilege to the targeted or compromised host by changing the owner of their malicious file to root. This event is not so common in corporate network except from the administrator doing normal task that needs high privilege.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = chown OR Processes.process = \"*chown *\") AND Processes.process = \"* root *\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_change_file_owner_to_root_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://unix.stackexchange.com/questions/101073/how-to-change-permissions-from-root-user-to-all-users", + "https://askubuntu.com/questions/617850/changing-from-user-to-superuser" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Change File Owner To Root", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.001/chmod_uid/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A commandline $process$ that may change ownership to root on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1222.002", + "T1222" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1222.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1222", + "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_change_file_owner_to_root_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_change_file_owner_to_root.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Common Process For Elevation Control", + "id": "66ab15c0-63d0-11ec-9e70-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-23", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to look for possible elevation control access using a common known process in linux platform to change the attribute and file ownership. This technique is commonly abused by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain persistence or privilege escalation on the target or compromised host. Tis common process is used to modify file attribute, file ownership or SUID. This tools can be used in legitimate purposes so filter is needed.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"chmod\", \"chown\", \"fchmod\", \"fchmodat\", \"fchown\", \"fchownat\", \"fremovexattr\", \"fsetxattr\", \"lchown\", \"lremovexattr\", \"lsetxattr\", \"removexattr\", \"setuid\", \"setgid\", \"setreuid\", \"setregid\", \"chattr\") OR Processes.process IN (\"*chmod *\", \"*chown *\", \"*fchmod *\", \"*fchmodat *\", \"*fchown *\", \"*fchownat *\", \"*fremovexattr *\", \"*fsetxattr *\", \"*lchown *\", \"*lremovexattr *\", \"*lsetxattr *\", \"*removexattr *\", \"*setuid *\", \"*setgid *\", \"*setreuid *\", \"*setregid *\", \"*setcap *\", \"*chattr *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_common_process_for_elevation_control_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/001/", + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/auditd/blob/master/audit.rules#L285-L297", + "https://github.com/bfuzzy1/auditd-attack/blob/master/auditd-attack/auditd-attack.rules#L269-L270", + "https://github.com/microsoft/MSTIC-Sysmon/blob/main/linux/configs/attack-based/privilege_escalation/T1548.001_ElevationControl_CommonProcesses.xml" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Common Process For Elevation Control", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.001/chmod_uid/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A commandline $process$ with process $process_name$ on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.001", + "T1548" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 9, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Setuid and Setgid", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_common_process_for_elevation_control_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_common_process_for_elevation_control.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux DD File Overwrite", + "id": "9b6aae5e-8d85-11ec-b2ae-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-14", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to look for dd command to overwrite file. This technique was abused by adversaries or threat actor to destroy files or data on specific system or in a large number of host within network to interrupt host avilability, services and many more. This is also used to destroy data where it make the file irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files, data or local and remote drives.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"dd\" AND Processes.process = \"*of=*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_dd_file_overwrite_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/dd/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1485/T1485.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux DD File Overwrite", + "analytic_story": [ + "Data Destruction" + ], + "asset_type": "endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/linux_dd_file_overwrite/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A commandline $process$ executed on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1485" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_dd_file_overwrite_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_dd_file_overwrite.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Doas Conf File Creation", + "id": "f6343e86-6e09-11ec-9376-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-05", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect the creation of doas.conf file in linux host platform. This configuration file can be use by doas utility tool to allow or permit standard users to perform tasks as root, the same way sudo does. This tool is developed as a minimalistic alternative to sudo application. This tool can be abused advesaries, attacker or malware to gain elevated privileges to the targeted or compromised host. On the other hand this can also be executed by administrator for a certain task that needs admin rights. In this case filter is needed.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/etc/doas.conf\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_doas_conf_file_creation_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://wiki.gentoo.org/wiki/Doas", + "https://www.makeuseof.com/how-to-install-and-use-doas/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Doas Conf File Creation", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/doas/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.003", + "T1548" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Filesystem.file_create_time", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.process_guid", + "Filesystem.file_path" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_doas_conf_file_creation_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_doas_conf_file_creation.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Doas Tool Execution", + "id": "d5a62490-6e09-11ec-884e-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-05", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect the doas tool execution in linux host platform. This utility tool allow standard users to perform tasks as root, the same way sudo does. This tool is developed as a minimalistic alternative to sudo application. This tool can be abused advesaries, attacker or malware to gain elevated privileges to the targeted or compromised host. On the other hand this can also be executed by administrator for a certain task that needs admin rights. In this case filter is needed.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"doas\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_doas_tool_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://wiki.gentoo.org/wiki/Doas", + "https://www.makeuseof.com/how-to-install-and-use-doas/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Doas Tool Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/doas_exec/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A doas $process_name$ with commandline $process$ was executed on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.003", + "T1548" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_doas_tool_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_doas_tool_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter", + "id": "0d370304-5f26-11ec-a4bb-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-17", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a suspicious cronjobs modification using crontab edit parameter. This commandline parameter can be abuse by malware author, adversaries, and red red teamers to add cronjob entry to their malicious code to execute to the schedule they want. This event can also be executed by administrator or normal user for automation purposes so filter is needed.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = crontab Processes.process = \"*crontab *\" Processes.process = \"* -e*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_edit_cron_table_parameter_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can use this application for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/crontab_edit_parameter/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A possible crontab edit command $process$ executed on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.003", + "T1053" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 9, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "Rocke" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_edit_cron_table_parameter_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_edit_cron_table_parameter.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory", + "id": "b85bbeec-6326-11ec-9311-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-22", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for suspicious file creation in kernel/driver directory in linux platform. This directory is known folder for all linux kernel module available within the system. so creation of file in this directory is a good indicator that there is a possible rootkit installation in the host machine. This technique was abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain high privileges to their malicious code such us in kernel level. Even this event is not so common administrator or legitimate 3rd party tool may install driver or linux kernel module as part of its installation.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/kernel/drivers/*\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_file_created_in_kernel_driver_directory_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can create file in this folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/fedora/rawhide/system-administrators-guide/kernel-module-driver-configuration/Working_with_Kernel_Modules/", + "https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/175953/how-to-load-a-malicious-lkm-at-startup", + "https://0x00sec.org/t/kernel-rootkits-getting-your-hands-dirty/1485" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.006/loading_linux_kernel_module/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1547.006", + "T1547" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Filesystem.file_create_time", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.process_guid", + "Filesystem.file_path" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.006", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_file_created_in_kernel_driver_directory_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_file_created_in_kernel_driver_directory.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory", + "id": "97d9cfb2-61ad-11ec-bb2d-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-20", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for suspicious file creation on init system directories for automatic execution of script or file upon boot up. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamer to persist on the targeted or compromised host. This behavior can be executed or use by an administrator or network operator to add script files or binary files as part of a task or automation. filter is needed.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/etc/init.d/*\", \"*/etc/rc.d/*\", \"*/sbin/init.d/*\", \"*/etc/rc.local*\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_file_creation_in_init_boot_directory_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can create file in this folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.004/linux_init_profile/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1037.004", + "T1037" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Filesystem.file_create_time", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.process_guid", + "Filesystem.file_path" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1037.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "RC Scripts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1037", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Rocke" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_file_creation_in_init_boot_directory_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_file_creation_in_init_boot_directory.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux File Creation In Profile Directory", + "id": "46ba0082-61af-11ec-9826-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-20", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for suspicious file creation in /etc/profile.d directory to automatically execute scripts by shell upon boot up of a linux machine. This technique is commonly abused by adversaries, malware and red teamers as a persistence mechanism to the targeted or compromised host. This Anomaly detection is a good indicator that someone wants to run a code after boot up which can be done also by the administrator or network operator for automation purposes.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/etc/profile.d/*\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_file_creation_in_profile_directory_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can create file in profile.d folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004/", + "https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux File Creation In Profile Directory", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.004/linux_init_profile/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1546.004", + "T1546" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Filesystem.file_create_time", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.process_guid", + "Filesystem.file_path" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell Configuration Modification", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_file_creation_in_profile_directory_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_file_creation_in_profile_directory.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility", + "id": "18b5a1a0-6326-11ec-943a-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-22", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for inserting of linux kernel module using insmod utility function. This event can detect a installation of rootkit or malicious kernel module to gain elevated privileges to their malicious code and bypassed detections. This Anomaly detection is a good indicator that someone installing kernel module in a linux host either admin or adversaries. filter is needed in this scenario", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN(\"kmod\", \"sudo\") AND Processes.process = *insmod* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_insert_kernel_module_using_insmod_utility_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/fedora/rawhide/system-administrators-guide/kernel-module-driver-configuration/Working_with_Kernel_Modules/", + "https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/175953/how-to-load-a-malicious-lkm-at-startup", + "https://0x00sec.org/t/kernel-rootkits-getting-your-hands-dirty/1485" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.006/loading_linux_kernel_module/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A commandline $process$ that may install kernel module on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1547.006", + "T1547" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.006", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_insert_kernel_module_using_insmod_utility_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_insert_kernel_module_using_insmod_utility.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility", + "id": "387b278a-6326-11ec-aa2c-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-22", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for possible installing a linux kernel module using modprobe utility function. This event can detect a installation of rootkit or malicious kernel module to gain elevated privileges to their malicious code and bypassed detections. This Anomaly detection is a good indicator that someone installing kernel module in a linux host either admin or adversaries. filter is needed in this scenario", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN(\"kmod\", \"sudo\") AND Processes.process = *modprobe* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_install_kernel_module_using_modprobe_utility_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/fedora/rawhide/system-administrators-guide/kernel-module-driver-configuration/Working_with_Kernel_Modules/", + "https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/175953/how-to-load-a-malicious-lkm-at-startup", + "https://0x00sec.org/t/kernel-rootkits-getting-your-hands-dirty/1485" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.006/loading_linux_kernel_module/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A commandline $process$ that may install kernel module on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1547.006", + "T1547" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.006", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_install_kernel_module_using_modprobe_utility_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_install_kernel_module_using_modprobe_utility.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "id": "7b09db8a-5c20-11ec-9945-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the process name of Java, Apache, or Tomcat spawning a Linux shell. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). The shells included in the macro are \"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\". Upon triage, review parallel processes and command-line arguments to determine legitimacy.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=java OR Processes.parent_process_name=apache OR Processes.parent_process_name=tomcat `linux_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_java_spawning_shell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. Ensure EDR product is mapping OS Linux to the datamodel properly. Add any additional java process names for your environment to the analytic as needed.", + "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required on internal developer build systems or classify assets as web facing and restrict the analytic based on asset type.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.netlab.360.com/ten-families-of-malicious-samples-are-spreading-using-the-log4j2-vulnerability-now/", + "https://gist.github.com/olafhartong/916ebc673ba066537740164f7e7e1d72" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ spawning a Linux shell, potentially indicative of exploitation.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "linux_shells", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name IN (\"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\"))", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "linux_java_spawning_shell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File", + "id": "ab1e0d52-624a-11ec-8e0b-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to look for suspicious command lines that may add entry to /etc/sudoers with NOPASSWD attribute in linux platform. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain elevated privilege to the targeted or compromised host. /etc/sudoers file controls who can run what commands users can execute on the machines and can also control whether user need a password to execute particular commands. This file is composed of aliases (basically variables) and user specifications.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*NOPASSWD:*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_nopasswd_entry_in_sudoers_file_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://askubuntu.com/questions/334318/sudoers-file-enable-nopasswd-for-user-all-commands", + "https://help.ubuntu.com/community/Sudoers" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/nopasswd_sudoers/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "a commandline $process$ executed on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.003", + "T1548" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_nopasswd_entry_in_sudoers_file_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_nopasswd_entry_in_sudoers_file.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux pkexec Privilege Escalation", + "id": "03e22c1c-8086-11ec-ac2e-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-28", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies `pkexec` spawning with no command-line arguments. A vulnerability in Polkit's pkexec component identified as CVE-2021-4034 (PwnKit) which is present in the default configuration of all major Linux distributions and can be exploited to gain full root privileges on the system.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=pkexec by _time Processes.dest Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(^.{1}$)\" | `linux_pkexec_privilege_escalation_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "Depending on the EDR product in use, there are multiple ways to \"null\" the command-line field, Processes.process. Two that may be useful `process=\"(^.{0}$)\"` or `| where isnull(process)`. To generate data for this behavior, Sysmon for Linux was utilized. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://www.reddit.com/r/crowdstrike/comments/sdfeig/20220126_cool_query_friday_hunting_pwnkit_local/", + "https://linux.die.net/man/1/pkexec", + "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/linux-system-service-bug-gives-root-on-all-major-distros-exploit-released/", + "https://access.redhat.com/security/security-updates/#/?q=polkit&p=1&sort=portal_publication_date%20desc&rows=10&portal_advisory_type=Security%20Advisory&documentKind=PortalProduct" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux pkexec Privilege Escalation", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1068/zoom_child_process/linux-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ related to a local privilege escalation in polkit pkexec.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1068" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-4034" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "Cobalt Group", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "PLATINUM", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "Whitefly", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_pkexec_privilege_escalation_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_pkexec_privilege_escalation.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File", + "id": "7a85eb24-72da-11ec-ac76-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-11", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to look for suspicious process command-line that might be accessing or modifying sshd_config. This file is the ssh configuration file that might be modify by threat actors or adversaries to redirect port connection, allow user using authorized key generated during attack. This anomaly detection might catch noise from administrator auditing or modifying ssh configuration file. In this scenario filter is needed", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN(\"cat\", \"nano*\",\"vim*\", \"vi*\") AND Processes.process IN(\"*/etc/ssh/sshd_config\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_access_or_modification_of_sshd_config_file_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.hackingarticles.in/ssh-penetration-testing-port-22/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/004/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098.004/ssh_authorized_keys/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "a commandline $process$ executed on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1098.004", + "T1098" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "SSH Authorized Keys", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT3", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_possible_access_or_modification_of_sshd_config_file_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_access_or_modification_of_sshd_config_file.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Possible Access To Credential Files", + "id": "16107e0e-71fc-11ec-b862-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-10", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a possible attempt to dump or access the content of /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow to enable offline credential cracking. \"etc/passwd\" store user information within linux OS while \"etc/shadow\" contain the user passwords hash. Adversaries and threat actors may attempt to access this to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator of possible credential dumping technique but it might catch some normal administrator automation scripts or during credential auditing. In this scenario filter is needed.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN(\"cat\", \"nano*\",\"vim*\", \"vi*\") AND Processes.process IN(\"*/etc/shadow*\", \"*/etc/passwd*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_access_to_credential_files_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://askubuntu.com/questions/445361/what-is-difference-between-etc-shadow-and-etc-passwd", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/008/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Possible Access To Credential Files", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.008/copy_file_stdoutpipe/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A commandline $process$ executed on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.008", + "T1003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.008", + "mitre_attack_technique": "/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_possible_access_to_credential_files_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_access_to_credential_files.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File", + "id": "4479539c-71fc-11ec-b2e2-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-10", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a possible access or modification of /etc/sudoers file. \"/etc/sudoers\" file controls who can run what command as what users on what machine and can also control whether a specific user need a password for particular commands. adversaries and threat actors abuse this file to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation during attack on targeted host.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN(\"cat\", \"nano*\",\"vim*\", \"vi*\") AND Processes.process IN(\"*/etc/sudoers*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_access_to_sudoers_file_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003/", + "https://web.archive.org/web/20210708035426/https://www.cobaltstrike.com/downloads/csmanual43.pdf" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.008/copy_file_stdoutpipe/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A commandline $process$ executed on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.003", + "T1548" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_possible_access_to_sudoers_file_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_access_to_sudoers_file.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File", + "id": "7bc20606-5f40-11ec-a586-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-17", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for suspicious commandline that may use to append user entry to /etc/at.allow or /etc/at.deny. These 2 files are commonly abused by malware, adversaries or red teamers to persist on the targeted or compromised host. These config file can restrict user that can only execute at application (another schedule task application in linux). attacker can create a user or add the compromised username to that config file to execute at to schedule it malicious code. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator to investigate further the entry in created config file and who created it to verify if it is a false positive.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*echo*\" AND Processes.process IN(\"*/etc/at.allow\", \"*/etc/at.deny\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://linuxize.com/post/at-command-in-linux/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/001/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.001/at_execution/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A commandline $process$ that may modify at allow config file in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.001", + "T1053" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 9, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "At (Linux)", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File", + "id": "9c94732a-61af-11ec-91e3-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-20", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for suspicious command-lines that can be possibly used to modify user profile files to automatically execute scripts/executables by shell upon reboot of the machine. This technique is commonly abused by adversaries, malware and red teamers as persistence mechanism to the targeted or compromised host. This Anomaly detection is a good indicator that someone wants to run code after reboot which can be done also by the administrator or network operator for automation purposes.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*echo*\" AND Processes.process IN(\"*~/.bashrc\", \"*~/.bash_profile\", \"*/etc/profile\", \"~/.bash_login\", \"*~/.profile\", \"~/.bash_logout\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_append_command_to_profile_config_file_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://unix.stackexchange.com/questions/129143/what-is-the-purpose-of-bashrc-and-how-does-it-work", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.004/linux_init_profile/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "a commandline $process$ that may modify profile files in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1546.004", + "T1546" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell Configuration Modification", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_possible_append_command_to_profile_config_file_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_append_command_to_profile_config_file.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File", + "id": "b5b91200-5f27-11ec-bb4e-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-17", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for possible suspicious commandline that may use to append a code to any existing cronjob files for persistence or privilege escalation. This technique is commonly abused by malware, adversaries and red teamers to automatically execute their code within a existing or sometimes in normal cronjob script file.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*echo*\" AND Processes.process IN(\"*/etc/cron*\", \"*/var/spool/cron/*\", \"*/etc/anacrontab*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003/", + "https://blog.aquasec.com/threat-alert-kinsing-malware-container-vulnerability", + "https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/cronjobs_entry/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A commandline $process$ that may modify cronjob file in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.003", + "T1053" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "Rocke" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor", + "id": "dcc89bde-5f24-11ec-87ca-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-17", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for possible modification of cronjobs file using editor. This event is can be seen in normal user but can also be a good hunting indicator for unwanted user modifying cronjobs for possible persistence or privilege escalation.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name IN(\"nano\",\"vim.basic\") OR Processes.process IN (\"*nano *\", \"*vi *\", \"*vim *\")) AND Processes.process IN(\"*/etc/cron*\", \"*/var/spool/cron/*\", \"*/etc/anacrontab*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/cronjobs_entry/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 20, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A commandline $process$ that may modify cronjob file using editor in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.003", + "T1053" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 6, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "Rocke" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation", + "id": "c04ef40c-72da-11ec-8eac-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-11", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to look for possible ssh key file creation on ~/.ssh/ folder. This technique is commonly abused by threat actors and adversaries to gain persistence and privilege escalation to the targeted host. by creating ssh private and public key and passing the public key to the attacker server. threat actor can access remotely the machine using openssh daemon service.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/.ssh*\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_possible_ssh_key_file_creation_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can create file in ~/.ssh folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.hackingarticles.in/ssh-penetration-testing-port-22/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/004/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098.004/ssh_authorized_keys/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1098.004", + "T1098" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Filesystem.file_create_time", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.process_guid", + "Filesystem.file_path" + ], + "risk_score": 36, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "SSH Authorized Keys", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT3", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_possible_ssh_key_file_creation_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_ssh_key_file_creation.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls", + "id": "cbe2ca30-631e-11ec-8670-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-22", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious command that may hijack a library function in linux platform. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain privileges and persist on the machine. This detection pertains to loading a dll to hijack or hook a library function of specific program using LD_PRELOAD command.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*LD_PRELOAD*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_preload_hijack_library_calls_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://compilepeace.medium.com/memory-malware-part-0x2-writing-userland-rootkits-via-ld-preload-30121c8343d5" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1574.006/lib_hijack/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A commandline $process$ that may hijack library function on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1574.006", + "T1574" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.006", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic Linker Hijacking", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT41", + "Rocke" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_preload_hijack_library_calls_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_preload_hijack_library_calls.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory", + "id": "c7495048-61b6-11ec-9a37-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-20", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for suspicious file creation in systemd timer directory in linux platform. systemd is a system and service manager for Linux distributions. From the Windows perspective, this process fulfills the duties of wininit.exe and services.exe combined. At the risk of simplifying the functionality of systemd, it initializes a Linux system and starts relevant services that are defined in service unit files. Adversaries, malware and red teamers may abuse this this feature by stashing systemd service file to persist on the targetted or compromised host.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name = *.service Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/etc/systemd/system*\", \"*/lib/systemd/system*\", \"*/usr/lib/systemd/system*\", \"*/run/systemd/system*\", \"*~/.config/systemd/*\", \"*~/.local/share/systemd/*\",\"*/etc/systemd/user*\", \"*/lib/systemd/user*\", \"*/usr/lib/systemd/user*\", \"*/run/systemd/user*\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_service_file_created_in_systemd_directory_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can create file in systemd folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/006/", + "https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/", + "https://redcanary.com/blog/attck-t1501-understanding-systemd-service-persistence/", + "https://github.com/microsoft/MSTIC-Sysmon/blob/main/linux/configs/attack-based/persistence/T1053.003_Cron_Activity.xml" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.006/service_systemd/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A service file named as $file_path$ is created in systemd folder on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.006", + "T1053" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Filesystem.file_create_time", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.process_guid", + "Filesystem.file_path" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.006", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_service_file_created_in_systemd_directory_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_service_file_created_in_systemd_directory.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Service Restarted", + "id": "084275ba-61b8-11ec-8d64-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-20", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for restarted or re-enable services in linux platform. This technique can be executed or performed using systemctl or service tool application. Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Administrator may also create a legitimated service for a specific tool or normal application as part of task or automation, in this scenario it is suggested to look for the service path of the actual script or executable that register as service and who created the service for further verification.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name IN (\"systemctl\", \"service\") OR Processes.process IN (\"*systemctl *\", \"*service *\")) Processes.process IN (\"*restart*\", \"*reload*\", \"*reenable*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_service_restarted_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and commandline executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Service Restarted", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.006/service_systemd/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A commandline $process$ that may create or start a service on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.006", + "T1053" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.006", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_service_restarted_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_service_restarted.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Service Started Or Enabled", + "id": "e0428212-61b7-11ec-88a3-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-20", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for created or enable services in linux platform. This technique can be executed or performed using systemctl or service tool application. Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Administrator may also create a legitimated service for a specific tool or normal application as part of task or automation, in this scenario it is suggested to look for the service path of the actual script or executable that register as service and who created the service for further verification.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name IN (\"systemctl\", \"service\") OR Processes.process IN (\"*systemctl *\", \"*service *\")) Processes.process IN (\"* start *\", \"* enable *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_service_started_or_enabled_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Service Started Or Enabled", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.006/service_systemd/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "a commandline $process$ that may create or start a service on $dest", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.006", + "T1053" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.006", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_service_started_or_enabled_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_service_started_or_enabled.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility", + "id": "bf0304b6-6250-11ec-9d7c-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for suspicious chmod utility execution to enable SUID bit. This allows a user to temporarily gain root access, usually in order to run a program. For example, only the root account is allowed to change the password information contained in the password database; If the SUID bit appears as an s, the file's owner also has execute permission to the file; if it appears as an S, the file's owner does not have execute permission. The second specialty permission is the SGID, or set group id bit. It is similar to the SUID bit, except it can temporarily change group membership, usually to execute a program. The SGID bit is set if an s or an S appears in the group section of permissions.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE (Processes.process_name = chmod OR Processes.process = \"*chmod *\") AND Processes.process IN(\"* g+s *\", \"* u+s *\", \"* 4777 *\", \"* 4577 *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_setuid_using_chmod_utility_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.hackingarticles.in/linux-privilege-escalation-using-capabilities/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.001/chmod_uid/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "a commandline $process$ that may set suid or sgid on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.001", + "T1548" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Setuid and Setgid", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_setuid_using_chmod_utility_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_setuid_using_chmod_utility.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility", + "id": "9d96022e-6250-11ec-9a19-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for suspicious setcap utility execution to enable SUID bit. This allows a user to temporarily gain root access, usually in order to run a program. For example, only the root account is allowed to change the password information contained in the password database; If the SUID bit appears as an s, the file's owner also has execute permission to the file; if it appears as an S, the file's owner does not have execute permission. The second specialty permission is the SGID, or set group id bit. It is similar to the SUID bit, except it can temporarily change group membership, usually to execute a program. The SGID bit is set if an s or an S appears in the group section of permissions.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = setcap OR Processes.process = \"*setcap *\") AND Processes.process IN (\"* cap_setuid=ep *\", \"* cap_setuid+ep *\", \"* cap_net_bind_service+p *\", \"* cap_net_raw+ep *\", \"* cap_dac_read_search+ep *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_setuid_using_setcap_utility_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.hackingarticles.in/linux-privilege-escalation-using-capabilities/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.001/linux_setcap/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A commandline $process$ that may set suid or sgid on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.001", + "T1548" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Setuid and Setgid", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_setuid_using_setcap_utility_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_setuid_using_setcap_utility.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Sudo OR Su Execution", + "id": "4b00f134-6d6a-11ec-a90c-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-04", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect the execution of sudo or su command in linux operating system. The \"sudo\" command allows a system administrator to delegate authority to give certain users (or groups of users) the ability to run some (or all) commands as root or another user while providing an audit trail of the commands and their arguments. This command is commonly abused by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to elevate privileges to the targeted host. This command can be executed by administrator for legitimate purposes or to execute process that need admin privileges, In this scenario filter is needed.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"sudo\", \"su\") OR Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"sudo\", \"su\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_sudo_or_su_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Sudo OR Su Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/sudo_su/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A commandline $process$ that execute sudo or su in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.003", + "T1548" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 9, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_sudo_or_su_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_sudo_or_su_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation", + "id": "be254a5c-63e7-11ec-89da-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-23", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to looks for file creation of sudoers.tmp file cause by editing /etc/sudoers using visudo or editor in linux platform. This technique may abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain elevated privilege to targeted or compromised host. /etc/sudoers file controls who can run what commands as what users on what machines and can also control special things such as whether you need a password for particular commands. The file is composed of aliases (basically variables) and user specifications (which control who can run what).", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*sudoers.tmp*\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_sudoers_tmp_file_creation_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://forum.ubuntuusers.de/topic/sudo-visudo-gibt-etc-sudoers-tmp/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/sudoers_temp/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.003", + "T1548" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Filesystem.file_create_time", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.process_guid", + "Filesystem.file_path" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_sudoers_tmp_file_creation_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_sudoers_tmp_file_creation.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux System Network Discovery", + "id": "535cb214-8b47-11ec-a2c7-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-11", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to look for possible enumeration of local network configuration. This technique is commonly used as part of recon of adversaries or threat actor to know some network information for its next or further attack. This anomaly detections may capture normal event made by administrator during auditing or testing network connection of specific host or network to network.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name_list values(Processes.process) as process_list values(Processes.process_id) as process_id_list values(Processes.parent_process_id) as parent_process_id_list values(Processes.process_guid) as process_guid_list dc(Processes.process_name) as process_name_count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"arp\", \"ifconfig\", \"ip\", \"netstat\", \"firewall-cmd\", \"ufw\", \"iptables\", \"ss\", \"route\") by _time span=30m Processes.dest Processes.user | where process_name_count >=4 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`| `linux_system_network_discovery_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1016/T1016.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux System Network Discovery", + "analytic_story": [ + "Network Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1016/atomic_red_team/linux_net_discovery/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "A commandline $process$ executed on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1016" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 9, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1016", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Higaisa", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_system_network_discovery_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_system_network_discovery.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Visudo Utility Execution", + "id": "08c41040-624c-11ec-a71f-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to looks for suspicious commandline that add entry to /etc/sudoers by using visudo utility tool in linux platform. This technique may abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain elevated privilege to targeted or compromised host. /etc/sudoers file controls who can run what commands as what users on what machines and can also control special things such as whether you need a password for particular commands. The file is composed of aliases (basically variables) and user specifications (which control who can run what).", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = visudo by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_visudo_utility_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://askubuntu.com/questions/334318/sudoers-file-enable-nopasswd-for-user-all-commands" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Visudo Utility Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 40, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/visudo/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 40, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A commandline $process$ executed on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.003", + "T1548" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 16, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_visudo_utility_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_visudo_utility_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Loading Of Dynwrapx Module", + "id": "eac5e8ba-4857-11ec-9371-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-18", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "DynamicWrapperX is an ActiveX component that can be used in a script to call Windows API functions, but it requires the dynwrapx.dll to be installed and registered. With that, registering or loading dynwrapx.dll to a host is highly suspicious. In most instances when it is used maliciously, the best way to triage is to review parallel processes and pivot on the process_guid. Review the registry for any suspicious modifications meant to load dynwrapx.dll. Identify any suspicious module loads of dynwrapx.dll. This detection will return and identify the processes that invoke vbs/wscript/cscript.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 (ImageLoaded = \"*\\\\dynwrapx.dll\" OR OriginalFileName = \"dynwrapx.dll\" OR Product = \"DynamicWrapperX\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded OriginalFileName Product process_name Computer EventCode Signed ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `loading_of_dynwrapx_module_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on processes that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however it is possible to filter by Processes.process_name and specific processes (ex. wscript.exe). Filter as needed. This may need modification based on EDR telemetry and how it brings in registry data. For example, removal of (Default).", + "references": [ + "https://blog.f-secure.com/hunting-for-koadic-a-com-based-rootkit/", + "https://www.script-coding.com/dynwrapx_eng.html", + "https://bohops.com/2018/06/28/abusing-com-registry-structure-clsid-localserver32-inprocserver32/", + "https://tria.ge/210929-ap75vsddan", + "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/cb77b93150cb0f7fe65ce8a7e2a5781e727419451355a7736db84109fa215a89" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Loading Of Dynwrapx Module", + "analytic_story": [ + "Remcos" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_dynwrapx/sysmon_dynwraper.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "dynwrapx.dll loaded by process $process_name$ on $Computer$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1055", + "T1055.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Image", + "ImageLoaded", + "OriginalFileName", + "Product", + "process_name", + "Computer", + "EventCode", + "Signed", + "ProcessId" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Cobalt Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sharpshooter", + "Silence", + "Turla" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic-link Library Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Putter Panda", + "TA505", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "loading_of_dynwrapx_module_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/loading_of_dynwrapx_module.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Local Account Discovery with Net", + "id": "5d0d4830-0133-11ec-bae3-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for local users. The two arguments `user` and 'users', return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` (Processes.process=*user OR Processes.process=*users) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `local_account_discovery_with_net_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Local Account Discovery with Net", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Local user discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1087", + "T1087.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "Chimera", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Poseidon Group", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "admin@338" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_net", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "local_account_discovery_with_net_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/local_account_discovery_with_net.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Local Account Discovery With Wmic", + "id": "4902d7aa-0134-11ec-9d65-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for local users. The argument `useraccount` is used to leverage WMI to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` (Processes.process=*useraccount*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `local_account_discovery_with_wmic_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Local Account Discovery With Wmic", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Local user discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1087", + "T1087.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "Chimera", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Poseidon Group", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "admin@338" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_wmic", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "local_account_discovery_with_wmic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/local_account_discovery_with_wmic.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 Exploitation", + "id": "9be30d80-3a39-4df9-9102-64a467b24eac", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-26", + "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", + "type": "Correlation", + "datamodel": [ + "Risk" + ], + "description": "This correlation find exploitation of Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 against systems using detections from Splunk Security Content Analytic Story. It does this by calculating the distinct count of MITRE ATT&CK tactics from Log4Shell detections fired. If the count is larger than 2 or more distinct MITRE ATT&CK tactics we assume high problability of exploitation. The Analytic story breaks down into 3 major phases of a Log4Shell exploitation, specifically 1. Initial Payload delivery eg. `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}` 2. Call back to malicious LDAP server eg. Exploit.class 3. Post Exploitation Activity/Lateral Movement using Powershell or similar T1562.001 Each of these phases fall into different MITRE ATT&CK Tactics (Initial Access, Execution, Command and Control), by looking into 2 or more phases showing up in detections triggerd is how this correlation search finds exploitation. If we get a notable from this correlation search the best way to triage it is by investigating the affected systems against Log4Shell exploitation using Splunk SOAR playbooks.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk where All_Risk.analyticstories=\"Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228\" All_Risk.risk_object_type=\"system\" by All_Risk.risk_object All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic source | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Risk)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | stats values(risk_object) as affected_systems values(source) as detection_name values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as tactics values(firstTime) as firstTime values(lastTime) as lastTime dc(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as distinct_tactics | where distinct_tactics >= 2 | `log4shell_cve_2021_44228_exploitation_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To implement this correlation search a user needs to enable all detections in the Log4Shell Analytic Story and confirm it is generation risk events. A simple search `index=risk analyticstories=\"Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228\"` should contain events.", + "known_false_positives": "There are no known false positive for this search, but it could contain false positives as multiple detections can trigger and not have successful exploitation.", + "references": [ + "https://research.splunk.com/stories/log4shell_cve-2021-44228/", + "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/simulating-detecting-and-responding-to-log4shell-with-splunk.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 Exploitation", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/log4shell_exploitation/log4shell_correlation.txt" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Log4Shell Exploitation detected against $affected_systems$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105", + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "affected_systems", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Risk.analyticstories", + "All_Risk.risk_object_type", + "All_Risk.risk_object", + "All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic", + "source" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "log4shell_cve_2021_44228_exploitation_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/log4shell_cve_2021_44228_exploitation.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Logon Script Event Trigger Execution", + "id": "4c38c264-1f74-11ec-b5fa-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-27", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry entry to persist and gain privilege escalation upon booting up of compromised host. This technique was seen in several APT and malware where it modify UserInitMprLogonScript registry entry to its malicious payload to be executed upon boot up of the machine.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path IN (\"*\\\\Environment\\\\UserInitMprLogonScript\") by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `logon_script_event_trigger_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/001" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Logon Script Event Trigger Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1037.001/logonscript_reg/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1037", + "T1037.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_value_name" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1037", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Rocke" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1037.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Logon Script (Windows)", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "Cobalt Group" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "logon_script_event_trigger_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/logon_script_event_trigger_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Mailsniper Invoke functions", + "id": "a36972c8-b894-11eb-9f78-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-19", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect known mailsniper.ps1 functions executed in a machine. This technique was seen in some attacker to harvest some sensitive e-mail in a compromised exchange server.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message IN (\"*Invoke-GlobalO365MailSearch*\", \"*Invoke-GlobalMailSearch*\", \"*Invoke-SelfSearch*\", \"*Invoke-PasswordSprayOWA*\", \"*Invoke-PasswordSprayEWS*\",\"*Invoke-DomainHarvestOWA*\", \"*Invoke-UsernameHarvestOWA*\",\"*Invoke-OpenInboxFinder*\",\"*Invoke-InjectGEventAPI*\",\"*Invoke-InjectGEvent*\",\"*Invoke-SearchGmail*\", \"*Invoke-MonitorCredSniper*\", \"*Invoke-AddGmailRule*\",\"*Invoke-PasswordSprayEAS*\",\"*Invoke-UsernameHarvestEAS*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mailsniper_invoke_functions_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the powershell logs from your endpoints. make sure you enable needed registry to monitor this event.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/introducing-mailsniper-a-tool-for-searching-every-users-email-for-sensitive-data/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Mailsniper Invoke functions", + "analytic_story": [ + "Data Exfiltration" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Exfiltration" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/casper/datasets1/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "mailsniper.ps1 functions $Message$ executed on a $ComputerName$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1114", + "T1114.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Magic Hound", + "Silent Librarian" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Email Collection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "Chimera", + "Magic Hound" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "mailsniper_invoke_functions_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/mailsniper_invoke_functions.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Malicious InProcServer32 Modification", + "id": "127c8d08-25ff-11ec-9223-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-10-05", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a process modifying the registry with a known malicious CLSID under InProcServer32. Most COM classes are registered with the operating system and are identified by a GUID that represents the Class Identifier (CLSID) within the registry (usually under HKLM\\\\Software\\\\Classes\\\\CLSID or HKCU\\\\Software\\\\Classes\\\\CLSID). Behind the implementation of a COM class is the server (some binary) that is referenced within registry keys under the CLSID. The LocalServer32 key represents a path to an executable (exe) implementation, and the InprocServer32 key represents a path to a dynamic link library (DLL) implementation (Bohops). During triage, review parallel processes for suspicious activity. Pivot on the process GUID to see the full timeline of events. Analyze the value and look for file modifications. Being this is looking for inprocserver32, a DLL found in the value will most likely be loaded by a parallel process.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_guid Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\CLSID\\\\{89565275-A714-4a43-912E-978B935EDCCC}\\\\InProcServer32\\\\(Default)\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest Registry.process_guid Registry.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | fields _time dest registry_path registry_key_name registry_value_name process_name process_path process process_guid user] | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, process_name registry_path registry_key_name registry_value_name user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_inprocserver32_modification_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, filter as needed. In our test case, Remcos used regsvr32.exe to modify the registry. It may be required, dependent upon the EDR tool producing registry events, to remove (Default) from the command-line.", + "references": [ + "https://bohops.com/2018/06/28/abusing-com-registry-structure-clsid-localserver32-inprocserver32/", + "https://tria.ge/210929-ap75vsddan", + "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/cb77b93150cb0f7fe65ce8a7e2a5781e727419451355a7736db84109fa215a89" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Malicious InProcServer32 Modification", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", + "Remcos" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "The $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ modifying the registry with a known malicious clsid under InProcServer32.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218.010", + "T1112" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "dest", + "process_name", + "registry_path", + "registry_key_name", + "registry_value_name", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cobalt Group", + "Deep Panda", + "Inception", + "Leviathan", + "TA551", + "WIRTE" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN8", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "malicious_inprocserver32_modification_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/malicious_inprocserver32_modification.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Malicious Powershell Executed As A Service", + "id": "8e204dfd-cae0-4ea8-a61d-e972a1ff2ff8", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-07", + "author": "Ryan Becwar", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This detection is to identify the abuse the Windows SC.exe to execute malicious commands or payloads via PowerShell.", + "search": " `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 | eval l_Service_File_Name=lower(Service_File_Name) | regex l_Service_File_Name=\"powershell[.\\s]|powershell_ise[.\\s]|pwsh[.\\s]|psexec[.\\s]\" | regex l_Service_File_Name=\"-nop[rofile\\s]+|-w[indowstyle]*\\s+hid[den]*|-noe[xit\\s]+|-enc[odedcommand\\s]+\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Service_File_Name Service_Name Service_Start_Type Service_Type Service_Account user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_powershell_executed_as_a_service_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows System logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints.", + "known_false_positives": "Creating a hidden powershell service is rare and could key off of those instances.", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/dosfuscation-report.pdf", + "http://az4n6.blogspot.com/2017/", + "https://www.danielbohannon.com/blog-1/2017/3/12/powershell-execution-argument-obfuscation-how-it-can-make-detection-easier" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Malicious Powershell Executed As A Service", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious Powershell" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1569.002/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Identifies the abuse the Windows SC.exe to execute malicious powerShell as a service $Service_File_Name$ by $user$ on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1569", + "T1569.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "EventCode", + "Service_File_Name", + "Service_Type", + "_time", + "Service_Name", + "Service_Start_Type", + "Service_Account", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1569", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "FIN6", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Operation Wocao", + "Silence", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_system", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "malicious_powershell_executed_as_a_service_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_executed_as_a_service.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command", + "id": "c4db14d9-7909-48b4-a054-aa14d89dbb19", + "version": 7, + "date": "2022-01-18", + "author": "David Dorsey, Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of the EncodedCommand PowerShell parameter. This is typically used by Administrators to run complex scripts, but commonly used by adversaries to hide their code. \\\nThe analytic identifies all variations of EncodedCommand, as PowerShell allows the ability to shorten the parameter. For example enc, enco, encod and so forth. In addition, through our research it was identified that PowerShell will interpret different command switch types beyond the hyphen. We have added endash, emdash, horizontal bar, and forward slash. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel events to determine legitimacy. Tune as needed based on admin scripts in use. \\\nAlternatively, may use regex per matching here https://regexr.com/662ov.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"(?i)[\\-|\\/|–|—|―]e(nc*o*d*e*d*c*o*m*m*a*n*d*)*\\s+[^-]\") | `malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "System administrators may use this option, but it's not common.", + "references": [ + "https://regexr.com/662ov", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses/blob/master/TestHarnesses/T1059.001_PowerShell/OutPowerShellCommandLineParameter.ps1", + "https://ss64.com/ps/powershell.html", + "https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/1440758396534214658?s=20", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell", + "NOBELIUM Group", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 7", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1027/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Powershell.exe running potentially malicious encodede commands on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1027" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1027", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackOasis", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dust Storm", + "Elderwood", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Group5", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_powershell", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass", + "id": "9be56c82-b1cc-4318-87eb-d138afaaca39", + "version": 5, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for PowerShell processes started with parameters used to bypass the local execution policy for scripts. These parameters are often observed in attacks leveraging PowerShell scripts as they override the default PowerShell execution policy.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process_id) as process_id, values(Processes.parent_process_id) as parent_process_id values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process=\"* -ex*\" OR Processes.process=\"* bypass *\") by Processes.process_id, Processes.user, Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "There may be legitimate reasons to bypass the PowerShell execution policy. The PowerShell script being run with this parameter should be validated to ensure that it is legitimate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass", + "analytic_story": [ + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "HAFNIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 7", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/encoded_powershell/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "PowerShell local execution policy bypass attempt on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_powershell", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques", + "id": "cde75cf6-3c7a-4dd6-af01-27cdb4511fd4", + "version": 5, + "date": "2021-01-19", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for PowerShell processes launched with arguments that have characters indicative of obfuscation on the command-line.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| eval num_obfuscation = (mvcount(split(process,\"`\"))-1) + (mvcount(split(process, \"^\"))-1) + (mvcount(split(process, \"'\"))-1) | `malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques_filter` | search num_obfuscation > 10 ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "These characters might be legitimately on the command-line, but it is not common.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 7", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/obfuscated_powershell/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Powershell.exe running with potential obfuscated arguments on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_powershell", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters", + "id": "13bbd574-83ac-11ec-99d4-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-01", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic looks for the use of Mimikatz command line parameters leveraged to execute pass the ticket attacks. Red teams and adversaries alike may use the pass the ticket technique using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Defenders should be aware that adversaries may customize the source code of Mimikatz and modify the command line parameters. This would effectively bypass this analytic.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process = \"*sekurlsa::tickets /export*\" OR Processes.process = \"*kerberos::ptt*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mimikatz_passtheticket_commandline_parameters_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "Although highly unlikely, legitimate applications may use the same command line parameters as Mimikatz.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" + ], + "asset_type": "endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1550.003/mimikatz/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Mimikatz command line parameters for pass the ticket attacks were used on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1550", + "T1550.003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_name" + ], + "risk_score": 36, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1550", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1550.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Ticket", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "mimikatz_passtheticket_commandline_parameters_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/mimikatz_passtheticket_commandline_parameters.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", + "id": "f6601940-4c74-11ec-b9b7-3e22fbd008af", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-23", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies `mmc.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the DCOM protocol and the MMC20 COM object, the executed command is spawned as a child processs of `mmc.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of mmc.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=mmc.exe) (Processes.process_name IN (\"Regsvcs.exe\", \"Ftp.exe\", \"OfflineScannerShell.exe\", \"Rasautou.exe\", \"Schtasks.exe\", \"Xwizard.exe\", \"Dllhost.exe\", \"Pnputil.exe\", \"Atbroker.exe\", \"Pcwrun.exe\", \"Ttdinject.exe\",\"Mshta.exe\", \"Bitsadmin.exe\", \"Certoc.exe\", \"Ieexec.exe\", \"Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe\", \"Runscripthelper.exe\", \"Forfiles.exe\", \"Msbuild.exe\", \"Register-cimprovider.exe\", \"Tttracer.exe\", \"Ie4uinit.exe\", \"Bash.exe\", \"Hh.exe\", \"SettingSyncHost.exe\", \"Cmstp.exe\", \"Mmc.exe\", \"Stordiag.exe\", \"Scriptrunner.exe\", \"Odbcconf.exe\", \"Extexport.exe\", \"Msdt.exe\", \"WorkFolders.exe\", \"Diskshadow.exe\", \"Mavinject.exe\", \"Regasm.exe\", \"Gpscript.exe\", \"Rundll32.exe\", \"Regsvr32.exe\", \"Msiexec.exe\", \"Wuauclt.exe\", \"Presentationhost.exe\", \"Wmic.exe\", \"Runonce.exe\", \"Syncappvpublishingserver.exe\", \"Verclsid.exe\", \"Infdefaultinstall.exe\", \"Explorer.exe\", \"Installutil.exe\", \"Netsh.exe\", \"Wab.exe\", \"Dnscmd.exe\", \"At.exe\", \"Pcalua.exe\", \"Msconfig.exe\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mmc_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003/", + "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/dcom-lateral-movement-techniques", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.003/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Mmc.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "mmc_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/mmc_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Modification Of Wallpaper", + "id": "accb0712-c381-11eb-8e5b-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-02", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies suspicious modification of registry to deface or change the wallpaper of a compromised machines as part of its payload. This technique was commonly seen in ransomware like REVIL where it create a bitmap file contain a note that the machine was compromised and make it as a wallpaper.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode =13 (TargetObject= \"*\\\\Control Panel\\\\Desktop\\\\Wallpaper\" AND Image != \"*\\\\explorer.exe\") OR (TargetObject= \"*\\\\Control Panel\\\\Desktop\\\\Wallpaper\" AND Details = \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Image TargetObject Details Computer process_guid process_id user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `modification_of_wallpaper_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Image, TargetObject registry key, registry Details from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "3rd party tool may used to changed the wallpaper of the machine", + "references": [ + "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", + "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Modification Of Wallpaper", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Revil Ransomware", + "BlackMatter Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Wallpaper modification on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1491" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Image", + "TargetObject", + "Details", + "Computer", + "process_guid", + "process_id", + "user_id" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1491", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Defacement", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "modification_of_wallpaper_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/modification_of_wallpaper.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Modify ACL permission To Files Or Folder", + "id": "7e8458cc-acca-11eb-9e3f-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-04", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies suspicious modification of ACL permission to a files or folder to make it available to everyone. This technique may be used by the adversary to evade ACLs or protected files access. This changes is commonly configured by the file or directory owner with appropriate permission. This behavior is a good indicator if this command seen on a machine utilized by an account with no permission to do so.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"cacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"icacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"xcacls.exe\" AND (Processes.process = \"*/G everyone:*\" OR Processes.process = \"*/G SYSTEM:*\") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `modify_acl_permission_to_files_or_folder_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed cacls.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "administrators may use this command. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Modify ACL permission To Files Or Folder", + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 40, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious ACL permission modification on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1222" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 32, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1222", + "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "modify_acl_permission_to_files_or_folder_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/modify_acl_permission_to_files_or_folder.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors", + "id": "f5f6af30-7ba7-4295-bfe9-07de87c01bbc", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-01-28", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for registry activity associated with modifications to the registry key `HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors`. In this scenario, an attacker can load an arbitrary .dll into the print-monitor registry by giving the full path name to the after.dll. The system will execute the .dll with elevated (SYSTEM) permissions and will persist after reboot.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.action=modified AND Registry.registry_path=\"*CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Print\\\\Monitors*\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report registry modifications.", + "known_false_positives": "You will encounter noise from legitimate print-monitor registry entries.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 5" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.010/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.010/atomic_red_team/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "New print monitor added on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1547.010", + "T1547" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.AC" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.action", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.registry_value_name" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.010", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Port Monitors", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "MS Scripting Process Loading Ldap Module", + "id": "0b0c40dc-14a6-11ec-b267-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-13", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious MS scripting process such as wscript.exe or cscript.exe that loading ldap module to process ldap query. This behavior was seen in FIN7 implant where it uses javascript to execute ldap query to parse host information that will send to its C2 server. this anomaly detections is a good initial step to hunt further a suspicious ldap query or ldap related events to the host that may give you good information regarding ldap or AD information processing or might be a attacker.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode =7 Image IN (\"*\\\\wscript.exe\", \"*\\\\cscript.exe\") ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\Wldap32.dll\", \"*\\\\adsldp.dll\", \"*\\\\adsldpc.dll\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Image EventCode process_name ProcessId ProcessGuid Computer ImageLoaded | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "automation scripting language may used by network operator to do ldap query.", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html", + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "MS Scripting Process Loading Ldap Module", + "analytic_story": [ + "FIN7" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_js_2/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "$process_name$ loading ldap modules $ImageLoaded$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.007" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Image", + "EventCode", + "process_name", + "ProcessId", + "ProcessGuid", + "Computer", + "ImageLoaded" + ], + "risk_score": 9, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.007", + "mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "Cobalt Group", + "Evilnum", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Higaisa", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "MS Scripting Process Loading WMI Module", + "id": "2eba3d36-14a6-11ec-a682-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-13", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious MS scripting process such as wscript.exe or cscript.exe that loading wmi module to process wmi query. This behavior was seen in FIN7 implant where it uses javascript to execute wmi query to parse host information that will send to its C2 server. this anomaly detections is a good initial step to hunt further a suspicious wmi query or wmi related events to the host that may give you good information regarding process that are commonly using wmi query or modules or might be an attacker using this technique.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode =7 Image IN (\"*\\\\wscript.exe\", \"*\\\\cscript.exe\") ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\fastprox.dll\", \"*\\\\wbemdisp.dll\", \"*\\\\wbemprox.dll\", \"*\\\\wbemsvc.dll\" , \"*\\\\wmiutils.dll\", \"*\\\\wbemcomn.dll\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Image EventCode process_name ProcessId ProcessGuid Computer ImageLoaded | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "automation scripting language may used by network operator to do ldap query.", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html", + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "MS Scripting Process Loading WMI Module", + "analytic_story": [ + "FIN7" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_js_2/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "$process_name$ loading wmi modules $ImageLoaded$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.007" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Image", + "EventCode", + "process_name", + "ProcessId", + "ProcessGuid", + "Computer", + "ImageLoaded" + ], + "risk_score": 9, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.007", + "mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "Cobalt Group", + "Evilnum", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Higaisa", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "MSBuild Suspicious Spawned By Script Process", + "id": "213b3148-24ea-11ec-93a2-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-10-04", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious child process of MSBuild spawned by Windows Script Host - cscript or wscript. This behavior or event are commonly seen and used by malware or adversaries to execute malicious msbuild process using malicious script in the compromised host. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any file modifications. MSBuild may load a script from the same path without having command-line arguments.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"wscript.exe\", \"cscript.exe\") AND `process_msbuild` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as developers do not spawn MSBuild via a WSH.", + "references": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/dc93ee63-050c-4ff8-b07e-8277af9ab939/#" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "MSBuild Suspicious Spawned By Script Process", + "analytic_story": [ + "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/regsvr32_silent/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Msbuild.exe process spawned by $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ executed by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1127.001", + "T1127" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Frankenstein" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_msbuild", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=msbuild.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSBuild.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process", + "id": "4aa5d062-e893-11eb-9eb2-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-07-19", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious mshta.exe process that spawn rundll32 or regsvr32 child process. This technique was seen in several malware nowadays like trickbot to load its initial .dll stage loader to execute and download the the actual trickbot payload.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name = \"mshta.exe\" `process_rundll32` OR `process_regsvr32` by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "limitted. this anomaly behavior is not commonly seen in clean host.", + "references": [ + "https://twitter.com/cyb3rops/status/1416050325870587910?s=21" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process", + "analytic_story": [ + "Trickbot", + "IcedID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/spear_phish/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "a mshta parent process $parent_process_name$ spawn child process $process_name$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.005" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "FIN7", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Sidewinder", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "process_regsvr32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=REGSVR32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "MSHTML Module Load in Office Product", + "id": "5f1c168e-118b-11ec-84ff-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-09", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following detection identifies the module load of mshtml.dll into an Office product. This behavior has been related to CVE-2021-40444, whereas the malicious document will load ActiveX, which activates the MSHTML component. The vulnerability resides in the MSHTML component. During triage, identify parallel processes and capture any file modifications for analysis.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventID=7 process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\",\"wordpad.exe\",\"wordview.exe\") ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\mshtml.dll\", \"*\\\\Microsoft.mshtml.dll\",\"*\\\\IE.Interop.MSHTML.dll\",\"*\\\\MshtmlDac.dll\",\"*\\\\MshtmlDed.dll\",\"*\\\\MshtmlDer.dll\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, process_name, ImageLoaded, OriginalFileName, process_id | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mshtml_module_load_in_office_product_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process names and image loads from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives will be present, however, tune as necessary.", + "references": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/36c14029-9df8-439c-bba0-45f2643b0c70/", + "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", + "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/index-dll" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "MSHTML Module Load in Office Product", + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments", + "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_mshtml.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ loading mshtml.dll.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "ImageLoaded", + "process_name", + "OriginalFileName", + "process_id", + "dest" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-40444" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "mshtml_module_load_in_office_product_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/mshtml_module_load_in_office_product.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary", + "id": "ccb98a66-5851-11ec-b91c-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-08", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following hunting analytic identifies `msi.dll` being loaded by a binary not located in `system32`, `syswow64`, `winsxs` or `windows` paths. This behavior is most recently related to InstallerFileTakeOver, or CVE-2021-41379, and DLL side-loading. CVE-2021-41379 requires a binary to be dropped and `msi.dll` to be loaded by it. To Successful exploitation of this issue happens in four parts \\\n1. Generation of an MSI that will trigger bad behavior. \\\n1. Preparing a directory for MSI installation. \\\n1. Inducing an error state. \\\n1. Racing to introduce a junction and a symlink to trick msiexec.exe to modify the attacker specified file. \\\nIn addition, `msi.dll` has been abused in DLL side-loading attacks by being loaded by non-system binaries.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded=\"*\\\\msi.dll\" NOT (Image IN (\"*\\\\System32\\\\*\",\"*\\\\syswow64\\\\*\",\"*\\\\windows\\\\*\", \"*\\\\winsxs\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name Computer EventCode ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `msi_module_loaded_by_non_system_binary_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible some Administrative utilities will load msi.dll outside of normal system paths, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://attackerkb.com/topics/7LstI2clmF/cve-2021-41379/rapid7-analysis", + "https://github.com/klinix5/InstallerFileTakeOver", + "https://github.com/mandiant/red_team_tool_countermeasures/blob/master/rules/PGF/supplemental/hxioc/msi.dll%20Hijack%20(Methodology).ioc" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Privilege Escalation" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "The following module $ImageLoaded$ was loaded by $Image$ outside of the normal system paths on endpoint $Computer$, potentally related to DLL side-loading.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1574.002", + "T1574" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Image", + "ImageLoaded", + "process_name", + "Computer", + "EventCode", + "ProcessId" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-41379" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Chimera", + "GALLIUM", + "Higaisa", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Patchwork", + "Sidewinder", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "msi_module_loaded_by_non_system_binary_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/msi_module_loaded_by_non_system_binary.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading", + "id": "8bb3f280-dd9b-11eb-84d5-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-07-05", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious creation of msmpeng.exe or mpsvc.dll in non default windows defender folder. This technique was seen couple days ago with revil ransomware in Kaseya Supply chain. The approach is to drop an old version of msmpeng.exe to load the actual payload name as mspvc.dll which will load the revil ransomware to the compromise machine", + "search": "|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_name = \"msmpeng.exe\" OR Filesystem.file_name = \"mpsvc.dll\") AND Filesystem.file_path != \"*\\\\Program Files\\\\windows defender\\\\*\" by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node.", + "known_false_positives": "quite minimal false positive expected.", + "references": [ + "https://community.sophos.com/b/security-blog/posts/active-ransomware-attack-on-kaseya-customers" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Revil Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets//malware/revil/msmpeng_side/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1574.002", + "T1574" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.file_create_time", + "Filesystem.process_id", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.user", + "Filesystem.file_path" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Chimera", + "GALLIUM", + "Higaisa", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Patchwork", + "Sidewinder", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Multiple Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos", + "id": "98f22d82-9d62-11eb-9fcf-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-14", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple disabled domain users using the Kerberos protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using Kerberos to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. As attackers progress in a breach, mistakes will be made. In certain scenarios, adversaries may execute a password spraying attack against disabled users. Event 4768 is generated every time the Key Distribution Center issues a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). Failure code `0x12` stands for `clients credentials have been revoked` (account disabled, expired or locked out).\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\\nThis detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\\\nThe analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source ip and attempted user accounts.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 Account_Name!=\"*$\" Result_Code=0x12 | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Account_Name) AS unique_accounts values(Account_Name) as tried_accounts by _time, Client_Address | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Client_Address | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_disabled_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", + "known_false_positives": "A host failing to authenticate with multiple disabled domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, multi-user systems missconfigured systems.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Multiple Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Password Spraying", + "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_disabled_users_kerberos/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Potential Kerberos based password spraying attack from $Client_Address$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1110.003", + "T1110" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Client_Address", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Result_Code", + "Account_Name", + "Client_Address" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "Chimera", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leafminer", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silent Librarian" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN5", + "Fox Kitten", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "multiple_disabled_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/multiple_disabled_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos", + "id": "001266a6-9d5b-11eb-829b-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-14", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple invalid domain users using the Kerberos protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using Kerberos to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. As attackers progress in a breach, mistakes will be made. In certain scenarios, adversaries may execute a password spraying attack using an invalid list of users. Event 4768 is generated every time the Key Distribution Center issues a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). Failure code 0x6 stands for `client not found in Kerberos database` (the attempted user is not a valid domain user).\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\\nThis detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\\\nThe analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source ip and attempted user accounts.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 Result_Code=0x6 Account_Name!=\"*$\" | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Account_Name) AS unique_accounts values(Account_Name) as tried_accounts by _time, Client_Address | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Client_Address | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", + "known_false_positives": "A host failing to authenticate with multiple invalid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, multi-user systems and missconfigured systems.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Password Spraying", + "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_invalid_users_kerberos/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Potential Kerberos based password spraying attack from $Client_Address$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1110.003", + "T1110" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Client_Address", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Result_Code", + "Account_Name", + "Client_Address" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "Chimera", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leafminer", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silent Librarian" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN5", + "Fox Kitten", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM", + "id": "57ad5a64-9df7-11eb-a290-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-15", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple invalid users using the NTLM protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using NTLM to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. As attackers progress in a breach, mistakes will be made. In certain scenarios, adversaries may execute a password spraying attack using an invalid list of users. Event 4776 is generated on the computer that is authoritative for the provided credentials. For domain accounts, the domain controller is authoritative. For local accounts, the local computer is authoritative. Error code 0xC0000064 stands for `The username you typed does not exist` (the attempted user is a legitimate domain user).\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\\nThis detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\\\nThe analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source workstation name and attempted user accounts.", + "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4776 Logon_Account!=\"*$\" 0xC0000064 action=failure | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Logon_Account) AS unique_accounts values(Logon_Account) as tried_accounts by _time, Source_Workstation | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Source_Workstation | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Credential Validation' within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", + "known_false_positives": "A host failing to authenticate with multiple invalid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners and missconfigured systems. If this detection triggers on a host other than a Domain Controller, the behavior could represent a password spraying attack against the host's local accounts.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-credential-validation", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4776" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Password Spraying" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_invalid_users_ntlm/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Potential NTLM based password spraying attack from $Source_Workstation$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1110.003", + "T1110" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Source_Workstation", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "action", + "Logon_Account", + "Source_Workstation" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "Chimera", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leafminer", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silent Librarian" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN5", + "Fox Kitten", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Multiple Users Attempting To Authenticate Using Explicit Credentials", + "id": "e61918fa-9ca4-11eb-836c-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-13", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a source user failing to authenticate with multiple users using explicit credentials on a host. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4648 is generated when a process attempts an account logon by explicitly specifying that accounts credentials. This event generates on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations.\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\\nThis detection will trigger on the potenfially malicious host, perhaps controlled via a trojan or operated by an insider threat, from where a password spraying attack is being executed.\\\nThe analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source account, attempted user accounts and the endpoint were the behavior was identified.", + "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4648 | bucket span=2m _time | eval Source_Account = mvindex(Account_Name, 0) | eval Destination_Account = mvindex(Account_Name, 1) | search Source_Account != \"*$\" Source_Account !=\"-\" Destination_Account !=\"*$\" | stats dc(Destination_Account) AS unique_accounts values(Destination_Account) as tried_account by _time, ComputerName, Source_Account | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by ComputerName | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_users_attempting_to_authenticate_using_explicit_credentials_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Event Logs from domain controllers as well as member servers and workstations. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Logon` within `Logon/Logoff` needs to be enabled.", + "known_false_positives": "A source user failing attempting to authenticate multiple users on a host is not a common behavior for regular systems. Some applications, however, may exhibit this behavior in which case sets of users hosts can be added to an allow list. Possible false positive scenarios include systems where several users connect to like Mail servers, identity providers, remote desktop services, Citrix, etc.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4648", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/basic-audit-logon-events" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Multiple Users Attempting To Authenticate Using Explicit Credentials", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Password Spraying" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_explicit_credential_spray/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Potential password spraying attack from $ComputerName$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1110.003", + "T1110" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Security_ID", + "Account_Name", + "ComputerName" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "Chimera", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leafminer", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silent Librarian" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN5", + "Fox Kitten", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "multiple_users_attempting_to_authenticate_using_explicit_credentials_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_attempting_to_authenticate_using_explicit_credentials.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos", + "id": "3a91a212-98a9-11eb-b86a-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-08", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple valid users using the Kerberos protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using Kerberos to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4771 is generated when the Key Distribution Center fails to issue a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). Failure code 0x18 stands for `wrong password provided` (the attempted user is a legitimate domain user).\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\\nThis detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\\\nThe analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source ip and attempted user accounts.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4771 Failure_Code=0x18 Account_Name!=\"*$\" | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Account_Name) AS unique_accounts values(Account_Name) as tried_accounts by _time, Client_Address | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Client_Address | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", + "known_false_positives": "A host failing to authenticate with multiple valid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, missconfigured systems and multi-user systems like Citrix farms.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/dn319109(v=ws.11)", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4771" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Password Spraying", + "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_valid_users_kerberos/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Potential Kerberos based password spraying attack from $Client_Address$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1110.003", + "T1110" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Client_Address", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Result_Code", + "Account_Name", + "Client_Address" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "Chimera", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leafminer", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silent Librarian" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN5", + "Fox Kitten", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM", + "id": "7ed272a4-9c77-11eb-af22-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-13", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple valid users using the NTLM protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using NTLM to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4776 is generated on the computer that is authoritative for the provided credentials. For domain accounts, the domain controller is authoritative. For local accounts, the local computer is authoritative. Error code 0xC000006A means: misspelled or bad password (the attempted user is a legitimate domain user).\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\\nThis detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\\\nThe analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source workstation name and attempted user accounts.", + "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4776 Logon_Account!=\"*$\" 0xC000006A action=failure | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Logon_Account) AS unique_accounts values(Logon_Account) as tried_accounts by _time, Source_Workstation | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Source_Workstation | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Credential Validation` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", + "known_false_positives": "A host failing to authenticate with multiple valid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners and missconfigured systems. If this detection triggers on a host other than a Domain Controller, the behavior could represent a password spraying attack against the host's local accounts.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-credential-validation", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4776" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Password Spraying" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_valid_users_ntlm/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Potential NTLM based password spraying attack from $Source_Workstation$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1110.003", + "T1110" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Source_Workstation", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "action", + "Logon_Account", + "Source_Workstation" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "Chimera", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leafminer", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silent Librarian" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN5", + "Fox Kitten", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Process", + "id": "9015385a-9c84-11eb-bef2-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-13", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a source process name failing to authenticate with multiple users. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4625 generates on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations when an account fails to logon. Logon Type 2 describes an iteractive logon attempt.\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\\nThis detection will trigger on the potenfially malicious host, perhaps controlled via a trojan or operated by an insider threat, from where a password spraying attack is being executed. This could be a domain controller as well as a member server or workstation.\\\nThe analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source process name, source account and attempted user accounts.", + "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4625 Logon_Type=2 Caller_Process_Name!=\"-\" | bucket span=2m _time | eval Source_Account = mvindex(Account_Name, 0) | eval Destination_Account = mvindex(Account_Name, 1) | stats dc(Destination_Account) AS unique_accounts values(Account_Name) as tried_accounts by _time, Caller_Process_Name, Source_Account, ComputerName | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Caller_Process_Name, Source_Account, ComputerName | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_process_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Event Logs from domain controllers aas well as member servers and workstations. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Logon` within `Logon/Logoff` needs to be enabled.", + "known_false_positives": "A process failing to authenticate with multiple users is not a common behavior for legitimate user sessions. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners and missconfigured systems.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4625", + "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4625", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/basic-audit-logon-events" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Process", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Password Spraying" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_multiple_users_from_process/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Potential password spraying attack from $ComputerName$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1110.003", + "T1110" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Logon_Type", + "Caller_Process_Name", + "Security_ID", + "Account_Name", + "ComputerName" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "Chimera", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leafminer", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silent Librarian" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN5", + "Fox Kitten", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_process_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_process.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Multiple Users Remotely Failing To Authenticate From Host", + "id": "80f9d53e-9ca1-11eb-b0d6-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-13", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a source host failing to authenticate against a remote host with multiple users. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4625 documents each and every failed attempt to logon to the local computer. This event generates on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations. Logon Type 3 describes an remote authentication attempt.\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\\nThis detection will trigger on the host that is the target of the password spraying attack. This could be a domain controller as well as a member server or workstation.\\\nThe analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source process name, source account and attempted user accounts.", + "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4625 Logon_Type=3 Source_Network_Address!=\"-\" | bucket span=2m _time | eval Destination_Account = mvindex(Account_Name, 1) | stats dc(Destination_Account) AS unique_accounts values(Destination_Account) as tried_accounts by _time, Source_Network_Address, ComputerName | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Source_Network_Address, ComputerName | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_users_remotely_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Event Logs from domain controllers as as well as member servers and workstations. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Logon` within `Logon/Logoff` needs to be enabled.", + "known_false_positives": "A host failing to authenticate with multiple valid users against a remote host is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, remote administration tools, missconfigyred systems, etc.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4625", + "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4625", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/basic-audit-logon-events" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Multiple Users Remotely Failing To Authenticate From Host", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Password Spraying" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_remote_spray/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Potential password spraying attack on $ComputerName$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1110.003", + "T1110" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Logon_Type", + "Security_ID", + "Account_Name", + "ComputerName", + "Source_Network_Address" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "Chimera", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leafminer", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silent Librarian" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN5", + "Fox Kitten", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "multiple_users_remotely_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_remotely_failing_to_authenticate_from_host.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Net Localgroup Discovery", + "id": "54f5201e-155b-11ec-a6e2-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-14", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following hunting analytic will identify the use of localgroup discovery using `net localgroup`. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=net.exe OR Processes.process_name=net1.exe (Processes.process=\"*localgroup*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `net_localgroup_discovery_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present. Tune as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Net Localgroup Discovery", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery", + "Windows Discovery Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Local group discovery on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "TA505" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Chimera", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "admin@338" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "net_localgroup_discovery_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/net_localgroup_discovery.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "NET Profiler UAC bypass", + "id": "0252ca80-e30d-11eb-8aa3-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-02-18", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect modification of registry to bypass UAC windows feature. This technique is to add a payload dll path on .NET COR file path that will be loaded by mmc.exe as soon it was executed. This detection rely on monitoring the registry key and values in the detection area. It may happened that windows update some dll related to mmc.exe and add dll path in this registry. In this case filtering is needed.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Environment\\\\COR_PROFILER_PATH\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"*.dll\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `net_profiler_uac_bypass_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "limited false positive. It may trigger by some windows update that will modify this registry.", + "references": [ + "https://offsec.almond.consulting/UAC-bypass-dotnet.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "NET Profiler UAC bypass", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Defense Evasion", + "Scope:Inbound" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon2.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious modification of registry $registry_path$ with possible payload path $registry_value_name$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT37", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Evilnum", + "Honeybee", + "MuddyWater", + "Patchwork", + "Threat Group-3390" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "net_profiler_uac_bypass_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/net_profiler_uac_bypass.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Network Connection Discovery With Arp", + "id": "ae008c0f-83bd-4ed4-9350-98d4328e15d2", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-10", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `arp.exe` utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use arp.exe for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"arp.exe\") (Processes.process=*-a*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `network_connection_discovery_with_arp_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Network Connection Discovery With Arp", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1049/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1049" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1049", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Andariel", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "GALLIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "network_connection_discovery_with_arp_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/network_connection_discovery_arp.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Network Connection Discovery With Net", + "id": "640337e5-6e41-4b7f-af06-9d9eab5e1e2d", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-10", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use net.exe for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\") (Processes.process=*use*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `network_connection_discovery_with_net_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Network Connection Discovery With Net", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1049/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1049" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1049", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Andariel", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "GALLIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "network_connection_discovery_with_net_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/network_connection_discovery_net.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Network Connection Discovery With Netstat", + "id": "2cf5cc25-f39a-436d-a790-4857e5995ede", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-10", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `netstat.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use netstat.exe for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"netstat.exe\") (Processes.process=*-a*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `network_connection_discovery_with_netstat_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Network Connection Discovery With Netstat", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1049/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1049" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1049", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Andariel", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "GALLIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "network_connection_discovery_with_netstat_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/network_connection_discovery_netstat.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Network Discovery Using Route Windows App", + "id": "dd83407e-439f-11ec-ab8e-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-12", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic look for a spawned process of route.exe windows application. Adversaries and red teams alike abuse this application the recon or do a network discovery on a target host. but one possible false positive might be an automated tool used by a system administator or a powershell script in amazon ec2 config services.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_route` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `network_discovery_using_route_windows_app_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated host discovery application that may generate false positives or an amazon ec2 script that uses this application. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/ad4c3cda-41f2-4401-8dba-56cc2d245488/#" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Network Discovery Using Route Windows App", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/vilsel/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1016", + "T1016.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 9, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1016", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Higaisa", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1016.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Internet Connection Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_route", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=route.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=route.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "network_discovery_using_route_windows_app_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/network_discovery_using_route_windows_app.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine", + "id": "1a382c6c-7c2e-11eb-ac69-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-03-03", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This query detects the Nishang Invoke-PowerShellTCPOneLine utility that spawns a call back to a remote command and control server. This is a powershell oneliner. In addition, this will capture on the command-line additional utilities used by Nishang. Triage the endpoint and identify any parallel processes that look suspicious. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain contacted by the powershell process.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process=*Net.Sockets.TCPClient* AND Processes.process=*System.Text.ASCIIEncoding*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `nishang_powershelltcponeline_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives may be present. Filter as needed based on initial analysis.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/samratashok/nishang/blob/master/Shells/Invoke-PowerShellTcpOneLine.ps1", + "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/", + "https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/03/03/rapid7s-insightidr-enables-detection-and-response-to-microsoft-exchange-0-day/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine", + "analytic_story": [ + "HAFNIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Command And Control" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Possible Nishang Invoke-PowerShellTCPOneLine behavior on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_powershell", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "nishang_powershelltcponeline_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/nishang_powershelltcponeline.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "NLTest Domain Trust Discovery", + "id": "c3e05466-5f22-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-01-25", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for the execution of `nltest.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for Domain Trust information. Two arguments `/domain trusts`, returns a list of trusted domains, and `/all_trusts`, returns all trusted domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike use NLTest.exe to enumerate the current domain to assist with further understanding where to pivot next.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=nltest.exe OR Processes.process_name!=nltest.exe) (Processes.process=*/domain_trusts* OR Processes.process=*/all_trusts*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `nltest_domain_trust_discovery_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may use nltest for troubleshooting purposes, otherwise, rarely used.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1482/T1482.md", + "https://malware.news/t/lets-learn-trickbot-implements-network-collector-module-leveraging-cmd-wmi-ldap/19104", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482/", + "https://www.owasp.org/images/4/4b/Red_Team_Operating_in_a_Modern_Environment.pdf", + "https://ss64.com/nt/nltest.html", + "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/domain-trust-discovery/", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/08/ryuks-return/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "NLTest Domain Trust Discovery", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Domain Trust Discovery", + "IcedID", + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Domain trust discovery execution on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1482" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "Chimera", + "FIN8" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "nltest_domain_trust_discovery_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir", + "id": "81263de4-160a-11ec-944f-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-15", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect an anomaly event of non-chrome process accessing the files in chrome user default folder. This folder contains all the sqlite database of the chrome browser related to users login, history, cookies and etc. Most of the RAT, trojan spy as well as FIN7 jssloader try to parse the those sqlite database to collect information on the compromised host. This SACL Event (4663) need to be enabled to tthe firefox profile directory to be eable to use this. Since you monitoring this access to the folder a noise coming from firefox need to be filter and also sqlite db browser and explorer .exe to make this detection more stable.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 NOT (process_name IN (\"*\\\\chrome.exe\", \"*\\\\explorer.exe\", \"*sql*\")) Object_Name=\"*\\\\Google\\\\Chrome\\\\User Data\\\\Default*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Object_Name Object_Type process_name Access_Mask Accesses process_id EventCode dest user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663. For 4663, enable \"Audit Object Access\" in Group Policy. Then check the two boxes listed for both \"Success\" and \"Failure.\"", + "known_false_positives": "other browser not listed related to firefox may catch by this rule.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir", + "analytic_story": [ + "FIN7", + "Remcos" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_sacl/security2.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "a non firefox browser process $process_name$ accessing $Object_Name$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1555", + "T1555.003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Object_Name", + "Object_Type", + "process_name", + "Access_Mask", + "Accesses", + "process_id", + "EventCode", + "dest", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1555", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "Evilnum", + "FIN6", + "Leafminer", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1555.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT3", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "Ajax Security Team", + "FIN6", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Patchwork", + "Sandworm Team", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA505", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir", + "id": "e6fc13b0-1609-11ec-b533-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-15", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect an anomaly event of non-firefox process accessing the files in profile folder. This folder contains all the sqlite database of the firefox browser related to users login, history, cookies and etc. Most of the RAT, trojan spy as well as FIN7 jssloader try to parse the those sqlite database to collect information on the compromised host. This SACL Event (4663) need to be enabled to tthe firefox profile directory to be eable to use this. Since you monitoring this access to the folder a noise coming from firefox need to be filter and also sqlite db browser and explorer .exe to make this detection more stable.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 NOT (process_name IN (\"*\\\\firefox.exe\", \"*\\\\explorer.exe\", \"*sql*\")) Object_Name=\"*\\\\AppData\\\\Roaming\\\\Mozilla\\\\Firefox\\\\Profiles*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Object_Name Object_Type process_name Access_Mask Accesses process_id EventCode dest user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663. For 4663, enable \"Audit Object Access\" in Group Policy. Then check the two boxes listed for both \"Success\" and \"Failure.\"", + "known_false_positives": "other browser not listed related to firefox may catch by this rule.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir", + "analytic_story": [ + "FIN7", + "Remcos" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_sacl/security.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "a non firefox browser process $process_name$ accessing $Object_Name$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1555", + "T1555.003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Object_Name", + "Object_Type", + "process_name", + "Access_Mask", + "Accesses", + "process_id", + "EventCode", + "dest", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1555", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "Evilnum", + "FIN6", + "Leafminer", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1555.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT3", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "Ajax Security Team", + "FIN6", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Patchwork", + "Sandworm Team", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA505", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Ntdsutil Export NTDS", + "id": "da63bc76-61ae-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-01-28", + "author": "Michael Haag, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "Monitor for signs that Ntdsutil is being used to Extract Active Directory database - NTDS.dit, typically used for offline password cracking. It may be used in normal circumstances with no command line arguments or shorthand variations of more common arguments. Ntdsutil.exe is typically seen run on a Windows Server. Typical command used to dump ntds.dit \\\nntdsutil \"ac i ntds\" \"ifm\" \"create full C:\\Temp\" q q \\\nThis technique uses \"Install from Media\" (IFM), which will extract a copy of the Active Directory database. A successful export of the Active Directory database will yield a file modification named ntds.dit to the destination.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=ntdsutil.exe Processes.process=*ntds* Processes.process=*create*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ntdsutil_export_ntds_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "Highly possible Server Administrators will troubleshoot with ntdsutil.exe, generating false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.003/T1003.003.md#atomic-test-3---dump-active-directory-database-with-ntdsutil", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc753343(v=ws.11)", + "https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf", + "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/vss_ps.dll-97B15BDAE9777F454C9A6BA25E938DB3.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Ntdsutil Export NTDS", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "HAFNIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 100, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Active Directory NTDS export on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.003", + "T1003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 50, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Fox Kitten", + "HAFNIUM", + "Mustang Panda", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "ntdsutil_export_ntds_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Office Application Drop Executable", + "id": "73ce70c4-146d-11ec-9184-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-13", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Michael Haag Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious MS office application that drop or create executables or script in the host. This behavior is commonly seen in spear phishing office attachment where it drop malicious files or script to compromised the host. It might be some normal macro may drop script or tools as part of automation but still this behavior is reallly suspicious and not commonly seen in normal office application", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\",\"wordpad.exe\",\"wordview.exe\") by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*.exe\",\"*.dll\",\"*.pif\",\"*.scr\",\"*.js\",\"*.vbs\",\"*.vbe\",\"*.ps1\") by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process proc_guid] | dedup file_create_time | table dest, process_name, process, file_create_time, file_name, file_path, proc_guid | `office_application_drop_executable_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "office macro for automation may do this behavior", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html", + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Office Application Drop Executable", + "analytic_story": [ + "FIN7" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_macro_js_1/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "process $process_name$ drops a file $TargetFilename$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Image", + "TargetFilename", + "ProcessGuid", + "dest", + "user_id" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "office_application_drop_executable_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_application_drop_executable.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process", + "id": "2d9fc90c-f11f-11eb-9300-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-07-30", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "this detection was designed to identifies suspicious spawned process of known MS office application due to macro or malicious code. this technique can be seen in so many malware like IcedID that used MS office as its weapon or attack vector to initially infect the machines.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = \"winword.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"excel.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"powerpnt.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"outlook.exe\") `process_regsvr32` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/380662/0/html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process", + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/phish_icedid/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Office application spawning regsvr32.exe on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_regsvr32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=REGSVR32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Office Application Spawn rundll32 process", + "id": "958751e4-9c5f-11eb-b103-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-04-13", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "this detection was designed to identifies suspicious spawned process of known MS office application due to macro or malicious code. this technique can be seen in so many malware like trickbot that used MS office as its weapon or attack vector to initially infect the machines.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = \"winword.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"excel.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"powerpnt.exe\") AND `process_rundll32` by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.process Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_application_spawn_rundll32_process_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://any.run/malware-trends/trickbot", + "https://any.run/report/47561b4e949041eff0a0f4693c59c81726591779fe21183ae9185b5eb6a69847/aba3722a-b373-4dae-8273-8730fb40cdbe" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Office Application Spawn rundll32 process", + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments", + "Trickbot", + "IcedID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Office application spawning rundll32.exe on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "office_application_spawn_rundll32_process_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_application_spawn_rundll32_process.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Office Document Creating Schedule Task", + "id": "cc8b7b74-9d0f-11eb-8342-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-14", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "this search detects a potential malicious office document that create schedule task entry through macro VBA api or through loading taskschd.dll. This technique was seen in so many malicious macro malware that create persistence , beaconing using task schedule malware entry The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\\Windows\\system32` and `C:\\Windows\\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it's possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.'", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 process_name IN (\"WINWORD.EXE\", \"EXCEL.EXE\", \"POWERPNT.EXE\") ImageLoaded = \"*\\\\taskschd.dll\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ImageLoaded) as AllImageLoaded count by Computer EventCode Image process_name ProcessId ProcessGuid | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_document_creating_schedule_task_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and ImageLoaded (Like sysmon EventCode 7) from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Also be sure to include those monitored dll to your own sysmon config.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/irans-apt34-returns-with-an-updated-arsenal/", + "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/scheduled-task-job/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Office Document Creating Schedule Task", + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Office document creating a schedule task on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "ImageLoaded", + "AllImageLoaded", + "Computer", + "EventCode", + "Image", + "process_name", + "ProcessId", + "ProcessGuid", + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "office_document_creating_schedule_task_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_document_creating_schedule_task.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Office Document Executing Macro Code", + "id": "b12c89bc-9d06-11eb-a592-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-14", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "this detection was designed to identifies suspicious office documents that using macro code. Macro code is known to be one of the prevalent weaponization or attack vector of threat actor. This malicious macro code is embed to a office document as an attachment that may execute malicious payload, download malware payload or other malware component. It is really good practice to disable macro by default to avoid automatically execute macro code while opening or closing a office document files.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 process_name IN (\"WINWORD.EXE\", \"EXCEL.EXE\", \"POWERPNT.EXE\") ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\VBE7INTL.DLL\",\"*\\\\VBE7.DLL\", \"*\\\\VBEUI.DLL\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ImageLoaded) as AllImageLoaded count by Computer EventCode Image process_name ProcessId ProcessGuid | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_document_executing_macro_code_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and ImageLoaded (Like sysmon EventCode 7) from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Also be sure to include those monitored dll to your own sysmon config.", + "known_false_positives": "Normal Office Document macro use for automation", + "references": [ + "https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/386500/0/html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Office Document Executing Macro Code", + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments", + "Trickbot", + "IcedID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Office document executing a macro on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "ImageLoaded", + "AllImageLoaded", + "Computer", + "EventCode", + "Image", + "process_name", + "ProcessId", + "ProcessGuid", + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "office_document_executing_macro_code_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_document_executing_macro_code.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download", + "id": "6fed27d2-9ec7-11eb-8fe4-aa665a019aa3", + "version": 3, + "date": "2021-09-20", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect potential malicious office document executing lolbin child process to download payload or other malware. Since most of the attacker abused the capability of office document to execute living on land application to blend it to the normal noise in the infected machine to cover its track.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\") Processes.process IN (\"*http:*\",\"*https:*\") NOT (Processes.original_file_name IN(\"firefox.exe\", \"chrome.exe\",\"iexplore.exe\",\"msedge.exe\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_document_spawned_child_process_to_download_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances office application and browser may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "Default browser not in the filter list.", + "references": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/92d7ef61-bfd7-4c92-bc15-322172b4ebec/#" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download", + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets2/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Office document spawning suspicious child process on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "office_document_spawned_child_process_to_download_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_document_spawned_child_process_to_download.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Office Product Spawn CMD Process", + "id": "b8b19420-e892-11eb-9244-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-07-19", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "this search is to detect a suspicious office product process that spawn cmd child process. This is commonly seen in a ms office product having macro to execute shell command to download or execute malicious lolbin relative to its malicious code. This is seen in trickbot spear phishing doc where it execute shell cmd to run mshta payload.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = \"winword.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name= \"excel.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"powerpnt.exe\") `process_cmd` by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawn_cmd_process_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "IT or network admin may create an document automation that will run shell script.", + "references": [ + "https://twitter.com/cyb3rops/status/1416050325870587910?s=21" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Office Product Spawn CMD Process", + "analytic_story": [ + "Trickbot" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/spear_phish/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "an office product parent process $parent_process_name$ spawn child process $process_name$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.005" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "FIN7", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Sidewinder", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_cmd", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "office_product_spawn_cmd_process_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawn_cmd_process.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin", + "id": "e8c591f4-a6d7-11eb-8cf7-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-04-26", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `bitsadmin.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `bitsadmin.exe` will contain a URL to a remote destination or similar command-line arguments as transfer, Download, priority, Foreground. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `bitsadmin.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `bitsadmin.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\") `process_bitsadmin` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_bitsadmin_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "No false positives known. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1197/T1197.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin", + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_macros.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_bitsadmin", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=bitsadmin.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=bitsadmin.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "office_product_spawning_bitsadmin_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_bitsadmin.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Office Product Spawning CertUtil", + "id": "6925fe72-a6d5-11eb-9e17-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-04-26", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `certutil.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `certutil.exe` will contain a URL to a remote destination. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `certutil.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `certutil.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\") `process_certutil` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_certutil_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "No false positives known. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/threats/TA551/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1105/T1105.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Office Product Spawning CertUtil", + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_macros.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_certutil", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=certutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=CertUtil.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "office_product_spawning_certutil_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_certutil.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Office Product Spawning MSHTA", + "id": "6078fa20-a6d2-11eb-b662-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-04-26", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `mshta.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `mshta.exe` will contain the `hta` file locally, or a URL to the remote destination. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `mshta.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `mshta.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\") `process_mshta` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_mshta_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "No false positives known. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/threats/TA551/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Office Product Spawning MSHTA", + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments", + "IcedID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_macros.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "process_mshta", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=mshta.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSHTA.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "office_product_spawning_mshta_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_mshta.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL", + "id": "c661f6be-a38c-11eb-be57-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-04-22", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by IcedID malware family. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `rundll32.exe` without a `.dll` file extension. In malicious instances, the command-line of `rundll32.exe` will look like `rundll32 ..\\oepddl.igk2,DllRegisterServer`. In addition, Threat Research has released a detection identifying the use of `DllRegisterServer` on the command-line of `rundll32.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze the `DLL` that was dropped to disk. The Office Product will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\") `process_rundll32` (Processes.process!=*.dll*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/395471/0/html", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/cef4b8ba-023c-4b3b-b2ef-6486a44f6ed9/", + "https://any.run/malware-trends/icedid" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL", + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_icedid.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ and no dll commandline $process$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Office Product Spawning Wmic", + "id": "ffc236d6-a6c9-11eb-95f1-acde48001122", + "version": 3, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by Ursnif malware family. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `wmic.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `wmic.exe` will contain `wmic process call create`. In addition, Threat Research has released a detection identifying the use of `wmic process call create` on the command-line of `wmic.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `wmic.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\") `process_wmic` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_wmic_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "No false positives known. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/fb894ab8-a966-4b72-920b-935f41756afd/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1047/T1047.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Office Product Spawning Wmic", + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments", + "FIN7" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_macros.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_wmic", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "office_product_spawning_wmic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_wmic.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Office Product Writing cab or inf", + "id": "f48cd1d4-125a-11ec-a447-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-10", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies behavior related to CVE-2021-40444. Whereas the malicious document will load ActiveX and download the remote payload (.inf, .cab). During triage, review parallel processes and further activity on endpoint to identify additional patterns. Retrieve the file modifications and analyze further.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\",\"wordpad.exe\",\"wordview.exe\") by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*.inf\",\"*.cab\") by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process] | dedup file_create_time | table dest, process_name, process, file_create_time, file_name, file_path | `office_product_writing_cab_or_inf_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node and `Filesystem` node.", + "known_false_positives": "The query is structured in a way that `action` (read, create) is not defined. Review the results of this query, filter, and tune as necessary. It may be necessary to generate this query specific to your endpoint product.", + "references": [ + "https://twitter.com/vxunderground/status/1436326057179860992?s=20", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/36c14029-9df8-439c-bba0-45f2643b0c70/", + "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", + "https://twitter.com/RonnyTNL/status/1436334640617373699?s=20" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Office Product Writing cab or inf", + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments", + "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_cabinf.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on $dest$ writing an inf or cab file to this. This is not typical of $process_name$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "dest", + "process_name", + "process", + "file_create_time", + "file_name", + "file_path" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-40444" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "office_product_writing_cab_or_inf_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_product_writing_cab_or_inf.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Office Spawning Control", + "id": "053e027c-10c7-11ec-8437-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-08", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following detection identifies control.exe spawning from an office product. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `control.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `control.exe` will contain a file path to a .cpl or .inf, related to CVE-2021-40444. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. review parallel and child processes to identify further suspicious behavior", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\",\"wordpad.exe\",\"wordview.exe\") Processes.process_name=control.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `office_spawning_control_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives should be present.", + "references": [ + "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/control.exe-1F13E714A0FEA8887707DFF49287996F.html", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/36c14029-9df8-439c-bba0-45f2643b0c70/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", + "https://www.echotrail.io/insights/search/control.exe", + "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.002/T1218.002.yaml" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Office Spawning Control", + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments", + "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_control.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ clicking a suspicious attachment.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-40444" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "office_spawning_control_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_spawning_control.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "id": "d2c14d28-5c47-11ec-9892-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "A required step while exploiting the CVE-2021-44228-Log4j vulnerability is that the victim server will perform outbound connections to attacker-controlled infrastructure. This is required as part of the JNDI lookup as well as for retrieving the second stage .class payload. The following analytic identifies the Java process reaching out to default ports used by the LDAP and RMI protocols. This behavior could represent successfull exploitation. Note that adversaries can easily decide to use arbitrary ports for these protocols and potentially bypass this detection.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"java.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe) by _time Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where (Ports.dest_port= 389 OR Ports.dest_port= 636 OR Ports.dest_port = 1389 OR Ports.dest_port = 1099 ) by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port| `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process connection_to_CNC dest_port | `outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate Java applications may use perform outbound connections to these ports. Filter as needed", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://www.govcert.admin.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_java/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Java performed outbound connections to default ports of LDAP or RMI on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_guid", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Ports.process_guid", + "Ports.dest", + "Ports.dest_port" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Overwriting Accessibility Binaries", + "id": "13c2f6c3-10c5-4deb-9ba1-7c4460ebe4ae", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "Microsoft Windows contains accessibility features that can be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in. An adversary can modify or replace these programs so they can get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system. This search looks for modifications to these binaries.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\sethc.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\utilman.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\osk.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\Magnify.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\Narrator.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\DisplaySwitch.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\AtBroker.exe*) by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `overwriting_accessibility_binaries_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.", + "known_false_positives": "Microsoft may provide updates to these binaries. Verify that these changes do not correspond with your normal software update cycle.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Overwriting Accessibility Binaries", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Privilege Escalation" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.008/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A suspicious file modification or replace in $file_path$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1546", + "T1546.008" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_path", + "type": "File", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Filesystem.file_path", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.008", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Accessibility Features", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "Deep Panda", + "Fox Kitten" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "overwriting_accessibility_binaries_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Password Policy Discovery with Net", + "id": "09336538-065a-11ec-8665-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-26", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command line arguments used to obtain the domain password policy. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `net.exe` for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\") AND Processes.process = \"*accounts*\" AND Processes.process = \"*/domain*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `password_policy_discovery_with_net_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/S1ckB0y1337/Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Password Policy Discovery with Net", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1201" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_name" + ], + "risk_score": 9, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1201", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Chimera", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "password_policy_discovery_with_net_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/password_policy_discovery_with_net.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Permission Modification using Takeown App", + "id": "fa7ca5c6-c9d8-11eb-bce9-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-10", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a modification of file or directory permission using takeown.exe windows app. This technique was seen in some ransomware that take the ownership of a folder or files to encrypt or delete it.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"takeown.exe\" Processes.process = \"*/f*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `permission_modification_using_takeown_app_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "takeown.exe is a normal windows application that may used by network operator.", + "references": [ + "https://research.nccgroup.com/2020/06/23/wastedlocker-a-new-ransomware-variant-developed-by-the-evil-corp-group/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Permission Modification using Takeown App", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A suspicious of execution of $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ and commandline $process$ to modify permission of directory or files in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1222" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process_guid" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1222", + "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "permission_modification_using_takeown_app_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/permission_modification_using_takeown_app.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "PetitPotam Network Share Access Request", + "id": "95b8061a-0a67-11ec-85ec-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-31", + "author": "Michael Haag, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes Windows Event Code 5145, \"A network share object was checked to see whether client can be granted desired access\". During our research into PetitPotam, CVE-2021-36942, we identified the ocurrence of this event on the target host with specific values. \\\nTo enable 5145 events via Group Policy - Computer Configuration->Polices->Windows Settings->Security Settings->Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Expand this node, go to Object Access (Audit Polices->Object Access), then select the Setting Audit Detailed File Share Audit \\\nIt is possible this is not enabled by default and may need to be reviewed and enabled. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel security events to identify further suspicious activity.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` Account_Name=\"ANONYMOUS LOGON\" EventCode=5145 Relative_Target_Name=lsarpc | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Security_ID, Share_Name, Source_Address, Accesses, Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `petitpotam_network_share_access_request_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "Windows Event Code 5145 is required to utilize this analytic and it may not be enabled in most environments.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives have been limited when the Anonymous Logon is used for Account Name.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187/", + "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventid=5145", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5145" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "PetitPotam Network Share Access Request", + "analytic_story": [ + "PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1187/petitpotam/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A remote host is enumerating a $dest$ to identify permissions. This is a precursor event to CVE-2021-36942, PetitPotam.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1187" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "dest", + "Security_ID", + "Share_Name", + "Source_Address", + "Accesses", + "Message" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-36942" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1187", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Forced Authentication", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "DarkHydrus", + "Dragonfly 2.0" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "petitpotam_network_share_access_request_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/petitpotam_network_share_access_request.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request", + "id": "e3ef244e-0a67-11ec-abf2-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-31", + "author": "Michael Haag, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifes Event Code 4768, A `Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested`, successfull occurs. This behavior has been identified to assist with detecting PetitPotam, CVE-2021-36942. Once an attacer obtains a computer certificate by abusing Active Directory Certificate Services in combination with PetitPotam, the next step would be to leverage the certificate for malicious purposes. One way of doing this is to request a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket using a tool like Rubeus. This request will generate a 4768 event with some unusual fields depending on the environment. This analytic will require tuning, we recommend filtering Account_Name to Domain Controllers for your environment.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 Client_Address!=\"::1\" Certificate_Thumbprint!=\"\" Account_Name=*$ | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Account_Name, Client_Address, action, Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "The following analytic requires Event Code 4768. Ensure that it is logging no Domain Controllers and appearing in Splunk.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives are possible if the environment is using certificates for authentication.", + "references": [ + "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventid=4768", + "https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Active+Directory+Certificate+Services+ADCS+PKI+domain+admin+vulnerability/27668/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request", + "analytic_story": [ + "PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1187/petitpotam/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A Kerberos TGT was requested in a non-standard manner against $dest$, potentially related to CVE-2021-36942, PetitPotam.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "dest", + "Account_Name", + "Client_Address", + "action", + "Message" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-36942" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Ping Sleep Batch Command", + "id": "ce058d6c-79f2-11ec-b476-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-20", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic will identify the possible execution of ping sleep batch commands. This technique was seen in several malware samples and is used to trigger sleep times without explicitly calling sleep functions or commandlets. The goal is to delay the execution of malicious code and bypass detection or sandbox analysis. This detection can be a good indicator of a process delaying its execution for malicious purposes.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_ping` (Processes.parent_process = \"*ping*\" Processes.parent_process = *-n* Processes.parent_process=\"* Nul*\"Processes.parent_process=\"*>*\") OR (Processes.process = \"*ping*\" Processes.process = *-n* Processes.process=\"* Nul*\"Processes.process=\"*>*\") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ping_sleep_batch_command_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator may execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Ping Sleep Batch Command", + "analytic_story": [ + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1497.003/ping_sleep/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "suspicious $process$ commandline run in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1497", + "T1497.003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 36, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1497", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Darkhotel" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1497.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Time Based Evasion", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_ping", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=ping.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=ping.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "ping_sleep_batch_command_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/ping_sleep_batch_command.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Possible Browser Pass View Parameter", + "id": "8ba484e8-4b97-11ec-b19a-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-22", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic will detect if a suspicious process contains a commandline parameter related to a web browser credential dumper. This technique is used by Remcos RAT malware which uses the Nirsoft webbrowserpassview.exe application to dump web browser credentials. Remcos uses the \"/stext\" command line to dump the credentials in text format. This Hunting query is a good indicator of hosts suffering from possible Remcos RAT infection. Since the hunting query is based on the parameter command and the possible path where it will save the text credential information, it may catch normal tools that are using the same command and behavior.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process IN (\"*/stext *\", \"*/shtml *\", \"*/LoadPasswordsIE*\", \"*/LoadPasswordsFirefox*\", \"*/LoadPasswordsChrome*\", \"*/LoadPasswordsOpera*\", \"*/LoadPasswordsSafari*\" , \"*/UseOperaPasswordFile*\", \"*/OperaPasswordFile*\",\"*/stab*\", \"*/scomma*\", \"*/stabular*\", \"*/shtml*\", \"*/sverhtml*\", \"*/sxml*\", \"*/skeepass*\" ) AND Processes.process IN (\"*\\\\temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\users\\\\public\\\\*\", \"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `possible_browser_pass_view_parameter_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "False positive is quite limited. Filter is needed", + "references": [ + "https://www.nirsoft.net/utils/web_browser_password.html", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/df0baf9f-8baf-4c32-a452-16562ecb19be/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Possible Browser Pass View Parameter", + "analytic_story": [ + "Remcos" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 40, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1555/web_browser_pass_view/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 40, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "suspicious process $process_name$ contains commandline $process$ on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1555.003", + "T1555" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 16, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1555.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT3", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "Ajax Security Team", + "FIN6", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Patchwork", + "Sandworm Team", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA505", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1555", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "Evilnum", + "FIN6", + "Leafminer", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "possible_browser_pass_view_parameter_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/possible_browser_pass_view_parameter.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn", + "id": "cb909b3e-512b-11ec-aa31-3e22fbd008af", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-29", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic assists with identifying a PowerShell process spawned as a child or grand child process of commonly abused processes during lateral movement techniques including `services.exe`, `wmiprsve.exe`, `svchost.exe`, `wsmprovhost.exe` and `mmc.exe`. Legitimate Windows features such as the Service Control Manager, Windows Management Instrumentation, Task Scheduler, Windows Remote Management and the DCOM protocol can be abused to start a process on a remote endpoint. Looking for PowerShell spawned out of this processes may reveal a lateral movement attack. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse these services during a breach for lateral movement and remote code execution.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=svchost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=wsmprovhost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=mmc.exe) (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR (Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process=*powershell.exe*) OR Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR (Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process=*pwsh.exe*)) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may spawn PowerShell as a child process of the the identified processes. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053.005/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement_powershell/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A PowerShell process was spawned as a child process of typically abused processes on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.003", + "T1021.006", + "T1047", + "T1053.005", + "T1543.003", + "T1059.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 45, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "Chimera", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CostaRicto", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Machete", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN7", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "PROMETHIUM", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Potentially malicious code on commandline", + "id": "9c53c446-757e-11ec-871d-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-14", + "author": "Michael Hart, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic uses a pretrained machine learning text classifier to detect potentially malicious commandlines. The model identifies unusual combinations of keywords found in samples of commandlines where adversaries executed powershell code, primarily for C2 communication. For example, adversaries will leverage IO capabilities such as \"streamreader\" and \"webclient\", threading capabilties such as \"mutex\" locks, programmatic constructs like \"function\" and \"catch\", and cryptographic operations like \"computehash\". Although observing one of these keywords in a commandline script is possible, combinations of keywords observed in attack data are not typically found in normal usage of the commandline. The model will output a score where all values above zero are suspicious, anything greater than one particularly so.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=\"Endpoint.Processes\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | where len(process) > 200 | `potentially_malicious_code_on_cmdline_tokenize_score` | apply unusual_commandline_detection | eval score='predicted(unusual_cmdline_logits)', process=orig_process | fields - unusual_cmdline* predicted(unusual_cmdline_logits) orig_process | where score > 0.5 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `potentially_malicious_code_on_commandline_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. You will also need to install the Machine Learning Toolkit version 5.3 or above to apply the pretrained model.", + "known_false_positives": "This model is an anomaly detector that identifies usage of APIs and scripting constructs that are correllated with malicious activity. These APIs and scripting constructs are part of the programming langauge and advanced scripts may generate false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Potentially malicious code on commandline", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 20, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/malicious_cmd_line_samples/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Unusual command-line execution with hallmarks of malicious activity run by $user$ found on $dest$ with commandline $process$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059.003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 12, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "potentially_malicious_code_on_cmdline_tokenize_score", + "definition": "eval orig_process=process, process=replace(lower(process), \"`\", \"\") | makemv tokenizer=\"([\\w\\d\\-]+)\" process | eval unusual_cmdline_feature_for=if(match(process, \"^for$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^for$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_netsh=if(match(process, \"^netsh$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^netsh$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_readbytes=if(match(process, \"^readbytes$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^readbytes$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_set=if(match(process, \"^set$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^set$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_unrestricted=if(match(process, \"^unrestricted$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^unrestricted$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_winstations=if(match(process, \"^winstations$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^winstations$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_-value=if(match(process, \"^-value$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^-value$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_compression=if(match(process, \"^compression$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^compression$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_server=if(match(process, \"^server$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^server$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_set-mppreference=if(match(process, \"^set-mppreference$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^set-mppreference$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_terminal=if(match(process, \"^terminal$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^terminal$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_-name=if(match(process, \"^-name$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^-name$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_catch=if(match(process, \"^catch$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^catch$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_get-wmiobject=if(match(process, \"^get-wmiobject$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^get-wmiobject$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_hklm=if(match(process, \"^hklm$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^hklm$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_streamreader=if(match(process, \"^streamreader$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^streamreader$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_system32=if(match(process, \"^system32$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^system32$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_username=if(match(process, \"^username$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^username$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_webrequest=if(match(process, \"^webrequest$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^webrequest$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_count=if(match(process, \"^count$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^count$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_webclient=if(match(process, \"^webclient$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^webclient$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_writeallbytes=if(match(process, \"^writeallbytes$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^writeallbytes$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_convert=if(match(process, \"^convert$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^convert$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_create=if(match(process, \"^create$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^create$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_function=if(match(process, \"^function$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^function$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_net=if(match(process, \"^net$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^net$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_com=if(match(process, \"^com$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^com$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_http=if(match(process, \"^http$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^http$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_io=if(match(process, \"^io$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^io$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_system=if(match(process, \"^system$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^system$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_new-object=if(match(process, \"^new-object$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^new-object$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_if=if(match(process, \"^if$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^if$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_threading=if(match(process, \"^threading$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^threading$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_mutex=if(match(process, \"^mutex$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^mutex$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_cryptography=if(match(process, \"^cryptography$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^cryptography$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_computehash=if(match(process, \"^computehash$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^computehash$\"))), 0)", + "description": "Performs the tokenization and application of the malicious commandline classifier" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "potentially_malicious_code_on_commandline_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/potentially_malicious_code_on_commandline.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "PowerShell 4104 Hunting", + "id": "d6f2b006-0041-11ec-8885-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-18", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following Hunting analytic assists with identifying suspicious PowerShell execution using Script Block Logging, or EventCode 4104. This analytic is not meant to be ran hourly, but occasionally to identify malicious or suspicious PowerShell. This analytic is a combination of work completed by Alex Teixeira and Splunk Threat Research Team.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 | eval DoIt = if(match(Message,\"(?i)(\\$doit)\"), \"4\", 0) | eval enccom=if(match(Message,\"[A-Za-z0-9+\\/]{44,}([A-Za-z0-9+\\/]{4}|[A-Za-z0-9+\\/]{3}=|[A-Za-z0-9+\\/]{2}==)\") OR match(Message, \"(?i)[-]e(nc*o*d*e*d*c*o*m*m*a*n*d*)*\\s+[^-]\"),4,0) | eval suspcmdlet=if(match(Message, \"(?i)Add-Exfiltration|Add-Persistence|Add-RegBackdoor|Add-ScrnSaveBackdoor|Check-VM|Do-Exfiltration|Enabled-DuplicateToken|Exploit-Jboss|Find-Fruit|Find-GPOLocation|Find-TrustedDocuments|Get-ApplicationHost|Get-ChromeDump|Get-ClipboardContents|Get-FoxDump|Get-GPPPassword|Get-IndexedItem|Get-Keystrokes|LSASecret|Get-PassHash|Get-RegAlwaysInstallElevated|Get-RegAutoLogon|Get-RickAstley|Get-Screenshot|Get-SecurityPackages|Get-ServiceFilePermission|Get-ServicePermission|Get-ServiceUnquoted|Get-SiteListPassword|Get-System|Get-TimedScreenshot|Get-UnattendedInstallFile|Get-Unconstrained|Get-VaultCredential|Get-VulnAutoRun|Get-VulnSchTask|Gupt-Backdoor|HTTP-Login|Install-SSP|Install-ServiceBinary|Invoke-ACLScanner|Invoke-ADSBackdoor|Invoke-ARPScan|Invoke-AllChecks|Invoke-BackdoorLNK|Invoke-BypassUAC|Invoke-CredentialInjection|Invoke-DCSync|Invoke-DllInjection|Invoke-DowngradeAccount|Invoke-EgressCheck|Invoke-Inveigh|Invoke-InveighRelay|Invoke-Mimikittenz|Invoke-NetRipper|Invoke-NinjaCopy|Invoke-PSInject|Invoke-Paranoia|Invoke-PortScan|Invoke-PoshRat|Invoke-PostExfil|Invoke-PowerDump|Invoke-PowerShellTCP|Invoke-PsExec|Invoke-PsUaCme|Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection|Invoke-ReverseDNSLookup|Invoke-RunAs|Invoke-SMBScanner|Invoke-SSHCommand|Invoke-Service|Invoke-Shellcode|Invoke-Tater|Invoke-ThunderStruck|Invoke-Token|Invoke-UserHunter|Invoke-VoiceTroll|Invoke-WScriptBypassUAC|Invoke-WinEnum|MailRaider|New-HoneyHash|Out-Minidump|Port-Scan|PowerBreach|PowerUp|PowerView|Remove-Update|Set-MacAttribute|Set-Wallpaper|Show-TargetScreen|Start-CaptureServer|VolumeShadowCopyTools|NEEEEWWW|(Computer|User)Property|CachedRDPConnection|get-net\\S+|invoke-\\S+hunter|Install-Service|get-\\S+(credent|password)|remoteps|Kerberos.*(policy|ticket)|netfirewall|Uninstall-Windows|Verb\\s+Runas|AmsiBypass|nishang|Invoke-Interceptor|EXEonRemote|NetworkRelay|PowerShelludp|PowerShellIcmp|CreateShortcut|copy-vss|invoke-dll|invoke-mass|out-shortcut|Invoke-ShellCommand\"),1,0) | eval base64 = if(match(lower(Message),\"frombase64\"), \"4\", 0) | eval empire=if(match(lower(Message),\"system.net.webclient\") AND match(lower(Message), \"frombase64string\") ,5,0) | eval mimikatz=if(match(lower(Message),\"mimikatz\") OR match(lower(Message), \"-dumpcr\") OR match(lower(Message), \"SEKURLSA::Pth\") OR match(lower(Message), \"kerberos::ptt\") OR match(lower(Message), \"kerberos::golden\") ,5,0) | eval iex = if(match(lower(Message),\"iex\"), \"2\", 0) | eval webclient=if(match(lower(Message),\"http\") OR match(lower(Message),\"web(client|request)\") OR match(lower(Message),\"socket\") OR match(lower(Message),\"download(file|string)\") OR match(lower(Message),\"bitstransfer\") OR match(lower(Message),\"internetexplorer.application\") OR match(lower(Message),\"xmlhttp\"),5,0) | eval get = if(match(lower(Message),\"get-\"), \"1\", 0) | eval rundll32 = if(match(lower(Message),\"rundll32\"), \"4\", 0) | eval suspkeywrd=if(match(Message, \"(?i)(bitstransfer|mimik|metasp|AssemblyBuilderAccess|Reflection\\.Assembly|shellcode|injection|cnvert|shell\\.application|start-process|Rc4ByteStream|System\\.Security\\.Cryptography|lsass\\.exe|localadmin|LastLoggedOn|hijack|BackupPrivilege|ngrok|comsvcs|backdoor|brute.?force|Port.?Scan|Exfiltration|exploit|DisableRealtimeMonitoring|beacon)\"),1,0) | eval syswow64 = if(match(lower(Message),\"syswow64\"), \"3\", 0) | eval httplocal = if(match(lower(Message),\"http://127.0.0.1\"), \"4\", 0) | eval reflection = if(match(lower(Message),\"reflection\"), \"1\", 0) | eval invokewmi=if(match(lower(Message), \"(?i)(wmiobject|WMIMethod|RemoteWMI|PowerShellWmi|wmicommand)\"),5,0) | eval downgrade=if(match(Message, \"(?i)([-]ve*r*s*i*o*n*\\s+2)\") OR match(lower(Message),\"powershell -version\"),3,0) | eval compressed=if(match(Message, \"(?i)GZipStream|::Decompress|IO.Compression|write-zip|(expand|compress)-Archive\"),5,0) | eval invokecmd = if(match(lower(Message),\"invoke-command\"), \"4\", 0) | addtotals fieldname=Score DoIt, enccom, suspcmdlet, suspkeywrd, compressed, downgrade, mimikatz, iex, empire, rundll32, webclient, syswow64, httplocal, reflection, invokewmi, invokecmd, base64, get | stats values(Score) by DoIt, enccom, compressed, downgrade, iex, mimikatz, rundll32, empire, webclient, syswow64, httplocal, reflection, invokewmi, invokecmd, base64, get, suspcmdlet, suspkeywrd | `powershell_4104_hunting_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives. May filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/inodee/threathunting-spl/blob/master/hunt-queries/powershell_qualifiers.md", + "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell", + "https://github.com/marcurdy/dfir-toolset/blob/master/Powershell%20Blueteam.txt", + "https://devblogs.microsoft.com/powershell/powershell-the-blue-team/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_logging?view=powershell-5.1", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/02/greater_visibilityt.html", + "https://hurricanelabs.com/splunk-tutorials/how-to-use-powershell-transcription-logs-in-splunk/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "PowerShell 4104 Hunting", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ executing suspicious commands.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Message" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "powershell_4104_hunting_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_4104_hunting.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window", + "id": "ee18ed37-0802-4268-9435-b3b91aaa18db", + "version": 8, + "date": "2022-01-12", + "author": "David Dorsey, Michael Haag Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following hunting analytic identifies PowerShell commands utilizing the WindowStyle parameter to hide the window on the compromised endpoint. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it is overriding the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide its activity from the user, and connects to the Internet. Removed in this version of the query is New-Object. The analytic identifies all variations of WindowStyle, as PowerShell allows the ability to shorten the parameter. For example w, win, windowsty and so forth. In addition, through our research it was identified that PowerShell will interpret different command switch types beyond the hyphen. We have added endash, emdash, horizontal bar, and forward slash.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"(?i)[\\-|\\/|–|—|―]w(in*d*o*w*s*t*y*l*e*)*\\s+[^-]\") | `powershell___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate process can have this combination of command-line options, but it's not common.", + "references": [ + "https://regexr.com/663rr", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses/blob/master/TestHarnesses/T1059.001_PowerShell/OutPowerShellCommandLineParameter.ps1", + "https://ss64.com/ps/powershell.html", + "https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/1440758396534214658?s=20", + "https://blog.netlab.360.com/ten-families-of-malicious-samples-are-spreading-using-the-log4j2-vulnerability-now/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "HAFNIUM Group", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 7", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Command And Control" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/hidden_powershell/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "PowerShell processes $process$ started with parameters to modify the execution policy of the run, run in a hidden window, and connect to the Internet on host $dest$ executed by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059.001", + "T1059" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 81, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_powershell", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "powershell___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Powershell Creating Thread Mutex", + "id": "637557ec-ca08-11eb-bd0a-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-10", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is using the `mutex` function. This function is commonly seen in some obfuscated PowerShell scripts to make sure that only one instance of there process is running on a compromise machine. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*Threading.Mutex*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_creating_thread_mutex_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "powershell developer may used this function in their script for instance checking too.", + "references": [ + "https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Some+Powershell+Malicious+Code/22988/", + "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", + "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Powershell Creating Thread Mutex", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains Thread Mutex in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1027", + "T1027.005" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1027", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackOasis", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dust Storm", + "Elderwood", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Group5", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1027.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal from Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT3", + "Deep Panda", + "GALLIUM", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "powershell_creating_thread_mutex_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_creating_thread_mutex.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Powershell Disable Security Monitoring", + "id": "c148a894-dd93-11eb-bf2a-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-07-05", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to identifies a modification in registry to disable the windows denfender real time behavior monitoring. This event or technique is commonly seen in RAT, bot, or Trojan to disable AV to evade detections.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process=\"*set-mppreference*\" AND Processes.process IN (\"*disablerealtimemonitoring*\",\"*disableioavprotection*\",\"*disableintrusionpreventionsystem*\",\"*disablescriptscanning*\",\"*disableblockatfirstseen*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_disable_security_monitoring_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives. However, tune based on scripts that may perform this action.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md#atomic-test-15---tamper-with-windows-defender-atp-powershell" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Powershell Disable Security Monitoring", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Revil Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/pwh_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_powershell", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "powershell_disable_security_monitoring_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_disable_security_monitoring.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "PowerShell Domain Enumeration", + "id": "e1866ce2-ca22-11eb-8e44-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-10", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies specific PowerShell modules typically used to enumerate an organizations domain or users. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message IN (*get-netdomaintrust*, *get-netforesttrust*, *get-addomain*, *get-adgroupmember*, *get-domainuser*) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_domain_enumeration_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible there will be false positives, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", + "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "PowerShell Domain Enumeration", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains domain enumeration command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "EventCode" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "powershell_domain_enumeration_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_domain_enumeration.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature", + "id": "afed80b2-d34b-11eb-a952-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-22", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious enabling of smb1protocol through \"powershell.exe\". This technique was seen in some ransomware (like reddot) where it enable smb share to do the lateral movement and encrypt other files within the compromise network system.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*Enable-WindowsOptionalFeature*\" Message = \"*SMB1Protocol*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the powershell logs from your endpoints. make sure you enable needed registry to monitor this event.", + "known_false_positives": "network operator may enable or disable this windows feature.", + "references": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/c0f98850-af65-4352-9746-fbebadee4f05/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1027", + "T1027.005" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1027", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackOasis", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dust Storm", + "Elderwood", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Group5", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1027.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal from Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT3", + "Deep Panda", + "GALLIUM", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Powershell Execute COM Object", + "id": "65711630-f9bf-11eb-8d72-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-10", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a COM CLSID execution through powershell. This technique was seen in several adversaries and malware like ransomware conti where it has a feature to execute command using COM Object. This technique may use by network operator at some cases but a good indicator if some application want to gain privilege escalation or bypass uac.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromCLSID*\" OR Message = \"*CreateInstance([Type]::GetTypeFromProgID*\"| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_execute_com_object_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "network operrator may use this command.", + "references": [ + "https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1423361119926816776.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Powershell Execute COM Object", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/conti/conti_leak/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 10, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains COM CLSID command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1546.015", + "T1546" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 5, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.015", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Component Object Model Hijacking", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "powershell_execute_com_object_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_execute_com_object.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress", + "id": "a26d9db4-c883-11eb-9d75-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-08", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable no critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies `GetProcAddress` in the script block. This is not normal to be used by most PowerShell scripts and is typically unsafe/malicious. Many attack toolkits use GetProcAddress to obtain code execution. \\\nIn use, `$var_gpa = $var_unsafe_native_methods.GetMethod(GetProcAddress` and later referenced/executed elsewhere. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message=*getprocaddress* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode ComputerName User EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_fileless_process_injection_via_getprocaddress_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", + "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains GetProcAddress API in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1055", + "T1059.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Message", + "OpCode", + "ComputerName", + "User", + "EventCode" + ], + "risk_score": 48, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Cobalt Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sharpshooter", + "Silence", + "Turla" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "powershell_fileless_process_injection_via_getprocaddress_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_fileless_process_injection_via_getprocaddress.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content", + "id": "8acbc04c-c882-11eb-b060-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-08", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies `FromBase64String` within the script block. A typical malicious instance will include additional code. \\\nCommand example - `[Byte[]]$var_code = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String(38uqIyMjQ6rG....` \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message=*frombase64string* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode ComputerName User EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_fileless_script_contains_base64_encoded_content_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", + "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains base64 command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1027", + "T1059.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Message", + "OpCode", + "ComputerName", + "User", + "EventCode" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1027", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackOasis", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dust Storm", + "Elderwood", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Group5", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "powershell_fileless_script_contains_base64_encoded_content_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_fileless_script_contains_base64_encoded_content.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "PowerShell Get LocalGroup Discovery", + "id": "b71adfcc-155b-11ec-9413-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-14", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following hunting analytic identifies the use of `get-localgroup` being used with PowerShell to identify local groups on the endpoint. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=cmd.exe) (Processes.process=\"*get-localgroup*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present. Tune as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "PowerShell Get LocalGroup Discovery", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Local group discovery on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "TA505" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Chimera", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "admin@338" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_get_localgroup_discovery.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Powershell Get LocalGroup Discovery with Script Block Logging", + "id": "d7c6ad22-155c-11ec-bb64-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-14", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies PowerShell cmdlet - `get-localgroup` being ran. Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*get-localgroup*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message OpCode ComputerName User EventCode| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_with_script_block_logging_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present. Tune as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/powershell-detections-threat-research-release-august-2021.html", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.md", + "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell", + "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", + "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Powershell Get LocalGroup Discovery with Script Block Logging", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Local group discovery on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "TA505" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Chimera", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "admin@338" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_with_script_block_logging_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_with_script_block_logging.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via System Reflection Assembly", + "id": "85bc3f30-ca28-11eb-bd21-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-10", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable no critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies the use of PowerShell loading .net assembly via reflection. This is commonly found in malicious PowerShell usage, including Empire and Cobalt Strike. In addition, the `load(` value may be modifed by removing `(` and it will identify more events to review. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message IN (\"*[system.reflection.assembly]::load(*\",\"*[reflection.assembly]*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode ComputerName User EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_system_reflection_assembly_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as day to day scripts do not use this method.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.reflection.assembly?view=net-5.0", + "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", + "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via System Reflection Assembly", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains reflective class assembly command in $Message$ to load .net code in memory with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Message", + "OpCode", + "ComputerName", + "User", + "EventCode" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "powershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_system_reflection_assembly_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_system_reflection_assembly.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Powershell Processing Stream Of Data", + "id": "0d718b52-c9f1-11eb-bc61-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-10", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is processing compressed stream data. This is typically found in obfuscated PowerShell or PowerShell executing embedded .NET or binary files that are stream flattened and will be deflated durnig execution. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*IO.Compression.*\" OR Message = \"*IO.StreamReader*\" OR Message = \"*]::Decompress*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_processing_stream_of_data_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "powershell may used this function to process compressed data.", + "references": [ + "https://medium.com/@ahmedjouini99/deobfuscating-emotets-powershell-payload-e39fb116f7b9", + "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell", + "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", + "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Powershell Processing Stream Of Data", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains stream command in $Message$ commonly for processing compressed or to decompressed binary file with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User", + "Score" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "powershell_processing_stream_of_data_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_processing_stream_of_data.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Powershell Remote Thread To Known Windows Process", + "id": "ec102cb2-a0f5-11eb-9b38-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-19", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "this search is designed to detect suspicious powershell process that tries to inject code and to known/critical windows process and execute it using CreateRemoteThread. This technique is seen in several malware like trickbot and offensive tooling like cobaltstrike where it load a shellcode to svchost.exe to execute reverse shell to c2 and download another payload", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode = 8 process_name IN (\"powershell_ise.exe\", \"powershell.exe\") TargetImage IN (\"*\\\\svchost.exe\",\"*\\\\csrss.exe\" \"*\\\\gpupdate.exe\", \"*\\\\explorer.exe\",\"*\\\\services.exe\",\"*\\\\winlogon.exe\",\"*\\\\smss.exe\",\"*\\\\wininit.exe\",\"*\\\\userinit.exe\",\"*\\\\spoolsv.exe\",\"*\\\\taskhost.exe\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by SourceImage process_name SourceProcessId SourceProcessGuid TargetImage TargetProcessId NewThreadId StartAddress Computer EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, Create Remote thread from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of create remote thread may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/01/11/trickbot-still-alive-and-well/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Powershell Remote Thread To Known Windows Process", + "analytic_story": [ + "Trickbot" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/infection/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A suspicious powershell process $process_name$ that tries to create a remote thread on target process $TargetImage$ with eventcode $EventCode$ in host $Computer$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1055" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "SourceImage", + "process_name", + "SourceProcessId", + "SourceProcessGuid", + "TargetImage", + "TargetProcessId", + "NewThreadId", + "StartAddress", + "Computer", + "EventCode" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Cobalt Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sharpshooter", + "Silence", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Powershell Remove Windows Defender Directory", + "id": "adf47620-79fa-11ec-b248-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-18", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic will identify a suspicious PowerShell command used to delete the Windows Defender folder. This technique was seen used by the WhisperGate malware campaign where it used Nirsofts advancedrun.exe to gain administrative privileges to then execute a PowerShell command to delete the Windows Defender folder. This is a good indicator the offending process is trying corrupt a Windows Defender installation.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*rmdir *\" AND Message = \"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_remove_windows_defender_directory_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Powershell Remove Windows Defender Directory", + "analytic_story": [ + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/rmdir_defender_pwsh/powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 100, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "suspicious powershell script $Message$ was executed on the $ComputerName$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 90, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "powershell_remove_windows_defender_directory_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_remove_windows_defender_directory.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer", + "id": "39e2605a-90d8-11eb-899e-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-03-29", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "Start-BitsTransfer is the PowerShell \"version\" of BitsAdmin.exe. Similar functionality is present. This technique variation is not as commonly used by adversaries, but has been abused in the past. Lesser known uses include the ability to set the `-TransferType` to `Upload` for exfiltration of files. In an instance where `Upload` is used, it is highly possible files will be archived. During triage, review parallel processes and process lineage. Capture any files on disk and review. For the remote domain or IP, what is the reputation?", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process=*start-bitstransfer* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_start_bitstransfer_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives. It is possible administrators will utilize Start-BitsTransfer for administrative tasks, otherwise filter based parent process or command-line arguments.", + "references": [ + "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Investigating+Microsoft+BITS+Activity/23281", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/bits/using-windows-powershell-to-create-bits-transfer-jobs" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer", + "analytic_story": [ + "BITS Jobs" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1197/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A suspicious process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ that are related to bittransfer functionality in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1197" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1197", + "mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Leviathan", + "Patchwork" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_powershell", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "powershell_start_bitstransfer_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_start_bitstransfer.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Powershell Using memory As Backing Store", + "id": "c396a0c4-c9f2-11eb-b4f5-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-10", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is using memory stream as new object backstore. The malicious PowerShell script will contain stream flate data and will be decompressed in memory to run or drop the actual payload. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*New-Object IO.MemoryStream*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "powershell may used this function to store out object into memory.", + "references": [ + "https://www.carbonblack.com/blog/decoding-malicious-powershell-streams/", + "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", + "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Powershell Using memory As Backing Store", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains memorystream command in $Message$ as new object backstore with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1140" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1140", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Darkhotel", + "Frankenstein", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Leviathan", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands", + "id": "907ac95c-4dd9-11ec-ba2c-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-25", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic will detect a suspicious process commandline related to windows defender exclusion feature. This command is abused by adversaries, malware author and red teams to bypassed Windows Defender Anti-Virus product by excluding folder path, file path, process, extensions and etc. from its real time or schedule scan to execute their malicious code. This is a good indicator for defense evasion and to look further for events after this behavior.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Add-MpPreference *\" OR Message = \"*Set-MpPreference *\") AND Message = \"*-exclusion*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to use this windows features.", + "references": [ + "https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.html", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/cf1245de-06a7-4366-8209-8e3006f2bfe5/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands", + "analytic_story": [ + "Remcos", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/defender_exclusion_powershell/powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "exclusion command $Message$ executed on $ComputerName$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit", + "id": "7742aa92-c9d9-11eb-bbfc-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-10", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious bcdedit.exe execution to ignore all failures. This technique was used by ransomware to prevent the compromise machine automatically boot in repair mode.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"bcdedit.exe\" Processes.process = \"*bootstatuspolicy*\" Processes.process = \"*ignoreallfailures*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `prevent_automatic_repair_mode_using_bcdedit_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed bcdedit.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may modify the boot configuration ignore failure during testing and debugging.", + "references": [ + "https://jsac.jpcert.or.jp/archive/2020/pdf/JSAC2020_1_tamada-yamazaki-nakatsuru_en.pdf" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A suspicious process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ contains commandline $process$ to ignore all bcdedit execution failure in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1490" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process_guid" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "prevent_automatic_repair_mode_using_bcdedit_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/prevent_automatic_repair_mode_using_bcdedit.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Print Spooler Adding A Printer Driver", + "id": "313681a2-da8e-11eb-adad-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-07-01", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies new printer drivers being load by utilizing the Windows PrintService operational logs, EventCode 316. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. \\\nWithin the proof of concept code, the following event will occur - \"Printer driver 1234 for Windows x64 Version-3 was added or updated. Files:- UNIDRV.DLL, kernelbase.dll, evil.dll. No user action is required.\" \\\nDuring triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events and review the source of where the exploitation began.", + "search": "`printservice` EventCode=316 category = \"Adding a printer driver\" Message = \"*kernelbase.dll,*\" Message = \"*UNIDRV.DLL,*\" Message = \"*.DLL.*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode EventCode ComputerName Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `print_spooler_adding_a_printer_driver_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You will need to ensure PrintService Admin and Operational logs are being logged to Splunk from critical or all systems.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown. This may require filtering.", + "references": [ + "https://twitter.com/MalwareJake/status/1410421445608476679?s=20", + "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/fix-for-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675-exploit-to-keep-your-print-servers-running-while-a-patch-is-not-available/", + "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/exploitable-critical-rce-vulnerability-allows-regular-users-to-fully-compromise-active-directory-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675/", + "https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/ob6y02/critical_vulnerability_printnightmare_exposes" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Print Spooler Adding A Printer Driver", + "analytic_story": [ + "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Defense Evasion", + "Scope:Inbound" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-printservice_operational.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious print driver was loaded on endpoint $ComputerName$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1547.012", + "T1547" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "OpCode", + "EventCode", + "ComputerName", + "Message" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-34527", + "CVE-2021-1675" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "printservice", + "definition": "source=\"wineventlog:microsoft-windows-printservice/operational\" OR sourcetype=\"WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PrintService/Admin\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "print_spooler_adding_a_printer_driver_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/print_spooler_adding_a_printer_driver.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Print Spooler Failed to Load a Plug-in", + "id": "1adc9548-da7c-11eb-8f13-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-07-01", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies driver load errors utilizing the Windows PrintService Admin logs. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. \\\nWithin the proof of concept code, the following error will occur - \"The print spooler failed to load a plug-in module C:\\Windows\\system32\\spool\\DRIVERS\\x64\\3\\meterpreter.dll, error code 0x45A. See the event user data for context information.\" \\\nThe analytic is based on file path and failure to load the plug-in. \\\nDuring triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events.", + "search": "`printservice` ((ErrorCode=\"0x45A\" (EventCode=\"808\" OR EventCode=\"4909\")) OR (\"The print spooler failed to load a plug-in module\" OR \"\\\\drivers\\\\x64\\\\\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode EventCode ComputerName Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `print_spooler_failed_to_load_a_plug_in_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You will need to ensure PrintService Admin and Operational logs are being logged to Splunk from critical or all systems.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives are unknown and filtering may be required.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/fix-for-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675-exploit-to-keep-your-print-servers-running-while-a-patch-is-not-available/", + "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/exploitable-critical-rce-vulnerability-allows-regular-users-to-fully-compromise-active-directory-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675/", + "https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/ob6y02/critical_vulnerability_printnightmare_exposes" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Print Spooler Failed to Load a Plug-in", + "analytic_story": [ + "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Defense Evasion", + "Scope:Inbound" + ], + "dataset": [], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious printer spooler errors have occured on endpoint $ComputerName$ with EventCode $EventCode$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1547.012", + "T1547" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "OpCode", + "EventCode", + "ComputerName", + "Message" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-34527", + "CVE-2021-1675" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "printservice", + "definition": "source=\"wineventlog:microsoft-windows-printservice/operational\" OR sourcetype=\"WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PrintService/Admin\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "print_spooler_failed_to_load_a_plug_in_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/print_spooler_failed_to_load_a_plug_in.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location", + "id": "5d814af1-1041-47b5-a9ac-d754e82e9a26", + "version": 5, + "date": "2021-08-26", + "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for a process launching an `*.lnk` file under `C:\\User*` or `*\\Local\\Temp\\*`. This is common behavior used by various spear phishing tools.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name=\"*.lnk\" AND (Filesystem.file_path=\"C:\\\\User\\\\*\" OR Filesystem.file_path=\"*\\\\Temp\\\\*\") by _time span=1h Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.file_hash Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | rename process_guid as lnk_guid | join lnk_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=* by _time span=1h Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | rename parent_process_guid as lnk_guid | fields _time lnk_guid process_id dest process_name process_path process] | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime, lastTime, lnk_guid, process_id, user, dest, file_name, file_path, process_name, process, process_path, file_hash | `process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon.", + "known_false_positives": "This detection should yield little or no false positive results. It is uncommon for LNK files to be executed from temporary or user directories.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/", + "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/17/e/rising-trend-attackers-using-lnk-files-download-malware.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location", + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 7", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.002/lnk_file_temp_folder/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A process $process_name$ that launching .lnk file in $file_path$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.002" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.file_path", + "Filesystem.process_id", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.file_path", + "Filesystem.file_hash", + "Filesystem.user" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Link", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN4", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Patchwork", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "TA505", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Turla", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Process Deleting Its Process File Path", + "id": "f7eda4bc-871c-11eb-b110-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-02-18", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This detection is to identify a suspicious process that tries to delete the process file path related to its process. This technique is known to be defense evasion once a certain condition of malware is satisfied or not. Clop ransomware use this technique where it will try to delete its process file path using a .bat command if the keyboard layout is not the layout it tries to infect.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=1 CommandLine = \"* /c *\" CommandLine = \"* del*\" Image = \"*\\\\cmd.exe\" | eval result = if(like(process,\"%\".parent_process.\"%\"), \"Found\", \"Not Found\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer user ParentImage ParentCommandLine Image CommandLine EventCode ProcessID result | where result = \"Found\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `process_deleting_its_process_file_path_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", + "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Process Deleting Its Process File Path", + "analytic_story": [ + "Clop Ransomware", + "Remcos", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A process $Image$ tries to delete its process path in commandline $cmdline$ as part of defense evasion in host $Computer$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1070" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "EventCode", + "Computer", + "user", + "ParentImage", + "ParentCommandLine", + "Image", + "cmdline", + "ProcessID", + "result", + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 60, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "process_deleting_its_process_file_path_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/process_deleting_its_process_file_path.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Process Execution via WMI", + "id": "24869767-8579-485d-9a4f-d9ddfd8f0cac", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-03-16", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies `WmiPrvSE.exe` spawning a process. This typically occurs when a process is instantiated from a local or remote process using `wmic.exe`. During triage, review parallel processes for suspicious behavior or commands executed. Review the process and command-line spawning from `wmiprvse.exe`. Contain and remediate the endpoint as necessary.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=WmiPrvSE.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `process_execution_via_wmi_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, administrators may use wmi to execute commands for legitimate purposes.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Process Execution via WMI", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious WMI Use" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A remote instance execution of wmic.exe that will spawn $parent_process_name$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1047" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.AT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_name" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "process_execution_via_wmi_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Process Kill Base On File Path", + "id": "5ffaa42c-acdb-11eb-9ad3-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-05-04", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of `wmic.exe` using `delete` to remove a executable path. This is typically ran via a batch file during beginning stages of an adversary setting up for mining on an endpoint.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` AND Processes.process=\"*process*\" AND Processes.process=\"*executablepath*\" AND Processes.process=\"*delete*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `process_kill_base_on_file_path_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown.", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Process Kill Base On File Path", + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A process $process_name$ attempt to kill process by its file path using commandline $process$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_wmic", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_kill_base_on_file_path_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/process_kill_base_on_file_path.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Process Writing DynamicWrapperX", + "id": "b0a078e4-2601-11ec-9aec-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-10-05", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "DynamicWrapperX is an ActiveX component that can be used in a script to call Windows API functions, but it requires the dynwrapx.dll to be installed and registered. With that, a binary writing dynwrapx.dll to disk and registering it into the registry is highly suspect. Why is it needed? In most malicious instances, it will be written to disk at a non-standard location. During triage, review parallel processes and pivot on the process_guid. Review the registry for any suspicious modifications meant to load dynwrapx.dll. Identify any suspicious module loads of dynwrapx.dll. This will identify the process that will invoke vbs/wscript/cscript.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_guid Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name=\"dynwrapx.dll\" by _time Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time process_guid file_path file_name file_create_time user dest process_name] | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest process_name process_guid file_name file_path file_create_time user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `process_writing_dynamicwrapperx_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however it is possible to filter by Processes.process_name and specific processes (ex. wscript.exe). Filter as needed. This may need modification based on EDR telemetry and how it brings in registry data. For example, removal of (Default).", + "references": [ + "https://blog.f-secure.com/hunting-for-koadic-a-com-based-rootkit/", + "https://www.script-coding.com/dynwrapx_eng.html", + "https://bohops.com/2018/06/28/abusing-com-registry-structure-clsid-localserver32-inprocserver32/", + "https://tria.ge/210929-ap75vsddan", + "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/cb77b93150cb0f7fe65ce8a7e2a5781e727419451355a7736db84109fa215a89" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Process Writing DynamicWrapperX", + "analytic_story": [ + "Remcos" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ downloading the DynamicWrapperX dll.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1559.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "dest", + "process_name", + "process_guid", + "file_name", + "file_path", + "file_create_time user" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1559.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Component Object Model", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Gamaredon Group", + "MuddyWater" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "process_writing_dynamicwrapperx_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/process_writing_dynamicwrapperx.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Processes launching netsh", + "id": "b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-95dbb162040e", + "version": 4, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Michael Haag, Josef Kuepker, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe. Netsh is a command-line scripting utility that allows you to, either locally or remotely, display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. Netsh can be used as a persistence proxy technique to execute a helper DLL when netsh.exe is executed. In this search, we are looking for processes spawned by netsh.exe and executing commands via the command line.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) AS Processes.process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_netsh` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest |`drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`processes_launching_netsh_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Some VPN applications are known to launch netsh.exe. Outside of these instances, it is unusual for an executable to launch netsh.exe and run commands.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Processes launching netsh", + "analytic_story": [ + "Netsh Abuse", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "DHS Report TA18-074A" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A process $process_name$ that tries to execute netsh commandline $process$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.004", + "T1562" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT38", + "Carbanak", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_netsh", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=netsh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=netsh.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "processes_launching_netsh_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Ransomware Notes bulk creation", + "id": "eff7919a-8330-11eb-83f8-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-03-12", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytics identifies a big number of instance of ransomware notes (filetype e.g .txt, .html, .hta) file creation to the infected machine. This behavior is a good sensor if the ransomware note filename is quite new for security industry or the ransomware note filename is not in your ransomware lookup table list for monitoring.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=11 file_name IN (\"*\\.txt\",\"*\\.html\",\"*\\.hta\") |bin _time span=10s | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(TargetFilename) as unique_readme_path_count values(TargetFilename) as list_of_readme_path by Computer Image file_name | where unique_readme_path_count >= 15 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ransomware_notes_bulk_creation_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", + "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Ransomware Notes bulk creation", + "analytic_story": [ + "Clop Ransomware", + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "BlackMatter Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A high frequency file creation of $file_name$ in different file path in host $Computer$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1486" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "EventCode", + "file_name", + "_time", + "TargetFilename", + "Computer", + "Image", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 81, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1486", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "APT41", + "FIN7", + "Indrik Spider", + "TA505" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "ransomware_notes_bulk_creation_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/ransomware_notes_bulk_creation.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI", + "id": "28077620-c9f6-11eb-8785-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-10", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 performing checks to identify anti-virus products installed on the endpoint. This technique is commonly found in malware and APT events where the adversary will map all running security applications or services. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*SELECT*\" OR Message = \"*WMIC*\") AND (Message = \"*AntiVirusProduct*\" OR Message = \"*AntiSpywareProduct*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "network administrator may used this command for checking purposes", + "references": [ + "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/05/12/maze-ransomware-1-year-counting/", + "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", + "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains AV recon command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1592" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1592", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Recon Using WMI Class", + "id": "018c1972-ca07-11eb-9473-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-10", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell via EventCode 4104, where WMI is performing an event query looking for running processes or running services. This technique is commonly found where the adversary will identify services and system information on the compromised machine. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message= \"*SELECT*\" OR Message= \"*Get-WmiObject*\") AND (Message= \"*Win32_Bios*\" OR Message= \"*Win32_OperatingSystem*\" OR Message= \"*Win32_Processor*\" OR Message= \"*Win32_ComputerSystem*\" OR Message= \"*Win32_ComputerSystemProduct*\" OR Message= \"*Win32_ShadowCopy*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `recon_using_wmi_class_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "network administrator may used this command for checking purposes", + "references": [ + "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/05/12/maze-ransomware-1-year-counting/", + "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", + "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Recon Using WMI Class", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 75, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains host recon command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1592" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 60, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1592", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "recon_using_wmi_class_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/recon_using_wmi_class.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD", + "id": "ba570b3a-d356-11eb-8358-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-06-22", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious commandline designed to delete files or directory recursive using batch command. This technique was seen in ransomware (reddot) where it it tries to delete the files in recycle bin to impaire user from recovering deleted files.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` Processes.process=*/c* Processes.process=* rd * Processes.process=\"*/s*\" Processes.process=\"*/q*\" by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.dest |`drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "network operator may use this batch command to delete recursively a directory or files within directory", + "references": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/c0f98850-af65-4352-9746-fbebadee4f05/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1070.004", + "T1070" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Evilnum", + "FIN10", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Group5", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "Mustang Panda", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "The White Company", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_cmd", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys", + "id": "8470d755-0c13-45b3-bd63-387a373c10cf", + "version": 5, + "date": "2020-11-26", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The search looks for reg.exe modifying registry keys that define Windows services and their configurations.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name values(Processes.user) as user FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=reg.exe Processes.process=*reg* Processes.process=*add* Processes.process=*Services* by Processes.process_id Processes.dest Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "It is unusual for a service to be created or modified by directly manipulating the registry. However, there may be legitimate instances of this behavior. It is important to validate and investigate, as appropriate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1574.011/change_registry_path_service/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 75, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation" + ], + "message": "A reg.exe process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1574.011", + "T1574" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP", + "PR.PT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 45, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases", + "id": "f5f6af30-7aa7-4295-bfe9-07fe87c01bbb", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-01-28", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for registry activity associated with application compatibility shims, which can be leveraged by attackers for various nefarious purposes.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*CurrentVersion\\\\AppCompatFlags\\\\Custom* OR Registry.registry_path=*CurrentVersion\\\\AppCompatFlags\\\\InstalledSDB* by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must populate the Change_Analysis data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection and response product, such as Carbon Black or other endpoint data sources such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "There are many legitimate applications that leverage shim databases for compatibility purposes for legacy applications", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to shim modication in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1546.011", + "T1546" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Shimming", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "FIN7" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", + "id": "f5f6af30-7aa7-4295-bfe9-07fe87c01a4b", + "version": 7, + "date": "2022-01-26", + "author": "Jose Hernandez, David Dorsey, Teoderick Contreras, Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to launch an application or service at system startup.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\RunOnce OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\run* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentVersion\\\\Windows\\\\Appinit_Dlls* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Shell* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Notify* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Userinit* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\VmApplet* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\policies\\\\explorer\\\\run* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\runservices* OR Registry.registry_path=HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Netsh\\\\* OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Image File Execution Options*\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=Debugger) OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Security Packages\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\\\\OSConfig\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Security Packages\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\SilentProcessExit\\\\*\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*currentVersion\\\\Windows\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Load\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentVersion\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Svchost\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\"AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"BootExecute\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Software\\\\Run\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"auto_update\")) by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "There are many legitimate applications that must execute on system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Ransomware", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "IcedID", + "Remcos" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 95, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/atomic_red_team/t1547001-runonce.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to persistence in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1547.001", + "T1547" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user" + ], + "risk_score": 76, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "Putter Panda", + "RTM", + "Rocke", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation", + "id": "c9f4b923-f8af-4155-b697-1354f5bcbc5e", + "version": 5, + "date": "2022-01-26", + "author": "David Dorsey, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to elevate privileges. The registry keys under \"Image File Execution Options\" are used to intercept calls to an executable and can be used to attach malicious binaries to benign system binaries.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=\"*Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Image File Execution Options*\") AND (Registry.registry_value_name=GlobalFlag OR Registry.registry_value_name=Debugger) by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "There are many legitimate applications that must execute upon system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2015/12/an-introduction-to-image-file-execution-options/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 95, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.012/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to privilege escalation in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1546.012", + "T1546" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user" + ], + "risk_score": 76, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.012", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Image File Execution Options Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "TEMP.Veles" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading", + "id": "f421c250-24e7-11ec-bc43-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-10-04", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a loading of dll using regsvr32 application with silent parameter and dllinstall execution. This technique was seen in several RAT malware similar to remcos, njrat and adversaries to load their malicious DLL on the compromised machine. This TTP may executed by normal 3rd party application so it is better to pivot by the parent process, parent command-line and command-line of the file that execute this regsvr32.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` AND Processes.process=\"*/i*\" by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"(?i)[\\-|\\/][Ss]{1}\") | `regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Other third part application may used this parameter but not so common in base windows environment.", + "references": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/dc93ee63-050c-4ff8-b07e-8277af9ab939/#", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", + "Remcos", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/vbs_wscript/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a DLL using the silent and dllinstall parameter.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.010" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 36, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cobalt Group", + "Deep Panda", + "Inception", + "Leviathan", + "TA551", + "WIRTE" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_regsvr32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=REGSVR32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline", + "id": "c9ef7dc4-eeaf-11eb-b2b6-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-07-27", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies Regsvr32.exe utilizing the silent switch to load DLLs. This technique has most recently been seen in IcedID campaigns to load its initial dll that will download the 2nd stage loader that will download and decrypt the config payload. The switch type may be either a hyphen `-` or forward slash `/`. This behavior is typically found with `-s`, and it is possible there are more switch types that may be used. \\ During triage, review parallel processes and capture any artifacts that may have landed on disk. Isolate and contain the endpoint as necessary.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"(?i)[\\-|\\/][Ss]{1}\") | `regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "minimal. but network operator can use this application to load dll.", + "references": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/56680cba-2bbc-4b34-8633-5f7878ddf858/", + "https://regexr.com/699e2" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline", + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID", + "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", + "Remcos" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a DLL using the silent parameter.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.010" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cobalt Group", + "Deep Panda", + "Inception", + "Leviathan", + "TA551", + "WIRTE" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_regsvr32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=REGSVR32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Remcos client registry install entry", + "id": "f2a1615a-1d63-11ec-97d2-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-26", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Rod Soto, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search detects registry key license at host where Remcos RAT agent is installed.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_key_name=*\\\\Software\\\\Remcos*) by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data |`remcos_client_registry_install_entry_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0332/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Remcos client registry install entry", + "analytic_story": [ + "Remcos" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_panel_client/remcos_registry_entry.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A registry entry $registry_path$ with registry keyname $registry_key_name$ related to Remcos RAT in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1112" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.process_id", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user" + ], + "risk_score": 90, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN8", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "remcos_client_registry_install_entry_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remcos_client_registry_install_entry.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Remcos RAT File Creation in Remcos Folder", + "id": "25ae862a-1ac3-11ec-94a1-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-21", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect file creation in remcos folder in appdata which is the keylog and clipboard logs that will be send to its c2 server. This is really a good TTP indicator that there is a remcos rat in the system that do keylogging, clipboard grabbing and audio recording.", + "search": "|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*.dat\") Filesystem.file_path = \"*\\\\remcos\\\\*\" by _time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remcos_rat_file_creation_in_remcos_folder_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://success.trendmicro.com/solution/1123281-remcos-malware-information", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2021/07/remcos-rat-delivered-via-visual-basic/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Remcos RAT File Creation in Remcos Folder", + "analytic_story": [ + "Remcos" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Collection" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_agent/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 100, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "file $file_name$ created in $file_path$ of $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1113" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "dest", + "file_create_time", + "file_name", + "file_path" + ], + "risk_score": 100, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1113", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Screen Capture", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dark Caracal", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN7", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Group5", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Silence" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "remcos_rat_file_creation_in_remcos_folder_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remcos_rat_file_creation_in_remcos_folder.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell", + "id": "d4f42098-4680-11ec-ad07-3e22fbd008af", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-15", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the DCOM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of ShellExecute and ExecuteShellCommand. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse DCOM and `powershell.exe` for lateral movement and remote code execution.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process=\"*Document.ActiveView.ExecuteShellCommand*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Document.Application.ShellExecute*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may leverage DCOM to start a process on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003/", + "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/dcom-lateral-movement-techniques" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.003/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A process was started on a remote endpoint from $dest by abusing DCOM using PowerShell.exe", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_powershell", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell Script Block", + "id": "fa1c3040-4680-11ec-a618-3e22fbd008af", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-15", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of PowerShell with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the DCOM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of ShellExecute and ExecuteShellCommand. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse DCOM for lateral movement and remote code execution.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message=\"*Document.Application.ShellExecute*\" OR Message=\"*Document.ActiveView.ExecuteShellCommand*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_script_block_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup instructions can be found https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may leverage DCOM to start a process on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003/", + "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/dcom-lateral-movement-techniques" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell Script Block", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.003/lateral_movement/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A process was started on a remote endpoint from $ComputerName by abusing WMI using PowerShell.exe", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_script_block_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_script_block.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell", + "id": "ba24cda8-4716-11ec-8009-3e22fbd008af", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-16", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the WinRM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of the `Invoke-Command` commandlet. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WinRM and `powershell.exe` for lateral movement and remote code execution.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process=\"*Invoke-Command*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-ComputerName*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may leverage WinRM and `Invoke-Command` to start a process on remote systems for system administration or automation use cases. However, this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006/", + "https://pentestlab.blog/2018/05/15/lateral-movement-winrm/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement_psh/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A process was started on a remote endpoint from $dest by abusing WinRM using PowerShell.exe", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.006" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 45, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "Chimera", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_powershell", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell Script Block", + "id": "7d4c618e-4716-11ec-951c-3e22fbd008af", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-16", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of PowerShell with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the WinRM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of the `Invoke-Command` commandlet. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WinRM for lateral movement and remote code execution.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message=\"*Invoke-Command*\" AND Message=\"*-ComputerName*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_script_block_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup instructions can be found https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may leverage WinRM and `Invoke-Command` to start a process on remote systems for system administration or automation use cases. This activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. In certain environments, tuning may not be possible.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006/", + "https://pentestlab.blog/2018/05/15/lateral-movement-winrm/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell Script Block", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement_psh/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A process was started on a remote endpoint from $ComputerName by abusing WinRM using PowerShell.exe", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.006" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 45, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "Chimera", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_script_block_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_script_block.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and Winrs", + "id": "0dd296a2-4338-11ec-ba02-3e22fbd008af", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-11", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `winrs.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the WinRM protocol and this binary for lateral movement and remote code execution.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=winrs.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=winrs.exe) (Processes.process=\"*-r:*\" OR Processes.process=\"*-remote:*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_winrs_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may leverage WinRM and WinRs to start a process on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/winrs", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and Winrs", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A process was started on a remote endpoint from $dest", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.006" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "Chimera", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_winrs_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_winrs.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI", + "id": "d25d2c3d-d9d8-40ec-8fdf-e86fe155a3da", + "version": 7, + "date": "2021-11-12", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies wmic.exe being launched with parameters to spawn a process on a remote system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WMI and this binary for lateral movement and remote code execution.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` (Processes.process=\"*/node:*\" AND Processes.process=\"*process*\" AND Processes.process=\"*call*\" AND Processes.process=\"*create*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "The wmic.exe utility is a benign Windows application. It may be used legitimately by Administrators with these parameters for remote system administration, but it's relatively uncommon.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/cimwin32prov/create-method-in-class-win32-process" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A wmic.exe process $process$ contain process spawn commandline $process$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1047" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.AT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_wmic", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell", + "id": "112638b4-4634-11ec-b9ab-3e22fbd008af", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-15", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` leveraging the `Invoke-WmiMethod` commandlet complemented with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing WMI. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WMI and `powershell.exe` for lateral movement and remote code execution.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process=\"*Invoke-WmiMethod*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-CN*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-Class Win32_Process*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-Name create*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may leverage WWMI and powershell.exe to start a process on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/invoke-wmimethod?view=powershell-5.1" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A process was started on a remote endpoint from $dest by abusing WMI using PowerShell.exe", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1047" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_powershell", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell Script Block", + "id": "2a048c14-4634-11ec-a618-3e22fbd008af", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-15", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Invoke-WmiMethod` commandlet with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing WMI. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WMI and this commandlet for lateral movement and remote code execution.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message=\"*Invoke-WmiMethod*\" AND Message=\"*-CN*\" AND Message=\"*-Class Win32_Process*\" AND Message=\"*-Name create*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_script_block_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup instructions can be found https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may leverage WWMI and powershell.exe to start a process on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/invoke-wmimethod?view=powershell-5.1" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell Script Block", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/lateral_movement/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A process was started on a remote endpoint from $ComputerName by abusing WMI using PowerShell.exe", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1047" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_script_block_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_script_block.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Remote System Discovery with Adsisearcher", + "id": "70803451-0047-4e12-9d63-77fa7eb8649c", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-01", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator being used to query Active Directory for domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `[Adsisearcher]` to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*[adsisearcher]*\" AND Message = \"*objectclass=computer*\" AND Message = \"*findAll()*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `remote_system_discovery_with_adsisearcher_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use Adsisearcher for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", + "https://devblogs.microsoft.com/scripting/use-the-powershell-adsisearcher-type-accelerator-to-search-active-directory/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Remote System Discovery with Adsisearcher", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1018" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Leafminer", + "Naikon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "remote_system_discovery_with_adsisearcher_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_adsisearcher.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Remote System Discovery with Dsquery", + "id": "9fb562f4-42f8-4139-8e11-a82edf7ed718", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-31", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `dsquery.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The `computer` argument returns a list of all computers registered in the domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike engage in remote system discovery for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"dsquery.exe\") (Processes.process=\"*computer*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_system_discovery_with_dsquery_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/cc732952(v=ws.11)" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Remote System Discovery with Dsquery", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1018" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Leafminer", + "Naikon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "remote_system_discovery_with_dsquery_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_dsquery.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Remote System Discovery with Net", + "id": "9df16706-04a2-41e2-bbfe-9b38b34409d3", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-30", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The argument `domain computers /domain` returns a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\") (Processes.process=\"*domain computers*\" AND Processes.process=*/do*) OR (Processes.process=\"*view*\" AND Processes.process=*/do*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_system_discovery_with_net_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Remote System Discovery with Net", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1018" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Leafminer", + "Naikon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "remote_system_discovery_with_net_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_net.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Remote System Discovery with Wmic", + "id": "d82eced3-b1dc-42ab-859e-a2fc98827359", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-01", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The arguments utilized in this command return a list of all the systems registered in the domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI and wmic.exe to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"wmic.exe\") (Processes.process=*/NAMESPACE:\\\\\\\\root\\\\directory\\\\ldap* AND Processes.process=*ds_computer* AND Processes.process=\"*GET ds_samaccountname*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_system_discovery_with_wmic_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wmisdk/wmic" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Remote System Discovery with Wmic", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1018" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Leafminer", + "Naikon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "remote_system_discovery_with_wmic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_wmic.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Remote WMI Command Attempt", + "id": "272df6de-61f1-4784-877c-1fbc3e2d0838", + "version": 4, + "date": "2018-12-03", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies usage of `wmic.exe` spawning a local or remote process, identified by the `node` switch. During triage, review parallel processes for additional commands executed. Look for any file modifications before and after `wmic.exe` execution. In addition, identify the remote endpoint and confirm execution or file modifications. Contain and isolate the endpoint as needed.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` Processes.process=*node* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_wmi_command_attempt_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. Deprecated because duplicate of Remote Process Instantiation via WMI.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may use this legitimately to gather info from remote systems. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1047/T1047.yaml" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Remote WMI Command Attempt", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious WMI Use" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A wmic.exe process $process$ contain node commandline $process$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1047" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.AT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.parent_process_id", + "Processes.process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 36, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_wmic", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "remote_wmi_command_attempt_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Resize ShadowStorage volume", + "id": "bc760ca6-8336-11eb-bcbb-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-03-12", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytics identifies the resizing of shadowstorage by ransomware malware to avoid the shadow volumes being made again. this technique is an alternative by ransomware attacker than deleting the shadowstorage which is known alert in defensive team. one example of ransomware that use this technique is CLOP ransomware where it drops a .bat file that will resize the shadowstorage to minimum size as much as possible", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as cmdline values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process values(Processes.process_name) as process_name min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name = \"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"powershell.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"powershell_ise.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"wmic.exe\" Processes.process_name = \"vssadmin.exe\" Processes.process=\"*resize*\" Processes.process=\"*shadowstorage*\" Processes.process=\"*/maxsize*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `resize_shadowstorage_volume_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "network admin can resize the shadowstorage for valid purposes.", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", + "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1490/T1490.md", + "https://redcanary.com/blog/blackbyte-ransomware/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/vssadmin-resize-shadowstorage" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Resize ShadowStorage volume", + "analytic_story": [ + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A process $parent_process_name$ attempt to resize shadow copy with commandline $process$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1490" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.process", + "Process.parent_process_name", + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "resize_shadowstorage_volume_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/resize_shadowstorage_volume.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Revil Common Exec Parameter", + "id": "85facebe-c382-11eb-9c3e-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-06-02", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies suspicious commandline parameter that are commonly used by REVIL ransomware to encrypts the compromise machine.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"* -nolan *\" OR Processes.process = \"* -nolocal *\" OR Processes.process = \"* -fast *\" OR Processes.process = \"* -full *\" by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `revil_common_exec_parameter_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "third party tool may have same command line parameters as revil ransomware.", + "references": [ + "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", + "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Revil Common Exec Parameter", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Revil Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ related to revil ransomware in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1204" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process_guid" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", + "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "revil_common_exec_parameter_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/revil_common_exec_parameter.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Revil Registry Entry", + "id": "e3d3f57a-c381-11eb-9e35-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-01-26", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies suspicious modification in registry entry to keep some malware data during its infection. This technique seen in several apt implant, malware and ransomware like REVIL where it keep some information like the random generated file extension it uses for all the encrypted files and ransomware notes file name in the compromised host.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\WOW6432Node\\\\Facebook_Assistant\\\\*\" OR Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\WOW6432Node\\\\BlackLivesMatter*\") by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `revil_registry_entry_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "to successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Image, TargetObject registry key, registry Details from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", + "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Revil Registry Entry", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Revil Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A registry entry $registry_path$ with registry value $registry_value_name$ and $registry_value_name$ related to revil ransomware in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1112" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_key_name" + ], + "risk_score": 60, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN8", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "revil_registry_entry_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/revil_registry_entry.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Rubeus Command Line Parameters", + "id": "cca37478-8377-11ec-b59a-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-01", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "Rubeus is a C# toolset for raw Kerberos interaction and abuses. It is heavily adapted from Benjamin Delpys Kekeo project and Vincent LE TOUXs MakeMeEnterpriseAdmin project. This analytic looks for the use of Rubeus command line arguments utilized in common Kerberos attacks like exporting and importing tickets, forging silver and golden tickets, requesting a TGT or TGS, kerberoasting, password spraying, etc. Red teams and adversaries alike use Rubeus for Kerberos attacks within Active Directory networks. Defenders should be aware that adversaries may customize the source code of Rubeus and modify the command line parameters. This would effectively bypass this analytic.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process = \"*ptt /ticket*\" OR Processes.process = \"* monitor*\" OR Processes.process =\"* asktgt* /user:*\" OR Processes.process =\"* asktgs* /service:*\" OR Processes.process =\"* golden* /user:*\" OR Processes.process =\"* silver* /service:*\" OR Processes.process =\"* kerberoast*\" OR Processes.process =\"* asreproast*\" OR Processes.process = \"* renew* /ticket:*\" OR Processes.process = \"* brute* /password:*\" OR Processes.process = \"* brute* /passwords:*\" OR Processes.process =\"* harvest*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rubeus_command_line_parameters_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, legitimate applications may use the same command line parameters as Rubeus. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus", + "http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/from-kekeo-to-rubeus/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Rubeus Command Line Parameters", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1550.003/rubeus/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Rubeus command line parameters were used on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1550", + "T1550.003", + "T1558", + "T1558.003", + "T1558.004" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_name" + ], + "risk_score": 36, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1550", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1550.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Ticket", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1558", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "FIN7", + "Operation Wocao", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "rubeus_command_line_parameters_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/rubeus_command_line_parameters.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access", + "id": "5ed8c50a-8869-11ec-876f-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-07", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic looks for a process accessing the winlogon.exe system process. The Splunk Threat Research team identified this behavior when using the Rubeus tool to monitor for and export kerberos tickets from memory. Before being able to export tickets. Rubeus will try to escalate privileges to SYSTEM by obtaining a handle to winlogon.exe before trying to monitor for kerberos tickets. Exporting tickets from memory is typically the first step for pass the ticket attacks. Red teams and adversaries alike may use the pass the ticket technique using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Defenders should be aware that adversaries may customize the source code of Rubeus to potentially bypass this analytic.", + "search": " `sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\winlogon.exe (GrantedAccess=0x1f3fff) (SourceImage!=C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\svchost.exe AND SourceImage!=C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\lsass.exe AND SourceImage!=C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\LogonUI.exe AND SourceImage!=C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\smss.exe AND SourceImage!=C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\wbem\\\\wmiprvse.exe) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, SourceImage, SourceProcessId, TargetImage, TargetProcessId, EventCode, GrantedAccess | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rubeus_kerberos_ticket_exports_through_winlogon_access_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This search needs Sysmon Logs and a sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 10. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may obtain a handle for winlogon.exe. Filter as needed", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus", + "http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/from-kekeo-to-rubeus/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1550.003/rubeus/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Winlogon.exe was accessed by $SourceImage$ on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1550", + "T1550.003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "TargetImage", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "TargetImage", + "CallTrace", + "Computer", + "TargetProcessId", + "SourceImage", + "SourceProcessId" + ], + "risk_score": 36, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1550", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1550.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Ticket", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "rubeus_kerberos_ticket_exports_through_winlogon_access_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/rubeus_kerberos_ticket_exports_through_winlogon_access.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Runas Execution in CommandLine", + "id": "4807e716-43a4-11ec-a0e7-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-12", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic look for a spawned runas.exe process with a administrator user option parameter. This parameter was abused by adversaries, malware author or even red teams to gain elevated privileges in target host. This is a good hunting query to figure out privilege escalation tactics that may used for different stages like lateral movement but take note that administrator may use this command in purpose so its better to see other event context before and after this analytic.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_runas` AND Processes.process = \"*/user:*\" AND Processes.process = \"*admin*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `runas_execution_in_commandline_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated or manual execute this command that may generate false positives. filter is needed.", + "references": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/ad4c3cda-41f2-4401-8dba-56cc2d245488/#" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Runas Execution in CommandLine", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Privilege Escalation" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/vilsel/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "elevated process using runas on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1134", + "T1134.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1134", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Blue Mockingbird", + "FIN6" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1134.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Token Impersonation/Theft", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "FIN8" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "process_runas", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=runas.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=runas.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "runas_execution_in_commandline_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/runas_execution_in_commandline.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt", + "id": "c8e7ced0-10c5-11ec-8b03-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-08", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following hunting detection identifies rundll32.exe with `control_rundll` within the command-line, loading a .cpl or another file type. Developed in relation to CVE-2021-40444. Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. \\ This is written to be a bit more broad by not including .cpl. \\ During triage, review parallel processes to identify any further suspicious behavior.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*Control_RunDLL* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_control_rundll_hunt_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "This is a hunting detection, meant to provide a understanding of how voluminous control_rundll is within the environment.", + "references": [ + "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/rundll32.exe-111474C61232202B5B588D2B512CBB25.html", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/36c14029-9df8-439c-bba0-45f2643b0c70/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", + "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.002/T1218.002.yaml", + "https://redcanary.com/blog/intelligence-insights-december-2021/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", + "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a suspicious file from disk.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-40444" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "CopyKittens", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "MuddyWater", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "rundll32_control_rundll_hunt_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/rundll32_control_rundll_hunt.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory", + "id": "1adffe86-10c3-11ec-8ce6-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-08", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following detection identifies rundll32.exe with `control_rundll` within the command-line, loading a .cpl or another file type from windows\\temp, programdata, or appdata. Developed in relation to CVE-2021-40444. Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. This is written to be a bit more broad by not including .cpl. The paths are specified, add more as needed. During triage, review parallel processes to identify any further suspicious behavior.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*Control_RunDLL* AND Processes.process IN (\"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\windows\\\\temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "This may be tuned, or a new one related, by adding .cpl to command-line. However, it's important to look for both. Tune/filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/rundll32.exe-111474C61232202B5B588D2B512CBB25.html", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/36c14029-9df8-439c-bba0-45f2643b0c70/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", + "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.002/T1218.002.yaml", + "https://redcanary.com/blog/intelligence-insights-december-2021/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", + "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a suspicious file from disk.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-40444" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "CopyKittens", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "MuddyWater", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process", + "id": "2dbeee3a-f067-11eb-96c0-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-07-29", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies the suspicious Remote Thread execution of rundll32.exe process to cmd.exe process. This technique was seen in IcedID malware to execute its malicious code in normal process for defense evasion and to steal sensitive information the the compromised host. browser process.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=8 SourceImage = \"*\\\\rundll32.exe\" TargetImage = \"*.exe\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by SourceImage TargetImage TargetProcessId SourceProcessId StartAddress EventCode Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the SourceImage, TargetImage, and EventCode executions from your endpoints related to create remote thread or injecting codes. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/380662/0/html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process", + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "rundl32 process $SourceImage$ create a remote thread to process $TargetImage$ in host $Computer$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1055" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "SourceImage", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "SourceImage", + "TargetImage", + "TargetProcessId", + "SourceProcessId", + "StartAddress", + "EventCode", + "Computer" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Cobalt Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sharpshooter", + "Silence", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser", + "id": "f8a22586-ee2d-11eb-a193-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-07-26", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies the suspicious Remote Thread execution of rundll32.exe process to \"firefox.exe\" and \"chrome.exe\" browser. This technique was seen in IcedID malware where it hooks the browser to parse banking information as user used the targetted browser process.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=8 SourceImage = \"*\\\\rundll32.exe\" TargetImage IN (\"*\\\\firefox.exe\", \"*\\\\chrome.exe\", \"*\\\\iexplore.exe\",\"*\\\\microsoftedgecp.exe\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by SourceImage TargetImage TargetProcessId SourceProcessId StartAddress EventCode Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the SourceImage, TargetImage, and EventCode executions from your endpoints related to create remote thread or injecting codes. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/380662/0/html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser", + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "rundl32 process $SourceImage$ create a remote thread to browser process $TargetImage$ in host $Computer$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1055" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "SourceImage", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "SourceImage", + "TargetImage", + "TargetProcessId", + "SourceProcessId", + "StartAddress", + "EventCode", + "Computer" + ], + "risk_score": 70, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Cobalt Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sharpshooter", + "Silence", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Rundll32 DNSQuery", + "id": "f1483f5e-ee29-11eb-9d23-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-02-18", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe process having a http connection and do a dns query in some web domain. This technique was seen in IcedID malware where the rundll32 that execute its payload will contact amazon.com to check internet connect and to communicate to its C&C server to download config and other file component.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=22 process_name=\"rundll32.exe\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image QueryName QueryStatus ProcessId Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_dnsquery_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and eventcode = 22 dnsquery executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://any.run/malware-trends/icedid" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Rundll32 DNSQuery", + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "rundll32 process $process_name$ having a dns query to $QueryName$ in host $Computer$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Image", + "QueryName", + "QueryStatus", + "ProcessId", + "Computer" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "CopyKittens", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "MuddyWater", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "rundll32_dnsquery_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/rundll32_dnsquery.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files", + "id": "6338266a-ee2a-11eb-bf68-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-07-26", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32 process that drops executable (.exe or .dll) files. this behavior seen in rundll32 process of IcedID that tries to drop copy of itself in temp folder or download executable drop it either appdata or programdata as part of its execution.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=11 process_name=\"rundll32.exe\" TargetFilename IN (\"*.exe\", \"*.dll\",) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image TargetFilename ProcessGuid dest user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, TargetFilename, and eventcode 11 executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://any.run/malware-trends/icedid" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files", + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "rundll32 process $process_name$ drops a file $TargetFilename$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Image", + "TargetFilename", + "ProcessGuid", + "dest", + "user_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "CopyKittens", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "MuddyWater", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Rundll32 Shimcache Flush", + "id": "a913718a-25b6-11ec-96d3-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-10-05", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious rundll32 commandline to clear shim cache. This technique is a anti-forensic technique to clear the cache taht are one important artifacts in terms of digital forensic during attacks or incident. This TTP is a good indicator that someone tries to evade some tools and clear foothold on the machine.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` AND Processes.process = \"*apphelp.dll,ShimFlushCache*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_shimcache_flush_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://blueteamops.medium.com/shimcache-flush-89daff28d15e" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Rundll32 Shimcache Flush", + "analytic_story": [ + "Unusual Processes" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/shimcache_flush/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "rundll32 process execute $process$ to clear shim cache in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1112" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN8", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "rundll32_shimcache_flush_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/rundll32_shimcache_flush.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network", + "id": "35307032-a12d-11eb-835f-acde48001122", + "version": 3, + "date": "2021-10-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments and performing a network connection. It is unusual for rundll32.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` by _time span=1h Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(rundll32\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port !=\"0\" by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port| `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_guid connection_to_CNC dest_port | `rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `port` node. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32", + "https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", + "Cobalt Strike", + "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A rundll32 process $process_name$ with no commandline argument like this process commandline $process$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 70, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-34527" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "CopyKittens", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "MuddyWater", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal", + "id": "6c135f8d-5e60-454e-80b7-c56eed739833", + "version": 6, + "date": "2022-02-08", + "author": "Michael Haag, David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading an export function by ordinal value. Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly, may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Utilizing ordinal values makes it a bit more complicated for analysts to understand the behavior until the DLL is reviewed.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"rundll32.+\\#\\d+\") | `rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives are possible with native utilities and third party applications. Filtering may be needed based on command-line, or add world writeable paths to restrict query.", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/07/qbot-likes-to-move-it-move-it/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal", + "analytic_story": [ + "Unusual Processes", + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/ordinal_windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation" + ], + "message": "A rundll32 process $process_name$ with ordinal parameter like this process commandline $process$ on host $dest$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "CopyKittens", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "MuddyWater", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Ryuk Test Files Detected", + "id": "57d44d70-28d9-4ed1-acf5-1c80ae2bbce3", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-11-06", + "author": "Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The search looks for files that contain the key word *Ryuk* under any folder in the C drive, which is consistent with Ryuk propagation.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem WHERE \"Filesystem.file_path\"=C:\\\\*Ryuk* BY \"Filesystem.dest\", \"Filesystem.user\", \"Filesystem.file_path\" | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `ryuk_test_files_detected_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Filesystem data-model object. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.", + "known_false_positives": "If there are files with this keywoord as file names it might trigger false possitives, please make use of our filters to tune out potential FPs.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Ryuk Test Files Detected", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ryuk Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ryuk/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "message": "A creation of ryuk test file $file_path$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1486" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.file_path", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Filesystem.user" + ], + "risk_score": 70, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1486", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "APT41", + "FIN7", + "Indrik Spider", + "TA505" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "ryuk_test_files_detected_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Ryuk Wake on LAN Command", + "id": "538d0152-7aaa-11eb-beaa-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-03-01", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This Splunk query identifies the use of Wake-on-LAN utilized by Ryuk ransomware. The Ryuk Ransomware uses the Wake-on-Lan feature to turn on powered off devices on a compromised network to have greater success encrypting them. This is a high fidelity indicator of Ryuk ransomware executing on an endpoint. Upon triage, isolate the endpoint. Additional file modification events will be within the users profile (\\appdata\\roaming) and in public directories (users\\public\\). Review all Scheduled Tasks on the isolated endpoint and across the fleet. Suspicious Scheduled Tasks will include a path to a unknown binary and those endpoints should be isolated until triaged.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process=\"*8 LAN*\" OR Processes.process=\"*9 REP*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ryuk_wake_on_lan_command_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited to no known false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ryuk-ransomware-uses-wake-on-lan-to-encrypt-offline-devices/", + "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ryuk-ransomware-now-self-spreads-to-other-windows-lan-devices/", + "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/uploads/CERTFR-2021-CTI-006.pdf" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Ryuk Wake on LAN Command", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ryuk Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/ryuk/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A process $process_name$ with wake on LAN commandline $process$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "ryuk_wake_on_lan_command_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/ryuk_wake_on_lan_command.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "SAM Database File Access Attempt", + "id": "57551656-ebdb-11eb-afdf-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-07-23", + "author": "Michael Haag, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies access to SAM, SYSTEM or SECURITY databases' within the file path of `windows\\system32\\config` using Windows Security EventCode 4663. This particular behavior is related to credential access, an attempt to either use a Shadow Copy or recent CVE-2021-36934 to access the SAM database. The Security Account Manager (SAM) is a database file in Windows XP, Windows Vista, Windows 7, 8.1 and 10 that stores users' passwords.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` (EventCode=4663) process_name!=*\\\\dllhost.exe Object_Name IN (\"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\config\\\\SAM*\",\"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\config\\\\SYSTEM*\",\"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\config\\\\SECURITY*\") | stats values(Accesses) count by process_name Object_Name dest user | `sam_database_file_access_attempt_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663. For 4663, enable \"Audit Object Access\" in Group Policy. Then check the two boxes listed for both \"Success\" and \"Failure.\"", + "known_false_positives": "Natively, `dllhost.exe` will access the files. Every environment will have additional native processes that do as well. Filter by process_name. As an aside, one can remove process_name entirely and add `Object_Name=*ShadowCopy*`.", + "references": [ + "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4663", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4663", + "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-36934", + "https://github.com/GossiTheDog/HiveNightmare", + "https://github.com/JumpsecLabs/Guidance-Advice/tree/main/SAM_Permissions", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security_Account_Manager" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "SAM Database File Access Attempt", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "The following process $process_name$ accessed the object $Object_Name$ attempting to gain access to credentials on $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.002", + "T1003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Object_Name", + "type": "File", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "process_name", + "Object_Name", + "dest", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-36934" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "GALLIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "Night Dragon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "sam_database_file_access_attempt_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/sam_database_file_access_attempt.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Samsam Test File Write", + "id": "493a879d-519d-428f-8f57-a06a0fdc107e", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-12-14", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The search looks for a file named \"test.txt\" written to the windows system directory tree, which is consistent with Samsam propagation.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_name) as file_name from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\windows\\\\system32\\\\test.txt by Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `samsam_test_file_write_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data-model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.", + "known_false_positives": "No false positives have been identified.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Samsam Test File Write", + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 20, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1486/sam_sam_note/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "message": "A samsam ransomware test file creation in $file_path$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1486" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.user", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.file_path" + ], + "risk_score": 12, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1486", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "APT41", + "FIN7", + "Indrik Spider", + "TA505" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "samsam_test_file_write_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services", + "id": "f0c693d8-2a89-4ce7-80b4-98fea4c3ea6d", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for arguments to sc.exe indicating the creation or modification of a Windows service.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = sc.exe (Processes.process=\"* create *\" OR Processes.process=\"* config *\") by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Using sc.exe to manipulate Windows services is uncommon. However, there may be legitimate instances of this behavior. It is important to validate and investigate as appropriate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Service Abuse", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation" + ], + "message": "A sc process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ to create of configure services in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1543.003", + "T1543" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP", + "PR.PT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN7", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "PROMETHIUM", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "SchCache Change By App Connect And Create ADSI Object", + "id": "991eb510-0fc6-11ec-82d3-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-07", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect an application try to connect and create ADSI Object to do LDAP query. Every time an application connects to the directory and attempts to create an ADSI object, the Active Directory Schema is checked for changes. If it has changed since the last connection, the schema is downloaded and stored in a cache on the local computer either in %LOCALAPPDATA%\\Microsoft\\Windows\\SchCache or %systemroot%\\SchCache. We found this a good anomaly use case to detect suspicious application like blackmatter ransomware that use ADS object api to execute ldap query. having a good list of ldap or normal AD query tool used within the network is a good start to reduce the noise.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=11 TargetFilename = \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SchCache\\\\*\" TargetFilename = \"*.sch*\" NOT (Image IN (\"*\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\mmc.exe\")) |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image TargetFilename EventCode process_id process_name Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schcache_change_by_app_connect_and_create_adsi_object_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "normal application like mmc.exe and other ldap query tool may trigger this detections.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/adsi/adsi-and-uac", + "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/08/09/blackmatter-ransomware-emerges-from-the-shadow-of-darkside/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "SchCache Change By App Connect And Create ADSI Object", + "analytic_story": [ + "blackMatter ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/blackmatter_schcache/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "process $Image$ create a file $TargetFilename$ in host $Computer$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1087" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Image", + "TargetFilename", + "EventCode", + "process_id", + "process_name", + "Computer" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "schcache_change_by_app_connect_and_create_adsi_object_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/schcache_change_by_app_connect_and_create_adsi_object.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments", + "id": "523c2684-a101-11eb-916b-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-19", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with an arguments \"HTTP\" string that are unique entry of malware or attack that uses lolbin to download other file or payload to the infected machine. The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\\Windows\\system32` and `C:\\Windows\\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.'", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message| search Arguments IN (\"*http*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Task_Name, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden, Arguments | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schedule_task_with_http_command_arguments_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the task schedule (Exa. Security Log EventCode 4698) endpoints. Tune and filter known instances of Task schedule used in your environment.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/92d7ef61-bfd7-4c92-bc15-322172b4ebec/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/tasksched/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A schedule task process commandline arguments $Arguments$ with http string on it in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "dest", + "Task_Name", + "Command", + "Author", + "Enabled", + "Hidden", + "Arguments" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "schedule_task_with_http_command_arguments_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/schedule_task_with_http_command_arguments.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger", + "id": "75b00fd8-a0ff-11eb-8b31-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-19", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed with a Rundll32. This technique is common in new trickbot that uses rundll32 to load is trickbot downloader. The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\\Windows\\system32` and `C:\\Windows\\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.'", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message | search Command IN (\"*rundll32*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Task_Name, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden, Arguments | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the task schedule (Exa. Security Log EventCode 4698) endpoints. Tune and filter known instances of Task schedule used in your environment.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/", + "https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Trickbot", + "IcedID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/tasksched/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A schedule task process commandline rundll32 arguments $Arguments$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "dest", + "Task_Name", + "Command", + "Author", + "Enabled", + "Hidden", + "Arguments" + ], + "risk_score": 70, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At", + "id": "4be54858-432f-11ec-8209-3e22fbd008af", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-11", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `at.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to create a Scheduled Task on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution. The `at.exe` binary internally leverages the AT protocol which was deprecated starting with Windows 8 and Windows Server 2012 but may still work on previous versions of Windows. Furthermore, attackers may enable this protocol on demand by changing a sytem registry key.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=at.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=at.exe) (Processes.process=*\\\\\\\\*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `scheduled_task_creation_on_remote_endpoint_using_at_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may create scheduled tasks on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/at", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/cimwin32prov/win32-scheduledjob?redirectedfrom=MSDN" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.002/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A Windows Scheduled Task was created on a remote endpoint from $dest", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053", + "T1053.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "At (Windows)", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Threat Group-3390" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "scheduled_task_creation_on_remote_endpoint_using_at_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_creation_on_remote_endpoint_using_at.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", + "id": "d5af132c-7c17-439c-9d31-13d55340f36c", + "version": 6, + "date": "2022-02-22", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation or deletion of a scheduled task using schtasks.exe with flags - create or delete being passed on the command-line. This has been associated with the Dragonfly threat actor, and the SUNBURST attack against Solarwinds. This analytic replaces \"Scheduled Task used in BadRabbit Ransomware\".", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe (Processes.process=*delete* OR Processes.process=*create*) by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible scripts or administrators may trigger this analytic. Filter as needed based on parent process, application.", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/21/qbot-and-zerologon-lead-to-full-domain-compromise/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", + "analytic_story": [ + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "NOBELIUM Group", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A schedule task process $process_name$ with create or delete commandline $process$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CostaRicto", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Machete", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint", + "id": "95cf4608-4302-11ec-8194-3e22fbd008af", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-11", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `schtasks.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to start a Scheduled Task on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=schtasks.exe) (Processes.process=*/s* AND Processes.process=*/run*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `scheduled_task_initiation_on_remote_endpoint_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may start scheduled tasks on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/schtasks", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A Windows Scheduled Task was ran on a remote endpoint from $dest", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053", + "T1053.005" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CostaRicto", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Machete", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "scheduled_task_initiation_on_remote_endpoint_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_initiation_on_remote_endpoint.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Schtasks Run Task On Demand", + "id": "bb37061e-af1f-11eb-a159-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-07", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies an on demand run of a Windows Schedule Task through shell or command-line. This technique has been used by adversaries that force to run their created Schedule Task as their persistence mechanism or for lateral movement as part of their malicious attack to the compromised machine.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"schtasks.exe\" Processes.process = \"*/run*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schtasks_run_task_on_demand_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed schtasks.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may use to debug Schedule Task entries. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Schtasks Run Task On Demand", + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A \"on demand\" execution of schedule task process $process_name$ using commandline $process$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 48, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "schtasks_run_task_on_demand_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/schtasks_run_task_on_demand.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Schtasks scheduling job on remote system", + "id": "1297fb80-f42a-4b4a-9c8a-88c066237cf6", + "version": 5, + "date": "2021-11-11", + "author": "David Dorsey, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `schtasks.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to create a Scheduled Task on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = schtasks.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=schtasks.exe) (Processes.process=\"*/create*\" AND Processes.process=\"*/s*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may create scheduled tasks on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. It is important to validate and investigate as appropriate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Schtasks scheduling job on remote system", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A schedule task process $process_name$ with remote job commandline $process$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Processes.dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Processes.user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CostaRicto", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Machete", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Schtasks used for forcing a reboot", + "id": "1297fb80-f42a-4b4a-9c8a-88c066437cf6", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-12-07", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line that indicate that a forced reboot of system is scheduled.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe Processes.process=\"*shutdown*\" Processes.process=\"*/create *\" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may create jobs on systems forcing reboots to perform updates, maintenance, etc.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Schtasks used for forcing a reboot", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/schtask_shutdown/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A schedule task process $process_name$ with force reboot commandline $process$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CostaRicto", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Machete", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Screensaver Event Trigger Execution", + "id": "58cea3ec-1f6d-11ec-8560-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-27", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is developed to detect possible event trigger execution through screensaver registry entry modification for persistence or privilege escalation. This technique was seen in several APT and malware where they put the malicious payload path to the SCRNSAVE.EXE registry key to redirect the execution to their malicious payload path. This TTP is a good indicator that some attacker may modify this entry for their persistence and privilege escalation.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Control Panel\\\\Desktop\\\\SCRNSAVE.EXE*\") by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `screensaver_event_trigger_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/002/", + "https://dmcxblue.gitbook.io/red-team-notes-2-0/red-team-techniques/privilege-escalation/untitled-3/screensaver" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Screensaver Event Trigger Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.002/scrnsave_reg/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1546", + "T1546.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_value_name" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Screensaver", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "screensaver_event_trigger_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/screensaver_event_trigger_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Script Execution via WMI", + "id": "aa73f80d-d728-4077-b226-81ea0c8be589", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-03-16", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for scripts launched via WMI.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=scrcons.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `script_execution_via_wmi_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, administrators may use wmi to launch scripts for legitimate purposes. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://redcanary.com/blog/child-processes/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Script Execution via WMI", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious WMI Use" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/execution_scrcons/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A wmic.exe process $process_name$ taht execute script in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1047" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.AT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 36, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "script_execution_via_wmi_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Sdclt UAC Bypass", + "id": "d71efbf6-da63-11eb-8c6e-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-01-28", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious sdclt.exe registry modification. This technique is commonly seen when attacker try to bypassed UAC by using sdclt.exe application by modifying some registry that sdclt.exe tries to open or query with payload file path on it to be executed.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\App Paths\\\\control.exe*\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\exefile\\\\shell\\\\runas\\\\command\\\\*\") (Registry.registry_value_name = \"(Default)\" OR Registry.registry_value_name = \"IsolatedCommand\") by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `sdclt_uac_bypass_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited to no false positives are expected.", + "references": [ + "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/17/fileless-uac-bypass-using-sdclt-exe/", + "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME", + "https://www.cyborgsecurity.com/cyborg_labs/threat-hunt-deep-dives-user-account-control-bypass-via-registry-modification/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Sdclt UAC Bypass", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Defense Evasion", + "Scope:Inbound" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious modification of registry $registry_path$ with possible payload path $registry_value_name$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT37", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Evilnum", + "Honeybee", + "MuddyWater", + "Patchwork", + "Threat Group-3390" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "sdclt_uac_bypass_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/sdclt_uac_bypass.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Sdelete Application Execution", + "id": "31702fc0-2682-11ec-85c3-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-10-06", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect the execution of sdelete.exe application sysinternal tools. This tool is one of the most use tool of malware and adversaries to remove or clear their tracks and artifact in the targetted host. This tool is designed to delete securely a file in file system that remove the forensic evidence on the machine. A good TTP query to check why user execute this application which is not a common practice.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_sdelete` by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sdelete_application_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "user may execute and use this application", + "references": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/956f50be-2c13-465a-ac00-6224c14c5f89/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Sdelete Application Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/sdelete/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "sdelete process $process_name$ executed in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1485", + "T1070.004", + "T1070" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Evilnum", + "FIN10", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Group5", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "Mustang Panda", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "The White Company", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_sdelete", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=sdelete.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=sdelete.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sdelete_application_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/sdelete_application_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network", + "id": "b690df8c-a145-11eb-a38b-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-10-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies searchprotocolhost.exe with no command line arguments and with a network connection. It is unusual for searchprotocolhost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. searchprotocolhost.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=searchprotocolhost.exe by _time span=1h Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(searchprotocolhost\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port !=\"0\" by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_guid connection_to_CNC dest_port | `searchprotocolhost_with_no_command_line_with_network_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `ports` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/fireeye/red_team_tool_countermeasures/blob/master/rules/PGF/supplemental/hxioc/SUSPICIOUS%20EXECUTION%20OF%20SEARCHPROTOCOLHOST%20(METHODOLOGY).ioc" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network", + "analytic_story": [ + "Cobalt Strike" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon_searchprotocolhost.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A searchprotocolhost.exe process $process_name$ with no commandline in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1055" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "process_name", + "process_id", + "parent_process_name", + "dest_port", + "process_path" + ], + "risk_score": 70, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Cobalt Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sharpshooter", + "Silence", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "searchprotocolhost_with_no_command_line_with_network_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/searchprotocolhost_with_no_command_line_with_network.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool", + "id": "5672819c-be09-11eb-bbfb-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-26", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic detects a potential usage of secretsdump.py tool for dumping credentials (ntlm hash) from a copy of ntds.dit and SAM.Security,SYSTEM registrry hive. This technique was seen in some attacker that dump ntlm hashes offline after having a copy of ntds.dit and SAM/SYSTEM/SECURITY registry hive.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"python*.exe\" Processes.process = \"*.py*\" Processes.process = \"*-ntds*\" (Processes.process = \"*-system*\" OR Processes.process = \"*-sam*\" OR Processes.process = \"*-security*\" OR Processes.process = \"*-bootkey*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `secretdumps_offline_ntds_dumping_tool_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/master/examples/secretsdump.py" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/casper/datasets1/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A secretdump process $process_name$ with secretdump commandline $process$ to dump credentials in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.003", + "T1003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process_guid" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Fox Kitten", + "HAFNIUM", + "Mustang Panda", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "secretdumps_offline_ntds_dumping_tool_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/secretdumps_offline_ntds_dumping_tool.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell", + "id": "13243068-2d38-11ec-8908-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-10-14", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies `powershell.exe` usage, using Script Block Logging EventCode 4104, related to querying the domain for Service Principle Names. typically, this is a precursor activity related to kerberoasting or the silver ticket attack. \\\nWhat is a ServicePrincipleName? \\\nA service principal name (SPN) is a unique identifier of a service instance. SPNs are used by Kerberos authentication to associate a service instance with a service logon account. This allows a client application to request that the service authenticate an account even if the client does not have the account name.\\\nThe following analytic identifies the use of KerberosRequestorSecurityToken class within the script block. Using .NET System.IdentityModel.Tokens.KerberosRequestorSecurityToken class in PowerShell is the equivelant of using setspn.exe. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes for further suspicious activity.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message=\"*KerberosRequestorSecurityToken*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message OpCode ComputerName User EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/ad/service-principal-names", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.identitymodel.tokens.kerberosrequestorsecuritytoken?view=netframework-4.8", + "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/t1208-kerberoasting", + "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/setspn.exe-5C184D581524245DAD7A0A02B51FD2C2.html", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/", + "https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/717.service-principal-names-spn-setspn-syntax.aspx", + "https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz/", + "https://blog.zsec.uk/paving-2-da-wholeset/", + "https://msitpros.com/?p=3113", + "https://adsecurity.org/?p=3466", + "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", + "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery", + "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/atomic_red_team/windows-powershell_kerberos.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to identify service principle names.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1558.003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "FIN7", + "Operation Wocao", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN", + "id": "ae8b3efc-2d2e-11ec-8b57-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-10-14", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies `setspn.exe` usage related to querying the domain for Service Principle Names. typically, this is a precursor activity related to kerberoasting or the silver ticket attack. \\\nWhat is a ServicePrincipleName? \\\nA service principal name (SPN) is a unique identifier of a service instance. SPNs are used by Kerberos authentication to associate a service instance with a service logon account. This allows a client application to request that the service authenticate an account even if the client does not have the account name.\\\nExample usage includes the following \\\n1. setspn -T offense -Q */* 1. setspn -T attackrange.local -F -Q MSSQLSvc/* 1. setspn -Q */* > allspns.txt 1. setspn -q \\\nValues \\\n1. -F = perform queries at the forest, rather than domain level 1. -T = perform query on the specified domain or forest (when -F is also used) 1. -Q = query for existence of SPN \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes for further suspicious activity.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_setspn` (Processes.process=\"*-t*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-f*\") OR (Processes.process=\"*-q*\" AND Processes.process=\"**/**\") OR (Processes.process=\"*-q*\") OR (Processes.process=\"*-s*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives may be caused by Administrators resetting SPNs or querying for SPNs. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/ad/service-principal-names", + "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/t1208-kerberoasting", + "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/setspn.exe-5C184D581524245DAD7A0A02B51FD2C2.html", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/", + "https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/717.service-principal-names-spn-setspn-syntax.aspx", + "https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz/", + "https://blog.zsec.uk/paving-2-da-wholeset/", + "https://msitpros.com/?p=3113", + "https://adsecurity.org/?p=3466" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery", + "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_setspn.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to identify service principle names.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1558.003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "FIN7", + "Operation Wocao", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_setspn", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=setspn.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=setspn.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Services Escalate Exe", + "id": "c448488c-b7ec-11eb-8253-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-18", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of `svc-exe` with Cobalt Strike. The behavior typically follows after an adversary has already gained initial access and is escalating privileges. Using `svc-exe`, a randomly named binary will be downloaded from the remote Teamserver and placed on disk within `C:\\Windows\\400619a.exe`. Following, the binary will be added to the registry under key `HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\400619a\\` with multiple keys and values added to look like a legitimate service. Upon loading, `services.exe` will spawn the randomly named binary from `\\\\127.0.0.1\\ADMIN$\\400619a.exe`. The process lineage is completed with `400619a.exe` spawning rundll32.exe, which is the default `spawnto_` value for Cobalt Strike. The `spawnto_` value is arbitrary and may be any process on disk (typically system32/syswow64 binary). The `spawnto_` process will also contain a network connection. During triage, review parallel procesess and identify any additional file modifications.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe Processes.process_path=*admin$* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `services_escalate_exe_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as `services.exe` should never spawn a process from `ADMIN$`. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/", + "https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-beacon" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Services Escalate Exe", + "analytic_story": [ + "Cobalt Strike" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 95, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A service process $parent_process_name$ with process path $process_path$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Processes.dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Processes.user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 76, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "services_escalate_exe_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/services_escalate_exe.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", + "id": "ba9e1954-4c04-11ec-8b74-3e22fbd008af", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-22", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies `services.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the Service Control Manager and creating a remote malicious service, the executed command is spawned as a child process of `services.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of services.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe) (Processes.process_name IN (\"Regsvcs.exe\", \"Ftp.exe\", \"OfflineScannerShell.exe\", \"Rasautou.exe\", \"Schtasks.exe\", \"Xwizard.exe\", \"Dllhost.exe\", \"Pnputil.exe\", \"Atbroker.exe\", \"Pcwrun.exe\", \"Ttdinject.exe\",\"Mshta.exe\", \"Bitsadmin.exe\", \"Certoc.exe\", \"Ieexec.exe\", \"Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe\", \"Runscripthelper.exe\", \"Forfiles.exe\", \"Msbuild.exe\", \"Register-cimprovider.exe\", \"Tttracer.exe\", \"Ie4uinit.exe\", \"Bash.exe\", \"Hh.exe\", \"SettingSyncHost.exe\", \"Cmstp.exe\", \"Mmc.exe\", \"Stordiag.exe\", \"Scriptrunner.exe\", \"Odbcconf.exe\", \"Extexport.exe\", \"Msdt.exe\", \"WorkFolders.exe\", \"Diskshadow.exe\", \"Mavinject.exe\", \"Regasm.exe\", \"Gpscript.exe\", \"Rundll32.exe\", \"Regsvr32.exe\", \"Msiexec.exe\", \"Wuauclt.exe\", \"Presentationhost.exe\", \"Wmic.exe\", \"Runonce.exe\", \"Syncappvpublishingserver.exe\", \"Verclsid.exe\", \"Infdefaultinstall.exe\", \"Explorer.exe\", \"Installutil.exe\", \"Netsh.exe\", \"Wab.exe\", \"Dnscmd.exe\", \"At.exe\", \"Pcalua.exe\", \"Msconfig.exe\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `services_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/", + "https://pentestlab.blog/2020/07/21/lateral-movement-services/", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Services.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1543", + "T1543.003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN7", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "PROMETHIUM", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "services_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/services_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass", + "id": "c2590137-0b08-4985-9ec5-6ae23d92f63d", + "version": 7, + "date": "2022-02-18", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "Monitor for changes of the ExecutionPolicy in the registry to the values \"unrestricted\" or \"bypass,\" which allows the execution of malicious scripts.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*Software\\\\Microsoft\\\\Powershell\\\\1\\\\ShellIds\\\\Microsoft.PowerShell* Registry.registry_value_name=ExecutionPolicy (Registry.registry_value_data=Unrestricted OR Registry.registry_value_data=Bypass) by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Registry node. You must also be ingesting logs with the fields registry_path, registry_key_name, and registry_value_name from your endpoints.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may attempt to change the default execution policy on a system for a variety of reasons. However, setting the policy to \"unrestricted\" or \"bypass\" as this search is designed to identify, would be unusual. Hits should be reviewed and investigated as appropriate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Credential Dumping", + "HAFNIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_execution_policy/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A registry modification in $registry_path$ with reg key $registry_key_name$ and reg value $registry_value_name$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "registry_path", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 48, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Shim Database File Creation", + "id": "6e4c4588-ba2f-42fa-97e6-9f6f548eaa33", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-12-08", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for shim database files being written to default directories. The sdbinst.exe application is used to install shim database files (.sdb). According to Microsoft, a shim is a small library that transparently intercepts an API, changes the parameters passed, handles the operation itself, or redirects the operation elsewhere.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.action) values(Filesystem.file_hash) as file_hash values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path=*Windows\\\\AppPatch\\\\Custom* by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `shim_database_file_creation_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.", + "known_false_positives": "Because legitimate shim files are created and used all the time, this event, in itself, is not suspicious. However, if there are other correlating events, it may warrant further investigation.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Shim Database File Creation", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A process that possibly write shim database in $file_path$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1546.011", + "T1546" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_path", + "type": "File", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.file_hash", + "Filesystem.file_path", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Shimming", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "FIN7" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "shim_database_file_creation_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters", + "id": "404620de-46d8-48b6-90cc-8a8d7b0876a3", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-11-23", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search detects the process execution and arguments required to silently create a shim database. The sdbinst.exe application is used to install shim database files (.sdb). A shim is a small library which transparently intercepts an API, changes the parameters passed, handles the operation itself, or redirects the operation elsewhere.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = sdbinst.exe by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A process $process_name$ that possible create a shim db silently in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1546.011", + "T1546" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Shimming", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "FIN7" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Short Lived Scheduled Task", + "id": "6fa31414-546e-11ec-adfa-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-03", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic leverages Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created` and Windows Security EventCode 4699, `A scheduled task was deleted` to identify scheduled tasks created and deleted in less than 30 seconds. This behavior may represent a lateral movement attack abusing the Task Scheduler to obtain code execution. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution.", + "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 OR EventCode=4699 | xmlkv Message | transaction Task_Name startswith=(EventCode=4698) endswith=(EventCode=4699) | eval short_lived=case((duration<30),\"TRUE\") | search short_lived = TRUE | table _time, ComputerName, Account_Name, Command, Task_Name, short_lived | `short_lived_scheduled_task_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required.", + "known_false_positives": "Although uncommon, legitimate applications may create and delete a Scheduled Task within 30 seconds. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/taskschd/about-the-task-scheduler" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Short Lived Scheduled Task", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/lateral_movement/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A windows scheduled task was created and deleted in 30 seconds on $ComputerName$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.005" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "dest", + "ComputerName", + "Account_Name", + "Task_Name", + "Description", + "Command" + ], + "risk_score": 81, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CostaRicto", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Machete", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "short_lived_scheduled_task_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/short_lived_scheduled_task.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Short Lived Windows Accounts", + "id": "b25f6f62-0782-43c1-b403-083231ffd97d", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-06", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search detects accounts that were created and deleted in a short time period.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Changes.result_id) as result_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.result_id=4720 OR All_Changes.result_id=4726 by _time span=4h All_Changes.user All_Changes.dest | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | search result_id = 4720 result_id=4726 | transaction user connected=false maxspan=240m | table firstTime lastTime count user dest result_id | `short_lived_windows_accounts_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This search requires you to have enabled your Group Management Audit Logs in your Local Windows Security Policy and be ingesting those logs. More information on how to enable them can be found here: http://whatevernetworks.com/auditing-group-membership-changes-in-active-directory/", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible that an administrator created and deleted an account in a short time period. Verifying activity with an administrator is advised.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Short Lived Windows Accounts", + "analytic_story": [ + "Account Monitoring and Controls" + ], + "asset_type": "Windows", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A user account created or delete shortly in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1136.001", + "T1136" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.result_id", + "All_Changes.user", + "All_Changes.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "access", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT3", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Fox Kitten", + "Leafminer", + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Indrik Spider", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "short_lived_windows_accounts_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "SilentCleanup UAC Bypass", + "id": "56d7cfcc-da63-11eb-92d4-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-01-28", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry that may related to UAC bypassed. This registry will be trigger once the attacker abuse the silentcleanup task schedule to gain high privilege execution that will bypass User control account.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Environment\\\\windir\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"*.exe*\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `silentcleanup_uac_bypass_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME", + "https://www.intezer.com/blog/malware-analysis/klingon-rat-holding-on-for-dear-life/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "SilentCleanup UAC Bypass", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious modification of registry $registry_path$ with possible payload path $registry_value_name$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT37", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Evilnum", + "Honeybee", + "MuddyWater", + "Patchwork", + "Threat Group-3390" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "silentcleanup_uac_bypass_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/silentcleanup_uac_bypass.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Single Letter Process On Endpoint", + "id": "a4214f0b-e01c-41bc-8cc4-d2b71e3056b4", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-12-08", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for process names that consist only of a single letter.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process, Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | eval process_name_length = len(process_name), endExe = if(substr(process_name, -4) == \".exe\", 1, 0) | search process_name_length=5 AND endExe=1 | table count, firstTime, lastTime, dest, user, process, process_name | `single_letter_process_on_endpoint_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "Single-letter executables are not always malicious. Investigate this activity with your normal incident-response process.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Single Letter Process On Endpoint", + "analytic_story": [ + "DHS Report TA18-074A" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1204.002/single_letter_exe/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A suspicious process $process_name$ with single letter in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1204", + "T1204.002" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_name" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", + "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "single_letter_process_on_endpoint_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "SLUI RunAs Elevated", + "id": "8d124810-b3e4-11eb-96c7-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the Microsoft Software Licensing User Interface Tool, `slui.exe`, elevating access using the `-verb runas` function. This particular bypass utilizes a registry key/value. Identified by two sources, the registry keys are `HKCU\\Software\\Classes\\exefile\\shell` and `HKCU\\Software\\Classes\\launcher.Systemsettings\\Shell\\open\\command`. To simulate this behavior, multiple POC are available. The analytic identifies the use of `runas` by `slui.exe`.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=slui.exe (Processes.process=*-verb* Processes.process=*runas*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `slui_runas_elevated_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives should be present as this is not commonly used by legitimate applications.", + "references": [ + "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/46998", + "https://medium.com/@mattharr0ey/privilege-escalation-uac-bypass-in-changepk-c40b92818d1b", + "https://gist.github.com/r00t-3xp10it/0c92cd554d3156fd74f6c25660ccc466", + "https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/windows/local/bypassuac_sluihijack/", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "SLUI RunAs Elevated", + "analytic_story": [ + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/slui/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A slui process $process_name$ with elevated commandline $process$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT37", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Evilnum", + "Honeybee", + "MuddyWater", + "Patchwork", + "Threat Group-3390" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "slui_runas_elevated_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/slui_runas_elevated.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "SLUI Spawning a Process", + "id": "879c4330-b3e0-11eb-b1b1-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the Microsoft Software Licensing User Interface Tool, `slui.exe`, spawning a child process. This behavior is associated with publicly known UAC bypass. `slui.exe` is commonly associated with software updates and is most often spawned by `svchost.exe`. The `slui.exe` process should not have child processes, and any processes spawning from it will be running with elevated privileges. During triage, review the child process and additional parallel processes. Identify any file modifications that may have lead to the bypass.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=slui.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `slui_spawning_a_process_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Certain applications may spawn from `slui.exe` that are legitimate. Filtering will be needed to ensure proper monitoring.", + "references": [ + "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/46998", + "https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/windows/local/bypassuac_sluihijack/", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "SLUI Spawning a Process", + "analytic_story": [ + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/slui/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A slui process $parent_process_name$ spawning child process $process_name$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT37", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Evilnum", + "Honeybee", + "MuddyWater", + "Patchwork", + "Threat Group-3390" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "slui_spawning_a_process_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/slui_spawning_a_process.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Spoolsv Spawning Rundll32", + "id": "15d905f6-da6b-11eb-ab82-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-07-01", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a suspicious child process, `rundll32.exe`, with no command-line arguments being spawned from `spoolsv.exe`. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. Typically, this is not normal behavior for `spoolsv.exe` to spawn a process. During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=spoolsv.exe `process_rundll32` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spoolsv_spawning_rundll32_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives have been identified. There are limited instances where `rundll32.exe` may be spawned by a legitimate print driver.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/fix-for-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675-exploit-to-keep-your-print-servers-running-while-a-patch-is-not-available/", + "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/exploitable-critical-rce-vulnerability-allows-regular-users-to-fully-compromise-active-directory-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675/", + "https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/ob6y02/critical_vulnerability_printnightmare_exposes" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Spoolsv Spawning Rundll32", + "analytic_story": [ + "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Defense Evasion", + "Scope:Local" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "$parent_process$ has spawned $process_name$ on endpoint $ComputerName$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1547.012", + "T1547" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_id", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process", + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_id", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-34527" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "spoolsv_spawning_rundll32_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/spoolsv_spawning_rundll32.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules", + "id": "a5e451f8-da81-11eb-b245-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-07-01", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect suspicious loading of dll in specific path relative to printnightmare exploitation. In this search we try to detect the loaded modules made by spoolsv.exe after the exploitation.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 Image =\"*\\\\spoolsv.exe\" ImageLoaded=\"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\spool\\\\drivers\\\\x64\\\\*\" ImageLoaded = \"*.dll\" | stats dc(ImageLoaded) as countImgloaded values(ImageLoaded) as ImgLoaded count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image Computer process_id EventCode | where countImgloaded >= 3 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/hieuttmmo/sigma/dceb13fe3f1821b119ae495b41e24438bd97e3d0/rules/windows/image_load/sysmon_cve_2021_1675_print_nightmare.yml" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules", + "analytic_story": [ + "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Defense Evasion", + "Scope:Local" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "$Image$ with process id $process_id$ has loaded a driver from $ImageLoaded$ on endpoint $Computer$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1547.012", + "T1547" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_id", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Parent Process", + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ImageLoaded", + "type": "File", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Image", + "Computer", + "EventCode", + "ImageLoaded" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-34527" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Spoolsv Suspicious Process Access", + "id": "799b606e-da81-11eb-93f8-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-07-01", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies a suspicious behavior related to PrintNightmare, or CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675), to gain privilege escalation on the vulnerable machine. This exploit attacks a critical Windows Print Spooler Vulnerability to elevate privilege. This detection is to look for suspicious process access made by the spoolsv.exe that may related to the attack.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 SourceImage = \"*\\\\spoolsv.exe\" CallTrace = \"*\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\spool\\\\DRIVERS\\\\x64\\\\*\" TargetImage IN (\"*\\\\rundll32.exe\", \"*\\\\spoolsv.exe\") GrantedAccess = 0x1fffff | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer SourceImage TargetImage GrantedAccess CallTrace EventCode ProcessID| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spoolsv_suspicious_process_access_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with process access event where SourceImage, TargetImage, GrantedAccess and CallTrace executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of spoolsv.exe.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/cube0x0/impacket/commit/73b9466c17761384ece11e1028ec6689abad6818", + "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/fix-for-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675-exploit-to-keep-your-print-servers-running-while-a-patch-is-not-available/", + "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/exploitable-critical-rce-vulnerability-allows-regular-users-to-fully-compromise-active-directory-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675/", + "https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/ob6y02/critical_vulnerability_printnightmare_exposes" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Spoolsv Suspicious Process Access", + "analytic_story": [ + "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Defense Evasion", + "Scope:Local" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "$SourceImage$ was GrantedAccess open access to $TargetImage$ on endpoint $Computer$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1068" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ProcessID", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "TargetImage", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "SourceImage", + "TargetImage", + "GrantedAccess", + "CallTrace", + "EventCode" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-34527" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "Cobalt Group", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "PLATINUM", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "Whitefly", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "spoolsv_suspicious_process_access_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/spoolsv_suspicious_process_access.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Spoolsv Writing a DLL", + "id": "d5bf5cf2-da71-11eb-92c2-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-07-01", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a `.dll` being written by `spoolsv.exe`. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. Typically, this is not normal behavior for `spoolsv.exe` to write a `.dll`. Current POC code used will write the suspicious DLL to disk within a path of `\\spool\\drivers\\x64\\`. During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=spoolsv.exe by _time Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path=\"*\\\\spool\\\\drivers\\\\x64\\\\*\" Filesystem.file_name=\"*.dll\" by _time Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process] | dedup file_create_time | table dest file_create_time, file_name, file_path, process_name | `spoolsv_writing_a_dll_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node and `Filesystem` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/fix-for-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675-exploit-to-keep-your-print-servers-running-while-a-patch-is-not-available/", + "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/exploitable-critical-rce-vulnerability-allows-regular-users-to-fully-compromise-active-directory-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675/", + "https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/ob6y02/critical_vulnerability_printnightmare_exposes" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Spoolsv Writing a DLL", + "analytic_story": [ + "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "$process_name$ has been identified writing dll's to $file_path$ on endpoint $dest$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1547.012", + "T1547" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_id", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_path", + "type": "File", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Filesystem.file_create_time", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.file_path", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-34527" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "spoolsv_writing_a_dll_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/spoolsv_writing_a_dll.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Sysmon", + "id": "347fd388-da87-11eb-836d-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-07-01", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a `.dll` being written by `spoolsv.exe`. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously(CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. Typically, this is not normal behavior for `spoolsv.exe` to write a `.dll`. Current POC code used will write the suspicious DLL to disk within a path of `\\spool\\drivers\\x64\\`. During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventID=11 process_name=spoolsv.exe file_path=\"*\\\\spool\\\\drivers\\\\x64\\\\*\" file_name=*.dll | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, UserID, process_name, file_path, file_name, TargetFilename, process_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spoolsv_writing_a_dll___sysmon_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/cube0x0/impacket/commit/73b9466c17761384ece11e1028ec6689abad6818", + "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/fix-for-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675-exploit-to-keep-your-print-servers-running-while-a-patch-is-not-available/", + "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/exploitable-critical-rce-vulnerability-allows-regular-users-to-fully-compromise-active-directory-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675/", + "https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/ob6y02/critical_vulnerability_printnightmare_exposes" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Sysmon", + "analytic_story": [ + "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Defense Evasion", + "Scope:Local" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "$process_name$ has been identified writing dll's to $file_path$ on endpoint $dest$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1547.012", + "T1547" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_id", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_path", + "type": "File", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "dest", + "UserID", + "process_name", + "file_path", + "file_name", + "TargetFilename" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-34527" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "spoolsv_writing_a_dll___sysmon_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/spoolsv_writing_a_dll___sysmon.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Sqlite Module In Temp Folder", + "id": "0f216a38-f45f-11eb-b09c-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-03", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious file creation of sqlite3.dll in %temp% folder. This behavior was seen in IcedID malware where it download sqlite module to parse browser database like for chrome or firefox to stole browser information related to bank, credit card or credentials.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=11 (TargetFilename = \"*\\\\sqlite32.dll\" OR TargetFilename = \"*\\\\sqlite64.dll\") (TargetFilename = \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\") |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by process_name TargetFilename EventCode ProcessId Image | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sqlite_module_in_temp_folder_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.cisecurity.org/white-papers/security-primer-icedid/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Sqlite Module In Temp Folder", + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Collection" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/simulated_icedid/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "process $SourceImage$ create a file $TargetImage$ in host $Computer$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1005" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "SourceImage", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "process_name", + "TargetFilename", + "EventCode", + "ProcessId", + "Image" + ], + "risk_score": 9, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Local System", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dark Caracal", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Dust Storm", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Sandworm Team", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Windigo", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "sqlite_module_in_temp_folder_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/sqlite_module_in_temp_folder.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Start Up During Safe Mode Boot", + "id": "c6149154-c9d8-11eb-9da7-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-26", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a modification or registry add to the safeboot registry as an autostart mechanism. This technique was seen in some ransomware to automatically execute its code upon a safe mode boot.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\System\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\SafeBoot\\\\Minimal\\*\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `start_up_during_safe_mode_boot_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "updated windows application needed in safe boot may used this registry", + "references": [ + "https://malware.news/t/threat-analysis-unit-tau-threat-intelligence-notification-snatch-ransomware/36365" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Start Up During Safe Mode Boot", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Safeboot registry $registry_path$ was added or modified with a new value $registry_value_name$ on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1547.001", + "T1547" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "Putter Panda", + "RTM", + "Rocke", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "start_up_during_safe_mode_boot_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/start_up_during_safe_mode_boot.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Computer Account Name Change", + "id": "35a61ed8-61c4-11ec-bc1e-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-20", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "As part of the sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287) exploitation chain, adversaries need to create a new computer account name and rename it to match the name of a domain controller account without the ending '$'. In Windows Active Directory environments, computer account names always end with `$`. This analytic leverages Event Id 4781, `The name of an account was changed`, to identify a computer account rename event with a suspicious name that does not terminate with `$`. This behavior could represent an exploitation attempt of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287 for privilege escalation.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4781 Old_Account_Name=\"*$\" New_Account_Name!=\"*$\" | table _time, ComputerName, Account_Name, Old_Account_Name, New_Account_Name | `suspicious_computer_account_name_change_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows event logs from your hosts. In addition, the Splunk Windows TA is needed.", + "known_false_positives": "Renaming a computer account name to a name that not end with '$' is highly unsual and may not have any legitimate scenarios.", + "references": [ + "https://exploit.ph/cve-2021-42287-cve-2021-42278-weaponisation.html", + "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42278", + "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42287" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Computer Account Name Change", + "analytic_story": [ + "sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/samaccountname_spoofing/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 100, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A computer account $Old_Account_Name$ was renamed with a suspicious computer name", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078", + "T1078.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "ComputerName", + "Account_Name", + "Old_Account_Name", + "New_Account_Name" + ], + "risk_score": 70, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-42287", + "CVE-2021-42278" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "Chimera", + "Indrik Spider", + "Naikon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_computer_account_name_change_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_computer_account_name_change.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Copy on System32", + "id": "ce633e56-25b2-11ec-9e76-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-10-05", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious copy of file from systemroot folder of the windows OS. This technique is commonly used by APT or other malware as part of execution (LOLBIN) to run its malicious code using the available legitimate tool in OS. this type of event may seen or may execute of normal user in some instance but this is really a anomaly that needs to be check within the network.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN(\"cmd.exe\", \"powershell*\",\"pwsh.exe\", \"sqlps.exe\", \"sqltoolsps.exe\", \"powershell_ise.exe\") AND `process_copy` AND Processes.process IN(\"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWow64\\\\*\") AND Processes.process = \"*copy*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `suspicious_copy_on_system32_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "every user may do this event but very un-ussual.", + "references": [ + "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/8da5b75b6380a41eee3a399c43dfe0d99eeefaa1fd21027a07b1ecaa4cd96fdd?environmentId=120" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Copy on System32", + "analytic_story": [ + "Unusual Processes" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/copy_sysmon/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "execution of copy exe to copy file from $process$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1036.003", + "T1036" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "GALLIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_copy", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=copy.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=copy.exe OR Processes.process_name=xcopy.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=xcopy.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_copy_on_system32_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_copy_on_system32.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments", + "id": "ff61e98c-0337-4593-a78f-72a676c56f26", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-09-20", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies DLLHost.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for DLLHost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. DLLHost.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_dllhost` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(dllhost\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | `suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process.", + "references": [ + "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/threatexpress/malleable-c2/c3385e481159a759f79b8acfe11acf240893b830/jquery-c2.4.2.profile", + "https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2021/02/09/learn-pipe-fitting-for-all-of-your-offense-projects/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments", + "analytic_story": [ + "Cobalt Strike" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious dllhost.exe process with no command line arguments executed on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1055" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Cobalt Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sharpshooter", + "Silence", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_dllhost", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=dllhost.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=dllhost.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Driver Loaded Path", + "id": "f880acd4-a8f1-11eb-a53b-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-29", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic will detect suspicious driver loaded paths. This technique is commonly used by malicious software like coin miners (xmrig) to register its malicious driver from notable directories where executable or drivers do not commonly exist. During triage, validate this driver is for legitimate business use. Review the metadata and certificate information. Unsigned drivers from non-standard paths is not normal, but occurs. In addition, review driver loads into `ntoskrnl.exe` for possible other drivers of interest. Long tail analyze drivers by path (outside of default, and in default) for further review.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=6 ImageLoaded = \"*.sys\" NOT (ImageLoaded IN(\"*\\\\WINDOWS\\\\inf\",\"*\\\\WINDOWS\\\\System32\\\\drivers\\\\*\", \"*\\\\WINDOWS\\\\System32\\\\DriverStore\\\\FileRepository\\\\*\")) | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer ImageLoaded Hashes IMPHASH Signature Signed | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_driver_loaded_path_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the driver loaded and Signature from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives will be present. Some applications do load drivers", + "references": [ + "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/hk/threat-encyclopedia/malware/trojan.ps1.powtran.a/", + "https://redcanary.com/blog/tracking-driver-inventory-to-expose-rootkits/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Driver Loaded Path", + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious driver $ImageLoaded$ on $Computer$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1543.003", + "T1543" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ImageLoaded", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Computer", + "ImageLoaded", + "Hashes", + "IMPHASH", + "Signature", + "Signed" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN7", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "PROMETHIUM", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_driver_loaded_path_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_driver_loaded_path.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior", + "id": "2b85aa3d-f5f6-4c2e-a081-a09f6e1c2e40", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-17", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes Windows Event ID 1100 to identify when Windows event log service is shutdown. Note that this is a voluminous analytic that will require tuning or restricted to specific endpoints based on criticality. This event generates every time Windows Event Log service has shut down. It also generates during normal system shutdown. During triage, based on time of day and user, determine if this was planned. If not planned, follow through with reviewing parallel alerts and other data sources to determine what else may have occurred.", + "search": "(`wineventlog_security` EventCode=1100) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest Message EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_event_log_service_behavior_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows event logs from your hosts. In addition, the Splunk Windows TA is needed.", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible the Event Logging service gets shut down due to system errors or legitimately administration tasks. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-1100", + "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/defense-evasion/disabling-windows-event-logs-by-suspending-eventlog-service-threads", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/001/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1070.001/T1070.001.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Ransomware", + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 6" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "The Windows Event Log Service shutdown on $ComputerName$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1070", + "T1070.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "PR.IP", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "dest" + ], + "risk_score": 9, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN8", + "Indrik Spider", + "Operation Wocao" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_event_log_service_behavior_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_event_log_service_behavior.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments", + "id": "f308490a-473a-40ef-ae64-dd7a6eba284a", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-09-20", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies gpupdate.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for gpupdate.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. gpupdate.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_gpupdate` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(gpupdate\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | `suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process.", + "references": [ + "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/xx0hcd/Malleable-C2-Profiles/0ef8cf4556e26f6d4190c56ba697c2159faa5822/crimeware/trick_ryuk.profile", + "https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2021/02/09/learn-pipe-fitting-for-all-of-your-offense-projects/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments", + "analytic_story": [ + "Cobalt Strike" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious gpupdate.exe process with no command line arguments executed on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1055" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Cobalt Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sharpshooter", + "Silence", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "process_gpupdate", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=gpupdate.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=GPUpdate.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline", + "id": "bed761f8-ee29-11eb-8bf3-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-07-26", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe commandline to execute dll file. This technique was seen in IcedID malware to load its payload dll with the following parameter to load encrypted dll payload which is the license.dat.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*/i:* by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "limitted. this parameter is not commonly used by windows application but can be used by the network operator.", + "references": [ + "https://threatpost.com/icedid-banking-trojan-surges-emotet/165314/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline", + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "rundll32 process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "CopyKittens", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "MuddyWater", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Image Creation In Appdata Folder", + "id": "f6f904c4-1ac0-11ec-806b-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-21", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious creation of image in appdata folder made by process that also has a file reference in appdata folder. This technique was seen in remcos rat that capture screenshot of the compromised machine and place it in the appdata and will be send to its C2 server. This TTP is really a good indicator to check that process because it is in suspicious folder path and image files are not commonly created by user in this folder path.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=*.exe Processes.process_path=\"*\\\\appdata\\\\Roaming\\\\*\" by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*.png\",\"*.jpg\",\"*.bmp\",\"*.gif\",\"*.tiff\") Filesystem.file_path = \"*\\\\appdata\\\\Roaming\\\\*\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process] | `suspicious_image_creation_in_appdata_folder_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://success.trendmicro.com/solution/1123281-remcos-malware-information", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2021/07/remcos-rat-delivered-via-visual-basic/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Image Creation In Appdata Folder", + "analytic_story": [ + "Remcos" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Collection" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_agent/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "process $process_name$ creating image file $file_path$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1113" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "dest", + "file_create_time", + "file_name", + "file_path", + "process_name", + "process_path", + "process" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1113", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Screen Capture", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dark Caracal", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN7", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Group5", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Silence" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_image_creation_in_appdata_folder_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_image_creation_in_appdata_folder.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request", + "id": "8b1297bc-6204-11ec-b7c4-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-20", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "As part of the sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287) exploitation chain, adversaries will request and obtain a Kerberos Service Ticket (TGS) with a domain controller computer account as the Service Name. This Service Ticket can be then used to take control of the domain controller on the final part of the attack. This analytic leverages Event Id 4769, `A Kerberos service ticket was requested`, to identify an unusual TGS request where the Account_Name requesting the ticket matches the Service_Name field. This behavior could represent an exploitation attempt of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287 for privilege escalation.", + "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769 | eval isSuspicious = if(lower(Service_Name) = lower(mvindex(split(Account_Name,\"@\"),0)+\"$\"),1,0) | where isSuspicious = 1 | table _time, Client_Address, Account_Name, Service_Name, Failure_Code, isSuspicious | `suspicious_kerberos_service_ticket_request_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", + "known_false_positives": "We have tested this detection logic with ~2 million 4769 events and did not identify false positives. However, they may be possible in certain environments. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://exploit.ph/cve-2021-42287-cve-2021-42278-weaponisation.html", + "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42278", + "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42287", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-sfu/02636893-7a1f-4357-af9a-b672e3e3de13" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request", + "analytic_story": [ + "sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/samaccountname_spoofing/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 100, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket was requested by $Account_Name$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078", + "T1078.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Service_Name", + "Account_Name", + "Client_Address", + "Failure_Code" + ], + "risk_score": 60, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-42287", + "CVE-2021-42278" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "Chimera", + "Indrik Spider", + "Naikon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_kerberos_service_ticket_request_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_kerberos_service_ticket_request.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Linux Discovery Commands", + "id": "0edd5112-56c9-11ec-b990-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-06", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search, detects execution of suspicious bash commands from various commonly leveraged bash scripts like (AutoSUID, LinEnum, LinPeas) to perform discovery of possible paths of privilege execution, password files, vulnerable directories, executables and file permissions on a Linux host.\\\nThe search logic specifically looks for high number of distinct commands run in a short period of time.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) values(Processes.process_name) values(Processes.parent_process_name) dc(Processes.process) as distinct_commands dc(Processes.process_name) as distinct_process_names min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where [|inputlookup linux_tool_discovery_process.csv | rename process as Processes.process |table Processes.process] by _time span=5m Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| where distinct_commands > 40 AND distinct_process_names > 3| `suspicious_linux_discovery_commands_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This detection search is based on Splunk add-on for Microsoft Sysmon-Linux.(https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/6176/). Please install this add-on to parse fields correctly and execute detection search. Consider customizing the time window and threshold values according to your environment.", + "known_false_positives": "Unless an administrator is using these commands to troubleshoot or audit a system, the execution of these commands should be monitored.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/linux/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/", + "https://github.com/IvanGlinkin/AutoSUID", + "https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng/tree/master/linPEAS", + "https://github.com/rebootuser/LinEnum" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Linux Discovery Commands", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Post-Exploitation" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.004/linux_discovery_tools/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious Linux Discovery Commands detected on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059.004" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_name" + ], + "risk_score": 81, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT41", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_linux_discovery_commands_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_linux_discovery_commands.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename", + "id": "f0db4464-55d9-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 3, + "date": "2021-09-20", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a renamed instance of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe. Microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v4.0.30319 and is rarely utilized. When investigating, identify the executed code on disk and review. A spawned child process from microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is uncommon. In any instance, microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe spawning from an Office product or any living off the land binary is highly suspect.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_microsoftworkflowcompiler` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe, triggering a false positive.", + "references": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md#atomic-test-6---microsoftworkflowcompilerexe-payload-execution" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename", + "analytic_story": [ + "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", + "Cobalt Strike", + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious renamed microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe binary ran on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1036", + "T1127", + "T1036.003" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "GALLIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_microsoftworkflowcompiler", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage", + "id": "9bbc62e8-55d8-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-01-12", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe usage. microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v4.0.30319 and is rarely utilized. When investigating, identify the executed code on disk and review. It is not a commonly used process by many applications.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_microsoftworkflowcompiler` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, limited instances have been identified coming from native Microsoft utilities similar to SCCM.", + "references": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md#atomic-test-6---microsoftworkflowcompilerexe-payload-execution" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage", + "analytic_story": [ + "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe process ran on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1127" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_microsoftworkflowcompiler", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious msbuild path", + "id": "f5198224-551c-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-01-12", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies msbuild.exe executing from a non-standard path. Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v4.0.30319 and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v4.0.30319. Instances of Visual Studio will run a copy of msbuild.exe. A moved instance of MSBuild is suspicious, however there are instances of build applications that will move or use a copy of MSBuild.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_msbuild` AND (Processes.process_path!=c:\\\\windows\\\\microsoft.net\\\\framework*\\\\v*\\\\*) by Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `suspicious_msbuild_path_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of msbuild.exe, triggering a false positive. Baselining of MSBuild.exe usage is recommended to better understand it's path usage. Visual Studio runs an instance out of a path that will need to be filtered on.", + "references": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious msbuild path", + "analytic_story": [ + "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild", + "Cobalt Strike", + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Msbuild.exe ran from an uncommon path on $dest$ execyted by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1036", + "T1127", + "T1036.003", + "T1127.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "GALLIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Frankenstein" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_msbuild", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=msbuild.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSBuild.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_msbuild_path_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious MSBuild Rename", + "id": "4006adac-5937-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-01-12", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies renamed instances of msbuild.exe executing. Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v4.0.30319 and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v4.0.30319. During investigation, identify the code executed and what is executing a renamed instance of MSBuild.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_msbuild` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_msbuild_rename_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of msbuild, triggering a false positive.", + "references": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md", + "https://github.com/infosecn1nja/MaliciousMacroMSBuild/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious MSBuild Rename", + "analytic_story": [ + "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild", + "Cobalt Strike", + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious renamed msbuild.exe binary ran on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1036", + "T1127", + "T1036.003", + "T1127.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "GALLIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Frankenstein" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_msbuild", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=msbuild.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSBuild.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_msbuild_rename_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious MSBuild Spawn", + "id": "a115fba6-5514-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-01-12", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning msbuild.exe. This behavior is indicative of a COM object being utilized to spawn msbuild from wmiprvse.exe. It is common for MSBuild.exe to be spawned from devenv.exe while using Visual Studio. In this instance, there will be command line arguments and file paths. In a malicious instance, MSBuild.exe will spawn from non-standard processes and have no command line arguments. For example, MSBuild.exe spawning from explorer.exe, powershell.exe is far less common and should be investigated.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe AND `process_msbuild` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_msbuild_spawn_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive.", + "references": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious MSBuild Spawn", + "analytic_story": [ + "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious msbuild.exe process executed on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1127", + "T1127.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Frankenstein" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_msbuild", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=msbuild.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSBuild.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_msbuild_spawn_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious mshta child process", + "id": "60023bb6-5500-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-01-12", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies child processes spawning from \"mshta.exe\". The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, parent process \"mshta.exe\" and its child process.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=mshta.exe AND (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=colorcpl.exe OR Processes.process_name=msbuild.exe OR Processes.process_name=microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe OR Processes.process_name=searchprotocolhost.exe OR Processes.process_name=scrcons.exe OR Processes.process_name=cscript.exe OR Processes.process_name=wscript.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=cmd.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_mshta_child_process_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses", + "https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious mshta child process", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "suspicious mshta child process detected on host $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.005" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "FIN7", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Sidewinder", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_mshta_child_process_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious mshta spawn", + "id": "4d33a488-5b5f-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-01-20", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning mshta.exe. This behavior is indicative of a DCOM object being utilized to spawn mshta from wmiprvse.exe or svchost.exe. In this instance, adversaries may use LethalHTA that will spawn mshta.exe from svchost.exe.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=svchost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe) AND `process_mshta` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.user Processes.original_file_name| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_mshta_spawn_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive.", + "references": [ + "https://codewhitesec.blogspot.com/2018/07/lethalhta.html", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses", + "https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious mshta spawn", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "mshta.exe spawned by wmiprvse.exe on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.005" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "FIN7", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Sidewinder", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "process_mshta", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=mshta.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSHTA.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_mshta_spawn_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services", + "id": "3cf0dc36-484d-11ec-a6bc-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-18", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic detects a suspicious process making a DNS query via known, abused text-paste web services, VoIP, instant messaging, and digital distribution platforms used to download external files. This technique is abused by adversaries, malware actors, and red teams to download a malicious file on the target host. This is a good TTP indicator for possible initial access techniques. A user will experience false positives if the following instant messaging is allowed or common applications like telegram or discord are allowed in the corporate network.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=22 QueryName IN (\"*pastebin*\", \"*discord*\", \"*telegram*\", \"*t.me*\") process_name IN (\"cmd.exe\", \"*powershell*\", \"pwsh.exe\", \"wscript.exe\", \"cscript.exe\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image QueryName QueryStatus process_name QueryResults Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This detection relies on sysmon logs with the Event ID 22, DNS Query. We suggest you run this detection at least once a day over the last 14 days.", + "known_false_positives": "Noise and false positive can be seen if the following instant messaging is allowed to use within corporate network. In this case, a filter is needed.", + "references": [ + "https://urlhaus.abuse.ch/url/1798923/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services", + "analytic_story": [ + "Remcos", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_pastebin_download/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "suspicious process $process_name$ has a dns query in $QueryName$ on $Computer$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059.005", + "T1059" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Image", + "QueryName", + "QueryStatus", + "process_name", + "QueryResults", + "Computer" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "FIN4", + "FIN7", + "Frankenstein", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Windshift" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Process File Path", + "id": "9be25988-ad82-11eb-a14f-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-05", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic will detect a suspicious process running in a file path where a process is not commonly seen and is most commonly used by malicious software. This behavior has been used by adversaries where they drop and run an exe in a path that is accessible without admin privileges.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\windows\\\\fonts\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\windows\\\\temp\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\users\\\\public\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\windows\\\\debug\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path.file_path = \"*\\\\Users\\\\Administrator\\\\Music\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path.file_path = \"*\\\\Windows\\\\servicing\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path.file_path = \"*\\\\Users\\\\Default\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path.file_path = \"*Recycle.bin*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Media\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"\\\\Windows\\\\repair\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\PerfLogs\\\\*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_path Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_process_file_path_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may allow execution of specific binaries in non-standard paths. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/hk/threat-encyclopedia/malware/trojan.ps1.powtran.a/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Process File Path", + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig", + "Remcos", + "WhisperGate", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicioues process $Processes.process_path.file_path$ running from suspicious location", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1543" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Processes.process_path.file_path", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_process_file_path_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_process_file_path.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query", + "id": "4d4332ae-792c-11ec-89c1-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-19", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies a process making a DNS query to Discord, a well known instant messaging and digital distribution platform. Discord can be abused by adversaries, as seen in the WhisperGate campaign, to host and download malicious. external files. A process resolving a Discord DNS name could be an indicator of malware trying to download files from Discord for further execution.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=22 QueryName IN (\"*discord*\") process_path != \"*\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Discord\\\\*\" AND process_path != \"*\\\\Program Files*\" AND process_name != \"discord.exe\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image QueryName QueryStatus process_name QueryResults Computer process_path | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "his detection relies on sysmon logs with the Event ID 22, DNS Query.", + "known_false_positives": "Noise and false positive can be seen if the following instant messaging is allowed to use within corporate network. In this case, a filter is needed.", + "references": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/", + "https://medium.com/s2wblog/analysis-of-destructive-malware-whispergate-targeting-ukraine-9d5d158f19f3", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query", + "analytic_story": [ + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/discord_dnsquery/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "suspicious process $process_name$ has a dns query in $QueryName$ on $Computer$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059.005", + "T1059" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Image", + "QueryName", + "QueryStatus", + "process_name", + "QueryResults", + "Computer", + "process_path" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "FIN4", + "FIN7", + "Frankenstein", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Windshift" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Reg exe Process", + "id": "a6b3ab4e-dd77-4213-95fa-fc94701995e0", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-07-22", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for reg.exe being launched from a command prompt not started by the user. When a user launches cmd.exe, the parent process is usually explorer.exe. This search filters out those instances.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name != explorer.exe Processes.process_name =cmd.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=cmd.exe Processes.process_name= reg.exe by Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename parent_process_id as process_id |dedup process_id| table process_id dest] | `suspicious_reg_exe_process_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "It's possible for system administrators to write scripts that exhibit this behavior. If this is the case, the search will need to be modified to filter them out.", + "references": [ + "https://car.mitre.org/wiki/CAR-2013-03-001" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Reg exe Process", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "DHS Report TA18-074A" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Suspicious $Processes.process_path.file_path$ process running with an uncommon parent process $Processes.parent_process_name$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1112" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Processes.process_path.file_path", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN8", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_reg_exe_process_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path", + "id": "62732736-6250-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-01-28", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code by using non-standard file extensions to load malciious DLLs. Upon investigating, look for network connections to remote destinations (internal or external). Review additional parrallel processes and child processes for additional activity.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` (Processes.process=*appdata* OR Processes.process=*programdata* OR Processes.process=*windows\\temp*) (Processes.process!=*.dll Processes.process!=*.ax Processes.process!=*.ocx) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model. Tune the query by filtering additional extensions found to be used by legitimate processes. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives with the query restricted to specified paths. Add more world writeable paths as tuning continues.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.md", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/", + "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/how-to-use-the-regsvr32-tool-and-troubleshoot-regsvr32-error-messages-a98d960a-7392-e6fe-d90a-3f4e0cb543e5", + "https://any.run/report/f29a7d2ecd3585e1e4208e44bcc7156ab5388725f1d29d03e7699da0d4598e7c/0826458b-5367-45cf-b841-c95a33a01718" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", + "Iceid" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.010/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Suspicious $Processes.process_path.file_path$ process potentially loading malicious code", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.010" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Processes.process_path.file_path", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cobalt Group", + "Deep Panda", + "Inception", + "Leviathan", + "TA551", + "WIRTE" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_regsvr32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=REGSVR32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver", + "id": "8c00a385-9b86-4ac0-8932-c9ec3713b159", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-02-09", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe using dllregisterserver on the command line to load a DLL. When a DLL is registered, the DllRegisterServer method entry point in the DLL is invoked. This is typically seen when a DLL is being registered on the system. Not every instance is considered malicious, but it will capture malicious use of it. During investigation, review the parent process and parrellel processes executing. Capture the DLL being loaded and inspect further. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*dllregisterserver* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "This is likely to produce false positives and will require some filtering. Tune the query by adding command line paths to known good DLLs, or filtering based on parent process names.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32", + "https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/seedworm-apt-iran-middle-east", + "https://github.com/pan-unit42/tweets/blob/master/2020-12-10-IOCs-from-Ursnif-infection-with-Delf-variant.txt", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/duck-hunting-with-falcon-complete-qakbot-zip-based-campaign/", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms682162(v=vs.85).aspx" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "$Processes.process_path.file_path$ process potentially loading malicious code", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Processes.process_path.file_path", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "CopyKittens", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "MuddyWater", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 PluginInit", + "id": "92d51712-ee29-11eb-b1ae-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-07-26", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe process with plugininit parameter. This technique is commonly seen in IceID malware to execute its initial dll stager to download another payload to the compromised machine.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*PluginInit* by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_plugininit_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "third party application may used this dll export name to execute function.", + "references": [ + "https://threatpost.com/icedid-banking-trojan-surges-emotet/165314/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 PluginInit", + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "rundll32 process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "CopyKittens", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "MuddyWater", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_rundll32_plugininit_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_plugininit.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 StartW", + "id": "9319dda5-73f2-4d43-a85a-67ce961bddb7", + "version": 3, + "date": "2021-02-04", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe executing a DLL function name, Start and StartW, on the command line that is commonly observed with Cobalt Strike x86 and x64 DLL payloads. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64. Typically, the DLL will be written and loaded from a world writeable path or user location. In most instances it will not have a valid certificate (Unsigned). During investigation, review the parent process and other parallel application execution. Capture and triage the DLL in question. In the instance of Cobalt Strike, rundll32.exe is the default process it opens and injects shellcode into. This default process can be changed, but typically is not.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*start* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_startw_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use Start as a function and call it via the command line. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", + "https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-windows-executable", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32", + "https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 StartW", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", + "Cobalt Strike", + "Trickbot" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "rundll32.exe running with suspicious parameters on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "CopyKittens", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "MuddyWater", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_rundll32_startw_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments", + "id": "e451bd16-e4c5-4109-8eb1-c4c6ecf048b4", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-09-20", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for rundll32.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(rundll32\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | `suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32", + "https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", + "Cobalt Strike", + "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Suspicious rundll32.exe process with no command line arguments executed on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-34527" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "CopyKittens", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "MuddyWater", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory", + "id": "7feb7972-7ac3-11eb-bac8-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-03-01", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following detection identifies Scheduled Tasks registering (creating a new task) a binary or script to run from a public directory which includes users\\public, \\programdata\\ and \\windows\\temp. Upon triage, review the binary or script in the command line for legitimacy, whether an approved binary/script or not. In addition, capture the binary or script in question and analyze for further behaviors. Identify the source and contain the endpoint.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe (Processes.process=*\\\\users\\\\public\\\\* OR Processes.process=*\\\\programdata\\\\* OR Processes.process=*windows\\\\temp*) Processes.process=*/create* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives may be present. Filter as needed by parent process or command line argument.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/schtasks/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious scheduled task registered on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CostaRicto", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Machete", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments", + "id": "f52d2db8-31f9-4aa7-a176-25779effe55c", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-09-20", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies searchprotocolhost.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for searchprotocolhost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. searchprotocolhost.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=searchprotocolhost.exe by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(searchprotocolhost\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | `suspicious_searchprotocolhost_no_command_line_arguments_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/fireeye/red_team_tool_countermeasures/blob/master/rules/PGF/supplemental/hxioc/SUSPICIOUS%20EXECUTION%20OF%20SEARCHPROTOCOLHOST%20(METHODOLOGY).ioc" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments", + "analytic_story": [ + "Cobalt Strike" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious searchprotocolhost.exe process with no command line arguments executed on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1055" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Cobalt Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sharpshooter", + "Silence", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_searchprotocolhost_no_command_line_arguments_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_searchprotocolhost_no_command_line_arguments.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request", + "id": "d77d349e-6269-11ec-9cfe-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "As part of the sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287) exploitation chain, adversaries will need to request a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) on behalf of the newly created and renamed computer account. The TGT request will be preceded by a computer account name event. This analytic leverages Event Id 4781, `The name of an account was changed` and event Id 4768 `A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested` to correlate a sequence of events where the new computer account on event id 4781 matches the request account on event id 4768. This behavior could represent an exploitation attempt of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287 for privilege escalation.", + "search": " `wineventlog_security` (EventCode=4781 Old_Account_Name=\"*$\" New_Account_Name!=\"*$\") OR (EventCode=4768 Account_Name!=\"*$\") | eval RenamedComputerAccount = coalesce(New_Account_Name, mvindex(Account_Name,0)) | transaction RenamedComputerAccount startswith=(EventCode=4781) endswith=(EventCode=4768) | eval short_lived=case((duration<2),\"TRUE\") | search short_lived = TRUE | table _time, ComputerName, EventCode, Account_Name,RenamedComputerAccount, short_lived |`suspicious_ticket_granting_ticket_request_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", + "known_false_positives": "A computer account name change event inmediately followed by a kerberos TGT request with matching fields is unsual. However, legitimate behavior may trigger it. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://exploit.ph/cve-2021-42287-cve-2021-42278-weaponisation.html", + "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42278", + "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42287" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request", + "analytic_story": [ + "sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/samaccountname_spoofing/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 100, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A suspicious TGT was requested was requested", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078", + "T1078.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Old_Account_Name", + "New_Account_Name", + "Account_Name", + "ComputerName" + ], + "risk_score": 60, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "Chimera", + "Indrik Spider", + "Naikon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_ticket_granting_ticket_request_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_ticket_granting_ticket_request.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious WAV file in Appdata Folder", + "id": "5be109e6-1ac5-11ec-b421-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-21", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious creation of .wav file in appdata folder. This behavior was seen in Remcos RAT malware where it put the audio recording in the appdata\\audio folde as part of data collection. this recording can be send to its C2 server as part of its exfiltration to the compromised machine. creation of wav files in this folder path is not a ussual disk place used by user to save audio format file.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=*.exe Processes.process_path=\"*\\\\appdata\\\\Roaming\\\\*\" by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*.wav\") Filesystem.file_path = \"*\\\\appdata\\\\Roaming\\\\*\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields file_name file_path process_name process_path process dest file_create_time _time ] | `suspicious_wav_file_in_appdata_folder_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, file_name, file_path and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://success.trendmicro.com/solution/1123281-remcos-malware-information", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2021/07/remcos-rat-delivered-via-visual-basic/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious WAV file in Appdata Folder", + "analytic_story": [ + "Remcos" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Collection" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_agent/sysmon_wav.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "process $process_name$ creating image file $file_path$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1113" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "dest", + "file_create_time", + "file_name", + "file_path", + "process_name", + "process_path", + "process" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1113", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Screen Capture", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dark Caracal", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN7", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Group5", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Silence" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_wav_file_in_appdata_folder_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wav_file_in_appdata_folder.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious wevtutil Usage", + "id": "2827c0fd-e1be-4868-ae25-59d28e0f9d4f", + "version": 4, + "date": "2021-10-11", + "author": "David Dorsey, Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The wevtutil.exe application is the windows event log utility. This searches for wevtutil.exe with parameters for clearing the application, security, setup, trace or system event logs.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wevtutil.exe Processes.process IN (\"* cl *\", \"*clear-log*\") (Processes.process=\"*System*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Security*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Setup*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Application*\" OR Processes.process=\"*trace*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_wevtutil_usage_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "The wevtutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows event log utility. Administrators may use it to manage Windows event logs.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1070.001/T1070.001.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious wevtutil Usage", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Ransomware", + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 6" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 40, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Wevtutil.exe being used to clear Event Logs on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1070.001", + "T1070" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "PR.IP", + "PR.PT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 28, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN8", + "Indrik Spider", + "Operation Wocao" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_wevtutil_usage_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin", + "id": "b5541828-8ffd-4070-9d95-b3da4de924cb", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-07-22", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects writes to the recycle bin by a process other than explorer.exe.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path values(Filesystem.file_name) as file_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path = \"*$Recycle.Bin*\" by Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Filesystem\")`| search [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.user) as user values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name != \"explorer.exe\" by Processes.process_id Processes.dest| `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | table process_id dest] | `suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on filesystem and process logs responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem` nodes.", + "known_false_positives": "Because the Recycle Bin is a hidden folder in modern versions of Windows, it would be unusual for a process other than explorer.exe to write to it. Incidents should be investigated as appropriate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin", + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging" + ], + "asset_type": "Windows", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036/write_to_recycle_bin/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 40, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin process $Processes.process_name$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1036" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Processes.process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.file_path", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.process_id", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 28, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", + "id": "09e5c72a-4c0d-11ec-aa29-3e22fbd008af", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-22", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies `svchost.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the Task Scheduler and creating a malicious remote scheduled task, the executed command is spawned as a child process of `svchost.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of svchost.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=svchost.exe) (Processes.process_name IN (\"Regsvcs.exe\", \"Ftp.exe\", \"OfflineScannerShell.exe\", \"Rasautou.exe\", \"Schtasks.exe\", \"Xwizard.exe\", \"Pnputil.exe\", \"Atbroker.exe\", \"Pcwrun.exe\", \"Ttdinject.exe\",\"Mshta.exe\", \"Bitsadmin.exe\", \"Certoc.exe\", \"Ieexec.exe\", \"Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe\", \"Runscripthelper.exe\", \"Forfiles.exe\", \"Msbuild.exe\", \"Register-cimprovider.exe\", \"Tttracer.exe\", \"Ie4uinit.exe\", \"Bash.exe\", \"Hh.exe\", \"SettingSyncHost.exe\", \"Cmstp.exe\", \"Stordiag.exe\", \"Scriptrunner.exe\", \"Odbcconf.exe\", \"Extexport.exe\", \"Msdt.exe\", \"WorkFolders.exe\", \"Diskshadow.exe\", \"Mavinject.exe\", \"Regasm.exe\", \"Gpscript.exe\", \"Regsvr32.exe\", \"Msiexec.exe\", \"Wuauclt.exe\", \"Presentationhost.exe\", \"Wmic.exe\", \"Runonce.exe\", \"Syncappvpublishingserver.exe\", \"Verclsid.exe\", \"Infdefaultinstall.exe\", \"Installutil.exe\", \"Netsh.exe\", \"Wab.exe\", \"Dnscmd.exe\", \"At.exe\", \"Pcalua.exe\", \"Msconfig.exe\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `svchost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/", + "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/persistence/t1053-schtask", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Svchost.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053", + "T1053.005" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CostaRicto", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Machete", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "svchost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/svchost_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "System Info Gathering Using Dxdiag Application", + "id": "f92d74f2-4921-11ec-b685-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-19", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious dxdiag.exe process command-line execution. Dxdiag is used to collect the system info of the target host. This technique has been used by Remcos RATS, various actors, and other malware to collect information as part of the recon or collection phase of an attack. This behavior should rarely be seen in a corporate network, but this command line can be used by a network administrator to audit host machine specifications. Thus in some rare cases, this detection will contain false positives in its results. To triage further, analyze what commands were passed after it pipes out the result to a file for further processing.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_dxdiag` AND Processes.process = \"* /t *\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "This commandline can be used by a network administrator to audit host machine specifications. Thus, a filter is needed.", + "references": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/df0baf9f-8baf-4c32-a452-16562ecb19be/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "System Info Gathering Using Dxdiag Application", + "analytic_story": [ + "Remcos" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/t1592/host_info_dxdiag/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "dxdiag.exe process with commandline $process$ on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1592" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1592", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_dxdiag", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=dxdiag.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=dxdiag.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "System Information Discovery Detection", + "id": "8e99f89e-ae58-4ebc-bf52-ae0b1a277e72", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-09-07", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "Detect system information discovery techniques used by attackers to understand configurations of the system to further exploit it.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process=\"*wmic* qfe*\" OR Processes.process=*systeminfo* OR Processes.process=*hostname*) by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | eventstats dc(process) as dc_processes_by_dest by dest | where dc_processes_by_dest > 2 | stats values(process) as process min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user, dest parent_process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `system_information_discovery_detection_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators debugging servers", + "references": [ + "https://oscp.infosecsanyam.in/priv-escalation/windows-priv-escalation" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "System Information Discovery Detection", + "analytic_story": [ + "Discovery Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Windows", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 6", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Recon", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1082/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Potential system information discovery behavior on $dest$ by $User$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1082" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1082", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Darkhotel", + "Frankenstein", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Sowbug", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TeamTNT", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Windigo", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "system_information_discovery_detection_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations", + "id": "a34aae96-ccf8-4aef-952c-3ea21444444d", + "version": 6, + "date": "2020-12-08", + "author": "David Dorsey, Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for system processes that typically execute from `C:\\Windows\\System32\\` or `C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64`. This may indicate a malicious process that is trying to hide as a legitimate process.\\\nThis detection utilizes a lookup that is deduped `system32` and `syswow64` directories from Server 2016 and Windows 10.\\\nDuring triage, review the parallel processes - what process moved the native Windows binary? identify any artifacts on disk and review. If a remote destination is contacted, what is the reputation?", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_path !=\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32*\" Processes.process_path !=\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_hash | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `is_windows_system_file` | `system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "This detection may require tuning based on third party applications utilizing native Windows binaries in non-standard paths.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.yaml", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Unusual Processes", + "Ransomware", + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "System process running from unexpected location on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1036", + "T1036.003" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Processes.process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_hash" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "GALLIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "is_windows_system_file", + "definition": "lookup update=true is_windows_system_file filename as process_name OUTPUT systemFile | search systemFile=true", + "description": "This macro limits the output to process names that are in the Windows System directory" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "System User Discovery With Query", + "id": "ad03bfcf-8a91-4bc2-a500-112993deba87", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-13", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `query.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover the logged user. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage `query.exe` to identify system users on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"query.exe\") (Processes.process=*user*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `system_user_discovery_with_query_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "System User Discovery With Query", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "System user discovery on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1033" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1033", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "system_user_discovery_with_query_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/system_user_discovery_with_query.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "System User Discovery With Whoami", + "id": "894fc43e-6f50-47d5-a68b-ee9ee23e18f4", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-13", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `whoami.exe` without any arguments. This windows native binary prints out the current logged user. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage `whoami.exe` to identify system users on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"whoami.exe\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `system_user_discovery_with_whoami_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "System User Discovery With Whoami", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "System user discovery on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1033" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1033", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "system_user_discovery_with_whoami_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/system_user_discovery_with_whoami.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Time Provider Persistence Registry", + "id": "5ba382c4-2105-11ec-8d8f-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-26", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of time provider registry for persistence and autostart. This technique can allow the attacker to persist on the compromised host and autostart as soon as the machine boot up. This TTP can be a good indicator of suspicious behavior since this registry is not commonly modified by normal user or even an admin.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path =\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services\\\\W32Time\\\\TimeProviders*\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `time_provider_persistence_registry_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://pentestlab.blog/2019/10/22/persistence-time-providers/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/003/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Time Provider Persistence Registry", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.003/timeprovider_reg/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1547.003", + "T1547" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_value_name" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Time Providers", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "time_provider_persistence_registry_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/time_provider_persistence_registry.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Trickbot Named Pipe", + "id": "1804b0a4-a682-11eb-8f68-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-26", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "this search is to detect potential trickbot infection through the create/connected named pipe to the system. This technique is used by trickbot to communicate to its c2 to post or get command during infection.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode IN (17,18) PipeName=\"\\\\pipe\\\\*lacesomepipe\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer user_id EventCode PipeName signature Image process_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `trickbot_named_pipe_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and pipename from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. .", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/", + "https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Trickbot Named Pipe", + "analytic_story": [ + "Trickbot" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/namedpipe/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Possible Trickbot namedpipe created on $Computer$ by $Image$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1055" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Image", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Computer", + "user_id", + "EventCode", + "PipeName", + "signature", + "Image", + "process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Cobalt Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sharpshooter", + "Silence", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "trickbot_named_pipe_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/trickbot_named_pipe.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll", + "id": "7f04349c-e30d-11eb-bc7f-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-07-12", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious loaded unsigned dll by MMC.exe application. This technique is commonly seen in attacker that tries to bypassed UAC feature or gain privilege escalation. This is done by modifying some CLSID registry that will trigger the mmc.exe to load the dll path", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded = \"*.dll\" Image = \"*\\\\mmc.exe\" Signed=false Company != \"Microsoft Corporation\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded Signed ProcessId OriginalFileName Computer EventCode Company | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown. all of the dll loaded by mmc.exe is microsoft signed dll.", + "references": [ + "https://offsec.almond.consulting/UAC-bypass-dotnet.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Defense Evasion", + "Scope:Inbound" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon2.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious unsigned $ImageLoaded$ loaded by $Image$ on endpoint $Computer$ with EventCode $EventCode$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Image", + "ImageLoaded", + "Signed", + "ProcessId", + "OriginalFileName", + "Computer", + "EventCode", + "Company" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT37", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Evilnum", + "Honeybee", + "MuddyWater", + "Patchwork", + "Threat Group-3390" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object", + "id": "2bcccd20-fc2b-11eb-8d22-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-13", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a possible uac bypass using the colorui.dll COM Object. this technique was seen in so many malware and ransomware like lockbit where it make use of the colorui.dll COM CLSID to bypass UAC.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded=\"*\\\\colorui.dll\" process_name != \"colorcpl.exe\" NOT(Image IN(\"*\\\\windows\\\\*\", \"*\\\\program files*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name Computer EventCode Signed ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "not so common. but 3rd part app may load this dll.", + "references": [ + "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/04/24/lockbit-ransomware-borrows-tricks-to-keep-up-with-revil-and-maze/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.015/uac_colorui/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "The following module $ImageLoaded$ was loaded by a non-standard application on endpoint $Computer$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ImageLoaded", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Image", + "ImageLoaded", + "process_name", + "Computer", + "EventCode", + "Signed", + "ProcessId" + ], + "risk_score": 48, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "CMSTP", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Cobalt Group", + "MuddyWater" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Unified Messaging Service Spawning a Process", + "id": "f1126df0-7bd5-11eb-988f-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-03-02", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This detection identifies Microsoft Exchange Server's Unified Messaging services, umworkerprocess.exe and umservice.exe, spawning a child process, indicating possible exploitation of CVE-2021-26857 vulnerability. The query filters out werfault.exe and wermgr.exe mostly due to potential false positives, however, if there is an excessive amount of \"wermgr.exe\" or \"WerFault.exe\" failures, it may be due to the active exploitation. During triage, identify any additional suspicious parallel processes. Identify any recent out of place file modifications. Review Exchange logs following Microsofts guide. To contain, perform egress filtering or restrict public access to Exchange. In final, patch the vulnerablity and monitor.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=\"umworkerprocess.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name=\"UMService.exe\" (Processes.process_name!=\"wermgr.exe\" OR Processes.process_name!=\"werfault.exe\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `unified_messaging_service_spawning_a_process_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown. Tune out child processes as needed to limit volume of false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/", + "https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/03/03/rapid7s-insightidr-enables-detection-and-response-to-microsoft-exchange-0-day/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Unified Messaging Service Spawning a Process", + "analytic_story": [ + "HAFNIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/windows-sysmon_umservices.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Possible CVE-2021-26857 exploitation on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-26857" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "unified_messaging_service_spawning_a_process_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/unified_messaging_service_spawning_a_process.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Uninstall App Using MsiExec", + "id": "1fca2b28-f922-11eb-b2dd-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-09", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious un-installation of application using msiexec. This technique was seen in conti leak tool and script where it tries to uninstall AV product using this commandline. This commandline to uninstall product is not a common practice in enterprise network.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=msiexec.exe Processes.process= \"* /qn *\" Processes.process= \"*/X*\" Processes.process= \"*REBOOT=*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `uninstall_app_using_msiexec_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown.", + "references": [ + "https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1423361119926816776.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Uninstall App Using MsiExec", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/conti/conti_leak/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "process $process_name$ with a cmdline $process$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218.007", + "T1218" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 30, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.007", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Msiexec", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Machete", + "Molerats", + "Rancor", + "TA505", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "uninstall_app_using_msiexec_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/uninstall_app_using_msiexec.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Unload Sysmon Filter Driver", + "id": "e5928ff3-23eb-4d8b-b8a4-dcbc844fdfbe", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-07-22", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "Attackers often disable security tools to avoid detection. This search looks for the usage of process `fltMC.exe` to unload a Sysmon Driver that will stop sysmon from collecting the data.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime values(Processes.process) as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=fltMC.exe AND Processes.process=*unload* AND Processes.process=*SysmonDrv* by Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter`| table firstTime lastTime dest user count process_name process_id parent_process_name process", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model. This search is also shipped with `unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter` macro, update this macro to filter out false positives.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Unload Sysmon Filter Driver", + "analytic_story": [ + "Disabling Security Tools" + ], + "asset_type": "", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Possible Sysmon filter driver unloading on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 45, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Unloading AMSI via Reflection", + "id": "a21e3484-c94d-11eb-b55b-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-09", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies the behavior of AMSI being tampered with. Implemented natively in many frameworks, the command will look similar to `SEtValuE($Null,(New-OBJEct COLlECtionS.GenerIC.HAshSEt{[StrINg]))}$ReF=[ReF].AsSeMbLY.GeTTyPe(\"System.Management.Automation.Amsi\"+\"Utils\")` taken from Powershell-Empire. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message=*system.management.automation.amsi* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode ComputerName User EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `unloading_amsi_via_reflection_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "Potential for some third party applications to disable AMSI upon invocation. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", + "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Unloading AMSI via Reflection", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Possible AMSI Unloading via Reflection using PowerShell on $ComputerName$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Message", + "OpCode", + "ComputerName", + "User", + "EventCode" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "unloading_amsi_via_reflection_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/unloading_amsi_via_reflection.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Unusual Number of Kerberos Service Tickets Requested", + "id": "eb3e6702-8936-11ec-98fe-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-08", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following hunting analytic leverages Kerberos Event 4769, A Kerberos service ticket was requested, to identify a potential kerberoasting attack against Active Directory networks. Kerberoasting allows an adversary to request kerberos tickets for domain accounts typically used as service accounts and attempt to crack them offline allowing them to obtain privileged access to the domain.\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number service ticket requests. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field.", + "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769 Service_Name!=\"*$\" Ticket_Encryption_Type=0x17 | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Service_Name) AS unique_services values(Service_Name) as requested_services by _time, Client_Address | eventstats avg(unique_services) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_services) as comp_std by Client_Address | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_services > 2 and unique_services >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `unusual_number_of_kerberos_service_tickets_requested_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", + "known_false_positives": "An single endpoint requesting a large number of kerberos service tickets is not common behavior. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, administration systems and missconfigured systems.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/", + "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/t1208-kerberoasting" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Unusual Number of Kerberos Service Tickets Requested", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/rubeus/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1558", + "T1558.003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Client_Address", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Ticket_Options", + "Ticket_Encryption_Type", + "dest", + "Service_Name", + "service_id", + "Client_Address" + ], + "risk_score": 36, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1558", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "FIN7", + "Operation Wocao", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "unusual_number_of_kerberos_service_tickets_requested_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/unusual_number_of_kerberos_service_tickets_requested.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell", + "id": "0cdf318b-a0dd-47d7-b257-c621c0247de8", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-13", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments that leverage PowerShell environment variables to identify the current logged user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=\"*$env:UserName*\" OR Processes.process=\"*[System.Environment]::UserName*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "System user discovery on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1033" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1033", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/user_discocvery_with_env_vars_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell Script Block", + "id": "77f41d9e-b8be-47e3-ab35-5776f5ec1d20", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-13", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the use of PowerShell environment variables to identify the current logged user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*$env:UserName*\" OR Message = \"*[System.Environment]::UserName*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_script_block_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell Script Block", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "System user discovery on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1033" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Path", + "Message", + "OpCode", + "ComputerName", + "User", + "EventCode" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1033", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_script_block_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_script_block.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "USN Journal Deletion", + "id": "b6e0ff70-b122-4227-9368-4cf322ab43c3", + "version": 2, + "date": "2018-12-03", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The fsutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows utility used to perform tasks related to the file allocation table (FAT) and NTFS file systems. The update sequence number (USN) change journal provides a log of all changes made to the files on the disk. This search looks for fsutil.exe deleting the USN journal.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=fsutil.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search process=\"*deletejournal*\" AND process=\"*usn*\" | `usn_journal_deletion_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "USN Journal Deletion", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 6", + "CIS 8", + "CIS 10" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Possible USN journal deletion on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1070" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.DP", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 45, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "usn_journal_deletion_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App", + "id": "35159940-228f-11ec-8a49-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-10-01", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious wscript commandline to execute vbscript. This technique was seen in several malware to execute malicious vbs file using wscript application. commonly vbs script is associated to cscript process and this can be a technique to evade process parent child detections or even some av script emulation system.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = \"wscript.exe\" AND Processes.parent_process = \"*//e:vbscript*\") OR (Processes.process_name = \"wscript.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*//e:vbscript*\") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `vbscript_execution_using_wscript_app_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/369332/0/html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App", + "analytic_story": [ + "FIN7", + "Remcos" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/vbs_wscript/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Process name $process_name$ with commandline $process$ to execute vbsscript", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059.005", + "T1059" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "FIN4", + "FIN7", + "Frankenstein", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Windshift" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "vbscript_execution_using_wscript_app_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/vbscript_execution_using_wscript_app.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Verclsid CLSID Execution", + "id": "61e9a56a-20fa-11ec-8ba3-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-29", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a possible abuse of verclsid to execute malicious file through generate CLSID. This process is a normal application of windows to verify the CLSID COM object before it is instantiated by Windows Explorer. This hunting query can be a good pivot point to analyze what is he CLSID or COM object pointing too to check if it is a valid application or not.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_verclsid` AND Processes.process=\"*/S*\" Processes.process=\"*/C*\" AND Processes.process=\"*{*\" AND Processes.process=\"*}*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `verclsid_clsid_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "windows can used this application for its normal COM object validation.", + "references": [ + "https://gist.github.com/NickTyrer/0598b60112eaafe6d07789f7964290d5", + "https://bohops.com/2018/08/18/abusing-the-com-registry-structure-part-2-loading-techniques-for-evasion-and-persistence/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Verclsid CLSID Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Unusual Processes" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.012/verclsid_exec/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "process $process_name$ to execute possible clsid commandline $process$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218.012", + "T1218" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.012", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Verclsid", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_verclsid", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=verclsid.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=verclsid.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "verclsid_clsid_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/verclsid_clsid_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "W3WP Spawning Shell", + "id": "0f03423c-7c6a-11eb-bc47-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-03-03", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This query identifies a shell, PowerShell.exe or Cmd.exe, spawning from W3WP.exe, or IIS. In addition to IIS logs, this behavior with an EDR product will capture potential webshell activity, similar to the HAFNIUM Group abusing CVEs, on publicly available Exchange mail servers. During triage, review the parent process and child process of the shell being spawned. Review the command-line arguments and any file modifications that may occur. Identify additional parallel process, child processes, that may highlight further commands executed. After triaging, work to contain the threat and patch the system that is vulnerable.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=w3wp.exe AND `process_cmd` OR `process_powershell` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `w3wp_spawning_shell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Baseline your environment before production. It is possible build systems using IIS will spawn cmd.exe to perform a software build. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/02/04/ghost-in-the-shell-investigating-web-shell-attacks/", + "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/8/17/from-pwn2own-2021-a-new-attack-surface-on-microsoft-exchange-proxyshell", + "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FC6iHw258RI", + "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-microsoft-exchange-servers-still-vulnerable-to-proxyshell-exploit#what-should-you-do" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "W3WP Spawning Shell", + "analytic_story": [ + "HAFNIUM Group", + "ProxyShell" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Possible Web Shell execution on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1505", + "T1505.003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-34473", + "CVE-2021-34523", + "CVE-2021-31207" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Volatile Cedar" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_powershell", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "process_cmd", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "w3wp_spawning_shell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/w3wp_spawning_shell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "WBAdmin Delete System Backups", + "id": "cd5aed7e-5cea-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-01-22", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for flags passed to wbadmin.exe (Windows Backup Administrator Tool) that delete backup files. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent recovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wbadmin.exe Processes.process=\"*delete*\" AND (Processes.process=\"*catalog*\" OR Processes.process=\"*systemstatebackup*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `wbadmin_delete_system_backups_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. Tune based on parent process names.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may modify the boot configuration.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1490/T1490.md", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/08/ryuks-return/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wbadmin" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "WBAdmin Delete System Backups", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "System backups deletion on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1490" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "wbadmin_delete_system_backups_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Wbemprox COM Object Execution", + "id": "9d911ce0-c3be-11eb-b177-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-02", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "this search is designed to detect potential malicious process loading COM object to wbemprox.dll,", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\fastprox.dll\", \"*\\\\wbemprox.dll\", \"*\\\\wbemcomn.dll\") NOT (process_name IN (\"wmiprvse.exe\", \"WmiApSrv.exe\", \"unsecapp.exe\")) NOT(Image IN(\"*\\\\windows\\\\*\",\"*\\\\program files*\", \"*\\\\wbem\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name Computer EventCode Signed ProcessId Hashes IMPHASH | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wbemprox_com_object_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "legitimate process that are not in the exception list may trigger this event.", + "references": [ + "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", + "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Wbemprox COM Object Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Revil Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf2/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious COM Object Execution on $Computer$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Image", + "ImageLoaded", + "process_name", + "Computer", + "EventCode", + "Signed", + "ProcessId", + "Hashes", + "IMPHASH" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "CMSTP", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Cobalt Group", + "MuddyWater" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "wbemprox_com_object_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wbemprox_com_object_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Wermgr Process Connecting To IP Check Web Services", + "id": "ed313326-a0f9-11eb-a89c-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-19", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "this search is designed to detect suspicious wermgr.exe process that tries to connect to known IP web services. This technique is know for trickbot and other trojan spy malware to recon the infected machine and look for its ip address without so much finger print on the commandline process. Since wermgr.exe is designed for error handling process of windows it is really suspicious that this process is trying to connect to this IP web services cause that maybe cause of some malicious code injection.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode =22 process_name = wermgr.exe QueryName IN (\"*wtfismyip.com\", \"*checkip.amazonaws.com\", \"*ipecho.net\", \"*ipinfo.io\", \"*api.ipify.org\", \"*icanhazip.com\", \"*ip.anysrc.com\",\"*api.ip.sb\", \"ident.me\", \"www.myexternalip.com\", \"*zen.spamhaus.org\", \"*cbl.abuseat.org\", \"*b.barracudacentral.org\",\"*dnsbl-1.uceprotect.net\", \"*spam.dnsbl.sorbs.net\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by process_path process_name process_id QueryName QueryStatus QueryResults Computer EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, dns query name process path , and query ststus from your endpoints like EventCode 22. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 12 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/", + "https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Wermgr Process Connecting To IP Check Web Services", + "analytic_story": [ + "Trickbot" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/infection/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Wermgr.exe process connecting IP location web services on $ComputerName$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1590", + "T1590.005" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "process_path", + "process_name", + "process_id", + "QueryName", + "QueryStatus", + "QueryResults", + "Computer", + "EventCode" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1590", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Network Information", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "HAFNIUM" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1590.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "IP Addresses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Andariel", + "HAFNIUM" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Wermgr Process Create Executable File", + "id": "ab3bcce0-a105-11eb-973c-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-19", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "this search is designed to detect potential malicious wermgr.exe process that drops or create executable file. Since wermgr.exe is an application trigger when error encountered in a process, it is really un ussual to this process to drop executable file. This technique is commonly seen in trickbot malware where it injects it code to this process to execute it malicious behavior like downloading other payload", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=11 process_name = \"wermgr.exe\" TargetFilename = \"*.exe\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Image TargetFilename process_name dest EventCode ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wermgr_process_create_executable_file_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of wermgr.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/", + "https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Wermgr Process Create Executable File", + "analytic_story": [ + "Trickbot" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/infection/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Wermgr.exe writing executable files on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1027" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Image", + "TargetFilename", + "process_name", + "dest", + "EventCode", + "ProcessId" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1027", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackOasis", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dust Storm", + "Elderwood", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Group5", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "wermgr_process_create_executable_file_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wermgr_process_create_executable_file.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process", + "id": "e8fc95bc-a107-11eb-a978-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-04-19", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is designed to detect suspicious cmd and powershell process spawned by wermgr.exe process. This suspicious behavior are commonly seen in code injection technique technique like trickbot to execute a shellcode, dll modules to run malicious behavior.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as cmdline min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name = \"wermgr.exe\" `process_cmd` OR `process_powershell` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/", + "https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process", + "analytic_story": [ + "Trickbot" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/infection/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Wermgr.exe spawning suspicious processes on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_powershell", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "process_cmd", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "id": "35682718-5a85-11ec-b8f7-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-11", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of wget on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wget (Processes.process=\"*-q *\" OR Processes.process=\"*--quiet*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-O- *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", + "references": [ + "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows AdFind Exe", + "id": "bd3b0187-189b-46c0-be45-f52da2bae67f", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-11-03", + "author": "Jose Hernandez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for the execution of `adfind.exe` with command-line arguments that it uses by default. Specifically the filter or search functions. It also considers the arguments necessary like objectcategory, see readme for more details: https://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/usage.htm. This has been seen used before by Wizard Spider, FIN6 and actors whom also launched SUNBURST. AdFind.exe is usually used a recon tool to enumare a domain controller.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process=\"* -f *\" OR Processes.process=\"* -b *\") AND (Processes.process=*objectcategory* OR Processes.process=\"* -gcb *\" OR Processes.process=\"* -sc *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_adfind_exe_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "administrators rarely use adfind, usually not used for legitimate reasons", + "references": [ + "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/a-nasty-trick-from-credential-theft-malware-to-business-disruption.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows AdFind Exe", + "analytic_story": [ + "NOBELIUM Group", + "Domain Trust Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Windows AdFind Exe", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1018" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Leafminer", + "Naikon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_adfind_exe_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path", + "id": "c32f091e-30db-11ec-8738-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-10-19", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of Windows Curl.exe downloading a file to a suspicious location. \\\n-O or --output is used when a file is to be downloaded and placed in a specified location. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes for further behavior. In addition, identify if the download was successful. If a file was downloaded, capture and analyze.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_curl` Processes.process IN (\"*-O *\",\"*--output*\") Processes.process IN (\"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\",\"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\",\"*\\\\public\\\\*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible Administrators or super users will use Curl for legitimate purposes. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1105/T1105.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path", + "analytic_story": [ + "IceID", + "Ingress Tool Transfer" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_curl.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ to download a file to a suspicious directory.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "process_curl", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=curl.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Curl.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination", + "id": "42f8f1a2-4228-11ec-aade-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-10", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of Windows Curl.exe uploading a file to a remote destination. \\\n`-T` or `--upload-file` is used when a file is to be uploaded to a remotge destination. \\\n`-d` or `--data` POST is the HTTP method that was invented to send data to a receiving web application, and it is, for example, how most common HTML forms on the web work. \\\nHTTP multipart formposts are done with `-F`, but this appears to not be compatible with the Windows version of Curl. Will update if identified adversary tradecraft. \\\nAdversaries may use one of the three methods based on the remote destination and what they are attempting to upload (zip vs txt). During triage, review parallel processes for further behavior. In addition, identify if the upload was successful in network logs. If a file was uploaded, isolate the endpoint and review.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_curl` Processes.process IN (\"*-T *\",\"*--upload-file *\", \"*-d *\", \"*--data *\", \"*-F *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives may be limited to source control applications and may be required to be filtered out.", + "references": [ + "https://everything.curl.dev/usingcurl/uploads", + "https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/containers/tar-and-curl-come-to-windows/ba-p/382409", + "https://twitter.com/d1r4c/status/1279042657508081664?s=20" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_curl_upload.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ uploading a file to a remote destination.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "process_curl", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=curl.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Curl.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry", + "id": "13395a44-4dd9-11ec-9df7-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-25", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic will detect a suspicious process that modify a registry related to windows defender exclusion feature. This registry is abused by adversaries, malware author and red teams to bypassed Windows Defender Anti-Virus product by excluding folder path, file path, process, extensions and etc. from its real time or schedule scan to execute their malicious code. This is a good indicator for a defense evasion and to look further for events after this behavior.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Exclusions\\\\*\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to use this windows features.", + "references": [ + "https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.html", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/cf1245de-06a7-4366-8209-8e3006f2bfe5/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry", + "analytic_story": [ + "Remcos", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/defender_exclusion_sysmon/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "exclusion registry $registry_path$ modified or added on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.registry_value_data" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump", + "id": "59e54602-9680-11ec-a8a6-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-25", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a process that is attempting to disable the ability on Windows to generate a memory crash dump. This was recently identified being utilized by HermeticWiper. To disable crash dumps, the value must be set to 0. This feature is typically modified to perform a memory crash dump when a computer stops unexpectedly because of a Stop error (also known as a blue screen, system crash, or bug check).", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\CrashControl\\\\CrashDumpEnabled\") AND Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000000\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process process_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process process_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `windows_disable_memory_crash_dump_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` and `Registry` node.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/02/threat-advisory-hermeticwiper.html", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/performance/memory-dump-file-options" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump", + "analytic_story": [ + "Data Destruction", + "Ransomware", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/hermetic_wiper/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A process $process_name$ was identified attempting to disable memory crash dumps on $dest$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1485" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.file_create_time", + "Filesystem.process_id", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.user", + "Filesystem.file_path", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_guid" + ], + "risk_score": 90, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_disable_memory_crash_dump_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_disable_memory_crash_dump.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry", + "id": "23150a40-9301-4195-b802-5bb4f43067fb", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-03-02", + "author": "Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The search looks for the Registry Key DisableAntiSpyware set to disable. This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints. This particular behavior is typically executed when an ransomware actor gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. Endpoint should be isolated.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_value_name=\"DisableAntiSpyware\" AND Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000001\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_disableantispyware_registry_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node.", + "known_false_positives": "It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro to tune the search.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "message": "Windows DisableAntiSpyware registry key set to 'disabled' on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.registry_path" + ], + "risk_score": 24, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_disableantispyware_registry_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows DiskCryptor Usage", + "id": "d56fe0c8-4650-11ec-a8fa-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-15", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies DiskCryptor process name of dcrypt.exe or internal name dcinst.exe. This utility has been utilized by adversaries to encrypt disks manually during an operation. In addition, during install, a dcrypt.sys driver is installed and requires a reboot in order to take effect. There are no command-line arguments used.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"dcrypt.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=dcinst.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_diskcryptor_usage_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible false positives may be present based on the internal name dcinst.exe, filter as needed. It may be worthy to alert on the service name.", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/11/15/exchange-exploit-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/", + "https://github.com/DavidXanatos/DiskCryptor" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows DiskCryptor Usage", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1486/dcrypt/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to encrypt disks.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1486" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1486", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "APT41", + "FIN7", + "Indrik Spider", + "TA505" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_diskcryptor_usage_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_diskcryptor_usage.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution", + "id": "58adae9e-8ea3-11ec-90f6-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-15", + "author": "Lou Stella, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "DiskShadow.exe is a Microsoft Signed binary present on Windows Server. It has a scripting mode intended for complex scripted backup operations. This feature also allows for execution of arbitrary unsigned code. This analytic looks for the usage of the scripting mode flags in executions of DiskShadow. During triage, compare to known backup behavior in your environment and then review the scripts called by diskshadow.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_diskshadow` (Processes.process=*-s* OR Processes.process=*/s*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on processes that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition,confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators using the DiskShadow tool in their infrastructure as a main backup tool with scripts will cause false positives that can be filtered with `windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution_filter`", + "references": [ + "https://bohops.com/2018/03/26/diskshadow-the-return-of-vss-evasion-persistence-and-active-directory-database-extraction/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Living Off The Land" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218/diskshadow/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Possible Signed Binary Proxy Execution on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Porcesses.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id", + "Processes.original_file_name" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "process_diskshadow", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=diskshadow.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=diskshadow.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows DISM Remove Defender", + "id": "8567da9e-47f0-11ec-99a9-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-17", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of the Windows Disk Image Utility, `dism.exe`, to remove Windows Defender. Adversaries may use `dism.exe` to disable Defender before completing their objective.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=dism.exe (Processes.process=\"*/online*\" AND Processes.process=\"*/disable-feature*\" AND Processes.process=\"*Windows-Defender*\" AND Processes.process=\"*/remove*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_dism_remove_defender_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate administrative tools leverage `dism.exe` to manipulate packages and features of the operating system. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/11/23/pysa-mespinoza-ransomware/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows DISM Remove Defender", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_dism.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to disable Windows Defender.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "access", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_dism_remove_defender_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_dism_remove_defender.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path", + "id": "fddf3b56-7933-11ec-98a6-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-19", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies native .net binaries within the Windows operating system that may be abused by adversaries by moving it to a new directory. The analytic identifies the .net binary by using a lookup and compares the process name and original file name (internal name). The analytic utilizes a lookup with the is_net_windows_file macro to identify the binary process name and original file name. if one or the other matches an alert will be generated. Adversaries abuse these binaries as they are native to windows and native DotNet. Note that not all SDK (post install of Windows) are captured in the lookup.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where NOT (Processes.process_path IN (\"*\\\\Windows\\\\ADWS\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\system32*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\NetworkController\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SystemApps\\\\*\", \"*\\\\WinSxS\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Microsoft.NET\\\\*\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_path Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `is_net_windows_file` | `windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present and filtering may be required. Certain utilities will run from non-standard paths based on the third-party application in use.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.yaml", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path", + "analytic_story": [ + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Ransomware", + "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_installutil_path.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ from a non-standard path was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1036", + "T1036.003", + "T1218", + "T1218.004" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "GALLIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Mustang Panda", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "is_net_windows_file", + "definition": "lookup update=true is_net_windows_file filename as process_name OUTPUT netFile | lookup update=true is_net_windows_file originalFileName as original_file_name OUTPUT netFile | search netFile=true", + "description": "This macro limits the output to process names that are .net binaries on Windows Server 2016 and Windows 11." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Event For Service Disabled", + "id": "9c2620a8-94a1-11ec-b40c-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-23", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic will identify suspicious system event of services that was modified from start to disabled. This technique is seen where the adversary attempts to disable security app services, other malware services to evade the defense systems on the compromised host", + "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7040 Message = \"*service was changed from demand start to disabled.\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName EventCode Message User Sid | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_event_for_service_disabled_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints.", + "known_false_positives": "Windows service update may cause this event. In that scenario, filtering is needed.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Event For Service Disabled", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/olympic_destroyer/system.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Service was disabled on $Computer$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "ComputerName", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "User", + "Sid" + ], + "risk_score": 36, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_system", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "windows_event_for_service_disabled_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_event_for_service_disabled.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Event Log Cleared", + "id": "ad517544-aff9-4c96-bd99-d6eb43bfbb6a", + "version": 6, + "date": "2020-07-06", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes Windows Security Event ID 1102 or System log event 104 to identify when a Windows event log is cleared. Note that this analytic will require tuning or restricted to specific endpoints based on criticality. During triage, based on time of day and user, determine if this was planned. If not planned, follow through with reviewing parallel alerts and other data sources to determine what else may have occurred.", + "search": "(`wineventlog_security` EventCode=1102) OR (`wineventlog_system` EventCode=104) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest Message EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_event_log_cleared_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows event logs from your hosts. In addition, the Splunk Windows TA is needed.", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible that these logs may be legitimately cleared by Administrators. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-1102", + "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/defense-evasion/disabling-windows-event-logs-by-suspending-eventlog-service-threads", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/001/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1070.001/T1070.001.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Event Log Cleared", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Ransomware", + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 6" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Windows event logs cleared on $dest$ via EventCode $EventCode$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1070", + "T1070.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "PR.IP", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "dest" + ], + "risk_score": 70, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN8", + "Indrik Spider", + "Operation Wocao" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_system", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "windows_event_log_cleared_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event", + "id": "c3f85976-94a5-11ec-9a58-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-23", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic will identify suspicious excessive number of system events of services that was modified from start to disabled. This technique is seen where the adversary attempts to disable security app services, other malware services oer serve as an destructive impact to complete the objective on the compromised system. One good example for this scenario is Olympic destroyer where it disable all active services in the compromised host as part of its destructive impact and defense evasion.", + "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7040 Message = \"*service was changed from demand start to disabled.\" | stats count values(Message) as MessageList dc(Message) as MessageCount min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName EventCode User Sid | where MessageCount >=10 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_excessive_disabled_services_event_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown", + "references": [ + "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/olympic_destroyer/system.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Service was disabled in $Computer$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "ComputerName", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "User", + "Sid" + ], + "risk_score": 81, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_system", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "windows_excessive_disabled_services_event_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_excessive_disabled_services_event.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder", + "id": "0dbcac64-963c-11ec-bf04-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-25", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to look for suspicious file creation in the critical folder like \"System32\\Drivers\" folder without file extension. This artifacts was seen in latest hermeticwiper where it drops its driver component in Driver Directory both the compressed(without file extension) and the actual driver component (with .sys file extension). This TTP is really a good indication that a host might be compromised by this destructive malware that wipes the boot sector of the system.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*\\\\System32\\\\drivers\\\\*\", \"*\\\\syswow64\\\\drivers\\\\*\") by _time span=5m Filesystem.dest Filesystem.user Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_create_time | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | rex field=\"file_name\" \"\\.(?[^\\.]*$)\" | where isnull(extension) | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=5m Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_guid Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`] | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest process_name process_guid file_name file_path file_create_time user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_file_without_extension_in_critical_folder_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown at this point", + "references": [ + "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/02/threat-advisory-hermeticwiper.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder", + "analytic_story": [ + "Data Destruction", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/hermetic_wiper/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Driver file with out file extension drop in $file_path$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1485" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.file_create_time", + "Filesystem.process_id", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.user", + "Filesystem.file_path", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_guid", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 90, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_file_without_extension_in_critical_folder_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_file_without_extension_in_critical_folder.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows High File Deletion Frequency", + "id": "45b125c4-866f-11eb-a95a-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-03-16", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for high frequency of file deletion relative to process name and process id. These events usually happen when the ransomware tries to encrypt the files with the ransomware file extensions and sysmon treat the original files to be deleted as soon it was replace as encrypted data.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=23 TargetFilename IN (\"*.cmd\", \"*.ini\",\"*.gif\", \"*.jpg\", \"*.jpeg\", \"*.db\", \"*.ps1\", \"*.doc*\", \"*.xls*\", \"*.ppt*\", \"*.bmp\",\"*.zip\", \"*.rar\", \"*.7z\", \"*.chm\", \"*.png\", \"*.log\", \"*.vbs\", \"*.js\", \"*.vhd\", \"*.bak\", \"*.wbcat\", \"*.bkf\" , \"*.backup*\", \"*.dsk\", , \"*.win\") | stats values(TargetFilename) as deleted_files min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer user EventCode Image ProcessID |where count >=100 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_high_file_deletion_frequency_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the deleted target file name, process name and process id from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "user may delete bunch of pictures or files in a folder.", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", + "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows High File Deletion Frequency", + "analytic_story": [ + "Clop Ransomware", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "High frequency file deletion activity detected on host $Computer$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1485" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "deleted_files", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "EventCode", + "TargetFilename", + "Computer", + "user", + "Image", + "ProcessID", + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "windows_high_file_deletion_frequency_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_high_file_deletion_frequency.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass", + "id": "1c6abb08-73d1-11ec-9ca0-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-12", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following hunting analytic identifies all processes requesting access into Lsass.exe. his behavior may be related to credential dumping or applications requiring access to credentials. Triaging this event will require understanding the GrantedAccess from the SourceImage. In addition, whether the account is privileged or not. Review the process requesting permissions and review parallel processes.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, TargetImage, GrantedAccess, SourceImage, SourceProcessId, SourceUser, TargetUser | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_hunting_system_account_targeting_lsass_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Enabling EventCode 10 TargetProcess lsass.exe is required.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives will occur based on GrantedAccess and SourceUser, filter based on source image as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Local_Security_Authority_Subsystem_Service", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/minidumpapiset/nf-minidumpapiset-minidumpwritedump", + "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for_22.html", + "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/process-security-and-access-rights?redirectedfrom=MSDN" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_creddump.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A process, $SourceImage$, has loaded $ImageLoaded$ that are typically related to credential dumping on $dest$. Review for further details.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ImageLoaded", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "SourceImage", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Computer", + "TargetImage", + "GrantedAccess", + "SourceImage", + "SourceProcessId", + "SourceUser", + "TargetUser" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cleaver", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Whitefly" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "windows_hunting_system_account_targeting_lsass_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_hunting_system_account_targeting_lsass.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft", + "id": "ccfeddec-43ec-11ec-b494-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-12", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary loading `vaultcli.dll` and Samlib.dll`. This technique may be used to execute code to bypassing application control and capture credentials by utilizing a tool like MimiKatz. \\\nWhen `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \\\nIf used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \\\nDuring triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 process_name=installutil.exe ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\samlib.dll\", \"*\\\\vaultcli.dll\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, process_name, ImageLoaded, OriginalFileName, process_id | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_installutil_credential_theft_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and module loads from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "Typically this will not trigger as by it's very nature InstallUtil does not need credentials. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://gist.github.com/xorrior/bbac3919ca2aef8d924bdf3b16cce3d0" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft", + "analytic_story": [ + "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ loading samlib.dll and vaultcli.dll to potentially capture credentials in memory.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218.004", + "T1218" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Mustang Panda", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "windows_installutil_credential_theft_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_credential_theft.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path", + "id": "dcf74b22-7933-11ec-857c-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-19", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the Windows binary InstallUtil.exe running from a non-standard location. The analytic utilizes a macro for InstallUtil and identifies both the process_name and original_file_name.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` NOT (Processes.process_path IN (\"*\\\\Windows\\\\ADWS\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\system32*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\NetworkController\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SystemApps\\\\*\", \"*\\\\WinSxS\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Microsoft.NET\\\\*\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_hash | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present and filtering may be required. Certain utilities will run from non-standard paths based on the third-party application in use.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.yaml", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path", + "analytic_story": [ + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Ransomware", + "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_installutil_path.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ from a non-standard path was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1036", + "T1036.003", + "T1218", + "T1218.004" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "GALLIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Mustang Panda", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_installutil", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=installutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=InstallUtil.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection", + "id": "4fbf9270-43da-11ec-9486-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-12", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary making a remote network connection. This technique may be used to download and execute code while bypassing application control. \\\nWhen `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \\\nIf used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \\\nDuring triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` by _time span=1h Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_guid [ | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port !=\"0\" by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_guid connection_to_CNC dest_port | `windows_installutil_remote_network_connection_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Ports` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives should be present as InstallUtil is not typically used to download remote files. Filter as needed based on Developers requirements.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection", + "analytic_story": [ + "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ generating a remote download.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218.004", + "T1218" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id", + "Ports.process_guid", + "Ports.dest", + "Ports.dest_port" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Mustang Panda", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_installutil", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=installutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=InstallUtil.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_installutil_remote_network_connection_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_remote_network_connection.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option", + "id": "cfa7b9ac-43f0-11ec-9b48-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-12", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary. This will execute code while bypassing application control using the `/u` (uninstall) switch. \\\nInstallUtil uses the functions install and uninstall within the System.Configuration.Install namespace to process .net assembly. Install function requires admin privileges, however, uninstall function can be run as an unprivileged user.\\\nWhen `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \\\nIf used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \\\nDuring triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` Processes.process IN (\"*/u*\", \"*uninstall*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_installutil_uninstall_option_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives should be present. Filter as needed by parent process or application.", + "references": [ + "https://evi1cg.me/archives/AppLocker_Bypass_Techniques.html#menu_index_12", + "https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList/blob/master/md/Installutil.exe.md", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option", + "analytic_story": [ + "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ performing an uninstall.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218.004", + "T1218" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Mustang Panda", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_installutil", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=installutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=InstallUtil.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_installutil_uninstall_option_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_uninstall_option.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network", + "id": "1a52c836-43ef-11ec-a36c-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-12", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary making a remote network connection. This technique may be used to download and execute code while bypassing application control using the `/u` (uninstall) switch. \\\nInstallUtil uses the functions install and uninstall within the System.Configuration.Install namespace to process .net assembly. Install function requires admin privileges, however, uninstall function can be run as an unprivileged user.\\\nWhen `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \\\nIf used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \\\nDuring triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` Processes.process IN (\"*/u*\", \"*uninstall*\") by _time span=1h Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_guid [ | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port !=\"0\" by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name original_file_name process_path process process_guid connection_to_CNC dest_port | `windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Ports` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives should be present as InstallUtil is not typically used to download remote files. Filter as needed based on Developers requirements.", + "references": [ + "https://evi1cg.me/archives/AppLocker_Bypass_Techniques.html#menu_index_12", + "https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList/blob/master/md/Installutil.exe.md", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network", + "analytic_story": [ + "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ performing an uninstall.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218.004", + "T1218" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id", + "Ports.process_guid", + "Ports.dest", + "Ports.dest_port" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Mustang Panda", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_installutil", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=installutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=InstallUtil.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line", + "id": "28e06670-43df-11ec-a569-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-12", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary passing a HTTP request on the command-line. This technique may be used to download and execute code while bypassing application control. \\\nWhen `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \\\nIf used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \\\nDuring triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` Processes.process IN (\"*http://*\",\"*https://*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_installutil_url_in_command_line_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives should be present as InstallUtil is not typically used to download remote files. Filter as needed based on Developers requirements.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md", + "https://gist.github.com/DanielRTeixeira/0fd06ec8f041f34a32bf5623c6dd479d" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line", + "analytic_story": [ + "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ passing a URL on the command-line.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218.004", + "T1218" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Mustang Panda", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_installutil", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=installutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=InstallUtil.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_installutil_url_in_command_line_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_url_in_command_line.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry", + "id": "b7548c2e-9a10-11ec-99e3-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-03-02", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to look for suspicious registry modification related to file compression color and information tips. This IOC was seen in hermetic wiper where it has a thread that will create this registry entry to change the color of compressed or encrypted files in NTFS file system as well as the pop up information tips. This is a good indicator that a process tries to modified one of the registry GlobalFolderOptions related to file compression attribution in terms of color in NTFS file system.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\Advanced*\" AND Registry.registry_value_name IN(\"ShowCompColor\", \"ShowInfoTip\") by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `windows_modify_show_compress_color_and_info_tip_registry_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Registry` node.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/02/threat-advisory-hermeticwiper.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/hermetic_wiper/globalfolderoptions_reg/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Registry modification in \"ShowCompColor\" and \"ShowInfoTips\" on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1112" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.dest Registry.user" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN8", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_modify_show_compress_color_and_info_tip_registry_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_modify_show_compress_color_and_info_tip_registry.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun", + "id": "bb4f3090-7ae4-11ec-897f-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-21", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of AdvancedRun.exe. AdvancedRun.exe has similar capabilities as other remote programs like psexec. AdvancedRun may also ingest a configuration file with all settings defined and perform its activity. The analytic is written in a way to identify a renamed binary and also the common command-line arguments.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=advancedrun.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=advancedrun.exe) Processes.process IN (\"*EXEFilename*\",\"*/cfg*\",\"*RunAs*\", \"*WindowState*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_nirsoft_advancedrun_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as it is specific to AdvancedRun. Filter as needed based on legitimate usage.", + "references": [ + "http://www.nirsoft.net/utils/advanced_run.html", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun", + "analytic_story": [ + "Unusual Processes", + "Ransomware", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1588.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of advancedrun.exe, $process_name$, was spawned by $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1588.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 60, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1588.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Tool", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Resource Development" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Cleaver", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "CostaRicto", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Dragonfly", + "FIN10", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gorgon Group", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Patchwork", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_nirsoft_advancedrun_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_nirsoft_advancedrun.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows NirSoft Utilities", + "id": "5b2f4596-7d4c-11ec-88a7-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-24", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following hunting analytic assists with identifying the proces execution of commonly used utilities from NirSoft. Potentially not adversary behavior, but worth identifying to know if the software is present and being used.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_path Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `is_nirsoft_software` | `windows_nirsoft_utilities_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present. Filtering may be required before setting to alert.", + "references": [ + "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A", + "http://www.nirsoft.net/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows NirSoft Utilities", + "analytic_story": [ + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1588.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ related to NiRSoft software usage.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1588.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1588.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Tool", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Resource Development" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Cleaver", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "CostaRicto", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Dragonfly", + "FIN10", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gorgon Group", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Patchwork", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "is_nirsoft_software", + "definition": "lookup update=true is_nirsoft_software filename as process_name OUTPUT nirsoftFile | search nirsoftFile=true", + "description": "This macro is related to potentially identifiable software related to NirSoft. Remove or filter as needed based." + }, + { + "name": "windows_nirsoft_utilities_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_nirsoft_utilities.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass", + "id": "b1ce9a72-73cf-11ec-981b-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-12", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies non SYSTEM accounts requesting access to lsass.exe. This behavior may be related to credential dumping or applications requiring access to credentials. Triaging this event will require understanding the GrantedAccess from the SourceImage. In addition, whether the account is privileged or not. Review the process requesting permissions and review parallel processes.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe SourceUser!=\"NT AUTHORITY\\\\*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, TargetImage, GrantedAccess, SourceImage, SourceProcessId, SourceUser, TargetUser | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_non_system_account_targeting_lsass_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Enabling EventCode 10 TargetProcess lsass.exe is required.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives will occur based on legitimate application requests, filter based on source image as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Local_Security_Authority_Subsystem_Service", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/minidumpapiset/nf-minidumpapiset-minidumpwritedump", + "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for_22.html", + "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/process-security-and-access-rights?redirectedfrom=MSDN" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_creddump.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A process, $SourceImage$, has loaded $ImageLoaded$ that are typically related to credential dumping on $dest$. Review for further details.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ImageLoaded", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "SourceImage", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Computer", + "TargetImage", + "GrantedAccess", + "SourceImage", + "SourceProcessId", + "SourceUser", + "TargetUser" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cleaver", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Whitefly" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "windows_non_system_account_targeting_lsass_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_non_system_account_targeting_lsass.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Possible Credential Dumping", + "id": "e4723b92-7266-11ec-af45-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-27", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic is an enhanced version of two previous analytics that identifies common GrantedAccess permission requests and CallTrace DLLs in order to detect credential dumping. \\\nGrantedAccess is the requested permissions by the SourceImage into the TargetImage. \\\nCallTrace Stack trace of where open process is called. Included is the DLL and the relative virtual address of the functions in the call stack right before the open process call. \\\ndbgcore.dll or dbghelp.dll are two core Windows debug DLLs that have minidump functions which provide a way for applications to produce crashdump files that contain a useful subset of the entire process context. \\\nThe idea behind using ntdll.dll is to blend in by using native api of ntdll.dll. For example in sekurlsa module there are many ntdll exported api, like RtlCopyMemory, used to execute this module which is related to lsass dumping.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe GrantedAccess IN (\"0x01000\", \"0x1010\", \"0x1038\", \"0x40\", \"0x1400\", \"0x1fffff\", \"0x1410\", \"0x143a\", \"0x1438\", \"0x1000\") CallTrace IN (\"*dbgcore.dll*\", \"*dbghelp.dll*\", \"*ntdll.dll*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, TargetImage, GrantedAccess, SourceImage, SourceProcessId, SourceUser, TargetUser | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_possible_credential_dumping_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Enabling EventCode 10 TargetProcess lsass.exe is required.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives will occur based on GrantedAccess 0x1010 and 0x1400, filter based on source image as needed or remove them. Concern is Cobalt Strike usage of Mimikatz will generate 0x1010 initially, but later be caught.", + "references": [ + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Local_Security_Authority_Subsystem_Service", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/minidumpapiset/nf-minidumpapiset-minidumpwritedump", + "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for_22.html", + "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/process-security-and-access-rights?redirectedfrom=MSDN" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Possible Credential Dumping", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_creddump.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A process, $SourceImage$, has loaded $ImageLoaded$ that are typically related to credential dumping on $dest$. Review for further details.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ImageLoaded", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "SourceImage", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Computer", + "TargetImage", + "GrantedAccess", + "SourceImage", + "SourceProcessId", + "SourceUser", + "TargetUser" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cleaver", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Whitefly" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "windows_possible_credential_dumping_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_possible_credential_dumping.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine", + "id": "e64399d4-94a8-11ec-a9da-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-23", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to look for process commandline that contains named pipe. This technique was seen in some adversaries, threat actor and malware like olympic destroyer to communicate to its other child processes after process injection that serve as defense evasion and privilege escalation. On the other hand this analytic may catch some normal process that using this technique for example browser application. In that scenario we include common process path we've seen during testing that cause false positive which is the program files. False positive may still be arise if the normal application is in other folder path.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*\\\\\\\\.\\\\pipe\\\\*\" NOT (Processes.process_path IN (\"*\\\\program files*\")) by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_process_with_namedpipe_commandline_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "Normal browser application may use this technique. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/olympic_destroyer/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Process with named pipe in $process$ on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1055" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id", + "Processes.process_guid" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Cobalt Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sharpshooter", + "Silence", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_process_with_namedpipe_commandline_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_process_with_namedpipe_commandline.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Raccine Scheduled Task Deletion", + "id": "c9f010da-57ab-11ec-82bd-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-07", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the Raccine Rules Updater scheduled task being deleted. Adversaries may attempt to remove this task in order to prevent the update of Raccine. Raccine is a \"ransomware vaccine\" created by security researcher Florian Roth, designed to intercept and prevent precursors and active ransomware behavior.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe Processes.process=\"*delete*\" AND Processes.process=\"*Raccine*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_raccine_scheduled_task_deletion_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://redcanary.com/blog/blackbyte-ransomware/", + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/Raccine" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Raccine Scheduled Task Deletion", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_raccine.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user user$ attempting to disable Raccines scheduled task.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_raccine_scheduled_task_deletion_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_raccine_scheduled_task_deletion.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Rasautou DLL Execution", + "id": "6f42b8be-8e96-11ec-ad5a-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-15", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the Windows Windows Remote Auto Dialer, rasautou.exe executing an arbitrary DLL. This technique is used to execute arbitrary shellcode or DLLs via the rasautou.exe LOLBin capability. During triage, review parent and child process behavior including file and image loads.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rasautou.exe Processes.process=\"* -d *\"AND Processes.process=\"* -p *\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_rasautou_dll_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives will be limited to applications that require Rasautou.exe to load a DLL from disk. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/mandiant/DueDLLigence", + "https://github.com/MHaggis/notes/blob/master/utilities/Invoke-SPLDLLigence.ps1", + "https://gist.github.com/NickTyrer/c6043e4b302d5424f701f15baf136513", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/10/staying-hidden-on-the-endpoint-evading-detection-with-shellcode.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Rasautou DLL Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055.001/rasautou/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to load a DLL in a suspicious manner.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1055.001", + "T1218", + "T1055" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic-link Library Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Putter Panda", + "TA505", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Cobalt Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sharpshooter", + "Silence", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_rasautou_dll_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_rasautou_dll_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition", + "id": "a85aa37e-9647-11ec-90c5-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-25", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to look for suspicious raw access read to device disk partition of the host machine. This technique was seen in several attacks by adversaries or threat actor to wipe, encrypt or overwrite the boot sector of each partition as part of their impact payload for example the \"hermeticwiper\" malware. This detection is a good indicator that there is a process try to read or write on boot sector.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=9 Device = \\\\Device\\\\HarddiskVolume* NOT (Image IN(\"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image Device ProcessGuid ProcessId EventDescription EventCode Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the raw access read event (like sysmon eventcode 9), process name and process guid from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "This event is really notable but we found minimal number of normal application from system32 folder like svchost.exe accessing it too. In this case we used 'system32' and 'syswow64' path as a filter for this detection.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/02/threat-advisory-hermeticwiper.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition", + "analytic_story": [ + "Data Destruction", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/hermetic_wiper/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Process accessing disk partition $device$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1561.002", + "T1561" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Computer", + "Image", + "Device", + "ProcessGuid", + "ProcessId", + "EventDescription", + "EventCode" + ], + "risk_score": 90, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1561.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT37", + "APT38", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1561", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive", + "id": "7b83f666-900c-11ec-a2d9-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-17", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to look for suspicious raw access read to drive where the master boot record is placed. This technique was seen in several attacks by adversaries or threat actor to wipe, encrypt or overwrite the master boot record code as part of their impact payload. This detection is a good indicator that there is a process try to read or write on MBR sector.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=9 Device = \\\\Device\\\\Harddisk0\\\\DR0 NOT (Image IN(\"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer Image Device ProcessGuid ProcessId EventDescription EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the raw access read event (like sysmon eventcode 9), process name and process guid from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "This event is really notable but we found minimal number of normal application from system32 folder like svchost.exe accessing it too. In this case we used 'system32' and 'syswow64' path as a filter for this detection.", + "references": [ + "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/threat-advisory-strt-ta02-destructive-software.html", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/technical-analysis-of-whispergate-malware/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive", + "analytic_story": [ + "WhisperGate", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1561.002/mbr_raw_access/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "process accessing MBR $device$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1561.002", + "T1561" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Computer", + "Image", + "Device", + "ProcessGuid", + "ProcessId", + "EventDescription", + "EventCode" + ], + "risk_score": 90, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1561.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT37", + "APT38", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1561", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Remote Assistance Spawning Process", + "id": "ced50492-8849-11ec-9f68-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-07", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of Microsoft Remote Assistance, msra.exe, spawning PowerShell.exe or cmd.exe as a child process. Msra.exe by default has no command-line arguments and typically spawns itself. It will generate a network connection to the remote system that is connected. This behavior is indicative of another process injected into msra.exe. Review the parent process or cross process events to identify source.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=msra.exe `windows_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_remote_assistance_spawning_process_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, filter as needed. Add additional shells as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/07/qbot-likes-to-move-it-move-it/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Remote Assistance Spawning Process", + "analytic_story": [ + "Unusual Processes" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/msra/msra-windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$, generating behavior not common with msra.exe.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1055" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Cobalt Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sharpshooter", + "Silence", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "windows_shells", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe)", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_remote_assistance_spawning_process_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_remote_assistance_spawning_process.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Schtasks Create Run As System", + "id": "41a0e58e-884c-11ec-9976-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-07", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies Schtasks.exe creating a new task to start and run as an elevated user - SYSTEM. This is commonly used by adversaries to spawn a process in an elevated state.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_schtasks` Processes.process=\"*/create *\" AND Processes.process=\"*/ru *\" AND Processes.process=\"*system*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_schtasks_create_run_as_system_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives will be limited to legitimate applications creating a task to run as SYSTEM. Filter as needed based on parent process, or modify the query to have world writeable paths to restrict it.", + "references": [ + "https://pentestlab.blog/2019/11/04/persistence-scheduled-tasks/", + "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/persistence/t1053-schtask", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/07/qbot-likes-to-move-it-move-it/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Schtasks Create Run As System", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/schtask_system/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An $process_name$ was created on endpoint $dest$ attempting to spawn as SYSTEM.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 48, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CostaRicto", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Machete", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_schtasks", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=schtasks.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_schtasks_create_run_as_system_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_schtasks_create_run_as_system.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Security Account Manager Stopped", + "id": "69c12d59-d951-431e-ab77-ec426b8d65e6", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-11-06", + "author": "Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The search looks for a Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) was stopped via command-line. This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE (\"Processes.process_name\"=\"net*.exe\" \"Processes.process\"=\"*stop \\\"samss\\\"*\") BY \"Processes.dest\", \"Processes.user\", \"Processes.process\" | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_security_account_manager_stopped_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the process-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Processes data-model object. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.", + "known_false_positives": "SAM is a critical windows service, stopping it would cause major issues on an endpoint this makes false positive rare. AlthoughNo false positives have been identified.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Security Account Manager Stopped", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ryuk Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ryuk/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "message": "The Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) was stopped via cli by $user$ on $dest$ by this command: $processs$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1489" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 70, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1489", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Indrik Spider", + "Lazarus Group", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_security_account_manager_stopped_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Service Created With Suspicious Service Path", + "id": "429141be-8311-11eb-adb6-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-11-22", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytc uses Windows Event Id 7045, `New Service Was Installed`, to identify the creation of a Windows Service where the service binary path path is located in a non-common Service folder in Windows. Red Teams and adversaries alike may create malicious Services for lateral movement or remote code execution as well as persistence and execution. The Clop ransomware has also been seen in the wild abusing Windows services.", + "search": " `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 Service_File_Name = \"*\\.exe\" NOT (Service_File_Name IN (\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\*\", \"C:\\\\Program File*\", \"C:\\\\Programdata\\\\*\", \"%systemroot%\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Service_File_Name Service_Name Service_Start_Type Service_Type | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may install services with uncommon services paths.", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", + "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Service Created With Suspicious Service Path", + "analytic_story": [ + "Clop Ransomware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-system.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A service $Service_File_Name$ was created from a non-standard path using $Service_Name$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1569", + "T1569.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Service_File_Name", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Service_Name", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "EventCode", + "Service_File_Name", + "Service_Type", + "_time", + "Service_Name", + "Service_Start_Type" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1569", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "FIN6", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Operation Wocao", + "Silence", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_system", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Service Created Within Public Path", + "id": "3abb2eda-4bb8-11ec-9ae4-3e22fbd008af", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-22", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytc uses Windows Event Id 7045, `New Service Was Installed`, to identify the creation of a Windows Service where the service binary path is located in public paths. This behavior could represent the installation of a malicious service. Red Teams and adversaries alike may create malicious Services for lateral movement or remote code execution", + "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 Service_File_Name = \"*\\.exe\" NOT (Service_File_Name IN (\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\*\", \"C:\\\\Program File*\", \"C:\\\\Programdata\\\\*\", \"%systemroot%\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName EventCode Service_File_Name Service_Name Service_Start_Type Service_Type | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_created_within_public_path_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may install services with uncommon services paths.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/services/service-control-manager", + "https://pentestlab.blog/2020/07/21/lateral-movement-services/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Service Created Within Public Path", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement_suspicious_path/windows-system.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A Windows Service $Service_File_Name$ with a public path was created on $ComputerName", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1543", + "T1543.003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Service_File_Name", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "EventCode", + "Service_File_Name", + "Service_Type", + "_time", + "Service_Name", + "Service_Start_Type" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN7", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "PROMETHIUM", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_system", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "windows_service_created_within_public_path_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_service_created_within_public_path.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Service Creation on Remote Endpoint", + "id": "e0eea4fa-4274-11ec-882b-3e22fbd008af", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-10", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `sc.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to create a Windows Service on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Service Control Manager for lateral movement and remote code execution.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=sc.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=sc.exe) (Processes.process=*\\\\\\\\* AND Processes.process=*create* AND Processes.process=*binpath*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_creation_on_remote_endpoint_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may create Windows Services on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/services/service-control-manager", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/services/controlling-a-service-using-sc", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Service Creation on Remote Endpoint", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A Windows Service was created on a remote endpoint from $dest", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1543", + "T1543.003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN7", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "PROMETHIUM", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_service_creation_on_remote_endpoint_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_service_creation_on_remote_endpoint.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry", + "id": "25212358-948e-11ec-ad47-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-23", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to look for suspicious modification or creation of registry to have service entry. This technique is abused by adversaries or threat actor to persist, gain privileges in the machine or even lateral movement. This technique can be executed using reg.exe application or using windows API like for example the CrashOveride malware. This detection is a good indicator that a process is trying to create a service entry using registry ImagePath.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services*\" Registry.registry_value_name = ImagePath by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `windows_service_creation_using_registry_entry_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "Third party tools may used this technique to create services but not so common.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/36d49de4c8b00bf36054294b4a1fcbab3917d7c5/atomics/T1574.011/T1574.011.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1574.011/change_registry_path_service/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A Windows Service was created on a endpoint from $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1574.011" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_guid" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_service_creation_using_registry_entry_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_service_creation_using_registry_entry.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Service Initiation on Remote Endpoint", + "id": "3f519894-4276-11ec-ab02-3e22fbd008af", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-10", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `sc.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to start a Windows Service on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Service Control Manager for lateral movement and remote code execution.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=sc.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=sc.exe) (Processes.process=*\\\\\\\\* AND Processes.process=*start*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_initiation_on_remote_endpoint_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may start Windows Services on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/services/controlling-a-service-using-sc", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Service Initiation on Remote Endpoint", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A Windows Service was started on a remote endpoint from $dest", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1543", + "T1543.003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN7", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "PROMETHIUM", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_service_initiation_on_remote_endpoint_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_service_initiation_on_remote_endpoint.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows WMI Process Call Create", + "id": "0661c2de-93de-11ec-9833-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-22", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to look for wmi commandlines to execute or create process. This technique was used by adversaries or threat actor to execute their malicious payload in local or remote host. This hunting query is a good pivot to start to look further which process trigger the wmi or what process it execute locally or remotely.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` Processes.process = \"* process *\" Processes.process = \"* call *\" Processes.process = \"* create *\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_wmi_process_call_create_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may execute this command for testing or auditing.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/NVISOsecurity/sigma-public/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/win_susp_wmi_execution.yml", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/2b804d25418004a5f1ba50e9dc637946ab8733c7/atomics/T1047/T1047.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows WMI Process Call Create", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious WMI Use" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "process with $process$ commandline executed in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1047" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id", + "Processes.process_guid" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_wmic", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "windows_wmi_process_call_create_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_wmi_process_call_create.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell", + "id": "203ef0ea-9bd8-11eb-8201-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-12", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed with a native Windows shell (PowerShell, Cmd, Wscript, Cscript).\\\nThe search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not.\\\nschtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\\Windows\\system32` and `C:\\Windows\\syswow64`.\\\nThe following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory.\\\nUpon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message | search Command IN (\"*powershell.exe*\", \"*wscript.exe*\", \"*cscript.exe*\", \"*cmd.exe*\", \"*sh.exe*\", \"*ksh.exe*\", \"*zsh.exe*\", \"*bash.exe*\", \"*scrcons.exe*\", \"*pwsh.exe*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Task_Name, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives are possible if legitimate applications are allowed to register tasks that call a shell to be spawned. Filter as needed based on command-line or processes that are used legitimately.", + "references": [ + "https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/irans-apt34-returns-with-an-updated-arsenal/", + "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4698", + "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/scheduled-task-job/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/taskschd/time-trigger-example--scripting-?redirectedfrom=MSDN" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A windows scheduled task was created (task name=$Task_Name$) on $dest$ by the following command: $Command$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Command", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "dest", + "Task_Name", + "Description", + "Command" + ], + "risk_score": 70, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CostaRicto", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Machete", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", + "id": "5d9c6eee-988c-11eb-8253-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-08", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed from a user writeable file path.\\\nThe search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not.\\\nschtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\\Windows\\system32` and `C:\\Windows\\syswow64`.\\\nThe following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory.\\\nUpon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or was it via TaskService. Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message | search Command IN (\"*\\\\users\\\\public\\\\*\", \"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Tasks\\\\*\", \"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Task_Name, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives are possible if legitimate applications are allowed to register tasks in public paths. Filter as needed based on paths that are used legitimately.", + "references": [ + "https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/irans-apt34-returns-with-an-updated-arsenal/", + "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4698", + "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/scheduled-task-job/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/taskschd/time-trigger-example--scripting-?redirectedfrom=MSDN", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/e26f1b2e-befa-483b-91d2-e18636e2faf3/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "IcedID", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/taskschedule/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A windows scheduled task was created (task name=$Task_Name$) on $dest$ by the following command: $Command$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Command", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "dest", + "Task_Name", + "Description", + "Command" + ], + "risk_score": 70, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CostaRicto", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Machete", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started", + "id": "b3632472-310b-11ec-9aab-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-10-19", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following hunting analytic assists with identifying suspicious tasks that have been registered and ran in Windows using EventID 200 (action run) and 201 (action completed). It is recommended to filter based on ActionName by specifying specific paths not used in your environment. After some basic tuning, this may be effective in capturing evasive ways to register tasks on Windows. Review parallel events related to tasks being scheduled. EventID 106 will generate when a new task is generated, however, that does not mean it ran. Capture any files on disk and analyze.", + "search": "`wineventlog_task_scheduler` EventCode IN (\"200\",\"201\") | rename ComputerName as dest | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message dest EventCode category | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "Task Scheduler logs are required to be collected. Enable logging with inputs.conf by adding a stanza for [WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational] and renderXml=false. Note, not translating it in XML may require a proper extraction of specific items in the Message.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives will be present. Filter based on ActionName paths or specify keywords of interest.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1053.005/T1053.005.md", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started", + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/windows_taskschedule/windows-taskschedule.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A Scheduled Task was scheduled and ran on $dest$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.005" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "TaskName", + "ActionName", + "EventID", + "dest", + "ProcessID" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CostaRicto", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Machete", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_task_scheduler", + "definition": "source=\"WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Winhlp32 Spawning a Process", + "id": "d17dae9e-2618-11ec-b9f5-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-10-05", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies winhlp32.exe, found natively in `c:\\windows\\`, spawning a child process that loads a file out of appdata, programdata, or temp. Winhlp32.exe has a rocky past in that multiple vulnerabilities were found and added to MetaSploit. WinHlp32.exe is required to display 32-bit Help files that have the \".hlp\" file name extension. This particular instance is related to a Remcos sample where dynwrapx.dll is added to the registry under inprocserver32, and later module loaded by winhlp32.exe to spawn wscript.exe and load a vbs or file from disk. During triage, review parallel processes to identify further suspicious behavior. Review module loads for unsuspecting unsigned modules. Capture any file modifications and analyze.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=winhlp32.exe Processes.process IN (\"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\",\"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winhlp32_spawning_a_process_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as winhlp32.exe is typically not used with the latest flavors of Windows OS. However, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/16541", + "https://tria.ge/210929-ap75vsddan", + "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/cb77b93150cb0f7fe65ce8a7e2a5781e727419451355a7736db84109fa215a89" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Winhlp32 Spawning a Process", + "analytic_story": [ + "Remcos" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$, and is not typical activity for this process.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1055" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Cobalt Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sharpshooter", + "Silence", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "winhlp32_spawning_a_process_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/winhlp32_spawning_a_process.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Winword Spawning Cmd", + "id": "6fcbaedc-a37b-11eb-956b-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-04-22", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following detection identifies Microsoft Word spawning `cmd.exe`. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with winword.exe. Winword.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Office16` (version will vary). Cmd.exe spawning from winword.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command-line will indicate what is being executed. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. It is possible that COM is utilized to trampoline the child process to `explorer.exe` or `wmiprvse.exe`.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=winword.exe `process_cmd` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winword_spawning_cmd_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/73af0064-a785-4c0a-ab0d-cde593fe16ef/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Winword Spawning Cmd", + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "$parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$ launched command: $process_name$ which is very common in spearphishing attacks.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 70, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_cmd", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "winword_spawning_cmd_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/winword_spawning_cmd.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Winword Spawning PowerShell", + "id": "b2c950b8-9be2-11eb-8658-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-04-12", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following detection identifies Microsoft Word spawning PowerShell. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with winword.exe. Winword.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Office16` (version will vary). PowerShell spawning from winword.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command executed will most likely be encoded and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=\"winword.exe\" `process_powershell` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winword_spawning_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/powershell/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/b79fa381-f35c-4b3e-8d02-507e7ee7342f/", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/181ac90b-0898-4631-8701-b778a30610ad/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Winword Spawning PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "$parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$ launched the following powershell process: $process_name$ which is very common in spearphishing attacks", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 70, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_powershell", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "winword_spawning_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/winword_spawning_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Winword Spawning Windows Script Host", + "id": "637e1b5c-9be1-11eb-9c32-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-12", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following detection identifies Microsoft Winword.exe spawning Windows Script Host - `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe`. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with Winword.exe. Winword.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Office16` (version will vary). `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` default location is `c:\\windows\\system32\\` or c:windows\\syswow64\\`. `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` spawning from Winword.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command-line executed will most likely be obfuscated and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. Review the reputation of the remote destination and block accordingly.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=\"winword.exe\" Processes.process_name IN (\"cscript.exe\", \"wscript.exe\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winword_spawning_windows_script_host_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "There will be limited false positives and it will be different for every environment. Tune by child process or command-line as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Winword Spawning Windows Script Host", + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachment" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_wsh.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "User $user$ on $dest$ spawned Windows Script Host from Winword.exe", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "process_name", + "process_id", + "parent_process_name", + "dest", + "user", + "parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 70, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "winword_spawning_windows_script_host_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/winword_spawning_windows_script_host.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon", + "id": "ad05aae6-3b2a-4f73-af97-57bd26cee3b9", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-12-08", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This analytic looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions. The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscription to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions.\\\nAll event subscriptions have three components \\\n1. Filter - WQL Query for the events we want. EventID = 19 \\\n1. Consumer - An action to take upon triggering the filter. EventID = 20 \\\n1. Binding - Registers a filter to a consumer. EventID = 21 \\\nMonitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding. It may be pertinent to review all 3 to identify the flow of execution. In addition, EventCode 4104 may assist with any other PowerShell script usage that registered the subscription.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=21 | rename host as dest | table _time, dest, user, Operation, EventType, Query, Consumer, Filter | `wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be collecting Sysmon data using Sysmon version 6.1 or greater and have Sysmon configured to generate alerts for WMI activity (eventID= 19, 20, 21). In addition, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA installed to properly parse the fields.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, administrators may use event subscriptions for legitimate purposes.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1546.003/T1546.003.md", + "https://www.eideon.com/2018-03-02-THL03-WMIBackdoors/", + "https://github.com/trustedsec/SysmonCommunityGuide/blob/master/WMI-events.md", + "https://in.security/an-intro-into-abusing-and-identifying-wmi-event-subscriptions-for-persistence/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious WMI Use" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user$ on $host$ executed the following suspicious WMI query: $Query$. Filter: $filter$. Consumer: $Consumer$. EventCode: $EventCode$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1546.003", + "T1546" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.AT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "host", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "host", + "user", + "Operation", + "EventType", + "Query", + "Consumer", + "Filter" + ], + "risk_score": 30, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT33", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "FIN8", + "Leviathan", + "Mustang Panda", + "Turla" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "WMI Recon Running Process Or Services", + "id": "b5cd5526-cce7-11eb-b3bd-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-14", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104, where WMI is performing an event query looking for running processes or running services. This technique is commonly found in malware and APT events where the adversary will map all running security applications or services on the compromised machine. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message= \"*SELECT*\" AND (Message=\"*Win32_Process*\" OR Message=\"*Win32_Service*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmi_recon_running_process_or_services_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "network administrator may used this command for checking purposes", + "references": [ + "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/05/12/maze-ransomware-1-year-counting/", + "https://www.eideon.com/2018-03-02-THL03-WMIBackdoors/", + "https://github.com/trustedsec/SysmonCommunityGuide/blob/master/WMI-events.md", + "https://in.security/an-intro-into-abusing-and-identifying-wmi-event-subscriptions-for-persistence/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "WMI Recon Running Process Or Services", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Suspicious powerShell script execution by $user$ on $ComputerName$ via EventCode 4104, where WMI is performing an event query looking for running processes or running services", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1592" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 30, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1592", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "wmi_recon_running_process_or_services_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wmi_recon_running_process_or_services.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Wmic Group Discovery", + "id": "83317b08-155b-11ec-8e00-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-14", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following hunting analytic identifies the use of `wmic.exe` enumerating local groups on the endpoint. \\\nTypically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wmic.exe (Processes.process=\"*group get name*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmic_group_discovery_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Wmic Group Discovery", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Local group discovery on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "TA505" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Chimera", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "admin@338" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "wmic_group_discovery_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wmic_group_discovery.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Wmic NonInteractive App Uninstallation", + "id": "bff0e7a0-317f-11ec-ab4e-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-10-20", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious wmic commandlined that uninstall application non interactively. This technique was seen in IceID to uninstall av products to the compromised host to bypassed and evade detections. This Hunting query maybe a good indicator that some process tries to uninstall application using wmic which is not a common behavior. This approach may seen in some script or third part appication to uninstall their application but it is a good thing to check what it uninstall and why.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wmic.exe Processes.process=\"* product *\" Processes.process=\"*where name*\" Processes.process=\"*call uninstall*\" Processes.process=\"*/nointeractive*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmic_noninteractive_app_uninstallation_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "third party application may use this approach to uninstall there application", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Wmic NonInteractive App Uninstallation", + "analytic_story": [ + "IceID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon2.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "wmic $process$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "wmic_noninteractive_app_uninstallation_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wmic_noninteractive_app_uninstallation.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "WMIC XSL Execution via URL", + "id": "787e9dd0-4328-11ec-a029-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-11", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies `wmic.exe` loading a remote XSL (eXtensible Stylesheet Language) script. This originally was identified by Casey Smith, dubbed Squiblytwo, as an application control bypass. Many adversaries will utilize this technique to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file. This technique can also execute local/remote scripts and, similar to its Regsvr32 \"Squiblydoo\" counterpart, leverages a trusted, built-in Windows tool. Adversaries may abuse any alias in Windows Management Instrumentation provided they utilize the /FORMAT switch. Upon identifying a suspicious execution, review for confirmed network connnection and script download.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` Processes.process IN (\"*http://*\", \"*https://*\") Processes.process=\"*/format:*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmic_xsl_execution_via_url_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives are limited as legitimate applications typically do not download files or xsl using WMIC. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1220/T1220.md", + "https://web.archive.org/web/20190814201250/https://subt0x11.blogspot.com/2018/04/wmicexe-whitelisting-bypass-hacking.html", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1220/T1220.md#atomic-test-4---wmic-bypass-using-remote-xsl-file" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "WMIC XSL Execution via URL", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious WMI Use" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1220/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ utilizing wmic to download a remote XSL script.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1220" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1220", + "mitre_attack_technique": "XSL Script Processing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Cobalt Group", + "Higaisa" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_wmic", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wmic_xsl_execution_via_url_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wmic_xsl_execution_via_url.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Wmiprsve LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", + "id": "95a455f0-4c04-11ec-b8ac-3e22fbd008af", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-22", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies `wmiprsve.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), the executed command is spawned as a child process of `wmiprvse.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of wmiprvse.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe) (Processes.process_name IN (\"Regsvcs.exe\", \"Ftp.exe\", \"OfflineScannerShell.exe\", \"Rasautou.exe\", \"Schtasks.exe\", \"Xwizard.exe\", \"Dllhost.exe\", \"Pnputil.exe\", \"Atbroker.exe\", \"Pcwrun.exe\", \"Ttdinject.exe\",\"Mshta.exe\", \"Bitsadmin.exe\", \"Certoc.exe\", \"Ieexec.exe\", \"Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe\", \"Runscripthelper.exe\", \"Forfiles.exe\", \"Msbuild.exe\", \"Register-cimprovider.exe\", \"Tttracer.exe\", \"Ie4uinit.exe\", \"Bash.exe\", \"Hh.exe\", \"SettingSyncHost.exe\", \"Cmstp.exe\", \"Mmc.exe\", \"Stordiag.exe\", \"Scriptrunner.exe\", \"Odbcconf.exe\", \"Extexport.exe\", \"Msdt.exe\", \"WorkFolders.exe\", \"Diskshadow.exe\", \"Mavinject.exe\", \"Regasm.exe\", \"Gpscript.exe\", \"Rundll32.exe\", \"Regsvr32.exe\", \"Msiexec.exe\", \"Wuauclt.exe\", \"Presentationhost.exe\", \"Wmic.exe\", \"Runonce.exe\", \"Syncappvpublishingserver.exe\", \"Verclsid.exe\", \"Infdefaultinstall.exe\", \"Explorer.exe\", \"Installutil.exe\", \"Netsh.exe\", \"Wab.exe\", \"Dnscmd.exe\", \"At.exe\", \"Pcalua.exe\", \"Msconfig.exe\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmiprsve_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/", + "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/lateral-movement/t1047-wmi-for-lateral-movement", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Wmiprsve LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Wmiprsve.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1047" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "wmiprsve_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wmiprsve_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process", + "id": "1f35e1da-267b-11ec-90a9-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-10-06", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies a suspicious spawned process by WScript or CScript process. This technique was a common technique used by adversaries and malware to execute different LOLBIN, other scripts like PowerShell or spawn a suspended process to inject its code as a defense evasion. This TTP may detect some normal script that using several application tool that are in the list of the child process it detects but a good pivot and indicator that a script is may execute suspicious code.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"cscript.exe\", \"wscript.exe\") Processes.process_name IN (\"regsvr32.exe\", \"rundll32.exe\",\"winhlp32.exe\",\"certutil.exe\",\"msbuild.exe\",\"cmd.exe\",\"powershell*\",\"wmic.exe\",\"mshta.exe\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may create vbs or js script that use several tool as part of its execution. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/8da5b75b6380a41eee3a399c43dfe0d99eeefaa1fd21027a07b1ecaa4cd96fdd?environmentId=120", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process", + "analytic_story": [ + "FIN7", + "Remcos", + "Unusual Processes", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/vbs_wscript/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "wscript or cscript parent process spawned $process_name$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1055", + "T1543", + "T1134.004", + "T1134" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Cobalt Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sharpshooter", + "Silence", + "Turla" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1134.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Parent PID Spoofing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1134", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Blue Mockingbird", + "FIN6" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Wsmprovhost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", + "id": "2eed004c-4c0d-11ec-93e8-3e22fbd008af", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-22", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies `Wsmprovhost.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the Windows Remote Management (WinRm) protocol, the executed command is spawned as a child processs of `Wsmprovhost.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of Wsmprovhost.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=wsmprovhost.exe) (Processes.process_name IN (\"Regsvcs.exe\", \"Ftp.exe\", \"OfflineScannerShell.exe\", \"Rasautou.exe\", \"Schtasks.exe\", \"Xwizard.exe\", \"Dllhost.exe\", \"Pnputil.exe\", \"Atbroker.exe\", \"Pcwrun.exe\", \"Ttdinject.exe\",\"Mshta.exe\", \"Bitsadmin.exe\", \"Certoc.exe\", \"Ieexec.exe\", \"Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe\", \"Runscripthelper.exe\", \"Forfiles.exe\", \"Msbuild.exe\", \"Register-cimprovider.exe\", \"Tttracer.exe\", \"Ie4uinit.exe\", \"Bash.exe\", \"Hh.exe\", \"SettingSyncHost.exe\", \"Cmstp.exe\", \"Mmc.exe\", \"Stordiag.exe\", \"Scriptrunner.exe\", \"Odbcconf.exe\", \"Extexport.exe\", \"Msdt.exe\", \"WorkFolders.exe\", \"Diskshadow.exe\", \"Mavinject.exe\", \"Regasm.exe\", \"Gpscript.exe\", \"Rundll32.exe\", \"Regsvr32.exe\", \"Msiexec.exe\", \"Wuauclt.exe\", \"Presentationhost.exe\", \"Wmic.exe\", \"Runonce.exe\", \"Syncappvpublishingserver.exe\", \"Verclsid.exe\", \"Infdefaultinstall.exe\", \"Explorer.exe\", \"Installutil.exe\", \"Netsh.exe\", \"Wab.exe\", \"Dnscmd.exe\", \"At.exe\", \"Pcalua.exe\", \"Msconfig.exe\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `wsmprovhost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006/", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/", + "https://pentestlab.blog/2018/05/15/lateral-movement-winrm/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Wsmprovhost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Wsmprovhost.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.006" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "Chimera", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "wsmprovhost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wsmprovhost_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "WSReset UAC Bypass", + "id": "8b5901bc-da63-11eb-be43-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-01-28", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry related to UAC bypass. This technique is to modify the registry in this detection, create a registry value with the path of the payload and run WSreset.exe to bypass User account Control.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\AppX82a6gwre4fdg3bt635tn5ctqjf8msdd2\\\\Shell\\\\open\\\\command*\" AND (Registry.registry_value_name = \"(Default)\" OR Registry.registry_value_name = \"DelegateExecute\") by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `wsreset_uac_bypass_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME", + "https://blog.morphisec.com/trickbot-uses-a-new-windows-10-uac-bypass" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "WSReset UAC Bypass", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Living Off The Land" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Defense Evasion", + "Scope:Inbound" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious modification of registry $registry_path$ with possible payload path $registry_value_name$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT37", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Evilnum", + "Honeybee", + "MuddyWater", + "Patchwork", + "Threat Group-3390" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "wsreset_uac_bypass_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wsreset_uac_bypass.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "XMRIG Driver Loaded", + "id": "90080fa6-a8df-11eb-91e4-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-29", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies XMRIG coinminer driver installation on the system. The XMRIG driver name by default is `WinRing0x64.sys`. This cpu miner is an open source project that is commonly abused by adversaries to infect and mine bitcoin.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=6 Signature=\"Noriyuki MIYAZAKI\" OR ImageLoaded= \"*\\\\WinRing0x64.sys\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer ImageLoaded Hashes IMPHASH Signature Signed | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `xmrig_driver_loaded_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the driver loaded and Signature from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited.", + "references": [ + "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/hk/threat-encyclopedia/malware/trojan.ps1.powtran.a/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "XMRIG Driver Loaded", + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A driver $ImageLoaded$ related to xmrig crytominer loaded in host $Computer$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1543.003", + "T1543" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Computer", + "ImageLoaded", + "Hashes", + "IMPHASH", + "Signature", + "Signed" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN7", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "PROMETHIUM", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "xmrig_driver_loaded_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/xmrig_driver_loaded.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "XSL Script Execution With WMIC", + "id": "004e32e2-146d-11ec-a83f-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-13", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious wmic.exe process or renamed wmic process to execute malicious xsl file. This technique was seen in FIN7 to execute its malicous jscript using the .xsl as the loader with the help of wmic.exe process. This TTP is really a good indicator for you to hunt further for FIN7 or other attacker that known to used this technique.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` Processes.process = \"*os get*\" Processes.process=\"*/format:*\" Processes.process = \"*.xsl*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `xsl_script_execution_with_wmic_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html", + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046/", + "https://web.archive.org/web/20190814201250/https://subt0x11.blogspot.com/2018/04/wmicexe-whitelisting-bypass-hacking.html", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1220/T1220.md#atomic-test-3---wmic-bypass-using-local-xsl-file" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "XSL Script Execution With WMIC", + "analytic_story": [ + "FIN7", + "Suspicious WMI Use" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_macro_js_1/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ utilizing wmic to load a XSL script.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1220" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1220", + "mitre_attack_technique": "XSL Script Processing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Cobalt Group", + "Higaisa" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_wmic", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "xsl_script_execution_with_wmic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/xsl_script_execution_with_wmic.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect New Login Attempts to Routers", + "id": "bce3ed7c-9b1f-42a0-abdf-d8b123a34836", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-12", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Authentication" + ], + "description": "The search queries the authentication logs for assets that are categorized as routers in the ES Assets and Identity Framework, to identify connections that have not been seen before in the last 30 days.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.dest_category=router by Authentication.dest Authentication.user| eval isOutlier=if(earliest >= relative_time(now(), \"-30d@d\"), 1, 0) | where isOutlier=1| `security_content_ctime(earliest)`| `security_content_ctime(latest)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Authentication\")` | `detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must ensure the network router devices are categorized as \"router\" in the Assets and identity table. You must also populate the Authentication data model with logs related to users authenticating to routing infrastructure.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate router connections may appear as new connections", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect New Login Attempts to Routers", + "analytic_story": [ + "Router and Infrastructure Security" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 11" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Authentication.dest_category", + "Authentication.dest", + "Authentication.user" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml", + "source": "application" + }, + { + "name": "Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces", + "id": "56e877a6-1455-4479-ada6-0550dc1e22f8", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-19", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Email" + ], + "description": "Attackers often use spaces as a means to obfuscate an attachment's file extension. This search looks for messages with email attachments that have many spaces within the file names.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(All_Email.recipient) as recipient_address min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Email where All_Email.file_name=\"*\" by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.file_name All_Email.message_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Email\")` | eval space_ratio = (mvcount(split(file_name,\" \"))-1)/len(file_name) | search space_ratio >= 0.1 | rex field=recipient_address \"(?.*)@\" | `email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You need to ingest data from emails. Specifically, the sender's address and the file names of any attachments must be mapped to the Email data model. The threshold ratio is set to 10%, but this value can be configured to suit each environment. \\\n **Splunk Phantom Playbook Integration**\\\nIf Splunk Phantom is also configured in your environment, a playbook called \"Suspicious Email Attachment Investigate and Delete\" can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/` and add the correct hostname to the \"Phantom Instance\" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search. The notable event will be sent to Phantom and the playbook will gather further information about the file attachment and its network behaviors. If Phantom finds malicious behavior and an analyst approves of the results, the email will be deleted from the user's inbox.", + "known_false_positives": "None at this time", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces", + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Suspicious Emails" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 7" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Email.recipient", + "All_Email.file_name", + "All_Email.src_user", + "All_Email.file_name", + "All_Email.message_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml", + "source": "application" + }, + { + "name": "Email files written outside of the Outlook directory", + "id": "8d52cf03-ba25-4101-aa78-07994aed4f74", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The search looks at the change-analysis data model and detects email files created outside the normal Outlook directory.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_name=*.pst OR Filesystem.file_name=*.ost) Filesystem.file_path != \"C:\\\\Users\\\\*\\\\My Documents\\\\Outlook Files\\\\*\" Filesystem.file_path!=\"C:\\\\Users\\\\*\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\Outlook*\" by Filesystem.action Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Filesystem\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records the file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint.Filesystem data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or by other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system reads and writes.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators and users sometimes prefer backing up their email data by moving the email files into a different folder. These attempts will be detected by the search.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Email files written outside of the Outlook directory", + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1114", + "T1114.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.file_path", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.action", + "Filesystem.process_id", + "Filesystem.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Magic Hound", + "Silent Librarian" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Email Collection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "Chimera", + "Magic Hound" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml", + "source": "application" + }, + { + "name": "Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts", + "id": "7f5fb3e1-4209-4914-90db-0ec21b556378", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search looks for an increase of data transfers from your email server to your clients. This could be indicative of a malicious actor collecting data using your email server.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` sum(All_Traffic.bytes_out) as bytes_out from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.src_category=email_server by All_Traffic.dest_ip _time span=1d | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | eventstats avg(bytes_out) as avg_bytes_out stdev(bytes_out) as stdev_bytes_out | eventstats count as num_data_samples avg(eval(if(_time < relative_time(now(), \"@d\"), bytes_out, null))) as per_source_avg_bytes_out stdev(eval(if(_time < relative_time(now(), \"@d\"), bytes_out, null))) as per_source_stdev_bytes_out by dest_ip | eval minimum_data_samples = 4, deviation_threshold = 3 | where num_data_samples >= minimum_data_samples AND bytes_out > (avg_bytes_out + (deviation_threshold * stdev_bytes_out)) AND bytes_out > (per_source_avg_bytes_out + (deviation_threshold * per_source_stdev_bytes_out)) AND _time >= relative_time(now(), \"@d\") | eval num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average = round(abs(bytes_out - avg_bytes_out) / stdev_bytes_out, 2), num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average = round(abs(bytes_out - per_source_avg_bytes_out) / per_source_stdev_bytes_out, 2) | table dest_ip, _time, bytes_out, avg_bytes_out, per_source_avg_bytes_out, num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average, num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average | `email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model. Your email servers must be categorized as \"email_server\" for the search to work, as well. You may need to adjust the deviation_threshold and minimum_data_samples values based on the network traffic in your environment. The \"deviation_threshold\" field is a multiplying factor to control how much variation you're willing to tolerate. The \"minimum_data_samples\" field is the minimum number of connections of data samples required for the statistic to be valid.", + "known_false_positives": "The false-positive rate will vary based on how you set the deviation_threshold and data_samples values. Our recommendation is to adjust these values based on your network traffic to and from your email servers.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts", + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging", + "HAFNIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 7" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1114", + "T1114.002" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.bytes_out", + "All_Traffic.src_category", + "All_Traffic.dest_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Magic Hound", + "Silent Librarian" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN4", + "HAFNIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "Leafminer" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml", + "source": "application" + }, + { + "name": "Monitor Email For Brand Abuse", + "id": "b2ea1f38-3a3e-4b8a-9cf1-82760d86a6b8", + "version": 2, + "date": "2018-01-05", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Email" + ], + "description": "This search looks for emails claiming to be sent from a domain similar to one that you want to have monitored for abuse.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Email.recipient) as recipients, min(_time) as firstTime, max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Email by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.message_id | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Email\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | eval temp=split(src_user, \"@\") | eval email_domain=mvindex(temp, 1) | lookup update=true brandMonitoring_lookup domain as email_domain OUTPUT domain_abuse | search domain_abuse=true | table message_id, src_user, email_domain, recipients, firstTime, lastTime | `monitor_email_for_brand_abuse_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You need to ingest email header data. Specifically the sender's address (src_user) must be populated. You also need to have run the search \"ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names\", which creates the permutations of the domain that will be checked for.", + "known_false_positives": "None at this time", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Monitor Email For Brand Abuse", + "analytic_story": [ + "Brand Monitoring", + "Suspicious Emails" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 7" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Email.recipient", + "All_Email.src_user", + "All_Email.message_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "monitor_email_for_brand_abuse_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "brandMonitoring_lookup", + "description": "A file that contains look-a-like domains for brands that you want to monitor", + "filename": "brand_monitoring.csv", + "default_match": "false", + "match_type": "WILDCARD(domain)", + "min_matches": 1 + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml", + "source": "application" + }, + { + "name": "Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP", + "id": "19cba45f-cad3-4032-8911-0c09e0444552", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects Okta login failures due to bad credentials for multiple users originating from the same ip address.", + "search": "`okta` outcome.reason=INVALID_CREDENTIALS | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(user) as distinct_users values(user) as users by src_ip, displayMessage, outcome.reason, country, state, city | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search distinct_users > 5| `multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being ingested in your Splunk deployment.", + "known_false_positives": "A single public IP address servicing multiple legitmate users may trigger this search. In addition, the threshold of 5 distinct users may be too low for your needs. You may modify the included filter macro `multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip_filter` to raise the threshold or except specific IP adresses from triggering this search.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Okta Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Infrastructure", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078", + "T1078.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "outcome.reason", + "client.geographicalContext.country", + "client.geographicalContext.state", + "client.geographicalContext.city", + "user", + "src_ip", + "displayMessage" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "access", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "okta", + "definition": "eventtype=okta_log", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip.yml", + "source": "application" + }, + { + "name": "No Windows Updates in a time frame", + "id": "1a77c08c-2f56-409c-a2d3-7d64617edd4f", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-15", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Updates" + ], + "description": "This search looks for Windows endpoints that have not generated an event indicating a successful Windows update in the last 60 days. Windows updates are typically released monthly and applied shortly thereafter. An endpoint that has not successfully applied an update in this time frame indicates the endpoint is not regularly being patched for some reason.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Updates where Updates.status=Installed Updates.vendor_product=\"Microsoft Windows\" by Updates.dest Updates.status Updates.vendor_product | rename Updates.dest as Host | rename Updates.status as \"Update Status\" | rename Updates.vendor_product as Product | eval isOutlier=if(lastTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-60d@d\"), 1, 0) | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search isOutlier=1 | rename lastTime as \"Last Update Time\", | table Host, \"Update Status\", Product, \"Last Update Time\" | `no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, it requires that the 'Update' data model is being populated. This can be accomplished by ingesting Windows events or the Windows Update log via a universal forwarder on the Windows endpoints you wish to monitor. The Windows add-on should be also be installed and configured to properly parse Windows events in Splunk. There may be other data sources which can populate this data model, including vulnerability management systems.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "No Windows Updates in a time frame", + "analytic_story": [ + "Monitor for Updates" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 18" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.MA" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Updates.status", + "Updates.vendor_product", + "Updates.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml", + "source": "application" + }, + { + "name": "Okta Account Lockout Events", + "id": "62b70968-a0a5-4724-8ac4-67871e6f544d", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "Detect Okta user lockout events", + "search": "`okta` displayMessage=\"Max sign in attempts exceeded\" | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | table _time, user, country, state, city, src_ip | `okta_account_lockout_events_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being ingested in your Splunk deployment.", + "known_false_positives": "None. Account lockouts should be followed up on to determine if the actual user was the one who caused the lockout, or if it was an unauthorized actor.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Okta Account Lockout Events", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Okta Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Infrastructure", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078", + "T1078.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "displayMessage", + "client.geographicalContext.country", + "client.geographicalContext.state", + "client.geographicalContext.city" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "access", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "okta", + "definition": "eventtype=okta_log", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "okta_account_lockout_events_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml", + "source": "application" + }, + { + "name": "Okta Failed SSO Attempts", + "id": "371a6545-2618-4032-ad84-93386b8698c5", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "Detect failed Okta SSO events", + "search": "`okta` displayMessage=\"User attempted unauthorized access to app\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(app) as Apps count by user, result ,displayMessage, src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_failed_sso_attempts_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being ingested in your Splunk deployment.", + "known_false_positives": "There may be a faulty config preventing legitmate users from accessing apps they should have access to.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Okta Failed SSO Attempts", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Okta Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Infrastructure", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078", + "T1078.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "displayMessage", + "app", + "user", + "result", + "src_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "access", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "okta", + "definition": "eventtype=okta_log", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "okta_failed_sso_attempts_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml", + "source": "application" + }, + { + "name": "Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities", + "id": "7594fa07-9f34-4d01-81cc-d6af6a5db9e8", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects logins from the same user from different cities in a 24 hour period.", + "search": "`okta` displayMessage=\"User login to Okta\" client.geographicalContext.city!=null | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(client.geographicalContext.city) as locations values(client.geographicalContext.city) as cities values(client.geographicalContext.state) as states by user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities_filter` | search locations > 1", + "how_to_implement": "This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being ingested in your Splunk deployment.", + "known_false_positives": "Users in your enviornment may legitmately be travelling and loggin in from different locations. This search is useful for those users that should *not* be travelling for some reason, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. The search also relies on the geographical information being populated in the Okta logs. It is also possible that a connection from another region may be attributed to a login from a remote VPN endpoint.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Okta Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Infrastructure", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078", + "T1078.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "displayMessage", + "client.geographicalContext.city", + "client.geographicalContext.state", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "access", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "okta", + "definition": "eventtype=okta_log", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml", + "source": "application" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions", + "id": "473bd65f-06ca-4dfe-a2b8-ba04ab4a0084", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-07-22", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Email" + ], + "description": "This search looks for emails that have attachments with suspicious file extensions.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Email where All_Email.file_name=\"*\" by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.file_name All_Email.message_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Email\")` | `suspicious_email_attachments` | `suspicious_email_attachment_extensions_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "You need to ingest data from emails. Specifically, the sender's address and the file names of any attachments must be mapped to the Email data model. \\\n **Splunk Phantom Playbook Integration**\\\nIf Splunk Phantom is also configured in your environment, a Playbook called \"Suspicious Email Attachment Investigate and Delete\" can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/`, and add the correct hostname to the \"Phantom Instance\" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search. The notable event will be sent to Phantom and the playbook will gather further information about the file attachment and its network behaviors. If Phantom finds malicious behavior and an analyst approves of the results, the email will be deleted from the user's inbox.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions", + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Suspicious Emails" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 7", + "CIS 12" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566.001", + "T1566" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Email.file_name", + "All_Email.src_user", + "All_Email.message_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_email_attachments", + "definition": "lookup update=true is_suspicious_file_extension_lookup file_name OUTPUT suspicious | search suspicious=true", + "description": "This macro limits the output to email attachments that have suspicious extensions" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_email_attachment_extensions_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml", + "source": "application" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Java Classes", + "id": "6ed33786-5e87-4f55-b62c-cb5f1168b831", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-12-06", + "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for suspicious Java classes that are often used to exploit remote command execution in common Java frameworks, such as Apache Struts.", + "search": "`stream_http` http_method=POST http_content_length>1 | regex form_data=\"(?i)java\\.lang\\.(?:runtime|processbuilder)\" | rename src_ip as src | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime, values(url) as uri, values(status) as status, values(http_user_agent) as http_user_agent by src, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_java_classes_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from your web-traffic appliances that serve or sit in the path of your Struts application servers. This can be accomplished by indexing data from a web proxy, or by using network traffic-analysis tools, such as Splunk Stream or Bro.", + "known_false_positives": "There are no known false positives.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Java Classes", + "analytic_story": [ + "Apache Struts Vulnerability" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 7", + "CIS 12" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "http_method", + "http_content_length", + "src_ip", + "url", + "status", + "http_user_agent", + "src", + "dest" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "stream_http", + "definition": "sourcetype=stream:http", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_java_classes_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml", + "source": "application" + }, + { + "name": "Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes", + "id": "ec3b7601-689a-4463-94e0-c9f45638efb9", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-04-01", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for suspicious processes on all systems labeled as web servers.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.dest_category=\"web_server\" AND (Processes.process=\"*whoami*\" OR Processes.process=\"*ping*\" OR Processes.process=\"*iptables*\" OR Processes.process=\"*wget*\" OR Processes.process=\"*service*\" OR Processes.process=\"*curl*\") by Processes.process Processes.process_name, Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model. In addition, web servers will need to be identified in the Assets and Identity Framework of Enterprise Security.", + "known_false_positives": "Some of these processes may be used legitimately on web servers during maintenance or other administrative tasks.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes", + "analytic_story": [ + "Apache Struts Vulnerability" + ], + "asset_type": "Web Server", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1082" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest_category", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1082", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Darkhotel", + "Frankenstein", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Sowbug", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TeamTNT", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Windigo", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml", + "source": "application" + }, + { + "name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", + "id": "ef629fc9-1583-4590-b62a-f2247fbf7bbf", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-08-21", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search finds for the number successfully destroyed cloud instances for every 4 hour block. This is split up between weekdays and the weekend. It then applies the probability densitiy model previously created and alerts on any outliers.", + "search": "| tstats count as instances_destroyed values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=deleted AND All_Changes.status=success AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%w\") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | join HourOfDay isWeekend [summary cloud_excessive_instances_destroyed_v1] | where cardinality >=16 | apply cloud_excessive_instances_destroyed_v1 threshold=0.005 | rename \"IsOutlier(instances_destroyed)\" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1 | eval expected_upper_threshold = mvindex(split(mvindex(BoundaryRanges, -1), \":\"), 0) | eval distance_from_threshold = instances_destroyed - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, instances_destroyed, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold, object_id | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_destroyed_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed` to create the probability density function.", + "known_false_positives": "Many service accounts configured within a cloud infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "Cloud Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078.004", + "T1078" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.object_id", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.status", + "All_Changes.object_category", + "All_Changes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "Cloud", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT33" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_destroyed_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched", + "id": "f2361e9f-3928-496c-a556-120cd4223a65", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-08-21", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search finds for the number successfully created cloud instances for every 4 hour block. This is split up between weekdays and the weekend. It then applies the probability densitiy model previously created and alerts on any outliers.", + "search": "| tstats count as instances_launched values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=created) AND All_Changes.status=success AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%w\") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | join HourOfDay isWeekend [summary cloud_excessive_instances_created_v1] | where cardinality >=16 | apply cloud_excessive_instances_created_v1 threshold=0.005 | rename \"IsOutlier(instances_launched)\" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1 | eval expected_upper_threshold = mvindex(split(mvindex(BoundaryRanges, -1), \":\"), 0) | eval distance_from_threshold = instances_launched - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, instances_launched, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold, object_id | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_launched_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched` to create the probability density function.", + "known_false_positives": "Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched", + "analytic_story": [ + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "Cloud Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078.004", + "T1078" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.object_id", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.status", + "All_Changes.object_category", + "All_Changes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "Cloud", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT33" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_launched_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_launched.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection", + "id": "294c4686-63dd-4fe6-93a2-ca807626704a", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-04-15", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster in AWS", + "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` \"user.username\"=\"system:anonymous\" userAgent!=\"AWS Security Scanner\" | rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(responseStatus.reason) values(source) as cluster_name values(responseStatus.code) values(userAgent) as http_user_agent values(verb) values(requestURI) by src_ip user.username user.groups{} | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudWatch EKS Logs inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, UA and source IPs will provide context.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection", + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1526" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "user.username", + "userAgent", + "sourceIPs{}", + "responseStatus.reason", + "source", + "responseStatus.code", + "verb", + "requestURI", + "src_ip", + "user.groups{}" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1526", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection", + "id": "dbfca1dd-b8e5-4ba4-be0e-e565e5d62002", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-04-15", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides detection information on unauthenticated requests against Kubernetes' Pods API", + "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` \"user.username\"=\"system:anonymous\" verb=list objectRef.resource=pods requestURI=\"/api/v1/pods\" | rename source as cluster_name sourceIPs{} as src_ip | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(responseStatus.reason) values(responseStatus.code) values(userAgent) values(verb) values(requestURI) by src_ip cluster_name user.username user.groups{} | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on forAWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudWatch EKS Logs.Please also customize the `kubernetes_pods_aws_scan_fingerprint_detection` macro to filter out the false positives.", + "known_false_positives": "Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, UA and source IPs and direct request to API provide context.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection", + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster Pod", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1526" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "user.username", + "verb", + "objectRef.resource", + "requestURI", + "source", + "sourceIPs{}", + "responseStatus.reason", + "responseStatus.code", + "userAgent", + "src_ip", + "user.groups{}" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1526", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "aws detect attach to role policy", + "id": "88fc31dd-f331-448c-9856-d3d51dd5d3a1", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-07-27", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides detection of an user attaching itself to a different role trust policy. This can be used for lateral movement and escalation of privileges.", + "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` attach policy| spath requestParameters.policyArn | table sourceIPAddress user_access_key userIdentity.arn userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.arn eventName errorCode errorMessage status action requestParameters.policyArn userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.mfaAuthenticated userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.creationDate | `aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add-on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs", + "known_false_positives": "Attach to policy can create a lot of noise. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse (i.e status=failure). The search can provide context for common users attaching themselves to higher privilege policies or even newly created policies.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "aws detect attach to role policy", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Account", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "requestParameters.policyArn" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "aws detect permanent key creation", + "id": "12d6d713-3cb4-4ffc-a064-1dca3d1cca01", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-07-27", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides detection of accounts creating permanent keys. Permanent keys are not created by default and they are only needed for programmatic calls. Creation of Permanent key is an important event to monitor.", + "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` CreateAccessKey | spath eventName | search eventName=CreateAccessKey \"userIdentity.type\"=IAMUser | table sourceIPAddress userName userIdentity.type userAgent action status responseElements.accessKey.createDate responseElements.accessKey.status responseElements.accessKey.accessKeyId |`aws_detect_permanent_key_creation_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs", + "known_false_positives": "Not all permanent key creations are malicious. If there is a policy of rotating keys this search can be adjusted to provide better context.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "aws detect permanent key creation", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Account", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "userIdentity.type", + "sourceIPAddress", + "userName userIdentity.type", + "userAgent", + "action", + "status", + "responseElements.accessKey.createDate", + "esponseElements.accessKey.status", + "responseElements.accessKey.accessKeyId" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_detect_permanent_key_creation_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "aws detect role creation", + "id": "5f04081e-ddee-4353-afe4-504f288de9ad", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-07-27", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides detection of role creation by IAM users. Role creation is an event by itself if user is creating a new role with trust policies different than the available in AWS and it can be used for lateral movement and escalation of privileges.", + "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` event_name=CreateRole action=created userIdentity.type=AssumedRole requestParameters.description=Allows* | table sourceIPAddress userIdentity.principalId userIdentity.arn action event_name awsRegion http_user_agent mfa_auth msg requestParameters.roleName requestParameters.description responseElements.role.arn responseElements.role.createDate | `aws_detect_role_creation_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add-on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs", + "known_false_positives": "CreateRole is not very common in common users. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse. In general AWS provides plenty of trust policies that fit most use cases.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "aws detect role creation", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Account", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "event_name", + "action", + "userIdentity.type", + "requestParameters.description", + "sourceIPAddress", + "userIdentity.principalId", + "userIdentity.arn", + "action", + "event_name", + "awsRegion", + "http_user_agent", + "mfa_auth", + "msg", + "requestParameters.roleName", + "requestParameters.description", + "responseElements.role.arn", + "responseElements.role.createDate" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_detect_role_creation_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_role_creation.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "aws detect sts assume role abuse", + "id": "8e565314-b6a2-46d8-9f05-1a34a176a662", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-07-27", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides detection of suspicious use of sts:AssumeRole. These tokens can be created on the go and used by attackers to move laterally and escalate privileges.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` user_type=AssumedRole userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.type=Role | table sourceIPAddress userIdentity.arn user_agent user_access_key status action requestParameters.roleName responseElements.role.roleName responseElements.role.createDate | `aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs", + "known_false_positives": "Sts:AssumeRole can be very noisy as it is a standard mechanism to provide cross account and cross resources access. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "aws detect sts assume role abuse", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Account", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "user_type", + "userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.type", + "sourceIPAddress", + "userIdentity.arn", + "user_agent", + "user_access_key", + "status", + "action", + "requestParameters.roleName", + "esponseElements.role.roleName", + "esponseElements.role.createDate" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "aws detect sts get session token abuse", + "id": "85d7b35f-b8b5-4b01-916f-29b81e7a0551", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-07-27", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides detection of suspicious use of sts:GetSessionToken. These tokens can be created on the go and used by attackers to move laterally and escalate privileges.", + "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` ASIA userIdentity.type=IAMUser| spath eventName | search eventName=GetSessionToken | table sourceIPAddress eventTime userIdentity.arn userName userAgent user_type status region | `aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add-on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs", + "known_false_positives": "Sts:GetSessionToken can be very noisy as in certain environments numerous calls of this type can be executed. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse. In specific environments the use of field requestParameters.serialNumber will need to be used.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "aws detect sts get session token abuse", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Account", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1550" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "userIdentity.type", + "eventName", + "sourceIPAddress", + "eventTime", + "userIdentity.arn", + "userName", + "userAgent", + "user_type", + "status", + "region" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1550", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP", + "id": "ccc3246a-daa1-11ea-87d0-0242ac130022", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-08-10", + "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks at GCP Storage bucket-access logs and detects new or previously unseen remote IP addresses that have successfully accessed a GCP Storage bucket.", + "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` | multikv | rename sc_status_ as status | rename cs_object_ as bucket_name | rename c_ip_ as remote_ip | rename cs_uri_ as request_uri | rename cs_method_ as operation | search status=\"\\\"200\\\"\" | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by bucket_name remote_ip operation request_uri | table firstTime, lastTime, bucket_name, remote_ip, operation, request_uri | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by bucket_name remote_ip operation request_uri | outputlookup previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip | eval newIP=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(),\"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newIP=1 | eval first_time=strftime(firstTime,\"%m/%d/%y %H:%M:%S\") | eval last_time=strftime(lastTime,\"%m/%d/%y %H:%M:%S\") | table first_time last_time bucket_name remote_ip operation request_uri | `detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This search relies on the Splunk Add-on for Google Cloud Platform, setting up a Cloud Pub/Sub input, along with the relevant GCP PubSub topics and logging sink to capture GCP Storage Bucket events (https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/routing/overview). In order to capture public GCP Storage Bucket access logs, you must also enable storage bucket logging to your PubSub Topic as per https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/access-logs. These logs are deposited into the nominated Storage Bucket on an hourly basis and typically show up by 15 minutes past the hour. It is recommended to configure any saved searches or correlation searches in Enterprise Security to run on an hourly basis at 30 minutes past the hour (cron definition of 30 * * * *). A lookup table (previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip.csv) stores the previously seen access requests, and is used by this search to determine any newly seen IP addresses accessing the Storage Buckets.", + "known_false_positives": "GCP Storage buckets can be accessed from any IP (if the ACLs are open to allow it), as long as it can make a successful connection. This will be a false postive, since the search is looking for a new IP within the past two hours.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "GCP Storage Bucket", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13", + "CIS 14" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1530" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "sc_status_", + "cs_object_", + "c_ip_", + "cs_uri_", + "cs_method_" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1530", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Cloud Storage Object", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Fox Kitten" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip", + "description": "A place holder for a list of GCP storage access from remote IPs", + "filename": "previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip.csv", + "default_match": "false", + "min_matches": 1 + }, + { + "name": "previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip", + "description": "A place holder for a list of GCP storage access from remote IPs", + "filename": "previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip.csv", + "default_match": "false", + "min_matches": 1 + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets", + "id": "f6ea3466-d6bb-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-08-05", + "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for GCP PubSub events where a user has created an open/public GCP Storage bucket.", + "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.resource.type=gcs_bucket data.protoPayload.methodName=storage.setIamPermissions | spath output=action path=data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.action | spath output=user path=data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail | spath output=location path=data.protoPayload.resourceLocation.currentLocations{} | spath output=src path=data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp | spath output=bucketName path=data.protoPayload.resourceName | spath output=role path=data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.role | spath output=member path=data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.member | search (member=allUsers AND action=ADD) | table _time, bucketName, src, user, location, action, role, member | search `detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This search relies on the Splunk Add-on for Google Cloud Platform, setting up a Cloud Pub/Sub input, along with the relevant GCP PubSub topics and logging sink to capture GCP Storage Bucket events (https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/routing/overview).", + "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that a GCP admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. That said, GCP strongly advises against granting full control to the \"allUsers\" group.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "GCP Storage Bucket", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1530" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "data.resource.type", + "data.protoPayload.methodName", + "data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.action", + "data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail", + "data.protoPayload.resourceLocation.currentLocations{}", + "data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp", + "data.protoPayload.resourceName", + "data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.role", + "data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.member" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1530", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Cloud Storage Object", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Fox Kitten" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Detect S3 access from a new IP", + "id": "e6f1bb1b-f441-492b-9126-902acda217da", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-06-28", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks at S3 bucket-access logs and detects new or previously unseen remote IP addresses that have successfully accessed an S3 bucket.", + "search": "`aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200 [search `aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200 | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by bucket_name remote_ip | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by bucket_name remote_ip | outputlookup previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip.csv | eval newIP=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newIP=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table bucket_name remote_ip]| iplocation remote_ip |rename remote_ip as src_ip | table _time bucket_name src_ip City Country operation request_uri | `detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your S3 access logs' inputs. This search works best when you run the \"Previously Seen S3 Bucket Access by Remote IP\" support search once to create a history of previously seen remote IPs and bucket names.", + "known_false_positives": "S3 buckets can be accessed from any IP, as long as it can make a successful connection. This will be a false postive, since the search is looking for a new IP within the past hour", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect S3 access from a new IP", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "S3 Bucket", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13", + "CIS 14" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1530" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "http_status", + "bucket_name", + "remote_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1530", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Cloud Storage Object", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Fox Kitten" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "aws_s3_accesslogs", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:s3:accesslogs", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User", + "id": "2a9b80d3-6220-4345-b5ad-290bf5d0d222", + "version": 3, + "date": "2021-01-26", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub alerts for an AWS IAM User in 4 hours intervals.", + "search": "`aws_securityhub_finding` \"findings{}.Resources{}.Type\"= AwsIamUser | rename findings{}.Resources{}.Id as user | bucket span=4h _time | stats count AS alerts by _time user | eventstats avg(alerts) as total_launched_avg, stdev(alerts) as total_launched_stdev | eval threshold_value = 2 | eval isOutlier=if(alerts > total_launched_avg+(total_launched_stdev * threshold_value), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | table _time user alerts |`detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Security Hub inputs. The threshold_value should be tuned to your environment and schedule these searches according to the bucket span interval.", + "known_false_positives": "None", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Security Hub Alerts" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "findings{}.Resources{}.Type", + "indings{}.Resources{}.Id", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "aws_securityhub_finding", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:securityhub:finding\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS", + "id": "d3fffa37-492f-487b-a35d-c60fcb2acf01", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-05-07", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search will detect spike in blocked outbound network connections originating from within your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data.", + "search": "`cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow` action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR src_ip=192.168.0.0/16) ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16) [search `cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow` action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR src_ip=192.168.0.0/16) ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16) | stats count as numberOfBlockedConnections by src_ip | inputlookup baseline_blocked_outbound_connections append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) as * by src_ip | rename numberOfBlockedConnections as latestCount | eval newAvgBlockedConnections=avgBlockedConnections + (latestCount-avgBlockedConnections)/720 | eval newStdevBlockedConnections=sqrt(((pow(stdevBlockedConnections, 2)*719 + (latestCount-newAvgBlockedConnections)*(latestCount-avgBlockedConnections))/720)) | eval avgBlockedConnections=coalesce(newAvgBlockedConnections, avgBlockedConnections), stdevBlockedConnections=coalesce(newStdevBlockedConnections, stdevBlockedConnections), numDataPoints=if(isnull(latestCount), numDataPoints, numDataPoints+1) | table src_ip, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgBlockedConnections, stdevBlockedConnections | outputlookup baseline_blocked_outbound_connections | eval dataPointThreshold = 5, deviationThreshold = 3 | eval isSpike=if((latestCount > avgBlockedConnections+deviationThreshold*stdevBlockedConnections) AND numDataPoints > dataPointThreshold, 1, 0) | where isSpike=1 | table src_ip] | stats values(dest_ip) as \"Blocked Destination IPs\", values(interface_id) as \"resourceId\" count as numberOfBlockedConnections, dc(dest_ip) as uniqueDestConnections by src_ip | `detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your VPC Flow logs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the number of data points required to meet the definition of \"spike.\" The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best when you run the \"Baseline of Blocked Outbound Connection\" support search once to create a history of previously seen blocked outbound connections.", + "known_false_positives": "The false-positive rate may vary based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`. Additionally, false positives may result when AWS administrators roll out policies enforcing network blocks, causing sudden increases in the number of blocked outbound connections.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Command & Control" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 11" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Command & Control" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM", + "PR.AC" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "action", + "src_ip", + "dest_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudwatchlogs:vpcflow", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "baseline_blocked_outbound_connections", + "description": "A lookup file that will contain the baseline information for number of blocked outbound connections", + "filename": "baseline_blocked_outbound_connections.csv" + }, + { + "name": "baseline_blocked_outbound_connections", + "description": "A lookup file that will contain the baseline information for number of blocked outbound connections", + "filename": "baseline_blocked_outbound_connections.csv" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion", + "id": "e733a326-59d2-446d-b8db-14a17151aa68", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-11-27", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects users creating spikes in API activity related to deletion of S3 buckets in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteBucket [search `cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteBucket | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | stats count as apiCalls by arn | inputlookup s3_deletion_baseline append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) as * by arn | rename apiCalls as latestCount | eval newAvgApiCalls=avgApiCalls + (latestCount-avgApiCalls)/720 | eval newStdevApiCalls=sqrt(((pow(stdevApiCalls, 2)*719 + (latestCount-newAvgApiCalls)*(latestCount-avgApiCalls))/720)) | eval avgApiCalls=coalesce(newAvgApiCalls, avgApiCalls), stdevApiCalls=coalesce(newStdevApiCalls, stdevApiCalls), numDataPoints=if(isnull(latestCount), numDataPoints, numDataPoints+1) | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup s3_deletion_baseline | eval dataPointThreshold = 15, deviationThreshold = 3 | eval isSpike=if((latestCount > avgApiCalls+deviationThreshold*stdevApiCalls) AND numDataPoints > dataPointThreshold, 1, 0) | where isSpike=1 | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | spath output=bucketName path=requestParameters.bucketName | stats values(bucketName) as bucketName, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName) as uniqueApisCalled by user | `detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best when you run the \"Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN\" support search once to create a baseline of previously seen S3 bucket-deletion activity.", + "known_false_positives": "Based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`, the false positive rate may vary. Please modify this according the your environment.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "S3 Bucket", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1530" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.CM", + "PR.AC" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "userIdentity.arn" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1530", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Cloud Storage Object", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Fox Kitten" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "s3_deletion_baseline", + "description": "A placeholder for the baseline information for AWS S3 deletions", + "filename": "s3_deletion_baseline.csv" + }, + { + "name": "s3_deletion_baseline", + "description": "A placeholder for the baseline information for AWS S3 deletions", + "filename": "s3_deletion_baseline.csv" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "GCP Detect gcploit framework", + "id": "a1c5a85e-a162-410c-a5d9-99ff639e5a52", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-10-08", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides detection of GCPloit exploitation framework. This framework can be used to escalate privileges and move laterally from compromised high privilege accounts.", + "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.request.function.timeout=539s | table src src_user data.resource.labels.project_id data.protoPayload.request.function.serviceAccountEmail data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission data.protoPayload.request.location http_user_agent | `gcp_detect_gcploit_framework_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message logs", + "known_false_positives": "Payload.request.function.timeout value can possibly be match with other functions or requests however the source user and target request account may indicate an attempt to move laterally accross acounts or projects", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/dxa4481/gcploit", + "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ml09R38jpok" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GCP Detect gcploit framework", + "analytic_story": [ + "GCP Cross Account Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "GCP Account", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "data.protoPayload.request.function.timeout", + "src", + "src_user", + "data.resource.labels.project_id", + "data.protoPayload.request.function.serviceAccountEmail", + "data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission", + "data.protoPayload.request.location", + "http_user_agent" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "gcp_detect_gcploit_framework_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection", + "id": "19b53215-4a16-405b-8087-9e6acf619842", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-07-17", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster's pods", + "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` category=kube-audit |spath input=properties.log |search responseStatus.code=401 |table sourceIPs{} userAgent verb requestURI responseStatus.reason properties.pod | `gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later), then configure stackdriver and set a Pub/Sub subscription to be imported to Splunk.", + "known_false_positives": "Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, User Agent, source IPs and pods will provide context.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection", + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "GCP Kubernetes cluster", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1526" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "category", + "responseStatus.code", + "sourceIPs{}", + "userAgent", + "verb", + "requestURI", + "responseStatus.reason", + "properties.pod" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1526", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Gdrive suspicious file sharing", + "id": "a7131dae-34e3-11ec-a2de-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-10-24", + "author": "Rod Soto, Teoderick Contreras", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search can help the detection of compromised accounts or internal users sharing potentially malicious/classified documents with users outside your organization via GSuite file sharing .", + "search": "`gsuite_drive` name=change_user_access | rename parameters.* as * | search email = \"*@yourdomain.com\" target_user != \"*@yourdomain.com\" | stats count values(owner) as owner values(target_user) as target values(doc_type) as doc_type values(doc_title) as doc_title dc(target_user) as distinct_target by src_ip email | where distinct_target > 50 | `gdrive_suspicious_file_sharing_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "Need to implement Gsuite logging targeting Google suite drive activity. In order for the search to work for your environment please update `yourdomain.com` value in the query with the domain relavant for your organization.", + "known_false_positives": "This is an anomaly search, you must specify your domain in the parameters so it either filters outside domains or focus on internal domains. This search may also help investigate compromise of accounts. By looking at for example source ip addresses, document titles and abnormal number of shares and shared target users.", + "references": [ + "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/investigating-gsuite-phishing-attacks-with-splunk.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Gdrive suspicious file sharing", + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments", + "Data Exfiltration" + ], + "asset_type": "GDrive", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "dataset": [ + [] + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "src_ip", + "parameters.owner", + "parameters.target_user", + "parameters.doc_title", + "parameters.doc_type" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "gsuite_drive", + "definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:drive:json", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "gdrive_suspicious_file_sharing_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/gdrive_suspicious_file_sharing.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Gsuite suspicious calendar invite", + "id": "03cdd68a-34fb-11ec-9bd3-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-10-24", + "author": "Rod Soto, Teoderick Contreras", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search can help the detection of compromised accounts or internal users sending suspcious calendar invites via GSuite calendar. These invites may contain malicious links or attachments.", + "search": "`gsuite_calendar` |bin span=5m _time |rename parameters.* as * |search target_calendar_id!=null email=\"*yourdomain.com\"| stats count values(target_calendar_id) values(event_title) values(event_guest) by email _time | where count >100| `gsuite_suspicious_calendar_invite_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "In order to successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite (gsuite:calendar:json) having the file sharing metadata like file type, source owner, destination target user, description, etc. This search can also be made more specific by selecting specific emails, subdomains timeframe, organizational units, targeted user, etc. In order for the search to work for your environment please update `yourdomain.com` value in the query with the domain relavant for your organization.", + "known_false_positives": "This search will also produce normal activity statistics. Fields such as email, ip address, name, parameters.organizer_calendar_id, parameters.target_calendar_id and parameters.event_title may give away phishing intent.For more specific results use email parameter.", + "references": [ + "https://www.techrepublic.com/article/how-to-avoid-the-dreaded-google-calendar-malicious-invite-issue/", + "https://gcn.com/articles/2012/09/26/20-most-common-words-phishing-attacks.aspx" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Gsuite suspicious calendar invite", + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments" + ], + "asset_type": "GSuite", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "dataset": [ + [] + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "email", + "parameters.event_title", + "parameters.target_calendar_id", + "parameters.event_title" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "gsuite_calendar", + "definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:calendar:json", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "gsuite_suspicious_calendar_invite_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/gsuite_suspicious_calendar_invite.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "High Number of Login Failures from a single source", + "id": "7f398cfb-918d-41f4-8db8-2e2474e02222", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-12-16", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search will detect more than 5 login failures in Office365 Azure Active Directory from a single source IP address. Please adjust the threshold value of 5 as suited for your environment.", + "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=UserLoginFailed record_type=AzureActiveDirectoryStsLogon app=AzureActiveDirectory | stats count dc(user) as accounts_locked values(user) as user values(LogonError) as LogonError values(authentication_method) as authentication_method values(signature) as signature values(UserAgent) as UserAgent by src_ip record_type Operation app | search accounts_locked >= 5| `high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "High Number of Login Failures from a single source", + "analytic_story": [ + "Office 365 Detections" + ], + "asset_type": "Office 365", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1110.001", + "T1110" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Operation", + "record_type", + "app", + "user", + "LogonError", + "authentication_method", + "signature", + "UserAgent", + "src_ip", + "record_type" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN5", + "Fox Kitten", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "o365_management_activity", + "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls", + "id": "042a3d32-8318-4763-9679-09db2644a8f2", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-06-23", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides information on anonymous Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context", + "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` userAgent=kubectl* sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1 sourceIPs{}!=::1 src_user=system:anonymous | table src_ip src_user verb userAgent requestURI | stats count by src_ip src_user verb userAgent requestURI |`kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs.", + "known_false_positives": "Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP, verb and Object can reveal potential malicious activity, specially anonymous suspicious IPs and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls", + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Kubernetes", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "userAgent", + "sourceIPs{}", + "src_user", + "src_ip", + "verb", + "requestURI" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "New container uploaded to AWS ECR", + "id": "f0f70b40-f7ad-489d-9905-23d149da8099", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-02-20", + "author": "Rod Soto, Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This searches show information on uploaded containers including source user, image id, source IP user type, http user agent, region, first time, last time of operation (PutImage). These searches are based on Cloud Infrastructure Data Model.", + "search": "| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Cloud_Infrastructure.Compute where Compute.user_type!=\"AssumeRole\" AND Compute.http_user_agent=\"AWS Internal\" AND Compute.event_name=\"PutImage\" by Compute.image_id Compute.src_user Compute.src Compute.region Compute.msg Compute.user_type | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Compute\")` | `new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model. Please also customize the `container_implant_aws_detection_filter` macro to filter out the false positives.", + "known_false_positives": "Uploading container is a normal behavior from developers or users with access to container registry.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "New container uploaded to AWS ECR", + "analytic_story": [ + "Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS ECR container", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1525" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1525", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Implant Internal Image", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Child Processes of Spoolsv exe", + "id": "aa0c4aeb-5b18-41c4-8c07-f1442d7599df", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-03-16", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for child processes of spoolsv.exe. This activity is associated with a POC privilege-escalation exploit associated with CVE-2018-8440. Spoolsv.exe is the process associated with the Print Spooler service in Windows and typically runs as SYSTEM.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=spoolsv.exe AND Processes.process_name!=regsvr32.exe by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model. Update the `children_of_spoolsv_filter` macro to filter out legitimate child processes spawned by spoolsv.exe.", + "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate printer-related processes may show up as children of spoolsv.exe. You should confirm that any activity as legitimate and may be added as exclusions in the search.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Child Processes of Spoolsv exe", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Privilege Escalation" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 5", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1068" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.AC", + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2018-8440" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "Cobalt Group", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "PLATINUM", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "Whitefly", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156", + "id": "93fbec4e-0375-440c-8db3-4508eca470c4", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-01-27", + "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit", + "search": "`linux_hosts` | search \"sudoedit -s \\\\\" | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "Splunk Universal Forwarder running on Linux systems, capturing logs from the /var/log directory. The vulnerability is exposed when a non privledged user tries passing in a single \\ character at the end of the command while using the shell and edit flags.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156", + "analytic_story": [ + "Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1068" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-3156" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "Cobalt Group", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "PLATINUM", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "Whitefly", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "linux_hosts", + "definition": "index=*", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault", + "id": "10f2bae0-bbe6-4984-808c-37dc1c67980d", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-01-29", + "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit", + "search": "`linux_hosts` | search sudoedit segfault | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by host | search count > 5 | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "Splunk Universal Forwarder running on Linux systems (tested on Centos and Ubuntu), where segfaults are being logged. This also captures instances where the exploit has been compiled into a binary. The detection looks for greater than 5 instances of sudoedit combined with segfault over your search time period on a single host", + "known_false_positives": "If sudoedit is throwing segfaults for other reasons this will pick those up too.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault", + "analytic_story": [ + "Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1068" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "host" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-3156" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "Cobalt Group", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "PLATINUM", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "Whitefly", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "linux_hosts", + "definition": "index=*", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery", + "id": "1de31d5d-8fa6-4ee0-af89-17069134118a", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-01-28", + "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit", + "search": "`osquery_process` | search \"columns.cmdline\"=\"sudoedit -s \\\\*\" | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "OSQuery installed and configured to pick up process events (info at https://osquery.io) as well as using the Splunk OSQuery Add-on https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4402. The vulnerability is exposed when a non privledged user tries passing in a single \\ character at the end of the command while using the shell and edit flags.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery", + "analytic_story": [ + "Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1068" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "columns.cmdline" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-3156" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "Cobalt Group", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "PLATINUM", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "Whitefly", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "osquery_process", + "definition": "eventtype=\"osquery-process\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account", + "id": "1400624a-d42d-484d-8843-e6753e6e3645", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-09-18", + "author": "Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for Event Code 4742 (Computer Change) or EventCode 4624 (An account was successfully logged on) with an anonymous account.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 OR EventCode=4742 TargetUserName=\"ANONYMOUS LOGON\" LogonType=3 | stats count values(host) as host, values(TargetDomainName) as Domain, values(user) as user | `detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This search requires audit computer account management to be enabled on the system in order to generate Event ID 4742. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Event Logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", + "known_false_positives": "None thus far found", + "references": [ + "https://www.lares.com/blog/from-lares-labs-defensive-guidance-for-zerologon-cve-2020-1472/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account", + "analytic_story": [ + "Detect Zerologon Attack" + ], + "asset_type": "Windows", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 6", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "The following $EventCode$ occurred on $dest$ by $user$ with Logon Type 3, which may be indicative of the an account or group being changed by an anonymous account.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1210" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "EventCode", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "TargetUserName", + "LogonType", + "TargetDomainName", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2020-1472" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1210", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation of Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file", + "id": "a51bfe1a-94f0-4822-b1e4-16ae10145893", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for execution of process `outlook.exe` where the process is writing a `.zip` file to the disk.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=outlook.exe OR Processes.process_name=explorer.exe by _time span=5m Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_id Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename process_id as malicious_id| rename parent_process_id as outlook_id| join malicious_id type=inner[| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path values(Filesystem.file_name) as file_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_path=*zip* OR Filesystem.file_name=*.lnk ) AND (Filesystem.file_path=C:\\\\Users* OR Filesystem.file_path=*Local\\\\Temp*) by _time span=5m Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_hash Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename process_id as malicious_id| fields malicious_id outlook_id dest file_path file_name file_hash count file_id] | table firstTime lastTime user malicious_id outlook_id process_name parent_process_name file_name file_path | where file_name != \"\" | `detect_outlook_exe_writing_a_zip_file_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon.", + "known_false_positives": "It is not uncommon for outlook to write legitimate zip files to the disk.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file", + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 7", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.parent_process_id", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_outlook_exe_writing_a_zip_file_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_outlook_exe_writing_a_zip_file.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Rare Executables", + "id": "44fddcb2-8d3b-454c-874e-7c6de5a4f7ac", + "version": 5, + "date": "2020-03-16", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search will return a table of rare processes, the names of the systems running them, and the users who initiated each process.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.dest) as dest values(Processes.user) as user min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name | rename Processes.process_name as process | rex field=user \"(?.*)\\\\\\\\(?.*)\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| search [| tstats count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name | rare Processes.process_name limit=30 | rename Processes.process_name as process| `filter_rare_process_allow_list`| table process ] | `detect_rare_executables_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts and populating the endpoint data model with the resultant dataset. The macro `filter_rare_process_allow_list` searches two lookup files for allowed processes. These consist of `rare_process_allow_list_default.csv` and `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv`. To add your own processes to the allow list, add them to `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv`. If you wish to remove an entry from the default lookup file, you will have to modify the macro itself to set the allow_list value for that process to false. You can modify the limit parameter and search scheduling to better suit your environment.", + "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate processes may be only rarely executed in your environment. As these are identified, update `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv` to filter them out of your search results.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Rare Executables", + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Unusual Processes", + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.PT", + "PR.DS", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_name" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "filter_rare_process_allow_list", + "definition": "lookup update=true lookup_rare_process_allow_list_default process as process OUTPUTNEW allow_list | where allow_list=\"false\" | lookup update=true lookup_rare_process_allow_list_local process as process OUTPUT allow_list | where allow_list=\"false\"", + "description": "This macro is intended to allow_list processes that have been definied as rare" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_rare_executables_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detection of tools built by NirSoft", + "id": "3d8d201c-aa03-422d-b0ee-2e5ecf9718c0", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for specific command-line arguments that may indicate the execution of tools made by Nirsoft, which are legitimate, but may be abused by attackers.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) values(Processes.process) as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process=\"* /stext *\" OR Processes.process=\"* /scomma *\" ) by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "While legitimate, these NirSoft tools are prone to abuse. You should verfiy that the tool was used for a legitimate purpose.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detection of tools built by NirSoft", + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A " + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1072" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1072", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Software Deployment Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-1314" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF", + "id": "29228ab4-0762-11ec-94aa-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-27", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This analytic identifies suspicious behavior related to ProxyShell against on-premise Microsoft Exchange servers. \\\nModification of this analytic is requried to ensure fields are mapped accordingly. \\\nA suspicious event will have `PowerShell`, the method `POST` and `autodiscover.json`. This is indicative of accessing PowerShell on the back end of Exchange with SSRF. \\\nAn event will look similar to `POST /autodiscover/autodiscover.json a=dsxvu@fnsso.flq/powershell/?X-Rps-CAT=VgEAVAdXaW5kb3d...` (abbreviated) \\\nReview the source attempting to perform this activity against your environment. In addition, review PowerShell logs and access recently granted to Exchange roles.", + "search": "| `exchange` c_uri=\"*//autodiscover.json*\" cs_uri_query=\"*PowerShell*\" cs_method=\"POST\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, cs_uri_query, cs_method, c_uri | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `exchange_powershell_abuse_via_ssrf_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "The following analytic requires on-premise Exchange to be logging to Splunk using the TA - https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3225. Ensure logs are parsed correctly, or tune the analytic for your environment.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives, however, tune as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/GossiTheDog/ThreatHunting/blob/master/AzureSentinel/Exchange-Powershell-via-SSRF", + "https://blog.orange.tw/2021/08/proxylogon-a-new-attack-surface-on-ms-exchange-part-1.html", + "https://peterjson.medium.com/reproducing-the-proxyshell-pwn2own-exploit-49743a4ea9a1" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF", + "analytic_story": [ + "ProxyShell" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/exchange-events.json" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Activity related to ProxyShell has been identified on $dest$. Review events and take action accordingly.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "dest", + "cs_uri_query", + "cs_method", + "c_uri" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "exchange", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"MSWindows:IIS\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "exchange_powershell_abuse_via_ssrf_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/exchange_powershell_abuse_via_ssrf.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Exchange PowerShell Module Usage", + "id": "2d10095e-05ae-11ec-8fdf-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-27", + "author": "Michael Haag", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the usage of Exchange PowerShell modules that were recently used for a proof of concept related to ProxyShell. Currently, there is no active data shared or data we could re-produce relate to this part of the ProxyShell chain of exploits. \\\nInherently, the usage of the modules is not malicious, but reviewing parallel processes, and user, of the session will assist with determining the intent. \\\nModule - New-MailboxExportRequest will begin the process of exporting contents of a primary mailbox or archive to a .pst file. \\\nModule - New-managementroleassignment can assign a management role to a management role group, management role assignment policy, user, or universal security group (USG).", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message IN (\"*New-MailboxExportRequest*\", \"*New-ManagementRoleAssignment*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Path Message OpCode ComputerName User EventCode| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `exchange_powershell_module_usage_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/new-mailboxexportrequest?view=exchange-ps", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/new-managementroleassignment?view=exchange-ps", + "https://blog.orange.tw/2021/08/proxyshell-a-new-attack-surface-on-ms-exchange-part-3.html", + "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/8/17/from-pwn2own-2021-a-new-attack-surface-on-microsoft-exchange-proxyshell", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/11/15/exchange-exploit-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Exchange PowerShell Module Usage", + "analytic_story": [ + "ProxyShell" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Local user discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Path", + "Message", + "OpCode", + "ComputerName", + "User", + "EventCode" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "exchange_powershell_module_usage_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/exchange_powershell_module_usage.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom", + "id": "e91bd102-d630-4e76-ab73-7e3ba22c5961", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-05-20", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for child processes spawned by zoom.exe or zoom.us that has not previously been seen.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name values(Processes.parent_process_id) as parent_process_id values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.us) by Processes.process_id Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | lookup zoom_first_time_child_process dest as dest process_name as process_name OUTPUT firstTimeSeen | where isnull(firstTimeSeen) OR firstTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), \"`previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window`\") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | table firstTime dest, process_id, process_name, parent_process_id, parent_process_name |`first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial` to build the initial table of child processes and hostnames for this search to work. You should also schedule at the same interval as this search the second baseline search `Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old child processes. Please update the `previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window` macro to adjust the time window.", + "known_false_positives": "A new child process of zoom isn't malicious by that fact alone. Further investigation of the actions of the child process is needed to verify any malicious behavior is taken.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Zoom Child Processes" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1068/zoom_child_process/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Child process $process_name$ with $process_id$ spawned by zoom.exe or zoom.us which has not been previously on host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1068" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Attacker", + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process_id", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "Cobalt Group", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "PLATINUM", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "Whitefly", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window", + "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", + "description": "Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new zoom child processes" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "zoom_first_time_child_process", + "description": "A list of suspicious file names", + "collection": "zoom_first_time_child_process", + "fields_list": "_key, dest, process_name, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "First Time Seen Running Windows Service", + "id": "823136f2-d755-4b6d-ae04-372b486a5808", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for the first and last time a Windows service is seen running in your environment. This table is then cached.", + "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rex field=Message \"The (?[-\\(\\)\\s\\w]+) service entered the (?\\w+) state\" | where state=\"running\" | lookup previously_seen_running_windows_services service as service OUTPUT firstTimeSeen | where isnull(firstTimeSeen) OR firstTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_windows_services_window`) | table _time dest service | `first_time_seen_running_windows_service_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM, you must be ingesting your Windows system event logs in order for this search to execute successfully. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial` to build the initial table of child processes and hostnames for this search to work. You should also schedule at the same interval as this search the second baseline search `Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old Windows Services. Please update the `previously_seen_windows_services_window` macro to adjust the time window. Please ensure that the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows is version 8.0.0 or above.", + "known_false_positives": "A previously unseen service is not necessarily malicious. Verify that the service is legitimate and that was installed by a legitimate process.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "First Time Seen Running Windows Service", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2", + "CIS 9" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1569", + "T1569.002" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "dest" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1569", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "FIN6", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Operation Wocao", + "Silence", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_system", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "previously_seen_windows_services_window", + "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", + "description": "Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new Windows services" + }, + { + "name": "first_time_seen_running_windows_service_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "previously_seen_running_windows_services", + "description": "A placeholder for the list of Windows Services running", + "collection": "previously_seen_running_windows_services", + "fields_list": "_key, service, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "MacOS - Re-opened Applications", + "id": "40bb64f9-f619-4e3d-8732-328d40377c4b", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-02-07", + "author": "Jamie Windley, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for processes referencing the plist files that determine which applications are re-opened when a user reboots their machine.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*com.apple.loginwindow*\" by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `macos___re_opened_applications_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest process data from your osquery deployed agents with the [splunk.conf](https://github.com/splunk/TA-osquery/blob/master/config/splunk.conf) pack enabled. Also the [TA-OSquery](https://github.com/splunk/TA-osquery) must be deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the data populate the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "At this stage, there are no known false positives. During testing, no process events refering the com.apple.loginwindow.plist files were observed during normal operation of re-opening applications on reboot. Therefore, it can be asumed that any occurences of this in the process events would be worth investigating. In the event that the legitimate modification by the system of these files is in fact logged to the process log, then the process_name of that process can be added to an allow list.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "MacOS - Re-opened Applications", + "analytic_story": [ + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Command & Control" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "macos___re_opened_applications_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/macos___re_opened_applications.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Microsoft Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages", + "id": "985f322c-57a5-11ec-b9ac-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-07", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following query identifies suspicious .aspx created in 3 paths identified by Microsoft as known drop locations for Exchange exploitation related to HAFNIUM group and recently disclosed vulnerablity named ProxyShell. Paths include: `\\HttpProxy\\owa\\auth\\`, `\\inetpub\\wwwroot\\aspnet_client\\`, and `\\HttpProxy\\OAB\\`. The analytic is limited to process name MSExchangeMailboxReplication.exe, which typically does not write .aspx files to disk. Upon triage, the suspicious .aspx file will likely look obvious on the surface. inspect the contents for script code inside. Identify additional log sources, IIS included, to review source and other potential exploitation. It is often the case that a particular threat is only applicable to a specific subset of systems in your environment. Typically analytics to detect those threats are written without the benefit of being able to only target those systems as well. Writing analytics against all systems when those behaviors are limited to identifiable subsets of those systems is suboptimal. Consider the case ProxyShell vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Servers. With asset information, a hunter can limit their analytics to systems that have been identified as Exchange servers. A hunter may start with the theory that the exchange server is communicating with new systems that it has not previously. If this theory is run against all publicly facing systems, the amount of noise it will generate will likely render this theory untenable. However, using the asset information to limit this analytic to just the Exchange servers will reduce the noise allowing the hunter to focus only on the systems where this behavioral change is relevant.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=MSExchangeMailboxReplication.exe by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process_guid Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*\\\\HttpProxy\\\\owa\\\\auth\\\\*\", \"*\\\\inetpub\\\\wwwroot\\\\aspnet_client\\\\*\", \"*\\\\HttpProxy\\\\OAB\\\\*\") Filesystem.file_name=\"*.aspx\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process process_guid] | dedup file_create_time | table dest file_create_time, file_name, file_path, process_name | `microsoft_exchange_mailbox_replication_service_writing_active_server_pages_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node and `Filesystem` node.", + "known_false_positives": "The query is structured in a way that `action` (read, create) is not defined. Review the results of this query, filter, and tune as necessary. It may be necessary to generate this query specific to your endpoint product.", + "references": [ + "https://redcanary.com/blog/blackbyte-ransomware/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Microsoft Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages", + "analytic_story": [ + "ProxyShell", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/windows-sysmon_proxylogon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk that is related to IIS exploitation related to ProxyShell. Review further file modifications on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1505", + "T1505.003", + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_name", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.file_path", + "Filesystem.process_id", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.file_hash", + "Filesystem.user", + "Filesystem.process_guid", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process_guid" + ], + "risk_score": 81, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Volatile Cedar" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "microsoft_exchange_mailbox_replication_service_writing_active_server_pages_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/microsoft_exchange_mailbox_replication_service_writing_active_server_pages.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Print Processor Registry Autostart", + "id": "1f5b68aa-2037-11ec-898e-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-28", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification or new registry entry regarding print processor. This registry is known to be abuse by turla or other APT to gain persistence and privilege escalation to the compromised machine. This is done by adding the malicious dll payload on the new created key in this registry that will be executed as it restarted the spoolsv.exe process and services.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path =\"*\\\\Control\\\\Print\\\\Environments\\\\Windows x64\\\\Print Processors*\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `print_processor_registry_autostart_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "possible new printer installation may add driver component on this registry.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/012/", + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/05/21/no-game-over-winnti-group/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Print Processor Registry Autostart", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/print_reg/sysmon_print.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1547.012", + "T1547" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_value_name" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "print_processor_registry_autostart_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/print_processor_registry_autostart.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Processes Tapping Keyboard Events", + "id": "2a371608-331d-4034-ae2c-21dda8f1d0ec", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-01-25", + "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for processes in an MacOS system that is tapping keyboard events in MacOS, and essentially monitoring all keystrokes made by a user. This is a common technique used by RATs to log keystrokes from a victim, although it can also be used by legitimate processes like Siri to react on human input", + "search": "| from datamodel Alerts.Alerts | search app=osquery:results name=pack_osx-attacks_Keyboard_Event_Taps | rename columns.cmdline as cmd, columns.name as process_name, columns.pid as process_id| dedup host,process_name | table host,process_name, cmd, process_id | `processes_tapping_keyboard_events_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from your osquery deployed agents with the [osx-attacks.conf](https://github.com/facebook/osquery/blob/experimental/packs/osx-attacks.conf#L599) pack enabled. Also the [TA-OSquery](https://github.com/d1vious/TA-osquery) must be deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the osquery data populate the Alerts data model.", + "known_false_positives": "There might be some false positives as keyboard event taps are used by processes like Siri and Zoom video chat, for some good examples of processes to exclude please see [this](https://github.com/facebook/osquery/pull/5345#issuecomment-454639161) comment.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Processes Tapping Keyboard Events", + "analytic_story": [ + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 4", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "DE.DP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "app", + "name", + "columns.cmdline", + "columns.name", + "columns.pid", + "host" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "processes_tapping_keyboard_events_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name", + "id": "9d22a780-5165-11ec-ad4f-3e22fbd008af", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-29", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following hunting analytic leverages Event ID 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify the creation of a Scheduled Task with a suspicious, high entropy, Task Name. To achieve this, this analytic also leverages the `ut_shannon` function from the URL ToolBox Splunk application. Red teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler to create and start a remote Scheduled Task and obtain remote code execution. To achieve this goal, tools like Impacket or Crapmapexec, typically create a Scheduled Task with a random task name on the victim host. This hunting analytic may help defenders identify Scheduled Tasks created as part of a lateral movement attack. The entropy threshold `ut_shannon > 3` should be customized by users. The Command field can be used to determine if the task has malicious intent or not.", + "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message | lookup ut_shannon_lookup word as Task_Name | where ut_shannon > 3 | table _time, dest, Task_Name, ut_shannon, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden | `randomly_generated_scheduled_task_name_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA as well as the URL ToolBox application are also required.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may use random Scheduled Task names.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/", + "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/2734/", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entropy_(information_theory)" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A windows scheduled task with a suspicious task name was created on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053", + "T1053.005" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "dest", + "Task_Name", + "Description", + "Command" + ], + "risk_score": 45, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CostaRicto", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Machete", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "randomly_generated_scheduled_task_name_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/randomly_generated_scheduled_task_name.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Randomly Generated Windows Service Name", + "id": "2032a95a-5165-11ec-a2c3-3e22fbd008af", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-29", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following hunting analytic leverages Event ID 7045, `A new service was installed in the system`, to identify the installation of a Windows Service with a suspicious, high entropy, Service Name. To achieve this, this analytic also leverages the `ut_shannon` function from the URL ToolBox Splunk application. Red teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Service Control Manager to create and start a remote Windows Service and obtain remote code execution. To achieve this goal, some tools like Metasploit, Cobalt Strike and Impacket, typically create a Windows Service with a random service name on the victim host. This hunting analytic may help defenders identify Windows Services installed as part of a lateral movement attack. The entropy threshold `ut_shannon > 3` should be customized by users. The Service_File_Name field can be used to determine if the Windows Service has malicious intent or not.", + "search": " `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 | lookup ut_shannon_lookup word as Service_Name | where ut_shannon > 3 | table EventCode ComputerName Service_Name ut_shannon Service_Start_Type Service_Type Service_File_Name | `randomly_generated_windows_service_name_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints. The Windows TA as well as the URL ToolBox application are also required.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may use random Windows Service names.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Randomly Generated Windows Service Name", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A Windows Service with a suspicious service name was installed on $ComputerName$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1543", + "T1543.003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Service_File_Name", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "ComputerName", + "Service_File_Name", + "Service_Type", + "Service_Name", + "Service_Start_Type" + ], + "risk_score": 45, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN7", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "PROMETHIUM", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_system", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "randomly_generated_windows_service_name_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/randomly_generated_windows_service_name.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Remote Desktop Process Running On System", + "id": "f5939373-8054-40ad-8c64-cec478a22a4a", + "version": 5, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for the remote desktop process mstsc.exe running on systems upon which it doesn't typically run. This is accomplished by filtering out all systems that are noted in the `common_rdp_source category` in the Assets and Identity framework.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=*mstsc.exe AND Processes.dest_category!=common_rdp_source by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `remote_desktop_process_running_on_system_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. The search requires you to identify systems that do not commonly use remote desktop. You can use the included support search \"Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop\" to identify these systems. After identifying them, you will need to add the \"common_rdp_source\" category to that system using the Enterprise Security Assets and Identities framework. This can be done by adding an entry in the assets.csv file located in `SA-IdentityManagement/lookups`.", + "known_false_positives": "Remote Desktop may be used legitimately by users on the network.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Remote Desktop Process Running On System", + "analytic_story": [ + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 9", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021.001", + "T1021" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest_category", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT3", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "OilRig", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "remote_desktop_process_running_on_system_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Spike in File Writes", + "id": "fdb0f805-74e4-4539-8c00-618927333aae", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-03-16", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The search looks for a sharp increase in the number of files written to a particular host", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.action=created by _time span=1h, Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | eventstats max(_time) as maxtime | stats count as num_data_samples max(eval(if(_time >= relative_time(maxtime, \"-1d@d\"), count, null))) as \"count\" avg(eval(if(_time upperBound) AND num_data_samples >=20, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `spike_in_file_writes_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "In order to implement this search, you must populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection and response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the file system.", + "known_false_positives": "It is important to understand that if you happen to install any new applications on your hosts or are copying a large number of files, you can expect to see a large increase of file modifications.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Spike in File Writes", + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.action", + "Filesystem.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "spike_in_file_writes_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event", + "id": "701a8740-e8db-40df-9190-5516d3819787", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-12-14", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The malware sunburst will load the malicious dll by SolarWinds.BusinessLayerHost.exe. After a period of 12-14 days, the malware will attempt to resolve a subdomain of avsvmcloud.com. This detections will correlate both events.", + "search": "(`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded=*SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll) OR (`sysmon` EventCode=22 QueryName=*avsvmcloud.com) | eventstats dc(EventCode) AS dc_events | where dc_events=2 | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ImageLoaded) AS ImageLoaded values(QueryName) AS QueryName by host | rename host as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "This detection relies on sysmon logs with the Event ID 7, Driver loaded. Please tune your sysmon config that you DriverLoad event for SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll is captured by Sysmon. Additionally, you need sysmon logs for Event ID 22, DNS Query. We suggest to run this detection at least once a day over the last 14 days.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event", + "analytic_story": [ + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Windows", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 6", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1203" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "ImageLoaded", + "QueryName" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1203", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Client Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT12", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Elderwood", + "Frankenstein", + "HAFNIUM", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Patchwork", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "TA459", + "The White Company", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "admin@338" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Curl Network Connection", + "id": "3f613dc0-21f2-4063-93b1-5d3c15eef22f", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-02-22", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of a curl contacting suspicious remote domains to checkin to command and control servers or download further implants. In the context of Silver Sparrow, curl is identified contacting s3.amazonaws.com. This particular behavior is common with MacOS adware-malicious software.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=curl Processes.process=s3.amazonaws.com by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_curl_network_connection_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/", + "https://marcosantadev.com/manage-plist-files-plistbuddy/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Curl Network Connection", + "analytic_story": [ + "Silver Sparrow", + "Ingress Tool Transfer" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "dataset": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_curl_network_connection_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/suspicious_curl_network_connection.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage", + "id": "c3194009-e0eb-4f84-87a9-4070f8688f00", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-02-22", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of a native MacOS utility, PlistBuddy, creating or modifying a properly list (.plist) file. In the instance of Silver Sparrow, the following commands were executed:\\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :Label string init_verx\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :RunAtLoad bool true\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :StartInterval integer 3600\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :ProgramArguments array\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :ProgramArguments:0 string /bin/sh\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :ProgramArguments:1 string -c\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\nUpon triage, capture the property list file being written to disk and review for further indicators. Contain the endpoint and triage further.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=PlistBuddy (Processes.process=*LaunchAgents* OR Processes.process=*RunAtLoad* OR Processes.process=*true*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate applications may use PlistBuddy to create or modify property lists and possibly generate false positives. Review the property list being modified or created to confirm.", + "references": [ + "https://marcosantadev.com/manage-plist-files-plistbuddy/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage", + "analytic_story": [ + "Silver Sparrow" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "dataset": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1543.001", + "T1543" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Launch Agent", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/suspicious_plistbuddy_usage.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage via OSquery", + "id": "20ba6c32-c733-4a32-b64e-2688cf231399", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-02-22", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of a native MacOS utility, PlistBuddy, creating or modifying a properly list (.plist) file. In the instance of Silver Sparrow, the following commands were executed:\\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :Label string init_verx\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :RunAtLoad bool true\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :StartInterval integer 3600\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :ProgramArguments array\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :ProgramArguments:0 string /bin/sh\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :ProgramArguments:1 string -c\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\nUpon triage, capture the property list file being written to disk and review for further indicators. Contain the endpoint and triage further.", + "search": "`osquery_process` \"columns.cmdline\"=\"*LaunchAgents*\" OR \"columns.cmdline\"=\"*RunAtLoad*\" OR \"columns.cmdline\"=\"*true*\" | `suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_via_osquery_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "OSQuery must be installed and configured to pick up process events (info at https://osquery.io) as well as using the Splunk OSQuery Add-on https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4402. Modify the macro and validate fields are correct.", + "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate applications may use PlistBuddy to create or modify property lists and possibly generate false positives. Review the property list being modified or created to confirm.", + "references": [ + "https://marcosantadev.com/manage-plist-files-plistbuddy/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage via OSquery", + "analytic_story": [ + "Silver Sparrow" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "dataset": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1543.001", + "T1543" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "columns.cmdline" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Launch Agent", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "osquery_process", + "definition": "eventtype=\"osquery-process\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_via_osquery_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_via_osquery.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior", + "id": "e1997b2e-655f-4561-82fd-aeba8e1c1a86", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-02-22", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of a SQLite3 querying the MacOS preferences to identify the original URL the pkg was downloaded from. This particular behavior is common with MacOS adware-malicious software. Upon triage, review other processes in parallel for suspicious activity. Identify any recent package installations.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=sqlite3 Processes.process=*LSQuarantine* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_sqlite3_lsquarantine_behavior_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown.", + "references": [ + "https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/", + "https://marcosantadev.com/manage-plist-files-plistbuddy/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior", + "analytic_story": [ + "Silver Sparrow" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "dataset": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1074" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1074", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Staged", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_sqlite3_lsquarantine_behavior_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/suspicious_sqlite3_lsquarantine_behavior.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested", + "id": "ac3b81c0-52f4-11ec-ac44-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-01", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following hunting analytic leverages Event ID 4769, `A Kerberos service ticket was requested`, to identify an unusual number of computer service ticket requests from one source. When a domain joined endpoint connects to a remote endpoint, it first will request a Kerberos Ticket with the computer name as the Service Name. An endpoint requesting a large number of computer service tickets for different endpoints could represent malicious behavior like lateral movement, malware staging, reconnaissance, etc.\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of service requests. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time, the calculation of the `upperBound` field as well as the Outlier calculation. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\", + "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769 Service_Name=\"*$\" Account_Name!=\"*$*\" | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Service_Name) AS unique_targets values(Service_Name) as host_targets by _time, Client_Address, Account_Name | eventstats avg(unique_targets) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_targets) as comp_std by Client_Address, Account_Name | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_targets >10 and unique_targets >= upperBound, 1, 0) | `unusual_number_of_computer_service_tickets_requested_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", + "known_false_positives": "An single endpoint requesting a large number of computer service tickets is not common behavior. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, administration systeams and missconfigured systems.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Client_Address", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Ticket_Options", + "Ticket_Encryption_Type", + "dest", + "service", + "service_id" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "unusual_number_of_computer_service_tickets_requested_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/unusual_number_of_computer_service_tickets_requested.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Unusual Number of Remote Endpoint Authentication Events", + "id": "acb5dc74-5324-11ec-a36d-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-01", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following hunting analytic leverages Event ID 4624, `An account was successfully logged on`, to identify an unusual number of remote authentication attempts coming from one source. An endpoint authenticating to a large number of remote endpoints could represent malicious behavior like lateral movement, malware staging, reconnaissance, etc.\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual high number of authentication events. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time, the calculation of the `upperBound` field as well as the Outlier calculation. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\", + "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=3 Account_Name!=\"*$\" | eval Source_Account = mvindex(Account_Name, 1) | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(ComputerName) AS unique_targets values(ComputerName) as target_hosts by _time, Source_Network_Address, Source_Account | eventstats avg(unique_targets) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_targets) as comp_std by Source_Network_Address, Source_Account | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_targets >10 and unique_targets >= upperBound, 1, 0) | `unusual_number_of_remote_endpoint_authentication_events_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Event Logs from domain controllers aas well as member servers and workstations. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Logon` within `Logon/Logoff` needs to be enabled.", + "known_false_positives": "An single endpoint authenticating to a large number of hosts is not common behavior. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, jump servers and missconfigured systems.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Unusual Number of Remote Endpoint Authentication Events", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Logon_Type", + "Caller_Process_Name", + "Security_ID", + "Account_Name", + "ComputerName" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "unusual_number_of_remote_endpoint_authentication_events_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/unusual_number_of_remote_endpoint_authentication_events.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Unusually Long Command Line", + "id": "c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6a4264e7f", + "version": 5, + "date": "2020-12-08", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious activity on your hosts.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| eval processlen=len(process) | eventstats stdev(processlen) as stdev, avg(processlen) as avg by dest | stats max(processlen) as maxlen, values(stdev) as stdevperhost, values(avg) as avgperhost by dest, user, process_name, process | `unusually_long_command_line_filter` |eval threshold = 3 | where maxlen > ((threshold*stdevperhost) + avgperhost)", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships, from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the process field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate applications start with long command lines.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Unusually Long Command Line", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Unusual Processes", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Unusually long command line $Processes.process_name$ on $dest$", + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Processes.process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "unusually_long_command_line_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK", + "id": "57edaefa-a73b-45e5-bbae-f39c1473f941", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-05-08", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious activity on your hosts. This search leverages the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) to help identify command lines with lengths that are unusual for a given user.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| eval processlen=len(process) | search user!=unknown | apply cmdline_pdfmodel threshold=0.01 | rename \"IsOutlier(processlen)\" as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | table firstTime lastTime user dest process_name process processlen count | `unusually_long_command_line___mltk_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that monitors command lines and populates the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model. In addition, MLTK version >= 4.2 must be installed on your search heads, along with any required dependencies. Finally, the support search \"Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK\" must be executed before this detection search, as it builds an ML model over the historical data used by this search. It is important that this search is run in the same app context as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild the model with the latest data available in your environment.", + "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate applications use long command lines for installs or updates. You should review identified command lines for legitimacy. You may modify the first part of the search to omit legitimate command lines from consideration. If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider changing the value of threshold in the search to a smaller value. You should also periodically re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data. You may get unexpected results if the user identified in the results is not present in the data used to build the associated model.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Unusual Processes", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "unusually_long_command_line___mltk_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Java Spawning Shells", + "id": "28c81306-5c47-11ec-bfea-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the process name of java.exe and w3wp.exe spawning a Windows shell. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). The shells included in the macro are \"cmd.exe\", \"powershell.exe\". Upon triage, review parallel processes and command-line arguments to determine legitimacy.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=java.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=w3wp.exe `windows_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_java_spawning_shells_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. Restrict the analytic to publicly facing endpoints to reduce false positives. Add any additional identified web application process name to the query. Add any further Windows process names to the macro (ex. LOLBins) to further expand this query.", + "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required on internal developer build systems or classify assets as web facing and restrict the analytic based on that.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.netlab.360.com/ten-families-of-malicious-samples-are-spreading-using-the-log4j2-vulnerability-now/", + "https://gist.github.com/olafhartong/916ebc673ba066537740164f7e7e1d72" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Java Spawning Shells", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ spawning a Windows shell, potentially indicative of exploitation.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "windows_shells", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe)", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_java_spawning_shells_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/windows_java_spawning_shells.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "WinRM Spawning a Process", + "id": "a081836a-ba4d-11eb-8593-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-21", + "author": "Drew Church, Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious processes spawning from WinRM (wsmprovhost.exe). This analytic is related to potential exploitation of CVE-2021-31166. which is a kernel-mode device driver http.sys vulnerability. Current proof of concept code will blue-screen the operating system. However, http.sys used by many different Windows processes, including WinRM. In this case, identifying suspicious process create (child processes) from `wsmprovhost.exe` is what this analytic is identifying.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=wsmprovhost.exe Processes.process_name IN (\"cmd.exe\",\"sh.exe\",\"bash.exe\",\"powershell.exe\",\"pwsh.exe\",\"schtasks.exe\",\"certutil.exe\",\"whoami.exe\",\"bitsadmin.exe\",\"scp.exe\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winrm_spawning_a_process_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown. Add new processes or filter as needed. It is possible system management software may spawn processes from `wsmprovhost.exe`.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_access/win_susp_shell_spawn_from_winrm.yml", + "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/5/17/cve-2021-31166-a-wormable-code-execution-bug-in-httpsys", + "https://github.com/0vercl0k/CVE-2021-31166/blob/main/cve-2021-31166.py" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "WinRM Spawning a Process", + "analytic_story": [ + "Unusual Processes" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "dataset": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-31166" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "winrm_spawning_a_process_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/winrm_spawning_a_process.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "WMI Permanent Event Subscription", + "id": "71bfdb13-f200-4c6c-b2c9-a2e07adf437d", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-10-23", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions.", + "search": "`wmi` EventCode=5861 Binding | rex field=Message \"Consumer =\\s+(?[^;|^$]+)\" | search consumer!=\"NTEventLogEventConsumer=\\\"SCM Event Log Consumer\\\"\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName, consumer, Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename ComputerName as dest | `wmi_permanent_event_subscription_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting the Windows WMI activity logs. This can be done by adding a stanza to inputs.conf on the system generating logs with a title of [WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational].", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, administrators may use event subscriptions for legitimate purposes.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "WMI Permanent Event Subscription", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious WMI Use" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1047" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.AT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "consumer", + "ComputerName" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wmi", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"wineventlog:microsoft-windows-wmi-activity/operational\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "wmi_permanent_event_subscription_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "WMI Temporary Event Subscription", + "id": "38cbd42c-1098-41bb-99cf-9d6d2b296d83", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-10-23", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for the creation of WMI temporary event subscriptions.", + "search": "`wmi` EventCode=5860 Temporary | rex field=Message \"NotificationQuery =\\s+(?[^;|^$]+)\" | search query!=\"SELECT * FROM Win32_ProcessStartTrace WHERE ProcessName = 'wsmprovhost.exe'\" AND query!=\"SELECT * FROM __InstanceOperationEvent WHERE TargetInstance ISA 'AntiVirusProduct' OR TargetInstance ISA 'FirewallProduct' OR TargetInstance ISA 'AntiSpywareProduct'\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName, query | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmi_temporary_event_subscription_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting the Windows WMI activity logs. This can be done by adding a stanza to inputs.conf on the system generating logs with a title of [WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational].", + "known_false_positives": "Some software may create WMI temporary event subscriptions for various purposes. The included search contains an exception for two of these that occur by default on Windows 10 systems. You may need to modify the search to create exceptions for other legitimate events.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "WMI Temporary Event Subscription", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious WMI Use" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1047" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.AT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "query" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wmi", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"wineventlog:microsoft-windows-wmi-activity/operational\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "wmi_temporary_event_subscription_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect ARP Poisoning", + "id": "b44bebd6-bd39-467b-9321-73971bcd7aac", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-08-11", + "author": "Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "By enabling Dynamic ARP Inspection as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect ARP Poisoning attacks in the Infrastructure.", + "search": "`cisco_networks` facility=\"PM\" mnemonic=\"ERR_DISABLE\" disable_cause=\"arp-inspection\" | eval src_interface=src_int_prefix_long+src_int_suffix | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime count BY host src_interface | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `detect_arp_poisoning_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with DHCP Snooping (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960x/software/15-0_2_EX/security/configuration_guide/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg_chapter_01101.html) and Dynamic ARP Inspection (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960x/software/15-2_2_e/security/configuration_guide/b_sec_1522e_2960x_cg/b_sec_1522e_2960x_cg_chapter_01111.html) and log with a severity level of minimum \"5 - notification\". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices.", + "known_false_positives": "This search might be prone to high false positives if DHCP Snooping or ARP inspection has been incorrectly configured, or if a device normally sends many ARP packets (unlikely).", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect ARP Poisoning", + "analytic_story": [ + "Router and Infrastructure Security" + ], + "asset_type": "Infrastructure", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1", + "CIS 11" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Delivery", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1200", + "T1498", + "T1557", + "T1557.002" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "facility", + "mnemonic", + "disable_cause", + "src_int_prefix_long", + "src_int_suffix", + "host", + "src_interface" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1200", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "DarkVishnya" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1498", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1557", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Adversary-in-the-Middle", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection", + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Kimsuky" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1557.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "ARP Cache Poisoning", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection", + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Cleaver" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cisco_networks", + "definition": "eventtype=cisco_ios", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_arp_poisoning_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats", + "id": "c3be767e-7959-44c5-8976-0e9c12a91ad2", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-10-28", + "author": "Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "By enabling IPv6 First Hop Security as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect various attacks such as packet forging in the Infrastructure.", + "search": "`cisco_networks` facility=\"SISF\" mnemonic IN (\"IP_THEFT\",\"MAC_THEFT\",\"MAC_AND_IP_THEFT\",\"PAK_DROP\") | eval src_interface=src_int_prefix_long+src_int_suffix | eval dest_interface=dest_int_prefix_long+dest_int_suffix | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime values(src_mac) AS src_mac values(src_vlan) AS src_vlan values(mnemonic) AS mnemonic values(vendor_explanation) AS vendor_explanation values(src_ip) AS src_ip values(dest_ip) AS dest_ip values(dest_interface) AS dest_interface values(action) AS action count BY host src_interface | table host src_interface dest_interface src_mac src_ip dest_ip src_vlan mnemonic vendor_explanation action count | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with one or more First Hop Security measures such as RA Guard, DHCP Guard and/or device tracking. See References for more information. The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices.", + "known_false_positives": "None currently known", + "references": [ + "https://www.ciscolive.com/c/dam/r/ciscolive/emea/docs/2019/pdf/BRKSEC-3200.pdf", + "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-ra-guard.html", + "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-snooping.html", + "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-dad-proxy.html", + "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-nd-mcast-supp.html", + "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-dhcpv6-guard.html", + "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-src-guard.html", + "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ipv6-dest-guard.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats", + "analytic_story": [ + "Router and Infrastructure Security" + ], + "asset_type": "Infrastructure", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1", + "CIS 11" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Delivery", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1200", + "T1498", + "T1557", + "T1557.002" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "facility", + "mnemonic", + "src_int_prefix_long", + "src_int_suffix", + "dest_int_prefix_long", + "dest_int_suffix", + "src_mac", + "src_vlan", + "vendor_explanation", + "action" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1200", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "DarkVishnya" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1498", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1557", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Adversary-in-the-Middle", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection", + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Kimsuky" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1557.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "ARP Cache Poisoning", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection", + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Cleaver" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cisco_networks", + "definition": "eventtype=cisco_ios", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets", + "id": "e9c102de-4d43-42a7-b1c8-8062ea297419", + "version": 2, + "date": "2018-06-01", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search looks for outbound ICMP packets with a packet size larger than 1,000 bytes. Various threat actors have been known to use ICMP as a command and control channel for their attack infrastructure. Large ICMP packets from an endpoint to a remote host may be indicative of this activity.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Traffic.action) values(All_Traffic.bytes) from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.action !=blocked All_Traffic.dest_category !=internal (All_Traffic.protocol=icmp OR All_Traffic.transport=icmp) All_Traffic.bytes > 1000 by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | search ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "In order to run this search effectively, we highly recommend that you leverage the Assets and Identity framework. It is important that you have a good understanding of how your network segments are designed and that you are able to distinguish internal from external address space. Add a category named `internal` to the CIDRs that host the company's assets in the `assets_by_cidr.csv` lookup file, which is located in `$SPLUNK_HOME/etc/apps/SA-IdentityManagement/lookups/`. More information on updating this lookup can be found here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.0.0/Admin/Addassetandidentitydata. This search also requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model", + "known_false_positives": "ICMP packets are used in a variety of ways to help troubleshoot networking issues and ensure the proper flow of traffic. As such, it is possible that a large ICMP packet could be perfectly legitimate. If large ICMP packets are associated with command and control traffic, there will typically be a large number of these packets observed over time. If the search is providing a large number of false positives, you can modify the macro `detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets_filter` to adjust the byte threshold or add specific IP addresses to an allow list.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets", + "analytic_story": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 9", + "CIS 12" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1095" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.action", + "All_Traffic.bytes", + "All_Traffic.dest_category", + "All_Traffic.protocol", + "All_Traffic.transport", + "All_Traffic.src_ip", + "All_Traffic.dest_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1095", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Non-Application Layer Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "FIN6", + "HAFNIUM", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Outbound SMB Traffic", + "id": "1bed7774-304a-4e8f-9d72-d80e45ff492b", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Stuart Hopkins from Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search looks for outbound SMB connections made by hosts within your network to the Internet. SMB traffic is used for Windows file-sharing activity. One of the techniques often used by attackers involves retrieving the credential hash using an SMB request made to a compromised server controlled by the threat actor.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as start_time latest(_time) as end_time values(All_Traffic.action) as action values(All_Traffic.app) as app values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as dest_port values(sourcetype) as sourcetype count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where ((All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=\"smb\") AND NOT (All_Traffic.action=\"blocked\" OR All_Traffic.dest_category=\"internal\" OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=192.168.0.0/16 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=100.64.0.0/10)) by All_Traffic.src_ip | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `security_content_ctime(start_time)` | `security_content_ctime(end_time)` | `detect_outbound_smb_traffic_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "In order to run this search effectively, we highly recommend that you leverage the Assets and Identity framework. It is important that you have good understanding of how your network segments are designed, and be able to distinguish internal from external address space. Add a category named `internal` to the CIDRs that host the companys assets in `assets_by_cidr.csv` lookup file, which is located in `$SPLUNK_HOME/etc/apps/SA-IdentityManagement/lookups/`. More information on updating this lookup can be found here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.0.0/Admin/Addassetandidentitydata. This search also requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model", + "known_false_positives": "It is likely that the outbound Server Message Block (SMB) traffic is legitimate, if the company's internal networks are not well-defined in the Assets and Identity Framework. Categorize the internal CIDR blocks as `internal` in the lookup file to avoid creating notable events for traffic destined to those CIDR blocks. Any other network connection that is going out to the Internet should be investigated and blocked. Best practices suggest preventing external communications of all SMB versions and related protocols at the network boundary.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Outbound SMB Traffic", + "analytic_story": [ + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Command & Control" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1071.002", + "T1071" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.action", + "All_Traffic.app", + "All_Traffic.dest_ip", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "sourcetype", + "All_Traffic.dest_category", + "All_Traffic.src_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "File Transfer Protocols", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT41", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "SilverTerrier" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1071", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Magic Hound", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_outbound_smb_traffic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Port Security Violation", + "id": "2de3d5b8-a4fa-45c5-8540-6d071c194d24", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-10-28", + "author": "Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "By enabling Port Security on a Cisco switch you can restrict input to an interface by limiting and identifying MAC addresses of the workstations that are allowed to access the port. When you assign secure MAC addresses to a secure port, the port does not forward packets with source addresses outside the group of defined addresses. If you limit the number of secure MAC addresses to one and assign a single secure MAC address, the workstation attached to that port is assured the full bandwidth of the port. If a port is configured as a secure port and the maximum number of secure MAC addresses is reached, when the MAC address of a workstation attempting to access the port is different from any of the identified secure MAC addresses, a security violation occurs.", + "search": "`cisco_networks` (facility=\"PM\" mnemonic=\"ERR_DISABLE\" disable_cause=\"psecure-violation\") OR (facility=\"PORT_SECURITY\" mnemonic=\"PSECURE_VIOLATION\" OR mnemonic=\"PSECURE_VIOLATION_VLAN\") | eval src_interface=src_int_prefix_long+src_int_suffix | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime values(disable_cause) AS disable_cause values(src_mac) AS src_mac values(src_vlan) AS src_vlan values(action) AS action count by host src_interface | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_port_security_violation_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with Port Security and Error Disable for this to work (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst4500/12-2/25ew/configuration/guide/conf/port_sec.html) and log with a severity level of minimum \"5 - notification\". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices.", + "known_false_positives": "This search might be prone to high false positives if you have malfunctioning devices connected to your ethernet ports or if end users periodically connect physical devices to the network.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Port Security Violation", + "analytic_story": [ + "Router and Infrastructure Security" + ], + "asset_type": "Infrastructure", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1", + "CIS 11" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Delivery", + "Exploitation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1200", + "T1498", + "T1557", + "T1557.002" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "facility", + "mnemonic", + "disable_cause", + "src_int_prefix_long", + "src_int_suffix", + "src_mac", + "src_vlan", + "action", + "host", + "src_interface" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1200", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "DarkVishnya" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1498", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1557", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Adversary-in-the-Middle", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection", + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Kimsuky" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1557.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "ARP Cache Poisoning", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection", + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Cleaver" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cisco_networks", + "definition": "eventtype=cisco_ios", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_port_security_violation_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Rogue DHCP Server", + "id": "6e1ada88-7a0d-4ac1-92c6-03d354686079", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-08-11", + "author": "Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "By enabling DHCP Snooping as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect unauthorized DHCP servers handing out DHCP leases to devices on the network (Man in the Middle attack).", + "search": "`cisco_networks` facility=\"DHCP_SNOOPING\" mnemonic=\"DHCP_SNOOPING_UNTRUSTED_PORT\" | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime count values(message_type) AS message_type values(src_mac) AS src_mac BY host | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `detect_rogue_dhcp_server_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with DHCP Snooping enabled (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960x/software/15-0_2_EX/security/configuration_guide/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg_chapter_01101.html) and log with a severity level of minimum \"5 - notification\". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices.", + "known_false_positives": "This search might be prone to high false positives if DHCP Snooping has been incorrectly configured or in the unlikely event that the DHCP server has been moved to another network interface.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Rogue DHCP Server", + "analytic_story": [ + "Router and Infrastructure Security" + ], + "asset_type": "Infrastructure", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1", + "CIS 11" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Delivery", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1200", + "T1498", + "T1557" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "facility", + "mnemonic", + "message_type", + "src_mac", + "host" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1200", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "DarkVishnya" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1498", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1557", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Adversary-in-the-Middle", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection", + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Kimsuky" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cisco_networks", + "definition": "eventtype=cisco_ios", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_rogue_dhcp_server_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration", + "id": "82d06410-134c-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-10-21", + "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for commands that the SNICat tool uses in the TLS SNI field.", + "search": "`zeek_ssl` | rex field=server_name \"(?(LIST|LS|SIZE|LD|CB|CD|EX|ALIVE|EXIT|WHERE|finito)-[A-Za-z0-9]{16}\\.)\" | stats count by src_ip dest_ip server_name snicat | where count>0 | table src_ip dest_ip server_name snicat | `detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Zeek SSL data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format. We are detecting when any of the predefined SNICat commands are found within the server_name (SNI) field. These commands are LIST, LS, SIZE, LD, CB, EX, ALIVE, EXIT, WHERE, and finito. You can go further once this has been detected, and run other searches to decode the SNI data to prove or disprove if any data exfiltration has taken place.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.mnemonic.no/blog/introducing-snicat/", + "https://github.com/mnemonic-no/SNIcat", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration", + "analytic_story": [ + "Data Exfiltration" + ], + "asset_type": "Network", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1041" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "DE.CM", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "server_name", + "src_ip", + "dest_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1041", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over C2 Channel", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Chimera", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "MuddyWater", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "zeek_ssl", + "definition": "index=zeek sourcetype=\"zeek:ssl:json\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Software Download To Network Device", + "id": "cc590c66-f65f-48f2-986a-4797244762f8", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-10-28", + "author": "Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "Adversaries may abuse netbooting to load an unauthorized network device operating system from a Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) server. TFTP boot (netbooting) is commonly used by network administrators to load configuration-controlled network device images from a centralized management server. Netbooting is one option in the boot sequence and can be used to centralize, manage, and control device images.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where (All_Traffic.transport=udp AND All_Traffic.dest_port=69) OR (All_Traffic.transport=tcp AND All_Traffic.dest_port=21) OR (All_Traffic.transport=tcp AND All_Traffic.dest_port=22) AND All_Traffic.dest_category!=common_software_repo_destination AND All_Traffic.src_category=network OR All_Traffic.src_category=router OR All_Traffic.src_category=switch by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_software_download_to_network_device_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This search looks for Network Traffic events to TFTP, FTP or SSH/SCP ports from network devices. Make sure to tag any network devices as network, router or switch in order for this detection to work. If the TFTP traffic doesn't traverse a firewall nor packet inspection, these events will not be logged. This is typically an issue if the TFTP server is on the same subnet as the network device. There is also a chance of the network device loading software using a DHCP assigned IP address (netboot) which is not in the Asset inventory.", + "known_false_positives": "This search will also report any legitimate attempts of software downloads to network devices as well as outbound SSH sessions from network devices.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Software Download To Network Device", + "analytic_story": [ + "Router and Infrastructure Security" + ], + "asset_type": "Infrastructure", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1", + "CIS 11" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1542.005", + "T1542" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.transport", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.dest_category", + "All_Traffic.src_category", + "All_Traffic.src", + "All_Traffic.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1542.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "TFTP Boot", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1542", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Pre-OS Boot", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_software_download_to_network_device_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Traffic Mirroring", + "id": "42b3b753-5925-49c5-9742-36fa40a73990", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-10-28", + "author": "Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to automate data exfiltration over compromised network infrastructure. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some network devices and used for network analysis and may be configured to duplicate traffic and forward to one or more destinations for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring device.", + "search": "`cisco_networks` (facility=\"MIRROR\" mnemonic=\"ETH_SPAN_SESSION_UP\") OR (facility=\"SPAN\" mnemonic=\"SESSION_UP\") OR (facility=\"SPAN\" mnemonic=\"PKTCAP_START\") OR (mnemonic=\"CFGLOG_LOGGEDCMD\" command=\"monitor session*\") | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime count BY host facility mnemonic | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_traffic_mirroring_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must log with a severity level of minimum \"5 - notification\". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices and that the devices have been configured according to the documentation of the Cisco Networks Add-on. Also note that an attacker may disable logging from the device prior to enabling traffic mirroring.", + "known_false_positives": "This search will return false positives for any legitimate traffic captures by network administrators.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Traffic Mirroring", + "analytic_story": [ + "Router and Infrastructure Security" + ], + "asset_type": "Infrastructure", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1", + "CIS 11" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1200", + "T1020", + "T1498", + "T1020.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "facility", + "mnemonic", + "host" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1200", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "DarkVishnya" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1020", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Exfiltration", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Frankenstein", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Honeybee", + "Sidewinder", + "Tropic Trooper" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1498", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1020.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Traffic Duplication", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cisco_networks", + "definition": "eventtype=cisco_ios", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_traffic_mirroring_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address", + "id": "dcfd6b40-42f9-469d-a433-2e53f7489ff4", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-13", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Sessions" + ], + "description": "By populating the organization's assets within the assets_by_str.csv, we will be able to detect unauthorized devices that are trying to connect with the organization's network by inspecting DHCP request packets, which are issued by devices when they attempt to obtain an IP address from the DHCP server. The MAC address associated with the source of the DHCP request is checked against the list of known devices, and reports on those that are not found.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Sessions where nodename=All_Sessions.DHCP All_Sessions.signature=DHCPREQUEST by All_Sessions.src_ip All_Sessions.dest_mac | dedup All_Sessions.dest_mac| `drop_dm_object_name(\"Network_Sessions\")`|`drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Sessions\")` | search NOT [| inputlookup asset_lookup_by_str |rename mac as dest_mac | fields + dest_mac] | `detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This search uses the Network_Sessions data model shipped with Enterprise Security. It leverages the Assets and Identity framework to populate the assets_by_str.csv file located in SA-IdentityManagement, which will contain a list of known authorized organizational assets including their MAC addresses. Ensure that all inventoried systems have their MAC address populated.", + "known_false_positives": "This search might be prone to high false positives. Please consider this when conducting analysis or investigations. Authorized devices may be detected as unauthorized. If this is the case, verify the MAC address of the system responsible for the false positive and add it to the Assets and Identity framework with the proper information.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address", + "analytic_story": [ + "Asset Tracking" + ], + "asset_type": "Infrastructure", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Delivery", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Sessions.signature", + "All_Sessions.src_ip", + "All_Sessions.dest_mac" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream", + "id": "babd8d10-d073-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-07-28", + "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects SIGRed via Splunk Stream.", + "search": "`stream_dns` | spath \"query_type{}\" | search \"query_type{}\" IN (SIG,KEY) | spath protocol_stack | search protocol_stack=\"ip:tcp:dns\" | append [search `stream_tcp` bytes_out>65000] | `detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream_filter` | stats count by flow_id | where count>1 | fields - count", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Splunk Stream DNS and Splunk Stream TCP. We are detecting SIG and KEY records via stream:dns and TCP payload over 65KB in size via stream:tcp. Replace the macro definitions ('stream:dns' and 'stream:tcp') with configurations for your Splunk environment.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1203" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1203", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Client Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT12", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Elderwood", + "Frankenstein", + "HAFNIUM", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Patchwork", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "TA459", + "The White Company", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "admin@338" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "stream_dns", + "definition": "sourcetype=stream:dns", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "stream_tcp", + "definition": "sourcetype=stream:tcp", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek", + "id": "c5c622e4-d073-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-07-28", + "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Resolution" + ], + "description": "This search detects SIGRed via Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.query_type IN (SIG,KEY) by DNS.flow_id | rename DNS.flow_id as flow_id | append [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.bytes_in>65000 by All_Traffic.flow_id | rename All_Traffic.flow_id as flow_id] | `detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek_filter` | stats count by flow_id | where count>1 | fields - count ", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format. We are detecting SIG and KEY records via bro:dns:json and TCP payload over 65KB in size via bro:conn:json. The Network Resolution and Network Traffic datamodels are in use for this search.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1203" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "DNS.query_type", + "DNS.flow_id", + "All_Traffic.bytes_in", + "All_Traffic.flow_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1203", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Client Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT12", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Elderwood", + "Frankenstein", + "HAFNIUM", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Patchwork", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "TA459", + "The White Company", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "admin@338" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Zerologon via Zeek", + "id": "bf7a06ec-f703-11ea-adc1-0242ac120002", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-09-15", + "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects attempts to run exploits for the Zerologon CVE-2020-1472 vulnerability via Zeek RPC", + "search": "`zeek_rpc` operation IN (NetrServerPasswordSet2,NetrServerReqChallenge,NetrServerAuthenticate3) | bin span=5m _time | stats values(operation) dc(operation) as opscount count(eval(operation==\"NetrServerReqChallenge\")) as challenge count(eval(operation==\"NetrServerAuthenticate3\")) as authcount count(eval(operation==\"NetrServerPasswordSet2\")) as passcount count as totalcount by _time,src_ip,dest_ip | search opscount=3 authcount>4 passcount>0 | search `detect_zerologon_via_zeek_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Zeek DCE-RPC data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format. We are detecting when all three RPC operations (NetrServerReqChallenge, NetrServerAuthenticate3, NetrServerPasswordSet2) are splunk_security_essentials_app via bro:rpc:json. These three operations are then correlated on the Zeek UID field.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.secura.com/blog/zero-logon", + "https://github.com/SecuraBV/CVE-2020-1472", + "https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-1472" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Zerologon via Zeek", + "analytic_story": [ + "Detect Zerologon Attack" + ], + "asset_type": "Network", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 11" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "operation" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2020-1472" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "zeek_rpc", + "definition": "index=zeek sourcetype=\"zeek:rpc:json\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_zerologon_via_zeek_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK", + "id": "85fbcfe8-9718-4911-adf6-7000d077a3a9", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-01-22", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Resolution" + ], + "description": "This search allows you to identify DNS requests that are unusually large for the record type being requested in your environment.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as start_time max(_time) as end_time values(DNS.src) as src values(DNS.dest) as dest from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query DNS.record_type | search DNS.record_type=* | `drop_dm_object_name(DNS)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | eval query_length = len(query) | apply dns_query_pdfmodel threshold=0.01 | rename \"IsOutlier(query_length)\" as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | sort -query_length | table start_time end_time query record_type count src dest query_length | `dns_query_length_outliers___mltk_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. In addition, the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or greater must be installed on your search heads, along with any required dependencies. Finally, the support search \"Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK\" must be executed before this detection search, because it builds a machine-learning (ML) model over the historical data used by this search. It is important that this search is run in the same app context as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild the model with the latest data available in your environment.\\\nThis search produces fields (`query`,`query_length`,`count`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** DNS Query, **Field:** query\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** DNS Query Length, **Field:** query_length\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** Number of events, **Field:** count\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", + "known_false_positives": "If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider reducing the value for threshold in the search. You should also periodically re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK", + "analytic_story": [ + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Command & Control" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1071.004", + "T1071" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "DNS.src", + "DNS.dest", + "DNS.query", + "DNS.record_type" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "DNS", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "FIN7", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Tropic Trooper" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1071", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Magic Hound", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "dns_query_length_outliers___mltk_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Excessive DNS Failures", + "id": "104658f4-afdc-499e-9719-17243f9826f1", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Resolution" + ], + "description": "This search identifies DNS query failures by counting the number of DNS responses that do not indicate success, and trigger on more than 50 occurrences.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(\"DNS.query\") as queries from datamodel=Network_Resolution where nodename=DNS \"DNS.reply_code\"!=\"No Error\" \"DNS.reply_code\"!=\"NoError\" DNS.reply_code!=\"unknown\" NOT \"DNS.query\"=\"*.arpa\" \"DNS.query\"=\"*.*\" by \"DNS.src\",\"DNS.query\"| `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")`| lookup cim_corporate_web_domain_lookup domain as query OUTPUT domain| where isnull(domain)| lookup update=true alexa_lookup_by_str domain as query OUTPUT rank| where isnull(rank)| stats sum(count) as count mode(queries) as queries by src| `get_asset(src)`| where count>50 | `excessive_dns_failures_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model.", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible legitimate traffic can trigger this rule. Please investigate as appropriate. The threshold for generating an event can also be customized to better suit your environment.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Excessive DNS Failures", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Command & Control" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 9", + "CIS 12" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1071.004", + "T1071" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "DNS.query", + "DNS.reply_code", + "DNS.src" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "DNS", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "FIN7", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Tropic Trooper" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1071", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Magic Hound", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "excessive_dns_failures_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server", + "id": "7f5fb3e1-4209-4914-90db-0ec21b556368", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search looks for an increase of data transfers from your email server to your clients. This could be indicative of a malicious actor collecting data using your email server.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` sum(All_Traffic.bytes_in) as bytes_in from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_category=email_server by All_Traffic.src_ip _time span=1d | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | eventstats avg(bytes_in) as avg_bytes_in stdev(bytes_in) as stdev_bytes_in | eventstats count as num_data_samples avg(eval(if(_time < relative_time(now(), \"@d\"), bytes_in, null))) as per_source_avg_bytes_in stdev(eval(if(_time < relative_time(now(), \"@d\"), bytes_in, null))) as per_source_stdev_bytes_in by src_ip | eval minimum_data_samples = 4, deviation_threshold = 3 | where num_data_samples >= minimum_data_samples AND bytes_in > (avg_bytes_in + (deviation_threshold * stdev_bytes_in)) AND bytes_in > (per_source_avg_bytes_in + (deviation_threshold * per_source_stdev_bytes_in)) AND _time >= relative_time(now(), \"@d\") | eval num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average = round(abs(bytes_in - avg_bytes_in) / stdev_bytes_in, 2), num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average = round(abs(bytes_in - per_source_avg_bytes_in) / per_source_stdev_bytes_in, 2) | table src_ip, _time, bytes_in, avg_bytes_in, per_source_avg_bytes_in, num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average, num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average | `hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model. Your email servers must be categorized as \"email_server\" for the search to work, as well. You may need to adjust the deviation_threshold and minimum_data_samples values based on the network traffic in your environment. The \"deviation_threshold\" field is a multiplying factor to control how much variation you're willing to tolerate. The \"minimum_data_samples\" field is the minimum number of connections of data samples required for the statistic to be valid.", + "known_false_positives": "The false-positive rate will vary based on how you set the deviation_threshold and data_samples values. Our recommendation is to adjust these values based on your network traffic to and from your email servers.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server", + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 7" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1114.002", + "T1114" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.bytes_in", + "All_Traffic.dest_category", + "All_Traffic.src_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN4", + "HAFNIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "Leafminer" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Magic Hound", + "Silent Librarian" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries", + "id": "8fa891f7-a533-4b3c-af85-5aa2e7c1f1eb", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Resolution" + ], + "description": "The search is used to identify attempts to use your DNS Infrastructure for DDoS purposes via a DNS amplification attack leveraging ANY queries.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where nodename=DNS \"DNS.message_type\"=\"QUERY\" \"DNS.record_type\"=\"ANY\" by \"DNS.dest\" | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | where count>200 | `large_volume_of_dns_any_queries_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate ANY requests may trigger this search, however it is unusual to see a large volume of them under typical circumstances. You may modify the threshold in the search to better suit your environment.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries", + "analytic_story": [ + "DNS Amplification Attacks" + ], + "asset_type": "DNS Servers", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 11", + "CIS 12" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1498", + "T1498.002" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "DNS.message_type", + "DNS.record_type", + "DNS.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1498", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1498.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Reflection Amplification", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "large_volume_of_dns_any_queries_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed", + "id": "ce5a0962-849f-4720-a678-753fe6674479", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search looks for network traffic defined by port and transport layer protocol in the Enterprise Security lookup table \"lookup_interesting_ports\", that is marked as prohibited, and has an associated 'allow' action in the Network_Traffic data model. This could be indicative of a misconfigured network device.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.action = allowed by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip All_Traffic.dest_port All_Traffic.action | lookup update=true interesting_ports_lookup dest_port as All_Traffic.dest_port OUTPUT app is_prohibited note transport | search is_prohibited=true | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `prohibited_network_traffic_allowed_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from firewalls or other network control devices that mediate the traffic allowed into an environment. This is necessary so that the search can identify an 'action' taken on the traffic of interest. The search requires the Network_Traffic data model be populated.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed", + "analytic_story": [ + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Command & Control" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 9", + "CIS 12" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery", + "Command & Control" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1048" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "PR.AC" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.action", + "All_Traffic.src_ip", + "All_Traffic.dest_ip", + "All_Traffic.dest_port" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "prohibited_network_traffic_allowed_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Protocol or Port Mismatch", + "id": "54dc1265-2f74-4b6d-b30d-49eb506a31b3", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search looks for network traffic on common ports where a higher layer protocol does not match the port that is being used. For example, this search should identify cases where protocols other than HTTP are running on TCP port 80. This can be used by attackers to circumvent firewall restrictions, or as an attempt to hide malicious communications over ports and protocols that are typically allowed and not well inspected.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where (All_Traffic.app=dns NOT All_Traffic.dest_port=53) OR ((All_Traffic.app=web-browsing OR All_Traffic.app=http) NOT (All_Traffic.dest_port=80 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=8080 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=8000)) OR (All_Traffic.app=ssl NOT (All_Traffic.dest_port=443 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=8443)) OR (All_Traffic.app=smtp NOT All_Traffic.dest_port=25) by All_Traffic.src_ip, All_Traffic.dest_ip, All_Traffic.app, All_Traffic.dest_port |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `protocol_or_port_mismatch_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "Running this search properly requires a technology that can inspect network traffic and identify common protocols. Technologies such as Bro and Palo Alto Networks firewalls are two examples that will identify protocols via inspection, and not just assume a specific protocol based on the transport protocol and ports.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Protocol or Port Mismatch", + "analytic_story": [ + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Command & Control" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 9", + "CIS 12" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1048.003", + "T1048" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "PR.AC" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.app", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.src_ip", + "All_Traffic.dest_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT33", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Lazarus Group", + "OilRig", + "Thrip", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "protocol_or_port_mismatch_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Protocols passing authentication in cleartext", + "id": "6923cd64-17a0-453c-b945-81ac2d8c6db9", + "version": 3, + "date": "2021-08-19", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies cleartext protocols at risk of leaking sensitive information. Currently, this consists of legacy protocols such as telnet (port 23), POP3 (port 110), IMAP (port 143), and non-anonymous FTP (port 21) sessions. While some of these protocols may be used over SSL, they typically are found on different assigned ports in those instances.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.action!=blocked AND All_Traffic.transport=\"tcp\" AND (All_Traffic.dest_port=\"23\" OR All_Traffic.dest_port=\"143\" OR All_Traffic.dest_port=\"110\" OR (All_Traffic.dest_port=\"21\" AND All_Traffic.user != \"anonymous\")) by All_Traffic.user All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic, and populating the Network_Traffic data model. For more accurate result it's better to limit destination to organization private and public IP range, like All_Traffic.dest IN(192.168.0.0/16,172.16.0.0/12,10.0.0.0/8, x.x.x.x/22)", + "known_false_positives": "Some networks may use kerberized FTP or telnet servers, however, this is rare.", + "references": [ + "https://www.rackaid.com/blog/secure-your-email-and-file-transfers/", + "https://www.infosecmatter.com/capture-passwords-using-wireshark/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Protocols passing authentication in cleartext", + "analytic_story": [ + "Use of Cleartext Protocols" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 9", + "CIS 14" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "PR.AC", + "PR.DS" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.transport", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.user", + "All_Traffic.src", + "All_Traffic.dest", + "All_Traffic.action" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce", + "id": "a98727cc-286b-4ff2-b898-41df64695923", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search looks for RDP application network traffic and filters any source/destination pair generating more than twice the standard deviation of the average traffic.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.app=rdp by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | eventstats stdev(count) AS stdev avg(count) AS avg p50(count) AS p50 | where count>(avg + stdev*2) | rename All_Traffic.src AS src All_Traffic.dest AS dest | table firstTime lastTime src dest count avg p50 stdev | `remote_desktop_network_bruteforce_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must ensure that your network traffic data is populating the Network_Traffic data model.", + "known_false_positives": "RDP gateways may have unusually high amounts of traffic from all other hosts' RDP applications in the network.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce", + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 9", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Delivery" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021.001", + "T1021" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.app", + "All_Traffic.src", + "All_Traffic.dest", + "All_Traffic.dest_port" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT3", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "OilRig", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "remote_desktop_network_bruteforce_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Remote Desktop Network Traffic", + "id": "272b8407-842d-4b3d-bead-a704584003d3", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-07-07", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search looks for network traffic on TCP/3389, the default port used by remote desktop. While remote desktop traffic is not uncommon on a network, it is usually associated with known hosts. This search will ignore common RDP sources and common RDP destinations so you can focus on the uncommon uses of remote desktop on your network.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=3389 AND All_Traffic.dest_category!=common_rdp_destination AND All_Traffic.src_category!=common_rdp_source by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_desktop_network_traffic_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to identify systems that commonly originate remote desktop traffic and that commonly receive remote desktop traffic. You can use the included support search \"Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic\" to identify systems that originate the traffic and the search \"Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic\" to identify systems that receive a lot of remote desktop traffic. After identifying these systems, you will need to add the \"common_rdp_source\" or \"common_rdp_destination\" category to that system depending on the usage, using the Enterprise Security Assets and Identities framework. This can be done by adding an entry in the assets.csv file located in SA-IdentityManagement/lookups.", + "known_false_positives": "Remote Desktop may be used legitimately by users on the network.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Remote Desktop Network Traffic", + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 9", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021.001", + "T1021" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.dest_category", + "All_Traffic.src_category", + "All_Traffic.src", + "All_Traffic.dest", + "All_Traffic.dest_port" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT3", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "OilRig", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "remote_desktop_network_traffic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "SMB Traffic Spike", + "id": "7f5fb3e1-4209-4914-90db-0ec21b936378", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-07-22", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search looks for spikes in the number of Server Message Block (SMB) traffic connections.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb by _time span=1h, All_Traffic.src | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | eventstats max(_time) as maxtime | stats count as num_data_samples max(eval(if(_time >= relative_time(maxtime, \"-70m@m\"), count, null))) as count avg(eval(if(_time upperBound AND num_data_samples >=50, 1, 0) | where isOutlier=1 | table src count | `smb_traffic_spike_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic logs and populating the `Network_Traffic` data model.", + "known_false_positives": "A file server may experience high-demand loads that could cause this analytic to trigger.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "SMB Traffic Spike", + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Ransomware", + "DHS Report TA18-074A" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021.002", + "T1021" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.app", + "All_Traffic.src" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Operation Wocao", + "Orangeworm", + "Sandworm Team", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "smb_traffic_spike_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK", + "id": "d25773ba-9ad8-48d1-858e-07ad0bbeb828", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-07-22", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search uses the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) to identify spikes in the number of Server Message Block (SMB) connections.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as port from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb by _time span=1h, All_Traffic.src | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%A\") | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | apply smb_pdfmodel threshold=0.001 | rename \"IsOutlier(count)\" as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | sort -count | table _time src dest port count | `smb_traffic_spike___mltk_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. In addition, the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or greater must be installed on your search heads, along with any required dependencies. Finally, the support search \"Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK\" must be executed before this detection search, because it builds a machine-learning (ML) model over the historical data used by this search. It is important that this search is run in the same app context as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild the model with the latest data available in your environment.\\\nThis search produces a field (Number of events,count) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. This field contributes additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following field, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry): \\\n1. **Label:** Number of events, **Field:** count\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review is found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", + "known_false_positives": "If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider reducing the value of the threshold in the search. You should also periodically re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data. Please update the `smb_traffic_spike_mltk_filter` macro to filter out false positive results", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK", + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Ransomware", + "DHS Report TA18-074A" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021.002", + "T1021" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_ip", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.app", + "All_Traffic.src" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Operation Wocao", + "Orangeworm", + "Sandworm Team", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "smb_traffic_spike___mltk_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "TOR Traffic", + "id": "ea688274-9c06-4473-b951-e4cb7a5d7a45", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-22", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search looks for network traffic identified as The Onion Router (TOR), a benign anonymity network which can be abused for a variety of nefarious purposes.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.app=tor AND All_Traffic.action=allowed by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip All_Traffic.dest_port All_Traffic.action | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `tor_traffic_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from firewalls or other network control devices that mediate the traffic allowed into an environment. This is necessary so that the search can identify an 'action' taken on the traffic of interest. The search requires the Network_Traffic data model be populated.", + "known_false_positives": "None at this time", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "TOR Traffic", + "analytic_story": [ + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Command & Control", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 9", + "CIS 12" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1071", + "T1071.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.app", + "All_Traffic.action", + "All_Traffic.src_ip", + "All_Traffic.dest_ip", + "All_Traffic.dest_port" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1071", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Magic Hound", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Protocols", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "FIN4", + "FIN8", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Orangeworm", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "SilverTerrier", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "tor_traffic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/tor_traffic.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Unusually Long Content-Type Length", + "id": "57a0a2bf-353f-40c1-84dc-29293f3c35b7", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-10-13", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for unusually long strings in the Content-Type http header that the client sends the server.", + "search": "`stream_http` | eval cs_content_type_length = len(cs_content_type) | where cs_content_type_length > 100 | table endtime src_ip dest_ip cs_content_type_length cs_content_type url | `unusually_long_content_type_length_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This particular search leverages data extracted from Stream:HTTP. You must configure the http stream using the Splunk Stream App on your Splunk Stream deployment server to extract the cs_content_type field.", + "known_false_positives": "Very few legitimate Content-Type fields will have a length greater than 100 characters.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Unusually Long Content-Type Length", + "analytic_story": [ + "Apache Struts Vulnerability" + ], + "asset_type": "Web Server", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 4", + "CIS 18", + "CIS 12" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "ID.RA", + "RS.MI", + "PR.PT", + "PR.IP", + "DE.AE", + "PR.MA", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "cs_content_type", + "endtime", + "src_ip", + "dest_ip", + "url" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "stream_http", + "definition": "sourcetype=stream:http", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "unusually_long_content_type_length_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers", + "id": "104658f4-afdc-499e-9719-17243f982681", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-23", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "This search looks for specific GET or HEAD requests to web servers that are indicative of reconnaissance attempts to identify vulnerable JBoss servers. JexBoss is described as the exploit tool of choice for this malicious activity.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where (Web.http_method=\"GET\" OR Web.http_method=\"HEAD\") AND (Web.url=\"*/web-console/ServerInfo.jsp*\" OR Web.url=\"*web-console*\" OR Web.url=\"*jmx-console*\" OR Web.url = \"*invoker*\") by Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.src, Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data from the web server or network traffic that contains web specific information, and populating the Web data model.", + "known_false_positives": "It's possible for legitimate HTTP requests to be made to URLs containing the suspicious paths.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers", + "analytic_story": [ + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "SamSam Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Web Server", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1082" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Web.http_method", + "Web.url", + "Web.src", + "Web.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1082", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Darkhotel", + "Frankenstein", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Sowbug", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TeamTNT", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Windigo", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml", + "source": "web" + }, + { + "name": "Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "id": "810e4dbc-d46e-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-08-02", + "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects remote code exploit attempts on F5 BIG-IP, BIG-IQ, and Traffix SDC devices", + "search": "`f5_bigip_rogue` | regex _raw=\"(hsqldb;|.*\\\\.\\\\.;.*)\" | search `detect_f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To consistently detect exploit attempts on F5 devices using the vulnerabilities contained within CVE-2020-5902 it is recommended to ingest logs via syslog. As many BIG-IP devices will have SSL enabled on their management interfaces, detections via wire data may not pick anything up unless you are decrypting SSL traffic in order to inspect it. I am using a regex string from a Cloudflare mitigation technique to try and always catch the offending string (..;), along with the other exploit of using (hsqldb;).", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/about/news/f5-fixes-critical-vulnerability-discovered-by-positive-technologies-in-big-ip-application-delivery-controller/", + "https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K52145254" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "analytic_story": [ + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902" + ], + "asset_type": "Network", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 11" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2020-5902" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "f5_bigip_rogue", + "definition": "index=netops sourcetype=\"f5:bigip:rogue\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902.yml", + "source": "web" + }, + { + "name": "Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers", + "id": "c8bff7a4-11ea-4416-a27d-c5bca472913d", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-23", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "This search is used to detect malicious HTTP requests crafted to exploit jmx-console in JBoss servers. The malicious requests have a long URL length, as the payload is embedded in the URL.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where (Web.http_method=\"GET\" OR Web.http_method=\"HEAD\") by Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest | search Web.url=\"*jmx-console/HtmlAdaptor?action=invokeOpByName&name=jboss.admin*import*\" AND Web.url_length > 200 | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table src, dest_ip, http_method, url, firstTime, lastTime | `detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must ingest data from the web server or capture network data that contains web specific information with solutions such as Bro or Splunk Stream, and populating the Web data model", + "known_false_positives": "No known false positives for this detection.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers", + "analytic_story": [ + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "SamSam Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Web Server", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 4", + "CIS 18" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "ID.RA", + "PR.PT", + "PR.IP", + "DE.AE", + "PR.MA", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Web.http_method", + "Web.url", + "Web.url_length", + "Web.src", + "Web.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml", + "source": "web" + }, + { + "name": "Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse", + "id": "134da869-e264-4a8f-8d7e-fcd0ec88f301", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-23", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "This search looks for Web requests to faux domains similar to the one that you want to have monitored for abuse.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Web.url) as urls min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Web by Web.src | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `brand_abuse_web` | `monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You need to ingest data from your web traffic. This can be accomplished by indexing data from a web proxy, or using a network traffic analysis tool, such as Bro or Splunk Stream. You also need to have run the search \"ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names\", which creates the permutations of the domain that will be checked for.", + "known_false_positives": "None at this time", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse", + "analytic_story": [ + "Brand Monitoring" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 7" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Web.url", + "Web.src" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "brand_abuse_web", + "definition": "lookup update=true brandMonitoring_lookup domain as urls OUTPUT domain_abuse | search domain_abuse=true", + "description": "This macro limits the output to only domains that are in the brand monitoring lookup file" + }, + { + "name": "monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml", + "source": "web" + }, + { + "name": "SQL Injection with Long URLs", + "id": "e0aad4cf-0790-423b-8328-7564d0d938f9", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "This search looks for long URLs that have several SQL commands visible within them.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Web where Web.dest_category=web_server AND (Web.url_length > 1024 OR Web.http_user_agent_length > 200) by Web.src Web.dest Web.url Web.url_length Web.http_user_agent | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | eval num_sql_cmds=mvcount(split(url, \"alter%20table\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"between\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"create%20table\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"create%20database\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"create%20index\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"create%20view\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"delete\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"drop%20database\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"drop%20index\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"drop%20table\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"exists\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"exec\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"group%20by\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"having\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"insert%20into\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"inner%20join\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"left%20join\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"right%20join\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"full%20join\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"select\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"distinct\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"select%20top\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"union\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"xp_cmdshell\")) - 24 | where num_sql_cmds > 3 | `sql_injection_with_long_urls_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be monitoring network communications to your web servers or ingesting your HTTP logs and populating the Web data model. You must also identify your web servers in the Enterprise Security assets table.", + "known_false_positives": "It's possible that legitimate traffic will have long URLs or long user agent strings and that common SQL commands may be found within the URL. Please investigate as appropriate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "SQL Injection with Long URLs", + "analytic_story": [ + "SQL Injection" + ], + "asset_type": "Database Server", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 4", + "CIS 13", + "CIS 18" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "ID.RA", + "PR.PT", + "PR.IP", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Web.dest_category", + "Web.url_length", + "Web.http_user_agent_length", + "Web.src", + "Web.dest", + "Web.url", + "Web.http_user_agent" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "sql_injection_with_long_urls_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml", + "source": "web" + }, + { + "name": "Supernova Webshell", + "id": "2ec08a09-9ff1-4dac-b59f-1efd57972ec1", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-01-06", + "author": "John Stoner, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "This search aims to detect the Supernova webshell used in the SUNBURST attack.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Web.Web where web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*codes* OR Web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*clazz* OR Web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*method* OR Web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*args* by Web.src Web.dest Web.url Web.vendor_product Web.user Web.http_user_agent _time span=1s | `supernova_webshell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be monitoring web traffic to your Solarwinds Orion. The logs should be ingested into splunk and populating/mapped to the Web data model.", + "known_false_positives": "There might be false positives associted with this detection since items like args as a web argument is pretty generic.", + "references": [ + "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-supernova-malware-solarwinds-continued.html", + "https://www.guidepointsecurity.com/supernova-solarwinds-net-webshell-analysis/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Supernova Webshell", + "analytic_story": [ + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Web Server", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 4", + "CIS 13", + "CIS 18" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1505.003" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "ID.RA", + "PR.PT", + "PR.IP", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Web.url", + "Web.src", + "Web.dest", + "Web.vendor_product", + "Web.user", + "Web.http_user_agent" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Volatile Cedar" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "supernova_webshell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml", + "source": "web" + }, + { + "name": "Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers", + "id": "a1e761ac-1344-4dbd-88b2-3f34c912d359", + "version": 3, + "date": "2021-01-14", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Resolution" + ], + "description": "Malicious actors often abuse legitimate Dynamic DNS services to host malicious payloads or interactive command and control nodes. Attackers will automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to countless IP addresses to circumvent firewall blocks, block lists as well as frustrate a network defenders analytic and investigative processes. This search will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.answer) as answer min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query host | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `dynamic_dns_providers` | `detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "First, you'll need to ingest data from your DNS operations. This can be done by ingesting logs from your server or data, collected passively by Splunk Stream or a similar solution. Specifically, data that contains the domain that is being queried and the IP of the host originating the request must be populating the `Network_Resolution` data model. This search also leverages a lookup file, `dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv`, which contains a non-exhaustive list of Dynamic DNS providers. Please consider updating the local lookup periodically by adding new domains to the list of `dynamic_dns_providers_local.csv`.\\\nThis search produces fields (query, answer, isDynDNS) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable event. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review. Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** DNS Query, **Field:** query\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** DNS Answer, **Field:** answer\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** IsDynamicDNS, **Field:** isDynDNS\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", + "known_false_positives": "Some users and applications may leverage Dynamic DNS to reach out to some domains on the Internet since dynamic DNS by itself is not malicious, however this activity must be verified.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers", + "analytic_story": [ + "Data Protection", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "DNS Hijacking", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Command & Control" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1189/dyn_dns_site/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A dns query $query$ from your infra connecting to suspicious domain in host $host$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1189" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "host", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "DNS.answer", + "DNS.query", + "host" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1189", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "PLATINUM", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Turla", + "Windigo", + "Windshift" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "dynamic_dns_providers", + "definition": "lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_default dynamic_dns_domains as query OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_default | lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_local dynamic_dns_domains as query OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_local| eval isDynDNS = coalesce(isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local)|fields - isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local| search isDynDNS=True", + "description": "This macro limits the output of the query field to dynamic dns domains. It looks up the domains in a file provided by Splunk and one intended to be updated by the end user." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "id": "5e06e262-d7cd-4216-b2f8-27b437e18458", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Johan Bjerke, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "Malicious actors often abuse misconfigured LDAP servers or applications that use the LDAP servers in organizations. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. This search will help determine if you have any LDAP connections to IP addresses outside of private (RFC1918) address space.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as earliest_time latest(_time) as latest_time values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port = 389 OR All_Traffic.dest_port = 636 AND NOT (All_Traffic.dest_ip = 10.0.0.0/8 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=192.168.0.0/16 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip = 172.16.0.0/12) by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip |`drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | where src_ip != dest_ip | `security_content_ctime(latest_time)` | `security_content_ctime(earliest_time)` |`detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format and should be mapped to the Network Traffic datamodels that are in use for this search.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown at this moment. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. Please check those servers to verify if the activity is legitimate.", + "references": [ + "https://www.govcert.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_ldap/bro_conn.json" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An outbound LDAP connection from $src_ip$ in your infrastructure connecting to dest ip $dest_ip$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_ip", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.src_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation", + "id": "1a67f15a-f4ff-4170-84e9-08cf6f75d6f5", + "version": 4, + "date": "2021-10-06", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Resolution" + ], + "description": "This search allows you to identify DNS requests and compute the standard deviation on the length of the names being resolved, then filter on two times the standard deviation to show you those queries that are unusually large for your environment.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where NOT DNS.message_type IN(\"Pointer\",\"PTR\") by DNS.query | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | eval tlds=split(query,\".\") | eval tld=mvindex(tlds,-1) | eval tld_len=len(tld) | search tld_len<=24 | eval query_length = len(query) | table query query_length record_type count | eventstats stdev(query_length) AS stdev avg(query_length) AS avg p50(query_length) AS p50| where query_length>(avg+stdev*2) | eval z_score=(query_length-avg)/stdev | `dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model.", + "known_false_positives": "It's possible there can be long domain names that are legitimate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation", + "analytic_story": [ + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Command & Control" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Exfiltration" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/long_dns_queries/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "message": "A dns query $query$ with 2 time standard deviation of name len of the dns query in host $host$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1048.003", + "T1048" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "host", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "DNS.query" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT33", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Lazarus Group", + "OilRig", + "Thrip", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic", + "id": "4477f3ea-a28f-11eb-b762-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-21", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search is designed to detect high frequency of archive files data exfiltration through HTTP POST method protocol. This are one of the common techniques used by APT or trojan spy after doing the data collection like screenshot, recording, sensitive data to the infected machines. The attacker may execute archiving command to the collected data, save it a temp folder with a hidden attribute then send it to its C2 through HTTP POST. Sometimes adversaries will rename the archive files or encode/encrypt to cover their tracks. This detection can detect a renamed archive files transfer to HTTP POST since it checks the request body header. Unfortunately this detection cannot support archive that was encrypted or encoded before doing the exfiltration.", + "search": "`stream_http` http_method=POST |eval archive_hdr1=substr(form_data,1,2) | eval archive_hdr2 = substr(form_data,1,4) |stats values(form_data) as http_request_body min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by http_method http_user_agent uri_path url bytes_in bytes_out archive_hdr1 archive_hdr2 |where count >20 AND (archive_hdr1 = \"7z\" OR archive_hdr1 = \"PK\" OR archive_hdr2=\"Rar!\") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the stream HTTP logs or network logs that catch network traffic. Make sure that the http-request-body, payload, or request field is enabled in stream http configuration.", + "known_false_positives": "Normal archive transfer via HTTP protocol may trip this detection.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/001/", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/apt39-iranian-cyber-espionage-group-focused-on-personal-information.html", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic", + "analytic_story": [ + "Command & Control", + "Data Exfiltration" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Exfiltration" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/archive_http_post/stream_http_events.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A http post $http_method$ sending packet with possible archive bytes header 4form_data$ in uri path $uri_path$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1048.003", + "T1048" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "uri_path", + "type": "URL", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "form_data", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "http_method", + "http_user_agent", + "uri_path", + "url", + "bytes_in", + "bytes_out", + "archive_hdr1", + "archive_hdr2", + "form_data" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT33", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Lazarus Group", + "OilRig", + "Thrip", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "stream_http", + "definition": "sourcetype=stream:http", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/network/multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data", + "id": "e2b36208-a364-11eb-8909-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-22", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect potential plain HTTP POST method data exfiltration. This network traffic is commonly used by trickbot, trojanspy, keylogger or APT adversary where arguments or commands are sent in plain text to the remote C2 server using HTTP POST method as part of data exfiltration.", + "search": "`stream_http` http_method=POST form_data IN (\"*wermgr.exe*\",\"*svchost.exe*\", \"*name=\\\"proclist\\\"*\",\"*ipconfig*\", \"*name=\\\"sysinfo\\\"*\", \"*net view*\") |stats values(form_data) as http_request_body min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by http_method http_user_agent uri_path url bytes_in bytes_out | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the stream HTTP logs or network logs that catch network traffic. Make sure that the http-request-body, payload, or request field is enabled.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/03/trickbot-primer.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data", + "analytic_story": [ + "Command & Control", + "Data Exfiltration" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Exfiltration" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/plain_exfil_data/stream_http_events.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A http post $http_method$ sending packet with plain text of information $form_data$ in uri path $uri_path$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1048.003", + "T1048" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "uri_path", + "type": "URL", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "form_data", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "http_method", + "http_user_agent", + "uri_path", + "url", + "bytes_in", + "bytes_out" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT33", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Lazarus Group", + "OilRig", + "Thrip", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "stream_http", + "definition": "sourcetype=stream:http", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/network/plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "id": "c184f12e-5c90-11ec-bf1f-497c9a704a72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Jose Hernandez", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we first limit the scope of our search to the Web Datamodel and use the `| from datamodel` function to benefit from schema accelerated searching capabilities, mainly because the second part of the detection is pretty heavy, it runs a regex across all _raw events that looks for `${jndi:ldap://` pattern across all potential web fields available to the raw data, like http headers for example. If you see results for this detection, it means that there was a attempt at a injection, which could be a reconnaissance activity or a valid expliotation attempt, but this does not exactly mean that the host was indeed successfully exploited.", + "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | regex _raw=\"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)\\w+(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?\" | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx.", + "known_false_positives": "If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "action", + "category", + "dest", + "dest_port", + "http_content_type", + "http_method", + "http_referrer", + "http_user_agent", + "site", + "src", + "url", + "url_domain", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.yml", + "source": "web" + }, + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "id": "69afee44-5c91-11ec-bf1f-497c9a704a72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Jose Hernandez", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic", + "Web" + ], + "description": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we match the invocation function with a network connection to a malicious ip address.", + "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | rex field=_raw max_match=0 \"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)(?\\w+)(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?(?[a-zA-Z0-9\\.\\-\\_\\$]+)\" | join affected_host type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic by All_Traffic.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename dest AS affected_host] | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx.", + "known_false_positives": "If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_network_logs/log4j_network_logs.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "action", + "category", + "dest", + "dest_port", + "http_content_type", + "http_method", + "http_referrer", + "http_user_agent", + "site", + "src", + "url", + "url_domain", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.yml", + "source": "web" + } +] \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/dist/api/lookups.json b/dist/api/lookups.json index 98880ca708..27a5a1bda7 100644 --- a/dist/api/lookups.json +++ b/dist/api/lookups.json @@ -1 +1,351 @@ -{"lookups": [{"description": "A placeholder for a list of cmd line arugments that been seen before", "filename": "previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments.csv", "name": "previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments"}, {"description": "A placeholder for a list of IPs that have access S3", "filename": "previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip.csv", "name": "previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip"}, {"description": "A lookup file that will contain the baseline information for number of AWS Network ACL Activity", "filename": "network_acl_activity_baseline.csv", "name": "network_acl_activity_baseline"}, {"description": "A placeholder for a list of AWS API calls for each user role", "filename": "previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles.csv", "name": "previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles"}, {"default_match": "false", "description": "A lookup to determine if you have a sufficient amount of time has passed to collect cloud instance data for behavioral searches", "collection": "cloud_instances_enough_data", "name": "cloud_instances_enough_data", "fields_list": "_key, filter, enough_data", "match_type": "WILDCARD(filter)"}, {"default_match": "false", "description": "A full baseline of executable files in Windows\\System32 and Windows\\Syswow64, including sub-directories from Server 2016 and Windows 10.", "filename": "is_windows_system_file.csv", "min_matches": 1, "name": "is_windows_system_file"}, {"description": "A list of legit domains to be used as an ignore list for possible phishing sites", "filename": "legit_domains.csv", "name": "legit_domains"}, {"description": "A list of suspicious file names", "collection": "zoom_first_time_child_process", "name": "zoom_first_time_child_process", "fields_list": "_key, dest, process_name, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen"}, {"description": "A table of previously seen Cloud image IDs", "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_images", "name": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_images", "fields_list": "_key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, image_id, enough_data"}, {"description": "A list of processes that have been marked as prohibited", "filename": "prohibited_processes.csv", "name": "prohibited_processes"}, {"description": "A list of domains that can be ignored", "filename": "domains.csv", "name": "domains"}, {"description": "A table of users seen doing console logins, and the first and last time that the activity was observed", "collection": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", "name": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", "fields_list": "_key, firstTime, lastTime, user, src, City, Region, Country"}, {"case_sensitive_match": "false", "description": "A list of dynammic dns providers that can be modified", "filename": "dynamic_dns_providers_local.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(dynamic_dns_domains)", "name": "dynamic_dns_providers_local"}, {"description": "A lookup file that will be used to define the mandatory job for workflow", "filename": "mandatory_job_for_workflow.csv", "name": "mandatory_job_for_workflow"}, {"description": "A table of users seen making instance modifications, and the first and last time that the activity was observed", "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user", "name": "previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user", "fields_list": "_key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, user, enough_data"}, {"case_sensitive_match": "false", "description": "A list of processes that are not common", "filename": "uncommon_processes_local.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(process)", "name": "lookup_uncommon_processes_local"}, {"description": "A lookup file that will contain the baseline information for number of blocked outbound connections", "filename": "baseline_blocked_outbound_connections.csv", "name": "baseline_blocked_outbound_connections"}, {"description": "The CSC control numbers and names", "filename": "csc_lookup.csv", "min_matches": 1, "name": "csc_lookup"}, {"default_match": "false", "description": "A list of suspicious file names", "filename": "suspicious_files.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(file)", "min_matches": 1, "name": "suspicious_writes_lookup"}, {"description": "A list of interesting files in a local file inclusion attack", "filename": "local_file_inclusion_paths.csv", "name": "local_file_inclusion_paths", "default_match": "false", "match_type": "WILDCARD(local_file_inclusion_paths)", "min_matches": 1, "case_sensitive_match": "false"}, {"description": "A place holder for a list of AWS EC2 modifications done by each user", "filename": "previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user.csv", "name": "previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user"}, {"description": "A place holder for a list of used cloud compute instance types", "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types", "name": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types", "fields_list": "_key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, instance_type, enough_data"}, {"description": "A placeholder for the baseline information for AWS S3 deletions", "filename": "s3_deletion_baseline.csv", "name": "s3_deletion_baseline"}, {"description": "A lookup file that will be used to define the mandatory step for job", "filename": "mandatory_step_for_job.csv", "name": "mandatory_step_for_job"}, {"description": "A placeholder for the baseline information for AWS security groups", "filename": "security_group_activity_baseline.csv", "name": "security_group_activity_baseline"}, {"default_match": "false", "description": "A file that contains look-a-like domains for brands that you want to monitor", "filename": "brand_monitoring.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(domain)", "min_matches": 1, "name": "brandMonitoring_lookup"}, {"case_sensitive_match": "false", "description": "A list of processes that are not common", "filename": "uncommon_processes_default.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(process)", "name": "lookup_uncommon_processes_default"}, {"description": "Mapping images to repositories", "filename": "images_to_repository.csv", "name": "images_to_repository"}, {"description": "A collection that will contain the baseline information for number of AWS API calls per user", "collection": "api_call_by_user_baseline", "name": "api_call_by_user_baseline", "fields_list": "arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls"}, {"default_match": "false", "description": "A list of file extensions that are associated with ransomware", "filename": "ransomware_extensions.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(Extensions)", "min_matches": 1, "name": "ransomware_extensions_lookup", "case_sensitive_match": "false"}, {"description": "A placeholder lookup file to hold information for ESCU Usage dashboard", "filename": "escu_search_id.csv", "name": "escu_search_id_lookup"}, {"description": "A table of vendor_region values and the first and last time that they have been observed in cloud provisioning activities", "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_regions", "name": "previously_seen_cloud_regions", "fields_list": "_key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, vendor_region, enough_data"}, {"case_sensitive_match": "false", "default_match": "false", "description": "A list of rare processes that are legitimate that is provided by Splunk", "filename": "rare_process_allow_list_default.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(process)", "min_matches": 1, "name": "lookup_rare_process_allow_list_default"}, {"description": "A table of source IPs, geographic locations, and the first and last time that they have that done cloud provisioning activities", "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", "name": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", "fields_list": "_key, src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data"}, {"description": "A list of processes that should not be launching cmd.exe", "fields": "prohibited_applications", "filename": "prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(prohibited_applications)", "name": "prohibited_apps_launching_cmd"}, {"description": "A table of previously seen users creating cloud instances", "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user", "name": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user", "fields_list": "_key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, user, enough_data"}, {"description": "A list of tools used by attackers", "filename": "attacker_tools.csv", "name": "attacker_tools", "default_match": "false", "match_type": "WILDCARD(attacker_tool_names)", "min_matches": 1, "case_sensitive_match": "false"}, {"description": "A list of suspicious extensions for email attachments", "filename": "is_suspicious_file_extension_lookup.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(file_name)", "name": "is_suspicious_file_extension_lookup"}, {"case_sensitive_match": "false", "default_match": "false", "description": "A list of rare processes that are legitimate provided by the end user", "filename": "rare_process_allow_list_local.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(process)", "min_matches": 1, "name": "lookup_rare_process_allow_list_local"}, {"description": "A lookup file that will contain AWS Service accounts", "filename": "aws_service_accounts.csv", "name": "aws_service_accounts"}, {"default_match": "false", "description": "A placeholder for a list of discovered DNS records generated by the baseline discover_dns_records", "filename": "discovered_dns_records.csv", "min_matches": 1, "name": "discovered_dns_records"}, {"description": "A list of processes that have been marked as prohibited", "filename": "prohibited_softwares.csv", "name": "prohibited_softwares"}, {"default_match": "false", "description": "A list of services that deal with security", "filename": "security_services.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(service)", "min_matches": 1, "name": "security_services_lookup"}, {"description": "A table of users, commands, and the first and last time that they have been seen", "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role", "name": "previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role", "fields_list": "_key, user, command, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data"}, {"default_match": "false", "description": "A list of file names that are ransomware note files", "filename": "ransomware_notes.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(ransomware_notes)", "min_matches": 1, "name": "ransomware_notes_lookup"}, {"default_match": "false", "description": "A place holder for a list of used AWS regions", "filename": "previously_seen_aws_regions.csv", "min_matches": 1, "name": "previously_seen_aws_regions"}, {"case_sensitive_match": "false", "description": "A list of dynammic dns providers that should not be modified", "filename": "dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(dynamic_dns_domains)", "name": "dynamic_dns_providers_default"}, {"description": "A placeholder for a list of AWS accounts and assumed roles", "filename": "previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.csv", "name": "previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity"}, {"description": "A placeholder for the list of Windows Services running", "collection": "previously_seen_running_windows_services", "name": "previously_seen_running_windows_services", "fields_list": "_key, service, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen"}], "count": 49} \ No newline at end of file +[ + { + "name": "__mlspl_unusual_commandline_detection", + "description": "An MLTK model for detecting malicious commandlines", + "filename": "__mlspl_unusual_commandline_detection.mlmodel", + "default_match": "false", + "min_matches": 1, + "case_sensitive_match": "false" + }, + { + "name": "api_call_by_user_baseline", + "description": "A collection that will contain the baseline information for number of AWS API calls per user", + "collection": "api_call_by_user_baseline", + "fields_list": "arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls" + }, + { + "name": "attacker_tools", + "description": "A list of tools used by attackers", + "filename": "attacker_tools.csv", + "default_match": "false", + "match_type": "WILDCARD(attacker_tool_names)", + "min_matches": 1, + "case_sensitive_match": "false" + }, + { + "name": "aws_service_accounts", + "description": "A lookup file that will contain AWS Service accounts", + "filename": "aws_service_accounts.csv" + }, + { + "name": "baseline_blocked_outbound_connections", + "description": "A lookup file that will contain the baseline information for number of blocked outbound connections", + "filename": "baseline_blocked_outbound_connections.csv" + }, + { + "name": "brandMonitoring_lookup", + "description": "A file that contains look-a-like domains for brands that you want to monitor", + "filename": "brand_monitoring.csv", + "default_match": "false", + "match_type": "WILDCARD(domain)", + "min_matches": 1 + }, + { + "name": "cloud_instances_enough_data", + "description": "A lookup to determine if you have a sufficient amount of time has passed to collect cloud instance data for behavioral searches", + "collection": "cloud_instances_enough_data", + "fields_list": "_key, filter, enough_data", + "default_match": "false", + "match_type": "WILDCARD(filter)" + }, + { + "name": "csc_lookup", + "description": "The CSC control numbers and names", + "filename": "csc_lookup.csv", + "min_matches": 1 + }, + { + "name": "discovered_dns_records", + "description": "A placeholder for a list of discovered DNS records generated by the baseline discover_dns_records", + "filename": "discovered_dns_records.csv", + "default_match": "false", + "min_matches": 1 + }, + { + "name": "domains", + "description": "A list of domains that can be ignored", + "filename": "domains.csv" + }, + { + "name": "dynamic_dns_providers_default", + "description": "A list of dynammic dns providers that should not be modified", + "filename": "dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv", + "match_type": "WILDCARD(dynamic_dns_domains)", + "case_sensitive_match": "false" + }, + { + "name": "dynamic_dns_providers_local", + "description": "A list of dynammic dns providers that can be modified", + "filename": "dynamic_dns_providers_local.csv", + "match_type": "WILDCARD(dynamic_dns_domains)", + "case_sensitive_match": "false" + }, + { + "name": "escu_search_id_lookup", + "description": "A placeholder lookup file to hold information for ESCU Usage dashboard", + "filename": "escu_search_id.csv" + }, + { + "name": "images_to_repository", + "description": "Mapping images to repositories", + "filename": "images_to_repository.csv" + }, + { + "name": "is_net_windows_file", + "description": "A full baseline of executable files in \\Windows\\, including sub-directories from Server 2016 and Windows 11. Certain .net binaries may not have been captured due to different Windows SDK's or developer utilities not installed during baseline.", + "filename": "is_net_windows_file.csv", + "default_match": "false", + "min_matches": 1, + "case_sensitive_match": "false" + }, + { + "name": "is_nirsoft_software", + "description": "A subset of utilities provided by NirSoft that may be used by adversaries.", + "filename": "is_nirsoft_software.csv", + "default_match": "false", + "min_matches": 1, + "case_sensitive_match": "false" + }, + { + "name": "is_suspicious_file_extension_lookup", + "description": "A list of suspicious extensions for email attachments", + "filename": "is_suspicious_file_extension_lookup.csv", + "match_type": "WILDCARD(file_name)" + }, + { + "name": "is_windows_system_file", + "description": "A full baseline of executable files in Windows\\System32 and Windows\\Syswow64, including sub-directories from Server 2016 and Windows 10.", + "filename": "is_windows_system_file.csv", + "default_match": "false", + "min_matches": 1, + "case_sensitive_match": "false" + }, + { + "name": "legit_domains", + "description": "A list of legit domains to be used as an ignore list for possible phishing sites", + "filename": "legit_domains.csv" + }, + { + "name": "linux_tool_discovery_process", + "description": "A list of suspicious bash commonly used by attackers via scripts", + "filename": "linux_tool_discovery_process.csv", + "default_match": "false", + "match_type": "WILDCARD(process)", + "min_matches": 1, + "case_sensitive_match": "false" + }, + { + "name": "local_file_inclusion_paths", + "description": "A list of interesting files in a local file inclusion attack", + "filename": "local_file_inclusion_paths.csv", + "default_match": "false", + "match_type": "WILDCARD(local_file_inclusion_paths)", + "min_matches": 1, + "case_sensitive_match": "false" + }, + { + "name": "lookup_rare_process_allow_list_default", + "description": "A list of rare processes that are legitimate that is provided by Splunk", + "filename": "rare_process_allow_list_default.csv", + "default_match": "false", + "match_type": "WILDCARD(process)", + "min_matches": 1, + "case_sensitive_match": "false" + }, + { + "name": "lookup_rare_process_allow_list_local", + "description": "A list of rare processes that are legitimate provided by the end user", + "filename": "rare_process_allow_list_local.csv", + "default_match": "false", + "match_type": "WILDCARD(process)", + "min_matches": 1, + "case_sensitive_match": "false" + }, + { + "name": "lookup_uncommon_processes_default", + "description": "A list of processes that are not common", + "filename": "uncommon_processes_default.csv", + "match_type": "WILDCARD(process)", + "case_sensitive_match": "false" + }, + { + "name": "lookup_uncommon_processes_local", + "description": "A list of processes that are not common", + "filename": "uncommon_processes_local.csv", + "match_type": "WILDCARD(process)", + "case_sensitive_match": "false" + }, + { + "name": "mandatory_job_for_workflow", + "description": "A lookup file that will be used to define the mandatory job for workflow", + "filename": "mandatory_job_for_workflow.csv" + }, + { + "name": "mandatory_step_for_job", + "description": "A lookup file that will be used to define the mandatory step for job", + "filename": "mandatory_step_for_job.csv" + }, + { + "name": "network_acl_activity_baseline", + "description": "A lookup file that will contain the baseline information for number of AWS Network ACL Activity", + "filename": "network_acl_activity_baseline.csv" + }, + { + "name": "previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip", + "description": "A placeholder for a list of IPs that have access S3", + "filename": "previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip.csv" + }, + { + "name": "previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles", + "description": "A placeholder for a list of AWS API calls for each user role", + "filename": "previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles.csv" + }, + { + "name": "previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity", + "description": "A placeholder for a list of AWS accounts and assumed roles", + "filename": "previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.csv" + }, + { + "name": "previously_seen_aws_regions", + "description": "A place holder for a list of used AWS regions", + "filename": "previously_seen_aws_regions.csv", + "default_match": "false", + "min_matches": 1 + }, + { + "name": "previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role", + "description": "A table of users, commands, and the first and last time that they have been seen", + "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role", + "fields_list": "_key, user, command, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data" + }, + { + "name": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user", + "description": "A table of previously seen users creating cloud instances", + "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user", + "fields_list": "_key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, user, enough_data" + }, + { + "name": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_images", + "description": "A table of previously seen Cloud image IDs", + "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_images", + "fields_list": "_key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, image_id, enough_data" + }, + { + "name": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types", + "description": "A place holder for a list of used cloud compute instance types", + "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types", + "fields_list": "_key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, instance_type, enough_data" + }, + { + "name": "previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user", + "description": "A table of users seen making instance modifications, and the first and last time that the activity was observed", + "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user", + "fields_list": "_key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, user, enough_data" + }, + { + "name": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", + "description": "A table of source IPs, geographic locations, and the first and last time that they have that done cloud provisioning activities", + "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", + "fields_list": "_key, src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data" + }, + { + "name": "previously_seen_cloud_regions", + "description": "A table of vendor_region values and the first and last time that they have been observed in cloud provisioning activities", + "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_regions", + "fields_list": "_key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, vendor_region, enough_data" + }, + { + "name": "previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments", + "description": "A placeholder for a list of cmd line arugments that been seen before", + "filename": "previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments.csv" + }, + { + "name": "previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user", + "description": "A place holder for a list of AWS EC2 modifications done by each user", + "filename": "previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user.csv" + }, + { + "name": "previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip", + "description": "A place holder for a list of GCP storage access from remote IPs", + "filename": "previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip.csv", + "default_match": "false", + "min_matches": 1 + }, + { + "name": "previously_seen_running_windows_services", + "description": "A placeholder for the list of Windows Services running", + "collection": "previously_seen_running_windows_services", + "fields_list": "_key, service, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen" + }, + { + "name": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", + "description": "A table of users seen doing console logins, and the first and last time that the activity was observed", + "collection": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", + "fields_list": "_key, firstTime, lastTime, user, src, City, Region, Country" + }, + { + "name": "prohibited_apps_launching_cmd", + "description": "A list of processes that should not be launching cmd.exe", + "filename": "prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.csv", + "match_type": "WILDCARD(prohibited_applications)" + }, + { + "name": "prohibited_processes", + "description": "A list of processes that have been marked as prohibited", + "filename": "prohibited_processes.csv" + }, + { + "name": "prohibited_softwares", + "description": "A list of processes that have been marked as prohibited", + "filename": "prohibited_softwares.csv" + }, + { + "name": "ransomware_extensions_lookup", + "description": "A list of file extensions that are associated with ransomware", + "filename": "ransomware_extensions.csv", + "default_match": "false", + "match_type": "WILDCARD(Extensions)", + "min_matches": 1, + "case_sensitive_match": "false" + }, + { + "name": "ransomware_notes_lookup", + "description": "A list of file names that are ransomware note files", + "filename": "ransomware_notes.csv", + "default_match": "false", + "match_type": "WILDCARD(ransomware_notes)", + "min_matches": 1 + }, + { + "name": "s3_deletion_baseline", + "description": "A placeholder for the baseline information for AWS S3 deletions", + "filename": "s3_deletion_baseline.csv" + }, + { + "name": "security_group_activity_baseline", + "description": "A placeholder for the baseline information for AWS security groups", + "filename": "security_group_activity_baseline.csv" + }, + { + "name": "security_services_lookup", + "description": "A list of services that deal with security", + "filename": "security_services.csv", + "default_match": "false", + "match_type": "WILDCARD(service)", + "min_matches": 1 + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_writes_lookup", + "description": "A list of suspicious file names", + "filename": "suspicious_files.csv", + "default_match": "false", + "match_type": "WILDCARD(file)", + "min_matches": 1 + }, + { + "name": "zoom_first_time_child_process", + "description": "A list of suspicious file names", + "collection": "zoom_first_time_child_process", + "fields_list": "_key, dest, process_name, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen" + } +] \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/dist/api/macros.json b/dist/api/macros.json index 2718de7895..2ccc0207e1 100644 --- a/dist/api/macros.json +++ b/dist/api/macros.json @@ -1 +1,680 @@ -{"macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:gmail:bigquery", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "gsuite_gmail"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=kube:container:controller", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Kubernetes data. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "kubernetes_container_controller"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:drive:json", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "gsuite_drive"}, {"definition": "lookup update=true brandMonitoring_lookup domain as urls OUTPUT domain_abuse | search domain_abuse=true", "description": "This macro limits the output to only domains that are in the brand monitoring lookup file", "name": "brand_abuse_web"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Google GCP. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "google_gcp_pubnet_message"}, {"description": "Use this macro to determine how long to keep track of Windows services", "definition": "\"-90d@d\"", "name": "previously_seen_windows_services_forget_window"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=procdump.exe OR Processes.process_name=procdump64.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=procdump)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_procdump"}, {"definition": "lookup ransomware_notes_lookup ransomware_notes as file_name OUTPUT status as \"Known Ransomware Notes\" | search \"Known Ransomware Notes\"=True", "description": "This macro limits the output to files that have been identified as a ransomware note", "name": "ransomware_notes"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=verclsid.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=verclsid.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_verclsid"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for AWS cloudwatch eks logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudwatch_eks"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=wbadmin.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=WBADMIN.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_wbadmin"}, {"description": "Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new zoom child processes", "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", "name": "previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=regasm.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RegAsm.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_regasm"}, {"definition": "index=zeek sourcetype=\"zeek:ssl:json\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "zeek_ssl"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudwatchlogs:vpcflow", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for AWS cloudwatch vpc logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudwatch_vpc"}, {"definition": "lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_default dynamic_dns_domains as query OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_default | lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_local dynamic_dns_domains as query OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_local| eval isDynDNS = coalesce(isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local)|fields - isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local| search isDynDNS=True", "description": "This macro limits the output of the query field to dynamic dns domains. It looks up the domains in a file provided by Splunk and one intended to be updated by the end user.", "name": "dynamic_dns_providers"}, {"definition": "(query=login* AND query=www*)", "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as Office 365", "name": "evilginx_phishlets_0365"}, {"definition": "lookup update=true is_windows_system_file filename as process_name OUTPUT systemFile | search systemFile=true", "description": "This macro limits the output to process names that are in the Windows System directory", "name": "is_windows_system_file"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=fodhelper.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=FodHelper.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_fodhelper"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=gpupdate.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=GPUpdate.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_gpupdate"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvcs.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RegSvcs.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_regsvcs"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=aws:s3:accesslogs", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "aws_s3_accesslogs"}, {"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_system"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=reg.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=reg.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_reg"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_wmic"}, {"description": "Use this macro to determine how long to keep track of cloud instance images", "definition": "\"-90d@d\"", "name": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_forget_window"}, {"definition": "index=signals", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "signals"}, {"description": "Use this macro to determine how long to keep track of cloud provisioning locations", "definition": "\"-90d@d\"", "name": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_forget_window"}, {"definition": "index=*", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "linux_hosts"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=aws:config", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "aws_config"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:securityhub:firehose\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "aws_securityhub_firehose"}, {"description": "Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new commands from user roles", "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", "name": "cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_activity_window"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=sdelete.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=sdelete.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_sdelete"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=aws:firehose:json", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "github"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=schtasks.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_schtasks"}, {"definition": "eval domain=trim(domain,\"*\") | search NOT[| inputlookup domains] NOT[ |inputlookup cim_corporate_email_domain_lookup] NOT[inputlookup cim_corporate_web_domain_lookup] | eval domain=\"*\"+domain+\"*\"", "description": "This macro removes valid domains from the output", "name": "remove_valid_domains"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"description": "Use this macro to determine how long to keep track of cloud instance types", "definition": "\"-90d@d\"", "name": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_type_forget_window"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=aws:s3:accesslogs", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for AWS cloudwatch vpc logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "s3_accesslogs"}, {"description": "Use this macro to determine how long to keep track of cloud api calls per user role", "definition": "\"-90d@d\"", "name": "previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_forget_window"}, {"definition": "(eventName = CreateNetworkAcl OR eventName = CreateNetworkAclEntry OR eventName = DeleteNetworkAcl OR eventName = DeleteNetworkAclEntry OR eventName = ReplaceNetworkAclEntry OR eventName = ReplaceNetworkAclAssociation)", "description": "This is a list of AWS event names that are associated with Network ACLs", "name": "network_acl_events"}, {"description": "Use this macro to determine how far into the past the window should be to determine if the instance type is new or not", "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", "name": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types_search_window_begin_offset"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "o365_management_activity"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:description\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "aws_description"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name IN (\"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\"))", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "linux_shells"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=mshta.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSHTA.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_mshta"}, {"description": "Use this macro to determine how far into the past the window should be to determine if the user is new or not", "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", "name": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_search_window_begin_offset"}, {"definition": "lookup update=true lookup_rare_process_allow_list_default process as process OUTPUTNEW allow_list | where allow_list=\"false\" | lookup update=true lookup_rare_process_allow_list_local process as process OUTPUT allow_list | where allow_list=\"false\"", "description": "This macro is intended to allow_list processes that have been definied as rare", "name": "filter_rare_process_allow_list"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe)", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "windows_shells"}, {"definition": "(Processes.original_file_name=rclone.exe OR Processes.process_name=rclone.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name.", "name": "process_rclone"}, {"description": "Use this macro to determine how far into the past the window should be to determine if the user is new or not", "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", "name": "previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user_search_window_begin_offset"}, {"definition": "lookup suspicious_writes_lookup file as file_name OUTPUT note as \"Reference\" | search \"Reference\" != False", "description": "This macro limites the output to file names that have been marked as suspicious", "name": "suspicious_writes"}, {"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"description": "Use this macro to determine how far into the past the window should be to determine if the image is new or not", "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", "name": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_image_search_window_begin_offset"}, {"definition": "lookup update=true is_suspicious_file_extension_lookup file_name OUTPUT suspicious | search suspicious=true", "description": "This macro limits the output to email attachments that have suspicious extensions", "name": "suspicious_email_attachments"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=setspn.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=setspn.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_setspn"}, {"description": "Use this macro to determine how long to keep track of cloud regions", "definition": "\"-90d@d\"", "name": "previously_seen_cloud_region_forget_window"}, {"definition": "(query=accounts* AND query=ssl* AND query=www*)", "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as Google", "name": "evilginx_phishlets_google"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_cmd"}, {"definition": "(eventName=AuthorizeSecurityGroupIngress OR eventName=CreateSecurityGroup OR eventName=DeleteSecurityGroup OR eventName=DescribeClusterSecurityGroups OR eventName=DescribeDBSecurityGroups OR eventName=DescribeSecurityGroupReferences OR eventName=DescribeSecurityGroups OR eventName=DescribeStaleSecurityGroups OR eventName=RevokeSecurityGroupIngress OR eventName=UpdateSecurityGroupRuleDescriptionsIngress)", "description": "This macro is a list of AWS event names associated with security groups", "name": "security_group_api_calls"}, {"definition": "(process_name= \"arp.exe\" OR process_name= \"at.exe\" OR process_name= \"attrib.exe\" OR process_name= \"cscript.exe\" OR process_name= \"dsquery.exe\" OR process_name= \"hostname.exe\" OR process_name= \"ipconfig.exe\" OR process_name= \"mimikatz.exe\" OR process_name= \"nbstat.exe\" OR process_name= \"net.exe\" OR process_name= \"netsh.exe\" OR process_name= \"nslookup.exe\" OR process_name= \"ping.exe\" OR process_name= \"quser.exe\" OR process_name= \"qwinsta.exe\" OR process_name= \"reg.exe\" OR process_name= \"runas.exe\" OR process_name= \"sc.exe\" OR process_name= \"schtasks.exe\" OR process_name= \"ssh.exe\" OR process_name= \"systeminfo.exe\" OR process_name= \"taskkill.exe\" OR process_name= \"telnet.exe\" OR process_name= \"tracert.exe\" OR process_name=\"wscript.exe\" OR process_name= \"xcopy.exe\")", "description": "This macro is a list of process that can be used to discover the network configuration", "name": "system_network_configuration_discovery_tools"}, {"definition": "eventtype=cisco_ios", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cisco_networks"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=esentutl.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=esentutl.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_esentutl"}, {"definition": "lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_default dynamic_dns_domains as url OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_default | lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_local dynamic_dns_domains as url OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_local| eval isDynDNS = coalesce(isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local)|fields - isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local| search isDynDNS=True", "description": "This is a description", "name": "dynamic_dns_web_traffic"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:calendar:json", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "gsuite_calendar"}, {"definition": "lookup update=true brandMonitoring_lookup domain as src_user OUTPUT domain_abuse | search domain_abuse=true", "description": "This macro limits the output to only domains that are in the brand monitoring lookup file", "name": "brand_abuse_email"}, {"definition": "lookup update=true lookup_uncommon_processes_default process_name as process_name outputnew uncommon_default,category_default,analytic_story_default,kill_chain_phase_default,mitre_attack_default | lookup update=true lookup_uncommon_processes_local process_name as process_name outputnew uncommon_local,category_local,analytic_story_local,kill_chain_phase_local,mitre_attack_local | eval uncommon = coalesce(uncommon_default, uncommon_local), analytic_story = coalesce(analytic_story_default, analytic_story_local), category=coalesce(category_default, category_local), kill_chain_phase=coalesce(kill_chain_phase_default, kill_chain_phase_local), mitre_attack=coalesce(mitre_attack_default, mitre_attack_local) | fields - analytic_story_default, analytic_story_local, category_default, category_local, kill_chain_phase_default, kill_chain_phase_local, mitre_attack_default, mitre_attack_local, uncommon_default, uncommon_local | search uncommon=true", "description": "This macro limits the output to processes that have been marked as uncommon", "name": "uncommon_processes"}, {"definition": "index=notable", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "notable"}, {"description": "Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new provisioning activities", "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", "name": "previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=ntdsutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=ntdsutil.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_ntdsutil"}, {"definition": "source=\"WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_task_scheduler"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=certutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=CertUtil.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_certutil"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_powershell"}, {"definition": "eventtype=\"osquery-process\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "osquery_process"}, {"definition": "source=\"wineventlog:microsoft-windows-printservice/operational\" OR sourcetype=\"WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PrintService/Admin\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "printservice"}, {"definition": "lookup update=true ransomware_extensions_lookup Extensions AS file_extension OUTPUT Name | search Name !=False", "description": "This macro limits the output to files that have extensions associated with ransomware", "name": "ransomware_extensions"}, {"definition": "(query=fls-na* AND query = www* AND query=images*)", "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as Amazon", "name": "evilginx_phishlets_amazon"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:securityhub:finding\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "aws_securityhub_finding"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=route.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=route.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_route"}, {"definition": "(query=api* AND query = github*)", "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as GitHub", "name": "evilginx_phishlets_github"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=csc.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=csc.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_csc"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=runas.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=runas.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_runas"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=REGSVR32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_regsvr32"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=installutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=InstallUtil.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_installutil"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=\"netbackup_logs\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "netbackup"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=\"wineventlog:microsoft-windows-wmi-activity/operational\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wmi"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=stream:http", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "stream_http"}, {"definition": "user IN (user_names_here)", "description": "specify the user allowed to create PRs in Github projects.", "name": "github_known_users"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=vssadmin.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=VSSADMIN.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_vssadmin"}, {"definition": "| inputlookup prohibited_apps_launching_cmd | rename prohibited_applications as parent_process_name | eval parent_process_name=\"*\" . parent_process_name | table parent_process_name", "description": "This macro outputs a list of process that should not be the parent process of cmd.exe", "name": "prohibited_apps_launching_cmd"}, {"definition": "index=zeek sourcetype=\"zeek:rpc:json\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "zeek_rpc"}, {"definition": "(query=www* AND query = m* AND query=static*)", "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as FaceBook", "name": "evilginx_phishlets_facebook"}, {"definition": "index=netops sourcetype=\"f5:bigip:rogue\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "f5_bigip_rogue"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=circleci", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "circleci"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_rundll32"}, {"description": "Use this macro to determine how far into the past the window should be to determine if the region is new or not", "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", "name": "previously_seen_cloud_regions_search_window_begin_offset"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=dsquery.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=dsquery.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_dsquery"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=\"MSWindows:IIS\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "exchange"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=psexec.exe OR Processes.process_name=psexec64.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=psexec.c)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_psexec"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_net"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=dllhost.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=dllhost.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_dllhost"}, {"definition": "userName IN (user)", "description": "specify the user allowed to push Images to AWS ECR.", "name": "aws_ecr_users"}, {"definition": "lookup prohibited_softwares app as process_name OUTPUT is_prohibited | search is_prohibited=True", "description": "This macro limits the output to process_names that have been marked as prohibited", "name": "prohibited_softwares"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=hh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=HH.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_hh"}, {"definition": "(eventName=AssociateAddress OR eventName=AssociateIamInstanceProfile OR eventName=AttachClassicLinkVpc OR eventName=AttachNetworkInterface OR eventName=AttachVolume OR eventName=BundleInstance OR eventName=DetachClassicLinkVpc OR eventName=DetachVolume OR eventName=ModifyInstanceAttribute OR eventName=ModifyInstancePlacement OR eventName=MonitorInstances OR eventName=RebootInstances OR eventName=ResetInstanceAttribute OR eventName=StartInstances OR eventName=StopInstances OR eventName=TerminateInstances OR eventName=UnmonitorInstances)", "description": "This is a list of AWS event names that have to do with modifying Amazon EC2 instances", "name": "ec2_modification_api_calls"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=mscs:storage:blob:json", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Kubernetes data from Azure. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "kubernetes_azure"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=msbuild.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSBuild.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_msbuild"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=stream:tcp", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "stream_tcp"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudwatchlogs:vpcflow", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=bitsadmin.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=bitsadmin.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_bitsadmin"}, {"description": "Use this macro to determine how long to keep track of zoom child processes", "definition": "\"-90d@d\"", "name": "previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_forget_window"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_microsoftworkflowcompiler"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks"}, {"definition": "(query=www* AND query=aws* AND query=console.aws* AND query=signin.aws* AND api-northeast-1.console.aws* AND query=fls-na* AND query=images-na*)", "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as an AWS console", "name": "evilginx_phishlets_aws"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=curl.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Curl.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_curl"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=stream:dns", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "stream_dns"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=nltest.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=nltestrk.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_nltest"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=kube:objects:events", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "kube_objects_events"}, {"definition": "(query=outlook* AND query=login* AND query=account*)", "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as Outlook", "name": "evilginx_phishlets_outlook"}, {"definition": "lookup update=true brandMonitoring_lookup domain as query OUTPUT domain_abuse | search domain_abuse=true", "description": "This macro limits the output to only domains that are in the brand monitoring lookup file", "name": "brand_abuse_dns"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=copy.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=copy.exe OR Processes.process_name=xcopy.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=xcopy.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_copy"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=netsh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=netsh.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_netsh"}, {"description": "Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new Windows services", "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", "name": "previously_seen_windows_services_window"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=dxdiag.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=dxdiag.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_dxdiag"}, {"definition": "eventtype=okta_log", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "okta"}], "count": 130} \ No newline at end of file +[ + { + "name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_config", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:config", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_description", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:description\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_ecr_users", + "definition": "userName IN (user)", + "description": "specify the user allowed to push Images to AWS ECR." + }, + { + "name": "aws_s3_accesslogs", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:s3:accesslogs", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_securityhub_finding", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:securityhub:finding\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_securityhub_firehose", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:securityhub:firehose\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "brand_abuse_dns", + "definition": "lookup update=true brandMonitoring_lookup domain as query OUTPUT domain_abuse | search domain_abuse=true", + "description": "This macro limits the output to only domains that are in the brand monitoring lookup file" + }, + { + "name": "brand_abuse_email", + "definition": "lookup update=true brandMonitoring_lookup domain as src_user OUTPUT domain_abuse | search domain_abuse=true", + "description": "This macro limits the output to only domains that are in the brand monitoring lookup file" + }, + { + "name": "brand_abuse_web", + "definition": "lookup update=true brandMonitoring_lookup domain as urls OUTPUT domain_abuse | search domain_abuse=true", + "description": "This macro limits the output to only domains that are in the brand monitoring lookup file" + }, + { + "name": "circleci", + "definition": "sourcetype=circleci", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "cisco_networks", + "definition": "eventtype=cisco_ios", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_activity_window", + "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", + "description": "Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new commands from user roles" + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "cloudwatch_eks", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for AWS cloudwatch eks logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "cloudwatch_vpc", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudwatchlogs:vpcflow", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for AWS cloudwatch vpc logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudwatchlogs:vpcflow", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "dynamic_dns_providers", + "definition": "lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_default dynamic_dns_domains as query OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_default | lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_local dynamic_dns_domains as query OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_local| eval isDynDNS = coalesce(isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local)|fields - isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local| search isDynDNS=True", + "description": "This macro limits the output of the query field to dynamic dns domains. It looks up the domains in a file provided by Splunk and one intended to be updated by the end user." + }, + { + "name": "dynamic_dns_web_traffic", + "definition": "lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_default dynamic_dns_domains as url OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_default | lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_local dynamic_dns_domains as url OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_local| eval isDynDNS = coalesce(isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local)|fields - isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local| search isDynDNS=True", + "description": "This is a description" + }, + { + "name": "ec2_modification_api_calls", + "definition": "(eventName=AssociateAddress OR eventName=AssociateIamInstanceProfile OR eventName=AttachClassicLinkVpc OR eventName=AttachNetworkInterface OR eventName=AttachVolume OR eventName=BundleInstance OR eventName=DetachClassicLinkVpc OR eventName=DetachVolume OR eventName=ModifyInstanceAttribute OR eventName=ModifyInstancePlacement OR eventName=MonitorInstances OR eventName=RebootInstances OR eventName=ResetInstanceAttribute OR eventName=StartInstances OR eventName=StopInstances OR eventName=TerminateInstances OR eventName=UnmonitorInstances)", + "description": "This is a list of AWS event names that have to do with modifying Amazon EC2 instances" + }, + { + "name": "evilginx_phishlets_0365", + "definition": "(query=login* AND query=www*)", + "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as Office 365" + }, + { + "name": "evilginx_phishlets_amazon", + "definition": "(query=fls-na* AND query = www* AND query=images*)", + "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as Amazon" + }, + { + "name": "evilginx_phishlets_aws", + "definition": "(query=www* AND query=aws* AND query=console.aws* AND query=signin.aws* AND api-northeast-1.console.aws* AND query=fls-na* AND query=images-na*)", + "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as an AWS console" + }, + { + "name": "evilginx_phishlets_facebook", + "definition": "(query=www* AND query = m* AND query=static*)", + "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as FaceBook" + }, + { + "name": "evilginx_phishlets_github", + "definition": "(query=api* AND query = github*)", + "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as GitHub" + }, + { + "name": "evilginx_phishlets_google", + "definition": "(query=accounts* AND query=ssl* AND query=www*)", + "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as Google" + }, + { + "name": "evilginx_phishlets_outlook", + "definition": "(query=outlook* AND query=login* AND query=account*)", + "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as Outlook" + }, + { + "name": "exchange", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"MSWindows:IIS\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "f5_bigip_rogue", + "definition": "index=netops sourcetype=\"f5:bigip:rogue\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "filter_rare_process_allow_list", + "definition": "lookup update=true lookup_rare_process_allow_list_default process as process OUTPUTNEW allow_list | where allow_list=\"false\" | lookup update=true lookup_rare_process_allow_list_local process as process OUTPUT allow_list | where allow_list=\"false\"", + "description": "This macro is intended to allow_list processes that have been definied as rare" + }, + { + "name": "github", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:firehose:json", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "github_known_users", + "definition": "user IN (user_names_here)", + "description": "specify the user allowed to create PRs in Github projects." + }, + { + "name": "google_gcp_pubnet_message", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Google GCP. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "gsuite_calendar", + "definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:calendar:json", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "gsuite_drive", + "definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:drive:json", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "gsuite_gmail", + "definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:gmail:bigquery", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "is_net_windows_file", + "definition": "lookup update=true is_net_windows_file filename as process_name OUTPUT netFile | lookup update=true is_net_windows_file originalFileName as original_file_name OUTPUT netFile | search netFile=true", + "description": "This macro limits the output to process names that are .net binaries on Windows Server 2016 and Windows 11." + }, + { + "name": "is_nirsoft_software", + "definition": "lookup update=true is_nirsoft_software filename as process_name OUTPUT nirsoftFile | search nirsoftFile=true", + "description": "This macro is related to potentially identifiable software related to NirSoft. Remove or filter as needed based." + }, + { + "name": "is_windows_system_file", + "definition": "lookup update=true is_windows_system_file filename as process_name OUTPUT systemFile | search systemFile=true", + "description": "This macro limits the output to process names that are in the Windows System directory" + }, + { + "name": "kube_objects_events", + "definition": "sourcetype=kube:objects:events", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "kubernetes_azure", + "definition": "sourcetype=mscs:storage:blob:json", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Kubernetes data from Azure. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "kubernetes_container_controller", + "definition": "sourcetype=kube:container:controller", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Kubernetes data. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "linux_hosts", + "definition": "index=*", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "linux_shells", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name IN (\"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\"))", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "netbackup", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"netbackup_logs\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "network_acl_events", + "definition": "(eventName = CreateNetworkAcl OR eventName = CreateNetworkAclEntry OR eventName = DeleteNetworkAcl OR eventName = DeleteNetworkAclEntry OR eventName = ReplaceNetworkAclEntry OR eventName = ReplaceNetworkAclAssociation)", + "description": "This is a list of AWS event names that are associated with Network ACLs" + }, + { + "name": "notable", + "definition": "index=notable", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "o365_management_activity", + "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "okta", + "definition": "eventtype=okta_log", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "osquery_process", + "definition": "eventtype=\"osquery-process\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "potentially_malicious_code_on_cmdline_tokenize_score", + "definition": "eval orig_process=process, process=replace(lower(process), \"`\", \"\") | makemv tokenizer=\"([\\w\\d\\-]+)\" process | eval unusual_cmdline_feature_for=if(match(process, \"^for$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^for$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_netsh=if(match(process, \"^netsh$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^netsh$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_readbytes=if(match(process, \"^readbytes$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^readbytes$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_set=if(match(process, \"^set$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^set$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_unrestricted=if(match(process, \"^unrestricted$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^unrestricted$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_winstations=if(match(process, \"^winstations$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^winstations$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_-value=if(match(process, \"^-value$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^-value$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_compression=if(match(process, \"^compression$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^compression$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_server=if(match(process, \"^server$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^server$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_set-mppreference=if(match(process, \"^set-mppreference$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^set-mppreference$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_terminal=if(match(process, \"^terminal$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^terminal$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_-name=if(match(process, \"^-name$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^-name$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_catch=if(match(process, \"^catch$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^catch$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_get-wmiobject=if(match(process, \"^get-wmiobject$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^get-wmiobject$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_hklm=if(match(process, \"^hklm$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^hklm$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_streamreader=if(match(process, \"^streamreader$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^streamreader$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_system32=if(match(process, \"^system32$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^system32$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_username=if(match(process, \"^username$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^username$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_webrequest=if(match(process, \"^webrequest$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^webrequest$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_count=if(match(process, \"^count$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^count$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_webclient=if(match(process, \"^webclient$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^webclient$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_writeallbytes=if(match(process, \"^writeallbytes$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^writeallbytes$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_convert=if(match(process, \"^convert$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^convert$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_create=if(match(process, \"^create$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^create$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_function=if(match(process, \"^function$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^function$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_net=if(match(process, \"^net$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^net$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_com=if(match(process, \"^com$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^com$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_http=if(match(process, \"^http$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^http$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_io=if(match(process, \"^io$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^io$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_system=if(match(process, \"^system$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^system$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_new-object=if(match(process, \"^new-object$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^new-object$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_if=if(match(process, \"^if$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^if$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_threading=if(match(process, \"^threading$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^threading$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_mutex=if(match(process, \"^mutex$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^mutex$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_cryptography=if(match(process, \"^cryptography$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^cryptography$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_computehash=if(match(process, \"^computehash$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^computehash$\"))), 0)", + "description": "Performs the tokenization and application of the malicious commandline classifier" + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_forget_window", + "definition": "\"-90d@d\"", + "description": "Use this macro to determine how long to keep track of cloud api calls per user role" + }, + { + "name": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_search_window_begin_offset", + "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", + "description": "Use this macro to determine how far into the past the window should be to determine if the user is new or not" + }, + { + "name": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_image_search_window_begin_offset", + "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", + "description": "Use this macro to determine how far into the past the window should be to determine if the image is new or not" + }, + { + "name": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_forget_window", + "definition": "\"-90d@d\"", + "description": "Use this macro to determine how long to keep track of cloud instance images" + }, + { + "name": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_type_forget_window", + "definition": "\"-90d@d\"", + "description": "Use this macro to determine how long to keep track of cloud instance types" + }, + { + "name": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types_search_window_begin_offset", + "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", + "description": "Use this macro to determine how far into the past the window should be to determine if the instance type is new or not" + }, + { + "name": "previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user_search_window_begin_offset", + "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", + "description": "Use this macro to determine how far into the past the window should be to determine if the user is new or not" + }, + { + "name": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_forget_window", + "definition": "\"-90d@d\"", + "description": "Use this macro to determine how long to keep track of cloud provisioning locations" + }, + { + "name": "previously_seen_cloud_region_forget_window", + "definition": "\"-90d@d\"", + "description": "Use this macro to determine how long to keep track of cloud regions" + }, + { + "name": "previously_seen_cloud_regions_search_window_begin_offset", + "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", + "description": "Use this macro to determine how far into the past the window should be to determine if the region is new or not" + }, + { + "name": "previously_seen_windows_services_forget_window", + "definition": "\"-90d@d\"", + "description": "Use this macro to determine how long to keep track of Windows services" + }, + { + "name": "previously_seen_windows_services_window", + "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", + "description": "Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new Windows services" + }, + { + "name": "previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_forget_window", + "definition": "\"-90d@d\"", + "description": "Use this macro to determine how long to keep track of zoom child processes" + }, + { + "name": "previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window", + "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", + "description": "Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new zoom child processes" + }, + { + "name": "previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window", + "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", + "description": "Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new provisioning activities" + }, + { + "name": "printservice", + "definition": "source=\"wineventlog:microsoft-windows-printservice/operational\" OR sourcetype=\"WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PrintService/Admin\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "process_bitsadmin", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=bitsadmin.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=bitsadmin.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "process_certutil", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=certutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=CertUtil.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "process_cmd", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "process_copy", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=copy.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=copy.exe OR Processes.process_name=xcopy.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=xcopy.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "process_csc", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=csc.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=csc.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "process_curl", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=curl.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Curl.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "process_diskshadow", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=diskshadow.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=diskshadow.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "process_dllhost", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=dllhost.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=dllhost.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "process_dsquery", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=dsquery.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=dsquery.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "process_dxdiag", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=dxdiag.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=dxdiag.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "process_esentutl", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=esentutl.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=esentutl.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "process_fodhelper", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=fodhelper.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=FodHelper.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "process_gpupdate", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=gpupdate.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=GPUpdate.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "process_hh", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=hh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=HH.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "process_installutil", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=installutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=InstallUtil.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "process_microsoftworkflowcompiler", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "process_msbuild", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=msbuild.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSBuild.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "process_mshta", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=mshta.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSHTA.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "process_net", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "process_netsh", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=netsh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=netsh.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "process_nltest", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=nltest.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=nltestrk.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "process_ntdsutil", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=ntdsutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=ntdsutil.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "process_ping", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=ping.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=ping.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "process_powershell", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "process_procdump", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=procdump.exe OR Processes.process_name=procdump64.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=procdump)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "process_psexec", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=psexec.exe OR Processes.process_name=psexec64.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=psexec.c)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "process_rclone", + "definition": "(Processes.original_file_name=rclone.exe OR Processes.process_name=rclone.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name." + }, + { + "name": "process_reg", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=reg.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=reg.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "process_regasm", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=regasm.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RegAsm.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "process_regsvcs", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvcs.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RegSvcs.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "process_regsvr32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=REGSVR32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "process_route", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=route.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=route.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "process_runas", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=runas.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=runas.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "process_schtasks", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=schtasks.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "process_sdelete", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=sdelete.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=sdelete.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "process_setspn", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=setspn.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=setspn.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "process_verclsid", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=verclsid.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=verclsid.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "process_vssadmin", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=vssadmin.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=VSSADMIN.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "process_wbadmin", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=wbadmin.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=WBADMIN.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "process_wmic", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "prohibited_apps_launching_cmd", + "definition": "| inputlookup prohibited_apps_launching_cmd | rename prohibited_applications as parent_process_name | eval parent_process_name=\"*\" . parent_process_name | table parent_process_name", + "description": "This macro outputs a list of process that should not be the parent process of cmd.exe" + }, + { + "name": "prohibited_softwares", + "definition": "lookup prohibited_softwares app as process_name OUTPUT is_prohibited | search is_prohibited=True", + "description": "This macro limits the output to process_names that have been marked as prohibited" + }, + { + "name": "ransomware_extensions", + "definition": "lookup update=true ransomware_extensions_lookup Extensions AS file_extension OUTPUT Name | search Name !=False", + "description": "This macro limits the output to files that have extensions associated with ransomware" + }, + { + "name": "ransomware_notes", + "definition": "lookup ransomware_notes_lookup ransomware_notes as file_name OUTPUT status as \"Known Ransomware Notes\" | search \"Known Ransomware Notes\"=True", + "description": "This macro limits the output to files that have been identified as a ransomware note" + }, + { + "name": "remove_valid_domains", + "definition": "eval domain=trim(domain,\"*\") | search NOT[| inputlookup domains] NOT[ |inputlookup cim_corporate_email_domain_lookup] NOT[inputlookup cim_corporate_web_domain_lookup] | eval domain=\"*\"+domain+\"*\"", + "description": "This macro removes valid domains from the output" + }, + { + "name": "s3_accesslogs", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:s3:accesslogs", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for AWS cloudwatch vpc logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_group_api_calls", + "definition": "(eventName=AuthorizeSecurityGroupIngress OR eventName=CreateSecurityGroup OR eventName=DeleteSecurityGroup OR eventName=DescribeClusterSecurityGroups OR eventName=DescribeDBSecurityGroups OR eventName=DescribeSecurityGroupReferences OR eventName=DescribeSecurityGroups OR eventName=DescribeStaleSecurityGroups OR eventName=RevokeSecurityGroupIngress OR eventName=UpdateSecurityGroupRuleDescriptionsIngress)", + "description": "This macro is a list of AWS event names associated with security groups" + }, + { + "name": "signals", + "definition": "index=signals", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "stream_dns", + "definition": "sourcetype=stream:dns", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "stream_http", + "definition": "sourcetype=stream:http", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "stream_tcp", + "definition": "sourcetype=stream:tcp", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_email_attachments", + "definition": "lookup update=true is_suspicious_file_extension_lookup file_name OUTPUT suspicious | search suspicious=true", + "description": "This macro limits the output to email attachments that have suspicious extensions" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_writes", + "definition": "lookup suspicious_writes_lookup file as file_name OUTPUT note as \"Reference\" | search \"Reference\" != False", + "description": "This macro limites the output to file names that have been marked as suspicious" + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "system_network_configuration_discovery_tools", + "definition": "(process_name= \"arp.exe\" OR process_name= \"at.exe\" OR process_name= \"attrib.exe\" OR process_name= \"cscript.exe\" OR process_name= \"dsquery.exe\" OR process_name= \"hostname.exe\" OR process_name= \"ipconfig.exe\" OR process_name= \"mimikatz.exe\" OR process_name= \"nbstat.exe\" OR process_name= \"net.exe\" OR process_name= \"netsh.exe\" OR process_name= \"nslookup.exe\" OR process_name= \"ping.exe\" OR process_name= \"quser.exe\" OR process_name= \"qwinsta.exe\" OR process_name= \"reg.exe\" OR process_name= \"runas.exe\" OR process_name= \"sc.exe\" OR process_name= \"schtasks.exe\" OR process_name= \"ssh.exe\" OR process_name= \"systeminfo.exe\" OR process_name= \"taskkill.exe\" OR process_name= \"telnet.exe\" OR process_name= \"tracert.exe\" OR process_name=\"wscript.exe\" OR process_name= \"xcopy.exe\")", + "description": "This macro is a list of process that can be used to discover the network configuration" + }, + { + "name": "uncommon_processes", + "definition": "lookup update=true lookup_uncommon_processes_default process_name as process_name outputnew uncommon_default,category_default,analytic_story_default,kill_chain_phase_default,mitre_attack_default | lookup update=true lookup_uncommon_processes_local process_name as process_name outputnew uncommon_local,category_local,analytic_story_local,kill_chain_phase_local,mitre_attack_local | eval uncommon = coalesce(uncommon_default, uncommon_local), analytic_story = coalesce(analytic_story_default, analytic_story_local), category=coalesce(category_default, category_local), kill_chain_phase=coalesce(kill_chain_phase_default, kill_chain_phase_local), mitre_attack=coalesce(mitre_attack_default, mitre_attack_local) | fields - analytic_story_default, analytic_story_local, category_default, category_local, kill_chain_phase_default, kill_chain_phase_local, mitre_attack_default, mitre_attack_local, uncommon_default, uncommon_local | search uncommon=true", + "description": "This macro limits the output to processes that have been marked as uncommon" + }, + { + "name": "windows_shells", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe)", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_system", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_task_scheduler", + "definition": "source=\"WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "wmi", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"wineventlog:microsoft-windows-wmi-activity/operational\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "zeek_rpc", + "definition": "index=zeek sourcetype=\"zeek:rpc:json\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "zeek_ssl", + "definition": "index=zeek sourcetype=\"zeek:ssl:json\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + } +] \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/dist/api/response_tasks.json b/dist/api/response_tasks.json index 9d695bf9f9..ab625e9b39 100644 --- a/dist/api/response_tasks.json +++ b/dist/api/response_tasks.json @@ -1 +1,1942 @@ -{"response_tasks": [], "count": 0} \ No newline at end of file +[ + { + "name": "All backup logs for host", + "id": "bc91a8cf-aaaa-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-12", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "Retrieve the backup logs for the last 2 weeks for a specific host in order to investigate why backups are not completing successfully.", + "search": "| search `netbackup` dest=$dest$", + "how_to_implement": "The successfully implement this search you must first send your backup logs to Splunk.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Monitor Backup Solution" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "all_backup_logs_for_host" + }, + { + "name": "Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip", + "id": "a636cca4-7434-4a15-a278-c70734938e39", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-04-13", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides investigation data about requests via user agent, authentication request URI, verb and cluster name data against Kubernetes cluster from a specific IP address", + "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` |rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip |search src_ip=$src_ip$ | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user.username) values(requestURI) values(verb) values(userAgent) by source annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision src_ip", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Cloud Watch EKS inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "src_ip" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "sourceIPs{}", + "user.username", + "requestURI", + "verb", + "userAgent", + "annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip" + }, + { + "name": "AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest", + "id": "b0d2e6a8-75fa-4b1b-9486-3d32acadf822", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-06-08", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search retrieves the all the alerts created by AWS Security Hub for a specific dest(instance_id).", + "search": "`aws_securityhub_firehose` \"findings{}.Resources{}.Type\"=AWSEC2Instance | rex field=findings{}.Resources{}.Id .*instance/(?.*)| rename instance as dest| search dest = $dest$ |rename findings{}.* as * | rename Remediation.Recommendation.Text as Remediation | table dest Title ProductArn Description FirstObservedAt RecordState Remediation", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Cloud Compute Instance", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "findings{}.Resources{}.Type", + "findings{}.Resources{}.Id", + "instance", + "Remediation.Recommendation.Text", + "Title", + "ProductArn", + "Description", + "FirstObservedAt", + "RecordState" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest" + }, + { + "name": "AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId", + "id": "703b65a4-a0ae-4171-965d-45507506c64f", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-06-08", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search retrieves the times, ARN, source IPs, AWS regions, event names, and the result of the event for specific credentials.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` | rename userIdentity.accessKeyId as accessKeyId| search accessKeyId=$accessKeyId$ | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode, errorMessage", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "accessKeyId" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom", + "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "userIdentity.accessKeyId", + "userIdentity.arn", + "sourceIPAddress", + "awsRegion", + "eventName", + "errorCode", + "errorMessage" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid" + }, + { + "name": "AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", + "id": "bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd72", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-30", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search lists all the logged CloudTrail activities by a specific user ARN and will create a table containing the source of the user, the region of the activity, the name and type of the event, the action taken, and all the user's identity information.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` | search user=$user$| table _time userIdentity.type userIdentity.userName userIdentity.arn aws_account_id src awsRegion eventName eventType", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "user" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "Command & Control", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Suspicious Cloud User Activities", + "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", + "AWS Security Hub Alerts" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "user", + "userIdentity.type", + "userIdentity.userName", + "userIdentity.arn", + "aws_account_id", + "src", + "awsRegion", + "eventName", + "eventType" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn" + }, + { + "name": "AWS Network ACL Details from ID", + "id": "2e11293f-c795-41bd-b470-fc87adc4e196", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-01-22", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries AWS description logs and returns all the information about a specific network ACL via network ACL ID", + "search": "`aws_description` | rename id as networkAclId | search networkAclId=$networkAclId$ | table id account_id vpc_id network_acl_entries{}.*", + "how_to_implement": "In order to implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS(version 4.4.0 or later) and configure your AWS description inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "networkAclId" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Command & Control", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "id", + "account_id", + "vpc_id", + "network_acl_entries{}.*" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "aws_network_acl_details_from_id" + }, + { + "name": "AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", + "id": "c55b0a17-8fca-4315-81e3-65ceaa176441", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-05-07", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries AWS configuration logs and returns the information about a specific network interface via network interface ID. The information will include the ARN of the network interface, its relationships with other AWS resources, the public and the private IP associated with the network interface.", + "search": "`aws_config` resourceId=$resourceId$ | table _time ARN relationships{}.resourceType relationships{}.name relationships{}.resourceId configuration.privateIpAddresses{}.privateIpAddress configuration.privateIpAddresses{}.association.publicIp", + "how_to_implement": "In order to implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS(version 4.4.0 or later) and configure your AWS configuration inputs", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "resourceId" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Command & Control", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "resourceId", + "ARN", + "relationships{}.resourceType", + "relationships{}.name", + "relationships{}.resourceId", + "configuration.privateIpAddresses{}.privateIpAddress", + "configuration.privateIpAddresses{}.association.publicIp" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid" + }, + { + "name": "AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName", + "id": "2762d4ed-9266-465e-b966-1c10dc8d91f3", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-06-26", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries AWS configuration logs and returns the information about a specific S3 bucket. The information returned includes the time the S3 bucket was created, the resource ID, the region it belongs to, the value of action performed, AWS account ID, and configuration values of the access-control lists associated with the bucket.", + "search": "`aws_config` | rename resourceId as bucketName |search bucketName=$bucketName$ | table resourceCreationTime bucketName vendor_region action aws_account_id supplementaryConfiguration.AccessControlList", + "how_to_implement": "To implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later) and configure your AWS inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "bucketName" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "resourceId", + "bucketName", + "resourceCreationTime", + "vendor_region", + "action", + "aws_account_id", + "supplementaryConfiguration.AccessControlList" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname" + }, + { + "name": "GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip", + "id": "c00e7626-92cc-4e06-9a51-b6db0a50bd1f", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-04-13", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides investigation data about requests via user agent, authentication request URI, resource path and cluster name data against Kubernetes cluster from a specific IP address", + "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` | rename data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp as src_ip | search src_ip =$src_ip$ | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(data.protoPayload.methodName) as method_names values(data.protoPayload.resourceName) as resource_name values(data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent) as http_user_agent values(data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail) as user values(data.protoPayload.status.message) by src_ip data.resource.labels.cluster_name data.resource.type", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later), then configure stackdriver and set a Pub/Sub subscription to be imported to Splunk. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model.Customize the macro kubernetes_gcp_scan_fingerprint_attack_detection to filter out FPs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "src_ip" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp", + "data.protoPayload.methodName", + "data.protoPayload.resourceName", + "data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent", + "data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail", + "data.protoPayload.status.message", + "data.resource.labels.cluster_name", + "data.resource.type" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip" + }, + { + "name": "Get All AWS Activity From City", + "id": "0abeeb40-1255-4b68-91d1-7a7eb410c4b8", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-03-19", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search retrieves all the activity from a specific city and will create a table containing the time, city, ARN, username, the type of user, the source IP address, the AWS region the activity was in, the API called, and whether or not the API call was successful.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search City=$City$ | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn | spath output=awsUserName path=userIdentity.userName | spath output=userType path=userIdentity.type | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, City, user, userName, userType, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "City" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "sourceIPAddress", + "userIdentity.arn", + "userIdentity.userName", + "userIdentity.type", + "awsRegion", + "eventName", + "errorCode" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_all_aws_activity_from_city" + }, + { + "name": "Get All AWS Activity From Country", + "id": "e763cdb9-00da-41e0-9bda-444debc9501a", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-03-19", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search retrieves all the activity from a specific country and will create a table containing the time, country, ARN, username, the type of user, the source IP address, the AWS region the activity was in, the API called, and whether or not the API call was successful.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Country=$Country$ | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn | spath output=awsUserName path=userIdentity.userName | spath output=userType path=userIdentity.type | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, Country, user, userName, userType, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "Country" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "sourceIPAddress", + "userIdentity.arn", + "userIdentity.userName", + "userIdentity.type", + "awsRegion", + "eventName", + "errorCode" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_all_aws_activity_from_country" + }, + { + "name": "Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", + "id": "446ec87a-85c6-40d4-b060-bea4498281d6", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-03-19", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search retrieves all the activity from a specific IP address and will create a table containing the time, ARN, username, the type of user, the IP address, the AWS region the activity was in, the API called, and whether or not the API call was successful.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search src_ip=$src_ip$ | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn | spath output=awsUserName path=userIdentity.userName | spath output=userType path=userIdentity.type | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, userName, userType, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "src_ip" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities", + "Command & Control", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "sourceIPAddress", + "userIdentity.arn", + "userIdentity.userName", + "userIdentity.type", + "awsRegion", + "eventName", + "errorCode" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address" + }, + { + "name": "Get All AWS Activity From Region", + "id": "5b794bef-1743-4f6f-804a-43915a2702ff", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-03-19", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search retrieves all the activity from a specific geographic region and will create a table containing the time, geographic region, ARN, username, the type of user, the source IP address, the AWS region the activity was in, the API called, and whether or not the API call was successful.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Region=$Region$ | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn | spath output=awsUserName path=userIdentity.userName | spath output=userType path=userIdentity.type | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, Region, user, userName, userType, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "Region" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "sourceIPAddress", + "userIdentity.arn", + "userIdentity.userName", + "userIdentity.type", + "awsRegion", + "eventName", + "errorCode" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_all_aws_activity_from_region" + }, + { + "name": "Get Backup Logs For Endpoint", + "id": "fdcfb369-1725-4c24-824a-22972d7f0d44", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-14", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search will tell you the backup status from your netbackup_logs of a specific endpoint for the last week.", + "search": "`netbackup` COMPUTERNAME=$dest$ | rename COMPUTERNAME as dest, MESSAGE as signature | table _time, dest, signature", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your backup logs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "COMPUTERNAME", + "MESSAGE" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_backup_logs_for_endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Get Certificate logs for a domain", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-2240-e756cc06fd73", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-29", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the Certificates datamodel and give you all the information for a specific domain. Please note that the certificates issued by \"Let's Encrypt\" are widely used by attackers.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Certificates.All_Certificates where All_Certificates.SSL.ssl_subject_common_name=*$domain$ by All_Certificates.dest All_Certificates.src All_Certificates.SSL.ssl_issuer_common_name All_Certificates.SSL.ssl_subject_common_name All_Certificates.SSL.ssl_hash | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Certificates)` | `drop_dm_object_name(SSL)` | rename ssl_subject_common_name as domain | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your certificates or SSL logs from your network traffic into your Certificates datamodel. Please note the wildcard(*) before domain in the search syntax, we use to match for all domain and subdomain combinations", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "domain" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Common Phishing Frameworks" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Certificates.SSL.ssl_subject_common_name", + "All_Certificates.dest", + "All_Certificates.src", + "All_Certificates.SSL.ssl_issuer_common_name", + "All_Certificates.SSL.ssl_hash" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain" + }, + { + "name": "Get DNS Server History for a host", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-11-09", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "While investigating any detections it is important to understand which and how many DNS servers a host has connected to in the past. This search uses data that is tagged as DNS and gives you a count and list of DNS servers that a particular host has connected to the previous 24 hours.", + "search": "| search tag=dns src_ip=$src_ip$ dest_port=53 | streamstats time_window=1d count values(dest_ip) as dcip by src_ip | table date_mday src_ip dcip count | sort -count", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting your DNS traffic", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "src_ip" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Command & Control", + "DNS Hijacking", + "Data Protection", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "src_ip", + "dest_port", + "dest_ip" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_dns_server_history_for_a_host" + }, + { + "name": "Get DNS traffic ratio", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd73", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-11-09", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search calculates the ratio of DNS traffic originating and coming from a host to a list of DNS servers over the last 24 hours. A high value of this ratio could be very useful to quickly understand if a src_ip (host) is sending a high volume of data out via port 53, could be an indicator of data exfiltration via DNS. ", + "search": "| tstats allow_old_summaries=true sum(All_Traffic.bytes_out) as \"bytes_out\" sum(All_Traffic.bytes_in) as \"bytes_in\" from datamodel=Network_Traffic where nodename=All_Traffic All_Traffic.dest_port=53 by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest| `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | rename src as src_ip | rename dest as dest_ip | search src_ip=$src_ip$ | search dest_ip = $dest_ip | eval ratio = (bytes_out/bytes_in) | table ratio", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your network traffic", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "src_ip" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Command & Control", + "Data Protection", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.bytes_out", + "All_Traffic.bytes_in", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.src", + "All_Traffic.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_dns_traffic_ratio" + }, + { + "name": "Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", + "id": "de4aed1d-f13a-4d2f-a97a-73c60e2e6b56", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-02-12", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries AWS description logs and returns all the information about a specific instance via the instanceId field", + "search": "`aws_description` | dedup id sortby -_time |rename id as instanceId| search instanceId=$instanceId$ | spath output=tags path=tags | eval tags=mvzip(key,value,\" = \"), ip_address=if((ip_address == \"null\"),private_ip_address,ip_address) | table id, tags.Name, aws_account_id, placement, instance_type, key_name, ip_address, launch_time, state, vpc_id, subnet_id, tags | rename aws_account_id as \"Account ID\", id as ID, instance_type as Type, ip_address as \"IP Address\", key_name as \"Key Pair\", launch_time as \"Launch Time\", placement as \"Availability Zone\", state as State, subnet_id as Subnet, \"tags.Name\" as Name, vpc_id as VPC", + "how_to_implement": "In order to implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS(version 4.4.0 or later) and configure your AWS description inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "instanceId" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "AWS Security Hub Alerts" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "id", + "ip_address", + "tags", + "aws_account_id", + "placement", + "instance_type", + "key_name", + "launch_time", + "state", + "vpc_id", + "subnet_id" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid" + }, + { + "name": "Get EC2 Launch Details", + "id": "0e40fe83-3edb-4d86-8206-8fed36529ca6", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-03-12", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search returns some of the launch details for a EC2 instance.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` dest=$dest$ |rename userIdentity.arn as arn, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as dest, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.privateIpAddress as privateIpAddress, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.imageId as amiID, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.architecture as architecture, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.keyName as keyName | table arn, awsRegion, dest, architecture, privateIpAddress, amiID, keyName", + "how_to_implement": "In order to implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS(version 4.4.0 or later) and configure your AWS description inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "AWS Security Hub Alerts" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "dest", + "userIdentity.arn", + "responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId", + "responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.privateIpAddress", + "responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.imageId", + "responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.architecture", + "responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.keyName" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_ec2_launch_details" + }, + { + "name": "Get Email Info", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd75", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-11-09", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search returns all the information Splunk might have collected a specific email message over the last 2 hours.", + "search": "| from datamodel Email.All_Email | search message_id=$message_id$", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting your email logs or capturing unencrypted network traffic which contains email communications.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "message_id" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Brand Monitoring", + "Suspicious Emails" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "message" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_email_info" + }, + { + "name": "Get Emails From Specific Sender", + "id": "5df39b3f-447d-4869-b673-8f45ad4616fe", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-11-09", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search returns all the emails from a specific sender over the last 24 and next hours.", + "search": "| from datamodel Email.All_Email | search src_user=$src_user$", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must ingest your email logs or capture unencrypted email communications within network traffic, and populate the Email data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "src_user" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Brand Monitoring", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Web Fraud Detection" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "src_user" + ], + "security_domain": "networks" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_emails_from_specific_sender" + }, + { + "name": "Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd33", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-13", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Sessions" + ], + "description": "This search allows you to gather more context around a notable which has detected a new device connecting to your network. Use this search to determine the first and last occurrences of the suspicious device attempting to connect with your network.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Sessions where nodename=All_Sessions.DHCP All_Sessions.signature=DHCPREQUEST All_Sessions.src_mac= $src_mac$ by All_Sessions.src_ip All_Sessions.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting the logs from your DHCP server.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "src_mac" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Asset Tracking" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Sessions.DHCP", + "All_Sessions.signature", + "All_Sessions.src_mac", + "All_Sessions.src_ip", + "All_Sessions.user" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address" + }, + { + "name": "Get History Of Email Sources", + "id": "ddc7af28-c34d-4392-af93-7f29a4e8806c", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-02-21", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Email" + ], + "description": "This search returns a list of all email sources seen in the 48 hours prior to the notable event to 24 hours after, and the number of emails from each source.", + "search": "|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Email.dest) as dest values(All_Email.recipient) as recepient min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count from datamodel=Email.All_Email by All_Email.src |`drop_dm_object_name(All_Email)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search src=$src$", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must ingest your email logs or capture unencrypted email communications within network traffic, and populate the Email data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "src" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Email.dest", + "All_Email.recipient", + "All_Email.src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_history_of_email_sources" + }, + { + "name": "Get Logon Rights Modifications For Endpoint", + "id": "03bffe94-ec7a-4cbe-b677-6af40d1c4505", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-12", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search allows you to retrieve any modifications to logon rights associated with a specific host.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` (signature_id=4718 OR signature_id=4717) dest=$dest$ | rename user as \"Account Modified\" | table _time, dest, \"Account Modified\", Access_Right, signature", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting your Windows event logs", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Account Monitoring and Controls" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "signature_id", + "dest", + "user" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Get Logon Rights Modifications For User", + "id": "552bc86c-f72c-4d44-b3f2-06ede13af7bb", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-02-27", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search allows you to retrieve any modifications to logon rights for a specific user account.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` (signature_id=4718 OR signature_id=4717) user=$user$ | rename user as \"Account Modified\" | table _time, dest, \"Account Modified\", Access_Right, signature", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting your Windows event logs", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "user" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Account Monitoring and Controls" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "signature_id", + "dest", + "user" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user" + }, + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + }, + { + "name": "Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors", + "id": "80bac352-e089-46b9-a6a4-8a8467d4d8cf", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-06-14", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Email" + ], + "description": "This search returns the information of the users that sent emails to the accounts controlled by the Hidden Cobra Threat Actors: specifically to `misswang8107@gmail.com`, and from `redhat@gmail.com`.", + "search": "| from datamodel Email.All_Email | search recipient=misswang8107@gmail.com OR src_user=redhat@gmail.com | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(dest) values(src) by src_user recipient | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must ingest your email logs or capture unencrypted email communications within network traffic, and populate the Email data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Hidden Cobra Malware" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "recipient", + "src_user", + "dest", + "sec" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors" + }, + { + "name": "Get Parent Process Info", + "id": "fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41bf9", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-02-28", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "parent_process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Phishing Payloads", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_parent_process_info" + }, + { + "name": "Get Process File Activity", + "id": "6a9ad4d9-6ef2-4b85-953f-a37ab256acd5", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-11-06", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search returns the file activity for a specific process on a specific endpoint", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Filesystem.file_name) as file_name values(Filesystem.dest) as dest, values(Filesystem.process_name) as process_name from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.process_name Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.action, _time | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | search dest=$dest$ | search process_name=$process_name$ | table _time, process_name, dest, action, file_name, file_path", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest", + "process_name" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Suspicious Zoom Child Processes" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Filesystem.process_name", + "Filesystem.file_path", + "Filesystem.action" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_process_file_activity" + }, + { + "name": "Get Process Info", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd71", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-01", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the process running on a host which is under investigation. To gather the process info, enter the values for the process name in question and the destination IP address.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search process_name= $process_name$ | search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_process_info" + }, + { + "name": "Get Process Information For Port Activity", + "id": "9925d08f-561e-4faa-8912-e3888a842341", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-01", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search will return information about the process associated with observed network traffic to a specific destination port from a specific host.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search dest=$dest$ | join dest type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Ports by Ports.process_id Ports.src Ports.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | search dest_port=$dest_port$ | rename src as dest]", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data that associates processes with network events and populate the Endpoint Datamodel", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest", + "dest_port" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Ports.process_id", + "Ports.src", + "Ports.dest_port" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_process_information_for_port_activity" + }, + { + "name": "Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", + "id": "910e6512-edc9-4f93-ba24-5b786f47a672", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-01", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "While investigating, an analyst will want to know what process and parent_process is responsible for generating suspicious DNS traffic. Use the following search and enter the value of `dest` in the search to get specific details on the process responsible for creating the DNS traffic.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search dest = $dest$ | join dest type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port=53 by Ports.process_id Ports.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename src as dest]", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that associates processes with network events into the Endpoint datamodel. This can come from endpoint protection products such as carbon black, or endpoint data sources such as Sysmon.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Command & Control", + "Data Protection", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Ports.process_id", + "Ports.src", + "Ports.dest_port" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic" + }, + { + "name": "Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host", + "id": "155e0571-7db6-42f2-aa62-9a3a4cf35c94", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-10-23", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries Sysmon WMI events for the host of interest.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode>18 EventCode<22 | rename host as dest | search dest=$dest$| table _time, dest, user, Name, Operation, EventType, Type, Query, Consumer, Filter", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be collecting Sysmon data using Sysmon version 6.1 or greater and have Sysmon configured to generate events for WMI activity. In addition, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA installed to properly parse the fields.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Suspicious WMI Use" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "user", + "Name", + "Operation", + "EventType", + "Type", + "Query", + "Consumer", + "Filter" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host" + }, + { + "name": "Get Web Session Information via session id", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-1120-e756cc06fd89", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-10-08", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search helps an analyst investigate a notable event to find out more about a specific web session. The search looks for a specific web session ID in the HTTP web traffic and outputs the URL and user agents, grouped by source IP address and HTTP status code.", + "search": "`stream_http` session_id = $session_id$ | stats values(url) values(http_user_agent) by src_ip status", + "how_to_implement": "This search leverages data extracted from Stream:HTTP. You must configure the HTTP stream using the Splunk Stream App on your Splunk Stream deployment server.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "session_id" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Web Fraud Detection" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "session_id", + "http_user_agent", + "src_ip", + "status" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_web_session_information_via_session_id" + }, + { + "name": "Investigate AWS activities via region name", + "id": "bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd11", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-02-09", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search lists all the user activities logged by CloudTrail for a specific region in question and will create a table of the values of parameters requested, the type of the event and the response from the AWS API by each user", + "search": "`cloudtrail` vendor_region=$vendor_region$| rename requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as instanceId | stats values(eventName) by user instanceId vendor_region", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "vendor_region" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "vendor_region", + "requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId", + "eventName", + "user" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name" + }, + { + "name": "Investigate AWS User Activities by user field", + "id": "bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd76", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-03-12", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search lists all the logged CloudTrail activities by a specific user and will create a table containing the source of the user, the region of the activity, the name and type of the event, the action taken, and the user's identity information.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` user=$user$ | table _time userIdentity.type userIdentity.userName userIdentity.arn aws_account_id src awsRegion eventName eventType ", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "user" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "user", + "userIdentity.type", + "userIdentity.userName", + "userIdentity.arn", + "aws_account_id", + "src", + "awsRegion", + "eventName", + "eventType" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field" + }, + { + "name": "Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations", + "id": "097e8030-8662-4254-a735-bf0bdda696e3", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-12-10", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Authentication" + ], + "description": "This search returns failed logins to multiple destinations by user.", + "search": "| tstats count `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as first_login latest(_time) as last_login dc(Authentication.dest) AS distinct_count_dest values(Authentication.dest) AS Authentication.dest values(Authentication.app) AS Authentication.app from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.action=failure by Authentication.user | where distinct_count_dest > 1 | `security_content_ctime(first_login)` | `security_content_ctime(last_login)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Authentication\")` | search user=$user$", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting authentication logs from your various systems and populating the Authentication data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "user" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Authentication.dest", + "Authentication.app", + "Authentication.action", + "Authentication.user" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations" + }, + { + "name": "Investigate Network Traffic From src ip", + "id": "9df9ca9c-a02b-4f48-9eba-0bac55179050", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-06-15", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search allows you to find all the network traffic from a specific IP address.", + "search": "| from datamodel Network_Traffic.All_Traffic | search src_ip=$src_ip$", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting your web-traffic logs and populating the web data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "src_ip" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "src_ip" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip" + }, + { + "name": "Investigate Okta Activity by app", + "id": "420eb1b8-2992-45d1-80cf-0b1b2759524d", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-04-02", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search returns all okta events associated with a specific app", + "search": "`okta` app=$app$ | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | table _time, user, displayMessage, app, src_ip, state, city, result, outcome.reason", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Okta logs", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "app" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Okta Activity" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "app", + "client.geographicalContext.country", + "client.geographicalContext.state", + "client.geographicalContext.city", + "user", + "displayMessage", + "src_ip", + "result", + "outcome.reason" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "investigate_okta_activity_by_app" + }, + { + "name": "Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address", + "id": "56aae066-d619-477c-93e3-3fb83b2d23c3", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-04-02", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search returns all okta events from a specific IP address.", + "search": "`okta` src_ip={src_ip} | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | table _time, user, displayMessage, app, src_ip, state, city, result, outcome.reason", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Okta logs", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Okta Activity" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "app", + "client.geographicalContext.country", + "client.geographicalContext.state", + "client.geographicalContext.city", + "user", + "displayMessage", + "src_ip", + "result", + "outcome.reason" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address" + }, + { + "name": "Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts", + "id": "ed3fff45-cba6-4990-983f-6fac72bee659", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-12-10", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search hunts for dumped NTLM hashes used for pass the hash.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=9 AuthenticationPackageName=Negotiate | stats count earliest(_time) as first_login latest(_time) as last_login by src_user dest | `security_content_ctime(first_login)` | `security_content_ctime(last_login)` | search dest=$dest$", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need be ingesting windows security logs. This search uses an input macro named `wineventlog_security`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Security logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Logon_Type", + "AuthenticationPackageName", + "src_user", + "dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts" + }, + { + "name": "Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts", + "id": "990007ad-d798-4b29-ab2f-f0034144c937", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-12-10", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search hunts for dumped kerberos ticket from LSASS memory.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 OR EventCode=4769 | rex field=user \"(?[^\\@]+)\" | stats count BY new_user, dest, EventCode | stats max(count) AS max_count sum(count) AS sum_count BY new_user, dest| search dest=$dest$ | where sum_count/max_count!=2 | rename new_user AS user ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting windows security logs. This search uses an input macro named `wineventlog_security`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Security logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "user", + "dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts" + }, + { + "name": "Investigate Previous Unseen User", + "id": "ad114d5c-8079-4a84-a646-2fd00dfc07cc", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-12-10", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Authentication" + ], + "description": "This search returns previous unseen user, which didn't log in for 30 days.", + "search": "| tstats count `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as first_login latest(_time) as last_login values(Authentication.dest) AS Authentication.dest values(Authentication.app) AS Authentication.app values(Authentication.action) AS Authentication.action from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.action=success by _time, Authentication.user | bucket _time span=30d | stats count min(first_login) as first_login max(last_login) as last_login values(Authentication.dest) AS Authentication.dest by Authentication.user | where count=1 | where first_login >= relative_time(now(), \"-30d\") | `security_content_ctime(first_login)` | `security_content_ctime(last_login)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Authentication\")` | search dest=$dest$", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting authentication logs from your various systems and populating the Authentication data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Authentication.dest", + "Authentication.app", + "Authentication.action", + "Authentication.user" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "investigate_previous_unseen_user" + }, + { + "name": "Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", + "id": "b6618e8e-be04-40a0-a0b9-f0bd4b6c81bc", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-12-14", + "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Authentication" + ], + "description": "This search returns the source, destination, and user for all successful remote-desktop authentications. A successful authentication after a brute-force attack on a destination machine is suspicious behavior. ", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature_id=4624 Authentication.app=win:remote by Authentication.src Authentication.dest Authentication.app Authentication.user Authentication.signature Authentication.src_nt_domain | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Authentication\")` | search dest=$dest$ | table firstTime lastTime src src_nt_domain dest user app count | sort count", + "how_to_implement": "You must be populating the Authentication data model with security events from your Windows event logs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement", + "SamSam Ransomware" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Authentication.signature_id", + "Authentication.app", + "Authentication.src", + "Authentication.dest", + "Authentication.user", + "Authentication.signature", + "Authentication.src_nt_domain" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications" + }, + { + "name": "Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd89", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-10-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search helps an analyst investigate a notable event related to a potential Apache Struts exploitation. To investigate, we will want to isolate and analyze the \"payload\" or the commands that were passed to the vulnerable hosts by creating a few regular expressions to carve out the commands focusing on common keywords from the payload, such as cmd.exe, /bin/bash and whois. The search returns these suspicious strings found in the HTTP logs of the system of interest.", + "search": "`stream_http` | search src_ip=$src_ip$ | search dest_ip=$dest_ip$ | eval cs_content_type_length = len(cs_content_type) | search cs_content_type_length > 100 | rex field=\"cs_content_type\" (?cmd.exe) | eval suspicious_strings_found=if(match(cs_content_type, \"application\"), \"True\", \"False\") | rename suspicious_strings_found AS \"Suspicious Content-Type Found\" | fields \"Suspicious Content-Type Found\", dest_ip, src_ip, suspicious_strings, cs_content_type, cs_content_type_length, url", + "how_to_implement": "This particular search leverages data extracted from Stream:HTTP. You must configure the http stream using the Splunk Stream App on your Splunk Stream deployment server to extract the cs_content_type field.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "src_ip", + "dest_ip" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Apache Struts Vulnerability" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "src_ip", + "dest_ip", + "cs_content_type", + "url" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header" + }, + { + "name": "Investigate User Activities In Okta", + "id": "24ff145d-4d16-420a-b047-480f2a51c403", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-04-02", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search returns all okta events by a specific user", + "search": "`okta` user=$user$ | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | table _time, user, displayMessage, app, src_ip, state, city, result, outcome.reason", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Okta logs", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "user" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Okta Activity" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "client.geographicalContext.country", + "client.geographicalContext.state", + "client.geographicalContext.city", + "user", + "displayMessage", + "src_ip", + "result", + "outcome.reason" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "investigate_user_activities_in_okta" + }, + { + "name": "Investigate Web POSTs From src", + "id": "f5c39fac-205c-4e07-9004-8fd61ea3431a", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-12-06", + "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "This investigative search retrieves POST requests from a specified source IP or hostname. Identifying the POST requests, as well as their associated destination URLs and user agent(s), may help you scope and characterize the suspicious traffic. ", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Web.url) as url from datamodel=Web by Web.src,Web.http_user_agent,Web.http_method | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")`| search http_method, \"POST\" | search src=$src$", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting your web-traffic logs and populating the web data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "src" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Apache Struts Vulnerability" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Web.url", + "Web.src", + "Web.http_user_agent", + "Web.http_method" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "investigate_web_posts_from_src" + }, + { + "name": "Rundll32 LockWorkStation", + "id": "fa90f372-f91d-11eb-816c-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-09", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32 commandline to lock the workstation through command line. This technique was seen in CONTI leak tooling and script as part of its defense evasion. This technique is not a common practice to lock a screen and maybe a good indicator of compromise.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe Processes.process= \"*user32.dll,LockWorkStation*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_lockworkstation_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1423361119926816776.html" + ], + "inputs": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "rundll32_lockworkstation" + } +] \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/dist/api/stories.json b/dist/api/stories.json index 7cf292b96e..ed29933e7e 100644 --- a/dist/api/stories.json +++ b/dist/api/stories.json @@ -1 +1,371073 @@ -{"stories": [{"name": "AWS Cross Account Activity", "id": "2f2f610a-d64d-48c2-b57c-967a2b49ab5a", "version": 1, "date": "2018-06-04", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "description": "Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another AWS account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity.", "narrative": "Amazon Web Services (AWS) admins manage access to AWS resources and services across the enterprise using AWS's Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage AWS users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as EC2 instances, the AWS Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\\\nHerein lies the rub. In between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\\\nThis Analytic Story includes searches that will help you monitor your AWS CloudTrail logs for evidence of suspicious cross-account activity. For example, while accessing multiple AWS accounts and roles may be perfectly valid behavior, it may be suspicious when an account requests privileges of an account it has not accessed in the past. After identifying suspicious activities, you can use the provided investigative searches to help you probe more deeply.", "references": ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "AWS Cross Account Activity", "category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078", "T1550"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Valid Accounts", "Use Alternate Authentication Material"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Sandworm Team", "TEMP.Veles", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT39", "Carbanak", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT41", "FIN5", "menuPass", "FIN6", "OilRig", "Wizard Spider", "APT18", "no", "FIN10", "PittyTiger", "FIN4", "APT28", "APT33", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Night Dragon"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "aws detect permanent key creation", "id": "12d6d713-3cb4-4ffc-a064-1dca3d1cca01", "version": 1, "date": "2020-07-27", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides detection of accounts creating permanent keys. Permanent keys are not created by default and they are only needed for programmatic calls. Creation of Permanent key is an important event to monitor.", "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` CreateAccessKey | spath eventName | search eventName=CreateAccessKey \"userIdentity.type\"=IAMUser | table sourceIPAddress userName userIdentity.type userAgent action status responseElements.accessKey.createDate responseElements.accessKey.status responseElements.accessKey.accessKeyId |`aws_detect_permanent_key_creation_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs", "known_false_positives": "Not all permanent key creations are malicious. If there is a policy of rotating keys this search can be adjusted to provide better context.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cross Account Activity"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "userIdentity.type", "sourceIPAddress", "userName userIdentity.type", "userAgent", "action", "status", "responseElements.accessKey.createDate", "esponseElements.accessKey.status", "responseElements.accessKey.accessKeyId"], "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Valid Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_detect_permanent_key_creation_filter"}]}, {"name": "aws detect role creation", "id": "5f04081e-ddee-4353-afe4-504f288de9ad", "version": 1, "date": "2020-07-27", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides detection of role creation by IAM users. Role creation is an event by itself if user is creating a new role with trust policies different than the available in AWS and it can be used for lateral movement and escalation of privileges.", "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` event_name=CreateRole action=created userIdentity.type=AssumedRole requestParameters.description=Allows* | table sourceIPAddress userIdentity.principalId userIdentity.arn action event_name awsRegion http_user_agent mfa_auth msg requestParameters.roleName requestParameters.description responseElements.role.arn responseElements.role.createDate | `aws_detect_role_creation_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add-on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs", "known_false_positives": "CreateRole is not very common in common users. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse. In general AWS provides plenty of trust policies that fit most use cases.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cross Account Activity"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "event_name", "action", "userIdentity.type", "requestParameters.description", "sourceIPAddress", "userIdentity.principalId", "userIdentity.arn", "action", "event_name", "awsRegion", "http_user_agent", "mfa_auth", "msg", "requestParameters.roleName", "requestParameters.description", "responseElements.role.arn", "responseElements.role.createDate"], "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Valid Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_detect_role_creation_filter"}]}, {"name": "aws detect attach to role policy", "id": "88fc31dd-f331-448c-9856-d3d51dd5d3a1", "version": 1, "date": "2020-07-27", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides detection of an user attaching itself to a different role trust policy. This can be used for lateral movement and escalation of privileges.", "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` attach policy| spath requestParameters.policyArn | table sourceIPAddress user_access_key userIdentity.arn userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.arn eventName errorCode errorMessage status action requestParameters.policyArn userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.mfaAuthenticated userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.creationDate | `aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add-on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs", "known_false_positives": "Attach to policy can create a lot of noise. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse (i.e status=failure). The search can provide context for common users attaching themselves to higher privilege policies or even newly created policies.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cross Account Activity"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "requestParameters.policyArn"], "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Valid Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy_filter"}]}, {"name": "aws detect sts assume role abuse", "id": "8e565314-b6a2-46d8-9f05-1a34a176a662", "version": 1, "date": "2020-07-27", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides detection of suspicious use of sts:AssumeRole. These tokens can be created on the go and used by attackers to move laterally and escalate privileges.", "search": "`cloudtrail` user_type=AssumedRole userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.type=Role | table sourceIPAddress userIdentity.arn user_agent user_access_key status action requestParameters.roleName responseElements.role.roleName responseElements.role.createDate | `aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs", "known_false_positives": "Sts:AssumeRole can be very noisy as it is a standard mechanism to provide cross account and cross resources access. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cross Account Activity"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "user_type", "userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.type", "sourceIPAddress", "userIdentity.arn", "user_agent", "user_access_key", "status", "action", "requestParameters.roleName", "esponseElements.role.roleName", "esponseElements.role.createDate"], "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Valid Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse_filter"}]}, {"name": "aws detect sts get session token abuse", "id": "85d7b35f-b8b5-4b01-916f-29b81e7a0551", "version": 1, "date": "2020-07-27", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides detection of suspicious use of sts:GetSessionToken. These tokens can be created on the go and used by attackers to move laterally and escalate privileges.", "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` ASIA userIdentity.type=IAMUser| spath eventName | search eventName=GetSessionToken | table sourceIPAddress eventTime userIdentity.arn userName userAgent user_type status region | `aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add-on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs", "known_false_positives": "Sts:GetSessionToken can be very noisy as in certain environments numerous calls of this type can be executed. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse. In specific environments the use of field requestParameters.serialNumber will need to be used.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cross Account Activity"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1550"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "userIdentity.type", "eventName", "sourceIPAddress", "eventTime", "userIdentity.arn", "userName", "userAgent", "user_type", "status", "region"], "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Use Alternate Authentication Material"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Credential Dumping", "id": "854d78bf-d0e2-4f4e-b05c-640905f86d7a", "version": 3, "date": "2020-02-04", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "description": "Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords. The threat actors use these pilfered credentials to further escalate privileges and spread throughout a target environment. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to credential dumping.", "narrative": "Credential dumping—gathering credentials from a target system, often hashed or encrypted—is a common attack technique. Even though the credentials may not be in plain text, an attacker can still exfiltrate the data and set to cracking it offline, on their own systems. The threat actors target a variety of sources to extract them, including the Security Accounts Manager (SAM), Local Security Authority (LSA), NTDS from Domain Controllers, or the Group Policy Preference (GPP) files.\\\nOnce attackers obtain valid credentials, they use them to move throughout a target network with ease, discovering new systems and identifying assets of interest. Credentials obtained in this manner typically include those of privileged users, which may provide access to more sensitive information and system operations.\\\nThe detection searches in this Analytic Story monitor access to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process, the usage of shadowcopies for credential dumping and some other techniques for credential dumping.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Credential Dumping", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1558", "T1059", "T1112", "T1059.001", "T1003.001", "T1003", "T1003.002", "T1558.003", "T1003.003"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "Modify Registry", "Kerberoasting", "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", "OS Credential Dumping", "LSASS Memory", "Security Account Manager", "NTDS", "PowerShell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Execution", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Sandworm Team", "Magic Hound", "Axiom", "Stealth Falcon", "Inception", "APT1", "Kimsuky", "TA459", "TEMP.Veles", "PLATINUM", "Poseidon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN8", "Ke3chang", "Leviathan", "APT39", "Molerats", "Turla", "APT29", "Gamaredon Group", "TA505", "Whitefly", "Frankenstein", "Stolen Pencil", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "APT19", "WIRTE", "APT41", "CopyKittens", "FIN5", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Blue Mockingbird", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Honeybee", "APT3", "Cleaver", "Wizard Spider", "Thrip", "Sowbug", "Leafminer", "no", "APT38", "MuddyWater", "FIN10", "DarkVishnya", "Patchwork", "APT28", "Gallmaker", "APT33", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN7", "Gorgon Group", "Night Dragon", "DarkHydrus"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Create Remote Thread into LSASS", "id": "67d4dbef-9564-4699-8da8-03a151529edc", "version": 1, "date": "2019-12-06", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "Detect remote thread creation into LSASS consistent with credential dumping.", "search": "`sysmon` EventID=8 TargetImage=*lsass.exe | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, EventCode, TargetImage, TargetProcessId | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `create_remote_thread_into_lsass_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search needs Sysmon Logs with a Sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 8 with lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", "known_false_positives": "Other tools can access LSASS for legitimate reasons and generate an event. In these cases, tweaking the search may help eliminate noise.", "references": ["https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "asset_type": "Windows", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A process has created a remote thread into $TargetImage$ on $dest$. This behavior is indicative of credential dumping and should be investigated.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "TargetImage", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventID", "TargetImage", "Computer", "EventCode", "TargetImage", "TargetProcessId", "dest"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["LSASS Memory", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Whitefly", "Blue Mockingbird", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Leviathan", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Stolen Pencil", "APT32", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "PLATINUM", "FIN8", "BRONZE BUTLER", "OilRig", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT28", "APT1", "Ke3chang", "Cleaver", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "create_remote_thread_into_lsass_filter"}]}, {"name": "Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL", "id": "8943b567-f14d-4ee8-a0bb-2121d4ce3184", "version": 2, "date": "2020-02-21", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Detect the usage of comsvcs.dll for dumping the lsass process.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*comsvcs.dll* Processes.process=*MiniDump* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "None identified.", "references": ["https://modexp.wordpress.com/2019/08/30/minidumpwritedump-via-com-services-dll/", "https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1167417096374050817"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "HAFNIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified accessing credentials using comsvcs.dll on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["LSASS Memory", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Whitefly", "Blue Mockingbird", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Leviathan", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Stolen Pencil", "APT32", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "PLATINUM", "FIN8", "BRONZE BUTLER", "OilRig", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT28", "APT1", "Ke3chang", "Cleaver", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_rundll32"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll_filter"}]}, {"name": "Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass", "id": "c2590137-0b08-4985-9ec5-6ae23d92f63d", "version": 6, "date": "2020-11-06", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Monitor for changes of the ExecutionPolicy in the registry to the values \"unrestricted\" or \"bypass,\" which allows the execution of malicious scripts.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*Software\\\\Microsoft\\\\Powershell\\\\1\\\\ShellIds\\\\Microsoft.PowerShell* Registry.registry_key_name=ExecutionPolicy (Registry.registry_value_name=Unrestricted OR Registry.registry_value_name=Bypass) by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Registry node. You must also be ingesting logs with the fields registry_path, registry_key_name, and registry_value_name from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may attempt to change the default execution policy on a system for a variety of reasons. However, setting the policy to \"unrestricted\" or \"bypass\" as this search is designed to identify, would be unusual. Hits should be reviewed and investigated as appropriate.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "Credential Dumping", "HAFNIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_execution_policy/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A registry modification in $registry_path$ with reg key $registry_key_name$ and reg value $registry_value_name$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "registry_path", "type": "RegistryPath", "role": ["Others"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.dest"], "risk_score": 48, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "PowerShell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "Gallmaker", "Turla", "APT19", "DarkHydrus", "APT28", "Thrip", "Gorgon Group", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leviathan", "TA459", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT32", "FIN7", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "APT3", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Kerberoasting", "id": "dabdd6d7-3e10-42be-8711-4e124f7a3850", "version": 2, "date": "2020-10-21", "author": "Xiao Lin, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Certificates"], "description": "This search detects a potential kerberoasting attack via service principal name requests", "search": " | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval _time=map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), EventCode=map_get(input_event, \"event_code\"), TicketOptions=map_get(input_event, \"ticket_options\"), TicketEncryptionType=map_get(input_event, \"ticket_encryption_type\"), ServiceName=map_get(input_event, \"service_name\"), ServiceID=map_get(input_event, \"service_id\"), dest_user_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), dest_device_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where EventCode=\"4769\" AND TicketOptions=\"0x40810000\" AND TicketEncryptionType=\"0x17\" | first_time_event input_columns=[\"EventCode\",\"TicketOptions\",\"TicketEncryptionType\",\"ServiceName\",\"ServiceID\"] | where first_time_EventCode_TicketOptions_TicketEncryptionType_ServiceName_ServiceID | eval start_time=_time, end_time=_time | eval body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"EventCode\", EventCode, \"ServiceName\", ServiceName, \"TicketOptions\", TicketOptions, \"TicketEncryptionType\", TicketEncryptionType]), entities = mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null)) | select start_time, end_time, entities, body | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "The test data is converted from Windows Security Event logs generated from Attach Range simulation and used in SPL search and extended to SPL2", "known_false_positives": "Older systems that support kerberos RC4 by default NetApp may generate false positives", "references": ["Initial ESCU implementation by Jose Hernandez and Patrick Bareiss"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 20, "context": ["Source:AD", "Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Kerberoasting malware is potentially applying stolen credentials. Operation is performed at the device $dest_device_id$, by the account $dest_user_id$ via command $cmd_line$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1558.003", "T1558"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "User", "role": ["Actor"]}, {"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "cmd_line", "type": "processname", "role": ["Others"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["service_name", "_time", "event_code", "ticket_encryption_type", "service_id", "ticket_options"], "risk_score": 14, "risk_severity": "low", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Kerberoasting", "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_kerberoasting_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access", "id": "2c365e57-4414-4540-8dc0-73ab10729996", "version": 3, "date": "2019-12-03", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for reading lsass memory consistent with credential dumping.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe (GrantedAccess=0x1010 OR GrantedAccess=0x1410) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, SourceImage, SourceProcessId, TargetImage, TargetProcessId, EventCode, GrantedAccess | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "This search needs Sysmon Logs and a sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 10 with lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", "known_false_positives": "The activity may be legitimate. Other tools can access lsass for legitimate reasons, and it's possible this event could be generated in those cases. In these cases, false positives should be fairly obvious and you may need to tweak the search to eliminate noise.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "Detect Zerologon Attack"], "asset_type": "Windows", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "The $source_image$ has attempted access to read $TargetImage$ was identified on endpoint $Computer$, this is indicative of credential dumping and should be investigated.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "source_image", "type": "Other", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "TargetImage", "type": "Other", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "TargetImage", "GrantedAccess", "Computer", "SourceImage", "SourceProcessId", "TargetImage", "TargetProcessId"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["LSASS Memory", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Whitefly", "Blue Mockingbird", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Leviathan", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Stolen Pencil", "APT32", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "PLATINUM", "FIN8", "BRONZE BUTLER", "OilRig", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT28", "APT1", "Ke3chang", "Cleaver", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access_filter"}]}, {"name": "Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy", "id": "c5eac648-fae0-4263-91a6-773df1f4c903", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search detects the creation of a symlink to a shadow copy.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` Processes.process=*mklink* Processes.process=*HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to create symlink to a shadow copy to grab credentials.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.003", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["NTDS", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN6", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_cmd"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy_filter"}]}, {"name": "Extraction of Registry Hives", "id": "8bbb7d58-b360-11eb-ba21-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-09", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of `reg.exe` exporting Windows Registry hives containing credentials. Adversaries may use this technique to export registry hives for offline credential access attacks. Typically found executed from a untrusted process or script. Upon execution, a file will be written to disk.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` (Processes.process=*save* OR Processes.process=*export*) AND (Processes.process=\"*\\sam *\" OR Processes.process=\"*\\system *\" OR Processes.process=\"*\\security *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `extraction_of_registry_hives_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible some agent based products will generate false positives. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Credential Dumping"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious use of `reg.exe` exporting Windows Registry hives containing credentials executed on $dest$ by user $user$, with a parent process of $parent_process_id$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_id", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process", "Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Security Account Manager", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390", "Ke3chang", "Soft Cell", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "menuPass", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=reg.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=reg.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_reg"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "extraction_of_registry_hives_filter"}]}, {"name": "Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell", "id": "2ed8b538-d284-449a-be1d-82ad1dbd186b", "version": 3, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search detects the use of wmic and Powershell to create a shadow copy.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` OR `process_powershell` Processes.process=*shadowcopy* Processes.process=*create* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Legtimate administrator usage of wmic to create a shadow copy.", "references": ["https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to create a shadow copy to perform offline password cracking.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.003", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["NTDS", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN6", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_powershell"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_wmic"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Dump LSASS via procdump", "id": "3742ebfe-64c2-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Detect procdump.exe dumping the lsass process. This query looks for both -mm and -ma usage. -mm will produce a mini dump file and -ma will write a dump file with all process memory. Both are highly suspect and should be reviewed. This query does not monitor for the internal name (original_file_name=procdump) of the PE or look for procdump64.exe. Modify the query as needed.\\\nDuring triage, confirm this is procdump.exe executing. If it is the first time a Sysinternals utility has been ran, it is possible there will be a -accepteula on the command line. Review other endpoint data sources for cross process (injection) into lsass.exe.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_procdump` (Processes.process=*-ma* OR Processes.process=*-mm*) Processes.process=*lsass* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dump_lsass_via_procdump_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "None identified.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procdump", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md#atomic-test-2---dump-lsassexe-memory-using-procdump"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "HAFNIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified attempting to dump lsass.exe on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["LSASS Memory", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Whitefly", "Blue Mockingbird", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Leviathan", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Stolen Pencil", "APT32", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "PLATINUM", "FIN8", "BRONZE BUTLER", "OilRig", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT28", "APT1", "Ke3chang", "Cleaver", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=procdump.exe OR Processes.process_name=procdump64.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=procdump)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_procdump"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "dump_lsass_via_procdump_filter"}]}, {"name": "Esentutl SAM Copy", "id": "d372f928-ce4f-11eb-a762-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-18", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the process - `esentutl.exe` - being used to capture credentials stored in ntds.dit or the SAM file on disk. During triage, review parallel processes and determine if legitimate activity. Upon determination of illegitimate activity, take further action to isolate and contain the threat.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_esentutl` Processes.process IN (\"*ntds*\", \"*SAM*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `esentutl_sam_copy_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/6a570c2a4630cf0c2bd41a2e8375b5d5ab92f700/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md", "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0404/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": [], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user user$ attempting to capture credentials for offline cracking or observability.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Security Account Manager", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390", "Ke3chang", "Soft Cell", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "menuPass", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=esentutl.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=esentutl.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_esentutl"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "esentutl_sam_copy_filter"}]}, {"name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", "id": "14038953-e5f2-4daf-acff-5452062baf03", "version": 2, "date": "2021-11-29", "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of `reg.exe` attempting to export Windows registry keys that contain hashed credentials. Adversaries will utilize this technique to capture and perform offline password cracking.", "search": " | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)) | eval process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null)), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null), dest_user_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), dest_device_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where process_name=\"cmd.exe\" OR process_name=\"reg.exe\" | where cmd_line != null AND match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)save\\s+/)=true AND ( match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)HKLM\\\\Security/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)HKLM\\\\SAM/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)HKLM\\\\System/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\Security/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\SAM/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\System/)=true ) | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend(dest_device_id, dest_user_id), body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line, \"process_name\", process_name]) | into write_ssa_detected_events(); ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "None identified.", "references": ["https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/55a17c65f9f56c2220000b62701765422b46125d/detections/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:AD", "Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An attempt to save registry keys storing credentials has been performed on $dest_device_id$ by $dest_user_id$ via process $process_name$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003", "T1003.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "User", "role": ["Actor"]}, {"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["process_name", "_time", "dest_device_id", "dest_user_id", "process", "cmd_line"], "risk_score": 63, "risk_severity": "low", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["OS Credential Dumping", "Security Account Manager"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom", "Threat Group-3390", "Ke3chang", "Soft Cell", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "menuPass"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter"}]}, {"name": "Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry", "id": "0c7d8ffe-25b1-11ec-9f39-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-05", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious registry modification to enable plain text credential feature of windows. This technique was used by several malware and also by mimikatz to be able to dumpe the a plain text credential to the compromised or target host. This TTP is really a good indicator that someone wants to dump the crendential of the host so it must be a good pivot for credential dumping techniques.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\System\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\SecurityProviders\\\\WDigest\\\\*\" Registry.registry_value_name = \"UseLogonCredential\" Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000001 by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `enable_wdigest_uselogoncredential_registry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.csoonline.com/article/3438824/how-to-detect-and-halt-credential-theft-via-windows-wdigest.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/wdigest_enable/sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "wdigest registry $registry_path$ was modified in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1112", "T1003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_value_data"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Modify Registry", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Turla", "APT32", "APT38", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "Threat Group-3390", "Honeybee", "Patchwork", "Gorgon Group", "FIN8", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "enable_wdigest_uselogoncredential_registry_filter"}]}, {"name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", "id": "e9fb4a59-c5fb-440a-9f24-191fbc6b2911", "version": 6, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` OR `process_cmd` Processes.process=*save* (Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\SAM* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\SAM*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "None identified.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to export the registry keys.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Security Account Manager", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390", "Ke3chang", "Soft Cell", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "menuPass", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=reg.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=reg.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_reg"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_cmd"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images", "id": "29e307ba-40af-4ab2-91b2-3c6b392bbba0", "version": 1, "date": "2019-12-03", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for reading loaded Images unique to credential dumping with Mimikatz. Deprecated because mimikatz libraries changed and very noisy sysmon Event Code.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 | stats values(ImageLoaded) as ImageLoaded values(ProcessId) as ProcessId by Computer, Image | search ImageLoaded=*WinSCard.dll ImageLoaded=*cryptdll.dll ImageLoaded=*hid.dll ImageLoaded=*samlib.dll ImageLoaded=*vaultcli.dll | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search needs Sysmon Logs and a sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 7 with powershell.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", "known_false_positives": "Other tools can import the same DLLs. These tools should be part of a whitelist. False positives may be present with any process that authenticates or uses credentials, PowerShell included. Filter based on parent process.", "references": ["https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "Detect Zerologon Attack", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Windows", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A process, $Image$, has loaded $ImageLoaded$ that are typically related to credential dumping on $Computer$. Review for further details.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "ImageLoaded", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Other"]}, {"name": "Image", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "ImageLoaded", "ProcessId", "Computer", "Image"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["LSASS Memory", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Whitefly", "Blue Mockingbird", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Leviathan", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Stolen Pencil", "APT32", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "PLATINUM", "FIN8", "BRONZE BUTLER", "OilRig", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT28", "APT1", "Ke3chang", "Cleaver", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Dump LSASS Memory using comsvcs", "id": "76bb9e35-f314-4c3d-a385-83c72a13ce4e", "version": 2, "date": "2021-11-29", "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "The following analytic identifies credential dumping using comsvcs.dll with `regsvr32.exe`. This technique is common with adversaries who would like to dump the memory of lsass.exe and perform offline password cracking.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval tenant=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_tenant\"), \"string\", null), machine=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null)), timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), process=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null)), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where process_name LIKE \"%rundll32.exe%\" AND match_regex(process, /(?i)comsvcs.dll[,\\s]+MiniDump/)=true | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend(machine), body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"process_name\", process_name, \"process\", process]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including Windows command line logging. You can see how we test this with [Event Code 4688](https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4688a) on the [attack_range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range/blob/develop/ansible/roles/windows_common/tasks/windows-enable-4688-cmd-line-audit.yml).", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md#atomic-test-3---dump-lsassexe-memory-using-comsvcsdll"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:AD", "Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A dump of lsass.exe was attempted using comsvcs.dll on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_device_user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.003", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "User", "role": ["Actor"]}, {"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["process_name", "_tenant", "_time", "dest_device_id", "process"], "risk_score": 70, "risk_severity": "low", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["NTDS", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN6", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs_filter"}]}, {"name": "Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr", "id": "b2fbe95a-9c62-4c12-8a29-24b97e84c0cd", "version": 1, "date": "2020-02-03", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "Detect the hands on keyboard behavior of Windows Task Manager creating a process dump of lsass.exe. Upon this behavior occurring, a file write/modification will occur in the users profile under \\AppData\\Local\\Temp. The dump file, lsass.dmp, cannot be renamed, however if the dump occurs more than once, it will be named lsass (2).dmp.", "search": "`sysmon` EventID=11 process_name=taskmgr.exe TargetFilename=*lsass*.dmp | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, object_category, process_name, TargetFilename | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 11 for detecting file create of lsass.dmp. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators can create memory dumps for debugging purposes, but memory dumps of the LSASS process would be unusual.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md#atomic-test-5---dump-lsassexe-memory-using-windows-task-manager", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/", "https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "asset_type": "Windows", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "$process_name$ was identified on endpoint $Computer$ writing $TargetFilename$ to disk. This behavior is related to dumping credentials via Task Manager.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "TargetFilename", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventID", "process_name", "TargetFilename", "Computer", "object_category"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["LSASS Memory", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Whitefly", "Blue Mockingbird", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Leviathan", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Stolen Pencil", "APT32", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "PLATINUM", "FIN8", "BRONZE BUTLER", "OilRig", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT28", "APT1", "Ke3chang", "Cleaver", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr_filter"}]}, {"name": "Creation of Shadow Copy", "id": "eb120f5f-b879-4a63-97c1-93352b5df844", "version": 1, "date": "2019-12-10", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Monitor for signs that Vssadmin or Wmic has been used to create a shadow copy.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=vssadmin.exe Processes.process=*create* Processes.process=*shadow*) OR (Processes.process_name=wmic.exe Processes.process=*shadowcopy* Processes.process=*create*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `creation_of_shadow_copy_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate administrator usage of Vssadmin or Wmic will create false positives.", "references": ["https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to create a shadow copy to perform offline password cracking.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.003", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["NTDS", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN6", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "creation_of_shadow_copy_filter"}]}, {"name": "Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation", "id": "fb4c31b0-13e8-4155-8aa5-24de4b8d6717", "version": 2, "date": "2019-12-06", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "Detect memory dumping of the LSASS process.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe CallTrace=*dbgcore.dll* OR CallTrace=*dbghelp.dll* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, TargetImage, TargetProcessId, SourceImage, SourceProcessId | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 10 for lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators can create memory dumps for debugging purposes, but memory dumps of the LSASS process would be unusual.", "references": ["https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "asset_type": "Windows", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "process $SourceImage$ injected into $TargetImage$ and was attempted dump LSASS on $dest$. Adversaries tend to do this when trying to accesss credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS).", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "TargetImage", "type": "Process", "role": ["Target"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "TargetImage", "CallTrace", "Computer", "TargetProcessId", "SourceImage", "SourceProcessId"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["LSASS Memory", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Whitefly", "Blue Mockingbird", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Leviathan", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Stolen Pencil", "APT32", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "PLATINUM", "FIN8", "BRONZE BUTLER", "OilRig", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT28", "APT1", "Ke3chang", "Cleaver", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Copy of ShadowCopy with Script Block Logging", "id": "9251299c-ea5b-11eb-a8de-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-21", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies `copy` or `[System.IO.File]::Copy` being used to capture the SAM, SYSTEM or SECURITY hives identified in script block. This will catch the most basic use cases for credentials being taken for offline cracking. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message IN (\"*copy*\",\"*[System.IO.File]::Copy*\") AND Message IN (\"*System32\\\\config\\\\SAM*\", \"*System32\\\\config\\\\SYSTEM*\",\"*System32\\\\config\\\\SECURITY*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode ComputerName User EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_copy_of_shadowcopy_with_script_block_logging_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives as the scope is limited to SAM, SYSTEM and SECURITY hives.", "references": ["https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-36934", "https://github.com/GossiTheDog/HiveNightmare", "https://github.com/JumpsecLabs/Guidance-Advice/tree/main/SAM_Permissions"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-36934"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/serioussam/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "PowerShell was identified running a script to capture the SAM hive on endpoint $ComputerName$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Message", "OpCode", "ComputerName", "User", "EventCode"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Security Account Manager", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390", "Ke3chang", "Soft Cell", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "menuPass", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_copy_of_shadowcopy_with_script_block_logging_filter"}]}, {"name": "SAM Database File Access Attempt", "id": "57551656-ebdb-11eb-afdf-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-23", "author": "Michael Haag, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies access to SAM, SYSTEM or SECURITY databases' within the file path of `windows\\system32\\config` using Windows Security EventCode 4663. This particular behavior is related to credential access, an attempt to either use a Shadow Copy or recent CVE-2021-36934 to access the SAM database. The Security Account Manager (SAM) is a database file in Windows XP, Windows Vista, Windows 7, 8.1 and 10 that stores users' passwords.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` (EventCode=4663) process_name!=*\\\\dllhost.exe Object_Name IN (\"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\config\\\\SAM*\",\"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\config\\\\SYSTEM*\",\"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\config\\\\SECURITY*\") | stats values(Accesses) count by process_name Object_Name dest user | `sam_database_file_access_attempt_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663. For 4663, enable \"Audit Object Access\" in Group Policy. Then check the two boxes listed for both \"Success\" and \"Failure.\"", "known_false_positives": "Natively, `dllhost.exe` will access the files. Every environment will have additional native processes that do as well. Filter by process_name. As an aside, one can remove process_name entirely and add `Object_Name=*ShadowCopy*`.", "references": ["https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4663", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4663", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-36934", "https://github.com/GossiTheDog/HiveNightmare", "https://github.com/JumpsecLabs/Guidance-Advice/tree/main/SAM_Permissions", "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security_Account_Manager"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-36934"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The following process $process_name$ accessed the object $Object_Name$ attempting to gain access to credentials on $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}, {"name": "Object_Name", "type": "File", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "process_name", "Object_Name", "dest", "user"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Security Account Manager", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390", "Ke3chang", "Soft Cell", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "menuPass", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "sam_database_file_access_attempt_filter"}]}, {"name": "Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy", "id": "d8c406fe-23d2-45f3-a983-1abe7b83ff3b", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search detects credential dumping using copy command from a shadow copy.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` (Processes.process=*\\\\system32\\\\config\\\\sam* OR Processes.process=*\\\\system32\\\\config\\\\security* OR Processes.process=*\\\\system32\\\\config\\\\system* OR Processes.process=*\\\\windows\\\\ntds\\\\ntds.dit*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to copy SAM and NTDS.dit for offline password cracking.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.003", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["NTDS", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN6", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_cmd"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy_filter"}]}, {"name": "Ntdsutil Export NTDS", "id": "da63bc76-61ae-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-28", "author": "Michael Haag, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Monitor for signs that Ntdsutil is being used to Extract Active Directory database - NTDS.dit, typically used for offline password cracking. It may be used in normal circumstances with no command line arguments or shorthand variations of more common arguments. Ntdsutil.exe is typically seen run on a Windows Server. Typical command used to dump ntds.dit \\\nntdsutil \"ac i ntds\" \"ifm\" \"create full C:\\Temp\" q q \\\nThis technique uses \"Install from Media\" (IFM), which will extract a copy of the Active Directory database. A successful export of the Active Directory database will yield a file modification named ntds.dit to the destination.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=ntdsutil.exe Processes.process=*ntds* Processes.process=*create*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ntdsutil_export_ntds_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "Highly possible Server Administrators will troubleshoot with ntdsutil.exe, generating false positives.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.003/T1003.003.md#atomic-test-3---dump-active-directory-database-with-ntdsutil", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc753343(v=ws.11)", "https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf", "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/vss_ps.dll-97B15BDAE9777F454C9A6BA25E938DB3.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "HAFNIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Active Directory NTDS export on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.003", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 50, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["NTDS", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN6", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "ntdsutil_export_ntds_filter"}]}, {"name": "SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool", "id": "5672819c-be09-11eb-bbfb-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic detects a potential usage of secretsdump.py tool for dumping credentials (ntlm hash) from a copy of ntds.dit and SAM.Security,SYSTEM registrry hive. This technique was seen in some attacker that dump ntlm hashes offline after having a copy of ntds.dit and SAM/SYSTEM/SECURITY registry hive.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"python*.exe\" Processes.process = \"*.py*\" Processes.process = \"*-ntds*\" (Processes.process = \"*-system*\" OR Processes.process = \"*-sam*\" OR Processes.process = \"*-security*\" OR Processes.process = \"*-bootkey*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `secretdumps_offline_ntds_dumping_tool_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/master/examples/secretsdump.py"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Credential Access"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/casper/datasets1/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A secretdump process $process_name$ with secretdump commandline $process$ to dump credentials in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.003", "T1003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process_guid"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["NTDS", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN6", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "secretdumps_offline_ntds_dumping_tool_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Use of Cleartext Protocols", "id": "826e6431-aeef-41b4-9fc0-6d0985d65a21", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-15", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "Leverage searches that detect cleartext network protocols that may leak credentials or should otherwise be encrypted.", "narrative": "Various legacy protocols operate by default in the clear, without the protections of encryption. This potentially leaks sensitive information that can be exploited by passively sniffing network traffic. Depending on the protocol, this information could be highly sensitive, or could allow for session hijacking. In addition, these protocols send authentication information, which would allow for the harvesting of usernames and passwords that could potentially be used to authenticate and compromise secondary systems.", "references": ["https://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Use of Cleartext Protocols", "category": ["Best Practices"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_id": [], "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Protocols passing authentication in cleartext", "id": "6923cd64-17a0-453c-b945-81ac2d8c6db9", "version": 3, "date": "2021-08-19", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "The following analytic identifies cleartext protocols at risk of leaking sensitive information. Currently, this consists of legacy protocols such as telnet (port 23), POP3 (port 110), IMAP (port 143), and non-anonymous FTP (port 21) sessions. While some of these protocols may be used over SSL, they typically are found on different assigned ports in those instances.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.action!=blocked AND All_Traffic.transport=\"tcp\" AND (All_Traffic.dest_port=\"23\" OR All_Traffic.dest_port=\"143\" OR All_Traffic.dest_port=\"110\" OR (All_Traffic.dest_port=\"21\" AND All_Traffic.user != \"anonymous\")) by All_Traffic.user All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic, and populating the Network_Traffic data model. For more accurate result it's better to limit destination to organization private and public IP range, like All_Traffic.dest IN(192.168.0.0/16,172.16.0.0/12,10.0.0.0/8, x.x.x.x/22)", "known_false_positives": "Some networks may use kerberized FTP or telnet servers, however, this is rare.", "references": ["https://www.rackaid.com/blog/secure-your-email-and-file-transfers/", "https://www.infosecmatter.com/capture-passwords-using-wireshark/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Use of Cleartext Protocols"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.transport", "All_Traffic.dest_port", "All_Traffic.user", "All_Traffic.src", "All_Traffic.dest", "All_Traffic.action"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", "id": "2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50w3168af3", "version": 2, "date": "2018-07-24", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required.", "narrative": "As cloud computing has exploded, so has the number of creative attacks on virtual environments. And as the number-two cloud-service provider, Amazon Web Services (AWS) has certainly had its share.\\\nAmazon's \"shared responsibility\" model dictates that the company has responsibility for the environment outside of the VM and the customer is responsible for the security inside of the S3 container. As such, it's important to stay vigilant for activities that may belie suspicious behavior inside of your environment.\\\nAmong things to look out for are S3 access from unfamiliar locations and by unfamiliar users. Some of the searches in this Analytic Story help you detect suspicious behavior and others help you investigate more deeply, when the situation warrants. ", "references": ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cloud/public-aws-s3-buckets-writable/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", "category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1530"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Data from Cloud Storage Object"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Detect S3 access from a new IP", "id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-291bq3d0daq4", "version": 1, "date": "2018-06-28", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks at S3 bucket-access logs and detects new or previously unseen remote IP addresses that have successfully accessed an S3 bucket.", "search": "`aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200 [search `aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200 | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by bucket_name remote_ip | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by bucket_name remote_ip | outputlookup previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip.csv | eval newIP=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newIP=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table bucket_name remote_ip]| iplocation remote_ip |rename remote_ip as src_ip | table _time bucket_name src_ip City Country operation request_uri | `detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your S3 access logs' inputs. This search works best when you run the \"Previously Seen S3 Bucket Access by Remote IP\" support search once to create a history of previously seen remote IPs and bucket names.", "known_false_positives": "S3 buckets can be accessed from any IP, as long as it can make a successful connection. This will be a false postive, since the search is looking for a new IP within the past hour", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"], "asset_type": "S3 Bucket", "cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "http_status", "bucket_name", "remote_ip"], "risk_object": "src_ip", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 10, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Data from Cloud Storage Object"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:s3:accesslogs", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "aws_s3_accesslogs"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion", "id": "ad12w478-84a8-4641-a3w1-e32372q4bd53", "version": 1, "date": "2018-11-27", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects users creating spikes in API activity related to deletion of S3 buckets in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteBucket [search `cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteBucket | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | stats count as apiCalls by arn | inputlookup s3_deletion_baseline append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) as * by arn | rename apiCalls as latestCount | eval newAvgApiCalls=avgApiCalls + (latestCount-avgApiCalls)/720 | eval newStdevApiCalls=sqrt(((pow(stdevApiCalls, 2)*719 + (latestCount-newAvgApiCalls)*(latestCount-avgApiCalls))/720)) | eval avgApiCalls=coalesce(newAvgApiCalls, avgApiCalls), stdevApiCalls=coalesce(newStdevApiCalls, stdevApiCalls), numDataPoints=if(isnull(latestCount), numDataPoints, numDataPoints+1) | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup s3_deletion_baseline | eval dataPointThreshold = 15, deviationThreshold = 3 | eval isSpike=if((latestCount > avgApiCalls+deviationThreshold*stdevApiCalls) AND numDataPoints > dataPointThreshold, 1, 0) | where isSpike=1 | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | spath output=bucketName path=requestParameters.bucketName | stats values(bucketName) as bucketName, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName) as uniqueApisCalled by user | `detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best when you run the \"Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN\" support search once to create a baseline of previously seen S3 bucket-deletion activity.", "known_false_positives": "Based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`, the false positive rate may vary. Please modify this according the your environment.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"], "asset_type": "S3 Bucket", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1530"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "userIdentity.arn"], "risk_object": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 10, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Data from Cloud Storage Object"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A placeholder for the baseline information for AWS S3 deletions", "filename": "s3_deletion_baseline.csv", "name": "s3_deletion_baseline", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/s3_deletion_baseline.csv"}, {"description": "A placeholder for the baseline information for AWS S3 deletions", "filename": "s3_deletion_baseline.csv", "name": "s3_deletion_baseline", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/s3_deletion_baseline.csv"}]}, {"name": "Detect New Open S3 buckets", "id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-290bf3d0dac4", "version": 3, "date": "2021-07-19", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public S3 bucket.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=s3.amazonaws.com eventName=PutBucketAcl | rex field=_raw \"(?{.+})\" | spath input=json_field output=grantees path=requestParameters.AccessControlPolicy.AccessControlList.Grant{} | search grantees=* | mvexpand grantees | spath input=grantees output=uri path=Grantee.URI | spath input=grantees output=permission path=Permission | search uri IN (\"http://acs.amazonaws.com/groups/global/AllUsers\",\"http://acs.amazonaws.com/groups/global/AuthenticatedUsers\") | search permission IN (\"READ\",\"READ_ACP\",\"WRITE\",\"WRITE_ACP\",\"FULL_CONTROL\") | rename requestParameters.bucketName AS bucketName | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user_arn userIdentity.principalId userAgent uri permission bucketName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_new_open_s3_buckets_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk.", "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to the \"All Users\" group.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"], "asset_type": "S3 Bucket", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1530/aws_s3_public_bucket/aws_cloudtrail_events.json"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user_arn$ has created an open/public bucket $bucketName$ with the following permissions $permission$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user_arn", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "bucketName", "type": "Other", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventSource", "eventName", "requestParameters.bucketName", "user_arn", "userIdentity.principalId", "userAgent", "uri", "permission"], "risk_score": 48, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Data from Cloud Storage Object"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_new_open_s3_buckets_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI", "id": "39c61d09-8b30-4154-922b-2d0a694ecc22", "version": 2, "date": "2021-07-19", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public S3 bucket over the aws cli.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=\"s3.amazonaws.com\" (userAgent=\"[aws-cli*\" OR userAgent=aws-cli* ) eventName=PutBucketAcl OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read-acp IN (\"*AuthenticatedUsers\",\"*AllUsers\") OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write IN (\"*AuthenticatedUsers\",\"*AllUsers\") OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write-acp IN (\"*AuthenticatedUsers\",\"*AllUsers\") OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-full-control IN (\"*AuthenticatedUsers\",\"*AllUsers\") | rename requestParameters.bucketName AS bucketName | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by userIdentity.userName userIdentity.principalId userAgent bucketName requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read-acp requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write-acp requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-full-control | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "", "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to the \"All Users\" group.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"], "asset_type": "S3 Bucket", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1530/aws_s3_public_bucket/aws_cloudtrail_events.json"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $userIdentity.userName$ has created an open/public bucket $bucketName$ using AWS CLI with the following permissions - $requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read$ $requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read-acp$ $requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write$ $requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write-acp$ $requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-full-control$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "userIdentity.userName", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "bucketName", "type": "Other", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventSource", "eventName", "requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read-acp", "requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write", "requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write-acp", "requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-full-control", "requestParameters.bucketName", "userIdentity.userName", "userIdentity.principalId", "userAgent", "bucketName"], "risk_score": 48, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Data from Cloud Storage Object"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Office 365 Detections", "id": "1a51dd71-effc-48b2-abc4-3e9cdb61e5b9", "version": 1, "date": "2020-12-16", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "description": "This story is focused around detecting Office 365 Attacks.", "narrative": "More and more companies are using Microsofts Office 365 cloud offering. Therefore, we see more and more attacks against Office 365. This story provides various detections for Office 365 attacks.", "references": ["https://i.blackhat.com/USA-20/Thursday/us-20-Bienstock-My-Cloud-Is-APTs-Cloud-Investigating-And-Defending-Office-365.pdf"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Office 365 Detections", "category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.007", "T1562", "T1136", "T1556", "T1110", "T1114.002", "T1114.003", "T1110.001", "T1114", "T1136.003"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Email Collection", "Remote Email Collection", "Cloud Account", "Password Guessing", "Create Account", "Email Forwarding Rule", "Brute Force", "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", "Impair Defenses", "Modify Authentication Process"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Collection", "Persistence", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["DarkVishnya", "FIN4", "APT1", "Leafminer", "APT28", "no", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Ke3chang", "Turla", "APT39", "FIN5", "OilRig"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "High Number of Login Failures from a single source", "id": "7f398cfb-918d-41f4-8db8-2e2474e02222", "version": 1, "date": "2020-12-16", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search will detect more than 5 login failures in Office365 Azure Active Directory from a single source IP address. Please adjust the threshold value of 5 as suited for your environment.", "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=UserLoginFailed record_type=AzureActiveDirectoryStsLogon app=AzureActiveDirectory | stats count dc(user) as accounts_locked values(user) as user values(LogonError) as LogonError values(authentication_method) as authentication_method values(signature) as signature values(UserAgent) as UserAgent by src_ip record_type Operation app | search accounts_locked >= 5| `high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source_filter`", "how_to_implement": "", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections"], "asset_type": "Office 365", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1110.001", "T1110"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Operation", "record_type", "app", "user", "LogonError", "authentication_method", "signature", "UserAgent", "src_ip", "record_type"], "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Password Guessing", "Brute Force"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "DarkVishnya", "APT39", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Turla"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "o365_management_activity"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source_filter"}]}, {"name": "O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User", "id": "b2c81cc6-6040-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-26", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects the creation of a new Federation setting by alerting about an specific event related to its creation.", "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation=\"Add app role assignment grant to user.\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Actor{}.ID) as Actor.ID values(Actor{}.Type) as Actor.Type by ActorIpAddress dest ResultStatus | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", "known_false_positives": "The creation of a new Federation is not necessarily malicious, however this events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a different cloud provider.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "asset_type": "Office 365", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_new_federation/o365_new_federation.json"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "message": "User $Actor.ID$ has created a new federation setting on $dest$ from IP Address $ActorIpAddress$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1136.003", "T1136"], "observable": [{"name": "ActorIpAddress", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "Actor.ID", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Workload", "Operation", "Actor{}.ID", "Actor{}.Type", "ActorIpAddress", "dest", "ResultStatus"], "risk_score": 18, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Cloud Account", "Create Account"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "o365_management_activity"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user_filter"}]}, {"name": "O365 Added Service Principal", "id": "1668812a-6047-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-26", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects the creation of a new Federation setting by alerting about an specific event related to its creation.", "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory signature=\"Add service principal credentials.\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Actor{}.ID) as Actor.ID values(ModifiedProperties{}.Name) as ModifiedProperties.Name values(ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue) as ModifiedProperties.NewValue values(Target{}.ID) as Target.ID by ActorIpAddress signature | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_added_service_principal_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", "known_false_positives": "The creation of a new Federation is not necessarily malicious, however these events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a different cloud provider.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html", "https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "asset_type": "Office 365", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_add_service_principal/o365_add_service_principal.json"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "message": "User $Actor.ID$ created a new federation setting on $Target.ID$ and added service principal credentials from IP Address $ActorIpAddress$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1136.003", "T1136"], "observable": [{"name": "ActorIpAddress", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "Target.ID", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Workload", "signature", "Actor{}.ID", "ModifiedProperties{}.Name", "ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue", "Target{}.ID", "ActorIpAddress"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Cloud Account", "Create Account"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "o365_management_activity"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "o365_added_service_principal_filter"}]}, {"name": "O365 Disable MFA", "id": "c783dd98-c703-4252-9e8a-f19d9f5c949e", "version": 1, "date": "2020-12-16", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects when multi factor authentication has been disabled, what entitiy performed the action and against what user", "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=\"Disable Strong Authentication.\" | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by UserType Operation user status signature dest ResultStatus |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_disable_mfa_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", "known_false_positives": "Unless it is a special case, it is uncommon to disable MFA or Strong Authentication", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections"], "asset_type": "Office 365", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/o365_disable_mfa/o365_disable_mfa.json"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "message": "User $user$ has executed an operation $Operation$ for this destination $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1556"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Operation", "UserType", "user", "status", "signature", "dest", "ResultStatus"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Modify Authentication Process"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "o365_management_activity"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "o365_disable_mfa_filter"}]}, {"name": "O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding", "id": "7f398cfb-918d-41f4-8db8-2e2474e02c28", "version": 1, "date": "2020-12-16", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects when an admin configured a forwarding rule for multiple mailboxes to the same destination.", "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=Set-Mailbox | spath input=Parameters | rename Identity AS src_user | search ForwardingAddress=* | stats dc(src_user) AS count_src_user earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(src_user) AS src_user values(user) AS user by ForwardingAddress | where count_src_user > 1 |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections", "Data Exfiltration"], "asset_type": "Office 365", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114.003/o365_email_forwarding_rule/o365_email_forwarding_rule.json"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user$ has configured a forwarding rule for multiple mailboxes to the same destination $ForwardingAddress$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1114.003", "T1114"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Operation", "Parameters"], "risk_score": 48, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Email Forwarding Rule", "Email Collection"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "o365_management_activity"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding_filter"}]}, {"name": "O365 Excessive SSO logon errors", "id": "8158ccc4-6038-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-26", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects accounts with high number of Single Sign ON (SSO) logon errors. Excessive logon errors may indicate attempts to bruteforce of password or single sign on token hijack or reuse.", "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory LogonError=SsoArtifactInvalidOrExpired | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by LogonError ActorIpAddress UserAgent UserId | where count > 5 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", "known_false_positives": "Logon errors may not be malicious in nature however it may indicate attempts to reuse a token or password obtained via credential access attack.", "references": ["https://stealthbits.com/blog/bypassing-mfa-with-pass-the-cookie/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "asset_type": "Office 365", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/o365_sso_logon_errors/o365_sso_logon_errors.json"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "message": "User $UserId$ has caused excessive number of SSO logon errors from $ActorIpAddress$ using UserAgent $UserAgent$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1556"], "observable": [{"name": "ActorIpAddress", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "UserId", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Workload", "LogonError", "ActorIpAddress", "UserAgent", "UserId"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Modify Authentication Process"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "o365_management_activity"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors_filter"}]}, {"name": "O365 New Federated Domain Added", "id": "e155876a-6048-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-26", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects the addition of a new Federated domain.", "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=Exchange Operation=\"Add-FederatedDomain\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Parameters{}.Value) as Parameters.Value by ObjectId Operation OrganizationName OriginatingServer UserId UserKey | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_new_federated_domain_added_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity.", "known_false_positives": "The creation of a new Federated domain is not necessarily malicious, however these events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a similar or different cloud provider.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html", "https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory", "https://o365blog.com/post/aadbackdoor/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "asset_type": "Office 365", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_new_federated_domain/o365_new_federated_domain.json"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "message": "User $UserId$ has added a new federated domaain $Parameters.Value$ for $OrganizationName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1136.003", "T1136"], "observable": [{"name": "OrganizationName", "type": "Other", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "UserId", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Workload", "Operation", "Parameters{}.Value", "ObjectId", "OrganizationName", "OriginatingServer", "UserId", "UserKey"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Cloud Account", "Create Account"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "o365_management_activity"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "o365_new_federated_domain_added_filter"}]}, {"name": "O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation", "id": "b25d2973-303e-47c8-bacd-52b61604c6a7", "version": 1, "date": "2020-12-15", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects the assignment of rights to accesss content from another mailbox. This is usually only assigned to a service account.", "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=Add-MailboxPermission | spath input=Parameters | rename User AS src_user, Identity AS dest_user | search AccessRights=FullAccess OR AccessRights=SendAs OR AccessRights=SendOnBehalf | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user src_user dest_user Operation AccessRights |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`o365_suspicious_rights_delegation_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", "known_false_positives": "Service Accounts", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections"], "asset_type": "Office 365", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Stage:Exfiltration", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114.002/suspicious_rights_delegation/suspicious_rights_delegation.json"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user$ has delegated suspicious rights $AccessRights$ to user $dest_user$ that allow access to sensitive", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1114.002", "T1114"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Operation", "Parameters"], "risk_score": 48, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote Email Collection", "Email Collection"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "FIN4", "APT28", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Ke3chang", "Leafminer", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "o365_management_activity"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "o365_suspicious_rights_delegation_filter"}]}, {"name": "O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP", "id": "c783dd98-c703-4252-9e8a-f19d9f66949e", "version": 2, "date": "2021-07-19", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects newly added IP addresses/CIDR blocks to the list of MFA Trusted IPs to bypass multi factor authentication. Attackers are often known to use this technique so that they can bypass the MFA system.", "search": "`o365_management_activity` signature=\"Set Company Information.\" ModifiedProperties{}.Name=StrongAuthenticationPolicy | rex max_match=100 field=ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue \"(?\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\/\\d{1,2})\" | rex max_match=100 field=ModifiedProperties{}.OldValue \"(?\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\/\\d{1,2})\" | eval ip_addresses_old=if(isnotnull(ip_addresses_old),ip_addresses_old,\"0\") | mvexpand ip_addresses_new_added | where isnull(mvfind(ip_addresses_old,ip_addresses_new_added)) |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ip_addresses_old) as ip_addresses_old by user ip_addresses_new_added signature Workload vendor_account status user_id action | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install Splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", "known_false_positives": "Unless it is a special case, it is uncommon to continually update Trusted IPs to MFA configuration.", "references": ["https://i.blackhat.com/USA-20/Thursday/us-20-Bienstock-My-Cloud-Is-APTs-Cloud-Investigating-And-Defending-Office-365.pdf", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/007/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections"], "asset_type": "Office 365", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.007/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.json"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "message": "User $user_id$ has added new IP addresses $ip_addresses_new_added$ to a list of trusted IPs to bypass MFA", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.007", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "ip_addresses_new_added", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "user_id", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "signature", "ModifiedProperties{}.Name", "ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue", "ModifiedProperties{}.OldValue", "user", "vendor_account", "status", "user_id", "action"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "o365_management_activity"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip_filter"}]}, {"name": "O365 PST export alert", "id": "5f694cc4-a678-4a60-9410-bffca1b647dc", "version": 1, "date": "2020-12-16", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects when a user has performed an Ediscovery search or exported a PST file from the search. This PST file usually has sensitive information including email body content", "search": "`o365_management_activity` Category=ThreatManagement Name=\"eDiscovery search started or exported\" | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by Source Severity AlertEntityId Operation Name |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_pst_export_alert_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", "known_false_positives": "PST export can be done for legitimate purposes but due to the sensitive nature of its content it must be monitored.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections", "Data Exfiltration"], "asset_type": "Office 365", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114/o365_export_pst_file/o365_export_pst_file.json"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "message": "User $Source$ has exported a PST file from the search using this operation- $Operation$ with a severity of $Severity$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1114"], "observable": [{"name": "Source", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Category", "Name", "Source", "Severity", "AlertEntityId", "Operation"], "risk_score": 48, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Email Collection"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "o365_management_activity"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "o365_pst_export_alert_filter"}]}, {"name": "O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding", "id": "f8dfe015-dbb3-4569-ba75-b13787e06aa4", "version": 1, "date": "2020-12-16", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects when multiple user configured a forwarding rule to the same destination.", "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=Set-Mailbox | spath input=Parameters | rename Identity AS src_user | search ForwardingSmtpAddress=* | stats dc(src_user) AS count_src_user earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(src_user) AS src_user values(user) AS user by ForwardingSmtpAddress | where count_src_user > 1 |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections", "Data Exfiltration"], "asset_type": "Office 365", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Stage:Exfiltration", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114.003/o365_email_forwarding_rule/o365_email_forwarding_rule.json"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user$ configured multiple users $src_user$ with a count of $count_src_user$, a forwarding rule to same destination $ForwardingSmtpAddress$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1114.003", "T1114"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "ForwardingSmtpAddress", "type": "Email Address", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Operation", "Parameters"], "risk_score": 48, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Email Forwarding Rule", "Email Collection"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "o365_management_activity"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding_filter"}]}, {"name": "O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert", "id": "d441364c-349c-453b-b55f-12eccab67cf9", "version": 1, "date": "2020-12-16", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects when an excessive number of authentication failures occur this search also includes attempts against MFA prompt codes", "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory UserAuthenticationMethod=* status=Failed | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) values(UserAuthenticationMethod) AS UserAuthenticationMethod values(UserAgent) AS UserAgent values(status) AS status values(src_ip) AS src_ip by user | where count > 10 |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", "known_false_positives": "The threshold for alert is above 10 attempts and this should reduce the number of false positives.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections"], "asset_type": "Office 365", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110/o365_brute_force_login/o365_brute_force_login.json"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Not Applicable"], "message": "User $user$ has caused excessive number of authentication failures from $src_ip$ using UserAgent $UserAgent$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "src_ip", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Workload", "UserAuthenticationMethod", "status", "UserAgent", "src_ip", "user"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Brute Force"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["DarkVishnya", "APT39", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Turla"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "o365_management_activity"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Cloud Cryptomining", "id": "3b96d13c-fdc7-45dd-b3ad-c132b31cdd2a", "version": 1, "date": "2019-10-02", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "description": "Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.", "narrative": "Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority. \\\nCryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS), Google Cloud Platform (GCP), and Azure. It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN. \\\nWhen malicious miners appropriate a cloud instance, often spinning up hundreds of new instances, the costs can become astronomical for the account holder. So it is critically important to monitor your systems for suspicious activities that could indicate that your network has been infiltrated. \\\nThis Analytic Story is focused on detecting suspicious new instances in your cloud environment to help prevent cryptominers from gaining a foothold. It contains detection searches that will detect when a previously unused instance type or AMI is used. It also contains support searches to build lookup files to ensure proper execution of the detection searches.", "references": ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Cloud Cryptomining", "category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1535", "T1078.004", "T1078"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Cloud Accounts", "Valid Accounts", "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Sandworm Team", "TEMP.Veles", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT39", "Carbanak", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT41", "FIN5", "menuPass", "FIN6", "OilRig", "Wizard Spider", "APT18", "no", "FIN10", "PittyTiger", "FIN4", "APT28", "APT33", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Night Dragon"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched", "id": "f2361e9f-3928-496c-a556-120cd4223a65", "version": 2, "date": "2020-08-21", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search finds for the number successfully created cloud instances for every 4 hour block. This is split up between weekdays and the weekend. It then applies the probability densitiy model previously created and alerts on any outliers.", "search": "| tstats count as instances_launched values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=created) AND All_Changes.status=success AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%w\") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | join HourOfDay isWeekend [summary cloud_excessive_instances_created_v1] | where cardinality >=16 | apply cloud_excessive_instances_created_v1 threshold=0.005 | rename \"IsOutlier(instances_launched)\" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1 | eval expected_upper_threshold = mvindex(split(mvindex(BoundaryRanges, -1), \":\"), 0) | eval distance_from_threshold = instances_launched - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, instances_launched, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold, object_id | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_launched_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched` to create the probability density function.", "known_false_positives": "Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Cryptomining", "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities"], "asset_type": "Cloud Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.object_id", "All_Changes.action", "All_Changes.status", "All_Changes.object_category", "All_Changes.user"], "risk_object": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 40, "security_domain": "Cloud", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Cloud Accounts", "Valid Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_launched_filter"}]}, {"name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image", "id": "bc24922d-987c-4645-b288-f8c73ec194c4", "version": 1, "date": "2018-10-12", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search looks for cloud compute instances being created with previously unseen image IDs.", "search": "| tstats count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id) as dest from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.image_id, All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Instance_Changes\")` | where image_id != \"unknown\" | lookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_images image_id as image_id OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenImage=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenImage) OR firstTimeSeenImage > relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") | table firstTime, user, image_id, count, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial` to build the initial table of images observed and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image_filter` macro.", "known_false_positives": "After a new image is created, the first systems created with that image will cause this alert to fire. Verify that the image being used was created by a legitimate user.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Cryptomining"], "asset_type": "Cloud Compute Instance", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json"], "impact": 60, "message": "User $user$ is creating an instance $dest$ with an image that has not been previously seen.", "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.object_id", "All_Changes.action", "All_Changes.Instance_Changes.image_id", "All_Changes.user"], "risk_score": 36, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A table of previously seen Cloud image IDs", "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_images", "name": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_images", "fields_list": "_key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, image_id, enough_data"}]}, {"name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User", "id": "37a0ec8d-827e-4d6d-8025-cedf31f3a149", "version": 2, "date": "2021-07-13", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search looks for cloud compute instances created by users who have not created them before.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object) as dest from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.user All_Changes.vendor_region | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user user as user OUTPUTNEW firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenUser=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenUser) OR firstTimeSeenUser > relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") | table firstTime, user, dest, count vendor_region | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting the appropriate cloud-infrastructure logs Run the \"Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User\" support search to create of baseline of previously seen users.", "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a user will start to create compute instances for the first time, for any number of reasons. Verify with the user launching instances that this is the intended behavior.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Cryptomining"], "asset_type": "Cloud Compute Instance", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Recon", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json"], "impact": 30, "message": "User $user$ is creating a new instance $dest$ for the first time", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.object", "All_Changes.action", "All_Changes.user", "All_Changes.vendor_region"], "risk_score": 18, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Cloud Accounts", "Valid Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A table of previously seen users creating cloud instances", "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user", "name": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user", "fields_list": "_key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, user, enough_data"}]}, {"name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region", "id": "fa4089e2-50e3-40f7-8469-d2cc1564ca59", "version": 1, "date": "2020-09-02", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search looks at cloud-infrastructure events where an instance is created in any region within the last hour and then compares it to a lookup file of previously seen regions where instances have been created.", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id) as dest, count from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.vendor_region, All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_regions vendor_region as vendor_region OUTPUTNEW firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenRegion=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenRegion) OR firstTimeSeenRegion > relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") | table firstTime, user, dest, count , vendor_region | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial` to build the initial table of images observed and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region_filter` macro.", "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a user has unknowingly started an instance in a new region. Please verify that this activity is legitimate.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Cryptomining"], "asset_type": "Cloud Compute Instance", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 12"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user$ is creating an instance $dest$ in a new region for the first time", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.object_id", "All_Changes.action", "All_Changes.vendor_region", "All_Changes.user"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A table of vendor_region values and the first and last time that they have been observed in cloud provisioning activities", "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_regions", "name": "previously_seen_cloud_regions", "fields_list": "_key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, vendor_region, enough_data"}]}, {"name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type", "id": "c6ddbf53-9715-49f3-bb4c-fb2e8a309cda", "version": 1, "date": "2020-09-12", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "Find EC2 instances being created with previously unseen instance types.", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id) as dest, count from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.instance_type, All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Instance_Changes\")` | where instance_type != \"unknown\" | lookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types instance_type as instance_type OUTPUTNEW firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenInstanceType=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenInstanceType) OR firstTimeSeenInstanceType > relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") | table firstTime, user, dest, count, instance_type | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial` to build the initial table of instance types observed and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter` macro.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible that an admin will create a new system using a new instance type that has never been used before. Verify with the creator that they intended to create the system with the new instance type.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Cryptomining"], "asset_type": "Cloud Compute Instance", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json"], "impact": 50, "message": "User $user$ is creating an instance $dest$ with an instance type $instance_type$ that has not been previously seen.", "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.object_id", "All_Changes.action", "All_Changes.Instance_Changes.instance_type", "All_Changes.user"], "risk_score": 30, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A place holder for a list of used cloud compute instance types", "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types", "name": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types", "fields_list": "_key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, instance_type, enough_data"}]}]}, {"name": "Windows Privilege Escalation", "id": "644e22d3-598a-429c-a007-16fdb802cae5", "version": 2, "date": "2020-02-04", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "description": "Monitor for and investigate activities that may be associated with a Windows privilege-escalation attack, including unusual processes running on endpoints, modified registry keys, and more.", "narrative": "Privilege escalation is a \"land-and-expand\" technique, wherein an adversary gains an initial foothold on a host and then exploits its weaknesses to increase his privileges. The motivation is simple: certain actions on a Windows machine--such as installing software--may require higher-level privileges than those the attacker initially acquired. By increasing his privilege level, the attacker can gain the control required to carry out his malicious ends. This Analytic Story provides searches to detect and investigate behaviors that attackers may use to elevate their privileges in your environment.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Windows Privilege Escalation", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1134.001", "T1546.001", "T1127", "T1068", "T1134", "T1562.006", "T1546.002", "T1547.014", "T1547.003", "T1562", "T1558", "T1558.003", "T1547", "T1037.001", "T1547.012", "T1546.008", "T1037", "T1546.012", "T1546"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Token Impersonation/Theft", "Impair Defenses", "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts", "Time Providers", "Event Triggered Execution", "Kerberoasting", "Image File Execution Options Injection", "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", "Access Token Manipulation", "Screensaver", "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", "Accessibility Features", "Logon Script (Windows)", "Change Default File Association", "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "Indicator Blocking"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390", "Axiom", "Kimsuky", "TEMP.Veles", "PLATINUM", "APT29", "FIN8", "Rocke", "Whitefly", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "APT32", "APT41", "FIN6", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT3", "no", "APT28", "APT33"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Time Provider Persistence Registry", "id": "5ba382c4-2105-11ec-8d8f-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-29", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspiciouos modification of time provider registry for persistence and autostart. This technique can allow the attacker to persist on the compromised host and autostart as soon as the machine boot up. This TTP can be a good indicator of suspicious behavior since this registry is not commonly modified by normal user or even an admin.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path =\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services\\\\W32Time\\\\TimeProviders*\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `time_provider_persistence_registry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://pentestlab.blog/2019/10/22/persistence-time-providers/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/003/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Privilege Escalation Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.003/timeprovider_reg/sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1547.003", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Time Providers", "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "time_provider_persistence_registry_filter"}]}, {"name": "Overwriting Accessibility Binaries", "id": "13c2f6c3-10c5-4deb-9ba1-7c4460ebe4ae", "version": 4, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Microsoft Windows contains accessibility features that can be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in. An adversary can modify or replace these programs so they can get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system. This search looks for modifications to these binaries.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\sethc.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\utilman.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\osk.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\Magnify.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\Narrator.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\DisplaySwitch.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\AtBroker.exe*) by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `overwriting_accessibility_binaries_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.", "known_false_positives": "Microsoft may provide updates to these binaries. Verify that these changes do not correspond with your normal software update cycle.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "privilege escalation"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.008/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A suspicious file modification or replace in $file_path$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1546", "T1546.008"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "file_path", "type": "file_path", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.dest", "Filesystem.file_path", "Filesystem.file_name", "Filesystem.dest"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Event Triggered Execution", "Accessibility Features"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT41", "APT3", "APT29", "Deep Panda", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "overwriting_accessibility_binaries_filter"}]}, {"name": "Active Setup Registry Autostart", "id": "f64579c0-203f-11ec-abcc-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-28", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of the active setup registry for persistence and privilege escalation. This technique was seen in several malware (poisonIvy), adware and APT to gain persistence to the compromised machine upon boot up. This TTP is a good indicator to further check the process id that do the modification since modification of this registry is not commonly done. check the legitimacy of the file and process involve in this rules to check if it is a valid setup installer that creating or modifying this registry.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_value_name = \"StubPath\" Registry.registry_key_name = \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Active Setup\\\\Installed Components*\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `active_setup_registry_autostart_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "Active setup installer may add or modify this registry.", "references": ["https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Backdoor%3aWin32%2fPoisonivy.E", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/014/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Privilege Escalation Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/t1547.014/active_setup_stubpath/sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1547.014", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "active_setup_registry_autostart_filter"}]}, {"name": "Screensaver Event Trigger Execution", "id": "58cea3ec-1f6d-11ec-8560-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-27", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is developed to detect possible event trigger execution through screensaver registry entry modification for persistence or privilege escalation. This technique was seen in several APT and malware where they put the malicious payload path to the SCRNSAVE.EXE registry key to redirect the execution to their malicious payload path. This TTP is a good indicator that some attacker may modify this entry for their persistence and privilege escalation.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Control Panel\\\\Desktop\\\\SCRNSAVE.EXE*\") by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `screensaver_event_trigger_execution_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/002/", "https://dmcxblue.gitbook.io/red-team-notes-2-0/red-team-techniques/privilege-escalation/untitled-3/screensaver"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Privilege Escalation Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.002/scrnsave_reg/sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1546", "T1546.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Event Triggered Execution", "Screensaver"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "screensaver_event_trigger_execution_filter"}]}, {"name": "Change Default File Association", "id": "462d17d8-1f71-11ec-ad07-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-27", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is developed to detect suspicious registry modification to change the default file association of windows to malicious payload. This techninique was seen in some APT where it modify the default process to run file association, like .txt to notepad.exe. Instead notepad.exe it will point to a Script or other payload that will load malicious command to the compromised host.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path =\"*\\\\shell\\\\open\\\\command\\\\*\" Registry.registry_path = \"*HKCR\\\\*\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `change_default_file_association_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://dmcxblue.gitbook.io/red-team-notes-2-0/red-team-techniques/privilege-escalation/untitled-3/accessibility-features"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Privilege Escalation Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.001/txtfile_reg/sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1546.001", "T1546"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Change Default File Association", "Event Triggered Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Kimsuky", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "change_default_file_association_filter"}]}, {"name": "Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption", "id": "5cc67381-44fa-4111-8a37-7a230943f027", "version": 3, "date": "2020-10-16", "author": "Jose Hernandez, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects a potential kerberoasting attack via service principal name requests", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769 Ticket_Options=0x40810000 Ticket_Encryption_Type=0x17 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, service, service_id, Ticket_Encryption_Type, Ticket_Options | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, and include the windows security event logs that contain kerberos", "known_false_positives": "Older systems that support kerberos RC4 by default NetApp may generate false positives", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1208/T1208.md", "https://www.trimarcsecurity.com/post/trimarcresearch-detecting-kerberoasting-activity"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "message": "Potential kerberoasting attack via service principal name requests detected on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1558.003", "T1558"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Ticket_Options", "Ticket_Encryption_Type", "dest", "service", "service_id"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Kerberoasting", "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption_filter"}]}, {"name": "Logon Script Event Trigger Execution", "id": "4c38c264-1f74-11ec-b5fa-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-27", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry entry to persist and gain privilege escalation upon booting up of compromised host. This technique was seen in several APT and malware where it modify UserInitMprLogonScript registry entry to its malicious payload to be executed upon boot up of the machine.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path IN (\"*\\\\Environment\\\\UserInitMprLogonScript\") by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `logon_script_event_trigger_execution_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/001"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Privilege Escalation Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1037.001/logonscript_reg/sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1037", "T1037.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts", "Logon Script (Windows)"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Rocke", "Cobalt Group", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "logon_script_event_trigger_execution_filter"}]}, {"name": "ETW Registry Disabled", "id": "8ed523ac-276b-11ec-ac39-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-07", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a registry modification to disable ETW feature of windows. This technique is to evade EDR appliance to evade detections and hide its execution from audit logs.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\.NETFramework*\") Registry.registry_value_name = ETWEnabled Registry.registry_value_data=0x00000000 by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `etw_registry_disabled_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://gist.github.com/Cyb3rWard0g/a4a115fd3ab518a0e593525a379adee3"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Privilege Escalation Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127/etw_disable/sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.006", "T1127", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.registry_value_data"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Indicator Blocking", "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "etw_registry_disabled_filter"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation", "id": "c9f4b923-f8af-4155-b697-1354f5bcbc5e", "version": 4, "date": "2020-11-27", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to elevate privileges. The registry keys under \"Image File Execution Options\" are used to intercept calls to an executable and can be used to attach malicious binaries to benign system binaries.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=\"*Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Image File Execution Options*\") AND (Registry.registry_value_name=GlobalFlag OR Registry.registry_value_name=Debugger) by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "There are many legitimate applications that must execute upon system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task.", "references": ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2015/12/an-introduction-to-image-file-execution-options/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 95, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Persistence"}, "Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.012/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to privilege escalation in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1546.012", "T1546"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user"], "risk_score": 76, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Image File Execution Options Injection", "Event Triggered Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TEMP.Veles", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation_filter"}]}, {"name": "Runas Execution in CommandLine", "id": "4807e716-43a4-11ec-a0e7-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-12", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic look for a spawned runas.exe process with a administrator user option parameter. This parameter was abused by adversaries, malware author or even red teams to gain elevated privileges in target host. This is a good hunting query to figure out privilege escalation tactics that may used for different stages like lateral movement but take note that administrator may use this command in purpose so its better to see other event context before and after this analytic.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_runas` AND Processes.process = \"*/user:*\" AND Processes.process = \"*admin*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `runas_execution_in_commandline_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated or manual execute this command that may generate false positives. filter is needed.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/ad4c3cda-41f2-4401-8dba-56cc2d245488/#"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/vilsel/sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "message": "elevated process using runas on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1134", "T1134.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Access Token Manipulation", "Token Impersonation/Theft"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=runas.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=runas.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_runas"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "runas_execution_in_commandline_filter"}]}, {"name": "Child Processes of Spoolsv exe", "id": "aa0c4aeb-5b18-41c4-8c07-f1442d7599df", "version": 3, "date": "2020-03-16", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for child processes of spoolsv.exe. This activity is associated with a POC privilege-escalation exploit associated with CVE-2018-8440. Spoolsv.exe is the process associated with the Print Spooler service in Windows and typically runs as SYSTEM.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=spoolsv.exe AND Processes.process_name!=regsvr32.exe by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model. Update the `children_of_spoolsv_filter` macro to filter out legitimate child processes spawned by spoolsv.exe.", "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate printer-related processes may show up as children of spoolsv.exe. You should confirm that any activity as legitimate and may be added as exclusions in the search.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "cve": ["CVE-2018-8440"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1068"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.user"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Whitefly", "APT33", "Cobalt Group", "PLATINUM", "FIN8", "APT32", "Threat Group-3390", "FIN6", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe_filter"}]}, {"name": "Print Processor Registry Autostart", "id": "1f5b68aa-2037-11ec-898e-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-28", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification or new registry entry regarding print processor. This registry is known to be abuse by turla or other APT to gain persistence and privilege escalation to the compromised machine. This is done by adding the malicious dll payload on the new created key in this registry that will be executed as it restarted the spoolsv.exe process and services.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path =\"*\\\\Control\\\\Print\\\\Environments\\\\Windows x64\\\\Print Processors*\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `print_processor_registry_autostart_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "possible new printer installation may add driver component on this registry.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/012/", "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/05/21/no-game-over-winnti-group/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Privilege Escalation Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/print_reg/sysmon_print.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1547.012", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "print_processor_registry_autostart_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", "id": "cecdc1e7-0af2-4a55-8967-b9ea62c0317d", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-26", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "description": "This analytical story addresses events that indicate abuse of cloud federated credentials. These credentials are usually extracted from endpoint desktop or servers specially those servers that provide federation services such as Windows Active Directory Federation Services. Identity Federation relies on objects such as Oauth2 tokens, cookies or SAML assertions in order to provide seamless access between cloud and perimeter environments. If these objects are either hijacked or forged then attackers will be able to pivot into victim's cloud environements.", "narrative": "This story is composed of detection searches based on endpoint that addresses the use of Mimikatz, Escalation of Privileges and Abnormal processes that may indicate the extraction of Federated directory objects such as passwords, Oauth2 tokens, certificates and keys. Cloud environment (AWS, Azure) related events are also addressed in specific cloud environment detection searches.", "references": ["https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a"], "tags": {"analytics_story": "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", "category": ["Cloud Security"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1136", "T1556", "T1003.001", "T1003", "T1546.012", "T1546", "T1078", "T1136.003"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Cloud Account", "Valid Accounts", "Event Triggered Execution", "Image File Execution Options Injection", "Create Account", "OS Credential Dumping", "LSASS Memory", "Modify Authentication Process"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Sandworm Team", "Magic Hound", "Axiom", "APT1", "TEMP.Veles", "PLATINUM", "Poseidon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN8", "Ke3chang", "Leviathan", "APT39", "Carbanak", "Whitefly", "Frankenstein", "Stolen Pencil", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "APT41", "FIN5", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Blue Mockingbird", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "APT3", "Cleaver", "Wizard Spider", "Sowbug", "Leafminer", "APT18", "no", "MuddyWater", "FIN10", "PittyTiger", "FIN4", "APT28", "APT33", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Night Dragon"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Certutil exe certificate extraction", "id": "337a46be-600f-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-26", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for arguments to certutil.exe indicating the manipulation or extraction of Certificate. This certificate can then be used to sign new authentication tokens specially inside Federated environments such as Windows ADFS.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=certutil.exe Processes.process = \"*-exportPFX*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `certutil_exe_certificate_extraction_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Unless there are specific use cases, manipulating or exporting certificates using certutil is uncommon. Extraction of certificate has been observed during attacks such as Golden SAML and other campaigns targeting Federated services.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting export a certificate.", "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "certutil_exe_certificate_extraction_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images", "id": "29e307ba-40af-4ab2-91b2-3c6b392bbba0", "version": 1, "date": "2019-12-03", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for reading loaded Images unique to credential dumping with Mimikatz. Deprecated because mimikatz libraries changed and very noisy sysmon Event Code.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 | stats values(ImageLoaded) as ImageLoaded values(ProcessId) as ProcessId by Computer, Image | search ImageLoaded=*WinSCard.dll ImageLoaded=*cryptdll.dll ImageLoaded=*hid.dll ImageLoaded=*samlib.dll ImageLoaded=*vaultcli.dll | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search needs Sysmon Logs and a sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 7 with powershell.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", "known_false_positives": "Other tools can import the same DLLs. These tools should be part of a whitelist. False positives may be present with any process that authenticates or uses credentials, PowerShell included. Filter based on parent process.", "references": ["https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "Detect Zerologon Attack", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Windows", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A process, $Image$, has loaded $ImageLoaded$ that are typically related to credential dumping on $Computer$. Review for further details.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "ImageLoaded", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Other"]}, {"name": "Image", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "ImageLoaded", "ProcessId", "Computer", "Image"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["LSASS Memory", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Whitefly", "Blue Mockingbird", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Leviathan", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Stolen Pencil", "APT32", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "PLATINUM", "FIN8", "BRONZE BUTLER", "OilRig", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT28", "APT1", "Ke3chang", "Cleaver", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images_filter"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation", "id": "c9f4b923-f8af-4155-b697-1354f5bcbc5e", "version": 4, "date": "2020-11-27", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to elevate privileges. The registry keys under \"Image File Execution Options\" are used to intercept calls to an executable and can be used to attach malicious binaries to benign system binaries.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=\"*Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Image File Execution Options*\") AND (Registry.registry_value_name=GlobalFlag OR Registry.registry_value_name=Debugger) by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "There are many legitimate applications that must execute upon system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task.", "references": ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2015/12/an-introduction-to-image-file-execution-options/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 95, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Persistence"}, "Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.012/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to privilege escalation in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1546.012", "T1546"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user"], "risk_score": 76, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Image File Execution Options Injection", "Event Triggered Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TEMP.Veles", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Rare Executables", "id": "44fddcb2-8d3b-454c-874e-7c6de5a4f7ac", "version": 5, "date": "2020-03-16", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search will return a table of rare processes, the names of the systems running them, and the users who initiated each process.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.dest) as dest values(Processes.user) as user min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name | rename Processes.process_name as process | rex field=user \"(?.*)\\\\\\\\(?.*)\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| search [| tstats count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name | rare Processes.process_name limit=30 | rename Processes.process_name as process| `filter_rare_process_allow_list`| table process ] | `detect_rare_executables_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts and populating the endpoint data model with the resultant dataset. The macro `filter_rare_process_allow_list` searches two lookup files for allowed processes. These consist of `rare_process_allow_list_default.csv` and `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv`. To add your own processes to the allow list, add them to `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv`. If you wish to remove an entry from the default lookup file, you will have to modify the macro itself to set the allow_list value for that process to false. You can modify the limit parameter and search scheduling to better suit your environment.", "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate processes may be only rarely executed in your environment. As these are identified, update `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv` to filter them out of your search results.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Unusual Processes", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.PT", "PR.DS", "DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_name"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "lookup update=true lookup_rare_process_allow_list_default process as process OUTPUTNEW allow_list | where allow_list=\"false\" | lookup update=true lookup_rare_process_allow_list_local process as process OUTPUT allow_list | where allow_list=\"false\"", "description": "This macro is intended to allow_list processes that have been definied as rare", "name": "filter_rare_process_allow_list", "lookups": [{"case_sensitive_match": "false", "default_match": "false", "description": "A list of rare processes that are legitimate that is provided by Splunk", "filename": "rare_process_allow_list_default.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(process)", "min_matches": 1, "name": "lookup_rare_process_allow_list_default", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/rare_process_allow_list_default.csv"}, {"case_sensitive_match": "false", "default_match": "false", "description": "A list of rare processes that are legitimate provided by the end user", "filename": "rare_process_allow_list_local.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(process)", "min_matches": 1, "name": "lookup_rare_process_allow_list_local", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/rare_process_allow_list_local.csv"}]}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_rare_executables_filter"}]}, {"name": "AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal", "id": "bbe23980-6019-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-26", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides specific SAML access from specific Service Provider, user and targeted principal at AWS. This search provides specific information to detect abnormal access or potential credential hijack or forgery, specially in federated environments using SAML protocol inside the perimeter or cloud provider.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=Assumerolewithsaml | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by requestParameters.principalArn requestParameters.roleArn requestParameters.roleSessionName recipientAccountId responseElements.issuer sourceIPAddress userAgent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs", "known_false_positives": "Attacks using a Golden SAML or SAML assertion hijacks or forgeries are very difficult to detect as accessing cloud providers with these assertions looks exactly like normal access, however things such as source IP sourceIPAddress user, and principal targeted at receiving cloud provider along with endpoint credential access and abuse detection searches can provide the necessary context to detect these attacks.", "references": ["https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", "https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "asset_type": "AWS Federated Account", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Stage:Credential Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/assume_role_with_saml/assume_role_with_saml.json"], "impact": 80, "message": "From IP address $sourceIPAddress$, user agent $userAgent$ has trigged an event $eventName$ for account ID $recipientAccountId$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078"], "observable": [{"name": "sourceIPAddress", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "recipientAccountId", "type": "Other", "role": ["Victim", "Target"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "requestParameters.principalArn", "requestParameters.roleArn", "requestParameters.roleSessionName", "recipientAccountId", "responseElements.issuer", "sourceIPAddress", "userAgent"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Valid Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal_filter"}]}, {"name": "O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User", "id": "b2c81cc6-6040-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-26", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects the creation of a new Federation setting by alerting about an specific event related to its creation.", "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation=\"Add app role assignment grant to user.\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Actor{}.ID) as Actor.ID values(Actor{}.Type) as Actor.Type by ActorIpAddress dest ResultStatus | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", "known_false_positives": "The creation of a new Federation is not necessarily malicious, however this events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a different cloud provider.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "asset_type": "Office 365", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_new_federation/o365_new_federation.json"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "message": "User $Actor.ID$ has created a new federation setting on $dest$ from IP Address $ActorIpAddress$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1136.003", "T1136"], "observable": [{"name": "ActorIpAddress", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "Actor.ID", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Workload", "Operation", "Actor{}.ID", "Actor{}.Type", "ActorIpAddress", "dest", "ResultStatus"], "risk_score": 18, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Cloud Account", "Create Account"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "o365_management_activity"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user_filter"}]}, {"name": "O365 Added Service Principal", "id": "1668812a-6047-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-26", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects the creation of a new Federation setting by alerting about an specific event related to its creation.", "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory signature=\"Add service principal credentials.\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Actor{}.ID) as Actor.ID values(ModifiedProperties{}.Name) as ModifiedProperties.Name values(ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue) as ModifiedProperties.NewValue values(Target{}.ID) as Target.ID by ActorIpAddress signature | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_added_service_principal_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", "known_false_positives": "The creation of a new Federation is not necessarily malicious, however these events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a different cloud provider.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html", "https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "asset_type": "Office 365", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_add_service_principal/o365_add_service_principal.json"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "message": "User $Actor.ID$ created a new federation setting on $Target.ID$ and added service principal credentials from IP Address $ActorIpAddress$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1136.003", "T1136"], "observable": [{"name": "ActorIpAddress", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "Target.ID", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Workload", "signature", "Actor{}.ID", "ModifiedProperties{}.Name", "ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue", "Target{}.ID", "ActorIpAddress"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Cloud Account", "Create Account"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "o365_management_activity"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "o365_added_service_principal_filter"}]}, {"name": "O365 Excessive SSO logon errors", "id": "8158ccc4-6038-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-26", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects accounts with high number of Single Sign ON (SSO) logon errors. Excessive logon errors may indicate attempts to bruteforce of password or single sign on token hijack or reuse.", "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory LogonError=SsoArtifactInvalidOrExpired | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by LogonError ActorIpAddress UserAgent UserId | where count > 5 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", "known_false_positives": "Logon errors may not be malicious in nature however it may indicate attempts to reuse a token or password obtained via credential access attack.", "references": ["https://stealthbits.com/blog/bypassing-mfa-with-pass-the-cookie/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "asset_type": "Office 365", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/o365_sso_logon_errors/o365_sso_logon_errors.json"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "message": "User $UserId$ has caused excessive number of SSO logon errors from $ActorIpAddress$ using UserAgent $UserAgent$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1556"], "observable": [{"name": "ActorIpAddress", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "UserId", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Workload", "LogonError", "ActorIpAddress", "UserAgent", "UserId"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Modify Authentication Process"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "o365_management_activity"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors_filter"}]}, {"name": "O365 New Federated Domain Added", "id": "e155876a-6048-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-26", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects the addition of a new Federated domain.", "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=Exchange Operation=\"Add-FederatedDomain\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Parameters{}.Value) as Parameters.Value by ObjectId Operation OrganizationName OriginatingServer UserId UserKey | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_new_federated_domain_added_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity.", "known_false_positives": "The creation of a new Federated domain is not necessarily malicious, however these events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a similar or different cloud provider.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html", "https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory", "https://o365blog.com/post/aadbackdoor/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "asset_type": "Office 365", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_new_federated_domain/o365_new_federated_domain.json"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "message": "User $UserId$ has added a new federated domaain $Parameters.Value$ for $OrganizationName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1136.003", "T1136"], "observable": [{"name": "OrganizationName", "type": "Other", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "UserId", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Workload", "Operation", "Parameters{}.Value", "ObjectId", "OrganizationName", "OriginatingServer", "UserId", "UserKey"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Cloud Account", "Create Account"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "o365_management_activity"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "o365_new_federated_domain_added_filter"}]}, {"name": "AWS SAML Update identity provider", "id": "2f0604c6-6030-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-26", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides detection of updates to SAML provider in AWS. Updates to SAML provider need to be monitored closely as they may indicate possible perimeter compromise of federated credentials, or backdoor access from another cloud provider set by attacker.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=UpdateSAMLProvider | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by eventType eventName requestParameters.sAMLProviderArn userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.arn sourceIPAddress userIdentity.accessKeyId userIdentity.principalId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`aws_saml_update_identity_provider_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", "known_false_positives": "Updating a SAML provider or creating a new one may not necessarily be malicious however it needs to be closely monitored.", "references": ["https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", "https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "asset_type": "AWS Federated Account", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/update_saml_provider/update_saml_provider.json"], "impact": 80, "message": "User $userIdentity.principalId$ from IP address $sourceIPAddress$ has trigged an event $eventName$ to update the SAML provider to $requestParameters.sAMLProviderArn$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078"], "observable": [{"name": "sourceIPAddress", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "userIdentity.principalId", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim", "Target"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "eventType", "requestParameters.sAMLProviderArn", "userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.arn", "sourceIPAddress", "userIdentity.accessKeyId", "userIdentity.principalId"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Valid Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_saml_update_identity_provider_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "FIN7", "id": "df2b00d3-06ba-49f1-b253-b19cef19b569", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-14", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "batch", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the FIN7 JS Implant and JSSLoader, including looking for Image Loading of ldap and wmi modules, associated with its payload, data collection and script execution.", "narrative": "FIN7 is a Russian criminal advanced persistent threat group that has primarily targeted the U.S. retail, restaurant, and hospitality sectors since mid-2015. A portion of FIN7 is run out of the front company Combi Security. It has been called one of the most successful criminal hacking groups in the world. this passed few day FIN7 tools and implant are seen in the wild where its code is updated. the FIN& is known to use the spear phishing attack as a entry to targetted network or host that will drop its staging payload like the JS and JSSloader. Now this artifacts and implants seen downloading other malware like cobaltstrike and event ransomware to encrypt host.", "references": ["https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIN7", "https://threatpost.com/fin7-windows-11-release/169206/", "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/jssloader-recoded-and-reloaded"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "FIN7", "category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1220", "T1033", "T1059", "T1555", "T1566", "T1134", "T1543", "T1555.003", "T1566.001", "T1059.005", "T1059.007", "T1134.004", "T1055"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "Parent PID Spoofing", "XSL Script Processing", "Phishing", "System Owner/User Discovery", "Visual Basic", "Spearphishing Attachment", "Create or Modify System Process", "Access Token Manipulation", "Credentials from Password Stores", "Credentials from Web Browsers", "JavaScript/JScript", "Process Injection"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Discovery", "Credential Access", "Initial Access", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Stealth Falcon", "Sandworm Team", "Inception", "Rancor", "Tropic Trooper", "Kimsuky", "TA459", "PLATINUM", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ke3chang", "FIN8", "Turla", "APT39", "Molerats", "Gamaredon Group", "APT12", "Leviathan", "RTM", "TA505", "Mofang", "Whitefly", "Frankenstein", "Cobalt Group", "Stolen Pencil", "APT32", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT19", "APT37", "APT-C-36", "WIRTE", "Darkhotel", "APT41", "FIN5", "menuPass", "FIN6", "OilRig", "Blue Mockingbird", "admin@338", "Lazarus Group", "Honeybee", "APT3", "Wizard Spider", "Machete", "Leafminer", "no", "The White Company", "Sharpshooter", "MuddyWater", "FIN10", "Patchwork", "FIN4", "Elderwood", "APT28", "Gallmaker", "APT33", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN7", "Windshift", "BlackTech", "Gorgon Group", "APT29", "Naikon", "DarkHydrus"]}, "detections": [{"name": "Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell", "id": "6c3f7dd8-153c-11ec-ac2d-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-14", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies a non-standard parent process (not matching CMD, PowerShell, or Explorer) spawning `ipconfig.exe` or `systeminfo.exe`. This particular behavior was seen in FIN7's JSSLoader .NET payload. This is also typically seen when an adversary is injected into another process performing different discovery techniques. This event stands out as a TTP since these tools are commonly executed with a shell application or Explorer parent, and not by another application. This TTP is a good indicator for an adversary gathering host information, but one possible false positive might be an automated tool used by a system administator.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = \"ipconfig.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"systeminfo.exe\") AND NOT (Processes.parent_process_name = \"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"powershell*\" OR Processes.parent_process_name=\"pwsh.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"explorer.exe\") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmdline_tool_not_executed_in_cmd_shell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated host discovery application that may generate false positives. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html", "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["FIN7"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/jssloader/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A non-standard parent process $parent_process_name$ spawned child process $process_name$ to execute command-line tool on $dest$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.007"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "JavaScript/JScript"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "APT32", "FIN7", "Cobalt Group", "Molerats", "TA505", "Silence", "Leafminer"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "cmdline_tool_not_executed_in_cmd_shell_filter"}]}, {"name": "XSL Script Execution With WMIC", "id": "004e32e2-146d-11ec-a83f-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-13", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious wmic.exe process or renamed wmic process to execute malicious xsl file. This technique was seen in FIN7 to execute its malicous jscript using the .xsl as the loader with the help of wmic.exe process. This TTP is really a good indicator for you to hunt further for FIN7 or other attacker that known to used this technique.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` Processes.process = \"*os get*\" Processes.process=\"*/format:*\" Processes.process = \"*.xsl*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `xsl_script_execution_with_wmic_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html", "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046/", "https://web.archive.org/web/20190814201250/https://subt0x11.blogspot.com/2018/04/wmicexe-whitelisting-bypass-hacking.html", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1220/T1220.md#atomic-test-3---wmic-bypass-using-local-xsl-file"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["FIN7", "Suspicious WMI Use"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_macro_js_1/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ utilizing wmic to load a XSL script.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1220"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["XSL Script Processing"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Cobalt Group"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_wmic"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "xsl_script_execution_with_wmic_filter"}]}, {"name": "Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process", "id": "1f35e1da-267b-11ec-90a9-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-06", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious spawned process by wscript or cscript process. This technique was a common technique used by adversaries and malware to execute different LOLBIN, other script like powershell or create a suspended process to inject its code as a defense evasion. This TTP may detect some normal script that using several application tool that are in the list of the child process it detects but a good pivot and indicator that a script is may execute suspicious code.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"cscript.exe\", \"wscript.exe\") Processes.process_name IN (\"regsvr32.exe\", \"rundll32.exe\",\"winhlp32.exe\",\"certutil.exe\",\"msbuild.exe\",\"cmd.exe\",\"powershell*\",\"wmic.exe\",\"mshta.exe\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "user may create vbs or js script that use several tool as part of its execution.", "references": ["https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/8da5b75b6380a41eee3a399c43dfe0d99eeefaa1fd21027a07b1ecaa4cd96fdd?environmentId=120"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["FIN7", "Remcos", "Unusual Processes"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/vbs_wscript/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "wscript or cscript parent process spawned $process_name$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1055", "T1543", "T1134.004", "T1134"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Process Injection", "Create or Modify System Process", "Parent PID Spoofing", "Access Token Manipulation"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Cobalt Group", "APT37", "Honeybee", "PLATINUM", "no", "no", "Blue Mockingbird"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process_filter"}]}, {"name": "Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir", "id": "e6fc13b0-1609-11ec-b533-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-15", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect an anomaly event of non-firefox process accessing the files in profile folder. This folder contains all the sqlite database of the firefox browser related to users login, history, cookies and etc. Most of the RAT, trojan spy as well as FIN7 jssloader try to parse the those sqlite database to collect information on the compromised host. This SACL Event (4663) need to be enabled to tthe firefox profile directory to be eable to use this. Since you monitoring this access to the folder a noise coming from firefox need to be filter and also sqlite db browser and explorer .exe to make this detection more stable.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 NOT (process_name IN (\"*\\\\firefox.exe\", \"*\\\\explorer.exe\", \"*sql*\")) Object_Name=\"*\\\\AppData\\\\Roaming\\\\Mozilla\\\\Firefox\\\\Profiles*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Object_Name Object_Type process_name Access_Mask Accesses process_id EventCode dest user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663. For 4663, enable \"Audit Object Access\" in Group Policy. Then check the two boxes listed for both \"Success\" and \"Failure.\"", "known_false_positives": "other browser not listed related to firefox may catch by this rule.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["FIN7", "Remcos"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_sacl/security.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "a non firefox browser process $process_name$ accessing $Object_Name$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1555", "T1555.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Object_Name", "Object_Type", "process_name", "Access_Mask", "Accesses", "process_id", "EventCode", "dest", "user"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Credentials from Password Stores", "Credentials from Web Browsers"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT39", "OilRig", "MuddyWater", "Leafminer", "APT33", "Turla", "Stealth Falcon", "Magic Hound", "Sandworm Team", "Inception", "Stealth Falcon", "OilRig", "Leafminer", "APT33", "APT3", "Kimsuky", "TA505", "Stolen Pencil", "MuddyWater", "APT37", "Patchwork", "Molerats"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir_filter"}]}, {"name": "MS Scripting Process Loading WMI Module", "id": "2eba3d36-14a6-11ec-a682-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-13", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious MS scripting process such as wscript.exe or cscript.exe that loading wmi module to process wmi query. This behavior was seen in FIN7 implant where it uses javascript to execute wmi query to parse host information that will send to its C2 server. this anomaly detections is a good initial step to hunt further a suspicious wmi query or wmi related events to the host that may give you good information regarding process that are commonly using wmi query or modules or might be an attacker using this technique.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode =7 Image IN (\"*\\\\wscript.exe\", \"*\\\\cscript.exe\") ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\fastprox.dll\", \"*\\\\wbemdisp.dll\", \"*\\\\wbemprox.dll\", \"*\\\\wbemsvc.dll\" , \"*\\\\wmiutils.dll\", \"*\\\\wbemcomn.dll\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Image EventCode process_name ProcessId ProcessGuid Computer ImageLoaded | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "automation scripting language may used by network operator to do ldap query.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html", "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["FIN7"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_js_2/sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "$process_name$ loading wmi modules $ImageLoaded$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.007"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Image", "EventCode", "process_name", "ProcessId", "ProcessGuid", "Computer", "ImageLoaded"], "risk_score": 9, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "JavaScript/JScript"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "APT32", "FIN7", "Cobalt Group", "Molerats", "TA505", "Silence", "Leafminer"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module_filter"}]}, {"name": "MS Scripting Process Loading Ldap Module", "id": "0b0c40dc-14a6-11ec-b267-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-13", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious MS scripting process such as wscript.exe or cscript.exe that loading ldap module to process ldap query. This behavior was seen in FIN7 implant where it uses javascript to execute ldap query to parse host information that will send to its C2 server. this anomaly detections is a good initial step to hunt further a suspicious ldap query or ldap related events to the host that may give you good information regarding ldap or AD information processing or might be a attacker.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode =7 Image IN (\"*\\\\wscript.exe\", \"*\\\\cscript.exe\") ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\Wldap32.dll\", \"*\\\\adsldp.dll\", \"*\\\\adsldpc.dll\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Image EventCode process_name ProcessId ProcessGuid Computer ImageLoaded | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "automation scripting language may used by network operator to do ldap query.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html", "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["FIN7"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_js_2/sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "$process_name$ loading ldap modules $ImageLoaded$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.007"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Image", "EventCode", "process_name", "ProcessId", "ProcessGuid", "Computer", "ImageLoaded"], "risk_score": 9, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "JavaScript/JScript"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "APT32", "FIN7", "Cobalt Group", "Molerats", "TA505", "Silence", "Leafminer"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module_filter"}]}, {"name": "Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir", "id": "81263de4-160a-11ec-944f-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-15", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect an anomaly event of non-chrome process accessing the files in chrome user default folder. This folder contains all the sqlite database of the chrome browser related to users login, history, cookies and etc. Most of the RAT, trojan spy as well as FIN7 jssloader try to parse the those sqlite database to collect information on the compromised host. This SACL Event (4663) need to be enabled to tthe firefox profile directory to be eable to use this. Since you monitoring this access to the folder a noise coming from firefox need to be filter and also sqlite db browser and explorer .exe to make this detection more stable.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 NOT (process_name IN (\"*\\\\chrome.exe\", \"*\\\\explorer.exe\", \"*sql*\")) Object_Name=\"*\\\\Google\\\\Chrome\\\\User Data\\\\Default*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Object_Name Object_Type process_name Access_Mask Accesses process_id EventCode dest user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663. For 4663, enable \"Audit Object Access\" in Group Policy. Then check the two boxes listed for both \"Success\" and \"Failure.\"", "known_false_positives": "other browser not listed related to firefox may catch by this rule.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["FIN7", "Remcos"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_sacl/security2.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "a non firefox browser process $process_name$ accessing $Object_Name$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1555", "T1555.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Object_Name", "Object_Type", "process_name", "Access_Mask", "Accesses", "process_id", "EventCode", "dest", "user"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Credentials from Password Stores", "Credentials from Web Browsers"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT39", "OilRig", "MuddyWater", "Leafminer", "APT33", "Turla", "Stealth Falcon", "Magic Hound", "Sandworm Team", "Inception", "Stealth Falcon", "OilRig", "Leafminer", "APT33", "APT3", "Kimsuky", "TA505", "Stolen Pencil", "MuddyWater", "APT37", "Patchwork", "Molerats"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir_filter"}]}, {"name": "Office Application Drop Executable", "id": "73ce70c4-146d-11ec-9184-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-13", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Michael Haag Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious MS office application that drop or create executables or script in the host. This behavior is commonly seen in spear phishing office attachment where it drop malicious files or script to compromised the host. It might be some normal macro may drop script or tools as part of automation but still this behavior is reallly suspicious and not commonly seen in normal office application", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\",\"wordpad.exe\",\"wordview.exe\") by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*.exe\",\"*.dll\",\"*.pif\",\"*.scr\",\"*.js\",\"*.vbs\",\"*.vbe\",\"*.ps1\") by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process proc_guid] | dedup file_create_time | table dest, process_name, process, file_create_time, file_name, file_path, proc_guid | `office_application_drop_executable_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "office macro for automation may do this behavior", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html", "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["FIN7"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_macro_js_1/sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "process $process_name$ drops a file $TargetFilename$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "process name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Image", "TargetFilename", "ProcessGuid", "dest", "user_id"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Phishing", "Spearphishing Attachment"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "office_application_drop_executable_filter"}]}, {"name": "Check Elevated CMD using whoami", "id": "a9079b18-1633-11ec-859c-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-15", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious whoami execution to check if the cmd or shell instance process is with elevated privileges. This technique was seen in FIN7 js implant where it execute this as part of its data collection to the infected machine to check if the running shell cmd process is elevated or not. This TTP is really a good alert for known attacker that recon on the targetted host. This command is not so commonly executed by a normal user or even an admin to check if a process is elevated.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*whoami*\" Processes.process = \"*/group*\" Processes.process = \"* find *\" Processes.process = \"*12288*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `check_elevated_cmd_using_whoami_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["FIN7"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_js_2/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Process name $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1033"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Owner/User Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Frankenstein", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Tropic Trooper", "APT39", "MuddyWater", "APT32", "APT37", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "Magic Hound", "FIN10", "Gamaredon Group", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "APT3"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "check_elevated_cmd_using_whoami_filter"}]}, {"name": "Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App", "id": "35159940-228f-11ec-8a49-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-01", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious wscript commandline to execute vbscript. This technique was seen in several malware to execute malicious vbs file using wscript application. commonly vbs script is associated to cscript process and this can be a technique to evade process parent child detections or even some av script emulation system.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = \"wscript.exe\" AND Processes.parent_process = \"*//e:vbscript*\") OR (Processes.process_name = \"wscript.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*//e:vbscript*\") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `vbscript_execution_using_wscript_app_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/369332/0/html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["FIN7", "Remcos"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/vbs_wscript/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Process name $process_name$ with commandline $process$ to execute vbsscript", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059.005", "T1059"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Visual Basic", "Command and Scripting Interpreter"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "APT-C-36", "Rancor", "Patchwork", "MuddyWater", "Honeybee", "FIN7", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "Turla", "TA505", "Silence", "WIRTE", "FIN4", "Cobalt Group", "Gorgon Group", "Leviathan", "TA459", "Magic Hound", "APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "vbscript_execution_using_wscript_app_filter"}]}, {"name": "Jscript Execution Using Cscript App", "id": "002f1e24-146e-11ec-a470-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-13", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a execution of jscript using cscript process. Commonly when a user run jscript file it was executed by wscript.exe application. This technique was seen in FIN7 js implant to execute its malicious script using cscript process. This behavior is uncommon and a good artifacts to check further anomalies within the network", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = \"cscript.exe\" AND Processes.parent_process = \"*//e:jscript*\") OR (Processes.process_name = \"cscript.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*//e:jscript*\") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `jscript_execution_using_cscript_app_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html", "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["FIN7", "Remcos"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_macro_js_1/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Process name $process_name$ with commandline $process$ to execute jscript in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.007"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "JavaScript/JScript"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "APT32", "FIN7", "Cobalt Group", "Molerats", "TA505", "Silence", "Leafminer"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "jscript_execution_using_cscript_app_filter"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawning Wmic", "id": "ffc236d6-a6c9-11eb-95f1-acde48001122", "version": 3, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by Ursnif malware family. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `wmic.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `wmic.exe` will contain `wmic process call create`. In addition, Threat Research has released a detection identifying the use of `wmic process call create` on the command-line of `wmic.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `wmic.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\") `process_wmic` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_wmic_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "No false positives known. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/fb894ab8-a966-4b72-920b-935f41756afd/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1047/T1047.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "FIN7"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "recon"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_macros.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Phishing", "Spearphishing Attachment"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_wmic"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "office_product_spawning_wmic_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "BlackMatter Ransomware", "id": "0da348a3-78a0-412e-ab27-2de9dd7f9fee", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-06", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the BlackMatter ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with BlackMatter, force safe mode boot, autadminlogon account registry modification and more.", "narrative": "BlackMatter ransomware campaigns targeting healthcare and other vertical sectors, involve the use of ransomware payloads along with exfiltration of data per HHS bulletin. Malicious actors demand payment for ransome of data and threaten deletion and exposure of exfiltrated data.", "references": ["https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/08/09/blackmatter-ransomware-emerges-from-the-shadow-of-darkside/", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/blackmatter-ransomware-gang-rises-from-the-ashes-of-darkside-revil/", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/ransomware/2021/07/blackmatter-a-new-ransomware-group-claims-link-to-darkside-revil/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "BlackMatter Ransomware", "category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1552.002", "T1491", "T1486", "T1490", "T1552"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Data Encrypted for Impact", "Unsecured Credentials", "Inhibit System Recovery", "Credentials in Registry", "Defacement"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "no", "APT41", "APT38", "TA505"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Ransomware Notes bulk creation", "id": "eff7919a-8330-11eb-83f8-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-12", "author": "Teoderick Contreras", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytics identifies a big number of instance of ransomware notes (filetype e.g .txt, .html, .hta) file creation to the infected machine. This behavior is a good sensor if the ransomware note filename is quite new for security industry or the ransomware note filename is not in your ransomware lookup table list for monitoring.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=11 file_name IN (\"*\\.txt\",\"*\\.html\",\"*\\.hta\") |bin _time span=10s | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(TargetFilename) as unique_readme_path_count values(TargetFilename) as list_of_readme_path by Computer Image file_name | where unique_readme_path_count >= 15 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ransomware_notes_bulk_creation_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware", "DarkSide Ransomware", "BlackMatter Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Impact"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Obfuscation"], "message": "A high frequency file creation of $file_name$ in different file path in host $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1486"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["EventCode", "file_name", "_time", "TargetFilename", "Computer", "Image", "user"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Data Encrypted for Impact"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "TA505", "APT38"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "ransomware_notes_bulk_creation_filter"}]}, {"name": "Add DefaultUser And Password In Registry", "id": "d4a3eb62-0f1e-11ec-a971-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-06", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this search is to detect a suspicious registry modification to implement auto admin logon to a host. This technique was seen in BlackMatter ransomware to automatically logon to the compromise host after triggering a safemode boot to continue encrypting the whole network. This behavior is not a common practice and really a suspicious TTP or alert need to be consider if found within then network premise.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon*\" AND Registry.registry_value_name= DefaultPassword OR Registry.registry_value_name= DefaultUserName by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `add_defaultuser_and_password_in_registry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/08/09/blackmatter-ransomware-emerges-from-the-shadow-of-darkside/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["BlackMatter Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1552.002/autoadminlogon/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified registry key $registry_key_name$ with registry value $registry_value_name$ to prepare autoadminlogon", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1552.002", "T1552"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.dest"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Credentials in Registry", "Unsecured Credentials"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "add_defaultuser_and_password_in_registry_filter"}]}, {"name": "Known Services Killed by Ransomware", "id": "3070f8e0-c528-11eb-b2a0-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-04", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search detects a suspicioous termination of known services killed by ransomware before encrypting files in a compromised machine. This technique is commonly seen in most of ransomware now a days to avoid exception error while accessing the targetted files it wants to encrypts because of the open handle of those services to the targetted file.", "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 Message IN (\"*Volume Shadow Copy*\",\"*VSS*\", \"*backup*\", \"*sophos*\", \"*sql*\", \"*memtas*\", \"*mepocs*\", \"*veeam*\", \"*svc$*\") Message=\"*service entered the stopped state*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message dest Type | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `known_services_killed_by_ransomware_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the 7036 EventCode ScManager in System audit Logs from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Admin activities or installing related updates may do a sudden stop to list of services we monitor.", "references": ["https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "BlackMatter Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf3/windows-system.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Known services $Message$ terminated by a potential ransomware on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1490"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Message", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "dest", "Type"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Inhibit System Recovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_system"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "known_services_killed_by_ransomware_filter"}]}, {"name": "Modification Of Wallpaper", "id": "accb0712-c381-11eb-8e5b-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-02", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies suspicious modification of registry to deface or change the wallpaper of a compromised machines as part of its payload. This technique was commonly seen in ransomware like REVIL where it create a bitmap file contain a note that the machine was compromised and make it as a wallpaper.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode =13 (TargetObject= \"*\\\\Control Panel\\\\Desktop\\\\Wallpaper\" AND Image != \"*\\\\explorer.exe\") OR (TargetObject= \"*\\\\Control Panel\\\\Desktop\\\\Wallpaper\" AND Details = \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Image TargetObject Details Computer process_guid process_id user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `modification_of_wallpaper_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Image, TargetObject registry key, registry Details from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "3rd party tool may used to changed the wallpaper of the machine", "references": ["https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware", "BlackMatter Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Wallpaper modification on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1491"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Image", "TargetObject", "Details", "Computer", "process_guid", "process_id", "user_id"], "risk_score": 54, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Defacement"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "modification_of_wallpaper_filter"}]}, {"name": "Change To Safe Mode With Network Config", "id": "81f1dce0-0f18-11ec-a5d7-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-06", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious bcdedit commandline to configure the host to boot in safe mode with network config. This technique was seen in blackMatter ransomware where it force the compromised host to boot in safe mode to continue its encryption and bring back to normal boot using bcdedit deletevalue command. This TTP can be a good alert for host that booted from safe mode forcefully since it need to modify the boot configuration to bring it back to normal.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = bcdedit.exe Processes.process=\"*/set*\" Processes.process=\"*{current}*\" Processes.process=\"*safeboot*\" Processes.process=\"*network*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user |`drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `change_to_safe_mode_with_network_config_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/08/09/blackmatter-ransomware-emerges-from-the-shadow-of-darkside/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["BlackMatter Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Impact"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1552.002/autoadminlogon/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "bcdedit process with commandline $process$ to force safemode boot the $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1490"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Inhibit System Recovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "change_to_safe_mode_with_network_config_filter"}]}, {"name": "Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry", "id": "1379d2b8-0f18-11ec-8ca3-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-06", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this search is to detect a suspicious registry modification to implement auto admin logon to a host. This technique was seen in BlackMatter ransomware to automatically logon to the compromise host after triggering a safemode boot to continue encrypting the whole network. This behavior is not a common practice and really a suspicious TTP or alert need to be consider if found within then network premise.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon*\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=AutoAdminLogon AND Registry.registry_value_name=1 by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `auto_admin_logon_registry_entry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/08/09/blackmatter-ransomware-emerges-from-the-shadow-of-darkside/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["BlackMatter Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1552.002/autoadminlogon/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified registry key $registry_key_name$ with registry value $registry_value_name$ to prepare autoadminlogon", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1552.002", "T1552"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.dest"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Credentials in Registry", "Unsecured Credentials"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "auto_admin_logon_registry_entry_filter"}]}, {"name": "Bcdedit Command Back To Normal Mode Boot", "id": "dc7a8004-0f18-11ec-8c54-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-06", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious bcdedit commandline to configure the host from safe mode back to normal boot configuration. This technique was seen in blackMatter ransomware where it force the compromised host to boot in safe mode to continue its encryption and bring back to normal boot using bcdedit deletevalue command. This TTP can be a good alert for host that booted from safe mode forcefully since it need to modify the boot configuration to bring it back to normal.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = bcdedit.exe Processes.process=\"*/deletevalue*\" Processes.process=\"*{current}*\" Processes.process=\"*safeboot*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user |`drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `bcdedit_command_back_to_normal_mode_boot_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/08/09/blackmatter-ransomware-emerges-from-the-shadow-of-darkside/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["BlackMatter Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Impact"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1552.002/autoadminlogon/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "bcdedit process with commandline $process$ to bring back to normal boot configuration the $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1490"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Inhibit System Recovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "bcdedit_command_back_to_normal_mode_boot_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350", "id": "36dbb206-d073-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003", "version": 1, "date": "2020-07-28", "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", "description": "Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-1350, or SIGRed. Discovered by Checkpoint researchers, this vulnerability affects Windows 2003 to 2019, and is triggered by a malicious DNS response (only affects DNS over TCP). An attacker can use the malicious payload to cause a buffer overflow on the vulnerable system, leading to compromise. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify the large response payload for SIG and KEY DNS records which can be used for the exploit.", "narrative": "When a client requests a DNS record for a particular domain, that request gets routed first through the client's locally configured DNS server, then to any DNS server(s) configured as forwarders, and then onto the target domain's own DNS server(s). If a attacker wanted to, they could host a malicious DNS server that responds to the initial request with a specially crafted large response (~65KB). This response would flow through to the client's local DNS server, which if not patched for CVE-2020-1350, would cause the buffer overflow. The detection searches in this Analytic Story use wire data to detect the malicious behavior. Searches for Splunk Stream and Zeek are included. The Splunk Stream search correlates across stream:dns and stream:tcp, while the Zeek search correlates across bro:dns:json and bro:conn:json. These correlations are required to pick up both the DNS record types (SIG and KEY) along with the payload size (>65KB).", "references": ["https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/", "https://support.microsoft.com/en-au/help/4569509/windows-dns-server-remote-code-execution-vulnerability"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1203"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploitation for Client Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390", "Sandworm Team", "Inception", "Tropic Trooper", "TA459", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT29", "Leviathan", "APT12", "Frankenstein", "Cobalt Group", "APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "Lazarus Group", "admin@338", "The White Company", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork", "Elderwood", "APT28", "APT33", "BlackTech"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream", "id": "babd8d10-d073-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003", "version": 1, "date": "2020-07-28", "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects SIGRed via Splunk Stream.", "search": "`stream_dns` | spath \"query_type{}\" | search \"query_type{}\" IN (SIG,KEY) | spath protocol_stack | search protocol_stack=\"ip:tcp:dns\" | append [search `stream_tcp` bytes_out>65000] | `detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream_filter` | stats count by flow_id | where count>1 | fields - count", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Splunk Stream DNS and Splunk Stream TCP. We are detecting SIG and KEY records via stream:dns and TCP payload over 65KB in size via stream:tcp. Replace the macro definitions ('stream:dns' and 'stream:tcp') with configurations for your Splunk environment.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "cve": ["CVE-2020-1350"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1203"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploitation for Client Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "MuddyWater", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT41", "admin@338", "Threat Group-3390", "APT12", "The White Company", "APT33", "APT32", "APT28", "Tropic Trooper", "Lazarus Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "APT37", "Patchwork", "Leviathan", "Elderwood", "TA459", "APT29"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=stream:tcp", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "stream_tcp"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=stream:dns", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "stream_dns"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek", "id": "c5c622e4-d073-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003", "version": 1, "date": "2020-07-28", "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Resolution"], "description": "This search detects SIGRed via Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.query_type IN (SIG,KEY) by DNS.flow_id | rename DNS.flow_id as flow_id | append [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.bytes_in>65000 by All_Traffic.flow_id | rename All_Traffic.flow_id as flow_id] | `detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek_filter` | stats count by flow_id | where count>1 | fields - count ", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format. We are detecting SIG and KEY records via bro:dns:json and TCP payload over 65KB in size via bro:conn:json. The Network Resolution and Network Traffic datamodels are in use for this search.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "cve": ["CVE-2020-1350"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1203"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "DNS.query_type", "DNS.flow_id", "All_Traffic.bytes_in", "All_Traffic.flow_id"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploitation for Client Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "MuddyWater", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT41", "admin@338", "Threat Group-3390", "APT12", "The White Company", "APT33", "APT32", "APT28", "Tropic Trooper", "Lazarus Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "APT37", "Patchwork", "Leviathan", "Elderwood", "TA459", "APT29"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", "id": "2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c59f1268af3", "version": 1, "date": "2019-05-01", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "Monitor your AWS authentication events using your CloudTrail logs. Searches within this Analytic Story will help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious logins. ", "narrative": "It is important to monitor and control who has access to your AWS infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins to your AWS infrastructure will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any EC2 instances created by the attacker.", "references": ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", "category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1535"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", "id": "67bd3def-c41c-4bf6-837b-ae196b4257c6", "version": 1, "date": "2020-10-07", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Authentication"], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | table firstTime lastTime user Country | join user type=outer [| inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) AS earliestseen by user Country | fields earliestseen user Country] | eval userCountry=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\"), \"New Country\",\"Previously Seen Country\") | eval userStatus=if(earliestseen >= relative_time(now(),\"-24h@h\") OR isnull(earliestseen), \"New User\",\"Old User\") | where userCountry = \"New Country\" AND userStatus != \"Old User\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime lastTime user Country userStatus userCountry | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter` macro.", "known_false_positives": "When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities", "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user$ is logging into the AWS console from Country $Country$ for the first time", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Authentication.signature", "Authentication.user", "Authentication.src"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A table of users seen doing console logins, and the first and last time that the activity was observed", "collection": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", "name": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", "fields_list": "_key, firstTime, lastTime, user, src, City, Region, Country"}]}, {"name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", "id": "9f31aa8e-e37c-46bc-bce1-8b3be646d026", "version": 1, "date": "2020-10-07", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Authentication"], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | table firstTime lastTime user Region | join user type=outer [| inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) AS earliestseen by user Region | fields earliestseen user Region] | eval userRegion=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\"), \"New Region\",\"Previously Seen Region\") | eval userStatus=if(earliestseen >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") OR isnull(earliestseen), \"New User\",\"Old User\") | where userRegion = \"New Region\" AND userStatus != \"Old User\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime lastTime user Region userStatus userRegion | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter` macro.", "known_false_positives": "When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities", "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user$ is logging into the AWS console from Region $Region$ for the first time", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Authentication.signature", "Authentication.user", "Authentication.src"], "risk_score": 36, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A table of users seen doing console logins, and the first and last time that the activity was observed", "collection": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", "name": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", "fields_list": "_key, firstTime, lastTime, user, src, City, Region, Country"}]}, {"name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", "id": "121b0b11-f8ac-4ed6-a132-3800ca4fc07a", "version": 1, "date": "2020-10-07", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Authentication"], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | table firstTime lastTime user City | join user type=outer [| inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) AS earliestseen by user City | fields earliestseen user City] | eval userCity=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\"), \"New City\",\"Previously Seen City\") | eval userStatus=if(earliestseen >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") OR isnull(earliestseen), \"New User\",\"Old User\") | where userCity = \"New City\" AND userStatus != \"Old User\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime lastTime user City userStatus userCity | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter` macro.", "known_false_positives": "When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities", "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user$ is logging into the AWS console from City $City$ for the first time", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Authentication.signature", "Authentication.user", "Authentication.src"], "risk_score": 18, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A table of users seen doing console logins, and the first and last time that the activity was observed", "collection": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", "name": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", "fields_list": "_key, firstTime, lastTime, user, src, City, Region, Country"}]}]}, {"name": "Dev Sec Ops", "id": "0ca8c38e-631e-4b81-940c-f9c5450ce41e", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-18", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "description": "This story is focused around detecting attacks on a DevSecOps lifeccycle which consists of the phases plan, code, build, test, release, deploy, operate and monitor.", "narrative": "DevSecOps is a collaborative framework, which thinks about application and infrastructure security from the start. This means that security tools are part of the continuous integration and continuous deployment pipeline. In this analytics story, we focused on detections around the tools used in this framework such as GitHub as a version control system, GDrive for the documentation, CircleCI as the CI/CD pipeline, Kubernetes as the container execution engine and multiple security tools such as Semgrep and Kube-Hunter.", "references": ["https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Dev Sec Ops", "category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1567.002", "T1554", "T1567", "T1199", "T1195", "T1526", "T1195.001", "T1566", "T1204.003", "T1566.001", "T1212", "T1204", "T1048", "T1048.003"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exfiltration Over Web Service", "Trusted Relationship", "Compromise Client Software Binary", "Phishing", "Exfiltration to Cloud Storage", "Supply Chain Compromise", "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", "Cloud Service Discovery", "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", "Exploitation for Credential Access", "User Execution", "Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools", "Spearphishing Attachment"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Credential Access", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Execution", "Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Sandworm Team", "Inception", "Rancor", "Tropic Trooper", "Kimsuky", "TA459", "PLATINUM", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN8", "APT29", "Turla", "APT39", "Molerats", "Gamaredon Group", "APT12", "Leviathan", "RTM", "Mofang", "TA505", "Frankenstein", "Cobalt Group", "APT32", "Silence", "APT-C-36", "APT19", "APT37", "Darkhotel", "APT41", "menuPass", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "admin@338", "Thrip", "Wizard Spider", "Machete", "no", "The White Company", "Sharpshooter", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork", "FIN4", "Elderwood", "APT28", "Gallmaker", "APT33", "Gorgon Group", "Windshift", "BlackTech", "FIN7", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Naikon", "DarkHydrus"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Medium", "id": "0b80e2c8-c746-4ddb-89eb-9efd892220cf", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-17", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). You need to activate image scanning in order to get the event DescribeImageScanFindings with the results.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=ecr.amazonaws.com eventName=DescribeImageScanFindings | spath path=responseElements.imageScanFindings.findings{} output=findings | mvexpand findings | spath input=findings| search severity=MEDIUM | rename name as finding_name, description as finding_description, requestParameters.imageId.imageDigest as imageDigest, requestParameters.repositoryName as image | eval finding = finding_name.\", \".finding_description | eval phase=\"release\" | eval severity=\"medium\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by awsRegion, eventName, eventSource, imageDigest, image, user, userName, src_ip, finding, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_medium_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECR/latest/userguide/image-scanning.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Vulnerabilities with severity high found in image $image$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1204.003", "T1204"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "image", "type": "System", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"], "required_fields": ["eventSource", "eventName", "responseElements.imageScanFindings.findings{}", "awsRegion", "requestParameters.imageId.imageDigest", "requestParameters.repositoryName", "user", "userName", "src_ip"], "risk_score": 21, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["User Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_medium_filter"}]}, {"name": "Correlation by User and Risk", "id": "610e12dc-b6fa-4541-825e-4a0b3b6f6773", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-06", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "Correlation", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search correlations detections by user and risk_score", "search": "`signals` | fillnull | stats sum(risk_score) as risk_score values(source) as signals values(repository) as repository by user | sort - risk_score | where risk_score > 80 | `correlation_by_user_and_risk_filter`", "how_to_implement": "For Dev Sec Ops POC", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 100, "deployments": ["Slack Alert"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Correlation triggered for user $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1204.003", "T1204"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["User Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "index=signals", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "signals"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "correlation_by_user_and_risk_filter"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Scanner Image Pulling", "id": "4890cd6b-0112-4974-a272-c5c153aee551", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-24", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search uses the Kubernetes logs from Splunk Connect from Kubernetes to detect Kubernetes Security Scanner.", "search": "`kube_objects_events` object.message IN (\"Pulling image *kube-hunter*\", \"Pulling image *kube-bench*\", \"Pulling image *kube-recon*\", \"Pulling image *kube-recon*\") | rename object.* AS * | rename involvedObject.* AS * | rename source.host AS host | eval phase=\"operate\" | eval severity=\"high\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by host, name, namespace, kind, reason, message, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `kubernetes_scanner_image_pulling_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must ingest Kubernetes logs through Splunk Connect for Kubernetes.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://github.com/splunk/splunk-connect-for-kubernetes"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "asset_type": "Kubernetes", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1526/kubernetes_kube_hunter/kubernetes_kube_hunter.json"], "deployments": ["Slack Alert"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Kubernetes Scanner image pulled on host $host$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1526"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "host", "type": "Entity"}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"], "required_fields": ["object.message", "source.host", "object.involvedObject.name", "object.involvedObject.namespace", "object.involvedObject.kind", "object.message", "object.reason"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Cloud Service Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=kube:objects:events", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "kube_objects_events"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "kubernetes_scanner_image_pulling_filter"}]}, {"name": "GitHub Pull Request from Unknown User", "id": "9d7b9100-8878-4404-914e-ca5e551a641e", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-01", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for Pull Request from unknown user.", "search": "`github` check_suite.pull_requests{}.id=* | stats count by check_suite.head_commit.author.name repository.full_name check_suite.pull_requests{}.head.ref check_suite.head_commit.message | rename check_suite.head_commit.author.name as user repository.full_name as repository check_suite.pull_requests{}.head.ref as ref_head check_suite.head_commit.message as commit_message | search NOT `github_known_users` | eval phase=\"code\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `github_pull_request_from_unknown_user_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must index GitHub logs. You can follow the url in reference to onboard GitHub logs.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/tips-and-tricks/getting-github-data-with-webhooks.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "asset_type": "GitHub", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1195.001/github_pull_request/github_pull_request.json"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Vulnerabilities found in packages used by GitHub repository $repository$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1195.001", "T1195"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "repository", "type": "System", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "alert.id", "repository.full_name", "repository.html_url", "action", "alert.affected_package_name", "alert.affected_range", "alert.created_at", "alert.external_identifier", "alert.external_reference", "alert.fixed_in", "alert.severity"], "risk_score": 27, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools", "Supply Chain Compromise"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Elderwood"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "user IN (user_names_here)", "description": "specify the user allowed to create PRs in Github projects.", "name": "github_known_users"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=aws:firehose:json", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "github"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "github_pull_request_from_unknown_user_filter"}]}, {"name": "AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Low Informational Unknown", "id": "cbc95e44-7c22-443f-88fd-0424478f5589", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-17", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). You need to activate image scanning in order to get the event DescribeImageScanFindings with the results.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=ecr.amazonaws.com eventName=DescribeImageScanFindings | spath path=responseElements.imageScanFindings.findings{} output=findings | mvexpand findings | spath input=findings| search severity IN (LOW, INFORMATIONAL, UNKNWON) | rename name as finding_name, description as finding_description, requestParameters.imageId.imageDigest as imageDigest, requestParameters.repositoryName as repositoryName | eval finding = finding_name.\", \".finding_description | eval phase=\"release\" | eval severity=\"low\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by awsRegion, eventName, eventSource, imageDigest, repositoryName, user, userName, src_ip, finding, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_low_informational_unknown_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECR/latest/userguide/image-scanning.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Vulnerabilities with severity high found in repository $repositoryName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1204.003", "T1204"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "repositoryName", "type": "System", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"], "required_fields": ["eventSource", "eventName", "responseElements.imageScanFindings.findings{}", "awsRegion", "requestParameters.imageId.imageDigest", "requestParameters.repositoryName", "user", "userName", "src_ip"], "risk_score": 7, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["User Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_low_informational_unknown_filter"}]}, {"name": "AWS ECR Container Upload Unknown User", "id": "300688e4-365c-4486-a065-7c884462b31d", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-19", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). A upload of a new container is normally done from only a few known users. When the user was never seen before, we should have a closer look into the event.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=ecr.amazonaws.com eventName=PutImage NOT `aws_ecr_users` | rename requestParameters.* as * | rename repositoryName AS image | eval phase=\"release\" | eval severity=\"high\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by awsRegion, eventName, eventSource, user, userName, src_ip, imageTag, registryId, image, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/003/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Container uploaded from unknown user $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1204.003", "T1204"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src_ip", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"], "required_fields": ["eventSource", "eventName", "awsRegion", "requestParameters.imageTag", "requestParameters.registryId", "requestParameters.repositoryName", "user", "userName", "src_ip"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["User Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "userName IN (user)", "description": "specify the user allowed to push Images to AWS ECR.", "name": "aws_ecr_users"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user_filter"}]}, {"name": "GitHub Dependabot Alert", "id": "05032b04-4469-4034-9df7-05f607d75cba", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-01", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for Dependabot Alerts in Github logs.", "search": "`github` alert.id=* action=create | rename repository.full_name as repository, repository.html_url as repository_url sender.login as user | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by action alert.affected_package_name alert.affected_range alert.created_at alert.external_identifier alert.external_reference alert.fixed_in alert.severity repository repository_url user | eval phase=\"code\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `github_dependabot_alert_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must index GitHub logs. You can follow the url in reference to onboard GitHub logs.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/tips-and-tricks/getting-github-data-with-webhooks.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "asset_type": "GitHub", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1195.001/github_security_advisor_alert/github_security_advisor_alert.json"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Vulnerabilities found in packages used by GitHub repository $repository$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1195.001", "T1195"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "repository", "type": "System", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "alert.id", "repository.full_name", "repository.html_url", "action", "alert.affected_package_name", "alert.affected_range", "alert.created_at", "alert.external_identifier", "alert.external_reference", "alert.fixed_in", "alert.severity"], "risk_score": 27, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools", "Supply Chain Compromise"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Elderwood"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=aws:firehose:json", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "github"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "github_dependabot_alert_filter"}]}, {"name": "Circle CI Disable Security Step", "id": "72cb9de9-e98b-4ac9-80b2-5331bba6ea97", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-01", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for disable security step in CircleCI pipeline.", "search": "`circleci` | rename workflows.job_id AS job_id | join job_id [ | search `circleci` | stats values(name) as step_names count by job_id job_name ] | stats count by step_names job_id job_name vcs.committer_name vcs.subject vcs.url owners{} | rename vcs.* as * , owners{} as user | lookup mandatory_step_for_job job_name OUTPUTNEW step_name AS mandatory_step | search mandatory_step=* | eval mandatory_step_executed=if(like(step_names, \"%\".mandatory_step.\"%\"), 1, 0) | where mandatory_step_executed=0 | rex field=url \"(?[^\\/]*\\/[^\\/]*)$\" | eval phase=\"build\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `circle_ci_disable_security_step_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must index CircleCI logs.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "asset_type": "CircleCI", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1554/circle_ci_disable_security_step/circle_ci_disable_security_step.json"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "disable security step $mandatory_step$ in job $job_name$ from user $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1554"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_times"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Compromise Client Software Binary"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=circleci", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "circleci"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "circle_ci_disable_security_step_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A lookup file that will be used to define the mandatory step for job", "filename": "mandatory_step_for_job.csv", "name": "mandatory_step_for_job", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/mandatory_step_for_job.csv"}]}, {"name": "Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain", "id": "dc4dc3a8-ff54-11eb-8bf7-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-17", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious outbound e-mail from internal email to external email domain. This can be a good hunting query to monitor insider or outbound email traffic for not common domain e-mail. The idea is to parse the domain of destination email check if there is a minimum outbound traffic < 20 with attachment.", "search": "`gsuite_gmail` num_message_attachments > 0 | rex field=source.from_header_address \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | rex field=destination{}.address \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | where source_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" and not dest_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" | eval phase=\"plan\" | eval severity=\"low\" | stats values(subject) as subject, values(source.from_header_address) as src_domain_list, count as numEvents, dc(source.from_header_address) as numSrcAddresses, min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest_domain phase severity | where numSrcAddresses < 20 |sort - numSrcAddresses | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_outbound_email_with_attachment_to_external_domain_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc.", "known_false_positives": "network admin and normal user may send this file attachment as part of their day to day work. having a good protocol in attaching this file type to an e-mail may reduce the risk of having a spear phishing attack.", "references": ["https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gsuite_outbound_email_to_external/gsuite_external_domain.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "suspicious email from $source.address$ to $destination{}.address$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1048.003", "T1048"], "observable": [{"name": "source.address", "type": "User", "role": ["attacker"]}, {"name": "destination{}.address", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 9, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration", "Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "Thrip", "FIN8", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:gmail:bigquery", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "gsuite_gmail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "gsuite_outbound_email_with_attachment_to_external_domain_filter"}]}, {"name": "Gsuite Email Suspicious Subject With Attachment", "id": "8ef3971e-00f2-11ec-b54f-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-19", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search is to detect a gsuite email contains suspicious subject having known file type used in spear phishing. This technique is a common and effective entry vector of attacker to compromise a network by luring the user to click or execute the suspicious attachment send from external email account because of the effective social engineering of subject related to delivery, bank and so on. On the other hand this detection may catch a normal email traffic related to legitimate transaction so better to check the email sender, spelling and etc. avoid click link or opening the attachment if you are not expecting this type of e-mail.", "search": "`gsuite_gmail` num_message_attachments > 0 subject IN (\"*dhl*\", \"* ups *\", \"*delivery*\", \"*parcel*\", \"*label*\", \"*invoice*\", \"*postal*\", \"* fedex *\", \"* usps *\", \"* express *\", \"*shipment*\", \"*Banking/Tax*\",\"*shipment*\", \"*new order*\") attachment{}.file_extension_type IN (\"doc\", \"docx\", \"xls\", \"xlsx\", \"ppt\", \"pptx\", \"pdf\", \"zip\", \"rar\", \"html\",\"htm\",\"hta\") | rex field=source.from_header_address \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | rex field=destination{}.address \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | where not source_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" and dest_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" | eval phase=\"plan\" | eval severity=\"medium\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(attachment{}.file_extension_type) as email_attachments, values(attachment{}.sha256) as attachment_sha256, values(payload_size) as payload_size by destination{}.service num_message_attachments subject destination{}.address source.address phase severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_email_suspicious_subject_with_attachment_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc.", "known_false_positives": "normal user or normal transaction may contain the subject and file type attachment that this detection try to search.", "references": ["https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-top-spear-phishing-words.pdf"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gsuite_susp_subj/gsuite_susp_subj_attach.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "suspicious email from $source.address$ to $destination{}.address$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566.001", "T1566"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Spearphishing Attachment", "Phishing"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:gmail:bigquery", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "gsuite_gmail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "gsuite_email_suspicious_subject_with_attachment_filter"}]}, {"name": "Circle CI Disable Security Job", "id": "4a2fdd41-c578-4cd4-9ef7-980e352517f2", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-02", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for disable security job in CircleCI pipeline.", "search": "`circleci` | rename vcs.committer_name as user vcs.subject as commit_message vcs.url as url workflows.* as * | stats values(job_name) as job_names by workflow_id workflow_name user commit_message url branch | lookup mandatory_job_for_workflow workflow_name OUTPUTNEW job_name AS mandatory_job | search mandatory_job=* | eval mandatory_job_executed=if(like(job_names, \"%\".mandatory_job.\"%\"), 1, 0) | where mandatory_job_executed=0 | eval phase=\"build\" | rex field=url \"(?[^\\/]*\\/[^\\/]*)$\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `circle_ci_disable_security_job_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must index CircleCI logs.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "asset_type": "CircleCI", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1554/circle_ci_disable_security_job/circle_ci_disable_security_job.json"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "disable security job $mandatory_job$ in workflow $workflow_name$ from user $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1554"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_times"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Compromise Client Software Binary"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=circleci", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "circleci"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "circle_ci_disable_security_job_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A lookup file that will be used to define the mandatory job for workflow", "filename": "mandatory_job_for_workflow.csv", "name": "mandatory_job_for_workflow", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/mandatory_job_for_workflow.csv"}]}, {"name": "Gsuite Suspicious Shared File Name", "id": "07eed200-03f5-11ec-98fb-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-23", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search is to detect a shared file in google drive with suspicious file name that are commonly used by spear phishing campaign. This technique is very popular to lure the user by running a malicious document or click a malicious link within the shared file that will redirected to malicious website. This detection can also catch some normal email communication between organization and its external customer.", "search": "`gsuite_drive` parameters.owner_is_team_drive=false \"parameters.doc_title\" IN (\"*dhl*\", \"* ups *\", \"*delivery*\", \"*parcel*\", \"*label*\", \"*invoice*\", \"*postal*\", \"*fedex*\", \"* usps *\", \"* express *\", \"*shipment*\", \"*Banking/Tax*\",\"*shipment*\", \"*new order*\") parameters.doc_type IN (\"document\",\"pdf\", \"msexcel\", \"msword\", \"spreadsheet\", \"presentation\") | rex field=parameters.owner \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | rex field=parameters.target_user \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | where not source_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" and dest_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" | eval phase=\"plan\" | eval severity=\"low\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by email parameters.owner parameters.target_user parameters.doc_title parameters.doc_type phase severity | rename parameters.target_user AS user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_suspicious_shared_file_name_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc. In order for the search to work for your environment, please edit the query to use your company specific email domain instead of `internal_test_email.com`.", "known_false_positives": "normal user or normal transaction may contain the subject and file type attachment that this detection try to search", "references": ["https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-top-spear-phishing-words.pdf"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gdrive_susp_file_share/gdrive_susp_attach.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "suspicious share gdrive from $parameters.owner$ to $email$ namely as $parameters.doc_title$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566.001", "T1566"], "observable": [{"name": "parameters.owner", "type": "User", "role": ["attacker"]}, {"name": "email", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "parameters.doc_title", "src_domain", "dest_domain", "email", "parameters.visibility", "parameters.owner", "parameters.doc_type"], "risk_score": 21, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Spearphishing Attachment", "Phishing"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass", "no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:drive:json", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "gsuite_drive"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "gsuite_suspicious_shared_file_name_filter"}]}, {"name": "AWS ECR Container Upload Outside Business Hours", "id": "d4c4d4eb-3994-41ca-a25e-a82d64e125bb", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-19", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). A upload of a new container is normally done during business hours. When done outside business hours, we want to take a look into it.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=ecr.amazonaws.com eventName=PutImage date_hour>=20 OR date_hour<8 NOT (date_wday=saturday OR date_wday=sunday) | rename requestParameters.* as * | rename repositoryName AS image | eval phase=\"release\" | eval severity=\"medium\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by awsRegion, eventName, eventSource, user, userName, src_ip, imageTag, registryId, image, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_ecr_container_upload_outside_business_hours_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", "known_false_positives": "When your development is spreaded in different time zones, applying this rule can be difficult.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/003/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Container uploaded outside business hours from $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1204.003", "T1204"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src_ip", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"], "required_fields": ["eventSource", "eventName", "awsRegion", "requestParameters.imageTag", "requestParameters.registryId", "requestParameters.repositoryName", "user", "userName", "src_ip"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["User Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_ecr_container_upload_outside_business_hours_filter"}]}, {"name": "Github Commit In Develop", "id": "f3030cb6-0b02-11ec-8f22-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-01", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search is to detect a pushed or commit to develop branch. This is to avoid unwanted modification to develop without a review to the changes. Ideally in terms of devsecops the changes made in a branch and do a PR for review. of course in some cases admin of the project may did a changes directly to master branch", "search": "`github` branches{}.name = main OR branches{}.name = develop | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by commit.author.html_url commit.commit.author.email commit.author.login commit.commit.message repository.pushed_at commit.commit.committer.date | eval phase=\"code\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `github_commit_in_develop_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to github logs having the fork, commit, push metadata that can be use to monitor the changes in a github project.", "known_false_positives": "admin can do changes directly to develop branch", "references": ["https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1199/github_push_master/github_push_develop.json"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "suspicious commit by $commit.commit.author.email$ to develop branch", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1199"], "observable": [{"name": "commit.commit.author.email", "type": "User", "role": ["attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 9, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Trusted Relationship"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "menuPass"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=aws:firehose:json", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "github"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "github_commit_in_develop_filter"}]}, {"name": "Gsuite Drive Share In External Email", "id": "f6ee02d6-fea0-11eb-b2c2-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-16", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search is to detect suspicious google drive or google docs files shared outside or externally. This behavior might be a good hunting query to monitor exfitration of data made by an attacker or insider to a targetted machine.", "search": "`gsuite_drive` NOT (email IN(\"\", \"null\")) | rex field=parameters.owner \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | rex field=email \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | where src_domain = \"internal_test_email.com\" and not dest_domain = \"internal_test_email.com\" | eval phase=\"plan\" | eval severity=\"low\" | stats values(parameters.doc_title) as doc_title, values(parameters.doc_type) as doc_types, values(email) as dst_email_list, values(parameters.visibility) as visibility, values(parameters.doc_id) as doc_id, count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by parameters.owner ip_address phase severity | rename parameters.owner as user ip_address as src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_drive_share_in_external_email_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc. In order for the search to work for your environment, please edit the query to use your company specific email domain instead of `internal_test_email.com`.", "known_false_positives": "network admin or normal user may share files to customer and external team.", "references": ["https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1567.002/gsuite_share_drive/gdrive_share_external.log"], "deployments": ["Send to Phantom"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "message": "suspicious share gdrive from $parameters.owner$ to $email$ namely as $parameters.doc_title$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1567.002", "T1567"], "observable": [{"name": "parameters.owner", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "email", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "parameters.doc_title", "src_domain", "dest_domain", "email", "parameters.visibility", "parameters.owner", "parameters.doc_type"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exfiltration to Cloud Storage", "Exfiltration Over Web Service"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration", "Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Leviathan", "Turla", "no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:drive:json", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "gsuite_drive"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "gsuite_drive_share_in_external_email_filter"}]}, {"name": "Github Commit Changes In Master", "id": "c9d2bfe2-019f-11ec-a8eb-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-20", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search is to detect a pushed or commit to master or main branch. This is to avoid unwanted modification to master without a review to the changes. Ideally in terms of devsecops the changes made in a branch and do a PR for review. of course in some cases admin of the project may did a changes directly to master branch", "search": "`github` branches{}.name = main OR branches{}.name = master | eval severity=\"low\" | eval phase=\"code\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by commit.author.html_url commit.commit.author.email commit.author.login commit.commit.message repository.pushed_at commit.commit.committer.date, phase, severity | eval phase=\"code\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `github_commit_changes_in_master_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to github logs having the fork, commit, push metadata that can be use to monitor the changes in a github project.", "known_false_positives": "admin can do changes directly to master branch", "references": ["https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1199/github_push_master/github_push_master.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "suspicious commit by $commit.commit.author.email$ to main branch", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1199"], "observable": [{"name": "commit.commit.author.email", "type": "User", "role": ["attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 9, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Trusted Relationship"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "menuPass"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=aws:firehose:json", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "github"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "github_commit_changes_in_master_filter"}]}, {"name": "Gsuite Email With Known Abuse Web Service Link", "id": "8630aa22-042b-11ec-af39-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-23", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This analytics is to detect a gmail containing a link that are known to be abused by malware or attacker like pastebin, telegram and discord to deliver malicious payload. This event can encounter some normal email traffic within organization and external email that normally using this application and services.", "search": "`gsuite_gmail` \"link_domain{}\" IN (\"*pastebin.com*\", \"*discord*\", \"*telegram*\",\"t.me\") | rex field=source.from_header_address \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | rex field=destination{}.address \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | where not source_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" and dest_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" | eval phase=\"plan\" | eval severity=\"low\" |stats values(link_domain{}) as link_domains min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by is_spam source.address source.from_header_address subject destination{}.address phase severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_email_with_known_abuse_web_service_link_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc.", "known_false_positives": "normal email contains this link that are known application within the organization or network can be catched by this detection.", "references": ["https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/07/22/malware-increasingly-targets-discord-for-abuse/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gsuite_susp_url/gsuite_susp_url.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "suspicious email from $source.address$ to $destination{}.address$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566.001", "T1566"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Spearphishing Attachment", "Phishing"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:gmail:bigquery", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "gsuite_gmail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "gsuite_email_with_known_abuse_web_service_link_filter"}]}, {"name": "GSuite Email Suspicious Attachment", "id": "6d663014-fe92-11eb-ab07-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-16", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious attachment file extension in Gsuite email that may related to spear phishing attack. This file type is commonly used by malware to lure user to click on it to execute malicious code to compromised targetted machine. But this search can also catch some normal files related to this file type that maybe send by employee or network admin.", "search": "`gsuite_gmail` \"attachment{}.file_extension_type\" IN (\"pl\", \"py\", \"rb\", \"sh\", \"bat\", \"exe\", \"dll\", \"cpl\", \"com\", \"js\", \"vbs\", \"ps1\", \"reg\",\"swf\", \"cmd\", \"go\") | eval phase=\"plan\" | eval severity=\"medium\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(attachment{}.file_extension_type) as email_attachments, values(attachment{}.sha256) as attachment_sha256, values(payload_size) as payload_size by destination{}.service num_message_attachments subject destination{}.address source.address phase severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_email_suspicious_attachment_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc.", "known_false_positives": "network admin and normal user may send this file attachment as part of their day to day work. having a good protocol in attaching this file type to an e-mail may reduce the risk of having a spear phishing attack.", "references": ["https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gsuite_susp_attachment_ext/gsuite_gmail_file_ext.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "suspicious email from $source.address$ to $destination{}.address$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566.001", "T1566"], "observable": [{"name": "source.address", "type": "User", "role": ["attacker"]}, {"name": "destination{}.address", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "attachment{}.file_extension_type", "attachment{}.sha256", "destination{}.service", "num_message_attachments", "payload_size", "subject", "destination{}.address", "source.address"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Spearphishing Attachment", "Phishing"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:gmail:bigquery", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "gsuite_gmail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "gsuite_email_suspicious_attachment_filter"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Nginx Ingress RFI", "id": "fc5531ae-62fd-4de6-9c36-b4afdae8ca95", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-23", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search uses the Kubernetes logs from a nginx ingress controller to detect remote file inclusion attacks.", "search": "`kubernetes_container_controller` | rex field=_raw \"^(?\\S+)\\s+-\\s+-\\s+\\[(?[^\\]]*)\\]\\s\\\"(?[^\\\"]*)\\\"\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s\\\"(?[^\\\"]*)\\\"\\s\\\"(?[^\\\"]*)\\\"\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s\\[(?[^\\]]*)\\]\\s\\[(?[^\\]]*)\\]\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\" | rex field=request \"^(?\\S+)?\\s(?\\S+)\\s\" | rex field=url \"(?\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3})\" | search dest_ip=* | rename remote_addr AS src_ip, upstream_status as status, proxy_upstream_name as proxy | eval phase=\"operate\" | eval severity=\"medium\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by src_ip, dest_ip status, url, http_method, host, http_user_agent, proxy, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `kubernetes_nginx_ingress_rfi_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must ingest Kubernetes logs through Splunk Connect for Kubernetes.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://github.com/splunk/splunk-connect-for-kubernetes", "https://www.netsparker.com/blog/web-security/remote-file-inclusion-vulnerability/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "asset_type": "Kubernetes", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1212/kuberntest_nginx_rfi_attack/kubernetes_nginx_rfi_attack.log"], "deployments": ["Slack Alert"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Remote File Inclusion Attack detected on $host$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1212"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src_ip", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"], "required_fields": ["raw"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploitation for Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=kube:container:controller", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Kubernetes data. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "kubernetes_container_controller"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "kubernetes_nginx_ingress_rfi_filter"}]}, {"name": "Correlation by Repository and Risk", "id": "8da9fdd9-6a1b-4ae0-8a34-8c25e6be9687", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-06", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "Correlation", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search correlations detections by repository and risk_score", "search": "`signals` | fillnull | stats sum(risk_score) as risk_score values(source) as signals values(user) as user by repository | sort - risk_score | where risk_score > 80 | `correlation_by_repository_and_risk_filter`", "how_to_implement": "For Dev Sec Ops POC", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 100, "deployments": ["Slack Alert"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Correlation triggered for user $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1204.003", "T1204"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["User Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "index=signals", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "signals"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "correlation_by_repository_and_risk_filter"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI", "id": "0f83244b-425b-4528-83db-7a88c5f66e48", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-20", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search uses the Kubernetes logs from a nginx ingress controller to detect local file inclusion attacks.", "search": "`kubernetes_container_controller` | rex field=_raw \"^(?\\S+)\\s+-\\s+-\\s+\\[(?[^\\]]*)\\]\\s\\\"(?[^\\\"]*)\\\"\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s\\\"(?[^\\\"]*)\\\"\\s\\\"(?[^\\\"]*)\\\"\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s\\[(?[^\\]]*)\\]\\s\\[(?[^\\]]*)\\]\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\" | lookup local_file_inclusion_paths local_file_inclusion_paths AS request OUTPUT lfi_path | search lfi_path=yes | rename remote_addr AS src_ip, upstream_status as status, proxy_upstream_name as proxy | rex field=request \"^(?\\S+)\\s(?\\S+)\\s\" | eval phase=\"operate\" | eval severity=\"high\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by src_ip, status, url, http_method, host, http_user_agent, proxy, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `kubernetes_nginx_ingress_lfi_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must ingest Kubernetes logs through Splunk Connect for Kubernetes.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://github.com/splunk/splunk-connect-for-kubernetes", "https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/file-inclusion-vulnerabilities/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "asset_type": "Kubernetes", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1212/kubernetes_nginx_lfi_attack/kubernetes_nginx_lfi_attack.log"], "deployments": ["Slack Alert"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Local File Inclusion Attack detected on $host$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1212"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src_ip", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"], "required_fields": ["raw"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploitation for Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=kube:container:controller", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Kubernetes data. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "kubernetes_container_controller"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "kubernetes_nginx_ingress_lfi_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A list of interesting files in a local file inclusion attack", "filename": "local_file_inclusion_paths.csv", "name": "local_file_inclusion_paths", "default_match": "false", "match_type": "WILDCARD(local_file_inclusion_paths)", "min_matches": 1, "case_sensitive_match": "false", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/local_file_inclusion_paths.csv"}]}, {"name": "AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings High", "id": "62721bd2-1d82-4623-b6e6-aac170014423", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-17", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). You need to activate image scanning in order to get the event DescribeImageScanFindings with the results.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=ecr.amazonaws.com eventName=DescribeImageScanFindings | spath path=responseElements.imageScanFindings.findings{} output=findings | mvexpand findings | spath input=findings| search severity=HIGH | rename name as finding_name, description as finding_description, requestParameters.imageId.imageDigest as imageDigest, requestParameters.repositoryName as image | eval finding = finding_name.\", \".finding_description | eval phase=\"release\" | eval severity=\"high\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by awsRegion, eventName, eventSource, imageDigest, image, user, userName, src_ip, finding, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_high_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECR/latest/userguide/image-scanning.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 100, "deployments": ["Slack Alert"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Vulnerabilities with severity high found in image $image$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1204.003", "T1204"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "image", "type": "System", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"], "required_fields": ["eventSource", "eventName", "responseElements.imageScanFindings.findings{}", "awsRegion", "requestParameters.imageId.imageDigest", "requestParameters.repositoryName", "user", "userName", "src_ip"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["User Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_high_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "id": "f4368ddf-d59f-4192-84f6-778ac5a3ffc7", "version": 2, "date": "2020-02-03", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "Leveraging the Windows command-line interface (CLI) is one of the most common attack techniques--one that is also detailed in the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Use this Analytic Story to help you identify unusual or suspicious use of the CLI on Windows systems.", "narrative": "The ability to execute arbitrary commands via the Windows CLI is a primary goal for the adversary. With access to the shell, an attacker can easily run scripts and interact with the target system. Often, attackers may only have limited access to the shell or may obtain access in unusual ways. In addition, malware may execute and interact with the CLI in ways that would be considered unusual and inconsistent with typical user activity. This provides defenders with opportunities to identify suspicious use and investigate, as appropriate. This Analytic Story contains various searches to help identify this suspicious activity, as well as others to aid you in deeper investigation.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059", "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/macro-malware", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1036", "T1036.003", "T1059", "T1059.003"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Masquerading", "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "Rename System Utilities", "Windows Command Shell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Magic Hound", "Stealth Falcon", "Rancor", "APT1", "Tropic Trooper", "Dark Caracal", "PLATINUM", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ke3chang", "FIN8", "Turla", "APT39", "Molerats", "Leviathan", "Gamaredon Group", "TA505", "Whitefly", "Frankenstein", "Cobalt Group", "APT32", "Soft Cell", "Silence", "APT19", "APT37", "Darkhotel", "APT41", "FIN5", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Blue Mockingbird", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "admin@338", "Honeybee", "APT3", "Sowbug", "APT18", "Threat Group-1314", "APT38", "MuddyWater", "FIN10", "Patchwork", "APT28", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN7", "Gorgon Group", "Windshift"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe", "id": "dcfd6b40-42f9-469d-a433-2e53f7486664", "version": 6, "date": "2020-11-10", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for executions of cmd.exe spawned by a process that is often abused by attackers and that does not typically launch cmd.exe.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |search [`prohibited_apps_launching_cmd`] | `detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts and populates the Endpoint data model with the resultant dataset. This search includes a lookup file, `prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.csv`, that contains a list of processes that should not be spawning cmd.exe. You can modify this lookup to better suit your environment. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "There are circumstances where an application may legitimately execute and interact with the Windows command-line interface. Investigate and modify the lookup file, as appropriate.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "Suspicious Zoom Child Processes", "NOBELIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/powershell_spawn_cmd/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ running prohibited applications.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "Windows Command Shell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "TA505", "Blue Mockingbird", "Tropic Trooper", "Frankenstein", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "Honeybee", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Turla", "Silence", "APT32", "APT39", "Darkhotel", "MuddyWater", "APT18", "APT38", "Dark Caracal", "Gorgon Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Rancor", "Ke3chang", "APT37", "Leviathan", "FIN8", "APT28", "Magic Hound", "Sowbug", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Gamaredon Group", "Suckfly", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-1314", "APT3", "admin@338", "APT1"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_cmd"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "| inputlookup prohibited_apps_launching_cmd | rename prohibited_applications as parent_process_name | eval parent_process_name=\"*\" . parent_process_name | table parent_process_name", "description": "This macro outputs a list of process that should not be the parent process of cmd.exe", "name": "prohibited_apps_launching_cmd", "lookups": [{"description": "A list of processes that should not be launching cmd.exe", "fields": "prohibited_applications", "filename": "prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(prohibited_applications)", "name": "prohibited_apps_launching_cmd", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.csv"}]}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters", "id": "b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-95dbb162039e", "version": 4, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for the execution of the cscript.exe or wscript.exe processes, with a parent of cmd.exe. The search will return the count, the first and last time this execution was seen on a machine, the user, and the destination of the machine", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=\"cmd.exe\" (Processes.process_name=cscript.exe OR Processes.process_name =wscript.exe) by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Suspicious Command-Line Executions"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/cmd_spawns_cscript/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "cmd.exe launching script interpreters on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.user", "Processes.dest"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "Windows Command Shell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "TA505", "Blue Mockingbird", "Tropic Trooper", "Frankenstein", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "Honeybee", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Turla", "Silence", "APT32", "APT39", "Darkhotel", "MuddyWater", "APT18", "APT38", "Dark Caracal", "Gorgon Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Rancor", "Ke3chang", "APT37", "Leviathan", "FIN8", "APT28", "Magic Hound", "Sowbug", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Gamaredon Group", "Suckfly", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-1314", "APT3", "admin@338", "APT1"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters_filter"}]}, {"name": "System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations", "id": "a34aae96-ccf8-4aef-952c-3ea21444444d", "version": 6, "date": "2020-12-08", "author": "David Dorsey, Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for system processes that typically execute from `C:\\Windows\\System32\\` or `C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64`. This may indicate a malicious process that is trying to hide as a legitimate process.\\\nThis detection utilizes a lookup that is deduped `system32` and `syswow64` directories from Server 2016 and Windows 10.\\\nDuring triage, review the parallel processes - what process moved the native Windows binary? identify any artifacts on disk and review. If a remote destination is contacted, what is the reputation?", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_path !=\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32*\" Processes.process_path !=\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_hash | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `is_windows_system_file` | `system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "This detection may require tuning based on third party applications utilizing native Windows binaries in non-standard paths.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.yaml", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Unusual Processes", "Ransomware", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "System process running from unexpected location on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1036", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Processes.process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.user", "Processes.dest", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_hash"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Masquerading", "Rename System Utilities"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Windshift", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "Dragonfly 2.0", "menuPass", "APT32", "Soft Cell", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "lookup update=true is_windows_system_file filename as process_name OUTPUT systemFile | search systemFile=true", "description": "This macro limits the output to process names that are in the Windows System directory", "name": "is_windows_system_file", "lookups": [{"default_match": "false", "description": "A full baseline of executable files in Windows\\System32 and Windows\\Syswow64, including sub-directories from Server 2016 and Windows 10.", "filename": "is_windows_system_file.csv", "min_matches": 1, "name": "is_windows_system_file", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/is_windows_system_file.csv"}]}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe", "id": "c10a18cb-fd80-4ffa-a844-25026e0a0c94", "version": 2, "date": "2020-11-10", "author": "Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "The following analytic identifies parent processes, browsers, Windows terminal applications, Office Products and Java spawning cmd.exe. By its very nature, many applications spawn cmd.exe natively or built into macros. Much of this will need to be tuned to further enhance the risk.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events()\n| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)) | eval process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null), parent_process=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"),\"string\", null)), dest_user_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), dest_device_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event,\"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where process_name=\"cmd.exe\" | rex field=parent_process \"(?[^\\\\\\\\]+)$\" | where ParentBaseFileName=\"winword.exe\" OR ParentBaseFileName=\"excel.exe\" OR ParentBaseFileName=\"outlook.exe\" OR ParentBaseFileName=\"powerpnt.exe\" OR ParentBaseFileName=\"visio.exe\" OR ParentBaseFileName=\"mspub.exe\" OR ParentBaseFileName=\"acrobat.exe\" OR ParentBaseFileName=\"acrord32.exe\" OR ParentBaseFileName=\"iexplore.exe\" OR ParentBaseFileName=\"opera.exe\" OR ParentBaseFileName=\"firefox.exe\" OR (ParentBaseFileName=\"java.exe\" AND (cmd_line IS NULL OR (cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND NOT like(cmd_line, \"%patch1-Hotfix1a%\")))) OR ParentBaseFileName=\"powershell.exe\" OR (ParentBaseFileName=\"chrome.exe\" AND (cmd_line IS NULL OR (cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND NOT like(cmd_line, \"%chrome-extension%\")))) | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(dest_device_id, dest_user_id), body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"process_name\", process_name, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "In order to successfully implement this analytic, you will need endpoint process data from a EDR product or Sysmon. This search has been modified to process raw sysmon data from attack_range's nxlogs on DSP.", "known_false_positives": "There are circumstances where an application may legitimately execute and interact with the Windows command-line interface.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Command-Line Executions"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$, producing a suspicious event that warrants investigating.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "User", "role": ["Actor"]}, {"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["process_name", "parent_process_name", "_time", "dest_device_id", "dest_user_id", "cmd_line"], "risk_score": 35, "risk_severity": "low", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe_filter"}]}, {"name": "Unusually Long Command Line", "id": "c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6a4264e7f", "version": 5, "date": "2020-12-08", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious activity on your hosts.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| eval processlen=len(process) | eventstats stdev(processlen) as stdev, avg(processlen) as avg by dest | stats max(processlen) as maxlen, values(stdev) as stdevperhost, values(avg) as avgperhost by dest, user, process_name, process | `unusually_long_command_line_filter` |eval threshold = 3 | where maxlen > ((threshold*stdevperhost) + avgperhost)", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships, from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the process field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate applications start with long command lines.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Unusual Processes", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Unusually long command line $Processes.process_name$ on $dest$", "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Processes.process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.user", "Processes.dest", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "unusually_long_command_line_filter"}]}, {"name": "Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK", "id": "57edaefa-a73b-45e5-bbae-f39c1473f941", "version": 1, "date": "2019-05-08", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious activity on your hosts. This search leverages the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) to help identify command lines with lengths that are unusual for a given user.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| eval processlen=len(process) | search user!=unknown | apply cmdline_pdfmodel threshold=0.01 | rename \"IsOutlier(processlen)\" as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | table firstTime lastTime user dest process_name process processlen count | `unusually_long_command_line___mltk_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that monitors command lines and populates the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model. In addition, MLTK version >= 4.2 must be installed on your search heads, along with any required dependencies. Finally, the support search \"Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK\" must be executed before this detection search, as it builds an ML model over the historical data used by this search. It is important that this search is run in the same app context as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild the model with the latest data available in your environment.", "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate applications use long command lines for installs or updates. You should review identified command lines for legitimacy. You may modify the first part of the search to omit legitimate command lines from consideration. If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider changing the value of threshold in the search to a smaller value. You should also periodically re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data. You may get unexpected results if the user identified in the results is not present in the data used to build the associated model.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Unusual Processes", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Ransomware"], "asset_type": "", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.user", "Processes.dest", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "unusually_long_command_line___mltk_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Clop Ransomware", "id": "5a6f6849-1a26-4fae-aa05-fa730556eeb6", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-17", "author": "Rod Soto, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Clop ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Clope, encrypting network shares, deleting and resizing shadow volume storage, registry key modification, deleting of security logs, and more.", "narrative": "Clop ransomware campaigns targeting healthcare and other vertical sectors, involve the use of ransomware payloads along with exfiltration of data per HHS bulletin. Malicious actors demand payment for ransome of data and threaten deletion and exposure of exfiltrated data.", "references": ["https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/analyst-note-cl0p-tlp-white.pdf", "https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/115250/data-breach/qualys-clop-ransomware.html", "https://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/qualys-is-the-latest-victim-of-accellion-data-breach/d/d-id/1340323"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Clop Ransomware", "category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1070", "T1070.001", "T1485", "T1569.002", "T1543", "T1486", "T1204", "T1490", "T1569", "T1489"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Indicator Removal on Host", "Data Encrypted for Impact", "Service Execution", "Clear Windows Event Logs", "Service Stop", "Inhibit System Recovery", "Create or Modify System Process", "User Execution", "Data Destruction", "System Services"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Impact", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Honeybee", "Sandworm Team", "Lazarus Group", "APT32", "Silence", "APT28", "no", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "APT41", "APT39", "Ke3chang", "FIN5", "APT38", "FIN6", "Blue Mockingbird", "TA505"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Ransomware Notes bulk creation", "id": "eff7919a-8330-11eb-83f8-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-12", "author": "Teoderick Contreras", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytics identifies a big number of instance of ransomware notes (filetype e.g .txt, .html, .hta) file creation to the infected machine. This behavior is a good sensor if the ransomware note filename is quite new for security industry or the ransomware note filename is not in your ransomware lookup table list for monitoring.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=11 file_name IN (\"*\\.txt\",\"*\\.html\",\"*\\.hta\") |bin _time span=10s | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(TargetFilename) as unique_readme_path_count values(TargetFilename) as list_of_readme_path by Computer Image file_name | where unique_readme_path_count >= 15 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ransomware_notes_bulk_creation_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware", "DarkSide Ransomware", "BlackMatter Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Impact"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Obfuscation"], "message": "A high frequency file creation of $file_name$ in different file path in host $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1486"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["EventCode", "file_name", "_time", "TargetFilename", "Computer", "Image", "user"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Data Encrypted for Impact"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "TA505", "APT38"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "ransomware_notes_bulk_creation_filter"}]}, {"name": "Process Deleting Its Process File Path", "id": "f7eda4bc-871c-11eb-b110-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-17", "author": "Teoderick Contreras", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This detection is to identify a suspicious process that tries to delete the process file path related to its process. This technique is known to be defense evasion once a certain condition of malware is satisfied or not. Clop ransomware use this technique where it will try to delete its process file path using a .bat command if the keyboard layout is not the layout it tries to infect.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=1 cmdline = \"*/c del*\" Image = \"*\\\\cmd.exe\" |eval result = if(like(process,\"%\".parent_process.\"%\"), \"Found\", \"Not Found\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer user ParentImage ParentCommandLine Image cmdline EventCode ProcessID result | where result = \"Found\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `process_deleting_its_process_file_path_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware", "Remcos"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Credential Access"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A process $Image$ tries to delete its process path in commandline $cmdline$ as part of defense evasion in host $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1070"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["EventCode", "Computer", "user", "ParentImage", "ParentCommandLine", "Image", "cmdline", "ProcessID", "result", "_time"], "risk_score": 60, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Indicator Removal on Host"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "process_deleting_its_process_file_path_filter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Event Log Cleared", "id": "ad517544-aff9-4c96-bd99-d6eb43bfbb6a", "version": 6, "date": "2020-07-06", "author": "Rico Valdez, Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes Windows Security Event ID 1102 or System log event 104 to identify when a Windows event log is cleared. Note that this analytic will require tuning or restricted to specific endpoints based on criticality. During triage, based on time of day and user, determine if this was planned. If not planned, follow through with reviewing parallel alerts and other data sources to determine what else may have occurred.", "search": "(`wineventlog_security` EventCode=1102) OR (`wineventlog_system` EventCode=104) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest Message EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_event_log_cleared_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows event logs from your hosts. In addition, the Splunk Windows TA is needed.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible that these logs may be legitimately cleared by Administrators. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-1102", "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/defense-evasion/disabling-windows-event-logs-by-suspending-eventlog-service-threads", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/001/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1070.001/T1070.001.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Log Manipulation", "Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Windows event logs cleared on $dest$ via EventCode $EventCode$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1070", "T1070.001"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "PR.IP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "dest"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Indicator Removal on Host", "Clear Windows Event Logs"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT41", "APT38", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT32", "FIN8", "FIN5", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_system"}, {"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "windows_event_log_cleared_filter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Created With Suspicious Service Path", "id": "429141be-8311-11eb-adb6-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-11-22", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytc uses Windows Event Id 7045, `New Service Was Installed`, to identify the creation of a Windows Service where the service binary path path is located in a non-common Service folder in Windows. Red Teams and adversaries alike may create malicious Services for lateral movement or remote code execution as well as persistence and execution. The Clop ransomware has also been seen in the wild abusing Windows services.", "search": " `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 Service_File_Name = \"*\\.exe\" NOT (Service_File_Name IN (\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\*\", \"C:\\\\Program File*\", \"C:\\\\Programdata\\\\*\", \"%systemroot%\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Service_File_Name Service_Name Service_Start_Type Service_Type | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may install services with uncommon services paths.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-system.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement"], "message": "A service $Service_File_Name$ was created from a non-standard path using $Service_Name$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1569", "T1569.002"], "observable": [{"name": "Service_File_Name", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}, {"name": "Service_Name", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["EventCode", "Service_File_Name", "Service_Type", "_time", "Service_Name", "Service_Start_Type"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Services", "Service Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "APT41", "Silence", "FIN6", "APT32", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_system"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path_filter"}]}, {"name": "WevtUtil Usage To Clear Logs", "id": "5438113c-cdd9-11eb-93b8-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-06-15", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "The wevtutil.exe application is the windows event log utility. This searches for wevtutil.exe with parameters for clearing the application, security, setup, powershell, sysmon, or system event logs.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where \"Endpoint_Processes\" IN(_datamodels) | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null), process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_path\"), \"string\", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND like(cmd_line, \"% cl %\") AND (match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)security/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)system/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)sysmon/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)application/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)setup/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)powershell/)=true) AND process_name=\"wevtutil.exe\" | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null)) | eval body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line, \"process_name\", process_name, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process_name, \"process_path\", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "The wevtutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows event log utility. Administrators may use it to manage Windows event logs.", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-clop-ransomware.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Log Manipulation", "Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/ssa_wevtutil/clear_evt.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A wevtutil process $process_name$ with commandline $cmd_line$ to clear event logs in host $dest_device_id$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1070", "T1070.001"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest_device_id", "process_name", "parent_process_name", "process_path", "dest_user_id", "process"], "risk_score": 63, "risk_severity": "medium", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Indicator Removal on Host", "Clear Windows Event Logs"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT41", "APT38", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT32", "FIN8", "FIN5", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "wevtutil_usage_to_clear_logs_filter"}]}, {"name": "Resize Shadowstorage Volume", "id": "dbc30554-d27e-11eb-9e5e-acde48001122", "version": 3, "date": "2021-11-30", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the resizing of shadowstorage using vssadmin.exe to avoid the shadow volumes being made again. This technique is typically found used by adversaries during a ransomware event and a precursor to deleting the shadowstorage.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null)), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_path\"), \"string\", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND like(cmd_line, \"%resize%\") AND like(cmd_line, \"%shadowstorage%\") AND like(cmd_line, \"%maxsize%\") AND process_name=\"vssadmin.exe\" | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null)), body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line, \"process_name\", process_name, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process_name, \"process_path\", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "System administrators may resize the shadowstorage for valid purposes. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10", "CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/ssa_data1/windows-security.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to create a shadow copy to perform offline password cracking.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1489"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest_device_id", "process_name", "parent_process_name", "process_path", "dest_user_id", "process", "cmd_line"], "risk_score": 64, "risk_severity": "high", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Service Stop"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "resize_shadowstorage_volume_filter"}]}, {"name": "High Process Termination Frequency", "id": "17cd75b2-8666-11eb-9ab4-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-16", "author": "Teoderick Contreras", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytics are designed to indentify a high frequency of process termination on a machine which is a common behavior of ransomware malware before encrypting files. This technique is designed to avoid an exception error while accessing (docs, images, database and etc..) in the infected machine for encryption.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=5 |bin _time span=3s |stats values(Image) as proc_terminated min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer EventCode ProcessID | where count >= 15 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `high_process_termination_frequency_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Image (process full path of terminated process) from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "admin or user tool that can terminate multiple process.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "High frequency process termination (more than 15 processes within 3s) detected on host $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1486"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "proc_terminated", "type": "Process", "role": ["Target"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["EventCode", "Image", "Computer", "_time", "ProcessID"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Data Encrypted for Impact"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "TA505", "APT38"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "high_process_termination_frequency_filter"}]}, {"name": "Common Ransomware Extensions", "id": "a9e5c5db-db11-43ca-86a8-c852d1b2c0ec", "version": 4, "date": "2020-11-09", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The search looks for file modifications with extensions commonly used by Ransomware", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| rex field=file_name \"(?\\.[^\\.]+)$\" | `ransomware_extensions` | `common_ransomware_extensions_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.\\\nThis search produces fields (`query`,`query_length`,`count`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** Name, **Field:** Name\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** File Extension, **Field:** file_extension\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", "known_false_positives": "It is possible for a legitimate file with these extensions to be created. If this is a true ransomware attack, there will be a large number of files created with these extensions.", "references": [], "tags": {"Consequence": "Data Destruction", "analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/ransomware_extensions/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$, this is indicative of a known ransomware file extension and should be reviewed immediately.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1485"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "file_name", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.user", "Filesystem.dest", "Filesystem.file_path", "Filesystem.file_name"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Data Destruction"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Lazarus Group", "APT38"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "lookup update=true ransomware_extensions_lookup Extensions AS file_extension OUTPUT Name | search Name !=False", "description": "This macro limits the output to files that have extensions associated with ransomware", "name": "ransomware_extensions", "lookups": [{"default_match": "false", "description": "A list of file extensions that are associated with ransomware", "filename": "ransomware_extensions.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(Extensions)", "min_matches": 1, "name": "ransomware_extensions_lookup", "case_sensitive_match": "false", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/ransomware_extensions.csv"}]}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "common_ransomware_extensions_filter"}]}, {"name": "Resize ShadowStorage volume", "id": "bc760ca6-8336-11eb-bcbb-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-12", "author": "Teoderick Contreras", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytics identifies the resizing of shadowstorage by ransomware malware to avoid the shadow volumes being made again. this technique is an alternative by ransomware attacker than deleting the shadowstorage which is known alert in defensive team. one example of ransomware that use this technique is CLOP ransomware where it drops a .bat file that will resize the shadowstorage to minimum size as much as possible", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as cmdline values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process values(Processes.process_name) as process_name min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name = \"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"powershell.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"powershell_ise.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"wmic.exe\" Processes.process_name = \"vssadmin.exe\" Processes.process=\"*resize*\" Processes.process=\"*shadowstorage*\" Processes.process=\"*/maxsize*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `resize_shadowstorage_volume_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "network admin can resize the shadowstorage for valid purposes.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Impact"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A process $parent_process_name$ attempt to resize shadow copy with commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1490"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.process", "Process.parent_process_name", "_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Inhibit System Recovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "resize_shadowstorage_volume_filter"}]}, {"name": "Common Ransomware Notes", "id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d6bd71", "version": 4, "date": "2020-11-09", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The search looks for files created with names matching those typically used in ransomware notes that tell the victim how to get their data back.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `ransomware_notes` | `common_ransomware_notes_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Filesystem data-model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system reads and writes.", "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a legitimate file could be created with the same name used by ransomware note files.", "references": [], "tags": {"Consequence": "Data Destruction", "analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/ransomware_notes/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$, this is indicative of a known ransomware note file and should be reviewed immediately.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1485"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "file_name", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.user", "Filesystem.dest", "Filesystem.file_path", "Filesystem.file_name"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Data Destruction"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Lazarus Group", "APT38"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "lookup ransomware_notes_lookup ransomware_notes as file_name OUTPUT status as \"Known Ransomware Notes\" | search \"Known Ransomware Notes\"=True", "description": "This macro limits the output to files that have been identified as a ransomware note", "name": "ransomware_notes", "lookups": [{"default_match": "false", "description": "A list of file names that are ransomware note files", "filename": "ransomware_notes.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(ransomware_notes)", "min_matches": 1, "name": "ransomware_notes_lookup", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/ransomware_notes.csv"}]}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "common_ransomware_notes_filter"}]}, {"name": "Deleting Shadow Copies", "id": "b89919ed-ee5f-492c-b139-95dbb162039e", "version": 4, "date": "2020-11-09", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The vssadmin.exe utility is used to interact with the Volume Shadow Copy Service. Wmic is an interface to the Windows Management Instrumentation. This search looks for either of these tools being used to delete shadow copies.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=vssadmin.exe OR Processes.process_name=wmic.exe) Processes.process=*delete* Processes.process=*shadow* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `deleting_shadow_copies_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "vssadmin.exe and wmic.exe are standard applications shipped with modern versions of windows. They may be used by administrators to legitimately delete old backup copies, although this is typically rare.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Log Manipulation", "SamSam Ransomware", "Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to delete shadow copies.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1490"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Inhibit System Recovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "deleting_shadow_copies_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious wevtutil Usage", "id": "2827c0fd-e1be-4868-ae25-59d28e0f9d4f", "version": 4, "date": "2021-10-11", "author": "David Dorsey, Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The wevtutil.exe application is the windows event log utility. This searches for wevtutil.exe with parameters for clearing the application, security, setup, trace or system event logs.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wevtutil.exe Processes.process IN (\"* cl *\", \"*clear-log*\") (Processes.process=\"*System*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Security*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Setup*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Application*\" OR Processes.process=\"*trace*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_wevtutil_usage_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "The wevtutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows event log utility. Administrators may use it to manage Windows event logs.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1070.001/T1070.001.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Log Manipulation", "Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Wevtutil.exe being used to clear Event Logs on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1070.001", "T1070"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 28, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Clear Windows Event Logs", "Indicator Removal on Host"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "APT38", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT32", "FIN8", "FIN5", "APT28", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_wevtutil_usage_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior", "id": "2b85aa3d-f5f6-4c2e-a081-a09f6e1c2e40", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-17", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes Windows Event ID 1100 to identify when Windows event log service is shutdown. Note that this is a voluminous analytic that will require tuning or restricted to specific endpoints based on criticality. This event generates every time Windows Event Log service has shut down. It also generates during normal system shutdown. During triage, based on time of day and user, determine if this was planned. If not planned, follow through with reviewing parallel alerts and other data sources to determine what else may have occurred.", "search": "(`wineventlog_security` EventCode=1100) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest Message EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_event_log_service_behavior_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows event logs from your hosts. In addition, the Splunk Windows TA is needed.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible the Event Logging service gets shut down due to system errors or legitimately administration tasks. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-1100", "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/defense-evasion/disabling-windows-event-logs-by-suspending-eventlog-service-threads", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/001/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1070.001/T1070.001.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Log Manipulation", "Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "The Windows Event Log Service shutdown on $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1070", "T1070.001"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "PR.IP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "dest"], "risk_score": 9, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Indicator Removal on Host", "Clear Windows Event Logs"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT41", "APT38", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT32", "FIN8", "FIN5", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_event_log_service_behavior_filter"}]}, {"name": "High File Deletion Frequency", "id": "45b125c4-866f-11eb-a95a-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-16", "author": "Teoderick Contreras", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for high frequency of file deletion relative to process name and process id. These events usually happen when the ransomware tries to encrypt the files with the ransomware file extensions and sysmon treat the original files to be deleted as soon it was replace as encrypted data.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=23 TargetFilename IN (\"*\\.cmd\", \"*\\.ini\",\"*\\.gif\", \"*\\.jpg\", \"*\\.jpeg\", \"*\\.db\", \"*\\.ps1\", \"*\\.doc*\", \"*\\.xls*\", \"*\\.ppt*\", \"*\\.bmp\",\"*\\.zip\", \"*\\.rar\", \"*\\.7z\", \"*\\.chm\", \"*\\.png\", \"*\\.log\", \"*\\.vbs\", \"*\\.js\") | stats values(TargetFilename) as deleted_files min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer user EventCode Image ProcessID |where count >=100 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `high_file_deletion_frequency_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the deleted target file name, process name and process id from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "user may delete bunch of pictures or files in a folder.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "High frequency file deletion activity detected on host $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1485"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "deleted_files", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Target"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["EventCode", "TargetFilename", "Computer", "user", "Image", "ProcessID", "_time"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Data Destruction"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Lazarus Group", "APT38"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "high_file_deletion_frequency_filter"}]}, {"name": "Clop Common Exec Parameter", "id": "5a8a2a72-8322-11eb-9ee9-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-17", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytics are designed to identifies some CLOP ransomware variant that using arguments to execute its main code or feature of its code. In this variant if the parameter is \"runrun\", CLOP ransomware will try to encrypt files in network shares and if it is \"temp.dat\", it will try to read from some stream pipe or file start encrypting files within the infected local machines. This technique can be also identified as an anti-sandbox technique to make its code non-responsive since it is waiting for some parameter to execute properly.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as cmdline values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process values(Processes.process_name) count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name != \"*temp.dat*\" Processes.process = \"*runrun*\" OR Processes.process = \"*temp.dat*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `clop_common_exec_parameter_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Operators can execute third party tools using these parameters.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_b/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Obfuscation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting using arguments to execute its main code or feature of its code related to Clop ransomware.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1204"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 100, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["User Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "clop_common_exec_parameter_filter"}]}, {"name": "High File Deletion Frequency", "id": "b6200efd-13bd-4336-920a-057b25bbcfaf", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-07", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Filesystem"], "description": "This detection detects a high amount of file deletions in a short time for specific file types. This can be an indicator for a malicious insider.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)) | eval action=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"action\"), \"string\", null), process=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null), file_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"file_name\"), \"string\", null), file_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"file_path\"), \"string\", null), dest_user_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), dest_device_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null) | where \"Endpoint_Filesystem\" IN(_datamodels) | where action=\"deleted\" | where like(file_name, \"%.cmd\") OR like(file_name, \"%.ini\") OR like(file_name, \"%.gif\") OR like(file_name, \"%.jpg\") OR like(file_name, \"%.jpeg\") OR like(file_name, \"%.db\") OR like(file_name, \"%.doc%\") OR like(file_name, \"%.ps1\") OR like(file_name, \"%.xls%\") OR like(file_name, \"%.ppt%\") OR like(file_name, \"%.bmp\") OR like(file_name, \"%.zip\") OR like(file_name, \"%.rar\") OR like(file_name, \"%.7z\") OR like(file_name, \"%.chm\") OR like(file_name, \"%.png\") OR like(file_name, \"%.log\") OR like(file_name, \"%.vbs\") OR like(file_name, \"%.js\") | stats count(file_name) AS count BY dest_user_id, dest_device_id, span(timestamp, 10m) | where count > 20 | eval start_time=window_start, end_time=window_end, entities=mvappend(dest_user_id, dest_device_id), body=create_map([\"count\", count]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesytem` node.", "known_false_positives": "user may delete bunch of pictures or files in a folder.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/excessive_file_deletions/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "High frequency file deletion activity detected on host $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1485"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "deleted_files", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Target"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["action", "process", "file_name", "file_path"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Data Destruction"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Lazarus Group", "APT38"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "high_file_deletion_frequency_filter"}]}, {"name": "Clop Ransomware Known Service Name", "id": "07e08a12-870c-11eb-b5f9-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-17", "author": "Teoderick Contreras", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This detection is to identify the common service name created by the CLOP ransomware as part of its persistence and high privilege code execution in the infected machine. Ussually CLOP ransomware use StartServiceCtrlDispatcherW API in creating this service entry.", "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 Service_Name IN (\"SecurityCenterIBM\", \"WinCheckDRVs\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Service_File_Name Service_Name Service_Start_Type Service_Type | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `clop_ransomware_known_service_name_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-system.log"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ executing known Clop Ransomware service names.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1543"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["EventCode", "cmdline", "_time", "parent_process_name", "process_name", "OriginalFileName", "process_path"], "risk_score": 100, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Create or Modify System Process"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_system"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "clop_ransomware_known_service_name_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Disabling Security Tools", "id": "fcc27099-46a0-46b0-a271-5c7dab56b6f1", "version": 2, "date": "2020-02-04", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "description": "Looks for activities and techniques associated with the disabling of security tools on a Windows system, such as suspicious `reg.exe` processes, processes launching netsh, and many others.", "narrative": "Attackers employ a variety of tactics in order to avoid detection and operate without barriers. This often involves modifying the configuration of security tools to get around them or explicitly disabling them to prevent them from running. This Analytic Story includes searches that look for activity consistent with attackers attempting to disable various security mechanisms. Such activity may involve monitoring for suspicious registry activity, as this is where much of the configuration for Windows and various other programs reside, or explicitly attempting to shut down security-related services. Other times, attackers attempt various tricks to prevent specific programs from running, such as adding the certificates with which the security tools are signed to a block list (which would prevent them from running).", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/11/vonteera-adware-uses-certificates-to-disable-anti-malware/", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Tools-Report.pdf"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Disabling Security Tools", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562", "T1543.003", "T1562.004", "T1112", "T1543", "T1553.004", "T1562.001", "T1553"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Modify Registry", "Disable or Modify System Firewall", "Subvert Trust Controls", "Disable or Modify Tools", "Create or Modify System Process", "Impair Defenses", "Windows Service", "Install Root Certificate"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390", "Putter Panda", "Tropic Trooper", "Kimsuky", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ke3chang", "FIN8", "Turla", "Gamaredon Group", "Rocke", "Carbanak", "Cobalt Group", "APT32", "Silence", "APT19", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Lazarus Group", "Honeybee", "APT3", "Wizard Spider", "no", "APT38", "DarkVishnya", "Patchwork", "Gorgon Group", "FIN7", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Night Dragon"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store", "id": "6bc5243e-ef36-45dc-9b12-f4a6be131159", "version": 7, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime values(Processes.process) as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_certutil` (Processes.process=*-addstore*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "There may be legitimate reasons for administrators to add a certificate to the untrusted certificate store. In such cases, this will typically be done on a large number of systems.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1553.004/T1553.004.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Disabling Security Tools"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1553.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified attempting to add a certificate to the store on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1553.004", "T1553"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Install Root Certificate", "Subvert Trust Controls"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=certutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=CertUtil.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_certutil"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store_filter"}]}, {"name": "Unload Sysmon Filter Driver", "id": "c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f665664g9f", "version": 3, "date": "2020-07-22", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Attackers often disable security tools to avoid detection. This search looks for the usage of process `fltMC.exe` to unload a Sysmon Driver that will stop sysmon from collecting the data.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime values(Processes.process) as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=fltMC.exe AND Processes.process=*unload* AND Processes.process=*SysmonDrv* by Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter`| table firstTime lastTime dest user count process_name process_id parent_process_name process", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model. This search is also shipped with `unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter` macro, update this macro to filter out false positives.", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Disabling Security Tools"], "asset_type": "", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Possible Sysmon filter driver unloading on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 45, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter"}]}, {"name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services", "id": "f0c693d8-2a89-4ce7-80b4-98fea4c3ea6d", "version": 4, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for arguments to sc.exe indicating the creation or modification of a Windows service.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = sc.exe (Processes.process=\"* create *\" OR Processes.process=\"* config *\") by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Using sc.exe to manipulate Windows services is uncommon. However, there may be legitimate instances of this behavior. It is important to validate and investigate as appropriate.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Service Abuse", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Disabling Security Tools", "NOBELIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Persistence"}, "Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "message": "A sc process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ to create of configure services in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1543.003", "T1543"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Windows Service", "Create or Modify System Process"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "DarkVishnya", "Wizard Spider", "APT32", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Tropic Trooper", "Cobalt Group", "Ke3chang", "Honeybee", "FIN7", "Threat Group-3390", "APT19", "APT3", "Lazarus Group", "Carbanak", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services_filter"}]}, {"name": "Processes launching netsh", "id": "b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-95dbb162040e", "version": 4, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Josef Kuepker, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe. Netsh is a command-line scripting utility that allows you to, either locally or remotely, display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. Netsh can be used as a persistence proxy technique to execute a helper DLL when netsh.exe is executed. In this search, we are looking for processes spawned by netsh.exe and executing commands via the command line.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) AS Processes.process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_netsh` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest |`drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`processes_launching_netsh_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Some VPN applications are known to launch netsh.exe. Outside of these instances, it is unusual for an executable to launch netsh.exe and run commands.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Netsh Abuse", "Disabling Security Tools", "DHS Report TA18-074A"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A process $process_name$ that tries to execute netsh commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.004", "T1562"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.user", "Processes.dest"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify System Firewall", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Rocke", "Lazarus Group", "Kimsuky", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Carbanak", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=netsh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=netsh.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_netsh"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "processes_launching_netsh_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Reg exe Process", "id": "a6b3ab4e-dd77-4213-95fa-fc94701995e0", "version": 4, "date": "2020-07-22", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for reg.exe being launched from a command prompt not started by the user. When a user launches cmd.exe, the parent process is usually explorer.exe. This search filters out those instances.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name != explorer.exe Processes.process_name =cmd.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=cmd.exe Processes.process_name= reg.exe by Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename parent_process_id as process_id |dedup process_id| table process_id dest] | `suspicious_reg_exe_process_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "It's possible for system administrators to write scripts that exhibit this behavior. If this is the case, the search will need to be modified to filter them out.", "references": ["https://car.mitre.org/wiki/CAR-2013-03-001"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Disabling Security Tools", "DHS Report TA18-074A"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Suspicious $Processes.process_path.file_path$ process running with an uncommon parent process $Processes.parent_process_name$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Processes.process_path.file_path", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Modify Registry"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Turla", "APT32", "APT38", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "Threat Group-3390", "Honeybee", "Patchwork", "Gorgon Group", "FIN8"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_reg_exe_process_filter"}]}, {"name": "Attempt To Stop Security Service", "id": "c8e349c6-b97c-486e-8949-bd7bcd1f3910", "version": 4, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for attempts to stop security-related services on the endpoint.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` OR Processes.process_name = sc.exe Processes.process=\"* stop *\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |lookup security_services_lookup service as process OUTPUTNEW category, description | search category=security | `attempt_to_stop_security_service_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "None identified. Attempts to disable security-related services should be identified and understood.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md#atomic-test-14---disable-arbitrary-security-windows-service"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Disabling Security Tools", "Trickbot"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_defend_service_stop/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified attempting to disable security services on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 20, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_net"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "attempt_to_stop_security_service_filter"}], "lookups": [{"default_match": "false", "description": "A list of services that deal with security", "filename": "security_services.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(service)", "min_matches": 1, "name": "security_services_lookup", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/security_services.csv"}]}]}, {"name": "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527", "id": "fd79470a-da88-11eb-b803-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-01", "author": "Splunk Threat Research Team", "description": "The following analytic story identifies behaviors related PrintNightmare, or CVE-2021-34527 previously known as (CVE-2021-1675), to gain privilege escalation on the vulnerable machine.", "narrative": "This vulnerability affects the Print Spooler service, enabled by default on Windows systems, and allows adversaries to trick this service into installing a remotely hosted print driver using a low privileged user account. Successful exploitation effectively allows adversaries to execute code in the target system (Remote Code Execution) in the context of the Print Spooler service which runs with the highest privileges (Privilege Escalation). \\\nThe prerequisites for successful exploitation consist of: \\\n1. Print Spooler service enabled on the target system \\\n1. Network connectivity to the target system (initial access has been obtained) \\\n1. Hash or password for a low privileged user ( or computer ) account. \\\nIn the most impactful scenario, an attacker would be able to leverage this vulnerability to obtain a SYSTEM shell on a domain controller and so escalate their privileges from a low privileged domain account to full domain access in the target environment as shown below.", "references": ["https://github.com/cube0x0/CVE-2021-1675/", "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/fix-for-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675-exploit-to-keep-your-print-servers-running-while-a-patch-is-not-available/", "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/exploitable-critical-rce-vulnerability-allows-regular-users-to-fully-compromise-active-directory-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675/", "https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/ob6y02/critical_vulnerability_printnightmare_exposes"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "category": ["Vulnerability"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1547.012", "T1218.011", "T1068", "T1547"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "Rundll32", "Signed Binary Proxy Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390", "Sandworm Team", "PLATINUM", "APT29", "FIN8", "Carbanak", "TA505", "Whitefly", "Cobalt Group", "APT32", "APT19", "CopyKittens", "FIN6", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT3", "no", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "APT33"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Print Spooler Failed to Load a Plug-in", "id": "1adc9548-da7c-11eb-8f13-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-01", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies driver load errors utilizing the Windows PrintService Admin logs. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. \\\nWithin the proof of concept code, the following error will occur - \"The print spooler failed to load a plug-in module C:\\Windows\\system32\\spool\\DRIVERS\\x64\\3\\meterpreter.dll, error code 0x45A. See the event user data for context information.\" \\\nThe analytic is based on file path and failure to load the plug-in. \\\nDuring triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events.", "search": "`printservice` ((ErrorCode=\"0x45A\" (EventCode=\"808\" OR EventCode=\"4909\")) OR (\"The print spooler failed to load a plug-in module\" OR \"\\\\drivers\\\\x64\\\\\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode EventCode ComputerName Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `print_spooler_failed_to_load_a_plug_in_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You will need to ensure PrintService Admin and Operational logs are being logged to Splunk from critical or all systems.", "known_false_positives": "False positives are unknown and filtering may be required.", "references": ["https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/fix-for-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675-exploit-to-keep-your-print-servers-running-while-a-patch-is-not-available/", "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/exploitable-critical-rce-vulnerability-allows-regular-users-to-fully-compromise-active-directory-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675/", "https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/ob6y02/critical_vulnerability_printnightmare_exposes"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence,", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Incoming"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527", "CVE-2021-1675"], "dataset": [], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious printer spooler errors have occured on endpoint $ComputerName$ with EventCode $EventCode$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1547.012", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "OpCode", "EventCode", "ComputerName", "Message"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "source=\"wineventlog:microsoft-windows-printservice/operational\" OR sourcetype=\"WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PrintService/Admin\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "printservice"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "print_spooler_failed_to_load_a_plug_in_filter"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network", "id": "35307032-a12d-11eb-835f-acde48001122", "version": 3, "date": "2021-10-13", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments and performing a network connection. It is unusual for rundll32.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` by _time span=1h Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(rundll32\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port !=\"0\" by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port| `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_guid connection_to_CNC dest_port | `rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `port` node. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32", "https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Cobalt Strike", "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A rundll32 process $process_name$ with no commandline argument like this process commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "processname", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Rundll32"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT32", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "TA505", "MuddyWater", "APT29", "APT19", "CopyKittens", "APT3", "Carbanak", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_rundll32"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter"}]}, {"name": "Print Spooler Adding A Printer Driver", "id": "313681a2-da8e-11eb-adad-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-01", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies new printer drivers being load by utilizing the Windows PrintService operational logs, EventCode 316. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. \\\nWithin the proof of concept code, the following event will occur - \"Printer driver 1234 for Windows x64 Version-3 was added or updated. Files:- UNIDRV.DLL, kernelbase.dll, evil.dll. No user action is required.\" \\\nDuring triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events and review the source of where the exploitation began.", "search": "`printservice` EventCode=316 category = \"Adding a printer driver\" Message = \"*kernelbase.dll,*\" Message = \"*UNIDRV.DLL,*\" Message = \"*.DLL.*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode EventCode ComputerName Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `print_spooler_adding_a_printer_driver_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You will need to ensure PrintService Admin and Operational logs are being logged to Splunk from critical or all systems.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown. This may require filtering.", "references": ["https://twitter.com/MalwareJake/status/1410421445608476679?s=20", "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/fix-for-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675-exploit-to-keep-your-print-servers-running-while-a-patch-is-not-available/", "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/exploitable-critical-rce-vulnerability-allows-regular-users-to-fully-compromise-active-directory-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675/", "https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/ob6y02/critical_vulnerability_printnightmare_exposes"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence,", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Incoming"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527", "CVE-2021-1675"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-printservice_operational.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious print driver was loaded on endpoint $ComputerName$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1547.012", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "OpCode", "EventCode", "ComputerName", "Message"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "source=\"wineventlog:microsoft-windows-printservice/operational\" OR sourcetype=\"WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PrintService/Admin\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "printservice"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "print_spooler_adding_a_printer_driver_filter"}]}, {"name": "Spoolsv Suspicious Process Access", "id": "799b606e-da81-11eb-93f8-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-01", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies a suspicious behavior related to PrintNightmare, or CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675), to gain privilege escalation on the vulnerable machine. This exploit attacks a critical Windows Print Spooler Vulnerability to elevate privilege. This detection is to look for suspicious process access made by the spoolsv.exe that may related to the attack.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 SourceImage = \"*\\\\spoolsv.exe\" CallTrace = \"*\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\spool\\\\DRIVERS\\\\x64\\\\*\" TargetImage IN (\"*\\\\rundll32.exe\", \"*\\\\spoolsv.exe\") GrantedAccess = 0x1fffff | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer SourceImage TargetImage GrantedAccess CallTrace EventCode ProcessID| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spoolsv_suspicious_process_access_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with process access event where SourceImage, TargetImage, GrantedAccess and CallTrace executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of spoolsv.exe.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://github.com/cube0x0/impacket/commit/73b9466c17761384ece11e1028ec6689abad6818", "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/fix-for-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675-exploit-to-keep-your-print-servers-running-while-a-patch-is-not-available/", "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/exploitable-critical-rce-vulnerability-allows-regular-users-to-fully-compromise-active-directory-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675/", "https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/ob6y02/critical_vulnerability_printnightmare_exposes"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Local"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "$SourceImage$ was GrantedAccess open access to $TargetImage$ on endpoint $Computer$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1068"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "ProcessID", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "TargetImage", "type": "Process Name", "role": ["Target"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "SourceImage", "TargetImage", "GrantedAccess", "CallTrace", "EventCode"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Whitefly", "APT33", "Cobalt Group", "PLATINUM", "FIN8", "APT32", "Threat Group-3390", "FIN6", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "spoolsv_suspicious_process_access_filter"}]}, {"name": "Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules", "id": "a5e451f8-da81-11eb-b245-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-01", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect suspicious loading of dll in specific path relative to printnightmare exploitation. In this search we try to detect the loaded modules made by spoolsv.exe after the exploitation.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 Image =\"*\\\\spoolsv.exe\" ImageLoaded=\"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\spool\\\\drivers\\\\x64\\\\*\" ImageLoaded = \"*.dll\" | stats dc(ImageLoaded) as countImgloaded values(ImageLoaded) as ImgLoaded count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image Computer process_id EventCode | where countImgloaded >= 3 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://raw.githubusercontent.com/hieuttmmo/sigma/dceb13fe3f1821b119ae495b41e24438bd97e3d0/rules/windows/image_load/sysmon_cve_2021_1675_print_nightmare.yml"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Local"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "$Image$ with process id $process_id$ has loaded a driver from $ImageLoaded$ on endpoint $Computer$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1547.012", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_id", "type": "Process Name", "role": ["Parent Process", "Attacker"]}, {"name": "ImageLoaded", "type": "File", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Image", "Computer", "EventCode", "ImageLoaded"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules_filter"}]}, {"name": "Spoolsv Writing a DLL", "id": "d5bf5cf2-da71-11eb-92c2-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-01", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies a `.dll` being written by `spoolsv.exe`. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. Typically, this is not normal behavior for `spoolsv.exe` to write a `.dll`. Current POC code used will write the suspicious DLL to disk within a path of `\\spool\\drivers\\x64\\`. During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=spoolsv.exe by _time Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path=\"*\\\\spool\\\\drivers\\\\x64\\\\*\" Filesystem.file_name=\"*.dll\" by _time Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process] | dedup file_create_time | table dest file_create_time, file_name, file_path, process_name | `spoolsv_writing_a_dll_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node and `Filesystem` node.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown.", "references": ["https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/fix-for-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675-exploit-to-keep-your-print-servers-running-while-a-patch-is-not-available/", "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/exploitable-critical-rce-vulnerability-allows-regular-users-to-fully-compromise-active-directory-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675/", "https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/ob6y02/critical_vulnerability_printnightmare_exposes"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "$process_name$ has been identified writing dll's to $file_path$ on endpoint $dest$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1547.012", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_id", "type": "Process", "role": ["Process"]}, {"name": "file_path", "type": "File", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.dest", "Filesystem.file_create_time", "Filesystem.file_name", "Filesystem.file_path", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.dest"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "spoolsv_writing_a_dll_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments", "id": "e451bd16-e4c5-4109-8eb1-c4c6ecf048b4", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-20", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for rundll32.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(rundll32\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | `suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32", "https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Cobalt Strike", "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Suspicious rundll32.exe process with no command line arguments executed on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Rundll32"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT32", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "TA505", "MuddyWater", "APT29", "APT19", "CopyKittens", "APT3", "Carbanak", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_rundll32"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments_filter"}]}, {"name": "Spoolsv Spawning Rundll32", "id": "15d905f6-da6b-11eb-ab82-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-07-01", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies a suspicious child process, `rundll32.exe`, with no command-line arguments being spawned from `spoolsv.exe`. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. Typically, this is not normal behavior for `spoolsv.exe` to spawn a process. During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=spoolsv.exe `process_rundll32` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spoolsv_spawning_rundll32_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives have been identified. There are limited instances where `rundll32.exe` may be spawned by a legitimate print driver.", "references": ["https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/fix-for-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675-exploit-to-keep-your-print-servers-running-while-a-patch-is-not-available/", "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/exploitable-critical-rce-vulnerability-allows-regular-users-to-fully-compromise-active-directory-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675/", "https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/ob6y02/critical_vulnerability_printnightmare_exposes"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Local"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "$parent_process$ has spawned $process_name$ on endpoint $ComputerName$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1547.012", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_id", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process", "Attacker"]}, {"name": "process_id", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_rundll32"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "spoolsv_spawning_rundll32_filter"}]}, {"name": "Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Sysmon", "id": "347fd388-da87-11eb-836d-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-01", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies a `.dll` being written by `spoolsv.exe`. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously(CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. Typically, this is not normal behavior for `spoolsv.exe` to write a `.dll`. Current POC code used will write the suspicious DLL to disk within a path of `\\spool\\drivers\\x64\\`. During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events.", "search": "`sysmon` EventID=11 process_name=spoolsv.exe file_path=\"*\\\\spool\\\\drivers\\\\x64\\\\*\" file_name=*.dll | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, UserID, process_name, file_path, file_name, TargetFilename, process_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spoolsv_writing_a_dll___sysmon_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://github.com/cube0x0/impacket/commit/73b9466c17761384ece11e1028ec6689abad6818", "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/fix-for-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675-exploit-to-keep-your-print-servers-running-while-a-patch-is-not-available/", "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/exploitable-critical-rce-vulnerability-allows-regular-users-to-fully-compromise-active-directory-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675/", "https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/ob6y02/critical_vulnerability_printnightmare_exposes"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Local"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "$process_name$ has been identified writing dll's to $file_path$ on endpoint $dest$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1547.012", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_id", "type": "Process", "role": ["Process"]}, {"name": "file_path", "type": "File", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "UserID", "process_name", "file_path", "file_name", "TargetFilename"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "spoolsv_writing_a_dll___sysmon_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "AWS Security Hub Alerts", "id": "2f2f610a-d64d-48c2-b57c-96722b49ab5a", "version": 1, "date": "2020-08-04", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "This story is focused around detecting Security Hub alerts generated from AWS", "narrative": "AWS Security Hub collects and consolidates findings from AWS security services enabled in your environment, such as intrusion detection findings from Amazon GuardDuty, vulnerability scans from Amazon Inspector, S3 bucket policy findings from Amazon Macie, publicly accessible and cross-account resources from IAM Access Analyzer, and resources lacking WAF coverage from AWS Firewall Manager.", "references": ["https://aws.amazon.com/security-hub/features/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "AWS Security Hub Alerts", "category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_id": [], "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User", "id": "2a9b80d3-6220-4345-b5ad-290bf5d0d222", "version": 3, "date": "2021-01-26", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub alerts for an AWS IAM User in 4 hours intervals.", "search": "`aws_securityhub_finding` \"findings{}.Resources{}.Type\"= AwsIamUser | rename findings{}.Resources{}.Id as user | bucket span=4h _time | stats count AS alerts by _time user | eventstats avg(alerts) as total_launched_avg, stdev(alerts) as total_launched_stdev | eval threshold_value = 2 | eval isOutlier=if(alerts > total_launched_avg+(total_launched_stdev * threshold_value), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | table _time user alerts |`detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Security Hub inputs. The threshold_value should be tuned to your environment and schedule these searches according to the bucket span interval.", "known_false_positives": "None", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS Security Hub Alerts"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "findings{}.Resources{}.Type", "indings{}.Resources{}.Id", "user"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:securityhub:finding\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "aws_securityhub_finding"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance", "id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-290bf5d0d222", "version": 3, "date": "2021-01-26", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub alerts for an EC2 instance in 4 hours intervals", "search": "`aws_securityhub_finding` \"Resources{}.Type\"=AWSEC2Instance | bucket span=4h _time | stats count AS alerts values(Title) as Title values(Types{}) as Types values(vendor_account) as vendor_account values(vendor_region) as vendor_region values(severity) as severity by _time dest | eventstats avg(alerts) as total_alerts_avg, stdev(alerts) as total_alerts_stdev | eval threshold_value = 3 | eval isOutlier=if(alerts > total_alerts_avg+(total_alerts_stdev * threshold_value), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | table _time dest alerts Title Types vendor_account vendor_region severity isOutlier total_alerts_avg | `detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Security Hub inputs. The threshold_value should be tuned to your environment and schedule these searches according to the bucket span interval.", "known_false_positives": "None", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS Security Hub Alerts"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/security_hub_ec2_spike/security_hub_ec2_spike.json"], "impact": 30, "message": "Spike in AWS security Hub alerts with title $Title$ for EC2 instance $dest$", "nist": ["DE.DP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Resources{}.Type", "Title", "Types{}", "vendor_account", "vendor_region", "severity", "dest"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:securityhub:finding\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "aws_securityhub_finding"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "DarkSide Ransomware", "id": "507edc74-13d5-4339-878e-b9114ded1f35", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-12", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the DarkSide Ransomware", "narrative": "This story addresses Darkside ransomware. This ransomware payload has many similarities to common ransomware however there are certain items particular to it. The creation of a .TXT log that shows every item being encrypted as well as the creation of ransomware notes and files adding a machine ID created based on CRC32 checksum algorithm. This ransomware payload leaves machines in minimal operation level,enough to browse the attackers websites. A customized URI with leaked information is presented to each victim.This is the ransomware payload that shut down the Colonial pipeline. The story is composed of several detection searches covering similar items to other ransomware payloads and those particular to Darkside payload.", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/the-darkside-of-the-ransomware-pipeline.htmlbig-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "DarkSide Ransomware", "category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1020", "T1218", "T1548.002", "T1548", "T1218.003", "T1021", "T1003.002", "T1105", "T1569.002", "T1486", "T1003", "T1021.002", "T1003.001", "T1490", "T1197", "T1569", "T1055"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Automated Exfiltration", "CMSTP", "Remote Services", "Data Encrypted for Impact", "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "Service Execution", "System Services", "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "BITS Jobs", "Ingress Tool Transfer", "Inhibit System Recovery", "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "OS Credential Dumping", "LSASS Memory", "Process Injection", "Security Account Manager", "Bypass User Access Control"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Impact", "Credential Access", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Execution", "Command And Control", "Lateral Movement", "Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Sandworm Team", "Magic Hound", "Rancor", "Axiom", "APT1", "Tropic Trooper", "Kimsuky", "PLATINUM", "Poseidon Group", "TEMP.Veles", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN8", "Ke3chang", "Turla", "APT39", "Molerats", "Leviathan", "Rocke", "Gamaredon Group", "APT29", "TA505", "Whitefly", "Frankenstein", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "Stolen Pencil", "APT32", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT-C-36", "APT37", "WIRTE", "APT41", "menuPass", "FIN6", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "Honeybee", "APT3", "Cleaver", "Sowbug", "Leafminer", "APT18", "no", "Threat Group-1314", "Sharpshooter", "APT38", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork", "Elderwood", "APT28", "APT33", "Gorgon Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN7", "Orangeworm", "Night Dragon"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Renamed RClone", "id": "6dca1124-b3ec-11eb-9328-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifies the usage of `rclone.exe`, renamed, being used to exfiltrate data to a remote destination. RClone has been used by multiple ransomware groups to exfiltrate data. In many instances, it will be downloaded from the legitimate site and executed accordingly. During triage, isolate the endpoint and begin to review parallel processes for additional behavior. At this stage, the adversary may have staged data to be exfiltrated.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.original_file_name=rclone.exe AND Processes.process_name!=rclone.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_renamed_rclone_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as this analytic identifies renamed instances of `rclone.exe`. Filter as needed if there is a legitimate business use case.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/blog/rclone-mega-extortion/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html", "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1020/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1020"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 27, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Automated Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Tropic Trooper", "Frankenstein", "Honeybee"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_renamed_rclone_filter"}]}, {"name": "Ransomware Notes bulk creation", "id": "eff7919a-8330-11eb-83f8-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-12", "author": "Teoderick Contreras", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytics identifies a big number of instance of ransomware notes (filetype e.g .txt, .html, .hta) file creation to the infected machine. This behavior is a good sensor if the ransomware note filename is quite new for security industry or the ransomware note filename is not in your ransomware lookup table list for monitoring.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=11 file_name IN (\"*\\.txt\",\"*\\.html\",\"*\\.hta\") |bin _time span=10s | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(TargetFilename) as unique_readme_path_count values(TargetFilename) as list_of_readme_path by Computer Image file_name | where unique_readme_path_count >= 15 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ransomware_notes_bulk_creation_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware", "DarkSide Ransomware", "BlackMatter Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Impact"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Obfuscation"], "message": "A high frequency file creation of $file_name$ in different file path in host $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1486"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["EventCode", "file_name", "_time", "TargetFilename", "Computer", "Image", "user"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Data Encrypted for Impact"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "TA505", "APT38"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "ransomware_notes_bulk_creation_filter"}]}, {"name": "Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell", "id": "5ee2bcd0-b2ff-11eb-bb34-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-12", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This following analytic detects PowerShell command to delete shadow copy using the WMIC PowerShell module. This technique was seen used by a recent adversary to deploy DarkSide Ransomware where it executed a child process of PowerShell to execute a hex encoded command to delete shadow copy. This hex encoded command was able to be decrypted by PowerShell log.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message= \"*ShadowCopy*\" (Message = \"*Delete*\" OR Message = \"*Remove*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the powershell logs from your endpoints. make sure you enable needed registry to monitor this event.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html", "https://searchwindowsserver.techtarget.com/tutorial/Set-up-PowerShell-script-block-logging-for-added-security"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An attempt to delete ShadowCopy was performed using PowerShell on $ComputerName$ by $User$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1490"], "observable": [{"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Inhibit System Recovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Cobalt Strike Named Pipes", "id": "5876d429-0240-4709-8b93-ea8330b411b5", "version": 1, "date": "2021-02-22", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of default or publicly known named pipes used with Cobalt Strike. A named pipe is a named, one-way or duplex pipe for communication between the pipe server and one or more pipe clients. Cobalt Strike uses named pipes in many ways and has default values used with the Artifact Kit and Malleable C2 Profiles. The following query assists with identifying these default named pipes. Each EDR product presents named pipes a little different. Consider taking the values and generating a query based on the product of choice. \\\nUpon triage, review the process performing the named pipe. If it is explorer.exe, It is possible it was injected into by another process. Review recent parallel processes to identify suspicious patterns or behaviors. A parallel process may have a network connection, review and follow the connection back to identify any file modifications.", "search": "`sysmon` EventID=17 OR EventID=18 PipeName IN (\\\\msagent_*, \\\\wkssvc*, \\\\DserNamePipe*, \\\\srvsvc_*, \\\\mojo.*, \\\\postex_*, \\\\status_*, \\\\MSSE-*, \\\\spoolss_*, \\\\win_svc*, \\\\ntsvcs*, \\\\winsock*, \\\\UIA_PIPE*) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, process_name, process_id process_path, PipeName | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cobalt_strike_named_pipes_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "The idea of using named pipes with Cobalt Strike is to blend in. Therefore, some of the named pipes identified and added may cause false positives. Filter by process name or pipe name to reduce false positives.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/ipc/named-pipes", "https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-smb-beacon", "https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2021/02/09/learn-pipe-fitting-for-all-of-your-offense-projects/", "https://gist.github.com/MHaggis/6c600e524045a6d49c35291a21e10752", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike", "Trickbot", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $Computer$ by user $user$ accessing known suspicious named pipes related to Cobalt Strike.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1055"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventID", "PipeName", "Computer", "process_name", "process_path", "process_id"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Process Injection"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Cobalt Group", "APT37", "Honeybee", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "cobalt_strike_named_pipes_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect RClone Command-Line Usage", "id": "e8b74268-5454-11ec-a799-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-03", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "This analytic identifies commonly used command-line arguments used by `rclone.exe` to initiate a file transfer. Some arguments were negated as they are specific to the configuration used by adversaries. In particular, an adversary may list the files or directories of the remote file share using `ls` or `lsd`, which is not indicative of malicious behavior. During triage, at this stage of a ransomware event, exfiltration is about to occur or has already. Isolate the endpoint and continue investigating by review file modifications and parallel processes.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where \"Endpoint_Processes\" IN(_datamodels) | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null), process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_path\"), \"string\", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND process_name IS NOT NULL AND process_name=\"rclone.exe\" AND (like (cmd_line, \"%copy%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%mega%\")OR like (cmd_line, \"%pcloud%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%ftp%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%--config%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%--progress%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%--no-check-certificate%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%--ignore-existing%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%--auto-confirm%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%--transfers%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%--multi-thread-streams%\")) | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null)) | eval body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line, \"process_name\", process_name, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process_name, \"process_path\", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint_Processess` datamodel.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as this is restricted to the Rclone process name. Filter or tune the analytic as needed.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/blog/rclone-mega-extortion/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html", "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/", "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/11/29/continuing-the-bazar-ransomware-story/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1020/windows-security.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to connect to a remote cloud service to move files or folders.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1020"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest_device_id", "process_name", "parent_process_name", "process_path", "dest_user_id", "process", "cmd_line"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Automated Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Tropic Trooper", "Frankenstein", "Honeybee"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_rclone_command_line_usage_filter"}]}, {"name": "CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments", "id": "415b4306-8bfb-11eb-85c4-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-03-23", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Certutil.exe may download a file from a remote destination using `-urlcache`. This behavior does require a URL to be passed on the command-line. In addition, `-f` (force) and `-split` (Split embedded ASN.1 elements, and save to files) will be used. It is not entirely common for `certutil.exe` to contact public IP space. However, it is uncommon for `certutil.exe` to write files to world writeable paths.\\ During triage, capture any files on disk and review. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain in question.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_certutil` Processes.process=*urlcache* Processes.process=*split* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives in most environments, however tune as needed based on parent-child relationship or network connection.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/", "https://www.avira.com/en/blog/certutil-abused-by-attackers-to-spread-threats", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/10/certutil-qualms-they-came-to-drop-fombs.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ingress Tool Transfer", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Command and Control"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to download a file.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1105"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Ingress Tool Transfer"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Whitefly", "Rocke", "APT39", "Tropic Trooper", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Frankenstein", "Silence", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "APT33", "MuddyWater", "APT18", "APT38", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "OilRig", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT37", "FIN8", "PLATINUM", "Leviathan", "Elderwood", "Magic Hound", "APT3", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Patchwork", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-3390", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=certutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=CertUtil.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_certutil"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments_filter"}]}, {"name": "Extraction of Registry Hives", "id": "8bbb7d58-b360-11eb-ba21-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-09", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of `reg.exe` exporting Windows Registry hives containing credentials. Adversaries may use this technique to export registry hives for offline credential access attacks. Typically found executed from a untrusted process or script. Upon execution, a file will be written to disk.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` (Processes.process=*save* OR Processes.process=*export*) AND (Processes.process=\"*\\sam *\" OR Processes.process=\"*\\system *\" OR Processes.process=\"*\\security *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `extraction_of_registry_hives_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible some agent based products will generate false positives. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Credential Dumping"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious use of `reg.exe` exporting Windows Registry hives containing credentials executed on $dest$ by user $user$, with a parent process of $parent_process_id$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_id", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process", "Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Security Account Manager", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390", "Ke3chang", "Soft Cell", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "menuPass", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=reg.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=reg.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_reg"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "extraction_of_registry_hives_filter"}]}, {"name": "SLUI RunAs Elevated", "id": "8d124810-b3e4-11eb-96c7-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-13", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the Microsoft Software Licensing User Interface Tool, `slui.exe`, elevating access using the `-verb runas` function. This particular bypass utilizes a registry key/value. Identified by two sources, the registry keys are `HKCU\\Software\\Classes\\exefile\\shell` and `HKCU\\Software\\Classes\\launcher.Systemsettings\\Shell\\open\\command`. To simulate this behavior, multiple POC are available. The analytic identifies the use of `runas` by `slui.exe`.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=slui.exe (Processes.process=*-verb* Processes.process=*runas*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `slui_runas_elevated_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives should be present as this is not commonly used by legitimate applications.", "references": ["https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/46998", "https://medium.com/@mattharr0ey/privilege-escalation-uac-bypass-in-changepk-c40b92818d1b", "https://gist.github.com/r00t-3xp10it/0c92cd554d3156fd74f6c25660ccc466", "https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/windows/local/bypassuac_sluihijack/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Privilege Escalation"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/slui/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A slui process $process_name$ with elevated commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Bypass User Access Control", "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "MuddyWater", "Honeybee", "Cobalt Group", "Threat Group-3390", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Patchwork", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "slui_runas_elevated_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect RClone Command-Line Usage", "id": "32e0baea-b3f1-11eb-a2ce-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-11-29", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies commonly used command-line arguments used by `rclone.exe` to initiate a file transfer. Some arguments were negated as they are specific to the configuration used by adversaries. In particular, an adversary may list the files or directories of the remote file share using `ls` or `lsd`, which is not indicative of malicious behavior. During triage, at this stage of a ransomware event, exfiltration is about to occur or has already. Isolate the endpoint and continue investigating by review file modifications and parallel processes.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rclone` Processes.process IN (\"*copy*\", \"*mega*\", \"*pcloud*\", \"*ftp*\", \"*--config*\", \"*--progress*\", \"*--no-check-certificate*\", \"*--ignore-existing*\", \"*--auto-confirm*\", \"*--transfers*\", \"*--multi-thread-streams*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rclone_command_line_usage_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as this is restricted to the Rclone process name. Filter or tune the analytic as needed.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/blog/rclone-mega-extortion/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html", "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/", "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/11/29/continuing-the-bazar-ransomware-story/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1020/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to connect to a remote cloud service to move files or folders.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1020"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id", "Processes.original_file_name"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Automated Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Tropic Trooper", "Frankenstein", "Honeybee"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.original_file_name=rclone.exe OR Processes.process_name=rclone.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name.", "name": "process_rclone"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_rclone_command_line_usage_filter"}]}, {"name": "CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments", "id": "801ad9e4-8bfb-11eb-8b31-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-03-23", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Certutil.exe may download a file from a remote destination using `-VerifyCtl`. This behavior does require a URL to be passed on the command-line. In addition, `-f` (force) and `-split` (Split embedded ASN.1 elements, and save to files) will be used. It is not entirely common for `certutil.exe` to contact public IP space. \\ During triage, capture any files on disk and review. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain in question. Using `-VerifyCtl`, the file will either be written to the current working directory or `%APPDATA%\\..\\LocalLow\\Microsoft\\CryptnetUrlCache\\Content\\`. ", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_certutil` Processes.process=*verifyctl* Processes.process=*split* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives in most environments, however tune as needed based on parent-child relationship or network connection.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/", "https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2020/08/23/certutil-one-more-gui-lolbin/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc732443(v=ws.11)#-verifyctl", "https://www.avira.com/en/blog/certutil-abused-by-attackers-to-spread-threats"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ingress Tool Transfer", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Command and Control"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to download a file.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1105"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Ingress Tool Transfer"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Whitefly", "Rocke", "APT39", "Tropic Trooper", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Frankenstein", "Silence", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "APT33", "MuddyWater", "APT18", "APT38", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "OilRig", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT37", "FIN8", "PLATINUM", "Leviathan", "Elderwood", "Magic Hound", "APT3", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Patchwork", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-3390", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=certutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=CertUtil.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_certutil"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag", "id": "b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-151xb162040e", "version": 4, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for events where `PsExec.exe` is run with the `accepteula` flag in the command line. PsExec is a built-in Windows utility that enables you to execute processes on other systems. It is fully interactive for console applications. This tool is widely used for launching interactive command prompts on remote systems. Threat actors leverage this extensively for executing code on compromised systems. If an attacker is running PsExec for the first time, they will be prompted to accept the end-user license agreement (EULA), which can be passed as the argument `accepteula` within the command line.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_psexec` Processes.process=*accepteula* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators can leverage PsExec for accessing remote systems and might pass `accepteula` as an argument if they are running this tool for the first time. However, it is not likely that you'd see multiple occurrences of this event on a machine", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "HAFNIUM Group", "DarkSide Ransomware", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ running the utility for possibly the first time.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021", "T1021.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote Services", "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "APT32", "Orangeworm", "FIN8", "APT3", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-1314", "Turla", "Deep Panda", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=psexec.exe OR Processes.process_name=psexec64.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=psexec.c)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_psexec"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag_filter"}]}, {"name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", "id": "e9fb4a59-c5fb-440a-9f24-191fbc6b2911", "version": 6, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` OR `process_cmd` Processes.process=*save* (Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\SAM* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\SAM*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "None identified.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to export the registry keys.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Security Account Manager", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390", "Ke3chang", "Soft Cell", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "menuPass", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=reg.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=reg.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_reg"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_cmd"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images", "id": "29e307ba-40af-4ab2-91b2-3c6b392bbba0", "version": 1, "date": "2019-12-03", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for reading loaded Images unique to credential dumping with Mimikatz. Deprecated because mimikatz libraries changed and very noisy sysmon Event Code.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 | stats values(ImageLoaded) as ImageLoaded values(ProcessId) as ProcessId by Computer, Image | search ImageLoaded=*WinSCard.dll ImageLoaded=*cryptdll.dll ImageLoaded=*hid.dll ImageLoaded=*samlib.dll ImageLoaded=*vaultcli.dll | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search needs Sysmon Logs and a sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 7 with powershell.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", "known_false_positives": "Other tools can import the same DLLs. These tools should be part of a whitelist. False positives may be present with any process that authenticates or uses credentials, PowerShell included. Filter based on parent process.", "references": ["https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "Detect Zerologon Attack", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Windows", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A process, $Image$, has loaded $ImageLoaded$ that are typically related to credential dumping on $Computer$. Review for further details.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "ImageLoaded", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Other"]}, {"name": "Image", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "ImageLoaded", "ProcessId", "Computer", "Image"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["LSASS Memory", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Whitefly", "Blue Mockingbird", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Leviathan", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Stolen Pencil", "APT32", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "PLATINUM", "FIN8", "BRONZE BUTLER", "OilRig", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT28", "APT1", "Ke3chang", "Cleaver", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Renamed PSExec", "id": "683e6196-b8e8-11eb-9a79-acde48001122", "version": 3, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies renamed instances of `PsExec.exe` being utilized on an endpoint. Most instances, it is highly probable to capture `Psexec.exe` or other SysInternal utility usage with the command-line argument of `-accepteula`. During triage, validate this is the legitimate version of `PsExec` by reviewing the PE metadata. In addition, review parallel processes for further suspicious behavior.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_psexec` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_renamed_psexec_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives should be present. It is possible some third party applications may use older versions of PsExec, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1569.002/T1569.002.yaml", "https://redcanary.com/blog/threat-hunting-psexec-lateral-movement/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "HAFNIUM Group", "DarkSide Ransomware", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1569.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Lateral Movement", "Execution"], "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1569", "T1569.002"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 27, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Services", "Service Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "APT41", "Silence", "FIN6", "APT32", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=psexec.exe OR Processes.process_name=psexec64.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=psexec.c)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_psexec"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_renamed_psexec_filter"}]}, {"name": "BITSAdmin Download File", "id": "80630ff4-8e4c-11eb-aab5-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service utility `bitsadmin.exe` using the `transfer` parameter to download a remote object. In addition, look for `download` or `upload` on the command-line, the switches are not required to perform a transfer. Capture any files downloaded. Review the reputation of the IP or domain used. Typically once executed, a follow on command will be used to execute the dropped file. Note that the network connection or file modification events related will not spawn or create from `bitsadmin.exe`, but the artifacts will appear in a parallel process of `svchost.exe` with a command-line similar to `svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s BITS`. It's important to review all parallel and child processes to capture any behaviors and artifacts. In some suspicious and malicious instances, BITS jobs will be created. You can use `bitsadmin /list /verbose` to list out the jobs during investigation.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_bitsadmin` Processes.process=*transfer* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `bitsadmin_download_file_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives, however it may be required to filter based on parent process name or network connection.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/8eb52117b748d378325f7719554a896e37bccec7/atomics/T1105/T1105.md#atomic-test-9---windows---bitsadmin-bits-download", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/bc705cb7aaa5f26f2d96585fac8e4c7052df0ff9/atomics/T1197/T1197.md", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/bits/bitsadmin-tool", "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ingress Tool Transfer", "BITS Jobs", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1197/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to download a file.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1197", "T1105"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["BITS Jobs", "Ingress Tool Transfer"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Patchwork", "APT41", "Leviathan", "Sandworm Team", "Whitefly", "Rocke", "APT39", "Tropic Trooper", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Frankenstein", "Silence", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "APT33", "MuddyWater", "APT18", "APT38", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "OilRig", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT37", "FIN8", "PLATINUM", "Leviathan", "Elderwood", "Magic Hound", "APT3", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Patchwork", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-3390", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=bitsadmin.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=bitsadmin.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_bitsadmin"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "bitsadmin_download_file_filter"}]}, {"name": "CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass", "id": "f87b5062-b405-11eb-a889-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-13", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic detects a potential process using COM Object like CMLUA or CMSTPLUA to bypass UAC. This technique has been used by ransomware adversaries to gain administrative privileges to its running process.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\CMLUA.dll\", \"*\\\\CMSTPLUA.dll\", \"*\\\\CMLUAUTIL.dll\") NOT(process_name IN(\"CMSTP.exe\", \"CMMGR32.exe\")) NOT(Image IN(\"*\\\\windows\\\\*\", \"*\\\\program files*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name Computer EventCode Signed ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate windows application that are not on the list loading this dll. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/003/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/darkside_cmstp_com/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The following module $ImageLoaded$ was loaded by a non-standard application on endpoint $Computer$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "ImageLoaded", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Image", "ImageLoaded", "process_name", "Computer", "EventCode", "Signed", "ProcessId"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "CMSTP"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Cobalt Group", "MuddyWater"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass_filter"}]}, {"name": "SLUI Spawning a Process", "id": "879c4330-b3e0-11eb-b1b1-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-13", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the Microsoft Software Licensing User Interface Tool, `slui.exe`, spawning a child process. This behavior is associated with publicly known UAC bypass. `slui.exe` is commonly associated with software updates and is most often spawned by `svchost.exe`. The `slui.exe` process should not have child processes, and any processes spawning from it will be running with elevated privileges. During triage, review the child process and additional parallel processes. Identify any file modifications that may have lead to the bypass.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=slui.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `slui_spawning_a_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Certain applications may spawn from `slui.exe` that are legitimate. Filtering will be needed to ensure proper monitoring.", "references": ["https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/46998", "https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/windows/local/bypassuac_sluihijack/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Privilege Escalation"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/slui/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A slui process $parent_process_name$ spawning child process $process_name$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Bypass User Access Control", "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "MuddyWater", "Honeybee", "Cobalt Group", "Threat Group-3390", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Patchwork", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "slui_spawning_a_process_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", "id": "6380ebbb-55c5-4fce-b754-01fd565fb73c", "version": 1, "date": "2020-06-04", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "description": "Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity. ", "narrative": "It is important to monitor and control who has access to your cloud infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any compute activity whether legitimate or otherwise.\\\nThis Analytic Story has data model versions of cloud searches leveraging Authentication data, including those looking for suspicious login activity, and cross-account activity for AWS.", "references": ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", "category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1535"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", "id": "67bd3def-c41c-4bf6-837b-ae196b4257c6", "version": 1, "date": "2020-10-07", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Authentication"], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | table firstTime lastTime user Country | join user type=outer [| inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) AS earliestseen by user Country | fields earliestseen user Country] | eval userCountry=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\"), \"New Country\",\"Previously Seen Country\") | eval userStatus=if(earliestseen >= relative_time(now(),\"-24h@h\") OR isnull(earliestseen), \"New User\",\"Old User\") | where userCountry = \"New Country\" AND userStatus != \"Old User\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime lastTime user Country userStatus userCountry | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter` macro.", "known_false_positives": "When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities", "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user$ is logging into the AWS console from Country $Country$ for the first time", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Authentication.signature", "Authentication.user", "Authentication.src"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A table of users seen doing console logins, and the first and last time that the activity was observed", "collection": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", "name": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", "fields_list": "_key, firstTime, lastTime, user, src, City, Region, Country"}]}, {"name": "Detect AWS Console Login by New User", "id": "bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd71", "version": 1, "date": "2020-05-28", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Authentication"], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | join user type=outer [ inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) as earliestseen by user] | eval userStatus=if(earliestseen >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") OR isnull(earliestseen), \"First Time Logging into AWS Console\", \"Previously Seen User\") | where userStatus=\"First Time Logging into AWS Console\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines.", "known_false_positives": "When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user$ is logging into the AWS console for the first time", "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Authentication.signature", "Authentication.user"], "risk_score": 30, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A table of users seen doing console logins, and the first and last time that the activity was observed", "collection": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", "name": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", "fields_list": "_key, firstTime, lastTime, user, src, City, Region, Country"}]}, {"name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", "id": "9f31aa8e-e37c-46bc-bce1-8b3be646d026", "version": 1, "date": "2020-10-07", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Authentication"], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | table firstTime lastTime user Region | join user type=outer [| inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) AS earliestseen by user Region | fields earliestseen user Region] | eval userRegion=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\"), \"New Region\",\"Previously Seen Region\") | eval userStatus=if(earliestseen >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") OR isnull(earliestseen), \"New User\",\"Old User\") | where userRegion = \"New Region\" AND userStatus != \"Old User\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime lastTime user Region userStatus userRegion | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter` macro.", "known_false_positives": "When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities", "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user$ is logging into the AWS console from Region $Region$ for the first time", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Authentication.signature", "Authentication.user", "Authentication.src"], "risk_score": 36, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A table of users seen doing console logins, and the first and last time that the activity was observed", "collection": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", "name": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", "fields_list": "_key, firstTime, lastTime, user, src, City, Region, Country"}]}, {"name": "AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account", "id": "21193641-cb96-4a2c-a707-d9b9a7f7792b", "version": 1, "date": "2020-05-28", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Authentication"], "description": "This search looks for AssumeRole events where an IAM role in a different account is requested for the first time.", "search": "| tstats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=AssumeRole by Authentication.vendor_account Authentication.user Authentication.src Authentication.user_role | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | rex field=user_role \"arn:aws:sts:*:(?.*):\" | where vendor_account != dest_account | rename vendor_account as requestingAccountId dest_account as requestedAccountId | lookup previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity requestingAccountId, requestedAccountId, OUTPUTNEW firstTime | eval status = if(firstTime > relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\"),\"New Cross Account Activity\",\"Previously Seen\") | where status = \"New Cross Account Activity\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account_filter` macro.", "known_false_positives": "Using multiple AWS accounts and roles is perfectly valid behavior. It's suspicious when an account requests privileges of an account it hasn't before. You should validate with the account owner that this is a legitimate request.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "AWS account $requestingAccountId$ is trying to access resource from some other account $requestedAccountId$, for the first time.", "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.DS", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "requestingAccountId", "type": "Other", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "requestedAccountId", "type": "Other", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Authentication.signature", "Authentication.vendor_account", "Authentication.user", "Authentication.user_role", "Authentication.src"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A placeholder for a list of AWS accounts and assumed roles", "filename": "previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.csv", "name": "previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.csv"}]}, {"name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", "id": "121b0b11-f8ac-4ed6-a132-3800ca4fc07a", "version": 1, "date": "2020-10-07", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Authentication"], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | table firstTime lastTime user City | join user type=outer [| inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) AS earliestseen by user City | fields earliestseen user City] | eval userCity=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\"), \"New City\",\"Previously Seen City\") | eval userStatus=if(earliestseen >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") OR isnull(earliestseen), \"New User\",\"Old User\") | where userCity = \"New City\" AND userStatus != \"Old User\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime lastTime user City userStatus userCity | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter` macro.", "known_false_positives": "When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities", "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user$ is logging into the AWS console from City $City$ for the first time", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Authentication.signature", "Authentication.user", "Authentication.src"], "risk_score": 18, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A table of users seen doing console logins, and the first and last time that the activity was observed", "collection": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", "name": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", "fields_list": "_key, firstTime, lastTime, user, src, City, Region, Country"}]}]}, {"name": "Command and Control", "id": "943773c6-c4de-4f38-89a8-0b92f98804d8", "version": 1, "date": "2018-06-01", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "description": "Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged by attackers to establish and operate command and control channels. Implants installed by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions and send data back to the malicious operators.", "narrative": "Threat actors typically architect and implement an infrastructure to use in various ways during the course of their attack campaigns. In some cases, they leverage this infrastructure for scanning and performing reconnaissance activities. In others, they may use this infrastructure to launch actual attacks. One of the most important functions of this infrastructure is to establish servers that will communicate with implants on compromised endpoints. These servers establish a command and control channel that is used to proxy data between the compromised endpoint and the attacker. These channels relay commands from the attacker to the compromised endpoint and the output of those commands back to the attacker.\\\nBecause this communication is so critical for an adversary, they often use techniques designed to hide the true nature of the communications. There are many different techniques used to establish and communicate over these channels. This Analytic Story provides searches that look for a variety of the techniques used for these channels, as well as indications that these channels are active, by examining logs associated with border control devices and network-access control lists.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Command_and_Control", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Command-and-control-servers-The-puppet-masters-that-govern-malware"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Command and Control", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1095", "T1071.001", "T1071", "T1071.004", "T1189", "T1048", "T1048.003"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["DNS", "Drive-by Compromise", "Non-Application Layer Protocol", "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", "Application Layer Protocol", "Web Protocols"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control", "Exfiltration", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390", "Magic Hound", "Sandworm Team", "Inception", "Rancor", "Stealth Falcon", "Tropic Trooper", "Dark Caracal", "PLATINUM", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN8", "Ke3chang", "Turla", "APT39", "APT29", "Gamaredon Group", "Rocke", "RTM", "TA505", "Cobalt Group", "APT32", "APT19", "APT37", "WIRTE", "Darkhotel", "APT41", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "Thrip", "Wizard Spider", "APT3", "Machete", "Leafminer", "APT18", "no", "APT38", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork", "FIN4", "Elderwood", "APT28", "APT33", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Windshift", "FIN7", "SilverTerrier", "Night Dragon", "Orangeworm"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App", "id": "2452e632-9e0d-11eb-bacd-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-15", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. This technique are seen in couple of malware and APT group to exfiltrated collected data in a infected machine or infected network. This detection is looking for unique use of nslookup where it tries to use specific record type, TXT, A, AAAA, that are commonly used by attacker and also the retry parameter which is designed to query C2 DNS multiple tries.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"nslookup.exe\" Processes.process = \"*-querytype=*\" OR Processes.process=\"*-qt=*\" OR Processes.process=\"*-q=*\" OR Processes.process=\"-type=*\" OR Processes.process=\"*-retry=*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of nslookup.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "admin nslookup usage", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7_spear_phishing.html", "https://www.varonis.com/blog/dns-tunneling/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Dynamic DNS", "Command and Control", "Data Exfiltration"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/nslookup_exfil/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ performing activity related to DNS exfiltration.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1048"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app_filter"}]}, {"name": "DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App", "id": "2452e632-9e0d-11eb-34ba-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-07", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "This search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. This technique are seen in couple of malware and APT group to exfiltrated collected data in a infected machine or infected network. This detection is looking for unique use of nslookup where it tries to use specific record type, TXT, A, AAAA, that are commonly used by attacker and also the retry parameter which is designed to query C2 DNS multiple tries.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where \"Endpoint_Processes\" IN(_datamodels) | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null), process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_path\"), \"string\", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND process_name IS NOT NULL AND process_name=\"nslookup.exe\" AND (like (cmd_line, \"%-querytype=%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%-qt=%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%-q=%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%-type=%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%-retry=%\")) | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null)) | eval body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line, \"process_name\", process_name, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process_name, \"process_path\", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint_Processess` datamodel.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible for some legitimate administrative utilities to use similar cmd_line parameters. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7_spear_phishing.html", "https://www.varonis.com/blog/dns-tunneling/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Dynamic DNS", "Command and Control", "Data Exfiltration"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/nslookup_exfil/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ performing activity related to DNS exfiltration.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1048"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest_device_id", "process_name", "parent_process_name", "process_path", "dest_user_id", "process", "cmd_line"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app_filter"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App", "id": "0a69fdaa-a2b8-11eb-b16d-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-21", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. This technique are seen in couple of malware and APT group to exfiltrated collected data in a infected machine or infected network. This detection is looking for unique use of nslookup where it tries to use specific record type (TXT, A, AAAA) that are commonly used by attacker and also the retry parameter which is designed to query C2 DNS multiple tries.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode = 1 process_name = \"nslookup.exe\" | bucket _time span=15m | stats count as numNsLookup by Computer, _time | eventstats avg(numNsLookup) as avgNsLookup, stdev(numNsLookup) as stdNsLookup, count as numSlots by Computer | eval upperThreshold=(avgNsLookup + stdNsLookup *3) | eval isOutlier=if(avgNsLookup > 20 and avgNsLookup >= upperThreshold, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of nslookup.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7_spear_phishing.html", "https://www.varonis.com/blog/dns-tunneling/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Dynamic DNS", "Command and Control", "Data Exfiltration"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Scope:Local", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/nslookup_exfil/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Excessive usage of nslookup.exe has been detected on $Computer$. This detection is triggered as as it violates the dynamic threshold", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1048"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Computer", "process_name", "EventCode"], "risk_score": 28, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app_filter"}]}, {"name": "Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic", "id": "4477f3ea-a28f-11eb-b762-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-21", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search is designed to detect high frequency of archive files data exfiltration through HTTP POST method protocol. This are one of the common techniques used by APT or trojan spy after doing the data collection like screenshot, recording, sensitive data to the infected machines. The attacker may execute archiving command to the collected data, save it a temp folder with a hidden attribute then send it to its C2 through HTTP POST. Sometimes adversaries will rename the archive files or encode/encrypt to cover their tracks. This detection can detect a renamed archive files transfer to HTTP POST since it checks the request body header. Unfortunately this detection cannot support archive that was encrypted or encoded before doing the exfiltration.", "search": "`stream_http` http_method=POST |eval archive_hdr1=substr(form_data,1,2) | eval archive_hdr2 = substr(form_data,1,4) |stats values(form_data) as http_request_body min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by http_method http_user_agent uri_path url bytes_in bytes_out archive_hdr1 archive_hdr2 |where count >20 AND (archive_hdr1 = \"7z\" OR archive_hdr1 = \"PK\" OR archive_hdr2=\"Rar!\") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the stream HTTP logs or network logs that catch network traffic. Make sure that the http-request-body, payload, or request field is enabled in stream http configuration.", "known_false_positives": "Normal archive transfer via HTTP protocol may trip this detection.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/001/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/apt39-iranian-cyber-espionage-group-focused-on-personal-information.html", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Command and Control", "Data Exfiltration"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/archive_http_post/stream_http_events.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "message": "A http post $http_method$ sending packet with possible archive bytes header 4form_data$ in uri path $uri_path$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1048.003", "T1048"], "observable": [{"name": "uri_path", "type": "UriPath", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "form_data", "type": "formdata", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "http_method", "http_user_agent", "uri_path", "url", "bytes_in", "bytes_out", "archive_hdr1", "archive_hdr2", "form_data"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration", "Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "Thrip", "FIN8", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=stream:http", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "stream_http"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers", "id": "c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6v5464g9f", "version": 3, "date": "2021-01-14", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Resolution"], "description": "Malicious actors often abuse legitimate Dynamic DNS services to host malicious payloads or interactive command and control nodes. Attackers will automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to countless IP addresses to circumvent firewall blocks, block lists as well as frustrate a network defenders analytic and investigative processes. This search will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.answer) as answer min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query host | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `dynamic_dns_providers` | `detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter`", "how_to_implement": "First, you'll need to ingest data from your DNS operations. This can be done by ingesting logs from your server or data, collected passively by Splunk Stream or a similar solution. Specifically, data that contains the domain that is being queried and the IP of the host originating the request must be populating the `Network_Resolution` data model. This search also leverages a lookup file, `dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv`, which contains a non-exhaustive list of Dynamic DNS providers. Please consider updating the local lookup periodically by adding new domains to the list of `dynamic_dns_providers_local.csv`.\\\nThis search produces fields (query, answer, isDynDNS) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable event. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review. Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** DNS Query, **Field:** query\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** DNS Answer, **Field:** answer\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** IsDynamicDNS, **Field:** isDynDNS\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", "known_false_positives": "Some users and applications may leverage Dynamic DNS to reach out to some domains on the Internet since dynamic DNS by itself is not malicious, however this activity must be verified.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Data Protection", "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "DNS Hijacking", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Dynamic DNS", "Command and Control"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Initial Access"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1189/dyn_dns_site/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A dns query $query$ from your infra connecting to suspicious domain in host $host$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1189"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "host", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "query", "type": "dnsquery", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "DNS.answer", "DNS.query", "host"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Drive-by Compromise"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Turla", "Windshift", "RTM", "Darkhotel", "APT38", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Leafminer", "Dark Caracal", "APT19", "APT32", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-3390", "Elderwood", "APT37", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_default dynamic_dns_domains as query OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_default | lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_local dynamic_dns_domains as query OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_local| eval isDynDNS = coalesce(isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local)|fields - isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local| search isDynDNS=True", "description": "This macro limits the output of the query field to dynamic dns domains. It looks up the domains in a file provided by Splunk and one intended to be updated by the end user.", "name": "dynamic_dns_providers", "lookups": [{"case_sensitive_match": "false", "description": "A list of dynammic dns providers that should not be modified", "filename": "dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(dynamic_dns_domains)", "name": "dynamic_dns_providers_default", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv"}, {"case_sensitive_match": "false", "description": "A list of dynammic dns providers that can be modified", "filename": "dynamic_dns_providers_local.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(dynamic_dns_domains)", "name": "dynamic_dns_providers_local", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/dynamic_dns_providers_local.csv"}]}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter"}]}, {"name": "Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data", "id": "e2b36208-a364-11eb-8909-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-22", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search is to detect potential plain HTTP POST method data exfiltration. This network traffic is commonly used by trickbot, trojanspy, keylogger or APT adversary where arguments or commands are sent in plain text to the remote C2 server using HTTP POST method as part of data exfiltration.", "search": "`stream_http` http_method=POST form_data IN (\"*wermgr.exe*\",\"*svchost.exe*\", \"*name=\\\"proclist\\\"*\",\"*ipconfig*\", \"*name=\\\"sysinfo\\\"*\", \"*net view*\") |stats values(form_data) as http_request_body min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by http_method http_user_agent uri_path url bytes_in bytes_out | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the stream HTTP logs or network logs that catch network traffic. Make sure that the http-request-body, payload, or request field is enabled.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/03/trickbot-primer.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Command and Control", "Data Exfiltration"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/plain_exfil_data/stream_http_events.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "message": "A http post $http_method$ sending packet with plain text of information $form_data$ in uri path $uri_path$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1048.003", "T1048"], "observable": [{"name": "uri_path", "type": "UriPath", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "form_data", "type": "formdata", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "http_method", "http_user_agent", "uri_path", "url", "bytes_in", "bytes_out"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration", "Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "Thrip", "FIN8", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=stream:http", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "stream_http"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data_filter"}]}, {"name": "DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation", "id": "1a67f15a-f4ff-4170-84e9-08cf6f75d6f5", "version": 4, "date": "2021-10-06", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Network_Resolution"], "description": "This search allows you to identify DNS requests and compute the standard deviation on the length of the names being resolved, then filter on two times the standard deviation to show you those queries that are unusually large for your environment.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where NOT DNS.message_type IN(\"Pointer\",\"PTR\") by DNS.query | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | eval tlds=split(query,\".\") | eval tld=mvindex(tlds,-1) | eval tld_len=len(tld) | search tld_len<=24 | eval query_length = len(query) | table query query_length record_type count | eventstats stdev(query_length) AS stdev avg(query_length) AS avg p50(query_length) AS p50| where query_length>(avg+stdev*2) | eval z_score=(query_length-avg)/stdev | `dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model.", "known_false_positives": "It's possible there can be long domain names that are legitimate.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Hidden Cobra Malware", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Command and Control"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/long_dns_queries/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "message": "A dns query $query$ with 2 time standard deviation of name len of the dns query in host $host$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1048.003", "T1048"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "host", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "query", "type": "dnsquery", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "DNS.query"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration", "Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "Thrip", "FIN8", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation_filter"}]}, {"name": "DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK", "id": "85fbcfe8-9718-4911-adf6-7000d077a3a9", "version": 2, "date": "2020-01-22", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Network_Resolution"], "description": "This search allows you to identify DNS requests that are unusually large for the record type being requested in your environment.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as start_time max(_time) as end_time values(DNS.src) as src values(DNS.dest) as dest from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query DNS.record_type | search DNS.record_type=* | `drop_dm_object_name(DNS)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | eval query_length = len(query) | apply dns_query_pdfmodel threshold=0.01 | rename \"IsOutlier(query_length)\" as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | sort -query_length | table start_time end_time query record_type count src dest query_length | `dns_query_length_outliers___mltk_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. In addition, the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or greater must be installed on your search heads, along with any required dependencies. Finally, the support search \"Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK\" must be executed before this detection search, because it builds a machine-learning (ML) model over the historical data used by this search. It is important that this search is run in the same app context as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild the model with the latest data available in your environment.\\\nThis search produces fields (`query`,`query_length`,`count`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** DNS Query, **Field:** query\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** DNS Query Length, **Field:** query_length\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** Number of events, **Field:** count\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", "known_false_positives": "If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider reducing the value for threshold in the search. You should also periodically re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Hidden Cobra Malware", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Command and Control"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1071.004", "T1071"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "DNS.src", "DNS.dest", "DNS.query", "DNS.record_type"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["DNS", "Application Layer Protocol"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control", "Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT39", "Tropic Trooper", "OilRig", "Ke3chang", "Cobalt Group", "APT18", "APT41", "FIN7", "Rocke", "Magic Hound", "Dragonfly 2.0"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "dns_query_length_outliers___mltk_filter"}]}, {"name": "Excessive DNS Failures", "id": "104658f4-afdc-499e-9719-17243f9826f1", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Network_Resolution"], "description": "This search identifies DNS query failures by counting the number of DNS responses that do not indicate success, and trigger on more than 50 occurrences.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(\"DNS.query\") as queries from datamodel=Network_Resolution where nodename=DNS \"DNS.reply_code\"!=\"No Error\" \"DNS.reply_code\"!=\"NoError\" DNS.reply_code!=\"unknown\" NOT \"DNS.query\"=\"*.arpa\" \"DNS.query\"=\"*.*\" by \"DNS.src\",\"DNS.query\"| `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")`| lookup cim_corporate_web_domain_lookup domain as query OUTPUT domain| where isnull(domain)| lookup update=true alexa_lookup_by_str domain as query OUTPUT rank| where isnull(rank)| stats sum(count) as count mode(queries) as queries by src| `get_asset(src)`| where count>50 | `excessive_dns_failures_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible legitimate traffic can trigger this rule. Please investigate as appropriate. The threshold for generating an event can also be customized to better suit your environment.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Command and Control"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1071.004", "T1071"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "DNS.query", "DNS.reply_code", "DNS.src"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["DNS", "Application Layer Protocol"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control", "Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT39", "Tropic Trooper", "OilRig", "Ke3chang", "Cobalt Group", "APT18", "APT41", "FIN7", "Rocke", "Magic Hound", "Dragonfly 2.0"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "excessive_dns_failures_filter"}]}, {"name": "Protocol or Port Mismatch", "id": "54dc1265-2f74-4b6d-b30d-49eb506a31b3", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search looks for network traffic on common ports where a higher layer protocol does not match the port that is being used. For example, this search should identify cases where protocols other than HTTP are running on TCP port 80. This can be used by attackers to circumvent firewall restrictions, or as an attempt to hide malicious communications over ports and protocols that are typically allowed and not well inspected.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where (All_Traffic.app=dns NOT All_Traffic.dest_port=53) OR ((All_Traffic.app=web-browsing OR All_Traffic.app=http) NOT (All_Traffic.dest_port=80 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=8080 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=8000)) OR (All_Traffic.app=ssl NOT (All_Traffic.dest_port=443 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=8443)) OR (All_Traffic.app=smtp NOT All_Traffic.dest_port=25) by All_Traffic.src_ip, All_Traffic.dest_ip, All_Traffic.app, All_Traffic.dest_port |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `protocol_or_port_mismatch_filter`", "how_to_implement": "Running this search properly requires a technology that can inspect network traffic and identify common protocols. Technologies such as Bro and Palo Alto Networks firewalls are two examples that will identify protocols via inspection, and not just assume a specific protocol based on the transport protocol and ports.", "known_false_positives": "None identified", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Command and Control"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1048.003", "T1048"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.app", "All_Traffic.dest_port", "All_Traffic.src_ip", "All_Traffic.dest_ip"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration", "Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "Thrip", "FIN8", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "protocol_or_port_mismatch_filter"}]}, {"name": "TOR Traffic", "id": "ea688274-9c06-4473-b951-e4cb7a5d7a45", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-22", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search looks for network traffic identified as The Onion Router (TOR), a benign anonymity network which can be abused for a variety of nefarious purposes.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.app=tor AND All_Traffic.action=allowed by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip All_Traffic.dest_port All_Traffic.action | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `tor_traffic_filter`", "how_to_implement": "In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from firewalls or other network control devices that mediate the traffic allowed into an environment. This is necessary so that the search can identify an 'action' taken on the traffic of interest. The search requires the Network_Traffic data model be populated.", "known_false_positives": "None at this time", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Ransomware", "Command and Control", "NOBELIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1071", "T1071.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.app", "All_Traffic.action", "All_Traffic.src_ip", "All_Traffic.dest_ip", "All_Traffic.dest_port"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Application Layer Protocol", "Web Protocols"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control", "Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Rocke", "Magic Hound", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "Rocke", "APT39", "Tropic Trooper", "MuddyWater", "Wizard Spider", "Inception", "APT41", "SilverTerrier", "Machete", "APT28", "WIRTE", "APT33", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "APT18", "APT38", "Cobalt Group", "APT19", "Threat Group-3390", "Rancor", "Orangeworm", "APT37", "Ke3chang", "Dark Caracal", "Turla", "Lazarus Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "OilRig", "Magic Hound", "Gamaredon Group", "Stealth Falcon"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "tor_traffic_filter"}]}, {"name": "Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed", "id": "ce5a0962-849f-4720-a678-753fe6674479", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search looks for network traffic defined by port and transport layer protocol in the Enterprise Security lookup table \"lookup_interesting_ports\", that is marked as prohibited, and has an associated 'allow' action in the Network_Traffic data model. This could be indicative of a misconfigured network device.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.action = allowed by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip All_Traffic.dest_port All_Traffic.action | lookup update=true interesting_ports_lookup dest_port as All_Traffic.dest_port OUTPUT app is_prohibited note transport | search is_prohibited=true | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `prohibited_network_traffic_allowed_filter`", "how_to_implement": "In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from firewalls or other network control devices that mediate the traffic allowed into an environment. This is necessary so that the search can identify an 'action' taken on the traffic of interest. The search requires the Network_Traffic data model be populated.", "known_false_positives": "None identified", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Ransomware", "Command and Control"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1048"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.action", "All_Traffic.src_ip", "All_Traffic.dest_ip", "All_Traffic.dest_port"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "prohibited_network_traffic_allowed_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets", "id": "e9c102de-4d43-42a7-b1c8-8062ea297419", "version": 2, "date": "2018-06-01", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search looks for outbound ICMP packets with a packet size larger than 1,000 bytes. Various threat actors have been known to use ICMP as a command and control channel for their attack infrastructure. Large ICMP packets from an endpoint to a remote host may be indicative of this activity.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Traffic.action) values(All_Traffic.bytes) from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.action !=blocked All_Traffic.dest_category !=internal (All_Traffic.protocol=icmp OR All_Traffic.transport=icmp) All_Traffic.bytes > 1000 by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | search ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets_filter`", "how_to_implement": "In order to run this search effectively, we highly recommend that you leverage the Assets and Identity framework. It is important that you have a good understanding of how your network segments are designed and that you are able to distinguish internal from external address space. Add a category named `internal` to the CIDRs that host the company's assets in the `assets_by_cidr.csv` lookup file, which is located in `$SPLUNK_HOME/etc/apps/SA-IdentityManagement/lookups/`. More information on updating this lookup can be found here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.0.0/Admin/Addassetandidentitydata. This search also requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model", "known_false_positives": "ICMP packets are used in a variety of ways to help troubleshoot networking issues and ensure the proper flow of traffic. As such, it is possible that a large ICMP packet could be perfectly legitimate. If large ICMP packets are associated with command and control traffic, there will typically be a large number of these packets observed over time. If the search is providing a large number of false positives, you can modify the macro `detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets_filter` to adjust the byte threshold or add specific IP addresses to an allow list.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Command and Control"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1095"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.action", "All_Traffic.bytes", "All_Traffic.dest_category", "All_Traffic.protocol", "All_Traffic.transport", "All_Traffic.src_ip", "All_Traffic.dest_ip"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Non-Application Layer Protocol"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "PLATINUM", "APT3"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS", "id": "ada0f278-84a8-46w1-a3f1-w32372d4bd53", "version": 1, "date": "2018-05-07", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search will detect spike in blocked outbound network connections originating from within your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data.", "search": "`cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow` action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR src_ip=192.168.0.0/16) ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16) [search `cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow` action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR src_ip=192.168.0.0/16) ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16) | stats count as numberOfBlockedConnections by src_ip | inputlookup baseline_blocked_outbound_connections append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) as * by src_ip | rename numberOfBlockedConnections as latestCount | eval newAvgBlockedConnections=avgBlockedConnections + (latestCount-avgBlockedConnections)/720 | eval newStdevBlockedConnections=sqrt(((pow(stdevBlockedConnections, 2)*719 + (latestCount-newAvgBlockedConnections)*(latestCount-avgBlockedConnections))/720)) | eval avgBlockedConnections=coalesce(newAvgBlockedConnections, avgBlockedConnections), stdevBlockedConnections=coalesce(newStdevBlockedConnections, stdevBlockedConnections), numDataPoints=if(isnull(latestCount), numDataPoints, numDataPoints+1) | table src_ip, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgBlockedConnections, stdevBlockedConnections | outputlookup baseline_blocked_outbound_connections | eval dataPointThreshold = 5, deviationThreshold = 3 | eval isSpike=if((latestCount > avgBlockedConnections+deviationThreshold*stdevBlockedConnections) AND numDataPoints > dataPointThreshold, 1, 0) | where isSpike=1 | table src_ip] | stats values(dest_ip) as \"Blocked Destination IPs\", values(interface_id) as \"resourceId\" count as numberOfBlockedConnections, dc(dest_ip) as uniqueDestConnections by src_ip | `detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your VPC Flow logs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the number of data points required to meet the definition of \"spike.\" The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best when you run the \"Baseline of Blocked Outbound Connection\" support search once to create a history of previously seen blocked outbound connections.", "known_false_positives": "The false-positive rate may vary based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`. Additionally, false positives may result when AWS administrators roll out policies enforcing network blocks, causing sudden increases in the number of blocked outbound connections.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS Network ACL Activity", "Suspicious AWS Traffic", "Command and Control"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "action", "src_ip", "dest_ip"], "risk_object": "src_ip", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 20, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudwatchlogs:vpcflow", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A lookup file that will contain the baseline information for number of blocked outbound connections", "filename": "baseline_blocked_outbound_connections.csv", "name": "baseline_blocked_outbound_connections", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/baseline_blocked_outbound_connections.csv"}, {"description": "A lookup file that will contain the baseline information for number of blocked outbound connections", "filename": "baseline_blocked_outbound_connections.csv", "name": "baseline_blocked_outbound_connections", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/baseline_blocked_outbound_connections.csv"}]}]}, {"name": "Ryuk Ransomware", "id": "507edc74-13d5-4339-878e-b9744ded1f35", "version": 1, "date": "2020-11-06", "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Ryuk ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Ryuk, Stopping Security Access Manager, DisableAntiSpyware registry key modification, suspicious psexec use, and more.", "narrative": "Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released Alert (AA20-302A) on October 28th called \u201cRansomware Activity Targeting the Healthcare and Public Health Sector.\u201d This alert details TTPs associated with ongoing and possible imminent attacks against the Healthcare sector, and is a joint advisory in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies. The objective of these malicious campaigns is to infiltrate targets in named sectors and to drop ransomware payloads, which will likely cause disruption of service and increase risk of actual harm to the health and safety of patients at hospitals, even with the aggravant of an ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. This document specifically refers to several crimeware exploitation frameworks, emphasizing the use of Ryuk ransomware as payload. The Ryuk ransomware payload is not new. It has been well documented and identified in multiple variants. Payloads need a carrier, and for Ryuk it has often been exploitation frameworks such as Cobalt Strike, or popular crimeware frameworks such as Emotet or Trickbot.", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-ryuk-using-splunk-attack-range.html", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-302a"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Ryuk Ransomware", "category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1021.001", "T1562", "T1489", "T1021", "T1059", "T1482", "T1485", "T1486", "T1490", "T1053", "T1059.003", "T1053.005"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Scheduled Task/Job", "Domain Trust Discovery", "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "Remote Desktop Protocol", "Remote Services", "Data Encrypted for Impact", "Service Stop", "Disable or Modify Tools", "Windows Command Shell", "Inhibit System Recovery", "Scheduled Task", "Impair Defenses", "Data Destruction"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Impact", "Discovery", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Execution", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "Rancor", "Putter Panda", "Magic Hound", "Axiom", "APT1", "Tropic Trooper", "Kimsuky", "Dark Caracal", "TEMP.Veles", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN8", "APT29", "Turla", "APT39", "Molerats", "Gamaredon Group", "Rocke", "Ke3chang", "Leviathan", "TA505", "Whitefly", "Frankenstein", "Cobalt Group", "Stolen Pencil", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "APT-C-36", "APT19", "APT37", "Darkhotel", "APT41", "FIN5", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Blue Mockingbird", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "admin@338", "Honeybee", "APT3", "Wizard Spider", "Machete", "Sowbug", "APT18", "no", "Threat Group-1314", "APT38", "MuddyWater", "FIN10", "Patchwork", "APT28", "APT33", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN7", "Gorgon Group", "Night Dragon"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "NLTest Domain Trust Discovery", "id": "c3e05466-5f22-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-25", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for the execution of `nltest.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for Domain Trust information. Two arguments `/domain trusts`, returns a list of trusted domains, and `/all_trusts`, returns all trusted domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike use NLTest.exe to enumerate the current domain to assist with further understanding where to pivot next.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=nltest.exe OR Processes.process_name!=nltest.exe) (Processes.process=*/domain_trusts* OR Processes.process=*/all_trusts*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `nltest_domain_trust_discovery_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may use nltest for troubleshooting purposes, otherwise, rarely used.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1482/T1482.md", "https://malware.news/t/lets-learn-trickbot-implements-network-collector-module-leveraging-cmd-wmi-ldap/19104", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482/", "https://www.owasp.org/images/4/4b/Red_Team_Operating_in_a_Modern_Environment.pdf", "https://ss64.com/nt/nltest.html", "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/domain-trust-discovery/", "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/08/ryuks-return/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware", "Domain Trust Discovery", "IcedID", "Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Domain trust discovery execution on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1482"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Domain Trust Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "nltest_domain_trust_discovery_filter"}]}, {"name": "WBAdmin Delete System Backups", "id": "71efbf52-4dbb-4c00-a520-306aa546cbb7", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-07", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "This search looks for flags passed to wbadmin.exe (Windows Backup Administrator Tool) that delete backup files. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent recovery.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null)), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_path\"), \"string\", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND process_name IS NOT NULL AND process_name=\"wbadmin.exe\" AND like (cmd_line, \"%delete%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%catalog%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%systemstatebackup%\") | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null)), body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line, \"process_name\", process_name, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process_name, \"process_path\", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint_Processess` datamodel.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may modify the boot configuration.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1490/T1490.md", "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/08/ryuks-return/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wbadmin"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": [], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to delete system backups.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1490"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest_device_id", "process_name", "parent_process_name", "process_path", "dest_user_id", "process", "cmd_line"], "risk_score": 15, "risk_severity": "high", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Inhibit System Recovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "wbadmin_delete_system_backups_filter"}]}, {"name": "Ryuk Test Files Detected", "id": "57d44d70-28d9-4ed1-acf5-1c80ae2bbce3", "version": 1, "date": "2020-11-06", "author": "Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The search looks for files that contain the key word *Ryuk* under any folder in the C drive, which is consistent with Ryuk propagation.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem WHERE \"Filesystem.file_path\"=C:\\\\*Ryuk* BY \"Filesystem.dest\", \"Filesystem.user\", \"Filesystem.file_path\" | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `ryuk_test_files_detected_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Filesystem data-model object. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.", "known_false_positives": "If there are files with this keywoord as file names it might trigger false possitives, please make use of our filters to tune out potential FPs.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Impact"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ryuk/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "message": "A creation of ryuk test file $file_path$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1486"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.file_path", "Filesystem.dest", "Filesystem.user"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Data Encrypted for Impact"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "TA505", "APT38"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "ryuk_test_files_detected_filter"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", "id": "5d9c6eee-988c-11eb-8253-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-08", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed from a user writeable file path.\\\nThe search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not.\\\nschtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\\Windows\\system32` and `C:\\Windows\\syswow64`.\\\nThe following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory.\\\nUpon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or was it via TaskService. Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message | search Command IN (\"*\\\\users\\\\public\\\\*\", \"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Tasks\\\\*\", \"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Task_Name, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required.", "known_false_positives": "False positives are possible if legitimate applications are allowed to register tasks in public paths. Filter as needed based on paths that are used legitimately.", "references": ["https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/irans-apt34-returns-with-an-updated-arsenal/", "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4698", "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/scheduled-task-job/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/taskschd/time-trigger-example--scripting-?redirectedfrom=MSDN", "https://app.any.run/tasks/e26f1b2e-befa-483b-91d2-e18636e2faf3/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "IcedID", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/taskschedule/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "message": "A windows scheduled task was created (task name=$Task_Name$) on $dest$ by the following command: $Command$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Command", "type": "Command", "role": ["Target"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "Task_Name", "Description", "Command"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Scheduled Task", "Scheduled Task/Job"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "MuddyWater", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT-C-36", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT41", "Machete", "Soft Cell", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Patchwork", "OilRig", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "FIN8", "menuPass", "FIN10", "APT32", "FIN7", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path_filter"}]}, {"name": "BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification", "id": "809b31d2-5462-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 1, "date": "2020-12-21", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for flags passed to bcdedit.exe modifications to the built-in Windows error recovery boot configurations. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent recovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = bcdedit.exe Processes.process=\"*recoveryenabled*\" (Processes.process=\"* no*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. Tune based on parent process names.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may modify the boot configuration.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1490/T1490.md#atomic-test-4---windows---disable-windows-recovery-console-repair"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Impact"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting disable the ability to recover the endpoint.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1490"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Inhibit System Recovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification_filter"}]}, {"name": "WBAdmin Delete System Backups", "id": "cd5aed7e-5cea-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-22", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for flags passed to wbadmin.exe (Windows Backup Administrator Tool) that delete backup files. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent recovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wbadmin.exe Processes.process=\"*delete*\" AND (Processes.process=\"*catalog*\" OR Processes.process=\"*systemstatebackup*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `wbadmin_delete_system_backups_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. Tune based on parent process names.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may modify the boot configuration.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1490/T1490.md", "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/08/ryuks-return/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wbadmin"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "System backups deletion on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1490"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Inhibit System Recovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "wbadmin_delete_system_backups_filter"}]}, {"name": "Common Ransomware Extensions", "id": "a9e5c5db-db11-43ca-86a8-c852d1b2c0ec", "version": 4, "date": "2020-11-09", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The search looks for file modifications with extensions commonly used by Ransomware", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| rex field=file_name \"(?\\.[^\\.]+)$\" | `ransomware_extensions` | `common_ransomware_extensions_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.\\\nThis search produces fields (`query`,`query_length`,`count`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** Name, **Field:** Name\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** File Extension, **Field:** file_extension\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", "known_false_positives": "It is possible for a legitimate file with these extensions to be created. If this is a true ransomware attack, there will be a large number of files created with these extensions.", "references": [], "tags": {"Consequence": "Data Destruction", "analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/ransomware_extensions/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$, this is indicative of a known ransomware file extension and should be reviewed immediately.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1485"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "file_name", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.user", "Filesystem.dest", "Filesystem.file_path", "Filesystem.file_name"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Data Destruction"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Lazarus Group", "APT38"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "lookup update=true ransomware_extensions_lookup Extensions AS file_extension OUTPUT Name | search Name !=False", "description": "This macro limits the output to files that have extensions associated with ransomware", "name": "ransomware_extensions", "lookups": [{"default_match": "false", "description": "A list of file extensions that are associated with ransomware", "filename": "ransomware_extensions.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(Extensions)", "min_matches": 1, "name": "ransomware_extensions_lookup", "case_sensitive_match": "false", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/ransomware_extensions.csv"}]}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "common_ransomware_extensions_filter"}]}, {"name": "BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification", "id": "76d79d6e-25bb-40f6-b3b2-e0a6b7e5ea13", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-07", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "This search looks for flags passed to bcdedit.exe modifications to the built-in Windows error recovery boot configurations. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent recovery.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null)), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_path\"), \"string\", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND process_name IS NOT NULL AND process_name=\"bcdedit.exe\" AND (like (cmd_line, \"%recoveryenabled%\") AND like (cmd_line, \"%no%\")) | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null)), body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line, \"process_name\", process_name, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process_name, \"process_path\", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint_Processess` datamodel.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may modify the boot configuration.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1490/T1490.md#atomic-test-4---windows---disable-windows-recovery-console-repair"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Impact"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting disable the ability to recover the endpoint.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1490"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest_device_id", "process_name", "parent_process_name", "process_path", "dest_user_id", "process", "cmd_line"], "risk_score": 80, "risk_severity": "high", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Inhibit System Recovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification_filter"}]}, {"name": "Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry", "id": "23150a40-9301-4195-b802-5bb4f43067fb", "version": 2, "date": "2021-03-02", "author": "Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The search looks for the Registry Key DisableAntiSpyware set to disable. This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints. This particular behavior is typically executed when an ransomware actor gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. Endpoint should be isolated.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_value_name=\"DisableAntiSpyware\" AND Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000001\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_disableantispyware_registry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node.", "known_false_positives": "It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro to tune the search.", "references": ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "message": "Windows DisableAntiSpyware registry key set to 'disabled' on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_path"], "risk_score": 24, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "windows_disableantispyware_registry_filter"}]}, {"name": "Common Ransomware Notes", "id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d6bd71", "version": 4, "date": "2020-11-09", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The search looks for files created with names matching those typically used in ransomware notes that tell the victim how to get their data back.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `ransomware_notes` | `common_ransomware_notes_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Filesystem data-model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system reads and writes.", "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a legitimate file could be created with the same name used by ransomware note files.", "references": [], "tags": {"Consequence": "Data Destruction", "analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/ransomware_notes/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$, this is indicative of a known ransomware note file and should be reviewed immediately.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1485"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "file_name", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.user", "Filesystem.dest", "Filesystem.file_path", "Filesystem.file_name"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Data Destruction"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Lazarus Group", "APT38"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "lookup ransomware_notes_lookup ransomware_notes as file_name OUTPUT status as \"Known Ransomware Notes\" | search \"Known Ransomware Notes\"=True", "description": "This macro limits the output to files that have been identified as a ransomware note", "name": "ransomware_notes", "lookups": [{"default_match": "false", "description": "A list of file names that are ransomware note files", "filename": "ransomware_notes.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(ransomware_notes)", "min_matches": 1, "name": "ransomware_notes_lookup", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/ransomware_notes.csv"}]}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "common_ransomware_notes_filter"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell", "id": "203ef0ea-9bd8-11eb-8201-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed with a native Windows shell (PowerShell, Cmd, Wscript, Cscript).\\\nThe search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not.\\\nschtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\\Windows\\system32` and `C:\\Windows\\syswow64`.\\\nThe following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory.\\\nUpon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message | search Command IN (\"*powershell.exe*\", \"*wscript.exe*\", \"*cscript.exe*\", \"*cmd.exe*\", \"*sh.exe*\", \"*ksh.exe*\", \"*zsh.exe*\", \"*bash.exe*\", \"*scrcons.exe*\", \"*pwsh.exe*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Task_Name, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required.", "known_false_positives": "False positives are possible if legitimate applications are allowed to register tasks that call a shell to be spawned. Filter as needed based on command-line or processes that are used legitimately.", "references": ["https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/irans-apt34-returns-with-an-updated-arsenal/", "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4698", "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/scheduled-task-job/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/taskschd/time-trigger-example--scripting-?redirectedfrom=MSDN"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "message": "A windows scheduled task was created (task name=$Task_Name$) on $dest$ by the following command: $Command$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Command", "type": "Command", "role": ["Target"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "Task_Name", "Description", "Command"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Scheduled Task", "Scheduled Task/Job"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "MuddyWater", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT-C-36", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT41", "Machete", "Soft Cell", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Patchwork", "OilRig", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "FIN8", "menuPass", "FIN10", "APT32", "FIN7", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory", "id": "7feb7972-7ac3-11eb-bac8-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-01", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies Scheduled Tasks registering (creating a new task) a binary or script to run from a public directory which includes users\\public, \\programdata\\ and \\windows\\temp. Upon triage, review the binary or script in the command line for legitimacy, whether an approved binary/script or not. In addition, capture the binary or script in question and analyze for further behaviors. Identify the source and contain the endpoint.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe (Processes.process=*\\\\users\\\\public\\\\* OR Processes.process=*\\\\programdata\\\\* OR Processes.process=*windows\\\\temp*) Processes.process=*/create* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives may be present. Filter as needed by parent process or command line argument.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/schtasks/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "message": "Suspicious scheduled task registered on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Scheduled Task", "Scheduled Task/Job"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "MuddyWater", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT-C-36", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT41", "Machete", "Soft Cell", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Patchwork", "OilRig", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "FIN8", "menuPass", "FIN10", "APT32", "FIN7", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory_filter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Security Account Manager Stopped", "id": "69c12d59-d951-431e-ab77-ec426b8d65e6", "version": 1, "date": "2020-11-06", "author": "Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The search looks for a Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) was stopped via command-line. This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE (\"Processes.process_name\"=\"net*.exe\" \"Processes.process\"=\"*stop \\\"samss\\\"*\") BY \"Processes.dest\", \"Processes.user\", \"Processes.process\" | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_security_account_manager_stopped_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the process-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Processes data-model object. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.", "known_false_positives": "SAM is a critical windows service, stopping it would cause major issues on an endpoint this makes false positive rare. AlthoughNo false positives have been identified.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ryuk/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "message": "The Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) was stopped via cli by $user$ on $dest$ by this command: $processs$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1489"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process", "type": "Process", "role": ["Target"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Service Stop"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "windows_security_account_manager_stopped_filter"}]}, {"name": "Ryuk Wake on LAN Command", "id": "538d0152-7aaa-11eb-beaa-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-01", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This Splunk query identifies the use of Wake-on-LAN utilized by Ryuk ransomware. The Ryuk Ransomware uses the Wake-on-Lan feature to turn on powered off devices on a compromised network to have greater success encrypting them. This is a high fidelity indicator of Ryuk ransomware executing on an endpoint. Upon triage, isolate the endpoint. Additional file modification events will be within the users profile (\\appdata\\roaming) and in public directories (users\\public\\). Review all Scheduled Tasks on the isolated endpoint and across the fleet. Suspicious Scheduled Tasks will include a path to a unknown binary and those endpoints should be isolated until triaged.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process=\"*8 LAN*\" OR Processes.process=\"*9 REP*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ryuk_wake_on_lan_command_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Limited to no known false positives.", "references": ["https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ryuk-ransomware-uses-wake-on-lan-to-encrypt-offline-devices/", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ryuk-ransomware-now-self-spreads-to-other-windows-lan-devices/", "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/uploads/CERTFR-2021-CTI-006.pdf"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/ryuk/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Lateral Movement"], "message": "A process $process_name$ with wake on LAN commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "Windows Command Shell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "TA505", "Blue Mockingbird", "Tropic Trooper", "Frankenstein", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "Honeybee", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Turla", "Silence", "APT32", "APT39", "Darkhotel", "MuddyWater", "APT18", "APT38", "Dark Caracal", "Gorgon Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Rancor", "Ke3chang", "APT37", "Leviathan", "FIN8", "APT28", "Magic Hound", "Sowbug", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Gamaredon Group", "Suckfly", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-1314", "APT3", "admin@338", "APT1"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "ryuk_wake_on_lan_command_filter"}]}, {"name": "Spike in File Writes", "id": "fdb0f805-74e4-4539-8c00-618927333aae", "version": 3, "date": "2020-03-16", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "The search looks for a sharp increase in the number of files written to a particular host", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.action=created by _time span=1h, Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | eventstats max(_time) as maxtime | stats count as num_data_samples max(eval(if(_time >= relative_time(maxtime, \"-1d@d\"), count, null))) as \"count\" avg(eval(if(_time upperBound) AND num_data_samples >=20, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `spike_in_file_writes_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "In order to implement this search, you must populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection and response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the file system.", "known_false_positives": "It is important to understand that if you happen to install any new applications on your hosts or are copying a large number of files, you can expect to see a large increase of file modifications.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.action", "Filesystem.dest"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "spike_in_file_writes_filter"}]}, {"name": "Remote Desktop Network Traffic", "id": "272b8407-842d-4b3d-bead-a704584003d3", "version": 3, "date": "2020-07-07", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search looks for network traffic on TCP/3389, the default port used by remote desktop. While remote desktop traffic is not uncommon on a network, it is usually associated with known hosts. This search will ignore common RDP sources and common RDP destinations so you can focus on the uncommon uses of remote desktop on your network.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=3389 AND All_Traffic.dest_category!=common_rdp_destination AND All_Traffic.src_category!=common_rdp_source by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_desktop_network_traffic_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to identify systems that commonly originate remote desktop traffic and that commonly receive remote desktop traffic. You can use the included support search \"Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic\" to identify systems that originate the traffic and the search \"Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic\" to identify systems that receive a lot of remote desktop traffic. After identifying these systems, you will need to add the \"common_rdp_source\" or \"common_rdp_destination\" category to that system depending on the usage, using the Enterprise Security Assets and Identities framework. This can be done by adding an entry in the assets.csv file located in SA-IdentityManagement/lookups.", "known_false_positives": "Remote Desktop may be used legitimately by users on the network.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 9", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021.001", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.dest_port", "All_Traffic.dest_category", "All_Traffic.src_category", "All_Traffic.src", "All_Traffic.dest", "All_Traffic.dest_port"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote Desktop Protocol", "Remote Services"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "TEMP.Veles", "Leviathan", "APT39", "Stolen Pencil", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "APT3", "OilRig", "menuPass", "FIN10", "Patchwork", "FIN6", "Lazarus Group", "APT1", "Axiom", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "remote_desktop_network_traffic_filter"}]}, {"name": "Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce", "id": "a98727cc-286b-4ff2-b898-41df64695923", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search looks for RDP application network traffic and filters any source/destination pair generating more than twice the standard deviation of the average traffic.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.app=rdp by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | eventstats stdev(count) AS stdev avg(count) AS avg p50(count) AS p50 | where count>(avg + stdev*2) | rename All_Traffic.src AS src All_Traffic.dest AS dest | table firstTime lastTime src dest count avg p50 stdev | `remote_desktop_network_bruteforce_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must ensure that your network traffic data is populating the Network_Traffic data model.", "known_false_positives": "RDP gateways may have unusually high amounts of traffic from all other hosts' RDP applications in the network.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 9", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021.001", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.app", "All_Traffic.src", "All_Traffic.dest", "All_Traffic.dest_port"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote Desktop Protocol", "Remote Services"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "TEMP.Veles", "Leviathan", "APT39", "Stolen Pencil", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "APT3", "OilRig", "menuPass", "FIN10", "Patchwork", "FIN6", "Lazarus Group", "APT1", "Axiom", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "remote_desktop_network_bruteforce_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Information Sabotage", "id": "b71ba595-ef80-4e39-8b66-887578a7a71b", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-17", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might correlate to insider threat specially in terms of information sabotage.", "narrative": "Information sabotage is the type of crime many people associate with insider threat. Where the current or former employees, contractors, or business partners intentionally exceeded or misused an authorized level of access to networks, systems, or data with the intention of harming a specific individual, the organization, or the organization's data, systems, and/or daily business operations.", "references": ["https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/blog/insider-threat-deep-dive-it-sabotage/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Information Sabotage", "category": ["Abuse"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1070.004", "T1070", "T1537", "T1485"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["File Deletion", "Data Destruction", "Transfer Data to Cloud Account", "Indicator Removal on Host"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Exfiltration", "Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390", "Sandworm Team", "Magic Hound", "Tropic Trooper", "Kimsuky", "TEMP.Veles", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN8", "Group5", "APT29", "Gamaredon Group", "Rocke", "Cobalt Group", "Silence", "APT32", "APT41", "FIN5", "menuPass", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "Honeybee", "APT3", "Wizard Spider", "APT18", "no", "The White Company", "APT38", "FIN10", "Patchwork", "APT28", "Dragonfly 2.0"]}, "detections": [{"name": "High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share", "id": "40925f12-4709-11ec-bb43-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-16", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious high frequency copying/moving of files in network share as part of information sabotage. This anomaly event can be a good indicator of insider trying to sabotage data by transfering classified or internal files within network share to exfitrate it after or to lure evidence of insider attack to other user. This behavior may catch several noise if network share is a common place for classified or internal document processing.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=5145 Relative_Target_Name IN (\"*.doc\",\"*.docx\",\"*.xls\",\"*.xlsx\",\"*.ppt\",\"*.pptx\",\"*.log\",\"*.txt\",\"*.db\",\"*.7z\",\"*.zip\",\"*.rar\",\"*.tar\",\"*.gz\",\"*.jpg\",\"*.gif\",\"*.png\",\"*.bmp\",\"*.pdf\",\"*.rtf\",\"*.key\") Object_Type=File Share_Name IN (\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\C$\",\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\IPC$\",\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\admin$\") Access_Mask= \"0x2\" | bucket _time span=5m | stats values(Relative_Target_Name) as valRelativeTargetName, values(Share_Name) as valShareName, values(Object_Type) as valObjectType, values(Access_Mask) as valAccessmask, values(src_port) as valSrcPort, values(Source_Address) as valSrcAddress count as numShareName by dest, _time, EventCode, user | eventstats avg(numShareName) as avgShareName, stdev(numShareName) as stdShareName, count as numSlots by dest, _time, EventCode, user | eval upperThreshold=(avgShareName + stdShareName *3) | eval isOutlier=if(avgShareName > 20 and avgShareName >= upperThreshold, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `high_frequency_copy_of_files_in_network_share_filter`", "how_to_implement": "o successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 5145 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required. Also enable the object Audit access success/failure in your group policy.", "known_false_positives": "this behavior may seen in normal transfer of file within network if network share is common place for sharing documents.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Information Sabotage"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1537/high_copy_files_in_net_share/security.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "message": "high frequency copy of document in network share $Share_Name$ from $Source_Address$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1537"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Share_Name", "Relative_Target_Name", "Object_Type", "Access_Mask", "user", "src_port", "Source_Address"], "risk_score": 9, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Transfer Data to Cloud Account"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "high_frequency_copy_of_files_in_network_share_filter"}]}, {"name": "Sdelete Application Execution", "id": "fcc52b9a-4616-11ec-8454-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-15", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "This analytic will detect the execution of sdelete.exe attempting to delete potentially important files that may related to adversary or insider threats to destroy evidence or information sabotage. Sdelete is a SysInternals utility meant to securely delete files on disk. This tool is commonly used to clear tracks and artifact on the targeted host.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event,\"_time\"), \"string\", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null)), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_path\"), \"string\", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null), parent_cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND process_name IS NOT NULL AND like(process_name, \"%sdelete%\") AND (like (cmd_line, \"%-c %\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%-f %\")OR like (cmd_line, \"%-p %\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%-r %\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%-q %\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%-s %\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%-z %\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%/accepteula%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%-nobanner%\")OR like (cmd_line, \"%.doc%\")OR like (cmd_line, \"%.xls%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%.ppt%\")OR like (cmd_line, \"%.rtf%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%.pdf%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%.key%\")OR like (cmd_line, \"%.log%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%.txt%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%.jpg%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%.png%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%.gif%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%.bmp%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%.7z%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%.zip%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%.rar%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%.tar%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%.gz%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%.xls%\")) | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null)), body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line, \"process_name\", process_name, \"process_path\", process_path, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process_name, \"parent_cmd_line\", parent_cmd_line]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1485/T1485.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Information Sabotage"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/sdelete/security.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Sdelete process $process_name$ executed on $dest_device_id$ attempting to permanently delete files by $dest_user_id$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1485", "T1070.004", "T1070"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "user", "parent_process_name", "parent_process", "process_name", "process", "process_id", "process_path", "cmd_line"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Data Destruction", "File Deletion", "Indicator Removal on Host"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact", "Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Lazarus Group", "APT38", "Sandworm Team", "Rocke", "Tropic Trooper", "Gamaredon Group", "Wizard Spider", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Silence", "The White Company", "TEMP.Veles", "APT32", "APT38", "Patchwork", "Honeybee", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "menuPass", "FIN8", "OilRig", "FIN5", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Magic Hound", "APT3", "FIN10", "APT28", "Threat Group-3390", "Group5", "Lazarus Group", "APT18", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "sdelete_application_execution_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "GCP Cross Account Activity", "id": "0432039c-ef41-4b03-b157-450c25dad1e6", "version": 1, "date": "2020-09-01", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "description": "Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another GCP account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity.", "narrative": "Google Cloud Platform (GCP) admins manage access to GCP resources and services across the enterprise using GCP Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage GCP users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as Compute instances, the GCP Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are potentially assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\\\nIn between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\\\nThis Analytic Story includes searches that will help you monitor your GCP Audit logs logs for evidence of suspicious cross-account activity. For example, while accessing multiple GCP accounts and roles may be perfectly valid behavior, it may be suspicious when an account requests privileges of an account it has not accessed in the past. After identifying suspicious activities, you can use the provided investigative searches to help you probe more deeply.", "references": ["https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-service-accounts"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "GCP Cross Account Activity", "category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Valid Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Sandworm Team", "TEMP.Veles", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT39", "Carbanak", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT41", "FIN5", "menuPass", "FIN6", "OilRig", "Wizard Spider", "APT18", "FIN10", "PittyTiger", "FIN4", "APT28", "APT33", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Night Dragon"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "GCP Detect gcploit framework", "id": "a1c5a85e-a162-410c-a5d9-99ff639e5a52", "version": 1, "date": "2020-10-08", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides detection of GCPloit exploitation framework. This framework can be used to escalate privileges and move laterally from compromised high privilege accounts.", "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.request.function.timeout=539s | table src src_user data.resource.labels.project_id data.protoPayload.request.function.serviceAccountEmail data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission data.protoPayload.request.location http_user_agent | `gcp_detect_gcploit_framework_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message logs", "known_false_positives": "Payload.request.function.timeout value can possibly be match with other functions or requests however the source user and target request account may indicate an attempt to move laterally accross acounts or projects", "references": ["https://github.com/dxa4481/gcploit", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ml09R38jpok"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["GCP Cross Account Activity"], "asset_type": "GCP Account", "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "data.protoPayload.request.function.timeout", "src", "src_user", "data.resource.labels.project_id", "data.protoPayload.request.function.serviceAccountEmail", "data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission", "data.protoPayload.request.location", "http_user_agent"], "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Valid Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "gcp_detect_gcploit_framework_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Brand Monitoring", "id": "91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e1fce78", "version": 1, "date": "2017-12-19", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "description": "Detect and investigate activity that may indicate that an adversary is using faux domains to mislead users into interacting with malicious infrastructure. Monitor DNS, email, and web traffic for permutations of your brand name.", "narrative": "While you can educate your users and customers about the risks and threats posed by typosquatting, phishing, and corporate espionage, human error is a persistent fact of life. Of course, your adversaries are all too aware of this reality and will happily leverage it for nefarious purposes whenever possible3phishing with lookalike addresses, embedding faux command-and-control domains in malware, and hosting malicious content on domains that closely mimic your corporate servers. This is where brand monitoring comes in.\\\nYou can use our adaptation of `DNSTwist`, together with the support searches in this Analytic Story, to generate permutations of specified brands and external domains. Splunk can monitor email, DNS requests, and web traffic for these permutations and provide you with early warnings and situational awareness--powerful elements of an effective defense.\\\nNotable events will include IP addresses, URLs, and user data. Drilling down can provide you with even more actionable intelligence, including likely geographic information, contextual searches to help you scope the problem, and investigative searches.", "references": ["https://www.zerofox.com/blog/what-is-digital-risk-monitoring/", "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/consumer/family-safety/what-is-typosquatting/", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/06/explained-typosquatting/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Brand Monitoring", "category": ["Abuse"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": [], "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse", "id": "134da869-e264-4a8f-8d7e-fcd0ec88f301", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-23", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Web"], "description": "This search looks for Web requests to faux domains similar to the one that you want to have monitored for abuse.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Web.url) as urls min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Web by Web.src | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `brand_abuse_web` | `monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You need to ingest data from your web traffic. This can be accomplished by indexing data from a web proxy, or using a network traffic analysis tool, such as Bro or Splunk Stream. You also need to have run the search \"ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names\", which creates the permutations of the domain that will be checked for.", "known_false_positives": "None at this time", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Brand Monitoring"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Web.url", "Web.src"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "lookup update=true brandMonitoring_lookup domain as urls OUTPUT domain_abuse | search domain_abuse=true", "description": "This macro limits the output to only domains that are in the brand monitoring lookup file", "name": "brand_abuse_web", "lookups": [{"default_match": "false", "description": "A file that contains look-a-like domains for brands that you want to monitor", "filename": "brand_monitoring.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(domain)", "min_matches": 1, "name": "brandMonitoring_lookup", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/brand_monitoring.csv"}]}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse_filter"}]}, {"name": "Monitor Email For Brand Abuse", "id": "b2ea1f38-3a3e-4b8a-9cf1-82760d86a6b8", "version": 2, "date": "2018-01-05", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Email"], "description": "This search looks for emails claiming to be sent from a domain similar to one that you want to have monitored for abuse.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Email.recipient) as recipients, min(_time) as firstTime, max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Email by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.message_id | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Email\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | eval temp=split(src_user, \"@\") | eval email_domain=mvindex(temp, 1) | lookup update=true brandMonitoring_lookup domain as email_domain OUTPUT domain_abuse | search domain_abuse=true | table message_id, src_user, email_domain, recipients, firstTime, lastTime | `monitor_email_for_brand_abuse_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You need to ingest email header data. Specifically the sender's address (src_user) must be populated. You also need to have run the search \"ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names\", which creates the permutations of the domain that will be checked for.", "known_false_positives": "None at this time", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Brand Monitoring", "Suspicious Emails"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Email.recipient", "All_Email.src_user", "All_Email.message_id"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "monitor_email_for_brand_abuse_filter"}], "lookups": [{"default_match": "false", "description": "A file that contains look-a-like domains for brands that you want to monitor", "filename": "brand_monitoring.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(domain)", "min_matches": 1, "name": "brandMonitoring_lookup", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/brand_monitoring.csv"}]}]}, {"name": "NOBELIUM Group", "id": "758196b5-2e21-424f-a50c-6e421ce926c2", "version": 2, "date": "2020-12-14", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Michael Haag, Splunk", "description": "Sunburst is a trojanized updates to SolarWinds Orion IT monitoring and management software. It was discovered by FireEye in December 2020. The actors behind this campaign gained access to numerous public and private organizations around the world.", "narrative": "This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) of the NOBELIUM Group. The threat actor behind sunburst compromised the SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll, is a SolarWinds digitally-signed component of the Orion software framework that contains a backdoor that communicates via HTTP to third party servers. The detections in this Analytic Story are focusing on the dll loading events, file create events and network events to detect This malware.", "references": ["https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldmax-goldfinder-sibot-analyzing-nobelium-malware/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html", "https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "NOBELIUM Group", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1569.002", "T1203", "T1569", "T1053", "T1218", "T1071.002", "T1218.005", "T1053.005", "T1059", "T1543", "T1560.001", "T1018", "T1071.001", "T1543.003", "T1505.003", "T1071", "T1560", "T1027", "T1059.003"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Windows Command Shell", "Create or Modify System Process", "File Transfer Protocols", "Scheduled Task/Job", "Remote System Discovery", "Mshta", "Web Shell", "Archive via Utility", "System Services", "Service Execution", "Application Layer Protocol", "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "Obfuscated Files or Information", "Exploitation for Client Execution", "Scheduled Task", "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Web Protocols", "Windows Service", "Archive Collected Data"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Discovery", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Execution", "Command And Control", "Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Suckfly", "Sandworm Team", "Rancor", "Inception", "TEMP.Veles", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT39", "Gamaredon Group", "Carbanak", "Frankenstein", "admin@338", "Honeybee", "APT18", "MuddyWater", "Dust Storm", "Gorgon Group", "BlackTech", "SilverTerrier", "Orangeworm", "Night Dragon", "Magic Hound", "Stealth Falcon", "Dark Caracal", "TA459", "APT29", "FIN8", "Molerats", "Rocke", "APT12", "Whitefly", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "Silence", "APT32", "WIRTE", "Darkhotel", "FIN5", "Blue Mockingbird", "Sowbug", "Machete", "Threat Group-1314", "Patchwork", "FIN4", "APT33", "Threat Group-3390", "Putter Panda", "Kimsuky", "Group5", "Turla", "TA505", "Mofang", "Soft Cell", "APT19", "APT37", "APT41", "menuPass", "OilRig", "BlackOasis", "Wizard Spider", "Leafminer", "no", "The White Company", "FIN10", "DarkVishnya", "Elderwood", "APT28", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN7", "APT1", "Tropic Trooper", "Ke3chang", "Leviathan", "APT-C-36", "CopyKittens", "FIN6", "Lazarus Group", "APT3", "APT38", "Gallmaker"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Windows AdFind Exe", "id": "bd3b0187-189b-46c0-be45-f52da2bae67f", "version": 2, "date": "2021-11-03", "author": "Jose Hernandez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for the execution of `adfind.exe` with command-line arguments that it uses by default. Specifically the filter or search functions. It also considers the arguments necessary like objectcategory, see readme for more details: https://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/usage.htm. This has been seen used before by Wizard Spider, FIN6 and actors whom also launched SUNBURST. AdFind.exe is usually used a recon tool to enumare a domain controller.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process=\"* -f *\" OR Processes.process=\"* -b *\") AND (Processes.process=*objectcategory* OR Processes.process=\"* -gcb *\" OR Processes.process=\"* -sc *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_adfind_exe_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "administrators rarely use adfind, usually not used for legitimate reasons", "references": ["https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/a-nasty-trick-from-credential-theft-malware-to-business-disruption.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["NOBELIUM Group", "Domain Trust Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1018"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote System Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Rocke", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT39", "APT32", "Deep Panda", "Threat Group-3390", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leafminer", "Ke3chang", "FIN8", "APT3", "FIN5", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Turla"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "windows_adfind_exe_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe", "id": "dcfd6b40-42f9-469d-a433-2e53f7486664", "version": 6, "date": "2020-11-10", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for executions of cmd.exe spawned by a process that is often abused by attackers and that does not typically launch cmd.exe.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |search [`prohibited_apps_launching_cmd`] | `detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts and populates the Endpoint data model with the resultant dataset. This search includes a lookup file, `prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.csv`, that contains a list of processes that should not be spawning cmd.exe. You can modify this lookup to better suit your environment. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "There are circumstances where an application may legitimately execute and interact with the Windows command-line interface. Investigate and modify the lookup file, as appropriate.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "Suspicious Zoom Child Processes", "NOBELIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/powershell_spawn_cmd/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ running prohibited applications.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "Windows Command Shell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "TA505", "Blue Mockingbird", "Tropic Trooper", "Frankenstein", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "Honeybee", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Turla", "Silence", "APT32", "APT39", "Darkhotel", "MuddyWater", "APT18", "APT38", "Dark Caracal", "Gorgon Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Rancor", "Ke3chang", "APT37", "Leviathan", "FIN8", "APT28", "Magic Hound", "Sowbug", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Gamaredon Group", "Suckfly", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-1314", "APT3", "admin@338", "APT1"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_cmd"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "| inputlookup prohibited_apps_launching_cmd | rename prohibited_applications as parent_process_name | eval parent_process_name=\"*\" . parent_process_name | table parent_process_name", "description": "This macro outputs a list of process that should not be the parent process of cmd.exe", "name": "prohibited_apps_launching_cmd", "lookups": [{"description": "A list of processes that should not be launching cmd.exe", "fields": "prohibited_applications", "filename": "prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(prohibited_applications)", "name": "prohibited_apps_launching_cmd", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.csv"}]}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe_filter"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", "id": "d5af132c-7c17-439c-9d31-13d55340f36c", "version": 5, "date": "2020-12-17", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line that indicate a task was created via command like. This has been associated with the Dragonfly threat actor, and the SUNBURST attack against Solarwinds.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe (Processes.process=*delete* OR Processes.process=*create*) by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "Tasks should not be manually created via CLI, this is rarely done by admins as well", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["DHS Report TA18-074A", "NOBELIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}, "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A schedule task process $process_name$ with create or delete commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Scheduled Task", "Scheduled Task/Job"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "MuddyWater", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT-C-36", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT41", "Machete", "Soft Cell", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Patchwork", "OilRig", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "FIN8", "menuPass", "FIN10", "APT32", "FIN7", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd_filter"}]}, {"name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services", "id": "f0c693d8-2a89-4ce7-80b4-98fea4c3ea6d", "version": 4, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for arguments to sc.exe indicating the creation or modification of a Windows service.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = sc.exe (Processes.process=\"* create *\" OR Processes.process=\"* config *\") by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Using sc.exe to manipulate Windows services is uncommon. However, there may be legitimate instances of this behavior. It is important to validate and investigate as appropriate.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Service Abuse", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Disabling Security Tools", "NOBELIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Persistence"}, "Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "message": "A sc process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ to create of configure services in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1543.003", "T1543"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Windows Service", "Create or Modify System Process"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "DarkVishnya", "Wizard Spider", "APT32", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Tropic Trooper", "Cobalt Group", "Ke3chang", "Honeybee", "FIN7", "Threat Group-3390", "APT19", "APT3", "Lazarus Group", "Carbanak", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services_filter"}]}, {"name": "Anomalous usage of Archive Tools", "id": "63614a58-10e2-4c6c-ae81-ea1113681439", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-22", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "The following detection identifies the usage of archive tools from the command line.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event,\"_time\"), \"string\", null)), process=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null)), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_path\"), \"string\", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null), parent_process=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where process_name IS NOT NULL AND parent_process_name IS NOT NULL | where like(process_name, \"7z%\") OR process_name=\"WinRAR.exe\" OR like(process_name, \"winzip%\") | where like(parent_process_name, \"%cmd.exe\") OR like(parent_process_name, \"%powershell.exe\") | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null)), body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"process_name\", process_name, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process_name, \"process_path\", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "False positives can be ligitmate usage of archive tools from the command line.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/001/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike", "NOBELIUM Group"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1560.001/archive_tools/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior is indicative of suspicious loading of 7zip.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1560.001", "T1560"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Archive via Utility", "Archive Collected Data"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Soft Cell", "Turla", "Gallmaker", "APT33", "APT39", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "FIN8", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT3", "Sowbug", "menuPass", "APT1", "Ke3chang", "menuPass", "APT32", "Honeybee", "Patchwork", "APT28", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN6", "Lazarus Group", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "anomalous_usage_of_archive_tools_filter"}]}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command", "id": "c4db14d9-7909-48b4-a054-aa14d89dbb19", "version": 6, "date": "2021-10-05", "author": "David Dorsey, Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of the EncodedCommand PowerShell parameter. This is typically used by Administrators to run complex scripts, but commonly used by adversaries to hide their code. \\\nThe analytic identifies all variations of EncodedCommand, as PowerShell allows the ability to shorten the parameter. For example enc, enco, encod and so forth. In addition, through our research it was identified that PowerShell will interpret different command switch types beyond the hyphen. We have added endash, emdash, horizontal bar, and forward slash. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel events to determine legitimacy. Tune as needed based on admin scripts in use. \\\nAlternatively, may use regex per matching here https://regexr.com/662ov.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"(?i)[\\-|\\/|\u2013|\u2014|\u2015]e(nc*o*d*e*d*c*o*m*m*a*n*d*)*\\s+[^-]\") | `malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "System administrators may use this option, but it's not common.", "references": ["https://regexr.com/662ov", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses/blob/master/TestHarnesses/T1059.001_PowerShell/OutPowerShellCommandLineParameter.ps1", "https://ss64.com/ps/powershell.html", "https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/1440758396534214658?s=20"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "NOBELIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1027/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Powershell.exe running potentially malicious encodede commands on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1027"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.process_id"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Obfuscated Files or Information"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "Whitefly", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Mofang", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "Soft Cell", "Turla", "TA505", "Silence", "APT33", "Night Dragon", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "APT29", "APT18", "Tropic Trooper", "Cobalt Group", "Patchwork", "Leafminer", "APT37", "Threat Group-3390", "Honeybee", "Dark Caracal", "menuPass", "APT19", "BlackOasis", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "Elderwood", "MuddyWater", "FIN7", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "APT3", "APT32", "Group5", "Dust Storm", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_powershell"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command_filter"}]}, {"name": "Schtasks scheduling job on remote system", "id": "1297fb80-f42a-4b4a-9c8a-88c066237cf6", "version": 5, "date": "2021-11-11", "author": "David Dorsey, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `schtasks.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to create a Scheduled Task on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = schtasks.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=schtasks.exe) (Processes.process=\"*/create*\" AND Processes.process=\"*/s*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may create scheduled tasks on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. It is important to validate and investigate as appropriate.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "NOBELIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}, "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A schedule task process $process_name$ with remote job commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "Processes.dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Processes.user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Scheduled Task", "Scheduled Task/Job"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "MuddyWater", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT-C-36", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT41", "Machete", "Soft Cell", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Patchwork", "OilRig", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "FIN8", "menuPass", "FIN10", "APT32", "FIN7", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system_filter"}]}, {"name": "Anomalous usage of 7zip", "id": "9364ee8e-a39a-11eb-8f1d-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-22", "author": "Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies a 7z.exe spawned from `Rundll32.exe` or `Dllhost.exe`. It is assumed that the adversary has brought in `7z.exe` and `7z.dll`. It has been observed where an adversary will rename `7z.exe`. Additional coverage may be required to identify the behavior of renamed instances of `7z.exe`. During triage, identify the source of injection into `Rundll32.exe` or `Dllhost.exe`. Capture any files written to disk and analyze as needed. Review parallel processes for additional behaviors. Typically, archiving files will result in exfiltration.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"rundll32.exe\", \"dllhost.exe\") Processes.process_name=*7z* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `anomalous_usage_of_7zip_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as this behavior is not normal for `rundll32.exe` or `dllhost.exe` to spawn and run 7zip.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/001/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/", "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/01/31/bazar-no-ryuk/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike", "NOBELIUM Group"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1560.001/archive_utility/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior is indicative of suspicious loading of 7zip.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1560.001", "T1560"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Archive via Utility", "Archive Collected Data"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Soft Cell", "Turla", "Gallmaker", "APT33", "APT39", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "FIN8", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT3", "Sowbug", "menuPass", "APT1", "Ke3chang", "menuPass", "APT32", "Honeybee", "Patchwork", "APT28", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN6", "Lazarus Group", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "anomalous_usage_of_7zip_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution", "id": "91c79f14-5b41-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 2, "date": "2021-01-20", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies \"rundll32.exe\" execution with inline protocol handlers. \"JavaScript\", \"VBScript\", and \"About\" are the only supported options when invoking HTA content directly on the command-line. This type of behavior is commonly observed with fileless malware or application whitelisting bypass techniques. The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process \"rundll32.exe\" and its parent process.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` (Processes.process=*vbscript* OR Processes.process=*javascript* OR Processes.process=*about*) by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses", "https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/search/-search-3x-wds-extidx-prot-implementing"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "NOBELIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious rundll32.exe inline HTA execution on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Mshta"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "APT32", "MuddyWater", "FIN7"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_rundll32"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution_filter"}]}, {"name": "Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event", "id": "701a8740-e8db-40df-9190-5516d3819787", "version": 1, "date": "2020-12-14", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The malware sunburst will load the malicious dll by SolarWinds.BusinessLayerHost.exe. After a period of 12-14 days, the malware will attempt to resolve a subdomain of avsvmcloud.com. This detections will correlate both events.", "search": "(`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded=*SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll) OR (`sysmon` EventCode=22 QueryName=*avsvmcloud.com) | eventstats dc(EventCode) AS dc_events | where dc_events=2 | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ImageLoaded) AS ImageLoaded values(QueryName) AS QueryName by host | rename host as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "This detection relies on sysmon logs with the Event ID 7, Driver loaded. Please tune your sysmon config that you DriverLoad event for SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll is captured by Sysmon. Additionally, you need sysmon logs for Event ID 22, DNS Query. We suggest to run this detection at least once a day over the last 14 days.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["NOBELIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Windows", "cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1203"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "ImageLoaded", "QueryName"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploitation for Client Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "MuddyWater", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT41", "admin@338", "Threat Group-3390", "APT12", "The White Company", "APT33", "APT32", "APT28", "Tropic Trooper", "Lazarus Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "APT37", "Patchwork", "Leviathan", "Elderwood", "TA459", "APT29"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event_filter"}]}, {"name": "First Time Seen Running Windows Service", "id": "823136f2-d755-4b6d-ae04-372b486a5808", "version": 4, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for the first and last time a Windows service is seen running in your environment. This table is then cached.", "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rex field=Message \"The (?[-\\(\\)\\s\\w]+) service entered the (?\\w+) state\" | where state=\"running\" | lookup previously_seen_running_windows_services service as service OUTPUT firstTimeSeen | where isnull(firstTimeSeen) OR firstTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_windows_services_window`) | table _time dest service | `first_time_seen_running_windows_service_filter`", "how_to_implement": "While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM, you must be ingesting your Windows system event logs in order for this search to execute successfully. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial` to build the initial table of child processes and hostnames for this search to work. You should also schedule at the same interval as this search the second baseline search `Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old Windows Services. Please update the `previously_seen_windows_services_window` macro to adjust the time window. Please ensure that the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows is version 8.0.0 or above.", "known_false_positives": "A previously unseen service is not necessarily malicious. Verify that the service is legitimate and that was installed by a legitimate process.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Service Abuse", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "NOBELIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1569", "T1569.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.AE"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "dest"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Services", "Service Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "APT41", "Silence", "FIN6", "APT32", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_system"}, {"description": "Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new Windows services", "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", "name": "previously_seen_windows_services_window"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "first_time_seen_running_windows_service_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A placeholder for the list of Windows Services running", "collection": "previously_seen_running_windows_services", "name": "previously_seen_running_windows_services", "fields_list": "_key, service, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen"}]}, {"name": "Supernova Webshell", "id": "2ec08a09-9ff1-4dac-b59f-1efd57972ec1", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-06", "author": "John Stoner, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Web"], "description": "This search aims to detect the Supernova webshell used in the SUNBURST attack.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Web.Web where web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*codes* OR Web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*clazz* OR Web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*method* OR Web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*args* by Web.src Web.dest Web.url Web.vendor_product Web.user Web.http_user_agent _time span=1s | `supernova_webshell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be monitoring web traffic to your Solarwinds Orion. The logs should be ingested into splunk and populating/mapped to the Web data model.", "known_false_positives": "There might be false positives associted with this detection since items like args as a web argument is pretty generic.", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-supernova-malware-solarwinds-continued.html", "https://www.guidepointsecurity.com/supernova-solarwinds-net-webshell-analysis/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["NOBELIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 13", "CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1505.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "ID.RA", "PR.PT", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Web.url", "Web.src", "Web.dest", "Web.vendor_product", "Web.user", "Web.http_user_agent"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Web Shell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Tropic Trooper", "Soft Cell", "Threat Group-3390", "TEMP.Veles", "Leviathan", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT32", "OilRig", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "supernova_webshell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Outbound SMB Traffic", "id": "7f5fb3e1-4209-414-90db-0ec21b936378", "version": 3, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Stuart Hopkins from Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search looks for outbound SMB connections made by hosts within your network to the Internet. SMB traffic is used for Windows file-sharing activity. One of the techniques often used by attackers involves retrieving the credential hash using an SMB request made to a compromised server controlled by the threat actor.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as start_time latest(_time) as end_time values(All_Traffic.action) as action values(All_Traffic.app) as app values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as dest_port values(sourcetype) as sourcetype count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where ((All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=\"smb\") AND NOT (All_Traffic.action=\"blocked\" OR All_Traffic.dest_category=\"internal\" OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=192.168.0.0/16 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=100.64.0.0/10)) by All_Traffic.src_ip | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `security_content_ctime(start_time)` | `security_content_ctime(end_time)` | `detect_outbound_smb_traffic_filter`", "how_to_implement": "In order to run this search effectively, we highly recommend that you leverage the Assets and Identity framework. It is important that you have good understanding of how your network segments are designed, and be able to distinguish internal from external address space. Add a category named `internal` to the CIDRs that host the companys assets in `assets_by_cidr.csv` lookup file, which is located in `$SPLUNK_HOME/etc/apps/SA-IdentityManagement/lookups/`. More information on updating this lookup can be found here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.0.0/Admin/Addassetandidentitydata. This search also requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model", "known_false_positives": "It is likely that the outbound Server Message Block (SMB) traffic is legitimate, if the company's internal networks are not well-defined in the Assets and Identity Framework. Categorize the internal CIDR blocks as `internal` in the lookup file to avoid creating notable events for traffic destined to those CIDR blocks. Any other network connection that is going out to the Internet should be investigated and blocked. Best practices suggest preventing external communications of all SMB versions and related protocols at the network boundary.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Hidden Cobra Malware", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "NOBELIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1071.002", "T1071"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.action", "All_Traffic.app", "All_Traffic.dest_ip", "All_Traffic.dest_port", "sourcetype", "All_Traffic.dest_category", "All_Traffic.src_ip"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["File Transfer Protocols", "Application Layer Protocol"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control", "Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "SilverTerrier", "Machete", "Honeybee", "Rocke", "Magic Hound", "Dragonfly 2.0"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_outbound_smb_traffic_filter"}]}, {"name": "TOR Traffic", "id": "ea688274-9c06-4473-b951-e4cb7a5d7a45", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-22", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search looks for network traffic identified as The Onion Router (TOR), a benign anonymity network which can be abused for a variety of nefarious purposes.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.app=tor AND All_Traffic.action=allowed by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip All_Traffic.dest_port All_Traffic.action | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `tor_traffic_filter`", "how_to_implement": "In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from firewalls or other network control devices that mediate the traffic allowed into an environment. This is necessary so that the search can identify an 'action' taken on the traffic of interest. The search requires the Network_Traffic data model be populated.", "known_false_positives": "None at this time", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Ransomware", "Command and Control", "NOBELIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1071", "T1071.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.app", "All_Traffic.action", "All_Traffic.src_ip", "All_Traffic.dest_ip", "All_Traffic.dest_port"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Application Layer Protocol", "Web Protocols"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control", "Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Rocke", "Magic Hound", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "Rocke", "APT39", "Tropic Trooper", "MuddyWater", "Wizard Spider", "Inception", "APT41", "SilverTerrier", "Machete", "APT28", "WIRTE", "APT33", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "APT18", "APT38", "Cobalt Group", "APT19", "Threat Group-3390", "Rancor", "Orangeworm", "APT37", "Ke3chang", "Dark Caracal", "Turla", "Lazarus Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "OilRig", "Magic Hound", "Gamaredon Group", "Stealth Falcon"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "tor_traffic_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Silver Sparrow", "id": "cb4f48fe-7699-11eb-af77-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-02-24", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "description": "Silver Sparrow, identified by Red Canary Intelligence, is a new forward looking MacOS (Intel and M1) malicious software downloader utilizing JavaScript for execution and a launchAgent to establish persistence.", "narrative": "Silver Sparrow works is a dropper and uses typical persistence mechanisms on a Mac. It is cross platform, covering both Intel and Apple M1 architecture. To this date, no implant has been downloaded for malicious purposes. During installation of the update.pkg or updater.pkg file, the malicious software utilizes JavaScript to generate files and scripts on disk for persistence.These files later download a implant from an S3 bucket every hour. This analytic assists with identifying different types of macOS malware families establishing LaunchAgent persistence. Per SentinelOne source, it is predicted that Silver Sparrow is likely selling itself as a mechanism to 3rd party \u201caffiliates\u201d or pay-per-install (PPI) partners, typically seen as commodity adware/malware. Additional indicators and behaviors may be found within the references.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/", "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/5-things-you-need-to-know-about-silver-sparrow/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Silver Sparrow", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1543", "T1074", "T1543.001", "T1105"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Ingress Tool Transfer", "Create or Modify System Process", "Data Staged", "Launch Agent"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390", "Sandworm Team", "Magic Hound", "Rancor", "Tropic Trooper", "PLATINUM", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN8", "Turla", "APT39", "Molerats", "Leviathan", "Rocke", "Gamaredon Group", "TA505", "Whitefly", "Frankenstein", "Cobalt Group", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "APT-C-36", "WIRTE", "APT37", "APT41", "menuPass", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT3", "Wizard Spider", "APT18", "no", "APT38", "Sharpshooter", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork", "Elderwood", "APT28", "APT33", "Gorgon Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN7"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Suspicious Curl Network Connection", "id": "3f613dc0-21f2-4063-93b1-5d3c15eef22f", "version": 1, "date": "2021-02-22", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of a curl contacting suspicious remote domains to checkin to command and control servers or download further implants. In the context of Silver Sparrow, curl is identified contacting s3.amazonaws.com. This particular behavior is common with MacOS adware-malicious software.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=curl Processes.process=s3.amazonaws.com by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_curl_network_connection_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/", "https://marcosantadev.com/manage-plist-files-plistbuddy/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Silver Sparrow", "Ingress Tool Transfer"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "dataset": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1105"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Ingress Tool Transfer"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Whitefly", "Rocke", "APT39", "Tropic Trooper", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Frankenstein", "Silence", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "APT33", "MuddyWater", "APT18", "APT38", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "OilRig", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT37", "FIN8", "PLATINUM", "Leviathan", "Elderwood", "Magic Hound", "APT3", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Patchwork", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-3390", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_curl_network_connection_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage", "id": "c3194009-e0eb-4f84-87a9-4070f8688f00", "version": 1, "date": "2021-02-22", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of a native MacOS utility, PlistBuddy, creating or modifying a properly list (.plist) file. In the instance of Silver Sparrow, the following commands were executed:\\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :Label string init_verx\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :RunAtLoad bool true\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :StartInterval integer 3600\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :ProgramArguments array\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :ProgramArguments:0 string /bin/sh\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :ProgramArguments:1 string -c\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\nUpon triage, capture the property list file being written to disk and review for further indicators. Contain the endpoint and triage further.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=PlistBuddy (Processes.process=*LaunchAgents* OR Processes.process=*RunAtLoad* OR Processes.process=*true*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate applications may use PlistBuddy to create or modify property lists and possibly generate false positives. Review the property list being modified or created to confirm.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/", "https://marcosantadev.com/manage-plist-files-plistbuddy/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Silver Sparrow"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "dataset": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1543.001", "T1543"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Launch Agent", "Create or Modify System Process"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior", "id": "e1997b2e-655f-4561-82fd-aeba8e1c1a86", "version": 1, "date": "2021-02-22", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of a SQLite3 querying the MacOS preferences to identify the original URL the pkg was downloaded from. This particular behavior is common with MacOS adware-malicious software. Upon triage, review other processes in parallel for suspicious activity. Identify any recent package installations.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=sqlite3 Processes.process=*LSQuarantine* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_sqlite3_lsquarantine_behavior_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/", "https://marcosantadev.com/manage-plist-files-plistbuddy/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Silver Sparrow"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "dataset": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1074"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Data Staged"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_sqlite3_lsquarantine_behavior_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage via OSquery", "id": "20ba6c32-c733-4a32-b64e-2688cf231399", "version": 1, "date": "2021-02-22", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of a native MacOS utility, PlistBuddy, creating or modifying a properly list (.plist) file. In the instance of Silver Sparrow, the following commands were executed:\\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :Label string init_verx\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :RunAtLoad bool true\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :StartInterval integer 3600\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :ProgramArguments array\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :ProgramArguments:0 string /bin/sh\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :ProgramArguments:1 string -c\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\nUpon triage, capture the property list file being written to disk and review for further indicators. Contain the endpoint and triage further.", "search": "`osquery_process` \"columns.cmdline\"=\"*LaunchAgents*\" OR \"columns.cmdline\"=\"*RunAtLoad*\" OR \"columns.cmdline\"=\"*true*\" | `suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_via_osquery_filter`", "how_to_implement": "OSQuery must be installed and configured to pick up process events (info at https://osquery.io) as well as using the Splunk OSQuery Add-on https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4402. Modify the macro and validate fields are correct.", "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate applications may use PlistBuddy to create or modify property lists and possibly generate false positives. Review the property list being modified or created to confirm.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/", "https://marcosantadev.com/manage-plist-files-plistbuddy/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Silver Sparrow"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "dataset": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1543.001", "T1543"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "columns.cmdline"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Launch Agent", "Create or Modify System Process"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=\"osquery-process\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "osquery_process"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_via_osquery_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "id": "bb9f5ed2-916e-4364-bb6d-91c310efcf52", "version": 1, "date": "2020-01-27", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "Detect rarely used executables, specific registry paths that may confer malware survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that the Emotet financial malware has compromised your environment.", "narrative": "The trojan downloader known as Emotet first surfaced in 2014, when it was discovered targeting the banking industry to steal credentials. However, according to a joint technical alert (TA) issued by three government agencies (https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A), Emotet has evolved far beyond those beginnings to become what a ThreatPost article called a threat-delivery service(see https://threatpost.com/emotet-malware-evolves-beyond-banking-to-threat-delivery-service/134342/). For example, in early 2018, Emotet was found to be using its loader function to spread the Quakbot and Ransomware variants. \\\nAccording to the TA, the the malware continues to be among the most costly and destructive malware affecting the private and public sectors. Researchers have linked it to the threat group Mealybug, which has also been on the security communitys radar since 2014.\\\nThe searches in this Analytic Story will help you find executables that are rarely used in your environment, specific registry paths that malware often uses to ensure survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that Emotet or other malware has compromised your environment. ", "references": ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A", "https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf", "https://www.vkremez.com/2017/05/emotet-banking-trojan-malware-analysis.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1547.001", "T1021", "T1059", "T1566.001", "T1021.002", "T1547", "T1566", "T1072", "T1059.003"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "Remote Services", "Phishing", "Software Deployment Tools", "Windows Command Shell", "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "Spearphishing Attachment"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Execution", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Magic Hound", "Stealth Falcon", "Rancor", "Inception", "Putter Panda", "Sandworm Team", "APT1", "Tropic Trooper", "Dark Caracal", "Kimsuky", "TA459", "PLATINUM", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ke3chang", "FIN8", "Turla", "APT39", "Molerats", "Leviathan", "Gamaredon Group", "Rocke", "RTM", "APT12", "TA505", "Mofang", "Whitefly", "Frankenstein", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "APT32", "Soft Cell", "Silence", "APT19", "APT37", "APT-C-36", "Darkhotel", "APT41", "FIN5", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Blue Mockingbird", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "admin@338", "Honeybee", "APT3", "Wizard Spider", "Sowbug", "Machete", "APT18", "no", "Threat Group-1314", "The White Company", "APT38", "Sharpshooter", "MuddyWater", "FIN10", "Patchwork", "FIN4", "Elderwood", "APT28", "Gallmaker", "APT33", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN7", "Gorgon Group", "APT29", "Orangeworm", "Windshift", "BlackTech", "Naikon", "DarkHydrus"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters", "id": "b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-95dbb162039e", "version": 4, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for the execution of the cscript.exe or wscript.exe processes, with a parent of cmd.exe. The search will return the count, the first and last time this execution was seen on a machine, the user, and the destination of the machine", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=\"cmd.exe\" (Processes.process_name=cscript.exe OR Processes.process_name =wscript.exe) by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Suspicious Command-Line Executions"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/cmd_spawns_cscript/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "cmd.exe launching script interpreters on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.user", "Processes.dest"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "Windows Command Shell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "TA505", "Blue Mockingbird", "Tropic Trooper", "Frankenstein", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "Honeybee", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Turla", "Silence", "APT32", "APT39", "Darkhotel", "MuddyWater", "APT18", "APT38", "Dark Caracal", "Gorgon Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Rancor", "Ke3chang", "APT37", "Leviathan", "FIN8", "APT28", "Magic Hound", "Sowbug", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Gamaredon Group", "Suckfly", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-1314", "APT3", "admin@338", "APT1"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters_filter"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "id": "f5f6af30-7aa7-4295-bfe9-07fe87c01a4b", "version": 6, "date": "2021-09-07", "author": "Jose Hernandez, David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to launch an application or service at system startup.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\run* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentVersion\\\\Windows\\\\Appinit_Dlls* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Shell* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Notify* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Userinit* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\VmApplet* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\policies\\\\explorer\\\\run* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\runservices* OR Registry.registry_path=HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Netsh\\\\* OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Image File Execution Options*\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=Debugger) OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Security Packages\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\\\\OSConfig\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Security Packages\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\SilentProcessExit\\\\*\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*currentVersion\\\\Windows\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Load\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentVersion\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Svchost\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\"AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"BootExecute\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Software\\\\Run\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"auto_update\")) by Registry.dest Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "There are many legitimate applications that must execute on system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Ransomware", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "IcedID", "Remcos"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 95, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Persistence"}, "Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to persistence in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1547.001", "T1547"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user"], "risk_score": 76, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Rocke", "Tropic Trooper", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Silence", "RTM", "Inception", "APT41", "Machete", "Kimsuky", "APT33", "APT39", "APT32", "APT18", "Turla", "Dark Caracal", "Cobalt Group", "Honeybee", "Threat Group-3390", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Gorgon Group", "Ke3chang", "APT19", "Leviathan", "MuddyWater", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Magic Hound", "APT3", "FIN10", "FIN7", "Patchwork", "FIN6", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "APT29", "Darkhotel", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Rare Executables", "id": "44fddcb2-8d3b-454c-874e-7c6de5a4f7ac", "version": 5, "date": "2020-03-16", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search will return a table of rare processes, the names of the systems running them, and the users who initiated each process.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.dest) as dest values(Processes.user) as user min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name | rename Processes.process_name as process | rex field=user \"(?.*)\\\\\\\\(?.*)\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| search [| tstats count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name | rare Processes.process_name limit=30 | rename Processes.process_name as process| `filter_rare_process_allow_list`| table process ] | `detect_rare_executables_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts and populating the endpoint data model with the resultant dataset. The macro `filter_rare_process_allow_list` searches two lookup files for allowed processes. These consist of `rare_process_allow_list_default.csv` and `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv`. To add your own processes to the allow list, add them to `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv`. If you wish to remove an entry from the default lookup file, you will have to modify the macro itself to set the allow_list value for that process to false. You can modify the limit parameter and search scheduling to better suit your environment.", "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate processes may be only rarely executed in your environment. As these are identified, update `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv` to filter them out of your search results.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Unusual Processes", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.PT", "PR.DS", "DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_name"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "lookup update=true lookup_rare_process_allow_list_default process as process OUTPUTNEW allow_list | where allow_list=\"false\" | lookup update=true lookup_rare_process_allow_list_local process as process OUTPUT allow_list | where allow_list=\"false\"", "description": "This macro is intended to allow_list processes that have been definied as rare", "name": "filter_rare_process_allow_list", "lookups": [{"case_sensitive_match": "false", "default_match": "false", "description": "A list of rare processes that are legitimate that is provided by Splunk", "filename": "rare_process_allow_list_default.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(process)", "min_matches": 1, "name": "lookup_rare_process_allow_list_default", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/rare_process_allow_list_default.csv"}, {"case_sensitive_match": "false", "default_match": "false", "description": "A list of rare processes that are legitimate provided by the end user", "filename": "rare_process_allow_list_local.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(process)", "min_matches": 1, "name": "lookup_rare_process_allow_list_local", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/rare_process_allow_list_local.csv"}]}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_rare_executables_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detection of tools built by NirSoft", "id": "1297fb80-f42a-4q4a-9c8b-78c061417cf6", "version": 3, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for specific command-line arguments that may indicate the execution of tools made by Nirsoft, which are legitimate, but may be abused by attackers.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) values(Processes.process) as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process=\"* /stext *\" OR Processes.process=\"* /scomma *\" ) by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "While legitimate, these NirSoft tools are prone to abuse. You should verfiy that the tool was used for a legitimate purpose.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A "], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1072"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.user"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Software Deployment Tools"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Silence", "APT32", "Threat Group-1314"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft_filter"}]}, {"name": "SMB Traffic Spike", "id": "7f5fb3e1-4209-4914-90db-0ec21b936378", "version": 3, "date": "2020-07-22", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search looks for spikes in the number of Server Message Block (SMB) traffic connections.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb by _time span=1h, All_Traffic.src | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | eventstats max(_time) as maxtime | stats count as num_data_samples max(eval(if(_time >= relative_time(maxtime, \"-70m@m\"), count, null))) as count avg(eval(if(_time upperBound AND num_data_samples >=50, 1, 0) | where isOutlier=1 | table src count | `smb_traffic_spike_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic logs and populating the `Network_Traffic` data model.", "known_false_positives": "A file server may experience high-demand loads that could cause this analytic to trigger.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Ransomware", "DHS Report TA18-074A"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021.002", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.dest_port", "All_Traffic.app", "All_Traffic.src"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "Remote Services"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "APT32", "Orangeworm", "FIN8", "APT3", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-1314", "Turla", "Deep Panda", "Ke3chang", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "smb_traffic_spike_filter"}]}, {"name": "SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK", "id": "d25773ba-9ad8-48d1-858e-07ad0bbeb828", "version": 3, "date": "2020-07-22", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search uses the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) to identify spikes in the number of Server Message Block (SMB) connections.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as port from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb by _time span=1h, All_Traffic.src | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%A\") | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | apply smb_pdfmodel threshold=0.001 | rename \"IsOutlier(count)\" as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | sort -count | table _time src dest port count | `smb_traffic_spike___mltk_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. In addition, the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or greater must be installed on your search heads, along with any required dependencies. Finally, the support search \"Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK\" must be executed before this detection search, because it builds a machine-learning (ML) model over the historical data used by this search. It is important that this search is run in the same app context as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild the model with the latest data available in your environment.\\\nThis search produces a field (Number of events,count) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. This field contributes additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following field, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry): \\\n1. **Label:** Number of events, **Field:** count\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review is found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", "known_false_positives": "If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider reducing the value of the threshold in the search. You should also periodically re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data. Please update the `smb_traffic_spike_mltk_filter` macro to filter out false positive results", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Ransomware", "DHS Report TA18-074A"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021.002", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.dest_ip", "All_Traffic.dest_port", "All_Traffic.app", "All_Traffic.src"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "Remote Services"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "APT32", "Orangeworm", "FIN8", "APT3", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-1314", "Turla", "Deep Panda", "Ke3chang", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "smb_traffic_spike___mltk_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions", "id": "473bd65f-06ca-4dfe-a2b8-ba04ab4a0084", "version": 3, "date": "2020-07-22", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Email"], "description": "This search looks for emails that have attachments with suspicious file extensions.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Email where All_Email.file_name=\"*\" by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.file_name All_Email.message_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Email\")` | `suspicious_email_attachments` | `suspicious_email_attachment_extensions_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "You need to ingest data from emails. Specifically, the sender's address and the file names of any attachments must be mapped to the Email data model. \\\n **Splunk Phantom Playbook Integration**\\\nIf Splunk Phantom is also configured in your environment, a Playbook called \"Suspicious Email Attachment Investigate and Delete\" can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/`, and add the correct hostname to the \"Phantom Instance\" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search. The notable event will be sent to Phantom and the playbook will gather further information about the file attachment and its network behaviors. If Phantom finds malicious behavior and an analyst approves of the results, the email will be deleted from the user's inbox.", "known_false_positives": "None identified", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Suspicious Emails"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566.001", "T1566"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.IP"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Email.file_name", "All_Email.src_user", "All_Email.message_id"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Spearphishing Attachment", "Phishing"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "lookup update=true is_suspicious_file_extension_lookup file_name OUTPUT suspicious | search suspicious=true", "description": "This macro limits the output to email attachments that have suspicious extensions", "name": "suspicious_email_attachments", "lookups": [{"description": "A list of suspicious extensions for email attachments", "filename": "is_suspicious_file_extension_lookup.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(file_name)", "name": "is_suspicious_file_extension_lookup", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/is_suspicious_file_extension_lookup.csv"}]}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_email_attachment_extensions_filter"}]}, {"name": "Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces", "id": "56e877a6-1455-4479-ada6-0550dc1e22f8", "version": 2, "date": "2017-09-19", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Email"], "description": "Attackers often use spaces as a means to obfuscate an attachment's file extension. This search looks for messages with email attachments that have many spaces within the file names.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(All_Email.recipient) as recipient_address min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Email where All_Email.file_name=\"*\" by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.file_name All_Email.message_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Email\")` | eval space_ratio = (mvcount(split(file_name,\" \"))-1)/len(file_name) | search space_ratio >= 0.1 | rex field=recipient_address \"(?.*)@\" | `email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You need to ingest data from emails. Specifically, the sender's address and the file names of any attachments must be mapped to the Email data model. The threshold ratio is set to 10%, but this value can be configured to suit each environment. \\\n **Splunk Phantom Playbook Integration**\\\nIf Splunk Phantom is also configured in your environment, a playbook called \"Suspicious Email Attachment Investigate and Delete\" can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/` and add the correct hostname to the \"Phantom Instance\" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search. The notable event will be sent to Phantom and the playbook will gather further information about the file attachment and its network behaviors. If Phantom finds malicious behavior and an analyst approves of the results, the email will be deleted from the user's inbox.", "known_false_positives": "None at this time", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Suspicious Emails"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Email.recipient", "All_Email.file_name", "All_Email.src_user", "All_Email.file_name", "All_Email.message_id"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation", "id": "aa0e28b1-0521-4b6f-9d2a-7b87e34af246", "version": 1, "date": "2020-02-20", "author": "Rod Soto, Rico Valdez, Splunk", "description": "Use the searches in this story to monitor your Kubernetes registry repositories for upload, and deployment of potentially vulnerable, backdoor, or implanted containers. These searches provide information on source users, destination path, container names and repository names. The searches provide context to address Mitre T1525 which refers to container implantation upload to a company's repository either in Amazon Elastic Container Registry, Google Container Registry and Azure Container Registry.", "narrative": "Container Registrys provide a way for organizations to keep customized images of their development and infrastructure environment in private. However if these repositories are misconfigured or priviledge users credentials are compromise, attackers can potentially upload implanted containers which can be deployed across the organization. These searches allow operator to monitor who, when and what was uploaded to container registry.", "references": ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation", "category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1525"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Implant Container Image"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "New container uploaded to AWS ECR", "id": "f0f70b40-f7ad-489d-9905-23d149da8099", "version": 1, "date": "2020-02-20", "author": "Rod Soto, Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This searches show information on uploaded containers including source user, image id, source IP user type, http user agent, region, first time, last time of operation (PutImage). These searches are based on Cloud Infrastructure Data Model.", "search": "| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Cloud_Infrastructure.Compute where Compute.user_type!=\"AssumeRole\" AND Compute.http_user_agent=\"AWS Internal\" AND Compute.event_name=\"PutImage\" by Compute.image_id Compute.src_user Compute.src Compute.region Compute.msg Compute.user_type | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Compute\")` | `new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model. Please also customize the `container_implant_aws_detection_filter` macro to filter out the false positives.", "known_false_positives": "Uploading container is a normal behavior from developers or users with access to container registry.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation"], "asset_type": "AWS ECR container", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1525"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Implant Container Image"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228", "id": "b4453928-5a98-11ec-afcd-8de10b48fc52", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-11", "author": "Jose Hernandez", "description": "Log4Shell or CVE-2021-44228 is a Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability in the Apache Log4j library, a widely used and ubiquitous logging framework for Java. The vulnerability allows an attacker who can control log messages to execute arbitrary code loaded from attacker-controlled servers and we anticipate that most apps using the Log4j library will meet this condition.", "narrative": "In late November 2021, Chen Zhaojun of Alibaba identified a remote code execution vulnerability. Previous work was seen in a 2016 Blackhat talk by Alvaro Munoz and Oleksandr Mirosh called [\"A Journey from JNDI/LDAP Manipulation to Remote Code Execution Dream Land\"](https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Munoz-A-Journey-From-JNDI-LDAP-Manipulation-To-RCE.pdf). Reported under the CVE ID : CVE-2021-44228, released to the public on December 10, 2021. The vulnerability is exploited through improper deserialization of user input passed into the framework. It permits remote code execution and it can allow an attacker to leak sensitive data, such as environment variables, or execute malicious software on the target system.", "references": ["https://mbechler.github.io/2021/12/10/PSA_Log4Shell_JNDI_Injection/", "https://www.fastly.com/blog/digging-deeper-into-log4shell-0day-rce-exploit-found-in-log4j", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/log4j2-vulnerability-analysis-and-mitigation-recommendations/", "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/log-jammin-log4j-2-rce.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Application Security", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1105", "T1059.001", "T1190", "T1059.003"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploit Public-Facing Application", "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "Windows Command Shell", "Ingress Tool Transfer", "PowerShell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Initial Access", "Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Sandworm Team", "Magic Hound", "Rancor", "Axiom", "Stealth Falcon", "Inception", "APT1", "Tropic Trooper", "Dark Caracal", "Kimsuky", "PLATINUM", "TEMP.Veles", "TA459", "Poseidon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN8", "Ke3chang", "Turla", "APT39", "Molerats", "Leviathan", "Rocke", "Gamaredon Group", "APT29", "TA505", "Whitefly", "Frankenstein", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "APT-C-36", "WIRTE", "APT37", "APT19", "Darkhotel", "APT41", "CopyKittens", "FIN5", "menuPass", "FIN6", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "admin@338", "Honeybee", "APT3", "Wizard Spider", "Thrip", "Sowbug", "APT18", "Threat Group-1314", "APT38", "Sharpshooter", "MuddyWater", "FIN10", "DarkVishnya", "Patchwork", "Elderwood", "APT28", "Gallmaker", "APT33", "Gorgon Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN7", "BlackTech", "Night Dragon", "DarkHydrus"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", "id": "900bc324-59f3-11ec-9fb4-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-10", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of curl on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=curl (Processes.process=\"*-s *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", "references": ["https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ingress Tool Transfer", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1105"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Ingress Tool Transfer"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Whitefly", "Rocke", "APT39", "Tropic Trooper", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Frankenstein", "Silence", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "APT33", "MuddyWater", "APT18", "APT38", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "OilRig", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT37", "FIN8", "PLATINUM", "Leviathan", "Elderwood", "Magic Hound", "APT3", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Patchwork", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-3390", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter"}]}, {"name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", "id": "8281ce42-5c50-11ec-82d2-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-13", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Web"], "description": "The following analytic identifies a Java user agent performing a GET request for a .class file from the remote site. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell).", "search": "| tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_user_agent=\"*Java*\" Web.http_method=\"GET\" Web.url=\"*.class*\" by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting web or proxy logs, or ensure it is being filled by a proxy like device, into the Web Datamodel. For additional filtering, allow list private IP space or restrict by known good.", "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required in some instances, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2021/12/as-log4shell-wreaks-havoc-payroll-service-reports-ransomware-attack/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "asset_type": "Web Server", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:network"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A Java user agent $http_user_agent$ was performing a $http_method$ to retrieve a remote class file.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1190"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "http_user_agent", "type": "Other", "role": ["other"]}, {"name": "http_method", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Web.http_method", "Web.url", "Web.url_length", "Web.src", "Web.dest", "Web.http_user_agent"], "risk_score": 40, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploit Public-Facing Application"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Rocke", "APT39", "BlackTech", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Night Dragon", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter"}]}, {"name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", "id": "54a6ed00-3256-11ec-b031-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-12-13", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies command-line arguments where `cmd.exe /c` is used to execute a program. `cmd /c` is used to run commands in MS-DOS and terminate after command or process completion. This technique is commonly seen in adversaries and malware to execute batch command using different shell like PowerShell or different process other than `cmd.exe`. This is a good hunting query for suspicious command-line made by a script or relative process execute it.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` AND Processes.process=\"* /c *\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives may be high based on legitimate scripted code in any environment. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["IcedID", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/cmd_carry_str_param/sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting spawn a new process.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059.003", "T1059"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 30, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Windows Command Shell", "Command and Scripting Interpreter"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TA505", "Blue Mockingbird", "Tropic Trooper", "Frankenstein", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "Honeybee", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Turla", "Silence", "APT32", "APT39", "Darkhotel", "MuddyWater", "APT18", "APT38", "Dark Caracal", "Gorgon Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Rancor", "Ke3chang", "APT37", "Leviathan", "FIN8", "APT28", "Magic Hound", "Sowbug", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Gamaredon Group", "Suckfly", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-1314", "APT3", "admin@338", "APT1", "APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_cmd"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter_filter"}]}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window", "id": "ee18ed37-0802-4268-9435-b3b91aaa18db", "version": 7, "date": "2021-10-05", "author": "David Dorsey, Michael Haag Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following hunting analytic identifies PowerShell commands utilizing the WindowStyle parameter to hide the window on the compromised endpoint. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it is overriding the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide its activity from the user, and connects to the Internet. Removed in this version of the query is New-Object. The analytic identifies all variations of WindowStyle, as PowerShell allows the ability to shorten the parameter. For example w, win, windowsty and so forth. In addition, through our research it was identified that PowerShell will interpret different command switch types beyond the hyphen. We have added endash, emdash, horizontal bar, and forward slash.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"(?i)[\\-|\\/|\u2013|\u2014|\u2015]w(in*d*o*w*s*t*y*l*e*)*\\s+[^-]\") | `malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate process can have this combination of command-line options, but it's not common.", "references": ["https://regexr.com/663rr", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses/blob/master/TestHarnesses/T1059.001_PowerShell/OutPowerShellCommandLineParameter.ps1", "https://ss64.com/ps/powershell.html", "https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/1440758396534214658?s=20", "https://blog.netlab.360.com/ten-families-of-malicious-samples-are-spreading-using-the-log4j2-vulnerability-now/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "HAFNIUM Group", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Command And Control"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/hidden_powershell/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "PowerShell processes $process$ started with parameters to modify the execution policy of the run, run in a hidden window, and connect to the Internet on host $dest$ executed by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059.001", "T1059"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process", "type": "Process", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["PowerShell", "Command and Scripting Interpreter"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "Gallmaker", "Turla", "APT19", "DarkHydrus", "APT28", "Thrip", "Gorgon Group", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leviathan", "TA459", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT32", "FIN7", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "APT3", "APT29", "Deep Panda", "APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_powershell"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window_filter"}]}, {"name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", "id": "35682718-5a85-11ec-b8f7-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-11", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of wget on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wget (Processes.process=\"*-q *\" OR Processes.process=\"*--quiet*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-O- *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", "references": ["https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ingress Tool Transfer", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1105"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Ingress Tool Transfer"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Whitefly", "Rocke", "APT39", "Tropic Trooper", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Frankenstein", "Silence", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "APT33", "MuddyWater", "APT18", "APT38", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "OilRig", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT37", "FIN8", "PLATINUM", "Leviathan", "Elderwood", "Magic Hound", "APT3", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Patchwork", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-3390", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter"}]}, {"name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", "id": "d2c14d28-5c47-11ec-9892-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-13", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "A required step while exploiting the CVE-2021-44228-Log4j vulnerability is that the victim server will perform outbound connections to attacker-controlled infrastructure. This is required as part of the JNDI lookup as well as for retrieving the second stage .class payload. The following analytic identifies the Java process reaching out to default ports used by the LDAP and RMI protocols. This behavior could represent successfull exploitation. Note that adversaries can easily decide to use arbitrary ports for these protocols and potentially bypass this detection.", "search": " `sysmon` EventCode=3 (process_name=java OR process_name=java.exe) (DestinationPort=389 OR DestinationPort=1389 OR DestinationPort = 1099 ) | rename Computer as dest | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, process_name, DestinationPort | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate Java applications may use perform outbound connections to these ports. Filter as needed", "references": ["https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", "https://www.govcert.admin.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_java/linux-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Java performed outbound connections to default ports of LDAP or RMI on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1190"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "process_name", "EventID", "CommandLine", "Computer", "DestinationPort", "DestinationIp"], "risk_score": 54, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploit Public-Facing Application"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Rocke", "APT39", "BlackTech", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Night Dragon", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter"}]}, {"name": "Hunting for Log4Shell", "id": "158b68fa-5d1a-11ec-aac8-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-14", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Web"], "description": "The following hunting query assists with quickly assessing CVE-2021-44228, or Log4Shell, activity mapped to the Web Datamodel. This is a combination query attempting to identify, score and dashboard. Because the Log4Shell vulnerability requires the string to be in the logs, this will work to identify the activity anywhere in the HTTP headers using _raw. Modify the first line to use the same pattern matching against other log sources. Scoring is based on a simple rubric of 0-5. 5 being the best match, and less than 5 meant to identify additional patterns that will equate to a higher total score. \\\nThe first jndi match identifies the standard pattern of `{jndi:` \\\njndi_fastmatch is meant to identify any jndi in the logs. The score is set low and is meant to be the \"base\" score used later. \\\njndi_proto is a protocol match that identifies `jndi` and one of `ldap, ldaps, rmi, dns, nis, iiop, corba, nds, http, https.` \\\nall_match is a very well written regex by https://gist.github.com/Schvenn that identifies nearly all patterns of this attack behavior. \\\nenv works to identify environment variables in the header, meant to capture `AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID`, `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY` and `env`. \\\nuri_detect is string match looking for the common uri paths currently being scanned/abused in the wild. \\\nkeywords matches on enumerated values that, like `$ctx:loginId`, that may be found in the header used by the adversary. \\\nlookup matching is meant to catch some basic obfuscation that has been identified using upper, lower and date. \\\nScoring will then occur based on any findings. The base score is meant to be 2 , created by jndi_fastmatch. Everything else is meant to increase that score. \\\nFinally, a simple table is created to show the scoring and the _raw field. Sort based on score or columns of interest.", "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | eval jndi=if(match(_raw, \"(\\{|%7B)[jJnNdDiI]{4}:\"),4,0) | eval jndi_fastmatch=if(match(_raw, \"[jJnNdDiI]{4}\"),2,0) | eval jndi_proto=if(match(_raw,\"(?i)jndi:(ldap[s]?|rmi|dns|nis|iiop|corba|nds|http|https):\"),5,0) | eval all_match = if(match(_raw, \"(?i)(%(25){0,}20|\\s)*(%(25){0,}24|\\$)(%(25){0,}20|\\s)*(%(25){0,}7B|{)(%(25){0,}20|\\s)*(%(25){0,}(6A|4A)|J)(%(25){0,}(6E|4E)|N)(%(25){0,}(64|44)|D)(%(25){0,}(69|49)|I)(%(25){0,}20|\\s)*(%(25){0,}3A|:)[\\w\\%]+(%(25){1,}3A|:)(%(25){1,}2F|\\/)[^\\n]+\"),5,0) | eval env_var = if(match(_raw, \"env:\") OR match(_raw, \"env:AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID\") OR match(_raw, \"env:AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY\"),5,0) | eval uridetect = if(match(_raw, \"(?i)Basic\\/Command\\/Base64|Basic\\/ReverseShell|Basic\\/TomcatMemshell|Basic\\/JBossMemshell|Basic\\/WebsphereMemshell|Basic\\/SpringMemshell|Basic\\/Command|Deserialization\\/CommonsCollectionsK|Deserialization\\/CommonsBeanutils|Deserialization\\/Jre8u20\\/TomcatMemshell|Deserialization\\/CVE_2020_2555\\/WeblogicMemshell|TomcatBypass|GroovyBypass|WebsphereBypass\"),4,0) | eval keywords = if(match(_raw,\"(?i)\\$\\{ctx\\:loginId\\}|\\$\\{map\\:type\\}|\\$\\{filename\\}|\\$\\{date\\:MM-dd-yyyy\\}|\\$\\{docker\\:containerId\\}|\\$\\{docker\\:containerName\\}|\\$\\{docker\\:imageName\\}|\\$\\{env\\:USER\\}|\\$\\{event\\:Marker\\}|\\$\\{mdc\\:UserId\\}|\\$\\{java\\:runtime\\}|\\$\\{java\\:vm\\}|\\$\\{java\\:os\\}|\\$\\{jndi\\:logging/context-name\\}|\\$\\{hostName\\}|\\$\\{docker\\:containerId\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:accountName\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:clusterName\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:containerId\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:containerName\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:host\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:labels.app\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:labels.podTemplateHash\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:masterUrl\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:namespaceId\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:namespaceName\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:podId\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:podIp\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:podName\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:imageId\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:imageName\\}|\\$\\{log4j\\:configLocation\\}|\\$\\{log4j\\:configParentLocation\\}|\\$\\{spring\\:spring.application.name\\}|\\$\\{main\\:myString\\}|\\$\\{main\\:0\\}|\\$\\{main\\:1\\}|\\$\\{main\\:2\\}|\\$\\{main\\:3\\}|\\$\\{main\\:4\\}|\\$\\{main\\:bar\\}|\\$\\{name\\}|\\$\\{marker\\}|\\$\\{marker\\:name\\}|\\$\\{spring\\:profiles.active[0]|\\$\\{sys\\:logPath\\}|\\$\\{web\\:rootDir\\}|\\$\\{sys\\:user.name\\}\"),4,0) | eval obf = if(match(_raw, \"(\\$|%24)[^ /]*({|%7b)[^ /]*(j|%6a)[^ /]*(n|%6e)[^ /]*(d|%64)[^ /]*(i|%69)[^ /]*(:|%3a)[^ /]*(:|%3a)[^ /]*(/|%2f)\"),5,0) | eval lookups = if(match(_raw, \"date:\") OR match(_raw, \"upper:\") OR match(_raw, \"lower:\"),4,0) | addtotals fieldname=Score, jndi, jndi_proto, env_var, uridetect, all_match, jndi_fastmatch, keywords, obf, lookups | where Score > 2 | stats values(Score) by jndi, jndi_proto, env_var, uridetect, all_match, jndi_fastmatch, keywords, lookups, obf, _raw | `hunting_for_log4shell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "Out of the box, the Web datamodel is required to be pre-filled. However, tested was performed against raw httpd access logs. Change the first line to any dataset to pass the regex's against.", "known_false_positives": "It is highly possible you will find false positives, however, the base score is set to 2 for _any_ jndi found in raw logs. tune and change as needed, include any filtering.", "references": ["https://gist.github.com/olafhartong/916ebc673ba066537740164f7e7e1d72", "https://gist.github.com/Neo23x0/e4c8b03ff8cdf1fa63b7d15db6e3860b#gistcomment-3994449", "https://regex101.com/r/OSrm0q/1/", "https://github.com/Neo23x0/signature-base/blob/master/yara/expl_log4j_cve_2021_44228.yar", "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/12/12/log4shell-hell-anatomy-of-an-exploit-outbreak/", "https://gist.github.com/MHaggis/1899b8554f38c8692a9fb0ceba60b44c", "https://twitter.com/sasi2103/status/1469764719850442760?s=20"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "asset_type": "Web Server", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:network"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/log4shell-nginx.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Hunting for Log4Shell exploitation has occurred.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1190"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "http_method", "type": "Other", "role": ["other"]}, {"name": "src", "type": "Other", "role": ["other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Web.http_method", "Web.url", "Web.url_length", "Web.src", "Web.dest", "Web.http_user_agent", "_raw"], "risk_score": 40, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploit Public-Facing Application"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Rocke", "APT39", "BlackTech", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Night Dragon", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "hunting_for_log4shell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Any Powershell DownloadFile", "id": "1a93b7ea-7af7-11eb-adb5-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-03-01", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a file using `DownloadFile` method. This particular method is utilized in many different PowerShell frameworks to download files and output to disk. Identify the source (IP/domain) and destination file and triage appropriately. If AMSI logging or PowerShell transaction logs are available, review for further details of the implant.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process=*DownloadFile* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `any_powershell_downloadfile_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present and filtering will need to occur by parent process or command line argument. It may be required to modify this query to an EDR product for more granular coverage.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.net.webclient.downloadfile?view=net-5.0", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "Ingress Tool Transfer", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exploitation"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior identifies the use of DownloadFile within PowerShell.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "PowerShell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "Gallmaker", "Turla", "APT19", "DarkHydrus", "APT28", "Thrip", "Gorgon Group", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leviathan", "TA459", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT32", "FIN7", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "APT3", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_powershell"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "any_powershell_downloadfile_filter"}]}, {"name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", "id": "c184f12e-5c90-11ec-bf1f-497c9a704a72", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-13", "author": "Jose Hernandez", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Web"], "description": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we first limit the scope of our search to the Web Datamodel and use the `| from datamodel` function to benefit from schema accelerated searching capabilities, mainly because the second part of the detection is pretty heavy, it runs a regex across all _raw events that looks for `${jndi:ldap://` pattern across all potential web fields available to the raw data, like http headers for example. If you see results for this detection, it means that there was a attempt at a injection, which could be a reconnaissance activity or a valid expliotation attempt, but this does not exactly mean that the host was indeed successfully exploited.", "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | regex _raw=\"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)\\w+(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?\" | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx.", "known_false_positives": "If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives.", "references": ["https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Application Log", "Stage:Execution"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Exploitation"], "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["action", "category", "dest", "dest_port", "http_content_type", "http_method", "http_referrer", "http_user_agent", "site", "src", "url", "url_domain", "user"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploit Public-Facing Application"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Rocke", "APT39", "BlackTech", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Night Dragon", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter"}]}, {"name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", "id": "69afee44-5c91-11ec-bf1f-497c9a704a72", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-13", "author": "Jose Hernandez", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic", "Web"], "description": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we match the invocation function with a network connection to a malicious ip address.", "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | rex field=_raw max_match=0 \"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)(?\\w+)(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?(?[a-zA-Z0-9\\.\\-\\_\\$]+)\" | join affected_host type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic by All_Traffic.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename dest AS affected_host] | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx.", "known_false_positives": "If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives.", "references": ["https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Application Log", "Stage:Execution"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_network_logs/log4j_network_logs.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["action", "category", "dest", "dest_port", "http_content_type", "http_method", "http_referrer", "http_user_agent", "site", "src", "url", "url_domain", "user"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploit Public-Facing Application"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Rocke", "APT39", "BlackTech", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Night Dragon", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", "id": "c77162d3-f91c-45cc-80c8-22f6v546119f", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-13", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Johan Bjerke, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "Malicious actors often abuse misconfigured LDAP servers or applications that use the LDAP servers in organizations. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. This search will help determine if you have any LDAP connections to IP addresses outside of private (RFC1918) address space.", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as earliest_time latest(_time) as latest_time values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port = 389 OR All_Traffic.dest_port = 636 AND NOT (All_Traffic.dest_ip = 10.0.0.0/8 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=192.168.0.0/16 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip = 172.16.0.0/12) by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip |`drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | where src_ip != dest_ip | `security_content_ctime(latest_time)` | `security_content_ctime(earliest_time)` |`detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format and should be mapped to the Network Traffic datamodels that are in use for this search.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown at this moment. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. Please check those servers to verify if the activity is legitimate.", "references": ["https://www.govcert.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_ldap/bro_conn.json"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An outbound LDAP connection from $src_ip$ in your infrastructure connecting to dest ip $dest_ip$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1190", "T1059"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src_ip", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_ip", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.dest_ip", "All_Traffic.dest_port", "All_Traffic.src_ip"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploit Public-Facing Application", "Command and Scripting Interpreter"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Rocke", "APT39", "BlackTech", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Night Dragon", "Axiom", "APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter"}]}, {"name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", "id": "7b09db8a-5c20-11ec-9945-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-13", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the process name of Java, Apache, or Tomcat spawning a Linux shell. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). The shells included in the macro are \"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\". Upon triage, review parallel processes and command-line arguments to determine legitimacy.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=java OR Processes.parent_process_name=apache OR Processes.parent_process_name=tomcat `linux_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_java_spawning_shell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. Ensure EDR product is mapping OS Linux to the datamodel properly. Add any additional java process names for your environment to the analytic as needed.", "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required on internal developer build systems or classify assets as web facing and restrict the analytic based on that.", "references": ["https://blog.netlab.360.com/ten-families-of-malicious-samples-are-spreading-using-the-log4j2-vulnerability-now/", "https://gist.github.com/olafhartong/916ebc673ba066537740164f7e7e1d72"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "dataset": [], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ spawning a Linux shell, potentially indicative of exploitation.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1190"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 40, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploit Public-Facing Application"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Rocke", "APT39", "BlackTech", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Night Dragon", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name IN (\"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\"))", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "linux_shells"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "linux_java_spawning_shell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Java Spawning Shells", "id": "28c81306-5c47-11ec-bfea-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-13", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the process name of java.exe and w3wp.exe spawning a Windows shell. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). The shells included in the macro are \"cmd.exe\", \"powershell.exe\". Upon triage, review parallel processes and command-line arguments to determine legitimacy.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=java.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=w3wp.exe `windows_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_java_spawning_shells_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. Restrict the analytic to publicly facing endpoints to reduce false positives. Add any additional identified web application process name to the query. Add any further Windows process names to the macro (ex. LOLBins) to further expand this query.", "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required on internal developer build systems or classify assets as web facing and restrict the analytic based on that.", "references": ["https://blog.netlab.360.com/ten-families-of-malicious-samples-are-spreading-using-the-log4j2-vulnerability-now/", "https://gist.github.com/olafhartong/916ebc673ba066537740164f7e7e1d72"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "dataset": [], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ spawning a Windows shell, potentially indicative of exploitation.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1190"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 40, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploit Public-Facing Application"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Rocke", "APT39", "BlackTech", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Night Dragon", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe)", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "windows_shells"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "windows_java_spawning_shells_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", "id": "8168ca88-392e-42f4-85a2-767579c660ce", "version": 1, "date": "2020-08-25", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "description": "Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.", "narrative": "Monitoring your cloud infrastructure logs allows you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the their cloud environments to ensure that your instances are not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your cloud compute instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities.", "references": ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", "category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1537", "T1078.004", "T1078"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Cloud Accounts", "Valid Accounts", "Transfer Data to Cloud Account"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Sandworm Team", "TEMP.Veles", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT39", "Carbanak", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT41", "FIN5", "menuPass", "FIN6", "OilRig", "Wizard Spider", "APT18", "no", "FIN10", "PittyTiger", "FIN4", "APT28", "APT33", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Night Dragon"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "id": "ef629fc9-1583-4590-b62a-f2247fbf7bbf", "version": 1, "date": "2020-08-21", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search finds for the number successfully destroyed cloud instances for every 4 hour block. This is split up between weekdays and the weekend. It then applies the probability densitiy model previously created and alerts on any outliers.", "search": "| tstats count as instances_destroyed values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=deleted AND All_Changes.status=success AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%w\") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | join HourOfDay isWeekend [summary cloud_excessive_instances_destroyed_v1] | where cardinality >=16 | apply cloud_excessive_instances_destroyed_v1 threshold=0.005 | rename \"IsOutlier(instances_destroyed)\" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1 | eval expected_upper_threshold = mvindex(split(mvindex(BoundaryRanges, -1), \":\"), 0) | eval distance_from_threshold = instances_destroyed - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, instances_destroyed, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold, object_id | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_destroyed_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed` to create the probability density function.", "known_false_positives": "Many service accounts configured within a cloud infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities"], "asset_type": "Cloud Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.object_id", "All_Changes.action", "All_Changes.status", "All_Changes.object_category", "All_Changes.user"], "risk_object": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 10, "security_domain": "Cloud", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Cloud Accounts", "Valid Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_destroyed_filter"}]}, {"name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched", "id": "f2361e9f-3928-496c-a556-120cd4223a65", "version": 2, "date": "2020-08-21", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search finds for the number successfully created cloud instances for every 4 hour block. This is split up between weekdays and the weekend. It then applies the probability densitiy model previously created and alerts on any outliers.", "search": "| tstats count as instances_launched values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=created) AND All_Changes.status=success AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%w\") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | join HourOfDay isWeekend [summary cloud_excessive_instances_created_v1] | where cardinality >=16 | apply cloud_excessive_instances_created_v1 threshold=0.005 | rename \"IsOutlier(instances_launched)\" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1 | eval expected_upper_threshold = mvindex(split(mvindex(BoundaryRanges, -1), \":\"), 0) | eval distance_from_threshold = instances_launched - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, instances_launched, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold, object_id | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_launched_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched` to create the probability density function.", "known_false_positives": "Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Cryptomining", "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities"], "asset_type": "Cloud Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.object_id", "All_Changes.action", "All_Changes.status", "All_Changes.object_category", "All_Changes.user"], "risk_object": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 40, "security_domain": "Cloud", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Cloud Accounts", "Valid Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_launched_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect shared ec2 snapshot", "id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-290bf3d222c4", "version": 2, "date": "2021-07-20", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes AWS CloudTrail events to identify when an EC2 snapshot permissions are modified to be shared with a different AWS account. This method is used by adversaries to exfiltrate the EC2 snapshot.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=ModifySnapshotAttribute | rename requestParameters.createVolumePermission.add.items{}.userId as requested_account_id | search requested_account_id != NULL | eval match=if(requested_account_id==aws_account_id,\"Match\",\"No Match\") | table _time user_arn src_ip requestParameters.attributeType requested_account_id aws_account_id match vendor_region user_agent | where match = \"No Match\" | `detect_shared_ec2_snapshot_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately shared a snapshot with others for a specific purpose.", "references": ["https://labs.nettitude.com/blog/how-to-exfiltrate-aws-ec2-data/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", "Data Exfiltration"], "asset_type": "EC2 Snapshot", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1537/aws_snapshot_exfil/aws_cloudtrail_events.json"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "AWS EC2 snapshot from account $aws_account_id$ is shared with $requested_account_id$ by user $user_arn$ from $src_ip$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1537"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user_arn", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "src_ip", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "user_arn", "src_ip", "requestParameters.attributeType", "aws_account_id", "vendor_region", "user_agent"], "risk_score": 48, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Transfer Data to Cloud Account"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_shared_ec2_snapshot_filter"}]}, {"name": "Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User", "id": "7fb15084-b14e-405a-bd61-a6de15a40722", "version": 1, "date": "2020-07-29", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search looks for cloud instances being modified by users who have not previously modified them.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id values(All_Changes.command) as command from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=modified All_Changes.change_type=EC2 All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user user as user OUTPUTNEW firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenUser=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenUser) OR firstTimeSeenUser > relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") | table firstTime user command object_id count | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_instance_modified_by_previously_unseen_user_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search has a dependency on other searches to create and update a baseline of users observed to be associated with this activity. The search \"Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update\" should be enabled for this detection to properly work.", "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a new user will start to modify EC2 instances when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is modifying instances that this is the intended behavior.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json"], "impact": 70, "message": "User $user$ is modifying an instance $dest$ for the first time.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.object_id", "All_Changes.command", "All_Changes.action", "All_Changes.change_type", "All_Changes.status", "All_Changes.user"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Cloud Accounts", "Valid Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "cloud_instance_modified_by_previously_unseen_user_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A table of users seen making instance modifications, and the first and last time that the activity was observed", "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user", "name": "previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user", "fields_list": "_key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, user, enough_data"}]}]}, {"name": "Data Exfiltration", "id": "66b0fe0c-1351-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002", "version": 1, "date": "2020-10-21", "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", "description": "The stealing of data by an adversary.", "narrative": "Exfiltration comes in many flavors. Adversaries can collect data over encrypted or non-encrypted channels. They can utilise Command and Control channels that are already in place to exfiltrate data. They can use both standard data transfer protocols such as FTP, SCP, etc to exfiltrate data. Or they can use non-standard protocols such as DNS, ICMP, etc with specially crafted fields to try and circumvent security technologies in place.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Data Exfiltration", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1041", "T1537", "T1566", "T1114.003", "T1048", "T1048.003", "T1114", "T1114.001"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Email Collection", "Phishing", "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", "Exfiltration Over C2 Channel", "Email Forwarding Rule", "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", "Local Email Collection", "Transfer Data to Cloud Account"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Exfiltration", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "APT1", "Kimsuky", "FIN8", "Ke3chang", "Gamaredon Group", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "Soft Cell", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "Thrip", "Wizard Spider", "APT3", "no", "MuddyWater", "APT33"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App", "id": "2452e632-9e0d-11eb-bacd-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-15", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. This technique are seen in couple of malware and APT group to exfiltrated collected data in a infected machine or infected network. This detection is looking for unique use of nslookup where it tries to use specific record type, TXT, A, AAAA, that are commonly used by attacker and also the retry parameter which is designed to query C2 DNS multiple tries.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"nslookup.exe\" Processes.process = \"*-querytype=*\" OR Processes.process=\"*-qt=*\" OR Processes.process=\"*-q=*\" OR Processes.process=\"-type=*\" OR Processes.process=\"*-retry=*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of nslookup.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "admin nslookup usage", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7_spear_phishing.html", "https://www.varonis.com/blog/dns-tunneling/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Dynamic DNS", "Command and Control", "Data Exfiltration"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/nslookup_exfil/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ performing activity related to DNS exfiltration.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1048"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app_filter"}]}, {"name": "DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App", "id": "2452e632-9e0d-11eb-34ba-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-07", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "This search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. This technique are seen in couple of malware and APT group to exfiltrated collected data in a infected machine or infected network. This detection is looking for unique use of nslookup where it tries to use specific record type, TXT, A, AAAA, that are commonly used by attacker and also the retry parameter which is designed to query C2 DNS multiple tries.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where \"Endpoint_Processes\" IN(_datamodels) | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null), process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_path\"), \"string\", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND process_name IS NOT NULL AND process_name=\"nslookup.exe\" AND (like (cmd_line, \"%-querytype=%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%-qt=%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%-q=%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%-type=%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%-retry=%\")) | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null)) | eval body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line, \"process_name\", process_name, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process_name, \"process_path\", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint_Processess` datamodel.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible for some legitimate administrative utilities to use similar cmd_line parameters. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7_spear_phishing.html", "https://www.varonis.com/blog/dns-tunneling/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Dynamic DNS", "Command and Control", "Data Exfiltration"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/nslookup_exfil/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ performing activity related to DNS exfiltration.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1048"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest_device_id", "process_name", "parent_process_name", "process_path", "dest_user_id", "process", "cmd_line"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app_filter"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App", "id": "0a69fdaa-a2b8-11eb-b16d-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-21", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. This technique are seen in couple of malware and APT group to exfiltrated collected data in a infected machine or infected network. This detection is looking for unique use of nslookup where it tries to use specific record type (TXT, A, AAAA) that are commonly used by attacker and also the retry parameter which is designed to query C2 DNS multiple tries.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode = 1 process_name = \"nslookup.exe\" | bucket _time span=15m | stats count as numNsLookup by Computer, _time | eventstats avg(numNsLookup) as avgNsLookup, stdev(numNsLookup) as stdNsLookup, count as numSlots by Computer | eval upperThreshold=(avgNsLookup + stdNsLookup *3) | eval isOutlier=if(avgNsLookup > 20 and avgNsLookup >= upperThreshold, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of nslookup.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7_spear_phishing.html", "https://www.varonis.com/blog/dns-tunneling/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Dynamic DNS", "Command and Control", "Data Exfiltration"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Scope:Local", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/nslookup_exfil/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Excessive usage of nslookup.exe has been detected on $Computer$. This detection is triggered as as it violates the dynamic threshold", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1048"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Computer", "process_name", "EventCode"], "risk_score": 28, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app_filter"}]}, {"name": "Mailsniper Invoke functions", "id": "a36972c8-b894-11eb-9f78-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-19", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect known mailsniper.ps1 functions executed in a machine. This technique was seen in some attacker to harvest some sensitive e-mail in a compromised exchange server.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message IN (\"*Invoke-GlobalO365MailSearch*\", \"*Invoke-GlobalMailSearch*\", \"*Invoke-SelfSearch*\", \"*Invoke-PasswordSprayOWA*\", \"*Invoke-PasswordSprayEWS*\",\"*Invoke-DomainHarvestOWA*\", \"*Invoke-UsernameHarvestOWA*\",\"*Invoke-OpenInboxFinder*\",\"*Invoke-InjectGEventAPI*\",\"*Invoke-InjectGEvent*\",\"*Invoke-SearchGmail*\", \"*Invoke-MonitorCredSniper*\", \"*Invoke-AddGmailRule*\",\"*Invoke-PasswordSprayEAS*\",\"*Invoke-UsernameHarvestEAS*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mailsniper_invoke_functions_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the powershell logs from your endpoints. make sure you enable needed registry to monitor this event.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/introducing-mailsniper-a-tool-for-searching-every-users-email-for-sensitive-data/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Data Exfiltration"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/casper/datasets1/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "mailsniper.ps1 functions $Message$ executed on a $ComputerName$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1114", "T1114.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Email Collection", "Local Email Collection"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Magic Hound", "APT1"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "mailsniper_invoke_functions_filter"}]}, {"name": "Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic", "id": "4477f3ea-a28f-11eb-b762-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-21", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search is designed to detect high frequency of archive files data exfiltration through HTTP POST method protocol. This are one of the common techniques used by APT or trojan spy after doing the data collection like screenshot, recording, sensitive data to the infected machines. The attacker may execute archiving command to the collected data, save it a temp folder with a hidden attribute then send it to its C2 through HTTP POST. Sometimes adversaries will rename the archive files or encode/encrypt to cover their tracks. This detection can detect a renamed archive files transfer to HTTP POST since it checks the request body header. Unfortunately this detection cannot support archive that was encrypted or encoded before doing the exfiltration.", "search": "`stream_http` http_method=POST |eval archive_hdr1=substr(form_data,1,2) | eval archive_hdr2 = substr(form_data,1,4) |stats values(form_data) as http_request_body min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by http_method http_user_agent uri_path url bytes_in bytes_out archive_hdr1 archive_hdr2 |where count >20 AND (archive_hdr1 = \"7z\" OR archive_hdr1 = \"PK\" OR archive_hdr2=\"Rar!\") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the stream HTTP logs or network logs that catch network traffic. Make sure that the http-request-body, payload, or request field is enabled in stream http configuration.", "known_false_positives": "Normal archive transfer via HTTP protocol may trip this detection.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/001/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/apt39-iranian-cyber-espionage-group-focused-on-personal-information.html", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Command and Control", "Data Exfiltration"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/archive_http_post/stream_http_events.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "message": "A http post $http_method$ sending packet with possible archive bytes header 4form_data$ in uri path $uri_path$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1048.003", "T1048"], "observable": [{"name": "uri_path", "type": "UriPath", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "form_data", "type": "formdata", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "http_method", "http_user_agent", "uri_path", "url", "bytes_in", "bytes_out", "archive_hdr1", "archive_hdr2", "form_data"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration", "Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "Thrip", "FIN8", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=stream:http", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "stream_http"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic_filter"}]}, {"name": "Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data", "id": "e2b36208-a364-11eb-8909-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-22", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search is to detect potential plain HTTP POST method data exfiltration. This network traffic is commonly used by trickbot, trojanspy, keylogger or APT adversary where arguments or commands are sent in plain text to the remote C2 server using HTTP POST method as part of data exfiltration.", "search": "`stream_http` http_method=POST form_data IN (\"*wermgr.exe*\",\"*svchost.exe*\", \"*name=\\\"proclist\\\"*\",\"*ipconfig*\", \"*name=\\\"sysinfo\\\"*\", \"*net view*\") |stats values(form_data) as http_request_body min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by http_method http_user_agent uri_path url bytes_in bytes_out | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the stream HTTP logs or network logs that catch network traffic. Make sure that the http-request-body, payload, or request field is enabled.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/03/trickbot-primer.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Command and Control", "Data Exfiltration"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/plain_exfil_data/stream_http_events.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "message": "A http post $http_method$ sending packet with plain text of information $form_data$ in uri path $uri_path$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1048.003", "T1048"], "observable": [{"name": "uri_path", "type": "UriPath", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "form_data", "type": "formdata", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "http_method", "http_user_agent", "uri_path", "url", "bytes_in", "bytes_out"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration", "Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "Thrip", "FIN8", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=stream:http", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "stream_http"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration", "id": "82d06410-134c-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002", "version": 1, "date": "2020-10-21", "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for commands that the SNICat tool uses in the TLS SNI field.", "search": "`zeek_ssl` | rex field=server_name \"(?(LIST|LS|SIZE|LD|CB|CD|EX|ALIVE|EXIT|WHERE|finito)-[A-Za-z0-9]{16}\\.)\" | stats count by src_ip dest_ip server_name snicat | where count>0 | table src_ip dest_ip server_name snicat | `detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Zeek SSL data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format. We are detecting when any of the predefined SNICat commands are found within the server_name (SNI) field. These commands are LIST, LS, SIZE, LD, CB, EX, ALIVE, EXIT, WHERE, and finito. You can go further once this has been detected, and run other searches to decode the SNI data to prove or disprove if any data exfiltration has taken place.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown", "references": ["https://www.mnemonic.no/blog/introducing-snicat/", "https://github.com/mnemonic-no/SNIcat", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Data Exfiltration"], "asset_type": "Network", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1041"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "server_name", "src_ip", "dest_ip"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exfiltration Over C2 Channel"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "MuddyWater", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "Kimsuky", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "APT3", "Gamaredon Group", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "index=zeek sourcetype=\"zeek:ssl:json\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "zeek_ssl"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration_filter"}]}, {"name": "Gdrive suspicious file sharing", "id": "a7131dae-34e3-11ec-a2de-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-24", "author": "Rod Soto, Teoderick Contreras", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search can help the detection of compromised accounts or internal users sharing potentially malicious/classified documents with users outside your organization via GSuite file sharing .", "search": "`gsuite_drive` name=change_user_access | rename parameters.* as * | search email = \"*@yourdomain.com\" target_user != \"*@yourdomain.com\" | stats count values(owner) as owner values(target_user) as target values(doc_type) as doc_type values(doc_title) as doc_title dc(target_user) as distinct_target by src_ip email | where distinct_target > 50 | `gdrive_suspicious_file_sharing_filter`", "how_to_implement": "Need to implement Gsuite logging targeting Google suite drive activity. In order for the search to work for your environment please update `yourdomain.com` value in the query with the domain relavant for your organization.", "known_false_positives": "This is an anomaly search, you must specify your domain in the parameters so it either filters outside domains or focus on internal domains. This search may also help investigate compromise of accounts. By looking at for example source ip addresses, document titles and abnormal number of shares and shared target users.", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/investigating-gsuite-phishing-attacks-with-splunk.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Data Exfiltration"], "dataset": [[]], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "src_ip", "parameters.owner", "parameters.target_user", "parameters.doc_title", "parameters.doc_type"], "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Phishing"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:drive:json", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "gsuite_drive"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "gdrive_suspicious_file_sharing_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect shared ec2 snapshot", "id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-290bf3d222c4", "version": 2, "date": "2021-07-20", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes AWS CloudTrail events to identify when an EC2 snapshot permissions are modified to be shared with a different AWS account. This method is used by adversaries to exfiltrate the EC2 snapshot.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=ModifySnapshotAttribute | rename requestParameters.createVolumePermission.add.items{}.userId as requested_account_id | search requested_account_id != NULL | eval match=if(requested_account_id==aws_account_id,\"Match\",\"No Match\") | table _time user_arn src_ip requestParameters.attributeType requested_account_id aws_account_id match vendor_region user_agent | where match = \"No Match\" | `detect_shared_ec2_snapshot_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately shared a snapshot with others for a specific purpose.", "references": ["https://labs.nettitude.com/blog/how-to-exfiltrate-aws-ec2-data/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", "Data Exfiltration"], "asset_type": "EC2 Snapshot", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1537/aws_snapshot_exfil/aws_cloudtrail_events.json"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "AWS EC2 snapshot from account $aws_account_id$ is shared with $requested_account_id$ by user $user_arn$ from $src_ip$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1537"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user_arn", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "src_ip", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "user_arn", "src_ip", "requestParameters.attributeType", "aws_account_id", "vendor_region", "user_agent"], "risk_score": 48, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Transfer Data to Cloud Account"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_shared_ec2_snapshot_filter"}]}, {"name": "O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding", "id": "7f398cfb-918d-41f4-8db8-2e2474e02c28", "version": 1, "date": "2020-12-16", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects when an admin configured a forwarding rule for multiple mailboxes to the same destination.", "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=Set-Mailbox | spath input=Parameters | rename Identity AS src_user | search ForwardingAddress=* | stats dc(src_user) AS count_src_user earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(src_user) AS src_user values(user) AS user by ForwardingAddress | where count_src_user > 1 |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections", "Data Exfiltration"], "asset_type": "Office 365", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114.003/o365_email_forwarding_rule/o365_email_forwarding_rule.json"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user$ has configured a forwarding rule for multiple mailboxes to the same destination $ForwardingAddress$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1114.003", "T1114"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Operation", "Parameters"], "risk_score": 48, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Email Forwarding Rule", "Email Collection"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "o365_management_activity"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding_filter"}]}, {"name": "O365 PST export alert", "id": "5f694cc4-a678-4a60-9410-bffca1b647dc", "version": 1, "date": "2020-12-16", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects when a user has performed an Ediscovery search or exported a PST file from the search. This PST file usually has sensitive information including email body content", "search": "`o365_management_activity` Category=ThreatManagement Name=\"eDiscovery search started or exported\" | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by Source Severity AlertEntityId Operation Name |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_pst_export_alert_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", "known_false_positives": "PST export can be done for legitimate purposes but due to the sensitive nature of its content it must be monitored.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections", "Data Exfiltration"], "asset_type": "Office 365", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114/o365_export_pst_file/o365_export_pst_file.json"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "message": "User $Source$ has exported a PST file from the search using this operation- $Operation$ with a severity of $Severity$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1114"], "observable": [{"name": "Source", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Category", "Name", "Source", "Severity", "AlertEntityId", "Operation"], "risk_score": 48, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Email Collection"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "o365_management_activity"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "o365_pst_export_alert_filter"}]}, {"name": "O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding", "id": "f8dfe015-dbb3-4569-ba75-b13787e06aa4", "version": 1, "date": "2020-12-16", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects when multiple user configured a forwarding rule to the same destination.", "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=Set-Mailbox | spath input=Parameters | rename Identity AS src_user | search ForwardingSmtpAddress=* | stats dc(src_user) AS count_src_user earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(src_user) AS src_user values(user) AS user by ForwardingSmtpAddress | where count_src_user > 1 |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections", "Data Exfiltration"], "asset_type": "Office 365", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Stage:Exfiltration", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114.003/o365_email_forwarding_rule/o365_email_forwarding_rule.json"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user$ configured multiple users $src_user$ with a count of $count_src_user$, a forwarding rule to same destination $ForwardingSmtpAddress$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1114.003", "T1114"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "ForwardingSmtpAddress", "type": "Email Address", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Operation", "Parameters"], "risk_score": 48, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Email Forwarding Rule", "Email Collection"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "o365_management_activity"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", "id": "7678c968-d46e-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003", "version": 1, "date": "2020-08-02", "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", "description": "Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-5902. Discovered by Positive Technologies researchers, this vulnerability affects F5 BIG-IP, BIG-IQ. and Traffix SDC devices (vulnerable versions in F5 support link below). This vulnerability allows unauthenticated users, along with authenticated users, who have access to the configuration utility to execute system commands, create/delete files, disable services, and/or execute Java code. This vulnerability can result in full system compromise.", "narrative": "A client is able to perform a remote code execution on an exposed and vulnerable system. The detection search in this Analytic Story uses syslog to detect the malicious behavior. Syslog is going to be the best detection method, as any systems using SSL to protect their management console will make detection via wire data difficult. The searches included used Splunk Connect For Syslog (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4740/), and used a custom destination port to help define the data as F5 data (covered in https://splunk-connect-for-syslog.readthedocs.io/en/master/sources/F5/)", "references": ["https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/about/news/f5-fixes-critical-vulnerability-discovered-by-positive-technologies-in-big-ip-application-delivery-controller/", "https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K52145254", "https://blog.cloudflare.com/cve-2020-5902-helping-to-protect-against-the-f5-tmui-rce-vulnerability/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1190"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploit Public-Facing Application"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "Soft Cell", "BlackTech", "APT41", "APT39", "Night Dragon", "Rocke", "Blue Mockingbird"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", "id": "810e4dbc-d46e-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003", "version": 1, "date": "2020-08-02", "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects remote code exploit attempts on F5 BIG-IP, BIG-IQ, and Traffix SDC devices", "search": "`f5_bigip_rogue` | regex _raw=\"(hsqldb;|.*\\\\.\\\\.;.*)\" | search `detect_f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To consistently detect exploit attempts on F5 devices using the vulnerabilities contained within CVE-2020-5902 it is recommended to ingest logs via syslog. As many BIG-IP devices will have SSL enabled on their management interfaces, detections via wire data may not pick anything up unless you are decrypting SSL traffic in order to inspect it. I am using a regex string from a Cloudflare mitigation technique to try and always catch the offending string (..;), along with the other exploit of using (hsqldb;).", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/about/news/f5-fixes-critical-vulnerability-discovered-by-positive-technologies-in-big-ip-application-delivery-controller/", "https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K52145254", "https://blog.cloudflare.com/cve-2020-5902-helping-to-protect-against-the-f5-tmui-rce-vulnerability/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902"], "asset_type": "Network", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 11"], "cve": ["CVE-2020-5902"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploit Public-Facing Application"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Rocke", "APT39", "BlackTech", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Night Dragon", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "index=netops sourcetype=\"f5:bigip:rogue\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "f5_bigip_rogue"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Zoom Child Processes", "id": "aa3749a6-49c7-491e-a03f-4eaee5fe0258", "version": 1, "date": "2020-04-13", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "description": "Attackers are using Zoom as an vector to increase privileges on a sytems. This story detects new child processes of zoom and provides investigative actions for this detection.", "narrative": "Zoom is a leader in modern enterprise video communications and its usage has increased dramatically with a large amount of the population under stay-at-home orders due to the COVID-19 pandemic. With increased usage has come increased scrutiny and several security flaws have been found with this application on both Windows and macOS systems.\\\nCurrent detections focus on finding new child processes of this application on a per host basis. Investigative searches are included to gather information needed during an investigation.", "references": ["https://blog.rapid7.com/2020/04/02/dispelling-zoom-bugbears-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-latest-zoom-vulnerabilities/", "https://threatpost.com/two-zoom-zero-day-flaws-uncovered/154337/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Suspicious Zoom Child Processes", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1068", "T1059.003"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "Windows Command Shell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Magic Hound", "Stealth Falcon", "Rancor", "APT1", "Tropic Trooper", "Dark Caracal", "PLATINUM", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ke3chang", "FIN8", "Turla", "APT39", "Molerats", "Leviathan", "Gamaredon Group", "TA505", "Whitefly", "Frankenstein", "Cobalt Group", "APT32", "Soft Cell", "Silence", "APT19", "APT37", "Darkhotel", "APT41", "FIN5", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Blue Mockingbird", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "admin@338", "Honeybee", "APT3", "Sowbug", "APT18", "Threat Group-1314", "APT38", "MuddyWater", "FIN10", "Patchwork", "APT28", "APT33", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN7", "Gorgon Group"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe", "id": "dcfd6b40-42f9-469d-a433-2e53f7486664", "version": 6, "date": "2020-11-10", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for executions of cmd.exe spawned by a process that is often abused by attackers and that does not typically launch cmd.exe.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |search [`prohibited_apps_launching_cmd`] | `detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts and populates the Endpoint data model with the resultant dataset. This search includes a lookup file, `prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.csv`, that contains a list of processes that should not be spawning cmd.exe. You can modify this lookup to better suit your environment. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "There are circumstances where an application may legitimately execute and interact with the Windows command-line interface. Investigate and modify the lookup file, as appropriate.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "Suspicious Zoom Child Processes", "NOBELIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/powershell_spawn_cmd/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ running prohibited applications.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "Windows Command Shell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "TA505", "Blue Mockingbird", "Tropic Trooper", "Frankenstein", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "Honeybee", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Turla", "Silence", "APT32", "APT39", "Darkhotel", "MuddyWater", "APT18", "APT38", "Dark Caracal", "Gorgon Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Rancor", "Ke3chang", "APT37", "Leviathan", "FIN8", "APT28", "Magic Hound", "Sowbug", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Gamaredon Group", "Suckfly", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-1314", "APT3", "admin@338", "APT1"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_cmd"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "| inputlookup prohibited_apps_launching_cmd | rename prohibited_applications as parent_process_name | eval parent_process_name=\"*\" . parent_process_name | table parent_process_name", "description": "This macro outputs a list of process that should not be the parent process of cmd.exe", "name": "prohibited_apps_launching_cmd", "lookups": [{"description": "A list of processes that should not be launching cmd.exe", "fields": "prohibited_applications", "filename": "prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(prohibited_applications)", "name": "prohibited_apps_launching_cmd", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.csv"}]}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe_filter"}]}, {"name": "First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom", "id": "e91bd102-d630-4e76-ab73-7e3ba22c5961", "version": 1, "date": "2020-05-20", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for child processes spawned by zoom.exe or zoom.us that has not previously been seen.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name values(Processes.parent_process_id) as parent_process_id values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.us) by Processes.process_id Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | lookup zoom_first_time_child_process dest as dest process_name as process_name OUTPUT firstTimeSeen | where isnull(firstTimeSeen) OR firstTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), \"`previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window`\") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | table firstTime dest, process_id, process_name, parent_process_id, parent_process_name |`first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial` to build the initial table of child processes and hostnames for this search to work. You should also schedule at the same interval as this search the second baseline search `Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old child processes. Please update the `previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window` macro to adjust the time window.", "known_false_positives": "A new child process of zoom isn't malicious by that fact alone. Further investigation of the actions of the child process is needed to verify any malicious behavior is taken.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Zoom Child Processes"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1068/zoom_child_process/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Child process $process_name$ with $process_id$ spawned by zoom.exe or zoom.us which has not been previously on host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1068"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process Name", "role": ["Attacker", "Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process_id", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.dest"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Whitefly", "APT33", "Cobalt Group", "PLATINUM", "FIN8", "APT32", "Threat Group-3390", "FIN6", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"description": "Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new zoom child processes", "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", "name": "previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A list of suspicious file names", "collection": "zoom_first_time_child_process", "name": "zoom_first_time_child_process", "fields_list": "_key, dest, process_name, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen"}]}]}, {"name": "BITS Jobs", "id": "dbc7edce-8e4c-11eb-9f31-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-26", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "description": "Adversaries may abuse BITS jobs to persistently execute or clean up after malicious payloads.", "narrative": "Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, asynchronous file transfer mechanism exposed through Component Object Model (COM). BITS is commonly used by updaters, messengers, and other applications preferred to operate in the background (using available idle bandwidth) without interrupting other networked applications. File transfer tasks are implemented as BITS jobs, which contain a queue of one or more file operations. The interface to create and manage BITS jobs is accessible through PowerShell and the BITSAdmin tool. Adversaries may abuse BITS to download, execute, and even clean up after running malicious code. BITS tasks are self-contained in the BITS job database, without new files or registry modifications, and often permitted by host firewalls. BITS enabled execution may also enable persistence by creating long-standing jobs (the default maximum lifetime is 90 days and extendable) or invoking an arbitrary program when a job completes or errors (including after system reboots).", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1197/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/bits/bitsadmin-tool"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["BITS Jobs"], "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1197", "T1105"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Ingress Tool Transfer", "BITS Jobs"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390", "Sandworm Team", "Magic Hound", "Rancor", "Tropic Trooper", "PLATINUM", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT39", "Molerats", "Turla", "Rocke", "Gamaredon Group", "TA505", "Whitefly", "Frankenstein", "Cobalt Group", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "APT-C-36", "WIRTE", "APT37", "APT41", "menuPass", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT3", "APT18", "Sharpshooter", "APT38", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork", "Elderwood", "APT28", "APT33", "Gorgon Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN7"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer", "id": "39e2605a-90d8-11eb-899e-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-03-29", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Start-BitsTransfer is the PowerShell \"version\" of BitsAdmin.exe. Similar functionality is present. This technique variation is not as commonly used by adversaries, but has been abused in the past. Lesser known uses include the ability to set the `-TransferType` to `Upload` for exfiltration of files. In an instance where `Upload` is used, it is highly possible files will be archived. During triage, review parallel processes and process lineage. Capture any files on disk and review. For the remote domain or IP, what is the reputation?", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process=*start-bitstransfer* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_start_bitstransfer_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives. It is possible administrators will utilize Start-BitsTransfer for administrative tasks, otherwise filter based parent process or command-line arguments.", "references": ["https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Investigating+Microsoft+BITS+Activity/23281", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/bits/using-windows-powershell-to-create-bits-transfer-jobs"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["BITS Jobs"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}, "Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1197/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A suspicious process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ that are related to bittransfer functionality in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1197"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["BITS Jobs"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Patchwork", "APT41", "Leviathan"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_powershell"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "powershell_start_bitstransfer_filter"}]}, {"name": "BITS Job Persistence", "id": "e97a5ffe-90bf-11eb-928a-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service utility `bitsadmin.exe` scheduling a BITS job to persist on an endpoint. The query identifies the parameters used to create, resume or add a file to a BITS job. Typically seen combined in a oneliner or ran in sequence. If identified, review the BITS job created and capture any files written to disk. It is possible for BITS to be used to upload files and this may require further network data analysis to identify. You can use `bitsadmin /list /verbose` to list out the jobs during investigation.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_bitsadmin` Processes.process IN (*create*, *addfile*, *setnotifyflags*, *setnotifycmdline*, *setminretrydelay*, *setcustomheaders*, *resume* ) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `bits_job_persistence_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives will be present. Typically, applications will use `BitsAdmin.exe`. Any filtering should be done based on command-line arguments (legitimate applications) or parent process.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1197/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/bitsadmin", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1197/T1197.md#atomic-test-3---persist-download--execute", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Bitsadmin/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["BITS Jobs"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1197/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to persist using BITS.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1197"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["BITS Jobs"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Patchwork", "APT41", "Leviathan"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=bitsadmin.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=bitsadmin.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_bitsadmin"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "bits_job_persistence_filter"}]}, {"name": "BITSAdmin Download File", "id": "80630ff4-8e4c-11eb-aab5-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service utility `bitsadmin.exe` using the `transfer` parameter to download a remote object. In addition, look for `download` or `upload` on the command-line, the switches are not required to perform a transfer. Capture any files downloaded. Review the reputation of the IP or domain used. Typically once executed, a follow on command will be used to execute the dropped file. Note that the network connection or file modification events related will not spawn or create from `bitsadmin.exe`, but the artifacts will appear in a parallel process of `svchost.exe` with a command-line similar to `svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s BITS`. It's important to review all parallel and child processes to capture any behaviors and artifacts. In some suspicious and malicious instances, BITS jobs will be created. You can use `bitsadmin /list /verbose` to list out the jobs during investigation.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_bitsadmin` Processes.process=*transfer* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `bitsadmin_download_file_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives, however it may be required to filter based on parent process name or network connection.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/8eb52117b748d378325f7719554a896e37bccec7/atomics/T1105/T1105.md#atomic-test-9---windows---bitsadmin-bits-download", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/bc705cb7aaa5f26f2d96585fac8e4c7052df0ff9/atomics/T1197/T1197.md", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/bits/bitsadmin-tool", "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ingress Tool Transfer", "BITS Jobs", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1197/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to download a file.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1197", "T1105"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["BITS Jobs", "Ingress Tool Transfer"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Patchwork", "APT41", "Leviathan", "Sandworm Team", "Whitefly", "Rocke", "APT39", "Tropic Trooper", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Frankenstein", "Silence", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "APT33", "MuddyWater", "APT18", "APT38", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "OilRig", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT37", "FIN8", "PLATINUM", "Leviathan", "Elderwood", "Magic Hound", "APT3", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Patchwork", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-3390", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=bitsadmin.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=bitsadmin.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_bitsadmin"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "bitsadmin_download_file_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Router and Infrastructure Security", "id": "91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e177e77", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-12", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "Validate the security configuration of network infrastructure and verify that only authorized users and systems are accessing critical assets. Core routing and switching infrastructure are common strategic targets for attackers.", "narrative": "Networking devices, such as routers and switches, are often overlooked as resources that attackers will leverage to subvert an enterprise. Advanced threats actors have shown a proclivity to target these critical assets as a means to siphon and redirect network traffic, flash backdoored operating systems, and implement cryptographic weakened algorithms to more easily decrypt network traffic.\\\nThis Analytic Story helps you gain a better understanding of how your network devices are interacting with your hosts. By compromising your network devices, attackers can obtain direct access to the company's internal infrastructure— effectively increasing the attack surface and accessing private services/data.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/09/the_new_route_toper.html", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/security-center/event-response/synful-knock.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Router and Infrastructure Security", "category": ["Best Practices"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1020", "T1557", "T1542.005", "T1200", "T1542", "T1020.001", "T1498", "T1557.002"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Network Denial of Service", "Pre-OS Boot", "Automated Exfiltration", "Hardware Additions", "Man-in-the-Middle"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Impact", "Credential Access", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Collection", "Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Honeybee", "Frankenstein", "DarkVishnya", "Tropic Trooper", "no"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Software Download To Network Device", "id": "cc590c66-f65f-48f2-986a-4797244762f8", "version": 1, "date": "2020-10-28", "author": "Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "Adversaries may abuse netbooting to load an unauthorized network device operating system from a Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) server. TFTP boot (netbooting) is commonly used by network administrators to load configuration-controlled network device images from a centralized management server. Netbooting is one option in the boot sequence and can be used to centralize, manage, and control device images.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where (All_Traffic.transport=udp AND All_Traffic.dest_port=69) OR (All_Traffic.transport=tcp AND All_Traffic.dest_port=21) OR (All_Traffic.transport=tcp AND All_Traffic.dest_port=22) AND All_Traffic.dest_category!=common_software_repo_destination AND All_Traffic.src_category=network OR All_Traffic.src_category=router OR All_Traffic.src_category=switch by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_software_download_to_network_device_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search looks for Network Traffic events to TFTP, FTP or SSH/SCP ports from network devices. Make sure to tag any network devices as network, router or switch in order for this detection to work. If the TFTP traffic doesn't traverse a firewall nor packet inspection, these events will not be logged. This is typically an issue if the TFTP server is on the same subnet as the network device. There is also a chance of the network device loading software using a DHCP assigned IP address (netboot) which is not in the Asset inventory.", "known_false_positives": "This search will also report any legitimate attempts of software downloads to network devices as well as outbound SSH sessions from network devices.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Router and Infrastructure Security"], "asset_type": "Infrastructure", "cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "detection_name": "Detect Software Download To Network Device", "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1542.005", "T1542"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.transport", "All_Traffic.dest_port", "All_Traffic.dest_category", "All_Traffic.src_category", "All_Traffic.src", "All_Traffic.dest"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Pre-OS Boot"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_software_download_to_network_device_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats", "id": "c3be767e-7959-44c5-8976-0e9c12a91ad2", "version": 1, "date": "2020-10-28", "author": "Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "By enabling IPv6 First Hop Security as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect various attacks such as packet forging in the Infrastructure.", "search": "`cisco_networks` facility=\"SISF\" mnemonic IN (\"IP_THEFT\",\"MAC_THEFT\",\"MAC_AND_IP_THEFT\",\"PAK_DROP\") | eval src_interface=src_int_prefix_long+src_int_suffix | eval dest_interface=dest_int_prefix_long+dest_int_suffix | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime values(src_mac) AS src_mac values(src_vlan) AS src_vlan values(mnemonic) AS mnemonic values(vendor_explanation) AS vendor_explanation values(src_ip) AS src_ip values(dest_ip) AS dest_ip values(dest_interface) AS dest_interface values(action) AS action count BY host src_interface | table host src_interface dest_interface src_mac src_ip dest_ip src_vlan mnemonic vendor_explanation action count | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with one or more First Hop Security measures such as RA Guard, DHCP Guard and/or device tracking. See References for more information. The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices.", "known_false_positives": "None currently known", "references": ["https://www.ciscolive.com/c/dam/r/ciscolive/emea/docs/2019/pdf/BRKSEC-3200.pdf", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-ra-guard.html", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-snooping.html", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-dad-proxy.html", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-nd-mcast-supp.html", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-dhcpv6-guard.html", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-src-guard.html", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ipv6-dest-guard.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Router and Infrastructure Security"], "asset_type": "Infrastructure", "cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "detection_name": "Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats", "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1557", "T1557.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "facility", "mnemonic", "src_int_prefix_long", "src_int_suffix", "dest_int_prefix_long", "dest_int_suffix", "src_mac", "src_vlan", "vendor_explanation", "action"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Hardware Additions", "Network Denial of Service", "Man-in-the-Middle"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Impact", "Credential Access", "Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["DarkVishnya", "no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "eventtype=cisco_ios", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cisco_networks"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect ARP Poisoning", "id": "b44bebd6-bd39-467b-9321-73971bcd7aac", "version": 1, "date": "2020-08-11", "author": "Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "By enabling Dynamic ARP Inspection as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect ARP Poisoning attacks in the Infrastructure.", "search": "`cisco_networks` facility=\"PM\" mnemonic=\"ERR_DISABLE\" disable_cause=\"arp-inspection\" | eval src_interface=src_int_prefix_long+src_int_suffix | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime count BY host src_interface | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `detect_arp_poisoning_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with DHCP Snooping (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960x/software/15-0_2_EX/security/configuration_guide/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg_chapter_01101.html) and Dynamic ARP Inspection (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960x/software/15-2_2_e/security/configuration_guide/b_sec_1522e_2960x_cg/b_sec_1522e_2960x_cg_chapter_01111.html) and log with a severity level of minimum \"5 - notification\". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices.", "known_false_positives": "This search might be prone to high false positives if DHCP Snooping or ARP inspection has been incorrectly configured, or if a device normally sends many ARP packets (unlikely).", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Router and Infrastructure Security"], "asset_type": "Infrastructure", "cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "detection_name": "Detect ARP Poisoning", "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1557", "T1557.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "facility", "mnemonic", "disable_cause", "src_int_prefix_long", "src_int_suffix", "host", "src_interface"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Hardware Additions", "Network Denial of Service", "Man-in-the-Middle"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Impact", "Credential Access", "Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["DarkVishnya", "no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "eventtype=cisco_ios", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cisco_networks"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_arp_poisoning_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Traffic Mirroring", "id": "42b3b753-5925-49c5-9742-36fa40a73990", "version": 1, "date": "2020-10-28", "author": "Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to automate data exfiltration over compromised network infrastructure. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some network devices and used for network analysis and may be configured to duplicate traffic and forward to one or more destinations for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring device.", "search": "`cisco_networks` (facility=\"MIRROR\" mnemonic=\"ETH_SPAN_SESSION_UP\") OR (facility=\"SPAN\" mnemonic=\"SESSION_UP\") OR (facility=\"SPAN\" mnemonic=\"PKTCAP_START\") OR (mnemonic=\"CFGLOG_LOGGEDCMD\" command=\"monitor session*\") | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime count BY host facility mnemonic | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_traffic_mirroring_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must log with a severity level of minimum \"5 - notification\". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices and that the devices have been configured according to the documentation of the Cisco Networks Add-on. Also note that an attacker may disable logging from the device prior to enabling traffic mirroring.", "known_false_positives": "This search will return false positives for any legitimate traffic captures by network administrators.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Router and Infrastructure Security"], "asset_type": "Infrastructure", "cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "detection_name": "Detect Traffic Mirroring", "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1200", "T1020", "T1498", "T1020.001"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "facility", "mnemonic", "host"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Hardware Additions", "Automated Exfiltration", "Network Denial of Service"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Exfiltration", "Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["DarkVishnya", "Tropic Trooper", "Frankenstein", "Honeybee", "no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "eventtype=cisco_ios", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cisco_networks"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_traffic_mirroring_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Port Security Violation", "id": "2de3d5b8-a4fa-45c5-8540-6d071c194d24", "version": 1, "date": "2020-10-28", "author": "Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "By enabling Port Security on a Cisco switch you can restrict input to an interface by limiting and identifying MAC addresses of the workstations that are allowed to access the port. When you assign secure MAC addresses to a secure port, the port does not forward packets with source addresses outside the group of defined addresses. If you limit the number of secure MAC addresses to one and assign a single secure MAC address, the workstation attached to that port is assured the full bandwidth of the port. If a port is configured as a secure port and the maximum number of secure MAC addresses is reached, when the MAC address of a workstation attempting to access the port is different from any of the identified secure MAC addresses, a security violation occurs.", "search": "`cisco_networks` (facility=\"PM\" mnemonic=\"ERR_DISABLE\" disable_cause=\"psecure-violation\") OR (facility=\"PORT_SECURITY\" mnemonic=\"PSECURE_VIOLATION\" OR mnemonic=\"PSECURE_VIOLATION_VLAN\") | eval src_interface=src_int_prefix_long+src_int_suffix | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime values(disable_cause) AS disable_cause values(src_mac) AS src_mac values(src_vlan) AS src_vlan values(action) AS action count by host src_interface | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_port_security_violation_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with Port Security and Error Disable for this to work (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst4500/12-2/25ew/configuration/guide/conf/port_sec.html) and log with a severity level of minimum \"5 - notification\". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices.", "known_false_positives": "This search might be prone to high false positives if you have malfunctioning devices connected to your ethernet ports or if end users periodically connect physical devices to the network.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Router and Infrastructure Security"], "asset_type": "Infrastructure", "cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "detection_name": "Detect Port Security Violation", "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Exploitation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1557", "T1557.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "facility", "mnemonic", "disable_cause", "src_int_prefix_long", "src_int_suffix", "src_mac", "src_vlan", "action", "host", "src_interface"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Hardware Additions", "Network Denial of Service", "Man-in-the-Middle"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Impact", "Credential Access", "Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["DarkVishnya", "no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "eventtype=cisco_ios", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cisco_networks"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_port_security_violation_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Rogue DHCP Server", "id": "6e1ada88-7a0d-4ac1-92c6-03d354686079", "version": 1, "date": "2020-08-11", "author": "Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "By enabling DHCP Snooping as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect unauthorized DHCP servers handing out DHCP leases to devices on the network (Man in the Middle attack).", "search": "`cisco_networks` facility=\"DHCP_SNOOPING\" mnemonic=\"DHCP_SNOOPING_UNTRUSTED_PORT\" | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime count values(message_type) AS message_type values(src_mac) AS src_mac BY host | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `detect_rogue_dhcp_server_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with DHCP Snooping enabled (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960x/software/15-0_2_EX/security/configuration_guide/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg_chapter_01101.html) and log with a severity level of minimum \"5 - notification\". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices.", "known_false_positives": "This search might be prone to high false positives if DHCP Snooping has been incorrectly configured or in the unlikely event that the DHCP server has been moved to another network interface.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Router and Infrastructure Security"], "asset_type": "Infrastructure", "cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "detection_name": "Detect Rogue DHCP Server", "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1557"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "facility", "mnemonic", "message_type", "src_mac", "host"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Hardware Additions", "Network Denial of Service", "Man-in-the-Middle"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Impact", "Credential Access", "Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["DarkVishnya", "no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "eventtype=cisco_ios", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cisco_networks"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_rogue_dhcp_server_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect New Login Attempts to Routers", "id": "104658f4-afdc-499e-9719-17243rr826f1", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-12", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Authentication"], "description": "The search queries the authentication logs for assets that are categorized as routers in the ES Assets and Identity Framework, to identify connections that have not been seen before in the last 30 days.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.dest_category=router by Authentication.dest Authentication.user| eval isOutlier=if(earliest >= relative_time(now(), \"-30d@d\"), 1, 0) | where isOutlier=1| `security_content_ctime(earliest)`| `security_content_ctime(latest)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Authentication\")` | `detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must ensure the network router devices are categorized as \"router\" in the Assets and identity table. You must also populate the Authentication data model with logs related to users authenticating to routing infrastructure.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate router connections may appear as new connections", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Router and Infrastructure Security"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Authentication.dest_category", "Authentication.dest", "Authentication.user"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "XMRig", "id": "06723e6a-6bd8-4817-ace2-5fb8a7b06628", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-07", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Rod Soto Splunk", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the xmrig monero, including looking for file writes associated with its payload, process command-line, defense evasion (killing services, deleting users, modifying files or folder permission, killing other malware or other coin miner) and hacking tools including Telegram as mean of command and control (C2) to download other files. Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems in order to solve resource intensive problems which may impact system and/or hosted service availability. One common purpose for Resource Hijacking is to validate transactions of cryptocurrency networks and earn virtual currency. Adversaries may consume enough system resources to negatively impact and/or cause affected machines to become unresponsive. (1) Servers and cloud-based (2) systems are common targets because of the high potential for available resources, but user endpoint systems may also be compromised and used for Resource Hijacking and cryptocurrency mining.", "narrative": "XMRig is a high performance, open source, cross platform RandomX, KawPow, CryptoNight and AstroBWT unified CPU/GPU miner. This monero is seen in the wild on May 2017.", "references": ["https://github.com/xmrig/xmrig", "https://www.getmonero.org/resources/user-guides/mine-to-pool.html", "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/", "https://blog.checkpoint.com/2021/03/11/february-2021s-most-wanted-malware-trickbot-takes-over-following-emotet-shutdown/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "XMRig", "category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1595", "T1562", "T1543.003", "T1036", "T1222", "T1105", "T1543", "T1531", "T1003", "T1087", "T1562.001", "T1036.005", "T1053", "T1078", "T1489"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Scheduled Task/Job", "File and Directory Permissions Modification", "Valid Accounts", "Account Discovery", "Match Legitimate Name or Location", "Service Stop", "Disable or Modify Tools", "Ingress Tool Transfer", "Create or Modify System Process", "OS Credential Dumping", "Impair Defenses", "Masquerading", "Windows Service", "Account Access Removal"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Impact", "Discovery", "Credential Access", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Execution", "Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Sandworm Team", "Putter Panda", "Rancor", "Magic Hound", "Axiom", "APT1", "Tropic Trooper", "Kimsuky", "TEMP.Veles", "PLATINUM", "Poseidon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN8", "Ke3chang", "Leviathan", "APT39", "Turla", "Gamaredon Group", "Rocke", "Molerats", "Carbanak", "TA505", "Whitefly", "Frankenstein", "Cobalt Group", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "APT19", "APT-C-36", "WIRTE", "APT37", "APT41", "FIN5", "menuPass", "FIN6", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "admin@338", "Honeybee", "APT3", "Wizard Spider", "Sowbug", "APT18", "no", "Sharpshooter", "APT38", "MuddyWater", "FIN10", "DarkVishnya", "PittyTiger", "Patchwork", "FIN4", "Elderwood", "APT28", "APT33", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN7", "Gorgon Group", "Windshift", "Night Dragon"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Disable Net User Account", "id": "ba858b08-d26c-11eb-af9b-acde48001122", "version": 3, "date": "2021-11-30", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "This analytic will identify a suspicious command-line that disables a user account using the native `net.exe` or `net1.exe` utility to Windows. This technique may used by the adversaries to interrupt availability of accounts and continue the impact against the organization.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null)), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_path\"), \"string\", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND like(cmd_line, \"%/active:no%\") AND like(cmd_line, \"%user%\") AND (process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR process_name=\"net.exe\") | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null)), body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line, \"process_name\", process_name, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process_name, \"process_path\", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed net.exe/net1.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "System administrators or automated scripts may disable an account but not a common practice. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/ssa_data1/net_user_dis.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to disable accounts.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1489", "T1078"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest_device_id", "process_name", "parent_process_name", "process_path", "dest_user_id", "process", "cmd_line"], "risk_score": 49, "risk_severity": "medium", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Service Stop", "Valid Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disable_net_user_account_filter"}]}, {"name": "Deny Permission using Cacls Utility", "id": "b76eae28-cd25-11eb-9c92-acde48001122", "version": 3, "date": "2021-11-29", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of `cacls.exe`, `icacls.exe` or `xcacls.exe` placing the deny permission on a file or directory. Adversaries perform this behavior to prevent responders from reviewing or gaining access to adversary files on disk.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null), process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_path\"), \"string\", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)deny/)=true AND (process_name=\"cacls.exe\" OR process_name=\"xcacls.exe\" OR process_name=\"icacls.exe\") | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null)), body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line, \"process_name\", process_name, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process_name, \"process_path\", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed icacls.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "System administrators may use cacls utilities but this is not a common practice. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "cis20": ["CIS 14", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1222.001/ssa_cacls/all_icalc.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A cacls process $process_name$ with commandline $cmd_line$ try to deny a permission of a file or directory in host $dest_device_id$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1222"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest_device_id", "process_name", "parent_process_name", "process_path", "dest_user_id", "process", "cmd_line"], "risk_score": 35, "risk_severity": "medium", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["File and Directory Permissions Modification"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "deny_permission_using_cacls_utility_filter"}]}, {"name": "Attempt To Delete Services", "id": "a0c8c292-d01a-11eb-aa18-acde48001122", "version": 3, "date": "2021-11-24", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "The following analytic identifies Windows Service Control, `sc.exe`, attempting to delete a service. This is typically identified in parallel with other instances of service enumeration of attempts to stop a service and then delete it. Adversaries utilize this technique to terminate security services or other related services to continue there objective and evade detections.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null)), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_path\"), \"string\", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND like(cmd_line, \"%delete%\") AND process_name = \"sc.exe\" | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null)), body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line, \"process_name\", process_name, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process_name, \"process_path\", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible administrative scripts may start/stop/delete services. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1543.003/T1543.003.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 13"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/ssa_data1/sc_del.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to delete a service.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1489", "T1543", "T1543.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest_device_id", "process_name", "parent_process_name", "process_path", "dest_user_id", "process", "cmd_line"], "risk_score": 36, "risk_severity": "high", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Service Stop", "Create or Modify System Process", "Windows Service"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group", "no", "Blue Mockingbird", "DarkVishnya", "Wizard Spider", "APT32", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Tropic Trooper", "Cobalt Group", "Ke3chang", "Honeybee", "FIN7", "Threat Group-3390", "APT19", "APT3", "Lazarus Group", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "attempt_to_delete_services_filter"}]}, {"name": "Modify ACL permission To Files Or Folder", "id": "7e8458cc-acca-11eb-9e3f-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-04", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies suspicious modification of ACL permission to a files or folder to make it available to everyone. This technique may be used by the adversary to evade ACLs or protected files access. This changes is commonly configured by the file or directory owner with appropriate permission. This behavior is a good indicator if this command seen on a machine utilized by an account with no permission to do so.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"cacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"icacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"xcacls.exe\" AND (Processes.process = \"*/G everyone:*\" OR Processes.process = \"*/G SYSTEM:*\") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `modify_acl_permission_to_files_or_folder_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed cacls.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "administrators may use this command. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious ACL permission modification on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1222"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id"], "risk_score": 32, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["File and Directory Permissions Modification"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "modify_acl_permission_to_files_or_folder_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "id": "9be25988-ad82-11eb-a14f-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-05", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic will detect a suspicious process running in a file path where a process is not commonly seen and is most commonly used by malicious softtware. This behavior has been used by adversaries where they drop and run an exe in a path that is accessible without admin privileges.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\windows\\\\fonts\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\windows\\\\temp\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\users\\\\public\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\windows\\\\debug\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path.file_path = \"*\\\\Users\\\\Administrator\\\\Music\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path.file_path = \"*\\\\Windows\\\\servicing\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path.file_path = \"*\\\\Users\\\\Default\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path.file_path = \"*Recycle.bin*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Media\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"\\\\Windows\\\\repair\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_path Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_process_file_path_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may allow execution of specific binaries in non-standard paths. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/hk/threat-encyclopedia/malware/trojan.ps1.powtran.a/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig", "Remcos"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicioues process $Processes.process_path.file_path$ running from suspicious location", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1543"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Processes.process_path.file_path", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Create or Modify System Process"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_process_file_path_filter"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage Of Taskkill", "id": "fe5bca48-accb-11eb-a67c-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-04", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies excessive usage of `taskkill.exe` application. This application is commonly used by adversaries to evade detections by killing security product processes or even other processes to evade detection.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"taskkill.exe\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=1m | where count >=10 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_taskkill_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed taskkill.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Excessive usage of taskkill.exe with process id $process_id$ (more than 10 within 1m) has been detected on $dest$ with a parent process of $parent_process_name$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process Name", "role": ["Parent Process", "Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id"], "risk_score": 28, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "excessive_usage_of_taskkill_filter"}]}, {"name": "Grant Permission Using Cacls Utility", "id": "c6da561a-cd29-11eb-ae65-acde48001122", "version": 3, "date": "2021-11-30", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of `cacls.exe`, `icacls.exe` or `xcacls.exe` placing the grant permission on a file or directory. Adversaries perform this behavior to allow components of their files to run, however it allows responders to review or gaining access to adversary files on disk.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null), process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_path\"), \"string\", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)grant/)=true AND (process_name=\"cacls.exe\" OR process_name=\"xcacls.exe\" OR process_name=\"icacls.exe\") | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null)), body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line, \"process_name\", process_name, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process_name, \"process_path\", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed icacls.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "System administrators may use cacls utilities but this is not a common practice. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "cis20": ["CIS 14", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1222.001/ssa_cacls/all_icalc.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A cacls process $process_name$ with commandline $cmd_line$ try to grant user a permission to a file or directory in host $dest_device_id$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1222"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest_device_id", "process_name", "parent_process_name", "process_path", "dest_user_id", "process", "cmd_line"], "risk_score": 35, "risk_severity": "medium", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["File and Directory Permissions Modification"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "grant_permission_using_cacls_utility_filter"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage Of Net App", "id": "45e52536-ae42-11eb-b5c6-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-05-06", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies excessive usage of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` within a bucket of time (1 minute). This behavior was seen in a Monero incident where the adversary attempts to create many users, delete and disable users as part of its malicious behavior.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=1m | where count >=10 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_net_app_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "unknown. Filter as needed. Modify the time span as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig", "Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Scope:Local", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Excessive usage of net1.exe or net.exe within 1m, with command line $process$ has been detected on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1531"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process Name", "role": ["Process", "Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 28, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Account Access Removal"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_net"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "excessive_usage_of_net_app_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Driver Loaded Path", "id": "f880acd4-a8f1-11eb-a53b-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-29", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic will detect suspicious driver loaded paths. This technique is commonly used by malicious software like coin miners (xmrig) to register its malicious driver from notable directories where executable or drivers do not commonly exist. During triage, validate this driver is for legitimate business use. Review the metadata and certificate information. Unsigned drivers from non-standard paths is not normal, but occurs. In addition, review driver loads into `ntoskrnl.exe` for possible other drivers of interest. Long tail analyze drivers by path (outside of default, and in default) for further review.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=6 ImageLoaded = \"*.sys\" NOT (ImageLoaded IN(\"*\\\\WINDOWS\\\\inf\",\"*\\\\WINDOWS\\\\System32\\\\drivers\\\\*\", \"*\\\\WINDOWS\\\\System32\\\\DriverStore\\\\FileRepository\\\\*\")) | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer ImageLoaded Hashes IMPHASH Signature Signed | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_driver_loaded_path_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the driver loaded and Signature from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives will be present. Some applications do load drivers", "references": ["https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/hk/threat-encyclopedia/malware/trojan.ps1.powtran.a/", "https://redcanary.com/blog/tracking-driver-inventory-to-expose-rootkits/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious driver $ImageLoaded$ on $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1543.003", "T1543"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "ImageLoaded", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Computer", "ImageLoaded", "Hashes", "IMPHASH", "Signature", "Signed"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Windows Service", "Create or Modify System Process"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "DarkVishnya", "Wizard Spider", "APT32", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Tropic Trooper", "Cobalt Group", "Ke3chang", "Honeybee", "FIN7", "Threat Group-3390", "APT19", "APT3", "Lazarus Group", "Carbanak", "no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_driver_loaded_path_filter"}]}, {"name": "Enumerate Users Local Group Using Telegram", "id": "fcd74532-ae54-11eb-a5ab-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-06", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic will detect a suspicious Telegram process enumerating all network users in a local group. This technique was seen in a Monero infected honeypot to mapped all the users on the compromised system. EventCode 4798 is generated when a process enumerates a user's security-enabled local groups on a computer or device.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4798 Process_Name = \"*\\\\telegram.exe\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName EventCode Process_Name Process_ID Account_Name Account_Domain Logon_ID Security_ID Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `enumerate_users_local_group_using_telegram_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Task Schedule (Exa. Security Log EventCode 4798) endpoints. Tune and filter known instances of process like logonUI used in your environment.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4798"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/minergate/windows-security.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The Telegram application has been identified enumerating local groups on $ComputerName$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "ComputerName", "EventCode", "Process_Name", "Process_ID", "Account_Name", "Account_Domain", "Logon_ID", "Security_ID", "Message"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Account Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "enumerate_users_local_group_using_telegram_filter"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Attempt To Disable Services", "id": "8fa2a0f0-acd9-11eb-8994-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-04", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic will identify suspicious series of command-line to disable several services. This technique is seen where the adversary attempts to disable security app services or other malware services to complete the objective on the compromised system.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"sc.exe\" AND Processes.process=\"*config*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Disabled*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=1m | where count >=5 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_attempt_to_disable_services_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed sc.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An excessive amount of $process_name$ was executed on $dest$ attempting to disable services.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1489"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Service Stop"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "excessive_attempt_to_disable_services_filter"}]}, {"name": "Disable Windows App Hotkeys", "id": "1490f224-ad8b-11eb-8c4f-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-05", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic detects a suspicious registry modification to disable Windows hotkey (shortcut keys) for native Windows applications. This technique is commonly used to disable certain or several Windows applications like `taskmgr.exe` and `cmd.exe`. This technique is used to impair the analyst in analyzing and removing the attacker implant in compromised systems.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Image File Execution Options\\\\*\" AND Registry.registry_value_name = \"HotKey Disabled\" AND Registry.registry_key_name = \"Debugger\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `disable_windows_app_hotkeys_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as CarbonBlack or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/hotkey_disabled_hidden_user/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Disabled 'Windows App Hotkeys' on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.dest Registry.user"], "risk_score": 40, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disable_windows_app_hotkeys_filter"}]}, {"name": "Icacls Deny Command", "id": "cf8d753e-a8fe-11eb-8f58-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-29", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies a potential adversary that changes the security permission of a specific file or directory. This technique is commonly seen in APT tradecraft or coinminer scripts. This behavior is meant to evade detection and prevent access to their component files.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"icacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"cacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"xcacls.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*/deny*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `icacls_deny_command_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed icacls.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown. It is possible some administrative scripts use ICacls. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Process name $process_name$ with deny argument executed by $user$ to change security permission of a specific file or directory on host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1222"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["File and Directory Permissions Modification"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "icacls_deny_command_filter"}]}, {"name": "Download Files Using Telegram", "id": "58194e28-ae5e-11eb-8912-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-06", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic will identify a suspicious download by the Telegram application on a Windows system. This behavior was identified on a honeypot where the adversary gained access, installed Telegram and followed through with downloading different network scanners (port, bruteforcer, masscan) to the system and later used to mapped the whole network and further move laterally.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode= 15 process_name = \"telegram.exe\" TargetFilename = \"*:Zone.Identifier\" |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer EventCode Image process_id TargetFilename Hash | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `download_files_using_telegram_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and TargetFilename from your endpoints or Events that monitor filestream events which is happened when process download something. (EventCode 15) If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "normal download of file in telegram app. (if it was a common app in network)", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/minergate/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious files were downloaded with the Telegram application on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1105"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Computer", "EventCode", "Image", "process_id", "TargetFilename", "Hash"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Ingress Tool Transfer"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Whitefly", "Rocke", "APT39", "Tropic Trooper", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Frankenstein", "Silence", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "APT33", "MuddyWater", "APT18", "APT38", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "OilRig", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT37", "FIN8", "PLATINUM", "Leviathan", "Elderwood", "Magic Hound", "APT3", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Patchwork", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-3390", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "download_files_using_telegram_filter"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage Of Cacls App", "id": "0bdf6092-af17-11eb-939a-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-07", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies excessive usage of `cacls.exe`, `xcacls.exe` or `icacls.exe` application to change file or folder permission. This behavior is commonly seen where the adversary attempts to impair some users from deleting or accessing its malware components or artifact from the compromised system.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id values(Processes.process_name) as process_name count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"cacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"icacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"XCACLS.exe\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=1m | where count >=10 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_cacls_app_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or administrative scripts may use this application. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An excessive amount of $process_name$ was executed on $dest$ attempting to modify permissions.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1222"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["File and Directory Permissions Modification"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "excessive_usage_of_cacls_app_filter"}]}, {"name": "Attacker Tools On Endpoint", "id": "a51bfe1a-94f0-48cc-b4e4-16a110145893", "version": 2, "date": "2021-11-04", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for execution of commonly used attacker tools on an endpoint.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.dest!=unknown Processes.user!=unknown by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | lookup attacker_tools attacker_tool_names AS process_name OUTPUT description | search description !=false| `attacker_tools_on_endpoint_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is usually generated via logs that report process tracking in your Windows audit settings.", "known_false_positives": "Some administrator activity can be potentially triggered, please add those users to the filter macro.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Monitor for Unauthorized Software", "XMRig", "SamSam Ransomware", "Unusual Processes"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 2"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exploitation", "Stage:Recon", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1595/attacker_scan_tools/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An attacker tool $process_name$,listed in attacker_tools.csv is executed on host $dest$ by User $user$. This process $process_name$ is known to do- $description$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1036.005", "T1036", "T1003", "T1595"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process", "Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Match Legitimate Name or Location", "Masquerading", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "APT39", "Blue Mockingbird", "Whitefly", "Tropic Trooper", "Silence", "APT41", "menuPass", "TEMP.Veles", "MuddyWater", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Sowbug", "APT32", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "admin@338", "Carbanak", "APT1", "Windshift", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "attacker_tools_on_endpoint_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A list of tools used by attackers", "filename": "attacker_tools.csv", "name": "attacker_tools", "default_match": "false", "match_type": "WILDCARD(attacker_tool_names)", "min_matches": 1, "case_sensitive_match": "false", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/attacker_tools.csv"}]}, {"name": "Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen", "id": "834ba832-ad89-11eb-937d-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-05", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies a suspicious registry modification to hide a user account on the Windows Login screen. This technique was seen in some tradecraft where the adversary will create a hidden user account with Admin privileges in login screen to avoid noticing by the user that they already compromise and to persist on that said machine.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\SpecialAccounts\\\\Userlist*\" AND Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000000\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_value_data | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `hide_user_account_from_sign_in_screen_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as CarbonBlack or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/hotkey_disabled_hidden_user/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious registry modification ($registry_value_name$) which is used go hide a user account on the Windows Login screen detected on $dest$ executed by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "registry_value_name", "type": "Other", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.dest Registry.user"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "hide_user_account_from_sign_in_screen_filter"}]}, {"name": "Process Kill Base On File Path", "id": "5ffaa42c-acdb-11eb-9ad3-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-05-04", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of `wmic.exe` using `delete` to remove a executable path. This is typically ran via a batch file during beginning stages of an adversary setting up for mining on an endpoint.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` AND Processes.process=\"*process*\" AND Processes.process=\"*executablepath*\" AND Processes.process=\"*delete*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `process_kill_base_on_file_path_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A process $process_name$ attempt to kill process by its file path using commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_wmic"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "process_kill_base_on_file_path_filter"}]}, {"name": "Schtasks Run Task On Demand", "id": "bb37061e-af1f-11eb-a159-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-07", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies an on demand run of a Windows Schedule Task through shell or command-line. This technique has been used by adversaries that force to run their created Schedule Task as their persistence mechanism or for lateral movement as part of their malicious attack to the compromised machine.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"schtasks.exe\" Processes.process = \"*/run*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schtasks_run_task_on_demand_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed schtasks.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may use to debug Schedule Task entries. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}, "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A \"on demand\" execution of schedule task process $process_name$ using commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 48, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Scheduled Task/Job"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "schtasks_run_task_on_demand_filter"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Service Stop Attempt", "id": "ae8d3f4a-acd7-11eb-8846-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-05-04", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies suspicious series of attempt to kill multiple services on a system using either `net.exe` or `sc.exe`. This technique is use by adversaries to terminate security services or other related services to continue there objective and evade detections.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` OR Processes.process_name = \"sc.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"net1.exe\" AND Processes.process=\"*stop*\" OR Processes.process=\"*delete*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=1m | where count >=5 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_service_stop_attempt_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig", "Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An excessive amount of $process_name$ was executed on $dest$ attempting to disable services.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1489"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Service Stop"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_net"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "excessive_service_stop_attempt_filter"}]}, {"name": "Attempt To Disable Services", "id": "afb31de4-d023-11eb-98d5-acde48001122", "version": 3, "date": "2021-11-24", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "The following analytic identifies Windows Service Control, `sc.exe`, attempting to disable a service. This is typically identified in parallel with other instances of service enumeration of attempts to stop a service and then disable it. Adversaries utilize this technique to terminate security services or other related services to continue there objective and evade detections.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval _datamodels=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_datamodels\"), \"collection\", []), body={} | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null)), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_path\"), \"string\", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND like(cmd_line, \"%disabled%\") AND like(cmd_line, \"%config%\") AND process_name=\"sc.exe\" | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null)), body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line, \"process_name\", process_name, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process_name, \"process_path\", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible administrative scripts may start/stop/delete services. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/", "https://app.any.run/tasks/c0f98850-af65-4352-9746-fbebadee4f05/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md#atomic-test-14---disable-arbitrary-security-windows-service"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/ssa_data1/sc_disable.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to disable a service.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1489"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest_device_id", "process_name", "parent_process_name", "process_path", "dest_user_id", "process"], "risk_score": 36, "risk_severity": "medium", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Service Stop"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "attempt_to_disable_services_filter"}]}, {"name": "Disabling Net User Account", "id": "c0325326-acd6-11eb-98c2-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-05-04", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic will identify a suspicious command-line that disables a user account using the `net.exe` utility native to Windows. This technique may used by the adversaries to interrupt availability of such users to do their malicious act.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` AND Processes.process=\"*user*\" AND Processes.process=\"*/active:no*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_net_user_account_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified disabling a user account on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1531"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Account Access Removal"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_net"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disabling_net_user_account_filter"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "id": "a7e3f0f0-ae42-11eb-b245-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-06", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic will identify suspicious executable or scripts (known file extensions) in list of suspicious file path in Windows. This technique is used by adversaries to evade detection. The suspicious file path are known paths used in the wild and are not common to have executable or scripts.", "search": "|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_name = *.exe OR Filesystem.file_name = *.dll OR Filesystem.file_name = *.sys OR Filesystem.file_name = *.com OR Filesystem.file_name = *.vbs OR Filesystem.file_name = *.vbe OR Filesystem.file_name = *.js OR Filesystem.file_name = *.ps1 OR Filesystem.file_name = *.bat OR Filesystem.file_name = *.cmd OR Filesystem.file_name = *.pif) AND ( Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\windows\\\\fonts\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\windows\\\\temp\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\users\\\\public\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\windows\\\\debug\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Users\\\\Administrator\\\\Music\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Windows\\\\servicing\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Users\\\\Default\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *Recycle.bin* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Windows\\\\Media\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Windows\\\\repair\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Temp*) by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may allow creation of script or exe in the paths specified. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig", "Remcos"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious executable or scripts with file name $file_name$, $file_path$ and process_id $process_id$ executed in suspicious file path in Windows by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1036"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_id", "type": "Process", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "file_name", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Other", "Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.file_path", "Filesystem.file_create_time", "Filesystem.process_id", "Filesystem.file_name", "Filesystem.user"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Masquerading"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Windshift", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "Dragonfly 2.0"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path_filter"}]}, {"name": "Modify ACLs Permission Of Files Or Folders", "id": "9ae9a48a-cdbe-11eb-875a-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-11-30", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "This analytic identifies suspicious modification of ACL permission to a files or folder to make it available to everyone or to a specific user. This technique may be used by the adversary to evade ACLs or protected files access. This changes is commonly configured by the file or directory owner with appropriate permission. This behavior raises suspicion if this command is seen on an endpoint utilized by an account with no permission to do so.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null), process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_path\"), \"string\", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND like(cmd_line, \"%/G%\") AND (match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)everyone:/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)SYSTEM:/)=true) AND (process_name=\"cacls.exe\" OR process_name=\"xcacls.exe\" OR process_name=\"icacls.exe\") | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null)), body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line, \"process_name\", process_name, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process_name, \"process_path\", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed cacls.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "System administrators may use this windows utility. filter is needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1222.001/ssa_cacls/all_icalc.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A cacls process $process_name$ with commandline $cmd_line$ try to modify a permission of a file or directory in host $dest_device_id$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1222"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest_device_id", "process_name", "parent_process_name", "process_path", "dest_user_id", "process", "cmd_line"], "risk_score": 35, "risk_severity": "medium", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["File and Directory Permissions Modification"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "modify_acls_permission_of_files_or_folders_filter"}]}, {"name": "Delete A Net User", "id": "8776d79c-d26e-11eb-9a56-acde48001122", "version": 3, "date": "2021-11-30", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "This analytic will detect a suspicious net.exe/net1.exe command-line to delete a user on a system. This technique may be use by an administrator for legitimate purposes, however this behavior has been used in the wild to impair some user or deleting adversaries tracks created during its lateral movement additional systems. During triage, review parallel processes for additional behavior. Identify any other user accounts created before or after.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null)), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_path\"), \"string\", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND like(cmd_line, \"%/delete%\") AND (process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR process_name=\"net.exe\") | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null)), body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line, \"process_name\", process_name, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process_name, \"process_path\", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed net.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "System administrators or scripts may delete user accounts via this technique. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/ssa_data1/net_user_del.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1531/atomic_red_team/security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to delete a user account.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1531"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest_device_id", "process_name", "parent_process_name", "process_path", "dest_user_id", "process", "cmd_line"], "risk_score": 49, "risk_severity": "high", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Account Access Removal"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "delete_a_net_user_filter"}]}, {"name": "ICACLS Grant Command", "id": "b1b1e316-accc-11eb-a9b4-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-04", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies potential adversaries that modify the security permission of a specific file or directory. This technique is commonly seen in APT tradecraft and coinminer scripts to evade detections and restrict access to their component files.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"icacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"cacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"xcacls.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*/grant*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `icacls_grant_command_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed icacls.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig", "Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Process name $process_name$ with grant argument executed by $user$ to change security permission of a specific file or directory on host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1222"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["File and Directory Permissions Modification"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "icacls_grant_command_filter"}]}, {"name": "Deleting Of Net Users", "id": "1c8c6f66-acce-11eb-aafb-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-05-04", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic will detect a suspicious net.exe/net1.exe command-line to delete a user on a system. This technique may be use by an administrator for legitimate purposes, however this behavior has been used in the wild to impair some user or deleting adversaries tracks created during its lateral movement additional systems. During triage, review parallel processes for additional behavior. Identify any other user accounts created before or after.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` AND Processes.process=\"*user*\" AND Processes.process=\"*/delete*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `deleting_of_net_users_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "System administrators or scripts may delete user accounts via this technique. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to delete accounts.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1531"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Account Access Removal"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_net"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "deleting_of_net_users_filter"}]}, {"name": "XMRIG Driver Loaded", "id": "90080fa6-a8df-11eb-91e4-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-29", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies XMRIG coinminer driver installation on the system. The XMRIG driver name by default is `WinRing0x64.sys`. This cpu miner is an open source project that is commonly abused by adversaries to infect and mine bitcoin.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=6 Signature=\"Noriyuki MIYAZAKI\" OR ImageLoaded= \"*\\\\WinRing0x64.sys\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer ImageLoaded Hashes IMPHASH Signature Signed | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `xmrig_driver_loaded_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the driver loaded and Signature from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited.", "references": ["https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/hk/threat-encyclopedia/malware/trojan.ps1.powtran.a/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Privilege Escalation"}, "Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A driver $ImageLoaded$ related to xmrig crytominer loaded in host $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1543.003", "T1543"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "ImageLoaded", "type": "ImageLoaded", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Computer", "ImageLoaded", "Hashes", "IMPHASH", "Signature", "Signed"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Windows Service", "Create or Modify System Process"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "DarkVishnya", "Wizard Spider", "APT32", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Tropic Trooper", "Cobalt Group", "Ke3chang", "Honeybee", "FIN7", "Threat Group-3390", "APT19", "APT3", "Lazarus Group", "Carbanak", "no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "xmrig_driver_loaded_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", "id": "b8bee41e-624f-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-29", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "description": "Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the regsvr32.exe process to execute malicious code.", "narrative": "One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the regsvr32.exe process. This particular bypass was popularized with \"SquiblyDoo\" using the \"scrobj.dll\" dll to load .sct scriptlets. This technique is still widely used by adversaries to bypass detection and prevention controls. The file extension of the DLL is irrelevant (it may load a .txt file extension for example). The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging regsvr32.exe to execute malicious code. Validate execution Determine if regsvr32.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of regsvr32.exe and further PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\\windows\\system32 or c:\\windows\\syswow64, it should be highly suspect. Determine if script code was executed with regsvr32. Situational Awareness - The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by regsvr32.exe. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application? Module loads. Is regsvr32 loading any suspicious .DLLs? Unsigned or signed from non-standard paths. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain. Retrieval of Script Code - confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/"], "tags": {"analytics_story": "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218.010", "T1218", "T1112"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Regsvr32", "Modify Registry", "Signed Binary Proxy Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390", "Inception", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "Turla", "Gamaredon Group", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "APT32", "Silence", "WIRTE", "APT19", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Honeybee", "Wizard Spider", "no", "APT38", "Patchwork", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Gorgon Group"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading", "id": "f421c250-24e7-11ec-bc43-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-04", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a loading of dll using regsvr32 application with silent parameter and dllinstall execution. This technique was seen in several RAT malware similar to remcos, njrat and adversaries to load their malicious DLL on the compromised machine. This TTP may executed by normal 3rd party application so it is better to pivot by the parent process, parent command-line and command-line of the file that execute this regsvr32.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` AND Processes.process=\"*/i*\" by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"(?i)[\\-|\\/][Ss]{1}\") | `regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Other third part application may used this parameter but not so common in base windows environment.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/dc93ee63-050c-4ff8-b07e-8277af9ab939/#", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", "Remcos"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/vbs_wscript/sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a DLL using the silent and dllinstall parameter.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.010"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 36, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Regsvr32"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Blue Mockingbird", "Inception", "WIRTE", "Cobalt Group", "APT19", "Leviathan", "APT32", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=REGSVR32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_regsvr32"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path", "id": "62732736-6250-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 2, "date": "2021-01-28", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code by using non-standard file extensions to load malciious DLLs. Upon investigating, look for network connections to remote destinations (internal or external). Review additional parrallel processes and child processes for additional activity.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` (Processes.process=*appdata* OR Processes.process=*programdata* OR Processes.process=*windows\\temp*) (Processes.process!=*.dll Processes.process!=*.ax Processes.process!=*.ocx) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model. Tune the query by filtering additional extensions found to be used by legitimate processes. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives with the query restricted to specified paths. Add more world writeable paths as tuning continues.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/", "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/how-to-use-the-regsvr32-tool-and-troubleshoot-regsvr32-error-messages-a98d960a-7392-e6fe-d90a-3f4e0cb543e5", "https://any.run/report/f29a7d2ecd3585e1e4208e44bcc7156ab5388725f1d29d03e7699da0d4598e7c/0826458b-5367-45cf-b841-c95a33a01718"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", "Iceid"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.010/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Suspicious $Processes.process_path.file_path$ process potentially loading malicious code", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.010"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Processes.process_path.file_path", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Regsvr32"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Blue Mockingbird", "Inception", "WIRTE", "Cobalt Group", "APT19", "Leviathan", "APT32", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=REGSVR32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_regsvr32"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass", "id": "070e9b80-6252-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 2, "date": "2021-01-28", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. Regsvr32.exe is also a Microsoft signed binary.This variation of the technique is often referred to as a \"Squiblydoo\" attack. \\\nUpon investigating, look for network connections to remote destinations (internal or external). Be cautious to modify the query to look for \"scrobj.dll\", the \".dll\" is not required to load scrobj. \"scrobj.dll\" will be loaded by \"regsvr32.exe\" upon execution. ", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` Processes.process=*scrobj* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives related to third party software registering .DLL's.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/", "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/how-to-use-the-regsvr32-tool-and-troubleshoot-regsvr32-error-messages-a98d960a-7392-e6fe-d90a-3f4e0cb543e5"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", "Cobalt Strike"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.010/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ in an attempt to bypass detection and preventative controls was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.010"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Regsvr32"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Blue Mockingbird", "Inception", "WIRTE", "Cobalt Group", "APT19", "Leviathan", "APT32", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=REGSVR32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_regsvr32"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass_filter"}]}, {"name": "Malicious InProcServer32 Modification", "id": "127c8d08-25ff-11ec-9223-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-05", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies a process modifying the registry with a known malicious CLSID under InProcServer32. Most COM classes are registered with the operating system and are identified by a GUID that represents the Class Identifier (CLSID) within the registry (usually under HKLM\\\\Software\\\\Classes\\\\CLSID or HKCU\\\\Software\\\\Classes\\\\CLSID). Behind the implementation of a COM class is the server (some binary) that is referenced within registry keys under the CLSID. The LocalServer32 key represents a path to an executable (exe) implementation, and the InprocServer32 key represents a path to a dynamic link library (DLL) implementation (Bohops). During triage, review parallel processes for suspicious activity. Pivot on the process GUID to see the full timeline of events. Analyze the value and look for file modifications. Being this is looking for inprocserver32, a DLL found in the value will most likely be loaded by a parallel process.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_guid Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\CLSID\\\\{89565275-A714-4a43-912E-978B935EDCCC}\\\\InProcServer32\\\\(Default)\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest Registry.process_guid Registry.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | fields _time dest registry_path registry_key_name registry_value_name process_name process_path process process_guid user] | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, process_name registry_path registry_key_name registry_value_name user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_inprocserver32_modification_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, filter as needed. In our test case, Remcos used regsvr32.exe to modify the registry. It may be required, dependent upon the EDR tool producing registry events, to remove (Default) from the command-line.", "references": ["https://bohops.com/2018/06/28/abusing-com-registry-structure-clsid-localserver32-inprocserver32/", "https://tria.ge/210929-ap75vsddan", "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/cb77b93150cb0f7fe65ce8a7e2a5781e727419451355a7736db84109fa215a89"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", "Remcos"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ modifying the registry with a known malicious clsid under InProcServer32.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218.010", "T1112"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "process_name", "registry_path", "registry_key_name", "registry_value_name", "user"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Regsvr32", "Modify Registry"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Inception", "WIRTE", "Cobalt Group", "APT19", "Leviathan", "APT32", "Deep Panda", "Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Turla", "APT32", "APT38", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "Threat Group-3390", "Honeybee", "Patchwork", "Gorgon Group", "FIN8"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "malicious_inprocserver32_modification_filter"}]}, {"name": "Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline", "id": "c9ef7dc4-eeaf-11eb-b2b6-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-07-27", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies Regsvr32.exe utilizing the silent switch to load DLLs. This technique has most recently been seen in IcedID campaigns to load its initial dll that will download the 2nd stage loader that will download and decrypt the config payload. The switch type may be either a hyphen `-` or forward slash `/`. This behavior is typically found with `-s`, and it is possible there are more switch types that may be used. \\ During triage, review parallel processes and capture any artifacts that may have landed on disk. Isolate and contain the endpoint as necessary.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"(?i)[\\-|\\/][Ss]{1}\") | `regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "minimal. but network operator can use this application to load dll.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/56680cba-2bbc-4b34-8633-5f7878ddf858/", "https://regexr.com/699e2"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["IcedID", "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", "Remcos"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a DLL using the silent parameter.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.010"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Regsvr32"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Blue Mockingbird", "Inception", "WIRTE", "Cobalt Group", "APT19", "Leviathan", "APT32", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=REGSVR32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_regsvr32"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Active Directory Password Spraying", "id": "3de109da-97d2-11eb-8b6a-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-07", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "description": "Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Password Spraying attacks within Active Directory environments.", "narrative": "In a password spraying attack, adversaries leverage one or a small list of commonly used / popular passwords against a large volume of usernames to acquire valid account credentials. Unlike a Brute Force attack that targets a specific user or small group of users with a large number of passwords, password spraying follows the opposite aproach and increases the chances of obtaining valid credentials while avoiding account lockouts. This allows adversaries to remain undetected if the target organization does not have the proper monitoring and detection controls in place.\\\nPassword Spraying can be leveraged by adversaries across different stages in an attack. It can be used to obtain an iniial access to an environment but can also be used to escalate privileges when access has been already achieved. In some scenarios, this technique capitalizes on a security policy most organizations implement, password rotation. As enterprise users change their passwords, it is possible some pick predictable, seasonal passwords such as `$CompanyNameWinter`, `Summer2021`, etc.\\\nSpecifically, this Analytic Story is focused on detecting possible Password Spraying attacks against Active Directory environments leveraging Windows Event Logs in the `Account Logon` and `Logon/Logoff` Advanced Audit Policy categories. It presents 9 detection analytics which can aid defenders in identifyng instances where one source user, source host or source process attempts to authenticate against a target or targets using a high, unsual, number of unique users. A user, host or process attempting to authenticate with multiple users is not common behavior for legitimate systems and should be monitored by security teams. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, remote administration tools, multi-user systems and missconfigured systems. These should be easily spotted when first implementing the detection and addded to an allow list or lookup table. The presented detections can also be used in Threat Hunting exercises.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/23/protecting-organization-password-spray-attacks/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/dn452415(v=ws.11)"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying"], "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Password Spraying", "Brute Force"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["DarkVishnya", "Leafminer", "APT33", "Turla", "APT39", "FIN5", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos", "id": "001266a6-9d5b-11eb-829b-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-14", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple invalid domain users using the Kerberos protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using Kerberos to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. As attackers progress in a breach, mistakes will be made. In certain scenarios, adversaries may execute a password spraying attack using an invalid list of users. Event 4768 is generated every time the Key Distribution Center issues a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). Failure code 0x6 stands for `client not found in Kerberos database` (the attempted user is not a valid domain user).\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\\nThis detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\\\nThe analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source ip and attempted user accounts.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 Result_Code=0x6 Account_Name!=\"*$\" | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Account_Name) AS unique_accounts values(Account_Name) as tried_accounts by _time, Client_Address | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Client_Address | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", "known_false_positives": "A host failing to authenticate with multiple invalid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, multi-user systems and missconfigured systems.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_invalid_users_kerberos/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Potential Kerberos based password spraying attack from $Client_Address$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "Client_Address", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Result_Code", "Account_Name", "Client_Address"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Password Spraying", "Brute Force"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "Leafminer", "Lazarus Group", "DarkVishnya", "APT39", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Turla"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos_filter"}]}, {"name": "Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos", "id": "3a91a212-98a9-11eb-b86a-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-08", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple valid users using the Kerberos protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using Kerberos to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4771 is generated when the Key Distribution Center fails to issue a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). Failure code 0x18 stands for `wrong password provided` (the attempted user is a legitimate domain user).\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\\nThis detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\\\nThe analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source ip and attempted user accounts.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4771 Failure_Code=0x18 Account_Name!=\"*$\" | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Account_Name) AS unique_accounts values(Account_Name) as tried_accounts by _time, Client_Address | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Client_Address | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", "known_false_positives": "A host failing to authenticate with multiple valid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, missconfigured systems and multi-user systems like Citrix farms.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/dn319109(v=ws.11)", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4771"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_valid_users_kerberos/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Potential Kerberos based password spraying attack from $Client_Address$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "Client_Address", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Result_Code", "Account_Name", "Client_Address"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Password Spraying", "Brute Force"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "Leafminer", "Lazarus Group", "DarkVishnya", "APT39", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Turla"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos_filter"}]}, {"name": "Multiple Users Attempting To Authenticate Using Explicit Credentials", "id": "e61918fa-9ca4-11eb-836c-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-13", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies a source user failing to authenticate with multiple users using explicit credentials on a host. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4648 is generated when a process attempts an account logon by explicitly specifying that accounts credentials. This event generates on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations.\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\\nThis detection will trigger on the potenfially malicious host, perhaps controlled via a trojan or operated by an insider threat, from where a password spraying attack is being executed.\\\nThe analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source account, attempted user accounts and the endpoint were the behavior was identified.", "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4648 | bucket span=2m _time | eval Source_Account = mvindex(Account_Name, 0) | eval Destination_Account = mvindex(Account_Name, 1) | search Source_Account != \"*$\" Source_Account !=\"-\" Destination_Account !=\"*$\" | stats dc(Destination_Account) AS unique_accounts values(Destination_Account) as tried_account by _time, ComputerName, Source_Account | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by ComputerName | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_users_attempting_to_authenticate_using_explicit_credentials_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Event Logs from domain controllers as well as member servers and workstations. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Logon` within `Logon/Logoff` needs to be enabled.", "known_false_positives": "A source user failing attempting to authenticate multiple users on a host is not a common behavior for regular systems. Some applications, however, may exhibit this behavior in which case sets of users hosts can be added to an allow list. Possible false positive scenarios include systems where several users connect to like Mail servers, identity providers, remote desktop services, Citrix, etc.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4648", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/basic-audit-logon-events"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_explicit_credential_spray/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Potential password spraying attack from $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Security_ID", "Account_Name", "ComputerName"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Password Spraying", "Brute Force"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "Leafminer", "Lazarus Group", "DarkVishnya", "APT39", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Turla"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "multiple_users_attempting_to_authenticate_using_explicit_credentials_filter"}]}, {"name": "Multiple Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos", "id": "98f22d82-9d62-11eb-9fcf-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-14", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple disabled domain users using the Kerberos protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using Kerberos to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. As attackers progress in a breach, mistakes will be made. In certain scenarios, adversaries may execute a password spraying attack against disabled users. Event 4768 is generated every time the Key Distribution Center issues a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). Failure code `0x12` stands for `clients credentials have been revoked` (account disabled, expired or locked out).\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\\nThis detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\\\nThe analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source ip and attempted user accounts.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 Account_Name!=\"*$\" Result_Code=0x12 | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Account_Name) AS unique_accounts values(Account_Name) as tried_accounts by _time, Client_Address | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Client_Address | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_disabled_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", "known_false_positives": "A host failing to authenticate with multiple disabled domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, multi-user systems missconfigured systems.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_disabled_users_kerberos/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Potential Kerberos based password spraying attack from $Client_Address$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "Client_Address", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Result_Code", "Account_Name", "Client_Address"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Password Spraying", "Brute Force"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "Leafminer", "Lazarus Group", "DarkVishnya", "APT39", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Turla"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "multiple_disabled_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos_filter"}]}, {"name": "Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Process", "id": "9015385a-9c84-11eb-bef2-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-13", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies a source process name failing to authenticate with multiple users. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4625 generates on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations when an account fails to logon. Logon Type 2 describes an iteractive logon attempt.\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\\nThis detection will trigger on the potenfially malicious host, perhaps controlled via a trojan or operated by an insider threat, from where a password spraying attack is being executed. This could be a domain controller as well as a member server or workstation.\\\nThe analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source process name, source account and attempted user accounts.", "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4625 Logon_Type=2 Caller_Process_Name!=\"-\" | bucket span=2m _time | eval Source_Account = mvindex(Account_Name, 0) | eval Destination_Account = mvindex(Account_Name, 1) | stats dc(Destination_Account) AS unique_accounts values(Account_Name) as tried_accounts by _time, Caller_Process_Name, Source_Account, ComputerName | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Caller_Process_Name, Source_Account, ComputerName | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_process_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Event Logs from domain controllers aas well as member servers and workstations. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Logon` within `Logon/Logoff` needs to be enabled.", "known_false_positives": "A process failing to authenticate with multiple users is not a common behavior for legitimate user sessions. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners and missconfigured systems.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4625", "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4625", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/basic-audit-logon-events"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_multiple_users_from_process/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Potential password spraying attack from $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Logon_Type", "Caller_Process_Name", "Security_ID", "Account_Name", "ComputerName"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Password Spraying", "Brute Force"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "Leafminer", "Lazarus Group", "DarkVishnya", "APT39", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Turla"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_process_filter"}]}, {"name": "Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM", "id": "57ad5a64-9df7-11eb-a290-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-15", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple invalid users using the NTLM protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using NTLM to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. As attackers progress in a breach, mistakes will be made. In certain scenarios, adversaries may execute a password spraying attack using an invalid list of users. Event 4776 is generated on the computer that is authoritative for the provided credentials. For domain accounts, the domain controller is authoritative. For local accounts, the local computer is authoritative. Error code 0xC0000064 stands for `The username you typed does not exist` (the attempted user is a legitimate domain user).\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\\nThis detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\\\nThe analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source workstation name and attempted user accounts.", "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4776 Logon_Account!=\"*$\" 0xC0000064 action=failure | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Logon_Account) AS unique_accounts values(Logon_Account) as tried_accounts by _time, Source_Workstation | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Source_Workstation | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Credential Validation' within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", "known_false_positives": "A host failing to authenticate with multiple invalid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners and missconfigured systems. If this detection triggers on a host other than a Domain Controller, the behavior could represent a password spraying attack against the host's local accounts.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-credential-validation", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4776"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_invalid_users_ntlm/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Potential NTLM based password spraying attack from $Source_Workstation$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "Source_Workstation", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "action", "Logon_Account", "Source_Workstation"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Password Spraying", "Brute Force"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "Leafminer", "Lazarus Group", "DarkVishnya", "APT39", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Turla"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm_filter"}]}, {"name": "Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM", "id": "7ed272a4-9c77-11eb-af22-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-13", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple valid users using the NTLM protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using NTLM to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4776 is generated on the computer that is authoritative for the provided credentials. For domain accounts, the domain controller is authoritative. For local accounts, the local computer is authoritative. Error code 0xC000006A means: misspelled or bad password (the attempted user is a legitimate domain user).\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\\nThis detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\\\nThe analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source workstation name and attempted user accounts.", "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4776 Logon_Account!=\"*$\" 0xC000006A action=failure | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Logon_Account) AS unique_accounts values(Logon_Account) as tried_accounts by _time, Source_Workstation | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Source_Workstation | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Credential Validation` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", "known_false_positives": "A host failing to authenticate with multiple valid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners and missconfigured systems. If this detection triggers on a host other than a Domain Controller, the behavior could represent a password spraying attack against the host's local accounts.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-credential-validation", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4776"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_valid_users_ntlm/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Potential NTLM based password spraying attack from $Source_Workstation$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "Source_Workstation", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "action", "Logon_Account", "Source_Workstation"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Password Spraying", "Brute Force"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "Leafminer", "Lazarus Group", "DarkVishnya", "APT39", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Turla"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm_filter"}]}, {"name": "Multiple Users Remotely Failing To Authenticate From Host", "id": "80f9d53e-9ca1-11eb-b0d6-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-13", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies a source host failing to authenticate against a remote host with multiple users. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4625 documents each and every failed attempt to logon to the local computer. This event generates on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations. Logon Type 3 describes an remote authentication attempt.\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\\nThis detection will trigger on the host that is the target of the password spraying attack. This could be a domain controller as well as a member server or workstation.\\\nThe analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source process name, source account and attempted user accounts.", "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4625 Logon_Type=3 Source_Network_Address!=\"-\" | bucket span=2m _time | eval Destination_Account = mvindex(Account_Name, 1) | stats dc(Destination_Account) AS unique_accounts values(Destination_Account) as tried_accounts by _time, Source_Network_Address, ComputerName | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Source_Network_Address, ComputerName | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_users_remotely_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Event Logs from domain controllers as as well as member servers and workstations. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Logon` within `Logon/Logoff` needs to be enabled.", "known_false_positives": "A host failing to authenticate with multiple valid users against a remote host is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, remote administration tools, missconfigyred systems, etc.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4625", "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4625", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/basic-audit-logon-events"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_remote_spray/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Potential password spraying attack on $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Logon_Type", "Security_ID", "Account_Name", "ComputerName", "Source_Network_Address"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Password Spraying", "Brute Force"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "Leafminer", "Lazarus Group", "DarkVishnya", "APT39", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Turla"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "multiple_users_remotely_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "HAFNIUM Group", "id": "beae2ab0-7c3f-11eb-8b63-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-03", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "description": "HAFNIUM group was identified by Microsoft as exploiting 4 Microsoft Exchange CVEs in the wild - CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858 and CVE-2021-27065.", "narrative": "On Tuesday, March 2, 2021, Microsoft released a set of security patches for its mail server, Microsoft Exchange. These patches respond to a group of vulnerabilities known to impact Exchange 2013, 2016, and 2019. It is important to note that an Exchange 2010 security update has also been issued, though the CVEs do not reference that version as being vulnerable.\\\nWhile the CVEs do not shed much light on the specifics of the vulnerabilities or exploits, the first vulnerability (CVE-2021-26855) has a remote network attack vector that allows the attacker, a group Microsoft named HAFNIUM, to authenticate as the Exchange server. Three additional vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065) were also identified as part of this activity. When chained together along with CVE-2021-26855 for initial access, the attacker would have complete control over the Exchange server. This includes the ability to run code as SYSTEM and write to any path on the server.\\\nThe following Splunk detections assist with identifying the HAFNIUM groups tradecraft and methodology.", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-hafnium-exchange-server-zero-day-activity-in-splunk.html", "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/", "https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/03/03/rapid7s-insightidr-enables-detection-and-response-to-microsoft-exchange-0-day/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["HAFNIUM Group"], "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1136", "T1505.003", "T1021", "T1059", "T1505", "T1059.001", "T1569.002", "T1114.002", "T1003.001", "T1003", "T1021.002", "T1569", "T1190", "T1114", "T1003.003", "T1136.001"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Email Collection", "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "Local Account", "Remote Services", "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "Service Execution", "NTDS", "Remote Email Collection", "Create Account", "Web Shell", "Server Software Component", "OS Credential Dumping", "LSASS Memory", "System Services", "PowerShell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Execution", "Collection", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Magic Hound", "Stealth Falcon", "Inception", "Sandworm Team", "Axiom", "APT1", "Tropic Trooper", "Kimsuky", "TA459", "TEMP.Veles", "Poseidon Group", "PLATINUM", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ke3chang", "FIN8", "Turla", "APT39", "Molerats", "Leviathan", "APT29", "Rocke", "TA505", "Whitefly", "Frankenstein", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "Stolen Pencil", "APT32", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "Night Dragon", "APT19", "WIRTE", "APT41", "CopyKittens", "FIN5", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Blue Mockingbird", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "Honeybee", "Thrip", "Wizard Spider", "APT3", "Cleaver", "Sowbug", "Leafminer", "no", "Threat Group-1314", "MuddyWater", "FIN10", "DarkVishnya", "Patchwork", "FIN4", "APT28", "Gallmaker", "APT33", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN7", "Gorgon Group", "Orangeworm", "BlackTech", "DarkHydrus"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Any Powershell DownloadString", "id": "4d015ef2-7adf-11eb-95da-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-03-01", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a file using `DownloadString` method. This particular method is utilized in many different PowerShell frameworks to download files and output to disk. Identify the source (IP/domain) and destination file and triage appropriately. If AMSI logging or PowerShell transaction logs are available, review for further details of the implant.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process=*.DownloadString* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `any_powershell_downloadstring_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present and filtering will need to occur by parent process or command line argument. It may be required to modify this query to an EDR product for more granular coverage.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.net.webclient.downloadstring?view=net-5.0", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "HAFNIUM Group", "Ingress Tool Transfer"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior identifies the use of DownloadString within PowerShell.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "PowerShell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "Gallmaker", "Turla", "APT19", "DarkHydrus", "APT28", "Thrip", "Gorgon Group", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leviathan", "TA459", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT32", "FIN7", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "APT3", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_powershell"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "any_powershell_downloadstring_filter"}]}, {"name": "Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL", "id": "8943b567-f14d-4ee8-a0bb-2121d4ce3184", "version": 2, "date": "2020-02-21", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Detect the usage of comsvcs.dll for dumping the lsass process.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*comsvcs.dll* Processes.process=*MiniDump* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "None identified.", "references": ["https://modexp.wordpress.com/2019/08/30/minidumpwritedump-via-com-services-dll/", "https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1167417096374050817"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "HAFNIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified accessing credentials using comsvcs.dll on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["LSASS Memory", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Whitefly", "Blue Mockingbird", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Leviathan", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Stolen Pencil", "APT32", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "PLATINUM", "FIN8", "BRONZE BUTLER", "OilRig", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT28", "APT1", "Ke3chang", "Cleaver", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_rundll32"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll_filter"}]}, {"name": "Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass", "id": "c2590137-0b08-4985-9ec5-6ae23d92f63d", "version": 6, "date": "2020-11-06", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Monitor for changes of the ExecutionPolicy in the registry to the values \"unrestricted\" or \"bypass,\" which allows the execution of malicious scripts.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*Software\\\\Microsoft\\\\Powershell\\\\1\\\\ShellIds\\\\Microsoft.PowerShell* Registry.registry_key_name=ExecutionPolicy (Registry.registry_value_name=Unrestricted OR Registry.registry_value_name=Bypass) by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Registry node. You must also be ingesting logs with the fields registry_path, registry_key_name, and registry_value_name from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may attempt to change the default execution policy on a system for a variety of reasons. However, setting the policy to \"unrestricted\" or \"bypass\" as this search is designed to identify, would be unusual. Hits should be reviewed and investigated as appropriate.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "Credential Dumping", "HAFNIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_execution_policy/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A registry modification in $registry_path$ with reg key $registry_key_name$ and reg value $registry_value_name$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "registry_path", "type": "RegistryPath", "role": ["Others"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.dest"], "risk_score": 48, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "PowerShell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "Gallmaker", "Turla", "APT19", "DarkHydrus", "APT28", "Thrip", "Gorgon Group", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leviathan", "TA459", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT32", "FIN7", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "APT3", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect New Local Admin account", "id": "b25f6f62-0712-43c1-b203-083231ffd97d", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-08", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for newly created accounts that have been elevated to local administrators.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4720 OR (EventCode=4732 Group_Name=Administrators) | transaction member_id connected=false maxspan=180m | rename member_id as user | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_new_local_admin_account_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Windows event logs using the Splunk Windows TA and collecting event code 4720 and 4732", "known_false_positives": "The activity may be legitimate. For this reason, it's best to verify the account with an administrator and ask whether there was a valid service request for the account creation. If your local administrator group name is not \"Administrators\", this search may generate an excessive number of false positives", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["DHS Report TA18-074A", "HAFNIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Windows", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "message": "A $user$ on $dest$ was added recently. Identify if this was legitimate behavior or not.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1136.001", "T1136"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Group_Name", "member_id", "dest", "user"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "access", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Local Account", "Create Account"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT39", "APT41", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leafminer", "APT3", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_new_local_admin_account_filter"}]}, {"name": "Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine", "id": "1a382c6c-7c2e-11eb-ac69-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-03-03", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This query detects the Nishang Invoke-PowerShellTCPOneLine utility that spawns a call back to a remote command and control server. This is a powershell oneliner. In addition, this will capture on the command-line additional utilities used by Nishang. Triage the endpoint and identify any parallel processes that look suspicious. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain contacted by the powershell process.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process=*Net.Sockets.TCPClient* AND Processes.process=*System.Text.ASCIIEncoding*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `nishang_powershelltcponeline_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives may be present. Filter as needed based on initial analysis.", "references": ["https://github.com/samratashok/nishang/blob/master/Shells/Invoke-PowerShellTcpOneLine.ps1", "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/", "https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/03/03/rapid7s-insightidr-enables-detection-and-response-to-microsoft-exchange-0-day/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["HAFNIUM Group"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Command and Control"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Possible Nishang Invoke-PowerShellTCPOneLine behavior on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "PowerShell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "Gallmaker", "Turla", "APT19", "DarkHydrus", "APT28", "Thrip", "Gorgon Group", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leviathan", "TA459", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT32", "FIN7", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "APT3", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_powershell"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "nishang_powershelltcponeline_filter"}]}, {"name": "Dump LSASS via procdump", "id": "3742ebfe-64c2-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Detect procdump.exe dumping the lsass process. This query looks for both -mm and -ma usage. -mm will produce a mini dump file and -ma will write a dump file with all process memory. Both are highly suspect and should be reviewed. This query does not monitor for the internal name (original_file_name=procdump) of the PE or look for procdump64.exe. Modify the query as needed.\\\nDuring triage, confirm this is procdump.exe executing. If it is the first time a Sysinternals utility has been ran, it is possible there will be a -accepteula on the command line. Review other endpoint data sources for cross process (injection) into lsass.exe.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_procdump` (Processes.process=*-ma* OR Processes.process=*-mm*) Processes.process=*lsass* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dump_lsass_via_procdump_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "None identified.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procdump", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md#atomic-test-2---dump-lsassexe-memory-using-procdump"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "HAFNIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified attempting to dump lsass.exe on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["LSASS Memory", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Whitefly", "Blue Mockingbird", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Leviathan", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Stolen Pencil", "APT32", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "PLATINUM", "FIN8", "BRONZE BUTLER", "OilRig", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT28", "APT1", "Ke3chang", "Cleaver", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=procdump.exe OR Processes.process_name=procdump64.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=procdump)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_procdump"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "dump_lsass_via_procdump_filter"}]}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window", "id": "ee18ed37-0802-4268-9435-b3b91aaa18db", "version": 7, "date": "2021-10-05", "author": "David Dorsey, Michael Haag Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following hunting analytic identifies PowerShell commands utilizing the WindowStyle parameter to hide the window on the compromised endpoint. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it is overriding the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide its activity from the user, and connects to the Internet. Removed in this version of the query is New-Object. The analytic identifies all variations of WindowStyle, as PowerShell allows the ability to shorten the parameter. For example w, win, windowsty and so forth. In addition, through our research it was identified that PowerShell will interpret different command switch types beyond the hyphen. We have added endash, emdash, horizontal bar, and forward slash.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"(?i)[\\-|\\/|\u2013|\u2014|\u2015]w(in*d*o*w*s*t*y*l*e*)*\\s+[^-]\") | `malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate process can have this combination of command-line options, but it's not common.", "references": ["https://regexr.com/663rr", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses/blob/master/TestHarnesses/T1059.001_PowerShell/OutPowerShellCommandLineParameter.ps1", "https://ss64.com/ps/powershell.html", "https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/1440758396534214658?s=20", "https://blog.netlab.360.com/ten-families-of-malicious-samples-are-spreading-using-the-log4j2-vulnerability-now/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "HAFNIUM Group", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Command And Control"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/hidden_powershell/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "PowerShell processes $process$ started with parameters to modify the execution policy of the run, run in a hidden window, and connect to the Internet on host $dest$ executed by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059.001", "T1059"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process", "type": "Process", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["PowerShell", "Command and Scripting Interpreter"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "Gallmaker", "Turla", "APT19", "DarkHydrus", "APT28", "Thrip", "Gorgon Group", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leviathan", "TA459", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT32", "FIN7", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "APT3", "APT29", "Deep Panda", "APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_powershell"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag", "id": "b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-151xb162040e", "version": 4, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for events where `PsExec.exe` is run with the `accepteula` flag in the command line. PsExec is a built-in Windows utility that enables you to execute processes on other systems. It is fully interactive for console applications. This tool is widely used for launching interactive command prompts on remote systems. Threat actors leverage this extensively for executing code on compromised systems. If an attacker is running PsExec for the first time, they will be prompted to accept the end-user license agreement (EULA), which can be passed as the argument `accepteula` within the command line.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_psexec` Processes.process=*accepteula* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators can leverage PsExec for accessing remote systems and might pass `accepteula` as an argument if they are running this tool for the first time. However, it is not likely that you'd see multiple occurrences of this event on a machine", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "HAFNIUM Group", "DarkSide Ransomware", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ running the utility for possibly the first time.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021", "T1021.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote Services", "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "APT32", "Orangeworm", "FIN8", "APT3", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-1314", "Turla", "Deep Panda", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=psexec.exe OR Processes.process_name=psexec64.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=psexec.c)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_psexec"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag_filter"}]}, {"name": "Unified Messaging Service Spawning a Process", "id": "f1126df0-7bd5-11eb-988f-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-02", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This detection identifies Microsoft Exchange Server's Unified Messaging services, umworkerprocess.exe and umservice.exe, spawning a child process, indicating possible exploitation of CVE-2021-26857 vulnerability. The query filters out werfault.exe and wermgr.exe mostly due to potential false positives, however, if there is an excessive amount of \"wermgr.exe\" or \"WerFault.exe\" failures, it may be due to the active exploitation. During triage, identify any additional suspicious parallel processes. Identify any recent out of place file modifications. Review Exchange logs following Microsofts guide. To contain, perform egress filtering or restrict public access to Exchange. In final, patch the vulnerablity and monitor.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=\"umworkerprocess.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name=\"UMService.exe\" (Processes.process_name!=\"wermgr.exe\" OR Processes.process_name!=\"werfault.exe\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `unified_messaging_service_spawning_a_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown. Tune out child processes as needed to limit volume of false positives.", "references": ["https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/", "https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/03/03/rapid7s-insightidr-enables-detection-and-response-to-microsoft-exchange-0-day/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["HAFNIUM Group"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-26857"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/windows-sysmon_umservices.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Possible CVE-2021-26857 exploitation on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1190"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploit Public-Facing Application"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Rocke", "APT39", "BlackTech", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Night Dragon", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "unified_messaging_service_spawning_a_process_filter"}]}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass", "id": "9be56c82-b1cc-4318-87eb-d138afaaca39", "version": 5, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Rico Valdez, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for PowerShell processes started with parameters used to bypass the local execution policy for scripts. These parameters are often observed in attacks leveraging PowerShell scripts as they override the default PowerShell execution policy.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process_id) as process_id, values(Processes.parent_process_id) as parent_process_id values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process=\"* -ex*\" OR Processes.process=\"* bypass *\") by Processes.process_id, Processes.user, Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "There may be legitimate reasons to bypass the PowerShell execution policy. The PowerShell script being run with this parameter should be validated to ensure that it is legitimate.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["DHS Report TA18-074A", "HAFNIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/encoded_powershell/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "PowerShell local execution policy bypass attempt on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "PowerShell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "Gallmaker", "Turla", "APT19", "DarkHydrus", "APT28", "Thrip", "Gorgon Group", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leviathan", "TA459", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT32", "FIN7", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "APT3", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_powershell"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Exchange Web Shell", "id": "8c14eeee-2af1-4a4b-bda8-228da0f4862a", "version": 3, "date": "2021-10-05", "author": "Michael Haag, Shannon Davis, David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following query identifies suspicious .aspx created in 3 paths identified by Microsoft as known drop locations for Exchange exploitation related to HAFNIUM group and recently disclosed vulnerablity named ProxyShell. Paths include: `\\HttpProxy\\owa\\auth\\`, `\\inetpub\\wwwroot\\aspnet_client\\`, and `\\HttpProxy\\OAB\\`. Upon triage, the suspicious .aspx file will likely look obvious on the surface. inspect the contents for script code inside. Identify additional log sources, IIS included, to review source and other potential exploitation. It is often the case that a particular threat is only applicable to a specific subset of systems in your environment. Typically analytics to detect those threats are written without the benefit of being able to only target those systems as well. Writing analytics against all systems when those behaviors are limited to identifiable subsets of those systems is suboptimal. Consider the case ProxyShell vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Servers. With asset information, a hunter can limit their analytics to systems that have been identified as Exchange servers. A hunter may start with the theory that the exchange server is communicating with new systems that it has not previously. If this theory is run against all publicly facing systems, the amount of noise it will generate will likely render this theory untenable. However, using the asset information to limit this analytic to just the Exchange servers will reduce the noise allowing the hunter to focus only on the systems where this behavioral change is relevant.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=System by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*\\\\HttpProxy\\\\owa\\\\auth\\\\*\", \"*\\\\inetpub\\\\wwwroot\\\\aspnet_client\\\\*\", \"*\\\\HttpProxy\\\\OAB\\\\*\") Filesystem.file_name=\"*.aspx\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process] | dedup file_create_time | table dest file_create_time, file_name, file_path, process_name | `detect_exchange_web_shell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node and `Filesystem` node.", "known_false_positives": "The query is structured in a way that `action` (read, create) is not defined. Review the results of this query, filter, and tune as necessary. It may be necessary to generate this query specific to your endpoint product.", "references": ["https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample%20Data/Feeds/MSTICIoCs-ExchangeServerVulnerabilitiesDisclosedMarch2021.csv", "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/8/17/from-pwn2own-2021-a-new-attack-surface-on-microsoft-exchange-proxyshell", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FC6iHw258RI", "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-microsoft-exchange-servers-still-vulnerable-to-proxyshell-exploit#what-should-you-do"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["HAFNIUM Group", "ProxyShell"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exploitation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/windows-sysmon_proxylogon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk that is related to IIS exploitation previously performed by HAFNIUM. Review further file modifications on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1505", "T1505.003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "file_name", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.file_path", "Filesystem.process_id", "Filesystem.file_name", "Filesystem.file_hash", "Filesystem.user"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Server Software Component", "Web Shell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Tropic Trooper", "Soft Cell", "Threat Group-3390", "TEMP.Veles", "Leviathan", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT32", "OilRig", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_exchange_web_shell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Renamed PSExec", "id": "683e6196-b8e8-11eb-9a79-acde48001122", "version": 3, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies renamed instances of `PsExec.exe` being utilized on an endpoint. Most instances, it is highly probable to capture `Psexec.exe` or other SysInternal utility usage with the command-line argument of `-accepteula`. During triage, validate this is the legitimate version of `PsExec` by reviewing the PE metadata. In addition, review parallel processes for further suspicious behavior.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_psexec` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_renamed_psexec_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives should be present. It is possible some third party applications may use older versions of PsExec, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1569.002/T1569.002.yaml", "https://redcanary.com/blog/threat-hunting-psexec-lateral-movement/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "HAFNIUM Group", "DarkSide Ransomware", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1569.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Lateral Movement", "Execution"], "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1569", "T1569.002"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 27, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Services", "Service Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "APT41", "Silence", "FIN6", "APT32", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=psexec.exe OR Processes.process_name=psexec64.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=psexec.c)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_psexec"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_renamed_psexec_filter"}]}, {"name": "W3WP Spawning Shell", "id": "0f03423c-7c6a-11eb-bc47-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-03-03", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This query identifies a shell, PowerShell.exe or Cmd.exe, spawning from W3WP.exe, or IIS. In addition to IIS logs, this behavior with an EDR product will capture potential webshell activity, similar to the HAFNIUM Group abusing CVEs, on publicly available Exchange mail servers. During triage, review the parent process and child process of the shell being spawned. Review the command-line arguments and any file modifications that may occur. Identify additional parallel process, child processes, that may highlight further commands executed. After triaging, work to contain the threat and patch the system that is vulnerable.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=w3wp.exe AND `process_cmd` OR `process_powershell` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `w3wp_spawning_shell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Baseline your environment before production. It is possible build systems using IIS will spawn cmd.exe to perform a software build. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/02/04/ghost-in-the-shell-investigating-web-shell-attacks/", "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/8/17/from-pwn2own-2021-a-new-attack-surface-on-microsoft-exchange-proxyshell", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FC6iHw258RI", "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-microsoft-exchange-servers-still-vulnerable-to-proxyshell-exploit#what-should-you-do"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["HAFNIUM Group", "ProxyShell"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523", "CVE-2021-31207"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Possible Web Shell execution on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1505", "T1505.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Server Software Component", "Web Shell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Tropic Trooper", "Soft Cell", "Threat Group-3390", "TEMP.Veles", "Leviathan", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT32", "OilRig", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_cmd"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_powershell"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "w3wp_spawning_shell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Ntdsutil Export NTDS", "id": "da63bc76-61ae-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-28", "author": "Michael Haag, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Monitor for signs that Ntdsutil is being used to Extract Active Directory database - NTDS.dit, typically used for offline password cracking. It may be used in normal circumstances with no command line arguments or shorthand variations of more common arguments. Ntdsutil.exe is typically seen run on a Windows Server. Typical command used to dump ntds.dit \\\nntdsutil \"ac i ntds\" \"ifm\" \"create full C:\\Temp\" q q \\\nThis technique uses \"Install from Media\" (IFM), which will extract a copy of the Active Directory database. A successful export of the Active Directory database will yield a file modification named ntds.dit to the destination.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=ntdsutil.exe Processes.process=*ntds* Processes.process=*create*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ntdsutil_export_ntds_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "Highly possible Server Administrators will troubleshoot with ntdsutil.exe, generating false positives.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.003/T1003.003.md#atomic-test-3---dump-active-directory-database-with-ntdsutil", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc753343(v=ws.11)", "https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf", "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/vss_ps.dll-97B15BDAE9777F454C9A6BA25E938DB3.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "HAFNIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Active Directory NTDS export on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.003", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 50, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["NTDS", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN6", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "ntdsutil_export_ntds_filter"}]}, {"name": "Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts", "id": "7f5fb3e1-4209-4914-90db-0ec21b556378", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search looks for an increase of data transfers from your email server to your clients. This could be indicative of a malicious actor collecting data using your email server.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` sum(All_Traffic.bytes_out) as bytes_out from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.src_category=email_server by All_Traffic.dest_ip _time span=1d | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | eventstats avg(bytes_out) as avg_bytes_out stdev(bytes_out) as stdev_bytes_out | eventstats count as num_data_samples avg(eval(if(_time < relative_time(now(), \"@d\"), bytes_out, null))) as per_source_avg_bytes_out stdev(eval(if(_time < relative_time(now(), \"@d\"), bytes_out, null))) as per_source_stdev_bytes_out by dest_ip | eval minimum_data_samples = 4, deviation_threshold = 3 | where num_data_samples >= minimum_data_samples AND bytes_out > (avg_bytes_out + (deviation_threshold * stdev_bytes_out)) AND bytes_out > (per_source_avg_bytes_out + (deviation_threshold * per_source_stdev_bytes_out)) AND _time >= relative_time(now(), \"@d\") | eval num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average = round(abs(bytes_out - avg_bytes_out) / stdev_bytes_out, 2), num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average = round(abs(bytes_out - per_source_avg_bytes_out) / per_source_stdev_bytes_out, 2) | table dest_ip, _time, bytes_out, avg_bytes_out, per_source_avg_bytes_out, num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average, num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average | `email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model. Your email servers must be categorized as \"email_server\" for the search to work, as well. You may need to adjust the deviation_threshold and minimum_data_samples values based on the network traffic in your environment. The \"deviation_threshold\" field is a multiplying factor to control how much variation you're willing to tolerate. The \"minimum_data_samples\" field is the minimum number of connections of data samples required for the statistic to be valid.", "known_false_positives": "The false-positive rate will vary based on how you set the deviation_threshold and data_samples values. Our recommendation is to adjust these values based on your network traffic to and from your email servers.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Collection and Staging", "HAFNIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1114", "T1114.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.bytes_out", "All_Traffic.src_category", "All_Traffic.dest_ip"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Email Collection", "Remote Email Collection"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT1", "FIN4", "APT28", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Ke3chang", "Leafminer"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", "id": "30552a76-ac78-48e4-b3c0-de4e34e9563d", "version": 1, "date": "2018-01-26", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "description": "Detect and investigate suspected abuse of file extensions and Windows file associations. Some of the malicious behaviors involved may include inserting spaces before file extensions or prepending the file extension with a different one, among other techniques.", "narrative": "Attackers use a variety of techniques to entice users to run malicious code or to persist on an endpoint. One way to accomplish these goals is to leverage file extensions and the mechanism Windows uses to associate files with specific applications. \\\n Since its earliest days, Windows has used extensions to identify file types. Users have become familiar with these extensions and their application associations. For example, if users see that a file ends in `.doc` or `.docx`, they will assume that it is a Microsoft Word document and expect that double-clicking will open it using `winword.exe`. The user will typically also presume that the `.docx` file is safe. \\\n Attackers take advantage of this expectation by obfuscating the true file extension. They can accomplish this in a couple of ways. One technique involves inserting multiple spaces in the file name before the extension to hide the extension from the GUI, obscuring the true nature of the file. Another approach involves prepending the real extension with a different one. This is especially effective when Windows is configured to \"hide extensions for known file types.\" In this case, the real extension is not displayed, but the prepended one is, leading end users to believe the file is a different type than it actually is.\\\nChanging the association between a file extension and an application can allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code. The technique typically involves changing the association for an often-launched file type to associate instead with a malicious program the attacker has dropped on the endpoint. When the end user launches a file that has been manipulated in this way, it will execute the attacker's malware. It will also execute the application the end user expected to run, cleverly obscuring the fact that something suspicious has occurred.\\\nRun the searches in this story to detect and investigate suspicious behavior that may indicate abuse or manipulation of Windows file extensions and/or associations.", "references": ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/12/file-extensions-2/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", "category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1036.003", "T1036"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Masquerading", "Rename System Utilities"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Soft Cell", "PLATINUM", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Windshift", "menuPass"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Execution of File with Multiple Extensions", "id": "b06a555e-dce0-417d-a2eb-28a5d8d66ef7", "version": 3, "date": "2020-11-18", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for processes launched from files that have double extensions in the file name. This is typically done to obscure the \"real\" file extension and make it appear as though the file being accessed is a data file, as opposed to executable content.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = *.doc.exe OR Processes.process = *.htm.exe OR Processes.process = *.html.exe OR Processes.process = *.txt.exe OR Processes.process = *.pdf.exe OR Processes.process = *.doc.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process Processes.parent_process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node.", "known_false_positives": "None identified.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "process $process$ have double extensions in the file name is executed on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1036", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process", "Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Masquerading", "Rename System Utilities"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Windshift", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "Dragonfly 2.0", "menuPass", "APT32", "Soft Cell", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444", "id": "4ad4253e-10ca-11ec-8235-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-08", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "description": "CVE-2021-40444 is a remote code execution vulnerability in MSHTML, recently used to delivery targeted spearphishing documents.", "narrative": "Microsoft is aware of targeted attacks that attempt to exploit this vulnerability, CVE-2021-40444 by using specially-crafted Microsoft Office documents. MSHTML is a software component used to render web pages on Windows. Although it\u2019s most commonly associated with Internet Explorer, it is also used in other software. CVE-2021-40444 received a CVSS score of 8.8 out of 10. MSHTML is the beating heart of Internet Explorer, the vulnerability also exists in that browser. Although given its limited use, there is little risk of infection by that vector. Microsoft Office applications use the MSHTML component to display web content in Office documents. The attack depends on MSHTML loading a specially crafted ActiveX control when the target opens a malicious Office document. The loaded ActiveX control can then run arbitrary code to infect the system with more malware. \\ At the moment all supported Windows versions are vulnerable. Since there is no patch available yet, Microsoft proposes a few methods to block these attacks. \\\n1. Disable the installation of all ActiveX controls in Internet Explorer via the registry. Previously-installed ActiveX controls will still run, but no new ones will be added, including malicious ones. \\\n1. Open documents from the Internet in Protected View or Application Guard for Office, both of which prevent the current attack. This is a default setting but it may have been changed.", "references": ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/09/windows-mshtml-zero-day-actively-exploited-mitigations-required/", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", "https://www.echotrail.io/insights/search/control.exe"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444"], "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.011", "T1218.002", "T1566.001", "T1566"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Rundll32", "Phishing", "Control Panel", "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Spearphishing Attachment"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Magic Hound", "Inception", "Rancor", "Tropic Trooper", "Kimsuky", "TA459", "PLATINUM", "APT29", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN8", "Turla", "APT39", "Molerats", "Gamaredon Group", "APT12", "Leviathan", "Carbanak", "RTM", "TA505", "Mofang", "Frankenstein", "Cobalt Group", "APT32", "Silence", "APT19", "APT-C-36", "APT37", "Darkhotel", "CopyKittens", "APT41", "menuPass", "Blue Mockingbird", "OilRig", "admin@338", "Lazarus Group", "APT3", "Wizard Spider", "Machete", "no", "The White Company", "Sharpshooter", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork", "FIN4", "Elderwood", "APT28", "Gallmaker", "APT33", "Gorgon Group", "Windshift", "BlackTech", "FIN7", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Naikon", "DarkHydrus"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Control Loading from World Writable Directory", "id": "10423ac4-10c9-11ec-8dc4-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-08", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies control.exe loading either a .cpl or .inf from a writable directory. This is related to CVE-2021-40444. During triage, review parallel processes, parent and child, for further suspicious behaviors. In addition, capture file modifications and analyze.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=control.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=CONTROL.EXE) AND Processes.process IN (\"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\windows\\\\temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `control_loading_from_world_writable_directory_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives will be present as control.exe does not natively load from writable paths as defined. One may add .cpl or .inf to the command-line if there is any false positives. Tune as needed.", "references": ["https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/rundll32.exe-111474C61232202B5B588D2B512CBB25.html", "https://app.any.run/tasks/36c14029-9df8-439c-bba0-45f2643b0c70/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.002/T1218.002.yaml"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a suspicious file from disk.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.002"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Control Panel"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "control_loading_from_world_writable_directory_filter"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory", "id": "1adffe86-10c3-11ec-8ce6-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-08", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies rundll32.exe with `control_rundll` within the command-line, loading a .cpl or another file type from windows\\temp, programdata, or appdata. Developed in relation to CVE-2021-40444. Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. This is written to be a bit more broad by not including .cpl. The paths are specified, add more as needed. During triage, review parallel processes to identify any further suspicious behavior.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE) Processes.process=*Control_RunDLL* AND Processes.process IN (\"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\windows\\\\temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "This may be tuned, or a new one related, by adding .cpl to command-line. However, it's important to look for both. Tune/filter as needed.", "references": ["https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/rundll32.exe-111474C61232202B5B588D2B512CBB25.html", "https://app.any.run/tasks/36c14029-9df8-439c-bba0-45f2643b0c70/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.002/T1218.002.yaml"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a suspicious file from disk.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Rundll32"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT32", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "TA505", "MuddyWater", "APT29", "APT19", "CopyKittens", "APT3", "Carbanak", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory_filter"}]}, {"name": "Office Spawning Control", "id": "053e027c-10c7-11ec-8437-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-08", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies control.exe spawning from an office product. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `control.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `control.exe` will contain a file path to a .cpl or .inf, related to CVE-2021-40444. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. review parallel and child processes to identify further suspicious behavior", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\",\"wordpad.exe\",\"wordview.exe\") Processes.process_name=control.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `office_spawning_control_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives should be present.", "references": ["https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/control.exe-1F13E714A0FEA8887707DFF49287996F.html", "https://app.any.run/tasks/36c14029-9df8-439c-bba0-45f2643b0c70/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://www.echotrail.io/insights/search/control.exe", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.002/T1218.002.yaml"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_control.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ clicking a suspicious attachment.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Phishing", "Spearphishing Attachment"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "office_spawning_control_filter"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Writing cab or inf", "id": "f48cd1d4-125a-11ec-a447-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-10", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies behavior related to CVE-2021-40444. Whereas the malicious document will load ActiveX and download the remote payload (.inf, .cab). During triage, review parallel processes and further activity on endpoint to identify additional patterns. Retrieve the file modifications and analyze further.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\",\"wordpad.exe\",\"wordview.exe\") by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*.inf\",\"*.cab\") by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process] | dedup file_create_time | table dest, process_name, process, file_create_time, file_name, file_path | `office_product_writing_cab_or_inf_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node and `Filesystem` node.", "known_false_positives": "The query is structured in a way that `action` (read, create) is not defined. Review the results of this query, filter, and tune as necessary. It may be necessary to generate this query specific to your endpoint product.", "references": ["https://twitter.com/vxunderground/status/1436326057179860992?s=20", "https://app.any.run/tasks/36c14029-9df8-439c-bba0-45f2643b0c70/", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", "https://twitter.com/RonnyTNL/status/1436334640617373699?s=20"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_cabinf.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on $dest$ writing an inf or cab file to this. This is not typical of $process_name$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "process_name", "process", "file_create_time", "file_name", "file_path"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Phishing", "Spearphishing Attachment"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "office_product_writing_cab_or_inf_filter"}]}, {"name": "MSHTML Module Load in Office Product", "id": "5f1c168e-118b-11ec-84ff-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-09", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies the module load of mshtml.dll into an Office product. This behavior has been related to CVE-2021-40444, whereas the malicious document will load ActiveX, which activates the MSHTML component. The vulnerability resides in the MSHTML component. During triage, identify parallel processes and capture any file modifications for analysis.", "search": "`sysmon` EventID=7 process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\",\"wordpad.exe\",\"wordview.exe\") ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\mshtml.dll\", \"*\\\\Microsoft.mshtml.dll\",\"*\\\\IE.Interop.MSHTML.dll\",\"*\\\\MshtmlDac.dll\",\"*\\\\MshtmlDed.dll\",\"*\\\\MshtmlDer.dll\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, process_name, ImageLoaded, OriginalFileName, process_id | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mshtml_module_load_in_office_product_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process names and image loads from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives will be present, however, tune as necessary.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/36c14029-9df8-439c-bba0-45f2643b0c70/", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/index-dll"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_mshtml.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ loading mshtml.dll.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "ImageLoaded", "process_name", "OriginalFileName", "process_id", "dest"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Phishing", "Spearphishing Attachment"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "mshtml_module_load_in_office_product_filter"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt", "id": "c8e7ced0-10c5-11ec-8b03-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-08", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following hunting detection identifies rundll32.exe with `control_rundll` within the command-line, loading a .cpl or another file type. Developed in relation to CVE-2021-40444. Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. \\ This is written to be a bit more broad by not including .cpl. \\ During triage, review parallel processes to identify any further suspicious behavior.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE) Processes.process=*Control_RunDLL* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_control_rundll_hunt_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "This is a hunting detection, meant to provide a understanding of how voluminous control_rundll is within the environment.", "references": ["https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/rundll32.exe-111474C61232202B5B588D2B512CBB25.html", "https://app.any.run/tasks/36c14029-9df8-439c-bba0-45f2643b0c70/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.002/T1218.002.yaml"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a suspicious file from disk.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Rundll32"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT32", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "TA505", "MuddyWater", "APT29", "APT19", "CopyKittens", "APT3", "Carbanak", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "rundll32_control_rundll_hunt_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Deobfuscate-Decode Files or Information", "id": "0bd01a54-8cbe-11eb-abcd-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-24", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "description": "Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis.", "narrative": "An example of obfuscated files is `Certutil.exe` usage to encode a portable executable to a certificate file, which is base64 encoded, to hide the originating file. There are many utilities cross-platform to encode using XOR, using compressed .cab files to hide contents and scripting languages that may perform similar native Windows tasks. Triaging an event related will require the capability to review related process events and file modifications. Using a tool such as CyberChef will assist with identifying the encoding that was used, and potentially assist with decoding the contents.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Deobfuscate-Decode Files or Information"], "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1140"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390", "Sandworm Team", "Tropic Trooper", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Turla", "Leviathan", "Molerats", "Gamaredon Group", "Rocke", "Frankenstein", "WIRTE", "APT19", "Darkhotel", "menuPass", "OilRig", "Honeybee", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "Gorgon Group"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "CertUtil With Decode Argument", "id": "bfe94226-8c10-11eb-a4b3-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-03-23", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "CertUtil.exe may be used to `encode` and `decode` a file, including PE and script code. Encoding will convert a file to base64 with `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----` and `-----END CERTIFICATE-----` tags. Malicious usage will include decoding a encoded file that was downloaded. Once decoded, it will be loaded by a parallel process. Note that there are two additional command switches that may be used - `encodehex` and `decodehex`. Similarly, the file will be encoded in HEX and later decoded for further execution. During triage, identify the source of the file being decoded. Review its contents or execution behavior for further analysis.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_certutil` Processes.process=*decode* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `certutil_with_decode_argument_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Typically seen used to `encode` files, but it is possible to see legitimate use of `decode`. Filter based on parent-child relationship, file paths, endpoint or user.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1140/T1140.md", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/certutil", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/certutilexe-could-allow-attackers-to-download-malware-while-bypassing-av/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Deobfuscate-Decode Files or Information"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1140/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to decode a file.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1140"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 40, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Gamaredon Group", "Molerats", "Frankenstein", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Darkhotel", "Tropic Trooper", "menuPass", "Honeybee", "Threat Group-3390", "APT19", "Gorgon Group", "Leviathan", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=certutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=CertUtil.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_certutil"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "certutil_with_decode_argument_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Unusual Processes", "id": "f4368e3f-d59f-4192-84f6-748ac5a3ddb6", "version": 2, "date": "2020-02-04", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "Quickly identify systems running new or unusual processes in your environment that could be indicators of suspicious activity. Processes run from unusual locations, those with conspicuously long command lines, and rare executables are all examples of activities that may warrant deeper investigation.", "narrative": "Being able to profile a host's processes within your environment can help you more quickly identify processes that seem out of place when compared to the rest of the population of hosts or asset types.\\\nThis Analytic Story lets you identify processes that are either a) not typically seen running or b) have some sort of suspicious command-line arguments associated with them. This Analytic Story will also help you identify the user running these processes and the associated process activity on the host.\\\nIn the event an unusual process is identified, it is imperative to better understand how that process was able to execute on the host, when it first executed, and whether other hosts are affected. This extra information may provide clues that can help the analyst further investigate any suspicious activity.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/08/monitoring-windows-console-activity-part-two.html", "https://www.splunk.com/pdfs/technical-briefs/advanced-threat-detection-and-response-tech-brief.pdf", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/logging/detecting-security-incidents-windows-workstation-event-logs-34262"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Unusual Processes", "category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1112", "T1134", "T1036.003", "T1203", "T1053", "T1055", "T1595", "T1218", "T1003", "T1072", "T1202", "T1036", "T1218.011", "T1059", "T1543", "T1036.005", "T1218.012", "T1134.004", "T1016", "T1190"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Scheduled Task/Job", "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "Rundll32", "Parent PID Spoofing", "Modify Registry", "Exploitation for Client Execution", "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "Indirect Command Execution", "Match Legitimate Name or Location", "Rename System Utilities", "Software Deployment Tools", "Create or Modify System Process", "Access Token Manipulation", "OS Credential Dumping", "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "System Network Configuration Discovery", "Masquerading", "Process Injection"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Discovery", "Credential Access", "Initial Access", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Execution", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Sandworm Team", "Magic Hound", "Stealth Falcon", "Inception", "Axiom", "APT1", "Tropic Trooper", "Kimsuky", "TA459", "PLATINUM", "TEMP.Veles", "Poseidon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ke3chang", "APT29", "Turla", "Leviathan", "Molerats", "APT39", "APT12", "Rocke", "Carbanak", "Gamaredon Group", "TA505", "Whitefly", "Frankenstein", "Cobalt Group", "APT32", "Soft Cell", "Silence", "Night Dragon", "APT19", "APT37", "Darkhotel", "APT41", "CopyKittens", "FIN5", "menuPass", "FIN6", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "admin@338", "Blue Mockingbird", "Honeybee", "APT3", "Wizard Spider", "Sowbug", "no", "Threat Group-1314", "The White Company", "Sharpshooter", "APT38", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork", "Elderwood", "FIN8", "APT28", "APT33", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Windshift", "FIN7", "BlackTech", "Gorgon Group", "Naikon"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations", "id": "a34aae96-ccf8-4aef-952c-3ea21444444d", "version": 6, "date": "2020-12-08", "author": "David Dorsey, Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for system processes that typically execute from `C:\\Windows\\System32\\` or `C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64`. This may indicate a malicious process that is trying to hide as a legitimate process.\\\nThis detection utilizes a lookup that is deduped `system32` and `syswow64` directories from Server 2016 and Windows 10.\\\nDuring triage, review the parallel processes - what process moved the native Windows binary? identify any artifacts on disk and review. If a remote destination is contacted, what is the reputation?", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_path !=\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32*\" Processes.process_path !=\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_hash | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `is_windows_system_file` | `system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "This detection may require tuning based on third party applications utilizing native Windows binaries in non-standard paths.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.yaml", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Unusual Processes", "Ransomware", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "System process running from unexpected location on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1036", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Processes.process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.user", "Processes.dest", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_hash"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Masquerading", "Rename System Utilities"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Windshift", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "Dragonfly 2.0", "menuPass", "APT32", "Soft Cell", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "lookup update=true is_windows_system_file filename as process_name OUTPUT systemFile | search systemFile=true", "description": "This macro limits the output to process names that are in the Windows System directory", "name": "is_windows_system_file", "lookups": [{"default_match": "false", "description": "A full baseline of executable files in Windows\\System32 and Windows\\Syswow64, including sub-directories from Server 2016 and Windows 10.", "filename": "is_windows_system_file.csv", "min_matches": 1, "name": "is_windows_system_file", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/is_windows_system_file.csv"}]}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery", "id": "a51bfe1a-94f0-48cc-b1e4-16ae10145893", "version": 2, "date": "2020-11-10", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for fast execution of processes used for system network configuration discovery on the endpoint.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where NOT Processes.user IN (\"\",\"unknown\") by Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.user _time | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | search `system_network_configuration_discovery_tools` | transaction dest connected=false maxpause=5m |where eventcount>=5 | table firstTime lastTime dest user process_name process parent_process eventcount | `detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the processes node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is usually generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry or that are populated via Windows event logs, after enabling process tracking in your Windows audit settings.", "known_false_positives": "It is uncommon for normal users to execute a series of commands used for network discovery. System administrators often use scripts to execute these commands. These can generate false positives.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Unusual Processes"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 2"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1016/discovery_commands/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning multiple $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ typically not a normal behavior of the process.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1016"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 32, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Network Configuration Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Frankenstein", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "Darkhotel", "MuddyWater", "APT1", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "menuPass", "Threat Group-3390", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "APT3", "Naikon", "admin@338", "Turla", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(process_name= \"arp.exe\" OR process_name= \"at.exe\" OR process_name= \"attrib.exe\" OR process_name= \"cscript.exe\" OR process_name= \"dsquery.exe\" OR process_name= \"hostname.exe\" OR process_name= \"ipconfig.exe\" OR process_name= \"mimikatz.exe\" OR process_name= \"nbstat.exe\" OR process_name= \"net.exe\" OR process_name= \"netsh.exe\" OR process_name= \"nslookup.exe\" OR process_name= \"ping.exe\" OR process_name= \"quser.exe\" OR process_name= \"qwinsta.exe\" OR process_name= \"reg.exe\" OR process_name= \"runas.exe\" OR process_name= \"sc.exe\" OR process_name= \"schtasks.exe\" OR process_name= \"ssh.exe\" OR process_name= \"systeminfo.exe\" OR process_name= \"taskkill.exe\" OR process_name= \"telnet.exe\" OR process_name= \"tracert.exe\" OR process_name=\"wscript.exe\" OR process_name= \"xcopy.exe\")", "description": "This macro is a list of process that can be used to discover the network configuration", "name": "system_network_configuration_discovery_tools"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery_filter"}]}, {"name": "First time seen command line argument", "id": "fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd23", "version": 4, "date": "2021-11-30", "author": "Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "This search looks for command-line arguments that use a `/c` parameter to execute a command that has not previously been seen. This is an implementation on SPL2 of the rule `First time seen command line argument` by @bpatel. 'The following analytic identifies first time seen command-line arguments on a single endpoint. The analytic looks for arguments instantiated by `cmd.exe /c` and the associated command-line. Adversaries automate or spawn multiple processes using this method, this analytic may assist with identifying the first time it's been found on this endpoint.'", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)) | eval dest_user_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), dest_device_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null), process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null), cmd_line_norm=lower(cmd_line), cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line_norm, /[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[1-5][0-9a-f]{3}-[89ab][0-9a-f]{3}-[0-9a-f]{12}/, \"GUID\"), cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line_norm, /(?<=\\s)+\\\\[^:]*(?=\\\\.*\\.\\w{3}(\\s|$)+)/, \"\\\\PATH\"), /* replaces \" \\\\Something\\\\Something\\\\command.ext\" => \"PATH\\\\command.ext\" */ cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line_norm, /\\w:\\\\[^:]*(?=\\\\.*\\.\\w{3}(\\s|$)+)/, \"\\\\PATH\"), /* replaces \"C:\\\\Something\\\\Something\\\\command.ext\" => \"PATH\\\\command.ext\" */ cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line_norm, /\\d+/, \"N\"), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where process_name=\"cmd.exe\" AND match_regex(ucast(cmd_line, \"string\", \"\"), /.* \\/[cC] .*/)=true | select process_name, cmd_line, cmd_line_norm, timestamp, dest_device_id, dest_user_id | first_time_event input_columns=[\"cmd_line_norm\"] | where first_time_cmd_line_norm | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend(dest_device_id, dest_user_id), body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line, \"process_name\", process_name]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate programs use command-line arguments to execute. Verify the command-line arguments to check what command/program is being executed. Filtering will be needed.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Unusual Processes"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A process $process_name$ ha been identified in the environment with a command-line $cmd_line$ not previously seen before on host $dest_device_id$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1202"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["process_name", "_time", "dest_device_id", "dest_user_id", "process", "cmd_line"], "risk_score": 30, "risk_severity": "low", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "Indirect Command Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "first_time_seen_command_line_argument_filter"}]}, {"name": "Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process", "id": "1f35e1da-267b-11ec-90a9-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-06", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious spawned process by wscript or cscript process. This technique was a common technique used by adversaries and malware to execute different LOLBIN, other script like powershell or create a suspended process to inject its code as a defense evasion. This TTP may detect some normal script that using several application tool that are in the list of the child process it detects but a good pivot and indicator that a script is may execute suspicious code.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"cscript.exe\", \"wscript.exe\") Processes.process_name IN (\"regsvr32.exe\", \"rundll32.exe\",\"winhlp32.exe\",\"certutil.exe\",\"msbuild.exe\",\"cmd.exe\",\"powershell*\",\"wmic.exe\",\"mshta.exe\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "user may create vbs or js script that use several tool as part of its execution.", "references": ["https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/8da5b75b6380a41eee3a399c43dfe0d99eeefaa1fd21027a07b1ecaa4cd96fdd?environmentId=120"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["FIN7", "Remcos", "Unusual Processes"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/vbs_wscript/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "wscript or cscript parent process spawned $process_name$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1055", "T1543", "T1134.004", "T1134"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Process Injection", "Create or Modify System Process", "Parent PID Spoofing", "Access Token Manipulation"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Cobalt Group", "APT37", "Honeybee", "PLATINUM", "no", "no", "Blue Mockingbird"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process_filter"}]}, {"name": "More than usual number of LOLBAS applications in short time period", "id": "59c0dd70-169c-4900-9a1f-bfcf13302f93", "version": 2, "date": "2020-08-25", "author": "Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "Attacker activity may compromise executing several LOLBAS applications in conjunction to accomplish their objectives. We are looking for more than usual LOLBAS applications over a window of time, by building profiles per machine.", "search": " | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval device=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null)), timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)) | where process_name==\"regsvcs.exe\" OR process_name==\"ftp.exe\" OR process_name==\"dfsvc.exe\" OR process_name==\"rasautou.exe\" OR process_name==\"schtasks.exe\" OR process_name==\"xwizard.exe\" OR process_name==\"findstr.exe\" OR process_name==\"esentutl.exe\" OR process_name==\"cscript.exe\" OR process_name==\"reg.exe\" OR process_name==\"csc.exe\" OR process_name==\"atbroker.exe\" OR process_name==\"print.exe\" OR process_name==\"pcwrun.exe\" OR process_name==\"vbc.exe\" OR process_name==\"rpcping.exe\" OR process_name==\"wsreset.exe\" OR process_name==\"ilasm.exe\" OR process_name==\"certutil.exe\" OR process_name==\"replace.exe\" OR process_name==\"mshta.exe\" OR process_name==\"bitsadmin.exe\" OR process_name==\"wscript.exe\" OR process_name==\"ieexec.exe\" OR process_name==\"cmd.exe\" OR process_name==\"microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe\" OR process_name==\"runscripthelper.exe\" OR process_name==\"makecab.exe\" OR process_name==\"forfiles.exe\" OR process_name==\"desktopimgdownldr.exe\" OR process_name==\"control.exe\" OR process_name==\"msbuild.exe\" OR process_name==\"register-cimprovider.exe\" OR process_name==\"tttracer.exe\" OR process_name==\"ie4uinit.exe\" OR process_name==\"sc.exe\" OR process_name==\"bash.exe\" OR process_name==\"hh.exe\" OR process_name==\"cmstp.exe\" OR process_name==\"mmc.exe\" OR process_name==\"jsc.exe\" OR process_name==\"scriptrunner.exe\" OR process_name==\"odbcconf.exe\" OR process_name==\"extexport.exe\" OR process_name==\"msdt.exe\" OR process_name==\"diskshadow.exe\" OR process_name==\"extrac32.exe\" OR process_name==\"eventvwr.exe\" OR process_name==\"mavinject.exe\" OR process_name==\"regasm.exe\" OR process_name==\"gpscript.exe\" OR process_name==\"rundll32.exe\" OR process_name==\"regsvr32.exe\" OR process_name==\"regedit.exe\" OR process_name==\"msiexec.exe\" OR process_name==\"gfxdownloadwrapper.exe\" OR process_name==\"presentationhost.exe\" OR process_name==\"regini.exe\" OR process_name==\"wmic.exe\" OR process_name==\"runonce.exe\" OR process_name==\"syncappvpublishingserver.exe\" OR process_name==\"verclsid.exe\" OR process_name==\"psr.exe\" OR process_name==\"infdefaultinstall.exe\" OR process_name==\"explorer.exe\" OR process_name==\"expand.exe\" OR process_name==\"installutil.exe\" OR process_name==\"netsh.exe\" OR process_name==\"wab.exe\" OR process_name==\"dnscmd.exe\" OR process_name==\"at.exe\" OR process_name==\"pcalua.exe\" OR process_name==\"cmdkey.exe\" OR process_name==\"msconfig.exe\" | stats count(process_name) as lolbas_counter by device,span(timestamp, 300s) | eval lolbas_counter=lolbas_counter*1.0 | rename window_end as timestamp | adaptive_threshold algorithm=\"quantile\" value=\"lolbas_counter\" entity=\"device\" window=2419200000L | where label AND quantile>0.99 | eval start_time = window_start, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend(device), body=create_map([\"lolbas_counter\", lolbas_counter, \"quantile\", quantile, \"device\", device]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "Collect endpoint data such as sysmon or 4688 events.", "known_false_positives": "Some administrative tasks may involve multiple use of LOLBAS applications in a short period of time. This might trigger false positives at the beginning when it hasn't collected yet enough data to construct the baseline.\n", "references": ["https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/tree/master/yml/OSBinaries"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Unusual Processes"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A system process $process_name$ with commandline $cmd_line$ spawn iin short period of time in host $dest_device_id$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1053"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "processname", "role": ["Others"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["dest_device_id", "_time", "process_name"], "risk_score": 25, "risk_severity": "low", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "Scheduled Task/Job"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "more_than_usual_number_of_lolbas_applications_in_short_time_period_filter"}]}, {"name": "Rare Parent-Child Process Relationship", "id": "cf090c78-bcc6-11eb-8529-0242ac130003", "version": 2, "date": "2021-11-30", "author": "Peter Gael, Splunk; Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "An attacker may use LOLBAS tools spawned from vulnerable applications not typically used by system administrators. This analytic leverages the Splunk Streaming ML DSP plugin to find rare parent/child relationships. The list of application has been extracted from https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/tree/master/yml/OSBinaries", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)) | eval parent_process=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null)), parent_process_name=mvindex(split(parent_process, \"\\\\\"), -1), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null)), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null), dest_user_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), dest_device_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where parent_process_name!=null | select parent_process_name, process_name, cmd_line, timestamp, dest_device_id, dest_user_id | conditional_anomaly conditional=\"parent_process_name\" target=\"process_name\" | where (process_name=\"powershell.exe\" OR process_name=\"regsvcs.exe\" OR process_name=\"ftp.exe\" OR process_name=\"dfsvc.exe\" OR process_name=\"rasautou.exe\" OR process_name=\"schtasks.exe\" OR process_name=\"xwizard.exe\" OR process_name=\"findstr.exe\" OR process_name=\"esentutl.exe\" OR process_name=\"cscript.exe\" OR process_name=\"reg.exe\" OR process_name=\"csc.exe\" OR process_name=\"atbroker.exe\" OR process_name=\"print.exe\" OR process_name=\"pcwrun.exe\" OR process_name=\"vbc.exe\" OR process_name=\"rpcping.exe\" OR process_name=\"wsreset.exe\" OR process_name=\"ilasm.exe\" OR process_name=\"certutil.exe\" OR process_name=\"replace.exe\" OR process_name=\"mshta.exe\" OR process_name=\"bitsadmin.exe\" OR process_name=\"wscript.exe\" OR process_name=\"ieexec.exe\" OR process_name=\"cmd.exe\" OR process_name=\"microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe\" OR process_name=\"runscripthelper.exe\" OR process_name=\"makecab.exe\" OR process_name=\"forfiles.exe\" OR process_name=\"desktopimgdownldr.exe\" OR process_name=\"control.exe\" OR process_name=\"msbuild.exe\" OR process_name=\"register-cimprovider.exe\" OR process_name=\"tttracer.exe\" OR process_name=\"ie4uinit.exe\" OR process_name=\"sc.exe\" OR process_name=\"bash.exe\" OR process_name=\"hh.exe\" OR process_name=\"cmstp.exe\" OR process_name=\"mmc.exe\" OR process_name=\"jsc.exe\" OR process_name=\"scriptrunner.exe\" OR process_name=\"odbcconf.exe\" OR process_name=\"extexport.exe\" OR process_name=\"msdt.exe\" OR process_name=\"diskshadow.exe\" OR process_name=\"extrac32.exe\" OR process_name=\"eventvwr.exe\" OR process_name=\"mavinject.exe\" OR process_name=\"regasm.exe\" OR process_name=\"gpscript.exe\" OR process_name=\"rundll32.exe\" OR process_name=\"regsvr32.exe\" OR process_name=\"regedit.exe\" OR process_name=\"msiexec.exe\" OR process_name=\"gfxdownloadwrapper.exe\" OR process_name=\"presentationhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"regini.exe\" OR process_name=\"wmic.exe\" OR process_name=\"runonce.exe\" OR process_name=\"syncappvpublishingserver.exe\" OR process_name=\"verclsid.exe\" OR process_name=\"psr.exe\" OR process_name=\"infdefaultinstall.exe\" OR process_name=\"explorer.exe\" OR process_name=\"expand.exe\" OR process_name=\"installutil.exe\" OR process_name=\"netsh.exe\" OR process_name=\"wab.exe\" OR process_name=\"dnscmd.exe\" OR process_name=\"at.exe\" OR process_name=\"pcalua.exe\" OR process_name=\"cmdkey.exe\" OR process_name=\"msconfig.exe\") | eval input = (-1)*log(output) | adaptive_threshold algorithm=\"gaussian\" threshold=0.001 window=604800000L | where label AND input > mean | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend(dest_device_id, dest_user_id), body = create_map([\"process_name\", process_name, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process_name, \"input\", input, \"mean\", mean, \"variance\", variance, \"output\", output, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "Collect endpoint data such as sysmon or 4688 events.", "known_false_positives": "Some custom tools used by administrators could be used rarely to launch remotely applications. This might trigger false positives at the beginning when it has not collected yet enough data to construct the baseline.", "references": ["https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/tree/master/yml/OSBinaries"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Unusual Processes"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1203", "T1059", "T1053", "T1072"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["process", "process_name", "parent_process_name", "_time", "dest_device_id", "dest_user_id", "cmd_line"], "risk_severity": "low", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploitation for Client Execution", "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "Scheduled Task/Job", "Software Deployment Tools"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution", "Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Execution", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "MuddyWater", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT41", "admin@338", "Threat Group-3390", "APT12", "The White Company", "APT33", "APT32", "APT28", "Tropic Trooper", "Lazarus Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "APT37", "Patchwork", "Leviathan", "Elderwood", "TA459", "APT29", "APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "no", "Silence", "APT32", "Threat Group-1314"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "rare_parent_child_process_relationship_filter"}]}, {"name": "Attacker Tools On Endpoint", "id": "a51bfe1a-94f0-48cc-b4e4-16a110145893", "version": 2, "date": "2021-11-04", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for execution of commonly used attacker tools on an endpoint.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.dest!=unknown Processes.user!=unknown by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | lookup attacker_tools attacker_tool_names AS process_name OUTPUT description | search description !=false| `attacker_tools_on_endpoint_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is usually generated via logs that report process tracking in your Windows audit settings.", "known_false_positives": "Some administrator activity can be potentially triggered, please add those users to the filter macro.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Monitor for Unauthorized Software", "XMRig", "SamSam Ransomware", "Unusual Processes"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 2"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exploitation", "Stage:Recon", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1595/attacker_scan_tools/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An attacker tool $process_name$,listed in attacker_tools.csv is executed on host $dest$ by User $user$. This process $process_name$ is known to do- $description$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1036.005", "T1036", "T1003", "T1595"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process", "Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Match Legitimate Name or Location", "Masquerading", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "APT39", "Blue Mockingbird", "Whitefly", "Tropic Trooper", "Silence", "APT41", "menuPass", "TEMP.Veles", "MuddyWater", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Sowbug", "APT32", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "admin@338", "Carbanak", "APT1", "Windshift", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "attacker_tools_on_endpoint_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A list of tools used by attackers", "filename": "attacker_tools.csv", "name": "attacker_tools", "default_match": "false", "match_type": "WILDCARD(attacker_tool_names)", "min_matches": 1, "case_sensitive_match": "false", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/attacker_tools.csv"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 Shimcache Flush", "id": "a913718a-25b6-11ec-96d3-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-05", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious rundll32 commandline to clear shim cache. This technique is a anti-forensic technique to clear the cache taht are one important artifacts in terms of digital forensic during attacks or incident. This TTP is a good indicator that someone tries to evade some tools and clear foothold on the machine.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` AND Processes.process = \"*apphelp.dll,ShimFlushCache*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_shimcache_flush_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://blueteamops.medium.com/shimcache-flush-89daff28d15e"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Unusual Processes"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/shimcache_flush/sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "rundll32 process execute $process$ to clear shim cache in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1112"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Modify Registry"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Turla", "APT32", "APT38", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "Threat Group-3390", "Honeybee", "Patchwork", "Gorgon Group", "FIN8"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_rundll32"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "rundll32_shimcache_flush_filter"}]}, {"name": "RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal", "id": "6c135f8d-5e60-454e-80b7-c56eed739833", "version": 5, "date": "2020-11-30", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for executing scripts with rundll32. Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly, may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "While not common, loading a DLL under %AppData% and calling a function by ordinal is possible by a legitimate process", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Unusual Processes"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "message": "A rundll32 process $process_name$ with ordinal parameter like this process commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Rundll32"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT32", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "TA505", "MuddyWater", "APT29", "APT19", "CopyKittens", "APT3", "Carbanak", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_rundll32"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal_filter"}]}, {"name": "Unusually Long Command Line", "id": "58f43aba-1775-445e-b19c-be2b87d83ae3", "version": 1, "date": "2020-10-06", "author": "Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious activity on your hosts. This search leverages the Splunk Streaming ML DSP plugin to help identify command lines with lengths that are unusual for a given user. This detection is inspired on Unusually Long Command Line authored by Rico Valdez.", "search": " | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)) | eval cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null), dest_user_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), dest_device_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null), process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where cmd_line!=null and dest_user_id!=null | eval cmd_line_norm=replace(cast(cmd_line, \"string\"), /\\s(--?\\w+)|(\\/\\w+)/, \" ARG\"), cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line_norm, /\\w:\\\\[^\\s]+/, \"PATH\"), cmd_line_norm=replace(cmd_line_norm, /\\d+/, \"N\"), input=parse_double(len(coalesce(cmd_line_norm, \"\"))) | select timestamp, process_name, dest_device_id, dest_user_id, cmd_line, input | adaptive_threshold algorithm=\"quantile\" entity=\"process_name\" window=60480000 | where label AND quantile>0.99 | first_time_event input_columns=[\"dest_device_id\", \"cmd_line\"] | where first_time_dest_device_id_cmd_line | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend(dest_device_id, dest_user_id), body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line, \"process_name\", process_name]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting sysmon endpoint data that monitors command lines.", "known_false_positives": "This detection may flag suspiciously long command lines when there is not sufficient evidence (samples) for a given process that this detection is tracking; or when there is high variability in the length of the command line for the tracked process. Also, some legitimate applications may use long command lines. Such is the case of Ansible, that encodes Powershell scripts using long base64. Attackers may use this technique to obfuscate their payloads.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Unusual Processes"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 40, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A process $process_name$ with a long commandline $cmd_line$ executed in host $dest_device_id$", "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["process_name", "_time", "dest_device_id", "dest_user_id", "process"], "risk_score": 12, "risk_severity": "low", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "unusually_long_command_line_filter"}]}, {"name": "Verclsid CLSID Execution", "id": "61e9a56a-20fa-11ec-8ba3-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-29", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a possible abuse of verclsid to execute malicious file through generate CLSID. This process is a normal application of windows to verify the CLSID COM object before it is instantiated by Windows Explorer. This hunting query can be a good pivot point to analyze what is he CLSID or COM object pointing too to check if it is a valid application or not.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_verclsid` AND Processes.process=\"*/S*\" Processes.process=\"*/C*\" AND Processes.process=\"*{*\" AND Processes.process=\"*}*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `verclsid_clsid_execution_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "windows can used this application for its normal COM object validation.", "references": ["https://gist.github.com/NickTyrer/0598b60112eaafe6d07789f7964290d5", "https://bohops.com/2018/08/18/abusing-the-com-registry-structure-part-2-loading-techniques-for-evasion-and-persistence/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Unusual Processes"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.012/verclsid_exec/sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "process $process_name$ to execute possible clsid commandline $process$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218.012", "T1218"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=verclsid.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=verclsid.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_verclsid"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "verclsid_clsid_execution_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Copy on System32", "id": "ce633e56-25b2-11ec-9e76-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-05", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious copy of file from systemroot folder of the windows OS. This technique is commonly used by APT or other malware as part of execution (LOLBIN) to run its malicious code using the available legitimate tool in OS. this type of event may seen or may execute of normal user in some instance but this is really a anomaly that needs to be check within the network.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN(\"cmd.exe\", \"powershell*\",\"pwsh.exe\", \"sqlps.exe\", \"sqltoolsps.exe\", \"powershell_ise.exe\") AND `process_copy` AND Processes.process IN(\"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWow64\\\\*\") AND Processes.process = \"*copy*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `suspicious_copy_on_system32_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "every user may do this event but very un-ussual.", "references": ["https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/8da5b75b6380a41eee3a399c43dfe0d99eeefaa1fd21027a07b1ecaa4cd96fdd?environmentId=120"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Unusual Processes"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/copy_sysmon/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "execution of copy exe to copy file from $process$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1036.003", "T1036"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Rename System Utilities", "Masquerading"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["menuPass", "APT32", "Soft Cell", "PLATINUM", "Windshift", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "Dragonfly 2.0"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=copy.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=copy.exe OR Processes.process_name=xcopy.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=xcopy.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_copy"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_copy_on_system32_filter"}]}, {"name": "Unusually Long Command Line", "id": "c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6a4264e7f", "version": 5, "date": "2020-12-08", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious activity on your hosts.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| eval processlen=len(process) | eventstats stdev(processlen) as stdev, avg(processlen) as avg by dest | stats max(processlen) as maxlen, values(stdev) as stdevperhost, values(avg) as avgperhost by dest, user, process_name, process | `unusually_long_command_line_filter` |eval threshold = 3 | where maxlen > ((threshold*stdevperhost) + avgperhost)", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships, from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the process field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate applications start with long command lines.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Unusual Processes", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Unusually long command line $Processes.process_name$ on $dest$", "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Processes.process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.user", "Processes.dest", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "unusually_long_command_line_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Rare Executables", "id": "44fddcb2-8d3b-454c-874e-7c6de5a4f7ac", "version": 5, "date": "2020-03-16", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search will return a table of rare processes, the names of the systems running them, and the users who initiated each process.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.dest) as dest values(Processes.user) as user min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name | rename Processes.process_name as process | rex field=user \"(?.*)\\\\\\\\(?.*)\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| search [| tstats count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name | rare Processes.process_name limit=30 | rename Processes.process_name as process| `filter_rare_process_allow_list`| table process ] | `detect_rare_executables_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts and populating the endpoint data model with the resultant dataset. The macro `filter_rare_process_allow_list` searches two lookup files for allowed processes. These consist of `rare_process_allow_list_default.csv` and `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv`. To add your own processes to the allow list, add them to `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv`. If you wish to remove an entry from the default lookup file, you will have to modify the macro itself to set the allow_list value for that process to false. You can modify the limit parameter and search scheduling to better suit your environment.", "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate processes may be only rarely executed in your environment. As these are identified, update `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv` to filter them out of your search results.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Unusual Processes", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.PT", "PR.DS", "DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_name"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "lookup update=true lookup_rare_process_allow_list_default process as process OUTPUTNEW allow_list | where allow_list=\"false\" | lookup update=true lookup_rare_process_allow_list_local process as process OUTPUT allow_list | where allow_list=\"false\"", "description": "This macro is intended to allow_list processes that have been definied as rare", "name": "filter_rare_process_allow_list", "lookups": [{"case_sensitive_match": "false", "default_match": "false", "description": "A list of rare processes that are legitimate that is provided by Splunk", "filename": "rare_process_allow_list_default.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(process)", "min_matches": 1, "name": "lookup_rare_process_allow_list_default", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/rare_process_allow_list_default.csv"}, {"case_sensitive_match": "false", "default_match": "false", "description": "A list of rare processes that are legitimate provided by the end user", "filename": "rare_process_allow_list_local.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(process)", "min_matches": 1, "name": "lookup_rare_process_allow_list_local", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/rare_process_allow_list_local.csv"}]}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_rare_executables_filter"}]}, {"name": "WinRM Spawning a Process", "id": "a081836a-ba4d-11eb-8593-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-21", "author": "Drew Church, Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious processes spawning from WinRM (wsmprovhost.exe). This analytic is related to potential exploitation of CVE-2021-31166. which is a kernel-mode device driver http.sys vulnerability. Current proof of concept code will blue-screen the operating system. However, http.sys used by many different Windows processes, including WinRM. In this case, identifying suspicious process create (child processes) from `wsmprovhost.exe` is what this analytic is identifying.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=wsmprovhost.exe Processes.process_name IN (\"cmd.exe\",\"sh.exe\",\"bash.exe\",\"powershell.exe\",\"pwsh.exe\",\"schtasks.exe\",\"certutil.exe\",\"whoami.exe\",\"bitsadmin.exe\",\"scp.exe\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winrm_spawning_a_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown. Add new processes or filter as needed. It is possible system management software may spawn processes from `wsmprovhost.exe`.", "references": ["https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_access/win_susp_shell_spawn_from_winrm.yml", "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/5/17/cve-2021-31166-a-wormable-code-execution-bug-in-httpsys", "https://github.com/0vercl0k/CVE-2021-31166/blob/main/cve-2021-31166.py"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Unusual Processes"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-31166"], "dataset": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation", "Denial of Service"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1190"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploit Public-Facing Application"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Rocke", "APT39", "BlackTech", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Night Dragon", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "winrm_spawning_a_process_filter"}]}, {"name": "Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK", "id": "57edaefa-a73b-45e5-bbae-f39c1473f941", "version": 1, "date": "2019-05-08", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious activity on your hosts. This search leverages the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) to help identify command lines with lengths that are unusual for a given user.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| eval processlen=len(process) | search user!=unknown | apply cmdline_pdfmodel threshold=0.01 | rename \"IsOutlier(processlen)\" as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | table firstTime lastTime user dest process_name process processlen count | `unusually_long_command_line___mltk_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that monitors command lines and populates the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model. In addition, MLTK version >= 4.2 must be installed on your search heads, along with any required dependencies. Finally, the support search \"Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK\" must be executed before this detection search, as it builds an ML model over the historical data used by this search. It is important that this search is run in the same app context as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild the model with the latest data available in your environment.", "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate applications use long command lines for installs or updates. You should review identified command lines for legitimacy. You may modify the first part of the search to omit legitimate command lines from consideration. If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider changing the value of threshold in the search to a smaller value. You should also periodically re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data. You may get unexpected results if the user identified in the results is not present in the data used to build the associated model.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Unusual Processes", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Ransomware"], "asset_type": "", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.user", "Processes.dest", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "unusually_long_command_line___mltk_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Windows Discovery Techniques", "id": "f7aba570-7d59-11eb-825e-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-04", "author": "Michael Hart, Splunk", "description": "Monitors for behaviors associated with adversaries discovering objects in the environment that can be leveraged in the progression of the attack.", "narrative": "Attackers may not have much if any insight into their target's environment before the initial compromise. Once a foothold has been established, attackers will start enumerating objects in the environment (accounts, services, network shares, etc.) that can be used to achieve their objectives. This Analytic Story provides searches to help identify activities consistent with adversaries gaining knowledge of compromised Windows environments.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/", "https://cyberd.us/penetration-testing", "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0521/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Discovery Techniques"], "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.001"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Local Groups", "Permission Groups Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["admin@338", "APT3", "Turla", "OilRig", "TA505"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Net Localgroup Discovery", "id": "54f5201e-155b-11ec-a6e2-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-14", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following hunting analytic will identify the use of localgroup discovery using `net localgroup`. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=net.exe OR Processes.process_name=net1.exe (Processes.process=\"*localgroup*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `net_localgroup_discovery_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present. Tune as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery", "Windows Discovery Techniques"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Local group discovery on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Permission Groups Discovery", "Local Groups"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TA505", "APT3", "Turla", "OilRig", "admin@338"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "net_localgroup_discovery_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "id": "80a65487-854b-42f1-80a1-935e4c170694", "version": 1, "date": "2021-02-03", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "description": "Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage rundll32.exe to execute arbitrary malicious code.", "narrative": "One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the rundll32.exe process. Natively, rundll32.exe will load DLLs and is a great example of a Living off the Land Binary. Rundll32.exe may load malicious DLLs by ordinals, function names or directly. The queries in this story focus on loading default DLLs, syssetup.dll, ieadvpack.dll, advpack.dll and setupapi.dll from disk that may be abused by adversaries. Additionally, two analytics developed to assist with identifying DLLRegisterServer, Start and StartW functions being called. The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging rundll32.exe to execute malicious code.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32"], "tags": {"analytics_story": "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1036", "T1218.011", "T1036.003", "T1003.001", "T1003"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Rundll32", "Rename System Utilities", "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "OS Credential Dumping", "LSASS Memory", "Masquerading"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Sandworm Team", "Magic Hound", "Axiom", "APT1", "TEMP.Veles", "PLATINUM", "Poseidon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN8", "Ke3chang", "Leviathan", "APT39", "APT29", "Carbanak", "TA505", "Whitefly", "Frankenstein", "Stolen Pencil", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "APT19", "APT41", "CopyKittens", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Blue Mockingbird", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "APT3", "Cleaver", "Sowbug", "Leafminer", "no", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "APT33", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Windshift"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL", "id": "8943b567-f14d-4ee8-a0bb-2121d4ce3184", "version": 2, "date": "2020-02-21", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Detect the usage of comsvcs.dll for dumping the lsass process.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*comsvcs.dll* Processes.process=*MiniDump* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "None identified.", "references": ["https://modexp.wordpress.com/2019/08/30/minidumpwritedump-via-com-services-dll/", "https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1167417096374050817"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "HAFNIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified accessing credentials using comsvcs.dll on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["LSASS Memory", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Whitefly", "Blue Mockingbird", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Leviathan", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Stolen Pencil", "APT32", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "PLATINUM", "FIN8", "BRONZE BUTLER", "OilRig", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT28", "APT1", "Ke3chang", "Cleaver", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_rundll32"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll_filter"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network", "id": "35307032-a12d-11eb-835f-acde48001122", "version": 3, "date": "2021-10-13", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments and performing a network connection. It is unusual for rundll32.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` by _time span=1h Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(rundll32\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port !=\"0\" by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port| `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_guid connection_to_CNC dest_port | `rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `port` node. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32", "https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Cobalt Strike", "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A rundll32 process $process_name$ with no commandline argument like this process commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "processname", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Rundll32"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT32", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "TA505", "MuddyWater", "APT29", "APT19", "CopyKittens", "APT3", "Carbanak", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_rundll32"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver", "id": "8c00a385-9b86-4ac0-8932-c9ec3713b159", "version": 2, "date": "2021-02-09", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe using dllregisterserver on the command line to load a DLL. When a DLL is registered, the DllRegisterServer method entry point in the DLL is invoked. This is typically seen when a DLL is being registered on the system. Not every instance is considered malicious, but it will capture malicious use of it. During investigation, review the parent process and parrellel processes executing. Capture the DLL being loaded and inspect further. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*dllregisterserver* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "This is likely to produce false positives and will require some filtering. Tune the query by adding command line paths to known good DLLs, or filtering based on parent process names.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32", "https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/seedworm-apt-iran-middle-east", "https://github.com/pan-unit42/tweets/blob/master/2020-12-10-IOCs-from-Ursnif-infection-with-Delf-variant.txt", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/duck-hunting-with-falcon-complete-qakbot-zip-based-campaign/", "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms682162(v=vs.85).aspx"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "$Processes.process_path.file_path$ process potentially loading malicious code", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Processes.process_path.file_path", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Rundll32"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT32", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "TA505", "MuddyWater", "APT29", "APT19", "CopyKittens", "APT3", "Carbanak", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_rundll32"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup", "id": "71b9bf37-cde1-45fb-b899-1b0aa6fa1183", "version": 2, "date": "2021-02-04", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading syssetup.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line. This particular technique will load script code from a file. Upon a successful execution, the following module loads may occur - clr.dll, jscript.dll and scrobj.dll. During investigation, identify script content origination. Generally, a child process will spawn from rundll32.exe, but that may be bypassed based on script code contents. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64. During investigation, review any network connections and obtain the script content executed. It's possible other files are on disk.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*syssetup* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use syssetup.dll, triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Syssetup/", "https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ loading syssetup.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Rundll32"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT32", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "TA505", "MuddyWater", "APT29", "APT19", "CopyKittens", "APT3", "Carbanak", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_rundll32"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup_filter"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory", "id": "1adffe86-10c3-11ec-8ce6-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-08", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies rundll32.exe with `control_rundll` within the command-line, loading a .cpl or another file type from windows\\temp, programdata, or appdata. Developed in relation to CVE-2021-40444. Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. This is written to be a bit more broad by not including .cpl. The paths are specified, add more as needed. During triage, review parallel processes to identify any further suspicious behavior.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE) Processes.process=*Control_RunDLL* AND Processes.process IN (\"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\windows\\\\temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "This may be tuned, or a new one related, by adding .cpl to command-line. However, it's important to look for both. Tune/filter as needed.", "references": ["https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/rundll32.exe-111474C61232202B5B588D2B512CBB25.html", "https://app.any.run/tasks/36c14029-9df8-439c-bba0-45f2643b0c70/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.002/T1218.002.yaml"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a suspicious file from disk.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Rundll32"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT32", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "TA505", "MuddyWater", "APT29", "APT19", "CopyKittens", "APT3", "Carbanak", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 Rename", "id": "7360137f-abad-473e-8189-acbdaa34d114", "version": 3, "date": "2021-02-04", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies renamed instances of rundll32.exe executing. rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64. During investigation, validate it is the legitimate rundll32.exe executing and what script content it is loading. This query relies on the original filename or internal name from the PE meta data. Expand the query as needed by looking for specific command line arguments outlined in other analytics.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_rename_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Suspicious renamed rundll32.exe binary ran on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1036", "T1218.011", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Masquerading", "Rundll32", "Rename System Utilities"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Windshift", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT32", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "TA505", "MuddyWater", "APT29", "APT19", "CopyKittens", "APT3", "Carbanak", "APT28", "menuPass", "APT32", "Soft Cell", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_rundll32"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_rundll32_rename_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack", "id": "4aefadfe-9abd-4bf8-b3fd-867e9ef95bf8", "version": 2, "date": "2021-02-04", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading advpack.dll and ieadvpack.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line. This particular technique will load script code from a file. Upon a successful execution, the following module loads may occur - clr.dll, jscript.dll and scrobj.dll. During investigation, identify script content origination. Generally, a child process will spawn from rundll32.exe, but that may be bypassed based on script code contents. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64. During investigation, review any network connections and obtain the script content executed. It's possible other files are on disk.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*advpack* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use advpack.dll or ieadvpack.dll, triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Advpack/", "https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ loading advpack.dll and ieadvpack.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Rundll32"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT32", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "TA505", "MuddyWater", "APT29", "APT19", "CopyKittens", "APT3", "Carbanak", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_rundll32"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments", "id": "e451bd16-e4c5-4109-8eb1-c4c6ecf048b4", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-20", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for rundll32.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(rundll32\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | `suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32", "https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Cobalt Strike", "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Suspicious rundll32.exe process with no command line arguments executed on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Rundll32"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT32", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "TA505", "MuddyWater", "APT29", "APT19", "CopyKittens", "APT3", "Carbanak", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_rundll32"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi", "id": "61e7b44a-6088-4f26-b788-9a96ba13b37a", "version": 2, "date": "2021-02-04", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading setupapi.dll and iesetupapi.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line. This particular technique will load script code from a file. Upon a successful execution, the following module loads may occur - clr.dll, jscript.dll and scrobj.dll. During investigation, identify script content origination. Generally, a child process will spawn from rundll32.exe, but that may be bypassed based on script code contents. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64. During investigation, review any network connections and obtain the script content executed. It's possible other files are on disk.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*setupapi* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use setupapi triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Setupapi/", "https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ loading setupapi.dll and iesetupapi.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Rundll32"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT32", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "TA505", "MuddyWater", "APT29", "APT19", "CopyKittens", "APT3", "Carbanak", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_rundll32"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 StartW", "id": "9319dda5-73f2-4d43-a85a-67ce961bddb7", "version": 3, "date": "2021-02-04", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe executing a DLL function name, Start and StartW, on the command line that is commonly observed with Cobalt Strike x86 and x64 DLL payloads. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64. Typically, the DLL will be written and loaded from a world writeable path or user location. In most instances it will not have a valid certificate (Unsigned). During investigation, review the parent process and other parallel application execution. Capture and triage the DLL in question. In the instance of Cobalt Strike, rundll32.exe is the default process it opens and injects shellcode into. This default process can be changed, but typically is not.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*start* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_startw_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use Start as a function and call it via the command line. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", "https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-windows-executable", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32", "https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Cobalt Strike", "Trickbot"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "rundll32.exe running with suspicious parameters on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Rundll32"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT32", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "TA505", "MuddyWater", "APT29", "APT19", "CopyKittens", "APT3", "Carbanak", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_rundll32"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_rundll32_startw_filter"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt", "id": "c8e7ced0-10c5-11ec-8b03-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-08", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following hunting detection identifies rundll32.exe with `control_rundll` within the command-line, loading a .cpl or another file type. Developed in relation to CVE-2021-40444. Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. \\ This is written to be a bit more broad by not including .cpl. \\ During triage, review parallel processes to identify any further suspicious behavior.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE) Processes.process=*Control_RunDLL* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_control_rundll_hunt_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "This is a hunting detection, meant to provide a understanding of how voluminous control_rundll is within the environment.", "references": ["https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/rundll32.exe-111474C61232202B5B588D2B512CBB25.html", "https://app.any.run/tasks/36c14029-9df8-439c-bba0-45f2643b0c70/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.002/T1218.002.yaml"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a suspicious file from disk.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Rundll32"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT32", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "TA505", "MuddyWater", "APT29", "APT19", "CopyKittens", "APT3", "Carbanak", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "rundll32_control_rundll_hunt_filter"}]}]}, {"author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2021-02-11", "description": "Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.", "id": "a09db4d1-3827-4833-87b8-3a397e532119", "name": "Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity", "narrative": "Adversaries may abuse Compiled HTML files (.chm) to conceal malicious code. CHM files are commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTML Help system. CHM files are compressed compilations of various content such as HTML documents, images, and scripting/web related programming languages such VBA, JScript, Java, and ActiveX. CHM content is displayed using underlying components of the Internet Explorer browser loaded by the HTML Help executable program (hh.exe). \\\nHH.exe relies upon hhctrl.ocx to load CHM topics.This will load upon execution of a chm file. \\\nDuring investigation, review all parallel processes and child processes. It is possible for file modification events to occur and it is best to capture the CHM file and decompile it for further analysis. \\\nUpon usage of InfoTech Storage Handlers, ms-its, its, mk, itss.dll will load.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/htmlhelp/nf-htmlhelp-htmlhelpa"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.001"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Compiled HTML File", "Signed Binary Proxy Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Silence", "Dark Caracal", "no", "APT41", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group"]}, "version": 1, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers", "id": "0b2eefa5-5508-450d-b970-3dd2fb761aec", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies hh.exe (HTML Help) execution of a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) file using InfoTech Storage Handlers. This particular technique will load Windows script code from a compiled help file, using InfoTech Storage Handlers. itss.dll will load upon execution. Three InfoTech Storage handlers are supported - ms-its, its, mk:@MSITStore. ITSS may be used to launch a specific html/htm file from within a CHM file. CHM files may contain nearly any file type embedded. Upon a successful execution, the following script engines may be used for execution - JScript, VBScript, VBScript.Encode, JScript.Encode, JScript.Compact. Analyst may identify vbscript.dll or jscript.dll loading into hh.exe upon execution. The \"htm\" and \"html\" file extensions were the only extensions observed to be supported for the execution of Shortcut commands or WSH script code. During investigation, identify script content origination. hh.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_hh` Processes.process IN (\"*its:*\", \"*mk:@MSITStore:*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "It is rare to see instances of InfoTech Storage Handlers being used, but it does happen in some legitimate instances. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001/", "https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/851869", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.001/T1218.001.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Hh/", "https://gist.github.com/mgeeky/cce31c8602a144d8f2172a73d510e0e7", "https://cyberforensicator.com/2019/01/20/silence-dissecting-malicious-chm-files-and-performing-forensic-analysis/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "$process_name$ has been identified using Infotech Storage Handlers to load a specific file within a CHM on $dest$ under user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Compiled HTML File"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT41", "Silence", "Lazarus Group", "Dark Caracal", "OilRig"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=hh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=HH.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_hh"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process", "id": "723716de-ee55-4cd4-9759-c44e7e55ba4b", "version": 1, "date": "2021-02-11", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies hh.exe (HTML Help) execution of a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) that spawns a child process. This particular technique will load Windows script code from a compiled help file. CHM files may contain nearly any file type embedded, but only execute html/htm. Upon a successful execution, the following script engines may be used for execution - JScript, VBScript, VBScript.Encode, JScript.Encode, JScript.Compact. Analyst may identify vbscript.dll or jscript.dll loading into hh.exe upon execution. The \"htm\" and \"html\" file extensions were the only extensions observed to be supported for the execution of Shortcut commands or WSH script code. During investigation, identify script content origination. Review child process events and investigate further. hh.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=hh.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_html_help_spawn_child_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications (ex. web browsers) may spawn a child process. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.001/T1218.001.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Hh/", "https://gist.github.com/mgeeky/cce31c8602a144d8f2172a73d510e0e7", "https://cyberforensicator.com/2019/01/20/silence-dissecting-malicious-chm-files-and-performing-forensic-analysis/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ spawning a child process, typically not normal behavior.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Compiled HTML File"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT41", "Silence", "Lazarus Group", "Dark Caracal", "OilRig"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_html_help_spawn_child_process_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect HTML Help Renamed", "id": "62fed254-513b-460e-953d-79771493a9f3", "version": 3, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies a renamed instance of hh.exe (HTML Help) executing a Compiled HTML Help (CHM). This particular technique will load Windows script code from a compiled help file. CHM files may contain nearly any file type embedded, but only execute html/htm. Upon a successful execution, the following script engines may be used for execution - JScript, VBScript, VBScript.Encode, JScript.Encode, JScript.Compact. Analyst may identify vbscript.dll or jscript.dll loading into hh.exe upon execution. The \"htm\" and \"html\" file extensions were the only extensions observed to be supported for the execution of Shortcut commands or WSH script code. During investigation, identify script content origination. Validate it is the legitimate version of hh.exe by reviewing the PE metadata. hh.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_hh` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_html_help_renamed_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely a renamed instance of hh.exe will be used legitimately, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.001/T1218.001.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Hh/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Compiled HTML File"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT41", "Silence", "Lazarus Group", "Dark Caracal", "OilRig"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=hh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=HH.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_hh"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_html_help_renamed_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line", "id": "8c5835b9-39d9-438b-817c-95f14c69a31e", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies hh.exe (HTML Help) execution of a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) file from a remote url. This particular technique will load Windows script code from a compiled help file. CHM files may contain nearly any file type embedded, but only execute html/htm. Upon a successful execution, the following script engines may be used for execution - JScript, VBScript, VBScript.Encode, JScript.Encode, JScript.Compact. Analyst may identify vbscript.dll or jscript.dll loading into hh.exe upon execution. The \"htm\" and \"html\" file extensions were the only extensions observed to be supported for the execution of Shortcut commands or WSH script code. During investigation, identify script content origination. Review reputation of remote IP and domain. Some instances, it is worth decompiling the .chm file to review its original contents. hh.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_hh` Processes.process=*http* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_html_help_url_in_command_line_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may retrieve a CHM remotely, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.001/T1218.001.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Hh/", "https://blog.sevagas.com/?Hacking-around-HTA-files", "https://gist.github.com/mgeeky/cce31c8602a144d8f2172a73d510e0e7", "https://cyberforensicator.com/2019/01/20/silence-dissecting-malicious-chm-files-and-performing-forensic-analysis/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_proces_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ contacting a remote destination to potentally download a malicious payload.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Compiled HTML File"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT41", "Silence", "Lazarus Group", "Dark Caracal", "OilRig"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=hh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=HH.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_hh"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_html_help_url_in_command_line_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", "id": "4d656b2e-d6be-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003", "version": 1, "date": "2020-08-05", "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", "description": "Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your GCP Storage buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open storage buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required.", "narrative": "Similar to other cloud providers, GCP operates on a shared responsibility model. This means the end user, you, are responsible for setting appropriate access control lists and permissions on your GCP resources.\\ This Analytics Story concentrates on detecting things like open storage buckets (both read and write) along with storage bucket access from unfamiliar users and IP addresses.", "references": ["https://cloud.google.com/blog/product/gcp/4-steps-for-hardening-your-cloud-storage-buckets-taking-charge-of-your-security", "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/gcp/google-cloud-platform-gcp-bucket-enumeration/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", "category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1530"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Data from Cloud Storage Object"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP", "id": "ccc3246a-daa1-11ea-87d0-0242ac130022", "version": 1, "date": "2020-08-10", "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks at GCP Storage bucket-access logs and detects new or previously unseen remote IP addresses that have successfully accessed a GCP Storage bucket.", "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` | multikv | rename sc_status_ as status | rename cs_object_ as bucket_name | rename c_ip_ as remote_ip | rename cs_uri_ as request_uri | rename cs_method_ as operation | search status=\"\\\"200\\\"\" | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by bucket_name remote_ip operation request_uri | table firstTime, lastTime, bucket_name, remote_ip, operation, request_uri | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by bucket_name remote_ip operation request_uri | outputlookup previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip.csv | eval newIP=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(),\"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newIP=1 | eval first_time=strftime(firstTime,\"%m/%d/%y %H:%M:%S\") | eval last_time=strftime(lastTime,\"%m/%d/%y %H:%M:%S\") | table first_time last_time bucket_name remote_ip operation request_uri | `detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search relies on the Splunk Add-on for Google Cloud Platform, setting up a Cloud Pub/Sub input, along with the relevant GCP PubSub topics and logging sink to capture GCP Storage Bucket events (https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/routing/overview). In order to capture public GCP Storage Bucket access logs, you must also enable storage bucket logging to your PubSub Topic as per https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/access-logs. These logs are deposited into the nominated Storage Bucket on an hourly basis and typically show up by 15 minutes past the hour. It is recommended to configure any saved searches or correlation searches in Enterprise Security to run on an hourly basis at 30 minutes past the hour (cron definition of 30 * * * *). A lookup table (previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip.csv) stores the previously seen access requests, and is used by this search to determine any newly seen IP addresses accessing the Storage Buckets.", "known_false_positives": "GCP Storage buckets can be accessed from any IP (if the ACLs are open to allow it), as long as it can make a successful connection. This will be a false postive, since the search is looking for a new IP within the past two hours.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious GCP Storage Activities"], "asset_type": "GCP Storage Bucket", "cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "sc_status_", "cs_object_", "c_ip_", "cs_uri_", "cs_method_"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Data from Cloud Storage Object"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets", "id": "f6ea3466-d6bb-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003", "version": 1, "date": "2020-08-05", "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for GCP PubSub events where a user has created an open/public GCP Storage bucket.", "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.resource.type=gcs_bucket data.protoPayload.methodName=storage.setIamPermissions | spath output=action path=data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.action | spath output=user path=data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail | spath output=location path=data.protoPayload.resourceLocation.currentLocations{} | spath output=src path=data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp | spath output=bucketName path=data.protoPayload.resourceName | spath output=role path=data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.role | spath output=member path=data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.member | search (member=allUsers AND action=ADD) | table _time, bucketName, src, user, location, action, role, member | search `detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search relies on the Splunk Add-on for Google Cloud Platform, setting up a Cloud Pub/Sub input, along with the relevant GCP PubSub topics and logging sink to capture GCP Storage Bucket events (https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/routing/overview).", "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that a GCP admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. That said, GCP strongly advises against granting full control to the \"allUsers\" group.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious GCP Storage Activities"], "asset_type": "GCP Storage Bucket", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "data.resource.type", "data.protoPayload.methodName", "data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.action", "data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail", "data.protoPayload.resourceLocation.currentLocations{}", "data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp", "data.protoPayload.resourceName", "data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.role", "data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.member"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Data from Cloud Storage Object"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "IcedID", "id": "1d2cc747-63d7-49a9-abb8-93aa36305603", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-29", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "batch", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the IcedID banking trojan, including looking for file writes associated with its payload, process injection, shellcode execution and data collection.", "narrative": "IcedId banking trojan campaigns targeting banks and other vertical sectors.This malware is known in Microsoft Windows OS targetting browser such as firefox and chrom to steal banking information. It is also known to its unique payload downloaded in C2 where it can be a .png file that hides the core shellcode bot using steganography technique or gzip dat file that contains \"license.dat\" which is the actual core icedid bot.", "references": ["https://threatpost.com/icedid-banking-trojan-surges-emotet/165314/", "https://app.any.run/tasks/48414a33-3d66-4a46-afe5-c2003bb55ccf/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "IcedID", "category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218.010", "T1548.002", "T1548", "T1482", "T1112", "T1562.001", "T1566", "T1053", "T1055", "T1087.002", "T1218", "T1562", "T1005", "T1087", "T1218.005", "T1053.005", "T1547.001", "T1218.011", "T1059", "T1566.001", "T1547", "T1560.001", "T1560", "T1204.002", "T1204", "T1059.003"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Rundll32", "Windows Command Shell", "Disable or Modify Tools", "User Execution", "Spearphishing Attachment", "Process Injection", "Scheduled Task/Job", "Account Discovery", "Mshta", "Malicious File", "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "Archive via Utility", "Bypass User Access Control", "Regsvr32", "Domain Trust Discovery", "Modify Registry", "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "Impair Defenses", "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "Phishing", "Data from Local System", "Domain Account", "Scheduled Task", "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "Archive Collected Data"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Discovery", "Initial Access", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Execution", "Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Suckfly", "Sandworm Team", "Inception", "Rancor", "PLATINUM", "TEMP.Veles", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT39", "Gamaredon Group", "RTM", "Carbanak", "Frankenstein", "admin@338", "Honeybee", "APT18", "MuddyWater", "Dust Storm", "Gorgon Group", "BlackTech", "Night Dragon", "Naikon", "Magic Hound", "Stealth Falcon", "Dark Caracal", "TA459", "APT29", "FIN8", "Molerats", "APT12", "Rocke", "Whitefly", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "Silence", "APT32", "WIRTE", "Darkhotel", "FIN5", "Blue Mockingbird", "Machete", "Sowbug", "Threat Group-1314", "Sharpshooter", "Patchwork", "FIN4", "APT33", "DarkHydrus", "Threat Group-3390", "Putter Panda", "Kimsuky", "Poseidon Group", "Turla", "Mofang", "TA505", "Soft Cell", "APT19", "APT37", "APT41", "menuPass", "OilRig", "Wizard Spider", "no", "The White Company", "FIN10", "Elderwood", "APT28", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN7", "APT1", "Tropic Trooper", "Ke3chang", "Leviathan", "APT-C-36", "CopyKittens", "FIN6", "Lazarus Group", "APT3", "APT38", "Gallmaker", "Windshift"]}, "detections": [{"name": "Office Document Executing Macro Code", "id": "b12c89bc-9d06-11eb-a592-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-14", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this detection was designed to identifies suspicious office documents that using macro code. Macro code is known to be one of the prevalent weaponization or attack vector of threat actor. This malicious macro code is embed to a office document as an attachment that may execute malicious payload, download malware payload or other malware component. It is really good practice to disable macro by default to avoid automatically execute macro code while opening or closing a office document files.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 process_name IN (\"WINWORD.EXE\", \"EXCEL.EXE\", \"POWERPNT.EXE\") ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\VBE7INTL.DLL\",\"*\\\\VBE7.DLL\", \"*\\\\VBEUI.DLL\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ImageLoaded) as AllImageLoaded count by Computer EventCode Image process_name ProcessId ProcessGuid | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_document_executing_macro_code_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and ImageLoaded (Like sysmon EventCode 7) from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Also be sure to include those monitored dll to your own sysmon config.", "known_false_positives": "Normal Office Document macro use for automation", "references": ["https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/386500/0/html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Trickbot", "IcedID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Office document executing a macro on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["ImageLoaded", "AllImageLoaded", "Computer", "EventCode", "Image", "process_name", "ProcessId", "ProcessGuid", "_time"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Phishing", "Spearphishing Attachment"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "office_document_executing_macro_code_filter"}]}, {"name": "NLTest Domain Trust Discovery", "id": "c3e05466-5f22-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-25", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for the execution of `nltest.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for Domain Trust information. Two arguments `/domain trusts`, returns a list of trusted domains, and `/all_trusts`, returns all trusted domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike use NLTest.exe to enumerate the current domain to assist with further understanding where to pivot next.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=nltest.exe OR Processes.process_name!=nltest.exe) (Processes.process=*/domain_trusts* OR Processes.process=*/all_trusts*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `nltest_domain_trust_discovery_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may use nltest for troubleshooting purposes, otherwise, rarely used.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1482/T1482.md", "https://malware.news/t/lets-learn-trickbot-implements-network-collector-module-leveraging-cmd-wmi-ldap/19104", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482/", "https://www.owasp.org/images/4/4b/Red_Team_Operating_in_a_Modern_Environment.pdf", "https://ss64.com/nt/nltest.html", "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/domain-trust-discovery/", "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/08/ryuks-return/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware", "Domain Trust Discovery", "IcedID", "Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Domain trust discovery execution on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1482"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Domain Trust Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "nltest_domain_trust_discovery_filter"}]}, {"name": "CHCP Command Execution", "id": "21d236ec-eec1-11eb-b23e-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-27", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect execution of chcp.exe application. this utility is used to change the active code page of the console. This technique was seen in icedid malware to know the locale region/language/country of the compromise host.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=chcp.com Processes.parent_process_name = cmd.exe Processes.parent_process=*/c* by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `chcp_command_execution_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed chcp.com may be used.", "known_false_positives": "other tools or script may used this to change code page to UTF-* or others", "references": ["https://ss64.com/nt/chcp.html", "https://twitter.com/tccontre18/status/1419941156633329665?s=20"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/simulated_icedid/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "parent process $parent_process_name$ spawning chcp process $process_name$ with parent command line $parent_process$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "process_name", "process", "parent_process_name", "parent_process", "process_id", "parent_process_id", "dest", "user"], "risk_score": 9, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "chcp_command_execution_filter"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "id": "f5f6af30-7aa7-4295-bfe9-07fe87c01a4b", "version": 6, "date": "2021-09-07", "author": "Jose Hernandez, David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to launch an application or service at system startup.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\run* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentVersion\\\\Windows\\\\Appinit_Dlls* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Shell* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Notify* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Userinit* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\VmApplet* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\policies\\\\explorer\\\\run* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\runservices* OR Registry.registry_path=HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Netsh\\\\* OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Image File Execution Options*\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=Debugger) OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Security Packages\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\\\\OSConfig\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Security Packages\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\SilentProcessExit\\\\*\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*currentVersion\\\\Windows\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Load\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentVersion\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Svchost\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\"AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"BootExecute\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Software\\\\Run\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"auto_update\")) by Registry.dest Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "There are many legitimate applications that must execute on system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Ransomware", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "IcedID", "Remcos"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 95, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Persistence"}, "Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to persistence in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1547.001", "T1547"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user"], "risk_score": 76, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Rocke", "Tropic Trooper", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Silence", "RTM", "Inception", "APT41", "Machete", "Kimsuky", "APT33", "APT39", "APT32", "APT18", "Turla", "Dark Caracal", "Cobalt Group", "Honeybee", "Threat Group-3390", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Gorgon Group", "Ke3chang", "APT19", "Leviathan", "MuddyWater", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Magic Hound", "APT3", "FIN10", "FIN7", "Patchwork", "FIN6", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "APT29", "Darkhotel", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files", "id": "6338266a-ee2a-11eb-bf68-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32 process that drops executable (.exe or .dll) files. this behavior seen in rundll32 process of IcedID that tries to drop copy of itself in temp folder or download executable drop it either appdata or programdata as part of its execution.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=11 process_name=\"rundll32.exe\" TargetFilename IN (\"*.exe\", \"*.dll\",) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image TargetFilename ProcessGuid dest user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, TargetFilename, and eventcode 11 executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://any.run/malware-trends/icedid"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "rundll32 process $process_name$ drops a file $TargetFilename$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "process name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Image", "TargetFilename", "ProcessGuid", "dest", "user_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Rundll32"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT32", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "TA505", "MuddyWater", "APT29", "APT19", "CopyKittens", "APT3", "Carbanak", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files_filter"}]}, {"name": "Office Application Spawn rundll32 process", "id": "958751e4-9c5f-11eb-b103-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-04-13", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this detection was designed to identifies suspicious spawned process of known MS office application due to macro or malicious code. this technique can be seen in so many malware like trickbot that used MS office as its weapon or attack vector to initially infect the machines.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = \"winword.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"excel.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"powerpnt.exe\") AND `process_rundll32` by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.process Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_application_spawn_rundll32_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://any.run/malware-trends/trickbot", "https://any.run/report/47561b4e949041eff0a0f4693c59c81726591779fe21183ae9185b5eb6a69847/aba3722a-b373-4dae-8273-8730fb40cdbe"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Trickbot", "IcedID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Office application spawning rundll32.exe on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Phishing", "Spearphishing Attachment"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_rundll32"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "office_application_spawn_rundll32_process_filter"}]}, {"name": "FodHelper UAC Bypass", "id": "909f8fd8-7ac8-11eb-a1f3-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-01", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Fodhelper.exe has a known UAC bypass as it attempts to look for specific registry keys upon execution, that do not exist. Therefore, an attacker can write its malicious commands in these registry keys to be executed by fodhelper.exe with the highest privilege. \\\n1. `HKCU:\\Software\\Classes\\ms-settings\\shell\\open\\command`\\\n1. `HKCU:\\Software\\Classes\\ms-settings\\shell\\open\\command\\DelegateExecute`\\\n1. `HKCU:\\Software\\Classes\\ms-settings\\shell\\open\\command\\(default)`\\\nUpon triage, fodhelper.exe will have a child process and read access will occur on the registry keys. Isolate the endpoint and review parallel processes for additional behavior.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=fodhelper.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `fodhelper_uac_bypass_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Limited to no false positives are expected.", "references": ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.md", "https://github.com/gushmazuko/WinBypass/blob/master/FodhelperBypass.ps1", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "IcedID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "message": "Suspcious registy keys added by process fodhelper.exe (process_id- $process_id), with a parent_process of $parent_process_name$ that has been executed on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1112", "T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process Name", "role": ["Parent Process", "Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Modify Registry", "Bypass User Access Control", "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Turla", "APT32", "APT38", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "Threat Group-3390", "Honeybee", "Patchwork", "Gorgon Group", "FIN8", "APT37", "MuddyWater", "Honeybee", "Cobalt Group", "Threat Group-3390", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Patchwork", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "fodhelper_uac_bypass_filter"}]}, {"name": "Account Discovery With Net App", "id": "339805ce-ac30-11eb-b87d-acde48001122", "version": 3, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this search is to detect a potential account discovery series of command used by several malware or attack to recon the target machine. This technique is also seen in some note worthy malware like trickbot where it runs a cmd process, or even drop its module that will execute the said series of net command. This series of command are good correlation search and indicator of attacker recon if seen in the machines within a none technical user or department (HR, finance, ceo and etc) network.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` AND (Processes.process=\"*user*\" OR Processes.process=\"*config*\" OR Processes.process=\"*view /all*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name | where count >=5 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `account_discovery_with_net_app_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product..", "known_false_positives": "admin or power user may used this series of command.", "references": ["https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/", "https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html", "https://app.any.run/tasks/48414a33-3d66-4a46-afe5-c2003bb55ccf/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Trickbot", "IcedID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/infection/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Suspicious $process_name$ usage detected on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process Name", "role": ["Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 5, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Domain Account", "Account Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Turla", "Sandworm Team", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "Ke3chang", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_net"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "account_discovery_with_net_app_filter"}]}, {"name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", "id": "54a6ed00-3256-11ec-b031-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-12-13", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies command-line arguments where `cmd.exe /c` is used to execute a program. `cmd /c` is used to run commands in MS-DOS and terminate after command or process completion. This technique is commonly seen in adversaries and malware to execute batch command using different shell like PowerShell or different process other than `cmd.exe`. This is a good hunting query for suspicious command-line made by a script or relative process execute it.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` AND Processes.process=\"* /c *\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives may be high based on legitimate scripted code in any environment. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["IcedID", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/cmd_carry_str_param/sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting spawn a new process.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059.003", "T1059"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 30, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Windows Command Shell", "Command and Scripting Interpreter"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TA505", "Blue Mockingbird", "Tropic Trooper", "Frankenstein", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "Honeybee", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Turla", "Silence", "APT32", "APT39", "Darkhotel", "MuddyWater", "APT18", "APT38", "Dark Caracal", "Gorgon Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Rancor", "Ke3chang", "APT37", "Leviathan", "FIN8", "APT28", "Magic Hound", "Sowbug", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Gamaredon Group", "Suckfly", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-1314", "APT3", "admin@338", "APT1", "APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_cmd"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter_filter"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", "id": "5d9c6eee-988c-11eb-8253-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-08", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed from a user writeable file path.\\\nThe search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not.\\\nschtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\\Windows\\system32` and `C:\\Windows\\syswow64`.\\\nThe following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory.\\\nUpon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or was it via TaskService. Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message | search Command IN (\"*\\\\users\\\\public\\\\*\", \"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Tasks\\\\*\", \"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Task_Name, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required.", "known_false_positives": "False positives are possible if legitimate applications are allowed to register tasks in public paths. Filter as needed based on paths that are used legitimately.", "references": ["https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/irans-apt34-returns-with-an-updated-arsenal/", "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4698", "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/scheduled-task-job/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/taskschd/time-trigger-example--scripting-?redirectedfrom=MSDN", "https://app.any.run/tasks/e26f1b2e-befa-483b-91d2-e18636e2faf3/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "IcedID", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/taskschedule/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "message": "A windows scheduled task was created (task name=$Task_Name$) on $dest$ by the following command: $Command$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Command", "type": "Command", "role": ["Target"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "Task_Name", "Description", "Command"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Scheduled Task", "Scheduled Task/Job"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "MuddyWater", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT-C-36", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT41", "Machete", "Soft Cell", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Patchwork", "OilRig", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "FIN8", "menuPass", "FIN10", "APT32", "FIN7", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path_filter"}]}, {"name": "Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process", "id": "2d9fc90c-f11f-11eb-9300-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-07-30", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this detection was designed to identifies suspicious spawned process of known MS office application due to macro or malicious code. this technique can be seen in so many malware like IcedID that used MS office as its weapon or attack vector to initially infect the machines.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = \"winword.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"excel.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"powerpnt.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"outlook.exe\") `process_regsvr32` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/380662/0/html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/phish_icedid/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Office application spawning regsvr32.exe on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Phishing", "Spearphishing Attachment"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=REGSVR32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_regsvr32"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process_filter"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started", "id": "b3632472-310b-11ec-9aab-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-19", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following hunting analytic assists with identifying suspicious tasks that have been registered and ran in Windows using EventID 200 (action run) and 201 (action completed). It is recommended to filter based on ActionName by specifying specific paths not used in your environment. After some basic tuning, this may be effective in capturing evasive ways to register tasks on Windows. Review parallel events related to tasks being scheduled. EventID 106 will generate when a new task is generated, however, that does not mean it ran. Capture any files on disk and analyze.", "search": "`wineventlog_task_scheduler` EventCode IN (\"200\",\"201\") | rename ComputerName as dest | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message dest EventCode category | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started_filter`", "how_to_implement": "Task Scheduler logs are required to be collected. Enable logging with inputs.conf by adding a stanza for [WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational] and renderXml=false. Note, not translating it in XML may require a proper extraction of specific items in the Message.", "known_false_positives": "False positives will be present. Filter based on ActionName paths or specify keywords of interest.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1053.005/T1053.005.md", "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["IcedID", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/windows_taskschedule/windows-taskschedule.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A Scheduled Task was scheduled and ran on $dest$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053.005"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "TaskName", "ActionName", "EventID", "dest", "ProcessID"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Scheduled Task"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "MuddyWater", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT-C-36", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT41", "Machete", "Soft Cell", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Patchwork", "OilRig", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "FIN8", "menuPass", "FIN10", "APT32", "FIN7", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT29"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "source=\"WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_task_scheduler"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started_filter"}]}, {"name": "Drop IcedID License dat", "id": "b7a045fc-f14a-11eb-8e79-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-30", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect dropping a suspicious file named as \"license.dat\" in %appdata%. This behavior seen in latest IcedID malware that contain the actual core bot that will be injected in other process to do banking stealing.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode= 11 TargetFilename = \"*\\\\license.dat\" AND (TargetFilename=\"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\" OR TargetFilename=\"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\") |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by TargetFilename EventCode process_id process_name Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_icedid_license_dat_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.cisecurity.org/white-papers/security-primer-icedid/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/simulated_icedid/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "process $SourceImage$ create a file $TargetImage$ in host $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1204", "T1204.002"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "SourceImage", "type": "process name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["User Execution", "Malicious File"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Whitefly", "Tropic Trooper", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Mofang", "Frankenstein", "RTM", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "Machete", "admin@338", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "DarkHydrus", "Gorgon Group", "Patchwork", "OilRig", "Dark Caracal", "MuddyWater", "Lazarus Group", "FIN7", "APT32", "Rancor", "APT37", "FIN8", "APT28", "Elderwood", "TA459", "APT29", "Leviathan", "menuPass", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "drop_icedid_license_dat_filter"}]}, {"name": "IcedID Exfiltrated Archived File Creation", "id": "0db4da70-f14b-11eb-8043-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-30", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious file creation namely passff.tar and cookie.tar. This files are possible archived of stolen browser information like history and cookies in a compromised machine with IcedID.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode= 11 (TargetFilename = \"*\\\\passff.tar\" OR TargetFilename = \"*\\\\cookie.tar\") |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by TargetFilename EventCode process_id process_name Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.cisecurity.org/white-papers/security-primer-icedid/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/simulated_icedid/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "process $SourceImage$ create a file $TargetImage$ in host $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1560.001", "T1560"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "SourceImage", "type": "process name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "TargetFilename", "EventCode", "process_id", "process_name", "Computer"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Archive via Utility", "Archive Collected Data"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Soft Cell", "Turla", "Gallmaker", "APT33", "APT39", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "FIN8", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT3", "Sowbug", "menuPass", "APT1", "Ke3chang", "menuPass", "APT32", "Honeybee", "Patchwork", "APT28", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN6", "Lazarus Group", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation_filter"}]}, {"name": "Sqlite Module In Temp Folder", "id": "0f216a38-f45f-11eb-b09c-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-03", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious file creation of sqlite3.dll in %temp% folder. This behavior was seen in IcedID malware where it download sqlite module to parse browser database like for chrome or firefox to stole browser information related to bank, credit card or credentials.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=11 (TargetFilename = \"*\\\\sqlite32.dll\" OR TargetFilename = \"*\\\\sqlite64.dll\") (TargetFilename = \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\") |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by process_name TargetFilename EventCode ProcessId Image | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sqlite_module_in_temp_folder_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.cisecurity.org/white-papers/security-primer-icedid/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/simulated_icedid/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "process $SourceImage$ create a file $TargetImage$ in host $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1005"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "SourceImage", "type": "process name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "process_name", "TargetFilename", "EventCode", "ProcessId", "Image"], "risk_score": 9, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Data from Local System"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Soft Cell", "Turla", "menuPass", "Dark Caracal", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Honeybee", "APT37", "APT28", "APT3", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "Dust Storm", "Threat Group-3390", "APT1", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "sqlite_module_in_temp_folder_filter"}]}, {"name": "Eventvwr UAC Bypass", "id": "9cf8fe08-7ad8-11eb-9819-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-01", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following search identifies Eventvwr bypass by identifying the registry modification into a specific path that eventvwr.msc looks to (but is not valid) upon execution. A successful attack will include a suspicious command to be executed upon eventvwr.msc loading. Upon triage, review the parallel processes that have executed. Identify any additional registry modifications on the endpoint that may look suspicious. Remediate as necessary.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*mscfile\\\\shell\\\\open\\\\command\\\\*\" by Registry.user, Registry.dest , Registry.registry_value_name| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `eventvwr_uac_bypass_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node.", "known_false_positives": "Some false positives may be present and will need to be filtered.", "references": ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.md", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002", "https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "IcedID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "message": "Registry values were modified to bypass UAC using Event Viewer on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.user", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Bypass User Access Control", "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "MuddyWater", "Honeybee", "Cobalt Group", "Threat Group-3390", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Patchwork", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "eventvwr_uac_bypass_filter"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process", "id": "2dbeee3a-f067-11eb-96c0-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-29", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies the suspicious Remote Thread execution of rundll32.exe process to cmd.exe process. This technique was seen in IcedID malware to execute its malicious code in normal process for defense evasion and to steal sensitive information the the compromised host. browser process.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=8 SourceImage = \"*\\\\rundll32.exe\" TargetImage = \"*.exe\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by SourceImage TargetImage TargetProcessId SourceProcessId StartAddress EventCode Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the SourceImage, TargetImage, and EventCode executions from your endpoints related to create remote thread or injecting codes. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/380662/0/html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "rundl32 process $SourceImage$ create a remote thread to process $TargetImage$ in host $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "SourceImage", "type": "process name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "SourceImage", "TargetImage", "TargetProcessId", "SourceProcessId", "StartAddress", "EventCode", "Computer"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Process Injection"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Cobalt Group", "APT37", "Honeybee", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process_filter"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser", "id": "f8a22586-ee2d-11eb-a193-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies the suspicious Remote Thread execution of rundll32.exe process to \"firefox.exe\" and \"chrome.exe\" browser. This technique was seen in IcedID malware where it hooks the browser to parse banking information as user used the targetted browser process.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=8 SourceImage = \"*\\\\rundll32.exe\" TargetImage IN (\"*\\\\firefox.exe\", \"*\\\\chrome.exe\", \"*\\\\iexplore.exe\",\"*\\\\microsoftedgecp.exe\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by SourceImage TargetImage TargetProcessId SourceProcessId StartAddress EventCode Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the SourceImage, TargetImage, and EventCode executions from your endpoints related to create remote thread or injecting codes. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/380662/0/html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "rundl32 process $SourceImage$ create a remote thread to browser process $TargetImage$ in host $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "SourceImage", "type": "process name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "SourceImage", "TargetImage", "TargetProcessId", "SourceProcessId", "StartAddress", "EventCode", "Computer"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Process Injection"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Cobalt Group", "APT37", "Honeybee", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser_filter"}]}, {"name": "Disable Schedule Task", "id": "db596056-3019-11ec-a9ff-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-18", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious commandline to disable existing schedule task. This technique is used by adversaries or commodity malware like IceID to disable security application (AV products) in the targetted host to evade detections. This TTP is a good pivot to check further why and what other process run before and after this detection. check which process execute the commandline and what task is disabled. parent child process is quite valuable in this scenario too.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe Processes.process=*/change* Processes.process=*/disable* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_schedule_task_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "admin may disable problematic schedule task", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_schtask/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "schtask process with commandline $process$ to disable schedule task in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disable_schedule_task_filter"}]}, {"name": "Create Remote Thread In Shell Application", "id": "10399c1e-f51e-11eb-b920-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-04", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect suspicious process injection in command shell. This technique was seen in IcedID where it execute cmd.exe process to inject its shellcode as part of its execution as banking trojan. It is really uncommon to have a create remote thread execution in the following application.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=8 TargetImage IN (\"*\\\\cmd.exe\", \"*\\\\powershell*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by TargetImage TargetProcessId SourceProcessId EventCode StartAddress SourceImage Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `create_remote_thread_in_shell_application_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2021/07/19/icedid-and-cobalt-strike-vs-antivirus/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/simulated_icedid/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "process $SourceImage$ create a remote thread to shell app process $TargetImage$ in host $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "SourceImage", "type": "process name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "SourceImage", "TargetImage", "TargetProcessId", "SourceProcessId", "StartAddress", "EventCode", "Computer"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Process Injection"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Cobalt Group", "APT37", "Honeybee", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "create_remote_thread_in_shell_application_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 PluginInit", "id": "92d51712-ee29-11eb-b1ae-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-07-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe process with plugininit parameter. This technique is commonly seen in IceID malware to execute its initial dll stager to download another payload to the compromised machine.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*PluginInit* by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_plugininit_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "third party application may used this dll export name to execute function.", "references": ["https://threatpost.com/icedid-banking-trojan-surges-emotet/165314/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "rundll32 process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "process name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Rundll32"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT32", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "TA505", "MuddyWater", "APT29", "APT19", "CopyKittens", "APT3", "Carbanak", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_rundll32"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_rundll32_plugininit_filter"}]}, {"name": "Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process", "id": "4aa5d062-e893-11eb-9eb2-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-07-19", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious mshta.exe process that spawn rundll32 or regsvr32 child process. This technique was seen in several malware nowadays like trickbot to load its initial .dll stage loader to execute and download the the actual trickbot payload.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name = \"mshta.exe\" `process_rundll32` OR `process_regsvr32` by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "limitted. this anomaly behavior is not commonly seen in clean host.", "references": ["https://twitter.com/cyb3rops/status/1416050325870587910?s=21"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Trickbot", "IcedID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "executions"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/spear_phish/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "a mshta parent process $parent_process_name$ spawn child process $process_name$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Mshta"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "APT32", "MuddyWater", "FIN7"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_rundll32"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=REGSVR32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_regsvr32"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process_filter"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 DNSQuery", "id": "f1483f5e-ee29-11eb-9d23-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe process having a http connection and do a dns query in some web domain. This technique was seen in IcedID malware where the rundll32 that execute its payload will contact amazon.com to check internet connect and to communicate to its C&C server to download config and other file component.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=22 process_name=\"rundll32.exe\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image QueryName QueryStatus ProcessId direction Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_dnsquery_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and eventcode = 22 dnsquery executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://any.run/malware-trends/icedid"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "rundll32 process $process_name$ having a dns query to $QueryName$ in host $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "process name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Image", "QueryName", "QueryStatus", "ProcessId", "direction", "Computer"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Rundll32"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT32", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "TA505", "MuddyWater", "APT29", "APT19", "CopyKittens", "APT3", "Carbanak", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "rundll32_dnsquery_filter"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawning MSHTA", "id": "6078fa20-a6d2-11eb-b662-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-04-26", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `mshta.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `mshta.exe` will contain the `hta` file locally, or a URL to the remote destination. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `mshta.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `mshta.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\") `process_mshta` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_mshta_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "No false positives known. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/threats/TA551/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "IcedID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "recon"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_macros.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Phishing", "Spearphishing Attachment"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=mshta.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSHTA.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_mshta"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "office_product_spawning_mshta_filter"}]}, {"name": "Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline", "id": "c9ef7dc4-eeaf-11eb-b2b6-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-07-27", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies Regsvr32.exe utilizing the silent switch to load DLLs. This technique has most recently been seen in IcedID campaigns to load its initial dll that will download the 2nd stage loader that will download and decrypt the config payload. The switch type may be either a hyphen `-` or forward slash `/`. This behavior is typically found with `-s`, and it is possible there are more switch types that may be used. \\ During triage, review parallel processes and capture any artifacts that may have landed on disk. Isolate and contain the endpoint as necessary.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"(?i)[\\-|\\/][Ss]{1}\") | `regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "minimal. but network operator can use this application to load dll.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/56680cba-2bbc-4b34-8633-5f7878ddf858/", "https://regexr.com/699e2"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["IcedID", "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", "Remcos"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a DLL using the silent parameter.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.010"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Regsvr32"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Blue Mockingbird", "Inception", "WIRTE", "Cobalt Group", "APT19", "Leviathan", "APT32", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=REGSVR32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_regsvr32"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline_filter"}]}, {"name": "Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger", "id": "75b00fd8-a0ff-11eb-8b31-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-19", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed with a Rundll32. This technique is common in new trickbot that uses rundll32 to load is trickbot downloader. The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\\Windows\\system32` and `C:\\Windows\\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.'", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message | search Command IN (\"*rundll32*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Task_Name, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden, Arguments | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the task schedule (Exa. Security Log EventCode 4698) endpoints. Tune and filter known instances of Task schedule used in your environment.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/", "https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Trickbot", "IcedID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/tasksched/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A schedule task process commandline rundll32 arguments $Arguments$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Arguments", "type": "Arguments", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "Task_Name", "Command", "Author", "Enabled", "Hidden", "Arguments"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Scheduled Task/Job"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline", "id": "bed761f8-ee29-11eb-8bf3-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-07-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe commandline to execute dll file. This technique was seen in IcedID malware to load its payload dll with the following parameter to load encrypted dll payload which is the license.dat.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*/i:* by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "limitted. this parameter is not commonly used by windows application but can be used by the network operator.", "references": ["https://threatpost.com/icedid-banking-trojan-surges-emotet/165314/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "rundll32 process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "process name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Rundll32"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT32", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "TA505", "MuddyWater", "APT29", "APT19", "CopyKittens", "APT3", "Carbanak", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_rundll32"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Okta Activity", "id": "9cbd34af-8f39-4476-a423-bacd126c750b", "version": 1, "date": "2020-04-02", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "description": "Monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities. Due to the Covid outbreak, many users are migrating over to leverage cloud services more and more. Okta is a popular tool to manage multiple users and the web-based applications they need to stay productive. The searches in this story will help monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities and associated user behaviors.", "narrative": "Okta is the leading single sign on (SSO) provider, allowing users to authenticate once to Okta, and from there access a variety of web-based applications. These applications are assigned to users and allow administrators to centrally manage which users are allowed to access which applications. It also provides centralized logging to help understand how the applications are used and by whom. \\\nWhile SSO is a major convenience for users, it also provides attackers with an opportunity. If the attacker can gain access to Okta, they can access a variety of applications. As such monitoring the environment is important. \\\nWith people moving quickly to adopt web-based applications and ways to manage them, many are still struggling to understand how best to monitor these environments. This analytic story provides searches to help monitor this environment, and identify events and activity that warrant further investigation such as credential stuffing or password spraying attacks, and users logging in from multiple locations when travel is disallowed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1078", "https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Credential_stuffing", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/answer/What-is-a-password-spraying-attack-and-how-does-it-work"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Suspicious Okta Activity", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078.001", "T1078"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Valid Accounts", "Default Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Sandworm Team", "TEMP.Veles", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT39", "Carbanak", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT41", "FIN5", "menuPass", "FIN6", "OilRig", "Wizard Spider", "APT18", "no", "FIN10", "PittyTiger", "FIN4", "APT28", "APT33", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Night Dragon"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Okta Failed SSO Attempts", "id": "371a6545-2618-4032-ad84-93386b8698c5", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "Detect failed Okta SSO events", "search": "`okta` displayMessage=\"User attempted unauthorized access to app\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(app) as Apps count by user, result ,displayMessage, src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_failed_sso_attempts_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being ingested in your Splunk deployment.", "known_false_positives": "There may be a faulty config preventing legitmate users from accessing apps they should have access to.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Okta Activity"], "asset_type": "Infrastructure", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078", "T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "displayMessage", "app", "user", "result", "src_ip"], "security_domain": "access", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Valid Accounts", "Default Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak", "no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "eventtype=okta_log", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "okta"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "okta_failed_sso_attempts_filter"}]}, {"name": "Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP", "id": "19cba45f-cad3-4032-8911-0c09e0444552", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects Okta login failures due to bad credentials for multiple users originating from the same ip address.", "search": "`okta` outcome.reason=INVALID_CREDENTIALS | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(user) as distinct_users values(user) as users by src_ip, displayMessage, outcome.reason, country, state, city | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search distinct_users > 5| `multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being ingested in your Splunk deployment.", "known_false_positives": "A single public IP address servicing multiple legitmate users may trigger this search. In addition, the threshold of 5 distinct users may be too low for your needs. You may modify the included filter macro `multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip_filter` to raise the threshold or except specific IP adresses from triggering this search.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Okta Activity"], "asset_type": "Infrastructure", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078", "T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "outcome.reason", "client.geographicalContext.country", "client.geographicalContext.state", "client.geographicalContext.city", "user", "src_ip", "displayMessage"], "security_domain": "access", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Valid Accounts", "Default Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak", "no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "eventtype=okta_log", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "okta"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip_filter"}]}, {"name": "Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities", "id": "7594fa07-9f34-4d01-81cc-d6af6a5db9e8", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects logins from the same user from different cities in a 24 hour period.", "search": "`okta` displayMessage=\"User login to Okta\" client.geographicalContext.city!=null | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(client.geographicalContext.city) as locations values(client.geographicalContext.city) as cities values(client.geographicalContext.state) as states by user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities_filter` | search locations > 1", "how_to_implement": "This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being ingested in your Splunk deployment.", "known_false_positives": "Users in your enviornment may legitmately be travelling and loggin in from different locations. This search is useful for those users that should *not* be travelling for some reason, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. The search also relies on the geographical information being populated in the Okta logs. It is also possible that a connection from another region may be attributed to a login from a remote VPN endpoint.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Okta Activity"], "asset_type": "Infrastructure", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078", "T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "displayMessage", "client.geographicalContext.city", "client.geographicalContext.state", "user"], "security_domain": "access", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Valid Accounts", "Default Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak", "no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "eventtype=okta_log", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "okta"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities_filter"}]}, {"name": "Okta Account Lockout Events", "id": "62b70968-a0a5-4724-8ac4-67871e6f544d", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "Detect Okta user lockout events", "search": "`okta` displayMessage=\"Max sign in attempts exceeded\" | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | table _time, user, country, state, city, src_ip | `okta_account_lockout_events_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being ingested in your Splunk deployment.", "known_false_positives": "None. Account lockouts should be followed up on to determine if the actual user was the one who caused the lockout, or if it was an unauthorized actor.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Okta Activity"], "asset_type": "Infrastructure", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078", "T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "displayMessage", "client.geographicalContext.country", "client.geographicalContext.state", "client.geographicalContext.city"], "security_domain": "access", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Valid Accounts", "Default Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=okta_log", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "okta"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "okta_account_lockout_events_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Hidden Cobra Malware", "id": "baf7580b-d4b4-4774-8173-7d198e9da335", "version": 2, "date": "2020-01-22", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "description": "Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A.", "narrative": "North Korea's government-sponsored \"cyber army\" has been slowly building momentum and gaining sophistication over the last 15 years or so. As a result, the group's activity, which the US government refers to as \"Hidden Cobra,\" has surreptitiously crept onto the collective radar as a preeminent global threat.\\\nThese state-sponsored actors are thought to be responsible for everything from a hack on a South Korean nuclear plant to an attack on Sony in anticipation of its release of the movie \"The Interview\" at the end of 2014. They're also notorious for cyberespionage. In recent years, the group seems to be focused on financial crimes, such as cryptojacking.\\\nIn June of 2018, The Department of Homeland Security, together with the FBI and other U.S. government partners, issued Technical Alert (TA-18-149A) to advise the public about two variants of North Korean malware. One variant, dubbed \"Joanap,\" is a multi-stage peer-to-peer botnet that allows North Korean state actors to exfiltrate data, download and execute secondary payloads, and initialize proxy communications. The other variant, \"Brambul,\" is a Windows32 SMB worm that is dropped into a victim network. When executed, the malware attempts to spread laterally within a victim's local subnet, connecting via the SMB protocol and initiating brute-force password attacks. It reports details to the Hidden Cobra actors via email, so they can use the information for secondary remote operations.\\\nAmong other searches in this Analytic Story is a detection search that looks for the creation or deletion of hidden shares, such as, \"adnim$,\" which the Hidden Cobra malware creates on the target system. Another looks for the creation of three malicious files associated with the malware. You can also use a search in this story to investigate activity that indicates that malware is sending email back to the attackers.", "references": ["https://www.us-cert.gov/HIDDEN-COBRA-North-Korean-Malicious-Cyber-Activity", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Hidden Cobra Malware", "category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021.001", "T1070", "T1021", "T1071", "T1071.004", "T1071.002", "T1021.002", "T1048", "T1048.003", "T1070.005"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["DNS", "Network Share Connection Removal", "Remote Desktop Protocol", "Remote Services", "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", "File Transfer Protocols", "Application Layer Protocol", "Indicator Removal on Host"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement", "Exfiltration", "Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390", "Magic Hound", "Axiom", "APT1", "Tropic Trooper", "TEMP.Veles", "FIN8", "Ke3chang", "Leviathan", "APT39", "Turla", "Rocke", "Stolen Pencil", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "APT32", "Silence", "APT41", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Blue Mockingbird", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "Honeybee", "Thrip", "Wizard Spider", "APT3", "Machete", "APT18", "no", "Threat Group-1314", "FIN10", "Patchwork", "APT33", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Orangeworm", "FIN7", "SilverTerrier"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Create or delete windows shares using net exe", "id": "qw9919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-151bb162140e", "version": 6, "date": "2020-09-16", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for the creation or deletion of hidden shares using net.exe.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.user) as user values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` by Processes.process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search process=*share* | `create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators often leverage net.exe to create or delete network shares. You should verify that the activity was intentional and is legitimate.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/005"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Hidden Cobra Malware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ enumerating Windows file shares.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1070", "T1070.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Indicator Removal on Host", "Network Share Connection Removal"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Threat Group-3390"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_net"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe_filter"}]}, {"name": "DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation", "id": "1a67f15a-f4ff-4170-84e9-08cf6f75d6f5", "version": 4, "date": "2021-10-06", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Network_Resolution"], "description": "This search allows you to identify DNS requests and compute the standard deviation on the length of the names being resolved, then filter on two times the standard deviation to show you those queries that are unusually large for your environment.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where NOT DNS.message_type IN(\"Pointer\",\"PTR\") by DNS.query | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | eval tlds=split(query,\".\") | eval tld=mvindex(tlds,-1) | eval tld_len=len(tld) | search tld_len<=24 | eval query_length = len(query) | table query query_length record_type count | eventstats stdev(query_length) AS stdev avg(query_length) AS avg p50(query_length) AS p50| where query_length>(avg+stdev*2) | eval z_score=(query_length-avg)/stdev | `dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model.", "known_false_positives": "It's possible there can be long domain names that are legitimate.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Hidden Cobra Malware", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Command and Control"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/long_dns_queries/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "message": "A dns query $query$ with 2 time standard deviation of name len of the dns query in host $host$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1048.003", "T1048"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "host", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "query", "type": "dnsquery", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "DNS.query"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration", "Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "Thrip", "FIN8", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation_filter"}]}, {"name": "Remote Desktop Process Running On System", "id": "f5939373-8054-40ad-8c64-cec478a22a4a", "version": 5, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for the remote desktop process mstsc.exe running on systems upon which it doesn't typically run. This is accomplished by filtering out all systems that are noted in the `common_rdp_source category` in the Assets and Identity framework.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=*mstsc.exe AND Processes.dest_category!=common_rdp_source by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `remote_desktop_process_running_on_system_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. The search requires you to identify systems that do not commonly use remote desktop. You can use the included support search \"Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop\" to identify these systems. After identifying them, you will need to add the \"common_rdp_source\" category to that system using the Enterprise Security Assets and Identities framework. This can be done by adding an entry in the assets.csv file located in `SA-IdentityManagement/lookups`.", "known_false_positives": "Remote Desktop may be used legitimately by users on the network.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Hidden Cobra Malware", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 9", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021.001", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest_category", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote Desktop Protocol", "Remote Services"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "TEMP.Veles", "Leviathan", "APT39", "Stolen Pencil", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "APT3", "OilRig", "menuPass", "FIN10", "Patchwork", "FIN6", "Lazarus Group", "APT1", "Axiom", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "remote_desktop_process_running_on_system_filter"}]}, {"name": "SMB Traffic Spike", "id": "7f5fb3e1-4209-4914-90db-0ec21b936378", "version": 3, "date": "2020-07-22", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search looks for spikes in the number of Server Message Block (SMB) traffic connections.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb by _time span=1h, All_Traffic.src | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | eventstats max(_time) as maxtime | stats count as num_data_samples max(eval(if(_time >= relative_time(maxtime, \"-70m@m\"), count, null))) as count avg(eval(if(_time upperBound AND num_data_samples >=50, 1, 0) | where isOutlier=1 | table src count | `smb_traffic_spike_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic logs and populating the `Network_Traffic` data model.", "known_false_positives": "A file server may experience high-demand loads that could cause this analytic to trigger.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Ransomware", "DHS Report TA18-074A"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021.002", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.dest_port", "All_Traffic.app", "All_Traffic.src"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "Remote Services"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "APT32", "Orangeworm", "FIN8", "APT3", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-1314", "Turla", "Deep Panda", "Ke3chang", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "smb_traffic_spike_filter"}]}, {"name": "SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK", "id": "d25773ba-9ad8-48d1-858e-07ad0bbeb828", "version": 3, "date": "2020-07-22", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search uses the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) to identify spikes in the number of Server Message Block (SMB) connections.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as port from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb by _time span=1h, All_Traffic.src | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%A\") | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | apply smb_pdfmodel threshold=0.001 | rename \"IsOutlier(count)\" as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | sort -count | table _time src dest port count | `smb_traffic_spike___mltk_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. In addition, the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or greater must be installed on your search heads, along with any required dependencies. Finally, the support search \"Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK\" must be executed before this detection search, because it builds a machine-learning (ML) model over the historical data used by this search. It is important that this search is run in the same app context as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild the model with the latest data available in your environment.\\\nThis search produces a field (Number of events,count) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. This field contributes additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following field, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry): \\\n1. **Label:** Number of events, **Field:** count\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review is found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", "known_false_positives": "If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider reducing the value of the threshold in the search. You should also periodically re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data. Please update the `smb_traffic_spike_mltk_filter` macro to filter out false positive results", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Ransomware", "DHS Report TA18-074A"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021.002", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.dest_ip", "All_Traffic.dest_port", "All_Traffic.app", "All_Traffic.src"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "Remote Services"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "APT32", "Orangeworm", "FIN8", "APT3", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-1314", "Turla", "Deep Panda", "Ke3chang", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "smb_traffic_spike___mltk_filter"}]}, {"name": "Remote Desktop Network Traffic", "id": "272b8407-842d-4b3d-bead-a704584003d3", "version": 3, "date": "2020-07-07", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search looks for network traffic on TCP/3389, the default port used by remote desktop. While remote desktop traffic is not uncommon on a network, it is usually associated with known hosts. This search will ignore common RDP sources and common RDP destinations so you can focus on the uncommon uses of remote desktop on your network.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=3389 AND All_Traffic.dest_category!=common_rdp_destination AND All_Traffic.src_category!=common_rdp_source by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_desktop_network_traffic_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to identify systems that commonly originate remote desktop traffic and that commonly receive remote desktop traffic. You can use the included support search \"Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic\" to identify systems that originate the traffic and the search \"Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic\" to identify systems that receive a lot of remote desktop traffic. After identifying these systems, you will need to add the \"common_rdp_source\" or \"common_rdp_destination\" category to that system depending on the usage, using the Enterprise Security Assets and Identities framework. This can be done by adding an entry in the assets.csv file located in SA-IdentityManagement/lookups.", "known_false_positives": "Remote Desktop may be used legitimately by users on the network.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 9", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021.001", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.dest_port", "All_Traffic.dest_category", "All_Traffic.src_category", "All_Traffic.src", "All_Traffic.dest", "All_Traffic.dest_port"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote Desktop Protocol", "Remote Services"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "TEMP.Veles", "Leviathan", "APT39", "Stolen Pencil", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "APT3", "OilRig", "menuPass", "FIN10", "Patchwork", "FIN6", "Lazarus Group", "APT1", "Axiom", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "remote_desktop_network_traffic_filter"}]}, {"name": "DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK", "id": "85fbcfe8-9718-4911-adf6-7000d077a3a9", "version": 2, "date": "2020-01-22", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Network_Resolution"], "description": "This search allows you to identify DNS requests that are unusually large for the record type being requested in your environment.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as start_time max(_time) as end_time values(DNS.src) as src values(DNS.dest) as dest from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query DNS.record_type | search DNS.record_type=* | `drop_dm_object_name(DNS)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | eval query_length = len(query) | apply dns_query_pdfmodel threshold=0.01 | rename \"IsOutlier(query_length)\" as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | sort -query_length | table start_time end_time query record_type count src dest query_length | `dns_query_length_outliers___mltk_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. In addition, the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or greater must be installed on your search heads, along with any required dependencies. Finally, the support search \"Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK\" must be executed before this detection search, because it builds a machine-learning (ML) model over the historical data used by this search. It is important that this search is run in the same app context as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild the model with the latest data available in your environment.\\\nThis search produces fields (`query`,`query_length`,`count`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** DNS Query, **Field:** query\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** DNS Query Length, **Field:** query_length\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** Number of events, **Field:** count\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", "known_false_positives": "If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider reducing the value for threshold in the search. You should also periodically re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Hidden Cobra Malware", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Command and Control"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1071.004", "T1071"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "DNS.src", "DNS.dest", "DNS.query", "DNS.record_type"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["DNS", "Application Layer Protocol"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control", "Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT39", "Tropic Trooper", "OilRig", "Ke3chang", "Cobalt Group", "APT18", "APT41", "FIN7", "Rocke", "Magic Hound", "Dragonfly 2.0"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "dns_query_length_outliers___mltk_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Outbound SMB Traffic", "id": "7f5fb3e1-4209-414-90db-0ec21b936378", "version": 3, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Stuart Hopkins from Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search looks for outbound SMB connections made by hosts within your network to the Internet. SMB traffic is used for Windows file-sharing activity. One of the techniques often used by attackers involves retrieving the credential hash using an SMB request made to a compromised server controlled by the threat actor.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as start_time latest(_time) as end_time values(All_Traffic.action) as action values(All_Traffic.app) as app values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as dest_port values(sourcetype) as sourcetype count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where ((All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=\"smb\") AND NOT (All_Traffic.action=\"blocked\" OR All_Traffic.dest_category=\"internal\" OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=192.168.0.0/16 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=100.64.0.0/10)) by All_Traffic.src_ip | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `security_content_ctime(start_time)` | `security_content_ctime(end_time)` | `detect_outbound_smb_traffic_filter`", "how_to_implement": "In order to run this search effectively, we highly recommend that you leverage the Assets and Identity framework. It is important that you have good understanding of how your network segments are designed, and be able to distinguish internal from external address space. Add a category named `internal` to the CIDRs that host the companys assets in `assets_by_cidr.csv` lookup file, which is located in `$SPLUNK_HOME/etc/apps/SA-IdentityManagement/lookups/`. More information on updating this lookup can be found here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.0.0/Admin/Addassetandidentitydata. This search also requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model", "known_false_positives": "It is likely that the outbound Server Message Block (SMB) traffic is legitimate, if the company's internal networks are not well-defined in the Assets and Identity Framework. Categorize the internal CIDR blocks as `internal` in the lookup file to avoid creating notable events for traffic destined to those CIDR blocks. Any other network connection that is going out to the Internet should be investigated and blocked. Best practices suggest preventing external communications of all SMB versions and related protocols at the network boundary.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Hidden Cobra Malware", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "NOBELIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1071.002", "T1071"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.action", "All_Traffic.app", "All_Traffic.dest_ip", "All_Traffic.dest_port", "sourcetype", "All_Traffic.dest_category", "All_Traffic.src_ip"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["File Transfer Protocols", "Application Layer Protocol"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control", "Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "SilverTerrier", "Machete", "Honeybee", "Rocke", "Magic Hound", "Dragonfly 2.0"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_outbound_smb_traffic_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "id": "6d13121c-90f3-446d-8ac3-27efbbc65218", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-11", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "description": "Detect instances of prohibited network traffic allowed in the environment, as well as protocols running on non-standard ports. Both of these types of behaviors typically violate policy and can be leveraged by attackers.", "narrative": "A traditional security best practice is to control the ports, protocols, and services allowed within your environment. By limiting the services and protocols to those explicitly approved by policy, administrators can minimize the attack surface. The combined effect allows both network defenders and security controls to focus and not be mired in superfluous traffic or data types. Looking for deviations to policy can identify attacker activity that abuses services and protocols to run on alternate or non-standard ports in the attempt to avoid detection or frustrate forensic analysts.", "references": ["http://www.novetta.com/2015/02/advanced-methods-to-detect-advanced-cyber-attacks-protocol-abuse/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "category": ["Best Practices"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021.001", "T1071.001", "T1021", "T1071", "T1189", "T1048", "T1048.003"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Drive-by Compromise", "Remote Desktop Protocol", "Remote Services", "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", "Application Layer Protocol", "Web Protocols"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control", "Lateral Movement", "Exfiltration", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390", "Magic Hound", "Axiom", "Sandworm Team", "Inception", "Rancor", "Stealth Falcon", "APT1", "Tropic Trooper", "Dark Caracal", "TEMP.Veles", "PLATINUM", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN8", "Ke3chang", "Leviathan", "APT39", "Turla", "Gamaredon Group", "Rocke", "RTM", "TA505", "Stolen Pencil", "Cobalt Group", "Silence", "APT32", "APT19", "APT37", "WIRTE", "Darkhotel", "APT41", "menuPass", "FIN6", "OilRig", "Blue Mockingbird", "Lazarus Group", "APT3", "Wizard Spider", "Thrip", "Machete", "Leafminer", "APT18", "no", "APT38", "MuddyWater", "FIN10", "Patchwork", "FIN4", "Elderwood", "APT28", "APT33", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Windshift", "SilverTerrier", "Orangeworm", "Night Dragon"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Enable RDP In Other Port Number", "id": "99495452-b899-11eb-96dc-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-19", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a modification to registry to enable rdp to a machine with different port number. This technique was seen in some atttacker tries to do lateral movement and remote access to a compromised machine to gain control of it.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*HKLM\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Terminal Server\\\\WinStations\\\\RDP-Tcp*\" Registry.registry_value_name = \"PortNumber\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `enable_rdp_in_other_port_number_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.mvps.net/docs/how-to-secure-remote-desktop-rdp/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/casper/datasets1/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "RDP was moved to a non-standard port on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote Services"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "enable_rdp_in_other_port_number_filter"}]}, {"name": "Allow Inbound Traffic In Firewall Rule", "id": "a5d85486-b89c-11eb-8267-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-19", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell command to allow inbound traffic inbound to a specific local port within the public profile. This technique was seen in some attacker want to have a remote access to a machine by allowing the traffic in firewall rule.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*firewall*\" Message = \"*Inbound*\" Message = \"*Allow*\" Message = \"*-LocalPort*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `allow_inbound_traffic_in_firewall_rule_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the powershell logs from your endpoints. make sure you enable needed registry to monitor this event.", "known_false_positives": "administrator may allow inbound traffic in certain network or machine.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/netsecurity/new-netfirewallrule?view=windowsserver2019-ps"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/casper/datasets1/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious firewall modification detected on endpoint $ComputerName$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021.001", "T1021"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 3, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote Desktop Protocol", "Remote Services"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "TEMP.Veles", "Leviathan", "APT39", "Stolen Pencil", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "APT3", "OilRig", "menuPass", "FIN10", "Patchwork", "FIN6", "Lazarus Group", "APT1", "Axiom", "no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "allow_inbound_traffic_in_firewall_rule_filter"}]}, {"name": "Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry", "id": "0a46537c-be02-11eb-92ca-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic detects a potential suspicious modification of firewall rule registry allowing inbound traffic in specific port with public profile. This technique was identified when an adversary wants to grant remote access to a machine by allowing the traffic in a firewall rule.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\System\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services\\\\SharedAccess\\\\Parameters\\\\FirewallPolicy\\\\FirewallRules\\\\*\" Registry.registry_value_name = \"*|Action=Allow|*\" Registry.registry_value_name = \"*|Dir=In|*\" Registry.registry_value_name = \"*|Profile=Public|*\" Registry.registry_value_name = \"*|LPort=*\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `allow_inbound_traffic_by_firewall_rule_registry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "network admin may add/remove/modify public inbound firewall rule that may cause this rule to be triggered.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/netsecurity/new-netfirewallrule?view=windowsserver2019-ps"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/casper/datasets1/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious firewall modifications were detected via the registry on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021.001", "T1021"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user"], "risk_score": 3, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote Desktop Protocol", "Remote Services"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "TEMP.Veles", "Leviathan", "APT39", "Stolen Pencil", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "APT3", "OilRig", "menuPass", "FIN10", "Patchwork", "FIN6", "Lazarus Group", "APT1", "Axiom", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "allow_inbound_traffic_by_firewall_rule_registry_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers", "id": "c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6v5464g9f", "version": 3, "date": "2021-01-14", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Resolution"], "description": "Malicious actors often abuse legitimate Dynamic DNS services to host malicious payloads or interactive command and control nodes. Attackers will automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to countless IP addresses to circumvent firewall blocks, block lists as well as frustrate a network defenders analytic and investigative processes. This search will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.answer) as answer min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query host | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `dynamic_dns_providers` | `detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter`", "how_to_implement": "First, you'll need to ingest data from your DNS operations. This can be done by ingesting logs from your server or data, collected passively by Splunk Stream or a similar solution. Specifically, data that contains the domain that is being queried and the IP of the host originating the request must be populating the `Network_Resolution` data model. This search also leverages a lookup file, `dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv`, which contains a non-exhaustive list of Dynamic DNS providers. Please consider updating the local lookup periodically by adding new domains to the list of `dynamic_dns_providers_local.csv`.\\\nThis search produces fields (query, answer, isDynDNS) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable event. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review. Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** DNS Query, **Field:** query\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** DNS Answer, **Field:** answer\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** IsDynamicDNS, **Field:** isDynDNS\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", "known_false_positives": "Some users and applications may leverage Dynamic DNS to reach out to some domains on the Internet since dynamic DNS by itself is not malicious, however this activity must be verified.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Data Protection", "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "DNS Hijacking", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Dynamic DNS", "Command and Control"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Initial Access"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1189/dyn_dns_site/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A dns query $query$ from your infra connecting to suspicious domain in host $host$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1189"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "host", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "query", "type": "dnsquery", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "DNS.answer", "DNS.query", "host"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Drive-by Compromise"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Turla", "Windshift", "RTM", "Darkhotel", "APT38", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Leafminer", "Dark Caracal", "APT19", "APT32", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-3390", "Elderwood", "APT37", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_default dynamic_dns_domains as query OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_default | lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_local dynamic_dns_domains as query OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_local| eval isDynDNS = coalesce(isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local)|fields - isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local| search isDynDNS=True", "description": "This macro limits the output of the query field to dynamic dns domains. It looks up the domains in a file provided by Splunk and one intended to be updated by the end user.", "name": "dynamic_dns_providers", "lookups": [{"case_sensitive_match": "false", "description": "A list of dynammic dns providers that should not be modified", "filename": "dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(dynamic_dns_domains)", "name": "dynamic_dns_providers_default", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv"}, {"case_sensitive_match": "false", "description": "A list of dynammic dns providers that can be modified", "filename": "dynamic_dns_providers_local.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(dynamic_dns_domains)", "name": "dynamic_dns_providers_local", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/dynamic_dns_providers_local.csv"}]}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter"}]}, {"name": "Protocol or Port Mismatch", "id": "54dc1265-2f74-4b6d-b30d-49eb506a31b3", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search looks for network traffic on common ports where a higher layer protocol does not match the port that is being used. For example, this search should identify cases where protocols other than HTTP are running on TCP port 80. This can be used by attackers to circumvent firewall restrictions, or as an attempt to hide malicious communications over ports and protocols that are typically allowed and not well inspected.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where (All_Traffic.app=dns NOT All_Traffic.dest_port=53) OR ((All_Traffic.app=web-browsing OR All_Traffic.app=http) NOT (All_Traffic.dest_port=80 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=8080 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=8000)) OR (All_Traffic.app=ssl NOT (All_Traffic.dest_port=443 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=8443)) OR (All_Traffic.app=smtp NOT All_Traffic.dest_port=25) by All_Traffic.src_ip, All_Traffic.dest_ip, All_Traffic.app, All_Traffic.dest_port |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `protocol_or_port_mismatch_filter`", "how_to_implement": "Running this search properly requires a technology that can inspect network traffic and identify common protocols. Technologies such as Bro and Palo Alto Networks firewalls are two examples that will identify protocols via inspection, and not just assume a specific protocol based on the transport protocol and ports.", "known_false_positives": "None identified", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Command and Control"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1048.003", "T1048"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.app", "All_Traffic.dest_port", "All_Traffic.src_ip", "All_Traffic.dest_ip"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration", "Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "Thrip", "FIN8", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "protocol_or_port_mismatch_filter"}]}, {"name": "TOR Traffic", "id": "ea688274-9c06-4473-b951-e4cb7a5d7a45", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-22", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search looks for network traffic identified as The Onion Router (TOR), a benign anonymity network which can be abused for a variety of nefarious purposes.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.app=tor AND All_Traffic.action=allowed by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip All_Traffic.dest_port All_Traffic.action | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `tor_traffic_filter`", "how_to_implement": "In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from firewalls or other network control devices that mediate the traffic allowed into an environment. This is necessary so that the search can identify an 'action' taken on the traffic of interest. The search requires the Network_Traffic data model be populated.", "known_false_positives": "None at this time", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Ransomware", "Command and Control", "NOBELIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1071", "T1071.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.app", "All_Traffic.action", "All_Traffic.src_ip", "All_Traffic.dest_ip", "All_Traffic.dest_port"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Application Layer Protocol", "Web Protocols"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control", "Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Rocke", "Magic Hound", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "Rocke", "APT39", "Tropic Trooper", "MuddyWater", "Wizard Spider", "Inception", "APT41", "SilverTerrier", "Machete", "APT28", "WIRTE", "APT33", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "APT18", "APT38", "Cobalt Group", "APT19", "Threat Group-3390", "Rancor", "Orangeworm", "APT37", "Ke3chang", "Dark Caracal", "Turla", "Lazarus Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "OilRig", "Magic Hound", "Gamaredon Group", "Stealth Falcon"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "tor_traffic_filter"}]}, {"name": "Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed", "id": "ce5a0962-849f-4720-a678-753fe6674479", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search looks for network traffic defined by port and transport layer protocol in the Enterprise Security lookup table \"lookup_interesting_ports\", that is marked as prohibited, and has an associated 'allow' action in the Network_Traffic data model. This could be indicative of a misconfigured network device.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.action = allowed by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip All_Traffic.dest_port All_Traffic.action | lookup update=true interesting_ports_lookup dest_port as All_Traffic.dest_port OUTPUT app is_prohibited note transport | search is_prohibited=true | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `prohibited_network_traffic_allowed_filter`", "how_to_implement": "In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from firewalls or other network control devices that mediate the traffic allowed into an environment. This is necessary so that the search can identify an 'action' taken on the traffic of interest. The search requires the Network_Traffic data model be populated.", "known_false_positives": "None identified", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Ransomware", "Command and Control"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1048"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.action", "All_Traffic.src_ip", "All_Traffic.dest_ip", "All_Traffic.dest_port"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "prohibited_network_traffic_allowed_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Windows Persistence Techniques", "id": "30874d4f-20a1-488f-85ec-5d52ef74e3f9", "version": 2, "date": "2018-05-31", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on a Windows system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment.", "narrative": "Maintaining persistence is one of the first steps taken by attackers after the initial compromise. Attackers leverage various custom and built-in tools to ensure survivability and persistent access within a compromised enterprise. This Analytic Story provides searches to help you identify various behaviors used by attackers to maintain persistent access to a Windows environment.", "references": ["http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/19.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html", "http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/common-malware-persistence-mechanisms/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dq2Hv7J9fvk"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Windows Persistence Techniques", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1574.009", "T1546.001", "T1222", "T1127", "T1562.006", "T1546.002", "T1547.014", "T1222.001", "T1547.003", "T1053", "T1562", "T1547.010", "T1053.005", "T1547.001", "T1546.011", "T1574.011", "T1543", "T1547", "T1037.001", "T1543.003", "T1547.012", "T1574", "T1037", "T1546"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["File and Directory Permissions Modification", "Create or Modify System Process", "Change Default File Association", "Scheduled Task/Job", "Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification", "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts", "Services Registry Permissions Weakness", "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "Time Providers", "Event Triggered Execution", "Application Shimming", "Logon Script (Windows)", "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "Impair Defenses", "Indicator Blocking", "Port Monitors", "Hijack Execution Flow", "Path Interception by Unquoted Path", "Screensaver", "Scheduled Task", "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "Windows Service"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390", "Magic Hound", "Stealth Falcon", "Rancor", "Inception", "Putter Panda", "Tropic Trooper", "Kimsuky", "Dark Caracal", "TEMP.Veles", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN8", "APT29", "Turla", "APT39", "Molerats", "Gamaredon Group", "Rocke", "Ke3chang", "RTM", "Leviathan", "Carbanak", "Frankenstein", "Cobalt Group", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "APT-C-36", "APT19", "APT37", "Darkhotel", "APT41", "menuPass", "FIN6", "OilRig", "Blue Mockingbird", "Lazarus Group", "Honeybee", "APT3", "Wizard Spider", "Machete", "APT18", "no", "Sharpshooter", "MuddyWater", "FIN10", "DarkVishnya", "Patchwork", "APT28", "APT33", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN7", "Gorgon Group"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Schtasks used for forcing a reboot", "id": "1297fb80-f42a-4b4a-9c8a-88c066437cf6", "version": 4, "date": "2020-12-07", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line that indicate that a forced reboot of system is scheduled.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe Processes.process=\"*shutdown*\" Processes.process=\"*/create *\" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may create jobs on systems forcing reboots to perform updates, maintenance, etc.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}, "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/schtask_shutdown/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A schedule task process $process_name$ with force reboot commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Scheduled Task", "Scheduled Task/Job"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "MuddyWater", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT-C-36", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT41", "Machete", "Soft Cell", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Patchwork", "OilRig", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "FIN8", "menuPass", "FIN10", "APT32", "FIN7", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot_filter"}]}, {"name": "Certutil exe certificate extraction", "id": "337a46be-600f-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-26", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for arguments to certutil.exe indicating the manipulation or extraction of Certificate. This certificate can then be used to sign new authentication tokens specially inside Federated environments such as Windows ADFS.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=certutil.exe Processes.process = \"*-exportPFX*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `certutil_exe_certificate_extraction_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Unless there are specific use cases, manipulating or exporting certificates using certutil is uncommon. Extraction of certificate has been observed during attacks such as Golden SAML and other campaigns targeting Federated services.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting export a certificate.", "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "certutil_exe_certificate_extraction_filter"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "id": "f5f6af30-7aa7-4295-bfe9-07fe87c01a4b", "version": 6, "date": "2021-09-07", "author": "Jose Hernandez, David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to launch an application or service at system startup.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\run* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentVersion\\\\Windows\\\\Appinit_Dlls* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Shell* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Notify* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Userinit* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\VmApplet* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\policies\\\\explorer\\\\run* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\runservices* OR Registry.registry_path=HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Netsh\\\\* OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Image File Execution Options*\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=Debugger) OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Security Packages\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\\\\OSConfig\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Security Packages\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\SilentProcessExit\\\\*\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*currentVersion\\\\Windows\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Load\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentVersion\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Svchost\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\"AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"BootExecute\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Software\\\\Run\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"auto_update\")) by Registry.dest Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "There are many legitimate applications that must execute on system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Ransomware", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "IcedID", "Remcos"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 95, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Persistence"}, "Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to persistence in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1547.001", "T1547"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user"], "risk_score": 76, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Rocke", "Tropic Trooper", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Silence", "RTM", "Inception", "APT41", "Machete", "Kimsuky", "APT33", "APT39", "APT32", "APT18", "Turla", "Dark Caracal", "Cobalt Group", "Honeybee", "Threat Group-3390", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Gorgon Group", "Ke3chang", "APT19", "Leviathan", "MuddyWater", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Magic Hound", "APT3", "FIN10", "FIN7", "Patchwork", "FIN6", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "APT29", "Darkhotel", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter"}]}, {"name": "Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys", "id": "8470d755-0c13-45b3-bd63-387a373c10cf", "version": 5, "date": "2020-11-26", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The search looks for reg.exe modifying registry keys that define Windows services and their configurations.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name values(Processes.user) as user FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=reg.exe Processes.process=*reg* Processes.process=*add* Processes.process=*Services* by Processes.process_id Processes.dest Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "It is unusual for a service to be created or modified by directly manipulating the registry. However, there may be legitimate instances of this behavior. It is important to validate and investigate, as appropriate.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Service Abuse", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Persistence"}, "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1574.011/change_registry_path_service/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 75, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "message": "A reg.exe process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1574.011", "T1574"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.user", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.dest"], "risk_score": 45, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Services Registry Permissions Weakness", "Hijack Execution Flow"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys_filter"}]}, {"name": "Time Provider Persistence Registry", "id": "5ba382c4-2105-11ec-8d8f-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-29", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspiciouos modification of time provider registry for persistence and autostart. This technique can allow the attacker to persist on the compromised host and autostart as soon as the machine boot up. This TTP can be a good indicator of suspicious behavior since this registry is not commonly modified by normal user or even an admin.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path =\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services\\\\W32Time\\\\TimeProviders*\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `time_provider_persistence_registry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://pentestlab.blog/2019/10/22/persistence-time-providers/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/003/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Privilege Escalation Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.003/timeprovider_reg/sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1547.003", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Time Providers", "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "time_provider_persistence_registry_filter"}]}, {"name": "Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors", "id": "f5f6af30-7ba7-4295-bfe9-07de87c01bbc", "version": 2, "date": "2020-11-23", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for registry activity associated with modifications to the registry key `HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors`. In this scenario, an attacker can load an arbitrary .dll into the print-monitor registry by giving the full path name to the after.dll. The system will execute the .dll with elevated (SYSTEM) permissions and will persist after reboot.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.action=modified AND Registry.registry_path=\"*CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Print\\\\Monitors*\" by Registry.dest, Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report registry modifications.", "known_false_positives": "You will encounter noise from legitimate print-monitor registry entries.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 5"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.010/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "New print monitor added on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1547.010", "T1547"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.action", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Port Monitors", "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors_filter"}]}, {"name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services", "id": "f0c693d8-2a89-4ce7-80b4-98fea4c3ea6d", "version": 4, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for arguments to sc.exe indicating the creation or modification of a Windows service.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = sc.exe (Processes.process=\"* create *\" OR Processes.process=\"* config *\") by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Using sc.exe to manipulate Windows services is uncommon. However, there may be legitimate instances of this behavior. It is important to validate and investigate as appropriate.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Service Abuse", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Disabling Security Tools", "NOBELIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Persistence"}, "Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "message": "A sc process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ to create of configure services in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1543.003", "T1543"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Windows Service", "Create or Modify System Process"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "DarkVishnya", "Wizard Spider", "APT32", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Tropic Trooper", "Cobalt Group", "Ke3chang", "Honeybee", "FIN7", "Threat Group-3390", "APT19", "APT3", "Lazarus Group", "Carbanak", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services_filter"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", "id": "5d9c6eee-988c-11eb-8253-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-08", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed from a user writeable file path.\\\nThe search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not.\\\nschtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\\Windows\\system32` and `C:\\Windows\\syswow64`.\\\nThe following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory.\\\nUpon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or was it via TaskService. Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message | search Command IN (\"*\\\\users\\\\public\\\\*\", \"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Tasks\\\\*\", \"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Task_Name, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required.", "known_false_positives": "False positives are possible if legitimate applications are allowed to register tasks in public paths. Filter as needed based on paths that are used legitimately.", "references": ["https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/irans-apt34-returns-with-an-updated-arsenal/", "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4698", "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/scheduled-task-job/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/taskschd/time-trigger-example--scripting-?redirectedfrom=MSDN", "https://app.any.run/tasks/e26f1b2e-befa-483b-91d2-e18636e2faf3/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "IcedID", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/taskschedule/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "message": "A windows scheduled task was created (task name=$Task_Name$) on $dest$ by the following command: $Command$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Command", "type": "Command", "role": ["Target"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "Task_Name", "Description", "Command"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Scheduled Task", "Scheduled Task/Job"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "MuddyWater", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT-C-36", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT41", "Machete", "Soft Cell", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Patchwork", "OilRig", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "FIN8", "menuPass", "FIN10", "APT32", "FIN7", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path_filter"}]}, {"name": "Active Setup Registry Autostart", "id": "f64579c0-203f-11ec-abcc-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-28", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of the active setup registry for persistence and privilege escalation. This technique was seen in several malware (poisonIvy), adware and APT to gain persistence to the compromised machine upon boot up. This TTP is a good indicator to further check the process id that do the modification since modification of this registry is not commonly done. check the legitimacy of the file and process involve in this rules to check if it is a valid setup installer that creating or modifying this registry.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_value_name = \"StubPath\" Registry.registry_key_name = \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Active Setup\\\\Installed Components*\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `active_setup_registry_autostart_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "Active setup installer may add or modify this registry.", "references": ["https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Backdoor%3aWin32%2fPoisonivy.E", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/014/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Privilege Escalation Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/t1547.014/active_setup_stubpath/sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1547.014", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "active_setup_registry_autostart_filter"}]}, {"name": "Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments", "id": "523c2684-a101-11eb-916b-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-19", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with an arguments \"HTTP\" string that are unique entry of malware or attack that uses lolbin to download other file or payload to the infected machine. The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\\Windows\\system32` and `C:\\Windows\\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.'", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message| search Arguments IN (\"*http*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Task_Name, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden, Arguments | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schedule_task_with_http_command_arguments_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the task schedule (Exa. Security Log EventCode 4698) endpoints. Tune and filter known instances of Task schedule used in your environment.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/92d7ef61-bfd7-4c92-bc15-322172b4ebec/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}, "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/tasksched/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A schedule task process commandline arguments $Arguments$ with http string on it in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Arguments", "type": "Arguments", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "Task_Name", "Command", "Author", "Enabled", "Hidden", "Arguments"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Scheduled Task/Job"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "schedule_task_with_http_command_arguments_filter"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started", "id": "b3632472-310b-11ec-9aab-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-19", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following hunting analytic assists with identifying suspicious tasks that have been registered and ran in Windows using EventID 200 (action run) and 201 (action completed). It is recommended to filter based on ActionName by specifying specific paths not used in your environment. After some basic tuning, this may be effective in capturing evasive ways to register tasks on Windows. Review parallel events related to tasks being scheduled. EventID 106 will generate when a new task is generated, however, that does not mean it ran. Capture any files on disk and analyze.", "search": "`wineventlog_task_scheduler` EventCode IN (\"200\",\"201\") | rename ComputerName as dest | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message dest EventCode category | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started_filter`", "how_to_implement": "Task Scheduler logs are required to be collected. Enable logging with inputs.conf by adding a stanza for [WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational] and renderXml=false. Note, not translating it in XML may require a proper extraction of specific items in the Message.", "known_false_positives": "False positives will be present. Filter based on ActionName paths or specify keywords of interest.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1053.005/T1053.005.md", "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["IcedID", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/windows_taskschedule/windows-taskschedule.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A Scheduled Task was scheduled and ran on $dest$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053.005"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "TaskName", "ActionName", "EventID", "dest", "ProcessID"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Scheduled Task"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "MuddyWater", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT-C-36", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT41", "Machete", "Soft Cell", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Patchwork", "OilRig", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "FIN8", "menuPass", "FIN10", "APT32", "FIN7", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT29"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "source=\"WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_task_scheduler"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started_filter"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases", "id": "f5f6af30-7aa7-4295-bfe9-07fe87c01bbb", "version": 3, "date": "2020-11-26", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for registry activity associated with application compatibility shims, which can be leveraged by attackers for various nefarious purposes.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*CurrentVersion\\\\AppCompatFlags\\\\Custom* OR Registry.registry_path=*CurrentVersion\\\\AppCompatFlags\\\\InstalledSDB* by Registry.dest Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must populate the Change_Analysis data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection and response product, such as Carbon Black or other endpoint data sources such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "There are many legitimate applications that leverage shim databases for compatibility purposes for legacy applications", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Privilege Escalation"}, "Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to shim modication in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1546.011", "T1546"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Application Shimming", "Event Triggered Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN7", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases_filter"}]}, {"name": "Screensaver Event Trigger Execution", "id": "58cea3ec-1f6d-11ec-8560-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-27", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is developed to detect possible event trigger execution through screensaver registry entry modification for persistence or privilege escalation. This technique was seen in several APT and malware where they put the malicious payload path to the SCRNSAVE.EXE registry key to redirect the execution to their malicious payload path. This TTP is a good indicator that some attacker may modify this entry for their persistence and privilege escalation.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Control Panel\\\\Desktop\\\\SCRNSAVE.EXE*\") by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `screensaver_event_trigger_execution_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/002/", "https://dmcxblue.gitbook.io/red-team-notes-2-0/red-team-techniques/privilege-escalation/untitled-3/screensaver"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Privilege Escalation Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.002/scrnsave_reg/sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1546", "T1546.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Event Triggered Execution", "Screensaver"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "screensaver_event_trigger_execution_filter"}]}, {"name": "Change Default File Association", "id": "462d17d8-1f71-11ec-ad07-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-27", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is developed to detect suspicious registry modification to change the default file association of windows to malicious payload. This techninique was seen in some APT where it modify the default process to run file association, like .txt to notepad.exe. Instead notepad.exe it will point to a Script or other payload that will load malicious command to the compromised host.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path =\"*\\\\shell\\\\open\\\\command\\\\*\" Registry.registry_path = \"*HKCR\\\\*\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `change_default_file_association_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://dmcxblue.gitbook.io/red-team-notes-2-0/red-team-techniques/privilege-escalation/untitled-3/accessibility-features"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Privilege Escalation Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.001/txtfile_reg/sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1546.001", "T1546"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Change Default File Association", "Event Triggered Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Kimsuky", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "change_default_file_association_filter"}]}, {"name": "Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe", "id": "c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6b5264g9f", "version": 4, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Attackers leverage an existing Windows binary, attrib.exe, to mark specific as hidden by using specific flags so that the victim does not see the file. The search looks for specific command-line arguments to detect the use of attrib.exe to hide files.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) values(Processes.process) as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=attrib.exe (Processes.process=*+h*) by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "Some applications and users may legitimately use attrib.exe to interact with the files. ", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1222.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Attrib.exe with +h flag to hide files on $dest$ executed by $user$ is detected.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1222", "T1222.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process", "type": "Other", "role": ["Attacker", "Parent Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.user", "Processes.dest"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["File and Directory Permissions Modification", "Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe_filter"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell", "id": "203ef0ea-9bd8-11eb-8201-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed with a native Windows shell (PowerShell, Cmd, Wscript, Cscript).\\\nThe search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not.\\\nschtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\\Windows\\system32` and `C:\\Windows\\syswow64`.\\\nThe following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory.\\\nUpon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message | search Command IN (\"*powershell.exe*\", \"*wscript.exe*\", \"*cscript.exe*\", \"*cmd.exe*\", \"*sh.exe*\", \"*ksh.exe*\", \"*zsh.exe*\", \"*bash.exe*\", \"*scrcons.exe*\", \"*pwsh.exe*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Task_Name, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required.", "known_false_positives": "False positives are possible if legitimate applications are allowed to register tasks that call a shell to be spawned. Filter as needed based on command-line or processes that are used legitimately.", "references": ["https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/irans-apt34-returns-with-an-updated-arsenal/", "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4698", "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/scheduled-task-job/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/taskschd/time-trigger-example--scripting-?redirectedfrom=MSDN"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "message": "A windows scheduled task was created (task name=$Task_Name$) on $dest$ by the following command: $Command$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Command", "type": "Command", "role": ["Target"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "Task_Name", "Description", "Command"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Scheduled Task", "Scheduled Task/Job"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "MuddyWater", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT-C-36", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT41", "Machete", "Soft Cell", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Patchwork", "OilRig", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "FIN8", "menuPass", "FIN10", "APT32", "FIN7", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Logon Script Event Trigger Execution", "id": "4c38c264-1f74-11ec-b5fa-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-27", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry entry to persist and gain privilege escalation upon booting up of compromised host. This technique was seen in several APT and malware where it modify UserInitMprLogonScript registry entry to its malicious payload to be executed upon boot up of the machine.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path IN (\"*\\\\Environment\\\\UserInitMprLogonScript\") by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `logon_script_event_trigger_execution_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/001"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Privilege Escalation Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1037.001/logonscript_reg/sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1037", "T1037.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts", "Logon Script (Windows)"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Rocke", "Cobalt Group", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "logon_script_event_trigger_execution_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory", "id": "7feb7972-7ac3-11eb-bac8-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-01", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies Scheduled Tasks registering (creating a new task) a binary or script to run from a public directory which includes users\\public, \\programdata\\ and \\windows\\temp. Upon triage, review the binary or script in the command line for legitimacy, whether an approved binary/script or not. In addition, capture the binary or script in question and analyze for further behaviors. Identify the source and contain the endpoint.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe (Processes.process=*\\\\users\\\\public\\\\* OR Processes.process=*\\\\programdata\\\\* OR Processes.process=*windows\\\\temp*) Processes.process=*/create* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives may be present. Filter as needed by parent process or command line argument.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/schtasks/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "message": "Suspicious scheduled task registered on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Scheduled Task", "Scheduled Task/Job"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "MuddyWater", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT-C-36", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT41", "Machete", "Soft Cell", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Patchwork", "OilRig", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "FIN8", "menuPass", "FIN10", "APT32", "FIN7", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory_filter"}]}, {"name": "Shim Database File Creation", "id": "6e4c4588-ba2f-42fa-97e6-9f6f548eaa33", "version": 3, "date": "2020-12-08", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for shim database files being written to default directories. The sdbinst.exe application is used to install shim database files (.sdb). According to Microsoft, a shim is a small library that transparently intercepts an API, changes the parameters passed, handles the operation itself, or redirects the operation elsewhere.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.action) values(Filesystem.file_hash) as file_hash values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path=*Windows\\\\AppPatch\\\\Custom* by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `shim_database_file_creation_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.", "known_false_positives": "Because legitimate shim files are created and used all the time, this event, in itself, is not suspicious. However, if there are other correlating events, it may warrant further investigation.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Privilege Escalation"}, "Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A process that possibly write shim database in $file_path$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1546.011", "T1546"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "file_path", "type": "file path", "role": ["Others"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.file_hash", "Filesystem.file_path", "Filesystem.file_name", "Filesystem.dest"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Application Shimming", "Event Triggered Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN7", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "shim_database_file_creation_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe", "id": "c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6v5264g9f", "version": 3, "date": "2020-07-03", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The detection Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe is detecting the abuse of unquoted service paths, which is a popular technique for privilege escalation. ", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | rex field=process \"^.*?\\\\\\\\(?[^\\\\\\\\]*\\.(?:exe|bat|com|ps1))\" | eval process_name = lower(process_name) | eval service_process = lower(service_process) | where process_name != service_process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://medium.com/@SumitVerma101/windows-privilege-escalation-part-1-unquoted-service-path-c7a011a8d8ae"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1574.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to perform privilege escalation by using unquoted service paths.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1574.009", "T1574"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Path Interception by Unquoted Path", "Hijack Execution Flow"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe_filter"}]}, {"name": "ETW Registry Disabled", "id": "8ed523ac-276b-11ec-ac39-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-07", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a registry modification to disable ETW feature of windows. This technique is to evade EDR appliance to evade detections and hide its execution from audit logs.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\.NETFramework*\") Registry.registry_value_name = ETWEnabled Registry.registry_value_data=0x00000000 by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `etw_registry_disabled_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://gist.github.com/Cyb3rWard0g/a4a115fd3ab518a0e593525a379adee3"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Privilege Escalation Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127/etw_disable/sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.006", "T1127", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.registry_value_data"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Indicator Blocking", "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "etw_registry_disabled_filter"}]}, {"name": "Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters", "id": "404620de-46d8-48b6-90cc-8a8d7b0876a3", "version": 4, "date": "2020-11-23", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search detects the process execution and arguments required to silently create a shim database. The sdbinst.exe application is used to install shim database files (.sdb). A shim is a small library which transparently intercepts an API, changes the parameters passed, handles the operation itself, or redirects the operation elsewhere.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = sdbinst.exe by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "None identified", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Privilege Escalation"}, "Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A process $process_name$ that possible create a shim db silently in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1546.011", "T1546"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Application Shimming", "Event Triggered Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN7", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters_filter"}]}, {"name": "Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger", "id": "75b00fd8-a0ff-11eb-8b31-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-19", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed with a Rundll32. This technique is common in new trickbot that uses rundll32 to load is trickbot downloader. The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\\Windows\\system32` and `C:\\Windows\\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.'", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message | search Command IN (\"*rundll32*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Task_Name, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden, Arguments | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the task schedule (Exa. Security Log EventCode 4698) endpoints. Tune and filter known instances of Task schedule used in your environment.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/", "https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Trickbot", "IcedID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/tasksched/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A schedule task process commandline rundll32 arguments $Arguments$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Arguments", "type": "Arguments", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "Task_Name", "Command", "Author", "Enabled", "Hidden", "Arguments"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Scheduled Task/Job"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger_filter"}]}, {"name": "Print Processor Registry Autostart", "id": "1f5b68aa-2037-11ec-898e-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-28", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification or new registry entry regarding print processor. This registry is known to be abuse by turla or other APT to gain persistence and privilege escalation to the compromised machine. This is done by adding the malicious dll payload on the new created key in this registry that will be executed as it restarted the spoolsv.exe process and services.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path =\"*\\\\Control\\\\Print\\\\Environments\\\\Windows x64\\\\Print Processors*\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `print_processor_registry_autostart_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "possible new printer installation may add driver component on this registry.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/012/", "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/05/21/no-game-over-winnti-group/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Privilege Escalation Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/print_reg/sysmon_print.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1547.012", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "print_processor_registry_autostart_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "id": "b3782036-8cbd-11eb-9d8e-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-24", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "description": "Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Files may be copied from an external adversary controlled system through the command and control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP.", "narrative": "Ingress tool transfer is a Technique under tactic Command and Control. Behaviors will include the use of living off the land binaries to download implants or binaries over alternate communication ports. It is imperative to baseline applications on endpoints to understand what generates network activity, to where, and what is its native behavior. These utilities, when abused, will write files to disk in world writeable paths.\\ During triage, review the reputation of the remote public destination IP or domain. Capture any files written to disk and perform analysis. Review other parrallel processes for additional behaviors.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ingress Tool Transfer"], "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1197", "T1105", "T1059.001"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Ingress Tool Transfer", "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "PowerShell", "BITS Jobs"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Execution", "Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390", "Magic Hound", "Stealth Falcon", "Inception", "Sandworm Team", "Rancor", "Tropic Trooper", "Kimsuky", "TA459", "TEMP.Veles", "Poseidon Group", "PLATINUM", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ke3chang", "FIN8", "Turla", "APT39", "Molerats", "Leviathan", "APT29", "Rocke", "Gamaredon Group", "TA505", "Whitefly", "Frankenstein", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "APT32", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT19", "WIRTE", "APT-C-36", "APT37", "APT41", "CopyKittens", "FIN5", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Blue Mockingbird", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "Thrip", "Wizard Spider", "APT3", "APT18", "Sharpshooter", "APT38", "MuddyWater", "FIN10", "DarkVishnya", "Patchwork", "Elderwood", "APT28", "Gallmaker", "APT33", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN7", "Gorgon Group", "DarkHydrus"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Any Powershell DownloadString", "id": "4d015ef2-7adf-11eb-95da-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-03-01", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a file using `DownloadString` method. This particular method is utilized in many different PowerShell frameworks to download files and output to disk. Identify the source (IP/domain) and destination file and triage appropriately. If AMSI logging or PowerShell transaction logs are available, review for further details of the implant.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process=*.DownloadString* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `any_powershell_downloadstring_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present and filtering will need to occur by parent process or command line argument. It may be required to modify this query to an EDR product for more granular coverage.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.net.webclient.downloadstring?view=net-5.0", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "HAFNIUM Group", "Ingress Tool Transfer"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior identifies the use of DownloadString within PowerShell.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "PowerShell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "Gallmaker", "Turla", "APT19", "DarkHydrus", "APT28", "Thrip", "Gorgon Group", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leviathan", "TA459", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT32", "FIN7", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "APT3", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_powershell"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "any_powershell_downloadstring_filter"}]}, {"name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", "id": "900bc324-59f3-11ec-9fb4-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-10", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of curl on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=curl (Processes.process=\"*-s *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", "references": ["https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ingress Tool Transfer", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1105"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Ingress Tool Transfer"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Whitefly", "Rocke", "APT39", "Tropic Trooper", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Frankenstein", "Silence", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "APT33", "MuddyWater", "APT18", "APT38", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "OilRig", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT37", "FIN8", "PLATINUM", "Leviathan", "Elderwood", "Magic Hound", "APT3", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Patchwork", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-3390", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter"}]}, {"name": "CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments", "id": "415b4306-8bfb-11eb-85c4-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-03-23", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Certutil.exe may download a file from a remote destination using `-urlcache`. This behavior does require a URL to be passed on the command-line. In addition, `-f` (force) and `-split` (Split embedded ASN.1 elements, and save to files) will be used. It is not entirely common for `certutil.exe` to contact public IP space. However, it is uncommon for `certutil.exe` to write files to world writeable paths.\\ During triage, capture any files on disk and review. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain in question.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_certutil` Processes.process=*urlcache* Processes.process=*split* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives in most environments, however tune as needed based on parent-child relationship or network connection.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/", "https://www.avira.com/en/blog/certutil-abused-by-attackers-to-spread-threats", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/10/certutil-qualms-they-came-to-drop-fombs.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ingress Tool Transfer", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Command and Control"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to download a file.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1105"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Ingress Tool Transfer"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Whitefly", "Rocke", "APT39", "Tropic Trooper", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Frankenstein", "Silence", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "APT33", "MuddyWater", "APT18", "APT38", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "OilRig", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT37", "FIN8", "PLATINUM", "Leviathan", "Elderwood", "Magic Hound", "APT3", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Patchwork", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-3390", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=certutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=CertUtil.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_certutil"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments_filter"}]}, {"name": "CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments", "id": "801ad9e4-8bfb-11eb-8b31-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-03-23", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Certutil.exe may download a file from a remote destination using `-VerifyCtl`. This behavior does require a URL to be passed on the command-line. In addition, `-f` (force) and `-split` (Split embedded ASN.1 elements, and save to files) will be used. It is not entirely common for `certutil.exe` to contact public IP space. \\ During triage, capture any files on disk and review. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain in question. Using `-VerifyCtl`, the file will either be written to the current working directory or `%APPDATA%\\..\\LocalLow\\Microsoft\\CryptnetUrlCache\\Content\\`. ", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_certutil` Processes.process=*verifyctl* Processes.process=*split* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives in most environments, however tune as needed based on parent-child relationship or network connection.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/", "https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2020/08/23/certutil-one-more-gui-lolbin/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc732443(v=ws.11)#-verifyctl", "https://www.avira.com/en/blog/certutil-abused-by-attackers-to-spread-threats"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ingress Tool Transfer", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Command and Control"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to download a file.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1105"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Ingress Tool Transfer"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Whitefly", "Rocke", "APT39", "Tropic Trooper", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Frankenstein", "Silence", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "APT33", "MuddyWater", "APT18", "APT38", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "OilRig", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT37", "FIN8", "PLATINUM", "Leviathan", "Elderwood", "Magic Hound", "APT3", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Patchwork", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-3390", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=certutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=CertUtil.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_certutil"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments_filter"}]}, {"name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", "id": "35682718-5a85-11ec-b8f7-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-11", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of wget on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wget (Processes.process=\"*-q *\" OR Processes.process=\"*--quiet*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-O- *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", "references": ["https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ingress Tool Transfer", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1105"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Ingress Tool Transfer"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Whitefly", "Rocke", "APT39", "Tropic Trooper", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Frankenstein", "Silence", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "APT33", "MuddyWater", "APT18", "APT38", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "OilRig", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT37", "FIN8", "PLATINUM", "Leviathan", "Elderwood", "Magic Hound", "APT3", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Patchwork", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-3390", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path", "id": "c32f091e-30db-11ec-8738-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-19", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of Windows Curl.exe downloading a file to a suspicious location. \\\n-O or --output is used when a file is to be downloaded and placed in a specified location. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes for further behavior. In addition, identify if the download was successful. If a file was downloaded, capture and analyze.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_curl` Processes.process IN (\"*-O *\",\"*--output*\") Processes.process IN (\"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\",\"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\",\"*\\\\public\\\\*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible Administrators or super users will use Curl for legitimate purposes. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1105/T1105.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["IceID", "Ingress Tool Transfer"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_curl.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ to download a file to a suspicious directory.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1105"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Ingress Tool Transfer"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Whitefly", "Rocke", "APT39", "Tropic Trooper", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Frankenstein", "Silence", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "APT33", "MuddyWater", "APT18", "APT38", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "OilRig", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT37", "FIN8", "PLATINUM", "Leviathan", "Elderwood", "Magic Hound", "APT3", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Patchwork", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-3390", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=curl.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Curl.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_curl"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path_filter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination", "id": "42f8f1a2-4228-11ec-aade-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-10", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of Windows Curl.exe uploading a file to a remote destination. \\\n`-T` or `--upload-file` is used when a file is to be uploaded to a remotge destination. \\\n`-d` or `--data` POST is the HTTP method that was invented to send data to a receiving web application, and it is, for example, how most common HTML forms on the web work. \\\nHTTP multipart formposts are done with `-F`, but this appears to not be compatible with the Windows version of Curl. Will update if identified adversary tradecraft. \\\nAdversaries may use one of the three methods based on the remote destination and what they are attempting to upload (zip vs txt). During triage, review parallel processes for further behavior. In addition, identify if the upload was successful in network logs. If a file was uploaded, isolate the endpoint and review.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_curl` Processes.process IN (\"*-T *\",\"*--upload-file *\", \"*-d *\", \"*--data *\", \"*-F *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives may be limited to source control applications and may be required to be filtered out.", "references": ["https://everything.curl.dev/usingcurl/uploads", "https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/containers/tar-and-curl-come-to-windows/ba-p/382409", "https://twitter.com/d1r4c/status/1279042657508081664?s=20"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ingress Tool Transfer"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_curl_upload.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ uploading a file to a remote destination.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1105"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Ingress Tool Transfer"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Whitefly", "Rocke", "APT39", "Tropic Trooper", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Frankenstein", "Silence", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "APT33", "MuddyWater", "APT18", "APT38", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "OilRig", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT37", "FIN8", "PLATINUM", "Leviathan", "Elderwood", "Magic Hound", "APT3", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Patchwork", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-3390", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=curl.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Curl.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_curl"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination_filter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination", "id": "cc8d046a-543b-11ec-b864-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-03", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of Windows Curl.exe uploading a file to a remote destination. \\\n`-T` or `--upload-file` is used when a file is to be uploaded to a remotge destination. \\\n`-d` or `--data` POST is the HTTP method that was invented to send data to a receiving web application, and it is, for example, how most common HTML forms on the web work. \\\nHTTP multipart formposts are done with `-F`, but this appears to not be compatible with the Windows version of Curl. Will update if identified adversary tradecraft. \\\nAdversaries may use one of the three methods based on the remote destination and what they are attempting to upload (zip vs txt). During triage, review parallel processes for further behavior. In addition, identify if the upload was successful in network logs. If a file was uploaded, isolate the endpoint and review.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where \"Endpoint_Processes\" IN(_datamodels) | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null), process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_path\"), \"string\", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null)\n| where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND process_name IS NOT NULL AND process_name=\"curl.exe\" AND (like (cmd_line, \"%-T %\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%--upload-file %\")OR like (cmd_line, \"%-d %\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%--data %\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%-F %\"))\n| eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null)) | eval body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line, \"process_name\", process_name, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process_name, \"process_path\", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint_Processess` datamodel.", "known_false_positives": "False positives may be limited to source control applications and may be required to be filtered out.", "references": ["https://everything.curl.dev/usingcurl/uploads", "https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/containers/tar-and-curl-come-to-windows/ba-p/382409", "https://twitter.com/d1r4c/status/1279042657508081664?s=20"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ingress Tool Transfer"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ uploading a file to a remote destination.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1105"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest_device_id", "process_name", "parent_process_name", "process_path", "dest_user_id", "process", "cmd_line"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Ingress Tool Transfer"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Whitefly", "Rocke", "APT39", "Tropic Trooper", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Frankenstein", "Silence", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "APT33", "MuddyWater", "APT18", "APT38", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "OilRig", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT37", "FIN8", "PLATINUM", "Leviathan", "Elderwood", "Magic Hound", "APT3", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Patchwork", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-3390", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination_filter"}]}, {"name": "BITSAdmin Download File", "id": "80630ff4-8e4c-11eb-aab5-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service utility `bitsadmin.exe` using the `transfer` parameter to download a remote object. In addition, look for `download` or `upload` on the command-line, the switches are not required to perform a transfer. Capture any files downloaded. Review the reputation of the IP or domain used. Typically once executed, a follow on command will be used to execute the dropped file. Note that the network connection or file modification events related will not spawn or create from `bitsadmin.exe`, but the artifacts will appear in a parallel process of `svchost.exe` with a command-line similar to `svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s BITS`. It's important to review all parallel and child processes to capture any behaviors and artifacts. In some suspicious and malicious instances, BITS jobs will be created. You can use `bitsadmin /list /verbose` to list out the jobs during investigation.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_bitsadmin` Processes.process=*transfer* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `bitsadmin_download_file_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives, however it may be required to filter based on parent process name or network connection.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/8eb52117b748d378325f7719554a896e37bccec7/atomics/T1105/T1105.md#atomic-test-9---windows---bitsadmin-bits-download", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/bc705cb7aaa5f26f2d96585fac8e4c7052df0ff9/atomics/T1197/T1197.md", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/bits/bitsadmin-tool", "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ingress Tool Transfer", "BITS Jobs", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1197/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to download a file.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1197", "T1105"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["BITS Jobs", "Ingress Tool Transfer"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Patchwork", "APT41", "Leviathan", "Sandworm Team", "Whitefly", "Rocke", "APT39", "Tropic Trooper", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Frankenstein", "Silence", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "APT33", "MuddyWater", "APT18", "APT38", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "OilRig", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT37", "FIN8", "PLATINUM", "Leviathan", "Elderwood", "Magic Hound", "APT3", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Patchwork", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-3390", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=bitsadmin.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=bitsadmin.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_bitsadmin"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "bitsadmin_download_file_filter"}]}, {"name": "Any Powershell DownloadFile", "id": "1a93b7ea-7af7-11eb-adb5-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-03-01", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a file using `DownloadFile` method. This particular method is utilized in many different PowerShell frameworks to download files and output to disk. Identify the source (IP/domain) and destination file and triage appropriately. If AMSI logging or PowerShell transaction logs are available, review for further details of the implant.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process=*DownloadFile* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `any_powershell_downloadfile_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present and filtering will need to occur by parent process or command line argument. It may be required to modify this query to an EDR product for more granular coverage.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.net.webclient.downloadfile?view=net-5.0", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "Ingress Tool Transfer", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exploitation"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior identifies the use of DownloadFile within PowerShell.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "PowerShell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "Gallmaker", "Turla", "APT19", "DarkHydrus", "APT28", "Thrip", "Gorgon Group", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leviathan", "TA459", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT32", "FIN7", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "APT3", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_powershell"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "any_powershell_downloadfile_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Curl Network Connection", "id": "3f613dc0-21f2-4063-93b1-5d3c15eef22f", "version": 1, "date": "2021-02-22", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of a curl contacting suspicious remote domains to checkin to command and control servers or download further implants. In the context of Silver Sparrow, curl is identified contacting s3.amazonaws.com. This particular behavior is common with MacOS adware-malicious software.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=curl Processes.process=s3.amazonaws.com by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_curl_network_connection_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/", "https://marcosantadev.com/manage-plist-files-plistbuddy/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Silver Sparrow", "Ingress Tool Transfer"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "dataset": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1105"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Ingress Tool Transfer"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Whitefly", "Rocke", "APT39", "Tropic Trooper", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Frankenstein", "Silence", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "APT33", "MuddyWater", "APT18", "APT38", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "OilRig", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT37", "FIN8", "PLATINUM", "Leviathan", "Elderwood", "Magic Hound", "APT3", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Patchwork", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-3390", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_curl_network_connection_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Suspicious AWS Traffic", "id": "2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50f2168af3", "version": 1, "date": "2018-05-07", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "Leverage these searches to monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as a spike in blocked outbound traffic in your virtual private cloud (VPC).", "narrative": "A virtual private cloud (VPC) is an on-demand managed cloud-computing service that isolates computing resources for each client. Inside the VPC container, the environment resembles a physical network. \\\nAmazon's VPC service enables you to launch EC2 instances and leverage other Amazon resources. The traffic that flows in and out of this VPC can be controlled via network access-control rules and security groups. Amazon also has a feature called VPC Flow Logs that enables you to log IP traffic going to and from the network interfaces in your VPC. This data is stored using Amazon CloudWatch Logs.\\\n Attackers may abuse the AWS infrastructure with insecure VPCs so they can co-opt AWS resources for command-and-control nodes, data exfiltration, and more. Once an EC2 instance is compromised, an attacker may initiate outbound network connections for malicious reasons. Monitoring these network traffic behaviors is crucial for understanding the type of traffic flowing in and out of your network and to alert you to suspicious activities.\\\nThe searches in this Analytic Story will monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors.", "references": ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/hiding-cloudcobalt-strike-beacon-c2-using-amazon-apis/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Suspicious AWS Traffic", "category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_id": [], "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS", "id": "ada0f278-84a8-46w1-a3f1-w32372d4bd53", "version": 1, "date": "2018-05-07", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search will detect spike in blocked outbound network connections originating from within your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data.", "search": "`cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow` action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR src_ip=192.168.0.0/16) ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16) [search `cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow` action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR src_ip=192.168.0.0/16) ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16) | stats count as numberOfBlockedConnections by src_ip | inputlookup baseline_blocked_outbound_connections append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) as * by src_ip | rename numberOfBlockedConnections as latestCount | eval newAvgBlockedConnections=avgBlockedConnections + (latestCount-avgBlockedConnections)/720 | eval newStdevBlockedConnections=sqrt(((pow(stdevBlockedConnections, 2)*719 + (latestCount-newAvgBlockedConnections)*(latestCount-avgBlockedConnections))/720)) | eval avgBlockedConnections=coalesce(newAvgBlockedConnections, avgBlockedConnections), stdevBlockedConnections=coalesce(newStdevBlockedConnections, stdevBlockedConnections), numDataPoints=if(isnull(latestCount), numDataPoints, numDataPoints+1) | table src_ip, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgBlockedConnections, stdevBlockedConnections | outputlookup baseline_blocked_outbound_connections | eval dataPointThreshold = 5, deviationThreshold = 3 | eval isSpike=if((latestCount > avgBlockedConnections+deviationThreshold*stdevBlockedConnections) AND numDataPoints > dataPointThreshold, 1, 0) | where isSpike=1 | table src_ip] | stats values(dest_ip) as \"Blocked Destination IPs\", values(interface_id) as \"resourceId\" count as numberOfBlockedConnections, dc(dest_ip) as uniqueDestConnections by src_ip | `detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your VPC Flow logs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the number of data points required to meet the definition of \"spike.\" The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best when you run the \"Baseline of Blocked Outbound Connection\" support search once to create a history of previously seen blocked outbound connections.", "known_false_positives": "The false-positive rate may vary based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`. Additionally, false positives may result when AWS administrators roll out policies enforcing network blocks, causing sudden increases in the number of blocked outbound connections.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS Network ACL Activity", "Suspicious AWS Traffic", "Command and Control"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "action", "src_ip", "dest_ip"], "risk_object": "src_ip", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 20, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudwatchlogs:vpcflow", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A lookup file that will contain the baseline information for number of blocked outbound connections", "filename": "baseline_blocked_outbound_connections.csv", "name": "baseline_blocked_outbound_connections", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/baseline_blocked_outbound_connections.csv"}, {"description": "A lookup file that will contain the baseline information for number of blocked outbound connections", "filename": "baseline_blocked_outbound_connections.csv", "name": "baseline_blocked_outbound_connections", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/baseline_blocked_outbound_connections.csv"}]}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "id": "2b1800dd-92f9-47dd-a981-fdf1351e5d55", "version": 1, "date": "2018-05-31", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "Monitor and detect registry changes initiated from remote locations, which can be a sign that an attacker has infiltrated your system.", "narrative": "Attackers are developing increasingly sophisticated techniques for hijacking target servers, while evading detection. One such technique that has become progressively more common is registry modification.\\\n The registry is a key component of the Windows operating system. It has a hierarchical database called \"registry\" that contains settings, options, and values for executables. Once the threat actor gains access to a machine, they can use reg.exe to modify their account to obtain administrator-level privileges, maintain persistence, and move laterally within the environment.\\\n The searches in this story are designed to help you detect behaviors associated with manipulation of the Windows registry.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1548.002", "T1548", "T1547.001", "T1546.011", "T1546.012", "T1547", "T1547.010", "T1546"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Port Monitors", "Event Triggered Execution", "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "Image File Execution Options Injection", "Application Shimming", "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "Bypass User Access Control"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390", "Magic Hound", "Putter Panda", "Inception", "Tropic Trooper", "Kimsuky", "Dark Caracal", "TEMP.Veles", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ke3chang", "APT29", "Turla", "APT39", "Molerats", "Gamaredon Group", "Rocke", "Leviathan", "RTM", "Cobalt Group", "Silence", "APT32", "APT19", "APT37", "Darkhotel", "APT41", "FIN6", "Lazarus Group", "Honeybee", "APT3", "Machete", "APT18", "no", "Sharpshooter", "MuddyWater", "FIN10", "Patchwork", "APT33", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Gorgon Group", "FIN7"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "id": "f5f6af30-7aa7-4295-bfe9-07fe87c01a4b", "version": 6, "date": "2021-09-07", "author": "Jose Hernandez, David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to launch an application or service at system startup.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\run* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentVersion\\\\Windows\\\\Appinit_Dlls* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Shell* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Notify* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Userinit* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\VmApplet* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\policies\\\\explorer\\\\run* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\runservices* OR Registry.registry_path=HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Netsh\\\\* OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Image File Execution Options*\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=Debugger) OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Security Packages\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\\\\OSConfig\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Security Packages\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\SilentProcessExit\\\\*\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*currentVersion\\\\Windows\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Load\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentVersion\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Svchost\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\"AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"BootExecute\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Software\\\\Run\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"auto_update\")) by Registry.dest Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "There are many legitimate applications that must execute on system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Ransomware", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "IcedID", "Remcos"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 95, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Persistence"}, "Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to persistence in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1547.001", "T1547"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user"], "risk_score": 76, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Rocke", "Tropic Trooper", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Silence", "RTM", "Inception", "APT41", "Machete", "Kimsuky", "APT33", "APT39", "APT32", "APT18", "Turla", "Dark Caracal", "Cobalt Group", "Honeybee", "Threat Group-3390", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Gorgon Group", "Ke3chang", "APT19", "Leviathan", "MuddyWater", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Magic Hound", "APT3", "FIN10", "FIN7", "Patchwork", "FIN6", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "APT29", "Darkhotel", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter"}]}, {"name": "Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors", "id": "f5f6af30-7ba7-4295-bfe9-07de87c01bbc", "version": 2, "date": "2020-11-23", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for registry activity associated with modifications to the registry key `HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors`. In this scenario, an attacker can load an arbitrary .dll into the print-monitor registry by giving the full path name to the after.dll. The system will execute the .dll with elevated (SYSTEM) permissions and will persist after reboot.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.action=modified AND Registry.registry_path=\"*CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Print\\\\Monitors*\" by Registry.dest, Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report registry modifications.", "known_false_positives": "You will encounter noise from legitimate print-monitor registry entries.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 5"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.010/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "New print monitor added on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1547.010", "T1547"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.action", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Port Monitors", "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors_filter"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases", "id": "f5f6af30-7aa7-4295-bfe9-07fe87c01bbb", "version": 3, "date": "2020-11-26", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for registry activity associated with application compatibility shims, which can be leveraged by attackers for various nefarious purposes.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*CurrentVersion\\\\AppCompatFlags\\\\Custom* OR Registry.registry_path=*CurrentVersion\\\\AppCompatFlags\\\\InstalledSDB* by Registry.dest Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must populate the Change_Analysis data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection and response product, such as Carbon Black or other endpoint data sources such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "There are many legitimate applications that leverage shim databases for compatibility purposes for legacy applications", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Privilege Escalation"}, "Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to shim modication in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1546.011", "T1546"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Application Shimming", "Event Triggered Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN7", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases_filter"}]}, {"name": "Disabling Remote User Account Control", "id": "bbc644bc-37df-4e1a-9c88-ec9a53e2038c", "version": 4, "date": "2020-11-18", "author": "David Dorsey, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The search looks for modifications to registry keys that control the enforcement of Windows User Account Control (UAC).", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System\\\\EnableLUA* Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000000\" by Registry.dest, Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `disabling_remote_user_account_control_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report registry modifications.", "known_false_positives": "This registry key may be modified via administrators to implement a change in system policy. This type of change should be a very rare occurrence.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Remcos"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "The Windows registry keys that control the enforcement of Windows User Account Control (UAC) were modified on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.user", "Registry.action"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Bypass User Access Control", "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "MuddyWater", "Honeybee", "Cobalt Group", "Threat Group-3390", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Patchwork", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disabling_remote_user_account_control_filter"}]}, {"name": "Disable UAC Remote Restriction", "id": "9928b732-210e-11ec-b65e-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-29", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable UAC remote restriction. This technique was well documented in Microsoft page where attacker may modify this registry value to bypassed UAC feature of windows host. This is a good indicator that some tries to bypassed UAC to suspicious process or gain privilege escalation.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path =\"*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System*\" Registry.registry_value_name=\"LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy\" Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000001\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `disable_uac_remote_restriction_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "admin may set this policy for non-critical machine.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/windows-security/user-account-control-and-remote-restriction"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Privilege Escalation Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy/sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.registry_value_data"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Bypass User Access Control", "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "MuddyWater", "Honeybee", "Cobalt Group", "Threat Group-3390", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Patchwork", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disable_uac_remote_restriction_filter"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation", "id": "c9f4b923-f8af-4155-b697-1354f5bcbc5e", "version": 4, "date": "2020-11-27", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to elevate privileges. The registry keys under \"Image File Execution Options\" are used to intercept calls to an executable and can be used to attach malicious binaries to benign system binaries.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=\"*Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Image File Execution Options*\") AND (Registry.registry_value_name=GlobalFlag OR Registry.registry_value_name=Debugger) by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "There are many legitimate applications that must execute upon system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task.", "references": ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2015/12/an-introduction-to-image-file-execution-options/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 95, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Persistence"}, "Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.012/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to privilege escalation in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1546.012", "T1546"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user"], "risk_score": 76, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Image File Execution Options Injection", "Event Triggered Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TEMP.Veles", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "ProxyShell", "id": "413bb68e-04e2-11ec-a835-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-24", "author": "Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "batch", "description": "ProxyShell is a chain of exploits targeting on-premise Microsoft Exchange Server - CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, and CVE-2021-31207.", "narrative": "During Pwn2Own April 2021, a security researcher demonstrated an attack chain targeting on-premise Microsoft Exchange Server. August 5th, the same researcher publicly released further details and demonstrated the attack chain. \\\n1. CVE-2021-34473\u00a0- Pre-auth path confusion leads to ACL Bypass\u00a0(Patched in April by\u00a0KB5001779) \\\n1. CVE-2021-34523\u00a0- Elevation of privilege on Exchange PowerShell backend\u00a0(Patched in April by\u00a0KB5001779) \\\n1. CVE-2021-31207\u00a0- Post-auth Arbitrary-File-Write leads to RCE\u00a0(Patched in May by\u00a0KB5003435) \\\nUpon successful exploitation, the remote attacker will have `SYSTEM` privileges on the Exchange Server. In addition to remote access/execution, the adversary may be able to run Exchange PowerShell Cmdlets to perform further actions.", "references": ["https://y4y.space/2021/08/12/my-steps-of-reproducing-proxyshell/", "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/8/17/from-pwn2own-2021-a-new-attack-surface-on-microsoft-exchange-proxyshell", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FC6iHw258RI", "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-microsoft-exchange-servers-still-vulnerable-to-proxyshell-exploit#what-should-you-do", "https://i.blackhat.com/USA21/Wednesday-Handouts/us-21-ProxyLogon-Is-Just-The-Tip-Of-The-Iceberg-A-New-Attack-Surface-On-Microsoft-Exchange-Server.pdf"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["ProxyShell"], "category": ["Adversary Tactics", "Ransomware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1505.003", "T1059", "T1505", "T1059.001", "T1190"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploit Public-Facing Application", "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "Web Shell", "Server Software Component", "PowerShell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Execution", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390", "Magic Hound", "Stealth Falcon", "Inception", "Axiom", "Tropic Trooper", "Kimsuky", "TA459", "TEMP.Veles", "Poseidon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ke3chang", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT39", "Molerats", "Turla", "APT29", "Rocke", "TA505", "Whitefly", "Frankenstein", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "APT32", "Soft Cell", "Silence", "APT19", "WIRTE", "APT41", "CopyKittens", "FIN5", "menuPass", "FIN6", "OilRig", "Blue Mockingbird", "Thrip", "Wizard Spider", "APT3", "no", "MuddyWater", "FIN10", "DarkVishnya", "Patchwork", "APT28", "Gallmaker", "APT33", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN7", "Gorgon Group", "BlackTech", "Night Dragon", "DarkHydrus"]}, "detections": [{"name": "Detect Exchange Web Shell", "id": "8c14eeee-2af1-4a4b-bda8-228da0f4862a", "version": 3, "date": "2021-10-05", "author": "Michael Haag, Shannon Davis, David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following query identifies suspicious .aspx created in 3 paths identified by Microsoft as known drop locations for Exchange exploitation related to HAFNIUM group and recently disclosed vulnerablity named ProxyShell. Paths include: `\\HttpProxy\\owa\\auth\\`, `\\inetpub\\wwwroot\\aspnet_client\\`, and `\\HttpProxy\\OAB\\`. Upon triage, the suspicious .aspx file will likely look obvious on the surface. inspect the contents for script code inside. Identify additional log sources, IIS included, to review source and other potential exploitation. It is often the case that a particular threat is only applicable to a specific subset of systems in your environment. Typically analytics to detect those threats are written without the benefit of being able to only target those systems as well. Writing analytics against all systems when those behaviors are limited to identifiable subsets of those systems is suboptimal. Consider the case ProxyShell vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Servers. With asset information, a hunter can limit their analytics to systems that have been identified as Exchange servers. A hunter may start with the theory that the exchange server is communicating with new systems that it has not previously. If this theory is run against all publicly facing systems, the amount of noise it will generate will likely render this theory untenable. However, using the asset information to limit this analytic to just the Exchange servers will reduce the noise allowing the hunter to focus only on the systems where this behavioral change is relevant.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=System by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*\\\\HttpProxy\\\\owa\\\\auth\\\\*\", \"*\\\\inetpub\\\\wwwroot\\\\aspnet_client\\\\*\", \"*\\\\HttpProxy\\\\OAB\\\\*\") Filesystem.file_name=\"*.aspx\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process] | dedup file_create_time | table dest file_create_time, file_name, file_path, process_name | `detect_exchange_web_shell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node and `Filesystem` node.", "known_false_positives": "The query is structured in a way that `action` (read, create) is not defined. Review the results of this query, filter, and tune as necessary. It may be necessary to generate this query specific to your endpoint product.", "references": ["https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample%20Data/Feeds/MSTICIoCs-ExchangeServerVulnerabilitiesDisclosedMarch2021.csv", "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/8/17/from-pwn2own-2021-a-new-attack-surface-on-microsoft-exchange-proxyshell", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FC6iHw258RI", "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-microsoft-exchange-servers-still-vulnerable-to-proxyshell-exploit#what-should-you-do"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["HAFNIUM Group", "ProxyShell"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exploitation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/windows-sysmon_proxylogon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk that is related to IIS exploitation previously performed by HAFNIUM. Review further file modifications on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1505", "T1505.003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "file_name", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.file_path", "Filesystem.process_id", "Filesystem.file_name", "Filesystem.file_hash", "Filesystem.user"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Server Software Component", "Web Shell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Tropic Trooper", "Soft Cell", "Threat Group-3390", "TEMP.Veles", "Leviathan", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT32", "OilRig", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_exchange_web_shell_filter"}]}, {"name": "W3WP Spawning Shell", "id": "0f03423c-7c6a-11eb-bc47-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-03-03", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This query identifies a shell, PowerShell.exe or Cmd.exe, spawning from W3WP.exe, or IIS. In addition to IIS logs, this behavior with an EDR product will capture potential webshell activity, similar to the HAFNIUM Group abusing CVEs, on publicly available Exchange mail servers. During triage, review the parent process and child process of the shell being spawned. Review the command-line arguments and any file modifications that may occur. Identify additional parallel process, child processes, that may highlight further commands executed. After triaging, work to contain the threat and patch the system that is vulnerable.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=w3wp.exe AND `process_cmd` OR `process_powershell` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `w3wp_spawning_shell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Baseline your environment before production. It is possible build systems using IIS will spawn cmd.exe to perform a software build. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/02/04/ghost-in-the-shell-investigating-web-shell-attacks/", "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/8/17/from-pwn2own-2021-a-new-attack-surface-on-microsoft-exchange-proxyshell", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FC6iHw258RI", "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-microsoft-exchange-servers-still-vulnerable-to-proxyshell-exploit#what-should-you-do"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["HAFNIUM Group", "ProxyShell"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523", "CVE-2021-31207"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Possible Web Shell execution on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1505", "T1505.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Server Software Component", "Web Shell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Tropic Trooper", "Soft Cell", "Threat Group-3390", "TEMP.Veles", "Leviathan", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT32", "OilRig", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_cmd"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_powershell"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "w3wp_spawning_shell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Exchange PowerShell Module Usage", "id": "2d10095e-05ae-11ec-8fdf-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-27", "author": "Michael Haag", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifies the usage of Exchange PowerShell modules that were recently used for a proof of concept related to ProxyShell. Currently, there is no active data shared or data we could re-produce relate to this part of the ProxyShell chain of exploits. \\\nInherently, the usage of the modules is not malicious, but reviewing parallel processes, and user, of the session will assist with determining the intent. \\\nModule - New-MailboxExportRequest will begin the process of exporting contents of a primary mailbox or archive to a .pst file. \\\nModule - New-managementroleassignment can assign a management role to a management role group, management role assignment policy, user, or universal security group (USG).", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message IN (\"*New-MailboxExportRequest*\", \"*New-ManagementRoleAssignment*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Path Message OpCode ComputerName User EventCode| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `exchange_powershell_module_usage_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/new-mailboxexportrequest?view=exchange-ps", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/new-managementroleassignment?view=exchange-ps", "https://blog.orange.tw/2021/08/proxyshell-a-new-attack-surface-on-ms-exchange-part-3.html", "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/8/17/from-pwn2own-2021-a-new-attack-surface-on-microsoft-exchange-proxyshell", "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/11/15/exchange-exploit-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["ProxyShell"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": [], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Exploitation"], "message": "Local user discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Path", "Message", "OpCode", "ComputerName", "User", "EventCode"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "PowerShell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "Gallmaker", "Turla", "APT19", "DarkHydrus", "APT28", "Thrip", "Gorgon Group", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leviathan", "TA459", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT32", "FIN7", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "APT3", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "exchange_powershell_module_usage_filter"}]}, {"name": "Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF", "id": "29228ab4-0762-11ec-94aa-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-27", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This analytic identifies suspicious behavior related to ProxyShell against on-premise Microsoft Exchange servers. \\\nModification of this analytic is requried to ensure fields are mapped accordingly. \\\nA suspicious event will have `PowerShell`, the method `POST` and `autodiscover.json`. This is indicative of accessing PowerShell on the back end of Exchange with SSRF. \\\nAn event will look similar to `POST /autodiscover/autodiscover.json a=dsxvu@fnsso.flq/powershell/?X-Rps-CAT=VgEAVAdXaW5kb3d...` (abbreviated) \\\nReview the source attempting to perform this activity against your environment. In addition, review PowerShell logs and access recently granted to Exchange roles.", "search": "| `exchange` c_uri=\"*//autodiscover.json*\" cs_uri_query=\"*PowerShell*\" cs_method=\"POST\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, cs_uri_query, cs_method, c_uri | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `exchange_powershell_abuse_via_ssrf_filter`", "how_to_implement": "The following analytic requires on-premise Exchange to be logging to Splunk using the TA - https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3225. Ensure logs are parsed correctly, or tune the analytic for your environment.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives, however, tune as needed.", "references": ["https://github.com/GossiTheDog/ThreatHunting/blob/master/AzureSentinel/Exchange-Powershell-via-SSRF", "https://blog.orange.tw/2021/08/proxylogon-a-new-attack-surface-on-ms-exchange-part-1.html", "https://peterjson.medium.com/reproducing-the-proxyshell-pwn2own-exploit-49743a4ea9a1"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["ProxyShell"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/exchange-events.json"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Activity related to ProxyShell has been identified on $dest$. Review events and take action accordingly.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1190"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "cs_uri_query", "cs_method", "c_uri"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploit Public-Facing Application"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Rocke", "APT39", "BlackTech", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Night Dragon", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=\"MSWindows:IIS\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "exchange"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "exchange_powershell_abuse_via_ssrf_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "AWS User Monitoring", "id": "2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50f1269af3", "version": 1, "date": "2018-03-12", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment.", "narrative": "It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it's all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable to attack. In fact, this was the very oversight that led to Tesla's cryptojacking attack in February, 2018.\\\nIn addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed for any new EC2 instances and increased bandwidth usage. \\\nFortunately, you can leverage Amazon Web Services (AWS) CloudTrail--a tool that helps you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing of your AWS account--to give you increased visibility into your user and resource activity by recording AWS Management Console actions and API calls. You can identify which users and accounts called AWS, the source IP address from which the calls were made, and when the calls occurred.\\\nThe detection searches in this Analytic Story are designed to help you uncover AWS API activities from users not listed in the identity table, as well as similar activities from disabled accounts.", "references": ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "AWS User Monitoring", "category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1526"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Cloud Service Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "AWS Excessive Security Scanning", "id": "1fdd164a-def8-4762-83a9-9ffe24e74d5a", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-13", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events and analyse the amount of eventNames which starts with Describe by a single user. This indicates that this user scans the configuration of your AWS cloud environment.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=Describe* OR eventName=List* OR eventName=Get* | stats dc(eventName) as dc_events min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(eventName) as eventName values(src) as src values(userAgent) as userAgent by user userIdentity.arn | where dc_events > 50 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|`aws_excessive_security_scanning_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives.", "references": ["https://github.com/aquasecurity/cloudsploit"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS User Monitoring"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:Inbound", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1526/aws_security_scanner/aws_security_scanner.json"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "user $user$ has excessive number of api calls $dc_events$ from these IP addresses $src$, violating the threshold of 50, using the following commands $command$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1526"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "src", "userAgent", "user", "userIdentity.arn"], "risk_object": "src", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 18, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Cloud Service Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_excessive_security_scanning_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "SamSam Ransomware", "id": "c4b89506-fbcf-4cb7-bfd6-527e54789604", "version": 1, "date": "2018-12-13", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the SamSam ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with SamSam, RDP brute force attacks, the presence of files with SamSam ransomware extensions, suspicious psexec use, and more.", "narrative": "The first version of the SamSam ransomware (a.k.a. Samas or SamsamCrypt) was launched in 2015 by a group of Iranian threat actors. The malicious software has affected and continues to affect thousands of victims and has raised almost $6M in ransom.\\\nAlthough categorized under the heading of ransomware, SamSam campaigns have some importance distinguishing characteristics. Most notable is the fact that conventional ransomware is a numbers game. Perpetrators use a \"spray-and-pray\" approach with phishing campaigns or other mechanisms, charging a small ransom (typically under $1,000). The goal is to find a large number of victims willing to pay these mini-ransoms, adding up to a lucrative payday. They use relatively simple methods for infecting systems.\\\nSamSam attacks are different beasts. They have become progressively more targeted and skillful than typical ransomware attacks. First, malicious actors break into a victim's network, surveil it, then run the malware manually. The attacks are tailored to cause maximum damage and the threat actors usually demand amounts in the tens of thousands of dollars.\\\nIn a typical attack on one large healthcare organization in 2018, the company ended up paying a ransom of four Bitcoins, then worth $56,707. Reports showed that access to the company's files was restored within two hours of paying the sum.\\\nAccording to Sophos, SamSam previously leveraged RDP to gain access to targeted networks via brute force. SamSam is not spread automatically, like other malware. It requires skill because it forces the attacker to adapt their tactics to the individual environment. Next, the actors escalate their privileges to admin level. They scan the networks for worthy targets, using conventional tools, such as PsExec or PaExec, to deploy/execute, quickly encrypting files.\\\nThis Analytic Story includes searches designed to help detect and investigate signs of the SamSam ransomware, such as the creation of fileswrites to system32, writes with tell-tale extensions, batch files written to system32, and evidence of brute-force attacks via RDP.", "references": ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/an-in-depth-analysis-of-samsam-ransomware-and-boss-spider/", "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/07/31/samsam-the-almost-6-million-ransomware/", "https://thehackernews.com/2018/07/samsam-ransomware-attacks.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "SamSam Ransomware", "category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021.001", "T1036", "T1021", "T1082", "T1485", "T1204.002", "T1569.002", "T1204", "T1486", "T1003", "T1021.002", "T1490", "T1036.005", "T1569", "T1595"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote Desktop Protocol", "Remote Services", "Data Encrypted for Impact", "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "Service Execution", "Match Legitimate Name or Location", "System Information Discovery", "Malicious File", "Inhibit System Recovery", "OS Credential Dumping", "Masquerading", "User Execution", "Data Destruction", "System Services"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Impact", "Discovery", "Credential Access", "Execution", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Suckfly", "Sandworm Team", "Magic Hound", "Inception", "Rancor", "Axiom", "Stealth Falcon", "APT1", "Tropic Trooper", "Dark Caracal", "TA459", "PLATINUM", "TEMP.Veles", "Poseidon Group", "Kimsuky", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN8", "APT29", "Leviathan", "APT39", "Molerats", "Gamaredon Group", "APT12", "Rocke", "RTM", "Carbanak", "Turla", "TA505", "Mofang", "Whitefly", "Frankenstein", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "Stolen Pencil", "Silence", "APT32", "APT-C-36", "APT19", "APT37", "Darkhotel", "APT41", "menuPass", "FIN6", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "admin@338", "Blue Mockingbird", "Honeybee", "APT3", "Wizard Spider", "Machete", "Sowbug", "APT18", "no", "Threat Group-1314", "The White Company", "Sharpshooter", "APT38", "MuddyWater", "FIN10", "Patchwork", "FIN4", "Elderwood", "APT28", "Gallmaker", "APT33", "Ke3chang", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Windshift", "BlackTech", "Gorgon Group", "FIN7", "Orangeworm", "Naikon", "DarkHydrus"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Samsam Test File Write", "id": "493a879d-519d-428f-8f57-a06a0fdc107e", "version": 1, "date": "2018-12-14", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The search looks for a file named \"test.txt\" written to the windows system directory tree, which is consistent with Samsam propagation.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_name) as file_name from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\windows\\\\system32\\\\test.txt by Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `samsam_test_file_write_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data-model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.", "known_false_positives": "No false positives have been identified.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 20, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Impact"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1486/sam_sam_note/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "message": "A samsam ransomware test file creation in $file_path$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1486"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.user", "Filesystem.dest", "Filesystem.file_name", "Filesystem.file_path"], "risk_score": 12, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Data Encrypted for Impact"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "TA505", "APT38"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "samsam_test_file_write_filter"}]}, {"name": "Common Ransomware Extensions", "id": "a9e5c5db-db11-43ca-86a8-c852d1b2c0ec", "version": 4, "date": "2020-11-09", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The search looks for file modifications with extensions commonly used by Ransomware", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| rex field=file_name \"(?\\.[^\\.]+)$\" | `ransomware_extensions` | `common_ransomware_extensions_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.\\\nThis search produces fields (`query`,`query_length`,`count`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** Name, **Field:** Name\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** File Extension, **Field:** file_extension\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", "known_false_positives": "It is possible for a legitimate file with these extensions to be created. If this is a true ransomware attack, there will be a large number of files created with these extensions.", "references": [], "tags": {"Consequence": "Data Destruction", "analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/ransomware_extensions/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$, this is indicative of a known ransomware file extension and should be reviewed immediately.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1485"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "file_name", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.user", "Filesystem.dest", "Filesystem.file_path", "Filesystem.file_name"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Data Destruction"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Lazarus Group", "APT38"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "lookup update=true ransomware_extensions_lookup Extensions AS file_extension OUTPUT Name | search Name !=False", "description": "This macro limits the output to files that have extensions associated with ransomware", "name": "ransomware_extensions", "lookups": [{"default_match": "false", "description": "A list of file extensions that are associated with ransomware", "filename": "ransomware_extensions.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(Extensions)", "min_matches": 1, "name": "ransomware_extensions_lookup", "case_sensitive_match": "false", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/ransomware_extensions.csv"}]}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "common_ransomware_extensions_filter"}]}, {"name": "Batch File Write to System32", "id": "503d17cb-9eab-4cf8-a20e-01d5c6987ae3", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The search looks for a batch file (.bat) written to the Windows system directory tree.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=* by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*\\\\system32\\\\*\", \"*\\\\syswow64\\\\*\") Filesystem.file_name=\"*.bat\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process] | dedup file_create_time | table dest file_create_time, file_name, file_path, process_name | `batch_file_write_to_system32_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible for this search to generate a notable event for a batch file write to a path that includes the string \"system32\", but is not the actual Windows system directory. As such, you should confirm the path of the batch file identified by the search. In addition, a false positive may be generated by an administrator copying a legitimate batch file in this directory tree. You should confirm that the activity is legitimate and modify the search to add exclusions, as necessary.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1204.002/batch_file_in_system32/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to system32 has occurred on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1204", "T1204.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "file_name", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.dest", "Filesystem.file_name", "Filesystem.user", "Filesystem.file_path", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.dest"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["User Execution", "Malicious File"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Whitefly", "Tropic Trooper", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Mofang", "Frankenstein", "RTM", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "Machete", "admin@338", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "DarkHydrus", "Gorgon Group", "Patchwork", "OilRig", "Dark Caracal", "MuddyWater", "Lazarus Group", "FIN7", "APT32", "Rancor", "APT37", "FIN8", "APT28", "Elderwood", "TA459", "APT29", "Leviathan", "menuPass", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "batch_file_write_to_system32_filter"}]}, {"name": "Common Ransomware Notes", "id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d6bd71", "version": 4, "date": "2020-11-09", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The search looks for files created with names matching those typically used in ransomware notes that tell the victim how to get their data back.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `ransomware_notes` | `common_ransomware_notes_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Filesystem data-model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system reads and writes.", "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a legitimate file could be created with the same name used by ransomware note files.", "references": [], "tags": {"Consequence": "Data Destruction", "analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/ransomware_notes/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$, this is indicative of a known ransomware note file and should be reviewed immediately.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1485"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "file_name", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.user", "Filesystem.dest", "Filesystem.file_path", "Filesystem.file_name"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Data Destruction"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Lazarus Group", "APT38"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "lookup ransomware_notes_lookup ransomware_notes as file_name OUTPUT status as \"Known Ransomware Notes\" | search \"Known Ransomware Notes\"=True", "description": "This macro limits the output to files that have been identified as a ransomware note", "name": "ransomware_notes", "lookups": [{"default_match": "false", "description": "A list of file names that are ransomware note files", "filename": "ransomware_notes.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(ransomware_notes)", "min_matches": 1, "name": "ransomware_notes_lookup", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/ransomware_notes.csv"}]}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "common_ransomware_notes_filter"}]}, {"name": "Deleting Shadow Copies", "id": "b89919ed-ee5f-492c-b139-95dbb162039e", "version": 4, "date": "2020-11-09", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The vssadmin.exe utility is used to interact with the Volume Shadow Copy Service. Wmic is an interface to the Windows Management Instrumentation. This search looks for either of these tools being used to delete shadow copies.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=vssadmin.exe OR Processes.process_name=wmic.exe) Processes.process=*delete* Processes.process=*shadow* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `deleting_shadow_copies_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "vssadmin.exe and wmic.exe are standard applications shipped with modern versions of windows. They may be used by administrators to legitimately delete old backup copies, although this is typically rare.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Log Manipulation", "SamSam Ransomware", "Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to delete shadow copies.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1490"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Inhibit System Recovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "deleting_shadow_copies_filter"}]}, {"name": "Attacker Tools On Endpoint", "id": "a51bfe1a-94f0-48cc-b4e4-16a110145893", "version": 2, "date": "2021-11-04", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for execution of commonly used attacker tools on an endpoint.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.dest!=unknown Processes.user!=unknown by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | lookup attacker_tools attacker_tool_names AS process_name OUTPUT description | search description !=false| `attacker_tools_on_endpoint_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is usually generated via logs that report process tracking in your Windows audit settings.", "known_false_positives": "Some administrator activity can be potentially triggered, please add those users to the filter macro.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Monitor for Unauthorized Software", "XMRig", "SamSam Ransomware", "Unusual Processes"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 2"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exploitation", "Stage:Recon", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1595/attacker_scan_tools/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An attacker tool $process_name$,listed in attacker_tools.csv is executed on host $dest$ by User $user$. This process $process_name$ is known to do- $description$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1036.005", "T1036", "T1003", "T1595"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process", "Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Match Legitimate Name or Location", "Masquerading", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "APT39", "Blue Mockingbird", "Whitefly", "Tropic Trooper", "Silence", "APT41", "menuPass", "TEMP.Veles", "MuddyWater", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Sowbug", "APT32", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "admin@338", "Carbanak", "APT1", "Windshift", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "attacker_tools_on_endpoint_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A list of tools used by attackers", "filename": "attacker_tools.csv", "name": "attacker_tools", "default_match": "false", "match_type": "WILDCARD(attacker_tool_names)", "min_matches": 1, "case_sensitive_match": "false", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/attacker_tools.csv"}]}, {"name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag", "id": "b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-151xb162040e", "version": 4, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for events where `PsExec.exe` is run with the `accepteula` flag in the command line. PsExec is a built-in Windows utility that enables you to execute processes on other systems. It is fully interactive for console applications. This tool is widely used for launching interactive command prompts on remote systems. Threat actors leverage this extensively for executing code on compromised systems. If an attacker is running PsExec for the first time, they will be prompted to accept the end-user license agreement (EULA), which can be passed as the argument `accepteula` within the command line.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_psexec` Processes.process=*accepteula* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators can leverage PsExec for accessing remote systems and might pass `accepteula` as an argument if they are running this tool for the first time. However, it is not likely that you'd see multiple occurrences of this event on a machine", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "HAFNIUM Group", "DarkSide Ransomware", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ running the utility for possibly the first time.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021", "T1021.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote Services", "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "APT32", "Orangeworm", "FIN8", "APT3", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-1314", "Turla", "Deep Panda", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=psexec.exe OR Processes.process_name=psexec64.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=psexec.c)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_psexec"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag_filter"}]}, {"name": "File with Samsam Extension", "id": "02c6cfc2-ae66-4735-bfc7-6291da834cbf", "version": 1, "date": "2018-12-14", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The search looks for file writes with extensions consistent with a SamSam ransomware attack.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| rex field=file_name \"(?\\.[^\\.]+)$\" | search file_extension=.stubbin OR file_extension=.berkshire OR file_extension=.satoshi OR file_extension=.sophos OR file_extension=.keyxml | `file_with_samsam_extension_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data-model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.", "known_false_positives": "Because these extensions are not typically used in normal operations, you should investigate all results.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/samsam_extension/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "message": "File writes $file_name$ with extensions consistent with a SamSam ransomware attack seen on $dest$", "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "file_name", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Other", "Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.user", "Filesystem.dest", "Filesystem.file_path", "Filesystem.file_name"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "file_with_samsam_extension_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Renamed PSExec", "id": "683e6196-b8e8-11eb-9a79-acde48001122", "version": 3, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies renamed instances of `PsExec.exe` being utilized on an endpoint. Most instances, it is highly probable to capture `Psexec.exe` or other SysInternal utility usage with the command-line argument of `-accepteula`. During triage, validate this is the legitimate version of `PsExec` by reviewing the PE metadata. In addition, review parallel processes for further suspicious behavior.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_psexec` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_renamed_psexec_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives should be present. It is possible some third party applications may use older versions of PsExec, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1569.002/T1569.002.yaml", "https://redcanary.com/blog/threat-hunting-psexec-lateral-movement/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "HAFNIUM Group", "DarkSide Ransomware", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1569.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Lateral Movement", "Execution"], "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1569", "T1569.002"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 27, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Services", "Service Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "APT41", "Silence", "FIN6", "APT32", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=psexec.exe OR Processes.process_name=psexec64.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=psexec.c)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_psexec"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_renamed_psexec_filter"}]}, {"name": "Spike in File Writes", "id": "fdb0f805-74e4-4539-8c00-618927333aae", "version": 3, "date": "2020-03-16", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "The search looks for a sharp increase in the number of files written to a particular host", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.action=created by _time span=1h, Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | eventstats max(_time) as maxtime | stats count as num_data_samples max(eval(if(_time >= relative_time(maxtime, \"-1d@d\"), count, null))) as \"count\" avg(eval(if(_time upperBound) AND num_data_samples >=20, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `spike_in_file_writes_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "In order to implement this search, you must populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection and response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the file system.", "known_false_positives": "It is important to understand that if you happen to install any new applications on your hosts or are copying a large number of files, you can expect to see a large increase of file modifications.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.action", "Filesystem.dest"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "spike_in_file_writes_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers", "id": "c8bff7a4-11ea-4416-a27d-c5bca472913d", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-23", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Web"], "description": "This search is used to detect malicious HTTP requests crafted to exploit jmx-console in JBoss servers. The malicious requests have a long URL length, as the payload is embedded in the URL.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where (Web.http_method=\"GET\" OR Web.http_method=\"HEAD\") by Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest | search Web.url=\"*jmx-console/HtmlAdaptor?action=invokeOpByName&name=jboss.admin*import*\" AND Web.url_length > 200 | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table src, dest_ip, http_method, url, firstTime, lastTime | `detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must ingest data from the web server or capture network data that contains web specific information with solutions such as Bro or Splunk Stream, and populating the Web data model", "known_false_positives": "No known false positives for this detection.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["JBoss Vulnerability", "SamSam Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Web Server", "cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 4", "CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["ID.RA", "PR.PT", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "PR.MA", "DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Web.http_method", "Web.url", "Web.url_length", "Web.src", "Web.dest"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers", "id": "104658f4-afdc-499e-9719-17243f982681", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-23", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Web"], "description": "This search looks for specific GET or HEAD requests to web servers that are indicative of reconnaissance attempts to identify vulnerable JBoss servers. JexBoss is described as the exploit tool of choice for this malicious activity.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where (Web.http_method=\"GET\" OR Web.http_method=\"HEAD\") AND (Web.url=\"*/web-console/ServerInfo.jsp*\" OR Web.url=\"*web-console*\" OR Web.url=\"*jmx-console*\" OR Web.url = \"*invoker*\") by Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.src, Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data from the web server or network traffic that contains web specific information, and populating the Web data model.", "known_false_positives": "It's possible for legitimate HTTP requests to be made to URLs containing the suspicious paths.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["JBoss Vulnerability", "SamSam Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Web Server", "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1082"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Web.http_method", "Web.url", "Web.src", "Web.dest"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Information Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "Tropic Trooper", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Darkhotel", "MuddyWater", "APT18", "Honeybee", "APT19", "APT37", "APT32", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "APT3", "Sowbug", "Gamaredon Group", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "admin@338", "Turla", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers_filter"}]}, {"name": "Remote Desktop Network Traffic", "id": "272b8407-842d-4b3d-bead-a704584003d3", "version": 3, "date": "2020-07-07", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search looks for network traffic on TCP/3389, the default port used by remote desktop. While remote desktop traffic is not uncommon on a network, it is usually associated with known hosts. This search will ignore common RDP sources and common RDP destinations so you can focus on the uncommon uses of remote desktop on your network.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=3389 AND All_Traffic.dest_category!=common_rdp_destination AND All_Traffic.src_category!=common_rdp_source by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_desktop_network_traffic_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to identify systems that commonly originate remote desktop traffic and that commonly receive remote desktop traffic. You can use the included support search \"Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic\" to identify systems that originate the traffic and the search \"Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic\" to identify systems that receive a lot of remote desktop traffic. After identifying these systems, you will need to add the \"common_rdp_source\" or \"common_rdp_destination\" category to that system depending on the usage, using the Enterprise Security Assets and Identities framework. This can be done by adding an entry in the assets.csv file located in SA-IdentityManagement/lookups.", "known_false_positives": "Remote Desktop may be used legitimately by users on the network.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 9", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021.001", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.dest_port", "All_Traffic.dest_category", "All_Traffic.src_category", "All_Traffic.src", "All_Traffic.dest", "All_Traffic.dest_port"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote Desktop Protocol", "Remote Services"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "TEMP.Veles", "Leviathan", "APT39", "Stolen Pencil", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "APT3", "OilRig", "menuPass", "FIN10", "Patchwork", "FIN6", "Lazarus Group", "APT1", "Axiom", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "remote_desktop_network_traffic_filter"}]}, {"name": "Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce", "id": "a98727cc-286b-4ff2-b898-41df64695923", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search looks for RDP application network traffic and filters any source/destination pair generating more than twice the standard deviation of the average traffic.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.app=rdp by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | eventstats stdev(count) AS stdev avg(count) AS avg p50(count) AS p50 | where count>(avg + stdev*2) | rename All_Traffic.src AS src All_Traffic.dest AS dest | table firstTime lastTime src dest count avg p50 stdev | `remote_desktop_network_bruteforce_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must ensure that your network traffic data is populating the Network_Traffic data model.", "known_false_positives": "RDP gateways may have unusually high amounts of traffic from all other hosts' RDP applications in the network.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 9", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021.001", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.app", "All_Traffic.src", "All_Traffic.dest", "All_Traffic.dest_port"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote Desktop Protocol", "Remote Services"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "TEMP.Veles", "Leviathan", "APT39", "Stolen Pencil", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "APT3", "OilRig", "menuPass", "FIN10", "Patchwork", "FIN6", "Lazarus Group", "APT1", "Axiom", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "remote_desktop_network_bruteforce_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", "id": "a9ef59cf-e981-4e66-9eef-bb049f695c09", "version": 1, "date": "2020-04-15", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "description": "This story addresses detection against Kubernetes cluster fingerprint scan and attack by providing information on items such as source ip, user agent, cluster names.", "narrative": "Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitve information and management priviledges of production workloads, microservices and applications. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious unauthenticated requests from the internet to kubernetes cluster.", "references": ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", "category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1526"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Cloud Service Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection", "id": "dbfca1dd-b8e5-4ba4-be0e-e565e5d62002", "version": 1, "date": "2020-04-15", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides detection information on unauthenticated requests against Kubernetes' Pods API", "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` \"user.username\"=\"system:anonymous\" verb=list objectRef.resource=pods requestURI=\"/api/v1/pods\" | rename source as cluster_name sourceIPs{} as src_ip | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(responseStatus.reason) values(responseStatus.code) values(userAgent) values(verb) values(requestURI) by src_ip cluster_name user.username user.groups{} | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on forAWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudWatch EKS Logs.Please also customize the `kubernetes_pods_aws_scan_fingerprint_detection` macro to filter out the false positives.", "known_false_positives": "Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, UA and source IPs and direct request to API provide context.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"], "asset_type": "Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster Pod", "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1526"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "user.username", "verb", "objectRef.resource", "requestURI", "source", "sourceIPs{}", "responseStatus.reason", "responseStatus.code", "userAgent", "src_ip", "user.groups{}"], "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Cloud Service Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection_filter"}]}, {"name": "Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection", "id": "294c4686-63dd-4fe6-93a2-ca807626704a", "version": 1, "date": "2020-04-15", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster in AWS", "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` \"user.username\"=\"system:anonymous\" userAgent!=\"AWS Security Scanner\" | rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(responseStatus.reason) values(source) as cluster_name values(responseStatus.code) values(userAgent) as http_user_agent values(verb) values(requestURI) by src_ip user.username user.groups{} | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudWatch EKS Logs inputs.", "known_false_positives": "Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, UA and source IPs will provide context.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"], "asset_type": "Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster", "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1526"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "user.username", "userAgent", "sourceIPs{}", "responseStatus.reason", "source", "responseStatus.code", "verb", "requestURI", "src_ip", "user.groups{}"], "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Cloud Service Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection_filter"}]}, {"name": "GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection", "id": "19b53215-4a16-405b-8087-9e6acf619842", "version": 1, "date": "2020-07-17", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster's pods", "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` category=kube-audit |spath input=properties.log |search responseStatus.code=401 |table sourceIPs{} userAgent verb requestURI responseStatus.reason properties.pod | `gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later), then configure stackdriver and set a Pub/Sub subscription to be imported to Splunk.", "known_false_positives": "Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, User Agent, source IPs and pods will provide context.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"], "asset_type": "GCP Kubernetes cluster", "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1526"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "category", "responseStatus.code", "sourceIPs{}", "userAgent", "verb", "requestURI", "responseStatus.reason", "properties.pod"], "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Cloud Service Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "DNS Amplification Attacks", "id": "e8afd39e-3294-11e6-b39d-a45e60c6700", "version": 1, "date": "2016-09-13", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "DNS poses a serious threat as a Denial of Service (DOS) amplifier, if it responds to `ANY` queries. This Analytic Story can help you detect attackers who may be abusing your company's DNS infrastructure to launch amplification attacks, causing Denial of Service to other victims.", "narrative": "The Domain Name System (DNS) is the protocol used to map domain names to IP addresses. It has been proven to work very well for its intended function. However if DNS is misconfigured, servers can be abused by attackers to levy amplification or redirection attacks against victims. Because DNS responses to `ANY` queries are so much larger than the queries themselves--and can be made with a UDP packet, which does not require a handshake--attackers can spoof the source address of the packet and cause much more data to be sent to the victim than if they sent the traffic themselves. The `ANY` requests are will be larger than normal DNS server requests, due to the fact that the server provides significant details, such as MX records and associated IP addresses. A large volume of this traffic can result in a DOS on the victim's machine. This misconfiguration leads to two possible victims, the first being the DNS servers participating in an attack and the other being the hosts that are the targets of the DOS attack.\\\nThe search in this story can help you to detect if attackers are abusing your company's DNS infrastructure to launch DNS amplification attacks causing Denial of Service to other victims.", "references": ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-088A", "https://www.imperva.com/learn/application-security/dns-amplification/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "DNS Amplification Attacks", "category": ["Abuse"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1498.002", "T1498"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Network Denial of Service", "Reflection Amplification"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries", "id": "8fa891f7-a533-4b3c-af85-5aa2e7c1f1eb", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-20", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Network_Resolution"], "description": "The search is used to identify attempts to use your DNS Infrastructure for DDoS purposes via a DNS amplification attack leveraging ANY queries.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where nodename=DNS \"DNS.message_type\"=\"QUERY\" \"DNS.record_type\"=\"ANY\" by \"DNS.dest\" | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | where count>200 | `large_volume_of_dns_any_queries_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate ANY requests may trigger this search, however it is unusual to see a large volume of them under typical circumstances. You may modify the threshold in the search to better suit your environment.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["DNS Amplification Attacks"], "asset_type": "DNS Servers", "cis20": ["CIS 11", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1498", "T1498.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "PR.IP"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "DNS.message_type", "DNS.record_type", "DNS.dest"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Network Denial of Service", "Reflection Amplification"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact", "Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "large_volume_of_dns_any_queries_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Cloud User Activities", "id": "1ed5ce7d-5469-4232-92af-89d1a3595b39", "version": 1, "date": "2020-09-04", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "description": "Detect and investigate suspicious activities by users and roles in your cloud environments.", "narrative": "It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it's all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable to attack. In fact, this was the very oversight that led to Tesla's cryptojacking attack in February, 2018.\\\nIn addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed for any new instances and increased bandwidth usage.", "references": ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Suspicious Cloud User Activities", "category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078.004", "T1580", "T1078"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Cloud Accounts", "Valid Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Sandworm Team", "TEMP.Veles", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT39", "Carbanak", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT41", "FIN5", "menuPass", "FIN6", "OilRig", "Wizard Spider", "APT18", "FIN10", "PittyTiger", "FIN4", "APT28", "APT33", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Night Dragon"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls", "id": "0840ddf1-8c89-46ff-b730-c8d6722478c0", "version": 1, "date": "2020-09-07", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search will detect a spike in the number of API calls made to your cloud infrastructure environment by a user.", "search": "| tstats count as api_calls values(All_Changes.command) as command from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.user!=unknown All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%w\") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | join user HourOfDay isWeekend [ summary cloud_excessive_api_calls_v1] | where cardinality >=16 | apply cloud_excessive_api_calls_v1 threshold=0.005 | rename \"IsOutlier(api_calls)\" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1 | eval expected_upper_threshold = mvindex(split(mvindex(BoundaryRanges, -1), \":\"), 0) | where api_calls > expected_upper_threshold | eval distance_from_threshold = api_calls - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, command, api_calls, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User` to create the probability density function.", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud User Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "user $user$ has made $api_calls$ api calls, violating the dynamic threshold of $expected_upper_threshold$ with the following command $command$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.command", "All_Changes.user", "All_Changes.status"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Cloud Accounts", "Valid Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_filter"}]}, {"name": "Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles", "id": "2181ad1f-1e73-4d0c-9780-e8880482a08f", "version": 1, "date": "2020-09-04", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search looks for new commands from each user role.", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.user_type=AssumedRole AND All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user, All_Changes.command All_Changes.object | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role user as user, command as command OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenUserApiCall=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenUserApiCall) OR firstTimeSeenUserApiCall > relative_time(now(),\"-24h@h\") | table firstTime, user, object, command |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial` to build the initial table of user roles, commands, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_filter`", "known_false_positives": ".", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud User Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Recon", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json"], "impact": 60, "message": "User $user$ of type AssumedRole attempting to execute new API calls $command$ that have not been seen before", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.user", "All_Changes.user_type", "All_Changes.status", "All_Changes.command", "All_Changes.object"], "risk_score": 36, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Valid Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A table of users, commands, and the first and last time that they have been seen", "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role", "name": "previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role", "fields_list": "_key, user, command, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data"}]}, {"name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls", "id": "d4dfb7f3-7a37-498a-b5df-f19334e871af", "version": 1, "date": "2020-09-07", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search will detect a spike in the number of API calls made to your cloud infrastructure environment about security groups by a user.", "search": "| tstats count as security_group_api_calls values(All_Changes.command) as command from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.object_category=firewall AND All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%w\") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | join user HourOfDay isWeekend [ summary cloud_excessive_security_group_api_calls_v1] | where cardinality >=16 | apply cloud_excessive_security_group_api_calls_v1 threshold=0.005 | rename \"IsOutlier(security_group_api_calls)\" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1 | eval expected_upper_threshold = mvindex(split(mvindex(BoundaryRanges, -1), \":\"), 0) | where security_group_api_calls > expected_upper_threshold | eval distance_from_threshold = security_group_api_calls - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, command, security_group_api_calls, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User` to create the probability density function model.", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud User Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:Inbound", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "user $user$ has made $api_calls$ api calls related to security groups, violating the dynamic threshold of $expected_upper_threshold$ with the following command $command$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.command", "All_Changes.object_category", "All_Changes.status", "All_Changes.user"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Cloud Accounts", "Valid Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls_filter"}]}, {"name": "AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events", "id": "3e1f1568-9633-11eb-a69c-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-11-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following detection identifies excessive AccessDenied events within an hour timeframe. It is possible that an access key to AWS may have been stolen and is being misused to perform discovery events. In these instances, the access is not available with the key stolen therefore these events will be generated.", "search": "`cloudtrail` (errorCode = \"AccessDenied\") user_type=IAMUser (userAgent!=*.amazonaws.com) | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as failures min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime, dc(eventName) as methods, dc(eventSource) as sources by src_ip, userIdentity.arn, _time | where failures >= 5 and methods >= 1 and sources >= 1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events_filter`", "how_to_implement": "The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible to start this detection will need to be tuned by source IP or user. In addition, change the count values to an upper threshold to restrict false positives.", "references": ["https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/troubleshoot-iam-permission-errors/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud User Activities"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Blocked", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1580/aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events/aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events.json"], "impact": 20, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "User $userIdentity.arn$ is seen to perform excessive number of discovery related api calls- $failures$, within an hour where the access was denied.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1580"], "observable": [{"name": "src_ip", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "userIdentity.arn", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "eventSource", "userAgent", "errorCode", "userIdentity.type"], "risk_object": "src_ip", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 10, "security_domain": "access", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "id": "2b1800dd-92f9-47dd-a981-fdf13w1q5d55", "version": 2, "date": "2021-01-20", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Michael Haag, Splunk", "description": "Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.", "narrative": "One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the mshta.exe process, which loads Microsoft HTML applications (mshtml.dll) with the .hta suffix. In these cases, attackers use the trusted Windows utility to proxy execution of malicious files, whether an .hta application, javascript, or VBScript.\\\nThe searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an attacker is leveraging mshta.exe to execute malicious code.\\\nTriage\\\nValidate execution \\\n1. Determine if MSHTA.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of MSHTA.exe and further PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\\windows\\system32 or c:\\windows\\syswow64, it should be highly suspect.\\\n1. Determine if script code was executed with MSHTA.\\\nSituational Awareness\\\nThe objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by MSHTA.exe.\\\n1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application?\\\n1. Module loads. Are the known MSHTA.exe modules being loaded by a non-standard application? Is MSHTA loading any suspicious .DLLs?\\\n1. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain.\\\nRetrieval of script code\\\nThe objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", "https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005/", "https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5"], "tags": {"analytics_story": "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1547.001", "T1059", "T1547", "T1218.005", "T1059.003"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "Mshta", "Windows Command Shell", "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Magic Hound", "Stealth Falcon", "Inception", "Rancor", "Putter Panda", "APT1", "Tropic Trooper", "Kimsuky", "Dark Caracal", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ke3chang", "FIN8", "Turla", "APT39", "Molerats", "Leviathan", "Gamaredon Group", "Rocke", "RTM", "TA505", "Whitefly", "Frankenstein", "Cobalt Group", "APT32", "Soft Cell", "Silence", "APT19", "APT37", "Darkhotel", "APT41", "FIN5", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Blue Mockingbird", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "admin@338", "Honeybee", "APT3", "Sowbug", "Machete", "APT18", "no", "Threat Group-1314", "APT38", "Sharpshooter", "MuddyWater", "FIN10", "Patchwork", "APT28", "APT33", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN7", "Gorgon Group", "APT29"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line", "id": "9b3af1e6-5b68-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies when Microsoft HTML Application Host (mshta.exe) utility is used to make remote http connections. Adversaries may use mshta.exe to proxy the download and execution of remote .hta files. The analytic identifies command line arguments of http and https being used. This technique is commonly used by malicious software to bypass preventative controls. The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process \"rundll32.exe\" and its parent process.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_mshta` (Processes.process=\"*http://*\" OR Processes.process=\"*https://*\") by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mshta_url_in_command_line_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible legitimate applications may perform this behavior and will need to be filtered.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses", "https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/search/-search-3x-wds-extidx-prot-implementing"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious MSHTA Activity"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $est$ by user $user$ attempting to access a remote destination to download an additional payload.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Mshta"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "APT32", "MuddyWater", "FIN7"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=mshta.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSHTA.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_mshta"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_mshta_url_in_command_line_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe", "id": "dcfd6b40-42f9-469d-a433-2e53f7486664", "version": 6, "date": "2020-11-10", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for executions of cmd.exe spawned by a process that is often abused by attackers and that does not typically launch cmd.exe.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |search [`prohibited_apps_launching_cmd`] | `detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts and populates the Endpoint data model with the resultant dataset. This search includes a lookup file, `prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.csv`, that contains a list of processes that should not be spawning cmd.exe. You can modify this lookup to better suit your environment. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "There are circumstances where an application may legitimately execute and interact with the Windows command-line interface. Investigate and modify the lookup file, as appropriate.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "Suspicious Zoom Child Processes", "NOBELIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/powershell_spawn_cmd/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ running prohibited applications.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "Windows Command Shell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "TA505", "Blue Mockingbird", "Tropic Trooper", "Frankenstein", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "Honeybee", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Turla", "Silence", "APT32", "APT39", "Darkhotel", "MuddyWater", "APT18", "APT38", "Dark Caracal", "Gorgon Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Rancor", "Ke3chang", "APT37", "Leviathan", "FIN8", "APT28", "Magic Hound", "Sowbug", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Gamaredon Group", "Suckfly", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-1314", "APT3", "admin@338", "APT1"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_cmd"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "| inputlookup prohibited_apps_launching_cmd | rename prohibited_applications as parent_process_name | eval parent_process_name=\"*\" . parent_process_name | table parent_process_name", "description": "This macro outputs a list of process that should not be the parent process of cmd.exe", "name": "prohibited_apps_launching_cmd", "lookups": [{"description": "A list of processes that should not be launching cmd.exe", "fields": "prohibited_applications", "filename": "prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(prohibited_applications)", "name": "prohibited_apps_launching_cmd", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.csv"}]}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe_filter"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "id": "f5f6af30-7aa7-4295-bfe9-07fe87c01a4b", "version": 6, "date": "2021-09-07", "author": "Jose Hernandez, David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to launch an application or service at system startup.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\run* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentVersion\\\\Windows\\\\Appinit_Dlls* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Shell* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Notify* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Userinit* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\VmApplet* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\policies\\\\explorer\\\\run* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\runservices* OR Registry.registry_path=HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Netsh\\\\* OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Image File Execution Options*\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=Debugger) OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Security Packages\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\\\\OSConfig\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Security Packages\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\SilentProcessExit\\\\*\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*currentVersion\\\\Windows\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Load\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentVersion\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Svchost\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\"AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"BootExecute\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Software\\\\Run\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"auto_update\")) by Registry.dest Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "There are many legitimate applications that must execute on system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Ransomware", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "IcedID", "Remcos"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 95, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Persistence"}, "Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to persistence in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1547.001", "T1547"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user"], "risk_score": 76, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Rocke", "Tropic Trooper", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Silence", "RTM", "Inception", "APT41", "Machete", "Kimsuky", "APT33", "APT39", "APT32", "APT18", "Turla", "Dark Caracal", "Cobalt Group", "Honeybee", "Threat Group-3390", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Gorgon Group", "Ke3chang", "APT19", "Leviathan", "MuddyWater", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Magic Hound", "APT3", "FIN10", "FIN7", "Patchwork", "FIN6", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "APT29", "Darkhotel", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect mshta renamed", "id": "8f45fcf0-5b68-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies renamed instances of mshta.exe executing. Mshta.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64. This analytic utilizes the internal name of the PE to identify if is the legitimate mshta binary. Further analysis should be performed to review the executed content and validation it is the real mshta.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_mshta` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mshta_renamed_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of mshta.exe, but never renamed, triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses", "https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious MSHTA Activity"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Mshta"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "APT32", "MuddyWater", "FIN7"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=mshta.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSHTA.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_mshta"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_mshta_renamed_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious mshta child process", "id": "60023bb6-5500-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies child processes spawning from \"mshta.exe\". The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, parent process \"mshta.exe\" and its child process.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=mshta.exe AND (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=colorcpl.exe OR Processes.process_name=msbuild.exe OR Processes.process_name=microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe OR Processes.process_name=searchprotocolhost.exe OR Processes.process_name=scrcons.exe OR Processes.process_name=cscript.exe OR Processes.process_name=wscript.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=cmd.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_mshta_child_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses", "https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious MSHTA Activity"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "suspicious mshta child process detected on host $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process", "type": "Process Name", "role": ["Parent Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 40, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Mshta"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "APT32", "MuddyWater", "FIN7"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_mshta_child_process_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect mshta inline hta execution", "id": "a0873b32-5b68-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 6, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies \"mshta.exe\" execution with inline protocol handlers. \"JavaScript\", \"VBScript\", and \"About\" are the only supported options when invoking HTA content directly on the command-line. The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process \"mshta.exe\" and its parent process.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_mshta` (Processes.process=*vbscript* OR Processes.process=*javascript* OR Processes.process=*about*) by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses", "https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/search/-search-3x-wds-extidx-prot-implementing"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious MSHTA Activity"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ executing with inline HTA, indicative of defense evasion.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Mshta"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "APT32", "MuddyWater", "FIN7"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=mshta.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSHTA.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_mshta"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious mshta spawn", "id": "4d33a488-5b5f-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 2, "date": "2021-01-20", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning mshta.exe. This behavior is indicative of a DCOM object being utilized to spawn mshta from wmiprvse.exe or svchost.exe. In this instance, adversaries may use LethalHTA that will spawn mshta.exe from svchost.exe.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=svchost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe) AND `process_mshta` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.user Processes.original_file_name| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_mshta_spawn_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://codewhitesec.blogspot.com/2018/07/lethalhta.html", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses", "https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious MSHTA Activity"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "mshta.exe spawned by wmiprvse.exe on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Mshta"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "APT32", "MuddyWater", "FIN7"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=mshta.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSHTA.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_mshta"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_mshta_spawn_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution", "id": "91c79f14-5b41-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 2, "date": "2021-01-20", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies \"rundll32.exe\" execution with inline protocol handlers. \"JavaScript\", \"VBScript\", and \"About\" are the only supported options when invoking HTA content directly on the command-line. This type of behavior is commonly observed with fileless malware or application whitelisting bypass techniques. The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process \"rundll32.exe\" and its parent process.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` (Processes.process=*vbscript* OR Processes.process=*javascript* OR Processes.process=*about*) by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses", "https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/search/-search-3x-wds-extidx-prot-implementing"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "NOBELIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious rundll32.exe inline HTA execution on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Mshta"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "APT32", "MuddyWater", "FIN7"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_rundll32"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Abuse", "id": "6dbd810e-f66d-414b-8dfc-e46de55cbfe2", "version": 3, "date": "2017-11-02", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "description": "Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence and the ability to load drivers or otherwise interact with the Windows kernel. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows services are being modified or created in a suspicious manner.", "narrative": "The Windows operating system uses a services architecture to allow for running code in the background, similar to a UNIX daemon. Attackers will often leverage Windows services for persistence, hiding in plain sight, seeking the ability to run privileged code that can interact with the kernel. In many cases, attackers will create a new service to host their malicious code. Attackers have also been observed modifying unnecessary or unused services to point to their own code, as opposed to what was intended. In these cases, attackers often use tools to create or modify services in ways that are not typical for most environments, providing opportunities for detection.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Windows Service Abuse", "category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1543.003", "T1574", "T1574.011", "T1543", "T1569.002", "T1569"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Hijack Execution Flow", "Service Execution", "Services Registry Permissions Weakness", "Create or Modify System Process", "Windows Service", "System Services"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Kimsuky", "Ke3chang", "APT39", "Carbanak", "Cobalt Group", "APT32", "Silence", "APT19", "APT41", "FIN6", "Blue Mockingbird", "Lazarus Group", "Honeybee", "APT3", "Wizard Spider", "no", "DarkVishnya", "FIN7"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys", "id": "8470d755-0c13-45b3-bd63-387a373c10cf", "version": 5, "date": "2020-11-26", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The search looks for reg.exe modifying registry keys that define Windows services and their configurations.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name values(Processes.user) as user FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=reg.exe Processes.process=*reg* Processes.process=*add* Processes.process=*Services* by Processes.process_id Processes.dest Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "It is unusual for a service to be created or modified by directly manipulating the registry. However, there may be legitimate instances of this behavior. It is important to validate and investigate, as appropriate.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Service Abuse", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Persistence"}, "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1574.011/change_registry_path_service/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 75, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "message": "A reg.exe process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1574.011", "T1574"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.user", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.dest"], "risk_score": 45, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Services Registry Permissions Weakness", "Hijack Execution Flow"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys_filter"}]}, {"name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services", "id": "f0c693d8-2a89-4ce7-80b4-98fea4c3ea6d", "version": 4, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for arguments to sc.exe indicating the creation or modification of a Windows service.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = sc.exe (Processes.process=\"* create *\" OR Processes.process=\"* config *\") by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Using sc.exe to manipulate Windows services is uncommon. However, there may be legitimate instances of this behavior. It is important to validate and investigate as appropriate.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Service Abuse", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Disabling Security Tools", "NOBELIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Persistence"}, "Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "message": "A sc process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ to create of configure services in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1543.003", "T1543"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Windows Service", "Create or Modify System Process"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "DarkVishnya", "Wizard Spider", "APT32", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Tropic Trooper", "Cobalt Group", "Ke3chang", "Honeybee", "FIN7", "Threat Group-3390", "APT19", "APT3", "Lazarus Group", "Carbanak", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services_filter"}]}, {"name": "First Time Seen Running Windows Service", "id": "823136f2-d755-4b6d-ae04-372b486a5808", "version": 4, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for the first and last time a Windows service is seen running in your environment. This table is then cached.", "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rex field=Message \"The (?[-\\(\\)\\s\\w]+) service entered the (?\\w+) state\" | where state=\"running\" | lookup previously_seen_running_windows_services service as service OUTPUT firstTimeSeen | where isnull(firstTimeSeen) OR firstTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_windows_services_window`) | table _time dest service | `first_time_seen_running_windows_service_filter`", "how_to_implement": "While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM, you must be ingesting your Windows system event logs in order for this search to execute successfully. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial` to build the initial table of child processes and hostnames for this search to work. You should also schedule at the same interval as this search the second baseline search `Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old Windows Services. Please update the `previously_seen_windows_services_window` macro to adjust the time window. Please ensure that the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows is version 8.0.0 or above.", "known_false_positives": "A previously unseen service is not necessarily malicious. Verify that the service is legitimate and that was installed by a legitimate process.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Service Abuse", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "NOBELIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1569", "T1569.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.AE"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "dest"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Services", "Service Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "APT41", "Silence", "FIN6", "APT32", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_system"}, {"description": "Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new Windows services", "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", "name": "previously_seen_windows_services_window"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "first_time_seen_running_windows_service_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A placeholder for the list of Windows Services running", "collection": "previously_seen_running_windows_services", "name": "previously_seen_running_windows_services", "fields_list": "_key, service, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen"}]}]}, {"name": "Asset Tracking", "id": "91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e1fce77", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-13", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "Keep a careful inventory of every asset on your network to make it easier to detect rogue devices. Unauthorized/unmanaged devices could be an indication of malicious behavior that should be investigated further.", "narrative": "This Analytic Story is designed to help you develop a better understanding of what authorized and unauthorized devices are part of your enterprise. This story can help you better categorize and classify assets, providing critical business context and awareness of their assets during an incident. Information derived from this Analytic Story can be used to better inform and support other analytic stories. For successful detection, you will need to leverage the Assets and Identity Framework from Enterprise Security to populate your known assets.", "references": ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/inventory-of-authorized-and-unauthorized-devices/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Asset Tracking", "category": ["Best Practices"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_id": [], "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address", "id": "dcfd6b40-42f9-469d-a433-2e53f7489ff4", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-13", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Sessions"], "description": "By populating the organization's assets within the assets_by_str.csv, we will be able to detect unauthorized devices that are trying to connect with the organization's network by inspecting DHCP request packets, which are issued by devices when they attempt to obtain an IP address from the DHCP server. The MAC address associated with the source of the DHCP request is checked against the list of known devices, and reports on those that are not found.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Sessions where nodename=All_Sessions.DHCP All_Sessions.signature=DHCPREQUEST by All_Sessions.src_ip All_Sessions.dest_mac | dedup All_Sessions.dest_mac| `drop_dm_object_name(\"Network_Sessions\")`|`drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Sessions\")` | search NOT [| inputlookup asset_lookup_by_str |rename mac as dest_mac | fields + dest_mac] | `detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search uses the Network_Sessions data model shipped with Enterprise Security. It leverages the Assets and Identity framework to populate the assets_by_str.csv file located in SA-IdentityManagement, which will contain a list of known authorized organizational assets including their MAC addresses. Ensure that all inventoried systems have their MAC address populated.", "known_false_positives": "This search might be prone to high false positives. Please consider this when conducting analysis or investigations. Authorized devices may be detected as unauthorized. If this is the case, verify the MAC address of the system responsible for the false positive and add it to the Assets and Identity framework with the proper information.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Asset Tracking"], "asset_type": "Infrastructure", "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Sessions.signature", "All_Sessions.src_ip", "All_Sessions.dest_mac"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Ransomware", "id": "cf309d0d-d4aa-4fbb-963d-1e79febd3756", "version": 1, "date": "2020-02-04", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage, the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected locations, and many others.", "narrative": "Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise. Attackers can deploy ransomware to enterprises through spearphishing campaigns and driveby downloads, as well as through traditional remote service-based exploitation. In the case of the WannaCry campaign, there was self-propagating wormable functionality that was used to maximize infection. Fortunately, organizations can apply several techniques--such as those in this Analytic Story--to detect and or mitigate the effects of ransomware.", "references": ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/06/28/carbon-black-threat-research-technical-analysis-petya-notpetya-ransomware/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2017/06/27/closing-the-detection-to-mitigation-gap-or-to-petya-or-notpetya-whocares-.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Ransomware", "category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1548", "T1222", "T1112", "T1482", "T1491", "T1047", "T1036.003", "T1059.005", "T1569.002", "T1562.001", "T1569", "T1053", "T1078", "T1218.007", "T1489", "T1069", "T1070.004", "T1562", "T1218", "T1218.003", "T1069.001", "T1070", "T1485", "T1087", "T1592", "T1048", "T1490", "T1027.005", "T1053.005", "T1020", "T1036", "T1547.001", "T1059", "T1543", "T1486", "T1547", "T1560.001", "T1562.007", "T1071.001", "T1543.003", "T1546.015", "T1021", "T1071", "T1069.002", "T1070.001", "T1560", "T1087.001", "T1574", "T1531", "T1204", "T1027", "T1574.002", "T1021.002", "T1546", "T1087.002"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["File and Directory Permissions Modification", "Remote Services", "Rename System Utilities", "Windows Management Instrumentation", "Visual Basic", "Disable or Modify Tools", "File Deletion", "Create or Modify System Process", "Permission Groups Discovery", "Defacement", "User Execution", "Indicator Removal on Host", "Indicator Removal from Tools", "Domain Groups", "Scheduled Task/Job", "Local Groups", "Component Object Model Hijacking", "Automated Exfiltration", "CMSTP", "Data Encrypted for Impact", "Valid Accounts", "Account Discovery", "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "Service Stop", "Inhibit System Recovery", "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", "Archive via Utility", "System Services", "Domain Trust Discovery", "Modify Registry", "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "Service Execution", "Msiexec", "Event Triggered Execution", "Application Layer Protocol", "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "Impair Defenses", "Masquerading", "Data Destruction", "Hijack Execution Flow", "Local Account", "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "Obfuscated Files or Information", "DLL Side-Loading", "Clear Windows Event Logs", "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", "Domain Account", "Scheduled Task", "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Web Protocols", "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "Windows Service", "Archive Collected Data", "Account Access Removal"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Impact", "Discovery", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Execution", "Command And Control", "Collection", "Lateral Movement", "Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Suckfly", "Sandworm Team", "Rancor", "Inception", "TEMP.Veles", "PLATINUM", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT39", "Gamaredon Group", "Carbanak", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "admin@338", "Honeybee", "APT18", "MuddyWater", "Dust Storm", "Gorgon Group", "Orangeworm", "SilverTerrier", "Night Dragon", "Naikon", "Magic Hound", "Stealth Falcon", "Dark Caracal", "TA459", "APT29", "FIN8", "Molerats", "Rocke", "Whitefly", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "Silence", "APT32", "WIRTE", "Darkhotel", "FIN5", "Blue Mockingbird", "Machete", "Sowbug", "Threat Group-1314", "Sharpshooter", "Patchwork", "FIN4", "APT33", "Threat Group-3390", "Putter Panda", "Kimsuky", "Poseidon Group", "Group5", "Turla", "TA505", "Mofang", "Soft Cell", "APT19", "APT37", "APT41", "menuPass", "OilRig", "BlackOasis", "Wizard Spider", "Leafminer", "no", "The White Company", "FIN10", "DarkVishnya", "Elderwood", "APT28", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN7", "APT1", "Tropic Trooper", "Ke3chang", "Leviathan", "APT-C-36", "CopyKittens", "FIN6", "Lazarus Group", "APT3", "APT38", "PittyTiger", "Gallmaker", "Windshift"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Renamed RClone", "id": "6dca1124-b3ec-11eb-9328-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifies the usage of `rclone.exe`, renamed, being used to exfiltrate data to a remote destination. RClone has been used by multiple ransomware groups to exfiltrate data. In many instances, it will be downloaded from the legitimate site and executed accordingly. During triage, isolate the endpoint and begin to review parallel processes for additional behavior. At this stage, the adversary may have staged data to be exfiltrated.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.original_file_name=rclone.exe AND Processes.process_name!=rclone.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_renamed_rclone_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as this analytic identifies renamed instances of `rclone.exe`. Filter as needed if there is a legitimate business use case.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/blog/rclone-mega-extortion/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html", "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1020/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1020"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 27, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Automated Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Tropic Trooper", "Frankenstein", "Honeybee"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_renamed_rclone_filter"}]}, {"name": "Windows DiskCryptor Usage", "id": "d56fe0c8-4650-11ec-a8fa-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-15", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies DiskCryptor process name of dcrypt.exe or internal name dcinst.exe. This utility has been utilized by adversaries to encrypt disks manually during an operation. In addition, during install, a dcrypt.sys driver is installed and requires a reboot in order to take effect. There are no command-line arguments used.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"dcrypt.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=dcinst.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_diskcryptor_usage_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible false positives may be present based on the internal name dcinst.exe, filter as needed. It may be worthy to alert on the service name.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2021/11/15/exchange-exploit-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/", "https://github.com/DavidXanatos/DiskCryptor"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1486/dcrypt/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to encrypt disks.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1486"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Data Encrypted for Impact"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "TA505", "APT38"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "windows_diskcryptor_usage_filter"}]}, {"name": "Schtasks used for forcing a reboot", "id": "1297fb80-f42a-4b4a-9c8a-88c066437cf6", "version": 4, "date": "2020-12-07", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line that indicate that a forced reboot of system is scheduled.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe Processes.process=\"*shutdown*\" Processes.process=\"*/create *\" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may create jobs on systems forcing reboots to perform updates, maintenance, etc.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}, "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/schtask_shutdown/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A schedule task process $process_name$ with force reboot commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Scheduled Task", "Scheduled Task/Job"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "MuddyWater", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT-C-36", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT41", "Machete", "Soft Cell", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Patchwork", "OilRig", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "FIN8", "menuPass", "FIN10", "APT32", "FIN7", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot_filter"}]}, {"name": "Revil Registry Entry", "id": "e3d3f57a-c381-11eb-9e35-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-02", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies suspicious modification in registry entry to keep some malware data during its infection. This technique seen in several apt implant, malware and ransomware like REVIL where it keep some information like the random generated file extension it uses for all the encrypted files and ransomware notes file name in the compromised host.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\WOW6432Node\\\\Facebook_Assistant\\\\*\" OR Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\WOW6432Node\\\\BlackLivesMatter*\") AND (Registry.registry_value_name = \"\\.*\" OR Registry.registry_value_name = \"Binary Data\") by Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `revil_registry_entry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "to successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Image, TargetObject registry key, registry Details from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A registry entry $registry_path$ with registry value $registry_value_name$ and $registry_value_name$ related to revil ransomware in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1112"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name"], "risk_score": 60, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Modify Registry"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Turla", "APT32", "APT38", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "Threat Group-3390", "Honeybee", "Patchwork", "Gorgon Group", "FIN8"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "revil_registry_entry_filter"}]}, {"name": "Disable Net User Account", "id": "ba858b08-d26c-11eb-af9b-acde48001122", "version": 3, "date": "2021-11-30", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "This analytic will identify a suspicious command-line that disables a user account using the native `net.exe` or `net1.exe` utility to Windows. This technique may used by the adversaries to interrupt availability of accounts and continue the impact against the organization.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null)), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_path\"), \"string\", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND like(cmd_line, \"%/active:no%\") AND like(cmd_line, \"%user%\") AND (process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR process_name=\"net.exe\") | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null)), body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line, \"process_name\", process_name, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process_name, \"process_path\", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed net.exe/net1.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "System administrators or automated scripts may disable an account but not a common practice. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/ssa_data1/net_user_dis.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to disable accounts.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1489", "T1078"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest_device_id", "process_name", "parent_process_name", "process_path", "dest_user_id", "process", "cmd_line"], "risk_score": 49, "risk_severity": "medium", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Service Stop", "Valid Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disable_net_user_account_filter"}]}, {"name": "Disable ETW Through Registry", "id": "f0eacfa4-d33f-11eb-8f9d-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-22", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this search is to identify modification in registry to disable ETW windows feature to evade detections. This technique was seen in several ransomware, RAT and even APT to impaire defenses of the compromise machine and to be able to execute payload with minimal alert as much as possible.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\.NETFramework\\\\ETWEnabled\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000000\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_etw_through_registry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "network operator may disable this feature of windows but not so common.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/c0f98850-af65-4352-9746-fbebadee4f05/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.user", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disable_etw_through_registry_filter"}]}, {"name": "Attempt To Delete Services", "id": "a0c8c292-d01a-11eb-aa18-acde48001122", "version": 3, "date": "2021-11-24", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "The following analytic identifies Windows Service Control, `sc.exe`, attempting to delete a service. This is typically identified in parallel with other instances of service enumeration of attempts to stop a service and then delete it. Adversaries utilize this technique to terminate security services or other related services to continue there objective and evade detections.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null)), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_path\"), \"string\", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND like(cmd_line, \"%delete%\") AND process_name = \"sc.exe\" | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null)), body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line, \"process_name\", process_name, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process_name, \"process_path\", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible administrative scripts may start/stop/delete services. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1543.003/T1543.003.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 13"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/ssa_data1/sc_del.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to delete a service.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1489", "T1543", "T1543.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest_device_id", "process_name", "parent_process_name", "process_path", "dest_user_id", "process", "cmd_line"], "risk_score": 36, "risk_severity": "high", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Service Stop", "Create or Modify System Process", "Windows Service"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group", "no", "Blue Mockingbird", "DarkVishnya", "Wizard Spider", "APT32", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Tropic Trooper", "Cobalt Group", "Ke3chang", "Honeybee", "FIN7", "Threat Group-3390", "APT19", "APT3", "Lazarus Group", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "attempt_to_delete_services_filter"}]}, {"name": "Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell", "id": "5ee2bcd0-b2ff-11eb-bb34-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-12", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This following analytic detects PowerShell command to delete shadow copy using the WMIC PowerShell module. This technique was seen used by a recent adversary to deploy DarkSide Ransomware where it executed a child process of PowerShell to execute a hex encoded command to delete shadow copy. This hex encoded command was able to be decrypted by PowerShell log.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message= \"*ShadowCopy*\" (Message = \"*Delete*\" OR Message = \"*Remove*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the powershell logs from your endpoints. make sure you enable needed registry to monitor this event.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html", "https://searchwindowsserver.techtarget.com/tutorial/Set-up-PowerShell-script-block-logging-for-added-security"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An attempt to delete ShadowCopy was performed using PowerShell on $ComputerName$ by $User$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1490"], "observable": [{"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Inhibit System Recovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "id": "f5f6af30-7aa7-4295-bfe9-07fe87c01a4b", "version": 6, "date": "2021-09-07", "author": "Jose Hernandez, David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to launch an application or service at system startup.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\run* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentVersion\\\\Windows\\\\Appinit_Dlls* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Shell* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Notify* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Userinit* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\VmApplet* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\policies\\\\explorer\\\\run* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\runservices* OR Registry.registry_path=HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Netsh\\\\* OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Image File Execution Options*\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=Debugger) OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Security Packages\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\\\\OSConfig\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Security Packages\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\SilentProcessExit\\\\*\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*currentVersion\\\\Windows\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Load\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentVersion\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Svchost\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\"AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"BootExecute\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Software\\\\Run\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"auto_update\")) by Registry.dest Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "There are many legitimate applications that must execute on system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Ransomware", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "IcedID", "Remcos"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 95, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Persistence"}, "Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to persistence in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1547.001", "T1547"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user"], "risk_score": 76, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Rocke", "Tropic Trooper", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Silence", "RTM", "Inception", "APT41", "Machete", "Kimsuky", "APT33", "APT39", "APT32", "APT18", "Turla", "Dark Caracal", "Cobalt Group", "Honeybee", "Threat Group-3390", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Gorgon Group", "Ke3chang", "APT19", "Leviathan", "MuddyWater", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Magic Hound", "APT3", "FIN10", "FIN7", "Patchwork", "FIN6", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "APT29", "Darkhotel", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect SharpHound File Modifications", "id": "42b4b438-beed-11eb-ba1d-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-27", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "SharpHound is used as a reconnaissance collector, ingestor, for BloodHound. SharpHound will query the domain controller and begin gathering all the data related to the domain and trusts. For output, it will drop a .zip file upon completion following a typical pattern that is often not changed. This analytic focuses on the default file name scheme. Note that this may be evaded with different parameters within SharpHound, but that depends on the operator. `-randomizefilenames` and `-encryptzip` are two examples. In addition, executing SharpHound via .exe or .ps1 without any command-line arguments will still perform activity and dump output to the default filename. Example default filename `20210601181553_BloodHound.zip`. SharpHound creates multiple temp files following the same pattern `20210601182121_computers.json`, `domains.json`, `gpos.json`, `ous.json` and `users.json`. Tuning may be required, or remove these json's entirely if it is too noisy. During traige, review parallel processes for further suspicious behavior. Typically, the process executing the `.ps1` ingestor will be PowerShell.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*bloodhound.zip\", \"*_computers.json\", \"*_gpos.json\", \"*_domains.json\", \"*_users.json\", \"*_groups.json\") by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_sharphound_file_modifications_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on file modifications that include the name of the process, and file, responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as the analytic is specific to a filename with extension .zip. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0521/", "https://thedfirreport.com/?s=bloodhound", "https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/tree/master/Collectors", "https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/SharpHound3", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md#atomic-test-2---run-bloodhound-from-local-disk"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Discovery Techniques", "Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/sharphound/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Potential SharpHound file modifications identified on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087.002", "T1069.001", "T1482", "T1087.001", "T1087", "T1069.002", "T1069"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "file_path", "dest", "file_name", "process_id", "file_create_time"], "risk_score": 24, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Domain Account", "Local Groups", "Domain Trust Discovery", "Local Account", "Account Discovery", "Domain Groups", "Permission Groups Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery", "Discovery", "Discovery", "Discovery", "Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Turla", "Sandworm Team", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "Ke3chang", "Turla", "OilRig", "admin@338", "Wizard Spider", "Turla", "Poseidon Group", "OilRig", "Ke3chang", "APT32", "APT1", "Threat Group-3390", "APT3", "admin@338", "no", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "Inception", "OilRig", "FIN6", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Ke3chang", "TA505", "APT3"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_sharphound_file_modifications_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments", "id": "a0bdd2f6-c2ff-11eb-b918-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-01", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies common command-line arguments used by SharpHound `-collectionMethod` and `invoke-bloodhound`. Being the script is FOSS, function names may be modified, but these changes are dependent upon the operator. In most instances the defaults are used. This analytic works to identify the common command-line attributes used. It does not cover the entirety of every argument in order to avoid false positives.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process IN (\"*-collectionMethod*\",\"*invoke-bloodhound*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_sharphound_command_line_arguments_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as the arguments used are specific to SharpHound. Filter as needed or add more command-line arguments as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0521/", "https://thedfirreport.com/?s=bloodhound", "https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/tree/master/Collectors", "https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/SharpHound3", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md#atomic-test-2---run-bloodhound-from-local-disk"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Discovery Techniques", "Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/sharphound/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Possible SharpHound command-Line arguments identified on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087.002", "T1069.001", "T1482", "T1087.001", "T1087", "T1069.002", "T1069"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 24, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Domain Account", "Local Groups", "Domain Trust Discovery", "Local Account", "Account Discovery", "Domain Groups", "Permission Groups Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery", "Discovery", "Discovery", "Discovery", "Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Turla", "Sandworm Team", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "Ke3chang", "Turla", "OilRig", "admin@338", "Wizard Spider", "Turla", "Poseidon Group", "OilRig", "Ke3chang", "APT32", "APT1", "Threat Group-3390", "APT3", "admin@338", "no", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "Inception", "OilRig", "FIN6", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Ke3chang", "TA505", "APT3"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_sharphound_command_line_arguments_filter"}]}, {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI", "id": "d25d2c3d-d9d8-40ec-8fdf-e86fe155a3da", "version": 7, "date": "2021-11-12", "author": "Rico Valdez, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies wmic.exe being launched with parameters to spawn a process on a remote system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WMI and this binary for lateral movement and remote code execution.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` (Processes.process=\"*/node:*\" AND Processes.process=\"*process*\" AND Processes.process=\"*call*\" AND Processes.process=\"*create*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "The wmic.exe utility is a benign Windows application. It may be used legitimately by Administrators with these parameters for remote system administration, but it's relatively uncommon.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/cimwin32prov/create-method-in-class-win32-process"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Suspicious WMI Use", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A wmic.exe process $process$ contain process spawn commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Windows Management Instrumentation"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT41", "FIN6", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Threat Group-3390", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "menuPass", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_wmic"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect RClone Command-Line Usage", "id": "e8b74268-5454-11ec-a799-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-03", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "This analytic identifies commonly used command-line arguments used by `rclone.exe` to initiate a file transfer. Some arguments were negated as they are specific to the configuration used by adversaries. In particular, an adversary may list the files or directories of the remote file share using `ls` or `lsd`, which is not indicative of malicious behavior. During triage, at this stage of a ransomware event, exfiltration is about to occur or has already. Isolate the endpoint and continue investigating by review file modifications and parallel processes.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where \"Endpoint_Processes\" IN(_datamodels) | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null), process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_path\"), \"string\", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND process_name IS NOT NULL AND process_name=\"rclone.exe\" AND (like (cmd_line, \"%copy%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%mega%\")OR like (cmd_line, \"%pcloud%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%ftp%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%--config%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%--progress%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%--no-check-certificate%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%--ignore-existing%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%--auto-confirm%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%--transfers%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%--multi-thread-streams%\")) | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null)) | eval body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line, \"process_name\", process_name, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process_name, \"process_path\", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint_Processess` datamodel.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as this is restricted to the Rclone process name. Filter or tune the analytic as needed.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/blog/rclone-mega-extortion/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html", "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/", "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/11/29/continuing-the-bazar-ransomware-story/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1020/windows-security.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to connect to a remote cloud service to move files or folders.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1020"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest_device_id", "process_name", "parent_process_name", "process_path", "dest_user_id", "process", "cmd_line"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Automated Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Tropic Trooper", "Frankenstein", "Honeybee"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_rclone_command_line_usage_filter"}]}, {"name": "Known Services Killed by Ransomware", "id": "3070f8e0-c528-11eb-b2a0-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-04", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search detects a suspicioous termination of known services killed by ransomware before encrypting files in a compromised machine. This technique is commonly seen in most of ransomware now a days to avoid exception error while accessing the targetted files it wants to encrypts because of the open handle of those services to the targetted file.", "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 Message IN (\"*Volume Shadow Copy*\",\"*VSS*\", \"*backup*\", \"*sophos*\", \"*sql*\", \"*memtas*\", \"*mepocs*\", \"*veeam*\", \"*svc$*\") Message=\"*service entered the stopped state*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message dest Type | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `known_services_killed_by_ransomware_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the 7036 EventCode ScManager in System audit Logs from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Admin activities or installing related updates may do a sudden stop to list of services we monitor.", "references": ["https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "BlackMatter Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf3/windows-system.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Known services $Message$ terminated by a potential ransomware on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1490"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Message", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "dest", "Type"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Inhibit System Recovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_system"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "known_services_killed_by_ransomware_filter"}]}, {"name": "WBAdmin Delete System Backups", "id": "71efbf52-4dbb-4c00-a520-306aa546cbb7", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-07", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "This search looks for flags passed to wbadmin.exe (Windows Backup Administrator Tool) that delete backup files. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent recovery.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null)), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_path\"), \"string\", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND process_name IS NOT NULL AND process_name=\"wbadmin.exe\" AND like (cmd_line, \"%delete%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%catalog%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%systemstatebackup%\") | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null)), body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line, \"process_name\", process_name, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process_name, \"process_path\", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint_Processess` datamodel.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may modify the boot configuration.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1490/T1490.md", "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/08/ryuks-return/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wbadmin"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": [], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to delete system backups.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1490"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest_device_id", "process_name", "parent_process_name", "process_path", "dest_user_id", "process", "cmd_line"], "risk_score": 15, "risk_severity": "high", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Inhibit System Recovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "wbadmin_delete_system_backups_filter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Event Log Cleared", "id": "ad517544-aff9-4c96-bd99-d6eb43bfbb6a", "version": 6, "date": "2020-07-06", "author": "Rico Valdez, Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes Windows Security Event ID 1102 or System log event 104 to identify when a Windows event log is cleared. Note that this analytic will require tuning or restricted to specific endpoints based on criticality. During triage, based on time of day and user, determine if this was planned. If not planned, follow through with reviewing parallel alerts and other data sources to determine what else may have occurred.", "search": "(`wineventlog_security` EventCode=1102) OR (`wineventlog_system` EventCode=104) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest Message EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_event_log_cleared_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows event logs from your hosts. In addition, the Splunk Windows TA is needed.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible that these logs may be legitimately cleared by Administrators. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-1102", "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/defense-evasion/disabling-windows-event-logs-by-suspending-eventlog-service-threads", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/001/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1070.001/T1070.001.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Log Manipulation", "Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Windows event logs cleared on $dest$ via EventCode $EventCode$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1070", "T1070.001"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "PR.IP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "dest"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Indicator Removal on Host", "Clear Windows Event Logs"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT41", "APT38", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT32", "FIN8", "FIN5", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_system"}, {"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "windows_event_log_cleared_filter"}]}, {"name": "System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations", "id": "a34aae96-ccf8-4aef-952c-3ea21444444d", "version": 6, "date": "2020-12-08", "author": "David Dorsey, Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for system processes that typically execute from `C:\\Windows\\System32\\` or `C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64`. This may indicate a malicious process that is trying to hide as a legitimate process.\\\nThis detection utilizes a lookup that is deduped `system32` and `syswow64` directories from Server 2016 and Windows 10.\\\nDuring triage, review the parallel processes - what process moved the native Windows binary? identify any artifacts on disk and review. If a remote destination is contacted, what is the reputation?", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_path !=\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32*\" Processes.process_path !=\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_hash | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `is_windows_system_file` | `system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "This detection may require tuning based on third party applications utilizing native Windows binaries in non-standard paths.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.yaml", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Unusual Processes", "Ransomware", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "System process running from unexpected location on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1036", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Processes.process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.user", "Processes.dest", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_hash"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Masquerading", "Rename System Utilities"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Windshift", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "Dragonfly 2.0", "menuPass", "APT32", "Soft Cell", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "lookup update=true is_windows_system_file filename as process_name OUTPUT systemFile | search systemFile=true", "description": "This macro limits the output to process names that are in the Windows System directory", "name": "is_windows_system_file", "lookups": [{"default_match": "false", "description": "A full baseline of executable files in Windows\\System32 and Windows\\Syswow64, including sub-directories from Server 2016 and Windows 10.", "filename": "is_windows_system_file.csv", "min_matches": 1, "name": "is_windows_system_file", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/is_windows_system_file.csv"}]}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect SharpHound Usage", "id": "dd04b29a-beed-11eb-87bc-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-05-27", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies SharpHound binary usage by using the original filena,e. In addition to renaming the PE, other coverage is available to detect command-line arguments. This particular analytic looks for the original_file_name of `SharpHound.exe` and the process name. It is possible older instances of SharpHound.exe have different original filenames. Dependent upon the operator, the code may be re-compiled and the attributes removed or changed to anything else. During triage, review the metadata of the binary in question. Review parallel processes for suspicious behavior. Identify the source of this binary.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=sharphound.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=SharpHound.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_sharphound_usage_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as this is specific to a file attribute not used by anything else. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0521/", "https://thedfirreport.com/?s=bloodhound", "https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/tree/master/Collectors", "https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/SharpHound3", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md#atomic-test-2---run-bloodhound-from-local-disk"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Discovery Techniques", "Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/sharphound/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Potential SharpHound binary identified on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087.002", "T1069.001", "T1482", "T1087.001", "T1087", "T1069.002", "T1069"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 24, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Domain Account", "Local Groups", "Domain Trust Discovery", "Local Account", "Account Discovery", "Domain Groups", "Permission Groups Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery", "Discovery", "Discovery", "Discovery", "Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Turla", "Sandworm Team", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "Ke3chang", "Turla", "OilRig", "admin@338", "Wizard Spider", "Turla", "Poseidon Group", "OilRig", "Ke3chang", "APT32", "APT1", "Threat Group-3390", "APT3", "admin@338", "no", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "Inception", "OilRig", "FIN6", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Ke3chang", "TA505", "APT3"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_sharphound_usage_filter"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage Of Net App", "id": "45e52536-ae42-11eb-b5c6-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-05-06", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies excessive usage of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` within a bucket of time (1 minute). This behavior was seen in a Monero incident where the adversary attempts to create many users, delete and disable users as part of its malicious behavior.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=1m | where count >=10 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_net_app_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "unknown. Filter as needed. Modify the time span as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig", "Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Scope:Local", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Excessive usage of net1.exe or net.exe within 1m, with command line $process$ has been detected on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1531"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process Name", "role": ["Process", "Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 28, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Account Access Removal"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_net"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "excessive_usage_of_net_app_filter"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", "id": "5d9c6eee-988c-11eb-8253-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-08", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed from a user writeable file path.\\\nThe search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not.\\\nschtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\\Windows\\system32` and `C:\\Windows\\syswow64`.\\\nThe following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory.\\\nUpon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or was it via TaskService. Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message | search Command IN (\"*\\\\users\\\\public\\\\*\", \"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Tasks\\\\*\", \"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Task_Name, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required.", "known_false_positives": "False positives are possible if legitimate applications are allowed to register tasks in public paths. Filter as needed based on paths that are used legitimately.", "references": ["https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/irans-apt34-returns-with-an-updated-arsenal/", "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4698", "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/scheduled-task-job/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/taskschd/time-trigger-example--scripting-?redirectedfrom=MSDN", "https://app.any.run/tasks/e26f1b2e-befa-483b-91d2-e18636e2faf3/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "IcedID", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/taskschedule/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "message": "A windows scheduled task was created (task name=$Task_Name$) on $dest$ by the following command: $Command$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Command", "type": "Command", "role": ["Target"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "Task_Name", "Description", "Command"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Scheduled Task", "Scheduled Task/Job"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "MuddyWater", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT-C-36", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT41", "Machete", "Soft Cell", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Patchwork", "OilRig", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "FIN8", "menuPass", "FIN10", "APT32", "FIN7", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path_filter"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Disable Security Monitoring", "id": "c148a894-dd93-11eb-bf2a-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-07-05", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to identifies a modification in registry to disable the windows denfender real time behavior monitoring. This event or technique is commonly seen in RAT, bot, or Trojan to disable AV to evade detections.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process=\"*set-mppreference*\" AND Processes.process IN (\"*disablerealtimemonitoring*\",\"*disableioavprotection*\",\"*disableintrusionpreventionsystem*\",\"*disablescriptscanning*\",\"*disableblockatfirstseen*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_disable_security_monitoring_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives. However, tune based on scripts that may perform this action.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md#atomic-test-15---tamper-with-windows-defender-atp-powershell"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/pwh_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_powershell"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "powershell_disable_security_monitoring_filter"}]}, {"name": "BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification", "id": "809b31d2-5462-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 1, "date": "2020-12-21", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for flags passed to bcdedit.exe modifications to the built-in Windows error recovery boot configurations. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent recovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = bcdedit.exe Processes.process=\"*recoveryenabled*\" (Processes.process=\"* no*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. Tune based on parent process names.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may modify the boot configuration.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1490/T1490.md#atomic-test-4---windows---disable-windows-recovery-console-repair"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Impact"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting disable the ability to recover the endpoint.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1490"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Inhibit System Recovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification_filter"}]}, {"name": "Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit", "id": "7742aa92-c9d9-11eb-bbfc-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-10", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious bcdedit.exe execution to ignore all failures. This technique was used by ransomware to prevent the compromise machine automatically boot in repair mode.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"bcdedit.exe\" Processes.process = \"*bootstatuspolicy*\" Processes.process = \"*ignoreallfailures*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `prevent_automatic_repair_mode_using_bcdedit_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed bcdedit.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may modify the boot configuration ignore failure during testing and debugging.", "references": ["https://jsac.jpcert.or.jp/archive/2020/pdf/JSAC2020_1_tamada-yamazaki-nakatsuru_en.pdf"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Impact"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A suspicious process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ contains commandline $process$ to ignore all bcdedit execution failure in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1490"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process_guid"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Inhibit System Recovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "prevent_automatic_repair_mode_using_bcdedit_filter"}]}, {"name": "Allow Network Discovery In Firewall", "id": "ccd6a38c-d40b-11eb-85a5-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-06-23", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious modification to the firewall to allow network discovery on a machine. This technique was seen in couple of ransomware (revil, reddot) to discover other machine connected to the compromised host to encrypt more files.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_netsh` Processes.process= \"*firewall*\" Processes.process= \"*group=\\\"Network Discovery\\\"*\" Processes.process=\"*enable*\" Processes.process=\"*Yes*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `allow_network_discovery_in_firewall_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "network admin may modify this firewall feature that may cause this rule to be triggered.", "references": ["https://kb.fortinet.com/kb/documentLink.do?externalID=FD52469", "https://app.any.run/tasks/c0f98850-af65-4352-9746-fbebadee4f05/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.007", "T1562"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=netsh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=netsh.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_netsh"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "allow_network_discovery_in_firewall_filter"}]}, {"name": "WBAdmin Delete System Backups", "id": "cd5aed7e-5cea-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-22", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for flags passed to wbadmin.exe (Windows Backup Administrator Tool) that delete backup files. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent recovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wbadmin.exe Processes.process=\"*delete*\" AND (Processes.process=\"*catalog*\" OR Processes.process=\"*systemstatebackup*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `wbadmin_delete_system_backups_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. Tune based on parent process names.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may modify the boot configuration.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1490/T1490.md", "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/08/ryuks-return/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wbadmin"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "System backups deletion on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1490"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Inhibit System Recovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "wbadmin_delete_system_backups_filter"}]}, {"name": "Disable Logs Using WevtUtil", "id": "236e7c8e-c9d9-11eb-a824-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-10", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect execution of wevtutil.exe to disable logs. This technique was seen in several ransomware to disable the event logs to evade alerts and detections.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"wevtutil.exe\" Processes.process = \"*sl*\" Processes.process = \"*/e:false*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_logs_using_wevtutil_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "network operator may disable audit event logs for debugging purposes.", "references": ["https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-ransom-x-ransomware-used-in-texas-txdot-cyberattack/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": [{"Source": "Endpoint"}, {"Stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "WevtUtil.exe used to disable Event Logging on $dest", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1070", "T1070.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process_guid"], "risk_score": 24, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Indicator Removal on Host", "Clear Windows Event Logs"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT41", "APT38", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT32", "FIN8", "FIN5", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disable_logs_using_wevtutil_filter"}]}, {"name": "Permission Modification using Takeown App", "id": "fa7ca5c6-c9d8-11eb-bce9-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-10", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a modification of file or directory permission using takeown.exe windows app. This technique was seen in some ransomware that take the ownership of a folder or files to encrypt or delete it.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"takeown.exe\" Processes.process = \"*/f*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `permission_modification_using_takeown_app_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "takeown.exe is a normal windows application that may used by network operator.", "references": ["https://research.nccgroup.com/2020/06/23/wastedlocker-a-new-ransomware-variant-developed-by-the-evil-corp-group/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A suspicious of execution of $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ and commandline $process$ to modify permission of directory or files in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1222"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "process name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process_guid"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["File and Directory Permissions Modification"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "permission_modification_using_takeown_app_filter"}]}, {"name": "Allow Operation with Consent Admin", "id": "7de17d7a-c9d8-11eb-a812-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-10", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies a potential privilege escalation attempt to perform malicious task. This registry modification is designed to allow the `Consent Admin` to perform an operation that requires elevation without consent or credentials. We also found this in some attacker to gain privilege escalation to the compromise machine.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System*\" Registry.registry_value_name = ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000000\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `allow_operation_with_consent_admin_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-gpsb/341747f5-6b5d-4d30-85fc-fa1cc04038d4", "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/no/threat-encyclopedia/malware/Ransom.Win32.MRDEC.MRA/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious registry modification was performed on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior is indicative of privilege escalation.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.dest"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "allow_operation_with_consent_admin_filter"}]}, {"name": "USN Journal Deletion", "id": "b6e0ff70-b122-4227-9368-4cf322ab43c3", "version": 2, "date": "2018-12-03", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The fsutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows utility used to perform tasks related to the file allocation table (FAT) and NTFS file systems. The update sequence number (USN) change journal provides a log of all changes made to the files on the disk. This search looks for fsutil.exe deleting the USN journal.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=fsutil.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search process=\"*deletejournal*\" AND process=\"*usn*\" | `usn_journal_deletion_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "None identified", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Log Manipulation", "Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8", "CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Possible USN journal deletion on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1070"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.DP", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest"], "risk_score": 45, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Indicator Removal on Host"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "usn_journal_deletion_filter"}]}, {"name": "Modification Of Wallpaper", "id": "accb0712-c381-11eb-8e5b-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-02", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies suspicious modification of registry to deface or change the wallpaper of a compromised machines as part of its payload. This technique was commonly seen in ransomware like REVIL where it create a bitmap file contain a note that the machine was compromised and make it as a wallpaper.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode =13 (TargetObject= \"*\\\\Control Panel\\\\Desktop\\\\Wallpaper\" AND Image != \"*\\\\explorer.exe\") OR (TargetObject= \"*\\\\Control Panel\\\\Desktop\\\\Wallpaper\" AND Details = \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Image TargetObject Details Computer process_guid process_id user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `modification_of_wallpaper_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Image, TargetObject registry key, registry Details from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "3rd party tool may used to changed the wallpaper of the machine", "references": ["https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware", "BlackMatter Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Wallpaper modification on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1491"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Image", "TargetObject", "Details", "Computer", "process_guid", "process_id", "user_id"], "risk_score": 54, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Defacement"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "modification_of_wallpaper_filter"}]}, {"name": "WevtUtil Usage To Clear Logs", "id": "5438113c-cdd9-11eb-93b8-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-06-15", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "The wevtutil.exe application is the windows event log utility. This searches for wevtutil.exe with parameters for clearing the application, security, setup, powershell, sysmon, or system event logs.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where \"Endpoint_Processes\" IN(_datamodels) | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null), process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_path\"), \"string\", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND like(cmd_line, \"% cl %\") AND (match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)security/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)system/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)sysmon/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)application/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)setup/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)powershell/)=true) AND process_name=\"wevtutil.exe\" | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null)) | eval body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line, \"process_name\", process_name, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process_name, \"process_path\", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "The wevtutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows event log utility. Administrators may use it to manage Windows event logs.", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-clop-ransomware.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Log Manipulation", "Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/ssa_wevtutil/clear_evt.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A wevtutil process $process_name$ with commandline $cmd_line$ to clear event logs in host $dest_device_id$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1070", "T1070.001"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest_device_id", "process_name", "parent_process_name", "process_path", "dest_user_id", "process"], "risk_score": 63, "risk_severity": "medium", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Indicator Removal on Host", "Clear Windows Event Logs"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT41", "APT38", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT32", "FIN8", "FIN5", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "wevtutil_usage_to_clear_logs_filter"}]}, {"name": "Resize Shadowstorage Volume", "id": "dbc30554-d27e-11eb-9e5e-acde48001122", "version": 3, "date": "2021-11-30", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the resizing of shadowstorage using vssadmin.exe to avoid the shadow volumes being made again. This technique is typically found used by adversaries during a ransomware event and a precursor to deleting the shadowstorage.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null)), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_path\"), \"string\", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND like(cmd_line, \"%resize%\") AND like(cmd_line, \"%shadowstorage%\") AND like(cmd_line, \"%maxsize%\") AND process_name=\"vssadmin.exe\" | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null)), body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line, \"process_name\", process_name, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process_name, \"process_path\", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "System administrators may resize the shadowstorage for valid purposes. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10", "CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/ssa_data1/windows-security.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to create a shadow copy to perform offline password cracking.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1489"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest_device_id", "process_name", "parent_process_name", "process_path", "dest_user_id", "process", "cmd_line"], "risk_score": 64, "risk_severity": "high", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Service Stop"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "resize_shadowstorage_volume_filter"}]}, {"name": "Common Ransomware Extensions", "id": "a9e5c5db-db11-43ca-86a8-c852d1b2c0ec", "version": 4, "date": "2020-11-09", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The search looks for file modifications with extensions commonly used by Ransomware", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| rex field=file_name \"(?\\.[^\\.]+)$\" | `ransomware_extensions` | `common_ransomware_extensions_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.\\\nThis search produces fields (`query`,`query_length`,`count`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** Name, **Field:** Name\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** File Extension, **Field:** file_extension\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", "known_false_positives": "It is possible for a legitimate file with these extensions to be created. If this is a true ransomware attack, there will be a large number of files created with these extensions.", "references": [], "tags": {"Consequence": "Data Destruction", "analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/ransomware_extensions/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$, this is indicative of a known ransomware file extension and should be reviewed immediately.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1485"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "file_name", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.user", "Filesystem.dest", "Filesystem.file_path", "Filesystem.file_name"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Data Destruction"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Lazarus Group", "APT38"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "lookup update=true ransomware_extensions_lookup Extensions AS file_extension OUTPUT Name | search Name !=False", "description": "This macro limits the output to files that have extensions associated with ransomware", "name": "ransomware_extensions", "lookups": [{"default_match": "false", "description": "A list of file extensions that are associated with ransomware", "filename": "ransomware_extensions.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(Extensions)", "min_matches": 1, "name": "ransomware_extensions_lookup", "case_sensitive_match": "false", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/ransomware_extensions.csv"}]}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "common_ransomware_extensions_filter"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Execute COM Object", "id": "65711630-f9bf-11eb-8d72-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-10", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a COM CLSID execution through powershell. This technique was seen in several adversaries and malware like ransomware conti where it has a feature to execute command using COM Object. This technique may use by network operator at some cases but a good indicator if some application want to gain privilege escalation or bypass uac.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromCLSID*\" OR Message = \"*CreateInstance([Type]::GetTypeFromProgID*\"| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_execute_com_object_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "network operrator may use this command.", "references": ["https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1423361119926816776.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/conti/conti_leak/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains COM CLSID command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1546.015", "T1546"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 5, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Component Object Model Hijacking", "Event Triggered Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "powershell_execute_com_object_filter"}]}, {"name": "Start Up During Safe Mode Boot", "id": "c6149154-c9d8-11eb-9da7-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-10", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a modification or registry add to the safeboot registry as an autostart mechanism. This technique was seen in some ransomware to automatically execute its code upon a safe mode boot.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\System\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\SafeBoot\\\\Minimal\\*\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `start_up_during_safe_mode_boot_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "updated windows application needed in safe boot may used this registry", "references": ["https://malware.news/t/threat-analysis-unit-tau-threat-intelligence-notification-snatch-ransomware/36365"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Safeboot registry $registry_path$ was added or modified with a new value $registry_value_name$ on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1547.001", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.dest"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Rocke", "Tropic Trooper", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Silence", "RTM", "Inception", "APT41", "Machete", "Kimsuky", "APT33", "APT39", "APT32", "APT18", "Turla", "Dark Caracal", "Cobalt Group", "Honeybee", "Threat Group-3390", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Gorgon Group", "Ke3chang", "APT19", "Leviathan", "MuddyWater", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Magic Hound", "APT3", "FIN10", "FIN7", "Patchwork", "FIN6", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "APT29", "Darkhotel", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "start_up_during_safe_mode_boot_filter"}]}, {"name": "BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification", "id": "76d79d6e-25bb-40f6-b3b2-e0a6b7e5ea13", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-07", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "This search looks for flags passed to bcdedit.exe modifications to the built-in Windows error recovery boot configurations. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent recovery.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null)), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_path\"), \"string\", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND process_name IS NOT NULL AND process_name=\"bcdedit.exe\" AND (like (cmd_line, \"%recoveryenabled%\") AND like (cmd_line, \"%no%\")) | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null)), body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line, \"process_name\", process_name, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process_name, \"process_path\", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint_Processess` datamodel.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may modify the boot configuration.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1490/T1490.md#atomic-test-4---windows---disable-windows-recovery-console-repair"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Impact"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting disable the ability to recover the endpoint.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1490"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest_device_id", "process_name", "parent_process_name", "process_path", "dest_user_id", "process", "cmd_line"], "risk_score": 80, "risk_severity": "high", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Inhibit System Recovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification_filter"}]}, {"name": "Revil Common Exec Parameter", "id": "85facebe-c382-11eb-9c3e-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-06-02", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies suspicious commandline parameter that are commonly used by REVIL ransomware to encrypts the compromise machine.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"* -nolan *\" OR Processes.process = \"* -nolocal *\" OR Processes.process = \"* -fast *\" OR Processes.process = \"* -full *\" by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `revil_common_exec_parameter_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "third party tool may have same command line parameters as revil ransomware.", "references": ["https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ related to revil ransomware in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1204"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process_guid"], "risk_score": 54, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["User Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "revil_common_exec_parameter_filter"}]}, {"name": "Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall", "id": "ce27646e-d411-11eb-8a00-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-06-23", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious modification of firewall to allow file and printer sharing. This technique was seen in ransomware to be able to discover more machine connected to the compromised host to encrypt more files", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_netsh` Processes.process= \"*firewall*\" Processes.process= \"*group=\\\"File and Printer Sharing\\\"*\" Processes.process=\"*enable=Yes*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "network admin may modify this firewall feature that may cause this rule to be triggered.", "references": ["https://kb.fortinet.com/kb/documentLink.do?externalID=FD52469", "https://app.any.run/tasks/c0f98850-af65-4352-9746-fbebadee4f05/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.007", "T1562"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=netsh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=netsh.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_netsh"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect RClone Command-Line Usage", "id": "32e0baea-b3f1-11eb-a2ce-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-11-29", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies commonly used command-line arguments used by `rclone.exe` to initiate a file transfer. Some arguments were negated as they are specific to the configuration used by adversaries. In particular, an adversary may list the files or directories of the remote file share using `ls` or `lsd`, which is not indicative of malicious behavior. During triage, at this stage of a ransomware event, exfiltration is about to occur or has already. Isolate the endpoint and continue investigating by review file modifications and parallel processes.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rclone` Processes.process IN (\"*copy*\", \"*mega*\", \"*pcloud*\", \"*ftp*\", \"*--config*\", \"*--progress*\", \"*--no-check-certificate*\", \"*--ignore-existing*\", \"*--auto-confirm*\", \"*--transfers*\", \"*--multi-thread-streams*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rclone_command_line_usage_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as this is restricted to the Rclone process name. Filter or tune the analytic as needed.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/blog/rclone-mega-extortion/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html", "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/", "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/11/29/continuing-the-bazar-ransomware-story/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1020/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to connect to a remote cloud service to move files or folders.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1020"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id", "Processes.original_file_name"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Automated Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Tropic Trooper", "Frankenstein", "Honeybee"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.original_file_name=rclone.exe OR Processes.process_name=rclone.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name.", "name": "process_rclone"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_rclone_command_line_usage_filter"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature", "id": "afed80b2-d34b-11eb-a952-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-22", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious enabling of smb1protocol through \"powershell.exe\". This technique was seen in some ransomware (like reddot) where it enable smb share to do the lateral movement and encrypt other files within the compromise network system.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*Enable-WindowsOptionalFeature*\" Message = \"*SMB1Protocol*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the powershell logs from your endpoints. make sure you enable needed registry to monitor this event.", "known_false_positives": "network operator may enable or disable this windows feature.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/c0f98850-af65-4352-9746-fbebadee4f05/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-powershell.log"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1027", "T1027.005"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Obfuscated Files or Information", "Indicator Removal from Tools"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "Whitefly", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Mofang", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "Soft Cell", "Turla", "TA505", "Silence", "APT33", "Night Dragon", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "APT29", "APT18", "Tropic Trooper", "Cobalt Group", "Patchwork", "Leafminer", "APT37", "Threat Group-3390", "Honeybee", "Dark Caracal", "menuPass", "APT19", "BlackOasis", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "Elderwood", "MuddyWater", "FIN7", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "APT3", "APT32", "Group5", "Dust Storm", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "APT28", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "Patchwork", "APT3", "Turla", "OilRig", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature_filter"}]}, {"name": "7zip CommandLine To SMB Share Path", "id": "01d29b48-ff6f-11eb-b81e-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-17", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious 7z process with commandline pointing to SMB network share. This technique was seen in CONTI LEAK tools where it use 7z to archive a sensitive files and place it in network share tmp folder. This search is a good hunting query that may give analyst a hint why specific user try to archive a file pointing to SMB user which is un usual.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name =\"7z.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"7za.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name = \"7z.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name = \"7za.exe\") AND (Processes.process=\"*\\\\C$\\\\*\" OR Processes.process=\"*\\\\Admin$\\\\*\" OR Processes.process=\"*\\\\IPC$\\\\*\") by Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `7zip_commandline_to_smb_share_path_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed 7z.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1423361119926816776.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/conti/conti_leak/windows-sysmon_7z.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "archive process $process_name$ with suspicious cmdline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1560.001", "T1560"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "SourceImage", "type": "process name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Archive via Utility", "Archive Collected Data"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Soft Cell", "Turla", "Gallmaker", "APT33", "APT39", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "FIN8", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT3", "Sowbug", "menuPass", "APT1", "Ke3chang", "menuPass", "APT32", "Honeybee", "Patchwork", "APT28", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN6", "Lazarus Group", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "7zip_commandline_to_smb_share_path_filter"}]}, {"name": "Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI", "id": "28077620-c9f6-11eb-8785-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-10", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 performing checks to identify anti-virus products installed on the endpoint. This technique is commonly found in malware and APT events where the adversary will map all running security applications or services. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*SELECT*\" OR Message = \"*WMIC*\") AND (Message = \"*AntiVirusProduct*\" OR Message = \"*AntiSpywareProduct*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "network administrator may used this command for checking purposes", "references": ["https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/05/12/maze-ransomware-1-year-counting/", "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Malicious PowerShell"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Reconnaissance"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains AV recon command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1592"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi_filter"}]}, {"name": "Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD", "id": "ba570b3a-d356-11eb-8358-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-06-22", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious commandline designed to delete files or directory recursive using batch command. This technique was seen in ransomware (reddot) where it it tries to delete the files in recycle bin to impaire user from recovering deleted files.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` Processes.process=*/c* Processes.process=* rd * Processes.process=\"*/s*\" Processes.process=\"*/q*\" by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.dest |`drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "network operator may use this batch command to delete recursively a directory or files within directory", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/c0f98850-af65-4352-9746-fbebadee4f05/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1070.004", "T1070"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["File Deletion", "Indicator Removal on Host"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Rocke", "Tropic Trooper", "Gamaredon Group", "Wizard Spider", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Silence", "The White Company", "TEMP.Veles", "APT32", "APT38", "Patchwork", "Honeybee", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "menuPass", "FIN8", "OilRig", "FIN5", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Magic Hound", "APT3", "FIN10", "APT28", "Threat Group-3390", "Group5", "Lazarus Group", "APT18", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_cmd"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd_filter"}]}, {"name": "Common Ransomware Notes", "id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d6bd71", "version": 4, "date": "2020-11-09", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The search looks for files created with names matching those typically used in ransomware notes that tell the victim how to get their data back.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `ransomware_notes` | `common_ransomware_notes_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Filesystem data-model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system reads and writes.", "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a legitimate file could be created with the same name used by ransomware note files.", "references": [], "tags": {"Consequence": "Data Destruction", "analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/ransomware_notes/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$, this is indicative of a known ransomware note file and should be reviewed immediately.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1485"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "file_name", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.user", "Filesystem.dest", "Filesystem.file_path", "Filesystem.file_name"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Data Destruction"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Lazarus Group", "APT38"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "lookup ransomware_notes_lookup ransomware_notes as file_name OUTPUT status as \"Known Ransomware Notes\" | search \"Known Ransomware Notes\"=True", "description": "This macro limits the output to files that have been identified as a ransomware note", "name": "ransomware_notes", "lookups": [{"default_match": "false", "description": "A list of file names that are ransomware note files", "filename": "ransomware_notes.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(ransomware_notes)", "min_matches": 1, "name": "ransomware_notes_lookup", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/ransomware_notes.csv"}]}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "common_ransomware_notes_filter"}]}, {"name": "Deleting Shadow Copies", "id": "b89919ed-ee5f-492c-b139-95dbb162039e", "version": 4, "date": "2020-11-09", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The vssadmin.exe utility is used to interact with the Volume Shadow Copy Service. Wmic is an interface to the Windows Management Instrumentation. This search looks for either of these tools being used to delete shadow copies.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=vssadmin.exe OR Processes.process_name=wmic.exe) Processes.process=*delete* Processes.process=*shadow* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `deleting_shadow_copies_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "vssadmin.exe and wmic.exe are standard applications shipped with modern versions of windows. They may be used by administrators to legitimately delete old backup copies, although this is typically rare.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Log Manipulation", "SamSam Ransomware", "Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to delete shadow copies.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1490"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Inhibit System Recovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "deleting_shadow_copies_filter"}]}, {"name": "Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring", "id": "79439cae-9200-11eb-a4d3-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-31", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to identifies a modification in registry to disable the windows denfender real time behavior monitoring. This event or technique is commonly seen in RAT, bot, or Trojan to disable AV to evade detections.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableBehaviorMonitoring\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableOnAccessProtection\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableScanOnRealtimeEnable\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableRealtimeMonitoring\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableIOAVProtection\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableScriptScanning\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_windows_behavior_monitoring_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to disable this windows features.", "references": ["https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": [{"Source": "Endpoint"}, {"Stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Windows Defender real time behavior monitoring disabled on $dest", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.user", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 40, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disable_windows_behavior_monitoring_filter"}]}, {"name": "Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID", "id": "dc64d064-d346-11eb-8588-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-22", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic will identify suspicious process of cscript.exe where it tries to execute javascript using jscript.encode CLSID (COM OBJ). This technique was seen in ransomware (reddot ransomware) where it execute javascript with this com object with combination of amsi disabling technique.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"cscript.exe\" Processes.process=\"*-e:{F414C262-6AC0-11CF-B6D1-00AA00BBBB58}*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `execute_javascript_with_jscript_com_clsid_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/c0f98850-af65-4352-9746-fbebadee4f05/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious process of cscript.exe with a parent process $parent_process_name$ where it tries to execute javascript using jscript.encode CLSID (COM OBJ), detected on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.005"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_id", "type": "Process", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process Name", "role": ["Parent Process", "Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "Visual Basic"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "APT-C-36", "Rancor", "Patchwork", "MuddyWater", "Honeybee", "FIN7", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "Turla", "TA505", "Silence", "WIRTE", "FIN4", "Cobalt Group", "Gorgon Group", "Leviathan", "TA459", "Magic Hound"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "execute_javascript_with_jscript_com_clsid_filter"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell", "id": "203ef0ea-9bd8-11eb-8201-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed with a native Windows shell (PowerShell, Cmd, Wscript, Cscript).\\\nThe search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not.\\\nschtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\\Windows\\system32` and `C:\\Windows\\syswow64`.\\\nThe following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory.\\\nUpon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message | search Command IN (\"*powershell.exe*\", \"*wscript.exe*\", \"*cscript.exe*\", \"*cmd.exe*\", \"*sh.exe*\", \"*ksh.exe*\", \"*zsh.exe*\", \"*bash.exe*\", \"*scrcons.exe*\", \"*pwsh.exe*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Task_Name, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required.", "known_false_positives": "False positives are possible if legitimate applications are allowed to register tasks that call a shell to be spawned. Filter as needed based on command-line or processes that are used legitimately.", "references": ["https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/irans-apt34-returns-with-an-updated-arsenal/", "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4698", "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/scheduled-task-job/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/taskschd/time-trigger-example--scripting-?redirectedfrom=MSDN"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "message": "A windows scheduled task was created (task name=$Task_Name$) on $dest$ by the following command: $Command$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Command", "type": "Command", "role": ["Target"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "Task_Name", "Description", "Command"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Scheduled Task", "Scheduled Task/Job"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "MuddyWater", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT-C-36", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT41", "Machete", "Soft Cell", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Patchwork", "OilRig", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "FIN8", "menuPass", "FIN10", "APT32", "FIN7", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Conti Common Exec parameter", "id": "624919bc-c382-11eb-adcc-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-02", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search detects the suspicious commandline argument of revil ransomware to encrypt specific or all local drive and network shares of the compromised machine or host.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*-m local*\" OR Processes.process = \"*-m net*\" OR Processes.process = \"*-m all*\" OR Processes.process = \"*-nomutex*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `conti_common_exec_parameter_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "3rd party tool may have commandline parameter that can trigger this detection.", "references": ["https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.conti"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/conti/inf1/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ executing specific Conti Ransomware related parameters.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1204"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["User Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "conti_common_exec_parameter_filter"}]}, {"name": "Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App", "id": "cd80a6ac-c9d9-11eb-8839-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-10", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this search is to detect execution of `cipher.exe` to clear the unallocated sectors of a specific disk. This technique was seen in some ransomware to make it impossible to forensically recover deleted files.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"cipher.exe\" Processes.process = \"*/w:*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "administrator may execute this app to manage disk", "references": ["https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/vatet-pyxie-defray777/3/", "https://www.sophos.com/en-us/medialibrary/PDFs/technical-papers/sophoslabs-ransomware-behavior-report.pdf"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Impact"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to clear the unallocated sectors of a specific disk.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1070.004", "T1070"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["File Deletion", "Indicator Removal on Host"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Rocke", "Tropic Trooper", "Gamaredon Group", "Wizard Spider", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Silence", "The White Company", "TEMP.Veles", "APT32", "APT38", "Patchwork", "Honeybee", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "menuPass", "FIN8", "OilRig", "FIN5", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Magic Hound", "APT3", "FIN10", "APT28", "Threat Group-3390", "Group5", "Lazarus Group", "APT18", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory", "id": "7feb7972-7ac3-11eb-bac8-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-01", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies Scheduled Tasks registering (creating a new task) a binary or script to run from a public directory which includes users\\public, \\programdata\\ and \\windows\\temp. Upon triage, review the binary or script in the command line for legitimacy, whether an approved binary/script or not. In addition, capture the binary or script in question and analyze for further behaviors. Identify the source and contain the endpoint.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe (Processes.process=*\\\\users\\\\public\\\\* OR Processes.process=*\\\\programdata\\\\* OR Processes.process=*windows\\\\temp*) Processes.process=*/create* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives may be present. Filter as needed by parent process or command line argument.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/schtasks/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "message": "Suspicious scheduled task registered on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Scheduled Task", "Scheduled Task/Job"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "MuddyWater", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT-C-36", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT41", "Machete", "Soft Cell", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Patchwork", "OilRig", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "FIN8", "menuPass", "FIN10", "APT32", "FIN7", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory_filter"}]}, {"name": "Uninstall App Using MsiExec", "id": "1fca2b28-f922-11eb-b2dd-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-09", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious un-installation of application using msiexec. This technique was seen in conti leak tool and script where it tries to uninstall AV product using this commandline. This commandline to uninstall product is not a common practice in enterprise network.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=msiexec.exe Processes.process= \"* /qn *\" Processes.process= \"*/X*\" Processes.process= \"*REBOOT=*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `uninstall_app_using_msiexec_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown.", "references": ["https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1423361119926816776.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/conti/conti_leak/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "process $process_name$ with a cmdline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218.007", "T1218"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "process name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 30, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Msiexec", "Signed Binary Proxy Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TA505", "Rancor", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "uninstall_app_using_msiexec_filter"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility", "id": "cb6b339e-d4c6-11eb-a026-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-24", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious excessive usage of sc.exe in a host machine. This technique was seen in several ransomware , xmrig and other malware to create, modify, delete or disable a service may related to security application or to gain privilege escalation.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode = 1 process_name = \"sc.exe\" | bucket _time span=15m | stats values(process) as process count as numScExe by Computer, _time | eventstats avg(numScExe) as avgScExe, stdev(numScExe) as stdScExe, count as numSlots by Computer | eval upperThreshold=(avgScExe + stdScExe *3) | eval isOutlier=if(avgScExe > 5 and avgScExe >= upperThreshold, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed taskkill.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "excessive execution of sc.exe is quite suspicious since it can modify or execute app in high privilege permission.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/c0f98850-af65-4352-9746-fbebadee4f05/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1569", "T1569.002"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "process_name", "process"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Services", "Service Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "APT41", "Silence", "FIN6", "APT32", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility_filter"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Service Stop Attempt", "id": "ae8d3f4a-acd7-11eb-8846-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-05-04", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies suspicious series of attempt to kill multiple services on a system using either `net.exe` or `sc.exe`. This technique is use by adversaries to terminate security services or other related services to continue there objective and evade detections.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` OR Processes.process_name = \"sc.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"net1.exe\" AND Processes.process=\"*stop*\" OR Processes.process=\"*delete*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=1m | where count >=5 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_service_stop_attempt_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig", "Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An excessive amount of $process_name$ was executed on $dest$ attempting to disable services.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1489"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Service Stop"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_net"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "excessive_service_stop_attempt_filter"}]}, {"name": "Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading", "id": "8bb3f280-dd9b-11eb-84d5-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-05", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious creation of msmpeng.exe or mpsvc.dll in non default windows defender folder. This technique was seen couple days ago with revil ransomware in Kaseya Supply chain. The approach is to drop an old version of msmpeng.exe to load the actual payload name as mspvc.dll which will load the revil ransomware to the compromise machine", "search": "|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_name = \"msmpeng.exe\" OR Filesystem.file_name = \"mpsvc.dll\") AND Filesystem.file_path != \"*\\\\Program Files\\\\windows defender\\\\*\" by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node.", "known_false_positives": "quite minimal false positive expected.", "references": ["https://community.sophos.com/b/security-blog/posts/active-ransomware-attack-on-kaseya-customers"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets//malware/revil/msmpeng_side/windows-sysmon.log"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1574.002", "T1574"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.file_create_time", "Filesystem.process_id", "Filesystem.file_name", "Filesystem.user", "Filesystem.file_path"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["DLL Side-Loading", "Hijack Execution Flow"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["BRONZE BUTLER", "Naikon", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Tropic Trooper", "Patchwork", "APT19", "APT32", "APT3", "menuPass", "Threat Group-3390", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious wevtutil Usage", "id": "2827c0fd-e1be-4868-ae25-59d28e0f9d4f", "version": 4, "date": "2021-10-11", "author": "David Dorsey, Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The wevtutil.exe application is the windows event log utility. This searches for wevtutil.exe with parameters for clearing the application, security, setup, trace or system event logs.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wevtutil.exe Processes.process IN (\"* cl *\", \"*clear-log*\") (Processes.process=\"*System*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Security*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Setup*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Application*\" OR Processes.process=\"*trace*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_wevtutil_usage_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "The wevtutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows event log utility. Administrators may use it to manage Windows event logs.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1070.001/T1070.001.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Log Manipulation", "Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Wevtutil.exe being used to clear Event Logs on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1070.001", "T1070"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 28, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Clear Windows Event Logs", "Indicator Removal on Host"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "APT38", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT32", "FIN8", "FIN5", "APT28", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_wevtutil_usage_filter"}]}, {"name": "Attempt To Disable Services", "id": "afb31de4-d023-11eb-98d5-acde48001122", "version": 3, "date": "2021-11-24", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "The following analytic identifies Windows Service Control, `sc.exe`, attempting to disable a service. This is typically identified in parallel with other instances of service enumeration of attempts to stop a service and then disable it. Adversaries utilize this technique to terminate security services or other related services to continue there objective and evade detections.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval _datamodels=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_datamodels\"), \"collection\", []), body={} | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null)), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_path\"), \"string\", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND like(cmd_line, \"%disabled%\") AND like(cmd_line, \"%config%\") AND process_name=\"sc.exe\" | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null)), body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line, \"process_name\", process_name, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process_name, \"process_path\", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible administrative scripts may start/stop/delete services. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/", "https://app.any.run/tasks/c0f98850-af65-4352-9746-fbebadee4f05/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md#atomic-test-14---disable-arbitrary-security-windows-service"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/ssa_data1/sc_disable.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to disable a service.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1489"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest_device_id", "process_name", "parent_process_name", "process_path", "dest_user_id", "process"], "risk_score": 36, "risk_severity": "medium", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Service Stop"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "attempt_to_disable_services_filter"}]}, {"name": "Fsutil Zeroing File", "id": "f792cdc9-43ee-4429-a3c0-ffce4fed1a85", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-07", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious fsutil process to zeroing a target file. This technique was seen in lockbit ransomware where it tries to zero out its malware path as part of its defense evasion after encrypting the compromised host.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null)), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_path\"), \"string\", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND process_name IS NOT NULL AND process_name=\"fsutil.exe\" AND (like (cmd_line, \"%setzerodata%\")) | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null)), body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line, \"process_name\", process_name, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process_name, \"process_path\", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed net.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "System administrators or scripts may delete user accounts via this technique. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/e0ac072d-58c9-4f53-8a3b-3e491c7ac5db/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/fsutil-file"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": [], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ atempting to perform file deletion.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1070"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest_device_id", "process_name", "parent_process_name", "process_path", "dest_user_id", "process", "cmd_line"], "risk_score": 54, "risk_severity": "high", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Indicator Removal on Host"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "fsutil_zeroing_file_filter"}]}, {"name": "Wevtutil Usage To Disable Logs", "id": "a4bdc944-cdd9-11eb-ac97-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-06-15", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "This search is to detect execution of wevtutil.exe to disable logs. This technique was seen in several ransomware to disable the event logs to evade alerts and detections in compromised host.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where \"Endpoint_Processes\" IN(_datamodels) | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null), process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_path\"), \"string\", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND like(cmd_line, \"% sl %\") AND like(cmd_line, \"%/e:false%\") AND process_name=\"wevtutil.exe\" | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null)) | eval body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line, \"process_name\", process_name, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process_name, \"process_path\", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "network operator may disable audit event logs for debugging purposes.", "references": ["https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-ransom-x-ransomware-used-in-texas-txdot-cyberattack/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Log Manipulation", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/ssa_wevtutil/disable_evt.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A wevtutil process $process_name$ with commandline $cmd_line$ to disable event logs in host $dest_device_id$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1070", "T1070.001"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest_device_id", "process_name", "parent_process_name", "process_path", "dest_user_id", "process"], "risk_score": 63, "risk_severity": "high", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Indicator Removal on Host", "Clear Windows Event Logs"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT41", "APT38", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT32", "FIN8", "FIN5", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "wevtutil_usage_to_disable_logs_filter"}]}, {"name": "Disable AMSI Through Registry", "id": "9c27ec42-d338-11eb-9044-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-22", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this search is to identify modification in registry to disable AMSI windows feature to evade detections. This technique was seen in several ransomware, RAT and even APT to impaire defenses of the compromise machine and to be able to execute payload with minimal alert as much as possible.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Script\\\\Settings\\\\AmsiEnable\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000000\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_amsi_through_registry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "network operator may disable this feature of windows but not so common.", "references": ["https://blog.f-secure.com/hunting-for-amsi-bypasses/", "https://gist.github.com/rxwx/8955e5abf18dc258fd6b43a3a7f4dbf9"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.user", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disable_amsi_through_registry_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior", "id": "2b85aa3d-f5f6-4c2e-a081-a09f6e1c2e40", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-17", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes Windows Event ID 1100 to identify when Windows event log service is shutdown. Note that this is a voluminous analytic that will require tuning or restricted to specific endpoints based on criticality. This event generates every time Windows Event Log service has shut down. It also generates during normal system shutdown. During triage, based on time of day and user, determine if this was planned. If not planned, follow through with reviewing parallel alerts and other data sources to determine what else may have occurred.", "search": "(`wineventlog_security` EventCode=1100) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest Message EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_event_log_service_behavior_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows event logs from your hosts. In addition, the Splunk Windows TA is needed.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible the Event Logging service gets shut down due to system errors or legitimately administration tasks. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-1100", "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/defense-evasion/disabling-windows-event-logs-by-suspending-eventlog-service-threads", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/001/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1070.001/T1070.001.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Log Manipulation", "Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "The Windows Event Log Service shutdown on $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1070", "T1070.001"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "PR.IP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "dest"], "risk_score": 9, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Indicator Removal on Host", "Clear Windows Event Logs"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT41", "APT38", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT32", "FIN8", "FIN5", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_event_log_service_behavior_filter"}]}, {"name": "Delete A Net User", "id": "8776d79c-d26e-11eb-9a56-acde48001122", "version": 3, "date": "2021-11-30", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "This analytic will detect a suspicious net.exe/net1.exe command-line to delete a user on a system. This technique may be use by an administrator for legitimate purposes, however this behavior has been used in the wild to impair some user or deleting adversaries tracks created during its lateral movement additional systems. During triage, review parallel processes for additional behavior. Identify any other user accounts created before or after.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null)), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_path\"), \"string\", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND like(cmd_line, \"%/delete%\") AND (process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR process_name=\"net.exe\") | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null)), body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line, \"process_name\", process_name, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process_name, \"process_path\", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed net.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "System administrators or scripts may delete user accounts via this technique. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/ssa_data1/net_user_del.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1531/atomic_red_team/security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to delete a user account.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1531"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest_device_id", "process_name", "parent_process_name", "process_path", "dest_user_id", "process", "cmd_line"], "risk_score": 49, "risk_severity": "high", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Account Access Removal"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "delete_a_net_user_filter"}]}, {"name": "ICACLS Grant Command", "id": "b1b1e316-accc-11eb-a9b4-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-04", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies potential adversaries that modify the security permission of a specific file or directory. This technique is commonly seen in APT tradecraft and coinminer scripts to evade detections and restrict access to their component files.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"icacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"cacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"xcacls.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*/grant*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `icacls_grant_command_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed icacls.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig", "Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Process name $process_name$ with grant argument executed by $user$ to change security permission of a specific file or directory on host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1222"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["File and Directory Permissions Modification"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "icacls_grant_command_filter"}]}, {"name": "UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object", "id": "2bcccd20-fc2b-11eb-8d22-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-13", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a possible uac bypass using the colorui.dll COM Object. this technique was seen in so many malware and ransomware like lockbit where it make use of the colorui.dll COM CLSID to bypass UAC.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded=\"*\\\\colorui.dll\" process_name != \"colorcpl.exe\" NOT(Image IN(\"*\\\\windows\\\\*\", \"*\\\\program files*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name Computer EventCode Signed ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "not so common. but 3rd part app may load this dll.", "references": ["https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/04/24/lockbit-ransomware-borrows-tricks-to-keep-up-with-revil-and-maze/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.015/uac_colorui/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The following module $ImageLoaded$ was loaded by a non-standard application on endpoint $Computer$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "ImageLoaded", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Image", "ImageLoaded", "process_name", "Computer", "EventCode", "Signed", "ProcessId"], "risk_score": 48, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "CMSTP"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Cobalt Group", "MuddyWater"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object_filter"}]}, {"name": "Fsutil Zeroing File", "id": "4e5e024e-fabb-11eb-8b8f-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-11", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious fsutil process to zeroing a target file. This technique was seen in lockbit ransomware where it tries to zero out its malware path as part of its defense evasion after encrypting the compromised host.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=fsutil.exe Processes.process=\"*setzerodata*\" by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.process Processes.parent_process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `fsutil_zeroing_file_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/e0ac072d-58c9-4f53-8a3b-3e491c7ac5db/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070/fsutil_file_zero/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Possible file data deletion on $dest$ using $process$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1070"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process"], "risk_score": 54, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Indicator Removal on Host"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "fsutil_zeroing_file_filter"}]}, {"name": "Unusually Long Command Line", "id": "c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6a4264e7f", "version": 5, "date": "2020-12-08", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious activity on your hosts.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| eval processlen=len(process) | eventstats stdev(processlen) as stdev, avg(processlen) as avg by dest | stats max(processlen) as maxlen, values(stdev) as stdevperhost, values(avg) as avgperhost by dest, user, process_name, process | `unusually_long_command_line_filter` |eval threshold = 3 | where maxlen > ((threshold*stdevperhost) + avgperhost)", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships, from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the process field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate applications start with long command lines.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Unusual Processes", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Unusually long command line $Processes.process_name$ on $dest$", "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Processes.process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.user", "Processes.dest", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "unusually_long_command_line_filter"}]}, {"name": "CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass", "id": "f87b5062-b405-11eb-a889-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-13", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic detects a potential process using COM Object like CMLUA or CMSTPLUA to bypass UAC. This technique has been used by ransomware adversaries to gain administrative privileges to its running process.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\CMLUA.dll\", \"*\\\\CMSTPLUA.dll\", \"*\\\\CMLUAUTIL.dll\") NOT(process_name IN(\"CMSTP.exe\", \"CMMGR32.exe\")) NOT(Image IN(\"*\\\\windows\\\\*\", \"*\\\\program files*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name Computer EventCode Signed ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate windows application that are not on the list loading this dll. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/003/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/darkside_cmstp_com/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The following module $ImageLoaded$ was loaded by a non-standard application on endpoint $Computer$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "ImageLoaded", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Image", "ImageLoaded", "process_name", "Computer", "EventCode", "Signed", "ProcessId"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "CMSTP"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Cobalt Group", "MuddyWater"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass_filter"}]}, {"name": "Wbemprox COM Object Execution", "id": "9d911ce0-c3be-11eb-b177-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-02", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this search is designed to detect potential malicious process loading COM object to wbemprox.dll,", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\fastprox.dll\", \"*\\\\wbemprox.dll\", \"*\\\\wbemcomn.dll\") NOT (process_name IN (\"wmiprvse.exe\", \"WmiApSrv.exe\", \"unsecapp.exe\")) NOT(Image IN(\"*\\\\windows\\\\*\",\"*\\\\program files*\", \"*\\\\wbem\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name Computer EventCode Signed ProcessId Hashes IMPHASH | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wbemprox_com_object_execution_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "legitimate process that are not in the exception list may trigger this event.", "references": ["https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf2/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious COM Object Execution on $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.003"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Image", "ImageLoaded", "process_name", "Computer", "EventCode", "Signed", "ProcessId", "Hashes", "IMPHASH"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "CMSTP"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Cobalt Group", "MuddyWater"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "wbemprox_com_object_execution_filter"}]}, {"name": "Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK", "id": "57edaefa-a73b-45e5-bbae-f39c1473f941", "version": 1, "date": "2019-05-08", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious activity on your hosts. This search leverages the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) to help identify command lines with lengths that are unusual for a given user.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| eval processlen=len(process) | search user!=unknown | apply cmdline_pdfmodel threshold=0.01 | rename \"IsOutlier(processlen)\" as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | table firstTime lastTime user dest process_name process processlen count | `unusually_long_command_line___mltk_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that monitors command lines and populates the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model. In addition, MLTK version >= 4.2 must be installed on your search heads, along with any required dependencies. Finally, the support search \"Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK\" must be executed before this detection search, as it builds an ML model over the historical data used by this search. It is important that this search is run in the same app context as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild the model with the latest data available in your environment.", "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate applications use long command lines for installs or updates. You should review identified command lines for legitimacy. You may modify the first part of the search to omit legitimate command lines from consideration. If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider changing the value of threshold in the search to a smaller value. You should also periodically re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data. You may get unexpected results if the user identified in the results is not present in the data used to build the associated model.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Unusual Processes", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Ransomware"], "asset_type": "", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.user", "Processes.dest", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "unusually_long_command_line___mltk_filter"}]}, {"name": "Spike in File Writes", "id": "fdb0f805-74e4-4539-8c00-618927333aae", "version": 3, "date": "2020-03-16", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "The search looks for a sharp increase in the number of files written to a particular host", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.action=created by _time span=1h, Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | eventstats max(_time) as maxtime | stats count as num_data_samples max(eval(if(_time >= relative_time(maxtime, \"-1d@d\"), count, null))) as \"count\" avg(eval(if(_time upperBound) AND num_data_samples >=20, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `spike_in_file_writes_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "In order to implement this search, you must populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection and response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the file system.", "known_false_positives": "It is important to understand that if you happen to install any new applications on your hosts or are copying a large number of files, you can expect to see a large increase of file modifications.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.action", "Filesystem.dest"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "spike_in_file_writes_filter"}]}, {"name": "SMB Traffic Spike", "id": "7f5fb3e1-4209-4914-90db-0ec21b936378", "version": 3, "date": "2020-07-22", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search looks for spikes in the number of Server Message Block (SMB) traffic connections.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb by _time span=1h, All_Traffic.src | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | eventstats max(_time) as maxtime | stats count as num_data_samples max(eval(if(_time >= relative_time(maxtime, \"-70m@m\"), count, null))) as count avg(eval(if(_time upperBound AND num_data_samples >=50, 1, 0) | where isOutlier=1 | table src count | `smb_traffic_spike_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic logs and populating the `Network_Traffic` data model.", "known_false_positives": "A file server may experience high-demand loads that could cause this analytic to trigger.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Ransomware", "DHS Report TA18-074A"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021.002", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.dest_port", "All_Traffic.app", "All_Traffic.src"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "Remote Services"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "APT32", "Orangeworm", "FIN8", "APT3", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-1314", "Turla", "Deep Panda", "Ke3chang", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "smb_traffic_spike_filter"}]}, {"name": "SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK", "id": "d25773ba-9ad8-48d1-858e-07ad0bbeb828", "version": 3, "date": "2020-07-22", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search uses the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) to identify spikes in the number of Server Message Block (SMB) connections.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as port from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb by _time span=1h, All_Traffic.src | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%A\") | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | apply smb_pdfmodel threshold=0.001 | rename \"IsOutlier(count)\" as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | sort -count | table _time src dest port count | `smb_traffic_spike___mltk_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. In addition, the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or greater must be installed on your search heads, along with any required dependencies. Finally, the support search \"Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK\" must be executed before this detection search, because it builds a machine-learning (ML) model over the historical data used by this search. It is important that this search is run in the same app context as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild the model with the latest data available in your environment.\\\nThis search produces a field (Number of events,count) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. This field contributes additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following field, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry): \\\n1. **Label:** Number of events, **Field:** count\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review is found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", "known_false_positives": "If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider reducing the value of the threshold in the search. You should also periodically re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data. Please update the `smb_traffic_spike_mltk_filter` macro to filter out false positive results", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Ransomware", "DHS Report TA18-074A"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021.002", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.dest_ip", "All_Traffic.dest_port", "All_Traffic.app", "All_Traffic.src"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "Remote Services"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "APT32", "Orangeworm", "FIN8", "APT3", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-1314", "Turla", "Deep Panda", "Ke3chang", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "smb_traffic_spike___mltk_filter"}]}, {"name": "TOR Traffic", "id": "ea688274-9c06-4473-b951-e4cb7a5d7a45", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-22", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search looks for network traffic identified as The Onion Router (TOR), a benign anonymity network which can be abused for a variety of nefarious purposes.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.app=tor AND All_Traffic.action=allowed by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip All_Traffic.dest_port All_Traffic.action | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `tor_traffic_filter`", "how_to_implement": "In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from firewalls or other network control devices that mediate the traffic allowed into an environment. This is necessary so that the search can identify an 'action' taken on the traffic of interest. The search requires the Network_Traffic data model be populated.", "known_false_positives": "None at this time", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Ransomware", "Command and Control", "NOBELIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1071", "T1071.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.app", "All_Traffic.action", "All_Traffic.src_ip", "All_Traffic.dest_ip", "All_Traffic.dest_port"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Application Layer Protocol", "Web Protocols"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control", "Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Rocke", "Magic Hound", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "Rocke", "APT39", "Tropic Trooper", "MuddyWater", "Wizard Spider", "Inception", "APT41", "SilverTerrier", "Machete", "APT28", "WIRTE", "APT33", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "APT18", "APT38", "Cobalt Group", "APT19", "Threat Group-3390", "Rancor", "Orangeworm", "APT37", "Ke3chang", "Dark Caracal", "Turla", "Lazarus Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "OilRig", "Magic Hound", "Gamaredon Group", "Stealth Falcon"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "tor_traffic_filter"}]}, {"name": "Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed", "id": "ce5a0962-849f-4720-a678-753fe6674479", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search looks for network traffic defined by port and transport layer protocol in the Enterprise Security lookup table \"lookup_interesting_ports\", that is marked as prohibited, and has an associated 'allow' action in the Network_Traffic data model. This could be indicative of a misconfigured network device.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.action = allowed by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip All_Traffic.dest_port All_Traffic.action | lookup update=true interesting_ports_lookup dest_port as All_Traffic.dest_port OUTPUT app is_prohibited note transport | search is_prohibited=true | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `prohibited_network_traffic_allowed_filter`", "how_to_implement": "In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from firewalls or other network control devices that mediate the traffic allowed into an environment. This is necessary so that the search can identify an 'action' taken on the traffic of interest. The search requires the Network_Traffic data model be populated.", "known_false_positives": "None identified", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Ransomware", "Command and Control"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1048"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.action", "All_Traffic.src_ip", "All_Traffic.dest_ip", "All_Traffic.dest_port"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "prohibited_network_traffic_allowed_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Windows Log Manipulation", "id": "b6db2c60-a281-48b4-95f1-2cd99ed56835", "version": 2, "date": "2017-09-12", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "description": "Adversaries often try to cover their tracks by manipulating Windows logs. Use these searches to help you monitor for suspicious activity surrounding log files--an essential component of an effective defense.", "narrative": "Because attackers often modify system logs to cover their tracks and/or to thwart the investigative process, log monitoring is an industry-recognized best practice. While there are legitimate reasons to manipulate system logs, it is still worthwhile to keep track of who manipulated the logs, when they manipulated them, and in what way they manipulated them (determining which accesses, tools, or utilities were employed). Even if no malicious activity is detected, the knowledge of an attempt to manipulate system logs may be indicative of a broader security risk that should be thoroughly investigated.\\\nThe Analytic Story gives users two different ways to detect manipulation of Windows Event Logs and one way to detect deletion of the Update Sequence Number (USN) Change Journal. The story helps determine the history of the host and the users who have accessed it. Finally, the story aides in investigation by retrieving all the information on the process that caused these events (if the process has been identified).", "references": ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", "https://zeltser.com/security-incident-log-review-checklist/", "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2013/01/re-introducing-usnjrnl.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Windows Log Manipulation", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1490", "T1070.001", "T1070"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Clear Windows Event Logs", "Indicator Removal on Host", "Inhibit System Recovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT28", "no", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "APT41", "FIN5", "APT38"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Windows Event Log Cleared", "id": "ad517544-aff9-4c96-bd99-d6eb43bfbb6a", "version": 6, "date": "2020-07-06", "author": "Rico Valdez, Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes Windows Security Event ID 1102 or System log event 104 to identify when a Windows event log is cleared. Note that this analytic will require tuning or restricted to specific endpoints based on criticality. During triage, based on time of day and user, determine if this was planned. If not planned, follow through with reviewing parallel alerts and other data sources to determine what else may have occurred.", "search": "(`wineventlog_security` EventCode=1102) OR (`wineventlog_system` EventCode=104) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest Message EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_event_log_cleared_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows event logs from your hosts. In addition, the Splunk Windows TA is needed.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible that these logs may be legitimately cleared by Administrators. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-1102", "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/defense-evasion/disabling-windows-event-logs-by-suspending-eventlog-service-threads", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/001/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1070.001/T1070.001.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Log Manipulation", "Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Windows event logs cleared on $dest$ via EventCode $EventCode$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1070", "T1070.001"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "PR.IP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "dest"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Indicator Removal on Host", "Clear Windows Event Logs"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT41", "APT38", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT32", "FIN8", "FIN5", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_system"}, {"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "windows_event_log_cleared_filter"}]}, {"name": "USN Journal Deletion", "id": "b6e0ff70-b122-4227-9368-4cf322ab43c3", "version": 2, "date": "2018-12-03", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The fsutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows utility used to perform tasks related to the file allocation table (FAT) and NTFS file systems. The update sequence number (USN) change journal provides a log of all changes made to the files on the disk. This search looks for fsutil.exe deleting the USN journal.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=fsutil.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search process=\"*deletejournal*\" AND process=\"*usn*\" | `usn_journal_deletion_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "None identified", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Log Manipulation", "Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8", "CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Possible USN journal deletion on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1070"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.DP", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest"], "risk_score": 45, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Indicator Removal on Host"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "usn_journal_deletion_filter"}]}, {"name": "WevtUtil Usage To Clear Logs", "id": "5438113c-cdd9-11eb-93b8-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-06-15", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "The wevtutil.exe application is the windows event log utility. This searches for wevtutil.exe with parameters for clearing the application, security, setup, powershell, sysmon, or system event logs.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where \"Endpoint_Processes\" IN(_datamodels) | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null), process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_path\"), \"string\", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND like(cmd_line, \"% cl %\") AND (match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)security/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)system/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)sysmon/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)application/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)setup/)=true OR match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)powershell/)=true) AND process_name=\"wevtutil.exe\" | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null)) | eval body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line, \"process_name\", process_name, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process_name, \"process_path\", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "The wevtutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows event log utility. Administrators may use it to manage Windows event logs.", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-clop-ransomware.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Log Manipulation", "Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/ssa_wevtutil/clear_evt.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A wevtutil process $process_name$ with commandline $cmd_line$ to clear event logs in host $dest_device_id$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1070", "T1070.001"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest_device_id", "process_name", "parent_process_name", "process_path", "dest_user_id", "process"], "risk_score": 63, "risk_severity": "medium", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Indicator Removal on Host", "Clear Windows Event Logs"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT41", "APT38", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT32", "FIN8", "FIN5", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "wevtutil_usage_to_clear_logs_filter"}]}, {"name": "Deleting Shadow Copies", "id": "b89919ed-ee5f-492c-b139-95dbb162039e", "version": 4, "date": "2020-11-09", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The vssadmin.exe utility is used to interact with the Volume Shadow Copy Service. Wmic is an interface to the Windows Management Instrumentation. This search looks for either of these tools being used to delete shadow copies.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=vssadmin.exe OR Processes.process_name=wmic.exe) Processes.process=*delete* Processes.process=*shadow* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `deleting_shadow_copies_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "vssadmin.exe and wmic.exe are standard applications shipped with modern versions of windows. They may be used by administrators to legitimately delete old backup copies, although this is typically rare.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Log Manipulation", "SamSam Ransomware", "Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to delete shadow copies.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1490"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Inhibit System Recovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "deleting_shadow_copies_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious wevtutil Usage", "id": "2827c0fd-e1be-4868-ae25-59d28e0f9d4f", "version": 4, "date": "2021-10-11", "author": "David Dorsey, Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The wevtutil.exe application is the windows event log utility. This searches for wevtutil.exe with parameters for clearing the application, security, setup, trace or system event logs.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wevtutil.exe Processes.process IN (\"* cl *\", \"*clear-log*\") (Processes.process=\"*System*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Security*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Setup*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Application*\" OR Processes.process=\"*trace*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_wevtutil_usage_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "The wevtutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows event log utility. Administrators may use it to manage Windows event logs.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1070.001/T1070.001.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Log Manipulation", "Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Wevtutil.exe being used to clear Event Logs on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1070.001", "T1070"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 28, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Clear Windows Event Logs", "Indicator Removal on Host"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "APT38", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT32", "FIN8", "FIN5", "APT28", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_wevtutil_usage_filter"}]}, {"name": "Wevtutil Usage To Disable Logs", "id": "a4bdc944-cdd9-11eb-ac97-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-06-15", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "This search is to detect execution of wevtutil.exe to disable logs. This technique was seen in several ransomware to disable the event logs to evade alerts and detections in compromised host.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where \"Endpoint_Processes\" IN(_datamodels) | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null), process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_path\"), \"string\", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND like(cmd_line, \"% sl %\") AND like(cmd_line, \"%/e:false%\") AND process_name=\"wevtutil.exe\" | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null)) | eval body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line, \"process_name\", process_name, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process_name, \"process_path\", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "network operator may disable audit event logs for debugging purposes.", "references": ["https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-ransom-x-ransomware-used-in-texas-txdot-cyberattack/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Log Manipulation", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/ssa_wevtutil/disable_evt.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A wevtutil process $process_name$ with commandline $cmd_line$ to disable event logs in host $dest_device_id$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1070", "T1070.001"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest_device_id", "process_name", "parent_process_name", "process_path", "dest_user_id", "process"], "risk_score": 63, "risk_severity": "high", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Indicator Removal on Host", "Clear Windows Event Logs"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT41", "APT38", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT32", "FIN8", "FIN5", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "wevtutil_usage_to_disable_logs_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior", "id": "2b85aa3d-f5f6-4c2e-a081-a09f6e1c2e40", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-17", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes Windows Event ID 1100 to identify when Windows event log service is shutdown. Note that this is a voluminous analytic that will require tuning or restricted to specific endpoints based on criticality. This event generates every time Windows Event Log service has shut down. It also generates during normal system shutdown. During triage, based on time of day and user, determine if this was planned. If not planned, follow through with reviewing parallel alerts and other data sources to determine what else may have occurred.", "search": "(`wineventlog_security` EventCode=1100) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest Message EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_event_log_service_behavior_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows event logs from your hosts. In addition, the Splunk Windows TA is needed.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible the Event Logging service gets shut down due to system errors or legitimately administration tasks. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-1100", "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/defense-evasion/disabling-windows-event-logs-by-suspending-eventlog-service-threads", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/001/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1070.001/T1070.001.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Log Manipulation", "Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "The Windows Event Log Service shutdown on $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1070", "T1070.001"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "PR.IP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "dest"], "risk_score": 9, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Indicator Removal on Host", "Clear Windows Event Logs"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT41", "APT38", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT32", "FIN8", "FIN5", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_event_log_service_behavior_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Monitor for Updates", "id": "9ef8d677-7b52-4213-a038-99cfc7acc2d8", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-15", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "description": "Monitor your enterprise to ensure that your endpoints are being patched and updated. Adversaries notoriously exploit known vulnerabilities that could be mitigated by applying routine security patches.", "narrative": "It is a common best practice to ensure that endpoints are being patched and updated in a timely manner, in order to reduce the risk of compromise via a publicly disclosed vulnerability. Timely application of updates/patches is important to eliminate known vulnerabilities that may be exploited by various threat actors.\\\nSearches in this analytic story are designed to help analysts monitor endpoints for system patches and/or updates. This helps analysts identify any systems that are not successfully updated in a timely matter.\\\nMicrosoft releases updates for Windows systems on a monthly cadence. They should be installed as soon as possible after following internal testing and validation procedures. Patches and updates for other systems or applications are typically released as needed.", "references": ["https://learn.cisecurity.org/20-controls-download"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Monitor for Updates", "category": ["Best Practices"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Compliance", "mitre_attack_id": [], "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "No Windows Updates in a time frame", "id": "1a77c08c-2f56-409c-a2d3-7d64617edd4f", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-15", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Updates"], "description": "This search looks for Windows endpoints that have not generated an event indicating a successful Windows update in the last 60 days. Windows updates are typically released monthly and applied shortly thereafter. An endpoint that has not successfully applied an update in this time frame indicates the endpoint is not regularly being patched for some reason.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Updates where Updates.status=Installed Updates.vendor_product=\"Microsoft Windows\" by Updates.dest Updates.status Updates.vendor_product | rename Updates.dest as Host | rename Updates.status as \"Update Status\" | rename Updates.vendor_product as Product | eval isOutlier=if(lastTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-60d@d\"), 1, 0) | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search isOutlier=1 | rename lastTime as \"Last Update Time\", | table Host, \"Update Status\", Product, \"Last Update Time\" | `no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, it requires that the 'Update' data model is being populated. This can be accomplished by ingesting Windows events or the Windows Update log via a universal forwarder on the Windows endpoints you wish to monitor. The Windows add-on should be also be installed and configured to properly parse Windows events in Splunk. There may be other data sources which can populate this data model, including vulnerability management systems.", "known_false_positives": "None identified", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Monitor for Updates"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 18"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.MA"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Updates.status", "Updates.vendor_product", "Updates.dest"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", "id": "51045ded-1575-4ba6-aef7-af6c73cffd86", "version": 1, "date": "2018-08-20", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "description": "Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.", "narrative": "Because most enterprise cloud infrastructure activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to add specific IPs to an allow list because they vary.\\\nThis Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further.", "references": ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", "category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Valid Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Sandworm Team", "TEMP.Veles", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT39", "Carbanak", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT41", "FIN5", "menuPass", "FIN6", "OilRig", "Wizard Spider", "APT18", "FIN10", "PittyTiger", "FIN4", "APT28", "APT33", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Night Dragon"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country", "id": "94994255-3acf-4213-9b3f-0494df03bb31", "version": 1, "date": "2020-10-09", "author": "Rico Valdez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen countries. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something.", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(Country) | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources Country as Country OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenCountry=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenCountry) OR firstTimeSeenCountry > relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") | table firstTime, src, Country, user, object, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_country_filter` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_country_filter` macro.", "known_false_positives": "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no \"false positives\" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\\\n This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json"], "impact": 70, "message": "User $user$ is starting or creating an instance $object$ for the first time in Country $Country$ from IP address $src$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "src", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "object", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.action", "All_Changes.status", "All_Changes.src", "All_Changes.user", "All_Changes.object", "All_Changes.command"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Valid Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_country_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A table of source IPs, geographic locations, and the first and last time that they have that done cloud provisioning activities", "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", "name": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", "fields_list": "_key, src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data"}]}, {"name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region", "id": "5aba1860-9617-4af9-b19d-aecac16fe4f2", "version": 1, "date": "2020-08-16", "author": "Rico Valdez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen regions. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something.", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(Region) | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources Region as Region OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenRegion=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenRegion) OR firstTimeSeenRegion > relative_time(now(), `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window`) | table firstTime, src, Region, user, object, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region_filter` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region_filter` macro.", "known_false_positives": "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no \"false positives\" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\\\n This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json"], "impact": 70, "message": "User $user$ is starting or creating an instance $object$ for the first time in region $Region$ from IP address $src$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "src", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "object", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.action", "All_Changes.status", "All_Changes.src", "All_Changes.user", "All_Changes.object", "All_Changes.command"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Valid Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"description": "Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new provisioning activities", "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", "name": "previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A table of source IPs, geographic locations, and the first and last time that they have that done cloud provisioning activities", "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", "name": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", "fields_list": "_key, src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data"}]}, {"name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address", "id": "f86a8ec9-b042-45eb-92f4-e9ed1d781078", "version": 1, "date": "2020-08-16", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen IP addresses. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something.", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime, values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources src as src OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenSrc=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenSrc) OR firstTimeSeenSrc > relative_time(now(), `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window`) | table firstTime, src, user, object_id, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter` macro.", "known_false_positives": "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no \"false positives\" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\\\n This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json"], "impact": 70, "message": "User $user$ is starting or creating an instance $object_id$ for the first time from IP address $src$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "src", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "object_id", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.object_id", "All_Changes.action", "All_Changes.status", "All_Changes.src", "All_Changes.user", "All_Changes.command"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Valid Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"description": "Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new provisioning activities", "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", "name": "previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A table of source IPs, geographic locations, and the first and last time that they have that done cloud provisioning activities", "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", "name": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", "fields_list": "_key, src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data"}]}, {"name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City", "id": "e7ecc5e0-88df-48b9-91af-51104c68f02f", "version": 1, "date": "2020-10-09", "author": "Rico Valdez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen cities. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something.", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(City) | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources City as City OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenCity=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenCity) OR firstTimeSeenCity > relative_time(now(), `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window`) | table firstTime, src, City, user, object, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city_filter` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city_filter` macro.", "known_false_positives": "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no \"false positives\" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\\\n This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json"], "impact": 30, "message": "User $user$ is starting or creating an instance $dest$ for the first time in City $City$ from IP address $src$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "src", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.action", "All_Changes.status", "All_Changes.src", "All_Changes.user", "All_Changes.object", "All_Changes.command"], "risk_score": 18, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Valid Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"description": "Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new provisioning activities", "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", "name": "previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A table of source IPs, geographic locations, and the first and last time that they have that done cloud provisioning activities", "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", "name": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", "fields_list": "_key, src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data"}]}]}, {"name": "Apache Struts Vulnerability", "id": "2dcfd6a2-e7d2-4873-b6ba-adaf819d2a1e", "version": 1, "date": "2018-12-06", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "description": "Detect and investigate activities--such as unusually long `Content-Type` length, suspicious java classes and web servers executing suspicious processes--consistent with attempts to exploit Apache Struts vulnerabilities.", "narrative": "In March of 2017, a remote code-execution vulnerability in the Jakarta Multipart parser in Apache Struts, a widely used open-source framework for creating Java web applications, was disclosed and assigned to CVE-2017-5638. About two months later, hackers exploited the flaw to carry out the world's 5th largest data breach. The target, credit giant Equifax, told investigators that it had become aware of the vulnerability two months before the attack. \\\nThe exploit involved manipulating the `Content-Type HTTP` header to execute commands embedded in the header.\\\nThis Analytic Story contains two different searches that help to identify activity that may be related to this issue. The first search looks for characteristics of the `Content-Type` header consistent with attempts to exploit the vulnerability. This should be a relatively pertinent indicator, as the `Content-Type` header is generally consistent and does not have a large degree of variation.\\\nThe second search looks for the execution of various commands typically entered on the command shell when an attacker first lands on a system. These commands are not generally executed on web servers during the course of day-to-day operation, but they may be used when the system is undergoing maintenance or troubleshooting.\\\nFirst, it is helpful is to understand how often the notable event is generated, as well as the commonalities in some of these events. This may help determine whether this is a common occurrence that is of a lesser concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. It can also help to understand whether the issue is restricted to a single user or system or is broader in scope.\\\nWhen looking at the target of the behavior illustrated by the event, you should note the sensitivity of the user and or/system to help determine the potential impact. It is also helpful to see what other events involving the target have occurred in the recent past. This can help tie different events together and give further situational awareness regarding the target.\\\nVarious types of information for external systems should be reviewed and (potentially) collected if the incident is, indeed, judged to be malicious. Information like this can be useful in generating your own threat intelligence to create alerts in the future.\\\nLooking at the country, responsible party, and fully qualified domain names associated with the external IP address--as well as the registration information associated with those domain names, if they are frequently visited by others--can help you answer the question of \"who,\" in regard to the external system. Answering that can help qualify the event and may serve useful for tracking. In addition, there are various sources that can provide some reputation information on the IP address or domain name, which can assist in determining if the event is malicious in nature. Finally, determining whether or not there are other events associated with the IP address may help connect some dots or show other events that should be brought into scope.\\\nGathering various data elements on the system of interest can sometimes help quickly determine that something suspicious may be happening. Some of these items include determining who else may have recently logged into the system, whether any unusual scheduled tasks exist, whether the system is communicating on suspicious ports, whether there are modifications to sensitive registry keys, and whether there are any known vulnerabilities on the system. This information can often highlight other activity commonly seen in attack scenarios or give more information about how the system may have been targeted.\\\nhen a specific service or application is targeted, it is often helpful to know the associated version to help determine whether or not it is vulnerable to a specific exploit.\\\nhen it is suspected there is an attack targeting a web server, it is helpful to look at some of the behavior of the web service to see if there is evidence that the service has been compromised. Some indications of this might be network connections to external resources, the web service spawning child processes that are not associated with typical behavior, and whether the service wrote any files that might be malicious in nature.\\\nIn the event that a suspicious file is found, we can review more information about it to help determine if it is, in fact, malicious. Identifying the file type, any processes that have the file open, what processes created and/or modified the file, and the number of systems that may have this file can help to determine if the file is malicious. Also, determining the file hash and checking it against reputation sources, such as VirusTotal, can sometimes quickly help determine whether it is malicious in nature.\\\nOften, a simple inspection of a suspect process name and path can tell you if the system has been compromised. For example, if `svchost.exe` is found running from a location other than `C:\\Windows\\System32`, it is likely something malicious designed to hide in plain sight when simply reviewing process names. Similarly, if the process itself seems legitimate, but the parent process is running from the temporary browser cache, there may be activity initiated via a compromised website the user visited.\\\nIt can also be very helpful to examine various behaviors of the process of interest or the parent of the process that is of interest. For example, if it turns out that the process of interest is malicious, it would be good to see if the parent to that process spawned other processes that might also be worth further scrutiny. If a process is suspect, reviewing the network connections made around the time of the event and/or if the process spawned any child processes could be helpful in determining whether it is malicious or executing a malicious script.", "references": ["https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/blob/v3.2/dev/rules/REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA.conf"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Apache Struts Vulnerability", "category": ["Vulnerability"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1082"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Information Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Magic Hound", "Inception", "Stealth Falcon", "Tropic Trooper", "Kimsuky", "Ke3chang", "Turla", "Gamaredon Group", "Rocke", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT19", "APT37", "Darkhotel", "OilRig", "Blue Mockingbird", "Lazarus Group", "admin@338", "Honeybee", "APT3", "Sowbug", "APT18", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Unusually Long Content-Type Length", "id": "57a0a2bf-353f-40c1-84dc-29293f3c35b7", "version": 1, "date": "2017-10-13", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for unusually long strings in the Content-Type http header that the client sends the server.", "search": "`stream_http` | eval cs_content_type_length = len(cs_content_type) | where cs_content_type_length > 100 | table endtime src_ip dest_ip cs_content_type_length cs_content_type url | `unusually_long_content_type_length_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This particular search leverages data extracted from Stream:HTTP. You must configure the http stream using the Splunk Stream App on your Splunk Stream deployment server to extract the cs_content_type field.", "known_false_positives": "Very few legitimate Content-Type fields will have a length greater than 100 characters.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Apache Struts Vulnerability"], "asset_type": "Web Server", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 18", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["ID.RA", "RS.MI", "PR.PT", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "PR.MA", "DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "cs_content_type", "endtime", "src_ip", "dest_ip", "url"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=stream:http", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "stream_http"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "unusually_long_content_type_length_filter"}]}, {"name": "Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes", "id": "ec3b7601-689a-4463-94e0-c9f45638efb9", "version": 1, "date": "2019-04-01", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for suspicious processes on all systems labeled as web servers.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.dest_category=\"web_server\" AND (Processes.process=\"*whoami*\" OR Processes.process=\"*ping*\" OR Processes.process=\"*iptables*\" OR Processes.process=\"*wget*\" OR Processes.process=\"*service*\" OR Processes.process=\"*curl*\") by Processes.process Processes.process_name, Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model. In addition, web servers will need to be identified in the Assets and Identity Framework of Enterprise Security.", "known_false_positives": "Some of these processes may be used legitimately on web servers during maintenance or other administrative tasks.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Apache Struts Vulnerability"], "asset_type": "Web Server", "cis20": ["CIS 3"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1082"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest_category", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Information Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "Tropic Trooper", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Darkhotel", "MuddyWater", "APT18", "Honeybee", "APT19", "APT37", "APT32", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "APT3", "Sowbug", "Gamaredon Group", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "admin@338", "Turla", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Java Classes", "id": "if1fea6da-3c86-4c1d-b255-fc3b2781a491", "version": 1, "date": "2018-12-06", "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for suspicious Java classes that are often used to exploit remote command execution in common Java frameworks, such as Apache Struts.", "search": "`stream_http` http_method=POST http_content_length>1 | regex form_data=\"(?i)java\\.lang\\.(?:runtime|processbuilder)\" | rename src_ip as src | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime, values(url) as uri, values(status) as status, values(http_user_agent) as http_user_agent by src, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_java_classes_filter`", "how_to_implement": "In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from your web-traffic appliances that serve or sit in the path of your Struts application servers. This can be accomplished by indexing data from a web proxy, or by using network traffic-analysis tools, such as Splunk Stream or Bro.", "known_false_positives": "There are no known false positives.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Apache Struts Vulnerability"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "http_method", "http_content_length", "src_ip", "url", "status", "http_user_agent", "src", "dest"], "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=stream:http", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "stream_http"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_java_classes_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", "id": "bd91a2bc-d20b-4f44-a982-1bea98e86390", "version": 1, "date": "2019-01-09", "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that relate to the ColdRoot Remote Access Trojan that affects MacOS. An example of some of these activities are changing sensative binaries in the MacOS sub-system, detecting process names and executables associated with the RAT, detecting when a keyboard tab is installed on a MacOS machine and more.", "narrative": "Conventional wisdom holds that Apple's MacOS operating system is significantly less vulnerable to attack than Windows machines. While that point is debatable, it is true that attacks against MacOS systems are much less common. However, this fact does not mean that Macs are impervious to breaches. To the contrary, research has shown that that Mac malware is increasing at an alarming rate. According to AV-test, in 2018, there were 86,865 new MacOS malware variants, up from 27,338 the year before—a 31% increase. In contrast, the independent research firm found that new Windows malware had increased from 65.17M to 76.86M during that same period, less than half the rate of growth. The bottom line is that while the numbers look a lot smaller than Windows, it's definitely time to take Mac security more seriously.\\\nThis Analytic Story addresses the ColdRoot remote access trojan (RAT), which was uploaded to Github in 2016, but was still escaping detection by the first quarter of 2018, when a new, more feature-rich variant was discovered masquerading as an Apple audio driver. Among other capabilities, the Pascal-based ColdRoot can heist passwords from users' keychains and remotely control infected machines without detection. In the initial report of his findings, Patrick Wardle, Chief Research Officer for Digita Security, explained that the new ColdRoot RAT could start and kill processes on the breached system, spawn new remote-desktop sessions, take screen captures and assemble them into a live stream of the victim's desktop, and more.\\\nSearches in this Analytic Story leverage the capabilities of OSquery to address ColdRoot detection from several different angles, such as looking for the existence of associated files and processes, and monitoring for signs of an installed keylogger.", "references": ["https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/osxcoldroot-and-the-rat-invasion/", "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/coldroot-rat-still-undetectable-despite-being-uploaded-on-github-two-years-ago/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", "category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": [], "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Processes Tapping Keyboard Events", "id": "2a371608-331d-4034-ae2c-21dda8f1d0ec", "version": 1, "date": "2019-01-25", "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for processes in an MacOS system that is tapping keyboard events in MacOS, and essentially monitoring all keystrokes made by a user. This is a common technique used by RATs to log keystrokes from a victim, although it can also be used by legitimate processes like Siri to react on human input", "search": "| from datamodel Alerts.Alerts | search app=osquery:results name=pack_osx-attacks_Keyboard_Event_Taps | rename columns.cmdline as cmd, columns.name as process_name, columns.pid as process_id| dedup host,process_name | table host,process_name, cmd, process_id | `processes_tapping_keyboard_events_filter`", "how_to_implement": "In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from your osquery deployed agents with the [osx-attacks.conf](https://github.com/facebook/osquery/blob/experimental/packs/osx-attacks.conf#L599) pack enabled. Also the [TA-OSquery](https://github.com/d1vious/TA-osquery) must be deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the osquery data populate the Alerts data model.", "known_false_positives": "There might be some false positives as keyboard event taps are used by processes like Siri and Zoom video chat, for some good examples of processes to exclude please see [this](https://github.com/facebook/osquery/pull/5345#issuecomment-454639161) comment.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["ColdRoot MacOS RAT"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "nist": ["DE.DP"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "app", "name", "columns.cmdline", "columns.name", "columns.pid", "host"], "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "processes_tapping_keyboard_events_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild", "id": "be3418e2-551b-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-21", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "description": "Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the msbuild.exe process to execute malicious code.", "narrative": "Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio and is native to Windows. It handles XML formatted project files that define requirements for loading and building various platforms and configurations.\\\nThe inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# code to be inserted into an XML project file. MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application control defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution.\\\nThe searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging msbuild.exe to execute malicious code.\\\nTriage\\\nValidate execution\\\n1. Determine if MSBuild.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of MSBuild.exe and further PE metadata.\\\n1. Determine if script code was executed with MSBuild.\\\nSituational Awareness\\\nThe objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by MSBuild.exe.\\\n1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application?\\\n1. Module loads. Are the known MSBuild.exe modules being loaded by a non-standard application? Is MSbuild loading any suspicious .DLLs?\\\n1. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain.\\\nRetrieval of script code\\\nThe objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/001/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md", "https://github.com/infosecn1nja/MaliciousMacroMSBuild", "https://github.com/xorrior/RandomPS-Scripts/blob/master/Invoke-ExecuteMSBuild.ps1", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/", "https://github.com/MHaggis/CBR-Queries/blob/master/msbuild.md"], "tags": {"analytics_story": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1127", "T1036.003", "T1127.001", "T1036"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Masquerading", "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "MSBuild", "Rename System Utilities"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Frankenstein", "APT32", "Soft Cell", "PLATINUM", "no", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Windshift", "menuPass"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "MSBuild Suspicious Spawned By Script Process", "id": "213b3148-24ea-11ec-93a2-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-04", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious child process of MSBuild spawned by Windows Script Host - cscript or wscript. This behavior or event are commonly seen and used by malware or adversaries to execute malicious msbuild process using malicious script in the compromised host. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any file modifications. MSBuild may load a script from the same path without having command-line arguments.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"wscript.exe\", \"cscript.exe\") AND `process_msbuild` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as developers do not spawn MSBuild via a WSH.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/dc93ee63-050c-4ff8-b07e-8277af9ab939/#"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/regsvr32_silent/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Msbuild.exe process spawned by $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ executed by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1127.001", "T1127"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["MSBuild", "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Frankenstein", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=msbuild.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSBuild.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_msbuild"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious MSBuild Spawn", "id": "a115fba6-5514-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 2, "date": "2021-01-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning msbuild.exe. This behavior is indicative of a COM object being utilized to spawn msbuild from wmiprvse.exe. It is common for MSBuild.exe to be spawned from devenv.exe while using Visual Studio. In this instance, there will be command line arguments and file paths. In a malicious instance, MSBuild.exe will spawn from non-standard processes and have no command line arguments. For example, MSBuild.exe spawning from explorer.exe, powershell.exe is far less common and should be investigated.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe AND `process_msbuild` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_msbuild_spawn_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious msbuild.exe process executed on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1127", "T1127.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "MSBuild"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Frankenstein"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=msbuild.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSBuild.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_msbuild"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_msbuild_spawn_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious MSBuild Rename", "id": "4006adac-5937-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 2, "date": "2021-01-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies renamed instances of msbuild.exe executing. Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v4.0.30319 and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v4.0.30319. During investigation, identify the code executed and what is executing a renamed instance of MSBuild.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_msbuild` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_msbuild_rename_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of msbuild, triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md", "https://github.com/infosecn1nja/MaliciousMacroMSBuild/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild", "Cobalt Strike", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious renamed msbuild.exe binary ran on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1036", "T1127", "T1036.003", "T1127.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Masquerading", "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "Rename System Utilities", "MSBuild"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Windshift", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "Dragonfly 2.0", "no", "menuPass", "APT32", "Soft Cell", "PLATINUM", "Frankenstein"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=msbuild.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSBuild.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_msbuild"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_msbuild_rename_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious msbuild path", "id": "f5198224-551c-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 2, "date": "2021-01-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies msbuild.exe executing from a non-standard path. Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v4.0.30319 and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v4.0.30319. Instances of Visual Studio will run a copy of msbuild.exe. A moved instance of MSBuild is suspicious, however there are instances of build applications that will move or use a copy of MSBuild.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_msbuild` AND (Processes.process_path!=c:\\\\windows\\\\microsoft.net\\\\framework*\\\\v*\\\\*) by Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `suspicious_msbuild_path_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of msbuild.exe, triggering a false positive. Baselining of MSBuild.exe usage is recommended to better understand it's path usage. Visual Studio runs an instance out of a path that will need to be filtered on.", "references": ["https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild", "Cobalt Strike", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Msbuild.exe ran from an uncommon path on $dest$ execyted by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1036", "T1127", "T1036.003", "T1127.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Masquerading", "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "Rename System Utilities", "MSBuild"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Windshift", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "Dragonfly 2.0", "no", "menuPass", "APT32", "Soft Cell", "PLATINUM", "Frankenstein"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=msbuild.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSBuild.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_msbuild"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_msbuild_path_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "id": "3c3835c0-255d-4f9e-ab84-e29ec9ec9b56", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-18", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "description": "Attackers often attempt to hide within or otherwise abuse the domain name system (DNS). You can thwart attempts to manipulate this omnipresent protocol by monitoring for these types of abuses.", "narrative": "Although DNS is one of the fundamental underlying protocols that make the Internet work, it is often ignored (perhaps because of its complexity and effectiveness). However, attackers have discovered ways to abuse the protocol to meet their objectives. One potential abuse involves manipulating DNS to hijack traffic and redirect it to an IP address under the attacker's control. This could inadvertently send users intending to visit google.com, for example, to an unrelated malicious website. Another technique involves using the DNS protocol for command-and-control activities with the attacker's malicious code or to covertly exfiltrate data. The searches within this Analytic Story look for these types of abuses.", "references": ["http://blogs.splunk.com/2015/10/01/random-words-on-entropy-and-dns/", "http://www.darkreading.com/analytics/security-monitoring/got-malware-three-signs-revealed-in-dns-traffic/d/d-id/1139680", "https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/Threat-Vulnerability-Articles/What-are-suspicious-DNS-queries/ta-p/71454"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1071", "T1071.004", "T1189", "T1048", "T1048.003"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["DNS", "Drive-by Compromise", "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", "Application Layer Protocol"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control", "Exfiltration", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390", "Magic Hound", "Tropic Trooper", "Dark Caracal", "PLATINUM", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN8", "Ke3chang", "Turla", "APT39", "Rocke", "RTM", "Cobalt Group", "APT32", "APT19", "APT37", "Darkhotel", "APT41", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "Thrip", "Leafminer", "APT18", "no", "APT38", "Patchwork", "Elderwood", "APT33", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Windshift", "FIN7"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App", "id": "2452e632-9e0d-11eb-bacd-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-15", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. This technique are seen in couple of malware and APT group to exfiltrated collected data in a infected machine or infected network. This detection is looking for unique use of nslookup where it tries to use specific record type, TXT, A, AAAA, that are commonly used by attacker and also the retry parameter which is designed to query C2 DNS multiple tries.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"nslookup.exe\" Processes.process = \"*-querytype=*\" OR Processes.process=\"*-qt=*\" OR Processes.process=\"*-q=*\" OR Processes.process=\"-type=*\" OR Processes.process=\"*-retry=*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of nslookup.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "admin nslookup usage", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7_spear_phishing.html", "https://www.varonis.com/blog/dns-tunneling/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Dynamic DNS", "Command and Control", "Data Exfiltration"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/nslookup_exfil/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ performing activity related to DNS exfiltration.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1048"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app_filter"}]}, {"name": "DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App", "id": "2452e632-9e0d-11eb-34ba-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-07", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "This search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. This technique are seen in couple of malware and APT group to exfiltrated collected data in a infected machine or infected network. This detection is looking for unique use of nslookup where it tries to use specific record type, TXT, A, AAAA, that are commonly used by attacker and also the retry parameter which is designed to query C2 DNS multiple tries.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where \"Endpoint_Processes\" IN(_datamodels) | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null), process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_path\"), \"string\", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND process_name IS NOT NULL AND process_name=\"nslookup.exe\" AND (like (cmd_line, \"%-querytype=%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%-qt=%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%-q=%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%-type=%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%-retry=%\")) | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null)) | eval body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line, \"process_name\", process_name, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process_name, \"process_path\", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint_Processess` datamodel.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible for some legitimate administrative utilities to use similar cmd_line parameters. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7_spear_phishing.html", "https://www.varonis.com/blog/dns-tunneling/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Dynamic DNS", "Command and Control", "Data Exfiltration"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/nslookup_exfil/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ performing activity related to DNS exfiltration.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1048"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest_device_id", "process_name", "parent_process_name", "process_path", "dest_user_id", "process", "cmd_line"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app_filter"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App", "id": "0a69fdaa-a2b8-11eb-b16d-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-21", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. This technique are seen in couple of malware and APT group to exfiltrated collected data in a infected machine or infected network. This detection is looking for unique use of nslookup where it tries to use specific record type (TXT, A, AAAA) that are commonly used by attacker and also the retry parameter which is designed to query C2 DNS multiple tries.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode = 1 process_name = \"nslookup.exe\" | bucket _time span=15m | stats count as numNsLookup by Computer, _time | eventstats avg(numNsLookup) as avgNsLookup, stdev(numNsLookup) as stdNsLookup, count as numSlots by Computer | eval upperThreshold=(avgNsLookup + stdNsLookup *3) | eval isOutlier=if(avgNsLookup > 20 and avgNsLookup >= upperThreshold, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of nslookup.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7_spear_phishing.html", "https://www.varonis.com/blog/dns-tunneling/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Dynamic DNS", "Command and Control", "Data Exfiltration"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Scope:Local", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/nslookup_exfil/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Excessive usage of nslookup.exe has been detected on $Computer$. This detection is triggered as as it violates the dynamic threshold", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1048"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Computer", "process_name", "EventCode"], "risk_score": 28, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers", "id": "c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6v5464g9f", "version": 3, "date": "2021-01-14", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Resolution"], "description": "Malicious actors often abuse legitimate Dynamic DNS services to host malicious payloads or interactive command and control nodes. Attackers will automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to countless IP addresses to circumvent firewall blocks, block lists as well as frustrate a network defenders analytic and investigative processes. This search will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.answer) as answer min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query host | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `dynamic_dns_providers` | `detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter`", "how_to_implement": "First, you'll need to ingest data from your DNS operations. This can be done by ingesting logs from your server or data, collected passively by Splunk Stream or a similar solution. Specifically, data that contains the domain that is being queried and the IP of the host originating the request must be populating the `Network_Resolution` data model. This search also leverages a lookup file, `dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv`, which contains a non-exhaustive list of Dynamic DNS providers. Please consider updating the local lookup periodically by adding new domains to the list of `dynamic_dns_providers_local.csv`.\\\nThis search produces fields (query, answer, isDynDNS) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable event. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review. Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** DNS Query, **Field:** query\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** DNS Answer, **Field:** answer\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** IsDynamicDNS, **Field:** isDynDNS\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", "known_false_positives": "Some users and applications may leverage Dynamic DNS to reach out to some domains on the Internet since dynamic DNS by itself is not malicious, however this activity must be verified.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Data Protection", "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "DNS Hijacking", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Dynamic DNS", "Command and Control"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Initial Access"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1189/dyn_dns_site/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A dns query $query$ from your infra connecting to suspicious domain in host $host$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1189"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "host", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "query", "type": "dnsquery", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "DNS.answer", "DNS.query", "host"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Drive-by Compromise"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Turla", "Windshift", "RTM", "Darkhotel", "APT38", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Leafminer", "Dark Caracal", "APT19", "APT32", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-3390", "Elderwood", "APT37", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_default dynamic_dns_domains as query OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_default | lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_local dynamic_dns_domains as query OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_local| eval isDynDNS = coalesce(isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local)|fields - isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local| search isDynDNS=True", "description": "This macro limits the output of the query field to dynamic dns domains. It looks up the domains in a file provided by Splunk and one intended to be updated by the end user.", "name": "dynamic_dns_providers", "lookups": [{"case_sensitive_match": "false", "description": "A list of dynammic dns providers that should not be modified", "filename": "dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(dynamic_dns_domains)", "name": "dynamic_dns_providers_default", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv"}, {"case_sensitive_match": "false", "description": "A list of dynammic dns providers that can be modified", "filename": "dynamic_dns_providers_local.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(dynamic_dns_domains)", "name": "dynamic_dns_providers_local", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/dynamic_dns_providers_local.csv"}]}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter"}]}, {"name": "DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation", "id": "1a67f15a-f4ff-4170-84e9-08cf6f75d6f5", "version": 4, "date": "2021-10-06", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Network_Resolution"], "description": "This search allows you to identify DNS requests and compute the standard deviation on the length of the names being resolved, then filter on two times the standard deviation to show you those queries that are unusually large for your environment.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where NOT DNS.message_type IN(\"Pointer\",\"PTR\") by DNS.query | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | eval tlds=split(query,\".\") | eval tld=mvindex(tlds,-1) | eval tld_len=len(tld) | search tld_len<=24 | eval query_length = len(query) | table query query_length record_type count | eventstats stdev(query_length) AS stdev avg(query_length) AS avg p50(query_length) AS p50| where query_length>(avg+stdev*2) | eval z_score=(query_length-avg)/stdev | `dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model.", "known_false_positives": "It's possible there can be long domain names that are legitimate.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Hidden Cobra Malware", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Command and Control"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/long_dns_queries/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "message": "A dns query $query$ with 2 time standard deviation of name len of the dns query in host $host$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1048.003", "T1048"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "host", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "query", "type": "dnsquery", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "DNS.query"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration", "Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "Thrip", "FIN8", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation_filter"}]}, {"name": "DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK", "id": "85fbcfe8-9718-4911-adf6-7000d077a3a9", "version": 2, "date": "2020-01-22", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Network_Resolution"], "description": "This search allows you to identify DNS requests that are unusually large for the record type being requested in your environment.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as start_time max(_time) as end_time values(DNS.src) as src values(DNS.dest) as dest from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query DNS.record_type | search DNS.record_type=* | `drop_dm_object_name(DNS)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | eval query_length = len(query) | apply dns_query_pdfmodel threshold=0.01 | rename \"IsOutlier(query_length)\" as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | sort -query_length | table start_time end_time query record_type count src dest query_length | `dns_query_length_outliers___mltk_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. In addition, the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or greater must be installed on your search heads, along with any required dependencies. Finally, the support search \"Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK\" must be executed before this detection search, because it builds a machine-learning (ML) model over the historical data used by this search. It is important that this search is run in the same app context as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild the model with the latest data available in your environment.\\\nThis search produces fields (`query`,`query_length`,`count`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** DNS Query, **Field:** query\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** DNS Query Length, **Field:** query_length\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** Number of events, **Field:** count\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", "known_false_positives": "If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider reducing the value for threshold in the search. You should also periodically re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Hidden Cobra Malware", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Command and Control"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1071.004", "T1071"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "DNS.src", "DNS.dest", "DNS.query", "DNS.record_type"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["DNS", "Application Layer Protocol"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control", "Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT39", "Tropic Trooper", "OilRig", "Ke3chang", "Cobalt Group", "APT18", "APT41", "FIN7", "Rocke", "Magic Hound", "Dragonfly 2.0"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "dns_query_length_outliers___mltk_filter"}]}, {"name": "Excessive DNS Failures", "id": "104658f4-afdc-499e-9719-17243f9826f1", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Network_Resolution"], "description": "This search identifies DNS query failures by counting the number of DNS responses that do not indicate success, and trigger on more than 50 occurrences.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(\"DNS.query\") as queries from datamodel=Network_Resolution where nodename=DNS \"DNS.reply_code\"!=\"No Error\" \"DNS.reply_code\"!=\"NoError\" DNS.reply_code!=\"unknown\" NOT \"DNS.query\"=\"*.arpa\" \"DNS.query\"=\"*.*\" by \"DNS.src\",\"DNS.query\"| `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")`| lookup cim_corporate_web_domain_lookup domain as query OUTPUT domain| where isnull(domain)| lookup update=true alexa_lookup_by_str domain as query OUTPUT rank| where isnull(rank)| stats sum(count) as count mode(queries) as queries by src| `get_asset(src)`| where count>50 | `excessive_dns_failures_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible legitimate traffic can trigger this rule. Please investigate as appropriate. The threshold for generating an event can also be customized to better suit your environment.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Command and Control"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1071.004", "T1071"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "DNS.query", "DNS.reply_code", "DNS.src"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["DNS", "Application Layer Protocol"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control", "Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT39", "Tropic Trooper", "OilRig", "Ke3chang", "Cobalt Group", "APT18", "APT41", "FIN7", "Rocke", "Magic Hound", "Dragonfly 2.0"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "excessive_dns_failures_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Active Directory Lateral Movement", "id": "399d65dc-1f08-499b-a259-aad9051f38ad", "version": 3, "date": "2021-12-09", "author": "David Dorsey, Mauricio Velazco Splunk", "description": "Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how attackers move laterally within an Active Directory environment. Since lateral movement is often a necessary step in a breach, it is important for cyber defenders to deploy detection coverage.", "narrative": "Once attackers gain a foothold within an enterprise, they will seek to expand their accesses and leverage techniques that facilitate lateral movement. Attackers will often spend quite a bit of time and effort moving laterally. Because lateral movement renders an attacker the most vulnerable to detection, it's an excellent focus for detection and investigation.\\\nIndications of lateral movement in an Active Directory network can include the abuse of system utilities (such as `psexec.exe`), unauthorized use of remote desktop services, `file/admin$` shares, WMI, PowerShell, Service Control Manager, the DCOM protocol, WinRM or the abuse of scheduled tasks. Organizations must be extra vigilant in detecting lateral movement techniques and look for suspicious activity in and around high-value strategic network assets, such as Active Directory, which are often considered the primary target or \"crown jewels\" to a persistent threat actor.\\\nAn adversary can use lateral movement for multiple purposes, including remote execution of tools, pivoting to additional systems, obtaining access to specific information or files, access to additional credentials, exfiltrating data, or delivering a secondary effect. Adversaries may use legitimate credentials alongside inherent network and operating-system functionality to remotely connect to other systems and remain under the radar of network defenders.\\\nIf there is evidence of lateral movement, it is imperative for analysts to collect evidence of the associated offending hosts. For example, an attacker might leverage host A to gain access to host B. From there, the attacker may try to move laterally to host C. In this example, the analyst should gather as much information as possible from all three hosts. \\\n It is also important to collect authentication logs for each host, to ensure that the offending accounts are well-documented. Analysts should account for all processes to ensure that the attackers did not install unauthorized software.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/08/malware_lateral_move.html", "http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=videos/derbycon7/t405-hunting-lateral-movement-for-fun-and-profit-mauricio-velazco"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Active Directory Lateral Movement", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021.001", "T1543.003", "T1021", "T1550", "T1059.001", "T1021.006", "T1543", "T1047", "T1053.002", "T1021.003", "T1021.002", "T1569.002", "T1550.002", "T1569", "T1053", "T1078", "T1053.005"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Scheduled Task/Job", "Remote Desktop Protocol", "Pass the Hash", "Remote Services", "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "Service Execution", "Valid Accounts", "Windows Management Instrumentation", "Distributed Component Object Model", "Create or Modify System Process", "Use Alternate Authentication Material", "Scheduled Task", "At (Windows)", "Windows Remote Management", "Windows Service", "System Services", "PowerShell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Execution", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Magic Hound", "Stealth Falcon", "Rancor", "Inception", "Axiom", "Sandworm Team", "APT1", "Tropic Trooper", "Kimsuky", "TA459", "TEMP.Veles", "Poseidon Group", "APT29", "FIN8", "Ke3chang", "Leviathan", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT39", "Turla", "Gamaredon Group", "Molerats", "Carbanak", "TA505", "Frankenstein", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "Stolen Pencil", "APT32", "Soft Cell", "Silence", "APT19", "APT-C-36", "WIRTE", "APT41", "CopyKittens", "FIN5", "menuPass", "FIN6", "OilRig", "Blue Mockingbird", "Lazarus Group", "Honeybee", "APT3", "Wizard Spider", "Thrip", "Machete", "APT18", "no", "Threat Group-1314", "MuddyWater", "FIN10", "DarkVishnya", "Patchwork", "PittyTiger", "FIN4", "APT28", "Gallmaker", "APT33", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN7", "Orangeworm", "Gorgon Group", "Night Dragon", "DarkHydrus"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Wmiprsve LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", "id": "95a455f0-4c04-11ec-b8ac-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-22", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies `wmiprsve.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), the executed command is spawned as a child process of `wmiprvse.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of wmiprvse.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe) (Processes.process_name IN (\"Regsvcs.exe\", \"Ftp.exe\", \"OfflineScannerShell.exe\", \"Rasautou.exe\", \"Schtasks.exe\", \"Xwizard.exe\", \"Dllhost.exe\", \"Pnputil.exe\", \"Atbroker.exe\", \"Pcwrun.exe\", \"Ttdinject.exe\",\"Mshta.exe\", \"Bitsadmin.exe\", \"Certoc.exe\", \"Ieexec.exe\", \"Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe\", \"Runscripthelper.exe\", \"Forfiles.exe\", \"Msbuild.exe\", \"Register-cimprovider.exe\", \"Tttracer.exe\", \"Ie4uinit.exe\", \"Bash.exe\", \"Hh.exe\", \"SettingSyncHost.exe\", \"Cmstp.exe\", \"Mmc.exe\", \"Stordiag.exe\", \"Scriptrunner.exe\", \"Odbcconf.exe\", \"Extexport.exe\", \"Msdt.exe\", \"WorkFolders.exe\", \"Diskshadow.exe\", \"Mavinject.exe\", \"Regasm.exe\", \"Gpscript.exe\", \"Rundll32.exe\", \"Regsvr32.exe\", \"Msiexec.exe\", \"Wuauclt.exe\", \"Presentationhost.exe\", \"Wmic.exe\", \"Runonce.exe\", \"Syncappvpublishingserver.exe\", \"Verclsid.exe\", \"Infdefaultinstall.exe\", \"Explorer.exe\", \"Installutil.exe\", \"Netsh.exe\", \"Wab.exe\", \"Dnscmd.exe\", \"At.exe\", \"Pcalua.exe\", \"Msconfig.exe\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmiprsve_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/", "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/lateral-movement/t1047-wmi-for-lateral-movement", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "message": "Wmiprsve.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1047"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 54, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Windows Management Instrumentation"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT41", "FIN6", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Threat Group-3390", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "menuPass", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "wmiprsve_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter"}]}, {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI", "id": "d25d2c3d-d9d8-40ec-8fdf-e86fe155a3da", "version": 7, "date": "2021-11-12", "author": "Rico Valdez, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies wmic.exe being launched with parameters to spawn a process on a remote system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WMI and this binary for lateral movement and remote code execution.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` (Processes.process=\"*/node:*\" AND Processes.process=\"*process*\" AND Processes.process=\"*call*\" AND Processes.process=\"*create*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "The wmic.exe utility is a benign Windows application. It may be used legitimately by Administrators with these parameters for remote system administration, but it's relatively uncommon.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/cimwin32prov/create-method-in-class-win32-process"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Suspicious WMI Use", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A wmic.exe process $process$ contain process spawn commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Windows Management Instrumentation"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT41", "FIN6", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Threat Group-3390", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "menuPass", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_wmic"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_filter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Creation on Remote Endpoint", "id": "e0eea4fa-4274-11ec-882b-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-10", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `sc.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to create a Windows Service on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Service Control Manager for lateral movement and remote code execution.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=sc.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=sc.exe) (Processes.process=*\\\\\\\\* AND Processes.process=*create* AND Processes.process=*binpath*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_creation_on_remote_endpoint_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may create Windows Services on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/services/service-control-manager", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/services/controlling-a-service-using-sc", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "message": "A Windows Service was created on a remote endpoint from $dest", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1543", "T1543.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 54, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Create or Modify System Process", "Windows Service"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Blue Mockingbird", "DarkVishnya", "Wizard Spider", "APT32", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Tropic Trooper", "Cobalt Group", "Ke3chang", "Honeybee", "FIN7", "Threat Group-3390", "APT19", "APT3", "Lazarus Group", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "windows_service_creation_on_remote_endpoint_filter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Created Within Public Path", "id": "3abb2eda-4bb8-11ec-9ae4-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-22", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytc uses Windows Event Id 7045, `New Service Was Installed`, to identify the creation of a Windows Service where the service binary path is located in public paths. This behavior could represent the installation of a malicious service. Red Teams and adversaries alike may create malicious Services for lateral movement or remote code execution", "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 Service_File_Name = \"*\\.exe\" NOT (Service_File_Name IN (\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\*\", \"C:\\\\Program File*\", \"C:\\\\Programdata\\\\*\", \"%systemroot%\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName EventCode Service_File_Name Service_Name Service_Start_Type Service_Type | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_created_within_public_path_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may install services with uncommon services paths.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/services/service-control-manager", "https://pentestlab.blog/2020/07/21/lateral-movement-services/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement_suspicious_path/windows-system.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "message": "A Windows Service $Service_File_Name$ with a public path was created on $ComputerName", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1543", "T1543.003"], "observable": [{"name": "Service_File_Name", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}, {"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["EventCode", "Service_File_Name", "Service_Type", "_time", "Service_Name", "Service_Start_Type"], "risk_score": 54, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Create or Modify System Process", "Windows Service"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Blue Mockingbird", "DarkVishnya", "Wizard Spider", "APT32", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Tropic Trooper", "Cobalt Group", "Ke3chang", "Honeybee", "FIN7", "Threat Group-3390", "APT19", "APT3", "Lazarus Group", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_system"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "windows_service_created_within_public_path_filter"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At", "id": "4be54858-432f-11ec-8209-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-11", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `at.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to create a Scheduled Task on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution. The `at.exe` binary internally leverages the AT protocol which was deprecated starting with Windows 8 and Windows Server 2012 but may still work on previous versions of Windows. Furthermore, attackers may enable this protocol on demand by changing a sytem registry key.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=at.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=at.exe) (Processes.process=*\\\\\\\\*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `scheduled_task_creation_on_remote_endpoint_using_at_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may create scheduled tasks on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/at", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/cimwin32prov/win32-scheduledjob?redirectedfrom=MSDN"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.002/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "message": "A Windows Scheduled Task was created on a remote endpoint from $dest", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053", "T1053.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 54, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Scheduled Task/Job", "At (Windows)"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "scheduled_task_creation_on_remote_endpoint_using_at_filter"}]}, {"name": "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share", "id": "f63c34fe-a435-11eb-935a-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-11-18", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies executable files (.exe or .dll) being written to Windows administrative SMB shares (Admin$, IPC$, C$). This represents suspicious behavior as its commonly used by tools like like PsExec/PaExec and others to stage service binaries before creating and starting a Windows service on remote endpoints. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse administrative shares for lateral movement and remote code execution. The Trickbot malware family also implements this behavior to try to infect other machines in the infected network.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=5145 Relative_Target_Name IN (\"*.exe\",\"*.dll\") Object_Type=File Share_Name IN (\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\C$\",\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\IPC$\",\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\admin$\") Access_Mask= \"0x2\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by EventCode Share_Name Relative_Target_Name Object_Type Access_Mask user src_port Source_Address | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 5145 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required. Also enable the object Audit access success/failure in your group policy.", "known_false_positives": "System Administrators may use looks like PsExec for troubleshooting or administrations tasks. However, this will typically come only from certain users and certain systems that can be added to an allow list.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002/", "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2013/03/09/psexec-demystified/", "https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/", "https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "Trickbot"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/exe_smbshare/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "message": "$user$ dropped or created an executable file in known sensitive SMB share. Share name=$Share_Name$, Target name=$Relative_Target_Name$, and Access mask=$Access_Mask$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021", "T1021.002"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Share_Name", "Relative_Target_Name", "Object_Type", "Access_Mask", "user", "src_port", "Source_Address"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote Services", "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "APT32", "Orangeworm", "FIN8", "APT3", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-1314", "Turla", "Deep Panda", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share_filter"}]}, {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell", "id": "ba24cda8-4716-11ec-8009-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-16", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the WinRM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of the `Invoke-Command` commandlet. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WinRM and `powershell.exe` for lateral movement and remote code execution.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process=\"*Invoke-Command*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-ComputerName*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may leverage WinRM and `Invoke-Command` to start a process on remote systems for system administration or automation use cases. However, this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006/", "https://pentestlab.blog/2018/05/15/lateral-movement-winrm/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement_psh/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "message": "A process was started on a remote endpoint from $dest by abusing WinRM using PowerShell.exe", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021", "T1021.006"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 45, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote Services", "Windows Remote Management"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Threat Group-3390"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_powershell"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", "id": "5d9c6eee-988c-11eb-8253-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-08", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed from a user writeable file path.\\\nThe search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not.\\\nschtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\\Windows\\system32` and `C:\\Windows\\syswow64`.\\\nThe following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory.\\\nUpon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or was it via TaskService. Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message | search Command IN (\"*\\\\users\\\\public\\\\*\", \"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Tasks\\\\*\", \"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Task_Name, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required.", "known_false_positives": "False positives are possible if legitimate applications are allowed to register tasks in public paths. Filter as needed based on paths that are used legitimately.", "references": ["https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/irans-apt34-returns-with-an-updated-arsenal/", "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4698", "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/scheduled-task-job/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/taskschd/time-trigger-example--scripting-?redirectedfrom=MSDN", "https://app.any.run/tasks/e26f1b2e-befa-483b-91d2-e18636e2faf3/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "IcedID", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/taskschedule/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "message": "A windows scheduled task was created (task name=$Task_Name$) on $dest$ by the following command: $Command$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Command", "type": "Command", "role": ["Target"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "Task_Name", "Description", "Command"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Scheduled Task", "Scheduled Task/Job"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "MuddyWater", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT-C-36", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT41", "Machete", "Soft Cell", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Patchwork", "OilRig", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "FIN8", "menuPass", "FIN10", "APT32", "FIN7", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path_filter"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint", "id": "95cf4608-4302-11ec-8194-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-11", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `schtasks.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to start a Scheduled Task on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=schtasks.exe) (Processes.process=*/s* AND Processes.process=*/run*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `scheduled_task_initiation_on_remote_endpoint_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may start scheduled tasks on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/schtasks", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "message": "A Windows Scheduled Task was ran on a remote endpoint from $dest", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053", "T1053.005"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 54, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Scheduled Task/Job", "Scheduled Task"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "MuddyWater", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT-C-36", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT41", "Machete", "Soft Cell", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Patchwork", "OilRig", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "FIN8", "menuPass", "FIN10", "APT32", "FIN7", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT29"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "scheduled_task_initiation_on_remote_endpoint_filter"}]}, {"name": "Wsmprovhost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", "id": "2eed004c-4c0d-11ec-93e8-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-22", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies `Wsmprovhost.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the Windows Remote Management (WinRm) protocol, the executed command is spawned as a child processs of `Wsmprovhost.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of Wsmprovhost.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=wsmprovhost.exe) (Processes.process_name IN (\"Regsvcs.exe\", \"Ftp.exe\", \"OfflineScannerShell.exe\", \"Rasautou.exe\", \"Schtasks.exe\", \"Xwizard.exe\", \"Dllhost.exe\", \"Pnputil.exe\", \"Atbroker.exe\", \"Pcwrun.exe\", \"Ttdinject.exe\",\"Mshta.exe\", \"Bitsadmin.exe\", \"Certoc.exe\", \"Ieexec.exe\", \"Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe\", \"Runscripthelper.exe\", \"Forfiles.exe\", \"Msbuild.exe\", \"Register-cimprovider.exe\", \"Tttracer.exe\", \"Ie4uinit.exe\", \"Bash.exe\", \"Hh.exe\", \"SettingSyncHost.exe\", \"Cmstp.exe\", \"Mmc.exe\", \"Stordiag.exe\", \"Scriptrunner.exe\", \"Odbcconf.exe\", \"Extexport.exe\", \"Msdt.exe\", \"WorkFolders.exe\", \"Diskshadow.exe\", \"Mavinject.exe\", \"Regasm.exe\", \"Gpscript.exe\", \"Rundll32.exe\", \"Regsvr32.exe\", \"Msiexec.exe\", \"Wuauclt.exe\", \"Presentationhost.exe\", \"Wmic.exe\", \"Runonce.exe\", \"Syncappvpublishingserver.exe\", \"Verclsid.exe\", \"Infdefaultinstall.exe\", \"Explorer.exe\", \"Installutil.exe\", \"Netsh.exe\", \"Wab.exe\", \"Dnscmd.exe\", \"At.exe\", \"Pcalua.exe\", \"Msconfig.exe\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `wsmprovhost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006/", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/", "https://pentestlab.blog/2018/05/15/lateral-movement-winrm/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "message": "Wsmprovhost.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021", "T1021.006"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 54, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote Services", "Windows Remote Management"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Threat Group-3390"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "wsmprovhost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter"}]}, {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and Winrs", "id": "0dd296a2-4338-11ec-ba02-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-11", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `winrs.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the WinRM protocol and this binary for lateral movement and remote code execution.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=winrs.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=winrs.exe) (Processes.process=\"*-r:*\" OR Processes.process=\"*-remote:*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_winrs_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may leverage WinRM and WinRs to start a process on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/winrs", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "message": "A process was started on a remote endpoint from $dest", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021", "T1021.006"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 54, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote Services", "Windows Remote Management"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Threat Group-3390"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_winrs_filter"}]}, {"name": "Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters", "id": "8ce07472-496f-11ec-ab3b-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-19", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the presence of suspicious commandline parameters typically present when using Impacket tools. Impacket is a collection of python classes meant to be used with Microsoft network protocols. There are multiple scripts that leverage impacket libraries like `wmiexec.py`, `smbexec.py`, `dcomexec.py` and `atexec.py` used to execute commands on remote endpoints. By default, these scripts leverage administrative shares and hardcoded parameters that can be used as a signature to detect its use. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage Impackets tools for lateral movement and remote code execution.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process = \"*/c* \\\\\\\\127.0.0.1\\\\*\" OR Processes.process= \"*/c* 2>&1\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Although uncommon, Administrators may leverage Impackets tools to start a process on remote systems for system administration or automation use cases.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005", "https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket", "https://vk9-sec.com/impacket-remote-code-execution-rce-on-windows-from-linux/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.003/impacket/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "message": "Suspicious command line parameters on $dest may represent a lateral movement attack with Impackets tools", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021", "T1021.002", "T1021.003", "T1047", "T1543.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote Services", "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "Distributed Component Object Model", "Windows Management Instrumentation", "Windows Service"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement", "Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "APT32", "Orangeworm", "FIN8", "APT3", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-1314", "Turla", "Deep Panda", "Ke3chang", "no", "Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT41", "FIN6", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Threat Group-3390", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "menuPass", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "APT29", "Deep Panda", "Blue Mockingbird", "DarkVishnya", "Wizard Spider", "APT32", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Tropic Trooper", "Cobalt Group", "Ke3chang", "Honeybee", "FIN7", "Threat Group-3390", "APT19", "APT3", "Lazarus Group", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters_filter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Created With Suspicious Service Path", "id": "429141be-8311-11eb-adb6-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-11-22", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytc uses Windows Event Id 7045, `New Service Was Installed`, to identify the creation of a Windows Service where the service binary path path is located in a non-common Service folder in Windows. Red Teams and adversaries alike may create malicious Services for lateral movement or remote code execution as well as persistence and execution. The Clop ransomware has also been seen in the wild abusing Windows services.", "search": " `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 Service_File_Name = \"*\\.exe\" NOT (Service_File_Name IN (\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\*\", \"C:\\\\Program File*\", \"C:\\\\Programdata\\\\*\", \"%systemroot%\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Service_File_Name Service_Name Service_Start_Type Service_Type | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may install services with uncommon services paths.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-system.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement"], "message": "A service $Service_File_Name$ was created from a non-standard path using $Service_Name$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1569", "T1569.002"], "observable": [{"name": "Service_File_Name", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}, {"name": "Service_Name", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["EventCode", "Service_File_Name", "Service_Type", "_time", "Service_Name", "Service_Start_Type"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Services", "Service Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "APT41", "Silence", "FIN6", "APT32", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_system"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path_filter"}]}, {"name": "Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", "id": "f6601940-4c74-11ec-b9b7-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-23", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies `mmc.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the DCOM protocol and the MMC20 COM object, the executed command is spawned as a child processs of `mmc.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of mmc.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=mmc.exe) (Processes.process_name IN (\"Regsvcs.exe\", \"Ftp.exe\", \"OfflineScannerShell.exe\", \"Rasautou.exe\", \"Schtasks.exe\", \"Xwizard.exe\", \"Dllhost.exe\", \"Pnputil.exe\", \"Atbroker.exe\", \"Pcwrun.exe\", \"Ttdinject.exe\",\"Mshta.exe\", \"Bitsadmin.exe\", \"Certoc.exe\", \"Ieexec.exe\", \"Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe\", \"Runscripthelper.exe\", \"Forfiles.exe\", \"Msbuild.exe\", \"Register-cimprovider.exe\", \"Tttracer.exe\", \"Ie4uinit.exe\", \"Bash.exe\", \"Hh.exe\", \"SettingSyncHost.exe\", \"Cmstp.exe\", \"Mmc.exe\", \"Stordiag.exe\", \"Scriptrunner.exe\", \"Odbcconf.exe\", \"Extexport.exe\", \"Msdt.exe\", \"WorkFolders.exe\", \"Diskshadow.exe\", \"Mavinject.exe\", \"Regasm.exe\", \"Gpscript.exe\", \"Rundll32.exe\", \"Regsvr32.exe\", \"Msiexec.exe\", \"Wuauclt.exe\", \"Presentationhost.exe\", \"Wmic.exe\", \"Runonce.exe\", \"Syncappvpublishingserver.exe\", \"Verclsid.exe\", \"Infdefaultinstall.exe\", \"Explorer.exe\", \"Installutil.exe\", \"Netsh.exe\", \"Wab.exe\", \"Dnscmd.exe\", \"At.exe\", \"Pcalua.exe\", \"Msconfig.exe\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mmc_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003/", "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/dcom-lateral-movement-techniques", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.003/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "message": "Mmc.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021", "T1021.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 54, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote Services", "Distributed Component Object Model"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "mmc_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter"}]}, {"name": "Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", "id": "ba9e1954-4c04-11ec-8b74-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-22", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies `services.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the Service Control Manager and creating a remote malicious service, the executed command is spawned as a child process of `services.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of services.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe) (Processes.process_name IN (\"Regsvcs.exe\", \"Ftp.exe\", \"OfflineScannerShell.exe\", \"Rasautou.exe\", \"Schtasks.exe\", \"Xwizard.exe\", \"Dllhost.exe\", \"Pnputil.exe\", \"Atbroker.exe\", \"Pcwrun.exe\", \"Ttdinject.exe\",\"Mshta.exe\", \"Bitsadmin.exe\", \"Certoc.exe\", \"Ieexec.exe\", \"Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe\", \"Runscripthelper.exe\", \"Forfiles.exe\", \"Msbuild.exe\", \"Register-cimprovider.exe\", \"Tttracer.exe\", \"Ie4uinit.exe\", \"Bash.exe\", \"Hh.exe\", \"SettingSyncHost.exe\", \"Cmstp.exe\", \"Mmc.exe\", \"Stordiag.exe\", \"Scriptrunner.exe\", \"Odbcconf.exe\", \"Extexport.exe\", \"Msdt.exe\", \"WorkFolders.exe\", \"Diskshadow.exe\", \"Mavinject.exe\", \"Regasm.exe\", \"Gpscript.exe\", \"Rundll32.exe\", \"Regsvr32.exe\", \"Msiexec.exe\", \"Wuauclt.exe\", \"Presentationhost.exe\", \"Wmic.exe\", \"Runonce.exe\", \"Syncappvpublishingserver.exe\", \"Verclsid.exe\", \"Infdefaultinstall.exe\", \"Explorer.exe\", \"Installutil.exe\", \"Netsh.exe\", \"Wab.exe\", \"Dnscmd.exe\", \"At.exe\", \"Pcalua.exe\", \"Msconfig.exe\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `services_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/", "https://pentestlab.blog/2020/07/21/lateral-movement-services/", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "message": "Services.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1543", "T1543.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 54, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Create or Modify System Process", "Windows Service"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Blue Mockingbird", "DarkVishnya", "Wizard Spider", "APT32", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Tropic Trooper", "Cobalt Group", "Ke3chang", "Honeybee", "FIN7", "Threat Group-3390", "APT19", "APT3", "Lazarus Group", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "services_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter"}]}, {"name": "Potential Pass the Token or Hash Observed by an Event Collecting Device", "id": "1058ba3e-a698-49bc-a1e5-7cedece4ea87", "version": 2, "date": "2021-11-05", "author": "Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Authentication"], "description": "This detection identifies potential Pass the Token or Pass the Hash credential stealing. We detect the main side effect of these attacks, which is a transition from the dominant Kerberos logins to rare NTLM logins for a given user, as reported by an event-collecting device (i.e., a specific domain controller or an endpoint destination).", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where \"Authentication\" IN(_datamodels)\n| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), dest_user= lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_primary_artifact\"), \"string\", null)), dest_user_id= ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), origin_device_id= ucast(map_get(input_event, \"origin_device_id\"), \"string\", null), signature_id= lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"signature_id\"), \"string\", null)), authentication_method= lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"authentication_method\"), \"string\", null)), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where signature_id = \"4624\" AND (authentication_method=\"ntlmssp\" OR authentication_method=\"kerberos\") AND dest_user_id != null AND origin_device_id != null\n| eval isKerberos=if(authentication_method == \"kerberos\", 1, 0), isNtlm=if(authentication_method == \"ntlmssp\", 1, 0), timeNTLM=if(isNtlm > 0, timestamp, null)\n| stats sum(isKerberos) as totalKerberos, sum(isNtlm) as totalNtlm, min(timestamp) as startTime, min(timeNTLM) as startNTLMTime, max(timestamp) as endTime, max(timeNTLM) as endNTLMTime by dest_user_id, dest_user, origin_device_id, span(timestamp, 86400s)\n| where NOT dest_user=\"-\" AND totalKerberos > 0 AND totalNtlm > 0 AND endTime - startTime > 1800000 AND (totalKerberos > 10 * totalNtlm AND totalKerberos > 50) AND (endTime - startTime) > 3 * (endNTLMTime - startNTLMTime)\n| eval start_time=startNTLMTime, end_time=endNTLMTime, entities=mvappend(dest_user_id, origin_device_id), body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"total_kerberos\", totalKerberos, \"total_ntlm\", totalNtlm, \"analysis_start_time\", startTime, \"analysis_end_time\", endTime, \"detection_start_time\", startNTLMTime, \"detection_end_time\", endNTLMTime])\n| into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest - at least from domain controllers. Please make sure that event ID 4624 is being logged.", "known_false_positives": "Environments in which NTLM is used extremely rarely and for benign purposes (such as a rare use of SMB shares).", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002/", "https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/psexec-pass-hash/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "asset_type": "Windows", "cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 20"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:AD", "Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "message": "Potential lateral movement and credential stealing via Pass the Token or Pass the Hash techniques. Operation is performed via credentials of the account $dest_user_id$ and observed by the logging device $origin_device_id$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1550", "T1550.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "User", "role": ["Actor"]}, {"name": "origin_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "signature_id", "dest_user", "dest_user_id", "origin_device_id", "authentication_method"], "risk_score": 64, "risk_severity": "high", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Use Alternate Authentication Material", "Pass the Hash"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement", "Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "Night Dragon", "APT28", "APT1"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "potential_pass_the_token_or_hash_observed_by_an_event_collecting_device_filter"}]}, {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell Script Block", "id": "fa1c3040-4680-11ec-a618-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-15", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of PowerShell with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the DCOM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of ShellExecute and ExecuteShellCommand. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse DCOM for lateral movement and remote code execution.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message=\"*Document.Application.ShellExecute*\" OR Message=\"*Document.ActiveView.ExecuteShellCommand*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup instructions can be found https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may leverage DCOM to start a process on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003/", "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/dcom-lateral-movement-techniques"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.003/lateral_movement/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "message": "A process was started on a remote endpoint from $ComputerName by abusing WMI using PowerShell.exe", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021", "T1021.003"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote Services", "Distributed Component Object Model"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_script_block_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks", "id": "f5939373-8054-40ad-8c64-cec478a22a4b", "version": 5, "date": "2020-10-15", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for specific authentication events from the Windows Security Event logs to detect potential attempts at using the Pass-the-Hash technique.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 (Logon_Type=3 Logon_Process=NtLmSsp WorkstationName=WORKSTATION NOT AccountName=\"ANONYMOUS LOGON\") OR (Logon_Type=9 Logon_Process=seclogo) | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode, Logon_Type, WorkstationName, user, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must ingest your Windows Security Event logs and leverage the latest TA for Windows.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate logon activity by authorized NTLM systems may be detected by this search. Please investigate as appropriate.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1550.002/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "The following $EventCode$ occurred on $dest$ by $user$ with Logon Type 3, which may be indicative of the pass the hash technique.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1550", "T1550.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "EventCode", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Logon_Type", "Logon_Process", "WorkstationName", "user", "dest"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "access", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Use Alternate Authentication Material", "Pass the Hash"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement", "Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "Night Dragon", "APT28", "APT1"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks_filter"}]}, {"name": "Schtasks scheduling job on remote system", "id": "1297fb80-f42a-4b4a-9c8a-88c066237cf6", "version": 5, "date": "2021-11-11", "author": "David Dorsey, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `schtasks.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to create a Scheduled Task on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = schtasks.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=schtasks.exe) (Processes.process=\"*/create*\" AND Processes.process=\"*/s*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may create scheduled tasks on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. It is important to validate and investigate as appropriate.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "NOBELIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}, "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A schedule task process $process_name$ with remote job commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "Processes.dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Processes.user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Scheduled Task", "Scheduled Task/Job"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "MuddyWater", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT-C-36", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT41", "Machete", "Soft Cell", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Patchwork", "OilRig", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "FIN8", "menuPass", "FIN10", "APT32", "FIN7", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system_filter"}]}, {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell Script Block", "id": "7d4c618e-4716-11ec-951c-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-16", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of PowerShell with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the WinRM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of the `Invoke-Command` commandlet. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WinRM for lateral movement and remote code execution.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message=\"*Invoke-Command*\" AND Message=\"*-ComputerName*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup instructions can be found https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may leverage WinRM and `Invoke-Command` to start a process on remote systems for system administration or automation use cases. This activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. In certain environments, tuning may not be possible.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006/", "https://pentestlab.blog/2018/05/15/lateral-movement-winrm/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement_psh/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "message": "A process was started on a remote endpoint from $ComputerName by abusing WinRM using PowerShell.exe", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021", "T1021.006"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 45, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote Services", "Windows Remote Management"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Threat Group-3390"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_script_block_filter"}]}, {"name": "Short Lived Scheduled Task", "id": "6fa31414-546e-11ec-adfa-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-03", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic leverages Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created` and Windows Security EventCode 4699, `A scheduled task was deleted` to identify scheduled tasks created and deleted in less than 30 seconds. This behavior may represent a lateral movement attack abusing the Task Scheduler to obtain code execution. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution.", "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 OR EventCode=4699 | xmlkv Message | transaction Task_Name startswith=(EventCode=4698) endswith=(EventCode=4699) | eval short_lived=case((duration<30),\"TRUE\") | search short_lived = TRUE | table _time, ComputerName, Account_Name, Command, Task_Name, short_lived | `short_lived_scheduled_task_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required.", "known_false_positives": "Although uncommon, legitimate applications may create and delete a Scheduled Task within 30 seconds. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/taskschd/about-the-task-scheduler"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/lateral_movement/windows-security.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "message": "A windows scheduled task was created and deleted in 30 seconds on $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053.005"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Command", "type": "Command", "role": ["Target"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "ComputerName", "Account_Name", "Task_Name", "Description", "Command"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Scheduled Task"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "MuddyWater", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT-C-36", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT41", "Machete", "Soft Cell", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Patchwork", "OilRig", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "FIN8", "menuPass", "FIN10", "APT32", "FIN7", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT29"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "short_lived_scheduled_task_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag", "id": "b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-151xb162040e", "version": 4, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for events where `PsExec.exe` is run with the `accepteula` flag in the command line. PsExec is a built-in Windows utility that enables you to execute processes on other systems. It is fully interactive for console applications. This tool is widely used for launching interactive command prompts on remote systems. Threat actors leverage this extensively for executing code on compromised systems. If an attacker is running PsExec for the first time, they will be prompted to accept the end-user license agreement (EULA), which can be passed as the argument `accepteula` within the command line.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_psexec` Processes.process=*accepteula* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators can leverage PsExec for accessing remote systems and might pass `accepteula` as an argument if they are running this tool for the first time. However, it is not likely that you'd see multiple occurrences of this event on a machine", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "HAFNIUM Group", "DarkSide Ransomware", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ running the utility for possibly the first time.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021", "T1021.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote Services", "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "APT32", "Orangeworm", "FIN8", "APT3", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-1314", "Turla", "Deep Panda", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=psexec.exe OR Processes.process_name=psexec64.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=psexec.c)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_psexec"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag_filter"}]}, {"name": "Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell", "id": "a4e8f3a4-48b2-11ec-bcfc-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-18", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the usage of the `Enter-PSSession`. This commandlet can be used to open an interactive session on a remote endpoint leveraging the WinRM protocol. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WinRM and `Enter-PSSession` for lateral movement and remote code execution.", "search": "powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message=\"*Enter-PSSession*\" AND Message=\"*-ComputerName*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `interactive_session_on_remote_endpoint_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup instructions can be found https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may leverage WinRM and `Enter-PSSession` for administrative and troubleshooting tasks. This activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. In certain environments, tuning may not be possible.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/enter-pssession?view=powershell-7.2"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement_pssession/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "message": "An interactive session was opened on a remote endpoint from $ComputerName", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021", "T1021.006"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 45, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote Services", "Windows Remote Management"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Threat Group-3390"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "interactive_session_on_remote_endpoint_with_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", "id": "09e5c72a-4c0d-11ec-aa29-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-22", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies `svchost.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the Task Scheduler and creating a malicious remote scheduled task, the executed command is spawned as a child process of `svchost.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of svchost.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=svchost.exe) (Processes.process_name IN (\"Regsvcs.exe\", \"Ftp.exe\", \"OfflineScannerShell.exe\", \"Rasautou.exe\", \"Schtasks.exe\", \"Xwizard.exe\", \"Pnputil.exe\", \"Atbroker.exe\", \"Pcwrun.exe\", \"Ttdinject.exe\",\"Mshta.exe\", \"Bitsadmin.exe\", \"Certoc.exe\", \"Ieexec.exe\", \"Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe\", \"Runscripthelper.exe\", \"Forfiles.exe\", \"Msbuild.exe\", \"Register-cimprovider.exe\", \"Tttracer.exe\", \"Ie4uinit.exe\", \"Bash.exe\", \"Hh.exe\", \"SettingSyncHost.exe\", \"Cmstp.exe\", \"Stordiag.exe\", \"Scriptrunner.exe\", \"Odbcconf.exe\", \"Extexport.exe\", \"Msdt.exe\", \"WorkFolders.exe\", \"Diskshadow.exe\", \"Mavinject.exe\", \"Regasm.exe\", \"Gpscript.exe\", \"Regsvr32.exe\", \"Msiexec.exe\", \"Wuauclt.exe\", \"Presentationhost.exe\", \"Wmic.exe\", \"Runonce.exe\", \"Syncappvpublishingserver.exe\", \"Verclsid.exe\", \"Infdefaultinstall.exe\", \"Installutil.exe\", \"Netsh.exe\", \"Wab.exe\", \"Dnscmd.exe\", \"At.exe\", \"Pcalua.exe\", \"Msconfig.exe\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `svchost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/", "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/persistence/t1053-schtask", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-security.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "message": "Svchost.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053", "T1053.005"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 54, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Scheduled Task/Job", "Scheduled Task"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "MuddyWater", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT-C-36", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT41", "Machete", "Soft Cell", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Patchwork", "OilRig", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "FIN8", "menuPass", "FIN10", "APT32", "FIN7", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT29"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "svchost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter"}]}, {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell", "id": "112638b4-4634-11ec-b9ab-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-15", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` leveraging the `Invoke-WmiMethod` commandlet complemented with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing WMI. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WMI and `powershell.exe` for lateral movement and remote code execution.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process=\"*Invoke-WmiMethod*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-CN*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-Class Win32_Process*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-Name create*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may leverage WWMI and powershell.exe to start a process on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/invoke-wmimethod?view=powershell-5.1"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "message": "A process was started on a remote endpoint from $dest by abusing WMI using PowerShell.exe", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1047"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Windows Management Instrumentation"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT41", "FIN6", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Threat Group-3390", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "menuPass", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_powershell"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Potential Pass the Token or Hash Observed at the Destination Device", "id": "82e76b80-5cdb-4899-9b43-85dbe777b36d", "version": 3, "date": "2021-11-30", "author": "Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Authentication"], "description": "This detection identifies potential Pass the Token or Pass the Hash credential stealing. We detect the main side effect of these attacks, which is a transition from the dominant Kerberos logins to rare NTLM logins for a given user, as reported by a detination device.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where \"Authentication\" IN(_datamodels) | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), dest_user=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_primary_artifact\"), \"string\", null)), dest_user_id= ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), dest_device_id= ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null), signature_id= lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"signature_id\"), \"string\", null)), authentication_method= lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"authentication_method\"), \"string\", null)), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null)\n| where signature_id = \"4624\" AND (authentication_method=\"ntlmssp\" OR authentication_method=\"kerberos\") AND dest_user_id != null AND dest_device_id != null\n| eval isKerberos=if(authentication_method == \"kerberos\", 1, 0), isNtlm=if(authentication_method == \"ntlmssp\", 1, 0), timeNTLM=if(isNtlm > 0, timestamp, null)\n| stats sum(isKerberos) as totalKerberos, sum(isNtlm) as totalNtlm, min(timestamp) as startTime, min(timeNTLM) as startNTLMTime, max(timestamp) as endTime, max(timeNTLM) as endNTLMTime by dest_user_id, dest_user, dest_device_id, span(timestamp, 86400s)\n| where NOT dest_user=\"-\" AND totalKerberos > 0 AND totalNtlm > 0 AND endTime - startTime > 1800000 AND (totalKerberos > 10 * totalNtlm AND totalKerberos > 50) AND (endTime - startTime) > 3 * (endNTLMTime - startNTLMTime)\n| eval start_time=ucast(startNTLMTime, \"long\", null), end_time=ucast(endNTLMTime, \"long\", null), entities=mvappend(dest_user_id, dest_device_id), body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"total_kerberos\", totalKerberos, \"total_ntlm\", totalNtlm, \"analysis_start_time\", startTime, \"analysis_end_time\", endTime, \"pth_start_time\", startNTLMTime, \"pth_end_time\", endNTLMTime])\n| into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from endpoint devices, i.e., destinations of interest. Please make sure that event ID 4624 is being logged.", "known_false_positives": "Environments in which NTLM is used extremely rarely and for benign purposes (such as a rare use of SMB shares).", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002/", "https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/psexec-pass-hash/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "asset_type": "Windows", "cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 20"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:AD", "Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "message": "Potential lateral movement and credential stealing via Pass the Token or Pass the Hash techniques. Operation is performed via credentials of the account $dest_user_id$ and observed by the destination device $dest_device_id$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1550", "T1550.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "User", "role": ["Actor"]}, {"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "signature_id", "dest_user", "dest_user_id", "dest_device_id", "authentication_method"], "risk_score": 72, "risk_severity": "high", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Use Alternate Authentication Material", "Pass the Hash"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement", "Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "Night Dragon", "APT28", "APT1"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "potential_pass_the_token_or_hash_observed_at_the_destination_device_filter"}]}, {"name": "Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn", "id": "cb909b3e-512b-11ec-aa31-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-29", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic assists with identifying a PowerShell process spawned as a child or grand child process of commonly abused processes during lateral movement techniques including `services.exe`, `wmiprsve.exe`, `svchost.exe`, `wsmprovhost.exe` and `mmc.exe`. Legitimate Windows features such as the Service Control Manager, Windows Management Instrumentation, Task Scheduler, Windows Remote Management and the DCOM protocol can be abused to start a process on a remote endpoint. Looking for PowerShell spawned out of this processes may reveal a lateral movement attack. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse these services during a breach for lateral movement and remote code execution.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=svchost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=wsmprovhost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=mmc.exe) (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR (Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process=*powershell.exe*) OR Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR (Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process=*pwsh.exe*)) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may spawn PowerShell as a child process of the the identified processes. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053.005/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "Malicious PowerShell"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement_powershell/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement", "Malicious PowerShell"], "message": "A PowerShell process was spawned as a child process of typically abused processes on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021", "T1021.003", "T1021.006", "T1047", "T1053.005", "T1543.003", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 45, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote Services", "Distributed Component Object Model", "Windows Remote Management", "Windows Management Instrumentation", "Scheduled Task", "Windows Service", "PowerShell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement", "Execution", "Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no", "Threat Group-3390", "Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT41", "FIN6", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Threat Group-3390", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "menuPass", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "APT29", "Deep Panda", "Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "MuddyWater", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT-C-36", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT41", "Machete", "Soft Cell", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Patchwork", "OilRig", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "FIN8", "menuPass", "FIN10", "APT32", "FIN7", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT29", "Blue Mockingbird", "DarkVishnya", "Wizard Spider", "APT32", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Tropic Trooper", "Cobalt Group", "Ke3chang", "Honeybee", "FIN7", "Threat Group-3390", "APT19", "APT3", "Lazarus Group", "Carbanak", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "Gallmaker", "Turla", "APT19", "DarkHydrus", "APT28", "Thrip", "Gorgon Group", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leviathan", "TA459", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT32", "FIN7", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "APT3", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn_filter"}]}, {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell", "id": "d4f42098-4680-11ec-ad07-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-15", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the DCOM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of ShellExecute and ExecuteShellCommand. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse DCOM and `powershell.exe` for lateral movement and remote code execution.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process=\"*Document.ActiveView.ExecuteShellCommand*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Document.Application.ShellExecute*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may leverage DCOM to start a process on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003/", "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/dcom-lateral-movement-techniques"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.003/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "message": "A process was started on a remote endpoint from $dest by abusing DCOM using PowerShell.exe", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021", "T1021.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote Services", "Distributed Component Object Model"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_powershell"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Initiation on Remote Endpoint", "id": "3f519894-4276-11ec-ab02-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-10", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `sc.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to start a Windows Service on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Service Control Manager for lateral movement and remote code execution.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=sc.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=sc.exe) (Processes.process=*\\\\\\\\* AND Processes.process=*start*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_initiation_on_remote_endpoint_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may start Windows Services on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/services/controlling-a-service-using-sc", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "message": "A Windows Service was started on a remote endpoint from $dest", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1543", "T1543.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 54, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Create or Modify System Process", "Windows Service"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Blue Mockingbird", "DarkVishnya", "Wizard Spider", "APT32", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Tropic Trooper", "Cobalt Group", "Ke3chang", "Honeybee", "FIN7", "Threat Group-3390", "APT19", "APT3", "Lazarus Group", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "windows_service_initiation_on_remote_endpoint_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Renamed PSExec", "id": "683e6196-b8e8-11eb-9a79-acde48001122", "version": 3, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies renamed instances of `PsExec.exe` being utilized on an endpoint. Most instances, it is highly probable to capture `Psexec.exe` or other SysInternal utility usage with the command-line argument of `-accepteula`. During triage, validate this is the legitimate version of `PsExec` by reviewing the PE metadata. In addition, review parallel processes for further suspicious behavior.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_psexec` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_renamed_psexec_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives should be present. It is possible some third party applications may use older versions of PsExec, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1569.002/T1569.002.yaml", "https://redcanary.com/blog/threat-hunting-psexec-lateral-movement/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "HAFNIUM Group", "DarkSide Ransomware", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1569.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Lateral Movement", "Execution"], "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1569", "T1569.002"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 27, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Services", "Service Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "APT41", "Silence", "FIN6", "APT32", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=psexec.exe OR Processes.process_name=psexec64.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=psexec.c)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_psexec"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_renamed_psexec_filter"}]}, {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell Script Block", "id": "2a048c14-4634-11ec-a618-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-15", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Invoke-WmiMethod` commandlet with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing WMI. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WMI and this commandlet for lateral movement and remote code execution.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message=\"*Invoke-WmiMethod*\" AND Message=\"*-CN*\" AND Message=\"*-Class Win32_Process*\" AND Message=\"*-Name create*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup instructions can be found https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may leverage WWMI and powershell.exe to start a process on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/invoke-wmimethod?view=powershell-5.1"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/lateral_movement/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "message": "A process was started on a remote endpoint from $ComputerName by abusing WMI using PowerShell.exe", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1047"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Windows Management Instrumentation"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT41", "FIN6", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Threat Group-3390", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "menuPass", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_script_block_filter"}]}, {"name": "Remote Desktop Process Running On System", "id": "f5939373-8054-40ad-8c64-cec478a22a4a", "version": 5, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for the remote desktop process mstsc.exe running on systems upon which it doesn't typically run. This is accomplished by filtering out all systems that are noted in the `common_rdp_source category` in the Assets and Identity framework.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=*mstsc.exe AND Processes.dest_category!=common_rdp_source by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `remote_desktop_process_running_on_system_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. The search requires you to identify systems that do not commonly use remote desktop. You can use the included support search \"Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop\" to identify these systems. After identifying them, you will need to add the \"common_rdp_source\" category to that system using the Enterprise Security Assets and Identities framework. This can be done by adding an entry in the assets.csv file located in `SA-IdentityManagement/lookups`.", "known_false_positives": "Remote Desktop may be used legitimately by users on the network.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Hidden Cobra Malware", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 9", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021.001", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest_category", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote Desktop Protocol", "Remote Services"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "TEMP.Veles", "Leviathan", "APT39", "Stolen Pencil", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "APT3", "OilRig", "menuPass", "FIN10", "Patchwork", "FIN6", "Lazarus Group", "APT1", "Axiom", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "remote_desktop_process_running_on_system_filter"}]}, {"name": "Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested", "id": "ac3b81c0-52f4-11ec-ac44-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-01", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following hunting analytic leverages Event ID 4769, `A Kerberos service ticket was requested`, to identify an unusual number of computer service ticket requests from one source. When a domain joined endpoint connects to a remote endpoint, it first will request a Kerberos Ticket with the computer name as the Service Name. An endpoint requesting a large number of computer service tickets for different endpoints could represent malicious behavior like lateral movement, malware staging, reconnaissance, etc.\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of service requests. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time, the calculation of the `upperBound` field as well as the Outlier calculation. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\", "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769 Service_Name=\"*$\" Account_Name!=\"*$*\" | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Service_Name) AS unique_targets values(Service_Name) as host_targets by _time, Client_Address, Account_Name | eventstats avg(unique_targets) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_targets) as comp_std by Client_Address, Account_Name | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_targets >10 and unique_targets >= upperBound, 1, 0) | `unusual_number_of_computer_service_tickets_requested_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", "known_false_positives": "An single endpoint requesting a large number of computer service tickets is not common behavior. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, administration systeams and missconfigured systems.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Exploitation", "Lateral Movement"], "message": null, "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078"], "observable": [{"name": "Client_Address", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Ticket_Options", "Ticket_Encryption_Type", "dest", "service", "service_id"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Valid Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "unusual_number_of_computer_service_tickets_requested_filter"}]}, {"name": "Unusual Number of Remote Endpoint Authentication Events", "id": "acb5dc74-5324-11ec-a36d-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-01", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following hunting analytic leverages Event ID 4624, `An account was successfully logged on`, to identify an unusual number of remote authentication attempts coming from one source. An endpoint authenticating to a large number of remote endpoints could represent malicious behavior like lateral movement, malware staging, reconnaissance, etc.\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual high number of authentication events. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time, the calculation of the `upperBound` field as well as the Outlier calculation. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\", "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=3 Account_Name!=\"*$\" | eval Source_Account = mvindex(Account_Name, 1) | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(ComputerName) AS unique_targets values(ComputerName) as target_hosts by _time, Source_Network_Address, Source_Account | eventstats avg(unique_targets) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_targets) as comp_std by Source_Network_Address, Source_Account | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_targets >10 and unique_targets >= upperBound, 1, 0) `unusual_number_of_remote_endpoint_authentication_events_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Event Logs from domain controllers aas well as member servers and workstations. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Logon` within `Logon/Logoff` needs to be enabled.", "known_false_positives": "An single endpoint authenticating to a large number of hosts is not common behavior. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, jump servers and missconfigured systems.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Lateral Movement"], "message": null, "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Logon_Type", "Caller_Process_Name", "Security_ID", "Account_Name", "ComputerName"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Valid Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "unusual_number_of_remote_endpoint_authentication_events_filter"}]}, {"name": "Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name", "id": "9d22a780-5165-11ec-ad4f-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-29", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following hunting analytic leverages Event ID 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify the creation of a Scheduled Task with a suspicious, high entropy, Task Name. To achieve this, this analytic also leverages the `ut_shannon` function from the URL ToolBox Splunk application. Red teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler to create and start a remote Scheduled Task and obtain remote code execution. To achieve this goal, tools like Impacket or Crapmapexec, typically create a Scheduled Task with a random task name on the victim host. This hunting analytic may help defenders identify Scheduled Tasks created as part of a lateral movement attack. The entropy threshold `ut_shannon > 3` should be customized by users. The Command field can be used to determine if the task has malicious intent or not.", "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message | lookup ut_shannon_lookup word as Task_Name | where ut_shannon > 3 | table _time, dest, Task_Name, ut_shannon, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden | `randomly_generated_scheduled_task_name_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA as well as the URL ToolBox application are also required.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may use random Scheduled Task names.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/", "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/2734/", "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entropy_(information_theory)"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement", "Persistence"], "message": "A windows scheduled task with a suspicious task name was created on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053", "T1053.005"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "Task_Name", "Description", "Command"], "risk_score": 45, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Scheduled Task/Job", "Scheduled Task"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "MuddyWater", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT-C-36", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT41", "Machete", "Soft Cell", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Patchwork", "OilRig", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "FIN8", "menuPass", "FIN10", "APT32", "FIN7", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT29"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "randomly_generated_scheduled_task_name_filter"}]}, {"name": "Randomly Generated Windows Service Name", "id": "2032a95a-5165-11ec-a2c3-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-29", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following hunting analytic leverages Event ID 7045, `A new service was installed in the system`, to identify the installation of a Windows Service with a suspicious, high entropy, Service Name. To achieve this, this analytic also leverages the `ut_shannon` function from the URL ToolBox Splunk application. Red teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Service Control Manager to create and start a remote Windows Service and obtain remote code execution. To achieve this goal, some tools like Metasploit, Cobalt Strike and Impacket, typically create a Windows Service with a random service name on the victim host. This hunting analytic may help defenders identify Windows Services installed as part of a lateral movement attack. The entropy threshold `ut_shannon > 3` should be customized by users. The Service_File_Name field can be used to determine if the Windows Service has malicious intent or not.", "search": " `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 | lookup ut_shannon_lookup word as Service_Name | where ut_shannon > 3 | table EventCode ComputerName Service_Name ut_shannon Service_Start_Type Service_Type Service_File_Name | `randomly_generated_windows_service_name_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints. The Windows TA as well as the URL ToolBox application are also required.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may use random Windows Service names.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement"], "message": "A Windows Service with a suspicious service name was installed on $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1543", "T1543.003"], "observable": [{"name": "Service_File_Name", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}, {"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "ComputerName", "Service_File_Name", "Service_Type", "Service_Name", "Service_Start_Type"], "risk_score": 45, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Create or Modify System Process", "Windows Service"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Blue Mockingbird", "DarkVishnya", "Wizard Spider", "APT32", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Tropic Trooper", "Cobalt Group", "Ke3chang", "Honeybee", "FIN7", "Threat Group-3390", "APT19", "APT3", "Lazarus Group", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_system"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "randomly_generated_windows_service_name_filter"}]}, {"name": "Remote Desktop Network Traffic", "id": "272b8407-842d-4b3d-bead-a704584003d3", "version": 3, "date": "2020-07-07", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search looks for network traffic on TCP/3389, the default port used by remote desktop. While remote desktop traffic is not uncommon on a network, it is usually associated with known hosts. This search will ignore common RDP sources and common RDP destinations so you can focus on the uncommon uses of remote desktop on your network.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=3389 AND All_Traffic.dest_category!=common_rdp_destination AND All_Traffic.src_category!=common_rdp_source by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_desktop_network_traffic_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to identify systems that commonly originate remote desktop traffic and that commonly receive remote desktop traffic. You can use the included support search \"Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic\" to identify systems that originate the traffic and the search \"Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic\" to identify systems that receive a lot of remote desktop traffic. After identifying these systems, you will need to add the \"common_rdp_source\" or \"common_rdp_destination\" category to that system depending on the usage, using the Enterprise Security Assets and Identities framework. This can be done by adding an entry in the assets.csv file located in SA-IdentityManagement/lookups.", "known_false_positives": "Remote Desktop may be used legitimately by users on the network.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 9", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021.001", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.dest_port", "All_Traffic.dest_category", "All_Traffic.src_category", "All_Traffic.src", "All_Traffic.dest", "All_Traffic.dest_port"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote Desktop Protocol", "Remote Services"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "TEMP.Veles", "Leviathan", "APT39", "Stolen Pencil", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "APT3", "OilRig", "menuPass", "FIN10", "Patchwork", "FIN6", "Lazarus Group", "APT1", "Axiom", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "remote_desktop_network_traffic_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Dynamic DNS", "id": "8169f17b-ef68-4b59-aae8-586907301221", "version": 2, "date": "2018-09-06", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them avoid firewall blocks and deny lists.", "narrative": "Dynamic DNS services (DDNS) are legitimate low-cost or free services that allow users to rapidly update domain resolutions to IP infrastructure. While their usage can be benign, malicious actors can abuse DDNS to host harmful payloads or interactive-command-and-control infrastructure. These attackers will manually update or automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to IP addresses that circumvent firewall blocks and deny lists and frustrate a network defender's analytic and investigative processes. These searches will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains and then investigate more deeply, when appropriate. While this list of top-level dynamic domains is not exhaustive, it can be dynamically updated as new suspicious dynamic domains are identified.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Dynamic DNS", "category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1189", "T1048"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Drive-by Compromise", "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390", "Patchwork", "Elderwood", "APT32", "Leafminer", "Dark Caracal", "PLATINUM", "APT19", "no", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Darkhotel", "Windshift", "Turla", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT38", "RTM", "Lazarus Group"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App", "id": "2452e632-9e0d-11eb-bacd-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-15", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. This technique are seen in couple of malware and APT group to exfiltrated collected data in a infected machine or infected network. This detection is looking for unique use of nslookup where it tries to use specific record type, TXT, A, AAAA, that are commonly used by attacker and also the retry parameter which is designed to query C2 DNS multiple tries.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"nslookup.exe\" Processes.process = \"*-querytype=*\" OR Processes.process=\"*-qt=*\" OR Processes.process=\"*-q=*\" OR Processes.process=\"-type=*\" OR Processes.process=\"*-retry=*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of nslookup.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "admin nslookup usage", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7_spear_phishing.html", "https://www.varonis.com/blog/dns-tunneling/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Dynamic DNS", "Command and Control", "Data Exfiltration"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/nslookup_exfil/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ performing activity related to DNS exfiltration.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1048"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app_filter"}]}, {"name": "DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App", "id": "2452e632-9e0d-11eb-34ba-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-07", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "This search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. This technique are seen in couple of malware and APT group to exfiltrated collected data in a infected machine or infected network. This detection is looking for unique use of nslookup where it tries to use specific record type, TXT, A, AAAA, that are commonly used by attacker and also the retry parameter which is designed to query C2 DNS multiple tries.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where \"Endpoint_Processes\" IN(_datamodels) | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null), process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_path\"), \"string\", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND process_name IS NOT NULL AND process_name=\"nslookup.exe\" AND (like (cmd_line, \"%-querytype=%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%-qt=%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%-q=%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%-type=%\") OR like (cmd_line, \"%-retry=%\")) | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null)) | eval body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"cmd_line\", cmd_line, \"process_name\", process_name, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process_name, \"process_path\", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint_Processess` datamodel.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible for some legitimate administrative utilities to use similar cmd_line parameters. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7_spear_phishing.html", "https://www.varonis.com/blog/dns-tunneling/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Dynamic DNS", "Command and Control", "Data Exfiltration"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/nslookup_exfil/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ performing activity related to DNS exfiltration.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1048"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest_device_id", "process_name", "parent_process_name", "process_path", "dest_user_id", "process", "cmd_line"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app_filter"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App", "id": "0a69fdaa-a2b8-11eb-b16d-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-21", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. This technique are seen in couple of malware and APT group to exfiltrated collected data in a infected machine or infected network. This detection is looking for unique use of nslookup where it tries to use specific record type (TXT, A, AAAA) that are commonly used by attacker and also the retry parameter which is designed to query C2 DNS multiple tries.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode = 1 process_name = \"nslookup.exe\" | bucket _time span=15m | stats count as numNsLookup by Computer, _time | eventstats avg(numNsLookup) as avgNsLookup, stdev(numNsLookup) as stdNsLookup, count as numSlots by Computer | eval upperThreshold=(avgNsLookup + stdNsLookup *3) | eval isOutlier=if(avgNsLookup > 20 and avgNsLookup >= upperThreshold, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of nslookup.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7_spear_phishing.html", "https://www.varonis.com/blog/dns-tunneling/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Dynamic DNS", "Command and Control", "Data Exfiltration"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Scope:Local", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/nslookup_exfil/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Excessive usage of nslookup.exe has been detected on $Computer$. This detection is triggered as as it violates the dynamic threshold", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1048"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Computer", "process_name", "EventCode"], "risk_score": 28, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers", "id": "c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6v5464g9f", "version": 3, "date": "2021-01-14", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Resolution"], "description": "Malicious actors often abuse legitimate Dynamic DNS services to host malicious payloads or interactive command and control nodes. Attackers will automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to countless IP addresses to circumvent firewall blocks, block lists as well as frustrate a network defenders analytic and investigative processes. This search will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.answer) as answer min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query host | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `dynamic_dns_providers` | `detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter`", "how_to_implement": "First, you'll need to ingest data from your DNS operations. This can be done by ingesting logs from your server or data, collected passively by Splunk Stream or a similar solution. Specifically, data that contains the domain that is being queried and the IP of the host originating the request must be populating the `Network_Resolution` data model. This search also leverages a lookup file, `dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv`, which contains a non-exhaustive list of Dynamic DNS providers. Please consider updating the local lookup periodically by adding new domains to the list of `dynamic_dns_providers_local.csv`.\\\nThis search produces fields (query, answer, isDynDNS) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable event. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review. Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** DNS Query, **Field:** query\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** DNS Answer, **Field:** answer\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** IsDynamicDNS, **Field:** isDynDNS\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", "known_false_positives": "Some users and applications may leverage Dynamic DNS to reach out to some domains on the Internet since dynamic DNS by itself is not malicious, however this activity must be verified.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Data Protection", "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "DNS Hijacking", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Dynamic DNS", "Command and Control"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Initial Access"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1189/dyn_dns_site/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A dns query $query$ from your infra connecting to suspicious domain in host $host$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1189"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "host", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "query", "type": "dnsquery", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "DNS.answer", "DNS.query", "host"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Drive-by Compromise"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Turla", "Windshift", "RTM", "Darkhotel", "APT38", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Leafminer", "Dark Caracal", "APT19", "APT32", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-3390", "Elderwood", "APT37", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_default dynamic_dns_domains as query OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_default | lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_local dynamic_dns_domains as query OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_local| eval isDynDNS = coalesce(isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local)|fields - isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local| search isDynDNS=True", "description": "This macro limits the output of the query field to dynamic dns domains. It looks up the domains in a file provided by Splunk and one intended to be updated by the end user.", "name": "dynamic_dns_providers", "lookups": [{"case_sensitive_match": "false", "description": "A list of dynammic dns providers that should not be modified", "filename": "dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(dynamic_dns_domains)", "name": "dynamic_dns_providers_default", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv"}, {"case_sensitive_match": "false", "description": "A list of dynammic dns providers that can be modified", "filename": "dynamic_dns_providers_local.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(dynamic_dns_domains)", "name": "dynamic_dns_providers_local", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/dynamic_dns_providers_local.csv"}]}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Collection and Staging", "id": "8e03c61e-13c4-4dcd-bfbe-5ce5a8dc031a", "version": 1, "date": "2020-02-03", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "description": "Monitor for and investigate activities--such as suspicious writes to the Windows Recycling Bin or email servers sending high amounts of traffic to specific hosts, for example--that may indicate that an adversary is harvesting and exfiltrating sensitive data. ", "narrative": "A common adversary goal is to identify and exfiltrate data of value from a target organization. This data may include email conversations and addresses, confidential company information, links to network design/infrastructure, important dates, and so on.\\\n Attacks are composed of three activities: identification, collection, and staging data for exfiltration. Identification typically involves scanning systems and observing user activity. Collection can involve the transfer of large amounts of data from various repositories. Staging/preparation includes moving data to a central location and compressing (and optionally encoding and/or encrypting) it. All of these activities provide opportunities for defenders to identify their presence. \\\nUse the searches to detect and monitor suspicious behavior related to these activities.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Collection", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Collection and Staging", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1036", "T1560", "T1114.002", "T1114", "T1560.001", "T1114.001"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Email Collection", "Remote Email Collection", "Local Email Collection", "Archive via Utility", "Masquerading", "Archive Collected Data"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "APT1", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN8", "Ke3chang", "Turla", "APT39", "APT32", "Soft Cell", "APT41", "CopyKittens", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Lazarus Group", "Honeybee", "APT3", "Sowbug", "Leafminer", "no", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork", "FIN4", "APT28", "Gallmaker", "APT33", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Windshift"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Renamed 7-Zip", "id": "4057291a-b8cf-11eb-95fe-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies renamed 7-Zip usage using Sysmon. At this stage of an attack, review parallel processes and file modifications for data that is staged or potentially have been exfiltrated. This analytic utilizes the OriginalFileName to capture the renamed process. During triage, validate this is the legitimate version of `7zip` by reviewing the PE metadata. In addition, review parallel processes for further suspicious behavior.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.original_file_name=7z*.exe AND Processes.process_name!=7z*.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_renamed_7_zip_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives, however this analytic will need to be modified for each environment if Sysmon is not used.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1560.001/T1560.001.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Collection and Staging"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1560.001/archive_utility/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1560.001", "T1560"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 27, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Archive via Utility", "Archive Collected Data"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Soft Cell", "Turla", "Gallmaker", "APT33", "APT39", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "FIN8", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT3", "Sowbug", "menuPass", "APT1", "Ke3chang", "menuPass", "APT32", "Honeybee", "Patchwork", "APT28", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN6", "Lazarus Group", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_renamed_7_zip_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Renamed WinRAR", "id": "1b7bfb2c-b8e6-11eb-99ac-acde48001122", "version": 3, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analtyic identifies renamed instances of `WinRAR.exe`. In most cases, it is not common for WinRAR to be used renamed, however it is common to be installed by a third party application and executed from a non-standard path. During triage, validate additional metadata from the binary that this is `WinRAR`. Review parallel processes and file modifications.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.original_file_name=WinRAR.exe (Processes.process_name!=rar.exe OR Processes.process_name!=winrar.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_renamed_winrar_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown. It is possible third party applications use renamed instances of WinRAR.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1560.001/T1560.001.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Collection and Staging"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1560.001/archive_utility/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Exfiltration"], "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1560.001", "T1560"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 27, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Archive via Utility", "Archive Collected Data"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Soft Cell", "Turla", "Gallmaker", "APT33", "APT39", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "FIN8", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT3", "Sowbug", "menuPass", "APT1", "Ke3chang", "menuPass", "APT32", "Honeybee", "Patchwork", "APT28", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN6", "Lazarus Group", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_renamed_winrar_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin", "id": "b5541828-8ffd-4070-9d95-b3da4de924cb", "version": 4, "date": "2020-07-22", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects writes to the recycle bin by a process other than explorer.exe.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path values(Filesystem.file_name) as file_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path = \"*$Recycle.Bin*\" by Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Filesystem\")`| search [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.user) as user values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name != \"explorer.exe\" by Processes.process_id Processes.dest| `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | table process_id dest] | `suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on filesystem and process logs responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem` nodes.", "known_false_positives": "Because the Recycle Bin is a hidden folder in modern versions of Windows, it would be unusual for a process other than explorer.exe to write to it. Incidents should be investigated as appropriate.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Collection and Staging"], "asset_type": "Windows", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036/write_to_recycle_bin/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 40, "message": "Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin process $Processes.process_name$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1036"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Processes.process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.file_path", "Filesystem.file_name", "Filesystem.process_id", "Filesystem.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.dest"], "risk_score": 28, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Masquerading"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Windshift", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "Dragonfly 2.0"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin_filter"}]}, {"name": "Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server", "id": "7f5fb3e1-4209-4914-90db-0ec21b556368", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search looks for an increase of data transfers from your email server to your clients. This could be indicative of a malicious actor collecting data using your email server.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` sum(All_Traffic.bytes_in) as bytes_in from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_category=email_server by All_Traffic.src_ip _time span=1d | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | eventstats avg(bytes_in) as avg_bytes_in stdev(bytes_in) as stdev_bytes_in | eventstats count as num_data_samples avg(eval(if(_time < relative_time(now(), \"@d\"), bytes_in, null))) as per_source_avg_bytes_in stdev(eval(if(_time < relative_time(now(), \"@d\"), bytes_in, null))) as per_source_stdev_bytes_in by src_ip | eval minimum_data_samples = 4, deviation_threshold = 3 | where num_data_samples >= minimum_data_samples AND bytes_in > (avg_bytes_in + (deviation_threshold * stdev_bytes_in)) AND bytes_in > (per_source_avg_bytes_in + (deviation_threshold * per_source_stdev_bytes_in)) AND _time >= relative_time(now(), \"@d\") | eval num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average = round(abs(bytes_in - avg_bytes_in) / stdev_bytes_in, 2), num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average = round(abs(bytes_in - per_source_avg_bytes_in) / per_source_stdev_bytes_in, 2) | table src_ip, _time, bytes_in, avg_bytes_in, per_source_avg_bytes_in, num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average, num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average | `hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model. Your email servers must be categorized as \"email_server\" for the search to work, as well. You may need to adjust the deviation_threshold and minimum_data_samples values based on the network traffic in your environment. The \"deviation_threshold\" field is a multiplying factor to control how much variation you're willing to tolerate. The \"minimum_data_samples\" field is the minimum number of connections of data samples required for the statistic to be valid.", "known_false_positives": "The false-positive rate will vary based on how you set the deviation_threshold and data_samples values. Our recommendation is to adjust these values based on your network traffic to and from your email servers.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Collection and Staging"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1114.002", "T1114"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.bytes_in", "All_Traffic.dest_category", "All_Traffic.src_ip"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote Email Collection", "Email Collection"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "FIN4", "APT28", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Ke3chang", "Leafminer", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server_filter"}]}, {"name": "Email files written outside of the Outlook directory", "id": "ee18ed37-0802-4268-9435-b3b91aaa18xx", "version": 3, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The search looks at the change-analysis data model and detects email files created outside the normal Outlook directory.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_name=*.pst OR Filesystem.file_name=*.ost) Filesystem.file_path != \"C:\\\\Users\\\\*\\\\My Documents\\\\Outlook Files\\\\*\" Filesystem.file_path!=\"C:\\\\Users\\\\*\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\Outlook*\" by Filesystem.action Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Filesystem\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records the file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint.Filesystem data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or by other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system reads and writes.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators and users sometimes prefer backing up their email data by moving the email files into a different folder. These attempts will be detected by the search.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Collection and Staging"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1114", "T1114.001"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.file_path", "Filesystem.file_name", "Filesystem.action", "Filesystem.process_id", "Filesystem.dest"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Email Collection", "Local Email Collection"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Magic Hound", "APT1"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory_filter"}]}, {"name": "Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts", "id": "7f5fb3e1-4209-4914-90db-0ec21b556378", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search looks for an increase of data transfers from your email server to your clients. This could be indicative of a malicious actor collecting data using your email server.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` sum(All_Traffic.bytes_out) as bytes_out from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.src_category=email_server by All_Traffic.dest_ip _time span=1d | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | eventstats avg(bytes_out) as avg_bytes_out stdev(bytes_out) as stdev_bytes_out | eventstats count as num_data_samples avg(eval(if(_time < relative_time(now(), \"@d\"), bytes_out, null))) as per_source_avg_bytes_out stdev(eval(if(_time < relative_time(now(), \"@d\"), bytes_out, null))) as per_source_stdev_bytes_out by dest_ip | eval minimum_data_samples = 4, deviation_threshold = 3 | where num_data_samples >= minimum_data_samples AND bytes_out > (avg_bytes_out + (deviation_threshold * stdev_bytes_out)) AND bytes_out > (per_source_avg_bytes_out + (deviation_threshold * per_source_stdev_bytes_out)) AND _time >= relative_time(now(), \"@d\") | eval num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average = round(abs(bytes_out - avg_bytes_out) / stdev_bytes_out, 2), num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average = round(abs(bytes_out - per_source_avg_bytes_out) / per_source_stdev_bytes_out, 2) | table dest_ip, _time, bytes_out, avg_bytes_out, per_source_avg_bytes_out, num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average, num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average | `email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model. Your email servers must be categorized as \"email_server\" for the search to work, as well. You may need to adjust the deviation_threshold and minimum_data_samples values based on the network traffic in your environment. The \"deviation_threshold\" field is a multiplying factor to control how much variation you're willing to tolerate. The \"minimum_data_samples\" field is the minimum number of connections of data samples required for the statistic to be valid.", "known_false_positives": "The false-positive rate will vary based on how you set the deviation_threshold and data_samples values. Our recommendation is to adjust these values based on your network traffic to and from your email servers.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Collection and Staging", "HAFNIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1114", "T1114.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.bytes_out", "All_Traffic.src_category", "All_Traffic.dest_ip"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Email Collection", "Remote Email Collection"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT1", "FIN4", "APT28", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Ke3chang", "Leafminer"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation", "id": "ced74200-8465-4bc3-bd2c-22782eec6750", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-08", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "This analytic story contains detections that query your AWS Cloudtrail for activities related to privilege escalation.", "narrative": "Amazon Web Services provides a neat feature called Identity and Access Management (IAM) that enables organizations to manage various AWS services and resources in a secure way. All IAM users have roles, groups and policies associated with them which governs and sets permissions to allow a user to access specific restrictions.\\\nHowever, if these IAM policies are misconfigured and have specific combinations of weak permissions; it can allow attackers to escalate their privileges and further compromise the organization. Rhino Security Labs have published comprehensive blogs detailing various AWS Escalation methods. By using this as an inspiration, Splunk\u2019s research team wants to highlight how these attack vectors look in AWS Cloudtrail logs and provide you with detection queries to uncover these potentially malicious events via this Analytic Story. \\", "references": ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/", "https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/the-cloud-shadow-admin-threat-10-permissions-to-protect", "https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation", "category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1580", "T1098", "T1136", "T1078.004", "T1110", "T1069.003", "T1078", "T1136.003"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Cloud Account", "Cloud Groups", "Account Manipulation", "Valid Accounts", "Create Account", "Brute Force", "Permission Groups Discovery", "Cloud Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Discovery", "Credential Access", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Sandworm Team", "TEMP.Veles", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT39", "Turla", "Carbanak", "TA505", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT41", "FIN5", "menuPass", "FIN6", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT3", "Wizard Spider", "APT18", "no", "FIN10", "DarkVishnya", "PittyTiger", "FIN4", "APT28", "APT33", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Night Dragon"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "AWS CreateAccessKey", "id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-11ad-212bf3d0d111", "version": 2, "date": "2021-07-19", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user A who has already permission to create access keys, makes an API call to create access keys for another user B. Attackers have been know to use this technique for Privilege Escalation in case new victim(user B) has more permissions than old victim(user B)", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName = CreateAccessKey userAgent !=console.amazonaws.com errorCode = success| search userIdentity.userName!=requestParameters.userName | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by requestParameters.userName src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|`aws_createaccesskey_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created keys for another user.", "references": ["https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws", "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation-part-2/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_createaccesskey/aws_cloudtrail_events.json"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user_arn$ is attempting to create access keys for $requestParameters.userName$ from this IP $src$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1136.003", "T1136"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "user_arn", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "userAgent", "errorCode", "requestParameters.userName"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Cloud Account", "Create Account"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_createaccesskey_filter"}]}, {"name": "AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources", "id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-212bf3d0dac4", "version": 2, "date": "2021-02-22", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user created a policy version that allows them to access any resource in their account", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=CreatePolicyVersion eventSource = iam.amazonaws.com errorCode = success | spath input=requestParameters.policyDocument output=key_policy_statements path=Statement{} | mvexpand key_policy_statements | spath input=key_policy_statements output=key_policy_action_1 path=Action | search key_policy_action_1 = \"*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(key_policy_statements) as policy_added by eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|`aws_create_policy_version_to_allow_all_resources_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a policy to allow a user to access all resources. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to all AWS resources", "references": ["https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws", "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation-part-2/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_create_policy_version/aws_cloudtrail_events.json"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user$ created a policy version that allows them to access any resource in their account", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "userAgent", "errorCode", "requestParameters.userName"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Cloud Accounts", "Valid Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_create_policy_version_to_allow_all_resources_filter"}]}, {"name": "AWS CreateLoginProfile", "id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-11ad-212bf444d111", "version": 2, "date": "2021-07-19", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user A(victim A) creates a login profile for user B, followed by a AWS Console login event from user B from the same src_ip as user B. This correlated event can be indicative of privilege escalation since both events happened from the same src_ip", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName = CreateLoginProfile | rename requestParameters.userName as new_login_profile | table src_ip eventName new_login_profile userIdentity.userName | join new_login_profile src_ip [| search `cloudtrail` eventName = ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.userName as new_login_profile | stats count values(eventName) min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn new_login_profile src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`] | `aws_createloginprofile_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a login profile for another user.", "references": ["https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws", "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation-part-2/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_createloginprofile/aws_cloudtrail_events.json"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user_arn$ is attempting to create a login profile for $requestParameters.userName$ and did a console login from this IP $src_ip$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1136.003", "T1136"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src_ip", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "user_arn", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "userAgent", "errorCode", "requestParameters.userName"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Cloud Account", "Create Account"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_createloginprofile_filter"}]}, {"name": "AWS UpdateLoginProfile", "id": "2a9b80d3-6a40-4115-11ad-212bf3d0d111", "version": 2, "date": "2021-07-19", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user A who has already permission to update login profile, makes an API call to update login profile for another user B . Attackers have been know to use this technique for Privilege Escalation in case new victim(user B) has more permissions than old victim(user B)", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName = UpdateLoginProfile userAgent !=console.amazonaws.com errorCode = success| search userIdentity.userName!=requestParameters.userName | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by requestParameters.userName src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.userName user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|`aws_updateloginprofile_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created keys for another user.", "references": ["https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws", "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation-part-2/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 60, "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_updateloginprofile/aws_cloudtrail_events.json"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "From IP address $sourceIPAddress$, user agent $userAgent$ has trigged an event $eventName$ for updating the existing login profile, potentially giving user $user_arn$ more access privilleges", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1136.003", "T1136"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "user_arn", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "userAgent", "errorCode", "requestParameters.userName"], "risk_score": 30, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Cloud Account", "Create Account"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_updateloginprofile_filter"}]}, {"name": "AWS IAM Failure Group Deletion", "id": "723b861a-92eb-11eb-93b8-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-01", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This detection identifies failure attempts to delete groups. We want to identify when a group is attempting to be deleted, but either access is denied, there is a conflict or there is no group. This is indicative of administrators performing an action, but also could be suspicious behavior occurring. Review parallel IAM events - recently added users, new groups and so forth.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=iam.amazonaws.com eventName=DeleteGroup errorCode IN (NoSuchEntityException,DeleteConflictException, AccessDenied) (userAgent!=*.amazonaws.com) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.groupName) as group_name by src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode errorMessage userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_iam_failure_group_deletion_filter`", "how_to_implement": "The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs.", "known_false_positives": "This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users. Not every user with AWS access should have permission to delete groups (least privilege).", "references": ["https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/iam/delete-group.html", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteGroup.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098/aws_iam_failure_group_deletion/aws_iam_failure_group_deletion.json"], "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user_arn$ has had mulitple failures while attempting to delete groups from $src$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1098"], "observable": [{"name": "src", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "user_arn", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "group_name", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "userAgent", "errorCode", "requestParameters.groupName"], "risk_score": 5, "security_domain": "cloud", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Account Manipulation"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Lazarus Group"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_iam_failure_group_deletion_filter"}]}, {"name": "AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force", "id": "f19e09b0-9308-11eb-b7ec-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-01", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following detection identifies any malformed policy document exceptions with a status of `failure`. A malformed policy document exception occurs in instances where roles are attempted to be assumed, or brute forced. In a brute force attempt, using a tool like CloudSploit or Pacu, an attempt will look like `arn:aws:iam::111111111111:role/aws-service-role/rds.amazonaws.com/AWSServiceRoleForRDS`. Meaning, when an adversary is attempting to identify a role name, multiple failures will occur. This detection focuses on the errors of a remote attempt that is failing.", "search": "`cloudtrail` (errorCode=MalformedPolicyDocumentException) status=failure (userAgent!=*.amazonaws.com) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.policyName) as policy_name by src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode requestParameters.policyDocument userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | where count >= 2 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force_filter`", "how_to_implement": "The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs. Set the `where count` greater than a value to identify suspicious activity in your environment.", "known_false_positives": "This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users.", "references": ["https://www.praetorian.com/blog/aws-iam-assume-role-vulnerabilities", "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/assume-worst-aws-assume-role-enumeration/", "https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/aws-iam-brute-force-of-assume-role-policy.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:Inbound", "Stage:Credential Access", "Other:Policy Violation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1580/aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force/aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force.json"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "User $user_arn$ has caused multiple failures with errorCode $errorCode$, which potentially means adversary is attempting to identify a role name.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1580", "T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "src", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "user_arn", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "userAgent", "errorCode", "requestParameters.policyName"], "risk_score": 28, "security_domain": "access", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Brute Force"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["DarkVishnya", "APT39", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Turla"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force_filter"}]}, {"name": "AWS IAM Delete Policy", "id": "ec3a9362-92fe-11eb-99d0-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-01", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following detection identifes when a policy is deleted on AWS. This does not identify whether successful or failed, but the error messages tell a story of suspicious attempts. There is a specific process to follow when deleting a policy. First, detach the policy from all users, groups, and roles that the policy is attached to, using DetachUserPolicy , DetachGroupPolicy , or DetachRolePolicy.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=DeletePolicy (userAgent!=*.amazonaws.com) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.policyArn) as policyArn by src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode errorMessage userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId userIdentity.arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_iam_delete_policy_filter`", "how_to_implement": "The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs.", "known_false_positives": "This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users. Not every user with AWS access should have permission to delete policies (least privilege). In addition, this may be saved seperately and tuned for failed or success attempts only.", "references": ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_DeletePolicy.html", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/iam/delete-policy.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Stage:Execution", "Other:Policy Violation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098/aws_iam_delete_policy/aws_iam_delete_policy.json"], "impact": 20, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user_arn$ has deleted AWS Policies from IP address $src$ by executing the following command $eventName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1098"], "observable": [{"name": "src", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "user_arn", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "userAgent", "errorCode", "requestParameters.policyArn"], "risk_score": 10, "security_domain": "access", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Account Manipulation"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Lazarus Group"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_iam_delete_policy_filter"}]}, {"name": "AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion", "id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-11ad-212bf3d0dac4", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-02", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user has set a default policy versions. Attackers have been know to use this technique for Privilege Escalation in case the previous versions of the policy had permissions to access more resources than the current version of the policy", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=SetDefaultPolicyVersion eventSource = iam.amazonaws.com | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.policyArn) as policy_arn by src requestParameters.versionId eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_setdefaultpolicyversion_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately set a default policy to allow a user to access all resources. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to all AWS resources", "references": ["https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws", "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation-part-2/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Stage:Credential Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_setdefaultpolicyversion/aws_cloudtrail_events.json"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "From IP address $sourceIPAddress$, user agent $userAgent$ has trigged an event $eventName$ for updating the the default policy version", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "user_arn", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "userAgent", "errorCode", "requestParameters.userName", "eventSource"], "risk_score": 30, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Cloud Accounts", "Valid Accounts"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT39", "FIN4", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "APT33", "OilRig", "FIN5", "menuPass", "APT28", "FIN10", "Suckfly", "FIN6", "Threat Group-3390", "APT18", "PittyTiger", "Carbanak"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_setdefaultpolicyversion_filter"}]}, {"name": "AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion", "id": "e776d06c-9267-11eb-819b-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-31", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following query uses IAM events to track the success of a group being deleted on AWS. This is typically not indicative of malicious behavior, but a precurser to additional events thay may unfold. Review parallel IAM events - recently added users, new groups and so forth. Inversely, review failed attempts in a similar manner.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=iam.amazonaws.com eventName=DeleteGroup errorCode=success (userAgent!=*.amazonaws.com) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.groupName) as group_deleted by src eventName eventSource errorCode user_agent awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_iam_successful_group_deletion_filter`", "how_to_implement": "The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs.", "known_false_positives": "This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users. Not every user with AWS access should have permission to delete groups (least privilege).", "references": ["https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/iam/delete-group.html", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteGroup.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098/aws_iam_successful_group_deletion/aws_iam_successful_group_deletion.json"], "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user_arn$ has sucessfully deleted mulitple groups $group_deleted$ from $src$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069.003", "T1098", "T1069"], "observable": [{"name": "src", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "user_arn", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "group_deleted", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "userAgent", "errorCode", "requestParameters.groupName"], "risk_score": 5, "security_domain": "cloud", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Cloud Groups", "Account Manipulation", "Permission Groups Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Persistence", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT3", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Lazarus Group", "TA505", "APT3"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_iam_successful_group_deletion_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "AWS Network ACL Activity", "id": "2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50ff268af4", "version": 2, "date": "2018-05-21", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it.", "narrative": "AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and operational/risk auditing of your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Management Console, AWS Command Line Interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your servers are not vulnerable to attacks. This analytic story contains detection searches that leverage CloudTrail logs from AWS to check for bad configurations and malicious activity in your AWS network access controls.", "references": ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/UserGuide/VPC_Appendix_NACLs.html", "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-help-prepare-for-ddos-attacks-by-reducing-your-attack-surface/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "AWS Network ACL Activity", "category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.007", "T1562"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Impair Defenses", "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS", "id": "ada0f278-84a8-46w1-a3f1-w32372d4bd53", "version": 1, "date": "2018-05-07", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search will detect spike in blocked outbound network connections originating from within your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data.", "search": "`cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow` action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR src_ip=192.168.0.0/16) ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16) [search `cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow` action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR src_ip=192.168.0.0/16) ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16) | stats count as numberOfBlockedConnections by src_ip | inputlookup baseline_blocked_outbound_connections append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) as * by src_ip | rename numberOfBlockedConnections as latestCount | eval newAvgBlockedConnections=avgBlockedConnections + (latestCount-avgBlockedConnections)/720 | eval newStdevBlockedConnections=sqrt(((pow(stdevBlockedConnections, 2)*719 + (latestCount-newAvgBlockedConnections)*(latestCount-avgBlockedConnections))/720)) | eval avgBlockedConnections=coalesce(newAvgBlockedConnections, avgBlockedConnections), stdevBlockedConnections=coalesce(newStdevBlockedConnections, stdevBlockedConnections), numDataPoints=if(isnull(latestCount), numDataPoints, numDataPoints+1) | table src_ip, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgBlockedConnections, stdevBlockedConnections | outputlookup baseline_blocked_outbound_connections | eval dataPointThreshold = 5, deviationThreshold = 3 | eval isSpike=if((latestCount > avgBlockedConnections+deviationThreshold*stdevBlockedConnections) AND numDataPoints > dataPointThreshold, 1, 0) | where isSpike=1 | table src_ip] | stats values(dest_ip) as \"Blocked Destination IPs\", values(interface_id) as \"resourceId\" count as numberOfBlockedConnections, dc(dest_ip) as uniqueDestConnections by src_ip | `detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your VPC Flow logs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the number of data points required to meet the definition of \"spike.\" The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best when you run the \"Baseline of Blocked Outbound Connection\" support search once to create a history of previously seen blocked outbound connections.", "known_false_positives": "The false-positive rate may vary based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`. Additionally, false positives may result when AWS administrators roll out policies enforcing network blocks, causing sudden increases in the number of blocked outbound connections.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS Network ACL Activity", "Suspicious AWS Traffic", "Command and Control"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "action", "src_ip", "dest_ip"], "risk_object": "src_ip", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 20, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudwatchlogs:vpcflow", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A lookup file that will contain the baseline information for number of blocked outbound connections", "filename": "baseline_blocked_outbound_connections.csv", "name": "baseline_blocked_outbound_connections", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/baseline_blocked_outbound_connections.csv"}, {"description": "A lookup file that will contain the baseline information for number of blocked outbound connections", "filename": "baseline_blocked_outbound_connections.csv", "name": "baseline_blocked_outbound_connections", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/baseline_blocked_outbound_connections.csv"}]}, {"name": "AWS Network Access Control List Deleted", "id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d6fd75", "version": 2, "date": "2021-01-12", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "Enforcing network-access controls is one of the defensive mechanisms used by cloud administrators to restrict access to a cloud instance. After the attacker has gained control of the AWS console by compromising an admin account, they can delete a network ACL and gain access to the instance from anywhere. This search will query the AWS CloudTrail logs to detect users deleting network ACLs.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteNetworkAclEntry requestParameters.egress=false | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by userName userIdentity.principalId eventName requestParameters.egress src userAgent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs.", "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a user has legitimately deleted a network ACL.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS Network ACL Activity"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 11"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.007/aws_delete_acl/aws_cloudtrail_events.json"], "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user_arn$ from $src$ has sucessfully deleted network ACLs entry (eventName= $eventName$), such that the instance is accessible from anywhere", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.007", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "src", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "user_arn", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "requestParameters.egress", "userName", "userIdentity.principalId", "src", "userAgent"], "risk_score": 5, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter"}]}, {"name": "AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports", "id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d6bd75", "version": 2, "date": "2021-01-11", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The search looks for AWS CloudTrail events to detect if any network ACLs were created with all the ports open to a specified CIDR.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=CreateNetworkAclEntry OR eventName=ReplaceNetworkAclEntry requestParameters.ruleAction=allow requestParameters.egress=false requestParameters.aclProtocol=-1 | append [search `cloudtrail` eventName=CreateNetworkAclEntry OR eventName=ReplaceNetworkAclEntry requestParameters.ruleAction=allow requestParameters.egress=false requestParameters.aclProtocol!=-1 | eval port_range='requestParameters.portRange.to' - 'requestParameters.portRange.from' | where port_range>1024] | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by userName userIdentity.principalId eventName requestParameters.ruleAction requestParameters.egress requestParameters.aclProtocol requestParameters.portRange.to requestParameters.portRange.from src userAgent requestParameters.cidrBlock | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS, version 4.4.0 or later, and configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs.", "known_false_positives": "It's possible that an admin has created this ACL with all ports open for some legitimate purpose however, this should be scoped and not allowed in production environment.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS Network ACL Activity"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 11"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.007/aws_create_acl/aws_cloudtrail_events.json"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user_arn$ has created network ACLs with all the ports open to a specified CIDR $requestParameters.cidrBlock$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.007", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "src", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "userName", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "requestParameters.cidrBlock", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "requestParameters.ruleAction", "requestParameters.egress", "requestParameters.aclProtocol", "requestParameters.portRange.to", "requestParameters.portRange.from", "requestParameters.cidrBlock", "userName", "userIdentity.principalId", "userAgent"], "risk_score": 48, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Ransomware Cloud", "id": "f52f6c43-05f8-4b19-a9d3-5b8c56da91c2", "version": 1, "date": "2020-10-27", "author": "Rod Soto, David Dorsey, Splunk", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware. These searches include cloud related objects that may be targeted by malicious actors via cloud providers own encryption features.", "narrative": "Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise.Cloud ransomware can be deployed by obtaining high privilege credentials from targeted users or resources.", "references": ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/", "https://github.com/d1vious/git-wild-hunt", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgzNib37g0M"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Ransomware Cloud", "category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1486"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Data Encrypted for Impact"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT41", "TA505"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA", "id": "c79c164f-4b21-4847-98f9-cf6a9f49179e", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-11", "author": "Rod Soto, Patrick Bareiss Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides detection of KMS keys where action kms:Encrypt is accessible for everyone (also outside of your organization). This is an indicator that your account is compromised and the attacker uses the encryption key to compromise another company.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=CreateKey OR eventName=PutKeyPolicy | spath input=requestParameters.policy output=key_policy_statements path=Statement{} | mvexpand key_policy_statements | spath input=key_policy_statements output=key_policy_action_1 path=Action | spath input=key_policy_statements output=key_policy_action_2 path=Action{} | eval key_policy_action=mvappend(key_policy_action_1, key_policy_action_2) | spath input=key_policy_statements output=key_policy_principal path=Principal.AWS | search key_policy_action=\"kms:Encrypt\" AND key_policy_principal=\"*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by eventName eventSource eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/", "https://github.com/d1vious/git-wild-hunt", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgzNib37g0M"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware Cloud"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1486/aws_kms_key/aws_cloudtrail_events.json"], "impact": 50, "message": "AWS account is potentially compromised and user $userIdentity.principalId$ is trying to compromise other accounts.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1486"], "observable": [{"name": "userIdentity.principalId", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "eventSource", "eventID", "awsRegion", "requestParameters.policy", "userIdentity.principalId"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Data Encrypted for Impact"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "TA505", "APT38"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa_filter"}]}, {"name": "AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3", "id": "884a5f59-eec7-4f4a-948b-dbde18225fdc", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-11", "author": "Rod Soto, Patrick Bareiss Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides detection of users with KMS keys performing encryption specifically against S3 buckets.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=CopyObject requestParameters.x-amz-server-side-encryption=\"aws:kms\" | rename requestParameters.bucketName AS bucket_name, requestParameters.x-amz-copy-source AS src_file, requestParameters.key AS dest_file | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(src_file) AS src_file values(dest_file) AS dest_file values(userAgent) AS userAgent values(region) AS region values(src) AS src by user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs", "known_false_positives": "bucket with S3 encryption", "references": ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/", "https://github.com/d1vious/git-wild-hunt", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgzNib37g0M"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware Cloud"], "asset_type": "S3 Bucket", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1486/s3_file_encryption/aws_cloudtrail_events.json"], "impact": 30, "message": "User $user$ with KMS keys is performing encryption, against S3 buckets on these files $dest_file$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1486"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "dest_file", "type": "File", "role": ["Target"]}], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "requestParameters.x-amz-server-side-encryption", "requestParameters.bucketName", "requestParameters.x-amz-copy-source", "requestParameters.key", "userAgent", "region"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Data Encrypted for Impact"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "TA505", "APT38"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "cloudtrail"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Emails", "id": "2b1800dd-92f9-47ec-a981-fdf1351e5d55", "version": 1, "date": "2020-01-27", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "Email remains one of the primary means for attackers to gain an initial foothold within the modern enterprise. Detect and investigate suspicious emails in your environment with the help of the searches in this Analytic Story.", "narrative": "It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage targeted spearphishing campaigns and mass mailers to deliver weaponized email messages and attachments. Fortunately, there are a number of ways to monitor email data in Splunk to detect suspicious content.\\\nOnce a phishing message has been detected, the next steps are to answer the following questions: \\\n1. Which users have received this or a similar message in the past?\\\n1. When did the targeted campaign begin?\\\n1. Have any users interacted with the content of the messages (by downloading an attachment or clicking on a malicious URL)?This Analytic Story provides detection searches to identify suspicious emails, as well as contextual and investigative searches to help answer some of these questions.", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/06/26/phishing-hits-a-new-level-of-quality/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Suspicious Emails", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566.001", "T1566"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Spearphishing Attachment", "Phishing"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Magic Hound", "Inception", "Rancor", "Tropic Trooper", "Kimsuky", "TA459", "PLATINUM", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN8", "APT29", "Turla", "APT39", "Molerats", "Gamaredon Group", "APT12", "Leviathan", "RTM", "Mofang", "TA505", "Frankenstein", "Cobalt Group", "Silence", "APT32", "APT-C-36", "APT19", "APT37", "Darkhotel", "APT41", "menuPass", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "admin@338", "Wizard Spider", "Machete", "no", "The White Company", "Sharpshooter", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork", "FIN4", "Elderwood", "APT28", "Gallmaker", "APT33", "Gorgon Group", "Windshift", "BlackTech", "FIN7", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Naikon", "DarkHydrus"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions", "id": "473bd65f-06ca-4dfe-a2b8-ba04ab4a0084", "version": 3, "date": "2020-07-22", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Email"], "description": "This search looks for emails that have attachments with suspicious file extensions.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Email where All_Email.file_name=\"*\" by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.file_name All_Email.message_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Email\")` | `suspicious_email_attachments` | `suspicious_email_attachment_extensions_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "You need to ingest data from emails. Specifically, the sender's address and the file names of any attachments must be mapped to the Email data model. \\\n **Splunk Phantom Playbook Integration**\\\nIf Splunk Phantom is also configured in your environment, a Playbook called \"Suspicious Email Attachment Investigate and Delete\" can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/`, and add the correct hostname to the \"Phantom Instance\" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search. The notable event will be sent to Phantom and the playbook will gather further information about the file attachment and its network behaviors. If Phantom finds malicious behavior and an analyst approves of the results, the email will be deleted from the user's inbox.", "known_false_positives": "None identified", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Suspicious Emails"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566.001", "T1566"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.IP"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Email.file_name", "All_Email.src_user", "All_Email.message_id"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Spearphishing Attachment", "Phishing"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "lookup update=true is_suspicious_file_extension_lookup file_name OUTPUT suspicious | search suspicious=true", "description": "This macro limits the output to email attachments that have suspicious extensions", "name": "suspicious_email_attachments", "lookups": [{"description": "A list of suspicious extensions for email attachments", "filename": "is_suspicious_file_extension_lookup.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(file_name)", "name": "is_suspicious_file_extension_lookup", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/is_suspicious_file_extension_lookup.csv"}]}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_email_attachment_extensions_filter"}]}, {"name": "Monitor Email For Brand Abuse", "id": "b2ea1f38-3a3e-4b8a-9cf1-82760d86a6b8", "version": 2, "date": "2018-01-05", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Email"], "description": "This search looks for emails claiming to be sent from a domain similar to one that you want to have monitored for abuse.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Email.recipient) as recipients, min(_time) as firstTime, max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Email by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.message_id | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Email\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | eval temp=split(src_user, \"@\") | eval email_domain=mvindex(temp, 1) | lookup update=true brandMonitoring_lookup domain as email_domain OUTPUT domain_abuse | search domain_abuse=true | table message_id, src_user, email_domain, recipients, firstTime, lastTime | `monitor_email_for_brand_abuse_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You need to ingest email header data. Specifically the sender's address (src_user) must be populated. You also need to have run the search \"ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names\", which creates the permutations of the domain that will be checked for.", "known_false_positives": "None at this time", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Brand Monitoring", "Suspicious Emails"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Email.recipient", "All_Email.src_user", "All_Email.message_id"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "monitor_email_for_brand_abuse_filter"}], "lookups": [{"default_match": "false", "description": "A file that contains look-a-like domains for brands that you want to monitor", "filename": "brand_monitoring.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(domain)", "min_matches": 1, "name": "brandMonitoring_lookup", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/brand_monitoring.csv"}]}, {"name": "Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces", "id": "56e877a6-1455-4479-ada6-0550dc1e22f8", "version": 2, "date": "2017-09-19", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Email"], "description": "Attackers often use spaces as a means to obfuscate an attachment's file extension. This search looks for messages with email attachments that have many spaces within the file names.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(All_Email.recipient) as recipient_address min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Email where All_Email.file_name=\"*\" by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.file_name All_Email.message_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Email\")` | eval space_ratio = (mvcount(split(file_name,\" \"))-1)/len(file_name) | search space_ratio >= 0.1 | rex field=recipient_address \"(?.*)@\" | `email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You need to ingest data from emails. Specifically, the sender's address and the file names of any attachments must be mapped to the Email data model. The threshold ratio is set to 10%, but this value can be configured to suit each environment. \\\n **Splunk Phantom Playbook Integration**\\\nIf Splunk Phantom is also configured in your environment, a playbook called \"Suspicious Email Attachment Investigate and Delete\" can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/` and add the correct hostname to the \"Phantom Instance\" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search. The notable event will be sent to Phantom and the playbook will gather further information about the file attachment and its network behaviors. If Phantom finds malicious behavior and an analyst approves of the results, the email will be deleted from the user's inbox.", "known_false_positives": "None at this time", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Suspicious Emails"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Email.recipient", "All_Email.file_name", "All_Email.src_user", "All_Email.file_name", "All_Email.message_id"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "DNS Hijacking", "id": "8169f17b-ef68-4b59-aa28-586907301221", "version": 1, "date": "2020-02-04", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "Secure your environment against DNS hijacks with searches that help you detect and investigate unauthorized changes to DNS records.", "narrative": "Dubbed the Achilles heel of the Internet (see https://www.f5.com/labs/articles/threat-intelligence/dns-is-still-the-achilles-heel-of-the-internet-25613), DNS plays a critical role in routing web traffic but is notoriously vulnerable to attack. One reason is its distributed nature. It relies on unstructured connections between millions of clients and servers over inherently insecure protocols.\\\nThe gravity and extent of the importance of securing DNS from attacks is undeniable. The fallout of compromised DNS can be disastrous. Not only can hackers bring down an entire business, they can intercept confidential information, emails, and login credentials, as well. \\\nOn January 22, 2019, the US Department of Homeland Security 2019's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) raised awareness of some high-profile DNS hijacking attacks against infrastructure, both in the United States and abroad. It issued Emergency Directive 19-01 (see https://cyber.dhs.gov/ed/19-01/), which summarized the activity and required government agencies to take the following four actions, all within 10 days: \\\n1. For all .gov or other agency-managed domains, audit public DNS records on all authoritative and secondary DNS servers, verify that they resolve to the intended location or report them to CISA.\\\n1. Update the passwords for all accounts on systems that can make changes to each agency 2019's DNS records.\\\n1. Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all accounts on systems that can make changes to each agency's 2019 DNS records or, if impossible, provide CISA with the names of systems, the reasons why MFA cannot be enabled within the required timeline, and an ETA for when it can be enabled.\\\n1. CISA will begin regular delivery of newly added certificates to Certificate Transparency (CT) logs for agency domains via the Cyber Hygiene service. Upon receipt, agencies must immediately begin monitoring CT log data for certificates issued that they did not request. If an agency confirms that a certificate was unauthorized, it must report the certificate to the issuing certificate authority and to CISA. Of course, it makes sense to put equivalent actions in place within your environment, as well. \\\nIn DNS hijacking, the attacker assumes control over an account or makes use of a DNS service exploit to make changes to DNS records. Once they gain access, attackers can substitute their own MX records, name-server records, and addresses, redirecting emails and traffic through their infrastructure, where they can read, copy, or modify information seen. They can also generate valid encryption certificates to help them avoid browser-certificate checks. In one notable attack on the Internet service provider, GoDaddy, the hackers altered Sender Policy Framework (SPF) records a relatively minor change that did not inflict excessive damage but allowed for more effective spam campaigns.\\\nThe searches in this Analytic Story help you detect and investigate activities that may indicate that DNS hijacking has taken place within your environment.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "DNS Hijacking", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1189"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Drive-by Compromise"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390", "Patchwork", "Elderwood", "APT32", "Leafminer", "Dark Caracal", "PLATINUM", "APT19", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Darkhotel", "Windshift", "Turla", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT38", "RTM", "Lazarus Group"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers", "id": "c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6v5464g9f", "version": 3, "date": "2021-01-14", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Resolution"], "description": "Malicious actors often abuse legitimate Dynamic DNS services to host malicious payloads or interactive command and control nodes. Attackers will automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to countless IP addresses to circumvent firewall blocks, block lists as well as frustrate a network defenders analytic and investigative processes. This search will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.answer) as answer min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query host | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `dynamic_dns_providers` | `detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter`", "how_to_implement": "First, you'll need to ingest data from your DNS operations. This can be done by ingesting logs from your server or data, collected passively by Splunk Stream or a similar solution. Specifically, data that contains the domain that is being queried and the IP of the host originating the request must be populating the `Network_Resolution` data model. This search also leverages a lookup file, `dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv`, which contains a non-exhaustive list of Dynamic DNS providers. Please consider updating the local lookup periodically by adding new domains to the list of `dynamic_dns_providers_local.csv`.\\\nThis search produces fields (query, answer, isDynDNS) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable event. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review. Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** DNS Query, **Field:** query\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** DNS Answer, **Field:** answer\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** IsDynamicDNS, **Field:** isDynDNS\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", "known_false_positives": "Some users and applications may leverage Dynamic DNS to reach out to some domains on the Internet since dynamic DNS by itself is not malicious, however this activity must be verified.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Data Protection", "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "DNS Hijacking", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Dynamic DNS", "Command and Control"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Initial Access"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1189/dyn_dns_site/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A dns query $query$ from your infra connecting to suspicious domain in host $host$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1189"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "host", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "query", "type": "dnsquery", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "DNS.answer", "DNS.query", "host"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Drive-by Compromise"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Turla", "Windshift", "RTM", "Darkhotel", "APT38", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Leafminer", "Dark Caracal", "APT19", "APT32", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-3390", "Elderwood", "APT37", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_default dynamic_dns_domains as query OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_default | lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_local dynamic_dns_domains as query OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_local| eval isDynDNS = coalesce(isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local)|fields - isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local| search isDynDNS=True", "description": "This macro limits the output of the query field to dynamic dns domains. It looks up the domains in a file provided by Splunk and one intended to be updated by the end user.", "name": "dynamic_dns_providers", "lookups": [{"case_sensitive_match": "false", "description": "A list of dynammic dns providers that should not be modified", "filename": "dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(dynamic_dns_domains)", "name": "dynamic_dns_providers_default", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv"}, {"case_sensitive_match": "false", "description": "A list of dynammic dns providers that can be modified", "filename": "dynamic_dns_providers_local.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(dynamic_dns_domains)", "name": "dynamic_dns_providers_local", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/dynamic_dns_providers_local.csv"}]}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Spearphishing Attachments", "id": "57226b40-94f3-4ce5-b101-a75f67759c27", "version": 1, "date": "2019-04-29", "author": "Splunk Research Team, Splunk", "description": "Detect signs of malicious payloads that may indicate that your environment has been breached via a phishing attack.", "narrative": "Despite its simplicity, phishing remains the most pervasive and dangerous cyberthreat. In fact, research shows that as many as [91% of all successful attacks](https://digitalguardian.com/blog/91-percent-cyber-attacks-start-phishing-email-heres-how-protect-against-phishing) are initiated via a phishing email. \\\nAs most people know, these emails use fraudulent domains, [email scraping](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), familiar contact names inserted as senders, and other tactics to lure targets into clicking a malicious link, opening an attachment with a [nefarious payload](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), or entering sensitive personal information that perpetrators may intercept. This attack technique requires a relatively low level of skill and allows adversaries to easily cast a wide net. Worse, because its success relies on the gullibility of humans, it's impossible to completely \"automate\" it out of your environment. However, you can use ES and ESCU to detect and investigate potentially malicious payloads injected into your environment subsequent to a phishing attack. \\\nWhile any kind of file may contain a malicious payload, some are more likely to be perceived as benign (and thus more often escape notice) by the average victim—especially when the attacker sends an email that seems to be from one of their contacts. An example is Microsoft Office files. Most corporate users are familiar with documents with the following suffixes: .doc/.docx (MS Word), .xls/.xlsx (MS Excel), and .ppt/.pptx (MS PowerPoint), so they may click without a second thought, slashing a hole in their organizations' security. \\\nFollowing is a typical series of events, according to an [article by Trend Micro](https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/rising-trend-attackers-using-lnk-files-download-malware/):\\\n1. Attacker sends a phishing email. Recipient downloads the attached file, which is typically a .docx or .zip file with an embedded .lnk file\\\n1. The .lnk file executes a PowerShell script\\\n1. Powershell executes a reverse shell, rendering the exploit successful As a side note, adversaries are likely to use a tool like Empire to craft and obfuscate payloads and their post-injection activities, such as [exfiltration, lateral movement, and persistence](https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire).\\\nThis Analytic Story focuses on detecting signs that a malicious payload has been injected into your environment. For example, one search detects outlook.exe writing a .zip file. Another looks for suspicious .lnk files launching processes.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/spear-phishing-campaign-targets-ukraine-government.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Spearphishing Attachments", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566.002", "T1566.001", "T1003", "T1003.002", "T1566"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Phishing", "Spearphishing Attachment", "Spearphishing Link", "OS Credential Dumping", "Security Account Manager"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Sandworm Team", "Magic Hound", "Inception", "Rancor", "Axiom", "Tropic Trooper", "Kimsuky", "TA459", "PLATINUM", "Poseidon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN8", "APT29", "Turla", "APT39", "Molerats", "Gamaredon Group", "APT12", "Leviathan", "RTM", "Ke3chang", "Mofang", "TA505", "Frankenstein", "Cobalt Group", "Stolen Pencil", "Silence", "APT32", "Soft Cell", "Night Dragon", "APT-C-36", "APT19", "APT37", "Darkhotel", "APT41", "menuPass", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "admin@338", "Wizard Spider", "Machete", "Sowbug", "no", "The White Company", "Sharpshooter", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork", "FIN4", "Elderwood", "APT28", "Gallmaker", "APT33", "Gorgon Group", "Windshift", "BlackTech", "FIN7", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Naikon", "DarkHydrus"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL", "id": "c661f6be-a38c-11eb-be57-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-04-22", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by IcedID malware family. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `rundll32.exe` without a `.dll` file extension. In malicious instances, the command-line of `rundll32.exe` will look like `rundll32 ..\\oepddl.igk2,DllRegisterServer`. In addition, Threat Research has released a detection identifying the use of `DllRegisterServer` on the command-line of `rundll32.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze the `DLL` that was dropped to disk. The Office Product will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\") `process_rundll32` (Processes.process!=*.dll*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/395471/0/html", "https://app.any.run/tasks/cef4b8ba-023c-4b3b-b2ef-6486a44f6ed9/", "https://any.run/malware-trends/icedid"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "recon"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_icedid.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ and no dll commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "process name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Phishing", "Spearphishing Attachment"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_rundll32"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll_filter"}]}, {"name": "Office Document Executing Macro Code", "id": "b12c89bc-9d06-11eb-a592-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-14", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this detection was designed to identifies suspicious office documents that using macro code. Macro code is known to be one of the prevalent weaponization or attack vector of threat actor. This malicious macro code is embed to a office document as an attachment that may execute malicious payload, download malware payload or other malware component. It is really good practice to disable macro by default to avoid automatically execute macro code while opening or closing a office document files.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 process_name IN (\"WINWORD.EXE\", \"EXCEL.EXE\", \"POWERPNT.EXE\") ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\VBE7INTL.DLL\",\"*\\\\VBE7.DLL\", \"*\\\\VBEUI.DLL\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ImageLoaded) as AllImageLoaded count by Computer EventCode Image process_name ProcessId ProcessGuid | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_document_executing_macro_code_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and ImageLoaded (Like sysmon EventCode 7) from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Also be sure to include those monitored dll to your own sysmon config.", "known_false_positives": "Normal Office Document macro use for automation", "references": ["https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/386500/0/html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Trickbot", "IcedID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Office document executing a macro on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["ImageLoaded", "AllImageLoaded", "Computer", "EventCode", "Image", "process_name", "ProcessId", "ProcessGuid", "_time"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Phishing", "Spearphishing Attachment"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "office_document_executing_macro_code_filter"}]}, {"name": "Office Application Spawn rundll32 process", "id": "958751e4-9c5f-11eb-b103-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-04-13", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this detection was designed to identifies suspicious spawned process of known MS office application due to macro or malicious code. this technique can be seen in so many malware like trickbot that used MS office as its weapon or attack vector to initially infect the machines.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = \"winword.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"excel.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"powerpnt.exe\") AND `process_rundll32` by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.process Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_application_spawn_rundll32_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://any.run/malware-trends/trickbot", "https://any.run/report/47561b4e949041eff0a0f4693c59c81726591779fe21183ae9185b5eb6a69847/aba3722a-b373-4dae-8273-8730fb40cdbe"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Trickbot", "IcedID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Office application spawning rundll32.exe on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Phishing", "Spearphishing Attachment"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_rundll32"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "office_application_spawn_rundll32_process_filter"}]}, {"name": "Office Document Creating Schedule Task", "id": "cc8b7b74-9d0f-11eb-8342-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-14", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this search detects a potential malicious office document that create schedule task entry through macro VBA api or through loading taskschd.dll. This technique was seen in so many malicious macro malware that create persistence , beaconing using task schedule malware entry The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\\Windows\\system32` and `C:\\Windows\\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it's possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.'", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 process_name IN (\"WINWORD.EXE\", \"EXCEL.EXE\", \"POWERPNT.EXE\") ImageLoaded = \"*\\\\taskschd.dll\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ImageLoaded) as AllImageLoaded count by Computer EventCode Image process_name ProcessId ProcessGuid | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_document_creating_schedule_task_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and ImageLoaded (Like sysmon EventCode 7) from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Also be sure to include those monitored dll to your own sysmon config.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/irans-apt34-returns-with-an-updated-arsenal/", "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/scheduled-task-job/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Office document creating a schedule task on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["ImageLoaded", "AllImageLoaded", "Computer", "EventCode", "Image", "process_name", "ProcessId", "ProcessGuid", "_time"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Phishing", "Spearphishing Attachment"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "office_document_creating_schedule_task_filter"}]}, {"name": "Excel Spawning PowerShell", "id": "42d40a22-9be3-11eb-8f08-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies Microsoft Excel spawning PowerShell. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with Excel.exe. Excel.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Office16` (version will vary). PowerShell spawning from Excel.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command executed will most likely be encoded and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=\"excel.exe\" `process_powershell` by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excel_spawning_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/powershell/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$, indicating potential suspicious macro execution.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Security Account Manager", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390", "Ke3chang", "Soft Cell", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "menuPass", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_powershell"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "excel_spawning_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Winword Spawning PowerShell", "id": "b2c950b8-9be2-11eb-8658-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-04-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies Microsoft Word spawning PowerShell. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with winword.exe. Winword.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Office16` (version will vary). PowerShell spawning from winword.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command executed will most likely be encoded and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=\"winword.exe\" `process_powershell` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winword_spawning_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/powershell/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/", "https://app.any.run/tasks/b79fa381-f35c-4b3e-8d02-507e7ee7342f/", "https://app.any.run/tasks/181ac90b-0898-4631-8701-b778a30610ad/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "$parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$ launched the following powershell process: $process_name$ which is very common in spearphishing attacks", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Target"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Phishing", "Spearphishing Attachment"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_powershell"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "winword_spawning_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download", "id": "6fed27d2-9ec7-11eb-8fe4-aa665a019aa3", "version": 3, "date": "2021-09-20", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect potential malicious office document executing lolbin child process to download payload or other malware. Since most of the attacker abused the capability of office document to execute living on land application to blend it to the normal noise in the infected machine to cover its track.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\") Processes.process IN (\"*http:*\",\"*https:*\") NOT (Processes.original_file_name IN(\"firefox.exe\", \"chrome.exe\",\"iexplore.exe\",\"msedge.exe\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_document_spawned_child_process_to_download_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances office application and browser may be used.", "known_false_positives": "Default browser not in the filter list.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/92d7ef61-bfd7-4c92-bc15-322172b4ebec/#"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets2/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Office document spawning suspicious child process on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Phishing", "Spearphishing Attachment"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "office_document_spawned_child_process_to_download_filter"}]}, {"name": "Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location", "id": "5d814af1-1041-47b5-a9ac-d754e82e9a26", "version": 5, "date": "2021-08-26", "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for a process launching an `*.lnk` file under `C:\\User*` or `*\\Local\\Temp\\*`. This is common behavior used by various spear phishing tools.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name=\"*.lnk\" AND (Filesystem.file_path=\"C:\\\\User\\\\*\" OR Filesystem.file_path=\"*\\\\Temp\\\\*\") by _time span=1h Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.file_hash Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | rename process_guid as lnk_guid | join lnk_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=* by _time span=1h Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | rename parent_process_guid as lnk_guid | fields _time lnk_guid process_id dest process_name process_path process] | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime, lastTime, lnk_guid, process_id, user, dest, file_name, file_path, process_name, process, process_path, file_hash | `process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon.", "known_false_positives": "This detection should yield little or no false positive results. It is uncommon for LNK files to be executed from temporary or user directories.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/", "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/17/e/rising-trend-attackers-using-lnk-files-download-malware.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Initial Access"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.002/lnk_file_temp_folder/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A process $process_name$ that launching .lnk file in $file_path$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.file_name", "Filesystem.file_path", "Filesystem.process_id", "Filesystem.file_name", "Filesystem.file_path", "Filesystem.file_hash", "Filesystem.user"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Phishing", "Spearphishing Link"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Windshift", "Molerats", "Mofang", "BlackTech", "Machete", "Kimsuky", "TA505", "Stolen Pencil", "APT39", "FIN4", "APT32", "Night Dragon", "Turla", "APT28", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "APT33", "Elderwood", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "APT29", "FIN8"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location_filter"}]}, {"name": "Excel Spawning Windows Script Host", "id": "57fe880a-9be3-11eb-9bf3-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies Microsoft Excel spawning Windows Script Host - `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe`. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with Excel.exe. Excel.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Office16` (version will vary). `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` default location is `c:\\windows\\system32\\` or c:windows\\syswow64`. `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` spawning from Excel.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command-line executed will most likely be obfuscated and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. Review the reputation of the remote destination and block accordingly.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=\"excel.exe\" Processes.process_name IN (\"cscript.exe\", \"wscript.exe\") by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excel_spawning_windows_script_host_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed. In some instances, `cscript.exe` is used for legitimate business practices.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/8ecfbc29-03d0-421c-a5bf-3905d29192a2/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$, indicating potential suspicious macro execution.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "process_name", "process_id", "parent_process_name", "dest", "user", "parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Security Account Manager", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390", "Ke3chang", "Soft Cell", "Night Dragon", "Dragonfly 2.0", "menuPass", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "excel_spawning_windows_script_host_filter"}]}, {"name": "Office Spawning Control", "id": "053e027c-10c7-11ec-8437-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-08", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies control.exe spawning from an office product. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `control.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `control.exe` will contain a file path to a .cpl or .inf, related to CVE-2021-40444. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. review parallel and child processes to identify further suspicious behavior", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\",\"wordpad.exe\",\"wordview.exe\") Processes.process_name=control.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `office_spawning_control_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives should be present.", "references": ["https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/control.exe-1F13E714A0FEA8887707DFF49287996F.html", "https://app.any.run/tasks/36c14029-9df8-439c-bba0-45f2643b0c70/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://www.echotrail.io/insights/search/control.exe", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.002/T1218.002.yaml"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_control.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ clicking a suspicious attachment.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Phishing", "Spearphishing Attachment"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "office_spawning_control_filter"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawning CertUtil", "id": "6925fe72-a6d5-11eb-9e17-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-04-26", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `certutil.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `certutil.exe` will contain a URL to a remote destination. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `certutil.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `certutil.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\") `process_certutil` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_certutil_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "No false positives known. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/threats/TA551/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1105/T1105.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "recon"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_macros.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Phishing", "Spearphishing Attachment"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=certutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=CertUtil.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_certutil"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "office_product_spawning_certutil_filter"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Writing cab or inf", "id": "f48cd1d4-125a-11ec-a447-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-10", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies behavior related to CVE-2021-40444. Whereas the malicious document will load ActiveX and download the remote payload (.inf, .cab). During triage, review parallel processes and further activity on endpoint to identify additional patterns. Retrieve the file modifications and analyze further.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\",\"wordpad.exe\",\"wordview.exe\") by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*.inf\",\"*.cab\") by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process] | dedup file_create_time | table dest, process_name, process, file_create_time, file_name, file_path | `office_product_writing_cab_or_inf_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node and `Filesystem` node.", "known_false_positives": "The query is structured in a way that `action` (read, create) is not defined. Review the results of this query, filter, and tune as necessary. It may be necessary to generate this query specific to your endpoint product.", "references": ["https://twitter.com/vxunderground/status/1436326057179860992?s=20", "https://app.any.run/tasks/36c14029-9df8-439c-bba0-45f2643b0c70/", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", "https://twitter.com/RonnyTNL/status/1436334640617373699?s=20"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_cabinf.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on $dest$ writing an inf or cab file to this. This is not typical of $process_name$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "process_name", "process", "file_create_time", "file_name", "file_path"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Phishing", "Spearphishing Attachment"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "office_product_writing_cab_or_inf_filter"}]}, {"name": "MSHTML Module Load in Office Product", "id": "5f1c168e-118b-11ec-84ff-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-09", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies the module load of mshtml.dll into an Office product. This behavior has been related to CVE-2021-40444, whereas the malicious document will load ActiveX, which activates the MSHTML component. The vulnerability resides in the MSHTML component. During triage, identify parallel processes and capture any file modifications for analysis.", "search": "`sysmon` EventID=7 process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\",\"wordpad.exe\",\"wordview.exe\") ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\mshtml.dll\", \"*\\\\Microsoft.mshtml.dll\",\"*\\\\IE.Interop.MSHTML.dll\",\"*\\\\MshtmlDac.dll\",\"*\\\\MshtmlDed.dll\",\"*\\\\MshtmlDer.dll\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, process_name, ImageLoaded, OriginalFileName, process_id | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mshtml_module_load_in_office_product_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process names and image loads from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives will be present, however, tune as necessary.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/36c14029-9df8-439c-bba0-45f2643b0c70/", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/index-dll"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_mshtml.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ loading mshtml.dll.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "ImageLoaded", "process_name", "OriginalFileName", "process_id", "dest"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Phishing", "Spearphishing Attachment"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "mshtml_module_load_in_office_product_filter"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawning MSHTA", "id": "6078fa20-a6d2-11eb-b662-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-04-26", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `mshta.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `mshta.exe` will contain the `hta` file locally, or a URL to the remote destination. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `mshta.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `mshta.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\") `process_mshta` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_mshta_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "No false positives known. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/threats/TA551/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "IcedID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "recon"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_macros.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Phishing", "Spearphishing Attachment"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=mshta.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSHTA.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_mshta"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "office_product_spawning_mshta_filter"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawning Wmic", "id": "ffc236d6-a6c9-11eb-95f1-acde48001122", "version": 3, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by Ursnif malware family. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `wmic.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `wmic.exe` will contain `wmic process call create`. In addition, Threat Research has released a detection identifying the use of `wmic process call create` on the command-line of `wmic.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `wmic.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\") `process_wmic` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_wmic_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "No false positives known. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/fb894ab8-a966-4b72-920b-935f41756afd/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1047/T1047.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "FIN7"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "recon"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_macros.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Phishing", "Spearphishing Attachment"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_wmic"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "office_product_spawning_wmic_filter"}]}, {"name": "Winword Spawning Cmd", "id": "6fcbaedc-a37b-11eb-956b-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-04-22", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies Microsoft Word spawning `cmd.exe`. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with winword.exe. Winword.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Office16` (version will vary). Cmd.exe spawning from winword.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command-line will indicate what is being executed. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. It is possible that COM is utilized to trampoline the child process to `explorer.exe` or `wmiprvse.exe`.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=winword.exe `process_cmd` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winword_spawning_cmd_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/73af0064-a785-4c0a-ab0d-cde593fe16ef/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "$parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$ launched command: $process_name$ which is very common in spearphishing attacks.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Target"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Phishing", "Spearphishing Attachment"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_cmd"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "winword_spawning_cmd_filter"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin", "id": "e8c591f4-a6d7-11eb-8cf7-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-04-26", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `bitsadmin.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `bitsadmin.exe` will contain a URL to a remote destination or similar command-line arguments as transfer, Download, priority, Foreground. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `bitsadmin.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `bitsadmin.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\") `process_bitsadmin` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_bitsadmin_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "No false positives known. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1197/T1197.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "recon"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_macros.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Phishing", "Spearphishing Attachment"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=bitsadmin.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=bitsadmin.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_bitsadmin"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "office_product_spawning_bitsadmin_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file", "id": "a51bfe1a-94f0-4822-b1e4-16ae10145893", "version": 3, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for execution of process `outlook.exe` where the process is writing a `.zip` file to the disk.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=outlook.exe OR Processes.process_name=explorer.exe by _time span=5m Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_id Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename process_id as malicious_id| rename parent_process_id as outlook_id| join malicious_id type=inner[| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path values(Filesystem.file_name) as file_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_path=*zip* OR Filesystem.file_name=*.lnk ) AND (Filesystem.file_path=C:\\\\Users* OR Filesystem.file_path=*Local\\\\Temp*) by _time span=5m Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_hash Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename process_id as malicious_id| fields malicious_id outlook_id dest file_path file_name file_hash count file_id] | table firstTime lastTime user malicious_id outlook_id process_name parent_process_name file_name file_path | where file_name != \"\" | `detect_outlook_exe_writing_a_zip_file_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon.", "known_false_positives": "It is not uncommon for outlook to write legitimate zip files to the disk.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process_id", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.dest", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.user"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Phishing", "Spearphishing Attachment"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_outlook_exe_writing_a_zip_file_filter"}]}, {"name": "Gsuite suspicious calendar invite", "id": "03cdd68a-34fb-11ec-9bd3-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-24", "author": "Rod Soto, Teoderick Contreras", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search can help the detection of compromised accounts or internal users sending suspcious calendar invites via GSuite calendar. These invites may contain malicious links or attachments.", "search": "`gsuite_calendar` |bin span=5m _time |rename parameters.* as * |search target_calendar_id!=null email=\"*yourdomain.com\"| stats count values(target_calendar_id) values(event_title) values(event_guest) by email _time | where count >100| `gsuite_suspicious_calendar_invite_filter`", "how_to_implement": "In order to successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite (gsuite:calendar:json) having the file sharing metadata like file type, source owner, destination target user, description, etc. This search can also be made more specific by selecting specific emails, subdomains timeframe, organizational units, targeted user, etc. In order for the search to work for your environment please update `yourdomain.com` value in the query with the domain relavant for your organization.", "known_false_positives": "This search will also produce normal activity statistics. Fields such as email, ip address, name, parameters.organizer_calendar_id, parameters.target_calendar_id and parameters.event_title may give away phishing intent.For more specific results use email parameter.", "references": ["https://www.techrepublic.com/article/how-to-avoid-the-dreaded-google-calendar-malicious-invite-issue/", "https://gcn.com/articles/2012/09/26/20-most-common-words-phishing-attacks.aspx"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "dataset": [[]], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "email", "parameters.event_title", "parameters.target_calendar_id", "parameters.event_title"], "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Phishing"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:calendar:json", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "gsuite_calendar"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "gsuite_suspicious_calendar_invite_filter"}]}, {"name": "Gdrive suspicious file sharing", "id": "a7131dae-34e3-11ec-a2de-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-24", "author": "Rod Soto, Teoderick Contreras", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search can help the detection of compromised accounts or internal users sharing potentially malicious/classified documents with users outside your organization via GSuite file sharing .", "search": "`gsuite_drive` name=change_user_access | rename parameters.* as * | search email = \"*@yourdomain.com\" target_user != \"*@yourdomain.com\" | stats count values(owner) as owner values(target_user) as target values(doc_type) as doc_type values(doc_title) as doc_title dc(target_user) as distinct_target by src_ip email | where distinct_target > 50 | `gdrive_suspicious_file_sharing_filter`", "how_to_implement": "Need to implement Gsuite logging targeting Google suite drive activity. In order for the search to work for your environment please update `yourdomain.com` value in the query with the domain relavant for your organization.", "known_false_positives": "This is an anomaly search, you must specify your domain in the parameters so it either filters outside domains or focus on internal domains. This search may also help investigate compromise of accounts. By looking at for example source ip addresses, document titles and abnormal number of shares and shared target users.", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/investigating-gsuite-phishing-attacks-with-splunk.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Data Exfiltration"], "dataset": [[]], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "src_ip", "parameters.owner", "parameters.target_user", "parameters.doc_title", "parameters.doc_type"], "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Phishing"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:drive:json", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "gsuite_drive"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "gdrive_suspicious_file_sharing_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "DHS Report TA18-074A", "id": "0c016e5c-88be-4e2c-8c6c-c2b55b4fb4ef", "version": 2, "date": "2020-01-22", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "description": "Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more.", "narrative": "The frequency of nation-state cyber attacks has increased significantly over the last decade. Employing numerous tactics and techniques, these attacks continue to escalate in complexity. \\\nThere is a wide range of motivations for these state-sponsored hacks, including stealing valuable corporate, military, or diplomatic dataѿall of which could confer advantages in various arenas. They may also target critical infrastructure. \\\nOne joint Technical Alert (TA) issued by the Department of Homeland and the FBI in mid-March of 2018 attributed some cyber activity targeting utility infrastructure to operatives sponsored by the Russian government. The hackers executed spearfishing attacks, installed malware, employed watering-hole domains, and more. While they caused no physical damage, the attacks provoked fears that a nation-state could turn off water, redirect power, or compromise a nuclear power plant.\\\nSuspicious activities--spikes in SMB traffic, processes that launch netsh (to modify the network configuration), suspicious registry modifications, and many more--may all be events you may wish to investigate further. While the use of these technique may be an indication that a nation-state actor is attempting to compromise your environment, it is important to note that these techniques are often employed by other groups, as well.", "references": ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "DHS Report TA18-074A", "category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.004", "T1136", "T1112", "T1569.002", "T1569", "T1053", "T1562", "T1059.001", "T1071.002", "T1053.005", "T1547.001", "T1059", "T1543", "T1547", "T1543.003", "T1021", "T1071", "T1204.002", "T1204", "T1021.002", "T1136.001"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote Services", "Disable or Modify System Firewall", "Create or Modify System Process", "File Transfer Protocols", "User Execution", "Scheduled Task/Job", "Malicious File", "Create Account", "System Services", "PowerShell", "Modify Registry", "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "Service Execution", "Application Layer Protocol", "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "Impair Defenses", "Local Account", "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "Scheduled Task", "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "Windows Service"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Execution", "Command And Control", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Inception", "Rancor", "TEMP.Veles", "PLATINUM", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT39", "Gamaredon Group", "RTM", "Carbanak", "Frankenstein", "admin@338", "Honeybee", "Thrip", "APT18", "MuddyWater", "Gorgon Group", "BlackTech", "Orangeworm", "SilverTerrier", "Naikon", "Magic Hound", "Stealth Falcon", "Dark Caracal", "TA459", "APT29", "FIN8", "Molerats", "Rocke", "APT12", "Whitefly", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "Silence", "APT32", "WIRTE", "Darkhotel", "FIN5", "Blue Mockingbird", "Machete", "Threat Group-1314", "Sharpshooter", "Patchwork", "FIN4", "APT33", "DarkHydrus", "Threat Group-3390", "Putter Panda", "Kimsuky", "Poseidon Group", "Turla", "Mofang", "TA505", "Soft Cell", "APT19", "APT37", "APT41", "menuPass", "OilRig", "Wizard Spider", "Leafminer", "no", "The White Company", "FIN10", "DarkVishnya", "Elderwood", "APT28", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN7", "Tropic Trooper", "Ke3chang", "Leviathan", "APT-C-36", "CopyKittens", "FIN6", "Lazarus Group", "APT3", "APT38", "Gallmaker", "Windshift"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "id": "f5f6af30-7aa7-4295-bfe9-07fe87c01a4b", "version": 6, "date": "2021-09-07", "author": "Jose Hernandez, David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to launch an application or service at system startup.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\run* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentVersion\\\\Windows\\\\Appinit_Dlls* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Shell* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Notify* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Userinit* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\VmApplet* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\policies\\\\explorer\\\\run* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\runservices* OR Registry.registry_path=HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Netsh\\\\* OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Image File Execution Options*\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=Debugger) OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Security Packages\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\\\\OSConfig\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Security Packages\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\SilentProcessExit\\\\*\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*currentVersion\\\\Windows\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Load\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentVersion\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Svchost\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\"AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"BootExecute\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Software\\\\Run\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"auto_update\")) by Registry.dest Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "There are many legitimate applications that must execute on system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Ransomware", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "IcedID", "Remcos"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 95, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Persistence"}, "Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to persistence in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1547.001", "T1547"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user"], "risk_score": 76, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Rocke", "Tropic Trooper", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Silence", "RTM", "Inception", "APT41", "Machete", "Kimsuky", "APT33", "APT39", "APT32", "APT18", "Turla", "Dark Caracal", "Cobalt Group", "Honeybee", "Threat Group-3390", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Gorgon Group", "Ke3chang", "APT19", "Leviathan", "MuddyWater", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Magic Hound", "APT3", "FIN10", "FIN7", "Patchwork", "FIN6", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "APT29", "Darkhotel", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect New Local Admin account", "id": "b25f6f62-0712-43c1-b203-083231ffd97d", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-08", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for newly created accounts that have been elevated to local administrators.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4720 OR (EventCode=4732 Group_Name=Administrators) | transaction member_id connected=false maxspan=180m | rename member_id as user | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_new_local_admin_account_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Windows event logs using the Splunk Windows TA and collecting event code 4720 and 4732", "known_false_positives": "The activity may be legitimate. For this reason, it's best to verify the account with an administrator and ask whether there was a valid service request for the account creation. If your local administrator group name is not \"Administrators\", this search may generate an excessive number of false positives", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["DHS Report TA18-074A", "HAFNIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Windows", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "message": "A $user$ on $dest$ was added recently. Identify if this was legitimate behavior or not.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1136.001", "T1136"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Group_Name", "member_id", "dest", "user"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "access", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Local Account", "Create Account"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT39", "APT41", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leafminer", "APT3", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_new_local_admin_account_filter"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", "id": "d5af132c-7c17-439c-9d31-13d55340f36c", "version": 5, "date": "2020-12-17", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line that indicate a task was created via command like. This has been associated with the Dragonfly threat actor, and the SUNBURST attack against Solarwinds.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe (Processes.process=*delete* OR Processes.process=*create*) by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "Tasks should not be manually created via CLI, this is rarely done by admins as well", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["DHS Report TA18-074A", "NOBELIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}, "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A schedule task process $process_name$ with create or delete commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Scheduled Task", "Scheduled Task/Job"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "MuddyWater", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT-C-36", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT41", "Machete", "Soft Cell", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Patchwork", "OilRig", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "FIN8", "menuPass", "FIN10", "APT32", "FIN7", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd_filter"}]}, {"name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services", "id": "f0c693d8-2a89-4ce7-80b4-98fea4c3ea6d", "version": 4, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for arguments to sc.exe indicating the creation or modification of a Windows service.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = sc.exe (Processes.process=\"* create *\" OR Processes.process=\"* config *\") by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Using sc.exe to manipulate Windows services is uncommon. However, there may be legitimate instances of this behavior. It is important to validate and investigate as appropriate.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Service Abuse", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Disabling Security Tools", "NOBELIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Persistence"}, "Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "message": "A sc process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ to create of configure services in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1543.003", "T1543"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Windows Service", "Create or Modify System Process"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "DarkVishnya", "Wizard Spider", "APT32", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Tropic Trooper", "Cobalt Group", "Ke3chang", "Honeybee", "FIN7", "Threat Group-3390", "APT19", "APT3", "Lazarus Group", "Carbanak", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services_filter"}]}, {"name": "Single Letter Process On Endpoint", "id": "a4214f0b-e01c-41bc-8cc4-d2b71e3056b4", "version": 3, "date": "2020-12-08", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for process names that consist only of a single letter.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process, Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | eval process_name_length = len(process_name), endExe = if(substr(process_name, -4) == \".exe\", 1, 0) | search process_name_length=5 AND endExe=1 | table count, firstTime, lastTime, dest, user, process, process_name | `single_letter_process_on_endpoint_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "Single-letter executables are not always malicious. Investigate this activity with your normal incident-response process.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["DHS Report TA18-074A"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 2"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1204.002/single_letter_exe/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A suspicious process $process_name$ with single letter in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1204", "T1204.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_name"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["User Execution", "Malicious File"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Whitefly", "Tropic Trooper", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Mofang", "Frankenstein", "RTM", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "Machete", "admin@338", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "DarkHydrus", "Gorgon Group", "Patchwork", "OilRig", "Dark Caracal", "MuddyWater", "Lazarus Group", "FIN7", "APT32", "Rancor", "APT37", "FIN8", "APT28", "Elderwood", "TA459", "APT29", "Leviathan", "menuPass", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "single_letter_process_on_endpoint_filter"}]}, {"name": "Processes launching netsh", "id": "b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-95dbb162040e", "version": 4, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Josef Kuepker, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe. Netsh is a command-line scripting utility that allows you to, either locally or remotely, display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. Netsh can be used as a persistence proxy technique to execute a helper DLL when netsh.exe is executed. In this search, we are looking for processes spawned by netsh.exe and executing commands via the command line.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) AS Processes.process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_netsh` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest |`drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`processes_launching_netsh_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Some VPN applications are known to launch netsh.exe. Outside of these instances, it is unusual for an executable to launch netsh.exe and run commands.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Netsh Abuse", "Disabling Security Tools", "DHS Report TA18-074A"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A process $process_name$ that tries to execute netsh commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.004", "T1562"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.user", "Processes.dest"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify System Firewall", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Rocke", "Lazarus Group", "Kimsuky", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Carbanak", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=netsh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=netsh.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_netsh"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "processes_launching_netsh_filter"}]}, {"name": "Create local admin accounts using net exe", "id": "b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-151bb162040e", "version": 6, "date": "2021-09-08", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for the creation of local administrator accounts using net.exe .", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.user) as user values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=net.exe OR Processes.process_name=net1.exe) AND Processes.process=*/add* AND (Processes.process=*administrators* OR Processes.process=*administratoren* OR Processes.process=*administrateurs* OR Processes.process=*administrador* OR Processes.process=*amministratori* OR Processes.process=*administratorer*) by Processes.process Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators often leverage net.exe to create admin accounts.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["DHS Report TA18-074A"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to add a user to the local Administrators group.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1136.001", "T1136"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 30, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Local Account", "Create Account"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT39", "APT41", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leafminer", "APT3", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Reg exe Process", "id": "a6b3ab4e-dd77-4213-95fa-fc94701995e0", "version": 4, "date": "2020-07-22", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for reg.exe being launched from a command prompt not started by the user. When a user launches cmd.exe, the parent process is usually explorer.exe. This search filters out those instances.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name != explorer.exe Processes.process_name =cmd.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=cmd.exe Processes.process_name= reg.exe by Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename parent_process_id as process_id |dedup process_id| table process_id dest] | `suspicious_reg_exe_process_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "It's possible for system administrators to write scripts that exhibit this behavior. If this is the case, the search will need to be modified to filter them out.", "references": ["https://car.mitre.org/wiki/CAR-2013-03-001"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Disabling Security Tools", "DHS Report TA18-074A"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Suspicious $Processes.process_path.file_path$ process running with an uncommon parent process $Processes.parent_process_name$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Processes.process_path.file_path", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Modify Registry"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Turla", "APT32", "APT38", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "Threat Group-3390", "Honeybee", "Patchwork", "Gorgon Group", "FIN8"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_reg_exe_process_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag", "id": "b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-151xb162040e", "version": 4, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for events where `PsExec.exe` is run with the `accepteula` flag in the command line. PsExec is a built-in Windows utility that enables you to execute processes on other systems. It is fully interactive for console applications. This tool is widely used for launching interactive command prompts on remote systems. Threat actors leverage this extensively for executing code on compromised systems. If an attacker is running PsExec for the first time, they will be prompted to accept the end-user license agreement (EULA), which can be passed as the argument `accepteula` within the command line.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_psexec` Processes.process=*accepteula* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators can leverage PsExec for accessing remote systems and might pass `accepteula` as an argument if they are running this tool for the first time. However, it is not likely that you'd see multiple occurrences of this event on a machine", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "HAFNIUM Group", "DarkSide Ransomware", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ running the utility for possibly the first time.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021", "T1021.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote Services", "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "APT32", "Orangeworm", "FIN8", "APT3", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-1314", "Turla", "Deep Panda", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=psexec.exe OR Processes.process_name=psexec64.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=psexec.c)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_psexec"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag_filter"}]}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass", "id": "9be56c82-b1cc-4318-87eb-d138afaaca39", "version": 5, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Rico Valdez, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for PowerShell processes started with parameters used to bypass the local execution policy for scripts. These parameters are often observed in attacks leveraging PowerShell scripts as they override the default PowerShell execution policy.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process_id) as process_id, values(Processes.parent_process_id) as parent_process_id values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process=\"* -ex*\" OR Processes.process=\"* bypass *\") by Processes.process_id, Processes.user, Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "There may be legitimate reasons to bypass the PowerShell execution policy. The PowerShell script being run with this parameter should be validated to ensure that it is legitimate.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["DHS Report TA18-074A", "HAFNIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/encoded_powershell/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "PowerShell local execution policy bypass attempt on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "PowerShell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "Gallmaker", "Turla", "APT19", "DarkHydrus", "APT28", "Thrip", "Gorgon Group", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leviathan", "TA459", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT32", "FIN7", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "APT3", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_powershell"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Renamed PSExec", "id": "683e6196-b8e8-11eb-9a79-acde48001122", "version": 3, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies renamed instances of `PsExec.exe` being utilized on an endpoint. Most instances, it is highly probable to capture `Psexec.exe` or other SysInternal utility usage with the command-line argument of `-accepteula`. During triage, validate this is the legitimate version of `PsExec` by reviewing the PE metadata. In addition, review parallel processes for further suspicious behavior.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_psexec` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_renamed_psexec_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives should be present. It is possible some third party applications may use older versions of PsExec, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1569.002/T1569.002.yaml", "https://redcanary.com/blog/threat-hunting-psexec-lateral-movement/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "HAFNIUM Group", "DarkSide Ransomware", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1569.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Lateral Movement", "Execution"], "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1569", "T1569.002"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 27, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Services", "Service Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "APT41", "Silence", "FIN6", "APT32", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=psexec.exe OR Processes.process_name=psexec64.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=psexec.c)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_psexec"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_renamed_psexec_filter"}]}, {"name": "SMB Traffic Spike", "id": "7f5fb3e1-4209-4914-90db-0ec21b936378", "version": 3, "date": "2020-07-22", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search looks for spikes in the number of Server Message Block (SMB) traffic connections.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb by _time span=1h, All_Traffic.src | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | eventstats max(_time) as maxtime | stats count as num_data_samples max(eval(if(_time >= relative_time(maxtime, \"-70m@m\"), count, null))) as count avg(eval(if(_time upperBound AND num_data_samples >=50, 1, 0) | where isOutlier=1 | table src count | `smb_traffic_spike_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic logs and populating the `Network_Traffic` data model.", "known_false_positives": "A file server may experience high-demand loads that could cause this analytic to trigger.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Ransomware", "DHS Report TA18-074A"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021.002", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.dest_port", "All_Traffic.app", "All_Traffic.src"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "Remote Services"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "APT32", "Orangeworm", "FIN8", "APT3", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-1314", "Turla", "Deep Panda", "Ke3chang", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "smb_traffic_spike_filter"}]}, {"name": "SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK", "id": "d25773ba-9ad8-48d1-858e-07ad0bbeb828", "version": 3, "date": "2020-07-22", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search uses the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) to identify spikes in the number of Server Message Block (SMB) connections.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as port from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb by _time span=1h, All_Traffic.src | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%A\") | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | apply smb_pdfmodel threshold=0.001 | rename \"IsOutlier(count)\" as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | sort -count | table _time src dest port count | `smb_traffic_spike___mltk_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. In addition, the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or greater must be installed on your search heads, along with any required dependencies. Finally, the support search \"Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK\" must be executed before this detection search, because it builds a machine-learning (ML) model over the historical data used by this search. It is important that this search is run in the same app context as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild the model with the latest data available in your environment.\\\nThis search produces a field (Number of events,count) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. This field contributes additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following field, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry): \\\n1. **Label:** Number of events, **Field:** count\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review is found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", "known_false_positives": "If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider reducing the value of the threshold in the search. You should also periodically re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data. Please update the `smb_traffic_spike_mltk_filter` macro to filter out false positive results", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Ransomware", "DHS Report TA18-074A"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021.002", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.dest_ip", "All_Traffic.dest_port", "All_Traffic.app", "All_Traffic.src"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "Remote Services"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "APT32", "Orangeworm", "FIN8", "APT3", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-1314", "Turla", "Deep Panda", "Ke3chang", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "smb_traffic_spike___mltk_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Outbound SMB Traffic", "id": "7f5fb3e1-4209-414-90db-0ec21b936378", "version": 3, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Stuart Hopkins from Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search looks for outbound SMB connections made by hosts within your network to the Internet. SMB traffic is used for Windows file-sharing activity. One of the techniques often used by attackers involves retrieving the credential hash using an SMB request made to a compromised server controlled by the threat actor.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as start_time latest(_time) as end_time values(All_Traffic.action) as action values(All_Traffic.app) as app values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as dest_port values(sourcetype) as sourcetype count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where ((All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=\"smb\") AND NOT (All_Traffic.action=\"blocked\" OR All_Traffic.dest_category=\"internal\" OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=192.168.0.0/16 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=100.64.0.0/10)) by All_Traffic.src_ip | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `security_content_ctime(start_time)` | `security_content_ctime(end_time)` | `detect_outbound_smb_traffic_filter`", "how_to_implement": "In order to run this search effectively, we highly recommend that you leverage the Assets and Identity framework. It is important that you have good understanding of how your network segments are designed, and be able to distinguish internal from external address space. Add a category named `internal` to the CIDRs that host the companys assets in `assets_by_cidr.csv` lookup file, which is located in `$SPLUNK_HOME/etc/apps/SA-IdentityManagement/lookups/`. More information on updating this lookup can be found here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.0.0/Admin/Addassetandidentitydata. This search also requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model", "known_false_positives": "It is likely that the outbound Server Message Block (SMB) traffic is legitimate, if the company's internal networks are not well-defined in the Assets and Identity Framework. Categorize the internal CIDR blocks as `internal` in the lookup file to avoid creating notable events for traffic destined to those CIDR blocks. Any other network connection that is going out to the Internet should be investigated and blocked. Best practices suggest preventing external communications of all SMB versions and related protocols at the network boundary.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Hidden Cobra Malware", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "NOBELIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1071.002", "T1071"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.action", "All_Traffic.app", "All_Traffic.dest_ip", "All_Traffic.dest_port", "sourcetype", "All_Traffic.dest_category", "All_Traffic.src_ip"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["File Transfer Protocols", "Application Layer Protocol"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control", "Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "SilverTerrier", "Machete", "Honeybee", "Rocke", "Magic Hound", "Dragonfly 2.0"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_outbound_smb_traffic_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Domain Trust Discovery", "id": "e6f30f14-8daf-11eb-a017-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-25", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "description": "Adversaries may attempt to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities in Windows multi-domain/forest environments.", "narrative": "Domain trusts provide a mechanism for a domain to allow access to resources based on the authentication procedures of another domain. Domain trusts allow the users of the trusted domain to access resources in the trusting domain. The information discovered may help the adversary conduct SID-History Injection, Pass the Ticket, and Kerberoasting. Domain trusts can be enumerated using the DSEnumerateDomainTrusts() Win32 API call, .NET methods, and LDAP. The Windows utility Nltest is known to be used by adversaries to enumerate domain trusts.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Domain Trust Discovery"], "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1018", "T1482"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Domain Trust Discovery", "Remote System Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390", "Sandworm Team", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ke3chang", "FIN8", "Turla", "APT39", "Rocke", "Deep Panda", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "FIN5", "menuPass", "FIN6", "APT3", "Wizard Spider", "Leafminer", "Dragonfly 2.0"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Windows AdFind Exe", "id": "bd3b0187-189b-46c0-be45-f52da2bae67f", "version": 2, "date": "2021-11-03", "author": "Jose Hernandez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for the execution of `adfind.exe` with command-line arguments that it uses by default. Specifically the filter or search functions. It also considers the arguments necessary like objectcategory, see readme for more details: https://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/usage.htm. This has been seen used before by Wizard Spider, FIN6 and actors whom also launched SUNBURST. AdFind.exe is usually used a recon tool to enumare a domain controller.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process=\"* -f *\" OR Processes.process=\"* -b *\") AND (Processes.process=*objectcategory* OR Processes.process=\"* -gcb *\" OR Processes.process=\"* -sc *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_adfind_exe_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "administrators rarely use adfind, usually not used for legitimate reasons", "references": ["https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/a-nasty-trick-from-credential-theft-malware-to-business-disruption.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["NOBELIUM Group", "Domain Trust Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1018"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote System Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Rocke", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT39", "APT32", "Deep Panda", "Threat Group-3390", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leafminer", "Ke3chang", "FIN8", "APT3", "FIN5", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Turla"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "windows_adfind_exe_filter"}]}, {"name": "NLTest Domain Trust Discovery", "id": "c3e05466-5f22-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-25", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for the execution of `nltest.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for Domain Trust information. Two arguments `/domain trusts`, returns a list of trusted domains, and `/all_trusts`, returns all trusted domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike use NLTest.exe to enumerate the current domain to assist with further understanding where to pivot next.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=nltest.exe OR Processes.process_name!=nltest.exe) (Processes.process=*/domain_trusts* OR Processes.process=*/all_trusts*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `nltest_domain_trust_discovery_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may use nltest for troubleshooting purposes, otherwise, rarely used.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1482/T1482.md", "https://malware.news/t/lets-learn-trickbot-implements-network-collector-module-leveraging-cmd-wmi-ldap/19104", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482/", "https://www.owasp.org/images/4/4b/Red_Team_Operating_in_a_Modern_Environment.pdf", "https://ss64.com/nt/nltest.html", "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/domain-trust-discovery/", "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/08/ryuks-return/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware", "Domain Trust Discovery", "IcedID", "Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Domain trust discovery execution on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1482"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Domain Trust Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "nltest_domain_trust_discovery_filter"}]}, {"name": "DSQuery Domain Discovery", "id": "cc316032-924a-11eb-91a2-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-31", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies \"dsquery.exe\" execution with arguments looking for `TrustedDomain` query directly on the command-line. This is typically indicative of an Administrator or adversary perform domain trust discovery. Note that this query does not identify any other variations of \"Dsquery.exe\" usage.\\\nWithin this detection, it is assumed `dsquery.exe` is not moved or renamed.\\\nThe search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process \"dsquery.exe\" and its parent process.\\\nDSQuery.exe is natively found in `C:\\Windows\\system32` and `C:\\Windows\\syswow64` and only on Server operating system.\\\nThe following DLL(s) are loaded when DSQuery.exe is launched `dsquery.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible dsquery is running within that process context in memory.\\\nIn addition to trust discovery, review parallel processes for additional behaviors performed. Identify the parent process and capture any files (batch files, for example) being used.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=dsquery.exe Processes.process=*trustedDomain* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dsquery_domain_discovery_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives. If there is a true false positive, filter based on command-line or parent process.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1482/T1482.md", "http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/a-guide-to-attacking-domain-trusts/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc732952(v=ws.11)", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc754232(v=ws.11)"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Domain Trust Discovery", "Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified performing domain discovery on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1482"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Domain Trust Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "dsquery_domain_discovery_filter"}]}]}, {"author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2021-02-11", "description": "Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.", "id": "2cdf33a0-4805-4b61-b025-59c20f418fbe", "name": "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity", "narrative": " Adversaries may abuse Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET Component Object Model (COM) assemblies. Both are digitally signed by Microsoft. The following queries assist with detecting suspicious and malicious usage of Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe. Upon reviewing usage of Regasm.exe Regsvcs.exe, review file modification events for possible script code written. Review parallel process events for csc.exe being utilized to compile script code.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", "https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master/documentation/modules/evasion/windows/applocker_evasion_regasm_regsvcs.md", "https://oddvar.moe/2017/12/13/applocker-case-study-how-insecure-is-it-really-part-1/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218.009", "T1218"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Regsvcs/Regasm", "Signed Binary Proxy Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "version": 1, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection", "id": "e3e7a1c0-f2b9-445c-8493-f30a63522d1a", "version": 1, "date": "2021-02-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifies Regsvcs.exe with a network connection to a public IP address, exluding private IP space. This particular technique has been used in the wild to bypass application control products. Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe are signed by Microsoft. By contacting a remote command and control server, the adversary will have the ability to escalate privileges and complete the objectives. During investigation, identify and retrieve the content being loaded. Review parallel processes for additional suspicious behavior. Gather any other file modifications and review accordingly. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain and block as needed. regsvcs.exe and regasm.exe are natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe.", "search": "`sysmon` EventID=3 dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/12 dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16 process_name=regsvcs.exe | rename Computer as dest | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, User, process_name, src_ip, dest_host, dest_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, limited instances of regsvcs.exe may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvcs/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $process_name$ contacting a remote destination was identified on endpoint $Computer$ by user $user$. This behavior is not normal for $process_name$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.009"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventID", "dest_ip", "process_name", "Computer", "User", "src_ip", "dest_host"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "Endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Regsvcs/Regasm"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Regasm Spawning a Process", "id": "72170ec5-f7d2-42f5-aefb-2b8be6aad15f", "version": 1, "date": "2021-02-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies regasm.exe spawning a process. This particular technique has been used in the wild to bypass application control products. Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe are signed by Microsoft. Spawning of a child process is rare from either process and should be investigated further. During investigation, identify and retrieve the content being loaded. Review parallel processes for additional suspicious behavior. Gather any other file modifications and review accordingly. regsvcs.exe and regasm.exe are natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=regasm.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regasm_spawning_a_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, limited instances of regasm.exe or regsvcs.exe may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvcs/", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regasm/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ spawning a child process, typically not normal behavior for $parent_process_name$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.009"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Regsvcs/Regasm"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_regasm_spawning_a_process_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Regasm with Network Connection", "id": "07921114-6db4-4e2e-ae58-3ea8a52ae93f", "version": 1, "date": "2021-02-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifies regasm.exe with a network connection to a public IP address, exluding private IP space. This particular technique has been used in the wild to bypass application control products. Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe are signed by Microsoft. By contacting a remote command and control server, the adversary will have the ability to escalate privileges and complete the objectives. During investigation, identify and retrieve the content being loaded. Review parallel processes for additional suspicious behavior. Gather any other file modifications and review accordingly. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain and block as needed. regsvcs.exe and regasm.exe are natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe.", "search": "`sysmon` EventID=3 dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/12 dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16 process_name=regasm.exe | rename Computer as dest | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, User, process_name, src_ip, dest_host, dest_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regasm_with_network_connection_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, limited instances of regasm.exe with a network connection may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regasm/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $process_name$ contacting a remote destination was identified on endpoint $Computer$ by user $user$. This behavior is not normal for $process_name$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.009"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventID", "dest_ip", "process_name", "Computer", "User", "src_ip", "dest_host", "dest_ip"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Regsvcs/Regasm"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_regasm_with_network_connection_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments", "id": "c3bc1430-04e7-4178-835f-047d8e6e97df", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-20", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies regasm.exe with no command line arguments. This particular behavior occurs when another process injects into regasm.exe, no command line arguments will be present. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Regasm.exe are natively found in `C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe` and `C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe`.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regasm` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(regasm\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | `detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, limited instances of regasm.exe or may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regasm/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "The process $process_name$ was spawned by $parent_process_name$ without any command-line arguments on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.009"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Regsvcs/Regasm"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=regasm.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RegAsm.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_regasm"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process", "id": "bc477b57-5c21-4ab6-9c33-668772e7f114", "version": 1, "date": "2021-02-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies regsvcs.exe spawning a process. This particular technique has been used in the wild to bypass application control products. Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe are signed by Microsoft. Spawning of a child process is rare from either process and should be investigated further. During investigation, identify and retrieve the content being loaded. Review parallel processes for additional suspicious behavior. Gather any other file modifications and review accordingly. regsvcs.exe and regasm.exe are natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=regsvcs.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regsvcs_spawning_a_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, limited instances of regasm.exe or regsvcs.exe may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvcs/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ typically not normal for this process.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.009"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Regsvcs/Regasm"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_regsvcs_spawning_a_process_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments", "id": "6b74d578-a02e-4e94-a0d1-39440d0bf254", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-20", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies regsvcs.exe with no command line arguments. This particular behavior occurs when another process injects into regsvcs.exe, no command line arguments will be present. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Regasm.exe are natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvcs` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(regsvcs\\.exe.{0,4}$)\"| `detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, limited instances of regsvcs.exe may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvcs/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "The process $process_name$ was spawned by $parent_process_name$ without any command-line arguments on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.009"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Regsvcs/Regasm"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvcs.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RegSvcs.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_regsvcs"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "id": "56e24a28-5003-4047-b2db-e8f3c4618064", "version": 1, "date": "2018-05-31", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "description": "Detect tactics used by malware to evade defenses on Windows endpoints. A few of these include suspicious `reg.exe` processes, files hidden with `attrib.exe` and disabling user-account control, among many others ", "narrative": "Defense evasion is a tactic--identified in the MITRE ATT&CK framework--that adversaries employ in a variety of ways to bypass or defeat defensive security measures. There are many techniques enumerated by the MITRE ATT&CK framework that are applicable in this context. This Analytic Story includes searches designed to identify the use of such techniques on Windows platforms.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Defense_Evasion"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1027.004", "T1562", "T1548", "T1548.002", "T1036", "T1222.001", "T1562.004", "T1222", "T1112", "T1027", "T1562.001", "T1564", "T1564.001"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification", "File and Directory Permissions Modification", "Modify Registry", "Obfuscated Files or Information", "Disable or Modify System Firewall", "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "Hide Artifacts", "Disable or Modify Tools", "Hidden Files and Directories", "Impair Defenses", "Masquerading", "Compile After Delivery", "Bypass User Access Control"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390", "Sandworm Team", "Putter Panda", "Inception", "Magic Hound", "Tropic Trooper", "Kimsuky", "Dark Caracal", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT29", "FIN8", "Turla", "Leviathan", "Molerats", "Gamaredon Group", "Rocke", "Group5", "Carbanak", "Mofang", "TA505", "Whitefly", "Frankenstein", "Cobalt Group", "Silence", "APT32", "Soft Cell", "APT19", "APT37", "APT-C-36", "Darkhotel", "APT41", "menuPass", "Blue Mockingbird", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Honeybee", "BlackOasis", "APT3", "Wizard Spider", "Machete", "Leafminer", "APT18", "no", "APT38", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork", "Elderwood", "Dust Storm", "APT28", "Gallmaker", "APT33", "Gorgon Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Windshift", "FIN7", "Night Dragon"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Disable Registry Tool", "id": "cd2cf33c-9201-11eb-a10a-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-31", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search identifies modification of registry to disable the regedit or registry tools of the windows operating system. Since registry tool is a swiss knife in analyzing registry, malware such as RAT or trojan Spy disable this application to prevent the removal of their registry entry such as persistence, file less components and defense evasion.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System\\\\DisableRegistryTools\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_registry_tool_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "admin may disable this application for non technical user.", "references": ["https://any.run/report/ea4ea08407d4ee72e009103a3b77e5a09412b722fdef67315ea63f22011152af/a866d7b1-c236-4f26-a391-5ae32213dfc4#registry"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Disabled Registry Tools on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.user", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 40, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disable_registry_tool_filter"}]}, {"name": "SilentCleanup UAC Bypass", "id": "56d7cfcc-da63-11eb-92d4-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-01", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry that may related to UAC bypassed. This registry will be trigger once the attacker abuse the silentcleanup task schedule to gain high privilege execution that will bypass User control account.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Environment\\\\windir\" Registry.registry_value_name = \"*.exe*\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `silentcleanup_uac_bypass_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME", "https://www.intezer.com/blog/malware-analysis/klingon-rat-holding-on-for-dear-life/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence,", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Incoming"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious modification of registry $registry_path$ with possible payload path $registry_value_name$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.dest"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Bypass User Access Control", "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "MuddyWater", "Honeybee", "Cobalt Group", "Threat Group-3390", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Patchwork", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "silentcleanup_uac_bypass_filter"}]}, {"name": "Disabling CMD Application", "id": "ff86077c-9212-11eb-a1e6-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-31", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this search is to identify modification in registry to disable cmd prompt application. This technique is commonly seen in RAT, Trojan or WORM to prevent triaging or deleting there samples through cmd application which is one of the tool of analyst to traverse on directory and files.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\System\\\\DisableCMD\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_cmd_application_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "admin may disable this application for non technical user.", "references": ["https://any.run/report/ea4ea08407d4ee72e009103a3b77e5a09412b722fdef67315ea63f22011152af/a866d7b1-c236-4f26-a391-5ae32213dfc4#registry"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The Windows command prompt was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.user", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disabling_cmd_application_filter"}]}, {"name": "Disabling SystemRestore In Registry", "id": "f4f837e2-91fb-11eb-8bf6-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-31", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following search identifies the modification of registry related in disabling the system restore of a machine. This event or behavior are seen in some RAT malware to make the restore of the infected machine difficult and keep their infection on the box.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\SystemRestore\\\\DisableSR\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\SystemRestore\\\\DisableConfig\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_systemrestore_in_registry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "in some cases admin can disable systemrestore on a machine.", "references": ["https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The Windows registry was modified to disable system restore on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.user", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disabling_systemrestore_in_registry_filter"}]}, {"name": "FodHelper UAC Bypass", "id": "909f8fd8-7ac8-11eb-a1f3-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-01", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Fodhelper.exe has a known UAC bypass as it attempts to look for specific registry keys upon execution, that do not exist. Therefore, an attacker can write its malicious commands in these registry keys to be executed by fodhelper.exe with the highest privilege. \\\n1. `HKCU:\\Software\\Classes\\ms-settings\\shell\\open\\command`\\\n1. `HKCU:\\Software\\Classes\\ms-settings\\shell\\open\\command\\DelegateExecute`\\\n1. `HKCU:\\Software\\Classes\\ms-settings\\shell\\open\\command\\(default)`\\\nUpon triage, fodhelper.exe will have a child process and read access will occur on the registry keys. Isolate the endpoint and review parallel processes for additional behavior.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=fodhelper.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `fodhelper_uac_bypass_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Limited to no false positives are expected.", "references": ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.md", "https://github.com/gushmazuko/WinBypass/blob/master/FodhelperBypass.ps1", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "IcedID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "message": "Suspcious registy keys added by process fodhelper.exe (process_id- $process_id), with a parent_process of $parent_process_name$ that has been executed on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1112", "T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process Name", "role": ["Parent Process", "Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Modify Registry", "Bypass User Access Control", "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Turla", "APT32", "APT38", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "Threat Group-3390", "Honeybee", "Patchwork", "Gorgon Group", "FIN8", "APT37", "MuddyWater", "Honeybee", "Cobalt Group", "Threat Group-3390", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Patchwork", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "fodhelper_uac_bypass_filter"}]}, {"name": "System Process Running from Unexpected Location", "id": "28179107-099a-464a-94d3-08301e6c055f", "version": 3, "date": "2020-08-25", "author": "Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "An attacker tries might try to use different version of a system command without overriding original, or they might try to avoid some detection running the process from a different folder. This detection checks that a list of system processes run inside C:\\\\Windows\\System32 or C:\\\\Windows\\SysWOW64 The list of system processes has been extracted from https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/is_windows_system_file.csv and the original detection https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml", "search": " $ssa_input = | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval device=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null), user=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null)), process_path=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_path\"), \"string\", null)), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null);\n$cond_1 = | from $ssa_input | where process_name=\"arp.exe\" OR process_name=\"adaptertroubleshooter.exe\" OR process_name=\"applicationframehost.exe\" OR process_name=\"atbroker.exe\" OR process_name=\"authhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"autoworkplace.exe\" OR process_name=\"axinstui.exe\" OR process_name=\"backgroundtransferhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"bdehdcfg.exe\" OR process_name=\"bdeuisrv.exe\" OR process_name=\"bdeunlockwizard.exe\" OR process_name=\"bitlockerdeviceencryption.exe\" OR process_name=\"bitlockerwizard.exe\" OR process_name=\"bitlockerwizardelev.exe\" OR process_name=\"bytecodegenerator.exe\" OR process_name=\"camerasettingsuihost.exe\" OR process_name=\"castsrv.exe\" OR process_name=\"certenrollctrl.exe\" OR process_name=\"checknetisolation.exe\" OR process_name=\"clipup.exe\" OR process_name=\"cloudexperiencehostbroker.exe\" OR process_name=\"cloudnotifications.exe\" OR process_name=\"cloudstoragewizard.exe\" OR process_name=\"compmgmtlauncher.exe\" OR process_name=\"compattelrunner.exe\" OR process_name=\"computerdefaults.exe\" OR process_name=\"credentialuibroker.exe\" OR process_name=\"dfdwiz.exe\" OR process_name=\"dwwin.exe\" OR process_name=\"dataexchangehost.exe\" OR process_name=\"defrag.exe\" OR process_name=\"devicedisplayobjectprovider.exe\" OR process_name=\"deviceeject.exe\" OR process_name=\"deviceenroller.exe\" OR process_name=\"devicepairingwizard.exe\" OR process_name=\"deviceproperties.exe\" OR process_name=\"disksnapshot.exe\" OR process_name=\"dism.exe\" OR process_name=\"displayswitch.exe\" OR process_name=\"dmnotificationbroker.exe\" OR process_name=\"dmomacpmo.exe\" OR process_name=\"dpiscaling.exe\" OR process_name=\"dsmusertask.exe\" OR process_name=\"dxpserver.exe\" OR process_name=\"edpcleanup.exe\" OR process_name=\"eosnotify.exe\" OR process_name=\"eap3host.exe\" OR process_name=\"easpoliciesbrokerhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"easeofaccessdialog.exe\" OR process_name=\"ehstorauthn.exe\" OR process_name=\"fxscover.exe\" OR process_name=\"fxssvc.exe\" OR process_name=\"fxsunatd.exe\" OR process_name=\"filehistory.exe\" OR process_name=\"fondue.exe\" OR process_name=\"gamepanel.exe\" OR process_name=\"genvalobj.exe\" OR process_name=\"gettingstarted.exe\" OR process_name=\"hostname.exe\" OR process_name=\"icsentitlementhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"infdefaultinstall.exe\" OR process_name=\"installagent.exe\" OR process_name=\"languagecomponentsinstallercomhandler.exe\" OR process_name=\"launchtm.exe\" OR process_name=\"launchwinapp.exe\" OR process_name=\"legacynetuxhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"licensemanagershellext.exe\" OR process_name=\"licensingui.exe\" OR process_name=\"locationnotificationwindows.exe\" OR process_name=\"locationnotifications.exe\" OR process_name=\"locator.exe\" OR process_name=\"lockapphost.exe\" OR process_name=\"lockscreencontentserver.exe\" OR process_name=\"logonui.exe\" OR process_name=\"lsaiso.exe\" OR process_name=\"mdeserver.exe\" OR process_name=\"mdmagent.exe\" OR process_name=\"mdmappinstaller.exe\" OR process_name=\"mrinfo.exe\" OR process_name=\"mrt.exe\" OR process_name=\"mschedexe.exe\" OR process_name=\"magnify.exe\" OR process_name=\"mbaeparsertask.exe\" OR process_name=\"mdres.exe\" OR process_name=\"mdsched.exe\" OR process_name=\"migautoplay.exe\" OR process_name=\"mpsigstub.exe\" OR process_name=\"msspellcheckinghost.exe\" OR process_name=\"muiunattend.exe\" OR process_name=\"multidigimon.exe\" OR process_name=\"musnotification.exe\" OR process_name=\"musnotificationux.exe\" OR process_name=\"napstat.exe\" OR process_name=\"netstat.exe\" OR process_name=\"narrator.exe\" OR process_name=\"netcfgnotifyobjecthost.exe\" OR process_name=\"netevtfwdr.exe\" OR process_name=\"netproj.exe\" OR process_name=\"netplwiz.exe\" OR process_name=\"networkuxbroker.exe\";\n$cond_2 = | from $ssa_input | where process_name=\"openwith.exe\" OR process_name=\"optionalfeatures.exe\" OR process_name=\"pathping.exe\" OR process_name=\"ping.exe\" OR process_name=\"passwordonwakesettingflyout.exe\" OR process_name=\"pickerhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"pkgmgr.exe\" OR process_name=\"pnpunattend.exe\" OR process_name=\"pnputil.exe\" OR process_name=\"presentationhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"presentationsettings.exe\" OR process_name=\"printbrmui.exe\" OR process_name=\"printdialoghost.exe\" OR process_name=\"printdialoghost3d.exe\" OR process_name=\"printisolationhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"proximityuxhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"rdspnf.exe\" OR process_name=\"rmactivate.exe\" OR process_name=\"rmactivate_isv.exe\" OR process_name=\"rmactivate_ssp.exe\" OR process_name=\"rmactivate_ssp_isv.exe\" OR process_name=\"route.exe\" OR process_name=\"rdpsa.exe\" OR process_name=\"rdpsaproxy.exe\" OR process_name=\"rdpsauachelper.exe\" OR process_name=\"reagentc.exe\" OR process_name=\"recoverydrive.exe\" OR process_name=\"register-cimprovider.exe\" OR process_name=\"registeriepkeys.exe\" OR process_name=\"relpost.exe\" OR process_name=\"remoteposworker.exe\" OR process_name=\"rmclient.exe\" OR process_name=\"robocopy.exe\" OR process_name=\"rpcping.exe\" OR process_name=\"runlegacycplelevated.exe\" OR process_name=\"runtimebroker.exe\" OR process_name=\"sihclient.exe\" OR process_name=\"searchfilterhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"searchindexer.exe\" OR process_name=\"searchprotocolhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"secedit.exe\" OR process_name=\"sensordataservice.exe\" OR process_name=\"setieinstalleddate.exe\" OR process_name=\"settingsynchost.exe\" OR process_name=\"slidetoshutdown.exe\" OR process_name=\"smartscreensettings.exe\" OR process_name=\"sndvol.exe\" OR process_name=\"snippingtool.exe\" OR process_name=\"soundrecorder.exe\" OR process_name=\"spaceagent.exe\" OR process_name=\"sppextcomobj.exe\" OR process_name=\"srtasks.exe\" OR process_name=\"stikynot.exe\" OR process_name=\"synchost.exe\" OR process_name=\"sysreseterr.exe\" OR process_name=\"systempropertiesadvanced.exe\" OR process_name=\"systempropertiescomputername.exe\" OR process_name=\"systempropertiesdataexecutionprevention.exe\" OR process_name=\"systempropertieshardware.exe\" OR process_name=\"systempropertiesperformance.exe\" OR process_name=\"systempropertiesprotection.exe\" OR process_name=\"systempropertiesremote.exe\" OR process_name=\"systemsettingsadminflows.exe\" OR process_name=\"systemsettingsbroker.exe\" OR process_name=\"systemsettingsremovedevice.exe\" OR process_name=\"tcpsvcs.exe\" OR process_name=\"tracert.exe\" OR process_name=\"tstheme.exe\" OR process_name=\"tswbprxy.exe\" OR process_name=\"tapiunattend.exe\" OR process_name=\"taskmgr.exe\" OR process_name=\"thumbnailextractionhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"tokenbrokercookies.exe\" OR process_name=\"tpminit.exe\" OR process_name=\"tswpfwrp.exe\" OR process_name=\"ui0detect.exe\" OR process_name=\"upgraderesultsui.exe\" OR process_name=\"useraccountbroker.exe\" OR process_name=\"useraccountcontrolsettings.exe\" OR process_name=\"usoclient.exe\" OR process_name=\"utilman.exe\" OR process_name=\"vssvc.exe\" OR process_name=\"vaultcmd.exe\" OR process_name=\"vaultsysui.exe\" OR process_name=\"wfs.exe\" OR process_name=\"wmpdmc.exe\" OR process_name=\"wpdshextautoplay.exe\" OR process_name=\"wscollect.exe\" OR process_name=\"wsmanhttpconfig.exe\" OR process_name=\"wsreset.exe\" OR process_name=\"wudfhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"wwahost.exe\" OR process_name=\"wallpaperhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"webcache.exe\" OR process_name=\"werfault.exe\" OR process_name=\"werfaultsecure.exe\" OR process_name=\"winsat.exe\" OR process_name=\"windows.media.backgroundplayback.exe\" OR process_name=\"windowsactiondialog.exe\" OR process_name=\"windowsanytimeupgrade.exe\" OR process_name=\"windowsanytimeupgraderesults.exe\";\n$cond_3 = | from $ssa_input | where process_name=\"windowsanytimeupgradeui.exe\" OR process_name=\"windowsupdateelevatedinstaller.exe\" OR process_name=\"workfolders.exe\" OR process_name=\"wpcmon.exe\" OR process_name=\"acu.exe\" OR process_name=\"aitagent.exe\" OR process_name=\"aitstatic.exe\" OR process_name=\"alg.exe\" OR process_name=\"appidcertstorecheck.exe\" OR process_name=\"appidpolicyconverter.exe\" OR process_name=\"at.exe\" OR process_name=\"attrib.exe\" OR process_name=\"audiodg.exe\" OR process_name=\"auditpol.exe\" OR process_name=\"autochk.exe\" OR process_name=\"autoconv.exe\" OR process_name=\"autofmt.exe\" OR process_name=\"baaupdate.exe\" OR process_name=\"backgroundtaskhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"bcastdvr.exe\" OR process_name=\"bcdboot.exe\" OR process_name=\"bcdedit.exe\" OR process_name=\"bdechangepin.exe\" OR process_name=\"bdeunlock.exe\" OR process_name=\"bitsadmin.exe\" OR process_name=\"bootcfg.exe\" OR process_name=\"bootim.exe\" OR process_name=\"bootsect.exe\" OR process_name=\"bridgeunattend.exe\" OR process_name=\"browser_broker.exe\" OR process_name=\"bthudtask.exe\" OR process_name=\"cacls.exe\" OR process_name=\"calc.exe\" OR process_name=\"cdpreference.exe\" OR process_name=\"certreq.exe\" OR process_name=\"certutil.exe\" OR process_name=\"change.exe\" OR process_name=\"changepk.exe\" OR process_name=\"charmap.exe\" OR process_name=\"chglogon.exe\" OR process_name=\"chgport.exe\" OR process_name=\"chgusr.exe\" OR process_name=\"chkdsk.exe\" OR process_name=\"chkntfs.exe\" OR process_name=\"choice.exe\" OR process_name=\"cipher.exe\" OR process_name=\"cleanmgr.exe\" OR process_name=\"cliconfg.exe\" OR process_name=\"clip.exe\" OR process_name=\"cmd.exe\" OR process_name=\"cmdkey.exe\" OR process_name=\"cmdl32.exe\" OR process_name=\"cmmon32.exe\" OR process_name=\"cmstp.exe\" OR process_name=\"cofire.exe\" OR process_name=\"colorcpl.exe\" OR process_name=\"comp.exe\" OR process_name=\"compact.exe\" OR process_name=\"conhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"consent.exe\" OR process_name=\"control.exe\" OR process_name=\"convert.exe\" OR process_name=\"credwiz.exe\" OR process_name=\"cscript.exe\" OR process_name=\"csrss.exe\" OR process_name=\"ctfmon.exe\" OR process_name=\"cttune.exe\" OR process_name=\"cttunesvr.exe\" OR process_name=\"dashost.exe\" OR process_name=\"dccw.exe\" OR process_name=\"dcomcnfg.exe\" OR process_name=\"ddodiag.exe\" OR process_name=\"dfrgui.exe\" OR process_name=\"dialer.exe\" OR process_name=\"diantz.exe\" OR process_name=\"dinotify.exe\" OR process_name=\"diskpart.exe\" OR process_name=\"diskperf.exe\" OR process_name=\"diskraid.exe\" OR process_name=\"dispdiag.exe\" OR process_name=\"djoin.exe\" OR process_name=\"dllhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"dllhst3g.exe\" OR process_name=\"dmcertinst.exe\" OR process_name=\"dmcfghost.exe\" OR process_name=\"dmclient.exe\" OR process_name=\"dnscacheugc.exe\" OR process_name=\"doskey.exe\" OR process_name=\"dpapimig.exe\" OR process_name=\"dpnsvr.exe\" OR process_name=\"driverquery.exe\" OR process_name=\"drvcfg.exe\" OR process_name=\"drvinst.exe\" OR process_name=\"dsregcmd.exe\" OR process_name=\"dstokenclean.exe\" OR process_name=\"dvdplay.exe\" OR process_name=\"dvdupgrd.exe\" OR process_name=\"dwm.exe\" OR process_name=\"dxdiag.exe\" OR process_name=\"easinvoker.exe\" OR process_name=\"efsui.exe\";\n$cond_4 = | from $ssa_input | where process_name=\"embeddedapplauncher.exe\" OR process_name=\"esentutl.exe\" OR process_name=\"eudcedit.exe\" OR process_name=\"eventcreate.exe\" OR process_name=\"eventvwr.exe\" OR process_name=\"expand.exe\" OR process_name=\"extrac32.exe\" OR process_name=\"fc.exe\" OR process_name=\"fhmanagew.exe\" OR process_name=\"find.exe\" OR process_name=\"findstr.exe\" OR process_name=\"finger.exe\" OR process_name=\"fixmapi.exe\" OR process_name=\"fltmc.exe\" OR process_name=\"fodhelper.exe\" OR process_name=\"fontdrvhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"fontview.exe\" OR process_name=\"forfiles.exe\" OR process_name=\"fsavailux.exe\" OR process_name=\"fsquirt.exe\" OR process_name=\"fsutil.exe\" OR process_name=\"ftp.exe\" OR process_name=\"fvenotify.exe\" OR process_name=\"fveprompt.exe\" OR process_name=\"getmac.exe\" OR process_name=\"gpresult.exe\" OR process_name=\"gpscript.exe\" OR process_name=\"gpupdate.exe\" OR process_name=\"grpconv.exe\" OR process_name=\"hdwwiz.exe\" OR process_name=\"help.exe\" OR process_name=\"hwrcomp.exe\" OR process_name=\"hwrreg.exe\" OR process_name=\"icacls.exe\" OR process_name=\"icardagt.exe\" OR process_name=\"icsunattend.exe\" OR process_name=\"ie4uinit.exe\" OR process_name=\"ieunatt.exe\" OR process_name=\"ieetwcollector.exe\" OR process_name=\"iexpress.exe\" OR process_name=\"immersivetpmvscmgrsvr.exe\" OR process_name=\"ipconfig.exe\" OR process_name=\"irftp.exe\" OR process_name=\"iscsicli.exe\" OR process_name=\"iscsicpl.exe\" OR process_name=\"isoburn.exe\" OR process_name=\"klist.exe\" OR process_name=\"ksetup.exe\" OR process_name=\"ktmutil.exe\" OR process_name=\"label.exe\" OR process_name=\"licensingdiag.exe\" OR process_name=\"lodctr.exe\" OR process_name=\"logagent.exe\" OR process_name=\"logman.exe\" OR process_name=\"logoff.exe\" OR process_name=\"lpkinstall.exe\" OR process_name=\"lpksetup.exe\" OR process_name=\"lpremove.exe\" OR process_name=\"lsass.exe\" OR process_name=\"lsm.exe\" OR process_name=\"makecab.exe\" OR process_name=\"manage-bde.exe\" OR process_name=\"mblctr.exe\" OR process_name=\"mcbuilder.exe\" OR process_name=\"mctadmin.exe\" OR process_name=\"mfpmp.exe\" OR process_name=\"mmc.exe\" OR process_name=\"mobsync.exe\" OR process_name=\"mountvol.exe\" OR process_name=\"mpnotify.exe\" OR process_name=\"msconfig.exe\" OR process_name=\"msdt.exe\" OR process_name=\"msdtc.exe\" OR process_name=\"msfeedssync.exe\" OR process_name=\"msg.exe\" OR process_name=\"mshta.exe\" OR process_name=\"msiexec.exe\" OR process_name=\"msinfo32.exe\" OR process_name=\"mspaint.exe\" OR process_name=\"msra.exe\" OR process_name=\"mstsc.exe\" OR process_name=\"mtstocom.exe\" OR process_name=\"nbtstat.exe\" OR process_name=\"ndadmin.exe\" OR process_name=\"net.exe\" OR process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR process_name=\"netbtugc.exe\" OR process_name=\"netcfg.exe\" OR process_name=\"netiougc.exe\" OR process_name=\"netsh.exe\" OR process_name=\"newdev.exe\" OR process_name=\"nltest.exe\" OR process_name=\"notepad.exe\" OR process_name=\"nslookup.exe\" OR process_name=\"ntoskrnl.exe\" OR process_name=\"ntprint.exe\" OR process_name=\"ocsetup.exe\" OR process_name=\"odbcad32.exe\" OR process_name=\"odbcconf.exe\" OR process_name=\"omadmclient.exe\" OR process_name=\"omadmprc.exe\";\n$cond_5 = | from $ssa_input | where process_name=\"openfiles.exe\" OR process_name=\"osk.exe\" OR process_name=\"p2phost.exe\" OR process_name=\"pcalua.exe\" OR process_name=\"pcaui.exe\" OR process_name=\"pcawrk.exe\" OR process_name=\"pcwrun.exe\" OR process_name=\"perfmon.exe\" OR process_name=\"phoneactivate.exe\" OR process_name=\"plasrv.exe\" OR process_name=\"poqexec.exe\" OR process_name=\"powercfg.exe\" OR process_name=\"prevhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"print.exe\" OR process_name=\"printfilterpipelinesvc.exe\" OR process_name=\"printui.exe\" OR process_name=\"proquota.exe\" OR process_name=\"provtool.exe\" OR process_name=\"psr.exe\" OR process_name=\"pwlauncher.exe\" OR process_name=\"qappsrv.exe\" OR process_name=\"qprocess.exe\" OR process_name=\"query.exe\" OR process_name=\"quser.exe\" OR process_name=\"qwinsta.exe\" OR process_name=\"rasautou.exe\" OR process_name=\"rasdial.exe\" OR process_name=\"raserver.exe\" OR process_name=\"rasphone.exe\" OR process_name=\"rdpclip.exe\" OR process_name=\"rdpinput.exe\" OR process_name=\"rdrleakdiag.exe\" OR process_name=\"recdisc.exe\" OR process_name=\"recover.exe\" OR process_name=\"reg.exe\" OR process_name=\"regedt32.exe\" OR process_name=\"regini.exe\" OR process_name=\"regsvr32.exe\" OR process_name=\"rekeywiz.exe\" OR process_name=\"relog.exe\" OR process_name=\"repair-bde.exe\" OR process_name=\"replace.exe\" OR process_name=\"reset.exe\" OR process_name=\"resmon.exe\" OR process_name=\"rmttpmvscmgrsvr.exe\" OR process_name=\"rrinstaller.exe\" OR process_name=\"rstrui.exe\" OR process_name=\"runas.exe\" OR process_name=\"rundll32.exe\" OR process_name=\"runonce.exe\" OR process_name=\"rwinsta.exe\" OR process_name=\"sbunattend.exe\" OR process_name=\"sc.exe\" OR process_name=\"schtasks.exe\" OR process_name=\"sdbinst.exe\" OR process_name=\"sdchange.exe\" OR process_name=\"sdclt.exe\" OR process_name=\"sdiagnhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"secinit.exe\" OR process_name=\"services.exe\" OR process_name=\"sessionmsg.exe\" OR process_name=\"sethc.exe\" OR process_name=\"setspn.exe\" OR process_name=\"setupcl.exe\" OR process_name=\"setupugc.exe\" OR process_name=\"setx.exe\" OR process_name=\"sfc.exe\" OR process_name=\"shadow.exe\" OR process_name=\"shrpubw.exe\" OR process_name=\"shutdown.exe\" OR process_name=\"sigverif.exe\" OR process_name=\"sihost.exe\" OR process_name=\"slui.exe\" OR process_name=\"smss.exe\" OR process_name=\"snmptrap.exe\" OR process_name=\"sort.exe\" OR process_name=\"spinstall.exe\" OR process_name=\"spoolsv.exe\" OR process_name=\"sppsvc.exe\" OR process_name=\"spreview.exe\" OR process_name=\"srdelayed.exe\" OR process_name=\"subst.exe\" OR process_name=\"svchost.exe\" OR process_name=\"sxstrace.exe\" OR process_name=\"syskey.exe\" OR process_name=\"systeminfo.exe\" OR process_name=\"systemreset.exe\" OR process_name=\"systray.exe\" OR process_name=\"tabcal.exe\" OR process_name=\"takeown.exe\" OR process_name=\"taskeng.exe\" OR process_name=\"taskhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"taskhostw.exe\" OR process_name=\"taskkill.exe\" OR process_name=\"tasklist.exe\" OR process_name=\"taskmgr.exe\" OR process_name=\"tcmsetup.exe\" OR process_name=\"timeout.exe\" OR process_name=\"tpmvscmgr.exe\" OR process_name=\"tpmvscmgrsvr.exe\";\n$cond_6 = | from $ssa_input | where process_name=\"tracerpt.exe\" OR process_name=\"tscon.exe\" OR process_name=\"tsdiscon.exe\" OR process_name=\"tskill.exe\" OR process_name=\"typeperf.exe\" OR process_name=\"tzsync.exe\" OR process_name=\"tzutil.exe\" OR process_name=\"ucsvc.exe\" OR process_name=\"unlodctr.exe\" OR process_name=\"unregmp2.exe\" OR process_name=\"upnpcont.exe\" OR process_name=\"userinit.exe\" OR process_name=\"vds.exe\" OR process_name=\"vdsldr.exe\" OR process_name=\"verclsid.exe\" OR process_name=\"verifier.exe\" OR process_name=\"verifiergui.exe\" OR process_name=\"vmicsvc.exe\" OR process_name=\"vssadmin.exe\" OR process_name=\"w32tm.exe\" OR process_name=\"waitfor.exe\" OR process_name=\"wbadmin.exe\" OR process_name=\"wbengine.exe\" OR process_name=\"wecutil.exe\" OR process_name=\"wermgr.exe\" OR process_name=\"wevtutil.exe\" OR process_name=\"wextract.exe\" OR process_name=\"where.exe\" OR process_name=\"whoami.exe\" OR process_name=\"wiaacmgr.exe\" OR process_name=\"wiawow64.exe\" OR process_name=\"wifitask.exe\" OR process_name=\"wimserv.exe\" OR process_name=\"wininit.exe\" OR process_name=\"winload.exe\" OR process_name=\"winlogon.exe\" OR process_name=\"winresume.exe\" OR process_name=\"winrs.exe\" OR process_name=\"winrshost.exe\" OR process_name=\"winver.exe\" OR process_name=\"wisptis.exe\" OR process_name=\"wkspbroker.exe\" OR process_name=\"wksprt.exe\" OR process_name=\"wlanext.exe\" OR process_name=\"wlrmdr.exe\" OR process_name=\"wowreg32.exe\" OR process_name=\"wpnpinst.exe\" OR process_name=\"wpr.exe\" OR process_name=\"write.exe\" OR process_name=\"wscript.exe\" OR process_name=\"wsmprovhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"wsqmcons.exe\" OR process_name=\"wuapihost.exe\" OR process_name=\"wuapp.exe\" OR process_name=\"wuauclt.exe\" OR process_name=\"wusa.exe\" OR process_name=\"xcopy.exe\" OR process_name=\"xpsrchvw.exe\" OR process_name=\"xwizard.exe\";\n| from $cond_1 | union $cond_2 | union $cond_3 | union $cond_4 | union $cond_5 | union $cond_6 | where match_regex(process_path, /(?i)\\\\windows\\\\system32/)=false AND match_regex(process_path, /(?i)\\\\windows\\\\syswow64/)=false | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(device, user), body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"process_path\", process_path, \"process_name\", process_name]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "Collect endpoint data such as sysmon or 4688 events.", "known_false_positives": "None", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036/system_process_running_unexpected_location/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A system process $process_name$ with commandline $cmd_line$ spawn in non-default folder path in host $dest_device_id$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1036"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["dest_device_id", "process_name", "_time", "dest_user_id", "process_path"], "risk_score": 56, "risk_severity": "low", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Masquerading"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Windshift", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "Dragonfly 2.0"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "system_process_running_from_unexpected_location_filter"}]}, {"name": "Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry", "id": "39ebdc68-25b9-11ec-aec7-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-05", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious registry modification to disable security audit logs. This technique was shared by a researcher to disable Security logs of windows by adding this registry. The Windows will think it is WinPE and will not log any event to the Security Log", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Control\\\\MiniNt\\\\*\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `disable_security_logs_using_minint_registry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown.", "references": ["https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1182516740955226112"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/minint_reg/sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1112"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_value_data"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Modify Registry"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Turla", "APT32", "APT38", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "Threat Group-3390", "Honeybee", "Patchwork", "Gorgon Group", "FIN8"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disable_security_logs_using_minint_registry_filter"}]}, {"name": "Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion", "id": "773b66fe-4dd9-11ec-8289-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-25", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic will detect a suspicious process commandline related to windows defender exclusion feature. This command is abused by adversaries, malware author and red teams to bypassed Windows Defender Anti-Virus product by excluding folder path, file path, process, extensions and etc. from its real time or schedule scan to execute their malicious code. This is a good indicator for defense evasion and to look further for events after this behavior.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process = \"*Add-MpPreference *\" OR Processes.process = \"*Set-MpPreference *\") AND Processes.process=\"*-exclusion*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to use this windows features.", "references": ["https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.html", "https://app.any.run/tasks/cf1245de-06a7-4366-8209-8e3006f2bfe5/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Remcos", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/defender_exclusion_sysmon/sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "exclusion command $process$ executed on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion_filter"}]}, {"name": "Disable Show Hidden Files", "id": "6f3ccfa2-91fe-11eb-8f9b-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-31", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic is to identify a modification in the Windows registry to prevent users from seeing all the files with hidden attributes. This event or techniques are known on some worm and trojan spy malware that will drop hidden files on the infected machine.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\Advanced\\\\Hidden\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\Advanced\\\\HideFileExt\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\") OR (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\Advanced\\\\ShowSuperHidden\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000000\") by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_show_hidden_files_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.sophos.com/en-us/threat-center/threat-analyses/viruses-and-spyware/W32~Tiotua-P/detailed-analysis.aspx"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Disabled 'Show Hidden Files' on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1564.001", "T1562.001", "T1564", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.user", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_value_nam"], "risk_score": 40, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Hidden Files and Directories", "Disable or Modify Tools", "Hide Artifacts", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Rocke", "APT32", "Tropic Trooper", "APT28", "Lazarus Group", "Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disable_show_hidden_files_filter"}]}, {"name": "Sdclt UAC Bypass", "id": "d71efbf6-da63-11eb-8c6e-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-01", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious sdclt.exe registry modification. This technique is commonly seen when attacker try to bypassed UAC by using sdclt.exe application by modifying some registry that sdclt.exe tries to open or query with payload file path on it to be executed.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\App Paths\\\\control.exe*\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\exefile\\\\shell\\\\runas\\\\command\\\\*\") (Registry.registry_value_name = \"(Default)\" OR Registry.registry_value_name = \"IsolatedCommand\") by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sdclt_uac_bypass_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Limited to no false positives are expected.", "references": ["https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/17/fileless-uac-bypass-using-sdclt-exe/", "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME", "https://www.cyborgsecurity.com/cyborg_labs/threat-hunt-deep-dives-user-account-control-bypass-via-registry-modification/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence,", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Incoming"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious modification of registry $registry_path$ with possible payload path $registry_value_name$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.dest"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Bypass User Access Control", "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "MuddyWater", "Honeybee", "Cobalt Group", "Threat Group-3390", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Patchwork", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "sdclt_uac_bypass_filter"}]}, {"name": "SLUI RunAs Elevated", "id": "8d124810-b3e4-11eb-96c7-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-13", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the Microsoft Software Licensing User Interface Tool, `slui.exe`, elevating access using the `-verb runas` function. This particular bypass utilizes a registry key/value. Identified by two sources, the registry keys are `HKCU\\Software\\Classes\\exefile\\shell` and `HKCU\\Software\\Classes\\launcher.Systemsettings\\Shell\\open\\command`. To simulate this behavior, multiple POC are available. The analytic identifies the use of `runas` by `slui.exe`.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=slui.exe (Processes.process=*-verb* Processes.process=*runas*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `slui_runas_elevated_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives should be present as this is not commonly used by legitimate applications.", "references": ["https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/46998", "https://medium.com/@mattharr0ey/privilege-escalation-uac-bypass-in-changepk-c40b92818d1b", "https://gist.github.com/r00t-3xp10it/0c92cd554d3156fd74f6c25660ccc466", "https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/windows/local/bypassuac_sluihijack/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Privilege Escalation"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/slui/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A slui process $process_name$ with elevated commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Bypass User Access Control", "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "MuddyWater", "Honeybee", "Cobalt Group", "Threat Group-3390", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Patchwork", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "slui_runas_elevated_filter"}]}, {"name": "Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry", "id": "23150a40-9301-4195-b802-5bb4f43067fb", "version": 2, "date": "2021-03-02", "author": "Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The search looks for the Registry Key DisableAntiSpyware set to disable. This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints. This particular behavior is typically executed when an ransomware actor gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. Endpoint should be isolated.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_value_name=\"DisableAntiSpyware\" AND Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000001\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_disableantispyware_registry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node.", "known_false_positives": "It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro to tune the search.", "references": ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "message": "Windows DisableAntiSpyware registry key set to 'disabled' on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_path"], "risk_score": 24, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "windows_disableantispyware_registry_filter"}]}, {"name": "CSC Net On The Fly Compilation", "id": "ea73128a-43ab-11ec-9753-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-12", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this analytic is to detect a suspicious compile before delivery approach of .net compiler csc.exe. This technique was seen in several adversaries, malware and even in red teams to take advantage the csc.exe .net compiler tool to compile on the fly a malicious .net code to evade detection from security product. This is a good hunting query to check further the file or process created after this event and check the file path that passed to csc.exe which is the .net code. Aside from that, powershell is capable of using this compiler in executing .net code in a powershell script so filter on that case is needed.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_csc` Processes.process = \"*/noconfig*\" Processes.process = \"*/fullpaths*\" Processes.process = \"*@*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `csc_net_on_the_fly_compilation_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated powershell script taht execute .net code that may generate false positive. filter is needed.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/ad4c3cda-41f2-4401-8dba-56cc2d245488/", "https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2019/06/maicious-macro-that-compile-c-code-as.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/vilsel/sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "csc.exe with commandline $process$ to compile .net code on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1027.004", "T1027"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Compile After Delivery", "Obfuscated Files or Information"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Rocke", "MuddyWater", "Gamaredon Group", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "Whitefly", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Mofang", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "Soft Cell", "Turla", "TA505", "Silence", "APT33", "Night Dragon", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "APT29", "APT18", "Tropic Trooper", "Cobalt Group", "Patchwork", "Leafminer", "APT37", "Threat Group-3390", "Honeybee", "Dark Caracal", "menuPass", "APT19", "BlackOasis", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "Elderwood", "MuddyWater", "FIN7", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "APT3", "APT32", "Group5", "Dust Storm", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=csc.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=csc.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_csc"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "csc_net_on_the_fly_compilation_filter"}]}, {"name": "UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll", "id": "7f04349c-e30d-11eb-bc7f-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-12", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious loaded unsigned dll by MMC.exe application. This technique is commonly seen in attacker that tries to bypassed UAC feature or gain privilege escalation. This is done by modifying some CLSID registry that will trigger the mmc.exe to load the dll path", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded = \"*.dll\" Image = \"*\\\\mmc.exe\" Signed=false Company != \"Microsoft Corporation\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded Signed ProcessId OriginalFileName Computer EventCode Company | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown. all of the dll loaded by mmc.exe is microsoft signed dll.", "references": ["https://offsec.almond.consulting/UAC-bypass-dotnet.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence,", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Incoming"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon2.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious unsigned $ImageLoaded$ loaded by $Image$ on endpoint $Computer$ with EventCode $EventCode$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Image", "ImageLoaded", "Signed", "ProcessId", "OriginalFileName", "Computer", "EventCode", "Company"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Bypass User Access Control", "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "MuddyWater", "Honeybee", "Cobalt Group", "Threat Group-3390", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Patchwork", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll_filter"}]}, {"name": "Disabling NoRun Windows App", "id": "de81bc46-9213-11eb-adc9-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-31", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to identify modification of registry to disable run application in window start menu. this application is known to be a helpful shortcut to windows OS user to run known application and also to execute some reg or batch script. This technique is used malware to make cleaning of its infection more harder by preventing known application run easily through run shortcut.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\Explorer\\\\NoRun\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_norun_windows_app_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "admin may disable this application for non technical user.", "references": ["https://any.run/report/ea4ea08407d4ee72e009103a3b77e5a09412b722fdef67315ea63f22011152af/a866d7b1-c236-4f26-a391-5ae32213dfc4#registry", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/pum-optional-norun/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The Windows registry was modified to disable run application in window start menu on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.user", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disabling_norun_windows_app_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Reg exe Process", "id": "a6b3ab4e-dd77-4213-95fa-fc94701995e0", "version": 4, "date": "2020-07-22", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for reg.exe being launched from a command prompt not started by the user. When a user launches cmd.exe, the parent process is usually explorer.exe. This search filters out those instances.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name != explorer.exe Processes.process_name =cmd.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=cmd.exe Processes.process_name= reg.exe by Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename parent_process_id as process_id |dedup process_id| table process_id dest] | `suspicious_reg_exe_process_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "It's possible for system administrators to write scripts that exhibit this behavior. If this is the case, the search will need to be modified to filter them out.", "references": ["https://car.mitre.org/wiki/CAR-2013-03-001"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Disabling Security Tools", "DHS Report TA18-074A"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Suspicious $Processes.process_path.file_path$ process running with an uncommon parent process $Processes.parent_process_name$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Processes.process_path.file_path", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Modify Registry"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Turla", "APT32", "APT38", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "Threat Group-3390", "Honeybee", "Patchwork", "Gorgon Group", "FIN8"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_reg_exe_process_filter"}]}, {"name": "Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection", "id": "664f0fd0-91ff-11eb-a56f-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-31", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following search identifies a modification of registry to disable the smartscreen protection of windows machine. This is windows feature provide an early warning system against website that might engage in phishing attack or malware distribution. This modification are seen in RAT malware to cover their tracks upon downloading other of its component or other payload.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\SmartScreenEnabled\" Registry.registry_value_name = \"Off\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_windows_smartscreen_protection_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to disable this windows features.", "references": ["https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The Windows Smartscreen was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.user", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_value_nam"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disable_windows_smartscreen_protection_filter"}]}, {"name": "Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe", "id": "c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6b5264g9f", "version": 4, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Attackers leverage an existing Windows binary, attrib.exe, to mark specific as hidden by using specific flags so that the victim does not see the file. The search looks for specific command-line arguments to detect the use of attrib.exe to hide files.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) values(Processes.process) as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=attrib.exe (Processes.process=*+h*) by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "Some applications and users may legitimately use attrib.exe to interact with the files. ", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1222.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Attrib.exe with +h flag to hide files on $dest$ executed by $user$ is detected.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1222", "T1222.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process", "type": "Other", "role": ["Attacker", "Parent Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.user", "Processes.dest"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["File and Directory Permissions Modification", "Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe_filter"}]}, {"name": "Eventvwr UAC Bypass", "id": "9cf8fe08-7ad8-11eb-9819-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-01", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following search identifies Eventvwr bypass by identifying the registry modification into a specific path that eventvwr.msc looks to (but is not valid) upon execution. A successful attack will include a suspicious command to be executed upon eventvwr.msc loading. Upon triage, review the parallel processes that have executed. Identify any additional registry modifications on the endpoint that may look suspicious. Remediate as necessary.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*mscfile\\\\shell\\\\open\\\\command\\\\*\" by Registry.user, Registry.dest , Registry.registry_value_name| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `eventvwr_uac_bypass_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node.", "known_false_positives": "Some false positives may be present and will need to be filtered.", "references": ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.md", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002", "https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "IcedID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "message": "Registry values were modified to bypass UAC using Event Viewer on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.user", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Bypass User Access Control", "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "MuddyWater", "Honeybee", "Cobalt Group", "Threat Group-3390", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Patchwork", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "eventvwr_uac_bypass_filter"}]}, {"name": "Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring", "id": "79439cae-9200-11eb-a4d3-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-31", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to identifies a modification in registry to disable the windows denfender real time behavior monitoring. This event or technique is commonly seen in RAT, bot, or Trojan to disable AV to evade detections.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableBehaviorMonitoring\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableOnAccessProtection\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableScanOnRealtimeEnable\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableRealtimeMonitoring\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableIOAVProtection\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableScriptScanning\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_windows_behavior_monitoring_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to disable this windows features.", "references": ["https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": [{"Source": "Endpoint"}, {"Stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Windows Defender real time behavior monitoring disabled on $dest", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.user", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 40, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disable_windows_behavior_monitoring_filter"}]}, {"name": "WSReset UAC Bypass", "id": "8b5901bc-da63-11eb-be43-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-01", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry related to UAC bypass. This technique is to modify the registry in this detection, create a registry value with the path of the payload and run WSreset.exe to bypass User account Control.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\AppX82a6gwre4fdg3bt635tn5ctqjf8msdd2\\\\Shell\\\\open\\\\command*\" (Registry.registry_value_name = \"(Default)\" OR Registry.registry_value_name = \"DelegateExecute\") by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wsreset_uac_bypass_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME", "https://blog.morphisec.com/trickbot-uses-a-new-windows-10-uac-bypass"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Incoming"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious modification of registry $registry_path$ with possible payload path $registry_value_name$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.dest"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Bypass User Access Control", "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "MuddyWater", "Honeybee", "Cobalt Group", "Threat Group-3390", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Patchwork", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "wsreset_uac_bypass_filter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry", "id": "13395a44-4dd9-11ec-9df7-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-25", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic will detect a suspicious process that modify a registry related to windows defender exclusion feature. This registry is abused by adversaries, malware author and red teams to bypassed Windows Defender Anti-Virus product by excluding folder path, file path, process, extensions and etc. from its real time or schedule scan to execute their malicious code. This is a good indicator for a defense evasion and to look further for events after this behavior.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Exclusions\\\\*\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to use this windows features.", "references": ["https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.html", "https://app.any.run/tasks/cf1245de-06a7-4366-8209-8e3006f2bfe5/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Remcos", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/defender_exclusion_sysmon/sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "exclusion registry $registry_path$ modified or added on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.user", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.registry_value_data"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry_filter"}]}, {"name": "Disabling Firewall with Netsh", "id": "6860a62c-9203-11eb-9e05-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-03-31", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to identifies suspicious firewall disabling using netsh application. this technique is commonly seen in malware that tries to communicate or download its component or other payload to its C2 server.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_netsh` Processes.process= \"*firewall*\" (Processes.process= \"*off*\" OR Processes.process= \"*disable*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_firewall_with_netsh_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "admin may disable firewall during testing or fixing network problem.", "references": ["https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.htm"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The Windows Firewall was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=netsh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=netsh.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_netsh"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disabling_firewall_with_netsh_filter"}]}, {"name": "NET Profiler UAC bypass", "id": "0252ca80-e30d-11eb-8aa3-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-12", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect modification of registry to bypass UAC windows feature. This technique is to add a payload dll path on .NET COR file path that will be loaded by mmc.exe as soon it was executed. This detection rely on monitoring the registry key and values in the detection area. It may happened that windows update some dll related to mmc.exe and add dll path in this registry. In this case filtering is needed.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Environment\\\\COR_PROFILER_PATH\" Registry.registry_value_name = \"*.dll\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `net_profiler_uac_bypass_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "limited false positive. It may trigger by some windows update that will modify this registry.", "references": ["https://offsec.almond.consulting/UAC-bypass-dotnet.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence,", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Incoming"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon2.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious modification of registry $registry_path$ with possible payload path $registry_value_name$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.dest"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Bypass User Access Control", "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "MuddyWater", "Honeybee", "Cobalt Group", "Threat Group-3390", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Patchwork", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "net_profiler_uac_bypass_filter"}]}, {"name": "Disabling Task Manager", "id": "dac279bc-9202-11eb-b7fb-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-31", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to identifies modification of registry to disable the task manager of windows operating system. this event or technique are commonly seen in malware such as RAT, Trojan, TrojanSpy or worm to prevent the user to terminate their process.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System\\\\DisableTaskMgr\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_task_manager_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "admin may disable this application for non technical user.", "references": ["https://any.run/report/ea4ea08407d4ee72e009103a3b77e5a09412b722fdef67315ea63f22011152af/a866d7b1-c236-4f26-a391-5ae32213dfc4#registry", "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/05/threat-roundup-0424-0501.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The Windows Task Manager was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.user", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disabling_task_manager_filter"}]}, {"name": "Disabling Remote User Account Control", "id": "bbc644bc-37df-4e1a-9c88-ec9a53e2038c", "version": 4, "date": "2020-11-18", "author": "David Dorsey, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The search looks for modifications to registry keys that control the enforcement of Windows User Account Control (UAC).", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System\\\\EnableLUA* Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000000\" by Registry.dest, Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `disabling_remote_user_account_control_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report registry modifications.", "known_false_positives": "This registry key may be modified via administrators to implement a change in system policy. This type of change should be a very rare occurrence.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Remcos"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "The Windows registry keys that control the enforcement of Windows User Account Control (UAC) were modified on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.user", "Registry.action"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Bypass User Access Control", "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "MuddyWater", "Honeybee", "Cobalt Group", "Threat Group-3390", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Patchwork", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disabling_remote_user_account_control_filter"}]}, {"name": "Firewall Allowed Program Enable", "id": "9a8f63a8-43ac-11ec-904c-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-12", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic detects a potential suspicious modification of firewall rule allowing to execute specific application. This technique was identified when an adversary and red teams to bypassed firewall file execution restriction in a targetted host. Take note that this event or command can run by administrator during testing or allowing legitimate tool or application.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*firewall*\" Processes.process = \"*allowedprogram*\" Processes.process = \"*add*\" Processes.process = \"*ENABLE*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `firewall_allowed_program_enable_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated or manual execution of this firewall rule that may generate false positives. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/ad4c3cda-41f2-4401-8dba-56cc2d245488/#"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/vilsel/sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "firewall allowed program commandline $process$ of $process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.004", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify System Firewall", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Rocke", "Lazarus Group", "Kimsuky", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Carbanak", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "firewall_allowed_program_enable_filter"}]}, {"name": "Disabling ControlPanel", "id": "6ae0148e-9215-11eb-a94a-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-31", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this search is to identify registry modification to disable control panel window. This technique is commonly seen in malware to prevent their artifacts , persistence removed on the infected machine.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\Explorer\\\\NoControlPanel\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_controlpanel_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "admin may disable this application for non technical user.", "references": ["https://any.run/report/ea4ea08407d4ee72e009103a3b77e5a09412b722fdef67315ea63f22011152af/a866d7b1-c236-4f26-a391-5ae32213dfc4#registry"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The Windows Control Panel was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.user", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disabling_controlpanel_filter"}]}, {"name": "Disable UAC Remote Restriction", "id": "9928b732-210e-11ec-b65e-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-29", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable UAC remote restriction. This technique was well documented in Microsoft page where attacker may modify this registry value to bypassed UAC feature of windows host. This is a good indicator that some tries to bypassed UAC to suspicious process or gain privilege escalation.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path =\"*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System*\" Registry.registry_value_name=\"LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy\" Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000001\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `disable_uac_remote_restriction_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "admin may set this policy for non-critical machine.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/windows-security/user-account-control-and-remote-restriction"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Privilege Escalation Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy/sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.registry_value_data"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Bypass User Access Control", "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "MuddyWater", "Honeybee", "Cobalt Group", "Threat Group-3390", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Patchwork", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disable_uac_remote_restriction_filter"}]}, {"name": "Excessive number of service control start as disabled", "id": "77592bec-d5cc-11eb-9e60-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-25", "author": "Michael Hart, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This detection targets behaviors observed when threat actors have used sc.exe to modify services. We observed malware in a honey pot spawning numerous sc.exe processes in a short period of time, presumably to impair defenses, possibly to block others from compromising the same machine. This detection will alert when we see both an excessive number of sc.exe processes launched with specific commandline arguments to disable the start of certain services.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` distinct_count(Processes.process) as distinct_cmdlines values(Processes.process_id) as process_ids min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE Processes.process_name = \"sc.exe\" AND Processes.process=\"*start= disabled*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_id, _time span=30m | where distinct_cmdlines >= 8 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_number_of_service_control_start_as_disabled_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The complete process name with command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate programs and administrators will execute sc.exe with the start disabled flag. It is possible, but unlikely from the telemetry of normal Windows operation we observed, that sc.exe will be called more than seven times in a short period of time.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/sc-create", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/sc_service_start_disabled/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An excessive amount of $process_name$ was executed on $dest$ attempting to disable services.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "excessive_number_of_service_control_start_as_disabled_filter"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands", "id": "907ac95c-4dd9-11ec-ba2c-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-25", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic will detect a suspicious process commandline related to windows defender exclusion feature. This command is abused by adversaries, malware author and red teams to bypassed Windows Defender Anti-Virus product by excluding folder path, file path, process, extensions and etc. from its real time or schedule scan to execute their malicious code. This is a good indicator for defense evasion and to look further for events after this behavior.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Add-MpPreference *\" OR Message = \"*Set-MpPreference *\") AND Message = \"*-exclusion*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to use this windows features.", "references": ["https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.html", "https://app.any.run/tasks/cf1245de-06a7-4366-8209-8e3006f2bfe5/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Remcos", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/defender_exclusion_powershell/powershell.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "exclusion command $Message$ executed on $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands_filter"}]}, {"name": "SLUI Spawning a Process", "id": "879c4330-b3e0-11eb-b1b1-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-13", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the Microsoft Software Licensing User Interface Tool, `slui.exe`, spawning a child process. This behavior is associated with publicly known UAC bypass. `slui.exe` is commonly associated with software updates and is most often spawned by `svchost.exe`. The `slui.exe` process should not have child processes, and any processes spawning from it will be running with elevated privileges. During triage, review the child process and additional parallel processes. Identify any file modifications that may have lead to the bypass.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=slui.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `slui_spawning_a_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Certain applications may spawn from `slui.exe` that are legitimate. Filtering will be needed to ensure proper monitoring.", "references": ["https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/46998", "https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/windows/local/bypassuac_sluihijack/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Privilege Escalation"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/slui/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A slui process $parent_process_name$ spawning child process $process_name$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Bypass User Access Control", "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "MuddyWater", "Honeybee", "Cobalt Group", "Threat Group-3390", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Patchwork", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "slui_spawning_a_process_filter"}]}, {"name": "Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature", "id": "83776de4-921a-11eb-868a-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-31", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to identify registry modification to disable folder options feature of windows to show hidden files, file extension and etc. This technique used by malware in combination if disabling show hidden files feature to hide their files and also to hide the file extension to lure the user base on file icons or fake file extensions.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\Explorer\\\\NoFolderOptions\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_folderoptions_windows_feature_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "admin may disable this application for non technical user.", "references": ["https://any.run/report/ea4ea08407d4ee72e009103a3b77e5a09412b722fdef67315ea63f22011152af/a866d7b1-c236-4f26-a391-5ae32213dfc4#registry"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The Windows Folder Options, to hide files, was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.user", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disabling_folderoptions_windows_feature_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Cobalt Strike", "id": "bcfd17e8-5461-400a-80a2-3b7d1459220c", "version": 1, "date": "2021-02-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "description": "Cobalt Strike is threat emulation software. Red teams and penetration testers use Cobalt Strike to demonstrate the risk of a breach and evaluate mature security programs. Most recently, Cobalt Strike has become the choice tool by threat groups due to its ease of use and extensibility.", "narrative": "This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from Cobalt Strike. Cobalt Strike has many ways to be enhanced by using aggressor scripts, malleable C2 profiles, default attack packages, and much more. For endpoint behavior, Cobalt Strike is most commonly identified via named pipes, spawn to processes, and DLL function names. Many additional variables are provided for in memory operation of the beacon implant. On the network, depending on the malleable C2 profile used, it is near infinite in the amount of ways to conceal the C2 traffic with Cobalt Strike. Not every query may be specific to Cobalt Strike the tool, but the methodologies and techniques used by it.\\\nSplunk Threat Research reviewed all publicly available instances of Malleabe C2 Profiles and generated a list of the most commonly used spawnto and pipenames.\\\n`Spawnto_x86` and `spawnto_x64` is the process that Cobalt Strike will spawn and injects shellcode into.\\\nPipename sets the named pipe name used in Cobalt Strikes Beacon SMB C2 traffic.\\\nWith that, new detections were generated focused on these spawnto processes spawning without command line arguments. Similar, the named pipes most commonly used by Cobalt Strike added as a detection. In generating content for Cobalt Strike, the following is considered:\\\n- Is it normal for spawnto_ value to have no command line arguments? No command line arguments and a network connection?\\\n- What is the default, or normal, process lineage for spawnto_ value?\\\n- Does the spawnto_ value make network connections?\\\n- Is it normal for spawnto_ value to load jscript, vbscript, Amsi.dll, and clr.dll?\\\nWhile investigating a detection related to this Analytic Story, keep in mind the parent process, process path, and any file modifications that may occur. Tuning may need to occur to remove any false positives.", "references": ["https://www.cobaltstrike.com/", "https://www.infocyte.com/blog/2020/09/02/cobalt-strike-the-new-favorite-among-thieves/", "https://bluescreenofjeff.com/2017-01-24-how-to-write-malleable-c2-profiles-for-cobalt-strike/", "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/09/coverage-strikes-back-cobalt-strike-paper.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/unauthorized-access-of-fireeye-red-team-tools.html", "https://github.com/MichaelKoczwara/Awesome-CobaltStrike-Defence", "https://github.com/zer0yu/Awesome-CobaltStrike"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Cobalt Strike", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218.010", "T1218", "T1543.003", "T1036", "T1548", "T1560.001", "T1218.011", "T1059", "T1127", "T1560", "T1543", "T1036.003", "T1127.001", "T1055", "T1059.003"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Regsvr32", "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "Rundll32", "Rename System Utilities", "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "Windows Command Shell", "Create or Modify System Process", "Archive Collected Data", "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Archive via Utility", "Masquerading", "Windows Service", "MSBuild", "Process Injection"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Execution", "Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Magic Hound", "Stealth Falcon", "Inception", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "APT1", "Tropic Trooper", "Kimsuky", "Dark Caracal", "PLATINUM", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ke3chang", "FIN8", "Turla", "Leviathan", "Molerats", "APT39", "Gamaredon Group", "APT29", "Carbanak", "TA505", "Whitefly", "Frankenstein", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "Silence", "APT32", "Soft Cell", "WIRTE", "APT37", "APT19", "Darkhotel", "APT41", "CopyKittens", "FIN5", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Blue Mockingbird", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "admin@338", "Honeybee", "APT3", "Wizard Spider", "Sowbug", "APT18", "no", "Threat Group-1314", "Sharpshooter", "APT38", "MuddyWater", "FIN10", "DarkVishnya", "Patchwork", "APT28", "Gallmaker", "APT33", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN7", "Gorgon Group", "Windshift"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Cobalt Strike Named Pipes", "id": "5876d429-0240-4709-8b93-ea8330b411b5", "version": 1, "date": "2021-02-22", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of default or publicly known named pipes used with Cobalt Strike. A named pipe is a named, one-way or duplex pipe for communication between the pipe server and one or more pipe clients. Cobalt Strike uses named pipes in many ways and has default values used with the Artifact Kit and Malleable C2 Profiles. The following query assists with identifying these default named pipes. Each EDR product presents named pipes a little different. Consider taking the values and generating a query based on the product of choice. \\\nUpon triage, review the process performing the named pipe. If it is explorer.exe, It is possible it was injected into by another process. Review recent parallel processes to identify suspicious patterns or behaviors. A parallel process may have a network connection, review and follow the connection back to identify any file modifications.", "search": "`sysmon` EventID=17 OR EventID=18 PipeName IN (\\\\msagent_*, \\\\wkssvc*, \\\\DserNamePipe*, \\\\srvsvc_*, \\\\mojo.*, \\\\postex_*, \\\\status_*, \\\\MSSE-*, \\\\spoolss_*, \\\\win_svc*, \\\\ntsvcs*, \\\\winsock*, \\\\UIA_PIPE*) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, process_name, process_id process_path, PipeName | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cobalt_strike_named_pipes_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "The idea of using named pipes with Cobalt Strike is to blend in. Therefore, some of the named pipes identified and added may cause false positives. Filter by process name or pipe name to reduce false positives.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/ipc/named-pipes", "https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-smb-beacon", "https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2021/02/09/learn-pipe-fitting-for-all-of-your-offense-projects/", "https://gist.github.com/MHaggis/6c600e524045a6d49c35291a21e10752", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike", "Trickbot", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $Computer$ by user $user$ accessing known suspicious named pipes related to Cobalt Strike.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1055"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventID", "PipeName", "Computer", "process_name", "process_path", "process_id"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Process Injection"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Cobalt Group", "APT37", "Honeybee", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "cobalt_strike_named_pipes_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass", "id": "070e9b80-6252-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 2, "date": "2021-01-28", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. Regsvr32.exe is also a Microsoft signed binary.This variation of the technique is often referred to as a \"Squiblydoo\" attack. \\\nUpon investigating, look for network connections to remote destinations (internal or external). Be cautious to modify the query to look for \"scrobj.dll\", the \".dll\" is not required to load scrobj. \"scrobj.dll\" will be loaded by \"regsvr32.exe\" upon execution. ", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` Processes.process=*scrobj* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives related to third party software registering .DLL's.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/", "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/how-to-use-the-regsvr32-tool-and-troubleshoot-regsvr32-error-messages-a98d960a-7392-e6fe-d90a-3f4e0cb543e5"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", "Cobalt Strike"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.010/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ in an attempt to bypass detection and preventative controls was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.010"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Regsvr32"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Blue Mockingbird", "Inception", "WIRTE", "Cobalt Group", "APT19", "Leviathan", "APT32", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=REGSVR32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_regsvr32"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass_filter"}]}, {"name": "CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation", "id": "eb277ba0-b96b-11eb-b00e-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-05-20", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies a common behavior by Cobalt Strike and other frameworks where the adversary will escalate privileges, either via `jump` (Cobalt Strike PTH) or `getsystem`, using named-pipe impersonation. A suspicious event will look like `cmd.exe /c echo 4sgryt3436 > \\\\.\\Pipe\\5erg53`.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` OR Processes.process=*%comspec%* (Processes.process=*echo* AND Processes.process=*pipe*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmd_echo_pipe___escalation_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown. It is possible filtering may be required to ensure fidelity.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/threats/cobalt-strike/", "https://github.com/rapid7/meterpreter/blob/master/source/extensions/priv/server/elevate/namedpipe.c"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ potentially performing privilege escalation using named pipes related to Cobalt Strike and other frameworks.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.003", "T1543.003", "T1543"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "Windows Command Shell", "Windows Service", "Create or Modify System Process"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "TA505", "Blue Mockingbird", "Tropic Trooper", "Frankenstein", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "Honeybee", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Turla", "Silence", "APT32", "APT39", "Darkhotel", "MuddyWater", "APT18", "APT38", "Dark Caracal", "Gorgon Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Rancor", "Ke3chang", "APT37", "Leviathan", "FIN8", "APT28", "Magic Hound", "Sowbug", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Gamaredon Group", "Suckfly", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-1314", "APT3", "admin@338", "APT1", "Blue Mockingbird", "DarkVishnya", "Wizard Spider", "APT32", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Tropic Trooper", "Cobalt Group", "Ke3chang", "Honeybee", "FIN7", "Threat Group-3390", "APT19", "APT3", "Lazarus Group", "Carbanak", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_cmd"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "cmd_echo_pipe___escalation_filter"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network", "id": "35307032-a12d-11eb-835f-acde48001122", "version": 3, "date": "2021-10-13", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments and performing a network connection. It is unusual for rundll32.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` by _time span=1h Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(rundll32\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port !=\"0\" by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port| `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_guid connection_to_CNC dest_port | `rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `port` node. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32", "https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Cobalt Strike", "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A rundll32 process $process_name$ with no commandline argument like this process commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "processname", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Rundll32"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT32", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "TA505", "MuddyWater", "APT29", "APT19", "CopyKittens", "APT3", "Carbanak", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_rundll32"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments", "id": "f52d2db8-31f9-4aa7-a176-25779effe55c", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-20", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies searchprotocolhost.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for searchprotocolhost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. searchprotocolhost.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=searchprotocolhost.exe by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(searchprotocolhost\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | `suspicious_searchprotocolhost_no_command_line_arguments_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process.", "references": ["https://github.com/fireeye/red_team_tool_countermeasures/blob/master/rules/PGF/supplemental/hxioc/SUSPICIOUS%20EXECUTION%20OF%20SEARCHPROTOCOLHOST%20(METHODOLOGY).ioc"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious searchprotocolhost.exe process with no command line arguments executed on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Process Injection"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Cobalt Group", "APT37", "Honeybee", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_searchprotocolhost_no_command_line_arguments_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious MSBuild Rename", "id": "4006adac-5937-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 2, "date": "2021-01-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies renamed instances of msbuild.exe executing. Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v4.0.30319 and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v4.0.30319. During investigation, identify the code executed and what is executing a renamed instance of MSBuild.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_msbuild` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_msbuild_rename_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of msbuild, triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md", "https://github.com/infosecn1nja/MaliciousMacroMSBuild/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild", "Cobalt Strike", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious renamed msbuild.exe binary ran on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1036", "T1127", "T1036.003", "T1127.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Masquerading", "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "Rename System Utilities", "MSBuild"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Windshift", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "Dragonfly 2.0", "no", "menuPass", "APT32", "Soft Cell", "PLATINUM", "Frankenstein"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=msbuild.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSBuild.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_msbuild"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_msbuild_rename_filter"}]}, {"name": "Anomalous usage of Archive Tools", "id": "63614a58-10e2-4c6c-ae81-ea1113681439", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-22", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "The following detection identifies the usage of archive tools from the command line.", "search": "| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event,\"_time\"), \"string\", null)), process=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process\"), \"string\", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null)), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_path\"), \"string\", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process_name\"), \"string\", null), parent_process=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"parent_process\"), \"string\", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null) | where process_name IS NOT NULL AND parent_process_name IS NOT NULL | where like(process_name, \"7z%\") OR process_name=\"WinRAR.exe\" OR like(process_name, \"winzip%\") | where like(parent_process_name, \"%cmd.exe\") OR like(parent_process_name, \"%powershell.exe\") | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null)), body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"process_name\", process_name, \"parent_process_name\", parent_process_name, \"process_path\", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "False positives can be ligitmate usage of archive tools from the command line.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/001/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike", "NOBELIUM Group"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1560.001/archive_tools/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior is indicative of suspicious loading of 7zip.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1560.001", "T1560"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Archive via Utility", "Archive Collected Data"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Soft Cell", "Turla", "Gallmaker", "APT33", "APT39", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "FIN8", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT3", "Sowbug", "menuPass", "APT1", "Ke3chang", "menuPass", "APT32", "Honeybee", "Patchwork", "APT28", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN6", "Lazarus Group", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "anomalous_usage_of_archive_tools_filter"}]}, {"name": "Anomalous usage of 7zip", "id": "9364ee8e-a39a-11eb-8f1d-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-22", "author": "Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies a 7z.exe spawned from `Rundll32.exe` or `Dllhost.exe`. It is assumed that the adversary has brought in `7z.exe` and `7z.dll`. It has been observed where an adversary will rename `7z.exe`. Additional coverage may be required to identify the behavior of renamed instances of `7z.exe`. During triage, identify the source of injection into `Rundll32.exe` or `Dllhost.exe`. Capture any files written to disk and analyze as needed. Review parallel processes for additional behaviors. Typically, archiving files will result in exfiltration.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"rundll32.exe\", \"dllhost.exe\") Processes.process_name=*7z* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `anomalous_usage_of_7zip_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as this behavior is not normal for `rundll32.exe` or `dllhost.exe` to spawn and run 7zip.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/001/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/", "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/01/31/bazar-no-ryuk/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike", "NOBELIUM Group"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1560.001/archive_utility/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior is indicative of suspicious loading of 7zip.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1560.001", "T1560"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Archive via Utility", "Archive Collected Data"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Soft Cell", "Turla", "Gallmaker", "APT33", "APT39", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "FIN8", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT3", "Sowbug", "menuPass", "APT1", "Ke3chang", "menuPass", "APT32", "Honeybee", "Patchwork", "APT28", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN6", "Lazarus Group", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "anomalous_usage_of_7zip_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments", "id": "e451bd16-e4c5-4109-8eb1-c4c6ecf048b4", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-20", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for rundll32.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(rundll32\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | `suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32", "https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Cobalt Strike", "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Suspicious rundll32.exe process with no command line arguments executed on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Rundll32"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT32", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "TA505", "MuddyWater", "APT29", "APT19", "CopyKittens", "APT3", "Carbanak", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_rundll32"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments_filter"}]}, {"name": "Services Escalate Exe", "id": "c448488c-b7ec-11eb-8253-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-18", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of `svc-exe` with Cobalt Strike. The behavior typically follows after an adversary has already gained initial access and is escalating privileges. Using `svc-exe`, a randomly named binary will be downloaded from the remote Teamserver and placed on disk within `C:\\Windows\\400619a.exe`. Following, the binary will be added to the registry under key `HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\400619a\\` with multiple keys and values added to look like a legitimate service. Upon loading, `services.exe` will spawn the randomly named binary from `\\\\127.0.0.1\\ADMIN$\\400619a.exe`. The process lineage is completed with `400619a.exe` spawning rundll32.exe, which is the default `spawnto_` value for Cobalt Strike. The `spawnto_` value is arbitrary and may be any process on disk (typically system32/syswow64 binary). The `spawnto_` process will also contain a network connection. During triage, review parallel procesess and identify any additional file modifications.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe Processes.process_path=*admin$* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `services_escalate_exe_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as `services.exe` should never spawn a process from `ADMIN$`. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/", "https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-beacon"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 95, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Privilege Escalation"}, "Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "message": "A service process $parent_process_name$ with process path $process_path$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "Processes.dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Processes.user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 76, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "services_escalate_exe_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 StartW", "id": "9319dda5-73f2-4d43-a85a-67ce961bddb7", "version": 3, "date": "2021-02-04", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe executing a DLL function name, Start and StartW, on the command line that is commonly observed with Cobalt Strike x86 and x64 DLL payloads. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64. Typically, the DLL will be written and loaded from a world writeable path or user location. In most instances it will not have a valid certificate (Unsigned). During investigation, review the parent process and other parallel application execution. Capture and triage the DLL in question. In the instance of Cobalt Strike, rundll32.exe is the default process it opens and injects shellcode into. This default process can be changed, but typically is not.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*start* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_startw_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use Start as a function and call it via the command line. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", "https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-windows-executable", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32", "https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Cobalt Strike", "Trickbot"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "rundll32.exe running with suspicious parameters on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Rundll32"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT32", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "TA505", "MuddyWater", "APT29", "APT19", "CopyKittens", "APT3", "Carbanak", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_rundll32"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_rundll32_startw_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename", "id": "f0db4464-55d9-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 3, "date": "2021-09-20", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies a renamed instance of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe. Microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v4.0.30319 and is rarely utilized. When investigating, identify the executed code on disk and review. A spawned child process from microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is uncommon. In any instance, microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe spawning from an Office product or any living off the land binary is highly suspect.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_microsoftworkflowcompiler` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe, triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md#atomic-test-6---microsoftworkflowcompilerexe-payload-execution"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "Cobalt Strike", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious renamed microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe binary ran on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1036", "T1127", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Masquerading", "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "Rename System Utilities"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Windshift", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "Dragonfly 2.0", "no", "menuPass", "APT32", "Soft Cell", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_microsoftworkflowcompiler"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename_filter"}]}, {"name": "GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network", "id": "2c853856-a140-11eb-a5b5-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-19", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies gpupdate.exe with no command line arguments and with a network connection. It is unusual for gpupdate.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. gpupdate.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=gpupdate.exe by _time span=1h Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(gpupdate\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port !=\"0\" by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port| `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_guid connection_to_CNC dest_port | `gpupdate_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process.", "references": ["https://raw.githubusercontent.com/xx0hcd/Malleable-C2-Profiles/0ef8cf4556e26f6d4190c56ba697c2159faa5822/crimeware/trick_ryuk.profile", "https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2021/02/09/learn-pipe-fitting-for-all-of-your-offense-projects/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Command And Control"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Process gpupdate.exe with parent_process $parent_process_name$ is executed on $dest$ by user $user$, followed by an outbound network connection to $connection_to_CNC$ on port $dest_port$. This behaviour is seen with cobaltstrike.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process Name", "role": ["Parent Process", "Attacker"]}, {"name": "connection_to_CNC", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventID", "process_name", "process_id", "parent_process_name", "dest_port", "process_path"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Process Injection"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Cobalt Group", "APT37", "Honeybee", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "gpupdate_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter"}]}, {"name": "DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network", "id": "f1c07594-a141-11eb-8407-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-10-13", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies DLLHost.exe with no command line arguments with a network connection. It is unusual for DLLHost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. DLLHost.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=dllhost.exe by _time span=1h Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(dllhost\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port !=\"0\" by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_guid connection_to_CNC dest_port | `dllhost_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `port` node.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate third party applications may use a moved copy of dllhost, triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://raw.githubusercontent.com/threatexpress/malleable-c2/c3385e481159a759f79b8acfe11acf240893b830/jquery-c2.4.2.profile", "https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2021/02/09/learn-pipe-fitting-for-all-of-your-offense-projects/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon_dllhost.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The process $process_name$ was spawned by $parent_image$ without any command-line arguments on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_image", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventID", "process_name", "process_id", "parent_process_name", "dest_port", "process_path"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Process Injection"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Cobalt Group", "APT37", "Honeybee", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "dllhost_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter"}]}, {"name": "SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network", "id": "b690df8c-a145-11eb-a38b-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-10-13", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies searchprotocolhost.exe with no command line arguments and with a network connection. It is unusual for searchprotocolhost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. searchprotocolhost.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=searchprotocolhost.exe by _time span=1h Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(searchprotocolhost\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port !=\"0\" by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_guid connection_to_CNC dest_port | `searchprotocolhost_with_no_command_line_with_network_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `ports` node.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process.", "references": ["https://github.com/fireeye/red_team_tool_countermeasures/blob/master/rules/PGF/supplemental/hxioc/SUSPICIOUS%20EXECUTION%20OF%20SEARCHPROTOCOLHOST%20(METHODOLOGY).ioc"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}, "Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon_searchprotocolhost.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A searchprotocolhost.exe process $process_name$ with no commandline in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "processname", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "process_name", "process_id", "parent_process_name", "dest_port", "process_path"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Process Injection"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Cobalt Group", "APT37", "Honeybee", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "searchprotocolhost_with_no_command_line_with_network_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments", "id": "f308490a-473a-40ef-ae64-dd7a6eba284a", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-20", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies gpupdate.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for gpupdate.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. gpupdate.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_gpupdate` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(gpupdate\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | `suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process.", "references": ["https://raw.githubusercontent.com/xx0hcd/Malleable-C2-Profiles/0ef8cf4556e26f6d4190c56ba697c2159faa5822/crimeware/trick_ryuk.profile", "https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2021/02/09/learn-pipe-fitting-for-all-of-your-offense-projects/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious gpupdate.exe process with no command line arguments executed on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Process Injection"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Cobalt Group", "APT37", "Honeybee", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=gpupdate.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=GPUpdate.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_gpupdate"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments", "id": "ff61e98c-0337-4593-a78f-72a676c56f26", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-20", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies DLLHost.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for DLLHost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. DLLHost.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_dllhost` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(dllhost\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | `suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process.", "references": ["https://raw.githubusercontent.com/threatexpress/malleable-c2/c3385e481159a759f79b8acfe11acf240893b830/jquery-c2.4.2.profile", "https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2021/02/09/learn-pipe-fitting-for-all-of-your-offense-projects/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious dllhost.exe process with no command line arguments executed on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Process Injection"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Cobalt Group", "APT37", "Honeybee", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=dllhost.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=dllhost.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_dllhost"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious msbuild path", "id": "f5198224-551c-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 2, "date": "2021-01-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies msbuild.exe executing from a non-standard path. Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v4.0.30319 and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v4.0.30319. Instances of Visual Studio will run a copy of msbuild.exe. A moved instance of MSBuild is suspicious, however there are instances of build applications that will move or use a copy of MSBuild.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_msbuild` AND (Processes.process_path!=c:\\\\windows\\\\microsoft.net\\\\framework*\\\\v*\\\\*) by Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `suspicious_msbuild_path_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of msbuild.exe, triggering a false positive. Baselining of MSBuild.exe usage is recommended to better understand it's path usage. Visual Studio runs an instance out of a path that will need to be filtered on.", "references": ["https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild", "Cobalt Strike", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Msbuild.exe ran from an uncommon path on $dest$ execyted by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1036", "T1127", "T1036.003", "T1127.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Masquerading", "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "Rename System Utilities", "MSBuild"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Windshift", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "Dragonfly 2.0", "no", "menuPass", "APT32", "Soft Cell", "PLATINUM", "Frankenstein"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=msbuild.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSBuild.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_msbuild"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_msbuild_path_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "SQL Injection", "id": "4f6632f5-449c-4686-80df-57625f59bab3", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-19", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "Use the searches in this Analytic Story to help you detect structured query language (SQL) injection attempts characterized by long URLs that contain malicious parameters.", "narrative": "It is very common for attackers to inject SQL parameters into vulnerable web applications, which then interpret the malicious SQL statements.\\\nThis Analytic Story contains a search designed to identify attempts by attackers to leverage this technique to compromise a host and gain a foothold in the target environment.", "references": ["https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/66.html", "https://www.incapsula.com/web-application-security/sql-injection.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "SQL Injection", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1190"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploit Public-Facing Application"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "Soft Cell", "BlackTech", "APT41", "APT39", "Night Dragon", "Rocke", "Blue Mockingbird"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "SQL Injection with Long URLs", "id": "e0aad4cf-0790-423b-8328-7564d0d938f9", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Web"], "description": "This search looks for long URLs that have several SQL commands visible within them.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Web where Web.dest_category=web_server AND (Web.url_length > 1024 OR Web.http_user_agent_length > 200) by Web.src Web.dest Web.url Web.url_length Web.http_user_agent | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | eval num_sql_cmds=mvcount(split(url, \"alter%20table\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"between\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"create%20table\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"create%20database\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"create%20index\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"create%20view\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"delete\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"drop%20database\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"drop%20index\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"drop%20table\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"exists\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"exec\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"group%20by\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"having\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"insert%20into\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"inner%20join\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"left%20join\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"right%20join\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"full%20join\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"select\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"distinct\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"select%20top\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"union\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"xp_cmdshell\")) - 24 | where num_sql_cmds > 3 | `sql_injection_with_long_urls_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be monitoring network communications to your web servers or ingesting your HTTP logs and populating the Web data model. You must also identify your web servers in the Enterprise Security assets table.", "known_false_positives": "It's possible that legitimate traffic will have long URLs or long user agent strings and that common SQL commands may be found within the URL. Please investigate as appropriate.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["SQL Injection"], "asset_type": "Database Server", "cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 13", "CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1190"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "ID.RA", "PR.PT", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Web.dest_category", "Web.url_length", "Web.http_user_agent_length", "Web.src", "Web.dest", "Web.url", "Web.http_user_agent"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploit Public-Facing Application"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Rocke", "APT39", "BlackTech", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Night Dragon", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "sql_injection_with_long_urls_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Orangeworm Attack Group", "id": "bb9f5ed2-916e-4364-bb6d-97c370efcf52", "version": 2, "date": "2020-01-22", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "description": "Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry.", "narrative": "In May of 2018, the attack group Orangeworm was implicated for installing a custom backdoor called Trojan.Kwampirs within large international healthcare corporations in the United States, Europe, and Asia. This malware provides the attackers with remote access to the target system, decrypting and extracting a copy of its main DLL payload from its resource section. Before writing the payload to disk, it inserts a randomly generated string into the middle of the decrypted payload in an attempt to evade hash-based detections.\\\nAwareness of the Orangeworm group first surfaced in January, 2015. It has conducted targeted attacks against related industries, as well, such as pharmaceuticals and healthcare IT solution providers.\\\nHealthcare may be a promising target, because it is notoriously behind in technology, often using older operating systems and neglecting to patch computers. Even so, the group was able to evade detection for a full three years. Sources say that the malware spread quickly within the target networks, infecting computers used to control medical devices, such as MRI and X-ray machines.\\\nThis Analytic Story is designed to help you detect and investigate suspicious activities that may be indicative of an Orangeworm attack. One detection search looks for command-line arguments. Another monitors for uses of sc.exe, a non-essential Windows file that can manipulate Windows services. One of the investigative searches helps you get more information on web hosts that you suspect have been compromised.", "references": ["https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/orangeworm-targets-healthcare-us-europe-asia", "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/healthcare-targeted-by-hacker/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Orangeworm Attack Group", "category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1543", "T1569", "T1543.003", "T1569.002"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Service Execution", "Create or Modify System Process", "Windows Service", "System Services"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Kimsuky", "Ke3chang", "APT39", "Carbanak", "Cobalt Group", "APT32", "Silence", "APT19", "APT41", "FIN6", "Blue Mockingbird", "Lazarus Group", "Honeybee", "APT3", "Wizard Spider", "no", "DarkVishnya", "FIN7"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services", "id": "f0c693d8-2a89-4ce7-80b4-98fea4c3ea6d", "version": 4, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for arguments to sc.exe indicating the creation or modification of a Windows service.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = sc.exe (Processes.process=\"* create *\" OR Processes.process=\"* config *\") by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Using sc.exe to manipulate Windows services is uncommon. However, there may be legitimate instances of this behavior. It is important to validate and investigate as appropriate.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Service Abuse", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Disabling Security Tools", "NOBELIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Persistence"}, "Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "message": "A sc process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ to create of configure services in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1543.003", "T1543"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Windows Service", "Create or Modify System Process"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "DarkVishnya", "Wizard Spider", "APT32", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Tropic Trooper", "Cobalt Group", "Ke3chang", "Honeybee", "FIN7", "Threat Group-3390", "APT19", "APT3", "Lazarus Group", "Carbanak", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services_filter"}]}, {"name": "First Time Seen Running Windows Service", "id": "823136f2-d755-4b6d-ae04-372b486a5808", "version": 4, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for the first and last time a Windows service is seen running in your environment. This table is then cached.", "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rex field=Message \"The (?[-\\(\\)\\s\\w]+) service entered the (?\\w+) state\" | where state=\"running\" | lookup previously_seen_running_windows_services service as service OUTPUT firstTimeSeen | where isnull(firstTimeSeen) OR firstTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_windows_services_window`) | table _time dest service | `first_time_seen_running_windows_service_filter`", "how_to_implement": "While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM, you must be ingesting your Windows system event logs in order for this search to execute successfully. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial` to build the initial table of child processes and hostnames for this search to work. You should also schedule at the same interval as this search the second baseline search `Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old Windows Services. Please update the `previously_seen_windows_services_window` macro to adjust the time window. Please ensure that the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows is version 8.0.0 or above.", "known_false_positives": "A previously unseen service is not necessarily malicious. Verify that the service is legitimate and that was installed by a legitimate process.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Service Abuse", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "NOBELIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1569", "T1569.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.AE"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "dest"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Services", "Service Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "APT41", "Silence", "FIN6", "APT32", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_system"}, {"description": "Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new Windows services", "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", "name": "previously_seen_windows_services_window"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "first_time_seen_running_windows_service_filter"}], "lookups": [{"description": "A placeholder for the list of Windows Services running", "collection": "previously_seen_running_windows_services", "name": "previously_seen_running_windows_services", "fields_list": "_key, service, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen"}]}]}, {"name": "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", "id": "f0258af4-a6ae-11eb-b3c2-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-26", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "description": "Adversaries may rename legitimate system utilities to try to evade security mechanisms concerning the usage of those utilities.", "narrative": "Security monitoring and control mechanisms may be in place for system utilities adversaries are capable of abusing. It may be possible to bypass those security mechanisms by renaming the utility prior to utilization (ex: rename rundll32.exe). An alternative case occurs when a legitimate utility is copied or moved to a different directory and renamed to avoid detections based on system utilities executing from non-standard paths.\\\nThe following content is here to assist with binaries within `system32` or `syswow64` being moved to a new location or an adversary bringing a the binary in to execute.\\\nThere will be false positives as some native Windows processes are moved or ran by third party applications from different paths. If file names are mismatched between the file name on disk and that of the binarys PE metadata, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries by looking to see if the InternalName, OriginalFilename, and or ProductName match what is expected could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. Do not focus on the possible names a file could have, but instead on the command-line arguments that are known to be used and are distinct because it will have a better rate of detection.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1070.004", "T1218", "T1036", "T1070", "T1218.011", "T1127", "T1485", "T1036.003", "T1127.001"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Rundll32", "MSBuild", "Rename System Utilities", "File Deletion", "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Masquerading", "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "Data Destruction", "Indicator Removal on Host"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390", "Sandworm Team", "Magic Hound", "Tropic Trooper", "Kimsuky", "TEMP.Veles", "PLATINUM", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN8", "Group5", "APT29", "Gamaredon Group", "Rocke", "Carbanak", "TA505", "Frankenstein", "Cobalt Group", "Silence", "APT32", "Soft Cell", "APT19", "APT41", "CopyKittens", "FIN5", "menuPass", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "Honeybee", "APT3", "Wizard Spider", "APT18", "no", "The White Company", "APT38", "MuddyWater", "FIN10", "Patchwork", "APT28", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Windshift"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Sdelete Application Execution", "id": "31702fc0-2682-11ec-85c3-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-06", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect the execution of sdelete.exe application sysinternal tools. This tool is one of the most use tool of malware and adversaries to remove or clear their tracks and artifact in the targetted host. This tool is designed to delete securely a file in file system that remove the forensic evidence on the machine. A good TTP query to check why user execute this application which is not a common practice.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_sdelete` by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sdelete_application_execution_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "user may execute and use this application", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/956f50be-2c13-465a-ac00-6224c14c5f89/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/sdelete/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "sdelete process $process_name$ executed in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1485", "T1070.004", "T1070"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Data Destruction", "File Deletion", "Indicator Removal on Host"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact", "Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Lazarus Group", "APT38", "Sandworm Team", "Rocke", "Tropic Trooper", "Gamaredon Group", "Wizard Spider", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Silence", "The White Company", "TEMP.Veles", "APT32", "APT38", "Patchwork", "Honeybee", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "menuPass", "FIN8", "OilRig", "FIN5", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Magic Hound", "APT3", "FIN10", "APT28", "Threat Group-3390", "Group5", "Lazarus Group", "APT18", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=sdelete.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=sdelete.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_sdelete"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "sdelete_application_execution_filter"}]}, {"name": "Execution of File with Multiple Extensions", "id": "b06a555e-dce0-417d-a2eb-28a5d8d66ef7", "version": 3, "date": "2020-11-18", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for processes launched from files that have double extensions in the file name. This is typically done to obscure the \"real\" file extension and make it appear as though the file being accessed is a data file, as opposed to executable content.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = *.doc.exe OR Processes.process = *.htm.exe OR Processes.process = *.html.exe OR Processes.process = *.txt.exe OR Processes.process = *.pdf.exe OR Processes.process = *.doc.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process Processes.parent_process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node.", "known_false_positives": "None identified.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "process $process$ have double extensions in the file name is executed on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1036", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process", "Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Masquerading", "Rename System Utilities"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Windshift", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "Dragonfly 2.0", "menuPass", "APT32", "Soft Cell", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions_filter"}]}, {"name": "System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations", "id": "a34aae96-ccf8-4aef-952c-3ea21444444d", "version": 6, "date": "2020-12-08", "author": "David Dorsey, Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for system processes that typically execute from `C:\\Windows\\System32\\` or `C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64`. This may indicate a malicious process that is trying to hide as a legitimate process.\\\nThis detection utilizes a lookup that is deduped `system32` and `syswow64` directories from Server 2016 and Windows 10.\\\nDuring triage, review the parallel processes - what process moved the native Windows binary? identify any artifacts on disk and review. If a remote destination is contacted, what is the reputation?", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_path !=\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32*\" Processes.process_path !=\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_hash | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `is_windows_system_file` | `system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "This detection may require tuning based on third party applications utilizing native Windows binaries in non-standard paths.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.yaml", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Unusual Processes", "Ransomware", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "System process running from unexpected location on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1036", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Processes.process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.user", "Processes.dest", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_hash"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Masquerading", "Rename System Utilities"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Windshift", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "Dragonfly 2.0", "menuPass", "APT32", "Soft Cell", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "lookup update=true is_windows_system_file filename as process_name OUTPUT systemFile | search systemFile=true", "description": "This macro limits the output to process names that are in the Windows System directory", "name": "is_windows_system_file", "lookups": [{"default_match": "false", "description": "A full baseline of executable files in Windows\\System32 and Windows\\Syswow64, including sub-directories from Server 2016 and Windows 10.", "filename": "is_windows_system_file.csv", "min_matches": 1, "name": "is_windows_system_file", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/is_windows_system_file.csv"}]}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations_filter"}]}, {"name": "System Process Running from Unexpected Location", "id": "28179107-099a-464a-94d3-08301e6c055f", "version": 3, "date": "2020-08-25", "author": "Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint_Processes"], "description": "An attacker tries might try to use different version of a system command without overriding original, or they might try to avoid some detection running the process from a different folder. This detection checks that a list of system processes run inside C:\\\\Windows\\System32 or C:\\\\Windows\\SysWOW64 The list of system processes has been extracted from https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/is_windows_system_file.csv and the original detection https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml", "search": " $ssa_input = | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval device=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_device_id\"), \"string\", null), user=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"dest_user_id\"), \"string\", null), timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"_time\"), \"string\", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_name\"), \"string\", null)), process_path=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, \"process_path\"), \"string\", null)), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, \"event_id\"), \"string\", null);\n$cond_1 = | from $ssa_input | where process_name=\"arp.exe\" OR process_name=\"adaptertroubleshooter.exe\" OR process_name=\"applicationframehost.exe\" OR process_name=\"atbroker.exe\" OR process_name=\"authhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"autoworkplace.exe\" OR process_name=\"axinstui.exe\" OR process_name=\"backgroundtransferhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"bdehdcfg.exe\" OR process_name=\"bdeuisrv.exe\" OR process_name=\"bdeunlockwizard.exe\" OR process_name=\"bitlockerdeviceencryption.exe\" OR process_name=\"bitlockerwizard.exe\" OR process_name=\"bitlockerwizardelev.exe\" OR process_name=\"bytecodegenerator.exe\" OR process_name=\"camerasettingsuihost.exe\" OR process_name=\"castsrv.exe\" OR process_name=\"certenrollctrl.exe\" OR process_name=\"checknetisolation.exe\" OR process_name=\"clipup.exe\" OR process_name=\"cloudexperiencehostbroker.exe\" OR process_name=\"cloudnotifications.exe\" OR process_name=\"cloudstoragewizard.exe\" OR process_name=\"compmgmtlauncher.exe\" OR process_name=\"compattelrunner.exe\" OR process_name=\"computerdefaults.exe\" OR process_name=\"credentialuibroker.exe\" OR process_name=\"dfdwiz.exe\" OR process_name=\"dwwin.exe\" OR process_name=\"dataexchangehost.exe\" OR process_name=\"defrag.exe\" OR process_name=\"devicedisplayobjectprovider.exe\" OR process_name=\"deviceeject.exe\" OR process_name=\"deviceenroller.exe\" OR process_name=\"devicepairingwizard.exe\" OR process_name=\"deviceproperties.exe\" OR process_name=\"disksnapshot.exe\" OR process_name=\"dism.exe\" OR process_name=\"displayswitch.exe\" OR process_name=\"dmnotificationbroker.exe\" OR process_name=\"dmomacpmo.exe\" OR process_name=\"dpiscaling.exe\" OR process_name=\"dsmusertask.exe\" OR process_name=\"dxpserver.exe\" OR process_name=\"edpcleanup.exe\" OR process_name=\"eosnotify.exe\" OR process_name=\"eap3host.exe\" OR process_name=\"easpoliciesbrokerhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"easeofaccessdialog.exe\" OR process_name=\"ehstorauthn.exe\" OR process_name=\"fxscover.exe\" OR process_name=\"fxssvc.exe\" OR process_name=\"fxsunatd.exe\" OR process_name=\"filehistory.exe\" OR process_name=\"fondue.exe\" OR process_name=\"gamepanel.exe\" OR process_name=\"genvalobj.exe\" OR process_name=\"gettingstarted.exe\" OR process_name=\"hostname.exe\" OR process_name=\"icsentitlementhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"infdefaultinstall.exe\" OR process_name=\"installagent.exe\" OR process_name=\"languagecomponentsinstallercomhandler.exe\" OR process_name=\"launchtm.exe\" OR process_name=\"launchwinapp.exe\" OR process_name=\"legacynetuxhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"licensemanagershellext.exe\" OR process_name=\"licensingui.exe\" OR process_name=\"locationnotificationwindows.exe\" OR process_name=\"locationnotifications.exe\" OR process_name=\"locator.exe\" OR process_name=\"lockapphost.exe\" OR process_name=\"lockscreencontentserver.exe\" OR process_name=\"logonui.exe\" OR process_name=\"lsaiso.exe\" OR process_name=\"mdeserver.exe\" OR process_name=\"mdmagent.exe\" OR process_name=\"mdmappinstaller.exe\" OR process_name=\"mrinfo.exe\" OR process_name=\"mrt.exe\" OR process_name=\"mschedexe.exe\" OR process_name=\"magnify.exe\" OR process_name=\"mbaeparsertask.exe\" OR process_name=\"mdres.exe\" OR process_name=\"mdsched.exe\" OR process_name=\"migautoplay.exe\" OR process_name=\"mpsigstub.exe\" OR process_name=\"msspellcheckinghost.exe\" OR process_name=\"muiunattend.exe\" OR process_name=\"multidigimon.exe\" OR process_name=\"musnotification.exe\" OR process_name=\"musnotificationux.exe\" OR process_name=\"napstat.exe\" OR process_name=\"netstat.exe\" OR process_name=\"narrator.exe\" OR process_name=\"netcfgnotifyobjecthost.exe\" OR process_name=\"netevtfwdr.exe\" OR process_name=\"netproj.exe\" OR process_name=\"netplwiz.exe\" OR process_name=\"networkuxbroker.exe\";\n$cond_2 = | from $ssa_input | where process_name=\"openwith.exe\" OR process_name=\"optionalfeatures.exe\" OR process_name=\"pathping.exe\" OR process_name=\"ping.exe\" OR process_name=\"passwordonwakesettingflyout.exe\" OR process_name=\"pickerhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"pkgmgr.exe\" OR process_name=\"pnpunattend.exe\" OR process_name=\"pnputil.exe\" OR process_name=\"presentationhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"presentationsettings.exe\" OR process_name=\"printbrmui.exe\" OR process_name=\"printdialoghost.exe\" OR process_name=\"printdialoghost3d.exe\" OR process_name=\"printisolationhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"proximityuxhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"rdspnf.exe\" OR process_name=\"rmactivate.exe\" OR process_name=\"rmactivate_isv.exe\" OR process_name=\"rmactivate_ssp.exe\" OR process_name=\"rmactivate_ssp_isv.exe\" OR process_name=\"route.exe\" OR process_name=\"rdpsa.exe\" OR process_name=\"rdpsaproxy.exe\" OR process_name=\"rdpsauachelper.exe\" OR process_name=\"reagentc.exe\" OR process_name=\"recoverydrive.exe\" OR process_name=\"register-cimprovider.exe\" OR process_name=\"registeriepkeys.exe\" OR process_name=\"relpost.exe\" OR process_name=\"remoteposworker.exe\" OR process_name=\"rmclient.exe\" OR process_name=\"robocopy.exe\" OR process_name=\"rpcping.exe\" OR process_name=\"runlegacycplelevated.exe\" OR process_name=\"runtimebroker.exe\" OR process_name=\"sihclient.exe\" OR process_name=\"searchfilterhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"searchindexer.exe\" OR process_name=\"searchprotocolhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"secedit.exe\" OR process_name=\"sensordataservice.exe\" OR process_name=\"setieinstalleddate.exe\" OR process_name=\"settingsynchost.exe\" OR process_name=\"slidetoshutdown.exe\" OR process_name=\"smartscreensettings.exe\" OR process_name=\"sndvol.exe\" OR process_name=\"snippingtool.exe\" OR process_name=\"soundrecorder.exe\" OR process_name=\"spaceagent.exe\" OR process_name=\"sppextcomobj.exe\" OR process_name=\"srtasks.exe\" OR process_name=\"stikynot.exe\" OR process_name=\"synchost.exe\" OR process_name=\"sysreseterr.exe\" OR process_name=\"systempropertiesadvanced.exe\" OR process_name=\"systempropertiescomputername.exe\" OR process_name=\"systempropertiesdataexecutionprevention.exe\" OR process_name=\"systempropertieshardware.exe\" OR process_name=\"systempropertiesperformance.exe\" OR process_name=\"systempropertiesprotection.exe\" OR process_name=\"systempropertiesremote.exe\" OR process_name=\"systemsettingsadminflows.exe\" OR process_name=\"systemsettingsbroker.exe\" OR process_name=\"systemsettingsremovedevice.exe\" OR process_name=\"tcpsvcs.exe\" OR process_name=\"tracert.exe\" OR process_name=\"tstheme.exe\" OR process_name=\"tswbprxy.exe\" OR process_name=\"tapiunattend.exe\" OR process_name=\"taskmgr.exe\" OR process_name=\"thumbnailextractionhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"tokenbrokercookies.exe\" OR process_name=\"tpminit.exe\" OR process_name=\"tswpfwrp.exe\" OR process_name=\"ui0detect.exe\" OR process_name=\"upgraderesultsui.exe\" OR process_name=\"useraccountbroker.exe\" OR process_name=\"useraccountcontrolsettings.exe\" OR process_name=\"usoclient.exe\" OR process_name=\"utilman.exe\" OR process_name=\"vssvc.exe\" OR process_name=\"vaultcmd.exe\" OR process_name=\"vaultsysui.exe\" OR process_name=\"wfs.exe\" OR process_name=\"wmpdmc.exe\" OR process_name=\"wpdshextautoplay.exe\" OR process_name=\"wscollect.exe\" OR process_name=\"wsmanhttpconfig.exe\" OR process_name=\"wsreset.exe\" OR process_name=\"wudfhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"wwahost.exe\" OR process_name=\"wallpaperhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"webcache.exe\" OR process_name=\"werfault.exe\" OR process_name=\"werfaultsecure.exe\" OR process_name=\"winsat.exe\" OR process_name=\"windows.media.backgroundplayback.exe\" OR process_name=\"windowsactiondialog.exe\" OR process_name=\"windowsanytimeupgrade.exe\" OR process_name=\"windowsanytimeupgraderesults.exe\";\n$cond_3 = | from $ssa_input | where process_name=\"windowsanytimeupgradeui.exe\" OR process_name=\"windowsupdateelevatedinstaller.exe\" OR process_name=\"workfolders.exe\" OR process_name=\"wpcmon.exe\" OR process_name=\"acu.exe\" OR process_name=\"aitagent.exe\" OR process_name=\"aitstatic.exe\" OR process_name=\"alg.exe\" OR process_name=\"appidcertstorecheck.exe\" OR process_name=\"appidpolicyconverter.exe\" OR process_name=\"at.exe\" OR process_name=\"attrib.exe\" OR process_name=\"audiodg.exe\" OR process_name=\"auditpol.exe\" OR process_name=\"autochk.exe\" OR process_name=\"autoconv.exe\" OR process_name=\"autofmt.exe\" OR process_name=\"baaupdate.exe\" OR process_name=\"backgroundtaskhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"bcastdvr.exe\" OR process_name=\"bcdboot.exe\" OR process_name=\"bcdedit.exe\" OR process_name=\"bdechangepin.exe\" OR process_name=\"bdeunlock.exe\" OR process_name=\"bitsadmin.exe\" OR process_name=\"bootcfg.exe\" OR process_name=\"bootim.exe\" OR process_name=\"bootsect.exe\" OR process_name=\"bridgeunattend.exe\" OR process_name=\"browser_broker.exe\" OR process_name=\"bthudtask.exe\" OR process_name=\"cacls.exe\" OR process_name=\"calc.exe\" OR process_name=\"cdpreference.exe\" OR process_name=\"certreq.exe\" OR process_name=\"certutil.exe\" OR process_name=\"change.exe\" OR process_name=\"changepk.exe\" OR process_name=\"charmap.exe\" OR process_name=\"chglogon.exe\" OR process_name=\"chgport.exe\" OR process_name=\"chgusr.exe\" OR process_name=\"chkdsk.exe\" OR process_name=\"chkntfs.exe\" OR process_name=\"choice.exe\" OR process_name=\"cipher.exe\" OR process_name=\"cleanmgr.exe\" OR process_name=\"cliconfg.exe\" OR process_name=\"clip.exe\" OR process_name=\"cmd.exe\" OR process_name=\"cmdkey.exe\" OR process_name=\"cmdl32.exe\" OR process_name=\"cmmon32.exe\" OR process_name=\"cmstp.exe\" OR process_name=\"cofire.exe\" OR process_name=\"colorcpl.exe\" OR process_name=\"comp.exe\" OR process_name=\"compact.exe\" OR process_name=\"conhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"consent.exe\" OR process_name=\"control.exe\" OR process_name=\"convert.exe\" OR process_name=\"credwiz.exe\" OR process_name=\"cscript.exe\" OR process_name=\"csrss.exe\" OR process_name=\"ctfmon.exe\" OR process_name=\"cttune.exe\" OR process_name=\"cttunesvr.exe\" OR process_name=\"dashost.exe\" OR process_name=\"dccw.exe\" OR process_name=\"dcomcnfg.exe\" OR process_name=\"ddodiag.exe\" OR process_name=\"dfrgui.exe\" OR process_name=\"dialer.exe\" OR process_name=\"diantz.exe\" OR process_name=\"dinotify.exe\" OR process_name=\"diskpart.exe\" OR process_name=\"diskperf.exe\" OR process_name=\"diskraid.exe\" OR process_name=\"dispdiag.exe\" OR process_name=\"djoin.exe\" OR process_name=\"dllhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"dllhst3g.exe\" OR process_name=\"dmcertinst.exe\" OR process_name=\"dmcfghost.exe\" OR process_name=\"dmclient.exe\" OR process_name=\"dnscacheugc.exe\" OR process_name=\"doskey.exe\" OR process_name=\"dpapimig.exe\" OR process_name=\"dpnsvr.exe\" OR process_name=\"driverquery.exe\" OR process_name=\"drvcfg.exe\" OR process_name=\"drvinst.exe\" OR process_name=\"dsregcmd.exe\" OR process_name=\"dstokenclean.exe\" OR process_name=\"dvdplay.exe\" OR process_name=\"dvdupgrd.exe\" OR process_name=\"dwm.exe\" OR process_name=\"dxdiag.exe\" OR process_name=\"easinvoker.exe\" OR process_name=\"efsui.exe\";\n$cond_4 = | from $ssa_input | where process_name=\"embeddedapplauncher.exe\" OR process_name=\"esentutl.exe\" OR process_name=\"eudcedit.exe\" OR process_name=\"eventcreate.exe\" OR process_name=\"eventvwr.exe\" OR process_name=\"expand.exe\" OR process_name=\"extrac32.exe\" OR process_name=\"fc.exe\" OR process_name=\"fhmanagew.exe\" OR process_name=\"find.exe\" OR process_name=\"findstr.exe\" OR process_name=\"finger.exe\" OR process_name=\"fixmapi.exe\" OR process_name=\"fltmc.exe\" OR process_name=\"fodhelper.exe\" OR process_name=\"fontdrvhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"fontview.exe\" OR process_name=\"forfiles.exe\" OR process_name=\"fsavailux.exe\" OR process_name=\"fsquirt.exe\" OR process_name=\"fsutil.exe\" OR process_name=\"ftp.exe\" OR process_name=\"fvenotify.exe\" OR process_name=\"fveprompt.exe\" OR process_name=\"getmac.exe\" OR process_name=\"gpresult.exe\" OR process_name=\"gpscript.exe\" OR process_name=\"gpupdate.exe\" OR process_name=\"grpconv.exe\" OR process_name=\"hdwwiz.exe\" OR process_name=\"help.exe\" OR process_name=\"hwrcomp.exe\" OR process_name=\"hwrreg.exe\" OR process_name=\"icacls.exe\" OR process_name=\"icardagt.exe\" OR process_name=\"icsunattend.exe\" OR process_name=\"ie4uinit.exe\" OR process_name=\"ieunatt.exe\" OR process_name=\"ieetwcollector.exe\" OR process_name=\"iexpress.exe\" OR process_name=\"immersivetpmvscmgrsvr.exe\" OR process_name=\"ipconfig.exe\" OR process_name=\"irftp.exe\" OR process_name=\"iscsicli.exe\" OR process_name=\"iscsicpl.exe\" OR process_name=\"isoburn.exe\" OR process_name=\"klist.exe\" OR process_name=\"ksetup.exe\" OR process_name=\"ktmutil.exe\" OR process_name=\"label.exe\" OR process_name=\"licensingdiag.exe\" OR process_name=\"lodctr.exe\" OR process_name=\"logagent.exe\" OR process_name=\"logman.exe\" OR process_name=\"logoff.exe\" OR process_name=\"lpkinstall.exe\" OR process_name=\"lpksetup.exe\" OR process_name=\"lpremove.exe\" OR process_name=\"lsass.exe\" OR process_name=\"lsm.exe\" OR process_name=\"makecab.exe\" OR process_name=\"manage-bde.exe\" OR process_name=\"mblctr.exe\" OR process_name=\"mcbuilder.exe\" OR process_name=\"mctadmin.exe\" OR process_name=\"mfpmp.exe\" OR process_name=\"mmc.exe\" OR process_name=\"mobsync.exe\" OR process_name=\"mountvol.exe\" OR process_name=\"mpnotify.exe\" OR process_name=\"msconfig.exe\" OR process_name=\"msdt.exe\" OR process_name=\"msdtc.exe\" OR process_name=\"msfeedssync.exe\" OR process_name=\"msg.exe\" OR process_name=\"mshta.exe\" OR process_name=\"msiexec.exe\" OR process_name=\"msinfo32.exe\" OR process_name=\"mspaint.exe\" OR process_name=\"msra.exe\" OR process_name=\"mstsc.exe\" OR process_name=\"mtstocom.exe\" OR process_name=\"nbtstat.exe\" OR process_name=\"ndadmin.exe\" OR process_name=\"net.exe\" OR process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR process_name=\"netbtugc.exe\" OR process_name=\"netcfg.exe\" OR process_name=\"netiougc.exe\" OR process_name=\"netsh.exe\" OR process_name=\"newdev.exe\" OR process_name=\"nltest.exe\" OR process_name=\"notepad.exe\" OR process_name=\"nslookup.exe\" OR process_name=\"ntoskrnl.exe\" OR process_name=\"ntprint.exe\" OR process_name=\"ocsetup.exe\" OR process_name=\"odbcad32.exe\" OR process_name=\"odbcconf.exe\" OR process_name=\"omadmclient.exe\" OR process_name=\"omadmprc.exe\";\n$cond_5 = | from $ssa_input | where process_name=\"openfiles.exe\" OR process_name=\"osk.exe\" OR process_name=\"p2phost.exe\" OR process_name=\"pcalua.exe\" OR process_name=\"pcaui.exe\" OR process_name=\"pcawrk.exe\" OR process_name=\"pcwrun.exe\" OR process_name=\"perfmon.exe\" OR process_name=\"phoneactivate.exe\" OR process_name=\"plasrv.exe\" OR process_name=\"poqexec.exe\" OR process_name=\"powercfg.exe\" OR process_name=\"prevhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"print.exe\" OR process_name=\"printfilterpipelinesvc.exe\" OR process_name=\"printui.exe\" OR process_name=\"proquota.exe\" OR process_name=\"provtool.exe\" OR process_name=\"psr.exe\" OR process_name=\"pwlauncher.exe\" OR process_name=\"qappsrv.exe\" OR process_name=\"qprocess.exe\" OR process_name=\"query.exe\" OR process_name=\"quser.exe\" OR process_name=\"qwinsta.exe\" OR process_name=\"rasautou.exe\" OR process_name=\"rasdial.exe\" OR process_name=\"raserver.exe\" OR process_name=\"rasphone.exe\" OR process_name=\"rdpclip.exe\" OR process_name=\"rdpinput.exe\" OR process_name=\"rdrleakdiag.exe\" OR process_name=\"recdisc.exe\" OR process_name=\"recover.exe\" OR process_name=\"reg.exe\" OR process_name=\"regedt32.exe\" OR process_name=\"regini.exe\" OR process_name=\"regsvr32.exe\" OR process_name=\"rekeywiz.exe\" OR process_name=\"relog.exe\" OR process_name=\"repair-bde.exe\" OR process_name=\"replace.exe\" OR process_name=\"reset.exe\" OR process_name=\"resmon.exe\" OR process_name=\"rmttpmvscmgrsvr.exe\" OR process_name=\"rrinstaller.exe\" OR process_name=\"rstrui.exe\" OR process_name=\"runas.exe\" OR process_name=\"rundll32.exe\" OR process_name=\"runonce.exe\" OR process_name=\"rwinsta.exe\" OR process_name=\"sbunattend.exe\" OR process_name=\"sc.exe\" OR process_name=\"schtasks.exe\" OR process_name=\"sdbinst.exe\" OR process_name=\"sdchange.exe\" OR process_name=\"sdclt.exe\" OR process_name=\"sdiagnhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"secinit.exe\" OR process_name=\"services.exe\" OR process_name=\"sessionmsg.exe\" OR process_name=\"sethc.exe\" OR process_name=\"setspn.exe\" OR process_name=\"setupcl.exe\" OR process_name=\"setupugc.exe\" OR process_name=\"setx.exe\" OR process_name=\"sfc.exe\" OR process_name=\"shadow.exe\" OR process_name=\"shrpubw.exe\" OR process_name=\"shutdown.exe\" OR process_name=\"sigverif.exe\" OR process_name=\"sihost.exe\" OR process_name=\"slui.exe\" OR process_name=\"smss.exe\" OR process_name=\"snmptrap.exe\" OR process_name=\"sort.exe\" OR process_name=\"spinstall.exe\" OR process_name=\"spoolsv.exe\" OR process_name=\"sppsvc.exe\" OR process_name=\"spreview.exe\" OR process_name=\"srdelayed.exe\" OR process_name=\"subst.exe\" OR process_name=\"svchost.exe\" OR process_name=\"sxstrace.exe\" OR process_name=\"syskey.exe\" OR process_name=\"systeminfo.exe\" OR process_name=\"systemreset.exe\" OR process_name=\"systray.exe\" OR process_name=\"tabcal.exe\" OR process_name=\"takeown.exe\" OR process_name=\"taskeng.exe\" OR process_name=\"taskhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"taskhostw.exe\" OR process_name=\"taskkill.exe\" OR process_name=\"tasklist.exe\" OR process_name=\"taskmgr.exe\" OR process_name=\"tcmsetup.exe\" OR process_name=\"timeout.exe\" OR process_name=\"tpmvscmgr.exe\" OR process_name=\"tpmvscmgrsvr.exe\";\n$cond_6 = | from $ssa_input | where process_name=\"tracerpt.exe\" OR process_name=\"tscon.exe\" OR process_name=\"tsdiscon.exe\" OR process_name=\"tskill.exe\" OR process_name=\"typeperf.exe\" OR process_name=\"tzsync.exe\" OR process_name=\"tzutil.exe\" OR process_name=\"ucsvc.exe\" OR process_name=\"unlodctr.exe\" OR process_name=\"unregmp2.exe\" OR process_name=\"upnpcont.exe\" OR process_name=\"userinit.exe\" OR process_name=\"vds.exe\" OR process_name=\"vdsldr.exe\" OR process_name=\"verclsid.exe\" OR process_name=\"verifier.exe\" OR process_name=\"verifiergui.exe\" OR process_name=\"vmicsvc.exe\" OR process_name=\"vssadmin.exe\" OR process_name=\"w32tm.exe\" OR process_name=\"waitfor.exe\" OR process_name=\"wbadmin.exe\" OR process_name=\"wbengine.exe\" OR process_name=\"wecutil.exe\" OR process_name=\"wermgr.exe\" OR process_name=\"wevtutil.exe\" OR process_name=\"wextract.exe\" OR process_name=\"where.exe\" OR process_name=\"whoami.exe\" OR process_name=\"wiaacmgr.exe\" OR process_name=\"wiawow64.exe\" OR process_name=\"wifitask.exe\" OR process_name=\"wimserv.exe\" OR process_name=\"wininit.exe\" OR process_name=\"winload.exe\" OR process_name=\"winlogon.exe\" OR process_name=\"winresume.exe\" OR process_name=\"winrs.exe\" OR process_name=\"winrshost.exe\" OR process_name=\"winver.exe\" OR process_name=\"wisptis.exe\" OR process_name=\"wkspbroker.exe\" OR process_name=\"wksprt.exe\" OR process_name=\"wlanext.exe\" OR process_name=\"wlrmdr.exe\" OR process_name=\"wowreg32.exe\" OR process_name=\"wpnpinst.exe\" OR process_name=\"wpr.exe\" OR process_name=\"write.exe\" OR process_name=\"wscript.exe\" OR process_name=\"wsmprovhost.exe\" OR process_name=\"wsqmcons.exe\" OR process_name=\"wuapihost.exe\" OR process_name=\"wuapp.exe\" OR process_name=\"wuauclt.exe\" OR process_name=\"wusa.exe\" OR process_name=\"xcopy.exe\" OR process_name=\"xpsrchvw.exe\" OR process_name=\"xwizard.exe\";\n| from $cond_1 | union $cond_2 | union $cond_3 | union $cond_4 | union $cond_5 | union $cond_6 | where match_regex(process_path, /(?i)\\\\windows\\\\system32/)=false AND match_regex(process_path, /(?i)\\\\windows\\\\syswow64/)=false | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(device, user), body=create_map([\"event_id\", event_id, \"process_path\", process_path, \"process_name\", process_name]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();", "how_to_implement": "Collect endpoint data such as sysmon or 4688 events.", "known_false_positives": "None", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036/system_process_running_unexpected_location/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A system process $process_name$ with commandline $cmd_line$ spawn in non-default folder path in host $dest_device_id$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1036"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest_device_id", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_user_id", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "required_fields": ["dest_device_id", "process_name", "_time", "dest_user_id", "process_path"], "risk_score": 56, "risk_severity": "low", "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Masquerading"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Windshift", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "Dragonfly 2.0"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "system_process_running_from_unexpected_location_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious MSBuild Rename", "id": "4006adac-5937-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 2, "date": "2021-01-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies renamed instances of msbuild.exe executing. Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v4.0.30319 and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v4.0.30319. During investigation, identify the code executed and what is executing a renamed instance of MSBuild.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_msbuild` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_msbuild_rename_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of msbuild, triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md", "https://github.com/infosecn1nja/MaliciousMacroMSBuild/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild", "Cobalt Strike", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious renamed msbuild.exe binary ran on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1036", "T1127", "T1036.003", "T1127.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Masquerading", "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "Rename System Utilities", "MSBuild"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Windshift", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "Dragonfly 2.0", "no", "menuPass", "APT32", "Soft Cell", "PLATINUM", "Frankenstein"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=msbuild.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSBuild.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_msbuild"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_msbuild_rename_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 Rename", "id": "7360137f-abad-473e-8189-acbdaa34d114", "version": 3, "date": "2021-02-04", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies renamed instances of rundll32.exe executing. rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64. During investigation, validate it is the legitimate rundll32.exe executing and what script content it is loading. This query relies on the original filename or internal name from the PE meta data. Expand the query as needed by looking for specific command line arguments outlined in other analytics.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_rename_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Suspicious renamed rundll32.exe binary ran on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1036", "T1218.011", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Masquerading", "Rundll32", "Rename System Utilities"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Windshift", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT32", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "TA505", "MuddyWater", "APT29", "APT19", "CopyKittens", "APT3", "Carbanak", "APT28", "menuPass", "APT32", "Soft Cell", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_rundll32"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_rundll32_rename_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename", "id": "f0db4464-55d9-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 3, "date": "2021-09-20", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies a renamed instance of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe. Microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v4.0.30319 and is rarely utilized. When investigating, identify the executed code on disk and review. A spawned child process from microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is uncommon. In any instance, microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe spawning from an Office product or any living off the land binary is highly suspect.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_microsoftworkflowcompiler` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe, triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md#atomic-test-6---microsoftworkflowcompilerexe-payload-execution"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "Cobalt Strike", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious renamed microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe binary ran on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1036", "T1127", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Masquerading", "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "Rename System Utilities"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Windshift", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "Dragonfly 2.0", "no", "menuPass", "APT32", "Soft Cell", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_microsoftworkflowcompiler"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious msbuild path", "id": "f5198224-551c-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 2, "date": "2021-01-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies msbuild.exe executing from a non-standard path. Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v4.0.30319 and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v4.0.30319. Instances of Visual Studio will run a copy of msbuild.exe. A moved instance of MSBuild is suspicious, however there are instances of build applications that will move or use a copy of MSBuild.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_msbuild` AND (Processes.process_path!=c:\\\\windows\\\\microsoft.net\\\\framework*\\\\v*\\\\*) by Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `suspicious_msbuild_path_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of msbuild.exe, triggering a false positive. Baselining of MSBuild.exe usage is recommended to better understand it's path usage. Visual Studio runs an instance out of a path that will need to be filtered on.", "references": ["https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild", "Cobalt Strike", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Msbuild.exe ran from an uncommon path on $dest$ execyted by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1036", "T1127", "T1036.003", "T1127.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Masquerading", "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "Rename System Utilities", "MSBuild"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Windshift", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "Dragonfly 2.0", "no", "menuPass", "APT32", "Soft Cell", "PLATINUM", "Frankenstein"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=msbuild.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSBuild.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_msbuild"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_msbuild_path_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "id": "270a67a6-55d8-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "description": "Monitor and detect behaviors used by attackers who leverage trusted developer utilities to execute malicious code.", "narrative": "Adversaries may take advantage of trusted developer utilities to proxy execution of malicious payloads. There are many utilities used for software development related tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development, debugging, and reverse engineering. These utilities may often be signed with legitimate certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution of malicious code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application control solutions.\\\nThe searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe to execute malicious code.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1036.003", "T1127", "T1036"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Masquerading", "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "Rename System Utilities"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Soft Cell", "PLATINUM", "no", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Windshift", "menuPass"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage", "id": "9bbc62e8-55d8-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 2, "date": "2021-01-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe usage. microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v4.0.30319 and is rarely utilized. When investigating, identify the executed code on disk and review. It is not a commonly used process by many applications.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_microsoftworkflowcompiler` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, limited instances have been identified coming from native Microsoft utilities similar to SCCM.", "references": ["https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md#atomic-test-6---microsoftworkflowcompilerexe-payload-execution"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe process ran on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1127"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_microsoftworkflowcompiler"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename", "id": "f0db4464-55d9-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 3, "date": "2021-09-20", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies a renamed instance of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe. Microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v4.0.30319 and is rarely utilized. When investigating, identify the executed code on disk and review. A spawned child process from microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is uncommon. In any instance, microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe spawning from an Office product or any living off the land binary is highly suspect.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_microsoftworkflowcompiler` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe, triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md#atomic-test-6---microsoftworkflowcompilerexe-payload-execution"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "Cobalt Strike", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious renamed microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe binary ran on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1036", "T1127", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Masquerading", "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "Rename System Utilities"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Windshift", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "Dragonfly 2.0", "no", "menuPass", "APT32", "Soft Cell", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_microsoftworkflowcompiler"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156", "id": "817b0dfc-23ba-4bcc-96cc-2cb77e428fbe", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-27", "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", "description": "Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2021-3156. Discovered by the Qualys Research Team, this vulnerability has been found to affect sudo across multiple Linux distributions (Ubuntu 20.04 and prior, Debian 10 and prior, Fedora 33 and prior). As this vulnerability was committed to code in July 2011, there will be many distributions affected. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows any unprivileged user to gain root privileges on the vulnerable host.", "narrative": "A non-privledged user is able to execute the sudoedit command to trigger a buffer overflow. After the successful buffer overflow, they are then able to gain root privileges on the affected host. The conditions needed to be run are a trailing \"\\\" along with shell and edit flags. Monitoring the /var/log directory on Linux hosts using the Splunk Universal Forwarder will allow you to pick up this behavior when using the provided detection.", "references": ["https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1068"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Whitefly", "Threat Group-3390", "Cobalt Group", "APT32", "APT28", "PLATINUM", "APT33", "FIN8", "FIN6"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault", "id": "10f2bae0-bbe6-4984-808c-37dc1c67980d", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-29", "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit", "search": "`linux_hosts` | search sudoedit segfault | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by host | search count > 5 | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault_filter`", "how_to_implement": "Splunk Universal Forwarder running on Linux systems (tested on Centos and Ubuntu), where segfaults are being logged. This also captures instances where the exploit has been compiled into a binary. The detection looks for greater than 5 instances of sudoedit combined with segfault over your search time period on a single host", "known_false_positives": "If sudoedit is throwing segfaults for other reasons this will pick those up too.", "references": ["https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 16"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-3156"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "host"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Whitefly", "APT33", "Cobalt Group", "PLATINUM", "FIN8", "APT32", "Threat Group-3390", "FIN6", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "index=*", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "linux_hosts"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery", "id": "1de31d5d-8fa6-4ee0-af89-17069134118a", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-28", "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit", "search": "`osquery_process` | search \"columns.cmdline\"=\"sudoedit -s \\\\*\" | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery_filter`", "how_to_implement": "OSQuery installed and configured to pick up process events (info at https://osquery.io) as well as using the Splunk OSQuery Add-on https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4402. The vulnerability is exposed when a non privledged user tries passing in a single \\ character at the end of the command while using the shell and edit flags.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 16"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-3156"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "columns.cmdline"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Whitefly", "APT33", "Cobalt Group", "PLATINUM", "FIN8", "APT32", "Threat Group-3390", "FIN6", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=\"osquery-process\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "osquery_process"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156", "id": "93fbec4e-0375-440c-8db3-4508eca470c4", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-27", "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit", "search": "`linux_hosts` | search \"sudoedit -s \\\\\" | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_filter`", "how_to_implement": "Splunk Universal Forwarder running on Linux systems, capturing logs from the /var/log directory. The vulnerability is exposed when a non privledged user tries passing in a single \\ character at the end of the command while using the shell and edit flags.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 16"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-3156"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Whitefly", "APT33", "Cobalt Group", "PLATINUM", "FIN8", "APT32", "Threat Group-3390", "FIN6", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "index=*", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "linux_hosts"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Revil Ransomware", "id": "817cae42-f54b-457a-8a36-fbf45521e29e", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-04", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Revil ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Revil, encrypting network shares, deleting shadow volume storage, registry key modification, deleting of security logs, and more.", "narrative": "Revil ransomware is a RaaS,that a single group may operates and manges the development of this ransomware. It involve the use of ransomware payloads along with exfiltration of data. Malicious actors demand payment for ransome of data and threaten deletion and exposure of exfiltrated data.", "references": ["https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Revil Ransomware", "category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562.007", "T1562", "T1218", "T1218.003", "T1112", "T1574", "T1491", "T1574.002", "T1204", "T1490"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Hijack Execution Flow", "CMSTP", "Modify Registry", "DLL Side-Loading", "Disable or Modify Tools", "Inhibit System Recovery", "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Impair Defenses", "Defacement", "User Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Impact", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390", "Putter Panda", "Tropic Trooper", "Kimsuky", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN8", "Turla", "Gamaredon Group", "Rocke", "Cobalt Group", "Silence", "APT32", "Soft Cell", "APT19", "APT41", "menuPass", "Blue Mockingbird", "Lazarus Group", "Honeybee", "APT3", "Wizard Spider", "no", "APT38", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Gorgon Group", "Night Dragon", "Naikon"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Revil Registry Entry", "id": "e3d3f57a-c381-11eb-9e35-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-02", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies suspicious modification in registry entry to keep some malware data during its infection. This technique seen in several apt implant, malware and ransomware like REVIL where it keep some information like the random generated file extension it uses for all the encrypted files and ransomware notes file name in the compromised host.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\WOW6432Node\\\\Facebook_Assistant\\\\*\" OR Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\WOW6432Node\\\\BlackLivesMatter*\") AND (Registry.registry_value_name = \"\\.*\" OR Registry.registry_value_name = \"Binary Data\") by Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `revil_registry_entry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "to successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Image, TargetObject registry key, registry Details from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A registry entry $registry_path$ with registry value $registry_value_name$ and $registry_value_name$ related to revil ransomware in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1112"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name"], "risk_score": 60, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Modify Registry"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Turla", "APT32", "APT38", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "Threat Group-3390", "Honeybee", "Patchwork", "Gorgon Group", "FIN8"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "revil_registry_entry_filter"}]}, {"name": "Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell", "id": "5ee2bcd0-b2ff-11eb-bb34-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-12", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This following analytic detects PowerShell command to delete shadow copy using the WMIC PowerShell module. This technique was seen used by a recent adversary to deploy DarkSide Ransomware where it executed a child process of PowerShell to execute a hex encoded command to delete shadow copy. This hex encoded command was able to be decrypted by PowerShell log.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message= \"*ShadowCopy*\" (Message = \"*Delete*\" OR Message = \"*Remove*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the powershell logs from your endpoints. make sure you enable needed registry to monitor this event.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html", "https://searchwindowsserver.techtarget.com/tutorial/Set-up-PowerShell-script-block-logging-for-added-security"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An attempt to delete ShadowCopy was performed using PowerShell on $ComputerName$ by $User$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1490"], "observable": [{"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Inhibit System Recovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Disable Security Monitoring", "id": "c148a894-dd93-11eb-bf2a-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-07-05", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to identifies a modification in registry to disable the windows denfender real time behavior monitoring. This event or technique is commonly seen in RAT, bot, or Trojan to disable AV to evade detections.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process=\"*set-mppreference*\" AND Processes.process IN (\"*disablerealtimemonitoring*\",\"*disableioavprotection*\",\"*disableintrusionpreventionsystem*\",\"*disablescriptscanning*\",\"*disableblockatfirstseen*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_disable_security_monitoring_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives. However, tune based on scripts that may perform this action.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md#atomic-test-15---tamper-with-windows-defender-atp-powershell"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/pwh_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_powershell"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "powershell_disable_security_monitoring_filter"}]}, {"name": "Allow Network Discovery In Firewall", "id": "ccd6a38c-d40b-11eb-85a5-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-06-23", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious modification to the firewall to allow network discovery on a machine. This technique was seen in couple of ransomware (revil, reddot) to discover other machine connected to the compromised host to encrypt more files.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_netsh` Processes.process= \"*firewall*\" Processes.process= \"*group=\\\"Network Discovery\\\"*\" Processes.process=\"*enable*\" Processes.process=\"*Yes*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `allow_network_discovery_in_firewall_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "network admin may modify this firewall feature that may cause this rule to be triggered.", "references": ["https://kb.fortinet.com/kb/documentLink.do?externalID=FD52469", "https://app.any.run/tasks/c0f98850-af65-4352-9746-fbebadee4f05/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.007", "T1562"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=netsh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=netsh.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_netsh"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "allow_network_discovery_in_firewall_filter"}]}, {"name": "Modification Of Wallpaper", "id": "accb0712-c381-11eb-8e5b-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-02", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies suspicious modification of registry to deface or change the wallpaper of a compromised machines as part of its payload. This technique was commonly seen in ransomware like REVIL where it create a bitmap file contain a note that the machine was compromised and make it as a wallpaper.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode =13 (TargetObject= \"*\\\\Control Panel\\\\Desktop\\\\Wallpaper\" AND Image != \"*\\\\explorer.exe\") OR (TargetObject= \"*\\\\Control Panel\\\\Desktop\\\\Wallpaper\" AND Details = \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Image TargetObject Details Computer process_guid process_id user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `modification_of_wallpaper_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Image, TargetObject registry key, registry Details from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "3rd party tool may used to changed the wallpaper of the machine", "references": ["https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware", "BlackMatter Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Wallpaper modification on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1491"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Image", "TargetObject", "Details", "Computer", "process_guid", "process_id", "user_id"], "risk_score": 54, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Defacement"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "modification_of_wallpaper_filter"}]}, {"name": "Revil Common Exec Parameter", "id": "85facebe-c382-11eb-9c3e-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-06-02", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies suspicious commandline parameter that are commonly used by REVIL ransomware to encrypts the compromise machine.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"* -nolan *\" OR Processes.process = \"* -nolocal *\" OR Processes.process = \"* -fast *\" OR Processes.process = \"* -full *\" by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `revil_common_exec_parameter_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "third party tool may have same command line parameters as revil ransomware.", "references": ["https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ related to revil ransomware in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1204"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process_guid"], "risk_score": 54, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["User Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "revil_common_exec_parameter_filter"}]}, {"name": "Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring", "id": "79439cae-9200-11eb-a4d3-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-31", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to identifies a modification in registry to disable the windows denfender real time behavior monitoring. This event or technique is commonly seen in RAT, bot, or Trojan to disable AV to evade detections.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableBehaviorMonitoring\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableOnAccessProtection\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableScanOnRealtimeEnable\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableRealtimeMonitoring\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableIOAVProtection\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableScriptScanning\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_windows_behavior_monitoring_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to disable this windows features.", "references": ["https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": [{"Source": "Endpoint"}, {"Stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Windows Defender real time behavior monitoring disabled on $dest", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.user", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 40, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disable_windows_behavior_monitoring_filter"}]}, {"name": "Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading", "id": "8bb3f280-dd9b-11eb-84d5-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-05", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious creation of msmpeng.exe or mpsvc.dll in non default windows defender folder. This technique was seen couple days ago with revil ransomware in Kaseya Supply chain. The approach is to drop an old version of msmpeng.exe to load the actual payload name as mspvc.dll which will load the revil ransomware to the compromise machine", "search": "|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_name = \"msmpeng.exe\" OR Filesystem.file_name = \"mpsvc.dll\") AND Filesystem.file_path != \"*\\\\Program Files\\\\windows defender\\\\*\" by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node.", "known_false_positives": "quite minimal false positive expected.", "references": ["https://community.sophos.com/b/security-blog/posts/active-ransomware-attack-on-kaseya-customers"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets//malware/revil/msmpeng_side/windows-sysmon.log"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1574.002", "T1574"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.file_create_time", "Filesystem.process_id", "Filesystem.file_name", "Filesystem.user", "Filesystem.file_path"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["DLL Side-Loading", "Hijack Execution Flow"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["BRONZE BUTLER", "Naikon", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Tropic Trooper", "Patchwork", "APT19", "APT32", "APT3", "menuPass", "Threat Group-3390", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading_filter"}]}, {"name": "Wbemprox COM Object Execution", "id": "9d911ce0-c3be-11eb-b177-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-02", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this search is designed to detect potential malicious process loading COM object to wbemprox.dll,", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\fastprox.dll\", \"*\\\\wbemprox.dll\", \"*\\\\wbemcomn.dll\") NOT (process_name IN (\"wmiprvse.exe\", \"WmiApSrv.exe\", \"unsecapp.exe\")) NOT(Image IN(\"*\\\\windows\\\\*\",\"*\\\\program files*\", \"*\\\\wbem\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name Computer EventCode Signed ProcessId Hashes IMPHASH | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wbemprox_com_object_execution_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "legitimate process that are not in the exception list may trigger this event.", "references": ["https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf2/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious COM Object Execution on $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.003"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Image", "ImageLoaded", "process_name", "Computer", "EventCode", "Signed", "ProcessId", "Hashes", "IMPHASH"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "CMSTP"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Cobalt Group", "MuddyWater"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "wbemprox_com_object_execution_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services", "id": "97aecafc-0a68-11ec-962f-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-31", "author": "Michael Haag, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "description": "PetitPotam (CVE-2021-36942,) is a vulnerablity identified in Microsofts EFSRPC Protocol that can allow an unauthenticated account to escalate privileges to domain administrator given the right circumstances.", "narrative": "In June 2021, security researchers at SpecterOps released a blog post and white paper detailing several potential attack vectors against Active Directory Certificated Services (ADCS). ADCS is a Microsoft product that implements Public Key Infrastrucutre (PKI) functionality and can be used by organizations to provide and manage digital certiticates within Active Directory.\\ In July 2021, a security researcher released PetitPotam, a tool that allows attackers to coerce Windows systems into authenticating to arbitrary endpoints.\\ Combining PetitPotam with the identified ADCS attack vectors allows attackers to escalate privileges from an unauthenticated anonymous user to full domain admin privileges.", "references": ["https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2021/07/27/microsoft-releases-guidance-mitigating-petitpotam-ntlm-relay", "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5005413-mitigating-ntlm-relay-attacks-on-active-directory-certificate-services-ad-cs-3612b773-4043-4aa9-b23d-b87910cd3429", "https://www.specterops.io/assets/resources/Certified_Pre-Owned.pdf", "https://github.com/topotam/PetitPotam/", "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/releases/tag/2.2.0-20210723", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-36942", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services"], "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003", "T1187"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Forced Authentication", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Suckfly", "Frankenstein", "Axiom", "APT32", "Sowbug", "APT28", "Poseidon Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leviathan", "APT39", "DarkHydrus"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request", "id": "e3ef244e-0a67-11ec-abf2-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-31", "author": "Michael Haag, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifes Event Code 4768, A `Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested`, successfull occurs. This behavior has been identified to assist with detecting PetitPotam, CVE-2021-36942. Once an attacer obtains a computer certificate by abusing Active Directory Certificate Services in combination with PetitPotam, the next step would be to leverage the certificate for malicious purposes. One way of doing this is to request a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket using a tool like Rubeus. This request will generate a 4768 event with some unusual fields depending on the environment. This analytic will require tuning, we recommend filtering Account_Name to Domain Controllers for your environment.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 Client_Address!=\"::1\" Certificate_Thumbprint!=\"\" Account_Name=*$ | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Account_Name, Client_Address, action, Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request_filter`", "how_to_implement": "The following analytic requires Event Code 4768. Ensure that it is logging no Domain Controllers and appearing in Splunk.", "known_false_positives": "False positives are possible if the environment is using certificates for authentication.", "references": ["https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventid=4768", "https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Active+Directory+Certificate+Services+ADCS+PKI+domain+admin+vulnerability/27668/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-36942"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1187/petitpotam/windows-security.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Lateral Movement"], "message": "A Kerberos TGT was requested in a non-standard manner against $dest$, potentially related to CVE-2021-36942, PetitPotam.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "Account_Name", "Client_Address", "action", "Message"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request_filter"}]}, {"name": "PetitPotam Network Share Access Request", "id": "95b8061a-0a67-11ec-85ec-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-31", "author": "Michael Haag, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes Windows Event Code 5145, \"A network share object was checked to see whether client can be granted desired access\". During our research into PetitPotam, CVE-2021-36942, we identified the ocurrence of this event on the target host with specific values. \\\nTo enable 5145 events via Group Policy - Computer Configuration->Polices->Windows Settings->Security Settings->Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Expand this node, go to Object Access (Audit Polices->Object Access), then select the Setting Audit Detailed File Share Audit \\\nIt is possible this is not enabled by default and may need to be reviewed and enabled. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel security events to identify further suspicious activity.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` Account_Name=\"ANONYMOUS LOGON\" EventCode=5145 Relative_Target_Name=lsarpc | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Security_ID, Share_Name, Source_Address, Accesses, Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `petitpotam_network_share_access_request_filter`", "how_to_implement": "Windows Event Code 5145 is required to utilize this analytic and it may not be enabled in most environments.", "known_false_positives": "False positives have been limited when the Anonymous Logon is used for Account Name.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187/", "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventid=5145", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5145"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-36942"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1187/petitpotam/windows-security.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Lateral Movement"], "message": "A remote host is enumerating a $dest$ to identify permissions. This is a precursor event to CVE-2021-36942, PetitPotam.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1187"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "Security_ID", "Share_Name", "Source_Address", "Accesses", "Message"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Forced Authentication"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["DarkHydrus", "Dragonfly 2.0"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "petitpotam_network_share_access_request_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell", "id": "2c8ff66e-0b57-42af-8ad7-912438a403fc", "version": 5, "date": "2017-08-23", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "description": "Attackers are finding stealthy ways \"live off the land,\" leveraging utilities and tools that come standard on the endpoint--such as PowerShell--to achieve their goals without downloading binary files. These searches can help you detect and investigate PowerShell command-line options that may be indicative of malicious intent.", "narrative": "The searches in this Analytic Story monitor for parameters often used for malicious purposes. It is helpful to understand how often the notable events generated by this story occur, as well as the commonalities between some of these events. These factors may provide clues about whether this is a common occurrence of minimal concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. Likewise, it is important to determine whether the issue is restricted to a single user/system or is broader in scope. \\\nThe following factors may assist you in determining whether the event is malicious: \\\n1. Country of origin \\\n1. Responsible party \\\n1. Fully qualified domain names associated with the external IP address \\\n1. Registration of fully qualified domain names associated with external IP address \\\nDetermining whether it is a dynamic domain frequently visited by others and/or how third parties categorize it can also help you answer some questions surrounding the attacker and details related to the external system. In addition, there are various sources--such as VirusTotal— that can provide some reputation information on the IP address or domain name, which can assist in determining whether the event is malicious. Finally, determining whether there are other events associated with the IP address may help connect data points or show other events that should be brought into scope. \\\nGathering data on the system of interest can sometimes help you quickly determine whether something suspicious is happening. Some of these items include finding out who else may have recently logged into the system, whether any unusual scheduled tasks exist, whether the system is communicating on suspicious ports, whether there are modifications to sensitive registry keys, and whether there are any known vulnerabilities on the system. This information can often highlight other activity commonly seen in attack scenarios or give more information about how the system may have been targeted. \\\nOften, a simple inspection of the process name and path can tell you if the system has been compromised. For example, if `svchost.exe` is found running from a location other than `C:\\Windows\\System32`, it is likely something malicious designed to hide in plain sight when cursorily reviewing process names. Similarly, if the process itself seems legitimate, but the parent process is running from the temporary browser cache, that could be indicative of activity initiated via a compromised website a user visited. \\\nIt can also be very helpful to examine various behaviors of the process of interest or the parent of the process of interest. For example, if it turns out the process of interest is malicious, it would be good to see if the parent to that process spawned other processes that might be worth further scrutiny. If a process is suspect, a review of the network connections made in and around the time of the event and/or whether the process spawned any child processes could be helpful, as well. \\\nIn the event a system is suspected of having been compromised via a malicious website, we suggest reviewing the browsing activity from that system around the time of the event. If categories are given for the URLs visited, that can help you zero in on possible malicious sites. \\\nMost recently we have added new content related to PowerShell Script Block logging, Windows EventCode 4104. Script block logging presents the deobfuscated and raw script executed on an endpoint. The analytics produced were tested against commonly used attack frameworks - PowerShell-Empire, Cobalt Strike and Covenant. In addition, we sampled publicly available samples that utilize PowerShell and validated coverage. The analytics are here to identify suspicious usage, cmdlets, or script values. 4104 events are enabled via the Windows registry and may generate a large volume of data if enabled globally. Enabling on critical systems or a limited set may be best. During triage of 4104 events, review parallel processes for other processes and command executed. Identify any file modifications and network communication and review accordingly. Fortunately, we get the full script to determine the level of threat identified.", "references": ["https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malware-employs-powershell-to-infect-systems/", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Malicious PowerShell", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562", "T1543.003", "T1546.015", "T1021", "T1055", "T1059", "T1059.001", "T1021.006", "T1021.003", "T1047", "T1003", "T1027", "T1592", "T1140", "T1027.005", "T1546", "T1053.005"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Component Object Model Hijacking", "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "Process Injection", "Obfuscated Files or Information", "Remote Services", "Event Triggered Execution", "Windows Management Instrumentation", "Distributed Component Object Model", "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information", "OS Credential Dumping", "Scheduled Task", "Impair Defenses", "Windows Remote Management", "Windows Service", "Indicator Removal from Tools", "PowerShell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Execution", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Magic Hound", "Stealth Falcon", "Inception", "Axiom", "Sandworm Team", "Putter Panda", "Rancor", "Tropic Trooper", "Kimsuky", "TA459", "TEMP.Veles", "Poseidon Group", "Dark Caracal", "PLATINUM", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ke3chang", "FIN8", "Turla", "APT39", "Molerats", "Leviathan", "APT29", "Gamaredon Group", "Rocke", "Group5", "Carbanak", "TA505", "Mofang", "Whitefly", "Frankenstein", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "APT32", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT19", "WIRTE", "APT-C-36", "APT37", "Darkhotel", "APT41", "CopyKittens", "FIN5", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Blue Mockingbird", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "Honeybee", "BlackOasis", "Thrip", "Wizard Spider", "APT3", "Sowbug", "Machete", "Leafminer", "APT18", "no", "Sharpshooter", "MuddyWater", "FIN10", "DarkVishnya", "Patchwork", "Elderwood", "Dust Storm", "APT28", "Gallmaker", "APT33", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN7", "Gorgon Group", "Night Dragon", "DarkHydrus"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques", "id": "cde75cf6-3c7a-4dd6-af01-27cdb4511fd4", "version": 5, "date": "2021-01-19", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for PowerShell processes launched with arguments that have characters indicative of obfuscation on the command-line.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| eval num_obfuscation = (mvcount(split(process,\"`\"))-1) + (mvcount(split(process, \"^\"))-1) + (mvcount(split(process, \"'\"))-1) | `malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques_filter` | search num_obfuscation > 10 ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "These characters might be legitimately on the command-line, but it is not common.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/obfuscated_powershell/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Powershell.exe running with potential obfuscated arguments on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "PowerShell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "Gallmaker", "Turla", "APT19", "DarkHydrus", "APT28", "Thrip", "Gorgon Group", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leviathan", "TA459", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT32", "FIN7", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "APT3", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_powershell"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques_filter"}]}, {"name": "Any Powershell DownloadString", "id": "4d015ef2-7adf-11eb-95da-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-03-01", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a file using `DownloadString` method. This particular method is utilized in many different PowerShell frameworks to download files and output to disk. Identify the source (IP/domain) and destination file and triage appropriately. If AMSI logging or PowerShell transaction logs are available, review for further details of the implant.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process=*.DownloadString* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `any_powershell_downloadstring_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present and filtering will need to occur by parent process or command line argument. It may be required to modify this query to an EDR product for more granular coverage.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.net.webclient.downloadstring?view=net-5.0", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "HAFNIUM Group", "Ingress Tool Transfer"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior identifies the use of DownloadString within PowerShell.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "PowerShell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "Gallmaker", "Turla", "APT19", "DarkHydrus", "APT28", "Thrip", "Gorgon Group", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leviathan", "TA459", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT32", "FIN7", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "APT3", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_powershell"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "any_powershell_downloadstring_filter"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Processing Stream Of Data", "id": "0d718b52-c9f1-11eb-bc61-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-10", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is processing compressed stream data. This is typically found in obfuscated PowerShell or PowerShell executing embedded .NET or binary files that are stream flattened and will be deflated durnig execution. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*IO.Compression.*\" OR Message = \"*IO.StreamReader*\" OR Message = \"*]::Decompress*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_processing_stream_of_data_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "powershell may used this function to process compressed data.", "references": ["https://medium.com/@ahmedjouini99/deobfuscating-emotets-powershell-payload-e39fb116f7b9", "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell", "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains stream command in $Message$ commonly for processing compressed or to decompressed binary file with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User", "Score"], "risk_score": 40, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "PowerShell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "Gallmaker", "Turla", "APT19", "DarkHydrus", "APT28", "Thrip", "Gorgon Group", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leviathan", "TA459", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT32", "FIN7", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "APT3", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "powershell_processing_stream_of_data_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging", "id": "bc1dc6b8-c954-11eb-bade-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-09", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies the common PowerShell stager used by PowerShell-Empire. Each stager that may use PowerShell all uses the same pattern. The initial HTTP will be base64 encoded and use `system.net.webclient`. Note that some obfuscation may evade the analytic. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message=*system.net.webclient* AND Message=*frombase64string*) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode ComputerName User EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_empire_with_powershell_script_block_logging_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "False positives may only pertain to it not being related to Empire, but another framework. Filter as needed if any applications use the same pattern.", "references": ["https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/", "https://github.com/BC-SECURITY/Empire"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The following behavior was identified and typically related to PowerShell-Empire on $ComputerName$ by $User$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Message", "OpCode", "ComputerName", "User", "EventCode"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "PowerShell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "Gallmaker", "Turla", "APT19", "DarkHydrus", "APT28", "Thrip", "Gorgon Group", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leviathan", "TA459", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT32", "FIN7", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "APT3", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_empire_with_powershell_script_block_logging_filter"}]}, {"name": "Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass", "id": "c2590137-0b08-4985-9ec5-6ae23d92f63d", "version": 6, "date": "2020-11-06", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Monitor for changes of the ExecutionPolicy in the registry to the values \"unrestricted\" or \"bypass,\" which allows the execution of malicious scripts.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*Software\\\\Microsoft\\\\Powershell\\\\1\\\\ShellIds\\\\Microsoft.PowerShell* Registry.registry_key_name=ExecutionPolicy (Registry.registry_value_name=Unrestricted OR Registry.registry_value_name=Bypass) by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Registry node. You must also be ingesting logs with the fields registry_path, registry_key_name, and registry_value_name from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may attempt to change the default execution policy on a system for a variety of reasons. However, setting the policy to \"unrestricted\" or \"bypass\" as this search is designed to identify, would be unusual. Hits should be reviewed and investigated as appropriate.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "Credential Dumping", "HAFNIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_execution_policy/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A registry modification in $registry_path$ with reg key $registry_key_name$ and reg value $registry_value_name$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "registry_path", "type": "RegistryPath", "role": ["Others"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.dest"], "risk_score": 48, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "PowerShell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "Gallmaker", "Turla", "APT19", "DarkHydrus", "APT28", "Thrip", "Gorgon Group", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leviathan", "TA459", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT32", "FIN7", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "APT3", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass_filter"}]}, {"name": "Unloading AMSI via Reflection", "id": "a21e3484-c94d-11eb-b55b-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-09", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies the behavior of AMSI being tampered with. Implemented natively in many frameworks, the command will look similar to `SEtValuE($Null,(New-OBJEct COLlECtionS.GenerIC.HAshSEt{[StrINg]))}$ReF=[ReF].AsSeMbLY.GeTTyPe(\"System.Management.Automation.Amsi\"+\"Utils\")` taken from Powershell-Empire. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message=*system.management.automation.amsi* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode ComputerName User EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `unloading_amsi_via_reflection_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Potential for some third party applications to disable AMSI upon invocation. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Possible AMSI Unloading via Reflection using PowerShell on $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Message", "OpCode", "ComputerName", "User", "EventCode"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "unloading_amsi_via_reflection_filter"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Execute COM Object", "id": "65711630-f9bf-11eb-8d72-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-10", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a COM CLSID execution through powershell. This technique was seen in several adversaries and malware like ransomware conti where it has a feature to execute command using COM Object. This technique may use by network operator at some cases but a good indicator if some application want to gain privilege escalation or bypass uac.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromCLSID*\" OR Message = \"*CreateInstance([Type]::GetTypeFromProgID*\"| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_execute_com_object_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "network operrator may use this command.", "references": ["https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1423361119926816776.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/conti/conti_leak/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains COM CLSID command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1546.015", "T1546"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 5, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Component Object Model Hijacking", "Event Triggered Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "powershell_execute_com_object_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging", "id": "8148c29c-c952-11eb-9255-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-09", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable no critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies common Mimikatz functions that may be identified in the script block, including `mimikatz`. This will catch the most basic use cases for Pass the Ticket, Pass the Hash and `-DumprCreds`. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message IN (*mimikatz*, *-dumpcr*, *sekurlsa::pth*, *kerberos::ptt*, *kerberos::golden*) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode ComputerName User EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mimikatz_with_powershell_script_block_logging_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as the commands being identifies are quite specific to EventCode 4104 and Mimikatz. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The following behavior was identified and typically related to MimiKatz being loaded within the context of PowerShell on $ComputerName$ by $User$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003"], "observable": [{"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Message", "OpCode", "ComputerName", "User", "EventCode"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_mimikatz_with_powershell_script_block_logging_filter"}]}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command", "id": "c4db14d9-7909-48b4-a054-aa14d89dbb19", "version": 6, "date": "2021-10-05", "author": "David Dorsey, Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of the EncodedCommand PowerShell parameter. This is typically used by Administrators to run complex scripts, but commonly used by adversaries to hide their code. \\\nThe analytic identifies all variations of EncodedCommand, as PowerShell allows the ability to shorten the parameter. For example enc, enco, encod and so forth. In addition, through our research it was identified that PowerShell will interpret different command switch types beyond the hyphen. We have added endash, emdash, horizontal bar, and forward slash. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel events to determine legitimacy. Tune as needed based on admin scripts in use. \\\nAlternatively, may use regex per matching here https://regexr.com/662ov.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"(?i)[\\-|\\/|\u2013|\u2014|\u2015]e(nc*o*d*e*d*c*o*m*m*a*n*d*)*\\s+[^-]\") | `malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "System administrators may use this option, but it's not common.", "references": ["https://regexr.com/662ov", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses/blob/master/TestHarnesses/T1059.001_PowerShell/OutPowerShellCommandLineParameter.ps1", "https://ss64.com/ps/powershell.html", "https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/1440758396534214658?s=20"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "NOBELIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1027/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Powershell.exe running potentially malicious encodede commands on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1027"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.process_id"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Obfuscated Files or Information"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "Whitefly", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Mofang", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "Soft Cell", "Turla", "TA505", "Silence", "APT33", "Night Dragon", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "APT29", "APT18", "Tropic Trooper", "Cobalt Group", "Patchwork", "Leafminer", "APT37", "Threat Group-3390", "Honeybee", "Dark Caracal", "menuPass", "APT19", "BlackOasis", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "Elderwood", "MuddyWater", "FIN7", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "APT3", "APT32", "Group5", "Dust Storm", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_powershell"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command_filter"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature", "id": "afed80b2-d34b-11eb-a952-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-22", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious enabling of smb1protocol through \"powershell.exe\". This technique was seen in some ransomware (like reddot) where it enable smb share to do the lateral movement and encrypt other files within the compromise network system.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*Enable-WindowsOptionalFeature*\" Message = \"*SMB1Protocol*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the powershell logs from your endpoints. make sure you enable needed registry to monitor this event.", "known_false_positives": "network operator may enable or disable this windows feature.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/c0f98850-af65-4352-9746-fbebadee4f05/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "Ransomware"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-powershell.log"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1027", "T1027.005"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Obfuscated Files or Information", "Indicator Removal from Tools"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "Whitefly", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Mofang", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "Soft Cell", "Turla", "TA505", "Silence", "APT33", "Night Dragon", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "APT29", "APT18", "Tropic Trooper", "Cobalt Group", "Patchwork", "Leafminer", "APT37", "Threat Group-3390", "Honeybee", "Dark Caracal", "menuPass", "APT19", "BlackOasis", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "Elderwood", "MuddyWater", "FIN7", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "APT3", "APT32", "Group5", "Dust Storm", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "APT28", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "Patchwork", "APT3", "Turla", "OilRig", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature_filter"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell 4104 Hunting", "id": "d6f2b006-0041-11ec-8885-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-18", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following Hunting analytic assists with identifying suspicious PowerShell execution using Script Block Logging, or EventCode 4104. This analytic is not meant to be ran hourly, but occasionally to identify malicious or suspicious PowerShell. This analytic is a combination of work completed by Alex Teixeira and Splunk Threat Research Team.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 | eval DoIt = if(match(Message,\"(?i)(\\$doit)\"), \"4\", 0) | eval enccom=if(match(Message,\"[A-Za-z0-9+\\/]{44,}([A-Za-z0-9+\\/]{4}|[A-Za-z0-9+\\/]{3}=|[A-Za-z0-9+\\/]{2}==)\") OR match(Message, \"(?i)[-]e(nc*o*d*e*d*c*o*m*m*a*n*d*)*\\s+[^-]\"),4,0) | eval suspcmdlet=if(match(Message, \"(?i)Add-Exfiltration|Add-Persistence|Add-RegBackdoor|Add-ScrnSaveBackdoor|Check-VM|Do-Exfiltration|Enabled-DuplicateToken|Exploit-Jboss|Find-Fruit|Find-GPOLocation|Find-TrustedDocuments|Get-ApplicationHost|Get-ChromeDump|Get-ClipboardContents|Get-FoxDump|Get-GPPPassword|Get-IndexedItem|Get-Keystrokes|LSASecret|Get-PassHash|Get-RegAlwaysInstallElevated|Get-RegAutoLogon|Get-RickAstley|Get-Screenshot|Get-SecurityPackages|Get-ServiceFilePermission|Get-ServicePermission|Get-ServiceUnquoted|Get-SiteListPassword|Get-System|Get-TimedScreenshot|Get-UnattendedInstallFile|Get-Unconstrained|Get-VaultCredential|Get-VulnAutoRun|Get-VulnSchTask|Gupt-Backdoor|HTTP-Login|Install-SSP|Install-ServiceBinary|Invoke-ACLScanner|Invoke-ADSBackdoor|Invoke-ARPScan|Invoke-AllChecks|Invoke-BackdoorLNK|Invoke-BypassUAC|Invoke-CredentialInjection|Invoke-DCSync|Invoke-DllInjection|Invoke-DowngradeAccount|Invoke-EgressCheck|Invoke-Inveigh|Invoke-InveighRelay|Invoke-Mimikittenz|Invoke-NetRipper|Invoke-NinjaCopy|Invoke-PSInject|Invoke-Paranoia|Invoke-PortScan|Invoke-PoshRat|Invoke-PostExfil|Invoke-PowerDump|Invoke-PowerShellTCP|Invoke-PsExec|Invoke-PsUaCme|Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection|Invoke-ReverseDNSLookup|Invoke-RunAs|Invoke-SMBScanner|Invoke-SSHCommand|Invoke-Service|Invoke-Shellcode|Invoke-Tater|Invoke-ThunderStruck|Invoke-Token|Invoke-UserHunter|Invoke-VoiceTroll|Invoke-WScriptBypassUAC|Invoke-WinEnum|MailRaider|New-HoneyHash|Out-Minidump|Port-Scan|PowerBreach|PowerUp|PowerView|Remove-Update|Set-MacAttribute|Set-Wallpaper|Show-TargetScreen|Start-CaptureServer|VolumeShadowCopyTools|NEEEEWWW|(Computer|User)Property|CachedRDPConnection|get-net\\S+|invoke-\\S+hunter|Install-Service|get-\\S+(credent|password)|remoteps|Kerberos.*(policy|ticket)|netfirewall|Uninstall-Windows|Verb\\s+Runas|AmsiBypass|nishang|Invoke-Interceptor|EXEonRemote|NetworkRelay|PowerShelludp|PowerShellIcmp|CreateShortcut|copy-vss|invoke-dll|invoke-mass|out-shortcut|Invoke-ShellCommand\"),1,0) | eval base64 = if(match(lower(Message),\"frombase64\"), \"4\", 0) | eval empire=if(match(lower(Message),\"system.net.webclient\") AND match(lower(Message), \"frombase64string\") ,5,0) | eval mimikatz=if(match(lower(Message),\"mimikatz\") OR match(lower(Message), \"-dumpcr\") OR match(lower(Message), \"SEKURLSA::Pth\") OR match(lower(Message), \"kerberos::ptt\") OR match(lower(Message), \"kerberos::golden\") ,5,0) | eval iex = if(match(lower(Message),\"iex\"), \"2\", 0) | eval webclient=if(match(lower(Message),\"http\") OR match(lower(Message),\"web(client|request)\") OR match(lower(Message),\"socket\") OR match(lower(Message),\"download(file|string)\") OR match(lower(Message),\"bitstransfer\") OR match(lower(Message),\"internetexplorer.application\") OR match(lower(Message),\"xmlhttp\"),5,0) | eval get = if(match(lower(Message),\"get-\"), \"1\", 0) | eval rundll32 = if(match(lower(Message),\"rundll32\"), \"4\", 0) | eval suspkeywrd=if(match(Message, \"(?i)(bitstransfer|mimik|metasp|AssemblyBuilderAccess|Reflection\\.Assembly|shellcode|injection|cnvert|shell\\.application|start-process|Rc4ByteStream|System\\.Security\\.Cryptography|lsass\\.exe|localadmin|LastLoggedOn|hijack|BackupPrivilege|ngrok|comsvcs|backdoor|brute.?force|Port.?Scan|Exfiltration|exploit|DisableRealtimeMonitoring|beacon)\"),1,0) | eval syswow64 = if(match(lower(Message),\"syswow64\"), \"3\", 0) | eval httplocal = if(match(lower(Message),\"http://127.0.0.1\"), \"4\", 0) | eval reflection = if(match(lower(Message),\"reflection\"), \"1\", 0) | eval invokewmi=if(match(lower(Message), \"(?i)(wmiobject|WMIMethod|RemoteWMI|PowerShellWmi|wmicommand)\"),5,0) | eval downgrade=if(match(Message, \"(?i)([-]ve*r*s*i*o*n*\\s+2)\") OR match(lower(Message),\"powershell -version\"),3,0) | eval compressed=if(match(Message, \"(?i)GZipStream|::Decompress|IO.Compression|write-zip|(expand|compress)-Archive\"),5,0) | eval invokecmd = if(match(lower(Message),\"invoke-command\"), \"4\", 0) | addtotals fieldname=Score DoIt, enccom, suspcmdlet, suspkeywrd, compressed, downgrade, mimikatz, iex, empire, rundll32, webclient, syswow64, httplocal, reflection, invokewmi, invokecmd, base64, get | stats values(Score) by DoIt, enccom, compressed, downgrade, iex, mimikatz, rundll32, empire, webclient, syswow64, httplocal, reflection, invokewmi, invokecmd, base64, get, suspcmdlet, suspkeywrd | `powershell_4104_hunting_filter`", "how_to_implement": "The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives. May filter as needed.", "references": ["https://github.com/inodee/threathunting-spl/blob/master/hunt-queries/powershell_qualifiers.md", "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell", "https://github.com/marcurdy/dfir-toolset/blob/master/Powershell%20Blueteam.txt", "https://devblogs.microsoft.com/powershell/powershell-the-blue-team/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_logging?view=powershell-5.1", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/02/greater_visibilityt.html", "https://hurricanelabs.com/splunk-tutorials/how-to-use-powershell-transcription-logs-in-splunk/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": [], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ executing suspicious commands.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Message"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "PowerShell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "Gallmaker", "Turla", "APT19", "DarkHydrus", "APT28", "Thrip", "Gorgon Group", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leviathan", "TA459", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT32", "FIN7", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "APT3", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "powershell_4104_hunting_filter"}]}, {"name": "Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI", "id": "28077620-c9f6-11eb-8785-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-10", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 performing checks to identify anti-virus products installed on the endpoint. This technique is commonly found in malware and APT events where the adversary will map all running security applications or services. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*SELECT*\" OR Message = \"*WMIC*\") AND (Message = \"*AntiVirusProduct*\" OR Message = \"*AntiSpywareProduct*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "network administrator may used this command for checking purposes", "references": ["https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/05/12/maze-ransomware-1-year-counting/", "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Malicious PowerShell"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Reconnaissance"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains AV recon command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1592"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi_filter"}]}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window", "id": "ee18ed37-0802-4268-9435-b3b91aaa18db", "version": 7, "date": "2021-10-05", "author": "David Dorsey, Michael Haag Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following hunting analytic identifies PowerShell commands utilizing the WindowStyle parameter to hide the window on the compromised endpoint. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it is overriding the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide its activity from the user, and connects to the Internet. Removed in this version of the query is New-Object. The analytic identifies all variations of WindowStyle, as PowerShell allows the ability to shorten the parameter. For example w, win, windowsty and so forth. In addition, through our research it was identified that PowerShell will interpret different command switch types beyond the hyphen. We have added endash, emdash, horizontal bar, and forward slash.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"(?i)[\\-|\\/|\u2013|\u2014|\u2015]w(in*d*o*w*s*t*y*l*e*)*\\s+[^-]\") | `malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate process can have this combination of command-line options, but it's not common.", "references": ["https://regexr.com/663rr", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses/blob/master/TestHarnesses/T1059.001_PowerShell/OutPowerShellCommandLineParameter.ps1", "https://ss64.com/ps/powershell.html", "https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/1440758396534214658?s=20", "https://blog.netlab.360.com/ten-families-of-malicious-samples-are-spreading-using-the-log4j2-vulnerability-now/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "HAFNIUM Group", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Command And Control"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/hidden_powershell/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "PowerShell processes $process$ started with parameters to modify the execution policy of the run, run in a hidden window, and connect to the Internet on host $dest$ executed by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059.001", "T1059"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process", "type": "Process", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["PowerShell", "Command and Scripting Interpreter"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "Gallmaker", "Turla", "APT19", "DarkHydrus", "APT28", "Thrip", "Gorgon Group", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leviathan", "TA459", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT32", "FIN7", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "APT3", "APT29", "Deep Panda", "APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_powershell"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window_filter"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell Domain Enumeration", "id": "e1866ce2-ca22-11eb-8e44-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-10", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies specific PowerShell modules typically used to enumerate an organizations domain or users. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message IN (*get-netdomaintrust*, *get-netforesttrust*, *get-addomain*, *get-adgroupmember*, *get-domainuser*) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_domain_enumeration_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible there will be false positives, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "recon"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains domain enumeration command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Message", "ComputerName", "EventCode"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "PowerShell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "Gallmaker", "Turla", "APT19", "DarkHydrus", "APT28", "Thrip", "Gorgon Group", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leviathan", "TA459", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT32", "FIN7", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "APT3", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "powershell_domain_enumeration_filter"}]}, {"name": "Recon Using WMI Class", "id": "018c1972-ca07-11eb-9473-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-10", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell via EventCode 4104, where WMI is performing an event query looking for running processes or running services. This technique is commonly found where the adversary will identify services and system information on the compromised machine. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message= \"*SELECT*\" OR Message= \"*Get-WmiObject*\") AND (Message= \"*Win32_Bios*\" OR Message= \"*Win32_OperatingSystem*\" OR Message= \"*Win32_Processor*\" OR Message= \"*Win32_ComputerSystem*\" OR Message= \"*Win32_ComputerSystemProduct*\" OR Message= \"*Win32_ShadowCopy*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `recon_using_wmi_class_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "network administrator may used this command for checking purposes", "references": ["https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/05/12/maze-ransomware-1-year-counting/", "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Reconnaissance"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 75, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains host recon command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1592"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 60, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "recon_using_wmi_class_filter"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Creating Thread Mutex", "id": "637557ec-ca08-11eb-bd0a-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-10", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is using the `mutex` function. This function is commonly seen in some obfuscated PowerShell scripts to make sure that only one instance of there process is running on a compromise machine. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*Threading.Mutex*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_creating_thread_mutex_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "powershell developer may used this function in their script for instance checking too.", "references": ["https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Some+Powershell+Malicious+Code/22988/", "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains Thread Mutex in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1027", "T1027.005"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 40, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Obfuscated Files or Information", "Indicator Removal from Tools"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "Whitefly", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Mofang", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "Soft Cell", "Turla", "TA505", "Silence", "APT33", "Night Dragon", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "APT29", "APT18", "Tropic Trooper", "Cobalt Group", "Patchwork", "Leafminer", "APT37", "Threat Group-3390", "Honeybee", "Dark Caracal", "menuPass", "APT19", "BlackOasis", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "Elderwood", "MuddyWater", "FIN7", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "APT3", "APT32", "Group5", "Dust Storm", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "APT28", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "Patchwork", "APT3", "Turla", "OilRig", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "powershell_creating_thread_mutex_filter"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via System Reflection Assembly", "id": "85bc3f30-ca28-11eb-bd21-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-10", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable no critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies the use of PowerShell loading .net assembly via reflection. This is commonly found in malicious PowerShell usage, including Empire and Cobalt Strike. In addition, the `load(` value may be modifed by removing `(` and it will identify more events to review. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message IN (\"*[system.reflection.assembly]::load(*\",\"*[reflection.assembly]*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode ComputerName User EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_system_reflection_assembly_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as day to day scripts do not use this method.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.reflection.assembly?view=net-5.0", "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains reflective class assembly command in $Message$ to load .net code in memory with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Message", "OpCode", "ComputerName", "User", "EventCode"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "PowerShell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "Gallmaker", "Turla", "APT19", "DarkHydrus", "APT28", "Thrip", "Gorgon Group", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leviathan", "TA459", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT32", "FIN7", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "APT3", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "powershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_system_reflection_assembly_filter"}]}, {"name": "Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn", "id": "cb909b3e-512b-11ec-aa31-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-29", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic assists with identifying a PowerShell process spawned as a child or grand child process of commonly abused processes during lateral movement techniques including `services.exe`, `wmiprsve.exe`, `svchost.exe`, `wsmprovhost.exe` and `mmc.exe`. Legitimate Windows features such as the Service Control Manager, Windows Management Instrumentation, Task Scheduler, Windows Remote Management and the DCOM protocol can be abused to start a process on a remote endpoint. Looking for PowerShell spawned out of this processes may reveal a lateral movement attack. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse these services during a breach for lateral movement and remote code execution.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=svchost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=wsmprovhost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=mmc.exe) (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR (Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process=*powershell.exe*) OR Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR (Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process=*pwsh.exe*)) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may spawn PowerShell as a child process of the the identified processes. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053.005/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "Malicious PowerShell"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement_powershell/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement", "Malicious PowerShell"], "message": "A PowerShell process was spawned as a child process of typically abused processes on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021", "T1021.003", "T1021.006", "T1047", "T1053.005", "T1543.003", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 45, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote Services", "Distributed Component Object Model", "Windows Remote Management", "Windows Management Instrumentation", "Scheduled Task", "Windows Service", "PowerShell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement", "Execution", "Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no", "Threat Group-3390", "Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT41", "FIN6", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Threat Group-3390", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "menuPass", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "APT29", "Deep Panda", "Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "MuddyWater", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT-C-36", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT41", "Machete", "Soft Cell", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Patchwork", "OilRig", "Rancor", "Cobalt Group", "FIN8", "menuPass", "FIN10", "APT32", "FIN7", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT29", "Blue Mockingbird", "DarkVishnya", "Wizard Spider", "APT32", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Tropic Trooper", "Cobalt Group", "Ke3chang", "Honeybee", "FIN7", "Threat Group-3390", "APT19", "APT3", "Lazarus Group", "Carbanak", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "Gallmaker", "Turla", "APT19", "DarkHydrus", "APT28", "Thrip", "Gorgon Group", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leviathan", "TA459", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT32", "FIN7", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "APT3", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn_filter"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Using memory As Backing Store", "id": "c396a0c4-c9f2-11eb-b4f5-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-10", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is using memory stream as new object backstore. The malicious PowerShell script will contain stream flate data and will be decompressed in memory to run or drop the actual payload. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*New-Object IO.MemoryStream*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "powershell may used this function to store out object into memory.", "references": ["https://www.carbonblack.com/blog/decoding-malicious-powershell-streams/", "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains memorystream command in $Message$ as new object backstore with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1140"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 40, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Gamaredon Group", "Molerats", "Frankenstein", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Darkhotel", "Tropic Trooper", "menuPass", "Honeybee", "Threat Group-3390", "APT19", "Gorgon Group", "Leviathan", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store_filter"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content", "id": "8acbc04c-c882-11eb-b060-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-08", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies `FromBase64String` within the script block. A typical malicious instance will include additional code. \\\nCommand example - `[Byte[]]$var_code = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String(38uqIyMjQ6rG....` \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message=*frombase64string* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode ComputerName User EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_fileless_script_contains_base64_encoded_content_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains base64 command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1027", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Message", "OpCode", "ComputerName", "User", "EventCode"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "Obfuscated Files or Information", "PowerShell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Defense Evasion", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Gamaredon Group", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "Whitefly", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Mofang", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "Soft Cell", "Turla", "TA505", "Silence", "APT33", "Night Dragon", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "APT29", "APT18", "Tropic Trooper", "Cobalt Group", "Patchwork", "Leafminer", "APT37", "Threat Group-3390", "Honeybee", "Dark Caracal", "menuPass", "APT19", "BlackOasis", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "Elderwood", "MuddyWater", "FIN7", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "APT3", "APT32", "Group5", "Dust Storm", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "APT28", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "Gallmaker", "Turla", "APT19", "DarkHydrus", "APT28", "Thrip", "Gorgon Group", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leviathan", "TA459", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT32", "FIN7", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "APT3", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "powershell_fileless_script_contains_base64_encoded_content_filter"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress", "id": "a26d9db4-c883-11eb-9d75-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-08", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable no critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies `GetProcAddress` in the script block. This is not normal to be used by most PowerShell scripts and is typically unsafe/malicious. Many attack toolkits use GetProcAddress to obtain code execution. \\\nIn use, `$var_gpa = $var_unsafe_native_methods.GetMethod(GetProcAddress` and later referenced/executed elsewhere. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message=*getprocaddress* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode ComputerName User EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_fileless_process_injection_via_getprocaddress_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "recon"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains GetProcAddress API in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1055", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Message", "OpCode", "ComputerName", "User", "EventCode"], "risk_score": 48, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "Process Injection", "PowerShell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "APT32", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Cobalt Group", "APT37", "Honeybee", "PLATINUM", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "Gallmaker", "Turla", "APT19", "DarkHydrus", "APT28", "Thrip", "Gorgon Group", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leviathan", "TA459", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT32", "FIN7", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "APT3", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "powershell_fileless_process_injection_via_getprocaddress_filter"}]}, {"name": "Any Powershell DownloadFile", "id": "1a93b7ea-7af7-11eb-adb5-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-03-01", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a file using `DownloadFile` method. This particular method is utilized in many different PowerShell frameworks to download files and output to disk. Identify the source (IP/domain) and destination file and triage appropriately. If AMSI logging or PowerShell transaction logs are available, review for further details of the implant.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process=*DownloadFile* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `any_powershell_downloadfile_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present and filtering will need to occur by parent process or command line argument. It may be required to modify this query to an EDR product for more granular coverage.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.net.webclient.downloadfile?view=net-5.0", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "Ingress Tool Transfer", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exploitation"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior identifies the use of DownloadFile within PowerShell.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "PowerShell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "Gallmaker", "Turla", "APT19", "DarkHydrus", "APT28", "Thrip", "Gorgon Group", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leviathan", "TA459", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT32", "FIN7", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "APT3", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_powershell"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "any_powershell_downloadfile_filter"}]}, {"name": "WMI Recon Running Process Or Services", "id": "b5cd5526-cce7-11eb-b3bd-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-14", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104, where WMI is performing an event query looking for running processes or running services. This technique is commonly found in malware and APT events where the adversary will map all running security applications or services on the compromised machine. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message= \"*SELECT*\" AND (Message=\"*Win32_Process*\" OR Message=\"*Win32_Service*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmi_recon_running_process_or_services_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "network administrator may used this command for checking purposes", "references": ["https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/05/12/maze-ransomware-1-year-counting/", "https://www.eideon.com/2018-03-02-THL03-WMIBackdoors/", "https://github.com/trustedsec/SysmonCommunityGuide/blob/master/WMI-events.md", "https://in.security/an-intro-into-abusing-and-identifying-wmi-event-subscriptions-for-persistence/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Suspicious powerShell script execution by $user$ on $ComputerName$ via EventCode 4104, where WMI is performing an event query looking for running processes or running services", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1592"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 30, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "wmi_recon_running_process_or_services_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Active Directory Discovery", "id": "8460679c-2b21-463e-b381-b813417c32f2", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-20", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "batch", "description": "Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Discovery and Reconnaissance within with Active Directory environments.", "narrative": "Discovery consists of techniques an adversay uses to gain knowledge about an internal environment or network. These techniques provide adversaries with situational awareness and allows them to have the necessary information before deciding how to act or who/what to target next.\\\nOnce an attacker obtains an initial foothold in an Active Directory environment, she is forced to engage in Discovery techniques in the initial phases of a breach to better understand and navigate the target network. Some examples include but are not limited to enumerating domain users, domain admins, computers, domain controllers, network shares, group policy objects, domain trusts, etc.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/", "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2535", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/003/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1016.001", "T1016", "T1069.001", "T1033", "T1069.002", "T1482", "T1087.001", "T1049", "T1201", "T1087", "T1558.003", "T1087.002", "T1018"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Local Groups", "Domain Trust Discovery", "Local Account", "Remote System Discovery", "System Network Connections Discovery", "Account Discovery", "System Owner/User Discovery", "Kerberoasting", "Password Policy Discovery", "Domain Account", "Permission Groups Discovery", "System Network Configuration Discovery", "Domain Groups"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390", "Sandworm Team", "Magic Hound", "Inception", "Stealth Falcon", "APT1", "Tropic Trooper", "Poseidon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ke3chang", "FIN8", "Turla", "APT39", "Gamaredon Group", "Rocke", "TA505", "Frankenstein", "Deep Panda", "APT32", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT19", "APT37", "Darkhotel", "APT41", "FIN5", "menuPass", "FIN6", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "admin@338", "APT3", "Wizard Spider", "Leafminer", "no", "APT38", "MuddyWater", "FIN10", "Patchwork", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Naikon"]}, "detections": [{"name": "Local Account Discovery With Wmic", "id": "4902d7aa-0134-11ec-9d65-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for local users. The argument `useraccount` is used to leverage WMI to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` (Processes.process=*useraccount*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `local_account_discovery_with_wmic_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Local user discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087", "T1087.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Account Discovery", "Local Account"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Turla", "Poseidon Group", "OilRig", "Ke3chang", "APT32", "APT1", "Threat Group-3390", "APT3", "admin@338"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_wmic"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "local_account_discovery_with_wmic_filter"}]}, {"name": "NLTest Domain Trust Discovery", "id": "c3e05466-5f22-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-25", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for the execution of `nltest.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for Domain Trust information. Two arguments `/domain trusts`, returns a list of trusted domains, and `/all_trusts`, returns all trusted domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike use NLTest.exe to enumerate the current domain to assist with further understanding where to pivot next.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=nltest.exe OR Processes.process_name!=nltest.exe) (Processes.process=*/domain_trusts* OR Processes.process=*/all_trusts*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `nltest_domain_trust_discovery_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may use nltest for troubleshooting purposes, otherwise, rarely used.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1482/T1482.md", "https://malware.news/t/lets-learn-trickbot-implements-network-collector-module-leveraging-cmd-wmi-ldap/19104", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482/", "https://www.owasp.org/images/4/4b/Red_Team_Operating_in_a_Modern_Environment.pdf", "https://ss64.com/nt/nltest.html", "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/domain-trust-discovery/", "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/08/ryuks-return/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware", "Domain Trust Discovery", "IcedID", "Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Domain trust discovery execution on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1482"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Domain Trust Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "nltest_domain_trust_discovery_filter"}]}, {"name": "Get WMIObject Group Discovery with Script Block Logging", "id": "69df7f7c-155d-11ec-a055-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-14", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies the usage of `Get-WMIObject Win32_Group`, which is typically used as a way to identify groups on the endpoint. Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*Get-WMIObject*\" AND Message = \"*Win32_Group*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message OpCode ComputerName User EventCode| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_wmiobject_group_discovery_with_script_block_logging_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present. Tune as needed.", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/powershell-detections-threat-research-release-august-2021.html", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.md", "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "System group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Permission Groups Discovery", "Local Groups"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TA505", "APT3", "Turla", "OilRig", "admin@338"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "get_wmiobject_group_discovery_with_script_block_logging_filter"}]}, {"name": "GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block", "id": "2e891cbe-0426-11ec-9c9c-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-23", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-LocalUser` commandlet. The `Get-LocalUser` commandlet is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-LocalUser*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getlocaluser_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Local user discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087", "T1087.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Account Discovery", "Local Account"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Turla", "Poseidon Group", "OilRig", "Ke3chang", "APT32", "APT1", "Threat Group-3390", "APT3", "admin@338"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "getlocaluser_with_powershell_script_block_filter"}]}, {"name": "GetDomainGroup with PowerShell", "id": "93c94be3-bead-4a60-860f-77ca3fe59903", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-25", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. `Get-DomainGroup` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-DomainGroup*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getdomaingroup_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainGroup/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Domain group discovery with PowerView on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Permission Groups Discovery", "Domain Groups"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TA505", "APT3", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "Inception", "OilRig", "FIN6", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "getdomaingroup_with_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell", "id": "36e46ebe-065a-11ec-b4c7-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` executing the Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"powershell*\") AND Processes.process = \"*Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://github.com/S1ckB0y1337/Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy?view=windowsserver2019-ps"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1201"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id", "Processes.parent_process_name"], "risk_score": 9, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Password Policy Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Turla", "OilRig"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "GetDomainController with PowerShell Script Block", "id": "676b600a-a94d-4951-b346-11329431e6c1", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-02", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainController` commandlet. `Get-DomainController` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerView to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-DomainController*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainController/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Remote system discovery with PowerView on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 24, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote System Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Rocke", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT39", "APT32", "Deep Panda", "Threat Group-3390", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leafminer", "Ke3chang", "FIN8", "APT3", "FIN5", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Turla"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_script_block_filter"}]}, {"name": "Domain Account Discovery with Dsquery", "id": "b1a8ce04-04c2-11ec-bea7-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-24", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `dsquery.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover domain users. The `user` argument returns a list of all users registered in the domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike engage in remote system discovery for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=\"dsquery.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*user*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_account_discovery_with_dsquery_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet/details/dsquery.htm", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id", "Processes.parent_process_name"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Domain Account", "Account Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Turla", "Sandworm Team", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "Ke3chang", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "domain_account_discovery_with_dsquery_filter"}]}, {"name": "Password Policy Discovery with Net", "id": "09336538-065a-11ec-8665-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command line arguments used to obtain the domain password policy. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `net.exe` for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\") AND Processes.process = \"*accounts*\" AND Processes.process = \"*/domain*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `password_policy_discovery_with_net_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://github.com/S1ckB0y1337/Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1201"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id", "Processes.parent_process_name"], "risk_score": 9, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Password Policy Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Turla", "OilRig"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "password_policy_discovery_with_net_filter"}]}, {"name": "Wmic Group Discovery", "id": "83317b08-155b-11ec-8e00-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-14", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following hunting analytic identifies the use of `wmic.exe` enumerating local groups on the endpoint. \\\nTypically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wmic.exe (Processes.process=\"*group get name*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmic_group_discovery_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Local group discovery on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Permission Groups Discovery", "Local Groups"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TA505", "APT3", "Turla", "OilRig", "admin@338"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "wmic_group_discovery_filter"}]}, {"name": "GetLocalUser with PowerShell", "id": "85fae8fa-0427-11ec-8b78-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-23", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for local users. The `Get-LocalUser` commandlet is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-LocalUser*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getlocaluser_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Local user discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087", "T1087.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Account Discovery", "Local Account"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Turla", "Poseidon Group", "OilRig", "Ke3chang", "APT32", "APT1", "Threat Group-3390", "APT3", "admin@338"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "getlocaluser_with_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "GetAdComputer with PowerShell", "id": "c5a31f80-5888-4d81-9f78-1cc65026316e", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-07", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The `Get-AdComputer' commandlet returns a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-AdComputer*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getadcomputer_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote System Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Rocke", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT39", "APT32", "Deep Panda", "Threat Group-3390", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leafminer", "Ke3chang", "FIN8", "APT3", "FIN5", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Turla"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "getadcomputer_with_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Domain Group Discovery With Dsquery", "id": "f0c9d62f-a232-4edd-b17e-bc409fb133d4", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-01", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `dsquery.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The argument `group`, returns a list of all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use may leverage dsquery.exe to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"dsquery.exe\") (Processes.process=\"*group*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_group_discovery_with_dsquery_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Permission Groups Discovery", "Domain Groups"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TA505", "APT3", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "Inception", "OilRig", "FIN6", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "domain_group_discovery_with_dsquery_filter"}]}, {"name": "Local Account Discovery with Net", "id": "5d0d4830-0133-11ec-bae3-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for local users. The two arguments `user` and 'users', return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` (Processes.process=*user OR Processes.process=*users) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `local_account_discovery_with_net_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Local user discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087", "T1087.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Account Discovery", "Local Account"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Turla", "Poseidon Group", "OilRig", "Ke3chang", "APT32", "APT1", "Threat Group-3390", "APT3", "admin@338"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_net"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "local_account_discovery_with_net_filter"}]}, {"name": "GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell", "id": "b44f6ac6-0429-11ec-87e9-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-23", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query local users. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `Win32_UserAccount` parameter is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-WmiObject* AND Processes.process=*Win32_UserAccount*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Local user discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087", "T1087.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Account Discovery", "Local Account"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Turla", "Poseidon Group", "OilRig", "Ke3chang", "APT32", "APT1", "Threat Group-3390", "APT3", "admin@338"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Elevated Group Discovery With Wmic", "id": "3f6bbf22-093e-4cb4-9641-83f47b8444b6", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-25", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for specific domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate elevated domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery to identify high privileged users.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"wmic.exe\") (Processes.process=*/NAMESPACE:\\\\\\\\root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*) (Processes.process=\"*Domain Admins*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Enterprise Admins*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Schema Admins*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Account Operators*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Server Operators*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Protected Users*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Dns Admins*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `elevated_group_discovery_with_wmic_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-practices/appendix-b--privileged-accounts-and-groups-in-active-directory", "https://adsecurity.org/?p=3658"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Elevated domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 21, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Permission Groups Discovery", "Domain Groups"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TA505", "APT3", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "Inception", "OilRig", "FIN6", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "elevated_group_discovery_with_wmic_filter"}]}, {"name": "GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell Script Block", "id": "67740bd3-1506-469c-b91d-effc322cc6e5", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-25", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet used with specific parameters . The `DS_Group` parameter leverages WMI to query for all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message=*Get-WmiObject* AND Message=*\"namespace root\\\\directory\\\\ldap\"* AND Message=*\"class ds_group\"*) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/get-wmiobject?view=powershell-5.1"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Permission Groups Discovery", "Domain Groups"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TA505", "APT3", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "Inception", "OilRig", "FIN6", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_script_block_filter"}]}, {"name": "Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell Script Block", "id": "70fac80e-0bf1-11ec-9ba0-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-02", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies Get-ForestTrust from PowerSploit in order to gather domain trust information. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*get-foresttrust*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message OpCode ComputerName User EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_foresttrust_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "UPDATE_KNOWN_FALSE_POSITIVES", "references": ["https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-ForestTrust/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 40, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Suspicious PowerShell Get-ForestTrust was identified on endpoint $ComputerName$ by user $User$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1482"], "observable": [{"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "Path", "OpCode", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 12, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Domain Trust Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "get_foresttrust_with_powershell_script_block_filter"}]}, {"name": "Domain Account Discovery with Wmic", "id": "383572e0-04c5-11ec-bdcc-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-24", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain users. Red Teams and adversaries alike use wmic.exe to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=\"wmic.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*/NAMESPACE:\\\\\\\\root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*\" AND Processes.process = \"*ds_user*\" AND Processes.process = \"*GET*\" AND Processes.process = \"*ds_samaccountname*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_account_discovery_with_wmic_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id", "Processes.parent_process_name"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Domain Account", "Account Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Turla", "Sandworm Team", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "Ke3chang", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "domain_account_discovery_with_wmic_filter"}]}, {"name": "GetAdGroup with PowerShell Script Block", "id": "e4c73d68-794b-468d-b4d0-dac1772bbae7", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-25", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-AdGroup` commandlet. The `Get-AdGroup` commandlet is used to return a list of all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-ADGroup*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getadgroup_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-adgroup?view=windowsserver2019-ps"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Permission Groups Discovery", "Domain Groups"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TA505", "APT3", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "Inception", "OilRig", "FIN6", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "getadgroup_with_powershell_script_block_filter"}]}, {"name": "GetDomainComputer with PowerShell Script Block", "id": "f64da023-b988-4775-8d57-38e512beb56e", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-02", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainComputer` commandlet. `GetDomainComputer` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerView to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-DomainComputer*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use PowerView for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainComputer/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Remote system discovery with PowerView on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 24, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote System Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Rocke", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT39", "APT32", "Deep Panda", "Threat Group-3390", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leafminer", "Ke3chang", "FIN8", "APT3", "FIN5", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Turla"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_script_block_filter"}]}, {"name": "Domain Group Discovery With Wmic", "id": "a87736a6-95cd-4728-8689-3c64d5026b3e", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-25", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The arguments utilized in this command return a list of all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use wmic.exe to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"wmic.exe\") (Processes.process=*/NAMESPACE:\\\\\\\\root\\\\directory\\\\ldap* AND Processes.process=*ds_group* AND Processes.process=\"*GET ds_samaccountname*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_group_discovery_with_wmic_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Permission Groups Discovery", "Domain Groups"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TA505", "APT3", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "Inception", "OilRig", "FIN6", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "domain_group_discovery_with_wmic_filter"}]}, {"name": "Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell", "id": "4fa7f846-054a-11ec-a836-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-24", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies Get-DomainTrust from PowerView in order to gather domain trust information. Typically, this is utilized within a script being executed and used to enumerate the domain trust information. This grants the adversary an understanding of how large or small the domain is. During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=*get-domaintrust* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domaintrust_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives as this requires an active Administrator or adversary to bring in, import, and execute.", "references": ["http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/a-guide-to-attacking-domain-trusts/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 40, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Suspicious PowerShell Get-DomainTrust was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1482"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 12, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Domain Trust Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "get_domaintrust_with_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Net Localgroup Discovery", "id": "54f5201e-155b-11ec-a6e2-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-14", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following hunting analytic will identify the use of localgroup discovery using `net localgroup`. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=net.exe OR Processes.process_name=net1.exe (Processes.process=\"*localgroup*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `net_localgroup_discovery_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present. Tune as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery", "Windows Discovery Techniques"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Local group discovery on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Permission Groups Discovery", "Local Groups"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TA505", "APT3", "Turla", "OilRig", "admin@338"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "net_localgroup_discovery_filter"}]}, {"name": "ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN", "id": "ae8b3efc-2d2e-11ec-8b57-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-14", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies `setspn.exe` usage related to querying the domain for Service Principle Names. typically, this is a precursor activity related to kerberoasting or the silver ticket attack. \\\nWhat is a ServicePrincipleName? \\\nA service principal name (SPN) is a unique identifier of a service instance. SPNs are used by Kerberos authentication to associate a service instance with a service logon account. This allows a client application to request that the service authenticate an account even if the client does not have the account name.\\\nExample usage includes the following \\\n1. setspn -T offense -Q */* 1. setspn -T attackrange.local -F -Q MSSQLSvc/* 1. setspn -Q */* > allspns.txt 1. setspn -q \\\nValues \\\n1. -F = perform queries at the forest, rather than domain level 1. -T = perform query on the specified domain or forest (when -F is also used) 1. -Q = query for existence of SPN \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes for further suspicious activity.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_setspn` (Processes.process=\"*-t*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-f*\") OR (Processes.process=\"*-q*\" AND Processes.process=\"**/**\") OR (Processes.process=\"*-q*\") OR (Processes.process=\"*-s*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives may be caused by Administrators resetting SPNs or querying for SPNs. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/ad/service-principal-names", "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/t1208-kerberoasting", "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/setspn.exe-5C184D581524245DAD7A0A02B51FD2C2.html", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/", "https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/717.service-principal-names-spn-setspn-syntax.aspx", "https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz/", "https://blog.zsec.uk/paving-2-da-wholeset/", "https://msitpros.com/?p=3113", "https://adsecurity.org/?p=3466"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_setspn.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to identify service principle names.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1558.003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Kerberoasting"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=setspn.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=setspn.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_setspn"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn_filter"}]}, {"name": "Network Connection Discovery With Netstat", "id": "2cf5cc25-f39a-436d-a790-4857e5995ede", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-10", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `netstat.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use netstat.exe for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"netstat.exe\") (Processes.process=*-a*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `network_connection_discovery_with_netstat_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1049/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1049"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Network Connections Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Tropic Trooper", "APT41", "APT38", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "APT1", "OilRig", "APT3", "menuPass", "Threat Group-3390", "Poseidon Group", "admin@338", "Turla", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "network_connection_discovery_with_netstat_filter"}]}, {"name": "GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell Script Block", "id": "091712ff-b02a-4d43-82ed-34765515d95d", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-10", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-NetTcpconnection ` commandlet. This commandlet is used to return a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-NetTcpconnection*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/nettcpip/get-nettcpconnection?view=windowsserver2019-ps"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1049/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1049"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Network Connections Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Tropic Trooper", "APT41", "APT38", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "APT1", "OilRig", "APT3", "menuPass", "Threat Group-3390", "Poseidon Group", "admin@338", "Turla", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_script_block_filter"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell Get LocalGroup Discovery", "id": "b71adfcc-155b-11ec-9413-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-14", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following hunting analytic identifies the use of `get-localgroup` being used with PowerShell to identify local groups on the endpoint. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=cmd.exe) (Processes.process=\"*get-localgroup*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present. Tune as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Local group discovery on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Permission Groups Discovery", "Local Groups"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TA505", "APT3", "Turla", "OilRig", "admin@338"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_filter"}]}, {"name": "Network Connection Discovery With Net", "id": "640337e5-6e41-4b7f-af06-9d9eab5e1e2d", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-10", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use net.exe for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\") (Processes.process=*use*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `network_connection_discovery_with_net_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1049/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1049"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Network Connections Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Tropic Trooper", "APT41", "APT38", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "APT1", "OilRig", "APT3", "menuPass", "Threat Group-3390", "Poseidon Group", "admin@338", "Turla", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "network_connection_discovery_with_net_filter"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Get LocalGroup Discovery with Script Block Logging", "id": "d7c6ad22-155c-11ec-bb64-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-14", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies PowerShell cmdlet - `get-localgroup` being ran. Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*get-localgroup*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message OpCode ComputerName User EventCode| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_with_script_block_logging_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present. Tune as needed.", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/powershell-detections-threat-research-release-august-2021.html", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.md", "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell", "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Local group discovery on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Permission Groups Discovery", "Local Groups"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TA505", "APT3", "Turla", "OilRig", "admin@338"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_with_script_block_logging_filter"}]}, {"name": "GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell Script Block", "id": "fabd364e-04f3-11ec-b34b-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-24", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet. The `DS_User` class parameter leverages WMI to query for all domain users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*get-wmiobject*\" Message = \"*ds_user*\" Message = \"*-namespace*\" Message = \"*root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "he following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-blue-purple/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wmisdk/describing-the-ldap-namespace"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Reconnaissance"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "powershell process having commandline $Message$ for user enumeration", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Domain Account", "Account Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Turla", "Sandworm Team", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "Ke3chang", "no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_script_block_filter"}]}, {"name": "ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell", "id": "13243068-2d38-11ec-8908-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-14", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies `powershell.exe` usage, using Script Block Logging EventCode 4104, related to querying the domain for Service Principle Names. typically, this is a precursor activity related to kerberoasting or the silver ticket attack. \\\nWhat is a ServicePrincipleName? \\\nA service principal name (SPN) is a unique identifier of a service instance. SPNs are used by Kerberos authentication to associate a service instance with a service logon account. This allows a client application to request that the service authenticate an account even if the client does not have the account name.\\\nThe following analytic identifies the use of KerberosRequestorSecurityToken class within the script block. Using .NET System.IdentityModel.Tokens.KerberosRequestorSecurityToken class in PowerShell is the equivelant of using setspn.exe. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes for further suspicious activity.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message=\"*KerberosRequestorSecurityToken*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message OpCode ComputerName User EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filter as needed.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/ad/service-principal-names", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.identitymodel.tokens.kerberosrequestorsecuritytoken?view=netframework-4.8", "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/t1208-kerberoasting", "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/setspn.exe-5C184D581524245DAD7A0A02B51FD2C2.html", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/", "https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/717.service-principal-names-spn-setspn-syntax.aspx", "https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz/", "https://blog.zsec.uk/paving-2-da-wholeset/", "https://msitpros.com/?p=3113", "https://adsecurity.org/?p=3466", "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/atomic_red_team/windows-powershell_kerberos.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to identify service principle names.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1558.003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Kerberoasting"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell", "id": "584f4884-0bf1-11ec-a5ec-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-02", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies Get-ForestTrust from PowerSploit in order to gather domain trust information. Typically, this is utilized within a script being executed and used to enumerate the domain trust information. This grants the adversary an understanding of how large or small the domain is. During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=cmd.exe Processes.process=*get-foresttrust* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_foresttrust_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives as this requires an active Administrator or adversary to bring in, import, and execute.", "references": ["https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-ForestTrust/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 40, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Suspicious PowerShell Get-ForestTrust was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1482"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 12, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Domain Trust Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "get_foresttrust_with_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell", "id": "22d3b118-04df-11ec-8fa3-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-24", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain users. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `-class ds_user` parameter can be used to return the full list of users in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI in this case, using PowerShell, to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"powershell*\") AND Processes.process = \"*get-wmiobject*\" AND Processes.process = \"*ds_user*\" AND Processes.process = \"*root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*\" AND Processes.process = \"*-namespace*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet/details/dsquery.htm"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id", "Processes.parent_process_name"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Domain Account", "Account Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Turla", "Sandworm Team", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "Ke3chang", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Domain Controller Discovery with Wmic", "id": "64c7adaa-48ee-483c-b0d6-7175bc65e6cc", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-01", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The arguments utilized in this command line return a list of all domain controllers in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike use *.exe to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"wmic.exe\") (Processes.process=\"\" OR Processes.process=\"*DomainControllerAddress*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_controller_discovery_with_wmic_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Domain controller discovery on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 21, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote System Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Rocke", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT39", "APT32", "Deep Panda", "Threat Group-3390", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leafminer", "Ke3chang", "FIN8", "APT3", "FIN5", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Turla"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "domain_controller_discovery_with_wmic_filter"}]}, {"name": "Get DomainPolicy with Powershell", "id": "b8f9947e-065a-11ec-aafb-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` executing the `Get-DomainPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"powershell*\") AND Processes.process = \"*Get-DomainPolicy*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://github.com/S1ckB0y1337/Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet", "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainPolicy/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1201"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id", "Processes.parent_process_name"], "risk_score": 30, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Password Policy Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Turla", "OilRig"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Domain Account Discovery With Net App", "id": "98f6a534-04c2-11ec-96b2-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-24", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain users. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use net.exe to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` AND Processes.process = \"* user*\" AND Processes.process = \"*/do*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_account_discovery_with_net_app_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-for-identity/playbook-domain-dominance", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id", "Processes.parent_process_name"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Domain Account", "Account Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Turla", "Sandworm Team", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "Ke3chang", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_net"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "domain_account_discovery_with_net_app_filter"}]}, {"name": "GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell Script Block", "id": "29b99201-723c-4118-847a-db2b3d3fb8ea", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-01", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet. The `DS_Computer` class parameter leverages WMI to query for all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message=*Get-WmiObject* AND Message=*\"namespace root\\\\directory\\\\ldap\"* AND Message=*\"class ds_computer\"*) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/get-wmiobject?view=powershell-5.1"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote System Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Rocke", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT39", "APT32", "Deep Panda", "Threat Group-3390", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leafminer", "Ke3chang", "FIN8", "APT3", "FIN5", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Turla"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_script_block_filter"}]}, {"name": "Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell", "id": "8b5ef342-065a-11ec-b0fc-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` executing the Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"powershell*\") AND Processes.process = \"*Get-ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://github.com/S1ckB0y1337/Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-aduserresultantpasswordpolicy?view=windowsserver2019-ps"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1201"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id", "Processes.parent_process_name"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Password Policy Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Turla", "OilRig"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "GetAdGroup with PowerShell", "id": "872e3063-0fc4-4e68-b2f3-f2b99184a708", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-25", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The `Get-AdGroup` commandlnet is used to return a list of all groups available in a Windows Domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-AdGroup*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getadgroup_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-adgroup?view=windowsserver2019-ps"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Permission Groups Discovery", "Domain Groups"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TA505", "APT3", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "Inception", "OilRig", "FIN6", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "getadgroup_with_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Remote System Discovery with Wmic", "id": "d82eced3-b1dc-42ab-859e-a2fc98827359", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-01", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The arguments utilized in this command return a list of all the systems registered in the domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI and wmic.exe to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"wmic.exe\") (Processes.process=*/NAMESPACE:\\\\\\\\root\\\\directory\\\\ldap* AND Processes.process=*ds_computer* AND Processes.process=\"*GET ds_samaccountname*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_system_discovery_with_wmic_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wmisdk/wmic"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote System Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Rocke", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT39", "APT32", "Deep Panda", "Threat Group-3390", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leafminer", "Ke3chang", "FIN8", "APT3", "FIN5", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Turla"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "remote_system_discovery_with_wmic_filter"}]}, {"name": "GetDomainGroup with PowerShell Script Block", "id": "09725404-a44f-4ed3-9efa-8ed5d69e4c53", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-26", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainGroup` commandlet. `Get-DomainGroup` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. As the name suggests, `Get-DomainGroup` is used to query domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this function to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-DomainGroup*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getdomaingroup_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerView functions for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainGroup/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration using PowerView on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Permission Groups Discovery", "Domain Groups"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TA505", "APT3", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "Inception", "OilRig", "FIN6", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "getdomaingroup_with_powershell_script_block_filter"}]}, {"name": "Get ADUser with PowerShell", "id": "0b6ee3f4-04e3-11ec-a87d-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-24", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to enumerate domain users. The `Get-AdUser' commandlet returns a list of all domain users. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"powershell*\") AND Processes.process = \"*Get-ADUser*\" AND Processes.process = \"*-filter*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_aduser_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-blue-purple/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-aduser?view=windowsserver2019-ps"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id", "Processes.parent_process_name"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Domain Account", "Account Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Turla", "Sandworm Team", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "Ke3chang", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "get_aduser_with_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Remote System Discovery with Adsisearcher", "id": "70803451-0047-4e12-9d63-77fa7eb8649c", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-01", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator being used to query Active Directory for domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `[Adsisearcher]` to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*[adsisearcher]*\" AND Message = \"*objectclass=computer*\" AND Message = \"*findAll()*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `remote_system_discovery_with_adsisearcher_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use Adsisearcher for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", "https://devblogs.microsoft.com/scripting/use-the-powershell-adsisearcher-type-accelerator-to-search-active-directory/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote System Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Rocke", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT39", "APT32", "Deep Panda", "Threat Group-3390", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leafminer", "Ke3chang", "FIN8", "APT3", "FIN5", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Turla"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "remote_system_discovery_with_adsisearcher_filter"}]}, {"name": "DSQuery Domain Discovery", "id": "cc316032-924a-11eb-91a2-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-31", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies \"dsquery.exe\" execution with arguments looking for `TrustedDomain` query directly on the command-line. This is typically indicative of an Administrator or adversary perform domain trust discovery. Note that this query does not identify any other variations of \"Dsquery.exe\" usage.\\\nWithin this detection, it is assumed `dsquery.exe` is not moved or renamed.\\\nThe search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process \"dsquery.exe\" and its parent process.\\\nDSQuery.exe is natively found in `C:\\Windows\\system32` and `C:\\Windows\\syswow64` and only on Server operating system.\\\nThe following DLL(s) are loaded when DSQuery.exe is launched `dsquery.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible dsquery is running within that process context in memory.\\\nIn addition to trust discovery, review parallel processes for additional behaviors performed. Identify the parent process and capture any files (batch files, for example) being used.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=dsquery.exe Processes.process=*trustedDomain* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dsquery_domain_discovery_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives. If there is a true false positive, filter based on command-line or parent process.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1482/T1482.md", "http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/a-guide-to-attacking-domain-trusts/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc732952(v=ws.11)", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc754232(v=ws.11)"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Domain Trust Discovery", "Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified performing domain discovery on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1482"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Domain Trust Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "dsquery_domain_discovery_filter"}]}, {"name": "GetCurrent User with PowerShell", "id": "7eb9c3d5-c98c-4088-acc5-8240bad15379", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-13", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powerhsell.exe` with command-line arguments that execute the `GetCurrent` method of the WindowsIdentity .NET class. This method returns an object that represents the current Windows user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity* OR Processes.process=*GetCurrent()*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getcurrent_user_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "System user discovery on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1033"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Owner/User Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Frankenstein", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Tropic Trooper", "APT39", "MuddyWater", "APT32", "APT37", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "Magic Hound", "FIN10", "Gamaredon Group", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "APT3"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "getcurrent_user_with_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Elevated Group Discovery With Net", "id": "a23a0e20-0b1b-4a07-82e5-ec5f70811e7a", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-25", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for specific elevated domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate elevated domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery to identify high privileged users.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\") (Processes.process=\"*group*\" AND Processes.process=\"*/do*\") (Processes.process=\"*Domain Admins*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Enterprise Admins*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Schema Admins*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Account Operators*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Server Operators*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Protected Users*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Dns Admins*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `elevated_group_discovery_with_net_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-practices/appendix-b--privileged-accounts-and-groups-in-active-directory", "https://adsecurity.org/?p=3658"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Elevated domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 21, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Permission Groups Discovery", "Domain Groups"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TA505", "APT3", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "Inception", "OilRig", "FIN6", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "elevated_group_discovery_with_net_filter"}]}, {"name": "GetDomainController with PowerShell", "id": "868ee0e4-52ab-484a-833a-6d85b7c028d0", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-07", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. `Get-DomainController` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-DomainController*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use PowerView for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainController/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Remote system discovery using PowerView on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 24, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote System Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Rocke", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT39", "APT32", "Deep Panda", "Threat Group-3390", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leafminer", "Ke3chang", "FIN8", "APT3", "FIN5", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Turla"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "System User Discovery With Query", "id": "ad03bfcf-8a91-4bc2-a500-112993deba87", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-13", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `query.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover the logged user. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage `query.exe` to identify system users on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"query.exe\") (Processes.process=*user*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `system_user_discovery_with_query_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "System user discovery on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1033"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Owner/User Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Frankenstein", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Tropic Trooper", "APT39", "MuddyWater", "APT32", "APT37", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "Magic Hound", "FIN10", "Gamaredon Group", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "APT3"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "system_user_discovery_with_query_filter"}]}, {"name": "Get DomainUser with PowerShell", "id": "9a5a41d6-04e7-11ec-923c-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-24", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to enumerate domain users. `Get-DomainUser` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"powershell*\") AND Processes.process = \"*Get-DomainUser*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domainuser_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainUser/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id", "Processes.parent_process_name"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Domain Account", "Account Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Turla", "Sandworm Team", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "Ke3chang", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "get_domainuser_with_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Remote System Discovery with Net", "id": "9df16706-04a2-41e2-bbfe-9b38b34409d3", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-30", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The argument `domain computers /domain` returns a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\") (Processes.process=\"*domain computers*\" AND Processes.process=*/do*) OR (Processes.process=\"*view*\" AND Processes.process=*/do*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_system_discovery_with_net_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote System Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Rocke", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT39", "APT32", "Deep Panda", "Threat Group-3390", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leafminer", "Ke3chang", "FIN8", "APT3", "FIN5", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Turla"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "remote_system_discovery_with_net_filter"}]}, {"name": "GetDomainComputer with PowerShell", "id": "ed550c19-712e-43f6-bd19-6f58f61b3a5e", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-07", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. `Get-DomainComputer` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-DomainComputer*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use PowerView for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 24, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote System Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Rocke", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT39", "APT32", "Deep Panda", "Threat Group-3390", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leafminer", "Ke3chang", "FIN8", "APT3", "FIN5", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Turla"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell Script Block", "id": "77f41d9e-b8be-47e3-ab35-5776f5ec1d20", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-13", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the use of PowerShell environment variables to identify the current logged user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*$env:UserName*\" OR Message = \"*[System.Environment]::UserName*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "System user discovery on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1033"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Path", "Message", "OpCode", "ComputerName", "User", "EventCode"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Owner/User Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Frankenstein", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Tropic Trooper", "APT39", "MuddyWater", "APT32", "APT37", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "Magic Hound", "FIN10", "Gamaredon Group", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "APT3"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_script_block_filter"}]}, {"name": "GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell", "id": "df275a44-4527-443b-b884-7600e066e3eb", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-25", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `-class ds_group` parameter can be used to return the full list of groups in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI in this case, using PowerShell, to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-WmiObject* AND Processes.process=\"*namespace root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*\" AND Processes.process=\"*class ds_group*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/get-wmiobject?view=powershell-5.1"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Permission Groups Discovery", "Domain Groups"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TA505", "APT3", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "Inception", "OilRig", "FIN6", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest", "id": "41243735-89a7-4c83-bcdd-570aa78f00a1", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-30", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `nltest.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The arguments `/dclist:` and '/dsgetdc:', can be used to return a list of all domain controllers. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use nltest.exe to identify domain controllers in a Windows Domain for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"nltest.exe\") (Processes.process=\"*/dclist:*\" OR Processes.process=\"*/dsgetdc:*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_controller_discovery_with_nltest_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Domain controller discovery on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 21, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote System Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Rocke", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT39", "APT32", "Deep Panda", "Threat Group-3390", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leafminer", "Ke3chang", "FIN8", "APT3", "FIN5", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Turla"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "domain_controller_discovery_with_nltest_filter"}]}, {"name": "Network Discovery Using Route Windows App", "id": "dd83407e-439f-11ec-ab8e-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-12", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic look for a spawned process of route.exe windows application. Adversaries and red teams alike abuse this application the recon or do a network discovery on a target host. but one possible false positive might be an automated tool used by a system administator or a powershell script in amazon ec2 config services.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_route` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `network_discovery_using_route_windows_app_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated host discovery application that may generate false positives or an amazon ec2 script that uses this application. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/ad4c3cda-41f2-4401-8dba-56cc2d245488/#"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/vilsel/sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1016", "T1016.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 9, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Network Configuration Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Frankenstein", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "Darkhotel", "MuddyWater", "APT1", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "menuPass", "Threat Group-3390", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "APT3", "Naikon", "admin@338", "Turla", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=route.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=route.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_route"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "network_discovery_using_route_windows_app_filter"}]}, {"name": "Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block", "id": "21432e40-04f4-11ec-b7e6-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-24", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-AdGUser` commandlet. The `Get-AdUser` commandlet is used to return a list of all domain users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*get-aduser*\" Message = \"*-filter*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_aduser_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-blue-purple/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-aduser?view=windowsserver2019-ps"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Reconnaissance"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "powershell process having commandline $Message$ for user enumeration", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Domain Account", "Account Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Turla", "Sandworm Team", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "Ke3chang", "no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "get_aduser_with_powershell_script_block_filter"}]}, {"name": "Domain Group Discovery With Net", "id": "f2f14ac7-fa81-471a-80d5-7eb65c3c7349", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-25", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The argument `group /domain`, returns a list of all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\") (Processes.process=*group* AND Processes.process=*/do*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_group_discovery_with_net_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Permission Groups Discovery", "Domain Groups"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TA505", "APT3", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "Inception", "OilRig", "FIN6", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "domain_group_discovery_with_net_filter"}]}, {"name": "Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell Script Block", "id": "89275e7e-0548-11ec-bf75-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-24", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies Get-DomainTrust from PowerView in order to gather domain trust information. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*get-foresttrust*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message ComputerName User EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domaintrust_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible certain system management frameworks utilize this command to gather trust information.", "references": ["http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/a-guide-to-attacking-domain-trusts/", "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 40, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Suspicious PowerShell Get-DomainTrust was identified on endpoint $ComputerName$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1482"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "Path", "OpCode", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 12, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Domain Trust Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "get_domaintrust_with_powershell_script_block_filter"}]}, {"name": "Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block", "id": "61994268-04f4-11ec-865c-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-24", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainUser` commandlet. `GetDomainUser` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerView to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*Get-DomainUser*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domainuser_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainUser/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Reconnaissance"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "powershell process having commandline $Message$ for user enumeration", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Domain Account", "Account Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Turla", "Sandworm Team", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "Ke3chang", "no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "get_domainuser_with_powershell_script_block_filter"}]}, {"name": "System User Discovery With Whoami", "id": "894fc43e-6f50-47d5-a68b-ee9ee23e18f4", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-13", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `whoami.exe` without any arguments. This windows native binary prints out the current logged user. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage `whoami.exe` to identify system users on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"whoami.exe\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `system_user_discovery_with_whoami_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "System user discovery on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1033"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Owner/User Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Frankenstein", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Tropic Trooper", "APT39", "MuddyWater", "APT32", "APT37", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "Magic Hound", "FIN10", "Gamaredon Group", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "APT3"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "system_user_discovery_with_whoami_filter"}]}, {"name": "GetCurrent User with PowerShell Script Block", "id": "80879283-c30f-44f7-8471-d1381f6d437a", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-13", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `GetCurrent` method of the WindowsIdentity .NET class. This method returns an object that represents the current Windows user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*[System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]*\" AND Message = \"*GetCurrent()*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getcurrent_user_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.security.principal.windowsidentity.getcurrent?view=net-5.0"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "System user discovery on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1033"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Path", "Message", "OpCode", "ComputerName", "User", "EventCode"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Owner/User Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Frankenstein", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Tropic Trooper", "APT39", "MuddyWater", "APT32", "APT37", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "Magic Hound", "FIN10", "Gamaredon Group", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "APT3"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "getcurrent_user_with_powershell_script_block_filter"}]}, {"name": "Domain Group Discovery with Adsisearcher", "id": "089c862f-5f83-49b5-b1c8-7e4ff66560c7", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-25", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator being used to query Active Directory for domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `[Adsisearcher]` to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*[adsisearcher]*\" AND Message = \"*(objectcategory=group)*\" AND Message = \"*findAll()*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `domain_group_discovery_with_adsisearcher_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use Adsisearcher for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", "https://devblogs.microsoft.com/scripting/use-the-powershell-adsisearcher-type-accelerator-to-search-active-directory/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 18, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Permission Groups Discovery", "Domain Groups"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TA505", "APT3", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "Inception", "OilRig", "FIN6", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "domain_group_discovery_with_adsisearcher_filter"}]}, {"name": "Network Connection Discovery With Arp", "id": "ae008c0f-83bd-4ed4-9350-98d4328e15d2", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-10", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `arp.exe` utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use arp.exe for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"arp.exe\") (Processes.process=*-a*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `network_connection_discovery_with_arp_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1049/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1049"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Network Connections Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Tropic Trooper", "APT41", "APT38", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "APT1", "OilRig", "APT3", "menuPass", "Threat Group-3390", "Poseidon Group", "admin@338", "Turla", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "network_connection_discovery_with_arp_filter"}]}, {"name": "User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell", "id": "0cdf318b-a0dd-47d7-b257-c621c0247de8", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-13", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments that leverage PowerShell environment variables to identify the current logged user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=\"*$env:UserName*\" OR Processes.process=\"*[System.Environment]::UserName*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "System user discovery on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1033"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Owner/User Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Frankenstein", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Tropic Trooper", "APT39", "MuddyWater", "APT32", "APT37", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "Magic Hound", "FIN10", "Gamaredon Group", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "APT3"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block", "id": "1ff7ccc8-065a-11ec-91e4-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message =\"*Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://github.com/S1ckB0y1337/Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy?view=windowsserver2019-ps"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 30, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Reconnaissance"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "powershell process having commandline $Message$ to query domain password policy", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1201"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 9, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Password Policy Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Turla", "OilRig"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter"}]}, {"name": "AdsiSearcher Account Discovery", "id": "de7fcadc-04f3-11ec-a241-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-24", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator being used to query Active Directory for domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `[Adsisearcher]` to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*[adsisearcher]*\" Message = \"*objectcategory=user*\" Message = \"*.findAll()*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `adsisearcher_account_discovery_filter`", "how_to_implement": "The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/", "https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-blue-purple/", "https://devblogs.microsoft.com/scripting/use-the-powershell-adsisearcher-type-accelerator-to-search-active-directory/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Reconnaissance"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "powershell process having commandline $Message$ for user enumeration", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Domain Account", "Account Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Turla", "Sandworm Team", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "Ke3chang", "no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "adsisearcher_account_discovery_filter"}]}, {"name": "Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block", "id": "737e1eb0-065a-11ec-921a-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, MAuricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message =\"*Get-ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://github.com/S1ckB0y1337/Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-aduserresultantpasswordpolicy?view=windowsserver2019-ps"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 30, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Reconnaissance"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "powershell process having commandline $Message$ to query domain user password policy.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1201"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 9, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Password Policy Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Turla", "OilRig"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter"}]}, {"name": "Get WMIObject Group Discovery", "id": "5434f670-155d-11ec-8cca-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-14", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following hunting analytic identifies the use of `Get-WMIObject Win32_Group` being used with PowerShell to identify local groups on the endpoint. \\ Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \\ During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR processes.process_name=cmd.exe) (Processes.process=\"*Get-WMIObject*\" AND Processes.process=\"*Win32_Group*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_wmiobject_group_discovery_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present. Tune as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "System group discovery on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Permission Groups Discovery", "Local Groups"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TA505", "APT3", "Turla", "OilRig", "admin@338"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "get_wmiobject_group_discovery_filter"}]}, {"name": "Remote System Discovery with Dsquery", "id": "9fb562f4-42f8-4139-8e11-a82edf7ed718", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-31", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `dsquery.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The `computer` argument returns a list of all computers registered in the domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike engage in remote system discovery for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"dsquery.exe\") (Processes.process=\"*computer*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_system_discovery_with_dsquery_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/cc732952(v=ws.11)"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote System Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Rocke", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT39", "APT32", "Deep Panda", "Threat Group-3390", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leafminer", "Ke3chang", "FIN8", "APT3", "FIN5", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Turla"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "remote_system_discovery_with_dsquery_filter"}]}, {"name": "GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block", "id": "640b0eda-0429-11ec-accd-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-23", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet used with specific parameters. The `Win32_UserAccount` parameter is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message=\"*Get-WmiObject*\" AND Message=\"*Win32_UserAccount*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Local user discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087", "T1087.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Account Discovery", "Local Account"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Turla", "Poseidon Group", "OilRig", "Ke3chang", "APT32", "APT1", "Threat Group-3390", "APT3", "admin@338"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_script_block_filter"}]}, {"name": "Elevated Group Discovery with PowerView", "id": "10d62950-0de5-4199-a710-cff9ea79b413", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-25", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainGroupMember` commandlet. `Get-DomainGroupMember` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. As the name suggests, `Get-DomainGroupMember` is used to list the members of an specific domain group. Red Teams and adversaries alike use PowerView to enumerate elevated domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery to identify high privileged users.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-DomainGroupMember*\") AND Message IN (\"*Domain Admins*\",\"*Enterprise Admins*\", \"*Schema Admins*\", \"*Account Operators*\" , \"*Server Operators*\", \"*Protected Users*\", \"*Dns Admins*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `elevated_group_discovery_with_powerview_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerView for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainGroupMember/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-practices/appendix-b--privileged-accounts-and-groups-in-active-directory", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Elevated group discovery using PowerView on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 21, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Permission Groups Discovery", "Domain Groups"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TA505", "APT3", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "Inception", "OilRig", "FIN6", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "elevated_group_discovery_with_powerview_filter"}]}, {"name": "GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell", "id": "e02af35c-1de5-4afe-b4be-f45aba57272b", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-25", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. The `Get-NetTcpConnection` commandlet lists the current TCP connections. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-NetTcpConnection*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/nettcpip/get-nettcpconnection?view=windowsserver2019-ps"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1049/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1049"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Network Connections Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Tropic Trooper", "APT41", "APT38", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "APT1", "OilRig", "APT3", "menuPass", "Threat Group-3390", "Poseidon Group", "admin@338", "Turla", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell", "id": "7141122c-3bc2-4aaa-ab3b-7a85a0bbefc3", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-07", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `DS_Computer` parameter can be used to return a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI in this case, using PowerShell, to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-WmiObject* AND Processes.process=\"*namespace root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*\" AND Processes.process=\"*class ds_computer*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration using WMI on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 21, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote System Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Rocke", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT39", "APT32", "Deep Panda", "Threat Group-3390", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leafminer", "Ke3chang", "FIN8", "APT3", "FIN5", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Turla"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_filter"}]}, {"name": "GetAdComputer with PowerShell Script Block", "id": "a9a1da02-8e27-4bf7-a348-f4389c9da487", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-01", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-AdGroup` commandlet. The `Get-AdGroup` commandlet is used to return a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-AdComputer*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getadcomputer_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-adgroup?view=windowsserver2019-ps"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote System Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Rocke", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT39", "APT32", "Deep Panda", "Threat Group-3390", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leafminer", "Ke3chang", "FIN8", "APT3", "FIN5", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Turla"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "getadcomputer_with_powershell_script_block_filter"}]}, {"name": "Get DomainPolicy with Powershell Script Block", "id": "a360d2b2-065a-11ec-b0bf-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get DomainPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message =\"*Get-DomainPolicy*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://github.com/S1ckB0y1337/Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet", "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainPolicy/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Reconnaissance"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "powershell process having commandline $Message$ to query domain policy.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1201"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 30, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Password Policy Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Turla", "OilRig"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Data Protection", "id": "91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e1fce33", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-14", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "Fortify your data-protection arsenal--while continuing to ensure data confidentiality and integrity--with searches that monitor for and help you investigate possible signs of data exfiltration.", "narrative": "Attackers can leverage a variety of resources to compromise or exfiltrate enterprise data. Common exfiltration techniques include remote-access channels via low-risk, high-payoff active-collections operations and close-access operations using insiders and removable media. While this Analytic Story is not a comprehensive listing of all the methods by which attackers can exfiltrate data, it provides a useful starting point.", "references": ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/data-protection/", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/dns/splunk-detect-dns-tunneling-37022", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Data Protection", "category": ["Abuse"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1189"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Drive-by Compromise"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390", "Patchwork", "Elderwood", "APT32", "Leafminer", "Dark Caracal", "PLATINUM", "APT19", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Darkhotel", "Windshift", "Turla", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT38", "RTM", "Lazarus Group"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers", "id": "c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6v5464g9f", "version": 3, "date": "2021-01-14", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Resolution"], "description": "Malicious actors often abuse legitimate Dynamic DNS services to host malicious payloads or interactive command and control nodes. Attackers will automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to countless IP addresses to circumvent firewall blocks, block lists as well as frustrate a network defenders analytic and investigative processes. This search will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.answer) as answer min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query host | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `dynamic_dns_providers` | `detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter`", "how_to_implement": "First, you'll need to ingest data from your DNS operations. This can be done by ingesting logs from your server or data, collected passively by Splunk Stream or a similar solution. Specifically, data that contains the domain that is being queried and the IP of the host originating the request must be populating the `Network_Resolution` data model. This search also leverages a lookup file, `dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv`, which contains a non-exhaustive list of Dynamic DNS providers. Please consider updating the local lookup periodically by adding new domains to the list of `dynamic_dns_providers_local.csv`.\\\nThis search produces fields (query, answer, isDynDNS) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable event. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review. Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** DNS Query, **Field:** query\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** DNS Answer, **Field:** answer\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** IsDynamicDNS, **Field:** isDynDNS\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", "known_false_positives": "Some users and applications may leverage Dynamic DNS to reach out to some domains on the Internet since dynamic DNS by itself is not malicious, however this activity must be verified.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Data Protection", "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "DNS Hijacking", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Dynamic DNS", "Command and Control"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Initial Access"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1189/dyn_dns_site/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A dns query $query$ from your infra connecting to suspicious domain in host $host$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1189"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "host", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "query", "type": "dnsquery", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "DNS.answer", "DNS.query", "host"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Drive-by Compromise"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Turla", "Windshift", "RTM", "Darkhotel", "APT38", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Leafminer", "Dark Caracal", "APT19", "APT32", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-3390", "Elderwood", "APT37", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_default dynamic_dns_domains as query OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_default | lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_local dynamic_dns_domains as query OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_local| eval isDynDNS = coalesce(isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local)|fields - isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local| search isDynDNS=True", "description": "This macro limits the output of the query field to dynamic dns domains. It looks up the domains in a file provided by Splunk and one intended to be updated by the end user.", "name": "dynamic_dns_providers", "lookups": [{"case_sensitive_match": "false", "description": "A list of dynammic dns providers that should not be modified", "filename": "dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(dynamic_dns_domains)", "name": "dynamic_dns_providers_default", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv"}, {"case_sensitive_match": "false", "description": "A list of dynammic dns providers that can be modified", "filename": "dynamic_dns_providers_local.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(dynamic_dns_domains)", "name": "dynamic_dns_providers_local", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/dynamic_dns_providers_local.csv"}]}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Trickbot", "id": "16f93769-8342-44c0-9b1d-f131937cce8e", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-20", "author": "Rod Soto, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the trickbot banking trojan, including looking for file writes associated with its payload, process injection, shellcode execution and data collection even in LDAP environment.", "narrative": "trickbot banking trojan campaigns targeting banks and other vertical sectors.This malware is known in Microsoft Windows OS where target security Microsoft Defender to prevent its detection and removal. steal Verizon credentials and targeting banks using its multi component modules that collect and exfiltrate data.", "references": ["https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trickbot", "https://blog.checkpoint.com/2021/03/11/february-2021s-most-wanted-malware-trickbot-takes-over-following-emotet-shutdown/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Trickbot", "category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1590.005", "T1218", "T1562", "T1590", "T1021", "T1218.011", "T1059", "T1566.001", "T1053", "T1027", "T1087", "T1021.002", "T1562.001", "T1566", "T1218.005", "T1055", "T1087.002"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Scheduled Task/Job", "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "Rundll32", "Obfuscated Files or Information", "Phishing", "Remote Services", "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "Account Discovery", "Mshta", "Spearphishing Attachment", "Disable or Modify Tools", "Domain Account", "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Impair Defenses", "Process Injection"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Discovery", "Initial Access", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Execution", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Inception", "Rancor", "PLATINUM", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT39", "Gamaredon Group", "RTM", "Carbanak", "Frankenstein", "admin@338", "Honeybee", "APT18", "MuddyWater", "Dust Storm", "Gorgon Group", "BlackTech", "Orangeworm", "Night Dragon", "Naikon", "Magic Hound", "Stealth Falcon", "Dark Caracal", "TA459", "APT29", "FIN8", "Molerats", "APT12", "Rocke", "Whitefly", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "Silence", "APT32", "Darkhotel", "FIN5", "Blue Mockingbird", "Machete", "Threat Group-1314", "Sharpshooter", "Patchwork", "FIN4", "APT33", "DarkHydrus", "Threat Group-3390", "Putter Panda", "Kimsuky", "Poseidon Group", "Group5", "Turla", "Mofang", "TA505", "Soft Cell", "APT19", "APT37", "APT41", "menuPass", "OilRig", "BlackOasis", "Wizard Spider", "Leafminer", "no", "The White Company", "Elderwood", "APT28", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN7", "Tropic Trooper", "Ke3chang", "Leviathan", "APT-C-36", "CopyKittens", "FIN6", "Lazarus Group", "APT3", "Gallmaker", "Windshift"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Office Document Executing Macro Code", "id": "b12c89bc-9d06-11eb-a592-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-14", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this detection was designed to identifies suspicious office documents that using macro code. Macro code is known to be one of the prevalent weaponization or attack vector of threat actor. This malicious macro code is embed to a office document as an attachment that may execute malicious payload, download malware payload or other malware component. It is really good practice to disable macro by default to avoid automatically execute macro code while opening or closing a office document files.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 process_name IN (\"WINWORD.EXE\", \"EXCEL.EXE\", \"POWERPNT.EXE\") ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\VBE7INTL.DLL\",\"*\\\\VBE7.DLL\", \"*\\\\VBEUI.DLL\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ImageLoaded) as AllImageLoaded count by Computer EventCode Image process_name ProcessId ProcessGuid | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_document_executing_macro_code_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and ImageLoaded (Like sysmon EventCode 7) from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Also be sure to include those monitored dll to your own sysmon config.", "known_false_positives": "Normal Office Document macro use for automation", "references": ["https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/386500/0/html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Trickbot", "IcedID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Office document executing a macro on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["ImageLoaded", "AllImageLoaded", "Computer", "EventCode", "Image", "process_name", "ProcessId", "ProcessGuid", "_time"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Phishing", "Spearphishing Attachment"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "office_document_executing_macro_code_filter"}]}, {"name": "Wermgr Process Connecting To IP Check Web Services", "id": "ed313326-a0f9-11eb-a89c-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-19", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this search is designed to detect suspicious wermgr.exe process that tries to connect to known IP web services. This technique is know for trickbot and other trojan spy malware to recon the infected machine and look for its ip address without so much finger print on the commandline process. Since wermgr.exe is designed for error handling process of windows it is really suspicious that this process is trying to connect to this IP web services cause that maybe cause of some malicious code injection.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode =22 process_name = wermgr.exe QueryName IN (\"*wtfismyip.com\", \"*checkip.amazonaws.com\", \"*ipecho.net\", \"*ipinfo.io\", \"*api.ipify.org\", \"*icanhazip.com\", \"*ip.anysrc.com\",\"*api.ip.sb\", \"ident.me\", \"www.myexternalip.com\", \"*zen.spamhaus.org\", \"*cbl.abuseat.org\", \"*b.barracudacentral.org\",\"*dnsbl-1.uceprotect.net\", \"*spam.dnsbl.sorbs.net\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by process_path process_name process_id QueryName QueryStatus QueryResults Computer EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, dns query name process path , and query ststus from your endpoints like EventCode 22. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 12 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/", "https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Trickbot"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/infection/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Wermgr.exe process connecting IP location web services on $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1590", "T1590.005"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "process_path", "process_name", "process_id", "QueryName", "QueryStatus", "QueryResults", "Computer", "EventCode"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services_filter"}]}, {"name": "Cobalt Strike Named Pipes", "id": "5876d429-0240-4709-8b93-ea8330b411b5", "version": 1, "date": "2021-02-22", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of default or publicly known named pipes used with Cobalt Strike. A named pipe is a named, one-way or duplex pipe for communication between the pipe server and one or more pipe clients. Cobalt Strike uses named pipes in many ways and has default values used with the Artifact Kit and Malleable C2 Profiles. The following query assists with identifying these default named pipes. Each EDR product presents named pipes a little different. Consider taking the values and generating a query based on the product of choice. \\\nUpon triage, review the process performing the named pipe. If it is explorer.exe, It is possible it was injected into by another process. Review recent parallel processes to identify suspicious patterns or behaviors. A parallel process may have a network connection, review and follow the connection back to identify any file modifications.", "search": "`sysmon` EventID=17 OR EventID=18 PipeName IN (\\\\msagent_*, \\\\wkssvc*, \\\\DserNamePipe*, \\\\srvsvc_*, \\\\mojo.*, \\\\postex_*, \\\\status_*, \\\\MSSE-*, \\\\spoolss_*, \\\\win_svc*, \\\\ntsvcs*, \\\\winsock*, \\\\UIA_PIPE*) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, process_name, process_id process_path, PipeName | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cobalt_strike_named_pipes_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "The idea of using named pipes with Cobalt Strike is to blend in. Therefore, some of the named pipes identified and added may cause false positives. Filter by process name or pipe name to reduce false positives.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/ipc/named-pipes", "https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-smb-beacon", "https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2021/02/09/learn-pipe-fitting-for-all-of-your-offense-projects/", "https://gist.github.com/MHaggis/6c600e524045a6d49c35291a21e10752", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike", "Trickbot", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $Computer$ by user $user$ accessing known suspicious named pipes related to Cobalt Strike.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1055"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventID", "PipeName", "Computer", "process_name", "process_path", "process_id"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Process Injection"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Cobalt Group", "APT37", "Honeybee", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "cobalt_strike_named_pipes_filter"}]}, {"name": "Office Application Spawn rundll32 process", "id": "958751e4-9c5f-11eb-b103-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-04-13", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this detection was designed to identifies suspicious spawned process of known MS office application due to macro or malicious code. this technique can be seen in so many malware like trickbot that used MS office as its weapon or attack vector to initially infect the machines.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = \"winword.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"excel.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"powerpnt.exe\") AND `process_rundll32` by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.process Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_application_spawn_rundll32_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://any.run/malware-trends/trickbot", "https://any.run/report/47561b4e949041eff0a0f4693c59c81726591779fe21183ae9185b5eb6a69847/aba3722a-b373-4dae-8273-8730fb40cdbe"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Trickbot", "IcedID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Office application spawning rundll32.exe on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Phishing", "Spearphishing Attachment"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Magic Hound", "Windshift", "APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Naikon", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Mofang", "Wizard Spider", "RTM", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "BlackTech", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "admin@338", "Kimsuky", "APT12", "TA505", "Silence", "The White Company", "APT39", "FIN4", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Gorgon Group", "Rancor", "DarkHydrus", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "TA459", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "PLATINUM", "Elderwood", "APT29", "APT37", "menuPass"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_rundll32"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "office_application_spawn_rundll32_process_filter"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawn CMD Process", "id": "b8b19420-e892-11eb-9244-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-07-19", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this search is to detect a suspicious office product process that spawn cmd child process. This is commonly seen in a ms office product having macro to execute shell command to download or execute malicious lolbin relative to its malicious code. This is seen in trickbot spear phishing doc where it execute shell cmd to run mshta payload.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = \"winword.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name= \"excel.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"powerpnt.exe\") `process_cmd` by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawn_cmd_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "IT or network admin may create an document automation that will run shell script.", "references": ["https://twitter.com/cyb3rops/status/1416050325870587910?s=21"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Trickbot"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "executions"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/spear_phish/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "an office product parent process $parent_process_name$ spawn child process $process_name$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Mshta"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "APT32", "MuddyWater", "FIN7"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_cmd"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "office_product_spawn_cmd_process_filter"}]}, {"name": "Wermgr Process Create Executable File", "id": "ab3bcce0-a105-11eb-973c-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-19", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this search is designed to detect potential malicious wermgr.exe process that drops or create executable file. Since wermgr.exe is an application trigger when error encountered in a process, it is really un ussual to this process to drop executable file. This technique is commonly seen in trickbot malware where it injects it code to this process to execute it malicious behavior like downloading other payload", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=11 process_name = \"wermgr.exe\" TargetFilename = \"*.exe\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Image TargetFilename process_name dest EventCode ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wermgr_process_create_executable_file_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of wermgr.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/", "https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Trickbot"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/infection/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Wermgr.exe writing executable files on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1027"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Image", "TargetFilename", "process_name", "dest", "EventCode", "ProcessId"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Obfuscated Files or Information"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "Whitefly", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Mofang", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "APT-C-36", "APT41", "Machete", "Soft Cell", "Turla", "TA505", "Silence", "APT33", "Night Dragon", "Darkhotel", "Gallmaker", "APT29", "APT18", "Tropic Trooper", "Cobalt Group", "Patchwork", "Leafminer", "APT37", "Threat Group-3390", "Honeybee", "Dark Caracal", "menuPass", "APT19", "BlackOasis", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "Elderwood", "MuddyWater", "FIN7", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "APT3", "APT32", "Group5", "Dust Storm", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "wermgr_process_create_executable_file_filter"}]}, {"name": "Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process", "id": "e8fc95bc-a107-11eb-a978-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-04-19", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is designed to detect suspicious cmd and powershell process spawned by wermgr.exe process. This suspicious behavior are commonly seen in code injection technique technique like trickbot to execute a shellcode, dll modules to run malicious behavior.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as cmdline min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name = \"wermgr.exe\" `process_cmd` OR `process_powershell` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/", "https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Trickbot"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/infection/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Wermgr.exe spawning suspicious processes on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_cmd"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_powershell"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process_filter"}]}, {"name": "Account Discovery With Net App", "id": "339805ce-ac30-11eb-b87d-acde48001122", "version": 3, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this search is to detect a potential account discovery series of command used by several malware or attack to recon the target machine. This technique is also seen in some note worthy malware like trickbot where it runs a cmd process, or even drop its module that will execute the said series of net command. This series of command are good correlation search and indicator of attacker recon if seen in the machines within a none technical user or department (HR, finance, ceo and etc) network.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` AND (Processes.process=\"*user*\" OR Processes.process=\"*config*\" OR Processes.process=\"*view /all*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name | where count >=5 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `account_discovery_with_net_app_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product..", "known_false_positives": "admin or power user may used this series of command.", "references": ["https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/", "https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html", "https://app.any.run/tasks/48414a33-3d66-4a46-afe5-c2003bb55ccf/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Trickbot", "IcedID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/infection/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Suspicious $process_name$ usage detected on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process Name", "role": ["Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 5, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Domain Account", "Account Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Turla", "Sandworm Team", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "Ke3chang", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_net"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "account_discovery_with_net_app_filter"}]}, {"name": "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share", "id": "f63c34fe-a435-11eb-935a-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-11-18", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies executable files (.exe or .dll) being written to Windows administrative SMB shares (Admin$, IPC$, C$). This represents suspicious behavior as its commonly used by tools like like PsExec/PaExec and others to stage service binaries before creating and starting a Windows service on remote endpoints. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse administrative shares for lateral movement and remote code execution. The Trickbot malware family also implements this behavior to try to infect other machines in the infected network.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=5145 Relative_Target_Name IN (\"*.exe\",\"*.dll\") Object_Type=File Share_Name IN (\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\C$\",\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\IPC$\",\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\admin$\") Access_Mask= \"0x2\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by EventCode Share_Name Relative_Target_Name Object_Type Access_Mask user src_port Source_Address | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 5145 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required. Also enable the object Audit access success/failure in your group policy.", "known_false_positives": "System Administrators may use looks like PsExec for troubleshooting or administrations tasks. However, this will typically come only from certain users and certain systems that can be added to an allow list.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002/", "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2013/03/09/psexec-demystified/", "https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/", "https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "Trickbot"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/exe_smbshare/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "message": "$user$ dropped or created an executable file in known sensitive SMB share. Share name=$Share_Name$, Target name=$Relative_Target_Name$, and Access mask=$Access_Mask$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021", "T1021.002"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Share_Name", "Relative_Target_Name", "Object_Type", "Access_Mask", "user", "src_port", "Source_Address"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Remote Services", "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "APT32", "Orangeworm", "FIN8", "APT3", "Lazarus Group", "Threat Group-1314", "Turla", "Deep Panda", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share_filter"}]}, {"name": "Trickbot Named Pipe", "id": "1804b0a4-a682-11eb-8f68-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this search is to detect potential trickbot infection through the create/connected named pipe to the system. This technique is used by trickbot to communicate to its c2 to post or get command during infection.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode IN (17,18) PipeName=\"\\\\pipe\\\\*lacesomepipe\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer user_id EventCode PipeName signature Image process_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `trickbot_named_pipe_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and pipename from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. .", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/", "https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Trickbot"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/namedpipe/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Possible Trickbot namedpipe created on $Computer$ by $Image$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Image", "type": "Process", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Computer", "user_id", "EventCode", "PipeName", "signature", "Image", "process_id"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Process Injection"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Cobalt Group", "APT37", "Honeybee", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "trickbot_named_pipe_filter"}]}, {"name": "Attempt To Stop Security Service", "id": "c8e349c6-b97c-486e-8949-bd7bcd1f3910", "version": 4, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for attempts to stop security-related services on the endpoint.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` OR Processes.process_name = sc.exe Processes.process=\"* stop *\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |lookup security_services_lookup service as process OUTPUTNEW category, description | search category=security | `attempt_to_stop_security_service_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "None identified. Attempts to disable security-related services should be identified and understood.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md#atomic-test-14---disable-arbitrary-security-windows-service"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Disabling Security Tools", "Trickbot"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_defend_service_stop/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified attempting to disable security services on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 20, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_net"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "attempt_to_stop_security_service_filter"}], "lookups": [{"default_match": "false", "description": "A list of services that deal with security", "filename": "security_services.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(service)", "min_matches": 1, "name": "security_services_lookup", "csv_file_url": "https://security-content.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lookups/security_services.csv"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 StartW", "id": "9319dda5-73f2-4d43-a85a-67ce961bddb7", "version": 3, "date": "2021-02-04", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe executing a DLL function name, Start and StartW, on the command line that is commonly observed with Cobalt Strike x86 and x64 DLL payloads. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64. Typically, the DLL will be written and loaded from a world writeable path or user location. In most instances it will not have a valid certificate (Unsigned). During investigation, review the parent process and other parallel application execution. Capture and triage the DLL in question. In the instance of Cobalt Strike, rundll32.exe is the default process it opens and injects shellcode into. This default process can be changed, but typically is not.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*start* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_startw_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use Start as a function and call it via the command line. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", "https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-windows-executable", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32", "https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Cobalt Strike", "Trickbot"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "rundll32.exe running with suspicious parameters on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Rundll32"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "APT32", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "TA505", "MuddyWater", "APT29", "APT19", "CopyKittens", "APT3", "Carbanak", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_rundll32"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_rundll32_startw_filter"}]}, {"name": "Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process", "id": "4aa5d062-e893-11eb-9eb2-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-07-19", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious mshta.exe process that spawn rundll32 or regsvr32 child process. This technique was seen in several malware nowadays like trickbot to load its initial .dll stage loader to execute and download the the actual trickbot payload.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name = \"mshta.exe\" `process_rundll32` OR `process_regsvr32` by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "limitted. this anomaly behavior is not commonly seen in clean host.", "references": ["https://twitter.com/cyb3rops/status/1416050325870587910?s=21"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Trickbot", "IcedID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "executions"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/spear_phish/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "a mshta parent process $parent_process_name$ spawn child process $process_name$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Mshta"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "APT32", "MuddyWater", "FIN7"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_rundll32"}, {"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=REGSVR32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_regsvr32"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process_filter"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Remote Thread To Known Windows Process", "id": "ec102cb2-a0f5-11eb-9b38-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-19", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this search is designed to detect suspicious powershell process that tries to inject code and to known/critical windows process and execute it using CreateRemoteThread. This technique is seen in several malware like trickbot and offensive tooling like cobaltstrike where it load a shellcode to svchost.exe to execute reverse shell to c2 and download another payload", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode = 8 process_name IN (\"powershell_ise.exe\", \"powershell.exe\") TargetImage IN (\"*\\\\svchost.exe\",\"*\\\\csrss.exe\" \"*\\\\gpupdate.exe\", \"*\\\\explorer.exe\",\"*\\\\services.exe\",\"*\\\\winlogon.exe\",\"*\\\\smss.exe\",\"*\\\\wininit.exe\",\"*\\\\userinit.exe\",\"*\\\\spoolsv.exe\",\"*\\\\taskhost.exe\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by SourceImage process_name SourceProcessId SourceProcessGuid TargetImage TargetProcessId NewThreadId StartAddress Computer EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, Create Remote thread from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of create remote thread may be used.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2021/01/11/trickbot-still-alive-and-well/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Trickbot"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}, "Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/infection/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A suspicious powershell process $process_name$ that tries to create a remote thread on target process $TargetImage$ with eventcode $EventCode$ in host $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "process name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "SourceImage", "process_name", "SourceProcessId", "SourceProcessGuid", "TargetImage", "TargetProcessId", "NewThreadId", "StartAddress", "Computer", "EventCode"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Process Injection"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Cobalt Group", "APT37", "Honeybee", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process_filter"}]}, {"name": "Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger", "id": "75b00fd8-a0ff-11eb-8b31-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-19", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed with a Rundll32. This technique is common in new trickbot that uses rundll32 to load is trickbot downloader. The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\\Windows\\system32` and `C:\\Windows\\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.'", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message | search Command IN (\"*rundll32*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Task_Name, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden, Arguments | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the task schedule (Exa. Security Log EventCode 4698) endpoints. Tune and filter known instances of Task schedule used in your environment.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/", "https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Trickbot", "IcedID"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/tasksched/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A schedule task process commandline rundll32 arguments $Arguments$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Arguments", "type": "Arguments", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "Task_Name", "Command", "Author", "Enabled", "Hidden", "Arguments"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Scheduled Task/Job"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Remcos", "id": "2bd4aa08-b9a5-40cf-bfe5-7d43f13d496c", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-23", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Remcos RAT trojan, including looking for file writes associated with its payload, screencapture, registry modification, UAC bypassed, persistence and data collection..", "narrative": "Remcos or Remote Control and Surveillance, marketed as a legitimate software for remotely managing Windows systems is now widely used in multiple malicious campaigns both APT and commodity malware by threat actors.", "references": ["https://success.trendmicro.com/solution/1123281-remcos-malware-information", "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0332/", "https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.remcos#:~:text=Remcos%20(acronym%20of%20Remote%20Control,used%20to%20remotely%20control%20computers.&text=Remcos%20can%20be%20used%20for,been%20used%20in%20hacking%20campaigns."], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Remcos", "category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1113", "T1218.010", "T1548.002", "T1548", "T1555", "T1112", "T1134", "T1059.005", "T1562.001", "T1055", "T1218", "T1562", "T1070", "T1592", "T1036", "T1547.001", "T1059", "T1543", "T1547", "T1134.004", "T1559.001", "T1055.001", "T1555.003", "T1059.007"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Visual Basic", "Disable or Modify Tools", "Create or Modify System Process", "Process Injection", "Indicator Removal on Host", "Parent PID Spoofing", "Dynamic-link Library Injection", "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "Screen Capture", "Bypass User Access Control", "Regsvr32", "Modify Registry", "Access Token Manipulation", "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "Impair Defenses", "Masquerading", "JavaScript/JScript", "Component Object Model", "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "Credentials from Password Stores", "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "Credentials from Web Browsers"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Execution", "Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390", "Magic Hound", "Putter Panda", "Inception", "Stealth Falcon", "Sandworm Team", "Rancor", "Tropic Trooper", "Kimsuky", "Dark Caracal", "PLATINUM", "TA459", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ke3chang", "APT29", "Leviathan", "APT39", "Molerats", "Gamaredon Group", "Rocke", "Turla", "RTM", "Group5", "TA505", "Whitefly", "Frankenstein", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "Stolen Pencil", "APT32", "Silence", "WIRTE", "APT19", "APT37", "APT-C-36", "Darkhotel", "APT41", "FIN5", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Blue Mockingbird", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Honeybee", "APT3", "Wizard Spider", "Machete", "Leafminer", "APT18", "no", "Sharpshooter", "APT38", "MuddyWater", "FIN10", "Patchwork", "FIN4", "FIN8", "APT28", "APT33", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Gorgon Group", "FIN7", "Windshift", "Night Dragon"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading", "id": "f421c250-24e7-11ec-bc43-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-04", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a loading of dll using regsvr32 application with silent parameter and dllinstall execution. This technique was seen in several RAT malware similar to remcos, njrat and adversaries to load their malicious DLL on the compromised machine. This TTP may executed by normal 3rd party application so it is better to pivot by the parent process, parent command-line and command-line of the file that execute this regsvr32.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` AND Processes.process=\"*/i*\" by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"(?i)[\\-|\\/][Ss]{1}\") | `regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Other third part application may used this parameter but not so common in base windows environment.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/dc93ee63-050c-4ff8-b07e-8277af9ab939/#", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", "Remcos"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/vbs_wscript/sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a DLL using the silent and dllinstall parameter.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.010"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 36, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Regsvr32"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Blue Mockingbird", "Inception", "WIRTE", "Cobalt Group", "APT19", "Leviathan", "APT32", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=REGSVR32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_regsvr32"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading_filter"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "id": "f5f6af30-7aa7-4295-bfe9-07fe87c01a4b", "version": 6, "date": "2021-09-07", "author": "Jose Hernandez, David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to launch an application or service at system startup.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\run* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentVersion\\\\Windows\\\\Appinit_Dlls* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Shell* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Notify* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Userinit* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\VmApplet* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\policies\\\\explorer\\\\run* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\runservices* OR Registry.registry_path=HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Netsh\\\\* OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Image File Execution Options*\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=Debugger) OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Security Packages\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\\\\OSConfig\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Security Packages\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\SilentProcessExit\\\\*\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*currentVersion\\\\Windows\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Load\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentVersion\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Svchost\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\"AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"BootExecute\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Software\\\\Run\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"auto_update\")) by Registry.dest Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "There are many legitimate applications that must execute on system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Ransomware", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "IcedID", "Remcos"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 95, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Persistence"}, "Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to persistence in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1547.001", "T1547"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user"], "risk_score": 76, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Rocke", "Tropic Trooper", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Silence", "RTM", "Inception", "APT41", "Machete", "Kimsuky", "APT33", "APT39", "APT32", "APT18", "Turla", "Dark Caracal", "Cobalt Group", "Honeybee", "Threat Group-3390", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Gorgon Group", "Ke3chang", "APT19", "Leviathan", "MuddyWater", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Magic Hound", "APT3", "FIN10", "FIN7", "Patchwork", "FIN6", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "APT29", "Darkhotel", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious WAV file in Appdata Folder", "id": "5be109e6-1ac5-11ec-b421-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-21", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious creation of .wav file in appdata folder. This behavior was seen in Remcos RAT malware where it put the audio recording in the appdata\\audio folde as part of data collection. this recording can be send to its C2 server as part of its exfiltration to the compromised machine. creation of wav files in this folder path is not a ussual disk place used by user to save audio format file.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=*.exe Processes.process_path=\"*\\\\appdata\\\\Roaming\\\\*\" by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*.wav\") Filesystem.file_path = \"*\\\\appdata\\\\Roaming\\\\*\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields file_name file_path process_name process_path process dest file_create_time _time ] | `suspicious_wav_file_in_appdata_folder_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, file_name, file_path and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://success.trendmicro.com/solution/1123281-remcos-malware-information", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2021/07/remcos-rat-delivered-via-visual-basic/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_agent/sysmon_wav.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "process $process_name$ creating image file $file_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1113"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "process name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "file_create_time", "file_name", "file_path", "process_name", "process_path", "process"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Screen Capture"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "APT39", "Silence", "MuddyWater", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "Dark Caracal", "FIN7", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Magic Hound", "Group5", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_wav_file_in_appdata_folder_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "id": "9be25988-ad82-11eb-a14f-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-05", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic will detect a suspicious process running in a file path where a process is not commonly seen and is most commonly used by malicious softtware. This behavior has been used by adversaries where they drop and run an exe in a path that is accessible without admin privileges.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\windows\\\\fonts\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\windows\\\\temp\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\users\\\\public\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\windows\\\\debug\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path.file_path = \"*\\\\Users\\\\Administrator\\\\Music\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path.file_path = \"*\\\\Windows\\\\servicing\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path.file_path = \"*\\\\Users\\\\Default\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path.file_path = \"*Recycle.bin*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Media\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"\\\\Windows\\\\repair\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_path Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_process_file_path_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may allow execution of specific binaries in non-standard paths. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/hk/threat-encyclopedia/malware/trojan.ps1.powtran.a/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig", "Remcos"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicioues process $Processes.process_path.file_path$ running from suspicious location", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1543"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Processes.process_path.file_path", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Create or Modify System Process"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_process_file_path_filter"}]}, {"name": "Process Deleting Its Process File Path", "id": "f7eda4bc-871c-11eb-b110-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-17", "author": "Teoderick Contreras", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This detection is to identify a suspicious process that tries to delete the process file path related to its process. This technique is known to be defense evasion once a certain condition of malware is satisfied or not. Clop ransomware use this technique where it will try to delete its process file path using a .bat command if the keyboard layout is not the layout it tries to infect.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=1 cmdline = \"*/c del*\" Image = \"*\\\\cmd.exe\" |eval result = if(like(process,\"%\".parent_process.\"%\"), \"Found\", \"Not Found\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer user ParentImage ParentCommandLine Image cmdline EventCode ProcessID result | where result = \"Found\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `process_deleting_its_process_file_path_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware", "Remcos"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Credential Access"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A process $Image$ tries to delete its process path in commandline $cmdline$ as part of defense evasion in host $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1070"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["EventCode", "Computer", "user", "ParentImage", "ParentCommandLine", "Image", "cmdline", "ProcessID", "result", "_time"], "risk_score": 60, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Indicator Removal on Host"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "process_deleting_its_process_file_path_filter"}]}, {"name": "Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process", "id": "1f35e1da-267b-11ec-90a9-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-06", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious spawned process by wscript or cscript process. This technique was a common technique used by adversaries and malware to execute different LOLBIN, other script like powershell or create a suspended process to inject its code as a defense evasion. This TTP may detect some normal script that using several application tool that are in the list of the child process it detects but a good pivot and indicator that a script is may execute suspicious code.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"cscript.exe\", \"wscript.exe\") Processes.process_name IN (\"regsvr32.exe\", \"rundll32.exe\",\"winhlp32.exe\",\"certutil.exe\",\"msbuild.exe\",\"cmd.exe\",\"powershell*\",\"wmic.exe\",\"mshta.exe\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "user may create vbs or js script that use several tool as part of its execution.", "references": ["https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/8da5b75b6380a41eee3a399c43dfe0d99eeefaa1fd21027a07b1ecaa4cd96fdd?environmentId=120"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["FIN7", "Remcos", "Unusual Processes"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/vbs_wscript/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "wscript or cscript parent process spawned $process_name$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1055", "T1543", "T1134.004", "T1134"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Process Injection", "Create or Modify System Process", "Parent PID Spoofing", "Access Token Manipulation"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Cobalt Group", "APT37", "Honeybee", "PLATINUM", "no", "no", "Blue Mockingbird"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process_filter"}]}, {"name": "Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir", "id": "e6fc13b0-1609-11ec-b533-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-15", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect an anomaly event of non-firefox process accessing the files in profile folder. This folder contains all the sqlite database of the firefox browser related to users login, history, cookies and etc. Most of the RAT, trojan spy as well as FIN7 jssloader try to parse the those sqlite database to collect information on the compromised host. This SACL Event (4663) need to be enabled to tthe firefox profile directory to be eable to use this. Since you monitoring this access to the folder a noise coming from firefox need to be filter and also sqlite db browser and explorer .exe to make this detection more stable.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 NOT (process_name IN (\"*\\\\firefox.exe\", \"*\\\\explorer.exe\", \"*sql*\")) Object_Name=\"*\\\\AppData\\\\Roaming\\\\Mozilla\\\\Firefox\\\\Profiles*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Object_Name Object_Type process_name Access_Mask Accesses process_id EventCode dest user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663. For 4663, enable \"Audit Object Access\" in Group Policy. Then check the two boxes listed for both \"Success\" and \"Failure.\"", "known_false_positives": "other browser not listed related to firefox may catch by this rule.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["FIN7", "Remcos"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_sacl/security.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "a non firefox browser process $process_name$ accessing $Object_Name$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1555", "T1555.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Object_Name", "Object_Type", "process_name", "Access_Mask", "Accesses", "process_id", "EventCode", "dest", "user"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Credentials from Password Stores", "Credentials from Web Browsers"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT39", "OilRig", "MuddyWater", "Leafminer", "APT33", "Turla", "Stealth Falcon", "Magic Hound", "Sandworm Team", "Inception", "Stealth Falcon", "OilRig", "Leafminer", "APT33", "APT3", "Kimsuky", "TA505", "Stolen Pencil", "MuddyWater", "APT37", "Patchwork", "Molerats"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir_filter"}]}, {"name": "Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion", "id": "773b66fe-4dd9-11ec-8289-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-25", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic will detect a suspicious process commandline related to windows defender exclusion feature. This command is abused by adversaries, malware author and red teams to bypassed Windows Defender Anti-Virus product by excluding folder path, file path, process, extensions and etc. from its real time or schedule scan to execute their malicious code. This is a good indicator for defense evasion and to look further for events after this behavior.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process = \"*Add-MpPreference *\" OR Processes.process = \"*Set-MpPreference *\") AND Processes.process=\"*-exclusion*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to use this windows features.", "references": ["https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.html", "https://app.any.run/tasks/cf1245de-06a7-4366-8209-8e3006f2bfe5/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Remcos", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/defender_exclusion_sysmon/sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "exclusion command $process$ executed on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion_filter"}]}, {"name": "Malicious InProcServer32 Modification", "id": "127c8d08-25ff-11ec-9223-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-05", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies a process modifying the registry with a known malicious CLSID under InProcServer32. Most COM classes are registered with the operating system and are identified by a GUID that represents the Class Identifier (CLSID) within the registry (usually under HKLM\\\\Software\\\\Classes\\\\CLSID or HKCU\\\\Software\\\\Classes\\\\CLSID). Behind the implementation of a COM class is the server (some binary) that is referenced within registry keys under the CLSID. The LocalServer32 key represents a path to an executable (exe) implementation, and the InprocServer32 key represents a path to a dynamic link library (DLL) implementation (Bohops). During triage, review parallel processes for suspicious activity. Pivot on the process GUID to see the full timeline of events. Analyze the value and look for file modifications. Being this is looking for inprocserver32, a DLL found in the value will most likely be loaded by a parallel process.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_guid Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\CLSID\\\\{89565275-A714-4a43-912E-978B935EDCCC}\\\\InProcServer32\\\\(Default)\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest Registry.process_guid Registry.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | fields _time dest registry_path registry_key_name registry_value_name process_name process_path process process_guid user] | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, process_name registry_path registry_key_name registry_value_name user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_inprocserver32_modification_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, filter as needed. In our test case, Remcos used regsvr32.exe to modify the registry. It may be required, dependent upon the EDR tool producing registry events, to remove (Default) from the command-line.", "references": ["https://bohops.com/2018/06/28/abusing-com-registry-structure-clsid-localserver32-inprocserver32/", "https://tria.ge/210929-ap75vsddan", "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/cb77b93150cb0f7fe65ce8a7e2a5781e727419451355a7736db84109fa215a89"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", "Remcos"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ modifying the registry with a known malicious clsid under InProcServer32.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218.010", "T1112"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "process_name", "registry_path", "registry_key_name", "registry_value_name", "user"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Regsvr32", "Modify Registry"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Inception", "WIRTE", "Cobalt Group", "APT19", "Leviathan", "APT32", "Deep Panda", "Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Turla", "APT32", "APT38", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "Threat Group-3390", "Honeybee", "Patchwork", "Gorgon Group", "FIN8"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "malicious_inprocserver32_modification_filter"}]}, {"name": "Process Writing DynamicWrapperX", "id": "b0a078e4-2601-11ec-9aec-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-05", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "DynamicWrapperX is an ActiveX component that can be used in a script to call Windows API functions, but it requires the dynwrapx.dll to be installed and registered. With that, a binary writing dynwrapx.dll to disk and registering it into the registry is highly suspect. Why is it needed? In most malicious instances, it will be written to disk at a non-standard location. During triage, review parallel processes and pivot on the process_guid. Review the registry for any suspicious modifications meant to load dynwrapx.dll. Identify any suspicious module loads of dynwrapx.dll. This will identify the process that will invoke vbs/wscript/cscript.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_guid Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name=\"dynwrapx.dll\" by _time Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time process_guid file_path file_name file_create_time user dest process_name] | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest process_name process_guid file_name file_path file_create_time user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `process_writing_dynamicwrapperx_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however it is possible to filter by Processes.process_name and specific processes (ex. wscript.exe). Filter as needed. This may need modification based on EDR telemetry and how it brings in registry data. For example, removal of (Default).", "references": ["https://blog.f-secure.com/hunting-for-koadic-a-com-based-rootkit/", "https://www.script-coding.com/dynwrapx_eng.html", "https://bohops.com/2018/06/28/abusing-com-registry-structure-clsid-localserver32-inprocserver32/", "https://tria.ge/210929-ap75vsddan", "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/cb77b93150cb0f7fe65ce8a7e2a5781e727419451355a7736db84109fa215a89"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ downloading the DynamicWrapperX dll.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1559.001"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "process_name", "process_guid", "file_name", "file_path", "file_create_time user"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "Component Object Model"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Gamaredon Group", "MuddyWater"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "process_writing_dynamicwrapperx_filter"}]}, {"name": "Possible Browser Pass View Parameter", "id": "8ba484e8-4b97-11ec-b19a-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-22", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic will detect a suspicious process contains a commandline parameter related to web browser credential dumper. This technique was used by Remcos RAT malware where it use the techique of Nirsoft webbrowserpassview.exe application to dump web browser credentials. Remcos use the \"/stext\" commandline to dump the credential in text format. This Hunting query is good indicator to look further for possible remcos infection within the network or possible compromised host. Since the detections is only base on the parameter command and the possible path where it will drop the text credential information, It may catch normal tools that having same command and behavior.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process IN (\"*/stext *\", \"*/shtml *\", \"*/LoadPasswordsIE*\", \"*/LoadPasswordsFirefox*\", \"*/LoadPasswordsChrome*\", \"*/LoadPasswordsOpera*\", \"*/LoadPasswordsSafari*\" , \"*/UseOperaPasswordFile*\", \"*/OperaPasswordFile*\",\"*/stab*\", \"*/scomma*\", \"*/stabular*\", \"*/shtml*\", \"*/sverhtml*\", \"*/sxml*\", \"*/skeepass*\" ) AND Processes.process IN (\"*\\\\temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\users\\\\public\\\\*\", \"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `possible_browser_pass_view_parameter_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "False positive is quite limited. Filter is needed", "references": ["https://www.nirsoft.net/utils/web_browser_password.html", "https://app.any.run/tasks/df0baf9f-8baf-4c32-a452-16562ecb19be/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 40, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1555/web_browser_pass_view/sysmon.log"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "suspicious process $process_name$ contains commandline $process$ on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1555.003", "T1555"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 16, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Credentials from Web Browsers", "Credentials from Password Stores"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Sandworm Team", "Inception", "Stealth Falcon", "OilRig", "Leafminer", "APT33", "APT3", "Kimsuky", "TA505", "Stolen Pencil", "MuddyWater", "APT37", "Patchwork", "Molerats", "APT39", "OilRig", "MuddyWater", "Leafminer", "APT33", "Turla", "Stealth Falcon"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "possible_browser_pass_view_parameter_filter"}]}, {"name": "Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir", "id": "81263de4-160a-11ec-944f-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-15", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect an anomaly event of non-chrome process accessing the files in chrome user default folder. This folder contains all the sqlite database of the chrome browser related to users login, history, cookies and etc. Most of the RAT, trojan spy as well as FIN7 jssloader try to parse the those sqlite database to collect information on the compromised host. This SACL Event (4663) need to be enabled to tthe firefox profile directory to be eable to use this. Since you monitoring this access to the folder a noise coming from firefox need to be filter and also sqlite db browser and explorer .exe to make this detection more stable.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 NOT (process_name IN (\"*\\\\chrome.exe\", \"*\\\\explorer.exe\", \"*sql*\")) Object_Name=\"*\\\\Google\\\\Chrome\\\\User Data\\\\Default*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Object_Name Object_Type process_name Access_Mask Accesses process_id EventCode dest user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663. For 4663, enable \"Audit Object Access\" in Group Policy. Then check the two boxes listed for both \"Success\" and \"Failure.\"", "known_false_positives": "other browser not listed related to firefox may catch by this rule.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["FIN7", "Remcos"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_sacl/security2.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "a non firefox browser process $process_name$ accessing $Object_Name$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1555", "T1555.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Object_Name", "Object_Type", "process_name", "Access_Mask", "Accesses", "process_id", "EventCode", "dest", "user"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Credentials from Password Stores", "Credentials from Web Browsers"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT39", "OilRig", "MuddyWater", "Leafminer", "APT33", "Turla", "Stealth Falcon", "Magic Hound", "Sandworm Team", "Inception", "Stealth Falcon", "OilRig", "Leafminer", "APT33", "APT3", "Kimsuky", "TA505", "Stolen Pencil", "MuddyWater", "APT37", "Patchwork", "Molerats"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir_filter"}]}, {"name": "System Info Gathering Using Dxdiag Application", "id": "f92d74f2-4921-11ec-b685-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-19", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious dxdiag.exe process commandline can collect system info of the target host. This technique was seen in remcos, adversaries and other malware to collect information as part of recon or collection phase of attack. Even this behavior is rarely seen in a corporate network this commandline can be used by network administrator to audit host machine specification. Better to check what it did after it pipes out the result to a file for further processing.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_dxdiag` AND Processes.process = \"* /t *\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "this commandline can be used by network administrator to audit host machine specification.filter is needed.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/df0baf9f-8baf-4c32-a452-16562ecb19be/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Reconnaissance"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/t1592/host_info_dxdiag/sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "dxdiag.exe process with commandline $process$ on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1592"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=dxdiag.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=dxdiag.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_dxdiag"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application_filter"}]}, {"name": "Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App", "id": "35159940-228f-11ec-8a49-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-01", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious wscript commandline to execute vbscript. This technique was seen in several malware to execute malicious vbs file using wscript application. commonly vbs script is associated to cscript process and this can be a technique to evade process parent child detections or even some av script emulation system.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = \"wscript.exe\" AND Processes.parent_process = \"*//e:vbscript*\") OR (Processes.process_name = \"wscript.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*//e:vbscript*\") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `vbscript_execution_using_wscript_app_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/369332/0/html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["FIN7", "Remcos"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/vbs_wscript/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Process name $process_name$ with commandline $process$ to execute vbsscript", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059.005", "T1059"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Visual Basic", "Command and Scripting Interpreter"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "APT-C-36", "Rancor", "Patchwork", "MuddyWater", "Honeybee", "FIN7", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "Turla", "TA505", "Silence", "WIRTE", "FIN4", "Cobalt Group", "Gorgon Group", "Leviathan", "TA459", "Magic Hound", "APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "vbscript_execution_using_wscript_app_filter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry", "id": "13395a44-4dd9-11ec-9df7-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-25", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic will detect a suspicious process that modify a registry related to windows defender exclusion feature. This registry is abused by adversaries, malware author and red teams to bypassed Windows Defender Anti-Virus product by excluding folder path, file path, process, extensions and etc. from its real time or schedule scan to execute their malicious code. This is a good indicator for a defense evasion and to look further for events after this behavior.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Exclusions\\\\*\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to use this windows features.", "references": ["https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.html", "https://app.any.run/tasks/cf1245de-06a7-4366-8209-8e3006f2bfe5/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Remcos", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/defender_exclusion_sysmon/sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "exclusion registry $registry_path$ modified or added on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.user", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.registry_value_data"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry_filter"}]}, {"name": "Disabling Remote User Account Control", "id": "bbc644bc-37df-4e1a-9c88-ec9a53e2038c", "version": 4, "date": "2020-11-18", "author": "David Dorsey, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The search looks for modifications to registry keys that control the enforcement of Windows User Account Control (UAC).", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System\\\\EnableLUA* Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000000\" by Registry.dest, Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `disabling_remote_user_account_control_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report registry modifications.", "known_false_positives": "This registry key may be modified via administrators to implement a change in system policy. This type of change should be a very rare occurrence.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Remcos"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "The Windows registry keys that control the enforcement of Windows User Account Control (UAC) were modified on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.user", "Registry.action"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Bypass User Access Control", "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "MuddyWater", "Honeybee", "Cobalt Group", "Threat Group-3390", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Patchwork", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "disabling_remote_user_account_control_filter"}]}, {"name": "Loading Of Dynwrapx Module", "id": "eac5e8ba-4857-11ec-9371-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-18", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "DynamicWrapperX is an ActiveX component that can be used in a script to call Windows API functions, but it requires the dynwrapx.dll to be installed and registered. With that, registering or loading dynwrapx.dll to a host highly suspect. Why is it needed? In most malicious instances, During triage, review parallel processes and pivot on the process_guid. Review the registry for any suspicious modifications meant to load dynwrapx.dll. Identify any suspicious module loads of dynwrapx.dll. This will identify the process that will invoke vbs/wscript/cscript.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 (ImageLoaded = \"*\\\\dynwrapx.dll\" OR OriginalFileName = \"dynwrapx.dll\" OR Product = \"DynamicWrapperX\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded OriginalFileName Product process_name Computer EventCode Signed ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `loading_of_dynwrapx_module_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however it is possible to filter by Processes.process_name and specific processes (ex. wscript.exe). Filter as needed. This may need modification based on EDR telemetry and how it brings in registry data. For example, removal of (Default).", "references": ["https://blog.f-secure.com/hunting-for-koadic-a-com-based-rootkit/", "https://www.script-coding.com/dynwrapx_eng.html", "https://bohops.com/2018/06/28/abusing-com-registry-structure-clsid-localserver32-inprocserver32/", "https://tria.ge/210929-ap75vsddan", "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/cb77b93150cb0f7fe65ce8a7e2a5781e727419451355a7736db84109fa215a89"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_dynwrapx/sysmon_dynwraper.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "dynwrapx.dll loaded by process $process_name$ on $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1055", "T1055.001"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Image", "ImageLoaded", "OriginalFileName", "Product", "process_name", "Computer", "EventCode", "Signed", "ProcessId"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Process Injection", "Dynamic-link Library Injection"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Cobalt Group", "APT37", "Honeybee", "PLATINUM", "TA505", "Turla", "Tropic Trooper", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "loading_of_dynwrapx_module_filter"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "id": "a7e3f0f0-ae42-11eb-b245-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-06", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic will identify suspicious executable or scripts (known file extensions) in list of suspicious file path in Windows. This technique is used by adversaries to evade detection. The suspicious file path are known paths used in the wild and are not common to have executable or scripts.", "search": "|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_name = *.exe OR Filesystem.file_name = *.dll OR Filesystem.file_name = *.sys OR Filesystem.file_name = *.com OR Filesystem.file_name = *.vbs OR Filesystem.file_name = *.vbe OR Filesystem.file_name = *.js OR Filesystem.file_name = *.ps1 OR Filesystem.file_name = *.bat OR Filesystem.file_name = *.cmd OR Filesystem.file_name = *.pif) AND ( Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\windows\\\\fonts\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\windows\\\\temp\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\users\\\\public\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\windows\\\\debug\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Users\\\\Administrator\\\\Music\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Windows\\\\servicing\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Users\\\\Default\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *Recycle.bin* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Windows\\\\Media\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Windows\\\\repair\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Temp*) by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may allow creation of script or exe in the paths specified. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["XMRig", "Remcos"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious executable or scripts with file name $file_name$, $file_path$ and process_id $process_id$ executed in suspicious file path in Windows by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1036"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_id", "type": "Process", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "file_name", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Other", "Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.file_path", "Filesystem.file_create_time", "Filesystem.process_id", "Filesystem.file_name", "Filesystem.user"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Masquerading"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Windshift", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "menuPass", "Dragonfly 2.0"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path_filter"}]}, {"name": "Remcos RAT File Creation in Remcos Folder", "id": "25ae862a-1ac3-11ec-94a1-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-21", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect file creation in remcos folder in appdata which is the keylog and clipboard logs that will be send to its c2 server. This is really a good TTP indicator that there is a remcos rat in the system that do keylogging, clipboard grabbing and audio recording.", "search": "|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*.dat\") Filesystem.file_path = \"*\\\\remcos\\\\*\" by _time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remcos_rat_file_creation_in_remcos_folder_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://success.trendmicro.com/solution/1123281-remcos-malware-information", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2021/07/remcos-rat-delivered-via-visual-basic/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_agent/sysmon.log"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "file $file_name$ created in $file_path$ of $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1113"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "file_create_time", "file_name", "file_path"], "risk_score": 100, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Screen Capture"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "APT39", "Silence", "MuddyWater", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "Dark Caracal", "FIN7", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Magic Hound", "Group5", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "remcos_rat_file_creation_in_remcos_folder_filter"}]}, {"name": "Jscript Execution Using Cscript App", "id": "002f1e24-146e-11ec-a470-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-13", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a execution of jscript using cscript process. Commonly when a user run jscript file it was executed by wscript.exe application. This technique was seen in FIN7 js implant to execute its malicious script using cscript process. This behavior is uncommon and a good artifacts to check further anomalies within the network", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = \"cscript.exe\" AND Processes.parent_process = \"*//e:jscript*\") OR (Processes.process_name = \"cscript.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*//e:jscript*\") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `jscript_execution_using_cscript_app_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html", "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["FIN7", "Remcos"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_macro_js_1/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Process name $process_name$ with commandline $process$ to execute jscript in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.007"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter", "JavaScript/JScript"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "APT32", "FIN7", "Cobalt Group", "Molerats", "TA505", "Silence", "Leafminer"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "jscript_execution_using_cscript_app_filter"}]}, {"name": "Remcos client registry install entry", "id": "f2a1615a-1d63-11ec-97d2-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-24", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search detects registry key license at host where Remcos RAT agent is installed.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_key_name=*\\\\Software\\\\Remcos*) by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_key_name Registry.process_id| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`remcos_client_registry_install_entry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0332/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_panel_client/remcos_registry_entry.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A registry entry $registry_path$ with registry keyname $registry_key_name$ related to Remcos RAT in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1112"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.process_id", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Modify Registry"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Silence", "APT41", "Turla", "APT32", "APT38", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "Threat Group-3390", "Honeybee", "Patchwork", "Gorgon Group", "FIN8"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "remcos_client_registry_install_entry_filter"}]}, {"name": "Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline", "id": "c9ef7dc4-eeaf-11eb-b2b6-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-07-27", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies Regsvr32.exe utilizing the silent switch to load DLLs. This technique has most recently been seen in IcedID campaigns to load its initial dll that will download the 2nd stage loader that will download and decrypt the config payload. The switch type may be either a hyphen `-` or forward slash `/`. This behavior is typically found with `-s`, and it is possible there are more switch types that may be used. \\ During triage, review parallel processes and capture any artifacts that may have landed on disk. Isolate and contain the endpoint as necessary.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"(?i)[\\-|\\/][Ss]{1}\") | `regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "minimal. but network operator can use this application to load dll.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/56680cba-2bbc-4b34-8633-5f7878ddf858/", "https://regexr.com/699e2"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["IcedID", "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", "Remcos"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a DLL using the silent parameter.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.010"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "Regsvr32"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "Blue Mockingbird", "Inception", "WIRTE", "Cobalt Group", "APT19", "Leviathan", "APT32", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=REGSVR32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_regsvr32"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline_filter"}]}, {"name": "Winhlp32 Spawning a Process", "id": "d17dae9e-2618-11ec-b9f5-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-05", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies winhlp32.exe, found natively in `c:\\windows\\`, spawning a child process that loads a file out of appdata, programdata, or temp. Winhlp32.exe has a rocky past in that multiple vulnerabilities were found and added to MetaSploit. WinHlp32.exe is required to display 32-bit Help files that have the \".hlp\" file name extension. This particular instance is related to a Remcos sample where dynwrapx.dll is added to the registry under inprocserver32, and later module loaded by winhlp32.exe to spawn wscript.exe and load a vbs or file from disk. During triage, review parallel processes to identify further suspicious behavior. Review module loads for unsuspecting unsigned modules. Capture any file modifications and analyze.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=winhlp32.exe Processes.process IN (\"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\",\"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winhlp32_spawning_a_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as winhlp32.exe is typically not used with the latest flavors of Windows OS. However, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/16541", "https://tria.ge/210929-ap75vsddan", "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/cb77b93150cb0f7fe65ce8a7e2a5781e727419451355a7736db84109fa215a89"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$, and is not typical activity for this process.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Process Injection"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Cobalt Group", "APT37", "Honeybee", "PLATINUM"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "winhlp32_spawning_a_process_filter"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands", "id": "907ac95c-4dd9-11ec-ba2c-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-25", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic will detect a suspicious process commandline related to windows defender exclusion feature. This command is abused by adversaries, malware author and red teams to bypassed Windows Defender Anti-Virus product by excluding folder path, file path, process, extensions and etc. from its real time or schedule scan to execute their malicious code. This is a good indicator for defense evasion and to look further for events after this behavior.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Add-MpPreference *\" OR Message = \"*Set-MpPreference *\") AND Message = \"*-exclusion*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to use this windows features.", "references": ["https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.html", "https://app.any.run/tasks/cf1245de-06a7-4366-8209-8e3006f2bfe5/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Remcos", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/defender_exclusion_powershell/powershell.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "exclusion command $Message$ executed on $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify Tools", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Rocke", "Kimsuky", "Turla", "Night Dragon", "Gorgon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "powershell"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services", "id": "3cf0dc36-484d-11ec-a6bc-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-18", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious process having a dns query on known abuse text paste web services, or VoIP, instant messaging and digital distribution platform to download some files. This technique is abused by adversaries, malware attacker and red team to download a malicious file on the target host. This is a good TTP indicator for possible initial access technique. Noise and false positive can be seen if the following instant messaging is allowed or common application in corporate network.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=22 QueryName IN (\"*pastebin*\", \"*discord*\", \"*telegram*\", \"*t.me*\") process_name IN (\"cmd.exe\", \"*powershell*\", \"pwsh.exe\", \"wscript.exe\", \"cscript.exe\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image QueryName QueryStatus process_name QueryResults Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services_filter`", "how_to_implement": "his detection relies on sysmon logs with the Event ID 7, Driver loaded. Please tune your sysmon config that you DriverLoad event for SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll is captured by Sysmon. Additionally, you need sysmon logs for Event ID 22, DNS Query. We suggest to run this detection at least once a day over the last 14 days.", "known_false_positives": "Noise and false positive can be seen if the following instant messaging is allowed to use within corporate network. filter is needed.", "references": ["https://urlhaus.abuse.ch/url/1798923/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_pastebin_download/sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "suspicious process $process_name$ has a dns query in $QueryName$ on $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059.005", "T1059"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "process name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Image", "QueryName", "QueryStatus", "process_name", "QueryResults", "Computer"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Visual Basic", "Command and Scripting Interpreter"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "Sandworm Team", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "APT-C-36", "Rancor", "Patchwork", "MuddyWater", "Honeybee", "FIN7", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "APT32", "Turla", "TA505", "Silence", "WIRTE", "FIN4", "Cobalt Group", "Gorgon Group", "Leviathan", "TA459", "Magic Hound", "APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services_filter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Image Creation In Appdata Folder", "id": "f6f904c4-1ac0-11ec-806b-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-21", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious creation of image in appdata folder made by process that also has a file reference in appdata folder. This technique was seen in remcos rat that capture screenshot of the compromised machine and place it in the appdata and will be send to its C2 server. This TTP is really a good indicator to check that process because it is in suspicious folder path and image files are not commonly created by user in this folder path.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=*.exe Processes.process_path=\"*\\\\appdata\\\\Roaming\\\\*\" by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*.png\",\"*.jpg\",\"*.bmp\",\"*.gif\",\"*.tiff\") Filesystem.file_path = \"*\\\\appdata\\\\Roaming\\\\*\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process] | `suspicious_image_creation_in_appdata_folder_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://success.trendmicro.com/solution/1123281-remcos-malware-information", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2021/07/remcos-rat-delivered-via-visual-basic/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_agent/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "process $process_name$ creating image file $file_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1113"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "process name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "file_create_time", "file_name", "file_path", "process_name", "process_path", "process"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Screen Capture"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "APT39", "Silence", "MuddyWater", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "Dark Caracal", "FIN7", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Magic Hound", "Group5", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "suspicious_image_creation_in_appdata_folder_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "id": "988C59C5-0A1C-45B6-A555-0C62276E327E", "version": 1, "date": "2020-01-22", "author": "iDefense Cyber Espionage Team, iDefense", "description": "Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques employed by the MUDCARP threat group.", "narrative": "This story was created as a joint effort between iDefense and Splunk.\\\niDefense analysts have recently discovered a Windows executable file that, upon execution, spoofs a decryption tool and then drops a file that appears to be the custom-built javascript backdoor, \"Orz,\" which is associated with the threat actors known as MUDCARP (as well as \"temp.Periscope\" and \"Leviathan\"). The file is executed using Wscript.\\\nThe MUDCARP techniques include the use of the compressed-folders module from Microsoft, zipfldr.dll, with RouteTheCall export to run the malicious process or command. After a successful reboot, the malware is made persistent by a manipulating `[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run]'help'='c:\\\\windows\\\\system32\\\\rundll32.exe c:\\\\windows\\\\system32\\\\zipfldr.dll,RouteTheCall c:\\\\programdata\\\\winapp.exe'`. Though this technique is not exclusive to MUDCARP, it has been spotted in the group's arsenal of advanced techniques seen in the wild.\\\nThis Analytic Story searches for evidence of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that allow for the use of a endpoint detection-and-response (EDR) bypass technique to mask the true parent of a malicious process. It can also be set as a registry key for further sandbox evasion and to allow the malware to launch only after reboot.\\\nIf behavioral searches included in this story yield positive hits, iDefense recommends conducting IOC searches for the following:\\\n\\\n1. www.chemscalere[.]com\\\n1. chemscalere[.]com\\\n1. about.chemscalere[.]com\\\n1. autoconfig.chemscalere[.]com\\\n1. autodiscover.chemscalere[.]com\\\n1. catalog.chemscalere[.]com\\\n1. cpanel.chemscalere[.]com\\\n1. db.chemscalere[.]com\\\n1. ftp.chemscalere[.]com\\\n1. mail.chemscalere[.]com\\\n1. news.chemscalere[.]com\\\n1. update.chemscalere[.]com\\\n1. webmail.chemscalere[.]com\\\n1. www.candlelightparty[.]org\\\n1. candlelightparty[.]org\\\n1. newapp.freshasianews[.]comIn addition, iDefense also recommends that organizations review their environments for activity related to the following hashes:\\\n\\\n1. cd195ee448a3657b5c2c2d13e9c7a2e2\\\n1. b43ad826fe6928245d3c02b648296b43\\\n1. 889a9b52566448231f112a5ce9b5dfaf\\\n1. b8ec65dab97cdef3cd256cc4753f0c54\\\n1. 04d83cd3813698de28cfbba326d7647c", "references": ["https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/scope-of-mudcarp-attacks-highlight-1/", "http://blog.amossys.fr/badflick-is-not-so-bad.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1547.001", "T1059", "T1059.001", "T1547"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "PowerShell"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390", "Magic Hound", "Putter Panda", "Inception", "Stealth Falcon", "Tropic Trooper", "Kimsuky", "Dark Caracal", "TEMP.Veles", "TA459", "Poseidon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ke3chang", "APT29", "Turla", "APT39", "Molerats", "Gamaredon Group", "Rocke", "Leviathan", "RTM", "FIN8", "TA505", "Whitefly", "Frankenstein", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "Silence", "APT32", "Soft Cell", "APT19", "APT37", "WIRTE", "Darkhotel", "APT41", "CopyKittens", "FIN5", "menuPass", "FIN6", "Blue Mockingbird", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Honeybee", "APT3", "Wizard Spider", "Thrip", "Machete", "APT18", "no", "Sharpshooter", "MuddyWater", "FIN10", "DarkVishnya", "Patchwork", "APT28", "Gallmaker", "APT33", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Gorgon Group", "FIN7", "DarkHydrus"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "id": "f5f6af30-7aa7-4295-bfe9-07fe87c01a4b", "version": 6, "date": "2021-09-07", "author": "Jose Hernandez, David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to launch an application or service at system startup.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\run* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentVersion\\\\Windows\\\\Appinit_Dlls* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Shell* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Notify* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Userinit* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\VmApplet* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\policies\\\\explorer\\\\run* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\runservices* OR Registry.registry_path=HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Netsh\\\\* OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Image File Execution Options*\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=Debugger) OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Security Packages\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\\\\OSConfig\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Security Packages\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\SilentProcessExit\\\\*\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*currentVersion\\\\Windows\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Load\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentVersion\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Svchost\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\"AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"BootExecute\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Software\\\\Run\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"auto_update\")) by Registry.dest Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "There are many legitimate applications that must execute on system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Ransomware", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "IcedID", "Remcos"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 95, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Persistence"}, "Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to persistence in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1547.001", "T1547"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user"], "risk_score": 76, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Rocke", "Tropic Trooper", "Gamaredon Group", "Sharpshooter", "Molerats", "Silence", "RTM", "Inception", "APT41", "Machete", "Kimsuky", "APT33", "APT39", "APT32", "APT18", "Turla", "Dark Caracal", "Cobalt Group", "Honeybee", "Threat Group-3390", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Gorgon Group", "Ke3chang", "APT19", "Leviathan", "MuddyWater", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Magic Hound", "APT3", "FIN10", "FIN7", "Patchwork", "FIN6", "Lazarus Group", "Putter Panda", "APT29", "Darkhotel", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter"}]}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window", "id": "ee18ed37-0802-4268-9435-b3b91aaa18db", "version": 7, "date": "2021-10-05", "author": "David Dorsey, Michael Haag Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following hunting analytic identifies PowerShell commands utilizing the WindowStyle parameter to hide the window on the compromised endpoint. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it is overriding the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide its activity from the user, and connects to the Internet. Removed in this version of the query is New-Object. The analytic identifies all variations of WindowStyle, as PowerShell allows the ability to shorten the parameter. For example w, win, windowsty and so forth. In addition, through our research it was identified that PowerShell will interpret different command switch types beyond the hyphen. We have added endash, emdash, horizontal bar, and forward slash.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"(?i)[\\-|\\/|\u2013|\u2014|\u2015]w(in*d*o*w*s*t*y*l*e*)*\\s+[^-]\") | `malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate process can have this combination of command-line options, but it's not common.", "references": ["https://regexr.com/663rr", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses/blob/master/TestHarnesses/T1059.001_PowerShell/OutPowerShellCommandLineParameter.ps1", "https://ss64.com/ps/powershell.html", "https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/1440758396534214658?s=20", "https://blog.netlab.360.com/ten-families-of-malicious-samples-are-spreading-using-the-log4j2-vulnerability-now/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "HAFNIUM Group", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Command And Control"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/hidden_powershell/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "PowerShell processes $process$ started with parameters to modify the execution policy of the run, run in a hidden window, and connect to the Internet on host $dest$ executed by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059.001", "T1059"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process", "type": "Process", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["PowerShell", "Command and Scripting Interpreter"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Molerats", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "Silence", "APT41", "Kimsuky", "Soft Cell", "TA505", "WIRTE", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "Gallmaker", "Turla", "APT19", "DarkHydrus", "APT28", "Thrip", "Gorgon Group", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Leviathan", "TA459", "FIN8", "MuddyWater", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CopyKittens", "APT32", "FIN7", "FIN10", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Poseidon Group", "APT3", "APT29", "Deep Panda", "APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_powershell"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window_filter"}]}, {"name": "Unusually Long Command Line", "id": "c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6a4264e7f", "version": 5, "date": "2020-12-08", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious activity on your hosts.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| eval processlen=len(process) | eventstats stdev(processlen) as stdev, avg(processlen) as avg by dest | stats max(processlen) as maxlen, values(stdev) as stdevperhost, values(avg) as avgperhost by dest, user, process_name, process | `unusually_long_command_line_filter` |eval threshold = 3 | where maxlen > ((threshold*stdevperhost) + avgperhost)", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships, from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the process field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate applications start with long command lines.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Unusual Processes", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Unusually long command line $Processes.process_name$ on $dest$", "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Processes.process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.user", "Processes.dest", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "unusually_long_command_line_filter"}]}, {"name": "Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK", "id": "57edaefa-a73b-45e5-bbae-f39c1473f941", "version": 1, "date": "2019-05-08", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious activity on your hosts. This search leverages the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) to help identify command lines with lengths that are unusual for a given user.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| eval processlen=len(process) | search user!=unknown | apply cmdline_pdfmodel threshold=0.01 | rename \"IsOutlier(processlen)\" as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | table firstTime lastTime user dest process_name process processlen count | `unusually_long_command_line___mltk_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that monitors command lines and populates the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model. In addition, MLTK version >= 4.2 must be installed on your search heads, along with any required dependencies. Finally, the support search \"Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK\" must be executed before this detection search, as it builds an ML model over the historical data used by this search. It is important that this search is run in the same app context as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild the model with the latest data available in your environment.", "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate applications use long command lines for installs or updates. You should review identified command lines for legitimacy. You may modify the first part of the search to omit legitimate command lines from consideration. If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider changing the value of threshold in the search to a smaller value. You should also periodically re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data. You may get unexpected results if the user identified in the results is not present in the data used to build the associated model.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Unusual Processes", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Ransomware"], "asset_type": "", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.user", "Processes.dest", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "unusually_long_command_line___mltk_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Netsh Abuse", "id": "2b1800dd-92f9-47ec-a981-fdf1351e5f65", "version": 1, "date": "2017-01-05", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "Detect activities and various techniques associated with the abuse of `netsh.exe`, which can disable local firewall settings or set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.", "narrative": "It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage native Windows tools and functionality to execute commands for malicious reasons. One such tool on Windows OS is `netsh.exe`,a command-line scripting utility that allows you to--either locally or remotely--display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. `Netsh.exe` can be used to discover and disable local firewall settings. It can also be used to set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.\\\nTo get started, run the detection search to identify parent processes of `netsh.exe`.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/tn-archive/bb490939(v=technet.10)", "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html", "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Netsh Abuse", "category": ["Abuse"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562", "T1562.004"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Impair Defenses", "Disable or Modify System Firewall"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Kimsuky", "no", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Rocke", "Carbanak", "Lazarus Group"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Processes launching netsh", "id": "b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-95dbb162040e", "version": 4, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Josef Kuepker, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe. Netsh is a command-line scripting utility that allows you to, either locally or remotely, display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. Netsh can be used as a persistence proxy technique to execute a helper DLL when netsh.exe is executed. In this search, we are looking for processes spawned by netsh.exe and executing commands via the command line.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) AS Processes.process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_netsh` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest |`drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`processes_launching_netsh_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Some VPN applications are known to launch netsh.exe. Outside of these instances, it is unusual for an executable to launch netsh.exe and run commands.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Netsh Abuse", "Disabling Security Tools", "DHS Report TA18-074A"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A process $process_name$ that tries to execute netsh commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.004", "T1562"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.user", "Processes.dest"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Disable or Modify System Firewall", "Impair Defenses"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Rocke", "Lazarus Group", "Kimsuky", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Carbanak", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=netsh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=netsh.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_netsh"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "processes_launching_netsh_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Detect Zerologon Attack", "id": "5d14a962-569e-4578-939f-f386feb63ce4", "version": 1, "date": "2020-09-18", "author": "Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Stan Miskowicz, David Dorsey, Shannon Davis Splunk", "description": "Uncover activity related to the execution of Zerologon CVE-2020-11472, a technique wherein attackers target a Microsoft Windows Domain Controller to reset its computer account password. The result from this attack is attackers can now provide themselves high privileges and take over Domain Controller. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to reset Domain Controller Computer Account via exploit code remotely or via the use of tool Mimikatz as payload carrier.", "narrative": "This attack is a privilege escalation technique, where attacker targets a Netlogon secure channel connection to a domain controller, using Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC). This vulnerability exposes vulnerable Windows Domain Controllers to be targeted via unaunthenticated RPC calls which eventually reset Domain Contoller computer account ($) providing the attacker the opportunity to exfil domain controller credential secrets and assign themselve high privileges that can lead to domain controller and potentially complete network takeover. The detection searches in this Analytic Story use Windows Event viewer events and Sysmon events to detect attack execution, these searches monitor access to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process which is an indicator of the use of Mimikatz tool which has bee updated to carry this attack payload.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://github.com/SecuraBV/CVE-2020-1472", "https://www.secura.com/blog/zero-logon", "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Detect Zerologon Attack", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1190", "T1003.001", "T1210", "T1003"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["OS Credential Dumping", "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "Exploitation of Remote Services", "LSASS Memory"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Credential Access", "Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Sandworm Team", "Magic Hound", "Axiom", "APT1", "TEMP.Veles", "PLATINUM", "Poseidon Group", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN8", "Ke3chang", "Leviathan", "APT39", "Rocke", "Whitefly", "Frankenstein", "Stolen Pencil", "Silence", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "APT41", "FIN6", "Blue Mockingbird", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "APT3", "Cleaver", "Sowbug", "Leafminer", "MuddyWater", "APT28", "APT33", "BlackTech", "Night Dragon"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access", "id": "2c365e57-4414-4540-8dc0-73ab10729996", "version": 3, "date": "2019-12-03", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for reading lsass memory consistent with credential dumping.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe (GrantedAccess=0x1010 OR GrantedAccess=0x1410) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, SourceImage, SourceProcessId, TargetImage, TargetProcessId, EventCode, GrantedAccess | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "This search needs Sysmon Logs and a sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 10 with lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", "known_false_positives": "The activity may be legitimate. Other tools can access lsass for legitimate reasons, and it's possible this event could be generated in those cases. In these cases, false positives should be fairly obvious and you may need to tweak the search to eliminate noise.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "Detect Zerologon Attack"], "asset_type": "Windows", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "The $source_image$ has attempted access to read $TargetImage$ was identified on endpoint $Computer$, this is indicative of credential dumping and should be investigated.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "source_image", "type": "Other", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "TargetImage", "type": "Other", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "TargetImage", "GrantedAccess", "Computer", "SourceImage", "SourceProcessId", "TargetImage", "TargetProcessId"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["LSASS Memory", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Whitefly", "Blue Mockingbird", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Leviathan", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Stolen Pencil", "APT32", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "PLATINUM", "FIN8", "BRONZE BUTLER", "OilRig", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT28", "APT1", "Ke3chang", "Cleaver", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images", "id": "29e307ba-40af-4ab2-91b2-3c6b392bbba0", "version": 1, "date": "2019-12-03", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for reading loaded Images unique to credential dumping with Mimikatz. Deprecated because mimikatz libraries changed and very noisy sysmon Event Code.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 | stats values(ImageLoaded) as ImageLoaded values(ProcessId) as ProcessId by Computer, Image | search ImageLoaded=*WinSCard.dll ImageLoaded=*cryptdll.dll ImageLoaded=*hid.dll ImageLoaded=*samlib.dll ImageLoaded=*vaultcli.dll | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search needs Sysmon Logs and a sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 7 with powershell.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", "known_false_positives": "Other tools can import the same DLLs. These tools should be part of a whitelist. False positives may be present with any process that authenticates or uses credentials, PowerShell included. Filter based on parent process.", "references": ["https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "Detect Zerologon Attack", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Windows", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A process, $Image$, has loaded $ImageLoaded$ that are typically related to credential dumping on $Computer$. Review for further details.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "ImageLoaded", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Other"]}, {"name": "Image", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "ImageLoaded", "ProcessId", "Computer", "Image"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["LSASS Memory", "OS Credential Dumping"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Whitefly", "Blue Mockingbird", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Leviathan", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "TEMP.Veles", "APT33", "APT39", "Stolen Pencil", "APT32", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "PLATINUM", "FIN8", "BRONZE BUTLER", "OilRig", "FIN6", "APT3", "APT28", "APT1", "Ke3chang", "Cleaver", "APT39", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT28", "Leviathan", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Poseidon Group", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account", "id": "1400624a-d42d-484d-8843-e6753e6e3645", "version": 1, "date": "2020-09-18", "author": "Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for Event Code 4742 (Computer Change) or EventCode 4624 (An account was successfully logged on) with an anonymous account.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 OR EventCode=4742 TargetUserName=\"ANONYMOUS LOGON\" LogonType=3 | stats count values(host) as host, values(TargetDomainName) as Domain, values(user) as user | `detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search requires audit computer account management to be enabled on the system in order to generate Event ID 4742. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Event Logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", "known_false_positives": "None thus far found", "references": ["https://www.lares.com/blog/from-lares-labs-defensive-guidance-for-zerologon-cve-2020-1472/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Detect Zerologon Attack"], "asset_type": "Windows", "cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "cve": ["CVE-2020-1472"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "The following $EventCode$ occurred on $dest$ by $user$ with Logon Type 3, which may be indicative of the an account or group being changed by an anonymous account.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1210"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "EventCode", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "TargetUserName", "LogonType", "TargetDomainName", "user"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploitation of Remote Services"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390", "APT28"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wineventlog_security"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Zerologon via Zeek", "id": "bf7a06ec-f703-11ea-adc1-0242ac120002", "version": 1, "date": "2020-09-15", "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects attempts to run exploits for the Zerologon CVE-2020-1472 vulnerability via Zeek RPC", "search": "`zeek_rpc` operation IN (NetrServerPasswordSet2,NetrServerReqChallenge,NetrServerAuthenticate3) | bin span=5m _time | stats values(operation) dc(operation) as opscount count(eval(operation==\"NetrServerReqChallenge\")) as challenge count(eval(operation==\"NetrServerAuthenticate3\")) as authcount count(eval(operation==\"NetrServerPasswordSet2\")) as passcount count as totalcount by _time,src_ip,dest_ip | search opscount=3 authcount>4 passcount>0 | search `detect_zerologon_via_zeek_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Zeek DCE-RPC data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format. We are detecting when all three RPC operations (NetrServerReqChallenge, NetrServerAuthenticate3, NetrServerPasswordSet2) are splunk_security_essentials_app via bro:rpc:json. These three operations are then correlated on the Zeek UID field.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.secura.com/blog/zero-logon", "https://github.com/SecuraBV/CVE-2020-1472", "https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-1472"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Detect Zerologon Attack"], "asset_type": "Network", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 11"], "cve": ["CVE-2020-1472"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "operation"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Exploit Public-Facing Application"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Rocke", "APT39", "BlackTech", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Night Dragon", "Axiom"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "index=zeek sourcetype=\"zeek:rpc:json\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "zeek_rpc"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_zerologon_via_zeek_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", "id": "9482a314-43dc-11ec-a3c9-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "description": "Adversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility.", "narrative": "InstallUtil is a command-line utility that allows for installation and uninstallation of resources by executing specific installer components specified in .NET binaries. InstallUtil is digitally signed by Microsoft and located in the .NET directories on a Windows system: C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v\\InstallUtil.exe and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v\\InstallUtil.exe. \\\nThere are multiple ways to instantiate InstallUtil and they are all outlined within Atomic Red Team - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md. Two specific ways may be used and that includes invoking via installer assembly class constructor through .NET and via InstallUtil.exe. \\\nTypically, adversaries will utilize the most commonly found way to invoke via InstallUtil Uninstall method. \\\nNote that parallel processes, and parent process, play a role in how InstallUtil is being used. In particular, a developer using InstallUtil will spawn from VisualStudio. Adversaries, will spawn from non-standard processes like Explorer.exe, cmd.exe or PowerShell.exe. It's important to review the command-line to identify the DLL being loaded. \\\nParallel processes may also include csc.exe being used to compile a local `.cs` file. This file will be the input to the output. Developers usually do not build direct on the command shell, therefore this should raise suspicion.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/004/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil"], "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.004"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["InstallUtil", "Signed Binary Proxy Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft", "id": "ccfeddec-43ec-11ec-b494-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary loading `vaultcli.dll` and Samlib.dll`. This technique may be used to execute code to bypassing application control and capture credentials by utilizing a tool like MimiKatz. \\\nWhen `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \\\nIf used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \\\nDuring triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 process_name=installutil.exe ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\samlib.dll\", \"*\\\\vaultcli.dll\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, process_name, ImageLoaded, OriginalFileName, process_id | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_installutil_credential_theft_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and module loads from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Typically this will not trigger as by it's very nature InstallUtil does not need credentials. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://gist.github.com/xorrior/bbac3919ca2aef8d924bdf3b16cce3d0"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ loading samlib.dll and vaultcli.dll to potentially capture credentials in memory.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218.004", "T1218"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["InstallUtil", "Signed Binary Proxy Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "windows_installutil_credential_theft_filter"}]}, {"name": "Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line", "id": "28e06670-43df-11ec-a569-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary passing a HTTP request on the command-line. This technique may be used to download and execute code while bypassing application control. \\\nWhen `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \\\nIf used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \\\nDuring triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` Processes.process IN (\"*http://*\",\"*https://*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_installutil_url_in_command_line_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives should be present as InstallUtil is not typically used to download remote files. Filter as needed based on Developers requirements.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md", "https://gist.github.com/DanielRTeixeira/0fd06ec8f041f34a32bf5623c6dd479d"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ passing a URL on the command-line.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218.004", "T1218"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["InstallUtil", "Signed Binary Proxy Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=installutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=InstallUtil.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_installutil"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "windows_installutil_url_in_command_line_filter"}]}, {"name": "Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection", "id": "4fbf9270-43da-11ec-9486-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary making a remote network connection. This technique may be used to download and execute code while bypassing application control. \\\nWhen `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \\\nIf used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \\\nDuring triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` by _time span=1h Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_guid [ | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port !=\"0\" by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_guid connection_to_CNC dest_port | `windows_installutil_remote_network_connection_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Ports` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives should be present as InstallUtil is not typically used to download remote files. Filter as needed based on Developers requirements.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ generating a remote download.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218.004", "T1218"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id", "Ports.process_guid", "Ports.dest", "Ports.dest_port"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["InstallUtil", "Signed Binary Proxy Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=installutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=InstallUtil.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_installutil"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "windows_installutil_remote_network_connection_filter"}]}, {"name": "Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network", "id": "1a52c836-43ef-11ec-a36c-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary making a remote network connection. This technique may be used to download and execute code while bypassing application control using the `/u` (uninstall) switch. \\\nInstallUtil uses the functions install and uninstall within the System.Configuration.Install namespace to process .net assembly. Install function requires admin privileges, however, uninstall function can be run as an unprivileged user.\\\nWhen `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \\\nIf used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \\\nDuring triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` Processes.process IN (\"*/u*\", \"*uninstall*\") by _time span=1h Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_guid [ | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port !=\"0\" by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name original_file_name process_path process process_guid connection_to_CNC dest_port | `windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Ports` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives should be present as InstallUtil is not typically used to download remote files. Filter as needed based on Developers requirements.", "references": ["https://evi1cg.me/archives/AppLocker_Bypass_Techniques.html#menu_index_12", "https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList/blob/master/md/Installutil.exe.md", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ performing an uninstall.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218.004", "T1218"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id", "Ports.process_guid", "Ports.dest", "Ports.dest_port"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["InstallUtil", "Signed Binary Proxy Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=installutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=InstallUtil.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_installutil"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network_filter"}]}, {"name": "Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option", "id": "cfa7b9ac-43f0-11ec-9b48-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary. This will execute code while bypassing application control using the `/u` (uninstall) switch. \\\nInstallUtil uses the functions install and uninstall within the System.Configuration.Install namespace to process .net assembly. Install function requires admin privileges, however, uninstall function can be run as an unprivileged user.\\\nWhen `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \\\nIf used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \\\nDuring triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` Processes.process IN (\"*/u*\", \"*uninstall*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_installutil_uninstall_option_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives should be present. Filter as needed by parent process or application.", "references": ["https://evi1cg.me/archives/AppLocker_Bypass_Techniques.html#menu_index_12", "https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList/blob/master/md/Installutil.exe.md", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ performing an uninstall.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218.004", "T1218"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["InstallUtil", "Signed Binary Proxy Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["no", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=installutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=InstallUtil.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_installutil"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "windows_installutil_uninstall_option_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Suspicious WMI Use", "id": "c8ddc5be-69bc-4202-b3ab-4010b27d7ad5", "version": 2, "date": "2018-10-23", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "description": "Attackers are increasingly abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), a framework and associated utilities available on all modern Windows operating systems. Because WMI can be leveraged to manage both local and remote systems, it is important to identify the processes executed and the user context within which the activity occurred.", "narrative": "WMI is a Microsoft infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows operating systems. It includes of a set of utilities that can be leveraged to manage both local and remote Windows systems. Attackers are increasingly turning to WMI abuse in their efforts to conduct nefarious tasks, such as reconnaissance, detection of antivirus and virtual machines, code execution, lateral movement, persistence, and data exfiltration. The detection searches included in this Analytic Story are used to look for suspicious use of WMI commands that attackers may leverage to interact with remote systems. The searches specifically look for the use of WMI to run processes on remote systems. In the event that unauthorized WMI execution occurs, it will be important for analysts and investigators to determine the context of the event. These details may provide insights related to how WMI was used and to what end.", "references": ["https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Graeber-Abusing-Windows-Management-Instrumentation-WMI-To-Build-A-Persistent%20Asynchronous-And-Fileless-Backdoor-wp.pdf", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/wmimplant_a_wmi_ba.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Suspicious WMI Use", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1546", "T1047", "T1546.003", "T1220"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["Event Triggered Execution", "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription", "Windows Management Instrumentation", "XSL Script Processing"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390", "Stealth Falcon", "APT29", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "Turla", "Frankenstein", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "APT32", "Soft Cell", "APT41", "menuPass", "FIN6", "OilRig", "Blue Mockingbird", "Lazarus Group", "Wizard Spider", "no", "MuddyWater", "APT33"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI", "id": "d25d2c3d-d9d8-40ec-8fdf-e86fe155a3da", "version": 7, "date": "2021-11-12", "author": "Rico Valdez, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies wmic.exe being launched with parameters to spawn a process on a remote system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WMI and this binary for lateral movement and remote code execution.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` (Processes.process=\"*/node:*\" AND Processes.process=\"*process*\" AND Processes.process=\"*call*\" AND Processes.process=\"*create*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "The wmic.exe utility is a benign Windows application. It may be used legitimately by Administrators with these parameters for remote system administration, but it's relatively uncommon.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/cimwin32prov/create-method-in-class-win32-process"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Suspicious WMI Use", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A wmic.exe process $process$ contain process spawn commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Windows Management Instrumentation"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT41", "FIN6", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Threat Group-3390", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "menuPass", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_wmic"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_filter"}]}, {"name": "XSL Script Execution With WMIC", "id": "004e32e2-146d-11ec-a83f-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-13", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious wmic.exe process or renamed wmic process to execute malicious xsl file. This technique was seen in FIN7 to execute its malicous jscript using the .xsl as the loader with the help of wmic.exe process. This TTP is really a good indicator for you to hunt further for FIN7 or other attacker that known to used this technique.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` Processes.process = \"*os get*\" Processes.process=\"*/format:*\" Processes.process = \"*.xsl*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `xsl_script_execution_with_wmic_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html", "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046/", "https://web.archive.org/web/20190814201250/https://subt0x11.blogspot.com/2018/04/wmicexe-whitelisting-bypass-hacking.html", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1220/T1220.md#atomic-test-3---wmic-bypass-using-local-xsl-file"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["FIN7", "Suspicious WMI Use"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_macro_js_1/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ utilizing wmic to load a XSL script.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1220"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["XSL Script Processing"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Cobalt Group"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_wmic"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "xsl_script_execution_with_wmic_filter"}]}, {"name": "Script Execution via WMI", "id": "aa73f80d-d728-4077-b226-81ea0c8be589", "version": 4, "date": "2020-03-16", "author": "Rico Valdez, Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for scripts launched via WMI.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=scrcons.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `script_execution_via_wmi_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, administrators may use wmi to launch scripts for legitimate purposes. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/blog/child-processes/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/execution_scrcons/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A wmic.exe process $process_name$ taht execute script in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.user", "Processes.dest"], "risk_score": 36, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Windows Management Instrumentation"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT41", "FIN6", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Threat Group-3390", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "menuPass", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "script_execution_via_wmi_filter"}]}, {"name": "WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon", "id": "ad05aae6-3b2a-4f73-af97-57bd26cee3b9", "version": 3, "date": "2020-12-08", "author": "Rico Valdez, Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This analytic looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions. The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscription to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions.\\\nAll event subscriptions have three components \\\n1. Filter - WQL Query for the events we want. EventID = 19 \\\n1. Consumer - An action to take upon triggering the filter. EventID = 20 \\\n1. Binding - Registers a filter to a consumer. EventID = 21 \\\nMonitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding. It may be pertinent to review all 3 to identify the flow of execution. In addition, EventCode 4104 may assist with any other PowerShell script usage that registered the subscription.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=21 | rename host as dest | table _time, dest, user, Operation, EventType, Query, Consumer, Filter | `wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be collecting Sysmon data using Sysmon version 6.1 or greater and have Sysmon configured to generate alerts for WMI activity (eventID= 19, 20, 21). In addition, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA installed to properly parse the fields.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, administrators may use event subscriptions for legitimate purposes.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1546.003/T1546.003.md", "https://www.eideon.com/2018-03-02-THL03-WMIBackdoors/", "https://github.com/trustedsec/SysmonCommunityGuide/blob/master/WMI-events.md", "https://in.security/an-intro-into-abusing-and-identifying-wmi-event-subscriptions-for-persistence/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user$ on $host$ executed the following suspicious WMI query: $Query$. Filter: $filter$. Consumer: $Consumer$. EventCode: $EventCode$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1546.003", "T1546"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "host", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "host", "user", "Operation", "EventType", "Query", "Consumer", "Filter"], "risk_score": 30, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription", "Event Triggered Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "Blue Mockingbird", "Turla", "Leviathan", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon_filter"}]}, {"name": "WMIC XSL Execution via URL", "id": "787e9dd0-4328-11ec-a029-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-11", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies `wmic.exe` loading a remote XSL (eXtensible Stylesheet Language) script. This originally was identified by Casey Smith, dubbed Squiblytwo, as an application control bypass. Many adversaries will utilize this technique to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file. This technique can also execute local/remote scripts and, similar to its Regsvr32 \"Squiblydoo\" counterpart, leverages a trusted, built-in Windows tool. Adversaries may abuse any alias in Windows Management Instrumentation provided they utilize the /FORMAT switch. Upon identifying a suspicious execution, review for confirmed network connnection and script download.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` Processes.process IN (\"*http://*\", \"*https://*\") Processes.process=\"*/format:*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmic_xsl_execution_via_url_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives are limited as legitimate applications typically do not download files or xsl using WMIC. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1220/T1220.md", "https://web.archive.org/web/20190814201250/https://subt0x11.blogspot.com/2018/04/wmicexe-whitelisting-bypass-hacking.html", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1220/T1220.md#atomic-test-4---wmic-bypass-using-remote-xsl-file"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1220/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ utilizing wmic to download a remote XSL script.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1220"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Parent Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["XSL Script Processing"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Cobalt Group"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_wmic"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "wmic_xsl_execution_via_url_filter"}]}, {"name": "Process Execution via WMI", "id": "24869767-8579-485d-9a4f-d9ddfd8f0cac", "version": 4, "date": "2020-03-16", "author": "Rico Valdez, Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies `WmiPrvSE.exe` spawning a process. This typically occurs when a process is instantiated from a local or remote process using `wmic.exe`. During triage, review parallel processes for suspicious behavior or commands executed. Review the process and command-line spawning from `wmiprvse.exe`. Contain and remediate the endpoint as necessary.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=WmiPrvSE.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `process_execution_via_wmi_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, administrators may use wmi to execute commands for legitimate purposes.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A remote instance execution of wmic.exe that will spawn $parent_process_name$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.user", "Processes.dest", "Processes.process_name"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Windows Management Instrumentation"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT41", "FIN6", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Threat Group-3390", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "menuPass", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "process_execution_via_wmi_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect WMI Event Subscription Persistence", "id": "01d9a0c2-cece-11eb-ab46-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscription to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions.\\\nAll event subscriptions have three components \\\n1. Filter - WQL Query for the events we want. EventID equals 19 \\\n1. Consumer - An action to take upon triggering the filter. EventID equals 20 \\\n1. Binding - Registers a filter to a consumer. EventID equals 21 \\\nMonitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding. It may be pertinent to review all 3 to identify the flow of execution. In addition, EventCode 4104 may assist with any other PowerShell script usage that registered the subscription.", "search": "`sysmon` EventID=20 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer User Destination | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with that provide WMI Event Subscription from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA and have enabled EventID 19, 20 and 21. Tune and filter known good to limit the volume.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible some applications will create a consumer and may be required to be filtered. For tuning, add any additional LOLBin's for further depth of coverage.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1546.003/T1546.003.md", "https://www.eideon.com/2018-03-02-THL03-WMIBackdoors/", "https://github.com/trustedsec/SysmonCommunityGuide/blob/master/WMI-events.md", "https://in.security/an-intro-into-abusing-and-identifying-wmi-event-subscriptions-for-persistence/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Possible malicious WMI Subscription created on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1546.003", "T1546"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Destination", "Computer", "User"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription", "Event Triggered Execution"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "Blue Mockingbird", "Turla", "Leviathan", "APT29", "no"]}, "macros": [{"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "sysmon"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence_filter"}]}, {"name": "Remote WMI Command Attempt", "id": "272df6de-61f1-4784-877c-1fbc3e2d0838", "version": 4, "date": "2018-12-03", "author": "Rico Valdez, Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies usage of `wmic.exe` spawning a local or remote process, identified by the `node` switch. During triage, review parallel processes for additional commands executed. Look for any file modifications before and after `wmic.exe` execution. In addition, identify the remote endpoint and confirm execution or file modifications. Contain and isolate the endpoint as needed.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` Processes.process=*node* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_wmi_command_attempt_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. Deprecated because duplicate of Remote Process Instantiation via WMI.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may use this legitimately to gather info from remote systems. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1047/T1047.yaml"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A wmic.exe process $process$ contain node commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "user", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.parent_process_id", "Processes.process_id"], "risk_score": 36, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Windows Management Instrumentation"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT41", "FIN6", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Threat Group-3390", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "menuPass", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/", "name": "process_wmic"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "remote_wmi_command_attempt_filter"}]}, {"name": "WMI Temporary Event Subscription", "id": "38cbd42c-1098-41bb-99cf-9d6d2b296d83", "version": 1, "date": "2018-10-23", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for the creation of WMI temporary event subscriptions.", "search": "`wmi` EventCode=5860 Temporary | rex field=Message \"NotificationQuery =\\s+(?[^;|^$]+)\" | search query!=\"SELECT * FROM Win32_ProcessStartTrace WHERE ProcessName = 'wsmprovhost.exe'\" AND query!=\"SELECT * FROM __InstanceOperationEvent WHERE TargetInstance ISA 'AntiVirusProduct' OR TargetInstance ISA 'FirewallProduct' OR TargetInstance ISA 'AntiSpywareProduct'\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName, query | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmi_temporary_event_subscription_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting the Windows WMI activity logs. This can be done by adding a stanza to inputs.conf on the system generating logs with a title of [WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational].", "known_false_positives": "Some software may create WMI temporary event subscriptions for various purposes. The included search contains an exception for two of these that occur by default on Windows 10 systems. You may need to modify the search to create exceptions for other legitimate events.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "query"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Windows Management Instrumentation"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT41", "FIN6", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Threat Group-3390", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "menuPass", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=\"wineventlog:microsoft-windows-wmi-activity/operational\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wmi"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "wmi_temporary_event_subscription_filter"}]}, {"name": "WMI Permanent Event Subscription", "id": "71bfdb13-f200-4c6c-b2c9-a2e07adf437d", "version": 1, "date": "2018-10-23", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions.", "search": "`wmi` EventCode=5861 Binding | rex field=Message \"Consumer =\\s+(?[^;|^$]+)\" | search consumer!=\"NTEventLogEventConsumer=\\\"SCM Event Log Consumer\\\"\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName, consumer, Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename ComputerName as dest | `wmi_permanent_event_subscription_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting the Windows WMI activity logs. This can be done by adding a stanza to inputs.conf on the system generating logs with a title of [WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational].", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, administrators may use event subscriptions for legitimate purposes.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "consumer", "ComputerName"], "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Windows Management Instrumentation"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "Wizard Spider", "Frankenstein", "APT41", "FIN6", "Soft Cell", "APT32", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Threat Group-3390", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "menuPass", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "APT29", "Deep Panda"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=\"wineventlog:microsoft-windows-wmi-activity/operational\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "wmi"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "wmi_permanent_event_subscription_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "JBoss Vulnerability", "id": "1f5294cb-b85f-4c2d-9c58-ffcf248f52bd", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-14", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "In March of 2016, adversaries were seen using JexBoss--an open-source utility used for testing and exploiting JBoss application servers. These searches help detect evidence of these attacks, such as network connections to external resources or web services spawning atypical child processes, among others.", "narrative": "This Analytic Story looks for probing and exploitation attempts targeting JBoss application servers. While the vulnerabilities associated with this story are rather dated, they were leveraged in a spring 2016 campaign in connection with the Samsam ransomware variant. Incidents involving this ransomware are unique, in that they begin with attacks against vulnerable services, rather than the phishing or drive-by attacks more common with ransomware. In this case, vulnerable JBoss applications appear to be the target of choice.\\\nIt is helpful to understand how often a notable event generated by this story occurs, as well as the commonalities between some of these events, both of which may provide clues about whether this is a common occurrence of minimal concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. It may also help to understand whether the issue is restricted to a single user/system or whether it is broader in scope.\\\nWhen looking at the target of the behavior uncovered by the event, you should note the sensitivity of the user and or/system to help determine the potential impact. It is also helpful to identify other recent events involving the target. This can help tie different events together and give further situational awareness regarding the target host.\\\nVarious types of information for external systems should be reviewed and, potentially, collected if the incident is, indeed, judged to be malicious. This data may be useful for generating your own threat intelligence, so you can create future alerts.\\\nThe following factors may assist you in determining whether the event is malicious: \\\n1. Country of origin\\\n1. Responsible party\\\n1. Fully qualified domain names associated with the external IP address\\\n1. Registration of fully qualified domain names associated with external IP address Determining whether it is a dynamic domain frequently visited by others and/or how third parties categorize it can also help you qualify and understand the event and possible motivation for the attack. In addition, there are various sources that may provide reputation information on the IP address or domain name, which can assist you in determining whether the event is malicious in nature. Finally, determining whether there are other events associated with the IP address may help connect data points or expose other historic events that might be brought back into scope.\\\nGathering various data on the system of interest can sometimes help quickly determine whether something suspicious is happening. Some of these items include determining who else may have logged into the system recently, whether any unusual scheduled tasks exist, whether the system is communicating on suspicious ports, whether there are modifications to sensitive registry keys, and/or whether there are any known vulnerabilities on the system. This information can often highlight other activity commonly seen in attack scenarios or give more information about how the system may have been targeted.\\\nhen a specific service or application is targeted, it is often helpful to know the associated version, to help determine whether it is vulnerable to a specific exploit.\\\nIf you suspect an attack targeting a web server, it is helpful to look at some of the behavior of the web service to see if there is evidence that the service has been compromised. Some indications of this might be network connections to external resources, the web service spawning child processes that are not associated with typical behavior, and whether the service wrote any files that might be malicious in nature.\\\nIf a suspicious file is found, we can review more information about it to help determine if it is, in fact, malicious. Identifying the file type, any processes that opened the file, the processes that may have created and/or modified the file, and how many other systems potentially have this file can you determine whether the file is malicious. Also, determining the file hash and checking it against reputation sources, such as VirusTotal, can sometimes help you quickly determine if it is malicious in nature.\\\nOften, a simple inspection of a suspect process name and path can tell you if the system has been compromised. For example, if svchost.exe is found running from a location other than `C:\\Windows\\System32`, it is likely something malicious designed to hide in plain sight when simply reviewing process names. \\\nIt can also be helpful to examine various behaviors of and the parent of the process of interest. For example, if it turns out the process of interest is malicious, it would be good to see whether the parent process spawned other processes that might also warrant further scrutiny. If a process is suspect, a review of the network connections made around the time of the event and noting whether the process has spawned any child processes could be helpful in determining whether it is malicious or executing a malicious script.", "references": ["http://www.deependresearch.org/2016/04/jboss-exploits-view-from-victim.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "JBoss Vulnerability", "category": ["Vulnerability"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1082"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Information Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team", "Magic Hound", "Inception", "Stealth Falcon", "Tropic Trooper", "Kimsuky", "Ke3chang", "Turla", "Gamaredon Group", "Rocke", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "APT19", "APT37", "Darkhotel", "OilRig", "Blue Mockingbird", "Lazarus Group", "admin@338", "Honeybee", "APT3", "Sowbug", "APT18", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers", "id": "c8bff7a4-11ea-4416-a27d-c5bca472913d", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-23", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Web"], "description": "This search is used to detect malicious HTTP requests crafted to exploit jmx-console in JBoss servers. The malicious requests have a long URL length, as the payload is embedded in the URL.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where (Web.http_method=\"GET\" OR Web.http_method=\"HEAD\") by Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest | search Web.url=\"*jmx-console/HtmlAdaptor?action=invokeOpByName&name=jboss.admin*import*\" AND Web.url_length > 200 | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table src, dest_ip, http_method, url, firstTime, lastTime | `detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must ingest data from the web server or capture network data that contains web specific information with solutions such as Bro or Splunk Stream, and populating the Web data model", "known_false_positives": "No known false positives for this detection.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["JBoss Vulnerability", "SamSam Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Web Server", "cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 4", "CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["ID.RA", "PR.PT", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "PR.MA", "DE.CM"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Web.http_method", "Web.url", "Web.url_length", "Web.src", "Web.dest"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers_filter"}]}, {"name": "Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers", "id": "104658f4-afdc-499e-9719-17243f982681", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-23", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Web"], "description": "This search looks for specific GET or HEAD requests to web servers that are indicative of reconnaissance attempts to identify vulnerable JBoss servers. JexBoss is described as the exploit tool of choice for this malicious activity.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where (Web.http_method=\"GET\" OR Web.http_method=\"HEAD\") AND (Web.url=\"*/web-console/ServerInfo.jsp*\" OR Web.url=\"*web-console*\" OR Web.url=\"*jmx-console*\" OR Web.url = \"*invoker*\") by Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.src, Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data from the web server or network traffic that contains web specific information, and populating the Web data model.", "known_false_positives": "It's possible for legitimate HTTP requests to be made to URLs containing the suspicious paths.", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["JBoss Vulnerability", "SamSam Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Web Server", "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_id": ["T1082"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Web.http_method", "Web.url", "Web.src", "Web.dest"], "security_domain": "network", "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Information Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Blue Mockingbird", "Tropic Trooper", "Frankenstein", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Darkhotel", "MuddyWater", "APT18", "Honeybee", "APT19", "APT37", "APT32", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "APT3", "Sowbug", "Gamaredon Group", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "admin@338", "Turla", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Meterpreter", "id": "d5f8e298-c85a-11eb-9fea-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-08", "author": "Michael Hart", "description": "Meterpreter provides red teams, pen testers and threat actors interactive access to a compromised host to run commands, upload payloads, download files, and other actions.", "narrative": "This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from Meterpreter. Meterpreter is a Metasploit payload for remote execution that leverages DLL injection to make it extremely difficult to detect. Since the software runs in memory, no new processes are created upon injection. It also leverages encrypted communication channels.\\\nMeterpreter enables the operator to remotely run commands on the target machine, upload payloads, download files, dump password hashes, and much more. It is difficult to determine from the forensic evidence what actions the operator performed. Splunk Research, however, has observed anomalous behaviors on the compromised hosts that seem to only appear when Meterpreter is executing various commands. With that, we have written new detections targeted to these detections.\\\nWhile investigating a detection related to this analytic story, please bear in mind that the detections look for anomalies in system behavior. It will be imperative to look for other signs in the endpoint and network logs for lateral movement, discovery and other actions to confirm that the host was compromised and a remote actor used it to progress on their objectives.", "references": ["https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/about-meterpreter/", "https://doubleoctopus.com/security-wiki/threats-and-tools/meterpreter/", "https://www.rapid7.com/products/metasploit/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Meterpreter"], "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1033"], "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Owner/User Discovery", "Command and Scripting Interpreter"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Stealth Falcon", "Tropic Trooper", "Ke3chang", "APT39", "Molerats", "Gamaredon Group", "Whitefly", "Frankenstein", "APT32", "Soft Cell", "APT19", "APT37", "APT41", "FIN5", "FIN6", "OilRig", "Lazarus Group", "APT3", "MuddyWater", "FIN10", "Patchwork", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN7"]}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Excessive number of taskhost processes", "id": "f443dac2-c7cf-11eb-ab51-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-07", "author": "Michael Hart", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This detection targets behaviors observed in post exploit kits like Meterpreter and Koadic that are run in memory. We have observed that these tools must invoke an excessive number of taskhost.exe and taskhostex.exe processes to complete various actions (discovery, lateral movement, etc.). It is extremely uncommon in the course of normal operations to see so many distinct taskhost and taskhostex processes running concurrently in a short time frame.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process_id) as process_ids min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE Processes.process_name = \"taskhost.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"taskhostex.exe\" BY Processes.dest Processes.process_name _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | eval pid_count=mvcount(process_ids) | eval taskhost_count_=if(process_name == \"taskhost.exe\", pid_count, 0) | eval taskhostex_count_=if(process_name == \"taskhostex.exe\", pid_count, 0) | stats sum(taskhost_count_) as taskhost_count, sum(taskhostex_count_) as taskhostex_count by _time, dest, firstTime, lastTime | where taskhost_count > 10 and taskhostex_count > 10 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_number_of_taskhost_processes_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting events related to processes on the endpoints that include the name of the process and process id into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators, administrative actions or certain applications may run many instances of taskhost and taskhostex concurrently. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Meterpreter"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059/meterpreter/taskhost_processes/logExcessiveTaskHost.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An excessive amount of $process_name$ was executed on $dest$ indicative of suspicious behavior.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1033"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["System Owner/User Discovery"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Frankenstein", "APT41", "Soft Cell", "Tropic Trooper", "APT39", "MuddyWater", "APT32", "APT37", "APT19", "Dragonfly 2.0", "OilRig", "Magic Hound", "FIN10", "Gamaredon Group", "Patchwork", "Stealth Falcon", "Lazarus Group", "APT3"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "excessive_number_of_taskhost_processes_filter"}]}, {"name": "Excessive number of distinct processes created in Windows Temp folder", "id": "23587b6a-c479-11eb-b671-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-03", "author": "Michael Hart, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic will identify suspicious series of process executions. We have observed that post exploit framework tools like Koadic and Meterpreter will launch an excessive number of processes with distinct file paths from Windows\\Temp to execute actions on objective. This behavior is extremely anomalous compared to typical application behaviors that use Windows\\Temp.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process distinct_count(Processes.process) as distinct_process_count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Temp\\\\*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=20m | where distinct_process_count > 37 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_number_of_distinct_processes_created_in_windows_temp_folder_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the full process path in the process field of CIM's Process data model. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed sc.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "Many benign applications will create processes from executables in Windows\\Temp, although unlikely to exceed the given threshold. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/about-meterpreter/"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Meterpreter"], "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059/meterpreter/windows_temp_processes/logExcessiveWindowsTemp.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Multiple processes were executed out of windows\\temp within a short amount of time on $dest$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "mitre_attack_technique": ["Command and Scripting Interpreter"], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Molerats", "Whitefly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "APT19", "FIN7", "OilRig", "FIN5", "Stealth Falcon", "FIN6", "Ke3chang"]}, "macros": [{"definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only", "name": "security_content_summariesonly"}, {"arguments": ["field"], "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "name": "security_content_ctime"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "excessive_number_of_distinct_processes_created_in_windows_temp_folder_filter"}]}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", "id": "2574e6d9-7254-4751-8925-0447deeec8ea", "version": 1, "date": "2020-05-20", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "description": "This story addresses detection and response of accounts acccesing Kubernetes cluster sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets providing information on items such as user user, group. object, namespace and authorization reason.", "narrative": "Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive objects within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes sensitive objects.", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"], "tags": {"analytic_story": "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", "category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_id": [], "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "type": "", "detections": [{"name": "Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls", "id": "042a3d32-8318-4763-9679-09db2644a8f2", "version": 1, "date": "2020-06-23", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides information on anonymous Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context", "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` userAgent=kubectl* sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1 sourceIPs{}!=::1 src_user=system:anonymous | table src_ip src_user verb userAgent requestURI | stats count by src_ip src_user verb userAgent requestURI |`kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs.", "known_false_positives": "Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP, verb and Object can reveal potential malicious activity, specially anonymous suspicious IPs and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"], "asset_type": "AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster", "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "userAgent", "sourceIPs{}", "src_user", "src_ip", "verb", "requestURI"], "security_domain": "threat", "mitre_attack_technique": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, "macros": [{"definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.", "name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks"}, {"definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. ", "name": "kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter"}]}]}], "count": 107} \ No newline at end of file +[ + { + "name": "IcedID", + "id": "1d2cc747-63d7-49a9-abb8-93aa36305603", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-07-29", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the IcedID banking trojan, including looking for file writes associated with its payload, process injection, shellcode execution and data collection.", + "narrative": "IcedId banking trojan campaigns targeting banks and other vertical sectors.This malware is known in Microsoft Windows OS targetting browser such as firefox and chrom to steal banking information. It is also known to its unique payload downloaded in C2 where it can be a .png file that hides the core shellcode bot using steganography technique or gzip dat file that contains \"license.dat\" which is the actual core icedid bot.", + "references": [ + "https://threatpost.com/icedid-banking-trojan-surges-emotet/165314/", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/48414a33-3d66-4a46-afe5-c2003bb55ccf/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "IcedID", + "analytic_story": "IcedID", + "category": [ + "Malware" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Cobalt Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sharpshooter", + "Silence", + "Turla" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", + "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT37", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Evilnum", + "Honeybee", + "MuddyWater", + "Patchwork", + "Threat Group-3390" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN8", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "CopyKittens", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Gallmaker", + "HAFNIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sowbug", + "Turla", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1560", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Patchwork", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "FIN7", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Sidewinder", + "TA551" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "Chimera", + "FIN8" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "Putter Panda", + "RTM", + "Rocke", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cobalt Group", + "Deep Panda", + "Inception", + "Leviathan", + "TA551", + "WIRTE" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "CopyKittens", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "MuddyWater", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "TA551" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Local System", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dark Caracal", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Dust Storm", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Sandworm Team", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Windigo", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CostaRicto", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Machete", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection", + "Defense Evasion", + "Discovery", + "Execution", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Exploitation", + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Account Discovery With Net App - Rule", + "ESCU - CHCP Command Execution - Rule", + "ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", + "ESCU - Create Remote Thread In Shell Application - Rule", + "ESCU - Disable Schedule Task - Rule", + "ESCU - Drop IcedID License dat - Rule", + "ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", + "ESCU - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule", + "ESCU - IcedID Exfiltrated Archived File Creation - Rule", + "ESCU - Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process - Rule", + "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", + "ESCU - Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process - Rule", + "ESCU - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule", + "ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", + "ESCU - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule", + "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", + "ESCU - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule", + "ESCU - Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process - Rule", + "ESCU - Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser - Rule", + "ESCU - Rundll32 DNSQuery - Rule", + "ESCU - Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files - Rule", + "ESCU - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule", + "ESCU - Sqlite Module In Temp Folder - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 PluginInit - Rule", + "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", + "ESCU - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [], + "baseline_names": [ + "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments" + ], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Account Discovery With Net App", + "id": "339805ce-ac30-11eb-b87d-acde48001122", + "version": 3, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "this search is to detect a potential account discovery series of command used by several malware or attack to recon the target machine. This technique is also seen in some note worthy malware like trickbot where it runs a cmd process, or even drop its module that will execute the said series of net command. This series of command are good correlation search and indicator of attacker recon if seen in the machines within a none technical user or department (HR, finance, ceo and etc) network.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` AND (Processes.process=\"*user*\" OR Processes.process=\"*config*\" OR Processes.process=\"*view /all*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name | where count >=5 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `account_discovery_with_net_app_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product..", + "known_false_positives": "admin or power user may used this series of command.", + "references": [ + "https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/", + "https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/48414a33-3d66-4a46-afe5-c2003bb55ccf/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Account Discovery With Net App", + "analytic_story": [ + "Trickbot", + "IcedID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/infection/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 10, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Suspicious $process_name$ usage detected on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1087" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 5, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1087" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Trickbot", + "IcedID" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 10, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 5 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 5 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process name" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1087" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Account Discovery With Net App Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Account Discovery With Net App", + "file": "endpoint/account_discovery_with_net_app.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/infection/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_net", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "account_discovery_with_net_app_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/account_discovery_with_net_app.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "CHCP Command Execution", + "id": "21d236ec-eec1-11eb-b23e-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-07-27", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect execution of chcp.exe application. this utility is used to change the active code page of the console. This technique was seen in icedid malware to know the locale region/language/country of the compromise host.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=chcp.com Processes.parent_process_name = cmd.exe Processes.parent_process=*/c* by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `chcp_command_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed chcp.com may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "other tools or script may used this to change code page to UTF-* or others", + "references": [ + "https://ss64.com/nt/chcp.html", + "https://twitter.com/tccontre18/status/1419941156633329665?s=20" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "CHCP Command Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/simulated_icedid/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "parent process $parent_process_name$ spawning chcp process $process_name$ with parent command line $parent_process$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "process_name", + "process", + "parent_process_name", + "parent_process", + "process_id", + "parent_process_id", + "dest", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 9, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 30 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 9 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 9 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "CHCP Command Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "CHCP Command Execution", + "file": "endpoint/chcp_command_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/simulated_icedid/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "chcp_command_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/chcp_command_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", + "id": "54a6ed00-3256-11ec-b031-acde48001122", + "version": 3, + "date": "2022-01-18", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies command-line arguments where `cmd.exe /c` is used to execute a program. `cmd /c` is used to run commands in MS-DOS and terminate after command or process completion. This technique is commonly seen in adversaries and malware to execute batch command using different shell like PowerShell or different process other than `cmd.exe`. This is a good hunting query for suspicious command-line made by a script or relative process execute it.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` AND Processes.process=\"* /c *\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives may be high based on legitimate scripted code in any environment. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228", + "WhisperGate", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/cmd_carry_str_param/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting spawn a new process.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059.003", + "T1059" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 30, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059.003", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228", + "WhisperGate", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 30 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 30 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059.003", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", + "file": "endpoint/cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/cmd_carry_str_param/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_cmd", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Create Remote Thread In Shell Application", + "id": "10399c1e-f51e-11eb-b920-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-04", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect suspicious process injection in command shell. This technique was seen in IcedID where it execute cmd.exe process to inject its shellcode as part of its execution as banking trojan. It is really uncommon to have a create remote thread execution in the following application.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=8 TargetImage IN (\"*\\\\cmd.exe\", \"*\\\\powershell*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by TargetImage TargetProcessId SourceProcessId EventCode StartAddress SourceImage Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `create_remote_thread_in_shell_application_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/07/19/icedid-and-cobalt-strike-vs-antivirus/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Create Remote Thread In Shell Application", + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/simulated_icedid/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "process $SourceImage$ create a remote thread to shell app process $TargetImage$ in host $Computer$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1055" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "SourceImage", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "SourceImage", + "TargetImage", + "TargetProcessId", + "SourceProcessId", + "StartAddress", + "EventCode", + "Computer" + ], + "risk_score": 70, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Cobalt Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sharpshooter", + "Silence", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1055" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "SourceImage", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 70 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "SourceImage", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1055" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Create Remote Thread In Shell Application Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Create Remote Thread In Shell Application", + "file": "endpoint/create_remote_thread_in_shell_application.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/simulated_icedid/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "create_remote_thread_in_shell_application_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_in_shell_application.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Disable Schedule Task", + "id": "db596056-3019-11ec-a9ff-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-10-18", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious commandline to disable existing schedule task. This technique is used by adversaries or commodity malware like IceID to disable security application (AV products) in the targetted host to evade detections. This TTP is a good pivot to check further why and what other process run before and after this detection. check which process execute the commandline and what task is disabled. parent child process is quite valuable in this scenario too.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe Processes.process=*/change* Processes.process=*/disable* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_schedule_task_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "admin may disable problematic schedule task", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Disable Schedule Task", + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_schtask/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "schtask process with commandline $process$ to disable schedule task in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Disable Schedule Task Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Disable Schedule Task", + "file": "endpoint/disable_schedule_task.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_schtask/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "disable_schedule_task_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_schedule_task.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Drop IcedID License dat", + "id": "b7a045fc-f14a-11eb-8e79-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-07-30", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect dropping a suspicious file named as \"license.dat\" in %appdata%. This behavior seen in latest IcedID malware that contain the actual core bot that will be injected in other process to do banking stealing.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode= 11 TargetFilename = \"*\\\\license.dat\" AND (TargetFilename=\"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\" OR TargetFilename=\"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\") |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by TargetFilename EventCode process_id process_name Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_icedid_license_dat_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.cisecurity.org/white-papers/security-primer-icedid/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Drop IcedID License dat", + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/simulated_icedid/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "process $SourceImage$ create a file $TargetImage$ in host $Computer$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1204", + "T1204.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "SourceImage", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", + "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1204", + "T1204.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "SourceImage", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 63 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "SourceImage", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1204", + "T1204.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Drop IcedID License dat Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Drop IcedID License dat", + "file": "endpoint/drop_icedid_license_dat.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/simulated_icedid/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "drop_icedid_license_dat_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/drop_icedid_license_dat.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Eventvwr UAC Bypass", + "id": "9cf8fe08-7ad8-11eb-9819-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-28", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following search identifies Eventvwr bypass by identifying the registry modification into a specific path that eventvwr.msc looks to (but is not valid) upon execution. A successful attack will include a suspicious command to be executed upon eventvwr.msc loading. Upon triage, review the parallel processes that have executed. Identify any additional registry modifications on the endpoint that may look suspicious. Remediate as necessary.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*mscfile\\\\shell\\\\open\\\\command\\\\*\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `eventvwr_uac_bypass_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Some false positives may be present and will need to be filtered.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.md", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002", + "https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Eventvwr UAC Bypass", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "IcedID", + "Living Off The Land" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Registry values were modified to bypass UAC using Event Viewer on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.registry_value_name" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT37", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Evilnum", + "Honeybee", + "MuddyWater", + "Patchwork", + "Threat Group-3390" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "IcedID", + "Living Off The Land" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Eventvwr UAC Bypass Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Eventvwr UAC Bypass", + "file": "endpoint/eventvwr_uac_bypass.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "eventvwr_uac_bypass_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/eventvwr_uac_bypass.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "FodHelper UAC Bypass", + "id": "909f8fd8-7ac8-11eb-a1f3-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-03-01", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "Fodhelper.exe has a known UAC bypass as it attempts to look for specific registry keys upon execution, that do not exist. Therefore, an attacker can write its malicious commands in these registry keys to be executed by fodhelper.exe with the highest privilege. \\\n1. `HKCU:\\Software\\Classes\\ms-settings\\shell\\open\\command`\\\n1. `HKCU:\\Software\\Classes\\ms-settings\\shell\\open\\command\\DelegateExecute`\\\n1. `HKCU:\\Software\\Classes\\ms-settings\\shell\\open\\command\\(default)`\\\nUpon triage, fodhelper.exe will have a child process and read access will occur on the registry keys. Isolate the endpoint and review parallel processes for additional behavior.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=fodhelper.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `fodhelper_uac_bypass_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited to no false positives are expected.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.md", + "https://github.com/gushmazuko/WinBypass/blob/master/FodhelperBypass.ps1", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "FodHelper UAC Bypass", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "IcedID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspcious registy keys added by process fodhelper.exe (process_id- $process_id), with a parent_process of $parent_process_name$ that has been executed on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1112", + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Parent Process", + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 81, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN8", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT37", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Evilnum", + "Honeybee", + "MuddyWater", + "Patchwork", + "Threat Group-3390" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1112", + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "IcedID" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Parent Process", + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 81 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 81 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process name" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1112", + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "FodHelper UAC Bypass Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "FodHelper UAC Bypass", + "file": "endpoint/fodhelper_uac_bypass.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "fodhelper_uac_bypass_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/fodhelper_uac_bypass.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "IcedID Exfiltrated Archived File Creation", + "id": "0db4da70-f14b-11eb-8043-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-07-30", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious file creation namely passff.tar and cookie.tar. This files are possible archived of stolen browser information like history and cookies in a compromised machine with IcedID.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode= 11 (TargetFilename = \"*\\\\passff.tar\" OR TargetFilename = \"*\\\\cookie.tar\") |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by TargetFilename EventCode process_id process_name Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.cisecurity.org/white-papers/security-primer-icedid/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "IcedID Exfiltrated Archived File Creation", + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Collection" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/simulated_icedid/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "process $SourceImage$ create a file $TargetImage$ in host $Computer$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1560.001", + "T1560" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "SourceImage", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "TargetFilename", + "EventCode", + "process_id", + "process_name", + "Computer" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "CopyKittens", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Gallmaker", + "HAFNIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sowbug", + "Turla", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1560", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Patchwork", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1560.001", + "T1560" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "SourceImage", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Collection" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 72 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "SourceImage", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1560.001", + "T1560" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "IcedID Exfiltrated Archived File Creation Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "IcedID Exfiltrated Archived File Creation", + "file": "endpoint/icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/simulated_icedid/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process", + "id": "4aa5d062-e893-11eb-9eb2-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-07-19", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious mshta.exe process that spawn rundll32 or regsvr32 child process. This technique was seen in several malware nowadays like trickbot to load its initial .dll stage loader to execute and download the the actual trickbot payload.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name = \"mshta.exe\" `process_rundll32` OR `process_regsvr32` by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "limitted. this anomaly behavior is not commonly seen in clean host.", + "references": [ + "https://twitter.com/cyb3rops/status/1416050325870587910?s=21" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process", + "analytic_story": [ + "Trickbot", + "IcedID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/spear_phish/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "a mshta parent process $parent_process_name$ spawn child process $process_name$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.005" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "FIN7", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Sidewinder", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.005" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Trickbot", + "IcedID" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.005" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process", + "file": "endpoint/mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/spear_phish/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "process_regsvr32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=REGSVR32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "NLTest Domain Trust Discovery", + "id": "c3e05466-5f22-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-01-25", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for the execution of `nltest.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for Domain Trust information. Two arguments `/domain trusts`, returns a list of trusted domains, and `/all_trusts`, returns all trusted domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike use NLTest.exe to enumerate the current domain to assist with further understanding where to pivot next.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=nltest.exe OR Processes.process_name!=nltest.exe) (Processes.process=*/domain_trusts* OR Processes.process=*/all_trusts*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `nltest_domain_trust_discovery_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may use nltest for troubleshooting purposes, otherwise, rarely used.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1482/T1482.md", + "https://malware.news/t/lets-learn-trickbot-implements-network-collector-module-leveraging-cmd-wmi-ldap/19104", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482/", + "https://www.owasp.org/images/4/4b/Red_Team_Operating_in_a_Modern_Environment.pdf", + "https://ss64.com/nt/nltest.html", + "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/domain-trust-discovery/", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/08/ryuks-return/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "NLTest Domain Trust Discovery", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Domain Trust Discovery", + "IcedID", + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Domain trust discovery execution on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1482" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "Chimera", + "FIN8" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1482" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Domain Trust Discovery", + "IcedID", + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1482" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "NLTest Domain Trust Discovery Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "NLTest Domain Trust Discovery", + "file": "endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "nltest_domain_trust_discovery_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process", + "id": "2d9fc90c-f11f-11eb-9300-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-07-30", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "this detection was designed to identifies suspicious spawned process of known MS office application due to macro or malicious code. this technique can be seen in so many malware like IcedID that used MS office as its weapon or attack vector to initially infect the machines.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = \"winword.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"excel.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"powerpnt.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"outlook.exe\") `process_regsvr32` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/380662/0/html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process", + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/phish_icedid/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Office application spawning regsvr32.exe on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 63 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process", + "file": "endpoint/office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/phish_icedid/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_regsvr32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=REGSVR32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Office Application Spawn rundll32 process", + "id": "958751e4-9c5f-11eb-b103-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-04-13", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "this detection was designed to identifies suspicious spawned process of known MS office application due to macro or malicious code. this technique can be seen in so many malware like trickbot that used MS office as its weapon or attack vector to initially infect the machines.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = \"winword.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"excel.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"powerpnt.exe\") AND `process_rundll32` by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.process Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_application_spawn_rundll32_process_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://any.run/malware-trends/trickbot", + "https://any.run/report/47561b4e949041eff0a0f4693c59c81726591779fe21183ae9185b5eb6a69847/aba3722a-b373-4dae-8273-8730fb40cdbe" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Office Application Spawn rundll32 process", + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments", + "Trickbot", + "IcedID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Office application spawning rundll32.exe on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments", + "Trickbot", + "IcedID" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 63 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Office Application Spawn rundll32 process Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Office Application Spawn rundll32 process", + "file": "endpoint/office_application_spawn_rundll32_process.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "office_application_spawn_rundll32_process_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_application_spawn_rundll32_process.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Office Document Executing Macro Code", + "id": "b12c89bc-9d06-11eb-a592-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-14", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "this detection was designed to identifies suspicious office documents that using macro code. Macro code is known to be one of the prevalent weaponization or attack vector of threat actor. This malicious macro code is embed to a office document as an attachment that may execute malicious payload, download malware payload or other malware component. It is really good practice to disable macro by default to avoid automatically execute macro code while opening or closing a office document files.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 process_name IN (\"WINWORD.EXE\", \"EXCEL.EXE\", \"POWERPNT.EXE\") ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\VBE7INTL.DLL\",\"*\\\\VBE7.DLL\", \"*\\\\VBEUI.DLL\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ImageLoaded) as AllImageLoaded count by Computer EventCode Image process_name ProcessId ProcessGuid | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_document_executing_macro_code_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and ImageLoaded (Like sysmon EventCode 7) from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Also be sure to include those monitored dll to your own sysmon config.", + "known_false_positives": "Normal Office Document macro use for automation", + "references": [ + "https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/386500/0/html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Office Document Executing Macro Code", + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments", + "Trickbot", + "IcedID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Office document executing a macro on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "ImageLoaded", + "AllImageLoaded", + "Computer", + "EventCode", + "Image", + "process_name", + "ProcessId", + "ProcessGuid", + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments", + "Trickbot", + "IcedID" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 35 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Office Document Executing Macro Code Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Office Document Executing Macro Code", + "file": "endpoint/office_document_executing_macro_code.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "office_document_executing_macro_code_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_document_executing_macro_code.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Office Product Spawning MSHTA", + "id": "6078fa20-a6d2-11eb-b662-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-04-26", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `mshta.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `mshta.exe` will contain the `hta` file locally, or a URL to the remote destination. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `mshta.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `mshta.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\") `process_mshta` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_mshta_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "No false positives known. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/threats/TA551/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Office Product Spawning MSHTA", + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments", + "IcedID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_macros.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments", + "IcedID" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 63 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Office Product Spawning MSHTA Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Office Product Spawning MSHTA", + "file": "endpoint/office_product_spawning_mshta.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon_macros.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_macros.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "process_mshta", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=mshta.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSHTA.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "office_product_spawning_mshta_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_mshta.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", + "id": "f5f6af30-7aa7-4295-bfe9-07fe87c01a4b", + "version": 7, + "date": "2022-01-26", + "author": "Jose Hernandez, David Dorsey, Teoderick Contreras, Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to launch an application or service at system startup.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\RunOnce OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\run* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentVersion\\\\Windows\\\\Appinit_Dlls* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Shell* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Notify* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Userinit* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\VmApplet* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\policies\\\\explorer\\\\run* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\runservices* OR Registry.registry_path=HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Netsh\\\\* OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Image File Execution Options*\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=Debugger) OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Security Packages\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\\\\OSConfig\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Security Packages\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\SilentProcessExit\\\\*\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*currentVersion\\\\Windows\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Load\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentVersion\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Svchost\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\"AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"BootExecute\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Software\\\\Run\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"auto_update\")) by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "There are many legitimate applications that must execute on system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Ransomware", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "IcedID", + "Remcos" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 95, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/atomic_red_team/t1547001-runonce.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to persistence in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1547.001", + "T1547" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user" + ], + "risk_score": 76, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "Putter Panda", + "RTM", + "Rocke", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.001", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Ransomware", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "IcedID", + "Remcos" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 95 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 76 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 76 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.001", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", + "file": "endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline", + "id": "c9ef7dc4-eeaf-11eb-b2b6-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-07-27", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies Regsvr32.exe utilizing the silent switch to load DLLs. This technique has most recently been seen in IcedID campaigns to load its initial dll that will download the 2nd stage loader that will download and decrypt the config payload. The switch type may be either a hyphen `-` or forward slash `/`. This behavior is typically found with `-s`, and it is possible there are more switch types that may be used. \\ During triage, review parallel processes and capture any artifacts that may have landed on disk. Isolate and contain the endpoint as necessary.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"(?i)[\\-|\\/][Ss]{1}\") | `regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "minimal. but network operator can use this application to load dll.", + "references": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/56680cba-2bbc-4b34-8633-5f7878ddf858/", + "https://regexr.com/699e2" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline", + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID", + "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", + "Remcos" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a DLL using the silent parameter.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.010" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cobalt Group", + "Deep Panda", + "Inception", + "Leviathan", + "TA551", + "WIRTE" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.010" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID", + "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", + "Remcos" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.010" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline", + "file": "endpoint/regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-150d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_regsvr32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=REGSVR32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process", + "id": "2dbeee3a-f067-11eb-96c0-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-07-29", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies the suspicious Remote Thread execution of rundll32.exe process to cmd.exe process. This technique was seen in IcedID malware to execute its malicious code in normal process for defense evasion and to steal sensitive information the the compromised host. browser process.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=8 SourceImage = \"*\\\\rundll32.exe\" TargetImage = \"*.exe\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by SourceImage TargetImage TargetProcessId SourceProcessId StartAddress EventCode Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the SourceImage, TargetImage, and EventCode executions from your endpoints related to create remote thread or injecting codes. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/380662/0/html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process", + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "rundl32 process $SourceImage$ create a remote thread to process $TargetImage$ in host $Computer$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1055" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "SourceImage", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "SourceImage", + "TargetImage", + "TargetProcessId", + "SourceProcessId", + "StartAddress", + "EventCode", + "Computer" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Cobalt Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sharpshooter", + "Silence", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1055" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "SourceImage", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "SourceImage", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1055" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process", + "file": "endpoint/rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser", + "id": "f8a22586-ee2d-11eb-a193-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-07-26", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies the suspicious Remote Thread execution of rundll32.exe process to \"firefox.exe\" and \"chrome.exe\" browser. This technique was seen in IcedID malware where it hooks the browser to parse banking information as user used the targetted browser process.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=8 SourceImage = \"*\\\\rundll32.exe\" TargetImage IN (\"*\\\\firefox.exe\", \"*\\\\chrome.exe\", \"*\\\\iexplore.exe\",\"*\\\\microsoftedgecp.exe\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by SourceImage TargetImage TargetProcessId SourceProcessId StartAddress EventCode Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the SourceImage, TargetImage, and EventCode executions from your endpoints related to create remote thread or injecting codes. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/380662/0/html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser", + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "rundl32 process $SourceImage$ create a remote thread to browser process $TargetImage$ in host $Computer$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1055" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "SourceImage", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "SourceImage", + "TargetImage", + "TargetProcessId", + "SourceProcessId", + "StartAddress", + "EventCode", + "Computer" + ], + "risk_score": 70, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Cobalt Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sharpshooter", + "Silence", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1055" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "SourceImage", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 70 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "SourceImage", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1055" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser", + "file": "endpoint/rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Rundll32 DNSQuery", + "id": "f1483f5e-ee29-11eb-9d23-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-02-18", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe process having a http connection and do a dns query in some web domain. This technique was seen in IcedID malware where the rundll32 that execute its payload will contact amazon.com to check internet connect and to communicate to its C&C server to download config and other file component.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=22 process_name=\"rundll32.exe\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image QueryName QueryStatus ProcessId Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_dnsquery_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and eventcode = 22 dnsquery executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://any.run/malware-trends/icedid" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Rundll32 DNSQuery", + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "rundll32 process $process_name$ having a dns query to $QueryName$ in host $Computer$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Image", + "QueryName", + "QueryStatus", + "ProcessId", + "Computer" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "CopyKittens", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "MuddyWater", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Rundll32 DNSQuery Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Rundll32 DNSQuery", + "file": "endpoint/rundll32_dnsquery.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "rundll32_dnsquery_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/rundll32_dnsquery.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files", + "id": "6338266a-ee2a-11eb-bf68-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-07-26", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32 process that drops executable (.exe or .dll) files. this behavior seen in rundll32 process of IcedID that tries to drop copy of itself in temp folder or download executable drop it either appdata or programdata as part of its execution.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=11 process_name=\"rundll32.exe\" TargetFilename IN (\"*.exe\", \"*.dll\",) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image TargetFilename ProcessGuid dest user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, TargetFilename, and eventcode 11 executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://any.run/malware-trends/icedid" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files", + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "rundll32 process $process_name$ drops a file $TargetFilename$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Image", + "TargetFilename", + "ProcessGuid", + "dest", + "user_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "CopyKittens", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "MuddyWater", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files", + "file": "endpoint/rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger", + "id": "75b00fd8-a0ff-11eb-8b31-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-19", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed with a Rundll32. This technique is common in new trickbot that uses rundll32 to load is trickbot downloader. The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\\Windows\\system32` and `C:\\Windows\\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.'", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message | search Command IN (\"*rundll32*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Task_Name, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden, Arguments | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the task schedule (Exa. Security Log EventCode 4698) endpoints. Tune and filter known instances of Task schedule used in your environment.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/", + "https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Trickbot", + "IcedID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/tasksched/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A schedule task process commandline rundll32 arguments $Arguments$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "dest", + "Task_Name", + "Command", + "Author", + "Enabled", + "Hidden", + "Arguments" + ], + "risk_score": 70, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Trickbot", + "IcedID" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 70 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger", + "file": "endpoint/schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/tasksched/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Sqlite Module In Temp Folder", + "id": "0f216a38-f45f-11eb-b09c-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-03", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious file creation of sqlite3.dll in %temp% folder. This behavior was seen in IcedID malware where it download sqlite module to parse browser database like for chrome or firefox to stole browser information related to bank, credit card or credentials.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=11 (TargetFilename = \"*\\\\sqlite32.dll\" OR TargetFilename = \"*\\\\sqlite64.dll\") (TargetFilename = \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\") |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by process_name TargetFilename EventCode ProcessId Image | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sqlite_module_in_temp_folder_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.cisecurity.org/white-papers/security-primer-icedid/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Sqlite Module In Temp Folder", + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Collection" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/simulated_icedid/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "process $SourceImage$ create a file $TargetImage$ in host $Computer$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1005" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "SourceImage", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "process_name", + "TargetFilename", + "EventCode", + "ProcessId", + "Image" + ], + "risk_score": 9, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Local System", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dark Caracal", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Dust Storm", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Sandworm Team", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Windigo", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1005" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "SourceImage", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Collection" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 30 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 9 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "SourceImage", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1005" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Sqlite Module In Temp Folder Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Sqlite Module In Temp Folder", + "file": "endpoint/sqlite_module_in_temp_folder.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/simulated_icedid/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "sqlite_module_in_temp_folder_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/sqlite_module_in_temp_folder.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline", + "id": "bed761f8-ee29-11eb-8bf3-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-07-26", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe commandline to execute dll file. This technique was seen in IcedID malware to load its payload dll with the following parameter to load encrypted dll payload which is the license.dat.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*/i:* by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "limitted. this parameter is not commonly used by windows application but can be used by the network operator.", + "references": [ + "https://threatpost.com/icedid-banking-trojan-surges-emotet/165314/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline", + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "rundll32 process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "CopyKittens", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "MuddyWater", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline", + "file": "endpoint/suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 PluginInit", + "id": "92d51712-ee29-11eb-b1ae-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-07-26", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe process with plugininit parameter. This technique is commonly seen in IceID malware to execute its initial dll stager to download another payload to the compromised machine.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*PluginInit* by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_plugininit_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "third party application may used this dll export name to execute function.", + "references": [ + "https://threatpost.com/icedid-banking-trojan-surges-emotet/165314/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 PluginInit", + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "rundll32 process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "CopyKittens", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "MuddyWater", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 42 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 PluginInit Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 PluginInit", + "file": "endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_plugininit.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_rundll32_plugininit_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_plugininit.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", + "id": "5d9c6eee-988c-11eb-8253-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-08", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed from a user writeable file path.\\\nThe search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not.\\\nschtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\\Windows\\system32` and `C:\\Windows\\syswow64`.\\\nThe following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory.\\\nUpon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or was it via TaskService. Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message | search Command IN (\"*\\\\users\\\\public\\\\*\", \"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Tasks\\\\*\", \"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Task_Name, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives are possible if legitimate applications are allowed to register tasks in public paths. Filter as needed based on paths that are used legitimately.", + "references": [ + "https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/irans-apt34-returns-with-an-updated-arsenal/", + "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4698", + "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/scheduled-task-job/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/taskschd/time-trigger-example--scripting-?redirectedfrom=MSDN", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/e26f1b2e-befa-483b-91d2-e18636e2faf3/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "IcedID", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/taskschedule/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A windows scheduled task was created (task name=$Task_Name$) on $dest$ by the following command: $Command$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Command", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "dest", + "Task_Name", + "Description", + "Command" + ], + "risk_score": 70, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CostaRicto", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Machete", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "IcedID", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Command", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 70 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "Command", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", + "file": "endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/taskschedule/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started", + "id": "b3632472-310b-11ec-9aab-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-10-19", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following hunting analytic assists with identifying suspicious tasks that have been registered and ran in Windows using EventID 200 (action run) and 201 (action completed). It is recommended to filter based on ActionName by specifying specific paths not used in your environment. After some basic tuning, this may be effective in capturing evasive ways to register tasks on Windows. Review parallel events related to tasks being scheduled. EventID 106 will generate when a new task is generated, however, that does not mean it ran. Capture any files on disk and analyze.", + "search": "`wineventlog_task_scheduler` EventCode IN (\"200\",\"201\") | rename ComputerName as dest | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message dest EventCode category | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "Task Scheduler logs are required to be collected. Enable logging with inputs.conf by adding a stanza for [WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational] and renderXml=false. Note, not translating it in XML may require a proper extraction of specific items in the Message.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives will be present. Filter based on ActionName paths or specify keywords of interest.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1053.005/T1053.005.md", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started", + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/windows_taskschedule/windows-taskschedule.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A Scheduled Task was scheduled and ran on $dest$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.005" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "TaskName", + "ActionName", + "EventID", + "dest", + "ProcessID" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CostaRicto", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Machete", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.005" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.005" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started", + "file": "endpoint/winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-45d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-taskschedule.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/windows_taskschedule/windows-taskschedule.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational", + "sourcetype": "wineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_task_scheduler", + "definition": "source=\"WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [] + }, + { + "name": "Active Directory Discovery", + "id": "8460679c-2b21-463e-b381-b813417c32f2", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-20", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "description": "Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Discovery and Reconnaissance within with Active Directory environments.", + "narrative": "Discovery consists of techniques an adversay uses to gain knowledge about an internal environment or network. These techniques provide adversaries with situational awareness and allows them to have the necessary information before deciding how to act or who/what to target next.\\\nOnce an attacker obtains an initial foothold in an Active Directory environment, she is forced to engage in Discovery techniques in the initial phases of a breach to better understand and navigate the target network. Some examples include but are not limited to enumerating domain users, domain admins, computers, domain controllers, network shares, group policy objects, domain trusts, etc.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/", + "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2535", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/003/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Active Directory Discovery", + "analytic_story": "Active Directory Discovery", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Leafminer", + "Naikon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "TA505" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "Chimera", + "FIN8" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1201", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Chimera", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Chimera", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "admin@338" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1033", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "Chimera", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Poseidon Group", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "admin@338" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1049", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Andariel", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "GALLIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1016", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Higaisa", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1016.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Internet Connection Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "Turla" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "FIN7", + "Operation Wocao", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access", + "Discovery" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation", + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - AdsiSearcher Account Discovery - Rule", + "ESCU - Domain Account Discovery with Dsquery - Rule", + "ESCU - Domain Account Discovery With Net App - Rule", + "ESCU - Domain Account Discovery with Wmic - Rule", + "ESCU - Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest - Rule", + "ESCU - Domain Controller Discovery with Wmic - Rule", + "ESCU - Domain Group Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule", + "ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Dsquery - Rule", + "ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Net - Rule", + "ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Wmic - Rule", + "ESCU - DSQuery Domain Discovery - Rule", + "ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery With Net - Rule", + "ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery with PowerView - Rule", + "ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery With Wmic - Rule", + "ESCU - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule", + "ESCU - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", + "ESCU - Get ADUser with PowerShell - Rule", + "ESCU - Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", + "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule", + "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", + "ESCU - Get DomainPolicy with Powershell - Rule", + "ESCU - Get DomainPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", + "ESCU - Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell - Rule", + "ESCU - Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", + "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell - Rule", + "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", + "ESCU - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell - Rule", + "ESCU - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", + "ESCU - Get WMIObject Group Discovery - Rule", + "ESCU - Get WMIObject Group Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule", + "ESCU - GetAdComputer with PowerShell - Rule", + "ESCU - GetAdComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", + "ESCU - GetAdGroup with PowerShell - Rule", + "ESCU - GetAdGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", + "ESCU - GetCurrent User with PowerShell - Rule", + "ESCU - GetCurrent User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", + "ESCU - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell - Rule", + "ESCU - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", + "ESCU - GetDomainController with PowerShell - Rule", + "ESCU - GetDomainController with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", + "ESCU - GetDomainGroup with PowerShell - Rule", + "ESCU - GetDomainGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", + "ESCU - GetLocalUser with PowerShell - Rule", + "ESCU - GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", + "ESCU - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell - Rule", + "ESCU - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", + "ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell - Rule", + "ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", + "ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell - Rule", + "ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", + "ESCU - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell - Rule", + "ESCU - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", + "ESCU - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell - Rule", + "ESCU - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", + "ESCU - Local Account Discovery with Net - Rule", + "ESCU - Local Account Discovery With Wmic - Rule", + "ESCU - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule", + "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Arp - Rule", + "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Net - Rule", + "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule", + "ESCU - Network Discovery Using Route Windows App - Rule", + "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", + "ESCU - Password Policy Discovery with Net - Rule", + "ESCU - PowerShell Get LocalGroup Discovery - Rule", + "ESCU - Powershell Get LocalGroup Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule", + "ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule", + "ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Dsquery - Rule", + "ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Net - Rule", + "ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Wmic - Rule", + "ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell - Rule", + "ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN - Rule", + "ESCU - System User Discovery With Query - Rule", + "ESCU - System User Discovery With Whoami - Rule", + "ESCU - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell - Rule", + "ESCU - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell Script Block - Rule", + "ESCU - Wmic Group Discovery - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Mauricio Velazco", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "AdsiSearcher Account Discovery", + "id": "de7fcadc-04f3-11ec-a241-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-24", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator being used to query Active Directory for domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `[Adsisearcher]` to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*[adsisearcher]*\" Message = \"*objectcategory=user*\" Message = \"*.findAll()*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `adsisearcher_account_discovery_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/", + "https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-blue-purple/", + "https://devblogs.microsoft.com/scripting/use-the-powershell-adsisearcher-type-accelerator-to-search-active-directory/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "AdsiSearcher Account Discovery", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "powershell process having commandline $Message$ for user enumeration", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1087" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1087" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1087" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "AdsiSearcher Account Discovery Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "AdsiSearcher Account Discovery", + "file": "endpoint/adsisearcher_account_discovery.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "adsisearcher_account_discovery_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/adsisearcher_account_discovery.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Domain Account Discovery with Dsquery", + "id": "b1a8ce04-04c2-11ec-bea7-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-24", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `dsquery.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover domain users. The `user` argument returns a list of all users registered in the domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike engage in remote system discovery for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=\"dsquery.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*user*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_account_discovery_with_dsquery_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet/details/dsquery.htm", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Domain Account Discovery with Dsquery", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1087" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_name" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1087" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1087" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Domain Account Discovery with Dsquery Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Domain Account Discovery with Dsquery", + "file": "endpoint/domain_account_discovery_with_dsquery.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "domain_account_discovery_with_dsquery_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/domain_account_discovery_with_dsquery.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Domain Account Discovery With Net App", + "id": "98f6a534-04c2-11ec-96b2-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-24", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain users. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use net.exe to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` AND Processes.process = \"* user*\" AND Processes.process = \"*/do*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_account_discovery_with_net_app_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-for-identity/playbook-domain-dominance", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Domain Account Discovery With Net App", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1087" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_name" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1087" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1087" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Domain Account Discovery With Net App Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Domain Account Discovery With Net App", + "file": "endpoint/domain_account_discovery_with_net_app.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_net", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "domain_account_discovery_with_net_app_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/domain_account_discovery_with_net_app.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Domain Account Discovery with Wmic", + "id": "383572e0-04c5-11ec-bdcc-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-24", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain users. Red Teams and adversaries alike use wmic.exe to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=\"wmic.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*/NAMESPACE:\\\\\\\\root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*\" AND Processes.process = \"*ds_user*\" AND Processes.process = \"*GET*\" AND Processes.process = \"*ds_samaccountname*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_account_discovery_with_wmic_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Domain Account Discovery with Wmic", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1087" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_name" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1087" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1087" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Domain Account Discovery with Wmic Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Domain Account Discovery with Wmic", + "file": "endpoint/domain_account_discovery_with_wmic.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "domain_account_discovery_with_wmic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/domain_account_discovery_with_wmic.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest", + "id": "41243735-89a7-4c83-bcdd-570aa78f00a1", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-30", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `nltest.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The arguments `/dclist:` and '/dsgetdc:', can be used to return a list of all domain controllers. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use nltest.exe to identify domain controllers in a Windows Domain for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"nltest.exe\") (Processes.process=\"*/dclist:*\" OR Processes.process=\"*/dsgetdc:*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_controller_discovery_with_nltest_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Domain controller discovery on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1018" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 21, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Leafminer", + "Naikon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1018" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 21 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1018" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest", + "file": "endpoint/domain_controller_discovery_with_nltest.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "domain_controller_discovery_with_nltest_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/domain_controller_discovery_with_nltest.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Domain Controller Discovery with Wmic", + "id": "64c7adaa-48ee-483c-b0d6-7175bc65e6cc", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-01", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The arguments utilized in this command line return a list of all domain controllers in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike use *.exe to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"wmic.exe\") (Processes.process=\"\" OR Processes.process=\"*DomainControllerAddress*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_controller_discovery_with_wmic_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Domain Controller Discovery with Wmic", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Domain controller discovery on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1018" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 21, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Leafminer", + "Naikon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1018" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 21 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1018" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Domain Controller Discovery with Wmic Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Domain Controller Discovery with Wmic", + "file": "endpoint/domain_controller_discovery_with_wmic.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "domain_controller_discovery_with_wmic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/domain_controller_discovery_with_wmic.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Domain Group Discovery with Adsisearcher", + "id": "089c862f-5f83-49b5-b1c8-7e4ff66560c7", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-25", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator being used to query Active Directory for domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `[Adsisearcher]` to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*[adsisearcher]*\" AND Message = \"*(objectcategory=group)*\" AND Message = \"*findAll()*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `domain_group_discovery_with_adsisearcher_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use Adsisearcher for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", + "https://devblogs.microsoft.com/scripting/use-the-powershell-adsisearcher-type-accelerator-to-search-active-directory/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Domain Group Discovery with Adsisearcher", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 18, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "TA505" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 18 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Domain Group Discovery with Adsisearcher Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Domain Group Discovery with Adsisearcher", + "file": "endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_adsisearcher.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "wineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "domain_group_discovery_with_adsisearcher_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_adsisearcher.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Domain Group Discovery With Dsquery", + "id": "f0c9d62f-a232-4edd-b17e-bc409fb133d4", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-01", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `dsquery.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The argument `group`, returns a list of all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use may leverage dsquery.exe to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"dsquery.exe\") (Processes.process=\"*group*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_group_discovery_with_dsquery_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Domain Group Discovery With Dsquery", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "TA505" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Domain Group Discovery With Dsquery Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Domain Group Discovery With Dsquery", + "file": "endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_dsquery.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "domain_group_discovery_with_dsquery_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_dsquery.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Domain Group Discovery With Net", + "id": "f2f14ac7-fa81-471a-80d5-7eb65c3c7349", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-25", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The argument `group /domain`, returns a list of all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\") (Processes.process=*group* AND Processes.process=*/do*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_group_discovery_with_net_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Domain Group Discovery With Net", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "TA505" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Domain Group Discovery With Net Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Domain Group Discovery With Net", + "file": "endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_net.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "domain_group_discovery_with_net_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_net.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Domain Group Discovery With Wmic", + "id": "a87736a6-95cd-4728-8689-3c64d5026b3e", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-25", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The arguments utilized in this command return a list of all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use wmic.exe to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"wmic.exe\") (Processes.process=*/NAMESPACE:\\\\\\\\root\\\\directory\\\\ldap* AND Processes.process=*ds_group* AND Processes.process=\"*GET ds_samaccountname*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_group_discovery_with_wmic_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Domain Group Discovery With Wmic", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "TA505" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Domain Group Discovery With Wmic Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Domain Group Discovery With Wmic", + "file": "endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_wmic.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "domain_group_discovery_with_wmic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_wmic.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "DSQuery Domain Discovery", + "id": "cc316032-924a-11eb-91a2-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-03-31", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies \"dsquery.exe\" execution with arguments looking for `TrustedDomain` query directly on the command-line. This is typically indicative of an Administrator or adversary perform domain trust discovery. Note that this query does not identify any other variations of \"Dsquery.exe\" usage.\\\nWithin this detection, it is assumed `dsquery.exe` is not moved or renamed.\\\nThe search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process \"dsquery.exe\" and its parent process.\\\nDSQuery.exe is natively found in `C:\\Windows\\system32` and `C:\\Windows\\syswow64` and only on Server operating system.\\\nThe following DLL(s) are loaded when DSQuery.exe is launched `dsquery.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible dsquery is running within that process context in memory.\\\nIn addition to trust discovery, review parallel processes for additional behaviors performed. Identify the parent process and capture any files (batch files, for example) being used.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=dsquery.exe Processes.process=*trustedDomain* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dsquery_domain_discovery_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives. If there is a true false positive, filter based on command-line or parent process.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1482/T1482.md", + "http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/a-guide-to-attacking-domain-trusts/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc732952(v=ws.11)", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc754232(v=ws.11)" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "DSQuery Domain Discovery", + "analytic_story": [ + "Domain Trust Discovery", + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified performing domain discovery on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1482" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "Chimera", + "FIN8" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1482" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Domain Trust Discovery", + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 72 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 72 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1482" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "DSQuery Domain Discovery Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "DSQuery Domain Discovery", + "file": "endpoint/dsquery_domain_discovery.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "dsquery_domain_discovery_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/dsquery_domain_discovery.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Elevated Group Discovery With Net", + "id": "a23a0e20-0b1b-4a07-82e5-ec5f70811e7a", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-25", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for specific elevated domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate elevated domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery to identify high privileged users.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\") (Processes.process=\"*group*\" AND Processes.process=\"*/do*\") (Processes.process=\"*Domain Admins*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Enterprise Admins*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Schema Admins*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Account Operators*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Server Operators*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Protected Users*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Dns Admins*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `elevated_group_discovery_with_net_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-practices/appendix-b--privileged-accounts-and-groups-in-active-directory", + "https://adsecurity.org/?p=3658" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Elevated Group Discovery With Net", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Elevated domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 21, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "TA505" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 21 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Elevated Group Discovery With Net Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Elevated Group Discovery With Net", + "file": "endpoint/elevated_group_discovery_with_net.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "elevated_group_discovery_with_net_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/elevated_group_discovery_with_net.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Elevated Group Discovery with PowerView", + "id": "10d62950-0de5-4199-a710-cff9ea79b413", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-25", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainGroupMember` commandlet. `Get-DomainGroupMember` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. As the name suggests, `Get-DomainGroupMember` is used to list the members of an specific domain group. Red Teams and adversaries alike use PowerView to enumerate elevated domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery to identify high privileged users.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-DomainGroupMember*\") AND Message IN (\"*Domain Admins*\",\"*Enterprise Admins*\", \"*Schema Admins*\", \"*Account Operators*\" , \"*Server Operators*\", \"*Protected Users*\", \"*Dns Admins*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `elevated_group_discovery_with_powerview_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerView for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", + "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainGroupMember/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-practices/appendix-b--privileged-accounts-and-groups-in-active-directory", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Elevated Group Discovery with PowerView", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Elevated group discovery using PowerView on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 21, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "TA505" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 21 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Elevated Group Discovery with PowerView Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Elevated Group Discovery with PowerView", + "file": "endpoint/elevated_group_discovery_with_powerview.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "wineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "elevated_group_discovery_with_powerview_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/elevated_group_discovery_with_powerview.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Elevated Group Discovery With Wmic", + "id": "3f6bbf22-093e-4cb4-9641-83f47b8444b6", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-25", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for specific domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate elevated domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery to identify high privileged users.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"wmic.exe\") (Processes.process=*/NAMESPACE:\\\\\\\\root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*) (Processes.process=\"*Domain Admins*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Enterprise Admins*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Schema Admins*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Account Operators*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Server Operators*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Protected Users*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Dns Admins*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `elevated_group_discovery_with_wmic_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-practices/appendix-b--privileged-accounts-and-groups-in-active-directory", + "https://adsecurity.org/?p=3658" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Elevated Group Discovery With Wmic", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Elevated domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 21, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "TA505" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 21 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Elevated Group Discovery With Wmic Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Elevated Group Discovery With Wmic", + "file": "endpoint/elevated_group_discovery_with_wmic.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "elevated_group_discovery_with_wmic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/elevated_group_discovery_with_wmic.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell", + "id": "36e46ebe-065a-11ec-b4c7-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-26", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` executing the Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"powershell*\") AND Processes.process = \"*Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/S1ckB0y1337/Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy?view=windowsserver2019-ps" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1201" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_name" + ], + "risk_score": 9, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1201", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Chimera", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1201" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 30 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 9 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 9 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1201" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell", + "file": "endpoint/get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block", + "id": "1ff7ccc8-065a-11ec-91e4-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-26", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message =\"*Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/S1ckB0y1337/Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy?view=windowsserver2019-ps" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "powershell process having commandline $Message$ to query domain password policy", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1201" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 9, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1201", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Chimera", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1201" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 30 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 9 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 9 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1201" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block", + "file": "endpoint/get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Get ADUser with PowerShell", + "id": "0b6ee3f4-04e3-11ec-a87d-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-24", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to enumerate domain users. The `Get-AdUser' commandlet returns a list of all domain users. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"powershell*\") AND Processes.process = \"*Get-ADUser*\" AND Processes.process = \"*-filter*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_aduser_with_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-blue-purple/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-aduser?view=windowsserver2019-ps" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Get ADUser with PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1087" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_name" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1087" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1087" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Get ADUser with PowerShell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Get ADUser with PowerShell", + "file": "endpoint/get_aduser_with_powershell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "get_aduser_with_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_aduser_with_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block", + "id": "21432e40-04f4-11ec-b7e6-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-24", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-AdGUser` commandlet. The `Get-AdUser` commandlet is used to return a list of all domain users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*get-aduser*\" Message = \"*-filter*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_aduser_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-blue-purple/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-aduser?view=windowsserver2019-ps" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "powershell process having commandline $Message$ for user enumeration", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1087" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1087" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1087" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block", + "file": "endpoint/get_aduser_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "get_aduser_with_powershell_script_block_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_aduser_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell", + "id": "8b5ef342-065a-11ec-b0fc-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-26", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` executing the Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"powershell*\") AND Processes.process = \"*Get-ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/S1ckB0y1337/Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-aduserresultantpasswordpolicy?view=windowsserver2019-ps" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1201" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_name" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1201", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Chimera", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1201" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1201" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell", + "file": "endpoint/get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block", + "id": "737e1eb0-065a-11ec-921a-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-26", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, MAuricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message =\"*Get-ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/S1ckB0y1337/Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-aduserresultantpasswordpolicy?view=windowsserver2019-ps" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "powershell process having commandline $Message$ to query domain user password policy.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1201" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 9, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1201", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Chimera", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1201" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 30 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 9 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 9 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1201" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block", + "file": "endpoint/get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Get DomainPolicy with Powershell", + "id": "b8f9947e-065a-11ec-aafb-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-26", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` executing the `Get-DomainPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"powershell*\") AND Processes.process = \"*Get-DomainPolicy*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/S1ckB0y1337/Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet", + "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainPolicy/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Get DomainPolicy with Powershell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1201" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_name" + ], + "risk_score": 30, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1201", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Chimera", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1201" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 30 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 30 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1201" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Get DomainPolicy with Powershell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Get DomainPolicy with Powershell", + "file": "endpoint/get_domainpolicy_with_powershell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_domainpolicy_with_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Get DomainPolicy with Powershell Script Block", + "id": "a360d2b2-065a-11ec-b0bf-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-26", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get DomainPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message =\"*Get-DomainPolicy*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/S1ckB0y1337/Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet", + "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainPolicy/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Get DomainPolicy with Powershell Script Block", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "powershell process having commandline $Message$ to query domain policy.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1201" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 30, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1201", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Chimera", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1201" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 30 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 30 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1201" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Get DomainPolicy with Powershell Script Block Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Get DomainPolicy with Powershell Script Block", + "file": "endpoint/get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell", + "id": "4fa7f846-054a-11ec-a836-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-24", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies Get-DomainTrust from PowerView in order to gather domain trust information. Typically, this is utilized within a script being executed and used to enumerate the domain trust information. This grants the adversary an understanding of how large or small the domain is. During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=*get-domaintrust* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domaintrust_with_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives as this requires an active Administrator or adversary to bring in, import, and execute.", + "references": [ + "http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/a-guide-to-attacking-domain-trusts/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 40, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Suspicious PowerShell Get-DomainTrust was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1482" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 12, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "Chimera", + "FIN8" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1482" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 40 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 12 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 12 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1482" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell", + "file": "endpoint/get_domaintrust_with_powershell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/discovery/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "get_domaintrust_with_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_domaintrust_with_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell Script Block", + "id": "89275e7e-0548-11ec-bf75-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-24", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies Get-DomainTrust from PowerView in order to gather domain trust information. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*get-foresttrust*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message ComputerName User EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domaintrust_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible certain system management frameworks utilize this command to gather trust information.", + "references": [ + "http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/a-guide-to-attacking-domain-trusts/", + "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", + "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell Script Block", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 40, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/discovery/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Suspicious PowerShell Get-DomainTrust was identified on endpoint $ComputerName$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1482" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "Path", + "OpCode", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 12, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "Chimera", + "FIN8" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1482" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 40 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 12 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 12 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1482" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell Script Block Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell Script Block", + "file": "endpoint/get_domaintrust_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/discovery/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "get_domaintrust_with_powershell_script_block_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_domaintrust_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Get DomainUser with PowerShell", + "id": "9a5a41d6-04e7-11ec-923c-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-24", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to enumerate domain users. `Get-DomainUser` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"powershell*\") AND Processes.process = \"*Get-DomainUser*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domainuser_with_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainUser/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Get DomainUser with PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1087" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_name" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1087" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1087" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Get DomainUser with PowerShell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Get DomainUser with PowerShell", + "file": "endpoint/get_domainuser_with_powershell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "get_domainuser_with_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_domainuser_with_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block", + "id": "61994268-04f4-11ec-865c-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-24", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainUser` commandlet. `GetDomainUser` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerView to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*Get-DomainUser*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domainuser_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainUser/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "powershell process having commandline $Message$ for user enumeration", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1087" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1087" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1087" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block", + "file": "endpoint/get_domainuser_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "get_domainuser_with_powershell_script_block_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_domainuser_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell", + "id": "584f4884-0bf1-11ec-a5ec-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-02", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies Get-ForestTrust from PowerSploit in order to gather domain trust information. Typically, this is utilized within a script being executed and used to enumerate the domain trust information. This grants the adversary an understanding of how large or small the domain is. During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=cmd.exe Processes.process=*get-foresttrust* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_foresttrust_with_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives as this requires an active Administrator or adversary to bring in, import, and execute.", + "references": [ + "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-ForestTrust/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 40, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Suspicious PowerShell Get-ForestTrust was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1482" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 12, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "Chimera", + "FIN8" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1482" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 40 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 12 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 12 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1482" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell", + "file": "endpoint/get_foresttrust_with_powershell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/discovery/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "get_foresttrust_with_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_foresttrust_with_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell Script Block", + "id": "70fac80e-0bf1-11ec-9ba0-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-02", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies Get-ForestTrust from PowerSploit in order to gather domain trust information. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*get-foresttrust*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message OpCode ComputerName User EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_foresttrust_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "UPDATE_KNOWN_FALSE_POSITIVES", + "references": [ + "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-ForestTrust/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell Script Block", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 40, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/discovery/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Suspicious PowerShell Get-ForestTrust was identified on endpoint $ComputerName$ by user $User$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1482" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "Path", + "OpCode", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 12, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "Chimera", + "FIN8" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1482" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 40 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 12 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 12 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1482" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell Script Block Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell Script Block", + "file": "endpoint/get_foresttrust_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/discovery/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "get_foresttrust_with_powershell_script_block_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_foresttrust_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Get WMIObject Group Discovery", + "id": "5434f670-155d-11ec-8cca-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-14", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following hunting analytic identifies the use of `Get-WMIObject Win32_Group` being used with PowerShell to identify local groups on the endpoint. \\ Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \\ During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR processes.process_name=cmd.exe) (Processes.process=\"*Get-WMIObject*\" AND Processes.process=\"*Win32_Group*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_wmiobject_group_discovery_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present. Tune as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Get WMIObject Group Discovery", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "System group discovery on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "TA505" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Chimera", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "admin@338" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Get WMIObject Group Discovery Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Get WMIObject Group Discovery", + "file": "endpoint/get_wmiobject_group_discovery.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "get_wmiobject_group_discovery_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_wmiobject_group_discovery.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Get WMIObject Group Discovery with Script Block Logging", + "id": "69df7f7c-155d-11ec-a055-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-14", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies the usage of `Get-WMIObject Win32_Group`, which is typically used as a way to identify groups on the endpoint. Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*Get-WMIObject*\" AND Message = \"*Win32_Group*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message OpCode ComputerName User EventCode| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_wmiobject_group_discovery_with_script_block_logging_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present. Tune as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/powershell-detections-threat-research-release-august-2021.html", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.md", + "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", + "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Get WMIObject Group Discovery with Script Block Logging", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "System group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "TA505" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Chimera", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "admin@338" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Get WMIObject Group Discovery with Script Block Logging Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Get WMIObject Group Discovery with Script Block Logging", + "file": "endpoint/get_wmiobject_group_discovery_with_script_block_logging.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "wineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "get_wmiobject_group_discovery_with_script_block_logging_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_wmiobject_group_discovery_with_script_block_logging.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "GetAdComputer with PowerShell", + "id": "c5a31f80-5888-4d81-9f78-1cc65026316e", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-07", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The `Get-AdComputer' commandlet returns a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-AdComputer*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getadcomputer_with_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GetAdComputer with PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1018" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Leafminer", + "Naikon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1018" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1018" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "GetAdComputer with PowerShell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "GetAdComputer with PowerShell", + "file": "endpoint/getadcomputer_with_powershell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "getadcomputer_with_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getadcomputer_with_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "GetAdComputer with PowerShell Script Block", + "id": "a9a1da02-8e27-4bf7-a348-f4389c9da487", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-01", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-AdGroup` commandlet. The `Get-AdGroup` commandlet is used to return a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-AdComputer*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getadcomputer_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-adgroup?view=windowsserver2019-ps" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GetAdComputer with PowerShell Script Block", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1018" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Leafminer", + "Naikon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1018" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1018" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "GetAdComputer with PowerShell Script Block Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "GetAdComputer with PowerShell Script Block", + "file": "endpoint/getadcomputer_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "wineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "getadcomputer_with_powershell_script_block_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getadcomputer_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "GetAdGroup with PowerShell", + "id": "872e3063-0fc4-4e68-b2f3-f2b99184a708", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-25", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The `Get-AdGroup` commandlnet is used to return a list of all groups available in a Windows Domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-AdGroup*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getadgroup_with_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-adgroup?view=windowsserver2019-ps" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GetAdGroup with PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "TA505" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "GetAdGroup with PowerShell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "GetAdGroup with PowerShell", + "file": "endpoint/getadgroup_with_powershell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "getadgroup_with_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getadgroup_with_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "GetAdGroup with PowerShell Script Block", + "id": "e4c73d68-794b-468d-b4d0-dac1772bbae7", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-25", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-AdGroup` commandlet. The `Get-AdGroup` commandlet is used to return a list of all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-ADGroup*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getadgroup_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-adgroup?view=windowsserver2019-ps" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GetAdGroup with PowerShell Script Block", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "TA505" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "GetAdGroup with PowerShell Script Block Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "GetAdGroup with PowerShell Script Block", + "file": "endpoint/getadgroup_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "wineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "getadgroup_with_powershell_script_block_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getadgroup_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "GetCurrent User with PowerShell", + "id": "7eb9c3d5-c98c-4088-acc5-8240bad15379", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-13", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powerhsell.exe` with command-line arguments that execute the `GetCurrent` method of the WindowsIdentity .NET class. This method returns an object that represents the current Windows user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity* OR Processes.process=*GetCurrent()*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getcurrent_user_with_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GetCurrent User with PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "System user discovery on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1033" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1033", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1033" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1033" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "GetCurrent User with PowerShell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "GetCurrent User with PowerShell", + "file": "endpoint/getcurrent_user_with_powershell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "getcurrent_user_with_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getcurrent_user_with_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "GetCurrent User with PowerShell Script Block", + "id": "80879283-c30f-44f7-8471-d1381f6d437a", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-13", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `GetCurrent` method of the WindowsIdentity .NET class. This method returns an object that represents the current Windows user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*[System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]*\" AND Message = \"*GetCurrent()*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getcurrent_user_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.security.principal.windowsidentity.getcurrent?view=net-5.0" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GetCurrent User with PowerShell Script Block", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "System user discovery on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1033" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Path", + "Message", + "OpCode", + "ComputerName", + "User", + "EventCode" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1033", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1033" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1033" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "GetCurrent User with PowerShell Script Block Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "GetCurrent User with PowerShell Script Block", + "file": "endpoint/getcurrent_user_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "wineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "getcurrent_user_with_powershell_script_block_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getcurrent_user_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "GetDomainComputer with PowerShell", + "id": "ed550c19-712e-43f6-bd19-6f58f61b3a5e", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-07", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. `Get-DomainComputer` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-DomainComputer*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use PowerView for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GetDomainComputer with PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1018" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 24, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Leafminer", + "Naikon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1018" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 24 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1018" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "GetDomainComputer with PowerShell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "GetDomainComputer with PowerShell", + "file": "endpoint/getdomaincomputer_with_powershell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getdomaincomputer_with_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "GetDomainComputer with PowerShell Script Block", + "id": "f64da023-b988-4775-8d57-38e512beb56e", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-02", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainComputer` commandlet. `GetDomainComputer` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerView to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-DomainComputer*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use PowerView for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", + "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainComputer/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GetDomainComputer with PowerShell Script Block", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Remote system discovery with PowerView on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1018" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 24, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Leafminer", + "Naikon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1018" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 24 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1018" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "GetDomainComputer with PowerShell Script Block Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "GetDomainComputer with PowerShell Script Block", + "file": "endpoint/getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "wineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_script_block_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "GetDomainController with PowerShell", + "id": "868ee0e4-52ab-484a-833a-6d85b7c028d0", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-07", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. `Get-DomainController` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-DomainController*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use PowerView for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", + "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainController/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GetDomainController with PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Remote system discovery using PowerView on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1018" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 24, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Leafminer", + "Naikon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1018" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 24 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1018" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "GetDomainController with PowerShell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "GetDomainController with PowerShell", + "file": "endpoint/getdomaincontroller_with_powershell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getdomaincontroller_with_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "GetDomainController with PowerShell Script Block", + "id": "676b600a-a94d-4951-b346-11329431e6c1", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-02", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainController` commandlet. `Get-DomainController` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerView to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-DomainController*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", + "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainController/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GetDomainController with PowerShell Script Block", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Remote system discovery with PowerView on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1018" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 24, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Leafminer", + "Naikon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1018" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 24 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1018" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "GetDomainController with PowerShell Script Block Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "GetDomainController with PowerShell Script Block", + "file": "endpoint/getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "wineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_script_block_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "GetDomainGroup with PowerShell", + "id": "93c94be3-bead-4a60-860f-77ca3fe59903", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-25", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. `Get-DomainGroup` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-DomainGroup*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getdomaingroup_with_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", + "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainGroup/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GetDomainGroup with PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Domain group discovery with PowerView on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "TA505" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "GetDomainGroup with PowerShell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "GetDomainGroup with PowerShell", + "file": "endpoint/getdomaingroup_with_powershell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "getdomaingroup_with_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getdomaingroup_with_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "GetDomainGroup with PowerShell Script Block", + "id": "09725404-a44f-4ed3-9efa-8ed5d69e4c53", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-26", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainGroup` commandlet. `Get-DomainGroup` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. As the name suggests, `Get-DomainGroup` is used to query domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this function to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-DomainGroup*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getdomaingroup_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerView functions for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", + "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainGroup/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GetDomainGroup with PowerShell Script Block", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration using PowerView on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "TA505" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "GetDomainGroup with PowerShell Script Block Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "GetDomainGroup with PowerShell Script Block", + "file": "endpoint/getdomaingroup_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "wineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "getdomaingroup_with_powershell_script_block_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getdomaingroup_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "GetLocalUser with PowerShell", + "id": "85fae8fa-0427-11ec-8b78-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-23", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for local users. The `Get-LocalUser` commandlet is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-LocalUser*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getlocaluser_with_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GetLocalUser with PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Local user discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1087", + "T1087.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "Chimera", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Poseidon Group", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "admin@338" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1087", + "T1087.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1087", + "T1087.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "GetLocalUser with PowerShell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "GetLocalUser with PowerShell", + "file": "endpoint/getlocaluser_with_powershell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "getlocaluser_with_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getlocaluser_with_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block", + "id": "2e891cbe-0426-11ec-9c9c-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-23", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-LocalUser` commandlet. The `Get-LocalUser` commandlet is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-LocalUser*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getlocaluser_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Local user discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1087", + "T1087.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "Chimera", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Poseidon Group", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "admin@338" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1087", + "T1087.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1087", + "T1087.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block", + "file": "endpoint/getlocaluser_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "wineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "getlocaluser_with_powershell_script_block_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getlocaluser_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell", + "id": "e02af35c-1de5-4afe-b4be-f45aba57272b", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-25", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. The `Get-NetTcpConnection` commandlet lists the current TCP connections. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-NetTcpConnection*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/nettcpip/get-nettcpconnection?view=windowsserver2019-ps" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1049/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1049" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1049", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Andariel", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "GALLIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1049" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1049" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell", + "file": "endpoint/getnettcpconnection_with_powershell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1049/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getnettcpconnection_with_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell Script Block", + "id": "091712ff-b02a-4d43-82ed-34765515d95d", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-10", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-NetTcpconnection ` commandlet. This commandlet is used to return a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-NetTcpconnection*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/nettcpip/get-nettcpconnection?view=windowsserver2019-ps" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell Script Block", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1049/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1049" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1049", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Andariel", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "GALLIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1049" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1049" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell Script Block Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell Script Block", + "file": "endpoint/getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1049/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "wineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_script_block_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell", + "id": "7141122c-3bc2-4aaa-ab3b-7a85a0bbefc3", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-07", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `DS_Computer` parameter can be used to return a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI in this case, using PowerShell, to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-WmiObject* AND Processes.process=\"*namespace root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*\" AND Processes.process=\"*class ds_computer*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration using WMI on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1018" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 21, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Leafminer", + "Naikon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1018" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 21 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1018" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell", + "file": "endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell Script Block", + "id": "29b99201-723c-4118-847a-db2b3d3fb8ea", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-01", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet. The `DS_Computer` class parameter leverages WMI to query for all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message=*Get-WmiObject* AND Message=\"*namespace root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*\" AND Message=\"*class ds_computer*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/get-wmiobject?view=powershell-5.1" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell Script Block", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1018" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Leafminer", + "Naikon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1018" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1018" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell Script Block Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell Script Block", + "file": "endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "wineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_script_block_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell", + "id": "df275a44-4527-443b-b884-7600e066e3eb", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-25", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `-class ds_group` parameter can be used to return the full list of groups in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI in this case, using PowerShell, to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-WmiObject* AND Processes.process=\"*namespace root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*\" AND Processes.process=\"*class ds_group*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/get-wmiobject?view=powershell-5.1" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "TA505" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell", + "file": "endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell Script Block", + "id": "67740bd3-1506-469c-b91d-effc322cc6e5", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-25", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet used with specific parameters . The `DS_Group` parameter leverages WMI to query for all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message=*Get-WmiObject* AND Message=\"*namespace root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*\" AND Message=\"*class ds_group*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/get-wmiobject?view=powershell-5.1" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell Script Block", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "TA505" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell Script Block Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell Script Block", + "file": "endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "wineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_script_block_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell", + "id": "22d3b118-04df-11ec-8fa3-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-24", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain users. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `-class ds_user` parameter can be used to return the full list of users in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI in this case, using PowerShell, to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"powershell*\") AND Processes.process = \"*get-wmiobject*\" AND Processes.process = \"*ds_user*\" AND Processes.process = \"*root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*\" AND Processes.process = \"*-namespace*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet/details/dsquery.htm" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1087" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_name" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1087" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1087" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell", + "file": "endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell Script Block", + "id": "fabd364e-04f3-11ec-b34b-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-24", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet. The `DS_User` class parameter leverages WMI to query for all domain users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*get-wmiobject*\" Message = \"*ds_user*\" Message = \"*-namespace*\" Message = \"*root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "he following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-blue-purple/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wmisdk/describing-the-ldap-namespace" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell Script Block", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "powershell process having commandline $Message$ for user enumeration", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1087" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1087" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1087" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell Script Block Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell Script Block", + "file": "endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_script_block_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell", + "id": "b44f6ac6-0429-11ec-87e9-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-23", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query local users. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `Win32_UserAccount` parameter is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-WmiObject* AND Processes.process=*Win32_UserAccount*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Local user discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1087", + "T1087.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "Chimera", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Poseidon Group", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "admin@338" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1087", + "T1087.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1087", + "T1087.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell", + "file": "endpoint/getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block", + "id": "640b0eda-0429-11ec-accd-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-23", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet used with specific parameters. The `Win32_UserAccount` parameter is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message=\"*Get-WmiObject*\" AND Message=\"*Win32_UserAccount*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Local user discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1087", + "T1087.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "Chimera", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Poseidon Group", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "admin@338" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1087", + "T1087.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1087", + "T1087.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block", + "file": "endpoint/getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "wineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_script_block_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_script_block.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Local Account Discovery with Net", + "id": "5d0d4830-0133-11ec-bae3-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for local users. The two arguments `user` and 'users', return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` (Processes.process=*user OR Processes.process=*users) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `local_account_discovery_with_net_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Local Account Discovery with Net", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Local user discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1087", + "T1087.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "Chimera", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Poseidon Group", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "admin@338" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1087", + "T1087.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1087", + "T1087.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Local Account Discovery with Net Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Local Account Discovery with Net", + "file": "endpoint/local_account_discovery_with_net.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_net", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "local_account_discovery_with_net_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/local_account_discovery_with_net.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Local Account Discovery With Wmic", + "id": "4902d7aa-0134-11ec-9d65-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for local users. The argument `useraccount` is used to leverage WMI to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` (Processes.process=*useraccount*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `local_account_discovery_with_wmic_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Local Account Discovery With Wmic", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Local user discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1087", + "T1087.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "Chimera", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Poseidon Group", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "admin@338" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1087", + "T1087.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1087", + "T1087.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Local Account Discovery With Wmic Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Local Account Discovery With Wmic", + "file": "endpoint/local_account_discovery_with_wmic.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_wmic", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "local_account_discovery_with_wmic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/local_account_discovery_with_wmic.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Net Localgroup Discovery", + "id": "54f5201e-155b-11ec-a6e2-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-14", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following hunting analytic will identify the use of localgroup discovery using `net localgroup`. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=net.exe OR Processes.process_name=net1.exe (Processes.process=\"*localgroup*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `net_localgroup_discovery_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present. Tune as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Net Localgroup Discovery", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery", + "Windows Discovery Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Local group discovery on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "TA505" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Chimera", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "admin@338" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery", + "Windows Discovery Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Net Localgroup Discovery Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Net Localgroup Discovery", + "file": "endpoint/net_localgroup_discovery.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "net_localgroup_discovery_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/net_localgroup_discovery.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Network Connection Discovery With Arp", + "id": "ae008c0f-83bd-4ed4-9350-98d4328e15d2", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-10", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `arp.exe` utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use arp.exe for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"arp.exe\") (Processes.process=*-a*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `network_connection_discovery_with_arp_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Network Connection Discovery With Arp", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1049/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1049" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1049", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Andariel", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "GALLIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1049" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1049" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Network Connection Discovery With Arp Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Network Connection Discovery With Arp", + "file": "endpoint/network_connection_discovery_arp.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1049/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "network_connection_discovery_with_arp_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/network_connection_discovery_arp.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Network Connection Discovery With Net", + "id": "640337e5-6e41-4b7f-af06-9d9eab5e1e2d", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-10", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use net.exe for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\") (Processes.process=*use*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `network_connection_discovery_with_net_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Network Connection Discovery With Net", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1049/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1049" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1049", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Andariel", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "GALLIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1049" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1049" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Network Connection Discovery With Net Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Network Connection Discovery With Net", + "file": "endpoint/network_connection_discovery_net.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1049/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "network_connection_discovery_with_net_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/network_connection_discovery_net.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Network Connection Discovery With Netstat", + "id": "2cf5cc25-f39a-436d-a790-4857e5995ede", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-10", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `netstat.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use netstat.exe for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"netstat.exe\") (Processes.process=*-a*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `network_connection_discovery_with_netstat_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Network Connection Discovery With Netstat", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1049/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1049" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1049", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Andariel", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "GALLIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1049" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1049" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Network Connection Discovery With Netstat Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Network Connection Discovery With Netstat", + "file": "endpoint/network_connection_discovery_netstat.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1049/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "network_connection_discovery_with_netstat_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/network_connection_discovery_netstat.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Network Discovery Using Route Windows App", + "id": "dd83407e-439f-11ec-ab8e-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-12", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic look for a spawned process of route.exe windows application. Adversaries and red teams alike abuse this application the recon or do a network discovery on a target host. but one possible false positive might be an automated tool used by a system administator or a powershell script in amazon ec2 config services.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_route` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `network_discovery_using_route_windows_app_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated host discovery application that may generate false positives or an amazon ec2 script that uses this application. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/ad4c3cda-41f2-4401-8dba-56cc2d245488/#" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Network Discovery Using Route Windows App", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/vilsel/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1016", + "T1016.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 9, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1016", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Higaisa", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1016.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Internet Connection Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1016", + "T1016.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 30 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 9 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1016", + "T1016.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Network Discovery Using Route Windows App Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Network Discovery Using Route Windows App", + "file": "endpoint/network_discovery_using_route_windows_app.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/vilsel/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_route", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=route.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=route.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "network_discovery_using_route_windows_app_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/network_discovery_using_route_windows_app.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "NLTest Domain Trust Discovery", + "id": "c3e05466-5f22-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-01-25", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for the execution of `nltest.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for Domain Trust information. Two arguments `/domain trusts`, returns a list of trusted domains, and `/all_trusts`, returns all trusted domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike use NLTest.exe to enumerate the current domain to assist with further understanding where to pivot next.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=nltest.exe OR Processes.process_name!=nltest.exe) (Processes.process=*/domain_trusts* OR Processes.process=*/all_trusts*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `nltest_domain_trust_discovery_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may use nltest for troubleshooting purposes, otherwise, rarely used.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1482/T1482.md", + "https://malware.news/t/lets-learn-trickbot-implements-network-collector-module-leveraging-cmd-wmi-ldap/19104", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482/", + "https://www.owasp.org/images/4/4b/Red_Team_Operating_in_a_Modern_Environment.pdf", + "https://ss64.com/nt/nltest.html", + "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/domain-trust-discovery/", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/08/ryuks-return/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "NLTest Domain Trust Discovery", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Domain Trust Discovery", + "IcedID", + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Domain trust discovery execution on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1482" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "Chimera", + "FIN8" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1482" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Domain Trust Discovery", + "IcedID", + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1482" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "NLTest Domain Trust Discovery Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "NLTest Domain Trust Discovery", + "file": "endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "nltest_domain_trust_discovery_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Password Policy Discovery with Net", + "id": "09336538-065a-11ec-8665-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-26", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command line arguments used to obtain the domain password policy. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `net.exe` for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\") AND Processes.process = \"*accounts*\" AND Processes.process = \"*/domain*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `password_policy_discovery_with_net_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/S1ckB0y1337/Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Password Policy Discovery with Net", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1201" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_name" + ], + "risk_score": 9, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1201", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Chimera", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1201" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 30 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 9 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 9 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1201" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Password Policy Discovery with Net Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Password Policy Discovery with Net", + "file": "endpoint/password_policy_discovery_with_net.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "password_policy_discovery_with_net_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/password_policy_discovery_with_net.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "PowerShell Get LocalGroup Discovery", + "id": "b71adfcc-155b-11ec-9413-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-14", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following hunting analytic identifies the use of `get-localgroup` being used with PowerShell to identify local groups on the endpoint. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=cmd.exe) (Processes.process=\"*get-localgroup*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present. Tune as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "PowerShell Get LocalGroup Discovery", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Local group discovery on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "TA505" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Chimera", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "admin@338" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "PowerShell Get LocalGroup Discovery Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "PowerShell Get LocalGroup Discovery", + "file": "endpoint/powershell_get_localgroup_discovery.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_get_localgroup_discovery.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Powershell Get LocalGroup Discovery with Script Block Logging", + "id": "d7c6ad22-155c-11ec-bb64-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-14", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies PowerShell cmdlet - `get-localgroup` being ran. Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*get-localgroup*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message OpCode ComputerName User EventCode| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_with_script_block_logging_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present. Tune as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/powershell-detections-threat-research-release-august-2021.html", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.md", + "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell", + "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", + "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Powershell Get LocalGroup Discovery with Script Block Logging", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Local group discovery on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "TA505" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Chimera", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "admin@338" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Powershell Get LocalGroup Discovery with Script Block Logging Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Powershell Get LocalGroup Discovery with Script Block Logging", + "file": "endpoint/powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_with_script_block_logging.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "wineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_with_script_block_logging_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_with_script_block_logging.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Remote System Discovery with Adsisearcher", + "id": "70803451-0047-4e12-9d63-77fa7eb8649c", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-01", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator being used to query Active Directory for domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `[Adsisearcher]` to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*[adsisearcher]*\" AND Message = \"*objectclass=computer*\" AND Message = \"*findAll()*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `remote_system_discovery_with_adsisearcher_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use Adsisearcher for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", + "https://devblogs.microsoft.com/scripting/use-the-powershell-adsisearcher-type-accelerator-to-search-active-directory/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Remote System Discovery with Adsisearcher", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1018" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Leafminer", + "Naikon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1018" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1018" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Remote System Discovery with Adsisearcher Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Remote System Discovery with Adsisearcher", + "file": "endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_adsisearcher.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "wineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "remote_system_discovery_with_adsisearcher_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_adsisearcher.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Remote System Discovery with Dsquery", + "id": "9fb562f4-42f8-4139-8e11-a82edf7ed718", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-31", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `dsquery.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The `computer` argument returns a list of all computers registered in the domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike engage in remote system discovery for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"dsquery.exe\") (Processes.process=\"*computer*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_system_discovery_with_dsquery_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/cc732952(v=ws.11)" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Remote System Discovery with Dsquery", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1018" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Leafminer", + "Naikon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1018" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1018" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Remote System Discovery with Dsquery Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Remote System Discovery with Dsquery", + "file": "endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_dsquery.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "remote_system_discovery_with_dsquery_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_dsquery.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Remote System Discovery with Net", + "id": "9df16706-04a2-41e2-bbfe-9b38b34409d3", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-30", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The argument `domain computers /domain` returns a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\") (Processes.process=\"*domain computers*\" AND Processes.process=*/do*) OR (Processes.process=\"*view*\" AND Processes.process=*/do*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_system_discovery_with_net_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Remote System Discovery with Net", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1018" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Leafminer", + "Naikon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1018" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1018" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Remote System Discovery with Net Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Remote System Discovery with Net", + "file": "endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_net.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "remote_system_discovery_with_net_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_net.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Remote System Discovery with Wmic", + "id": "d82eced3-b1dc-42ab-859e-a2fc98827359", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-01", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The arguments utilized in this command return a list of all the systems registered in the domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI and wmic.exe to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"wmic.exe\") (Processes.process=*/NAMESPACE:\\\\\\\\root\\\\directory\\\\ldap* AND Processes.process=*ds_computer* AND Processes.process=\"*GET ds_samaccountname*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_system_discovery_with_wmic_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wmisdk/wmic" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Remote System Discovery with Wmic", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1018" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Leafminer", + "Naikon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1018" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1018" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Remote System Discovery with Wmic Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Remote System Discovery with Wmic", + "file": "endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_wmic.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "remote_system_discovery_with_wmic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_wmic.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell", + "id": "13243068-2d38-11ec-8908-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-10-14", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies `powershell.exe` usage, using Script Block Logging EventCode 4104, related to querying the domain for Service Principle Names. typically, this is a precursor activity related to kerberoasting or the silver ticket attack. \\\nWhat is a ServicePrincipleName? \\\nA service principal name (SPN) is a unique identifier of a service instance. SPNs are used by Kerberos authentication to associate a service instance with a service logon account. This allows a client application to request that the service authenticate an account even if the client does not have the account name.\\\nThe following analytic identifies the use of KerberosRequestorSecurityToken class within the script block. Using .NET System.IdentityModel.Tokens.KerberosRequestorSecurityToken class in PowerShell is the equivelant of using setspn.exe. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes for further suspicious activity.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message=\"*KerberosRequestorSecurityToken*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message OpCode ComputerName User EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/ad/service-principal-names", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.identitymodel.tokens.kerberosrequestorsecuritytoken?view=netframework-4.8", + "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/t1208-kerberoasting", + "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/setspn.exe-5C184D581524245DAD7A0A02B51FD2C2.html", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/", + "https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/717.service-principal-names-spn-setspn-syntax.aspx", + "https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz/", + "https://blog.zsec.uk/paving-2-da-wholeset/", + "https://msitpros.com/?p=3113", + "https://adsecurity.org/?p=3466", + "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", + "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery", + "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/atomic_red_team/windows-powershell_kerberos.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to identify service principle names.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1558.003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "FIN7", + "Operation Wocao", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1558.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery", + "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1558.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell", + "file": "endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell_kerberos.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/atomic_red_team/windows-powershell_kerberos.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "wineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN", + "id": "ae8b3efc-2d2e-11ec-8b57-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-10-14", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies `setspn.exe` usage related to querying the domain for Service Principle Names. typically, this is a precursor activity related to kerberoasting or the silver ticket attack. \\\nWhat is a ServicePrincipleName? \\\nA service principal name (SPN) is a unique identifier of a service instance. SPNs are used by Kerberos authentication to associate a service instance with a service logon account. This allows a client application to request that the service authenticate an account even if the client does not have the account name.\\\nExample usage includes the following \\\n1. setspn -T offense -Q */* 1. setspn -T attackrange.local -F -Q MSSQLSvc/* 1. setspn -Q */* > allspns.txt 1. setspn -q \\\nValues \\\n1. -F = perform queries at the forest, rather than domain level 1. -T = perform query on the specified domain or forest (when -F is also used) 1. -Q = query for existence of SPN \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes for further suspicious activity.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_setspn` (Processes.process=\"*-t*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-f*\") OR (Processes.process=\"*-q*\" AND Processes.process=\"**/**\") OR (Processes.process=\"*-q*\") OR (Processes.process=\"*-s*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives may be caused by Administrators resetting SPNs or querying for SPNs. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/ad/service-principal-names", + "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/t1208-kerberoasting", + "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/setspn.exe-5C184D581524245DAD7A0A02B51FD2C2.html", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/", + "https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/717.service-principal-names-spn-setspn-syntax.aspx", + "https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz/", + "https://blog.zsec.uk/paving-2-da-wholeset/", + "https://msitpros.com/?p=3113", + "https://adsecurity.org/?p=3466" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery", + "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_setspn.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to identify service principle names.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1558.003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "FIN7", + "Operation Wocao", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1558.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery", + "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1558.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN", + "file": "endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon_setspn.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_setspn.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_setspn", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=setspn.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=setspn.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "System User Discovery With Query", + "id": "ad03bfcf-8a91-4bc2-a500-112993deba87", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-13", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `query.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover the logged user. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage `query.exe` to identify system users on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"query.exe\") (Processes.process=*user*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `system_user_discovery_with_query_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "System User Discovery With Query", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "System user discovery on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1033" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1033", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1033" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1033" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "System User Discovery With Query Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "System User Discovery With Query", + "file": "endpoint/system_user_discovery_with_query.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "system_user_discovery_with_query_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/system_user_discovery_with_query.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "System User Discovery With Whoami", + "id": "894fc43e-6f50-47d5-a68b-ee9ee23e18f4", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-13", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `whoami.exe` without any arguments. This windows native binary prints out the current logged user. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage `whoami.exe` to identify system users on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"whoami.exe\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `system_user_discovery_with_whoami_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "System User Discovery With Whoami", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "System user discovery on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1033" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1033", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1033" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1033" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "System User Discovery With Whoami Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "System User Discovery With Whoami", + "file": "endpoint/system_user_discovery_with_whoami.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "system_user_discovery_with_whoami_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/system_user_discovery_with_whoami.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell", + "id": "0cdf318b-a0dd-47d7-b257-c621c0247de8", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-13", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments that leverage PowerShell environment variables to identify the current logged user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=\"*$env:UserName*\" OR Processes.process=\"*[System.Environment]::UserName*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "System user discovery on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1033" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1033", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1033" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1033" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell", + "file": "endpoint/user_discocvery_with_env_vars_powershell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/user_discocvery_with_env_vars_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell Script Block", + "id": "77f41d9e-b8be-47e3-ab35-5776f5ec1d20", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-13", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the use of PowerShell environment variables to identify the current logged user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*$env:UserName*\" OR Message = \"*[System.Environment]::UserName*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_script_block_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell Script Block", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "System user discovery on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1033" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Path", + "Message", + "OpCode", + "ComputerName", + "User", + "EventCode" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1033", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1033" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1033" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell Script Block Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell Script Block", + "file": "endpoint/user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_script_block.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "wineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_script_block_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_script_block.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Wmic Group Discovery", + "id": "83317b08-155b-11ec-8e00-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-14", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following hunting analytic identifies the use of `wmic.exe` enumerating local groups on the endpoint. \\\nTypically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wmic.exe (Processes.process=\"*group get name*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmic_group_discovery_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Wmic Group Discovery", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Local group discovery on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "TA505" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Chimera", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "admin@338" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Wmic Group Discovery Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Wmic Group Discovery", + "file": "endpoint/wmic_group_discovery.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "wmic_group_discovery_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wmic_group_discovery.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [] + }, + { + "name": "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", + "id": "38b8cf16-8461-11ec-ade1-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-02", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "description": "Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Kerberos based attacks within with Active Directory environments.", + "narrative": "Kerberos, initially named after Cerberus, the three-headed dog in Greek mythology, is a network authentication protocol that allows computers and users to prove their identity through a trusted third-party. This trusted third-party issues Kerberos tickets using symmetric encryption to allow users access to services and network resources based on their privilege level. Kerberos is the default authentication protocol used on Windows Active Directory networks since the introduction of Windows Server 2003. With Kerberos being the backbone of Windows authentication, it is commonly abused by adversaries across the different phases of a breach including initial access, privilege escalation, defense evasion, credential access, lateral movement, etc.\\ This Analytic Story groups detection use cases in which the Kerberos protocol is abused. Defenders can leverage these analytics to detect and hunt for adversaries engaging in Kerberos based attacks.", + "references": [ + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kerberos_(protocol)", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-kile/2a32282e-dd48-4ad9-a542-609804b02cc9", + "https://m0chan.github.io/2019/07/31/How-To-Attack-Kerberos-101.html", + "https://stealthbits.com/blog/cracking-active-directory-passwords-with-as-rep-roasting/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/004/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", + "analytic_story": "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics", + "Account Compromise", + "Lateral Movement", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1558", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "FIN7", + "Operation Wocao", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1550", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1550.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Ticket", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "Chimera", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leafminer", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silent Librarian" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN5", + "Fox Kitten", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access", + "Defense Evasion", + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser - Rule", + "ESCU - Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With PowerView - Rule", + "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", + "ESCU - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled in UserAccountControl - Rule", + "ESCU - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled with PowerShell - Rule", + "ESCU - Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters - Rule", + "ESCU - Multiple Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule", + "ESCU - Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule", + "ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule", + "ESCU - Rubeus Command Line Parameters - Rule", + "ESCU - Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access - Rule", + "ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell - Rule", + "ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN - Rule", + "ESCU - Unusual Number of Kerberos Service Tickets Requested - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Mauricio Velazco", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser", + "id": "114c6bfe-9406-11ec-bcce-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-22", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-ADUser` commandlet with specific parameters. `Get-ADUser` is part of the Active Directory PowerShell module used to manage Windows Active Directory networks. As the name suggests, `Get-ADUser` is used to query for domain users. With the appropiate parameters, Get-ADUser allows adversaries to discover domain accounts with Kerberos Pre Authentication disabled.\\ Red Teams and adversaries alike use may abuse Get-ADUSer to enumerate these accounts and attempt to crack their passwords offline.", + "search": " `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-ADUser*\" AND Message=\"*4194304*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `disabled_kerberos_pre_authentication_discovery_with_get_aduser_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use search for accounts with Kerberos Pre Authentication disabled for legitimate purposes.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/004/", + "https://m0chan.github.io/2019/07/31/How-To-Attack-Kerberos-101.html", + "https://stealthbits.com/blog/cracking-active-directory-passwords-with-as-rep-roasting/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" + ], + "asset_type": "endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.004/getaduser/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser from $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1558", + "T1558.004" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1558", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1558", + "T1558.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 54 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1558", + "T1558.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser", + "file": "endpoint/disabled_kerberos_pre_authentication_discovery_with_get_aduser.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.004/getaduser/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "wineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "disabled_kerberos_pre_authentication_discovery_with_get_aduser_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disabled_kerberos_pre_authentication_discovery_with_get_aduser.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With PowerView", + "id": "b0b34e2c-90de-11ec-baeb-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-18", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainUser` commandlet with specific parameters. `Get-DomainUser` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows Active Directory networks. As the name suggests, `Get-DomainUser` is used to identify domain users and combining it with `-PreauthNotRequired` allows adversaries to discover domain accounts with Kerberos Pre Authentication disabled.\\ Red Teams and adversaries alike use may leverage PowerView to enumerate these accounts and attempt to crack their passwords offline.", + "search": " `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-DomainUser*\" AND Message=\"*PreauthNotRequired*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `disabled_kerberos_pre_authentication_discovery_with_powerview_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use PowerView for troubleshooting", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/004/", + "https://m0chan.github.io/2019/07/31/How-To-Attack-Kerberos-101.html", + "https://stealthbits.com/blog/cracking-active-directory-passwords-with-as-rep-roasting/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With PowerView", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" + ], + "asset_type": "endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.004/powerview/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With PowerView from $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1558", + "T1558.004" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1558", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1558", + "T1558.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 54 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1558", + "T1558.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With PowerView Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With PowerView", + "file": "endpoint/disabled_kerberos_pre_authentication_discovery_with_powerview.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.004/powerview/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "wineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "disabled_kerberos_pre_authentication_discovery_with_powerview_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disabled_kerberos_pre_authentication_discovery_with_powerview.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption", + "id": "5cc67381-44fa-4111-8a37-7a230943f027", + "version": 4, + "date": "2022-02-09", + "author": "Jose Hernandez, Patrick Bareiss, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic leverages Kerberos Event 4769, A Kerberos service ticket was requested, to identify a potential kerberoasting attack against Active Directory networks. Kerberoasting allows an adversary to request kerberos tickets for domain accounts typically used as service accounts and attempt to crack them offline allowing them to obtain privileged access to the domain. This analytic looks for a specific combination of the Ticket_Options field based on common kerberoasting tools. Defenders should be aware that it may be possible for a Kerberoast attack to use different Ticket_Options.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769 Service_Name!=\"*$\" (Ticket_Options=0x40810000 OR Ticket_Options=0x40800000 OR Ticket_Options=0x40810010) Ticket_Encryption_Type=0x17 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, service, service_id, Ticket_Encryption_Type, Ticket_Options | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", + "known_false_positives": "Older systems that support kerberos RC4 by default like NetApp may generate false positives. Filter as needed", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1208/T1208.md", + "https://www.trimarcsecurity.com/post/trimarcresearch-detecting-kerberoasting-activity" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/rubeus/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Potential kerberoasting attack via service principal name requests detected on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1558", + "T1558.003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Ticket_Options", + "Ticket_Encryption_Type", + "dest", + "service", + "service_id" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1558", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "FIN7", + "Operation Wocao", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1558", + "T1558.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 72 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1558", + "T1558.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption", + "file": "endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/rubeus/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled in UserAccountControl", + "id": "0cb847ee-9423-11ec-b2df-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-22", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic leverages Windows Security Event 4738, `A user account was changed`, to identify a change performed on a domain user object that disables Kerberos Pre-Authentication. Disabling the Pre Authentication flag in the UserAccountControl property allows an adversary to easily perform a brute force attack against the user's password offline leveraging the ASP REP Roasting technique. Red Teams and adversaries alike who have obtained privileges in an Active Directory network may use this technique as a backdoor or a way to escalate privileges.", + "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4738 MSADChangedAttributes=\"*Don't Require Preauth' - Enabled*\" | table EventCode, Account_Name, Security_ID, MSADChangedAttributes | `kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_in_useraccountcontrol_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `User Account Management` within `Account Management` needs to be enabled.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/identity/useraccountcontrol-manipulate-account-properties", + "https://m0chan.github.io/2019/07/31/How-To-Attack-Kerberos-101.html", + "https://stealthbits.com/blog/cracking-active-directory-passwords-with-as-rep-roasting/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled in UserAccountControl", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" + ], + "asset_type": "endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.004/powershell/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Kerberos Pre Authentication was Disabled for $Account_Name$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1558", + "T1558.004" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Account_Name", + "Security_ID", + "MSADChangedAttributes" + ], + "risk_score": 45, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1558", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1558", + "T1558.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 45 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1558", + "T1558.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled in UserAccountControl Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled in UserAccountControl", + "file": "endpoint/kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_in_useraccountcontrol.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.004/powershell/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_in_useraccountcontrol_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_in_useraccountcontrol.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled with PowerShell", + "id": "59b51620-94c9-11ec-b3d5-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-23", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Set-ADAccountControl` commandlet with specific parameters. `Set-ADAccountControl` is part of the Active Directory PowerShell module used to manage Windows Active Directory networks. As the name suggests, `Set-ADAccountControl` is used to modify User Account Control values for an Active Directory domain account. With the appropiate parameters, Set-ADAccountControl allows adversaries to disable Kerberos Pre-Authentication for an account to to easily perform a brute force attack against the user's password offline leveraging the ASP REP Roasting technique. Red Teams and adversaries alike who have obtained privileges in an Active Directory network may use this technique as a backdoor or a way to escalate privileges.", + "search": " `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Set-ADAccountControl*\" AND Message=\"*DoesNotRequirePreAuth:$true*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_with_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, Administrators may need to set this flag for legitimate purposes.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/identity/useraccountcontrol-manipulate-account-properties", + "https://m0chan.github.io/2019/07/31/How-To-Attack-Kerberos-101.html", + "https://stealthbits.com/blog/cracking-active-directory-passwords-with-as-rep-roasting/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled with PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" + ], + "asset_type": "endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.004/powershell/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Kerberos Pre Authentication was Disabled using PowerShell on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1558", + "T1558.004" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 45, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1558", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1558", + "T1558.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 45 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1558", + "T1558.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled with PowerShell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled with PowerShell", + "file": "endpoint/kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_with_powershell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.004/powershell/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "wineventlog", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_with_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_with_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters", + "id": "13bbd574-83ac-11ec-99d4-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-01", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic looks for the use of Mimikatz command line parameters leveraged to execute pass the ticket attacks. Red teams and adversaries alike may use the pass the ticket technique using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Defenders should be aware that adversaries may customize the source code of Mimikatz and modify the command line parameters. This would effectively bypass this analytic.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process = \"*sekurlsa::tickets /export*\" OR Processes.process = \"*kerberos::ptt*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mimikatz_passtheticket_commandline_parameters_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "Although highly unlikely, legitimate applications may use the same command line parameters as Mimikatz.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" + ], + "asset_type": "endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1550.003/mimikatz/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Mimikatz command line parameters for pass the ticket attacks were used on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1550", + "T1550.003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_name" + ], + "risk_score": 36, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1550", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1550.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Ticket", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1550", + "T1550.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 36 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 36 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1550", + "T1550.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters", + "file": "endpoint/mimikatz_passtheticket_commandline_parameters.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1550.003/mimikatz/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "mimikatz_passtheticket_commandline_parameters_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/mimikatz_passtheticket_commandline_parameters.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Multiple Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos", + "id": "98f22d82-9d62-11eb-9fcf-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-14", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple disabled domain users using the Kerberos protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using Kerberos to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. As attackers progress in a breach, mistakes will be made. In certain scenarios, adversaries may execute a password spraying attack against disabled users. Event 4768 is generated every time the Key Distribution Center issues a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). Failure code `0x12` stands for `clients credentials have been revoked` (account disabled, expired or locked out).\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\\nThis detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\\\nThe analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source ip and attempted user accounts.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 Account_Name!=\"*$\" Result_Code=0x12 | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Account_Name) AS unique_accounts values(Account_Name) as tried_accounts by _time, Client_Address | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Client_Address | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_disabled_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", + "known_false_positives": "A host failing to authenticate with multiple disabled domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, multi-user systems missconfigured systems.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Multiple Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Password Spraying", + "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_disabled_users_kerberos/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Potential Kerberos based password spraying attack from $Client_Address$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1110.003", + "T1110" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Client_Address", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Result_Code", + "Account_Name", + "Client_Address" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "Chimera", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leafminer", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silent Librarian" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN5", + "Fox Kitten", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1110.003", + "T1110" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Password Spraying", + "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Client_Address", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Client_Address", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1110.003", + "T1110" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Multiple Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Multiple Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos", + "file": "endpoint/multiple_disabled_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_disabled_users_kerberos/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "multiple_disabled_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/multiple_disabled_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos", + "id": "001266a6-9d5b-11eb-829b-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-14", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple invalid domain users using the Kerberos protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using Kerberos to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. As attackers progress in a breach, mistakes will be made. In certain scenarios, adversaries may execute a password spraying attack using an invalid list of users. Event 4768 is generated every time the Key Distribution Center issues a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). Failure code 0x6 stands for `client not found in Kerberos database` (the attempted user is not a valid domain user).\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\\nThis detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\\\nThe analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source ip and attempted user accounts.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 Result_Code=0x6 Account_Name!=\"*$\" | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Account_Name) AS unique_accounts values(Account_Name) as tried_accounts by _time, Client_Address | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Client_Address | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", + "known_false_positives": "A host failing to authenticate with multiple invalid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, multi-user systems and missconfigured systems.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Password Spraying", + "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_invalid_users_kerberos/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Potential Kerberos based password spraying attack from $Client_Address$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1110.003", + "T1110" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Client_Address", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Result_Code", + "Account_Name", + "Client_Address" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "Chimera", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leafminer", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silent Librarian" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN5", + "Fox Kitten", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1110.003", + "T1110" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Password Spraying", + "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Client_Address", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Client_Address", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1110.003", + "T1110" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos", + "file": "endpoint/multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_invalid_users_kerberos/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos", + "id": "3a91a212-98a9-11eb-b86a-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-08", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple valid users using the Kerberos protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using Kerberos to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4771 is generated when the Key Distribution Center fails to issue a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). Failure code 0x18 stands for `wrong password provided` (the attempted user is a legitimate domain user).\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\\nThis detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\\\nThe analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source ip and attempted user accounts.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4771 Failure_Code=0x18 Account_Name!=\"*$\" | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Account_Name) AS unique_accounts values(Account_Name) as tried_accounts by _time, Client_Address | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Client_Address | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", + "known_false_positives": "A host failing to authenticate with multiple valid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, missconfigured systems and multi-user systems like Citrix farms.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/dn319109(v=ws.11)", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4771" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Password Spraying", + "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_valid_users_kerberos/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Potential Kerberos based password spraying attack from $Client_Address$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1110.003", + "T1110" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Client_Address", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Result_Code", + "Account_Name", + "Client_Address" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "Chimera", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leafminer", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silent Librarian" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN5", + "Fox Kitten", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1110.003", + "T1110" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Password Spraying", + "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Client_Address", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Client_Address", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1110.003", + "T1110" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos", + "file": "endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_valid_users_kerberos/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Rubeus Command Line Parameters", + "id": "cca37478-8377-11ec-b59a-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-01", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "Rubeus is a C# toolset for raw Kerberos interaction and abuses. It is heavily adapted from Benjamin Delpys Kekeo project and Vincent LE TOUXs MakeMeEnterpriseAdmin project. This analytic looks for the use of Rubeus command line arguments utilized in common Kerberos attacks like exporting and importing tickets, forging silver and golden tickets, requesting a TGT or TGS, kerberoasting, password spraying, etc. Red teams and adversaries alike use Rubeus for Kerberos attacks within Active Directory networks. Defenders should be aware that adversaries may customize the source code of Rubeus and modify the command line parameters. This would effectively bypass this analytic.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process = \"*ptt /ticket*\" OR Processes.process = \"* monitor*\" OR Processes.process =\"* asktgt* /user:*\" OR Processes.process =\"* asktgs* /service:*\" OR Processes.process =\"* golden* /user:*\" OR Processes.process =\"* silver* /service:*\" OR Processes.process =\"* kerberoast*\" OR Processes.process =\"* asreproast*\" OR Processes.process = \"* renew* /ticket:*\" OR Processes.process = \"* brute* /password:*\" OR Processes.process = \"* brute* /passwords:*\" OR Processes.process =\"* harvest*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rubeus_command_line_parameters_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, legitimate applications may use the same command line parameters as Rubeus. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus", + "http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/from-kekeo-to-rubeus/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Rubeus Command Line Parameters", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1550.003/rubeus/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Rubeus command line parameters were used on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1550", + "T1550.003", + "T1558", + "T1558.003", + "T1558.004" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_name" + ], + "risk_score": 36, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1550", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1550.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Ticket", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1558", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "FIN7", + "Operation Wocao", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1550", + "T1550.003", + "T1558", + "T1558.003", + "T1558.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 36 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 36 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1550", + "T1550.003", + "T1558", + "T1558.003", + "T1558.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Rubeus Command Line Parameters Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Rubeus Command Line Parameters", + "file": "endpoint/rubeus_command_line_parameters.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1550.003/rubeus/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "rubeus_command_line_parameters_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/rubeus_command_line_parameters.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access", + "id": "5ed8c50a-8869-11ec-876f-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-07", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic looks for a process accessing the winlogon.exe system process. The Splunk Threat Research team identified this behavior when using the Rubeus tool to monitor for and export kerberos tickets from memory. Before being able to export tickets. Rubeus will try to escalate privileges to SYSTEM by obtaining a handle to winlogon.exe before trying to monitor for kerberos tickets. Exporting tickets from memory is typically the first step for pass the ticket attacks. Red teams and adversaries alike may use the pass the ticket technique using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Defenders should be aware that adversaries may customize the source code of Rubeus to potentially bypass this analytic.", + "search": " `sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\winlogon.exe (GrantedAccess=0x1f3fff) (SourceImage!=C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\svchost.exe AND SourceImage!=C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\lsass.exe AND SourceImage!=C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\LogonUI.exe AND SourceImage!=C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\smss.exe AND SourceImage!=C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\wbem\\\\wmiprvse.exe) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, SourceImage, SourceProcessId, TargetImage, TargetProcessId, EventCode, GrantedAccess | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rubeus_kerberos_ticket_exports_through_winlogon_access_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This search needs Sysmon Logs and a sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 10. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may obtain a handle for winlogon.exe. Filter as needed", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus", + "http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/from-kekeo-to-rubeus/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1550.003/rubeus/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Winlogon.exe was accessed by $SourceImage$ on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1550", + "T1550.003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "TargetImage", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "TargetImage", + "CallTrace", + "Computer", + "TargetProcessId", + "SourceImage", + "SourceProcessId" + ], + "risk_score": 36, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1550", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1550.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Ticket", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1550", + "T1550.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "TargetImage", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 36 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "TargetImage", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1550", + "T1550.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access", + "file": "endpoint/rubeus_kerberos_ticket_exports_through_winlogon_access.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1550.003/rubeus/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "rubeus_kerberos_ticket_exports_through_winlogon_access_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/rubeus_kerberos_ticket_exports_through_winlogon_access.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell", + "id": "13243068-2d38-11ec-8908-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-10-14", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies `powershell.exe` usage, using Script Block Logging EventCode 4104, related to querying the domain for Service Principle Names. typically, this is a precursor activity related to kerberoasting or the silver ticket attack. \\\nWhat is a ServicePrincipleName? \\\nA service principal name (SPN) is a unique identifier of a service instance. SPNs are used by Kerberos authentication to associate a service instance with a service logon account. This allows a client application to request that the service authenticate an account even if the client does not have the account name.\\\nThe following analytic identifies the use of KerberosRequestorSecurityToken class within the script block. Using .NET System.IdentityModel.Tokens.KerberosRequestorSecurityToken class in PowerShell is the equivelant of using setspn.exe. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes for further suspicious activity.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message=\"*KerberosRequestorSecurityToken*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message OpCode ComputerName User EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/ad/service-principal-names", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.identitymodel.tokens.kerberosrequestorsecuritytoken?view=netframework-4.8", + "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/t1208-kerberoasting", + "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/setspn.exe-5C184D581524245DAD7A0A02B51FD2C2.html", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/", + "https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/717.service-principal-names-spn-setspn-syntax.aspx", + "https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz/", + "https://blog.zsec.uk/paving-2-da-wholeset/", + "https://msitpros.com/?p=3113", + "https://adsecurity.org/?p=3466", + "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", + "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery", + "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/atomic_red_team/windows-powershell_kerberos.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to identify service principle names.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1558.003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "FIN7", + "Operation Wocao", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1558.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery", + "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1558.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell", + "file": "endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell_kerberos.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/atomic_red_team/windows-powershell_kerberos.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "wineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN", + "id": "ae8b3efc-2d2e-11ec-8b57-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-10-14", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies `setspn.exe` usage related to querying the domain for Service Principle Names. typically, this is a precursor activity related to kerberoasting or the silver ticket attack. \\\nWhat is a ServicePrincipleName? \\\nA service principal name (SPN) is a unique identifier of a service instance. SPNs are used by Kerberos authentication to associate a service instance with a service logon account. This allows a client application to request that the service authenticate an account even if the client does not have the account name.\\\nExample usage includes the following \\\n1. setspn -T offense -Q */* 1. setspn -T attackrange.local -F -Q MSSQLSvc/* 1. setspn -Q */* > allspns.txt 1. setspn -q \\\nValues \\\n1. -F = perform queries at the forest, rather than domain level 1. -T = perform query on the specified domain or forest (when -F is also used) 1. -Q = query for existence of SPN \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes for further suspicious activity.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_setspn` (Processes.process=\"*-t*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-f*\") OR (Processes.process=\"*-q*\" AND Processes.process=\"**/**\") OR (Processes.process=\"*-q*\") OR (Processes.process=\"*-s*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives may be caused by Administrators resetting SPNs or querying for SPNs. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/ad/service-principal-names", + "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/t1208-kerberoasting", + "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/setspn.exe-5C184D581524245DAD7A0A02B51FD2C2.html", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/", + "https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/717.service-principal-names-spn-setspn-syntax.aspx", + "https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz/", + "https://blog.zsec.uk/paving-2-da-wholeset/", + "https://msitpros.com/?p=3113", + "https://adsecurity.org/?p=3466" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery", + "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_setspn.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to identify service principle names.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1558.003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "FIN7", + "Operation Wocao", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1558.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery", + "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1558.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN", + "file": "endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon_setspn.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_setspn.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_setspn", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=setspn.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=setspn.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Unusual Number of Kerberos Service Tickets Requested", + "id": "eb3e6702-8936-11ec-98fe-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-08", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following hunting analytic leverages Kerberos Event 4769, A Kerberos service ticket was requested, to identify a potential kerberoasting attack against Active Directory networks. Kerberoasting allows an adversary to request kerberos tickets for domain accounts typically used as service accounts and attempt to crack them offline allowing them to obtain privileged access to the domain.\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number service ticket requests. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field.", + "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769 Service_Name!=\"*$\" Ticket_Encryption_Type=0x17 | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Service_Name) AS unique_services values(Service_Name) as requested_services by _time, Client_Address | eventstats avg(unique_services) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_services) as comp_std by Client_Address | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_services > 2 and unique_services >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `unusual_number_of_kerberos_service_tickets_requested_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", + "known_false_positives": "An single endpoint requesting a large number of kerberos service tickets is not common behavior. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, administration systems and missconfigured systems.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/", + "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/t1208-kerberoasting" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Unusual Number of Kerberos Service Tickets Requested", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/rubeus/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1558", + "T1558.003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Client_Address", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Ticket_Options", + "Ticket_Encryption_Type", + "dest", + "Service_Name", + "service_id", + "Client_Address" + ], + "risk_score": 36, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1558", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "FIN7", + "Operation Wocao", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1558", + "T1558.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Client_Address", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Client_Address", + "risk_score": 36 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1558", + "T1558.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Unusual Number of Kerberos Service Tickets Requested Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Unusual Number of Kerberos Service Tickets Requested", + "file": "endpoint/unusual_number_of_kerberos_service_tickets_requested.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/rubeus/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "unusual_number_of_kerberos_service_tickets_requested_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/unusual_number_of_kerberos_service_tickets_requested.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [] + }, + { + "name": "Active Directory Lateral Movement", + "id": "399d65dc-1f08-499b-a259-aad9051f38ad", + "version": 3, + "date": "2021-12-09", + "author": "David Dorsey, Mauricio Velazco Splunk", + "description": "Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how attackers move laterally within an Active Directory environment. Since lateral movement is often a necessary step in a breach, it is important for cyber defenders to deploy detection coverage.", + "narrative": "Once attackers gain a foothold within an enterprise, they will seek to expand their accesses and leverage techniques that facilitate lateral movement. Attackers will often spend quite a bit of time and effort moving laterally. Because lateral movement renders an attacker the most vulnerable to detection, it's an excellent focus for detection and investigation.\\\nIndications of lateral movement in an Active Directory network can include the abuse of system utilities (such as `psexec.exe`), unauthorized use of remote desktop services, `file/admin$` shares, WMI, PowerShell, Service Control Manager, the DCOM protocol, WinRM or the abuse of scheduled tasks. Organizations must be extra vigilant in detecting lateral movement techniques and look for suspicious activity in and around high-value strategic network assets, such as Active Directory, which are often considered the primary target or \"crown jewels\" to a persistent threat actor.\\\nAn adversary can use lateral movement for multiple purposes, including remote execution of tools, pivoting to additional systems, obtaining access to specific information or files, access to additional credentials, exfiltrating data, or delivering a secondary effect. Adversaries may use legitimate credentials alongside inherent network and operating-system functionality to remotely connect to other systems and remain under the radar of network defenders.\\\nIf there is evidence of lateral movement, it is imperative for analysts to collect evidence of the associated offending hosts. For example, an attacker might leverage host A to gain access to host B. From there, the attacker may try to move laterally to host C. In this example, the analyst should gather as much information as possible from all three hosts. \\\n It is also important to collect authentication logs for each host, to ensure that the offending accounts are well-documented. Analysts should account for all processes to ensure that the attackers did not install unauthorized software.", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/08/malware_lateral_move.html", + "http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=videos/derbycon7/t405-hunting-lateral-movement-for-fun-and-profit-mauricio-velazco" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Active Directory Lateral Movement", + "analytic_story": "Active Directory Lateral Movement", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1550", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1550.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Hash", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT32", + "Chimera", + "GALLIUM", + "Kimsuky", + "Night Dragon" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Operation Wocao", + "Orangeworm", + "Sandworm Team", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1569", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "FIN6", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Operation Wocao", + "Silence", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN7", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "PROMETHIUM", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "Chimera", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CostaRicto", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Machete", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "At (Windows)", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Threat Group-3390" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT3", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "OilRig", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Execution", + "Initial Access", + "Lateral Movement", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint", + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Exploitation", + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", + "ESCU - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule", + "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule", + "ESCU - Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell - Rule", + "ESCU - Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", + "ESCU - Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn - Rule", + "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell - Rule", + "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell Script Block - Rule", + "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell - Rule", + "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell Script Block - Rule", + "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and Winrs - Rule", + "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", + "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell - Rule", + "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell Script Block - Rule", + "ESCU - Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At - Rule", + "ESCU - Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule", + "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", + "ESCU - Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", + "ESCU - Short Lived Scheduled Task - Rule", + "ESCU - Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows Service Created With Suspicious Service Path - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows Service Created Within Public Path - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows Service Creation on Remote Endpoint - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows Service Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule", + "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", + "ESCU - Wmiprsve LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", + "ESCU - Wsmprovhost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", + "ESCU - Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name - Rule", + "ESCU - Randomly Generated Windows Service Name - Rule", + "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", + "ESCU - Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested - Rule", + "ESCU - Unusual Number of Remote Endpoint Authentication Events - Rule", + "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [ + "ESCU - Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic", + "ESCU - Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic", + "ESCU - Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop" + ], + "author_company": "Mauricio Velazco Splunk", + "author_name": "David Dorsey", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks", + "id": "f5939373-8054-40ad-8c64-cec478a22a4b", + "version": 5, + "date": "2020-10-15", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for specific authentication events from the Windows Security Event logs to detect potential attempts at using the Pass-the-Hash technique.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 (Logon_Type=3 Logon_Process=NtLmSsp WorkstationName=WORKSTATION NOT AccountName=\"ANONYMOUS LOGON\") OR (Logon_Type=9 Logon_Process=seclogo) | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode, Logon_Type, WorkstationName, user, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must ingest your Windows Security Event logs and leverage the latest TA for Windows.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate logon activity by authorized NTLM systems may be detected by this search. Please investigate as appropriate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1550.002/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "The following $EventCode$ occurred on $dest$ by $user$ with Logon Type 3, which may be indicative of the pass the hash technique.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1550", + "T1550.002" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.AT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "EventCode", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Logon_Type", + "Logon_Process", + "WorkstationName", + "user", + "dest" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "access", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1550", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1550.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Hash", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT32", + "Chimera", + "GALLIUM", + "Kimsuky", + "Night Dragon" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1550", + "T1550.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.AT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "EventCode", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "EventCode", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1550", + "T1550.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.AT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks", + "file": "endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1550.002/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag", + "id": "27c3a83d-cada-47c6-9042-67baf19d2574", + "version": 4, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for events where `PsExec.exe` is run with the `accepteula` flag in the command line. PsExec is a built-in Windows utility that enables you to execute processes on other systems. It is fully interactive for console applications. This tool is widely used for launching interactive command prompts on remote systems. Threat actors leverage this extensively for executing code on compromised systems. If an attacker is running PsExec for the first time, they will be prompted to accept the end-user license agreement (EULA), which can be passed as the argument `accepteula` within the command line.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_psexec` Processes.process=*accepteula* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators can leverage PsExec for accessing remote systems and might pass `accepteula` as an argument if they are running this tool for the first time. However, it is not likely that you'd see multiple occurrences of this event on a machine", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag", + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "HAFNIUM Group", + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ running the utility for possibly the first time.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.002" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Operation Wocao", + "Orangeworm", + "Sandworm Team", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "HAFNIUM Group", + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 35 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 35 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag", + "file": "endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_psexec", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=psexec.exe OR Processes.process_name=psexec64.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=psexec.c)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Renamed PSExec", + "id": "683e6196-b8e8-11eb-9a79-acde48001122", + "version": 3, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies renamed instances of `PsExec.exe` being utilized on an endpoint. Most instances, it is highly probable to capture `Psexec.exe` or other SysInternal utility usage with the command-line argument of `-accepteula`. During triage, validate this is the legitimate version of `PsExec` by reviewing the PE metadata. In addition, review parallel processes for further suspicious behavior.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_psexec` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_renamed_psexec_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives should be present. It is possible some third party applications may use older versions of PsExec, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1569.002/T1569.002.yaml", + "https://redcanary.com/blog/threat-hunting-psexec-lateral-movement/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Renamed PSExec", + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "HAFNIUM Group", + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Collection" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1569.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1569", + "T1569.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 27, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1569", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "FIN6", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Operation Wocao", + "Silence", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1569", + "T1569.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "HAFNIUM Group", + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Collection" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 27 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 27 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1569", + "T1569.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Renamed PSExec Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Renamed PSExec", + "file": "endpoint/detect_renamed_psexec.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1569.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_psexec", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=psexec.exe OR Processes.process_name=psexec64.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=psexec.c)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_renamed_psexec_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_renamed_psexec.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share", + "id": "f63c34fe-a435-11eb-935a-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-11-18", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies executable files (.exe or .dll) being written to Windows administrative SMB shares (Admin$, IPC$, C$). This represents suspicious behavior as its commonly used by tools like like PsExec/PaExec and others to stage service binaries before creating and starting a Windows service on remote endpoints. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse administrative shares for lateral movement and remote code execution. The Trickbot malware family also implements this behavior to try to infect other machines in the infected network.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=5145 Relative_Target_Name IN (\"*.exe\",\"*.dll\") Object_Type=File Share_Name IN (\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\C$\",\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\IPC$\",\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\admin$\") Access_Mask= \"0x2\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by EventCode Share_Name Relative_Target_Name Object_Type Access_Mask user src_port Source_Address | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 5145 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required. Also enable the object Audit access success/failure in your group policy.", + "known_false_positives": "System Administrators may use looks like PsExec for troubleshooting or administrations tasks. However, this will typically come only from certain users and certain systems that can be added to an allow list.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002/", + "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2013/03/09/psexec-demystified/", + "https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/", + "https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement", + "Trickbot", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/exe_smbshare/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "$user$ dropped or created an executable file in known sensitive SMB share. Share name=$Share_Name$, Target name=$Relative_Target_Name$, and Access mask=$Access_Mask$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Share_Name", + "Relative_Target_Name", + "Object_Type", + "Access_Mask", + "user", + "src_port", + "Source_Address" + ], + "risk_score": 70, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Operation Wocao", + "Orangeworm", + "Sandworm Team", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement", + "Trickbot", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 70 + } + ], + "playbooks": [ + { + "name": "Delete Detected Files", + "id": "fc0edc96-ff2b-48b0-9a6f-63da6783fd63", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-03-29", + "author": "Philip Royer, Splunk", + "type": "Response", + "description": "This playbook acts upon events where a file has been determined to be malicious (ie webshells being dropped on an end host). Before deleting the file, we run a \"more\" command on the file in question to extract its contents. We then run a delete on the file in question.", + "how_to_implement": "This playbook reads and then deletes files stored with artifact:*.cef.filePath from hosts stored in artifact:*.cef.destinationAddress. Windows Remote Management must be enabled on the remote computer.", + "playbook": "delete_detected_files", + "references": [], + "app_list": [ + "Windows Remote Management" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "detections": [ + "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share" + ], + "platform_tags": [], + "playbook_fields": [ + "filePath", + "destinationAddress" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk SOAR" + ], + "detection_objects": [ + { + "name": "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share", + "id": "f63c34fe-a435-11eb-935a-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-11-18", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies executable files (.exe or .dll) being written to Windows administrative SMB shares (Admin$, IPC$, C$). This represents suspicious behavior as its commonly used by tools like like PsExec/PaExec and others to stage service binaries before creating and starting a Windows service on remote endpoints. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse administrative shares for lateral movement and remote code execution. The Trickbot malware family also implements this behavior to try to infect other machines in the infected network.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=5145 Relative_Target_Name IN (\"*.exe\",\"*.dll\") Object_Type=File Share_Name IN (\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\C$\",\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\IPC$\",\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\admin$\") Access_Mask= \"0x2\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by EventCode Share_Name Relative_Target_Name Object_Type Access_Mask user src_port Source_Address | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 5145 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required. Also enable the object Audit access success/failure in your group policy.", + "known_false_positives": "System Administrators may use looks like PsExec for troubleshooting or administrations tasks. However, this will typically come only from certain users and certain systems that can be added to an allow list.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002/", + "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2013/03/09/psexec-demystified/", + "https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/", + "https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement", + "Trickbot", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/exe_smbshare/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "$user$ dropped or created an executable file in known sensitive SMB share. Share name=$Share_Name$, Target name=$Relative_Target_Name$, and Access mask=$Access_Mask$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Share_Name", + "Relative_Target_Name", + "Object_Type", + "Access_Mask", + "user", + "src_port", + "Source_Address" + ], + "risk_score": 70, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Operation Wocao", + "Orangeworm", + "Sandworm Team", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement", + "Trickbot", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 70 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share", + "file": "endpoint/executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/exe_smbshare/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ] + } + } + ], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share", + "file": "endpoint/executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/exe_smbshare/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters", + "id": "8ce07472-496f-11ec-ab3b-3e22fbd008af", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-18", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the presence of suspicious commandline parameters typically present when using Impacket tools. Impacket is a collection of python classes meant to be used with Microsoft network protocols. There are multiple scripts that leverage impacket libraries like `wmiexec.py`, `smbexec.py`, `dcomexec.py` and `atexec.py` used to execute commands on remote endpoints. By default, these scripts leverage administrative shares and hardcoded parameters that can be used as a signature to detect its use. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage Impackets tools for lateral movement and remote code execution.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process = \"*/c* \\\\\\\\127.0.0.1\\\\*\" OR Processes.process= \"*/c* 2>&1\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", + "known_false_positives": "Although uncommon, Administrators may leverage Impackets tools to start a process on remote systems for system administration or automation use cases.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005", + "https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket", + "https://vk9-sec.com/impacket-remote-code-execution-rce-on-windows-from-linux/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.003/impacket/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious command line parameters on $dest may represent a lateral movement attack with Impackets tools", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.002", + "T1021.003", + "T1047", + "T1543.003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Operation Wocao", + "Orangeworm", + "Sandworm Team", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN7", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "PROMETHIUM", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.002", + "T1021.003", + "T1047", + "T1543.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 63 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.002", + "T1021.003", + "T1047", + "T1543.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters", + "file": "endpoint/impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.003/impacket/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell", + "id": "a4e8f3a4-48b2-11ec-bcfc-3e22fbd008af", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-02-18", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the usage of the `Enter-PSSession`. This commandlet can be used to open an interactive session on a remote endpoint leveraging the WinRM protocol. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WinRM and `Enter-PSSession` for lateral movement and remote code execution.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message=\"*Enter-PSSession*\" AND Message=\"*-ComputerName*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `interactive_session_on_remote_endpoint_with_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup instructions can be found https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may leverage WinRM and `Enter-PSSession` for administrative and troubleshooting tasks. This activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. In certain environments, tuning may not be possible.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/enter-pssession?view=powershell-7.2" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement_pssession/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An interactive session was opened on a remote endpoint from $ComputerName", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.006" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 45, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "Chimera", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.006" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 45 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.006" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell", + "file": "endpoint/interactive_session_on_remote_endpoint_with_powershell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement_pssession/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "wineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "interactive_session_on_remote_endpoint_with_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/interactive_session_on_remote_endpoint_with_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", + "id": "f6601940-4c74-11ec-b9b7-3e22fbd008af", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-23", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies `mmc.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the DCOM protocol and the MMC20 COM object, the executed command is spawned as a child processs of `mmc.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of mmc.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=mmc.exe) (Processes.process_name IN (\"Regsvcs.exe\", \"Ftp.exe\", \"OfflineScannerShell.exe\", \"Rasautou.exe\", \"Schtasks.exe\", \"Xwizard.exe\", \"Dllhost.exe\", \"Pnputil.exe\", \"Atbroker.exe\", \"Pcwrun.exe\", \"Ttdinject.exe\",\"Mshta.exe\", \"Bitsadmin.exe\", \"Certoc.exe\", \"Ieexec.exe\", \"Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe\", \"Runscripthelper.exe\", \"Forfiles.exe\", \"Msbuild.exe\", \"Register-cimprovider.exe\", \"Tttracer.exe\", \"Ie4uinit.exe\", \"Bash.exe\", \"Hh.exe\", \"SettingSyncHost.exe\", \"Cmstp.exe\", \"Mmc.exe\", \"Stordiag.exe\", \"Scriptrunner.exe\", \"Odbcconf.exe\", \"Extexport.exe\", \"Msdt.exe\", \"WorkFolders.exe\", \"Diskshadow.exe\", \"Mavinject.exe\", \"Regasm.exe\", \"Gpscript.exe\", \"Rundll32.exe\", \"Regsvr32.exe\", \"Msiexec.exe\", \"Wuauclt.exe\", \"Presentationhost.exe\", \"Wmic.exe\", \"Runonce.exe\", \"Syncappvpublishingserver.exe\", \"Verclsid.exe\", \"Infdefaultinstall.exe\", \"Explorer.exe\", \"Installutil.exe\", \"Netsh.exe\", \"Wab.exe\", \"Dnscmd.exe\", \"At.exe\", \"Pcalua.exe\", \"Msconfig.exe\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mmc_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003/", + "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/dcom-lateral-movement-techniques", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.003/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Mmc.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 54 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", + "file": "endpoint/mmc_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.003/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "mmc_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/mmc_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn", + "id": "cb909b3e-512b-11ec-aa31-3e22fbd008af", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-29", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic assists with identifying a PowerShell process spawned as a child or grand child process of commonly abused processes during lateral movement techniques including `services.exe`, `wmiprsve.exe`, `svchost.exe`, `wsmprovhost.exe` and `mmc.exe`. Legitimate Windows features such as the Service Control Manager, Windows Management Instrumentation, Task Scheduler, Windows Remote Management and the DCOM protocol can be abused to start a process on a remote endpoint. Looking for PowerShell spawned out of this processes may reveal a lateral movement attack. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse these services during a breach for lateral movement and remote code execution.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=svchost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=wsmprovhost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=mmc.exe) (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR (Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process=*powershell.exe*) OR Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR (Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process=*pwsh.exe*)) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may spawn PowerShell as a child process of the the identified processes. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053.005/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement_powershell/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A PowerShell process was spawned as a child process of typically abused processes on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.003", + "T1021.006", + "T1047", + "T1053.005", + "T1543.003", + "T1059.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 45, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "Chimera", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CostaRicto", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Machete", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN7", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "PROMETHIUM", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.003", + "T1021.006", + "T1047", + "T1053.005", + "T1543.003", + "T1059.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 45 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.003", + "T1021.006", + "T1047", + "T1053.005", + "T1543.003", + "T1059.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn", + "file": "endpoint/possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement_powershell/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell", + "id": "d4f42098-4680-11ec-ad07-3e22fbd008af", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-15", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the DCOM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of ShellExecute and ExecuteShellCommand. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse DCOM and `powershell.exe` for lateral movement and remote code execution.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process=\"*Document.ActiveView.ExecuteShellCommand*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Document.Application.ShellExecute*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may leverage DCOM to start a process on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003/", + "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/dcom-lateral-movement-techniques" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.003/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A process was started on a remote endpoint from $dest by abusing DCOM using PowerShell.exe", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 63 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell", + "file": "endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.003/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_powershell", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell Script Block", + "id": "fa1c3040-4680-11ec-a618-3e22fbd008af", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-15", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of PowerShell with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the DCOM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of ShellExecute and ExecuteShellCommand. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse DCOM for lateral movement and remote code execution.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message=\"*Document.Application.ShellExecute*\" OR Message=\"*Document.ActiveView.ExecuteShellCommand*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_script_block_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup instructions can be found https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may leverage DCOM to start a process on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003/", + "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/dcom-lateral-movement-techniques" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell Script Block", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.003/lateral_movement/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A process was started on a remote endpoint from $ComputerName by abusing WMI using PowerShell.exe", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 63 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell Script Block Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell Script Block", + "file": "endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_script_block.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.003/lateral_movement/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "wineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_script_block_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_script_block.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell", + "id": "ba24cda8-4716-11ec-8009-3e22fbd008af", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-16", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the WinRM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of the `Invoke-Command` commandlet. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WinRM and `powershell.exe` for lateral movement and remote code execution.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process=\"*Invoke-Command*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-ComputerName*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may leverage WinRM and `Invoke-Command` to start a process on remote systems for system administration or automation use cases. However, this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006/", + "https://pentestlab.blog/2018/05/15/lateral-movement-winrm/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement_psh/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A process was started on a remote endpoint from $dest by abusing WinRM using PowerShell.exe", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.006" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 45, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "Chimera", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.006" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 45 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.006" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell", + "file": "endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement_psh/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_powershell", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell Script Block", + "id": "7d4c618e-4716-11ec-951c-3e22fbd008af", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-16", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of PowerShell with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the WinRM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of the `Invoke-Command` commandlet. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WinRM for lateral movement and remote code execution.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message=\"*Invoke-Command*\" AND Message=\"*-ComputerName*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_script_block_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup instructions can be found https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may leverage WinRM and `Invoke-Command` to start a process on remote systems for system administration or automation use cases. This activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. In certain environments, tuning may not be possible.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006/", + "https://pentestlab.blog/2018/05/15/lateral-movement-winrm/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell Script Block", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement_psh/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A process was started on a remote endpoint from $ComputerName by abusing WinRM using PowerShell.exe", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.006" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 45, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "Chimera", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.006" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 45 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.006" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell Script Block Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell Script Block", + "file": "endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_script_block.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement_psh/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "wineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_script_block_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_script_block.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and Winrs", + "id": "0dd296a2-4338-11ec-ba02-3e22fbd008af", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-11", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `winrs.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the WinRM protocol and this binary for lateral movement and remote code execution.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=winrs.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=winrs.exe) (Processes.process=\"*-r:*\" OR Processes.process=\"*-remote:*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_winrs_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may leverage WinRM and WinRs to start a process on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/winrs", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and Winrs", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A process was started on a remote endpoint from $dest", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.006" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "Chimera", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.006" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 54 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.006" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and Winrs Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and Winrs", + "file": "endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_winrs.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_winrs_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_winrs.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI", + "id": "d25d2c3d-d9d8-40ec-8fdf-e86fe155a3da", + "version": 7, + "date": "2021-11-12", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies wmic.exe being launched with parameters to spawn a process on a remote system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WMI and this binary for lateral movement and remote code execution.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` (Processes.process=\"*/node:*\" AND Processes.process=\"*process*\" AND Processes.process=\"*call*\" AND Processes.process=\"*create*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "The wmic.exe utility is a benign Windows application. It may be used legitimately by Administrators with these parameters for remote system administration, but it's relatively uncommon.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/cimwin32prov/create-method-in-class-win32-process" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A wmic.exe process $process$ contain process spawn commandline $process$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1047" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.AT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1047" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.AT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1047" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.AT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI", + "file": "endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_wmic", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell", + "id": "112638b4-4634-11ec-b9ab-3e22fbd008af", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-15", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` leveraging the `Invoke-WmiMethod` commandlet complemented with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing WMI. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WMI and `powershell.exe` for lateral movement and remote code execution.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process=\"*Invoke-WmiMethod*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-CN*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-Class Win32_Process*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-Name create*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may leverage WWMI and powershell.exe to start a process on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/invoke-wmimethod?view=powershell-5.1" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A process was started on a remote endpoint from $dest by abusing WMI using PowerShell.exe", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1047" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1047" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 63 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1047" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell", + "file": "endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_powershell", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell Script Block", + "id": "2a048c14-4634-11ec-a618-3e22fbd008af", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-15", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Invoke-WmiMethod` commandlet with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing WMI. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WMI and this commandlet for lateral movement and remote code execution.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message=\"*Invoke-WmiMethod*\" AND Message=\"*-CN*\" AND Message=\"*-Class Win32_Process*\" AND Message=\"*-Name create*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_script_block_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup instructions can be found https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may leverage WWMI and powershell.exe to start a process on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/invoke-wmimethod?view=powershell-5.1" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell Script Block", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/lateral_movement/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A process was started on a remote endpoint from $ComputerName by abusing WMI using PowerShell.exe", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1047" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1047" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 63 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1047" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell Script Block Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell Script Block", + "file": "endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_script_block.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/lateral_movement/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "wineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_script_block_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_script_block.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At", + "id": "4be54858-432f-11ec-8209-3e22fbd008af", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-11", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `at.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to create a Scheduled Task on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution. The `at.exe` binary internally leverages the AT protocol which was deprecated starting with Windows 8 and Windows Server 2012 but may still work on previous versions of Windows. Furthermore, attackers may enable this protocol on demand by changing a sytem registry key.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=at.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=at.exe) (Processes.process=*\\\\\\\\*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `scheduled_task_creation_on_remote_endpoint_using_at_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may create scheduled tasks on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/at", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/cimwin32prov/win32-scheduledjob?redirectedfrom=MSDN" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.002/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A Windows Scheduled Task was created on a remote endpoint from $dest", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053", + "T1053.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "At (Windows)", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Threat Group-3390" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053", + "T1053.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 54 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053", + "T1053.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At", + "file": "endpoint/scheduled_task_creation_on_remote_endpoint_using_at.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.002/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "scheduled_task_creation_on_remote_endpoint_using_at_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_creation_on_remote_endpoint_using_at.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint", + "id": "95cf4608-4302-11ec-8194-3e22fbd008af", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-11", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `schtasks.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to start a Scheduled Task on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=schtasks.exe) (Processes.process=*/s* AND Processes.process=*/run*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `scheduled_task_initiation_on_remote_endpoint_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may start scheduled tasks on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/schtasks", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A Windows Scheduled Task was ran on a remote endpoint from $dest", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053", + "T1053.005" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CostaRicto", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Machete", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053", + "T1053.005" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 54 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053", + "T1053.005" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint", + "file": "endpoint/scheduled_task_initiation_on_remote_endpoint.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "scheduled_task_initiation_on_remote_endpoint_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_initiation_on_remote_endpoint.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Schtasks scheduling job on remote system", + "id": "1297fb80-f42a-4b4a-9c8a-88c066237cf6", + "version": 5, + "date": "2021-11-11", + "author": "David Dorsey, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `schtasks.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to create a Scheduled Task on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = schtasks.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=schtasks.exe) (Processes.process=\"*/create*\" AND Processes.process=\"*/s*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may create scheduled tasks on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. It is important to validate and investigate as appropriate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Schtasks scheduling job on remote system", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A schedule task process $process_name$ with remote job commandline $process$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Processes.dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Processes.user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CostaRicto", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Machete", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Processes.dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Processes.user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Processes.dest", + "risk_score": 63 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "Processes.user", + "risk_score": 63 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Schtasks scheduling job on remote system Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Schtasks scheduling job on remote system", + "file": "endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", + "id": "ba9e1954-4c04-11ec-8b74-3e22fbd008af", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-22", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies `services.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the Service Control Manager and creating a remote malicious service, the executed command is spawned as a child process of `services.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of services.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe) (Processes.process_name IN (\"Regsvcs.exe\", \"Ftp.exe\", \"OfflineScannerShell.exe\", \"Rasautou.exe\", \"Schtasks.exe\", \"Xwizard.exe\", \"Dllhost.exe\", \"Pnputil.exe\", \"Atbroker.exe\", \"Pcwrun.exe\", \"Ttdinject.exe\",\"Mshta.exe\", \"Bitsadmin.exe\", \"Certoc.exe\", \"Ieexec.exe\", \"Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe\", \"Runscripthelper.exe\", \"Forfiles.exe\", \"Msbuild.exe\", \"Register-cimprovider.exe\", \"Tttracer.exe\", \"Ie4uinit.exe\", \"Bash.exe\", \"Hh.exe\", \"SettingSyncHost.exe\", \"Cmstp.exe\", \"Mmc.exe\", \"Stordiag.exe\", \"Scriptrunner.exe\", \"Odbcconf.exe\", \"Extexport.exe\", \"Msdt.exe\", \"WorkFolders.exe\", \"Diskshadow.exe\", \"Mavinject.exe\", \"Regasm.exe\", \"Gpscript.exe\", \"Rundll32.exe\", \"Regsvr32.exe\", \"Msiexec.exe\", \"Wuauclt.exe\", \"Presentationhost.exe\", \"Wmic.exe\", \"Runonce.exe\", \"Syncappvpublishingserver.exe\", \"Verclsid.exe\", \"Infdefaultinstall.exe\", \"Explorer.exe\", \"Installutil.exe\", \"Netsh.exe\", \"Wab.exe\", \"Dnscmd.exe\", \"At.exe\", \"Pcalua.exe\", \"Msconfig.exe\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `services_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/", + "https://pentestlab.blog/2020/07/21/lateral-movement-services/", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Services.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1543", + "T1543.003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN7", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "PROMETHIUM", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1543", + "T1543.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 54 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1543", + "T1543.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", + "file": "endpoint/services_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "services_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/services_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Short Lived Scheduled Task", + "id": "6fa31414-546e-11ec-adfa-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-03", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic leverages Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created` and Windows Security EventCode 4699, `A scheduled task was deleted` to identify scheduled tasks created and deleted in less than 30 seconds. This behavior may represent a lateral movement attack abusing the Task Scheduler to obtain code execution. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution.", + "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 OR EventCode=4699 | xmlkv Message | transaction Task_Name startswith=(EventCode=4698) endswith=(EventCode=4699) | eval short_lived=case((duration<30),\"TRUE\") | search short_lived = TRUE | table _time, ComputerName, Account_Name, Command, Task_Name, short_lived | `short_lived_scheduled_task_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required.", + "known_false_positives": "Although uncommon, legitimate applications may create and delete a Scheduled Task within 30 seconds. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/taskschd/about-the-task-scheduler" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Short Lived Scheduled Task", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/lateral_movement/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A windows scheduled task was created and deleted in 30 seconds on $ComputerName$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.005" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "dest", + "ComputerName", + "Account_Name", + "Task_Name", + "Description", + "Command" + ], + "risk_score": 81, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CostaRicto", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Machete", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.005" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 81 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.005" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Short Lived Scheduled Task Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Short Lived Scheduled Task", + "file": "endpoint/short_lived_scheduled_task.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/lateral_movement/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "short_lived_scheduled_task_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/short_lived_scheduled_task.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", + "id": "09e5c72a-4c0d-11ec-aa29-3e22fbd008af", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-22", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies `svchost.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the Task Scheduler and creating a malicious remote scheduled task, the executed command is spawned as a child process of `svchost.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of svchost.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=svchost.exe) (Processes.process_name IN (\"Regsvcs.exe\", \"Ftp.exe\", \"OfflineScannerShell.exe\", \"Rasautou.exe\", \"Schtasks.exe\", \"Xwizard.exe\", \"Pnputil.exe\", \"Atbroker.exe\", \"Pcwrun.exe\", \"Ttdinject.exe\",\"Mshta.exe\", \"Bitsadmin.exe\", \"Certoc.exe\", \"Ieexec.exe\", \"Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe\", \"Runscripthelper.exe\", \"Forfiles.exe\", \"Msbuild.exe\", \"Register-cimprovider.exe\", \"Tttracer.exe\", \"Ie4uinit.exe\", \"Bash.exe\", \"Hh.exe\", \"SettingSyncHost.exe\", \"Cmstp.exe\", \"Stordiag.exe\", \"Scriptrunner.exe\", \"Odbcconf.exe\", \"Extexport.exe\", \"Msdt.exe\", \"WorkFolders.exe\", \"Diskshadow.exe\", \"Mavinject.exe\", \"Regasm.exe\", \"Gpscript.exe\", \"Regsvr32.exe\", \"Msiexec.exe\", \"Wuauclt.exe\", \"Presentationhost.exe\", \"Wmic.exe\", \"Runonce.exe\", \"Syncappvpublishingserver.exe\", \"Verclsid.exe\", \"Infdefaultinstall.exe\", \"Installutil.exe\", \"Netsh.exe\", \"Wab.exe\", \"Dnscmd.exe\", \"At.exe\", \"Pcalua.exe\", \"Msconfig.exe\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `svchost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/", + "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/persistence/t1053-schtask", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Svchost.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053", + "T1053.005" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CostaRicto", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Machete", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053", + "T1053.005" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 54 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053", + "T1053.005" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", + "file": "endpoint/svchost_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "svchost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/svchost_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Service Created With Suspicious Service Path", + "id": "429141be-8311-11eb-adb6-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-11-22", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytc uses Windows Event Id 7045, `New Service Was Installed`, to identify the creation of a Windows Service where the service binary path path is located in a non-common Service folder in Windows. Red Teams and adversaries alike may create malicious Services for lateral movement or remote code execution as well as persistence and execution. The Clop ransomware has also been seen in the wild abusing Windows services.", + "search": " `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 Service_File_Name = \"*\\.exe\" NOT (Service_File_Name IN (\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\*\", \"C:\\\\Program File*\", \"C:\\\\Programdata\\\\*\", \"%systemroot%\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Service_File_Name Service_Name Service_Start_Type Service_Type | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may install services with uncommon services paths.", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", + "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Service Created With Suspicious Service Path", + "analytic_story": [ + "Clop Ransomware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-system.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A service $Service_File_Name$ was created from a non-standard path using $Service_Name$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1569", + "T1569.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Service_File_Name", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Service_Name", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "EventCode", + "Service_File_Name", + "Service_Type", + "_time", + "Service_Name", + "Service_Start_Type" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1569", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "FIN6", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Operation Wocao", + "Silence", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1569", + "T1569.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Clop Ransomware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Service_File_Name", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Service_Name", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "Service_File_Name", + "threat_object_type": "other" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "Service_Name", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1569", + "T1569.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows Service Created With Suspicious Service Path Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows Service Created With Suspicious Service Path", + "file": "endpoint/windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-system.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-system.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:System", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_system", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Service Created Within Public Path", + "id": "3abb2eda-4bb8-11ec-9ae4-3e22fbd008af", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-22", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytc uses Windows Event Id 7045, `New Service Was Installed`, to identify the creation of a Windows Service where the service binary path is located in public paths. This behavior could represent the installation of a malicious service. Red Teams and adversaries alike may create malicious Services for lateral movement or remote code execution", + "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 Service_File_Name = \"*\\.exe\" NOT (Service_File_Name IN (\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\*\", \"C:\\\\Program File*\", \"C:\\\\Programdata\\\\*\", \"%systemroot%\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName EventCode Service_File_Name Service_Name Service_Start_Type Service_Type | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_created_within_public_path_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may install services with uncommon services paths.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/services/service-control-manager", + "https://pentestlab.blog/2020/07/21/lateral-movement-services/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Service Created Within Public Path", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement_suspicious_path/windows-system.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A Windows Service $Service_File_Name$ with a public path was created on $ComputerName", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1543", + "T1543.003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Service_File_Name", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "EventCode", + "Service_File_Name", + "Service_Type", + "_time", + "Service_Name", + "Service_Start_Type" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN7", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "PROMETHIUM", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1543", + "T1543.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Service_File_Name", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "Service_File_Name", + "threat_object_type": "other" + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 54 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1543", + "T1543.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows Service Created Within Public Path Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows Service Created Within Public Path", + "file": "endpoint/windows_service_created_within_public_path.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-system.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement_suspicious_path/windows-system.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:System", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_system", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "windows_service_created_within_public_path_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_service_created_within_public_path.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Service Creation on Remote Endpoint", + "id": "e0eea4fa-4274-11ec-882b-3e22fbd008af", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-10", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `sc.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to create a Windows Service on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Service Control Manager for lateral movement and remote code execution.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=sc.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=sc.exe) (Processes.process=*\\\\\\\\* AND Processes.process=*create* AND Processes.process=*binpath*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_creation_on_remote_endpoint_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may create Windows Services on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/services/service-control-manager", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/services/controlling-a-service-using-sc", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Service Creation on Remote Endpoint", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A Windows Service was created on a remote endpoint from $dest", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1543", + "T1543.003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN7", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "PROMETHIUM", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1543", + "T1543.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 54 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1543", + "T1543.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows Service Creation on Remote Endpoint Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows Service Creation on Remote Endpoint", + "file": "endpoint/windows_service_creation_on_remote_endpoint.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_service_creation_on_remote_endpoint_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_service_creation_on_remote_endpoint.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry", + "id": "25212358-948e-11ec-ad47-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-23", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to look for suspicious modification or creation of registry to have service entry. This technique is abused by adversaries or threat actor to persist, gain privileges in the machine or even lateral movement. This technique can be executed using reg.exe application or using windows API like for example the CrashOveride malware. This detection is a good indicator that a process is trying to create a service entry using registry ImagePath.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services*\" Registry.registry_value_name = ImagePath by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `windows_service_creation_using_registry_entry_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "Third party tools may used this technique to create services but not so common.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/36d49de4c8b00bf36054294b4a1fcbab3917d7c5/atomics/T1574.011/T1574.011.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1574.011/change_registry_path_service/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A Windows Service was created on a endpoint from $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1574.011" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_guid" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1574.011" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 64 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1574.011" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry", + "file": "endpoint/windows_service_creation_using_registry_entry.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1574.011/change_registry_path_service/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_service_creation_using_registry_entry_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_service_creation_using_registry_entry.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Service Initiation on Remote Endpoint", + "id": "3f519894-4276-11ec-ab02-3e22fbd008af", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-10", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `sc.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to start a Windows Service on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Service Control Manager for lateral movement and remote code execution.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=sc.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=sc.exe) (Processes.process=*\\\\\\\\* AND Processes.process=*start*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_initiation_on_remote_endpoint_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may start Windows Services on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/services/controlling-a-service-using-sc", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Service Initiation on Remote Endpoint", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A Windows Service was started on a remote endpoint from $dest", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1543", + "T1543.003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN7", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "PROMETHIUM", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1543", + "T1543.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 54 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1543", + "T1543.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows Service Initiation on Remote Endpoint Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows Service Initiation on Remote Endpoint", + "file": "endpoint/windows_service_initiation_on_remote_endpoint.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_service_initiation_on_remote_endpoint_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_service_initiation_on_remote_endpoint.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", + "id": "5d9c6eee-988c-11eb-8253-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-08", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed from a user writeable file path.\\\nThe search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not.\\\nschtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\\Windows\\system32` and `C:\\Windows\\syswow64`.\\\nThe following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory.\\\nUpon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or was it via TaskService. Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message | search Command IN (\"*\\\\users\\\\public\\\\*\", \"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Tasks\\\\*\", \"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Task_Name, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives are possible if legitimate applications are allowed to register tasks in public paths. Filter as needed based on paths that are used legitimately.", + "references": [ + "https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/irans-apt34-returns-with-an-updated-arsenal/", + "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4698", + "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/scheduled-task-job/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/taskschd/time-trigger-example--scripting-?redirectedfrom=MSDN", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/e26f1b2e-befa-483b-91d2-e18636e2faf3/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "IcedID", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/taskschedule/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A windows scheduled task was created (task name=$Task_Name$) on $dest$ by the following command: $Command$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Command", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "dest", + "Task_Name", + "Description", + "Command" + ], + "risk_score": 70, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CostaRicto", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Machete", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "IcedID", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Command", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 70 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "Command", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", + "file": "endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/taskschedule/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Wmiprsve LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", + "id": "95a455f0-4c04-11ec-b8ac-3e22fbd008af", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-22", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies `wmiprsve.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), the executed command is spawned as a child process of `wmiprvse.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of wmiprvse.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe) (Processes.process_name IN (\"Regsvcs.exe\", \"Ftp.exe\", \"OfflineScannerShell.exe\", \"Rasautou.exe\", \"Schtasks.exe\", \"Xwizard.exe\", \"Dllhost.exe\", \"Pnputil.exe\", \"Atbroker.exe\", \"Pcwrun.exe\", \"Ttdinject.exe\",\"Mshta.exe\", \"Bitsadmin.exe\", \"Certoc.exe\", \"Ieexec.exe\", \"Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe\", \"Runscripthelper.exe\", \"Forfiles.exe\", \"Msbuild.exe\", \"Register-cimprovider.exe\", \"Tttracer.exe\", \"Ie4uinit.exe\", \"Bash.exe\", \"Hh.exe\", \"SettingSyncHost.exe\", \"Cmstp.exe\", \"Mmc.exe\", \"Stordiag.exe\", \"Scriptrunner.exe\", \"Odbcconf.exe\", \"Extexport.exe\", \"Msdt.exe\", \"WorkFolders.exe\", \"Diskshadow.exe\", \"Mavinject.exe\", \"Regasm.exe\", \"Gpscript.exe\", \"Rundll32.exe\", \"Regsvr32.exe\", \"Msiexec.exe\", \"Wuauclt.exe\", \"Presentationhost.exe\", \"Wmic.exe\", \"Runonce.exe\", \"Syncappvpublishingserver.exe\", \"Verclsid.exe\", \"Infdefaultinstall.exe\", \"Explorer.exe\", \"Installutil.exe\", \"Netsh.exe\", \"Wab.exe\", \"Dnscmd.exe\", \"At.exe\", \"Pcalua.exe\", \"Msconfig.exe\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmiprsve_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/", + "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/lateral-movement/t1047-wmi-for-lateral-movement", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Wmiprsve LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Wmiprsve.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1047" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1047" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 54 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1047" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Wmiprsve LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Wmiprsve LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", + "file": "endpoint/wmiprsve_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "wmiprsve_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wmiprsve_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Wsmprovhost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", + "id": "2eed004c-4c0d-11ec-93e8-3e22fbd008af", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-22", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies `Wsmprovhost.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the Windows Remote Management (WinRm) protocol, the executed command is spawned as a child processs of `Wsmprovhost.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of Wsmprovhost.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=wsmprovhost.exe) (Processes.process_name IN (\"Regsvcs.exe\", \"Ftp.exe\", \"OfflineScannerShell.exe\", \"Rasautou.exe\", \"Schtasks.exe\", \"Xwizard.exe\", \"Dllhost.exe\", \"Pnputil.exe\", \"Atbroker.exe\", \"Pcwrun.exe\", \"Ttdinject.exe\",\"Mshta.exe\", \"Bitsadmin.exe\", \"Certoc.exe\", \"Ieexec.exe\", \"Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe\", \"Runscripthelper.exe\", \"Forfiles.exe\", \"Msbuild.exe\", \"Register-cimprovider.exe\", \"Tttracer.exe\", \"Ie4uinit.exe\", \"Bash.exe\", \"Hh.exe\", \"SettingSyncHost.exe\", \"Cmstp.exe\", \"Mmc.exe\", \"Stordiag.exe\", \"Scriptrunner.exe\", \"Odbcconf.exe\", \"Extexport.exe\", \"Msdt.exe\", \"WorkFolders.exe\", \"Diskshadow.exe\", \"Mavinject.exe\", \"Regasm.exe\", \"Gpscript.exe\", \"Rundll32.exe\", \"Regsvr32.exe\", \"Msiexec.exe\", \"Wuauclt.exe\", \"Presentationhost.exe\", \"Wmic.exe\", \"Runonce.exe\", \"Syncappvpublishingserver.exe\", \"Verclsid.exe\", \"Infdefaultinstall.exe\", \"Explorer.exe\", \"Installutil.exe\", \"Netsh.exe\", \"Wab.exe\", \"Dnscmd.exe\", \"At.exe\", \"Pcalua.exe\", \"Msconfig.exe\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `wsmprovhost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006/", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/", + "https://pentestlab.blog/2018/05/15/lateral-movement-winrm/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Wsmprovhost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Wsmprovhost.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.006" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "Chimera", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.006" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 54 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.006" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Wsmprovhost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Wsmprovhost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", + "file": "endpoint/wsmprovhost_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "wsmprovhost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wsmprovhost_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name", + "id": "9d22a780-5165-11ec-ad4f-3e22fbd008af", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-29", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following hunting analytic leverages Event ID 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify the creation of a Scheduled Task with a suspicious, high entropy, Task Name. To achieve this, this analytic also leverages the `ut_shannon` function from the URL ToolBox Splunk application. Red teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler to create and start a remote Scheduled Task and obtain remote code execution. To achieve this goal, tools like Impacket or Crapmapexec, typically create a Scheduled Task with a random task name on the victim host. This hunting analytic may help defenders identify Scheduled Tasks created as part of a lateral movement attack. The entropy threshold `ut_shannon > 3` should be customized by users. The Command field can be used to determine if the task has malicious intent or not.", + "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message | lookup ut_shannon_lookup word as Task_Name | where ut_shannon > 3 | table _time, dest, Task_Name, ut_shannon, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden | `randomly_generated_scheduled_task_name_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA as well as the URL ToolBox application are also required.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may use random Scheduled Task names.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/", + "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/2734/", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entropy_(information_theory)" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A windows scheduled task with a suspicious task name was created on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053", + "T1053.005" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "dest", + "Task_Name", + "Description", + "Command" + ], + "risk_score": 45, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CostaRicto", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Machete", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053", + "T1053.005" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 45 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053", + "T1053.005" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "randomly_generated_scheduled_task_name_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/randomly_generated_scheduled_task_name.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Randomly Generated Windows Service Name", + "id": "2032a95a-5165-11ec-a2c3-3e22fbd008af", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-29", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following hunting analytic leverages Event ID 7045, `A new service was installed in the system`, to identify the installation of a Windows Service with a suspicious, high entropy, Service Name. To achieve this, this analytic also leverages the `ut_shannon` function from the URL ToolBox Splunk application. Red teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Service Control Manager to create and start a remote Windows Service and obtain remote code execution. To achieve this goal, some tools like Metasploit, Cobalt Strike and Impacket, typically create a Windows Service with a random service name on the victim host. This hunting analytic may help defenders identify Windows Services installed as part of a lateral movement attack. The entropy threshold `ut_shannon > 3` should be customized by users. The Service_File_Name field can be used to determine if the Windows Service has malicious intent or not.", + "search": " `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 | lookup ut_shannon_lookup word as Service_Name | where ut_shannon > 3 | table EventCode ComputerName Service_Name ut_shannon Service_Start_Type Service_Type Service_File_Name | `randomly_generated_windows_service_name_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints. The Windows TA as well as the URL ToolBox application are also required.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may use random Windows Service names.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Randomly Generated Windows Service Name", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A Windows Service with a suspicious service name was installed on $ComputerName$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1543", + "T1543.003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Service_File_Name", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "ComputerName", + "Service_File_Name", + "Service_Type", + "Service_Name", + "Service_Start_Type" + ], + "risk_score": 45, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN7", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "PROMETHIUM", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1543", + "T1543.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Service_File_Name", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "Service_File_Name", + "threat_object_type": "other" + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 45 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1543", + "T1543.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_system", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "randomly_generated_windows_service_name_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/randomly_generated_windows_service_name.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Remote Desktop Process Running On System", + "id": "f5939373-8054-40ad-8c64-cec478a22a4a", + "version": 5, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for the remote desktop process mstsc.exe running on systems upon which it doesn't typically run. This is accomplished by filtering out all systems that are noted in the `common_rdp_source category` in the Assets and Identity framework.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=*mstsc.exe AND Processes.dest_category!=common_rdp_source by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `remote_desktop_process_running_on_system_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. The search requires you to identify systems that do not commonly use remote desktop. You can use the included support search \"Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop\" to identify these systems. After identifying them, you will need to add the \"common_rdp_source\" category to that system using the Enterprise Security Assets and Identities framework. This can be done by adding an entry in the assets.csv file located in `SA-IdentityManagement/lookups`.", + "known_false_positives": "Remote Desktop may be used legitimately by users on the network.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Remote Desktop Process Running On System", + "analytic_story": [ + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 9", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021.001", + "T1021" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest_category", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT3", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "OilRig", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021.001", + "T1021" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 9", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021.001", + "T1021" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 9", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "remote_desktop_process_running_on_system_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested", + "id": "ac3b81c0-52f4-11ec-ac44-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-01", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following hunting analytic leverages Event ID 4769, `A Kerberos service ticket was requested`, to identify an unusual number of computer service ticket requests from one source. When a domain joined endpoint connects to a remote endpoint, it first will request a Kerberos Ticket with the computer name as the Service Name. An endpoint requesting a large number of computer service tickets for different endpoints could represent malicious behavior like lateral movement, malware staging, reconnaissance, etc.\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of service requests. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time, the calculation of the `upperBound` field as well as the Outlier calculation. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\", + "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769 Service_Name=\"*$\" Account_Name!=\"*$*\" | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Service_Name) AS unique_targets values(Service_Name) as host_targets by _time, Client_Address, Account_Name | eventstats avg(unique_targets) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_targets) as comp_std by Client_Address, Account_Name | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_targets >10 and unique_targets >= upperBound, 1, 0) | `unusual_number_of_computer_service_tickets_requested_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", + "known_false_positives": "An single endpoint requesting a large number of computer service tickets is not common behavior. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, administration systeams and missconfigured systems.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Client_Address", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Ticket_Options", + "Ticket_Encryption_Type", + "dest", + "service", + "service_id" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Client_Address", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Client_Address", + "risk_score": 42 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "unusual_number_of_computer_service_tickets_requested_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/unusual_number_of_computer_service_tickets_requested.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Unusual Number of Remote Endpoint Authentication Events", + "id": "acb5dc74-5324-11ec-a36d-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-01", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following hunting analytic leverages Event ID 4624, `An account was successfully logged on`, to identify an unusual number of remote authentication attempts coming from one source. An endpoint authenticating to a large number of remote endpoints could represent malicious behavior like lateral movement, malware staging, reconnaissance, etc.\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual high number of authentication events. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time, the calculation of the `upperBound` field as well as the Outlier calculation. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\", + "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=3 Account_Name!=\"*$\" | eval Source_Account = mvindex(Account_Name, 1) | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(ComputerName) AS unique_targets values(ComputerName) as target_hosts by _time, Source_Network_Address, Source_Account | eventstats avg(unique_targets) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_targets) as comp_std by Source_Network_Address, Source_Account | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_targets >10 and unique_targets >= upperBound, 1, 0) | `unusual_number_of_remote_endpoint_authentication_events_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Event Logs from domain controllers aas well as member servers and workstations. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Logon` within `Logon/Logoff` needs to be enabled.", + "known_false_positives": "An single endpoint authenticating to a large number of hosts is not common behavior. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, jump servers and missconfigured systems.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Unusual Number of Remote Endpoint Authentication Events", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Logon_Type", + "Caller_Process_Name", + "Security_ID", + "Account_Name", + "ComputerName" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 42 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "unusual_number_of_remote_endpoint_authentication_events_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/unusual_number_of_remote_endpoint_authentication_events.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Remote Desktop Network Traffic", + "id": "272b8407-842d-4b3d-bead-a704584003d3", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-07-07", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search looks for network traffic on TCP/3389, the default port used by remote desktop. While remote desktop traffic is not uncommon on a network, it is usually associated with known hosts. This search will ignore common RDP sources and common RDP destinations so you can focus on the uncommon uses of remote desktop on your network.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=3389 AND All_Traffic.dest_category!=common_rdp_destination AND All_Traffic.src_category!=common_rdp_source by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_desktop_network_traffic_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to identify systems that commonly originate remote desktop traffic and that commonly receive remote desktop traffic. You can use the included support search \"Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic\" to identify systems that originate the traffic and the search \"Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic\" to identify systems that receive a lot of remote desktop traffic. After identifying these systems, you will need to add the \"common_rdp_source\" or \"common_rdp_destination\" category to that system depending on the usage, using the Enterprise Security Assets and Identities framework. This can be done by adding an entry in the assets.csv file located in SA-IdentityManagement/lookups.", + "known_false_positives": "Remote Desktop may be used legitimately by users on the network.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Remote Desktop Network Traffic", + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 9", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021.001", + "T1021" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.dest_category", + "All_Traffic.src_category", + "All_Traffic.src", + "All_Traffic.dest", + "All_Traffic.dest_port" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT3", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "OilRig", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021.001", + "T1021" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 9", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic", + "id": "5cdda34f-4caf-4128-a713-0837fc48b67a", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-15", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search counts the numbers of times the system has generated remote desktop traffic.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=3389 by All_Traffic.src | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | sort - count", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must ingest network traffic and populate the Network_Traffic data model.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Remote Desktop Network Traffic" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + }, + { + "name": "Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic", + "id": "baaeea15-fe8a-4090-92c2-5b60943bb608", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-15", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search counts the numbers of times the system has created remote desktop traffic", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=3389 by All_Traffic.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | sort - count", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must ingest network traffic and populate the Network_Traffic data model. If a system receives a lot of remote desktop traffic, you can apply the category common_rdp_destination to it.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Remote Desktop Network Traffic" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + }, + { + "name": "Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop", + "id": "063dfe9f-b1d7-4254-a16d-1e2e7eadd6a8", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-04-01", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search counts the numbers of times the remote desktop process, mstsc.exe, has run on each system.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=\"*mstsc.exe*\" by Processes.dest Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | sort - count", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data that records process activity.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Remote Desktop Network Traffic" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021.001", + "T1021" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 9", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "remote_desktop_network_traffic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml", + "source": "network" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", + "id": "b6618e8e-be04-40a0-a0b9-f0bd4b6c81bc", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-12-14", + "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Authentication" + ], + "description": "This search returns the source, destination, and user for all successful remote-desktop authentications. A successful authentication after a brute-force attack on a destination machine is suspicious behavior. ", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature_id=4624 Authentication.app=win:remote by Authentication.src Authentication.dest Authentication.app Authentication.user Authentication.signature Authentication.src_nt_domain | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Authentication\")` | search dest=$dest$ | table firstTime lastTime src src_nt_domain dest user app count | sort count", + "how_to_implement": "You must be populating the Authentication data model with security events from your Windows event logs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement", + "SamSam Ransomware" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Authentication.signature_id", + "Authentication.app", + "Authentication.src", + "Authentication.dest", + "Authentication.user", + "Authentication.signature", + "Authentication.src_nt_domain" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Active Directory Password Spraying", + "id": "3de109da-97d2-11eb-8b6a-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-07", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "description": "Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Password Spraying attacks within Active Directory environments.", + "narrative": "In a password spraying attack, adversaries leverage one or a small list of commonly used / popular passwords against a large volume of usernames to acquire valid account credentials. Unlike a Brute Force attack that targets a specific user or small group of users with a large number of passwords, password spraying follows the opposite aproach and increases the chances of obtaining valid credentials while avoiding account lockouts. This allows adversaries to remain undetected if the target organization does not have the proper monitoring and detection controls in place.\\\nPassword Spraying can be leveraged by adversaries across different stages in an attack. It can be used to obtain an iniial access to an environment but can also be used to escalate privileges when access has been already achieved. In some scenarios, this technique capitalizes on a security policy most organizations implement, password rotation. As enterprise users change their passwords, it is possible some pick predictable, seasonal passwords such as `$CompanyNameWinter`, `Summer2021`, etc.\\\nSpecifically, this Analytic Story is focused on detecting possible Password Spraying attacks against Active Directory environments leveraging Windows Event Logs in the `Account Logon` and `Logon/Logoff` Advanced Audit Policy categories. It presents 9 detection analytics which can aid defenders in identifyng instances where one source user, source host or source process attempts to authenticate against a target or targets using a high, unsual, number of unique users. A user, host or process attempting to authenticate with multiple users is not common behavior for legitimate systems and should be monitored by security teams. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, remote administration tools, multi-user systems and missconfigured systems. These should be easily spotted when first implementing the detection and addded to an allow list or lookup table. The presented detections can also be used in Threat Hunting exercises.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/23/protecting-organization-password-spray-attacks/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/dn452415(v=ws.11)" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Active Directory Password Spraying", + "analytic_story": "Active Directory Password Spraying", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "Chimera", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leafminer", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silent Librarian" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN5", + "Fox Kitten", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "datamodels": [], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Multiple Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule", + "ESCU - Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule", + "ESCU - Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM - Rule", + "ESCU - Multiple Users Attempting To Authenticate Using Explicit Credentials - Rule", + "ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule", + "ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM - Rule", + "ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Process - Rule", + "ESCU - Multiple Users Remotely Failing To Authenticate From Host - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Mauricio Velazco", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Multiple Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos", + "id": "98f22d82-9d62-11eb-9fcf-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-14", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple disabled domain users using the Kerberos protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using Kerberos to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. As attackers progress in a breach, mistakes will be made. In certain scenarios, adversaries may execute a password spraying attack against disabled users. Event 4768 is generated every time the Key Distribution Center issues a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). Failure code `0x12` stands for `clients credentials have been revoked` (account disabled, expired or locked out).\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\\nThis detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\\\nThe analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source ip and attempted user accounts.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 Account_Name!=\"*$\" Result_Code=0x12 | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Account_Name) AS unique_accounts values(Account_Name) as tried_accounts by _time, Client_Address | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Client_Address | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_disabled_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", + "known_false_positives": "A host failing to authenticate with multiple disabled domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, multi-user systems missconfigured systems.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Multiple Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Password Spraying", + "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_disabled_users_kerberos/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Potential Kerberos based password spraying attack from $Client_Address$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1110.003", + "T1110" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Client_Address", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Result_Code", + "Account_Name", + "Client_Address" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "Chimera", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leafminer", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silent Librarian" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN5", + "Fox Kitten", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1110.003", + "T1110" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Password Spraying", + "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Client_Address", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Client_Address", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1110.003", + "T1110" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Multiple Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Multiple Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos", + "file": "endpoint/multiple_disabled_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_disabled_users_kerberos/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "multiple_disabled_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/multiple_disabled_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos", + "id": "001266a6-9d5b-11eb-829b-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-14", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple invalid domain users using the Kerberos protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using Kerberos to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. As attackers progress in a breach, mistakes will be made. In certain scenarios, adversaries may execute a password spraying attack using an invalid list of users. Event 4768 is generated every time the Key Distribution Center issues a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). Failure code 0x6 stands for `client not found in Kerberos database` (the attempted user is not a valid domain user).\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\\nThis detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\\\nThe analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source ip and attempted user accounts.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 Result_Code=0x6 Account_Name!=\"*$\" | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Account_Name) AS unique_accounts values(Account_Name) as tried_accounts by _time, Client_Address | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Client_Address | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", + "known_false_positives": "A host failing to authenticate with multiple invalid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, multi-user systems and missconfigured systems.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Password Spraying", + "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_invalid_users_kerberos/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Potential Kerberos based password spraying attack from $Client_Address$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1110.003", + "T1110" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Client_Address", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Result_Code", + "Account_Name", + "Client_Address" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "Chimera", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leafminer", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silent Librarian" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN5", + "Fox Kitten", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1110.003", + "T1110" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Password Spraying", + "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Client_Address", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Client_Address", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1110.003", + "T1110" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos", + "file": "endpoint/multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_invalid_users_kerberos/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM", + "id": "57ad5a64-9df7-11eb-a290-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-15", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple invalid users using the NTLM protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using NTLM to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. As attackers progress in a breach, mistakes will be made. In certain scenarios, adversaries may execute a password spraying attack using an invalid list of users. Event 4776 is generated on the computer that is authoritative for the provided credentials. For domain accounts, the domain controller is authoritative. For local accounts, the local computer is authoritative. Error code 0xC0000064 stands for `The username you typed does not exist` (the attempted user is a legitimate domain user).\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\\nThis detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\\\nThe analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source workstation name and attempted user accounts.", + "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4776 Logon_Account!=\"*$\" 0xC0000064 action=failure | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Logon_Account) AS unique_accounts values(Logon_Account) as tried_accounts by _time, Source_Workstation | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Source_Workstation | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Credential Validation' within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", + "known_false_positives": "A host failing to authenticate with multiple invalid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners and missconfigured systems. If this detection triggers on a host other than a Domain Controller, the behavior could represent a password spraying attack against the host's local accounts.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-credential-validation", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4776" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Password Spraying" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_invalid_users_ntlm/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Potential NTLM based password spraying attack from $Source_Workstation$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1110.003", + "T1110" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Source_Workstation", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "action", + "Logon_Account", + "Source_Workstation" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "Chimera", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leafminer", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silent Librarian" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN5", + "Fox Kitten", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1110.003", + "T1110" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Password Spraying" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Source_Workstation", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Source_Workstation", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1110.003", + "T1110" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM", + "file": "endpoint/multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_invalid_users_ntlm/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Multiple Users Attempting To Authenticate Using Explicit Credentials", + "id": "e61918fa-9ca4-11eb-836c-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-13", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a source user failing to authenticate with multiple users using explicit credentials on a host. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4648 is generated when a process attempts an account logon by explicitly specifying that accounts credentials. This event generates on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations.\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\\nThis detection will trigger on the potenfially malicious host, perhaps controlled via a trojan or operated by an insider threat, from where a password spraying attack is being executed.\\\nThe analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source account, attempted user accounts and the endpoint were the behavior was identified.", + "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4648 | bucket span=2m _time | eval Source_Account = mvindex(Account_Name, 0) | eval Destination_Account = mvindex(Account_Name, 1) | search Source_Account != \"*$\" Source_Account !=\"-\" Destination_Account !=\"*$\" | stats dc(Destination_Account) AS unique_accounts values(Destination_Account) as tried_account by _time, ComputerName, Source_Account | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by ComputerName | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_users_attempting_to_authenticate_using_explicit_credentials_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Event Logs from domain controllers as well as member servers and workstations. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Logon` within `Logon/Logoff` needs to be enabled.", + "known_false_positives": "A source user failing attempting to authenticate multiple users on a host is not a common behavior for regular systems. Some applications, however, may exhibit this behavior in which case sets of users hosts can be added to an allow list. Possible false positive scenarios include systems where several users connect to like Mail servers, identity providers, remote desktop services, Citrix, etc.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4648", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/basic-audit-logon-events" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Multiple Users Attempting To Authenticate Using Explicit Credentials", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Password Spraying" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_explicit_credential_spray/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Potential password spraying attack from $ComputerName$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1110.003", + "T1110" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Security_ID", + "Account_Name", + "ComputerName" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "Chimera", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leafminer", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silent Librarian" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN5", + "Fox Kitten", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1110.003", + "T1110" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Password Spraying" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1110.003", + "T1110" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Multiple Users Attempting To Authenticate Using Explicit Credentials Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Multiple Users Attempting To Authenticate Using Explicit Credentials", + "file": "endpoint/multiple_users_attempting_to_authenticate_using_explicit_credentials.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_explicit_credential_spray/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "multiple_users_attempting_to_authenticate_using_explicit_credentials_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_attempting_to_authenticate_using_explicit_credentials.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos", + "id": "3a91a212-98a9-11eb-b86a-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-08", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple valid users using the Kerberos protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using Kerberos to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4771 is generated when the Key Distribution Center fails to issue a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). Failure code 0x18 stands for `wrong password provided` (the attempted user is a legitimate domain user).\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\\nThis detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\\\nThe analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source ip and attempted user accounts.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4771 Failure_Code=0x18 Account_Name!=\"*$\" | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Account_Name) AS unique_accounts values(Account_Name) as tried_accounts by _time, Client_Address | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Client_Address | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", + "known_false_positives": "A host failing to authenticate with multiple valid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, missconfigured systems and multi-user systems like Citrix farms.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/dn319109(v=ws.11)", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4771" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Password Spraying", + "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_valid_users_kerberos/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Potential Kerberos based password spraying attack from $Client_Address$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1110.003", + "T1110" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Client_Address", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Result_Code", + "Account_Name", + "Client_Address" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "Chimera", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leafminer", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silent Librarian" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN5", + "Fox Kitten", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1110.003", + "T1110" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Password Spraying", + "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Client_Address", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Client_Address", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1110.003", + "T1110" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos", + "file": "endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_valid_users_kerberos/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM", + "id": "7ed272a4-9c77-11eb-af22-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-13", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple valid users using the NTLM protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using NTLM to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4776 is generated on the computer that is authoritative for the provided credentials. For domain accounts, the domain controller is authoritative. For local accounts, the local computer is authoritative. Error code 0xC000006A means: misspelled or bad password (the attempted user is a legitimate domain user).\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\\nThis detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\\\nThe analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source workstation name and attempted user accounts.", + "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4776 Logon_Account!=\"*$\" 0xC000006A action=failure | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Logon_Account) AS unique_accounts values(Logon_Account) as tried_accounts by _time, Source_Workstation | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Source_Workstation | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Credential Validation` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", + "known_false_positives": "A host failing to authenticate with multiple valid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners and missconfigured systems. If this detection triggers on a host other than a Domain Controller, the behavior could represent a password spraying attack against the host's local accounts.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-credential-validation", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4776" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Password Spraying" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_valid_users_ntlm/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Potential NTLM based password spraying attack from $Source_Workstation$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1110.003", + "T1110" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Source_Workstation", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "action", + "Logon_Account", + "Source_Workstation" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "Chimera", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leafminer", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silent Librarian" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN5", + "Fox Kitten", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1110.003", + "T1110" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Password Spraying" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Source_Workstation", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Source_Workstation", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1110.003", + "T1110" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM", + "file": "endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_valid_users_ntlm/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Process", + "id": "9015385a-9c84-11eb-bef2-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-13", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a source process name failing to authenticate with multiple users. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4625 generates on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations when an account fails to logon. Logon Type 2 describes an iteractive logon attempt.\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\\nThis detection will trigger on the potenfially malicious host, perhaps controlled via a trojan or operated by an insider threat, from where a password spraying attack is being executed. This could be a domain controller as well as a member server or workstation.\\\nThe analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source process name, source account and attempted user accounts.", + "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4625 Logon_Type=2 Caller_Process_Name!=\"-\" | bucket span=2m _time | eval Source_Account = mvindex(Account_Name, 0) | eval Destination_Account = mvindex(Account_Name, 1) | stats dc(Destination_Account) AS unique_accounts values(Account_Name) as tried_accounts by _time, Caller_Process_Name, Source_Account, ComputerName | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Caller_Process_Name, Source_Account, ComputerName | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_process_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Event Logs from domain controllers aas well as member servers and workstations. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Logon` within `Logon/Logoff` needs to be enabled.", + "known_false_positives": "A process failing to authenticate with multiple users is not a common behavior for legitimate user sessions. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners and missconfigured systems.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4625", + "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4625", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/basic-audit-logon-events" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Process", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Password Spraying" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_multiple_users_from_process/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Potential password spraying attack from $ComputerName$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1110.003", + "T1110" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Logon_Type", + "Caller_Process_Name", + "Security_ID", + "Account_Name", + "ComputerName" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "Chimera", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leafminer", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silent Librarian" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN5", + "Fox Kitten", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1110.003", + "T1110" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Password Spraying" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1110.003", + "T1110" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Process Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Process", + "file": "endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_process.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_multiple_users_from_process/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_process_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_process.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Multiple Users Remotely Failing To Authenticate From Host", + "id": "80f9d53e-9ca1-11eb-b0d6-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-13", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a source host failing to authenticate against a remote host with multiple users. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4625 documents each and every failed attempt to logon to the local computer. This event generates on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations. Logon Type 3 describes an remote authentication attempt.\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\\nThis detection will trigger on the host that is the target of the password spraying attack. This could be a domain controller as well as a member server or workstation.\\\nThe analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source process name, source account and attempted user accounts.", + "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4625 Logon_Type=3 Source_Network_Address!=\"-\" | bucket span=2m _time | eval Destination_Account = mvindex(Account_Name, 1) | stats dc(Destination_Account) AS unique_accounts values(Destination_Account) as tried_accounts by _time, Source_Network_Address, ComputerName | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Source_Network_Address, ComputerName | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_users_remotely_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Event Logs from domain controllers as as well as member servers and workstations. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Logon` within `Logon/Logoff` needs to be enabled.", + "known_false_positives": "A host failing to authenticate with multiple valid users against a remote host is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, remote administration tools, missconfigyred systems, etc.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4625", + "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4625", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/basic-audit-logon-events" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Multiple Users Remotely Failing To Authenticate From Host", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Password Spraying" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_remote_spray/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Potential password spraying attack on $ComputerName$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1110.003", + "T1110" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Logon_Type", + "Security_ID", + "Account_Name", + "ComputerName", + "Source_Network_Address" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "Chimera", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leafminer", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silent Librarian" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN5", + "Fox Kitten", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1110.003", + "T1110" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Password Spraying" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1110.003", + "T1110" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Multiple Users Remotely Failing To Authenticate From Host Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Multiple Users Remotely Failing To Authenticate From Host", + "file": "endpoint/multiple_users_remotely_failing_to_authenticate_from_host.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_remote_spray/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "multiple_users_remotely_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_remotely_failing_to_authenticate_from_host.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [] + }, + { + "name": "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "id": "2dcfd6a2-e7d2-4873-b6ba-adaf819d2a1e", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-12-06", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "description": "Detect and investigate activities--such as unusually long `Content-Type` length, suspicious java classes and web servers executing suspicious processes--consistent with attempts to exploit Apache Struts vulnerabilities.", + "narrative": "In March of 2017, a remote code-execution vulnerability in the Jakarta Multipart parser in Apache Struts, a widely used open-source framework for creating Java web applications, was disclosed and assigned to CVE-2017-5638. About two months later, hackers exploited the flaw to carry out the world's 5th largest data breach. The target, credit giant Equifax, told investigators that it had become aware of the vulnerability two months before the attack. \\\nThe exploit involved manipulating the `Content-Type HTTP` header to execute commands embedded in the header.\\\nThis Analytic Story contains two different searches that help to identify activity that may be related to this issue. The first search looks for characteristics of the `Content-Type` header consistent with attempts to exploit the vulnerability. This should be a relatively pertinent indicator, as the `Content-Type` header is generally consistent and does not have a large degree of variation.\\\nThe second search looks for the execution of various commands typically entered on the command shell when an attacker first lands on a system. These commands are not generally executed on web servers during the course of day-to-day operation, but they may be used when the system is undergoing maintenance or troubleshooting.\\\nFirst, it is helpful is to understand how often the notable event is generated, as well as the commonalities in some of these events. This may help determine whether this is a common occurrence that is of a lesser concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. It can also help to understand whether the issue is restricted to a single user or system or is broader in scope.\\\nWhen looking at the target of the behavior illustrated by the event, you should note the sensitivity of the user and or/system to help determine the potential impact. It is also helpful to see what other events involving the target have occurred in the recent past. This can help tie different events together and give further situational awareness regarding the target.\\\nVarious types of information for external systems should be reviewed and (potentially) collected if the incident is, indeed, judged to be malicious. Information like this can be useful in generating your own threat intelligence to create alerts in the future.\\\nLooking at the country, responsible party, and fully qualified domain names associated with the external IP address--as well as the registration information associated with those domain names, if they are frequently visited by others--can help you answer the question of \"who,\" in regard to the external system. Answering that can help qualify the event and may serve useful for tracking. In addition, there are various sources that can provide some reputation information on the IP address or domain name, which can assist in determining if the event is malicious in nature. Finally, determining whether or not there are other events associated with the IP address may help connect some dots or show other events that should be brought into scope.\\\nGathering various data elements on the system of interest can sometimes help quickly determine that something suspicious may be happening. Some of these items include determining who else may have recently logged into the system, whether any unusual scheduled tasks exist, whether the system is communicating on suspicious ports, whether there are modifications to sensitive registry keys, and whether there are any known vulnerabilities on the system. This information can often highlight other activity commonly seen in attack scenarios or give more information about how the system may have been targeted.\\\nhen a specific service or application is targeted, it is often helpful to know the associated version to help determine whether or not it is vulnerable to a specific exploit.\\\nhen it is suspected there is an attack targeting a web server, it is helpful to look at some of the behavior of the web service to see if there is evidence that the service has been compromised. Some indications of this might be network connections to external resources, the web service spawning child processes that are not associated with typical behavior, and whether the service wrote any files that might be malicious in nature.\\\nIn the event that a suspicious file is found, we can review more information about it to help determine if it is, in fact, malicious. Identifying the file type, any processes that have the file open, what processes created and/or modified the file, and the number of systems that may have this file can help to determine if the file is malicious. Also, determining the file hash and checking it against reputation sources, such as VirusTotal, can sometimes quickly help determine whether it is malicious in nature.\\\nOften, a simple inspection of a suspect process name and path can tell you if the system has been compromised. For example, if `svchost.exe` is found running from a location other than `C:\\Windows\\System32`, it is likely something malicious designed to hide in plain sight when simply reviewing process names. Similarly, if the process itself seems legitimate, but the parent process is running from the temporary browser cache, there may be activity initiated via a compromised website the user visited.\\\nIt can also be very helpful to examine various behaviors of the process of interest or the parent of the process that is of interest. For example, if it turns out that the process of interest is malicious, it would be good to see if the parent to that process spawned other processes that might also be worth further scrutiny. If a process is suspect, reviewing the network connections made around the time of the event and/or if the process spawned any child processes could be helpful in determining whether it is malicious or executing a malicious script.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/blob/v3.2/dev/rules/REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA.conf" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "analytic_story": "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "category": [ + "Vulnerability" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1082", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Darkhotel", + "Frankenstein", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Sowbug", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TeamTNT", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Windigo", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Delivery", + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", + "ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule", + "ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", + "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task", + "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Rico Valdez", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious Java Classes", + "id": "6ed33786-5e87-4f55-b62c-cb5f1168b831", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-12-06", + "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for suspicious Java classes that are often used to exploit remote command execution in common Java frameworks, such as Apache Struts.", + "search": "`stream_http` http_method=POST http_content_length>1 | regex form_data=\"(?i)java\\.lang\\.(?:runtime|processbuilder)\" | rename src_ip as src | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime, values(url) as uri, values(status) as status, values(http_user_agent) as http_user_agent by src, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_java_classes_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from your web-traffic appliances that serve or sit in the path of your Struts application servers. This can be accomplished by indexing data from a web proxy, or by using network traffic-analysis tools, such as Splunk Stream or Bro.", + "known_false_positives": "There are no known false positives.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Java Classes", + "analytic_story": [ + "Apache Struts Vulnerability" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 7", + "CIS 12" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "http_method", + "http_content_length", + "src_ip", + "url", + "status", + "http_user_agent", + "src", + "dest" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 7", + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Apache Struts Vulnerability" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 7", + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "stream_http", + "definition": "sourcetype=stream:http", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_java_classes_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml", + "source": "application" + }, + { + "name": "Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes", + "id": "ec3b7601-689a-4463-94e0-c9f45638efb9", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-04-01", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for suspicious processes on all systems labeled as web servers.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.dest_category=\"web_server\" AND (Processes.process=\"*whoami*\" OR Processes.process=\"*ping*\" OR Processes.process=\"*iptables*\" OR Processes.process=\"*wget*\" OR Processes.process=\"*service*\" OR Processes.process=\"*curl*\") by Processes.process Processes.process_name, Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model. In addition, web servers will need to be identified in the Assets and Identity Framework of Enterprise Security.", + "known_false_positives": "Some of these processes may be used legitimately on web servers during maintenance or other administrative tasks.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes", + "analytic_story": [ + "Apache Struts Vulnerability" + ], + "asset_type": "Web Server", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1082" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest_category", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1082", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Darkhotel", + "Frankenstein", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Sowbug", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TeamTNT", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Windigo", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1082" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Apache Struts Vulnerability" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1082" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml", + "source": "application" + }, + { + "name": "Unusually Long Content-Type Length", + "id": "57a0a2bf-353f-40c1-84dc-29293f3c35b7", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-10-13", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for unusually long strings in the Content-Type http header that the client sends the server.", + "search": "`stream_http` | eval cs_content_type_length = len(cs_content_type) | where cs_content_type_length > 100 | table endtime src_ip dest_ip cs_content_type_length cs_content_type url | `unusually_long_content_type_length_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This particular search leverages data extracted from Stream:HTTP. You must configure the http stream using the Splunk Stream App on your Splunk Stream deployment server to extract the cs_content_type field.", + "known_false_positives": "Very few legitimate Content-Type fields will have a length greater than 100 characters.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Unusually Long Content-Type Length", + "analytic_story": [ + "Apache Struts Vulnerability" + ], + "asset_type": "Web Server", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 4", + "CIS 18", + "CIS 12" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "ID.RA", + "RS.MI", + "PR.PT", + "PR.IP", + "DE.AE", + "PR.MA", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "cs_content_type", + "endtime", + "src_ip", + "dest_ip", + "url" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 4", + "CIS 18", + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.RA", + "RS.MI", + "PR.PT", + "PR.IP", + "DE.AE", + "PR.MA", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Apache Struts Vulnerability" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 4", + "CIS 18", + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.RA", + "RS.MI", + "PR.PT", + "PR.IP", + "DE.AE", + "PR.MA", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "stream_http", + "definition": "sourcetype=stream:http", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "unusually_long_content_type_length_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml", + "source": "network" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + }, + { + "name": "Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd89", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-10-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search helps an analyst investigate a notable event related to a potential Apache Struts exploitation. To investigate, we will want to isolate and analyze the \"payload\" or the commands that were passed to the vulnerable hosts by creating a few regular expressions to carve out the commands focusing on common keywords from the payload, such as cmd.exe, /bin/bash and whois. The search returns these suspicious strings found in the HTTP logs of the system of interest.", + "search": "`stream_http` | search src_ip=$src_ip$ | search dest_ip=$dest_ip$ | eval cs_content_type_length = len(cs_content_type) | search cs_content_type_length > 100 | rex field=\"cs_content_type\" (?cmd.exe) | eval suspicious_strings_found=if(match(cs_content_type, \"application\"), \"True\", \"False\") | rename suspicious_strings_found AS \"Suspicious Content-Type Found\" | fields \"Suspicious Content-Type Found\", dest_ip, src_ip, suspicious_strings, cs_content_type, cs_content_type_length, url", + "how_to_implement": "This particular search leverages data extracted from Stream:HTTP. You must configure the http stream using the Splunk Stream App on your Splunk Stream deployment server to extract the cs_content_type field.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "src_ip", + "dest_ip" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Apache Struts Vulnerability" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "src_ip", + "dest_ip", + "cs_content_type", + "url" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header" + }, + { + "name": "Investigate Web POSTs From src", + "id": "f5c39fac-205c-4e07-9004-8fd61ea3431a", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-12-06", + "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "This investigative search retrieves POST requests from a specified source IP or hostname. Identifying the POST requests, as well as their associated destination URLs and user agent(s), may help you scope and characterize the suspicious traffic. ", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Web.url) as url from datamodel=Web by Web.src,Web.http_user_agent,Web.http_method | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")`| search http_method, \"POST\" | search src=$src$", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting your web-traffic logs and populating the web data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "src" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Apache Struts Vulnerability" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Web.url", + "Web.src", + "Web.http_user_agent", + "Web.http_method" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "investigate_web_posts_from_src" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Asset Tracking", + "id": "91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e1fce77", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-13", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "description": "Keep a careful inventory of every asset on your network to make it easier to detect rogue devices. Unauthorized/unmanaged devices could be an indication of malicious behavior that should be investigated further.", + "narrative": "This Analytic Story is designed to help you develop a better understanding of what authorized and unauthorized devices are part of your enterprise. This story can help you better categorize and classify assets, providing critical business context and awareness of their assets during an incident. Information derived from this Analytic Story can be used to better inform and support other analytic stories. For successful detection, you will need to leverage the Assets and Identity Framework from Enterprise Security to populate your known assets.", + "references": [ + "https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/inventory-of-authorized-and-unauthorized-devices/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Asset Tracking", + "analytic_story": "Asset Tracking", + "category": [ + "Best Practices" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Security Monitoring", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [], + "datamodels": [ + "Network_Sessions" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Delivery", + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [ + "ESCU - Count of assets by category" + ], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address", + "id": "dcfd6b40-42f9-469d-a433-2e53f7489ff4", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-13", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Sessions" + ], + "description": "By populating the organization's assets within the assets_by_str.csv, we will be able to detect unauthorized devices that are trying to connect with the organization's network by inspecting DHCP request packets, which are issued by devices when they attempt to obtain an IP address from the DHCP server. The MAC address associated with the source of the DHCP request is checked against the list of known devices, and reports on those that are not found.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Sessions where nodename=All_Sessions.DHCP All_Sessions.signature=DHCPREQUEST by All_Sessions.src_ip All_Sessions.dest_mac | dedup All_Sessions.dest_mac| `drop_dm_object_name(\"Network_Sessions\")`|`drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Sessions\")` | search NOT [| inputlookup asset_lookup_by_str |rename mac as dest_mac | fields + dest_mac] | `detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This search uses the Network_Sessions data model shipped with Enterprise Security. It leverages the Assets and Identity framework to populate the assets_by_str.csv file located in SA-IdentityManagement, which will contain a list of known authorized organizational assets including their MAC addresses. Ensure that all inventoried systems have their MAC address populated.", + "known_false_positives": "This search might be prone to high false positives. Please consider this when conducting analysis or investigations. Authorized devices may be detected as unauthorized. If this is the case, verify the MAC address of the system responsible for the false positive and add it to the Assets and Identity framework with the proper information.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address", + "analytic_story": [ + "Asset Tracking" + ], + "asset_type": "Infrastructure", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Delivery", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Sessions.signature", + "All_Sessions.src_ip", + "All_Sessions.dest_mac" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Delivery", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Asset Tracking" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Count of assets by category", + "id": "dcfd6b40-42f9-469d-a433-2e53f7489ff9", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-13", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search shows you every asset category you have and the assets that belong to those categories.", + "search": "| from datamodel Identity_Management.All_Assets | stats count values(nt_host) by category | sort -count", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must first leverage the Assets and Identity framework in Enterprise Security to populate your assets_by_str.csv file which should then be mapped to the Identity_Management data model. The Identity_Management data model will contain a list of known authorized company assets. Ensure that all inventoried systems are constantly vetted and updated.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Asset Tracking" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Identity_Management.All_Assets", + "category" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Delivery", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml", + "source": "network" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd33", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-13", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Sessions" + ], + "description": "This search allows you to gather more context around a notable which has detected a new device connecting to your network. Use this search to determine the first and last occurrences of the suspicious device attempting to connect with your network.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Sessions where nodename=All_Sessions.DHCP All_Sessions.signature=DHCPREQUEST All_Sessions.src_mac= $src_mac$ by All_Sessions.src_ip All_Sessions.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting the logs from your DHCP server.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "src_mac" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Asset Tracking" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Sessions.DHCP", + "All_Sessions.signature", + "All_Sessions.src_mac", + "All_Sessions.src_ip", + "All_Sessions.user" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address" + }, + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "id": "2f2f610a-d64d-48c2-b57c-967a2b49ab5a", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-06-04", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "description": "Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another AWS account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity.", + "narrative": "Amazon Web Services (AWS) admins manage access to AWS resources and services across the enterprise using AWS's Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage AWS users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as EC2 instances, the AWS Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\\\nHerein lies the rub. In between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\\\nThis Analytic Story includes searches that will help you monitor your AWS CloudTrail logs for evidence of suspicious cross-account activity. For example, while accessing multiple AWS accounts and roles may be perfectly valid behavior, it may be suspicious when an account requests privileges of an account it has not accessed in the past. After identifying suspicious activities, you can use the provided investigative searches to help you probe more deeply.", + "references": [ + "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "analytic_story": "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "category": [ + "Cloud Security" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Security Monitoring", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1550", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Lateral Movement", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "datamodels": [], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule", + "ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule", + "ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule", + "ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule", + "ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [ + "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity" + ], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "David Dorsey", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "aws detect attach to role policy", + "id": "88fc31dd-f331-448c-9856-d3d51dd5d3a1", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-07-27", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides detection of an user attaching itself to a different role trust policy. This can be used for lateral movement and escalation of privileges.", + "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` attach policy| spath requestParameters.policyArn | table sourceIPAddress user_access_key userIdentity.arn userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.arn eventName errorCode errorMessage status action requestParameters.policyArn userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.mfaAuthenticated userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.creationDate | `aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add-on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs", + "known_false_positives": "Attach to policy can create a lot of noise. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse (i.e status=failure). The search can provide context for common users attaching themselves to higher privilege policies or even newly created policies.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "aws detect attach to role policy", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Account", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "requestParameters.policyArn" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "aws detect permanent key creation", + "id": "12d6d713-3cb4-4ffc-a064-1dca3d1cca01", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-07-27", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides detection of accounts creating permanent keys. Permanent keys are not created by default and they are only needed for programmatic calls. Creation of Permanent key is an important event to monitor.", + "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` CreateAccessKey | spath eventName | search eventName=CreateAccessKey \"userIdentity.type\"=IAMUser | table sourceIPAddress userName userIdentity.type userAgent action status responseElements.accessKey.createDate responseElements.accessKey.status responseElements.accessKey.accessKeyId |`aws_detect_permanent_key_creation_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs", + "known_false_positives": "Not all permanent key creations are malicious. If there is a policy of rotating keys this search can be adjusted to provide better context.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "aws detect permanent key creation", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Account", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "userIdentity.type", + "sourceIPAddress", + "userName userIdentity.type", + "userAgent", + "action", + "status", + "responseElements.accessKey.createDate", + "esponseElements.accessKey.status", + "responseElements.accessKey.accessKeyId" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_detect_permanent_key_creation_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "aws detect role creation", + "id": "5f04081e-ddee-4353-afe4-504f288de9ad", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-07-27", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides detection of role creation by IAM users. Role creation is an event by itself if user is creating a new role with trust policies different than the available in AWS and it can be used for lateral movement and escalation of privileges.", + "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` event_name=CreateRole action=created userIdentity.type=AssumedRole requestParameters.description=Allows* | table sourceIPAddress userIdentity.principalId userIdentity.arn action event_name awsRegion http_user_agent mfa_auth msg requestParameters.roleName requestParameters.description responseElements.role.arn responseElements.role.createDate | `aws_detect_role_creation_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add-on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs", + "known_false_positives": "CreateRole is not very common in common users. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse. In general AWS provides plenty of trust policies that fit most use cases.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "aws detect role creation", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Account", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "event_name", + "action", + "userIdentity.type", + "requestParameters.description", + "sourceIPAddress", + "userIdentity.principalId", + "userIdentity.arn", + "action", + "event_name", + "awsRegion", + "http_user_agent", + "mfa_auth", + "msg", + "requestParameters.roleName", + "requestParameters.description", + "responseElements.role.arn", + "responseElements.role.createDate" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_detect_role_creation_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_role_creation.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "aws detect sts assume role abuse", + "id": "8e565314-b6a2-46d8-9f05-1a34a176a662", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-07-27", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides detection of suspicious use of sts:AssumeRole. These tokens can be created on the go and used by attackers to move laterally and escalate privileges.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` user_type=AssumedRole userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.type=Role | table sourceIPAddress userIdentity.arn user_agent user_access_key status action requestParameters.roleName responseElements.role.roleName responseElements.role.createDate | `aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs", + "known_false_positives": "Sts:AssumeRole can be very noisy as it is a standard mechanism to provide cross account and cross resources access. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "aws detect sts assume role abuse", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Account", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "user_type", + "userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.type", + "sourceIPAddress", + "userIdentity.arn", + "user_agent", + "user_access_key", + "status", + "action", + "requestParameters.roleName", + "esponseElements.role.roleName", + "esponseElements.role.createDate" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "aws detect sts get session token abuse", + "id": "85d7b35f-b8b5-4b01-916f-29b81e7a0551", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-07-27", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides detection of suspicious use of sts:GetSessionToken. These tokens can be created on the go and used by attackers to move laterally and escalate privileges.", + "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` ASIA userIdentity.type=IAMUser| spath eventName | search eventName=GetSessionToken | table sourceIPAddress eventTime userIdentity.arn userName userAgent user_type status region | `aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add-on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs", + "known_false_positives": "Sts:GetSessionToken can be very noisy as in certain environments numerous calls of this type can be executed. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse. In specific environments the use of field requestParameters.serialNumber will need to be used.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "aws detect sts get session token abuse", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Account", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1550" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "userIdentity.type", + "eventName", + "sourceIPAddress", + "eventTime", + "userIdentity.arn", + "userName", + "userAgent", + "user_type", + "status", + "region" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1550", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1550" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1550" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.yml", + "source": "cloud" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId", + "id": "703b65a4-a0ae-4171-965d-45507506c64f", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-06-08", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search retrieves the times, ARN, source IPs, AWS regions, event names, and the result of the event for specific credentials.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` | rename userIdentity.accessKeyId as accessKeyId| search accessKeyId=$accessKeyId$ | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode, errorMessage", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "accessKeyId" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom", + "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "userIdentity.accessKeyId", + "userIdentity.arn", + "sourceIPAddress", + "awsRegion", + "eventName", + "errorCode", + "errorMessage" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid" + }, + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation", + "id": "ced74200-8465-4bc3-bd2c-22782eec6750", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-03-08", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "description": "This analytic story contains detections that query your AWS Cloudtrail for activities related to privilege escalation.", + "narrative": "Amazon Web Services provides a neat feature called Identity and Access Management (IAM) that enables organizations to manage various AWS services and resources in a secure way. All IAM users have roles, groups and policies associated with them which governs and sets permissions to allow a user to access specific restrictions.\\\nHowever, if these IAM policies are misconfigured and have specific combinations of weak permissions; it can allow attackers to escalate their privileges and further compromise the organization. Rhino Security Labs have published comprehensive blogs detailing various AWS Escalation methods. By using this as an inspiration, Splunks research team wants to highlight how these attack vectors look in AWS Cloudtrail logs and provide you with detection queries to uncover these potentially malicious events via this Analytic Story. ", + "references": [ + "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/", + "https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/the-cloud-shadow-admin-threat-10-permissions-to-protect", + "https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation", + "analytic_story": "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation", + "category": [ + "Cloud Security" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Security Monitoring", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT33" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Indrik Spider", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1580", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Infrastructure Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN5", + "Fox Kitten", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT3", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "TA505" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access", + "Defense Evasion", + "Discovery", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "datamodels": [], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources - Rule", + "ESCU - AWS CreateAccessKey - Rule", + "ESCU - AWS CreateLoginProfile - Rule", + "ESCU - AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force - Rule", + "ESCU - AWS IAM Delete Policy - Rule", + "ESCU - AWS IAM Failure Group Deletion - Rule", + "ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", + "ESCU - AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion - Rule", + "ESCU - AWS UpdateLoginProfile - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources", + "id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-212bf3d0dac4", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-02-22", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user created a policy version that allows them to access any resource in their account", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=CreatePolicyVersion eventSource = iam.amazonaws.com errorCode = success | spath input=requestParameters.policyDocument output=key_policy_statements path=Statement{} | mvexpand key_policy_statements | spath input=key_policy_statements output=key_policy_action_1 path=Action | search key_policy_action_1 = \"*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(key_policy_statements) as policy_added by eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|`aws_create_policy_version_to_allow_all_resources_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", + "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a policy to allow a user to access all resources. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to all AWS resources", + "references": [ + "https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws", + "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation-part-2/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Account", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_create_policy_version/aws_cloudtrail_events.json" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user$ created a policy version that allows them to access any resource in their account", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078.004", + "T1078" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "userAgent", + "errorCode", + "requestParameters.userName" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT33" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078.004", + "T1078" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078.004", + "T1078" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources", + "file": "cloud/aws_create_policy_version_to_allow_all_resources.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-7d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "aws_cloudtrail_events.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_create_policy_version/aws_cloudtrail_events.json", + "source": "aws_cloudtrail", + "sourcetype": "aws:cloudtrail", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_create_policy_version_to_allow_all_resources_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_create_policy_version_to_allow_all_resources.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "AWS CreateAccessKey", + "id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-11ad-212bf3d0d111", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-07-19", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user A who has already permission to create access keys, makes an API call to create access keys for another user B. Attackers have been know to use this technique for Privilege Escalation in case new victim(user B) has more permissions than old victim(user B)", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName = CreateAccessKey userAgent !=console.amazonaws.com errorCode = success| search userIdentity.userName!=requestParameters.userName | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by requestParameters.userName src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|`aws_createaccesskey_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", + "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created keys for another user.", + "references": [ + "https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws", + "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation-part-2/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS CreateAccessKey", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Account", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_createaccesskey/aws_cloudtrail_events.json" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user_arn$ is attempting to create access keys for $requestParameters.userName$ from this IP $src$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1136.003", + "T1136" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user_arn", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "userAgent", + "errorCode", + "requestParameters.userName" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Indrik Spider", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1136.003", + "T1136" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user_arn", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "src", + "risk_score": 63 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user_arn", + "risk_score": 63 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1136.003", + "T1136" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "AWS CreateAccessKey Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "AWS CreateAccessKey", + "file": "cloud/aws_createaccesskey.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-7d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "aws_cloudtrail_events.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_createaccesskey/aws_cloudtrail_events.json", + "source": "aws_cloudtrail", + "sourcetype": "aws:cloudtrail", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_createaccesskey_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_createaccesskey.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "AWS CreateLoginProfile", + "id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-11ad-212bf444d111", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-07-19", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user A(victim A) creates a login profile for user B, followed by a AWS Console login event from user B from the same src_ip as user B. This correlated event can be indicative of privilege escalation since both events happened from the same src_ip", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName = CreateLoginProfile | rename requestParameters.userName as new_login_profile | table src_ip eventName new_login_profile userIdentity.userName | join new_login_profile src_ip [| search `cloudtrail` eventName = ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.userName as new_login_profile | stats count values(eventName) min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn new_login_profile src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`] | `aws_createloginprofile_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", + "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a login profile for another user.", + "references": [ + "https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws", + "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation-part-2/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS CreateLoginProfile", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Account", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_createloginprofile/aws_cloudtrail_events.json" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user_arn$ is attempting to create a login profile for $requestParameters.userName$ and did a console login from this IP $src_ip$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1136.003", + "T1136" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user_arn", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "userAgent", + "errorCode", + "requestParameters.userName" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Indrik Spider", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1136.003", + "T1136" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user_arn", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "src_ip", + "risk_score": 72 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user_arn", + "risk_score": 72 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1136.003", + "T1136" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "AWS CreateLoginProfile Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "AWS CreateLoginProfile", + "file": "cloud/aws_createloginprofile.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-7d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "aws_cloudtrail_events.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_createloginprofile/aws_cloudtrail_events.json", + "source": "aws_cloudtrail", + "sourcetype": "aws:cloudtrail", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_createloginprofile_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_createloginprofile.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force", + "id": "f19e09b0-9308-11eb-b7ec-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-01", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following detection identifies any malformed policy document exceptions with a status of `failure`. A malformed policy document exception occurs in instances where roles are attempted to be assumed, or brute forced. In a brute force attempt, using a tool like CloudSploit or Pacu, an attempt will look like `arn:aws:iam::111111111111:role/aws-service-role/rds.amazonaws.com/AWSServiceRoleForRDS`. Meaning, when an adversary is attempting to identify a role name, multiple failures will occur. This detection focuses on the errors of a remote attempt that is failing.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` (errorCode=MalformedPolicyDocumentException) status=failure (userAgent!=*.amazonaws.com) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.policyName) as policy_name by src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode requestParameters.policyDocument userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | where count >= 2 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs. Set the `where count` greater than a value to identify suspicious activity in your environment.", + "known_false_positives": "This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users.", + "references": [ + "https://www.praetorian.com/blog/aws-iam-assume-role-vulnerabilities", + "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/assume-worst-aws-assume-role-enumeration/", + "https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/aws-iam-brute-force-of-assume-role-policy.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Account", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:Inbound", + "Stage:Credential Access", + "Other:Policy Violation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1580/aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force/aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force.json" + ], + "impact": 40, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "User $user_arn$ has caused multiple failures with errorCode $errorCode$, which potentially means adversary is attempting to identify a role name.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1580", + "T1110" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user_arn", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "userAgent", + "errorCode", + "requestParameters.policyName" + ], + "risk_score": 28, + "security_domain": "access", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1580", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Infrastructure Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN5", + "Fox Kitten", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1580", + "T1110" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user_arn", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:Inbound", + "Stage:Credential Access", + "Other:Policy Violation" + ], + "impact": 40, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "src", + "risk_score": 28 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user_arn", + "risk_score": 28 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1580", + "T1110" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force", + "file": "cloud/aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1580/aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force/aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force.json", + "source": "aws_cloudtrail", + "sourcetype": "aws:cloudtrail", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "AWS IAM Delete Policy", + "id": "ec3a9362-92fe-11eb-99d0-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-01", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following detection identifes when a policy is deleted on AWS. This does not identify whether successful or failed, but the error messages tell a story of suspicious attempts. There is a specific process to follow when deleting a policy. First, detach the policy from all users, groups, and roles that the policy is attached to, using DetachUserPolicy , DetachGroupPolicy , or DetachRolePolicy.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=DeletePolicy (userAgent!=*.amazonaws.com) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.policyArn) as policyArn by src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode errorMessage userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId userIdentity.arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_iam_delete_policy_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs.", + "known_false_positives": "This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users. Not every user with AWS access should have permission to delete policies (least privilege). In addition, this may be saved seperately and tuned for failed or success attempts only.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_DeletePolicy.html", + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/iam/delete-policy.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS IAM Delete Policy", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Account", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Stage:Execution", + "Other:Policy Violation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098/aws_iam_delete_policy/aws_iam_delete_policy.json" + ], + "impact": 20, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user_arn$ has deleted AWS Policies from IP address $src$ by executing the following command $eventName$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1098" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user_arn", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "userAgent", + "errorCode", + "requestParameters.policyArn" + ], + "risk_score": 10, + "security_domain": "access", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT3", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1098" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user_arn", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Stage:Execution", + "Other:Policy Violation" + ], + "impact": 20, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "src", + "risk_score": 10 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user_arn", + "risk_score": 10 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1098" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "AWS IAM Delete Policy Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "AWS IAM Delete Policy", + "file": "cloud/aws_iam_delete_policy.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "aws_iam_delete_policy.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098/aws_iam_delete_policy/aws_iam_delete_policy.json", + "source": "aws_cloudtrail", + "sourcetype": "aws:cloudtrail", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_iam_delete_policy_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_iam_delete_policy.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "AWS IAM Failure Group Deletion", + "id": "723b861a-92eb-11eb-93b8-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-01", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This detection identifies failure attempts to delete groups. We want to identify when a group is attempting to be deleted, but either access is denied, there is a conflict or there is no group. This is indicative of administrators performing an action, but also could be suspicious behavior occurring. Review parallel IAM events - recently added users, new groups and so forth.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=iam.amazonaws.com eventName=DeleteGroup errorCode IN (NoSuchEntityException,DeleteConflictException, AccessDenied) (userAgent!=*.amazonaws.com) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.groupName) as group_name by src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode errorMessage userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_iam_failure_group_deletion_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs.", + "known_false_positives": "This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users. Not every user with AWS access should have permission to delete groups (least privilege).", + "references": [ + "https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/iam/delete-group.html", + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteGroup.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS IAM Failure Group Deletion", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Account", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098/aws_iam_failure_group_deletion/aws_iam_failure_group_deletion.json" + ], + "impact": 10, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user_arn$ has had mulitple failures while attempting to delete groups from $src$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1098" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user_arn", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "group_name", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "userAgent", + "errorCode", + "requestParameters.groupName" + ], + "risk_score": 5, + "security_domain": "cloud", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT3", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1098" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user_arn", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "group_name", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 10, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "src", + "risk_score": 5 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user_arn", + "risk_score": 5 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "group_name", + "risk_score": 5 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1098" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "AWS IAM Failure Group Deletion Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "AWS IAM Failure Group Deletion", + "file": "cloud/aws_iam_failure_group_deletion.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "aws_iam_delete_policy.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098/aws_iam_failure_group_deletion/aws_iam_failure_group_deletion.json", + "source": "aws_cloudtrail", + "sourcetype": "aws:cloudtrail", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_iam_failure_group_deletion_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_iam_failure_group_deletion.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion", + "id": "e776d06c-9267-11eb-819b-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-03-31", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following query uses IAM events to track the success of a group being deleted on AWS. This is typically not indicative of malicious behavior, but a precurser to additional events thay may unfold. Review parallel IAM events - recently added users, new groups and so forth. Inversely, review failed attempts in a similar manner.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=iam.amazonaws.com eventName=DeleteGroup errorCode=success (userAgent!=*.amazonaws.com) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.groupName) as group_deleted by src eventName eventSource errorCode user_agent awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_iam_successful_group_deletion_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs.", + "known_false_positives": "This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users. Not every user with AWS access should have permission to delete groups (least privilege).", + "references": [ + "https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/iam/delete-group.html", + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteGroup.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Account", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098/aws_iam_successful_group_deletion/aws_iam_successful_group_deletion.json" + ], + "impact": 10, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user_arn$ has sucessfully deleted mulitple groups $group_deleted$ from $src$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1069.003", + "T1098", + "T1069" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user_arn", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "group_deleted", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "userAgent", + "errorCode", + "requestParameters.groupName" + ], + "risk_score": 5, + "security_domain": "cloud", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT3", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "TA505" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1069.003", + "T1098", + "T1069" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user_arn", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "group_deleted", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 10, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "src", + "risk_score": 5 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user_arn", + "risk_score": 5 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "group_deleted", + "risk_score": 5 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1069.003", + "T1098", + "T1069" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion", + "file": "cloud/aws_iam_successful_group_deletion.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "aws_iam_successful_group_deletion.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098/aws_iam_successful_group_deletion/aws_iam_successful_group_deletion.json", + "source": "aws_cloudtrail", + "sourcetype": "aws:cloudtrail", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_iam_successful_group_deletion_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_iam_successful_group_deletion.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion", + "id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-11ad-212bf3d0dac4", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-03-02", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user has set a default policy versions. Attackers have been know to use this technique for Privilege Escalation in case the previous versions of the policy had permissions to access more resources than the current version of the policy", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=SetDefaultPolicyVersion eventSource = iam.amazonaws.com | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.policyArn) as policy_arn by src requestParameters.versionId eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_setdefaultpolicyversion_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", + "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately set a default policy to allow a user to access all resources. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to all AWS resources", + "references": [ + "https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws", + "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation-part-2/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Account", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Stage:Credential Access", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_setdefaultpolicyversion/aws_cloudtrail_events.json" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "From IP address $sourceIPAddress$, user agent $userAgent$ has trigged an event $eventName$ for updating the the default policy version", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078.004", + "T1078" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user_arn", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "userAgent", + "errorCode", + "requestParameters.userName", + "eventSource" + ], + "risk_score": 30, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT33" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078.004", + "T1078" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user_arn", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Stage:Credential Access", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "src", + "risk_score": 30 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user_arn", + "risk_score": 30 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078.004", + "T1078" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion", + "file": "cloud/aws_setdefaultpolicyversion.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-7d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "aws_cloudtrail_events.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_setdefaultpolicyversion/aws_cloudtrail_events.json", + "source": "aws_cloudtrail", + "sourcetype": "aws:cloudtrail", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_setdefaultpolicyversion_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_setdefaultpolicyversion.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "AWS UpdateLoginProfile", + "id": "2a9b80d3-6a40-4115-11ad-212bf3d0d111", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-07-19", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user A who has already permission to update login profile, makes an API call to update login profile for another user B . Attackers have been know to use this technique for Privilege Escalation in case new victim(user B) has more permissions than old victim(user B)", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName = UpdateLoginProfile userAgent !=console.amazonaws.com errorCode = success| search userIdentity.userName!=requestParameters.userName | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by requestParameters.userName src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.userName user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|`aws_updateloginprofile_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", + "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created keys for another user.", + "references": [ + "https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws", + "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation-part-2/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS UpdateLoginProfile", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Account", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_updateloginprofile/aws_cloudtrail_events.json" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "From IP address $sourceIPAddress$, user agent $userAgent$ has trigged an event $eventName$ for updating the existing login profile, potentially giving user $user_arn$ more access privilleges", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1136.003", + "T1136" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user_arn", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "userAgent", + "errorCode", + "requestParameters.userName" + ], + "risk_score": 30, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Indrik Spider", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1136.003", + "T1136" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user_arn", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "src", + "risk_score": 30 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user_arn", + "risk_score": 30 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1136.003", + "T1136" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "AWS UpdateLoginProfile Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "AWS UpdateLoginProfile", + "file": "cloud/aws_updateloginprofile.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-7d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "aws_cloudtrail_events.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_updateloginprofile/aws_cloudtrail_events.json", + "source": "aws_cloudtrail", + "sourcetype": "aws:cloudtrail", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_updateloginprofile_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_updateloginprofile.yml", + "source": "cloud" + } + ], + "investigations": [] + }, + { + "name": "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "id": "2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50ff268af4", + "version": 2, + "date": "2018-05-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "description": "Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it.", + "narrative": "AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and operational/risk auditing of your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Management Console, AWS Command Line Interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your servers are not vulnerable to attacks. This analytic story contains detection searches that leverage CloudTrail logs from AWS to check for bad configurations and malicious activity in your AWS network access controls.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/UserGuide/VPC_Appendix_NACLs.html", + "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-help-prepare-for-ddos-attacks-by-reducing-your-attack-surface/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "analytic_story": "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "category": [ + "Cloud Security" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Security Monitoring", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "datamodels": [], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Command & Control" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", + "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", + "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", + "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [ + "ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS", + "ESCU - Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN" + ], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports", + "id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d6bd75", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-01-11", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The search looks for AWS CloudTrail events to detect if any network ACLs were created with all the ports open to a specified CIDR.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=CreateNetworkAclEntry OR eventName=ReplaceNetworkAclEntry requestParameters.ruleAction=allow requestParameters.egress=false requestParameters.aclProtocol=-1 | append [search `cloudtrail` eventName=CreateNetworkAclEntry OR eventName=ReplaceNetworkAclEntry requestParameters.ruleAction=allow requestParameters.egress=false requestParameters.aclProtocol!=-1 | eval port_range='requestParameters.portRange.to' - 'requestParameters.portRange.from' | where port_range>1024] | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by userName userIdentity.principalId eventName requestParameters.ruleAction requestParameters.egress requestParameters.aclProtocol requestParameters.portRange.to requestParameters.portRange.from src userAgent requestParameters.cidrBlock | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS, version 4.4.0 or later, and configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "It's possible that an admin has created this ACL with all ports open for some legitimate purpose however, this should be scoped and not allowed in production environment.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 11" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.007/aws_create_acl/aws_cloudtrail_events.json" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user_arn$ has created network ACLs with all the ports open to a specified CIDR $requestParameters.cidrBlock$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.007", + "T1562" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "userName", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "requestParameters.cidrBlock", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "requestParameters.ruleAction", + "requestParameters.egress", + "requestParameters.aclProtocol", + "requestParameters.portRange.to", + "requestParameters.portRange.from", + "requestParameters.cidrBlock", + "userName", + "userIdentity.principalId", + "userAgent" + ], + "risk_score": 48, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.007", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 11" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "userName", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "requestParameters.cidrBlock", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "src", + "risk_score": 48 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "userName", + "risk_score": 48 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "requestParameters.cidrBlock", + "risk_score": 48 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.007", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 11" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports", + "file": "cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "aws_cloudtrail_events.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.007/aws_create_acl/aws_cloudtrail_events.json", + "source": "aws_cloudtrail", + "sourcetype": "aws:cloudtrail", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "AWS Network Access Control List Deleted", + "id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d6fd75", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-01-12", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "Enforcing network-access controls is one of the defensive mechanisms used by cloud administrators to restrict access to a cloud instance. After the attacker has gained control of the AWS console by compromising an admin account, they can delete a network ACL and gain access to the instance from anywhere. This search will query the AWS CloudTrail logs to detect users deleting network ACLs.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteNetworkAclEntry requestParameters.egress=false | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by userName userIdentity.principalId eventName requestParameters.egress src userAgent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a user has legitimately deleted a network ACL.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS Network Access Control List Deleted", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 11" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.007/aws_delete_acl/aws_cloudtrail_events.json" + ], + "impact": 10, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user_arn$ from $src$ has sucessfully deleted network ACLs entry (eventName= $eventName$), such that the instance is accessible from anywhere", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.007", + "T1562" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user_arn", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "requestParameters.egress", + "userName", + "userIdentity.principalId", + "src", + "userAgent" + ], + "risk_score": 5, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.007", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 11" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user_arn", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 10, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "src", + "risk_score": 5 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user_arn", + "risk_score": 5 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.007", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 11" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "AWS Network Access Control List Deleted Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "AWS Network Access Control List Deleted", + "file": "cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "aws_cloudtrail_events.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.007/aws_delete_acl/aws_cloudtrail_events.json", + "source": "aws_cloudtrail", + "sourcetype": "aws:cloudtrail", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity", + "id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a1f1-e32372d4bd53", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-05-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to network access-control lists (ACLs)in your AWS environment. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` `network_acl_events` [search `cloudtrail` `network_acl_events` | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | stats count as apiCalls by arn | inputlookup network_acl_activity_baseline append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) as * by arn | rename apiCalls as latestCount | eval newAvgApiCalls=avgApiCalls + (latestCount-avgApiCalls)/720 | eval newStdevApiCalls=sqrt(((pow(stdevApiCalls, 2)*719 + (latestCount-newAvgApiCalls)*(latestCount-avgApiCalls))/720)) | eval avgApiCalls=coalesce(newAvgApiCalls, avgApiCalls), stdevApiCalls=coalesce(newStdevApiCalls, stdevApiCalls), numDataPoints=if(isnull(latestCount), numDataPoints, numDataPoints+1) | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup network_acl_activity_baseline | eval dataPointThreshold = 15, deviationThreshold = 3 | eval isSpike=if((latestCount > avgApiCalls+deviationThreshold*stdevApiCalls) AND numDataPoints > dataPointThreshold, 1, 0) | where isSpike=1 | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | stats values(eventName) as eventNames, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName) as uniqueApisCalled by user | `detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best when you run the \"Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN\" support search once to create a lookup file of previously seen Network ACL Activity. To add or remove API event names related to network ACLs, edit the macro `network_acl_events`.", + "known_false_positives": "The false-positive rate may vary based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`. Please modify this according the your environment.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 11" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.007" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.CM", + "PR.AC" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "userIdentity.arn" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.007" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 11" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.CM", + "PR.AC" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN", + "id": "fc0edd96-ff2b-4810-9f1f-63da3783fd63", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-05-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and the standard deviation of the number of API calls that were related to network ACLs made by each user. Also recorded is the number of data points for each user. This table is then outputted to a lookup file to allow the detection search to operate quickly.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` `network_acl_events` | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as apiCalls by _time, arn | stats count(apiCalls) as numDataPoints, latest(apiCalls) as latestCount, avg(apiCalls) as avgApiCalls, stdev(apiCalls) as stdevApiCalls by arn | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup network_acl_activity_baseline | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. To add or remove API event names for network ACLs, edit the macro `network_acl_events`.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "userIdentity.arn" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.007" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 11" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.CM", + "PR.AC" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "network_acl_events", + "definition": "(eventName = CreateNetworkAcl OR eventName = CreateNetworkAclEntry OR eventName = DeleteNetworkAcl OR eventName = DeleteNetworkAclEntry OR eventName = ReplaceNetworkAclEntry OR eventName = ReplaceNetworkAclAssociation)", + "description": "This is a list of AWS event names that are associated with Network ACLs" + }, + { + "name": "detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "network_acl_activity_baseline", + "description": "A lookup file that will contain the baseline information for number of AWS Network ACL Activity", + "filename": "network_acl_activity_baseline.csv" + }, + { + "name": "network_acl_activity_baseline", + "description": "A lookup file that will contain the baseline information for number of AWS Network ACL Activity", + "filename": "network_acl_activity_baseline.csv" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS", + "id": "d3fffa37-492f-487b-a35d-c60fcb2acf01", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-05-07", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search will detect spike in blocked outbound network connections originating from within your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data.", + "search": "`cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow` action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR src_ip=192.168.0.0/16) ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16) [search `cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow` action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR src_ip=192.168.0.0/16) ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16) | stats count as numberOfBlockedConnections by src_ip | inputlookup baseline_blocked_outbound_connections append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) as * by src_ip | rename numberOfBlockedConnections as latestCount | eval newAvgBlockedConnections=avgBlockedConnections + (latestCount-avgBlockedConnections)/720 | eval newStdevBlockedConnections=sqrt(((pow(stdevBlockedConnections, 2)*719 + (latestCount-newAvgBlockedConnections)*(latestCount-avgBlockedConnections))/720)) | eval avgBlockedConnections=coalesce(newAvgBlockedConnections, avgBlockedConnections), stdevBlockedConnections=coalesce(newStdevBlockedConnections, stdevBlockedConnections), numDataPoints=if(isnull(latestCount), numDataPoints, numDataPoints+1) | table src_ip, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgBlockedConnections, stdevBlockedConnections | outputlookup baseline_blocked_outbound_connections | eval dataPointThreshold = 5, deviationThreshold = 3 | eval isSpike=if((latestCount > avgBlockedConnections+deviationThreshold*stdevBlockedConnections) AND numDataPoints > dataPointThreshold, 1, 0) | where isSpike=1 | table src_ip] | stats values(dest_ip) as \"Blocked Destination IPs\", values(interface_id) as \"resourceId\" count as numberOfBlockedConnections, dc(dest_ip) as uniqueDestConnections by src_ip | `detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your VPC Flow logs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the number of data points required to meet the definition of \"spike.\" The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best when you run the \"Baseline of Blocked Outbound Connection\" support search once to create a history of previously seen blocked outbound connections.", + "known_false_positives": "The false-positive rate may vary based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`. Additionally, false positives may result when AWS administrators roll out policies enforcing network blocks, causing sudden increases in the number of blocked outbound connections.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Command & Control" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 11" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Command & Control" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM", + "PR.AC" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "action", + "src_ip", + "dest_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 11" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM", + "PR.AC" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Command & Control" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS", + "id": "fc0edd96-ff2b-48b0-9f1f-63da3782fd63", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-05-07", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and the standard deviation of the number of outbound connections blocked in your VPC flow logs by each source IP address (IP address of your EC2 instances). Also recorded is the number of data points for each source IP. This table outputs to a lookup file to allow the detection search to operate quickly.", + "search": "`cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow` action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR src_ip=192.168.0.0/16) ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16) | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as numberOfBlockedConnections by _time, src_ip | stats count(numberOfBlockedConnections) as numDataPoints, latest(numberOfBlockedConnections) as latestCount, avg(numberOfBlockedConnections) as avgBlockedConnections, stdev(numberOfBlockedConnections) as stdevBlockedConnections by src_ip | table src_ip, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgBlockedConnections, stdevBlockedConnections | outputlookup baseline_blocked_outbound_connections | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your `VPC flow logs.`.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Command & Control", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "action", + "src_ip", + "dest_ip" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 11" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM", + "PR.AC" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudwatchlogs:vpcflow", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "baseline_blocked_outbound_connections", + "description": "A lookup file that will contain the baseline information for number of blocked outbound connections", + "filename": "baseline_blocked_outbound_connections.csv" + }, + { + "name": "baseline_blocked_outbound_connections", + "description": "A lookup file that will contain the baseline information for number of blocked outbound connections", + "filename": "baseline_blocked_outbound_connections.csv" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml", + "source": "cloud" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", + "id": "bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd72", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-30", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search lists all the logged CloudTrail activities by a specific user ARN and will create a table containing the source of the user, the region of the activity, the name and type of the event, the action taken, and all the user's identity information.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` | search user=$user$| table _time userIdentity.type userIdentity.userName userIdentity.arn aws_account_id src awsRegion eventName eventType", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "user" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "Command & Control", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Suspicious Cloud User Activities", + "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", + "AWS Security Hub Alerts" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "user", + "userIdentity.type", + "userIdentity.userName", + "userIdentity.arn", + "aws_account_id", + "src", + "awsRegion", + "eventName", + "eventType" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn" + }, + { + "name": "AWS Network ACL Details from ID", + "id": "2e11293f-c795-41bd-b470-fc87adc4e196", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-01-22", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries AWS description logs and returns all the information about a specific network ACL via network ACL ID", + "search": "`aws_description` | rename id as networkAclId | search networkAclId=$networkAclId$ | table id account_id vpc_id network_acl_entries{}.*", + "how_to_implement": "In order to implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS(version 4.4.0 or later) and configure your AWS description inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "networkAclId" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Command & Control", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "id", + "account_id", + "vpc_id", + "network_acl_entries{}.*" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "aws_network_acl_details_from_id" + }, + { + "name": "AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", + "id": "c55b0a17-8fca-4315-81e3-65ceaa176441", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-05-07", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries AWS configuration logs and returns the information about a specific network interface via network interface ID. The information will include the ARN of the network interface, its relationships with other AWS resources, the public and the private IP associated with the network interface.", + "search": "`aws_config` resourceId=$resourceId$ | table _time ARN relationships{}.resourceType relationships{}.name relationships{}.resourceId configuration.privateIpAddresses{}.privateIpAddress configuration.privateIpAddresses{}.association.publicIp", + "how_to_implement": "In order to implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS(version 4.4.0 or later) and configure your AWS configuration inputs", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "resourceId" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Command & Control", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "resourceId", + "ARN", + "relationships{}.resourceType", + "relationships{}.name", + "relationships{}.resourceId", + "configuration.privateIpAddresses{}.privateIpAddress", + "configuration.privateIpAddresses{}.association.publicIp" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid" + }, + { + "name": "Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", + "id": "446ec87a-85c6-40d4-b060-bea4498281d6", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-03-19", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search retrieves all the activity from a specific IP address and will create a table containing the time, ARN, username, the type of user, the IP address, the AWS region the activity was in, the API called, and whether or not the API call was successful.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search src_ip=$src_ip$ | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn | spath output=awsUserName path=userIdentity.userName | spath output=userType path=userIdentity.type | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, userName, userType, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "src_ip" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities", + "Command & Control", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "sourceIPAddress", + "userIdentity.arn", + "userIdentity.userName", + "userIdentity.type", + "awsRegion", + "eventName", + "errorCode" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address" + }, + { + "name": "Get DNS Server History for a host", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-11-09", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "While investigating any detections it is important to understand which and how many DNS servers a host has connected to in the past. This search uses data that is tagged as DNS and gives you a count and list of DNS servers that a particular host has connected to the previous 24 hours.", + "search": "| search tag=dns src_ip=$src_ip$ dest_port=53 | streamstats time_window=1d count values(dest_ip) as dcip by src_ip | table date_mday src_ip dcip count | sort -count", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting your DNS traffic", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "src_ip" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Command & Control", + "DNS Hijacking", + "Data Protection", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "src_ip", + "dest_port", + "dest_ip" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_dns_server_history_for_a_host" + }, + { + "name": "Get DNS traffic ratio", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd73", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-11-09", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search calculates the ratio of DNS traffic originating and coming from a host to a list of DNS servers over the last 24 hours. A high value of this ratio could be very useful to quickly understand if a src_ip (host) is sending a high volume of data out via port 53, could be an indicator of data exfiltration via DNS. ", + "search": "| tstats allow_old_summaries=true sum(All_Traffic.bytes_out) as \"bytes_out\" sum(All_Traffic.bytes_in) as \"bytes_in\" from datamodel=Network_Traffic where nodename=All_Traffic All_Traffic.dest_port=53 by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest| `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | rename src as src_ip | rename dest as dest_ip | search src_ip=$src_ip$ | search dest_ip = $dest_ip | eval ratio = (bytes_out/bytes_in) | table ratio", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your network traffic", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "src_ip" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Command & Control", + "Data Protection", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.bytes_out", + "All_Traffic.bytes_in", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.src", + "All_Traffic.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_dns_traffic_ratio" + }, + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + }, + { + "name": "Get Process Info", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd71", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-01", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the process running on a host which is under investigation. To gather the process info, enter the values for the process name in question and the destination IP address.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search process_name= $process_name$ | search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_process_info" + }, + { + "name": "Get Process Information For Port Activity", + "id": "9925d08f-561e-4faa-8912-e3888a842341", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-01", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search will return information about the process associated with observed network traffic to a specific destination port from a specific host.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search dest=$dest$ | join dest type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Ports by Ports.process_id Ports.src Ports.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | search dest_port=$dest_port$ | rename src as dest]", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data that associates processes with network events and populate the Endpoint Datamodel", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest", + "dest_port" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Ports.process_id", + "Ports.src", + "Ports.dest_port" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_process_information_for_port_activity" + }, + { + "name": "Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", + "id": "910e6512-edc9-4f93-ba24-5b786f47a672", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-01", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "While investigating, an analyst will want to know what process and parent_process is responsible for generating suspicious DNS traffic. Use the following search and enter the value of `dest` in the search to get specific details on the process responsible for creating the DNS traffic.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search dest = $dest$ | join dest type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port=53 by Ports.process_id Ports.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename src as dest]", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that associates processes with network events into the Endpoint datamodel. This can come from endpoint protection products such as carbon black, or endpoint data sources such as Sysmon.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Command & Control", + "Data Protection", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Ports.process_id", + "Ports.src", + "Ports.dest_port" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "AWS Security Hub Alerts", + "id": "2f2f610a-d64d-48c2-b57c-96722b49ab5a", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-08-04", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "description": "This story is focused around detecting Security Hub alerts generated from AWS", + "narrative": "AWS Security Hub collects and consolidates findings from AWS security services enabled in your environment, such as intrusion detection findings from Amazon GuardDuty, vulnerability scans from Amazon Inspector, S3 bucket policy findings from Amazon Macie, publicly accessible and cross-account resources from IAM Access Analyzer, and resources lacking WAF coverage from AWS Firewall Manager.", + "references": [ + "https://aws.amazon.com/security-hub/features/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS Security Hub Alerts", + "analytic_story": "AWS Security Hub Alerts", + "category": [ + "Cloud Security" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Security Monitoring", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [], + "datamodels": [], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance", + "id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-290bf5d0d222", + "version": 3, + "date": "2021-01-26", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub alerts for an EC2 instance in 4 hours intervals", + "search": "`aws_securityhub_finding` \"Resources{}.Type\"=AWSEC2Instance | bucket span=4h _time | stats count AS alerts values(Title) as Title values(Types{}) as Types values(vendor_account) as vendor_account values(vendor_region) as vendor_region values(severity) as severity by _time dest | eventstats avg(alerts) as total_alerts_avg, stdev(alerts) as total_alerts_stdev | eval threshold_value = 3 | eval isOutlier=if(alerts > total_alerts_avg+(total_alerts_stdev * threshold_value), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | table _time dest alerts Title Types vendor_account vendor_region severity isOutlier total_alerts_avg | `detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Security Hub inputs. The threshold_value should be tuned to your environment and schedule these searches according to the bucket span interval.", + "known_false_positives": "None", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Security Hub Alerts" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/security_hub_ec2_spike/security_hub_ec2_spike.json" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Spike in AWS security Hub alerts with title $Title$ for EC2 instance $dest$", + "nist": [ + "DE.DP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Resources{}.Type", + "Title", + "Types{}", + "vendor_account", + "vendor_region", + "severity", + "dest" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Security Hub Alerts" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance", + "file": "cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "security_hub_ec2_spike.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/security_hub_ec2_spike/security_hub_ec2_spike.json", + "source": "aws_securityhub_finding", + "sourcetype": "aws:securityhub:finding" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "aws_securityhub_finding", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:securityhub:finding\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User", + "id": "2a9b80d3-6220-4345-b5ad-290bf5d0d222", + "version": 3, + "date": "2021-01-26", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub alerts for an AWS IAM User in 4 hours intervals.", + "search": "`aws_securityhub_finding` \"findings{}.Resources{}.Type\"= AwsIamUser | rename findings{}.Resources{}.Id as user | bucket span=4h _time | stats count AS alerts by _time user | eventstats avg(alerts) as total_launched_avg, stdev(alerts) as total_launched_stdev | eval threshold_value = 2 | eval isOutlier=if(alerts > total_launched_avg+(total_launched_stdev * threshold_value), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | table _time user alerts |`detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Security Hub inputs. The threshold_value should be tuned to your environment and schedule these searches according to the bucket span interval.", + "known_false_positives": "None", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Security Hub Alerts" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "findings{}.Resources{}.Type", + "indings{}.Resources{}.Id", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Security Hub Alerts" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "aws_securityhub_finding", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:securityhub:finding\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml", + "source": "cloud" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", + "id": "bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd72", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-30", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search lists all the logged CloudTrail activities by a specific user ARN and will create a table containing the source of the user, the region of the activity, the name and type of the event, the action taken, and all the user's identity information.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` | search user=$user$| table _time userIdentity.type userIdentity.userName userIdentity.arn aws_account_id src awsRegion eventName eventType", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "user" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "Command & Control", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Suspicious Cloud User Activities", + "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", + "AWS Security Hub Alerts" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "user", + "userIdentity.type", + "userIdentity.userName", + "userIdentity.arn", + "aws_account_id", + "src", + "awsRegion", + "eventName", + "eventType" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn" + }, + { + "name": "Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", + "id": "de4aed1d-f13a-4d2f-a97a-73c60e2e6b56", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-02-12", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries AWS description logs and returns all the information about a specific instance via the instanceId field", + "search": "`aws_description` | dedup id sortby -_time |rename id as instanceId| search instanceId=$instanceId$ | spath output=tags path=tags | eval tags=mvzip(key,value,\" = \"), ip_address=if((ip_address == \"null\"),private_ip_address,ip_address) | table id, tags.Name, aws_account_id, placement, instance_type, key_name, ip_address, launch_time, state, vpc_id, subnet_id, tags | rename aws_account_id as \"Account ID\", id as ID, instance_type as Type, ip_address as \"IP Address\", key_name as \"Key Pair\", launch_time as \"Launch Time\", placement as \"Availability Zone\", state as State, subnet_id as Subnet, \"tags.Name\" as Name, vpc_id as VPC", + "how_to_implement": "In order to implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS(version 4.4.0 or later) and configure your AWS description inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "instanceId" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "AWS Security Hub Alerts" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "id", + "ip_address", + "tags", + "aws_account_id", + "placement", + "instance_type", + "key_name", + "launch_time", + "state", + "vpc_id", + "subnet_id" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid" + }, + { + "name": "Get EC2 Launch Details", + "id": "0e40fe83-3edb-4d86-8206-8fed36529ca6", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-03-12", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search returns some of the launch details for a EC2 instance.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` dest=$dest$ |rename userIdentity.arn as arn, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as dest, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.privateIpAddress as privateIpAddress, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.imageId as amiID, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.architecture as architecture, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.keyName as keyName | table arn, awsRegion, dest, architecture, privateIpAddress, amiID, keyName", + "how_to_implement": "In order to implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS(version 4.4.0 or later) and configure your AWS description inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "AWS Security Hub Alerts" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "dest", + "userIdentity.arn", + "responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId", + "responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.privateIpAddress", + "responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.imageId", + "responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.architecture", + "responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.keyName" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_ec2_launch_details" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "AWS User Monitoring", + "id": "2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50f1269af3", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-03-12", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "description": "Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment.", + "narrative": "It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it's all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable to attack. In fact, this was the very oversight that led to Tesla's cryptojacking attack in February, 2018.\\\nIn addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed for any new EC2 instances and increased bandwidth usage. \\\nFortunately, you can leverage Amazon Web Services (AWS) CloudTrail--a tool that helps you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing of your AWS account--to give you increased visibility into your user and resource activity by recording AWS Management Console actions and API calls. You can identify which users and accounts called AWS, the source IP address from which the calls were made, and when the calls occurred.\\\nThe detection searches in this Analytic Story are designed to help you uncover AWS API activities from users not listed in the identity table, as well as similar activities from disabled accounts.", + "references": [ + "https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", + "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS User Monitoring", + "analytic_story": "AWS User Monitoring", + "category": [ + "Cloud Security" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Security Monitoring", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1526", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT33" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Discovery", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "datamodels": [], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - AWS Excessive Security Scanning - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", + "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [ + "ESCU - Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN", + "ESCU - Create a list of approved AWS service accounts", + "ESCU - Baseline of API Calls per User ARN", + "ESCU - Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail" + ], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "AWS Excessive Security Scanning", + "id": "1fdd164a-def8-4762-83a9-9ffe24e74d5a", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-13", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events and analyse the amount of eventNames which starts with Describe by a single user. This indicates that this user scans the configuration of your AWS cloud environment.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=Describe* OR eventName=List* OR eventName=Get* | stats dc(eventName) as dc_events min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(eventName) as eventName values(src) as src values(userAgent) as userAgent by user userIdentity.arn | where dc_events > 50 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|`aws_excessive_security_scanning_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", + "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/aquasecurity/cloudsploit" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS Excessive Security Scanning", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS User Monitoring" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Account", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:Inbound", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1526/aws_security_scanner/aws_security_scanner.json" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "user $user$ has excessive number of api calls $dc_events$ from these IP addresses $src$, violating the threshold of 50, using the following commands $command$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1526" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "src", + "userAgent", + "user", + "userIdentity.arn" + ], + "risk_score": 18, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1526", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1526" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS User Monitoring" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:Inbound", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "src", + "risk_score": 18 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 18 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1526" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "AWS Excessive Security Scanning Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "AWS Excessive Security Scanning", + "file": "cloud/aws_excessive_security_scanning.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "aws_cloudtrail_events.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1526/aws_security_scanner/aws_security_scanner.json", + "source": "aws_cloudtrail", + "sourcetype": "aws:cloudtrail", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_excessive_security_scanning_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_excessive_security_scanning.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Detect API activity from users without MFA", + "id": "4d46e8bd-4072-48e4-92db-0325889ef894", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-05-17", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user logged into the AWS account, is making API calls and has not enabled Multi Factor authentication. Multi factor authentication adds a layer of security by forcing the users to type a unique authentication code from an approved authentication device when they access AWS websites or services. AWS Best Practices recommend that you enable MFA for privileged IAM users.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.mfaAuthenticated=false | search NOT [| inputlookup aws_service_accounts | fields identity | rename identity as user]| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(eventName) as eventName by userIdentity.arn userIdentity.type user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. Leverage the support search `Create a list of approved AWS service accounts`: run it once every 30 days to create a list of service accounts and validate them.\\\nThis search produces fields (`eventName`,`userIdentity.type`,`userIdentity.arn`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** AWS Event Name, **Field:** eventName\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** AWS User ARN, **Field:** userIdentity.arn\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** AWS User Type, **Field:** userIdentity.type\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", + "known_false_positives": "Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure do not have multi factor authentication enabled. Please ignore the service accounts, if triggered and instead add them to the aws_service_accounts.csv file to fine tune the detection. It is also possible that the search detects users in your environment using Single Sign-On systems, since the MFA is not handled by AWS.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect API activity from users without MFA", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS User Monitoring" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "PR.AC" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.mfaAuthenticated", + "eventName", + "userIdentity.arn", + "userIdentity.type", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "PR.AC" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS User Monitoring" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "PR.AC" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "aws_service_accounts", + "description": "A lookup file that will contain AWS Service accounts", + "filename": "aws_service_accounts.csv" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts", + "id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d4bd55", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for successful AWS CloudTrail activity by user accounts that are not listed in the identity table or `aws_service_accounts.csv`. It returns event names and count, as well as the first and last time a specific user or service is detected, grouped by users. Deprecated because managing this list can be quite hard.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` errorCode=success | rename userName as identity | search NOT [| inputlookup identity_lookup_expanded | fields identity] | search NOT [| inputlookup aws_service_accounts | fields identity] | rename identity as user | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(eventName) as eventName by user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You must also populate the `identity_lookup_expanded` lookup shipped with the Asset and Identity framework to be able to look up users in your identity table in Enterprise Security (ES). Leverage the support search called \"Create a list of approved AWS service accounts\": run it once every 30 days to create and validate a list of service accounts.\\\nThis search produces fields (`eventName`,`firstTime`,`lastTime`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** AWS Event Name, **Field:** eventName\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** First Time, **Field:** firstTime\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** Last Time, **Field:** lastTime\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", + "known_false_positives": "It's likely that you'll find activity detected by users/service accounts that are not listed in the `identity_lookup_expanded` or ` aws_service_accounts.csv` file. If the user is a legitimate service account, update the `aws_service_accounts.csv` table with that entry.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS User Monitoring" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078.004" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.CM", + "PR.AC", + "ID.AM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "errorCode", + "userName", + "eventName", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "access", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT33" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.CM", + "PR.AC", + "ID.AM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS User Monitoring" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Create a list of approved AWS service accounts", + "id": "08ef80f5-6555-474b-bb2d-22e2aa4206a4", + "version": 2, + "date": "2018-12-03", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for successful API activity in CloudTrail within the last 30 days, filters out known users from the identity table, and outputs values of users into `aws_service_accounts.csv` lookup file.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` errorCode=success | rename userName as identity | search NOT [inputlookup identity_lookup_expanded | fields identity] | stats count by identity | table identity | outputlookup aws_service_accounts | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Please validate the service account entires in `aws_service_accounts.csv`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search. Please remove the entries of service accounts that are not legitimate.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS User Monitoring" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "errorCode", + "userName" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.CM", + "PR.AC", + "ID.AM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "aws_service_accounts", + "description": "A lookup file that will contain AWS Service accounts", + "filename": "aws_service_accounts.csv" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Detect new API calls from user roles", + "id": "22773e84-bac0-4595-b086-20d3f335b4f1", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-04-16", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects new API calls that have either never been seen before or that have not been seen in the previous hour, where the identity type is `AssumedRole`.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall errorCode=success userIdentity.type=AssumedRole [search `cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall errorCode=success userIdentity.type=AssumedRole | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by userName eventName | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles | stats min(earliest) as earliest, max(latest) as latest by userName eventName | outputlookup previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles| eval newApiCallfromUserRole=if(earliest>=relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newApiCallfromUserRole=1 | `security_content_ctime(earliest)` | `security_content_ctime(latest)` | table eventName userName] |rename userName as user| stats values(eventName) earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by user | `security_content_ctime(earliest)` | `security_content_ctime(latest)` | `detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the \"Previously seen API call per user roles in AWS CloudTrail\" support search once to create a history of previously seen user roles.", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible that there are legitimate user roles making new or infrequently used API calls in your infrastructure, causing the search to trigger.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect new API calls from user roles", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS User Monitoring" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078.004" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventType", + "errorCode", + "userIdentity.type", + "userName", + "eventName" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT33" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS User Monitoring" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail", + "id": "02add098-efa3-428d-b2e2-4ed0831c92f4", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-04-16", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for successful API calls made by different user roles, then creates a baseline of the earliest and latest times we have encountered this user role. It also returns the name of the API call in our dataset--grouped by user role and name of the API call--that occurred within the last 30 days. In this support search, we are only looking for events where the user identity is Assumed Role.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall errorCode=success userIdentity.type=AssumedRole | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by userName eventName | outputlookup previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Please validate the user role entries in `previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles.csv`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS User Monitoring" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect new API calls from user roles" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventType", + "errorCode", + "userIdentity.type", + "userName", + "eventName" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles", + "description": "A placeholder for a list of AWS API calls for each user role", + "filename": "previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles.csv" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Spike in AWS API Activity", + "id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d32362d4bd55", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search will detect users creating spikes of API activity in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall [search `cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | stats count as apiCalls by arn | inputlookup api_call_by_user_baseline append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) as * by arn | rename apiCalls as latestCount | eval newAvgApiCalls=avgApiCalls + (latestCount-avgApiCalls)/720 | eval newStdevApiCalls=sqrt(((pow(stdevApiCalls, 2)*719 + (latestCount-newAvgApiCalls)*(latestCount-avgApiCalls))/720)) | eval avgApiCalls=coalesce(newAvgApiCalls, avgApiCalls), stdevApiCalls=coalesce(newStdevApiCalls, stdevApiCalls), numDataPoints=if(isnull(latestCount), numDataPoints, numDataPoints+1) | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup api_call_by_user_baseline | eval dataPointThreshold = 15, deviationThreshold = 3 | eval isSpike=if((latestCount > avgApiCalls+deviationThreshold*stdevApiCalls) AND numDataPoints > dataPointThreshold, 1, 0) | where isSpike=1 | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | stats values(eventName) as eventName, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName) as uniqueApisCalled by user | `detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike.\\\nThis search produces fields (`eventName`,`numberOfApiCalls`,`uniqueApisCalled`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** AWS Event Name, **Field:** eventName\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** Number of API Calls, **Field:** numberOfApiCalls\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** Unique API Calls, **Field:** uniqueApisCalled\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Spike in AWS API Activity", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS User Monitoring" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078.004" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.CM", + "PR.AC" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventType", + "userIdentity.arn" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT33" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.CM", + "PR.AC" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS User Monitoring" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Baseline of API Calls per User ARN", + "id": "4b5119c3-5369-4040-9430-b63b1a314229", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-04-09", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and the standard deviation of the number of API calls made by each user. Also recorded is the number of data points for each user. This table is then outputted to a lookup file to allow the detection search to operate quickly.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as apiCalls by _time, arn | stats count(apiCalls) as numDataPoints, latest(apiCalls) as latestCount, avg(apiCalls) as avgApiCalls, stdev(apiCalls) as stdevApiCalls by arn | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup api_call_by_user_baseline | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS User Monitoring" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect Spike in AWS API Activity" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventType", + "userIdentity.arn" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.CM", + "PR.AC" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "api_call_by_user_baseline", + "description": "A collection that will contain the baseline information for number of AWS API calls per user", + "collection": "api_call_by_user_baseline", + "fields_list": "arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls" + }, + { + "name": "api_call_by_user_baseline", + "description": "A collection that will contain the baseline information for number of AWS API calls per user", + "collection": "api_call_by_user_baseline", + "fields_list": "arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Spike in Security Group Activity", + "id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-e32372d4bd53", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-04-18", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to security groups in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` `security_group_api_calls` [search `cloudtrail` `security_group_api_calls` | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | stats count as apiCalls by arn | inputlookup security_group_activity_baseline append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) as * by arn | rename apiCalls as latestCount | eval newAvgApiCalls=avgApiCalls + (latestCount-avgApiCalls)/720 | eval newStdevApiCalls=sqrt(((pow(stdevApiCalls, 2)*719 + (latestCount-newAvgApiCalls)*(latestCount-avgApiCalls))/720)) | eval avgApiCalls=coalesce(newAvgApiCalls, avgApiCalls), stdevApiCalls=coalesce(newStdevApiCalls, stdevApiCalls), numDataPoints=if(isnull(latestCount), numDataPoints, numDataPoints+1) | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup security_group_activity_baseline | eval dataPointThreshold = 15, deviationThreshold = 3 | eval isSpike=if((latestCount > avgApiCalls+deviationThreshold*stdevApiCalls) AND numDataPoints > dataPointThreshold, 1, 0) | where isSpike=1 | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | stats values(eventName) as eventNames, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName) as uniqueApisCalled by user | `detect_spike_in_security_group_activity_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike.This search works best when you run the \"Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN\" support search once to create a history of previously seen Security Group Activity. To add or remove API event names for security groups, edit the macro `security_group_api_calls`.", + "known_false_positives": "Based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`, the false positive rate may vary. Please modify this according the your environment.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Spike in Security Group Activity", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS User Monitoring" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078.004" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.CM", + "PR.AC" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "serIdentity.arn" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT33" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.CM", + "PR.AC" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS User Monitoring" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN", + "id": "fc0edd96-ff2b-48b0-9f1f-63da3783fd63", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-04-17", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and the standard deviation for the number of API calls related to security groups made by each user. Also recorded is the number of data points for each user. This table is then outputted to a lookup file to allow the detection search to operate quickly.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` `security_group_api_calls` | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as apiCalls by _time, arn | stats count(apiCalls) as numDataPoints, latest(apiCalls) as latestCount, avg(apiCalls) as avgApiCalls, stdev(apiCalls) as stdevApiCalls by arn | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup security_group_activity_baseline | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. To add or remove API event names for security groups, edit the macro `security_group_api_calls`.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS User Monitoring" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect Spike in Security Group Activity" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "userIdentity.arn" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.CM", + "PR.AC" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_group_api_calls", + "definition": "(eventName=AuthorizeSecurityGroupIngress OR eventName=CreateSecurityGroup OR eventName=DeleteSecurityGroup OR eventName=DescribeClusterSecurityGroups OR eventName=DescribeDBSecurityGroups OR eventName=DescribeSecurityGroupReferences OR eventName=DescribeSecurityGroups OR eventName=DescribeStaleSecurityGroups OR eventName=RevokeSecurityGroupIngress OR eventName=UpdateSecurityGroupRuleDescriptionsIngress)", + "description": "This macro is a list of AWS event names associated with security groups" + }, + { + "name": "detect_spike_in_security_group_activity_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "security_group_activity_baseline", + "description": "A placeholder for the baseline information for AWS security groups", + "filename": "security_group_activity_baseline.csv" + }, + { + "name": "security_group_activity_baseline", + "description": "A placeholder for the baseline information for AWS security groups", + "filename": "security_group_activity_baseline.csv" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + }, + { + "name": "Investigate AWS User Activities by user field", + "id": "bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd76", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-03-12", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search lists all the logged CloudTrail activities by a specific user and will create a table containing the source of the user, the region of the activity, the name and type of the event, the action taken, and the user's identity information.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` user=$user$ | table _time userIdentity.type userIdentity.userName userIdentity.arn aws_account_id src awsRegion eventName eventType ", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "user" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "user", + "userIdentity.type", + "userIdentity.userName", + "userIdentity.arn", + "aws_account_id", + "src", + "awsRegion", + "eventName", + "eventType" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156", + "id": "817b0dfc-23ba-4bcc-96cc-2cb77e428fbe", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-01-27", + "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", + "description": "Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2021-3156. Discovered by the Qualys Research Team, this vulnerability has been found to affect sudo across multiple Linux distributions (Ubuntu 20.04 and prior, Debian 10 and prior, Fedora 33 and prior). As this vulnerability was committed to code in July 2011, there will be many distributions affected. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows any unprivileged user to gain root privileges on the vulnerable host.", + "narrative": "A non-privledged user is able to execute the sudoedit command to trigger a buffer overflow. After the successful buffer overflow, they are then able to gain root privileges on the affected host. The conditions needed to be run are a trailing \"\\\" along with shell and edit flags. Monitoring the /var/log directory on Linux hosts using the Splunk Universal Forwarder will allow you to pick up this behavior when using the provided detection.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156", + "analytic_story": "Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "Cobalt Group", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "PLATINUM", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "Whitefly", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "datamodels": [], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Shannon Davis", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156", + "id": "93fbec4e-0375-440c-8db3-4508eca470c4", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-01-27", + "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit", + "search": "`linux_hosts` | search \"sudoedit -s \\\\\" | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "Splunk Universal Forwarder running on Linux systems, capturing logs from the /var/log directory. The vulnerability is exposed when a non privledged user tries passing in a single \\ character at the end of the command while using the shell and edit flags.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156", + "analytic_story": [ + "Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1068" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-3156" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "Cobalt Group", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "PLATINUM", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "Whitefly", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1068" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-3156" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "dest", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1068" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "linux_hosts", + "definition": "index=*", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault", + "id": "10f2bae0-bbe6-4984-808c-37dc1c67980d", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-01-29", + "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit", + "search": "`linux_hosts` | search sudoedit segfault | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by host | search count > 5 | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "Splunk Universal Forwarder running on Linux systems (tested on Centos and Ubuntu), where segfaults are being logged. This also captures instances where the exploit has been compiled into a binary. The detection looks for greater than 5 instances of sudoedit combined with segfault over your search time period on a single host", + "known_false_positives": "If sudoedit is throwing segfaults for other reasons this will pick those up too.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault", + "analytic_story": [ + "Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1068" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "host" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-3156" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "Cobalt Group", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "PLATINUM", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "Whitefly", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1068" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-3156" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "dest", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1068" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "linux_hosts", + "definition": "index=*", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery", + "id": "1de31d5d-8fa6-4ee0-af89-17069134118a", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-01-28", + "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit", + "search": "`osquery_process` | search \"columns.cmdline\"=\"sudoedit -s \\\\*\" | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "OSQuery installed and configured to pick up process events (info at https://osquery.io) as well as using the Splunk OSQuery Add-on https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4402. The vulnerability is exposed when a non privledged user tries passing in a single \\ character at the end of the command while using the shell and edit flags.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery", + "analytic_story": [ + "Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1068" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "columns.cmdline" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-3156" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "Cobalt Group", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "PLATINUM", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "Whitefly", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1068" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-3156" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "dest", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1068" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "osquery_process", + "definition": "eventtype=\"osquery-process\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [] + }, + { + "name": "BITS Jobs", + "id": "dbc7edce-8e4c-11eb-9f31-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-03-26", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse BITS jobs to persistently execute or clean up after malicious payloads.", + "narrative": "Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, asynchronous file transfer mechanism exposed through Component Object Model (COM). BITS is commonly used by updaters, messengers, and other applications preferred to operate in the background (using available idle bandwidth) without interrupting other networked applications. File transfer tasks are implemented as BITS jobs, which contain a queue of one or more file operations. The interface to create and manage BITS jobs is accessible through PowerShell and the BITSAdmin tool. Adversaries may abuse BITS to download, execute, and even clean up after running malicious code. BITS tasks are self-contained in the BITS job database, without new files or registry modifications, and often permitted by host firewalls. BITS enabled execution may also enable persistence by creating long-standing jobs (the default maximum lifetime is 90 days and extendable) or invoking an arbitrary program when a job completes or errors (including after system reboots).", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1197/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/bits/bitsadmin-tool" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "BITS Jobs", + "analytic_story": "BITS Jobs", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1197", + "mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Leviathan", + "Patchwork" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control", + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - BITS Job Persistence - Rule", + "ESCU - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule", + "ESCU - PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Michael Haag", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "BITS Job Persistence", + "id": "e97a5ffe-90bf-11eb-928a-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service utility `bitsadmin.exe` scheduling a BITS job to persist on an endpoint. The query identifies the parameters used to create, resume or add a file to a BITS job. Typically seen combined in a oneliner or ran in sequence. If identified, review the BITS job created and capture any files written to disk. It is possible for BITS to be used to upload files and this may require further network data analysis to identify. You can use `bitsadmin /list /verbose` to list out the jobs during investigation.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_bitsadmin` Processes.process IN (*create*, *addfile*, *setnotifyflags*, *setnotifycmdline*, *setminretrydelay*, *setcustomheaders*, *resume* ) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `bits_job_persistence_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives will be present. Typically, applications will use `BitsAdmin.exe`. Any filtering should be done based on command-line arguments (legitimate applications) or parent process.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1197/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/bitsadmin", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1197/T1197.md#atomic-test-3---persist-download--execute", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Bitsadmin/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "BITS Job Persistence", + "analytic_story": [ + "BITS Jobs" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1197/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to persist using BITS.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1197" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1197", + "mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Leviathan", + "Patchwork" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1197" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "BITS Jobs" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1197" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "BITS Job Persistence Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "BITS Job Persistence", + "file": "endpoint/bits_job_persistence.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1197/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_bitsadmin", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=bitsadmin.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=bitsadmin.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "bits_job_persistence_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/bits_job_persistence.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "BITSAdmin Download File", + "id": "80630ff4-8e4c-11eb-aab5-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service utility `bitsadmin.exe` using the `transfer` parameter to download a remote object. In addition, look for `download` or `upload` on the command-line, the switches are not required to perform a transfer. Capture any files downloaded. Review the reputation of the IP or domain used. Typically once executed, a follow on command will be used to execute the dropped file. Note that the network connection or file modification events related will not spawn or create from `bitsadmin.exe`, but the artifacts will appear in a parallel process of `svchost.exe` with a command-line similar to `svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s BITS`. It's important to review all parallel and child processes to capture any behaviors and artifacts. In some suspicious and malicious instances, BITS jobs will be created. You can use `bitsadmin /list /verbose` to list out the jobs during investigation.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_bitsadmin` Processes.process=*transfer* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `bitsadmin_download_file_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives, however it may be required to filter based on parent process name or network connection.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/8eb52117b748d378325f7719554a896e37bccec7/atomics/T1105/T1105.md#atomic-test-9---windows---bitsadmin-bits-download", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/bc705cb7aaa5f26f2d96585fac8e4c7052df0ff9/atomics/T1197/T1197.md", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/bits/bitsadmin-tool", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "BITSAdmin Download File", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "BITS Jobs", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1197/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to download a file.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1197", + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1197", + "mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Leviathan", + "Patchwork" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1197", + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "BITS Jobs", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1197", + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "BITSAdmin Download File Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "BITSAdmin Download File", + "file": "endpoint/bitsadmin_download_file.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1197/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_bitsadmin", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=bitsadmin.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=bitsadmin.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "bitsadmin_download_file_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/bitsadmin_download_file.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer", + "id": "39e2605a-90d8-11eb-899e-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-03-29", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "Start-BitsTransfer is the PowerShell \"version\" of BitsAdmin.exe. Similar functionality is present. This technique variation is not as commonly used by adversaries, but has been abused in the past. Lesser known uses include the ability to set the `-TransferType` to `Upload` for exfiltration of files. In an instance where `Upload` is used, it is highly possible files will be archived. During triage, review parallel processes and process lineage. Capture any files on disk and review. For the remote domain or IP, what is the reputation?", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process=*start-bitstransfer* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_start_bitstransfer_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives. It is possible administrators will utilize Start-BitsTransfer for administrative tasks, otherwise filter based parent process or command-line arguments.", + "references": [ + "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Investigating+Microsoft+BITS+Activity/23281", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/bits/using-windows-powershell-to-create-bits-transfer-jobs" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer", + "analytic_story": [ + "BITS Jobs" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1197/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A suspicious process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ that are related to bittransfer functionality in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1197" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1197", + "mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Leviathan", + "Patchwork" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1197" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "BITS Jobs" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1197" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer", + "file": "endpoint/powershell_start_bitstransfer.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1197/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_powershell", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "powershell_start_bitstransfer_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_start_bitstransfer.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [] + }, + { + "name": "Brand Monitoring", + "id": "91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e1fce78", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-12-19", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "description": "Detect and investigate activity that may indicate that an adversary is using faux domains to mislead users into interacting with malicious infrastructure. Monitor DNS, email, and web traffic for permutations of your brand name.", + "narrative": "While you can educate your users and customers about the risks and threats posed by typosquatting, phishing, and corporate espionage, human error is a persistent fact of life. Of course, your adversaries are all too aware of this reality and will happily leverage it for nefarious purposes whenever possible3phishing with lookalike addresses, embedding faux command-and-control domains in malware, and hosting malicious content on domains that closely mimic your corporate servers. This is where brand monitoring comes in.\\\nYou can use our adaptation of `DNSTwist`, together with the support searches in this Analytic Story, to generate permutations of specified brands and external domains. Splunk can monitor email, DNS requests, and web traffic for these permutations and provide you with early warnings and situational awareness--powerful elements of an effective defense.\\\nNotable events will include IP addresses, URLs, and user data. Drilling down can provide you with even more actionable intelligence, including likely geographic information, contextual searches to help you scope the problem, and investigative searches.", + "references": [ + "https://www.zerofox.com/blog/what-is-digital-risk-monitoring/", + "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/consumer/family-safety/what-is-typosquatting/", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/06/explained-typosquatting/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Brand Monitoring", + "analytic_story": "Brand Monitoring", + "category": [ + "Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [], + "datamodels": [ + "Email", + "Network_Resolution", + "Web" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Delivery" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", + "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", + "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [ + "ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names" + ], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "David Dorsey", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse", + "id": "24dd17b1-e2fb-4c31-878c-d4f746595bfa", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-23", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Resolution" + ], + "description": "This search looks for DNS requests for faux domains similar to the domains that you want to have monitored for abuse.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(DNS.answer) as IPs min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.src, DNS.query | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `brand_abuse_dns` | `monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You need to ingest data from your DNS logs. Specifically you must ingest the domain that is being queried and the IP of the host originating the request. Ideally, you should also be ingesting the answer to the query and the query type. This approach allows you to also create your own localized passive DNS capability which can aid you in future investigations. You also need to have run the search \"ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names\", which creates the permutations of the domain that will be checked for.", + "known_false_positives": "None at this time", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse", + "analytic_story": [ + "Brand Monitoring" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Brand Monitoring" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "DNSTwist Domain Names", + "id": "19f7d2ec-6028-4d01-bcdb-bda9a034c17f", + "version": 2, + "date": "2018-10-08", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search creates permutations of your existing domains, removes the valid domain names and stores them in a specified lookup file so they can be checked for in the associated detection searches.", + "search": "| dnstwist domainlist=domains.csv | `remove_valid_domains` | eval domain_abuse=\"true\" | table domain, domain_abuse | outputlookup brandMonitoring_lookup | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to update the file called domains.csv in the DA-ESS-SOC/lookup directory. Or `cim_corporate_email_domains.csv` and `cim_corporate_web_domains.csv` from **Splunk\\_SA\\_CIM**.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Brand Monitoring", + "Suspicious Emails" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Monitor Email For Brand Abuse", + "Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse", + "Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery", + "Actions on Objectives" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "brand_abuse_dns", + "definition": "lookup update=true brandMonitoring_lookup domain as query OUTPUT domain_abuse | search domain_abuse=true", + "description": "This macro limits the output to only domains that are in the brand monitoring lookup file" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Monitor Email For Brand Abuse", + "id": "b2ea1f38-3a3e-4b8a-9cf1-82760d86a6b8", + "version": 2, + "date": "2018-01-05", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Email" + ], + "description": "This search looks for emails claiming to be sent from a domain similar to one that you want to have monitored for abuse.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Email.recipient) as recipients, min(_time) as firstTime, max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Email by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.message_id | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Email\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | eval temp=split(src_user, \"@\") | eval email_domain=mvindex(temp, 1) | lookup update=true brandMonitoring_lookup domain as email_domain OUTPUT domain_abuse | search domain_abuse=true | table message_id, src_user, email_domain, recipients, firstTime, lastTime | `monitor_email_for_brand_abuse_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You need to ingest email header data. Specifically the sender's address (src_user) must be populated. You also need to have run the search \"ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names\", which creates the permutations of the domain that will be checked for.", + "known_false_positives": "None at this time", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Monitor Email For Brand Abuse", + "analytic_story": [ + "Brand Monitoring", + "Suspicious Emails" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 7" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Email.recipient", + "All_Email.src_user", + "All_Email.message_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 7" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Brand Monitoring", + "Suspicious Emails" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "DNSTwist Domain Names", + "id": "19f7d2ec-6028-4d01-bcdb-bda9a034c17f", + "version": 2, + "date": "2018-10-08", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search creates permutations of your existing domains, removes the valid domain names and stores them in a specified lookup file so they can be checked for in the associated detection searches.", + "search": "| dnstwist domainlist=domains.csv | `remove_valid_domains` | eval domain_abuse=\"true\" | table domain, domain_abuse | outputlookup brandMonitoring_lookup | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to update the file called domains.csv in the DA-ESS-SOC/lookup directory. Or `cim_corporate_email_domains.csv` and `cim_corporate_web_domains.csv` from **Splunk\\_SA\\_CIM**.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Brand Monitoring", + "Suspicious Emails" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Monitor Email For Brand Abuse", + "Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse", + "Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 7" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "monitor_email_for_brand_abuse_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "brandMonitoring_lookup", + "description": "A file that contains look-a-like domains for brands that you want to monitor", + "filename": "brand_monitoring.csv", + "default_match": "false", + "match_type": "WILDCARD(domain)", + "min_matches": 1 + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml", + "source": "application" + }, + { + "name": "Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse", + "id": "134da869-e264-4a8f-8d7e-fcd0ec88f301", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-23", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "This search looks for Web requests to faux domains similar to the one that you want to have monitored for abuse.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Web.url) as urls min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Web by Web.src | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `brand_abuse_web` | `monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You need to ingest data from your web traffic. This can be accomplished by indexing data from a web proxy, or using a network traffic analysis tool, such as Bro or Splunk Stream. You also need to have run the search \"ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names\", which creates the permutations of the domain that will be checked for.", + "known_false_positives": "None at this time", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse", + "analytic_story": [ + "Brand Monitoring" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 7" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Web.url", + "Web.src" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 7" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Brand Monitoring" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "src", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "DNSTwist Domain Names", + "id": "19f7d2ec-6028-4d01-bcdb-bda9a034c17f", + "version": 2, + "date": "2018-10-08", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search creates permutations of your existing domains, removes the valid domain names and stores them in a specified lookup file so they can be checked for in the associated detection searches.", + "search": "| dnstwist domainlist=domains.csv | `remove_valid_domains` | eval domain_abuse=\"true\" | table domain, domain_abuse | outputlookup brandMonitoring_lookup | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to update the file called domains.csv in the DA-ESS-SOC/lookup directory. Or `cim_corporate_email_domains.csv` and `cim_corporate_web_domains.csv` from **Splunk\\_SA\\_CIM**.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Brand Monitoring", + "Suspicious Emails" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Monitor Email For Brand Abuse", + "Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse", + "Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 7" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "brand_abuse_web", + "definition": "lookup update=true brandMonitoring_lookup domain as urls OUTPUT domain_abuse | search domain_abuse=true", + "description": "This macro limits the output to only domains that are in the brand monitoring lookup file" + }, + { + "name": "monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml", + "source": "web" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get Email Info", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd75", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-11-09", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search returns all the information Splunk might have collected a specific email message over the last 2 hours.", + "search": "| from datamodel Email.All_Email | search message_id=$message_id$", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting your email logs or capturing unencrypted network traffic which contains email communications.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "message_id" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Brand Monitoring", + "Suspicious Emails" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "message" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_email_info" + }, + { + "name": "Get Emails From Specific Sender", + "id": "5df39b3f-447d-4869-b673-8f45ad4616fe", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-11-09", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search returns all the emails from a specific sender over the last 24 and next hours.", + "search": "| from datamodel Email.All_Email | search src_user=$src_user$", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must ingest your email logs or capture unencrypted email communications within network traffic, and populate the Email data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "src_user" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Brand Monitoring", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Web Fraud Detection" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "src_user" + ], + "security_domain": "networks" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_emails_from_specific_sender" + }, + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + }, + { + "name": "Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", + "id": "910e6512-edc9-4f93-ba24-5b786f47a672", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-01", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "While investigating, an analyst will want to know what process and parent_process is responsible for generating suspicious DNS traffic. Use the following search and enter the value of `dest` in the search to get specific details on the process responsible for creating the DNS traffic.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search dest = $dest$ | join dest type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port=53 by Ports.process_id Ports.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename src as dest]", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that associates processes with network events into the Endpoint datamodel. This can come from endpoint protection products such as carbon black, or endpoint data sources such as Sysmon.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Command & Control", + "Data Protection", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Ports.process_id", + "Ports.src", + "Ports.dest_port" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Cloud Cryptomining", + "id": "3b96d13c-fdc7-45dd-b3ad-c132b31cdd2a", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-10-02", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "description": "Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.", + "narrative": "Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority. \\\nCryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS), Google Cloud Platform (GCP), and Azure. It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN. \\\nWhen malicious miners appropriate a cloud instance, often spinning up hundreds of new instances, the costs can become astronomical for the account holder. So it is critically important to monitor your systems for suspicious activities that could indicate that your network has been infiltrated. \\\nThis Analytic Story is focused on detecting suspicious new instances in your cloud environment to help prevent cryptominers from gaining a foothold. It contains detection searches that will detect when a previously unused instance type or AMI is used. It also contains support searches to build lookup files to ensure proper execution of the detection searches.", + "references": [ + "https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Cloud Cryptomining", + "analytic_story": "Cloud Cryptomining", + "category": [ + "Cloud Security" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Security Monitoring", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT33" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Change" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", + "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", + "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", + "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", + "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", + "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", + "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [ + "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", + "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", + "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Initial", + "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Update", + "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial", + "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update", + "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial", + "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update", + "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial", + "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update" + ], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "David Dorsey", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User", + "id": "37a0ec8d-827e-4d6d-8025-cedf31f3a149", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-07-13", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search looks for cloud compute instances created by users who have not created them before.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object) as dest from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.user All_Changes.vendor_region | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user user as user OUTPUTNEW firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenUser=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenUser) OR firstTimeSeenUser > relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") | table firstTime, user, dest, count vendor_region | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting the appropriate cloud-infrastructure logs Run the \"Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User\" support search to create of baseline of previously seen users.", + "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a user will start to create compute instances for the first time, for any number of reasons. Verify with the user launching instances that this is the intended behavior.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User", + "analytic_story": [ + "Cloud Cryptomining" + ], + "asset_type": "Cloud Compute Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Recon", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user$ is creating a new instance $dest$ for the first time", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078.004", + "T1078" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.object", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.user", + "All_Changes.vendor_region" + ], + "risk_score": 18, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT33" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078.004", + "T1078" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Cloud Cryptomining" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Recon", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 18 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 18 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Initial", + "id": "dd4ced8a-15a9-4285-94ac-7e4134673bf8", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-08-15", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search builds a table of previously seen users that have launched a cloud compute instance.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs and have the proper TAs installed.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Cloud Cryptomining" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Hourly Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.object_category", + "All_Changes.user" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Update", + "id": "6bf75d69-7766-47bc-8097-e41696807a6f", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-08-15", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search builds a table of previously seen users that have launched a cloud compute instance.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by All_Changes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by user | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), \"-90d@d\") | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-7d@d\"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs and have the proper TAs installed.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Cloud Cryptomining" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.object_category", + "All_Changes.user" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078.004", + "T1078" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User", + "file": "cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Initial", + "file": "detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_initial.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "-1d" + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Update", + "file": "detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_update.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "-1d" + } + ], + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json", + "source": "aws_cloudtrail", + "sourcetype": "aws:cloudtrail", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user", + "description": "A table of previously seen users creating cloud instances", + "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user", + "fields_list": "_key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, user, enough_data" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region", + "id": "fa4089e2-50e3-40f7-8469-d2cc1564ca59", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-09-02", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search looks at cloud-infrastructure events where an instance is created in any region within the last hour and then compares it to a lookup file of previously seen regions where instances have been created.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id) as dest, count from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.vendor_region, All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_regions vendor_region as vendor_region OUTPUTNEW firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenRegion=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenRegion) OR firstTimeSeenRegion > relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") | table firstTime, user, dest, count , vendor_region | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial` to build the initial table of images observed and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region_filter` macro.", + "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a user has unknowingly started an instance in a new region. Please verify that this activity is legitimate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region", + "analytic_story": [ + "Cloud Cryptomining" + ], + "asset_type": "Cloud Compute Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user$ is creating an instance $dest$ in a new region for the first time", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1535" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.object_id", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.vendor_region", + "All_Changes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1535" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Cloud Cryptomining" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 42 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 42 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial", + "id": "b5e232db-dec6-4db8-aaa1-dd5474521e40", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-09-02", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search looks for cloud compute events where a compute instance is started and creates a baseline of most recent time, `lastTime` and the first time `firstTime` we've seen this region in our dataset grouped by the region for the last 30 days", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.vendor_region | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-14d@d\"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_regions", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs and have the Security Research cloud data model installed.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Cloud Cryptomining" + ], + "deployments": [ + "90 Day Baseline" + ], + "detections": [ + "Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.vendor_region" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update", + "id": "512f928a-a461-41b4-8984-db4dd2c472e4", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-09-02", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search looks for cloud compute events where a compute instance is started and creates a baseline of most recent time, `lastTime` and the first time `firstTime` we've seen this region in our dataset grouped by the region for the last 30 days", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.vendor_region | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cloud_regions | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by vendor_region | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_region_forget_window`) | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-14d@d\"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_regions | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs and have the Security Research cloud data model installed.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Cloud Cryptomining" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.vendor_region" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1535" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region", + "file": "cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml", + "pass_condition": "| outputlookup test_1.csv | stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial", + "file": "detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_regions_initial.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "-1d" + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update", + "file": "detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_regions_update.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "-1d" + } + ], + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json", + "source": "aws_cloudtrail", + "sourcetype": "aws:cloudtrail", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "previously_seen_cloud_regions", + "description": "A table of vendor_region values and the first and last time that they have been observed in cloud provisioning activities", + "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_regions", + "fields_list": "_key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, vendor_region, enough_data" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image", + "id": "bc24922d-987c-4645-b288-f8c73ec194c4", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-10-12", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search looks for cloud compute instances being created with previously unseen image IDs.", + "search": "| tstats count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id) as dest from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.image_id, All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Instance_Changes\")` | where image_id != \"unknown\" | lookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_images image_id as image_id OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenImage=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenImage) OR firstTimeSeenImage > relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") | table firstTime, user, image_id, count, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial` to build the initial table of images observed and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image_filter` macro.", + "known_false_positives": "After a new image is created, the first systems created with that image will cause this alert to fire. Verify that the image being used was created by a legitimate user.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image", + "analytic_story": [ + "Cloud Cryptomining" + ], + "asset_type": "Cloud Compute Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user$ is creating an instance $dest$ with an image that has not been previously seen.", + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.object_id", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.Instance_Changes.image_id", + "All_Changes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 36, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Cloud Cryptomining" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 36 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 36 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial", + "id": "7744597f-d07a-4cea-94a7-e0f8aaebc410", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-10-08", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search builds a table of previously seen images used to launch cloud compute instances", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.image_id | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Instance_Changes\")` | where image_id != \"unknown\" | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-7d@d\"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_images", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs and have the latest Change Datamodel accelerated", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Cloud Cryptomining" + ], + "deployments": [ + "90 Day Baseline" + ], + "detections": [ + "Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.Instance_Changes.image_id" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update", + "id": "6f1ca5dc-e445-401c-9845-a96d2b6ba184", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-08-12", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search builds a table of previously seen images used to launch cloud compute instances", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.image_id | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Instance_Changes\")` | where image_id != \"unknown\" | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cloud_compute_images | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by image_id | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_forget_window`) | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-7d@d\"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_images", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Cloud Cryptomining" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.Instance_Changes.image_id" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image", + "file": "cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial", + "file": "detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_initial.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "-1d" + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update", + "file": "detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_update.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "-1d" + } + ], + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json", + "source": "aws_cloudtrail", + "sourcetype": "aws:cloudtrail", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_images", + "description": "A table of previously seen Cloud image IDs", + "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_images", + "fields_list": "_key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, image_id, enough_data" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type", + "id": "c6ddbf53-9715-49f3-bb4c-fb2e8a309cda", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-09-12", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "Find EC2 instances being created with previously unseen instance types.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id) as dest, count from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.instance_type, All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Instance_Changes\")` | where instance_type != \"unknown\" | lookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types instance_type as instance_type OUTPUTNEW firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenInstanceType=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenInstanceType) OR firstTimeSeenInstanceType > relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") | table firstTime, user, dest, count, instance_type | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial` to build the initial table of instance types observed and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter` macro.", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible that an admin will create a new system using a new instance type that has never been used before. Verify with the creator that they intended to create the system with the new instance type.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type", + "analytic_story": [ + "Cloud Cryptomining" + ], + "asset_type": "Cloud Compute Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user$ is creating an instance $dest$ with an instance type $instance_type$ that has not been previously seen.", + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.object_id", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.Instance_Changes.instance_type", + "All_Changes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 30, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Cloud Cryptomining" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 30 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 30 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial", + "id": "3c78025c-1ffe-4976-a640-75ef604842be", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-9-03", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search builds a table of previously seen cloud compute instance types", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.instance_type | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes.Instance_Changes\")` | where instance_type != \"unknown\" | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-14d@d\"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs and have the Security Research cloud data model installed.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Cloud Cryptomining" + ], + "deployments": [ + "90 Day Baseline" + ], + "detections": [ + "Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.Instance_Changes.instance_type" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update", + "id": "7b7ef9ab-acb9-4e07-af76-4cf1e722885c", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-9-03", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search builds a table of previously seen cloud compute instance types", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.instance_type | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes.Instance_Changes\")` | where instance_type != \"unknown\" | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by instance_type | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_type_forget_window`) | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-14d@d\"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Cloud Cryptomining" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.Instance_Changes.instance_type" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type", + "file": "cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial", + "file": "detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types_initial.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "-1d" + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update", + "file": "detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types_update.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "-1d" + } + ], + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json", + "source": "aws_cloudtrail", + "sourcetype": "aws:cloudtrail", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types", + "description": "A place holder for a list of used cloud compute instance types", + "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types", + "fields_list": "_key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, instance_type, enough_data" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched", + "id": "f2361e9f-3928-496c-a556-120cd4223a65", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-08-21", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search finds for the number successfully created cloud instances for every 4 hour block. This is split up between weekdays and the weekend. It then applies the probability densitiy model previously created and alerts on any outliers.", + "search": "| tstats count as instances_launched values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=created) AND All_Changes.status=success AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%w\") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | join HourOfDay isWeekend [summary cloud_excessive_instances_created_v1] | where cardinality >=16 | apply cloud_excessive_instances_created_v1 threshold=0.005 | rename \"IsOutlier(instances_launched)\" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1 | eval expected_upper_threshold = mvindex(split(mvindex(BoundaryRanges, -1), \":\"), 0) | eval distance_from_threshold = instances_launched - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, instances_launched, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold, object_id | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_launched_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched` to create the probability density function.", + "known_false_positives": "Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched", + "analytic_story": [ + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "Cloud Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078.004", + "T1078" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.object_id", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.status", + "All_Changes.object_category", + "All_Changes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "Cloud", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT33" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078.004", + "T1078" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", + "id": "b01bd274-f661-4f9c-bd9f-cf23ff6ae0bc", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-08-14", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many instances are created in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model and the model is rebuilt weekly. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of instances created in a small time window.", + "search": "| tstats count as instances_launched from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=created) AND All_Changes.status=success AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by _time span=1h | makecontinuous span=1h _time | eval instances_launched=coalesce(instances_launched, (random()%2)*0.0000000001) | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%w\") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | table _time instances_launched, HourOfDay, isWeekend | fit DensityFunction instances_launched by \"HourOfDay,isWeekend\" into cloud_excessive_instances_created_v1 dist=expon show_density=true", + "how_to_implement": "You must have Enterprise Security 6.0 or later, if not you will need to verify that the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or later is installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users in your environment, you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 90 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data.\\\nMore information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Weekly Model Rebuild 90 Day Lookback" + ], + "detections": [ + "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.status", + "All_Changes.object_category" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078.004", + "T1078" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_launched_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_launched.yml", + "source": "cloud" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest", + "id": "b0d2e6a8-75fa-4b1b-9486-3d32acadf822", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-06-08", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search retrieves the all the alerts created by AWS Security Hub for a specific dest(instance_id).", + "search": "`aws_securityhub_firehose` \"findings{}.Resources{}.Type\"=AWSEC2Instance | rex field=findings{}.Resources{}.Id .*instance/(?.*)| rename instance as dest| search dest = $dest$ |rename findings{}.* as * | rename Remediation.Recommendation.Text as Remediation | table dest Title ProductArn Description FirstObservedAt RecordState Remediation", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Cloud Compute Instance", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "findings{}.Resources{}.Type", + "findings{}.Resources{}.Id", + "instance", + "Remediation.Recommendation.Text", + "Title", + "ProductArn", + "Description", + "FirstObservedAt", + "RecordState" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest" + }, + { + "name": "AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", + "id": "bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd72", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-30", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search lists all the logged CloudTrail activities by a specific user ARN and will create a table containing the source of the user, the region of the activity, the name and type of the event, the action taken, and all the user's identity information.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` | search user=$user$| table _time userIdentity.type userIdentity.userName userIdentity.arn aws_account_id src awsRegion eventName eventType", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "user" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "Command & Control", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Suspicious Cloud User Activities", + "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", + "AWS Security Hub Alerts" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "user", + "userIdentity.type", + "userIdentity.userName", + "userIdentity.arn", + "aws_account_id", + "src", + "awsRegion", + "eventName", + "eventType" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn" + }, + { + "name": "Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", + "id": "de4aed1d-f13a-4d2f-a97a-73c60e2e6b56", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-02-12", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries AWS description logs and returns all the information about a specific instance via the instanceId field", + "search": "`aws_description` | dedup id sortby -_time |rename id as instanceId| search instanceId=$instanceId$ | spath output=tags path=tags | eval tags=mvzip(key,value,\" = \"), ip_address=if((ip_address == \"null\"),private_ip_address,ip_address) | table id, tags.Name, aws_account_id, placement, instance_type, key_name, ip_address, launch_time, state, vpc_id, subnet_id, tags | rename aws_account_id as \"Account ID\", id as ID, instance_type as Type, ip_address as \"IP Address\", key_name as \"Key Pair\", launch_time as \"Launch Time\", placement as \"Availability Zone\", state as State, subnet_id as Subnet, \"tags.Name\" as Name, vpc_id as VPC", + "how_to_implement": "In order to implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS(version 4.4.0 or later) and configure your AWS description inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "instanceId" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "AWS Security Hub Alerts" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "id", + "ip_address", + "tags", + "aws_account_id", + "placement", + "instance_type", + "key_name", + "launch_time", + "state", + "vpc_id", + "subnet_id" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid" + }, + { + "name": "Get EC2 Launch Details", + "id": "0e40fe83-3edb-4d86-8206-8fed36529ca6", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-03-12", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search returns some of the launch details for a EC2 instance.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` dest=$dest$ |rename userIdentity.arn as arn, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as dest, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.privateIpAddress as privateIpAddress, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.imageId as amiID, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.architecture as architecture, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.keyName as keyName | table arn, awsRegion, dest, architecture, privateIpAddress, amiID, keyName", + "how_to_implement": "In order to implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS(version 4.4.0 or later) and configure your AWS description inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "AWS Security Hub Alerts" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "dest", + "userIdentity.arn", + "responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId", + "responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.privateIpAddress", + "responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.imageId", + "responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.architecture", + "responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.keyName" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_ec2_launch_details" + }, + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + }, + { + "name": "Investigate AWS activities via region name", + "id": "bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd11", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-02-09", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search lists all the user activities logged by CloudTrail for a specific region in question and will create a table of the values of parameters requested, the type of the event and the response from the AWS API by each user", + "search": "`cloudtrail` vendor_region=$vendor_region$| rename requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as instanceId | stats values(eventName) by user instanceId vendor_region", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "vendor_region" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "vendor_region", + "requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId", + "eventName", + "user" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", + "id": "cecdc1e7-0af2-4a55-8967-b9ea62c0317d", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-01-26", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "description": "This analytical story addresses events that indicate abuse of cloud federated credentials. These credentials are usually extracted from endpoint desktop or servers specially those servers that provide federation services such as Windows Active Directory Federation Services. Identity Federation relies on objects such as Oauth2 tokens, cookies or SAML assertions in order to provide seamless access between cloud and perimeter environments. If these objects are either hijacked or forged then attackers will be able to pivot into victim's cloud environements.", + "narrative": "This story is composed of detection searches based on endpoint that addresses the use of Mimikatz, Escalation of Privileges and Abnormal processes that may indicate the extraction of Federated directory objects such as passwords, Oauth2 tokens, certificates and keys. Cloud environment (AWS, Azure) related events are also addressed in specific cloud environment detection searches.", + "references": [ + "https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", + "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", + "analytic_story": "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", + "category": [ + "Cloud Security" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Security Monitoring", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Indrik Spider", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1556", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access", + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cleaver", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Whitefly" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.012", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Image File Execution Options Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "TEMP.Veles" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access", + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Command & Control", + "Exploitation", + "Installation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal - Rule", + "ESCU - AWS SAML Update identity provider - Rule", + "ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule", + "ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", + "ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule", + "ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703 - Rule", + "ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", + "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Rod Soto", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal", + "id": "bbe23980-6019-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-01-26", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides specific SAML access from specific Service Provider, user and targeted principal at AWS. This search provides specific information to detect abnormal access or potential credential hijack or forgery, specially in federated environments using SAML protocol inside the perimeter or cloud provider.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=Assumerolewithsaml | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by requestParameters.principalArn requestParameters.roleArn requestParameters.roleSessionName recipientAccountId responseElements.issuer sourceIPAddress userAgent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs", + "known_false_positives": "Attacks using a Golden SAML or SAML assertion hijacks or forgeries are very difficult to detect as accessing cloud providers with these assertions looks exactly like normal access, however things such as source IP sourceIPAddress user, and principal targeted at receiving cloud provider along with endpoint credential access and abuse detection searches can provide the necessary context to detect these attacks.", + "references": [ + "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a", + "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", + "https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal", + "analytic_story": [ + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Federated Account", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Stage:Credential Access", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/assume_role_with_saml/assume_role_with_saml.json" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "From IP address $sourceIPAddress$, user agent $userAgent$ has trigged an event $eventName$ for account ID $recipientAccountId$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "sourceIPAddress", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "recipientAccountId", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Victim", + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "requestParameters.principalArn", + "requestParameters.roleArn", + "requestParameters.roleSessionName", + "recipientAccountId", + "responseElements.issuer", + "sourceIPAddress", + "userAgent" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "sourceIPAddress", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "recipientAccountId", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Victim", + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Stage:Credential Access", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "sourceIPAddress", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "recipientAccountId", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal", + "file": "cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "aws_cloudtrail_events.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/assume_role_with_saml/assume_role_with_saml.json", + "source": "aws_cloudtrail", + "sourcetype": "aws:cloudtrail", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "AWS SAML Update identity provider", + "id": "2f0604c6-6030-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-01-26", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides detection of updates to SAML provider in AWS. Updates to SAML provider need to be monitored closely as they may indicate possible perimeter compromise of federated credentials, or backdoor access from another cloud provider set by attacker.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=UpdateSAMLProvider | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by eventType eventName requestParameters.sAMLProviderArn userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.arn sourceIPAddress userIdentity.accessKeyId userIdentity.principalId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`aws_saml_update_identity_provider_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", + "known_false_positives": "Updating a SAML provider or creating a new one may not necessarily be malicious however it needs to be closely monitored.", + "references": [ + "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a", + "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", + "https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS SAML Update identity provider", + "analytic_story": [ + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Federated Account", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/update_saml_provider/update_saml_provider.json" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "User $userIdentity.principalId$ from IP address $sourceIPAddress$ has trigged an event $eventName$ to update the SAML provider to $requestParameters.sAMLProviderArn$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "sourceIPAddress", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "userIdentity.principalId", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim", + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "eventType", + "requestParameters.sAMLProviderArn", + "userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.arn", + "sourceIPAddress", + "userIdentity.accessKeyId", + "userIdentity.principalId" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "sourceIPAddress", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "userIdentity.principalId", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim", + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "sourceIPAddress", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "userIdentity.principalId", + "risk_score": 64 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "AWS SAML Update identity provider Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "AWS SAML Update identity provider", + "file": "cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "aws_cloudtrail_events.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/update_saml_provider/update_saml_provider.json", + "source": "aws_cloudtrail", + "sourcetype": "aws:cloudtrail", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_saml_update_identity_provider_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User", + "id": "b2c81cc6-6040-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-01-26", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects the creation of a new Federation setting by alerting about an specific event related to its creation.", + "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation=\"Add app role assignment grant to user.\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Actor{}.ID) as Actor.ID values(Actor{}.Type) as Actor.Type by ActorIpAddress dest ResultStatus | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", + "known_false_positives": "The creation of a new Federation is not necessarily malicious, however this events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a different cloud provider.", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", + "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User", + "analytic_story": [ + "Office 365 Detections", + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" + ], + "asset_type": "Office 365", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_new_federation/o365_new_federation.json" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "User $Actor.ID$ has created a new federation setting on $dest$ from IP Address $ActorIpAddress$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1136.003", + "T1136" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ActorIpAddress", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Actor.ID", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Workload", + "Operation", + "Actor{}.ID", + "Actor{}.Type", + "ActorIpAddress", + "dest", + "ResultStatus" + ], + "risk_score": 18, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Indrik Spider", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1136.003", + "T1136" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Office 365 Detections", + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ActorIpAddress", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Actor.ID", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ActorIpAddress", + "risk_score": 18 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "Actor.ID", + "risk_score": 18 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 18 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1136.003", + "T1136" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User", + "file": "cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "o365_management_activity.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_new_federation/o365_new_federation.json", + "source": "o365", + "sourcetype": "o365:management:activity" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "o365_management_activity", + "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "O365 Added Service Principal", + "id": "1668812a-6047-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-03", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects the creation of a new Federation setting by alerting about an specific event related to its creation.", + "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation=\"Add service principal credentials.\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Actor{}.ID) as Actor.ID values(ModifiedProperties{}.Name) as ModifiedProperties.Name values(ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue) as ModifiedProperties.NewValue values(Target{}.ID) as Target.ID by ActorIpAddress Operation | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_added_service_principal_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", + "known_false_positives": "The creation of a new Federation is not necessarily malicious, however these events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a different cloud provider.", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", + "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a", + "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html", + "https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "O365 Added Service Principal", + "analytic_story": [ + "Office 365 Detections", + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" + ], + "asset_type": "Office 365", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_add_service_principal/o365_add_service_principal.json" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "User $Actor.ID$ created a new federation setting on $Target.ID$ and added service principal credentials from IP Address $ActorIpAddress$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1136.003", + "T1136" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ActorIpAddress", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Target.ID", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Workload", + "signature", + "Actor{}.ID", + "ModifiedProperties{}.Name", + "ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue", + "Target{}.ID", + "ActorIpAddress" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Indrik Spider", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1136.003", + "T1136" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Office 365 Detections", + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ActorIpAddress", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Target.ID", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ActorIpAddress", + "risk_score": 42 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Target.ID", + "risk_score": 42 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1136.003", + "T1136" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "O365 Added Service Principal Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "O365 Added Service Principal", + "file": "cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "o365_management_activity.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_add_service_principal/o365_add_service_principal.json", + "source": "o365", + "sourcetype": "o365:management:activity" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "o365_management_activity", + "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "o365_added_service_principal_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "O365 Excessive SSO logon errors", + "id": "8158ccc4-6038-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-01-26", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects accounts with high number of Single Sign ON (SSO) logon errors. Excessive logon errors may indicate attempts to bruteforce of password or single sign on token hijack or reuse.", + "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory LogonError=SsoArtifactInvalidOrExpired | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by LogonError ActorIpAddress UserAgent UserId | where count > 5 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", + "known_false_positives": "Logon errors may not be malicious in nature however it may indicate attempts to reuse a token or password obtained via credential access attack.", + "references": [ + "https://stealthbits.com/blog/bypassing-mfa-with-pass-the-cookie/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "O365 Excessive SSO logon errors", + "analytic_story": [ + "Office 365 Detections", + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" + ], + "asset_type": "Office 365", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/o365_sso_logon_errors/o365_sso_logon_errors.json" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "User $UserId$ has caused excessive number of SSO logon errors from $ActorIpAddress$ using UserAgent $UserAgent$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1556" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ActorIpAddress", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "UserId", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Workload", + "LogonError", + "ActorIpAddress", + "UserAgent", + "UserId" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1556", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access", + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1556" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Office 365 Detections", + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ActorIpAddress", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "UserId", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ActorIpAddress", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "UserId", + "risk_score": 64 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1556" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "O365 Excessive SSO logon errors Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "O365 Excessive SSO logon errors", + "file": "cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "o365_management_activity.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/o365_sso_logon_errors/o365_sso_logon_errors.json", + "source": "o365", + "sourcetype": "o365:management:activity" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "o365_management_activity", + "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "O365 New Federated Domain Added", + "id": "e155876a-6048-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-01-26", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects the addition of a new Federated domain.", + "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=Exchange Operation=\"Add-FederatedDomain\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Parameters{}.Value) as Parameters.Value by ObjectId Operation OrganizationName OriginatingServer UserId UserKey | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_new_federated_domain_added_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity.", + "known_false_positives": "The creation of a new Federated domain is not necessarily malicious, however these events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a similar or different cloud provider.", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", + "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a", + "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html", + "https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory", + "https://o365blog.com/post/aadbackdoor/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "O365 New Federated Domain Added", + "analytic_story": [ + "Office 365 Detections", + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" + ], + "asset_type": "Office 365", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_new_federated_domain/o365_new_federated_domain.json" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "User $UserId$ has added a new federated domaain $Parameters.Value$ for $OrganizationName$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1136.003", + "T1136" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "OrganizationName", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "UserId", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Workload", + "Operation", + "Parameters{}.Value", + "ObjectId", + "OrganizationName", + "OriginatingServer", + "UserId", + "UserKey" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Indrik Spider", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1136.003", + "T1136" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Office 365 Detections", + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "OrganizationName", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "UserId", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "OrganizationName", + "threat_object_type": "other" + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "UserId", + "risk_score": 64 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1136.003", + "T1136" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "O365 New Federated Domain Added Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "O365 New Federated Domain Added", + "file": "cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-7d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "o365_management_activity.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_new_federated_domain/o365_new_federated_domain.json", + "source": "exchange", + "sourcetype": "o365:management:activity", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "o365_management_activity", + "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "o365_new_federated_domain_added_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703", + "id": "98917be2-bfc8-475a-8618-a9bb06575188", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-02-27", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for PowerShell requesting privileges consistent with credential dumping. Deprecated, looks like things changed from a logging perspective.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` signature_id=4703 Process_Name=*powershell.exe | rex field=Message \"Enabled Privileges:\\s+(?\\w+)\\s+Disabled Privileges:\" | where privs=\"SeDebugPrivilege\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Process_Name, privs, Process_ID, Message | rename privs as \"Enabled Privilege\" | rename Process_Name as process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Windows Security logs. You must also enable the account change auditing here: http://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/7.0.2/Data/MonitorWindowseventlogdata. Additionally, this search requires you to enable your Group Management Audit Logs in your Local Windows Security Policy and to be ingesting those logs. More information on how to enable them can be found here: http://whatevernetworks.com/auditing-group-membership-changes-in-active-directory/. Finally, please make sure that the local administrator group name is \"Administrators\" to be able to look for the right group membership changes.", + "known_false_positives": "The activity may be legitimate. PowerShell is often used by administrators to perform various tasks, and it's possible this event could be generated in those cases. In these cases, false positives should be fairly obvious and you may need to tweak the search to eliminate noise.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703", + "analytic_story": [ + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" + ], + "asset_type": "Windows", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "signature_id", + "Process_Name", + "Message", + "dest", + "Process_ID" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "access", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cleaver", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Whitefly" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Certutil exe certificate extraction", + "id": "337a46be-600f-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-01-26", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for arguments to certutil.exe indicating the manipulation or extraction of Certificate. This certificate can then be used to sign new authentication tokens specially inside Federated environments such as Windows ADFS.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=certutil.exe Processes.process = \"*-exportPFX*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `certutil_exe_certificate_extraction_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Unless there are specific use cases, manipulating or exporting certificates using certutil is uncommon. Extraction of certificate has been observed during attacks such as Golden SAML and other campaigns targeting Federated services.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Certutil exe certificate extraction", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting export a certificate.", + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium" + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 63 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 63 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Certutil exe certificate extraction Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Certutil exe certificate extraction", + "file": "endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-7d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "certutil_exe_certificate_extraction_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images", + "id": "29e307ba-40af-4ab2-91b2-3c6b392bbba0", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-12-03", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for reading loaded Images unique to credential dumping with Mimikatz. Deprecated because mimikatz libraries changed and very noisy sysmon Event Code.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 | stats values(ImageLoaded) as ImageLoaded values(ProcessId) as ProcessId by Computer, Image | search ImageLoaded=*WinSCard.dll ImageLoaded=*cryptdll.dll ImageLoaded=*hid.dll ImageLoaded=*samlib.dll ImageLoaded=*vaultcli.dll | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This search needs Sysmon Logs and a sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 7 with powershell.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", + "known_false_positives": "Other tools can import the same DLLs. These tools should be part of a whitelist. False positives may be present with any process that authenticates or uses credentials, PowerShell included. Filter based on parent process.", + "references": [ + "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Windows", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 6", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A process, $Image$, has loaded $ImageLoaded$ that are typically related to credential dumping on $Computer$. Review for further details.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ImageLoaded", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Image", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "ImageLoaded", + "ProcessId", + "Computer", + "Image" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cleaver", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Whitefly" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 6", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ImageLoaded", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Image", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "ImageLoaded", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "Image", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 6", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images", + "file": "endpoint/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation", + "id": "c9f4b923-f8af-4155-b697-1354f5bcbc5e", + "version": 5, + "date": "2022-01-26", + "author": "David Dorsey, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to elevate privileges. The registry keys under \"Image File Execution Options\" are used to intercept calls to an executable and can be used to attach malicious binaries to benign system binaries.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=\"*Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Image File Execution Options*\") AND (Registry.registry_value_name=GlobalFlag OR Registry.registry_value_name=Debugger) by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "There are many legitimate applications that must execute upon system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2015/12/an-introduction-to-image-file-execution-options/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 95, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.012/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to privilege escalation in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1546.012", + "T1546" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user" + ], + "risk_score": 76, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.012", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Image File Execution Options Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "TEMP.Veles" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1546.012", + "T1546" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 95 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 76 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 76 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1546.012", + "T1546" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation", + "file": "endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.012/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Rare Executables", + "id": "44fddcb2-8d3b-454c-874e-7c6de5a4f7ac", + "version": 5, + "date": "2020-03-16", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search will return a table of rare processes, the names of the systems running them, and the users who initiated each process.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.dest) as dest values(Processes.user) as user min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name | rename Processes.process_name as process | rex field=user \"(?.*)\\\\\\\\(?.*)\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| search [| tstats count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name | rare Processes.process_name limit=30 | rename Processes.process_name as process| `filter_rare_process_allow_list`| table process ] | `detect_rare_executables_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts and populating the endpoint data model with the resultant dataset. The macro `filter_rare_process_allow_list` searches two lookup files for allowed processes. These consist of `rare_process_allow_list_default.csv` and `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv`. To add your own processes to the allow list, add them to `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv`. If you wish to remove an entry from the default lookup file, you will have to modify the macro itself to set the allow_list value for that process to false. You can modify the limit parameter and search scheduling to better suit your environment.", + "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate processes may be only rarely executed in your environment. As these are identified, update `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv` to filter them out of your search results.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Rare Executables", + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Unusual Processes", + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.PT", + "PR.DS", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_name" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.PT", + "PR.DS", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Unusual Processes", + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.PT", + "PR.DS", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "filter_rare_process_allow_list", + "definition": "lookup update=true lookup_rare_process_allow_list_default process as process OUTPUTNEW allow_list | where allow_list=\"false\" | lookup update=true lookup_rare_process_allow_list_local process as process OUTPUT allow_list | where allow_list=\"false\"", + "description": "This macro is intended to allow_list processes that have been definied as rare" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_rare_executables_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [] + }, + { + "name": "Cobalt Strike", + "id": "bcfd17e8-5461-400a-80a2-3b7d1459220c", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-02-16", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "description": "Cobalt Strike is threat emulation software. Red teams and penetration testers use Cobalt Strike to demonstrate the risk of a breach and evaluate mature security programs. Most recently, Cobalt Strike has become the choice tool by threat groups due to its ease of use and extensibility.", + "narrative": "This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from Cobalt Strike. Cobalt Strike has many ways to be enhanced by using aggressor scripts, malleable C2 profiles, default attack packages, and much more. For endpoint behavior, Cobalt Strike is most commonly identified via named pipes, spawn to processes, and DLL function names. Many additional variables are provided for in memory operation of the beacon implant. On the network, depending on the malleable C2 profile used, it is near infinite in the amount of ways to conceal the C2 traffic with Cobalt Strike. Not every query may be specific to Cobalt Strike the tool, but the methodologies and techniques used by it.\\\nSplunk Threat Research reviewed all publicly available instances of Malleabe C2 Profiles and generated a list of the most commonly used spawnto and pipenames.\\\n`Spawnto_x86` and `spawnto_x64` is the process that Cobalt Strike will spawn and injects shellcode into.\\\nPipename sets the named pipe name used in Cobalt Strikes Beacon SMB C2 traffic.\\\nWith that, new detections were generated focused on these spawnto processes spawning without command line arguments. Similar, the named pipes most commonly used by Cobalt Strike added as a detection. In generating content for Cobalt Strike, the following is considered:\\\n- Is it normal for spawnto_ value to have no command line arguments? No command line arguments and a network connection?\\\n- What is the default, or normal, process lineage for spawnto_ value?\\\n- Does the spawnto_ value make network connections?\\\n- Is it normal for spawnto_ value to load jscript, vbscript, Amsi.dll, and clr.dll?\\\nWhile investigating a detection related to this Analytic Story, keep in mind the parent process, process path, and any file modifications that may occur. Tuning may need to occur to remove any false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.cobaltstrike.com/", + "https://www.infocyte.com/blog/2020/09/02/cobalt-strike-the-new-favorite-among-thieves/", + "https://bluescreenofjeff.com/2017-01-24-how-to-write-malleable-c2-profiles-for-cobalt-strike/", + "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/09/coverage-strikes-back-cobalt-strike-paper.html", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/unauthorized-access-of-fireeye-red-team-tools.html", + "https://github.com/MichaelKoczwara/Awesome-CobaltStrike-Defence", + "https://github.com/zer0yu/Awesome-CobaltStrike" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Cobalt Strike", + "analytic_story": "Cobalt Strike", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "CopyKittens", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Gallmaker", + "HAFNIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sowbug", + "Turla", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1560", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Patchwork", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN7", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "PROMETHIUM", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Cobalt Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sharpshooter", + "Silence", + "Turla" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cobalt Group", + "Deep Panda", + "Inception", + "Leviathan", + "TA551", + "WIRTE" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "CopyKittens", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "MuddyWater", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "TA551" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "GALLIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Frankenstein" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection", + "Defense Evasion", + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Anomalous usage of 7zip - Rule", + "ESCU - CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation - Rule", + "ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule", + "ESCU - DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", + "ESCU - GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", + "ESCU - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", + "ESCU - SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network - Rule", + "ESCU - Services Escalate Exe - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Michael Haag", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Anomalous usage of 7zip", + "id": "9364ee8e-a39a-11eb-8f1d-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-22", + "author": "Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following detection identifies a 7z.exe spawned from `Rundll32.exe` or `Dllhost.exe`. It is assumed that the adversary has brought in `7z.exe` and `7z.dll`. It has been observed where an adversary will rename `7z.exe`. Additional coverage may be required to identify the behavior of renamed instances of `7z.exe`. During triage, identify the source of injection into `Rundll32.exe` or `Dllhost.exe`. Capture any files written to disk and analyze as needed. Review parallel processes for additional behaviors. Typically, archiving files will result in exfiltration.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"rundll32.exe\", \"dllhost.exe\") Processes.process_name=*7z* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `anomalous_usage_of_7zip_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as this behavior is not normal for `rundll32.exe` or `dllhost.exe` to spawn and run 7zip.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/001/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/01/31/bazar-no-ryuk/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Anomalous usage of 7zip", + "analytic_story": [ + "Cobalt Strike", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Collection" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1560.001/archive_utility/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior is indicative of suspicious loading of 7zip.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1560.001", + "T1560" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "CopyKittens", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Gallmaker", + "HAFNIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sowbug", + "Turla", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1560", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Patchwork", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1560.001", + "T1560" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Cobalt Strike", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Collection" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1560.001", + "T1560" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Anomalous usage of 7zip Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Anomalous usage of 7zip", + "file": "endpoint/anomalous_usage_of_7zip.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1560.001/archive_utility/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "anomalous_usage_of_7zip_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/anomalous_usage_of_7zip.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation", + "id": "eb277ba0-b96b-11eb-b00e-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-05-20", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies a common behavior by Cobalt Strike and other frameworks where the adversary will escalate privileges, either via `jump` (Cobalt Strike PTH) or `getsystem`, using named-pipe impersonation. A suspicious event will look like `cmd.exe /c echo 4sgryt3436 > \\\\.\\Pipe\\5erg53`.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` OR Processes.process=*%comspec%* (Processes.process=*echo* AND Processes.process=*pipe*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmd_echo_pipe___escalation_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown. It is possible filtering may be required to ensure fidelity.", + "references": [ + "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/threats/cobalt-strike/", + "https://github.com/rapid7/meterpreter/blob/master/source/extensions/priv/server/elevate/namedpipe.c" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation", + "analytic_story": [ + "Cobalt Strike" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ potentially performing privilege escalation using named pipes related to Cobalt Strike and other frameworks.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.003", + "T1543.003", + "T1543" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN7", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "PROMETHIUM", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.003", + "T1543.003", + "T1543" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Cobalt Strike" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.003", + "T1543.003", + "T1543" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation", + "file": "endpoint/cmd_echo_pipe___escalation.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_cmd", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "cmd_echo_pipe___escalation_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/cmd_echo_pipe___escalation.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Cobalt Strike Named Pipes", + "id": "5876d429-0240-4709-8b93-ea8330b411b5", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-02-22", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of default or publicly known named pipes used with Cobalt Strike. A named pipe is a named, one-way or duplex pipe for communication between the pipe server and one or more pipe clients. Cobalt Strike uses named pipes in many ways and has default values used with the Artifact Kit and Malleable C2 Profiles. The following query assists with identifying these default named pipes. Each EDR product presents named pipes a little different. Consider taking the values and generating a query based on the product of choice. \\\nUpon triage, review the process performing the named pipe. If it is explorer.exe, It is possible it was injected into by another process. Review recent parallel processes to identify suspicious patterns or behaviors. A parallel process may have a network connection, review and follow the connection back to identify any file modifications.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventID=17 OR EventID=18 PipeName IN (\\\\msagent_*, \\\\wkssvc*, \\\\DserNamePipe*, \\\\srvsvc_*, \\\\mojo.*, \\\\postex_*, \\\\status_*, \\\\MSSE-*, \\\\spoolss_*, \\\\win_svc*, \\\\ntsvcs*, \\\\winsock*, \\\\UIA_PIPE*) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, process_name, process_id process_path, PipeName | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cobalt_strike_named_pipes_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "The idea of using named pipes with Cobalt Strike is to blend in. Therefore, some of the named pipes identified and added may cause false positives. Filter by process name or pipe name to reduce false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/ipc/named-pipes", + "https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-smb-beacon", + "https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2021/02/09/learn-pipe-fitting-for-all-of-your-offense-projects/", + "https://gist.github.com/MHaggis/6c600e524045a6d49c35291a21e10752", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Cobalt Strike Named Pipes", + "analytic_story": [ + "Cobalt Strike", + "Trickbot", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $Computer$ by user $user$ accessing known suspicious named pipes related to Cobalt Strike.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1055" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventID", + "PipeName", + "Computer", + "process_name", + "process_path", + "process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Cobalt Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sharpshooter", + "Silence", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1055" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Cobalt Strike", + "Trickbot", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 72 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 72 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1055" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Cobalt Strike Named Pipes Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Cobalt Strike Named Pipes", + "file": "endpoint/cobalt_strike_named_pipes.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "cobalt_strike_named_pipes_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/cobalt_strike_named_pipes.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass", + "id": "070e9b80-6252-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-01-28", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. Regsvr32.exe is also a Microsoft signed binary.This variation of the technique is often referred to as a \"Squiblydoo\" attack. \\\nUpon investigating, look for network connections to remote destinations (internal or external). Be cautious to modify the query to look for \"scrobj.dll\", the \".dll\" is not required to load scrobj. \"scrobj.dll\" will be loaded by \"regsvr32.exe\" upon execution. ", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` Processes.process=*scrobj* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives related to third party software registering .DLL's.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.md", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/", + "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/how-to-use-the-regsvr32-tool-and-troubleshoot-regsvr32-error-messages-a98d960a-7392-e6fe-d90a-3f4e0cb543e5" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", + "Cobalt Strike" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.010/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ in an attempt to bypass detection and preventative controls was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.010" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cobalt Group", + "Deep Panda", + "Inception", + "Leviathan", + "TA551", + "WIRTE" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.010" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", + "Cobalt Strike" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.010" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass", + "file": "endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.010/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_regsvr32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=REGSVR32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network", + "id": "f1c07594-a141-11eb-8407-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-10-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies DLLHost.exe with no command line arguments with a network connection. It is unusual for DLLHost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. DLLHost.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=dllhost.exe by _time span=1h Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(dllhost\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port !=\"0\" by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_guid connection_to_CNC dest_port | `dllhost_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `port` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate third party applications may use a moved copy of dllhost, triggering a false positive.", + "references": [ + "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/threatexpress/malleable-c2/c3385e481159a759f79b8acfe11acf240893b830/jquery-c2.4.2.profile", + "https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2021/02/09/learn-pipe-fitting-for-all-of-your-offense-projects/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network", + "analytic_story": [ + "Cobalt Strike" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon_dllhost.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "The process $process_name$ was spawned by $parent_image$ without any command-line arguments on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1055" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_image", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventID", + "process_name", + "process_id", + "parent_process_name", + "dest_port", + "process_path" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Cobalt Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sharpshooter", + "Silence", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1055" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Cobalt Strike" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_image", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_image", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1055" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network", + "file": "endpoint/dllhost_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon_dllhost.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "dllhost_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/dllhost_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network", + "id": "2c853856-a140-11eb-a5b5-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-19", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies gpupdate.exe with no command line arguments and with a network connection. It is unusual for gpupdate.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. gpupdate.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=gpupdate.exe by _time span=1h Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(gpupdate\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port !=\"0\" by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port| `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_guid connection_to_CNC dest_port | `gpupdate_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process.", + "references": [ + "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/xx0hcd/Malleable-C2-Profiles/0ef8cf4556e26f6d4190c56ba697c2159faa5822/crimeware/trick_ryuk.profile", + "https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2021/02/09/learn-pipe-fitting-for-all-of-your-offense-projects/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network", + "analytic_story": [ + "Cobalt Strike" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Command And Control" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Process gpupdate.exe with parent_process $parent_process_name$ is executed on $dest$ by user $user$, followed by an outbound network connection to $connection_to_CNC$ on port $dest_port$. This behaviour is seen with cobaltstrike.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1055" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Parent Process", + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "connection_to_CNC", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventID", + "process_name", + "process_id", + "parent_process_name", + "dest_port", + "process_path" + ], + "risk_score": 81, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Cobalt Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sharpshooter", + "Silence", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1055" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Cobalt Strike" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Parent Process", + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "connection_to_CNC", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Command And Control" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 81 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 81 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process name" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1055" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network", + "file": "endpoint/gpupdate_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "gpupdate_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/gpupdate_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network", + "id": "35307032-a12d-11eb-835f-acde48001122", + "version": 3, + "date": "2021-10-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments and performing a network connection. It is unusual for rundll32.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` by _time span=1h Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(rundll32\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port !=\"0\" by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port| `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_guid connection_to_CNC dest_port | `rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `port` node. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32", + "https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", + "Cobalt Strike", + "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A rundll32 process $process_name$ with no commandline argument like this process commandline $process$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 70, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-34527" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "CopyKittens", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "MuddyWater", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", + "Cobalt Strike", + "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-34527" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 70 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process name" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network", + "file": "endpoint/rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network", + "id": "b690df8c-a145-11eb-a38b-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-10-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies searchprotocolhost.exe with no command line arguments and with a network connection. It is unusual for searchprotocolhost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. searchprotocolhost.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=searchprotocolhost.exe by _time span=1h Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(searchprotocolhost\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port !=\"0\" by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_guid connection_to_CNC dest_port | `searchprotocolhost_with_no_command_line_with_network_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `ports` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/fireeye/red_team_tool_countermeasures/blob/master/rules/PGF/supplemental/hxioc/SUSPICIOUS%20EXECUTION%20OF%20SEARCHPROTOCOLHOST%20(METHODOLOGY).ioc" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network", + "analytic_story": [ + "Cobalt Strike" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon_searchprotocolhost.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A searchprotocolhost.exe process $process_name$ with no commandline in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1055" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "process_name", + "process_id", + "parent_process_name", + "dest_port", + "process_path" + ], + "risk_score": 70, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Cobalt Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sharpshooter", + "Silence", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1055" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Cobalt Strike" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 70 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process name" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1055" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network", + "file": "endpoint/searchprotocolhost_with_no_command_line_with_network.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon_searchprotocolhost.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "searchprotocolhost_with_no_command_line_with_network_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/searchprotocolhost_with_no_command_line_with_network.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Services Escalate Exe", + "id": "c448488c-b7ec-11eb-8253-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-18", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of `svc-exe` with Cobalt Strike. The behavior typically follows after an adversary has already gained initial access and is escalating privileges. Using `svc-exe`, a randomly named binary will be downloaded from the remote Teamserver and placed on disk within `C:\\Windows\\400619a.exe`. Following, the binary will be added to the registry under key `HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\400619a\\` with multiple keys and values added to look like a legitimate service. Upon loading, `services.exe` will spawn the randomly named binary from `\\\\127.0.0.1\\ADMIN$\\400619a.exe`. The process lineage is completed with `400619a.exe` spawning rundll32.exe, which is the default `spawnto_` value for Cobalt Strike. The `spawnto_` value is arbitrary and may be any process on disk (typically system32/syswow64 binary). The `spawnto_` process will also contain a network connection. During triage, review parallel procesess and identify any additional file modifications.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe Processes.process_path=*admin$* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `services_escalate_exe_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as `services.exe` should never spawn a process from `ADMIN$`. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/", + "https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-beacon" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Services Escalate Exe", + "analytic_story": [ + "Cobalt Strike" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 95, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A service process $parent_process_name$ with process path $process_path$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Processes.dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Processes.user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 76, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Cobalt Strike" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Processes.dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Processes.user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 95 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Processes.dest", + "risk_score": 76 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "Processes.user", + "risk_score": 76 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Services Escalate Exe Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Services Escalate Exe", + "file": "endpoint/services_escalate_exe.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "services_escalate_exe_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/services_escalate_exe.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments", + "id": "ff61e98c-0337-4593-a78f-72a676c56f26", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-09-20", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies DLLHost.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for DLLHost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. DLLHost.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_dllhost` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(dllhost\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | `suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process.", + "references": [ + "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/threatexpress/malleable-c2/c3385e481159a759f79b8acfe11acf240893b830/jquery-c2.4.2.profile", + "https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2021/02/09/learn-pipe-fitting-for-all-of-your-offense-projects/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments", + "analytic_story": [ + "Cobalt Strike" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious dllhost.exe process with no command line arguments executed on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1055" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Cobalt Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sharpshooter", + "Silence", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1055" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Cobalt Strike" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1055" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments", + "file": "endpoint/suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_dllhost", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=dllhost.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=dllhost.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments", + "id": "f308490a-473a-40ef-ae64-dd7a6eba284a", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-09-20", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies gpupdate.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for gpupdate.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. gpupdate.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_gpupdate` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(gpupdate\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | `suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process.", + "references": [ + "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/xx0hcd/Malleable-C2-Profiles/0ef8cf4556e26f6d4190c56ba697c2159faa5822/crimeware/trick_ryuk.profile", + "https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2021/02/09/learn-pipe-fitting-for-all-of-your-offense-projects/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments", + "analytic_story": [ + "Cobalt Strike" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious gpupdate.exe process with no command line arguments executed on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1055" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Cobalt Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sharpshooter", + "Silence", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1055" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Cobalt Strike" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1055" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments", + "file": "endpoint/suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "process_gpupdate", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=gpupdate.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=GPUpdate.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename", + "id": "f0db4464-55d9-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 3, + "date": "2021-09-20", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a renamed instance of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe. Microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v4.0.30319 and is rarely utilized. When investigating, identify the executed code on disk and review. A spawned child process from microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is uncommon. In any instance, microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe spawning from an Office product or any living off the land binary is highly suspect.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_microsoftworkflowcompiler` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe, triggering a false positive.", + "references": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md#atomic-test-6---microsoftworkflowcompilerexe-payload-execution" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename", + "analytic_story": [ + "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", + "Cobalt Strike", + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious renamed microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe binary ran on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1036", + "T1127", + "T1036.003" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "GALLIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036", + "T1127", + "T1036.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", + "Cobalt Strike", + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 63 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 63 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036", + "T1127", + "T1036.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename", + "file": "endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_microsoftworkflowcompiler", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious msbuild path", + "id": "f5198224-551c-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-01-12", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies msbuild.exe executing from a non-standard path. Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v4.0.30319 and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v4.0.30319. Instances of Visual Studio will run a copy of msbuild.exe. A moved instance of MSBuild is suspicious, however there are instances of build applications that will move or use a copy of MSBuild.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_msbuild` AND (Processes.process_path!=c:\\\\windows\\\\microsoft.net\\\\framework*\\\\v*\\\\*) by Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `suspicious_msbuild_path_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of msbuild.exe, triggering a false positive. Baselining of MSBuild.exe usage is recommended to better understand it's path usage. Visual Studio runs an instance out of a path that will need to be filtered on.", + "references": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious msbuild path", + "analytic_story": [ + "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild", + "Cobalt Strike", + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Msbuild.exe ran from an uncommon path on $dest$ execyted by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1036", + "T1127", + "T1036.003", + "T1127.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "GALLIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Frankenstein" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036", + "T1127", + "T1036.003", + "T1127.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild", + "Cobalt Strike", + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036", + "T1127", + "T1036.003", + "T1127.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Suspicious msbuild path Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious msbuild path", + "file": "endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_msbuild", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=msbuild.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSBuild.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_msbuild_path_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious MSBuild Rename", + "id": "4006adac-5937-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-01-12", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies renamed instances of msbuild.exe executing. Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v4.0.30319 and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v4.0.30319. During investigation, identify the code executed and what is executing a renamed instance of MSBuild.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_msbuild` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_msbuild_rename_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of msbuild, triggering a false positive.", + "references": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md", + "https://github.com/infosecn1nja/MaliciousMacroMSBuild/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious MSBuild Rename", + "analytic_story": [ + "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild", + "Cobalt Strike", + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious renamed msbuild.exe binary ran on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1036", + "T1127", + "T1036.003", + "T1127.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "GALLIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Frankenstein" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036", + "T1127", + "T1036.003", + "T1127.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild", + "Cobalt Strike", + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 63 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 63 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036", + "T1127", + "T1036.003", + "T1127.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Suspicious MSBuild Rename Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious MSBuild Rename", + "file": "endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_msbuild", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=msbuild.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSBuild.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_msbuild_rename_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 StartW", + "id": "9319dda5-73f2-4d43-a85a-67ce961bddb7", + "version": 3, + "date": "2021-02-04", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe executing a DLL function name, Start and StartW, on the command line that is commonly observed with Cobalt Strike x86 and x64 DLL payloads. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64. Typically, the DLL will be written and loaded from a world writeable path or user location. In most instances it will not have a valid certificate (Unsigned). During investigation, review the parent process and other parallel application execution. Capture and triage the DLL in question. In the instance of Cobalt Strike, rundll32.exe is the default process it opens and injects shellcode into. This default process can be changed, but typically is not.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*start* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_startw_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use Start as a function and call it via the command line. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", + "https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-windows-executable", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32", + "https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 StartW", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", + "Cobalt Strike", + "Trickbot" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "rundll32.exe running with suspicious parameters on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "CopyKittens", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "MuddyWater", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", + "Cobalt Strike", + "Trickbot" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 35 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 35 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 StartW Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 StartW", + "file": "endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_rundll32_startw_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments", + "id": "e451bd16-e4c5-4109-8eb1-c4c6ecf048b4", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-09-20", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for rundll32.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(rundll32\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | `suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32", + "https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", + "Cobalt Strike", + "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Suspicious rundll32.exe process with no command line arguments executed on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-34527" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "CopyKittens", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "MuddyWater", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", + "Cobalt Strike", + "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-34527" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments", + "file": "endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments", + "id": "f52d2db8-31f9-4aa7-a176-25779effe55c", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-09-20", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies searchprotocolhost.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for searchprotocolhost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. searchprotocolhost.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=searchprotocolhost.exe by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(searchprotocolhost\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | `suspicious_searchprotocolhost_no_command_line_arguments_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/fireeye/red_team_tool_countermeasures/blob/master/rules/PGF/supplemental/hxioc/SUSPICIOUS%20EXECUTION%20OF%20SEARCHPROTOCOLHOST%20(METHODOLOGY).ioc" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments", + "analytic_story": [ + "Cobalt Strike" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious searchprotocolhost.exe process with no command line arguments executed on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1055" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Cobalt Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sharpshooter", + "Silence", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1055" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Cobalt Strike" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1055" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments", + "file": "endpoint/suspicious_searchprotocolhost_no_command_line_arguments.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_searchprotocolhost_no_command_line_arguments_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_searchprotocolhost_no_command_line_arguments.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [] + }, + { + "name": "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "id": "bd91a2bc-d20b-4f44-a982-1bea98e86390", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-01-09", + "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", + "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that relate to the ColdRoot Remote Access Trojan that affects MacOS. An example of some of these activities are changing sensative binaries in the MacOS sub-system, detecting process names and executables associated with the RAT, detecting when a keyboard tab is installed on a MacOS machine and more.", + "narrative": "Conventional wisdom holds that Apple's MacOS operating system is significantly less vulnerable to attack than Windows machines. While that point is debatable, it is true that attacks against MacOS systems are much less common. However, this fact does not mean that Macs are impervious to breaches. To the contrary, research has shown that that Mac malware is increasing at an alarming rate. According to AV-test, in 2018, there were 86,865 new MacOS malware variants, up from 27,338 the year before—a 31% increase. In contrast, the independent research firm found that new Windows malware had increased from 65.17M to 76.86M during that same period, less than half the rate of growth. The bottom line is that while the numbers look a lot smaller than Windows, it's definitely time to take Mac security more seriously.\\\nThis Analytic Story addresses the ColdRoot remote access trojan (RAT), which was uploaded to Github in 2016, but was still escaping detection by the first quarter of 2018, when a new, more feature-rich variant was discovered masquerading as an Apple audio driver. Among other capabilities, the Pascal-based ColdRoot can heist passwords from users' keychains and remotely control infected machines without detection. In the initial report of his findings, Patrick Wardle, Chief Research Officer for Digita Security, explained that the new ColdRoot RAT could start and kill processes on the breached system, spawn new remote-desktop sessions, take screen captures and assemble them into a live stream of the victim's desktop, and more.\\\nSearches in this Analytic Story leverage the capabilities of OSquery to address ColdRoot detection from several different angles, such as looking for the existence of associated files and processes, and monitoring for signs of an installed keylogger.", + "references": [ + "https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/osxcoldroot-and-the-rat-invasion/", + "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html", + "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/coldroot-rat-still-undetectable-despite-being-uploaded-on-github-two-years-ago/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "analytic_story": "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "category": [ + "Malware" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Installation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", + "ESCU - MacOS - Re-opened Applications - Rule", + "ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", + "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Jose Hernandez", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection", + "id": "a6fffe5e-05c3-4c04-badc-887607fbb8dc", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-01-29", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for ColdRoot events from the osx-attacks osquery pack.", + "search": "| from datamodel Alerts.Alerts | search app=osquery:results (name=pack_osx-attacks_OSX_ColdRoot_RAT_Launchd OR name=pack_osx-attacks_OSX_ColdRoot_RAT_Files) | rename columns.path as path | bucket _time span=30s | stats count(path) by _time, host, user, path | `osquery_pack___coldroot_detection_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from your osquery deployed agents with the [osx-attacks.conf](https://github.com/facebook/osquery/blob/experimental/packs/osx-attacks.conf#L599) pack enabled. Also the [TA-OSquery](https://github.com/d1vious/TA-osquery) must be deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the osquery data populate the Alerts data model", + "known_false_positives": "There are no known false positives.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection", + "analytic_story": [ + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 4", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Command & Control" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.CM", + "PR.PT" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 4", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.CM", + "PR.PT" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 4", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.CM", + "PR.PT" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "osquery_pack___coldroot_detection_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "MacOS - Re-opened Applications", + "id": "40bb64f9-f619-4e3d-8732-328d40377c4b", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-02-07", + "author": "Jamie Windley, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for processes referencing the plist files that determine which applications are re-opened when a user reboots their machine.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*com.apple.loginwindow*\" by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `macos___re_opened_applications_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest process data from your osquery deployed agents with the [splunk.conf](https://github.com/splunk/TA-osquery/blob/master/config/splunk.conf) pack enabled. Also the [TA-OSquery](https://github.com/splunk/TA-osquery) must be deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the data populate the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "At this stage, there are no known false positives. During testing, no process events refering the com.apple.loginwindow.plist files were observed during normal operation of re-opening applications on reboot. Therefore, it can be asumed that any occurences of this in the process events would be worth investigating. In the event that the legitimate modification by the system of these files is in fact logged to the process log, then the process_name of that process can be added to an allow list.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "MacOS - Re-opened Applications", + "analytic_story": [ + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Command & Control" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "macos___re_opened_applications_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/macos___re_opened_applications.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Processes Tapping Keyboard Events", + "id": "2a371608-331d-4034-ae2c-21dda8f1d0ec", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-01-25", + "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for processes in an MacOS system that is tapping keyboard events in MacOS, and essentially monitoring all keystrokes made by a user. This is a common technique used by RATs to log keystrokes from a victim, although it can also be used by legitimate processes like Siri to react on human input", + "search": "| from datamodel Alerts.Alerts | search app=osquery:results name=pack_osx-attacks_Keyboard_Event_Taps | rename columns.cmdline as cmd, columns.name as process_name, columns.pid as process_id| dedup host,process_name | table host,process_name, cmd, process_id | `processes_tapping_keyboard_events_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from your osquery deployed agents with the [osx-attacks.conf](https://github.com/facebook/osquery/blob/experimental/packs/osx-attacks.conf#L599) pack enabled. Also the [TA-OSquery](https://github.com/d1vious/TA-osquery) must be deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the osquery data populate the Alerts data model.", + "known_false_positives": "There might be some false positives as keyboard event taps are used by processes like Siri and Zoom video chat, for some good examples of processes to exclude please see [this](https://github.com/facebook/osquery/pull/5345#issuecomment-454639161) comment.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Processes Tapping Keyboard Events", + "analytic_story": [ + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 4", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "DE.DP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "app", + "name", + "columns.cmdline", + "columns.name", + "columns.pid", + "host" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 4", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "dest", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 4", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "processes_tapping_keyboard_events_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + }, + { + "name": "Investigate Network Traffic From src ip", + "id": "9df9ca9c-a02b-4f48-9eba-0bac55179050", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-06-15", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search allows you to find all the network traffic from a specific IP address.", + "search": "| from datamodel Network_Traffic.All_Traffic | search src_ip=$src_ip$", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting your web-traffic logs and populating the web data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "src_ip" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "src_ip" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Collection and Staging", + "id": "8e03c61e-13c4-4dcd-bfbe-5ce5a8dc031a", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-02-03", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "description": "Monitor for and investigate activities--such as suspicious writes to the Windows Recycling Bin or email servers sending high amounts of traffic to specific hosts, for example--that may indicate that an adversary is harvesting and exfiltrating sensitive data. ", + "narrative": "A common adversary goal is to identify and exfiltrate data of value from a target organization. This data may include email conversations and addresses, confidential company information, links to network design/infrastructure, important dates, and so on.\\\n Attacks are composed of three activities: identification, collection, and staging data for exfiltration. Identification typically involves scanning systems and observing user activity. Collection can involve the transfer of large amounts of data from various repositories. Staging/preparation includes moving data to a central location and compressing (and optionally encoding and/or encrypting) it. All of these activities provide opportunities for defenders to identify their presence. \\\nUse the searches to detect and monitor suspicious behavior related to these activities.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Collection", + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Collection and Staging", + "analytic_story": "Collection and Staging", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Security Monitoring", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "CopyKittens", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Gallmaker", + "HAFNIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sowbug", + "Turla", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1560", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Patchwork", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Magic Hound", + "Silent Librarian" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Email Collection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "Chimera", + "Magic Hound" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN4", + "HAFNIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "Leafminer" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection", + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint", + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Renamed 7-Zip - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Renamed WinRAR - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule", + "ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", + "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", + "ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Rico Valdez", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious writes to System Volume Information", + "id": "cd6297cd-2bdd-4aa1-84aa-5d2f84228fac", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-22", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects writes to the 'System Volume Information' folder by something other than the System process.", + "search": "(`sysmon` OR tag=process) EventCode=11 process_id!=4 file_path=*System\\ Volume\\ Information* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Image, file_path | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You need to be ingesting logs with both the process name and command-line from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible that other utilities or system processes may legitimately write to this folder. Investigate and modify the search to include exceptions as appropriate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious writes to System Volume Information", + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging" + ], + "asset_type": "Windows", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1036" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Renamed 7-Zip", + "id": "4057291a-b8cf-11eb-95fe-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies renamed 7-Zip usage using Sysmon. At this stage of an attack, review parallel processes and file modifications for data that is staged or potentially have been exfiltrated. This analytic utilizes the OriginalFileName to capture the renamed process. During triage, validate this is the legitimate version of `7zip` by reviewing the PE metadata. In addition, review parallel processes for further suspicious behavior.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.original_file_name=7z*.exe AND Processes.process_name!=7z*.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_renamed_7_zip_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives, however this analytic will need to be modified for each environment if Sysmon is not used.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1560.001/T1560.001.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Renamed 7-Zip", + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Collection" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1560.001/archive_utility/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1560.001", + "T1560" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 27, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "CopyKittens", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Gallmaker", + "HAFNIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sowbug", + "Turla", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1560", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Patchwork", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1560.001", + "T1560" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Collection" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 27 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 27 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1560.001", + "T1560" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Renamed 7-Zip Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Renamed 7-Zip", + "file": "endpoint/detect_renamed_7_zip.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1560.001/archive_utility/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_renamed_7_zip_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_renamed_7_zip.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Renamed WinRAR", + "id": "1b7bfb2c-b8e6-11eb-99ac-acde48001122", + "version": 3, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analtyic identifies renamed instances of `WinRAR.exe`. In most cases, it is not common for WinRAR to be used renamed, however it is common to be installed by a third party application and executed from a non-standard path. During triage, validate additional metadata from the binary that this is `WinRAR`. Review parallel processes and file modifications.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.original_file_name=WinRAR.exe (Processes.process_name!=rar.exe OR Processes.process_name!=winrar.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_renamed_winrar_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown. It is possible third party applications use renamed instances of WinRAR.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1560.001/T1560.001.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Renamed WinRAR", + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Collection" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1560.001/archive_utility/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1560.001", + "T1560" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 27, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "CopyKittens", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Gallmaker", + "HAFNIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sowbug", + "Turla", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1560", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Patchwork", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1560.001", + "T1560" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Collection" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 27 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 27 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1560.001", + "T1560" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Renamed WinRAR Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Renamed WinRAR", + "file": "endpoint/detect_renamed_winrar.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1560.001/archive_utility/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_renamed_winrar_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_renamed_winrar.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin", + "id": "b5541828-8ffd-4070-9d95-b3da4de924cb", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-07-22", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects writes to the recycle bin by a process other than explorer.exe.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path values(Filesystem.file_name) as file_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path = \"*$Recycle.Bin*\" by Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Filesystem\")`| search [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.user) as user values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name != \"explorer.exe\" by Processes.process_id Processes.dest| `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | table process_id dest] | `suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on filesystem and process logs responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem` nodes.", + "known_false_positives": "Because the Recycle Bin is a hidden folder in modern versions of Windows, it would be unusual for a process other than explorer.exe to write to it. Incidents should be investigated as appropriate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin", + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging" + ], + "asset_type": "Windows", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036/write_to_recycle_bin/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 40, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin process $Processes.process_name$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1036" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Processes.process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.file_path", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.process_id", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 28, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Processes.process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 40, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 28 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "Processes.process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin", + "file": "endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036/write_to_recycle_bin/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Email files written outside of the Outlook directory", + "id": "8d52cf03-ba25-4101-aa78-07994aed4f74", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The search looks at the change-analysis data model and detects email files created outside the normal Outlook directory.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_name=*.pst OR Filesystem.file_name=*.ost) Filesystem.file_path != \"C:\\\\Users\\\\*\\\\My Documents\\\\Outlook Files\\\\*\" Filesystem.file_path!=\"C:\\\\Users\\\\*\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\Outlook*\" by Filesystem.action Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Filesystem\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records the file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint.Filesystem data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or by other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system reads and writes.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators and users sometimes prefer backing up their email data by moving the email files into a different folder. These attempts will be detected by the search.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Email files written outside of the Outlook directory", + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1114", + "T1114.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.file_path", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.action", + "Filesystem.process_id", + "Filesystem.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Magic Hound", + "Silent Librarian" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Email Collection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "Chimera", + "Magic Hound" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1114", + "T1114.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1114", + "T1114.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml", + "source": "application" + }, + { + "name": "Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts", + "id": "7f5fb3e1-4209-4914-90db-0ec21b556378", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search looks for an increase of data transfers from your email server to your clients. This could be indicative of a malicious actor collecting data using your email server.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` sum(All_Traffic.bytes_out) as bytes_out from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.src_category=email_server by All_Traffic.dest_ip _time span=1d | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | eventstats avg(bytes_out) as avg_bytes_out stdev(bytes_out) as stdev_bytes_out | eventstats count as num_data_samples avg(eval(if(_time < relative_time(now(), \"@d\"), bytes_out, null))) as per_source_avg_bytes_out stdev(eval(if(_time < relative_time(now(), \"@d\"), bytes_out, null))) as per_source_stdev_bytes_out by dest_ip | eval minimum_data_samples = 4, deviation_threshold = 3 | where num_data_samples >= minimum_data_samples AND bytes_out > (avg_bytes_out + (deviation_threshold * stdev_bytes_out)) AND bytes_out > (per_source_avg_bytes_out + (deviation_threshold * per_source_stdev_bytes_out)) AND _time >= relative_time(now(), \"@d\") | eval num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average = round(abs(bytes_out - avg_bytes_out) / stdev_bytes_out, 2), num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average = round(abs(bytes_out - per_source_avg_bytes_out) / per_source_stdev_bytes_out, 2) | table dest_ip, _time, bytes_out, avg_bytes_out, per_source_avg_bytes_out, num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average, num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average | `email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model. Your email servers must be categorized as \"email_server\" for the search to work, as well. You may need to adjust the deviation_threshold and minimum_data_samples values based on the network traffic in your environment. The \"deviation_threshold\" field is a multiplying factor to control how much variation you're willing to tolerate. The \"minimum_data_samples\" field is the minimum number of connections of data samples required for the statistic to be valid.", + "known_false_positives": "The false-positive rate will vary based on how you set the deviation_threshold and data_samples values. Our recommendation is to adjust these values based on your network traffic to and from your email servers.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts", + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging", + "HAFNIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 7" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1114", + "T1114.002" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.bytes_out", + "All_Traffic.src_category", + "All_Traffic.dest_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Magic Hound", + "Silent Librarian" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN4", + "HAFNIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "Leafminer" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1114", + "T1114.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 7" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging", + "HAFNIUM Group" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1114", + "T1114.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 7" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml", + "source": "application" + }, + { + "name": "Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server", + "id": "7f5fb3e1-4209-4914-90db-0ec21b556368", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search looks for an increase of data transfers from your email server to your clients. This could be indicative of a malicious actor collecting data using your email server.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` sum(All_Traffic.bytes_in) as bytes_in from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_category=email_server by All_Traffic.src_ip _time span=1d | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | eventstats avg(bytes_in) as avg_bytes_in stdev(bytes_in) as stdev_bytes_in | eventstats count as num_data_samples avg(eval(if(_time < relative_time(now(), \"@d\"), bytes_in, null))) as per_source_avg_bytes_in stdev(eval(if(_time < relative_time(now(), \"@d\"), bytes_in, null))) as per_source_stdev_bytes_in by src_ip | eval minimum_data_samples = 4, deviation_threshold = 3 | where num_data_samples >= minimum_data_samples AND bytes_in > (avg_bytes_in + (deviation_threshold * stdev_bytes_in)) AND bytes_in > (per_source_avg_bytes_in + (deviation_threshold * per_source_stdev_bytes_in)) AND _time >= relative_time(now(), \"@d\") | eval num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average = round(abs(bytes_in - avg_bytes_in) / stdev_bytes_in, 2), num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average = round(abs(bytes_in - per_source_avg_bytes_in) / per_source_stdev_bytes_in, 2) | table src_ip, _time, bytes_in, avg_bytes_in, per_source_avg_bytes_in, num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average, num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average | `hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model. Your email servers must be categorized as \"email_server\" for the search to work, as well. You may need to adjust the deviation_threshold and minimum_data_samples values based on the network traffic in your environment. The \"deviation_threshold\" field is a multiplying factor to control how much variation you're willing to tolerate. The \"minimum_data_samples\" field is the minimum number of connections of data samples required for the statistic to be valid.", + "known_false_positives": "The false-positive rate will vary based on how you set the deviation_threshold and data_samples values. Our recommendation is to adjust these values based on your network traffic to and from your email servers.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server", + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 7" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1114.002", + "T1114" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.bytes_in", + "All_Traffic.dest_category", + "All_Traffic.src_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN4", + "HAFNIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "Leafminer" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Magic Hound", + "Silent Librarian" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1114.002", + "T1114" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 7" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1114.002", + "T1114" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 7" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml", + "source": "network" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + }, + { + "name": "Get Parent Process Info", + "id": "fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41bf9", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-02-28", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "parent_process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Phishing Payloads", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_parent_process_info" + }, + { + "name": "Get Process Info", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd71", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-01", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the process running on a host which is under investigation. To gather the process info, enter the values for the process name in question and the destination IP address.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search process_name= $process_name$ | search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_process_info" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Command and Control", + "id": "943773c6-c4de-4f38-89a8-0b92f98804d8", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-06-01", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "description": "Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged by attackers to establish and operate command and control channels. Implants installed by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions and send data back to the malicious operators.", + "narrative": "Threat actors typically architect and implement an infrastructure to use in various ways during the course of their attack campaigns. In some cases, they leverage this infrastructure for scanning and performing reconnaissance activities. In others, they may use this infrastructure to launch actual attacks. One of the most important functions of this infrastructure is to establish servers that will communicate with implants on compromised endpoints. These servers establish a command and control channel that is used to proxy data between the compromised endpoint and the attacker. These channels relay commands from the attacker to the compromised endpoint and the output of those commands back to the attacker.\\\nBecause this communication is so critical for an adversary, they often use techniques designed to hide the true nature of the communications. There are many different techniques used to establish and communicate over these channels. This Analytic Story provides searches that look for a variety of the techniques used for these channels, as well as indications that these channels are active, by examining logs associated with border control devices and network-access control lists.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Command_and_Control", + "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Command-and-control-servers-The-puppet-masters-that-govern-malware" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Command and Control", + "analytic_story": "Command and Control", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Security Monitoring", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [], + "datamodels": [], + "kill_chain_phases": [] + }, + "detection_names": [], + "investigation_names": [], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Rico Valdez", + "detections": [], + "investigations": [] + }, + { + "name": "Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation", + "id": "aa0e28b1-0521-4b6f-9d2a-7b87e34af246", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-02-20", + "author": "Rod Soto, Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "description": "Use the searches in this story to monitor your Kubernetes registry repositories for upload, and deployment of potentially vulnerable, backdoor, or implanted containers. These searches provide information on source users, destination path, container names and repository names. The searches provide context to address Mitre T1525 which refers to container implantation upload to a company's repository either in Amazon Elastic Container Registry, Google Container Registry and Azure Container Registry.", + "narrative": "Container Registrys provide a way for organizations to keep customized images of their development and infrastructure environment in private. However if these repositories are misconfigured or priviledge users credentials are compromise, attackers can potentially upload implanted containers which can be deployed across the organization. These searches allow operator to monitor who, when and what was uploaded to container registry.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation", + "analytic_story": "Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation", + "category": [ + "Cloud Security" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Security Monitoring", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1525", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Implant Internal Image", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "datamodels": [], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - GCP GCR container uploaded - Rule", + "ESCU - New container uploaded to AWS ECR - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "author_name": "Rod Soto", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "GCP GCR container uploaded", + "id": "4f00ca88-e766-4605-ac65-ae51c9fd185b", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-02-20", + "author": "Rod Soto, Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search show information on uploaded containers including source user, account, action, bucket name event name, http user agent, message and destination path.", + "search": "|tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Cloud_Infrastructure.Storage where Storage.event_name=storage.objects.create by Storage.src_user Storage.account Storage.action Storage.bucket_name Storage.event_name Storage.http_user_agent Storage.msg Storage.object_path | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Storage\")` | `gcp_gcr_container_uploaded_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later), then configure stackdriver and set a subpub subscription to be imported to Splunk. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model. Please also customize the `container_implant_gcp_detection_filter` macro to filter out the false positives.", + "known_false_positives": "Uploading container is a normal behavior from developers or users with access to container registry. GCP GCR registers container upload as a Storage event, this search must be considered under the context of CONTAINER upload creation which automatically generates a bucket entry for destination path.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "GCP GCR container uploaded", + "analytic_story": [ + "Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation" + ], + "asset_type": "GCP GCR Container", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1525" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1525", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Implant Internal Image", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1525" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1525" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "gcp_gcr_container_uploaded_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "New container uploaded to AWS ECR", + "id": "f0f70b40-f7ad-489d-9905-23d149da8099", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-02-20", + "author": "Rod Soto, Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This searches show information on uploaded containers including source user, image id, source IP user type, http user agent, region, first time, last time of operation (PutImage). These searches are based on Cloud Infrastructure Data Model.", + "search": "| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Cloud_Infrastructure.Compute where Compute.user_type!=\"AssumeRole\" AND Compute.http_user_agent=\"AWS Internal\" AND Compute.event_name=\"PutImage\" by Compute.image_id Compute.src_user Compute.src Compute.region Compute.msg Compute.user_type | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Compute\")` | `new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model. Please also customize the `container_implant_aws_detection_filter` macro to filter out the false positives.", + "known_false_positives": "Uploading container is a normal behavior from developers or users with access to container registry.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "New container uploaded to AWS ECR", + "analytic_story": [ + "Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS ECR container", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1525" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1525", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Implant Internal Image", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1525" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1525" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml", + "source": "cloud" + } + ], + "investigations": [] + }, + { + "name": "Credential Dumping", + "id": "854d78bf-d0e2-4f4e-b05c-640905f86d7a", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-02-04", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "description": "Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords. The threat actors use these pilfered credentials to further escalate privileges and spread throughout a target environment. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to credential dumping.", + "narrative": "Credential dumping—gathering credentials from a target system, often hashed or encrypted—is a common attack technique. Even though the credentials may not be in plain text, an attacker can still exfiltrate the data and set to cracking it offline, on their own systems. The threat actors target a variety of sources to extract them, including the Security Accounts Manager (SAM), Local Security Authority (LSA), NTDS from Domain Controllers, or the Group Policy Preference (GPP) files.\\\nOnce attackers obtain valid credentials, they use them to move throughout a target network with ease, discovering new systems and identifying assets of interest. Credentials obtained in this manner typically include those of privileged users, which may provide access to more sensitive information and system operations.\\\nThe detection searches in this Analytic Story monitor access to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process, the usage of shadowcopies for credential dumping and some other techniques for credential dumping.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", + "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Credential Dumping", + "analytic_story": "Credential Dumping", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cleaver", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Whitefly" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "GALLIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "Night Dragon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Fox Kitten", + "HAFNIUM", + "Mustang Panda", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN8", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access", + "Defense Evasion", + "Execution" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Exploitation", + "Installation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", + "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule", + "ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", + "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", + "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", + "ESCU - Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr - Rule", + "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", + "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", + "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", + "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Copy of ShadowCopy with Script Block Logging - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", + "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", + "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", + "ESCU - Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry - Rule", + "ESCU - Esentutl SAM Copy - Rule", + "ESCU - Extraction of Registry Hives - Rule", + "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", + "ESCU - SAM Database File Access Attempt - Rule", + "ESCU - SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool - Rule", + "ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task", + "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task", + "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task", + "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Rico Valdez", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Dump LSASS via procdump Rename", + "id": "21276daa-663d-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-02-01", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "Detect a renamed instance of procdump.exe dumping the lsass process. This query looks for both -mm and -ma usage. -mm will produce a mini dump file and -ma will write a dump file with all process memory. Both are highly suspect and should be reviewed. Modify the query as needed.\\\nDuring triage, confirm this is procdump.exe executing. If it is the first time a Sysinternals utility has been ran, it is possible there will be a -accepteula on the command line. Review other endpoint data sources for cross process (injection) into lsass.exe.", + "search": "`sysmon` OriginalFileName=procdump process_name!=procdump*.exe EventID=1 (CommandLine=*-ma* OR CommandLine=*-mm*) CommandLine=*lsass* | rename Computer as dest | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, parent_process_name, process_name, OriginalFileName, CommandLine | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procdump", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md#atomic-test-2---dump-lsassexe-memory-using-procdump" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Dump LSASS via procdump Rename", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "HAFNIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$, attempting to dump lsass.exe.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "OriginalFileName", + "process_name", + "EventID", + "CommandLine", + "Computer", + "parent_process_name" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cleaver", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Whitefly" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "HAFNIUM Group" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS", + "id": "56ef054c-76ef-45f9-af4a-a634695dcd65", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-12-06", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects loading of unsigned images by LSASS. Deprecated because too noisy.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventID=7 Image=*lsass.exe Signed=false | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, Image, ImageLoaded, Signed, SHA1 | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "This search needs Sysmon Logs with a sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 7 with lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", + "known_false_positives": "Other tools could load images into LSASS for legitimate reason. But enterprise tools should always use signed DLLs.", + "references": [ + "https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "asset_type": "Windows", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cleaver", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Whitefly" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation", + "id": "fb4c31b0-13e8-4155-8aa5-24de4b8d6717", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-12-06", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "Detect memory dumping of the LSASS process.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe CallTrace=*dbgcore.dll* OR CallTrace=*dbghelp.dll* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, TargetImage, TargetProcessId, SourceImage, SourceProcessId | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 10 for lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators can create memory dumps for debugging purposes, but memory dumps of the LSASS process would be unusual.", + "references": [ + "https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "asset_type": "Windows", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 6", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "process $SourceImage$ injected into $TargetImage$ and was attempted dump LSASS on $dest$. Adversaries tend to do this when trying to accesss credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS).", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "TargetImage", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "TargetImage", + "CallTrace", + "Computer", + "TargetProcessId", + "SourceImage", + "SourceProcessId" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cleaver", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Whitefly" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 6", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "TargetImage", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 63 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "TargetImage", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 6", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation", + "file": "endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", + "id": "e9fb4a59-c5fb-440a-9f24-191fbc6b2911", + "version": 6, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` OR `process_cmd` Processes.process=*save* (Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\SAM* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\SAM*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to export the registry keys.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.002", + "T1003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 90, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "GALLIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "Night Dragon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.002", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 90 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 90 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.002", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", + "file": "endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_reg", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=reg.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=reg.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_cmd", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Create Remote Thread into LSASS", + "id": "67d4dbef-9564-4699-8da8-03a151529edc", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-12-06", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "Detect remote thread creation into LSASS consistent with credential dumping.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventID=8 TargetImage=*lsass.exe | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, EventCode, TargetImage, TargetProcessId | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `create_remote_thread_into_lsass_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This search needs Sysmon Logs with a Sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 8 with lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", + "known_false_positives": "Other tools can access LSASS for legitimate reasons and generate an event. In these cases, tweaking the search may help eliminate noise.", + "references": [ + "https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Create Remote Thread into LSASS", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "asset_type": "Windows", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A process has created a remote thread into $TargetImage$ on $dest$. This behavior is indicative of credential dumping and should be investigated.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "TargetImage", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventID", + "TargetImage", + "Computer", + "EventCode", + "TargetImage", + "TargetProcessId", + "dest" + ], + "risk_score": 81, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cleaver", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Whitefly" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "TargetImage", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "TargetImage", + "threat_object_type": "other" + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 81 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Create Remote Thread into LSASS Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Create Remote Thread into LSASS", + "file": "endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "create_remote_thread_into_lsass_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr", + "id": "b2fbe95a-9c62-4c12-8a29-24b97e84c0cd", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-02-03", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "Detect the hands on keyboard behavior of Windows Task Manager creating a process dump of lsass.exe. Upon this behavior occurring, a file write/modification will occur in the users profile under \\AppData\\Local\\Temp. The dump file, lsass.dmp, cannot be renamed, however if the dump occurs more than once, it will be named lsass (2).dmp.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventID=11 process_name=taskmgr.exe TargetFilename=*lsass*.dmp | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, object_category, process_name, TargetFilename | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 11 for detecting file create of lsass.dmp. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators can create memory dumps for debugging purposes, but memory dumps of the LSASS process would be unusual.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md#atomic-test-5---dump-lsassexe-memory-using-windows-task-manager", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/", + "https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "asset_type": "Windows", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 6", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "$process_name$ was identified on endpoint $Computer$ writing $TargetFilename$ to disk. This behavior is related to dumping credentials via Task Manager.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "TargetFilename", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventID", + "process_name", + "TargetFilename", + "Computer", + "object_category" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cleaver", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Whitefly" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 6", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "TargetFilename", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "TargetFilename", + "threat_object_type": "file name" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 6", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Creation of lsass dump with taskmgr Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr", + "file": "endpoint/creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Creation of Shadow Copy", + "id": "eb120f5f-b879-4a63-97c1-93352b5df844", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-12-10", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "Monitor for signs that Vssadmin or Wmic has been used to create a shadow copy.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=vssadmin.exe Processes.process=*create* Processes.process=*shadow*) OR (Processes.process_name=wmic.exe Processes.process=*shadowcopy* Processes.process=*create*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `creation_of_shadow_copy_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate administrator usage of Vssadmin or Wmic will create false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Creation of Shadow Copy", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to create a shadow copy to perform offline password cracking.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.003", + "T1003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 81, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Fox Kitten", + "HAFNIUM", + "Mustang Panda", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.003", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 81 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 81 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.003", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Creation of Shadow Copy Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Creation of Shadow Copy", + "file": "endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "creation_of_shadow_copy_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell", + "id": "2ed8b538-d284-449a-be1d-82ad1dbd186b", + "version": 3, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search detects the use of wmic and Powershell to create a shadow copy.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` OR `process_powershell` Processes.process=*shadowcopy* Processes.process=*create* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Legtimate administrator usage of wmic to create a shadow copy.", + "references": [ + "https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to create a shadow copy to perform offline password cracking.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.003", + "T1003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 81, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Fox Kitten", + "HAFNIUM", + "Mustang Panda", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.003", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 81 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 81 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.003", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell", + "file": "endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_wmic", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "process_powershell", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy", + "id": "d8c406fe-23d2-45f3-a983-1abe7b83ff3b", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search detects credential dumping using copy command from a shadow copy.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` (Processes.process=*\\\\system32\\\\config\\\\sam* OR Processes.process=*\\\\system32\\\\config\\\\security* OR Processes.process=*\\\\system32\\\\config\\\\system* OR Processes.process=*\\\\windows\\\\ntds\\\\ntds.dit*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to copy SAM and NTDS.dit for offline password cracking.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.003", + "T1003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 81, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Fox Kitten", + "HAFNIUM", + "Mustang Panda", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.003", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 81 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 81 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.003", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy", + "file": "endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_cmd", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy", + "id": "c5eac648-fae0-4263-91a6-773df1f4c903", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search detects the creation of a symlink to a shadow copy.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` Processes.process=*mklink* Processes.process=*HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to create symlink to a shadow copy to grab credentials.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.003", + "T1003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 81, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Fox Kitten", + "HAFNIUM", + "Mustang Panda", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.003", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 81 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 81 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.003", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy", + "file": "endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_cmd", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Copy of ShadowCopy with Script Block Logging", + "id": "9251299c-ea5b-11eb-a8de-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-07-21", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies `copy` or `[System.IO.File]::Copy` being used to capture the SAM, SYSTEM or SECURITY hives identified in script block. This will catch the most basic use cases for credentials being taken for offline cracking. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message IN (\"*copy*\",\"*[System.IO.File]::Copy*\") AND Message IN (\"*System32\\\\config\\\\SAM*\", \"*System32\\\\config\\\\SYSTEM*\",\"*System32\\\\config\\\\SECURITY*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode ComputerName User EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_copy_of_shadowcopy_with_script_block_logging_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives as the scope is limited to SAM, SYSTEM and SECURITY hives.", + "references": [ + "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-36934", + "https://github.com/GossiTheDog/HiveNightmare", + "https://github.com/JumpsecLabs/Guidance-Advice/tree/main/SAM_Permissions" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Copy of ShadowCopy with Script Block Logging", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/serioussam/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "PowerShell was identified running a script to capture the SAM hive on endpoint $ComputerName$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.002", + "T1003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Message", + "OpCode", + "ComputerName", + "User", + "EventCode" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-36934" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "GALLIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "Night Dragon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.002", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-36934" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 80 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.002", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Copy of ShadowCopy with Script Block Logging Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Copy of ShadowCopy with Script Block Logging", + "file": "endpoint/detect_copy_of_shadowcopy_with_script_block_logging.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/serioussam/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "wineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_copy_of_shadowcopy_with_script_block_logging_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_copy_of_shadowcopy_with_script_block_logging.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access", + "id": "2c365e57-4414-4540-8dc0-73ab10729996", + "version": 3, + "date": "2019-12-03", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for reading lsass memory consistent with credential dumping.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe (GrantedAccess=0x1010 OR GrantedAccess=0x1410) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, SourceImage, SourceProcessId, TargetImage, TargetProcessId, EventCode, GrantedAccess | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "This search needs Sysmon Logs and a sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 10 with lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", + "known_false_positives": "The activity may be legitimate. Other tools can access lsass for legitimate reasons, and it's possible this event could be generated in those cases. In these cases, false positives should be fairly obvious and you may need to tweak the search to eliminate noise.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "Detect Zerologon Attack" + ], + "asset_type": "Windows", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "The $source_image$ has attempted access to read $TargetImage$ was identified on endpoint $Computer$, this is indicative of credential dumping and should be investigated.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "source_image", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "TargetImage", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "TargetImage", + "GrantedAccess", + "Computer", + "SourceImage", + "SourceProcessId", + "TargetImage", + "TargetProcessId" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cleaver", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Whitefly" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "Detect Zerologon Attack" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "source_image", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "TargetImage", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "source_image", + "threat_object_type": "other" + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "TargetImage", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access", + "file": "endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images", + "id": "29e307ba-40af-4ab2-91b2-3c6b392bbba0", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-12-03", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for reading loaded Images unique to credential dumping with Mimikatz. Deprecated because mimikatz libraries changed and very noisy sysmon Event Code.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 | stats values(ImageLoaded) as ImageLoaded values(ProcessId) as ProcessId by Computer, Image | search ImageLoaded=*WinSCard.dll ImageLoaded=*cryptdll.dll ImageLoaded=*hid.dll ImageLoaded=*samlib.dll ImageLoaded=*vaultcli.dll | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This search needs Sysmon Logs and a sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 7 with powershell.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", + "known_false_positives": "Other tools can import the same DLLs. These tools should be part of a whitelist. False positives may be present with any process that authenticates or uses credentials, PowerShell included. Filter based on parent process.", + "references": [ + "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Windows", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 6", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A process, $Image$, has loaded $ImageLoaded$ that are typically related to credential dumping on $Computer$. Review for further details.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ImageLoaded", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Image", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "ImageLoaded", + "ProcessId", + "Computer", + "Image" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cleaver", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Whitefly" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 6", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ImageLoaded", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Image", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "ImageLoaded", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "Image", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 6", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images", + "file": "endpoint/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL", + "id": "8943b567-f14d-4ee8-a0bb-2121d4ce3184", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-02-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "Detect the usage of comsvcs.dll for dumping the lsass process.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*comsvcs.dll* Processes.process=*MiniDump* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified.", + "references": [ + "https://modexp.wordpress.com/2019/08/30/minidumpwritedump-via-com-services-dll/", + "https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1167417096374050817" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", + "HAFNIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified accessing credentials using comsvcs.dll on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cleaver", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Whitefly" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", + "HAFNIUM Group" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL", + "file": "endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Dump LSASS via procdump", + "id": "3742ebfe-64c2-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "Detect procdump.exe dumping the lsass process. This query looks for both -mm and -ma usage. -mm will produce a mini dump file and -ma will write a dump file with all process memory. Both are highly suspect and should be reviewed. This query does not monitor for the internal name (original_file_name=procdump) of the PE or look for procdump64.exe. Modify the query as needed.\\\nDuring triage, confirm this is procdump.exe executing. If it is the first time a Sysinternals utility has been ran, it is possible there will be a -accepteula on the command line. Review other endpoint data sources for cross process (injection) into lsass.exe.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_procdump` (Processes.process=*-ma* OR Processes.process=*-mm*) Processes.process=*lsass* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dump_lsass_via_procdump_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procdump", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md#atomic-test-2---dump-lsassexe-memory-using-procdump" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Dump LSASS via procdump", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "HAFNIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified attempting to dump lsass.exe on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cleaver", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Whitefly" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "HAFNIUM Group" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Dump LSASS via procdump Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Dump LSASS via procdump", + "file": "endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_procdump", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=procdump.exe OR Processes.process_name=procdump64.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=procdump)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "dump_lsass_via_procdump_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry", + "id": "0c7d8ffe-25b1-11ec-9f39-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-28", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious registry modification to enable plain text credential feature of windows. This technique was used by several malware and also by mimikatz to be able to dumpe the a plain text credential to the compromised or target host. This TTP is really a good indicator that someone wants to dump the crendential of the host so it must be a good pivot for credential dumping techniques.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\System\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\SecurityProviders\\\\WDigest\\\\*\" Registry.registry_value_name = \"UseLogonCredential\" Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000001 by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `enable_wdigest_uselogoncredential_registry_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.csoonline.com/article/3438824/how-to-detect-and-halt-credential-theft-via-windows-wdigest.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/wdigest_enable/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "wdigest registry $registry_path$ was modified in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1112", + "T1003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_value_data" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN8", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1112", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1112", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry", + "file": "endpoint/enable_wdigest_uselogoncredential_registry.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/wdigest_enable/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "enable_wdigest_uselogoncredential_registry_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/enable_wdigest_uselogoncredential_registry.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Esentutl SAM Copy", + "id": "d372f928-ce4f-11eb-a762-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-18", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the process - `esentutl.exe` - being used to capture credentials stored in ntds.dit or the SAM file on disk. During triage, review parallel processes and determine if legitimate activity. Upon determination of illegitimate activity, take further action to isolate and contain the threat.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_esentutl` Processes.process IN (\"*ntds*\", \"*SAM*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `esentutl_sam_copy_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/6a570c2a4630cf0c2bd41a2e8375b5d5ab92f700/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md", + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0404/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Esentutl SAM Copy", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user user$ attempting to capture credentials for offline cracking or observability.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.002", + "T1003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "GALLIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "Night Dragon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.002", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.002", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Esentutl SAM Copy Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Esentutl SAM Copy", + "file": "endpoint/esentutl_sam_copy.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_esentutl", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=esentutl.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=esentutl.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "esentutl_sam_copy_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/esentutl_sam_copy.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Extraction of Registry Hives", + "id": "8bbb7d58-b360-11eb-ba21-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-09-09", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of `reg.exe` exporting Windows Registry hives containing credentials. Adversaries may use this technique to export registry hives for offline credential access attacks. Typically found executed from a untrusted process or script. Upon execution, a file will be written to disk.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` (Processes.process=*save* OR Processes.process=*export*) AND (Processes.process=\"*\\sam *\" OR Processes.process=\"*\\system *\" OR Processes.process=\"*\\security *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `extraction_of_registry_hives_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible some agent based products will generate false positives. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Extraction of Registry Hives", + "analytic_story": [ + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious use of `reg.exe` exporting Windows Registry hives containing credentials executed on $dest$ by user $user$, with a parent process of $parent_process_id$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.002", + "T1003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_id", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process", + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "GALLIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "Night Dragon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.002", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_id", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process", + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_id", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.002", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Extraction of Registry Hives Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Extraction of Registry Hives", + "file": "endpoint/extraction_of_registry_hives.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_reg", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=reg.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=reg.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "extraction_of_registry_hives_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/extraction_of_registry_hives.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Ntdsutil Export NTDS", + "id": "da63bc76-61ae-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-01-28", + "author": "Michael Haag, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "Monitor for signs that Ntdsutil is being used to Extract Active Directory database - NTDS.dit, typically used for offline password cracking. It may be used in normal circumstances with no command line arguments or shorthand variations of more common arguments. Ntdsutil.exe is typically seen run on a Windows Server. Typical command used to dump ntds.dit \\\nntdsutil \"ac i ntds\" \"ifm\" \"create full C:\\Temp\" q q \\\nThis technique uses \"Install from Media\" (IFM), which will extract a copy of the Active Directory database. A successful export of the Active Directory database will yield a file modification named ntds.dit to the destination.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=ntdsutil.exe Processes.process=*ntds* Processes.process=*create*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ntdsutil_export_ntds_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "Highly possible Server Administrators will troubleshoot with ntdsutil.exe, generating false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.003/T1003.003.md#atomic-test-3---dump-active-directory-database-with-ntdsutil", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc753343(v=ws.11)", + "https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf", + "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/vss_ps.dll-97B15BDAE9777F454C9A6BA25E938DB3.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Ntdsutil Export NTDS", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "HAFNIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 100, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Active Directory NTDS export on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.003", + "T1003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 50, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Fox Kitten", + "HAFNIUM", + "Mustang Panda", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.003", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "HAFNIUM Group" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "impact": 100, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 50 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.003", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Ntdsutil Export NTDS Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Ntdsutil Export NTDS", + "file": "endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "ntdsutil_export_ntds_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "SAM Database File Access Attempt", + "id": "57551656-ebdb-11eb-afdf-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-07-23", + "author": "Michael Haag, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies access to SAM, SYSTEM or SECURITY databases' within the file path of `windows\\system32\\config` using Windows Security EventCode 4663. This particular behavior is related to credential access, an attempt to either use a Shadow Copy or recent CVE-2021-36934 to access the SAM database. The Security Account Manager (SAM) is a database file in Windows XP, Windows Vista, Windows 7, 8.1 and 10 that stores users' passwords.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` (EventCode=4663) process_name!=*\\\\dllhost.exe Object_Name IN (\"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\config\\\\SAM*\",\"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\config\\\\SYSTEM*\",\"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\config\\\\SECURITY*\") | stats values(Accesses) count by process_name Object_Name dest user | `sam_database_file_access_attempt_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663. For 4663, enable \"Audit Object Access\" in Group Policy. Then check the two boxes listed for both \"Success\" and \"Failure.\"", + "known_false_positives": "Natively, `dllhost.exe` will access the files. Every environment will have additional native processes that do as well. Filter by process_name. As an aside, one can remove process_name entirely and add `Object_Name=*ShadowCopy*`.", + "references": [ + "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4663", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4663", + "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-36934", + "https://github.com/GossiTheDog/HiveNightmare", + "https://github.com/JumpsecLabs/Guidance-Advice/tree/main/SAM_Permissions", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security_Account_Manager" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "SAM Database File Access Attempt", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "The following process $process_name$ accessed the object $Object_Name$ attempting to gain access to credentials on $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.002", + "T1003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Object_Name", + "type": "File", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "process_name", + "Object_Name", + "dest", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-36934" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "GALLIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "Night Dragon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.002", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Object_Name", + "type": "File", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-36934" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "Object_Name", + "threat_object_type": "file" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.002", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "SAM Database File Access Attempt Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "SAM Database File Access Attempt", + "file": "endpoint/sam_database_file_access_attempt.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/serioussam/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "sam_database_file_access_attempt_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/sam_database_file_access_attempt.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool", + "id": "5672819c-be09-11eb-bbfb-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-26", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic detects a potential usage of secretsdump.py tool for dumping credentials (ntlm hash) from a copy of ntds.dit and SAM.Security,SYSTEM registrry hive. This technique was seen in some attacker that dump ntlm hashes offline after having a copy of ntds.dit and SAM/SYSTEM/SECURITY registry hive.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"python*.exe\" Processes.process = \"*.py*\" Processes.process = \"*-ntds*\" (Processes.process = \"*-system*\" OR Processes.process = \"*-sam*\" OR Processes.process = \"*-security*\" OR Processes.process = \"*-bootkey*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `secretdumps_offline_ntds_dumping_tool_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/master/examples/secretsdump.py" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/casper/datasets1/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A secretdump process $process_name$ with secretdump commandline $process$ to dump credentials in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.003", + "T1003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process_guid" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Fox Kitten", + "HAFNIUM", + "Mustang Panda", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.003", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.003", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool", + "file": "endpoint/secretdumps_offline_ntds_dumping_tool.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/casper/datasets1/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "secretdumps_offline_ntds_dumping_tool_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/secretdumps_offline_ntds_dumping_tool.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass", + "id": "c2590137-0b08-4985-9ec5-6ae23d92f63d", + "version": 7, + "date": "2022-02-18", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "Monitor for changes of the ExecutionPolicy in the registry to the values \"unrestricted\" or \"bypass,\" which allows the execution of malicious scripts.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*Software\\\\Microsoft\\\\Powershell\\\\1\\\\ShellIds\\\\Microsoft.PowerShell* Registry.registry_value_name=ExecutionPolicy (Registry.registry_value_data=Unrestricted OR Registry.registry_value_data=Bypass) by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Registry node. You must also be ingesting logs with the fields registry_path, registry_key_name, and registry_value_name from your endpoints.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may attempt to change the default execution policy on a system for a variety of reasons. However, setting the policy to \"unrestricted\" or \"bypass\" as this search is designed to identify, would be unusual. Hits should be reviewed and investigated as appropriate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Credential Dumping", + "HAFNIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_execution_policy/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A registry modification in $registry_path$ with reg key $registry_key_name$ and reg value $registry_value_name$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "registry_path", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 48, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Credential Dumping", + "HAFNIUM Group" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "registry_path", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 48 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "registry_path", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass", + "file": "endpoint/set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_execution_policy/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass", + "id": "1c6abb08-73d1-11ec-9ca0-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-12", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following hunting analytic identifies all processes requesting access into Lsass.exe. his behavior may be related to credential dumping or applications requiring access to credentials. Triaging this event will require understanding the GrantedAccess from the SourceImage. In addition, whether the account is privileged or not. Review the process requesting permissions and review parallel processes.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, TargetImage, GrantedAccess, SourceImage, SourceProcessId, SourceUser, TargetUser | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_hunting_system_account_targeting_lsass_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Enabling EventCode 10 TargetProcess lsass.exe is required.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives will occur based on GrantedAccess and SourceUser, filter based on source image as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Local_Security_Authority_Subsystem_Service", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/minidumpapiset/nf-minidumpapiset-minidumpwritedump", + "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for_22.html", + "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/process-security-and-access-rights?redirectedfrom=MSDN" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_creddump.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A process, $SourceImage$, has loaded $ImageLoaded$ that are typically related to credential dumping on $dest$. Review for further details.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ImageLoaded", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "SourceImage", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Computer", + "TargetImage", + "GrantedAccess", + "SourceImage", + "SourceProcessId", + "SourceUser", + "TargetUser" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cleaver", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Whitefly" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ImageLoaded", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "SourceImage", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "ImageLoaded", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "SourceImage", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass", + "file": "endpoint/windows_hunting_system_account_targeting_lsass.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_creddump.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "windows_hunting_system_account_targeting_lsass_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_hunting_system_account_targeting_lsass.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass", + "id": "b1ce9a72-73cf-11ec-981b-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-12", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies non SYSTEM accounts requesting access to lsass.exe. This behavior may be related to credential dumping or applications requiring access to credentials. Triaging this event will require understanding the GrantedAccess from the SourceImage. In addition, whether the account is privileged or not. Review the process requesting permissions and review parallel processes.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe SourceUser!=\"NT AUTHORITY\\\\*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, TargetImage, GrantedAccess, SourceImage, SourceProcessId, SourceUser, TargetUser | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_non_system_account_targeting_lsass_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Enabling EventCode 10 TargetProcess lsass.exe is required.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives will occur based on legitimate application requests, filter based on source image as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Local_Security_Authority_Subsystem_Service", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/minidumpapiset/nf-minidumpapiset-minidumpwritedump", + "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for_22.html", + "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/process-security-and-access-rights?redirectedfrom=MSDN" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_creddump.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A process, $SourceImage$, has loaded $ImageLoaded$ that are typically related to credential dumping on $dest$. Review for further details.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ImageLoaded", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "SourceImage", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Computer", + "TargetImage", + "GrantedAccess", + "SourceImage", + "SourceProcessId", + "SourceUser", + "TargetUser" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cleaver", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Whitefly" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ImageLoaded", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "SourceImage", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "ImageLoaded", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "SourceImage", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass", + "file": "endpoint/windows_non_system_account_targeting_lsass.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_creddump.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "windows_non_system_account_targeting_lsass_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_non_system_account_targeting_lsass.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Possible Credential Dumping", + "id": "e4723b92-7266-11ec-af45-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-27", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic is an enhanced version of two previous analytics that identifies common GrantedAccess permission requests and CallTrace DLLs in order to detect credential dumping. \\\nGrantedAccess is the requested permissions by the SourceImage into the TargetImage. \\\nCallTrace Stack trace of where open process is called. Included is the DLL and the relative virtual address of the functions in the call stack right before the open process call. \\\ndbgcore.dll or dbghelp.dll are two core Windows debug DLLs that have minidump functions which provide a way for applications to produce crashdump files that contain a useful subset of the entire process context. \\\nThe idea behind using ntdll.dll is to blend in by using native api of ntdll.dll. For example in sekurlsa module there are many ntdll exported api, like RtlCopyMemory, used to execute this module which is related to lsass dumping.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe GrantedAccess IN (\"0x01000\", \"0x1010\", \"0x1038\", \"0x40\", \"0x1400\", \"0x1fffff\", \"0x1410\", \"0x143a\", \"0x1438\", \"0x1000\") CallTrace IN (\"*dbgcore.dll*\", \"*dbghelp.dll*\", \"*ntdll.dll*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, TargetImage, GrantedAccess, SourceImage, SourceProcessId, SourceUser, TargetUser | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_possible_credential_dumping_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Enabling EventCode 10 TargetProcess lsass.exe is required.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives will occur based on GrantedAccess 0x1010 and 0x1400, filter based on source image as needed or remove them. Concern is Cobalt Strike usage of Mimikatz will generate 0x1010 initially, but later be caught.", + "references": [ + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Local_Security_Authority_Subsystem_Service", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/minidumpapiset/nf-minidumpapiset-minidumpwritedump", + "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for_22.html", + "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/process-security-and-access-rights?redirectedfrom=MSDN" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Possible Credential Dumping", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_creddump.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A process, $SourceImage$, has loaded $ImageLoaded$ that are typically related to credential dumping on $dest$. Review for further details.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ImageLoaded", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "SourceImage", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Computer", + "TargetImage", + "GrantedAccess", + "SourceImage", + "SourceProcessId", + "SourceUser", + "TargetUser" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cleaver", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Whitefly" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ImageLoaded", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "SourceImage", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "ImageLoaded", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "SourceImage", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows Possible Credential Dumping Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows Possible Credential Dumping", + "file": "endpoint/windows_possible_credential_dumping.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_creddump.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "windows_possible_credential_dumping_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_possible_credential_dumping.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations", + "id": "097e8030-8662-4254-a735-bf0bdda696e3", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-12-10", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Authentication" + ], + "description": "This search returns failed logins to multiple destinations by user.", + "search": "| tstats count `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as first_login latest(_time) as last_login dc(Authentication.dest) AS distinct_count_dest values(Authentication.dest) AS Authentication.dest values(Authentication.app) AS Authentication.app from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.action=failure by Authentication.user | where distinct_count_dest > 1 | `security_content_ctime(first_login)` | `security_content_ctime(last_login)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Authentication\")` | search user=$user$", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting authentication logs from your various systems and populating the Authentication data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "user" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Authentication.dest", + "Authentication.app", + "Authentication.action", + "Authentication.user" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations" + }, + { + "name": "Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts", + "id": "ed3fff45-cba6-4990-983f-6fac72bee659", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-12-10", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search hunts for dumped NTLM hashes used for pass the hash.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=9 AuthenticationPackageName=Negotiate | stats count earliest(_time) as first_login latest(_time) as last_login by src_user dest | `security_content_ctime(first_login)` | `security_content_ctime(last_login)` | search dest=$dest$", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need be ingesting windows security logs. This search uses an input macro named `wineventlog_security`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Security logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Logon_Type", + "AuthenticationPackageName", + "src_user", + "dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts" + }, + { + "name": "Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts", + "id": "990007ad-d798-4b29-ab2f-f0034144c937", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-12-10", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search hunts for dumped kerberos ticket from LSASS memory.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 OR EventCode=4769 | rex field=user \"(?[^\\@]+)\" | stats count BY new_user, dest, EventCode | stats max(count) AS max_count sum(count) AS sum_count BY new_user, dest| search dest=$dest$ | where sum_count/max_count!=2 | rename new_user AS user ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting windows security logs. This search uses an input macro named `wineventlog_security`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Security logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "user", + "dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts" + }, + { + "name": "Investigate Previous Unseen User", + "id": "ad114d5c-8079-4a84-a646-2fd00dfc07cc", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-12-10", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Authentication" + ], + "description": "This search returns previous unseen user, which didn't log in for 30 days.", + "search": "| tstats count `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as first_login latest(_time) as last_login values(Authentication.dest) AS Authentication.dest values(Authentication.app) AS Authentication.app values(Authentication.action) AS Authentication.action from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.action=success by _time, Authentication.user | bucket _time span=30d | stats count min(first_login) as first_login max(last_login) as last_login values(Authentication.dest) AS Authentication.dest by Authentication.user | where count=1 | where first_login >= relative_time(now(), \"-30d\") | `security_content_ctime(first_login)` | `security_content_ctime(last_login)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Authentication\")` | search dest=$dest$", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting authentication logs from your various systems and populating the Authentication data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Authentication.dest", + "Authentication.app", + "Authentication.action", + "Authentication.user" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "investigate_previous_unseen_user" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Data Destruction", + "id": "4ae5c0d1-cebd-47d1-bfce-71bf096e38aa", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-14", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the data destruction, including deleting files, overwriting files, wiping disk and encrypting files.", + "narrative": "Adversaries may use this technique to maximize the impact on the target organization in operations where network wide availability interruption is the goal.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485/", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/09/unit42-xbash-combines-botnet-ransomware-coinmining-worm-targets-linux-windows/", + "https://www.picussecurity.com/blog/a-brief-history-and-further-technical-analysis-of-sodinokibi-ransomware" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Data Destruction", + "analytic_story": "Data Destruction", + "category": [ + "Malware" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1561.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT37", + "APT38", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1561", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Linux DD File Overwrite - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Linux DD File Overwrite", + "id": "9b6aae5e-8d85-11ec-b2ae-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-14", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to look for dd command to overwrite file. This technique was abused by adversaries or threat actor to destroy files or data on specific system or in a large number of host within network to interrupt host avilability, services and many more. This is also used to destroy data where it make the file irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files, data or local and remote drives.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"dd\" AND Processes.process = \"*of=*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_dd_file_overwrite_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/dd/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1485/T1485.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux DD File Overwrite", + "analytic_story": [ + "Data Destruction" + ], + "asset_type": "endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/linux_dd_file_overwrite/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A commandline $process$ executed on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1485" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1485" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Data Destruction" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 64 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1485" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux DD File Overwrite Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux DD File Overwrite", + "file": "endpoint/linux_dd_file_overwrite.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/linux_dd_file_overwrite/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_dd_file_overwrite_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_dd_file_overwrite.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump", + "id": "59e54602-9680-11ec-a8a6-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-25", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a process that is attempting to disable the ability on Windows to generate a memory crash dump. This was recently identified being utilized by HermeticWiper. To disable crash dumps, the value must be set to 0. This feature is typically modified to perform a memory crash dump when a computer stops unexpectedly because of a Stop error (also known as a blue screen, system crash, or bug check).", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\CrashControl\\\\CrashDumpEnabled\") AND Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000000\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process process_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process process_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `windows_disable_memory_crash_dump_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` and `Registry` node.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/02/threat-advisory-hermeticwiper.html", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/performance/memory-dump-file-options" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump", + "analytic_story": [ + "Data Destruction", + "Ransomware", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/hermetic_wiper/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A process $process_name$ was identified attempting to disable memory crash dumps on $dest$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1485" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.file_create_time", + "Filesystem.process_id", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.user", + "Filesystem.file_path", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_guid" + ], + "risk_score": 90, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1485" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Data Destruction", + "Ransomware", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 90 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 90 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1485" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_disable_memory_crash_dump_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_disable_memory_crash_dump.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder", + "id": "0dbcac64-963c-11ec-bf04-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-25", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to look for suspicious file creation in the critical folder like \"System32\\Drivers\" folder without file extension. This artifacts was seen in latest hermeticwiper where it drops its driver component in Driver Directory both the compressed(without file extension) and the actual driver component (with .sys file extension). This TTP is really a good indication that a host might be compromised by this destructive malware that wipes the boot sector of the system.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*\\\\System32\\\\drivers\\\\*\", \"*\\\\syswow64\\\\drivers\\\\*\") by _time span=5m Filesystem.dest Filesystem.user Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_create_time | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | rex field=\"file_name\" \"\\.(?[^\\.]*$)\" | where isnull(extension) | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=5m Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_guid Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`] | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest process_name process_guid file_name file_path file_create_time user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_file_without_extension_in_critical_folder_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown at this point", + "references": [ + "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/02/threat-advisory-hermeticwiper.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder", + "analytic_story": [ + "Data Destruction", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/hermetic_wiper/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Driver file with out file extension drop in $file_path$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1485" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.file_create_time", + "Filesystem.process_id", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.user", + "Filesystem.file_path", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_guid", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 90, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1485" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Data Destruction", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 90 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1485" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder", + "file": "endpoint/windows_file_without_extension_in_critical_folder.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/hermetic_wiper/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_file_without_extension_in_critical_folder_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_file_without_extension_in_critical_folder.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition", + "id": "a85aa37e-9647-11ec-90c5-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-25", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to look for suspicious raw access read to device disk partition of the host machine. This technique was seen in several attacks by adversaries or threat actor to wipe, encrypt or overwrite the boot sector of each partition as part of their impact payload for example the \"hermeticwiper\" malware. This detection is a good indicator that there is a process try to read or write on boot sector.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=9 Device = \\\\Device\\\\HarddiskVolume* NOT (Image IN(\"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image Device ProcessGuid ProcessId EventDescription EventCode Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the raw access read event (like sysmon eventcode 9), process name and process guid from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "This event is really notable but we found minimal number of normal application from system32 folder like svchost.exe accessing it too. In this case we used 'system32' and 'syswow64' path as a filter for this detection.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/02/threat-advisory-hermeticwiper.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition", + "analytic_story": [ + "Data Destruction", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/hermetic_wiper/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Process accessing disk partition $device$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1561.002", + "T1561" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Computer", + "Image", + "Device", + "ProcessGuid", + "ProcessId", + "EventDescription", + "EventCode" + ], + "risk_score": 90, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1561.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT37", + "APT38", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1561", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1561.002", + "T1561" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Data Destruction", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 90 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1561.002", + "T1561" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition", + "file": "endpoint/windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/hermetic_wiper/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [] + }, + { + "name": "Data Exfiltration", + "id": "66b0fe0c-1351-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-10-21", + "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", + "description": "The stealing of data by an adversary.", + "narrative": "Exfiltration comes in many flavors. Adversaries can collect data over encrypted or non-encrypted channels. They can utilise Command and Control channels that are already in place to exfiltrate data. They can use both standard data transfer protocols such as FTP, SCP, etc to exfiltrate data. Or they can use non-standard protocols such as DNS, ICMP, etc with specially crafted fields to try and circumvent security technologies in place.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Data Exfiltration", + "analytic_story": "Data Exfiltration", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1537", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Magic Hound", + "Silent Librarian" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Forwarding Rule", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Kimsuky", + "Silent Librarian" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Email Collection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "Chimera", + "Magic Hound" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1041", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over C2 Channel", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Chimera", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "MuddyWater", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT33", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Lazarus Group", + "OilRig", + "Thrip", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection", + "Exfiltration", + "Initial Access" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint", + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Detect shared ec2 snapshot - Rule", + "ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule", + "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule", + "ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule", + "ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", + "ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule", + "ESCU - Mailsniper Invoke functions - Rule", + "ESCU - Gdrive suspicious file sharing - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration - Rule", + "ESCU - Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic - Rule", + "ESCU - Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Shannon Davis", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Detect shared ec2 snapshot", + "id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-290bf3d222c4", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-07-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes AWS CloudTrail events to identify when an EC2 snapshot permissions are modified to be shared with a different AWS account. This method is used by adversaries to exfiltrate the EC2 snapshot.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=ModifySnapshotAttribute | rename requestParameters.createVolumePermission.add.items{}.userId as requested_account_id | search requested_account_id != NULL | eval match=if(requested_account_id==aws_account_id,\"Match\",\"No Match\") | table _time user_arn src_ip requestParameters.attributeType requested_account_id aws_account_id match vendor_region user_agent | where match = \"No Match\" | `detect_shared_ec2_snapshot_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately shared a snapshot with others for a specific purpose.", + "references": [ + "https://labs.nettitude.com/blog/how-to-exfiltrate-aws-ec2-data/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect shared ec2 snapshot", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", + "Data Exfiltration" + ], + "asset_type": "EC2 Snapshot", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Exfiltration" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1537/aws_snapshot_exfil/aws_cloudtrail_events.json" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "AWS EC2 snapshot from account $aws_account_id$ is shared with $requested_account_id$ by user $user_arn$ from $src_ip$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1537" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user_arn", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "user_arn", + "src_ip", + "requestParameters.attributeType", + "aws_account_id", + "vendor_region", + "user_agent" + ], + "risk_score": 48, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1537", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1537" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", + "Data Exfiltration" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user_arn", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Exfiltration" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user_arn", + "risk_score": 48 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "src_ip", + "risk_score": 48 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1537" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect shared ec2 snapshot Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect shared ec2 snapshot", + "file": "cloud/detect_shared_ec2_snapshot.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-7d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "aws_cloudtrail_events.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1537/aws_snapshot_exfil/aws_cloudtrail_events.json", + "source": "aws_cloudtrail", + "sourcetype": "aws:cloudtrail", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_shared_ec2_snapshot_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/detect_shared_ec2_snapshot.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "O365 PST export alert", + "id": "5f694cc4-a678-4a60-9410-bffca1b647dc", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-12-16", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects when a user has performed an Ediscovery search or exported a PST file from the search. This PST file usually has sensitive information including email body content", + "search": "`o365_management_activity` Category=ThreatManagement Name=\"eDiscovery search started or exported\" | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by Source Severity AlertEntityId Operation Name |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_pst_export_alert_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", + "known_false_positives": "PST export can be done for legitimate purposes but due to the sensitive nature of its content it must be monitored.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "O365 PST export alert", + "analytic_story": [ + "Office 365 Detections", + "Data Exfiltration" + ], + "asset_type": "Office 365", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Exfiltration" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114/o365_export_pst_file/o365_export_pst_file.json" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "User $Source$ has exported a PST file from the search using this operation- $Operation$ with a severity of $Severity$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1114" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Source", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Category", + "Name", + "Source", + "Severity", + "AlertEntityId", + "Operation" + ], + "risk_score": 48, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Magic Hound", + "Silent Librarian" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1114" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Office 365 Detections", + "Data Exfiltration" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Source", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Exfiltration" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "Source", + "risk_score": 48 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1114" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "O365 PST export alert Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "O365 PST export alert", + "file": "cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "o365_export_pst_file.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114/o365_export_pst_file/o365_export_pst_file.json", + "source": "o365", + "sourcetype": "o365:management:activity" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "o365_management_activity", + "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "o365_pst_export_alert_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding", + "id": "7f398cfb-918d-41f4-8db8-2e2474e02c28", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-12-16", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects when an admin configured a forwarding rule for multiple mailboxes to the same destination.", + "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=Set-Mailbox | spath input=Parameters | rename Identity AS src_user | search ForwardingAddress=* | stats dc(src_user) AS count_src_user earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(src_user) AS src_user values(user) AS user by ForwardingAddress | where count_src_user > 1 |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding", + "analytic_story": [ + "Office 365 Detections", + "Data Exfiltration" + ], + "asset_type": "Office 365", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Exfiltration" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114.003/o365_email_forwarding_rule/o365_email_forwarding_rule.json" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user$ has configured a forwarding rule for multiple mailboxes to the same destination $ForwardingAddress$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1114.003", + "T1114" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Operation", + "Parameters" + ], + "risk_score": 48, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Forwarding Rule", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Kimsuky", + "Silent Librarian" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Magic Hound", + "Silent Librarian" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1114.003", + "T1114" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Office 365 Detections", + "Data Exfiltration" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Exfiltration" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 48 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1114.003", + "T1114" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding", + "file": "cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "o365_email_forwarding_rule.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114.003/o365_email_forwarding_rule/o365_email_forwarding_rule.json", + "source": "o365", + "sourcetype": "o365:management:activity" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "o365_management_activity", + "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding", + "id": "f8dfe015-dbb3-4569-ba75-b13787e06aa4", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-12-16", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects when multiple user configured a forwarding rule to the same destination.", + "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=Set-Mailbox | spath input=Parameters | rename Identity AS src_user | search ForwardingSmtpAddress=* | stats dc(src_user) AS count_src_user earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(src_user) AS src_user values(user) AS user by ForwardingSmtpAddress | where count_src_user > 1 |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding", + "analytic_story": [ + "Office 365 Detections", + "Data Exfiltration" + ], + "asset_type": "Office 365", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Stage:Exfiltration", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114.003/o365_email_forwarding_rule/o365_email_forwarding_rule.json" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user$ configured multiple users $src_user$ with a count of $count_src_user$, a forwarding rule to same destination $ForwardingSmtpAddress$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1114.003", + "T1114" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ForwardingSmtpAddress", + "type": "Email Address", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Operation", + "Parameters" + ], + "risk_score": 48, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Forwarding Rule", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Kimsuky", + "Silent Librarian" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Magic Hound", + "Silent Librarian" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1114.003", + "T1114" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Office 365 Detections", + "Data Exfiltration" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ForwardingSmtpAddress", + "type": "Email Address", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Stage:Exfiltration", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 48 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1114.003", + "T1114" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding", + "file": "cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "o365_email_forwarding_rule.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114.003/o365_email_forwarding_rule/o365_email_forwarding_rule.json", + "source": "o365", + "sourcetype": "o365:management:activity" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "o365_management_activity", + "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App", + "id": "2452e632-9e0d-11eb-bacd-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-15", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "this search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. This technique are seen in couple of malware and APT group to exfiltrated collected data in a infected machine or infected network. This detection is looking for unique use of nslookup where it tries to use specific record type, TXT, A, AAAA, that are commonly used by attacker and also the retry parameter which is designed to query C2 DNS multiple tries.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"nslookup.exe\" Processes.process = \"*-querytype=*\" OR Processes.process=\"*-qt=*\" OR Processes.process=\"*-q=*\" OR Processes.process=\"-type=*\" OR Processes.process=\"*-retry=*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of nslookup.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "admin nslookup usage", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7_spear_phishing.html", + "https://www.varonis.com/blog/dns-tunneling/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Command & Control", + "Data Exfiltration" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Exfiltration" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/nslookup_exfil/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ performing activity related to DNS exfiltration.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1048" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1048" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Command & Control", + "Data Exfiltration" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Exfiltration" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 72 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 72 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1048" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App", + "file": "endpoint/dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/nslookup_exfil/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App", + "id": "0a69fdaa-a2b8-11eb-b16d-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-21", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. This technique are seen in couple of malware and APT group to exfiltrated collected data in a infected machine or infected network. This detection is looking for unique use of nslookup where it tries to use specific record type (TXT, A, AAAA) that are commonly used by attacker and also the retry parameter which is designed to query C2 DNS multiple tries.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode = 1 process_name = \"nslookup.exe\" | bucket _time span=15m | stats count as numNsLookup by Computer, _time | eventstats avg(numNsLookup) as avgNsLookup, stdev(numNsLookup) as stdNsLookup, count as numSlots by Computer | eval upperThreshold=(avgNsLookup + stdNsLookup *3) | eval isOutlier=if(avgNsLookup > 20 and avgNsLookup >= upperThreshold, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of nslookup.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7_spear_phishing.html", + "https://www.varonis.com/blog/dns-tunneling/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Command & Control", + "Data Exfiltration" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Scope:Local", + "Stage:Exfiltration" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/nslookup_exfil/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 40, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Excessive usage of nslookup.exe has been detected on $Computer$. This detection is triggered as as it violates the dynamic threshold", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1048" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Computer", + "process_name", + "EventCode" + ], + "risk_score": 28, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1048" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Command & Control", + "Data Exfiltration" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Scope:Local", + "Stage:Exfiltration" + ], + "impact": 40, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 28 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1048" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App", + "file": "endpoint/excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/nslookup_exfil/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Mailsniper Invoke functions", + "id": "a36972c8-b894-11eb-9f78-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-19", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect known mailsniper.ps1 functions executed in a machine. This technique was seen in some attacker to harvest some sensitive e-mail in a compromised exchange server.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message IN (\"*Invoke-GlobalO365MailSearch*\", \"*Invoke-GlobalMailSearch*\", \"*Invoke-SelfSearch*\", \"*Invoke-PasswordSprayOWA*\", \"*Invoke-PasswordSprayEWS*\",\"*Invoke-DomainHarvestOWA*\", \"*Invoke-UsernameHarvestOWA*\",\"*Invoke-OpenInboxFinder*\",\"*Invoke-InjectGEventAPI*\",\"*Invoke-InjectGEvent*\",\"*Invoke-SearchGmail*\", \"*Invoke-MonitorCredSniper*\", \"*Invoke-AddGmailRule*\",\"*Invoke-PasswordSprayEAS*\",\"*Invoke-UsernameHarvestEAS*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mailsniper_invoke_functions_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the powershell logs from your endpoints. make sure you enable needed registry to monitor this event.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/introducing-mailsniper-a-tool-for-searching-every-users-email-for-sensitive-data/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Mailsniper Invoke functions", + "analytic_story": [ + "Data Exfiltration" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Exfiltration" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/casper/datasets1/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "mailsniper.ps1 functions $Message$ executed on a $ComputerName$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1114", + "T1114.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Magic Hound", + "Silent Librarian" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Email Collection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "Chimera", + "Magic Hound" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1114", + "T1114.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Data Exfiltration" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Exfiltration" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 72 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 72 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1114", + "T1114.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Mailsniper Invoke functions Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Mailsniper Invoke functions", + "file": "endpoint/mailsniper_invoke_functions.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/casper/datasets1/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "mailsniper_invoke_functions_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/mailsniper_invoke_functions.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Gdrive suspicious file sharing", + "id": "a7131dae-34e3-11ec-a2de-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-10-24", + "author": "Rod Soto, Teoderick Contreras", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search can help the detection of compromised accounts or internal users sharing potentially malicious/classified documents with users outside your organization via GSuite file sharing .", + "search": "`gsuite_drive` name=change_user_access | rename parameters.* as * | search email = \"*@yourdomain.com\" target_user != \"*@yourdomain.com\" | stats count values(owner) as owner values(target_user) as target values(doc_type) as doc_type values(doc_title) as doc_title dc(target_user) as distinct_target by src_ip email | where distinct_target > 50 | `gdrive_suspicious_file_sharing_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "Need to implement Gsuite logging targeting Google suite drive activity. In order for the search to work for your environment please update `yourdomain.com` value in the query with the domain relavant for your organization.", + "known_false_positives": "This is an anomaly search, you must specify your domain in the parameters so it either filters outside domains or focus on internal domains. This search may also help investigate compromise of accounts. By looking at for example source ip addresses, document titles and abnormal number of shares and shared target users.", + "references": [ + "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/investigating-gsuite-phishing-attacks-with-splunk.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Gdrive suspicious file sharing", + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments", + "Data Exfiltration" + ], + "asset_type": "GDrive", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "dataset": [ + [] + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "src_ip", + "parameters.owner", + "parameters.target_user", + "parameters.doc_title", + "parameters.doc_type" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments", + "Data Exfiltration" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "gsuite_drive", + "definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:drive:json", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "gdrive_suspicious_file_sharing_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/gdrive_suspicious_file_sharing.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration", + "id": "82d06410-134c-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-10-21", + "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for commands that the SNICat tool uses in the TLS SNI field.", + "search": "`zeek_ssl` | rex field=server_name \"(?(LIST|LS|SIZE|LD|CB|CD|EX|ALIVE|EXIT|WHERE|finito)-[A-Za-z0-9]{16}\\.)\" | stats count by src_ip dest_ip server_name snicat | where count>0 | table src_ip dest_ip server_name snicat | `detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Zeek SSL data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format. We are detecting when any of the predefined SNICat commands are found within the server_name (SNI) field. These commands are LIST, LS, SIZE, LD, CB, EX, ALIVE, EXIT, WHERE, and finito. You can go further once this has been detected, and run other searches to decode the SNI data to prove or disprove if any data exfiltration has taken place.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.mnemonic.no/blog/introducing-snicat/", + "https://github.com/mnemonic-no/SNIcat", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration", + "analytic_story": [ + "Data Exfiltration" + ], + "asset_type": "Network", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1041" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "DE.CM", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "server_name", + "src_ip", + "dest_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1041", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over C2 Channel", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Chimera", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "MuddyWater", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1041" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "DE.CM", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Data Exfiltration" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1041" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "DE.CM", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "zeek_ssl", + "definition": "index=zeek sourcetype=\"zeek:ssl:json\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic", + "id": "4477f3ea-a28f-11eb-b762-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-21", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search is designed to detect high frequency of archive files data exfiltration through HTTP POST method protocol. This are one of the common techniques used by APT or trojan spy after doing the data collection like screenshot, recording, sensitive data to the infected machines. The attacker may execute archiving command to the collected data, save it a temp folder with a hidden attribute then send it to its C2 through HTTP POST. Sometimes adversaries will rename the archive files or encode/encrypt to cover their tracks. This detection can detect a renamed archive files transfer to HTTP POST since it checks the request body header. Unfortunately this detection cannot support archive that was encrypted or encoded before doing the exfiltration.", + "search": "`stream_http` http_method=POST |eval archive_hdr1=substr(form_data,1,2) | eval archive_hdr2 = substr(form_data,1,4) |stats values(form_data) as http_request_body min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by http_method http_user_agent uri_path url bytes_in bytes_out archive_hdr1 archive_hdr2 |where count >20 AND (archive_hdr1 = \"7z\" OR archive_hdr1 = \"PK\" OR archive_hdr2=\"Rar!\") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the stream HTTP logs or network logs that catch network traffic. Make sure that the http-request-body, payload, or request field is enabled in stream http configuration.", + "known_false_positives": "Normal archive transfer via HTTP protocol may trip this detection.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/001/", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/apt39-iranian-cyber-espionage-group-focused-on-personal-information.html", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic", + "analytic_story": [ + "Command & Control", + "Data Exfiltration" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Exfiltration" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/archive_http_post/stream_http_events.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A http post $http_method$ sending packet with possible archive bytes header 4form_data$ in uri path $uri_path$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1048.003", + "T1048" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "uri_path", + "type": "URL", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "form_data", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "http_method", + "http_user_agent", + "uri_path", + "url", + "bytes_in", + "bytes_out", + "archive_hdr1", + "archive_hdr2", + "form_data" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT33", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Lazarus Group", + "OilRig", + "Thrip", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1048.003", + "T1048" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Command & Control", + "Data Exfiltration" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "uri_path", + "type": "URL", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "form_data", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Exfiltration" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "uri_path", + "threat_object_type": "url" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "form_data", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1048.003", + "T1048" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic", + "file": "network/multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "stream_http_events.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/archive_http_post/stream_http_events.log", + "source": "stream", + "sourcetype": "stream:http" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "stream_http", + "definition": "sourcetype=stream:http", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/network/multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data", + "id": "e2b36208-a364-11eb-8909-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-22", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect potential plain HTTP POST method data exfiltration. This network traffic is commonly used by trickbot, trojanspy, keylogger or APT adversary where arguments or commands are sent in plain text to the remote C2 server using HTTP POST method as part of data exfiltration.", + "search": "`stream_http` http_method=POST form_data IN (\"*wermgr.exe*\",\"*svchost.exe*\", \"*name=\\\"proclist\\\"*\",\"*ipconfig*\", \"*name=\\\"sysinfo\\\"*\", \"*net view*\") |stats values(form_data) as http_request_body min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by http_method http_user_agent uri_path url bytes_in bytes_out | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the stream HTTP logs or network logs that catch network traffic. Make sure that the http-request-body, payload, or request field is enabled.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/03/trickbot-primer.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data", + "analytic_story": [ + "Command & Control", + "Data Exfiltration" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Exfiltration" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/plain_exfil_data/stream_http_events.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A http post $http_method$ sending packet with plain text of information $form_data$ in uri path $uri_path$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1048.003", + "T1048" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "uri_path", + "type": "URL", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "form_data", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "http_method", + "http_user_agent", + "uri_path", + "url", + "bytes_in", + "bytes_out" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT33", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Lazarus Group", + "OilRig", + "Thrip", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1048.003", + "T1048" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Command & Control", + "Data Exfiltration" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "uri_path", + "type": "URL", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "form_data", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Exfiltration" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "uri_path", + "threat_object_type": "url" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "form_data", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1048.003", + "T1048" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data", + "file": "network/plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "stream_http_events.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/plain_exfil_data/stream_http_events.log", + "source": "stream", + "sourcetype": "stream:http" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "stream_http", + "definition": "sourcetype=stream:http", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/network/plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data.yml", + "source": "network" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Data Protection", + "id": "91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e1fce33", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-14", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "description": "Fortify your data-protection arsenal--while continuing to ensure data confidentiality and integrity--with searches that monitor for and help you investigate possible signs of data exfiltration.", + "narrative": "Attackers can leverage a variety of resources to compromise or exfiltrate enterprise data. Common exfiltration techniques include remote-access channels via low-risk, high-payoff active-collections operations and close-access operations using insiders and removable media. While this Analytic Story is not a comprehensive listing of all the methods by which attackers can exfiltrate data, it provides a useful starting point.", + "references": [ + "https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/data-protection/", + "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/dns/splunk-detect-dns-tunneling-37022", + "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Data Protection", + "analytic_story": "Data Protection", + "category": [ + "Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Security Monitoring", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT33", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Lazarus Group", + "OilRig", + "Thrip", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1189", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "PLATINUM", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Turla", + "Windigo", + "Windshift" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration", + "Initial Access" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Change_Analysis", + "Network_Resolution" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Command & Control", + "Installation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", + "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Detect USB device insertion", + "id": "104658f4-afdc-499f-9719-17a43f9826f5", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-11-27", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Change_Analysis" + ], + "description": "The search is used to detect hosts that generate Windows Event ID 4663 for successful attempts to write to or read from a removable storage and Event ID 4656 for failures, which occurs when a USB drive is plugged in. In this scenario we are querying the Change_Analysis data model to look for Windows Event ID 4656 or 4663 where the priority of the affected host is marked as high in the ES Assets and Identity Framework.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) AS earliest latest(_time) AS latest from datamodel=Change_Analysis where (nodename = All_Changes) All_Changes.result=\"Removable Storage device\" (All_Changes.result_id=4663 OR All_Changes.result_id=4656) (All_Changes.src_priority=high) by All_Changes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")`| `security_content_ctime(earliest)`| `security_content_ctime(latest)` | `detect_usb_device_insertion_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663 and 4656. Ensure that the field from the event logs is being mapped to the result_id field in the Change_Analysis data model. To minimize the alert volume, this search leverages the Assets and Identity framework to filter out events from those assets not marked high priority in the Enterprise Security Assets and Identity Framework.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate USB activity will also be detected. Please verify and investigate as appropriate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect USB device insertion", + "analytic_story": [ + "Data Protection" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.DS" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.result", + "All_Changes.result_id", + "All_Changes.src_priority", + "All_Changes.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.DS" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Data Protection" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.DS" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_usb_device_insertion_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Detection of DNS Tunnels", + "id": "104658f4-afdc-499f-9719-17a43f9826f4", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-02-15", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Resolution" + ], + "description": "This search is used to detect DNS tunneling, by calculating the sum of the length of DNS queries and DNS answers. The search also filters out potential false positives by filtering out queries made to internal systems and the queries originating from internal DNS, Web, and Email servers. Endpoints using DNS as a method of transmission for data exfiltration, command and control, or evasion of security controls can often be detected by noting an unusually large volume of DNS traffic. \\\nNOTE:Deprecated because existing detection is doing the same. This detection is replaced with two other variations, if you are using MLTK then you can use this search `ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule` or use the standard deviation version `ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule`, as an alternantive.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc(\"DNS.query\") as count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where nodename=DNS \"DNS.message_type\"=\"QUERY\" NOT (`cim_corporate_web_domain_search(\"DNS.query\")`) NOT \"DNS.query\"=\"*.in-addr.arpa\" NOT (\"DNS.src_category\"=\"svc_infra_dns\" OR \"DNS.src_category\"=\"svc_infra_webproxy\" OR \"DNS.src_category\"=\"svc_infra_email*\" ) by \"DNS.src\",\"DNS.query\" | rename \"DNS.src\" as src \"DNS.query\" as message | eval length=len(message) | stats sum(length) as length by src | append [ tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc(\"DNS.answer\") as count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where nodename=DNS \"DNS.message_type\"=\"QUERY\" NOT (`cim_corporate_web_domain_search(\"DNS.query\")`) NOT \"DNS.query\"=\"*.in-addr.arpa\" NOT (\"DNS.src_category\"=\"svc_infra_dns\" OR \"DNS.src_category\"=\"svc_infra_webproxy\" OR \"DNS.src_category\"=\"svc_infra_email*\" ) by \"DNS.src\",\"DNS.answer\" | rename \"DNS.src\" as src \"DNS.answer\" as message | eval message=if(message==\"unknown\",\"\", message) | eval length=len(message) | stats sum(length) as length by src ] | stats sum(length) as length by src | where length > 10000 | `detection_of_dns_tunnels_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, we must ensure that DNS data is being ingested and mapped to the appropriate fields in the Network_Resolution data model. Fields like src_category are automatically provided by the Assets and Identity Framework shipped with Splunk Enterprise Security. You will need to ensure you are using the Assets and Identity Framework and populating the src_category field. You will also need to enable the `cim_corporate_web_domain_search()` macro which will essentially filter out the DNS queries made to the corporate web domains to reduce alert fatigue.", + "known_false_positives": "It's possible that normal DNS traffic will exhibit this behavior. If an alert is generated, please investigate and validate as appropriate. The threshold can also be modified to better suit your environment.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detection of DNS Tunnels", + "analytic_story": [ + "Data Protection", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Command & Control" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1048.003" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.DS" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "DNS.query", + "DNS.message_type", + "DNS.src_category", + "DNS.src" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT33", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Lazarus Group", + "OilRig", + "Thrip", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1048.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.DS" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Data Protection", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Command & Control" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1048.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.DS" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detection_of_dns_tunnels_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers", + "id": "a1e761ac-1344-4dbd-88b2-3f34c912d359", + "version": 3, + "date": "2021-01-14", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Resolution" + ], + "description": "Malicious actors often abuse legitimate Dynamic DNS services to host malicious payloads or interactive command and control nodes. Attackers will automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to countless IP addresses to circumvent firewall blocks, block lists as well as frustrate a network defenders analytic and investigative processes. This search will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.answer) as answer min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query host | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `dynamic_dns_providers` | `detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "First, you'll need to ingest data from your DNS operations. This can be done by ingesting logs from your server or data, collected passively by Splunk Stream or a similar solution. Specifically, data that contains the domain that is being queried and the IP of the host originating the request must be populating the `Network_Resolution` data model. This search also leverages a lookup file, `dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv`, which contains a non-exhaustive list of Dynamic DNS providers. Please consider updating the local lookup periodically by adding new domains to the list of `dynamic_dns_providers_local.csv`.\\\nThis search produces fields (query, answer, isDynDNS) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable event. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review. Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** DNS Query, **Field:** query\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** DNS Answer, **Field:** answer\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** IsDynamicDNS, **Field:** isDynDNS\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", + "known_false_positives": "Some users and applications may leverage Dynamic DNS to reach out to some domains on the Internet since dynamic DNS by itself is not malicious, however this activity must be verified.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers", + "analytic_story": [ + "Data Protection", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "DNS Hijacking", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Command & Control" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1189/dyn_dns_site/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A dns query $query$ from your infra connecting to suspicious domain in host $host$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1189" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "host", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "DNS.answer", + "DNS.query", + "host" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1189", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "PLATINUM", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Turla", + "Windigo", + "Windshift" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1189" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Data Protection", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "DNS Hijacking", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Command & Control" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "host", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "host", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1189" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers", + "file": "network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1189/dyn_dns_site/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "dynamic_dns_providers", + "definition": "lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_default dynamic_dns_domains as query OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_default | lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_local dynamic_dns_domains as query OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_local| eval isDynDNS = coalesce(isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local)|fields - isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local| search isDynDNS=True", + "description": "This macro limits the output of the query field to dynamic dns domains. It looks up the domains in a file provided by Splunk and one intended to be updated by the end user." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml", + "source": "network" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get DNS Server History for a host", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-11-09", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "While investigating any detections it is important to understand which and how many DNS servers a host has connected to in the past. This search uses data that is tagged as DNS and gives you a count and list of DNS servers that a particular host has connected to the previous 24 hours.", + "search": "| search tag=dns src_ip=$src_ip$ dest_port=53 | streamstats time_window=1d count values(dest_ip) as dcip by src_ip | table date_mday src_ip dcip count | sort -count", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting your DNS traffic", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "src_ip" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Command & Control", + "DNS Hijacking", + "Data Protection", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "src_ip", + "dest_port", + "dest_ip" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_dns_server_history_for_a_host" + }, + { + "name": "Get DNS traffic ratio", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd73", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-11-09", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search calculates the ratio of DNS traffic originating and coming from a host to a list of DNS servers over the last 24 hours. A high value of this ratio could be very useful to quickly understand if a src_ip (host) is sending a high volume of data out via port 53, could be an indicator of data exfiltration via DNS. ", + "search": "| tstats allow_old_summaries=true sum(All_Traffic.bytes_out) as \"bytes_out\" sum(All_Traffic.bytes_in) as \"bytes_in\" from datamodel=Network_Traffic where nodename=All_Traffic All_Traffic.dest_port=53 by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest| `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | rename src as src_ip | rename dest as dest_ip | search src_ip=$src_ip$ | search dest_ip = $dest_ip | eval ratio = (bytes_out/bytes_in) | table ratio", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your network traffic", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "src_ip" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Command & Control", + "Data Protection", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.bytes_out", + "All_Traffic.bytes_in", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.src", + "All_Traffic.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_dns_traffic_ratio" + }, + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + }, + { + "name": "Get Process Info", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd71", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-01", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the process running on a host which is under investigation. To gather the process info, enter the values for the process name in question and the destination IP address.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search process_name= $process_name$ | search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_process_info" + }, + { + "name": "Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", + "id": "910e6512-edc9-4f93-ba24-5b786f47a672", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-01", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "While investigating, an analyst will want to know what process and parent_process is responsible for generating suspicious DNS traffic. Use the following search and enter the value of `dest` in the search to get specific details on the process responsible for creating the DNS traffic.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search dest = $dest$ | join dest type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port=53 by Ports.process_id Ports.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename src as dest]", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that associates processes with network events into the Endpoint datamodel. This can come from endpoint protection products such as carbon black, or endpoint data sources such as Sysmon.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Command & Control", + "Data Protection", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Ports.process_id", + "Ports.src", + "Ports.dest_port" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Deobfuscate-Decode Files or Information", + "id": "0bd01a54-8cbe-11eb-abcd-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-03-24", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "description": "Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis.", + "narrative": "An example of obfuscated files is `Certutil.exe` usage to encode a portable executable to a certificate file, which is base64 encoded, to hide the originating file. There are many utilities cross-platform to encode using XOR, using compressed .cab files to hide contents and scripting languages that may perform similar native Windows tasks. Triaging an event related will require the capability to review related process events and file modifications. Using a tool such as CyberChef will assist with identifying the encoding that was used, and potentially assist with decoding the contents.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Deobfuscate-Decode Files or Information", + "analytic_story": "Deobfuscate-Decode Files or Information", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1140", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Darkhotel", + "Frankenstein", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Leviathan", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - CertUtil With Decode Argument - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Michael Haag", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "CertUtil With Decode Argument", + "id": "bfe94226-8c10-11eb-a4b3-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-03-23", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "CertUtil.exe may be used to `encode` and `decode` a file, including PE and script code. Encoding will convert a file to base64 with `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----` and `-----END CERTIFICATE-----` tags. Malicious usage will include decoding a encoded file that was downloaded. Once decoded, it will be loaded by a parallel process. Note that there are two additional command switches that may be used - `encodehex` and `decodehex`. Similarly, the file will be encoded in HEX and later decoded for further execution. During triage, identify the source of the file being decoded. Review its contents or execution behavior for further analysis.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_certutil` Processes.process=*decode* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `certutil_with_decode_argument_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Typically seen used to `encode` files, but it is possible to see legitimate use of `decode`. Filter based on parent-child relationship, file paths, endpoint or user.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1140/T1140.md", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/certutil", + "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/certutilexe-could-allow-attackers-to-download-malware-while-bypassing-av/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "CertUtil With Decode Argument", + "analytic_story": [ + "Deobfuscate-Decode Files or Information" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1140/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to decode a file.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1140" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1140", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Darkhotel", + "Frankenstein", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Leviathan", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1140" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Deobfuscate-Decode Files or Information" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 40 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 40 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1140" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "CertUtil With Decode Argument Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "CertUtil With Decode Argument", + "file": "endpoint/certutil_with_decode_argument.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1140/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_certutil", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=certutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=CertUtil.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "certutil_with_decode_argument_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/certutil_with_decode_argument.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [] + }, + { + "name": "AWS Cryptomining", + "id": "ced74200-8465-4bc3-bd2c-9a782eec6750", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-03-08", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "description": "Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.", + "narrative": "Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority. \\\nCryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS). It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN. \\\nWhen malicious miners appropriate a cloud instance, often spinning up hundreds of new instances, the costs can become astronomical for the account holder. So, it is critically important to monitor your systems for suspicious activities that could indicate that your network has been infiltrated. \\\nThis Analytic Story is focused on detecting suspicious new instances in your EC2 environment to help prevent such a disaster. It contains detection searches that will detect when a previously unused instance type or AMI is used. It also contains support searches to build lookup files to ensure proper execution of the detection searches.", + "references": [ + "https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS Cryptomining", + "analytic_story": "AWS Cryptomining", + "category": [ + "Cloud Security" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Security Monitoring", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT33" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "datamodels": [], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", + "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", + "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", + "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", + "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", + "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", + "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [ + "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", + "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 AMIs", + "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types", + "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User", + "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions" + ], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "David Dorsey", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User", + "id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-290bf5d0dac4", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | bucket span=10m _time | stats count AS instances_launched by _time userName | eventstats avg(instances_launched) as total_launched_avg, stdev(instances_launched) as total_launched_stdev | eval threshold_value = 4 | eval isOutlier=if(instances_launched > total_launched_avg+(total_launched_stdev * threshold_value), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 AND _time >= relative_time(now(), \"-10m@m\") | eval num_standard_deviations_away = round(abs(instances_launched - total_launched_avg) / total_launched_stdev, 2) | table _time, userName, instances_launched, num_standard_deviations_away, total_launched_avg, total_launched_stdev | `abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment.", + "known_false_positives": "Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078.004" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "errorCode", + "userName" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT33" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", + "id": "dec41ad5-d579-42cb-b4c6-f5dbb778bbe5", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Jason Brewer, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success `abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk_filter` | bucket span=10m _time | stats count as instances_launched by _time src_user | apply ec2_excessive_runinstances_v1 | rename \"IsOutlier(instances_launched)\" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment.", + "known_false_positives": "Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078.004" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "errorCode", + "src_user" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT33" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", + "id": "fa5634df-fb05-4b4b-aba0-6115138bb1ba", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-11-14", + "author": "Jason Brewer, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many RunInstances users do in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of RunInstances performed by a user in a small time window.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success `ec2_excessive_runinstances_mltk_input_filter` | bucket span=10m _time | stats count as instances_launched by _time src_user | fit DensityFunction instances_launched threshold=0.0005 into ec2_excessive_runinstances_v1", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.\\\nIn addition, you must have the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version >= 4.2 installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users in your environment, you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 30 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data.\\\nMore information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "errorCode", + "src_user" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region", + "id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f3-d82362d6fd75", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-02-23", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where an instance is started in a particular region in the last one hour and then compares it to a lookup file of previously seen regions where an instance was started", + "search": "`cloudtrail` earliest=-1h StartInstances | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by awsRegion | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_aws_regions.csv | stats min(earliest) as earliest max(latest) as latest by awsRegion | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_regions.csv | eval regionStatus=if(earliest >= relative_time(now(),\"-1d@d\"), \"Instance Started in a New Region\",\"Previously Seen Region\") | `security_content_ctime(earliest)` | `security_content_ctime(latest)` | where regionStatus=\"Instance Started in a New Region\" | `ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. Run the \"Previously seen AWS Regions\" support search only once to create of baseline of previously seen regions. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", + "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a user has unknowingly started an instance in a new region. Please verify that this activity is legitimate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1535" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "awsRegion" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1535" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously Seen AWS Regions", + "id": "fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd63", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-01-08", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where an AWS instance is started and creates a baseline of most recent time (latest) and the first time (earliest) we've seen this region in our dataset grouped by the value awsRegion for the last 30 days", + "search": "`cloudtrail` StartInstances | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by awsRegion | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_regions.csv | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "awsRegion" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1535" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI", + "id": "347ec301-601b-48b9-81aa-9ddf9c829dd3", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-03-12", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen AMIs. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId | rename requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId as amiID | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_ec2_amis.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by amiID | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_amis.csv | eval newAMI=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where newAMI=1 | rename amiID as requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId | table requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId] | rename requestParameters.instanceType as instanceType, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as dest, userIdentity.arn as arn, requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId as amiID | table firstTime, lastTime, arn, amiID, dest, instanceType | `ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the \"Previously Seen EC2 AMIs\" support search once to create a history of previously seen AMIs.", + "known_false_positives": "After a new AMI is created, the first systems created with that AMI will cause this alert to fire. Verify that the AMI being used was created by a legitimate user.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "errorCode", + "requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously Seen EC2 AMIs", + "id": "bb1bd99d-1e93-45f1-9571-cfed42d372b9", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-03-12", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search builds a table of previously seen AMIs used to launch EC2 instances", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | rename requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId as amiID | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by amiID | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_amis.csv | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "errorCode", + "requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type", + "id": "65541c80-03c7-4e05-83c8-1dcd57a2e1ad", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-02-07", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen instance types. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | fillnull value=\"m1.small\" requestParameters.instanceType | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by requestParameters.instanceType | rename requestParameters.instanceType as instanceType | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.csv | stats min(earliest) as earliest max(latest) as latest by instanceType | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.csv | eval newType=if(earliest >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | `security_content_ctime(earliest)` | `security_content_ctime(latest)` | where newType=1 | rename instanceType as requestParameters.instanceType | table requestParameters.instanceType] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename requestParameters.instanceType as instanceType, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as dest | table _time, user, dest, instanceType | `ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the \"Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types\" support search once to create a history of previously seen instance types.", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible that an admin will create a new system using a new instance type never used before. Verify with the creator that they intended to create the system with the new instance type.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "errorCode", + "requestParameters.instanceType" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types", + "id": "b8f029f2-65a6-4d76-be98-dad1c9d59c45", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-03-08", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search builds a table of previously seen EC2 instance types", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | rename requestParameters.instanceType as instanceType | fillnull value=\"m1.small\" instanceType | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by instanceType | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.csv | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "errorCode", + "requestParameters.instanceType" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User", + "id": "22773e84-bac0-4595-b086-20d3f735b4f1", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for EC2 instances being created by users who have not created them before. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by userIdentity.arn | rename userIdentity.arn as arn | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by arn | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.csv | eval newUser=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newUser=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | rename requestParameters.instanceType as instanceType, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as dest, userIdentity.arn as user | table _time, user, dest, instanceType | `ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the \"Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User\" support search once to create a history of previously seen ARNs.", + "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a user will start to create EC2 instances when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is launching instances that this is the intended behavior.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078.004" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "errorCode", + "userIdentity.arn" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT33" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User", + "id": "6c767ac0-0906-4355-9a83-927f5ee7bdad", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-03-15", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search builds a table of previously seen ARNs that have launched a EC2 instance.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | rename userIdentity.arn as arn | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by arn | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.csv | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "errorCode", + "requestParameters.instanceType" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", + "id": "bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd72", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-30", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search lists all the logged CloudTrail activities by a specific user ARN and will create a table containing the source of the user, the region of the activity, the name and type of the event, the action taken, and all the user's identity information.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` | search user=$user$| table _time userIdentity.type userIdentity.userName userIdentity.arn aws_account_id src awsRegion eventName eventType", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "user" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "Command & Control", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Suspicious Cloud User Activities", + "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", + "AWS Security Hub Alerts" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "user", + "userIdentity.type", + "userIdentity.userName", + "userIdentity.arn", + "aws_account_id", + "src", + "awsRegion", + "eventName", + "eventType" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn" + }, + { + "name": "Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", + "id": "de4aed1d-f13a-4d2f-a97a-73c60e2e6b56", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-02-12", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries AWS description logs and returns all the information about a specific instance via the instanceId field", + "search": "`aws_description` | dedup id sortby -_time |rename id as instanceId| search instanceId=$instanceId$ | spath output=tags path=tags | eval tags=mvzip(key,value,\" = \"), ip_address=if((ip_address == \"null\"),private_ip_address,ip_address) | table id, tags.Name, aws_account_id, placement, instance_type, key_name, ip_address, launch_time, state, vpc_id, subnet_id, tags | rename aws_account_id as \"Account ID\", id as ID, instance_type as Type, ip_address as \"IP Address\", key_name as \"Key Pair\", launch_time as \"Launch Time\", placement as \"Availability Zone\", state as State, subnet_id as Subnet, \"tags.Name\" as Name, vpc_id as VPC", + "how_to_implement": "In order to implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS(version 4.4.0 or later) and configure your AWS description inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "instanceId" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "AWS Security Hub Alerts" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "id", + "ip_address", + "tags", + "aws_account_id", + "placement", + "instance_type", + "key_name", + "launch_time", + "state", + "vpc_id", + "subnet_id" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid" + }, + { + "name": "Get EC2 Launch Details", + "id": "0e40fe83-3edb-4d86-8206-8fed36529ca6", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-03-12", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search returns some of the launch details for a EC2 instance.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` dest=$dest$ |rename userIdentity.arn as arn, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as dest, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.privateIpAddress as privateIpAddress, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.imageId as amiID, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.architecture as architecture, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.keyName as keyName | table arn, awsRegion, dest, architecture, privateIpAddress, amiID, keyName", + "how_to_implement": "In order to implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS(version 4.4.0 or later) and configure your AWS description inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "AWS Security Hub Alerts" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "dest", + "userIdentity.arn", + "responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId", + "responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.privateIpAddress", + "responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.imageId", + "responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.architecture", + "responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.keyName" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_ec2_launch_details" + }, + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + }, + { + "name": "Investigate AWS activities via region name", + "id": "bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd11", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-02-09", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search lists all the user activities logged by CloudTrail for a specific region in question and will create a table of the values of parameters requested, the type of the event and the response from the AWS API by each user", + "search": "`cloudtrail` vendor_region=$vendor_region$| rename requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as instanceId | stats values(eventName) by user instanceId vendor_region", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "vendor_region" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "vendor_region", + "requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId", + "eventName", + "user" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities", + "id": "3338b567-3804-4261-9889-cf0ca4753c7f", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-03-16", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "description": "Monitor your AWS provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your network.", + "narrative": "Because most enterprise AWS activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to add specific IPs to an allow list because they vary. \\\nThis Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further.", + "references": [ + "https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities", + "analytic_story": "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities", + "category": [ + "Cloud Security" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Security Monitoring", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "datamodels": [], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", + "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", + "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", + "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", + "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [ + "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources" + ], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "David Dorsey", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City", + "id": "344a1778-0b25-490c-adb1-de8beddf59cd", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-03-16", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen cities. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with \"Run\" or \"Create.\" This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. ", + "search": "`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search City=* [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search City=* | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by City | eval newCity=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newCity=1 | table City] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip, City, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the \"Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources\" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources.", + "known_false_positives": "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no \"false positives\" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\\\n This search will fire any time a new city is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your city, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1535" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "sourceIPAddress" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1535" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources", + "id": "ac88e6a0-4fba-4dfd-b7b9-8964df7d1aee", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-03-16", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search builds a table of the first and last times seen for every IP address (along with its physical location) previously associated with cloud-provisioning activity. This is broadly defined as any event that runs or creates something.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address", + "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City", + "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country", + "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "sourceIPAddress" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1535" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country", + "id": "ceb8d3d8-06cb-49eb-beaf-829526e33ff0", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-03-16", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen countries. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with \"Run\" or \"Create.\" This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. ", + "search": "`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Country=* [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Country=* | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by Country | eval newCountry=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newCountry=1 | table Country] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip, Country, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the \"Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources\" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources.", + "known_false_positives": "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching over plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no \"false positives\" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\\\n This search will fire any time a new country is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1535" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "sourceIPAddress" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1535" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources", + "id": "ac88e6a0-4fba-4dfd-b7b9-8964df7d1aee", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-03-16", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search builds a table of the first and last times seen for every IP address (along with its physical location) previously associated with cloud-provisioning activity. This is broadly defined as any event that runs or creates something.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address", + "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City", + "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country", + "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "sourceIPAddress" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1535" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address", + "id": "42e15012-ac14-4801-94f4-f1acbe64880b", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-03-16", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen IP addresses. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with \"Run\" or \"Create.\" This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. ", + "search": "`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Country=* | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress | eval newIP=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newIP=1 | table sourceIPAddress] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the \"Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources\" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources.", + "known_false_positives": "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no \"false positives\" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\\\n This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "sourceIPAddress" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources", + "id": "ac88e6a0-4fba-4dfd-b7b9-8964df7d1aee", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-03-16", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search builds a table of the first and last times seen for every IP address (along with its physical location) previously associated with cloud-provisioning activity. This is broadly defined as any event that runs or creates something.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address", + "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City", + "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country", + "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "sourceIPAddress" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region", + "id": "7971d3df-da82-4648-a6e5-b5637bea5253", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-03-16", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen regions. Region in this context is similar to a state in the United States. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with \"Run\" or \"Create.\" This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Region=* [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Region=* | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by Region | eval newRegion=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newRegion=1 | table Region] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip, Region, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the \"Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources\" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources.", + "known_false_positives": "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no \"false positives\" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\\\n This search will fire any time a new region is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your region, there should be few false positives. If you are located in regions where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1535" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "sourceIPAddress" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1535" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources", + "id": "ac88e6a0-4fba-4dfd-b7b9-8964df7d1aee", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-03-16", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search builds a table of the first and last times seen for every IP address (along with its physical location) previously associated with cloud-provisioning activity. This is broadly defined as any event that runs or creates something.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address", + "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City", + "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country", + "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "sourceIPAddress" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1535" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest", + "id": "b0d2e6a8-75fa-4b1b-9486-3d32acadf822", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-06-08", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search retrieves the all the alerts created by AWS Security Hub for a specific dest(instance_id).", + "search": "`aws_securityhub_firehose` \"findings{}.Resources{}.Type\"=AWSEC2Instance | rex field=findings{}.Resources{}.Id .*instance/(?.*)| rename instance as dest| search dest = $dest$ |rename findings{}.* as * | rename Remediation.Recommendation.Text as Remediation | table dest Title ProductArn Description FirstObservedAt RecordState Remediation", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Cloud Compute Instance", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "findings{}.Resources{}.Type", + "findings{}.Resources{}.Id", + "instance", + "Remediation.Recommendation.Text", + "Title", + "ProductArn", + "Description", + "FirstObservedAt", + "RecordState" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest" + }, + { + "name": "AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", + "id": "bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd72", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-30", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search lists all the logged CloudTrail activities by a specific user ARN and will create a table containing the source of the user, the region of the activity, the name and type of the event, the action taken, and all the user's identity information.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` | search user=$user$| table _time userIdentity.type userIdentity.userName userIdentity.arn aws_account_id src awsRegion eventName eventType", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "user" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "Command & Control", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Suspicious Cloud User Activities", + "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", + "AWS Security Hub Alerts" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "user", + "userIdentity.type", + "userIdentity.userName", + "userIdentity.arn", + "aws_account_id", + "src", + "awsRegion", + "eventName", + "eventType" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn" + }, + { + "name": "Get All AWS Activity From City", + "id": "0abeeb40-1255-4b68-91d1-7a7eb410c4b8", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-03-19", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search retrieves all the activity from a specific city and will create a table containing the time, city, ARN, username, the type of user, the source IP address, the AWS region the activity was in, the API called, and whether or not the API call was successful.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search City=$City$ | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn | spath output=awsUserName path=userIdentity.userName | spath output=userType path=userIdentity.type | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, City, user, userName, userType, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "City" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "sourceIPAddress", + "userIdentity.arn", + "userIdentity.userName", + "userIdentity.type", + "awsRegion", + "eventName", + "errorCode" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_all_aws_activity_from_city" + }, + { + "name": "Get All AWS Activity From Country", + "id": "e763cdb9-00da-41e0-9bda-444debc9501a", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-03-19", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search retrieves all the activity from a specific country and will create a table containing the time, country, ARN, username, the type of user, the source IP address, the AWS region the activity was in, the API called, and whether or not the API call was successful.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Country=$Country$ | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn | spath output=awsUserName path=userIdentity.userName | spath output=userType path=userIdentity.type | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, Country, user, userName, userType, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "Country" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "sourceIPAddress", + "userIdentity.arn", + "userIdentity.userName", + "userIdentity.type", + "awsRegion", + "eventName", + "errorCode" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_all_aws_activity_from_country" + }, + { + "name": "Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", + "id": "446ec87a-85c6-40d4-b060-bea4498281d6", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-03-19", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search retrieves all the activity from a specific IP address and will create a table containing the time, ARN, username, the type of user, the IP address, the AWS region the activity was in, the API called, and whether or not the API call was successful.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search src_ip=$src_ip$ | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn | spath output=awsUserName path=userIdentity.userName | spath output=userType path=userIdentity.type | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, userName, userType, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "src_ip" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities", + "Command & Control", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "sourceIPAddress", + "userIdentity.arn", + "userIdentity.userName", + "userIdentity.type", + "awsRegion", + "eventName", + "errorCode" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address" + }, + { + "name": "Get All AWS Activity From Region", + "id": "5b794bef-1743-4f6f-804a-43915a2702ff", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-03-19", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search retrieves all the activity from a specific geographic region and will create a table containing the time, geographic region, ARN, username, the type of user, the source IP address, the AWS region the activity was in, the API called, and whether or not the API call was successful.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Region=$Region$ | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn | spath output=awsUserName path=userIdentity.userName | spath output=userType path=userIdentity.type | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, Region, user, userName, userType, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "Region" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "sourceIPAddress", + "userIdentity.arn", + "userIdentity.userName", + "userIdentity.type", + "awsRegion", + "eventName", + "errorCode" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_all_aws_activity_from_region" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Common Phishing Frameworks", + "id": "9a64ab44-9214-4639-8163-7eaa2621bd61", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-04-29", + "author": "Splunk Research Team, Splunk", + "description": "Detect DNS and web requests to fake websites generated by the EvilGinx2 toolkit. These websites are designed to fool unwitting users who have clicked on a malicious link in a phishing email. ", + "narrative": "As most people know, these emails use fraudulent domains, [email scraping](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), familiar contact names inserted as senders, and other tactics to lure targets into clicking a malicious link, opening an attachment with a [nefarious payload](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), or entering sensitive personal information that perpetrators may intercept. This attack technique requires a relatively low level of skill and allows adversaries to easily cast a wide net. Because phishing is a technique that relies on human psychology, you will never be able to eliminate this vulnerability 100%. But you can use automated detection to significantly reduce the risks.\\\nThis Analytic Story focuses on detecting signs of MiTM attacks enabled by [EvilGinx2](https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2), a toolkit that sets up a transparent proxy between the targeted site and the user. In this way, the attacker is able to intercept credentials and two-factor identification tokens. It employs a proxy template to allow a registered domain to impersonate targeted sites, such as Linkedin, Amazon, Okta, Github, Twitter, Instagram, Reddit, Office 365, and others. It can even register SSL certificates and camouflage them via a URL shortener, making them difficult to detect. Searches in this story look for signs of MiTM attacks enabled by EvilGinx2.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1192/", + "https://breakdev.org/evilginx-advanced-phishing-with-two-factor-authentication-bypass/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Common Phishing Frameworks", + "analytic_story": "Common Phishing Frameworks", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing via Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Dark Caracal", + "FIN6", + "Magic Hound", + "OilRig", + "Windshift" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Network_Resolution" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Delivery" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2 - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get Certificate logs for a domain - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Splunk Research Team", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2", + "id": "24dd17b1-e2fb-4c31-878c-d4f226595bfa", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Resolution" + ], + "description": "This search looks for DNS requests for phishing domains that are leveraging EvilGinx tools to mimic websites.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(DNS.answer) as answer from datamodel=Network_Resolution.DNS by DNS.dest DNS.src DNS.query host | `drop_dm_object_name(DNS)`| rex field=query \".*?(?[^./:]+\\.(\\S{2,3}|\\S{2,3}.\\S{2,3}))$\" | stats count values(query) as query by domain dest src answer| search `evilginx_phishlets_amazon` OR `evilginx_phishlets_facebook` OR `evilginx_phishlets_github` OR `evilginx_phishlets_0365` OR `evilginx_phishlets_outlook` OR `evilginx_phishlets_aws` OR `evilginx_phishlets_google` | search NOT [ inputlookup legit_domains.csv | fields domain]| join domain type=outer [| tstats count `security_content_summariesonly` values(Web.url) as url from datamodel=Web.Web by Web.dest Web.site | rename \"Web.*\" as * | rex field=site \".*?(?[^./:]+\\.(\\S{2,3}|\\S{2,3}.\\S{2,3}))$\" | table dest domain url] | table count src dest query answer domain url | `detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You need to ingest data from your DNS logs in the Network_Resolution datamodel. Specifically you must ingest the domain that is being queried and the IP of the host originating the request. Ideally, you should also be ingesting the answer to the query and the query type. This approach allows you to also create your own localized passive DNS capability which can aid you in future investigations. You will have to add legitimate domain names to the `legit_domains.csv` file shipped with the app. \\\n **Splunk>Phantom Playbook Integration**\\\nIf Splunk>Phantom is also configured in your environment, a Playbook called `Lets Encrypt Domain Investigate` can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/`, add the correct hostname to the \"Phantom Instance\" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search, and set the corresponding Playbook to active. \\\n(Playbook link:`https://my.phantom.us/4.2/playbook/lets-encrypt-domain-investigate/`).\\\n", + "known_false_positives": "If a known good domain is not listed in the legit_domains.csv file, then the search could give you false postives. Please update that lookup file to filter out DNS requests to legitimate domains.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2", + "analytic_story": [ + "Common Phishing Frameworks" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 7" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery", + "Command & Control" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566.003" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS", + "PR.IP", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "DNS.answer", + "DNS.dest", + "DNS.src", + "DNS.query", + "host" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing via Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Dark Caracal", + "FIN6", + "Magic Hound", + "OilRig", + "Windshift" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery", + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 7" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS", + "PR.IP", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Common Phishing Frameworks" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery", + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 7" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS", + "PR.IP", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "evilginx_phishlets_github", + "definition": "(query=api* AND query = github*)", + "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as GitHub" + }, + { + "name": "evilginx_phishlets_google", + "definition": "(query=accounts* AND query=ssl* AND query=www*)", + "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as Google" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "evilginx_phishlets_outlook", + "definition": "(query=outlook* AND query=login* AND query=account*)", + "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as Outlook" + }, + { + "name": "evilginx_phishlets_0365", + "definition": "(query=login* AND query=www*)", + "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as Office 365" + }, + { + "name": "evilginx_phishlets_facebook", + "definition": "(query=www* AND query = m* AND query=static*)", + "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as FaceBook" + }, + { + "name": "evilginx_phishlets_aws", + "definition": "(query=www* AND query=aws* AND query=console.aws* AND query=signin.aws* AND api-northeast-1.console.aws* AND query=fls-na* AND query=images-na*)", + "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as an AWS console" + }, + { + "name": "evilginx_phishlets_amazon", + "definition": "(query=fls-na* AND query = www* AND query=images*)", + "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as Amazon" + }, + { + "name": "detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get Certificate logs for a domain", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-2240-e756cc06fd73", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-29", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the Certificates datamodel and give you all the information for a specific domain. Please note that the certificates issued by \"Let's Encrypt\" are widely used by attackers.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Certificates.All_Certificates where All_Certificates.SSL.ssl_subject_common_name=*$domain$ by All_Certificates.dest All_Certificates.src All_Certificates.SSL.ssl_issuer_common_name All_Certificates.SSL.ssl_subject_common_name All_Certificates.SSL.ssl_hash | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Certificates)` | `drop_dm_object_name(SSL)` | rename ssl_subject_common_name as domain | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your certificates or SSL logs from your network traffic into your Certificates datamodel. Please note the wildcard(*) before domain in the search syntax, we use to match for all domain and subdomain combinations", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "domain" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Common Phishing Frameworks" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Certificates.SSL.ssl_subject_common_name", + "All_Certificates.dest", + "All_Certificates.src", + "All_Certificates.SSL.ssl_issuer_common_name", + "All_Certificates.SSL.ssl_hash" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Host Redirection", + "id": "2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50fe268af4", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-14", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "description": "Detect evidence of tactics used to redirect traffic from a host to a destination other than the one intended--potentially one that is part of an adversary's attack infrastructure. An example is redirecting communications regarding patches and updates or misleading users into visiting a malicious website.", + "narrative": "Attackers will often attempt to manipulate client communications for nefarious purposes. In some cases, an attacker may endeavor to modify a local host file to redirect communications with resources (such as antivirus or system-update services) to prevent clients from receiving patches or updates. In other cases, an attacker might use this tactic to have the client connect to a site that looks like the intended site, but instead installs malware or collects information from the victim. Additionally, an attacker may redirect a victim in order to execute a MITM attack and observe communications.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/09/hosts-file-hijacks/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Host Redirection", + "analytic_story": "Host Redirection", + "category": [ + "Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT33", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Lazarus Group", + "OilRig", + "Thrip", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "DNS", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "FIN7", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Tropic Trooper" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control", + "Exfiltration" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Network_Resolution" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", + "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Rico Valdez", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers", + "id": "74ec6f18-604b-4202-a567-86b2066be3ce", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Resolution" + ], + "description": "This search allows you to identify the endpoints that have connected to more than five DNS servers and made DNS Queries over the time frame of the search.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count, values(DNS.dest) AS dest dc(DNS.dest) as dest_count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.message_type=QUERY by DNS.src | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Network_Resolution\")` |where dest_count > 5 | `clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "This search requires that DNS data is being ingested and populating the `Network_Resolution` data model. This data can come from DNS logs or from solutions that parse network traffic for this data, such as Splunk Stream or Bro.\\\nThis search produces fields (`dest_count`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** Distinct DNS Connections, **Field:** dest_count\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", + "known_false_positives": "It's possible that an enterprise has more than five DNS servers that are configured in a round-robin rotation. Please customize the search, as appropriate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers", + "analytic_story": [ + "DNS Hijacking", + "Command & Control", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Host Redirection" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 9", + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1048.003" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "PR.DS" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "DNS.dest", + "DNS.message_type", + "DNS.src" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT33", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Lazarus Group", + "OilRig", + "Thrip", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1048.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 9", + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "PR.DS" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "DNS Hijacking", + "Command & Control", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Host Redirection" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1048.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 9", + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "PR.DS" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers", + "id": "1a67f15a-f4ff-4170-84e9-08cf6f75d6f6", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Resolution" + ], + "description": "This search will detect DNS requests resolved by unauthorized DNS servers. Legitimate DNS servers should be identified in the Enterprise Security Assets and Identity Framework.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.dest_category != dns_server AND DNS.src_category != dns_server by DNS.src DNS.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | `dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. It also requires that your DNS servers are identified correctly in the Assets and Identity table of Enterprise Security.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate DNS activity can be detected in this search. Investigate, verify and update the list of authorized DNS servers as appropriate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers", + "analytic_story": [ + "DNS Hijacking", + "Command & Control", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Host Redirection" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1", + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1071.004" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS", + "PR.IP", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "DNS.dest_category", + "DNS.src_category", + "DNS.src", + "DNS.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "DNS", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "FIN7", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Tropic Trooper" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1071.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1", + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS", + "PR.IP", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "DNS Hijacking", + "Command & Control", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Host Redirection" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1071.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1", + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS", + "PR.IP", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Windows hosts file modification", + "id": "06a6fc63-a72d-41dc-8736-7e3dd9612116", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-11-02", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The search looks for modifications to the hosts file on all Windows endpoints across your environment.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | search Filesystem.file_name=hosts AND Filesystem.file_path=*Windows\\\\System32\\\\* | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `windows_hosts_file_modification_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records the file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint.Filesystem data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or by other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system reads and writes.", + "known_false_positives": "There may be legitimate reasons for system administrators to add entries to this file.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows hosts file modification", + "analytic_story": [ + "Host Redirection" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "PR.IP", + "PR.PT", + "PR.AC", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP", + "PR.PT", + "PR.AC", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Host Redirection" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP", + "PR.PT", + "PR.AC", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_hosts_file_modification_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get DNS Server History for a host", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-11-09", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "While investigating any detections it is important to understand which and how many DNS servers a host has connected to in the past. This search uses data that is tagged as DNS and gives you a count and list of DNS servers that a particular host has connected to the previous 24 hours.", + "search": "| search tag=dns src_ip=$src_ip$ dest_port=53 | streamstats time_window=1d count values(dest_ip) as dcip by src_ip | table date_mday src_ip dcip count | sort -count", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting your DNS traffic", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "src_ip" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Command & Control", + "DNS Hijacking", + "Data Protection", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "src_ip", + "dest_port", + "dest_ip" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_dns_server_history_for_a_host" + }, + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "id": "8b3984d2-17b6-47e9-ba43-a3376e70fdcc", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-05-20", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "description": "This story addresses detection and response around Sensitive Role usage within a Kubernetes clusters against cluster resources and namespaces.", + "narrative": "Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive roles within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes role activities", + "references": [ + "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "analytic_story": "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "category": [ + "Cloud Security" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Security Monitoring", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [], + "datamodels": [], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", + "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", + "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule", + "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule", + "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", + "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule", + "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule", + "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", + "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Rod Soto", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod", + "id": "5b30b25d-7d32-42d8-95ca-64dfcd9076e6", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-06-23", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods by IP address, verb and decision", + "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts objectRef.resource=pods | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision | top sourceIPs{} user.username verb annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision |`kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs", + "known_false_positives": "Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst must consider IP, verb and decision context when trying to detect maliciousness.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod", + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account", + "id": "de7264ed-3ed9-4fef-bb01-6eefc87cefe8", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-06-23", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences", + "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason=* | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | stats count by user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | rare user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |`kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs", + "known_false_positives": "Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account", + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access", + "id": "b6013a7b-85e0-4a45-b051-10b252d69569", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-06-23", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets", + "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` objectRef.resource=clusterroles OR clusterrolebindings sourceIPs{}!=::1 sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1 | table sourceIPs{} user.username user.groups{} objectRef.namespace requestURI annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | dedup user.username user.groups{} |`kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs.", + "known_false_positives": "Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation, however source IP, namespace and user group may indicate possible malicious use. ", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access", + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace", + "id": "55a2264a-b7f0-45e5-addd-1e5ab3415c72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-05-26", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods and namespaces by IP address and verb", + "search": "`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts* OR user.username=system.anonymous OR annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision=allow | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb responseStatus.reason responseStatus.status properties.pod objectRef.namespace | top sourceIPs{} user.username verb responseStatus.status properties.pod objectRef.namespace |`kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics", + "known_false_positives": "Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst must consider IP and verb context when trying to detect maliciousness.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace", + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "kubernetes_azure", + "definition": "sourcetype=mscs:storage:blob:json", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Kubernetes data from Azure. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account", + "id": "47af7d20-0607-4079-97d7-7a29af58b54e", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-05-26", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding rare or top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences", + "search": "`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason=* | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |stats count by user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | rare user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |`kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics", + "known_false_positives": "Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account", + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "kubernetes_azure", + "definition": "sourcetype=mscs:storage:blob:json", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Kubernetes data from Azure. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access", + "id": "f27349e5-1641-4f6a-9e68-30402be0ad4c", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-05-20", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets", + "search": "`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log| search objectRef.resource=clusterroles OR clusterrolebindings | table sourceIPs{} user.username user.groups{} objectRef.namespace requestURI annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | dedup user.username user.groups{} |`kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics", + "known_false_positives": "Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation, however source IP, namespace and user group may indicate possible malicious use. ", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access", + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "kubernetes_azure", + "definition": "sourcetype=mscs:storage:blob:json", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Kubernetes data from Azure. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account", + "id": "99487de3-7192-4b41-939d-fbe9acfb1340", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-07-11", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences", + "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason=ClusterRoleBinding OR Clusterrole | table src_ip src_user data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason | rare src_user data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub messaging service logs", + "known_false_positives": "Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account", + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "kubernetes_gcp_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod", + "id": "7f5c2779-88a0-4824-9caa-0f606c8f260f", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-07-10", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods by IP address, verb and decision", + "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.request.spec.group{}=system:serviceaccounts | table src_ip src_user http_user_agent data.protoPayload.request.spec.nonResourceAttributes.verb data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision data.protoPayload.response.spec.resourceAttributes.resource | top src_ip src_user http_user_agent data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision data.protoPayload.response.spec.resourceAttributes.resource |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk GCP add on. This search works with pubsub messaging service logs", + "known_false_positives": "Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst must consider IP, verb and decision context when trying to detect maliciousness.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod", + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access", + "id": "a46923f6-36b9-4806-a681-31f314907c30", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-07-11", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets", + "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason=ClusterRoleBinding OR Clusterrole dest=apis/rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1 src_ip!=::1 | table src_ip src_user http_user_agent data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason | dedup src_ip src_user |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub messaging servicelogs.", + "known_false_positives": "Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation, however source IP, user agent, decision and reason may indicate possible malicious use. ", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access", + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "GCP GKE EKS Kubernetes cluster", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Monitor Backup Solution", + "id": "abe807c7-1eb6-4304-ac32-6e7aacdb891d", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-12", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "description": "Address common concerns when monitoring your backup processes. These searches can help you reduce risks from ransomware, device theft, or denial of physical access to a host by backing up data on endpoints.", + "narrative": "Having backups is a standard best practice that helps ensure continuity of business operations. Having mature backup processes can also help you reduce the risks of many security-related incidents and streamline your response processes. The detection searches in this Analytic Story will help you identify systems that have backup failures, as well as systems that have not been backed up for an extended period of time. The story will also return the notable event history and all of the backup logs for an endpoint.", + "references": [ + "https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/03/04/tracking-locky-ransomware-using-carbon-black/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Monitor Backup Solution", + "analytic_story": "Monitor Backup Solution", + "category": [ + "Best Practices" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Compliance", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [], + "datamodels": [], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule", + "ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - All backup logs for host - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [ + "ESCU - Monitor Successful Backups", + "ESCU - Monitor Unsuccessful Backups" + ], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "David Dorsey", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups", + "id": "a34aae96-ccf8-4aef-952c-3ea214444440", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-12", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search returns a list of hosts that have not successfully completed a backup in over a week. Deprecated because it's a infrastructure monitoring.", + "search": "`netbackup` MESSAGE=\"Disk/Partition backup completed successfully.\" | stats latest(_time) as latestTime by COMPUTERNAME | `security_content_ctime(latestTime)` | rename COMPUTERNAME as dest | eval isOutlier=if(latestTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-7d@d\"), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | table latestTime, dest | `extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to first obtain data from your backup solution, either from the backup logs on your hosts, or from a central server responsible for performing the backups. If you do not use Netbackup, you can modify this search for your backup solution. Depending on how often you backup your systems, you may want to modify how far in the past to look for a successful backup, other than the default of seven days.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups", + "analytic_story": [ + "Monitor Backup Solution" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 10" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "MESSAGE", + "COMPUTERNAME" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 10" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Monitor Backup Solution" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 10" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "netbackup", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"netbackup_logs\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Unsuccessful Netbackup backups", + "id": "a34aae96-ccf8-4aaa-952c-3ea21444444f", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-12", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search gives you the hosts where a backup was attempted and then failed.", + "search": "`netbackup` | stats latest(_time) as latestTime by COMPUTERNAME, MESSAGE | search MESSAGE=\"An error occurred, failed to backup.\" | `security_content_ctime(latestTime)` | rename COMPUTERNAME as dest, MESSAGE as signature | table latestTime, dest, signature | `unsuccessful_netbackup_backups_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to obtain data from your backup solution, either from the backup logs on your endpoints or from a central server responsible for performing the backups. If you do not use Netbackup, you can modify this search for your specific backup solution.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Unsuccessful Netbackup backups", + "analytic_story": [ + "Monitor Backup Solution" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 10" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 10" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Monitor Backup Solution" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Monitor Successful Backups", + "id": "b4d0dfb2-2195-4f6e-93a3-48468ed9734e", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-12", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search is intended to give you a feel for how often successful backups are conducted in your environment. Fluctuations in these numbers will allow you to determine when you should investigate.", + "search": "`netbackup` \"Disk/Partition backup completed successfully.\" | bucket _time span=1d | stats dc(COMPUTERNAME) as count values(COMPUTERNAME) as dest by _time, MESSAGE", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting your backup logs.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Monitor Backup Solution" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Unsuccessful Netbackup backups" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + }, + { + "name": "Monitor Unsuccessful Backups", + "id": "b2178fed-592f-492b-b851-74161678aa56", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-12", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search is intended to give you a feel for how often backup failures happen in your environments. Fluctuations in these numbers will allow you to determine when you should investigate.", + "search": "`netbackup` \"An error occurred, failed to backup.\" | bucket _time span=1d | stats dc(COMPUTERNAME) as count values(COMPUTERNAME) as dest by _time, MESSAGE", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting your backup logs.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Monitor Backup Solution" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Unsuccessful Netbackup backups" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 10" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "netbackup", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"netbackup_logs\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "unsuccessful_netbackup_backups_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "All backup logs for host", + "id": "bc91a8cf-aaaa-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-12", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "Retrieve the backup logs for the last 2 weeks for a specific host in order to investigate why backups are not completing successfully.", + "search": "| search `netbackup` dest=$dest$", + "how_to_implement": "The successfully implement this search you must first send your backup logs to Splunk.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Monitor Backup Solution" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "all_backup_logs_for_host" + }, + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "id": "8892a655-6205-43f7-abba-06460e38c8ae", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-15", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "description": "Identify and investigate prohibited/unauthorized software or processes that may be concealing malicious behavior within your environment. ", + "narrative": "It is critical to identify unauthorized software and processes running on enterprise endpoints and determine whether they are likely to be malicious. This Analytic Story requires the user to populate the Interesting Processes table within Enterprise Security with prohibited processes. An included support search will augment this data, adding information on processes thought to be malicious. This search requires data from endpoint detection-and-response solutions, endpoint data sources (such as Sysmon), or Windows Event Logs--assuming that the Active Directory administrator has enabled process tracking within the System Event Audit Logs.\\\nIt is important to investigate any software identified as suspicious, in order to understand how it was installed or executed. Analyzing authentication logs or any historic notable events might elicit additional investigative leads of interest. For best results, schedule the search to run every two weeks. ", + "references": [ + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "analytic_story": "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "category": [ + "Best Practices" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Compliance", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Match Legitimate Name or Location", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Darkhotel", + "FIN7", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Fox Kitten", + "Indrik Spider", + "Lazarus Group", + "Machete", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Sowbug", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Whitefly", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1595", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Active Scanning", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access", + "Defense Evasion", + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Command & Control", + "Installation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", + "ESCU - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [ + "ESCU - Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security" + ], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "David Dorsey", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Prohibited Software On Endpoint", + "id": "a51bfe1a-94f0-48cc-b4e4-b6ae50145893", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-10-11", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for applications on the endpoint that you have marked as prohibited.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `prohibited_softwares` | `prohibited_software_on_endpoint_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is usually generated via logs that report process tracking in your Windows audit settings. In addition, you must also have only the `process_name` (not the entire process path) marked as \"prohibited\" in the Enterprise Security `interesting processes` table. To include the process names marked as \"prohibited\", which is included with ES Content Updates, run the included search Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Prohibited Software On Endpoint", + "analytic_story": [ + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "SamSam Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_times" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "SamSam Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security", + "id": "251930a5-1451-4428-bb13-eed5775be0ce", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-15", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search takes the existing interesting process table from ES, filters out any existing additions added by ESCU and then updates the table with processes identified by ESCU that should be prohibited on your endpoints.", + "search": "| inputlookup prohibited_processes | search note!=ESCU* | inputlookup append=T prohibited_processes | fillnull value=* dest dest_pci_domain | fillnull value=false is_required is_secure | fillnull value=true is_prohibited | outputlookup prohibited_processes | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "This search should be run on each new install of ESCU.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "SamSam Ransomware" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Prohibited Software On Endpoint" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "prohibited_softwares", + "definition": "lookup prohibited_softwares app as process_name OUTPUT is_prohibited | search is_prohibited=True", + "description": "This macro limits the output to process_names that have been marked as prohibited" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "prohibited_software_on_endpoint_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Attacker Tools On Endpoint", + "id": "a51bfe1a-94f0-48cc-b4e4-16a110145893", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-11-04", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for execution of commonly used attacker tools on an endpoint.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.dest!=unknown Processes.user!=unknown by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | lookup attacker_tools attacker_tool_names AS process_name OUTPUT description | search description !=false| `attacker_tools_on_endpoint_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is usually generated via logs that report process tracking in your Windows audit settings.", + "known_false_positives": "Some administrator activity can be potentially triggered, please add those users to the filter macro.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Attacker Tools On Endpoint", + "analytic_story": [ + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "XMRig", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Unusual Processes" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1595/attacker_scan_tools/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An attacker tool $process_name$,listed in attacker_tools.csv is executed on host $dest$ by User $user$. This process $process_name$ is known to do- $description$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1036.005", + "T1036", + "T1003", + "T1595" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process", + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.parent_process" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Match Legitimate Name or Location", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Darkhotel", + "FIN7", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Fox Kitten", + "Indrik Spider", + "Lazarus Group", + "Machete", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Sowbug", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Whitefly", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1595", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Active Scanning", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036.005", + "T1036", + "T1003", + "T1595" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "XMRig", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Unusual Processes" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process", + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036.005", + "T1036", + "T1003", + "T1595" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Attacker Tools On Endpoint Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Attacker Tools On Endpoint", + "file": "endpoint/attacker_tools_on_endpoint.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1595/attacker_scan_tools/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "attacker_tools_on_endpoint_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "attacker_tools", + "description": "A list of tools used by attackers", + "filename": "attacker_tools.csv", + "default_match": "false", + "match_type": "WILDCARD(attacker_tool_names)", + "min_matches": 1, + "case_sensitive_match": "false" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/attacker_tools_on_endpoint.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + }, + { + "name": "Get Parent Process Info", + "id": "fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41bf9", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-02-28", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "parent_process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Phishing Payloads", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_parent_process_info" + }, + { + "name": "Get Process Info", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd71", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-01", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the process running on a host which is under investigation. To gather the process info, enter the values for the process name in question and the destination IP address.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search process_name= $process_name$ | search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_process_info" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "id": "6d3306f6-bb2b-4219-8609-8efad64032f2", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-01-08", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "description": "Assess and mitigate your systems' vulnerability to Spectre and Meltdown exploitation with the searches in this Analytic Story.", + "narrative": "Meltdown and Spectre exploit critical vulnerabilities in modern CPUs that allow unintended access to data in memory. This Analytic Story will help you identify the systems can be patched for these vulnerabilities, as well as those that still need to be patched.", + "references": [ + "https://meltdownattack.com/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "analytic_story": "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "category": [ + "Vulnerability" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Security Monitoring", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [], + "datamodels": [ + "Vulnerabilities" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [ + "ESCU - Systems Ready for Spectre-Meltdown Windows Patch" + ], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "David Dorsey", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems", + "id": "354be8e0-32cd-4da0-8c47-796de13b60ea", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-01-07", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Vulnerabilities" + ], + "description": "The search is used to detect systems that are still vulnerable to the Spectre and Meltdown vulnerabilities.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Vulnerabilities where Vulnerabilities.cve =\"CVE-2017-5753\" OR Vulnerabilities.cve =\"CVE-2017-5715\" OR Vulnerabilities.cve =\"CVE-2017-5754\" by Vulnerabilities.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Vulnerabilities)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "The search requires that you are ingesting your vulnerability-scanner data and that it reports the CVE of the vulnerability identified.", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible that your vulnerability scanner is not detecting that the patches have been applied.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems", + "analytic_story": [ + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 4" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "ID.RA", + "RS.MI", + "PR.IP", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2017-5753" + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 4" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.RA", + "RS.MI", + "PR.IP", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2017-5753" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Systems Ready for Spectre-Meltdown Windows Patch", + "id": "fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd61", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-01-08", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "Some AV applications can cause the Spectre/Meltdown patch for Windows not to install successfully. This registry key is supposed to be created by the AV engine when it has been patched to be able to handle the Windows patch. If this key has been written, the system can then be patched for Spectre and Meltdown.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Change_Analysis.All_Changes where All_Changes.object_category=registry AND (All_Changes.object_path=\"HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\QualityCompat*\") by All_Changes.dest, All_Changes.command, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.object_path | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")`", + "how_to_implement": "You need to be ingesting logs with both the process name and command-line from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.object_category", + "All_Changes.object_path", + "All_Changes.dest", + "All_Changes.command", + "All_Changes.user", + "All_Changes.object" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 4" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.RA", + "RS.MI", + "PR.IP", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "id": "4e692b96-de2d-4bd1-9105-37e2368a8db1", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-19", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "description": "Keeping your Splunk deployment up to date is critical and may help you reduce the risk of CVE-2016-4859, an open-redirection vulnerability within some older versions of Splunk Enterprise. The detection search will help ensure that users are being properly authenticated and not being redirected to malicious domains.", + "narrative": "This Analytic Story is associated with CVE-2016-4859, an open-redirect vulnerability in the following versions of Splunk Enterprise:\\\n\\\n1. Splunk Enterprise 6.4.x, prior to 6.4.3\\\n1. Splunk Enterprise 6.3.x, prior to 6.3.6\\\n1. Splunk Enterprise 6.2.x, prior to 6.2.10\\\n1. Splunk Enterprise 6.1.x, prior to 6.1.11\\\n1. Splunk Enterprise 6.0.x, prior to 6.0.12\\\n1. Splunk Enterprise 5.0.x, prior to 5.0.16\\\n1. Splunk Light, prior to 6.4.3CVE-2016-4859 allows attackers to redirect users to arbitrary web sites and conduct phishing attacks via unspecified vectors. (Credit: Noriaki Iwasaki, Cyber Defense Institute, Inc.).\\\nIt is important to ensure that your Splunk deployment is being kept up to date and is properly configured. This detection search allows analysts to monitor internal logs to ensure users are properly authenticated and cannot be redirected to any malicious third-party websites.", + "references": [ + "http://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAPQ6#announce", + "https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-4859" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "analytic_story": "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "category": [ + "Vulnerability" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Security Monitoring", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [], + "datamodels": [], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Open Redirect in Splunk Web - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Open Redirect in Splunk Web", + "id": "d199fb99-2312-451a-9daa-e5efa6ed76a7", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-19", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search allows you to look for evidence of exploitation for CVE-2016-4859, the Splunk Open Redirect Vulnerability.", + "search": "index=_internal sourcetype=splunk_web_access return_to=\"/%09/*\" | `open_redirect_in_splunk_web_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "No extra steps needed to implement this search.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Open Redirect in Splunk Web", + "analytic_story": [ + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability" + ], + "asset_type": "Splunk Server", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 4", + "CIS 18" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "ID.RA", + "RS.MI", + "PR.PT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2016-4859" + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 4", + "CIS 18" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.RA", + "RS.MI", + "PR.PT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2016-4859" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 4", + "CIS 18" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.RA", + "RS.MI", + "PR.PT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "open_redirect_in_splunk_web_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "id": "1fc34cbc-34e9-43ba-87ab-6811c9e95400", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-06-14", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "description": "Reduce the risk of CVE-2018-11409, an information disclosure vulnerability within some older versions of Splunk Enterprise, with searches designed to help ensure that your Splunk system does not leak information to authenticated users.", + "narrative": "Although there have been no reports of it being exploited, Splunk Enterprise versions through 7.0.1 reportedly have a vulnerability that may expose information through a REST endpoint (read more here: https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings). NIST has included it in its vulnerability database (read more here: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409). The REST endpoint that exposes system information is also necessary for the proper operation of Splunk clustering and instrumentation. Customers should upgrade to the latest version to reduce the risk of this vulnerability.\\\nSplunk Enterprise exposes partial information about the host operating system, hardware, and Splunk license. Splunk Enterprise before 6.6.0 exposes this information without authentication. Splunk Enterprise 6.6.0 and later exposes this information only to authenticated Splunk users. Based on the information exposure, Splunk characterizes this issue as a low severity impact.\\\nRead more in Splunk's official response: https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings.\\\nA detection search within this Analytic Story looks for vulnerabilities described in CVE-2018-11409: Information Exposure (https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409). If it turns up activities that may be specific, you can use the included investigative searches to return information regarding web activity and network traffic by src_ip.", + "references": [ + "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409", + "https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings", + "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44865/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "analytic_story": "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "category": [ + "Vulnerability" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Security Monitoring", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [], + "datamodels": [], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", + "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "David Dorsey", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure", + "id": "f6a26b7b-7e80-4963-a9a8-d836e7534ebd", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-06-14", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search allows you to look for evidence of exploitation for CVE-2018-11409, a Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure Bug.", + "search": "index=_internal sourcetype=splunkd_ui_access server-info | search clientip!=127.0.0.1 uri_path=\"*raw/services/server/info/server-info\" | rename clientip as src_ip, splunk_server as dest | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime, values(uri) as uri, values(useragent) as http_user_agent, values(user) as user by src_ip, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "The REST endpoint that exposes system information is also necessary for the proper operation of Splunk clustering and instrumentation. Whitelisting your Splunk systems will reduce false positives.", + "known_false_positives": "Retrieving server information may be a legitimate API request. Verify that the attempt is a valid request for information.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure", + "analytic_story": [ + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409" + ], + "asset_type": "Splunk Server", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 4", + "CIS 18" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "ID.RA", + "RS.MI", + "PR.PT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2018-11409" + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 4", + "CIS 18" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.RA", + "RS.MI", + "PR.PT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2018-11409" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 4", + "CIS 18" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.RA", + "RS.MI", + "PR.PT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + }, + { + "name": "Investigate Network Traffic From src ip", + "id": "9df9ca9c-a02b-4f48-9eba-0bac55179050", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-06-15", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search allows you to find all the network traffic from a specific IP address.", + "search": "| from datamodel Network_Traffic.All_Traffic | search src_ip=$src_ip$", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting your web-traffic logs and populating the web data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "src_ip" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "src_ip" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "id": "2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50f1268af3", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-02-09", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "description": "Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply, when the information warrants it.", + "narrative": "AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing within your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Console, AWS command-line interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your EC2 instances are not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your AWS EC2 instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities.", + "references": [ + "https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "analytic_story": "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "category": [ + "Cloud Security" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Security Monitoring", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT33" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "datamodels": [], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", + "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", + "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", + "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", + "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", + "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", + "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", + "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [ + "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", + "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK", + "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User", + "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions" + ], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User", + "id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-290bf5d0dac4", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | bucket span=10m _time | stats count AS instances_launched by _time userName | eventstats avg(instances_launched) as total_launched_avg, stdev(instances_launched) as total_launched_stdev | eval threshold_value = 4 | eval isOutlier=if(instances_launched > total_launched_avg+(total_launched_stdev * threshold_value), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 AND _time >= relative_time(now(), \"-10m@m\") | eval num_standard_deviations_away = round(abs(instances_launched - total_launched_avg) / total_launched_stdev, 2) | table _time, userName, instances_launched, num_standard_deviations_away, total_launched_avg, total_launched_stdev | `abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment.", + "known_false_positives": "Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078.004" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "errorCode", + "userName" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT33" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", + "id": "dec41ad5-d579-42cb-b4c6-f5dbb778bbe5", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Jason Brewer, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success `abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk_filter` | bucket span=10m _time | stats count as instances_launched by _time src_user | apply ec2_excessive_runinstances_v1 | rename \"IsOutlier(instances_launched)\" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment.", + "known_false_positives": "Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078.004" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "errorCode", + "src_user" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT33" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", + "id": "fa5634df-fb05-4b4b-aba0-6115138bb1ba", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-11-14", + "author": "Jason Brewer, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many RunInstances users do in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of RunInstances performed by a user in a small time window.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success `ec2_excessive_runinstances_mltk_input_filter` | bucket span=10m _time | stats count as instances_launched by _time src_user | fit DensityFunction instances_launched threshold=0.0005 into ec2_excessive_runinstances_v1", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.\\\nIn addition, you must have the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version >= 4.2 installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users in your environment, you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 30 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data.\\\nMore information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "errorCode", + "src_user" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User", + "id": "8d301246-fccf-45e2-a8e7-3655fd14379c", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where an abnormally high number of instances were successfully terminated by a user in a 10-minute window. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=TerminateInstances errorCode=success | bucket span=10m _time | stats count AS instances_terminated by _time userName | eventstats avg(instances_terminated) as total_terminations_avg, stdev(instances_terminated) as total_terminations_stdev | eval threshold_value = 4 | eval isOutlier=if(instances_terminated > total_terminations_avg+(total_terminations_stdev * threshold_value), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 AND _time >= relative_time(now(), \"-10m@m\")| eval num_standard_deviations_away = round(abs(instances_terminated - total_terminations_avg) / total_terminations_stdev, 2) |table _time, userName, instances_terminated, num_standard_deviations_away, total_terminations_avg, total_terminations_stdev | `abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "Many service accounts configured with your AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify whether this search alerted on a human user.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078.004" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "errorCode", + "userName" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT33" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK", + "id": "1c02b86a-cd85-473e-a50b-014a9ac8fe3e", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Jason Brewer, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user successfully terminates an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=TerminateInstances errorCode=success `abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk_filter` | bucket span=10m _time | stats count as instances_terminated by _time src_user | apply ec2_excessive_terminateinstances_v1 | rename \"IsOutlier(instances_terminated)\" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment.", + "known_false_positives": "Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078.004" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "errorCode", + "src_user" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT33" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK", + "id": "b28ed6de-e4ba-40f7-ae0a-93a088c774ab", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-11-14", + "author": "Jason Brewer, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many TerminateInstances users do in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of TerminateInstances performed by a user in a small time window.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=TerminateInstances errorCode=success `ec2_excessive_terminateinstances_mltk_input_filter` | bucket span=10m _time | stats count as instances_terminated by _time src_user | fit DensityFunction instances_terminated threshold=0.0005 into ec2_excessive_terminateinstances_v1", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.\\\nIn addition, you must have the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version >= 4.2 installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users in your environment, you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 30 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data.\\\nMore information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "errorCode", + "src_user" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region", + "id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f3-d82362d6fd75", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-02-23", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where an instance is started in a particular region in the last one hour and then compares it to a lookup file of previously seen regions where an instance was started", + "search": "`cloudtrail` earliest=-1h StartInstances | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by awsRegion | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_aws_regions.csv | stats min(earliest) as earliest max(latest) as latest by awsRegion | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_regions.csv | eval regionStatus=if(earliest >= relative_time(now(),\"-1d@d\"), \"Instance Started in a New Region\",\"Previously Seen Region\") | `security_content_ctime(earliest)` | `security_content_ctime(latest)` | where regionStatus=\"Instance Started in a New Region\" | `ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. Run the \"Previously seen AWS Regions\" support search only once to create of baseline of previously seen regions. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", + "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a user has unknowingly started an instance in a new region. Please verify that this activity is legitimate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1535" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "awsRegion" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1535" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously Seen AWS Regions", + "id": "fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd63", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-01-08", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where an AWS instance is started and creates a baseline of most recent time (latest) and the first time (earliest) we've seen this region in our dataset grouped by the value awsRegion for the last 30 days", + "search": "`cloudtrail` StartInstances | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by awsRegion | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_regions.csv | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "awsRegion" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1535" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User", + "id": "22773e84-bac0-4595-b086-20d3f735b4f1", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for EC2 instances being created by users who have not created them before. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by userIdentity.arn | rename userIdentity.arn as arn | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by arn | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.csv | eval newUser=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newUser=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | rename requestParameters.instanceType as instanceType, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as dest, userIdentity.arn as user | table _time, user, dest, instanceType | `ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the \"Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User\" support search once to create a history of previously seen ARNs.", + "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a user will start to create EC2 instances when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is launching instances that this is the intended behavior.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078.004" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "errorCode", + "userIdentity.arn" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT33" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User", + "id": "6c767ac0-0906-4355-9a83-927f5ee7bdad", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-03-15", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search builds a table of previously seen ARNs that have launched a EC2 instance.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | rename userIdentity.arn as arn | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by arn | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.csv | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "errorCode", + "requestParameters.instanceType" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest", + "id": "b0d2e6a8-75fa-4b1b-9486-3d32acadf822", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-06-08", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search retrieves the all the alerts created by AWS Security Hub for a specific dest(instance_id).", + "search": "`aws_securityhub_firehose` \"findings{}.Resources{}.Type\"=AWSEC2Instance | rex field=findings{}.Resources{}.Id .*instance/(?.*)| rename instance as dest| search dest = $dest$ |rename findings{}.* as * | rename Remediation.Recommendation.Text as Remediation | table dest Title ProductArn Description FirstObservedAt RecordState Remediation", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Cloud Compute Instance", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "findings{}.Resources{}.Type", + "findings{}.Resources{}.Id", + "instance", + "Remediation.Recommendation.Text", + "Title", + "ProductArn", + "Description", + "FirstObservedAt", + "RecordState" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest" + }, + { + "name": "AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", + "id": "bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd72", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-30", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search lists all the logged CloudTrail activities by a specific user ARN and will create a table containing the source of the user, the region of the activity, the name and type of the event, the action taken, and all the user's identity information.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` | search user=$user$| table _time userIdentity.type userIdentity.userName userIdentity.arn aws_account_id src awsRegion eventName eventType", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "user" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "Command & Control", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Suspicious Cloud User Activities", + "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", + "AWS Security Hub Alerts" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "user", + "userIdentity.type", + "userIdentity.userName", + "userIdentity.arn", + "aws_account_id", + "src", + "awsRegion", + "eventName", + "eventType" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn" + }, + { + "name": "Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", + "id": "de4aed1d-f13a-4d2f-a97a-73c60e2e6b56", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-02-12", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries AWS description logs and returns all the information about a specific instance via the instanceId field", + "search": "`aws_description` | dedup id sortby -_time |rename id as instanceId| search instanceId=$instanceId$ | spath output=tags path=tags | eval tags=mvzip(key,value,\" = \"), ip_address=if((ip_address == \"null\"),private_ip_address,ip_address) | table id, tags.Name, aws_account_id, placement, instance_type, key_name, ip_address, launch_time, state, vpc_id, subnet_id, tags | rename aws_account_id as \"Account ID\", id as ID, instance_type as Type, ip_address as \"IP Address\", key_name as \"Key Pair\", launch_time as \"Launch Time\", placement as \"Availability Zone\", state as State, subnet_id as Subnet, \"tags.Name\" as Name, vpc_id as VPC", + "how_to_implement": "In order to implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS(version 4.4.0 or later) and configure your AWS description inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "instanceId" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "AWS Security Hub Alerts" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "id", + "ip_address", + "tags", + "aws_account_id", + "placement", + "instance_type", + "key_name", + "launch_time", + "state", + "vpc_id", + "subnet_id" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid" + }, + { + "name": "Get EC2 Launch Details", + "id": "0e40fe83-3edb-4d86-8206-8fed36529ca6", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-03-12", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search returns some of the launch details for a EC2 instance.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` dest=$dest$ |rename userIdentity.arn as arn, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as dest, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.privateIpAddress as privateIpAddress, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.imageId as amiID, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.architecture as architecture, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.keyName as keyName | table arn, awsRegion, dest, architecture, privateIpAddress, amiID, keyName", + "how_to_implement": "In order to implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS(version 4.4.0 or later) and configure your AWS description inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "AWS Security Hub Alerts" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "dest", + "userIdentity.arn", + "responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId", + "responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.privateIpAddress", + "responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.imageId", + "responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.architecture", + "responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.keyName" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_ec2_launch_details" + }, + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + }, + { + "name": "Investigate AWS activities via region name", + "id": "bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd11", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-02-09", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search lists all the user activities logged by CloudTrail for a specific region in question and will create a table of the values of parameters requested, the type of the event and the response from the AWS API by each user", + "search": "`cloudtrail` vendor_region=$vendor_region$| rename requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as instanceId | stats values(eventName) by user instanceId vendor_region", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "vendor_region" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "vendor_region", + "requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId", + "eventName", + "user" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "id": "73de57ef-0dfc-411f-b1e7-fa24428aeae0", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-04-09", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "description": "Identify unusual changes to your AWS EC2 instances that may indicate malicious activity. Modifications to your EC2 instances by previously unseen users is an example of an activity that may warrant further investigation.", + "narrative": "A common attack technique is to infiltrate a cloud instance and make modifications. The adversary can then secure access to your infrastructure or hide their activities. So it's important to stay alert to changes that may indicate that your environment has been compromised. \\\n Searches within this Analytic Story can help you detect the presence of a threat by monitoring for EC2 instances that have been created or changed--either by users that have never previously performed these activities or by known users who modify or create instances in a way that have not been done before. This story also provides investigative searches that help you go deeper once you detect suspicious behavior.", + "references": [ + "https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "analytic_story": "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "category": [ + "Cloud Security" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Security Monitoring", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT33" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "datamodels": [], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [ + "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Modifications By User" + ], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "David Dorsey", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User", + "id": "56f91724-cf3f-4666-84e1-e3712fb41e76", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for EC2 instances being modified by users who have not previously modified them. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` `ec2_modification_api_calls` [search `cloudtrail` `ec2_modification_api_calls` errorCode=success | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by userIdentity.arn | rename userIdentity.arn as arn | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by arn | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user | eval newUser=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newUser=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=dest responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | table _time, user, dest | `ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the \"Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User\" support search once to create a history of previously seen ARNs. To add or remove APIs that modify an EC2 instance, edit the macro `ec2_modification_api_calls`.", + "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a new user will start to modify EC2 instances when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is modifying instances that this is the intended behavior.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User", + "analytic_story": [ + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078.004" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "errorCode", + "userIdentity.arn" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT33" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously Seen EC2 Modifications By User", + "id": "4d69091b-d975-4267-85df-888bd41034eb", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-04-05", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search builds a table of previously seen ARNs that have launched a EC2 instance.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` `ec2_modification_api_calls` errorCode=success | spath output=arn userIdentity.arn | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by arn | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. To add or remove APIs that modify an EC2 instance, edit the macro `ec2_modification_api_calls`.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "userIdentity.arn", + "errorCode" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "ec2_modification_api_calls", + "definition": "(eventName=AssociateAddress OR eventName=AssociateIamInstanceProfile OR eventName=AttachClassicLinkVpc OR eventName=AttachNetworkInterface OR eventName=AttachVolume OR eventName=BundleInstance OR eventName=DetachClassicLinkVpc OR eventName=DetachVolume OR eventName=ModifyInstanceAttribute OR eventName=ModifyInstancePlacement OR eventName=MonitorInstances OR eventName=RebootInstances OR eventName=ResetInstanceAttribute OR eventName=StartInstances OR eventName=StopInstances OR eventName=TerminateInstances OR eventName=UnmonitorInstances)", + "description": "This is a list of AWS event names that have to do with modifying Amazon EC2 instances" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user", + "description": "A place holder for a list of AWS EC2 modifications done by each user", + "filename": "previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user.csv" + }, + { + "name": "previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user", + "description": "A place holder for a list of AWS EC2 modifications done by each user", + "filename": "previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user.csv" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", + "id": "bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd72", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-30", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search lists all the logged CloudTrail activities by a specific user ARN and will create a table containing the source of the user, the region of the activity, the name and type of the event, the action taken, and all the user's identity information.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` | search user=$user$| table _time userIdentity.type userIdentity.userName userIdentity.arn aws_account_id src awsRegion eventName eventType", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "user" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "Command & Control", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Suspicious Cloud User Activities", + "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", + "AWS Security Hub Alerts" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "user", + "userIdentity.type", + "userIdentity.userName", + "userIdentity.arn", + "aws_account_id", + "src", + "awsRegion", + "eventName", + "eventType" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn" + }, + { + "name": "Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", + "id": "de4aed1d-f13a-4d2f-a97a-73c60e2e6b56", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-02-12", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries AWS description logs and returns all the information about a specific instance via the instanceId field", + "search": "`aws_description` | dedup id sortby -_time |rename id as instanceId| search instanceId=$instanceId$ | spath output=tags path=tags | eval tags=mvzip(key,value,\" = \"), ip_address=if((ip_address == \"null\"),private_ip_address,ip_address) | table id, tags.Name, aws_account_id, placement, instance_type, key_name, ip_address, launch_time, state, vpc_id, subnet_id, tags | rename aws_account_id as \"Account ID\", id as ID, instance_type as Type, ip_address as \"IP Address\", key_name as \"Key Pair\", launch_time as \"Launch Time\", placement as \"Availability Zone\", state as State, subnet_id as Subnet, \"tags.Name\" as Name, vpc_id as VPC", + "how_to_implement": "In order to implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS(version 4.4.0 or later) and configure your AWS description inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "instanceId" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "AWS Security Hub Alerts" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "id", + "ip_address", + "tags", + "aws_account_id", + "placement", + "instance_type", + "key_name", + "launch_time", + "state", + "vpc_id", + "subnet_id" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid" + }, + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Web Fraud Detection", + "id": "18bb45b9-7684-45c6-9e97-1fdd0d98c0a7", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-10-08", + "author": "Jim Apger, Splunk", + "description": "Monitor your environment for activity consistent with common attack techniques bad actors use when attempting to compromise web servers or other web-related assets.", + "narrative": "The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) defines Internet fraud as the use of Internet services or software with Internet access to defraud victims or to otherwise take advantage of them. According to the Bureau, Internet crime schemes are used to steal millions of dollars each year from victims and continue to plague the Internet through various methods. The agency includes phishing scams, data breaches, Denial of Service (DOS) attacks, email account compromise, malware, spoofing, and ransomware in this category.\\\nThese crimes are not the fraud itself, but rather the attack techniques commonly employed by fraudsters in their pursuit of data that enables them to commit malicious actssuch as obtaining and using stolen credit cards. They represent a serious problem that is steadily increasing and not likely to go away anytime soon.\\\nWhen developing a strategy for preventing fraud in your environment, its important to look across all of your web services for evidence that attackers are abusing enterprise resources to enumerate systems, harvest data for secondary fraudulent activity, or abuse terms of service.This Analytic Story looks for evidence of common Internet attack techniques that could be indicative of web fraud in your environmentincluding account harvesting, anomalous user clickspeed, and password sharing across accounts, to name just a few.\\\nThe account-harvesting search focuses on web pages used for user-account registration. It detects the creation of a large number of user accounts using the same email domain name, a type of activity frequently seen in advance of a fraud campaign.\\\nThe anomalous clickspeed search looks for users who are moving through your website at a faster-than-normal speed or with a perfect click cadence (high periodicity or low standard deviation), which could indicate that the user is a script, not an actual human.\\\nAnother search detects incidents wherein a single password is used across multiple accounts, which may indicate that a fraudster has infiltrated your environment and embedded a common password within a script.", + "references": [ + "https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-fraud-schemes/internet-fraud", + "https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2017-internet-crime-report-released-050718" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Web Fraud Detection", + "analytic_story": "Web Fraud Detection", + "category": [ + "Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Fraud Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Indrik Spider", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "datamodels": [], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", + "ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", + "ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Jim Apger", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Web Fraud - Account Harvesting", + "id": "bf1d7b5c-df2f-4249-a401-c09fdc221ddf", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-10-08", + "author": "Jim Apger, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search is used to identify the creation of multiple user accounts using the same email domain name.", + "search": "`stream_http` http_content_type=text* uri=\"/magento2/customer/account/loginPost/\" | rex field=cookie \"form_key=(?\\w+)\" | rex field=form_data \"login\\[username\\]=(?[^&|^$]+)\" | search Username=* | rex field=Username \"@(?.*)\" | stats dc(Username) as UniqueUsernames list(Username) as src_user by email_domain | where UniqueUsernames> 25 | `web_fraud___account_harvesting_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "We start with a dataset that provides visibility into the email address used for the account creation. In this example, we are narrowing our search down to the single web page that hosts the Magento2 e-commerce platform (via URI) used for account creation, the single http content-type to grab only the user's clicks, and the http field that provides the username (form_data), for performance reasons. After we have the username and email domain, we look for numerous account creations per email domain. Common data sources used for this detection are customized Apache logs or Splunk Stream.", + "known_false_positives": "As is common with many fraud-related searches, we are usually looking to attribute risk or synthesize relevant context with loosely written detections that simply detect anamolous behavior. This search will need to be customized to fit your environment—improving its fidelity by counting based on something much more specific, such as a device ID that may be present in your dataset. Consideration for whether the large number of registrations are occuring from a first-time seen domain may also be important. Extending the search window to look further back in time, or even calculating the average per hour/day for each email domain to look for an anomalous spikes, will improve this search. You can also use Shannon entropy or Levenshtein Distance (both courtesy of URL Toolbox) to consider the randomness or similarity of the email name or email domain, as the names are often machine-generated.", + "references": [ + "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/2734/", + "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1809/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Web Fraud - Account Harvesting", + "analytic_story": [ + "Web Fraud Detection" + ], + "asset_type": "Account", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1136" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM", + "DE.DP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "http_content_type", + "uri", + "cookie" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Indrik Spider", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1136" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM", + "DE.DP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Web Fraud Detection" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1136" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM", + "DE.DP" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "stream_http", + "definition": "sourcetype=stream:http", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "web_fraud___account_harvesting_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed", + "id": "31337bbb-bc22-4752-b599-ef192df2dc7a", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-10-08", + "author": "Jim Apger, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search is used to examine web sessions to identify those where the clicks are occurring too quickly for a human or are occurring with a near-perfect cadence (high periodicity or low standard deviation), resembling a script driven session.", + "search": "`stream_http` http_content_type=text* | rex field=cookie \"form_key=(?\\w+)\" | streamstats window=2 current=1 range(_time) as TimeDelta by session_id | where TimeDelta>0 |stats count stdev(TimeDelta) as ClickSpeedStdDev avg(TimeDelta) as ClickSpeedAvg by session_id | where count>5 AND (ClickSpeedStdDev<.5 OR ClickSpeedAvg<.5) | `web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "Start with a dataset that allows you to see clickstream data for each user click on the website. That data must have a time stamp and must contain a reference to the session identifier being used by the website. This ties the clicks together into clickstreams. This value is usually found in the http cookie. With a bit of tuning, a version of this search could be used in high-volume scenarios, such as scraping, crawling, application DDOS, credit-card testing, account takeover, etc. Common data sources used for this detection are customized Apache logs, customized IIS, and Splunk Stream.", + "known_false_positives": "As is common with many fraud-related searches, we are usually looking to attribute risk or synthesize relevant context with loosly written detections that simply detect anamoluous behavior.", + "references": [ + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Session_ID", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Session_(computer_science)", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_cookie", + "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1809/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed", + "analytic_story": [ + "Web Fraud Detection" + ], + "asset_type": "account", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 6" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "http_content_type", + "cookie" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 6" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Web Fraud Detection" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 6" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "stream_http", + "definition": "sourcetype=stream:http", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts", + "id": "31337a1a-53b9-4e05-96e9-55c934cb71d3", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-10-08", + "author": "Jim Apger, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search is used to identify user accounts that share a common password.", + "search": "`stream_http` http_content_type=text* uri=/magento2/customer/account/loginPost* | rex field=form_data \"login\\[username\\]=(?[^&|^$]+)\" | rex field=form_data \"login\\[password\\]=(?[^&|^$]+)\" | stats dc(Username) as UniqueUsernames values(Username) as user list(src_ip) as src_ip by Password|where UniqueUsernames>5 | `web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "We need to start with a dataset that allows us to see the values of usernames and passwords that users are submitting to the website hosting the Magento2 e-commerce platform (commonly found in the HTTP form_data field). A tokenized or hashed value of a password is acceptable and certainly preferable to a clear-text password. Common data sources used for this detection are customized Apache logs, customized IIS, and Splunk Stream.", + "known_false_positives": "As is common with many fraud-related searches, we are usually looking to attribute risk or synthesize relevant context with loosely written detections that simply detect anamoluous behavior.", + "references": [ + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Session_ID", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Session_(computer_science)", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_cookie", + "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1809/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts", + "analytic_story": [ + "Web Fraud Detection" + ], + "asset_type": "account", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "DE.DP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "http_content_type", + "uri" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Web Fraud Detection" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "stream_http", + "definition": "sourcetype=stream:http", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get Emails From Specific Sender", + "id": "5df39b3f-447d-4869-b673-8f45ad4616fe", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-11-09", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search returns all the emails from a specific sender over the last 24 and next hours.", + "search": "| from datamodel Email.All_Email | search src_user=$src_user$", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must ingest your email logs or capture unencrypted email communications within network traffic, and populate the Email data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "src_user" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Brand Monitoring", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Web Fraud Detection" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "src_user" + ], + "security_domain": "networks" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_emails_from_specific_sender" + }, + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + }, + { + "name": "Get Web Session Information via session id", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-1120-e756cc06fd89", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-10-08", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search helps an analyst investigate a notable event to find out more about a specific web session. The search looks for a specific web session ID in the HTTP web traffic and outputs the URL and user agents, grouped by source IP address and HTTP status code.", + "search": "`stream_http` session_id = $session_id$ | stats values(url) values(http_user_agent) by src_ip status", + "how_to_implement": "This search leverages data extracted from Stream:HTTP. You must configure the HTTP stream using the Splunk Stream App on your Splunk Stream deployment server.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "session_id" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Web Fraud Detection" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "session_id", + "http_user_agent", + "src_ip", + "status" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_web_session_information_via_session_id" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "id": "5d14a962-569e-4578-939f-f386feb63ce4", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-09-18", + "author": "Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Stan Miskowicz, David Dorsey, Shannon Davis Splunk", + "description": "Uncover activity related to the execution of Zerologon CVE-2020-11472, a technique wherein attackers target a Microsoft Windows Domain Controller to reset its computer account password. The result from this attack is attackers can now provide themselves high privileges and take over Domain Controller. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to reset Domain Controller Computer Account via exploit code remotely or via the use of tool Mimikatz as payload carrier.", + "narrative": "This attack is a privilege escalation technique, where attacker targets a Netlogon secure channel connection to a domain controller, using Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC). This vulnerability exposes vulnerable Windows Domain Controllers to be targeted via unaunthenticated RPC calls which eventually reset Domain Contoller computer account ($) providing the attacker the opportunity to exfil domain controller credential secrets and assign themselve high privileges that can lead to domain controller and potentially complete network takeover. The detection searches in this Analytic Story use Windows Event viewer events and Sysmon events to detect attack execution, these searches monitor access to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process which is an indicator of the use of Mimikatz tool which has bee updated to carry this attack payload.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", + "https://github.com/SecuraBV/CVE-2020-1472", + "https://www.secura.com/blog/zero-logon", + "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "analytic_story": "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cleaver", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Whitefly" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1210", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation of Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access", + "Initial Access", + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "datamodels": [], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Jose Hernandez, Stan Miskowicz, David Dorsey, Shannon Davis Splunk", + "author_name": "Rod Soto", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access", + "id": "2c365e57-4414-4540-8dc0-73ab10729996", + "version": 3, + "date": "2019-12-03", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for reading lsass memory consistent with credential dumping.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe (GrantedAccess=0x1010 OR GrantedAccess=0x1410) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, SourceImage, SourceProcessId, TargetImage, TargetProcessId, EventCode, GrantedAccess | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "This search needs Sysmon Logs and a sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 10 with lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", + "known_false_positives": "The activity may be legitimate. Other tools can access lsass for legitimate reasons, and it's possible this event could be generated in those cases. In these cases, false positives should be fairly obvious and you may need to tweak the search to eliminate noise.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "Detect Zerologon Attack" + ], + "asset_type": "Windows", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "The $source_image$ has attempted access to read $TargetImage$ was identified on endpoint $Computer$, this is indicative of credential dumping and should be investigated.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "source_image", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "TargetImage", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "TargetImage", + "GrantedAccess", + "Computer", + "SourceImage", + "SourceProcessId", + "TargetImage", + "TargetProcessId" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cleaver", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Whitefly" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "Detect Zerologon Attack" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "source_image", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "TargetImage", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "source_image", + "threat_object_type": "other" + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "TargetImage", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access", + "file": "endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images", + "id": "29e307ba-40af-4ab2-91b2-3c6b392bbba0", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-12-03", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for reading loaded Images unique to credential dumping with Mimikatz. Deprecated because mimikatz libraries changed and very noisy sysmon Event Code.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 | stats values(ImageLoaded) as ImageLoaded values(ProcessId) as ProcessId by Computer, Image | search ImageLoaded=*WinSCard.dll ImageLoaded=*cryptdll.dll ImageLoaded=*hid.dll ImageLoaded=*samlib.dll ImageLoaded=*vaultcli.dll | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This search needs Sysmon Logs and a sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 7 with powershell.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", + "known_false_positives": "Other tools can import the same DLLs. These tools should be part of a whitelist. False positives may be present with any process that authenticates or uses credentials, PowerShell included. Filter based on parent process.", + "references": [ + "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Windows", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 6", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A process, $Image$, has loaded $ImageLoaded$ that are typically related to credential dumping on $Computer$. Review for further details.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ImageLoaded", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Image", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "ImageLoaded", + "ProcessId", + "Computer", + "Image" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cleaver", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Whitefly" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 6", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ImageLoaded", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Image", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "ImageLoaded", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "Image", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 6", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images", + "file": "endpoint/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Possible Credential Dumping", + "id": "e4723b92-7266-11ec-af45-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-27", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic is an enhanced version of two previous analytics that identifies common GrantedAccess permission requests and CallTrace DLLs in order to detect credential dumping. \\\nGrantedAccess is the requested permissions by the SourceImage into the TargetImage. \\\nCallTrace Stack trace of where open process is called. Included is the DLL and the relative virtual address of the functions in the call stack right before the open process call. \\\ndbgcore.dll or dbghelp.dll are two core Windows debug DLLs that have minidump functions which provide a way for applications to produce crashdump files that contain a useful subset of the entire process context. \\\nThe idea behind using ntdll.dll is to blend in by using native api of ntdll.dll. For example in sekurlsa module there are many ntdll exported api, like RtlCopyMemory, used to execute this module which is related to lsass dumping.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe GrantedAccess IN (\"0x01000\", \"0x1010\", \"0x1038\", \"0x40\", \"0x1400\", \"0x1fffff\", \"0x1410\", \"0x143a\", \"0x1438\", \"0x1000\") CallTrace IN (\"*dbgcore.dll*\", \"*dbghelp.dll*\", \"*ntdll.dll*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, TargetImage, GrantedAccess, SourceImage, SourceProcessId, SourceUser, TargetUser | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_possible_credential_dumping_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Enabling EventCode 10 TargetProcess lsass.exe is required.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives will occur based on GrantedAccess 0x1010 and 0x1400, filter based on source image as needed or remove them. Concern is Cobalt Strike usage of Mimikatz will generate 0x1010 initially, but later be caught.", + "references": [ + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Local_Security_Authority_Subsystem_Service", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/minidumpapiset/nf-minidumpapiset-minidumpwritedump", + "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for_22.html", + "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/process-security-and-access-rights?redirectedfrom=MSDN" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Possible Credential Dumping", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_creddump.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A process, $SourceImage$, has loaded $ImageLoaded$ that are typically related to credential dumping on $dest$. Review for further details.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ImageLoaded", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "SourceImage", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Computer", + "TargetImage", + "GrantedAccess", + "SourceImage", + "SourceProcessId", + "SourceUser", + "TargetUser" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cleaver", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Whitefly" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ImageLoaded", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "SourceImage", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "ImageLoaded", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "SourceImage", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows Possible Credential Dumping Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows Possible Credential Dumping", + "file": "endpoint/windows_possible_credential_dumping.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_creddump.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "windows_possible_credential_dumping_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_possible_credential_dumping.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account", + "id": "1400624a-d42d-484d-8843-e6753e6e3645", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-09-18", + "author": "Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for Event Code 4742 (Computer Change) or EventCode 4624 (An account was successfully logged on) with an anonymous account.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 OR EventCode=4742 TargetUserName=\"ANONYMOUS LOGON\" LogonType=3 | stats count values(host) as host, values(TargetDomainName) as Domain, values(user) as user | `detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This search requires audit computer account management to be enabled on the system in order to generate Event ID 4742. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Event Logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", + "known_false_positives": "None thus far found", + "references": [ + "https://www.lares.com/blog/from-lares-labs-defensive-guidance-for-zerologon-cve-2020-1472/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account", + "analytic_story": [ + "Detect Zerologon Attack" + ], + "asset_type": "Windows", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 6", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "The following $EventCode$ occurred on $dest$ by $user$ with Logon Type 3, which may be indicative of the an account or group being changed by an anonymous account.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1210" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "EventCode", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "TargetUserName", + "LogonType", + "TargetDomainName", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2020-1472" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1210", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation of Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1210" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 6", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Detect Zerologon Attack" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "EventCode", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2020-1472" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "EventCode", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1210" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 6", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Zerologon via Zeek", + "id": "bf7a06ec-f703-11ea-adc1-0242ac120002", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-09-15", + "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects attempts to run exploits for the Zerologon CVE-2020-1472 vulnerability via Zeek RPC", + "search": "`zeek_rpc` operation IN (NetrServerPasswordSet2,NetrServerReqChallenge,NetrServerAuthenticate3) | bin span=5m _time | stats values(operation) dc(operation) as opscount count(eval(operation==\"NetrServerReqChallenge\")) as challenge count(eval(operation==\"NetrServerAuthenticate3\")) as authcount count(eval(operation==\"NetrServerPasswordSet2\")) as passcount count as totalcount by _time,src_ip,dest_ip | search opscount=3 authcount>4 passcount>0 | search `detect_zerologon_via_zeek_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Zeek DCE-RPC data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format. We are detecting when all three RPC operations (NetrServerReqChallenge, NetrServerAuthenticate3, NetrServerPasswordSet2) are splunk_security_essentials_app via bro:rpc:json. These three operations are then correlated on the Zeek UID field.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.secura.com/blog/zero-logon", + "https://github.com/SecuraBV/CVE-2020-1472", + "https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-1472" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Zerologon via Zeek", + "analytic_story": [ + "Detect Zerologon Attack" + ], + "asset_type": "Network", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 11" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "operation" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2020-1472" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 11" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Detect Zerologon Attack" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2020-1472" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 11" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "zeek_rpc", + "definition": "index=zeek sourcetype=\"zeek:rpc:json\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_zerologon_via_zeek_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml", + "source": "network" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Dev Sec Ops", + "id": "0ca8c38e-631e-4b81-940c-f9c5450ce41e", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-18", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "description": "This story is focused around detecting attacks on a DevSecOps lifeccycle which consists of the phases plan, code, build, test, release, deploy, operate and monitor.", + "narrative": "DevSecOps is a collaborative framework, which thinks about application and infrastructure security from the start. This means that security tools are part of the continuous integration and continuous deployment pipeline. In this analytics story, we focused on detections around the tools used in this framework such as GitHub as a version control system, GDrive for the documentation, CircleCI as the CI/CD pipeline, Kubernetes as the container execution engine and multiple security tools such as Semgrep and Kube-Hunter.", + "references": [ + "https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Dev Sec Ops", + "analytic_story": "Dev Sec Ops", + "category": [ + "Cloud Security" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Security Monitoring", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", + "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1554", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Client Software Binary", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1199", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Relationship", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Sandworm Team", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1195.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1195", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Supply Chain Compromise", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1567.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration to Cloud Storage", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Chimera", + "FIN7", + "HAFNIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Turla", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1567", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Web Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT33", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Lazarus Group", + "OilRig", + "Thrip", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1212", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Credential Access", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1526", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access", + "Discovery", + "Execution", + "Exfiltration", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence" + ], + "datamodels": [], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings High - Rule", + "ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Low Informational Unknown - Rule", + "ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Medium - Rule", + "ESCU - AWS ECR Container Upload Outside Business Hours - Rule", + "ESCU - AWS ECR Container Upload Unknown User - Rule", + "ESCU - Circle CI Disable Security Job - Rule", + "ESCU - Circle CI Disable Security Step - Rule", + "ESCU - Correlation by Repository and Risk - Rule", + "ESCU - Correlation by User and Risk - Rule", + "ESCU - Github Commit Changes In Master - Rule", + "ESCU - Github Commit In Develop - Rule", + "ESCU - GitHub Dependabot Alert - Rule", + "ESCU - GitHub Pull Request from Unknown User - Rule", + "ESCU - Gsuite Drive Share In External Email - Rule", + "ESCU - GSuite Email Suspicious Attachment - Rule", + "ESCU - Gsuite Email Suspicious Subject With Attachment - Rule", + "ESCU - Gsuite Email With Known Abuse Web Service Link - Rule", + "ESCU - Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain - Rule", + "ESCU - Gsuite Suspicious Shared File Name - Rule", + "ESCU - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI - Rule", + "ESCU - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress RFI - Rule", + "ESCU - Kubernetes Scanner Image Pulling - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Patrick Bareiss", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings High", + "id": "62721bd2-1d82-4623-b6e6-aac170014423", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-17", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). You need to activate image scanning in order to get the event DescribeImageScanFindings with the results.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=ecr.amazonaws.com eventName=DescribeImageScanFindings | spath path=responseElements.imageScanFindings.findings{} output=findings | mvexpand findings | spath input=findings| search severity=HIGH | rename name as finding_name, description as finding_description, requestParameters.imageId.imageDigest as imageDigest, requestParameters.repositoryName as image | eval finding = finding_name.\", \".finding_description | eval phase=\"release\" | eval severity=\"high\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by awsRegion, eventName, eventSource, imageDigest, image, user, userName, src_ip, finding, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_high_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECR/latest/userguide/image-scanning.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings High", + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Account", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Vulnerabilities with severity high found in image $image$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1204.003", + "T1204" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "eventSource", + "eventName", + "responseElements.imageScanFindings.findings{}", + "awsRegion", + "requestParameters.imageId.imageDigest", + "requestParameters.repositoryName", + "user", + "userName", + "src_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 70, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", + "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1204.003", + "T1204" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 70 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1204.003", + "T1204" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings High Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings High", + "file": "cloud/aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_high.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-7d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "aws_ecr_scanning_findings_events.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1204.003/aws_ecr_image_scanning/aws_ecr_scanning_findings_events.json", + "source": "aws_cloudtrail", + "sourcetype": "aws:cloudtrail" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_high_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_high.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Low Informational Unknown", + "id": "cbc95e44-7c22-443f-88fd-0424478f5589", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-17", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). You need to activate image scanning in order to get the event DescribeImageScanFindings with the results.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=ecr.amazonaws.com eventName=DescribeImageScanFindings | spath path=responseElements.imageScanFindings.findings{} output=findings | mvexpand findings | spath input=findings| search severity IN (LOW, INFORMATIONAL, UNKNWON) | rename name as finding_name, description as finding_description, requestParameters.imageId.imageDigest as imageDigest, requestParameters.repositoryName as repositoryName | eval finding = finding_name.\", \".finding_description | eval phase=\"release\" | eval severity=\"low\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by awsRegion, eventName, eventSource, imageDigest, repositoryName, user, userName, src_ip, finding, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_low_informational_unknown_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECR/latest/userguide/image-scanning.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Low Informational Unknown", + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Account", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 10, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Vulnerabilities with severity high found in repository $repositoryName$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1204.003", + "T1204" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "eventSource", + "eventName", + "responseElements.imageScanFindings.findings{}", + "awsRegion", + "requestParameters.imageId.imageDigest", + "requestParameters.repositoryName", + "user", + "userName", + "src_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 7, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", + "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1204.003", + "T1204" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 10, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 7 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1204.003", + "T1204" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Low Informational Unknwon Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Low Informational Unknown", + "file": "cloud/aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_low_informational_unknown.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-7d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "aws_ecr_scanning_findings_events.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1204.003/aws_ecr_image_scanning/aws_ecr_scanning_findings_events.json", + "source": "aws_cloudtrail", + "sourcetype": "aws:cloudtrail" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_low_informational_unknown_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_low_informational_unknown.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Medium", + "id": "0b80e2c8-c746-4ddb-89eb-9efd892220cf", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-17", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). You need to activate image scanning in order to get the event DescribeImageScanFindings with the results.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=ecr.amazonaws.com eventName=DescribeImageScanFindings | spath path=responseElements.imageScanFindings.findings{} output=findings | mvexpand findings | spath input=findings| search severity=MEDIUM | rename name as finding_name, description as finding_description, requestParameters.imageId.imageDigest as imageDigest, requestParameters.repositoryName as image | eval finding = finding_name.\", \".finding_description | eval phase=\"release\" | eval severity=\"medium\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by awsRegion, eventName, eventSource, imageDigest, image, user, userName, src_ip, finding, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_medium_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECR/latest/userguide/image-scanning.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Medium", + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Account", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Vulnerabilities with severity high found in image $image$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1204.003", + "T1204" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "eventSource", + "eventName", + "responseElements.imageScanFindings.findings{}", + "awsRegion", + "requestParameters.imageId.imageDigest", + "requestParameters.repositoryName", + "user", + "userName", + "src_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 21, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", + "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1204.003", + "T1204" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 21 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1204.003", + "T1204" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Medium Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Medium", + "file": "cloud/aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_medium.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-7d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "aws_ecr_scanning_findings_events.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1204.003/aws_ecr_image_scanning/aws_ecr_scanning_findings_events.json", + "source": "aws_cloudtrail", + "sourcetype": "aws:cloudtrail" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_medium_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_medium.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "AWS ECR Container Upload Outside Business Hours", + "id": "d4c4d4eb-3994-41ca-a25e-a82d64e125bb", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-19", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). A upload of a new container is normally done during business hours. When done outside business hours, we want to take a look into it.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=ecr.amazonaws.com eventName=PutImage date_hour>=20 OR date_hour<8 NOT (date_wday=saturday OR date_wday=sunday) | rename requestParameters.* as * | rename repositoryName AS image | eval phase=\"release\" | eval severity=\"medium\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by awsRegion, eventName, eventSource, user, userName, src_ip, imageTag, registryId, image, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_ecr_container_upload_outside_business_hours_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", + "known_false_positives": "When your development is spreaded in different time zones, applying this rule can be difficult.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/003/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS ECR Container Upload Outside Business Hours", + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Account", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Container uploaded outside business hours from $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1204.003", + "T1204" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "eventSource", + "eventName", + "awsRegion", + "requestParameters.imageTag", + "requestParameters.registryId", + "requestParameters.repositoryName", + "user", + "userName", + "src_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", + "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1204.003", + "T1204" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "src_ip", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1204.003", + "T1204" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "AWS ECR Container Upload Outside Business Hours Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "AWS ECR Container Upload Outside Business Hours", + "file": "cloud/aws_ecr_container_upload_outside_business_hours.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-7d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "aws_ecr_container_upload.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1204.003/aws_ecr_container_upload/aws_ecr_container_upload.json", + "source": "aws_cloudtrail", + "sourcetype": "aws:cloudtrail" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_ecr_container_upload_outside_business_hours_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_ecr_container_upload_outside_business_hours.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "AWS ECR Container Upload Unknown User", + "id": "300688e4-365c-4486-a065-7c884462b31d", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-19", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). A upload of a new container is normally done from only a few known users. When the user was never seen before, we should have a closer look into the event.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=ecr.amazonaws.com eventName=PutImage NOT `aws_ecr_users` | rename requestParameters.* as * | rename repositoryName AS image | eval phase=\"release\" | eval severity=\"high\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by awsRegion, eventName, eventSource, user, userName, src_ip, imageTag, registryId, image, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/003/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS ECR Container Upload Unknown User", + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Account", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Container uploaded from unknown user $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1204.003", + "T1204" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "eventSource", + "eventName", + "awsRegion", + "requestParameters.imageTag", + "requestParameters.registryId", + "requestParameters.repositoryName", + "user", + "userName", + "src_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", + "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1204.003", + "T1204" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "src_ip", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1204.003", + "T1204" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "AWS ECR Container Upload Unknown User Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "AWS ECR Container Upload Unknown User", + "file": "cloud/aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-7d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "aws_ecr_container_upload.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1204.003/aws_ecr_container_upload/aws_ecr_container_upload.json", + "source": "aws_cloudtrail", + "sourcetype": "aws:cloudtrail" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "aws_ecr_users", + "definition": "userName IN (user)", + "description": "specify the user allowed to push Images to AWS ECR." + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Circle CI Disable Security Job", + "id": "4a2fdd41-c578-4cd4-9ef7-980e352517f2", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-02", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for disable security job in CircleCI pipeline.", + "search": "`circleci` | rename vcs.committer_name as user vcs.subject as commit_message vcs.url as url workflows.* as * | stats values(job_name) as job_names by workflow_id workflow_name user commit_message url branch | lookup mandatory_job_for_workflow workflow_name OUTPUTNEW job_name AS mandatory_job | search mandatory_job=* | eval mandatory_job_executed=if(like(job_names, \"%\".mandatory_job.\"%\"), 1, 0) | where mandatory_job_executed=0 | eval phase=\"build\" | rex field=url \"(?[^\\/]*\\/[^\\/]*)$\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `circle_ci_disable_security_job_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must index CircleCI logs.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Circle CI Disable Security Job", + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "asset_type": "CircleCI", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1554/circle_ci_disable_security_job/circle_ci_disable_security_job.json" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "disable security job $mandatory_job$ in workflow $workflow_name$ from user $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1554" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_times" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1554", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Client Software Binary", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1554" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 72 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1554" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Circle CI Disable Security Job Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Circle CI Disable Security Job", + "file": "cloud/circle_ci_disable_security_job.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-365d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "circle_ci_disable_security_job.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1554/circle_ci_disable_security_job/circle_ci_disable_security_job.json", + "source": "circleci", + "sourcetype": "circleci" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "circleci", + "definition": "sourcetype=circleci", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "circle_ci_disable_security_job_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "mandatory_job_for_workflow", + "description": "A lookup file that will be used to define the mandatory job for workflow", + "filename": "mandatory_job_for_workflow.csv" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/circle_ci_disable_security_job.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Circle CI Disable Security Step", + "id": "72cb9de9-e98b-4ac9-80b2-5331bba6ea97", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-01", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for disable security step in CircleCI pipeline.", + "search": "`circleci` | rename workflows.job_id AS job_id | join job_id [ | search `circleci` | stats values(name) as step_names count by job_id job_name ] | stats count by step_names job_id job_name vcs.committer_name vcs.subject vcs.url owners{} | rename vcs.* as * , owners{} as user | lookup mandatory_step_for_job job_name OUTPUTNEW step_name AS mandatory_step | search mandatory_step=* | eval mandatory_step_executed=if(like(step_names, \"%\".mandatory_step.\"%\"), 1, 0) | where mandatory_step_executed=0 | rex field=url \"(?[^\\/]*\\/[^\\/]*)$\" | eval phase=\"build\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `circle_ci_disable_security_step_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must index CircleCI logs.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Circle CI Disable Security Step", + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "asset_type": "CircleCI", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1554/circle_ci_disable_security_step/circle_ci_disable_security_step.json" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "disable security step $mandatory_step$ in job $job_name$ from user $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1554" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_times" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1554", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Client Software Binary", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1554" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 72 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1554" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Circle CI Disable Security Step Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Circle CI Disable Security Step", + "file": "cloud/circle_ci_disable_security_step.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-365d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "circle_ci_disable_security_step.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1554/circle_ci_disable_security_step/circle_ci_disable_security_step.json", + "source": "circleci", + "sourcetype": "circleci" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "circleci", + "definition": "sourcetype=circleci", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "circle_ci_disable_security_step_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "mandatory_step_for_job", + "description": "A lookup file that will be used to define the mandatory step for job", + "filename": "mandatory_step_for_job.csv" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/circle_ci_disable_security_step.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Correlation by Repository and Risk", + "id": "8da9fdd9-6a1b-4ae0-8a34-8c25e6be9687", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-06", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "Correlation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search correlations detections by repository and risk_score", + "search": "`signals` | fillnull | stats sum(risk_score) as risk_score values(source) as signals values(user) as user by repository | sort - risk_score | where risk_score > 80 | `correlation_by_repository_and_risk_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "For Dev Sec Ops POC", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Correlation by Repository and Risk", + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Account", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Correlation triggered for user $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1204.003", + "T1204" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 70, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", + "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Correlation", + "id": "36ba498c-46e8-4b62-8bde-67e984a40fb4", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type Correlation. These correlations will generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Correlation", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1204.003", + "T1204" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 70 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1204.003", + "T1204" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "signals", + "definition": "index=signals", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "correlation_by_repository_and_risk_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/correlation_by_repository_and_risk.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Correlation by User and Risk", + "id": "610e12dc-b6fa-4541-825e-4a0b3b6f6773", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-06", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "Correlation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search correlations detections by user and risk_score", + "search": "`signals` | fillnull | stats sum(risk_score) as risk_score values(source) as signals values(repository) as repository by user | sort - risk_score | where risk_score > 80 | `correlation_by_user_and_risk_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "For Dev Sec Ops POC", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Correlation by User and Risk", + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Account", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Correlation triggered for user $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1204.003", + "T1204" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 70, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", + "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Correlation", + "id": "36ba498c-46e8-4b62-8bde-67e984a40fb4", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type Correlation. These correlations will generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Correlation", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1204.003", + "T1204" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 70 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1204.003", + "T1204" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "signals", + "definition": "index=signals", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "correlation_by_user_and_risk_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/correlation_by_user_and_risk.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Github Commit Changes In Master", + "id": "c9d2bfe2-019f-11ec-a8eb-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-20", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search is to detect a pushed or commit to master or main branch. This is to avoid unwanted modification to master without a review to the changes. Ideally in terms of devsecops the changes made in a branch and do a PR for review. of course in some cases admin of the project may did a changes directly to master branch", + "search": "`github` branches{}.name = main OR branches{}.name = master | eval severity=\"low\" | eval phase=\"code\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by commit.author.html_url commit.commit.author.email commit.author.login commit.commit.message repository.pushed_at commit.commit.committer.date, phase, severity | eval phase=\"code\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `github_commit_changes_in_master_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to github logs having the fork, commit, push metadata that can be use to monitor the changes in a github project.", + "known_false_positives": "admin can do changes directly to master branch", + "references": [ + "https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Github Commit Changes In Master", + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "asset_type": "GitHub", + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1199/github_push_master/github_push_master.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "suspicious commit by $commit.commit.author.email$ to main branch", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1199" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "commit.commit.author.email", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 9, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1199", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Relationship", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Sandworm Team", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1199" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "commit.commit.author.email", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 30 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "commit.commit.author.email", + "risk_score": 9 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1199" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Github Commit Changes In Master Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Github Commit Changes In Master", + "file": "cloud/github_commit_changes_in_master.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "github_push_master.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1199/github_push_master/github_push_master.log", + "source": "github", + "sourcetype": "aws:firehose:json" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "github", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:firehose:json", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "github_commit_changes_in_master_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/github_commit_changes_in_master.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Github Commit In Develop", + "id": "f3030cb6-0b02-11ec-8f22-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-01", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search is to detect a pushed or commit to develop branch. This is to avoid unwanted modification to develop without a review to the changes. Ideally in terms of devsecops the changes made in a branch and do a PR for review. of course in some cases admin of the project may did a changes directly to master branch", + "search": "`github` branches{}.name = main OR branches{}.name = develop | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by commit.author.html_url commit.commit.author.email commit.author.login commit.commit.message repository.pushed_at commit.commit.committer.date | eval phase=\"code\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `github_commit_in_develop_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to github logs having the fork, commit, push metadata that can be use to monitor the changes in a github project.", + "known_false_positives": "admin can do changes directly to develop branch", + "references": [ + "https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Github Commit In Develop", + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "asset_type": "GitHub", + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1199/github_push_master/github_push_develop.json" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "suspicious commit by $commit.commit.author.email$ to develop branch", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1199" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "commit.commit.author.email", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 9, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1199", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Relationship", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Sandworm Team", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1199" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "commit.commit.author.email", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 30 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "commit.commit.author.email", + "risk_score": 9 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1199" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Github Commit In Develop Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Github Commit In Develop", + "file": "cloud/github_commit_in_develop.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "github_push_develop.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1199/github_push_master/github_push_develop.json", + "source": "github", + "sourcetype": "aws:firehose:json" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "github", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:firehose:json", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "github_commit_in_develop_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/github_commit_in_develop.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "GitHub Dependabot Alert", + "id": "05032b04-4469-4034-9df7-05f607d75cba", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-01", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for Dependabot Alerts in Github logs.", + "search": "`github` alert.id=* action=create | rename repository.full_name as repository, repository.html_url as repository_url sender.login as user | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by action alert.affected_package_name alert.affected_range alert.created_at alert.external_identifier alert.external_reference alert.fixed_in alert.severity repository repository_url user | eval phase=\"code\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `github_dependabot_alert_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must index GitHub logs. You can follow the url in reference to onboard GitHub logs.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/tips-and-tricks/getting-github-data-with-webhooks.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GitHub Dependabot Alert", + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "asset_type": "GitHub", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1195.001/github_security_advisor_alert/github_security_advisor_alert.json" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Vulnerabilities found in packages used by GitHub repository $repository$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1195.001", + "T1195" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "repository", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "alert.id", + "repository.full_name", + "repository.html_url", + "action", + "alert.affected_package_name", + "alert.affected_range", + "alert.created_at", + "alert.external_identifier", + "alert.external_reference", + "alert.fixed_in", + "alert.severity" + ], + "risk_score": 27, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1195.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1195", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Supply Chain Compromise", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1195.001", + "T1195" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "repository", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "repository", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1195.001", + "T1195" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "GitHub Dependabot Alert Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "GitHub Dependabot Alert", + "file": "cloud/github_dependabot_alert.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-365d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "github_security_advisor_alert.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1195.001/github_security_advisor_alert/github_security_advisor_alert.json", + "source": "github", + "sourcetype": "aws:firehose:json" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "github", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:firehose:json", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "github_dependabot_alert_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/github_dependabot_alert.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "GitHub Pull Request from Unknown User", + "id": "9d7b9100-8878-4404-914e-ca5e551a641e", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-01", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for Pull Request from unknown user.", + "search": "`github` check_suite.pull_requests{}.id=* | stats count by check_suite.head_commit.author.name repository.full_name check_suite.pull_requests{}.head.ref check_suite.head_commit.message | rename check_suite.head_commit.author.name as user repository.full_name as repository check_suite.pull_requests{}.head.ref as ref_head check_suite.head_commit.message as commit_message | search NOT `github_known_users` | eval phase=\"code\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `github_pull_request_from_unknown_user_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must index GitHub logs. You can follow the url in reference to onboard GitHub logs.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/tips-and-tricks/getting-github-data-with-webhooks.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GitHub Pull Request from Unknown User", + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "asset_type": "GitHub", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1195.001/github_pull_request/github_pull_request.json" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Vulnerabilities found in packages used by GitHub repository $repository$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1195.001", + "T1195" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "repository", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "alert.id", + "repository.full_name", + "repository.html_url", + "action", + "alert.affected_package_name", + "alert.affected_range", + "alert.created_at", + "alert.external_identifier", + "alert.external_reference", + "alert.fixed_in", + "alert.severity" + ], + "risk_score": 27, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1195.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1195", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Supply Chain Compromise", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1195.001", + "T1195" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "repository", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "repository", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1195.001", + "T1195" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "GitHub Pull Request from Unknown User Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "GitHub Pull Request from Unknown User", + "file": "cloud/github_pull_request_from_unknown_user.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-365d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "github_pull_request.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1195.001/github_pull_request/github_pull_request.json", + "source": "github", + "sourcetype": "aws:firehose:json" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "github", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:firehose:json", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "github_known_users", + "definition": "user IN (user_names_here)", + "description": "specify the user allowed to create PRs in Github projects." + }, + { + "name": "github_pull_request_from_unknown_user_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/github_pull_request_from_unknown_user.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Gsuite Drive Share In External Email", + "id": "f6ee02d6-fea0-11eb-b2c2-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-16", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search is to detect suspicious google drive or google docs files shared outside or externally. This behavior might be a good hunting query to monitor exfitration of data made by an attacker or insider to a targetted machine.", + "search": "`gsuite_drive` NOT (email IN(\"\", \"null\")) | rex field=parameters.owner \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | rex field=email \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | where src_domain = \"internal_test_email.com\" and not dest_domain = \"internal_test_email.com\" | eval phase=\"plan\" | eval severity=\"low\" | stats values(parameters.doc_title) as doc_title, values(parameters.doc_type) as doc_types, values(email) as dst_email_list, values(parameters.visibility) as visibility, values(parameters.doc_id) as doc_id, count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by parameters.owner ip_address phase severity | rename parameters.owner as user ip_address as src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_drive_share_in_external_email_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc. In order for the search to work for your environment, please edit the query to use your company specific email domain instead of `internal_test_email.com`.", + "known_false_positives": "network admin or normal user may share files to customer and external team.", + "references": [ + "https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Gsuite Drive Share In External Email", + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "asset_type": "GSuite", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1567.002/gsuite_share_drive/gdrive_share_external.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "suspicious share gdrive from $parameters.owner$ to $email$ namely as $parameters.doc_title$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1567.002", + "T1567" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "parameters.owner", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "email", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "parameters.doc_title", + "src_domain", + "dest_domain", + "email", + "parameters.visibility", + "parameters.owner", + "parameters.doc_type" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1567.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration to Cloud Storage", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Chimera", + "FIN7", + "HAFNIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Turla", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1567", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Web Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1567.002", + "T1567" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "parameters.owner", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "email", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "parameters.owner", + "risk_score": 72 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "email", + "risk_score": 72 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1567.002", + "T1567" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Gsuite Drive Share In External Email Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Gsuite Drive Share In External Email", + "file": "cloud/gsuite_drive_share_in_external_email.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "gdrive_share_external.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1567.002/gsuite_share_drive/gdrive_share_external.log", + "source": "http:gsuite", + "sourcetype": "gsuite:drive:json" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "gsuite_drive", + "definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:drive:json", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "gsuite_drive_share_in_external_email_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/gsuite_drive_share_in_external_email.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "GSuite Email Suspicious Attachment", + "id": "6d663014-fe92-11eb-ab07-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-16", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious attachment file extension in Gsuite email that may related to spear phishing attack. This file type is commonly used by malware to lure user to click on it to execute malicious code to compromised targetted machine. But this search can also catch some normal files related to this file type that maybe send by employee or network admin.", + "search": "`gsuite_gmail` \"attachment{}.file_extension_type\" IN (\"pl\", \"py\", \"rb\", \"sh\", \"bat\", \"exe\", \"dll\", \"cpl\", \"com\", \"js\", \"vbs\", \"ps1\", \"reg\",\"swf\", \"cmd\", \"go\") | eval phase=\"plan\" | eval severity=\"medium\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(attachment{}.file_extension_type) as email_attachments, values(attachment{}.sha256) as attachment_sha256, values(payload_size) as payload_size by destination{}.service num_message_attachments subject destination{}.address source.address phase severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_email_suspicious_attachment_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc.", + "known_false_positives": "network admin and normal user may send this file attachment as part of their day to day work. having a good protocol in attaching this file type to an e-mail may reduce the risk of having a spear phishing attack.", + "references": [ + "https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GSuite Email Suspicious Attachment", + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "asset_type": "GSuite", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gsuite_susp_attachment_ext/gsuite_gmail_file_ext.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "suspicious email from $source.address$ to $destination{}.address$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566.001", + "T1566" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "source.address", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "destination{}.address", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "attachment{}.file_extension_type", + "attachment{}.sha256", + "destination{}.service", + "num_message_attachments", + "payload_size", + "subject", + "destination{}.address", + "source.address" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566.001", + "T1566" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "source.address", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "destination{}.address", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "source.address", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "destination{}.address", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566.001", + "T1566" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "GSuite Email Suspicious Attachment Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "GSuite Email Suspicious Attachment", + "file": "cloud/gsuite_email_suspicious_attachment.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "gsuite_gmail_file_ext.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gsuite_susp_attachment_ext/gsuite_gmail_file_ext.log", + "source": "http:gsuite", + "sourcetype": "gsuite:gmail:bigquery" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "gsuite_gmail", + "definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:gmail:bigquery", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "gsuite_email_suspicious_attachment_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/gsuite_email_suspicious_attachment.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Gsuite Email Suspicious Subject With Attachment", + "id": "8ef3971e-00f2-11ec-b54f-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-19", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search is to detect a gsuite email contains suspicious subject having known file type used in spear phishing. This technique is a common and effective entry vector of attacker to compromise a network by luring the user to click or execute the suspicious attachment send from external email account because of the effective social engineering of subject related to delivery, bank and so on. On the other hand this detection may catch a normal email traffic related to legitimate transaction so better to check the email sender, spelling and etc. avoid click link or opening the attachment if you are not expecting this type of e-mail.", + "search": "`gsuite_gmail` num_message_attachments > 0 subject IN (\"*dhl*\", \"* ups *\", \"*delivery*\", \"*parcel*\", \"*label*\", \"*invoice*\", \"*postal*\", \"* fedex *\", \"* usps *\", \"* express *\", \"*shipment*\", \"*Banking/Tax*\",\"*shipment*\", \"*new order*\") attachment{}.file_extension_type IN (\"doc\", \"docx\", \"xls\", \"xlsx\", \"ppt\", \"pptx\", \"pdf\", \"zip\", \"rar\", \"html\",\"htm\",\"hta\") | rex field=source.from_header_address \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | rex field=destination{}.address \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | where not source_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" and dest_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" | eval phase=\"plan\" | eval severity=\"medium\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(attachment{}.file_extension_type) as email_attachments, values(attachment{}.sha256) as attachment_sha256, values(payload_size) as payload_size by destination{}.service num_message_attachments subject destination{}.address source.address phase severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_email_suspicious_subject_with_attachment_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc.", + "known_false_positives": "normal user or normal transaction may contain the subject and file type attachment that this detection try to search.", + "references": [ + "https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-top-spear-phishing-words.pdf" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Gsuite Email Suspicious Subject With Attachment", + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "asset_type": "GSuite", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gsuite_susp_subj/gsuite_susp_subj_attach.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "suspicious email from $source.address$ to $destination{}.address$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566.001", + "T1566" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "source.address", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566.001", + "T1566" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "source.address", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "source.address", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566.001", + "T1566" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Gsuite Email Suspicious Subject With Attachment Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Gsuite Email Suspicious Subject With Attachment", + "file": "cloud/gsuite_email_suspicious_subject_with_attachment.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "gsuite_susp_subj_attach.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gsuite_susp_subj/gsuite_susp_subj_attach.log", + "source": "http:gsuite", + "sourcetype": "gsuite:gmail:bigquery" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "gsuite_gmail", + "definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:gmail:bigquery", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "gsuite_email_suspicious_subject_with_attachment_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/gsuite_email_suspicious_subject_with_attachment.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Gsuite Email With Known Abuse Web Service Link", + "id": "8630aa22-042b-11ec-af39-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-23", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This analytics is to detect a gmail containing a link that are known to be abused by malware or attacker like pastebin, telegram and discord to deliver malicious payload. This event can encounter some normal email traffic within organization and external email that normally using this application and services.", + "search": "`gsuite_gmail` \"link_domain{}\" IN (\"*pastebin.com*\", \"*discord*\", \"*telegram*\",\"t.me\") | rex field=source.from_header_address \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | rex field=destination{}.address \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | where not source_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" and dest_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" | eval phase=\"plan\" | eval severity=\"low\" |stats values(link_domain{}) as link_domains min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by is_spam source.address source.from_header_address subject destination{}.address phase severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_email_with_known_abuse_web_service_link_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc.", + "known_false_positives": "normal email contains this link that are known application within the organization or network can be catched by this detection.", + "references": [ + "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/07/22/malware-increasingly-targets-discord-for-abuse/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Gsuite Email With Known Abuse Web Service Link", + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "asset_type": "GSuite", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gsuite_susp_url/gsuite_susp_url.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "suspicious email from $source.address$ to $destination{}.address$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566.001", + "T1566" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "source.address", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566.001", + "T1566" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "source.address", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "source.address", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566.001", + "T1566" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Gsuite Email With Known Abuse Web Service Link Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Gsuite Email With Known Abuse Web Service Link", + "file": "cloud/gsuite_email_with_known_abuse_web_service_link.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "gsuite_susp_url.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gsuite_susp_url/gsuite_susp_url.log", + "source": "http:gsuite", + "sourcetype": "gsuite:gmail:bigquery" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "gsuite_gmail", + "definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:gmail:bigquery", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "gsuite_email_with_known_abuse_web_service_link_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/gsuite_email_with_known_abuse_web_service_link.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain", + "id": "dc4dc3a8-ff54-11eb-8bf7-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-17", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious outbound e-mail from internal email to external email domain. This can be a good hunting query to monitor insider or outbound email traffic for not common domain e-mail. The idea is to parse the domain of destination email check if there is a minimum outbound traffic < 20 with attachment.", + "search": "`gsuite_gmail` num_message_attachments > 0 | rex field=source.from_header_address \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | rex field=destination{}.address \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | where source_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" and not dest_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" | eval phase=\"plan\" | eval severity=\"low\" | stats values(subject) as subject, values(source.from_header_address) as src_domain_list, count as numEvents, dc(source.from_header_address) as numSrcAddresses, min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest_domain phase severity | where numSrcAddresses < 20 |sort - numSrcAddresses | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_outbound_email_with_attachment_to_external_domain_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc.", + "known_false_positives": "network admin and normal user may send this file attachment as part of their day to day work. having a good protocol in attaching this file type to an e-mail may reduce the risk of having a spear phishing attack.", + "references": [ + "https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain", + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "asset_type": "GSuite", + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gsuite_outbound_email_to_external/gsuite_external_domain.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "suspicious email from $source.address$ to $destination{}.address$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1048.003", + "T1048" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "source.address", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "destination{}.address", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 9, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT33", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Lazarus Group", + "OilRig", + "Thrip", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1048.003", + "T1048" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "source.address", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "destination{}.address", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 30 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "source.address", + "risk_score": 9 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "destination{}.address", + "risk_score": 9 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1048.003", + "T1048" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain", + "file": "cloud/gsuite_outbound_email_with_attachment_to_external_domain.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "gsuite_external_domain.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gsuite_outbound_email_to_external/gsuite_external_domain.log", + "source": "http:gsuite", + "sourcetype": "gsuite:gmail:bigquery" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "gsuite_gmail", + "definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:gmail:bigquery", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "gsuite_outbound_email_with_attachment_to_external_domain_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/gsuite_outbound_email_with_attachment_to_external_domain.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Gsuite Suspicious Shared File Name", + "id": "07eed200-03f5-11ec-98fb-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-23", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search is to detect a shared file in google drive with suspicious file name that are commonly used by spear phishing campaign. This technique is very popular to lure the user by running a malicious document or click a malicious link within the shared file that will redirected to malicious website. This detection can also catch some normal email communication between organization and its external customer.", + "search": "`gsuite_drive` parameters.owner_is_team_drive=false \"parameters.doc_title\" IN (\"*dhl*\", \"* ups *\", \"*delivery*\", \"*parcel*\", \"*label*\", \"*invoice*\", \"*postal*\", \"*fedex*\", \"* usps *\", \"* express *\", \"*shipment*\", \"*Banking/Tax*\",\"*shipment*\", \"*new order*\") parameters.doc_type IN (\"document\",\"pdf\", \"msexcel\", \"msword\", \"spreadsheet\", \"presentation\") | rex field=parameters.owner \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | rex field=parameters.target_user \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | where not source_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" and dest_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" | eval phase=\"plan\" | eval severity=\"low\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by email parameters.owner parameters.target_user parameters.doc_title parameters.doc_type phase severity | rename parameters.target_user AS user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_suspicious_shared_file_name_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc. In order for the search to work for your environment, please edit the query to use your company specific email domain instead of `internal_test_email.com`.", + "known_false_positives": "normal user or normal transaction may contain the subject and file type attachment that this detection try to search", + "references": [ + "https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-top-spear-phishing-words.pdf" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Gsuite Suspicious Shared File Name", + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "asset_type": "GSuite", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gdrive_susp_file_share/gdrive_susp_attach.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "suspicious share gdrive from $parameters.owner$ to $email$ namely as $parameters.doc_title$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566.001", + "T1566" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "parameters.owner", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "email", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "parameters.doc_title", + "src_domain", + "dest_domain", + "email", + "parameters.visibility", + "parameters.owner", + "parameters.doc_type" + ], + "risk_score": 21, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566.001", + "T1566" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "parameters.owner", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "email", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "parameters.owner", + "risk_score": 21 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "email", + "risk_score": 21 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566.001", + "T1566" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Gsuite Suspicious Shared File Name Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Gsuite Suspicious Shared File Name", + "file": "cloud/gsuite_suspicious_shared_file_name.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "gdrive_susp_attach.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gdrive_susp_file_share/gdrive_susp_attach.log", + "source": "http:gsuite", + "sourcetype": "gsuite:drive:json" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "gsuite_drive", + "definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:drive:json", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "gsuite_suspicious_shared_file_name_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/gsuite_suspicious_shared_file_name.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI", + "id": "0f83244b-425b-4528-83db-7a88c5f66e48", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-20", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search uses the Kubernetes logs from a nginx ingress controller to detect local file inclusion attacks.", + "search": "`kubernetes_container_controller` | rex field=_raw \"^(?\\S+)\\s+-\\s+-\\s+\\[(?[^\\]]*)\\]\\s\\\"(?[^\\\"]*)\\\"\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s\\\"(?[^\\\"]*)\\\"\\s\\\"(?[^\\\"]*)\\\"\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s\\[(?[^\\]]*)\\]\\s\\[(?[^\\]]*)\\]\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\" | lookup local_file_inclusion_paths local_file_inclusion_paths AS request OUTPUT lfi_path | search lfi_path=yes | rename remote_addr AS src_ip, upstream_status as status, proxy_upstream_name as proxy | rex field=request \"^(?\\S+)\\s(?\\S+)\\s\" | eval phase=\"operate\" | eval severity=\"high\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by src_ip, status, url, http_method, host, http_user_agent, proxy, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `kubernetes_nginx_ingress_lfi_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must ingest Kubernetes logs through Splunk Connect for Kubernetes.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/splunk/splunk-connect-for-kubernetes", + "https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/file-inclusion-vulnerabilities/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI", + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "asset_type": "Kubernetes", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1212/kubernetes_nginx_lfi_attack/kubernetes_nginx_lfi_attack.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Local File Inclusion Attack detected on $host$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1212" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "raw" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1212", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Credential Access", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1212" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "src_ip", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1212" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI", + "file": "cloud/kubernetes_nginx_ingress_lfi.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-365d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "kubernetes_nginx_lfi_attack.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1212/kubernetes_nginx_lfi_attack/kubernetes_nginx_lfi_attack.log", + "source": "kubernetes", + "sourcetype": "kube:container:controller" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "kubernetes_container_controller", + "definition": "sourcetype=kube:container:controller", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Kubernetes data. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "kubernetes_nginx_ingress_lfi_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "local_file_inclusion_paths", + "description": "A list of interesting files in a local file inclusion attack", + "filename": "local_file_inclusion_paths.csv", + "default_match": "false", + "match_type": "WILDCARD(local_file_inclusion_paths)", + "min_matches": 1, + "case_sensitive_match": "false" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/kubernetes_nginx_ingress_lfi.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Kubernetes Nginx Ingress RFI", + "id": "fc5531ae-62fd-4de6-9c36-b4afdae8ca95", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-23", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search uses the Kubernetes logs from a nginx ingress controller to detect remote file inclusion attacks.", + "search": "`kubernetes_container_controller` | rex field=_raw \"^(?\\S+)\\s+-\\s+-\\s+\\[(?[^\\]]*)\\]\\s\\\"(?[^\\\"]*)\\\"\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s\\\"(?[^\\\"]*)\\\"\\s\\\"(?[^\\\"]*)\\\"\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s\\[(?[^\\]]*)\\]\\s\\[(?[^\\]]*)\\]\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\" | rex field=request \"^(?\\S+)?\\s(?\\S+)\\s\" | rex field=url \"(?\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3})\" | search dest_ip=* | rename remote_addr AS src_ip, upstream_status as status, proxy_upstream_name as proxy | eval phase=\"operate\" | eval severity=\"medium\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by src_ip, dest_ip status, url, http_method, host, http_user_agent, proxy, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `kubernetes_nginx_ingress_rfi_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must ingest Kubernetes logs through Splunk Connect for Kubernetes.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/splunk/splunk-connect-for-kubernetes", + "https://www.netsparker.com/blog/web-security/remote-file-inclusion-vulnerability/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Kubernetes Nginx Ingress RFI", + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "asset_type": "Kubernetes", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1212/kuberntest_nginx_rfi_attack/kubernetes_nginx_rfi_attack.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Remote File Inclusion Attack detected on $host$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1212" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "raw" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1212", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Credential Access", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1212" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "src_ip", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1212" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Kubernetes Nginx Ingress RFI Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Kubernetes Nginx Ingress RFI", + "file": "cloud/kubernetes_nginx_ingress_rfi.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-365d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "kubernetes_nginx_rfi_attack.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1212/kuberntest_nginx_rfi_attack/kubernetes_nginx_rfi_attack.log", + "source": "kubernetes", + "sourcetype": "kube:container:controller" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "kubernetes_container_controller", + "definition": "sourcetype=kube:container:controller", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Kubernetes data. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "kubernetes_nginx_ingress_rfi_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/kubernetes_nginx_ingress_rfi.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Kubernetes Scanner Image Pulling", + "id": "4890cd6b-0112-4974-a272-c5c153aee551", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-24", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search uses the Kubernetes logs from Splunk Connect from Kubernetes to detect Kubernetes Security Scanner.", + "search": "`kube_objects_events` object.message IN (\"Pulling image *kube-hunter*\", \"Pulling image *kube-bench*\", \"Pulling image *kube-recon*\", \"Pulling image *kube-recon*\") | rename object.* AS * | rename involvedObject.* AS * | rename source.host AS host | eval phase=\"operate\" | eval severity=\"high\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by host, name, namespace, kind, reason, message, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `kubernetes_scanner_image_pulling_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must ingest Kubernetes logs through Splunk Connect for Kubernetes.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/splunk/splunk-connect-for-kubernetes" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Kubernetes Scanner Image Pulling", + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "asset_type": "Kubernetes", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1526/kubernetes_kube_hunter/kubernetes_kube_hunter.json" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Kubernetes Scanner image pulled on host $host$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1526" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "host", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "object.message", + "source.host", + "object.involvedObject.name", + "object.involvedObject.namespace", + "object.involvedObject.kind", + "object.message", + "object.reason" + ], + "risk_score": 81, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1526", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1526" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Dev Sec Ops" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "host", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "host", + "risk_score": 81 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1526" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Kubernetes Scanner Image Pulling Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Kubernetes Scanner Image Pulling", + "file": "cloud/kubernetes_scanner_image_pulling.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-7d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "kubernetes_kube_hunter.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1526/kubernetes_kube_hunter/kubernetes_kube_hunter.json", + "source": "kubernetes", + "sourcetype": "kube:objects:events" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "kube_objects_events", + "definition": "sourcetype=kube:objects:events", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "kubernetes_scanner_image_pulling_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/kubernetes_scanner_image_pulling.yml", + "source": "cloud" + } + ], + "investigations": [] + }, + { + "name": "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "id": "0c016e5c-88be-4e2c-8c6c-c2b55b4fb4ef", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-01-22", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "description": "Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more.", + "narrative": "The frequency of nation-state cyber attacks has increased significantly over the last decade. Employing numerous tactics and techniques, these attacks continue to escalate in complexity. \\\nThere is a wide range of motivations for these state-sponsored hacks, including stealing valuable corporate, military, or diplomatic dataѿall of which could confer advantages in various arenas. They may also target critical infrastructure. \\\nOne joint Technical Alert (TA) issued by the Department of Homeland and the FBI in mid-March of 2018 attributed some cyber activity targeting utility infrastructure to operatives sponsored by the Russian government. The hackers executed spearfishing attacks, installed malware, employed watering-hole domains, and more. While they caused no physical damage, the attacks provoked fears that a nation-state could turn off water, redirect power, or compromise a nuclear power plant.\\\nSuspicious activities--spikes in SMB traffic, processes that launch netsh (to modify the network configuration), suspicious registry modifications, and many more--may all be events you may wish to investigate further. While the use of these technique may be an indication that a nation-state actor is attempting to compromise your environment, it is important to note that these techniques are often employed by other groups, as well.", + "references": [ + "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "analytic_story": "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "category": [ + "Malware" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT3", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Fox Kitten", + "Leafminer", + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Indrik Spider", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Operation Wocao", + "Orangeworm", + "Sandworm Team", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1569", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "FIN6", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Operation Wocao", + "Silence", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT38", + "Carbanak", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "Putter Panda", + "RTM", + "Rocke", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN7", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "PROMETHIUM", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CostaRicto", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Machete", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", + "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN8", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "File Transfer Protocols", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT41", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "SilverTerrier" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1071", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Magic Hound", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control", + "Defense Evasion", + "Execution", + "Lateral Movement", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint", + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Command & Control", + "Exploitation", + "Installation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", + "ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", + "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", + "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", + "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", + "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", + "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", + "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", + "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", + "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [ + "ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", + "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments" + ], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Rico Valdez", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "First time seen command line argument", + "id": "a1b6e73f-98d5-470f-99ac-77aacd578473", + "version": 5, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for command-line arguments that use a `/c` parameter to execute a command that has not previously been seen.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = cmd.exe Processes.process = \"* /c *\" by Processes.process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = cmd.exe Processes.process = \"* /c *\" by Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by process | outputlookup previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments | eval newCmdLineArgument=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newCmdLineArgument=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table process] | `first_time_seen_command_line_argument_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The complete process name with command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model. Please make sure you run the support search \"Previously seen command line arguments,\"—which creates a lookup file called `previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments.csv`—a historical baseline of all command-line arguments. You must also validate this list. For the search to do accurate calculation, ensure the search scheduling is the same value as the `relative_time` evaluation function.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate programs can also use command-line arguments to execute. Please verify the command-line arguments to check what command/program is being executed. We recommend customizing the `first_time_seen_cmd_line_filter` macro to exclude legitimate parent_process_name", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "First time seen command line argument", + "analytic_story": [ + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Hidden Cobra Malware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059.001", + "T1059.003" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059.001", + "T1059.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Hidden Cobra Malware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously seen command line arguments", + "id": "56059acf-50fe-4f60-98d1-b75b51b5c2f3", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-03-01", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for command-line arguments where `cmd.exe /c` is used to execute a program, then creates a baseline of the earliest and latest times we have encountered this command-line argument in our dataset within the last 30 days.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process=\"* /c *\" by Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The complete process name with command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "IcedID" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "First time seen command line argument" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059.001", + "T1059.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "first_time_seen_command_line_argument_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments", + "description": "A placeholder for a list of cmd line arugments that been seen before", + "filename": "previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments.csv" + }, + { + "name": "previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments", + "description": "A placeholder for a list of cmd line arugments that been seen before", + "filename": "previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments.csv" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Create local admin accounts using net exe", + "id": "b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-151bb162040e", + "version": 6, + "date": "2021-09-08", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for the creation of local administrator accounts using net.exe .", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.user) as user values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=net.exe OR Processes.process_name=net1.exe) AND Processes.process=*/add* AND (Processes.process=*administrators* OR Processes.process=*administratoren* OR Processes.process=*administrateurs* OR Processes.process=*administrador* OR Processes.process=*amministratori* OR Processes.process=*administratorer*) by Processes.process Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators often leverage net.exe to create admin accounts.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Create local admin accounts using net exe", + "analytic_story": [ + "DHS Report TA18-074A" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to add a user to the local Administrators group.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1136.001", + "T1136" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 30, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT3", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Fox Kitten", + "Leafminer", + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Indrik Spider", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1136.001", + "T1136" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "DHS Report TA18-074A" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 30 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 30 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1136.001", + "T1136" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Create local admin accounts using net exe Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Create local admin accounts using net exe", + "file": "endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + }, + { + "file_name": "windows-system.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:System", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + }, + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect New Local Admin account", + "id": "b25f6f62-0712-43c1-b203-083231ffd97d", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-08", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for newly created accounts that have been elevated to local administrators.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4720 OR (EventCode=4732 Group_Name=Administrators) | transaction member_id connected=false maxspan=180m | rename member_id as user | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_new_local_admin_account_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Windows event logs using the Splunk Windows TA and collecting event code 4720 and 4732", + "known_false_positives": "The activity may be legitimate. For this reason, it's best to verify the account with an administrator and ask whether there was a valid service request for the account creation. If your local administrator group name is not \"Administrators\", this search may generate an excessive number of false positives", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect New Local Admin account", + "analytic_story": [ + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "HAFNIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Windows", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Command & Control" + ], + "message": "A $user$ on $dest$ was added recently. Identify if this was legitimate behavior or not.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1136.001", + "T1136" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Group_Name", + "member_id", + "dest", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "access", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT3", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Fox Kitten", + "Leafminer", + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Indrik Spider", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1136.001", + "T1136" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "HAFNIUM Group" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 42 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 42 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1136.001", + "T1136" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect New Local Admin account Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect New Local Admin account", + "file": "endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + }, + { + "file_name": "windows-system.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:System", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + }, + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_new_local_admin_account_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag", + "id": "27c3a83d-cada-47c6-9042-67baf19d2574", + "version": 4, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for events where `PsExec.exe` is run with the `accepteula` flag in the command line. PsExec is a built-in Windows utility that enables you to execute processes on other systems. It is fully interactive for console applications. This tool is widely used for launching interactive command prompts on remote systems. Threat actors leverage this extensively for executing code on compromised systems. If an attacker is running PsExec for the first time, they will be prompted to accept the end-user license agreement (EULA), which can be passed as the argument `accepteula` within the command line.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_psexec` Processes.process=*accepteula* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators can leverage PsExec for accessing remote systems and might pass `accepteula` as an argument if they are running this tool for the first time. However, it is not likely that you'd see multiple occurrences of this event on a machine", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag", + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "HAFNIUM Group", + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ running the utility for possibly the first time.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.002" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Operation Wocao", + "Orangeworm", + "Sandworm Team", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "HAFNIUM Group", + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 35 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 35 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag", + "file": "endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_psexec", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=psexec.exe OR Processes.process_name=psexec64.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=psexec.c)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Renamed PSExec", + "id": "683e6196-b8e8-11eb-9a79-acde48001122", + "version": 3, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies renamed instances of `PsExec.exe` being utilized on an endpoint. Most instances, it is highly probable to capture `Psexec.exe` or other SysInternal utility usage with the command-line argument of `-accepteula`. During triage, validate this is the legitimate version of `PsExec` by reviewing the PE metadata. In addition, review parallel processes for further suspicious behavior.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_psexec` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_renamed_psexec_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives should be present. It is possible some third party applications may use older versions of PsExec, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1569.002/T1569.002.yaml", + "https://redcanary.com/blog/threat-hunting-psexec-lateral-movement/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Renamed PSExec", + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "HAFNIUM Group", + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Collection" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1569.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1569", + "T1569.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 27, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1569", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "FIN6", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Operation Wocao", + "Silence", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1569", + "T1569.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "HAFNIUM Group", + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Collection" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 27 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 27 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1569", + "T1569.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Renamed PSExec Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Renamed PSExec", + "file": "endpoint/detect_renamed_psexec.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1569.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_psexec", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=psexec.exe OR Processes.process_name=psexec64.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=psexec.c)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_renamed_psexec_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_renamed_psexec.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass", + "id": "9be56c82-b1cc-4318-87eb-d138afaaca39", + "version": 5, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for PowerShell processes started with parameters used to bypass the local execution policy for scripts. These parameters are often observed in attacks leveraging PowerShell scripts as they override the default PowerShell execution policy.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process_id) as process_id, values(Processes.parent_process_id) as parent_process_id values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process=\"* -ex*\" OR Processes.process=\"* bypass *\") by Processes.process_id, Processes.user, Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "There may be legitimate reasons to bypass the PowerShell execution policy. The PowerShell script being run with this parameter should be validated to ensure that it is legitimate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass", + "analytic_story": [ + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "HAFNIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 7", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/encoded_powershell/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "PowerShell local execution policy bypass attempt on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 7", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "HAFNIUM Group" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 42 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 7", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass", + "file": "endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/encoded_powershell/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_powershell", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Processes launching netsh", + "id": "b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-95dbb162040e", + "version": 4, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Michael Haag, Josef Kuepker, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe. Netsh is a command-line scripting utility that allows you to, either locally or remotely, display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. Netsh can be used as a persistence proxy technique to execute a helper DLL when netsh.exe is executed. In this search, we are looking for processes spawned by netsh.exe and executing commands via the command line.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) AS Processes.process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_netsh` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest |`drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`processes_launching_netsh_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Some VPN applications are known to launch netsh.exe. Outside of these instances, it is unusual for an executable to launch netsh.exe and run commands.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Processes launching netsh", + "analytic_story": [ + "Netsh Abuse", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "DHS Report TA18-074A" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A process $process_name$ that tries to execute netsh commandline $process$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.004", + "T1562" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT38", + "Carbanak", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.004", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Netsh Abuse", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "DHS Report TA18-074A" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 42 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 42 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", + "id": "df98763b-0b08-4281-8ef9-08db7ac572a9", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-05-08", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model to characterize the number of SMB connections observed each hour for every day of week. By default, the search uses the last 30 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search to identify outliers in the number of SMB connections for that hour and day of the week.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb by _time span=10m, All_Traffic.src | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%A\") | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | fit DensityFunction count by \"HourOfDay,DayOfWeek\" into smb_pdfmodel", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model. In addition, you must have the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version >= 4.2 installed, along with any required dependencies. To improve your results, you may consider adding \"src\" to the by clause, which will build the model for each unique source in your enviornment. However, if you have a large number of hosts in your environment, this search may be very resource intensive. In this case, you may need to raise the value of max_inputs and/or max_groups in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 30 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data. More information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Ransomware" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Processes launching netsh", + "SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.app", + "All_Traffic.src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.004", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Processes launching netsh Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Processes launching netsh", + "file": "endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_netsh", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=netsh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=netsh.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "processes_launching_netsh_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", + "id": "f5f6af30-7aa7-4295-bfe9-07fe87c01a4b", + "version": 7, + "date": "2022-01-26", + "author": "Jose Hernandez, David Dorsey, Teoderick Contreras, Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to launch an application or service at system startup.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\RunOnce OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\run* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentVersion\\\\Windows\\\\Appinit_Dlls* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Shell* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Notify* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Userinit* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\VmApplet* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\policies\\\\explorer\\\\run* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\runservices* OR Registry.registry_path=HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Netsh\\\\* OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Image File Execution Options*\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=Debugger) OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Security Packages\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\\\\OSConfig\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Security Packages\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\SilentProcessExit\\\\*\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*currentVersion\\\\Windows\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Load\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentVersion\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Svchost\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\"AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"BootExecute\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Software\\\\Run\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"auto_update\")) by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "There are many legitimate applications that must execute on system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Ransomware", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "IcedID", + "Remcos" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 95, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/atomic_red_team/t1547001-runonce.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to persistence in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1547.001", + "T1547" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user" + ], + "risk_score": 76, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "Putter Panda", + "RTM", + "Rocke", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.001", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Ransomware", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "IcedID", + "Remcos" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 95 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 76 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 76 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.001", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", + "file": "endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services", + "id": "f0c693d8-2a89-4ce7-80b4-98fea4c3ea6d", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for arguments to sc.exe indicating the creation or modification of a Windows service.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = sc.exe (Processes.process=\"* create *\" OR Processes.process=\"* config *\") by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Using sc.exe to manipulate Windows services is uncommon. However, there may be legitimate instances of this behavior. It is important to validate and investigate as appropriate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Service Abuse", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation" + ], + "message": "A sc process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ to create of configure services in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1543.003", + "T1543" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP", + "PR.PT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN7", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "PROMETHIUM", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1543.003", + "T1543" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP", + "PR.PT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Service Abuse", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1543.003", + "T1543" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP", + "PR.PT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services", + "file": "endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", + "id": "d5af132c-7c17-439c-9d31-13d55340f36c", + "version": 6, + "date": "2022-02-22", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation or deletion of a scheduled task using schtasks.exe with flags - create or delete being passed on the command-line. This has been associated with the Dragonfly threat actor, and the SUNBURST attack against Solarwinds. This analytic replaces \"Scheduled Task used in BadRabbit Ransomware\".", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe (Processes.process=*delete* OR Processes.process=*create*) by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible scripts or administrators may trigger this analytic. Filter as needed based on parent process, application.", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/21/qbot-and-zerologon-lead-to-full-domain-compromise/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", + "analytic_story": [ + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "NOBELIUM Group", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A schedule task process $process_name$ with create or delete commandline $process$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CostaRicto", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Machete", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "NOBELIUM Group", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", + "file": "endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Single Letter Process On Endpoint", + "id": "a4214f0b-e01c-41bc-8cc4-d2b71e3056b4", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-12-08", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for process names that consist only of a single letter.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process, Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | eval process_name_length = len(process_name), endExe = if(substr(process_name, -4) == \".exe\", 1, 0) | search process_name_length=5 AND endExe=1 | table count, firstTime, lastTime, dest, user, process, process_name | `single_letter_process_on_endpoint_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "Single-letter executables are not always malicious. Investigate this activity with your normal incident-response process.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Single Letter Process On Endpoint", + "analytic_story": [ + "DHS Report TA18-074A" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1204.002/single_letter_exe/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A suspicious process $process_name$ with single letter in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1204", + "T1204.002" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_name" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", + "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1204", + "T1204.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "DHS Report TA18-074A" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 63 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 63 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1204", + "T1204.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Single Letter Process On Endpoint Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Single Letter Process On Endpoint", + "file": "endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1204.002/single_letter_exe/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "single_letter_process_on_endpoint_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Reg exe Process", + "id": "a6b3ab4e-dd77-4213-95fa-fc94701995e0", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-07-22", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for reg.exe being launched from a command prompt not started by the user. When a user launches cmd.exe, the parent process is usually explorer.exe. This search filters out those instances.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name != explorer.exe Processes.process_name =cmd.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=cmd.exe Processes.process_name= reg.exe by Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename parent_process_id as process_id |dedup process_id| table process_id dest] | `suspicious_reg_exe_process_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "It's possible for system administrators to write scripts that exhibit this behavior. If this is the case, the search will need to be modified to filter them out.", + "references": [ + "https://car.mitre.org/wiki/CAR-2013-03-001" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Reg exe Process", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "DHS Report TA18-074A" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Suspicious $Processes.process_path.file_path$ process running with an uncommon parent process $Processes.parent_process_name$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1112" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Processes.process_path.file_path", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN8", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1112" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "DHS Report TA18-074A" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Processes.process_path.file_path", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 35 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "Processes.process_path.file_path", + "threat_object_type": "file name" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1112" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Suspicious Reg exe Process Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious Reg exe Process", + "file": "endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 5", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_reg_exe_process_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Outbound SMB Traffic", + "id": "1bed7774-304a-4e8f-9d72-d80e45ff492b", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Stuart Hopkins from Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search looks for outbound SMB connections made by hosts within your network to the Internet. SMB traffic is used for Windows file-sharing activity. One of the techniques often used by attackers involves retrieving the credential hash using an SMB request made to a compromised server controlled by the threat actor.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as start_time latest(_time) as end_time values(All_Traffic.action) as action values(All_Traffic.app) as app values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as dest_port values(sourcetype) as sourcetype count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where ((All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=\"smb\") AND NOT (All_Traffic.action=\"blocked\" OR All_Traffic.dest_category=\"internal\" OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=192.168.0.0/16 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=100.64.0.0/10)) by All_Traffic.src_ip | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `security_content_ctime(start_time)` | `security_content_ctime(end_time)` | `detect_outbound_smb_traffic_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "In order to run this search effectively, we highly recommend that you leverage the Assets and Identity framework. It is important that you have good understanding of how your network segments are designed, and be able to distinguish internal from external address space. Add a category named `internal` to the CIDRs that host the companys assets in `assets_by_cidr.csv` lookup file, which is located in `$SPLUNK_HOME/etc/apps/SA-IdentityManagement/lookups/`. More information on updating this lookup can be found here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.0.0/Admin/Addassetandidentitydata. This search also requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model", + "known_false_positives": "It is likely that the outbound Server Message Block (SMB) traffic is legitimate, if the company's internal networks are not well-defined in the Assets and Identity Framework. Categorize the internal CIDR blocks as `internal` in the lookup file to avoid creating notable events for traffic destined to those CIDR blocks. Any other network connection that is going out to the Internet should be investigated and blocked. Best practices suggest preventing external communications of all SMB versions and related protocols at the network boundary.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Outbound SMB Traffic", + "analytic_story": [ + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Command & Control" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1071.002", + "T1071" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.action", + "All_Traffic.app", + "All_Traffic.dest_ip", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "sourcetype", + "All_Traffic.dest_category", + "All_Traffic.src_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "File Transfer Protocols", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT41", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "SilverTerrier" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1071", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Magic Hound", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1071.002", + "T1071" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1071.002", + "T1071" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_outbound_smb_traffic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "SMB Traffic Spike", + "id": "7f5fb3e1-4209-4914-90db-0ec21b936378", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-07-22", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search looks for spikes in the number of Server Message Block (SMB) traffic connections.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb by _time span=1h, All_Traffic.src | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | eventstats max(_time) as maxtime | stats count as num_data_samples max(eval(if(_time >= relative_time(maxtime, \"-70m@m\"), count, null))) as count avg(eval(if(_time upperBound AND num_data_samples >=50, 1, 0) | where isOutlier=1 | table src count | `smb_traffic_spike_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic logs and populating the `Network_Traffic` data model.", + "known_false_positives": "A file server may experience high-demand loads that could cause this analytic to trigger.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "SMB Traffic Spike", + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Ransomware", + "DHS Report TA18-074A" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021.002", + "T1021" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.app", + "All_Traffic.src" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Operation Wocao", + "Orangeworm", + "Sandworm Team", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021.002", + "T1021" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Ransomware", + "DHS Report TA18-074A" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021.002", + "T1021" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "smb_traffic_spike_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK", + "id": "d25773ba-9ad8-48d1-858e-07ad0bbeb828", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-07-22", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search uses the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) to identify spikes in the number of Server Message Block (SMB) connections.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as port from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb by _time span=1h, All_Traffic.src | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%A\") | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | apply smb_pdfmodel threshold=0.001 | rename \"IsOutlier(count)\" as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | sort -count | table _time src dest port count | `smb_traffic_spike___mltk_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. In addition, the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or greater must be installed on your search heads, along with any required dependencies. Finally, the support search \"Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK\" must be executed before this detection search, because it builds a machine-learning (ML) model over the historical data used by this search. It is important that this search is run in the same app context as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild the model with the latest data available in your environment.\\\nThis search produces a field (Number of events,count) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. This field contributes additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following field, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry): \\\n1. **Label:** Number of events, **Field:** count\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review is found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", + "known_false_positives": "If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider reducing the value of the threshold in the search. You should also periodically re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data. Please update the `smb_traffic_spike_mltk_filter` macro to filter out false positive results", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK", + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Ransomware", + "DHS Report TA18-074A" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021.002", + "T1021" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_ip", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.app", + "All_Traffic.src" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Operation Wocao", + "Orangeworm", + "Sandworm Team", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021.002", + "T1021" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Ransomware", + "DHS Report TA18-074A" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", + "id": "df98763b-0b08-4281-8ef9-08db7ac572a9", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-05-08", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model to characterize the number of SMB connections observed each hour for every day of week. By default, the search uses the last 30 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search to identify outliers in the number of SMB connections for that hour and day of the week.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb by _time span=10m, All_Traffic.src | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%A\") | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | fit DensityFunction count by \"HourOfDay,DayOfWeek\" into smb_pdfmodel", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model. In addition, you must have the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version >= 4.2 installed, along with any required dependencies. To improve your results, you may consider adding \"src\" to the by clause, which will build the model for each unique source in your enviornment. However, if you have a large number of hosts in your environment, this search may be very resource intensive. In this case, you may need to raise the value of max_inputs and/or max_groups in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 30 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data. More information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Ransomware" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Processes launching netsh", + "SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.app", + "All_Traffic.src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021.002", + "T1021" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "smb_traffic_spike___mltk_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml", + "source": "network" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + }, + { + "name": "Get Parent Process Info", + "id": "fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41bf9", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-02-28", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "parent_process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Phishing Payloads", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_parent_process_info" + }, + { + "name": "Get Process File Activity", + "id": "6a9ad4d9-6ef2-4b85-953f-a37ab256acd5", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-11-06", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search returns the file activity for a specific process on a specific endpoint", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Filesystem.file_name) as file_name values(Filesystem.dest) as dest, values(Filesystem.process_name) as process_name from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.process_name Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.action, _time | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | search dest=$dest$ | search process_name=$process_name$ | table _time, process_name, dest, action, file_name, file_path", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest", + "process_name" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Suspicious Zoom Child Processes" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Filesystem.process_name", + "Filesystem.file_path", + "Filesystem.action" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_process_file_activity" + }, + { + "name": "Get Process Info", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd71", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-01", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the process running on a host which is under investigation. To gather the process info, enter the values for the process name in question and the destination IP address.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search process_name= $process_name$ | search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_process_info" + }, + { + "name": "Get Process Information For Port Activity", + "id": "9925d08f-561e-4faa-8912-e3888a842341", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-01", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search will return information about the process associated with observed network traffic to a specific destination port from a specific host.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search dest=$dest$ | join dest type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Ports by Ports.process_id Ports.src Ports.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | search dest_port=$dest_port$ | rename src as dest]", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data that associates processes with network events and populate the Endpoint Datamodel", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest", + "dest_port" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Ports.process_id", + "Ports.src", + "Ports.dest_port" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_process_information_for_port_activity" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Disabling Security Tools", + "id": "fcc27099-46a0-46b0-a271-5c7dab56b6f1", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-02-04", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "description": "Looks for activities and techniques associated with the disabling of security tools on a Windows system, such as suspicious `reg.exe` processes, processes launching netsh, and many others.", + "narrative": "Attackers employ a variety of tactics in order to avoid detection and operate without barriers. This often involves modifying the configuration of security tools to get around them or explicitly disabling them to prevent them from running. This Analytic Story includes searches that look for activity consistent with attackers attempting to disable various security mechanisms. Such activity may involve monitoring for suspicious registry activity, as this is where much of the configuration for Windows and various other programs reside, or explicitly attempting to shut down security-related services. Other times, attackers attempt various tricks to prevent specific programs from running, such as adding the certificates with which the security tools are signed to a block list (which would prevent them from running).", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/11/vonteera-adware-uses-certificates-to-disable-anti-malware/", + "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Tools-Report.pdf" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Disabling Security Tools", + "analytic_story": "Disabling Security Tools", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Security Monitoring", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1553.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Install Root Certificate", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1553", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Subvert Trust Controls", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT38", + "Carbanak", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN7", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "PROMETHIUM", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN8", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Installation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", + "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", + "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", + "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", + "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [ + "ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", + "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments" + ], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Rico Valdez", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store", + "id": "6bc5243e-ef36-45dc-9b12-f4a6be131159", + "version": 7, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime values(Processes.process) as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_certutil` (Processes.process=*-addstore*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "There may be legitimate reasons for administrators to add a certificate to the untrusted certificate store. In such cases, this will typically be done on a large number of systems.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1553.004/T1553.004.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store", + "analytic_story": [ + "Disabling Security Tools" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1553.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified attempting to add a certificate to the store on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1553.004", + "T1553" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1553.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Install Root Certificate", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1553", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Subvert Trust Controls", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1553.004", + "T1553" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Disabling Security Tools" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 35 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 35 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1553.004", + "T1553" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store", + "file": "endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1553.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_certutil", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=certutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=CertUtil.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Attempt To Stop Security Service", + "id": "c8e349c6-b97c-486e-8949-bd7bcd1f3910", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for attempts to stop security-related services on the endpoint.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` OR Processes.process_name = sc.exe Processes.process=\"* stop *\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |lookup security_services_lookup service as process OUTPUTNEW category, description | search category=security | `attempt_to_stop_security_service_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified. Attempts to disable security-related services should be identified and understood.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md#atomic-test-14---disable-arbitrary-security-windows-service", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Attempt To Stop Security Service", + "analytic_story": [ + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Trickbot", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_defend_service_stop/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 40, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified attempting to disable security services on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 20, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Trickbot", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 40, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 20 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 20 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Attempt To Stop Security Service Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Attempt To Stop Security Service", + "file": "endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_defend_service_stop/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_net", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "attempt_to_stop_security_service_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "security_services_lookup", + "description": "A list of services that deal with security", + "filename": "security_services.csv", + "default_match": "false", + "match_type": "WILDCARD(service)", + "min_matches": 1 + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Processes launching netsh", + "id": "b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-95dbb162040e", + "version": 4, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Michael Haag, Josef Kuepker, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe. Netsh is a command-line scripting utility that allows you to, either locally or remotely, display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. Netsh can be used as a persistence proxy technique to execute a helper DLL when netsh.exe is executed. In this search, we are looking for processes spawned by netsh.exe and executing commands via the command line.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) AS Processes.process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_netsh` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest |`drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`processes_launching_netsh_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Some VPN applications are known to launch netsh.exe. Outside of these instances, it is unusual for an executable to launch netsh.exe and run commands.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Processes launching netsh", + "analytic_story": [ + "Netsh Abuse", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "DHS Report TA18-074A" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A process $process_name$ that tries to execute netsh commandline $process$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.004", + "T1562" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT38", + "Carbanak", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.004", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Netsh Abuse", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "DHS Report TA18-074A" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 42 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 42 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", + "id": "df98763b-0b08-4281-8ef9-08db7ac572a9", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-05-08", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model to characterize the number of SMB connections observed each hour for every day of week. By default, the search uses the last 30 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search to identify outliers in the number of SMB connections for that hour and day of the week.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb by _time span=10m, All_Traffic.src | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%A\") | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | fit DensityFunction count by \"HourOfDay,DayOfWeek\" into smb_pdfmodel", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model. In addition, you must have the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version >= 4.2 installed, along with any required dependencies. To improve your results, you may consider adding \"src\" to the by clause, which will build the model for each unique source in your enviornment. However, if you have a large number of hosts in your environment, this search may be very resource intensive. In this case, you may need to raise the value of max_inputs and/or max_groups in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 30 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data. More information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Ransomware" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Processes launching netsh", + "SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.app", + "All_Traffic.src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.004", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Processes launching netsh Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Processes launching netsh", + "file": "endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_netsh", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=netsh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=netsh.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "processes_launching_netsh_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services", + "id": "f0c693d8-2a89-4ce7-80b4-98fea4c3ea6d", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for arguments to sc.exe indicating the creation or modification of a Windows service.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = sc.exe (Processes.process=\"* create *\" OR Processes.process=\"* config *\") by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Using sc.exe to manipulate Windows services is uncommon. However, there may be legitimate instances of this behavior. It is important to validate and investigate as appropriate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Service Abuse", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation" + ], + "message": "A sc process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ to create of configure services in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1543.003", + "T1543" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP", + "PR.PT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN7", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "PROMETHIUM", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1543.003", + "T1543" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP", + "PR.PT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Service Abuse", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1543.003", + "T1543" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP", + "PR.PT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services", + "file": "endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Reg exe Process", + "id": "a6b3ab4e-dd77-4213-95fa-fc94701995e0", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-07-22", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for reg.exe being launched from a command prompt not started by the user. When a user launches cmd.exe, the parent process is usually explorer.exe. This search filters out those instances.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name != explorer.exe Processes.process_name =cmd.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=cmd.exe Processes.process_name= reg.exe by Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename parent_process_id as process_id |dedup process_id| table process_id dest] | `suspicious_reg_exe_process_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "It's possible for system administrators to write scripts that exhibit this behavior. If this is the case, the search will need to be modified to filter them out.", + "references": [ + "https://car.mitre.org/wiki/CAR-2013-03-001" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Reg exe Process", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "DHS Report TA18-074A" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Suspicious $Processes.process_path.file_path$ process running with an uncommon parent process $Processes.parent_process_name$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1112" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Processes.process_path.file_path", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN8", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1112" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "DHS Report TA18-074A" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Processes.process_path.file_path", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 35 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "Processes.process_path.file_path", + "threat_object_type": "file name" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1112" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Suspicious Reg exe Process Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious Reg exe Process", + "file": "endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 5", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_reg_exe_process_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Unload Sysmon Filter Driver", + "id": "e5928ff3-23eb-4d8b-b8a4-dcbc844fdfbe", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-07-22", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "Attackers often disable security tools to avoid detection. This search looks for the usage of process `fltMC.exe` to unload a Sysmon Driver that will stop sysmon from collecting the data.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime values(Processes.process) as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=fltMC.exe AND Processes.process=*unload* AND Processes.process=*SysmonDrv* by Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter`| table firstTime lastTime dest user count process_name process_id parent_process_name process", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model. This search is also shipped with `unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter` macro, update this macro to filter out false positives.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Unload Sysmon Filter Driver", + "analytic_story": [ + "Disabling Security Tools" + ], + "asset_type": "", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Possible Sysmon filter driver unloading on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 45, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Disabling Security Tools" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 45 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Unload Sysmon Filter Driver Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Unload Sysmon Filter Driver", + "file": "endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count = 1", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + }, + { + "name": "Get Parent Process Info", + "id": "fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41bf9", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-02-28", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "parent_process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Phishing Payloads", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_parent_process_info" + }, + { + "name": "Get Process Info", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd71", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-01", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the process running on a host which is under investigation. To gather the process info, enter the values for the process name in question and the destination IP address.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search process_name= $process_name$ | search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_process_info" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "id": "a563972b-d2e2-4978-b6ca-6e83e24af4d3", + "version": 1, + "date": "2016-09-13", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "description": "DNS poses a serious threat as a Denial of Service (DOS) amplifier, if it responds to `ANY` queries. This Analytic Story can help you detect attackers who may be abusing your company's DNS infrastructure to launch amplification attacks, causing Denial of Service to other victims.", + "narrative": "The Domain Name System (DNS) is the protocol used to map domain names to IP addresses. It has been proven to work very well for its intended function. However if DNS is misconfigured, servers can be abused by attackers to levy amplification or redirection attacks against victims. Because DNS responses to `ANY` queries are so much larger than the queries themselves--and can be made with a UDP packet, which does not require a handshake--attackers can spoof the source address of the packet and cause much more data to be sent to the victim than if they sent the traffic themselves. The `ANY` requests are will be larger than normal DNS server requests, due to the fact that the server provides significant details, such as MX records and associated IP addresses. A large volume of this traffic can result in a DOS on the victim's machine. This misconfiguration leads to two possible victims, the first being the DNS servers participating in an attack and the other being the hosts that are the targets of the DOS attack.\\\nThe search in this story can help you to detect if attackers are abusing your company's DNS infrastructure to launch DNS amplification attacks causing Denial of Service to other victims.", + "references": [ + "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-088A", + "https://www.imperva.com/learn/application-security/dns-amplification/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "analytic_story": "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "category": [ + "Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Security Monitoring", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1498", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1498.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Reflection Amplification", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Network_Resolution" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries", + "id": "8fa891f7-a533-4b3c-af85-5aa2e7c1f1eb", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Resolution" + ], + "description": "The search is used to identify attempts to use your DNS Infrastructure for DDoS purposes via a DNS amplification attack leveraging ANY queries.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where nodename=DNS \"DNS.message_type\"=\"QUERY\" \"DNS.record_type\"=\"ANY\" by \"DNS.dest\" | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | where count>200 | `large_volume_of_dns_any_queries_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate ANY requests may trigger this search, however it is unusual to see a large volume of them under typical circumstances. You may modify the threshold in the search to better suit your environment.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries", + "analytic_story": [ + "DNS Amplification Attacks" + ], + "asset_type": "DNS Servers", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 11", + "CIS 12" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1498", + "T1498.002" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "DNS.message_type", + "DNS.record_type", + "DNS.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1498", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1498.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Reflection Amplification", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1498", + "T1498.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 11", + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "DNS Amplification Attacks" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1498", + "T1498.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 11", + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "large_volume_of_dns_any_queries_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml", + "source": "network" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "DNS Hijacking", + "id": "8169f17b-ef68-4b59-aa28-586907301221", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-02-04", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "description": "Secure your environment against DNS hijacks with searches that help you detect and investigate unauthorized changes to DNS records.", + "narrative": "Dubbed the Achilles heel of the Internet (see https://www.f5.com/labs/articles/threat-intelligence/dns-is-still-the-achilles-heel-of-the-internet-25613), DNS plays a critical role in routing web traffic but is notoriously vulnerable to attack. One reason is its distributed nature. It relies on unstructured connections between millions of clients and servers over inherently insecure protocols.\\\nThe gravity and extent of the importance of securing DNS from attacks is undeniable. The fallout of compromised DNS can be disastrous. Not only can hackers bring down an entire business, they can intercept confidential information, emails, and login credentials, as well. \\\nOn January 22, 2019, the US Department of Homeland Security 2019's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) raised awareness of some high-profile DNS hijacking attacks against infrastructure, both in the United States and abroad. It issued Emergency Directive 19-01 (see https://cyber.dhs.gov/ed/19-01/), which summarized the activity and required government agencies to take the following four actions, all within 10 days: \\\n1. For all .gov or other agency-managed domains, audit public DNS records on all authoritative and secondary DNS servers, verify that they resolve to the intended location or report them to CISA.\\\n1. Update the passwords for all accounts on systems that can make changes to each agency 2019's DNS records.\\\n1. Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all accounts on systems that can make changes to each agency's 2019 DNS records or, if impossible, provide CISA with the names of systems, the reasons why MFA cannot be enabled within the required timeline, and an ETA for when it can be enabled.\\\n1. CISA will begin regular delivery of newly added certificates to Certificate Transparency (CT) logs for agency domains via the Cyber Hygiene service. Upon receipt, agencies must immediately begin monitoring CT log data for certificates issued that they did not request. If an agency confirms that a certificate was unauthorized, it must report the certificate to the issuing certificate authority and to CISA. Of course, it makes sense to put equivalent actions in place within your environment, as well. \\\nIn DNS hijacking, the attacker assumes control over an account or makes use of a DNS service exploit to make changes to DNS records. Once they gain access, attackers can substitute their own MX records, name-server records, and addresses, redirecting emails and traffic through their infrastructure, where they can read, copy, or modify information seen. They can also generate valid encryption certificates to help them avoid browser-certificate checks. In one notable attack on the Internet service provider, GoDaddy, the hackers altered Sender Policy Framework (SPF) records a relatively minor change that did not inflict excessive damage but allowed for more effective spam campaigns.\\\nThe searches in this Analytic Story help you detect and investigate activities that may indicate that DNS hijacking has taken place within your environment.", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", + "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", + "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", + "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "DNS Hijacking", + "analytic_story": "DNS Hijacking", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT33", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Lazarus Group", + "OilRig", + "Thrip", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "DNS", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "FIN7", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Tropic Trooper" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1189", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "PLATINUM", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Turla", + "Windigo", + "Windshift" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control", + "Exfiltration", + "Initial Access" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Network_Resolution" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Command & Control" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", + "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", + "ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [ + "ESCU - Discover DNS records" + ], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers", + "id": "74ec6f18-604b-4202-a567-86b2066be3ce", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Resolution" + ], + "description": "This search allows you to identify the endpoints that have connected to more than five DNS servers and made DNS Queries over the time frame of the search.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count, values(DNS.dest) AS dest dc(DNS.dest) as dest_count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.message_type=QUERY by DNS.src | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Network_Resolution\")` |where dest_count > 5 | `clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "This search requires that DNS data is being ingested and populating the `Network_Resolution` data model. This data can come from DNS logs or from solutions that parse network traffic for this data, such as Splunk Stream or Bro.\\\nThis search produces fields (`dest_count`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** Distinct DNS Connections, **Field:** dest_count\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", + "known_false_positives": "It's possible that an enterprise has more than five DNS servers that are configured in a round-robin rotation. Please customize the search, as appropriate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers", + "analytic_story": [ + "DNS Hijacking", + "Command & Control", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Host Redirection" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 9", + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1048.003" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "PR.DS" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "DNS.dest", + "DNS.message_type", + "DNS.src" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT33", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Lazarus Group", + "OilRig", + "Thrip", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1048.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 9", + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "PR.DS" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "DNS Hijacking", + "Command & Control", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Host Redirection" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1048.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 9", + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "PR.DS" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers", + "id": "1a67f15a-f4ff-4170-84e9-08cf6f75d6f6", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Resolution" + ], + "description": "This search will detect DNS requests resolved by unauthorized DNS servers. Legitimate DNS servers should be identified in the Enterprise Security Assets and Identity Framework.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.dest_category != dns_server AND DNS.src_category != dns_server by DNS.src DNS.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | `dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. It also requires that your DNS servers are identified correctly in the Assets and Identity table of Enterprise Security.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate DNS activity can be detected in this search. Investigate, verify and update the list of authorized DNS servers as appropriate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers", + "analytic_story": [ + "DNS Hijacking", + "Command & Control", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Host Redirection" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1", + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1071.004" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS", + "PR.IP", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "DNS.dest_category", + "DNS.src_category", + "DNS.src", + "DNS.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "DNS", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "FIN7", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Tropic Trooper" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1071.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1", + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS", + "PR.IP", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "DNS Hijacking", + "Command & Control", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Host Redirection" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1071.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1", + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS", + "PR.IP", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "DNS record changed", + "id": "44d3a43e-dcd5-49f7-8356-5209bb369065", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Resolution" + ], + "description": "The search takes the DNS records and their answers results of the discovered_dns_records lookup and finds if any records have changed by searching DNS response from the Network_Resolution datamodel across the last day.", + "search": "| inputlookup discovered_dns_records | rename answer as discovered_answer | join domain[|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.record_type) as type, values(DNS.answer) as current_answer values(DNS.src) as src from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.message_type=RESPONSE DNS.answer!=\"unknown\" DNS.answer!=\"\" by DNS.query | rename DNS.query as query | where query!=\"unknown\" | rex field=query \"(?\\w+\\.\\w+?)(?:$|/)\"] | makemv delim=\" \" answer | makemv delim=\" \" type | sort -count | table count,src,domain,type,query,current_answer,discovered_answer | makemv current_answer | mvexpand current_answer | makemv discovered_answer | eval n=mvfind(discovered_answer, current_answer) | where isnull(n) | `dns_record_changed_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the `Network_Resolution` data model. It also requires that the `discover_dns_record` lookup table be populated by the included support search \"Discover DNS record\". \\\n **Splunk>Phantom Playbook Integration**\\\nIf Splunk>Phantom is also configured in your environment, a Playbook called \"DNS Hijack Enrichment\" can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. The playbook takes in the DNS record changed and uses Geoip, whois, Censys and PassiveTotal to detect if DNS issuers changed. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/`, add the correct hostname to the \"Phantom Instance\" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search, and set the corresponding Playbook to active. \\\n(Playbook Link:`https://my.phantom.us/4.2/playbook/dns-hijack-enrichment/`).\\\n", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate DNS changes can be detected in this search. Investigate, verify and update the list of provided current answers for the domains in question as appropriate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "DNS record changed", + "analytic_story": [ + "DNS Hijacking" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1", + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1071.004" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS", + "PR.IP", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "DNS.record_type", + "DNS.answer", + "DNS.src", + "DNS.message_type", + "DNS.query" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "DNS", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "FIN7", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Tropic Trooper" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1071.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1", + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS", + "PR.IP", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "DNS Hijacking" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Discover DNS records", + "id": "c096f721-8842-42ce-bfc7-74bd8c72b7c3", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-02-14", + "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Resolution" + ], + "description": "The search takes corporate and common cloud provider domains configured under `cim_corporate_email_domains.csv`, `cim_corporate_web_domains.csv`, and `cloud_domains.csv` finds their responses across the last 30 days from data in the `Network_Resolution ` datamodel, then stores the output under the `discovered_dns_records.csv` lookup", + "search": "| inputlookup cim_corporate_email_domains.csv | inputlookup append=T cim_corporate_web_domains.csv | inputlookup append=T cim_cloud_domains.csv | eval domain = trim(replace(domain, \"\\*\", \"\")) | join domain [|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.record_type) as type, values(DNS.answer) as answer from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.message_type=RESPONSE DNS.answer!=\"unknown\" DNS.answer!=\"\" by DNS.query | rename DNS.query as query | where query!=\"unknown\" | rex field=query \"(?\\w+\\.\\w+?)(?:$|/)\"] | makemv delim=\" \" answer | makemv delim=\" \" type | sort -count | table count,domain,type,query,answer | outputlookup createinapp=true discovered_dns_records", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting DNS logs, and populating the Network_Resolution data model. Also make sure that the cim_corporate_web_domains and cim_corporate_email_domains lookups are populated with the domains owned by your corporation", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "DNS Hijacking" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "DNS record changed" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "DNS.record_type", + "DNS.answer", + "DNS.query" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1071.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1", + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS", + "PR.IP", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "dns_record_changed_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "discovered_dns_records", + "description": "A placeholder for a list of discovered DNS records generated by the baseline discover_dns_records", + "filename": "discovered_dns_records.csv", + "default_match": "false", + "min_matches": 1 + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/dns_record_changed.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers", + "id": "a1e761ac-1344-4dbd-88b2-3f34c912d359", + "version": 3, + "date": "2021-01-14", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Resolution" + ], + "description": "Malicious actors often abuse legitimate Dynamic DNS services to host malicious payloads or interactive command and control nodes. Attackers will automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to countless IP addresses to circumvent firewall blocks, block lists as well as frustrate a network defenders analytic and investigative processes. This search will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.answer) as answer min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query host | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `dynamic_dns_providers` | `detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "First, you'll need to ingest data from your DNS operations. This can be done by ingesting logs from your server or data, collected passively by Splunk Stream or a similar solution. Specifically, data that contains the domain that is being queried and the IP of the host originating the request must be populating the `Network_Resolution` data model. This search also leverages a lookup file, `dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv`, which contains a non-exhaustive list of Dynamic DNS providers. Please consider updating the local lookup periodically by adding new domains to the list of `dynamic_dns_providers_local.csv`.\\\nThis search produces fields (query, answer, isDynDNS) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable event. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review. Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** DNS Query, **Field:** query\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** DNS Answer, **Field:** answer\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** IsDynamicDNS, **Field:** isDynDNS\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", + "known_false_positives": "Some users and applications may leverage Dynamic DNS to reach out to some domains on the Internet since dynamic DNS by itself is not malicious, however this activity must be verified.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers", + "analytic_story": [ + "Data Protection", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "DNS Hijacking", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Command & Control" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1189/dyn_dns_site/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A dns query $query$ from your infra connecting to suspicious domain in host $host$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1189" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "host", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "DNS.answer", + "DNS.query", + "host" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1189", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "PLATINUM", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Turla", + "Windigo", + "Windshift" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1189" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Data Protection", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "DNS Hijacking", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Command & Control" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "host", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "host", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1189" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers", + "file": "network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1189/dyn_dns_site/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "dynamic_dns_providers", + "definition": "lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_default dynamic_dns_domains as query OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_default | lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_local dynamic_dns_domains as query OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_local| eval isDynDNS = coalesce(isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local)|fields - isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local| search isDynDNS=True", + "description": "This macro limits the output of the query field to dynamic dns domains. It looks up the domains in a file provided by Splunk and one intended to be updated by the end user." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml", + "source": "network" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get DNS Server History for a host", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-11-09", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "While investigating any detections it is important to understand which and how many DNS servers a host has connected to in the past. This search uses data that is tagged as DNS and gives you a count and list of DNS servers that a particular host has connected to the previous 24 hours.", + "search": "| search tag=dns src_ip=$src_ip$ dest_port=53 | streamstats time_window=1d count values(dest_ip) as dcip by src_ip | table date_mday src_ip dcip count | sort -count", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting your DNS traffic", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "src_ip" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Command & Control", + "DNS Hijacking", + "Data Protection", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "src_ip", + "dest_port", + "dest_ip" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_dns_server_history_for_a_host" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation", + "id": "0244fdee-61be-11ec-900e-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-20", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "description": "Monitor for activities and techniques associated with the exploitation of the sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287) vulnerabilities.", + "narrative": "On November 9, 2021, Microsoft released patches to address two vulnerabilities that affect Windows Active Directory networks, sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287). On December 10, 2021, security researchers Charlie Clark and Andrew Schwartz released a blog post where they shared how to weaponise these vulnerabilities in a target network an the initial detection opportunities. When successfully exploited, CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287 allow an adversary, who has stolen the credentials of a low priviled domain user, to obtain a Kerberos Service ticket for a Domain Controller computer account. The only requirement is to have network connectivity to a domain controller. This attack vector effectivelly allows attackers to escalate their privileges in an Active Directory from a regular domain user account and take control of a domain controller. While patches have been released to address these vulnerabilities, deploying detection controls for this attack may help help defenders identify attackers attempting exploitation.", + "references": [ + "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42278", + "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42287", + "https://exploit.ph/cve-2021-42287-cve-2021-42278-weaponisation.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation", + "analytic_story": "sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation", + "category": [ + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "Chimera", + "Indrik Spider", + "Naikon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Suspicious Computer Account Name Change - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Mauricio Velazco", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious Computer Account Name Change", + "id": "35a61ed8-61c4-11ec-bc1e-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-20", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "As part of the sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287) exploitation chain, adversaries need to create a new computer account name and rename it to match the name of a domain controller account without the ending '$'. In Windows Active Directory environments, computer account names always end with `$`. This analytic leverages Event Id 4781, `The name of an account was changed`, to identify a computer account rename event with a suspicious name that does not terminate with `$`. This behavior could represent an exploitation attempt of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287 for privilege escalation.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4781 Old_Account_Name=\"*$\" New_Account_Name!=\"*$\" | table _time, ComputerName, Account_Name, Old_Account_Name, New_Account_Name | `suspicious_computer_account_name_change_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows event logs from your hosts. In addition, the Splunk Windows TA is needed.", + "known_false_positives": "Renaming a computer account name to a name that not end with '$' is highly unsual and may not have any legitimate scenarios.", + "references": [ + "https://exploit.ph/cve-2021-42287-cve-2021-42278-weaponisation.html", + "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42278", + "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42287" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Computer Account Name Change", + "analytic_story": [ + "sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/samaccountname_spoofing/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 100, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A computer account $Old_Account_Name$ was renamed with a suspicious computer name", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078", + "T1078.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "ComputerName", + "Account_Name", + "Old_Account_Name", + "New_Account_Name" + ], + "risk_score": 70, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-42287", + "CVE-2021-42278" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "Chimera", + "Indrik Spider", + "Naikon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078", + "T1078.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 100, + "confidence": 70, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-42287", + "CVE-2021-42278" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 70 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078", + "T1078.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Suspicious Computer Account Name Change Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious Computer Account Name Change", + "file": "endpoint/suspicious_computer_account_name_change.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/samaccountname_spoofing/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_computer_account_name_change_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_computer_account_name_change.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request", + "id": "8b1297bc-6204-11ec-b7c4-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-20", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "As part of the sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287) exploitation chain, adversaries will request and obtain a Kerberos Service Ticket (TGS) with a domain controller computer account as the Service Name. This Service Ticket can be then used to take control of the domain controller on the final part of the attack. This analytic leverages Event Id 4769, `A Kerberos service ticket was requested`, to identify an unusual TGS request where the Account_Name requesting the ticket matches the Service_Name field. This behavior could represent an exploitation attempt of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287 for privilege escalation.", + "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769 | eval isSuspicious = if(lower(Service_Name) = lower(mvindex(split(Account_Name,\"@\"),0)+\"$\"),1,0) | where isSuspicious = 1 | table _time, Client_Address, Account_Name, Service_Name, Failure_Code, isSuspicious | `suspicious_kerberos_service_ticket_request_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", + "known_false_positives": "We have tested this detection logic with ~2 million 4769 events and did not identify false positives. However, they may be possible in certain environments. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://exploit.ph/cve-2021-42287-cve-2021-42278-weaponisation.html", + "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42278", + "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42287", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-sfu/02636893-7a1f-4357-af9a-b672e3e3de13" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request", + "analytic_story": [ + "sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/samaccountname_spoofing/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 100, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket was requested by $Account_Name$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078", + "T1078.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Service_Name", + "Account_Name", + "Client_Address", + "Failure_Code" + ], + "risk_score": 60, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-42287", + "CVE-2021-42278" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "Chimera", + "Indrik Spider", + "Naikon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078", + "T1078.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 100, + "confidence": 60, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-42287", + "CVE-2021-42278" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 60 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078", + "T1078.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request", + "file": "endpoint/suspicious_kerberos_service_ticket_request.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/samaccountname_spoofing/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_kerberos_service_ticket_request_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_kerberos_service_ticket_request.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request", + "id": "d77d349e-6269-11ec-9cfe-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "As part of the sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287) exploitation chain, adversaries will need to request a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) on behalf of the newly created and renamed computer account. The TGT request will be preceded by a computer account name event. This analytic leverages Event Id 4781, `The name of an account was changed` and event Id 4768 `A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested` to correlate a sequence of events where the new computer account on event id 4781 matches the request account on event id 4768. This behavior could represent an exploitation attempt of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287 for privilege escalation.", + "search": " `wineventlog_security` (EventCode=4781 Old_Account_Name=\"*$\" New_Account_Name!=\"*$\") OR (EventCode=4768 Account_Name!=\"*$\") | eval RenamedComputerAccount = coalesce(New_Account_Name, mvindex(Account_Name,0)) | transaction RenamedComputerAccount startswith=(EventCode=4781) endswith=(EventCode=4768) | eval short_lived=case((duration<2),\"TRUE\") | search short_lived = TRUE | table _time, ComputerName, EventCode, Account_Name,RenamedComputerAccount, short_lived |`suspicious_ticket_granting_ticket_request_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", + "known_false_positives": "A computer account name change event inmediately followed by a kerberos TGT request with matching fields is unsual. However, legitimate behavior may trigger it. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://exploit.ph/cve-2021-42287-cve-2021-42278-weaponisation.html", + "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42278", + "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42287" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request", + "analytic_story": [ + "sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/samaccountname_spoofing/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 100, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A suspicious TGT was requested was requested", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078", + "T1078.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Old_Account_Name", + "New_Account_Name", + "Account_Name", + "ComputerName" + ], + "risk_score": 60, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "Chimera", + "Indrik Spider", + "Naikon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078", + "T1078.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 100, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 60 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078", + "T1078.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request", + "file": "endpoint/suspicious_ticket_granting_ticket_request.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/samaccountname_spoofing/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_ticket_granting_ticket_request_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_ticket_granting_ticket_request.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [] + }, + { + "name": "Domain Trust Discovery", + "id": "e6f30f14-8daf-11eb-a017-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-03-25", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities in Windows multi-domain/forest environments.", + "narrative": "Domain trusts provide a mechanism for a domain to allow access to resources based on the authentication procedures of another domain. Domain trusts allow the users of the trusted domain to access resources in the trusting domain. The information discovered may help the adversary conduct SID-History Injection, Pass the Ticket, and Kerberoasting. Domain trusts can be enumerated using the DSEnumerateDomainTrusts() Win32 API call, .NET methods, and LDAP. The Windows utility Nltest is known to be used by adversaries to enumerate domain trusts.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Domain Trust Discovery", + "analytic_story": "Domain Trust Discovery", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "Chimera", + "FIN8" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Leafminer", + "Naikon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - DSQuery Domain Discovery - Rule", + "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Michael Haag", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "DSQuery Domain Discovery", + "id": "cc316032-924a-11eb-91a2-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-03-31", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies \"dsquery.exe\" execution with arguments looking for `TrustedDomain` query directly on the command-line. This is typically indicative of an Administrator or adversary perform domain trust discovery. Note that this query does not identify any other variations of \"Dsquery.exe\" usage.\\\nWithin this detection, it is assumed `dsquery.exe` is not moved or renamed.\\\nThe search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process \"dsquery.exe\" and its parent process.\\\nDSQuery.exe is natively found in `C:\\Windows\\system32` and `C:\\Windows\\syswow64` and only on Server operating system.\\\nThe following DLL(s) are loaded when DSQuery.exe is launched `dsquery.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible dsquery is running within that process context in memory.\\\nIn addition to trust discovery, review parallel processes for additional behaviors performed. Identify the parent process and capture any files (batch files, for example) being used.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=dsquery.exe Processes.process=*trustedDomain* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dsquery_domain_discovery_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives. If there is a true false positive, filter based on command-line or parent process.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1482/T1482.md", + "http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/a-guide-to-attacking-domain-trusts/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc732952(v=ws.11)", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc754232(v=ws.11)" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "DSQuery Domain Discovery", + "analytic_story": [ + "Domain Trust Discovery", + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified performing domain discovery on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1482" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "Chimera", + "FIN8" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1482" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Domain Trust Discovery", + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 72 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 72 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1482" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "DSQuery Domain Discovery Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "DSQuery Domain Discovery", + "file": "endpoint/dsquery_domain_discovery.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "dsquery_domain_discovery_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/dsquery_domain_discovery.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "NLTest Domain Trust Discovery", + "id": "c3e05466-5f22-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-01-25", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for the execution of `nltest.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for Domain Trust information. Two arguments `/domain trusts`, returns a list of trusted domains, and `/all_trusts`, returns all trusted domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike use NLTest.exe to enumerate the current domain to assist with further understanding where to pivot next.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=nltest.exe OR Processes.process_name!=nltest.exe) (Processes.process=*/domain_trusts* OR Processes.process=*/all_trusts*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `nltest_domain_trust_discovery_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may use nltest for troubleshooting purposes, otherwise, rarely used.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1482/T1482.md", + "https://malware.news/t/lets-learn-trickbot-implements-network-collector-module-leveraging-cmd-wmi-ldap/19104", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482/", + "https://www.owasp.org/images/4/4b/Red_Team_Operating_in_a_Modern_Environment.pdf", + "https://ss64.com/nt/nltest.html", + "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/domain-trust-discovery/", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/08/ryuks-return/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "NLTest Domain Trust Discovery", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Domain Trust Discovery", + "IcedID", + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Domain trust discovery execution on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1482" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "Chimera", + "FIN8" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1482" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Domain Trust Discovery", + "IcedID", + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1482" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "NLTest Domain Trust Discovery Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "NLTest Domain Trust Discovery", + "file": "endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "nltest_domain_trust_discovery_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows AdFind Exe", + "id": "bd3b0187-189b-46c0-be45-f52da2bae67f", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-11-03", + "author": "Jose Hernandez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for the execution of `adfind.exe` with command-line arguments that it uses by default. Specifically the filter or search functions. It also considers the arguments necessary like objectcategory, see readme for more details: https://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/usage.htm. This has been seen used before by Wizard Spider, FIN6 and actors whom also launched SUNBURST. AdFind.exe is usually used a recon tool to enumare a domain controller.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process=\"* -f *\" OR Processes.process=\"* -b *\") AND (Processes.process=*objectcategory* OR Processes.process=\"* -gcb *\" OR Processes.process=\"* -sc *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_adfind_exe_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "administrators rarely use adfind, usually not used for legitimate reasons", + "references": [ + "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/a-nasty-trick-from-credential-theft-malware-to-business-disruption.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows AdFind Exe", + "analytic_story": [ + "NOBELIUM Group", + "Domain Trust Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Windows AdFind Exe", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1018" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Leafminer", + "Naikon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1018" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "NOBELIUM Group", + "Domain Trust Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1018" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows AdFind Exe Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows AdFind Exe", + "file": "endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_adfind_exe_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [] + }, + { + "name": "Dynamic DNS", + "id": "8169f17b-ef68-4b59-aae8-586907301221", + "version": 2, + "date": "2018-09-06", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "description": "Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them avoid firewall blocks and deny lists.", + "narrative": "Dynamic DNS services (DDNS) are legitimate low-cost or free services that allow users to rapidly update domain resolutions to IP infrastructure. While their usage can be benign, malicious actors can abuse DDNS to host harmful payloads or interactive-command-and-control infrastructure. These attackers will manually update or automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to IP addresses that circumvent firewall blocks and deny lists and frustrate a network defender's analytic and investigative processes. These searches will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains and then investigate more deeply, when appropriate. While this list of top-level dynamic domains is not exhaustive, it can be dynamically updated as new suspicious dynamic domains are identified.", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", + "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", + "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", + "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Dynamic DNS", + "analytic_story": "Dynamic DNS", + "category": [ + "Malware" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Security Monitoring", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Protocols", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "FIN4", + "FIN8", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Orangeworm", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "SilverTerrier", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1189", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "PLATINUM", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Turla", + "Windigo", + "Windshift" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control", + "Exfiltration", + "Initial Access" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint", + "Network_Resolution", + "Web" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Command & Control", + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule", + "ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", + "ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers", + "id": "134da869-e264-4a8f-8d7e-fcd01c18f301", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "This search looks for web connections to dynamic DNS providers.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Web.url) as url min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Web where Web.status=200 by Web.src Web.dest Web.status | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `dynamic_dns_web_traffic` | `detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This search requires you to be ingesting web-traffic logs. You can obtain these logs from indexing data from a web proxy or by using a network-traffic-analysis tool, such as Bro or Splunk Stream. The web data model must contain the URL being requested, the IP address of the host initiating the request, and the destination IP. This search also leverages a lookup file, `dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv`, which contains a non-exhaustive list of dynamic DNS providers. Consider periodically updating this local lookup file with new domains.\\\nThis search produces fields (`isDynDNS`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** IsDynamicDNS, **Field:** isDynDNS\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` Deprecated because duplicate.", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible that list of dynamic DNS providers is outdated and/or that the URL being requested is legitimate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers", + "analytic_story": [ + "Dynamic DNS" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 7", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1071.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP", + "DE.DP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Web.url", + "Web.status", + "Web.src", + "Web.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Protocols", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "FIN4", + "FIN8", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Orangeworm", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "SilverTerrier", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1071.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 7", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP", + "DE.DP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Dynamic DNS" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1071.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 7", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP", + "DE.DP" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dynamic_dns_web_traffic", + "definition": "lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_default dynamic_dns_domains as url OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_default | lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_local dynamic_dns_domains as url OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_local| eval isDynDNS = coalesce(isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local)|fields - isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local| search isDynDNS=True", + "description": "This is a description" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App", + "id": "2452e632-9e0d-11eb-bacd-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-15", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "this search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. This technique are seen in couple of malware and APT group to exfiltrated collected data in a infected machine or infected network. This detection is looking for unique use of nslookup where it tries to use specific record type, TXT, A, AAAA, that are commonly used by attacker and also the retry parameter which is designed to query C2 DNS multiple tries.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"nslookup.exe\" Processes.process = \"*-querytype=*\" OR Processes.process=\"*-qt=*\" OR Processes.process=\"*-q=*\" OR Processes.process=\"-type=*\" OR Processes.process=\"*-retry=*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of nslookup.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "admin nslookup usage", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7_spear_phishing.html", + "https://www.varonis.com/blog/dns-tunneling/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Command & Control", + "Data Exfiltration" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Exfiltration" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/nslookup_exfil/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ performing activity related to DNS exfiltration.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1048" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1048" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Command & Control", + "Data Exfiltration" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Exfiltration" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 72 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 72 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1048" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App", + "file": "endpoint/dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/nslookup_exfil/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App", + "id": "0a69fdaa-a2b8-11eb-b16d-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-21", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. This technique are seen in couple of malware and APT group to exfiltrated collected data in a infected machine or infected network. This detection is looking for unique use of nslookup where it tries to use specific record type (TXT, A, AAAA) that are commonly used by attacker and also the retry parameter which is designed to query C2 DNS multiple tries.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode = 1 process_name = \"nslookup.exe\" | bucket _time span=15m | stats count as numNsLookup by Computer, _time | eventstats avg(numNsLookup) as avgNsLookup, stdev(numNsLookup) as stdNsLookup, count as numSlots by Computer | eval upperThreshold=(avgNsLookup + stdNsLookup *3) | eval isOutlier=if(avgNsLookup > 20 and avgNsLookup >= upperThreshold, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of nslookup.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7_spear_phishing.html", + "https://www.varonis.com/blog/dns-tunneling/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Command & Control", + "Data Exfiltration" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Scope:Local", + "Stage:Exfiltration" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/nslookup_exfil/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 40, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Excessive usage of nslookup.exe has been detected on $Computer$. This detection is triggered as as it violates the dynamic threshold", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1048" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Computer", + "process_name", + "EventCode" + ], + "risk_score": 28, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1048" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Command & Control", + "Data Exfiltration" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Scope:Local", + "Stage:Exfiltration" + ], + "impact": 40, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 28 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1048" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App", + "file": "endpoint/excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/nslookup_exfil/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers", + "id": "a1e761ac-1344-4dbd-88b2-3f34c912d359", + "version": 3, + "date": "2021-01-14", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Resolution" + ], + "description": "Malicious actors often abuse legitimate Dynamic DNS services to host malicious payloads or interactive command and control nodes. Attackers will automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to countless IP addresses to circumvent firewall blocks, block lists as well as frustrate a network defenders analytic and investigative processes. This search will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.answer) as answer min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query host | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `dynamic_dns_providers` | `detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "First, you'll need to ingest data from your DNS operations. This can be done by ingesting logs from your server or data, collected passively by Splunk Stream or a similar solution. Specifically, data that contains the domain that is being queried and the IP of the host originating the request must be populating the `Network_Resolution` data model. This search also leverages a lookup file, `dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv`, which contains a non-exhaustive list of Dynamic DNS providers. Please consider updating the local lookup periodically by adding new domains to the list of `dynamic_dns_providers_local.csv`.\\\nThis search produces fields (query, answer, isDynDNS) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable event. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review. Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** DNS Query, **Field:** query\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** DNS Answer, **Field:** answer\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** IsDynamicDNS, **Field:** isDynDNS\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", + "known_false_positives": "Some users and applications may leverage Dynamic DNS to reach out to some domains on the Internet since dynamic DNS by itself is not malicious, however this activity must be verified.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers", + "analytic_story": [ + "Data Protection", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "DNS Hijacking", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Command & Control" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1189/dyn_dns_site/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A dns query $query$ from your infra connecting to suspicious domain in host $host$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1189" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "host", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "DNS.answer", + "DNS.query", + "host" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1189", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "PLATINUM", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Turla", + "Windigo", + "Windshift" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1189" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Data Protection", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "DNS Hijacking", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Command & Control" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "host", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "host", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1189" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers", + "file": "network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1189/dyn_dns_site/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "dynamic_dns_providers", + "definition": "lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_default dynamic_dns_domains as query OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_default | lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_local dynamic_dns_domains as query OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_local| eval isDynDNS = coalesce(isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local)|fields - isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local| search isDynDNS=True", + "description": "This macro limits the output of the query field to dynamic dns domains. It looks up the domains in a file provided by Splunk and one intended to be updated by the end user." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml", + "source": "network" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get DNS Server History for a host", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-11-09", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "While investigating any detections it is important to understand which and how many DNS servers a host has connected to in the past. This search uses data that is tagged as DNS and gives you a count and list of DNS servers that a particular host has connected to the previous 24 hours.", + "search": "| search tag=dns src_ip=$src_ip$ dest_port=53 | streamstats time_window=1d count values(dest_ip) as dcip by src_ip | table date_mday src_ip dcip count | sort -count", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting your DNS traffic", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "src_ip" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Command & Control", + "DNS Hijacking", + "Data Protection", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "src_ip", + "dest_port", + "dest_ip" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_dns_server_history_for_a_host" + }, + { + "name": "Get DNS traffic ratio", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd73", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-11-09", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search calculates the ratio of DNS traffic originating and coming from a host to a list of DNS servers over the last 24 hours. A high value of this ratio could be very useful to quickly understand if a src_ip (host) is sending a high volume of data out via port 53, could be an indicator of data exfiltration via DNS. ", + "search": "| tstats allow_old_summaries=true sum(All_Traffic.bytes_out) as \"bytes_out\" sum(All_Traffic.bytes_in) as \"bytes_in\" from datamodel=Network_Traffic where nodename=All_Traffic All_Traffic.dest_port=53 by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest| `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | rename src as src_ip | rename dest as dest_ip | search src_ip=$src_ip$ | search dest_ip = $dest_ip | eval ratio = (bytes_out/bytes_in) | table ratio", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your network traffic", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "src_ip" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Command & Control", + "Data Protection", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.bytes_out", + "All_Traffic.bytes_in", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.src", + "All_Traffic.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_dns_traffic_ratio" + }, + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + }, + { + "name": "Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", + "id": "910e6512-edc9-4f93-ba24-5b786f47a672", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-01", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "While investigating, an analyst will want to know what process and parent_process is responsible for generating suspicious DNS traffic. Use the following search and enter the value of `dest` in the search to get specific details on the process responsible for creating the DNS traffic.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search dest = $dest$ | join dest type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port=53 by Ports.process_id Ports.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename src as dest]", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that associates processes with network events into the Endpoint datamodel. This can come from endpoint protection products such as carbon black, or endpoint data sources such as Sysmon.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Command & Control", + "Data Protection", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Ports.process_id", + "Ports.src", + "Ports.dest_port" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "id": "bb9f5ed2-916e-4364-bb6d-91c310efcf52", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-01-27", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "description": "Detect rarely used executables, specific registry paths that may confer malware survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that the Emotet financial malware has compromised your environment.", + "narrative": "The trojan downloader known as Emotet first surfaced in 2014, when it was discovered targeting the banking industry to steal credentials. However, according to a joint technical alert (TA) issued by three government agencies (https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A), Emotet has evolved far beyond those beginnings to become what a ThreatPost article called a threat-delivery service(see https://threatpost.com/emotet-malware-evolves-beyond-banking-to-threat-delivery-service/134342/). For example, in early 2018, Emotet was found to be using its loader function to spread the Quakbot and Ransomware variants. \\\nAccording to the TA, the the malware continues to be among the most costly and destructive malware affecting the private and public sectors. Researchers have linked it to the threat group Mealybug, which has also been on the security communitys radar since 2014.\\\nThe searches in this Analytic Story will help you find executables that are rarely used in your environment, specific registry paths that malware often uses to ensure survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that Emotet or other malware has compromised your environment. ", + "references": [ + "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A", + "https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf", + "https://www.vkremez.com/2017/05/emotet-banking-trojan-malware-analysis.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "analytic_story": "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "category": [ + "Malware" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "Putter Panda", + "RTM", + "Rocke", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1072", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Software Deployment Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-1314" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Operation Wocao", + "Orangeworm", + "Sandworm Team", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Initial Access", + "Lateral Movement", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Email", + "Endpoint", + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Command & Control", + "Delivery", + "Exploitation", + "Installation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", + "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", + "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", + "ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", + "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", + "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [ + "ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", + "ESCU - Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security" + ], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Prohibited Software On Endpoint", + "id": "a51bfe1a-94f0-48cc-b4e4-b6ae50145893", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-10-11", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for applications on the endpoint that you have marked as prohibited.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `prohibited_softwares` | `prohibited_software_on_endpoint_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is usually generated via logs that report process tracking in your Windows audit settings. In addition, you must also have only the `process_name` (not the entire process path) marked as \"prohibited\" in the Enterprise Security `interesting processes` table. To include the process names marked as \"prohibited\", which is included with ES Content Updates, run the included search Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Prohibited Software On Endpoint", + "analytic_story": [ + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "SamSam Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_times" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "SamSam Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security", + "id": "251930a5-1451-4428-bb13-eed5775be0ce", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-15", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search takes the existing interesting process table from ES, filters out any existing additions added by ESCU and then updates the table with processes identified by ESCU that should be prohibited on your endpoints.", + "search": "| inputlookup prohibited_processes | search note!=ESCU* | inputlookup append=T prohibited_processes | fillnull value=* dest dest_pci_domain | fillnull value=false is_required is_secure | fillnull value=true is_prohibited | outputlookup prohibited_processes | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "This search should be run on each new install of ESCU.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "SamSam Ransomware" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Prohibited Software On Endpoint" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "prohibited_softwares", + "definition": "lookup prohibited_softwares app as process_name OUTPUT is_prohibited | search is_prohibited=True", + "description": "This macro limits the output to process_names that have been marked as prohibited" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "prohibited_software_on_endpoint_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters", + "id": "b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-95dbb162039e", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for the execution of the cscript.exe or wscript.exe processes, with a parent of cmd.exe. The search will return the count, the first and last time this execution was seen on a machine, the user, and the destination of the machine", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=\"cmd.exe\" (Processes.process_name=cscript.exe OR Processes.process_name =wscript.exe) by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters", + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/cmd_spawns_cscript/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "cmd.exe launching script interpreters on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.003" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 35 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters", + "file": "endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/cmd_spawns_cscript/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", + "id": "f5f6af30-7aa7-4295-bfe9-07fe87c01a4b", + "version": 7, + "date": "2022-01-26", + "author": "Jose Hernandez, David Dorsey, Teoderick Contreras, Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to launch an application or service at system startup.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\RunOnce OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\run* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentVersion\\\\Windows\\\\Appinit_Dlls* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Shell* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Notify* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Userinit* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\VmApplet* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\policies\\\\explorer\\\\run* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\runservices* OR Registry.registry_path=HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Netsh\\\\* OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Image File Execution Options*\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=Debugger) OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Security Packages\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\\\\OSConfig\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Security Packages\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\SilentProcessExit\\\\*\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*currentVersion\\\\Windows\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Load\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentVersion\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Svchost\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\"AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"BootExecute\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Software\\\\Run\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"auto_update\")) by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "There are many legitimate applications that must execute on system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Ransomware", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "IcedID", + "Remcos" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 95, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/atomic_red_team/t1547001-runonce.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to persistence in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1547.001", + "T1547" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user" + ], + "risk_score": 76, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "Putter Panda", + "RTM", + "Rocke", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.001", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Ransomware", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "IcedID", + "Remcos" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 95 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 76 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 76 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.001", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", + "file": "endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces", + "id": "56e877a6-1455-4479-ada6-0550dc1e22f8", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-19", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Email" + ], + "description": "Attackers often use spaces as a means to obfuscate an attachment's file extension. This search looks for messages with email attachments that have many spaces within the file names.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(All_Email.recipient) as recipient_address min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Email where All_Email.file_name=\"*\" by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.file_name All_Email.message_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Email\")` | eval space_ratio = (mvcount(split(file_name,\" \"))-1)/len(file_name) | search space_ratio >= 0.1 | rex field=recipient_address \"(?.*)@\" | `email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You need to ingest data from emails. Specifically, the sender's address and the file names of any attachments must be mapped to the Email data model. The threshold ratio is set to 10%, but this value can be configured to suit each environment. \\\n **Splunk Phantom Playbook Integration**\\\nIf Splunk Phantom is also configured in your environment, a playbook called \"Suspicious Email Attachment Investigate and Delete\" can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/` and add the correct hostname to the \"Phantom Instance\" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search. The notable event will be sent to Phantom and the playbook will gather further information about the file attachment and its network behaviors. If Phantom finds malicious behavior and an analyst approves of the results, the email will be deleted from the user's inbox.", + "known_false_positives": "None at this time", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces", + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Suspicious Emails" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 7" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Email.recipient", + "All_Email.file_name", + "All_Email.src_user", + "All_Email.file_name", + "All_Email.message_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 7" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Suspicious Emails" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 7" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml", + "source": "application" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions", + "id": "473bd65f-06ca-4dfe-a2b8-ba04ab4a0084", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-07-22", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Email" + ], + "description": "This search looks for emails that have attachments with suspicious file extensions.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Email where All_Email.file_name=\"*\" by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.file_name All_Email.message_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Email\")` | `suspicious_email_attachments` | `suspicious_email_attachment_extensions_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "You need to ingest data from emails. Specifically, the sender's address and the file names of any attachments must be mapped to the Email data model. \\\n **Splunk Phantom Playbook Integration**\\\nIf Splunk Phantom is also configured in your environment, a Playbook called \"Suspicious Email Attachment Investigate and Delete\" can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/`, and add the correct hostname to the \"Phantom Instance\" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search. The notable event will be sent to Phantom and the playbook will gather further information about the file attachment and its network behaviors. If Phantom finds malicious behavior and an analyst approves of the results, the email will be deleted from the user's inbox.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions", + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Suspicious Emails" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 7", + "CIS 12" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566.001", + "T1566" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Email.file_name", + "All_Email.src_user", + "All_Email.message_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566.001", + "T1566" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 7", + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Suspicious Emails" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566.001", + "T1566" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 7", + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_email_attachments", + "definition": "lookup update=true is_suspicious_file_extension_lookup file_name OUTPUT suspicious | search suspicious=true", + "description": "This macro limits the output to email attachments that have suspicious extensions" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_email_attachment_extensions_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml", + "source": "application" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Rare Executables", + "id": "44fddcb2-8d3b-454c-874e-7c6de5a4f7ac", + "version": 5, + "date": "2020-03-16", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search will return a table of rare processes, the names of the systems running them, and the users who initiated each process.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.dest) as dest values(Processes.user) as user min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name | rename Processes.process_name as process | rex field=user \"(?.*)\\\\\\\\(?.*)\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| search [| tstats count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name | rare Processes.process_name limit=30 | rename Processes.process_name as process| `filter_rare_process_allow_list`| table process ] | `detect_rare_executables_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts and populating the endpoint data model with the resultant dataset. The macro `filter_rare_process_allow_list` searches two lookup files for allowed processes. These consist of `rare_process_allow_list_default.csv` and `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv`. To add your own processes to the allow list, add them to `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv`. If you wish to remove an entry from the default lookup file, you will have to modify the macro itself to set the allow_list value for that process to false. You can modify the limit parameter and search scheduling to better suit your environment.", + "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate processes may be only rarely executed in your environment. As these are identified, update `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv` to filter them out of your search results.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Rare Executables", + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Unusual Processes", + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.PT", + "PR.DS", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_name" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.PT", + "PR.DS", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Unusual Processes", + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.PT", + "PR.DS", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "filter_rare_process_allow_list", + "definition": "lookup update=true lookup_rare_process_allow_list_default process as process OUTPUTNEW allow_list | where allow_list=\"false\" | lookup update=true lookup_rare_process_allow_list_local process as process OUTPUT allow_list | where allow_list=\"false\"", + "description": "This macro is intended to allow_list processes that have been definied as rare" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_rare_executables_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detection of tools built by NirSoft", + "id": "3d8d201c-aa03-422d-b0ee-2e5ecf9718c0", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for specific command-line arguments that may indicate the execution of tools made by Nirsoft, which are legitimate, but may be abused by attackers.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) values(Processes.process) as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process=\"* /stext *\" OR Processes.process=\"* /scomma *\" ) by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "While legitimate, these NirSoft tools are prone to abuse. You should verfiy that the tool was used for a legitimate purpose.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detection of tools built by NirSoft", + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A " + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1072" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1072", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Software Deployment Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-1314" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1072" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A " + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1072" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "SMB Traffic Spike", + "id": "7f5fb3e1-4209-4914-90db-0ec21b936378", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-07-22", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search looks for spikes in the number of Server Message Block (SMB) traffic connections.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb by _time span=1h, All_Traffic.src | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | eventstats max(_time) as maxtime | stats count as num_data_samples max(eval(if(_time >= relative_time(maxtime, \"-70m@m\"), count, null))) as count avg(eval(if(_time upperBound AND num_data_samples >=50, 1, 0) | where isOutlier=1 | table src count | `smb_traffic_spike_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic logs and populating the `Network_Traffic` data model.", + "known_false_positives": "A file server may experience high-demand loads that could cause this analytic to trigger.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "SMB Traffic Spike", + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Ransomware", + "DHS Report TA18-074A" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021.002", + "T1021" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.app", + "All_Traffic.src" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Operation Wocao", + "Orangeworm", + "Sandworm Team", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021.002", + "T1021" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Ransomware", + "DHS Report TA18-074A" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021.002", + "T1021" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "smb_traffic_spike_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK", + "id": "d25773ba-9ad8-48d1-858e-07ad0bbeb828", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-07-22", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search uses the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) to identify spikes in the number of Server Message Block (SMB) connections.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as port from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb by _time span=1h, All_Traffic.src | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%A\") | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | apply smb_pdfmodel threshold=0.001 | rename \"IsOutlier(count)\" as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | sort -count | table _time src dest port count | `smb_traffic_spike___mltk_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. In addition, the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or greater must be installed on your search heads, along with any required dependencies. Finally, the support search \"Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK\" must be executed before this detection search, because it builds a machine-learning (ML) model over the historical data used by this search. It is important that this search is run in the same app context as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild the model with the latest data available in your environment.\\\nThis search produces a field (Number of events,count) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. This field contributes additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following field, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry): \\\n1. **Label:** Number of events, **Field:** count\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review is found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", + "known_false_positives": "If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider reducing the value of the threshold in the search. You should also periodically re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data. Please update the `smb_traffic_spike_mltk_filter` macro to filter out false positive results", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK", + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Ransomware", + "DHS Report TA18-074A" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021.002", + "T1021" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_ip", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.app", + "All_Traffic.src" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Operation Wocao", + "Orangeworm", + "Sandworm Team", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021.002", + "T1021" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Ransomware", + "DHS Report TA18-074A" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", + "id": "df98763b-0b08-4281-8ef9-08db7ac572a9", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-05-08", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model to characterize the number of SMB connections observed each hour for every day of week. By default, the search uses the last 30 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search to identify outliers in the number of SMB connections for that hour and day of the week.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb by _time span=10m, All_Traffic.src | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%A\") | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | fit DensityFunction count by \"HourOfDay,DayOfWeek\" into smb_pdfmodel", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model. In addition, you must have the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version >= 4.2 installed, along with any required dependencies. To improve your results, you may consider adding \"src\" to the by clause, which will build the model for each unique source in your enviornment. However, if you have a large number of hosts in your environment, this search may be very resource intensive. In this case, you may need to raise the value of max_inputs and/or max_groups in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 30 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data. More information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Ransomware" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Processes launching netsh", + "SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.app", + "All_Traffic.src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021.002", + "T1021" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "smb_traffic_spike___mltk_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml", + "source": "network" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get History Of Email Sources", + "id": "ddc7af28-c34d-4392-af93-7f29a4e8806c", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-02-21", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Email" + ], + "description": "This search returns a list of all email sources seen in the 48 hours prior to the notable event to 24 hours after, and the number of emails from each source.", + "search": "|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Email.dest) as dest values(All_Email.recipient) as recepient min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count from datamodel=Email.All_Email by All_Email.src |`drop_dm_object_name(All_Email)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search src=$src$", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must ingest your email logs or capture unencrypted email communications within network traffic, and populate the Email data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "src" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Email.dest", + "All_Email.recipient", + "All_Email.src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_history_of_email_sources" + }, + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + }, + { + "name": "Get Parent Process Info", + "id": "fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41bf9", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-02-28", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "parent_process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Phishing Payloads", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_parent_process_info" + }, + { + "name": "Get Process Info", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd71", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-01", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the process running on a host which is under investigation. To gather the process info, enter the values for the process name in question and the destination IP address.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search process_name= $process_name$ | search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_process_info" + }, + { + "name": "Get Process Information For Port Activity", + "id": "9925d08f-561e-4faa-8912-e3888a842341", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-01", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search will return information about the process associated with observed network traffic to a specific destination port from a specific host.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search dest=$dest$ | join dest type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Ports by Ports.process_id Ports.src Ports.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | search dest_port=$dest_port$ | rename src as dest]", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data that associates processes with network events and populate the Endpoint Datamodel", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest", + "dest_port" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Ports.process_id", + "Ports.src", + "Ports.dest_port" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_process_information_for_port_activity" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "id": "7678c968-d46e-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-08-02", + "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", + "description": "Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-5902. Discovered by Positive Technologies researchers, this vulnerability affects F5 BIG-IP, BIG-IQ. and Traffix SDC devices (vulnerable versions in F5 support link below). This vulnerability allows unauthenticated users, along with authenticated users, who have access to the configuration utility to execute system commands, create/delete files, disable services, and/or execute Java code. This vulnerability can result in full system compromise.", + "narrative": "A client is able to perform a remote code execution on an exposed and vulnerable system. The detection search in this Analytic Story uses syslog to detect the malicious behavior. Syslog is going to be the best detection method, as any systems using SSL to protect their management console will make detection via wire data difficult. The searches included used Splunk Connect For Syslog (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4740/), and used a custom destination port to help define the data as F5 data (covered in https://splunk-connect-for-syslog.readthedocs.io/en/master/sources/F5/)", + "references": [ + "https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/about/news/f5-fixes-critical-vulnerability-discovered-by-positive-technologies-in-big-ip-application-delivery-controller/", + "https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K52145254", + "https://blog.cloudflare.com/cve-2020-5902-helping-to-protect-against-the-f5-tmui-rce-vulnerability/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "analytic_story": "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "datamodels": [], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902 - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Shannon Davis", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "id": "810e4dbc-d46e-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-08-02", + "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects remote code exploit attempts on F5 BIG-IP, BIG-IQ, and Traffix SDC devices", + "search": "`f5_bigip_rogue` | regex _raw=\"(hsqldb;|.*\\\\.\\\\.;.*)\" | search `detect_f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To consistently detect exploit attempts on F5 devices using the vulnerabilities contained within CVE-2020-5902 it is recommended to ingest logs via syslog. As many BIG-IP devices will have SSL enabled on their management interfaces, detections via wire data may not pick anything up unless you are decrypting SSL traffic in order to inspect it. I am using a regex string from a Cloudflare mitigation technique to try and always catch the offending string (..;), along with the other exploit of using (hsqldb;).", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/about/news/f5-fixes-critical-vulnerability-discovered-by-positive-technologies-in-big-ip-application-delivery-controller/", + "https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K52145254" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "analytic_story": [ + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902" + ], + "asset_type": "Network", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 11" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2020-5902" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 11" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2020-5902" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "dest", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 11" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "f5_bigip_rogue", + "definition": "index=netops sourcetype=\"f5:bigip:rogue\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902.yml", + "source": "web" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "FIN7", + "id": "df2b00d3-06ba-49f1-b253-b19cef19b569", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-14", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the FIN7 JS Implant and JSSLoader, including looking for Image Loading of ldap and wmi modules, associated with its payload, data collection and script execution.", + "narrative": "FIN7 is a Russian criminal advanced persistent threat group that has primarily targeted the U.S. retail, restaurant, and hospitality sectors since mid-2015. A portion of FIN7 is run out of the front company Combi Security. It has been called one of the most successful criminal hacking groups in the world. this passed few day FIN7 tools and implant are seen in the wild where its code is updated. the FIN& is known to use the spear phishing attack as a entry to targetted network or host that will drop its staging payload like the JS and JSSloader. Now this artifacts and implants seen downloading other malware like cobaltstrike and event ransomware to encrypt host.", + "references": [ + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIN7", + "https://threatpost.com/fin7-windows-11-release/169206/", + "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/jssloader-recoded-and-reloaded" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "FIN7", + "analytic_story": "FIN7", + "category": [ + "Malware" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1033", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.007", + "mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "Cobalt Group", + "Evilnum", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Higaisa", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "Turla" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1555", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "Evilnum", + "FIN6", + "Leafminer", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1555.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT3", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "Ajax Security Team", + "FIN6", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Patchwork", + "Sandworm Team", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA505", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "FIN4", + "FIN7", + "Frankenstein", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Windshift" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Cobalt Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sharpshooter", + "Silence", + "Turla" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1134.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Parent PID Spoofing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1134", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Blue Mockingbird", + "FIN6" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1220", + "mitre_attack_technique": "XSL Script Processing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Cobalt Group", + "Higaisa" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access", + "Defense Evasion", + "Discovery", + "Execution", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Check Elevated CMD using whoami - Rule", + "ESCU - Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell - Rule", + "ESCU - Jscript Execution Using Cscript App - Rule", + "ESCU - MS Scripting Process Loading Ldap Module - Rule", + "ESCU - MS Scripting Process Loading WMI Module - Rule", + "ESCU - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", + "ESCU - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", + "ESCU - Office Application Drop Executable - Rule", + "ESCU - Office Product Spawning Wmic - Rule", + "ESCU - Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App - Rule", + "ESCU - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule", + "ESCU - XSL Script Execution With WMIC - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Check Elevated CMD using whoami", + "id": "a9079b18-1633-11ec-859c-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-15", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious whoami execution to check if the cmd or shell instance process is with elevated privileges. This technique was seen in FIN7 js implant where it execute this as part of its data collection to the infected machine to check if the running shell cmd process is elevated or not. This TTP is really a good alert for known attacker that recon on the targetted host. This command is not so commonly executed by a normal user or even an admin to check if a process is elevated.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*whoami*\" Processes.process = \"*/group*\" Processes.process = \"* find *\" Processes.process = \"*12288*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `check_elevated_cmd_using_whoami_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Check Elevated CMD using whoami", + "analytic_story": [ + "FIN7" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_js_2/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Process name $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1033" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1033", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1033" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "FIN7" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1033" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Check Elevated CMD using whoami Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Check Elevated CMD using whoami", + "file": "endpoint/check_elevated_cmd_using_whoami.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_js_2/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "check_elevated_cmd_using_whoami_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/check_elevated_cmd_using_whoami.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell", + "id": "6c3f7dd8-153c-11ec-ac2d-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-14", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a non-standard parent process (not matching CMD, PowerShell, or Explorer) spawning `ipconfig.exe` or `systeminfo.exe`. This particular behavior was seen in FIN7's JSSLoader .NET payload. This is also typically seen when an adversary is injected into another process performing different discovery techniques. This event stands out as a TTP since these tools are commonly executed with a shell application or Explorer parent, and not by another application. This TTP is a good indicator for an adversary gathering host information, but one possible false positive might be an automated tool used by a system administator.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = \"ipconfig.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"systeminfo.exe\") AND NOT (Processes.parent_process_name = \"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"powershell*\" OR Processes.parent_process_name=\"pwsh.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"explorer.exe\") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmdline_tool_not_executed_in_cmd_shell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated host discovery application that may generate false positives. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html", + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell", + "analytic_story": [ + "FIN7" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/jssloader/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A non-standard parent process $parent_process_name$ spawned child process $process_name$ to execute command-line tool on $dest$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.007" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.007", + "mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "Cobalt Group", + "Evilnum", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Higaisa", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.007" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "FIN7" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.007" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell", + "file": "endpoint/cmdline_tool_not_executed_in_cmd_shell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/jssloader/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "cmdline_tool_not_executed_in_cmd_shell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/cmdline_tool_not_executed_in_cmd_shell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Jscript Execution Using Cscript App", + "id": "002f1e24-146e-11ec-a470-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-13", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a execution of jscript using cscript process. Commonly when a user run jscript file it was executed by wscript.exe application. This technique was seen in FIN7 js implant to execute its malicious script using cscript process. This behavior is uncommon and a good artifacts to check further anomalies within the network", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = \"cscript.exe\" AND Processes.parent_process = \"*//e:jscript*\") OR (Processes.process_name = \"cscript.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*//e:jscript*\") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `jscript_execution_using_cscript_app_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html", + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Jscript Execution Using Cscript App", + "analytic_story": [ + "FIN7", + "Remcos" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_macro_js_1/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Process name $process_name$ with commandline $process$ to execute jscript in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.007" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.007", + "mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "Cobalt Group", + "Evilnum", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Higaisa", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.007" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "FIN7", + "Remcos" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.007" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Jscript Execution Using Cscript App Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Jscript Execution Using Cscript App", + "file": "endpoint/jscript_execution_using_cscript_app.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_macro_js_1/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "jscript_execution_using_cscript_app_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/jscript_execution_using_cscript_app.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "MS Scripting Process Loading Ldap Module", + "id": "0b0c40dc-14a6-11ec-b267-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-13", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious MS scripting process such as wscript.exe or cscript.exe that loading ldap module to process ldap query. This behavior was seen in FIN7 implant where it uses javascript to execute ldap query to parse host information that will send to its C2 server. this anomaly detections is a good initial step to hunt further a suspicious ldap query or ldap related events to the host that may give you good information regarding ldap or AD information processing or might be a attacker.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode =7 Image IN (\"*\\\\wscript.exe\", \"*\\\\cscript.exe\") ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\Wldap32.dll\", \"*\\\\adsldp.dll\", \"*\\\\adsldpc.dll\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Image EventCode process_name ProcessId ProcessGuid Computer ImageLoaded | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "automation scripting language may used by network operator to do ldap query.", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html", + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "MS Scripting Process Loading Ldap Module", + "analytic_story": [ + "FIN7" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_js_2/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "$process_name$ loading ldap modules $ImageLoaded$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.007" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Image", + "EventCode", + "process_name", + "ProcessId", + "ProcessGuid", + "Computer", + "ImageLoaded" + ], + "risk_score": 9, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.007", + "mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "Cobalt Group", + "Evilnum", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Higaisa", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.007" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "FIN7" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 30 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 9 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.007" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "MS Scripting Process Loading Ldap Module Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "MS Scripting Process Loading Ldap Module", + "file": "endpoint/ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count >= 2", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_js_2/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "MS Scripting Process Loading WMI Module", + "id": "2eba3d36-14a6-11ec-a682-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-13", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious MS scripting process such as wscript.exe or cscript.exe that loading wmi module to process wmi query. This behavior was seen in FIN7 implant where it uses javascript to execute wmi query to parse host information that will send to its C2 server. this anomaly detections is a good initial step to hunt further a suspicious wmi query or wmi related events to the host that may give you good information regarding process that are commonly using wmi query or modules or might be an attacker using this technique.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode =7 Image IN (\"*\\\\wscript.exe\", \"*\\\\cscript.exe\") ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\fastprox.dll\", \"*\\\\wbemdisp.dll\", \"*\\\\wbemprox.dll\", \"*\\\\wbemsvc.dll\" , \"*\\\\wmiutils.dll\", \"*\\\\wbemcomn.dll\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Image EventCode process_name ProcessId ProcessGuid Computer ImageLoaded | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "automation scripting language may used by network operator to do ldap query.", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html", + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "MS Scripting Process Loading WMI Module", + "analytic_story": [ + "FIN7" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_js_2/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "$process_name$ loading wmi modules $ImageLoaded$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.007" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Image", + "EventCode", + "process_name", + "ProcessId", + "ProcessGuid", + "Computer", + "ImageLoaded" + ], + "risk_score": 9, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.007", + "mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "Cobalt Group", + "Evilnum", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Higaisa", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.007" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "FIN7" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 30 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 9 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.007" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "MS Scripting Process Loading WMI Module Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "MS Scripting Process Loading WMI Module", + "file": "endpoint/ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count >=5", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_js_2/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir", + "id": "81263de4-160a-11ec-944f-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-15", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect an anomaly event of non-chrome process accessing the files in chrome user default folder. This folder contains all the sqlite database of the chrome browser related to users login, history, cookies and etc. Most of the RAT, trojan spy as well as FIN7 jssloader try to parse the those sqlite database to collect information on the compromised host. This SACL Event (4663) need to be enabled to tthe firefox profile directory to be eable to use this. Since you monitoring this access to the folder a noise coming from firefox need to be filter and also sqlite db browser and explorer .exe to make this detection more stable.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 NOT (process_name IN (\"*\\\\chrome.exe\", \"*\\\\explorer.exe\", \"*sql*\")) Object_Name=\"*\\\\Google\\\\Chrome\\\\User Data\\\\Default*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Object_Name Object_Type process_name Access_Mask Accesses process_id EventCode dest user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663. For 4663, enable \"Audit Object Access\" in Group Policy. Then check the two boxes listed for both \"Success\" and \"Failure.\"", + "known_false_positives": "other browser not listed related to firefox may catch by this rule.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir", + "analytic_story": [ + "FIN7", + "Remcos" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_sacl/security2.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "a non firefox browser process $process_name$ accessing $Object_Name$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1555", + "T1555.003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Object_Name", + "Object_Type", + "process_name", + "Access_Mask", + "Accesses", + "process_id", + "EventCode", + "dest", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1555", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "Evilnum", + "FIN6", + "Leafminer", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1555.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT3", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "Ajax Security Team", + "FIN6", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Patchwork", + "Sandworm Team", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA505", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1555", + "T1555.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "FIN7", + "Remcos" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 35 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 35 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1555", + "T1555.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir", + "file": "endpoint/non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "security2.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_sacl/security2.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir", + "id": "e6fc13b0-1609-11ec-b533-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-15", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect an anomaly event of non-firefox process accessing the files in profile folder. This folder contains all the sqlite database of the firefox browser related to users login, history, cookies and etc. Most of the RAT, trojan spy as well as FIN7 jssloader try to parse the those sqlite database to collect information on the compromised host. This SACL Event (4663) need to be enabled to tthe firefox profile directory to be eable to use this. Since you monitoring this access to the folder a noise coming from firefox need to be filter and also sqlite db browser and explorer .exe to make this detection more stable.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 NOT (process_name IN (\"*\\\\firefox.exe\", \"*\\\\explorer.exe\", \"*sql*\")) Object_Name=\"*\\\\AppData\\\\Roaming\\\\Mozilla\\\\Firefox\\\\Profiles*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Object_Name Object_Type process_name Access_Mask Accesses process_id EventCode dest user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663. For 4663, enable \"Audit Object Access\" in Group Policy. Then check the two boxes listed for both \"Success\" and \"Failure.\"", + "known_false_positives": "other browser not listed related to firefox may catch by this rule.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir", + "analytic_story": [ + "FIN7", + "Remcos" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_sacl/security.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "a non firefox browser process $process_name$ accessing $Object_Name$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1555", + "T1555.003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Object_Name", + "Object_Type", + "process_name", + "Access_Mask", + "Accesses", + "process_id", + "EventCode", + "dest", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1555", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "Evilnum", + "FIN6", + "Leafminer", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1555.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT3", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "Ajax Security Team", + "FIN6", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Patchwork", + "Sandworm Team", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA505", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1555", + "T1555.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "FIN7", + "Remcos" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 35 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 35 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1555", + "T1555.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir", + "file": "endpoint/non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_sacl/security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Office Application Drop Executable", + "id": "73ce70c4-146d-11ec-9184-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-13", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Michael Haag Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious MS office application that drop or create executables or script in the host. This behavior is commonly seen in spear phishing office attachment where it drop malicious files or script to compromised the host. It might be some normal macro may drop script or tools as part of automation but still this behavior is reallly suspicious and not commonly seen in normal office application", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\",\"wordpad.exe\",\"wordview.exe\") by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*.exe\",\"*.dll\",\"*.pif\",\"*.scr\",\"*.js\",\"*.vbs\",\"*.vbe\",\"*.ps1\") by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process proc_guid] | dedup file_create_time | table dest, process_name, process, file_create_time, file_name, file_path, proc_guid | `office_application_drop_executable_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "office macro for automation may do this behavior", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html", + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Office Application Drop Executable", + "analytic_story": [ + "FIN7" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_macro_js_1/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "process $process_name$ drops a file $TargetFilename$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Image", + "TargetFilename", + "ProcessGuid", + "dest", + "user_id" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "FIN7" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Office Application Drop Executable Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Office Application Drop Executable", + "file": "endpoint/office_application_drop_executable.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-120d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_macro_js_1/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "office_application_drop_executable_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_application_drop_executable.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Office Product Spawning Wmic", + "id": "ffc236d6-a6c9-11eb-95f1-acde48001122", + "version": 3, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by Ursnif malware family. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `wmic.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `wmic.exe` will contain `wmic process call create`. In addition, Threat Research has released a detection identifying the use of `wmic process call create` on the command-line of `wmic.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `wmic.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\") `process_wmic` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_wmic_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "No false positives known. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/fb894ab8-a966-4b72-920b-935f41756afd/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1047/T1047.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Office Product Spawning Wmic", + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments", + "FIN7" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_macros.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments", + "FIN7" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 63 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process name" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Office Product Spawning Wmic Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Office Product Spawning Wmic", + "file": "endpoint/office_product_spawning_wmic.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon_macros.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_macros.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_wmic", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "office_product_spawning_wmic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_wmic.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App", + "id": "35159940-228f-11ec-8a49-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-10-01", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious wscript commandline to execute vbscript. This technique was seen in several malware to execute malicious vbs file using wscript application. commonly vbs script is associated to cscript process and this can be a technique to evade process parent child detections or even some av script emulation system.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = \"wscript.exe\" AND Processes.parent_process = \"*//e:vbscript*\") OR (Processes.process_name = \"wscript.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*//e:vbscript*\") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `vbscript_execution_using_wscript_app_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/369332/0/html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App", + "analytic_story": [ + "FIN7", + "Remcos" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/vbs_wscript/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Process name $process_name$ with commandline $process$ to execute vbsscript", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059.005", + "T1059" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "FIN4", + "FIN7", + "Frankenstein", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Windshift" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059.005", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "FIN7", + "Remcos" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059.005", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App", + "file": "endpoint/vbscript_execution_using_wscript_app.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/vbs_wscript/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "vbscript_execution_using_wscript_app_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/vbscript_execution_using_wscript_app.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process", + "id": "1f35e1da-267b-11ec-90a9-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-10-06", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies a suspicious spawned process by WScript or CScript process. This technique was a common technique used by adversaries and malware to execute different LOLBIN, other scripts like PowerShell or spawn a suspended process to inject its code as a defense evasion. This TTP may detect some normal script that using several application tool that are in the list of the child process it detects but a good pivot and indicator that a script is may execute suspicious code.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"cscript.exe\", \"wscript.exe\") Processes.process_name IN (\"regsvr32.exe\", \"rundll32.exe\",\"winhlp32.exe\",\"certutil.exe\",\"msbuild.exe\",\"cmd.exe\",\"powershell*\",\"wmic.exe\",\"mshta.exe\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may create vbs or js script that use several tool as part of its execution. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/8da5b75b6380a41eee3a399c43dfe0d99eeefaa1fd21027a07b1ecaa4cd96fdd?environmentId=120", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process", + "analytic_story": [ + "FIN7", + "Remcos", + "Unusual Processes", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/vbs_wscript/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "wscript or cscript parent process spawned $process_name$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1055", + "T1543", + "T1134.004", + "T1134" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Cobalt Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sharpshooter", + "Silence", + "Turla" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1134.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Parent PID Spoofing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1134", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Blue Mockingbird", + "FIN6" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1055", + "T1543", + "T1134.004", + "T1134" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "FIN7", + "Remcos", + "Unusual Processes", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1055", + "T1543", + "T1134.004", + "T1134" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process", + "file": "endpoint/wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/vbs_wscript/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "XSL Script Execution With WMIC", + "id": "004e32e2-146d-11ec-a83f-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-13", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious wmic.exe process or renamed wmic process to execute malicious xsl file. This technique was seen in FIN7 to execute its malicous jscript using the .xsl as the loader with the help of wmic.exe process. This TTP is really a good indicator for you to hunt further for FIN7 or other attacker that known to used this technique.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` Processes.process = \"*os get*\" Processes.process=\"*/format:*\" Processes.process = \"*.xsl*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `xsl_script_execution_with_wmic_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html", + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046/", + "https://web.archive.org/web/20190814201250/https://subt0x11.blogspot.com/2018/04/wmicexe-whitelisting-bypass-hacking.html", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1220/T1220.md#atomic-test-3---wmic-bypass-using-local-xsl-file" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "XSL Script Execution With WMIC", + "analytic_story": [ + "FIN7", + "Suspicious WMI Use" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_macro_js_1/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ utilizing wmic to load a XSL script.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1220" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1220", + "mitre_attack_technique": "XSL Script Processing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Cobalt Group", + "Higaisa" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1220" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "FIN7", + "Suspicious WMI Use" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1220" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "XSL Script Execution With WMIC Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "XSL Script Execution With WMIC", + "file": "endpoint/xsl_script_execution_with_wmic.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_macro_js_1/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_wmic", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "xsl_script_execution_with_wmic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/xsl_script_execution_with_wmic.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [] + }, + { + "name": "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "id": "0432039c-ef41-4b03-b157-450c25dad1e6", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-09-01", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "description": "Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another GCP account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity.", + "narrative": "Google Cloud Platform (GCP) admins manage access to GCP resources and services across the enterprise using GCP Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage GCP users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as Compute instances, the GCP Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are potentially assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\\\nIn between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\\\nThis Analytic Story includes searches that will help you monitor your GCP Audit logs logs for evidence of suspicious cross-account activity. For example, while accessing multiple GCP accounts and roles may be perfectly valid behavior, it may be suspicious when an account requests privileges of an account it has not accessed in the past. After identifying suspicious activities, you can use the provided investigative searches to help you probe more deeply.", + "references": [ + "https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-service-accounts" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "analytic_story": "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "category": [ + "Cloud Security" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Security Monitoring", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "datamodels": [], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule", + "ESCU - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule", + "ESCU - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule", + "ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Rod Soto", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project", + "id": "27af8c15-38b0-4408-b339-920170724adb", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-10-09", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides detection of accounts with high risk roles by projects. Compromised accounts with high risk roles can move laterally or even scalate privileges at different projects depending on organization schema.", + "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.request.policy.bindings{}.role=roles/owner OR roles/editor OR roles/iam.serviceAccountUser OR roles/iam.serviceAccountAdmin OR roles/iam.serviceAccountTokenCreator OR roles/dataflow.developer OR roles/dataflow.admin OR roles/composer.admin OR roles/dataproc.admin OR roles/dataproc.editor | table data.resource.type data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.resource data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.role data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.members{} | `gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message logs", + "known_false_positives": "Accounts with high risk roles should be reduced to the minimum number needed, however specific tasks and setups may be simply expected behavior within organization", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/dxa4481/gcploit", + "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ml09R38jpok", + "https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-roles" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project", + "analytic_story": [ + "GCP Cross Account Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "GCP Account", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "data.protoPayload.request.policy.bindings{}.role", + "data.resource.type data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail", + "data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission", + "data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.resource", + "data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.role", + "data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.members{}" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "GCP Cross Account Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account", + "id": "2e70ef35-2187-431f-aedc-4503dc9b06ba", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-10-09", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides detection of high risk permissions by resource and accounts. These are permissions that can allow attackers with compromised accounts to move laterally and escalate privileges.", + "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission=iam.serviceAccounts.getaccesstoken OR iam.serviceAccounts.setIamPolicy OR iam.serviceAccounts.actas OR dataflow.jobs.create OR composer.environments.create OR dataproc.clusters.create |table data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.members{} data.resource.labels.project_id | `gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message logs", + "known_false_positives": "High risk permissions are part of any GCP environment, however it is important to track resource and accounts usage, this search may produce false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/dxa4481/gcploit", + "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ml09R38jpok", + "https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/permissions-reference" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account", + "analytic_story": [ + "GCP Cross Account Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "GCP Account", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission", + "data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp", + "data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail", + "data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission", + "data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.members{}", + "data.resource.labels.project_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "GCP Cross Account Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "gcp detect oauth token abuse", + "id": "a7e9f7bb-8901-4ad0-8d88-0a4ab07b1972", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-09-01", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides detection of possible GCP Oauth token abuse. GCP Oauth token without time limit can be exfiltrated and reused for keeping access sessions alive without further control of authentication, allowing attackers to access and move laterally.", + "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` type.googleapis.com/google.cloud.audit.AuditLog |table protoPayload.@type protoPayload.status.details{}.@type protoPayload.status.details{}.violations{}.callerIp protoPayload.status.details{}.violations{}.type protoPayload.status.message | `gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message logs", + "known_false_positives": "GCP Oauth token abuse detection will only work if there are access policies in place along with audit logs.", + "references": [ + "https://www.netskope.com/blog/gcp-oauth-token-hijacking-in-google-cloud-part-1", + "https://www.netskope.com/blog/gcp-oauth-token-hijacking-in-google-cloud-part-2" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "gcp detect oauth token abuse", + "analytic_story": [ + "GCP Cross Account Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "GCP Account", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "GCP Cross Account Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "GCP Detect gcploit framework", + "id": "a1c5a85e-a162-410c-a5d9-99ff639e5a52", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-10-08", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides detection of GCPloit exploitation framework. This framework can be used to escalate privileges and move laterally from compromised high privilege accounts.", + "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.request.function.timeout=539s | table src src_user data.resource.labels.project_id data.protoPayload.request.function.serviceAccountEmail data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission data.protoPayload.request.location http_user_agent | `gcp_detect_gcploit_framework_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message logs", + "known_false_positives": "Payload.request.function.timeout value can possibly be match with other functions or requests however the source user and target request account may indicate an attempt to move laterally accross acounts or projects", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/dxa4481/gcploit", + "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ml09R38jpok" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "GCP Detect gcploit framework", + "analytic_story": [ + "GCP Cross Account Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "GCP Account", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "data.protoPayload.request.function.timeout", + "src", + "src_user", + "data.resource.labels.project_id", + "data.protoPayload.request.function.serviceAccountEmail", + "data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission", + "data.protoPayload.request.location", + "http_user_agent" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "GCP Cross Account Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "gcp_detect_gcploit_framework_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.yml", + "source": "cloud" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "HAFNIUM Group", + "id": "beae2ab0-7c3f-11eb-8b63-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-03-03", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "description": "HAFNIUM group was identified by Microsoft as exploiting 4 Microsoft Exchange CVEs in the wild - CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858 and CVE-2021-27065.", + "narrative": "On Tuesday, March 2, 2021, Microsoft released a set of security patches for its mail server, Microsoft Exchange. These patches respond to a group of vulnerabilities known to impact Exchange 2013, 2016, and 2019. It is important to note that an Exchange 2010 security update has also been issued, though the CVEs do not reference that version as being vulnerable.\\\nWhile the CVEs do not shed much light on the specifics of the vulnerabilities or exploits, the first vulnerability (CVE-2021-26855) has a remote network attack vector that allows the attacker, a group Microsoft named HAFNIUM, to authenticate as the Exchange server. Three additional vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065) were also identified as part of this activity. When chained together along with CVE-2021-26855 for initial access, the attacker would have complete control over the Exchange server. This includes the ability to run code as SYSTEM and write to any path on the server.\\\nThe following Splunk detections assist with identifying the HAFNIUM groups tradecraft and methodology.", + "references": [ + "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-hafnium-exchange-server-zero-day-activity-in-splunk.html", + "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/", + "https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/03/03/rapid7s-insightidr-enables-detection-and-response-to-microsoft-exchange-0-day/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "HAFNIUM Group", + "analytic_story": "HAFNIUM Group", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cleaver", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Whitefly" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Volatile Cedar" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT3", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Fox Kitten", + "Leafminer", + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Indrik Spider", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Operation Wocao", + "Orangeworm", + "Sandworm Team", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1569", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "FIN6", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Operation Wocao", + "Silence", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Fox Kitten", + "HAFNIUM", + "Mustang Panda", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Magic Hound", + "Silent Librarian" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN4", + "HAFNIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "Leafminer" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection", + "Credential Access", + "Execution", + "Initial Access", + "Lateral Movement", + "Persistence" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint", + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Command & Control", + "Exploitation", + "Installation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", + "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Exchange Web Shell - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", + "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", + "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", + "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", + "ESCU - Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine - Rule", + "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", + "ESCU - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", + "ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", + "ESCU - Unified Messaging Service Spawning a Process - Rule", + "ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule", + "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Michael Haag", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Dump LSASS via procdump Rename", + "id": "21276daa-663d-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-02-01", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "Detect a renamed instance of procdump.exe dumping the lsass process. This query looks for both -mm and -ma usage. -mm will produce a mini dump file and -ma will write a dump file with all process memory. Both are highly suspect and should be reviewed. Modify the query as needed.\\\nDuring triage, confirm this is procdump.exe executing. If it is the first time a Sysinternals utility has been ran, it is possible there will be a -accepteula on the command line. Review other endpoint data sources for cross process (injection) into lsass.exe.", + "search": "`sysmon` OriginalFileName=procdump process_name!=procdump*.exe EventID=1 (CommandLine=*-ma* OR CommandLine=*-mm*) CommandLine=*lsass* | rename Computer as dest | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, parent_process_name, process_name, OriginalFileName, CommandLine | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procdump", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md#atomic-test-2---dump-lsassexe-memory-using-procdump" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Dump LSASS via procdump Rename", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "HAFNIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$, attempting to dump lsass.exe.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "OriginalFileName", + "process_name", + "EventID", + "CommandLine", + "Computer", + "parent_process_name" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cleaver", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Whitefly" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "HAFNIUM Group" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Any Powershell DownloadString", + "id": "4d015ef2-7adf-11eb-95da-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-03-01", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a file using `DownloadString` method. This particular method is utilized in many different PowerShell frameworks to download files and output to disk. Identify the source (IP/domain) and destination file and triage appropriately. If AMSI logging or PowerShell transaction logs are available, review for further details of the implant.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process=*.DownloadString* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `any_powershell_downloadstring_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present and filtering will need to occur by parent process or command line argument. It may be required to modify this query to an EDR product for more granular coverage.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.net.webclient.downloadstring?view=net-5.0", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Any Powershell DownloadString", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell", + "HAFNIUM Group", + "Ingress Tool Transfer" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior identifies the use of DownloadString within PowerShell.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell", + "HAFNIUM Group", + "Ingress Tool Transfer" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Any Powershell DownloadString Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Any Powershell DownloadString", + "file": "endpoint/any_powershell_downloadstring.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_powershell", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "any_powershell_downloadstring_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadstring.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Exchange Web Shell", + "id": "8c14eeee-2af1-4a4b-bda8-228da0f4862a", + "version": 3, + "date": "2021-10-05", + "author": "Michael Haag, Shannon Davis, David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following query identifies suspicious .aspx created in 3 paths identified by Microsoft as known drop locations for Exchange exploitation related to HAFNIUM group and recently disclosed vulnerablity named ProxyShell. Paths include: `\\HttpProxy\\owa\\auth\\`, `\\inetpub\\wwwroot\\aspnet_client\\`, and `\\HttpProxy\\OAB\\`. Upon triage, the suspicious .aspx file will likely look obvious on the surface. inspect the contents for script code inside. Identify additional log sources, IIS included, to review source and other potential exploitation. It is often the case that a particular threat is only applicable to a specific subset of systems in your environment. Typically analytics to detect those threats are written without the benefit of being able to only target those systems as well. Writing analytics against all systems when those behaviors are limited to identifiable subsets of those systems is suboptimal. Consider the case ProxyShell vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Servers. With asset information, a hunter can limit their analytics to systems that have been identified as Exchange servers. A hunter may start with the theory that the exchange server is communicating with new systems that it has not previously. If this theory is run against all publicly facing systems, the amount of noise it will generate will likely render this theory untenable. However, using the asset information to limit this analytic to just the Exchange servers will reduce the noise allowing the hunter to focus only on the systems where this behavioral change is relevant.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=System by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*\\\\HttpProxy\\\\owa\\\\auth\\\\*\", \"*\\\\inetpub\\\\wwwroot\\\\aspnet_client\\\\*\", \"*\\\\HttpProxy\\\\OAB\\\\*\") Filesystem.file_name=\"*.aspx\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process] | dedup file_create_time | table dest file_create_time, file_name, file_path, process_name | `detect_exchange_web_shell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node and `Filesystem` node.", + "known_false_positives": "The query is structured in a way that `action` (read, create) is not defined. Review the results of this query, filter, and tune as necessary. It may be necessary to generate this query specific to your endpoint product.", + "references": [ + "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample%20Data/Feeds/MSTICIoCs-ExchangeServerVulnerabilitiesDisclosedMarch2021.csv", + "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/8/17/from-pwn2own-2021-a-new-attack-surface-on-microsoft-exchange-proxyshell", + "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FC6iHw258RI", + "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-microsoft-exchange-servers-still-vulnerable-to-proxyshell-exploit#what-should-you-do" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Exchange Web Shell", + "analytic_story": [ + "HAFNIUM Group", + "ProxyShell" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/windows-sysmon_proxylogon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk that is related to IIS exploitation previously performed by HAFNIUM. Review further file modifications on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1505", + "T1505.003", + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_name", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.file_path", + "Filesystem.process_id", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.file_hash", + "Filesystem.user" + ], + "risk_score": 81, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Volatile Cedar" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1505", + "T1505.003", + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "HAFNIUM Group", + "ProxyShell" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_name", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 81 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 81 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "file_name", + "threat_object_type": "file name" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1505", + "T1505.003", + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Exchange Web Shell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Exchange Web Shell", + "file": "endpoint/detect_exchange_web_shell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/windows-sysmon_proxylogon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_exchange_web_shell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_exchange_web_shell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect New Local Admin account", + "id": "b25f6f62-0712-43c1-b203-083231ffd97d", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-08", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for newly created accounts that have been elevated to local administrators.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4720 OR (EventCode=4732 Group_Name=Administrators) | transaction member_id connected=false maxspan=180m | rename member_id as user | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_new_local_admin_account_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Windows event logs using the Splunk Windows TA and collecting event code 4720 and 4732", + "known_false_positives": "The activity may be legitimate. For this reason, it's best to verify the account with an administrator and ask whether there was a valid service request for the account creation. If your local administrator group name is not \"Administrators\", this search may generate an excessive number of false positives", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect New Local Admin account", + "analytic_story": [ + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "HAFNIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Windows", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Command & Control" + ], + "message": "A $user$ on $dest$ was added recently. Identify if this was legitimate behavior or not.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1136.001", + "T1136" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Group_Name", + "member_id", + "dest", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "access", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT3", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Fox Kitten", + "Leafminer", + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Indrik Spider", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1136.001", + "T1136" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "HAFNIUM Group" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 42 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 42 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1136.001", + "T1136" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect New Local Admin account Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect New Local Admin account", + "file": "endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + }, + { + "file_name": "windows-system.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:System", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + }, + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_new_local_admin_account_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag", + "id": "27c3a83d-cada-47c6-9042-67baf19d2574", + "version": 4, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for events where `PsExec.exe` is run with the `accepteula` flag in the command line. PsExec is a built-in Windows utility that enables you to execute processes on other systems. It is fully interactive for console applications. This tool is widely used for launching interactive command prompts on remote systems. Threat actors leverage this extensively for executing code on compromised systems. If an attacker is running PsExec for the first time, they will be prompted to accept the end-user license agreement (EULA), which can be passed as the argument `accepteula` within the command line.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_psexec` Processes.process=*accepteula* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators can leverage PsExec for accessing remote systems and might pass `accepteula` as an argument if they are running this tool for the first time. However, it is not likely that you'd see multiple occurrences of this event on a machine", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag", + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "HAFNIUM Group", + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ running the utility for possibly the first time.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.002" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Operation Wocao", + "Orangeworm", + "Sandworm Team", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "HAFNIUM Group", + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 35 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 35 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag", + "file": "endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_psexec", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=psexec.exe OR Processes.process_name=psexec64.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=psexec.c)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Renamed PSExec", + "id": "683e6196-b8e8-11eb-9a79-acde48001122", + "version": 3, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies renamed instances of `PsExec.exe` being utilized on an endpoint. Most instances, it is highly probable to capture `Psexec.exe` or other SysInternal utility usage with the command-line argument of `-accepteula`. During triage, validate this is the legitimate version of `PsExec` by reviewing the PE metadata. In addition, review parallel processes for further suspicious behavior.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_psexec` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_renamed_psexec_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives should be present. It is possible some third party applications may use older versions of PsExec, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1569.002/T1569.002.yaml", + "https://redcanary.com/blog/threat-hunting-psexec-lateral-movement/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Renamed PSExec", + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "HAFNIUM Group", + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Collection" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1569.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1569", + "T1569.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 27, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1569", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "FIN6", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Operation Wocao", + "Silence", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1569", + "T1569.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "HAFNIUM Group", + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Collection" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 27 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 27 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1569", + "T1569.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Renamed PSExec Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Renamed PSExec", + "file": "endpoint/detect_renamed_psexec.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1569.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_psexec", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=psexec.exe OR Processes.process_name=psexec64.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=psexec.c)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_renamed_psexec_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_renamed_psexec.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL", + "id": "8943b567-f14d-4ee8-a0bb-2121d4ce3184", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-02-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "Detect the usage of comsvcs.dll for dumping the lsass process.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*comsvcs.dll* Processes.process=*MiniDump* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified.", + "references": [ + "https://modexp.wordpress.com/2019/08/30/minidumpwritedump-via-com-services-dll/", + "https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1167417096374050817" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", + "HAFNIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified accessing credentials using comsvcs.dll on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cleaver", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Whitefly" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", + "HAFNIUM Group" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL", + "file": "endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Dump LSASS via procdump", + "id": "3742ebfe-64c2-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "Detect procdump.exe dumping the lsass process. This query looks for both -mm and -ma usage. -mm will produce a mini dump file and -ma will write a dump file with all process memory. Both are highly suspect and should be reviewed. This query does not monitor for the internal name (original_file_name=procdump) of the PE or look for procdump64.exe. Modify the query as needed.\\\nDuring triage, confirm this is procdump.exe executing. If it is the first time a Sysinternals utility has been ran, it is possible there will be a -accepteula on the command line. Review other endpoint data sources for cross process (injection) into lsass.exe.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_procdump` (Processes.process=*-ma* OR Processes.process=*-mm*) Processes.process=*lsass* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dump_lsass_via_procdump_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procdump", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md#atomic-test-2---dump-lsassexe-memory-using-procdump" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Dump LSASS via procdump", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "HAFNIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified attempting to dump lsass.exe on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cleaver", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Whitefly" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "HAFNIUM Group" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Dump LSASS via procdump Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Dump LSASS via procdump", + "file": "endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_procdump", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=procdump.exe OR Processes.process_name=procdump64.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=procdump)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "dump_lsass_via_procdump_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass", + "id": "9be56c82-b1cc-4318-87eb-d138afaaca39", + "version": 5, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for PowerShell processes started with parameters used to bypass the local execution policy for scripts. These parameters are often observed in attacks leveraging PowerShell scripts as they override the default PowerShell execution policy.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process_id) as process_id, values(Processes.parent_process_id) as parent_process_id values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process=\"* -ex*\" OR Processes.process=\"* bypass *\") by Processes.process_id, Processes.user, Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "There may be legitimate reasons to bypass the PowerShell execution policy. The PowerShell script being run with this parameter should be validated to ensure that it is legitimate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass", + "analytic_story": [ + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "HAFNIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 7", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/encoded_powershell/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "PowerShell local execution policy bypass attempt on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 7", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "HAFNIUM Group" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 42 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 7", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass", + "file": "endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/encoded_powershell/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_powershell", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine", + "id": "1a382c6c-7c2e-11eb-ac69-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-03-03", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This query detects the Nishang Invoke-PowerShellTCPOneLine utility that spawns a call back to a remote command and control server. This is a powershell oneliner. In addition, this will capture on the command-line additional utilities used by Nishang. Triage the endpoint and identify any parallel processes that look suspicious. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain contacted by the powershell process.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process=*Net.Sockets.TCPClient* AND Processes.process=*System.Text.ASCIIEncoding*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `nishang_powershelltcponeline_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives may be present. Filter as needed based on initial analysis.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/samratashok/nishang/blob/master/Shells/Invoke-PowerShellTcpOneLine.ps1", + "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/", + "https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/03/03/rapid7s-insightidr-enables-detection-and-response-to-microsoft-exchange-0-day/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine", + "analytic_story": [ + "HAFNIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Command And Control" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Possible Nishang Invoke-PowerShellTCPOneLine behavior on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "HAFNIUM Group" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Command And Control" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 42 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine", + "file": "endpoint/nishang_powershelltcponeline.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_powershell", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "nishang_powershelltcponeline_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/nishang_powershelltcponeline.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Ntdsutil Export NTDS", + "id": "da63bc76-61ae-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-01-28", + "author": "Michael Haag, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "Monitor for signs that Ntdsutil is being used to Extract Active Directory database - NTDS.dit, typically used for offline password cracking. It may be used in normal circumstances with no command line arguments or shorthand variations of more common arguments. Ntdsutil.exe is typically seen run on a Windows Server. Typical command used to dump ntds.dit \\\nntdsutil \"ac i ntds\" \"ifm\" \"create full C:\\Temp\" q q \\\nThis technique uses \"Install from Media\" (IFM), which will extract a copy of the Active Directory database. A successful export of the Active Directory database will yield a file modification named ntds.dit to the destination.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=ntdsutil.exe Processes.process=*ntds* Processes.process=*create*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ntdsutil_export_ntds_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "Highly possible Server Administrators will troubleshoot with ntdsutil.exe, generating false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.003/T1003.003.md#atomic-test-3---dump-active-directory-database-with-ntdsutil", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc753343(v=ws.11)", + "https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf", + "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/vss_ps.dll-97B15BDAE9777F454C9A6BA25E938DB3.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Ntdsutil Export NTDS", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "HAFNIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 100, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Active Directory NTDS export on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.003", + "T1003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 50, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Fox Kitten", + "HAFNIUM", + "Mustang Panda", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.003", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "HAFNIUM Group" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "impact": 100, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 50 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.003", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Ntdsutil Export NTDS Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Ntdsutil Export NTDS", + "file": "endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "ntdsutil_export_ntds_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window", + "id": "ee18ed37-0802-4268-9435-b3b91aaa18db", + "version": 8, + "date": "2022-01-12", + "author": "David Dorsey, Michael Haag Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following hunting analytic identifies PowerShell commands utilizing the WindowStyle parameter to hide the window on the compromised endpoint. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it is overriding the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide its activity from the user, and connects to the Internet. Removed in this version of the query is New-Object. The analytic identifies all variations of WindowStyle, as PowerShell allows the ability to shorten the parameter. For example w, win, windowsty and so forth. In addition, through our research it was identified that PowerShell will interpret different command switch types beyond the hyphen. We have added endash, emdash, horizontal bar, and forward slash.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"(?i)[\\-|\\/|–|—|―]w(in*d*o*w*s*t*y*l*e*)*\\s+[^-]\") | `powershell___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate process can have this combination of command-line options, but it's not common.", + "references": [ + "https://regexr.com/663rr", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses/blob/master/TestHarnesses/T1059.001_PowerShell/OutPowerShellCommandLineParameter.ps1", + "https://ss64.com/ps/powershell.html", + "https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/1440758396534214658?s=20", + "https://blog.netlab.360.com/ten-families-of-malicious-samples-are-spreading-using-the-log4j2-vulnerability-now/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "HAFNIUM Group", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 7", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Command And Control" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/hidden_powershell/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "PowerShell processes $process$ started with parameters to modify the execution policy of the run, run in a hidden window, and connect to the Internet on host $dest$ executed by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059.001", + "T1059" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 81, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059.001", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 7", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "HAFNIUM Group", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Command And Control" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 90, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 81 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 81 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059.001", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 7", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window", + "file": "endpoint/powershell___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/hidden_powershell/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_powershell", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "powershell___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass", + "id": "c2590137-0b08-4985-9ec5-6ae23d92f63d", + "version": 7, + "date": "2022-02-18", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "Monitor for changes of the ExecutionPolicy in the registry to the values \"unrestricted\" or \"bypass,\" which allows the execution of malicious scripts.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*Software\\\\Microsoft\\\\Powershell\\\\1\\\\ShellIds\\\\Microsoft.PowerShell* Registry.registry_value_name=ExecutionPolicy (Registry.registry_value_data=Unrestricted OR Registry.registry_value_data=Bypass) by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Registry node. You must also be ingesting logs with the fields registry_path, registry_key_name, and registry_value_name from your endpoints.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may attempt to change the default execution policy on a system for a variety of reasons. However, setting the policy to \"unrestricted\" or \"bypass\" as this search is designed to identify, would be unusual. Hits should be reviewed and investigated as appropriate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Credential Dumping", + "HAFNIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_execution_policy/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A registry modification in $registry_path$ with reg key $registry_key_name$ and reg value $registry_value_name$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "registry_path", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 48, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Credential Dumping", + "HAFNIUM Group" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "registry_path", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 48 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "registry_path", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass", + "file": "endpoint/set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_execution_policy/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Unified Messaging Service Spawning a Process", + "id": "f1126df0-7bd5-11eb-988f-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-03-02", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This detection identifies Microsoft Exchange Server's Unified Messaging services, umworkerprocess.exe and umservice.exe, spawning a child process, indicating possible exploitation of CVE-2021-26857 vulnerability. The query filters out werfault.exe and wermgr.exe mostly due to potential false positives, however, if there is an excessive amount of \"wermgr.exe\" or \"WerFault.exe\" failures, it may be due to the active exploitation. During triage, identify any additional suspicious parallel processes. Identify any recent out of place file modifications. Review Exchange logs following Microsofts guide. To contain, perform egress filtering or restrict public access to Exchange. In final, patch the vulnerablity and monitor.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=\"umworkerprocess.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name=\"UMService.exe\" (Processes.process_name!=\"wermgr.exe\" OR Processes.process_name!=\"werfault.exe\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `unified_messaging_service_spawning_a_process_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown. Tune out child processes as needed to limit volume of false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/", + "https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/03/03/rapid7s-insightidr-enables-detection-and-response-to-microsoft-exchange-0-day/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Unified Messaging Service Spawning a Process", + "analytic_story": [ + "HAFNIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/windows-sysmon_umservices.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Possible CVE-2021-26857 exploitation on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-26857" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "HAFNIUM Group" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-26857" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Unified Messaging Service Spawning a Process Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Unified Messaging Service Spawning a Process", + "file": "endpoint/unified_messaging_service_spawning_a_process.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/windows-sysmon_umservices.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "unified_messaging_service_spawning_a_process_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/unified_messaging_service_spawning_a_process.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "W3WP Spawning Shell", + "id": "0f03423c-7c6a-11eb-bc47-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-03-03", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This query identifies a shell, PowerShell.exe or Cmd.exe, spawning from W3WP.exe, or IIS. In addition to IIS logs, this behavior with an EDR product will capture potential webshell activity, similar to the HAFNIUM Group abusing CVEs, on publicly available Exchange mail servers. During triage, review the parent process and child process of the shell being spawned. Review the command-line arguments and any file modifications that may occur. Identify additional parallel process, child processes, that may highlight further commands executed. After triaging, work to contain the threat and patch the system that is vulnerable.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=w3wp.exe AND `process_cmd` OR `process_powershell` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `w3wp_spawning_shell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Baseline your environment before production. It is possible build systems using IIS will spawn cmd.exe to perform a software build. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/02/04/ghost-in-the-shell-investigating-web-shell-attacks/", + "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/8/17/from-pwn2own-2021-a-new-attack-surface-on-microsoft-exchange-proxyshell", + "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FC6iHw258RI", + "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-microsoft-exchange-servers-still-vulnerable-to-proxyshell-exploit#what-should-you-do" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "W3WP Spawning Shell", + "analytic_story": [ + "HAFNIUM Group", + "ProxyShell" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Possible Web Shell execution on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1505", + "T1505.003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-34473", + "CVE-2021-34523", + "CVE-2021-31207" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Volatile Cedar" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1505", + "T1505.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "HAFNIUM Group", + "ProxyShell" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-34473", + "CVE-2021-34523", + "CVE-2021-31207" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1505", + "T1505.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "W3WP Spawning Shell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "W3WP Spawning Shell", + "file": "endpoint/w3wp_spawning_shell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_powershell", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "process_cmd", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "w3wp_spawning_shell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/w3wp_spawning_shell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts", + "id": "7f5fb3e1-4209-4914-90db-0ec21b556378", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search looks for an increase of data transfers from your email server to your clients. This could be indicative of a malicious actor collecting data using your email server.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` sum(All_Traffic.bytes_out) as bytes_out from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.src_category=email_server by All_Traffic.dest_ip _time span=1d | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | eventstats avg(bytes_out) as avg_bytes_out stdev(bytes_out) as stdev_bytes_out | eventstats count as num_data_samples avg(eval(if(_time < relative_time(now(), \"@d\"), bytes_out, null))) as per_source_avg_bytes_out stdev(eval(if(_time < relative_time(now(), \"@d\"), bytes_out, null))) as per_source_stdev_bytes_out by dest_ip | eval minimum_data_samples = 4, deviation_threshold = 3 | where num_data_samples >= minimum_data_samples AND bytes_out > (avg_bytes_out + (deviation_threshold * stdev_bytes_out)) AND bytes_out > (per_source_avg_bytes_out + (deviation_threshold * per_source_stdev_bytes_out)) AND _time >= relative_time(now(), \"@d\") | eval num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average = round(abs(bytes_out - avg_bytes_out) / stdev_bytes_out, 2), num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average = round(abs(bytes_out - per_source_avg_bytes_out) / per_source_stdev_bytes_out, 2) | table dest_ip, _time, bytes_out, avg_bytes_out, per_source_avg_bytes_out, num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average, num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average | `email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model. Your email servers must be categorized as \"email_server\" for the search to work, as well. You may need to adjust the deviation_threshold and minimum_data_samples values based on the network traffic in your environment. The \"deviation_threshold\" field is a multiplying factor to control how much variation you're willing to tolerate. The \"minimum_data_samples\" field is the minimum number of connections of data samples required for the statistic to be valid.", + "known_false_positives": "The false-positive rate will vary based on how you set the deviation_threshold and data_samples values. Our recommendation is to adjust these values based on your network traffic to and from your email servers.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts", + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging", + "HAFNIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 7" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1114", + "T1114.002" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.bytes_out", + "All_Traffic.src_category", + "All_Traffic.dest_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Magic Hound", + "Silent Librarian" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN4", + "HAFNIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "Leafminer" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1114", + "T1114.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 7" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging", + "HAFNIUM Group" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1114", + "T1114.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 7" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml", + "source": "application" + } + ], + "investigations": [] + }, + { + "name": "Hermetic Wiper", + "id": "b7511c2e-9a10-11ec-99e3-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-03-02", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Rod Soto, Michael Haag, Splunk", + "description": "This analytic story contains detections that allow security analysts to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the destructive malware targeting Ukrainian organizations also known as \"Hermetic Wiper\". This analytic story looks for abuse of Regsvr32, executables written in administrative SMB Share, suspicious processes, disabling of memory crash dump and more.", + "narrative": "Hermetic Wiper is destructive malware operation found by Sentinel One targeting multiple organizations in Ukraine. This malicious payload corrupts Master Boot Records, uses signed drivers and manipulates NTFS attributes for file destruction.", + "references": [ + "https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/hermetic-wiper-ukraine-under-attack/", + "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-057a" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Hermetic Wiper", + "analytic_story": "Hermetic Wiper", + "category": [ + "Malware", + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Operation Wocao", + "Orangeworm", + "Sandworm Team", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cobalt Group", + "Deep Panda", + "Inception", + "Leviathan", + "TA551", + "WIRTE" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN8", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1561.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT37", + "APT38", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1561", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Execution", + "Impact", + "Lateral Movement", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", + "ESCU - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule", + "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", + "ESCU - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Rod Soto, Michael Haag, Splunk", + "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", + "id": "54a6ed00-3256-11ec-b031-acde48001122", + "version": 3, + "date": "2022-01-18", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies command-line arguments where `cmd.exe /c` is used to execute a program. `cmd /c` is used to run commands in MS-DOS and terminate after command or process completion. This technique is commonly seen in adversaries and malware to execute batch command using different shell like PowerShell or different process other than `cmd.exe`. This is a good hunting query for suspicious command-line made by a script or relative process execute it.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` AND Processes.process=\"* /c *\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives may be high based on legitimate scripted code in any environment. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228", + "WhisperGate", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/cmd_carry_str_param/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting spawn a new process.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059.003", + "T1059" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 30, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059.003", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228", + "WhisperGate", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 30 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 30 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059.003", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", + "file": "endpoint/cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/cmd_carry_str_param/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_cmd", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share", + "id": "f63c34fe-a435-11eb-935a-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-11-18", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies executable files (.exe or .dll) being written to Windows administrative SMB shares (Admin$, IPC$, C$). This represents suspicious behavior as its commonly used by tools like like PsExec/PaExec and others to stage service binaries before creating and starting a Windows service on remote endpoints. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse administrative shares for lateral movement and remote code execution. The Trickbot malware family also implements this behavior to try to infect other machines in the infected network.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=5145 Relative_Target_Name IN (\"*.exe\",\"*.dll\") Object_Type=File Share_Name IN (\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\C$\",\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\IPC$\",\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\admin$\") Access_Mask= \"0x2\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by EventCode Share_Name Relative_Target_Name Object_Type Access_Mask user src_port Source_Address | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 5145 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required. Also enable the object Audit access success/failure in your group policy.", + "known_false_positives": "System Administrators may use looks like PsExec for troubleshooting or administrations tasks. However, this will typically come only from certain users and certain systems that can be added to an allow list.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002/", + "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2013/03/09/psexec-demystified/", + "https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/", + "https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement", + "Trickbot", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/exe_smbshare/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "$user$ dropped or created an executable file in known sensitive SMB share. Share name=$Share_Name$, Target name=$Relative_Target_Name$, and Access mask=$Access_Mask$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Share_Name", + "Relative_Target_Name", + "Object_Type", + "Access_Mask", + "user", + "src_port", + "Source_Address" + ], + "risk_score": 70, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Operation Wocao", + "Orangeworm", + "Sandworm Team", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement", + "Trickbot", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 70 + } + ], + "playbooks": [ + { + "name": "Delete Detected Files", + "id": "fc0edc96-ff2b-48b0-9a6f-63da6783fd63", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-03-29", + "author": "Philip Royer, Splunk", + "type": "Response", + "description": "This playbook acts upon events where a file has been determined to be malicious (ie webshells being dropped on an end host). Before deleting the file, we run a \"more\" command on the file in question to extract its contents. We then run a delete on the file in question.", + "how_to_implement": "This playbook reads and then deletes files stored with artifact:*.cef.filePath from hosts stored in artifact:*.cef.destinationAddress. Windows Remote Management must be enabled on the remote computer.", + "playbook": "delete_detected_files", + "references": [], + "app_list": [ + "Windows Remote Management" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "detections": [ + "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share" + ], + "platform_tags": [], + "playbook_fields": [ + "filePath", + "destinationAddress" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk SOAR" + ], + "detection_objects": [ + { + "name": "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share", + "id": "f63c34fe-a435-11eb-935a-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-11-18", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies executable files (.exe or .dll) being written to Windows administrative SMB shares (Admin$, IPC$, C$). This represents suspicious behavior as its commonly used by tools like like PsExec/PaExec and others to stage service binaries before creating and starting a Windows service on remote endpoints. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse administrative shares for lateral movement and remote code execution. The Trickbot malware family also implements this behavior to try to infect other machines in the infected network.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=5145 Relative_Target_Name IN (\"*.exe\",\"*.dll\") Object_Type=File Share_Name IN (\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\C$\",\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\IPC$\",\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\admin$\") Access_Mask= \"0x2\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by EventCode Share_Name Relative_Target_Name Object_Type Access_Mask user src_port Source_Address | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 5145 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required. Also enable the object Audit access success/failure in your group policy.", + "known_false_positives": "System Administrators may use looks like PsExec for troubleshooting or administrations tasks. However, this will typically come only from certain users and certain systems that can be added to an allow list.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002/", + "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2013/03/09/psexec-demystified/", + "https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/", + "https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement", + "Trickbot", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/exe_smbshare/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "$user$ dropped or created an executable file in known sensitive SMB share. Share name=$Share_Name$, Target name=$Relative_Target_Name$, and Access mask=$Access_Mask$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Share_Name", + "Relative_Target_Name", + "Object_Type", + "Access_Mask", + "user", + "src_port", + "Source_Address" + ], + "risk_score": 70, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Operation Wocao", + "Orangeworm", + "Sandworm Team", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement", + "Trickbot", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 70 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share", + "file": "endpoint/executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/exe_smbshare/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ] + } + } + ], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share", + "file": "endpoint/executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/exe_smbshare/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", + "id": "a7e3f0f0-ae42-11eb-b245-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-06", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic will identify suspicious executable or scripts (known file extensions) in list of suspicious file path in Windows. This technique is used by adversaries to evade detection. The suspicious file path are known paths used in the wild and are not common to have executable or scripts.", + "search": "|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_name = *.exe OR Filesystem.file_name = *.dll OR Filesystem.file_name = *.sys OR Filesystem.file_name = *.com OR Filesystem.file_name = *.vbs OR Filesystem.file_name = *.vbe OR Filesystem.file_name = *.js OR Filesystem.file_name = *.ps1 OR Filesystem.file_name = *.bat OR Filesystem.file_name = *.cmd OR Filesystem.file_name = *.pif) AND ( Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\windows\\\\fonts\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\windows\\\\temp\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\users\\\\public\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\windows\\\\debug\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Users\\\\Administrator\\\\Music\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Windows\\\\servicing\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Users\\\\Default\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *Recycle.bin* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Windows\\\\Media\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Windows\\\\repair\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Temp* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\PerfLogs\\\\*) by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may allow creation of script or exe in the paths specified. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig", + "Remcos", + "WhisperGate", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious executable or scripts with file name $file_name$, $file_path$ and process_id $process_id$ executed in suspicious file path in Windows by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1036" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_id", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_name", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Other", + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.file_path", + "Filesystem.file_create_time", + "Filesystem.process_id", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.user" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig", + "Remcos", + "WhisperGate", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_id", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_name", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Other", + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_id", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "file_name", + "threat_object_type": "file name" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", + "file": "endpoint/executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading", + "id": "f421c250-24e7-11ec-bc43-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-10-04", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a loading of dll using regsvr32 application with silent parameter and dllinstall execution. This technique was seen in several RAT malware similar to remcos, njrat and adversaries to load their malicious DLL on the compromised machine. This TTP may executed by normal 3rd party application so it is better to pivot by the parent process, parent command-line and command-line of the file that execute this regsvr32.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` AND Processes.process=\"*/i*\" by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"(?i)[\\-|\\/][Ss]{1}\") | `regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Other third part application may used this parameter but not so common in base windows environment.", + "references": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/dc93ee63-050c-4ff8-b07e-8277af9ab939/#", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", + "Remcos", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/vbs_wscript/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a DLL using the silent and dllinstall parameter.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.010" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 36, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cobalt Group", + "Deep Panda", + "Inception", + "Leviathan", + "TA551", + "WIRTE" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.010" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", + "Remcos", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 36 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 36 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.010" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading", + "file": "endpoint/regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/vbs_wscript/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_regsvr32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=REGSVR32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Process File Path", + "id": "9be25988-ad82-11eb-a14f-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-05", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic will detect a suspicious process running in a file path where a process is not commonly seen and is most commonly used by malicious software. This behavior has been used by adversaries where they drop and run an exe in a path that is accessible without admin privileges.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\windows\\\\fonts\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\windows\\\\temp\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\users\\\\public\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\windows\\\\debug\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path.file_path = \"*\\\\Users\\\\Administrator\\\\Music\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path.file_path = \"*\\\\Windows\\\\servicing\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path.file_path = \"*\\\\Users\\\\Default\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path.file_path = \"*Recycle.bin*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Media\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"\\\\Windows\\\\repair\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\PerfLogs\\\\*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_path Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_process_file_path_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may allow execution of specific binaries in non-standard paths. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/hk/threat-encyclopedia/malware/trojan.ps1.powtran.a/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Process File Path", + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig", + "Remcos", + "WhisperGate", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicioues process $Processes.process_path.file_path$ running from suspicious location", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1543" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Processes.process_path.file_path", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1543" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig", + "Remcos", + "WhisperGate", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Processes.process_path.file_path", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 35 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "Processes.process_path.file_path", + "threat_object_type": "file name" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1543" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Suspicious Process File Path Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious Process File Path", + "file": "endpoint/suspicious_process_file_path.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_process_file_path_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_process_file_path.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump", + "id": "59e54602-9680-11ec-a8a6-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-25", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a process that is attempting to disable the ability on Windows to generate a memory crash dump. This was recently identified being utilized by HermeticWiper. To disable crash dumps, the value must be set to 0. This feature is typically modified to perform a memory crash dump when a computer stops unexpectedly because of a Stop error (also known as a blue screen, system crash, or bug check).", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\CrashControl\\\\CrashDumpEnabled\") AND Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000000\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process process_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process process_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `windows_disable_memory_crash_dump_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` and `Registry` node.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/02/threat-advisory-hermeticwiper.html", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/performance/memory-dump-file-options" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump", + "analytic_story": [ + "Data Destruction", + "Ransomware", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/hermetic_wiper/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A process $process_name$ was identified attempting to disable memory crash dumps on $dest$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1485" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.file_create_time", + "Filesystem.process_id", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.user", + "Filesystem.file_path", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_guid" + ], + "risk_score": 90, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1485" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Data Destruction", + "Ransomware", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 90 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 90 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1485" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_disable_memory_crash_dump_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_disable_memory_crash_dump.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder", + "id": "0dbcac64-963c-11ec-bf04-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-25", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to look for suspicious file creation in the critical folder like \"System32\\Drivers\" folder without file extension. This artifacts was seen in latest hermeticwiper where it drops its driver component in Driver Directory both the compressed(without file extension) and the actual driver component (with .sys file extension). This TTP is really a good indication that a host might be compromised by this destructive malware that wipes the boot sector of the system.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*\\\\System32\\\\drivers\\\\*\", \"*\\\\syswow64\\\\drivers\\\\*\") by _time span=5m Filesystem.dest Filesystem.user Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_create_time | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | rex field=\"file_name\" \"\\.(?[^\\.]*$)\" | where isnull(extension) | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=5m Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_guid Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`] | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest process_name process_guid file_name file_path file_create_time user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_file_without_extension_in_critical_folder_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown at this point", + "references": [ + "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/02/threat-advisory-hermeticwiper.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder", + "analytic_story": [ + "Data Destruction", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/hermetic_wiper/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Driver file with out file extension drop in $file_path$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1485" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.file_create_time", + "Filesystem.process_id", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.user", + "Filesystem.file_path", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_guid", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 90, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1485" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Data Destruction", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 90 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1485" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder", + "file": "endpoint/windows_file_without_extension_in_critical_folder.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/hermetic_wiper/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_file_without_extension_in_critical_folder_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_file_without_extension_in_critical_folder.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry", + "id": "b7548c2e-9a10-11ec-99e3-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-03-02", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to look for suspicious registry modification related to file compression color and information tips. This IOC was seen in hermetic wiper where it has a thread that will create this registry entry to change the color of compressed or encrypted files in NTFS file system as well as the pop up information tips. This is a good indicator that a process tries to modified one of the registry GlobalFolderOptions related to file compression attribution in terms of color in NTFS file system.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\Advanced*\" AND Registry.registry_value_name IN(\"ShowCompColor\", \"ShowInfoTip\") by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `windows_modify_show_compress_color_and_info_tip_registry_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Registry` node.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/02/threat-advisory-hermeticwiper.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/hermetic_wiper/globalfolderoptions_reg/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Registry modification in \"ShowCompColor\" and \"ShowInfoTips\" on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1112" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.dest Registry.user" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN8", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1112" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1112" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry", + "file": "endpoint/windows_modify_show_compress_color_and_info_tip_registry.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/hermetic_wiper/globalfolderoptions_reg/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_modify_show_compress_color_and_info_tip_registry_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_modify_show_compress_color_and_info_tip_registry.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition", + "id": "a85aa37e-9647-11ec-90c5-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-25", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to look for suspicious raw access read to device disk partition of the host machine. This technique was seen in several attacks by adversaries or threat actor to wipe, encrypt or overwrite the boot sector of each partition as part of their impact payload for example the \"hermeticwiper\" malware. This detection is a good indicator that there is a process try to read or write on boot sector.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=9 Device = \\\\Device\\\\HarddiskVolume* NOT (Image IN(\"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image Device ProcessGuid ProcessId EventDescription EventCode Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the raw access read event (like sysmon eventcode 9), process name and process guid from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "This event is really notable but we found minimal number of normal application from system32 folder like svchost.exe accessing it too. In this case we used 'system32' and 'syswow64' path as a filter for this detection.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/02/threat-advisory-hermeticwiper.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition", + "analytic_story": [ + "Data Destruction", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/hermetic_wiper/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Process accessing disk partition $device$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1561.002", + "T1561" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Computer", + "Image", + "Device", + "ProcessGuid", + "ProcessId", + "EventDescription", + "EventCode" + ], + "risk_score": 90, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1561.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT37", + "APT38", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1561", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1561.002", + "T1561" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Data Destruction", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 90 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1561.002", + "T1561" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition", + "file": "endpoint/windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/hermetic_wiper/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive", + "id": "7b83f666-900c-11ec-a2d9-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-17", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to look for suspicious raw access read to drive where the master boot record is placed. This technique was seen in several attacks by adversaries or threat actor to wipe, encrypt or overwrite the master boot record code as part of their impact payload. This detection is a good indicator that there is a process try to read or write on MBR sector.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=9 Device = \\\\Device\\\\Harddisk0\\\\DR0 NOT (Image IN(\"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer Image Device ProcessGuid ProcessId EventDescription EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the raw access read event (like sysmon eventcode 9), process name and process guid from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "This event is really notable but we found minimal number of normal application from system32 folder like svchost.exe accessing it too. In this case we used 'system32' and 'syswow64' path as a filter for this detection.", + "references": [ + "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/threat-advisory-strt-ta02-destructive-software.html", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/technical-analysis-of-whispergate-malware/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive", + "analytic_story": [ + "WhisperGate", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1561.002/mbr_raw_access/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "process accessing MBR $device$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1561.002", + "T1561" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Computer", + "Image", + "Device", + "ProcessGuid", + "ProcessId", + "EventDescription", + "EventCode" + ], + "risk_score": 90, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1561.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT37", + "APT38", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1561", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1561.002", + "T1561" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "WhisperGate", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 90 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1561.002", + "T1561" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive", + "file": "endpoint/windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1561.002/mbr_raw_access/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [] + }, + { + "name": "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "id": "baf7580b-d4b4-4774-8173-7d198e9da335", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-01-22", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "description": "Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A.", + "narrative": "North Korea's government-sponsored \"cyber army\" has been slowly building momentum and gaining sophistication over the last 15 years or so. As a result, the group's activity, which the US government refers to as \"Hidden Cobra,\" has surreptitiously crept onto the collective radar as a preeminent global threat.\\\nThese state-sponsored actors are thought to be responsible for everything from a hack on a South Korean nuclear plant to an attack on Sony in anticipation of its release of the movie \"The Interview\" at the end of 2014. They're also notorious for cyberespionage. In recent years, the group seems to be focused on financial crimes, such as cryptojacking.\\\nIn June of 2018, The Department of Homeland Security, together with the FBI and other U.S. government partners, issued Technical Alert (TA-18-149A) to advise the public about two variants of North Korean malware. One variant, dubbed \"Joanap,\" is a multi-stage peer-to-peer botnet that allows North Korean state actors to exfiltrate data, download and execute secondary payloads, and initialize proxy communications. The other variant, \"Brambul,\" is a Windows32 SMB worm that is dropped into a victim network. When executed, the malware attempts to spread laterally within a victim's local subnet, connecting via the SMB protocol and initiating brute-force password attacks. It reports details to the Hidden Cobra actors via email, so they can use the information for secondary remote operations.\\\nAmong other searches in this Analytic Story is a detection search that looks for the creation or deletion of hidden shares, such as, \"adnim$,\" which the Hidden Cobra malware creates on the target system. Another looks for the creation of three malicious files associated with the malware. You can also use a search in this story to investigate activity that indicates that malware is sending email back to the attackers.", + "references": [ + "https://www.us-cert.gov/HIDDEN-COBRA-North-Korean-Malicious-Cyber-Activity", + "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "analytic_story": "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "category": [ + "Malware" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Connection Removal", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Threat Group-3390" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT3", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "OilRig", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "File Transfer Protocols", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT41", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "SilverTerrier" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1071", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Magic Hound", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "DNS", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "FIN7", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Tropic Trooper" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Operation Wocao", + "Orangeworm", + "Sandworm Team", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT33", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Lazarus Group", + "OilRig", + "Thrip", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control", + "Defense Evasion", + "Execution", + "Exfiltration", + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint", + "Network_Resolution", + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Command & Control" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule", + "ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", + "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", + "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", + "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", + "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", + "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", + "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", + "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [ + "ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK", + "ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", + "ESCU - Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic", + "ESCU - Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic", + "ESCU - Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop", + "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments" + ], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Rico Valdez", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "First time seen command line argument", + "id": "a1b6e73f-98d5-470f-99ac-77aacd578473", + "version": 5, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for command-line arguments that use a `/c` parameter to execute a command that has not previously been seen.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = cmd.exe Processes.process = \"* /c *\" by Processes.process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = cmd.exe Processes.process = \"* /c *\" by Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by process | outputlookup previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments | eval newCmdLineArgument=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newCmdLineArgument=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table process] | `first_time_seen_command_line_argument_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The complete process name with command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model. Please make sure you run the support search \"Previously seen command line arguments,\"—which creates a lookup file called `previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments.csv`—a historical baseline of all command-line arguments. You must also validate this list. For the search to do accurate calculation, ensure the search scheduling is the same value as the `relative_time` evaluation function.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate programs can also use command-line arguments to execute. Please verify the command-line arguments to check what command/program is being executed. We recommend customizing the `first_time_seen_cmd_line_filter` macro to exclude legitimate parent_process_name", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "First time seen command line argument", + "analytic_story": [ + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Hidden Cobra Malware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059.001", + "T1059.003" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059.001", + "T1059.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Hidden Cobra Malware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously seen command line arguments", + "id": "56059acf-50fe-4f60-98d1-b75b51b5c2f3", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-03-01", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for command-line arguments where `cmd.exe /c` is used to execute a program, then creates a baseline of the earliest and latest times we have encountered this command-line argument in our dataset within the last 30 days.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process=\"* /c *\" by Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The complete process name with command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "IcedID" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "First time seen command line argument" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059.001", + "T1059.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "first_time_seen_command_line_argument_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments", + "description": "A placeholder for a list of cmd line arugments that been seen before", + "filename": "previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments.csv" + }, + { + "name": "previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments", + "description": "A placeholder for a list of cmd line arugments that been seen before", + "filename": "previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments.csv" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious File Write", + "id": "57f76b8a-32f0-42ed-b358-d9fa3ca7bac8", + "version": 3, + "date": "2019-04-25", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The search looks for files created with names that have been linked to malicious activity.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.action) as action values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `suspicious_writes` | `suspicious_file_write_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file system reads and writes. In addition, this search leverages an included lookup file that contains the names of the files to watch for, as well as a note to communicate why that file name is being monitored. This lookup file can be edited to add or remove file the file names you want to monitor.", + "known_false_positives": "It's possible for a legitimate file to be created with the same name as one noted in the lookup file. Filenames listed in the lookup file should be unique enough that collisions are rare. Looking at the location of the file and the process responsible for the activity can help determine whether or not the activity is legitimate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious File Write", + "analytic_story": [ + "Hidden Cobra Malware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Hidden Cobra Malware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "suspicious_writes", + "definition": "lookup suspicious_writes_lookup file as file_name OUTPUT note as \"Reference\" | search \"Reference\" != False", + "description": "This macro limites the output to file names that have been marked as suspicious" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_file_write_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Create or delete windows shares using net exe", + "id": "743a322c-9a68-4a0f-9c17-85d9cce2a27c", + "version": 6, + "date": "2020-09-16", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for the creation or deletion of hidden shares using net.exe.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.user) as user values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` by Processes.process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search process=*share* | `create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators often leverage net.exe to create or delete network shares. You should verify that the activity was intentional and is legitimate.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/005" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Create or delete windows shares using net exe", + "analytic_story": [ + "Hidden Cobra Malware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ enumerating Windows file shares.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1070", + "T1070.005" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Connection Removal", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Threat Group-3390" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1070", + "T1070.005" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Hidden Cobra Malware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1070", + "T1070.005" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Create or delete windows shares using net exe Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Create or delete windows shares using net exe", + "file": "endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_net", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Remote Desktop Process Running On System", + "id": "f5939373-8054-40ad-8c64-cec478a22a4a", + "version": 5, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for the remote desktop process mstsc.exe running on systems upon which it doesn't typically run. This is accomplished by filtering out all systems that are noted in the `common_rdp_source category` in the Assets and Identity framework.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=*mstsc.exe AND Processes.dest_category!=common_rdp_source by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `remote_desktop_process_running_on_system_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. The search requires you to identify systems that do not commonly use remote desktop. You can use the included support search \"Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop\" to identify these systems. After identifying them, you will need to add the \"common_rdp_source\" category to that system using the Enterprise Security Assets and Identities framework. This can be done by adding an entry in the assets.csv file located in `SA-IdentityManagement/lookups`.", + "known_false_positives": "Remote Desktop may be used legitimately by users on the network.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Remote Desktop Process Running On System", + "analytic_story": [ + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 9", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021.001", + "T1021" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest_category", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT3", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "OilRig", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021.001", + "T1021" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 9", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021.001", + "T1021" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 9", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "remote_desktop_process_running_on_system_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Outbound SMB Traffic", + "id": "1bed7774-304a-4e8f-9d72-d80e45ff492b", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Stuart Hopkins from Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search looks for outbound SMB connections made by hosts within your network to the Internet. SMB traffic is used for Windows file-sharing activity. One of the techniques often used by attackers involves retrieving the credential hash using an SMB request made to a compromised server controlled by the threat actor.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as start_time latest(_time) as end_time values(All_Traffic.action) as action values(All_Traffic.app) as app values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as dest_port values(sourcetype) as sourcetype count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where ((All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=\"smb\") AND NOT (All_Traffic.action=\"blocked\" OR All_Traffic.dest_category=\"internal\" OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=192.168.0.0/16 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=100.64.0.0/10)) by All_Traffic.src_ip | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `security_content_ctime(start_time)` | `security_content_ctime(end_time)` | `detect_outbound_smb_traffic_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "In order to run this search effectively, we highly recommend that you leverage the Assets and Identity framework. It is important that you have good understanding of how your network segments are designed, and be able to distinguish internal from external address space. Add a category named `internal` to the CIDRs that host the companys assets in `assets_by_cidr.csv` lookup file, which is located in `$SPLUNK_HOME/etc/apps/SA-IdentityManagement/lookups/`. More information on updating this lookup can be found here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.0.0/Admin/Addassetandidentitydata. This search also requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model", + "known_false_positives": "It is likely that the outbound Server Message Block (SMB) traffic is legitimate, if the company's internal networks are not well-defined in the Assets and Identity Framework. Categorize the internal CIDR blocks as `internal` in the lookup file to avoid creating notable events for traffic destined to those CIDR blocks. Any other network connection that is going out to the Internet should be investigated and blocked. Best practices suggest preventing external communications of all SMB versions and related protocols at the network boundary.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Outbound SMB Traffic", + "analytic_story": [ + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Command & Control" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1071.002", + "T1071" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.action", + "All_Traffic.app", + "All_Traffic.dest_ip", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "sourcetype", + "All_Traffic.dest_category", + "All_Traffic.src_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "File Transfer Protocols", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT41", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "SilverTerrier" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1071", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Magic Hound", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1071.002", + "T1071" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1071.002", + "T1071" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_outbound_smb_traffic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK", + "id": "85fbcfe8-9718-4911-adf6-7000d077a3a9", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-01-22", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Resolution" + ], + "description": "This search allows you to identify DNS requests that are unusually large for the record type being requested in your environment.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as start_time max(_time) as end_time values(DNS.src) as src values(DNS.dest) as dest from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query DNS.record_type | search DNS.record_type=* | `drop_dm_object_name(DNS)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | eval query_length = len(query) | apply dns_query_pdfmodel threshold=0.01 | rename \"IsOutlier(query_length)\" as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | sort -query_length | table start_time end_time query record_type count src dest query_length | `dns_query_length_outliers___mltk_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. In addition, the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or greater must be installed on your search heads, along with any required dependencies. Finally, the support search \"Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK\" must be executed before this detection search, because it builds a machine-learning (ML) model over the historical data used by this search. It is important that this search is run in the same app context as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild the model with the latest data available in your environment.\\\nThis search produces fields (`query`,`query_length`,`count`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** DNS Query, **Field:** query\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** DNS Query Length, **Field:** query_length\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** Number of events, **Field:** count\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", + "known_false_positives": "If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider reducing the value for threshold in the search. You should also periodically re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK", + "analytic_story": [ + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Command & Control" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1071.004", + "T1071" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "DNS.src", + "DNS.dest", + "DNS.query", + "DNS.record_type" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "DNS", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "FIN7", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Tropic Trooper" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1071", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Magic Hound", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1071.004", + "T1071" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Command & Control" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK", + "id": "c914844c-0ff5-4efc-8d44-c063443129ba", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-05-08", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Resolution" + ], + "description": "This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model to characterize the length of the DNS queries for each DNS record type observed in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 30 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which uses it to identify outliers in the length of the DNS query.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query DNS.record_type | search DNS.record_type=* | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | eval query_length = len(query) | fit DensityFunction query_length by record_type into dns_query_pdfmodel", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. In addition, you must have the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version >= 4.2 installed, along with any required dependencies. By default, the search builds the model using the past 30 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data. More information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Command & Control", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "DNS.query", + "DNS.record_type" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1071.004", + "T1071" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "dns_query_length_outliers___mltk_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Remote Desktop Network Traffic", + "id": "272b8407-842d-4b3d-bead-a704584003d3", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-07-07", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search looks for network traffic on TCP/3389, the default port used by remote desktop. While remote desktop traffic is not uncommon on a network, it is usually associated with known hosts. This search will ignore common RDP sources and common RDP destinations so you can focus on the uncommon uses of remote desktop on your network.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=3389 AND All_Traffic.dest_category!=common_rdp_destination AND All_Traffic.src_category!=common_rdp_source by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_desktop_network_traffic_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to identify systems that commonly originate remote desktop traffic and that commonly receive remote desktop traffic. You can use the included support search \"Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic\" to identify systems that originate the traffic and the search \"Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic\" to identify systems that receive a lot of remote desktop traffic. After identifying these systems, you will need to add the \"common_rdp_source\" or \"common_rdp_destination\" category to that system depending on the usage, using the Enterprise Security Assets and Identities framework. This can be done by adding an entry in the assets.csv file located in SA-IdentityManagement/lookups.", + "known_false_positives": "Remote Desktop may be used legitimately by users on the network.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Remote Desktop Network Traffic", + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 9", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021.001", + "T1021" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.dest_category", + "All_Traffic.src_category", + "All_Traffic.src", + "All_Traffic.dest", + "All_Traffic.dest_port" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT3", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "OilRig", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021.001", + "T1021" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 9", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic", + "id": "5cdda34f-4caf-4128-a713-0837fc48b67a", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-15", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search counts the numbers of times the system has generated remote desktop traffic.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=3389 by All_Traffic.src | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | sort - count", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must ingest network traffic and populate the Network_Traffic data model.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Remote Desktop Network Traffic" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + }, + { + "name": "Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic", + "id": "baaeea15-fe8a-4090-92c2-5b60943bb608", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-15", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search counts the numbers of times the system has created remote desktop traffic", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=3389 by All_Traffic.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | sort - count", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must ingest network traffic and populate the Network_Traffic data model. If a system receives a lot of remote desktop traffic, you can apply the category common_rdp_destination to it.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Remote Desktop Network Traffic" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + }, + { + "name": "Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop", + "id": "063dfe9f-b1d7-4254-a16d-1e2e7eadd6a8", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-04-01", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search counts the numbers of times the remote desktop process, mstsc.exe, has run on each system.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=\"*mstsc.exe*\" by Processes.dest Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | sort - count", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data that records process activity.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Remote Desktop Network Traffic" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021.001", + "T1021" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 9", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "remote_desktop_network_traffic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "SMB Traffic Spike", + "id": "7f5fb3e1-4209-4914-90db-0ec21b936378", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-07-22", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search looks for spikes in the number of Server Message Block (SMB) traffic connections.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb by _time span=1h, All_Traffic.src | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | eventstats max(_time) as maxtime | stats count as num_data_samples max(eval(if(_time >= relative_time(maxtime, \"-70m@m\"), count, null))) as count avg(eval(if(_time upperBound AND num_data_samples >=50, 1, 0) | where isOutlier=1 | table src count | `smb_traffic_spike_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic logs and populating the `Network_Traffic` data model.", + "known_false_positives": "A file server may experience high-demand loads that could cause this analytic to trigger.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "SMB Traffic Spike", + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Ransomware", + "DHS Report TA18-074A" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021.002", + "T1021" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.app", + "All_Traffic.src" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Operation Wocao", + "Orangeworm", + "Sandworm Team", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021.002", + "T1021" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Ransomware", + "DHS Report TA18-074A" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021.002", + "T1021" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "smb_traffic_spike_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK", + "id": "d25773ba-9ad8-48d1-858e-07ad0bbeb828", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-07-22", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search uses the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) to identify spikes in the number of Server Message Block (SMB) connections.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as port from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb by _time span=1h, All_Traffic.src | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%A\") | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | apply smb_pdfmodel threshold=0.001 | rename \"IsOutlier(count)\" as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | sort -count | table _time src dest port count | `smb_traffic_spike___mltk_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. In addition, the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or greater must be installed on your search heads, along with any required dependencies. Finally, the support search \"Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK\" must be executed before this detection search, because it builds a machine-learning (ML) model over the historical data used by this search. It is important that this search is run in the same app context as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild the model with the latest data available in your environment.\\\nThis search produces a field (Number of events,count) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. This field contributes additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following field, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry): \\\n1. **Label:** Number of events, **Field:** count\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review is found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", + "known_false_positives": "If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider reducing the value of the threshold in the search. You should also periodically re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data. Please update the `smb_traffic_spike_mltk_filter` macro to filter out false positive results", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK", + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Ransomware", + "DHS Report TA18-074A" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021.002", + "T1021" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_ip", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.app", + "All_Traffic.src" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Operation Wocao", + "Orangeworm", + "Sandworm Team", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021.002", + "T1021" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Ransomware", + "DHS Report TA18-074A" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", + "id": "df98763b-0b08-4281-8ef9-08db7ac572a9", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-05-08", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model to characterize the number of SMB connections observed each hour for every day of week. By default, the search uses the last 30 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search to identify outliers in the number of SMB connections for that hour and day of the week.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb by _time span=10m, All_Traffic.src | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%A\") | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | fit DensityFunction count by \"HourOfDay,DayOfWeek\" into smb_pdfmodel", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model. In addition, you must have the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version >= 4.2 installed, along with any required dependencies. To improve your results, you may consider adding \"src\" to the by clause, which will build the model for each unique source in your enviornment. However, if you have a large number of hosts in your environment, this search may be very resource intensive. In this case, you may need to raise the value of max_inputs and/or max_groups in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 30 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data. More information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Ransomware" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Processes launching netsh", + "SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.app", + "All_Traffic.src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021.002", + "T1021" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "smb_traffic_spike___mltk_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation", + "id": "1a67f15a-f4ff-4170-84e9-08cf6f75d6f5", + "version": 4, + "date": "2021-10-06", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Resolution" + ], + "description": "This search allows you to identify DNS requests and compute the standard deviation on the length of the names being resolved, then filter on two times the standard deviation to show you those queries that are unusually large for your environment.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where NOT DNS.message_type IN(\"Pointer\",\"PTR\") by DNS.query | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | eval tlds=split(query,\".\") | eval tld=mvindex(tlds,-1) | eval tld_len=len(tld) | search tld_len<=24 | eval query_length = len(query) | table query query_length record_type count | eventstats stdev(query_length) AS stdev avg(query_length) AS avg p50(query_length) AS p50| where query_length>(avg+stdev*2) | eval z_score=(query_length-avg)/stdev | `dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model.", + "known_false_positives": "It's possible there can be long domain names that are legitimate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation", + "analytic_story": [ + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Command & Control" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Exfiltration" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/long_dns_queries/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "message": "A dns query $query$ with 2 time standard deviation of name len of the dns query in host $host$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1048.003", + "T1048" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "host", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "DNS.query" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT33", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Lazarus Group", + "OilRig", + "Thrip", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1048.003", + "T1048" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Command & Control" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "host", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Exfiltration" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "host", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1048.003", + "T1048" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation", + "file": "network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/long_dns_queries/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml", + "source": "network" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get DNS Server History for a host", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-11-09", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "While investigating any detections it is important to understand which and how many DNS servers a host has connected to in the past. This search uses data that is tagged as DNS and gives you a count and list of DNS servers that a particular host has connected to the previous 24 hours.", + "search": "| search tag=dns src_ip=$src_ip$ dest_port=53 | streamstats time_window=1d count values(dest_ip) as dcip by src_ip | table date_mday src_ip dcip count | sort -count", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting your DNS traffic", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "src_ip" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Command & Control", + "DNS Hijacking", + "Data Protection", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "src_ip", + "dest_port", + "dest_ip" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_dns_server_history_for_a_host" + }, + { + "name": "Get DNS traffic ratio", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd73", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-11-09", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search calculates the ratio of DNS traffic originating and coming from a host to a list of DNS servers over the last 24 hours. A high value of this ratio could be very useful to quickly understand if a src_ip (host) is sending a high volume of data out via port 53, could be an indicator of data exfiltration via DNS. ", + "search": "| tstats allow_old_summaries=true sum(All_Traffic.bytes_out) as \"bytes_out\" sum(All_Traffic.bytes_in) as \"bytes_in\" from datamodel=Network_Traffic where nodename=All_Traffic All_Traffic.dest_port=53 by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest| `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | rename src as src_ip | rename dest as dest_ip | search src_ip=$src_ip$ | search dest_ip = $dest_ip | eval ratio = (bytes_out/bytes_in) | table ratio", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your network traffic", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "src_ip" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Command & Control", + "Data Protection", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.bytes_out", + "All_Traffic.bytes_in", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.src", + "All_Traffic.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_dns_traffic_ratio" + }, + { + "name": "Get History Of Email Sources", + "id": "ddc7af28-c34d-4392-af93-7f29a4e8806c", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-02-21", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Email" + ], + "description": "This search returns a list of all email sources seen in the 48 hours prior to the notable event to 24 hours after, and the number of emails from each source.", + "search": "|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Email.dest) as dest values(All_Email.recipient) as recepient min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count from datamodel=Email.All_Email by All_Email.src |`drop_dm_object_name(All_Email)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search src=$src$", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must ingest your email logs or capture unencrypted email communications within network traffic, and populate the Email data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "src" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Email.dest", + "All_Email.recipient", + "All_Email.src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_history_of_email_sources" + }, + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + }, + { + "name": "Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors", + "id": "80bac352-e089-46b9-a6a4-8a8467d4d8cf", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-06-14", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Email" + ], + "description": "This search returns the information of the users that sent emails to the accounts controlled by the Hidden Cobra Threat Actors: specifically to `misswang8107@gmail.com`, and from `redhat@gmail.com`.", + "search": "| from datamodel Email.All_Email | search recipient=misswang8107@gmail.com OR src_user=redhat@gmail.com | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(dest) values(src) by src_user recipient | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must ingest your email logs or capture unencrypted email communications within network traffic, and populate the Email data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Hidden Cobra Malware" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "recipient", + "src_user", + "dest", + "sec" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors" + }, + { + "name": "Get Parent Process Info", + "id": "fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41bf9", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-02-28", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "parent_process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Phishing Payloads", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_parent_process_info" + }, + { + "name": "Get Process Info", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd71", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-01", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the process running on a host which is under investigation. To gather the process info, enter the values for the process name in question and the destination IP address.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search process_name= $process_name$ | search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_process_info" + }, + { + "name": "Get Process Information For Port Activity", + "id": "9925d08f-561e-4faa-8912-e3888a842341", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-01", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search will return information about the process associated with observed network traffic to a specific destination port from a specific host.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search dest=$dest$ | join dest type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Ports by Ports.process_id Ports.src Ports.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | search dest_port=$dest_port$ | rename src as dest]", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data that associates processes with network events and populate the Endpoint Datamodel", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest", + "dest_port" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Ports.process_id", + "Ports.src", + "Ports.dest_port" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_process_information_for_port_activity" + }, + { + "name": "Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", + "id": "910e6512-edc9-4f93-ba24-5b786f47a672", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-01", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "While investigating, an analyst will want to know what process and parent_process is responsible for generating suspicious DNS traffic. Use the following search and enter the value of `dest` in the search to get specific details on the process responsible for creating the DNS traffic.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search dest = $dest$ | join dest type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port=53 by Ports.process_id Ports.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename src as dest]", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that associates processes with network events into the Endpoint datamodel. This can come from endpoint protection products such as carbon black, or endpoint data sources such as Sysmon.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Command & Control", + "Data Protection", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Ports.process_id", + "Ports.src", + "Ports.dest_port" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic" + }, + { + "name": "Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", + "id": "b6618e8e-be04-40a0-a0b9-f0bd4b6c81bc", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-12-14", + "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Authentication" + ], + "description": "This search returns the source, destination, and user for all successful remote-desktop authentications. A successful authentication after a brute-force attack on a destination machine is suspicious behavior. ", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature_id=4624 Authentication.app=win:remote by Authentication.src Authentication.dest Authentication.app Authentication.user Authentication.signature Authentication.src_nt_domain | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Authentication\")` | search dest=$dest$ | table firstTime lastTime src src_nt_domain dest user app count | sort count", + "how_to_implement": "You must be populating the Authentication data model with security events from your Windows event logs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement", + "SamSam Ransomware" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Authentication.signature_id", + "Authentication.app", + "Authentication.src", + "Authentication.dest", + "Authentication.user", + "Authentication.signature", + "Authentication.src_nt_domain" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Information Sabotage", + "id": "b71ba595-ef80-4e39-8b66-887578a7a71b", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-17", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might correlate to insider threat specially in terms of information sabotage.", + "narrative": "Information sabotage is the type of crime many people associate with insider threat. Where the current or former employees, contractors, or business partners intentionally exceeded or misused an authorized level of access to networks, systems, or data with the intention of harming a specific individual, the organization, or the organization's data, systems, and/or daily business operations.", + "references": [ + "https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/blog/insider-threat-deep-dive-it-sabotage/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Information Sabotage", + "analytic_story": "Information Sabotage", + "category": [ + "Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud", + "Splunk Behavioral Analytics" + ], + "usecase": "Security Monitoring", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1537", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share", + "id": "40925f12-4709-11ec-bb43-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-16", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious high frequency copying/moving of files in network share as part of information sabotage. This anomaly event can be a good indicator of insider trying to sabotage data by transfering classified or internal files within network share to exfitrate it after or to lure evidence of insider attack to other user. This behavior may catch several noise if network share is a common place for classified or internal document processing.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=5145 Relative_Target_Name IN (\"*.doc\",\"*.docx\",\"*.xls\",\"*.xlsx\",\"*.ppt\",\"*.pptx\",\"*.log\",\"*.txt\",\"*.db\",\"*.7z\",\"*.zip\",\"*.rar\",\"*.tar\",\"*.gz\",\"*.jpg\",\"*.gif\",\"*.png\",\"*.bmp\",\"*.pdf\",\"*.rtf\",\"*.key\") Object_Type=File Share_Name IN (\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\C$\",\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\IPC$\",\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\admin$\") Access_Mask= \"0x2\" | bucket _time span=5m | stats values(Relative_Target_Name) as valRelativeTargetName, values(Share_Name) as valShareName, values(Object_Type) as valObjectType, values(Access_Mask) as valAccessmask, values(src_port) as valSrcPort, values(Source_Address) as valSrcAddress count as numShareName by dest, _time, EventCode, user | eventstats avg(numShareName) as avgShareName, stdev(numShareName) as stdShareName, count as numSlots by dest, _time, EventCode, user | eval upperThreshold=(avgShareName + stdShareName *3) | eval isOutlier=if(avgShareName > 20 and avgShareName >= upperThreshold, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `high_frequency_copy_of_files_in_network_share_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "o successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 5145 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required. Also enable the object Audit access success/failure in your group policy.", + "known_false_positives": "this behavior may seen in normal transfer of file within network if network share is common place for sharing documents.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share", + "analytic_story": [ + "Information Sabotage" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Exfiltration" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1537/high_copy_files_in_net_share/security.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "high frequency copy of document in network share $Share_Name$ from $Source_Address$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1537" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Share_Name", + "Relative_Target_Name", + "Object_Type", + "Access_Mask", + "user", + "src_port", + "Source_Address" + ], + "risk_score": 9, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1537", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1537" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Information Sabotage" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Exfiltration" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 30 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 9 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1537" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share", + "file": "endpoint/high_frequency_copy_of_files_in_network_share.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1537/high_copy_files_in_net_share/security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "high_frequency_copy_of_files_in_network_share_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/high_frequency_copy_of_files_in_network_share.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [] + }, + { + "name": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "id": "b3782036-8cbd-11eb-9d8e-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-03-24", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "description": "Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Files may be copied from an external adversary controlled system through the command and control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP.", + "narrative": "Ingress tool transfer is a Technique under tactic Command and Control. Behaviors will include the use of living off the land binaries to download implants or binaries over alternate communication ports. It is imperative to baseline applications on endpoints to understand what generates network activity, to where, and what is its native behavior. These utilities, when abused, will write files to disk in world writeable paths.\\ During triage, review the reputation of the remote public destination IP or domain. Capture any files written to disk and perform analysis. Review other parrallel processes for additional behaviors.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "analytic_story": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1197", + "mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Leviathan", + "Patchwork" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control", + "Defense Evasion", + "Execution", + "Persistence" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", + "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", + "ESCU - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule", + "ESCU - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule", + "ESCU - CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments - Rule", + "ESCU - Curl Download and Bash Execution - Rule", + "ESCU - Wget Download and Bash Execution - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Michael Haag", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Any Powershell DownloadFile", + "id": "1a93b7ea-7af7-11eb-adb5-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-03-01", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a file using `DownloadFile` method. This particular method is utilized in many different PowerShell frameworks to download files and output to disk. Identify the source (IP/domain) and destination file and triage appropriately. If AMSI logging or PowerShell transaction logs are available, review for further details of the implant.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process=*DownloadFile* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `any_powershell_downloadfile_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present and filtering will need to occur by parent process or command line argument. It may be required to modify this query to an EDR product for more granular coverage.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.net.webclient.downloadfile?view=net-5.0", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Any Powershell DownloadFile", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior identifies the use of DownloadFile within PowerShell.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 70, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Any Powershell DownloadFile Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Any Powershell DownloadFile", + "file": "endpoint/any_powershell_downloadfile.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_powershell", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "any_powershell_downloadfile_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadfile.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Any Powershell DownloadString", + "id": "4d015ef2-7adf-11eb-95da-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-03-01", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a file using `DownloadString` method. This particular method is utilized in many different PowerShell frameworks to download files and output to disk. Identify the source (IP/domain) and destination file and triage appropriately. If AMSI logging or PowerShell transaction logs are available, review for further details of the implant.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process=*.DownloadString* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `any_powershell_downloadstring_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present and filtering will need to occur by parent process or command line argument. It may be required to modify this query to an EDR product for more granular coverage.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.net.webclient.downloadstring?view=net-5.0", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Any Powershell DownloadString", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell", + "HAFNIUM Group", + "Ingress Tool Transfer" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior identifies the use of DownloadString within PowerShell.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell", + "HAFNIUM Group", + "Ingress Tool Transfer" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Any Powershell DownloadString Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Any Powershell DownloadString", + "file": "endpoint/any_powershell_downloadstring.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_powershell", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "any_powershell_downloadstring_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadstring.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "BITSAdmin Download File", + "id": "80630ff4-8e4c-11eb-aab5-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service utility `bitsadmin.exe` using the `transfer` parameter to download a remote object. In addition, look for `download` or `upload` on the command-line, the switches are not required to perform a transfer. Capture any files downloaded. Review the reputation of the IP or domain used. Typically once executed, a follow on command will be used to execute the dropped file. Note that the network connection or file modification events related will not spawn or create from `bitsadmin.exe`, but the artifacts will appear in a parallel process of `svchost.exe` with a command-line similar to `svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s BITS`. It's important to review all parallel and child processes to capture any behaviors and artifacts. In some suspicious and malicious instances, BITS jobs will be created. You can use `bitsadmin /list /verbose` to list out the jobs during investigation.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_bitsadmin` Processes.process=*transfer* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `bitsadmin_download_file_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives, however it may be required to filter based on parent process name or network connection.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/8eb52117b748d378325f7719554a896e37bccec7/atomics/T1105/T1105.md#atomic-test-9---windows---bitsadmin-bits-download", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/bc705cb7aaa5f26f2d96585fac8e4c7052df0ff9/atomics/T1197/T1197.md", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/bits/bitsadmin-tool", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "BITSAdmin Download File", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "BITS Jobs", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1197/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to download a file.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1197", + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1197", + "mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Leviathan", + "Patchwork" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1197", + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "BITS Jobs", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1197", + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "BITSAdmin Download File Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "BITSAdmin Download File", + "file": "endpoint/bitsadmin_download_file.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1197/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_bitsadmin", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=bitsadmin.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=bitsadmin.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "bitsadmin_download_file_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/bitsadmin_download_file.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments", + "id": "415b4306-8bfb-11eb-85c4-acde48001122", + "version": 3, + "date": "2022-02-03", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "Certutil.exe may download a file from a remote destination using `-urlcache`. This behavior does require a URL to be passed on the command-line. In addition, `-f` (force) and `-split` (Split embedded ASN.1 elements, and save to files) will be used. It is not entirely common for `certutil.exe` to contact public IP space. However, it is uncommon for `certutil.exe` to write files to world writeable paths.\\ During triage, capture any files on disk and review. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain in question.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_certutil` (Processes.process=*urlcache* Processes.process=*split*) OR Processes.process=*urlcache* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives in most environments, however tune as needed based on parent-child relationship or network connection.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/", + "https://www.avira.com/en/blog/certutil-abused-by-attackers-to-spread-threats", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/10/certutil-qualms-they-came-to-drop-fombs.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Command And Control" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to download a file.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 90, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Command And Control" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 90 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 90 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments", + "file": "endpoint/certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_certutil", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=certutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=CertUtil.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments", + "id": "801ad9e4-8bfb-11eb-8b31-acde48001122", + "version": 3, + "date": "2022-02-03", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "Certutil.exe may download a file from a remote destination using `-VerifyCtl`. This behavior does require a URL to be passed on the command-line. In addition, `-f` (force) and `-split` (Split embedded ASN.1 elements, and save to files) will be used. It is not entirely common for `certutil.exe` to contact public IP space. \\ During triage, capture any files on disk and review. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain in question. Using `-VerifyCtl`, the file will either be written to the current working directory or `%APPDATA%\\..\\LocalLow\\Microsoft\\CryptnetUrlCache\\Content\\`. ", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_certutil` (Processes.process=*verifyctl* Processes.process=*split*) OR Processes.process=*verifyctl* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives in most environments, however tune as needed based on parent-child relationship or network connection.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/", + "https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2020/08/23/certutil-one-more-gui-lolbin/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc732443(v=ws.11)#-verifyctl", + "https://www.avira.com/en/blog/certutil-abused-by-attackers-to-spread-threats" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Command And Control" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to download a file.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 90, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Command And Control" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 90 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 90 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments", + "file": "endpoint/certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_certutil", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=certutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=CertUtil.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "id": "900bc324-59f3-11ec-9fb4-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-10", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of curl on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=curl (Processes.process=\"*-s *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", + "references": [ + "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [ + { + "name": "Log4j Investigate", + "id": "e609d729-0076-421a-b8f7-9e545d000381", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-12-14", + "author": "Philip Royer, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "description": "Published in response to CVE-2021-44228, this playbook and its sub-playbooks can be used to investigate and respond to attacks against hosts running vulnerable Java applications which use log4j. Between the parent playbook and seven sub-playbooks, each potentially compromised host found in Splunk Enteprise can be investigated and the risk can be mitigated using SSH for unix systems and WinRM for Windows systems.", + "how_to_implement": "To start this playbook, create a custom list called \"log4j_hosts\" with a format in which the first column should be an IP or hostname of a potentially affected log4j host, the second should be the operating system family (either unix or windows). If the operating system is unknown it can be left blank. In the block called \"fetch_hosts_from_custom_list\", change the custom list name from \"log4j_hosts\" if needed. If the operating system family (\"windows\" or \"unix\") is not known, both ssh and winrm will be attempted. If ssh and/or winrm are not the preferred endpoint management methods, these playbooks could be ported to use Google's GRR, osquery, CrowdStrike's RTR, Carbon Black's EDR API, or similar tools. The artifact scope \"all\" is used throughout this playbook because the artifact list can be added to as the playbook progresses.", + "playbook": "log4j_investigate", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/Fenrir/blob/master/fenrir.sh", + "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Log4j++Log4Shell+Followup%3A+What+we+see+and+how+to+defend+%28and+how+to+access+our+data%29/28122", + "https://twitter.com/ElektroWolle/status/1469962895849140224?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1469962895849140224%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_c10&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fpublish.twitter.com%2F%3Fquery%3Dhttps3A2F2Ftwitter.com2FElektroWolle2Fstatus2F1469962895849140224widget%3DTweet", + "https://blog.cloudflare.com/cve-2021-44228-log4j-rce-0-day-mitigation/" + ], + "app_list": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "detections": [ + "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "Windows Java Spawning Shell", + "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic" + ], + "platform_tags": [ + "Log4J" + ], + "playbook_fields": [], + "product": [ + "Splunk SOAR" + ], + "detection_objects": [ + { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "id": "900bc324-59f3-11ec-9fb4-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-10", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of curl on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=curl (Processes.process=\"*-s *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", + "references": [ + "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "file": "endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "id": "8281ce42-5c50-11ec-82d2-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a Java user agent performing a GET request for a .class file from the remote site. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell).", + "search": "| tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_user_agent=\"*Java*\" Web.http_method=\"GET\" Web.url=\"*.class*\" by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting web or proxy logs, or ensure it is being filled by a proxy like device, into the Web Datamodel. For additional filtering, allow list private IP space or restrict by known good.", + "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required in some instances, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2021/12/as-log4shell-wreaks-havoc-payroll-service-reports-ransomware-attack/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Web Server", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Scope:Network" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A Java user agent $http_user_agent$ was performing a $http_method$ to retrieve a remote class file.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_user_agent", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_method", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Web.http_method", + "Web.url", + "Web.url_length", + "Web.src", + "Web.dest", + "Web.http_user_agent" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_user_agent", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_method", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Scope:Network" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 40 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "http_user_agent", + "threat_object_type": "other" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "http_method", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "file": "endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "java.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java.log", + "source": "stream:http", + "sourcetype": "stream:http" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "id": "7b09db8a-5c20-11ec-9945-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the process name of Java, Apache, or Tomcat spawning a Linux shell. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). The shells included in the macro are \"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\". Upon triage, review parallel processes and command-line arguments to determine legitimacy.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=java OR Processes.parent_process_name=apache OR Processes.parent_process_name=tomcat `linux_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_java_spawning_shell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. Ensure EDR product is mapping OS Linux to the datamodel properly. Add any additional java process names for your environment to the analytic as needed.", + "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required on internal developer build systems or classify assets as web facing and restrict the analytic based on asset type.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.netlab.360.com/ten-families-of-malicious-samples-are-spreading-using-the-log4j2-vulnerability-now/", + "https://gist.github.com/olafhartong/916ebc673ba066537740164f7e7e1d72" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ spawning a Linux shell, potentially indicative of exploitation.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 40 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "file": "endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "java_spawn_shell_nix.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java_spawn_shell_nix.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "linux_shells", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name IN (\"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\"))", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "linux_java_spawning_shell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "id": "d2c14d28-5c47-11ec-9892-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "A required step while exploiting the CVE-2021-44228-Log4j vulnerability is that the victim server will perform outbound connections to attacker-controlled infrastructure. This is required as part of the JNDI lookup as well as for retrieving the second stage .class payload. The following analytic identifies the Java process reaching out to default ports used by the LDAP and RMI protocols. This behavior could represent successfull exploitation. Note that adversaries can easily decide to use arbitrary ports for these protocols and potentially bypass this detection.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"java.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe) by _time Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where (Ports.dest_port= 389 OR Ports.dest_port= 636 OR Ports.dest_port = 1389 OR Ports.dest_port = 1099 ) by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port| `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process connection_to_CNC dest_port | `outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate Java applications may use perform outbound connections to these ports. Filter as needed", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://www.govcert.admin.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_java/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Java performed outbound connections to default ports of LDAP or RMI on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_guid", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Ports.process_guid", + "Ports.dest", + "Ports.dest_port" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 60, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 54 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "file": "endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_java/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "id": "35682718-5a85-11ec-b8f7-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-11", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of wget on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wget (Processes.process=\"*-q *\" OR Processes.process=\"*--quiet*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-O- *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", + "references": [ + "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "file": "endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "id": "5e06e262-d7cd-4216-b2f8-27b437e18458", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Johan Bjerke, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "Malicious actors often abuse misconfigured LDAP servers or applications that use the LDAP servers in organizations. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. This search will help determine if you have any LDAP connections to IP addresses outside of private (RFC1918) address space.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as earliest_time latest(_time) as latest_time values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port = 389 OR All_Traffic.dest_port = 636 AND NOT (All_Traffic.dest_ip = 10.0.0.0/8 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=192.168.0.0/16 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip = 172.16.0.0/12) by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip |`drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | where src_ip != dest_ip | `security_content_ctime(latest_time)` | `security_content_ctime(earliest_time)` |`detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format and should be mapped to the Network Traffic datamodels that are in use for this search.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown at this moment. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. Please check those servers to verify if the activity is legitimate.", + "references": [ + "https://www.govcert.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_ldap/bro_conn.json" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An outbound LDAP connection from $src_ip$ in your infrastructure connecting to dest ip $dest_ip$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_ip", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.src_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "src_ip", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest_ip", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "file": "network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "stream_http_events.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_ldap/bro_conn.json", + "source": "/opt/malware/conn.log", + "sourcetype": "bro:conn:json" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "id": "c184f12e-5c90-11ec-bf1f-497c9a704a72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Jose Hernandez", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we first limit the scope of our search to the Web Datamodel and use the `| from datamodel` function to benefit from schema accelerated searching capabilities, mainly because the second part of the detection is pretty heavy, it runs a regex across all _raw events that looks for `${jndi:ldap://` pattern across all potential web fields available to the raw data, like http headers for example. If you see results for this detection, it means that there was a attempt at a injection, which could be a reconnaissance activity or a valid expliotation attempt, but this does not exactly mean that the host was indeed successfully exploited.", + "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | regex _raw=\"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)\\w+(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?\" | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx.", + "known_false_positives": "If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "action", + "category", + "dest", + "dest_port", + "http_content_type", + "http_method", + "http_referrer", + "http_user_agent", + "site", + "src", + "url", + "url_domain", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 30, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 15 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "file": "web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "nginx.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "source": "nginx", + "sourcetype": "nginx:plus:kv" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.yml", + "source": "web" + }, + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "id": "69afee44-5c91-11ec-bf1f-497c9a704a72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Jose Hernandez", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic", + "Web" + ], + "description": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we match the invocation function with a network connection to a malicious ip address.", + "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | rex field=_raw max_match=0 \"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)(?\\w+)(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?(?[a-zA-Z0-9\\.\\-\\_\\$]+)\" | join affected_host type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic by All_Traffic.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename dest AS affected_host] | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx.", + "known_false_positives": "If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_network_logs/log4j_network_logs.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "action", + "category", + "dest", + "dest_port", + "http_content_type", + "http_method", + "http_referrer", + "http_user_agent", + "site", + "src", + "url", + "url_domain", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 30, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 15 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "file": "web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-360d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "nginx.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "source": "nginx", + "sourcetype": "nginx:plus:kv" + }, + { + "file_name": "stream.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_network_logs/log4j_network_logs.log", + "source": "stream:Splunk_IP", + "sourcetype": "stream:ip" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.yml", + "source": "web" + } + ] + } + }, + { + "name": "Log4j Respond", + "id": "e609d729-4076-421a-b8f7-9e545d000381", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-14", + "author": "Philip Royer, Splunk", + "type": "Response", + "description": "Published in response to CVE-2021-44228, this playbook is meant to be launched after log4j_investigate. In this playbook, the risk from exploited hosts can be mitigated by optionally deleting malicious files from the hosts, blocking outbound network connections from the hosts, and/or shutting down the hosts", + "how_to_implement": "To use this playbook, create a custom list called \"log4j_hosts_and_files\" with a format in which the first column should be an IP or hostname of a potentially affected log4j host, the second should be the operating system family (either unix or windows), and the third should be a full path to a file to delete if there are any. The first two are mandatory and the file is optional. In the block called \"enumerate_files_to_delete\", change the custom list name from \"log4j_hosts_and_files\" if needed. If ssh and/or winrm are not the preferred endpoint management methods, these playbooks could be ported to use Google's GRR, osquery, CrowdStrike's RTR, Carbon Black's EDR API, or similar tools. The artifact scope \"all\" is used throughout this playbook because the artifact list can be added to as the playbook progresses.", + "playbook": "log4j_respond", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/Fenrir/blob/master/fenrir.sh", + "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Log4j++Log4Shell+Followup%3A+What+we+see+and+how+to+defend+%28and+how+to+access+our+data%29/28122", + "https://twitter.com/ElektroWolle/status/1469962895849140224?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1469962895849140224%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_c10&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fpublish.twitter.com%2F%3Fquery%3Dhttps3A2F2Ftwitter.com2FElektroWolle2Fstatus2F1469962895849140224widget%3DTweet", + "https://blog.cloudflare.com/cve-2021-44228-log4j-rce-0-day-mitigation/" + ], + "app_list": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "detections": [ + "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "Windows Java Spawning Shell", + "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic" + ], + "platform_tags": [ + "Log4J" + ], + "playbook_fields": [], + "product": [ + "Splunk SOAR" + ], + "detection_objects": [ + { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "id": "900bc324-59f3-11ec-9fb4-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-10", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of curl on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=curl (Processes.process=\"*-s *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", + "references": [ + "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "file": "endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "id": "8281ce42-5c50-11ec-82d2-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a Java user agent performing a GET request for a .class file from the remote site. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell).", + "search": "| tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_user_agent=\"*Java*\" Web.http_method=\"GET\" Web.url=\"*.class*\" by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting web or proxy logs, or ensure it is being filled by a proxy like device, into the Web Datamodel. For additional filtering, allow list private IP space or restrict by known good.", + "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required in some instances, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2021/12/as-log4shell-wreaks-havoc-payroll-service-reports-ransomware-attack/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Web Server", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Scope:Network" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A Java user agent $http_user_agent$ was performing a $http_method$ to retrieve a remote class file.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_user_agent", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_method", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Web.http_method", + "Web.url", + "Web.url_length", + "Web.src", + "Web.dest", + "Web.http_user_agent" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_user_agent", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_method", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Scope:Network" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 40 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "http_user_agent", + "threat_object_type": "other" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "http_method", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "file": "endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "java.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java.log", + "source": "stream:http", + "sourcetype": "stream:http" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "id": "7b09db8a-5c20-11ec-9945-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the process name of Java, Apache, or Tomcat spawning a Linux shell. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). The shells included in the macro are \"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\". Upon triage, review parallel processes and command-line arguments to determine legitimacy.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=java OR Processes.parent_process_name=apache OR Processes.parent_process_name=tomcat `linux_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_java_spawning_shell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. Ensure EDR product is mapping OS Linux to the datamodel properly. Add any additional java process names for your environment to the analytic as needed.", + "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required on internal developer build systems or classify assets as web facing and restrict the analytic based on asset type.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.netlab.360.com/ten-families-of-malicious-samples-are-spreading-using-the-log4j2-vulnerability-now/", + "https://gist.github.com/olafhartong/916ebc673ba066537740164f7e7e1d72" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ spawning a Linux shell, potentially indicative of exploitation.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 40 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "file": "endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "java_spawn_shell_nix.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java_spawn_shell_nix.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "linux_shells", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name IN (\"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\"))", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "linux_java_spawning_shell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "id": "d2c14d28-5c47-11ec-9892-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "A required step while exploiting the CVE-2021-44228-Log4j vulnerability is that the victim server will perform outbound connections to attacker-controlled infrastructure. This is required as part of the JNDI lookup as well as for retrieving the second stage .class payload. The following analytic identifies the Java process reaching out to default ports used by the LDAP and RMI protocols. This behavior could represent successfull exploitation. Note that adversaries can easily decide to use arbitrary ports for these protocols and potentially bypass this detection.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"java.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe) by _time Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where (Ports.dest_port= 389 OR Ports.dest_port= 636 OR Ports.dest_port = 1389 OR Ports.dest_port = 1099 ) by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port| `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process connection_to_CNC dest_port | `outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate Java applications may use perform outbound connections to these ports. Filter as needed", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://www.govcert.admin.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_java/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Java performed outbound connections to default ports of LDAP or RMI on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_guid", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Ports.process_guid", + "Ports.dest", + "Ports.dest_port" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 60, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 54 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "file": "endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_java/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "id": "35682718-5a85-11ec-b8f7-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-11", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of wget on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wget (Processes.process=\"*-q *\" OR Processes.process=\"*--quiet*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-O- *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", + "references": [ + "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "file": "endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "id": "5e06e262-d7cd-4216-b2f8-27b437e18458", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Johan Bjerke, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "Malicious actors often abuse misconfigured LDAP servers or applications that use the LDAP servers in organizations. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. This search will help determine if you have any LDAP connections to IP addresses outside of private (RFC1918) address space.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as earliest_time latest(_time) as latest_time values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port = 389 OR All_Traffic.dest_port = 636 AND NOT (All_Traffic.dest_ip = 10.0.0.0/8 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=192.168.0.0/16 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip = 172.16.0.0/12) by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip |`drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | where src_ip != dest_ip | `security_content_ctime(latest_time)` | `security_content_ctime(earliest_time)` |`detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format and should be mapped to the Network Traffic datamodels that are in use for this search.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown at this moment. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. Please check those servers to verify if the activity is legitimate.", + "references": [ + "https://www.govcert.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_ldap/bro_conn.json" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An outbound LDAP connection from $src_ip$ in your infrastructure connecting to dest ip $dest_ip$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_ip", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.src_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "src_ip", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest_ip", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "file": "network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "stream_http_events.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_ldap/bro_conn.json", + "source": "/opt/malware/conn.log", + "sourcetype": "bro:conn:json" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "id": "c184f12e-5c90-11ec-bf1f-497c9a704a72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Jose Hernandez", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we first limit the scope of our search to the Web Datamodel and use the `| from datamodel` function to benefit from schema accelerated searching capabilities, mainly because the second part of the detection is pretty heavy, it runs a regex across all _raw events that looks for `${jndi:ldap://` pattern across all potential web fields available to the raw data, like http headers for example. If you see results for this detection, it means that there was a attempt at a injection, which could be a reconnaissance activity or a valid expliotation attempt, but this does not exactly mean that the host was indeed successfully exploited.", + "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | regex _raw=\"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)\\w+(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?\" | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx.", + "known_false_positives": "If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "action", + "category", + "dest", + "dest_port", + "http_content_type", + "http_method", + "http_referrer", + "http_user_agent", + "site", + "src", + "url", + "url_domain", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 30, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 15 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "file": "web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "nginx.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "source": "nginx", + "sourcetype": "nginx:plus:kv" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.yml", + "source": "web" + }, + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "id": "69afee44-5c91-11ec-bf1f-497c9a704a72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Jose Hernandez", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic", + "Web" + ], + "description": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we match the invocation function with a network connection to a malicious ip address.", + "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | rex field=_raw max_match=0 \"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)(?\\w+)(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?(?[a-zA-Z0-9\\.\\-\\_\\$]+)\" | join affected_host type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic by All_Traffic.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename dest AS affected_host] | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx.", + "known_false_positives": "If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_network_logs/log4j_network_logs.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "action", + "category", + "dest", + "dest_port", + "http_content_type", + "http_method", + "http_referrer", + "http_user_agent", + "site", + "src", + "url", + "url_domain", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 30, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 15 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "file": "web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-360d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "nginx.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "source": "nginx", + "sourcetype": "nginx:plus:kv" + }, + { + "file_name": "stream.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_network_logs/log4j_network_logs.log", + "source": "stream:Splunk_IP", + "sourcetype": "stream:ip" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.yml", + "source": "web" + } + ] + } + } + ], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "file": "endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "id": "35682718-5a85-11ec-b8f7-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-11", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of wget on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wget (Processes.process=\"*-q *\" OR Processes.process=\"*--quiet*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-O- *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", + "references": [ + "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [ + { + "name": "Log4j Investigate", + "id": "e609d729-0076-421a-b8f7-9e545d000381", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-12-14", + "author": "Philip Royer, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "description": "Published in response to CVE-2021-44228, this playbook and its sub-playbooks can be used to investigate and respond to attacks against hosts running vulnerable Java applications which use log4j. Between the parent playbook and seven sub-playbooks, each potentially compromised host found in Splunk Enteprise can be investigated and the risk can be mitigated using SSH for unix systems and WinRM for Windows systems.", + "how_to_implement": "To start this playbook, create a custom list called \"log4j_hosts\" with a format in which the first column should be an IP or hostname of a potentially affected log4j host, the second should be the operating system family (either unix or windows). If the operating system is unknown it can be left blank. In the block called \"fetch_hosts_from_custom_list\", change the custom list name from \"log4j_hosts\" if needed. If the operating system family (\"windows\" or \"unix\") is not known, both ssh and winrm will be attempted. If ssh and/or winrm are not the preferred endpoint management methods, these playbooks could be ported to use Google's GRR, osquery, CrowdStrike's RTR, Carbon Black's EDR API, or similar tools. The artifact scope \"all\" is used throughout this playbook because the artifact list can be added to as the playbook progresses.", + "playbook": "log4j_investigate", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/Fenrir/blob/master/fenrir.sh", + "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Log4j++Log4Shell+Followup%3A+What+we+see+and+how+to+defend+%28and+how+to+access+our+data%29/28122", + "https://twitter.com/ElektroWolle/status/1469962895849140224?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1469962895849140224%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_c10&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fpublish.twitter.com%2F%3Fquery%3Dhttps3A2F2Ftwitter.com2FElektroWolle2Fstatus2F1469962895849140224widget%3DTweet", + "https://blog.cloudflare.com/cve-2021-44228-log4j-rce-0-day-mitigation/" + ], + "app_list": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "detections": [ + "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "Windows Java Spawning Shell", + "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic" + ], + "platform_tags": [ + "Log4J" + ], + "playbook_fields": [], + "product": [ + "Splunk SOAR" + ], + "detection_objects": [ + { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "id": "900bc324-59f3-11ec-9fb4-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-10", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of curl on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=curl (Processes.process=\"*-s *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", + "references": [ + "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "file": "endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "id": "8281ce42-5c50-11ec-82d2-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a Java user agent performing a GET request for a .class file from the remote site. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell).", + "search": "| tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_user_agent=\"*Java*\" Web.http_method=\"GET\" Web.url=\"*.class*\" by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting web or proxy logs, or ensure it is being filled by a proxy like device, into the Web Datamodel. For additional filtering, allow list private IP space or restrict by known good.", + "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required in some instances, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2021/12/as-log4shell-wreaks-havoc-payroll-service-reports-ransomware-attack/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Web Server", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Scope:Network" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A Java user agent $http_user_agent$ was performing a $http_method$ to retrieve a remote class file.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_user_agent", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_method", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Web.http_method", + "Web.url", + "Web.url_length", + "Web.src", + "Web.dest", + "Web.http_user_agent" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_user_agent", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_method", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Scope:Network" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 40 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "http_user_agent", + "threat_object_type": "other" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "http_method", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "file": "endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "java.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java.log", + "source": "stream:http", + "sourcetype": "stream:http" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "id": "7b09db8a-5c20-11ec-9945-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the process name of Java, Apache, or Tomcat spawning a Linux shell. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). The shells included in the macro are \"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\". Upon triage, review parallel processes and command-line arguments to determine legitimacy.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=java OR Processes.parent_process_name=apache OR Processes.parent_process_name=tomcat `linux_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_java_spawning_shell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. Ensure EDR product is mapping OS Linux to the datamodel properly. Add any additional java process names for your environment to the analytic as needed.", + "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required on internal developer build systems or classify assets as web facing and restrict the analytic based on asset type.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.netlab.360.com/ten-families-of-malicious-samples-are-spreading-using-the-log4j2-vulnerability-now/", + "https://gist.github.com/olafhartong/916ebc673ba066537740164f7e7e1d72" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ spawning a Linux shell, potentially indicative of exploitation.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 40 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "file": "endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "java_spawn_shell_nix.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java_spawn_shell_nix.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "linux_shells", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name IN (\"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\"))", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "linux_java_spawning_shell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "id": "d2c14d28-5c47-11ec-9892-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "A required step while exploiting the CVE-2021-44228-Log4j vulnerability is that the victim server will perform outbound connections to attacker-controlled infrastructure. This is required as part of the JNDI lookup as well as for retrieving the second stage .class payload. The following analytic identifies the Java process reaching out to default ports used by the LDAP and RMI protocols. This behavior could represent successfull exploitation. Note that adversaries can easily decide to use arbitrary ports for these protocols and potentially bypass this detection.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"java.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe) by _time Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where (Ports.dest_port= 389 OR Ports.dest_port= 636 OR Ports.dest_port = 1389 OR Ports.dest_port = 1099 ) by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port| `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process connection_to_CNC dest_port | `outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate Java applications may use perform outbound connections to these ports. Filter as needed", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://www.govcert.admin.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_java/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Java performed outbound connections to default ports of LDAP or RMI on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_guid", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Ports.process_guid", + "Ports.dest", + "Ports.dest_port" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 60, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 54 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "file": "endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_java/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "id": "35682718-5a85-11ec-b8f7-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-11", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of wget on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wget (Processes.process=\"*-q *\" OR Processes.process=\"*--quiet*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-O- *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", + "references": [ + "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "file": "endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "id": "5e06e262-d7cd-4216-b2f8-27b437e18458", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Johan Bjerke, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "Malicious actors often abuse misconfigured LDAP servers or applications that use the LDAP servers in organizations. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. This search will help determine if you have any LDAP connections to IP addresses outside of private (RFC1918) address space.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as earliest_time latest(_time) as latest_time values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port = 389 OR All_Traffic.dest_port = 636 AND NOT (All_Traffic.dest_ip = 10.0.0.0/8 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=192.168.0.0/16 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip = 172.16.0.0/12) by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip |`drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | where src_ip != dest_ip | `security_content_ctime(latest_time)` | `security_content_ctime(earliest_time)` |`detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format and should be mapped to the Network Traffic datamodels that are in use for this search.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown at this moment. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. Please check those servers to verify if the activity is legitimate.", + "references": [ + "https://www.govcert.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_ldap/bro_conn.json" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An outbound LDAP connection from $src_ip$ in your infrastructure connecting to dest ip $dest_ip$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_ip", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.src_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "src_ip", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest_ip", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "file": "network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "stream_http_events.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_ldap/bro_conn.json", + "source": "/opt/malware/conn.log", + "sourcetype": "bro:conn:json" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "id": "c184f12e-5c90-11ec-bf1f-497c9a704a72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Jose Hernandez", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we first limit the scope of our search to the Web Datamodel and use the `| from datamodel` function to benefit from schema accelerated searching capabilities, mainly because the second part of the detection is pretty heavy, it runs a regex across all _raw events that looks for `${jndi:ldap://` pattern across all potential web fields available to the raw data, like http headers for example. If you see results for this detection, it means that there was a attempt at a injection, which could be a reconnaissance activity or a valid expliotation attempt, but this does not exactly mean that the host was indeed successfully exploited.", + "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | regex _raw=\"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)\\w+(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?\" | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx.", + "known_false_positives": "If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "action", + "category", + "dest", + "dest_port", + "http_content_type", + "http_method", + "http_referrer", + "http_user_agent", + "site", + "src", + "url", + "url_domain", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 30, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 15 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "file": "web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "nginx.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "source": "nginx", + "sourcetype": "nginx:plus:kv" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.yml", + "source": "web" + }, + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "id": "69afee44-5c91-11ec-bf1f-497c9a704a72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Jose Hernandez", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic", + "Web" + ], + "description": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we match the invocation function with a network connection to a malicious ip address.", + "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | rex field=_raw max_match=0 \"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)(?\\w+)(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?(?[a-zA-Z0-9\\.\\-\\_\\$]+)\" | join affected_host type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic by All_Traffic.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename dest AS affected_host] | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx.", + "known_false_positives": "If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_network_logs/log4j_network_logs.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "action", + "category", + "dest", + "dest_port", + "http_content_type", + "http_method", + "http_referrer", + "http_user_agent", + "site", + "src", + "url", + "url_domain", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 30, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 15 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "file": "web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-360d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "nginx.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "source": "nginx", + "sourcetype": "nginx:plus:kv" + }, + { + "file_name": "stream.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_network_logs/log4j_network_logs.log", + "source": "stream:Splunk_IP", + "sourcetype": "stream:ip" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.yml", + "source": "web" + } + ] + } + }, + { + "name": "Log4j Respond", + "id": "e609d729-4076-421a-b8f7-9e545d000381", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-14", + "author": "Philip Royer, Splunk", + "type": "Response", + "description": "Published in response to CVE-2021-44228, this playbook is meant to be launched after log4j_investigate. In this playbook, the risk from exploited hosts can be mitigated by optionally deleting malicious files from the hosts, blocking outbound network connections from the hosts, and/or shutting down the hosts", + "how_to_implement": "To use this playbook, create a custom list called \"log4j_hosts_and_files\" with a format in which the first column should be an IP or hostname of a potentially affected log4j host, the second should be the operating system family (either unix or windows), and the third should be a full path to a file to delete if there are any. The first two are mandatory and the file is optional. In the block called \"enumerate_files_to_delete\", change the custom list name from \"log4j_hosts_and_files\" if needed. If ssh and/or winrm are not the preferred endpoint management methods, these playbooks could be ported to use Google's GRR, osquery, CrowdStrike's RTR, Carbon Black's EDR API, or similar tools. The artifact scope \"all\" is used throughout this playbook because the artifact list can be added to as the playbook progresses.", + "playbook": "log4j_respond", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/Fenrir/blob/master/fenrir.sh", + "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Log4j++Log4Shell+Followup%3A+What+we+see+and+how+to+defend+%28and+how+to+access+our+data%29/28122", + "https://twitter.com/ElektroWolle/status/1469962895849140224?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1469962895849140224%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_c10&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fpublish.twitter.com%2F%3Fquery%3Dhttps3A2F2Ftwitter.com2FElektroWolle2Fstatus2F1469962895849140224widget%3DTweet", + "https://blog.cloudflare.com/cve-2021-44228-log4j-rce-0-day-mitigation/" + ], + "app_list": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "detections": [ + "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "Windows Java Spawning Shell", + "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic" + ], + "platform_tags": [ + "Log4J" + ], + "playbook_fields": [], + "product": [ + "Splunk SOAR" + ], + "detection_objects": [ + { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "id": "900bc324-59f3-11ec-9fb4-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-10", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of curl on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=curl (Processes.process=\"*-s *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", + "references": [ + "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "file": "endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "id": "8281ce42-5c50-11ec-82d2-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a Java user agent performing a GET request for a .class file from the remote site. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell).", + "search": "| tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_user_agent=\"*Java*\" Web.http_method=\"GET\" Web.url=\"*.class*\" by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting web or proxy logs, or ensure it is being filled by a proxy like device, into the Web Datamodel. For additional filtering, allow list private IP space or restrict by known good.", + "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required in some instances, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2021/12/as-log4shell-wreaks-havoc-payroll-service-reports-ransomware-attack/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Web Server", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Scope:Network" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A Java user agent $http_user_agent$ was performing a $http_method$ to retrieve a remote class file.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_user_agent", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_method", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Web.http_method", + "Web.url", + "Web.url_length", + "Web.src", + "Web.dest", + "Web.http_user_agent" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_user_agent", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_method", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Scope:Network" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 40 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "http_user_agent", + "threat_object_type": "other" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "http_method", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "file": "endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "java.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java.log", + "source": "stream:http", + "sourcetype": "stream:http" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "id": "7b09db8a-5c20-11ec-9945-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the process name of Java, Apache, or Tomcat spawning a Linux shell. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). The shells included in the macro are \"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\". Upon triage, review parallel processes and command-line arguments to determine legitimacy.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=java OR Processes.parent_process_name=apache OR Processes.parent_process_name=tomcat `linux_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_java_spawning_shell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. Ensure EDR product is mapping OS Linux to the datamodel properly. Add any additional java process names for your environment to the analytic as needed.", + "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required on internal developer build systems or classify assets as web facing and restrict the analytic based on asset type.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.netlab.360.com/ten-families-of-malicious-samples-are-spreading-using-the-log4j2-vulnerability-now/", + "https://gist.github.com/olafhartong/916ebc673ba066537740164f7e7e1d72" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ spawning a Linux shell, potentially indicative of exploitation.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 40 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "file": "endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "java_spawn_shell_nix.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java_spawn_shell_nix.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "linux_shells", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name IN (\"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\"))", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "linux_java_spawning_shell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "id": "d2c14d28-5c47-11ec-9892-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "A required step while exploiting the CVE-2021-44228-Log4j vulnerability is that the victim server will perform outbound connections to attacker-controlled infrastructure. This is required as part of the JNDI lookup as well as for retrieving the second stage .class payload. The following analytic identifies the Java process reaching out to default ports used by the LDAP and RMI protocols. This behavior could represent successfull exploitation. Note that adversaries can easily decide to use arbitrary ports for these protocols and potentially bypass this detection.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"java.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe) by _time Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where (Ports.dest_port= 389 OR Ports.dest_port= 636 OR Ports.dest_port = 1389 OR Ports.dest_port = 1099 ) by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port| `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process connection_to_CNC dest_port | `outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate Java applications may use perform outbound connections to these ports. Filter as needed", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://www.govcert.admin.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_java/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Java performed outbound connections to default ports of LDAP or RMI on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_guid", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Ports.process_guid", + "Ports.dest", + "Ports.dest_port" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 60, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 54 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "file": "endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_java/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "id": "35682718-5a85-11ec-b8f7-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-11", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of wget on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wget (Processes.process=\"*-q *\" OR Processes.process=\"*--quiet*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-O- *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", + "references": [ + "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "file": "endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "id": "5e06e262-d7cd-4216-b2f8-27b437e18458", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Johan Bjerke, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "Malicious actors often abuse misconfigured LDAP servers or applications that use the LDAP servers in organizations. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. This search will help determine if you have any LDAP connections to IP addresses outside of private (RFC1918) address space.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as earliest_time latest(_time) as latest_time values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port = 389 OR All_Traffic.dest_port = 636 AND NOT (All_Traffic.dest_ip = 10.0.0.0/8 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=192.168.0.0/16 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip = 172.16.0.0/12) by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip |`drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | where src_ip != dest_ip | `security_content_ctime(latest_time)` | `security_content_ctime(earliest_time)` |`detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format and should be mapped to the Network Traffic datamodels that are in use for this search.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown at this moment. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. Please check those servers to verify if the activity is legitimate.", + "references": [ + "https://www.govcert.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_ldap/bro_conn.json" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An outbound LDAP connection from $src_ip$ in your infrastructure connecting to dest ip $dest_ip$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_ip", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.src_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "src_ip", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest_ip", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "file": "network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "stream_http_events.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_ldap/bro_conn.json", + "source": "/opt/malware/conn.log", + "sourcetype": "bro:conn:json" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "id": "c184f12e-5c90-11ec-bf1f-497c9a704a72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Jose Hernandez", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we first limit the scope of our search to the Web Datamodel and use the `| from datamodel` function to benefit from schema accelerated searching capabilities, mainly because the second part of the detection is pretty heavy, it runs a regex across all _raw events that looks for `${jndi:ldap://` pattern across all potential web fields available to the raw data, like http headers for example. If you see results for this detection, it means that there was a attempt at a injection, which could be a reconnaissance activity or a valid expliotation attempt, but this does not exactly mean that the host was indeed successfully exploited.", + "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | regex _raw=\"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)\\w+(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?\" | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx.", + "known_false_positives": "If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "action", + "category", + "dest", + "dest_port", + "http_content_type", + "http_method", + "http_referrer", + "http_user_agent", + "site", + "src", + "url", + "url_domain", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 30, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 15 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "file": "web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "nginx.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "source": "nginx", + "sourcetype": "nginx:plus:kv" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.yml", + "source": "web" + }, + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "id": "69afee44-5c91-11ec-bf1f-497c9a704a72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Jose Hernandez", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic", + "Web" + ], + "description": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we match the invocation function with a network connection to a malicious ip address.", + "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | rex field=_raw max_match=0 \"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)(?\\w+)(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?(?[a-zA-Z0-9\\.\\-\\_\\$]+)\" | join affected_host type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic by All_Traffic.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename dest AS affected_host] | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx.", + "known_false_positives": "If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_network_logs/log4j_network_logs.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "action", + "category", + "dest", + "dest_port", + "http_content_type", + "http_method", + "http_referrer", + "http_user_agent", + "site", + "src", + "url", + "url_domain", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 30, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 15 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "file": "web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-360d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "nginx.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "source": "nginx", + "sourcetype": "nginx:plus:kv" + }, + { + "file_name": "stream.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_network_logs/log4j_network_logs.log", + "source": "stream:Splunk_IP", + "sourcetype": "stream:ip" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.yml", + "source": "web" + } + ] + } + } + ], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "file": "endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path", + "id": "c32f091e-30db-11ec-8738-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-10-19", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of Windows Curl.exe downloading a file to a suspicious location. \\\n-O or --output is used when a file is to be downloaded and placed in a specified location. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes for further behavior. In addition, identify if the download was successful. If a file was downloaded, capture and analyze.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_curl` Processes.process IN (\"*-O *\",\"*--output*\") Processes.process IN (\"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\",\"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\",\"*\\\\public\\\\*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible Administrators or super users will use Curl for legitimate purposes. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1105/T1105.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path", + "analytic_story": [ + "IceID", + "Ingress Tool Transfer" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_curl.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ to download a file to a suspicious directory.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "IceID", + "Ingress Tool Transfer" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path", + "file": "endpoint/windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon_curl.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_curl.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "process_curl", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=curl.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Curl.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination", + "id": "42f8f1a2-4228-11ec-aade-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-10", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of Windows Curl.exe uploading a file to a remote destination. \\\n`-T` or `--upload-file` is used when a file is to be uploaded to a remotge destination. \\\n`-d` or `--data` POST is the HTTP method that was invented to send data to a receiving web application, and it is, for example, how most common HTML forms on the web work. \\\nHTTP multipart formposts are done with `-F`, but this appears to not be compatible with the Windows version of Curl. Will update if identified adversary tradecraft. \\\nAdversaries may use one of the three methods based on the remote destination and what they are attempting to upload (zip vs txt). During triage, review parallel processes for further behavior. In addition, identify if the upload was successful in network logs. If a file was uploaded, isolate the endpoint and review.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_curl` Processes.process IN (\"*-T *\",\"*--upload-file *\", \"*-d *\", \"*--data *\", \"*-F *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives may be limited to source control applications and may be required to be filtered out.", + "references": [ + "https://everything.curl.dev/usingcurl/uploads", + "https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/containers/tar-and-curl-come-to-windows/ba-p/382409", + "https://twitter.com/d1r4c/status/1279042657508081664?s=20" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_curl_upload.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ uploading a file to a remote destination.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination", + "file": "endpoint/windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon_curl_upload.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_curl_upload.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "process_curl", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=curl.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Curl.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Curl Network Connection", + "id": "3f613dc0-21f2-4063-93b1-5d3c15eef22f", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-02-22", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of a curl contacting suspicious remote domains to checkin to command and control servers or download further implants. In the context of Silver Sparrow, curl is identified contacting s3.amazonaws.com. This particular behavior is common with MacOS adware-malicious software.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=curl Processes.process=s3.amazonaws.com by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_curl_network_connection_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/", + "https://marcosantadev.com/manage-plist-files-plistbuddy/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Curl Network Connection", + "analytic_story": [ + "Silver Sparrow", + "Ingress Tool Transfer" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "dataset": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Silver Sparrow", + "Ingress Tool Transfer" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_curl_network_connection_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/suspicious_curl_network_connection.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [] + }, + { + "name": "JBoss Vulnerability", + "id": "1f5294cb-b85f-4c2d-9c58-ffcf248f52bd", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-14", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "description": "In March of 2016, adversaries were seen using JexBoss--an open-source utility used for testing and exploiting JBoss application servers. These searches help detect evidence of these attacks, such as network connections to external resources or web services spawning atypical child processes, among others.", + "narrative": "This Analytic Story looks for probing and exploitation attempts targeting JBoss application servers. While the vulnerabilities associated with this story are rather dated, they were leveraged in a spring 2016 campaign in connection with the Samsam ransomware variant. Incidents involving this ransomware are unique, in that they begin with attacks against vulnerable services, rather than the phishing or drive-by attacks more common with ransomware. In this case, vulnerable JBoss applications appear to be the target of choice.\\\nIt is helpful to understand how often a notable event generated by this story occurs, as well as the commonalities between some of these events, both of which may provide clues about whether this is a common occurrence of minimal concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. It may also help to understand whether the issue is restricted to a single user/system or whether it is broader in scope.\\\nWhen looking at the target of the behavior uncovered by the event, you should note the sensitivity of the user and or/system to help determine the potential impact. It is also helpful to identify other recent events involving the target. This can help tie different events together and give further situational awareness regarding the target host.\\\nVarious types of information for external systems should be reviewed and, potentially, collected if the incident is, indeed, judged to be malicious. This data may be useful for generating your own threat intelligence, so you can create future alerts.\\\nThe following factors may assist you in determining whether the event is malicious: \\\n1. Country of origin\\\n1. Responsible party\\\n1. Fully qualified domain names associated with the external IP address\\\n1. Registration of fully qualified domain names associated with external IP address Determining whether it is a dynamic domain frequently visited by others and/or how third parties categorize it can also help you qualify and understand the event and possible motivation for the attack. In addition, there are various sources that may provide reputation information on the IP address or domain name, which can assist you in determining whether the event is malicious in nature. Finally, determining whether there are other events associated with the IP address may help connect data points or expose other historic events that might be brought back into scope.\\\nGathering various data on the system of interest can sometimes help quickly determine whether something suspicious is happening. Some of these items include determining who else may have logged into the system recently, whether any unusual scheduled tasks exist, whether the system is communicating on suspicious ports, whether there are modifications to sensitive registry keys, and/or whether there are any known vulnerabilities on the system. This information can often highlight other activity commonly seen in attack scenarios or give more information about how the system may have been targeted.\\\nhen a specific service or application is targeted, it is often helpful to know the associated version, to help determine whether it is vulnerable to a specific exploit.\\\nIf you suspect an attack targeting a web server, it is helpful to look at some of the behavior of the web service to see if there is evidence that the service has been compromised. Some indications of this might be network connections to external resources, the web service spawning child processes that are not associated with typical behavior, and whether the service wrote any files that might be malicious in nature.\\\nIf a suspicious file is found, we can review more information about it to help determine if it is, in fact, malicious. Identifying the file type, any processes that opened the file, the processes that may have created and/or modified the file, and how many other systems potentially have this file can you determine whether the file is malicious. Also, determining the file hash and checking it against reputation sources, such as VirusTotal, can sometimes help you quickly determine if it is malicious in nature.\\\nOften, a simple inspection of a suspect process name and path can tell you if the system has been compromised. For example, if svchost.exe is found running from a location other than `C:\\Windows\\System32`, it is likely something malicious designed to hide in plain sight when simply reviewing process names. \\\nIt can also be helpful to examine various behaviors of and the parent of the process of interest. For example, if it turns out the process of interest is malicious, it would be good to see whether the parent process spawned other processes that might also warrant further scrutiny. If a process is suspect, a review of the network connections made around the time of the event and noting whether the process has spawned any child processes could be helpful in determining whether it is malicious or executing a malicious script.", + "references": [ + "http://www.deependresearch.org/2016/04/jboss-exploits-view-from-victim.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "JBoss Vulnerability", + "analytic_story": "JBoss Vulnerability", + "category": [ + "Vulnerability" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1082", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Darkhotel", + "Frankenstein", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Sowbug", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TeamTNT", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Windigo", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Web" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery", + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers", + "id": "104658f4-afdc-499e-9719-17243f982681", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-23", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "This search looks for specific GET or HEAD requests to web servers that are indicative of reconnaissance attempts to identify vulnerable JBoss servers. JexBoss is described as the exploit tool of choice for this malicious activity.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where (Web.http_method=\"GET\" OR Web.http_method=\"HEAD\") AND (Web.url=\"*/web-console/ServerInfo.jsp*\" OR Web.url=\"*web-console*\" OR Web.url=\"*jmx-console*\" OR Web.url = \"*invoker*\") by Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.src, Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data from the web server or network traffic that contains web specific information, and populating the Web data model.", + "known_false_positives": "It's possible for legitimate HTTP requests to be made to URLs containing the suspicious paths.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers", + "analytic_story": [ + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "SamSam Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Web Server", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1082" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Web.http_method", + "Web.url", + "Web.src", + "Web.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1082", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Darkhotel", + "Frankenstein", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Sowbug", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TeamTNT", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Windigo", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1082" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "SamSam Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1082" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml", + "source": "web" + }, + { + "name": "Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers", + "id": "c8bff7a4-11ea-4416-a27d-c5bca472913d", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-23", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "This search is used to detect malicious HTTP requests crafted to exploit jmx-console in JBoss servers. The malicious requests have a long URL length, as the payload is embedded in the URL.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where (Web.http_method=\"GET\" OR Web.http_method=\"HEAD\") by Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest | search Web.url=\"*jmx-console/HtmlAdaptor?action=invokeOpByName&name=jboss.admin*import*\" AND Web.url_length > 200 | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table src, dest_ip, http_method, url, firstTime, lastTime | `detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must ingest data from the web server or capture network data that contains web specific information with solutions such as Bro or Splunk Stream, and populating the Web data model", + "known_false_positives": "No known false positives for this detection.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers", + "analytic_story": [ + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "SamSam Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Web Server", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 4", + "CIS 18" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "ID.RA", + "PR.PT", + "PR.IP", + "DE.AE", + "PR.MA", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Web.http_method", + "Web.url", + "Web.url_length", + "Web.src", + "Web.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 4", + "CIS 18" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.RA", + "PR.PT", + "PR.IP", + "DE.AE", + "PR.MA", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "SamSam Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 4", + "CIS 18" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.RA", + "PR.PT", + "PR.IP", + "DE.AE", + "PR.MA", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml", + "source": "web" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "id": "a9ef59cf-e981-4e66-9eef-bb049f695c09", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-04-15", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "description": "This story addresses detection against Kubernetes cluster fingerprint scan and attack by providing information on items such as source ip, user agent, cluster names.", + "narrative": "Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitve information and management priviledges of production workloads, microservices and applications. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious unauthenticated requests from the internet to kubernetes cluster.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "analytic_story": "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "category": [ + "Cloud Security" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Security Monitoring", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1526", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "datamodels": [], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", + "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", + "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule", + "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", + "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", + "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", + "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Rod Soto", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection", + "id": "db5957ec-0144-4c56-b512-9dccbe7a2d26", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-04-15", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster", + "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp!=127.0.0.1 data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp!=::1 \"data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision\"=forbid \"data.protoPayload.status.message\"=PERMISSION_DENIED data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail=\"system:anonymous\" | rename data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp as src_ip | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(data.protoPayload.methodName) as method_name values(data.protoPayload.resourceName) as resource_name values(data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent) as http_user_agent by src_ip data.resource.labels.cluster_name | rename data.resource.labels.cluster_name as cluster_name| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later), then configure stackdriver and set a Pub/Sub subscription to be imported to Splunk. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model.Customize the macro kubernetes_gcp_scan_fingerprint_attack_detection to filter out FPs.", + "known_false_positives": "Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, User Agent and source IPs will provide context.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection", + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "GCP Kubernetes cluster", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1526" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1526", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1526" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1526" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint", + "id": "86aad3e0-732f-4f66-bbbc-70df448e461d", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-05-20", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via source IP user agent, request URI and response status data against Kubernetes cluster pod in Azure", + "search": "`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search responseStatus.code=401 | table sourceIPs{} userAgent verb requestURI responseStatus.reason properties.pod |`kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics", + "known_false_positives": "Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but source IPs, userAgent, verb, request URI and response status will provide context.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint", + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "kubernetes_azure", + "definition": "sourcetype=mscs:storage:blob:json", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Kubernetes data from Azure. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint", + "id": "c5e5bd5c-1013-4841-8b23-e7b3253c840a", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-05-19", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via source IP user agent, request URI and response status data against Kubernetes cluster in Azure", + "search": "`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search responseStatus.code=401 | table sourceIPs{} userAgent verb requestURI responseStatus.reason |`kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics", + "known_false_positives": "Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but source IPs, userAgent, verb, request URI and response status will provide context.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint", + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1526" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1526", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1526" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1526" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "kubernetes_azure", + "definition": "sourcetype=mscs:storage:blob:json", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Kubernetes data from Azure. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection", + "id": "294c4686-63dd-4fe6-93a2-ca807626704a", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-04-15", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster in AWS", + "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` \"user.username\"=\"system:anonymous\" userAgent!=\"AWS Security Scanner\" | rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(responseStatus.reason) values(source) as cluster_name values(responseStatus.code) values(userAgent) as http_user_agent values(verb) values(requestURI) by src_ip user.username user.groups{} | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudWatch EKS Logs inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, UA and source IPs will provide context.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection", + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1526" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "user.username", + "userAgent", + "sourceIPs{}", + "responseStatus.reason", + "source", + "responseStatus.code", + "verb", + "requestURI", + "src_ip", + "user.groups{}" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1526", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1526" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1526" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection", + "id": "dbfca1dd-b8e5-4ba4-be0e-e565e5d62002", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-04-15", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides detection information on unauthenticated requests against Kubernetes' Pods API", + "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` \"user.username\"=\"system:anonymous\" verb=list objectRef.resource=pods requestURI=\"/api/v1/pods\" | rename source as cluster_name sourceIPs{} as src_ip | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(responseStatus.reason) values(responseStatus.code) values(userAgent) values(verb) values(requestURI) by src_ip cluster_name user.username user.groups{} | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on forAWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudWatch EKS Logs.Please also customize the `kubernetes_pods_aws_scan_fingerprint_detection` macro to filter out the false positives.", + "known_false_positives": "Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, UA and source IPs and direct request to API provide context.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection", + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster Pod", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1526" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "user.username", + "verb", + "objectRef.resource", + "requestURI", + "source", + "sourceIPs{}", + "responseStatus.reason", + "responseStatus.code", + "userAgent", + "src_ip", + "user.groups{}" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1526", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1526" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1526" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection", + "id": "19b53215-4a16-405b-8087-9e6acf619842", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-07-17", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster's pods", + "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` category=kube-audit |spath input=properties.log |search responseStatus.code=401 |table sourceIPs{} userAgent verb requestURI responseStatus.reason properties.pod | `gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later), then configure stackdriver and set a Pub/Sub subscription to be imported to Splunk.", + "known_false_positives": "Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, User Agent, source IPs and pods will provide context.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection", + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "GCP Kubernetes cluster", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1526" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "category", + "responseStatus.code", + "sourceIPs{}", + "userAgent", + "verb", + "requestURI", + "responseStatus.reason", + "properties.pod" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1526", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1526" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1526" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml", + "source": "cloud" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip", + "id": "a636cca4-7434-4a15-a278-c70734938e39", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-04-13", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides investigation data about requests via user agent, authentication request URI, verb and cluster name data against Kubernetes cluster from a specific IP address", + "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` |rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip |search src_ip=$src_ip$ | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user.username) values(requestURI) values(verb) values(userAgent) by source annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision src_ip", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Cloud Watch EKS inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "src_ip" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "sourceIPs{}", + "user.username", + "requestURI", + "verb", + "userAgent", + "annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip" + }, + { + "name": "GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip", + "id": "c00e7626-92cc-4e06-9a51-b6db0a50bd1f", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-04-13", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides investigation data about requests via user agent, authentication request URI, resource path and cluster name data against Kubernetes cluster from a specific IP address", + "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` | rename data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp as src_ip | search src_ip =$src_ip$ | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(data.protoPayload.methodName) as method_names values(data.protoPayload.resourceName) as resource_name values(data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent) as http_user_agent values(data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail) as user values(data.protoPayload.status.message) by src_ip data.resource.labels.cluster_name data.resource.type", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later), then configure stackdriver and set a Pub/Sub subscription to be imported to Splunk. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model.Customize the macro kubernetes_gcp_scan_fingerprint_attack_detection to filter out FPs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "src_ip" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp", + "data.protoPayload.methodName", + "data.protoPayload.resourceName", + "data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent", + "data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail", + "data.protoPayload.status.message", + "data.resource.labels.cluster_name", + "data.resource.type" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip" + }, + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "id": "c7d4dbf0-a171-4eaf-8444-4f40392e4f92", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-05-20", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "description": "This story addresses detection and response of accounts acccesing Kubernetes cluster sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets providing information on items such as user user, group. object, namespace and authorization reason.", + "narrative": "Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive objects within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes sensitive objects.", + "references": [ + "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "analytic_story": "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "category": [ + "Cloud Security" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Security Monitoring", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [], + "datamodels": [], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule", + "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", + "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule", + "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", + "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", + "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule", + "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", + "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", + "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Rod Soto", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access", + "id": "7f227943-2196-4d4d-8d6a-ac8cb308e61c", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-06-23", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmaps or secrets", + "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` objectRef.resource=secrets OR configmaps sourceIPs{}!=::1 sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1 |table sourceIPs{} user.username user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace objectRef.name annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |dedup user.username user.groups{} |`aws_eks_kubernetes_cluster_sensitive_object_access_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install Splunk Add-on for Amazon Web Services and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs.", + "known_false_positives": "Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user and object context can provide guidance for detection.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access", + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_eks_kubernetes_cluster_sensitive_object_access_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access", + "id": "a6959c57-fa8f-4277-bb86-7c32fba579d5", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-06-23", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status, this search can be extended by using top or rare operators to find trends or rarities in failure status, user agents, source IPs and request URI", + "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts responseStatus.status = Failure | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb responseStatus.status requestURI | `kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs.", + "known_false_positives": "This search can give false positives as there might be inherent issues with authentications and permissions at cluster.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access", + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access", + "id": "1bba382b-07fd-4ffa-b390-8002739b76e8", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-05-20", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets", + "search": "`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log| search objectRef.resource=secrets OR configmaps user.username=system.anonymous OR annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision=allow |table user.username user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace objectRef.name annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |dedup user.username user.groups{} |`kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics", + "known_false_positives": "Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user and object context can provide guidance for detection.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access", + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "kubernetes_azure", + "definition": "sourcetype=mscs:storage:blob:json", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Kubernetes data from Azure. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access", + "id": "019690d7-420f-4da0-b320-f27b09961514", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-05-20", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status", + "search": "`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts* responseStatus.reason=Forbidden | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb responseStatus.reason responseStatus.status properties.pod objectRef.namespace |`kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics", + "known_false_positives": "This search can give false positives as there might be inherent issues with authentications and permissions at cluster.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access", + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "kubernetes_azure", + "definition": "sourcetype=mscs:storage:blob:json", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Kubernetes data from Azure. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls", + "id": "4b6d1ba8-0000-4cec-87e6-6cbbd71651b5", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-05-26", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides information on rare Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context", + "search": "`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | spath input=responseObject.metadata.annotations.kubectl.kubernetes.io/last-applied-configuration | search userAgent=kubectl* sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1 sourceIPs{}!=::1 | table sourceIPs{} verb userAgent user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace requestURI | rare sourceIPs{} verb userAgent user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace requestURI |`kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics", + "known_false_positives": "Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP, verb and Object can reveal potential malicious activity, specially suspicious IPs and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls", + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "kubernetes_azure", + "definition": "sourcetype=mscs:storage:blob:json", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Kubernetes data from Azure. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access", + "id": "bdb6d596-86a0-4aba-8369-418ae8b9963a", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-07-11", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmaps or secrets", + "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.resource=configmaps OR secrets | table data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp src_user data.resource.labels.cluster_name data.protoPayload.request.metadata.namespace data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision | dedup data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp src_user data.resource.labels.cluster_name |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk add on for GCP . This search works with pubsub messaging service logs.", + "known_false_positives": "Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user and object context can provide guidance for detection.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access", + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access", + "id": "7094808d-432a-48e7-bb3c-77e96c894f3b", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-06-23", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status, this search can be extended by using top or rare operators to find trends or rarities in failure status, user agents, source IPs and request URI", + "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` system:serviceaccounts data.protoPayload.response.status.allowed!=* | table src_ip src_user http_user_agent data.protoPayload.response.spec.resourceAttributes.namespace data.resource.labels.cluster_name data.protoPayload.response.spec.resourceAttributes.verb data.protoPayload.request.status.allowed data.protoPayload.response.status.reason data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision | dedup src_ip src_user | `kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub messaging service logs.", + "known_false_positives": "This search can give false positives as there might be inherent issues with authentications and permissions at cluster.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access", + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls", + "id": "a5bed417-070a-41f2-a1e4-82b6aa281557", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-07-11", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides information on anonymous Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context", + "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent=kubectl* src_user=system:unsecured OR src_user=system:anonymous | table src_ip src_user data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.granted object_path |dedup src_ip src_user |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub messaging logs.", + "known_false_positives": "Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP, source user, user agent, object path, and authorization context can reveal potential malicious activity, specially anonymous suspicious IPs and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls", + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls", + "id": "042a3d32-8318-4763-9679-09db2644a8f2", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-06-23", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides information on anonymous Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context", + "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` userAgent=kubectl* sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1 sourceIPs{}!=::1 src_user=system:anonymous | table src_ip src_user verb userAgent requestURI | stats count by src_ip src_user verb userAgent requestURI |`kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs.", + "known_false_positives": "Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP, verb and Object can reveal potential malicious activity, specially anonymous suspicious IPs and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls", + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Kubernetes", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "userAgent", + "sourceIPs{}", + "src_user", + "src_ip", + "verb", + "requestURI" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml", + "source": "cloud" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Linux Persistence Techniques", + "id": "e40d13e5-d38b-457e-af2a-e8e6a2f2b516", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-17", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "description": "Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on a Linux system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment.", + "narrative": "Maintaining persistence is one of the first steps taken by attackers after the initial compromise. Attackers leverage various custom and built-in tools to ensure survivability and persistent access within a compromised enterprise. This Analytic Story provides searches to help you identify various behaviors used by attackers to maintain persistent access to a Linux environment.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/", + "https://kifarunix.com/scheduling-tasks-using-at-command-in-linux/", + "https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/at/", + "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/uploads/CERTFR-2021-CTI-005.pdf" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Persistence Techniques", + "analytic_story": "Linux Persistence Techniques", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "Rocke" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT3", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Fox Kitten", + "Leafminer", + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Indrik Spider", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "At (Linux)", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1222.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1222", + "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Setuid and Setgid", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.006", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1037.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "RC Scripts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1037", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Rocke" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell Configuration Modification", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "SSH Authorized Keys", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT3", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.008", + "mitre_attack_technique": "/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.006", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic Linker Hijacking", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT41", + "Rocke" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.006", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access", + "Defense Evasion", + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux Add User Account - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux At Allow Config File Creation - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux At Application Execution - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux Change File Owner To Root - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux Common Process For Elevation Control - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux Doas Conf File Creation - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux Doas Tool Execution - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux File Creation In Profile Directory - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux Possible Access To Credential Files - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux Service Restarted - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux Service Started Or Enabled - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux Sudo OR Su Execution - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux Visudo Utility Execution - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories", + "id": "023f3452-5f27-11ec-bf00-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-17", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a suspicious file creation in known cron table directories. This event is commonly abuse by malware, adversaries and red teamers to persist on the target or compromised host. crontab or cronjob is like a schedule task in windows environment where you can create an executable or script on the known crontab directories to run it base on its schedule. This Anomaly query is a good indicator to look further what file is added and who added the file if to consider it legitimate file.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/etc/cron*\", \"*/var/spool/cron/*\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_add_files_in_known_crontab_directories_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can create file in crontab folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.sandflysecurity.com/blog/detecting-cronrat-malware-on-linux-instantly/", + "https://www.cyberciti.biz/faq/how-do-i-add-jobs-to-cron-under-linux-or-unix-oses/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/cronjobs_entry/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "a file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.003", + "T1053" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Filesystem.file_create_time", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.process_guid", + "Filesystem.file_path" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "Rocke" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.003", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.003", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories", + "file": "endpoint/linux_add_files_in_known_crontab_directories.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/cronjobs_entry/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_add_files_in_known_crontab_directories_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_add_files_in_known_crontab_directories.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Add User Account", + "id": "51fbcaf2-6259-11ec-b0f3-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for commands to create user accounts on the linux platform. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to persist on the targeted or compromised host by creating new user with an elevated privilege. This Hunting query may catch normal creation of user by administrator so filter is needed.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"useradd\", \"adduser\") OR Processes.process IN (\"*useradd *\", \"*adduser *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_add_user_account_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://linuxize.com/post/how-to-create-users-in-linux-using-the-useradd-command/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Add User Account", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/linux_adduser/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A commandline $process$ that may create user account on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1136.001", + "T1136" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT3", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Fox Kitten", + "Leafminer", + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Indrik Spider", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1136.001", + "T1136" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1136.001", + "T1136" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Add User Account Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Add User Account", + "file": "endpoint/linux_add_user_account.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/linux_adduser/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_add_user_account_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_add_user_account.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux At Allow Config File Creation", + "id": "977b3082-5f3d-11ec-b954-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-17", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a suspicious file creation of /etc/at.allow or /etc/at.deny. These 2 files are commonly abused by malware, adversaries or red teamers to persist on the targeted or compromised host. These config files can restrict or allow user to execute \"at\" application (another schedule task application in linux). attacker can create a user or add the compromised username to that config file to execute \"at\" to schedule it malicious code. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator to investigate further the entry in created config file and who created it to verify if it is a false positive.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/etc/at.allow\", \"*/etc/at.deny\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_at_allow_config_file_creation_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can create this file for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://linuxize.com/post/at-command-in-linux/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux At Allow Config File Creation", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.001/at_execution/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.003", + "T1053" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Filesystem.file_create_time", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.process_guid", + "Filesystem.file_path" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "Rocke" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.003", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.003", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux At Allow Config File Creation Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux At Allow Config File Creation", + "file": "endpoint/linux_at_allow_config_file_creation.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.001/at_execution/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_at_allow_config_file_creation_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_at_allow_config_file_creation.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux At Application Execution", + "id": "bf0a378e-5f3c-11ec-a6de-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-17", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a suspicious process creation of At application. This process can be used by malware, adversaries and red teamers to create persistence entry to the targeted or compromised host with their malicious code. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator to investigate the event before and after this process execution, when it was executed and what schedule task it will execute.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"at\", \"atd\") OR Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"at\", \"atd\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_at_application_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can use this application for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/001/", + "https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/getting-attacker-ip-address-from-malicious-linux-job-craig-rowland/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux At Application Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.001/at_execution/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "At application was executed in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.001", + "T1053" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 9, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "At (Linux)", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.001", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 30 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 9 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.001", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux At Application Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux At Application Execution", + "file": "endpoint/linux_at_application_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.001/at_execution/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_at_application_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_at_application_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Change File Owner To Root", + "id": "c1400ea2-6257-11ec-ad49-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for a commandline that change the file owner to root using chown utility tool. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to escalate privilege to the targeted or compromised host by changing the owner of their malicious file to root. This event is not so common in corporate network except from the administrator doing normal task that needs high privilege.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = chown OR Processes.process = \"*chown *\") AND Processes.process = \"* root *\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_change_file_owner_to_root_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://unix.stackexchange.com/questions/101073/how-to-change-permissions-from-root-user-to-all-users", + "https://askubuntu.com/questions/617850/changing-from-user-to-superuser" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Change File Owner To Root", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.001/chmod_uid/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A commandline $process$ that may change ownership to root on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1222.002", + "T1222" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1222.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1222", + "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1222.002", + "T1222" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 64 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1222.002", + "T1222" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Change File Owner To Root Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Change File Owner To Root", + "file": "endpoint/linux_change_file_owner_to_root.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.001/chmod_uid/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_change_file_owner_to_root_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_change_file_owner_to_root.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Common Process For Elevation Control", + "id": "66ab15c0-63d0-11ec-9e70-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-23", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to look for possible elevation control access using a common known process in linux platform to change the attribute and file ownership. This technique is commonly abused by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain persistence or privilege escalation on the target or compromised host. Tis common process is used to modify file attribute, file ownership or SUID. This tools can be used in legitimate purposes so filter is needed.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"chmod\", \"chown\", \"fchmod\", \"fchmodat\", \"fchown\", \"fchownat\", \"fremovexattr\", \"fsetxattr\", \"lchown\", \"lremovexattr\", \"lsetxattr\", \"removexattr\", \"setuid\", \"setgid\", \"setreuid\", \"setregid\", \"chattr\") OR Processes.process IN (\"*chmod *\", \"*chown *\", \"*fchmod *\", \"*fchmodat *\", \"*fchown *\", \"*fchownat *\", \"*fremovexattr *\", \"*fsetxattr *\", \"*lchown *\", \"*lremovexattr *\", \"*lsetxattr *\", \"*removexattr *\", \"*setuid *\", \"*setgid *\", \"*setreuid *\", \"*setregid *\", \"*setcap *\", \"*chattr *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_common_process_for_elevation_control_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/001/", + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/auditd/blob/master/audit.rules#L285-L297", + "https://github.com/bfuzzy1/auditd-attack/blob/master/auditd-attack/auditd-attack.rules#L269-L270", + "https://github.com/microsoft/MSTIC-Sysmon/blob/main/linux/configs/attack-based/privilege_escalation/T1548.001_ElevationControl_CommonProcesses.xml" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Common Process For Elevation Control", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.001/chmod_uid/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A commandline $process$ with process $process_name$ on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.001", + "T1548" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 9, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Setuid and Setgid", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.001", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 30 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 9 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.001", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Common Process For Elevation Control Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Common Process For Elevation Control", + "file": "endpoint/linux_common_process_for_elevation_control.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.001/chmod_uid/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_common_process_for_elevation_control_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_common_process_for_elevation_control.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Doas Conf File Creation", + "id": "f6343e86-6e09-11ec-9376-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-05", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect the creation of doas.conf file in linux host platform. This configuration file can be use by doas utility tool to allow or permit standard users to perform tasks as root, the same way sudo does. This tool is developed as a minimalistic alternative to sudo application. This tool can be abused advesaries, attacker or malware to gain elevated privileges to the targeted or compromised host. On the other hand this can also be executed by administrator for a certain task that needs admin rights. In this case filter is needed.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/etc/doas.conf\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_doas_conf_file_creation_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://wiki.gentoo.org/wiki/Doas", + "https://www.makeuseof.com/how-to-install-and-use-doas/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Doas Conf File Creation", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/doas/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.003", + "T1548" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Filesystem.file_create_time", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.process_guid", + "Filesystem.file_path" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.003", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.003", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Doas Conf File Creation Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Doas Conf File Creation", + "file": "endpoint/linux_doas_conf_file_creation.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/doas/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_doas_conf_file_creation_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_doas_conf_file_creation.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Doas Tool Execution", + "id": "d5a62490-6e09-11ec-884e-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-05", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect the doas tool execution in linux host platform. This utility tool allow standard users to perform tasks as root, the same way sudo does. This tool is developed as a minimalistic alternative to sudo application. This tool can be abused advesaries, attacker or malware to gain elevated privileges to the targeted or compromised host. On the other hand this can also be executed by administrator for a certain task that needs admin rights. In this case filter is needed.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"doas\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_doas_tool_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://wiki.gentoo.org/wiki/Doas", + "https://www.makeuseof.com/how-to-install-and-use-doas/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Doas Tool Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/doas_exec/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A doas $process_name$ with commandline $process$ was executed on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.003", + "T1548" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.003", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.003", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Doas Tool Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Doas Tool Execution", + "file": "endpoint/linux_doas_tool_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/doas_exec/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_doas_tool_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_doas_tool_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter", + "id": "0d370304-5f26-11ec-a4bb-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-17", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a suspicious cronjobs modification using crontab edit parameter. This commandline parameter can be abuse by malware author, adversaries, and red red teamers to add cronjob entry to their malicious code to execute to the schedule they want. This event can also be executed by administrator or normal user for automation purposes so filter is needed.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = crontab Processes.process = \"*crontab *\" Processes.process = \"* -e*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_edit_cron_table_parameter_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can use this application for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/crontab_edit_parameter/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A possible crontab edit command $process$ executed on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.003", + "T1053" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 9, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "Rocke" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.003", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 30 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 9 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.003", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter", + "file": "endpoint/linux_edit_cron_table_parameter.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/crontab_edit_parameter/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_edit_cron_table_parameter_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_edit_cron_table_parameter.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory", + "id": "b85bbeec-6326-11ec-9311-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-22", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for suspicious file creation in kernel/driver directory in linux platform. This directory is known folder for all linux kernel module available within the system. so creation of file in this directory is a good indicator that there is a possible rootkit installation in the host machine. This technique was abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain high privileges to their malicious code such us in kernel level. Even this event is not so common administrator or legitimate 3rd party tool may install driver or linux kernel module as part of its installation.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/kernel/drivers/*\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_file_created_in_kernel_driver_directory_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can create file in this folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/fedora/rawhide/system-administrators-guide/kernel-module-driver-configuration/Working_with_Kernel_Modules/", + "https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/175953/how-to-load-a-malicious-lkm-at-startup", + "https://0x00sec.org/t/kernel-rootkits-getting-your-hands-dirty/1485" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.006/loading_linux_kernel_module/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1547.006", + "T1547" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Filesystem.file_create_time", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.process_guid", + "Filesystem.file_path" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.006", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.006", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 72 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.006", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory", + "file": "endpoint/linux_file_created_in_kernel_driver_directory.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.006/loading_linux_kernel_module/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_file_created_in_kernel_driver_directory_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_file_created_in_kernel_driver_directory.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory", + "id": "97d9cfb2-61ad-11ec-bb2d-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-20", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for suspicious file creation on init system directories for automatic execution of script or file upon boot up. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamer to persist on the targeted or compromised host. This behavior can be executed or use by an administrator or network operator to add script files or binary files as part of a task or automation. filter is needed.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/etc/init.d/*\", \"*/etc/rc.d/*\", \"*/sbin/init.d/*\", \"*/etc/rc.local*\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_file_creation_in_init_boot_directory_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can create file in this folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.004/linux_init_profile/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1037.004", + "T1037" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Filesystem.file_create_time", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.process_guid", + "Filesystem.file_path" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1037.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "RC Scripts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1037", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Rocke" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1037.004", + "T1037" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1037.004", + "T1037" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory", + "file": "endpoint/linux_file_creation_in_init_boot_directory.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.004/linux_init_profile/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_file_creation_in_init_boot_directory_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_file_creation_in_init_boot_directory.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux File Creation In Profile Directory", + "id": "46ba0082-61af-11ec-9826-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-20", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for suspicious file creation in /etc/profile.d directory to automatically execute scripts by shell upon boot up of a linux machine. This technique is commonly abused by adversaries, malware and red teamers as a persistence mechanism to the targeted or compromised host. This Anomaly detection is a good indicator that someone wants to run a code after boot up which can be done also by the administrator or network operator for automation purposes.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/etc/profile.d/*\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_file_creation_in_profile_directory_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can create file in profile.d folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004/", + "https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux File Creation In Profile Directory", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.004/linux_init_profile/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1546.004", + "T1546" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Filesystem.file_create_time", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.process_guid", + "Filesystem.file_path" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell Configuration Modification", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1546.004", + "T1546" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1546.004", + "T1546" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux File Creation In Profile Directory Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux File Creation In Profile Directory", + "file": "endpoint/linux_file_creation_in_profile_directory.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.004/linux_init_profile/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_file_creation_in_profile_directory_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_file_creation_in_profile_directory.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility", + "id": "18b5a1a0-6326-11ec-943a-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-22", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for inserting of linux kernel module using insmod utility function. This event can detect a installation of rootkit or malicious kernel module to gain elevated privileges to their malicious code and bypassed detections. This Anomaly detection is a good indicator that someone installing kernel module in a linux host either admin or adversaries. filter is needed in this scenario", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN(\"kmod\", \"sudo\") AND Processes.process = *insmod* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_insert_kernel_module_using_insmod_utility_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/fedora/rawhide/system-administrators-guide/kernel-module-driver-configuration/Working_with_Kernel_Modules/", + "https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/175953/how-to-load-a-malicious-lkm-at-startup", + "https://0x00sec.org/t/kernel-rootkits-getting-your-hands-dirty/1485" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.006/loading_linux_kernel_module/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A commandline $process$ that may install kernel module on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1547.006", + "T1547" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.006", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.006", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 64 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.006", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility", + "file": "endpoint/linux_insert_kernel_module_using_insmod_utility.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.006/loading_linux_kernel_module/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_insert_kernel_module_using_insmod_utility_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_insert_kernel_module_using_insmod_utility.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility", + "id": "387b278a-6326-11ec-aa2c-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-22", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for possible installing a linux kernel module using modprobe utility function. This event can detect a installation of rootkit or malicious kernel module to gain elevated privileges to their malicious code and bypassed detections. This Anomaly detection is a good indicator that someone installing kernel module in a linux host either admin or adversaries. filter is needed in this scenario", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN(\"kmod\", \"sudo\") AND Processes.process = *modprobe* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_install_kernel_module_using_modprobe_utility_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/fedora/rawhide/system-administrators-guide/kernel-module-driver-configuration/Working_with_Kernel_Modules/", + "https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/175953/how-to-load-a-malicious-lkm-at-startup", + "https://0x00sec.org/t/kernel-rootkits-getting-your-hands-dirty/1485" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.006/loading_linux_kernel_module/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A commandline $process$ that may install kernel module on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1547.006", + "T1547" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.006", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.006", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 64 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.006", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility", + "file": "endpoint/linux_install_kernel_module_using_modprobe_utility.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.006/loading_linux_kernel_module/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_install_kernel_module_using_modprobe_utility_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_install_kernel_module_using_modprobe_utility.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File", + "id": "ab1e0d52-624a-11ec-8e0b-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to look for suspicious command lines that may add entry to /etc/sudoers with NOPASSWD attribute in linux platform. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain elevated privilege to the targeted or compromised host. /etc/sudoers file controls who can run what commands users can execute on the machines and can also control whether user need a password to execute particular commands. This file is composed of aliases (basically variables) and user specifications.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*NOPASSWD:*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_nopasswd_entry_in_sudoers_file_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://askubuntu.com/questions/334318/sudoers-file-enable-nopasswd-for-user-all-commands", + "https://help.ubuntu.com/community/Sudoers" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/nopasswd_sudoers/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "a commandline $process$ executed on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.003", + "T1548" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.003", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 64 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.003", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File", + "file": "endpoint/linux_nopasswd_entry_in_sudoers_file.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/nopasswd_sudoers/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_nopasswd_entry_in_sudoers_file_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_nopasswd_entry_in_sudoers_file.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File", + "id": "7a85eb24-72da-11ec-ac76-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-11", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to look for suspicious process command-line that might be accessing or modifying sshd_config. This file is the ssh configuration file that might be modify by threat actors or adversaries to redirect port connection, allow user using authorized key generated during attack. This anomaly detection might catch noise from administrator auditing or modifying ssh configuration file. In this scenario filter is needed", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN(\"cat\", \"nano*\",\"vim*\", \"vi*\") AND Processes.process IN(\"*/etc/ssh/sshd_config\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_access_or_modification_of_sshd_config_file_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.hackingarticles.in/ssh-penetration-testing-port-22/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/004/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098.004/ssh_authorized_keys/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "a commandline $process$ executed on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1098.004", + "T1098" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "SSH Authorized Keys", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT3", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1098.004", + "T1098" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1098.004", + "T1098" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File", + "file": "endpoint/linux_possible_access_or_modification_of_sshd_config_file.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098.004/ssh_authorized_keys/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_possible_access_or_modification_of_sshd_config_file_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_access_or_modification_of_sshd_config_file.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Possible Access To Credential Files", + "id": "16107e0e-71fc-11ec-b862-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-10", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a possible attempt to dump or access the content of /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow to enable offline credential cracking. \"etc/passwd\" store user information within linux OS while \"etc/shadow\" contain the user passwords hash. Adversaries and threat actors may attempt to access this to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator of possible credential dumping technique but it might catch some normal administrator automation scripts or during credential auditing. In this scenario filter is needed.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN(\"cat\", \"nano*\",\"vim*\", \"vi*\") AND Processes.process IN(\"*/etc/shadow*\", \"*/etc/passwd*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_access_to_credential_files_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://askubuntu.com/questions/445361/what-is-difference-between-etc-shadow-and-etc-passwd", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/008/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Possible Access To Credential Files", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.008/copy_file_stdoutpipe/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A commandline $process$ executed on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.008", + "T1003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.008", + "mitre_attack_technique": "/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.008", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.008", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Possible Access To Credential Files Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Possible Access To Credential Files", + "file": "endpoint/linux_possible_access_to_credential_files.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.008/copy_file_stdoutpipe/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_possible_access_to_credential_files_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_access_to_credential_files.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File", + "id": "4479539c-71fc-11ec-b2e2-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-10", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a possible access or modification of /etc/sudoers file. \"/etc/sudoers\" file controls who can run what command as what users on what machine and can also control whether a specific user need a password for particular commands. adversaries and threat actors abuse this file to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation during attack on targeted host.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN(\"cat\", \"nano*\",\"vim*\", \"vi*\") AND Processes.process IN(\"*/etc/sudoers*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_access_to_sudoers_file_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003/", + "https://web.archive.org/web/20210708035426/https://www.cobaltstrike.com/downloads/csmanual43.pdf" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.008/copy_file_stdoutpipe/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A commandline $process$ executed on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.003", + "T1548" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.003", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.003", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File", + "file": "endpoint/linux_possible_access_to_sudoers_file.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.008/copy_file_stdoutpipe/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_possible_access_to_sudoers_file_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_access_to_sudoers_file.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File", + "id": "7bc20606-5f40-11ec-a586-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-17", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for suspicious commandline that may use to append user entry to /etc/at.allow or /etc/at.deny. These 2 files are commonly abused by malware, adversaries or red teamers to persist on the targeted or compromised host. These config file can restrict user that can only execute at application (another schedule task application in linux). attacker can create a user or add the compromised username to that config file to execute at to schedule it malicious code. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator to investigate further the entry in created config file and who created it to verify if it is a false positive.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*echo*\" AND Processes.process IN(\"*/etc/at.allow\", \"*/etc/at.deny\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://linuxize.com/post/at-command-in-linux/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/001/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.001/at_execution/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A commandline $process$ that may modify at allow config file in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.001", + "T1053" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 9, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "At (Linux)", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.001", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 30 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 9 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.001", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File", + "file": "endpoint/linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.001/at_execution/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File", + "id": "9c94732a-61af-11ec-91e3-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-20", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for suspicious command-lines that can be possibly used to modify user profile files to automatically execute scripts/executables by shell upon reboot of the machine. This technique is commonly abused by adversaries, malware and red teamers as persistence mechanism to the targeted or compromised host. This Anomaly detection is a good indicator that someone wants to run code after reboot which can be done also by the administrator or network operator for automation purposes.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*echo*\" AND Processes.process IN(\"*~/.bashrc\", \"*~/.bash_profile\", \"*/etc/profile\", \"~/.bash_login\", \"*~/.profile\", \"~/.bash_logout\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_append_command_to_profile_config_file_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://unix.stackexchange.com/questions/129143/what-is-the-purpose-of-bashrc-and-how-does-it-work", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.004/linux_init_profile/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "a commandline $process$ that may modify profile files in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1546.004", + "T1546" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell Configuration Modification", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1546.004", + "T1546" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1546.004", + "T1546" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File", + "file": "endpoint/linux_possible_append_command_to_profile_config_file.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.004/linux_init_profile/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_possible_append_command_to_profile_config_file_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_append_command_to_profile_config_file.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File", + "id": "b5b91200-5f27-11ec-bb4e-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-17", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for possible suspicious commandline that may use to append a code to any existing cronjob files for persistence or privilege escalation. This technique is commonly abused by malware, adversaries and red teamers to automatically execute their code within a existing or sometimes in normal cronjob script file.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*echo*\" AND Processes.process IN(\"*/etc/cron*\", \"*/var/spool/cron/*\", \"*/etc/anacrontab*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003/", + "https://blog.aquasec.com/threat-alert-kinsing-malware-container-vulnerability", + "https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/cronjobs_entry/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A commandline $process$ that may modify cronjob file in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.003", + "T1053" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "Rocke" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.003", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.003", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File", + "file": "endpoint/linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/cronjobs_entry/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor", + "id": "dcc89bde-5f24-11ec-87ca-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-17", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for possible modification of cronjobs file using editor. This event is can be seen in normal user but can also be a good hunting indicator for unwanted user modifying cronjobs for possible persistence or privilege escalation.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name IN(\"nano\",\"vim.basic\") OR Processes.process IN (\"*nano *\", \"*vi *\", \"*vim *\")) AND Processes.process IN(\"*/etc/cron*\", \"*/var/spool/cron/*\", \"*/etc/anacrontab*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/cronjobs_entry/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 20, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A commandline $process$ that may modify cronjob file using editor in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.003", + "T1053" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 6, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "Rocke" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.003", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 20, + "confidence": 30 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 6 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.003", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor", + "file": "endpoint/linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/cronjobs_entry/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation", + "id": "c04ef40c-72da-11ec-8eac-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-11", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to look for possible ssh key file creation on ~/.ssh/ folder. This technique is commonly abused by threat actors and adversaries to gain persistence and privilege escalation to the targeted host. by creating ssh private and public key and passing the public key to the attacker server. threat actor can access remotely the machine using openssh daemon service.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/.ssh*\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_possible_ssh_key_file_creation_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can create file in ~/.ssh folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.hackingarticles.in/ssh-penetration-testing-port-22/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/004/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098.004/ssh_authorized_keys/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1098.004", + "T1098" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Filesystem.file_create_time", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.process_guid", + "Filesystem.file_path" + ], + "risk_score": 36, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "SSH Authorized Keys", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT3", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1098.004", + "T1098" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 36 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1098.004", + "T1098" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation", + "file": "endpoint/linux_possible_ssh_key_file_creation.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098.004/ssh_authorized_keys/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_possible_ssh_key_file_creation_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_ssh_key_file_creation.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls", + "id": "cbe2ca30-631e-11ec-8670-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-22", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious command that may hijack a library function in linux platform. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain privileges and persist on the machine. This detection pertains to loading a dll to hijack or hook a library function of specific program using LD_PRELOAD command.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*LD_PRELOAD*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_preload_hijack_library_calls_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://compilepeace.medium.com/memory-malware-part-0x2-writing-userland-rootkits-via-ld-preload-30121c8343d5" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1574.006/lib_hijack/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A commandline $process$ that may hijack library function on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1574.006", + "T1574" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.006", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic Linker Hijacking", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT41", + "Rocke" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1574.006", + "T1574" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 64 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1574.006", + "T1574" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls", + "file": "endpoint/linux_preload_hijack_library_calls.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1574.006/lib_hijack/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_preload_hijack_library_calls_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_preload_hijack_library_calls.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory", + "id": "c7495048-61b6-11ec-9a37-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-20", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for suspicious file creation in systemd timer directory in linux platform. systemd is a system and service manager for Linux distributions. From the Windows perspective, this process fulfills the duties of wininit.exe and services.exe combined. At the risk of simplifying the functionality of systemd, it initializes a Linux system and starts relevant services that are defined in service unit files. Adversaries, malware and red teamers may abuse this this feature by stashing systemd service file to persist on the targetted or compromised host.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name = *.service Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/etc/systemd/system*\", \"*/lib/systemd/system*\", \"*/usr/lib/systemd/system*\", \"*/run/systemd/system*\", \"*~/.config/systemd/*\", \"*~/.local/share/systemd/*\",\"*/etc/systemd/user*\", \"*/lib/systemd/user*\", \"*/usr/lib/systemd/user*\", \"*/run/systemd/user*\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_service_file_created_in_systemd_directory_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can create file in systemd folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/006/", + "https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/", + "https://redcanary.com/blog/attck-t1501-understanding-systemd-service-persistence/", + "https://github.com/microsoft/MSTIC-Sysmon/blob/main/linux/configs/attack-based/persistence/T1053.003_Cron_Activity.xml" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.006/service_systemd/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A service file named as $file_path$ is created in systemd folder on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.006", + "T1053" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Filesystem.file_create_time", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.process_guid", + "Filesystem.file_path" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.006", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.006", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 64 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.006", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory", + "file": "endpoint/linux_service_file_created_in_systemd_directory.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.006/service_systemd/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_service_file_created_in_systemd_directory_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_service_file_created_in_systemd_directory.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Service Restarted", + "id": "084275ba-61b8-11ec-8d64-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-20", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for restarted or re-enable services in linux platform. This technique can be executed or performed using systemctl or service tool application. Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Administrator may also create a legitimated service for a specific tool or normal application as part of task or automation, in this scenario it is suggested to look for the service path of the actual script or executable that register as service and who created the service for further verification.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name IN (\"systemctl\", \"service\") OR Processes.process IN (\"*systemctl *\", \"*service *\")) Processes.process IN (\"*restart*\", \"*reload*\", \"*reenable*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_service_restarted_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and commandline executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Service Restarted", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.006/service_systemd/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A commandline $process$ that may create or start a service on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.006", + "T1053" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.006", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.006", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.006", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Service Restarted Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Service Restarted", + "file": "endpoint/linux_service_restarted.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.006/service_systemd/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_service_restarted_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_service_restarted.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Service Started Or Enabled", + "id": "e0428212-61b7-11ec-88a3-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-20", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for created or enable services in linux platform. This technique can be executed or performed using systemctl or service tool application. Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Administrator may also create a legitimated service for a specific tool or normal application as part of task or automation, in this scenario it is suggested to look for the service path of the actual script or executable that register as service and who created the service for further verification.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name IN (\"systemctl\", \"service\") OR Processes.process IN (\"*systemctl *\", \"*service *\")) Processes.process IN (\"* start *\", \"* enable *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_service_started_or_enabled_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Service Started Or Enabled", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.006/service_systemd/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "a commandline $process$ that may create or start a service on $dest", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.006", + "T1053" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.006", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.006", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 42 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.006", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Service Started Or Enabled Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Service Started Or Enabled", + "file": "endpoint/linux_service_started_or_enabled.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.006/service_systemd/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_service_started_or_enabled_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_service_started_or_enabled.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility", + "id": "bf0304b6-6250-11ec-9d7c-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for suspicious chmod utility execution to enable SUID bit. This allows a user to temporarily gain root access, usually in order to run a program. For example, only the root account is allowed to change the password information contained in the password database; If the SUID bit appears as an s, the file's owner also has execute permission to the file; if it appears as an S, the file's owner does not have execute permission. The second specialty permission is the SGID, or set group id bit. It is similar to the SUID bit, except it can temporarily change group membership, usually to execute a program. The SGID bit is set if an s or an S appears in the group section of permissions.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE (Processes.process_name = chmod OR Processes.process = \"*chmod *\") AND Processes.process IN(\"* g+s *\", \"* u+s *\", \"* 4777 *\", \"* 4577 *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_setuid_using_chmod_utility_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.hackingarticles.in/linux-privilege-escalation-using-capabilities/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.001/chmod_uid/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "a commandline $process$ that may set suid or sgid on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.001", + "T1548" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Setuid and Setgid", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.001", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.001", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility", + "file": "endpoint/linux_setuid_using_chmod_utility.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.001/chmod_uid/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_setuid_using_chmod_utility_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_setuid_using_chmod_utility.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility", + "id": "9d96022e-6250-11ec-9a19-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for suspicious setcap utility execution to enable SUID bit. This allows a user to temporarily gain root access, usually in order to run a program. For example, only the root account is allowed to change the password information contained in the password database; If the SUID bit appears as an s, the file's owner also has execute permission to the file; if it appears as an S, the file's owner does not have execute permission. The second specialty permission is the SGID, or set group id bit. It is similar to the SUID bit, except it can temporarily change group membership, usually to execute a program. The SGID bit is set if an s or an S appears in the group section of permissions.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = setcap OR Processes.process = \"*setcap *\") AND Processes.process IN (\"* cap_setuid=ep *\", \"* cap_setuid+ep *\", \"* cap_net_bind_service+p *\", \"* cap_net_raw+ep *\", \"* cap_dac_read_search+ep *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_setuid_using_setcap_utility_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.hackingarticles.in/linux-privilege-escalation-using-capabilities/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.001/linux_setcap/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A commandline $process$ that may set suid or sgid on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.001", + "T1548" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Setuid and Setgid", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.001", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.001", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility", + "file": "endpoint/linux_setuid_using_setcap_utility.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.001/linux_setcap/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_setuid_using_setcap_utility_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_setuid_using_setcap_utility.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Sudo OR Su Execution", + "id": "4b00f134-6d6a-11ec-a90c-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-04", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect the execution of sudo or su command in linux operating system. The \"sudo\" command allows a system administrator to delegate authority to give certain users (or groups of users) the ability to run some (or all) commands as root or another user while providing an audit trail of the commands and their arguments. This command is commonly abused by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to elevate privileges to the targeted host. This command can be executed by administrator for legitimate purposes or to execute process that need admin privileges, In this scenario filter is needed.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"sudo\", \"su\") OR Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"sudo\", \"su\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_sudo_or_su_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Sudo OR Su Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/sudo_su/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A commandline $process$ that execute sudo or su in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.003", + "T1548" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 9, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.003", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 30 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 9 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.003", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Sudo OR Su Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Sudo OR Su Execution", + "file": "endpoint/linux_sudo_or_su_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/sudo_su/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_sudo_or_su_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_sudo_or_su_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation", + "id": "be254a5c-63e7-11ec-89da-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-23", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to looks for file creation of sudoers.tmp file cause by editing /etc/sudoers using visudo or editor in linux platform. This technique may abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain elevated privilege to targeted or compromised host. /etc/sudoers file controls who can run what commands as what users on what machines and can also control special things such as whether you need a password for particular commands. The file is composed of aliases (basically variables) and user specifications (which control who can run what).", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*sudoers.tmp*\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_sudoers_tmp_file_creation_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://forum.ubuntuusers.de/topic/sudo-visudo-gibt-etc-sudoers-tmp/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/sudoers_temp/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.003", + "T1548" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Filesystem.file_create_time", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.process_guid", + "Filesystem.file_path" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.003", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 72 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.003", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation", + "file": "endpoint/linux_sudoers_tmp_file_creation.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/sudoers_temp/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_sudoers_tmp_file_creation_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_sudoers_tmp_file_creation.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Visudo Utility Execution", + "id": "08c41040-624c-11ec-a71f-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to looks for suspicious commandline that add entry to /etc/sudoers by using visudo utility tool in linux platform. This technique may abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain elevated privilege to targeted or compromised host. /etc/sudoers file controls who can run what commands as what users on what machines and can also control special things such as whether you need a password for particular commands. The file is composed of aliases (basically variables) and user specifications (which control who can run what).", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = visudo by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_visudo_utility_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://askubuntu.com/questions/334318/sudoers-file-enable-nopasswd-for-user-all-commands" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Visudo Utility Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 40, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/visudo/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 40, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A commandline $process$ executed on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.003", + "T1548" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 16, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.003", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 40, + "confidence": 40 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 16 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.003", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Visudo Utility Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Visudo Utility Execution", + "file": "endpoint/linux_visudo_utility_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/visudo/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_visudo_utility_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_visudo_utility_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [] + }, + { + "name": "Linux Post-Exploitation", + "id": "d310ccfe-5477-11ec-ad05-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-03", + "author": "Rod Soto", + "description": "This analytic story identifies popular Linux post exploitation tools such as autoSUID, LinEnum, LinPEAS, Linux Exploit Suggesters, MimiPenguin.", + "narrative": "These tools allow operators find possible exploits or paths for privilege escalation based on SUID binaries, user permissions, kernel version and distro version.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/linux/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Post-Exploitation", + "analytic_story": "Linux Post-Exploitation", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Security Monitoring", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT41", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Suspicious Linux Discovery Commands - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "no", + "author_name": "Rod Soto", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious Linux Discovery Commands", + "id": "0edd5112-56c9-11ec-b990-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-06", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search, detects execution of suspicious bash commands from various commonly leveraged bash scripts like (AutoSUID, LinEnum, LinPeas) to perform discovery of possible paths of privilege execution, password files, vulnerable directories, executables and file permissions on a Linux host.\\\nThe search logic specifically looks for high number of distinct commands run in a short period of time.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) values(Processes.process_name) values(Processes.parent_process_name) dc(Processes.process) as distinct_commands dc(Processes.process_name) as distinct_process_names min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where [|inputlookup linux_tool_discovery_process.csv | rename process as Processes.process |table Processes.process] by _time span=5m Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| where distinct_commands > 40 AND distinct_process_names > 3| `suspicious_linux_discovery_commands_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This detection search is based on Splunk add-on for Microsoft Sysmon-Linux.(https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/6176/). Please install this add-on to parse fields correctly and execute detection search. Consider customizing the time window and threshold values according to your environment.", + "known_false_positives": "Unless an administrator is using these commands to troubleshoot or audit a system, the execution of these commands should be monitored.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/linux/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/", + "https://github.com/IvanGlinkin/AutoSUID", + "https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng/tree/master/linPEAS", + "https://github.com/rebootuser/LinEnum" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Linux Discovery Commands", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Post-Exploitation" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.004/linux_discovery_tools/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious Linux Discovery Commands detected on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059.004" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_name" + ], + "risk_score": 81, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT41", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Post-Exploitation" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 81 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Suspicious Linux Discovery Commands", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious Linux Discovery Commands", + "file": "endpoint/suspicious_linux_discovery_commands.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-60d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.004/linux_discovery_tools/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_linux_discovery_commands_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_linux_discovery_commands.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [] + }, + { + "name": "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "id": "b9879c24-670a-44c0-895e-98cdb7d0e848", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-17", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "description": "Monitor for and investigate activities that may be associated with a Linux privilege-escalation attack, including unusual processes running on endpoints, schedule task, services, setuid, root execution and more.", + "narrative": "Privilege escalation is a \"land-and-expand\" technique, wherein an adversary gains an initial foothold on a host and then exploits its weaknesses to increase his privileges. The motivation is simple: certain actions on a Linux machine--such as installing software--may require higher-level privileges than those the attacker initially acquired. By increasing his privilege level, the attacker can gain the control required to carry out his malicious ends. This Analytic Story provides searches to detect and investigate behaviors that attackers may use to elevate their privileges in your environment.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "analytic_story": "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "Rocke" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT3", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Fox Kitten", + "Leafminer", + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Indrik Spider", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "At (Linux)", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1222.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1222", + "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Setuid and Setgid", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.006", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1037.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "RC Scripts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1037", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Rocke" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell Configuration Modification", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "Cobalt Group", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "PLATINUM", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "Whitefly", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "SSH Authorized Keys", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT3", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.008", + "mitre_attack_technique": "/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.006", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic Linker Hijacking", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT41", + "Rocke" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.006", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access", + "Defense Evasion", + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux Add User Account - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux At Allow Config File Creation - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux At Application Execution - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux Change File Owner To Root - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux Common Process For Elevation Control - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux Doas Conf File Creation - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux Doas Tool Execution - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux File Creation In Profile Directory - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux pkexec Privilege Escalation - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux Possible Access To Credential Files - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux Service Restarted - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux Service Started Or Enabled - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux Sudo OR Su Execution - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux Visudo Utility Execution - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories", + "id": "023f3452-5f27-11ec-bf00-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-17", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a suspicious file creation in known cron table directories. This event is commonly abuse by malware, adversaries and red teamers to persist on the target or compromised host. crontab or cronjob is like a schedule task in windows environment where you can create an executable or script on the known crontab directories to run it base on its schedule. This Anomaly query is a good indicator to look further what file is added and who added the file if to consider it legitimate file.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/etc/cron*\", \"*/var/spool/cron/*\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_add_files_in_known_crontab_directories_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can create file in crontab folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.sandflysecurity.com/blog/detecting-cronrat-malware-on-linux-instantly/", + "https://www.cyberciti.biz/faq/how-do-i-add-jobs-to-cron-under-linux-or-unix-oses/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/cronjobs_entry/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "a file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.003", + "T1053" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Filesystem.file_create_time", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.process_guid", + "Filesystem.file_path" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "Rocke" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.003", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.003", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories", + "file": "endpoint/linux_add_files_in_known_crontab_directories.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/cronjobs_entry/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_add_files_in_known_crontab_directories_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_add_files_in_known_crontab_directories.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Add User Account", + "id": "51fbcaf2-6259-11ec-b0f3-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for commands to create user accounts on the linux platform. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to persist on the targeted or compromised host by creating new user with an elevated privilege. This Hunting query may catch normal creation of user by administrator so filter is needed.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"useradd\", \"adduser\") OR Processes.process IN (\"*useradd *\", \"*adduser *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_add_user_account_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://linuxize.com/post/how-to-create-users-in-linux-using-the-useradd-command/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Add User Account", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/linux_adduser/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A commandline $process$ that may create user account on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1136.001", + "T1136" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT3", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Fox Kitten", + "Leafminer", + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Indrik Spider", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1136.001", + "T1136" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1136.001", + "T1136" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Add User Account Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Add User Account", + "file": "endpoint/linux_add_user_account.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/linux_adduser/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_add_user_account_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_add_user_account.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux At Allow Config File Creation", + "id": "977b3082-5f3d-11ec-b954-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-17", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a suspicious file creation of /etc/at.allow or /etc/at.deny. These 2 files are commonly abused by malware, adversaries or red teamers to persist on the targeted or compromised host. These config files can restrict or allow user to execute \"at\" application (another schedule task application in linux). attacker can create a user or add the compromised username to that config file to execute \"at\" to schedule it malicious code. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator to investigate further the entry in created config file and who created it to verify if it is a false positive.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/etc/at.allow\", \"*/etc/at.deny\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_at_allow_config_file_creation_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can create this file for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://linuxize.com/post/at-command-in-linux/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux At Allow Config File Creation", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.001/at_execution/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.003", + "T1053" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Filesystem.file_create_time", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.process_guid", + "Filesystem.file_path" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "Rocke" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.003", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.003", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux At Allow Config File Creation Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux At Allow Config File Creation", + "file": "endpoint/linux_at_allow_config_file_creation.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.001/at_execution/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_at_allow_config_file_creation_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_at_allow_config_file_creation.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux At Application Execution", + "id": "bf0a378e-5f3c-11ec-a6de-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-17", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a suspicious process creation of At application. This process can be used by malware, adversaries and red teamers to create persistence entry to the targeted or compromised host with their malicious code. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator to investigate the event before and after this process execution, when it was executed and what schedule task it will execute.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"at\", \"atd\") OR Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"at\", \"atd\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_at_application_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can use this application for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/001/", + "https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/getting-attacker-ip-address-from-malicious-linux-job-craig-rowland/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux At Application Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.001/at_execution/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "At application was executed in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.001", + "T1053" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 9, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "At (Linux)", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.001", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 30 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 9 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.001", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux At Application Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux At Application Execution", + "file": "endpoint/linux_at_application_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.001/at_execution/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_at_application_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_at_application_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Change File Owner To Root", + "id": "c1400ea2-6257-11ec-ad49-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for a commandline that change the file owner to root using chown utility tool. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to escalate privilege to the targeted or compromised host by changing the owner of their malicious file to root. This event is not so common in corporate network except from the administrator doing normal task that needs high privilege.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = chown OR Processes.process = \"*chown *\") AND Processes.process = \"* root *\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_change_file_owner_to_root_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://unix.stackexchange.com/questions/101073/how-to-change-permissions-from-root-user-to-all-users", + "https://askubuntu.com/questions/617850/changing-from-user-to-superuser" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Change File Owner To Root", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.001/chmod_uid/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A commandline $process$ that may change ownership to root on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1222.002", + "T1222" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1222.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1222", + "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1222.002", + "T1222" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 64 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1222.002", + "T1222" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Change File Owner To Root Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Change File Owner To Root", + "file": "endpoint/linux_change_file_owner_to_root.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.001/chmod_uid/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_change_file_owner_to_root_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_change_file_owner_to_root.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Common Process For Elevation Control", + "id": "66ab15c0-63d0-11ec-9e70-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-23", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to look for possible elevation control access using a common known process in linux platform to change the attribute and file ownership. This technique is commonly abused by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain persistence or privilege escalation on the target or compromised host. Tis common process is used to modify file attribute, file ownership or SUID. This tools can be used in legitimate purposes so filter is needed.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"chmod\", \"chown\", \"fchmod\", \"fchmodat\", \"fchown\", \"fchownat\", \"fremovexattr\", \"fsetxattr\", \"lchown\", \"lremovexattr\", \"lsetxattr\", \"removexattr\", \"setuid\", \"setgid\", \"setreuid\", \"setregid\", \"chattr\") OR Processes.process IN (\"*chmod *\", \"*chown *\", \"*fchmod *\", \"*fchmodat *\", \"*fchown *\", \"*fchownat *\", \"*fremovexattr *\", \"*fsetxattr *\", \"*lchown *\", \"*lremovexattr *\", \"*lsetxattr *\", \"*removexattr *\", \"*setuid *\", \"*setgid *\", \"*setreuid *\", \"*setregid *\", \"*setcap *\", \"*chattr *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_common_process_for_elevation_control_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/001/", + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/auditd/blob/master/audit.rules#L285-L297", + "https://github.com/bfuzzy1/auditd-attack/blob/master/auditd-attack/auditd-attack.rules#L269-L270", + "https://github.com/microsoft/MSTIC-Sysmon/blob/main/linux/configs/attack-based/privilege_escalation/T1548.001_ElevationControl_CommonProcesses.xml" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Common Process For Elevation Control", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.001/chmod_uid/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A commandline $process$ with process $process_name$ on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.001", + "T1548" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 9, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Setuid and Setgid", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.001", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 30 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 9 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.001", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Common Process For Elevation Control Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Common Process For Elevation Control", + "file": "endpoint/linux_common_process_for_elevation_control.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.001/chmod_uid/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_common_process_for_elevation_control_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_common_process_for_elevation_control.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Doas Conf File Creation", + "id": "f6343e86-6e09-11ec-9376-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-05", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect the creation of doas.conf file in linux host platform. This configuration file can be use by doas utility tool to allow or permit standard users to perform tasks as root, the same way sudo does. This tool is developed as a minimalistic alternative to sudo application. This tool can be abused advesaries, attacker or malware to gain elevated privileges to the targeted or compromised host. On the other hand this can also be executed by administrator for a certain task that needs admin rights. In this case filter is needed.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/etc/doas.conf\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_doas_conf_file_creation_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://wiki.gentoo.org/wiki/Doas", + "https://www.makeuseof.com/how-to-install-and-use-doas/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Doas Conf File Creation", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/doas/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.003", + "T1548" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Filesystem.file_create_time", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.process_guid", + "Filesystem.file_path" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.003", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.003", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Doas Conf File Creation Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Doas Conf File Creation", + "file": "endpoint/linux_doas_conf_file_creation.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/doas/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_doas_conf_file_creation_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_doas_conf_file_creation.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Doas Tool Execution", + "id": "d5a62490-6e09-11ec-884e-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-05", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect the doas tool execution in linux host platform. This utility tool allow standard users to perform tasks as root, the same way sudo does. This tool is developed as a minimalistic alternative to sudo application. This tool can be abused advesaries, attacker or malware to gain elevated privileges to the targeted or compromised host. On the other hand this can also be executed by administrator for a certain task that needs admin rights. In this case filter is needed.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"doas\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_doas_tool_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://wiki.gentoo.org/wiki/Doas", + "https://www.makeuseof.com/how-to-install-and-use-doas/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Doas Tool Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/doas_exec/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A doas $process_name$ with commandline $process$ was executed on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.003", + "T1548" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.003", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.003", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Doas Tool Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Doas Tool Execution", + "file": "endpoint/linux_doas_tool_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/doas_exec/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_doas_tool_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_doas_tool_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter", + "id": "0d370304-5f26-11ec-a4bb-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-17", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a suspicious cronjobs modification using crontab edit parameter. This commandline parameter can be abuse by malware author, adversaries, and red red teamers to add cronjob entry to their malicious code to execute to the schedule they want. This event can also be executed by administrator or normal user for automation purposes so filter is needed.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = crontab Processes.process = \"*crontab *\" Processes.process = \"* -e*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_edit_cron_table_parameter_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can use this application for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/crontab_edit_parameter/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A possible crontab edit command $process$ executed on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.003", + "T1053" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 9, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "Rocke" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.003", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 30 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 9 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.003", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter", + "file": "endpoint/linux_edit_cron_table_parameter.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/crontab_edit_parameter/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_edit_cron_table_parameter_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_edit_cron_table_parameter.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory", + "id": "b85bbeec-6326-11ec-9311-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-22", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for suspicious file creation in kernel/driver directory in linux platform. This directory is known folder for all linux kernel module available within the system. so creation of file in this directory is a good indicator that there is a possible rootkit installation in the host machine. This technique was abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain high privileges to their malicious code such us in kernel level. Even this event is not so common administrator or legitimate 3rd party tool may install driver or linux kernel module as part of its installation.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/kernel/drivers/*\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_file_created_in_kernel_driver_directory_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can create file in this folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/fedora/rawhide/system-administrators-guide/kernel-module-driver-configuration/Working_with_Kernel_Modules/", + "https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/175953/how-to-load-a-malicious-lkm-at-startup", + "https://0x00sec.org/t/kernel-rootkits-getting-your-hands-dirty/1485" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.006/loading_linux_kernel_module/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1547.006", + "T1547" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Filesystem.file_create_time", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.process_guid", + "Filesystem.file_path" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.006", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.006", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 72 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.006", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory", + "file": "endpoint/linux_file_created_in_kernel_driver_directory.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.006/loading_linux_kernel_module/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_file_created_in_kernel_driver_directory_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_file_created_in_kernel_driver_directory.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory", + "id": "97d9cfb2-61ad-11ec-bb2d-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-20", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for suspicious file creation on init system directories for automatic execution of script or file upon boot up. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamer to persist on the targeted or compromised host. This behavior can be executed or use by an administrator or network operator to add script files or binary files as part of a task or automation. filter is needed.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/etc/init.d/*\", \"*/etc/rc.d/*\", \"*/sbin/init.d/*\", \"*/etc/rc.local*\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_file_creation_in_init_boot_directory_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can create file in this folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.004/linux_init_profile/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1037.004", + "T1037" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Filesystem.file_create_time", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.process_guid", + "Filesystem.file_path" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1037.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "RC Scripts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1037", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Rocke" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1037.004", + "T1037" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1037.004", + "T1037" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory", + "file": "endpoint/linux_file_creation_in_init_boot_directory.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.004/linux_init_profile/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_file_creation_in_init_boot_directory_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_file_creation_in_init_boot_directory.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux File Creation In Profile Directory", + "id": "46ba0082-61af-11ec-9826-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-20", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for suspicious file creation in /etc/profile.d directory to automatically execute scripts by shell upon boot up of a linux machine. This technique is commonly abused by adversaries, malware and red teamers as a persistence mechanism to the targeted or compromised host. This Anomaly detection is a good indicator that someone wants to run a code after boot up which can be done also by the administrator or network operator for automation purposes.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/etc/profile.d/*\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_file_creation_in_profile_directory_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can create file in profile.d folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004/", + "https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux File Creation In Profile Directory", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.004/linux_init_profile/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1546.004", + "T1546" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Filesystem.file_create_time", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.process_guid", + "Filesystem.file_path" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell Configuration Modification", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1546.004", + "T1546" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1546.004", + "T1546" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux File Creation In Profile Directory Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux File Creation In Profile Directory", + "file": "endpoint/linux_file_creation_in_profile_directory.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.004/linux_init_profile/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_file_creation_in_profile_directory_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_file_creation_in_profile_directory.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility", + "id": "18b5a1a0-6326-11ec-943a-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-22", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for inserting of linux kernel module using insmod utility function. This event can detect a installation of rootkit or malicious kernel module to gain elevated privileges to their malicious code and bypassed detections. This Anomaly detection is a good indicator that someone installing kernel module in a linux host either admin or adversaries. filter is needed in this scenario", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN(\"kmod\", \"sudo\") AND Processes.process = *insmod* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_insert_kernel_module_using_insmod_utility_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/fedora/rawhide/system-administrators-guide/kernel-module-driver-configuration/Working_with_Kernel_Modules/", + "https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/175953/how-to-load-a-malicious-lkm-at-startup", + "https://0x00sec.org/t/kernel-rootkits-getting-your-hands-dirty/1485" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.006/loading_linux_kernel_module/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A commandline $process$ that may install kernel module on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1547.006", + "T1547" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.006", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.006", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 64 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.006", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility", + "file": "endpoint/linux_insert_kernel_module_using_insmod_utility.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.006/loading_linux_kernel_module/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_insert_kernel_module_using_insmod_utility_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_insert_kernel_module_using_insmod_utility.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility", + "id": "387b278a-6326-11ec-aa2c-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-22", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for possible installing a linux kernel module using modprobe utility function. This event can detect a installation of rootkit or malicious kernel module to gain elevated privileges to their malicious code and bypassed detections. This Anomaly detection is a good indicator that someone installing kernel module in a linux host either admin or adversaries. filter is needed in this scenario", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN(\"kmod\", \"sudo\") AND Processes.process = *modprobe* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_install_kernel_module_using_modprobe_utility_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/fedora/rawhide/system-administrators-guide/kernel-module-driver-configuration/Working_with_Kernel_Modules/", + "https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/175953/how-to-load-a-malicious-lkm-at-startup", + "https://0x00sec.org/t/kernel-rootkits-getting-your-hands-dirty/1485" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.006/loading_linux_kernel_module/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A commandline $process$ that may install kernel module on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1547.006", + "T1547" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.006", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.006", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 64 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.006", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility", + "file": "endpoint/linux_install_kernel_module_using_modprobe_utility.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.006/loading_linux_kernel_module/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_install_kernel_module_using_modprobe_utility_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_install_kernel_module_using_modprobe_utility.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File", + "id": "ab1e0d52-624a-11ec-8e0b-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to look for suspicious command lines that may add entry to /etc/sudoers with NOPASSWD attribute in linux platform. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain elevated privilege to the targeted or compromised host. /etc/sudoers file controls who can run what commands users can execute on the machines and can also control whether user need a password to execute particular commands. This file is composed of aliases (basically variables) and user specifications.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*NOPASSWD:*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_nopasswd_entry_in_sudoers_file_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://askubuntu.com/questions/334318/sudoers-file-enable-nopasswd-for-user-all-commands", + "https://help.ubuntu.com/community/Sudoers" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/nopasswd_sudoers/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "a commandline $process$ executed on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.003", + "T1548" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.003", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 64 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.003", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File", + "file": "endpoint/linux_nopasswd_entry_in_sudoers_file.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/nopasswd_sudoers/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_nopasswd_entry_in_sudoers_file_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_nopasswd_entry_in_sudoers_file.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux pkexec Privilege Escalation", + "id": "03e22c1c-8086-11ec-ac2e-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-28", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies `pkexec` spawning with no command-line arguments. A vulnerability in Polkit's pkexec component identified as CVE-2021-4034 (PwnKit) which is present in the default configuration of all major Linux distributions and can be exploited to gain full root privileges on the system.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=pkexec by _time Processes.dest Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(^.{1}$)\" | `linux_pkexec_privilege_escalation_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "Depending on the EDR product in use, there are multiple ways to \"null\" the command-line field, Processes.process. Two that may be useful `process=\"(^.{0}$)\"` or `| where isnull(process)`. To generate data for this behavior, Sysmon for Linux was utilized. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://www.reddit.com/r/crowdstrike/comments/sdfeig/20220126_cool_query_friday_hunting_pwnkit_local/", + "https://linux.die.net/man/1/pkexec", + "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/linux-system-service-bug-gives-root-on-all-major-distros-exploit-released/", + "https://access.redhat.com/security/security-updates/#/?q=polkit&p=1&sort=portal_publication_date%20desc&rows=10&portal_advisory_type=Security%20Advisory&documentKind=PortalProduct" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux pkexec Privilege Escalation", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1068/zoom_child_process/linux-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ related to a local privilege escalation in polkit pkexec.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1068" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-4034" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "Cobalt Group", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "PLATINUM", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "Whitefly", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1068" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 70, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-4034" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1068" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux pkexec Privilege Escalation Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux pkexec Privilege Escalation", + "file": "endpoint/linux_pkexec_privilege_escalation.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "linux-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1068/pkexec/linux-sysmon.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_pkexec_privilege_escalation_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_pkexec_privilege_escalation.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File", + "id": "7a85eb24-72da-11ec-ac76-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-11", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to look for suspicious process command-line that might be accessing or modifying sshd_config. This file is the ssh configuration file that might be modify by threat actors or adversaries to redirect port connection, allow user using authorized key generated during attack. This anomaly detection might catch noise from administrator auditing or modifying ssh configuration file. In this scenario filter is needed", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN(\"cat\", \"nano*\",\"vim*\", \"vi*\") AND Processes.process IN(\"*/etc/ssh/sshd_config\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_access_or_modification_of_sshd_config_file_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.hackingarticles.in/ssh-penetration-testing-port-22/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/004/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098.004/ssh_authorized_keys/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "a commandline $process$ executed on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1098.004", + "T1098" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "SSH Authorized Keys", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT3", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1098.004", + "T1098" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1098.004", + "T1098" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File", + "file": "endpoint/linux_possible_access_or_modification_of_sshd_config_file.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098.004/ssh_authorized_keys/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_possible_access_or_modification_of_sshd_config_file_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_access_or_modification_of_sshd_config_file.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Possible Access To Credential Files", + "id": "16107e0e-71fc-11ec-b862-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-10", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a possible attempt to dump or access the content of /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow to enable offline credential cracking. \"etc/passwd\" store user information within linux OS while \"etc/shadow\" contain the user passwords hash. Adversaries and threat actors may attempt to access this to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator of possible credential dumping technique but it might catch some normal administrator automation scripts or during credential auditing. In this scenario filter is needed.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN(\"cat\", \"nano*\",\"vim*\", \"vi*\") AND Processes.process IN(\"*/etc/shadow*\", \"*/etc/passwd*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_access_to_credential_files_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://askubuntu.com/questions/445361/what-is-difference-between-etc-shadow-and-etc-passwd", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/008/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Possible Access To Credential Files", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.008/copy_file_stdoutpipe/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A commandline $process$ executed on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.008", + "T1003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.008", + "mitre_attack_technique": "/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.008", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.008", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Possible Access To Credential Files Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Possible Access To Credential Files", + "file": "endpoint/linux_possible_access_to_credential_files.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.008/copy_file_stdoutpipe/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_possible_access_to_credential_files_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_access_to_credential_files.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File", + "id": "4479539c-71fc-11ec-b2e2-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-10", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a possible access or modification of /etc/sudoers file. \"/etc/sudoers\" file controls who can run what command as what users on what machine and can also control whether a specific user need a password for particular commands. adversaries and threat actors abuse this file to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation during attack on targeted host.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN(\"cat\", \"nano*\",\"vim*\", \"vi*\") AND Processes.process IN(\"*/etc/sudoers*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_access_to_sudoers_file_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003/", + "https://web.archive.org/web/20210708035426/https://www.cobaltstrike.com/downloads/csmanual43.pdf" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.008/copy_file_stdoutpipe/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A commandline $process$ executed on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.003", + "T1548" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.003", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.003", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File", + "file": "endpoint/linux_possible_access_to_sudoers_file.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.008/copy_file_stdoutpipe/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_possible_access_to_sudoers_file_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_access_to_sudoers_file.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File", + "id": "7bc20606-5f40-11ec-a586-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-17", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for suspicious commandline that may use to append user entry to /etc/at.allow or /etc/at.deny. These 2 files are commonly abused by malware, adversaries or red teamers to persist on the targeted or compromised host. These config file can restrict user that can only execute at application (another schedule task application in linux). attacker can create a user or add the compromised username to that config file to execute at to schedule it malicious code. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator to investigate further the entry in created config file and who created it to verify if it is a false positive.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*echo*\" AND Processes.process IN(\"*/etc/at.allow\", \"*/etc/at.deny\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://linuxize.com/post/at-command-in-linux/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/001/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.001/at_execution/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A commandline $process$ that may modify at allow config file in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.001", + "T1053" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 9, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "At (Linux)", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.001", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 30 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 9 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.001", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File", + "file": "endpoint/linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.001/at_execution/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File", + "id": "9c94732a-61af-11ec-91e3-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-20", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for suspicious command-lines that can be possibly used to modify user profile files to automatically execute scripts/executables by shell upon reboot of the machine. This technique is commonly abused by adversaries, malware and red teamers as persistence mechanism to the targeted or compromised host. This Anomaly detection is a good indicator that someone wants to run code after reboot which can be done also by the administrator or network operator for automation purposes.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*echo*\" AND Processes.process IN(\"*~/.bashrc\", \"*~/.bash_profile\", \"*/etc/profile\", \"~/.bash_login\", \"*~/.profile\", \"~/.bash_logout\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_append_command_to_profile_config_file_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://unix.stackexchange.com/questions/129143/what-is-the-purpose-of-bashrc-and-how-does-it-work", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.004/linux_init_profile/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "a commandline $process$ that may modify profile files in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1546.004", + "T1546" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell Configuration Modification", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1546.004", + "T1546" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1546.004", + "T1546" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File", + "file": "endpoint/linux_possible_append_command_to_profile_config_file.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.004/linux_init_profile/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_possible_append_command_to_profile_config_file_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_append_command_to_profile_config_file.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File", + "id": "b5b91200-5f27-11ec-bb4e-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-17", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for possible suspicious commandline that may use to append a code to any existing cronjob files for persistence or privilege escalation. This technique is commonly abused by malware, adversaries and red teamers to automatically execute their code within a existing or sometimes in normal cronjob script file.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*echo*\" AND Processes.process IN(\"*/etc/cron*\", \"*/var/spool/cron/*\", \"*/etc/anacrontab*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003/", + "https://blog.aquasec.com/threat-alert-kinsing-malware-container-vulnerability", + "https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/cronjobs_entry/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A commandline $process$ that may modify cronjob file in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.003", + "T1053" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "Rocke" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.003", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.003", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File", + "file": "endpoint/linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/cronjobs_entry/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor", + "id": "dcc89bde-5f24-11ec-87ca-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-17", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for possible modification of cronjobs file using editor. This event is can be seen in normal user but can also be a good hunting indicator for unwanted user modifying cronjobs for possible persistence or privilege escalation.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name IN(\"nano\",\"vim.basic\") OR Processes.process IN (\"*nano *\", \"*vi *\", \"*vim *\")) AND Processes.process IN(\"*/etc/cron*\", \"*/var/spool/cron/*\", \"*/etc/anacrontab*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/cronjobs_entry/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 20, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A commandline $process$ that may modify cronjob file using editor in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.003", + "T1053" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 6, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "Rocke" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.003", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 20, + "confidence": 30 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 6 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.003", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor", + "file": "endpoint/linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/cronjobs_entry/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation", + "id": "c04ef40c-72da-11ec-8eac-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-11", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to look for possible ssh key file creation on ~/.ssh/ folder. This technique is commonly abused by threat actors and adversaries to gain persistence and privilege escalation to the targeted host. by creating ssh private and public key and passing the public key to the attacker server. threat actor can access remotely the machine using openssh daemon service.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/.ssh*\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_possible_ssh_key_file_creation_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can create file in ~/.ssh folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.hackingarticles.in/ssh-penetration-testing-port-22/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/004/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098.004/ssh_authorized_keys/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1098.004", + "T1098" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Filesystem.file_create_time", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.process_guid", + "Filesystem.file_path" + ], + "risk_score": 36, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "SSH Authorized Keys", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT3", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1098.004", + "T1098" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 36 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1098.004", + "T1098" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation", + "file": "endpoint/linux_possible_ssh_key_file_creation.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098.004/ssh_authorized_keys/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_possible_ssh_key_file_creation_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_ssh_key_file_creation.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls", + "id": "cbe2ca30-631e-11ec-8670-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-22", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious command that may hijack a library function in linux platform. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain privileges and persist on the machine. This detection pertains to loading a dll to hijack or hook a library function of specific program using LD_PRELOAD command.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*LD_PRELOAD*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_preload_hijack_library_calls_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://compilepeace.medium.com/memory-malware-part-0x2-writing-userland-rootkits-via-ld-preload-30121c8343d5" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1574.006/lib_hijack/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A commandline $process$ that may hijack library function on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1574.006", + "T1574" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.006", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic Linker Hijacking", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT41", + "Rocke" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1574.006", + "T1574" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 64 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1574.006", + "T1574" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls", + "file": "endpoint/linux_preload_hijack_library_calls.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1574.006/lib_hijack/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_preload_hijack_library_calls_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_preload_hijack_library_calls.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory", + "id": "c7495048-61b6-11ec-9a37-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-20", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for suspicious file creation in systemd timer directory in linux platform. systemd is a system and service manager for Linux distributions. From the Windows perspective, this process fulfills the duties of wininit.exe and services.exe combined. At the risk of simplifying the functionality of systemd, it initializes a Linux system and starts relevant services that are defined in service unit files. Adversaries, malware and red teamers may abuse this this feature by stashing systemd service file to persist on the targetted or compromised host.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name = *.service Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/etc/systemd/system*\", \"*/lib/systemd/system*\", \"*/usr/lib/systemd/system*\", \"*/run/systemd/system*\", \"*~/.config/systemd/*\", \"*~/.local/share/systemd/*\",\"*/etc/systemd/user*\", \"*/lib/systemd/user*\", \"*/usr/lib/systemd/user*\", \"*/run/systemd/user*\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_service_file_created_in_systemd_directory_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can create file in systemd folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/006/", + "https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/", + "https://redcanary.com/blog/attck-t1501-understanding-systemd-service-persistence/", + "https://github.com/microsoft/MSTIC-Sysmon/blob/main/linux/configs/attack-based/persistence/T1053.003_Cron_Activity.xml" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.006/service_systemd/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A service file named as $file_path$ is created in systemd folder on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.006", + "T1053" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Filesystem.file_create_time", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.process_guid", + "Filesystem.file_path" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.006", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.006", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 64 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.006", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory", + "file": "endpoint/linux_service_file_created_in_systemd_directory.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.006/service_systemd/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_service_file_created_in_systemd_directory_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_service_file_created_in_systemd_directory.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Service Restarted", + "id": "084275ba-61b8-11ec-8d64-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-20", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for restarted or re-enable services in linux platform. This technique can be executed or performed using systemctl or service tool application. Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Administrator may also create a legitimated service for a specific tool or normal application as part of task or automation, in this scenario it is suggested to look for the service path of the actual script or executable that register as service and who created the service for further verification.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name IN (\"systemctl\", \"service\") OR Processes.process IN (\"*systemctl *\", \"*service *\")) Processes.process IN (\"*restart*\", \"*reload*\", \"*reenable*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_service_restarted_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and commandline executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Service Restarted", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.006/service_systemd/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A commandline $process$ that may create or start a service on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.006", + "T1053" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.006", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.006", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.006", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Service Restarted Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Service Restarted", + "file": "endpoint/linux_service_restarted.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.006/service_systemd/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_service_restarted_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_service_restarted.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Service Started Or Enabled", + "id": "e0428212-61b7-11ec-88a3-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-20", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for created or enable services in linux platform. This technique can be executed or performed using systemctl or service tool application. Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Administrator may also create a legitimated service for a specific tool or normal application as part of task or automation, in this scenario it is suggested to look for the service path of the actual script or executable that register as service and who created the service for further verification.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name IN (\"systemctl\", \"service\") OR Processes.process IN (\"*systemctl *\", \"*service *\")) Processes.process IN (\"* start *\", \"* enable *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_service_started_or_enabled_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Service Started Or Enabled", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.006/service_systemd/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "a commandline $process$ that may create or start a service on $dest", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.006", + "T1053" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.006", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.006", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 42 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.006", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Service Started Or Enabled Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Service Started Or Enabled", + "file": "endpoint/linux_service_started_or_enabled.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.006/service_systemd/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_service_started_or_enabled_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_service_started_or_enabled.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility", + "id": "bf0304b6-6250-11ec-9d7c-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for suspicious chmod utility execution to enable SUID bit. This allows a user to temporarily gain root access, usually in order to run a program. For example, only the root account is allowed to change the password information contained in the password database; If the SUID bit appears as an s, the file's owner also has execute permission to the file; if it appears as an S, the file's owner does not have execute permission. The second specialty permission is the SGID, or set group id bit. It is similar to the SUID bit, except it can temporarily change group membership, usually to execute a program. The SGID bit is set if an s or an S appears in the group section of permissions.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE (Processes.process_name = chmod OR Processes.process = \"*chmod *\") AND Processes.process IN(\"* g+s *\", \"* u+s *\", \"* 4777 *\", \"* 4577 *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_setuid_using_chmod_utility_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.hackingarticles.in/linux-privilege-escalation-using-capabilities/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.001/chmod_uid/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "a commandline $process$ that may set suid or sgid on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.001", + "T1548" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Setuid and Setgid", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.001", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.001", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility", + "file": "endpoint/linux_setuid_using_chmod_utility.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.001/chmod_uid/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_setuid_using_chmod_utility_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_setuid_using_chmod_utility.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility", + "id": "9d96022e-6250-11ec-9a19-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for suspicious setcap utility execution to enable SUID bit. This allows a user to temporarily gain root access, usually in order to run a program. For example, only the root account is allowed to change the password information contained in the password database; If the SUID bit appears as an s, the file's owner also has execute permission to the file; if it appears as an S, the file's owner does not have execute permission. The second specialty permission is the SGID, or set group id bit. It is similar to the SUID bit, except it can temporarily change group membership, usually to execute a program. The SGID bit is set if an s or an S appears in the group section of permissions.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = setcap OR Processes.process = \"*setcap *\") AND Processes.process IN (\"* cap_setuid=ep *\", \"* cap_setuid+ep *\", \"* cap_net_bind_service+p *\", \"* cap_net_raw+ep *\", \"* cap_dac_read_search+ep *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_setuid_using_setcap_utility_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.hackingarticles.in/linux-privilege-escalation-using-capabilities/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.001/linux_setcap/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A commandline $process$ that may set suid or sgid on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.001", + "T1548" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Setuid and Setgid", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.001", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.001", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility", + "file": "endpoint/linux_setuid_using_setcap_utility.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.001/linux_setcap/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_setuid_using_setcap_utility_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_setuid_using_setcap_utility.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Sudo OR Su Execution", + "id": "4b00f134-6d6a-11ec-a90c-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-04", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect the execution of sudo or su command in linux operating system. The \"sudo\" command allows a system administrator to delegate authority to give certain users (or groups of users) the ability to run some (or all) commands as root or another user while providing an audit trail of the commands and their arguments. This command is commonly abused by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to elevate privileges to the targeted host. This command can be executed by administrator for legitimate purposes or to execute process that need admin privileges, In this scenario filter is needed.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"sudo\", \"su\") OR Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"sudo\", \"su\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_sudo_or_su_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Sudo OR Su Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/sudo_su/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A commandline $process$ that execute sudo or su in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.003", + "T1548" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 9, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.003", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 30 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 9 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.003", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Sudo OR Su Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Sudo OR Su Execution", + "file": "endpoint/linux_sudo_or_su_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/sudo_su/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_sudo_or_su_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_sudo_or_su_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation", + "id": "be254a5c-63e7-11ec-89da-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-23", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to looks for file creation of sudoers.tmp file cause by editing /etc/sudoers using visudo or editor in linux platform. This technique may abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain elevated privilege to targeted or compromised host. /etc/sudoers file controls who can run what commands as what users on what machines and can also control special things such as whether you need a password for particular commands. The file is composed of aliases (basically variables) and user specifications (which control who can run what).", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*sudoers.tmp*\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_sudoers_tmp_file_creation_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://forum.ubuntuusers.de/topic/sudo-visudo-gibt-etc-sudoers-tmp/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/sudoers_temp/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.003", + "T1548" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Filesystem.file_create_time", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.process_guid", + "Filesystem.file_path" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.003", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 72 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.003", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation", + "file": "endpoint/linux_sudoers_tmp_file_creation.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/sudoers_temp/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_sudoers_tmp_file_creation_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_sudoers_tmp_file_creation.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Visudo Utility Execution", + "id": "08c41040-624c-11ec-a71f-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to looks for suspicious commandline that add entry to /etc/sudoers by using visudo utility tool in linux platform. This technique may abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain elevated privilege to targeted or compromised host. /etc/sudoers file controls who can run what commands as what users on what machines and can also control special things such as whether you need a password for particular commands. The file is composed of aliases (basically variables) and user specifications (which control who can run what).", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = visudo by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_visudo_utility_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://askubuntu.com/questions/334318/sudoers-file-enable-nopasswd-for-user-all-commands" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Visudo Utility Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 40, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/visudo/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 40, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A commandline $process$ executed on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.003", + "T1548" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 16, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.003", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Linux Privilege Escalation", + "Linux Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 40, + "confidence": 40 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 16 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.003", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Visudo Utility Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Visudo Utility Execution", + "file": "endpoint/linux_visudo_utility_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/visudo/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_visudo_utility_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_visudo_utility_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [] + }, + { + "name": "Living Off The Land", + "id": "6f7982e2-900b-11ec-a54a-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-17", + "author": "Lou Stella, Splunk", + "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to search for the presence of an attacker leveraging existing tooling within your environment.", + "narrative": "Living Off The Land refers to an attacker methodology of using software already installed on their target host to achieve their goals. Many utilities that ship with Windows can be used to achieve various goals, with reduced chances of detection by an antivirus software.", + "references": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Living Off The Land", + "analytic_story": "Living Off The Land", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics", + "Unauthorized Software", + "Lateral Movement", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Security Monitoring", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT37", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Evilnum", + "Honeybee", + "MuddyWater", + "Patchwork", + "Threat Group-3390" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution - Rule", + "ESCU - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Lou Stella", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Eventvwr UAC Bypass", + "id": "9cf8fe08-7ad8-11eb-9819-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-28", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following search identifies Eventvwr bypass by identifying the registry modification into a specific path that eventvwr.msc looks to (but is not valid) upon execution. A successful attack will include a suspicious command to be executed upon eventvwr.msc loading. Upon triage, review the parallel processes that have executed. Identify any additional registry modifications on the endpoint that may look suspicious. Remediate as necessary.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*mscfile\\\\shell\\\\open\\\\command\\\\*\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `eventvwr_uac_bypass_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Some false positives may be present and will need to be filtered.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.md", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002", + "https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Eventvwr UAC Bypass", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "IcedID", + "Living Off The Land" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Registry values were modified to bypass UAC using Event Viewer on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.registry_value_name" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT37", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Evilnum", + "Honeybee", + "MuddyWater", + "Patchwork", + "Threat Group-3390" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "IcedID", + "Living Off The Land" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Eventvwr UAC Bypass Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Eventvwr UAC Bypass", + "file": "endpoint/eventvwr_uac_bypass.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "eventvwr_uac_bypass_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/eventvwr_uac_bypass.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution", + "id": "58adae9e-8ea3-11ec-90f6-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-15", + "author": "Lou Stella, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "DiskShadow.exe is a Microsoft Signed binary present on Windows Server. It has a scripting mode intended for complex scripted backup operations. This feature also allows for execution of arbitrary unsigned code. This analytic looks for the usage of the scripting mode flags in executions of DiskShadow. During triage, compare to known backup behavior in your environment and then review the scripts called by diskshadow.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_diskshadow` (Processes.process=*-s* OR Processes.process=*/s*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on processes that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition,confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators using the DiskShadow tool in their infrastructure as a main backup tool with scripts will cause false positives that can be filtered with `windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution_filter`", + "references": [ + "https://bohops.com/2018/03/26/diskshadow-the-return-of-vss-evasion-persistence-and-active-directory-database-extraction/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Living Off The Land" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218/diskshadow/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Possible Signed Binary Proxy Execution on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Porcesses.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id", + "Processes.original_file_name" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Living Off The Land" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "process_diskshadow", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=diskshadow.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=diskshadow.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "WSReset UAC Bypass", + "id": "8b5901bc-da63-11eb-be43-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-01-28", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry related to UAC bypass. This technique is to modify the registry in this detection, create a registry value with the path of the payload and run WSreset.exe to bypass User account Control.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\AppX82a6gwre4fdg3bt635tn5ctqjf8msdd2\\\\Shell\\\\open\\\\command*\" AND (Registry.registry_value_name = \"(Default)\" OR Registry.registry_value_name = \"DelegateExecute\") by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `wsreset_uac_bypass_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME", + "https://blog.morphisec.com/trickbot-uses-a-new-windows-10-uac-bypass" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "WSReset UAC Bypass", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Living Off The Land" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Defense Evasion", + "Scope:Inbound" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious modification of registry $registry_path$ with possible payload path $registry_value_name$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT37", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Evilnum", + "Honeybee", + "MuddyWater", + "Patchwork", + "Threat Group-3390" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Living Off The Land" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Defense Evasion", + "Scope:Inbound" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 63 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "WSReset UAC Bypass Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "WSReset UAC Bypass", + "file": "endpoint/wsreset_uac_bypass.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "wsreset_uac_bypass_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wsreset_uac_bypass.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [] + }, + { + "name": "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228", + "id": "b4453928-5a98-11ec-afcd-8de10b48fc52", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-11", + "author": "Jose Hernandez", + "description": "Log4Shell or CVE-2021-44228 is a Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability in the Apache Log4j library, a widely used and ubiquitous logging framework for Java. The vulnerability allows an attacker who can control log messages to execute arbitrary code loaded from attacker-controlled servers and we anticipate that most apps using the Log4j library will meet this condition.", + "narrative": "In late November 2021, Chen Zhaojun of Alibaba identified a remote code execution vulnerability. Previous work was seen in a 2016 Blackhat talk by Alvaro Munoz and Oleksandr Mirosh called [\"A Journey from JNDI/LDAP Manipulation to Remote Code Execution Dream Land\"](https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Munoz-A-Journey-From-JNDI-LDAP-Manipulation-To-RCE.pdf). Reported under the CVE ID : CVE-2021-44228, released to the public on December 10, 2021. The vulnerability is exploited through improper deserialization of user input passed into the framework. It permits remote code execution and it can allow an attacker to leak sensitive data, such as environment variables, or execute malicious software on the target system.", + "references": [ + "https://mbechler.github.io/2021/12/10/PSA_Log4Shell_JNDI_Injection/", + "https://www.fastly.com/blog/digging-deeper-into-log4shell-0day-rce-exploit-found-in-log4j", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/log4j2-vulnerability-analysis-and-mitigation-recommendations/", + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/log-jammin-log4j-2-rce.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228", + "analytic_story": "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Application Security", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control", + "Execution", + "Initial Access" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint", + "Network_Traffic", + "Risk", + "Web" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Command & Control", + "Exploitation", + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", + "ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", + "ESCU - Curl Download and Bash Execution - Rule", + "ESCU - Hunting for Log4Shell - Rule", + "ESCU - Java Class File download by Java User Agent - Rule", + "ESCU - Linux Java Spawning Shell - Rule", + "ESCU - Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 Exploitation - Rule", + "ESCU - Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports - Rule", + "ESCU - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", + "ESCU - Wget Download and Bash Execution - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows Java Spawning Shells - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic - Rule", + "ESCU - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt - Rule", + "ESCU - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "no", + "author_name": "Jose Hernandez", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Any Powershell DownloadFile", + "id": "1a93b7ea-7af7-11eb-adb5-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-03-01", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a file using `DownloadFile` method. This particular method is utilized in many different PowerShell frameworks to download files and output to disk. Identify the source (IP/domain) and destination file and triage appropriately. If AMSI logging or PowerShell transaction logs are available, review for further details of the implant.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process=*DownloadFile* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `any_powershell_downloadfile_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present and filtering will need to occur by parent process or command line argument. It may be required to modify this query to an EDR product for more granular coverage.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.net.webclient.downloadfile?view=net-5.0", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Any Powershell DownloadFile", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior identifies the use of DownloadFile within PowerShell.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 70, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Any Powershell DownloadFile Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Any Powershell DownloadFile", + "file": "endpoint/any_powershell_downloadfile.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_powershell", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "any_powershell_downloadfile_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadfile.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", + "id": "54a6ed00-3256-11ec-b031-acde48001122", + "version": 3, + "date": "2022-01-18", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies command-line arguments where `cmd.exe /c` is used to execute a program. `cmd /c` is used to run commands in MS-DOS and terminate after command or process completion. This technique is commonly seen in adversaries and malware to execute batch command using different shell like PowerShell or different process other than `cmd.exe`. This is a good hunting query for suspicious command-line made by a script or relative process execute it.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` AND Processes.process=\"* /c *\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives may be high based on legitimate scripted code in any environment. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228", + "WhisperGate", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/cmd_carry_str_param/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting spawn a new process.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059.003", + "T1059" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 30, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059.003", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228", + "WhisperGate", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 30 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 30 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059.003", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", + "file": "endpoint/cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/cmd_carry_str_param/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_cmd", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "id": "900bc324-59f3-11ec-9fb4-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-10", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of curl on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=curl (Processes.process=\"*-s *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", + "references": [ + "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [ + { + "name": "Log4j Investigate", + "id": "e609d729-0076-421a-b8f7-9e545d000381", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-12-14", + "author": "Philip Royer, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "description": "Published in response to CVE-2021-44228, this playbook and its sub-playbooks can be used to investigate and respond to attacks against hosts running vulnerable Java applications which use log4j. Between the parent playbook and seven sub-playbooks, each potentially compromised host found in Splunk Enteprise can be investigated and the risk can be mitigated using SSH for unix systems and WinRM for Windows systems.", + "how_to_implement": "To start this playbook, create a custom list called \"log4j_hosts\" with a format in which the first column should be an IP or hostname of a potentially affected log4j host, the second should be the operating system family (either unix or windows). If the operating system is unknown it can be left blank. In the block called \"fetch_hosts_from_custom_list\", change the custom list name from \"log4j_hosts\" if needed. If the operating system family (\"windows\" or \"unix\") is not known, both ssh and winrm will be attempted. If ssh and/or winrm are not the preferred endpoint management methods, these playbooks could be ported to use Google's GRR, osquery, CrowdStrike's RTR, Carbon Black's EDR API, or similar tools. The artifact scope \"all\" is used throughout this playbook because the artifact list can be added to as the playbook progresses.", + "playbook": "log4j_investigate", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/Fenrir/blob/master/fenrir.sh", + "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Log4j++Log4Shell+Followup%3A+What+we+see+and+how+to+defend+%28and+how+to+access+our+data%29/28122", + "https://twitter.com/ElektroWolle/status/1469962895849140224?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1469962895849140224%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_c10&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fpublish.twitter.com%2F%3Fquery%3Dhttps3A2F2Ftwitter.com2FElektroWolle2Fstatus2F1469962895849140224widget%3DTweet", + "https://blog.cloudflare.com/cve-2021-44228-log4j-rce-0-day-mitigation/" + ], + "app_list": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "detections": [ + "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "Windows Java Spawning Shell", + "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic" + ], + "platform_tags": [ + "Log4J" + ], + "playbook_fields": [], + "product": [ + "Splunk SOAR" + ], + "detection_objects": [ + { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "id": "900bc324-59f3-11ec-9fb4-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-10", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of curl on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=curl (Processes.process=\"*-s *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", + "references": [ + "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "file": "endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "id": "8281ce42-5c50-11ec-82d2-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a Java user agent performing a GET request for a .class file from the remote site. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell).", + "search": "| tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_user_agent=\"*Java*\" Web.http_method=\"GET\" Web.url=\"*.class*\" by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting web or proxy logs, or ensure it is being filled by a proxy like device, into the Web Datamodel. For additional filtering, allow list private IP space or restrict by known good.", + "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required in some instances, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2021/12/as-log4shell-wreaks-havoc-payroll-service-reports-ransomware-attack/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Web Server", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Scope:Network" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A Java user agent $http_user_agent$ was performing a $http_method$ to retrieve a remote class file.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_user_agent", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_method", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Web.http_method", + "Web.url", + "Web.url_length", + "Web.src", + "Web.dest", + "Web.http_user_agent" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_user_agent", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_method", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Scope:Network" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 40 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "http_user_agent", + "threat_object_type": "other" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "http_method", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "file": "endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "java.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java.log", + "source": "stream:http", + "sourcetype": "stream:http" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "id": "7b09db8a-5c20-11ec-9945-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the process name of Java, Apache, or Tomcat spawning a Linux shell. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). The shells included in the macro are \"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\". Upon triage, review parallel processes and command-line arguments to determine legitimacy.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=java OR Processes.parent_process_name=apache OR Processes.parent_process_name=tomcat `linux_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_java_spawning_shell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. Ensure EDR product is mapping OS Linux to the datamodel properly. Add any additional java process names for your environment to the analytic as needed.", + "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required on internal developer build systems or classify assets as web facing and restrict the analytic based on asset type.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.netlab.360.com/ten-families-of-malicious-samples-are-spreading-using-the-log4j2-vulnerability-now/", + "https://gist.github.com/olafhartong/916ebc673ba066537740164f7e7e1d72" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ spawning a Linux shell, potentially indicative of exploitation.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 40 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "file": "endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "java_spawn_shell_nix.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java_spawn_shell_nix.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "linux_shells", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name IN (\"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\"))", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "linux_java_spawning_shell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "id": "d2c14d28-5c47-11ec-9892-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "A required step while exploiting the CVE-2021-44228-Log4j vulnerability is that the victim server will perform outbound connections to attacker-controlled infrastructure. This is required as part of the JNDI lookup as well as for retrieving the second stage .class payload. The following analytic identifies the Java process reaching out to default ports used by the LDAP and RMI protocols. This behavior could represent successfull exploitation. Note that adversaries can easily decide to use arbitrary ports for these protocols and potentially bypass this detection.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"java.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe) by _time Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where (Ports.dest_port= 389 OR Ports.dest_port= 636 OR Ports.dest_port = 1389 OR Ports.dest_port = 1099 ) by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port| `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process connection_to_CNC dest_port | `outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate Java applications may use perform outbound connections to these ports. Filter as needed", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://www.govcert.admin.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_java/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Java performed outbound connections to default ports of LDAP or RMI on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_guid", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Ports.process_guid", + "Ports.dest", + "Ports.dest_port" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 60, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 54 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "file": "endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_java/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "id": "35682718-5a85-11ec-b8f7-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-11", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of wget on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wget (Processes.process=\"*-q *\" OR Processes.process=\"*--quiet*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-O- *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", + "references": [ + "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "file": "endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "id": "5e06e262-d7cd-4216-b2f8-27b437e18458", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Johan Bjerke, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "Malicious actors often abuse misconfigured LDAP servers or applications that use the LDAP servers in organizations. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. This search will help determine if you have any LDAP connections to IP addresses outside of private (RFC1918) address space.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as earliest_time latest(_time) as latest_time values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port = 389 OR All_Traffic.dest_port = 636 AND NOT (All_Traffic.dest_ip = 10.0.0.0/8 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=192.168.0.0/16 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip = 172.16.0.0/12) by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip |`drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | where src_ip != dest_ip | `security_content_ctime(latest_time)` | `security_content_ctime(earliest_time)` |`detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format and should be mapped to the Network Traffic datamodels that are in use for this search.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown at this moment. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. Please check those servers to verify if the activity is legitimate.", + "references": [ + "https://www.govcert.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_ldap/bro_conn.json" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An outbound LDAP connection from $src_ip$ in your infrastructure connecting to dest ip $dest_ip$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_ip", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.src_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "src_ip", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest_ip", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "file": "network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "stream_http_events.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_ldap/bro_conn.json", + "source": "/opt/malware/conn.log", + "sourcetype": "bro:conn:json" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "id": "c184f12e-5c90-11ec-bf1f-497c9a704a72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Jose Hernandez", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we first limit the scope of our search to the Web Datamodel and use the `| from datamodel` function to benefit from schema accelerated searching capabilities, mainly because the second part of the detection is pretty heavy, it runs a regex across all _raw events that looks for `${jndi:ldap://` pattern across all potential web fields available to the raw data, like http headers for example. If you see results for this detection, it means that there was a attempt at a injection, which could be a reconnaissance activity or a valid expliotation attempt, but this does not exactly mean that the host was indeed successfully exploited.", + "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | regex _raw=\"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)\\w+(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?\" | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx.", + "known_false_positives": "If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "action", + "category", + "dest", + "dest_port", + "http_content_type", + "http_method", + "http_referrer", + "http_user_agent", + "site", + "src", + "url", + "url_domain", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 30, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 15 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "file": "web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "nginx.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "source": "nginx", + "sourcetype": "nginx:plus:kv" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.yml", + "source": "web" + }, + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "id": "69afee44-5c91-11ec-bf1f-497c9a704a72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Jose Hernandez", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic", + "Web" + ], + "description": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we match the invocation function with a network connection to a malicious ip address.", + "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | rex field=_raw max_match=0 \"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)(?\\w+)(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?(?[a-zA-Z0-9\\.\\-\\_\\$]+)\" | join affected_host type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic by All_Traffic.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename dest AS affected_host] | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx.", + "known_false_positives": "If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_network_logs/log4j_network_logs.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "action", + "category", + "dest", + "dest_port", + "http_content_type", + "http_method", + "http_referrer", + "http_user_agent", + "site", + "src", + "url", + "url_domain", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 30, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 15 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "file": "web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-360d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "nginx.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "source": "nginx", + "sourcetype": "nginx:plus:kv" + }, + { + "file_name": "stream.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_network_logs/log4j_network_logs.log", + "source": "stream:Splunk_IP", + "sourcetype": "stream:ip" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.yml", + "source": "web" + } + ] + } + }, + { + "name": "Log4j Respond", + "id": "e609d729-4076-421a-b8f7-9e545d000381", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-14", + "author": "Philip Royer, Splunk", + "type": "Response", + "description": "Published in response to CVE-2021-44228, this playbook is meant to be launched after log4j_investigate. In this playbook, the risk from exploited hosts can be mitigated by optionally deleting malicious files from the hosts, blocking outbound network connections from the hosts, and/or shutting down the hosts", + "how_to_implement": "To use this playbook, create a custom list called \"log4j_hosts_and_files\" with a format in which the first column should be an IP or hostname of a potentially affected log4j host, the second should be the operating system family (either unix or windows), and the third should be a full path to a file to delete if there are any. The first two are mandatory and the file is optional. In the block called \"enumerate_files_to_delete\", change the custom list name from \"log4j_hosts_and_files\" if needed. If ssh and/or winrm are not the preferred endpoint management methods, these playbooks could be ported to use Google's GRR, osquery, CrowdStrike's RTR, Carbon Black's EDR API, or similar tools. The artifact scope \"all\" is used throughout this playbook because the artifact list can be added to as the playbook progresses.", + "playbook": "log4j_respond", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/Fenrir/blob/master/fenrir.sh", + "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Log4j++Log4Shell+Followup%3A+What+we+see+and+how+to+defend+%28and+how+to+access+our+data%29/28122", + "https://twitter.com/ElektroWolle/status/1469962895849140224?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1469962895849140224%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_c10&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fpublish.twitter.com%2F%3Fquery%3Dhttps3A2F2Ftwitter.com2FElektroWolle2Fstatus2F1469962895849140224widget%3DTweet", + "https://blog.cloudflare.com/cve-2021-44228-log4j-rce-0-day-mitigation/" + ], + "app_list": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "detections": [ + "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "Windows Java Spawning Shell", + "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic" + ], + "platform_tags": [ + "Log4J" + ], + "playbook_fields": [], + "product": [ + "Splunk SOAR" + ], + "detection_objects": [ + { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "id": "900bc324-59f3-11ec-9fb4-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-10", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of curl on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=curl (Processes.process=\"*-s *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", + "references": [ + "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "file": "endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "id": "8281ce42-5c50-11ec-82d2-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a Java user agent performing a GET request for a .class file from the remote site. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell).", + "search": "| tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_user_agent=\"*Java*\" Web.http_method=\"GET\" Web.url=\"*.class*\" by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting web or proxy logs, or ensure it is being filled by a proxy like device, into the Web Datamodel. For additional filtering, allow list private IP space or restrict by known good.", + "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required in some instances, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2021/12/as-log4shell-wreaks-havoc-payroll-service-reports-ransomware-attack/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Web Server", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Scope:Network" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A Java user agent $http_user_agent$ was performing a $http_method$ to retrieve a remote class file.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_user_agent", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_method", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Web.http_method", + "Web.url", + "Web.url_length", + "Web.src", + "Web.dest", + "Web.http_user_agent" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_user_agent", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_method", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Scope:Network" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 40 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "http_user_agent", + "threat_object_type": "other" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "http_method", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "file": "endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "java.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java.log", + "source": "stream:http", + "sourcetype": "stream:http" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "id": "7b09db8a-5c20-11ec-9945-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the process name of Java, Apache, or Tomcat spawning a Linux shell. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). The shells included in the macro are \"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\". Upon triage, review parallel processes and command-line arguments to determine legitimacy.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=java OR Processes.parent_process_name=apache OR Processes.parent_process_name=tomcat `linux_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_java_spawning_shell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. Ensure EDR product is mapping OS Linux to the datamodel properly. Add any additional java process names for your environment to the analytic as needed.", + "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required on internal developer build systems or classify assets as web facing and restrict the analytic based on asset type.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.netlab.360.com/ten-families-of-malicious-samples-are-spreading-using-the-log4j2-vulnerability-now/", + "https://gist.github.com/olafhartong/916ebc673ba066537740164f7e7e1d72" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ spawning a Linux shell, potentially indicative of exploitation.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 40 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "file": "endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "java_spawn_shell_nix.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java_spawn_shell_nix.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "linux_shells", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name IN (\"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\"))", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "linux_java_spawning_shell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "id": "d2c14d28-5c47-11ec-9892-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "A required step while exploiting the CVE-2021-44228-Log4j vulnerability is that the victim server will perform outbound connections to attacker-controlled infrastructure. This is required as part of the JNDI lookup as well as for retrieving the second stage .class payload. The following analytic identifies the Java process reaching out to default ports used by the LDAP and RMI protocols. This behavior could represent successfull exploitation. Note that adversaries can easily decide to use arbitrary ports for these protocols and potentially bypass this detection.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"java.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe) by _time Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where (Ports.dest_port= 389 OR Ports.dest_port= 636 OR Ports.dest_port = 1389 OR Ports.dest_port = 1099 ) by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port| `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process connection_to_CNC dest_port | `outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate Java applications may use perform outbound connections to these ports. Filter as needed", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://www.govcert.admin.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_java/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Java performed outbound connections to default ports of LDAP or RMI on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_guid", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Ports.process_guid", + "Ports.dest", + "Ports.dest_port" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 60, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 54 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "file": "endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_java/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "id": "35682718-5a85-11ec-b8f7-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-11", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of wget on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wget (Processes.process=\"*-q *\" OR Processes.process=\"*--quiet*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-O- *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", + "references": [ + "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "file": "endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "id": "5e06e262-d7cd-4216-b2f8-27b437e18458", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Johan Bjerke, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "Malicious actors often abuse misconfigured LDAP servers or applications that use the LDAP servers in organizations. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. This search will help determine if you have any LDAP connections to IP addresses outside of private (RFC1918) address space.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as earliest_time latest(_time) as latest_time values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port = 389 OR All_Traffic.dest_port = 636 AND NOT (All_Traffic.dest_ip = 10.0.0.0/8 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=192.168.0.0/16 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip = 172.16.0.0/12) by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip |`drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | where src_ip != dest_ip | `security_content_ctime(latest_time)` | `security_content_ctime(earliest_time)` |`detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format and should be mapped to the Network Traffic datamodels that are in use for this search.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown at this moment. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. Please check those servers to verify if the activity is legitimate.", + "references": [ + "https://www.govcert.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_ldap/bro_conn.json" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An outbound LDAP connection from $src_ip$ in your infrastructure connecting to dest ip $dest_ip$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_ip", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.src_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "src_ip", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest_ip", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "file": "network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "stream_http_events.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_ldap/bro_conn.json", + "source": "/opt/malware/conn.log", + "sourcetype": "bro:conn:json" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "id": "c184f12e-5c90-11ec-bf1f-497c9a704a72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Jose Hernandez", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we first limit the scope of our search to the Web Datamodel and use the `| from datamodel` function to benefit from schema accelerated searching capabilities, mainly because the second part of the detection is pretty heavy, it runs a regex across all _raw events that looks for `${jndi:ldap://` pattern across all potential web fields available to the raw data, like http headers for example. If you see results for this detection, it means that there was a attempt at a injection, which could be a reconnaissance activity or a valid expliotation attempt, but this does not exactly mean that the host was indeed successfully exploited.", + "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | regex _raw=\"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)\\w+(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?\" | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx.", + "known_false_positives": "If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "action", + "category", + "dest", + "dest_port", + "http_content_type", + "http_method", + "http_referrer", + "http_user_agent", + "site", + "src", + "url", + "url_domain", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 30, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 15 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "file": "web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "nginx.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "source": "nginx", + "sourcetype": "nginx:plus:kv" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.yml", + "source": "web" + }, + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "id": "69afee44-5c91-11ec-bf1f-497c9a704a72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Jose Hernandez", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic", + "Web" + ], + "description": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we match the invocation function with a network connection to a malicious ip address.", + "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | rex field=_raw max_match=0 \"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)(?\\w+)(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?(?[a-zA-Z0-9\\.\\-\\_\\$]+)\" | join affected_host type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic by All_Traffic.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename dest AS affected_host] | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx.", + "known_false_positives": "If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_network_logs/log4j_network_logs.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "action", + "category", + "dest", + "dest_port", + "http_content_type", + "http_method", + "http_referrer", + "http_user_agent", + "site", + "src", + "url", + "url_domain", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 30, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 15 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "file": "web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-360d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "nginx.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "source": "nginx", + "sourcetype": "nginx:plus:kv" + }, + { + "file_name": "stream.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_network_logs/log4j_network_logs.log", + "source": "stream:Splunk_IP", + "sourcetype": "stream:ip" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.yml", + "source": "web" + } + ] + } + } + ], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "file": "endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Hunting for Log4Shell", + "id": "158b68fa-5d1a-11ec-aac8-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-14", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "The following hunting query assists with quickly assessing CVE-2021-44228, or Log4Shell, activity mapped to the Web Datamodel. This is a combination query attempting to identify, score and dashboard. Because the Log4Shell vulnerability requires the string to be in the logs, this will work to identify the activity anywhere in the HTTP headers using _raw. Modify the first line to use the same pattern matching against other log sources. Scoring is based on a simple rubric of 0-5. 5 being the best match, and less than 5 meant to identify additional patterns that will equate to a higher total score. \\\nThe first jndi match identifies the standard pattern of `{jndi:` \\\njndi_fastmatch is meant to identify any jndi in the logs. The score is set low and is meant to be the \"base\" score used later. \\\njndi_proto is a protocol match that identifies `jndi` and one of `ldap, ldaps, rmi, dns, nis, iiop, corba, nds, http, https.` \\\nall_match is a very well written regex by https://gist.github.com/Schvenn that identifies nearly all patterns of this attack behavior. \\\nenv works to identify environment variables in the header, meant to capture `AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID`, `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY` and `env`. \\\nuri_detect is string match looking for the common uri paths currently being scanned/abused in the wild. \\\nkeywords matches on enumerated values that, like `$ctx:loginId`, that may be found in the header used by the adversary. \\\nlookup matching is meant to catch some basic obfuscation that has been identified using upper, lower and date. \\\nScoring will then occur based on any findings. The base score is meant to be 2 , created by jndi_fastmatch. Everything else is meant to increase that score. \\\nFinally, a simple table is created to show the scoring and the _raw field. Sort based on score or columns of interest.", + "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | eval jndi=if(match(_raw, \"(\\{|%7B)[jJnNdDiI]{4}:\"),4,0) | eval jndi_fastmatch=if(match(_raw, \"[jJnNdDiI]{4}\"),2,0) | eval jndi_proto=if(match(_raw,\"(?i)jndi:(ldap[s]?|rmi|dns|nis|iiop|corba|nds|http|https):\"),5,0) | eval all_match = if(match(_raw, \"(?i)(%(25){0,}20|\\s)*(%(25){0,}24|\\$)(%(25){0,}20|\\s)*(%(25){0,}7B|{)(%(25){0,}20|\\s)*(%(25){0,}(6A|4A)|J)(%(25){0,}(6E|4E)|N)(%(25){0,}(64|44)|D)(%(25){0,}(69|49)|I)(%(25){0,}20|\\s)*(%(25){0,}3A|:)[\\w\\%]+(%(25){1,}3A|:)(%(25){1,}2F|\\/)[^\\n]+\"),5,0) | eval env_var = if(match(_raw, \"env:\") OR match(_raw, \"env:AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID\") OR match(_raw, \"env:AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY\"),5,0) | eval uridetect = if(match(_raw, \"(?i)Basic\\/Command\\/Base64|Basic\\/ReverseShell|Basic\\/TomcatMemshell|Basic\\/JBossMemshell|Basic\\/WebsphereMemshell|Basic\\/SpringMemshell|Basic\\/Command|Deserialization\\/CommonsCollectionsK|Deserialization\\/CommonsBeanutils|Deserialization\\/Jre8u20\\/TomcatMemshell|Deserialization\\/CVE_2020_2555\\/WeblogicMemshell|TomcatBypass|GroovyBypass|WebsphereBypass\"),4,0) | eval keywords = if(match(_raw,\"(?i)\\$\\{ctx\\:loginId\\}|\\$\\{map\\:type\\}|\\$\\{filename\\}|\\$\\{date\\:MM-dd-yyyy\\}|\\$\\{docker\\:containerId\\}|\\$\\{docker\\:containerName\\}|\\$\\{docker\\:imageName\\}|\\$\\{env\\:USER\\}|\\$\\{event\\:Marker\\}|\\$\\{mdc\\:UserId\\}|\\$\\{java\\:runtime\\}|\\$\\{java\\:vm\\}|\\$\\{java\\:os\\}|\\$\\{jndi\\:logging/context-name\\}|\\$\\{hostName\\}|\\$\\{docker\\:containerId\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:accountName\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:clusterName\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:containerId\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:containerName\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:host\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:labels.app\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:labels.podTemplateHash\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:masterUrl\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:namespaceId\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:namespaceName\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:podId\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:podIp\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:podName\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:imageId\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:imageName\\}|\\$\\{log4j\\:configLocation\\}|\\$\\{log4j\\:configParentLocation\\}|\\$\\{spring\\:spring.application.name\\}|\\$\\{main\\:myString\\}|\\$\\{main\\:0\\}|\\$\\{main\\:1\\}|\\$\\{main\\:2\\}|\\$\\{main\\:3\\}|\\$\\{main\\:4\\}|\\$\\{main\\:bar\\}|\\$\\{name\\}|\\$\\{marker\\}|\\$\\{marker\\:name\\}|\\$\\{spring\\:profiles.active[0]|\\$\\{sys\\:logPath\\}|\\$\\{web\\:rootDir\\}|\\$\\{sys\\:user.name\\}\"),4,0) | eval obf = if(match(_raw, \"(\\$|%24)[^ /]*({|%7b)[^ /]*(j|%6a)[^ /]*(n|%6e)[^ /]*(d|%64)[^ /]*(i|%69)[^ /]*(:|%3a)[^ /]*(:|%3a)[^ /]*(/|%2f)\"),5,0) | eval lookups = if(match(_raw, \"(?i)({|%7b)(main|sys|k8s|spring|lower|upper|env|date|sd)\"),4,0) | addtotals fieldname=Score, jndi, jndi_proto, env_var, uridetect, all_match, jndi_fastmatch, keywords, obf, lookups | where Score > 2 | stats values(Score) by jndi, jndi_proto, env_var, uridetect, all_match, jndi_fastmatch, keywords, lookups, obf, _raw | `hunting_for_log4shell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "Out of the box, the Web datamodel is required to be pre-filled. However, tested was performed against raw httpd access logs. Change the first line to any dataset to pass the regex's against.", + "known_false_positives": "It is highly possible you will find false positives, however, the base score is set to 2 for _any_ jndi found in raw logs. tune and change as needed, include any filtering.", + "references": [ + "https://gist.github.com/olafhartong/916ebc673ba066537740164f7e7e1d72", + "https://gist.github.com/Neo23x0/e4c8b03ff8cdf1fa63b7d15db6e3860b#gistcomment-3994449", + "https://regex101.com/r/OSrm0q/1/", + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/signature-base/blob/master/yara/expl_log4j_cve_2021_44228.yar", + "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/12/12/log4shell-hell-anatomy-of-an-exploit-outbreak/", + "https://gist.github.com/MHaggis/1899b8554f38c8692a9fb0ceba60b44c", + "https://twitter.com/sasi2103/status/1469764719850442760?s=20" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Hunting for Log4Shell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Web Server", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Scope:Network" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/log4shell-nginx.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Hunting for Log4Shell exploitation has occurred.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_method", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "src", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Web.http_method", + "Web.url", + "Web.url_length", + "Web.src", + "Web.dest", + "Web.http_user_agent", + "_raw" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_method", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "src", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Scope:Network" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 40 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "http_method", + "threat_object_type": "other" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "src", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Hunting for Log4Shell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Hunting for Log4Shell", + "file": "endpoint/hunting_for_log4shell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "log4shell-nginx.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/log4shell-nginx.log", + "source": "/var/log/nginx/access.log", + "sourcetype": "nginx:plus:kv" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "hunting_for_log4shell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/hunting_for_log4shell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "id": "8281ce42-5c50-11ec-82d2-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a Java user agent performing a GET request for a .class file from the remote site. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell).", + "search": "| tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_user_agent=\"*Java*\" Web.http_method=\"GET\" Web.url=\"*.class*\" by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting web or proxy logs, or ensure it is being filled by a proxy like device, into the Web Datamodel. For additional filtering, allow list private IP space or restrict by known good.", + "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required in some instances, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2021/12/as-log4shell-wreaks-havoc-payroll-service-reports-ransomware-attack/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Web Server", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Scope:Network" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A Java user agent $http_user_agent$ was performing a $http_method$ to retrieve a remote class file.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_user_agent", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_method", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Web.http_method", + "Web.url", + "Web.url_length", + "Web.src", + "Web.dest", + "Web.http_user_agent" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_user_agent", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_method", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Scope:Network" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 40 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "http_user_agent", + "threat_object_type": "other" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "http_method", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [ + { + "name": "Log4j Investigate", + "id": "e609d729-0076-421a-b8f7-9e545d000381", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-12-14", + "author": "Philip Royer, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "description": "Published in response to CVE-2021-44228, this playbook and its sub-playbooks can be used to investigate and respond to attacks against hosts running vulnerable Java applications which use log4j. Between the parent playbook and seven sub-playbooks, each potentially compromised host found in Splunk Enteprise can be investigated and the risk can be mitigated using SSH for unix systems and WinRM for Windows systems.", + "how_to_implement": "To start this playbook, create a custom list called \"log4j_hosts\" with a format in which the first column should be an IP or hostname of a potentially affected log4j host, the second should be the operating system family (either unix or windows). If the operating system is unknown it can be left blank. In the block called \"fetch_hosts_from_custom_list\", change the custom list name from \"log4j_hosts\" if needed. If the operating system family (\"windows\" or \"unix\") is not known, both ssh and winrm will be attempted. If ssh and/or winrm are not the preferred endpoint management methods, these playbooks could be ported to use Google's GRR, osquery, CrowdStrike's RTR, Carbon Black's EDR API, or similar tools. The artifact scope \"all\" is used throughout this playbook because the artifact list can be added to as the playbook progresses.", + "playbook": "log4j_investigate", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/Fenrir/blob/master/fenrir.sh", + "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Log4j++Log4Shell+Followup%3A+What+we+see+and+how+to+defend+%28and+how+to+access+our+data%29/28122", + "https://twitter.com/ElektroWolle/status/1469962895849140224?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1469962895849140224%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_c10&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fpublish.twitter.com%2F%3Fquery%3Dhttps3A2F2Ftwitter.com2FElektroWolle2Fstatus2F1469962895849140224widget%3DTweet", + "https://blog.cloudflare.com/cve-2021-44228-log4j-rce-0-day-mitigation/" + ], + "app_list": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "detections": [ + "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "Windows Java Spawning Shell", + "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic" + ], + "platform_tags": [ + "Log4J" + ], + "playbook_fields": [], + "product": [ + "Splunk SOAR" + ], + "detection_objects": [ + { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "id": "900bc324-59f3-11ec-9fb4-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-10", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of curl on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=curl (Processes.process=\"*-s *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", + "references": [ + "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "file": "endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "id": "8281ce42-5c50-11ec-82d2-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a Java user agent performing a GET request for a .class file from the remote site. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell).", + "search": "| tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_user_agent=\"*Java*\" Web.http_method=\"GET\" Web.url=\"*.class*\" by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting web or proxy logs, or ensure it is being filled by a proxy like device, into the Web Datamodel. For additional filtering, allow list private IP space or restrict by known good.", + "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required in some instances, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2021/12/as-log4shell-wreaks-havoc-payroll-service-reports-ransomware-attack/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Web Server", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Scope:Network" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A Java user agent $http_user_agent$ was performing a $http_method$ to retrieve a remote class file.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_user_agent", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_method", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Web.http_method", + "Web.url", + "Web.url_length", + "Web.src", + "Web.dest", + "Web.http_user_agent" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_user_agent", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_method", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Scope:Network" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 40 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "http_user_agent", + "threat_object_type": "other" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "http_method", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "file": "endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "java.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java.log", + "source": "stream:http", + "sourcetype": "stream:http" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "id": "7b09db8a-5c20-11ec-9945-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the process name of Java, Apache, or Tomcat spawning a Linux shell. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). The shells included in the macro are \"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\". Upon triage, review parallel processes and command-line arguments to determine legitimacy.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=java OR Processes.parent_process_name=apache OR Processes.parent_process_name=tomcat `linux_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_java_spawning_shell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. Ensure EDR product is mapping OS Linux to the datamodel properly. Add any additional java process names for your environment to the analytic as needed.", + "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required on internal developer build systems or classify assets as web facing and restrict the analytic based on asset type.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.netlab.360.com/ten-families-of-malicious-samples-are-spreading-using-the-log4j2-vulnerability-now/", + "https://gist.github.com/olafhartong/916ebc673ba066537740164f7e7e1d72" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ spawning a Linux shell, potentially indicative of exploitation.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 40 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "file": "endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "java_spawn_shell_nix.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java_spawn_shell_nix.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "linux_shells", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name IN (\"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\"))", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "linux_java_spawning_shell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "id": "d2c14d28-5c47-11ec-9892-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "A required step while exploiting the CVE-2021-44228-Log4j vulnerability is that the victim server will perform outbound connections to attacker-controlled infrastructure. This is required as part of the JNDI lookup as well as for retrieving the second stage .class payload. The following analytic identifies the Java process reaching out to default ports used by the LDAP and RMI protocols. This behavior could represent successfull exploitation. Note that adversaries can easily decide to use arbitrary ports for these protocols and potentially bypass this detection.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"java.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe) by _time Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where (Ports.dest_port= 389 OR Ports.dest_port= 636 OR Ports.dest_port = 1389 OR Ports.dest_port = 1099 ) by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port| `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process connection_to_CNC dest_port | `outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate Java applications may use perform outbound connections to these ports. Filter as needed", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://www.govcert.admin.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_java/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Java performed outbound connections to default ports of LDAP or RMI on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_guid", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Ports.process_guid", + "Ports.dest", + "Ports.dest_port" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 60, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 54 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "file": "endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_java/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "id": "35682718-5a85-11ec-b8f7-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-11", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of wget on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wget (Processes.process=\"*-q *\" OR Processes.process=\"*--quiet*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-O- *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", + "references": [ + "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "file": "endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "id": "5e06e262-d7cd-4216-b2f8-27b437e18458", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Johan Bjerke, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "Malicious actors often abuse misconfigured LDAP servers or applications that use the LDAP servers in organizations. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. This search will help determine if you have any LDAP connections to IP addresses outside of private (RFC1918) address space.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as earliest_time latest(_time) as latest_time values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port = 389 OR All_Traffic.dest_port = 636 AND NOT (All_Traffic.dest_ip = 10.0.0.0/8 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=192.168.0.0/16 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip = 172.16.0.0/12) by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip |`drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | where src_ip != dest_ip | `security_content_ctime(latest_time)` | `security_content_ctime(earliest_time)` |`detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format and should be mapped to the Network Traffic datamodels that are in use for this search.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown at this moment. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. Please check those servers to verify if the activity is legitimate.", + "references": [ + "https://www.govcert.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_ldap/bro_conn.json" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An outbound LDAP connection from $src_ip$ in your infrastructure connecting to dest ip $dest_ip$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_ip", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.src_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "src_ip", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest_ip", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "file": "network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "stream_http_events.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_ldap/bro_conn.json", + "source": "/opt/malware/conn.log", + "sourcetype": "bro:conn:json" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "id": "c184f12e-5c90-11ec-bf1f-497c9a704a72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Jose Hernandez", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we first limit the scope of our search to the Web Datamodel and use the `| from datamodel` function to benefit from schema accelerated searching capabilities, mainly because the second part of the detection is pretty heavy, it runs a regex across all _raw events that looks for `${jndi:ldap://` pattern across all potential web fields available to the raw data, like http headers for example. If you see results for this detection, it means that there was a attempt at a injection, which could be a reconnaissance activity or a valid expliotation attempt, but this does not exactly mean that the host was indeed successfully exploited.", + "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | regex _raw=\"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)\\w+(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?\" | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx.", + "known_false_positives": "If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "action", + "category", + "dest", + "dest_port", + "http_content_type", + "http_method", + "http_referrer", + "http_user_agent", + "site", + "src", + "url", + "url_domain", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 30, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 15 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "file": "web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "nginx.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "source": "nginx", + "sourcetype": "nginx:plus:kv" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.yml", + "source": "web" + }, + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "id": "69afee44-5c91-11ec-bf1f-497c9a704a72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Jose Hernandez", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic", + "Web" + ], + "description": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we match the invocation function with a network connection to a malicious ip address.", + "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | rex field=_raw max_match=0 \"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)(?\\w+)(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?(?[a-zA-Z0-9\\.\\-\\_\\$]+)\" | join affected_host type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic by All_Traffic.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename dest AS affected_host] | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx.", + "known_false_positives": "If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_network_logs/log4j_network_logs.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "action", + "category", + "dest", + "dest_port", + "http_content_type", + "http_method", + "http_referrer", + "http_user_agent", + "site", + "src", + "url", + "url_domain", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 30, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 15 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "file": "web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-360d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "nginx.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "source": "nginx", + "sourcetype": "nginx:plus:kv" + }, + { + "file_name": "stream.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_network_logs/log4j_network_logs.log", + "source": "stream:Splunk_IP", + "sourcetype": "stream:ip" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.yml", + "source": "web" + } + ] + } + }, + { + "name": "Log4j Respond", + "id": "e609d729-4076-421a-b8f7-9e545d000381", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-14", + "author": "Philip Royer, Splunk", + "type": "Response", + "description": "Published in response to CVE-2021-44228, this playbook is meant to be launched after log4j_investigate. In this playbook, the risk from exploited hosts can be mitigated by optionally deleting malicious files from the hosts, blocking outbound network connections from the hosts, and/or shutting down the hosts", + "how_to_implement": "To use this playbook, create a custom list called \"log4j_hosts_and_files\" with a format in which the first column should be an IP or hostname of a potentially affected log4j host, the second should be the operating system family (either unix or windows), and the third should be a full path to a file to delete if there are any. The first two are mandatory and the file is optional. In the block called \"enumerate_files_to_delete\", change the custom list name from \"log4j_hosts_and_files\" if needed. If ssh and/or winrm are not the preferred endpoint management methods, these playbooks could be ported to use Google's GRR, osquery, CrowdStrike's RTR, Carbon Black's EDR API, or similar tools. The artifact scope \"all\" is used throughout this playbook because the artifact list can be added to as the playbook progresses.", + "playbook": "log4j_respond", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/Fenrir/blob/master/fenrir.sh", + "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Log4j++Log4Shell+Followup%3A+What+we+see+and+how+to+defend+%28and+how+to+access+our+data%29/28122", + "https://twitter.com/ElektroWolle/status/1469962895849140224?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1469962895849140224%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_c10&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fpublish.twitter.com%2F%3Fquery%3Dhttps3A2F2Ftwitter.com2FElektroWolle2Fstatus2F1469962895849140224widget%3DTweet", + "https://blog.cloudflare.com/cve-2021-44228-log4j-rce-0-day-mitigation/" + ], + "app_list": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "detections": [ + "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "Windows Java Spawning Shell", + "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic" + ], + "platform_tags": [ + "Log4J" + ], + "playbook_fields": [], + "product": [ + "Splunk SOAR" + ], + "detection_objects": [ + { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "id": "900bc324-59f3-11ec-9fb4-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-10", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of curl on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=curl (Processes.process=\"*-s *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", + "references": [ + "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "file": "endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "id": "8281ce42-5c50-11ec-82d2-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a Java user agent performing a GET request for a .class file from the remote site. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell).", + "search": "| tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_user_agent=\"*Java*\" Web.http_method=\"GET\" Web.url=\"*.class*\" by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting web or proxy logs, or ensure it is being filled by a proxy like device, into the Web Datamodel. For additional filtering, allow list private IP space or restrict by known good.", + "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required in some instances, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2021/12/as-log4shell-wreaks-havoc-payroll-service-reports-ransomware-attack/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Web Server", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Scope:Network" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A Java user agent $http_user_agent$ was performing a $http_method$ to retrieve a remote class file.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_user_agent", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_method", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Web.http_method", + "Web.url", + "Web.url_length", + "Web.src", + "Web.dest", + "Web.http_user_agent" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_user_agent", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_method", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Scope:Network" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 40 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "http_user_agent", + "threat_object_type": "other" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "http_method", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "file": "endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "java.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java.log", + "source": "stream:http", + "sourcetype": "stream:http" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "id": "7b09db8a-5c20-11ec-9945-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the process name of Java, Apache, or Tomcat spawning a Linux shell. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). The shells included in the macro are \"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\". Upon triage, review parallel processes and command-line arguments to determine legitimacy.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=java OR Processes.parent_process_name=apache OR Processes.parent_process_name=tomcat `linux_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_java_spawning_shell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. Ensure EDR product is mapping OS Linux to the datamodel properly. Add any additional java process names for your environment to the analytic as needed.", + "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required on internal developer build systems or classify assets as web facing and restrict the analytic based on asset type.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.netlab.360.com/ten-families-of-malicious-samples-are-spreading-using-the-log4j2-vulnerability-now/", + "https://gist.github.com/olafhartong/916ebc673ba066537740164f7e7e1d72" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ spawning a Linux shell, potentially indicative of exploitation.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 40 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "file": "endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "java_spawn_shell_nix.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java_spawn_shell_nix.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "linux_shells", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name IN (\"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\"))", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "linux_java_spawning_shell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "id": "d2c14d28-5c47-11ec-9892-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "A required step while exploiting the CVE-2021-44228-Log4j vulnerability is that the victim server will perform outbound connections to attacker-controlled infrastructure. This is required as part of the JNDI lookup as well as for retrieving the second stage .class payload. The following analytic identifies the Java process reaching out to default ports used by the LDAP and RMI protocols. This behavior could represent successfull exploitation. Note that adversaries can easily decide to use arbitrary ports for these protocols and potentially bypass this detection.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"java.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe) by _time Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where (Ports.dest_port= 389 OR Ports.dest_port= 636 OR Ports.dest_port = 1389 OR Ports.dest_port = 1099 ) by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port| `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process connection_to_CNC dest_port | `outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate Java applications may use perform outbound connections to these ports. Filter as needed", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://www.govcert.admin.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_java/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Java performed outbound connections to default ports of LDAP or RMI on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_guid", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Ports.process_guid", + "Ports.dest", + "Ports.dest_port" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 60, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 54 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "file": "endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_java/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "id": "35682718-5a85-11ec-b8f7-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-11", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of wget on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wget (Processes.process=\"*-q *\" OR Processes.process=\"*--quiet*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-O- *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", + "references": [ + "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "file": "endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "id": "5e06e262-d7cd-4216-b2f8-27b437e18458", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Johan Bjerke, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "Malicious actors often abuse misconfigured LDAP servers or applications that use the LDAP servers in organizations. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. This search will help determine if you have any LDAP connections to IP addresses outside of private (RFC1918) address space.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as earliest_time latest(_time) as latest_time values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port = 389 OR All_Traffic.dest_port = 636 AND NOT (All_Traffic.dest_ip = 10.0.0.0/8 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=192.168.0.0/16 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip = 172.16.0.0/12) by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip |`drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | where src_ip != dest_ip | `security_content_ctime(latest_time)` | `security_content_ctime(earliest_time)` |`detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format and should be mapped to the Network Traffic datamodels that are in use for this search.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown at this moment. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. Please check those servers to verify if the activity is legitimate.", + "references": [ + "https://www.govcert.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_ldap/bro_conn.json" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An outbound LDAP connection from $src_ip$ in your infrastructure connecting to dest ip $dest_ip$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_ip", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.src_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "src_ip", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest_ip", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "file": "network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "stream_http_events.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_ldap/bro_conn.json", + "source": "/opt/malware/conn.log", + "sourcetype": "bro:conn:json" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "id": "c184f12e-5c90-11ec-bf1f-497c9a704a72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Jose Hernandez", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we first limit the scope of our search to the Web Datamodel and use the `| from datamodel` function to benefit from schema accelerated searching capabilities, mainly because the second part of the detection is pretty heavy, it runs a regex across all _raw events that looks for `${jndi:ldap://` pattern across all potential web fields available to the raw data, like http headers for example. If you see results for this detection, it means that there was a attempt at a injection, which could be a reconnaissance activity or a valid expliotation attempt, but this does not exactly mean that the host was indeed successfully exploited.", + "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | regex _raw=\"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)\\w+(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?\" | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx.", + "known_false_positives": "If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "action", + "category", + "dest", + "dest_port", + "http_content_type", + "http_method", + "http_referrer", + "http_user_agent", + "site", + "src", + "url", + "url_domain", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 30, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 15 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "file": "web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "nginx.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "source": "nginx", + "sourcetype": "nginx:plus:kv" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.yml", + "source": "web" + }, + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "id": "69afee44-5c91-11ec-bf1f-497c9a704a72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Jose Hernandez", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic", + "Web" + ], + "description": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we match the invocation function with a network connection to a malicious ip address.", + "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | rex field=_raw max_match=0 \"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)(?\\w+)(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?(?[a-zA-Z0-9\\.\\-\\_\\$]+)\" | join affected_host type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic by All_Traffic.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename dest AS affected_host] | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx.", + "known_false_positives": "If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_network_logs/log4j_network_logs.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "action", + "category", + "dest", + "dest_port", + "http_content_type", + "http_method", + "http_referrer", + "http_user_agent", + "site", + "src", + "url", + "url_domain", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 30, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 15 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "file": "web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-360d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "nginx.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "source": "nginx", + "sourcetype": "nginx:plus:kv" + }, + { + "file_name": "stream.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_network_logs/log4j_network_logs.log", + "source": "stream:Splunk_IP", + "sourcetype": "stream:ip" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.yml", + "source": "web" + } + ] + } + } + ], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "file": "endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "java.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java.log", + "source": "stream:http", + "sourcetype": "stream:http" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "id": "7b09db8a-5c20-11ec-9945-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the process name of Java, Apache, or Tomcat spawning a Linux shell. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). The shells included in the macro are \"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\". Upon triage, review parallel processes and command-line arguments to determine legitimacy.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=java OR Processes.parent_process_name=apache OR Processes.parent_process_name=tomcat `linux_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_java_spawning_shell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. Ensure EDR product is mapping OS Linux to the datamodel properly. Add any additional java process names for your environment to the analytic as needed.", + "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required on internal developer build systems or classify assets as web facing and restrict the analytic based on asset type.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.netlab.360.com/ten-families-of-malicious-samples-are-spreading-using-the-log4j2-vulnerability-now/", + "https://gist.github.com/olafhartong/916ebc673ba066537740164f7e7e1d72" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ spawning a Linux shell, potentially indicative of exploitation.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 40 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [ + { + "name": "Log4j Investigate", + "id": "e609d729-0076-421a-b8f7-9e545d000381", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-12-14", + "author": "Philip Royer, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "description": "Published in response to CVE-2021-44228, this playbook and its sub-playbooks can be used to investigate and respond to attacks against hosts running vulnerable Java applications which use log4j. Between the parent playbook and seven sub-playbooks, each potentially compromised host found in Splunk Enteprise can be investigated and the risk can be mitigated using SSH for unix systems and WinRM for Windows systems.", + "how_to_implement": "To start this playbook, create a custom list called \"log4j_hosts\" with a format in which the first column should be an IP or hostname of a potentially affected log4j host, the second should be the operating system family (either unix or windows). If the operating system is unknown it can be left blank. In the block called \"fetch_hosts_from_custom_list\", change the custom list name from \"log4j_hosts\" if needed. If the operating system family (\"windows\" or \"unix\") is not known, both ssh and winrm will be attempted. If ssh and/or winrm are not the preferred endpoint management methods, these playbooks could be ported to use Google's GRR, osquery, CrowdStrike's RTR, Carbon Black's EDR API, or similar tools. The artifact scope \"all\" is used throughout this playbook because the artifact list can be added to as the playbook progresses.", + "playbook": "log4j_investigate", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/Fenrir/blob/master/fenrir.sh", + "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Log4j++Log4Shell+Followup%3A+What+we+see+and+how+to+defend+%28and+how+to+access+our+data%29/28122", + "https://twitter.com/ElektroWolle/status/1469962895849140224?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1469962895849140224%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_c10&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fpublish.twitter.com%2F%3Fquery%3Dhttps3A2F2Ftwitter.com2FElektroWolle2Fstatus2F1469962895849140224widget%3DTweet", + "https://blog.cloudflare.com/cve-2021-44228-log4j-rce-0-day-mitigation/" + ], + "app_list": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "detections": [ + "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "Windows Java Spawning Shell", + "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic" + ], + "platform_tags": [ + "Log4J" + ], + "playbook_fields": [], + "product": [ + "Splunk SOAR" + ], + "detection_objects": [ + { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "id": "900bc324-59f3-11ec-9fb4-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-10", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of curl on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=curl (Processes.process=\"*-s *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", + "references": [ + "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "file": "endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "id": "8281ce42-5c50-11ec-82d2-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a Java user agent performing a GET request for a .class file from the remote site. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell).", + "search": "| tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_user_agent=\"*Java*\" Web.http_method=\"GET\" Web.url=\"*.class*\" by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting web or proxy logs, or ensure it is being filled by a proxy like device, into the Web Datamodel. For additional filtering, allow list private IP space or restrict by known good.", + "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required in some instances, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2021/12/as-log4shell-wreaks-havoc-payroll-service-reports-ransomware-attack/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Web Server", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Scope:Network" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A Java user agent $http_user_agent$ was performing a $http_method$ to retrieve a remote class file.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_user_agent", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_method", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Web.http_method", + "Web.url", + "Web.url_length", + "Web.src", + "Web.dest", + "Web.http_user_agent" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_user_agent", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_method", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Scope:Network" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 40 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "http_user_agent", + "threat_object_type": "other" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "http_method", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "file": "endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "java.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java.log", + "source": "stream:http", + "sourcetype": "stream:http" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "id": "7b09db8a-5c20-11ec-9945-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the process name of Java, Apache, or Tomcat spawning a Linux shell. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). The shells included in the macro are \"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\". Upon triage, review parallel processes and command-line arguments to determine legitimacy.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=java OR Processes.parent_process_name=apache OR Processes.parent_process_name=tomcat `linux_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_java_spawning_shell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. Ensure EDR product is mapping OS Linux to the datamodel properly. Add any additional java process names for your environment to the analytic as needed.", + "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required on internal developer build systems or classify assets as web facing and restrict the analytic based on asset type.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.netlab.360.com/ten-families-of-malicious-samples-are-spreading-using-the-log4j2-vulnerability-now/", + "https://gist.github.com/olafhartong/916ebc673ba066537740164f7e7e1d72" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ spawning a Linux shell, potentially indicative of exploitation.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 40 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "file": "endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "java_spawn_shell_nix.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java_spawn_shell_nix.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "linux_shells", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name IN (\"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\"))", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "linux_java_spawning_shell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "id": "d2c14d28-5c47-11ec-9892-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "A required step while exploiting the CVE-2021-44228-Log4j vulnerability is that the victim server will perform outbound connections to attacker-controlled infrastructure. This is required as part of the JNDI lookup as well as for retrieving the second stage .class payload. The following analytic identifies the Java process reaching out to default ports used by the LDAP and RMI protocols. This behavior could represent successfull exploitation. Note that adversaries can easily decide to use arbitrary ports for these protocols and potentially bypass this detection.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"java.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe) by _time Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where (Ports.dest_port= 389 OR Ports.dest_port= 636 OR Ports.dest_port = 1389 OR Ports.dest_port = 1099 ) by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port| `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process connection_to_CNC dest_port | `outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate Java applications may use perform outbound connections to these ports. Filter as needed", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://www.govcert.admin.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_java/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Java performed outbound connections to default ports of LDAP or RMI on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_guid", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Ports.process_guid", + "Ports.dest", + "Ports.dest_port" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 60, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 54 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "file": "endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_java/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "id": "35682718-5a85-11ec-b8f7-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-11", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of wget on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wget (Processes.process=\"*-q *\" OR Processes.process=\"*--quiet*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-O- *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", + "references": [ + "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "file": "endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "id": "5e06e262-d7cd-4216-b2f8-27b437e18458", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Johan Bjerke, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "Malicious actors often abuse misconfigured LDAP servers or applications that use the LDAP servers in organizations. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. This search will help determine if you have any LDAP connections to IP addresses outside of private (RFC1918) address space.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as earliest_time latest(_time) as latest_time values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port = 389 OR All_Traffic.dest_port = 636 AND NOT (All_Traffic.dest_ip = 10.0.0.0/8 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=192.168.0.0/16 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip = 172.16.0.0/12) by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip |`drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | where src_ip != dest_ip | `security_content_ctime(latest_time)` | `security_content_ctime(earliest_time)` |`detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format and should be mapped to the Network Traffic datamodels that are in use for this search.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown at this moment. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. Please check those servers to verify if the activity is legitimate.", + "references": [ + "https://www.govcert.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_ldap/bro_conn.json" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An outbound LDAP connection from $src_ip$ in your infrastructure connecting to dest ip $dest_ip$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_ip", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.src_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "src_ip", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest_ip", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "file": "network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "stream_http_events.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_ldap/bro_conn.json", + "source": "/opt/malware/conn.log", + "sourcetype": "bro:conn:json" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "id": "c184f12e-5c90-11ec-bf1f-497c9a704a72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Jose Hernandez", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we first limit the scope of our search to the Web Datamodel and use the `| from datamodel` function to benefit from schema accelerated searching capabilities, mainly because the second part of the detection is pretty heavy, it runs a regex across all _raw events that looks for `${jndi:ldap://` pattern across all potential web fields available to the raw data, like http headers for example. If you see results for this detection, it means that there was a attempt at a injection, which could be a reconnaissance activity or a valid expliotation attempt, but this does not exactly mean that the host was indeed successfully exploited.", + "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | regex _raw=\"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)\\w+(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?\" | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx.", + "known_false_positives": "If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "action", + "category", + "dest", + "dest_port", + "http_content_type", + "http_method", + "http_referrer", + "http_user_agent", + "site", + "src", + "url", + "url_domain", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 30, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 15 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "file": "web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "nginx.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "source": "nginx", + "sourcetype": "nginx:plus:kv" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.yml", + "source": "web" + }, + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "id": "69afee44-5c91-11ec-bf1f-497c9a704a72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Jose Hernandez", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic", + "Web" + ], + "description": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we match the invocation function with a network connection to a malicious ip address.", + "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | rex field=_raw max_match=0 \"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)(?\\w+)(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?(?[a-zA-Z0-9\\.\\-\\_\\$]+)\" | join affected_host type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic by All_Traffic.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename dest AS affected_host] | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx.", + "known_false_positives": "If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_network_logs/log4j_network_logs.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "action", + "category", + "dest", + "dest_port", + "http_content_type", + "http_method", + "http_referrer", + "http_user_agent", + "site", + "src", + "url", + "url_domain", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 30, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 15 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "file": "web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-360d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "nginx.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "source": "nginx", + "sourcetype": "nginx:plus:kv" + }, + { + "file_name": "stream.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_network_logs/log4j_network_logs.log", + "source": "stream:Splunk_IP", + "sourcetype": "stream:ip" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.yml", + "source": "web" + } + ] + } + }, + { + "name": "Log4j Respond", + "id": "e609d729-4076-421a-b8f7-9e545d000381", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-14", + "author": "Philip Royer, Splunk", + "type": "Response", + "description": "Published in response to CVE-2021-44228, this playbook is meant to be launched after log4j_investigate. In this playbook, the risk from exploited hosts can be mitigated by optionally deleting malicious files from the hosts, blocking outbound network connections from the hosts, and/or shutting down the hosts", + "how_to_implement": "To use this playbook, create a custom list called \"log4j_hosts_and_files\" with a format in which the first column should be an IP or hostname of a potentially affected log4j host, the second should be the operating system family (either unix or windows), and the third should be a full path to a file to delete if there are any. The first two are mandatory and the file is optional. In the block called \"enumerate_files_to_delete\", change the custom list name from \"log4j_hosts_and_files\" if needed. If ssh and/or winrm are not the preferred endpoint management methods, these playbooks could be ported to use Google's GRR, osquery, CrowdStrike's RTR, Carbon Black's EDR API, or similar tools. The artifact scope \"all\" is used throughout this playbook because the artifact list can be added to as the playbook progresses.", + "playbook": "log4j_respond", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/Fenrir/blob/master/fenrir.sh", + "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Log4j++Log4Shell+Followup%3A+What+we+see+and+how+to+defend+%28and+how+to+access+our+data%29/28122", + "https://twitter.com/ElektroWolle/status/1469962895849140224?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1469962895849140224%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_c10&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fpublish.twitter.com%2F%3Fquery%3Dhttps3A2F2Ftwitter.com2FElektroWolle2Fstatus2F1469962895849140224widget%3DTweet", + "https://blog.cloudflare.com/cve-2021-44228-log4j-rce-0-day-mitigation/" + ], + "app_list": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "detections": [ + "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "Windows Java Spawning Shell", + "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic" + ], + "platform_tags": [ + "Log4J" + ], + "playbook_fields": [], + "product": [ + "Splunk SOAR" + ], + "detection_objects": [ + { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "id": "900bc324-59f3-11ec-9fb4-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-10", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of curl on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=curl (Processes.process=\"*-s *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", + "references": [ + "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "file": "endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "id": "8281ce42-5c50-11ec-82d2-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a Java user agent performing a GET request for a .class file from the remote site. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell).", + "search": "| tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_user_agent=\"*Java*\" Web.http_method=\"GET\" Web.url=\"*.class*\" by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting web or proxy logs, or ensure it is being filled by a proxy like device, into the Web Datamodel. For additional filtering, allow list private IP space or restrict by known good.", + "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required in some instances, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2021/12/as-log4shell-wreaks-havoc-payroll-service-reports-ransomware-attack/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Web Server", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Scope:Network" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A Java user agent $http_user_agent$ was performing a $http_method$ to retrieve a remote class file.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_user_agent", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_method", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Web.http_method", + "Web.url", + "Web.url_length", + "Web.src", + "Web.dest", + "Web.http_user_agent" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_user_agent", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_method", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Scope:Network" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 40 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "http_user_agent", + "threat_object_type": "other" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "http_method", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "file": "endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "java.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java.log", + "source": "stream:http", + "sourcetype": "stream:http" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "id": "7b09db8a-5c20-11ec-9945-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the process name of Java, Apache, or Tomcat spawning a Linux shell. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). The shells included in the macro are \"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\". Upon triage, review parallel processes and command-line arguments to determine legitimacy.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=java OR Processes.parent_process_name=apache OR Processes.parent_process_name=tomcat `linux_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_java_spawning_shell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. Ensure EDR product is mapping OS Linux to the datamodel properly. Add any additional java process names for your environment to the analytic as needed.", + "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required on internal developer build systems or classify assets as web facing and restrict the analytic based on asset type.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.netlab.360.com/ten-families-of-malicious-samples-are-spreading-using-the-log4j2-vulnerability-now/", + "https://gist.github.com/olafhartong/916ebc673ba066537740164f7e7e1d72" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ spawning a Linux shell, potentially indicative of exploitation.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 40 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "file": "endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "java_spawn_shell_nix.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java_spawn_shell_nix.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "linux_shells", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name IN (\"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\"))", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "linux_java_spawning_shell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "id": "d2c14d28-5c47-11ec-9892-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "A required step while exploiting the CVE-2021-44228-Log4j vulnerability is that the victim server will perform outbound connections to attacker-controlled infrastructure. This is required as part of the JNDI lookup as well as for retrieving the second stage .class payload. The following analytic identifies the Java process reaching out to default ports used by the LDAP and RMI protocols. This behavior could represent successfull exploitation. Note that adversaries can easily decide to use arbitrary ports for these protocols and potentially bypass this detection.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"java.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe) by _time Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where (Ports.dest_port= 389 OR Ports.dest_port= 636 OR Ports.dest_port = 1389 OR Ports.dest_port = 1099 ) by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port| `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process connection_to_CNC dest_port | `outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate Java applications may use perform outbound connections to these ports. Filter as needed", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://www.govcert.admin.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_java/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Java performed outbound connections to default ports of LDAP or RMI on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_guid", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Ports.process_guid", + "Ports.dest", + "Ports.dest_port" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 60, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 54 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "file": "endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_java/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "id": "35682718-5a85-11ec-b8f7-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-11", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of wget on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wget (Processes.process=\"*-q *\" OR Processes.process=\"*--quiet*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-O- *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", + "references": [ + "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "file": "endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "id": "5e06e262-d7cd-4216-b2f8-27b437e18458", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Johan Bjerke, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "Malicious actors often abuse misconfigured LDAP servers or applications that use the LDAP servers in organizations. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. This search will help determine if you have any LDAP connections to IP addresses outside of private (RFC1918) address space.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as earliest_time latest(_time) as latest_time values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port = 389 OR All_Traffic.dest_port = 636 AND NOT (All_Traffic.dest_ip = 10.0.0.0/8 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=192.168.0.0/16 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip = 172.16.0.0/12) by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip |`drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | where src_ip != dest_ip | `security_content_ctime(latest_time)` | `security_content_ctime(earliest_time)` |`detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format and should be mapped to the Network Traffic datamodels that are in use for this search.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown at this moment. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. Please check those servers to verify if the activity is legitimate.", + "references": [ + "https://www.govcert.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_ldap/bro_conn.json" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An outbound LDAP connection from $src_ip$ in your infrastructure connecting to dest ip $dest_ip$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_ip", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.src_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "src_ip", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest_ip", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "file": "network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "stream_http_events.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_ldap/bro_conn.json", + "source": "/opt/malware/conn.log", + "sourcetype": "bro:conn:json" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "id": "c184f12e-5c90-11ec-bf1f-497c9a704a72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Jose Hernandez", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we first limit the scope of our search to the Web Datamodel and use the `| from datamodel` function to benefit from schema accelerated searching capabilities, mainly because the second part of the detection is pretty heavy, it runs a regex across all _raw events that looks for `${jndi:ldap://` pattern across all potential web fields available to the raw data, like http headers for example. If you see results for this detection, it means that there was a attempt at a injection, which could be a reconnaissance activity or a valid expliotation attempt, but this does not exactly mean that the host was indeed successfully exploited.", + "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | regex _raw=\"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)\\w+(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?\" | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx.", + "known_false_positives": "If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "action", + "category", + "dest", + "dest_port", + "http_content_type", + "http_method", + "http_referrer", + "http_user_agent", + "site", + "src", + "url", + "url_domain", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 30, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 15 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "file": "web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "nginx.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "source": "nginx", + "sourcetype": "nginx:plus:kv" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.yml", + "source": "web" + }, + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "id": "69afee44-5c91-11ec-bf1f-497c9a704a72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Jose Hernandez", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic", + "Web" + ], + "description": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we match the invocation function with a network connection to a malicious ip address.", + "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | rex field=_raw max_match=0 \"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)(?\\w+)(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?(?[a-zA-Z0-9\\.\\-\\_\\$]+)\" | join affected_host type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic by All_Traffic.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename dest AS affected_host] | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx.", + "known_false_positives": "If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_network_logs/log4j_network_logs.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "action", + "category", + "dest", + "dest_port", + "http_content_type", + "http_method", + "http_referrer", + "http_user_agent", + "site", + "src", + "url", + "url_domain", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 30, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 15 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "file": "web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-360d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "nginx.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "source": "nginx", + "sourcetype": "nginx:plus:kv" + }, + { + "file_name": "stream.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_network_logs/log4j_network_logs.log", + "source": "stream:Splunk_IP", + "sourcetype": "stream:ip" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.yml", + "source": "web" + } + ] + } + } + ], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "file": "endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "java_spawn_shell_nix.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java_spawn_shell_nix.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "linux_shells", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name IN (\"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\"))", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "linux_java_spawning_shell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 Exploitation", + "id": "9be30d80-3a39-4df9-9102-64a467b24eac", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-26", + "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", + "type": "Correlation", + "datamodel": [ + "Risk" + ], + "description": "This correlation find exploitation of Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 against systems using detections from Splunk Security Content Analytic Story. It does this by calculating the distinct count of MITRE ATT&CK tactics from Log4Shell detections fired. If the count is larger than 2 or more distinct MITRE ATT&CK tactics we assume high problability of exploitation. The Analytic story breaks down into 3 major phases of a Log4Shell exploitation, specifically 1. Initial Payload delivery eg. `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}` 2. Call back to malicious LDAP server eg. Exploit.class 3. Post Exploitation Activity/Lateral Movement using Powershell or similar T1562.001 Each of these phases fall into different MITRE ATT&CK Tactics (Initial Access, Execution, Command and Control), by looking into 2 or more phases showing up in detections triggerd is how this correlation search finds exploitation. If we get a notable from this correlation search the best way to triage it is by investigating the affected systems against Log4Shell exploitation using Splunk SOAR playbooks.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk where All_Risk.analyticstories=\"Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228\" All_Risk.risk_object_type=\"system\" by All_Risk.risk_object All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic source | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Risk)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | stats values(risk_object) as affected_systems values(source) as detection_name values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as tactics values(firstTime) as firstTime values(lastTime) as lastTime dc(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as distinct_tactics | where distinct_tactics >= 2 | `log4shell_cve_2021_44228_exploitation_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To implement this correlation search a user needs to enable all detections in the Log4Shell Analytic Story and confirm it is generation risk events. A simple search `index=risk analyticstories=\"Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228\"` should contain events.", + "known_false_positives": "There are no known false positive for this search, but it could contain false positives as multiple detections can trigger and not have successful exploitation.", + "references": [ + "https://research.splunk.com/stories/log4shell_cve-2021-44228/", + "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/simulating-detecting-and-responding-to-log4shell-with-splunk.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 Exploitation", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/log4shell_exploitation/log4shell_correlation.txt" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Log4Shell Exploitation detected against $affected_systems$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105", + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "affected_systems", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Risk.analyticstories", + "All_Risk.risk_object_type", + "All_Risk.risk_object", + "All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic", + "source" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Correlation", + "id": "36ba498c-46e8-4b62-8bde-67e984a40fb4", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type Correlation. These correlations will generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Correlation", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105", + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "affected_systems", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "affected_systems", + "risk_score": 63 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105", + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 Exploitation Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 Exploitation", + "file": "endpoint/log4shell_cve_2021_44228_exploitation.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "log4shell_correlation.txt", + "data": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/log4shell_exploitation/log4shell_correlation.txt", + "source": "log4shell", + "sourcetype": "stash" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "log4shell_cve_2021_44228_exploitation_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/log4shell_cve_2021_44228_exploitation.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "id": "d2c14d28-5c47-11ec-9892-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "A required step while exploiting the CVE-2021-44228-Log4j vulnerability is that the victim server will perform outbound connections to attacker-controlled infrastructure. This is required as part of the JNDI lookup as well as for retrieving the second stage .class payload. The following analytic identifies the Java process reaching out to default ports used by the LDAP and RMI protocols. This behavior could represent successfull exploitation. Note that adversaries can easily decide to use arbitrary ports for these protocols and potentially bypass this detection.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"java.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe) by _time Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where (Ports.dest_port= 389 OR Ports.dest_port= 636 OR Ports.dest_port = 1389 OR Ports.dest_port = 1099 ) by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port| `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process connection_to_CNC dest_port | `outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate Java applications may use perform outbound connections to these ports. Filter as needed", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://www.govcert.admin.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_java/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Java performed outbound connections to default ports of LDAP or RMI on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_guid", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Ports.process_guid", + "Ports.dest", + "Ports.dest_port" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 60, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 54 + } + ], + "playbooks": [ + { + "name": "Log4j Investigate", + "id": "e609d729-0076-421a-b8f7-9e545d000381", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-12-14", + "author": "Philip Royer, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "description": "Published in response to CVE-2021-44228, this playbook and its sub-playbooks can be used to investigate and respond to attacks against hosts running vulnerable Java applications which use log4j. Between the parent playbook and seven sub-playbooks, each potentially compromised host found in Splunk Enteprise can be investigated and the risk can be mitigated using SSH for unix systems and WinRM for Windows systems.", + "how_to_implement": "To start this playbook, create a custom list called \"log4j_hosts\" with a format in which the first column should be an IP or hostname of a potentially affected log4j host, the second should be the operating system family (either unix or windows). If the operating system is unknown it can be left blank. In the block called \"fetch_hosts_from_custom_list\", change the custom list name from \"log4j_hosts\" if needed. If the operating system family (\"windows\" or \"unix\") is not known, both ssh and winrm will be attempted. If ssh and/or winrm are not the preferred endpoint management methods, these playbooks could be ported to use Google's GRR, osquery, CrowdStrike's RTR, Carbon Black's EDR API, or similar tools. The artifact scope \"all\" is used throughout this playbook because the artifact list can be added to as the playbook progresses.", + "playbook": "log4j_investigate", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/Fenrir/blob/master/fenrir.sh", + "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Log4j++Log4Shell+Followup%3A+What+we+see+and+how+to+defend+%28and+how+to+access+our+data%29/28122", + "https://twitter.com/ElektroWolle/status/1469962895849140224?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1469962895849140224%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_c10&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fpublish.twitter.com%2F%3Fquery%3Dhttps3A2F2Ftwitter.com2FElektroWolle2Fstatus2F1469962895849140224widget%3DTweet", + "https://blog.cloudflare.com/cve-2021-44228-log4j-rce-0-day-mitigation/" + ], + "app_list": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "detections": [ + "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "Windows Java Spawning Shell", + "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic" + ], + "platform_tags": [ + "Log4J" + ], + "playbook_fields": [], + "product": [ + "Splunk SOAR" + ], + "detection_objects": [ + { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "id": "900bc324-59f3-11ec-9fb4-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-10", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of curl on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=curl (Processes.process=\"*-s *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", + "references": [ + "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "file": "endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "id": "8281ce42-5c50-11ec-82d2-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a Java user agent performing a GET request for a .class file from the remote site. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell).", + "search": "| tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_user_agent=\"*Java*\" Web.http_method=\"GET\" Web.url=\"*.class*\" by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting web or proxy logs, or ensure it is being filled by a proxy like device, into the Web Datamodel. For additional filtering, allow list private IP space or restrict by known good.", + "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required in some instances, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2021/12/as-log4shell-wreaks-havoc-payroll-service-reports-ransomware-attack/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Web Server", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Scope:Network" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A Java user agent $http_user_agent$ was performing a $http_method$ to retrieve a remote class file.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_user_agent", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_method", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Web.http_method", + "Web.url", + "Web.url_length", + "Web.src", + "Web.dest", + "Web.http_user_agent" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_user_agent", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_method", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Scope:Network" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 40 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "http_user_agent", + "threat_object_type": "other" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "http_method", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "file": "endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "java.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java.log", + "source": "stream:http", + "sourcetype": "stream:http" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "id": "7b09db8a-5c20-11ec-9945-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the process name of Java, Apache, or Tomcat spawning a Linux shell. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). The shells included in the macro are \"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\". Upon triage, review parallel processes and command-line arguments to determine legitimacy.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=java OR Processes.parent_process_name=apache OR Processes.parent_process_name=tomcat `linux_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_java_spawning_shell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. Ensure EDR product is mapping OS Linux to the datamodel properly. Add any additional java process names for your environment to the analytic as needed.", + "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required on internal developer build systems or classify assets as web facing and restrict the analytic based on asset type.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.netlab.360.com/ten-families-of-malicious-samples-are-spreading-using-the-log4j2-vulnerability-now/", + "https://gist.github.com/olafhartong/916ebc673ba066537740164f7e7e1d72" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ spawning a Linux shell, potentially indicative of exploitation.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 40 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "file": "endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "java_spawn_shell_nix.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java_spawn_shell_nix.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "linux_shells", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name IN (\"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\"))", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "linux_java_spawning_shell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "id": "d2c14d28-5c47-11ec-9892-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "A required step while exploiting the CVE-2021-44228-Log4j vulnerability is that the victim server will perform outbound connections to attacker-controlled infrastructure. This is required as part of the JNDI lookup as well as for retrieving the second stage .class payload. The following analytic identifies the Java process reaching out to default ports used by the LDAP and RMI protocols. This behavior could represent successfull exploitation. Note that adversaries can easily decide to use arbitrary ports for these protocols and potentially bypass this detection.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"java.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe) by _time Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where (Ports.dest_port= 389 OR Ports.dest_port= 636 OR Ports.dest_port = 1389 OR Ports.dest_port = 1099 ) by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port| `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process connection_to_CNC dest_port | `outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate Java applications may use perform outbound connections to these ports. Filter as needed", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://www.govcert.admin.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_java/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Java performed outbound connections to default ports of LDAP or RMI on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_guid", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Ports.process_guid", + "Ports.dest", + "Ports.dest_port" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 60, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 54 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "file": "endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_java/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "id": "35682718-5a85-11ec-b8f7-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-11", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of wget on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wget (Processes.process=\"*-q *\" OR Processes.process=\"*--quiet*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-O- *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", + "references": [ + "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "file": "endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "id": "5e06e262-d7cd-4216-b2f8-27b437e18458", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Johan Bjerke, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "Malicious actors often abuse misconfigured LDAP servers or applications that use the LDAP servers in organizations. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. This search will help determine if you have any LDAP connections to IP addresses outside of private (RFC1918) address space.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as earliest_time latest(_time) as latest_time values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port = 389 OR All_Traffic.dest_port = 636 AND NOT (All_Traffic.dest_ip = 10.0.0.0/8 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=192.168.0.0/16 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip = 172.16.0.0/12) by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip |`drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | where src_ip != dest_ip | `security_content_ctime(latest_time)` | `security_content_ctime(earliest_time)` |`detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format and should be mapped to the Network Traffic datamodels that are in use for this search.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown at this moment. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. Please check those servers to verify if the activity is legitimate.", + "references": [ + "https://www.govcert.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_ldap/bro_conn.json" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An outbound LDAP connection from $src_ip$ in your infrastructure connecting to dest ip $dest_ip$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_ip", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.src_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "src_ip", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest_ip", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "file": "network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "stream_http_events.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_ldap/bro_conn.json", + "source": "/opt/malware/conn.log", + "sourcetype": "bro:conn:json" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "id": "c184f12e-5c90-11ec-bf1f-497c9a704a72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Jose Hernandez", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we first limit the scope of our search to the Web Datamodel and use the `| from datamodel` function to benefit from schema accelerated searching capabilities, mainly because the second part of the detection is pretty heavy, it runs a regex across all _raw events that looks for `${jndi:ldap://` pattern across all potential web fields available to the raw data, like http headers for example. If you see results for this detection, it means that there was a attempt at a injection, which could be a reconnaissance activity or a valid expliotation attempt, but this does not exactly mean that the host was indeed successfully exploited.", + "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | regex _raw=\"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)\\w+(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?\" | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx.", + "known_false_positives": "If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "action", + "category", + "dest", + "dest_port", + "http_content_type", + "http_method", + "http_referrer", + "http_user_agent", + "site", + "src", + "url", + "url_domain", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 30, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 15 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "file": "web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "nginx.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "source": "nginx", + "sourcetype": "nginx:plus:kv" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.yml", + "source": "web" + }, + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "id": "69afee44-5c91-11ec-bf1f-497c9a704a72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Jose Hernandez", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic", + "Web" + ], + "description": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we match the invocation function with a network connection to a malicious ip address.", + "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | rex field=_raw max_match=0 \"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)(?\\w+)(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?(?[a-zA-Z0-9\\.\\-\\_\\$]+)\" | join affected_host type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic by All_Traffic.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename dest AS affected_host] | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx.", + "known_false_positives": "If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_network_logs/log4j_network_logs.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "action", + "category", + "dest", + "dest_port", + "http_content_type", + "http_method", + "http_referrer", + "http_user_agent", + "site", + "src", + "url", + "url_domain", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 30, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 15 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "file": "web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-360d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "nginx.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "source": "nginx", + "sourcetype": "nginx:plus:kv" + }, + { + "file_name": "stream.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_network_logs/log4j_network_logs.log", + "source": "stream:Splunk_IP", + "sourcetype": "stream:ip" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.yml", + "source": "web" + } + ] + } + }, + { + "name": "Log4j Respond", + "id": "e609d729-4076-421a-b8f7-9e545d000381", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-14", + "author": "Philip Royer, Splunk", + "type": "Response", + "description": "Published in response to CVE-2021-44228, this playbook is meant to be launched after log4j_investigate. In this playbook, the risk from exploited hosts can be mitigated by optionally deleting malicious files from the hosts, blocking outbound network connections from the hosts, and/or shutting down the hosts", + "how_to_implement": "To use this playbook, create a custom list called \"log4j_hosts_and_files\" with a format in which the first column should be an IP or hostname of a potentially affected log4j host, the second should be the operating system family (either unix or windows), and the third should be a full path to a file to delete if there are any. The first two are mandatory and the file is optional. In the block called \"enumerate_files_to_delete\", change the custom list name from \"log4j_hosts_and_files\" if needed. If ssh and/or winrm are not the preferred endpoint management methods, these playbooks could be ported to use Google's GRR, osquery, CrowdStrike's RTR, Carbon Black's EDR API, or similar tools. The artifact scope \"all\" is used throughout this playbook because the artifact list can be added to as the playbook progresses.", + "playbook": "log4j_respond", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/Fenrir/blob/master/fenrir.sh", + "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Log4j++Log4Shell+Followup%3A+What+we+see+and+how+to+defend+%28and+how+to+access+our+data%29/28122", + "https://twitter.com/ElektroWolle/status/1469962895849140224?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1469962895849140224%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_c10&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fpublish.twitter.com%2F%3Fquery%3Dhttps3A2F2Ftwitter.com2FElektroWolle2Fstatus2F1469962895849140224widget%3DTweet", + "https://blog.cloudflare.com/cve-2021-44228-log4j-rce-0-day-mitigation/" + ], + "app_list": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "detections": [ + "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "Windows Java Spawning Shell", + "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic" + ], + "platform_tags": [ + "Log4J" + ], + "playbook_fields": [], + "product": [ + "Splunk SOAR" + ], + "detection_objects": [ + { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "id": "900bc324-59f3-11ec-9fb4-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-10", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of curl on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=curl (Processes.process=\"*-s *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", + "references": [ + "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "file": "endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "id": "8281ce42-5c50-11ec-82d2-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a Java user agent performing a GET request for a .class file from the remote site. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell).", + "search": "| tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_user_agent=\"*Java*\" Web.http_method=\"GET\" Web.url=\"*.class*\" by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting web or proxy logs, or ensure it is being filled by a proxy like device, into the Web Datamodel. For additional filtering, allow list private IP space or restrict by known good.", + "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required in some instances, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2021/12/as-log4shell-wreaks-havoc-payroll-service-reports-ransomware-attack/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Web Server", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Scope:Network" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A Java user agent $http_user_agent$ was performing a $http_method$ to retrieve a remote class file.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_user_agent", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_method", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Web.http_method", + "Web.url", + "Web.url_length", + "Web.src", + "Web.dest", + "Web.http_user_agent" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_user_agent", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_method", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Scope:Network" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 40 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "http_user_agent", + "threat_object_type": "other" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "http_method", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "file": "endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "java.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java.log", + "source": "stream:http", + "sourcetype": "stream:http" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "id": "7b09db8a-5c20-11ec-9945-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the process name of Java, Apache, or Tomcat spawning a Linux shell. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). The shells included in the macro are \"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\". Upon triage, review parallel processes and command-line arguments to determine legitimacy.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=java OR Processes.parent_process_name=apache OR Processes.parent_process_name=tomcat `linux_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_java_spawning_shell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. Ensure EDR product is mapping OS Linux to the datamodel properly. Add any additional java process names for your environment to the analytic as needed.", + "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required on internal developer build systems or classify assets as web facing and restrict the analytic based on asset type.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.netlab.360.com/ten-families-of-malicious-samples-are-spreading-using-the-log4j2-vulnerability-now/", + "https://gist.github.com/olafhartong/916ebc673ba066537740164f7e7e1d72" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ spawning a Linux shell, potentially indicative of exploitation.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 40 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "file": "endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "java_spawn_shell_nix.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java_spawn_shell_nix.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "linux_shells", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name IN (\"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\"))", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "linux_java_spawning_shell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "id": "d2c14d28-5c47-11ec-9892-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "A required step while exploiting the CVE-2021-44228-Log4j vulnerability is that the victim server will perform outbound connections to attacker-controlled infrastructure. This is required as part of the JNDI lookup as well as for retrieving the second stage .class payload. The following analytic identifies the Java process reaching out to default ports used by the LDAP and RMI protocols. This behavior could represent successfull exploitation. Note that adversaries can easily decide to use arbitrary ports for these protocols and potentially bypass this detection.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"java.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe) by _time Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where (Ports.dest_port= 389 OR Ports.dest_port= 636 OR Ports.dest_port = 1389 OR Ports.dest_port = 1099 ) by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port| `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process connection_to_CNC dest_port | `outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate Java applications may use perform outbound connections to these ports. Filter as needed", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://www.govcert.admin.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_java/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Java performed outbound connections to default ports of LDAP or RMI on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_guid", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Ports.process_guid", + "Ports.dest", + "Ports.dest_port" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 60, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 54 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "file": "endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_java/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "id": "35682718-5a85-11ec-b8f7-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-11", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of wget on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wget (Processes.process=\"*-q *\" OR Processes.process=\"*--quiet*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-O- *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", + "references": [ + "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "file": "endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "id": "5e06e262-d7cd-4216-b2f8-27b437e18458", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Johan Bjerke, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "Malicious actors often abuse misconfigured LDAP servers or applications that use the LDAP servers in organizations. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. This search will help determine if you have any LDAP connections to IP addresses outside of private (RFC1918) address space.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as earliest_time latest(_time) as latest_time values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port = 389 OR All_Traffic.dest_port = 636 AND NOT (All_Traffic.dest_ip = 10.0.0.0/8 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=192.168.0.0/16 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip = 172.16.0.0/12) by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip |`drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | where src_ip != dest_ip | `security_content_ctime(latest_time)` | `security_content_ctime(earliest_time)` |`detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format and should be mapped to the Network Traffic datamodels that are in use for this search.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown at this moment. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. Please check those servers to verify if the activity is legitimate.", + "references": [ + "https://www.govcert.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_ldap/bro_conn.json" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An outbound LDAP connection from $src_ip$ in your infrastructure connecting to dest ip $dest_ip$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_ip", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.src_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "src_ip", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest_ip", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "file": "network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "stream_http_events.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_ldap/bro_conn.json", + "source": "/opt/malware/conn.log", + "sourcetype": "bro:conn:json" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "id": "c184f12e-5c90-11ec-bf1f-497c9a704a72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Jose Hernandez", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we first limit the scope of our search to the Web Datamodel and use the `| from datamodel` function to benefit from schema accelerated searching capabilities, mainly because the second part of the detection is pretty heavy, it runs a regex across all _raw events that looks for `${jndi:ldap://` pattern across all potential web fields available to the raw data, like http headers for example. If you see results for this detection, it means that there was a attempt at a injection, which could be a reconnaissance activity or a valid expliotation attempt, but this does not exactly mean that the host was indeed successfully exploited.", + "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | regex _raw=\"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)\\w+(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?\" | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx.", + "known_false_positives": "If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "action", + "category", + "dest", + "dest_port", + "http_content_type", + "http_method", + "http_referrer", + "http_user_agent", + "site", + "src", + "url", + "url_domain", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 30, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 15 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "file": "web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "nginx.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "source": "nginx", + "sourcetype": "nginx:plus:kv" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.yml", + "source": "web" + }, + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "id": "69afee44-5c91-11ec-bf1f-497c9a704a72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Jose Hernandez", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic", + "Web" + ], + "description": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we match the invocation function with a network connection to a malicious ip address.", + "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | rex field=_raw max_match=0 \"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)(?\\w+)(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?(?[a-zA-Z0-9\\.\\-\\_\\$]+)\" | join affected_host type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic by All_Traffic.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename dest AS affected_host] | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx.", + "known_false_positives": "If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_network_logs/log4j_network_logs.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "action", + "category", + "dest", + "dest_port", + "http_content_type", + "http_method", + "http_referrer", + "http_user_agent", + "site", + "src", + "url", + "url_domain", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 30, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 15 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "file": "web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-360d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "nginx.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "source": "nginx", + "sourcetype": "nginx:plus:kv" + }, + { + "file_name": "stream.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_network_logs/log4j_network_logs.log", + "source": "stream:Splunk_IP", + "sourcetype": "stream:ip" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.yml", + "source": "web" + } + ] + } + } + ], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "file": "endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_java/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window", + "id": "ee18ed37-0802-4268-9435-b3b91aaa18db", + "version": 8, + "date": "2022-01-12", + "author": "David Dorsey, Michael Haag Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following hunting analytic identifies PowerShell commands utilizing the WindowStyle parameter to hide the window on the compromised endpoint. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it is overriding the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide its activity from the user, and connects to the Internet. Removed in this version of the query is New-Object. The analytic identifies all variations of WindowStyle, as PowerShell allows the ability to shorten the parameter. For example w, win, windowsty and so forth. In addition, through our research it was identified that PowerShell will interpret different command switch types beyond the hyphen. We have added endash, emdash, horizontal bar, and forward slash.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"(?i)[\\-|\\/|–|—|―]w(in*d*o*w*s*t*y*l*e*)*\\s+[^-]\") | `powershell___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate process can have this combination of command-line options, but it's not common.", + "references": [ + "https://regexr.com/663rr", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses/blob/master/TestHarnesses/T1059.001_PowerShell/OutPowerShellCommandLineParameter.ps1", + "https://ss64.com/ps/powershell.html", + "https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/1440758396534214658?s=20", + "https://blog.netlab.360.com/ten-families-of-malicious-samples-are-spreading-using-the-log4j2-vulnerability-now/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "HAFNIUM Group", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 7", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Command And Control" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/hidden_powershell/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "PowerShell processes $process$ started with parameters to modify the execution policy of the run, run in a hidden window, and connect to the Internet on host $dest$ executed by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059.001", + "T1059" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 81, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059.001", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 7", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "HAFNIUM Group", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Command And Control" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 90, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 81 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 81 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059.001", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 7", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window", + "file": "endpoint/powershell___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/hidden_powershell/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_powershell", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "powershell___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "id": "35682718-5a85-11ec-b8f7-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-11", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of wget on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wget (Processes.process=\"*-q *\" OR Processes.process=\"*--quiet*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-O- *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", + "references": [ + "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [ + { + "name": "Log4j Investigate", + "id": "e609d729-0076-421a-b8f7-9e545d000381", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-12-14", + "author": "Philip Royer, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "description": "Published in response to CVE-2021-44228, this playbook and its sub-playbooks can be used to investigate and respond to attacks against hosts running vulnerable Java applications which use log4j. Between the parent playbook and seven sub-playbooks, each potentially compromised host found in Splunk Enteprise can be investigated and the risk can be mitigated using SSH for unix systems and WinRM for Windows systems.", + "how_to_implement": "To start this playbook, create a custom list called \"log4j_hosts\" with a format in which the first column should be an IP or hostname of a potentially affected log4j host, the second should be the operating system family (either unix or windows). If the operating system is unknown it can be left blank. In the block called \"fetch_hosts_from_custom_list\", change the custom list name from \"log4j_hosts\" if needed. If the operating system family (\"windows\" or \"unix\") is not known, both ssh and winrm will be attempted. If ssh and/or winrm are not the preferred endpoint management methods, these playbooks could be ported to use Google's GRR, osquery, CrowdStrike's RTR, Carbon Black's EDR API, or similar tools. The artifact scope \"all\" is used throughout this playbook because the artifact list can be added to as the playbook progresses.", + "playbook": "log4j_investigate", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/Fenrir/blob/master/fenrir.sh", + "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Log4j++Log4Shell+Followup%3A+What+we+see+and+how+to+defend+%28and+how+to+access+our+data%29/28122", + "https://twitter.com/ElektroWolle/status/1469962895849140224?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1469962895849140224%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_c10&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fpublish.twitter.com%2F%3Fquery%3Dhttps3A2F2Ftwitter.com2FElektroWolle2Fstatus2F1469962895849140224widget%3DTweet", + "https://blog.cloudflare.com/cve-2021-44228-log4j-rce-0-day-mitigation/" + ], + "app_list": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "detections": [ + "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "Windows Java Spawning Shell", + "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic" + ], + "platform_tags": [ + "Log4J" + ], + "playbook_fields": [], + "product": [ + "Splunk SOAR" + ], + "detection_objects": [ + { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "id": "900bc324-59f3-11ec-9fb4-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-10", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of curl on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=curl (Processes.process=\"*-s *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", + "references": [ + "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "file": "endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "id": "8281ce42-5c50-11ec-82d2-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a Java user agent performing a GET request for a .class file from the remote site. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell).", + "search": "| tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_user_agent=\"*Java*\" Web.http_method=\"GET\" Web.url=\"*.class*\" by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting web or proxy logs, or ensure it is being filled by a proxy like device, into the Web Datamodel. For additional filtering, allow list private IP space or restrict by known good.", + "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required in some instances, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2021/12/as-log4shell-wreaks-havoc-payroll-service-reports-ransomware-attack/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Web Server", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Scope:Network" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A Java user agent $http_user_agent$ was performing a $http_method$ to retrieve a remote class file.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_user_agent", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_method", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Web.http_method", + "Web.url", + "Web.url_length", + "Web.src", + "Web.dest", + "Web.http_user_agent" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_user_agent", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_method", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Scope:Network" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 40 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "http_user_agent", + "threat_object_type": "other" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "http_method", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "file": "endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "java.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java.log", + "source": "stream:http", + "sourcetype": "stream:http" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "id": "7b09db8a-5c20-11ec-9945-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the process name of Java, Apache, or Tomcat spawning a Linux shell. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). The shells included in the macro are \"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\". Upon triage, review parallel processes and command-line arguments to determine legitimacy.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=java OR Processes.parent_process_name=apache OR Processes.parent_process_name=tomcat `linux_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_java_spawning_shell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. Ensure EDR product is mapping OS Linux to the datamodel properly. Add any additional java process names for your environment to the analytic as needed.", + "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required on internal developer build systems or classify assets as web facing and restrict the analytic based on asset type.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.netlab.360.com/ten-families-of-malicious-samples-are-spreading-using-the-log4j2-vulnerability-now/", + "https://gist.github.com/olafhartong/916ebc673ba066537740164f7e7e1d72" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ spawning a Linux shell, potentially indicative of exploitation.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 40 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "file": "endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "java_spawn_shell_nix.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java_spawn_shell_nix.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "linux_shells", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name IN (\"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\"))", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "linux_java_spawning_shell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "id": "d2c14d28-5c47-11ec-9892-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "A required step while exploiting the CVE-2021-44228-Log4j vulnerability is that the victim server will perform outbound connections to attacker-controlled infrastructure. This is required as part of the JNDI lookup as well as for retrieving the second stage .class payload. The following analytic identifies the Java process reaching out to default ports used by the LDAP and RMI protocols. This behavior could represent successfull exploitation. Note that adversaries can easily decide to use arbitrary ports for these protocols and potentially bypass this detection.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"java.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe) by _time Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where (Ports.dest_port= 389 OR Ports.dest_port= 636 OR Ports.dest_port = 1389 OR Ports.dest_port = 1099 ) by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port| `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process connection_to_CNC dest_port | `outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate Java applications may use perform outbound connections to these ports. Filter as needed", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://www.govcert.admin.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_java/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Java performed outbound connections to default ports of LDAP or RMI on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_guid", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Ports.process_guid", + "Ports.dest", + "Ports.dest_port" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 60, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 54 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "file": "endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_java/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "id": "35682718-5a85-11ec-b8f7-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-11", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of wget on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wget (Processes.process=\"*-q *\" OR Processes.process=\"*--quiet*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-O- *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", + "references": [ + "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "file": "endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "id": "5e06e262-d7cd-4216-b2f8-27b437e18458", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Johan Bjerke, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "Malicious actors often abuse misconfigured LDAP servers or applications that use the LDAP servers in organizations. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. This search will help determine if you have any LDAP connections to IP addresses outside of private (RFC1918) address space.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as earliest_time latest(_time) as latest_time values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port = 389 OR All_Traffic.dest_port = 636 AND NOT (All_Traffic.dest_ip = 10.0.0.0/8 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=192.168.0.0/16 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip = 172.16.0.0/12) by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip |`drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | where src_ip != dest_ip | `security_content_ctime(latest_time)` | `security_content_ctime(earliest_time)` |`detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format and should be mapped to the Network Traffic datamodels that are in use for this search.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown at this moment. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. Please check those servers to verify if the activity is legitimate.", + "references": [ + "https://www.govcert.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_ldap/bro_conn.json" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An outbound LDAP connection from $src_ip$ in your infrastructure connecting to dest ip $dest_ip$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_ip", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.src_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "src_ip", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest_ip", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "file": "network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "stream_http_events.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_ldap/bro_conn.json", + "source": "/opt/malware/conn.log", + "sourcetype": "bro:conn:json" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "id": "c184f12e-5c90-11ec-bf1f-497c9a704a72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Jose Hernandez", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we first limit the scope of our search to the Web Datamodel and use the `| from datamodel` function to benefit from schema accelerated searching capabilities, mainly because the second part of the detection is pretty heavy, it runs a regex across all _raw events that looks for `${jndi:ldap://` pattern across all potential web fields available to the raw data, like http headers for example. If you see results for this detection, it means that there was a attempt at a injection, which could be a reconnaissance activity or a valid expliotation attempt, but this does not exactly mean that the host was indeed successfully exploited.", + "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | regex _raw=\"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)\\w+(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?\" | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx.", + "known_false_positives": "If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "action", + "category", + "dest", + "dest_port", + "http_content_type", + "http_method", + "http_referrer", + "http_user_agent", + "site", + "src", + "url", + "url_domain", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 30, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 15 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "file": "web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "nginx.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "source": "nginx", + "sourcetype": "nginx:plus:kv" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.yml", + "source": "web" + }, + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "id": "69afee44-5c91-11ec-bf1f-497c9a704a72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Jose Hernandez", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic", + "Web" + ], + "description": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we match the invocation function with a network connection to a malicious ip address.", + "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | rex field=_raw max_match=0 \"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)(?\\w+)(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?(?[a-zA-Z0-9\\.\\-\\_\\$]+)\" | join affected_host type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic by All_Traffic.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename dest AS affected_host] | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx.", + "known_false_positives": "If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_network_logs/log4j_network_logs.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "action", + "category", + "dest", + "dest_port", + "http_content_type", + "http_method", + "http_referrer", + "http_user_agent", + "site", + "src", + "url", + "url_domain", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 30, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 15 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "file": "web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-360d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "nginx.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "source": "nginx", + "sourcetype": "nginx:plus:kv" + }, + { + "file_name": "stream.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_network_logs/log4j_network_logs.log", + "source": "stream:Splunk_IP", + "sourcetype": "stream:ip" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.yml", + "source": "web" + } + ] + } + }, + { + "name": "Log4j Respond", + "id": "e609d729-4076-421a-b8f7-9e545d000381", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-14", + "author": "Philip Royer, Splunk", + "type": "Response", + "description": "Published in response to CVE-2021-44228, this playbook is meant to be launched after log4j_investigate. In this playbook, the risk from exploited hosts can be mitigated by optionally deleting malicious files from the hosts, blocking outbound network connections from the hosts, and/or shutting down the hosts", + "how_to_implement": "To use this playbook, create a custom list called \"log4j_hosts_and_files\" with a format in which the first column should be an IP or hostname of a potentially affected log4j host, the second should be the operating system family (either unix or windows), and the third should be a full path to a file to delete if there are any. The first two are mandatory and the file is optional. In the block called \"enumerate_files_to_delete\", change the custom list name from \"log4j_hosts_and_files\" if needed. If ssh and/or winrm are not the preferred endpoint management methods, these playbooks could be ported to use Google's GRR, osquery, CrowdStrike's RTR, Carbon Black's EDR API, or similar tools. The artifact scope \"all\" is used throughout this playbook because the artifact list can be added to as the playbook progresses.", + "playbook": "log4j_respond", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/Fenrir/blob/master/fenrir.sh", + "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Log4j++Log4Shell+Followup%3A+What+we+see+and+how+to+defend+%28and+how+to+access+our+data%29/28122", + "https://twitter.com/ElektroWolle/status/1469962895849140224?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1469962895849140224%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_c10&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fpublish.twitter.com%2F%3Fquery%3Dhttps3A2F2Ftwitter.com2FElektroWolle2Fstatus2F1469962895849140224widget%3DTweet", + "https://blog.cloudflare.com/cve-2021-44228-log4j-rce-0-day-mitigation/" + ], + "app_list": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "detections": [ + "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "Windows Java Spawning Shell", + "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic" + ], + "platform_tags": [ + "Log4J" + ], + "playbook_fields": [], + "product": [ + "Splunk SOAR" + ], + "detection_objects": [ + { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "id": "900bc324-59f3-11ec-9fb4-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-10", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of curl on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=curl (Processes.process=\"*-s *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", + "references": [ + "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "file": "endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "id": "8281ce42-5c50-11ec-82d2-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a Java user agent performing a GET request for a .class file from the remote site. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell).", + "search": "| tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_user_agent=\"*Java*\" Web.http_method=\"GET\" Web.url=\"*.class*\" by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting web or proxy logs, or ensure it is being filled by a proxy like device, into the Web Datamodel. For additional filtering, allow list private IP space or restrict by known good.", + "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required in some instances, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2021/12/as-log4shell-wreaks-havoc-payroll-service-reports-ransomware-attack/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Web Server", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Scope:Network" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A Java user agent $http_user_agent$ was performing a $http_method$ to retrieve a remote class file.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_user_agent", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_method", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Web.http_method", + "Web.url", + "Web.url_length", + "Web.src", + "Web.dest", + "Web.http_user_agent" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_user_agent", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_method", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Scope:Network" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 40 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "http_user_agent", + "threat_object_type": "other" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "http_method", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "file": "endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "java.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java.log", + "source": "stream:http", + "sourcetype": "stream:http" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "id": "7b09db8a-5c20-11ec-9945-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the process name of Java, Apache, or Tomcat spawning a Linux shell. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). The shells included in the macro are \"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\". Upon triage, review parallel processes and command-line arguments to determine legitimacy.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=java OR Processes.parent_process_name=apache OR Processes.parent_process_name=tomcat `linux_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_java_spawning_shell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. Ensure EDR product is mapping OS Linux to the datamodel properly. Add any additional java process names for your environment to the analytic as needed.", + "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required on internal developer build systems or classify assets as web facing and restrict the analytic based on asset type.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.netlab.360.com/ten-families-of-malicious-samples-are-spreading-using-the-log4j2-vulnerability-now/", + "https://gist.github.com/olafhartong/916ebc673ba066537740164f7e7e1d72" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ spawning a Linux shell, potentially indicative of exploitation.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 40 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "file": "endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "java_spawn_shell_nix.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java_spawn_shell_nix.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "linux_shells", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name IN (\"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\"))", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "linux_java_spawning_shell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "id": "d2c14d28-5c47-11ec-9892-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "A required step while exploiting the CVE-2021-44228-Log4j vulnerability is that the victim server will perform outbound connections to attacker-controlled infrastructure. This is required as part of the JNDI lookup as well as for retrieving the second stage .class payload. The following analytic identifies the Java process reaching out to default ports used by the LDAP and RMI protocols. This behavior could represent successfull exploitation. Note that adversaries can easily decide to use arbitrary ports for these protocols and potentially bypass this detection.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"java.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe) by _time Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where (Ports.dest_port= 389 OR Ports.dest_port= 636 OR Ports.dest_port = 1389 OR Ports.dest_port = 1099 ) by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port| `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process connection_to_CNC dest_port | `outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate Java applications may use perform outbound connections to these ports. Filter as needed", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://www.govcert.admin.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_java/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Java performed outbound connections to default ports of LDAP or RMI on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_guid", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Ports.process_guid", + "Ports.dest", + "Ports.dest_port" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 60, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 54 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "file": "endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_java/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "id": "35682718-5a85-11ec-b8f7-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-11", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of wget on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wget (Processes.process=\"*-q *\" OR Processes.process=\"*--quiet*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-O- *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", + "references": [ + "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "file": "endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "id": "5e06e262-d7cd-4216-b2f8-27b437e18458", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Johan Bjerke, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "Malicious actors often abuse misconfigured LDAP servers or applications that use the LDAP servers in organizations. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. This search will help determine if you have any LDAP connections to IP addresses outside of private (RFC1918) address space.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as earliest_time latest(_time) as latest_time values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port = 389 OR All_Traffic.dest_port = 636 AND NOT (All_Traffic.dest_ip = 10.0.0.0/8 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=192.168.0.0/16 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip = 172.16.0.0/12) by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip |`drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | where src_ip != dest_ip | `security_content_ctime(latest_time)` | `security_content_ctime(earliest_time)` |`detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format and should be mapped to the Network Traffic datamodels that are in use for this search.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown at this moment. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. Please check those servers to verify if the activity is legitimate.", + "references": [ + "https://www.govcert.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_ldap/bro_conn.json" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An outbound LDAP connection from $src_ip$ in your infrastructure connecting to dest ip $dest_ip$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_ip", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.src_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "src_ip", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest_ip", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "file": "network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "stream_http_events.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_ldap/bro_conn.json", + "source": "/opt/malware/conn.log", + "sourcetype": "bro:conn:json" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "id": "c184f12e-5c90-11ec-bf1f-497c9a704a72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Jose Hernandez", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we first limit the scope of our search to the Web Datamodel and use the `| from datamodel` function to benefit from schema accelerated searching capabilities, mainly because the second part of the detection is pretty heavy, it runs a regex across all _raw events that looks for `${jndi:ldap://` pattern across all potential web fields available to the raw data, like http headers for example. If you see results for this detection, it means that there was a attempt at a injection, which could be a reconnaissance activity or a valid expliotation attempt, but this does not exactly mean that the host was indeed successfully exploited.", + "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | regex _raw=\"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)\\w+(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?\" | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx.", + "known_false_positives": "If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "action", + "category", + "dest", + "dest_port", + "http_content_type", + "http_method", + "http_referrer", + "http_user_agent", + "site", + "src", + "url", + "url_domain", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 30, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 15 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "file": "web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "nginx.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "source": "nginx", + "sourcetype": "nginx:plus:kv" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.yml", + "source": "web" + }, + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "id": "69afee44-5c91-11ec-bf1f-497c9a704a72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Jose Hernandez", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic", + "Web" + ], + "description": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we match the invocation function with a network connection to a malicious ip address.", + "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | rex field=_raw max_match=0 \"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)(?\\w+)(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?(?[a-zA-Z0-9\\.\\-\\_\\$]+)\" | join affected_host type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic by All_Traffic.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename dest AS affected_host] | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx.", + "known_false_positives": "If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_network_logs/log4j_network_logs.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "action", + "category", + "dest", + "dest_port", + "http_content_type", + "http_method", + "http_referrer", + "http_user_agent", + "site", + "src", + "url", + "url_domain", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 30, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 15 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "file": "web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-360d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "nginx.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "source": "nginx", + "sourcetype": "nginx:plus:kv" + }, + { + "file_name": "stream.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_network_logs/log4j_network_logs.log", + "source": "stream:Splunk_IP", + "sourcetype": "stream:ip" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.yml", + "source": "web" + } + ] + } + } + ], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "file": "endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Java Spawning Shells", + "id": "28c81306-5c47-11ec-bfea-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the process name of java.exe and w3wp.exe spawning a Windows shell. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). The shells included in the macro are \"cmd.exe\", \"powershell.exe\". Upon triage, review parallel processes and command-line arguments to determine legitimacy.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=java.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=w3wp.exe `windows_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_java_spawning_shells_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. Restrict the analytic to publicly facing endpoints to reduce false positives. Add any additional identified web application process name to the query. Add any further Windows process names to the macro (ex. LOLBins) to further expand this query.", + "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required on internal developer build systems or classify assets as web facing and restrict the analytic based on that.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.netlab.360.com/ten-families-of-malicious-samples-are-spreading-using-the-log4j2-vulnerability-now/", + "https://gist.github.com/olafhartong/916ebc673ba066537740164f7e7e1d72" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Java Spawning Shells", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ spawning a Windows shell, potentially indicative of exploitation.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 40 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "windows_shells", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe)", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_java_spawning_shells_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/windows_java_spawning_shells.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "id": "5e06e262-d7cd-4216-b2f8-27b437e18458", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Johan Bjerke, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "Malicious actors often abuse misconfigured LDAP servers or applications that use the LDAP servers in organizations. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. This search will help determine if you have any LDAP connections to IP addresses outside of private (RFC1918) address space.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as earliest_time latest(_time) as latest_time values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port = 389 OR All_Traffic.dest_port = 636 AND NOT (All_Traffic.dest_ip = 10.0.0.0/8 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=192.168.0.0/16 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip = 172.16.0.0/12) by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip |`drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | where src_ip != dest_ip | `security_content_ctime(latest_time)` | `security_content_ctime(earliest_time)` |`detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format and should be mapped to the Network Traffic datamodels that are in use for this search.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown at this moment. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. Please check those servers to verify if the activity is legitimate.", + "references": [ + "https://www.govcert.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_ldap/bro_conn.json" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An outbound LDAP connection from $src_ip$ in your infrastructure connecting to dest ip $dest_ip$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_ip", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.src_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "src_ip", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest_ip", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [ + { + "name": "Log4j Investigate", + "id": "e609d729-0076-421a-b8f7-9e545d000381", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-12-14", + "author": "Philip Royer, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "description": "Published in response to CVE-2021-44228, this playbook and its sub-playbooks can be used to investigate and respond to attacks against hosts running vulnerable Java applications which use log4j. Between the parent playbook and seven sub-playbooks, each potentially compromised host found in Splunk Enteprise can be investigated and the risk can be mitigated using SSH for unix systems and WinRM for Windows systems.", + "how_to_implement": "To start this playbook, create a custom list called \"log4j_hosts\" with a format in which the first column should be an IP or hostname of a potentially affected log4j host, the second should be the operating system family (either unix or windows). If the operating system is unknown it can be left blank. In the block called \"fetch_hosts_from_custom_list\", change the custom list name from \"log4j_hosts\" if needed. If the operating system family (\"windows\" or \"unix\") is not known, both ssh and winrm will be attempted. If ssh and/or winrm are not the preferred endpoint management methods, these playbooks could be ported to use Google's GRR, osquery, CrowdStrike's RTR, Carbon Black's EDR API, or similar tools. The artifact scope \"all\" is used throughout this playbook because the artifact list can be added to as the playbook progresses.", + "playbook": "log4j_investigate", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/Fenrir/blob/master/fenrir.sh", + "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Log4j++Log4Shell+Followup%3A+What+we+see+and+how+to+defend+%28and+how+to+access+our+data%29/28122", + "https://twitter.com/ElektroWolle/status/1469962895849140224?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1469962895849140224%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_c10&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fpublish.twitter.com%2F%3Fquery%3Dhttps3A2F2Ftwitter.com2FElektroWolle2Fstatus2F1469962895849140224widget%3DTweet", + "https://blog.cloudflare.com/cve-2021-44228-log4j-rce-0-day-mitigation/" + ], + "app_list": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "detections": [ + "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "Windows Java Spawning Shell", + "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic" + ], + "platform_tags": [ + "Log4J" + ], + "playbook_fields": [], + "product": [ + "Splunk SOAR" + ], + "detection_objects": [ + { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "id": "900bc324-59f3-11ec-9fb4-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-10", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of curl on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=curl (Processes.process=\"*-s *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", + "references": [ + "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "file": "endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "id": "8281ce42-5c50-11ec-82d2-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a Java user agent performing a GET request for a .class file from the remote site. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell).", + "search": "| tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_user_agent=\"*Java*\" Web.http_method=\"GET\" Web.url=\"*.class*\" by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting web or proxy logs, or ensure it is being filled by a proxy like device, into the Web Datamodel. For additional filtering, allow list private IP space or restrict by known good.", + "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required in some instances, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2021/12/as-log4shell-wreaks-havoc-payroll-service-reports-ransomware-attack/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Web Server", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Scope:Network" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A Java user agent $http_user_agent$ was performing a $http_method$ to retrieve a remote class file.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_user_agent", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_method", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Web.http_method", + "Web.url", + "Web.url_length", + "Web.src", + "Web.dest", + "Web.http_user_agent" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_user_agent", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_method", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Scope:Network" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 40 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "http_user_agent", + "threat_object_type": "other" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "http_method", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "file": "endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "java.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java.log", + "source": "stream:http", + "sourcetype": "stream:http" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "id": "7b09db8a-5c20-11ec-9945-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the process name of Java, Apache, or Tomcat spawning a Linux shell. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). The shells included in the macro are \"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\". Upon triage, review parallel processes and command-line arguments to determine legitimacy.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=java OR Processes.parent_process_name=apache OR Processes.parent_process_name=tomcat `linux_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_java_spawning_shell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. Ensure EDR product is mapping OS Linux to the datamodel properly. Add any additional java process names for your environment to the analytic as needed.", + "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required on internal developer build systems or classify assets as web facing and restrict the analytic based on asset type.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.netlab.360.com/ten-families-of-malicious-samples-are-spreading-using-the-log4j2-vulnerability-now/", + "https://gist.github.com/olafhartong/916ebc673ba066537740164f7e7e1d72" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ spawning a Linux shell, potentially indicative of exploitation.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 40 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "file": "endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "java_spawn_shell_nix.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java_spawn_shell_nix.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "linux_shells", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name IN (\"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\"))", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "linux_java_spawning_shell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "id": "d2c14d28-5c47-11ec-9892-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "A required step while exploiting the CVE-2021-44228-Log4j vulnerability is that the victim server will perform outbound connections to attacker-controlled infrastructure. This is required as part of the JNDI lookup as well as for retrieving the second stage .class payload. The following analytic identifies the Java process reaching out to default ports used by the LDAP and RMI protocols. This behavior could represent successfull exploitation. Note that adversaries can easily decide to use arbitrary ports for these protocols and potentially bypass this detection.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"java.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe) by _time Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where (Ports.dest_port= 389 OR Ports.dest_port= 636 OR Ports.dest_port = 1389 OR Ports.dest_port = 1099 ) by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port| `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process connection_to_CNC dest_port | `outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate Java applications may use perform outbound connections to these ports. Filter as needed", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://www.govcert.admin.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_java/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Java performed outbound connections to default ports of LDAP or RMI on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_guid", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Ports.process_guid", + "Ports.dest", + "Ports.dest_port" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 60, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 54 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "file": "endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_java/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "id": "35682718-5a85-11ec-b8f7-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-11", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of wget on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wget (Processes.process=\"*-q *\" OR Processes.process=\"*--quiet*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-O- *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", + "references": [ + "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "file": "endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "id": "5e06e262-d7cd-4216-b2f8-27b437e18458", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Johan Bjerke, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "Malicious actors often abuse misconfigured LDAP servers or applications that use the LDAP servers in organizations. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. This search will help determine if you have any LDAP connections to IP addresses outside of private (RFC1918) address space.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as earliest_time latest(_time) as latest_time values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port = 389 OR All_Traffic.dest_port = 636 AND NOT (All_Traffic.dest_ip = 10.0.0.0/8 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=192.168.0.0/16 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip = 172.16.0.0/12) by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip |`drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | where src_ip != dest_ip | `security_content_ctime(latest_time)` | `security_content_ctime(earliest_time)` |`detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format and should be mapped to the Network Traffic datamodels that are in use for this search.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown at this moment. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. Please check those servers to verify if the activity is legitimate.", + "references": [ + "https://www.govcert.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_ldap/bro_conn.json" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An outbound LDAP connection from $src_ip$ in your infrastructure connecting to dest ip $dest_ip$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_ip", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.src_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "src_ip", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest_ip", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "file": "network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "stream_http_events.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_ldap/bro_conn.json", + "source": "/opt/malware/conn.log", + "sourcetype": "bro:conn:json" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "id": "c184f12e-5c90-11ec-bf1f-497c9a704a72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Jose Hernandez", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we first limit the scope of our search to the Web Datamodel and use the `| from datamodel` function to benefit from schema accelerated searching capabilities, mainly because the second part of the detection is pretty heavy, it runs a regex across all _raw events that looks for `${jndi:ldap://` pattern across all potential web fields available to the raw data, like http headers for example. If you see results for this detection, it means that there was a attempt at a injection, which could be a reconnaissance activity or a valid expliotation attempt, but this does not exactly mean that the host was indeed successfully exploited.", + "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | regex _raw=\"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)\\w+(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?\" | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx.", + "known_false_positives": "If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "action", + "category", + "dest", + "dest_port", + "http_content_type", + "http_method", + "http_referrer", + "http_user_agent", + "site", + "src", + "url", + "url_domain", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 30, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 15 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "file": "web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "nginx.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "source": "nginx", + "sourcetype": "nginx:plus:kv" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.yml", + "source": "web" + }, + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "id": "69afee44-5c91-11ec-bf1f-497c9a704a72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Jose Hernandez", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic", + "Web" + ], + "description": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we match the invocation function with a network connection to a malicious ip address.", + "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | rex field=_raw max_match=0 \"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)(?\\w+)(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?(?[a-zA-Z0-9\\.\\-\\_\\$]+)\" | join affected_host type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic by All_Traffic.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename dest AS affected_host] | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx.", + "known_false_positives": "If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_network_logs/log4j_network_logs.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "action", + "category", + "dest", + "dest_port", + "http_content_type", + "http_method", + "http_referrer", + "http_user_agent", + "site", + "src", + "url", + "url_domain", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 30, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 15 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "file": "web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-360d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "nginx.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "source": "nginx", + "sourcetype": "nginx:plus:kv" + }, + { + "file_name": "stream.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_network_logs/log4j_network_logs.log", + "source": "stream:Splunk_IP", + "sourcetype": "stream:ip" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.yml", + "source": "web" + } + ] + } + }, + { + "name": "Log4j Respond", + "id": "e609d729-4076-421a-b8f7-9e545d000381", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-14", + "author": "Philip Royer, Splunk", + "type": "Response", + "description": "Published in response to CVE-2021-44228, this playbook is meant to be launched after log4j_investigate. In this playbook, the risk from exploited hosts can be mitigated by optionally deleting malicious files from the hosts, blocking outbound network connections from the hosts, and/or shutting down the hosts", + "how_to_implement": "To use this playbook, create a custom list called \"log4j_hosts_and_files\" with a format in which the first column should be an IP or hostname of a potentially affected log4j host, the second should be the operating system family (either unix or windows), and the third should be a full path to a file to delete if there are any. The first two are mandatory and the file is optional. In the block called \"enumerate_files_to_delete\", change the custom list name from \"log4j_hosts_and_files\" if needed. If ssh and/or winrm are not the preferred endpoint management methods, these playbooks could be ported to use Google's GRR, osquery, CrowdStrike's RTR, Carbon Black's EDR API, or similar tools. The artifact scope \"all\" is used throughout this playbook because the artifact list can be added to as the playbook progresses.", + "playbook": "log4j_respond", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/Fenrir/blob/master/fenrir.sh", + "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Log4j++Log4Shell+Followup%3A+What+we+see+and+how+to+defend+%28and+how+to+access+our+data%29/28122", + "https://twitter.com/ElektroWolle/status/1469962895849140224?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1469962895849140224%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_c10&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fpublish.twitter.com%2F%3Fquery%3Dhttps3A2F2Ftwitter.com2FElektroWolle2Fstatus2F1469962895849140224widget%3DTweet", + "https://blog.cloudflare.com/cve-2021-44228-log4j-rce-0-day-mitigation/" + ], + "app_list": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "detections": [ + "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "Windows Java Spawning Shell", + "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic" + ], + "platform_tags": [ + "Log4J" + ], + "playbook_fields": [], + "product": [ + "Splunk SOAR" + ], + "detection_objects": [ + { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "id": "900bc324-59f3-11ec-9fb4-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-10", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of curl on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=curl (Processes.process=\"*-s *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", + "references": [ + "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "file": "endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "id": "8281ce42-5c50-11ec-82d2-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a Java user agent performing a GET request for a .class file from the remote site. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell).", + "search": "| tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_user_agent=\"*Java*\" Web.http_method=\"GET\" Web.url=\"*.class*\" by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting web or proxy logs, or ensure it is being filled by a proxy like device, into the Web Datamodel. For additional filtering, allow list private IP space or restrict by known good.", + "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required in some instances, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2021/12/as-log4shell-wreaks-havoc-payroll-service-reports-ransomware-attack/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Web Server", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Scope:Network" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A Java user agent $http_user_agent$ was performing a $http_method$ to retrieve a remote class file.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_user_agent", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_method", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Web.http_method", + "Web.url", + "Web.url_length", + "Web.src", + "Web.dest", + "Web.http_user_agent" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_user_agent", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_method", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Scope:Network" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 40 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "http_user_agent", + "threat_object_type": "other" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "http_method", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "file": "endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "java.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java.log", + "source": "stream:http", + "sourcetype": "stream:http" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "id": "7b09db8a-5c20-11ec-9945-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the process name of Java, Apache, or Tomcat spawning a Linux shell. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). The shells included in the macro are \"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\". Upon triage, review parallel processes and command-line arguments to determine legitimacy.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=java OR Processes.parent_process_name=apache OR Processes.parent_process_name=tomcat `linux_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_java_spawning_shell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. Ensure EDR product is mapping OS Linux to the datamodel properly. Add any additional java process names for your environment to the analytic as needed.", + "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required on internal developer build systems or classify assets as web facing and restrict the analytic based on asset type.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.netlab.360.com/ten-families-of-malicious-samples-are-spreading-using-the-log4j2-vulnerability-now/", + "https://gist.github.com/olafhartong/916ebc673ba066537740164f7e7e1d72" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ spawning a Linux shell, potentially indicative of exploitation.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 40 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "file": "endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "java_spawn_shell_nix.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java_spawn_shell_nix.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "linux_shells", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name IN (\"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\"))", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "linux_java_spawning_shell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "id": "d2c14d28-5c47-11ec-9892-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "A required step while exploiting the CVE-2021-44228-Log4j vulnerability is that the victim server will perform outbound connections to attacker-controlled infrastructure. This is required as part of the JNDI lookup as well as for retrieving the second stage .class payload. The following analytic identifies the Java process reaching out to default ports used by the LDAP and RMI protocols. This behavior could represent successfull exploitation. Note that adversaries can easily decide to use arbitrary ports for these protocols and potentially bypass this detection.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"java.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe) by _time Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where (Ports.dest_port= 389 OR Ports.dest_port= 636 OR Ports.dest_port = 1389 OR Ports.dest_port = 1099 ) by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port| `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process connection_to_CNC dest_port | `outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate Java applications may use perform outbound connections to these ports. Filter as needed", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://www.govcert.admin.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_java/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Java performed outbound connections to default ports of LDAP or RMI on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_guid", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Ports.process_guid", + "Ports.dest", + "Ports.dest_port" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 60, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 54 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "file": "endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_java/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "id": "35682718-5a85-11ec-b8f7-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-11", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of wget on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wget (Processes.process=\"*-q *\" OR Processes.process=\"*--quiet*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-O- *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", + "references": [ + "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "file": "endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "id": "5e06e262-d7cd-4216-b2f8-27b437e18458", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Johan Bjerke, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "Malicious actors often abuse misconfigured LDAP servers or applications that use the LDAP servers in organizations. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. This search will help determine if you have any LDAP connections to IP addresses outside of private (RFC1918) address space.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as earliest_time latest(_time) as latest_time values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port = 389 OR All_Traffic.dest_port = 636 AND NOT (All_Traffic.dest_ip = 10.0.0.0/8 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=192.168.0.0/16 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip = 172.16.0.0/12) by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip |`drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | where src_ip != dest_ip | `security_content_ctime(latest_time)` | `security_content_ctime(earliest_time)` |`detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format and should be mapped to the Network Traffic datamodels that are in use for this search.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown at this moment. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. Please check those servers to verify if the activity is legitimate.", + "references": [ + "https://www.govcert.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_ldap/bro_conn.json" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An outbound LDAP connection from $src_ip$ in your infrastructure connecting to dest ip $dest_ip$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_ip", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.src_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "src_ip", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest_ip", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "file": "network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "stream_http_events.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_ldap/bro_conn.json", + "source": "/opt/malware/conn.log", + "sourcetype": "bro:conn:json" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "id": "c184f12e-5c90-11ec-bf1f-497c9a704a72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Jose Hernandez", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we first limit the scope of our search to the Web Datamodel and use the `| from datamodel` function to benefit from schema accelerated searching capabilities, mainly because the second part of the detection is pretty heavy, it runs a regex across all _raw events that looks for `${jndi:ldap://` pattern across all potential web fields available to the raw data, like http headers for example. If you see results for this detection, it means that there was a attempt at a injection, which could be a reconnaissance activity or a valid expliotation attempt, but this does not exactly mean that the host was indeed successfully exploited.", + "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | regex _raw=\"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)\\w+(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?\" | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx.", + "known_false_positives": "If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "action", + "category", + "dest", + "dest_port", + "http_content_type", + "http_method", + "http_referrer", + "http_user_agent", + "site", + "src", + "url", + "url_domain", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 30, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 15 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "file": "web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "nginx.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "source": "nginx", + "sourcetype": "nginx:plus:kv" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.yml", + "source": "web" + }, + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "id": "69afee44-5c91-11ec-bf1f-497c9a704a72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Jose Hernandez", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic", + "Web" + ], + "description": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we match the invocation function with a network connection to a malicious ip address.", + "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | rex field=_raw max_match=0 \"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)(?\\w+)(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?(?[a-zA-Z0-9\\.\\-\\_\\$]+)\" | join affected_host type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic by All_Traffic.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename dest AS affected_host] | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx.", + "known_false_positives": "If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_network_logs/log4j_network_logs.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "action", + "category", + "dest", + "dest_port", + "http_content_type", + "http_method", + "http_referrer", + "http_user_agent", + "site", + "src", + "url", + "url_domain", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 30, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 15 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "file": "web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-360d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "nginx.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "source": "nginx", + "sourcetype": "nginx:plus:kv" + }, + { + "file_name": "stream.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_network_logs/log4j_network_logs.log", + "source": "stream:Splunk_IP", + "sourcetype": "stream:ip" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.yml", + "source": "web" + } + ] + } + } + ], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "file": "network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "stream_http_events.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_ldap/bro_conn.json", + "source": "/opt/malware/conn.log", + "sourcetype": "bro:conn:json" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "id": "c184f12e-5c90-11ec-bf1f-497c9a704a72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Jose Hernandez", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we first limit the scope of our search to the Web Datamodel and use the `| from datamodel` function to benefit from schema accelerated searching capabilities, mainly because the second part of the detection is pretty heavy, it runs a regex across all _raw events that looks for `${jndi:ldap://` pattern across all potential web fields available to the raw data, like http headers for example. If you see results for this detection, it means that there was a attempt at a injection, which could be a reconnaissance activity or a valid expliotation attempt, but this does not exactly mean that the host was indeed successfully exploited.", + "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | regex _raw=\"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)\\w+(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?\" | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx.", + "known_false_positives": "If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "action", + "category", + "dest", + "dest_port", + "http_content_type", + "http_method", + "http_referrer", + "http_user_agent", + "site", + "src", + "url", + "url_domain", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 30, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 15 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [ + { + "name": "Log4j Investigate", + "id": "e609d729-0076-421a-b8f7-9e545d000381", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-12-14", + "author": "Philip Royer, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "description": "Published in response to CVE-2021-44228, this playbook and its sub-playbooks can be used to investigate and respond to attacks against hosts running vulnerable Java applications which use log4j. Between the parent playbook and seven sub-playbooks, each potentially compromised host found in Splunk Enteprise can be investigated and the risk can be mitigated using SSH for unix systems and WinRM for Windows systems.", + "how_to_implement": "To start this playbook, create a custom list called \"log4j_hosts\" with a format in which the first column should be an IP or hostname of a potentially affected log4j host, the second should be the operating system family (either unix or windows). If the operating system is unknown it can be left blank. In the block called \"fetch_hosts_from_custom_list\", change the custom list name from \"log4j_hosts\" if needed. If the operating system family (\"windows\" or \"unix\") is not known, both ssh and winrm will be attempted. If ssh and/or winrm are not the preferred endpoint management methods, these playbooks could be ported to use Google's GRR, osquery, CrowdStrike's RTR, Carbon Black's EDR API, or similar tools. The artifact scope \"all\" is used throughout this playbook because the artifact list can be added to as the playbook progresses.", + "playbook": "log4j_investigate", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/Fenrir/blob/master/fenrir.sh", + "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Log4j++Log4Shell+Followup%3A+What+we+see+and+how+to+defend+%28and+how+to+access+our+data%29/28122", + "https://twitter.com/ElektroWolle/status/1469962895849140224?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1469962895849140224%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_c10&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fpublish.twitter.com%2F%3Fquery%3Dhttps3A2F2Ftwitter.com2FElektroWolle2Fstatus2F1469962895849140224widget%3DTweet", + "https://blog.cloudflare.com/cve-2021-44228-log4j-rce-0-day-mitigation/" + ], + "app_list": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "detections": [ + "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "Windows Java Spawning Shell", + "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic" + ], + "platform_tags": [ + "Log4J" + ], + "playbook_fields": [], + "product": [ + "Splunk SOAR" + ], + "detection_objects": [ + { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "id": "900bc324-59f3-11ec-9fb4-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-10", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of curl on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=curl (Processes.process=\"*-s *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", + "references": [ + "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "file": "endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "id": "8281ce42-5c50-11ec-82d2-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a Java user agent performing a GET request for a .class file from the remote site. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell).", + "search": "| tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_user_agent=\"*Java*\" Web.http_method=\"GET\" Web.url=\"*.class*\" by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting web or proxy logs, or ensure it is being filled by a proxy like device, into the Web Datamodel. For additional filtering, allow list private IP space or restrict by known good.", + "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required in some instances, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2021/12/as-log4shell-wreaks-havoc-payroll-service-reports-ransomware-attack/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Web Server", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Scope:Network" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A Java user agent $http_user_agent$ was performing a $http_method$ to retrieve a remote class file.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_user_agent", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_method", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Web.http_method", + "Web.url", + "Web.url_length", + "Web.src", + "Web.dest", + "Web.http_user_agent" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_user_agent", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_method", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Scope:Network" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 40 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "http_user_agent", + "threat_object_type": "other" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "http_method", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "file": "endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "java.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java.log", + "source": "stream:http", + "sourcetype": "stream:http" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "id": "7b09db8a-5c20-11ec-9945-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the process name of Java, Apache, or Tomcat spawning a Linux shell. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). The shells included in the macro are \"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\". Upon triage, review parallel processes and command-line arguments to determine legitimacy.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=java OR Processes.parent_process_name=apache OR Processes.parent_process_name=tomcat `linux_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_java_spawning_shell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. Ensure EDR product is mapping OS Linux to the datamodel properly. Add any additional java process names for your environment to the analytic as needed.", + "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required on internal developer build systems or classify assets as web facing and restrict the analytic based on asset type.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.netlab.360.com/ten-families-of-malicious-samples-are-spreading-using-the-log4j2-vulnerability-now/", + "https://gist.github.com/olafhartong/916ebc673ba066537740164f7e7e1d72" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ spawning a Linux shell, potentially indicative of exploitation.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 40 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "file": "endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "java_spawn_shell_nix.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java_spawn_shell_nix.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "linux_shells", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name IN (\"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\"))", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "linux_java_spawning_shell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "id": "d2c14d28-5c47-11ec-9892-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "A required step while exploiting the CVE-2021-44228-Log4j vulnerability is that the victim server will perform outbound connections to attacker-controlled infrastructure. This is required as part of the JNDI lookup as well as for retrieving the second stage .class payload. The following analytic identifies the Java process reaching out to default ports used by the LDAP and RMI protocols. This behavior could represent successfull exploitation. Note that adversaries can easily decide to use arbitrary ports for these protocols and potentially bypass this detection.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"java.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe) by _time Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where (Ports.dest_port= 389 OR Ports.dest_port= 636 OR Ports.dest_port = 1389 OR Ports.dest_port = 1099 ) by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port| `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process connection_to_CNC dest_port | `outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate Java applications may use perform outbound connections to these ports. Filter as needed", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://www.govcert.admin.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_java/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Java performed outbound connections to default ports of LDAP or RMI on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_guid", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Ports.process_guid", + "Ports.dest", + "Ports.dest_port" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 60, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 54 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "file": "endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_java/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "id": "35682718-5a85-11ec-b8f7-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-11", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of wget on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wget (Processes.process=\"*-q *\" OR Processes.process=\"*--quiet*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-O- *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", + "references": [ + "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "file": "endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "id": "5e06e262-d7cd-4216-b2f8-27b437e18458", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Johan Bjerke, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "Malicious actors often abuse misconfigured LDAP servers or applications that use the LDAP servers in organizations. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. This search will help determine if you have any LDAP connections to IP addresses outside of private (RFC1918) address space.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as earliest_time latest(_time) as latest_time values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port = 389 OR All_Traffic.dest_port = 636 AND NOT (All_Traffic.dest_ip = 10.0.0.0/8 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=192.168.0.0/16 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip = 172.16.0.0/12) by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip |`drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | where src_ip != dest_ip | `security_content_ctime(latest_time)` | `security_content_ctime(earliest_time)` |`detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format and should be mapped to the Network Traffic datamodels that are in use for this search.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown at this moment. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. Please check those servers to verify if the activity is legitimate.", + "references": [ + "https://www.govcert.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_ldap/bro_conn.json" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An outbound LDAP connection from $src_ip$ in your infrastructure connecting to dest ip $dest_ip$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_ip", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.src_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "src_ip", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest_ip", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "file": "network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "stream_http_events.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_ldap/bro_conn.json", + "source": "/opt/malware/conn.log", + "sourcetype": "bro:conn:json" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "id": "c184f12e-5c90-11ec-bf1f-497c9a704a72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Jose Hernandez", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we first limit the scope of our search to the Web Datamodel and use the `| from datamodel` function to benefit from schema accelerated searching capabilities, mainly because the second part of the detection is pretty heavy, it runs a regex across all _raw events that looks for `${jndi:ldap://` pattern across all potential web fields available to the raw data, like http headers for example. If you see results for this detection, it means that there was a attempt at a injection, which could be a reconnaissance activity or a valid expliotation attempt, but this does not exactly mean that the host was indeed successfully exploited.", + "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | regex _raw=\"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)\\w+(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?\" | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx.", + "known_false_positives": "If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "action", + "category", + "dest", + "dest_port", + "http_content_type", + "http_method", + "http_referrer", + "http_user_agent", + "site", + "src", + "url", + "url_domain", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 30, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 15 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "file": "web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "nginx.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "source": "nginx", + "sourcetype": "nginx:plus:kv" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.yml", + "source": "web" + }, + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "id": "69afee44-5c91-11ec-bf1f-497c9a704a72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Jose Hernandez", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic", + "Web" + ], + "description": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we match the invocation function with a network connection to a malicious ip address.", + "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | rex field=_raw max_match=0 \"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)(?\\w+)(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?(?[a-zA-Z0-9\\.\\-\\_\\$]+)\" | join affected_host type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic by All_Traffic.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename dest AS affected_host] | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx.", + "known_false_positives": "If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_network_logs/log4j_network_logs.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "action", + "category", + "dest", + "dest_port", + "http_content_type", + "http_method", + "http_referrer", + "http_user_agent", + "site", + "src", + "url", + "url_domain", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 30, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 15 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "file": "web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-360d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "nginx.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "source": "nginx", + "sourcetype": "nginx:plus:kv" + }, + { + "file_name": "stream.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_network_logs/log4j_network_logs.log", + "source": "stream:Splunk_IP", + "sourcetype": "stream:ip" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.yml", + "source": "web" + } + ] + } + }, + { + "name": "Log4j Respond", + "id": "e609d729-4076-421a-b8f7-9e545d000381", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-14", + "author": "Philip Royer, Splunk", + "type": "Response", + "description": "Published in response to CVE-2021-44228, this playbook is meant to be launched after log4j_investigate. In this playbook, the risk from exploited hosts can be mitigated by optionally deleting malicious files from the hosts, blocking outbound network connections from the hosts, and/or shutting down the hosts", + "how_to_implement": "To use this playbook, create a custom list called \"log4j_hosts_and_files\" with a format in which the first column should be an IP or hostname of a potentially affected log4j host, the second should be the operating system family (either unix or windows), and the third should be a full path to a file to delete if there are any. The first two are mandatory and the file is optional. In the block called \"enumerate_files_to_delete\", change the custom list name from \"log4j_hosts_and_files\" if needed. If ssh and/or winrm are not the preferred endpoint management methods, these playbooks could be ported to use Google's GRR, osquery, CrowdStrike's RTR, Carbon Black's EDR API, or similar tools. The artifact scope \"all\" is used throughout this playbook because the artifact list can be added to as the playbook progresses.", + "playbook": "log4j_respond", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/Fenrir/blob/master/fenrir.sh", + "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Log4j++Log4Shell+Followup%3A+What+we+see+and+how+to+defend+%28and+how+to+access+our+data%29/28122", + "https://twitter.com/ElektroWolle/status/1469962895849140224?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1469962895849140224%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_c10&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fpublish.twitter.com%2F%3Fquery%3Dhttps3A2F2Ftwitter.com2FElektroWolle2Fstatus2F1469962895849140224widget%3DTweet", + "https://blog.cloudflare.com/cve-2021-44228-log4j-rce-0-day-mitigation/" + ], + "app_list": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "detections": [ + "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "Windows Java Spawning Shell", + "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic" + ], + "platform_tags": [ + "Log4J" + ], + "playbook_fields": [], + "product": [ + "Splunk SOAR" + ], + "detection_objects": [ + { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "id": "900bc324-59f3-11ec-9fb4-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-10", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of curl on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=curl (Processes.process=\"*-s *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", + "references": [ + "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "file": "endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "id": "8281ce42-5c50-11ec-82d2-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a Java user agent performing a GET request for a .class file from the remote site. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell).", + "search": "| tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_user_agent=\"*Java*\" Web.http_method=\"GET\" Web.url=\"*.class*\" by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting web or proxy logs, or ensure it is being filled by a proxy like device, into the Web Datamodel. For additional filtering, allow list private IP space or restrict by known good.", + "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required in some instances, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2021/12/as-log4shell-wreaks-havoc-payroll-service-reports-ransomware-attack/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Web Server", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Scope:Network" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A Java user agent $http_user_agent$ was performing a $http_method$ to retrieve a remote class file.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_user_agent", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_method", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Web.http_method", + "Web.url", + "Web.url_length", + "Web.src", + "Web.dest", + "Web.http_user_agent" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_user_agent", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_method", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Scope:Network" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 40 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "http_user_agent", + "threat_object_type": "other" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "http_method", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "file": "endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "java.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java.log", + "source": "stream:http", + "sourcetype": "stream:http" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "id": "7b09db8a-5c20-11ec-9945-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the process name of Java, Apache, or Tomcat spawning a Linux shell. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). The shells included in the macro are \"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\". Upon triage, review parallel processes and command-line arguments to determine legitimacy.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=java OR Processes.parent_process_name=apache OR Processes.parent_process_name=tomcat `linux_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_java_spawning_shell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. Ensure EDR product is mapping OS Linux to the datamodel properly. Add any additional java process names for your environment to the analytic as needed.", + "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required on internal developer build systems or classify assets as web facing and restrict the analytic based on asset type.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.netlab.360.com/ten-families-of-malicious-samples-are-spreading-using-the-log4j2-vulnerability-now/", + "https://gist.github.com/olafhartong/916ebc673ba066537740164f7e7e1d72" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ spawning a Linux shell, potentially indicative of exploitation.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 40 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "file": "endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "java_spawn_shell_nix.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java_spawn_shell_nix.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "linux_shells", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name IN (\"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\"))", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "linux_java_spawning_shell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "id": "d2c14d28-5c47-11ec-9892-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "A required step while exploiting the CVE-2021-44228-Log4j vulnerability is that the victim server will perform outbound connections to attacker-controlled infrastructure. This is required as part of the JNDI lookup as well as for retrieving the second stage .class payload. The following analytic identifies the Java process reaching out to default ports used by the LDAP and RMI protocols. This behavior could represent successfull exploitation. Note that adversaries can easily decide to use arbitrary ports for these protocols and potentially bypass this detection.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"java.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe) by _time Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where (Ports.dest_port= 389 OR Ports.dest_port= 636 OR Ports.dest_port = 1389 OR Ports.dest_port = 1099 ) by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port| `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process connection_to_CNC dest_port | `outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate Java applications may use perform outbound connections to these ports. Filter as needed", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://www.govcert.admin.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_java/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Java performed outbound connections to default ports of LDAP or RMI on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_guid", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Ports.process_guid", + "Ports.dest", + "Ports.dest_port" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 60, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 54 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "file": "endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_java/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "id": "35682718-5a85-11ec-b8f7-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-11", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of wget on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wget (Processes.process=\"*-q *\" OR Processes.process=\"*--quiet*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-O- *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", + "references": [ + "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "file": "endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "id": "5e06e262-d7cd-4216-b2f8-27b437e18458", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Johan Bjerke, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "Malicious actors often abuse misconfigured LDAP servers or applications that use the LDAP servers in organizations. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. This search will help determine if you have any LDAP connections to IP addresses outside of private (RFC1918) address space.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as earliest_time latest(_time) as latest_time values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port = 389 OR All_Traffic.dest_port = 636 AND NOT (All_Traffic.dest_ip = 10.0.0.0/8 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=192.168.0.0/16 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip = 172.16.0.0/12) by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip |`drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | where src_ip != dest_ip | `security_content_ctime(latest_time)` | `security_content_ctime(earliest_time)` |`detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format and should be mapped to the Network Traffic datamodels that are in use for this search.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown at this moment. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. Please check those servers to verify if the activity is legitimate.", + "references": [ + "https://www.govcert.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_ldap/bro_conn.json" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An outbound LDAP connection from $src_ip$ in your infrastructure connecting to dest ip $dest_ip$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_ip", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.src_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "src_ip", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest_ip", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "file": "network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "stream_http_events.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_ldap/bro_conn.json", + "source": "/opt/malware/conn.log", + "sourcetype": "bro:conn:json" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "id": "c184f12e-5c90-11ec-bf1f-497c9a704a72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Jose Hernandez", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we first limit the scope of our search to the Web Datamodel and use the `| from datamodel` function to benefit from schema accelerated searching capabilities, mainly because the second part of the detection is pretty heavy, it runs a regex across all _raw events that looks for `${jndi:ldap://` pattern across all potential web fields available to the raw data, like http headers for example. If you see results for this detection, it means that there was a attempt at a injection, which could be a reconnaissance activity or a valid expliotation attempt, but this does not exactly mean that the host was indeed successfully exploited.", + "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | regex _raw=\"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)\\w+(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?\" | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx.", + "known_false_positives": "If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "action", + "category", + "dest", + "dest_port", + "http_content_type", + "http_method", + "http_referrer", + "http_user_agent", + "site", + "src", + "url", + "url_domain", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 30, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 15 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "file": "web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "nginx.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "source": "nginx", + "sourcetype": "nginx:plus:kv" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.yml", + "source": "web" + }, + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "id": "69afee44-5c91-11ec-bf1f-497c9a704a72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Jose Hernandez", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic", + "Web" + ], + "description": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we match the invocation function with a network connection to a malicious ip address.", + "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | rex field=_raw max_match=0 \"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)(?\\w+)(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?(?[a-zA-Z0-9\\.\\-\\_\\$]+)\" | join affected_host type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic by All_Traffic.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename dest AS affected_host] | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx.", + "known_false_positives": "If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_network_logs/log4j_network_logs.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "action", + "category", + "dest", + "dest_port", + "http_content_type", + "http_method", + "http_referrer", + "http_user_agent", + "site", + "src", + "url", + "url_domain", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 30, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 15 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "file": "web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-360d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "nginx.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "source": "nginx", + "sourcetype": "nginx:plus:kv" + }, + { + "file_name": "stream.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_network_logs/log4j_network_logs.log", + "source": "stream:Splunk_IP", + "sourcetype": "stream:ip" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.yml", + "source": "web" + } + ] + } + } + ], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "file": "web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "nginx.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "source": "nginx", + "sourcetype": "nginx:plus:kv" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.yml", + "source": "web" + }, + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "id": "69afee44-5c91-11ec-bf1f-497c9a704a72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Jose Hernandez", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic", + "Web" + ], + "description": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we match the invocation function with a network connection to a malicious ip address.", + "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | rex field=_raw max_match=0 \"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)(?\\w+)(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?(?[a-zA-Z0-9\\.\\-\\_\\$]+)\" | join affected_host type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic by All_Traffic.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename dest AS affected_host] | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx.", + "known_false_positives": "If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_network_logs/log4j_network_logs.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "action", + "category", + "dest", + "dest_port", + "http_content_type", + "http_method", + "http_referrer", + "http_user_agent", + "site", + "src", + "url", + "url_domain", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 30, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 15 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [ + { + "name": "Log4j Investigate", + "id": "e609d729-0076-421a-b8f7-9e545d000381", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-12-14", + "author": "Philip Royer, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "description": "Published in response to CVE-2021-44228, this playbook and its sub-playbooks can be used to investigate and respond to attacks against hosts running vulnerable Java applications which use log4j. Between the parent playbook and seven sub-playbooks, each potentially compromised host found in Splunk Enteprise can be investigated and the risk can be mitigated using SSH for unix systems and WinRM for Windows systems.", + "how_to_implement": "To start this playbook, create a custom list called \"log4j_hosts\" with a format in which the first column should be an IP or hostname of a potentially affected log4j host, the second should be the operating system family (either unix or windows). If the operating system is unknown it can be left blank. In the block called \"fetch_hosts_from_custom_list\", change the custom list name from \"log4j_hosts\" if needed. If the operating system family (\"windows\" or \"unix\") is not known, both ssh and winrm will be attempted. If ssh and/or winrm are not the preferred endpoint management methods, these playbooks could be ported to use Google's GRR, osquery, CrowdStrike's RTR, Carbon Black's EDR API, or similar tools. The artifact scope \"all\" is used throughout this playbook because the artifact list can be added to as the playbook progresses.", + "playbook": "log4j_investigate", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/Fenrir/blob/master/fenrir.sh", + "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Log4j++Log4Shell+Followup%3A+What+we+see+and+how+to+defend+%28and+how+to+access+our+data%29/28122", + "https://twitter.com/ElektroWolle/status/1469962895849140224?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1469962895849140224%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_c10&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fpublish.twitter.com%2F%3Fquery%3Dhttps3A2F2Ftwitter.com2FElektroWolle2Fstatus2F1469962895849140224widget%3DTweet", + "https://blog.cloudflare.com/cve-2021-44228-log4j-rce-0-day-mitigation/" + ], + "app_list": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "detections": [ + "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "Windows Java Spawning Shell", + "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic" + ], + "platform_tags": [ + "Log4J" + ], + "playbook_fields": [], + "product": [ + "Splunk SOAR" + ], + "detection_objects": [ + { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "id": "900bc324-59f3-11ec-9fb4-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-10", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of curl on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=curl (Processes.process=\"*-s *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", + "references": [ + "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "file": "endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "id": "8281ce42-5c50-11ec-82d2-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a Java user agent performing a GET request for a .class file from the remote site. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell).", + "search": "| tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_user_agent=\"*Java*\" Web.http_method=\"GET\" Web.url=\"*.class*\" by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting web or proxy logs, or ensure it is being filled by a proxy like device, into the Web Datamodel. For additional filtering, allow list private IP space or restrict by known good.", + "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required in some instances, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2021/12/as-log4shell-wreaks-havoc-payroll-service-reports-ransomware-attack/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Web Server", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Scope:Network" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A Java user agent $http_user_agent$ was performing a $http_method$ to retrieve a remote class file.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_user_agent", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_method", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Web.http_method", + "Web.url", + "Web.url_length", + "Web.src", + "Web.dest", + "Web.http_user_agent" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_user_agent", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_method", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Scope:Network" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 40 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "http_user_agent", + "threat_object_type": "other" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "http_method", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "file": "endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "java.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java.log", + "source": "stream:http", + "sourcetype": "stream:http" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "id": "7b09db8a-5c20-11ec-9945-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the process name of Java, Apache, or Tomcat spawning a Linux shell. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). The shells included in the macro are \"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\". Upon triage, review parallel processes and command-line arguments to determine legitimacy.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=java OR Processes.parent_process_name=apache OR Processes.parent_process_name=tomcat `linux_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_java_spawning_shell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. Ensure EDR product is mapping OS Linux to the datamodel properly. Add any additional java process names for your environment to the analytic as needed.", + "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required on internal developer build systems or classify assets as web facing and restrict the analytic based on asset type.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.netlab.360.com/ten-families-of-malicious-samples-are-spreading-using-the-log4j2-vulnerability-now/", + "https://gist.github.com/olafhartong/916ebc673ba066537740164f7e7e1d72" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ spawning a Linux shell, potentially indicative of exploitation.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 40 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "file": "endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "java_spawn_shell_nix.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java_spawn_shell_nix.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "linux_shells", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name IN (\"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\"))", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "linux_java_spawning_shell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "id": "d2c14d28-5c47-11ec-9892-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "A required step while exploiting the CVE-2021-44228-Log4j vulnerability is that the victim server will perform outbound connections to attacker-controlled infrastructure. This is required as part of the JNDI lookup as well as for retrieving the second stage .class payload. The following analytic identifies the Java process reaching out to default ports used by the LDAP and RMI protocols. This behavior could represent successfull exploitation. Note that adversaries can easily decide to use arbitrary ports for these protocols and potentially bypass this detection.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"java.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe) by _time Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where (Ports.dest_port= 389 OR Ports.dest_port= 636 OR Ports.dest_port = 1389 OR Ports.dest_port = 1099 ) by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port| `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process connection_to_CNC dest_port | `outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate Java applications may use perform outbound connections to these ports. Filter as needed", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://www.govcert.admin.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_java/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Java performed outbound connections to default ports of LDAP or RMI on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_guid", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Ports.process_guid", + "Ports.dest", + "Ports.dest_port" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 60, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 54 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "file": "endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_java/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "id": "35682718-5a85-11ec-b8f7-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-11", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of wget on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wget (Processes.process=\"*-q *\" OR Processes.process=\"*--quiet*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-O- *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", + "references": [ + "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "file": "endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "id": "5e06e262-d7cd-4216-b2f8-27b437e18458", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Johan Bjerke, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "Malicious actors often abuse misconfigured LDAP servers or applications that use the LDAP servers in organizations. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. This search will help determine if you have any LDAP connections to IP addresses outside of private (RFC1918) address space.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as earliest_time latest(_time) as latest_time values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port = 389 OR All_Traffic.dest_port = 636 AND NOT (All_Traffic.dest_ip = 10.0.0.0/8 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=192.168.0.0/16 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip = 172.16.0.0/12) by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip |`drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | where src_ip != dest_ip | `security_content_ctime(latest_time)` | `security_content_ctime(earliest_time)` |`detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format and should be mapped to the Network Traffic datamodels that are in use for this search.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown at this moment. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. Please check those servers to verify if the activity is legitimate.", + "references": [ + "https://www.govcert.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_ldap/bro_conn.json" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An outbound LDAP connection from $src_ip$ in your infrastructure connecting to dest ip $dest_ip$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_ip", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.src_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "src_ip", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest_ip", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "file": "network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "stream_http_events.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_ldap/bro_conn.json", + "source": "/opt/malware/conn.log", + "sourcetype": "bro:conn:json" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "id": "c184f12e-5c90-11ec-bf1f-497c9a704a72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Jose Hernandez", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we first limit the scope of our search to the Web Datamodel and use the `| from datamodel` function to benefit from schema accelerated searching capabilities, mainly because the second part of the detection is pretty heavy, it runs a regex across all _raw events that looks for `${jndi:ldap://` pattern across all potential web fields available to the raw data, like http headers for example. If you see results for this detection, it means that there was a attempt at a injection, which could be a reconnaissance activity or a valid expliotation attempt, but this does not exactly mean that the host was indeed successfully exploited.", + "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | regex _raw=\"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)\\w+(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?\" | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx.", + "known_false_positives": "If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "action", + "category", + "dest", + "dest_port", + "http_content_type", + "http_method", + "http_referrer", + "http_user_agent", + "site", + "src", + "url", + "url_domain", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 30, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 15 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "file": "web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "nginx.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "source": "nginx", + "sourcetype": "nginx:plus:kv" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.yml", + "source": "web" + }, + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "id": "69afee44-5c91-11ec-bf1f-497c9a704a72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Jose Hernandez", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic", + "Web" + ], + "description": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we match the invocation function with a network connection to a malicious ip address.", + "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | rex field=_raw max_match=0 \"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)(?\\w+)(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?(?[a-zA-Z0-9\\.\\-\\_\\$]+)\" | join affected_host type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic by All_Traffic.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename dest AS affected_host] | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx.", + "known_false_positives": "If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_network_logs/log4j_network_logs.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "action", + "category", + "dest", + "dest_port", + "http_content_type", + "http_method", + "http_referrer", + "http_user_agent", + "site", + "src", + "url", + "url_domain", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 30, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 15 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "file": "web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-360d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "nginx.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "source": "nginx", + "sourcetype": "nginx:plus:kv" + }, + { + "file_name": "stream.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_network_logs/log4j_network_logs.log", + "source": "stream:Splunk_IP", + "sourcetype": "stream:ip" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.yml", + "source": "web" + } + ] + } + }, + { + "name": "Log4j Respond", + "id": "e609d729-4076-421a-b8f7-9e545d000381", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-14", + "author": "Philip Royer, Splunk", + "type": "Response", + "description": "Published in response to CVE-2021-44228, this playbook is meant to be launched after log4j_investigate. In this playbook, the risk from exploited hosts can be mitigated by optionally deleting malicious files from the hosts, blocking outbound network connections from the hosts, and/or shutting down the hosts", + "how_to_implement": "To use this playbook, create a custom list called \"log4j_hosts_and_files\" with a format in which the first column should be an IP or hostname of a potentially affected log4j host, the second should be the operating system family (either unix or windows), and the third should be a full path to a file to delete if there are any. The first two are mandatory and the file is optional. In the block called \"enumerate_files_to_delete\", change the custom list name from \"log4j_hosts_and_files\" if needed. If ssh and/or winrm are not the preferred endpoint management methods, these playbooks could be ported to use Google's GRR, osquery, CrowdStrike's RTR, Carbon Black's EDR API, or similar tools. The artifact scope \"all\" is used throughout this playbook because the artifact list can be added to as the playbook progresses.", + "playbook": "log4j_respond", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/Fenrir/blob/master/fenrir.sh", + "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Log4j++Log4Shell+Followup%3A+What+we+see+and+how+to+defend+%28and+how+to+access+our+data%29/28122", + "https://twitter.com/ElektroWolle/status/1469962895849140224?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1469962895849140224%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_c10&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fpublish.twitter.com%2F%3Fquery%3Dhttps3A2F2Ftwitter.com2FElektroWolle2Fstatus2F1469962895849140224widget%3DTweet", + "https://blog.cloudflare.com/cve-2021-44228-log4j-rce-0-day-mitigation/" + ], + "app_list": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "detections": [ + "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "Windows Java Spawning Shell", + "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic" + ], + "platform_tags": [ + "Log4J" + ], + "playbook_fields": [], + "product": [ + "Splunk SOAR" + ], + "detection_objects": [ + { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "id": "900bc324-59f3-11ec-9fb4-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-10", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of curl on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=curl (Processes.process=\"*-s *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", + "references": [ + "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", + "file": "endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "id": "8281ce42-5c50-11ec-82d2-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a Java user agent performing a GET request for a .class file from the remote site. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell).", + "search": "| tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_user_agent=\"*Java*\" Web.http_method=\"GET\" Web.url=\"*.class*\" by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting web or proxy logs, or ensure it is being filled by a proxy like device, into the Web Datamodel. For additional filtering, allow list private IP space or restrict by known good.", + "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required in some instances, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2021/12/as-log4shell-wreaks-havoc-payroll-service-reports-ransomware-attack/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Web Server", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Scope:Network" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A Java user agent $http_user_agent$ was performing a $http_method$ to retrieve a remote class file.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_user_agent", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_method", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Web.http_method", + "Web.url", + "Web.url_length", + "Web.src", + "Web.dest", + "Web.http_user_agent" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_user_agent", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "http_method", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Scope:Network" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 40 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "http_user_agent", + "threat_object_type": "other" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "http_method", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", + "file": "endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "java.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java.log", + "source": "stream:http", + "sourcetype": "stream:http" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "id": "7b09db8a-5c20-11ec-9945-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the process name of Java, Apache, or Tomcat spawning a Linux shell. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). The shells included in the macro are \"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\". Upon triage, review parallel processes and command-line arguments to determine legitimacy.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=java OR Processes.parent_process_name=apache OR Processes.parent_process_name=tomcat `linux_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_java_spawning_shell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. Ensure EDR product is mapping OS Linux to the datamodel properly. Add any additional java process names for your environment to the analytic as needed.", + "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required on internal developer build systems or classify assets as web facing and restrict the analytic based on asset type.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.netlab.360.com/ten-families-of-malicious-samples-are-spreading-using-the-log4j2-vulnerability-now/", + "https://gist.github.com/olafhartong/916ebc673ba066537740164f7e7e1d72" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ spawning a Linux shell, potentially indicative of exploitation.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 40 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", + "file": "endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "java_spawn_shell_nix.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java_spawn_shell_nix.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "linux_shells", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name IN (\"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\"))", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "linux_java_spawning_shell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "id": "d2c14d28-5c47-11ec-9892-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "A required step while exploiting the CVE-2021-44228-Log4j vulnerability is that the victim server will perform outbound connections to attacker-controlled infrastructure. This is required as part of the JNDI lookup as well as for retrieving the second stage .class payload. The following analytic identifies the Java process reaching out to default ports used by the LDAP and RMI protocols. This behavior could represent successfull exploitation. Note that adversaries can easily decide to use arbitrary ports for these protocols and potentially bypass this detection.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"java.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe) by _time Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where (Ports.dest_port= 389 OR Ports.dest_port= 636 OR Ports.dest_port = 1389 OR Ports.dest_port = 1099 ) by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port| `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process connection_to_CNC dest_port | `outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate Java applications may use perform outbound connections to these ports. Filter as needed", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://www.govcert.admin.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_java/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Java performed outbound connections to default ports of LDAP or RMI on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_guid", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Ports.process_guid", + "Ports.dest", + "Ports.dest_port" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 60, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 54 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", + "file": "endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_java/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "id": "35682718-5a85-11ec-b8f7-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-11", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of wget on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wget (Processes.process=\"*-q *\" OR Processes.process=\"*--quiet*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-O- *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", + "references": [ + "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", + "file": "endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "id": "5e06e262-d7cd-4216-b2f8-27b437e18458", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Johan Bjerke, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "Malicious actors often abuse misconfigured LDAP servers or applications that use the LDAP servers in organizations. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. This search will help determine if you have any LDAP connections to IP addresses outside of private (RFC1918) address space.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as earliest_time latest(_time) as latest_time values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port = 389 OR All_Traffic.dest_port = 636 AND NOT (All_Traffic.dest_ip = 10.0.0.0/8 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=192.168.0.0/16 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip = 172.16.0.0/12) by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip |`drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | where src_ip != dest_ip | `security_content_ctime(latest_time)` | `security_content_ctime(earliest_time)` |`detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format and should be mapped to the Network Traffic datamodels that are in use for this search.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown at this moment. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. Please check those servers to verify if the activity is legitimate.", + "references": [ + "https://www.govcert.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_ldap/bro_conn.json" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An outbound LDAP connection from $src_ip$ in your infrastructure connecting to dest ip $dest_ip$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_ip", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.src_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "src_ip", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest_ip", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", + "file": "network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "stream_http_events.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_ldap/bro_conn.json", + "source": "/opt/malware/conn.log", + "sourcetype": "bro:conn:json" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "id": "c184f12e-5c90-11ec-bf1f-497c9a704a72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Jose Hernandez", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we first limit the scope of our search to the Web Datamodel and use the `| from datamodel` function to benefit from schema accelerated searching capabilities, mainly because the second part of the detection is pretty heavy, it runs a regex across all _raw events that looks for `${jndi:ldap://` pattern across all potential web fields available to the raw data, like http headers for example. If you see results for this detection, it means that there was a attempt at a injection, which could be a reconnaissance activity or a valid expliotation attempt, but this does not exactly mean that the host was indeed successfully exploited.", + "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | regex _raw=\"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)\\w+(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?\" | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx.", + "known_false_positives": "If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "action", + "category", + "dest", + "dest_port", + "http_content_type", + "http_method", + "http_referrer", + "http_user_agent", + "site", + "src", + "url", + "url_domain", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 30, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 15 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", + "file": "web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "nginx.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "source": "nginx", + "sourcetype": "nginx:plus:kv" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.yml", + "source": "web" + }, + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "id": "69afee44-5c91-11ec-bf1f-497c9a704a72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-13", + "author": "Jose Hernandez", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic", + "Web" + ], + "description": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we match the invocation function with a network connection to a malicious ip address.", + "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | rex field=_raw max_match=0 \"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)(?\\w+)(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?(?[a-zA-Z0-9\\.\\-\\_\\$]+)\" | join affected_host type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic by All_Traffic.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename dest AS affected_host] | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx.", + "known_false_positives": "If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_network_logs/log4j_network_logs.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "action", + "category", + "dest", + "dest_port", + "http_content_type", + "http_method", + "http_referrer", + "http_user_agent", + "site", + "src", + "url", + "url_domain", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Application Log", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 30, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 15 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "file": "web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-360d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "nginx.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "source": "nginx", + "sourcetype": "nginx:plus:kv" + }, + { + "file_name": "stream.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_network_logs/log4j_network_logs.log", + "source": "stream:Splunk_IP", + "sourcetype": "stream:ip" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.yml", + "source": "web" + } + ] + } + } + ], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", + "file": "web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-360d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "nginx.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", + "source": "nginx", + "sourcetype": "nginx:plus:kv" + }, + { + "file_name": "stream.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_network_logs/log4j_network_logs.log", + "source": "stream:Splunk_IP", + "sourcetype": "stream:ip" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.yml", + "source": "web" + } + ], + "investigations": [] + }, + { + "name": "Malicious PowerShell", + "id": "2c8ff66e-0b57-42af-8ad7-912438a403fc", + "version": 5, + "date": "2017-08-23", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "description": "Attackers are finding stealthy ways \"live off the land,\" leveraging utilities and tools that come standard on the endpoint--such as PowerShell--to achieve their goals without downloading binary files. These searches can help you detect and investigate PowerShell command-line options that may be indicative of malicious intent.", + "narrative": "The searches in this Analytic Story monitor for parameters often used for malicious purposes. It is helpful to understand how often the notable events generated by this story occur, as well as the commonalities between some of these events. These factors may provide clues about whether this is a common occurrence of minimal concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. Likewise, it is important to determine whether the issue is restricted to a single user/system or is broader in scope. \\\nThe following factors may assist you in determining whether the event is malicious: \\\n1. Country of origin \\\n1. Responsible party \\\n1. Fully qualified domain names associated with the external IP address \\\n1. Registration of fully qualified domain names associated with external IP address \\\nDetermining whether it is a dynamic domain frequently visited by others and/or how third parties categorize it can also help you answer some questions surrounding the attacker and details related to the external system. In addition, there are various sources--such as VirusTotal— that can provide some reputation information on the IP address or domain name, which can assist in determining whether the event is malicious. Finally, determining whether there are other events associated with the IP address may help connect data points or show other events that should be brought into scope. \\\nGathering data on the system of interest can sometimes help you quickly determine whether something suspicious is happening. Some of these items include finding out who else may have recently logged into the system, whether any unusual scheduled tasks exist, whether the system is communicating on suspicious ports, whether there are modifications to sensitive registry keys, and whether there are any known vulnerabilities on the system. This information can often highlight other activity commonly seen in attack scenarios or give more information about how the system may have been targeted. \\\nOften, a simple inspection of the process name and path can tell you if the system has been compromised. For example, if `svchost.exe` is found running from a location other than `C:\\Windows\\System32`, it is likely something malicious designed to hide in plain sight when cursorily reviewing process names. Similarly, if the process itself seems legitimate, but the parent process is running from the temporary browser cache, that could be indicative of activity initiated via a compromised website a user visited. \\\nIt can also be very helpful to examine various behaviors of the process of interest or the parent of the process of interest. For example, if it turns out the process of interest is malicious, it would be good to see if the parent to that process spawned other processes that might be worth further scrutiny. If a process is suspect, a review of the network connections made in and around the time of the event and/or whether the process spawned any child processes could be helpful, as well. \\\nIn the event a system is suspected of having been compromised via a malicious website, we suggest reviewing the browsing activity from that system around the time of the event. If categories are given for the URLs visited, that can help you zero in on possible malicious sites. \\\nMost recently we have added new content related to PowerShell Script Block logging, Windows EventCode 4104. Script block logging presents the deobfuscated and raw script executed on an endpoint. The analytics produced were tested against commonly used attack frameworks - PowerShell-Empire, Cobalt Strike and Covenant. In addition, we sampled publicly available samples that utilize PowerShell and validated coverage. The analytics are here to identify suspicious usage, cmdlets, or script values. 4104 events are enabled via the Windows registry and may generate a large volume of data if enabled globally. Enabling on critical systems or a limited set may be best. During triage of 4104 events, review parallel processes for other processes and command executed. Identify any file modifications and network communication and review accordingly. Fortunately, we get the full script to determine the level of threat identified.", + "references": [ + "https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malware-employs-powershell-to-infect-systems/", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Malicious PowerShell", + "analytic_story": "Malicious PowerShell", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1027", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackOasis", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dust Storm", + "Elderwood", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Group5", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "Chimera", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CostaRicto", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Machete", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN7", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "PROMETHIUM", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1027.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal from Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT3", + "Deep Panda", + "GALLIUM", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Turla" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.015", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Component Object Model Hijacking", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Cobalt Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sharpshooter", + "Silence", + "Turla" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1140", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Darkhotel", + "Frankenstein", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Leviathan", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1592", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access", + "Defense Evasion", + "Execution", + "Lateral Movement", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation", + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Command & Control", + "Exploitation", + "Installation", + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", + "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", + "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", + "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", + "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", + "ESCU - Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn - Rule", + "ESCU - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule", + "ESCU - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", + "ESCU - Powershell Creating Thread Mutex - Rule", + "ESCU - PowerShell Domain Enumeration - Rule", + "ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule", + "ESCU - Powershell Execute COM Object - Rule", + "ESCU - Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress - Rule", + "ESCU - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule", + "ESCU - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via System Reflection Assembly - Rule", + "ESCU - Powershell Processing Stream Of Data - Rule", + "ESCU - Powershell Using memory As Backing Store - Rule", + "ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", + "ESCU - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule", + "ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", + "ESCU - Unloading AMSI via Reflection - Rule", + "ESCU - WMI Recon Running Process Or Services - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "David Dorsey", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments", + "id": "2cdb91d2-542c-497f-b252-be495e71f38c", + "version": 6, + "date": "2021-01-19", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for PowerShell processes started with a base64 encoded command-line passed to it, with parameters to modify the execution policy for the process, and those that prevent the display of an interactive prompt to the user. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it overrides the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide itself from the user, and passes an encoded script to be run on the command-line. Deprecated because almost the same as Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=powershell.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| search (process=*-EncodedCommand* OR process=*-enc*) process=*-Exec* | `malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate process can have this combination of command-line options, but it's not common.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 7", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 7", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 7", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Any Powershell DownloadFile", + "id": "1a93b7ea-7af7-11eb-adb5-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-03-01", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a file using `DownloadFile` method. This particular method is utilized in many different PowerShell frameworks to download files and output to disk. Identify the source (IP/domain) and destination file and triage appropriately. If AMSI logging or PowerShell transaction logs are available, review for further details of the implant.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process=*DownloadFile* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `any_powershell_downloadfile_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present and filtering will need to occur by parent process or command line argument. It may be required to modify this query to an EDR product for more granular coverage.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.net.webclient.downloadfile?view=net-5.0", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Any Powershell DownloadFile", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior identifies the use of DownloadFile within PowerShell.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 70, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Any Powershell DownloadFile Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Any Powershell DownloadFile", + "file": "endpoint/any_powershell_downloadfile.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_powershell", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "any_powershell_downloadfile_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadfile.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Any Powershell DownloadString", + "id": "4d015ef2-7adf-11eb-95da-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-03-01", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a file using `DownloadString` method. This particular method is utilized in many different PowerShell frameworks to download files and output to disk. Identify the source (IP/domain) and destination file and triage appropriately. If AMSI logging or PowerShell transaction logs are available, review for further details of the implant.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process=*.DownloadString* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `any_powershell_downloadstring_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present and filtering will need to occur by parent process or command line argument. It may be required to modify this query to an EDR product for more granular coverage.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.net.webclient.downloadstring?view=net-5.0", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Any Powershell DownloadString", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell", + "HAFNIUM Group", + "Ingress Tool Transfer" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior identifies the use of DownloadString within PowerShell.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell", + "HAFNIUM Group", + "Ingress Tool Transfer" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Any Powershell DownloadString Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Any Powershell DownloadString", + "file": "endpoint/any_powershell_downloadstring.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_powershell", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "any_powershell_downloadstring_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadstring.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging", + "id": "bc1dc6b8-c954-11eb-bade-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-09", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies the common PowerShell stager used by PowerShell-Empire. Each stager that may use PowerShell all uses the same pattern. The initial HTTP will be base64 encoded and use `system.net.webclient`. Note that some obfuscation may evade the analytic. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message=*system.net.webclient* AND Message=*frombase64string*) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode ComputerName User EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_empire_with_powershell_script_block_logging_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives may only pertain to it not being related to Empire, but another framework. Filter as needed if any applications use the same pattern.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", + "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/", + "https://github.com/BC-SECURITY/Empire" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "The following behavior was identified and typically related to PowerShell-Empire on $ComputerName$ by $User$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Message", + "OpCode", + "ComputerName", + "User", + "EventCode" + ], + "risk_score": 81, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 81 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 81 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging", + "file": "endpoint/detect_empire_with_powershell_script_block_logging.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_empire_with_powershell_script_block_logging_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_empire_with_powershell_script_block_logging.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging", + "id": "8148c29c-c952-11eb-9255-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-09", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable no critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies common Mimikatz functions that may be identified in the script block, including `mimikatz`. This will catch the most basic use cases for Pass the Ticket, Pass the Hash and `-DumprCreds`. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message IN (*mimikatz*, *-dumpcr*, *sekurlsa::pth*, *kerberos::ptt*, *kerberos::golden*) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode ComputerName User EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mimikatz_with_powershell_script_block_logging_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as the commands being identifies are quite specific to EventCode 4104 and Mimikatz. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", + "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "The following behavior was identified and typically related to MimiKatz being loaded within the context of PowerShell on $ComputerName$ by $User$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Message", + "OpCode", + "ComputerName", + "User", + "EventCode" + ], + "risk_score": 90, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 90 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 90 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging", + "file": "endpoint/detect_mimikatz_with_powershell_script_block_logging.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_mimikatz_with_powershell_script_block_logging_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_mimikatz_with_powershell_script_block_logging.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command", + "id": "c4db14d9-7909-48b4-a054-aa14d89dbb19", + "version": 7, + "date": "2022-01-18", + "author": "David Dorsey, Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of the EncodedCommand PowerShell parameter. This is typically used by Administrators to run complex scripts, but commonly used by adversaries to hide their code. \\\nThe analytic identifies all variations of EncodedCommand, as PowerShell allows the ability to shorten the parameter. For example enc, enco, encod and so forth. In addition, through our research it was identified that PowerShell will interpret different command switch types beyond the hyphen. We have added endash, emdash, horizontal bar, and forward slash. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel events to determine legitimacy. Tune as needed based on admin scripts in use. \\\nAlternatively, may use regex per matching here https://regexr.com/662ov.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"(?i)[\\-|\\/|–|—|―]e(nc*o*d*e*d*c*o*m*m*a*n*d*)*\\s+[^-]\") | `malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "System administrators may use this option, but it's not common.", + "references": [ + "https://regexr.com/662ov", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses/blob/master/TestHarnesses/T1059.001_PowerShell/OutPowerShellCommandLineParameter.ps1", + "https://ss64.com/ps/powershell.html", + "https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/1440758396534214658?s=20", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell", + "NOBELIUM Group", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 7", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1027/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Powershell.exe running potentially malicious encodede commands on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1027" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1027", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackOasis", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dust Storm", + "Elderwood", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Group5", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1027" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 7", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell", + "NOBELIUM Group", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 35 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1027" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 7", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command", + "file": "endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1027/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_powershell", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques", + "id": "cde75cf6-3c7a-4dd6-af01-27cdb4511fd4", + "version": 5, + "date": "2021-01-19", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for PowerShell processes launched with arguments that have characters indicative of obfuscation on the command-line.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| eval num_obfuscation = (mvcount(split(process,\"`\"))-1) + (mvcount(split(process, \"^\"))-1) + (mvcount(split(process, \"'\"))-1) | `malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques_filter` | search num_obfuscation > 10 ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "These characters might be legitimately on the command-line, but it is not common.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 7", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/obfuscated_powershell/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Powershell.exe running with potential obfuscated arguments on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 7", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 42 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 7", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques", + "file": "endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/obfuscated_powershell/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_powershell", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn", + "id": "cb909b3e-512b-11ec-aa31-3e22fbd008af", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-29", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic assists with identifying a PowerShell process spawned as a child or grand child process of commonly abused processes during lateral movement techniques including `services.exe`, `wmiprsve.exe`, `svchost.exe`, `wsmprovhost.exe` and `mmc.exe`. Legitimate Windows features such as the Service Control Manager, Windows Management Instrumentation, Task Scheduler, Windows Remote Management and the DCOM protocol can be abused to start a process on a remote endpoint. Looking for PowerShell spawned out of this processes may reveal a lateral movement attack. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse these services during a breach for lateral movement and remote code execution.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=svchost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=wsmprovhost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=mmc.exe) (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR (Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process=*powershell.exe*) OR Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR (Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process=*pwsh.exe*)) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may spawn PowerShell as a child process of the the identified processes. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053.005/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement_powershell/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A PowerShell process was spawned as a child process of typically abused processes on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.003", + "T1021.006", + "T1047", + "T1053.005", + "T1543.003", + "T1059.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 45, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "Chimera", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CostaRicto", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Machete", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN7", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "PROMETHIUM", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.003", + "T1021.006", + "T1047", + "T1053.005", + "T1543.003", + "T1059.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 45 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.003", + "T1021.006", + "T1047", + "T1053.005", + "T1543.003", + "T1059.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn", + "file": "endpoint/possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement_powershell/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "PowerShell 4104 Hunting", + "id": "d6f2b006-0041-11ec-8885-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-18", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following Hunting analytic assists with identifying suspicious PowerShell execution using Script Block Logging, or EventCode 4104. This analytic is not meant to be ran hourly, but occasionally to identify malicious or suspicious PowerShell. This analytic is a combination of work completed by Alex Teixeira and Splunk Threat Research Team.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 | eval DoIt = if(match(Message,\"(?i)(\\$doit)\"), \"4\", 0) | eval enccom=if(match(Message,\"[A-Za-z0-9+\\/]{44,}([A-Za-z0-9+\\/]{4}|[A-Za-z0-9+\\/]{3}=|[A-Za-z0-9+\\/]{2}==)\") OR match(Message, \"(?i)[-]e(nc*o*d*e*d*c*o*m*m*a*n*d*)*\\s+[^-]\"),4,0) | eval suspcmdlet=if(match(Message, \"(?i)Add-Exfiltration|Add-Persistence|Add-RegBackdoor|Add-ScrnSaveBackdoor|Check-VM|Do-Exfiltration|Enabled-DuplicateToken|Exploit-Jboss|Find-Fruit|Find-GPOLocation|Find-TrustedDocuments|Get-ApplicationHost|Get-ChromeDump|Get-ClipboardContents|Get-FoxDump|Get-GPPPassword|Get-IndexedItem|Get-Keystrokes|LSASecret|Get-PassHash|Get-RegAlwaysInstallElevated|Get-RegAutoLogon|Get-RickAstley|Get-Screenshot|Get-SecurityPackages|Get-ServiceFilePermission|Get-ServicePermission|Get-ServiceUnquoted|Get-SiteListPassword|Get-System|Get-TimedScreenshot|Get-UnattendedInstallFile|Get-Unconstrained|Get-VaultCredential|Get-VulnAutoRun|Get-VulnSchTask|Gupt-Backdoor|HTTP-Login|Install-SSP|Install-ServiceBinary|Invoke-ACLScanner|Invoke-ADSBackdoor|Invoke-ARPScan|Invoke-AllChecks|Invoke-BackdoorLNK|Invoke-BypassUAC|Invoke-CredentialInjection|Invoke-DCSync|Invoke-DllInjection|Invoke-DowngradeAccount|Invoke-EgressCheck|Invoke-Inveigh|Invoke-InveighRelay|Invoke-Mimikittenz|Invoke-NetRipper|Invoke-NinjaCopy|Invoke-PSInject|Invoke-Paranoia|Invoke-PortScan|Invoke-PoshRat|Invoke-PostExfil|Invoke-PowerDump|Invoke-PowerShellTCP|Invoke-PsExec|Invoke-PsUaCme|Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection|Invoke-ReverseDNSLookup|Invoke-RunAs|Invoke-SMBScanner|Invoke-SSHCommand|Invoke-Service|Invoke-Shellcode|Invoke-Tater|Invoke-ThunderStruck|Invoke-Token|Invoke-UserHunter|Invoke-VoiceTroll|Invoke-WScriptBypassUAC|Invoke-WinEnum|MailRaider|New-HoneyHash|Out-Minidump|Port-Scan|PowerBreach|PowerUp|PowerView|Remove-Update|Set-MacAttribute|Set-Wallpaper|Show-TargetScreen|Start-CaptureServer|VolumeShadowCopyTools|NEEEEWWW|(Computer|User)Property|CachedRDPConnection|get-net\\S+|invoke-\\S+hunter|Install-Service|get-\\S+(credent|password)|remoteps|Kerberos.*(policy|ticket)|netfirewall|Uninstall-Windows|Verb\\s+Runas|AmsiBypass|nishang|Invoke-Interceptor|EXEonRemote|NetworkRelay|PowerShelludp|PowerShellIcmp|CreateShortcut|copy-vss|invoke-dll|invoke-mass|out-shortcut|Invoke-ShellCommand\"),1,0) | eval base64 = if(match(lower(Message),\"frombase64\"), \"4\", 0) | eval empire=if(match(lower(Message),\"system.net.webclient\") AND match(lower(Message), \"frombase64string\") ,5,0) | eval mimikatz=if(match(lower(Message),\"mimikatz\") OR match(lower(Message), \"-dumpcr\") OR match(lower(Message), \"SEKURLSA::Pth\") OR match(lower(Message), \"kerberos::ptt\") OR match(lower(Message), \"kerberos::golden\") ,5,0) | eval iex = if(match(lower(Message),\"iex\"), \"2\", 0) | eval webclient=if(match(lower(Message),\"http\") OR match(lower(Message),\"web(client|request)\") OR match(lower(Message),\"socket\") OR match(lower(Message),\"download(file|string)\") OR match(lower(Message),\"bitstransfer\") OR match(lower(Message),\"internetexplorer.application\") OR match(lower(Message),\"xmlhttp\"),5,0) | eval get = if(match(lower(Message),\"get-\"), \"1\", 0) | eval rundll32 = if(match(lower(Message),\"rundll32\"), \"4\", 0) | eval suspkeywrd=if(match(Message, \"(?i)(bitstransfer|mimik|metasp|AssemblyBuilderAccess|Reflection\\.Assembly|shellcode|injection|cnvert|shell\\.application|start-process|Rc4ByteStream|System\\.Security\\.Cryptography|lsass\\.exe|localadmin|LastLoggedOn|hijack|BackupPrivilege|ngrok|comsvcs|backdoor|brute.?force|Port.?Scan|Exfiltration|exploit|DisableRealtimeMonitoring|beacon)\"),1,0) | eval syswow64 = if(match(lower(Message),\"syswow64\"), \"3\", 0) | eval httplocal = if(match(lower(Message),\"http://127.0.0.1\"), \"4\", 0) | eval reflection = if(match(lower(Message),\"reflection\"), \"1\", 0) | eval invokewmi=if(match(lower(Message), \"(?i)(wmiobject|WMIMethod|RemoteWMI|PowerShellWmi|wmicommand)\"),5,0) | eval downgrade=if(match(Message, \"(?i)([-]ve*r*s*i*o*n*\\s+2)\") OR match(lower(Message),\"powershell -version\"),3,0) | eval compressed=if(match(Message, \"(?i)GZipStream|::Decompress|IO.Compression|write-zip|(expand|compress)-Archive\"),5,0) | eval invokecmd = if(match(lower(Message),\"invoke-command\"), \"4\", 0) | addtotals fieldname=Score DoIt, enccom, suspcmdlet, suspkeywrd, compressed, downgrade, mimikatz, iex, empire, rundll32, webclient, syswow64, httplocal, reflection, invokewmi, invokecmd, base64, get | stats values(Score) by DoIt, enccom, compressed, downgrade, iex, mimikatz, rundll32, empire, webclient, syswow64, httplocal, reflection, invokewmi, invokecmd, base64, get, suspcmdlet, suspkeywrd | `powershell_4104_hunting_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives. May filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/inodee/threathunting-spl/blob/master/hunt-queries/powershell_qualifiers.md", + "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell", + "https://github.com/marcurdy/dfir-toolset/blob/master/Powershell%20Blueteam.txt", + "https://devblogs.microsoft.com/powershell/powershell-the-blue-team/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_logging?view=powershell-5.1", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/02/greater_visibilityt.html", + "https://hurricanelabs.com/splunk-tutorials/how-to-use-powershell-transcription-logs-in-splunk/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "PowerShell 4104 Hunting", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ executing suspicious commands.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Message" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "PowerShell 4104 Hunting Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "PowerShell 4104 Hunting", + "file": "endpoint/powershell_4104_hunting.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_testing/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "powershell_4104_hunting_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_4104_hunting.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window", + "id": "ee18ed37-0802-4268-9435-b3b91aaa18db", + "version": 8, + "date": "2022-01-12", + "author": "David Dorsey, Michael Haag Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following hunting analytic identifies PowerShell commands utilizing the WindowStyle parameter to hide the window on the compromised endpoint. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it is overriding the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide its activity from the user, and connects to the Internet. Removed in this version of the query is New-Object. The analytic identifies all variations of WindowStyle, as PowerShell allows the ability to shorten the parameter. For example w, win, windowsty and so forth. In addition, through our research it was identified that PowerShell will interpret different command switch types beyond the hyphen. We have added endash, emdash, horizontal bar, and forward slash.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"(?i)[\\-|\\/|–|—|―]w(in*d*o*w*s*t*y*l*e*)*\\s+[^-]\") | `powershell___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate process can have this combination of command-line options, but it's not common.", + "references": [ + "https://regexr.com/663rr", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses/blob/master/TestHarnesses/T1059.001_PowerShell/OutPowerShellCommandLineParameter.ps1", + "https://ss64.com/ps/powershell.html", + "https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/1440758396534214658?s=20", + "https://blog.netlab.360.com/ten-families-of-malicious-samples-are-spreading-using-the-log4j2-vulnerability-now/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "HAFNIUM Group", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 7", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Command And Control" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/hidden_powershell/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "PowerShell processes $process$ started with parameters to modify the execution policy of the run, run in a hidden window, and connect to the Internet on host $dest$ executed by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059.001", + "T1059" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 81, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059.001", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 7", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "HAFNIUM Group", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Command And Control" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 90, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 81 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 81 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059.001", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 7", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window", + "file": "endpoint/powershell___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/hidden_powershell/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_powershell", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "powershell___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Powershell Creating Thread Mutex", + "id": "637557ec-ca08-11eb-bd0a-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-10", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is using the `mutex` function. This function is commonly seen in some obfuscated PowerShell scripts to make sure that only one instance of there process is running on a compromise machine. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*Threading.Mutex*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_creating_thread_mutex_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "powershell developer may used this function in their script for instance checking too.", + "references": [ + "https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Some+Powershell+Malicious+Code/22988/", + "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", + "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Powershell Creating Thread Mutex", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains Thread Mutex in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1027", + "T1027.005" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1027", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackOasis", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dust Storm", + "Elderwood", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Group5", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1027.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal from Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT3", + "Deep Panda", + "GALLIUM", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1027", + "T1027.005" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 40 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 40 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1027", + "T1027.005" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Powershell Creating Thread Mutex Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Powershell Creating Thread Mutex", + "file": "endpoint/powershell_creating_thread_mutex.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "powershell_creating_thread_mutex_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_creating_thread_mutex.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "PowerShell Domain Enumeration", + "id": "e1866ce2-ca22-11eb-8e44-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-10", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies specific PowerShell modules typically used to enumerate an organizations domain or users. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message IN (*get-netdomaintrust*, *get-netforesttrust*, *get-addomain*, *get-adgroupmember*, *get-domainuser*) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_domain_enumeration_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible there will be false positives, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", + "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "PowerShell Domain Enumeration", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains domain enumeration command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "EventCode" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 42 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 42 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "PowerShell Domain Enumeration Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "PowerShell Domain Enumeration", + "file": "endpoint/powershell_domain_enumeration.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "powershell_domain_enumeration_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_domain_enumeration.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature", + "id": "afed80b2-d34b-11eb-a952-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-22", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious enabling of smb1protocol through \"powershell.exe\". This technique was seen in some ransomware (like reddot) where it enable smb share to do the lateral movement and encrypt other files within the compromise network system.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*Enable-WindowsOptionalFeature*\" Message = \"*SMB1Protocol*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the powershell logs from your endpoints. make sure you enable needed registry to monitor this event.", + "known_false_positives": "network operator may enable or disable this windows feature.", + "references": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/c0f98850-af65-4352-9746-fbebadee4f05/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1027", + "T1027.005" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1027", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackOasis", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dust Storm", + "Elderwood", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Group5", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1027.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal from Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT3", + "Deep Panda", + "GALLIUM", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1027", + "T1027.005" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1027", + "T1027.005" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature", + "file": "endpoint/powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Powershell Execute COM Object", + "id": "65711630-f9bf-11eb-8d72-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-10", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a COM CLSID execution through powershell. This technique was seen in several adversaries and malware like ransomware conti where it has a feature to execute command using COM Object. This technique may use by network operator at some cases but a good indicator if some application want to gain privilege escalation or bypass uac.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromCLSID*\" OR Message = \"*CreateInstance([Type]::GetTypeFromProgID*\"| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_execute_com_object_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "network operrator may use this command.", + "references": [ + "https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1423361119926816776.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Powershell Execute COM Object", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/conti/conti_leak/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 10, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains COM CLSID command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1546.015", + "T1546" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 5, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.015", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Component Object Model Hijacking", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1546.015", + "T1546" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 10, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 5 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 5 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1546.015", + "T1546" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Powershell Execute COM Object Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Powershell Execute COM Object", + "file": "endpoint/powershell_execute_com_object.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/conti/conti_leak/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "powershell_execute_com_object_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_execute_com_object.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress", + "id": "a26d9db4-c883-11eb-9d75-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-08", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable no critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies `GetProcAddress` in the script block. This is not normal to be used by most PowerShell scripts and is typically unsafe/malicious. Many attack toolkits use GetProcAddress to obtain code execution. \\\nIn use, `$var_gpa = $var_unsafe_native_methods.GetMethod(GetProcAddress` and later referenced/executed elsewhere. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message=*getprocaddress* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode ComputerName User EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_fileless_process_injection_via_getprocaddress_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", + "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains GetProcAddress API in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1055", + "T1059.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Message", + "OpCode", + "ComputerName", + "User", + "EventCode" + ], + "risk_score": 48, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Cobalt Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sharpshooter", + "Silence", + "Turla" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1055", + "T1059.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 48 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 48 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1055", + "T1059.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress", + "file": "endpoint/powershell_fileless_process_injection_via_getprocaddress.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "powershell_fileless_process_injection_via_getprocaddress_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_fileless_process_injection_via_getprocaddress.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content", + "id": "8acbc04c-c882-11eb-b060-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-08", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies `FromBase64String` within the script block. A typical malicious instance will include additional code. \\\nCommand example - `[Byte[]]$var_code = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String(38uqIyMjQ6rG....` \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message=*frombase64string* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode ComputerName User EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_fileless_script_contains_base64_encoded_content_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", + "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains base64 command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1027", + "T1059.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Message", + "OpCode", + "ComputerName", + "User", + "EventCode" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1027", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackOasis", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dust Storm", + "Elderwood", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Group5", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1027", + "T1059.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1027", + "T1059.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content", + "file": "endpoint/powershell_fileless_script_contains_base64_encoded_content.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "powershell_fileless_script_contains_base64_encoded_content_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_fileless_script_contains_base64_encoded_content.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via System Reflection Assembly", + "id": "85bc3f30-ca28-11eb-bd21-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-10", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable no critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies the use of PowerShell loading .net assembly via reflection. This is commonly found in malicious PowerShell usage, including Empire and Cobalt Strike. In addition, the `load(` value may be modifed by removing `(` and it will identify more events to review. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message IN (\"*[system.reflection.assembly]::load(*\",\"*[reflection.assembly]*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode ComputerName User EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_system_reflection_assembly_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as day to day scripts do not use this method.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.reflection.assembly?view=net-5.0", + "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", + "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via System Reflection Assembly", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains reflective class assembly command in $Message$ to load .net code in memory with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Message", + "OpCode", + "ComputerName", + "User", + "EventCode" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via System Reflection Assembly Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via System Reflection Assembly", + "file": "endpoint/powershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_system_reflection_assembly.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "powershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_system_reflection_assembly_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_system_reflection_assembly.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Powershell Processing Stream Of Data", + "id": "0d718b52-c9f1-11eb-bc61-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-10", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is processing compressed stream data. This is typically found in obfuscated PowerShell or PowerShell executing embedded .NET or binary files that are stream flattened and will be deflated durnig execution. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*IO.Compression.*\" OR Message = \"*IO.StreamReader*\" OR Message = \"*]::Decompress*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_processing_stream_of_data_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "powershell may used this function to process compressed data.", + "references": [ + "https://medium.com/@ahmedjouini99/deobfuscating-emotets-powershell-payload-e39fb116f7b9", + "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell", + "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", + "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Powershell Processing Stream Of Data", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains stream command in $Message$ commonly for processing compressed or to decompressed binary file with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User", + "Score" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 40 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 40 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Powershell Processing Stream Of Data Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Powershell Processing Stream Of Data", + "file": "endpoint/powershell_processing_stream_of_data.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "powershell_processing_stream_of_data_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_processing_stream_of_data.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Powershell Using memory As Backing Store", + "id": "c396a0c4-c9f2-11eb-b4f5-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-10", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is using memory stream as new object backstore. The malicious PowerShell script will contain stream flate data and will be decompressed in memory to run or drop the actual payload. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*New-Object IO.MemoryStream*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "powershell may used this function to store out object into memory.", + "references": [ + "https://www.carbonblack.com/blog/decoding-malicious-powershell-streams/", + "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", + "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Powershell Using memory As Backing Store", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains memorystream command in $Message$ as new object backstore with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1140" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1140", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Darkhotel", + "Frankenstein", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Leviathan", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1140" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 40 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 40 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1140" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Powershell Using memory As Backing Store Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Powershell Using memory As Backing Store", + "file": "endpoint/powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI", + "id": "28077620-c9f6-11eb-8785-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-10", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 performing checks to identify anti-virus products installed on the endpoint. This technique is commonly found in malware and APT events where the adversary will map all running security applications or services. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*SELECT*\" OR Message = \"*WMIC*\") AND (Message = \"*AntiVirusProduct*\" OR Message = \"*AntiSpywareProduct*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "network administrator may used this command for checking purposes", + "references": [ + "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/05/12/maze-ransomware-1-year-counting/", + "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", + "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains AV recon command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1592" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1592", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1592" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1592" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI", + "file": "endpoint/recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Recon Using WMI Class", + "id": "018c1972-ca07-11eb-9473-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-10", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell via EventCode 4104, where WMI is performing an event query looking for running processes or running services. This technique is commonly found where the adversary will identify services and system information on the compromised machine. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message= \"*SELECT*\" OR Message= \"*Get-WmiObject*\") AND (Message= \"*Win32_Bios*\" OR Message= \"*Win32_OperatingSystem*\" OR Message= \"*Win32_Processor*\" OR Message= \"*Win32_ComputerSystem*\" OR Message= \"*Win32_ComputerSystemProduct*\" OR Message= \"*Win32_ShadowCopy*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `recon_using_wmi_class_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "network administrator may used this command for checking purposes", + "references": [ + "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/05/12/maze-ransomware-1-year-counting/", + "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", + "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Recon Using WMI Class", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 75, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains host recon command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1592" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 60, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1592", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1592" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 75, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 60 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 60 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1592" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Recon Using WMI Class Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Recon Using WMI Class", + "file": "endpoint/recon_using_wmi_class.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "recon_using_wmi_class_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/recon_using_wmi_class.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass", + "id": "c2590137-0b08-4985-9ec5-6ae23d92f63d", + "version": 7, + "date": "2022-02-18", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "Monitor for changes of the ExecutionPolicy in the registry to the values \"unrestricted\" or \"bypass,\" which allows the execution of malicious scripts.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*Software\\\\Microsoft\\\\Powershell\\\\1\\\\ShellIds\\\\Microsoft.PowerShell* Registry.registry_value_name=ExecutionPolicy (Registry.registry_value_data=Unrestricted OR Registry.registry_value_data=Bypass) by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Registry node. You must also be ingesting logs with the fields registry_path, registry_key_name, and registry_value_name from your endpoints.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may attempt to change the default execution policy on a system for a variety of reasons. However, setting the policy to \"unrestricted\" or \"bypass\" as this search is designed to identify, would be unusual. Hits should be reviewed and investigated as appropriate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Credential Dumping", + "HAFNIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_execution_policy/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A registry modification in $registry_path$ with reg key $registry_key_name$ and reg value $registry_value_name$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "registry_path", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 48, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Credential Dumping", + "HAFNIUM Group" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "registry_path", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 48 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "registry_path", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass", + "file": "endpoint/set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_execution_policy/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Unloading AMSI via Reflection", + "id": "a21e3484-c94d-11eb-b55b-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-09", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies the behavior of AMSI being tampered with. Implemented natively in many frameworks, the command will look similar to `SEtValuE($Null,(New-OBJEct COLlECtionS.GenerIC.HAshSEt{[StrINg]))}$ReF=[ReF].AsSeMbLY.GeTTyPe(\"System.Management.Automation.Amsi\"+\"Utils\")` taken from Powershell-Empire. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message=*system.management.automation.amsi* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode ComputerName User EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `unloading_amsi_via_reflection_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "Potential for some third party applications to disable AMSI upon invocation. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", + "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Unloading AMSI via Reflection", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Possible AMSI Unloading via Reflection using PowerShell on $ComputerName$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Message", + "OpCode", + "ComputerName", + "User", + "EventCode" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Unloading AMSI via Reflection Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Unloading AMSI via Reflection", + "file": "endpoint/unloading_amsi_via_reflection.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "unloading_amsi_via_reflection_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/unloading_amsi_via_reflection.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "WMI Recon Running Process Or Services", + "id": "b5cd5526-cce7-11eb-b3bd-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-14", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104, where WMI is performing an event query looking for running processes or running services. This technique is commonly found in malware and APT events where the adversary will map all running security applications or services on the compromised machine. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message= \"*SELECT*\" AND (Message=\"*Win32_Process*\" OR Message=\"*Win32_Service*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmi_recon_running_process_or_services_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "network administrator may used this command for checking purposes", + "references": [ + "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/05/12/maze-ransomware-1-year-counting/", + "https://www.eideon.com/2018-03-02-THL03-WMIBackdoors/", + "https://github.com/trustedsec/SysmonCommunityGuide/blob/master/WMI-events.md", + "https://in.security/an-intro-into-abusing-and-identifying-wmi-event-subscriptions-for-persistence/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "WMI Recon Running Process Or Services", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Suspicious powerShell script execution by $user$ on $ComputerName$ via EventCode 4104, where WMI is performing an event query looking for running processes or running services", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1592" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 30, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1592", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1592" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 30 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 30 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1592" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "WMI Recon Running Process Or Services Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "WMI Recon Running Process Or Services", + "file": "endpoint/wmi_recon_running_process_or_services.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "wmi_recon_running_process_or_services_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wmi_recon_running_process_or_services.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get History Of Email Sources", + "id": "ddc7af28-c34d-4392-af93-7f29a4e8806c", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-02-21", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Email" + ], + "description": "This search returns a list of all email sources seen in the 48 hours prior to the notable event to 24 hours after, and the number of emails from each source.", + "search": "|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Email.dest) as dest values(All_Email.recipient) as recepient min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count from datamodel=Email.All_Email by All_Email.src |`drop_dm_object_name(All_Email)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search src=$src$", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must ingest your email logs or capture unencrypted email communications within network traffic, and populate the Email data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "src" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Email.dest", + "All_Email.recipient", + "All_Email.src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_history_of_email_sources" + }, + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + }, + { + "name": "Get Parent Process Info", + "id": "fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41bf9", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-02-28", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "parent_process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Phishing Payloads", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_parent_process_info" + }, + { + "name": "Get Process Info", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd71", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-01", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the process running on a host which is under investigation. To gather the process info, enter the values for the process name in question and the destination IP address.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search process_name= $process_name$ | search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_process_info" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", + "id": "f0258af4-a6ae-11eb-b3c2-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-26", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "description": "Adversaries may rename legitimate system utilities to try to evade security mechanisms concerning the usage of those utilities.", + "narrative": "Security monitoring and control mechanisms may be in place for system utilities adversaries are capable of abusing. It may be possible to bypass those security mechanisms by renaming the utility prior to utilization (ex: rename rundll32.exe). An alternative case occurs when a legitimate utility is copied or moved to a different directory and renamed to avoid detections based on system utilities executing from non-standard paths.\\\nThe following content is here to assist with binaries within `system32` or `syswow64` being moved to a new location or an adversary bringing a the binary in to execute.\\\nThere will be false positives as some native Windows processes are moved or ran by third party applications from different paths. If file names are mismatched between the file name on disk and that of the binarys PE metadata, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries by looking to see if the InternalName, OriginalFilename, and or ProductName match what is expected could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. Do not focus on the possible names a file could have, but instead on the command-line arguments that are known to be used and are distinct because it will have a better rate of detection.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", + "analytic_story": "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "GALLIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "CopyKittens", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "MuddyWater", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "TA551" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Evilnum", + "FIN10", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Group5", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "Mustang Panda", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "The White Company", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Frankenstein" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Mustang Panda", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Impact" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule", + "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", + "ESCU - Sdelete Application Execution - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", + "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Michael Haag", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension", + "id": "ab0353e6-a956-420b-b724-a8b4846d5d5a", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-11-19", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for processes launched from files with at least five spaces in the name before the extension. This is typically done to obfuscate the file extension by pushing it outside of the default view.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_path) as process_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"* .*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process Processes.process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1036.003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM", + "PR.PT", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_name" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "GALLIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM", + "PR.PT", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM", + "PR.PT", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 Rename", + "id": "7360137f-abad-473e-8189-acbdaa34d114", + "version": 4, + "date": "2022-02-01", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following hunting analytic identifies renamed instances of rundll32.exe executing. rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64. During investigation, validate it is the legitimate rundll32.exe executing and what script content it is loading. This query relies on the original filename or internal name from the PE meta data. Expand the query as needed by looking for specific command line arguments outlined in other analytics.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_rename_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 Rename", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Suspicious renamed rundll32.exe binary ran on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1036", + "T1218.011", + "T1036.003" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "CopyKittens", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "MuddyWater", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "TA551" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "GALLIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1036", + "T1218.011", + "T1036.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 63 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 63 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1036", + "T1218.011", + "T1036.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_rundll32_rename_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/suspicious_rundll32_rename.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Execution of File with Multiple Extensions", + "id": "b06a555e-dce0-417d-a2eb-28a5d8d66ef7", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-11-18", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for processes launched from files that have double extensions in the file name. This is typically done to obscure the \"real\" file extension and make it appear as though the file being accessed is a data file, as opposed to executable content.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = *.doc.exe OR Processes.process = *.htm.exe OR Processes.process = *.html.exe OR Processes.process = *.txt.exe OR Processes.process = *.pdf.exe OR Processes.process = *.doc.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process Processes.parent_process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Execution of File with Multiple Extensions", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "process $process$ have double extensions in the file name is executed on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1036", + "T1036.003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM", + "PR.PT", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process", + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "GALLIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036", + "T1036.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM", + "PR.PT", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process", + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036", + "T1036.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM", + "PR.PT", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Execution of File with Multiple Extensions Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Execution of File with Multiple Extensions", + "file": "endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Sdelete Application Execution", + "id": "31702fc0-2682-11ec-85c3-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-10-06", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect the execution of sdelete.exe application sysinternal tools. This tool is one of the most use tool of malware and adversaries to remove or clear their tracks and artifact in the targetted host. This tool is designed to delete securely a file in file system that remove the forensic evidence on the machine. A good TTP query to check why user execute this application which is not a common practice.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_sdelete` by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sdelete_application_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "user may execute and use this application", + "references": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/956f50be-2c13-465a-ac00-6224c14c5f89/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Sdelete Application Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/sdelete/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "sdelete process $process_name$ executed in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1485", + "T1070.004", + "T1070" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Evilnum", + "FIN10", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Group5", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "Mustang Panda", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "The White Company", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1485", + "T1070.004", + "T1070" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1485", + "T1070.004", + "T1070" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Sdelete Application Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Sdelete Application Execution", + "file": "endpoint/sdelete_application_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/sdelete/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_sdelete", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=sdelete.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=sdelete.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sdelete_application_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/sdelete_application_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename", + "id": "f0db4464-55d9-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 3, + "date": "2021-09-20", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a renamed instance of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe. Microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v4.0.30319 and is rarely utilized. When investigating, identify the executed code on disk and review. A spawned child process from microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is uncommon. In any instance, microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe spawning from an Office product or any living off the land binary is highly suspect.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_microsoftworkflowcompiler` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe, triggering a false positive.", + "references": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md#atomic-test-6---microsoftworkflowcompilerexe-payload-execution" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename", + "analytic_story": [ + "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", + "Cobalt Strike", + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious renamed microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe binary ran on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1036", + "T1127", + "T1036.003" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "GALLIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036", + "T1127", + "T1036.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", + "Cobalt Strike", + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 63 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 63 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036", + "T1127", + "T1036.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename", + "file": "endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_microsoftworkflowcompiler", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious msbuild path", + "id": "f5198224-551c-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-01-12", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies msbuild.exe executing from a non-standard path. Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v4.0.30319 and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v4.0.30319. Instances of Visual Studio will run a copy of msbuild.exe. A moved instance of MSBuild is suspicious, however there are instances of build applications that will move or use a copy of MSBuild.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_msbuild` AND (Processes.process_path!=c:\\\\windows\\\\microsoft.net\\\\framework*\\\\v*\\\\*) by Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `suspicious_msbuild_path_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of msbuild.exe, triggering a false positive. Baselining of MSBuild.exe usage is recommended to better understand it's path usage. Visual Studio runs an instance out of a path that will need to be filtered on.", + "references": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious msbuild path", + "analytic_story": [ + "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild", + "Cobalt Strike", + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Msbuild.exe ran from an uncommon path on $dest$ execyted by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1036", + "T1127", + "T1036.003", + "T1127.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "GALLIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Frankenstein" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036", + "T1127", + "T1036.003", + "T1127.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild", + "Cobalt Strike", + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036", + "T1127", + "T1036.003", + "T1127.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Suspicious msbuild path Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious msbuild path", + "file": "endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_msbuild", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=msbuild.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSBuild.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_msbuild_path_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious MSBuild Rename", + "id": "4006adac-5937-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-01-12", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies renamed instances of msbuild.exe executing. Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v4.0.30319 and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v4.0.30319. During investigation, identify the code executed and what is executing a renamed instance of MSBuild.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_msbuild` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_msbuild_rename_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of msbuild, triggering a false positive.", + "references": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md", + "https://github.com/infosecn1nja/MaliciousMacroMSBuild/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious MSBuild Rename", + "analytic_story": [ + "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild", + "Cobalt Strike", + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious renamed msbuild.exe binary ran on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1036", + "T1127", + "T1036.003", + "T1127.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "GALLIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Frankenstein" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036", + "T1127", + "T1036.003", + "T1127.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild", + "Cobalt Strike", + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 63 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 63 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036", + "T1127", + "T1036.003", + "T1127.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Suspicious MSBuild Rename Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious MSBuild Rename", + "file": "endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_msbuild", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=msbuild.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSBuild.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_msbuild_rename_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations", + "id": "a34aae96-ccf8-4aef-952c-3ea21444444d", + "version": 6, + "date": "2020-12-08", + "author": "David Dorsey, Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for system processes that typically execute from `C:\\Windows\\System32\\` or `C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64`. This may indicate a malicious process that is trying to hide as a legitimate process.\\\nThis detection utilizes a lookup that is deduped `system32` and `syswow64` directories from Server 2016 and Windows 10.\\\nDuring triage, review the parallel processes - what process moved the native Windows binary? identify any artifacts on disk and review. If a remote destination is contacted, what is the reputation?", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_path !=\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32*\" Processes.process_path !=\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_hash | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `is_windows_system_file` | `system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "This detection may require tuning based on third party applications utilizing native Windows binaries in non-standard paths.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.yaml", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Unusual Processes", + "Ransomware", + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "System process running from unexpected location on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1036", + "T1036.003" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Processes.process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_hash" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "GALLIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036", + "T1036.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Unusual Processes", + "Ransomware", + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Processes.process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "Processes.process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036", + "T1036.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations", + "file": "endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "is_windows_system_file", + "definition": "lookup update=true is_windows_system_file filename as process_name OUTPUT systemFile | search systemFile=true", + "description": "This macro limits the output to process names that are in the Windows System directory" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path", + "id": "fddf3b56-7933-11ec-98a6-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-19", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies native .net binaries within the Windows operating system that may be abused by adversaries by moving it to a new directory. The analytic identifies the .net binary by using a lookup and compares the process name and original file name (internal name). The analytic utilizes a lookup with the is_net_windows_file macro to identify the binary process name and original file name. if one or the other matches an alert will be generated. Adversaries abuse these binaries as they are native to windows and native DotNet. Note that not all SDK (post install of Windows) are captured in the lookup.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where NOT (Processes.process_path IN (\"*\\\\Windows\\\\ADWS\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\system32*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\NetworkController\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SystemApps\\\\*\", \"*\\\\WinSxS\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Microsoft.NET\\\\*\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_path Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `is_net_windows_file` | `windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present and filtering may be required. Certain utilities will run from non-standard paths based on the third-party application in use.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.yaml", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path", + "analytic_story": [ + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Ransomware", + "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_installutil_path.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ from a non-standard path was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1036", + "T1036.003", + "T1218", + "T1218.004" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "GALLIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Mustang Panda", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036", + "T1036.003", + "T1218", + "T1218.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Ransomware", + "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036", + "T1036.003", + "T1218", + "T1218.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path", + "file": "endpoint/windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon_installutil_path.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_installutil_path.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "is_net_windows_file", + "definition": "lookup update=true is_net_windows_file filename as process_name OUTPUT netFile | lookup update=true is_net_windows_file originalFileName as original_file_name OUTPUT netFile | search netFile=true", + "description": "This macro limits the output to process names that are .net binaries on Windows Server 2016 and Windows 11." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path", + "id": "dcf74b22-7933-11ec-857c-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-19", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the Windows binary InstallUtil.exe running from a non-standard location. The analytic utilizes a macro for InstallUtil and identifies both the process_name and original_file_name.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` NOT (Processes.process_path IN (\"*\\\\Windows\\\\ADWS\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\system32*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\NetworkController\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SystemApps\\\\*\", \"*\\\\WinSxS\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Microsoft.NET\\\\*\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_hash | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present and filtering may be required. Certain utilities will run from non-standard paths based on the third-party application in use.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.yaml", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path", + "analytic_story": [ + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Ransomware", + "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_installutil_path.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ from a non-standard path was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1036", + "T1036.003", + "T1218", + "T1218.004" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "GALLIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Mustang Panda", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036", + "T1036.003", + "T1218", + "T1218.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Ransomware", + "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036", + "T1036.003", + "T1218", + "T1218.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path", + "file": "endpoint/windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon_installutil_path.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_installutil_path.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_installutil", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=installutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=InstallUtil.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [] + }, + { + "name": "Meterpreter", + "id": "d5f8e298-c85a-11eb-9fea-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-08", + "author": "Michael Hart", + "description": "Meterpreter provides red teams, pen testers and threat actors interactive access to a compromised host to run commands, upload payloads, download files, and other actions.", + "narrative": "This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from Meterpreter. Meterpreter is a Metasploit payload for remote execution that leverages DLL injection to make it extremely difficult to detect. Since the software runs in memory, no new processes are created upon injection. It also leverages encrypted communication channels.\\\nMeterpreter enables the operator to remotely run commands on the target machine, upload payloads, download files, dump password hashes, and much more. It is difficult to determine from the forensic evidence what actions the operator performed. Splunk Research, however, has observed anomalous behaviors on the compromised hosts that seem to only appear when Meterpreter is executing various commands. With that, we have written new detections targeted to these detections.\\\nWhile investigating a detection related to this analytic story, please bear in mind that the detections look for anomalies in system behavior. It will be imperative to look for other signs in the endpoint and network logs for lateral movement, discovery and other actions to confirm that the host was compromised and a remote actor used it to progress on their objectives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/about-meterpreter/", + "https://doubleoctopus.com/security-wiki/threats-and-tools/meterpreter/", + "https://www.rapid7.com/products/metasploit/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Meterpreter", + "analytic_story": "Meterpreter", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1033", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery", + "Execution" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Excessive number of distinct processes created in Windows Temp folder - Rule", + "ESCU - Excessive number of taskhost processes - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "no", + "author_name": "Michael Hart", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Excessive number of distinct processes created in Windows Temp folder", + "id": "23587b6a-c479-11eb-b671-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-02-28", + "author": "Michael Hart, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic will identify suspicious series of process executions. We have observed that post exploit framework tools like Koadic and Meterpreter will launch an excessive number of processes with distinct file paths from Windows\\Temp to execute actions on objective. This behavior is extremely anomalous compared to typical application behaviors that use Windows\\Temp.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process distinct_count(Processes.process) as distinct_process_count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Temp\\\\*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=20m | where distinct_process_count > 37 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_number_of_distinct_processes_created_in_windows_temp_folder_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the full process path in the process field of CIM's Process data model. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed sc.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "Many benign applications will create processes from executables in Windows\\Temp, although unlikely to exceed the given threshold. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/about-meterpreter/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Excessive number of distinct processes created in Windows Temp folder", + "analytic_story": [ + "Meterpreter" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059/meterpreter/windows_temp_processes/logExcessiveWindowsTemp.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Multiple processes were executed out of windows\\temp within a short amount of time on $dest$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Meterpreter" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Excessive number of distinct processes created in Windows Temp folder Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Excessive number of distinct processes created in Windows Temp folder", + "file": "endpoint/excessive_number_of_distinct_processes_created_in_windows_temp_folder.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059/meterpreter/windows_temp_processes/logExcessiveWindowsTemp.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "excessive_number_of_distinct_processes_created_in_windows_temp_folder_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excessive_number_of_distinct_processes_created_in_windows_temp_folder.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Excessive number of taskhost processes", + "id": "f443dac2-c7cf-11eb-ab51-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-07", + "author": "Michael Hart", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This detection targets behaviors observed in post exploit kits like Meterpreter and Koadic that are run in memory. We have observed that these tools must invoke an excessive number of taskhost.exe and taskhostex.exe processes to complete various actions (discovery, lateral movement, etc.). It is extremely uncommon in the course of normal operations to see so many distinct taskhost and taskhostex processes running concurrently in a short time frame.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process_id) as process_ids min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE Processes.process_name = \"taskhost.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"taskhostex.exe\" BY Processes.dest Processes.process_name _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | eval pid_count=mvcount(process_ids) | eval taskhost_count_=if(process_name == \"taskhost.exe\", pid_count, 0) | eval taskhostex_count_=if(process_name == \"taskhostex.exe\", pid_count, 0) | stats sum(taskhost_count_) as taskhost_count, sum(taskhostex_count_) as taskhostex_count by _time, dest, firstTime, lastTime | where taskhost_count > 10 and taskhostex_count > 10 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_number_of_taskhost_processes_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting events related to processes on the endpoints that include the name of the process and process id into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators, administrative actions or certain applications may run many instances of taskhost and taskhostex concurrently. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Excessive number of taskhost processes", + "analytic_story": [ + "Meterpreter" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059/meterpreter/taskhost_processes/logExcessiveTaskHost.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An excessive amount of $process_name$ was executed on $dest$ indicative of suspicious behavior.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1033" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1033", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1033" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Meterpreter" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1033" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Excessive number of taskhost processes Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Excessive number of taskhost processes", + "file": "endpoint/excessive_number_of_taskhost_processes.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059/meterpreter/taskhost_processes/logExcessiveTaskHost.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "excessive_number_of_taskhost_processes_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excessive_number_of_taskhost_processes.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [] + }, + { + "name": "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444", + "id": "4ad4253e-10ca-11ec-8235-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-08", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "description": "CVE-2021-40444 is a remote code execution vulnerability in MSHTML, recently used to delivery targeted spearphishing documents.", + "narrative": "Microsoft is aware of targeted attacks that attempt to exploit this vulnerability, CVE-2021-40444 by using specially-crafted Microsoft Office documents. MSHTML is a software component used to render web pages on Windows. Although it is 2019s most commonly associated with Internet Explorer, it is also used in other software. CVE-2021-40444 received a CVSS score of 8.8 out of 10. MSHTML is the beating heart of Internet Explorer, the vulnerability also exists in that browser. Although given its limited use, there is little risk of infection by that vector. Microsoft Office applications use the MSHTML component to display web content in Office documents. The attack depends on MSHTML loading a specially crafted ActiveX control when the target opens a malicious Office document. The loaded ActiveX control can then run arbitrary code to infect the system with more malware. At the moment all supported Windows versions are vulnerable. Since there is no patch available yet, Microsoft proposes a few methods to block these attacks. \\\n1. Disable the installation of all ActiveX controls in Internet Explorer via the registry. Previously-installed ActiveX controls will still run, but no new ones will be added, including malicious ones. Open documents from the Internet in Protected View or Application Guard for Office, both of which prevent the current attack. This is a default setting but it may have been changed.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/09/windows-mshtml-zero-day-actively-exploited-mitigations-required/", + "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", + "https://www.echotrail.io/insights/search/control.exe" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444", + "analytic_story": "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Control Panel", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "CopyKittens", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "MuddyWater", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "TA551" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Control Loading from World Writable Directory - Rule", + "ESCU - MSHTML Module Load in Office Product - Rule", + "ESCU - Office Product Writing cab or inf - Rule", + "ESCU - Office Spawning Control - Rule", + "ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt - Rule", + "ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Michael Haag", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Control Loading from World Writable Directory", + "id": "10423ac4-10c9-11ec-8dc4-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-08", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following detection identifies control.exe loading either a .cpl or .inf from a writable directory. This is related to CVE-2021-40444. During triage, review parallel processes, parent and child, for further suspicious behaviors. In addition, capture file modifications and analyze.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=control.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=CONTROL.EXE) AND Processes.process IN (\"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\windows\\\\temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `control_loading_from_world_writable_directory_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives will be present as control.exe does not natively load from writable paths as defined. One may add .cpl or .inf to the command-line if there is any false positives. Tune as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/rundll32.exe-111474C61232202B5B588D2B512CBB25.html", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/36c14029-9df8-439c-bba0-45f2643b0c70/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", + "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.002/T1218.002.yaml" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Control Loading from World Writable Directory", + "analytic_story": [ + "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a suspicious file from disk.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-40444" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Control Panel", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-40444" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Control Loading from World Writable Directory Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Control Loading from World Writable Directory", + "file": "endpoint/control_loading_from_world_writable_directory.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "control_loading_from_world_writable_directory_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/control_loading_from_world_writable_directory.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "MSHTML Module Load in Office Product", + "id": "5f1c168e-118b-11ec-84ff-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-09", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following detection identifies the module load of mshtml.dll into an Office product. This behavior has been related to CVE-2021-40444, whereas the malicious document will load ActiveX, which activates the MSHTML component. The vulnerability resides in the MSHTML component. During triage, identify parallel processes and capture any file modifications for analysis.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventID=7 process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\",\"wordpad.exe\",\"wordview.exe\") ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\mshtml.dll\", \"*\\\\Microsoft.mshtml.dll\",\"*\\\\IE.Interop.MSHTML.dll\",\"*\\\\MshtmlDac.dll\",\"*\\\\MshtmlDed.dll\",\"*\\\\MshtmlDer.dll\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, process_name, ImageLoaded, OriginalFileName, process_id | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mshtml_module_load_in_office_product_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process names and image loads from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives will be present, however, tune as necessary.", + "references": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/36c14029-9df8-439c-bba0-45f2643b0c70/", + "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", + "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/index-dll" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "MSHTML Module Load in Office Product", + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments", + "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_mshtml.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ loading mshtml.dll.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "ImageLoaded", + "process_name", + "OriginalFileName", + "process_id", + "dest" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-40444" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments", + "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-40444" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "MSHTML Module Load in Office Product Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "MSHTML Module Load in Office Product", + "file": "endpoint/mshtml_module_load_in_office_product.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon_mshtml.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_mshtml.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "mshtml_module_load_in_office_product_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/mshtml_module_load_in_office_product.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Office Product Writing cab or inf", + "id": "f48cd1d4-125a-11ec-a447-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-10", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies behavior related to CVE-2021-40444. Whereas the malicious document will load ActiveX and download the remote payload (.inf, .cab). During triage, review parallel processes and further activity on endpoint to identify additional patterns. Retrieve the file modifications and analyze further.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\",\"wordpad.exe\",\"wordview.exe\") by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*.inf\",\"*.cab\") by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process] | dedup file_create_time | table dest, process_name, process, file_create_time, file_name, file_path | `office_product_writing_cab_or_inf_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node and `Filesystem` node.", + "known_false_positives": "The query is structured in a way that `action` (read, create) is not defined. Review the results of this query, filter, and tune as necessary. It may be necessary to generate this query specific to your endpoint product.", + "references": [ + "https://twitter.com/vxunderground/status/1436326057179860992?s=20", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/36c14029-9df8-439c-bba0-45f2643b0c70/", + "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", + "https://twitter.com/RonnyTNL/status/1436334640617373699?s=20" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Office Product Writing cab or inf", + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments", + "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_cabinf.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on $dest$ writing an inf or cab file to this. This is not typical of $process_name$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "dest", + "process_name", + "process", + "file_create_time", + "file_name", + "file_path" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-40444" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments", + "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-40444" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Office Product Writing cab or inf Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Office Product Writing cab or inf", + "file": "endpoint/office_product_writing_cab_or_inf.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon_control.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_cabinf.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "office_product_writing_cab_or_inf_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_product_writing_cab_or_inf.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Office Spawning Control", + "id": "053e027c-10c7-11ec-8437-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-08", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following detection identifies control.exe spawning from an office product. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `control.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `control.exe` will contain a file path to a .cpl or .inf, related to CVE-2021-40444. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. review parallel and child processes to identify further suspicious behavior", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\",\"wordpad.exe\",\"wordview.exe\") Processes.process_name=control.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `office_spawning_control_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives should be present.", + "references": [ + "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/control.exe-1F13E714A0FEA8887707DFF49287996F.html", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/36c14029-9df8-439c-bba0-45f2643b0c70/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", + "https://www.echotrail.io/insights/search/control.exe", + "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.002/T1218.002.yaml" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Office Spawning Control", + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments", + "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_control.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ clicking a suspicious attachment.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-40444" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments", + "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-40444" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Office Spawning Control Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Office Spawning Control", + "file": "endpoint/office_spawning_control.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon_control.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_control.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "office_spawning_control_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_spawning_control.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt", + "id": "c8e7ced0-10c5-11ec-8b03-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-08", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following hunting detection identifies rundll32.exe with `control_rundll` within the command-line, loading a .cpl or another file type. Developed in relation to CVE-2021-40444. Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. \\ This is written to be a bit more broad by not including .cpl. \\ During triage, review parallel processes to identify any further suspicious behavior.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*Control_RunDLL* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_control_rundll_hunt_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "This is a hunting detection, meant to provide a understanding of how voluminous control_rundll is within the environment.", + "references": [ + "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/rundll32.exe-111474C61232202B5B588D2B512CBB25.html", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/36c14029-9df8-439c-bba0-45f2643b0c70/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", + "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.002/T1218.002.yaml", + "https://redcanary.com/blog/intelligence-insights-december-2021/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", + "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a suspicious file from disk.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-40444" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "CopyKittens", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "MuddyWater", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", + "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-40444" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 15 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt", + "file": "endpoint/rundll32_control_rundll_hunt.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "rundll32_control_rundll_hunt_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/rundll32_control_rundll_hunt.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory", + "id": "1adffe86-10c3-11ec-8ce6-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-08", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following detection identifies rundll32.exe with `control_rundll` within the command-line, loading a .cpl or another file type from windows\\temp, programdata, or appdata. Developed in relation to CVE-2021-40444. Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. This is written to be a bit more broad by not including .cpl. The paths are specified, add more as needed. During triage, review parallel processes to identify any further suspicious behavior.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*Control_RunDLL* AND Processes.process IN (\"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\windows\\\\temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "This may be tuned, or a new one related, by adding .cpl to command-line. However, it's important to look for both. Tune/filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/rundll32.exe-111474C61232202B5B588D2B512CBB25.html", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/36c14029-9df8-439c-bba0-45f2643b0c70/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", + "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.002/T1218.002.yaml", + "https://redcanary.com/blog/intelligence-insights-december-2021/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", + "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a suspicious file from disk.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-40444" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "CopyKittens", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "MuddyWater", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", + "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-40444" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory", + "file": "endpoint/rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [] + }, + { + "name": "Monitor for Updates", + "id": "9ef8d677-7b52-4213-a038-99cfc7acc2d8", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-15", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "description": "Monitor your enterprise to ensure that your endpoints are being patched and updated. Adversaries notoriously exploit known vulnerabilities that could be mitigated by applying routine security patches.", + "narrative": "It is a common best practice to ensure that endpoints are being patched and updated in a timely manner, in order to reduce the risk of compromise via a publicly disclosed vulnerability. Timely application of updates/patches is important to eliminate known vulnerabilities that may be exploited by various threat actors.\\\nSearches in this analytic story are designed to help analysts monitor endpoints for system patches and/or updates. This helps analysts identify any systems that are not successfully updated in a timely matter.\\\nMicrosoft releases updates for Windows systems on a monthly cadence. They should be installed as soon as possible after following internal testing and validation procedures. Patches and updates for other systems or applications are typically released as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://learn.cisecurity.org/20-controls-download" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Monitor for Updates", + "analytic_story": "Monitor for Updates", + "category": [ + "Best Practices" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Compliance", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [], + "datamodels": [ + "Updates" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - No Windows Updates in a time frame - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [ + "ESCU - Windows Updates Install Failures", + "ESCU - Windows Updates Install Successes" + ], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Rico Valdez", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "No Windows Updates in a time frame", + "id": "1a77c08c-2f56-409c-a2d3-7d64617edd4f", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-15", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Updates" + ], + "description": "This search looks for Windows endpoints that have not generated an event indicating a successful Windows update in the last 60 days. Windows updates are typically released monthly and applied shortly thereafter. An endpoint that has not successfully applied an update in this time frame indicates the endpoint is not regularly being patched for some reason.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Updates where Updates.status=Installed Updates.vendor_product=\"Microsoft Windows\" by Updates.dest Updates.status Updates.vendor_product | rename Updates.dest as Host | rename Updates.status as \"Update Status\" | rename Updates.vendor_product as Product | eval isOutlier=if(lastTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-60d@d\"), 1, 0) | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search isOutlier=1 | rename lastTime as \"Last Update Time\", | table Host, \"Update Status\", Product, \"Last Update Time\" | `no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, it requires that the 'Update' data model is being populated. This can be accomplished by ingesting Windows events or the Windows Update log via a universal forwarder on the Windows endpoints you wish to monitor. The Windows add-on should be also be installed and configured to properly parse Windows events in Splunk. There may be other data sources which can populate this data model, including vulnerability management systems.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "No Windows Updates in a time frame", + "analytic_story": [ + "Monitor for Updates" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 18" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.MA" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Updates.status", + "Updates.vendor_product", + "Updates.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 18" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.MA" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Monitor for Updates" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Windows Updates Install Failures", + "id": "6a4dbd1b-4502-4a11-943a-82b5ae7a42d7", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-14", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search is intended to give you a feel for how often Windows updates fail to install in your environment. Fluctuations in these numbers will allow you to determine when you should be concerned.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc(Updates.dest) as count FROM datamodel=Updates where Updates.vendor_product=\"Microsoft Windows\" AND Updates.status=failure by _time span=1d", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your Windows Update Logs", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Monitor for Updates" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "No Windows Updates in a time frame" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Updates.vendor_product", + "Updates.status" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + }, + { + "name": "Windows Updates Install Successes", + "id": "6a80535c-86a6-4b54-894c-4b446d0c701d", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-14", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search is intended to give you a feel for how often successful Windows updates are applied in your environments. Fluctuations in these numbers will allow you to determine when you should be concerned.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc(Updates.dest) as count FROM datamodel=Updates where Updates.vendor_product=\"Microsoft Windows\" AND Updates.status=installed by _time span=1d", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your Windows Update Logs", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Monitor for Updates" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "No Windows Updates in a time frame" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Updates.vendor_product", + "Updates.status" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 18" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.MA" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml", + "source": "application" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Netsh Abuse", + "id": "2b1800dd-92f9-47ec-a981-fdf1351e5f65", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-01-05", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "description": "Detect activities and various techniques associated with the abuse of `netsh.exe`, which can disable local firewall settings or set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.", + "narrative": "It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage native Windows tools and functionality to execute commands for malicious reasons. One such tool on Windows OS is `netsh.exe`,a command-line scripting utility that allows you to--either locally or remotely--display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. `Netsh.exe` can be used to discover and disable local firewall settings. It can also be used to set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.\\\nTo get started, run the detection search to identify parent processes of `netsh.exe`.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/tn-archive/bb490939(v=technet.10)", + "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html", + "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Netsh Abuse", + "analytic_story": "Netsh Abuse", + "category": [ + "Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT38", + "Carbanak", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", + "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [ + "ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", + "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments" + ], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Processes created by netsh", + "id": "b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-95dbb162041e", + "version": 5, + "date": "2020-11-23", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe to execute various commands via the netsh command-line utility. Netsh.exe is a command-line scripting utility that allows you to, either locally or remotely, display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. Netsh can be used as a persistence proxy technique to execute a helper .dll when netsh.exe is executed. In this search, we are looking for processes spawned by netsh.exe that are executing commands via the command line. Deprecated because we have another detection of the same type.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=netsh.exe by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `processes_created_by_netsh_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting logs with the process name, command-line arguments, and parent processes from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "It is unusual for netsh.exe to have any child processes in most environments. It makes sense to investigate the child process and verify whether the process spawned is legitimate. We explicitely exclude \"C:\\Program Files\\rempl\\sedlauncher.exe\" process path since it is a legitimate process by Mircosoft.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Processes created by netsh", + "analytic_story": [ + "Netsh Abuse" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.004" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT38", + "Carbanak", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Netsh Abuse" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "processes_created_by_netsh_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Processes launching netsh", + "id": "b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-95dbb162040e", + "version": 4, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Michael Haag, Josef Kuepker, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe. Netsh is a command-line scripting utility that allows you to, either locally or remotely, display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. Netsh can be used as a persistence proxy technique to execute a helper DLL when netsh.exe is executed. In this search, we are looking for processes spawned by netsh.exe and executing commands via the command line.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) AS Processes.process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_netsh` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest |`drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`processes_launching_netsh_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Some VPN applications are known to launch netsh.exe. Outside of these instances, it is unusual for an executable to launch netsh.exe and run commands.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Processes launching netsh", + "analytic_story": [ + "Netsh Abuse", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "DHS Report TA18-074A" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A process $process_name$ that tries to execute netsh commandline $process$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.004", + "T1562" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT38", + "Carbanak", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.004", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Netsh Abuse", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "DHS Report TA18-074A" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 42 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 42 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", + "id": "df98763b-0b08-4281-8ef9-08db7ac572a9", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-05-08", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model to characterize the number of SMB connections observed each hour for every day of week. By default, the search uses the last 30 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search to identify outliers in the number of SMB connections for that hour and day of the week.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb by _time span=10m, All_Traffic.src | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%A\") | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | fit DensityFunction count by \"HourOfDay,DayOfWeek\" into smb_pdfmodel", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model. In addition, you must have the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version >= 4.2 installed, along with any required dependencies. To improve your results, you may consider adding \"src\" to the by clause, which will build the model for each unique source in your enviornment. However, if you have a large number of hosts in your environment, this search may be very resource intensive. In this case, you may need to raise the value of max_inputs and/or max_groups in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 30 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data. More information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Ransomware" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Processes launching netsh", + "SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.app", + "All_Traffic.src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.004", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Processes launching netsh Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Processes launching netsh", + "file": "endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_netsh", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=netsh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=netsh.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "processes_launching_netsh_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + }, + { + "name": "Get Parent Process Info", + "id": "fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41bf9", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-02-28", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "parent_process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Phishing Payloads", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_parent_process_info" + }, + { + "name": "Get Process Info", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd71", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-01", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the process running on a host which is under investigation. To gather the process info, enter the values for the process name in question and the destination IP address.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search process_name= $process_name$ | search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_process_info" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Network Discovery", + "id": "af228995-f182-49d7-90b3-2a732944f00f", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-14", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the network discovery, including looking for network configuration, settings such as IP, MAC address, firewall settings and many more.", + "narrative": "Adversaries may use the information from System Network Configuration Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining certain access within the target network and what actions to do next.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016/", + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/ESET_Kobalos.pdf", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/09/unit42-xbash-combines-botnet-ransomware-coinmining-worm-targets-linux-windows/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Network Discovery", + "analytic_story": "Network Discovery", + "category": [ + "Malware" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1016", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Higaisa", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Linux System Network Discovery - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Linux System Network Discovery", + "id": "535cb214-8b47-11ec-a2c7-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-11", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to look for possible enumeration of local network configuration. This technique is commonly used as part of recon of adversaries or threat actor to know some network information for its next or further attack. This anomaly detections may capture normal event made by administrator during auditing or testing network connection of specific host or network to network.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name_list values(Processes.process) as process_list values(Processes.process_id) as process_id_list values(Processes.parent_process_id) as parent_process_id_list values(Processes.process_guid) as process_guid_list dc(Processes.process_name) as process_name_count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"arp\", \"ifconfig\", \"ip\", \"netstat\", \"firewall-cmd\", \"ufw\", \"iptables\", \"ss\", \"route\") by _time span=30m Processes.dest Processes.user | where process_name_count >=4 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`| `linux_system_network_discovery_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1016/T1016.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Linux System Network Discovery", + "analytic_story": [ + "Network Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1016/atomic_red_team/linux_net_discovery/sysmon_linux.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "A commandline $process$ executed on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1016" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 9, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1016", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Higaisa", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1016" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Network Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 30 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 9 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1016" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Linux System Network Discovery Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Linux System Network Discovery", + "file": "endpoint/linux_system_network_discovery.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_linux.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1016/atomic_red_team/linux_net_discovery/sysmon_linux.log", + "source": "Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "sysmon_linux" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "linux_system_network_discovery_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_system_network_discovery.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [] + }, + { + "name": "NOBELIUM Group", + "id": "758196b5-2e21-424f-a50c-6e421ce926c2", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-12-14", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Michael Haag, Splunk", + "description": "Sunburst is a trojanized updates to SolarWinds Orion IT monitoring and management software. It was discovered by FireEye in December 2020. The actors behind this campaign gained access to numerous public and private organizations around the world.", + "narrative": "This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) of the NOBELIUM Group. The threat actor behind sunburst compromised the SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll, is a SolarWinds digitally-signed component of the Orion software framework that contains a backdoor that communicates via HTTP to third party servers. The detections in this Analytic Story are focusing on the dll loading events, file create events and network events to detect This malware.", + "references": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldmax-goldfinder-sibot-analyzing-nobelium-malware/", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html", + "https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "NOBELIUM Group", + "analytic_story": "NOBELIUM Group", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "CopyKittens", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Gallmaker", + "HAFNIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sowbug", + "Turla", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1560", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Patchwork", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "FIN7", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Sidewinder", + "TA551" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1027", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackOasis", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dust Storm", + "Elderwood", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Group5", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN7", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "PROMETHIUM", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CostaRicto", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Machete", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Leafminer", + "Naikon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1569", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "FIN6", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Operation Wocao", + "Silence", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1203", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Client Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT12", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Elderwood", + "Frankenstein", + "HAFNIUM", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Patchwork", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "TA459", + "The White Company", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "admin@338" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "File Transfer Protocols", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT41", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "SilverTerrier" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1071", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Magic Hound", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Protocols", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "FIN4", + "FIN8", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Orangeworm", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "SilverTerrier", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Volatile Cedar" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection", + "Command And Control", + "Defense Evasion", + "Discovery", + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint", + "Network_Traffic", + "Web" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Command & Control", + "Exploitation", + "Installation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Anomalous usage of 7zip - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", + "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", + "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", + "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", + "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule", + "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", + "ESCU - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", + "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", + "ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [], + "baseline_names": [ + "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial", + "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update" + ], + "author_company": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "author_name": "Patrick Bareiss", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Anomalous usage of 7zip", + "id": "9364ee8e-a39a-11eb-8f1d-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-22", + "author": "Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following detection identifies a 7z.exe spawned from `Rundll32.exe` or `Dllhost.exe`. It is assumed that the adversary has brought in `7z.exe` and `7z.dll`. It has been observed where an adversary will rename `7z.exe`. Additional coverage may be required to identify the behavior of renamed instances of `7z.exe`. During triage, identify the source of injection into `Rundll32.exe` or `Dllhost.exe`. Capture any files written to disk and analyze as needed. Review parallel processes for additional behaviors. Typically, archiving files will result in exfiltration.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"rundll32.exe\", \"dllhost.exe\") Processes.process_name=*7z* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `anomalous_usage_of_7zip_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as this behavior is not normal for `rundll32.exe` or `dllhost.exe` to spawn and run 7zip.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/001/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/01/31/bazar-no-ryuk/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Anomalous usage of 7zip", + "analytic_story": [ + "Cobalt Strike", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Collection" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1560.001/archive_utility/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior is indicative of suspicious loading of 7zip.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1560.001", + "T1560" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "CopyKittens", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Gallmaker", + "HAFNIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sowbug", + "Turla", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1560", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Patchwork", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1560.001", + "T1560" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Cobalt Strike", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Collection" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1560.001", + "T1560" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Anomalous usage of 7zip Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Anomalous usage of 7zip", + "file": "endpoint/anomalous_usage_of_7zip.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1560.001/archive_utility/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "anomalous_usage_of_7zip_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/anomalous_usage_of_7zip.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe", + "id": "dcfd6b40-42f9-469d-a433-2e53f7486664", + "version": 6, + "date": "2020-11-10", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for executions of cmd.exe spawned by a process that is often abused by attackers and that does not typically launch cmd.exe.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |search [`prohibited_apps_launching_cmd`] | `detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts and populates the Endpoint data model with the resultant dataset. This search includes a lookup file, `prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.csv`, that contains a list of processes that should not be spawning cmd.exe. You can modify this lookup to better suit your environment. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "There are circumstances where an application may legitimately execute and interact with the Windows command-line interface. Investigate and modify the lookup file, as appropriate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious Zoom Child Processes", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/powershell_spawn_cmd/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ running prohibited applications.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.003" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious Zoom Child Processes", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe", + "file": "endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/powershell_spawn_cmd/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "prohibited_apps_launching_cmd", + "definition": "| inputlookup prohibited_apps_launching_cmd | rename prohibited_applications as parent_process_name | eval parent_process_name=\"*\" . parent_process_name | table parent_process_name", + "description": "This macro outputs a list of process that should not be the parent process of cmd.exe" + }, + { + "name": "process_cmd", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution", + "id": "91c79f14-5b41-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-01-20", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies \"rundll32.exe\" execution with inline protocol handlers. \"JavaScript\", \"VBScript\", and \"About\" are the only supported options when invoking HTA content directly on the command-line. This type of behavior is commonly observed with fileless malware or application whitelisting bypass techniques. The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process \"rundll32.exe\" and its parent process.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` (Processes.process=*vbscript* OR Processes.process=*javascript* OR Processes.process=*about*) by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses", + "https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/search/-search-3x-wds-extidx-prot-implementing" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious rundll32.exe inline HTA execution on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.005" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "FIN7", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Sidewinder", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.005" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.005" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution", + "file": "endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command", + "id": "c4db14d9-7909-48b4-a054-aa14d89dbb19", + "version": 7, + "date": "2022-01-18", + "author": "David Dorsey, Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of the EncodedCommand PowerShell parameter. This is typically used by Administrators to run complex scripts, but commonly used by adversaries to hide their code. \\\nThe analytic identifies all variations of EncodedCommand, as PowerShell allows the ability to shorten the parameter. For example enc, enco, encod and so forth. In addition, through our research it was identified that PowerShell will interpret different command switch types beyond the hyphen. We have added endash, emdash, horizontal bar, and forward slash. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel events to determine legitimacy. Tune as needed based on admin scripts in use. \\\nAlternatively, may use regex per matching here https://regexr.com/662ov.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"(?i)[\\-|\\/|–|—|―]e(nc*o*d*e*d*c*o*m*m*a*n*d*)*\\s+[^-]\") | `malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "System administrators may use this option, but it's not common.", + "references": [ + "https://regexr.com/662ov", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses/blob/master/TestHarnesses/T1059.001_PowerShell/OutPowerShellCommandLineParameter.ps1", + "https://ss64.com/ps/powershell.html", + "https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/1440758396534214658?s=20", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell", + "NOBELIUM Group", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 7", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1027/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Powershell.exe running potentially malicious encodede commands on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1027" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1027", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackOasis", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dust Storm", + "Elderwood", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Group5", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1027" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 7", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell", + "NOBELIUM Group", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 35 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1027" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 7", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command", + "file": "endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1027/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_powershell", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services", + "id": "f0c693d8-2a89-4ce7-80b4-98fea4c3ea6d", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for arguments to sc.exe indicating the creation or modification of a Windows service.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = sc.exe (Processes.process=\"* create *\" OR Processes.process=\"* config *\") by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Using sc.exe to manipulate Windows services is uncommon. However, there may be legitimate instances of this behavior. It is important to validate and investigate as appropriate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Service Abuse", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation" + ], + "message": "A sc process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ to create of configure services in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1543.003", + "T1543" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP", + "PR.PT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN7", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "PROMETHIUM", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1543.003", + "T1543" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP", + "PR.PT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Service Abuse", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1543.003", + "T1543" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP", + "PR.PT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services", + "file": "endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", + "id": "d5af132c-7c17-439c-9d31-13d55340f36c", + "version": 6, + "date": "2022-02-22", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation or deletion of a scheduled task using schtasks.exe with flags - create or delete being passed on the command-line. This has been associated with the Dragonfly threat actor, and the SUNBURST attack against Solarwinds. This analytic replaces \"Scheduled Task used in BadRabbit Ransomware\".", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe (Processes.process=*delete* OR Processes.process=*create*) by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible scripts or administrators may trigger this analytic. Filter as needed based on parent process, application.", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/21/qbot-and-zerologon-lead-to-full-domain-compromise/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", + "analytic_story": [ + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "NOBELIUM Group", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A schedule task process $process_name$ with create or delete commandline $process$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CostaRicto", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Machete", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "NOBELIUM Group", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", + "file": "endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Schtasks scheduling job on remote system", + "id": "1297fb80-f42a-4b4a-9c8a-88c066237cf6", + "version": 5, + "date": "2021-11-11", + "author": "David Dorsey, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `schtasks.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to create a Scheduled Task on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = schtasks.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=schtasks.exe) (Processes.process=\"*/create*\" AND Processes.process=\"*/s*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may create scheduled tasks on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. It is important to validate and investigate as appropriate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Schtasks scheduling job on remote system", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A schedule task process $process_name$ with remote job commandline $process$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Processes.dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Processes.user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CostaRicto", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Machete", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Processes.dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Processes.user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Processes.dest", + "risk_score": 63 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "Processes.user", + "risk_score": 63 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Schtasks scheduling job on remote system Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Schtasks scheduling job on remote system", + "file": "endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows AdFind Exe", + "id": "bd3b0187-189b-46c0-be45-f52da2bae67f", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-11-03", + "author": "Jose Hernandez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for the execution of `adfind.exe` with command-line arguments that it uses by default. Specifically the filter or search functions. It also considers the arguments necessary like objectcategory, see readme for more details: https://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/usage.htm. This has been seen used before by Wizard Spider, FIN6 and actors whom also launched SUNBURST. AdFind.exe is usually used a recon tool to enumare a domain controller.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process=\"* -f *\" OR Processes.process=\"* -b *\") AND (Processes.process=*objectcategory* OR Processes.process=\"* -gcb *\" OR Processes.process=\"* -sc *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_adfind_exe_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "administrators rarely use adfind, usually not used for legitimate reasons", + "references": [ + "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/a-nasty-trick-from-credential-theft-malware-to-business-disruption.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows AdFind Exe", + "analytic_story": [ + "NOBELIUM Group", + "Domain Trust Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Windows AdFind Exe", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1018" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Leafminer", + "Naikon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1018" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "NOBELIUM Group", + "Domain Trust Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1018" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows AdFind Exe Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows AdFind Exe", + "file": "endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_adfind_exe_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "First Time Seen Running Windows Service", + "id": "823136f2-d755-4b6d-ae04-372b486a5808", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for the first and last time a Windows service is seen running in your environment. This table is then cached.", + "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rex field=Message \"The (?[-\\(\\)\\s\\w]+) service entered the (?\\w+) state\" | where state=\"running\" | lookup previously_seen_running_windows_services service as service OUTPUT firstTimeSeen | where isnull(firstTimeSeen) OR firstTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_windows_services_window`) | table _time dest service | `first_time_seen_running_windows_service_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM, you must be ingesting your Windows system event logs in order for this search to execute successfully. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial` to build the initial table of child processes and hostnames for this search to work. You should also schedule at the same interval as this search the second baseline search `Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old Windows Services. Please update the `previously_seen_windows_services_window` macro to adjust the time window. Please ensure that the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows is version 8.0.0 or above.", + "known_false_positives": "A previously unseen service is not necessarily malicious. Verify that the service is legitimate and that was installed by a legitimate process.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "First Time Seen Running Windows Service", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2", + "CIS 9" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1569", + "T1569.002" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "dest" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1569", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "FIN6", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Operation Wocao", + "Silence", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1569", + "T1569.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2", + "CIS 9" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial", + "id": "64ce0ade-cb01-4678-bddd-d31c0b175394", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-06-23", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This collects the services that have been started across your entire enterprise.", + "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rex field=Message \"The (?[-\\(\\)\\s\\w]+) service entered the (?\\w+) state\" | where state=\"running\" | stats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen by service | outputlookup previously_seen_running_windows_services", + "how_to_implement": "While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM, you must be ingesting your Windows security-event logs for it to execute successfully. Please ensure that the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows is version 8.0.0 or above.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "deployments": [ + "90 Day Baseline" + ], + "detections": [ + "First Time Seen Running Windows Service" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update", + "id": "2e3bdd68-1863-46ee-81f8-87273eee7f1c", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-06-23", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search returns the first and last time a Windows service was seen across your enterprise within the last hour. It then updates this information with historical data and filters out Windows services pairs that have not been seen within the specified time window. This updated table is then cached.", + "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rex field=Message \"The (?[-\\(\\)\\s\\w]+) service entered the (?\\w+) state\" | where state=\"running\" | stats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen by service | inputlookup previously_seen_running_windows_services append=t | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen, max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by service | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), \"`previously_seen_windows_service_forget_window`\") | outputlookup previously_seen_running_windows_services", + "how_to_implement": "While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM, you must be ingesting your Windows security-event logs for it to execute successfully. Please ensure that the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows is version 8.0.0 or above.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Hourly Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "First Time Seen Running Windows Service" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1569", + "T1569.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2", + "CIS 9" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_system", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "previously_seen_windows_services_window", + "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", + "description": "Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new Windows services" + }, + { + "name": "first_time_seen_running_windows_service_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "previously_seen_running_windows_services", + "description": "A placeholder for the list of Windows Services running", + "collection": "previously_seen_running_windows_services", + "fields_list": "_key, service, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event", + "id": "701a8740-e8db-40df-9190-5516d3819787", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-12-14", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The malware sunburst will load the malicious dll by SolarWinds.BusinessLayerHost.exe. After a period of 12-14 days, the malware will attempt to resolve a subdomain of avsvmcloud.com. This detections will correlate both events.", + "search": "(`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded=*SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll) OR (`sysmon` EventCode=22 QueryName=*avsvmcloud.com) | eventstats dc(EventCode) AS dc_events | where dc_events=2 | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ImageLoaded) AS ImageLoaded values(QueryName) AS QueryName by host | rename host as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "This detection relies on sysmon logs with the Event ID 7, Driver loaded. Please tune your sysmon config that you DriverLoad event for SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll is captured by Sysmon. Additionally, you need sysmon logs for Event ID 22, DNS Query. We suggest to run this detection at least once a day over the last 14 days.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event", + "analytic_story": [ + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Windows", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 6", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1203" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "ImageLoaded", + "QueryName" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1203", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Client Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT12", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Elderwood", + "Frankenstein", + "HAFNIUM", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Patchwork", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "TA459", + "The White Company", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "admin@338" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1203" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 6", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1203" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 6", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Outbound SMB Traffic", + "id": "1bed7774-304a-4e8f-9d72-d80e45ff492b", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Stuart Hopkins from Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search looks for outbound SMB connections made by hosts within your network to the Internet. SMB traffic is used for Windows file-sharing activity. One of the techniques often used by attackers involves retrieving the credential hash using an SMB request made to a compromised server controlled by the threat actor.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as start_time latest(_time) as end_time values(All_Traffic.action) as action values(All_Traffic.app) as app values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as dest_port values(sourcetype) as sourcetype count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where ((All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=\"smb\") AND NOT (All_Traffic.action=\"blocked\" OR All_Traffic.dest_category=\"internal\" OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=192.168.0.0/16 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=100.64.0.0/10)) by All_Traffic.src_ip | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `security_content_ctime(start_time)` | `security_content_ctime(end_time)` | `detect_outbound_smb_traffic_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "In order to run this search effectively, we highly recommend that you leverage the Assets and Identity framework. It is important that you have good understanding of how your network segments are designed, and be able to distinguish internal from external address space. Add a category named `internal` to the CIDRs that host the companys assets in `assets_by_cidr.csv` lookup file, which is located in `$SPLUNK_HOME/etc/apps/SA-IdentityManagement/lookups/`. More information on updating this lookup can be found here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.0.0/Admin/Addassetandidentitydata. This search also requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model", + "known_false_positives": "It is likely that the outbound Server Message Block (SMB) traffic is legitimate, if the company's internal networks are not well-defined in the Assets and Identity Framework. Categorize the internal CIDR blocks as `internal` in the lookup file to avoid creating notable events for traffic destined to those CIDR blocks. Any other network connection that is going out to the Internet should be investigated and blocked. Best practices suggest preventing external communications of all SMB versions and related protocols at the network boundary.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Outbound SMB Traffic", + "analytic_story": [ + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Command & Control" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1071.002", + "T1071" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.action", + "All_Traffic.app", + "All_Traffic.dest_ip", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "sourcetype", + "All_Traffic.dest_category", + "All_Traffic.src_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "File Transfer Protocols", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT41", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "SilverTerrier" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1071", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Magic Hound", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1071.002", + "T1071" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1071.002", + "T1071" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_outbound_smb_traffic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "TOR Traffic", + "id": "ea688274-9c06-4473-b951-e4cb7a5d7a45", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-22", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search looks for network traffic identified as The Onion Router (TOR), a benign anonymity network which can be abused for a variety of nefarious purposes.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.app=tor AND All_Traffic.action=allowed by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip All_Traffic.dest_port All_Traffic.action | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `tor_traffic_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from firewalls or other network control devices that mediate the traffic allowed into an environment. This is necessary so that the search can identify an 'action' taken on the traffic of interest. The search requires the Network_Traffic data model be populated.", + "known_false_positives": "None at this time", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "TOR Traffic", + "analytic_story": [ + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Command & Control", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 9", + "CIS 12" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1071", + "T1071.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.app", + "All_Traffic.action", + "All_Traffic.src_ip", + "All_Traffic.dest_ip", + "All_Traffic.dest_port" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1071", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Magic Hound", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Protocols", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "FIN4", + "FIN8", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Orangeworm", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "SilverTerrier", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1071", + "T1071.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 9", + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Command & Control", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1071", + "T1071.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 9", + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "tor_traffic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/tor_traffic.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Supernova Webshell", + "id": "2ec08a09-9ff1-4dac-b59f-1efd57972ec1", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-01-06", + "author": "John Stoner, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "This search aims to detect the Supernova webshell used in the SUNBURST attack.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Web.Web where web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*codes* OR Web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*clazz* OR Web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*method* OR Web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*args* by Web.src Web.dest Web.url Web.vendor_product Web.user Web.http_user_agent _time span=1s | `supernova_webshell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be monitoring web traffic to your Solarwinds Orion. The logs should be ingested into splunk and populating/mapped to the Web data model.", + "known_false_positives": "There might be false positives associted with this detection since items like args as a web argument is pretty generic.", + "references": [ + "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-supernova-malware-solarwinds-continued.html", + "https://www.guidepointsecurity.com/supernova-solarwinds-net-webshell-analysis/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Supernova Webshell", + "analytic_story": [ + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Web Server", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 4", + "CIS 13", + "CIS 18" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1505.003" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "ID.RA", + "PR.PT", + "PR.IP", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Web.url", + "Web.src", + "Web.dest", + "Web.vendor_product", + "Web.user", + "Web.http_user_agent" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Volatile Cedar" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1505.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 4", + "CIS 13", + "CIS 18" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "ID.RA", + "PR.PT", + "PR.IP", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1505.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 4", + "CIS 13", + "CIS 18" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "ID.RA", + "PR.PT", + "PR.IP", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "supernova_webshell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml", + "source": "web" + } + ], + "investigations": [] + }, + { + "name": "Office 365 Detections", + "id": "1a51dd71-effc-48b2-abc4-3e9cdb61e5b9", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-12-16", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "description": "This story is focused around detecting Office 365 Attacks.", + "narrative": "More and more companies are using Microsofts Office 365 cloud offering. Therefore, we see more and more attacks against Office 365. This story provides various detections for Office 365 attacks.", + "references": [ + "https://i.blackhat.com/USA-20/Thursday/us-20-Bienstock-My-Cloud-Is-APTs-Cloud-Investigating-And-Defending-Office-365.pdf" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Office 365 Detections", + "analytic_story": "Office 365 Detections", + "category": [ + "Cloud Security" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Security Monitoring", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Indrik Spider", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1556", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access", + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN5", + "Fox Kitten", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Magic Hound", + "Silent Librarian" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Forwarding Rule", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Kimsuky", + "Silent Librarian" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN4", + "HAFNIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "Leafminer" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection", + "Credential Access", + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence" + ], + "datamodels": [], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule", + "ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", + "ESCU - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule", + "ESCU - O365 Disable MFA - Rule", + "ESCU - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule", + "ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule", + "ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule", + "ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule", + "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule", + "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule", + "ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule", + "ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Patrick Bareiss", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User", + "id": "b2c81cc6-6040-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-01-26", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects the creation of a new Federation setting by alerting about an specific event related to its creation.", + "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation=\"Add app role assignment grant to user.\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Actor{}.ID) as Actor.ID values(Actor{}.Type) as Actor.Type by ActorIpAddress dest ResultStatus | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", + "known_false_positives": "The creation of a new Federation is not necessarily malicious, however this events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a different cloud provider.", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", + "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User", + "analytic_story": [ + "Office 365 Detections", + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" + ], + "asset_type": "Office 365", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_new_federation/o365_new_federation.json" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "User $Actor.ID$ has created a new federation setting on $dest$ from IP Address $ActorIpAddress$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1136.003", + "T1136" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ActorIpAddress", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Actor.ID", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Workload", + "Operation", + "Actor{}.ID", + "Actor{}.Type", + "ActorIpAddress", + "dest", + "ResultStatus" + ], + "risk_score": 18, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Indrik Spider", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1136.003", + "T1136" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Office 365 Detections", + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ActorIpAddress", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Actor.ID", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ActorIpAddress", + "risk_score": 18 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "Actor.ID", + "risk_score": 18 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 18 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1136.003", + "T1136" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User", + "file": "cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "o365_management_activity.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_new_federation/o365_new_federation.json", + "source": "o365", + "sourcetype": "o365:management:activity" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "o365_management_activity", + "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "O365 Added Service Principal", + "id": "1668812a-6047-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-03", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects the creation of a new Federation setting by alerting about an specific event related to its creation.", + "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation=\"Add service principal credentials.\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Actor{}.ID) as Actor.ID values(ModifiedProperties{}.Name) as ModifiedProperties.Name values(ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue) as ModifiedProperties.NewValue values(Target{}.ID) as Target.ID by ActorIpAddress Operation | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_added_service_principal_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", + "known_false_positives": "The creation of a new Federation is not necessarily malicious, however these events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a different cloud provider.", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", + "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a", + "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html", + "https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "O365 Added Service Principal", + "analytic_story": [ + "Office 365 Detections", + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" + ], + "asset_type": "Office 365", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_add_service_principal/o365_add_service_principal.json" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "User $Actor.ID$ created a new federation setting on $Target.ID$ and added service principal credentials from IP Address $ActorIpAddress$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1136.003", + "T1136" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ActorIpAddress", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Target.ID", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Workload", + "signature", + "Actor{}.ID", + "ModifiedProperties{}.Name", + "ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue", + "Target{}.ID", + "ActorIpAddress" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Indrik Spider", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1136.003", + "T1136" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Office 365 Detections", + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ActorIpAddress", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Target.ID", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ActorIpAddress", + "risk_score": 42 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Target.ID", + "risk_score": 42 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1136.003", + "T1136" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "O365 Added Service Principal Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "O365 Added Service Principal", + "file": "cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "o365_management_activity.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_add_service_principal/o365_add_service_principal.json", + "source": "o365", + "sourcetype": "o365:management:activity" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "o365_management_activity", + "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "o365_added_service_principal_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP", + "id": "c783dd98-c703-4252-9e8a-f19d9f66949e", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-02-03", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects newly added IP addresses/CIDR blocks to the list of MFA Trusted IPs to bypass multi factor authentication. Attackers are often known to use this technique so that they can bypass the MFA system.", + "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=\"Set Company Information.\" ModifiedProperties{}.Name=StrongAuthenticationPolicy | rex max_match=100 field=ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue \"(?\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\/\\d{1,2})\" | rex max_match=100 field=ModifiedProperties{}.OldValue \"(?\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\/\\d{1,2})\" | eval ip_addresses_old=if(isnotnull(ip_addresses_old),ip_addresses_old,\"0\") | mvexpand ip_addresses_new_added | where isnull(mvfind(ip_addresses_old,ip_addresses_new_added)) |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ip_addresses_old) as ip_addresses_old by user ip_addresses_new_added Operation Workload vendor_account status user_id action | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install Splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", + "known_false_positives": "Unless it is a special case, it is uncommon to continually update Trusted IPs to MFA configuration.", + "references": [ + "https://i.blackhat.com/USA-20/Thursday/us-20-Bienstock-My-Cloud-Is-APTs-Cloud-Investigating-And-Defending-Office-365.pdf", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/007/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP", + "analytic_story": [ + "Office 365 Detections" + ], + "asset_type": "Office 365", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.007/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.json" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "User $user_id$ has added new IP addresses $ip_addresses_new_added$ to a list of trusted IPs to bypass MFA", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.007", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ip_addresses_new_added", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user_id", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "signature", + "ModifiedProperties{}.Name", + "ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue", + "ModifiedProperties{}.OldValue", + "user", + "vendor_account", + "status", + "user_id", + "action" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.007", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Office 365 Detections" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ip_addresses_new_added", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user_id", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ip_addresses_new_added", + "risk_score": 42 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user_id", + "risk_score": 42 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.007", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP", + "file": "cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.007/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.json", + "source": "o365", + "sourcetype": "o365:management:activity" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "o365_management_activity", + "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "O365 Disable MFA", + "id": "c783dd98-c703-4252-9e8a-f19d9f5c949e", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-03", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects when multi factor authentication has been disabled, what entitiy performed the action and against what user", + "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=\"Disable Strong Authentication.\" | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by UserType Operation UserId ResultStatus |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_disable_mfa_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", + "known_false_positives": "Unless it is a special case, it is uncommon to disable MFA or Strong Authentication", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "O365 Disable MFA", + "analytic_story": [ + "Office 365 Detections" + ], + "asset_type": "Office 365", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/o365_disable_mfa/o365_disable_mfa.json" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "User $user$ has executed an operation $Operation$ for this destination $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1556" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Operation", + "UserType", + "user", + "status", + "signature", + "dest", + "ResultStatus" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1556", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access", + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1556" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Office 365 Detections" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 64 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1556" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "O365 Disable MFA Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "O365 Disable MFA", + "file": "cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "o365_disable_mfa.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/o365_disable_mfa/o365_disable_mfa.json", + "source": "o365", + "sourcetype": "o365:management:activity" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "o365_management_activity", + "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "o365_disable_mfa_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert", + "id": "d441364c-349c-453b-b55f-12eccab67cf9", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-02-18", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects when an excessive number of authentication failures occur this search also includes attempts against MFA prompt codes", + "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory UserAuthenticationMethod=* status=failure | stats count earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime values(UserAuthenticationMethod) AS UserAuthenticationMethod values(UserAgent) AS UserAgent values(status) AS status values(src_ip) AS src_ip by user | where count > 10 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", + "known_false_positives": "The threshold for alert is above 10 attempts and this should reduce the number of false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert", + "analytic_story": [ + "Office 365 Detections" + ], + "asset_type": "Office 365", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110/o365_brute_force_login/o365_brute_force_login.json" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "User $user$ has caused excessive number of authentication failures from $src_ip$ using UserAgent $UserAgent$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1110" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Workload", + "UserAuthenticationMethod", + "status", + "UserAgent", + "src_ip", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN5", + "Fox Kitten", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1110" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Office 365 Detections" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "src_ip", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 64 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1110" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert", + "file": "cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "o365_brute_force_login.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110/o365_brute_force_login/o365_brute_force_login.json", + "source": "o365", + "sourcetype": "o365:management:activity" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "o365_management_activity", + "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "O365 Excessive SSO logon errors", + "id": "8158ccc4-6038-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-01-26", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects accounts with high number of Single Sign ON (SSO) logon errors. Excessive logon errors may indicate attempts to bruteforce of password or single sign on token hijack or reuse.", + "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory LogonError=SsoArtifactInvalidOrExpired | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by LogonError ActorIpAddress UserAgent UserId | where count > 5 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", + "known_false_positives": "Logon errors may not be malicious in nature however it may indicate attempts to reuse a token or password obtained via credential access attack.", + "references": [ + "https://stealthbits.com/blog/bypassing-mfa-with-pass-the-cookie/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "O365 Excessive SSO logon errors", + "analytic_story": [ + "Office 365 Detections", + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" + ], + "asset_type": "Office 365", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/o365_sso_logon_errors/o365_sso_logon_errors.json" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "User $UserId$ has caused excessive number of SSO logon errors from $ActorIpAddress$ using UserAgent $UserAgent$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1556" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ActorIpAddress", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "UserId", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Workload", + "LogonError", + "ActorIpAddress", + "UserAgent", + "UserId" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1556", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access", + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1556" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Office 365 Detections", + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ActorIpAddress", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "UserId", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ActorIpAddress", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "UserId", + "risk_score": 64 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1556" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "O365 Excessive SSO logon errors Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "O365 Excessive SSO logon errors", + "file": "cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "o365_management_activity.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/o365_sso_logon_errors/o365_sso_logon_errors.json", + "source": "o365", + "sourcetype": "o365:management:activity" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "o365_management_activity", + "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "O365 New Federated Domain Added", + "id": "e155876a-6048-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-01-26", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects the addition of a new Federated domain.", + "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=Exchange Operation=\"Add-FederatedDomain\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Parameters{}.Value) as Parameters.Value by ObjectId Operation OrganizationName OriginatingServer UserId UserKey | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_new_federated_domain_added_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity.", + "known_false_positives": "The creation of a new Federated domain is not necessarily malicious, however these events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a similar or different cloud provider.", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", + "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a", + "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html", + "https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory", + "https://o365blog.com/post/aadbackdoor/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "O365 New Federated Domain Added", + "analytic_story": [ + "Office 365 Detections", + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" + ], + "asset_type": "Office 365", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_new_federated_domain/o365_new_federated_domain.json" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "User $UserId$ has added a new federated domaain $Parameters.Value$ for $OrganizationName$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1136.003", + "T1136" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "OrganizationName", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "UserId", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Workload", + "Operation", + "Parameters{}.Value", + "ObjectId", + "OrganizationName", + "OriginatingServer", + "UserId", + "UserKey" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Indrik Spider", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1136.003", + "T1136" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Office 365 Detections", + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "OrganizationName", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "UserId", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "OrganizationName", + "threat_object_type": "other" + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "UserId", + "risk_score": 64 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1136.003", + "T1136" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "O365 New Federated Domain Added Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "O365 New Federated Domain Added", + "file": "cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-7d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "o365_management_activity.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_new_federated_domain/o365_new_federated_domain.json", + "source": "exchange", + "sourcetype": "o365:management:activity", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "o365_management_activity", + "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "o365_new_federated_domain_added_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "O365 PST export alert", + "id": "5f694cc4-a678-4a60-9410-bffca1b647dc", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-12-16", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects when a user has performed an Ediscovery search or exported a PST file from the search. This PST file usually has sensitive information including email body content", + "search": "`o365_management_activity` Category=ThreatManagement Name=\"eDiscovery search started or exported\" | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by Source Severity AlertEntityId Operation Name |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_pst_export_alert_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", + "known_false_positives": "PST export can be done for legitimate purposes but due to the sensitive nature of its content it must be monitored.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "O365 PST export alert", + "analytic_story": [ + "Office 365 Detections", + "Data Exfiltration" + ], + "asset_type": "Office 365", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Exfiltration" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114/o365_export_pst_file/o365_export_pst_file.json" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "User $Source$ has exported a PST file from the search using this operation- $Operation$ with a severity of $Severity$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1114" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Source", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Category", + "Name", + "Source", + "Severity", + "AlertEntityId", + "Operation" + ], + "risk_score": 48, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Magic Hound", + "Silent Librarian" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1114" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Office 365 Detections", + "Data Exfiltration" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Source", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Exfiltration" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "Source", + "risk_score": 48 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1114" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "O365 PST export alert Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "O365 PST export alert", + "file": "cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "o365_export_pst_file.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114/o365_export_pst_file/o365_export_pst_file.json", + "source": "o365", + "sourcetype": "o365:management:activity" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "o365_management_activity", + "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "o365_pst_export_alert_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding", + "id": "7f398cfb-918d-41f4-8db8-2e2474e02c28", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-12-16", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects when an admin configured a forwarding rule for multiple mailboxes to the same destination.", + "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=Set-Mailbox | spath input=Parameters | rename Identity AS src_user | search ForwardingAddress=* | stats dc(src_user) AS count_src_user earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(src_user) AS src_user values(user) AS user by ForwardingAddress | where count_src_user > 1 |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding", + "analytic_story": [ + "Office 365 Detections", + "Data Exfiltration" + ], + "asset_type": "Office 365", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Exfiltration" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114.003/o365_email_forwarding_rule/o365_email_forwarding_rule.json" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user$ has configured a forwarding rule for multiple mailboxes to the same destination $ForwardingAddress$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1114.003", + "T1114" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Operation", + "Parameters" + ], + "risk_score": 48, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Forwarding Rule", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Kimsuky", + "Silent Librarian" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Magic Hound", + "Silent Librarian" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1114.003", + "T1114" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Office 365 Detections", + "Data Exfiltration" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Exfiltration" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 48 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1114.003", + "T1114" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding", + "file": "cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "o365_email_forwarding_rule.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114.003/o365_email_forwarding_rule/o365_email_forwarding_rule.json", + "source": "o365", + "sourcetype": "o365:management:activity" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "o365_management_activity", + "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation", + "id": "b25d2973-303e-47c8-bacd-52b61604c6a7", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-12-15", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects the assignment of rights to accesss content from another mailbox. This is usually only assigned to a service account.", + "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=Add-MailboxPermission | spath input=Parameters | rename User AS src_user, Identity AS dest_user | search AccessRights=FullAccess OR AccessRights=SendAs OR AccessRights=SendOnBehalf | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user src_user dest_user Operation AccessRights |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`o365_suspicious_rights_delegation_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", + "known_false_positives": "Service Accounts", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation", + "analytic_story": [ + "Office 365 Detections" + ], + "asset_type": "Office 365", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Stage:Exfiltration", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114.002/suspicious_rights_delegation/suspicious_rights_delegation.json" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user$ has delegated suspicious rights $AccessRights$ to user $dest_user$ that allow access to sensitive", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1114.002", + "T1114" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Operation", + "Parameters" + ], + "risk_score": 48, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN4", + "HAFNIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "Leafminer" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Magic Hound", + "Silent Librarian" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1114.002", + "T1114" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Office 365 Detections" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Stage:Exfiltration", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 48 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1114.002", + "T1114" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation", + "file": "cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "suspicious_rights_delegation.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114.002/suspicious_rights_delegation/suspicious_rights_delegation.json", + "source": "o365", + "sourcetype": "o365:management:activity" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "o365_management_activity", + "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "o365_suspicious_rights_delegation_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding", + "id": "f8dfe015-dbb3-4569-ba75-b13787e06aa4", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-12-16", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects when multiple user configured a forwarding rule to the same destination.", + "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=Set-Mailbox | spath input=Parameters | rename Identity AS src_user | search ForwardingSmtpAddress=* | stats dc(src_user) AS count_src_user earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(src_user) AS src_user values(user) AS user by ForwardingSmtpAddress | where count_src_user > 1 |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding", + "analytic_story": [ + "Office 365 Detections", + "Data Exfiltration" + ], + "asset_type": "Office 365", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Stage:Exfiltration", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114.003/o365_email_forwarding_rule/o365_email_forwarding_rule.json" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user$ configured multiple users $src_user$ with a count of $count_src_user$, a forwarding rule to same destination $ForwardingSmtpAddress$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1114.003", + "T1114" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ForwardingSmtpAddress", + "type": "Email Address", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Operation", + "Parameters" + ], + "risk_score": 48, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Forwarding Rule", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Kimsuky", + "Silent Librarian" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Magic Hound", + "Silent Librarian" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1114.003", + "T1114" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Office 365 Detections", + "Data Exfiltration" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ForwardingSmtpAddress", + "type": "Email Address", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Stage:Exfiltration", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 48 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1114.003", + "T1114" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding", + "file": "cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "o365_email_forwarding_rule.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114.003/o365_email_forwarding_rule/o365_email_forwarding_rule.json", + "source": "o365", + "sourcetype": "o365:management:activity" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "o365_management_activity", + "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "High Number of Login Failures from a single source", + "id": "7f398cfb-918d-41f4-8db8-2e2474e02222", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-12-16", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search will detect more than 5 login failures in Office365 Azure Active Directory from a single source IP address. Please adjust the threshold value of 5 as suited for your environment.", + "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=UserLoginFailed record_type=AzureActiveDirectoryStsLogon app=AzureActiveDirectory | stats count dc(user) as accounts_locked values(user) as user values(LogonError) as LogonError values(authentication_method) as authentication_method values(signature) as signature values(UserAgent) as UserAgent by src_ip record_type Operation app | search accounts_locked >= 5| `high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "High Number of Login Failures from a single source", + "analytic_story": [ + "Office 365 Detections" + ], + "asset_type": "Office 365", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1110.001", + "T1110" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Operation", + "record_type", + "app", + "user", + "LogonError", + "authentication_method", + "signature", + "UserAgent", + "src_ip", + "record_type" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN5", + "Fox Kitten", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1110.001", + "T1110" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Office 365 Detections" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1110.001", + "T1110" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "High Number of Login Failures from a single source Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "High Number of Login Failures from a single source", + "file": "experimental/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.001/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.json", + "source": "o365", + "sourcetype": "o365:management:activity" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "o365_management_activity", + "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml", + "source": "cloud" + } + ], + "investigations": [] + }, + { + "name": "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "id": "bb9f5ed2-916e-4364-bb6d-97c370efcf52", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-01-22", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "description": "Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry.", + "narrative": "In May of 2018, the attack group Orangeworm was implicated for installing a custom backdoor called Trojan.Kwampirs within large international healthcare corporations in the United States, Europe, and Asia. This malware provides the attackers with remote access to the target system, decrypting and extracting a copy of its main DLL payload from its resource section. Before writing the payload to disk, it inserts a randomly generated string into the middle of the decrypted payload in an attempt to evade hash-based detections.\\\nAwareness of the Orangeworm group first surfaced in January, 2015. It has conducted targeted attacks against related industries, as well, such as pharmaceuticals and healthcare IT solution providers.\\\nHealthcare may be a promising target, because it is notoriously behind in technology, often using older operating systems and neglecting to patch computers. Even so, the group was able to evade detection for a full three years. Sources say that the malware spread quickly within the target networks, infecting computers used to control medical devices, such as MRI and X-ray machines.\\\nThis Analytic Story is designed to help you detect and investigate suspicious activities that may be indicative of an Orangeworm attack. One detection search looks for command-line arguments. Another monitors for uses of sc.exe, a non-essential Windows file that can manipulate Windows services. One of the investigative searches helps you get more information on web hosts that you suspect have been compromised.", + "references": [ + "https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/orangeworm-targets-healthcare-us-europe-asia", + "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/healthcare-targeted-by-hacker/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "analytic_story": "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "category": [ + "Malware" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN7", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "PROMETHIUM", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1569", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "FIN6", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Operation Wocao", + "Silence", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Command & Control", + "Installation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", + "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", + "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [ + "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", + "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial", + "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update" + ], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "David Dorsey", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "First time seen command line argument", + "id": "a1b6e73f-98d5-470f-99ac-77aacd578473", + "version": 5, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for command-line arguments that use a `/c` parameter to execute a command that has not previously been seen.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = cmd.exe Processes.process = \"* /c *\" by Processes.process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = cmd.exe Processes.process = \"* /c *\" by Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by process | outputlookup previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments | eval newCmdLineArgument=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newCmdLineArgument=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table process] | `first_time_seen_command_line_argument_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The complete process name with command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model. Please make sure you run the support search \"Previously seen command line arguments,\"—which creates a lookup file called `previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments.csv`—a historical baseline of all command-line arguments. You must also validate this list. For the search to do accurate calculation, ensure the search scheduling is the same value as the `relative_time` evaluation function.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate programs can also use command-line arguments to execute. Please verify the command-line arguments to check what command/program is being executed. We recommend customizing the `first_time_seen_cmd_line_filter` macro to exclude legitimate parent_process_name", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "First time seen command line argument", + "analytic_story": [ + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Hidden Cobra Malware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059.001", + "T1059.003" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059.001", + "T1059.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Hidden Cobra Malware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously seen command line arguments", + "id": "56059acf-50fe-4f60-98d1-b75b51b5c2f3", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-03-01", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for command-line arguments where `cmd.exe /c` is used to execute a program, then creates a baseline of the earliest and latest times we have encountered this command-line argument in our dataset within the last 30 days.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process=\"* /c *\" by Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The complete process name with command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "IcedID" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "First time seen command line argument" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059.001", + "T1059.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "first_time_seen_command_line_argument_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments", + "description": "A placeholder for a list of cmd line arugments that been seen before", + "filename": "previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments.csv" + }, + { + "name": "previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments", + "description": "A placeholder for a list of cmd line arugments that been seen before", + "filename": "previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments.csv" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services", + "id": "f0c693d8-2a89-4ce7-80b4-98fea4c3ea6d", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for arguments to sc.exe indicating the creation or modification of a Windows service.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = sc.exe (Processes.process=\"* create *\" OR Processes.process=\"* config *\") by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Using sc.exe to manipulate Windows services is uncommon. However, there may be legitimate instances of this behavior. It is important to validate and investigate as appropriate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Service Abuse", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation" + ], + "message": "A sc process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ to create of configure services in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1543.003", + "T1543" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP", + "PR.PT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN7", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "PROMETHIUM", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1543.003", + "T1543" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP", + "PR.PT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Service Abuse", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1543.003", + "T1543" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP", + "PR.PT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services", + "file": "endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "First Time Seen Running Windows Service", + "id": "823136f2-d755-4b6d-ae04-372b486a5808", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for the first and last time a Windows service is seen running in your environment. This table is then cached.", + "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rex field=Message \"The (?[-\\(\\)\\s\\w]+) service entered the (?\\w+) state\" | where state=\"running\" | lookup previously_seen_running_windows_services service as service OUTPUT firstTimeSeen | where isnull(firstTimeSeen) OR firstTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_windows_services_window`) | table _time dest service | `first_time_seen_running_windows_service_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM, you must be ingesting your Windows system event logs in order for this search to execute successfully. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial` to build the initial table of child processes and hostnames for this search to work. You should also schedule at the same interval as this search the second baseline search `Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old Windows Services. Please update the `previously_seen_windows_services_window` macro to adjust the time window. Please ensure that the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows is version 8.0.0 or above.", + "known_false_positives": "A previously unseen service is not necessarily malicious. Verify that the service is legitimate and that was installed by a legitimate process.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "First Time Seen Running Windows Service", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2", + "CIS 9" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1569", + "T1569.002" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "dest" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1569", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "FIN6", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Operation Wocao", + "Silence", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1569", + "T1569.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2", + "CIS 9" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial", + "id": "64ce0ade-cb01-4678-bddd-d31c0b175394", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-06-23", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This collects the services that have been started across your entire enterprise.", + "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rex field=Message \"The (?[-\\(\\)\\s\\w]+) service entered the (?\\w+) state\" | where state=\"running\" | stats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen by service | outputlookup previously_seen_running_windows_services", + "how_to_implement": "While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM, you must be ingesting your Windows security-event logs for it to execute successfully. Please ensure that the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows is version 8.0.0 or above.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "deployments": [ + "90 Day Baseline" + ], + "detections": [ + "First Time Seen Running Windows Service" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update", + "id": "2e3bdd68-1863-46ee-81f8-87273eee7f1c", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-06-23", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search returns the first and last time a Windows service was seen across your enterprise within the last hour. It then updates this information with historical data and filters out Windows services pairs that have not been seen within the specified time window. This updated table is then cached.", + "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rex field=Message \"The (?[-\\(\\)\\s\\w]+) service entered the (?\\w+) state\" | where state=\"running\" | stats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen by service | inputlookup previously_seen_running_windows_services append=t | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen, max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by service | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), \"`previously_seen_windows_service_forget_window`\") | outputlookup previously_seen_running_windows_services", + "how_to_implement": "While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM, you must be ingesting your Windows security-event logs for it to execute successfully. Please ensure that the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows is version 8.0.0 or above.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Hourly Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "First Time Seen Running Windows Service" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1569", + "T1569.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2", + "CIS 9" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_system", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "previously_seen_windows_services_window", + "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", + "description": "Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new Windows services" + }, + { + "name": "first_time_seen_running_windows_service_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "previously_seen_running_windows_services", + "description": "A placeholder for the list of Windows Services running", + "collection": "previously_seen_running_windows_services", + "fields_list": "_key, service, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get History Of Email Sources", + "id": "ddc7af28-c34d-4392-af93-7f29a4e8806c", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-02-21", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Email" + ], + "description": "This search returns a list of all email sources seen in the 48 hours prior to the notable event to 24 hours after, and the number of emails from each source.", + "search": "|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Email.dest) as dest values(All_Email.recipient) as recepient min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count from datamodel=Email.All_Email by All_Email.src |`drop_dm_object_name(All_Email)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search src=$src$", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must ingest your email logs or capture unencrypted email communications within network traffic, and populate the Email data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "src" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Email.dest", + "All_Email.recipient", + "All_Email.src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_history_of_email_sources" + }, + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + }, + { + "name": "Get Parent Process Info", + "id": "fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41bf9", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-02-28", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "parent_process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Phishing Payloads", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_parent_process_info" + }, + { + "name": "Get Process Info", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd71", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-01", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the process running on a host which is under investigation. To gather the process info, enter the values for the process name in question and the destination IP address.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search process_name= $process_name$ | search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_process_info" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services", + "id": "97aecafc-0a68-11ec-962f-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-31", + "author": "Michael Haag, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "description": "PetitPotam (CVE-2021-36942,) is a vulnerablity identified in Microsofts EFSRPC Protocol that can allow an unauthenticated account to escalate privileges to domain administrator given the right circumstances.", + "narrative": "In June 2021, security researchers at SpecterOps released a blog post and white paper detailing several potential attack vectors against Active Directory Certificated Services (ADCS). ADCS is a Microsoft product that implements Public Key Infrastrucutre (PKI) functionality and can be used by organizations to provide and manage digital certiticates within Active Directory.\\ In July 2021, a security researcher released PetitPotam, a tool that allows attackers to coerce Windows systems into authenticating to arbitrary endpoints.\\ Combining PetitPotam with the identified ADCS attack vectors allows attackers to escalate privileges from an unauthenticated anonymous user to full domain admin privileges.", + "references": [ + "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2021/07/27/microsoft-releases-guidance-mitigating-petitpotam-ntlm-relay", + "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5005413-mitigating-ntlm-relay-attacks-on-active-directory-certificate-services-ad-cs-3612b773-4043-4aa9-b23d-b87910cd3429", + "https://www.specterops.io/assets/resources/Certified_Pre-Owned.pdf", + "https://github.com/topotam/PetitPotam/", + "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/releases/tag/2.2.0-20210723", + "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-36942", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services", + "analytic_story": "PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1187", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Forced Authentication", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "DarkHydrus", + "Dragonfly 2.0" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "datamodels": [], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - PetitPotam Network Share Access Request - Rule", + "ESCU - PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "author_name": "Michael Haag", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "PetitPotam Network Share Access Request", + "id": "95b8061a-0a67-11ec-85ec-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-31", + "author": "Michael Haag, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes Windows Event Code 5145, \"A network share object was checked to see whether client can be granted desired access\". During our research into PetitPotam, CVE-2021-36942, we identified the ocurrence of this event on the target host with specific values. \\\nTo enable 5145 events via Group Policy - Computer Configuration->Polices->Windows Settings->Security Settings->Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Expand this node, go to Object Access (Audit Polices->Object Access), then select the Setting Audit Detailed File Share Audit \\\nIt is possible this is not enabled by default and may need to be reviewed and enabled. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel security events to identify further suspicious activity.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` Account_Name=\"ANONYMOUS LOGON\" EventCode=5145 Relative_Target_Name=lsarpc | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Security_ID, Share_Name, Source_Address, Accesses, Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `petitpotam_network_share_access_request_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "Windows Event Code 5145 is required to utilize this analytic and it may not be enabled in most environments.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives have been limited when the Anonymous Logon is used for Account Name.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187/", + "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventid=5145", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5145" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "PetitPotam Network Share Access Request", + "analytic_story": [ + "PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1187/petitpotam/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A remote host is enumerating a $dest$ to identify permissions. This is a precursor event to CVE-2021-36942, PetitPotam.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1187" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "dest", + "Security_ID", + "Share_Name", + "Source_Address", + "Accesses", + "Message" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-36942" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1187", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Forced Authentication", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "DarkHydrus", + "Dragonfly 2.0" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1187" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 70, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-36942" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1187" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "PetitPotam Network Share Access Request Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "PetitPotam Network Share Access Request", + "file": "endpoint/petitpotam_network_share_access_request.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1187/petitpotam/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "petitpotam_network_share_access_request_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/petitpotam_network_share_access_request.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request", + "id": "e3ef244e-0a67-11ec-abf2-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-31", + "author": "Michael Haag, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifes Event Code 4768, A `Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested`, successfull occurs. This behavior has been identified to assist with detecting PetitPotam, CVE-2021-36942. Once an attacer obtains a computer certificate by abusing Active Directory Certificate Services in combination with PetitPotam, the next step would be to leverage the certificate for malicious purposes. One way of doing this is to request a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket using a tool like Rubeus. This request will generate a 4768 event with some unusual fields depending on the environment. This analytic will require tuning, we recommend filtering Account_Name to Domain Controllers for your environment.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 Client_Address!=\"::1\" Certificate_Thumbprint!=\"\" Account_Name=*$ | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Account_Name, Client_Address, action, Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "The following analytic requires Event Code 4768. Ensure that it is logging no Domain Controllers and appearing in Splunk.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives are possible if the environment is using certificates for authentication.", + "references": [ + "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventid=4768", + "https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Active+Directory+Certificate+Services+ADCS+PKI+domain+admin+vulnerability/27668/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request", + "analytic_story": [ + "PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1187/petitpotam/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A Kerberos TGT was requested in a non-standard manner against $dest$, potentially related to CVE-2021-36942, PetitPotam.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "dest", + "Account_Name", + "Client_Address", + "action", + "Message" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-36942" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 70, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-36942" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request", + "file": "endpoint/petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1187/petitpotam/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [] + }, + { + "name": "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "id": "988C59C5-0A1C-45B6-A555-0C62276E327E", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-01-22", + "author": "iDefense Cyber Espionage Team, iDefense", + "description": "Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques employed by the MUDCARP threat group.", + "narrative": "This story was created as a joint effort between iDefense and Splunk.\\\niDefense analysts have recently discovered a Windows executable file that, upon execution, spoofs a decryption tool and then drops a file that appears to be the custom-built javascript backdoor, \"Orz,\" which is associated with the threat actors known as MUDCARP (as well as \"temp.Periscope\" and \"Leviathan\"). The file is executed using Wscript.\\\nThe MUDCARP techniques include the use of the compressed-folders module from Microsoft, zipfldr.dll, with RouteTheCall export to run the malicious process or command. After a successful reboot, the malware is made persistent by a manipulating `[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run]'help'='c:\\\\windows\\\\system32\\\\rundll32.exe c:\\\\windows\\\\system32\\\\zipfldr.dll,RouteTheCall c:\\\\programdata\\\\winapp.exe'`. Though this technique is not exclusive to MUDCARP, it has been spotted in the group's arsenal of advanced techniques seen in the wild.\\\nThis Analytic Story searches for evidence of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that allow for the use of a endpoint detection-and-response (EDR) bypass technique to mask the true parent of a malicious process. It can also be set as a registry key for further sandbox evasion and to allow the malware to launch only after reboot.\\\nIf behavioral searches included in this story yield positive hits, iDefense recommends conducting IOC searches for the following:\\\n\\\n1. www.chemscalere[.]com\\\n1. chemscalere[.]com\\\n1. about.chemscalere[.]com\\\n1. autoconfig.chemscalere[.]com\\\n1. autodiscover.chemscalere[.]com\\\n1. catalog.chemscalere[.]com\\\n1. cpanel.chemscalere[.]com\\\n1. db.chemscalere[.]com\\\n1. ftp.chemscalere[.]com\\\n1. mail.chemscalere[.]com\\\n1. news.chemscalere[.]com\\\n1. update.chemscalere[.]com\\\n1. webmail.chemscalere[.]com\\\n1. www.candlelightparty[.]org\\\n1. candlelightparty[.]org\\\n1. newapp.freshasianews[.]comIn addition, iDefense also recommends that organizations review their environments for activity related to the following hashes:\\\n\\\n1. cd195ee448a3657b5c2c2d13e9c7a2e2\\\n1. b43ad826fe6928245d3c02b648296b43\\\n1. 889a9b52566448231f112a5ce9b5dfaf\\\n1. b8ec65dab97cdef3cd256cc4753f0c54\\\n1. 04d83cd3813698de28cfbba326d7647c", + "references": [ + "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/scope-of-mudcarp-attacks-highlight-1/", + "http://blog.amossys.fr/badflick-is-not-so-bad.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "analytic_story": "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "Putter Panda", + "RTM", + "Rocke", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Command & Control" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", + "ESCU - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", + "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", + "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", + "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [ + "ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", + "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments" + ], + "author_company": "iDefense", + "author_name": "iDefense Cyber Espionage Team", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "First time seen command line argument", + "id": "a1b6e73f-98d5-470f-99ac-77aacd578473", + "version": 5, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for command-line arguments that use a `/c` parameter to execute a command that has not previously been seen.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = cmd.exe Processes.process = \"* /c *\" by Processes.process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = cmd.exe Processes.process = \"* /c *\" by Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by process | outputlookup previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments | eval newCmdLineArgument=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newCmdLineArgument=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table process] | `first_time_seen_command_line_argument_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The complete process name with command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model. Please make sure you run the support search \"Previously seen command line arguments,\"—which creates a lookup file called `previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments.csv`—a historical baseline of all command-line arguments. You must also validate this list. For the search to do accurate calculation, ensure the search scheduling is the same value as the `relative_time` evaluation function.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate programs can also use command-line arguments to execute. Please verify the command-line arguments to check what command/program is being executed. We recommend customizing the `first_time_seen_cmd_line_filter` macro to exclude legitimate parent_process_name", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "First time seen command line argument", + "analytic_story": [ + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Hidden Cobra Malware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059.001", + "T1059.003" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059.001", + "T1059.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Hidden Cobra Malware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously seen command line arguments", + "id": "56059acf-50fe-4f60-98d1-b75b51b5c2f3", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-03-01", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for command-line arguments where `cmd.exe /c` is used to execute a program, then creates a baseline of the earliest and latest times we have encountered this command-line argument in our dataset within the last 30 days.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process=\"* /c *\" by Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The complete process name with command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "IcedID" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "First time seen command line argument" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059.001", + "T1059.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "first_time_seen_command_line_argument_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments", + "description": "A placeholder for a list of cmd line arugments that been seen before", + "filename": "previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments.csv" + }, + { + "name": "previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments", + "description": "A placeholder for a list of cmd line arugments that been seen before", + "filename": "previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments.csv" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window", + "id": "ee18ed37-0802-4268-9435-b3b91aaa18db", + "version": 8, + "date": "2022-01-12", + "author": "David Dorsey, Michael Haag Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following hunting analytic identifies PowerShell commands utilizing the WindowStyle parameter to hide the window on the compromised endpoint. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it is overriding the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide its activity from the user, and connects to the Internet. Removed in this version of the query is New-Object. The analytic identifies all variations of WindowStyle, as PowerShell allows the ability to shorten the parameter. For example w, win, windowsty and so forth. In addition, through our research it was identified that PowerShell will interpret different command switch types beyond the hyphen. We have added endash, emdash, horizontal bar, and forward slash.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"(?i)[\\-|\\/|–|—|―]w(in*d*o*w*s*t*y*l*e*)*\\s+[^-]\") | `powershell___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate process can have this combination of command-line options, but it's not common.", + "references": [ + "https://regexr.com/663rr", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses/blob/master/TestHarnesses/T1059.001_PowerShell/OutPowerShellCommandLineParameter.ps1", + "https://ss64.com/ps/powershell.html", + "https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/1440758396534214658?s=20", + "https://blog.netlab.360.com/ten-families-of-malicious-samples-are-spreading-using-the-log4j2-vulnerability-now/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "HAFNIUM Group", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 7", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Command And Control" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/hidden_powershell/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "PowerShell processes $process$ started with parameters to modify the execution policy of the run, run in a hidden window, and connect to the Internet on host $dest$ executed by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059.001", + "T1059" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 81, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059.001", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 7", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "HAFNIUM Group", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Command And Control" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 90, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 81 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 81 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059.001", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 7", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window", + "file": "endpoint/powershell___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/hidden_powershell/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_powershell", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "powershell___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", + "id": "f5f6af30-7aa7-4295-bfe9-07fe87c01a4b", + "version": 7, + "date": "2022-01-26", + "author": "Jose Hernandez, David Dorsey, Teoderick Contreras, Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to launch an application or service at system startup.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\RunOnce OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\run* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentVersion\\\\Windows\\\\Appinit_Dlls* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Shell* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Notify* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Userinit* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\VmApplet* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\policies\\\\explorer\\\\run* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\runservices* OR Registry.registry_path=HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Netsh\\\\* OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Image File Execution Options*\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=Debugger) OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Security Packages\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\\\\OSConfig\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Security Packages\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\SilentProcessExit\\\\*\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*currentVersion\\\\Windows\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Load\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentVersion\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Svchost\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\"AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"BootExecute\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Software\\\\Run\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"auto_update\")) by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "There are many legitimate applications that must execute on system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Ransomware", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "IcedID", + "Remcos" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 95, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/atomic_red_team/t1547001-runonce.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to persistence in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1547.001", + "T1547" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user" + ], + "risk_score": 76, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "Putter Panda", + "RTM", + "Rocke", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.001", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Ransomware", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "IcedID", + "Remcos" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 95 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 76 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 76 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.001", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", + "file": "endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Unusually Long Command Line", + "id": "c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6a4264e7f", + "version": 5, + "date": "2020-12-08", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious activity on your hosts.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| eval processlen=len(process) | eventstats stdev(processlen) as stdev, avg(processlen) as avg by dest | stats max(processlen) as maxlen, values(stdev) as stdevperhost, values(avg) as avgperhost by dest, user, process_name, process | `unusually_long_command_line_filter` |eval threshold = 3 | where maxlen > ((threshold*stdevperhost) + avgperhost)", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships, from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the process field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate applications start with long command lines.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Unusually Long Command Line", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Unusual Processes", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Unusually long command line $Processes.process_name$ on $dest$", + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Processes.process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Unusual Processes", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Processes.process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 42 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "Processes.process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "unusually_long_command_line_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK", + "id": "57edaefa-a73b-45e5-bbae-f39c1473f941", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-05-08", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious activity on your hosts. This search leverages the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) to help identify command lines with lengths that are unusual for a given user.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| eval processlen=len(process) | search user!=unknown | apply cmdline_pdfmodel threshold=0.01 | rename \"IsOutlier(processlen)\" as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | table firstTime lastTime user dest process_name process processlen count | `unusually_long_command_line___mltk_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that monitors command lines and populates the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model. In addition, MLTK version >= 4.2 must be installed on your search heads, along with any required dependencies. Finally, the support search \"Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK\" must be executed before this detection search, as it builds an ML model over the historical data used by this search. It is important that this search is run in the same app context as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild the model with the latest data available in your environment.", + "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate applications use long command lines for installs or updates. You should review identified command lines for legitimacy. You may modify the first part of the search to omit legitimate command lines from consideration. If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider changing the value of threshold in the search to a smaller value. You should also periodically re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data. You may get unexpected results if the user identified in the results is not present in the data used to build the associated model.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Unusual Processes", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Unusual Processes", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", + "id": "d2a4d85b-fc6a-47a0-82f6-bc1ec2ebc459", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-05-08", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model to characterize the length of the command lines observed for each user in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 30 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies outliers in the length of the command line.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as start_time max(_time) as end_time FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | search user!=unknown | `security_content_ctime(start_time)`| `security_content_ctime(end_time)`| eval processlen=len(process) | fit DensityFunction processlen by user into cmdline_pdfmodel", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint data model. In addition, you must have the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version >= 4.2 installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users in your environment, you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 30 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data. More information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Ransomware", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Unusual Processes" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd.exe", + "Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "unusually_long_command_line___mltk_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get History Of Email Sources", + "id": "ddc7af28-c34d-4392-af93-7f29a4e8806c", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-02-21", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Email" + ], + "description": "This search returns a list of all email sources seen in the 48 hours prior to the notable event to 24 hours after, and the number of emails from each source.", + "search": "|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Email.dest) as dest values(All_Email.recipient) as recepient min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count from datamodel=Email.All_Email by All_Email.src |`drop_dm_object_name(All_Email)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search src=$src$", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must ingest your email logs or capture unencrypted email communications within network traffic, and populate the Email data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "src" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Email.dest", + "All_Email.recipient", + "All_Email.src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_history_of_email_sources" + }, + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + }, + { + "name": "Get Parent Process Info", + "id": "fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41bf9", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-02-28", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "parent_process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Phishing Payloads", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_parent_process_info" + }, + { + "name": "Get Process Info", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd71", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-01", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the process running on a host which is under investigation. To gather the process info, enter the values for the process name in question and the destination IP address.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search process_name= $process_name$ | search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_process_info" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527", + "id": "fd79470a-da88-11eb-b803-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-07-01", + "author": "Splunk Threat Research Team", + "description": "The following analytic story identifies behaviors related PrintNightmare, or CVE-2021-34527 previously known as (CVE-2021-1675), to gain privilege escalation on the vulnerable machine.", + "narrative": "This vulnerability affects the Print Spooler service, enabled by default on Windows systems, and allows adversaries to trick this service into installing a remotely hosted print driver using a low privileged user account. Successful exploitation effectively allows adversaries to execute code in the target system (Remote Code Execution) in the context of the Print Spooler service which runs with the highest privileges (Privilege Escalation). \\\nThe prerequisites for successful exploitation consist of: \\\n1. Print Spooler service enabled on the target system \\\n1. Network connectivity to the target system (initial access has been obtained) \\\n1. Hash or password for a low privileged user ( or computer ) account. \\\nIn the most impactful scenario, an attacker would be able to leverage this vulnerability to obtain a SYSTEM shell on a domain controller and so escalate their privileges from a low privileged domain account to full domain access in the target environment as shown below.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/cube0x0/CVE-2021-1675/", + "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/fix-for-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675-exploit-to-keep-your-print-servers-running-while-a-patch-is-not-available/", + "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/exploitable-critical-rce-vulnerability-allows-regular-users-to-fully-compromise-active-directory-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675/", + "https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/ob6y02/critical_vulnerability_printnightmare_exposes" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527", + "analytic_story": "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527", + "category": [ + "Vulnerability" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "CopyKittens", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "MuddyWater", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "TA551" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "Cobalt Group", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "PLATINUM", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "Whitefly", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Print Spooler Adding A Printer Driver - Rule", + "ESCU - Print Spooler Failed to Load a Plug-in - Rule", + "ESCU - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", + "ESCU - Spoolsv Spawning Rundll32 - Rule", + "ESCU - Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules - Rule", + "ESCU - Spoolsv Suspicious Process Access - Rule", + "ESCU - Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Rule", + "ESCU - Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Sysmon - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "no", + "author_name": "Splunk Threat Research Team", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Print Spooler Adding A Printer Driver", + "id": "313681a2-da8e-11eb-adad-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-07-01", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies new printer drivers being load by utilizing the Windows PrintService operational logs, EventCode 316. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. \\\nWithin the proof of concept code, the following event will occur - \"Printer driver 1234 for Windows x64 Version-3 was added or updated. Files:- UNIDRV.DLL, kernelbase.dll, evil.dll. No user action is required.\" \\\nDuring triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events and review the source of where the exploitation began.", + "search": "`printservice` EventCode=316 category = \"Adding a printer driver\" Message = \"*kernelbase.dll,*\" Message = \"*UNIDRV.DLL,*\" Message = \"*.DLL.*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode EventCode ComputerName Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `print_spooler_adding_a_printer_driver_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You will need to ensure PrintService Admin and Operational logs are being logged to Splunk from critical or all systems.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown. This may require filtering.", + "references": [ + "https://twitter.com/MalwareJake/status/1410421445608476679?s=20", + "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/fix-for-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675-exploit-to-keep-your-print-servers-running-while-a-patch-is-not-available/", + "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/exploitable-critical-rce-vulnerability-allows-regular-users-to-fully-compromise-active-directory-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675/", + "https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/ob6y02/critical_vulnerability_printnightmare_exposes" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Print Spooler Adding A Printer Driver", + "analytic_story": [ + "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Defense Evasion", + "Scope:Inbound" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-printservice_operational.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious print driver was loaded on endpoint $ComputerName$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1547.012", + "T1547" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "OpCode", + "EventCode", + "ComputerName", + "Message" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-34527", + "CVE-2021-1675" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.012", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Defense Evasion", + "Scope:Inbound" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 90, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-34527", + "CVE-2021-1675" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 72 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.012", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Print Spooler Adding A Printer Driver Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Print Spooler Adding A Printer Driver", + "file": "endpoint/print_spooler_adding_a_printer_driver.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-printservice_operational.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-printservice_operational.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PrintService/Operational", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "printservice", + "definition": "source=\"wineventlog:microsoft-windows-printservice/operational\" OR sourcetype=\"WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PrintService/Admin\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "print_spooler_adding_a_printer_driver_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/print_spooler_adding_a_printer_driver.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Print Spooler Failed to Load a Plug-in", + "id": "1adc9548-da7c-11eb-8f13-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-07-01", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies driver load errors utilizing the Windows PrintService Admin logs. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. \\\nWithin the proof of concept code, the following error will occur - \"The print spooler failed to load a plug-in module C:\\Windows\\system32\\spool\\DRIVERS\\x64\\3\\meterpreter.dll, error code 0x45A. See the event user data for context information.\" \\\nThe analytic is based on file path and failure to load the plug-in. \\\nDuring triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events.", + "search": "`printservice` ((ErrorCode=\"0x45A\" (EventCode=\"808\" OR EventCode=\"4909\")) OR (\"The print spooler failed to load a plug-in module\" OR \"\\\\drivers\\\\x64\\\\\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode EventCode ComputerName Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `print_spooler_failed_to_load_a_plug_in_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You will need to ensure PrintService Admin and Operational logs are being logged to Splunk from critical or all systems.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives are unknown and filtering may be required.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/fix-for-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675-exploit-to-keep-your-print-servers-running-while-a-patch-is-not-available/", + "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/exploitable-critical-rce-vulnerability-allows-regular-users-to-fully-compromise-active-directory-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675/", + "https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/ob6y02/critical_vulnerability_printnightmare_exposes" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Print Spooler Failed to Load a Plug-in", + "analytic_story": [ + "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Defense Evasion", + "Scope:Inbound" + ], + "dataset": [], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious printer spooler errors have occured on endpoint $ComputerName$ with EventCode $EventCode$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1547.012", + "T1547" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "OpCode", + "EventCode", + "ComputerName", + "Message" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-34527", + "CVE-2021-1675" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.012", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Defense Evasion", + "Scope:Inbound" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 90, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-34527", + "CVE-2021-1675" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 72 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.012", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Print Spooler Failed to Load a Plug-in Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Print Spooler Failed to Load a Plug-in", + "file": "endpoint/print_spooler_failed_to_load_a_plug_in.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-printservice_admin.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-printservice_admin.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PrintService/Admin", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "printservice", + "definition": "source=\"wineventlog:microsoft-windows-printservice/operational\" OR sourcetype=\"WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PrintService/Admin\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "print_spooler_failed_to_load_a_plug_in_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/print_spooler_failed_to_load_a_plug_in.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network", + "id": "35307032-a12d-11eb-835f-acde48001122", + "version": 3, + "date": "2021-10-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments and performing a network connection. It is unusual for rundll32.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` by _time span=1h Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(rundll32\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port !=\"0\" by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port| `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_guid connection_to_CNC dest_port | `rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `port` node. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32", + "https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", + "Cobalt Strike", + "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A rundll32 process $process_name$ with no commandline argument like this process commandline $process$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 70, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-34527" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "CopyKittens", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "MuddyWater", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", + "Cobalt Strike", + "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-34527" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 70 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process name" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network", + "file": "endpoint/rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Spoolsv Spawning Rundll32", + "id": "15d905f6-da6b-11eb-ab82-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-07-01", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a suspicious child process, `rundll32.exe`, with no command-line arguments being spawned from `spoolsv.exe`. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. Typically, this is not normal behavior for `spoolsv.exe` to spawn a process. During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=spoolsv.exe `process_rundll32` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spoolsv_spawning_rundll32_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives have been identified. There are limited instances where `rundll32.exe` may be spawned by a legitimate print driver.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/fix-for-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675-exploit-to-keep-your-print-servers-running-while-a-patch-is-not-available/", + "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/exploitable-critical-rce-vulnerability-allows-regular-users-to-fully-compromise-active-directory-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675/", + "https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/ob6y02/critical_vulnerability_printnightmare_exposes" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Spoolsv Spawning Rundll32", + "analytic_story": [ + "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Defense Evasion", + "Scope:Local" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "$parent_process$ has spawned $process_name$ on endpoint $ComputerName$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1547.012", + "T1547" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_id", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process", + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_id", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-34527" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.012", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_id", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process", + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_id", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Defense Evasion", + "Scope:Local" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 90, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-34527" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 72 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_id", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_id", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.012", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Spoolsv Spawning Rundll32 Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Spoolsv Spawning Rundll32", + "file": "endpoint/spoolsv_spawning_rundll32.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "spoolsv_spawning_rundll32_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/spoolsv_spawning_rundll32.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules", + "id": "a5e451f8-da81-11eb-b245-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-07-01", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect suspicious loading of dll in specific path relative to printnightmare exploitation. In this search we try to detect the loaded modules made by spoolsv.exe after the exploitation.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 Image =\"*\\\\spoolsv.exe\" ImageLoaded=\"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\spool\\\\drivers\\\\x64\\\\*\" ImageLoaded = \"*.dll\" | stats dc(ImageLoaded) as countImgloaded values(ImageLoaded) as ImgLoaded count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image Computer process_id EventCode | where countImgloaded >= 3 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/hieuttmmo/sigma/dceb13fe3f1821b119ae495b41e24438bd97e3d0/rules/windows/image_load/sysmon_cve_2021_1675_print_nightmare.yml" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules", + "analytic_story": [ + "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Defense Evasion", + "Scope:Local" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "$Image$ with process id $process_id$ has loaded a driver from $ImageLoaded$ on endpoint $Computer$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1547.012", + "T1547" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_id", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Parent Process", + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ImageLoaded", + "type": "File", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Image", + "Computer", + "EventCode", + "ImageLoaded" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-34527" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.012", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_id", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Parent Process", + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ImageLoaded", + "type": "File", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Defense Evasion", + "Scope:Local" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 90, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-34527" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 72 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_id", + "threat_object_type": "process name" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "ImageLoaded", + "threat_object_type": "file" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.012", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules", + "file": "endpoint/spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Spoolsv Suspicious Process Access", + "id": "799b606e-da81-11eb-93f8-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-07-01", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies a suspicious behavior related to PrintNightmare, or CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675), to gain privilege escalation on the vulnerable machine. This exploit attacks a critical Windows Print Spooler Vulnerability to elevate privilege. This detection is to look for suspicious process access made by the spoolsv.exe that may related to the attack.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 SourceImage = \"*\\\\spoolsv.exe\" CallTrace = \"*\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\spool\\\\DRIVERS\\\\x64\\\\*\" TargetImage IN (\"*\\\\rundll32.exe\", \"*\\\\spoolsv.exe\") GrantedAccess = 0x1fffff | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer SourceImage TargetImage GrantedAccess CallTrace EventCode ProcessID| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spoolsv_suspicious_process_access_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with process access event where SourceImage, TargetImage, GrantedAccess and CallTrace executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of spoolsv.exe.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/cube0x0/impacket/commit/73b9466c17761384ece11e1028ec6689abad6818", + "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/fix-for-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675-exploit-to-keep-your-print-servers-running-while-a-patch-is-not-available/", + "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/exploitable-critical-rce-vulnerability-allows-regular-users-to-fully-compromise-active-directory-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675/", + "https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/ob6y02/critical_vulnerability_printnightmare_exposes" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Spoolsv Suspicious Process Access", + "analytic_story": [ + "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Defense Evasion", + "Scope:Local" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "$SourceImage$ was GrantedAccess open access to $TargetImage$ on endpoint $Computer$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1068" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ProcessID", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "TargetImage", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "SourceImage", + "TargetImage", + "GrantedAccess", + "CallTrace", + "EventCode" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-34527" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "Cobalt Group", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "PLATINUM", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "Whitefly", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1068" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ProcessID", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "TargetImage", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Defense Evasion", + "Scope:Local" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 90, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-34527" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 72 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "ProcessID", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "TargetImage", + "threat_object_type": "process name" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1068" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Spoolsv Suspicious Process Access Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Spoolsv Suspicious Process Access", + "file": "endpoint/spoolsv_suspicious_process_access.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "spoolsv_suspicious_process_access_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/spoolsv_suspicious_process_access.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Spoolsv Writing a DLL", + "id": "d5bf5cf2-da71-11eb-92c2-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-07-01", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a `.dll` being written by `spoolsv.exe`. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. Typically, this is not normal behavior for `spoolsv.exe` to write a `.dll`. Current POC code used will write the suspicious DLL to disk within a path of `\\spool\\drivers\\x64\\`. During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=spoolsv.exe by _time Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path=\"*\\\\spool\\\\drivers\\\\x64\\\\*\" Filesystem.file_name=\"*.dll\" by _time Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process] | dedup file_create_time | table dest file_create_time, file_name, file_path, process_name | `spoolsv_writing_a_dll_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node and `Filesystem` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/fix-for-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675-exploit-to-keep-your-print-servers-running-while-a-patch-is-not-available/", + "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/exploitable-critical-rce-vulnerability-allows-regular-users-to-fully-compromise-active-directory-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675/", + "https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/ob6y02/critical_vulnerability_printnightmare_exposes" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Spoolsv Writing a DLL", + "analytic_story": [ + "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "$process_name$ has been identified writing dll's to $file_path$ on endpoint $dest$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1547.012", + "T1547" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_id", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_path", + "type": "File", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Filesystem.file_create_time", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.file_path", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-34527" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.012", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_id", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_path", + "type": "File", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 90, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-34527" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 72 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_id", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "file_path", + "threat_object_type": "file" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.012", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Spoolsv Writing a DLL Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Spoolsv Writing a DLL", + "file": "endpoint/spoolsv_writing_a_dll.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "spoolsv_writing_a_dll_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/spoolsv_writing_a_dll.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Sysmon", + "id": "347fd388-da87-11eb-836d-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-07-01", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a `.dll` being written by `spoolsv.exe`. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously(CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. Typically, this is not normal behavior for `spoolsv.exe` to write a `.dll`. Current POC code used will write the suspicious DLL to disk within a path of `\\spool\\drivers\\x64\\`. During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventID=11 process_name=spoolsv.exe file_path=\"*\\\\spool\\\\drivers\\\\x64\\\\*\" file_name=*.dll | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, UserID, process_name, file_path, file_name, TargetFilename, process_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spoolsv_writing_a_dll___sysmon_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/cube0x0/impacket/commit/73b9466c17761384ece11e1028ec6689abad6818", + "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/fix-for-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675-exploit-to-keep-your-print-servers-running-while-a-patch-is-not-available/", + "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/exploitable-critical-rce-vulnerability-allows-regular-users-to-fully-compromise-active-directory-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675/", + "https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/ob6y02/critical_vulnerability_printnightmare_exposes" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Sysmon", + "analytic_story": [ + "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Defense Evasion", + "Scope:Local" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "$process_name$ has been identified writing dll's to $file_path$ on endpoint $dest$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1547.012", + "T1547" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_id", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_path", + "type": "File", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "dest", + "UserID", + "process_name", + "file_path", + "file_name", + "TargetFilename" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-34527" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.012", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_id", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_path", + "type": "File", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Defense Evasion", + "Scope:Local" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 90, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-34527" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 72 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_id", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "file_path", + "threat_object_type": "file" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.012", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Sysmon Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Sysmon", + "file": "endpoint/spoolsv_writing_a_dll___sysmon.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "spoolsv_writing_a_dll___sysmon_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/spoolsv_writing_a_dll___sysmon.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments", + "id": "e451bd16-e4c5-4109-8eb1-c4c6ecf048b4", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-09-20", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for rundll32.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(rundll32\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | `suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32", + "https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", + "Cobalt Strike", + "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Suspicious rundll32.exe process with no command line arguments executed on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-34527" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "CopyKittens", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "MuddyWater", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", + "Cobalt Strike", + "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-34527" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments", + "file": "endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [] + }, + { + "name": "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "id": "6d13121c-90f3-446d-8ac3-27efbbc65218", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-11", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "description": "Detect instances of prohibited network traffic allowed in the environment, as well as protocols running on non-standard ports. Both of these types of behaviors typically violate policy and can be leveraged by attackers.", + "narrative": "A traditional security best practice is to control the ports, protocols, and services allowed within your environment. By limiting the services and protocols to those explicitly approved by policy, administrators can minimize the attack surface. The combined effect allows both network defenders and security controls to focus and not be mired in superfluous traffic or data types. Looking for deviations to policy can identify attacker activity that abuses services and protocols to run on alternate or non-standard ports in the attempt to avoid detection or frustrate forensic analysts.", + "references": [ + "http://www.novetta.com/2015/02/advanced-methods-to-detect-advanced-cyber-attacks-protocol-abuse/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "analytic_story": "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "category": [ + "Best Practices" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Security Monitoring", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT3", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "OilRig", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT33", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Lazarus Group", + "OilRig", + "Thrip", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1071", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Magic Hound", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Protocols", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "FIN4", + "FIN8", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Orangeworm", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "SilverTerrier", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1189", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "PLATINUM", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Turla", + "Windigo", + "Windshift" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control", + "Exfiltration", + "Initial Access", + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint", + "Network_Resolution", + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Command & Control", + "Delivery", + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry - Rule", + "ESCU - Allow Inbound Traffic In Firewall Rule - Rule", + "ESCU - Enable RDP In Other Port Number - Rule", + "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", + "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", + "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [ + "ESCU - Count of Unique IPs Connecting to Ports" + ], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Rico Valdez", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry", + "id": "0a46537c-be02-11eb-92ca-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-26", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic detects a potential suspicious modification of firewall rule registry allowing inbound traffic in specific port with public profile. This technique was identified when an adversary wants to grant remote access to a machine by allowing the traffic in a firewall rule.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\System\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services\\\\SharedAccess\\\\Parameters\\\\FirewallPolicy\\\\FirewallRules\\\\*\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"*|Action=Allow|*\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"*|Dir=In|*\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"*|Profile=Public|*\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"*|LPort=*\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `allow_inbound_traffic_by_firewall_rule_registry_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "network admin may add/remove/modify public inbound firewall rule that may cause this rule to be triggered.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/netsecurity/new-netfirewallrule?view=windowsserver2019-ps" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry", + "analytic_story": [ + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/casper/datasets1/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 10, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious firewall modifications were detected via the registry on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021.001", + "T1021" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user" + ], + "risk_score": 3, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT3", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "OilRig", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021.001", + "T1021" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "impact": 10, + "confidence": 30 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 3 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 3 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021.001", + "T1021" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry", + "file": "endpoint/allow_inbound_traffic_by_firewall_rule_registry.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/casper/datasets1/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "allow_inbound_traffic_by_firewall_rule_registry_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/allow_inbound_traffic_by_firewall_rule_registry.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Allow Inbound Traffic In Firewall Rule", + "id": "a5d85486-b89c-11eb-8267-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-19", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell command to allow inbound traffic inbound to a specific local port within the public profile. This technique was seen in some attacker want to have a remote access to a machine by allowing the traffic in firewall rule.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*firewall*\" Message = \"*Inbound*\" Message = \"*Allow*\" Message = \"*-LocalPort*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `allow_inbound_traffic_in_firewall_rule_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the powershell logs from your endpoints. make sure you enable needed registry to monitor this event.", + "known_false_positives": "administrator may allow inbound traffic in certain network or machine.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/netsecurity/new-netfirewallrule?view=windowsserver2019-ps" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Allow Inbound Traffic In Firewall Rule", + "analytic_story": [ + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/casper/datasets1/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 10, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious firewall modification detected on endpoint $ComputerName$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021.001", + "T1021" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 3, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT3", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "OilRig", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021.001", + "T1021" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "impact": 10, + "confidence": 30 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 3 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 3 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021.001", + "T1021" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Allow Inbound Traffic In Firewall Rule Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Allow Inbound Traffic In Firewall Rule", + "file": "endpoint/allow_inbound_traffic_in_firewall_rule.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/casper/datasets1/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "allow_inbound_traffic_in_firewall_rule_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/allow_inbound_traffic_in_firewall_rule.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Enable RDP In Other Port Number", + "id": "99495452-b899-11eb-96dc-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-28", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a modification to registry to enable rdp to a machine with different port number. This technique was seen in some atttacker tries to do lateral movement and remote access to a compromised machine to gain control of it.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*HKLM\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Terminal Server\\\\WinStations\\\\RDP-Tcp*\" Registry.registry_value_name = \"PortNumber\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `enable_rdp_in_other_port_number_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.mvps.net/docs/how-to-secure-remote-desktop-rdp/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Enable RDP In Other Port Number", + "analytic_story": [ + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/casper/datasets1/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "RDP was moved to a non-standard port on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.registry_value_name" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Enable RDP In Other Port Number Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Enable RDP In Other Port Number", + "file": "endpoint/enable_rdp_in_other_port_number.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/casper/datasets1/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "enable_rdp_in_other_port_number_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/enable_rdp_in_other_port_number.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed", + "id": "ce5a0962-849f-4720-a678-753fe6674479", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search looks for network traffic defined by port and transport layer protocol in the Enterprise Security lookup table \"lookup_interesting_ports\", that is marked as prohibited, and has an associated 'allow' action in the Network_Traffic data model. This could be indicative of a misconfigured network device.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.action = allowed by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip All_Traffic.dest_port All_Traffic.action | lookup update=true interesting_ports_lookup dest_port as All_Traffic.dest_port OUTPUT app is_prohibited note transport | search is_prohibited=true | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `prohibited_network_traffic_allowed_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from firewalls or other network control devices that mediate the traffic allowed into an environment. This is necessary so that the search can identify an 'action' taken on the traffic of interest. The search requires the Network_Traffic data model be populated.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed", + "analytic_story": [ + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Command & Control" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 9", + "CIS 12" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery", + "Command & Control" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1048" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "PR.AC" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.action", + "All_Traffic.src_ip", + "All_Traffic.dest_ip", + "All_Traffic.dest_port" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1048" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery", + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 9", + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "PR.AC" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Command & Control" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Count of Unique IPs Connecting to Ports", + "id": "9f3bae5a-9fe3-49df-8c84-5edc51d84b7f", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-13", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "The search counts the number of times a connection was observed to each destination port, and the number of unique source IPs connecting to them.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count dc(All_Traffic.src) as numberOfUniqueHosts from datamodel=Network_Traffic by All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | sort - count", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting network traffic, and populating the Network_Traffic data model.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Command & Control" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1048" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery", + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 9", + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "PR.AC" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "prohibited_network_traffic_allowed_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Protocol or Port Mismatch", + "id": "54dc1265-2f74-4b6d-b30d-49eb506a31b3", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search looks for network traffic on common ports where a higher layer protocol does not match the port that is being used. For example, this search should identify cases where protocols other than HTTP are running on TCP port 80. This can be used by attackers to circumvent firewall restrictions, or as an attempt to hide malicious communications over ports and protocols that are typically allowed and not well inspected.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where (All_Traffic.app=dns NOT All_Traffic.dest_port=53) OR ((All_Traffic.app=web-browsing OR All_Traffic.app=http) NOT (All_Traffic.dest_port=80 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=8080 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=8000)) OR (All_Traffic.app=ssl NOT (All_Traffic.dest_port=443 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=8443)) OR (All_Traffic.app=smtp NOT All_Traffic.dest_port=25) by All_Traffic.src_ip, All_Traffic.dest_ip, All_Traffic.app, All_Traffic.dest_port |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `protocol_or_port_mismatch_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "Running this search properly requires a technology that can inspect network traffic and identify common protocols. Technologies such as Bro and Palo Alto Networks firewalls are two examples that will identify protocols via inspection, and not just assume a specific protocol based on the transport protocol and ports.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Protocol or Port Mismatch", + "analytic_story": [ + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Command & Control" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 9", + "CIS 12" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1048.003", + "T1048" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "PR.AC" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.app", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.src_ip", + "All_Traffic.dest_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT33", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Lazarus Group", + "OilRig", + "Thrip", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1048.003", + "T1048" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 9", + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "PR.AC" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Command & Control" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1048.003", + "T1048" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 9", + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "PR.AC" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "protocol_or_port_mismatch_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "TOR Traffic", + "id": "ea688274-9c06-4473-b951-e4cb7a5d7a45", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-22", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search looks for network traffic identified as The Onion Router (TOR), a benign anonymity network which can be abused for a variety of nefarious purposes.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.app=tor AND All_Traffic.action=allowed by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip All_Traffic.dest_port All_Traffic.action | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `tor_traffic_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from firewalls or other network control devices that mediate the traffic allowed into an environment. This is necessary so that the search can identify an 'action' taken on the traffic of interest. The search requires the Network_Traffic data model be populated.", + "known_false_positives": "None at this time", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "TOR Traffic", + "analytic_story": [ + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Command & Control", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 9", + "CIS 12" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1071", + "T1071.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.app", + "All_Traffic.action", + "All_Traffic.src_ip", + "All_Traffic.dest_ip", + "All_Traffic.dest_port" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1071", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Magic Hound", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Protocols", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "FIN4", + "FIN8", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Orangeworm", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "SilverTerrier", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1071", + "T1071.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 9", + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Command & Control", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1071", + "T1071.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 9", + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "tor_traffic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/tor_traffic.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers", + "id": "a1e761ac-1344-4dbd-88b2-3f34c912d359", + "version": 3, + "date": "2021-01-14", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Resolution" + ], + "description": "Malicious actors often abuse legitimate Dynamic DNS services to host malicious payloads or interactive command and control nodes. Attackers will automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to countless IP addresses to circumvent firewall blocks, block lists as well as frustrate a network defenders analytic and investigative processes. This search will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.answer) as answer min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query host | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `dynamic_dns_providers` | `detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "First, you'll need to ingest data from your DNS operations. This can be done by ingesting logs from your server or data, collected passively by Splunk Stream or a similar solution. Specifically, data that contains the domain that is being queried and the IP of the host originating the request must be populating the `Network_Resolution` data model. This search also leverages a lookup file, `dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv`, which contains a non-exhaustive list of Dynamic DNS providers. Please consider updating the local lookup periodically by adding new domains to the list of `dynamic_dns_providers_local.csv`.\\\nThis search produces fields (query, answer, isDynDNS) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable event. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review. Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** DNS Query, **Field:** query\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** DNS Answer, **Field:** answer\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** IsDynamicDNS, **Field:** isDynDNS\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", + "known_false_positives": "Some users and applications may leverage Dynamic DNS to reach out to some domains on the Internet since dynamic DNS by itself is not malicious, however this activity must be verified.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers", + "analytic_story": [ + "Data Protection", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "DNS Hijacking", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Command & Control" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1189/dyn_dns_site/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A dns query $query$ from your infra connecting to suspicious domain in host $host$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1189" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "host", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "DNS.answer", + "DNS.query", + "host" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1189", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "PLATINUM", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Turla", + "Windigo", + "Windshift" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1189" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Data Protection", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "DNS Hijacking", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Command & Control" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "host", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "host", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1189" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers", + "file": "network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1189/dyn_dns_site/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "dynamic_dns_providers", + "definition": "lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_default dynamic_dns_domains as query OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_default | lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_local dynamic_dns_domains as query OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_local| eval isDynDNS = coalesce(isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local)|fields - isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local| search isDynDNS=True", + "description": "This macro limits the output of the query field to dynamic dns domains. It looks up the domains in a file provided by Splunk and one intended to be updated by the end user." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml", + "source": "network" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get DNS Server History for a host", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-11-09", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "While investigating any detections it is important to understand which and how many DNS servers a host has connected to in the past. This search uses data that is tagged as DNS and gives you a count and list of DNS servers that a particular host has connected to the previous 24 hours.", + "search": "| search tag=dns src_ip=$src_ip$ dest_port=53 | streamstats time_window=1d count values(dest_ip) as dcip by src_ip | table date_mday src_ip dcip count | sort -count", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting your DNS traffic", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "src_ip" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Command & Control", + "DNS Hijacking", + "Data Protection", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "src_ip", + "dest_port", + "dest_ip" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_dns_server_history_for_a_host" + }, + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + }, + { + "name": "Get Parent Process Info", + "id": "fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41bf9", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-02-28", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "parent_process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Phishing Payloads", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_parent_process_info" + }, + { + "name": "Get Process Info", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd71", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-01", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the process running on a host which is under investigation. To gather the process info, enter the values for the process name in question and the destination IP address.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search process_name= $process_name$ | search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_process_info" + }, + { + "name": "Get Process Information For Port Activity", + "id": "9925d08f-561e-4faa-8912-e3888a842341", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-01", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search will return information about the process associated with observed network traffic to a specific destination port from a specific host.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search dest=$dest$ | join dest type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Ports by Ports.process_id Ports.src Ports.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | search dest_port=$dest_port$ | rename src as dest]", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data that associates processes with network events and populate the Endpoint Datamodel", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest", + "dest_port" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Ports.process_id", + "Ports.src", + "Ports.dest_port" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_process_information_for_port_activity" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "ProxyShell", + "id": "413bb68e-04e2-11ec-a835-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-24", + "author": "Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "description": "ProxyShell is a chain of exploits targeting on-premise Microsoft Exchange Server - CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, and CVE-2021-31207.", + "narrative": "During Pwn2Own April 2021, a security researcher demonstrated an attack chain targeting on-premise Microsoft Exchange Server. August 5th, the same researcher publicly released further details and demonstrated the attack chain. CVE-2021-34473 Pre-auth path confusion leads to ACL Bypass (Patched in April by KB5001779) CVE-2021-34523 - Elevation of privilege on Exchange PowerShell backend (Patched in April by KB5001779) . CVE-2021-31207 - Post-auth Arbitrary-File-Write leads to RCE (Patched in May by KB5003435) Upon successful exploitation, the remote attacker will have SYSTEM privileges on the Exchange Server. In addition to remote access/execution, the adversary may be able to run Exchange PowerShell Cmdlets to perform further actions.", + "references": [ + "https://y4y.space/2021/08/12/my-steps-of-reproducing-proxyshell/", + "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/8/17/from-pwn2own-2021-a-new-attack-surface-on-microsoft-exchange-proxyshell", + "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FC6iHw258RI", + "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-microsoft-exchange-servers-still-vulnerable-to-proxyshell-exploit#what-should-you-do", + "https://i.blackhat.com/USA21/Wednesday-Handouts/us-21-ProxyLogon-Is-Just-The-Tip-Of-The-Iceberg-A-New-Attack-Surface-On-Microsoft-Exchange-Server.pdf" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "ProxyShell", + "analytic_story": "ProxyShell", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics", + "Ransomware" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Volatile Cedar" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation", + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Detect Exchange Web Shell - Rule", + "ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule", + "ESCU - Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF - Rule", + "ESCU - Exchange PowerShell Module Usage - Rule", + "ESCU - Microsoft Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "author_name": "Michael Haag", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Detect Exchange Web Shell", + "id": "8c14eeee-2af1-4a4b-bda8-228da0f4862a", + "version": 3, + "date": "2021-10-05", + "author": "Michael Haag, Shannon Davis, David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following query identifies suspicious .aspx created in 3 paths identified by Microsoft as known drop locations for Exchange exploitation related to HAFNIUM group and recently disclosed vulnerablity named ProxyShell. Paths include: `\\HttpProxy\\owa\\auth\\`, `\\inetpub\\wwwroot\\aspnet_client\\`, and `\\HttpProxy\\OAB\\`. Upon triage, the suspicious .aspx file will likely look obvious on the surface. inspect the contents for script code inside. Identify additional log sources, IIS included, to review source and other potential exploitation. It is often the case that a particular threat is only applicable to a specific subset of systems in your environment. Typically analytics to detect those threats are written without the benefit of being able to only target those systems as well. Writing analytics against all systems when those behaviors are limited to identifiable subsets of those systems is suboptimal. Consider the case ProxyShell vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Servers. With asset information, a hunter can limit their analytics to systems that have been identified as Exchange servers. A hunter may start with the theory that the exchange server is communicating with new systems that it has not previously. If this theory is run against all publicly facing systems, the amount of noise it will generate will likely render this theory untenable. However, using the asset information to limit this analytic to just the Exchange servers will reduce the noise allowing the hunter to focus only on the systems where this behavioral change is relevant.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=System by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*\\\\HttpProxy\\\\owa\\\\auth\\\\*\", \"*\\\\inetpub\\\\wwwroot\\\\aspnet_client\\\\*\", \"*\\\\HttpProxy\\\\OAB\\\\*\") Filesystem.file_name=\"*.aspx\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process] | dedup file_create_time | table dest file_create_time, file_name, file_path, process_name | `detect_exchange_web_shell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node and `Filesystem` node.", + "known_false_positives": "The query is structured in a way that `action` (read, create) is not defined. Review the results of this query, filter, and tune as necessary. It may be necessary to generate this query specific to your endpoint product.", + "references": [ + "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample%20Data/Feeds/MSTICIoCs-ExchangeServerVulnerabilitiesDisclosedMarch2021.csv", + "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/8/17/from-pwn2own-2021-a-new-attack-surface-on-microsoft-exchange-proxyshell", + "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FC6iHw258RI", + "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-microsoft-exchange-servers-still-vulnerable-to-proxyshell-exploit#what-should-you-do" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Exchange Web Shell", + "analytic_story": [ + "HAFNIUM Group", + "ProxyShell" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/windows-sysmon_proxylogon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk that is related to IIS exploitation previously performed by HAFNIUM. Review further file modifications on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1505", + "T1505.003", + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_name", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.file_path", + "Filesystem.process_id", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.file_hash", + "Filesystem.user" + ], + "risk_score": 81, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Volatile Cedar" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1505", + "T1505.003", + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "HAFNIUM Group", + "ProxyShell" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_name", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 81 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 81 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "file_name", + "threat_object_type": "file name" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1505", + "T1505.003", + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Exchange Web Shell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Exchange Web Shell", + "file": "endpoint/detect_exchange_web_shell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/windows-sysmon_proxylogon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_exchange_web_shell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_exchange_web_shell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "W3WP Spawning Shell", + "id": "0f03423c-7c6a-11eb-bc47-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-03-03", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This query identifies a shell, PowerShell.exe or Cmd.exe, spawning from W3WP.exe, or IIS. In addition to IIS logs, this behavior with an EDR product will capture potential webshell activity, similar to the HAFNIUM Group abusing CVEs, on publicly available Exchange mail servers. During triage, review the parent process and child process of the shell being spawned. Review the command-line arguments and any file modifications that may occur. Identify additional parallel process, child processes, that may highlight further commands executed. After triaging, work to contain the threat and patch the system that is vulnerable.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=w3wp.exe AND `process_cmd` OR `process_powershell` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `w3wp_spawning_shell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Baseline your environment before production. It is possible build systems using IIS will spawn cmd.exe to perform a software build. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/02/04/ghost-in-the-shell-investigating-web-shell-attacks/", + "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/8/17/from-pwn2own-2021-a-new-attack-surface-on-microsoft-exchange-proxyshell", + "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FC6iHw258RI", + "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-microsoft-exchange-servers-still-vulnerable-to-proxyshell-exploit#what-should-you-do" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "W3WP Spawning Shell", + "analytic_story": [ + "HAFNIUM Group", + "ProxyShell" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Possible Web Shell execution on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1505", + "T1505.003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-34473", + "CVE-2021-34523", + "CVE-2021-31207" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Volatile Cedar" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1505", + "T1505.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "HAFNIUM Group", + "ProxyShell" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-34473", + "CVE-2021-34523", + "CVE-2021-31207" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1505", + "T1505.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "W3WP Spawning Shell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "W3WP Spawning Shell", + "file": "endpoint/w3wp_spawning_shell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_powershell", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "process_cmd", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "w3wp_spawning_shell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/w3wp_spawning_shell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF", + "id": "29228ab4-0762-11ec-94aa-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-27", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This analytic identifies suspicious behavior related to ProxyShell against on-premise Microsoft Exchange servers. \\\nModification of this analytic is requried to ensure fields are mapped accordingly. \\\nA suspicious event will have `PowerShell`, the method `POST` and `autodiscover.json`. This is indicative of accessing PowerShell on the back end of Exchange with SSRF. \\\nAn event will look similar to `POST /autodiscover/autodiscover.json a=dsxvu@fnsso.flq/powershell/?X-Rps-CAT=VgEAVAdXaW5kb3d...` (abbreviated) \\\nReview the source attempting to perform this activity against your environment. In addition, review PowerShell logs and access recently granted to Exchange roles.", + "search": "| `exchange` c_uri=\"*//autodiscover.json*\" cs_uri_query=\"*PowerShell*\" cs_method=\"POST\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, cs_uri_query, cs_method, c_uri | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `exchange_powershell_abuse_via_ssrf_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "The following analytic requires on-premise Exchange to be logging to Splunk using the TA - https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3225. Ensure logs are parsed correctly, or tune the analytic for your environment.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives, however, tune as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/GossiTheDog/ThreatHunting/blob/master/AzureSentinel/Exchange-Powershell-via-SSRF", + "https://blog.orange.tw/2021/08/proxylogon-a-new-attack-surface-on-ms-exchange-part-1.html", + "https://peterjson.medium.com/reproducing-the-proxyshell-pwn2own-exploit-49743a4ea9a1" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF", + "analytic_story": [ + "ProxyShell" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/exchange-events.json" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Activity related to ProxyShell has been identified on $dest$. Review events and take action accordingly.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "dest", + "cs_uri_query", + "cs_method", + "c_uri" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "ProxyShell" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "exchange", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"MSWindows:IIS\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "exchange_powershell_abuse_via_ssrf_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/exchange_powershell_abuse_via_ssrf.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Exchange PowerShell Module Usage", + "id": "2d10095e-05ae-11ec-8fdf-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-27", + "author": "Michael Haag", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the usage of Exchange PowerShell modules that were recently used for a proof of concept related to ProxyShell. Currently, there is no active data shared or data we could re-produce relate to this part of the ProxyShell chain of exploits. \\\nInherently, the usage of the modules is not malicious, but reviewing parallel processes, and user, of the session will assist with determining the intent. \\\nModule - New-MailboxExportRequest will begin the process of exporting contents of a primary mailbox or archive to a .pst file. \\\nModule - New-managementroleassignment can assign a management role to a management role group, management role assignment policy, user, or universal security group (USG).", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message IN (\"*New-MailboxExportRequest*\", \"*New-ManagementRoleAssignment*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Path Message OpCode ComputerName User EventCode| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `exchange_powershell_module_usage_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/new-mailboxexportrequest?view=exchange-ps", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/new-managementroleassignment?view=exchange-ps", + "https://blog.orange.tw/2021/08/proxyshell-a-new-attack-surface-on-ms-exchange-part-3.html", + "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/8/17/from-pwn2own-2021-a-new-attack-surface-on-microsoft-exchange-proxyshell", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/11/15/exchange-exploit-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Exchange PowerShell Module Usage", + "analytic_story": [ + "ProxyShell" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Local user discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Path", + "Message", + "OpCode", + "ComputerName", + "User", + "EventCode" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "ProxyShell" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "exchange_powershell_module_usage_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/exchange_powershell_module_usage.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Microsoft Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages", + "id": "985f322c-57a5-11ec-b9ac-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-07", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following query identifies suspicious .aspx created in 3 paths identified by Microsoft as known drop locations for Exchange exploitation related to HAFNIUM group and recently disclosed vulnerablity named ProxyShell. Paths include: `\\HttpProxy\\owa\\auth\\`, `\\inetpub\\wwwroot\\aspnet_client\\`, and `\\HttpProxy\\OAB\\`. The analytic is limited to process name MSExchangeMailboxReplication.exe, which typically does not write .aspx files to disk. Upon triage, the suspicious .aspx file will likely look obvious on the surface. inspect the contents for script code inside. Identify additional log sources, IIS included, to review source and other potential exploitation. It is often the case that a particular threat is only applicable to a specific subset of systems in your environment. Typically analytics to detect those threats are written without the benefit of being able to only target those systems as well. Writing analytics against all systems when those behaviors are limited to identifiable subsets of those systems is suboptimal. Consider the case ProxyShell vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Servers. With asset information, a hunter can limit their analytics to systems that have been identified as Exchange servers. A hunter may start with the theory that the exchange server is communicating with new systems that it has not previously. If this theory is run against all publicly facing systems, the amount of noise it will generate will likely render this theory untenable. However, using the asset information to limit this analytic to just the Exchange servers will reduce the noise allowing the hunter to focus only on the systems where this behavioral change is relevant.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=MSExchangeMailboxReplication.exe by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process_guid Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*\\\\HttpProxy\\\\owa\\\\auth\\\\*\", \"*\\\\inetpub\\\\wwwroot\\\\aspnet_client\\\\*\", \"*\\\\HttpProxy\\\\OAB\\\\*\") Filesystem.file_name=\"*.aspx\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process process_guid] | dedup file_create_time | table dest file_create_time, file_name, file_path, process_name | `microsoft_exchange_mailbox_replication_service_writing_active_server_pages_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node and `Filesystem` node.", + "known_false_positives": "The query is structured in a way that `action` (read, create) is not defined. Review the results of this query, filter, and tune as necessary. It may be necessary to generate this query specific to your endpoint product.", + "references": [ + "https://redcanary.com/blog/blackbyte-ransomware/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Microsoft Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages", + "analytic_story": [ + "ProxyShell", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/windows-sysmon_proxylogon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk that is related to IIS exploitation related to ProxyShell. Review further file modifications on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1505", + "T1505.003", + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_name", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.file_path", + "Filesystem.process_id", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.file_hash", + "Filesystem.user", + "Filesystem.process_guid", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process_guid" + ], + "risk_score": 81, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Volatile Cedar" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1505", + "T1505.003", + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "ProxyShell", + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_name", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 81 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 81 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "file_name", + "threat_object_type": "file name" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1505", + "T1505.003", + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "microsoft_exchange_mailbox_replication_service_writing_active_server_pages_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/microsoft_exchange_mailbox_replication_service_writing_active_server_pages.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [] + }, + { + "name": "Ransomware", + "id": "cf309d0d-d4aa-4fbb-963d-1e79febd3756", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-02-04", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage, the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected locations, and many others.", + "narrative": "Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise. Attackers can deploy ransomware to enterprises through spearphishing campaigns and driveby downloads, as well as through traditional remote service-based exploitation. In the case of the WannaCry campaign, there was self-propagating wormable functionality that was used to maximize infection. Fortunately, organizations can apply several techniques--such as those in this Analytic Story--to detect and or mitigate the effects of ransomware.", + "references": [ + "https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/06/28/carbon-black-threat-research-technical-analysis-petya-notpetya-ransomware/", + "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2017/06/27/closing-the-detection-to-mitigation-gap-or-to-petya-or-notpetya-whocares-.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Ransomware", + "analytic_story": "Ransomware", + "category": [ + "Malware" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CostaRicto", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Machete", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "CopyKittens", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Gallmaker", + "HAFNIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sowbug", + "Turla", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1560", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Patchwork", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Evilnum", + "FIN10", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Group5", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "Mustang Panda", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "The White Company", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "CMSTP", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Cobalt Group", + "MuddyWater" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", + "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1020", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Exfiltration", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Frankenstein", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Honeybee", + "Sidewinder", + "Tropic Trooper" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Chimera", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "admin@338" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "Chimera", + "FIN8" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "Chimera", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Poseidon Group", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "admin@338" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "TA505" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN8", + "Indrik Spider", + "Operation Wocao" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1489", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Indrik Spider", + "Lazarus Group", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1531", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1569", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "FIN6", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Operation Wocao", + "Silence", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "FIN4", + "FIN7", + "Frankenstein", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Windshift" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1222", + "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1491", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Defacement", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Chimera", + "GALLIUM", + "Higaisa", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Patchwork", + "Sidewinder", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1027", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackOasis", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dust Storm", + "Elderwood", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Group5", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1027.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal from Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT3", + "Deep Panda", + "GALLIUM", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Turla" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.015", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Component Object Model Hijacking", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1592", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "Putter Panda", + "RTM", + "Rocke", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN8", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "GALLIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.007", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Msiexec", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Machete", + "Molerats", + "Rancor", + "TA505", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1486", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "APT41", + "FIN7", + "Indrik Spider", + "TA505" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Mustang Panda", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1588.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Tool", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Resource Development" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Cleaver", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "CostaRicto", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Dragonfly", + "FIN10", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gorgon Group", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Patchwork", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Volatile Cedar" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Operation Wocao", + "Orangeworm", + "Sandworm Team", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1071", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Magic Hound", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Protocols", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "FIN4", + "FIN8", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Orangeworm", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "SilverTerrier", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection", + "Command And Control", + "Defense Evasion", + "Discovery", + "Execution", + "Exfiltration", + "Impact", + "Initial Access", + "Lateral Movement", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation", + "Reconnaissance", + "Resource Development" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint", + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Command & Control", + "Delivery", + "Exploitation", + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", + "ESCU - 7zip CommandLine To SMB Share Path - Rule", + "ESCU - Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall - Rule", + "ESCU - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule", + "ESCU - Allow Operation with Consent Admin - Rule", + "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", + "ESCU - Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App - Rule", + "ESCU - CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass - Rule", + "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", + "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", + "ESCU - Conti Common Exec parameter - Rule", + "ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule", + "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect RClone Command-Line Usage - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Renamed RClone - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect SharpHound File Modifications - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect SharpHound Usage - Rule", + "ESCU - Disable AMSI Through Registry - Rule", + "ESCU - Disable ETW Through Registry - Rule", + "ESCU - Disable Logs Using WevtUtil - Rule", + "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", + "ESCU - Excessive Service Stop Attempt - Rule", + "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule", + "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility - Rule", + "ESCU - Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID - Rule", + "ESCU - Fsutil Zeroing File - Rule", + "ESCU - ICACLS Grant Command - Rule", + "ESCU - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule", + "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", + "ESCU - Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading - Rule", + "ESCU - Permission Modification using Takeown App - Rule", + "ESCU - Powershell Disable Security Monitoring - Rule", + "ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule", + "ESCU - Powershell Execute COM Object - Rule", + "ESCU - Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit - Rule", + "ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", + "ESCU - Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD - Rule", + "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", + "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", + "ESCU - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule", + "ESCU - Revil Registry Entry - Rule", + "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", + "ESCU - Start Up During Safe Mode Boot - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", + "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", + "ESCU - UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object - Rule", + "ESCU - Uninstall App Using MsiExec - Rule", + "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", + "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", + "ESCU - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows DiskCryptor Usage - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows Raccine Scheduled Task Deletion - Rule", + "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", + "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", + "ESCU - Microsoft Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages - Rule", + "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", + "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", + "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", + "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", + "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", + "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", + "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", + "ESCU - Rundll32 LockWorkStation - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [ + "ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", + "ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", + "ESCU - Count of Unique IPs Connecting to Ports" + ], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "David Dorsey", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware", + "id": "1297fb80-f42a-4b4a-9c8b-78c066437cf6", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line that indicate that task names related to the execution of Bad Rabbit ransomware were created or deleted. Deprecated because we already have a similar detection", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process) as process from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe (Processes.process= \"*create*\" OR Processes.process= \"*delete*\") by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search (process=*rhaegal* OR process=*drogon* OR *viserion_*) | `scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "No known false positives", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.005" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CostaRicto", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Machete", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.005" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.005" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "7zip CommandLine To SMB Share Path", + "id": "01d29b48-ff6f-11eb-b81e-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-17", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious 7z process with commandline pointing to SMB network share. This technique was seen in CONTI LEAK tools where it use 7z to archive a sensitive files and place it in network share tmp folder. This search is a good hunting query that may give analyst a hint why specific user try to archive a file pointing to SMB user which is un usual.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name =\"7z.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"7za.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name = \"7z.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name = \"7za.exe\") AND (Processes.process=\"*\\\\C$\\\\*\" OR Processes.process=\"*\\\\Admin$\\\\*\" OR Processes.process=\"*\\\\IPC$\\\\*\") by Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `7zip_commandline_to_smb_share_path_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed 7z.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1423361119926816776.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "7zip CommandLine To SMB Share Path", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/conti/conti_leak/windows-sysmon_7z.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "archive process $process_name$ with suspicious cmdline $process$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1560.001", + "T1560" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "SourceImage", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "CopyKittens", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Gallmaker", + "HAFNIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sowbug", + "Turla", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1560", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Patchwork", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1560.001", + "T1560" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "SourceImage", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "SourceImage", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1560.001", + "T1560" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "7zip CommandLine To SMB Share Path Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "7zip CommandLine To SMB Share Path", + "file": "endpoint/7zip_commandline_to_smb_share_path.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon_7z.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/conti/conti_leak/windows-sysmon_7z.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "7zip_commandline_to_smb_share_path_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/7zip_commandline_to_smb_share_path.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall", + "id": "ce27646e-d411-11eb-8a00-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-06-23", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious modification of firewall to allow file and printer sharing. This technique was seen in ransomware to be able to discover more machine connected to the compromised host to encrypt more files", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_netsh` Processes.process= \"*firewall*\" Processes.process= \"*group=\\\"File and Printer Sharing\\\"*\" Processes.process=\"*enable=Yes*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "network admin may modify this firewall feature that may cause this rule to be triggered.", + "references": [ + "https://kb.fortinet.com/kb/documentLink.do?externalID=FD52469", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/c0f98850-af65-4352-9746-fbebadee4f05/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.007", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.007", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.007", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall", + "file": "endpoint/allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_netsh", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=netsh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=netsh.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Allow Network Discovery In Firewall", + "id": "ccd6a38c-d40b-11eb-85a5-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-06-23", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious modification to the firewall to allow network discovery on a machine. This technique was seen in couple of ransomware (revil, reddot) to discover other machine connected to the compromised host to encrypt more files.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_netsh` Processes.process= \"*firewall*\" Processes.process= \"*group=\\\"Network Discovery\\\"*\" Processes.process=\"*enable*\" Processes.process=\"*Yes*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `allow_network_discovery_in_firewall_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "network admin may modify this firewall feature that may cause this rule to be triggered.", + "references": [ + "https://kb.fortinet.com/kb/documentLink.do?externalID=FD52469", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/c0f98850-af65-4352-9746-fbebadee4f05/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Allow Network Discovery In Firewall", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Revil Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.007", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.007", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Revil Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.007", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Allow Network Discovery In Firewall Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Allow Network Discovery In Firewall", + "file": "endpoint/allow_network_discovery_in_firewall.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_netsh", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=netsh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=netsh.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "allow_network_discovery_in_firewall_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/allow_network_discovery_in_firewall.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Allow Operation with Consent Admin", + "id": "7de17d7a-c9d8-11eb-a812-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-26", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies a potential privilege escalation attempt to perform malicious task. This registry modification is designed to allow the `Consent Admin` to perform an operation that requires elevation without consent or credentials. We also found this in some attacker to gain privilege escalation to the compromise machine.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System*\" Registry.registry_value_name = ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000000\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `allow_operation_with_consent_admin_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-gpsb/341747f5-6b5d-4d30-85fc-fa1cc04038d4", + "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/no/threat-encyclopedia/malware/Ransom.Win32.MRDEC.MRA/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Allow Operation with Consent Admin", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious registry modification was performed on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior is indicative of privilege escalation.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Allow Operation with Consent Admin Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Allow Operation with Consent Admin", + "file": "endpoint/allow_operation_with_consent_admin.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "allow_operation_with_consent_admin_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/allow_operation_with_consent_admin.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification", + "id": "809b31d2-5462-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-12-21", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for flags passed to bcdedit.exe modifications to the built-in Windows error recovery boot configurations. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent recovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = bcdedit.exe Processes.process=\"*recoveryenabled*\" (Processes.process=\"* no*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. Tune based on parent process names.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may modify the boot configuration.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1490/T1490.md#atomic-test-4---windows---disable-windows-recovery-console-repair" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 100, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting disable the ability to recover the endpoint.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1490" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1490" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "impact": 100, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1490" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification", + "file": "endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App", + "id": "cd80a6ac-c9d9-11eb-8839-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-10", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "this search is to detect execution of `cipher.exe` to clear the unallocated sectors of a specific disk. This technique was seen in some ransomware to make it impossible to forensically recover deleted files.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"cipher.exe\" Processes.process = \"*/w:*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "administrator may execute this app to manage disk", + "references": [ + "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/vatet-pyxie-defray777/3/", + "https://www.sophos.com/en-us/medialibrary/PDFs/technical-papers/sophoslabs-ransomware-behavior-report.pdf" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 100, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to clear the unallocated sectors of a specific disk.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1070.004", + "T1070" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 90, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Evilnum", + "FIN10", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Group5", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "Mustang Panda", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "The White Company", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1070.004", + "T1070" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "impact": 100, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 90 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 90 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1070.004", + "T1070" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App", + "file": "endpoint/clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass", + "id": "f87b5062-b405-11eb-a889-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-13", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic detects a potential process using COM Object like CMLUA or CMSTPLUA to bypass UAC. This technique has been used by ransomware adversaries to gain administrative privileges to its running process.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\CMLUA.dll\", \"*\\\\CMSTPLUA.dll\", \"*\\\\CMLUAUTIL.dll\") NOT(process_name IN(\"CMSTP.exe\", \"CMMGR32.exe\")) NOT(Image IN(\"*\\\\windows\\\\*\", \"*\\\\program files*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name Computer EventCode Signed ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate windows application that are not on the list loading this dll. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/003/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass", + "analytic_story": [ + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/darkside_cmstp_com/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "The following module $ImageLoaded$ was loaded by a non-standard application on endpoint $Computer$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ImageLoaded", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Image", + "ImageLoaded", + "process_name", + "Computer", + "EventCode", + "Signed", + "ProcessId" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "CMSTP", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Cobalt Group", + "MuddyWater" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ImageLoaded", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "ImageLoaded", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass", + "file": "endpoint/cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/darkside_cmstp_com/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Common Ransomware Extensions", + "id": "a9e5c5db-db11-43ca-86a8-c852d1b2c0ec", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-11-09", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The search looks for file modifications with extensions commonly used by Ransomware", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| rex field=file_name \"(?\\.[^\\.]+)$\" | `ransomware_extensions` | `common_ransomware_extensions_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.\\\nThis search produces fields (`query`,`query_length`,`count`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** Name, **Field:** Name\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** File Extension, **Field:** file_extension\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible for a legitimate file with these extensions to be created. If this is a true ransomware attack, there will be a large number of files created with these extensions.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Common Ransomware Extensions", + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Ransomware", + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/ransomware_extensions/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$, this is indicative of a known ransomware file extension and should be reviewed immediately.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1485" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_name", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.user", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Filesystem.file_path", + "Filesystem.file_name" + ], + "risk_score": 90, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1485" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Ransomware", + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_name", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 90 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 90 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "file_name", + "threat_object_type": "file name" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1485" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Common Ransomware Extensions Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Common Ransomware Extensions", + "file": "endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/ransomware_extensions/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "ransomware_extensions", + "definition": "lookup update=true ransomware_extensions_lookup Extensions AS file_extension OUTPUT Name | search Name !=False", + "description": "This macro limits the output to files that have extensions associated with ransomware" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "common_ransomware_extensions_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Common Ransomware Notes", + "id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d6bd71", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-11-09", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The search looks for files created with names matching those typically used in ransomware notes that tell the victim how to get their data back.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `ransomware_notes` | `common_ransomware_notes_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Filesystem data-model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system reads and writes.", + "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a legitimate file could be created with the same name used by ransomware note files.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Common Ransomware Notes", + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/ransomware_notes/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$, this is indicative of a known ransomware note file and should be reviewed immediately.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1485" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_name", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.user", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Filesystem.file_path", + "Filesystem.file_name" + ], + "risk_score": 90, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1485" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_name", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 90 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 90 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "file_name", + "threat_object_type": "file name" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1485" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Common Ransomware Notes Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Common Ransomware Notes", + "file": "endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/ransomware_notes/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ransomware_notes", + "definition": "lookup ransomware_notes_lookup ransomware_notes as file_name OUTPUT status as \"Known Ransomware Notes\" | search \"Known Ransomware Notes\"=True", + "description": "This macro limits the output to files that have been identified as a ransomware note" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "common_ransomware_notes_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Conti Common Exec parameter", + "id": "624919bc-c382-11eb-adcc-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-02", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search detects the suspicious commandline argument of revil ransomware to encrypt specific or all local drive and network shares of the compromised machine or host.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*-m local*\" OR Processes.process = \"*-m net*\" OR Processes.process = \"*-m all*\" OR Processes.process = \"*-nomutex*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `conti_common_exec_parameter_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "3rd party tool may have commandline parameter that can trigger this detection.", + "references": [ + "https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.conti" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Conti Common Exec parameter", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/conti/inf1/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ executing specific Conti Ransomware related parameters.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1204" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", + "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1204" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [ + { + "name": "Ransomware Investigate and Contain", + "id": "fc0edc96-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3783fd63", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-02-04", + "author": "Philip Royer, Splunk", + "type": "Response", + "description": "This playbook investigates and contains ransomware detected on endpoints.", + "how_to_implement": "This playbook requires the Splunk SOAR apps for Palo Alto Networks Firewalls, Palo Alto Wildfire, LDAP, and Carbon Black Response.", + "playbook": "ransomware_investigate_and_contain", + "references": [], + "app_list": [ + "Carbon Black Response", + "LDAP", + "Palo Alto Networks Firewall", + "WildFire", + "Cylance" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "detections": [ + "Conti Common Exec parameter" + ], + "platform_tags": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "playbook_fields": [ + "ComputerName", + "Username" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk SOAR" + ], + "detection_objects": [ + { + "name": "Conti Common Exec parameter", + "id": "624919bc-c382-11eb-adcc-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-02", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search detects the suspicious commandline argument of revil ransomware to encrypt specific or all local drive and network shares of the compromised machine or host.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*-m local*\" OR Processes.process = \"*-m net*\" OR Processes.process = \"*-m all*\" OR Processes.process = \"*-nomutex*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `conti_common_exec_parameter_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "3rd party tool may have commandline parameter that can trigger this detection.", + "references": [ + "https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.conti" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Conti Common Exec parameter", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/conti/inf1/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ executing specific Conti Ransomware related parameters.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1204" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", + "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1204" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1204" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Conti Common Exec parameter Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Conti Common Exec parameter", + "file": "endpoint/conti_common_exec_parameter.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/conti/inf1/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "conti_common_exec_parameter_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/conti_common_exec_parameter.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ] + } + } + ], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1204" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Conti Common Exec parameter Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Conti Common Exec parameter", + "file": "endpoint/conti_common_exec_parameter.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/conti/inf1/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "conti_common_exec_parameter_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/conti_common_exec_parameter.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell", + "id": "5ee2bcd0-b2ff-11eb-bb34-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-12", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This following analytic detects PowerShell command to delete shadow copy using the WMIC PowerShell module. This technique was seen used by a recent adversary to deploy DarkSide Ransomware where it executed a child process of PowerShell to execute a hex encoded command to delete shadow copy. This hex encoded command was able to be decrypted by PowerShell log.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message= \"*ShadowCopy*\" (Message = \"*Delete*\" OR Message = \"*Remove*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the powershell logs from your endpoints. make sure you enable needed registry to monitor this event.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html", + "https://searchwindowsserver.techtarget.com/tutorial/Set-up-PowerShell-script-block-logging-for-added-security" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Ransomware", + "Revil Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An attempt to delete ShadowCopy was performed using PowerShell on $ComputerName$ by $User$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1490" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 81, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1490" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Ransomware", + "Revil Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 81 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 81 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1490" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell", + "file": "endpoint/delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Deleting Shadow Copies", + "id": "b89919ed-ee5f-492c-b139-95dbb162039e", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-11-09", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The vssadmin.exe utility is used to interact with the Volume Shadow Copy Service. Wmic is an interface to the Windows Management Instrumentation. This search looks for either of these tools being used to delete shadow copies.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=vssadmin.exe OR Processes.process_name=wmic.exe) Processes.process=*delete* Processes.process=*shadow* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `deleting_shadow_copies_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "vssadmin.exe and wmic.exe are standard applications shipped with modern versions of windows. They may be used by administrators to legitimately delete old backup copies, although this is typically rare.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Deleting Shadow Copies", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ransomware", + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 10" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to delete shadow copies.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1490" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 81, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1490" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 10" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ransomware", + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 81 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 81 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1490" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 10" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Deleting Shadow Copies Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Deleting Shadow Copies", + "file": "endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "deleting_shadow_copies_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect RClone Command-Line Usage", + "id": "32e0baea-b3f1-11eb-a2ce-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-11-29", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies commonly used command-line arguments used by `rclone.exe` to initiate a file transfer. Some arguments were negated as they are specific to the configuration used by adversaries. In particular, an adversary may list the files or directories of the remote file share using `ls` or `lsd`, which is not indicative of malicious behavior. During triage, at this stage of a ransomware event, exfiltration is about to occur or has already. Isolate the endpoint and continue investigating by review file modifications and parallel processes.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rclone` Processes.process IN (\"*copy*\", \"*mega*\", \"*pcloud*\", \"*ftp*\", \"*--config*\", \"*--progress*\", \"*--no-check-certificate*\", \"*--ignore-existing*\", \"*--auto-confirm*\", \"*--transfers*\", \"*--multi-thread-streams*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rclone_command_line_usage_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as this is restricted to the Rclone process name. Filter or tune the analytic as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://redcanary.com/blog/rclone-mega-extortion/", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/11/29/continuing-the-bazar-ransomware-story/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect RClone Command-Line Usage", + "analytic_story": [ + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Exfiltration" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1020/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to connect to a remote cloud service to move files or folders.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1020" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id", + "Processes.original_file_name" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1020", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Exfiltration", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Frankenstein", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Honeybee", + "Sidewinder", + "Tropic Trooper" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1020" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Exfiltration" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 35 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 35 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1020" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect RClone Command-Line Usage Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect RClone Command-Line Usage", + "file": "endpoint/detect_rclone_command_line_usage.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1020/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "process_rclone", + "definition": "(Processes.original_file_name=rclone.exe OR Processes.process_name=rclone.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name." + }, + { + "name": "detect_rclone_command_line_usage_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_rclone_command_line_usage.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Renamed RClone", + "id": "6dca1124-b3ec-11eb-9328-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the usage of `rclone.exe`, renamed, being used to exfiltrate data to a remote destination. RClone has been used by multiple ransomware groups to exfiltrate data. In many instances, it will be downloaded from the legitimate site and executed accordingly. During triage, isolate the endpoint and begin to review parallel processes for additional behavior. At this stage, the adversary may have staged data to be exfiltrated.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.original_file_name=rclone.exe AND Processes.process_name!=rclone.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_renamed_rclone_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as this analytic identifies renamed instances of `rclone.exe`. Filter as needed if there is a legitimate business use case.", + "references": [ + "https://redcanary.com/blog/rclone-mega-extortion/", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Renamed RClone", + "analytic_story": [ + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Collection" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1020/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1020" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 27, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1020", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Exfiltration", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Frankenstein", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Honeybee", + "Sidewinder", + "Tropic Trooper" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1020" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Collection" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 27 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 27 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1020" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Renamed RClone Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Renamed RClone", + "file": "endpoint/detect_renamed_rclone.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1020/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_renamed_rclone_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_renamed_rclone.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments", + "id": "a0bdd2f6-c2ff-11eb-b918-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-01", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies common command-line arguments used by SharpHound `-collectionMethod` and `invoke-bloodhound`. Being the script is FOSS, function names may be modified, but these changes are dependent upon the operator. In most instances the defaults are used. This analytic works to identify the common command-line attributes used. It does not cover the entirety of every argument in order to avoid false positives.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process IN (\"*-collectionMethod*\",\"*invoke-bloodhound*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_sharphound_command_line_arguments_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as the arguments used are specific to SharpHound. Filter as needed or add more command-line arguments as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0521/", + "https://thedfirreport.com/?s=bloodhound", + "https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/tree/master/Collectors", + "https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/SharpHound3", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md#atomic-test-2---run-bloodhound-from-local-disk" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments", + "analytic_story": [ + "Discovery Techniques", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/sharphound/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Possible SharpHound command-Line arguments identified on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1069.001", + "T1482", + "T1087.001", + "T1087", + "T1069.002", + "T1069" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 24, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Chimera", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "admin@338" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "Chimera", + "FIN8" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "Chimera", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Poseidon Group", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "admin@338" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "TA505" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1069.001", + "T1482", + "T1087.001", + "T1087", + "T1069.002", + "T1069" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Discovery Techniques", + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 24 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1069.001", + "T1482", + "T1087.001", + "T1087", + "T1069.002", + "T1069" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments", + "file": "endpoint/detect_sharphound_command_line_arguments.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/sharphound/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_sharphound_command_line_arguments_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_sharphound_command_line_arguments.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect SharpHound File Modifications", + "id": "42b4b438-beed-11eb-ba1d-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-27", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "SharpHound is used as a reconnaissance collector, ingestor, for BloodHound. SharpHound will query the domain controller and begin gathering all the data related to the domain and trusts. For output, it will drop a .zip file upon completion following a typical pattern that is often not changed. This analytic focuses on the default file name scheme. Note that this may be evaded with different parameters within SharpHound, but that depends on the operator. `-randomizefilenames` and `-encryptzip` are two examples. In addition, executing SharpHound via .exe or .ps1 without any command-line arguments will still perform activity and dump output to the default filename. Example default filename `20210601181553_BloodHound.zip`. SharpHound creates multiple temp files following the same pattern `20210601182121_computers.json`, `domains.json`, `gpos.json`, `ous.json` and `users.json`. Tuning may be required, or remove these json's entirely if it is too noisy. During traige, review parallel processes for further suspicious behavior. Typically, the process executing the `.ps1` ingestor will be PowerShell.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*bloodhound.zip\", \"*_computers.json\", \"*_gpos.json\", \"*_domains.json\", \"*_users.json\", \"*_groups.json\") by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_sharphound_file_modifications_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on file modifications that include the name of the process, and file, responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as the analytic is specific to a filename with extension .zip. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0521/", + "https://thedfirreport.com/?s=bloodhound", + "https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/tree/master/Collectors", + "https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/SharpHound3", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md#atomic-test-2---run-bloodhound-from-local-disk" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect SharpHound File Modifications", + "analytic_story": [ + "Discovery Techniques", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/sharphound/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Potential SharpHound file modifications identified on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1069.001", + "T1482", + "T1087.001", + "T1087", + "T1069.002", + "T1069" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "file_path", + "dest", + "file_name", + "process_id", + "file_create_time" + ], + "risk_score": 24, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Chimera", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "admin@338" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "Chimera", + "FIN8" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "Chimera", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Poseidon Group", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "admin@338" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "TA505" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1069.001", + "T1482", + "T1087.001", + "T1087", + "T1069.002", + "T1069" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Discovery Techniques", + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 24 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 24 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1069.001", + "T1482", + "T1087.001", + "T1087", + "T1069.002", + "T1069" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect SharpHound File Modifications Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect SharpHound File Modifications", + "file": "endpoint/detect_sharphound_file_modifications.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/sharphound/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_sharphound_file_modifications_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_sharphound_file_modifications.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect SharpHound Usage", + "id": "dd04b29a-beed-11eb-87bc-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-05-27", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies SharpHound binary usage by using the original filena,e. In addition to renaming the PE, other coverage is available to detect command-line arguments. This particular analytic looks for the original_file_name of `SharpHound.exe` and the process name. It is possible older instances of SharpHound.exe have different original filenames. Dependent upon the operator, the code may be re-compiled and the attributes removed or changed to anything else. During triage, review the metadata of the binary in question. Review parallel processes for suspicious behavior. Identify the source of this binary.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=sharphound.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=SharpHound.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_sharphound_usage_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as this is specific to a file attribute not used by anything else. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0521/", + "https://thedfirreport.com/?s=bloodhound", + "https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/tree/master/Collectors", + "https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/SharpHound3", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md#atomic-test-2---run-bloodhound-from-local-disk" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect SharpHound Usage", + "analytic_story": [ + "Discovery Techniques", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/sharphound/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Potential SharpHound binary identified on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1069.001", + "T1482", + "T1087.001", + "T1087", + "T1069.002", + "T1069" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 24, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Chimera", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "admin@338" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "Chimera", + "FIN8" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "Chimera", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Poseidon Group", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "admin@338" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Turla" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "TA505" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1069.001", + "T1482", + "T1087.001", + "T1087", + "T1069.002", + "T1069" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Discovery Techniques", + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 24 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1069.001", + "T1482", + "T1087.001", + "T1087", + "T1069.002", + "T1069" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect SharpHound Usage Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect SharpHound Usage", + "file": "endpoint/detect_sharphound_usage.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/sharphound/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_sharphound_usage_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_sharphound_usage.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Disable AMSI Through Registry", + "id": "9c27ec42-d338-11eb-9044-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-26", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "this search is to identify modification in registry to disable AMSI windows feature to evade detections. This technique was seen in several ransomware, RAT and even APT to impaire defenses of the compromise machine and to be able to execute payload with minimal alert as much as possible.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Script\\\\Settings\\\\AmsiEnable\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000000\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disable_amsi_through_registry_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "network operator may disable this feature of windows but not so common.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.f-secure.com/hunting-for-amsi-bypasses/", + "https://gist.github.com/rxwx/8955e5abf18dc258fd6b43a3a7f4dbf9" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Disable AMSI Through Registry", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Disable AMSI Through Registry", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.registry_value_name" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Disable AMSI Through Registry Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Disable AMSI Through Registry", + "file": "endpoint/disable_amsi_through_registry.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "disable_amsi_through_registry_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_amsi_through_registry.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Disable ETW Through Registry", + "id": "f0eacfa4-d33f-11eb-8f9d-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-27", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "this search is to identify modification in registry to disable ETW windows feature to evade detections. This technique was seen in several ransomware, RAT and even APT to impaire defenses of the compromise machine and to be able to execute payload with minimal alert as much as possible.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\.NETFramework\\\\ETWEnabled\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000000\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disable_etw_through_registry_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "network operator may disable this feature of windows but not so common.", + "references": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/c0f98850-af65-4352-9746-fbebadee4f05/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Disable ETW Through Registry", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Disable ETW Through Registry", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.registry_value_name" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Disable ETW Through Registry Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Disable ETW Through Registry", + "file": "endpoint/disable_etw_through_registry.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "disable_etw_through_registry_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_etw_through_registry.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Disable Logs Using WevtUtil", + "id": "236e7c8e-c9d9-11eb-a824-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-10", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect execution of wevtutil.exe to disable logs. This technique was seen in several ransomware to disable the event logs to evade alerts and detections.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"wevtutil.exe\" Processes.process = \"*sl*\" Processes.process = \"*/e:false*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_logs_using_wevtutil_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "network operator may disable audit event logs for debugging purposes.", + "references": [ + "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-ransom-x-ransomware-used-in-texas-txdot-cyberattack/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Disable Logs Using WevtUtil", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "WevtUtil.exe used to disable Event Logging on $dest", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1070", + "T1070.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process_guid" + ], + "risk_score": 24, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN8", + "Indrik Spider", + "Operation Wocao" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1070", + "T1070.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 24 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1070", + "T1070.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Disable Logs Using WevtUtil Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Disable Logs Using WevtUtil", + "file": "endpoint/disable_logs_using_wevtutil.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "disable_logs_using_wevtutil_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_logs_using_wevtutil.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring", + "id": "79439cae-9200-11eb-a4d3-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-27", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to identifies a modification in registry to disable the windows denfender real time behavior monitoring. This event or technique is commonly seen in RAT, bot, or Trojan to disable AV to evade detections.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableBehaviorMonitoring\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableOnAccessProtection\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableScanOnRealtimeEnable\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableRealtimeMonitoring\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableIOAVProtection\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableScriptScanning\" AND Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disable_windows_behavior_monitoring_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to disable this windows features.", + "references": [ + "https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Ransomware", + "Revil Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 40, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Windows Defender real time behavior monitoring disabled on $dest", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.registry_value_name" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Ransomware", + "Revil Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 40, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 40 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring", + "file": "endpoint/disable_windows_behavior_monitoring.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + }, + { + "file_name": "windows-system.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:System", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + }, + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "disable_windows_behavior_monitoring_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_windows_behavior_monitoring.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Excessive Service Stop Attempt", + "id": "ae8d3f4a-acd7-11eb-8846-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-05-04", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies suspicious series of attempt to kill multiple services on a system using either `net.exe` or `sc.exe`. This technique is use by adversaries to terminate security services or other related services to continue there objective and evade detections.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` OR Processes.process_name = \"sc.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"net1.exe\" AND Processes.process=\"*stop*\" OR Processes.process=\"*delete*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=1m | where count >=5 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_service_stop_attempt_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Excessive Service Stop Attempt", + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An excessive amount of $process_name$ was executed on $dest$ attempting to disable services.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1489" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1489", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Indrik Spider", + "Lazarus Group", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1489" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig", + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1489" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Excessive Service Stop Attempt Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Excessive Service Stop Attempt", + "file": "endpoint/excessive_service_stop_attempt.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_net", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "excessive_service_stop_attempt_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excessive_service_stop_attempt.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Excessive Usage Of Net App", + "id": "45e52536-ae42-11eb-b5c6-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-05-06", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies excessive usage of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` within a bucket of time (1 minute). This behavior was seen in a Monero incident where the adversary attempts to create many users, delete and disable users as part of its malicious behavior.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=1m | where count >=10 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_net_app_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown. Filter as needed. Modify the time span as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Excessive Usage Of Net App", + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Scope:Local", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 40, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Excessive usage of net1.exe or net.exe within 1m, with command line $process$ has been detected on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1531" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 28, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1531", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1531" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig", + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Scope:Local", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 40, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 28 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 28 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1531" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Excessive Usage Of Net App Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Excessive Usage Of Net App", + "file": "endpoint/excessive_usage_of_net_app.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_net", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "excessive_usage_of_net_app_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_net_app.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility", + "id": "cb6b339e-d4c6-11eb-a026-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-24", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious excessive usage of sc.exe in a host machine. This technique was seen in several ransomware , xmrig and other malware to create, modify, delete or disable a service may related to security application or to gain privilege escalation.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode = 1 process_name = \"sc.exe\" | bucket _time span=15m | stats values(process) as process count as numScExe by Computer, _time | eventstats avg(numScExe) as avgScExe, stdev(numScExe) as stdScExe, count as numSlots by Computer | eval upperThreshold=(avgScExe + stdScExe *3) | eval isOutlier=if(avgScExe > 5 and avgScExe >= upperThreshold, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed taskkill.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "excessive execution of sc.exe is quite suspicious since it can modify or execute app in high privilege permission.", + "references": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/c0f98850-af65-4352-9746-fbebadee4f05/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Scope:Local", + "Stage:Exfiltration" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1569", + "T1569.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "process_name", + "process" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1569", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "FIN6", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Operation Wocao", + "Silence", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1569", + "T1569.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Scope:Local", + "Stage:Exfiltration" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1569", + "T1569.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility", + "file": "endpoint/excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID", + "id": "dc64d064-d346-11eb-8588-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-22", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic will identify suspicious process of cscript.exe where it tries to execute javascript using jscript.encode CLSID (COM OBJ). This technique was seen in ransomware (reddot ransomware) where it execute javascript with this com object with combination of amsi disabling technique.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"cscript.exe\" Processes.process=\"*-e:{F414C262-6AC0-11CF-B6D1-00AA00BBBB58}*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `execute_javascript_with_jscript_com_clsid_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/c0f98850-af65-4352-9746-fbebadee4f05/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious process of cscript.exe with a parent process $parent_process_name$ where it tries to execute javascript using jscript.encode CLSID (COM OBJ), detected on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.005" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_id", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Parent Process", + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "FIN4", + "FIN7", + "Frankenstein", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Windshift" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.005" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_id", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Parent Process", + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_id", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process name" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.005" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID", + "file": "endpoint/execute_javascript_with_jscript_com_clsid.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "execute_javascript_with_jscript_com_clsid_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/execute_javascript_with_jscript_com_clsid.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Fsutil Zeroing File", + "id": "4e5e024e-fabb-11eb-8b8f-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-11", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious fsutil process to zeroing a target file. This technique was seen in lockbit ransomware where it tries to zero out its malware path as part of its defense evasion after encrypting the compromised host.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=fsutil.exe Processes.process=\"*setzerodata*\" by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.process Processes.parent_process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `fsutil_zeroing_file_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/e0ac072d-58c9-4f53-8a3b-3e491c7ac5db/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Fsutil Zeroing File", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070/fsutil_file_zero/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Possible file data deletion on $dest$ using $process$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1070" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1070" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 54 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1070" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Fsutil Zeroing File Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Fsutil Zeroing File", + "file": "endpoint/fsutil_zeroing_file.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070/fsutil_file_zero/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "fsutil_zeroing_file_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/fsutil_zeroing_file.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "ICACLS Grant Command", + "id": "b1b1e316-accc-11eb-a9b4-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-04", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies potential adversaries that modify the security permission of a specific file or directory. This technique is commonly seen in APT tradecraft and coinminer scripts to evade detections and restrict access to their component files.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"icacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"cacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"xcacls.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*/grant*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `icacls_grant_command_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed icacls.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "ICACLS Grant Command", + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Process name $process_name$ with grant argument executed by $user$ to change security permission of a specific file or directory on host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1222" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1222", + "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1222" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig", + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1222" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "ICACLS Grant Command Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "ICACLS Grant Command", + "file": "endpoint/icacls_grant_command.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "icacls_grant_command_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/icacls_grant_command.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Known Services Killed by Ransomware", + "id": "3070f8e0-c528-11eb-b2a0-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-04", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search detects a suspicioous termination of known services killed by ransomware before encrypting files in a compromised machine. This technique is commonly seen in most of ransomware now a days to avoid exception error while accessing the targetted files it wants to encrypts because of the open handle of those services to the targetted file.", + "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 Message IN (\"*Volume Shadow Copy*\",\"*VSS*\", \"*backup*\", \"*sophos*\", \"*sql*\", \"*memtas*\", \"*mepocs*\", \"*veeam*\", \"*svc$*\") Message=\"*service entered the stopped state*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message dest Type | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `known_services_killed_by_ransomware_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the 7036 EventCode ScManager in System audit Logs from your endpoints.", + "known_false_positives": "Admin activities or installing related updates may do a sudden stop to list of services we monitor.", + "references": [ + "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", + "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Known Services Killed by Ransomware", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "BlackMatter Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf3/windows-system.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Known services $Message$ terminated by a potential ransomware on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1490" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Message", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "dest", + "Type" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1490" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "BlackMatter Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Message", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 72 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "Message", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1490" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Known Services Killed by Ransomware Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Known Services Killed by Ransomware", + "file": "endpoint/known_services_killed_by_ransomware.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-system.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf3/windows-system.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:System", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_system", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "known_services_killed_by_ransomware_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/known_services_killed_by_ransomware.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Modification Of Wallpaper", + "id": "accb0712-c381-11eb-8e5b-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-02", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies suspicious modification of registry to deface or change the wallpaper of a compromised machines as part of its payload. This technique was commonly seen in ransomware like REVIL where it create a bitmap file contain a note that the machine was compromised and make it as a wallpaper.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode =13 (TargetObject= \"*\\\\Control Panel\\\\Desktop\\\\Wallpaper\" AND Image != \"*\\\\explorer.exe\") OR (TargetObject= \"*\\\\Control Panel\\\\Desktop\\\\Wallpaper\" AND Details = \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Image TargetObject Details Computer process_guid process_id user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `modification_of_wallpaper_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Image, TargetObject registry key, registry Details from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "3rd party tool may used to changed the wallpaper of the machine", + "references": [ + "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", + "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Modification Of Wallpaper", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Revil Ransomware", + "BlackMatter Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Wallpaper modification on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1491" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Image", + "TargetObject", + "Details", + "Computer", + "process_guid", + "process_id", + "user_id" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1491", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Defacement", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1491" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Revil Ransomware", + "BlackMatter Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 54 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1491" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Modification Of Wallpaper Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Modification Of Wallpaper", + "file": "endpoint/modification_of_wallpaper.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "modification_of_wallpaper_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/modification_of_wallpaper.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading", + "id": "8bb3f280-dd9b-11eb-84d5-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-07-05", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious creation of msmpeng.exe or mpsvc.dll in non default windows defender folder. This technique was seen couple days ago with revil ransomware in Kaseya Supply chain. The approach is to drop an old version of msmpeng.exe to load the actual payload name as mspvc.dll which will load the revil ransomware to the compromise machine", + "search": "|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_name = \"msmpeng.exe\" OR Filesystem.file_name = \"mpsvc.dll\") AND Filesystem.file_path != \"*\\\\Program Files\\\\windows defender\\\\*\" by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node.", + "known_false_positives": "quite minimal false positive expected.", + "references": [ + "https://community.sophos.com/b/security-blog/posts/active-ransomware-attack-on-kaseya-customers" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Revil Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets//malware/revil/msmpeng_side/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1574.002", + "T1574" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.file_create_time", + "Filesystem.process_id", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.user", + "Filesystem.file_path" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Chimera", + "GALLIUM", + "Higaisa", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Patchwork", + "Sidewinder", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1574.002", + "T1574" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Revil Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1574.002", + "T1574" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading", + "file": "endpoint/msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets//malware/revil/msmpeng_side/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Permission Modification using Takeown App", + "id": "fa7ca5c6-c9d8-11eb-bce9-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-10", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a modification of file or directory permission using takeown.exe windows app. This technique was seen in some ransomware that take the ownership of a folder or files to encrypt or delete it.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"takeown.exe\" Processes.process = \"*/f*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `permission_modification_using_takeown_app_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "takeown.exe is a normal windows application that may used by network operator.", + "references": [ + "https://research.nccgroup.com/2020/06/23/wastedlocker-a-new-ransomware-variant-developed-by-the-evil-corp-group/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Permission Modification using Takeown App", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A suspicious of execution of $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ and commandline $process$ to modify permission of directory or files in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1222" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process_guid" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1222", + "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1222" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1222" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Permission Modification using Takeown App Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Permission Modification using Takeown App", + "file": "endpoint/permission_modification_using_takeown_app.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "permission_modification_using_takeown_app_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/permission_modification_using_takeown_app.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Powershell Disable Security Monitoring", + "id": "c148a894-dd93-11eb-bf2a-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-07-05", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to identifies a modification in registry to disable the windows denfender real time behavior monitoring. This event or technique is commonly seen in RAT, bot, or Trojan to disable AV to evade detections.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process=\"*set-mppreference*\" AND Processes.process IN (\"*disablerealtimemonitoring*\",\"*disableioavprotection*\",\"*disableintrusionpreventionsystem*\",\"*disablescriptscanning*\",\"*disableblockatfirstseen*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_disable_security_monitoring_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives. However, tune based on scripts that may perform this action.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md#atomic-test-15---tamper-with-windows-defender-atp-powershell" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Powershell Disable Security Monitoring", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Revil Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/pwh_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Revil Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Powershell Disable Security Monitoring Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Powershell Disable Security Monitoring", + "file": "endpoint/powershell_disable_security_monitoring.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/pwh_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_powershell", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "powershell_disable_security_monitoring_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_disable_security_monitoring.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature", + "id": "afed80b2-d34b-11eb-a952-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-22", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious enabling of smb1protocol through \"powershell.exe\". This technique was seen in some ransomware (like reddot) where it enable smb share to do the lateral movement and encrypt other files within the compromise network system.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*Enable-WindowsOptionalFeature*\" Message = \"*SMB1Protocol*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the powershell logs from your endpoints. make sure you enable needed registry to monitor this event.", + "known_false_positives": "network operator may enable or disable this windows feature.", + "references": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/c0f98850-af65-4352-9746-fbebadee4f05/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1027", + "T1027.005" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1027", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackOasis", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dust Storm", + "Elderwood", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Group5", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1027.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal from Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT3", + "Deep Panda", + "GALLIUM", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1027", + "T1027.005" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1027", + "T1027.005" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature", + "file": "endpoint/powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Powershell Execute COM Object", + "id": "65711630-f9bf-11eb-8d72-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-10", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a COM CLSID execution through powershell. This technique was seen in several adversaries and malware like ransomware conti where it has a feature to execute command using COM Object. This technique may use by network operator at some cases but a good indicator if some application want to gain privilege escalation or bypass uac.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromCLSID*\" OR Message = \"*CreateInstance([Type]::GetTypeFromProgID*\"| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_execute_com_object_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "network operrator may use this command.", + "references": [ + "https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1423361119926816776.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Powershell Execute COM Object", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/conti/conti_leak/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 10, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains COM CLSID command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1546.015", + "T1546" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 5, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.015", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Component Object Model Hijacking", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1546.015", + "T1546" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 10, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 5 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 5 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1546.015", + "T1546" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Powershell Execute COM Object Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Powershell Execute COM Object", + "file": "endpoint/powershell_execute_com_object.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/conti/conti_leak/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "powershell_execute_com_object_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_execute_com_object.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit", + "id": "7742aa92-c9d9-11eb-bbfc-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-10", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious bcdedit.exe execution to ignore all failures. This technique was used by ransomware to prevent the compromise machine automatically boot in repair mode.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"bcdedit.exe\" Processes.process = \"*bootstatuspolicy*\" Processes.process = \"*ignoreallfailures*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `prevent_automatic_repair_mode_using_bcdedit_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed bcdedit.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may modify the boot configuration ignore failure during testing and debugging.", + "references": [ + "https://jsac.jpcert.or.jp/archive/2020/pdf/JSAC2020_1_tamada-yamazaki-nakatsuru_en.pdf" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A suspicious process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ contains commandline $process$ to ignore all bcdedit execution failure in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1490" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process_guid" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1490" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1490" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit", + "file": "endpoint/prevent_automatic_repair_mode_using_bcdedit.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "prevent_automatic_repair_mode_using_bcdedit_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/prevent_automatic_repair_mode_using_bcdedit.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI", + "id": "28077620-c9f6-11eb-8785-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-10", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 performing checks to identify anti-virus products installed on the endpoint. This technique is commonly found in malware and APT events where the adversary will map all running security applications or services. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*SELECT*\" OR Message = \"*WMIC*\") AND (Message = \"*AntiVirusProduct*\" OR Message = \"*AntiSpywareProduct*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "network administrator may used this command for checking purposes", + "references": [ + "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/05/12/maze-ransomware-1-year-counting/", + "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", + "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains AV recon command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1592" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1592", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1592" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Malicious PowerShell" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1592" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI", + "file": "endpoint/recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD", + "id": "ba570b3a-d356-11eb-8358-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-06-22", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious commandline designed to delete files or directory recursive using batch command. This technique was seen in ransomware (reddot) where it it tries to delete the files in recycle bin to impaire user from recovering deleted files.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` Processes.process=*/c* Processes.process=* rd * Processes.process=\"*/s*\" Processes.process=\"*/q*\" by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.dest |`drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "network operator may use this batch command to delete recursively a directory or files within directory", + "references": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/c0f98850-af65-4352-9746-fbebadee4f05/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1070.004", + "T1070" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Evilnum", + "FIN10", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Group5", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "Mustang Panda", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "The White Company", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1070.004", + "T1070" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1070.004", + "T1070" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD", + "file": "endpoint/recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_cmd", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", + "id": "f5f6af30-7aa7-4295-bfe9-07fe87c01a4b", + "version": 7, + "date": "2022-01-26", + "author": "Jose Hernandez, David Dorsey, Teoderick Contreras, Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to launch an application or service at system startup.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\RunOnce OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\run* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentVersion\\\\Windows\\\\Appinit_Dlls* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Shell* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Notify* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Userinit* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\VmApplet* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\policies\\\\explorer\\\\run* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\runservices* OR Registry.registry_path=HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Netsh\\\\* OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Image File Execution Options*\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=Debugger) OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Security Packages\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\\\\OSConfig\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Security Packages\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\SilentProcessExit\\\\*\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*currentVersion\\\\Windows\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Load\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentVersion\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Svchost\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\"AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"BootExecute\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Software\\\\Run\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"auto_update\")) by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "There are many legitimate applications that must execute on system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Ransomware", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "IcedID", + "Remcos" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 95, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/atomic_red_team/t1547001-runonce.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to persistence in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1547.001", + "T1547" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user" + ], + "risk_score": 76, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "Putter Panda", + "RTM", + "Rocke", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.001", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Ransomware", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "IcedID", + "Remcos" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 95 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 76 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 76 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.001", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", + "file": "endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI", + "id": "d25d2c3d-d9d8-40ec-8fdf-e86fe155a3da", + "version": 7, + "date": "2021-11-12", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies wmic.exe being launched with parameters to spawn a process on a remote system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WMI and this binary for lateral movement and remote code execution.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` (Processes.process=\"*/node:*\" AND Processes.process=\"*process*\" AND Processes.process=\"*call*\" AND Processes.process=\"*create*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "The wmic.exe utility is a benign Windows application. It may be used legitimately by Administrators with these parameters for remote system administration, but it's relatively uncommon.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/cimwin32prov/create-method-in-class-win32-process" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A wmic.exe process $process$ contain process spawn commandline $process$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1047" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.AT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1047" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.AT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1047" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.AT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI", + "file": "endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_wmic", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Revil Common Exec Parameter", + "id": "85facebe-c382-11eb-9c3e-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-06-02", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies suspicious commandline parameter that are commonly used by REVIL ransomware to encrypts the compromise machine.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"* -nolan *\" OR Processes.process = \"* -nolocal *\" OR Processes.process = \"* -fast *\" OR Processes.process = \"* -full *\" by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `revil_common_exec_parameter_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "third party tool may have same command line parameters as revil ransomware.", + "references": [ + "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", + "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Revil Common Exec Parameter", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Revil Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ related to revil ransomware in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1204" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process_guid" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", + "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1204" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Revil Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 54 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 54 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1204" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Revil Common Exec Parameter Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Revil Common Exec Parameter", + "file": "endpoint/revil_common_exec_parameter.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "revil_common_exec_parameter_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/revil_common_exec_parameter.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Revil Registry Entry", + "id": "e3d3f57a-c381-11eb-9e35-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-01-26", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies suspicious modification in registry entry to keep some malware data during its infection. This technique seen in several apt implant, malware and ransomware like REVIL where it keep some information like the random generated file extension it uses for all the encrypted files and ransomware notes file name in the compromised host.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\WOW6432Node\\\\Facebook_Assistant\\\\*\" OR Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\WOW6432Node\\\\BlackLivesMatter*\") by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `revil_registry_entry_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "to successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Image, TargetObject registry key, registry Details from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", + "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Revil Registry Entry", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Revil Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A registry entry $registry_path$ with registry value $registry_value_name$ and $registry_value_name$ related to revil ransomware in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1112" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_key_name" + ], + "risk_score": 60, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN8", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1112" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Revil Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 60 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 60 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1112" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Revil Registry Entry Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Revil Registry Entry", + "file": "endpoint/revil_registry_entry.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "revil_registry_entry_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/revil_registry_entry.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Schtasks used for forcing a reboot", + "id": "1297fb80-f42a-4b4a-9c8a-88c066437cf6", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-12-07", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line that indicate that a forced reboot of system is scheduled.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe Processes.process=\"*shutdown*\" Processes.process=\"*/create *\" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may create jobs on systems forcing reboots to perform updates, maintenance, etc.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Schtasks used for forcing a reboot", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/schtask_shutdown/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A schedule task process $process_name$ with force reboot commandline $process$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CostaRicto", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Machete", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Schtasks used for forcing a reboot Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Schtasks used for forcing a reboot", + "file": "endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/schtask_shutdown/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Start Up During Safe Mode Boot", + "id": "c6149154-c9d8-11eb-9da7-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-26", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a modification or registry add to the safeboot registry as an autostart mechanism. This technique was seen in some ransomware to automatically execute its code upon a safe mode boot.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\System\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\SafeBoot\\\\Minimal\\*\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `start_up_during_safe_mode_boot_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "updated windows application needed in safe boot may used this registry", + "references": [ + "https://malware.news/t/threat-analysis-unit-tau-threat-intelligence-notification-snatch-ransomware/36365" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Start Up During Safe Mode Boot", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Safeboot registry $registry_path$ was added or modified with a new value $registry_value_name$ on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1547.001", + "T1547" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "Putter Panda", + "RTM", + "Rocke", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.001", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 42 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.001", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Start Up During Safe Mode Boot Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Start Up During Safe Mode Boot", + "file": "endpoint/start_up_during_safe_mode_boot.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "start_up_during_safe_mode_boot_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/start_up_during_safe_mode_boot.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior", + "id": "2b85aa3d-f5f6-4c2e-a081-a09f6e1c2e40", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-17", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes Windows Event ID 1100 to identify when Windows event log service is shutdown. Note that this is a voluminous analytic that will require tuning or restricted to specific endpoints based on criticality. This event generates every time Windows Event Log service has shut down. It also generates during normal system shutdown. During triage, based on time of day and user, determine if this was planned. If not planned, follow through with reviewing parallel alerts and other data sources to determine what else may have occurred.", + "search": "(`wineventlog_security` EventCode=1100) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest Message EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_event_log_service_behavior_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows event logs from your hosts. In addition, the Splunk Windows TA is needed.", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible the Event Logging service gets shut down due to system errors or legitimately administration tasks. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-1100", + "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/defense-evasion/disabling-windows-event-logs-by-suspending-eventlog-service-threads", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/001/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1070.001/T1070.001.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Ransomware", + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 6" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "The Windows Event Log Service shutdown on $ComputerName$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1070", + "T1070.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "PR.IP", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "dest" + ], + "risk_score": 9, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN8", + "Indrik Spider", + "Operation Wocao" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1070", + "T1070.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 6" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "PR.IP", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Ransomware", + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 30 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 9 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1070", + "T1070.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 6" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "PR.IP", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior", + "file": "endpoint/suspicious_event_log_service_behavior.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_event_log_service_behavior_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_event_log_service_behavior.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory", + "id": "7feb7972-7ac3-11eb-bac8-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-03-01", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following detection identifies Scheduled Tasks registering (creating a new task) a binary or script to run from a public directory which includes users\\public, \\programdata\\ and \\windows\\temp. Upon triage, review the binary or script in the command line for legitimacy, whether an approved binary/script or not. In addition, capture the binary or script in question and analyze for further behaviors. Identify the source and contain the endpoint.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe (Processes.process=*\\\\users\\\\public\\\\* OR Processes.process=*\\\\programdata\\\\* OR Processes.process=*windows\\\\temp*) Processes.process=*/create* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives may be present. Filter as needed by parent process or command line argument.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/schtasks/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious scheduled task registered on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CostaRicto", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Machete", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 35 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 35 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory", + "file": "endpoint/suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/schtasks/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious wevtutil Usage", + "id": "2827c0fd-e1be-4868-ae25-59d28e0f9d4f", + "version": 4, + "date": "2021-10-11", + "author": "David Dorsey, Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The wevtutil.exe application is the windows event log utility. This searches for wevtutil.exe with parameters for clearing the application, security, setup, trace or system event logs.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wevtutil.exe Processes.process IN (\"* cl *\", \"*clear-log*\") (Processes.process=\"*System*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Security*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Setup*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Application*\" OR Processes.process=\"*trace*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_wevtutil_usage_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "The wevtutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows event log utility. Administrators may use it to manage Windows event logs.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1070.001/T1070.001.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious wevtutil Usage", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Ransomware", + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 6" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 40, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Wevtutil.exe being used to clear Event Logs on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1070.001", + "T1070" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "PR.IP", + "PR.PT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 28, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN8", + "Indrik Spider", + "Operation Wocao" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1070.001", + "T1070" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 6" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "PR.IP", + "PR.PT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Ransomware", + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 40, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 28 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 28 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1070.001", + "T1070" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 6" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "PR.IP", + "PR.PT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Suspicious wevtutil Usage Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious wevtutil Usage", + "file": "endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_wevtutil_usage_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations", + "id": "a34aae96-ccf8-4aef-952c-3ea21444444d", + "version": 6, + "date": "2020-12-08", + "author": "David Dorsey, Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for system processes that typically execute from `C:\\Windows\\System32\\` or `C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64`. This may indicate a malicious process that is trying to hide as a legitimate process.\\\nThis detection utilizes a lookup that is deduped `system32` and `syswow64` directories from Server 2016 and Windows 10.\\\nDuring triage, review the parallel processes - what process moved the native Windows binary? identify any artifacts on disk and review. If a remote destination is contacted, what is the reputation?", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_path !=\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32*\" Processes.process_path !=\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_hash | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `is_windows_system_file` | `system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "This detection may require tuning based on third party applications utilizing native Windows binaries in non-standard paths.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.yaml", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Unusual Processes", + "Ransomware", + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "System process running from unexpected location on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1036", + "T1036.003" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Processes.process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_hash" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "GALLIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036", + "T1036.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Unusual Processes", + "Ransomware", + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Processes.process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "Processes.process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036", + "T1036.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations", + "file": "endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "is_windows_system_file", + "definition": "lookup update=true is_windows_system_file filename as process_name OUTPUT systemFile | search systemFile=true", + "description": "This macro limits the output to process names that are in the Windows System directory" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object", + "id": "2bcccd20-fc2b-11eb-8d22-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-13", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a possible uac bypass using the colorui.dll COM Object. this technique was seen in so many malware and ransomware like lockbit where it make use of the colorui.dll COM CLSID to bypass UAC.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded=\"*\\\\colorui.dll\" process_name != \"colorcpl.exe\" NOT(Image IN(\"*\\\\windows\\\\*\", \"*\\\\program files*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name Computer EventCode Signed ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "not so common. but 3rd part app may load this dll.", + "references": [ + "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/04/24/lockbit-ransomware-borrows-tricks-to-keep-up-with-revil-and-maze/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.015/uac_colorui/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "The following module $ImageLoaded$ was loaded by a non-standard application on endpoint $Computer$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ImageLoaded", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Image", + "ImageLoaded", + "process_name", + "Computer", + "EventCode", + "Signed", + "ProcessId" + ], + "risk_score": 48, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "CMSTP", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Cobalt Group", + "MuddyWater" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ImageLoaded", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 48 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 48 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "ImageLoaded", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object", + "file": "endpoint/uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.015/uac_colorui/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Uninstall App Using MsiExec", + "id": "1fca2b28-f922-11eb-b2dd-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-09", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious un-installation of application using msiexec. This technique was seen in conti leak tool and script where it tries to uninstall AV product using this commandline. This commandline to uninstall product is not a common practice in enterprise network.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=msiexec.exe Processes.process= \"* /qn *\" Processes.process= \"*/X*\" Processes.process= \"*REBOOT=*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `uninstall_app_using_msiexec_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown.", + "references": [ + "https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1423361119926816776.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Uninstall App Using MsiExec", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/conti/conti_leak/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "process $process_name$ with a cmdline $process$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218.007", + "T1218" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 30, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.007", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Msiexec", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Machete", + "Molerats", + "Rancor", + "TA505", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218.007", + "T1218" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 30 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218.007", + "T1218" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Uninstall App Using MsiExec Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Uninstall App Using MsiExec", + "file": "endpoint/uninstall_app_using_msiexec.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/conti/conti_leak/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "uninstall_app_using_msiexec_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/uninstall_app_using_msiexec.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "USN Journal Deletion", + "id": "b6e0ff70-b122-4227-9368-4cf322ab43c3", + "version": 2, + "date": "2018-12-03", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The fsutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows utility used to perform tasks related to the file allocation table (FAT) and NTFS file systems. The update sequence number (USN) change journal provides a log of all changes made to the files on the disk. This search looks for fsutil.exe deleting the USN journal.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=fsutil.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search process=\"*deletejournal*\" AND process=\"*usn*\" | `usn_journal_deletion_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "USN Journal Deletion", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 6", + "CIS 8", + "CIS 10" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Possible USN journal deletion on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1070" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.DP", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 45, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1070" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 6", + "CIS 8", + "CIS 10" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.DP", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 45 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1070" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 6", + "CIS 8", + "CIS 10" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.DP", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "USN Journal Deletion Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "USN Journal Deletion", + "file": "endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "usn_journal_deletion_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "WBAdmin Delete System Backups", + "id": "cd5aed7e-5cea-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-01-22", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for flags passed to wbadmin.exe (Windows Backup Administrator Tool) that delete backup files. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent recovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wbadmin.exe Processes.process=\"*delete*\" AND (Processes.process=\"*catalog*\" OR Processes.process=\"*systemstatebackup*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `wbadmin_delete_system_backups_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. Tune based on parent process names.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may modify the boot configuration.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1490/T1490.md", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/08/ryuks-return/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wbadmin" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "WBAdmin Delete System Backups", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "System backups deletion on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1490" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1490" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1490" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "WBAdmin Delete System Backups Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "WBAdmin Delete System Backups", + "file": "endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "wbadmin_delete_system_backups_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Wbemprox COM Object Execution", + "id": "9d911ce0-c3be-11eb-b177-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-02", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "this search is designed to detect potential malicious process loading COM object to wbemprox.dll,", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\fastprox.dll\", \"*\\\\wbemprox.dll\", \"*\\\\wbemcomn.dll\") NOT (process_name IN (\"wmiprvse.exe\", \"WmiApSrv.exe\", \"unsecapp.exe\")) NOT(Image IN(\"*\\\\windows\\\\*\",\"*\\\\program files*\", \"*\\\\wbem\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name Computer EventCode Signed ProcessId Hashes IMPHASH | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wbemprox_com_object_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "legitimate process that are not in the exception list may trigger this event.", + "references": [ + "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", + "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Wbemprox COM Object Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Revil Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf2/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious COM Object Execution on $Computer$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Image", + "ImageLoaded", + "process_name", + "Computer", + "EventCode", + "Signed", + "ProcessId", + "Hashes", + "IMPHASH" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "CMSTP", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Cobalt Group", + "MuddyWater" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Revil Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 35 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Wbemprox COM Object Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Wbemprox COM Object Execution", + "file": "endpoint/wbemprox_com_object_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf2/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "wbemprox_com_object_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wbemprox_com_object_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump", + "id": "59e54602-9680-11ec-a8a6-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-25", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a process that is attempting to disable the ability on Windows to generate a memory crash dump. This was recently identified being utilized by HermeticWiper. To disable crash dumps, the value must be set to 0. This feature is typically modified to perform a memory crash dump when a computer stops unexpectedly because of a Stop error (also known as a blue screen, system crash, or bug check).", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\CrashControl\\\\CrashDumpEnabled\") AND Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000000\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process process_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process process_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `windows_disable_memory_crash_dump_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` and `Registry` node.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/02/threat-advisory-hermeticwiper.html", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/performance/memory-dump-file-options" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump", + "analytic_story": [ + "Data Destruction", + "Ransomware", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/hermetic_wiper/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A process $process_name$ was identified attempting to disable memory crash dumps on $dest$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1485" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.file_create_time", + "Filesystem.process_id", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.user", + "Filesystem.file_path", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_guid" + ], + "risk_score": 90, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1485" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Data Destruction", + "Ransomware", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 90 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 90 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1485" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_disable_memory_crash_dump_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_disable_memory_crash_dump.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows DiskCryptor Usage", + "id": "d56fe0c8-4650-11ec-a8fa-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-15", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies DiskCryptor process name of dcrypt.exe or internal name dcinst.exe. This utility has been utilized by adversaries to encrypt disks manually during an operation. In addition, during install, a dcrypt.sys driver is installed and requires a reboot in order to take effect. There are no command-line arguments used.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"dcrypt.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=dcinst.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_diskcryptor_usage_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible false positives may be present based on the internal name dcinst.exe, filter as needed. It may be worthy to alert on the service name.", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/11/15/exchange-exploit-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/", + "https://github.com/DavidXanatos/DiskCryptor" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows DiskCryptor Usage", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1486/dcrypt/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to encrypt disks.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1486" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1486", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "APT41", + "FIN7", + "Indrik Spider", + "TA505" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1486" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 35 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 35 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1486" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows DiskCryptor Usage Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows DiskCryptor Usage", + "file": "endpoint/windows_diskcryptor_usage.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1486/dcrypt/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_diskcryptor_usage_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_diskcryptor_usage.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path", + "id": "fddf3b56-7933-11ec-98a6-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-19", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies native .net binaries within the Windows operating system that may be abused by adversaries by moving it to a new directory. The analytic identifies the .net binary by using a lookup and compares the process name and original file name (internal name). The analytic utilizes a lookup with the is_net_windows_file macro to identify the binary process name and original file name. if one or the other matches an alert will be generated. Adversaries abuse these binaries as they are native to windows and native DotNet. Note that not all SDK (post install of Windows) are captured in the lookup.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where NOT (Processes.process_path IN (\"*\\\\Windows\\\\ADWS\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\system32*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\NetworkController\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SystemApps\\\\*\", \"*\\\\WinSxS\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Microsoft.NET\\\\*\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_path Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `is_net_windows_file` | `windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present and filtering may be required. Certain utilities will run from non-standard paths based on the third-party application in use.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.yaml", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path", + "analytic_story": [ + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Ransomware", + "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_installutil_path.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ from a non-standard path was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1036", + "T1036.003", + "T1218", + "T1218.004" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "GALLIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Mustang Panda", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036", + "T1036.003", + "T1218", + "T1218.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Ransomware", + "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036", + "T1036.003", + "T1218", + "T1218.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path", + "file": "endpoint/windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon_installutil_path.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_installutil_path.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "is_net_windows_file", + "definition": "lookup update=true is_net_windows_file filename as process_name OUTPUT netFile | lookup update=true is_net_windows_file originalFileName as original_file_name OUTPUT netFile | search netFile=true", + "description": "This macro limits the output to process names that are .net binaries on Windows Server 2016 and Windows 11." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Event Log Cleared", + "id": "ad517544-aff9-4c96-bd99-d6eb43bfbb6a", + "version": 6, + "date": "2020-07-06", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes Windows Security Event ID 1102 or System log event 104 to identify when a Windows event log is cleared. Note that this analytic will require tuning or restricted to specific endpoints based on criticality. During triage, based on time of day and user, determine if this was planned. If not planned, follow through with reviewing parallel alerts and other data sources to determine what else may have occurred.", + "search": "(`wineventlog_security` EventCode=1102) OR (`wineventlog_system` EventCode=104) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest Message EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_event_log_cleared_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows event logs from your hosts. In addition, the Splunk Windows TA is needed.", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible that these logs may be legitimately cleared by Administrators. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-1102", + "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/defense-evasion/disabling-windows-event-logs-by-suspending-eventlog-service-threads", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/001/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1070.001/T1070.001.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Event Log Cleared", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Ransomware", + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 6" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Windows event logs cleared on $dest$ via EventCode $EventCode$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1070", + "T1070.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "PR.IP", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "dest" + ], + "risk_score": 70, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN8", + "Indrik Spider", + "Operation Wocao" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1070", + "T1070.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 6" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "PR.IP", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Ransomware", + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 70 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1070", + "T1070.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 6" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "PR.IP", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows Event Log Cleared Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows Event Log Cleared", + "file": "endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + }, + { + "file_name": "windows-system.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:System", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_system", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "windows_event_log_cleared_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path", + "id": "dcf74b22-7933-11ec-857c-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-19", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the Windows binary InstallUtil.exe running from a non-standard location. The analytic utilizes a macro for InstallUtil and identifies both the process_name and original_file_name.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` NOT (Processes.process_path IN (\"*\\\\Windows\\\\ADWS\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\system32*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\NetworkController\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SystemApps\\\\*\", \"*\\\\WinSxS\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Microsoft.NET\\\\*\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_hash | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present and filtering may be required. Certain utilities will run from non-standard paths based on the third-party application in use.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.yaml", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path", + "analytic_story": [ + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Ransomware", + "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_installutil_path.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ from a non-standard path was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1036", + "T1036.003", + "T1218", + "T1218.004" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "GALLIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Mustang Panda", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036", + "T1036.003", + "T1218", + "T1218.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Ransomware", + "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036", + "T1036.003", + "T1218", + "T1218.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path", + "file": "endpoint/windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon_installutil_path.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_installutil_path.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_installutil", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=installutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=InstallUtil.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun", + "id": "bb4f3090-7ae4-11ec-897f-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-21", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of AdvancedRun.exe. AdvancedRun.exe has similar capabilities as other remote programs like psexec. AdvancedRun may also ingest a configuration file with all settings defined and perform its activity. The analytic is written in a way to identify a renamed binary and also the common command-line arguments.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=advancedrun.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=advancedrun.exe) Processes.process IN (\"*EXEFilename*\",\"*/cfg*\",\"*RunAs*\", \"*WindowState*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_nirsoft_advancedrun_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as it is specific to AdvancedRun. Filter as needed based on legitimate usage.", + "references": [ + "http://www.nirsoft.net/utils/advanced_run.html", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun", + "analytic_story": [ + "Unusual Processes", + "Ransomware", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1588.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of advancedrun.exe, $process_name$, was spawned by $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1588.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 60, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1588.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Tool", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Resource Development" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Cleaver", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "CostaRicto", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Dragonfly", + "FIN10", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gorgon Group", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Patchwork", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1588.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Unusual Processes", + "Ransomware", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 60 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 60 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1588.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun", + "file": "endpoint/windows_nirsoft_advancedrun.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1588.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_nirsoft_advancedrun_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_nirsoft_advancedrun.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Raccine Scheduled Task Deletion", + "id": "c9f010da-57ab-11ec-82bd-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-07", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the Raccine Rules Updater scheduled task being deleted. Adversaries may attempt to remove this task in order to prevent the update of Raccine. Raccine is a \"ransomware vaccine\" created by security researcher Florian Roth, designed to intercept and prevent precursors and active ransomware behavior.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe Processes.process=\"*delete*\" AND Processes.process=\"*Raccine*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_raccine_scheduled_task_deletion_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://redcanary.com/blog/blackbyte-ransomware/", + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/Raccine" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Raccine Scheduled Task Deletion", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_raccine.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user user$ attempting to disable Raccines scheduled task.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows Raccine Scheduled Task Deletion Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows Raccine Scheduled Task Deletion", + "file": "endpoint/windows_raccine_scheduled_task_deletion.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon_raccine.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_raccine.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_raccine_scheduled_task_deletion_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_raccine_scheduled_task_deletion.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell", + "id": "203ef0ea-9bd8-11eb-8201-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-12", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed with a native Windows shell (PowerShell, Cmd, Wscript, Cscript).\\\nThe search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not.\\\nschtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\\Windows\\system32` and `C:\\Windows\\syswow64`.\\\nThe following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory.\\\nUpon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message | search Command IN (\"*powershell.exe*\", \"*wscript.exe*\", \"*cscript.exe*\", \"*cmd.exe*\", \"*sh.exe*\", \"*ksh.exe*\", \"*zsh.exe*\", \"*bash.exe*\", \"*scrcons.exe*\", \"*pwsh.exe*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Task_Name, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives are possible if legitimate applications are allowed to register tasks that call a shell to be spawned. Filter as needed based on command-line or processes that are used legitimately.", + "references": [ + "https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/irans-apt34-returns-with-an-updated-arsenal/", + "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4698", + "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/scheduled-task-job/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/taskschd/time-trigger-example--scripting-?redirectedfrom=MSDN" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A windows scheduled task was created (task name=$Task_Name$) on $dest$ by the following command: $Command$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Command", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "dest", + "Task_Name", + "Description", + "Command" + ], + "risk_score": 70, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CostaRicto", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Machete", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Command", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 70 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "Command", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell", + "file": "endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", + "id": "5d9c6eee-988c-11eb-8253-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-08", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed from a user writeable file path.\\\nThe search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not.\\\nschtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\\Windows\\system32` and `C:\\Windows\\syswow64`.\\\nThe following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory.\\\nUpon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or was it via TaskService. Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message | search Command IN (\"*\\\\users\\\\public\\\\*\", \"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Tasks\\\\*\", \"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Task_Name, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives are possible if legitimate applications are allowed to register tasks in public paths. Filter as needed based on paths that are used legitimately.", + "references": [ + "https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/irans-apt34-returns-with-an-updated-arsenal/", + "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4698", + "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/scheduled-task-job/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/taskschd/time-trigger-example--scripting-?redirectedfrom=MSDN", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/e26f1b2e-befa-483b-91d2-e18636e2faf3/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "IcedID", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/taskschedule/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A windows scheduled task was created (task name=$Task_Name$) on $dest$ by the following command: $Command$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Command", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "dest", + "Task_Name", + "Description", + "Command" + ], + "risk_score": 70, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CostaRicto", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Machete", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "IcedID", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Command", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 70 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "Command", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", + "file": "endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/taskschedule/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Microsoft Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages", + "id": "985f322c-57a5-11ec-b9ac-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-07", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following query identifies suspicious .aspx created in 3 paths identified by Microsoft as known drop locations for Exchange exploitation related to HAFNIUM group and recently disclosed vulnerablity named ProxyShell. Paths include: `\\HttpProxy\\owa\\auth\\`, `\\inetpub\\wwwroot\\aspnet_client\\`, and `\\HttpProxy\\OAB\\`. The analytic is limited to process name MSExchangeMailboxReplication.exe, which typically does not write .aspx files to disk. Upon triage, the suspicious .aspx file will likely look obvious on the surface. inspect the contents for script code inside. Identify additional log sources, IIS included, to review source and other potential exploitation. It is often the case that a particular threat is only applicable to a specific subset of systems in your environment. Typically analytics to detect those threats are written without the benefit of being able to only target those systems as well. Writing analytics against all systems when those behaviors are limited to identifiable subsets of those systems is suboptimal. Consider the case ProxyShell vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Servers. With asset information, a hunter can limit their analytics to systems that have been identified as Exchange servers. A hunter may start with the theory that the exchange server is communicating with new systems that it has not previously. If this theory is run against all publicly facing systems, the amount of noise it will generate will likely render this theory untenable. However, using the asset information to limit this analytic to just the Exchange servers will reduce the noise allowing the hunter to focus only on the systems where this behavioral change is relevant.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=MSExchangeMailboxReplication.exe by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process_guid Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*\\\\HttpProxy\\\\owa\\\\auth\\\\*\", \"*\\\\inetpub\\\\wwwroot\\\\aspnet_client\\\\*\", \"*\\\\HttpProxy\\\\OAB\\\\*\") Filesystem.file_name=\"*.aspx\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process process_guid] | dedup file_create_time | table dest file_create_time, file_name, file_path, process_name | `microsoft_exchange_mailbox_replication_service_writing_active_server_pages_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node and `Filesystem` node.", + "known_false_positives": "The query is structured in a way that `action` (read, create) is not defined. Review the results of this query, filter, and tune as necessary. It may be necessary to generate this query specific to your endpoint product.", + "references": [ + "https://redcanary.com/blog/blackbyte-ransomware/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Microsoft Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages", + "analytic_story": [ + "ProxyShell", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/windows-sysmon_proxylogon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk that is related to IIS exploitation related to ProxyShell. Review further file modifications on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1505", + "T1505.003", + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_name", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.file_path", + "Filesystem.process_id", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.file_hash", + "Filesystem.user", + "Filesystem.process_guid", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process_guid" + ], + "risk_score": 81, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Volatile Cedar" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1505", + "T1505.003", + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "ProxyShell", + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_name", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 81 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 81 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "file_name", + "threat_object_type": "file name" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1505", + "T1505.003", + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "microsoft_exchange_mailbox_replication_service_writing_active_server_pages_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/microsoft_exchange_mailbox_replication_service_writing_active_server_pages.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Spike in File Writes", + "id": "fdb0f805-74e4-4539-8c00-618927333aae", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-03-16", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The search looks for a sharp increase in the number of files written to a particular host", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.action=created by _time span=1h, Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | eventstats max(_time) as maxtime | stats count as num_data_samples max(eval(if(_time >= relative_time(maxtime, \"-1d@d\"), count, null))) as \"count\" avg(eval(if(_time upperBound) AND num_data_samples >=20, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `spike_in_file_writes_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "In order to implement this search, you must populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection and response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the file system.", + "known_false_positives": "It is important to understand that if you happen to install any new applications on your hosts or are copying a large number of files, you can expect to see a large increase of file modifications.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Spike in File Writes", + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.action", + "Filesystem.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "spike_in_file_writes_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Unusually Long Command Line", + "id": "c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6a4264e7f", + "version": 5, + "date": "2020-12-08", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious activity on your hosts.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| eval processlen=len(process) | eventstats stdev(processlen) as stdev, avg(processlen) as avg by dest | stats max(processlen) as maxlen, values(stdev) as stdevperhost, values(avg) as avgperhost by dest, user, process_name, process | `unusually_long_command_line_filter` |eval threshold = 3 | where maxlen > ((threshold*stdevperhost) + avgperhost)", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships, from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the process field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate applications start with long command lines.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Unusually Long Command Line", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Unusual Processes", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Unusually long command line $Processes.process_name$ on $dest$", + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Processes.process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Unusual Processes", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Processes.process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 42 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "Processes.process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "unusually_long_command_line_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK", + "id": "57edaefa-a73b-45e5-bbae-f39c1473f941", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-05-08", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious activity on your hosts. This search leverages the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) to help identify command lines with lengths that are unusual for a given user.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| eval processlen=len(process) | search user!=unknown | apply cmdline_pdfmodel threshold=0.01 | rename \"IsOutlier(processlen)\" as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | table firstTime lastTime user dest process_name process processlen count | `unusually_long_command_line___mltk_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that monitors command lines and populates the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model. In addition, MLTK version >= 4.2 must be installed on your search heads, along with any required dependencies. Finally, the support search \"Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK\" must be executed before this detection search, as it builds an ML model over the historical data used by this search. It is important that this search is run in the same app context as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild the model with the latest data available in your environment.", + "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate applications use long command lines for installs or updates. You should review identified command lines for legitimacy. You may modify the first part of the search to omit legitimate command lines from consideration. If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider changing the value of threshold in the search to a smaller value. You should also periodically re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data. You may get unexpected results if the user identified in the results is not present in the data used to build the associated model.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Unusual Processes", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Unusual Processes", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", + "id": "d2a4d85b-fc6a-47a0-82f6-bc1ec2ebc459", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-05-08", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model to characterize the length of the command lines observed for each user in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 30 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies outliers in the length of the command line.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as start_time max(_time) as end_time FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | search user!=unknown | `security_content_ctime(start_time)`| `security_content_ctime(end_time)`| eval processlen=len(process) | fit DensityFunction processlen by user into cmdline_pdfmodel", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint data model. In addition, you must have the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version >= 4.2 installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users in your environment, you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 30 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data. More information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Ransomware", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Unusual Processes" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd.exe", + "Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "unusually_long_command_line___mltk_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed", + "id": "ce5a0962-849f-4720-a678-753fe6674479", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search looks for network traffic defined by port and transport layer protocol in the Enterprise Security lookup table \"lookup_interesting_ports\", that is marked as prohibited, and has an associated 'allow' action in the Network_Traffic data model. This could be indicative of a misconfigured network device.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.action = allowed by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip All_Traffic.dest_port All_Traffic.action | lookup update=true interesting_ports_lookup dest_port as All_Traffic.dest_port OUTPUT app is_prohibited note transport | search is_prohibited=true | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `prohibited_network_traffic_allowed_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from firewalls or other network control devices that mediate the traffic allowed into an environment. This is necessary so that the search can identify an 'action' taken on the traffic of interest. The search requires the Network_Traffic data model be populated.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed", + "analytic_story": [ + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Command & Control" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 9", + "CIS 12" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery", + "Command & Control" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1048" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "PR.AC" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.action", + "All_Traffic.src_ip", + "All_Traffic.dest_ip", + "All_Traffic.dest_port" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1048" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery", + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 9", + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "PR.AC" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Command & Control" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Count of Unique IPs Connecting to Ports", + "id": "9f3bae5a-9fe3-49df-8c84-5edc51d84b7f", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-13", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "The search counts the number of times a connection was observed to each destination port, and the number of unique source IPs connecting to them.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count dc(All_Traffic.src) as numberOfUniqueHosts from datamodel=Network_Traffic by All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | sort - count", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting network traffic, and populating the Network_Traffic data model.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Command & Control" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1048" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery", + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 9", + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "PR.AC" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "prohibited_network_traffic_allowed_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "SMB Traffic Spike", + "id": "7f5fb3e1-4209-4914-90db-0ec21b936378", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-07-22", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search looks for spikes in the number of Server Message Block (SMB) traffic connections.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb by _time span=1h, All_Traffic.src | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | eventstats max(_time) as maxtime | stats count as num_data_samples max(eval(if(_time >= relative_time(maxtime, \"-70m@m\"), count, null))) as count avg(eval(if(_time upperBound AND num_data_samples >=50, 1, 0) | where isOutlier=1 | table src count | `smb_traffic_spike_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic logs and populating the `Network_Traffic` data model.", + "known_false_positives": "A file server may experience high-demand loads that could cause this analytic to trigger.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "SMB Traffic Spike", + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Ransomware", + "DHS Report TA18-074A" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021.002", + "T1021" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.app", + "All_Traffic.src" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Operation Wocao", + "Orangeworm", + "Sandworm Team", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021.002", + "T1021" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Ransomware", + "DHS Report TA18-074A" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021.002", + "T1021" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "smb_traffic_spike_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK", + "id": "d25773ba-9ad8-48d1-858e-07ad0bbeb828", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-07-22", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search uses the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) to identify spikes in the number of Server Message Block (SMB) connections.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as port from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb by _time span=1h, All_Traffic.src | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%A\") | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | apply smb_pdfmodel threshold=0.001 | rename \"IsOutlier(count)\" as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | sort -count | table _time src dest port count | `smb_traffic_spike___mltk_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. In addition, the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or greater must be installed on your search heads, along with any required dependencies. Finally, the support search \"Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK\" must be executed before this detection search, because it builds a machine-learning (ML) model over the historical data used by this search. It is important that this search is run in the same app context as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild the model with the latest data available in your environment.\\\nThis search produces a field (Number of events,count) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. This field contributes additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following field, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry): \\\n1. **Label:** Number of events, **Field:** count\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review is found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", + "known_false_positives": "If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider reducing the value of the threshold in the search. You should also periodically re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data. Please update the `smb_traffic_spike_mltk_filter` macro to filter out false positive results", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK", + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Ransomware", + "DHS Report TA18-074A" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021.002", + "T1021" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_ip", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.app", + "All_Traffic.src" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Operation Wocao", + "Orangeworm", + "Sandworm Team", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021.002", + "T1021" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Ransomware", + "DHS Report TA18-074A" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", + "id": "df98763b-0b08-4281-8ef9-08db7ac572a9", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-05-08", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model to characterize the number of SMB connections observed each hour for every day of week. By default, the search uses the last 30 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search to identify outliers in the number of SMB connections for that hour and day of the week.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb by _time span=10m, All_Traffic.src | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%A\") | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | fit DensityFunction count by \"HourOfDay,DayOfWeek\" into smb_pdfmodel", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model. In addition, you must have the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version >= 4.2 installed, along with any required dependencies. To improve your results, you may consider adding \"src\" to the by clause, which will build the model for each unique source in your enviornment. However, if you have a large number of hosts in your environment, this search may be very resource intensive. In this case, you may need to raise the value of max_inputs and/or max_groups in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 30 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data. More information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Ransomware" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Processes launching netsh", + "SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.app", + "All_Traffic.src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021.002", + "T1021" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "smb_traffic_spike___mltk_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "TOR Traffic", + "id": "ea688274-9c06-4473-b951-e4cb7a5d7a45", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-22", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search looks for network traffic identified as The Onion Router (TOR), a benign anonymity network which can be abused for a variety of nefarious purposes.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.app=tor AND All_Traffic.action=allowed by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip All_Traffic.dest_port All_Traffic.action | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `tor_traffic_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from firewalls or other network control devices that mediate the traffic allowed into an environment. This is necessary so that the search can identify an 'action' taken on the traffic of interest. The search requires the Network_Traffic data model be populated.", + "known_false_positives": "None at this time", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "TOR Traffic", + "analytic_story": [ + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Command & Control", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 9", + "CIS 12" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1071", + "T1071.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.app", + "All_Traffic.action", + "All_Traffic.src_ip", + "All_Traffic.dest_ip", + "All_Traffic.dest_port" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1071", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Magic Hound", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Protocols", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "FIN4", + "FIN8", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Orangeworm", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "SilverTerrier", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1071", + "T1071.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 9", + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Command & Control", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1071", + "T1071.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 9", + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "tor_traffic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/tor_traffic.yml", + "source": "network" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get Backup Logs For Endpoint", + "id": "fdcfb369-1725-4c24-824a-22972d7f0d44", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-14", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search will tell you the backup status from your netbackup_logs of a specific endpoint for the last week.", + "search": "`netbackup` COMPUTERNAME=$dest$ | rename COMPUTERNAME as dest, MESSAGE as signature | table _time, dest, signature", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your backup logs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "COMPUTERNAME", + "MESSAGE" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_backup_logs_for_endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Get History Of Email Sources", + "id": "ddc7af28-c34d-4392-af93-7f29a4e8806c", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-02-21", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Email" + ], + "description": "This search returns a list of all email sources seen in the 48 hours prior to the notable event to 24 hours after, and the number of emails from each source.", + "search": "|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Email.dest) as dest values(All_Email.recipient) as recepient min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count from datamodel=Email.All_Email by All_Email.src |`drop_dm_object_name(All_Email)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search src=$src$", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must ingest your email logs or capture unencrypted email communications within network traffic, and populate the Email data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "src" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Email.dest", + "All_Email.recipient", + "All_Email.src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_history_of_email_sources" + }, + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + }, + { + "name": "Get Parent Process Info", + "id": "fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41bf9", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-02-28", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "parent_process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Phishing Payloads", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_parent_process_info" + }, + { + "name": "Get Process Info", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd71", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-01", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the process running on a host which is under investigation. To gather the process info, enter the values for the process name in question and the destination IP address.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search process_name= $process_name$ | search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_process_info" + }, + { + "name": "Get Process Information For Port Activity", + "id": "9925d08f-561e-4faa-8912-e3888a842341", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-01", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search will return information about the process associated with observed network traffic to a specific destination port from a specific host.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search dest=$dest$ | join dest type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Ports by Ports.process_id Ports.src Ports.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | search dest_port=$dest_port$ | rename src as dest]", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data that associates processes with network events and populate the Endpoint Datamodel", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest", + "dest_port" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Ports.process_id", + "Ports.src", + "Ports.dest_port" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_process_information_for_port_activity" + }, + { + "name": "Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host", + "id": "155e0571-7db6-42f2-aa62-9a3a4cf35c94", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-10-23", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries Sysmon WMI events for the host of interest.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode>18 EventCode<22 | rename host as dest | search dest=$dest$| table _time, dest, user, Name, Operation, EventType, Type, Query, Consumer, Filter", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be collecting Sysmon data using Sysmon version 6.1 or greater and have Sysmon configured to generate events for WMI activity. In addition, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA installed to properly parse the fields.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Suspicious WMI Use" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "user", + "Name", + "Operation", + "EventType", + "Type", + "Query", + "Consumer", + "Filter" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host" + }, + { + "name": "Rundll32 LockWorkStation", + "id": "fa90f372-f91d-11eb-816c-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-08-09", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32 commandline to lock the workstation through command line. This technique was seen in CONTI leak tooling and script as part of its defense evasion. This technique is not a common practice to lock a screen and maybe a good indicator of compromise.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe Processes.process= \"*user32.dll,LockWorkStation*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_lockworkstation_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1423361119926816776.html" + ], + "inputs": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "rundll32_lockworkstation" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "BlackMatter Ransomware", + "id": "0da348a3-78a0-412e-ab27-2de9dd7f9fee", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-06", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the BlackMatter ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with BlackMatter, force safe mode boot, autadminlogon account registry modification and more.", + "narrative": "BlackMatter ransomware campaigns targeting healthcare and other vertical sectors, involve the use of ransomware payloads along with exfiltration of data per HHS bulletin. Malicious actors demand payment for ransome of data and threaten deletion and exposure of exfiltrated data.", + "references": [ + "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/08/09/blackmatter-ransomware-emerges-from-the-shadow-of-darkside/", + "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/blackmatter-ransomware-gang-rises-from-the-ashes-of-darkside-revil/", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/ransomware/2021/07/blackmatter-a-new-ransomware-group-claims-link-to-darkside-revil/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "BlackMatter Ransomware", + "analytic_story": "BlackMatter Ransomware", + "category": [ + "Malware" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1552.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials in Registry", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1552", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1491", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Defacement", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1486", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "APT41", + "FIN7", + "Indrik Spider", + "TA505" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access", + "Impact" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Add DefaultUser And Password In Registry - Rule", + "ESCU - Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry - Rule", + "ESCU - Bcdedit Command Back To Normal Mode Boot - Rule", + "ESCU - Change To Safe Mode With Network Config - Rule", + "ESCU - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule", + "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", + "ESCU - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Add DefaultUser And Password In Registry", + "id": "d4a3eb62-0f1e-11ec-a971-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-26", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "this search is to detect a suspicious registry modification to implement auto admin logon to a host. This technique was seen in BlackMatter ransomware to automatically logon to the compromise host after triggering a safemode boot to continue encrypting the whole network. This behavior is not a common practice and really a suspicious TTP or alert need to be consider if found within then network premise.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon*\" AND Registry.registry_value_name= DefaultPassword OR Registry.registry_value_name= DefaultUserName by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `add_defaultuser_and_password_in_registry_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/08/09/blackmatter-ransomware-emerges-from-the-shadow-of-darkside/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Add DefaultUser And Password In Registry", + "analytic_story": [ + "BlackMatter Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1552.002/autoadminlogon/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "modified registry key $registry_key_name$ with registry value $registry_value_name$ to prepare autoadminlogon", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1552.002", + "T1552" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1552.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials in Registry", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1552", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1552.002", + "T1552" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "BlackMatter Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1552.002", + "T1552" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Add DefaultUser And Password In Registry Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Add DefaultUser And Password In Registry", + "file": "endpoint/add_defaultuser_and_password_in_registry.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1552.002/autoadminlogon/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "add_defaultuser_and_password_in_registry_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/add_defaultuser_and_password_in_registry.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry", + "id": "1379d2b8-0f18-11ec-8ca3-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-01-28", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "this search is to detect a suspicious registry modification to implement auto admin logon to a host. This technique was seen in BlackMatter ransomware to automatically logon to the compromise host after triggering a safemode boot to continue encrypting the whole network. This behavior is not a common practice and really a suspicious TTP or alert need to be consider if found within then network premise.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon*\" AND Registry.registry_value_name=AutoAdminLogon AND Registry.registry_value_data=1 by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `auto_admin_logon_registry_entry_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/08/09/blackmatter-ransomware-emerges-from-the-shadow-of-darkside/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry", + "analytic_story": [ + "BlackMatter Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1552.002/autoadminlogon/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "modified registry key $registry_key_name$ with registry value $registry_value_name$ to prepare autoadminlogon", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1552.002", + "T1552" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1552.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials in Registry", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1552", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1552.002", + "T1552" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "BlackMatter Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 63 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1552.002", + "T1552" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry", + "file": "endpoint/auto_admin_logon_registry_entry.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1552.002/autoadminlogon/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "auto_admin_logon_registry_entry_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/auto_admin_logon_registry_entry.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Bcdedit Command Back To Normal Mode Boot", + "id": "dc7a8004-0f18-11ec-8c54-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-06", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious bcdedit commandline to configure the host from safe mode back to normal boot configuration. This technique was seen in blackMatter ransomware where it force the compromised host to boot in safe mode to continue its encryption and bring back to normal boot using bcdedit deletevalue command. This TTP can be a good alert for host that booted from safe mode forcefully since it need to modify the boot configuration to bring it back to normal.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = bcdedit.exe Processes.process=\"*/deletevalue*\" Processes.process=\"*{current}*\" Processes.process=\"*safeboot*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user |`drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `bcdedit_command_back_to_normal_mode_boot_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/08/09/blackmatter-ransomware-emerges-from-the-shadow-of-darkside/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Bcdedit Command Back To Normal Mode Boot", + "analytic_story": [ + "BlackMatter Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1552.002/autoadminlogon/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "bcdedit process with commandline $process$ to bring back to normal boot configuration the $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1490" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1490" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "BlackMatter Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 35 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 35 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1490" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Bcdedit Command Back To Normal Mode Boot Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Bcdedit Command Back To Normal Mode Boot", + "file": "endpoint/bcdedit_command_back_to_normal_mode_boot.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1552.002/autoadminlogon/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "bcdedit_command_back_to_normal_mode_boot_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_command_back_to_normal_mode_boot.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Change To Safe Mode With Network Config", + "id": "81f1dce0-0f18-11ec-a5d7-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-06", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious bcdedit commandline to configure the host to boot in safe mode with network config. This technique was seen in blackMatter ransomware where it force the compromised host to boot in safe mode to continue its encryption and bring back to normal boot using bcdedit deletevalue command. This TTP can be a good alert for host that booted from safe mode forcefully since it need to modify the boot configuration to bring it back to normal.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = bcdedit.exe Processes.process=\"*/set*\" Processes.process=\"*{current}*\" Processes.process=\"*safeboot*\" Processes.process=\"*network*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user |`drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `change_to_safe_mode_with_network_config_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/08/09/blackmatter-ransomware-emerges-from-the-shadow-of-darkside/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Change To Safe Mode With Network Config", + "analytic_story": [ + "BlackMatter Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1552.002/autoadminlogon/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "bcdedit process with commandline $process$ to force safemode boot the $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1490" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1490" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "BlackMatter Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1490" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Change To Safe Mode With Network Config Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Change To Safe Mode With Network Config", + "file": "endpoint/change_to_safe_mode_with_network_config.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1552.002/autoadminlogon/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "change_to_safe_mode_with_network_config_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/change_to_safe_mode_with_network_config.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Known Services Killed by Ransomware", + "id": "3070f8e0-c528-11eb-b2a0-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-04", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search detects a suspicioous termination of known services killed by ransomware before encrypting files in a compromised machine. This technique is commonly seen in most of ransomware now a days to avoid exception error while accessing the targetted files it wants to encrypts because of the open handle of those services to the targetted file.", + "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 Message IN (\"*Volume Shadow Copy*\",\"*VSS*\", \"*backup*\", \"*sophos*\", \"*sql*\", \"*memtas*\", \"*mepocs*\", \"*veeam*\", \"*svc$*\") Message=\"*service entered the stopped state*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message dest Type | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `known_services_killed_by_ransomware_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the 7036 EventCode ScManager in System audit Logs from your endpoints.", + "known_false_positives": "Admin activities or installing related updates may do a sudden stop to list of services we monitor.", + "references": [ + "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", + "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Known Services Killed by Ransomware", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "BlackMatter Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf3/windows-system.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Known services $Message$ terminated by a potential ransomware on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1490" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Message", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "dest", + "Type" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1490" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "BlackMatter Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Message", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 72 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "Message", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1490" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Known Services Killed by Ransomware Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Known Services Killed by Ransomware", + "file": "endpoint/known_services_killed_by_ransomware.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-system.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf3/windows-system.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:System", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_system", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "known_services_killed_by_ransomware_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/known_services_killed_by_ransomware.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Modification Of Wallpaper", + "id": "accb0712-c381-11eb-8e5b-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-02", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies suspicious modification of registry to deface or change the wallpaper of a compromised machines as part of its payload. This technique was commonly seen in ransomware like REVIL where it create a bitmap file contain a note that the machine was compromised and make it as a wallpaper.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode =13 (TargetObject= \"*\\\\Control Panel\\\\Desktop\\\\Wallpaper\" AND Image != \"*\\\\explorer.exe\") OR (TargetObject= \"*\\\\Control Panel\\\\Desktop\\\\Wallpaper\" AND Details = \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Image TargetObject Details Computer process_guid process_id user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `modification_of_wallpaper_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Image, TargetObject registry key, registry Details from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "3rd party tool may used to changed the wallpaper of the machine", + "references": [ + "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", + "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Modification Of Wallpaper", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Revil Ransomware", + "BlackMatter Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Wallpaper modification on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1491" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Image", + "TargetObject", + "Details", + "Computer", + "process_guid", + "process_id", + "user_id" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1491", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Defacement", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1491" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Revil Ransomware", + "BlackMatter Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 54 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1491" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Modification Of Wallpaper Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Modification Of Wallpaper", + "file": "endpoint/modification_of_wallpaper.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "modification_of_wallpaper_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/modification_of_wallpaper.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Ransomware Notes bulk creation", + "id": "eff7919a-8330-11eb-83f8-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-03-12", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytics identifies a big number of instance of ransomware notes (filetype e.g .txt, .html, .hta) file creation to the infected machine. This behavior is a good sensor if the ransomware note filename is quite new for security industry or the ransomware note filename is not in your ransomware lookup table list for monitoring.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=11 file_name IN (\"*\\.txt\",\"*\\.html\",\"*\\.hta\") |bin _time span=10s | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(TargetFilename) as unique_readme_path_count values(TargetFilename) as list_of_readme_path by Computer Image file_name | where unique_readme_path_count >= 15 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ransomware_notes_bulk_creation_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", + "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Ransomware Notes bulk creation", + "analytic_story": [ + "Clop Ransomware", + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "BlackMatter Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A high frequency file creation of $file_name$ in different file path in host $Computer$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1486" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "EventCode", + "file_name", + "_time", + "TargetFilename", + "Computer", + "Image", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 81, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1486", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "APT41", + "FIN7", + "Indrik Spider", + "TA505" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1486" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Clop Ransomware", + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "BlackMatter Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 81 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 81 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1486" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Ransomware Notes bulk creation Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Ransomware Notes bulk creation", + "file": "endpoint/ransomware_notes_bulk_creation.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "ransomware_notes_bulk_creation_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/ransomware_notes_bulk_creation.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [] + }, + { + "name": "Clop Ransomware", + "id": "5a6f6849-1a26-4fae-aa05-fa730556eeb6", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-03-17", + "author": "Rod Soto, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Clop ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Clope, encrypting network shares, deleting and resizing shadow volume storage, registry key modification, deleting of security logs, and more.", + "narrative": "Clop ransomware campaigns targeting healthcare and other vertical sectors, involve the use of ransomware payloads along with exfiltration of data per HHS bulletin. Malicious actors demand payment for ransome of data and threaten deletion and exposure of exfiltrated data.", + "references": [ + "https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/analyst-note-cl0p-tlp-white.pdf", + "https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/115250/data-breach/qualys-clop-ransomware.html", + "https://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/qualys-is-the-latest-victim-of-accellion-data-breach/d/d-id/1340323" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Clop Ransomware", + "analytic_story": "Clop Ransomware", + "category": [ + "Malware" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", + "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1486", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "APT41", + "FIN7", + "Indrik Spider", + "TA505" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN8", + "Indrik Spider", + "Operation Wocao" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1569", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "FIN6", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Operation Wocao", + "Silence", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Execution", + "Impact", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Clop Common Exec Parameter - Rule", + "ESCU - Clop Ransomware Known Service Name - Rule", + "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", + "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", + "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", + "ESCU - High Process Termination Frequency - Rule", + "ESCU - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule", + "ESCU - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule", + "ESCU - Resize ShadowStorage volume - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows High File Deletion Frequency - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows Service Created With Suspicious Service Path - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "author_name": "Rod Soto", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Clop Common Exec Parameter", + "id": "5a8a2a72-8322-11eb-9ee9-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-03-17", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytics are designed to identifies some CLOP ransomware variant that using arguments to execute its main code or feature of its code. In this variant if the parameter is \"runrun\", CLOP ransomware will try to encrypt files in network shares and if it is \"temp.dat\", it will try to read from some stream pipe or file start encrypting files within the infected local machines. This technique can be also identified as an anti-sandbox technique to make its code non-responsive since it is waiting for some parameter to execute properly.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as cmdline values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process values(Processes.process_name) count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name != \"*temp.dat*\" Processes.process = \"*runrun*\" OR Processes.process = \"*temp.dat*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `clop_common_exec_parameter_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Operators can execute third party tools using these parameters.", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", + "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Clop Common Exec Parameter", + "analytic_story": [ + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_b/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 100, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting using arguments to execute its main code or feature of its code related to Clop ransomware.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1204" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 100, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", + "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1204" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 100, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 100 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 100 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1204" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Clop Common Exec Parameter Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Clop Common Exec Parameter", + "file": "endpoint/clop_common_exec_parameter.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_b/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "clop_common_exec_parameter_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/clop_common_exec_parameter.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Clop Ransomware Known Service Name", + "id": "07e08a12-870c-11eb-b5f9-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-03-17", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This detection is to identify the common service name created by the CLOP ransomware as part of its persistence and high privilege code execution in the infected machine. Ussually CLOP ransomware use StartServiceCtrlDispatcherW API in creating this service entry.", + "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 Service_Name IN (\"SecurityCenterIBM\", \"WinCheckDRVs\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Service_File_Name Service_Name Service_Start_Type Service_Type | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `clop_ransomware_known_service_name_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", + "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Clop Ransomware Known Service Name", + "analytic_story": [ + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-system.log" + ], + "impact": 100, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ executing known Clop Ransomware service names.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1543" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "EventCode", + "cmdline", + "_time", + "parent_process_name", + "process_name", + "OriginalFileName", + "process_path" + ], + "risk_score": 100, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1543" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 100, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 100 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 100 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1543" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Clop Ransomware Known Service Name Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Clop Ransomware Known Service Name", + "file": "endpoint/clop_ransomware_known_service_name.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-system.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-system.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:System", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_system", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "clop_ransomware_known_service_name_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/clop_ransomware_known_service_name.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Common Ransomware Extensions", + "id": "a9e5c5db-db11-43ca-86a8-c852d1b2c0ec", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-11-09", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The search looks for file modifications with extensions commonly used by Ransomware", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| rex field=file_name \"(?\\.[^\\.]+)$\" | `ransomware_extensions` | `common_ransomware_extensions_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.\\\nThis search produces fields (`query`,`query_length`,`count`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** Name, **Field:** Name\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** File Extension, **Field:** file_extension\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible for a legitimate file with these extensions to be created. If this is a true ransomware attack, there will be a large number of files created with these extensions.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Common Ransomware Extensions", + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Ransomware", + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/ransomware_extensions/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$, this is indicative of a known ransomware file extension and should be reviewed immediately.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1485" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_name", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.user", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Filesystem.file_path", + "Filesystem.file_name" + ], + "risk_score": 90, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1485" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Ransomware", + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_name", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 90 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 90 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "file_name", + "threat_object_type": "file name" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1485" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Common Ransomware Extensions Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Common Ransomware Extensions", + "file": "endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/ransomware_extensions/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "ransomware_extensions", + "definition": "lookup update=true ransomware_extensions_lookup Extensions AS file_extension OUTPUT Name | search Name !=False", + "description": "This macro limits the output to files that have extensions associated with ransomware" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "common_ransomware_extensions_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Common Ransomware Notes", + "id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d6bd71", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-11-09", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The search looks for files created with names matching those typically used in ransomware notes that tell the victim how to get their data back.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `ransomware_notes` | `common_ransomware_notes_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Filesystem data-model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system reads and writes.", + "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a legitimate file could be created with the same name used by ransomware note files.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Common Ransomware Notes", + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/ransomware_notes/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$, this is indicative of a known ransomware note file and should be reviewed immediately.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1485" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_name", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.user", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Filesystem.file_path", + "Filesystem.file_name" + ], + "risk_score": 90, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1485" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_name", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 90 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 90 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "file_name", + "threat_object_type": "file name" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1485" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Common Ransomware Notes Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Common Ransomware Notes", + "file": "endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/ransomware_notes/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ransomware_notes", + "definition": "lookup ransomware_notes_lookup ransomware_notes as file_name OUTPUT status as \"Known Ransomware Notes\" | search \"Known Ransomware Notes\"=True", + "description": "This macro limits the output to files that have been identified as a ransomware note" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "common_ransomware_notes_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Deleting Shadow Copies", + "id": "b89919ed-ee5f-492c-b139-95dbb162039e", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-11-09", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The vssadmin.exe utility is used to interact with the Volume Shadow Copy Service. Wmic is an interface to the Windows Management Instrumentation. This search looks for either of these tools being used to delete shadow copies.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=vssadmin.exe OR Processes.process_name=wmic.exe) Processes.process=*delete* Processes.process=*shadow* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `deleting_shadow_copies_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "vssadmin.exe and wmic.exe are standard applications shipped with modern versions of windows. They may be used by administrators to legitimately delete old backup copies, although this is typically rare.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Deleting Shadow Copies", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ransomware", + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 10" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to delete shadow copies.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1490" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 81, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1490" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 10" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ransomware", + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 81 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 81 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1490" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 10" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Deleting Shadow Copies Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Deleting Shadow Copies", + "file": "endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "deleting_shadow_copies_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "High Process Termination Frequency", + "id": "17cd75b2-8666-11eb-9ab4-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-03-16", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytics are designed to indentify a high frequency of process termination on a machine which is a common behavior of ransomware malware before encrypting files. This technique is designed to avoid an exception error while accessing (docs, images, database and etc..) in the infected machine for encryption.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=5 |bin _time span=3s |stats values(Image) as proc_terminated min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer EventCode ProcessID | where count >= 15 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `high_process_termination_frequency_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Image (process full path of terminated process) from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "admin or user tool that can terminate multiple process.", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", + "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "High Process Termination Frequency", + "analytic_story": [ + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "High frequency process termination (more than 15 processes within 3s) detected on host $Computer$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1486" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "proc_terminated", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "EventCode", + "Image", + "Computer", + "_time", + "ProcessID" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1486", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "APT41", + "FIN7", + "Indrik Spider", + "TA505" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1486" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "proc_terminated", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 72 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "proc_terminated", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1486" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "High Process Termination Frequency Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "High Process Termination Frequency", + "file": "endpoint/high_process_termination_frequency.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "high_process_termination_frequency_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/high_process_termination_frequency.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Process Deleting Its Process File Path", + "id": "f7eda4bc-871c-11eb-b110-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-02-18", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This detection is to identify a suspicious process that tries to delete the process file path related to its process. This technique is known to be defense evasion once a certain condition of malware is satisfied or not. Clop ransomware use this technique where it will try to delete its process file path using a .bat command if the keyboard layout is not the layout it tries to infect.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=1 CommandLine = \"* /c *\" CommandLine = \"* del*\" Image = \"*\\\\cmd.exe\" | eval result = if(like(process,\"%\".parent_process.\"%\"), \"Found\", \"Not Found\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer user ParentImage ParentCommandLine Image CommandLine EventCode ProcessID result | where result = \"Found\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `process_deleting_its_process_file_path_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", + "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Process Deleting Its Process File Path", + "analytic_story": [ + "Clop Ransomware", + "Remcos", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A process $Image$ tries to delete its process path in commandline $cmdline$ as part of defense evasion in host $Computer$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1070" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "EventCode", + "Computer", + "user", + "ParentImage", + "ParentCommandLine", + "Image", + "cmdline", + "ProcessID", + "result", + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 60, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1070" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Clop Ransomware", + "Remcos", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 60 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 60 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1070" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Process Deleting Its Process File Path Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Process Deleting Its Process File Path", + "file": "endpoint/process_deleting_its_process_file_path.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "process_deleting_its_process_file_path_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/process_deleting_its_process_file_path.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Ransomware Notes bulk creation", + "id": "eff7919a-8330-11eb-83f8-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-03-12", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytics identifies a big number of instance of ransomware notes (filetype e.g .txt, .html, .hta) file creation to the infected machine. This behavior is a good sensor if the ransomware note filename is quite new for security industry or the ransomware note filename is not in your ransomware lookup table list for monitoring.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=11 file_name IN (\"*\\.txt\",\"*\\.html\",\"*\\.hta\") |bin _time span=10s | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(TargetFilename) as unique_readme_path_count values(TargetFilename) as list_of_readme_path by Computer Image file_name | where unique_readme_path_count >= 15 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ransomware_notes_bulk_creation_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", + "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Ransomware Notes bulk creation", + "analytic_story": [ + "Clop Ransomware", + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "BlackMatter Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A high frequency file creation of $file_name$ in different file path in host $Computer$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1486" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "EventCode", + "file_name", + "_time", + "TargetFilename", + "Computer", + "Image", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 81, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1486", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "APT41", + "FIN7", + "Indrik Spider", + "TA505" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1486" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Clop Ransomware", + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "BlackMatter Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 81 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 81 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1486" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Ransomware Notes bulk creation Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Ransomware Notes bulk creation", + "file": "endpoint/ransomware_notes_bulk_creation.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "ransomware_notes_bulk_creation_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/ransomware_notes_bulk_creation.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Resize ShadowStorage volume", + "id": "bc760ca6-8336-11eb-bcbb-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-03-12", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytics identifies the resizing of shadowstorage by ransomware malware to avoid the shadow volumes being made again. this technique is an alternative by ransomware attacker than deleting the shadowstorage which is known alert in defensive team. one example of ransomware that use this technique is CLOP ransomware where it drops a .bat file that will resize the shadowstorage to minimum size as much as possible", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as cmdline values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process values(Processes.process_name) as process_name min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name = \"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"powershell.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"powershell_ise.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"wmic.exe\" Processes.process_name = \"vssadmin.exe\" Processes.process=\"*resize*\" Processes.process=\"*shadowstorage*\" Processes.process=\"*/maxsize*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `resize_shadowstorage_volume_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "network admin can resize the shadowstorage for valid purposes.", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", + "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1490/T1490.md", + "https://redcanary.com/blog/blackbyte-ransomware/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/vssadmin-resize-shadowstorage" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Resize ShadowStorage volume", + "analytic_story": [ + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A process $parent_process_name$ attempt to resize shadow copy with commandline $process$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1490" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.process", + "Process.parent_process_name", + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1490" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 72 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 72 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1490" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Resize ShadowStorage volume Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Resize ShadowStorage volume", + "file": "endpoint/resize_shadowstorage_volume.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "resize_shadowstorage_volume_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/resize_shadowstorage_volume.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior", + "id": "2b85aa3d-f5f6-4c2e-a081-a09f6e1c2e40", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-17", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes Windows Event ID 1100 to identify when Windows event log service is shutdown. Note that this is a voluminous analytic that will require tuning or restricted to specific endpoints based on criticality. This event generates every time Windows Event Log service has shut down. It also generates during normal system shutdown. During triage, based on time of day and user, determine if this was planned. If not planned, follow through with reviewing parallel alerts and other data sources to determine what else may have occurred.", + "search": "(`wineventlog_security` EventCode=1100) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest Message EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_event_log_service_behavior_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows event logs from your hosts. In addition, the Splunk Windows TA is needed.", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible the Event Logging service gets shut down due to system errors or legitimately administration tasks. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-1100", + "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/defense-evasion/disabling-windows-event-logs-by-suspending-eventlog-service-threads", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/001/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1070.001/T1070.001.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Ransomware", + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 6" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "The Windows Event Log Service shutdown on $ComputerName$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1070", + "T1070.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "PR.IP", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "dest" + ], + "risk_score": 9, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN8", + "Indrik Spider", + "Operation Wocao" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1070", + "T1070.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 6" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "PR.IP", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Ransomware", + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 30 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 9 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1070", + "T1070.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 6" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "PR.IP", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior", + "file": "endpoint/suspicious_event_log_service_behavior.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_event_log_service_behavior_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_event_log_service_behavior.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious wevtutil Usage", + "id": "2827c0fd-e1be-4868-ae25-59d28e0f9d4f", + "version": 4, + "date": "2021-10-11", + "author": "David Dorsey, Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The wevtutil.exe application is the windows event log utility. This searches for wevtutil.exe with parameters for clearing the application, security, setup, trace or system event logs.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wevtutil.exe Processes.process IN (\"* cl *\", \"*clear-log*\") (Processes.process=\"*System*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Security*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Setup*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Application*\" OR Processes.process=\"*trace*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_wevtutil_usage_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "The wevtutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows event log utility. Administrators may use it to manage Windows event logs.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1070.001/T1070.001.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious wevtutil Usage", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Ransomware", + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 6" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 40, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Wevtutil.exe being used to clear Event Logs on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1070.001", + "T1070" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "PR.IP", + "PR.PT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 28, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN8", + "Indrik Spider", + "Operation Wocao" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1070.001", + "T1070" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 6" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "PR.IP", + "PR.PT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Ransomware", + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 40, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 28 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 28 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1070.001", + "T1070" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 6" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "PR.IP", + "PR.PT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Suspicious wevtutil Usage Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious wevtutil Usage", + "file": "endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_wevtutil_usage_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Event Log Cleared", + "id": "ad517544-aff9-4c96-bd99-d6eb43bfbb6a", + "version": 6, + "date": "2020-07-06", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes Windows Security Event ID 1102 or System log event 104 to identify when a Windows event log is cleared. Note that this analytic will require tuning or restricted to specific endpoints based on criticality. During triage, based on time of day and user, determine if this was planned. If not planned, follow through with reviewing parallel alerts and other data sources to determine what else may have occurred.", + "search": "(`wineventlog_security` EventCode=1102) OR (`wineventlog_system` EventCode=104) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest Message EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_event_log_cleared_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows event logs from your hosts. In addition, the Splunk Windows TA is needed.", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible that these logs may be legitimately cleared by Administrators. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-1102", + "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/defense-evasion/disabling-windows-event-logs-by-suspending-eventlog-service-threads", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/001/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1070.001/T1070.001.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Event Log Cleared", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Ransomware", + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 6" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Windows event logs cleared on $dest$ via EventCode $EventCode$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1070", + "T1070.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "PR.IP", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "dest" + ], + "risk_score": 70, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN8", + "Indrik Spider", + "Operation Wocao" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1070", + "T1070.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 6" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "PR.IP", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Ransomware", + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 70 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1070", + "T1070.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 6" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "PR.IP", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows Event Log Cleared Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows Event Log Cleared", + "file": "endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + }, + { + "file_name": "windows-system.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:System", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_system", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "windows_event_log_cleared_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows High File Deletion Frequency", + "id": "45b125c4-866f-11eb-a95a-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-03-16", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for high frequency of file deletion relative to process name and process id. These events usually happen when the ransomware tries to encrypt the files with the ransomware file extensions and sysmon treat the original files to be deleted as soon it was replace as encrypted data.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=23 TargetFilename IN (\"*.cmd\", \"*.ini\",\"*.gif\", \"*.jpg\", \"*.jpeg\", \"*.db\", \"*.ps1\", \"*.doc*\", \"*.xls*\", \"*.ppt*\", \"*.bmp\",\"*.zip\", \"*.rar\", \"*.7z\", \"*.chm\", \"*.png\", \"*.log\", \"*.vbs\", \"*.js\", \"*.vhd\", \"*.bak\", \"*.wbcat\", \"*.bkf\" , \"*.backup*\", \"*.dsk\", , \"*.win\") | stats values(TargetFilename) as deleted_files min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer user EventCode Image ProcessID |where count >=100 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_high_file_deletion_frequency_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the deleted target file name, process name and process id from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "user may delete bunch of pictures or files in a folder.", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", + "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows High File Deletion Frequency", + "analytic_story": [ + "Clop Ransomware", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "High frequency file deletion activity detected on host $Computer$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1485" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "deleted_files", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "EventCode", + "TargetFilename", + "Computer", + "user", + "Image", + "ProcessID", + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1485" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Clop Ransomware", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "deleted_files", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 72 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 72 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "deleted_files", + "threat_object_type": "file name" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1485" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows High File Deletion Frequency Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows High File Deletion Frequency", + "file": "endpoint/windows_high_file_deletion_frequency.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "windows_high_file_deletion_frequency_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_high_file_deletion_frequency.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Service Created With Suspicious Service Path", + "id": "429141be-8311-11eb-adb6-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-11-22", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytc uses Windows Event Id 7045, `New Service Was Installed`, to identify the creation of a Windows Service where the service binary path path is located in a non-common Service folder in Windows. Red Teams and adversaries alike may create malicious Services for lateral movement or remote code execution as well as persistence and execution. The Clop ransomware has also been seen in the wild abusing Windows services.", + "search": " `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 Service_File_Name = \"*\\.exe\" NOT (Service_File_Name IN (\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\*\", \"C:\\\\Program File*\", \"C:\\\\Programdata\\\\*\", \"%systemroot%\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Service_File_Name Service_Name Service_Start_Type Service_Type | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may install services with uncommon services paths.", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", + "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Service Created With Suspicious Service Path", + "analytic_story": [ + "Clop Ransomware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-system.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A service $Service_File_Name$ was created from a non-standard path using $Service_Name$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1569", + "T1569.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Service_File_Name", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Service_Name", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "EventCode", + "Service_File_Name", + "Service_Type", + "_time", + "Service_Name", + "Service_Start_Type" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1569", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "FIN6", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Operation Wocao", + "Silence", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1569", + "T1569.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Clop Ransomware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Service_File_Name", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Service_Name", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "Service_File_Name", + "threat_object_type": "other" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "Service_Name", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1569", + "T1569.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows Service Created With Suspicious Service Path Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows Service Created With Suspicious Service Path", + "file": "endpoint/windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-system.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-system.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:System", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_system", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [] + }, + { + "name": "Ransomware Cloud", + "id": "f52f6c43-05f8-4b19-a9d3-5b8c56da91c2", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-10-27", + "author": "Rod Soto, David Dorsey, Splunk", + "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware. These searches include cloud related objects that may be targeted by malicious actors via cloud providers own encryption features.", + "narrative": "Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise.Cloud ransomware can be deployed by obtaining high privilege credentials from targeted users or resources.", + "references": [ + "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/", + "https://github.com/d1vious/git-wild-hunt", + "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgzNib37g0M" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Ransomware Cloud", + "analytic_story": "Ransomware Cloud", + "category": [ + "Malware" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1486", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "APT41", + "FIN7", + "Indrik Spider", + "TA505" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "datamodels": [], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA - Rule", + "ESCU - AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "author_name": "Rod Soto", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA", + "id": "c79c164f-4b21-4847-98f9-cf6a9f49179e", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-01-11", + "author": "Rod Soto, Patrick Bareiss Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides detection of KMS keys where action kms:Encrypt is accessible for everyone (also outside of your organization). This is an indicator that your account is compromised and the attacker uses the encryption key to compromise another company.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=CreateKey OR eventName=PutKeyPolicy | spath input=requestParameters.policy output=key_policy_statements path=Statement{} | mvexpand key_policy_statements | spath input=key_policy_statements output=key_policy_action_1 path=Action | spath input=key_policy_statements output=key_policy_action_2 path=Action{} | eval key_policy_action=mvappend(key_policy_action_1, key_policy_action_2) | spath input=key_policy_statements output=key_policy_principal path=Principal.AWS | search key_policy_action=\"kms:Encrypt\" AND key_policy_principal=\"*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by eventName eventSource eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/", + "https://github.com/d1vious/git-wild-hunt", + "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgzNib37g0M" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware Cloud" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Account", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1486/aws_kms_key/aws_cloudtrail_events.json" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "AWS account is potentially compromised and user $userIdentity.principalId$ is trying to compromise other accounts.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1486" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "userIdentity.principalId", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "eventSource", + "eventID", + "awsRegion", + "requestParameters.policy", + "userIdentity.principalId" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1486", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "APT41", + "FIN7", + "Indrik Spider", + "TA505" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1486" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware Cloud" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "userIdentity.principalId", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "userIdentity.principalId", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1486" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA", + "file": "cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "aws_cloudtrail_events.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1486/aws_kms_key/aws_cloudtrail_events.json", + "source": "aws_cloudtrail", + "sourcetype": "aws:cloudtrail", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3", + "id": "884a5f59-eec7-4f4a-948b-dbde18225fdc", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-01-11", + "author": "Rod Soto, Patrick Bareiss Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search provides detection of users with KMS keys performing encryption specifically against S3 buckets.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=CopyObject requestParameters.x-amz-server-side-encryption=\"aws:kms\" | rename requestParameters.bucketName AS bucket_name, requestParameters.x-amz-copy-source AS src_file, requestParameters.key AS dest_file | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(src_file) AS src_file values(dest_file) AS dest_file values(userAgent) AS userAgent values(region) AS region values(src) AS src by user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs", + "known_false_positives": "bucket with S3 encryption", + "references": [ + "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/", + "https://github.com/d1vious/git-wild-hunt", + "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgzNib37g0M" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware Cloud" + ], + "asset_type": "S3 Bucket", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1486/s3_file_encryption/aws_cloudtrail_events.json" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "User $user$ with KMS keys is performing encryption, against S3 buckets on these files $dest_file$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1486" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest_file", + "type": "File", + "role": [ + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "requestParameters.x-amz-server-side-encryption", + "requestParameters.bucketName", + "requestParameters.x-amz-copy-source", + "requestParameters.key", + "userAgent", + "region" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1486", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "APT41", + "FIN7", + "Indrik Spider", + "TA505" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1486" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware Cloud" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest_file", + "type": "File", + "role": [ + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 15 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "dest_file", + "threat_object_type": "file" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1486" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3", + "file": "cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "aws_cloudtrail_events.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1486/s3_file_encryption/aws_cloudtrail_events.json", + "source": "aws_cloudtrail", + "sourcetype": "aws:cloudtrail", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml", + "source": "cloud" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "DarkSide Ransomware", + "id": "507edc74-13d5-4339-878e-b9114ded1f35", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-12", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the DarkSide Ransomware", + "narrative": "This story addresses Darkside ransomware. This ransomware payload has many similarities to common ransomware however there are certain items particular to it. The creation of a .TXT log that shows every item being encrypted as well as the creation of ransomware notes and files adding a machine ID created based on CRC32 checksum algorithm. This ransomware payload leaves machines in minimal operation level,enough to browse the attackers websites. A customized URI with leaked information is presented to each victim.This is the ransomware payload that shut down the Colonial pipeline. The story is composed of several detection searches covering similar items to other ransomware payloads and those particular to Darkside payload.", + "references": [ + "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/the-darkside-of-the-ransomware-pipeline.htmlbig-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "DarkSide Ransomware", + "analytic_story": "DarkSide Ransomware", + "category": [ + "Malware" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "GALLIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "Night Dragon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1197", + "mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Leviathan", + "Patchwork" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "CMSTP", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Cobalt Group", + "MuddyWater" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Cobalt Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sharpshooter", + "Silence", + "Turla" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cleaver", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Whitefly" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Operation Wocao", + "Orangeworm", + "Sandworm Team", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1020", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Exfiltration", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Frankenstein", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Honeybee", + "Sidewinder", + "Tropic Trooper" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1569", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "FIN6", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Operation Wocao", + "Silence", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1486", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "APT41", + "FIN7", + "Indrik Spider", + "TA505" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT37", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Evilnum", + "Honeybee", + "MuddyWater", + "Patchwork", + "Threat Group-3390" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control", + "Credential Access", + "Defense Evasion", + "Execution", + "Exfiltration", + "Impact", + "Lateral Movement", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", + "ESCU - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule", + "ESCU - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule", + "ESCU - CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments - Rule", + "ESCU - CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass - Rule", + "ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", + "ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect RClone Command-Line Usage - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Renamed RClone - Rule", + "ESCU - Extraction of Registry Hives - Rule", + "ESCU - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule", + "ESCU - SLUI RunAs Elevated - Rule", + "ESCU - SLUI Spawning a Process - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", + "id": "e9fb4a59-c5fb-440a-9f24-191fbc6b2911", + "version": 6, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` OR `process_cmd` Processes.process=*save* (Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\SAM* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\SAM*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to export the registry keys.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.002", + "T1003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 90, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "GALLIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "Night Dragon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.002", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 90 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 90 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.002", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", + "file": "endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_reg", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=reg.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=reg.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_cmd", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "BITSAdmin Download File", + "id": "80630ff4-8e4c-11eb-aab5-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service utility `bitsadmin.exe` using the `transfer` parameter to download a remote object. In addition, look for `download` or `upload` on the command-line, the switches are not required to perform a transfer. Capture any files downloaded. Review the reputation of the IP or domain used. Typically once executed, a follow on command will be used to execute the dropped file. Note that the network connection or file modification events related will not spawn or create from `bitsadmin.exe`, but the artifacts will appear in a parallel process of `svchost.exe` with a command-line similar to `svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s BITS`. It's important to review all parallel and child processes to capture any behaviors and artifacts. In some suspicious and malicious instances, BITS jobs will be created. You can use `bitsadmin /list /verbose` to list out the jobs during investigation.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_bitsadmin` Processes.process=*transfer* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `bitsadmin_download_file_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives, however it may be required to filter based on parent process name or network connection.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/8eb52117b748d378325f7719554a896e37bccec7/atomics/T1105/T1105.md#atomic-test-9---windows---bitsadmin-bits-download", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/bc705cb7aaa5f26f2d96585fac8e4c7052df0ff9/atomics/T1197/T1197.md", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/bits/bitsadmin-tool", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "BITSAdmin Download File", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "BITS Jobs", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1197/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to download a file.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1197", + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1197", + "mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Leviathan", + "Patchwork" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1197", + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "BITS Jobs", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1197", + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "BITSAdmin Download File Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "BITSAdmin Download File", + "file": "endpoint/bitsadmin_download_file.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1197/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_bitsadmin", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=bitsadmin.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=bitsadmin.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "bitsadmin_download_file_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/bitsadmin_download_file.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments", + "id": "415b4306-8bfb-11eb-85c4-acde48001122", + "version": 3, + "date": "2022-02-03", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "Certutil.exe may download a file from a remote destination using `-urlcache`. This behavior does require a URL to be passed on the command-line. In addition, `-f` (force) and `-split` (Split embedded ASN.1 elements, and save to files) will be used. It is not entirely common for `certutil.exe` to contact public IP space. However, it is uncommon for `certutil.exe` to write files to world writeable paths.\\ During triage, capture any files on disk and review. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain in question.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_certutil` (Processes.process=*urlcache* Processes.process=*split*) OR Processes.process=*urlcache* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives in most environments, however tune as needed based on parent-child relationship or network connection.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/", + "https://www.avira.com/en/blog/certutil-abused-by-attackers-to-spread-threats", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/10/certutil-qualms-they-came-to-drop-fombs.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Command And Control" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to download a file.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 90, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Command And Control" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 90 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 90 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments", + "file": "endpoint/certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_certutil", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=certutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=CertUtil.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments", + "id": "801ad9e4-8bfb-11eb-8b31-acde48001122", + "version": 3, + "date": "2022-02-03", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "Certutil.exe may download a file from a remote destination using `-VerifyCtl`. This behavior does require a URL to be passed on the command-line. In addition, `-f` (force) and `-split` (Split embedded ASN.1 elements, and save to files) will be used. It is not entirely common for `certutil.exe` to contact public IP space. \\ During triage, capture any files on disk and review. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain in question. Using `-VerifyCtl`, the file will either be written to the current working directory or `%APPDATA%\\..\\LocalLow\\Microsoft\\CryptnetUrlCache\\Content\\`. ", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_certutil` (Processes.process=*verifyctl* Processes.process=*split*) OR Processes.process=*verifyctl* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives in most environments, however tune as needed based on parent-child relationship or network connection.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/", + "https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2020/08/23/certutil-one-more-gui-lolbin/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc732443(v=ws.11)#-verifyctl", + "https://www.avira.com/en/blog/certutil-abused-by-attackers-to-spread-threats" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Command And Control" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to download a file.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 90, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Command And Control" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 90 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 90 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments", + "file": "endpoint/certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_certutil", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=certutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=CertUtil.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass", + "id": "f87b5062-b405-11eb-a889-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-13", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic detects a potential process using COM Object like CMLUA or CMSTPLUA to bypass UAC. This technique has been used by ransomware adversaries to gain administrative privileges to its running process.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\CMLUA.dll\", \"*\\\\CMSTPLUA.dll\", \"*\\\\CMLUAUTIL.dll\") NOT(process_name IN(\"CMSTP.exe\", \"CMMGR32.exe\")) NOT(Image IN(\"*\\\\windows\\\\*\", \"*\\\\program files*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name Computer EventCode Signed ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate windows application that are not on the list loading this dll. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/003/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass", + "analytic_story": [ + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/darkside_cmstp_com/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "The following module $ImageLoaded$ was loaded by a non-standard application on endpoint $Computer$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ImageLoaded", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Image", + "ImageLoaded", + "process_name", + "Computer", + "EventCode", + "Signed", + "ProcessId" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "CMSTP", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Cobalt Group", + "MuddyWater" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ImageLoaded", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "ImageLoaded", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass", + "file": "endpoint/cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/darkside_cmstp_com/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Cobalt Strike Named Pipes", + "id": "5876d429-0240-4709-8b93-ea8330b411b5", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-02-22", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of default or publicly known named pipes used with Cobalt Strike. A named pipe is a named, one-way or duplex pipe for communication between the pipe server and one or more pipe clients. Cobalt Strike uses named pipes in many ways and has default values used with the Artifact Kit and Malleable C2 Profiles. The following query assists with identifying these default named pipes. Each EDR product presents named pipes a little different. Consider taking the values and generating a query based on the product of choice. \\\nUpon triage, review the process performing the named pipe. If it is explorer.exe, It is possible it was injected into by another process. Review recent parallel processes to identify suspicious patterns or behaviors. A parallel process may have a network connection, review and follow the connection back to identify any file modifications.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventID=17 OR EventID=18 PipeName IN (\\\\msagent_*, \\\\wkssvc*, \\\\DserNamePipe*, \\\\srvsvc_*, \\\\mojo.*, \\\\postex_*, \\\\status_*, \\\\MSSE-*, \\\\spoolss_*, \\\\win_svc*, \\\\ntsvcs*, \\\\winsock*, \\\\UIA_PIPE*) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, process_name, process_id process_path, PipeName | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cobalt_strike_named_pipes_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "The idea of using named pipes with Cobalt Strike is to blend in. Therefore, some of the named pipes identified and added may cause false positives. Filter by process name or pipe name to reduce false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/ipc/named-pipes", + "https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-smb-beacon", + "https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2021/02/09/learn-pipe-fitting-for-all-of-your-offense-projects/", + "https://gist.github.com/MHaggis/6c600e524045a6d49c35291a21e10752", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Cobalt Strike Named Pipes", + "analytic_story": [ + "Cobalt Strike", + "Trickbot", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $Computer$ by user $user$ accessing known suspicious named pipes related to Cobalt Strike.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1055" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventID", + "PipeName", + "Computer", + "process_name", + "process_path", + "process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Cobalt Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sharpshooter", + "Silence", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1055" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Cobalt Strike", + "Trickbot", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 72 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 72 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1055" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Cobalt Strike Named Pipes Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Cobalt Strike Named Pipes", + "file": "endpoint/cobalt_strike_named_pipes.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "cobalt_strike_named_pipes_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/cobalt_strike_named_pipes.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell", + "id": "5ee2bcd0-b2ff-11eb-bb34-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-12", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This following analytic detects PowerShell command to delete shadow copy using the WMIC PowerShell module. This technique was seen used by a recent adversary to deploy DarkSide Ransomware where it executed a child process of PowerShell to execute a hex encoded command to delete shadow copy. This hex encoded command was able to be decrypted by PowerShell log.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message= \"*ShadowCopy*\" (Message = \"*Delete*\" OR Message = \"*Remove*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the powershell logs from your endpoints. make sure you enable needed registry to monitor this event.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html", + "https://searchwindowsserver.techtarget.com/tutorial/Set-up-PowerShell-script-block-logging-for-added-security" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Ransomware", + "Revil Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An attempt to delete ShadowCopy was performed using PowerShell on $ComputerName$ by $User$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1490" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 81, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1490" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Ransomware", + "Revil Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 81 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 81 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1490" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell", + "file": "endpoint/delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images", + "id": "29e307ba-40af-4ab2-91b2-3c6b392bbba0", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-12-03", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for reading loaded Images unique to credential dumping with Mimikatz. Deprecated because mimikatz libraries changed and very noisy sysmon Event Code.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 | stats values(ImageLoaded) as ImageLoaded values(ProcessId) as ProcessId by Computer, Image | search ImageLoaded=*WinSCard.dll ImageLoaded=*cryptdll.dll ImageLoaded=*hid.dll ImageLoaded=*samlib.dll ImageLoaded=*vaultcli.dll | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This search needs Sysmon Logs and a sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 7 with powershell.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", + "known_false_positives": "Other tools can import the same DLLs. These tools should be part of a whitelist. False positives may be present with any process that authenticates or uses credentials, PowerShell included. Filter based on parent process.", + "references": [ + "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Windows", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 6", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A process, $Image$, has loaded $ImageLoaded$ that are typically related to credential dumping on $Computer$. Review for further details.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ImageLoaded", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Image", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "ImageLoaded", + "ProcessId", + "Computer", + "Image" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cleaver", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Whitefly" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 6", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ImageLoaded", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Image", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "ImageLoaded", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "Image", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 6", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images", + "file": "endpoint/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag", + "id": "27c3a83d-cada-47c6-9042-67baf19d2574", + "version": 4, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for events where `PsExec.exe` is run with the `accepteula` flag in the command line. PsExec is a built-in Windows utility that enables you to execute processes on other systems. It is fully interactive for console applications. This tool is widely used for launching interactive command prompts on remote systems. Threat actors leverage this extensively for executing code on compromised systems. If an attacker is running PsExec for the first time, they will be prompted to accept the end-user license agreement (EULA), which can be passed as the argument `accepteula` within the command line.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_psexec` Processes.process=*accepteula* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators can leverage PsExec for accessing remote systems and might pass `accepteula` as an argument if they are running this tool for the first time. However, it is not likely that you'd see multiple occurrences of this event on a machine", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag", + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "HAFNIUM Group", + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ running the utility for possibly the first time.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.002" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Operation Wocao", + "Orangeworm", + "Sandworm Team", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "HAFNIUM Group", + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 35 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 35 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag", + "file": "endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_psexec", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=psexec.exe OR Processes.process_name=psexec64.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=psexec.c)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect RClone Command-Line Usage", + "id": "32e0baea-b3f1-11eb-a2ce-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-11-29", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies commonly used command-line arguments used by `rclone.exe` to initiate a file transfer. Some arguments were negated as they are specific to the configuration used by adversaries. In particular, an adversary may list the files or directories of the remote file share using `ls` or `lsd`, which is not indicative of malicious behavior. During triage, at this stage of a ransomware event, exfiltration is about to occur or has already. Isolate the endpoint and continue investigating by review file modifications and parallel processes.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rclone` Processes.process IN (\"*copy*\", \"*mega*\", \"*pcloud*\", \"*ftp*\", \"*--config*\", \"*--progress*\", \"*--no-check-certificate*\", \"*--ignore-existing*\", \"*--auto-confirm*\", \"*--transfers*\", \"*--multi-thread-streams*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rclone_command_line_usage_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as this is restricted to the Rclone process name. Filter or tune the analytic as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://redcanary.com/blog/rclone-mega-extortion/", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/11/29/continuing-the-bazar-ransomware-story/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect RClone Command-Line Usage", + "analytic_story": [ + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Exfiltration" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1020/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to connect to a remote cloud service to move files or folders.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1020" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id", + "Processes.original_file_name" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1020", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Exfiltration", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Frankenstein", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Honeybee", + "Sidewinder", + "Tropic Trooper" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1020" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Exfiltration" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 35 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 35 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1020" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect RClone Command-Line Usage Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect RClone Command-Line Usage", + "file": "endpoint/detect_rclone_command_line_usage.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1020/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "process_rclone", + "definition": "(Processes.original_file_name=rclone.exe OR Processes.process_name=rclone.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name." + }, + { + "name": "detect_rclone_command_line_usage_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_rclone_command_line_usage.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Renamed PSExec", + "id": "683e6196-b8e8-11eb-9a79-acde48001122", + "version": 3, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies renamed instances of `PsExec.exe` being utilized on an endpoint. Most instances, it is highly probable to capture `Psexec.exe` or other SysInternal utility usage with the command-line argument of `-accepteula`. During triage, validate this is the legitimate version of `PsExec` by reviewing the PE metadata. In addition, review parallel processes for further suspicious behavior.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_psexec` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_renamed_psexec_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives should be present. It is possible some third party applications may use older versions of PsExec, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1569.002/T1569.002.yaml", + "https://redcanary.com/blog/threat-hunting-psexec-lateral-movement/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Renamed PSExec", + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "HAFNIUM Group", + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Collection" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1569.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1569", + "T1569.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 27, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1569", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "FIN6", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Operation Wocao", + "Silence", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1569", + "T1569.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "HAFNIUM Group", + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Collection" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 27 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 27 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1569", + "T1569.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Renamed PSExec Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Renamed PSExec", + "file": "endpoint/detect_renamed_psexec.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1569.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_psexec", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=psexec.exe OR Processes.process_name=psexec64.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=psexec.c)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_renamed_psexec_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_renamed_psexec.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Renamed RClone", + "id": "6dca1124-b3ec-11eb-9328-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the usage of `rclone.exe`, renamed, being used to exfiltrate data to a remote destination. RClone has been used by multiple ransomware groups to exfiltrate data. In many instances, it will be downloaded from the legitimate site and executed accordingly. During triage, isolate the endpoint and begin to review parallel processes for additional behavior. At this stage, the adversary may have staged data to be exfiltrated.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.original_file_name=rclone.exe AND Processes.process_name!=rclone.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_renamed_rclone_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as this analytic identifies renamed instances of `rclone.exe`. Filter as needed if there is a legitimate business use case.", + "references": [ + "https://redcanary.com/blog/rclone-mega-extortion/", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Renamed RClone", + "analytic_story": [ + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Collection" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1020/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1020" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 27, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1020", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Exfiltration", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Frankenstein", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Honeybee", + "Sidewinder", + "Tropic Trooper" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1020" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Collection" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 27 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 27 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1020" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Renamed RClone Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Renamed RClone", + "file": "endpoint/detect_renamed_rclone.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1020/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_renamed_rclone_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_renamed_rclone.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Extraction of Registry Hives", + "id": "8bbb7d58-b360-11eb-ba21-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-09-09", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of `reg.exe` exporting Windows Registry hives containing credentials. Adversaries may use this technique to export registry hives for offline credential access attacks. Typically found executed from a untrusted process or script. Upon execution, a file will be written to disk.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` (Processes.process=*save* OR Processes.process=*export*) AND (Processes.process=\"*\\sam *\" OR Processes.process=\"*\\system *\" OR Processes.process=\"*\\security *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `extraction_of_registry_hives_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible some agent based products will generate false positives. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Extraction of Registry Hives", + "analytic_story": [ + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious use of `reg.exe` exporting Windows Registry hives containing credentials executed on $dest$ by user $user$, with a parent process of $parent_process_id$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.002", + "T1003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_id", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process", + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "GALLIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "Night Dragon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.002", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Credential Dumping" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_id", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process", + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_id", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.002", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Extraction of Registry Hives Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Extraction of Registry Hives", + "file": "endpoint/extraction_of_registry_hives.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_reg", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=reg.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=reg.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "extraction_of_registry_hives_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/extraction_of_registry_hives.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Ransomware Notes bulk creation", + "id": "eff7919a-8330-11eb-83f8-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-03-12", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytics identifies a big number of instance of ransomware notes (filetype e.g .txt, .html, .hta) file creation to the infected machine. This behavior is a good sensor if the ransomware note filename is quite new for security industry or the ransomware note filename is not in your ransomware lookup table list for monitoring.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=11 file_name IN (\"*\\.txt\",\"*\\.html\",\"*\\.hta\") |bin _time span=10s | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(TargetFilename) as unique_readme_path_count values(TargetFilename) as list_of_readme_path by Computer Image file_name | where unique_readme_path_count >= 15 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ransomware_notes_bulk_creation_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", + "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Ransomware Notes bulk creation", + "analytic_story": [ + "Clop Ransomware", + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "BlackMatter Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A high frequency file creation of $file_name$ in different file path in host $Computer$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1486" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "EventCode", + "file_name", + "_time", + "TargetFilename", + "Computer", + "Image", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 81, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1486", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "APT41", + "FIN7", + "Indrik Spider", + "TA505" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1486" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Clop Ransomware", + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "BlackMatter Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 81 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 81 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1486" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Ransomware Notes bulk creation Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Ransomware Notes bulk creation", + "file": "endpoint/ransomware_notes_bulk_creation.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "ransomware_notes_bulk_creation_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/ransomware_notes_bulk_creation.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "SLUI RunAs Elevated", + "id": "8d124810-b3e4-11eb-96c7-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the Microsoft Software Licensing User Interface Tool, `slui.exe`, elevating access using the `-verb runas` function. This particular bypass utilizes a registry key/value. Identified by two sources, the registry keys are `HKCU\\Software\\Classes\\exefile\\shell` and `HKCU\\Software\\Classes\\launcher.Systemsettings\\Shell\\open\\command`. To simulate this behavior, multiple POC are available. The analytic identifies the use of `runas` by `slui.exe`.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=slui.exe (Processes.process=*-verb* Processes.process=*runas*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `slui_runas_elevated_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives should be present as this is not commonly used by legitimate applications.", + "references": [ + "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/46998", + "https://medium.com/@mattharr0ey/privilege-escalation-uac-bypass-in-changepk-c40b92818d1b", + "https://gist.github.com/r00t-3xp10it/0c92cd554d3156fd74f6c25660ccc466", + "https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/windows/local/bypassuac_sluihijack/", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "SLUI RunAs Elevated", + "analytic_story": [ + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/slui/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A slui process $process_name$ with elevated commandline $process$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT37", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Evilnum", + "Honeybee", + "MuddyWater", + "Patchwork", + "Threat Group-3390" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 63 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 63 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "SLUI RunAs Elevated Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "SLUI RunAs Elevated", + "file": "endpoint/slui_runas_elevated.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/slui/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "slui_runas_elevated_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/slui_runas_elevated.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "SLUI Spawning a Process", + "id": "879c4330-b3e0-11eb-b1b1-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the Microsoft Software Licensing User Interface Tool, `slui.exe`, spawning a child process. This behavior is associated with publicly known UAC bypass. `slui.exe` is commonly associated with software updates and is most often spawned by `svchost.exe`. The `slui.exe` process should not have child processes, and any processes spawning from it will be running with elevated privileges. During triage, review the child process and additional parallel processes. Identify any file modifications that may have lead to the bypass.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=slui.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `slui_spawning_a_process_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Certain applications may spawn from `slui.exe` that are legitimate. Filtering will be needed to ensure proper monitoring.", + "references": [ + "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/46998", + "https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/windows/local/bypassuac_sluihijack/", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "SLUI Spawning a Process", + "analytic_story": [ + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/slui/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A slui process $parent_process_name$ spawning child process $process_name$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT37", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Evilnum", + "Honeybee", + "MuddyWater", + "Patchwork", + "Threat Group-3390" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 63 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 63 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "SLUI Spawning a Process Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "SLUI Spawning a Process", + "file": "endpoint/slui_spawning_a_process.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/slui/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "slui_spawning_a_process_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/slui_spawning_a_process.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Possible Credential Dumping", + "id": "e4723b92-7266-11ec-af45-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-27", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic is an enhanced version of two previous analytics that identifies common GrantedAccess permission requests and CallTrace DLLs in order to detect credential dumping. \\\nGrantedAccess is the requested permissions by the SourceImage into the TargetImage. \\\nCallTrace Stack trace of where open process is called. Included is the DLL and the relative virtual address of the functions in the call stack right before the open process call. \\\ndbgcore.dll or dbghelp.dll are two core Windows debug DLLs that have minidump functions which provide a way for applications to produce crashdump files that contain a useful subset of the entire process context. \\\nThe idea behind using ntdll.dll is to blend in by using native api of ntdll.dll. For example in sekurlsa module there are many ntdll exported api, like RtlCopyMemory, used to execute this module which is related to lsass dumping.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe GrantedAccess IN (\"0x01000\", \"0x1010\", \"0x1038\", \"0x40\", \"0x1400\", \"0x1fffff\", \"0x1410\", \"0x143a\", \"0x1438\", \"0x1000\") CallTrace IN (\"*dbgcore.dll*\", \"*dbghelp.dll*\", \"*ntdll.dll*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, TargetImage, GrantedAccess, SourceImage, SourceProcessId, SourceUser, TargetUser | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_possible_credential_dumping_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Enabling EventCode 10 TargetProcess lsass.exe is required.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives will occur based on GrantedAccess 0x1010 and 0x1400, filter based on source image as needed or remove them. Concern is Cobalt Strike usage of Mimikatz will generate 0x1010 initially, but later be caught.", + "references": [ + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Local_Security_Authority_Subsystem_Service", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/minidumpapiset/nf-minidumpapiset-minidumpwritedump", + "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for_22.html", + "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/process-security-and-access-rights?redirectedfrom=MSDN" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Possible Credential Dumping", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_creddump.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A process, $SourceImage$, has loaded $ImageLoaded$ that are typically related to credential dumping on $dest$. Review for further details.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ImageLoaded", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "SourceImage", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Computer", + "TargetImage", + "GrantedAccess", + "SourceImage", + "SourceProcessId", + "SourceUser", + "TargetUser" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cleaver", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Whitefly" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ImageLoaded", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + }, + { + "name": "SourceImage", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "ImageLoaded", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "SourceImage", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows Possible Credential Dumping Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows Possible Credential Dumping", + "file": "endpoint/windows_possible_credential_dumping.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_creddump.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "windows_possible_credential_dumping_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_possible_credential_dumping.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [] + }, + { + "name": "Revil Ransomware", + "id": "817cae42-f54b-457a-8a36-fbf45521e29e", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-04", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Revil ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Revil, encrypting network shares, deleting shadow volume storage, registry key modification, deleting of security logs, and more.", + "narrative": "Revil ransomware is a RaaS,that a single group may operates and manges the development of this ransomware. It involve the use of ransomware payloads along with exfiltration of data. Malicious actors demand payment for ransome of data and threaten deletion and exposure of exfiltrated data.", + "references": [ + "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", + "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Revil Ransomware", + "analytic_story": "Revil Ransomware", + "category": [ + "Malware" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1491", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Defacement", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Chimera", + "GALLIUM", + "Higaisa", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Patchwork", + "Sidewinder", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", + "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN8", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "CMSTP", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Cobalt Group", + "MuddyWater" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Execution", + "Impact", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule", + "ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule", + "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", + "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", + "ESCU - Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading - Rule", + "ESCU - Powershell Disable Security Monitoring - Rule", + "ESCU - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule", + "ESCU - Revil Registry Entry - Rule", + "ESCU - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Allow Network Discovery In Firewall", + "id": "ccd6a38c-d40b-11eb-85a5-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-06-23", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious modification to the firewall to allow network discovery on a machine. This technique was seen in couple of ransomware (revil, reddot) to discover other machine connected to the compromised host to encrypt more files.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_netsh` Processes.process= \"*firewall*\" Processes.process= \"*group=\\\"Network Discovery\\\"*\" Processes.process=\"*enable*\" Processes.process=\"*Yes*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `allow_network_discovery_in_firewall_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "network admin may modify this firewall feature that may cause this rule to be triggered.", + "references": [ + "https://kb.fortinet.com/kb/documentLink.do?externalID=FD52469", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/c0f98850-af65-4352-9746-fbebadee4f05/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Allow Network Discovery In Firewall", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Revil Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.007", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.007", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Revil Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.007", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Allow Network Discovery In Firewall Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Allow Network Discovery In Firewall", + "file": "endpoint/allow_network_discovery_in_firewall.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_netsh", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=netsh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=netsh.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "allow_network_discovery_in_firewall_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/allow_network_discovery_in_firewall.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell", + "id": "5ee2bcd0-b2ff-11eb-bb34-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-12", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This following analytic detects PowerShell command to delete shadow copy using the WMIC PowerShell module. This technique was seen used by a recent adversary to deploy DarkSide Ransomware where it executed a child process of PowerShell to execute a hex encoded command to delete shadow copy. This hex encoded command was able to be decrypted by PowerShell log.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message= \"*ShadowCopy*\" (Message = \"*Delete*\" OR Message = \"*Remove*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the powershell logs from your endpoints. make sure you enable needed registry to monitor this event.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html", + "https://searchwindowsserver.techtarget.com/tutorial/Set-up-PowerShell-script-block-logging-for-added-security" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Ransomware", + "Revil Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An attempt to delete ShadowCopy was performed using PowerShell on $ComputerName$ by $User$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1490" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 81, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1490" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Ransomware", + "Revil Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 81 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 81 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1490" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell", + "file": "endpoint/delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring", + "id": "79439cae-9200-11eb-a4d3-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-27", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to identifies a modification in registry to disable the windows denfender real time behavior monitoring. This event or technique is commonly seen in RAT, bot, or Trojan to disable AV to evade detections.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableBehaviorMonitoring\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableOnAccessProtection\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableScanOnRealtimeEnable\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableRealtimeMonitoring\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableIOAVProtection\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableScriptScanning\" AND Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disable_windows_behavior_monitoring_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to disable this windows features.", + "references": [ + "https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Ransomware", + "Revil Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 40, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Windows Defender real time behavior monitoring disabled on $dest", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.registry_value_name" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Ransomware", + "Revil Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 40, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 40 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring", + "file": "endpoint/disable_windows_behavior_monitoring.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + }, + { + "file_name": "windows-system.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:System", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + }, + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "disable_windows_behavior_monitoring_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_windows_behavior_monitoring.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Modification Of Wallpaper", + "id": "accb0712-c381-11eb-8e5b-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-02", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies suspicious modification of registry to deface or change the wallpaper of a compromised machines as part of its payload. This technique was commonly seen in ransomware like REVIL where it create a bitmap file contain a note that the machine was compromised and make it as a wallpaper.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode =13 (TargetObject= \"*\\\\Control Panel\\\\Desktop\\\\Wallpaper\" AND Image != \"*\\\\explorer.exe\") OR (TargetObject= \"*\\\\Control Panel\\\\Desktop\\\\Wallpaper\" AND Details = \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Image TargetObject Details Computer process_guid process_id user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `modification_of_wallpaper_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Image, TargetObject registry key, registry Details from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "3rd party tool may used to changed the wallpaper of the machine", + "references": [ + "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", + "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Modification Of Wallpaper", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Revil Ransomware", + "BlackMatter Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Wallpaper modification on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1491" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Image", + "TargetObject", + "Details", + "Computer", + "process_guid", + "process_id", + "user_id" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1491", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Defacement", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1491" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Revil Ransomware", + "BlackMatter Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 54 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1491" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Modification Of Wallpaper Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Modification Of Wallpaper", + "file": "endpoint/modification_of_wallpaper.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "modification_of_wallpaper_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/modification_of_wallpaper.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading", + "id": "8bb3f280-dd9b-11eb-84d5-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-07-05", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious creation of msmpeng.exe or mpsvc.dll in non default windows defender folder. This technique was seen couple days ago with revil ransomware in Kaseya Supply chain. The approach is to drop an old version of msmpeng.exe to load the actual payload name as mspvc.dll which will load the revil ransomware to the compromise machine", + "search": "|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_name = \"msmpeng.exe\" OR Filesystem.file_name = \"mpsvc.dll\") AND Filesystem.file_path != \"*\\\\Program Files\\\\windows defender\\\\*\" by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node.", + "known_false_positives": "quite minimal false positive expected.", + "references": [ + "https://community.sophos.com/b/security-blog/posts/active-ransomware-attack-on-kaseya-customers" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Revil Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets//malware/revil/msmpeng_side/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1574.002", + "T1574" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.file_create_time", + "Filesystem.process_id", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.user", + "Filesystem.file_path" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Chimera", + "GALLIUM", + "Higaisa", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Patchwork", + "Sidewinder", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1574.002", + "T1574" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Revil Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1574.002", + "T1574" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading", + "file": "endpoint/msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets//malware/revil/msmpeng_side/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Powershell Disable Security Monitoring", + "id": "c148a894-dd93-11eb-bf2a-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-07-05", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to identifies a modification in registry to disable the windows denfender real time behavior monitoring. This event or technique is commonly seen in RAT, bot, or Trojan to disable AV to evade detections.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process=\"*set-mppreference*\" AND Processes.process IN (\"*disablerealtimemonitoring*\",\"*disableioavprotection*\",\"*disableintrusionpreventionsystem*\",\"*disablescriptscanning*\",\"*disableblockatfirstseen*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_disable_security_monitoring_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives. However, tune based on scripts that may perform this action.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md#atomic-test-15---tamper-with-windows-defender-atp-powershell" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Powershell Disable Security Monitoring", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Revil Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/pwh_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Revil Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Powershell Disable Security Monitoring Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Powershell Disable Security Monitoring", + "file": "endpoint/powershell_disable_security_monitoring.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/pwh_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_powershell", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "powershell_disable_security_monitoring_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_disable_security_monitoring.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Revil Common Exec Parameter", + "id": "85facebe-c382-11eb-9c3e-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-06-02", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies suspicious commandline parameter that are commonly used by REVIL ransomware to encrypts the compromise machine.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"* -nolan *\" OR Processes.process = \"* -nolocal *\" OR Processes.process = \"* -fast *\" OR Processes.process = \"* -full *\" by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `revil_common_exec_parameter_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "third party tool may have same command line parameters as revil ransomware.", + "references": [ + "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", + "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Revil Common Exec Parameter", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Revil Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ related to revil ransomware in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1204" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process_guid" + ], + "risk_score": 54, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", + "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1204" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Revil Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 54 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 54 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1204" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Revil Common Exec Parameter Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Revil Common Exec Parameter", + "file": "endpoint/revil_common_exec_parameter.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "revil_common_exec_parameter_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/revil_common_exec_parameter.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Revil Registry Entry", + "id": "e3d3f57a-c381-11eb-9e35-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-01-26", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies suspicious modification in registry entry to keep some malware data during its infection. This technique seen in several apt implant, malware and ransomware like REVIL where it keep some information like the random generated file extension it uses for all the encrypted files and ransomware notes file name in the compromised host.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\WOW6432Node\\\\Facebook_Assistant\\\\*\" OR Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\WOW6432Node\\\\BlackLivesMatter*\") by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `revil_registry_entry_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "to successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Image, TargetObject registry key, registry Details from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", + "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Revil Registry Entry", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Revil Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A registry entry $registry_path$ with registry value $registry_value_name$ and $registry_value_name$ related to revil ransomware in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1112" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_key_name" + ], + "risk_score": 60, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN8", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1112" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Revil Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 60 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 60 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1112" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Revil Registry Entry Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Revil Registry Entry", + "file": "endpoint/revil_registry_entry.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "revil_registry_entry_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/revil_registry_entry.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Wbemprox COM Object Execution", + "id": "9d911ce0-c3be-11eb-b177-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-02", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "this search is designed to detect potential malicious process loading COM object to wbemprox.dll,", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\fastprox.dll\", \"*\\\\wbemprox.dll\", \"*\\\\wbemcomn.dll\") NOT (process_name IN (\"wmiprvse.exe\", \"WmiApSrv.exe\", \"unsecapp.exe\")) NOT(Image IN(\"*\\\\windows\\\\*\",\"*\\\\program files*\", \"*\\\\wbem\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name Computer EventCode Signed ProcessId Hashes IMPHASH | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wbemprox_com_object_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "legitimate process that are not in the exception list may trigger this event.", + "references": [ + "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", + "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Wbemprox COM Object Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Revil Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf2/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious COM Object Execution on $Computer$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Image", + "ImageLoaded", + "process_name", + "Computer", + "EventCode", + "Signed", + "ProcessId", + "Hashes", + "IMPHASH" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "CMSTP", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Cobalt Group", + "MuddyWater" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Revil Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 35 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Wbemprox COM Object Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Wbemprox COM Object Execution", + "file": "endpoint/wbemprox_com_object_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf2/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "wbemprox_com_object_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wbemprox_com_object_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [] + }, + { + "name": "Ryuk Ransomware", + "id": "507edc74-13d5-4339-878e-b9744ded1f35", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-11-06", + "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", + "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Ryuk ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Ryuk, Stopping Security Access Manager, DisableAntiSpyware registry key modification, suspicious psexec use, and more.", + "narrative": "Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released Alert (AA20-302A) on October 28th called Ransomware Activity Targeting the Healthcare and Public Health Sector. This alert details TTPs associated with ongoing and possible imminent attacks against the Healthcare sector, and is a joint advisory in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies. The objective of these malicious campaigns is to infiltrate targets in named sectors and to drop ransomware payloads, which will likely cause disruption of service and increase risk of actual harm to the health and safety of patients at hospitals, even with the aggravant of an ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. This document specifically refers to several crimeware exploitation frameworks, emphasizing the use of Ryuk ransomware as payload. The Ryuk ransomware payload is not new. It has been well documented and identified in multiple variants. Payloads need a carrier, and for Ryuk it has often been exploitation frameworks such as Cobalt Strike, or popular crimeware frameworks such as Emotet or Trickbot.", + "references": [ + "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-ryuk-using-splunk-attack-range.html", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", + "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-302a" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Ryuk Ransomware", + "analytic_story": "Ryuk Ransomware", + "category": [ + "Malware" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "Chimera", + "FIN8" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1486", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "APT41", + "FIN7", + "Indrik Spider", + "TA505" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CostaRicto", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Machete", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1489", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Indrik Spider", + "Lazarus Group", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT3", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "OilRig", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Discovery", + "Execution", + "Impact", + "Lateral Movement", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint", + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Delivery", + "Exploitation", + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule", + "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", + "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", + "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", + "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", + "ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule", + "ESCU - Ryuk Wake on LAN Command - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", + "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule", + "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", + "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", + "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", + "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", + "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [ + "ESCU - Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic", + "ESCU - Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic", + "ESCU - Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop" + ], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Jose Hernandez", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Windows connhost exe started forcefully", + "id": "c114aaca-68ee-41c2-ad8c-32bf21db8769", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-11-06", + "author": "Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The search looks for the Console Window Host process (connhost.exe) executed using the force flag -ForceV1. This is not regular behavior in the Windows OS and is often seen executed by the Ryuk Ransomware. DEPRECATED This event is actually seen in the windows 10 client of attack_range_local. After further testing we realized this is not specific to Ryuk. ", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE Processes.process=\"*C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\conhost.exe* 0xffffffff *-ForceV1*\" by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_connhost_exe_started_forcefully_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the process-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Processes data-model object. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.", + "known_false_positives": "This process should not be ran forcefully, we have not see any false positives for this detection", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows connhost exe started forcefully", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ryuk Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059.003" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ryuk Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_connhost_exe_started_forcefully_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification", + "id": "809b31d2-5462-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-12-21", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for flags passed to bcdedit.exe modifications to the built-in Windows error recovery boot configurations. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent recovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = bcdedit.exe Processes.process=\"*recoveryenabled*\" (Processes.process=\"* no*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. Tune based on parent process names.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may modify the boot configuration.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1490/T1490.md#atomic-test-4---windows---disable-windows-recovery-console-repair" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 100, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting disable the ability to recover the endpoint.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1490" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1490" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "impact": 100, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1490" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification", + "file": "endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Common Ransomware Extensions", + "id": "a9e5c5db-db11-43ca-86a8-c852d1b2c0ec", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-11-09", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The search looks for file modifications with extensions commonly used by Ransomware", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| rex field=file_name \"(?\\.[^\\.]+)$\" | `ransomware_extensions` | `common_ransomware_extensions_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.\\\nThis search produces fields (`query`,`query_length`,`count`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** Name, **Field:** Name\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** File Extension, **Field:** file_extension\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible for a legitimate file with these extensions to be created. If this is a true ransomware attack, there will be a large number of files created with these extensions.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Common Ransomware Extensions", + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Ransomware", + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/ransomware_extensions/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$, this is indicative of a known ransomware file extension and should be reviewed immediately.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1485" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_name", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.user", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Filesystem.file_path", + "Filesystem.file_name" + ], + "risk_score": 90, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1485" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Ransomware", + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_name", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 90 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 90 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "file_name", + "threat_object_type": "file name" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1485" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Common Ransomware Extensions Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Common Ransomware Extensions", + "file": "endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/ransomware_extensions/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "ransomware_extensions", + "definition": "lookup update=true ransomware_extensions_lookup Extensions AS file_extension OUTPUT Name | search Name !=False", + "description": "This macro limits the output to files that have extensions associated with ransomware" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "common_ransomware_extensions_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Common Ransomware Notes", + "id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d6bd71", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-11-09", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The search looks for files created with names matching those typically used in ransomware notes that tell the victim how to get their data back.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `ransomware_notes` | `common_ransomware_notes_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Filesystem data-model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system reads and writes.", + "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a legitimate file could be created with the same name used by ransomware note files.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Common Ransomware Notes", + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/ransomware_notes/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$, this is indicative of a known ransomware note file and should be reviewed immediately.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1485" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_name", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.user", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Filesystem.file_path", + "Filesystem.file_name" + ], + "risk_score": 90, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1485" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_name", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 90 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 90 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "file_name", + "threat_object_type": "file name" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1485" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Common Ransomware Notes Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Common Ransomware Notes", + "file": "endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/ransomware_notes/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ransomware_notes", + "definition": "lookup ransomware_notes_lookup ransomware_notes as file_name OUTPUT status as \"Known Ransomware Notes\" | search \"Known Ransomware Notes\"=True", + "description": "This macro limits the output to files that have been identified as a ransomware note" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "common_ransomware_notes_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "NLTest Domain Trust Discovery", + "id": "c3e05466-5f22-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-01-25", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for the execution of `nltest.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for Domain Trust information. Two arguments `/domain trusts`, returns a list of trusted domains, and `/all_trusts`, returns all trusted domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike use NLTest.exe to enumerate the current domain to assist with further understanding where to pivot next.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=nltest.exe OR Processes.process_name!=nltest.exe) (Processes.process=*/domain_trusts* OR Processes.process=*/all_trusts*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `nltest_domain_trust_discovery_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may use nltest for troubleshooting purposes, otherwise, rarely used.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1482/T1482.md", + "https://malware.news/t/lets-learn-trickbot-implements-network-collector-module-leveraging-cmd-wmi-ldap/19104", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482/", + "https://www.owasp.org/images/4/4b/Red_Team_Operating_in_a_Modern_Environment.pdf", + "https://ss64.com/nt/nltest.html", + "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/domain-trust-discovery/", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/08/ryuks-return/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "NLTest Domain Trust Discovery", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Domain Trust Discovery", + "IcedID", + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Domain trust discovery execution on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1482" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "Chimera", + "FIN8" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1482" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Domain Trust Discovery", + "IcedID", + "Active Directory Discovery" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1482" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "NLTest Domain Trust Discovery Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "NLTest Domain Trust Discovery", + "file": "endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "nltest_domain_trust_discovery_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Ryuk Test Files Detected", + "id": "57d44d70-28d9-4ed1-acf5-1c80ae2bbce3", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-11-06", + "author": "Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The search looks for files that contain the key word *Ryuk* under any folder in the C drive, which is consistent with Ryuk propagation.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem WHERE \"Filesystem.file_path\"=C:\\\\*Ryuk* BY \"Filesystem.dest\", \"Filesystem.user\", \"Filesystem.file_path\" | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `ryuk_test_files_detected_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Filesystem data-model object. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.", + "known_false_positives": "If there are files with this keywoord as file names it might trigger false possitives, please make use of our filters to tune out potential FPs.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Ryuk Test Files Detected", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ryuk Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ryuk/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "message": "A creation of ryuk test file $file_path$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1486" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.file_path", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Filesystem.user" + ], + "risk_score": 70, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1486", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "APT41", + "FIN7", + "Indrik Spider", + "TA505" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1486" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ryuk Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 70 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 70 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1486" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Ryuk Test Files Detected Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Ryuk Test Files Detected", + "file": "endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ryuk/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "ryuk_test_files_detected_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Ryuk Wake on LAN Command", + "id": "538d0152-7aaa-11eb-beaa-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-03-01", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This Splunk query identifies the use of Wake-on-LAN utilized by Ryuk ransomware. The Ryuk Ransomware uses the Wake-on-Lan feature to turn on powered off devices on a compromised network to have greater success encrypting them. This is a high fidelity indicator of Ryuk ransomware executing on an endpoint. Upon triage, isolate the endpoint. Additional file modification events will be within the users profile (\\appdata\\roaming) and in public directories (users\\public\\). Review all Scheduled Tasks on the isolated endpoint and across the fleet. Suspicious Scheduled Tasks will include a path to a unknown binary and those endpoints should be isolated until triaged.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process=\"*8 LAN*\" OR Processes.process=\"*9 REP*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ryuk_wake_on_lan_command_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited to no known false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ryuk-ransomware-uses-wake-on-lan-to-encrypt-offline-devices/", + "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ryuk-ransomware-now-self-spreads-to-other-windows-lan-devices/", + "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/uploads/CERTFR-2021-CTI-006.pdf" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Ryuk Wake on LAN Command", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ryuk Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/ryuk/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A process $process_name$ with wake on LAN commandline $process$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ryuk Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 63 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 63 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Ryuk Wake on LAN Command Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Ryuk Wake on LAN Command", + "file": "endpoint/ryuk_wake_on_lan_command.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/ryuk/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "ryuk_wake_on_lan_command_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/ryuk_wake_on_lan_command.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory", + "id": "7feb7972-7ac3-11eb-bac8-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-03-01", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following detection identifies Scheduled Tasks registering (creating a new task) a binary or script to run from a public directory which includes users\\public, \\programdata\\ and \\windows\\temp. Upon triage, review the binary or script in the command line for legitimacy, whether an approved binary/script or not. In addition, capture the binary or script in question and analyze for further behaviors. Identify the source and contain the endpoint.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe (Processes.process=*\\\\users\\\\public\\\\* OR Processes.process=*\\\\programdata\\\\* OR Processes.process=*windows\\\\temp*) Processes.process=*/create* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives may be present. Filter as needed by parent process or command line argument.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/schtasks/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious scheduled task registered on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CostaRicto", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Machete", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 35 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 35 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory", + "file": "endpoint/suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/schtasks/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "WBAdmin Delete System Backups", + "id": "cd5aed7e-5cea-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-01-22", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for flags passed to wbadmin.exe (Windows Backup Administrator Tool) that delete backup files. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent recovery.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wbadmin.exe Processes.process=\"*delete*\" AND (Processes.process=\"*catalog*\" OR Processes.process=\"*systemstatebackup*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `wbadmin_delete_system_backups_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. Tune based on parent process names.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may modify the boot configuration.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1490/T1490.md", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/08/ryuks-return/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wbadmin" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "WBAdmin Delete System Backups", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "System backups deletion on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1490" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1490" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1490" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "WBAdmin Delete System Backups Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "WBAdmin Delete System Backups", + "file": "endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "wbadmin_delete_system_backups_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry", + "id": "23150a40-9301-4195-b802-5bb4f43067fb", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-03-02", + "author": "Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The search looks for the Registry Key DisableAntiSpyware set to disable. This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints. This particular behavior is typically executed when an ransomware actor gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. Endpoint should be isolated.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_value_name=\"DisableAntiSpyware\" AND Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000001\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_disableantispyware_registry_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node.", + "known_false_positives": "It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro to tune the search.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "message": "Windows DisableAntiSpyware registry key set to 'disabled' on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.registry_path" + ], + "risk_score": 24, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 24 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry", + "file": "endpoint/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_disableantispyware_registry_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Security Account Manager Stopped", + "id": "69c12d59-d951-431e-ab77-ec426b8d65e6", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-11-06", + "author": "Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The search looks for a Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) was stopped via command-line. This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE (\"Processes.process_name\"=\"net*.exe\" \"Processes.process\"=\"*stop \\\"samss\\\"*\") BY \"Processes.dest\", \"Processes.user\", \"Processes.process\" | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_security_account_manager_stopped_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the process-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Processes data-model object. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.", + "known_false_positives": "SAM is a critical windows service, stopping it would cause major issues on an endpoint this makes false positive rare. AlthoughNo false positives have been identified.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Security Account Manager Stopped", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ryuk Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ryuk/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "message": "The Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) was stopped via cli by $user$ on $dest$ by this command: $processs$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1489" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 70, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1489", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Indrik Spider", + "Lazarus Group", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1489" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ryuk Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 70 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 70 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1489" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows Security Account Manager Stopped Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows Security Account Manager Stopped", + "file": "endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ryuk/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_security_account_manager_stopped_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell", + "id": "203ef0ea-9bd8-11eb-8201-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-12", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed with a native Windows shell (PowerShell, Cmd, Wscript, Cscript).\\\nThe search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not.\\\nschtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\\Windows\\system32` and `C:\\Windows\\syswow64`.\\\nThe following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory.\\\nUpon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message | search Command IN (\"*powershell.exe*\", \"*wscript.exe*\", \"*cscript.exe*\", \"*cmd.exe*\", \"*sh.exe*\", \"*ksh.exe*\", \"*zsh.exe*\", \"*bash.exe*\", \"*scrcons.exe*\", \"*pwsh.exe*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Task_Name, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives are possible if legitimate applications are allowed to register tasks that call a shell to be spawned. Filter as needed based on command-line or processes that are used legitimately.", + "references": [ + "https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/irans-apt34-returns-with-an-updated-arsenal/", + "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4698", + "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/scheduled-task-job/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/taskschd/time-trigger-example--scripting-?redirectedfrom=MSDN" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A windows scheduled task was created (task name=$Task_Name$) on $dest$ by the following command: $Command$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Command", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "dest", + "Task_Name", + "Description", + "Command" + ], + "risk_score": 70, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CostaRicto", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Machete", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Command", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 70 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "Command", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell", + "file": "endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", + "id": "5d9c6eee-988c-11eb-8253-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-08", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed from a user writeable file path.\\\nThe search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not.\\\nschtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\\Windows\\system32` and `C:\\Windows\\syswow64`.\\\nThe following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory.\\\nUpon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or was it via TaskService. Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message | search Command IN (\"*\\\\users\\\\public\\\\*\", \"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Tasks\\\\*\", \"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Task_Name, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives are possible if legitimate applications are allowed to register tasks in public paths. Filter as needed based on paths that are used legitimately.", + "references": [ + "https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/irans-apt34-returns-with-an-updated-arsenal/", + "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4698", + "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/scheduled-task-job/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/taskschd/time-trigger-example--scripting-?redirectedfrom=MSDN", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/e26f1b2e-befa-483b-91d2-e18636e2faf3/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "IcedID", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/taskschedule/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A windows scheduled task was created (task name=$Task_Name$) on $dest$ by the following command: $Command$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Command", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "dest", + "Task_Name", + "Description", + "Command" + ], + "risk_score": 70, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CostaRicto", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Machete", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "IcedID", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Command", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 70 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "Command", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", + "file": "endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/taskschedule/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Spike in File Writes", + "id": "fdb0f805-74e4-4539-8c00-618927333aae", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-03-16", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The search looks for a sharp increase in the number of files written to a particular host", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.action=created by _time span=1h, Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | eventstats max(_time) as maxtime | stats count as num_data_samples max(eval(if(_time >= relative_time(maxtime, \"-1d@d\"), count, null))) as \"count\" avg(eval(if(_time upperBound) AND num_data_samples >=20, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `spike_in_file_writes_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "In order to implement this search, you must populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection and response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the file system.", + "known_false_positives": "It is important to understand that if you happen to install any new applications on your hosts or are copying a large number of files, you can expect to see a large increase of file modifications.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Spike in File Writes", + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.action", + "Filesystem.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "spike_in_file_writes_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce", + "id": "a98727cc-286b-4ff2-b898-41df64695923", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search looks for RDP application network traffic and filters any source/destination pair generating more than twice the standard deviation of the average traffic.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.app=rdp by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | eventstats stdev(count) AS stdev avg(count) AS avg p50(count) AS p50 | where count>(avg + stdev*2) | rename All_Traffic.src AS src All_Traffic.dest AS dest | table firstTime lastTime src dest count avg p50 stdev | `remote_desktop_network_bruteforce_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must ensure that your network traffic data is populating the Network_Traffic data model.", + "known_false_positives": "RDP gateways may have unusually high amounts of traffic from all other hosts' RDP applications in the network.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce", + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 9", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Delivery" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021.001", + "T1021" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.app", + "All_Traffic.src", + "All_Traffic.dest", + "All_Traffic.dest_port" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT3", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "OilRig", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021.001", + "T1021" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Delivery" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 9", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021.001", + "T1021" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Delivery" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 9", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "remote_desktop_network_bruteforce_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Remote Desktop Network Traffic", + "id": "272b8407-842d-4b3d-bead-a704584003d3", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-07-07", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search looks for network traffic on TCP/3389, the default port used by remote desktop. While remote desktop traffic is not uncommon on a network, it is usually associated with known hosts. This search will ignore common RDP sources and common RDP destinations so you can focus on the uncommon uses of remote desktop on your network.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=3389 AND All_Traffic.dest_category!=common_rdp_destination AND All_Traffic.src_category!=common_rdp_source by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_desktop_network_traffic_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to identify systems that commonly originate remote desktop traffic and that commonly receive remote desktop traffic. You can use the included support search \"Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic\" to identify systems that originate the traffic and the search \"Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic\" to identify systems that receive a lot of remote desktop traffic. After identifying these systems, you will need to add the \"common_rdp_source\" or \"common_rdp_destination\" category to that system depending on the usage, using the Enterprise Security Assets and Identities framework. This can be done by adding an entry in the assets.csv file located in SA-IdentityManagement/lookups.", + "known_false_positives": "Remote Desktop may be used legitimately by users on the network.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Remote Desktop Network Traffic", + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 9", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021.001", + "T1021" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.dest_category", + "All_Traffic.src_category", + "All_Traffic.src", + "All_Traffic.dest", + "All_Traffic.dest_port" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT3", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "OilRig", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021.001", + "T1021" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 9", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic", + "id": "5cdda34f-4caf-4128-a713-0837fc48b67a", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-15", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search counts the numbers of times the system has generated remote desktop traffic.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=3389 by All_Traffic.src | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | sort - count", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must ingest network traffic and populate the Network_Traffic data model.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Remote Desktop Network Traffic" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + }, + { + "name": "Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic", + "id": "baaeea15-fe8a-4090-92c2-5b60943bb608", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-15", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search counts the numbers of times the system has created remote desktop traffic", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=3389 by All_Traffic.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | sort - count", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must ingest network traffic and populate the Network_Traffic data model. If a system receives a lot of remote desktop traffic, you can apply the category common_rdp_destination to it.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Remote Desktop Network Traffic" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + }, + { + "name": "Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop", + "id": "063dfe9f-b1d7-4254-a16d-1e2e7eadd6a8", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-04-01", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search counts the numbers of times the remote desktop process, mstsc.exe, has run on each system.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=\"*mstsc.exe*\" by Processes.dest Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | sort - count", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data that records process activity.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Remote Desktop Network Traffic" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021.001", + "T1021" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 9", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "remote_desktop_network_traffic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml", + "source": "network" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "SamSam Ransomware", + "id": "c4b89506-fbcf-4cb7-bfd6-527e54789604", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-12-13", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the SamSam ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with SamSam, RDP brute force attacks, the presence of files with SamSam ransomware extensions, suspicious psexec use, and more.", + "narrative": "The first version of the SamSam ransomware (a.k.a. Samas or SamsamCrypt) was launched in 2015 by a group of Iranian threat actors. The malicious software has affected and continues to affect thousands of victims and has raised almost $6M in ransom.\\\nAlthough categorized under the heading of ransomware, SamSam campaigns have some importance distinguishing characteristics. Most notable is the fact that conventional ransomware is a numbers game. Perpetrators use a \"spray-and-pray\" approach with phishing campaigns or other mechanisms, charging a small ransom (typically under $1,000). The goal is to find a large number of victims willing to pay these mini-ransoms, adding up to a lucrative payday. They use relatively simple methods for infecting systems.\\\nSamSam attacks are different beasts. They have become progressively more targeted and skillful than typical ransomware attacks. First, malicious actors break into a victim's network, surveil it, then run the malware manually. The attacks are tailored to cause maximum damage and the threat actors usually demand amounts in the tens of thousands of dollars.\\\nIn a typical attack on one large healthcare organization in 2018, the company ended up paying a ransom of four Bitcoins, then worth $56,707. Reports showed that access to the company's files was restored within two hours of paying the sum.\\\nAccording to Sophos, SamSam previously leveraged RDP to gain access to targeted networks via brute force. SamSam is not spread automatically, like other malware. It requires skill because it forces the attacker to adapt their tactics to the individual environment. Next, the actors escalate their privileges to admin level. They scan the networks for worthy targets, using conventional tools, such as PsExec or PaExec, to deploy/execute, quickly encrypting files.\\\nThis Analytic Story includes searches designed to help detect and investigate signs of the SamSam ransomware, such as the creation of fileswrites to system32, writes with tell-tale extensions, batch files written to system32, and evidence of brute-force attacks via RDP.", + "references": [ + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/an-in-depth-analysis-of-samsam-ransomware-and-boss-spider/", + "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/07/31/samsam-the-almost-6-million-ransomware/", + "https://thehackernews.com/2018/07/samsam-ransomware-attacks.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "SamSam Ransomware", + "analytic_story": "SamSam Ransomware", + "category": [ + "Malware" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Match Legitimate Name or Location", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Darkhotel", + "FIN7", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Fox Kitten", + "Indrik Spider", + "Lazarus Group", + "Machete", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Sowbug", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Whitefly", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1595", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Active Scanning", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", + "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Operation Wocao", + "Orangeworm", + "Sandworm Team", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1569", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "FIN6", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Operation Wocao", + "Silence", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1486", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "APT41", + "FIN7", + "Indrik Spider", + "TA505" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT3", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "OilRig", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1082", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Darkhotel", + "Frankenstein", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Sowbug", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TeamTNT", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Windigo", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access", + "Defense Evasion", + "Discovery", + "Execution", + "Impact", + "Lateral Movement", + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint", + "Network_Traffic", + "Web" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Command & Control", + "Delivery", + "Exploitation", + "Installation", + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", + "ESCU - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule", + "ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", + "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", + "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", + "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", + "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", + "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", + "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", + "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", + "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", + "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [ + "ESCU - Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security", + "ESCU - Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic", + "ESCU - Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic", + "ESCU - Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop" + ], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Rico Valdez", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Prohibited Software On Endpoint", + "id": "a51bfe1a-94f0-48cc-b4e4-b6ae50145893", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-10-11", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for applications on the endpoint that you have marked as prohibited.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `prohibited_softwares` | `prohibited_software_on_endpoint_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is usually generated via logs that report process tracking in your Windows audit settings. In addition, you must also have only the `process_name` (not the entire process path) marked as \"prohibited\" in the Enterprise Security `interesting processes` table. To include the process names marked as \"prohibited\", which is included with ES Content Updates, run the included search Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Prohibited Software On Endpoint", + "analytic_story": [ + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "SamSam Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_times" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "SamSam Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security", + "id": "251930a5-1451-4428-bb13-eed5775be0ce", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-15", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search takes the existing interesting process table from ES, filters out any existing additions added by ESCU and then updates the table with processes identified by ESCU that should be prohibited on your endpoints.", + "search": "| inputlookup prohibited_processes | search note!=ESCU* | inputlookup append=T prohibited_processes | fillnull value=* dest dest_pci_domain | fillnull value=false is_required is_secure | fillnull value=true is_prohibited | outputlookup prohibited_processes | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "This search should be run on each new install of ESCU.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "SamSam Ransomware" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Prohibited Software On Endpoint" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "prohibited_softwares", + "definition": "lookup prohibited_softwares app as process_name OUTPUT is_prohibited | search is_prohibited=True", + "description": "This macro limits the output to process_names that have been marked as prohibited" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "prohibited_software_on_endpoint_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Attacker Tools On Endpoint", + "id": "a51bfe1a-94f0-48cc-b4e4-16a110145893", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-11-04", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for execution of commonly used attacker tools on an endpoint.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.dest!=unknown Processes.user!=unknown by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | lookup attacker_tools attacker_tool_names AS process_name OUTPUT description | search description !=false| `attacker_tools_on_endpoint_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is usually generated via logs that report process tracking in your Windows audit settings.", + "known_false_positives": "Some administrator activity can be potentially triggered, please add those users to the filter macro.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Attacker Tools On Endpoint", + "analytic_story": [ + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "XMRig", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Unusual Processes" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1595/attacker_scan_tools/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An attacker tool $process_name$,listed in attacker_tools.csv is executed on host $dest$ by User $user$. This process $process_name$ is known to do- $description$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1036.005", + "T1036", + "T1003", + "T1595" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process", + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.parent_process" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Match Legitimate Name or Location", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Darkhotel", + "FIN7", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Fox Kitten", + "Indrik Spider", + "Lazarus Group", + "Machete", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Sowbug", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Whitefly", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1595", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Active Scanning", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036.005", + "T1036", + "T1003", + "T1595" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "XMRig", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Unusual Processes" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process", + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036.005", + "T1036", + "T1003", + "T1595" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Attacker Tools On Endpoint Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Attacker Tools On Endpoint", + "file": "endpoint/attacker_tools_on_endpoint.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1595/attacker_scan_tools/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "attacker_tools_on_endpoint_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "attacker_tools", + "description": "A list of tools used by attackers", + "filename": "attacker_tools.csv", + "default_match": "false", + "match_type": "WILDCARD(attacker_tool_names)", + "min_matches": 1, + "case_sensitive_match": "false" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/attacker_tools_on_endpoint.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Batch File Write to System32", + "id": "503d17cb-9eab-4cf8-a20e-01d5c6987ae3", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Michael Haag, Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The search looks for a batch file (.bat) written to the Windows system directory tree.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=* by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*\\\\system32\\\\*\", \"*\\\\syswow64\\\\*\") Filesystem.file_name=\"*.bat\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process] | dedup file_create_time | table dest file_create_time, file_name, file_path, process_name | `batch_file_write_to_system32_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible for this search to generate a notable event for a batch file write to a path that includes the string \"system32\", but is not the actual Windows system directory. As such, you should confirm the path of the batch file identified by the search. In addition, a false positive may be generated by an administrator copying a legitimate batch file in this directory tree. You should confirm that the activity is legitimate and modify the search to add exclusions, as necessary.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Batch File Write to System32", + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1204.002/batch_file_in_system32/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to system32 has occurred on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1204", + "T1204.002" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_name", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.user", + "Filesystem.file_path", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", + "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1204", + "T1204.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_name", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 63 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 63 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "file_name", + "threat_object_type": "file name" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1204", + "T1204.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Batch File Write to System32 Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Batch File Write to System32", + "file": "endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1204.002/batch_file_in_system32/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "batch_file_write_to_system32_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Common Ransomware Extensions", + "id": "a9e5c5db-db11-43ca-86a8-c852d1b2c0ec", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-11-09", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The search looks for file modifications with extensions commonly used by Ransomware", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| rex field=file_name \"(?\\.[^\\.]+)$\" | `ransomware_extensions` | `common_ransomware_extensions_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.\\\nThis search produces fields (`query`,`query_length`,`count`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** Name, **Field:** Name\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** File Extension, **Field:** file_extension\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible for a legitimate file with these extensions to be created. If this is a true ransomware attack, there will be a large number of files created with these extensions.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Common Ransomware Extensions", + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Ransomware", + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/ransomware_extensions/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$, this is indicative of a known ransomware file extension and should be reviewed immediately.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1485" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_name", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.user", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Filesystem.file_path", + "Filesystem.file_name" + ], + "risk_score": 90, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1485" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Ransomware", + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_name", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 90 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 90 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "file_name", + "threat_object_type": "file name" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1485" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Common Ransomware Extensions Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Common Ransomware Extensions", + "file": "endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/ransomware_extensions/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "ransomware_extensions", + "definition": "lookup update=true ransomware_extensions_lookup Extensions AS file_extension OUTPUT Name | search Name !=False", + "description": "This macro limits the output to files that have extensions associated with ransomware" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "common_ransomware_extensions_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Common Ransomware Notes", + "id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d6bd71", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-11-09", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The search looks for files created with names matching those typically used in ransomware notes that tell the victim how to get their data back.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `ransomware_notes` | `common_ransomware_notes_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Filesystem data-model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system reads and writes.", + "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a legitimate file could be created with the same name used by ransomware note files.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Common Ransomware Notes", + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/ransomware_notes/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$, this is indicative of a known ransomware note file and should be reviewed immediately.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1485" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_name", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.user", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Filesystem.file_path", + "Filesystem.file_name" + ], + "risk_score": 90, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1485" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_name", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 90 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 90 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "file_name", + "threat_object_type": "file name" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1485" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Common Ransomware Notes Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Common Ransomware Notes", + "file": "endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/ransomware_notes/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ransomware_notes", + "definition": "lookup ransomware_notes_lookup ransomware_notes as file_name OUTPUT status as \"Known Ransomware Notes\" | search \"Known Ransomware Notes\"=True", + "description": "This macro limits the output to files that have been identified as a ransomware note" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "common_ransomware_notes_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Deleting Shadow Copies", + "id": "b89919ed-ee5f-492c-b139-95dbb162039e", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-11-09", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The vssadmin.exe utility is used to interact with the Volume Shadow Copy Service. Wmic is an interface to the Windows Management Instrumentation. This search looks for either of these tools being used to delete shadow copies.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=vssadmin.exe OR Processes.process_name=wmic.exe) Processes.process=*delete* Processes.process=*shadow* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `deleting_shadow_copies_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "vssadmin.exe and wmic.exe are standard applications shipped with modern versions of windows. They may be used by administrators to legitimately delete old backup copies, although this is typically rare.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Deleting Shadow Copies", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ransomware", + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 10" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to delete shadow copies.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1490" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 81, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1490" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 10" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ransomware", + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 81 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 81 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1490" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 10" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Deleting Shadow Copies Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Deleting Shadow Copies", + "file": "endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "deleting_shadow_copies_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag", + "id": "27c3a83d-cada-47c6-9042-67baf19d2574", + "version": 4, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for events where `PsExec.exe` is run with the `accepteula` flag in the command line. PsExec is a built-in Windows utility that enables you to execute processes on other systems. It is fully interactive for console applications. This tool is widely used for launching interactive command prompts on remote systems. Threat actors leverage this extensively for executing code on compromised systems. If an attacker is running PsExec for the first time, they will be prompted to accept the end-user license agreement (EULA), which can be passed as the argument `accepteula` within the command line.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_psexec` Processes.process=*accepteula* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators can leverage PsExec for accessing remote systems and might pass `accepteula` as an argument if they are running this tool for the first time. However, it is not likely that you'd see multiple occurrences of this event on a machine", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag", + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "HAFNIUM Group", + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ running the utility for possibly the first time.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.002" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Operation Wocao", + "Orangeworm", + "Sandworm Team", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "HAFNIUM Group", + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 35 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 35 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag", + "file": "endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_psexec", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=psexec.exe OR Processes.process_name=psexec64.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=psexec.c)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Renamed PSExec", + "id": "683e6196-b8e8-11eb-9a79-acde48001122", + "version": 3, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies renamed instances of `PsExec.exe` being utilized on an endpoint. Most instances, it is highly probable to capture `Psexec.exe` or other SysInternal utility usage with the command-line argument of `-accepteula`. During triage, validate this is the legitimate version of `PsExec` by reviewing the PE metadata. In addition, review parallel processes for further suspicious behavior.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_psexec` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_renamed_psexec_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives should be present. It is possible some third party applications may use older versions of PsExec, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1569.002/T1569.002.yaml", + "https://redcanary.com/blog/threat-hunting-psexec-lateral-movement/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Renamed PSExec", + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "HAFNIUM Group", + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Collection" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1569.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1569", + "T1569.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 27, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1569", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "FIN6", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Operation Wocao", + "Silence", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1569", + "T1569.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "HAFNIUM Group", + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Collection" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 27 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 27 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1569", + "T1569.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Renamed PSExec Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Renamed PSExec", + "file": "endpoint/detect_renamed_psexec.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1569.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_psexec", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=psexec.exe OR Processes.process_name=psexec64.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=psexec.c)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_renamed_psexec_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_renamed_psexec.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "File with Samsam Extension", + "id": "02c6cfc2-ae66-4735-bfc7-6291da834cbf", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-12-14", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The search looks for file writes with extensions consistent with a SamSam ransomware attack.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| rex field=file_name \"(?\\.[^\\.]+)$\" | search file_extension=.stubbin OR file_extension=.berkshire OR file_extension=.satoshi OR file_extension=.sophos OR file_extension=.keyxml | `file_with_samsam_extension_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data-model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.", + "known_false_positives": "Because these extensions are not typically used in normal operations, you should investigate all results.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "File with Samsam Extension", + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/samsam_extension/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 100, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation" + ], + "message": "File writes $file_name$ with extensions consistent with a SamSam ransomware attack seen on $dest$", + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_name", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Other", + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.user", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Filesystem.file_path", + "Filesystem.file_name" + ], + "risk_score": 90, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high" + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_name", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Other", + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 100, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 90 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 90 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "file_name", + "threat_object_type": "file name" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "File with Samsam Extension Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "File with Samsam Extension", + "file": "endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/samsam_extension/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "file_with_samsam_extension_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Samsam Test File Write", + "id": "493a879d-519d-428f-8f57-a06a0fdc107e", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-12-14", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The search looks for a file named \"test.txt\" written to the windows system directory tree, which is consistent with Samsam propagation.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_name) as file_name from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\windows\\\\system32\\\\test.txt by Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `samsam_test_file_write_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data-model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.", + "known_false_positives": "No false positives have been identified.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Samsam Test File Write", + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 20, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1486/sam_sam_note/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "message": "A samsam ransomware test file creation in $file_path$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1486" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.user", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.file_path" + ], + "risk_score": 12, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1486", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "APT41", + "FIN7", + "Indrik Spider", + "TA505" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1486" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 20 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 12 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 12 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1486" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Samsam Test File Write Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Samsam Test File Write", + "file": "endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1486/sam_sam_note/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "samsam_test_file_write_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Spike in File Writes", + "id": "fdb0f805-74e4-4539-8c00-618927333aae", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-03-16", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The search looks for a sharp increase in the number of files written to a particular host", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.action=created by _time span=1h, Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | eventstats max(_time) as maxtime | stats count as num_data_samples max(eval(if(_time >= relative_time(maxtime, \"-1d@d\"), count, null))) as \"count\" avg(eval(if(_time upperBound) AND num_data_samples >=20, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `spike_in_file_writes_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "In order to implement this search, you must populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection and response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the file system.", + "known_false_positives": "It is important to understand that if you happen to install any new applications on your hosts or are copying a large number of files, you can expect to see a large increase of file modifications.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Spike in File Writes", + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.action", + "Filesystem.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "spike_in_file_writes_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce", + "id": "a98727cc-286b-4ff2-b898-41df64695923", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search looks for RDP application network traffic and filters any source/destination pair generating more than twice the standard deviation of the average traffic.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.app=rdp by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | eventstats stdev(count) AS stdev avg(count) AS avg p50(count) AS p50 | where count>(avg + stdev*2) | rename All_Traffic.src AS src All_Traffic.dest AS dest | table firstTime lastTime src dest count avg p50 stdev | `remote_desktop_network_bruteforce_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must ensure that your network traffic data is populating the Network_Traffic data model.", + "known_false_positives": "RDP gateways may have unusually high amounts of traffic from all other hosts' RDP applications in the network.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce", + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 9", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Delivery" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021.001", + "T1021" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.app", + "All_Traffic.src", + "All_Traffic.dest", + "All_Traffic.dest_port" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT3", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "OilRig", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021.001", + "T1021" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Delivery" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 9", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021.001", + "T1021" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Delivery" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 9", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "remote_desktop_network_bruteforce_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Remote Desktop Network Traffic", + "id": "272b8407-842d-4b3d-bead-a704584003d3", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-07-07", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search looks for network traffic on TCP/3389, the default port used by remote desktop. While remote desktop traffic is not uncommon on a network, it is usually associated with known hosts. This search will ignore common RDP sources and common RDP destinations so you can focus on the uncommon uses of remote desktop on your network.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=3389 AND All_Traffic.dest_category!=common_rdp_destination AND All_Traffic.src_category!=common_rdp_source by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_desktop_network_traffic_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to identify systems that commonly originate remote desktop traffic and that commonly receive remote desktop traffic. You can use the included support search \"Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic\" to identify systems that originate the traffic and the search \"Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic\" to identify systems that receive a lot of remote desktop traffic. After identifying these systems, you will need to add the \"common_rdp_source\" or \"common_rdp_destination\" category to that system depending on the usage, using the Enterprise Security Assets and Identities framework. This can be done by adding an entry in the assets.csv file located in SA-IdentityManagement/lookups.", + "known_false_positives": "Remote Desktop may be used legitimately by users on the network.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Remote Desktop Network Traffic", + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 9", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021.001", + "T1021" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.dest_category", + "All_Traffic.src_category", + "All_Traffic.src", + "All_Traffic.dest", + "All_Traffic.dest_port" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT3", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "OilRig", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021.001", + "T1021" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 9", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic", + "id": "5cdda34f-4caf-4128-a713-0837fc48b67a", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-15", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search counts the numbers of times the system has generated remote desktop traffic.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=3389 by All_Traffic.src | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | sort - count", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must ingest network traffic and populate the Network_Traffic data model.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Remote Desktop Network Traffic" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + }, + { + "name": "Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic", + "id": "baaeea15-fe8a-4090-92c2-5b60943bb608", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-15", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search counts the numbers of times the system has created remote desktop traffic", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=3389 by All_Traffic.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | sort - count", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must ingest network traffic and populate the Network_Traffic data model. If a system receives a lot of remote desktop traffic, you can apply the category common_rdp_destination to it.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Remote Desktop Network Traffic" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + }, + { + "name": "Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop", + "id": "063dfe9f-b1d7-4254-a16d-1e2e7eadd6a8", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-04-01", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search counts the numbers of times the remote desktop process, mstsc.exe, has run on each system.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=\"*mstsc.exe*\" by Processes.dest Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | sort - count", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data that records process activity.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Remote Desktop Network Traffic" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021.001", + "T1021" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 9", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "remote_desktop_network_traffic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers", + "id": "104658f4-afdc-499e-9719-17243f982681", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-23", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "This search looks for specific GET or HEAD requests to web servers that are indicative of reconnaissance attempts to identify vulnerable JBoss servers. JexBoss is described as the exploit tool of choice for this malicious activity.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where (Web.http_method=\"GET\" OR Web.http_method=\"HEAD\") AND (Web.url=\"*/web-console/ServerInfo.jsp*\" OR Web.url=\"*web-console*\" OR Web.url=\"*jmx-console*\" OR Web.url = \"*invoker*\") by Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.src, Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data from the web server or network traffic that contains web specific information, and populating the Web data model.", + "known_false_positives": "It's possible for legitimate HTTP requests to be made to URLs containing the suspicious paths.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers", + "analytic_story": [ + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "SamSam Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Web Server", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1082" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Web.http_method", + "Web.url", + "Web.src", + "Web.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1082", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Darkhotel", + "Frankenstein", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Sowbug", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TeamTNT", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Windigo", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1082" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "SamSam Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1082" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml", + "source": "web" + }, + { + "name": "Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers", + "id": "c8bff7a4-11ea-4416-a27d-c5bca472913d", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-23", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "This search is used to detect malicious HTTP requests crafted to exploit jmx-console in JBoss servers. The malicious requests have a long URL length, as the payload is embedded in the URL.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where (Web.http_method=\"GET\" OR Web.http_method=\"HEAD\") by Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest | search Web.url=\"*jmx-console/HtmlAdaptor?action=invokeOpByName&name=jboss.admin*import*\" AND Web.url_length > 200 | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table src, dest_ip, http_method, url, firstTime, lastTime | `detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must ingest data from the web server or capture network data that contains web specific information with solutions such as Bro or Splunk Stream, and populating the Web data model", + "known_false_positives": "No known false positives for this detection.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers", + "analytic_story": [ + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "SamSam Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Web Server", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 4", + "CIS 18" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "ID.RA", + "PR.PT", + "PR.IP", + "DE.AE", + "PR.MA", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Web.http_method", + "Web.url", + "Web.url_length", + "Web.src", + "Web.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 4", + "CIS 18" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.RA", + "PR.PT", + "PR.IP", + "DE.AE", + "PR.MA", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "SamSam Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 12", + "CIS 4", + "CIS 18" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.RA", + "PR.PT", + "PR.IP", + "DE.AE", + "PR.MA", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml", + "source": "web" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get Backup Logs For Endpoint", + "id": "fdcfb369-1725-4c24-824a-22972d7f0d44", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-14", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search will tell you the backup status from your netbackup_logs of a specific endpoint for the last week.", + "search": "`netbackup` COMPUTERNAME=$dest$ | rename COMPUTERNAME as dest, MESSAGE as signature | table _time, dest, signature", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your backup logs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "COMPUTERNAME", + "MESSAGE" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_backup_logs_for_endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Get History Of Email Sources", + "id": "ddc7af28-c34d-4392-af93-7f29a4e8806c", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-02-21", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Email" + ], + "description": "This search returns a list of all email sources seen in the 48 hours prior to the notable event to 24 hours after, and the number of emails from each source.", + "search": "|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Email.dest) as dest values(All_Email.recipient) as recepient min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count from datamodel=Email.All_Email by All_Email.src |`drop_dm_object_name(All_Email)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search src=$src$", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must ingest your email logs or capture unencrypted email communications within network traffic, and populate the Email data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "src" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Email.dest", + "All_Email.recipient", + "All_Email.src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_history_of_email_sources" + }, + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + }, + { + "name": "Get Parent Process Info", + "id": "fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41bf9", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-02-28", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "parent_process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Phishing Payloads", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_parent_process_info" + }, + { + "name": "Get Process Info", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd71", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-01", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the process running on a host which is under investigation. To gather the process info, enter the values for the process name in question and the destination IP address.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search process_name= $process_name$ | search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_process_info" + }, + { + "name": "Get Process Information For Port Activity", + "id": "9925d08f-561e-4faa-8912-e3888a842341", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-01", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search will return information about the process associated with observed network traffic to a specific destination port from a specific host.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search dest=$dest$ | join dest type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Ports by Ports.process_id Ports.src Ports.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | search dest_port=$dest_port$ | rename src as dest]", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data that associates processes with network events and populate the Endpoint Datamodel", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest", + "dest_port" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Ports.process_id", + "Ports.src", + "Ports.dest_port" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_process_information_for_port_activity" + }, + { + "name": "Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", + "id": "b6618e8e-be04-40a0-a0b9-f0bd4b6c81bc", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-12-14", + "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Authentication" + ], + "description": "This search returns the source, destination, and user for all successful remote-desktop authentications. A successful authentication after a brute-force attack on a destination machine is suspicious behavior. ", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature_id=4624 Authentication.app=win:remote by Authentication.src Authentication.dest Authentication.app Authentication.user Authentication.signature Authentication.src_nt_domain | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Authentication\")` | search dest=$dest$ | table firstTime lastTime src src_nt_domain dest user app count | sort count", + "how_to_implement": "You must be populating the Authentication data model with security events from your Windows event logs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement", + "SamSam Ransomware" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Authentication.signature_id", + "Authentication.app", + "Authentication.src", + "Authentication.dest", + "Authentication.user", + "Authentication.signature", + "Authentication.src_nt_domain" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Remcos", + "id": "2bd4aa08-b9a5-40cf-bfe5-7d43f13d496c", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-23", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Remcos RAT trojan, including looking for file writes associated with its payload, screencapture, registry modification, UAC bypassed, persistence and data collection..", + "narrative": "Remcos or Remote Control and Surveillance, marketed as a legitimate software for remotely managing Windows systems is now widely used in multiple malicious campaigns both APT and commodity malware by threat actors.", + "references": [ + "https://success.trendmicro.com/solution/1123281-remcos-malware-information", + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0332/", + "https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.remcos#:~:text=Remcos%20(acronym%20of%20Remote%20Control,used%20to%20remotely%20control%20computers.&text=Remcos%20can%20be%20used%20for,been%20used%20in%20hacking%20campaigns." + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Remcos", + "analytic_story": "Remcos", + "category": [ + "Malware" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT37", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Evilnum", + "Honeybee", + "MuddyWater", + "Patchwork", + "Threat Group-3390" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.007", + "mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "Cobalt Group", + "Evilnum", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Higaisa", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "Turla" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Cobalt Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sharpshooter", + "Silence", + "Turla" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic-link Library Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Putter Panda", + "TA505", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cobalt Group", + "Deep Panda", + "Inception", + "Leviathan", + "TA551", + "WIRTE" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN8", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1555", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "Evilnum", + "FIN6", + "Leafminer", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1555.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT3", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "Ajax Security Team", + "FIN6", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Patchwork", + "Sandworm Team", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA505", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1559.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Component Object Model", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Gamaredon Group", + "MuddyWater" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "Putter Panda", + "RTM", + "Rocke", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1113", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Screen Capture", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dark Caracal", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN7", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Group5", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Silence" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "FIN4", + "FIN7", + "Frankenstein", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Windshift" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1592", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1134.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Parent PID Spoofing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1134", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Blue Mockingbird", + "FIN6" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection", + "Credential Access", + "Defense Evasion", + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation", + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Exploitation", + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule", + "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", + "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", + "ESCU - Jscript Execution Using Cscript App - Rule", + "ESCU - Loading Of Dynwrapx Module - Rule", + "ESCU - Malicious InProcServer32 Modification - Rule", + "ESCU - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", + "ESCU - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", + "ESCU - Possible Browser Pass View Parameter - Rule", + "ESCU - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule", + "ESCU - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule", + "ESCU - Process Writing DynamicWrapperX - Rule", + "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", + "ESCU - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule", + "ESCU - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule", + "ESCU - Remcos client registry install entry - Rule", + "ESCU - Remcos RAT File Creation in Remcos Folder - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious Image Creation In Appdata Folder - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious WAV file in Appdata Folder - Rule", + "ESCU - System Info Gathering Using Dxdiag Application - Rule", + "ESCU - Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry - Rule", + "ESCU - Winhlp32 Spawning a Process - Rule", + "ESCU - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion", + "id": "773b66fe-4dd9-11ec-8289-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-25", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic will identify a suspicious process command-line related to Windows Defender exclusion feature. This command is abused by adversaries, malware authors and red teams to bypass Windows Defender Antivirus products by excluding folder path, file path, process and extensions. From its real time or schedule scan to execute their malicious code. This is a good indicator for defense evasion and to look further for events after this behavior.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process = \"*Add-MpPreference *\" OR Processes.process = \"*Set-MpPreference *\") AND Processes.process=\"*-exclusion*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "Admin or user may choose to use this windows features. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.html", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/cf1245de-06a7-4366-8209-8e3006f2bfe5/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion", + "analytic_story": [ + "Remcos", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/defender_exclusion_sysmon/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "exclusion command $process$ executed on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Remcos", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 64 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion", + "file": "endpoint/add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/defender_exclusion_sysmon/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Disabling Remote User Account Control", + "id": "bbc644bc-37df-4e1a-9c88-ec9a53e2038c", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-11-18", + "author": "David Dorsey, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The search looks for modifications to registry keys that control the enforcement of Windows User Account Control (UAC).", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System\\\\EnableLUA* Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000000\" by Registry.dest, Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `disabling_remote_user_account_control_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report registry modifications.", + "known_false_positives": "This registry key may be modified via administrators to implement a change in system policy. This type of change should be a very rare occurrence.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Disabling Remote User Account Control", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Remcos" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "The Windows registry keys that control the enforcement of Windows User Account Control (UAC) were modified on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.action" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT37", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Evilnum", + "Honeybee", + "MuddyWater", + "Patchwork", + "Threat Group-3390" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Remcos" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 42 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 42 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Disabling Remote User Account Control Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Disabling Remote User Account Control", + "file": "endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "disabling_remote_user_account_control_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", + "id": "a7e3f0f0-ae42-11eb-b245-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-06", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic will identify suspicious executable or scripts (known file extensions) in list of suspicious file path in Windows. This technique is used by adversaries to evade detection. The suspicious file path are known paths used in the wild and are not common to have executable or scripts.", + "search": "|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_name = *.exe OR Filesystem.file_name = *.dll OR Filesystem.file_name = *.sys OR Filesystem.file_name = *.com OR Filesystem.file_name = *.vbs OR Filesystem.file_name = *.vbe OR Filesystem.file_name = *.js OR Filesystem.file_name = *.ps1 OR Filesystem.file_name = *.bat OR Filesystem.file_name = *.cmd OR Filesystem.file_name = *.pif) AND ( Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\windows\\\\fonts\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\windows\\\\temp\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\users\\\\public\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\windows\\\\debug\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Users\\\\Administrator\\\\Music\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Windows\\\\servicing\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Users\\\\Default\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *Recycle.bin* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Windows\\\\Media\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Windows\\\\repair\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Temp* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\PerfLogs\\\\*) by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may allow creation of script or exe in the paths specified. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig", + "Remcos", + "WhisperGate", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious executable or scripts with file name $file_name$, $file_path$ and process_id $process_id$ executed in suspicious file path in Windows by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1036" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_id", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_name", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Other", + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.file_path", + "Filesystem.file_create_time", + "Filesystem.process_id", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.user" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig", + "Remcos", + "WhisperGate", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_id", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_name", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Other", + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_id", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "file_name", + "threat_object_type": "file name" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", + "file": "endpoint/executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Jscript Execution Using Cscript App", + "id": "002f1e24-146e-11ec-a470-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-13", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a execution of jscript using cscript process. Commonly when a user run jscript file it was executed by wscript.exe application. This technique was seen in FIN7 js implant to execute its malicious script using cscript process. This behavior is uncommon and a good artifacts to check further anomalies within the network", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = \"cscript.exe\" AND Processes.parent_process = \"*//e:jscript*\") OR (Processes.process_name = \"cscript.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*//e:jscript*\") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `jscript_execution_using_cscript_app_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html", + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Jscript Execution Using Cscript App", + "analytic_story": [ + "FIN7", + "Remcos" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_macro_js_1/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Process name $process_name$ with commandline $process$ to execute jscript in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.007" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.007", + "mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "Cobalt Group", + "Evilnum", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Higaisa", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.007" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "FIN7", + "Remcos" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.007" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Jscript Execution Using Cscript App Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Jscript Execution Using Cscript App", + "file": "endpoint/jscript_execution_using_cscript_app.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_macro_js_1/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "jscript_execution_using_cscript_app_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/jscript_execution_using_cscript_app.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Loading Of Dynwrapx Module", + "id": "eac5e8ba-4857-11ec-9371-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-18", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "DynamicWrapperX is an ActiveX component that can be used in a script to call Windows API functions, but it requires the dynwrapx.dll to be installed and registered. With that, registering or loading dynwrapx.dll to a host is highly suspicious. In most instances when it is used maliciously, the best way to triage is to review parallel processes and pivot on the process_guid. Review the registry for any suspicious modifications meant to load dynwrapx.dll. Identify any suspicious module loads of dynwrapx.dll. This detection will return and identify the processes that invoke vbs/wscript/cscript.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 (ImageLoaded = \"*\\\\dynwrapx.dll\" OR OriginalFileName = \"dynwrapx.dll\" OR Product = \"DynamicWrapperX\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded OriginalFileName Product process_name Computer EventCode Signed ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `loading_of_dynwrapx_module_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on processes that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however it is possible to filter by Processes.process_name and specific processes (ex. wscript.exe). Filter as needed. This may need modification based on EDR telemetry and how it brings in registry data. For example, removal of (Default).", + "references": [ + "https://blog.f-secure.com/hunting-for-koadic-a-com-based-rootkit/", + "https://www.script-coding.com/dynwrapx_eng.html", + "https://bohops.com/2018/06/28/abusing-com-registry-structure-clsid-localserver32-inprocserver32/", + "https://tria.ge/210929-ap75vsddan", + "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/cb77b93150cb0f7fe65ce8a7e2a5781e727419451355a7736db84109fa215a89" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Loading Of Dynwrapx Module", + "analytic_story": [ + "Remcos" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_dynwrapx/sysmon_dynwraper.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "dynwrapx.dll loaded by process $process_name$ on $Computer$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1055", + "T1055.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Image", + "ImageLoaded", + "OriginalFileName", + "Product", + "process_name", + "Computer", + "EventCode", + "Signed", + "ProcessId" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Cobalt Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sharpshooter", + "Silence", + "Turla" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic-link Library Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Putter Panda", + "TA505", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1055", + "T1055.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Remcos" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 80 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1055", + "T1055.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Loading Of Dynwrapx Module Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Loading Of Dynwrapx Module", + "file": "endpoint/loading_of_dynwrapx_module.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_dynwraper.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_dynwrapx/sysmon_dynwraper.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "loading_of_dynwrapx_module_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/loading_of_dynwrapx_module.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Malicious InProcServer32 Modification", + "id": "127c8d08-25ff-11ec-9223-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-10-05", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a process modifying the registry with a known malicious CLSID under InProcServer32. Most COM classes are registered with the operating system and are identified by a GUID that represents the Class Identifier (CLSID) within the registry (usually under HKLM\\\\Software\\\\Classes\\\\CLSID or HKCU\\\\Software\\\\Classes\\\\CLSID). Behind the implementation of a COM class is the server (some binary) that is referenced within registry keys under the CLSID. The LocalServer32 key represents a path to an executable (exe) implementation, and the InprocServer32 key represents a path to a dynamic link library (DLL) implementation (Bohops). During triage, review parallel processes for suspicious activity. Pivot on the process GUID to see the full timeline of events. Analyze the value and look for file modifications. Being this is looking for inprocserver32, a DLL found in the value will most likely be loaded by a parallel process.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_guid Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\CLSID\\\\{89565275-A714-4a43-912E-978B935EDCCC}\\\\InProcServer32\\\\(Default)\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest Registry.process_guid Registry.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | fields _time dest registry_path registry_key_name registry_value_name process_name process_path process process_guid user] | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, process_name registry_path registry_key_name registry_value_name user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_inprocserver32_modification_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, filter as needed. In our test case, Remcos used regsvr32.exe to modify the registry. It may be required, dependent upon the EDR tool producing registry events, to remove (Default) from the command-line.", + "references": [ + "https://bohops.com/2018/06/28/abusing-com-registry-structure-clsid-localserver32-inprocserver32/", + "https://tria.ge/210929-ap75vsddan", + "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/cb77b93150cb0f7fe65ce8a7e2a5781e727419451355a7736db84109fa215a89" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Malicious InProcServer32 Modification", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", + "Remcos" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "The $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ modifying the registry with a known malicious clsid under InProcServer32.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218.010", + "T1112" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "dest", + "process_name", + "registry_path", + "registry_key_name", + "registry_value_name", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cobalt Group", + "Deep Panda", + "Inception", + "Leviathan", + "TA551", + "WIRTE" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN8", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218.010", + "T1112" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", + "Remcos" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218.010", + "T1112" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Malicious InProcServer32 Modification Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Malicious InProcServer32 Modification", + "file": "endpoint/malicious_inprocserver32_modification.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "malicious_inprocserver32_modification_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/malicious_inprocserver32_modification.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir", + "id": "81263de4-160a-11ec-944f-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-15", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect an anomaly event of non-chrome process accessing the files in chrome user default folder. This folder contains all the sqlite database of the chrome browser related to users login, history, cookies and etc. Most of the RAT, trojan spy as well as FIN7 jssloader try to parse the those sqlite database to collect information on the compromised host. This SACL Event (4663) need to be enabled to tthe firefox profile directory to be eable to use this. Since you monitoring this access to the folder a noise coming from firefox need to be filter and also sqlite db browser and explorer .exe to make this detection more stable.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 NOT (process_name IN (\"*\\\\chrome.exe\", \"*\\\\explorer.exe\", \"*sql*\")) Object_Name=\"*\\\\Google\\\\Chrome\\\\User Data\\\\Default*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Object_Name Object_Type process_name Access_Mask Accesses process_id EventCode dest user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663. For 4663, enable \"Audit Object Access\" in Group Policy. Then check the two boxes listed for both \"Success\" and \"Failure.\"", + "known_false_positives": "other browser not listed related to firefox may catch by this rule.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir", + "analytic_story": [ + "FIN7", + "Remcos" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_sacl/security2.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "a non firefox browser process $process_name$ accessing $Object_Name$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1555", + "T1555.003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Object_Name", + "Object_Type", + "process_name", + "Access_Mask", + "Accesses", + "process_id", + "EventCode", + "dest", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1555", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "Evilnum", + "FIN6", + "Leafminer", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1555.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT3", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "Ajax Security Team", + "FIN6", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Patchwork", + "Sandworm Team", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA505", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1555", + "T1555.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "FIN7", + "Remcos" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 35 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 35 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1555", + "T1555.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir", + "file": "endpoint/non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "security2.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_sacl/security2.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir", + "id": "e6fc13b0-1609-11ec-b533-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-15", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect an anomaly event of non-firefox process accessing the files in profile folder. This folder contains all the sqlite database of the firefox browser related to users login, history, cookies and etc. Most of the RAT, trojan spy as well as FIN7 jssloader try to parse the those sqlite database to collect information on the compromised host. This SACL Event (4663) need to be enabled to tthe firefox profile directory to be eable to use this. Since you monitoring this access to the folder a noise coming from firefox need to be filter and also sqlite db browser and explorer .exe to make this detection more stable.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 NOT (process_name IN (\"*\\\\firefox.exe\", \"*\\\\explorer.exe\", \"*sql*\")) Object_Name=\"*\\\\AppData\\\\Roaming\\\\Mozilla\\\\Firefox\\\\Profiles*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Object_Name Object_Type process_name Access_Mask Accesses process_id EventCode dest user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663. For 4663, enable \"Audit Object Access\" in Group Policy. Then check the two boxes listed for both \"Success\" and \"Failure.\"", + "known_false_positives": "other browser not listed related to firefox may catch by this rule.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir", + "analytic_story": [ + "FIN7", + "Remcos" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_sacl/security.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "a non firefox browser process $process_name$ accessing $Object_Name$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1555", + "T1555.003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Object_Name", + "Object_Type", + "process_name", + "Access_Mask", + "Accesses", + "process_id", + "EventCode", + "dest", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1555", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "Evilnum", + "FIN6", + "Leafminer", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1555.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT3", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "Ajax Security Team", + "FIN6", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Patchwork", + "Sandworm Team", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA505", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1555", + "T1555.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "FIN7", + "Remcos" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 35 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 35 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1555", + "T1555.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir", + "file": "endpoint/non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_sacl/security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Possible Browser Pass View Parameter", + "id": "8ba484e8-4b97-11ec-b19a-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-22", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic will detect if a suspicious process contains a commandline parameter related to a web browser credential dumper. This technique is used by Remcos RAT malware which uses the Nirsoft webbrowserpassview.exe application to dump web browser credentials. Remcos uses the \"/stext\" command line to dump the credentials in text format. This Hunting query is a good indicator of hosts suffering from possible Remcos RAT infection. Since the hunting query is based on the parameter command and the possible path where it will save the text credential information, it may catch normal tools that are using the same command and behavior.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process IN (\"*/stext *\", \"*/shtml *\", \"*/LoadPasswordsIE*\", \"*/LoadPasswordsFirefox*\", \"*/LoadPasswordsChrome*\", \"*/LoadPasswordsOpera*\", \"*/LoadPasswordsSafari*\" , \"*/UseOperaPasswordFile*\", \"*/OperaPasswordFile*\",\"*/stab*\", \"*/scomma*\", \"*/stabular*\", \"*/shtml*\", \"*/sverhtml*\", \"*/sxml*\", \"*/skeepass*\" ) AND Processes.process IN (\"*\\\\temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\users\\\\public\\\\*\", \"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `possible_browser_pass_view_parameter_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "False positive is quite limited. Filter is needed", + "references": [ + "https://www.nirsoft.net/utils/web_browser_password.html", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/df0baf9f-8baf-4c32-a452-16562ecb19be/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Possible Browser Pass View Parameter", + "analytic_story": [ + "Remcos" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 40, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1555/web_browser_pass_view/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 40, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "suspicious process $process_name$ contains commandline $process$ on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1555.003", + "T1555" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 16, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1555.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT3", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "Ajax Security Team", + "FIN6", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Patchwork", + "Sandworm Team", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA505", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1555", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "Evilnum", + "FIN6", + "Leafminer", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1555.003", + "T1555" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Remcos" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "impact": 40, + "confidence": 40 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 16 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 16 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1555.003", + "T1555" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Possible Browser Pass View Parameter Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Possible Browser Pass View Parameter", + "file": "endpoint/possible_browser_pass_view_parameter.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1555/web_browser_pass_view/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "possible_browser_pass_view_parameter_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/possible_browser_pass_view_parameter.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands", + "id": "907ac95c-4dd9-11ec-ba2c-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-25", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic will detect a suspicious process commandline related to windows defender exclusion feature. This command is abused by adversaries, malware author and red teams to bypassed Windows Defender Anti-Virus product by excluding folder path, file path, process, extensions and etc. from its real time or schedule scan to execute their malicious code. This is a good indicator for defense evasion and to look further for events after this behavior.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Add-MpPreference *\" OR Message = \"*Set-MpPreference *\") AND Message = \"*-exclusion*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to use this windows features.", + "references": [ + "https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.html", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/cf1245de-06a7-4366-8209-8e3006f2bfe5/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands", + "analytic_story": [ + "Remcos", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/defender_exclusion_powershell/powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "exclusion command $Message$ executed on $ComputerName$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Remcos", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 64 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands", + "file": "endpoint/powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/defender_exclusion_powershell/powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Process Deleting Its Process File Path", + "id": "f7eda4bc-871c-11eb-b110-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-02-18", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This detection is to identify a suspicious process that tries to delete the process file path related to its process. This technique is known to be defense evasion once a certain condition of malware is satisfied or not. Clop ransomware use this technique where it will try to delete its process file path using a .bat command if the keyboard layout is not the layout it tries to infect.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=1 CommandLine = \"* /c *\" CommandLine = \"* del*\" Image = \"*\\\\cmd.exe\" | eval result = if(like(process,\"%\".parent_process.\"%\"), \"Found\", \"Not Found\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer user ParentImage ParentCommandLine Image CommandLine EventCode ProcessID result | where result = \"Found\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `process_deleting_its_process_file_path_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", + "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Process Deleting Its Process File Path", + "analytic_story": [ + "Clop Ransomware", + "Remcos", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A process $Image$ tries to delete its process path in commandline $cmdline$ as part of defense evasion in host $Computer$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1070" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "EventCode", + "Computer", + "user", + "ParentImage", + "ParentCommandLine", + "Image", + "cmdline", + "ProcessID", + "result", + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 60, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1070" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Clop Ransomware", + "Remcos", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 60 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 60 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1070" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Process Deleting Its Process File Path Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Process Deleting Its Process File Path", + "file": "endpoint/process_deleting_its_process_file_path.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "process_deleting_its_process_file_path_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/process_deleting_its_process_file_path.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Process Writing DynamicWrapperX", + "id": "b0a078e4-2601-11ec-9aec-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-10-05", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "DynamicWrapperX is an ActiveX component that can be used in a script to call Windows API functions, but it requires the dynwrapx.dll to be installed and registered. With that, a binary writing dynwrapx.dll to disk and registering it into the registry is highly suspect. Why is it needed? In most malicious instances, it will be written to disk at a non-standard location. During triage, review parallel processes and pivot on the process_guid. Review the registry for any suspicious modifications meant to load dynwrapx.dll. Identify any suspicious module loads of dynwrapx.dll. This will identify the process that will invoke vbs/wscript/cscript.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_guid Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name=\"dynwrapx.dll\" by _time Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time process_guid file_path file_name file_create_time user dest process_name] | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest process_name process_guid file_name file_path file_create_time user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `process_writing_dynamicwrapperx_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however it is possible to filter by Processes.process_name and specific processes (ex. wscript.exe). Filter as needed. This may need modification based on EDR telemetry and how it brings in registry data. For example, removal of (Default).", + "references": [ + "https://blog.f-secure.com/hunting-for-koadic-a-com-based-rootkit/", + "https://www.script-coding.com/dynwrapx_eng.html", + "https://bohops.com/2018/06/28/abusing-com-registry-structure-clsid-localserver32-inprocserver32/", + "https://tria.ge/210929-ap75vsddan", + "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/cb77b93150cb0f7fe65ce8a7e2a5781e727419451355a7736db84109fa215a89" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Process Writing DynamicWrapperX", + "analytic_story": [ + "Remcos" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ downloading the DynamicWrapperX dll.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1559.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "dest", + "process_name", + "process_guid", + "file_name", + "file_path", + "file_create_time user" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1559.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Component Object Model", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Gamaredon Group", + "MuddyWater" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1559.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Remcos" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1559.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Process Writing DynamicWrapperX Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Process Writing DynamicWrapperX", + "file": "endpoint/process_writing_dynamicwrapperx.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "process_writing_dynamicwrapperx_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/process_writing_dynamicwrapperx.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", + "id": "f5f6af30-7aa7-4295-bfe9-07fe87c01a4b", + "version": 7, + "date": "2022-01-26", + "author": "Jose Hernandez, David Dorsey, Teoderick Contreras, Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to launch an application or service at system startup.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\RunOnce OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\run* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentVersion\\\\Windows\\\\Appinit_Dlls* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Shell* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Notify* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Userinit* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\VmApplet* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\policies\\\\explorer\\\\run* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\runservices* OR Registry.registry_path=HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Netsh\\\\* OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Image File Execution Options*\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=Debugger) OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Security Packages\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\\\\OSConfig\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Security Packages\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\SilentProcessExit\\\\*\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*currentVersion\\\\Windows\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Load\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentVersion\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Svchost\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\"AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"BootExecute\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Software\\\\Run\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"auto_update\")) by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "There are many legitimate applications that must execute on system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Ransomware", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "IcedID", + "Remcos" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 95, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/atomic_red_team/t1547001-runonce.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to persistence in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1547.001", + "T1547" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user" + ], + "risk_score": 76, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "Putter Panda", + "RTM", + "Rocke", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.001", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Ransomware", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "IcedID", + "Remcos" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 95 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 76 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 76 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.001", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", + "file": "endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading", + "id": "f421c250-24e7-11ec-bc43-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-10-04", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a loading of dll using regsvr32 application with silent parameter and dllinstall execution. This technique was seen in several RAT malware similar to remcos, njrat and adversaries to load their malicious DLL on the compromised machine. This TTP may executed by normal 3rd party application so it is better to pivot by the parent process, parent command-line and command-line of the file that execute this regsvr32.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` AND Processes.process=\"*/i*\" by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"(?i)[\\-|\\/][Ss]{1}\") | `regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Other third part application may used this parameter but not so common in base windows environment.", + "references": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/dc93ee63-050c-4ff8-b07e-8277af9ab939/#", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", + "Remcos", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/vbs_wscript/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a DLL using the silent and dllinstall parameter.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.010" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 36, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cobalt Group", + "Deep Panda", + "Inception", + "Leviathan", + "TA551", + "WIRTE" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.010" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", + "Remcos", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 36 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 36 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.010" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading", + "file": "endpoint/regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/vbs_wscript/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_regsvr32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=REGSVR32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline", + "id": "c9ef7dc4-eeaf-11eb-b2b6-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-07-27", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies Regsvr32.exe utilizing the silent switch to load DLLs. This technique has most recently been seen in IcedID campaigns to load its initial dll that will download the 2nd stage loader that will download and decrypt the config payload. The switch type may be either a hyphen `-` or forward slash `/`. This behavior is typically found with `-s`, and it is possible there are more switch types that may be used. \\ During triage, review parallel processes and capture any artifacts that may have landed on disk. Isolate and contain the endpoint as necessary.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"(?i)[\\-|\\/][Ss]{1}\") | `regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "minimal. but network operator can use this application to load dll.", + "references": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/56680cba-2bbc-4b34-8633-5f7878ddf858/", + "https://regexr.com/699e2" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline", + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID", + "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", + "Remcos" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a DLL using the silent parameter.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.010" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cobalt Group", + "Deep Panda", + "Inception", + "Leviathan", + "TA551", + "WIRTE" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.010" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID", + "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", + "Remcos" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.010" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline", + "file": "endpoint/regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-150d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_regsvr32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=REGSVR32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Remcos client registry install entry", + "id": "f2a1615a-1d63-11ec-97d2-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-26", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Rod Soto, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search detects registry key license at host where Remcos RAT agent is installed.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_key_name=*\\\\Software\\\\Remcos*) by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data |`remcos_client_registry_install_entry_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0332/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Remcos client registry install entry", + "analytic_story": [ + "Remcos" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_panel_client/remcos_registry_entry.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A registry entry $registry_path$ with registry keyname $registry_key_name$ related to Remcos RAT in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1112" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.process_id", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user" + ], + "risk_score": 90, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN8", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1112" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Remcos" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 90 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1112" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Remcos client registry install entry Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Remcos client registry install entry", + "file": "endpoint/remcos_client_registry_install_entry.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-15d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "remcos_registry_entry.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_panel_client/remcos_registry_entry.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "remcos_client_registry_install_entry_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remcos_client_registry_install_entry.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Remcos RAT File Creation in Remcos Folder", + "id": "25ae862a-1ac3-11ec-94a1-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-21", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect file creation in remcos folder in appdata which is the keylog and clipboard logs that will be send to its c2 server. This is really a good TTP indicator that there is a remcos rat in the system that do keylogging, clipboard grabbing and audio recording.", + "search": "|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*.dat\") Filesystem.file_path = \"*\\\\remcos\\\\*\" by _time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remcos_rat_file_creation_in_remcos_folder_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://success.trendmicro.com/solution/1123281-remcos-malware-information", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2021/07/remcos-rat-delivered-via-visual-basic/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Remcos RAT File Creation in Remcos Folder", + "analytic_story": [ + "Remcos" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Collection" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_agent/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 100, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "file $file_name$ created in $file_path$ of $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1113" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "dest", + "file_create_time", + "file_name", + "file_path" + ], + "risk_score": 100, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1113", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Screen Capture", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dark Caracal", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN7", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Group5", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Silence" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1113" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Remcos" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Collection" + ], + "impact": 100, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 100 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1113" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Remcos RAT File Creation in Remcos Folder Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Remcos RAT File Creation in Remcos Folder", + "file": "endpoint/remcos_rat_file_creation_in_remcos_folder.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_agent/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "remcos_rat_file_creation_in_remcos_folder_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remcos_rat_file_creation_in_remcos_folder.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Image Creation In Appdata Folder", + "id": "f6f904c4-1ac0-11ec-806b-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-21", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious creation of image in appdata folder made by process that also has a file reference in appdata folder. This technique was seen in remcos rat that capture screenshot of the compromised machine and place it in the appdata and will be send to its C2 server. This TTP is really a good indicator to check that process because it is in suspicious folder path and image files are not commonly created by user in this folder path.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=*.exe Processes.process_path=\"*\\\\appdata\\\\Roaming\\\\*\" by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*.png\",\"*.jpg\",\"*.bmp\",\"*.gif\",\"*.tiff\") Filesystem.file_path = \"*\\\\appdata\\\\Roaming\\\\*\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process] | `suspicious_image_creation_in_appdata_folder_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://success.trendmicro.com/solution/1123281-remcos-malware-information", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2021/07/remcos-rat-delivered-via-visual-basic/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Image Creation In Appdata Folder", + "analytic_story": [ + "Remcos" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Collection" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_agent/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "process $process_name$ creating image file $file_path$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1113" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "dest", + "file_create_time", + "file_name", + "file_path", + "process_name", + "process_path", + "process" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1113", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Screen Capture", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dark Caracal", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN7", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Group5", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Silence" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1113" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Remcos" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Collection" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1113" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Suspicious Image Creation In Appdata Folder Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious Image Creation In Appdata Folder", + "file": "endpoint/suspicious_image_creation_in_appdata_folder.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_agent/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_image_creation_in_appdata_folder_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_image_creation_in_appdata_folder.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services", + "id": "3cf0dc36-484d-11ec-a6bc-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-18", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic detects a suspicious process making a DNS query via known, abused text-paste web services, VoIP, instant messaging, and digital distribution platforms used to download external files. This technique is abused by adversaries, malware actors, and red teams to download a malicious file on the target host. This is a good TTP indicator for possible initial access techniques. A user will experience false positives if the following instant messaging is allowed or common applications like telegram or discord are allowed in the corporate network.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=22 QueryName IN (\"*pastebin*\", \"*discord*\", \"*telegram*\", \"*t.me*\") process_name IN (\"cmd.exe\", \"*powershell*\", \"pwsh.exe\", \"wscript.exe\", \"cscript.exe\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image QueryName QueryStatus process_name QueryResults Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This detection relies on sysmon logs with the Event ID 22, DNS Query. We suggest you run this detection at least once a day over the last 14 days.", + "known_false_positives": "Noise and false positive can be seen if the following instant messaging is allowed to use within corporate network. In this case, a filter is needed.", + "references": [ + "https://urlhaus.abuse.ch/url/1798923/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services", + "analytic_story": [ + "Remcos", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_pastebin_download/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "suspicious process $process_name$ has a dns query in $QueryName$ on $Computer$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059.005", + "T1059" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Image", + "QueryName", + "QueryStatus", + "process_name", + "QueryResults", + "Computer" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "FIN4", + "FIN7", + "Frankenstein", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Windshift" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059.005", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Remcos", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059.005", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services", + "file": "endpoint/suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_pastebin_download/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Process File Path", + "id": "9be25988-ad82-11eb-a14f-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-05", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic will detect a suspicious process running in a file path where a process is not commonly seen and is most commonly used by malicious software. This behavior has been used by adversaries where they drop and run an exe in a path that is accessible without admin privileges.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\windows\\\\fonts\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\windows\\\\temp\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\users\\\\public\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\windows\\\\debug\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path.file_path = \"*\\\\Users\\\\Administrator\\\\Music\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path.file_path = \"*\\\\Windows\\\\servicing\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path.file_path = \"*\\\\Users\\\\Default\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path.file_path = \"*Recycle.bin*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Media\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"\\\\Windows\\\\repair\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\PerfLogs\\\\*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_path Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_process_file_path_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may allow execution of specific binaries in non-standard paths. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/hk/threat-encyclopedia/malware/trojan.ps1.powtran.a/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Process File Path", + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig", + "Remcos", + "WhisperGate", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicioues process $Processes.process_path.file_path$ running from suspicious location", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1543" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Processes.process_path.file_path", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1543" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig", + "Remcos", + "WhisperGate", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Processes.process_path.file_path", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 35 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "Processes.process_path.file_path", + "threat_object_type": "file name" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1543" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Suspicious Process File Path Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious Process File Path", + "file": "endpoint/suspicious_process_file_path.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_process_file_path_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_process_file_path.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious WAV file in Appdata Folder", + "id": "5be109e6-1ac5-11ec-b421-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-21", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious creation of .wav file in appdata folder. This behavior was seen in Remcos RAT malware where it put the audio recording in the appdata\\audio folde as part of data collection. this recording can be send to its C2 server as part of its exfiltration to the compromised machine. creation of wav files in this folder path is not a ussual disk place used by user to save audio format file.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=*.exe Processes.process_path=\"*\\\\appdata\\\\Roaming\\\\*\" by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*.wav\") Filesystem.file_path = \"*\\\\appdata\\\\Roaming\\\\*\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields file_name file_path process_name process_path process dest file_create_time _time ] | `suspicious_wav_file_in_appdata_folder_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, file_name, file_path and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://success.trendmicro.com/solution/1123281-remcos-malware-information", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2021/07/remcos-rat-delivered-via-visual-basic/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious WAV file in Appdata Folder", + "analytic_story": [ + "Remcos" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Collection" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_agent/sysmon_wav.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "process $process_name$ creating image file $file_path$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1113" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "dest", + "file_create_time", + "file_name", + "file_path", + "process_name", + "process_path", + "process" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1113", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Screen Capture", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dark Caracal", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN7", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Group5", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Silence" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1113" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Remcos" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Collection" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1113" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Suspicious WAV file in Appdata Folder Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious WAV file in Appdata Folder", + "file": "endpoint/suspicious_wav_file_in_appdata_folder.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_wav.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_agent/sysmon_wav.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_wav_file_in_appdata_folder_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wav_file_in_appdata_folder.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "System Info Gathering Using Dxdiag Application", + "id": "f92d74f2-4921-11ec-b685-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-19", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious dxdiag.exe process command-line execution. Dxdiag is used to collect the system info of the target host. This technique has been used by Remcos RATS, various actors, and other malware to collect information as part of the recon or collection phase of an attack. This behavior should rarely be seen in a corporate network, but this command line can be used by a network administrator to audit host machine specifications. Thus in some rare cases, this detection will contain false positives in its results. To triage further, analyze what commands were passed after it pipes out the result to a file for further processing.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_dxdiag` AND Processes.process = \"* /t *\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "This commandline can be used by a network administrator to audit host machine specifications. Thus, a filter is needed.", + "references": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/df0baf9f-8baf-4c32-a452-16562ecb19be/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "System Info Gathering Using Dxdiag Application", + "analytic_story": [ + "Remcos" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/t1592/host_info_dxdiag/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "dxdiag.exe process with commandline $process$ on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1592" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1592", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1592" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Remcos" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1592" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "System Info Gathering Using Dxdiag Application Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "System Info Gathering Using Dxdiag Application", + "file": "endpoint/system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/t1592/host_info_dxdiag/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_dxdiag", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=dxdiag.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=dxdiag.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App", + "id": "35159940-228f-11ec-8a49-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-10-01", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious wscript commandline to execute vbscript. This technique was seen in several malware to execute malicious vbs file using wscript application. commonly vbs script is associated to cscript process and this can be a technique to evade process parent child detections or even some av script emulation system.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = \"wscript.exe\" AND Processes.parent_process = \"*//e:vbscript*\") OR (Processes.process_name = \"wscript.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*//e:vbscript*\") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `vbscript_execution_using_wscript_app_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/369332/0/html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App", + "analytic_story": [ + "FIN7", + "Remcos" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/vbs_wscript/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Process name $process_name$ with commandline $process$ to execute vbsscript", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059.005", + "T1059" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "FIN4", + "FIN7", + "Frankenstein", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Windshift" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059.005", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "FIN7", + "Remcos" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059.005", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App", + "file": "endpoint/vbscript_execution_using_wscript_app.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/vbs_wscript/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "vbscript_execution_using_wscript_app_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/vbscript_execution_using_wscript_app.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry", + "id": "13395a44-4dd9-11ec-9df7-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-25", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic will detect a suspicious process that modify a registry related to windows defender exclusion feature. This registry is abused by adversaries, malware author and red teams to bypassed Windows Defender Anti-Virus product by excluding folder path, file path, process, extensions and etc. from its real time or schedule scan to execute their malicious code. This is a good indicator for a defense evasion and to look further for events after this behavior.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Exclusions\\\\*\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to use this windows features.", + "references": [ + "https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.html", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/cf1245de-06a7-4366-8209-8e3006f2bfe5/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry", + "analytic_story": [ + "Remcos", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/defender_exclusion_sysmon/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "exclusion registry $registry_path$ modified or added on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.registry_value_data" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Remcos", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 64 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry", + "file": "endpoint/windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/defender_exclusion_sysmon/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Winhlp32 Spawning a Process", + "id": "d17dae9e-2618-11ec-b9f5-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-10-05", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies winhlp32.exe, found natively in `c:\\windows\\`, spawning a child process that loads a file out of appdata, programdata, or temp. Winhlp32.exe has a rocky past in that multiple vulnerabilities were found and added to MetaSploit. WinHlp32.exe is required to display 32-bit Help files that have the \".hlp\" file name extension. This particular instance is related to a Remcos sample where dynwrapx.dll is added to the registry under inprocserver32, and later module loaded by winhlp32.exe to spawn wscript.exe and load a vbs or file from disk. During triage, review parallel processes to identify further suspicious behavior. Review module loads for unsuspecting unsigned modules. Capture any file modifications and analyze.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=winhlp32.exe Processes.process IN (\"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\",\"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winhlp32_spawning_a_process_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as winhlp32.exe is typically not used with the latest flavors of Windows OS. However, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/16541", + "https://tria.ge/210929-ap75vsddan", + "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/cb77b93150cb0f7fe65ce8a7e2a5781e727419451355a7736db84109fa215a89" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Winhlp32 Spawning a Process", + "analytic_story": [ + "Remcos" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$, and is not typical activity for this process.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1055" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Cobalt Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sharpshooter", + "Silence", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1055" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Remcos" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1055" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Winhlp32 Spawning a Process Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Winhlp32 Spawning a Process", + "file": "endpoint/winhlp32_spawning_a_process.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "winhlp32_spawning_a_process_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/winhlp32_spawning_a_process.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process", + "id": "1f35e1da-267b-11ec-90a9-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-10-06", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies a suspicious spawned process by WScript or CScript process. This technique was a common technique used by adversaries and malware to execute different LOLBIN, other scripts like PowerShell or spawn a suspended process to inject its code as a defense evasion. This TTP may detect some normal script that using several application tool that are in the list of the child process it detects but a good pivot and indicator that a script is may execute suspicious code.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"cscript.exe\", \"wscript.exe\") Processes.process_name IN (\"regsvr32.exe\", \"rundll32.exe\",\"winhlp32.exe\",\"certutil.exe\",\"msbuild.exe\",\"cmd.exe\",\"powershell*\",\"wmic.exe\",\"mshta.exe\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may create vbs or js script that use several tool as part of its execution. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/8da5b75b6380a41eee3a399c43dfe0d99eeefaa1fd21027a07b1ecaa4cd96fdd?environmentId=120", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process", + "analytic_story": [ + "FIN7", + "Remcos", + "Unusual Processes", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/vbs_wscript/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "wscript or cscript parent process spawned $process_name$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1055", + "T1543", + "T1134.004", + "T1134" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Cobalt Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sharpshooter", + "Silence", + "Turla" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1134.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Parent PID Spoofing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1134", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Blue Mockingbird", + "FIN6" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1055", + "T1543", + "T1134.004", + "T1134" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "FIN7", + "Remcos", + "Unusual Processes", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1055", + "T1543", + "T1134.004", + "T1134" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process", + "file": "endpoint/wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/vbs_wscript/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [] + }, + { + "name": "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "id": "91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e177e77", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-12", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "description": "Validate the security configuration of network infrastructure and verify that only authorized users and systems are accessing critical assets. Core routing and switching infrastructure are common strategic targets for attackers.", + "narrative": "Networking devices, such as routers and switches, are often overlooked as resources that attackers will leverage to subvert an enterprise. Advanced threats actors have shown a proclivity to target these critical assets as a means to siphon and redirect network traffic, flash backdoored operating systems, and implement cryptographic weakened algorithms to more easily decrypt network traffic.\\\nThis Analytic Story helps you gain a better understanding of how your network devices are interacting with your hosts. By compromising your network devices, attackers can obtain direct access to the company's internal infrastructure— effectively increasing the attack surface and accessing private services/data.", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/09/the_new_route_toper.html", + "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/security-center/event-response/synful-knock.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "analytic_story": "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "category": [ + "Best Practices" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Security Monitoring", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1200", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "DarkVishnya" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1498", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1557", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Adversary-in-the-Middle", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection", + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Kimsuky" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1557.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "ARP Cache Poisoning", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection", + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Cleaver" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1542.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "TFTP Boot", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1542", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Pre-OS Boot", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1020", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Exfiltration", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Frankenstein", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Honeybee", + "Sidewinder", + "Tropic Trooper" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1020.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Traffic Duplication", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection", + "Credential Access", + "Defense Evasion", + "Exfiltration", + "Impact", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Authentication", + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Delivery", + "Exploitation", + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Detect New Login Attempts to Routers", + "id": "bce3ed7c-9b1f-42a0-abdf-d8b123a34836", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-12", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Authentication" + ], + "description": "The search queries the authentication logs for assets that are categorized as routers in the ES Assets and Identity Framework, to identify connections that have not been seen before in the last 30 days.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.dest_category=router by Authentication.dest Authentication.user| eval isOutlier=if(earliest >= relative_time(now(), \"-30d@d\"), 1, 0) | where isOutlier=1| `security_content_ctime(earliest)`| `security_content_ctime(latest)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Authentication\")` | `detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must ensure the network router devices are categorized as \"router\" in the Assets and identity table. You must also populate the Authentication data model with logs related to users authenticating to routing infrastructure.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate router connections may appear as new connections", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect New Login Attempts to Routers", + "analytic_story": [ + "Router and Infrastructure Security" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 11" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Authentication.dest_category", + "Authentication.dest", + "Authentication.user" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 11" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Router and Infrastructure Security" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 11" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml", + "source": "application" + }, + { + "name": "Detect ARP Poisoning", + "id": "b44bebd6-bd39-467b-9321-73971bcd7aac", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-08-11", + "author": "Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "By enabling Dynamic ARP Inspection as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect ARP Poisoning attacks in the Infrastructure.", + "search": "`cisco_networks` facility=\"PM\" mnemonic=\"ERR_DISABLE\" disable_cause=\"arp-inspection\" | eval src_interface=src_int_prefix_long+src_int_suffix | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime count BY host src_interface | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `detect_arp_poisoning_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with DHCP Snooping (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960x/software/15-0_2_EX/security/configuration_guide/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg_chapter_01101.html) and Dynamic ARP Inspection (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960x/software/15-2_2_e/security/configuration_guide/b_sec_1522e_2960x_cg/b_sec_1522e_2960x_cg_chapter_01111.html) and log with a severity level of minimum \"5 - notification\". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices.", + "known_false_positives": "This search might be prone to high false positives if DHCP Snooping or ARP inspection has been incorrectly configured, or if a device normally sends many ARP packets (unlikely).", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect ARP Poisoning", + "analytic_story": [ + "Router and Infrastructure Security" + ], + "asset_type": "Infrastructure", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1", + "CIS 11" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Delivery", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1200", + "T1498", + "T1557", + "T1557.002" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "facility", + "mnemonic", + "disable_cause", + "src_int_prefix_long", + "src_int_suffix", + "host", + "src_interface" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1200", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "DarkVishnya" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1498", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1557", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Adversary-in-the-Middle", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection", + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Kimsuky" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1557.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "ARP Cache Poisoning", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection", + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Cleaver" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1200", + "T1498", + "T1557", + "T1557.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Delivery", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1", + "CIS 11" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Router and Infrastructure Security" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "dest", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1200", + "T1498", + "T1557", + "T1557.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Delivery", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1", + "CIS 11" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cisco_networks", + "definition": "eventtype=cisco_ios", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_arp_poisoning_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats", + "id": "c3be767e-7959-44c5-8976-0e9c12a91ad2", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-10-28", + "author": "Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "By enabling IPv6 First Hop Security as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect various attacks such as packet forging in the Infrastructure.", + "search": "`cisco_networks` facility=\"SISF\" mnemonic IN (\"IP_THEFT\",\"MAC_THEFT\",\"MAC_AND_IP_THEFT\",\"PAK_DROP\") | eval src_interface=src_int_prefix_long+src_int_suffix | eval dest_interface=dest_int_prefix_long+dest_int_suffix | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime values(src_mac) AS src_mac values(src_vlan) AS src_vlan values(mnemonic) AS mnemonic values(vendor_explanation) AS vendor_explanation values(src_ip) AS src_ip values(dest_ip) AS dest_ip values(dest_interface) AS dest_interface values(action) AS action count BY host src_interface | table host src_interface dest_interface src_mac src_ip dest_ip src_vlan mnemonic vendor_explanation action count | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with one or more First Hop Security measures such as RA Guard, DHCP Guard and/or device tracking. See References for more information. The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices.", + "known_false_positives": "None currently known", + "references": [ + "https://www.ciscolive.com/c/dam/r/ciscolive/emea/docs/2019/pdf/BRKSEC-3200.pdf", + "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-ra-guard.html", + "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-snooping.html", + "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-dad-proxy.html", + "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-nd-mcast-supp.html", + "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-dhcpv6-guard.html", + "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-src-guard.html", + "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ipv6-dest-guard.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats", + "analytic_story": [ + "Router and Infrastructure Security" + ], + "asset_type": "Infrastructure", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1", + "CIS 11" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Delivery", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1200", + "T1498", + "T1557", + "T1557.002" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "facility", + "mnemonic", + "src_int_prefix_long", + "src_int_suffix", + "dest_int_prefix_long", + "dest_int_suffix", + "src_mac", + "src_vlan", + "vendor_explanation", + "action" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1200", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "DarkVishnya" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1498", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1557", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Adversary-in-the-Middle", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection", + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Kimsuky" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1557.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "ARP Cache Poisoning", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection", + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Cleaver" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1200", + "T1498", + "T1557", + "T1557.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Delivery", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1", + "CIS 11" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Router and Infrastructure Security" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1200", + "T1498", + "T1557", + "T1557.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Delivery", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1", + "CIS 11" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cisco_networks", + "definition": "eventtype=cisco_ios", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Port Security Violation", + "id": "2de3d5b8-a4fa-45c5-8540-6d071c194d24", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-10-28", + "author": "Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "By enabling Port Security on a Cisco switch you can restrict input to an interface by limiting and identifying MAC addresses of the workstations that are allowed to access the port. When you assign secure MAC addresses to a secure port, the port does not forward packets with source addresses outside the group of defined addresses. If you limit the number of secure MAC addresses to one and assign a single secure MAC address, the workstation attached to that port is assured the full bandwidth of the port. If a port is configured as a secure port and the maximum number of secure MAC addresses is reached, when the MAC address of a workstation attempting to access the port is different from any of the identified secure MAC addresses, a security violation occurs.", + "search": "`cisco_networks` (facility=\"PM\" mnemonic=\"ERR_DISABLE\" disable_cause=\"psecure-violation\") OR (facility=\"PORT_SECURITY\" mnemonic=\"PSECURE_VIOLATION\" OR mnemonic=\"PSECURE_VIOLATION_VLAN\") | eval src_interface=src_int_prefix_long+src_int_suffix | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime values(disable_cause) AS disable_cause values(src_mac) AS src_mac values(src_vlan) AS src_vlan values(action) AS action count by host src_interface | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_port_security_violation_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with Port Security and Error Disable for this to work (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst4500/12-2/25ew/configuration/guide/conf/port_sec.html) and log with a severity level of minimum \"5 - notification\". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices.", + "known_false_positives": "This search might be prone to high false positives if you have malfunctioning devices connected to your ethernet ports or if end users periodically connect physical devices to the network.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Port Security Violation", + "analytic_story": [ + "Router and Infrastructure Security" + ], + "asset_type": "Infrastructure", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1", + "CIS 11" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Delivery", + "Exploitation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1200", + "T1498", + "T1557", + "T1557.002" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "facility", + "mnemonic", + "disable_cause", + "src_int_prefix_long", + "src_int_suffix", + "src_mac", + "src_vlan", + "action", + "host", + "src_interface" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1200", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "DarkVishnya" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1498", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1557", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Adversary-in-the-Middle", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection", + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Kimsuky" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1557.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "ARP Cache Poisoning", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection", + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Cleaver" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1200", + "T1498", + "T1557", + "T1557.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Delivery", + "Exploitation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1", + "CIS 11" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Router and Infrastructure Security" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "dest", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1200", + "T1498", + "T1557", + "T1557.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Delivery", + "Exploitation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1", + "CIS 11" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cisco_networks", + "definition": "eventtype=cisco_ios", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_port_security_violation_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Rogue DHCP Server", + "id": "6e1ada88-7a0d-4ac1-92c6-03d354686079", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-08-11", + "author": "Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "By enabling DHCP Snooping as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect unauthorized DHCP servers handing out DHCP leases to devices on the network (Man in the Middle attack).", + "search": "`cisco_networks` facility=\"DHCP_SNOOPING\" mnemonic=\"DHCP_SNOOPING_UNTRUSTED_PORT\" | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime count values(message_type) AS message_type values(src_mac) AS src_mac BY host | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `detect_rogue_dhcp_server_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with DHCP Snooping enabled (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960x/software/15-0_2_EX/security/configuration_guide/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg_chapter_01101.html) and log with a severity level of minimum \"5 - notification\". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices.", + "known_false_positives": "This search might be prone to high false positives if DHCP Snooping has been incorrectly configured or in the unlikely event that the DHCP server has been moved to another network interface.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Rogue DHCP Server", + "analytic_story": [ + "Router and Infrastructure Security" + ], + "asset_type": "Infrastructure", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1", + "CIS 11" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Delivery", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1200", + "T1498", + "T1557" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "facility", + "mnemonic", + "message_type", + "src_mac", + "host" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1200", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "DarkVishnya" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1498", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1557", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Adversary-in-the-Middle", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection", + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Kimsuky" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1200", + "T1498", + "T1557" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Delivery", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1", + "CIS 11" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Router and Infrastructure Security" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "dest", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1200", + "T1498", + "T1557" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Delivery", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1", + "CIS 11" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cisco_networks", + "definition": "eventtype=cisco_ios", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_rogue_dhcp_server_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Software Download To Network Device", + "id": "cc590c66-f65f-48f2-986a-4797244762f8", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-10-28", + "author": "Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "Adversaries may abuse netbooting to load an unauthorized network device operating system from a Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) server. TFTP boot (netbooting) is commonly used by network administrators to load configuration-controlled network device images from a centralized management server. Netbooting is one option in the boot sequence and can be used to centralize, manage, and control device images.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where (All_Traffic.transport=udp AND All_Traffic.dest_port=69) OR (All_Traffic.transport=tcp AND All_Traffic.dest_port=21) OR (All_Traffic.transport=tcp AND All_Traffic.dest_port=22) AND All_Traffic.dest_category!=common_software_repo_destination AND All_Traffic.src_category=network OR All_Traffic.src_category=router OR All_Traffic.src_category=switch by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_software_download_to_network_device_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This search looks for Network Traffic events to TFTP, FTP or SSH/SCP ports from network devices. Make sure to tag any network devices as network, router or switch in order for this detection to work. If the TFTP traffic doesn't traverse a firewall nor packet inspection, these events will not be logged. This is typically an issue if the TFTP server is on the same subnet as the network device. There is also a chance of the network device loading software using a DHCP assigned IP address (netboot) which is not in the Asset inventory.", + "known_false_positives": "This search will also report any legitimate attempts of software downloads to network devices as well as outbound SSH sessions from network devices.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Software Download To Network Device", + "analytic_story": [ + "Router and Infrastructure Security" + ], + "asset_type": "Infrastructure", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1", + "CIS 11" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1542.005", + "T1542" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.transport", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.dest_category", + "All_Traffic.src_category", + "All_Traffic.src", + "All_Traffic.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1542.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "TFTP Boot", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1542", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Pre-OS Boot", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1542.005", + "T1542" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1", + "CIS 11" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Router and Infrastructure Security" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1542.005", + "T1542" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1", + "CIS 11" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_software_download_to_network_device_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Traffic Mirroring", + "id": "42b3b753-5925-49c5-9742-36fa40a73990", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-10-28", + "author": "Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to automate data exfiltration over compromised network infrastructure. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some network devices and used for network analysis and may be configured to duplicate traffic and forward to one or more destinations for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring device.", + "search": "`cisco_networks` (facility=\"MIRROR\" mnemonic=\"ETH_SPAN_SESSION_UP\") OR (facility=\"SPAN\" mnemonic=\"SESSION_UP\") OR (facility=\"SPAN\" mnemonic=\"PKTCAP_START\") OR (mnemonic=\"CFGLOG_LOGGEDCMD\" command=\"monitor session*\") | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime count BY host facility mnemonic | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_traffic_mirroring_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must log with a severity level of minimum \"5 - notification\". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices and that the devices have been configured according to the documentation of the Cisco Networks Add-on. Also note that an attacker may disable logging from the device prior to enabling traffic mirroring.", + "known_false_positives": "This search will return false positives for any legitimate traffic captures by network administrators.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Traffic Mirroring", + "analytic_story": [ + "Router and Infrastructure Security" + ], + "asset_type": "Infrastructure", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1", + "CIS 11" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1200", + "T1020", + "T1498", + "T1020.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "facility", + "mnemonic", + "host" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1200", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "DarkVishnya" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1020", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Exfiltration", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Frankenstein", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Honeybee", + "Sidewinder", + "Tropic Trooper" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1498", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1020.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Traffic Duplication", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1200", + "T1020", + "T1498", + "T1020.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1", + "CIS 11" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Router and Infrastructure Security" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "dest", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1200", + "T1020", + "T1498", + "T1020.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1", + "CIS 11" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cisco_networks", + "definition": "eventtype=cisco_ios", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_traffic_mirroring_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml", + "source": "network" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", + "id": "9482a314-43dc-11ec-a3c9-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-12", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "description": "Adversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility.", + "narrative": "InstallUtil is a command-line utility that allows for installation and uninstallation of resources by executing specific installer components specified in .NET binaries. InstallUtil is digitally signed by Microsoft and located in the .NET directories on a Windows system: C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v\\InstallUtil.exe and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v\\InstallUtil.exe. \\\nThere are multiple ways to instantiate InstallUtil and they are all outlined within Atomic Red Team - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md. Two specific ways may be used and that includes invoking via installer assembly class constructor through .NET and via InstallUtil.exe. \\\nTypically, adversaries will utilize the most commonly found way to invoke via InstallUtil Uninstall method. \\\nNote that parallel processes, and parent process, play a role in how InstallUtil is being used. In particular, a developer using InstallUtil will spawn from VisualStudio. Adversaries, will spawn from non-standard processes like Explorer.exe, cmd.exe or PowerShell.exe. It's important to review the command-line to identify the DLL being loaded. \\\nParallel processes may also include csc.exe being used to compile a local `.cs` file. This file will be the input to the output. Developers usually do not build direct on the command shell, therefore this should raise suspicion.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/004/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", + "analytic_story": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "GALLIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Mustang Panda", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Michael Haag", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path", + "id": "fddf3b56-7933-11ec-98a6-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-19", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies native .net binaries within the Windows operating system that may be abused by adversaries by moving it to a new directory. The analytic identifies the .net binary by using a lookup and compares the process name and original file name (internal name). The analytic utilizes a lookup with the is_net_windows_file macro to identify the binary process name and original file name. if one or the other matches an alert will be generated. Adversaries abuse these binaries as they are native to windows and native DotNet. Note that not all SDK (post install of Windows) are captured in the lookup.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where NOT (Processes.process_path IN (\"*\\\\Windows\\\\ADWS\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\system32*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\NetworkController\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SystemApps\\\\*\", \"*\\\\WinSxS\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Microsoft.NET\\\\*\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_path Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `is_net_windows_file` | `windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present and filtering may be required. Certain utilities will run from non-standard paths based on the third-party application in use.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.yaml", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path", + "analytic_story": [ + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Ransomware", + "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_installutil_path.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ from a non-standard path was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1036", + "T1036.003", + "T1218", + "T1218.004" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "GALLIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Mustang Panda", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036", + "T1036.003", + "T1218", + "T1218.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Ransomware", + "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036", + "T1036.003", + "T1218", + "T1218.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path", + "file": "endpoint/windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon_installutil_path.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_installutil_path.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "is_net_windows_file", + "definition": "lookup update=true is_net_windows_file filename as process_name OUTPUT netFile | lookup update=true is_net_windows_file originalFileName as original_file_name OUTPUT netFile | search netFile=true", + "description": "This macro limits the output to process names that are .net binaries on Windows Server 2016 and Windows 11." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft", + "id": "ccfeddec-43ec-11ec-b494-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-12", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary loading `vaultcli.dll` and Samlib.dll`. This technique may be used to execute code to bypassing application control and capture credentials by utilizing a tool like MimiKatz. \\\nWhen `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \\\nIf used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \\\nDuring triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 process_name=installutil.exe ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\samlib.dll\", \"*\\\\vaultcli.dll\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, process_name, ImageLoaded, OriginalFileName, process_id | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_installutil_credential_theft_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and module loads from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "Typically this will not trigger as by it's very nature InstallUtil does not need credentials. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://gist.github.com/xorrior/bbac3919ca2aef8d924bdf3b16cce3d0" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft", + "analytic_story": [ + "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ loading samlib.dll and vaultcli.dll to potentially capture credentials in memory.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218.004", + "T1218" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Mustang Panda", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218.004", + "T1218" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218.004", + "T1218" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft", + "file": "endpoint/windows_installutil_credential_theft.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "windows_installutil_credential_theft_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_credential_theft.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path", + "id": "dcf74b22-7933-11ec-857c-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-19", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the Windows binary InstallUtil.exe running from a non-standard location. The analytic utilizes a macro for InstallUtil and identifies both the process_name and original_file_name.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` NOT (Processes.process_path IN (\"*\\\\Windows\\\\ADWS\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\system32*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\NetworkController\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SystemApps\\\\*\", \"*\\\\WinSxS\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Microsoft.NET\\\\*\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_hash | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present and filtering may be required. Certain utilities will run from non-standard paths based on the third-party application in use.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.yaml", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path", + "analytic_story": [ + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Ransomware", + "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_installutil_path.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ from a non-standard path was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1036", + "T1036.003", + "T1218", + "T1218.004" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "GALLIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Mustang Panda", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036", + "T1036.003", + "T1218", + "T1218.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Ransomware", + "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036", + "T1036.003", + "T1218", + "T1218.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path", + "file": "endpoint/windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon_installutil_path.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_installutil_path.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_installutil", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=installutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=InstallUtil.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection", + "id": "4fbf9270-43da-11ec-9486-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-12", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary making a remote network connection. This technique may be used to download and execute code while bypassing application control. \\\nWhen `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \\\nIf used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \\\nDuring triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` by _time span=1h Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_guid [ | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port !=\"0\" by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_guid connection_to_CNC dest_port | `windows_installutil_remote_network_connection_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Ports` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives should be present as InstallUtil is not typically used to download remote files. Filter as needed based on Developers requirements.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection", + "analytic_story": [ + "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ generating a remote download.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218.004", + "T1218" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id", + "Ports.process_guid", + "Ports.dest", + "Ports.dest_port" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Mustang Panda", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218.004", + "T1218" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218.004", + "T1218" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection", + "file": "endpoint/windows_installutil_remote_network_connection.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_installutil", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=installutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=InstallUtil.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_installutil_remote_network_connection_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_remote_network_connection.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option", + "id": "cfa7b9ac-43f0-11ec-9b48-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-12", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary. This will execute code while bypassing application control using the `/u` (uninstall) switch. \\\nInstallUtil uses the functions install and uninstall within the System.Configuration.Install namespace to process .net assembly. Install function requires admin privileges, however, uninstall function can be run as an unprivileged user.\\\nWhen `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \\\nIf used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \\\nDuring triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` Processes.process IN (\"*/u*\", \"*uninstall*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_installutil_uninstall_option_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives should be present. Filter as needed by parent process or application.", + "references": [ + "https://evi1cg.me/archives/AppLocker_Bypass_Techniques.html#menu_index_12", + "https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList/blob/master/md/Installutil.exe.md", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option", + "analytic_story": [ + "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ performing an uninstall.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218.004", + "T1218" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Mustang Panda", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218.004", + "T1218" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218.004", + "T1218" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option", + "file": "endpoint/windows_installutil_uninstall_option.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_installutil", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=installutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=InstallUtil.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_installutil_uninstall_option_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_uninstall_option.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network", + "id": "1a52c836-43ef-11ec-a36c-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-12", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary making a remote network connection. This technique may be used to download and execute code while bypassing application control using the `/u` (uninstall) switch. \\\nInstallUtil uses the functions install and uninstall within the System.Configuration.Install namespace to process .net assembly. Install function requires admin privileges, however, uninstall function can be run as an unprivileged user.\\\nWhen `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \\\nIf used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \\\nDuring triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` Processes.process IN (\"*/u*\", \"*uninstall*\") by _time span=1h Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_guid [ | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port !=\"0\" by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name original_file_name process_path process process_guid connection_to_CNC dest_port | `windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Ports` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives should be present as InstallUtil is not typically used to download remote files. Filter as needed based on Developers requirements.", + "references": [ + "https://evi1cg.me/archives/AppLocker_Bypass_Techniques.html#menu_index_12", + "https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList/blob/master/md/Installutil.exe.md", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network", + "analytic_story": [ + "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ performing an uninstall.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218.004", + "T1218" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id", + "Ports.process_guid", + "Ports.dest", + "Ports.dest_port" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Mustang Panda", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218.004", + "T1218" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218.004", + "T1218" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network", + "file": "endpoint/windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_installutil", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=installutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=InstallUtil.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line", + "id": "28e06670-43df-11ec-a569-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-12", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary passing a HTTP request on the command-line. This technique may be used to download and execute code while bypassing application control. \\\nWhen `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \\\nIf used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \\\nDuring triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` Processes.process IN (\"*http://*\",\"*https://*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_installutil_url_in_command_line_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives should be present as InstallUtil is not typically used to download remote files. Filter as needed based on Developers requirements.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md", + "https://gist.github.com/DanielRTeixeira/0fd06ec8f041f34a32bf5623c6dd479d" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line", + "analytic_story": [ + "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ passing a URL on the command-line.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218.004", + "T1218" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Mustang Panda", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218.004", + "T1218" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218.004", + "T1218" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line", + "file": "endpoint/windows_installutil_url_in_command_line.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_installutil", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=installutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=InstallUtil.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_installutil_url_in_command_line_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_url_in_command_line.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [] + }, + { + "name": "Silver Sparrow", + "id": "cb4f48fe-7699-11eb-af77-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-02-24", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "description": "Silver Sparrow, identified by Red Canary Intelligence, is a new forward looking MacOS (Intel and M1) malicious software downloader utilizing JavaScript for execution and a launchAgent to establish persistence.", + "narrative": "Silver Sparrow works is a dropper and uses typical persistence mechanisms on a Mac. It is cross platform, covering both Intel and Apple M1 architecture. To this date, no implant has been downloaded for malicious purposes. During installation of the update.pkg or updater.pkg file, the malicious software utilizes JavaScript to generate files and scripts on disk for persistence.These files later download a implant from an S3 bucket every hour. This analytic assists with identifying different types of macOS malware families establishing LaunchAgent persistence. Per SentinelOne source, it is predicted that Silver Sparrow is likely selling itself as a mechanism to 3rd party Caffiliates or pay-per-install (PPI) partners, typically seen as commodity adware/malware. Additional indicators and behaviors may be found within the references.", + "references": [ + "https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/", + "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/5-things-you-need-to-know-about-silver-sparrow/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Silver Sparrow", + "analytic_story": "Silver Sparrow", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Launch Agent", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1074", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Staged", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection", + "Command And Control", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage via OSquery - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Michael Haag", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious Curl Network Connection", + "id": "3f613dc0-21f2-4063-93b1-5d3c15eef22f", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-02-22", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of a curl contacting suspicious remote domains to checkin to command and control servers or download further implants. In the context of Silver Sparrow, curl is identified contacting s3.amazonaws.com. This particular behavior is common with MacOS adware-malicious software.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=curl Processes.process=s3.amazonaws.com by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_curl_network_connection_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/", + "https://marcosantadev.com/manage-plist-files-plistbuddy/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Curl Network Connection", + "analytic_story": [ + "Silver Sparrow", + "Ingress Tool Transfer" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "dataset": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Silver Sparrow", + "Ingress Tool Transfer" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_curl_network_connection_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/suspicious_curl_network_connection.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage", + "id": "c3194009-e0eb-4f84-87a9-4070f8688f00", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-02-22", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of a native MacOS utility, PlistBuddy, creating or modifying a properly list (.plist) file. In the instance of Silver Sparrow, the following commands were executed:\\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :Label string init_verx\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :RunAtLoad bool true\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :StartInterval integer 3600\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :ProgramArguments array\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :ProgramArguments:0 string /bin/sh\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :ProgramArguments:1 string -c\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\nUpon triage, capture the property list file being written to disk and review for further indicators. Contain the endpoint and triage further.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=PlistBuddy (Processes.process=*LaunchAgents* OR Processes.process=*RunAtLoad* OR Processes.process=*true*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate applications may use PlistBuddy to create or modify property lists and possibly generate false positives. Review the property list being modified or created to confirm.", + "references": [ + "https://marcosantadev.com/manage-plist-files-plistbuddy/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage", + "analytic_story": [ + "Silver Sparrow" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "dataset": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1543.001", + "T1543" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Launch Agent", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1543.001", + "T1543" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Silver Sparrow" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1543.001", + "T1543" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/suspicious_plistbuddy_usage.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage via OSquery", + "id": "20ba6c32-c733-4a32-b64e-2688cf231399", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-02-22", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of a native MacOS utility, PlistBuddy, creating or modifying a properly list (.plist) file. In the instance of Silver Sparrow, the following commands were executed:\\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :Label string init_verx\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :RunAtLoad bool true\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :StartInterval integer 3600\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :ProgramArguments array\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :ProgramArguments:0 string /bin/sh\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :ProgramArguments:1 string -c\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\nUpon triage, capture the property list file being written to disk and review for further indicators. Contain the endpoint and triage further.", + "search": "`osquery_process` \"columns.cmdline\"=\"*LaunchAgents*\" OR \"columns.cmdline\"=\"*RunAtLoad*\" OR \"columns.cmdline\"=\"*true*\" | `suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_via_osquery_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "OSQuery must be installed and configured to pick up process events (info at https://osquery.io) as well as using the Splunk OSQuery Add-on https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4402. Modify the macro and validate fields are correct.", + "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate applications may use PlistBuddy to create or modify property lists and possibly generate false positives. Review the property list being modified or created to confirm.", + "references": [ + "https://marcosantadev.com/manage-plist-files-plistbuddy/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage via OSquery", + "analytic_story": [ + "Silver Sparrow" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "dataset": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1543.001", + "T1543" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "columns.cmdline" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Launch Agent", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1543.001", + "T1543" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Silver Sparrow" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "dest", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1543.001", + "T1543" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "osquery_process", + "definition": "eventtype=\"osquery-process\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_via_osquery_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_via_osquery.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior", + "id": "e1997b2e-655f-4561-82fd-aeba8e1c1a86", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-02-22", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of a SQLite3 querying the MacOS preferences to identify the original URL the pkg was downloaded from. This particular behavior is common with MacOS adware-malicious software. Upon triage, review other processes in parallel for suspicious activity. Identify any recent package installations.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=sqlite3 Processes.process=*LSQuarantine* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_sqlite3_lsquarantine_behavior_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown.", + "references": [ + "https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/", + "https://marcosantadev.com/manage-plist-files-plistbuddy/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior", + "analytic_story": [ + "Silver Sparrow" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "dataset": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1074" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1074", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Staged", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1074" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Silver Sparrow" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1074" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_sqlite3_lsquarantine_behavior_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/suspicious_sqlite3_lsquarantine_behavior.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [] + }, + { + "name": "Spearphishing Attachments", + "id": "57226b40-94f3-4ce5-b101-a75f67759c27", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-04-29", + "author": "Splunk Research Team, Splunk", + "description": "Detect signs of malicious payloads that may indicate that your environment has been breached via a phishing attack.", + "narrative": "Despite its simplicity, phishing remains the most pervasive and dangerous cyberthreat. In fact, research shows that as many as [91% of all successful attacks](https://digitalguardian.com/blog/91-percent-cyber-attacks-start-phishing-email-heres-how-protect-against-phishing) are initiated via a phishing email. \\\nAs most people know, these emails use fraudulent domains, [email scraping](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), familiar contact names inserted as senders, and other tactics to lure targets into clicking a malicious link, opening an attachment with a [nefarious payload](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), or entering sensitive personal information that perpetrators may intercept. This attack technique requires a relatively low level of skill and allows adversaries to easily cast a wide net. Worse, because its success relies on the gullibility of humans, it's impossible to completely \"automate\" it out of your environment. However, you can use ES and ESCU to detect and investigate potentially malicious payloads injected into your environment subsequent to a phishing attack. \\\nWhile any kind of file may contain a malicious payload, some are more likely to be perceived as benign (and thus more often escape notice) by the average victim—especially when the attacker sends an email that seems to be from one of their contacts. An example is Microsoft Office files. Most corporate users are familiar with documents with the following suffixes: .doc/.docx (MS Word), .xls/.xlsx (MS Excel), and .ppt/.pptx (MS PowerPoint), so they may click without a second thought, slashing a hole in their organizations' security. \\\nFollowing is a typical series of events, according to an [article by Trend Micro](https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/rising-trend-attackers-using-lnk-files-download-malware/):\\\n1. Attacker sends a phishing email. Recipient downloads the attached file, which is typically a .docx or .zip file with an embedded .lnk file\\\n1. The .lnk file executes a PowerShell script\\\n1. Powershell executes a reverse shell, rendering the exploit successful As a side note, adversaries are likely to use a tool like Empire to craft and obfuscate payloads and their post-injection activities, such as [exfiltration, lateral movement, and persistence](https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire).\\\nThis Analytic Story focuses on detecting signs that a malicious payload has been injected into your environment. For example, one search detects outlook.exe writing a .zip file. Another looks for suspicious .lnk files launching processes.", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/spear-phishing-campaign-targets-ukraine-government.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Spearphishing Attachments", + "analytic_story": "Spearphishing Attachments", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "GALLIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "Night Dragon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Link", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN4", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Patchwork", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "TA505", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Turla", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access", + "Initial Access" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Exploitation", + "Installation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Excel Spawning PowerShell - Rule", + "ESCU - Excel Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule", + "ESCU - MSHTML Module Load in Office Product - Rule", + "ESCU - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule", + "ESCU - Office Document Creating Schedule Task - Rule", + "ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", + "ESCU - Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download - Rule", + "ESCU - Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin - Rule", + "ESCU - Office Product Spawning CertUtil - Rule", + "ESCU - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule", + "ESCU - Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL - Rule", + "ESCU - Office Product Spawning Wmic - Rule", + "ESCU - Office Product Writing cab or inf - Rule", + "ESCU - Office Spawning Control - Rule", + "ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule", + "ESCU - Winword Spawning Cmd - Rule", + "ESCU - Winword Spawning PowerShell - Rule", + "ESCU - Gdrive suspicious file sharing - Rule", + "ESCU - Gsuite suspicious calendar invite - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Splunk Research Team", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Excel Spawning PowerShell", + "id": "42d40a22-9be3-11eb-8f08-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-12", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following detection identifies Microsoft Excel spawning PowerShell. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with Excel.exe. Excel.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Office16` (version will vary). PowerShell spawning from Excel.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command executed will most likely be encoded and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=\"excel.exe\" `process_powershell` by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excel_spawning_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/powershell/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Excel Spawning PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$, indicating potential suspicious macro execution.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.002", + "T1003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "GALLIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "Night Dragon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.002", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.002", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Excel Spawning PowerShell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Excel Spawning PowerShell", + "file": "endpoint/excel_spawning_powershell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_powershell", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "excel_spawning_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excel_spawning_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Excel Spawning Windows Script Host", + "id": "57fe880a-9be3-11eb-9bf3-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-12", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following detection identifies Microsoft Excel spawning Windows Script Host - `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe`. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with Excel.exe. Excel.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Office16` (version will vary). `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` default location is `c:\\windows\\system32\\` or c:windows\\syswow64`. `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` spawning from Excel.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command-line executed will most likely be obfuscated and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. Review the reputation of the remote destination and block accordingly.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=\"excel.exe\" Processes.process_name IN (\"cscript.exe\", \"wscript.exe\") by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excel_spawning_windows_script_host_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed. In some instances, `cscript.exe` is used for legitimate business practices.", + "references": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/8ecfbc29-03d0-421c-a5bf-3905d29192a2/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Excel Spawning Windows Script Host", + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$, indicating potential suspicious macro execution.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.002", + "T1003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "process_name", + "process_id", + "parent_process_name", + "dest", + "user", + "parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "GALLIUM", + "Ke3chang", + "Night Dragon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.002", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.002", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Excel Spawning Windows Script Host Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Excel Spawning Windows Script Host", + "file": "endpoint/excel_spawning_windows_script_host.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "excel_spawning_windows_script_host_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excel_spawning_windows_script_host.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "MSHTML Module Load in Office Product", + "id": "5f1c168e-118b-11ec-84ff-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-09", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following detection identifies the module load of mshtml.dll into an Office product. This behavior has been related to CVE-2021-40444, whereas the malicious document will load ActiveX, which activates the MSHTML component. The vulnerability resides in the MSHTML component. During triage, identify parallel processes and capture any file modifications for analysis.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventID=7 process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\",\"wordpad.exe\",\"wordview.exe\") ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\mshtml.dll\", \"*\\\\Microsoft.mshtml.dll\",\"*\\\\IE.Interop.MSHTML.dll\",\"*\\\\MshtmlDac.dll\",\"*\\\\MshtmlDed.dll\",\"*\\\\MshtmlDer.dll\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, process_name, ImageLoaded, OriginalFileName, process_id | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mshtml_module_load_in_office_product_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process names and image loads from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives will be present, however, tune as necessary.", + "references": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/36c14029-9df8-439c-bba0-45f2643b0c70/", + "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", + "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/index-dll" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "MSHTML Module Load in Office Product", + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments", + "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_mshtml.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ loading mshtml.dll.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "ImageLoaded", + "process_name", + "OriginalFileName", + "process_id", + "dest" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-40444" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments", + "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-40444" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "MSHTML Module Load in Office Product Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "MSHTML Module Load in Office Product", + "file": "endpoint/mshtml_module_load_in_office_product.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon_mshtml.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_mshtml.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "mshtml_module_load_in_office_product_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/mshtml_module_load_in_office_product.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Office Application Spawn rundll32 process", + "id": "958751e4-9c5f-11eb-b103-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-04-13", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "this detection was designed to identifies suspicious spawned process of known MS office application due to macro or malicious code. this technique can be seen in so many malware like trickbot that used MS office as its weapon or attack vector to initially infect the machines.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = \"winword.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"excel.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"powerpnt.exe\") AND `process_rundll32` by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.process Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_application_spawn_rundll32_process_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://any.run/malware-trends/trickbot", + "https://any.run/report/47561b4e949041eff0a0f4693c59c81726591779fe21183ae9185b5eb6a69847/aba3722a-b373-4dae-8273-8730fb40cdbe" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Office Application Spawn rundll32 process", + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments", + "Trickbot", + "IcedID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Office application spawning rundll32.exe on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments", + "Trickbot", + "IcedID" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 63 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Office Application Spawn rundll32 process Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Office Application Spawn rundll32 process", + "file": "endpoint/office_application_spawn_rundll32_process.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "office_application_spawn_rundll32_process_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_application_spawn_rundll32_process.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Office Document Creating Schedule Task", + "id": "cc8b7b74-9d0f-11eb-8342-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-14", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "this search detects a potential malicious office document that create schedule task entry through macro VBA api or through loading taskschd.dll. This technique was seen in so many malicious macro malware that create persistence , beaconing using task schedule malware entry The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\\Windows\\system32` and `C:\\Windows\\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it's possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.'", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 process_name IN (\"WINWORD.EXE\", \"EXCEL.EXE\", \"POWERPNT.EXE\") ImageLoaded = \"*\\\\taskschd.dll\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ImageLoaded) as AllImageLoaded count by Computer EventCode Image process_name ProcessId ProcessGuid | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_document_creating_schedule_task_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and ImageLoaded (Like sysmon EventCode 7) from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Also be sure to include those monitored dll to your own sysmon config.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/irans-apt34-returns-with-an-updated-arsenal/", + "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/scheduled-task-job/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Office Document Creating Schedule Task", + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Office document creating a schedule task on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "ImageLoaded", + "AllImageLoaded", + "Computer", + "EventCode", + "Image", + "process_name", + "ProcessId", + "ProcessGuid", + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Office Document Creating Schedule Task Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Office Document Creating Schedule Task", + "file": "endpoint/office_document_creating_schedule_task.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "office_document_creating_schedule_task_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_document_creating_schedule_task.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Office Document Executing Macro Code", + "id": "b12c89bc-9d06-11eb-a592-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-14", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "this detection was designed to identifies suspicious office documents that using macro code. Macro code is known to be one of the prevalent weaponization or attack vector of threat actor. This malicious macro code is embed to a office document as an attachment that may execute malicious payload, download malware payload or other malware component. It is really good practice to disable macro by default to avoid automatically execute macro code while opening or closing a office document files.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 process_name IN (\"WINWORD.EXE\", \"EXCEL.EXE\", \"POWERPNT.EXE\") ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\VBE7INTL.DLL\",\"*\\\\VBE7.DLL\", \"*\\\\VBEUI.DLL\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ImageLoaded) as AllImageLoaded count by Computer EventCode Image process_name ProcessId ProcessGuid | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_document_executing_macro_code_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and ImageLoaded (Like sysmon EventCode 7) from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Also be sure to include those monitored dll to your own sysmon config.", + "known_false_positives": "Normal Office Document macro use for automation", + "references": [ + "https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/386500/0/html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Office Document Executing Macro Code", + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments", + "Trickbot", + "IcedID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Office document executing a macro on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "ImageLoaded", + "AllImageLoaded", + "Computer", + "EventCode", + "Image", + "process_name", + "ProcessId", + "ProcessGuid", + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments", + "Trickbot", + "IcedID" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 35 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Office Document Executing Macro Code Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Office Document Executing Macro Code", + "file": "endpoint/office_document_executing_macro_code.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "office_document_executing_macro_code_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_document_executing_macro_code.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download", + "id": "6fed27d2-9ec7-11eb-8fe4-aa665a019aa3", + "version": 3, + "date": "2021-09-20", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect potential malicious office document executing lolbin child process to download payload or other malware. Since most of the attacker abused the capability of office document to execute living on land application to blend it to the normal noise in the infected machine to cover its track.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\") Processes.process IN (\"*http:*\",\"*https:*\") NOT (Processes.original_file_name IN(\"firefox.exe\", \"chrome.exe\",\"iexplore.exe\",\"msedge.exe\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_document_spawned_child_process_to_download_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances office application and browser may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "Default browser not in the filter list.", + "references": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/92d7ef61-bfd7-4c92-bc15-322172b4ebec/#" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download", + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets2/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Office document spawning suspicious child process on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 35 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download", + "file": "endpoint/office_document_spawned_child_process_to_download.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets2/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "office_document_spawned_child_process_to_download_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_document_spawned_child_process_to_download.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin", + "id": "e8c591f4-a6d7-11eb-8cf7-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-04-26", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `bitsadmin.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `bitsadmin.exe` will contain a URL to a remote destination or similar command-line arguments as transfer, Download, priority, Foreground. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `bitsadmin.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `bitsadmin.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\") `process_bitsadmin` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_bitsadmin_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "No false positives known. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1197/T1197.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin", + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_macros.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 63 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin", + "file": "endpoint/office_product_spawning_bitsadmin.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon_macros.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_macros.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_bitsadmin", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=bitsadmin.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=bitsadmin.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "office_product_spawning_bitsadmin_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_bitsadmin.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Office Product Spawning CertUtil", + "id": "6925fe72-a6d5-11eb-9e17-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-04-26", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `certutil.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `certutil.exe` will contain a URL to a remote destination. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `certutil.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `certutil.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\") `process_certutil` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_certutil_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "No false positives known. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/threats/TA551/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1105/T1105.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Office Product Spawning CertUtil", + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_macros.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 63 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process name" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Office Product Spawning CertUtil Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Office Product Spawning CertUtil", + "file": "endpoint/office_product_spawning_certutil.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon_macros.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_macros.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_certutil", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=certutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=CertUtil.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "office_product_spawning_certutil_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_certutil.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Office Product Spawning MSHTA", + "id": "6078fa20-a6d2-11eb-b662-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-04-26", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `mshta.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `mshta.exe` will contain the `hta` file locally, or a URL to the remote destination. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `mshta.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `mshta.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\") `process_mshta` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_mshta_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "No false positives known. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/threats/TA551/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Office Product Spawning MSHTA", + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments", + "IcedID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_macros.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments", + "IcedID" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 63 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Office Product Spawning MSHTA Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Office Product Spawning MSHTA", + "file": "endpoint/office_product_spawning_mshta.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon_macros.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_macros.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "process_mshta", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=mshta.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSHTA.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "office_product_spawning_mshta_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_mshta.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL", + "id": "c661f6be-a38c-11eb-be57-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-04-22", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by IcedID malware family. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `rundll32.exe` without a `.dll` file extension. In malicious instances, the command-line of `rundll32.exe` will look like `rundll32 ..\\oepddl.igk2,DllRegisterServer`. In addition, Threat Research has released a detection identifying the use of `DllRegisterServer` on the command-line of `rundll32.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze the `DLL` that was dropped to disk. The Office Product will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\") `process_rundll32` (Processes.process!=*.dll*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/395471/0/html", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/cef4b8ba-023c-4b3b-b2ef-6486a44f6ed9/", + "https://any.run/malware-trends/icedid" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL", + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_icedid.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ and no dll commandline $process$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 63 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL", + "file": "endpoint/office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon_icedid.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_icedid.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Office Product Spawning Wmic", + "id": "ffc236d6-a6c9-11eb-95f1-acde48001122", + "version": 3, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by Ursnif malware family. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `wmic.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `wmic.exe` will contain `wmic process call create`. In addition, Threat Research has released a detection identifying the use of `wmic process call create` on the command-line of `wmic.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `wmic.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\") `process_wmic` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_wmic_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "No false positives known. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/fb894ab8-a966-4b72-920b-935f41756afd/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1047/T1047.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Office Product Spawning Wmic", + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments", + "FIN7" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_macros.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments", + "FIN7" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 63 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process name" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Office Product Spawning Wmic Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Office Product Spawning Wmic", + "file": "endpoint/office_product_spawning_wmic.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon_macros.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_macros.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_wmic", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "office_product_spawning_wmic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_wmic.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Office Product Writing cab or inf", + "id": "f48cd1d4-125a-11ec-a447-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-10", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies behavior related to CVE-2021-40444. Whereas the malicious document will load ActiveX and download the remote payload (.inf, .cab). During triage, review parallel processes and further activity on endpoint to identify additional patterns. Retrieve the file modifications and analyze further.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\",\"wordpad.exe\",\"wordview.exe\") by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*.inf\",\"*.cab\") by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process] | dedup file_create_time | table dest, process_name, process, file_create_time, file_name, file_path | `office_product_writing_cab_or_inf_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node and `Filesystem` node.", + "known_false_positives": "The query is structured in a way that `action` (read, create) is not defined. Review the results of this query, filter, and tune as necessary. It may be necessary to generate this query specific to your endpoint product.", + "references": [ + "https://twitter.com/vxunderground/status/1436326057179860992?s=20", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/36c14029-9df8-439c-bba0-45f2643b0c70/", + "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", + "https://twitter.com/RonnyTNL/status/1436334640617373699?s=20" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Office Product Writing cab or inf", + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments", + "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_cabinf.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on $dest$ writing an inf or cab file to this. This is not typical of $process_name$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "dest", + "process_name", + "process", + "file_create_time", + "file_name", + "file_path" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-40444" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments", + "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-40444" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Office Product Writing cab or inf Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Office Product Writing cab or inf", + "file": "endpoint/office_product_writing_cab_or_inf.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon_control.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_cabinf.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "office_product_writing_cab_or_inf_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_product_writing_cab_or_inf.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Office Spawning Control", + "id": "053e027c-10c7-11ec-8437-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-08", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following detection identifies control.exe spawning from an office product. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `control.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `control.exe` will contain a file path to a .cpl or .inf, related to CVE-2021-40444. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. review parallel and child processes to identify further suspicious behavior", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\",\"wordpad.exe\",\"wordview.exe\") Processes.process_name=control.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `office_spawning_control_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives should be present.", + "references": [ + "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/control.exe-1F13E714A0FEA8887707DFF49287996F.html", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/36c14029-9df8-439c-bba0-45f2643b0c70/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", + "https://www.echotrail.io/insights/search/control.exe", + "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.002/T1218.002.yaml" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Office Spawning Control", + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments", + "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_control.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ clicking a suspicious attachment.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-40444" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments", + "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-40444" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Office Spawning Control Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Office Spawning Control", + "file": "endpoint/office_spawning_control.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon_control.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_control.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "office_spawning_control_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_spawning_control.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location", + "id": "5d814af1-1041-47b5-a9ac-d754e82e9a26", + "version": 5, + "date": "2021-08-26", + "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for a process launching an `*.lnk` file under `C:\\User*` or `*\\Local\\Temp\\*`. This is common behavior used by various spear phishing tools.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name=\"*.lnk\" AND (Filesystem.file_path=\"C:\\\\User\\\\*\" OR Filesystem.file_path=\"*\\\\Temp\\\\*\") by _time span=1h Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.file_hash Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | rename process_guid as lnk_guid | join lnk_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=* by _time span=1h Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | rename parent_process_guid as lnk_guid | fields _time lnk_guid process_id dest process_name process_path process] | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime, lastTime, lnk_guid, process_id, user, dest, file_name, file_path, process_name, process, process_path, file_hash | `process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon.", + "known_false_positives": "This detection should yield little or no false positive results. It is uncommon for LNK files to be executed from temporary or user directories.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/", + "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/17/e/rising-trend-attackers-using-lnk-files-download-malware.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location", + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 7", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.002/lnk_file_temp_folder/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A process $process_name$ that launching .lnk file in $file_path$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.002" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.file_path", + "Filesystem.process_id", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.file_path", + "Filesystem.file_hash", + "Filesystem.user" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Link", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN4", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Patchwork", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "TA505", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Turla", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 7", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 63 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 63 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 7", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location", + "file": "endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.002/lnk_file_temp_folder/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Winword Spawning Cmd", + "id": "6fcbaedc-a37b-11eb-956b-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-04-22", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following detection identifies Microsoft Word spawning `cmd.exe`. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with winword.exe. Winword.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Office16` (version will vary). Cmd.exe spawning from winword.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command-line will indicate what is being executed. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. It is possible that COM is utilized to trampoline the child process to `explorer.exe` or `wmiprvse.exe`.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=winword.exe `process_cmd` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winword_spawning_cmd_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/73af0064-a785-4c0a-ab0d-cde593fe16ef/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Winword Spawning Cmd", + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "$parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$ launched command: $process_name$ which is very common in spearphishing attacks.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 70, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 70 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 70 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Winword Spawning Cmd Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Winword Spawning Cmd", + "file": "endpoint/winword_spawning_cmd.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_cmd", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "winword_spawning_cmd_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/winword_spawning_cmd.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Winword Spawning PowerShell", + "id": "b2c950b8-9be2-11eb-8658-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-04-12", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following detection identifies Microsoft Word spawning PowerShell. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with winword.exe. Winword.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Office16` (version will vary). PowerShell spawning from winword.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command executed will most likely be encoded and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=\"winword.exe\" `process_powershell` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winword_spawning_powershell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/powershell/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/b79fa381-f35c-4b3e-8d02-507e7ee7342f/", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/181ac90b-0898-4631-8701-b778a30610ad/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Winword Spawning PowerShell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "$parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$ launched the following powershell process: $process_name$ which is very common in spearphishing attacks", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 70, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 70 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 70 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Winword Spawning PowerShell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Winword Spawning PowerShell", + "file": "endpoint/winword_spawning_powershell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_powershell", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "winword_spawning_powershell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/winword_spawning_powershell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Gdrive suspicious file sharing", + "id": "a7131dae-34e3-11ec-a2de-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-10-24", + "author": "Rod Soto, Teoderick Contreras", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search can help the detection of compromised accounts or internal users sharing potentially malicious/classified documents with users outside your organization via GSuite file sharing .", + "search": "`gsuite_drive` name=change_user_access | rename parameters.* as * | search email = \"*@yourdomain.com\" target_user != \"*@yourdomain.com\" | stats count values(owner) as owner values(target_user) as target values(doc_type) as doc_type values(doc_title) as doc_title dc(target_user) as distinct_target by src_ip email | where distinct_target > 50 | `gdrive_suspicious_file_sharing_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "Need to implement Gsuite logging targeting Google suite drive activity. In order for the search to work for your environment please update `yourdomain.com` value in the query with the domain relavant for your organization.", + "known_false_positives": "This is an anomaly search, you must specify your domain in the parameters so it either filters outside domains or focus on internal domains. This search may also help investigate compromise of accounts. By looking at for example source ip addresses, document titles and abnormal number of shares and shared target users.", + "references": [ + "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/investigating-gsuite-phishing-attacks-with-splunk.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Gdrive suspicious file sharing", + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments", + "Data Exfiltration" + ], + "asset_type": "GDrive", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "dataset": [ + [] + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "src_ip", + "parameters.owner", + "parameters.target_user", + "parameters.doc_title", + "parameters.doc_type" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments", + "Data Exfiltration" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "gsuite_drive", + "definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:drive:json", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "gdrive_suspicious_file_sharing_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/gdrive_suspicious_file_sharing.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Gsuite suspicious calendar invite", + "id": "03cdd68a-34fb-11ec-9bd3-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-10-24", + "author": "Rod Soto, Teoderick Contreras", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search can help the detection of compromised accounts or internal users sending suspcious calendar invites via GSuite calendar. These invites may contain malicious links or attachments.", + "search": "`gsuite_calendar` |bin span=5m _time |rename parameters.* as * |search target_calendar_id!=null email=\"*yourdomain.com\"| stats count values(target_calendar_id) values(event_title) values(event_guest) by email _time | where count >100| `gsuite_suspicious_calendar_invite_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "In order to successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite (gsuite:calendar:json) having the file sharing metadata like file type, source owner, destination target user, description, etc. This search can also be made more specific by selecting specific emails, subdomains timeframe, organizational units, targeted user, etc. In order for the search to work for your environment please update `yourdomain.com` value in the query with the domain relavant for your organization.", + "known_false_positives": "This search will also produce normal activity statistics. Fields such as email, ip address, name, parameters.organizer_calendar_id, parameters.target_calendar_id and parameters.event_title may give away phishing intent.For more specific results use email parameter.", + "references": [ + "https://www.techrepublic.com/article/how-to-avoid-the-dreaded-google-calendar-malicious-invite-issue/", + "https://gcn.com/articles/2012/09/26/20-most-common-words-phishing-attacks.aspx" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Gsuite suspicious calendar invite", + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments" + ], + "asset_type": "GSuite", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "dataset": [ + [] + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "email", + "parameters.event_title", + "parameters.target_calendar_id", + "parameters.event_title" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "dest", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "gsuite_calendar", + "definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:calendar:json", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "gsuite_suspicious_calendar_invite_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/gsuite_suspicious_calendar_invite.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file", + "id": "a51bfe1a-94f0-4822-b1e4-16ae10145893", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for execution of process `outlook.exe` where the process is writing a `.zip` file to the disk.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=outlook.exe OR Processes.process_name=explorer.exe by _time span=5m Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_id Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename process_id as malicious_id| rename parent_process_id as outlook_id| join malicious_id type=inner[| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path values(Filesystem.file_name) as file_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_path=*zip* OR Filesystem.file_name=*.lnk ) AND (Filesystem.file_path=C:\\\\Users* OR Filesystem.file_path=*Local\\\\Temp*) by _time span=5m Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_hash Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename process_id as malicious_id| fields malicious_id outlook_id dest file_path file_name file_hash count file_id] | table firstTime lastTime user malicious_id outlook_id process_name parent_process_name file_name file_path | where file_name != \"\" | `detect_outlook_exe_writing_a_zip_file_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon.", + "known_false_positives": "It is not uncommon for outlook to write legitimate zip files to the disk.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file", + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 7", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.parent_process_id", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 7", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 7", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_outlook_exe_writing_a_zip_file_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_outlook_exe_writing_a_zip_file.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [] + }, + { + "name": "SQL Injection", + "id": "4f6632f5-449c-4686-80df-57625f59bab3", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-19", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "description": "Use the searches in this Analytic Story to help you detect structured query language (SQL) injection attempts characterized by long URLs that contain malicious parameters.", + "narrative": "It is very common for attackers to inject SQL parameters into vulnerable web applications, which then interpret the malicious SQL statements.\\\nThis Analytic Story contains a search designed to identify attempts by attackers to leverage this technique to compromise a host and gain a foothold in the target environment.", + "references": [ + "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/66.html", + "https://www.incapsula.com/web-application-security/sql-injection.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "SQL Injection", + "analytic_story": "SQL Injection", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Web" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - SQL Injection with Long URLs - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "SQL Injection with Long URLs", + "id": "e0aad4cf-0790-423b-8328-7564d0d938f9", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Web" + ], + "description": "This search looks for long URLs that have several SQL commands visible within them.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Web where Web.dest_category=web_server AND (Web.url_length > 1024 OR Web.http_user_agent_length > 200) by Web.src Web.dest Web.url Web.url_length Web.http_user_agent | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | eval num_sql_cmds=mvcount(split(url, \"alter%20table\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"between\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"create%20table\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"create%20database\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"create%20index\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"create%20view\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"delete\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"drop%20database\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"drop%20index\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"drop%20table\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"exists\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"exec\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"group%20by\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"having\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"insert%20into\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"inner%20join\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"left%20join\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"right%20join\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"full%20join\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"select\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"distinct\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"select%20top\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"union\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"xp_cmdshell\")) - 24 | where num_sql_cmds > 3 | `sql_injection_with_long_urls_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be monitoring network communications to your web servers or ingesting your HTTP logs and populating the Web data model. You must also identify your web servers in the Enterprise Security assets table.", + "known_false_positives": "It's possible that legitimate traffic will have long URLs or long user agent strings and that common SQL commands may be found within the URL. Please investigate as appropriate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "SQL Injection with Long URLs", + "analytic_story": [ + "SQL Injection" + ], + "asset_type": "Database Server", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 4", + "CIS 13", + "CIS 18" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "ID.RA", + "PR.PT", + "PR.IP", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Web.dest_category", + "Web.url_length", + "Web.http_user_agent_length", + "Web.src", + "Web.dest", + "Web.url", + "Web.http_user_agent" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 4", + "CIS 13", + "CIS 18" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "ID.RA", + "PR.PT", + "PR.IP", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "SQL Injection" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 4", + "CIS 13", + "CIS 18" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "ID.RA", + "PR.PT", + "PR.IP", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "sql_injection_with_long_urls_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml", + "source": "web" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", + "id": "2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c59f1268af3", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-05-01", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "description": "Monitor your AWS authentication events using your CloudTrail logs. Searches within this Analytic Story will help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious logins. ", + "narrative": "It is important to monitor and control who has access to your AWS infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins to your AWS infrastructure will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any EC2 instances created by the attacker.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", + "analytic_story": "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", + "category": [ + "Cloud Security" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Security Monitoring", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT33" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Authentication" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [ + "ESCU - Previously seen users in CloudTrail", + "ESCU - Update previously seen users in CloudTrail" + ], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", + "id": "121b0b11-f8ac-4ed6-a132-3800ca4fc07a", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-10-07", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Authentication" + ], + "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | table firstTime lastTime user City | join user type=outer [| inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) AS earliestseen by user City | fields earliestseen user City] | eval userCity=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\"), \"New City\",\"Previously Seen City\") | eval userStatus=if(earliestseen >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") OR isnull(earliestseen), \"New User\",\"Old User\") | where userCity = \"New City\" AND userStatus != \"Old User\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime lastTime user City userStatus userCity | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter` macro.", + "known_false_positives": "When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user$ is logging into the AWS console from City $City$ for the first time", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1535" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Authentication.signature", + "Authentication.user", + "Authentication.src" + ], + "risk_score": 18, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1535" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 18 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously seen users in CloudTrail", + "id": "fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd03", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-04-30", + "author": "Jason Brewer, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then creates a baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last 30 days. NOTE - This baseline search is deprecated and has been updated to use the Authentication Datamodel", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | iplocation src | eval City=if(City LIKE \"\",src,City),Region=if(Region LIKE \"\",src,Region) | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Please validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS Login Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", + "Detect new user AWS Console Login" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "userIdentity.arn", + "src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + }, + { + "name": "Update previously seen users in CloudTrail", + "id": "06c036e6-d6d7-4daa-bd76-411c3d356031", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-04-30", + "author": "Jason Brewer, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last hour. NOTE - This baseline search is deprecated and has been updated to use the Authentication Datamodel", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | iplocation src | eval City=if(City LIKE \"\",src,City),Region=if(Region LIKE \"\",src,Region) | stats earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime by user src City Region Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Please validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS Login Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", + "Detect new user AWS Console Login" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "userIdentity.arn", + "src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial", + "id": "0a87ecf9-dc6a-43af-861a-205e75a09bf5", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-05-28", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Authentication" + ], + "description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then creates a baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by username, within the last 30 days.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | rename Authentication.user as user Authentication.src as src | table user src City Region Country firstTime lastTime | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`, which is a lookup file created by this support search.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "90 Day Baseline" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", + "Detect AWS Console Login by New User" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Authentication.signature", + "Authentication.user", + "Authentication.src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update", + "id": "66ff71c2-7e01-47dd-a041-906688c9d322", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-05-28", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Authentication" + ], + "description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by user, within the last hour.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | rename Authentication.user as user Authentication.src as src | table user src City Region Country firstTime lastTime | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins", + "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`, which is a lookup file created by this support search.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", + "Detect AWS Console Login by New User" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Authentication.signature", + "Authentication.user", + "Authentication.src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1535" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", + "file": "cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously Seen Users In Cloudtrail - Initial", + "file": "detections/cloud/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_initial.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "-1d" + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Users In Cloudtrail - Update", + "file": "detections/cloud/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_update.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "-1d" + } + ], + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json", + "source": "aws_cloudtrail", + "sourcetype": "aws:cloudtrail", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", + "description": "A table of users seen doing console logins, and the first and last time that the activity was observed", + "collection": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", + "fields_list": "_key, firstTime, lastTime, user, src, City, Region, Country" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", + "id": "67bd3def-c41c-4bf6-837b-ae196b4257c6", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-10-07", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Authentication" + ], + "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | table firstTime lastTime user Country | join user type=outer [| inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) AS earliestseen by user Country | fields earliestseen user Country] | eval userCountry=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\"), \"New Country\",\"Previously Seen Country\") | eval userStatus=if(earliestseen >= relative_time(now(),\"-24h@h\") OR isnull(earliestseen), \"New User\",\"Old User\") | where userCountry = \"New Country\" AND userStatus != \"Old User\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime lastTime user Country userStatus userCountry | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter` macro.", + "known_false_positives": "When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user$ is logging into the AWS console from Country $Country$ for the first time", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1535" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Authentication.signature", + "Authentication.user", + "Authentication.src" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1535" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 42 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously seen users in CloudTrail", + "id": "fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd03", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-04-30", + "author": "Jason Brewer, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then creates a baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last 30 days. NOTE - This baseline search is deprecated and has been updated to use the Authentication Datamodel", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | iplocation src | eval City=if(City LIKE \"\",src,City),Region=if(Region LIKE \"\",src,Region) | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Please validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS Login Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", + "Detect new user AWS Console Login" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "userIdentity.arn", + "src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + }, + { + "name": "Update previously seen users in CloudTrail", + "id": "06c036e6-d6d7-4daa-bd76-411c3d356031", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-04-30", + "author": "Jason Brewer, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last hour. NOTE - This baseline search is deprecated and has been updated to use the Authentication Datamodel", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | iplocation src | eval City=if(City LIKE \"\",src,City),Region=if(Region LIKE \"\",src,Region) | stats earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime by user src City Region Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Please validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS Login Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", + "Detect new user AWS Console Login" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "userIdentity.arn", + "src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial", + "id": "0a87ecf9-dc6a-43af-861a-205e75a09bf5", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-05-28", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Authentication" + ], + "description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then creates a baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by username, within the last 30 days.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | rename Authentication.user as user Authentication.src as src | table user src City Region Country firstTime lastTime | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`, which is a lookup file created by this support search.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "90 Day Baseline" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", + "Detect AWS Console Login by New User" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Authentication.signature", + "Authentication.user", + "Authentication.src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update", + "id": "66ff71c2-7e01-47dd-a041-906688c9d322", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-05-28", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Authentication" + ], + "description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by user, within the last hour.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | rename Authentication.user as user Authentication.src as src | table user src City Region Country firstTime lastTime | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins", + "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`, which is a lookup file created by this support search.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", + "Detect AWS Console Login by New User" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Authentication.signature", + "Authentication.user", + "Authentication.src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1535" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", + "file": "cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously Seen Users In Cloudtrail - Initial", + "file": "detections/cloud/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_initial.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "-1d" + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Users In Cloudtrail - Update", + "file": "detections/cloud/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_update.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "-1d" + } + ], + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json", + "source": "aws_cloudtrail", + "sourcetype": "aws:cloudtrail", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", + "description": "A table of users seen doing console logins, and the first and last time that the activity was observed", + "collection": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", + "fields_list": "_key, firstTime, lastTime, user, src, City, Region, Country" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", + "id": "9f31aa8e-e37c-46bc-bce1-8b3be646d026", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-10-07", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Authentication" + ], + "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | table firstTime lastTime user Region | join user type=outer [| inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) AS earliestseen by user Region | fields earliestseen user Region] | eval userRegion=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\"), \"New Region\",\"Previously Seen Region\") | eval userStatus=if(earliestseen >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") OR isnull(earliestseen), \"New User\",\"Old User\") | where userRegion = \"New Region\" AND userStatus != \"Old User\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime lastTime user Region userStatus userRegion | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter` macro.", + "known_false_positives": "When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user$ is logging into the AWS console from Region $Region$ for the first time", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1535" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Authentication.signature", + "Authentication.user", + "Authentication.src" + ], + "risk_score": 36, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1535" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 36 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously seen users in CloudTrail", + "id": "fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd03", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-04-30", + "author": "Jason Brewer, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then creates a baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last 30 days. NOTE - This baseline search is deprecated and has been updated to use the Authentication Datamodel", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | iplocation src | eval City=if(City LIKE \"\",src,City),Region=if(Region LIKE \"\",src,Region) | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Please validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS Login Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", + "Detect new user AWS Console Login" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "userIdentity.arn", + "src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + }, + { + "name": "Update previously seen users in CloudTrail", + "id": "06c036e6-d6d7-4daa-bd76-411c3d356031", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-04-30", + "author": "Jason Brewer, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last hour. NOTE - This baseline search is deprecated and has been updated to use the Authentication Datamodel", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | iplocation src | eval City=if(City LIKE \"\",src,City),Region=if(Region LIKE \"\",src,Region) | stats earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime by user src City Region Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Please validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS Login Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", + "Detect new user AWS Console Login" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "userIdentity.arn", + "src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial", + "id": "0a87ecf9-dc6a-43af-861a-205e75a09bf5", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-05-28", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Authentication" + ], + "description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then creates a baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by username, within the last 30 days.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | rename Authentication.user as user Authentication.src as src | table user src City Region Country firstTime lastTime | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`, which is a lookup file created by this support search.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "90 Day Baseline" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", + "Detect AWS Console Login by New User" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Authentication.signature", + "Authentication.user", + "Authentication.src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update", + "id": "66ff71c2-7e01-47dd-a041-906688c9d322", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-05-28", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Authentication" + ], + "description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by user, within the last hour.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | rename Authentication.user as user Authentication.src as src | table user src City Region Country firstTime lastTime | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins", + "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`, which is a lookup file created by this support search.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", + "Detect AWS Console Login by New User" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Authentication.signature", + "Authentication.user", + "Authentication.src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1535" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", + "file": "cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously Seen Users In Cloudtrail - Initial", + "file": "detections/cloud/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_initial.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "-1d" + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Users In Cloudtrail - Update", + "file": "detections/cloud/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_update.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "-1d" + } + ], + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json", + "source": "aws_cloudtrail", + "sourcetype": "aws:cloudtrail", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", + "description": "A table of users seen doing console logins, and the first and last time that the activity was observed", + "collection": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", + "fields_list": "_key, firstTime, lastTime, user, src, City, Region, Country" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Detect new user AWS Console Login", + "id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f3-d82362dffd75", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour. Deprecated now this search is updated to use the Authentication datamodel.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user | eval userStatus=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), \"First Time Logging into AWS Console\",\"Previously Seen User\") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| where userStatus =\"First Time Logging into AWS Console\" | `detect_new_user_aws_console_login_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. Run the \"Previously seen users in AWS CloudTrail\" support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run \"Update previously seen users in AWS CloudTrail\" hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines.", + "known_false_positives": "When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect new user AWS Console Login", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS Login Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078.004" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "userIdentity.arn" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT33" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS Login Activities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously seen users in CloudTrail", + "id": "fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd03", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-04-30", + "author": "Jason Brewer, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then creates a baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last 30 days. NOTE - This baseline search is deprecated and has been updated to use the Authentication Datamodel", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | iplocation src | eval City=if(City LIKE \"\",src,City),Region=if(Region LIKE \"\",src,Region) | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Please validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS Login Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", + "Detect new user AWS Console Login" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "userIdentity.arn", + "src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + }, + { + "name": "Update previously seen users in CloudTrail", + "id": "06c036e6-d6d7-4daa-bd76-411c3d356031", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-04-30", + "author": "Jason Brewer, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last hour. NOTE - This baseline search is deprecated and has been updated to use the Authentication Datamodel", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | iplocation src | eval City=if(City LIKE \"\",src,City),Region=if(Region LIKE \"\",src,Region) | stats earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime by user src City Region Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Please validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS Login Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", + "Detect new user AWS Console Login" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "userIdentity.arn", + "src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_new_user_aws_console_login_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", + "id": "bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd72", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-30", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search lists all the logged CloudTrail activities by a specific user ARN and will create a table containing the source of the user, the region of the activity, the name and type of the event, the action taken, and all the user's identity information.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` | search user=$user$| table _time userIdentity.type userIdentity.userName userIdentity.arn aws_account_id src awsRegion eventName eventType", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "user" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "Command & Control", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Suspicious Cloud User Activities", + "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", + "AWS Security Hub Alerts" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "user", + "userIdentity.type", + "userIdentity.userName", + "userIdentity.arn", + "aws_account_id", + "src", + "awsRegion", + "eventName", + "eventType" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "id": "66732346-8fb0-407b-9633-da16756567d6", + "version": 2, + "date": "2018-07-24", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "description": "Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required.", + "narrative": "As cloud computing has exploded, so has the number of creative attacks on virtual environments. And as the number-two cloud-service provider, Amazon Web Services (AWS) has certainly had its share.\\\nAmazon's \"shared responsibility\" model dictates that the company has responsibility for the environment outside of the VM and the customer is responsible for the security inside of the S3 container. As such, it's important to stay vigilant for activities that may belie suspicious behavior inside of your environment.\\\nAmong things to look out for are S3 access from unfamiliar locations and by unfamiliar users. Some of the searches in this Analytic Story help you detect suspicious behavior and others help you investigate more deeply, when the situation warrants. ", + "references": [ + "https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", + "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cloud/public-aws-s3-buckets-writable/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "analytic_story": "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "category": [ + "Cloud Security" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Security Monitoring", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1530", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Cloud Storage Object", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Fox Kitten" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "datamodels": [], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", + "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", + "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [ + "ESCU - Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN", + "ESCU - Previously seen S3 bucket access by remote IP" + ], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Detect New Open S3 buckets", + "id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-290bf3d0dac4", + "version": 3, + "date": "2021-07-19", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public S3 bucket.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=s3.amazonaws.com eventName=PutBucketAcl | rex field=_raw \"(?{.+})\" | spath input=json_field output=grantees path=requestParameters.AccessControlPolicy.AccessControlList.Grant{} | search grantees=* | mvexpand grantees | spath input=grantees output=uri path=Grantee.URI | spath input=grantees output=permission path=Permission | search uri IN (\"http://acs.amazonaws.com/groups/global/AllUsers\",\"http://acs.amazonaws.com/groups/global/AuthenticatedUsers\") | search permission IN (\"READ\",\"READ_ACP\",\"WRITE\",\"WRITE_ACP\",\"FULL_CONTROL\") | rename requestParameters.bucketName AS bucketName | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user_arn userIdentity.principalId userAgent uri permission bucketName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_new_open_s3_buckets_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk.", + "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to the \"All Users\" group.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect New Open S3 buckets", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "S3 Bucket", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1530/aws_s3_public_bucket/aws_cloudtrail_events.json" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user_arn$ has created an open/public bucket $bucketName$ with the following permissions $permission$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1530" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user_arn", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "bucketName", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventSource", + "eventName", + "requestParameters.bucketName", + "user_arn", + "userIdentity.principalId", + "userAgent", + "uri", + "permission" + ], + "risk_score": 48, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1530", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Cloud Storage Object", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Fox Kitten" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1530" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user_arn", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "bucketName", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user_arn", + "risk_score": 48 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "bucketName", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1530" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect New Open S3 buckets Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect New Open S3 buckets", + "file": "cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "aws_cloudtrail_events.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1530/aws_s3_public_bucket/aws_cloudtrail_events.json", + "source": "aws_cloudtrail", + "sourcetype": "aws:cloudtrail", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_new_open_s3_buckets_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI", + "id": "39c61d09-8b30-4154-922b-2d0a694ecc22", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-07-19", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public S3 bucket over the aws cli.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=\"s3.amazonaws.com\" (userAgent=\"[aws-cli*\" OR userAgent=aws-cli* ) eventName=PutBucketAcl OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read-acp IN (\"*AuthenticatedUsers\",\"*AllUsers\") OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write IN (\"*AuthenticatedUsers\",\"*AllUsers\") OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write-acp IN (\"*AuthenticatedUsers\",\"*AllUsers\") OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-full-control IN (\"*AuthenticatedUsers\",\"*AllUsers\") | rename requestParameters.bucketName AS bucketName | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by userIdentity.userName userIdentity.principalId userAgent bucketName requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read-acp requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write-acp requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-full-control | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "", + "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to the \"All Users\" group.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "S3 Bucket", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1530/aws_s3_public_bucket/aws_cloudtrail_events.json" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $userIdentity.userName$ has created an open/public bucket $bucketName$ using AWS CLI with the following permissions - $requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read$ $requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read-acp$ $requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write$ $requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write-acp$ $requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-full-control$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1530" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "userIdentity.userName", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "bucketName", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventSource", + "eventName", + "requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read-acp", + "requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write", + "requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write-acp", + "requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-full-control", + "requestParameters.bucketName", + "userIdentity.userName", + "userIdentity.principalId", + "userAgent", + "bucketName" + ], + "risk_score": 48, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1530", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Cloud Storage Object", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Fox Kitten" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1530" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "userIdentity.userName", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "bucketName", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "userIdentity.userName", + "risk_score": 48 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "bucketName", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1530" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI", + "file": "cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "aws_cloudtrail_events.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1530/aws_s3_public_bucket/aws_cloudtrail_events.json", + "source": "aws_cloudtrail", + "sourcetype": "aws:cloudtrail", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Detect S3 access from a new IP", + "id": "e6f1bb1b-f441-492b-9126-902acda217da", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-06-28", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks at S3 bucket-access logs and detects new or previously unseen remote IP addresses that have successfully accessed an S3 bucket.", + "search": "`aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200 [search `aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200 | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by bucket_name remote_ip | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by bucket_name remote_ip | outputlookup previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip.csv | eval newIP=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newIP=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table bucket_name remote_ip]| iplocation remote_ip |rename remote_ip as src_ip | table _time bucket_name src_ip City Country operation request_uri | `detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your S3 access logs' inputs. This search works best when you run the \"Previously Seen S3 Bucket Access by Remote IP\" support search once to create a history of previously seen remote IPs and bucket names.", + "known_false_positives": "S3 buckets can be accessed from any IP, as long as it can make a successful connection. This will be a false postive, since the search is looking for a new IP within the past hour", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect S3 access from a new IP", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "S3 Bucket", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13", + "CIS 14" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1530" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "http_status", + "bucket_name", + "remote_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1530", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Cloud Storage Object", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Fox Kitten" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1530" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13", + "CIS 14" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "dest", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously seen S3 bucket access by remote IP", + "id": "54c40c6a-9a5b-4a79-9291-85977f713961", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-06-28", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for successful access to S3 buckets from remote IP addresses, then creates a baseline of the earliest and latest times we have encountered this remote IP within the last 30 days. In this support search, we are only looking for S3 access events where the HTTP response code from AWS is \"200\"", + "search": "`aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200 | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by bucket_name remote_ip | outputlookup previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your S3 access-logs inputs. You must validate the remote IP and bucket name entries in `previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip.csv`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect S3 access from a new IP" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "http_status", + "bucket_name", + "remote_ip" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1530" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13", + "CIS 14" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "aws_s3_accesslogs", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:s3:accesslogs", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion", + "id": "e733a326-59d2-446d-b8db-14a17151aa68", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-11-27", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects users creating spikes in API activity related to deletion of S3 buckets in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteBucket [search `cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteBucket | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | stats count as apiCalls by arn | inputlookup s3_deletion_baseline append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) as * by arn | rename apiCalls as latestCount | eval newAvgApiCalls=avgApiCalls + (latestCount-avgApiCalls)/720 | eval newStdevApiCalls=sqrt(((pow(stdevApiCalls, 2)*719 + (latestCount-newAvgApiCalls)*(latestCount-avgApiCalls))/720)) | eval avgApiCalls=coalesce(newAvgApiCalls, avgApiCalls), stdevApiCalls=coalesce(newStdevApiCalls, stdevApiCalls), numDataPoints=if(isnull(latestCount), numDataPoints, numDataPoints+1) | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup s3_deletion_baseline | eval dataPointThreshold = 15, deviationThreshold = 3 | eval isSpike=if((latestCount > avgApiCalls+deviationThreshold*stdevApiCalls) AND numDataPoints > dataPointThreshold, 1, 0) | where isSpike=1 | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | spath output=bucketName path=requestParameters.bucketName | stats values(bucketName) as bucketName, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName) as uniqueApisCalled by user | `detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best when you run the \"Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN\" support search once to create a baseline of previously seen S3 bucket-deletion activity.", + "known_false_positives": "Based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`, the false positive rate may vary. Please modify this according the your environment.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "S3 Bucket", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1530" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.CM", + "PR.AC" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "userIdentity.arn" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1530", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Cloud Storage Object", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Fox Kitten" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1530" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.CM", + "PR.AC" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN", + "id": "841b102c-8866-494b-a704-87b674fe9b09", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-07-17", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and standard deviation for the number of API calls related to deleting an S3 bucket by each user. Also recorded is the number of data points for each user. This table is then outputted to a lookup file to allow the detection search to operate quickly.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteBucket | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as apiCalls by _time, arn | stats count(apiCalls) as numDataPoints, latest(apiCalls) as latestCount, avg(apiCalls) as avgApiCalls, stdev(apiCalls) as stdevApiCalls by arn | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup s3_deletion_baseline | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "userIdentity.arn" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1530" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.CM", + "PR.AC" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "s3_deletion_baseline", + "description": "A placeholder for the baseline information for AWS S3 deletions", + "filename": "s3_deletion_baseline.csv" + }, + { + "name": "s3_deletion_baseline", + "description": "A placeholder for the baseline information for AWS S3 deletions", + "filename": "s3_deletion_baseline.csv" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml", + "source": "cloud" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", + "id": "bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd72", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-30", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search lists all the logged CloudTrail activities by a specific user ARN and will create a table containing the source of the user, the region of the activity, the name and type of the event, the action taken, and all the user's identity information.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` | search user=$user$| table _time userIdentity.type userIdentity.userName userIdentity.arn aws_account_id src awsRegion eventName eventType", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "user" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "Command & Control", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Suspicious Cloud User Activities", + "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", + "AWS Security Hub Alerts" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "user", + "userIdentity.type", + "userIdentity.userName", + "userIdentity.arn", + "aws_account_id", + "src", + "awsRegion", + "eventName", + "eventType" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn" + }, + { + "name": "AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName", + "id": "2762d4ed-9266-465e-b966-1c10dc8d91f3", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-06-26", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries AWS configuration logs and returns the information about a specific S3 bucket. The information returned includes the time the S3 bucket was created, the resource ID, the region it belongs to, the value of action performed, AWS account ID, and configuration values of the access-control lists associated with the bucket.", + "search": "`aws_config` | rename resourceId as bucketName |search bucketName=$bucketName$ | table resourceCreationTime bucketName vendor_region action aws_account_id supplementaryConfiguration.AccessControlList", + "how_to_implement": "To implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later) and configure your AWS inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "bucketName" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "resourceId", + "bucketName", + "resourceCreationTime", + "vendor_region", + "action", + "aws_account_id", + "supplementaryConfiguration.AccessControlList" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname" + }, + { + "name": "Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", + "id": "446ec87a-85c6-40d4-b060-bea4498281d6", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-03-19", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search retrieves all the activity from a specific IP address and will create a table containing the time, ARN, username, the type of user, the IP address, the AWS region the activity was in, the API called, and whether or not the API call was successful.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search src_ip=$src_ip$ | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn | spath output=awsUserName path=userIdentity.userName | spath output=userType path=userIdentity.type | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, userName, userType, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "src_ip" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities", + "Command & Control", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "sourceIPAddress", + "userIdentity.arn", + "userIdentity.userName", + "userIdentity.type", + "awsRegion", + "eventName", + "errorCode" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address" + }, + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + }, + { + "name": "Investigate AWS activities via region name", + "id": "bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd11", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-02-09", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search lists all the user activities logged by CloudTrail for a specific region in question and will create a table of the values of parameters requested, the type of the event and the response from the AWS API by each user", + "search": "`cloudtrail` vendor_region=$vendor_region$| rename requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as instanceId | stats values(eventName) by user instanceId vendor_region", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "vendor_region" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "vendor_region", + "requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId", + "eventName", + "user" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "id": "2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50f2168af3", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-05-07", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "description": "Leverage these searches to monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as a spike in blocked outbound traffic in your virtual private cloud (VPC).", + "narrative": "A virtual private cloud (VPC) is an on-demand managed cloud-computing service that isolates computing resources for each client. Inside the VPC container, the environment resembles a physical network. \\\nAmazon's VPC service enables you to launch EC2 instances and leverage other Amazon resources. The traffic that flows in and out of this VPC can be controlled via network access-control rules and security groups. Amazon also has a feature called VPC Flow Logs that enables you to log IP traffic going to and from the network interfaces in your VPC. This data is stored using Amazon CloudWatch Logs.\\\n Attackers may abuse the AWS infrastructure with insecure VPCs so they can co-opt AWS resources for command-and-control nodes, data exfiltration, and more. Once an EC2 instance is compromised, an attacker may initiate outbound network connections for malicious reasons. Monitoring these network traffic behaviors is crucial for understanding the type of traffic flowing in and out of your network and to alert you to suspicious activities.\\\nThe searches in this Analytic Story will monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors.", + "references": [ + "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/hiding-cloudcobalt-strike-beacon-c2-using-amazon-apis/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "analytic_story": "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "category": [ + "Cloud Security" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Security Monitoring", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [], + "datamodels": [], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Command & Control" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", + "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", + "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [ + "ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS" + ], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS", + "id": "d3fffa37-492f-487b-a35d-c60fcb2acf01", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-05-07", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search will detect spike in blocked outbound network connections originating from within your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data.", + "search": "`cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow` action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR src_ip=192.168.0.0/16) ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16) [search `cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow` action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR src_ip=192.168.0.0/16) ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16) | stats count as numberOfBlockedConnections by src_ip | inputlookup baseline_blocked_outbound_connections append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) as * by src_ip | rename numberOfBlockedConnections as latestCount | eval newAvgBlockedConnections=avgBlockedConnections + (latestCount-avgBlockedConnections)/720 | eval newStdevBlockedConnections=sqrt(((pow(stdevBlockedConnections, 2)*719 + (latestCount-newAvgBlockedConnections)*(latestCount-avgBlockedConnections))/720)) | eval avgBlockedConnections=coalesce(newAvgBlockedConnections, avgBlockedConnections), stdevBlockedConnections=coalesce(newStdevBlockedConnections, stdevBlockedConnections), numDataPoints=if(isnull(latestCount), numDataPoints, numDataPoints+1) | table src_ip, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgBlockedConnections, stdevBlockedConnections | outputlookup baseline_blocked_outbound_connections | eval dataPointThreshold = 5, deviationThreshold = 3 | eval isSpike=if((latestCount > avgBlockedConnections+deviationThreshold*stdevBlockedConnections) AND numDataPoints > dataPointThreshold, 1, 0) | where isSpike=1 | table src_ip] | stats values(dest_ip) as \"Blocked Destination IPs\", values(interface_id) as \"resourceId\" count as numberOfBlockedConnections, dc(dest_ip) as uniqueDestConnections by src_ip | `detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your VPC Flow logs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the number of data points required to meet the definition of \"spike.\" The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best when you run the \"Baseline of Blocked Outbound Connection\" support search once to create a history of previously seen blocked outbound connections.", + "known_false_positives": "The false-positive rate may vary based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`. Additionally, false positives may result when AWS administrators roll out policies enforcing network blocks, causing sudden increases in the number of blocked outbound connections.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS", + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Command & Control" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 11" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Command & Control" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM", + "PR.AC" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "action", + "src_ip", + "dest_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 11" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM", + "PR.AC" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Command & Control" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS", + "id": "fc0edd96-ff2b-48b0-9f1f-63da3782fd63", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-05-07", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and the standard deviation of the number of outbound connections blocked in your VPC flow logs by each source IP address (IP address of your EC2 instances). Also recorded is the number of data points for each source IP. This table outputs to a lookup file to allow the detection search to operate quickly.", + "search": "`cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow` action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR src_ip=192.168.0.0/16) ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16) | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as numberOfBlockedConnections by _time, src_ip | stats count(numberOfBlockedConnections) as numDataPoints, latest(numberOfBlockedConnections) as latestCount, avg(numberOfBlockedConnections) as avgBlockedConnections, stdev(numberOfBlockedConnections) as stdevBlockedConnections by src_ip | table src_ip, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgBlockedConnections, stdevBlockedConnections | outputlookup baseline_blocked_outbound_connections | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your `VPC flow logs.`.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Command & Control", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "action", + "src_ip", + "dest_ip" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 11" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM", + "PR.AC" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudwatchlogs:vpcflow", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "baseline_blocked_outbound_connections", + "description": "A lookup file that will contain the baseline information for number of blocked outbound connections", + "filename": "baseline_blocked_outbound_connections.csv" + }, + { + "name": "baseline_blocked_outbound_connections", + "description": "A lookup file that will contain the baseline information for number of blocked outbound connections", + "filename": "baseline_blocked_outbound_connections.csv" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml", + "source": "cloud" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", + "id": "bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd72", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-30", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search lists all the logged CloudTrail activities by a specific user ARN and will create a table containing the source of the user, the region of the activity, the name and type of the event, the action taken, and all the user's identity information.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` | search user=$user$| table _time userIdentity.type userIdentity.userName userIdentity.arn aws_account_id src awsRegion eventName eventType", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "user" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "Command & Control", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Suspicious Cloud User Activities", + "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", + "AWS Security Hub Alerts" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "user", + "userIdentity.type", + "userIdentity.userName", + "userIdentity.arn", + "aws_account_id", + "src", + "awsRegion", + "eventName", + "eventType" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn" + }, + { + "name": "AWS Network ACL Details from ID", + "id": "2e11293f-c795-41bd-b470-fc87adc4e196", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-01-22", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries AWS description logs and returns all the information about a specific network ACL via network ACL ID", + "search": "`aws_description` | rename id as networkAclId | search networkAclId=$networkAclId$ | table id account_id vpc_id network_acl_entries{}.*", + "how_to_implement": "In order to implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS(version 4.4.0 or later) and configure your AWS description inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "networkAclId" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Command & Control", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "id", + "account_id", + "vpc_id", + "network_acl_entries{}.*" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "aws_network_acl_details_from_id" + }, + { + "name": "AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", + "id": "c55b0a17-8fca-4315-81e3-65ceaa176441", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-05-07", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries AWS configuration logs and returns the information about a specific network interface via network interface ID. The information will include the ARN of the network interface, its relationships with other AWS resources, the public and the private IP associated with the network interface.", + "search": "`aws_config` resourceId=$resourceId$ | table _time ARN relationships{}.resourceType relationships{}.name relationships{}.resourceId configuration.privateIpAddresses{}.privateIpAddress configuration.privateIpAddresses{}.association.publicIp", + "how_to_implement": "In order to implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS(version 4.4.0 or later) and configure your AWS configuration inputs", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "resourceId" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Command & Control", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "resourceId", + "ARN", + "relationships{}.resourceType", + "relationships{}.name", + "relationships{}.resourceId", + "configuration.privateIpAddresses{}.privateIpAddress", + "configuration.privateIpAddresses{}.association.publicIp" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid" + }, + { + "name": "Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", + "id": "446ec87a-85c6-40d4-b060-bea4498281d6", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-03-19", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search retrieves all the activity from a specific IP address and will create a table containing the time, ARN, username, the type of user, the IP address, the AWS region the activity was in, the API called, and whether or not the API call was successful.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search src_ip=$src_ip$ | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn | spath output=awsUserName path=userIdentity.userName | spath output=userType path=userIdentity.type | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, userName, userType, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "src_ip" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities", + "Command & Control", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "sourceIPAddress", + "userIdentity.arn", + "userIdentity.userName", + "userIdentity.type", + "awsRegion", + "eventName", + "errorCode" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address" + }, + { + "name": "Get DNS Server History for a host", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-11-09", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "While investigating any detections it is important to understand which and how many DNS servers a host has connected to in the past. This search uses data that is tagged as DNS and gives you a count and list of DNS servers that a particular host has connected to the previous 24 hours.", + "search": "| search tag=dns src_ip=$src_ip$ dest_port=53 | streamstats time_window=1d count values(dest_ip) as dcip by src_ip | table date_mday src_ip dcip count | sort -count", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting your DNS traffic", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "src_ip" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Command & Control", + "DNS Hijacking", + "Data Protection", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "src_ip", + "dest_port", + "dest_ip" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_dns_server_history_for_a_host" + }, + { + "name": "Get DNS traffic ratio", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd73", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-11-09", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search calculates the ratio of DNS traffic originating and coming from a host to a list of DNS servers over the last 24 hours. A high value of this ratio could be very useful to quickly understand if a src_ip (host) is sending a high volume of data out via port 53, could be an indicator of data exfiltration via DNS. ", + "search": "| tstats allow_old_summaries=true sum(All_Traffic.bytes_out) as \"bytes_out\" sum(All_Traffic.bytes_in) as \"bytes_in\" from datamodel=Network_Traffic where nodename=All_Traffic All_Traffic.dest_port=53 by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest| `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | rename src as src_ip | rename dest as dest_ip | search src_ip=$src_ip$ | search dest_ip = $dest_ip | eval ratio = (bytes_out/bytes_in) | table ratio", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your network traffic", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "src_ip" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Command & Control", + "Data Protection", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.bytes_out", + "All_Traffic.bytes_in", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.src", + "All_Traffic.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_dns_traffic_ratio" + }, + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + }, + { + "name": "Get Process Info", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd71", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-01", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the process running on a host which is under investigation. To gather the process info, enter the values for the process name in question and the destination IP address.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search process_name= $process_name$ | search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_process_info" + }, + { + "name": "Get Process Information For Port Activity", + "id": "9925d08f-561e-4faa-8912-e3888a842341", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-01", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search will return information about the process associated with observed network traffic to a specific destination port from a specific host.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search dest=$dest$ | join dest type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Ports by Ports.process_id Ports.src Ports.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | search dest_port=$dest_port$ | rename src as dest]", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data that associates processes with network events and populate the Endpoint Datamodel", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest", + "dest_port" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Ports.process_id", + "Ports.src", + "Ports.dest_port" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_process_information_for_port_activity" + }, + { + "name": "Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", + "id": "910e6512-edc9-4f93-ba24-5b786f47a672", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-01", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "While investigating, an analyst will want to know what process and parent_process is responsible for generating suspicious DNS traffic. Use the following search and enter the value of `dest` in the search to get specific details on the process responsible for creating the DNS traffic.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search dest = $dest$ | join dest type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port=53 by Ports.process_id Ports.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename src as dest]", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that associates processes with network events into the Endpoint datamodel. This can come from endpoint protection products such as carbon black, or endpoint data sources such as Sysmon.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Command & Control", + "Data Protection", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Ports.process_id", + "Ports.src", + "Ports.dest_port" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "id": "6380ebbb-55c5-4fce-b754-01fd565fb73c", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-06-04", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "description": "Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity. ", + "narrative": "It is important to monitor and control who has access to your cloud infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any compute activity whether legitimate or otherwise.\\\nThis Analytic Story has data model versions of cloud searches leveraging Authentication data, including those looking for suspicious login activity, and cross-account activity for AWS.", + "references": [ + "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/", + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "analytic_story": "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "category": [ + "Cloud Security" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Security Monitoring", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Authentication" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", + "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [ + "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial", + "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update", + "ESCU - Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial", + "ESCU - Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update" + ], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Rico Valdez", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account", + "id": "21193641-cb96-4a2c-a707-d9b9a7f7792b", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-05-28", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Authentication" + ], + "description": "This search looks for AssumeRole events where an IAM role in a different account is requested for the first time.", + "search": "| tstats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=AssumeRole by Authentication.vendor_account Authentication.user Authentication.src Authentication.user_role | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | rex field=user_role \"arn:aws:sts:*:(?.*):\" | where vendor_account != dest_account | rename vendor_account as requestingAccountId dest_account as requestedAccountId | lookup previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity requestingAccountId, requestedAccountId, OUTPUTNEW firstTime | eval status = if(firstTime > relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\"),\"New Cross Account Activity\",\"Previously Seen\") | where status = \"New Cross Account Activity\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account_filter` macro.", + "known_false_positives": "Using multiple AWS accounts and roles is perfectly valid behavior. It's suspicious when an account requests privileges of an account it hasn't before. You should validate with the account owner that this is a legitimate request.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "AWS account $requestingAccountId$ is trying to access resource from some other account $requestedAccountId$, for the first time.", + "nist": [ + "PR.AC", + "PR.DS", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "requestingAccountId", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "requestedAccountId", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Authentication.signature", + "Authentication.vendor_account", + "Authentication.user", + "Authentication.user_role", + "Authentication.src" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.AC", + "PR.DS", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "requestingAccountId", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "requestedAccountId", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "requestingAccountId", + "threat_object_type": "other" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "requestedAccountId", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity", + "id": "1cc22b09-c867-416e-a511-cb36ac44aee2", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-06-04", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for **AssumeRole** events where the requesting account differs from the requested account, then writes these relationships to a lookup file.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=AssumeRole | spath output=requestingAccountId path=userIdentity.accountId | spath output=requestedAccountId path=resources{}.accountId | search requestingAccountId=* | where requestingAccountId!=requestedAccountId | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by requestingAccountId, requestedAccountId | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.csv`, a lookup file created by this support search.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "userIdentity.accountId", + "resources{}.accountId" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial", + "id": "82af2ed9-8f4b-4785-a152-ba61e6a23bbf", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-08-15", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Authentication" + ], + "description": "This search looks for **AssumeRole** events where the requesting account differs from the requested account, then writes these relationships to a lookup file.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=AssumeRole by Authentication.vendor_account Authentication.user Authentication.src Authentication.user_role | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | rex field=user_role \"arn:aws:sts:*:(?.*):\" | where vendor_account != dest_account | rename vendor_account as requestingAccountId dest_account as requestedAccountId | table requestingAccountId requestedAccountId firstTime lastTime | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity", + "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later)and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.csv`, a lookup file created by this support search.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "90 Day Baseline" + ], + "detections": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Authentication.signature", + "Authentication.vendor_account", + "Authentication.user", + "Authentication.src", + "Authentication.user_role" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update", + "id": "dd6fb3a9-4906-48cb-8626-c88a25a056c3", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-08-15", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Authentication" + ], + "description": "This search looks for **AssumeRole** events where the requesting account differs from the requested account, then writes these relationships to a lookup file.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=AssumeRole by Authentication.vendor_account Authentication.user Authentication.src Authentication.user_role | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | rex field=user_role \"arn:aws:sts:*:(?.*):\" | where vendor_account != dest_account | rename vendor_account as requestingAccountId dest_account as requestedAccountId | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by requestingAccountId requestedAccountId | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity", + "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.csv`, a lookup file created by this support search.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Authentication.signature", + "Authentication.vendor_account", + "Authentication.user", + "Authentication.src", + "Authentication.user_role" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.AC", + "PR.DS", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account", + "file": "cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial", + "file": "detections/cloud/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity_initial.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "-1d" + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update", + "file": "detections/cloud/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity_update.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "-1d" + } + ], + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json", + "source": "aws_cloudtrail", + "sourcetype": "aws:cloudtrail", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity", + "description": "A placeholder for a list of AWS accounts and assumed roles", + "filename": "previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.csv" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by New User", + "id": "bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd71", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-05-28", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Authentication" + ], + "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | join user type=outer [ inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) as earliestseen by user] | eval userStatus=if(earliestseen >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") OR isnull(earliestseen), \"First Time Logging into AWS Console\", \"Previously Seen User\") | where userStatus=\"First Time Logging into AWS Console\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines.", + "known_false_positives": "When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by New User", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user$ is logging into the AWS console for the first time", + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Authentication.signature", + "Authentication.user" + ], + "risk_score": 30, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 30 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial", + "id": "0a87ecf9-dc6a-43af-861a-205e75a09bf5", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-05-28", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Authentication" + ], + "description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then creates a baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by username, within the last 30 days.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | rename Authentication.user as user Authentication.src as src | table user src City Region Country firstTime lastTime | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`, which is a lookup file created by this support search.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "90 Day Baseline" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", + "Detect AWS Console Login by New User" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Authentication.signature", + "Authentication.user", + "Authentication.src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update", + "id": "66ff71c2-7e01-47dd-a041-906688c9d322", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-05-28", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Authentication" + ], + "description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by user, within the last hour.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | rename Authentication.user as user Authentication.src as src | table user src City Region Country firstTime lastTime | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins", + "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`, which is a lookup file created by this support search.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", + "Detect AWS Console Login by New User" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Authentication.signature", + "Authentication.user", + "Authentication.src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by New User Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by New User", + "file": "cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously Seen Users In Cloudtrail - Initial", + "file": "detections/cloud/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_initial.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "-1d" + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Users In Cloudtrail - Update", + "file": "detections/cloud/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_update.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "-1d" + } + ], + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json", + "source": "aws_cloudtrail", + "sourcetype": "aws:cloudtrail", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", + "description": "A table of users seen doing console logins, and the first and last time that the activity was observed", + "collection": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", + "fields_list": "_key, firstTime, lastTime, user, src, City, Region, Country" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", + "id": "121b0b11-f8ac-4ed6-a132-3800ca4fc07a", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-10-07", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Authentication" + ], + "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | table firstTime lastTime user City | join user type=outer [| inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) AS earliestseen by user City | fields earliestseen user City] | eval userCity=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\"), \"New City\",\"Previously Seen City\") | eval userStatus=if(earliestseen >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") OR isnull(earliestseen), \"New User\",\"Old User\") | where userCity = \"New City\" AND userStatus != \"Old User\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime lastTime user City userStatus userCity | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter` macro.", + "known_false_positives": "When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user$ is logging into the AWS console from City $City$ for the first time", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1535" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Authentication.signature", + "Authentication.user", + "Authentication.src" + ], + "risk_score": 18, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1535" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 18 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously seen users in CloudTrail", + "id": "fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd03", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-04-30", + "author": "Jason Brewer, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then creates a baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last 30 days. NOTE - This baseline search is deprecated and has been updated to use the Authentication Datamodel", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | iplocation src | eval City=if(City LIKE \"\",src,City),Region=if(Region LIKE \"\",src,Region) | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Please validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS Login Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", + "Detect new user AWS Console Login" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "userIdentity.arn", + "src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + }, + { + "name": "Update previously seen users in CloudTrail", + "id": "06c036e6-d6d7-4daa-bd76-411c3d356031", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-04-30", + "author": "Jason Brewer, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last hour. NOTE - This baseline search is deprecated and has been updated to use the Authentication Datamodel", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | iplocation src | eval City=if(City LIKE \"\",src,City),Region=if(Region LIKE \"\",src,Region) | stats earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime by user src City Region Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Please validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS Login Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", + "Detect new user AWS Console Login" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "userIdentity.arn", + "src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial", + "id": "0a87ecf9-dc6a-43af-861a-205e75a09bf5", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-05-28", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Authentication" + ], + "description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then creates a baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by username, within the last 30 days.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | rename Authentication.user as user Authentication.src as src | table user src City Region Country firstTime lastTime | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`, which is a lookup file created by this support search.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "90 Day Baseline" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", + "Detect AWS Console Login by New User" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Authentication.signature", + "Authentication.user", + "Authentication.src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update", + "id": "66ff71c2-7e01-47dd-a041-906688c9d322", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-05-28", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Authentication" + ], + "description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by user, within the last hour.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | rename Authentication.user as user Authentication.src as src | table user src City Region Country firstTime lastTime | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins", + "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`, which is a lookup file created by this support search.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", + "Detect AWS Console Login by New User" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Authentication.signature", + "Authentication.user", + "Authentication.src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1535" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", + "file": "cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously Seen Users In Cloudtrail - Initial", + "file": "detections/cloud/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_initial.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "-1d" + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Users In Cloudtrail - Update", + "file": "detections/cloud/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_update.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "-1d" + } + ], + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json", + "source": "aws_cloudtrail", + "sourcetype": "aws:cloudtrail", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", + "description": "A table of users seen doing console logins, and the first and last time that the activity was observed", + "collection": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", + "fields_list": "_key, firstTime, lastTime, user, src, City, Region, Country" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", + "id": "67bd3def-c41c-4bf6-837b-ae196b4257c6", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-10-07", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Authentication" + ], + "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | table firstTime lastTime user Country | join user type=outer [| inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) AS earliestseen by user Country | fields earliestseen user Country] | eval userCountry=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\"), \"New Country\",\"Previously Seen Country\") | eval userStatus=if(earliestseen >= relative_time(now(),\"-24h@h\") OR isnull(earliestseen), \"New User\",\"Old User\") | where userCountry = \"New Country\" AND userStatus != \"Old User\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime lastTime user Country userStatus userCountry | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter` macro.", + "known_false_positives": "When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user$ is logging into the AWS console from Country $Country$ for the first time", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1535" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Authentication.signature", + "Authentication.user", + "Authentication.src" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1535" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 42 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously seen users in CloudTrail", + "id": "fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd03", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-04-30", + "author": "Jason Brewer, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then creates a baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last 30 days. NOTE - This baseline search is deprecated and has been updated to use the Authentication Datamodel", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | iplocation src | eval City=if(City LIKE \"\",src,City),Region=if(Region LIKE \"\",src,Region) | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Please validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS Login Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", + "Detect new user AWS Console Login" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "userIdentity.arn", + "src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + }, + { + "name": "Update previously seen users in CloudTrail", + "id": "06c036e6-d6d7-4daa-bd76-411c3d356031", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-04-30", + "author": "Jason Brewer, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last hour. NOTE - This baseline search is deprecated and has been updated to use the Authentication Datamodel", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | iplocation src | eval City=if(City LIKE \"\",src,City),Region=if(Region LIKE \"\",src,Region) | stats earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime by user src City Region Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Please validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS Login Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", + "Detect new user AWS Console Login" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "userIdentity.arn", + "src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial", + "id": "0a87ecf9-dc6a-43af-861a-205e75a09bf5", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-05-28", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Authentication" + ], + "description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then creates a baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by username, within the last 30 days.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | rename Authentication.user as user Authentication.src as src | table user src City Region Country firstTime lastTime | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`, which is a lookup file created by this support search.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "90 Day Baseline" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", + "Detect AWS Console Login by New User" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Authentication.signature", + "Authentication.user", + "Authentication.src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update", + "id": "66ff71c2-7e01-47dd-a041-906688c9d322", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-05-28", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Authentication" + ], + "description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by user, within the last hour.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | rename Authentication.user as user Authentication.src as src | table user src City Region Country firstTime lastTime | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins", + "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`, which is a lookup file created by this support search.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", + "Detect AWS Console Login by New User" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Authentication.signature", + "Authentication.user", + "Authentication.src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1535" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", + "file": "cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously Seen Users In Cloudtrail - Initial", + "file": "detections/cloud/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_initial.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "-1d" + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Users In Cloudtrail - Update", + "file": "detections/cloud/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_update.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "-1d" + } + ], + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json", + "source": "aws_cloudtrail", + "sourcetype": "aws:cloudtrail", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", + "description": "A table of users seen doing console logins, and the first and last time that the activity was observed", + "collection": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", + "fields_list": "_key, firstTime, lastTime, user, src, City, Region, Country" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", + "id": "9f31aa8e-e37c-46bc-bce1-8b3be646d026", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-10-07", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Authentication" + ], + "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | table firstTime lastTime user Region | join user type=outer [| inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) AS earliestseen by user Region | fields earliestseen user Region] | eval userRegion=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\"), \"New Region\",\"Previously Seen Region\") | eval userStatus=if(earliestseen >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") OR isnull(earliestseen), \"New User\",\"Old User\") | where userRegion = \"New Region\" AND userStatus != \"Old User\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime lastTime user Region userStatus userRegion | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter` macro.", + "known_false_positives": "When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user$ is logging into the AWS console from Region $Region$ for the first time", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1535" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Authentication.signature", + "Authentication.user", + "Authentication.src" + ], + "risk_score": 36, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1535" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 36 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously seen users in CloudTrail", + "id": "fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd03", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-04-30", + "author": "Jason Brewer, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then creates a baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last 30 days. NOTE - This baseline search is deprecated and has been updated to use the Authentication Datamodel", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | iplocation src | eval City=if(City LIKE \"\",src,City),Region=if(Region LIKE \"\",src,Region) | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Please validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS Login Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", + "Detect new user AWS Console Login" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "userIdentity.arn", + "src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + }, + { + "name": "Update previously seen users in CloudTrail", + "id": "06c036e6-d6d7-4daa-bd76-411c3d356031", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-04-30", + "author": "Jason Brewer, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last hour. NOTE - This baseline search is deprecated and has been updated to use the Authentication Datamodel", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | iplocation src | eval City=if(City LIKE \"\",src,City),Region=if(Region LIKE \"\",src,Region) | stats earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime by user src City Region Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Please validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious AWS Login Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", + "Detect new user AWS Console Login" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "userIdentity.arn", + "src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial", + "id": "0a87ecf9-dc6a-43af-861a-205e75a09bf5", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-05-28", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Authentication" + ], + "description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then creates a baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by username, within the last 30 days.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | rename Authentication.user as user Authentication.src as src | table user src City Region Country firstTime lastTime | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`, which is a lookup file created by this support search.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "90 Day Baseline" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", + "Detect AWS Console Login by New User" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Authentication.signature", + "Authentication.user", + "Authentication.src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update", + "id": "66ff71c2-7e01-47dd-a041-906688c9d322", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-05-28", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Authentication" + ], + "description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by user, within the last hour.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | rename Authentication.user as user Authentication.src as src | table user src City Region Country firstTime lastTime | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins", + "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`, which is a lookup file created by this support search.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", + "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", + "Detect AWS Console Login by New User" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Authentication.signature", + "Authentication.user", + "Authentication.src" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1535" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", + "file": "cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously Seen Users In Cloudtrail - Initial", + "file": "detections/cloud/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_initial.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "-1d" + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Users In Cloudtrail - Update", + "file": "detections/cloud/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_update.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "-1d" + } + ], + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json", + "source": "aws_cloudtrail", + "sourcetype": "aws:cloudtrail", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", + "description": "A table of users seen doing console logins, and the first and last time that the activity was observed", + "collection": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", + "fields_list": "_key, firstTime, lastTime, user, src, City, Region, Country" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml", + "source": "cloud" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + }, + { + "name": "Investigate AWS User Activities by user field", + "id": "bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd76", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-03-12", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search lists all the logged CloudTrail activities by a specific user and will create a table containing the source of the user, the region of the activity, the name and type of the event, the action taken, and the user's identity information.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` user=$user$ | table _time userIdentity.type userIdentity.userName userIdentity.arn aws_account_id src awsRegion eventName eventType ", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "user" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "user", + "userIdentity.type", + "userIdentity.userName", + "userIdentity.arn", + "aws_account_id", + "src", + "awsRegion", + "eventName", + "eventType" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", + "id": "8168ca88-392e-42f4-85a2-767579c660ce", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-08-25", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "description": "Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.", + "narrative": "Monitoring your cloud infrastructure logs allows you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the their cloud environments to ensure that your instances are not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your cloud compute instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities.", + "references": [ + "https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", + "analytic_story": "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", + "category": [ + "Cloud Security" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Security Monitoring", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT33" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1537", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Exfiltration", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Change" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect shared ec2 snapshot - Rule", + "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", + "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [ + "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", + "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", + "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Initial", + "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update" + ], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "David Dorsey", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User", + "id": "7fb15084-b14e-405a-bd61-a6de15a40722", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-07-29", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search looks for cloud instances being modified by users who have not previously modified them.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id values(All_Changes.command) as command from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=modified All_Changes.change_type=EC2 All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user user as user OUTPUTNEW firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenUser=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenUser) OR firstTimeSeenUser > relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") | table firstTime user command object_id count | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_instance_modified_by_previously_unseen_user_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This search has a dependency on other searches to create and update a baseline of users observed to be associated with this activity. The search \"Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update\" should be enabled for this detection to properly work.", + "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a new user will start to modify EC2 instances when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is modifying instances that this is the intended behavior.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user$ is modifying an instance $dest$ for the first time.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078.004", + "T1078" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.object_id", + "All_Changes.command", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.change_type", + "All_Changes.status", + "All_Changes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT33" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078.004", + "T1078" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 42 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 42 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Initial", + "id": "f36dc403-739d-42f3-83a3-49237d8654c5", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-07-29", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search builds a table of previously seen users that have modified a cloud instance.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=modified All_Changes.change_type=EC2 c=success by All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-7d@d\"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs and have the latest Change Datamodel accelerated.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "90 Day Baseline" + ], + "detections": [ + "Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.change_type", + "All_Changes.status", + "All_Changes.user" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update", + "id": "534b7d30-7b0c-4510-8f55-65439850d58d", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-07-29", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search updates a table of previously seen Cloud Instance modifications that have been made by a user", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=modified All_Changes.change_type=EC2 All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by user | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_forget_window`) | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-7d@d\"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. To add or remove APIs that modify an EC2 instance, edit the macro `ec2_modification_api_calls`.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.change_type", + "All_Changes.status", + "All_Changes.user" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078.004", + "T1078" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User", + "file": "cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Initial", + "file": "detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user_initial.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "-1d" + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update", + "file": "detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user_update.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "-1d" + } + ], + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json", + "source": "aws_cloudtrail", + "sourcetype": "aws:cloudtrail", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "cloud_instance_modified_by_previously_unseen_user_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user", + "description": "A table of users seen making instance modifications, and the first and last time that the activity was observed", + "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user", + "fields_list": "_key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, user, enough_data" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Detect shared ec2 snapshot", + "id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-290bf3d222c4", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-07-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes AWS CloudTrail events to identify when an EC2 snapshot permissions are modified to be shared with a different AWS account. This method is used by adversaries to exfiltrate the EC2 snapshot.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=ModifySnapshotAttribute | rename requestParameters.createVolumePermission.add.items{}.userId as requested_account_id | search requested_account_id != NULL | eval match=if(requested_account_id==aws_account_id,\"Match\",\"No Match\") | table _time user_arn src_ip requestParameters.attributeType requested_account_id aws_account_id match vendor_region user_agent | where match = \"No Match\" | `detect_shared_ec2_snapshot_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately shared a snapshot with others for a specific purpose.", + "references": [ + "https://labs.nettitude.com/blog/how-to-exfiltrate-aws-ec2-data/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect shared ec2 snapshot", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", + "Data Exfiltration" + ], + "asset_type": "EC2 Snapshot", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Exfiltration" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1537/aws_snapshot_exfil/aws_cloudtrail_events.json" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "AWS EC2 snapshot from account $aws_account_id$ is shared with $requested_account_id$ by user $user_arn$ from $src_ip$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1537" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user_arn", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "user_arn", + "src_ip", + "requestParameters.attributeType", + "aws_account_id", + "vendor_region", + "user_agent" + ], + "risk_score": 48, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1537", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1537" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", + "Data Exfiltration" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user_arn", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Exfiltration" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user_arn", + "risk_score": 48 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "src_ip", + "risk_score": 48 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1537" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect shared ec2 snapshot Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect shared ec2 snapshot", + "file": "cloud/detect_shared_ec2_snapshot.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-7d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "aws_cloudtrail_events.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1537/aws_snapshot_exfil/aws_cloudtrail_events.json", + "source": "aws_cloudtrail", + "sourcetype": "aws:cloudtrail", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_shared_ec2_snapshot_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/detect_shared_ec2_snapshot.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", + "id": "ef629fc9-1583-4590-b62a-f2247fbf7bbf", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-08-21", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search finds for the number successfully destroyed cloud instances for every 4 hour block. This is split up between weekdays and the weekend. It then applies the probability densitiy model previously created and alerts on any outliers.", + "search": "| tstats count as instances_destroyed values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=deleted AND All_Changes.status=success AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%w\") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | join HourOfDay isWeekend [summary cloud_excessive_instances_destroyed_v1] | where cardinality >=16 | apply cloud_excessive_instances_destroyed_v1 threshold=0.005 | rename \"IsOutlier(instances_destroyed)\" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1 | eval expected_upper_threshold = mvindex(split(mvindex(BoundaryRanges, -1), \":\"), 0) | eval distance_from_threshold = instances_destroyed - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, instances_destroyed, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold, object_id | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_destroyed_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed` to create the probability density function.", + "known_false_positives": "Many service accounts configured within a cloud infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "Cloud Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078.004", + "T1078" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.object_id", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.status", + "All_Changes.object_category", + "All_Changes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "Cloud", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT33" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078.004", + "T1078" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", + "id": "a2f701f8-5296-4d74-829c-0b7eb346d549", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-08-25", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many instances are destroyed in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model and the model is rebuilt weekly. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of instances destroyed in a small time window.", + "search": "| tstats count as instances_destroyed from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=deleted AND All_Changes.status=success AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by _time span=1h | makecontinuous span=1h _time | eval instances_destroyed=coalesce(instances_destroyed, (random()%2)*0.0000000001) | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%w\") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | table _time instances_destroyed, HourOfDay, isWeekend | fit DensityFunction instances_destroyed by \"HourOfDay,isWeekend\" into cloud_excessive_instances_destroyed_v1 dist=expon show_density=true", + "how_to_implement": "You must have Enterprise Security 6.0 or later, if not you will need to verify that the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or later is installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users in your environment, you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 30 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data.\\\nMore information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", + "Cloud Cryptomining" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Weekly Model Rebuild 90 Day Lookback" + ], + "detections": [ + "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.status", + "All_Changes.object_category" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078.004", + "T1078" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_destroyed_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched", + "id": "f2361e9f-3928-496c-a556-120cd4223a65", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-08-21", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search finds for the number successfully created cloud instances for every 4 hour block. This is split up between weekdays and the weekend. It then applies the probability densitiy model previously created and alerts on any outliers.", + "search": "| tstats count as instances_launched values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=created) AND All_Changes.status=success AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%w\") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | join HourOfDay isWeekend [summary cloud_excessive_instances_created_v1] | where cardinality >=16 | apply cloud_excessive_instances_created_v1 threshold=0.005 | rename \"IsOutlier(instances_launched)\" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1 | eval expected_upper_threshold = mvindex(split(mvindex(BoundaryRanges, -1), \":\"), 0) | eval distance_from_threshold = instances_launched - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, instances_launched, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold, object_id | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_launched_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched` to create the probability density function.", + "known_false_positives": "Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched", + "analytic_story": [ + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "Cloud Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078.004", + "T1078" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.object_id", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.status", + "All_Changes.object_category", + "All_Changes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "Cloud", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT33" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078.004", + "T1078" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", + "id": "b01bd274-f661-4f9c-bd9f-cf23ff6ae0bc", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-08-14", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many instances are created in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model and the model is rebuilt weekly. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of instances created in a small time window.", + "search": "| tstats count as instances_launched from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=created) AND All_Changes.status=success AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by _time span=1h | makecontinuous span=1h _time | eval instances_launched=coalesce(instances_launched, (random()%2)*0.0000000001) | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%w\") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | table _time instances_launched, HourOfDay, isWeekend | fit DensityFunction instances_launched by \"HourOfDay,isWeekend\" into cloud_excessive_instances_created_v1 dist=expon show_density=true", + "how_to_implement": "You must have Enterprise Security 6.0 or later, if not you will need to verify that the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or later is installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users in your environment, you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 90 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data.\\\nMore information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Weekly Model Rebuild 90 Day Lookback" + ], + "detections": [ + "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.status", + "All_Changes.object_category" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078.004", + "T1078" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_launched_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_launched.yml", + "source": "cloud" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", + "id": "bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd72", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-30", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search lists all the logged CloudTrail activities by a specific user ARN and will create a table containing the source of the user, the region of the activity, the name and type of the event, the action taken, and all the user's identity information.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` | search user=$user$| table _time userIdentity.type userIdentity.userName userIdentity.arn aws_account_id src awsRegion eventName eventType", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "user" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "Command & Control", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Suspicious Cloud User Activities", + "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", + "AWS Security Hub Alerts" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "user", + "userIdentity.type", + "userIdentity.userName", + "userIdentity.arn", + "aws_account_id", + "src", + "awsRegion", + "eventName", + "eventType" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn" + }, + { + "name": "Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", + "id": "446ec87a-85c6-40d4-b060-bea4498281d6", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-03-19", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search retrieves all the activity from a specific IP address and will create a table containing the time, ARN, username, the type of user, the IP address, the AWS region the activity was in, the API called, and whether or not the API call was successful.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search src_ip=$src_ip$ | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn | spath output=awsUserName path=userIdentity.userName | spath output=userType path=userIdentity.type | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, userName, userType, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "src_ip" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities", + "Command & Control", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "sourceIPAddress", + "userIdentity.arn", + "userIdentity.userName", + "userIdentity.type", + "awsRegion", + "eventName", + "errorCode" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "id": "51045ded-1575-4ba6-aef7-af6c73cffd86", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-08-20", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "description": "Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.", + "narrative": "Because most enterprise cloud infrastructure activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to add specific IPs to an allow list because they vary.\\\nThis Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further.", + "references": [ + "https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "analytic_story": "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "category": [ + "Cloud Security" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Security Monitoring", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Change" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule", + "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", + "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", + "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [ + "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial", + "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update" + ], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "David Dorsey", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City", + "id": "e7ecc5e0-88df-48b9-91af-51104c68f02f", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-10-09", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen cities. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(City) | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources City as City OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenCity=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenCity) OR firstTimeSeenCity > relative_time(now(), `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window`) | table firstTime, src, City, user, object, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city_filter` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city_filter` macro.", + "known_false_positives": "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no \"false positives\" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\\\n This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user$ is starting or creating an instance $dest$ for the first time in City $City$ from IP address $src$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "src", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.status", + "All_Changes.src", + "All_Changes.user", + "All_Changes.object", + "All_Changes.command" + ], + "risk_score": 18, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "src", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 18 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "src", + "risk_score": 18 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 18 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial", + "id": "4ce865fc-f43e-4521-a8ed-ab8af99052d7", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-08-19", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search builds a table of the first and last times seen for every IP address (along with its physical location) previously associated with cloud-provisioning activity. This is broadly defined as any event that runs or creates something. This table is then cached.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(Country) | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-7d@d\"), 1, 0) | table src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "90 Day Baseline" + ], + "detections": [ + "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address", + "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City", + "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country", + "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.src", + "All_Changes.status" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update", + "id": "9830abb9-be80-4563-b232-09bf1f628cf3", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-08-20", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This returns the first and last times seen for every IP address (along with its physical location) previously associated with cloud-provisioning activity within the last day. Cloud provisioning is broadly defined as any event that runs or creates something. It then updates this information with historical data and filters out locations that have not been seen within the specified time window. This updated table is then cached.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(Country) | table src, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, City, Country, Region | inputlookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources append=t | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen, max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by src, City, Country, Region | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_forget_window`) | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-7d@d\"), 1, 0) | table src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address", + "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City", + "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country", + "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.src", + "All_Changes.status" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City", + "file": "cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial", + "file": "detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_initial.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "-1d" + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update", + "file": "detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_update.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "-1d" + } + ], + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json", + "source": "aws_cloudtrail", + "sourcetype": "aws:cloudtrail", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window", + "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", + "description": "Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new provisioning activities" + }, + { + "name": "cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", + "description": "A table of source IPs, geographic locations, and the first and last time that they have that done cloud provisioning activities", + "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", + "fields_list": "_key, src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country", + "id": "94994255-3acf-4213-9b3f-0494df03bb31", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-10-09", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen countries. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(Country) | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources Country as Country OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenCountry=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenCountry) OR firstTimeSeenCountry > relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") | table firstTime, src, Country, user, object, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_country_filter` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_country_filter` macro.", + "known_false_positives": "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no \"false positives\" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\\\n This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user$ is starting or creating an instance $object$ for the first time in Country $Country$ from IP address $src$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "src", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "object", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.status", + "All_Changes.src", + "All_Changes.user", + "All_Changes.object", + "All_Changes.command" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "src", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "object", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 42 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "src", + "risk_score": 42 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "object", + "risk_score": 42 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial", + "id": "4ce865fc-f43e-4521-a8ed-ab8af99052d7", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-08-19", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search builds a table of the first and last times seen for every IP address (along with its physical location) previously associated with cloud-provisioning activity. This is broadly defined as any event that runs or creates something. This table is then cached.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(Country) | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-7d@d\"), 1, 0) | table src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "90 Day Baseline" + ], + "detections": [ + "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address", + "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City", + "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country", + "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.src", + "All_Changes.status" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update", + "id": "9830abb9-be80-4563-b232-09bf1f628cf3", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-08-20", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This returns the first and last times seen for every IP address (along with its physical location) previously associated with cloud-provisioning activity within the last day. Cloud provisioning is broadly defined as any event that runs or creates something. It then updates this information with historical data and filters out locations that have not been seen within the specified time window. This updated table is then cached.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(Country) | table src, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, City, Country, Region | inputlookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources append=t | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen, max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by src, City, Country, Region | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_forget_window`) | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-7d@d\"), 1, 0) | table src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address", + "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City", + "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country", + "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.src", + "All_Changes.status" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country", + "file": "cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial", + "file": "detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_initial.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "-1d" + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update", + "file": "detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_update.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "-1d" + } + ], + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json", + "source": "aws_cloudtrail", + "sourcetype": "aws:cloudtrail", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_country_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", + "description": "A table of source IPs, geographic locations, and the first and last time that they have that done cloud provisioning activities", + "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", + "fields_list": "_key, src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address", + "id": "f86a8ec9-b042-45eb-92f4-e9ed1d781078", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-08-16", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen IP addresses. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime, values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources src as src OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenSrc=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenSrc) OR firstTimeSeenSrc > relative_time(now(), `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window`) | table firstTime, src, user, object_id, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter` macro.", + "known_false_positives": "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no \"false positives\" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\\\n This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user$ is starting or creating an instance $object_id$ for the first time from IP address $src$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "src", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "object_id", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.object_id", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.status", + "All_Changes.src", + "All_Changes.user", + "All_Changes.command" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "src", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "object_id", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 42 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "src", + "risk_score": 42 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "object_id", + "risk_score": 42 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial", + "id": "4ce865fc-f43e-4521-a8ed-ab8af99052d7", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-08-19", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search builds a table of the first and last times seen for every IP address (along with its physical location) previously associated with cloud-provisioning activity. This is broadly defined as any event that runs or creates something. This table is then cached.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(Country) | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-7d@d\"), 1, 0) | table src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "90 Day Baseline" + ], + "detections": [ + "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address", + "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City", + "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country", + "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.src", + "All_Changes.status" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update", + "id": "9830abb9-be80-4563-b232-09bf1f628cf3", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-08-20", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This returns the first and last times seen for every IP address (along with its physical location) previously associated with cloud-provisioning activity within the last day. Cloud provisioning is broadly defined as any event that runs or creates something. It then updates this information with historical data and filters out locations that have not been seen within the specified time window. This updated table is then cached.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(Country) | table src, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, City, Country, Region | inputlookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources append=t | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen, max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by src, City, Country, Region | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_forget_window`) | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-7d@d\"), 1, 0) | table src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address", + "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City", + "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country", + "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.src", + "All_Changes.status" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address", + "file": "cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial", + "file": "detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_initial.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "-1d" + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update", + "file": "detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_update.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "-1d" + } + ], + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json", + "source": "aws_cloudtrail", + "sourcetype": "aws:cloudtrail", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window", + "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", + "description": "Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new provisioning activities" + }, + { + "name": "cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", + "description": "A table of source IPs, geographic locations, and the first and last time that they have that done cloud provisioning activities", + "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", + "fields_list": "_key, src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region", + "id": "5aba1860-9617-4af9-b19d-aecac16fe4f2", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-08-16", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen regions. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(Region) | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources Region as Region OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenRegion=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenRegion) OR firstTimeSeenRegion > relative_time(now(), `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window`) | table firstTime, src, Region, user, object, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region_filter` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region_filter` macro.", + "known_false_positives": "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no \"false positives\" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\\\n This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user$ is starting or creating an instance $object$ for the first time in region $Region$ from IP address $src$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "src", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "object", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.status", + "All_Changes.src", + "All_Changes.user", + "All_Changes.object", + "All_Changes.command" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "src", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "object", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 42 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "src", + "risk_score": 42 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "object", + "risk_score": 42 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial", + "id": "4ce865fc-f43e-4521-a8ed-ab8af99052d7", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-08-19", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search builds a table of the first and last times seen for every IP address (along with its physical location) previously associated with cloud-provisioning activity. This is broadly defined as any event that runs or creates something. This table is then cached.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(Country) | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-7d@d\"), 1, 0) | table src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "90 Day Baseline" + ], + "detections": [ + "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address", + "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City", + "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country", + "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.src", + "All_Changes.status" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update", + "id": "9830abb9-be80-4563-b232-09bf1f628cf3", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-08-20", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This returns the first and last times seen for every IP address (along with its physical location) previously associated with cloud-provisioning activity within the last day. Cloud provisioning is broadly defined as any event that runs or creates something. It then updates this information with historical data and filters out locations that have not been seen within the specified time window. This updated table is then cached.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(Country) | table src, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, City, Country, Region | inputlookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources append=t | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen, max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by src, City, Country, Region | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_forget_window`) | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-7d@d\"), 1, 0) | table src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address", + "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City", + "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country", + "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.action", + "All_Changes.src", + "All_Changes.status" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region", + "file": "cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial", + "file": "detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_initial.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "-1d" + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update", + "file": "detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_update.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "-1d" + } + ], + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json", + "source": "aws_cloudtrail", + "sourcetype": "aws:cloudtrail", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window", + "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", + "description": "Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new provisioning activities" + }, + { + "name": "cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", + "description": "A table of source IPs, geographic locations, and the first and last time that they have that done cloud provisioning activities", + "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", + "fields_list": "_key, src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml", + "source": "cloud" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Cloud User Activities", + "id": "1ed5ce7d-5469-4232-92af-89d1a3595b39", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-09-04", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "description": "Detect and investigate suspicious activities by users and roles in your cloud environments.", + "narrative": "It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it's all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable to attack. In fact, this was the very oversight that led to Tesla's cryptojacking attack in February, 2018.\\\nIn addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed for any new instances and increased bandwidth usage.", + "references": [ + "https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", + "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Cloud User Activities", + "analytic_story": "Suspicious Cloud User Activities", + "category": [ + "Cloud Security" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Security Monitoring", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT33" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1580", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Infrastructure Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", + "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Discovery", + "Execution", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Change" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule", + "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule", + "ESCU - AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events - Rule", + "ESCU - AWS Lambda UpdateFunctionCode - Rule", + "ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [ + "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User", + "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User", + "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial", + "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update" + ], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "David Dorsey", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls", + "id": "0840ddf1-8c89-46ff-b730-c8d6722478c0", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-09-07", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search will detect a spike in the number of API calls made to your cloud infrastructure environment by a user.", + "search": "| tstats count as api_calls values(All_Changes.command) as command from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.user!=unknown All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%w\") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | join user HourOfDay isWeekend [ summary cloud_excessive_api_calls_v1] | where cardinality >=16 | apply cloud_excessive_api_calls_v1 threshold=0.005 | rename \"IsOutlier(api_calls)\" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1 | eval expected_upper_threshold = mvindex(split(mvindex(BoundaryRanges, -1), \":\"), 0) | where api_calls > expected_upper_threshold | eval distance_from_threshold = api_calls - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, command, api_calls, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User` to create the probability density function.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud User Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "user $user$ has made $api_calls$ api calls, violating the dynamic threshold of $expected_upper_threshold$ with the following command $command$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078.004", + "T1078" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.CM", + "PR.AC" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.command", + "All_Changes.user", + "All_Changes.status" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT33" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078.004", + "T1078" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.CM", + "PR.AC" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud User Activities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User", + "id": "1da5d5ea-4382-447d-98a9-87c358c95fcb", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-09-07", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many API calls are performed by each user. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model and the model is rebuilt weekly. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of instances created in a small time window.", + "search": "| tstats count as api_calls from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.user!=unknown All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%w\") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | table _time api_calls, user, HourOfDay, isWeekend | eventstats dc(api_calls) as api_calls by user, HourOfDay, isWeekend | where api_calls >= 1 | fit DensityFunction api_calls by \"user,HourOfDay,isWeekend\" into cloud_excessive_api_calls_v1 dist=norm show_density=true", + "how_to_implement": "You must have Enterprise Security 6.0 or later, if not you will need to verify that the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or later is installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users in your environment, you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 90 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud User Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Weekly Model Rebuild 90 Day Lookback" + ], + "detections": [ + "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.user", + "All_Changes.status" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078.004", + "T1078" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.CM", + "PR.AC" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls", + "file": "cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User", + "file": "detections/cloud/baseline_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_per_user.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "-1d" + } + ], + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json", + "source": "aws_cloudtrail", + "sourcetype": "aws:cloudtrail", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls", + "id": "d4dfb7f3-7a37-498a-b5df-f19334e871af", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-09-07", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search will detect a spike in the number of API calls made to your cloud infrastructure environment about security groups by a user.", + "search": "| tstats count as security_group_api_calls values(All_Changes.command) as command from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.object_category=firewall AND All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%w\") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | join user HourOfDay isWeekend [ summary cloud_excessive_security_group_api_calls_v1] | where cardinality >=16 | apply cloud_excessive_security_group_api_calls_v1 threshold=0.005 | rename \"IsOutlier(security_group_api_calls)\" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1 | eval expected_upper_threshold = mvindex(split(mvindex(BoundaryRanges, -1), \":\"), 0) | where security_group_api_calls > expected_upper_threshold | eval distance_from_threshold = security_group_api_calls - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, command, security_group_api_calls, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User` to create the probability density function model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud User Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:Inbound", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "user $user$ has made $api_calls$ api calls related to security groups, violating the dynamic threshold of $expected_upper_threshold$ with the following command $command$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078.004", + "T1078" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.CM", + "PR.AC" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.command", + "All_Changes.object_category", + "All_Changes.status", + "All_Changes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT33" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078.004", + "T1078" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.CM", + "PR.AC" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud User Activities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:Inbound", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User", + "id": "67b84d51-8329-4909-849f-8d38ce54260a", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-09-07", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many API calls for security groups are performed by each user. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model and the model is rebuilt weekly.", + "search": "| tstats count as security_group_api_calls from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.object_category=firewall All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%w\") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | table _time security_group_api_calls, user, HourOfDay, isWeekend | eventstats dc(security_group_api_calls) as security_group_api_calls by user, HourOfDay, isWeekend | where security_group_api_calls >= 1 | fit DensityFunction security_group_api_calls by \"user,HourOfDay,isWeekend\" into cloud_excessive_security_group_api_calls_v1 dist=norm show_density=true", + "how_to_implement": "You must have Enterprise Security 6.0 or later, if not you will need to verify that the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or later is installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users in your environment, you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 90 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud User Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Weekly Model Rebuild 90 Day Lookback" + ], + "detections": [ + "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.user", + "All_Changes.status", + "All_Changes.object_category" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078.004", + "T1078" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "DE.CM", + "PR.AC" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls", + "file": "cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User", + "file": "detections/cloud/baseline_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls_per_user.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "-1d" + } + ], + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json", + "source": "aws_cloudtrail", + "sourcetype": "aws:cloudtrail", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events", + "id": "3e1f1568-9633-11eb-a69c-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-11-12", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following detection identifies excessive AccessDenied events within an hour timeframe. It is possible that an access key to AWS may have been stolen and is being misused to perform discovery events. In these instances, the access is not available with the key stolen therefore these events will be generated.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` (errorCode = \"AccessDenied\") user_type=IAMUser (userAgent!=*.amazonaws.com) | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as failures min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime, dc(eventName) as methods, dc(eventSource) as sources by src_ip, userIdentity.arn, _time | where failures >= 5 and methods >= 1 and sources >= 1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs.", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible to start this detection will need to be tuned by source IP or user. In addition, change the count values to an upper threshold to restrict false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/troubleshoot-iam-permission-errors/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud User Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Account", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Blocked", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1580/aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events/aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events.json" + ], + "impact": 20, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "User $userIdentity.arn$ is seen to perform excessive number of discovery related api calls- $failures$, within an hour where the access was denied.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1580" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "userIdentity.arn", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "eventSource", + "userAgent", + "errorCode", + "userIdentity.type" + ], + "risk_score": 10, + "security_domain": "access", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1580", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Infrastructure Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1580" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud User Activities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "userIdentity.arn", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Blocked", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 20, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "src_ip", + "risk_score": 10 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "userIdentity.arn", + "risk_score": 10 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1580" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events", + "file": "cloud/aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1580/aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events/aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events.json", + "source": "aws_cloudtrail", + "sourcetype": "aws:cloudtrail", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "AWS Lambda UpdateFunctionCode", + "id": "211b80d3-6340-4345-11ad-212bf3d0d111", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-24", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This analytic is designed to detect IAM users attempting to update/modify AWS lambda code via the AWS CLI to gain persistence, futher access into your AWS environment and to facilitate planting backdoors. In this instance, an attacker may upload malicious code/binary to a lambda function which will be executed automatically when the funnction is triggered.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=lambda.amazonaws.com eventName=UpdateFunctionCode* errorCode = success user_type=IAMUser | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.functionName) as function_updated by src_ip user_arn user_agent user_type eventName aws_account_id |`aws_lambda_updatefunctioncode_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must install Splunk AWS Add on and enable Cloudtrail logs in your AWS Environment.", + "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin or an autorized IAM user has updated the lambda fuction code legitimately.", + "references": [ + "http://detectioninthe.cloud/execution/modify_lambda_function_code/", + "https://sysdig.com/blog/exploit-mitigate-aws-lambdas-mitre/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "AWS Lambda UpdateFunctionCode", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud User Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Account", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1204/aws_updatelambdafunctioncode/aws_cloudtrail_events.json" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user_arn$ is attempting to update the lambda function code of $function_updated$ from this IP $src_ip$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1204" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user_arn", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "eventName", + "userAgent", + "errorCode" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "cloud", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", + "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1204" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud User Activities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "src_ip", + "type": "IP Address", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user_arn", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "src_ip", + "risk_score": 63 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user_arn", + "risk_score": 63 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1204" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "AWS Lambda UpdateFunctionCode Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "AWS Lambda UpdateFunctionCode", + "file": "cloud/aws_lambda_updatefunctioncode.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "aws_cloudtrail_events.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1204/aws_updatelambdafunctioncode/aws_cloudtrail_events.json", + "source": "aws_cloudtrail", + "sourcetype": "aws:cloudtrail", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "cloudtrail", + "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "aws_lambda_updatefunctioncode_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_lambda_updatefunctioncode.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles", + "id": "2181ad1f-1e73-4d0c-9780-e8880482a08f", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-09-04", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search looks for new commands from each user role.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.user_type=AssumedRole AND All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user, All_Changes.command All_Changes.object | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role user as user, command as command OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenUserApiCall=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenUserApiCall) OR firstTimeSeenUserApiCall > relative_time(now(),\"-24h@h\") | table firstTime, user, object, command |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial` to build the initial table of user roles, commands, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_filter`", + "known_false_positives": ".", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud User Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "AWS Instance", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Recon", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user$ of type AssumedRole attempting to execute new API calls $command$ that have not been seen before", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.user", + "All_Changes.user_type", + "All_Changes.status", + "All_Changes.command", + "All_Changes.object" + ], + "risk_score": 36, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud User Activities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Cloud Data", + "Scope:External", + "Outcome:Allowed", + "Stage:Recon", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 36 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial", + "id": "69d75f4b-b794-4a66-a777-730357b886b4", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-09-03", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search builds a table of the first and last times seen for every user role and command combination. This is broadly defined as any event that runs or creates something. This table is then cached.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.user_type=AssumedRole AND All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-7d@d\"), 1, 0) | table user, command, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud User Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "90 Day Baseline" + ], + "detections": [ + "Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.user_type", + "All_Changes.status", + "All_Changes.user", + "All_Changes.command" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update", + "id": "c4b760a0-6a97-47e9-b089-8ae9e57f210e", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-09-03", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Change" + ], + "description": "This search updates the table of the first and last times seen for every user role and command combination.", + "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.user_type=AssumedRole AND All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | table user, command, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen | inputlookup previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role append=t | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen, max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by user, command | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_forget_window`) | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-7d@d\"), 1, 0) | table user, command, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Cloud User Activities" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Changes.user_type", + "All_Changes.status", + "All_Changes.user", + "All_Changes.command" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles", + "file": "cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial", + "file": "detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_initial.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "-1d" + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update", + "file": "detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_update.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "-1d" + } + ], + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json", + "source": "aws_cloudtrail", + "sourcetype": "aws:cloudtrail", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role", + "description": "A table of users, commands, and the first and last time that they have been seen", + "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role", + "fields_list": "_key, user, command, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml", + "source": "cloud" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", + "id": "bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd72", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-30", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search lists all the logged CloudTrail activities by a specific user ARN and will create a table containing the source of the user, the region of the activity, the name and type of the event, the action taken, and all the user's identity information.", + "search": "`cloudtrail` | search user=$user$| table _time userIdentity.type userIdentity.userName userIdentity.arn aws_account_id src awsRegion eventName eventType", + "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "user" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "Command & Control", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Suspicious Cloud User Activities", + "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", + "AWS Security Hub Alerts" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "user", + "userIdentity.type", + "userIdentity.userName", + "userIdentity.arn", + "aws_account_id", + "src", + "awsRegion", + "eventName", + "eventType" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "id": "f4368ddf-d59f-4192-84f6-778ac5a3ffc7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-02-03", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "description": "Leveraging the Windows command-line interface (CLI) is one of the most common attack techniques--one that is also detailed in the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Use this Analytic Story to help you identify unusual or suspicious use of the CLI on Windows systems.", + "narrative": "The ability to execute arbitrary commands via the Windows CLI is a primary goal for the adversary. With access to the shell, an attacker can easily run scripts and interact with the target system. Often, attackers may only have limited access to the shell or may obtain access in unusual ways. In addition, malware may execute and interact with the CLI in ways that would be considered unusual and inconsistent with typical user activity. This provides defenders with opportunities to identify suspicious use and investigate, as appropriate. This Analytic Story contains various searches to help identify this suspicious activity, as well as others to aid you in deeper investigation.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059", + "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/macro-malware", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "analytic_story": "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "GALLIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Execution" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Command & Control", + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", + "ESCU - Potentially malicious code on commandline - Rule", + "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", + "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", + "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [ + "ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", + "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments" + ], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "First time seen command line argument", + "id": "a1b6e73f-98d5-470f-99ac-77aacd578473", + "version": 5, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for command-line arguments that use a `/c` parameter to execute a command that has not previously been seen.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = cmd.exe Processes.process = \"* /c *\" by Processes.process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = cmd.exe Processes.process = \"* /c *\" by Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by process | outputlookup previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments | eval newCmdLineArgument=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newCmdLineArgument=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table process] | `first_time_seen_command_line_argument_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The complete process name with command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model. Please make sure you run the support search \"Previously seen command line arguments,\"—which creates a lookup file called `previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments.csv`—a historical baseline of all command-line arguments. You must also validate this list. For the search to do accurate calculation, ensure the search scheduling is the same value as the `relative_time` evaluation function.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate programs can also use command-line arguments to execute. Please verify the command-line arguments to check what command/program is being executed. We recommend customizing the `first_time_seen_cmd_line_filter` macro to exclude legitimate parent_process_name", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "First time seen command line argument", + "analytic_story": [ + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Hidden Cobra Malware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059.001", + "T1059.003" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Deep Panda", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "Inception", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TEMP.Veles", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059.001", + "T1059.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Hidden Cobra Malware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously seen command line arguments", + "id": "56059acf-50fe-4f60-98d1-b75b51b5c2f3", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-03-01", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for command-line arguments where `cmd.exe /c` is used to execute a program, then creates a baseline of the earliest and latest times we have encountered this command-line argument in our dataset within the last 30 days.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process=\"* /c *\" by Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The complete process name with command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "IcedID" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "First time seen command line argument" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059.001", + "T1059.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "first_time_seen_command_line_argument_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments", + "description": "A placeholder for a list of cmd line arugments that been seen before", + "filename": "previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments.csv" + }, + { + "name": "previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments", + "description": "A placeholder for a list of cmd line arugments that been seen before", + "filename": "previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments.csv" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe", + "id": "dcfd6b40-42f9-469d-a433-2e53f7486664", + "version": 6, + "date": "2020-11-10", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for executions of cmd.exe spawned by a process that is often abused by attackers and that does not typically launch cmd.exe.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |search [`prohibited_apps_launching_cmd`] | `detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts and populates the Endpoint data model with the resultant dataset. This search includes a lookup file, `prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.csv`, that contains a list of processes that should not be spawning cmd.exe. You can modify this lookup to better suit your environment. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "There are circumstances where an application may legitimately execute and interact with the Windows command-line interface. Investigate and modify the lookup file, as appropriate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious Zoom Child Processes", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/powershell_spawn_cmd/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ running prohibited applications.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.003" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious Zoom Child Processes", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe", + "file": "endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/powershell_spawn_cmd/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "prohibited_apps_launching_cmd", + "definition": "| inputlookup prohibited_apps_launching_cmd | rename prohibited_applications as parent_process_name | eval parent_process_name=\"*\" . parent_process_name | table parent_process_name", + "description": "This macro outputs a list of process that should not be the parent process of cmd.exe" + }, + { + "name": "process_cmd", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters", + "id": "b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-95dbb162039e", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for the execution of the cscript.exe or wscript.exe processes, with a parent of cmd.exe. The search will return the count, the first and last time this execution was seen on a machine, the user, and the destination of the machine", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=\"cmd.exe\" (Processes.process_name=cscript.exe OR Processes.process_name =wscript.exe) by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters", + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/cmd_spawns_cscript/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "cmd.exe launching script interpreters on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.003" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 35 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters", + "file": "endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/cmd_spawns_cscript/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Potentially malicious code on commandline", + "id": "9c53c446-757e-11ec-871d-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-14", + "author": "Michael Hart, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic uses a pretrained machine learning text classifier to detect potentially malicious commandlines. The model identifies unusual combinations of keywords found in samples of commandlines where adversaries executed powershell code, primarily for C2 communication. For example, adversaries will leverage IO capabilities such as \"streamreader\" and \"webclient\", threading capabilties such as \"mutex\" locks, programmatic constructs like \"function\" and \"catch\", and cryptographic operations like \"computehash\". Although observing one of these keywords in a commandline script is possible, combinations of keywords observed in attack data are not typically found in normal usage of the commandline. The model will output a score where all values above zero are suspicious, anything greater than one particularly so.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=\"Endpoint.Processes\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | where len(process) > 200 | `potentially_malicious_code_on_cmdline_tokenize_score` | apply unusual_commandline_detection | eval score='predicted(unusual_cmdline_logits)', process=orig_process | fields - unusual_cmdline* predicted(unusual_cmdline_logits) orig_process | where score > 0.5 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `potentially_malicious_code_on_commandline_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. You will also need to install the Machine Learning Toolkit version 5.3 or above to apply the pretrained model.", + "known_false_positives": "This model is an anomaly detector that identifies usage of APIs and scripting constructs that are correllated with malicious activity. These APIs and scripting constructs are part of the programming langauge and advanced scripts may generate false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Potentially malicious code on commandline", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 20, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/malicious_cmd_line_samples/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Unusual command-line execution with hallmarks of malicious activity run by $user$ found on $dest$ with commandline $process$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059.003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 12, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 20 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 12 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 12 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Potentially malicious code on commandline Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Potentially malicious code on commandline", + "file": "endpoint/potentially_malicious_code_on_commandline.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-10y", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/malicious_cmd_line_samples/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "potentially_malicious_code_on_cmdline_tokenize_score", + "definition": "eval orig_process=process, process=replace(lower(process), \"`\", \"\") | makemv tokenizer=\"([\\w\\d\\-]+)\" process | eval unusual_cmdline_feature_for=if(match(process, \"^for$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^for$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_netsh=if(match(process, \"^netsh$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^netsh$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_readbytes=if(match(process, \"^readbytes$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^readbytes$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_set=if(match(process, \"^set$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^set$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_unrestricted=if(match(process, \"^unrestricted$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^unrestricted$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_winstations=if(match(process, \"^winstations$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^winstations$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_-value=if(match(process, \"^-value$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^-value$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_compression=if(match(process, \"^compression$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^compression$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_server=if(match(process, \"^server$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^server$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_set-mppreference=if(match(process, \"^set-mppreference$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^set-mppreference$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_terminal=if(match(process, \"^terminal$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^terminal$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_-name=if(match(process, \"^-name$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^-name$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_catch=if(match(process, \"^catch$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^catch$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_get-wmiobject=if(match(process, \"^get-wmiobject$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^get-wmiobject$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_hklm=if(match(process, \"^hklm$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^hklm$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_streamreader=if(match(process, \"^streamreader$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^streamreader$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_system32=if(match(process, \"^system32$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^system32$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_username=if(match(process, \"^username$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^username$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_webrequest=if(match(process, \"^webrequest$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^webrequest$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_count=if(match(process, \"^count$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^count$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_webclient=if(match(process, \"^webclient$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^webclient$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_writeallbytes=if(match(process, \"^writeallbytes$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^writeallbytes$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_convert=if(match(process, \"^convert$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^convert$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_create=if(match(process, \"^create$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^create$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_function=if(match(process, \"^function$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^function$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_net=if(match(process, \"^net$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^net$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_com=if(match(process, \"^com$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^com$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_http=if(match(process, \"^http$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^http$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_io=if(match(process, \"^io$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^io$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_system=if(match(process, \"^system$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^system$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_new-object=if(match(process, \"^new-object$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^new-object$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_if=if(match(process, \"^if$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^if$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_threading=if(match(process, \"^threading$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^threading$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_mutex=if(match(process, \"^mutex$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^mutex$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_cryptography=if(match(process, \"^cryptography$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^cryptography$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_computehash=if(match(process, \"^computehash$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^computehash$\"))), 0)", + "description": "Performs the tokenization and application of the malicious commandline classifier" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "potentially_malicious_code_on_commandline_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/potentially_malicious_code_on_commandline.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations", + "id": "a34aae96-ccf8-4aef-952c-3ea21444444d", + "version": 6, + "date": "2020-12-08", + "author": "David Dorsey, Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for system processes that typically execute from `C:\\Windows\\System32\\` or `C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64`. This may indicate a malicious process that is trying to hide as a legitimate process.\\\nThis detection utilizes a lookup that is deduped `system32` and `syswow64` directories from Server 2016 and Windows 10.\\\nDuring triage, review the parallel processes - what process moved the native Windows binary? identify any artifacts on disk and review. If a remote destination is contacted, what is the reputation?", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_path !=\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32*\" Processes.process_path !=\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_hash | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `is_windows_system_file` | `system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "This detection may require tuning based on third party applications utilizing native Windows binaries in non-standard paths.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.yaml", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Unusual Processes", + "Ransomware", + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "System process running from unexpected location on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1036", + "T1036.003" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Processes.process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_hash" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "GALLIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036", + "T1036.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Unusual Processes", + "Ransomware", + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Processes.process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "Processes.process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036", + "T1036.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations", + "file": "endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "is_windows_system_file", + "definition": "lookup update=true is_windows_system_file filename as process_name OUTPUT systemFile | search systemFile=true", + "description": "This macro limits the output to process names that are in the Windows System directory" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Unusually Long Command Line", + "id": "c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6a4264e7f", + "version": 5, + "date": "2020-12-08", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious activity on your hosts.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| eval processlen=len(process) | eventstats stdev(processlen) as stdev, avg(processlen) as avg by dest | stats max(processlen) as maxlen, values(stdev) as stdevperhost, values(avg) as avgperhost by dest, user, process_name, process | `unusually_long_command_line_filter` |eval threshold = 3 | where maxlen > ((threshold*stdevperhost) + avgperhost)", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships, from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the process field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate applications start with long command lines.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Unusually Long Command Line", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Unusual Processes", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Unusually long command line $Processes.process_name$ on $dest$", + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Processes.process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Unusual Processes", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Processes.process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 42 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "Processes.process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "unusually_long_command_line_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK", + "id": "57edaefa-a73b-45e5-bbae-f39c1473f941", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-05-08", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious activity on your hosts. This search leverages the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) to help identify command lines with lengths that are unusual for a given user.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| eval processlen=len(process) | search user!=unknown | apply cmdline_pdfmodel threshold=0.01 | rename \"IsOutlier(processlen)\" as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | table firstTime lastTime user dest process_name process processlen count | `unusually_long_command_line___mltk_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that monitors command lines and populates the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model. In addition, MLTK version >= 4.2 must be installed on your search heads, along with any required dependencies. Finally, the support search \"Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK\" must be executed before this detection search, as it builds an ML model over the historical data used by this search. It is important that this search is run in the same app context as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild the model with the latest data available in your environment.", + "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate applications use long command lines for installs or updates. You should review identified command lines for legitimacy. You may modify the first part of the search to omit legitimate command lines from consideration. If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider changing the value of threshold in the search to a smaller value. You should also periodically re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data. You may get unexpected results if the user identified in the results is not present in the data used to build the associated model.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Unusual Processes", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Unusual Processes", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", + "id": "d2a4d85b-fc6a-47a0-82f6-bc1ec2ebc459", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-05-08", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model to characterize the length of the command lines observed for each user in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 30 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies outliers in the length of the command line.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as start_time max(_time) as end_time FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | search user!=unknown | `security_content_ctime(start_time)`| `security_content_ctime(end_time)`| eval processlen=len(process) | fit DensityFunction processlen by user into cmdline_pdfmodel", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint data model. In addition, you must have the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version >= 4.2 installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users in your environment, you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 30 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data. More information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Ransomware", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Unusual Processes" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd.exe", + "Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "unusually_long_command_line___mltk_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + }, + { + "name": "Get Parent Process Info", + "id": "fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41bf9", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-02-28", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "parent_process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Phishing Payloads", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_parent_process_info" + }, + { + "name": "Get Process Info", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd71", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-01", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the process running on a host which is under investigation. To gather the process info, enter the values for the process name in question and the destination IP address.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search process_name= $process_name$ | search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_process_info" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity", + "id": "a09db4d1-3827-4833-87b8-3a397e532119", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-02-11", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "description": "Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.", + "narrative": "Adversaries may abuse Compiled HTML files (.chm) to conceal malicious code. CHM files are commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTML Help system. CHM files are compressed compilations of various content such as HTML documents, images, and scripting/web related programming languages such VBA, JScript, Java, and ActiveX. CHM content is displayed using underlying components of the Internet Explorer browser loaded by the HTML Help executable program (hh.exe). \\\nHH.exe relies upon hhctrl.ocx to load CHM topics.This will load upon execution of a chm file. \\\nDuring investigation, review all parallel processes and child processes. It is possible for file modification events to occur and it is best to capture the CHM file and decompile it for further analysis. \\\nUpon usage of InfoTech Storage Handlers, ms-its, its, mk, itss.dll will load.", + "references": [ + "https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/htmlhelp/nf-htmlhelp-htmlhelpa" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity", + "analytic_story": "Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT41", + "Dark Caracal", + "Lazarus Group", + "OilRig", + "Silence" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Detect HTML Help Renamed - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Michael Haag", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Detect HTML Help Renamed", + "id": "62fed254-513b-460e-953d-79771493a9f3", + "version": 3, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a renamed instance of hh.exe (HTML Help) executing a Compiled HTML Help (CHM). This particular technique will load Windows script code from a compiled help file. CHM files may contain nearly any file type embedded, but only execute html/htm. Upon a successful execution, the following script engines may be used for execution - JScript, VBScript, VBScript.Encode, JScript.Encode, JScript.Compact. Analyst may identify vbscript.dll or jscript.dll loading into hh.exe upon execution. The \"htm\" and \"html\" file extensions were the only extensions observed to be supported for the execution of Shortcut commands or WSH script code. During investigation, identify script content origination. Validate it is the legitimate version of hh.exe by reviewing the PE metadata. hh.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_hh` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_html_help_renamed_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely a renamed instance of hh.exe will be used legitimately, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.001/T1218.001.md", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Hh/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect HTML Help Renamed", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT41", + "Dark Caracal", + "Lazarus Group", + "OilRig", + "Silence" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect HTML Help Renamed Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect HTML Help Renamed", + "file": "endpoint/detect_html_help_renamed.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "process_hh", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=hh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=HH.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "detect_html_help_renamed_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_html_help_renamed.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process", + "id": "723716de-ee55-4cd4-9759-c44e7e55ba4b", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-02-11", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies hh.exe (HTML Help) execution of a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) that spawns a child process. This particular technique will load Windows script code from a compiled help file. CHM files may contain nearly any file type embedded, but only execute html/htm. Upon a successful execution, the following script engines may be used for execution - JScript, VBScript, VBScript.Encode, JScript.Encode, JScript.Compact. Analyst may identify vbscript.dll or jscript.dll loading into hh.exe upon execution. The \"htm\" and \"html\" file extensions were the only extensions observed to be supported for the execution of Shortcut commands or WSH script code. During investigation, identify script content origination. Review child process events and investigate further. hh.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=hh.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_html_help_spawn_child_process_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications (ex. web browsers) may spawn a child process. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.001/T1218.001.md", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Hh/", + "https://gist.github.com/mgeeky/cce31c8602a144d8f2172a73d510e0e7", + "https://cyberforensicator.com/2019/01/20/silence-dissecting-malicious-chm-files-and-performing-forensic-analysis/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ spawning a child process, typically not normal behavior.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT41", + "Dark Caracal", + "Lazarus Group", + "OilRig", + "Silence" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process", + "file": "endpoint/detect_html_help_spawn_child_process.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_html_help_spawn_child_process_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_html_help_spawn_child_process.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line", + "id": "8c5835b9-39d9-438b-817c-95f14c69a31e", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies hh.exe (HTML Help) execution of a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) file from a remote url. This particular technique will load Windows script code from a compiled help file. CHM files may contain nearly any file type embedded, but only execute html/htm. Upon a successful execution, the following script engines may be used for execution - JScript, VBScript, VBScript.Encode, JScript.Encode, JScript.Compact. Analyst may identify vbscript.dll or jscript.dll loading into hh.exe upon execution. The \"htm\" and \"html\" file extensions were the only extensions observed to be supported for the execution of Shortcut commands or WSH script code. During investigation, identify script content origination. Review reputation of remote IP and domain. Some instances, it is worth decompiling the .chm file to review its original contents. hh.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_hh` Processes.process=*http* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_html_help_url_in_command_line_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may retrieve a CHM remotely, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.001/T1218.001.md", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Hh/", + "https://blog.sevagas.com/?Hacking-around-HTA-files", + "https://gist.github.com/mgeeky/cce31c8602a144d8f2172a73d510e0e7", + "https://cyberforensicator.com/2019/01/20/silence-dissecting-malicious-chm-files-and-performing-forensic-analysis/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_proces_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ contacting a remote destination to potentally download a malicious payload.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 90, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT41", + "Dark Caracal", + "Lazarus Group", + "OilRig", + "Silence" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 90 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 90 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line", + "file": "endpoint/detect_html_help_url_in_command_line.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "process_hh", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=hh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=HH.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "detect_html_help_url_in_command_line_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_html_help_url_in_command_line.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers", + "id": "0b2eefa5-5508-450d-b970-3dd2fb761aec", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies hh.exe (HTML Help) execution of a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) file using InfoTech Storage Handlers. This particular technique will load Windows script code from a compiled help file, using InfoTech Storage Handlers. itss.dll will load upon execution. Three InfoTech Storage handlers are supported - ms-its, its, mk:@MSITStore. ITSS may be used to launch a specific html/htm file from within a CHM file. CHM files may contain nearly any file type embedded. Upon a successful execution, the following script engines may be used for execution - JScript, VBScript, VBScript.Encode, JScript.Encode, JScript.Compact. Analyst may identify vbscript.dll or jscript.dll loading into hh.exe upon execution. The \"htm\" and \"html\" file extensions were the only extensions observed to be supported for the execution of Shortcut commands or WSH script code. During investigation, identify script content origination. hh.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_hh` Processes.process IN (\"*its:*\", \"*mk:@MSITStore:*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "It is rare to see instances of InfoTech Storage Handlers being used, but it does happen in some legitimate instances. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001/", + "https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/851869", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.001/T1218.001.md", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Hh/", + "https://gist.github.com/mgeeky/cce31c8602a144d8f2172a73d510e0e7", + "https://cyberforensicator.com/2019/01/20/silence-dissecting-malicious-chm-files-and-performing-forensic-analysis/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "$process_name$ has been identified using Infotech Storage Handlers to load a specific file within a CHM on $dest$ under user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT41", + "Dark Caracal", + "Lazarus Group", + "OilRig", + "Silence" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 72 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 72 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers", + "file": "endpoint/detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "process_hh", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=hh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=HH.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [] + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "id": "3c3835c0-255d-4f9e-ab84-e29ec9ec9b56", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-18", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "description": "Attackers often attempt to hide within or otherwise abuse the domain name system (DNS). You can thwart attempts to manipulate this omnipresent protocol by monitoring for these types of abuses.", + "narrative": "Although DNS is one of the fundamental underlying protocols that make the Internet work, it is often ignored (perhaps because of its complexity and effectiveness). However, attackers have discovered ways to abuse the protocol to meet their objectives. One potential abuse involves manipulating DNS to hijack traffic and redirect it to an IP address under the attacker's control. This could inadvertently send users intending to visit google.com, for example, to an unrelated malicious website. Another technique involves using the DNS protocol for command-and-control activities with the attacker's malicious code or to covertly exfiltrate data. The searches within this Analytic Story look for these types of abuses.", + "references": [ + "http://blogs.splunk.com/2015/10/01/random-words-on-entropy-and-dns/", + "http://www.darkreading.com/analytics/security-monitoring/got-malware-three-signs-revealed-in-dns-traffic/d/d-id/1139680", + "https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/Threat-Vulnerability-Articles/What-are-suspicious-DNS-queries/ta-p/71454" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "analytic_story": "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT33", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Lazarus Group", + "OilRig", + "Thrip", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "DNS", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "FIN7", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Tropic Trooper" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1071", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Magic Hound", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1189", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "PLATINUM", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Turla", + "Windigo", + "Windshift" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control", + "Exfiltration", + "Initial Access" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint", + "Network_Resolution" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Command & Control", + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", + "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", + "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", + "ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", + "ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule", + "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", + "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", + "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [ + "ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK" + ], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Rico Valdez", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers", + "id": "74ec6f18-604b-4202-a567-86b2066be3ce", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Resolution" + ], + "description": "This search allows you to identify the endpoints that have connected to more than five DNS servers and made DNS Queries over the time frame of the search.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count, values(DNS.dest) AS dest dc(DNS.dest) as dest_count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.message_type=QUERY by DNS.src | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Network_Resolution\")` |where dest_count > 5 | `clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "This search requires that DNS data is being ingested and populating the `Network_Resolution` data model. This data can come from DNS logs or from solutions that parse network traffic for this data, such as Splunk Stream or Bro.\\\nThis search produces fields (`dest_count`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** Distinct DNS Connections, **Field:** dest_count\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", + "known_false_positives": "It's possible that an enterprise has more than five DNS servers that are configured in a round-robin rotation. Please customize the search, as appropriate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers", + "analytic_story": [ + "DNS Hijacking", + "Command & Control", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Host Redirection" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 9", + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1048.003" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "PR.DS" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "DNS.dest", + "DNS.message_type", + "DNS.src" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT33", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Lazarus Group", + "OilRig", + "Thrip", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1048.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 9", + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "PR.DS" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "DNS Hijacking", + "Command & Control", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Host Redirection" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1048.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 9", + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "PR.DS" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response", + "id": "05437c07-62f5-452e-afdc-04dd44815bb9", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Resolution" + ], + "description": "This search is used to detect attempts to use DNS tunneling, by calculating the length of responses to DNS TXT queries. Endpoints using DNS as a method of transmission for data exfiltration, command and control, or evasion of security controls can often be detected by noting unusually large volumes of DNS traffic. Deprecated because this detection should focus on DNS queries instead of DNS responses.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.message_type=response AND DNS.record_type=TXT by DNS.src DNS.dest DNS.answer DNS.record_type | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | eval anslen=len(answer) | search anslen>100 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename src as \"Source IP\", dest as \"Destination IP\", answer as \"DNS Answer\" anslen as \"Answer Length\" record_type as \"DNS Record Type\" firstTime as \"First Time\" lastTime as \"Last Time\" count as Count | table \"Source IP\" \"Destination IP\" \"DNS Answer\" \"DNS Record Type\" \"Answer Length\" Count \"First Time\" \"Last Time\" | `detect_long_dns_txt_record_response_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to ingest data from your DNS logs, or monitor DNS traffic using Stream, Bro or something similar. Specifically, this query requires that the DNS data model is populated with information regarding the DNS record type that is being returned as well as the data in the answer section of the protocol.", + "known_false_positives": "It's possible that legitimate TXT record responses can be long enough to trigger this search. You can modify the packet threshold for this search to help mitigate false positives.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Command & Control" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1048.003" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "DNS.message_type", + "DNS.record_type", + "DNS.src", + "DNS.dest", + "DNS.answer" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT33", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Lazarus Group", + "OilRig", + "Thrip", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1048.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Command & Control" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1048.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_long_dns_txt_record_response_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Detection of DNS Tunnels", + "id": "104658f4-afdc-499f-9719-17a43f9826f4", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-02-15", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Resolution" + ], + "description": "This search is used to detect DNS tunneling, by calculating the sum of the length of DNS queries and DNS answers. The search also filters out potential false positives by filtering out queries made to internal systems and the queries originating from internal DNS, Web, and Email servers. Endpoints using DNS as a method of transmission for data exfiltration, command and control, or evasion of security controls can often be detected by noting an unusually large volume of DNS traffic. \\\nNOTE:Deprecated because existing detection is doing the same. This detection is replaced with two other variations, if you are using MLTK then you can use this search `ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule` or use the standard deviation version `ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule`, as an alternantive.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc(\"DNS.query\") as count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where nodename=DNS \"DNS.message_type\"=\"QUERY\" NOT (`cim_corporate_web_domain_search(\"DNS.query\")`) NOT \"DNS.query\"=\"*.in-addr.arpa\" NOT (\"DNS.src_category\"=\"svc_infra_dns\" OR \"DNS.src_category\"=\"svc_infra_webproxy\" OR \"DNS.src_category\"=\"svc_infra_email*\" ) by \"DNS.src\",\"DNS.query\" | rename \"DNS.src\" as src \"DNS.query\" as message | eval length=len(message) | stats sum(length) as length by src | append [ tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc(\"DNS.answer\") as count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where nodename=DNS \"DNS.message_type\"=\"QUERY\" NOT (`cim_corporate_web_domain_search(\"DNS.query\")`) NOT \"DNS.query\"=\"*.in-addr.arpa\" NOT (\"DNS.src_category\"=\"svc_infra_dns\" OR \"DNS.src_category\"=\"svc_infra_webproxy\" OR \"DNS.src_category\"=\"svc_infra_email*\" ) by \"DNS.src\",\"DNS.answer\" | rename \"DNS.src\" as src \"DNS.answer\" as message | eval message=if(message==\"unknown\",\"\", message) | eval length=len(message) | stats sum(length) as length by src ] | stats sum(length) as length by src | where length > 10000 | `detection_of_dns_tunnels_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, we must ensure that DNS data is being ingested and mapped to the appropriate fields in the Network_Resolution data model. Fields like src_category are automatically provided by the Assets and Identity Framework shipped with Splunk Enterprise Security. You will need to ensure you are using the Assets and Identity Framework and populating the src_category field. You will also need to enable the `cim_corporate_web_domain_search()` macro which will essentially filter out the DNS queries made to the corporate web domains to reduce alert fatigue.", + "known_false_positives": "It's possible that normal DNS traffic will exhibit this behavior. If an alert is generated, please investigate and validate as appropriate. The threshold can also be modified to better suit your environment.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detection of DNS Tunnels", + "analytic_story": [ + "Data Protection", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Command & Control" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1048.003" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.DS" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "DNS.query", + "DNS.message_type", + "DNS.src_category", + "DNS.src" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT33", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Lazarus Group", + "OilRig", + "Thrip", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1048.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.DS" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Data Protection", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Command & Control" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1048.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.DS" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detection_of_dns_tunnels_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers", + "id": "1a67f15a-f4ff-4170-84e9-08cf6f75d6f6", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Resolution" + ], + "description": "This search will detect DNS requests resolved by unauthorized DNS servers. Legitimate DNS servers should be identified in the Enterprise Security Assets and Identity Framework.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.dest_category != dns_server AND DNS.src_category != dns_server by DNS.src DNS.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | `dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. It also requires that your DNS servers are identified correctly in the Assets and Identity table of Enterprise Security.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate DNS activity can be detected in this search. Investigate, verify and update the list of authorized DNS servers as appropriate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers", + "analytic_story": [ + "DNS Hijacking", + "Command & Control", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Host Redirection" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1", + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1071.004" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS", + "PR.IP", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "DNS.dest_category", + "DNS.src_category", + "DNS.src", + "DNS.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "DNS", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "FIN7", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Tropic Trooper" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1071.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1", + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS", + "PR.IP", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "DNS Hijacking", + "Command & Control", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Host Redirection" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1071.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 1", + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS", + "PR.IP", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App", + "id": "2452e632-9e0d-11eb-bacd-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-15", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "this search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. This technique are seen in couple of malware and APT group to exfiltrated collected data in a infected machine or infected network. This detection is looking for unique use of nslookup where it tries to use specific record type, TXT, A, AAAA, that are commonly used by attacker and also the retry parameter which is designed to query C2 DNS multiple tries.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"nslookup.exe\" Processes.process = \"*-querytype=*\" OR Processes.process=\"*-qt=*\" OR Processes.process=\"*-q=*\" OR Processes.process=\"-type=*\" OR Processes.process=\"*-retry=*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of nslookup.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "admin nslookup usage", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7_spear_phishing.html", + "https://www.varonis.com/blog/dns-tunneling/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Command & Control", + "Data Exfiltration" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Exfiltration" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/nslookup_exfil/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ performing activity related to DNS exfiltration.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1048" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1048" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Command & Control", + "Data Exfiltration" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Exfiltration" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 72 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 72 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1048" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App", + "file": "endpoint/dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/nslookup_exfil/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App", + "id": "0a69fdaa-a2b8-11eb-b16d-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-21", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. This technique are seen in couple of malware and APT group to exfiltrated collected data in a infected machine or infected network. This detection is looking for unique use of nslookup where it tries to use specific record type (TXT, A, AAAA) that are commonly used by attacker and also the retry parameter which is designed to query C2 DNS multiple tries.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode = 1 process_name = \"nslookup.exe\" | bucket _time span=15m | stats count as numNsLookup by Computer, _time | eventstats avg(numNsLookup) as avgNsLookup, stdev(numNsLookup) as stdNsLookup, count as numSlots by Computer | eval upperThreshold=(avgNsLookup + stdNsLookup *3) | eval isOutlier=if(avgNsLookup > 20 and avgNsLookup >= upperThreshold, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of nslookup.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7_spear_phishing.html", + "https://www.varonis.com/blog/dns-tunneling/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Command & Control", + "Data Exfiltration" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Scope:Local", + "Stage:Exfiltration" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/nslookup_exfil/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 40, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Excessive usage of nslookup.exe has been detected on $Computer$. This detection is triggered as as it violates the dynamic threshold", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1048" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Computer", + "process_name", + "EventCode" + ], + "risk_score": 28, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1048" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Command & Control", + "Data Exfiltration" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Scope:Local", + "Stage:Exfiltration" + ], + "impact": 40, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 28 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1048" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App", + "file": "endpoint/excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/nslookup_exfil/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK", + "id": "85fbcfe8-9718-4911-adf6-7000d077a3a9", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-01-22", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Resolution" + ], + "description": "This search allows you to identify DNS requests that are unusually large for the record type being requested in your environment.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as start_time max(_time) as end_time values(DNS.src) as src values(DNS.dest) as dest from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query DNS.record_type | search DNS.record_type=* | `drop_dm_object_name(DNS)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | eval query_length = len(query) | apply dns_query_pdfmodel threshold=0.01 | rename \"IsOutlier(query_length)\" as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | sort -query_length | table start_time end_time query record_type count src dest query_length | `dns_query_length_outliers___mltk_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. In addition, the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or greater must be installed on your search heads, along with any required dependencies. Finally, the support search \"Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK\" must be executed before this detection search, because it builds a machine-learning (ML) model over the historical data used by this search. It is important that this search is run in the same app context as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild the model with the latest data available in your environment.\\\nThis search produces fields (`query`,`query_length`,`count`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** DNS Query, **Field:** query\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** DNS Query Length, **Field:** query_length\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** Number of events, **Field:** count\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", + "known_false_positives": "If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider reducing the value for threshold in the search. You should also periodically re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK", + "analytic_story": [ + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Command & Control" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1071.004", + "T1071" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "DNS.src", + "DNS.dest", + "DNS.query", + "DNS.record_type" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "DNS", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "FIN7", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Tropic Trooper" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1071", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Magic Hound", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1071.004", + "T1071" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Command & Control" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK", + "id": "c914844c-0ff5-4efc-8d44-c063443129ba", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-05-08", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Resolution" + ], + "description": "This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model to characterize the length of the DNS queries for each DNS record type observed in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 30 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which uses it to identify outliers in the length of the DNS query.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query DNS.record_type | search DNS.record_type=* | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | eval query_length = len(query) | fit DensityFunction query_length by record_type into dns_query_pdfmodel", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. In addition, you must have the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version >= 4.2 installed, along with any required dependencies. By default, the search builds the model using the past 30 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data. More information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Command & Control", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "DNS.query", + "DNS.record_type" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1071.004", + "T1071" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "dns_query_length_outliers___mltk_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Excessive DNS Failures", + "id": "104658f4-afdc-499e-9719-17243f9826f1", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Resolution" + ], + "description": "This search identifies DNS query failures by counting the number of DNS responses that do not indicate success, and trigger on more than 50 occurrences.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(\"DNS.query\") as queries from datamodel=Network_Resolution where nodename=DNS \"DNS.reply_code\"!=\"No Error\" \"DNS.reply_code\"!=\"NoError\" DNS.reply_code!=\"unknown\" NOT \"DNS.query\"=\"*.arpa\" \"DNS.query\"=\"*.*\" by \"DNS.src\",\"DNS.query\"| `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")`| lookup cim_corporate_web_domain_lookup domain as query OUTPUT domain| where isnull(domain)| lookup update=true alexa_lookup_by_str domain as query OUTPUT rank| where isnull(rank)| stats sum(count) as count mode(queries) as queries by src| `get_asset(src)`| where count>50 | `excessive_dns_failures_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model.", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible legitimate traffic can trigger this rule. Please investigate as appropriate. The threshold for generating an event can also be customized to better suit your environment.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Excessive DNS Failures", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Command & Control" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 9", + "CIS 12" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1071.004", + "T1071" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "DNS.query", + "DNS.reply_code", + "DNS.src" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "DNS", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "FIN7", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Tropic Trooper" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1071", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Magic Hound", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1071.004", + "T1071" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 9", + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Command & Control" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "dest", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1071.004", + "T1071" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 9", + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "excessive_dns_failures_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers", + "id": "a1e761ac-1344-4dbd-88b2-3f34c912d359", + "version": 3, + "date": "2021-01-14", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Resolution" + ], + "description": "Malicious actors often abuse legitimate Dynamic DNS services to host malicious payloads or interactive command and control nodes. Attackers will automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to countless IP addresses to circumvent firewall blocks, block lists as well as frustrate a network defenders analytic and investigative processes. This search will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.answer) as answer min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query host | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `dynamic_dns_providers` | `detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "First, you'll need to ingest data from your DNS operations. This can be done by ingesting logs from your server or data, collected passively by Splunk Stream or a similar solution. Specifically, data that contains the domain that is being queried and the IP of the host originating the request must be populating the `Network_Resolution` data model. This search also leverages a lookup file, `dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv`, which contains a non-exhaustive list of Dynamic DNS providers. Please consider updating the local lookup periodically by adding new domains to the list of `dynamic_dns_providers_local.csv`.\\\nThis search produces fields (query, answer, isDynDNS) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable event. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review. Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** DNS Query, **Field:** query\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** DNS Answer, **Field:** answer\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** IsDynamicDNS, **Field:** isDynDNS\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", + "known_false_positives": "Some users and applications may leverage Dynamic DNS to reach out to some domains on the Internet since dynamic DNS by itself is not malicious, however this activity must be verified.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers", + "analytic_story": [ + "Data Protection", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "DNS Hijacking", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Command & Control" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1189/dyn_dns_site/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A dns query $query$ from your infra connecting to suspicious domain in host $host$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1189" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "host", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "DNS.answer", + "DNS.query", + "host" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1189", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "PLATINUM", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Turla", + "Windigo", + "Windshift" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1189" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Data Protection", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "DNS Hijacking", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Command & Control" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "host", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "host", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1189" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12", + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers", + "file": "network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1189/dyn_dns_site/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "dynamic_dns_providers", + "definition": "lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_default dynamic_dns_domains as query OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_default | lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_local dynamic_dns_domains as query OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_local| eval isDynDNS = coalesce(isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local)|fields - isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local| search isDynDNS=True", + "description": "This macro limits the output of the query field to dynamic dns domains. It looks up the domains in a file provided by Splunk and one intended to be updated by the end user." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation", + "id": "1a67f15a-f4ff-4170-84e9-08cf6f75d6f5", + "version": 4, + "date": "2021-10-06", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Resolution" + ], + "description": "This search allows you to identify DNS requests and compute the standard deviation on the length of the names being resolved, then filter on two times the standard deviation to show you those queries that are unusually large for your environment.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where NOT DNS.message_type IN(\"Pointer\",\"PTR\") by DNS.query | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | eval tlds=split(query,\".\") | eval tld=mvindex(tlds,-1) | eval tld_len=len(tld) | search tld_len<=24 | eval query_length = len(query) | table query query_length record_type count | eventstats stdev(query_length) AS stdev avg(query_length) AS avg p50(query_length) AS p50| where query_length>(avg+stdev*2) | eval z_score=(query_length-avg)/stdev | `dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model.", + "known_false_positives": "It's possible there can be long domain names that are legitimate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation", + "analytic_story": [ + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Command & Control" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Exfiltration" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/long_dns_queries/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "message": "A dns query $query$ with 2 time standard deviation of name len of the dns query in host $host$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1048.003", + "T1048" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "host", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "DNS.query" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT33", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Lazarus Group", + "OilRig", + "Thrip", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1048.003", + "T1048" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Command & Control" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "host", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Exfiltration" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "host", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1048.003", + "T1048" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation", + "file": "network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/long_dns_queries/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml", + "source": "network" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get DNS Server History for a host", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd72", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-11-09", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "While investigating any detections it is important to understand which and how many DNS servers a host has connected to in the past. This search uses data that is tagged as DNS and gives you a count and list of DNS servers that a particular host has connected to the previous 24 hours.", + "search": "| search tag=dns src_ip=$src_ip$ dest_port=53 | streamstats time_window=1d count values(dest_ip) as dcip by src_ip | table date_mday src_ip dcip count | sort -count", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting your DNS traffic", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "src_ip" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Command & Control", + "DNS Hijacking", + "Data Protection", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "src_ip", + "dest_port", + "dest_ip" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_dns_server_history_for_a_host" + }, + { + "name": "Get DNS traffic ratio", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd73", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-11-09", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "This search calculates the ratio of DNS traffic originating and coming from a host to a list of DNS servers over the last 24 hours. A high value of this ratio could be very useful to quickly understand if a src_ip (host) is sending a high volume of data out via port 53, could be an indicator of data exfiltration via DNS. ", + "search": "| tstats allow_old_summaries=true sum(All_Traffic.bytes_out) as \"bytes_out\" sum(All_Traffic.bytes_in) as \"bytes_in\" from datamodel=Network_Traffic where nodename=All_Traffic All_Traffic.dest_port=53 by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest| `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | rename src as src_ip | rename dest as dest_ip | search src_ip=$src_ip$ | search dest_ip = $dest_ip | eval ratio = (bytes_out/bytes_in) | table ratio", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your network traffic", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "src_ip" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Command & Control", + "Data Protection", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.bytes_out", + "All_Traffic.bytes_in", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.src", + "All_Traffic.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_dns_traffic_ratio" + }, + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + }, + { + "name": "Get Parent Process Info", + "id": "fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41bf9", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-02-28", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "parent_process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Phishing Payloads", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_parent_process_info" + }, + { + "name": "Get Process Info", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd71", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-01", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the process running on a host which is under investigation. To gather the process info, enter the values for the process name in question and the destination IP address.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search process_name= $process_name$ | search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_process_info" + }, + { + "name": "Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", + "id": "910e6512-edc9-4f93-ba24-5b786f47a672", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-01", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "While investigating, an analyst will want to know what process and parent_process is responsible for generating suspicious DNS traffic. Use the following search and enter the value of `dest` in the search to get specific details on the process responsible for creating the DNS traffic.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search dest = $dest$ | join dest type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port=53 by Ports.process_id Ports.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename src as dest]", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that associates processes with network events into the Endpoint datamodel. This can come from endpoint protection products such as carbon black, or endpoint data sources such as Sysmon.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Command & Control", + "Data Protection", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Ports.process_id", + "Ports.src", + "Ports.dest_port" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Emails", + "id": "2b1800dd-92f9-47ec-a981-fdf1351e5d55", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-01-27", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "description": "Email remains one of the primary means for attackers to gain an initial foothold within the modern enterprise. Detect and investigate suspicious emails in your environment with the help of the searches in this Analytic Story.", + "narrative": "It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage targeted spearphishing campaigns and mass mailers to deliver weaponized email messages and attachments. Fortunately, there are a number of ways to monitor email data in Splunk to detect suspicious content.\\\nOnce a phishing message has been detected, the next steps are to answer the following questions: \\\n1. Which users have received this or a similar message in the past?\\\n1. When did the targeted campaign begin?\\\n1. Have any users interacted with the content of the messages (by downloading an attachment or clicking on a malicious URL)?This Analytic Story provides detection searches to identify suspicious emails, as well as contextual and investigative searches to help answer some of these questions.", + "references": [ + "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/06/26/phishing-hits-a-new-level-of-quality/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Emails", + "analytic_story": "Suspicious Emails", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Email", + "UEBA" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", + "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", + "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [ + "ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names" + ], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly", + "id": "56e877a6-1455-4479-ad16-0550dc1e33f8", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-07-22", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "UEBA" + ], + "description": "This detection looks for emails that are suspicious because of their sender, domain rareness, or behavior differences. This is an anomaly generated by Splunk User Behavior Analytics (UBA).", + "search": "|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(All_UEBA_Events.category) as category from datamodel=UEBA where nodename=All_UEBA_Events.UEBA_Anomalies All_UEBA_Events.UEBA_Anomalies.uba_model = \"SuspiciousEmailDetectionModel\" by All_UEBA_Events.description All_UEBA_Events.severity All_UEBA_Events.user All_UEBA_Events.uba_event_type All_UEBA_Events.link All_UEBA_Events.signature All_UEBA_Events.url All_UEBA_Events.UEBA_Anomalies.uba_model | `drop_dm_object_name(All_UEBA_Events)` | `drop_dm_object_name(UEBA_Anomalies)`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_email___uba_anomaly_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data from email logs and have Splunk integrated with UBA. This anomaly is raised by a UBA detection model called \"SuspiciousEmailDetectionModel.\" Ensure that this model is enabled on your UBA instance.", + "known_false_positives": "This detection model will alert on any sender domain that is seen for the first time. This could be a potential false positive. The next step is to investigate and add the URL to an allow list if you determine that it is a legitimate sender.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Emails" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 7" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "threat", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 7" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Emails" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 7" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_email___uba_anomaly_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces", + "id": "56e877a6-1455-4479-ada6-0550dc1e22f8", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-19", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Email" + ], + "description": "Attackers often use spaces as a means to obfuscate an attachment's file extension. This search looks for messages with email attachments that have many spaces within the file names.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(All_Email.recipient) as recipient_address min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Email where All_Email.file_name=\"*\" by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.file_name All_Email.message_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Email\")` | eval space_ratio = (mvcount(split(file_name,\" \"))-1)/len(file_name) | search space_ratio >= 0.1 | rex field=recipient_address \"(?.*)@\" | `email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You need to ingest data from emails. Specifically, the sender's address and the file names of any attachments must be mapped to the Email data model. The threshold ratio is set to 10%, but this value can be configured to suit each environment. \\\n **Splunk Phantom Playbook Integration**\\\nIf Splunk Phantom is also configured in your environment, a playbook called \"Suspicious Email Attachment Investigate and Delete\" can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/` and add the correct hostname to the \"Phantom Instance\" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search. The notable event will be sent to Phantom and the playbook will gather further information about the file attachment and its network behaviors. If Phantom finds malicious behavior and an analyst approves of the results, the email will be deleted from the user's inbox.", + "known_false_positives": "None at this time", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces", + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Suspicious Emails" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 7" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Email.recipient", + "All_Email.file_name", + "All_Email.src_user", + "All_Email.file_name", + "All_Email.message_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 7" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Suspicious Emails" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 7" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml", + "source": "application" + }, + { + "name": "Monitor Email For Brand Abuse", + "id": "b2ea1f38-3a3e-4b8a-9cf1-82760d86a6b8", + "version": 2, + "date": "2018-01-05", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Email" + ], + "description": "This search looks for emails claiming to be sent from a domain similar to one that you want to have monitored for abuse.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Email.recipient) as recipients, min(_time) as firstTime, max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Email by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.message_id | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Email\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | eval temp=split(src_user, \"@\") | eval email_domain=mvindex(temp, 1) | lookup update=true brandMonitoring_lookup domain as email_domain OUTPUT domain_abuse | search domain_abuse=true | table message_id, src_user, email_domain, recipients, firstTime, lastTime | `monitor_email_for_brand_abuse_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You need to ingest email header data. Specifically the sender's address (src_user) must be populated. You also need to have run the search \"ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names\", which creates the permutations of the domain that will be checked for.", + "known_false_positives": "None at this time", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Monitor Email For Brand Abuse", + "analytic_story": [ + "Brand Monitoring", + "Suspicious Emails" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 7" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Email.recipient", + "All_Email.src_user", + "All_Email.message_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 7" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Brand Monitoring", + "Suspicious Emails" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "DNSTwist Domain Names", + "id": "19f7d2ec-6028-4d01-bcdb-bda9a034c17f", + "version": 2, + "date": "2018-10-08", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search creates permutations of your existing domains, removes the valid domain names and stores them in a specified lookup file so they can be checked for in the associated detection searches.", + "search": "| dnstwist domainlist=domains.csv | `remove_valid_domains` | eval domain_abuse=\"true\" | table domain, domain_abuse | outputlookup brandMonitoring_lookup | stats count", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to update the file called domains.csv in the DA-ESS-SOC/lookup directory. Or `cim_corporate_email_domains.csv` and `cim_corporate_web_domains.csv` from **Splunk\\_SA\\_CIM**.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Brand Monitoring", + "Suspicious Emails" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Monitor Email For Brand Abuse", + "Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse", + "Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 7" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "monitor_email_for_brand_abuse_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "brandMonitoring_lookup", + "description": "A file that contains look-a-like domains for brands that you want to monitor", + "filename": "brand_monitoring.csv", + "default_match": "false", + "match_type": "WILDCARD(domain)", + "min_matches": 1 + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml", + "source": "application" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions", + "id": "473bd65f-06ca-4dfe-a2b8-ba04ab4a0084", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-07-22", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Email" + ], + "description": "This search looks for emails that have attachments with suspicious file extensions.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Email where All_Email.file_name=\"*\" by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.file_name All_Email.message_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Email\")` | `suspicious_email_attachments` | `suspicious_email_attachment_extensions_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "You need to ingest data from emails. Specifically, the sender's address and the file names of any attachments must be mapped to the Email data model. \\\n **Splunk Phantom Playbook Integration**\\\nIf Splunk Phantom is also configured in your environment, a Playbook called \"Suspicious Email Attachment Investigate and Delete\" can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/`, and add the correct hostname to the \"Phantom Instance\" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search. The notable event will be sent to Phantom and the playbook will gather further information about the file attachment and its network behaviors. If Phantom finds malicious behavior and an analyst approves of the results, the email will be deleted from the user's inbox.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions", + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Suspicious Emails" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 7", + "CIS 12" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566.001", + "T1566" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Email.file_name", + "All_Email.src_user", + "All_Email.message_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566.001", + "T1566" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 7", + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Suspicious Emails" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566.001", + "T1566" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 7", + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.AE", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_email_attachments", + "definition": "lookup update=true is_suspicious_file_extension_lookup file_name OUTPUT suspicious | search suspicious=true", + "description": "This macro limits the output to email attachments that have suspicious extensions" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_email_attachment_extensions_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml", + "source": "application" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get Email Info", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd75", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-11-09", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search returns all the information Splunk might have collected a specific email message over the last 2 hours.", + "search": "| from datamodel Email.All_Email | search message_id=$message_id$", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting your email logs or capturing unencrypted network traffic which contains email communications.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "message_id" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Brand Monitoring", + "Suspicious Emails" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "message" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_email_info" + }, + { + "name": "Get Emails From Specific Sender", + "id": "5df39b3f-447d-4869-b673-8f45ad4616fe", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-11-09", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search returns all the emails from a specific sender over the last 24 and next hours.", + "search": "| from datamodel Email.All_Email | search src_user=$src_user$", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must ingest your email logs or capture unencrypted email communications within network traffic, and populate the Email data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "src_user" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Brand Monitoring", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Web Fraud Detection" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "src_user" + ], + "security_domain": "networks" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_emails_from_specific_sender" + }, + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "id": "4d656b2e-d6be-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-08-05", + "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", + "description": "Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your GCP Storage buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open storage buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required.", + "narrative": "Similar to other cloud providers, GCP operates on a shared responsibility model. This means the end user, you, are responsible for setting appropriate access control lists and permissions on your GCP resources.\\ This Analytics Story concentrates on detecting things like open storage buckets (both read and write) along with storage bucket access from unfamiliar users and IP addresses.", + "references": [ + "https://cloud.google.com/blog/product/gcp/4-steps-for-hardening-your-cloud-storage-buckets-taking-charge-of-your-security", + "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/gcp/google-cloud-platform-gcp-bucket-enumeration/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "analytic_story": "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "category": [ + "Cloud Security" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Security Monitoring", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1530", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Cloud Storage Object", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Fox Kitten" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "datamodels": [], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Shannon Davis", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP", + "id": "ccc3246a-daa1-11ea-87d0-0242ac130022", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-08-10", + "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks at GCP Storage bucket-access logs and detects new or previously unseen remote IP addresses that have successfully accessed a GCP Storage bucket.", + "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` | multikv | rename sc_status_ as status | rename cs_object_ as bucket_name | rename c_ip_ as remote_ip | rename cs_uri_ as request_uri | rename cs_method_ as operation | search status=\"\\\"200\\\"\" | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by bucket_name remote_ip operation request_uri | table firstTime, lastTime, bucket_name, remote_ip, operation, request_uri | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by bucket_name remote_ip operation request_uri | outputlookup previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip | eval newIP=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(),\"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newIP=1 | eval first_time=strftime(firstTime,\"%m/%d/%y %H:%M:%S\") | eval last_time=strftime(lastTime,\"%m/%d/%y %H:%M:%S\") | table first_time last_time bucket_name remote_ip operation request_uri | `detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This search relies on the Splunk Add-on for Google Cloud Platform, setting up a Cloud Pub/Sub input, along with the relevant GCP PubSub topics and logging sink to capture GCP Storage Bucket events (https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/routing/overview). In order to capture public GCP Storage Bucket access logs, you must also enable storage bucket logging to your PubSub Topic as per https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/access-logs. These logs are deposited into the nominated Storage Bucket on an hourly basis and typically show up by 15 minutes past the hour. It is recommended to configure any saved searches or correlation searches in Enterprise Security to run on an hourly basis at 30 minutes past the hour (cron definition of 30 * * * *). A lookup table (previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip.csv) stores the previously seen access requests, and is used by this search to determine any newly seen IP addresses accessing the Storage Buckets.", + "known_false_positives": "GCP Storage buckets can be accessed from any IP (if the ACLs are open to allow it), as long as it can make a successful connection. This will be a false postive, since the search is looking for a new IP within the past two hours.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "GCP Storage Bucket", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13", + "CIS 14" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1530" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "sc_status_", + "cs_object_", + "c_ip_", + "cs_uri_", + "cs_method_" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1530", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Cloud Storage Object", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Fox Kitten" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1530" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13", + "CIS 14" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "dest", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1530" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13", + "CIS 14" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip", + "description": "A place holder for a list of GCP storage access from remote IPs", + "filename": "previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip.csv", + "default_match": "false", + "min_matches": 1 + }, + { + "name": "previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip", + "description": "A place holder for a list of GCP storage access from remote IPs", + "filename": "previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip.csv", + "default_match": "false", + "min_matches": 1 + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml", + "source": "cloud" + }, + { + "name": "Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets", + "id": "f6ea3466-d6bb-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-08-05", + "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for GCP PubSub events where a user has created an open/public GCP Storage bucket.", + "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.resource.type=gcs_bucket data.protoPayload.methodName=storage.setIamPermissions | spath output=action path=data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.action | spath output=user path=data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail | spath output=location path=data.protoPayload.resourceLocation.currentLocations{} | spath output=src path=data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp | spath output=bucketName path=data.protoPayload.resourceName | spath output=role path=data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.role | spath output=member path=data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.member | search (member=allUsers AND action=ADD) | table _time, bucketName, src, user, location, action, role, member | search `detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This search relies on the Splunk Add-on for Google Cloud Platform, setting up a Cloud Pub/Sub input, along with the relevant GCP PubSub topics and logging sink to capture GCP Storage Bucket events (https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/routing/overview).", + "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that a GCP admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. That said, GCP strongly advises against granting full control to the \"allUsers\" group.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "GCP Storage Bucket", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1530" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "data.resource.type", + "data.protoPayload.methodName", + "data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.action", + "data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail", + "data.protoPayload.resourceLocation.currentLocations{}", + "data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp", + "data.protoPayload.resourceName", + "data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.role", + "data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.member" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1530", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Cloud Storage Object", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Collection" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Fox Kitten" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1530" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1530" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 13" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml", + "source": "cloud" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "id": "1e5a5a53-540b-462a-8fb7-f44a4292f5dc", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-01-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Michael Haag, Splunk", + "description": "Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.", + "narrative": "One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the mshta.exe process, which loads Microsoft HTML applications (mshtml.dll) with the .hta suffix. In these cases, attackers use the trusted Windows utility to proxy execution of malicious files, whether an .hta application, javascript, or VBScript.\\\nThe searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an attacker is leveraging mshta.exe to execute malicious code.\\\nTriage\\\nValidate execution \\\n1. Determine if MSHTA.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of MSHTA.exe and further PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\\windows\\system32 or c:\\windows\\syswow64, it should be highly suspect.\\\n1. Determine if script code was executed with MSHTA.\\\nSituational Awareness\\\nThe objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by MSHTA.exe.\\\n1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application?\\\n1. Module loads. Are the known MSHTA.exe modules being loaded by a non-standard application? Is MSHTA loading any suspicious .DLLs?\\\n1. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain.\\\nRetrieval of script code\\\nThe objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.", + "references": [ + "https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", + "https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005/", + "https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "analytic_story": "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "FIN7", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Sidewinder", + "TA551" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "Putter Panda", + "RTM", + "Rocke", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", + "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [ + "ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", + "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments" + ], + "author_company": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Detect mshta inline hta execution", + "id": "a0873b32-5b68-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 6, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies \"mshta.exe\" execution with inline protocol handlers. \"JavaScript\", \"VBScript\", and \"About\" are the only supported options when invoking HTA content directly on the command-line. The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process \"mshta.exe\" and its parent process.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_mshta` (Processes.process=*vbscript* OR Processes.process=*javascript* OR Processes.process=*about*) by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses", + "https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/search/-search-3x-wds-extidx-prot-implementing" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect mshta inline hta execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ executing with inline HTA, indicative of defense evasion.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.005" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 90, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "FIN7", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Sidewinder", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.005" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 90 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 90 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.005" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect mshta inline hta execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect mshta inline hta execution", + "file": "endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "process_mshta", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=mshta.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSHTA.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect mshta renamed", + "id": "8f45fcf0-5b68-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies renamed instances of mshta.exe executing. Mshta.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64. This analytic utilizes the internal name of the PE to identify if is the legitimate mshta binary. Further analysis should be performed to review the executed content and validation it is the real mshta.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_mshta` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mshta_renamed_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of mshta.exe, but never renamed, triggering a false positive.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses", + "https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect mshta renamed", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.005" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "FIN7", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Sidewinder", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.005" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.005" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect mshta renamed Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect mshta renamed", + "file": "endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "process_mshta", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=mshta.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSHTA.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "detect_mshta_renamed_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line", + "id": "9b3af1e6-5b68-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies when Microsoft HTML Application Host (mshta.exe) utility is used to make remote http connections. Adversaries may use mshta.exe to proxy the download and execution of remote .hta files. The analytic identifies command line arguments of http and https being used. This technique is commonly used by malicious software to bypass preventative controls. The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process \"rundll32.exe\" and its parent process.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_mshta` (Processes.process=\"*http://*\" OR Processes.process=\"*https://*\") by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mshta_url_in_command_line_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible legitimate applications may perform this behavior and will need to be filtered.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses", + "https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/search/-search-3x-wds-extidx-prot-implementing" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $est$ by user $user$ attempting to access a remote destination to download an additional payload.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.005" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "FIN7", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Sidewinder", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.005" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.005" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line", + "file": "endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "process_mshta", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=mshta.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSHTA.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "detect_mshta_url_in_command_line_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe", + "id": "dcfd6b40-42f9-469d-a433-2e53f7486664", + "version": 6, + "date": "2020-11-10", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for executions of cmd.exe spawned by a process that is often abused by attackers and that does not typically launch cmd.exe.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |search [`prohibited_apps_launching_cmd`] | `detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts and populates the Endpoint data model with the resultant dataset. This search includes a lookup file, `prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.csv`, that contains a list of processes that should not be spawning cmd.exe. You can modify this lookup to better suit your environment. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "There are circumstances where an application may legitimately execute and interact with the Windows command-line interface. Investigate and modify the lookup file, as appropriate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious Zoom Child Processes", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/powershell_spawn_cmd/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ running prohibited applications.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.003" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious Zoom Child Processes", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe", + "file": "endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/powershell_spawn_cmd/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "prohibited_apps_launching_cmd", + "definition": "| inputlookup prohibited_apps_launching_cmd | rename prohibited_applications as parent_process_name | eval parent_process_name=\"*\" . parent_process_name | table parent_process_name", + "description": "This macro outputs a list of process that should not be the parent process of cmd.exe" + }, + { + "name": "process_cmd", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution", + "id": "91c79f14-5b41-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-01-20", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies \"rundll32.exe\" execution with inline protocol handlers. \"JavaScript\", \"VBScript\", and \"About\" are the only supported options when invoking HTA content directly on the command-line. This type of behavior is commonly observed with fileless malware or application whitelisting bypass techniques. The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process \"rundll32.exe\" and its parent process.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` (Processes.process=*vbscript* OR Processes.process=*javascript* OR Processes.process=*about*) by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses", + "https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/search/-search-3x-wds-extidx-prot-implementing" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious rundll32.exe inline HTA execution on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.005" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "FIN7", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Sidewinder", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.005" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.005" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution", + "file": "endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", + "id": "f5f6af30-7aa7-4295-bfe9-07fe87c01a4b", + "version": 7, + "date": "2022-01-26", + "author": "Jose Hernandez, David Dorsey, Teoderick Contreras, Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to launch an application or service at system startup.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\RunOnce OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\run* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentVersion\\\\Windows\\\\Appinit_Dlls* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Shell* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Notify* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Userinit* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\VmApplet* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\policies\\\\explorer\\\\run* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\runservices* OR Registry.registry_path=HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Netsh\\\\* OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Image File Execution Options*\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=Debugger) OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Security Packages\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\\\\OSConfig\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Security Packages\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\SilentProcessExit\\\\*\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*currentVersion\\\\Windows\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Load\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentVersion\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Svchost\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\"AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"BootExecute\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Software\\\\Run\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"auto_update\")) by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "There are many legitimate applications that must execute on system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Ransomware", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "IcedID", + "Remcos" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 95, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/atomic_red_team/t1547001-runonce.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to persistence in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1547.001", + "T1547" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user" + ], + "risk_score": 76, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "Putter Panda", + "RTM", + "Rocke", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.001", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Ransomware", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "IcedID", + "Remcos" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 95 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 76 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 76 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.001", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", + "file": "endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious mshta child process", + "id": "60023bb6-5500-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-01-12", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies child processes spawning from \"mshta.exe\". The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, parent process \"mshta.exe\" and its child process.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=mshta.exe AND (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=colorcpl.exe OR Processes.process_name=msbuild.exe OR Processes.process_name=microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe OR Processes.process_name=searchprotocolhost.exe OR Processes.process_name=scrcons.exe OR Processes.process_name=cscript.exe OR Processes.process_name=wscript.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=cmd.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_mshta_child_process_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses", + "https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious mshta child process", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "suspicious mshta child process detected on host $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.005" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "FIN7", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Sidewinder", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.005" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 40 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 40 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process", + "threat_object_type": "process name" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.005" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Suspicious mshta child process Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious mshta child process", + "file": "endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-7d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_mshta_child_process_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious mshta spawn", + "id": "4d33a488-5b5f-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-01-20", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning mshta.exe. This behavior is indicative of a DCOM object being utilized to spawn mshta from wmiprvse.exe or svchost.exe. In this instance, adversaries may use LethalHTA that will spawn mshta.exe from svchost.exe.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=svchost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe) AND `process_mshta` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.user Processes.original_file_name| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_mshta_spawn_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive.", + "references": [ + "https://codewhitesec.blogspot.com/2018/07/lethalhta.html", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses", + "https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious mshta spawn", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "mshta.exe spawned by wmiprvse.exe on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.005" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "FIN7", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Sidewinder", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.005" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 42 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.005" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Suspicious mshta spawn Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious mshta spawn", + "file": "endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "process_mshta", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=mshta.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSHTA.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_mshta_spawn_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + }, + { + "name": "Get Parent Process Info", + "id": "fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41bf9", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-02-28", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "parent_process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Phishing Payloads", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_parent_process_info" + }, + { + "name": "Get Process Info", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd71", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-01", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the process running on a host which is under investigation. To gather the process info, enter the values for the process name in question and the destination IP address.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search process_name= $process_name$ | search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_process_info" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Okta Activity", + "id": "9cbd34af-8f39-4476-a423-bacd126c750b", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-04-02", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "description": "Monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities. Due to the Covid outbreak, many users are migrating over to leverage cloud services more and more. Okta is a popular tool to manage multiple users and the web-based applications they need to stay productive. The searches in this story will help monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities and associated user behaviors.", + "narrative": "Okta is the leading single sign on (SSO) provider, allowing users to authenticate once to Okta, and from there access a variety of web-based applications. These applications are assigned to users and allow administrators to centrally manage which users are allowed to access which applications. It also provides centralized logging to help understand how the applications are used and by whom. \\\nWhile SSO is a major convenience for users, it also provides attackers with an opportunity. If the attacker can gain access to Okta, they can access a variety of applications. As such monitoring the environment is important. \\\nWith people moving quickly to adopt web-based applications and ways to manage them, many are still struggling to understand how best to monitor these environments. This analytic story provides searches to help monitor this environment, and identify events and activity that warrant further investigation such as credential stuffing or password spraying attacks, and users logging in from multiple locations when travel is disallowed.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1078", + "https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Credential_stuffing", + "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/answer/What-is-a-password-spraying-attack-and-how-does-it-work" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Okta Activity", + "analytic_story": "Suspicious Okta Activity", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Security Monitoring", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "datamodels": [], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP - Rule", + "ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", + "ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", + "ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task", + "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task", + "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Rico Valdez", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP", + "id": "19cba45f-cad3-4032-8911-0c09e0444552", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects Okta login failures due to bad credentials for multiple users originating from the same ip address.", + "search": "`okta` outcome.reason=INVALID_CREDENTIALS | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(user) as distinct_users values(user) as users by src_ip, displayMessage, outcome.reason, country, state, city | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search distinct_users > 5| `multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being ingested in your Splunk deployment.", + "known_false_positives": "A single public IP address servicing multiple legitmate users may trigger this search. In addition, the threshold of 5 distinct users may be too low for your needs. You may modify the included filter macro `multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip_filter` to raise the threshold or except specific IP adresses from triggering this search.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Okta Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Infrastructure", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078", + "T1078.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "outcome.reason", + "client.geographicalContext.country", + "client.geographicalContext.state", + "client.geographicalContext.city", + "user", + "src_ip", + "displayMessage" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "access", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078", + "T1078.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Okta Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078", + "T1078.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "okta", + "definition": "eventtype=okta_log", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip.yml", + "source": "application" + }, + { + "name": "Okta Account Lockout Events", + "id": "62b70968-a0a5-4724-8ac4-67871e6f544d", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "Detect Okta user lockout events", + "search": "`okta` displayMessage=\"Max sign in attempts exceeded\" | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | table _time, user, country, state, city, src_ip | `okta_account_lockout_events_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being ingested in your Splunk deployment.", + "known_false_positives": "None. Account lockouts should be followed up on to determine if the actual user was the one who caused the lockout, or if it was an unauthorized actor.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Okta Account Lockout Events", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Okta Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Infrastructure", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078", + "T1078.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "displayMessage", + "client.geographicalContext.country", + "client.geographicalContext.state", + "client.geographicalContext.city" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "access", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078", + "T1078.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Okta Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078", + "T1078.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "okta", + "definition": "eventtype=okta_log", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "okta_account_lockout_events_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml", + "source": "application" + }, + { + "name": "Okta Failed SSO Attempts", + "id": "371a6545-2618-4032-ad84-93386b8698c5", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "Detect failed Okta SSO events", + "search": "`okta` displayMessage=\"User attempted unauthorized access to app\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(app) as Apps count by user, result ,displayMessage, src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_failed_sso_attempts_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being ingested in your Splunk deployment.", + "known_false_positives": "There may be a faulty config preventing legitmate users from accessing apps they should have access to.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Okta Failed SSO Attempts", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Okta Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Infrastructure", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078", + "T1078.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "displayMessage", + "app", + "user", + "result", + "src_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "access", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078", + "T1078.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Okta Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078", + "T1078.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "okta", + "definition": "eventtype=okta_log", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "okta_failed_sso_attempts_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml", + "source": "application" + }, + { + "name": "Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities", + "id": "7594fa07-9f34-4d01-81cc-d6af6a5db9e8", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects logins from the same user from different cities in a 24 hour period.", + "search": "`okta` displayMessage=\"User login to Okta\" client.geographicalContext.city!=null | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(client.geographicalContext.city) as locations values(client.geographicalContext.city) as cities values(client.geographicalContext.state) as states by user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities_filter` | search locations > 1", + "how_to_implement": "This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being ingested in your Splunk deployment.", + "known_false_positives": "Users in your enviornment may legitmately be travelling and loggin in from different locations. This search is useful for those users that should *not* be travelling for some reason, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. The search also relies on the geographical information being populated in the Okta logs. It is also possible that a connection from another region may be attributed to a login from a remote VPN endpoint.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Okta Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Infrastructure", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1078", + "T1078.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "displayMessage", + "client.geographicalContext.city", + "client.geographicalContext.state", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "access", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN4", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "Leviathan", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "Suckfly", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078", + "T1078.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Okta Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1078", + "T1078.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "okta", + "definition": "eventtype=okta_log", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml", + "source": "application" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Investigate Okta Activity by app", + "id": "420eb1b8-2992-45d1-80cf-0b1b2759524d", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-04-02", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search returns all okta events associated with a specific app", + "search": "`okta` app=$app$ | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | table _time, user, displayMessage, app, src_ip, state, city, result, outcome.reason", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Okta logs", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "app" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Okta Activity" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "app", + "client.geographicalContext.country", + "client.geographicalContext.state", + "client.geographicalContext.city", + "user", + "displayMessage", + "src_ip", + "result", + "outcome.reason" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "investigate_okta_activity_by_app" + }, + { + "name": "Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address", + "id": "56aae066-d619-477c-93e3-3fb83b2d23c3", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-04-02", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search returns all okta events from a specific IP address.", + "search": "`okta` src_ip={src_ip} | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | table _time, user, displayMessage, app, src_ip, state, city, result, outcome.reason", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Okta logs", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Okta Activity" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "app", + "client.geographicalContext.country", + "client.geographicalContext.state", + "client.geographicalContext.city", + "user", + "displayMessage", + "src_ip", + "result", + "outcome.reason" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address" + }, + { + "name": "Investigate User Activities In Okta", + "id": "24ff145d-4d16-420a-b047-480f2a51c403", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-04-02", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search returns all okta events by a specific user", + "search": "`okta` user=$user$ | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | table _time, user, displayMessage, app, src_ip, state, city, result, outcome.reason", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Okta logs", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "user" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Okta Activity" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "client.geographicalContext.country", + "client.geographicalContext.state", + "client.geographicalContext.city", + "user", + "displayMessage", + "src_ip", + "result", + "outcome.reason" + ], + "security_domain": "network" + }, + "lowercase_name": "investigate_user_activities_in_okta" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity", + "id": "2cdf33a0-4805-4b61-b025-59c20f418fbe", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-02-11", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "description": "Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.", + "narrative": " Adversaries may abuse Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET Component Object Model (COM) assemblies. Both are digitally signed by Microsoft. The following queries assist with detecting suspicious and malicious usage of Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe. Upon reviewing usage of Regasm.exe Regsvcs.exe, review file modification events for possible script code written. Review parallel process events for csc.exe being utilized to compile script code.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", + "https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master/documentation/modules/evasion/windows/applocker_evasion_regasm_regsvcs.md", + "https://oddvar.moe/2017/12/13/applocker-case-study-how-insecure-is-it-really-part-1/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity", + "analytic_story": "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.009", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Detect Regasm Spawning a Process - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Regasm with Network Connection - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Michael Haag", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Detect Regasm Spawning a Process", + "id": "72170ec5-f7d2-42f5-aefb-2b8be6aad15f", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-02-12", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies regasm.exe spawning a process. This particular technique has been used in the wild to bypass application control products. Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe are signed by Microsoft. Spawning of a child process is rare from either process and should be investigated further. During investigation, identify and retrieve the content being loaded. Review parallel processes for additional suspicious behavior. Gather any other file modifications and review accordingly. regsvcs.exe and regasm.exe are natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=regasm.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regasm_spawning_a_process_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, limited instances of regasm.exe or regsvcs.exe may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.md", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvcs/", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regasm/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Regasm Spawning a Process", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ spawning a child process, typically not normal behavior for $parent_process_name$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.009" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.009", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.009" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.009" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Regasm Spawning a Process Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Regasm Spawning a Process", + "file": "endpoint/detect_regasm_spawning_a_process.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_regasm_spawning_a_process_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_regasm_spawning_a_process.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Regasm with Network Connection", + "id": "07921114-6db4-4e2e-ae58-3ea8a52ae93f", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-02-18", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies regasm.exe with a network connection to a public IP address, exluding private IP space. This particular technique has been used in the wild to bypass application control products. Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe are signed by Microsoft. By contacting a remote command and control server, the adversary will have the ability to escalate privileges and complete the objectives. During investigation, identify and retrieve the content being loaded. Review parallel processes for additional suspicious behavior. Gather any other file modifications and review accordingly. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain and block as needed. regsvcs.exe and regasm.exe are natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventID=3 dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/12 dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16 process_name=regasm.exe | rename Computer as dest | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, user, process_name, src_ip, dest_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regasm_with_network_connection_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, limited instances of regasm.exe with a network connection may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.md", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regasm/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Regasm with Network Connection", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ contacting a remote destination was identified on endpoint $Computer$ by user $user$. This behavior is not normal for $process_name$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.009" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventID", + "dest_ip", + "process_name", + "Computer", + "user", + "src_ip", + "dest_host", + "dest_ip" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.009", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.009" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.009" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Regasm with Network Connection Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Regasm with Network Connection", + "file": "endpoint/detect_regasm_with_network_connection.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_regasm_with_network_connection_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_regasm_with_network_connection.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments", + "id": "c3bc1430-04e7-4178-835f-047d8e6e97df", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-09-20", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies regasm.exe with no command line arguments. This particular behavior occurs when another process injects into regasm.exe, no command line arguments will be present. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Regasm.exe are natively found in `C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe` and `C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe`.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regasm` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(regasm\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | `detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, limited instances of regasm.exe or may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.md", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regasm/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "The process $process_name$ was spawned by $parent_process_name$ without any command-line arguments on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.009" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.009", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.009" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.009" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments", + "file": "endpoint/detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_regasm", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=regasm.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RegAsm.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process", + "id": "bc477b57-5c21-4ab6-9c33-668772e7f114", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-02-12", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies regsvcs.exe spawning a process. This particular technique has been used in the wild to bypass application control products. Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe are signed by Microsoft. Spawning of a child process is rare from either process and should be investigated further. During investigation, identify and retrieve the content being loaded. Review parallel processes for additional suspicious behavior. Gather any other file modifications and review accordingly. regsvcs.exe and regasm.exe are natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=regsvcs.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regsvcs_spawning_a_process_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, limited instances of regasm.exe or regsvcs.exe may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.md", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvcs/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ typically not normal for this process.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.009" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.009", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.009" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.009" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process", + "file": "endpoint/detect_regsvcs_spawning_a_process.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_regsvcs_spawning_a_process_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_spawning_a_process.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection", + "id": "e3e7a1c0-f2b9-445c-8493-f30a63522d1a", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-02-18", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies Regsvcs.exe with a network connection to a public IP address, exluding private IP space. This particular technique has been used in the wild to bypass application control products. Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe are signed by Microsoft. By contacting a remote command and control server, the adversary will have the ability to escalate privileges and complete the objectives. During investigation, identify and retrieve the content being loaded. Review parallel processes for additional suspicious behavior. Gather any other file modifications and review accordingly. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain and block as needed. regsvcs.exe and regasm.exe are natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventID=3 dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/12 dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16 process_name=regsvcs.exe | rename Computer as dest | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, user, process_name, src_ip, dest_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, limited instances of regsvcs.exe may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.md", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvcs/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ contacting a remote destination was identified on endpoint $Computer$ by user $user$. This behavior is not normal for $process_name$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.009" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventID", + "dest_ip", + "process_name", + "Computer", + "user", + "src_ip", + "dest_host" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "Endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.009", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.009" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.009" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection", + "file": "endpoint/detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments", + "id": "6b74d578-a02e-4e94-a0d1-39440d0bf254", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-09-20", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies regsvcs.exe with no command line arguments. This particular behavior occurs when another process injects into regsvcs.exe, no command line arguments will be present. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Regasm.exe are natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvcs` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(regsvcs\\.exe.{0,4}$)\"| `detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, limited instances of regsvcs.exe may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.md", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvcs/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "The process $process_name$ was spawned by $parent_process_name$ without any command-line arguments on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.009" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.009", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.009" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.009" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments", + "file": "endpoint/detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_regsvcs", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvcs.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RegSvcs.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [] + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", + "id": "b8bee41e-624f-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-01-29", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "description": "Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the regsvr32.exe process to execute malicious code.", + "narrative": "One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the regsvr32.exe process. This particular bypass was popularized with \"SquiblyDoo\" using the \"scrobj.dll\" dll to load .sct scriptlets. This technique is still widely used by adversaries to bypass detection and prevention controls. The file extension of the DLL is irrelevant (it may load a .txt file extension for example). The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging regsvr32.exe to execute malicious code. Validate execution Determine if regsvr32.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of regsvr32.exe and further PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\\windows\\system32 or c:\\windows\\syswow64, it should be highly suspect. Determine if script code was executed with regsvr32. Situational Awareness - The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by regsvr32.exe. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application? Module loads. Is regsvr32 loading any suspicious .DLLs? Unsigned or signed from non-standard paths. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain. Retrieval of Script Code - confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.md", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", + "analytic_story": "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cobalt Group", + "Deep Panda", + "Inception", + "Leviathan", + "TA551", + "WIRTE" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN8", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule", + "ESCU - Malicious InProcServer32 Modification - Rule", + "ESCU - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule", + "ESCU - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Michael Haag", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass", + "id": "070e9b80-6252-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-01-28", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. Regsvr32.exe is also a Microsoft signed binary.This variation of the technique is often referred to as a \"Squiblydoo\" attack. \\\nUpon investigating, look for network connections to remote destinations (internal or external). Be cautious to modify the query to look for \"scrobj.dll\", the \".dll\" is not required to load scrobj. \"scrobj.dll\" will be loaded by \"regsvr32.exe\" upon execution. ", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` Processes.process=*scrobj* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives related to third party software registering .DLL's.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.md", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/", + "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/how-to-use-the-regsvr32-tool-and-troubleshoot-regsvr32-error-messages-a98d960a-7392-e6fe-d90a-3f4e0cb543e5" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", + "Cobalt Strike" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.010/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ in an attempt to bypass detection and preventative controls was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.010" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cobalt Group", + "Deep Panda", + "Inception", + "Leviathan", + "TA551", + "WIRTE" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.010" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", + "Cobalt Strike" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.010" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass", + "file": "endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.010/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_regsvr32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=REGSVR32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Malicious InProcServer32 Modification", + "id": "127c8d08-25ff-11ec-9223-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-10-05", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a process modifying the registry with a known malicious CLSID under InProcServer32. Most COM classes are registered with the operating system and are identified by a GUID that represents the Class Identifier (CLSID) within the registry (usually under HKLM\\\\Software\\\\Classes\\\\CLSID or HKCU\\\\Software\\\\Classes\\\\CLSID). Behind the implementation of a COM class is the server (some binary) that is referenced within registry keys under the CLSID. The LocalServer32 key represents a path to an executable (exe) implementation, and the InprocServer32 key represents a path to a dynamic link library (DLL) implementation (Bohops). During triage, review parallel processes for suspicious activity. Pivot on the process GUID to see the full timeline of events. Analyze the value and look for file modifications. Being this is looking for inprocserver32, a DLL found in the value will most likely be loaded by a parallel process.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_guid Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\CLSID\\\\{89565275-A714-4a43-912E-978B935EDCCC}\\\\InProcServer32\\\\(Default)\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest Registry.process_guid Registry.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | fields _time dest registry_path registry_key_name registry_value_name process_name process_path process process_guid user] | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, process_name registry_path registry_key_name registry_value_name user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_inprocserver32_modification_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, filter as needed. In our test case, Remcos used regsvr32.exe to modify the registry. It may be required, dependent upon the EDR tool producing registry events, to remove (Default) from the command-line.", + "references": [ + "https://bohops.com/2018/06/28/abusing-com-registry-structure-clsid-localserver32-inprocserver32/", + "https://tria.ge/210929-ap75vsddan", + "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/cb77b93150cb0f7fe65ce8a7e2a5781e727419451355a7736db84109fa215a89" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Malicious InProcServer32 Modification", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", + "Remcos" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "The $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ modifying the registry with a known malicious clsid under InProcServer32.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218.010", + "T1112" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "dest", + "process_name", + "registry_path", + "registry_key_name", + "registry_value_name", + "user" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cobalt Group", + "Deep Panda", + "Inception", + "Leviathan", + "TA551", + "WIRTE" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN8", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218.010", + "T1112" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", + "Remcos" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218.010", + "T1112" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Malicious InProcServer32 Modification Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Malicious InProcServer32 Modification", + "file": "endpoint/malicious_inprocserver32_modification.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "malicious_inprocserver32_modification_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/malicious_inprocserver32_modification.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading", + "id": "f421c250-24e7-11ec-bc43-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-10-04", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a loading of dll using regsvr32 application with silent parameter and dllinstall execution. This technique was seen in several RAT malware similar to remcos, njrat and adversaries to load their malicious DLL on the compromised machine. This TTP may executed by normal 3rd party application so it is better to pivot by the parent process, parent command-line and command-line of the file that execute this regsvr32.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` AND Processes.process=\"*/i*\" by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"(?i)[\\-|\\/][Ss]{1}\") | `regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Other third part application may used this parameter but not so common in base windows environment.", + "references": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/dc93ee63-050c-4ff8-b07e-8277af9ab939/#", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", + "Remcos", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/vbs_wscript/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a DLL using the silent and dllinstall parameter.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.010" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 36, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cobalt Group", + "Deep Panda", + "Inception", + "Leviathan", + "TA551", + "WIRTE" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.010" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", + "Remcos", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 36 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 36 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.010" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading", + "file": "endpoint/regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/vbs_wscript/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_regsvr32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=REGSVR32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline", + "id": "c9ef7dc4-eeaf-11eb-b2b6-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-07-27", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies Regsvr32.exe utilizing the silent switch to load DLLs. This technique has most recently been seen in IcedID campaigns to load its initial dll that will download the 2nd stage loader that will download and decrypt the config payload. The switch type may be either a hyphen `-` or forward slash `/`. This behavior is typically found with `-s`, and it is possible there are more switch types that may be used. \\ During triage, review parallel processes and capture any artifacts that may have landed on disk. Isolate and contain the endpoint as necessary.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"(?i)[\\-|\\/][Ss]{1}\") | `regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "minimal. but network operator can use this application to load dll.", + "references": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/56680cba-2bbc-4b34-8633-5f7878ddf858/", + "https://regexr.com/699e2" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline", + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID", + "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", + "Remcos" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a DLL using the silent parameter.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.010" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cobalt Group", + "Deep Panda", + "Inception", + "Leviathan", + "TA551", + "WIRTE" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.010" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID", + "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", + "Remcos" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.010" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline", + "file": "endpoint/regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-150d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_regsvr32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=REGSVR32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path", + "id": "62732736-6250-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-01-28", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code by using non-standard file extensions to load malciious DLLs. Upon investigating, look for network connections to remote destinations (internal or external). Review additional parrallel processes and child processes for additional activity.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` (Processes.process=*appdata* OR Processes.process=*programdata* OR Processes.process=*windows\\temp*) (Processes.process!=*.dll Processes.process!=*.ax Processes.process!=*.ocx) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model. Tune the query by filtering additional extensions found to be used by legitimate processes. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives with the query restricted to specified paths. Add more world writeable paths as tuning continues.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.md", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/", + "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/how-to-use-the-regsvr32-tool-and-troubleshoot-regsvr32-error-messages-a98d960a-7392-e6fe-d90a-3f4e0cb543e5", + "https://any.run/report/f29a7d2ecd3585e1e4208e44bcc7156ab5388725f1d29d03e7699da0d4598e7c/0826458b-5367-45cf-b841-c95a33a01718" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", + "Iceid" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.010/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Suspicious $Processes.process_path.file_path$ process potentially loading malicious code", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.010" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Processes.process_path.file_path", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cobalt Group", + "Deep Panda", + "Inception", + "Leviathan", + "TA551", + "WIRTE" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.010" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", + "Iceid" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Processes.process_path.file_path", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 35 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "Processes.process_path.file_path", + "threat_object_type": "file name" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.010" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path", + "file": "endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.010/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_regsvr32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=REGSVR32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [] + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", + "id": "80a65487-854b-42f1-80a1-935e4c170694", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-02-03", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "description": "Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage rundll32.exe to execute arbitrary malicious code.", + "narrative": "One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the rundll32.exe process. Natively, rundll32.exe will load DLLs and is a great example of a Living off the Land Binary. Rundll32.exe may load malicious DLLs by ordinals, function names or directly. The queries in this story focus on loading default DLLs, syssetup.dll, ieadvpack.dll, advpack.dll and setupapi.dll from disk that may be abused by adversaries. Additionally, two analytics developed to assist with identifying DLLRegisterServer, Start and StartW functions being called. The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging rundll32.exe to execute malicious code.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", + "analytic_story": "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "CopyKittens", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "MuddyWater", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "TA551" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "GALLIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cleaver", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Whitefly" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access", + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Exploitation", + "Installation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup - Rule", + "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", + "ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt - Rule", + "ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory - Rule", + "ESCU - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", + "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Michael Haag", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 Rename", + "id": "7360137f-abad-473e-8189-acbdaa34d114", + "version": 4, + "date": "2022-02-01", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following hunting analytic identifies renamed instances of rundll32.exe executing. rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64. During investigation, validate it is the legitimate rundll32.exe executing and what script content it is loading. This query relies on the original filename or internal name from the PE meta data. Expand the query as needed by looking for specific command line arguments outlined in other analytics.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_rename_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 Rename", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Suspicious renamed rundll32.exe binary ran on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1036", + "T1218.011", + "T1036.003" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "CopyKittens", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "MuddyWater", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "TA551" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "GALLIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1036", + "T1218.011", + "T1036.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 63 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 63 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1036", + "T1218.011", + "T1036.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_rundll32_rename_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/suspicious_rundll32_rename.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack", + "id": "4aefadfe-9abd-4bf8-b3fd-867e9ef95bf8", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-02-04", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading advpack.dll and ieadvpack.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line. This particular technique will load script code from a file. Upon a successful execution, the following module loads may occur - clr.dll, jscript.dll and scrobj.dll. During investigation, identify script content origination. Generally, a child process will spawn from rundll32.exe, but that may be bypassed based on script code contents. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64. During investigation, review any network connections and obtain the script content executed. It's possible other files are on disk.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*advpack* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use advpack.dll or ieadvpack.dll, triggering a false positive.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Advpack/", + "https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ loading advpack.dll and ieadvpack.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "CopyKittens", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "MuddyWater", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack", + "file": "endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi", + "id": "61e7b44a-6088-4f26-b788-9a96ba13b37a", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-02-04", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading setupapi.dll and iesetupapi.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line. This particular technique will load script code from a file. Upon a successful execution, the following module loads may occur - clr.dll, jscript.dll and scrobj.dll. During investigation, identify script content origination. Generally, a child process will spawn from rundll32.exe, but that may be bypassed based on script code contents. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64. During investigation, review any network connections and obtain the script content executed. It's possible other files are on disk.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*setupapi* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use setupapi triggering a false positive.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Setupapi/", + "https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ loading setupapi.dll and iesetupapi.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "CopyKittens", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "MuddyWater", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi", + "file": "endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup", + "id": "71b9bf37-cde1-45fb-b899-1b0aa6fa1183", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-02-04", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading syssetup.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line. This particular technique will load script code from a file. Upon a successful execution, the following module loads may occur - clr.dll, jscript.dll and scrobj.dll. During investigation, identify script content origination. Generally, a child process will spawn from rundll32.exe, but that may be bypassed based on script code contents. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64. During investigation, review any network connections and obtain the script content executed. It's possible other files are on disk.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*syssetup* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use syssetup.dll, triggering a false positive.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Syssetup/", + "https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ loading syssetup.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "CopyKittens", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "MuddyWater", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup", + "file": "endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL", + "id": "8943b567-f14d-4ee8-a0bb-2121d4ce3184", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-02-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "Detect the usage of comsvcs.dll for dumping the lsass process.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*comsvcs.dll* Processes.process=*MiniDump* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified.", + "references": [ + "https://modexp.wordpress.com/2019/08/30/minidumpwritedump-via-com-services-dll/", + "https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1167417096374050817" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL", + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", + "HAFNIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified accessing credentials using comsvcs.dll on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Cleaver", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "HAFNIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Whitefly" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Credential Dumping", + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", + "HAFNIUM Group" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1003.001", + "T1003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL", + "file": "endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt", + "id": "c8e7ced0-10c5-11ec-8b03-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-08", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following hunting detection identifies rundll32.exe with `control_rundll` within the command-line, loading a .cpl or another file type. Developed in relation to CVE-2021-40444. Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. \\ This is written to be a bit more broad by not including .cpl. \\ During triage, review parallel processes to identify any further suspicious behavior.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*Control_RunDLL* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_control_rundll_hunt_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "This is a hunting detection, meant to provide a understanding of how voluminous control_rundll is within the environment.", + "references": [ + "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/rundll32.exe-111474C61232202B5B588D2B512CBB25.html", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/36c14029-9df8-439c-bba0-45f2643b0c70/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", + "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.002/T1218.002.yaml", + "https://redcanary.com/blog/intelligence-insights-december-2021/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", + "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a suspicious file from disk.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-40444" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "CopyKittens", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "MuddyWater", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", + "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-40444" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 15 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt", + "file": "endpoint/rundll32_control_rundll_hunt.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "rundll32_control_rundll_hunt_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/rundll32_control_rundll_hunt.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory", + "id": "1adffe86-10c3-11ec-8ce6-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-08", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following detection identifies rundll32.exe with `control_rundll` within the command-line, loading a .cpl or another file type from windows\\temp, programdata, or appdata. Developed in relation to CVE-2021-40444. Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. This is written to be a bit more broad by not including .cpl. The paths are specified, add more as needed. During triage, review parallel processes to identify any further suspicious behavior.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*Control_RunDLL* AND Processes.process IN (\"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\windows\\\\temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "This may be tuned, or a new one related, by adding .cpl to command-line. However, it's important to look for both. Tune/filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/rundll32.exe-111474C61232202B5B588D2B512CBB25.html", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/36c14029-9df8-439c-bba0-45f2643b0c70/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", + "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.002/T1218.002.yaml", + "https://redcanary.com/blog/intelligence-insights-december-2021/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", + "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a suspicious file from disk.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-40444" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "CopyKittens", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "MuddyWater", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", + "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-40444" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory", + "file": "endpoint/rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network", + "id": "35307032-a12d-11eb-835f-acde48001122", + "version": 3, + "date": "2021-10-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments and performing a network connection. It is unusual for rundll32.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` by _time span=1h Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(rundll32\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port !=\"0\" by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port| `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_guid connection_to_CNC dest_port | `rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `port` node. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32", + "https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", + "Cobalt Strike", + "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A rundll32 process $process_name$ with no commandline argument like this process commandline $process$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 70, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-34527" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "CopyKittens", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "MuddyWater", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", + "Cobalt Strike", + "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 100, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-34527" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 70 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process name" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network", + "file": "endpoint/rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal", + "id": "6c135f8d-5e60-454e-80b7-c56eed739833", + "version": 6, + "date": "2022-02-08", + "author": "Michael Haag, David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading an export function by ordinal value. Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly, may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Utilizing ordinal values makes it a bit more complicated for analysts to understand the behavior until the DLL is reviewed.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"rundll32.+\\#\\d+\") | `rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives are possible with native utilities and third party applications. Filtering may be needed based on command-line, or add world writeable paths to restrict query.", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/07/qbot-likes-to-move-it-move-it/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal", + "analytic_story": [ + "Unusual Processes", + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/ordinal_windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation" + ], + "message": "A rundll32 process $process_name$ with ordinal parameter like this process commandline $process$ on host $dest$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "CopyKittens", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "MuddyWater", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Unusual Processes", + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal", + "file": "endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/ordinal_windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver", + "id": "8c00a385-9b86-4ac0-8932-c9ec3713b159", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-02-09", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe using dllregisterserver on the command line to load a DLL. When a DLL is registered, the DllRegisterServer method entry point in the DLL is invoked. This is typically seen when a DLL is being registered on the system. Not every instance is considered malicious, but it will capture malicious use of it. During investigation, review the parent process and parrellel processes executing. Capture the DLL being loaded and inspect further. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*dllregisterserver* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "This is likely to produce false positives and will require some filtering. Tune the query by adding command line paths to known good DLLs, or filtering based on parent process names.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32", + "https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/seedworm-apt-iran-middle-east", + "https://github.com/pan-unit42/tweets/blob/master/2020-12-10-IOCs-from-Ursnif-infection-with-Delf-variant.txt", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/duck-hunting-with-falcon-complete-qakbot-zip-based-campaign/", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms682162(v=vs.85).aspx" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "$Processes.process_path.file_path$ process potentially loading malicious code", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Processes.process_path.file_path", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "CopyKittens", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "MuddyWater", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Processes.process_path.file_path", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 35 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "Processes.process_path.file_path", + "threat_object_type": "file name" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver", + "file": "endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 StartW", + "id": "9319dda5-73f2-4d43-a85a-67ce961bddb7", + "version": 3, + "date": "2021-02-04", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe executing a DLL function name, Start and StartW, on the command line that is commonly observed with Cobalt Strike x86 and x64 DLL payloads. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64. Typically, the DLL will be written and loaded from a world writeable path or user location. In most instances it will not have a valid certificate (Unsigned). During investigation, review the parent process and other parallel application execution. Capture and triage the DLL in question. In the instance of Cobalt Strike, rundll32.exe is the default process it opens and injects shellcode into. This default process can be changed, but typically is not.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*start* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_startw_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use Start as a function and call it via the command line. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", + "https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-windows-executable", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32", + "https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 StartW", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", + "Cobalt Strike", + "Trickbot" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "rundll32.exe running with suspicious parameters on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "CopyKittens", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "MuddyWater", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", + "Cobalt Strike", + "Trickbot" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 35 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 35 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 StartW Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 StartW", + "file": "endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_rundll32_startw_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments", + "id": "e451bd16-e4c5-4109-8eb1-c4c6ecf048b4", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-09-20", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for rundll32.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(rundll32\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | `suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32", + "https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", + "Cobalt Strike", + "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Suspicious rundll32.exe process with no command line arguments executed on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-34527" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "CopyKittens", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "MuddyWater", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", + "Cobalt Strike", + "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-34527" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments", + "file": "endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [] + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "id": "2b1800dd-92f9-47dd-a981-fdf1351e5d55", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-05-31", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "description": "Monitor and detect registry changes initiated from remote locations, which can be a sign that an attacker has infiltrated your system.", + "narrative": "Attackers are developing increasingly sophisticated techniques for hijacking target servers, while evading detection. One such technique that has become progressively more common is registry modification.\\\n The registry is a key component of the Windows operating system. It has a hierarchical database called \"registry\" that contains settings, options, and values for executables. Once the threat actor gains access to a machine, they can use reg.exe to modify their account to obtain administrator-level privileges, maintain persistence, and move laterally within the environment.\\\n The searches in this story are designed to help you detect behaviors associated with manipulation of the Windows registry.", + "references": [ + "https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "analytic_story": "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1564.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Files and Directories", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "Lazarus Group", + "Mustang Panda", + "Rocke", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Kimsuky" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT37", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Evilnum", + "Honeybee", + "MuddyWater", + "Patchwork", + "Threat Group-3390" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.010", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Port Monitors", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Shimming", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "FIN7" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "Putter Panda", + "RTM", + "Rocke", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.012", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Image File Execution Options Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "TEMP.Veles" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", + "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", + "ESCU - Disable UAC Remote Restriction - Rule", + "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", + "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", + "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", + "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", + "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys", + "id": "61a7d1e6-f5d4-41d9-a9be-39a1ffe69459", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-02-27", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The search looks for command-line arguments used to hide a file or directory using the reg add command.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = reg.exe Processes.process=\"*add*\" Processes.process=\"*Hidden*\" Processes.process=\"*REG_DWORD*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| regex process = \"(/d\\s+2)\" | `reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "None at the moment", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1564.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1564.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Files and Directories", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "Lazarus Group", + "Mustang Panda", + "Rocke", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1564.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1564.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Remote Registry Key modifications", + "id": "c9f4b923-f8af-4155-b697-1354f5dcbc5e", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-03-02", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search monitors for remote modifications to registry keys.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"\\\\\\\\*\" by Registry.dest , Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `remote_registry_key_modifications_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must populate the `Endpoint` data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. Deprecated because I don't think the logic is right.", + "known_false_positives": "This technique may be legitimately used by administrators to modify remote registries, so it's important to filter these events out.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Remote Registry Key modifications", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "remote_registry_key_modifications_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Changes to File Associations", + "id": "1b989a0e-0129-4446-a695-f193a5b746fc", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-07-22", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for changes to registry values that control Windows file associations, executed by a process that is not typical for legitimate, routine changes to this area.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name!=Explorer.exe AND Processes.process_name!=OpenWith.exe by Processes.process_id Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*\\\\Explorer\\\\FileExts* by Registry.process_id Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Registry\")` | table process_id dest registry_path]| `suspicious_changes_to_file_associations_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on registry changes that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Registry` nodes.", + "known_false_positives": "There may be other processes in your environment that users may legitimately use to modify file associations. If this is the case and you are finding false positives, you can modify the search to add those processes as exceptions.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Changes to File Associations", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1546.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM", + "PR.PT", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Kimsuky" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1546.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM", + "PR.PT", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1546.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM", + "PR.PT", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_changes_to_file_associations_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Disable UAC Remote Restriction", + "id": "9928b732-210e-11ec-b65e-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-27", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable UAC remote restriction. This technique was well documented in Microsoft page where attacker may modify this registry value to bypassed UAC feature of windows host. This is a good indicator that some tries to bypassed UAC to suspicious process or gain privilege escalation.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System*\" Registry.registry_value_name=\"LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy\" Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000001\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disable_uac_remote_restriction_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "admin may set this policy for non-critical machine.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/windows-security/user-account-control-and-remote-restriction" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Disable UAC Remote Restriction", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.registry_value_data" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT37", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Evilnum", + "Honeybee", + "MuddyWater", + "Patchwork", + "Threat Group-3390" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Disable UAC Remote Restriction Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Disable UAC Remote Restriction", + "file": "endpoint/disable_uac_remote_restriction.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "disable_uac_remote_restriction_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_uac_remote_restriction.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Disabling Remote User Account Control", + "id": "bbc644bc-37df-4e1a-9c88-ec9a53e2038c", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-11-18", + "author": "David Dorsey, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The search looks for modifications to registry keys that control the enforcement of Windows User Account Control (UAC).", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System\\\\EnableLUA* Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000000\" by Registry.dest, Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `disabling_remote_user_account_control_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report registry modifications.", + "known_false_positives": "This registry key may be modified via administrators to implement a change in system policy. This type of change should be a very rare occurrence.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Disabling Remote User Account Control", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Remcos" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "The Windows registry keys that control the enforcement of Windows User Account Control (UAC) were modified on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.action" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT37", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Evilnum", + "Honeybee", + "MuddyWater", + "Patchwork", + "Threat Group-3390" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Remcos" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 42 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 42 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Disabling Remote User Account Control Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Disabling Remote User Account Control", + "file": "endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "disabling_remote_user_account_control_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors", + "id": "f5f6af30-7ba7-4295-bfe9-07de87c01bbc", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-01-28", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for registry activity associated with modifications to the registry key `HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors`. In this scenario, an attacker can load an arbitrary .dll into the print-monitor registry by giving the full path name to the after.dll. The system will execute the .dll with elevated (SYSTEM) permissions and will persist after reboot.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.action=modified AND Registry.registry_path=\"*CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Print\\\\Monitors*\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report registry modifications.", + "known_false_positives": "You will encounter noise from legitimate print-monitor registry entries.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 5" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.010/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.010/atomic_red_team/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "New print monitor added on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1547.010", + "T1547" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.AC" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.action", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.registry_value_name" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.010", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Port Monitors", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.010", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 5" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.AC" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 64 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.010", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 5" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.AC" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors", + "file": "endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.010/atomic_red_team/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases", + "id": "f5f6af30-7aa7-4295-bfe9-07fe87c01bbb", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-01-28", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for registry activity associated with application compatibility shims, which can be leveraged by attackers for various nefarious purposes.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*CurrentVersion\\\\AppCompatFlags\\\\Custom* OR Registry.registry_path=*CurrentVersion\\\\AppCompatFlags\\\\InstalledSDB* by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must populate the Change_Analysis data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection and response product, such as Carbon Black or other endpoint data sources such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "There are many legitimate applications that leverage shim databases for compatibility purposes for legacy applications", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to shim modication in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1546.011", + "T1546" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Shimming", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "FIN7" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1546.011", + "T1546" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1546.011", + "T1546" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases", + "file": "endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", + "id": "f5f6af30-7aa7-4295-bfe9-07fe87c01a4b", + "version": 7, + "date": "2022-01-26", + "author": "Jose Hernandez, David Dorsey, Teoderick Contreras, Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to launch an application or service at system startup.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\RunOnce OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\run* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentVersion\\\\Windows\\\\Appinit_Dlls* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Shell* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Notify* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Userinit* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\VmApplet* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\policies\\\\explorer\\\\run* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\runservices* OR Registry.registry_path=HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Netsh\\\\* OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Image File Execution Options*\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=Debugger) OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Security Packages\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\\\\OSConfig\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Security Packages\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\SilentProcessExit\\\\*\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*currentVersion\\\\Windows\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Load\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentVersion\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Svchost\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\"AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"BootExecute\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Software\\\\Run\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"auto_update\")) by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "There are many legitimate applications that must execute on system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Ransomware", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "IcedID", + "Remcos" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 95, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/atomic_red_team/t1547001-runonce.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to persistence in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1547.001", + "T1547" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user" + ], + "risk_score": 76, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "Putter Panda", + "RTM", + "Rocke", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.001", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Ransomware", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "IcedID", + "Remcos" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 95 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 76 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 76 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.001", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", + "file": "endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation", + "id": "c9f4b923-f8af-4155-b697-1354f5bcbc5e", + "version": 5, + "date": "2022-01-26", + "author": "David Dorsey, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to elevate privileges. The registry keys under \"Image File Execution Options\" are used to intercept calls to an executable and can be used to attach malicious binaries to benign system binaries.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=\"*Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Image File Execution Options*\") AND (Registry.registry_value_name=GlobalFlag OR Registry.registry_value_name=Debugger) by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "There are many legitimate applications that must execute upon system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2015/12/an-introduction-to-image-file-execution-options/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 95, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.012/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to privilege escalation in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1546.012", + "T1546" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user" + ], + "risk_score": 76, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.012", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Image File Execution Options Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "TEMP.Veles" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1546.012", + "T1546" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 95 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 76 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 76 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1546.012", + "T1546" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation", + "file": "endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.012/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry", + "id": "25212358-948e-11ec-ad47-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-23", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to look for suspicious modification or creation of registry to have service entry. This technique is abused by adversaries or threat actor to persist, gain privileges in the machine or even lateral movement. This technique can be executed using reg.exe application or using windows API like for example the CrashOveride malware. This detection is a good indicator that a process is trying to create a service entry using registry ImagePath.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services*\" Registry.registry_value_name = ImagePath by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `windows_service_creation_using_registry_entry_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "Third party tools may used this technique to create services but not so common.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/36d49de4c8b00bf36054294b4a1fcbab3917d7c5/atomics/T1574.011/T1574.011.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1574.011/change_registry_path_service/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A Windows Service was created on a endpoint from $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1574.011" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_guid" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1574.011" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 64 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1574.011" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry", + "file": "endpoint/windows_service_creation_using_registry_entry.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1574.011/change_registry_path_service/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_service_creation_using_registry_entry_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_service_creation_using_registry_entry.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + }, + { + "name": "Get Parent Process Info", + "id": "fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41bf9", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-02-28", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "parent_process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Phishing Payloads", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_parent_process_info" + }, + { + "name": "Get Process Info", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd71", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-01", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the process running on a host which is under investigation. To gather the process info, enter the values for the process name in question and the destination IP address.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search process_name= $process_name$ | search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_process_info" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious WMI Use", + "id": "c8ddc5be-69bc-4202-b3ab-4010b27d7ad5", + "version": 2, + "date": "2018-10-23", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "description": "Attackers are increasingly abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), a framework and associated utilities available on all modern Windows operating systems. Because WMI can be leveraged to manage both local and remote systems, it is important to identify the processes executed and the user context within which the activity occurred.", + "narrative": "WMI is a Microsoft infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows operating systems. It includes of a set of utilities that can be leveraged to manage both local and remote Windows systems. Attackers are increasingly turning to WMI abuse in their efforts to conduct nefarious tasks, such as reconnaissance, detection of antivirus and virtual machines, code execution, lateral movement, persistence, and data exfiltration. The detection searches included in this Analytic Story are used to look for suspicious use of WMI commands that attackers may leverage to interact with remote systems. The searches specifically look for the use of WMI to run processes on remote systems. In the event that unauthorized WMI execution occurs, it will be important for analysts and investigators to determine the context of the event. These details may provide insights related to how WMI was used and to what end.", + "references": [ + "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Graeber-Abusing-Windows-Management-Instrumentation-WMI-To-Build-A-Persistent%20Asynchronous-And-Fileless-Backdoor-wp.pdf", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/wmimplant_a_wmi_ba.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious WMI Use", + "analytic_story": "Suspicious WMI Use", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT33", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "FIN8", + "Leviathan", + "Mustang Panda", + "Turla" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1220", + "mitre_attack_technique": "XSL Script Processing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Cobalt Group", + "Higaisa" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Detect WMI Event Subscription Persistence - Rule", + "ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", + "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", + "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", + "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows WMI Process Call Create - Rule", + "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", + "ESCU - WMIC XSL Execution via URL - Rule", + "ESCU - XSL Script Execution With WMIC - Rule", + "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", + "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Rico Valdez", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Detect WMI Event Subscription Persistence", + "id": "01d9a0c2-cece-11eb-ab46-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-16", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscription to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions.\\\nAll event subscriptions have three components \\\n1. Filter - WQL Query for the events we want. EventID equals 19 \\\n1. Consumer - An action to take upon triggering the filter. EventID equals 20 \\\n1. Binding - Registers a filter to a consumer. EventID equals 21 \\\nMonitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding. It may be pertinent to review all 3 to identify the flow of execution. In addition, EventCode 4104 may assist with any other PowerShell script usage that registered the subscription.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventID=20 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer User Destination | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with that provide WMI Event Subscription from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA and have enabled EventID 19, 20 and 21. Tune and filter known good to limit the volume.", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible some applications will create a consumer and may be required to be filtered. For tuning, add any additional LOLBin's for further depth of coverage.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1546.003/T1546.003.md", + "https://www.eideon.com/2018-03-02-THL03-WMIBackdoors/", + "https://github.com/trustedsec/SysmonCommunityGuide/blob/master/WMI-events.md", + "https://in.security/an-intro-into-abusing-and-identifying-wmi-event-subscriptions-for-persistence/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect WMI Event Subscription Persistence", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious WMI Use" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Possible malicious WMI Subscription created on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1546.003", + "T1546" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Destination", + "Computer", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT33", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "FIN8", + "Leviathan", + "Mustang Panda", + "Turla" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1546.003", + "T1546" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious WMI Use" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 63 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1546.003", + "T1546" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect WMI Event Subscription Persistence Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect WMI Event Subscription Persistence", + "file": "endpoint/detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Process Execution via WMI", + "id": "24869767-8579-485d-9a4f-d9ddfd8f0cac", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-03-16", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies `WmiPrvSE.exe` spawning a process. This typically occurs when a process is instantiated from a local or remote process using `wmic.exe`. During triage, review parallel processes for suspicious behavior or commands executed. Review the process and command-line spawning from `wmiprvse.exe`. Contain and remediate the endpoint as necessary.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=WmiPrvSE.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `process_execution_via_wmi_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, administrators may use wmi to execute commands for legitimate purposes.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Process Execution via WMI", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious WMI Use" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A remote instance execution of wmic.exe that will spawn $parent_process_name$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1047" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.AT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_name" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1047" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.AT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious WMI Use" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1047" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.AT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Process Execution via WMI Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Process Execution via WMI", + "file": "endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "process_execution_via_wmi_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI", + "id": "d25d2c3d-d9d8-40ec-8fdf-e86fe155a3da", + "version": 7, + "date": "2021-11-12", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies wmic.exe being launched with parameters to spawn a process on a remote system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WMI and this binary for lateral movement and remote code execution.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` (Processes.process=\"*/node:*\" AND Processes.process=\"*process*\" AND Processes.process=\"*call*\" AND Processes.process=\"*create*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "The wmic.exe utility is a benign Windows application. It may be used legitimately by Administrators with these parameters for remote system administration, but it's relatively uncommon.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/cimwin32prov/create-method-in-class-win32-process" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A wmic.exe process $process$ contain process spawn commandline $process$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1047" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.AT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1047" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.AT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1047" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.AT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI", + "file": "endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_wmic", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Remote WMI Command Attempt", + "id": "272df6de-61f1-4784-877c-1fbc3e2d0838", + "version": 4, + "date": "2018-12-03", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies usage of `wmic.exe` spawning a local or remote process, identified by the `node` switch. During triage, review parallel processes for additional commands executed. Look for any file modifications before and after `wmic.exe` execution. In addition, identify the remote endpoint and confirm execution or file modifications. Contain and isolate the endpoint as needed.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` Processes.process=*node* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_wmi_command_attempt_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. Deprecated because duplicate of Remote Process Instantiation via WMI.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may use this legitimately to gather info from remote systems. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1047/T1047.yaml" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Remote WMI Command Attempt", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious WMI Use" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A wmic.exe process $process$ contain node commandline $process$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1047" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.AT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.parent_process_id", + "Processes.process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 36, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1047" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.AT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious WMI Use" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 36 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 36 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1047" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.AT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Remote WMI Command Attempt Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Remote WMI Command Attempt", + "file": "endpoint/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_wmic", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "remote_wmi_command_attempt_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Script Execution via WMI", + "id": "aa73f80d-d728-4077-b226-81ea0c8be589", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-03-16", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for scripts launched via WMI.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=scrcons.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `script_execution_via_wmi_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, administrators may use wmi to launch scripts for legitimate purposes. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://redcanary.com/blog/child-processes/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Script Execution via WMI", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious WMI Use" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/execution_scrcons/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A wmic.exe process $process_name$ taht execute script in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1047" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.AT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 36, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1047" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.AT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious WMI Use" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 36 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 36 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1047" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.AT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Script Execution via WMI Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Script Execution via WMI", + "file": "endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/execution_scrcons/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "script_execution_via_wmi_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows WMI Process Call Create", + "id": "0661c2de-93de-11ec-9833-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-22", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to look for wmi commandlines to execute or create process. This technique was used by adversaries or threat actor to execute their malicious payload in local or remote host. This hunting query is a good pivot to start to look further which process trigger the wmi or what process it execute locally or remotely.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` Processes.process = \"* process *\" Processes.process = \"* call *\" Processes.process = \"* create *\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_wmi_process_call_create_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may execute this command for testing or auditing.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/NVISOsecurity/sigma-public/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/win_susp_wmi_execution.yml", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/2b804d25418004a5f1ba50e9dc637946ab8733c7/atomics/T1047/T1047.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows WMI Process Call Create", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious WMI Use" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "process with $process$ commandline executed in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1047" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id", + "Processes.process_guid" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1047" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious WMI Use" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1047" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows WMI Process Call Create Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows WMI Process Call Create", + "file": "endpoint/windows_wmi_process_call_create.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_wmic", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "windows_wmi_process_call_create_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_wmi_process_call_create.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon", + "id": "ad05aae6-3b2a-4f73-af97-57bd26cee3b9", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-12-08", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This analytic looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions. The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscription to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions.\\\nAll event subscriptions have three components \\\n1. Filter - WQL Query for the events we want. EventID = 19 \\\n1. Consumer - An action to take upon triggering the filter. EventID = 20 \\\n1. Binding - Registers a filter to a consumer. EventID = 21 \\\nMonitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding. It may be pertinent to review all 3 to identify the flow of execution. In addition, EventCode 4104 may assist with any other PowerShell script usage that registered the subscription.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=21 | rename host as dest | table _time, dest, user, Operation, EventType, Query, Consumer, Filter | `wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be collecting Sysmon data using Sysmon version 6.1 or greater and have Sysmon configured to generate alerts for WMI activity (eventID= 19, 20, 21). In addition, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA installed to properly parse the fields.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, administrators may use event subscriptions for legitimate purposes.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1546.003/T1546.003.md", + "https://www.eideon.com/2018-03-02-THL03-WMIBackdoors/", + "https://github.com/trustedsec/SysmonCommunityGuide/blob/master/WMI-events.md", + "https://in.security/an-intro-into-abusing-and-identifying-wmi-event-subscriptions-for-persistence/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious WMI Use" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "User $user$ on $host$ executed the following suspicious WMI query: $Query$. Filter: $filter$. Consumer: $Consumer$. EventCode: $EventCode$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1546.003", + "T1546" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.AT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "host", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "host", + "user", + "Operation", + "EventType", + "Query", + "Consumer", + "Filter" + ], + "risk_score": 30, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT33", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "FIN8", + "Leviathan", + "Mustang Panda", + "Turla" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1546.003", + "T1546" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.AT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious WMI Use" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "host", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "host", + "risk_score": 30 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 30 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1546.003", + "T1546" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.AT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon", + "file": "endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "WMIC XSL Execution via URL", + "id": "787e9dd0-4328-11ec-a029-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-11", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies `wmic.exe` loading a remote XSL (eXtensible Stylesheet Language) script. This originally was identified by Casey Smith, dubbed Squiblytwo, as an application control bypass. Many adversaries will utilize this technique to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file. This technique can also execute local/remote scripts and, similar to its Regsvr32 \"Squiblydoo\" counterpart, leverages a trusted, built-in Windows tool. Adversaries may abuse any alias in Windows Management Instrumentation provided they utilize the /FORMAT switch. Upon identifying a suspicious execution, review for confirmed network connnection and script download.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` Processes.process IN (\"*http://*\", \"*https://*\") Processes.process=\"*/format:*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmic_xsl_execution_via_url_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives are limited as legitimate applications typically do not download files or xsl using WMIC. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1220/T1220.md", + "https://web.archive.org/web/20190814201250/https://subt0x11.blogspot.com/2018/04/wmicexe-whitelisting-bypass-hacking.html", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1220/T1220.md#atomic-test-4---wmic-bypass-using-remote-xsl-file" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "WMIC XSL Execution via URL", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious WMI Use" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1220/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ utilizing wmic to download a remote XSL script.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1220" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1220", + "mitre_attack_technique": "XSL Script Processing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Cobalt Group", + "Higaisa" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1220" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious WMI Use" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1220" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "WMIC XSL Execution via URL Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "WMIC XSL Execution via URL", + "file": "endpoint/wmic_xsl_execution_via_url.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1220/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_wmic", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wmic_xsl_execution_via_url_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wmic_xsl_execution_via_url.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "XSL Script Execution With WMIC", + "id": "004e32e2-146d-11ec-a83f-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-13", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious wmic.exe process or renamed wmic process to execute malicious xsl file. This technique was seen in FIN7 to execute its malicous jscript using the .xsl as the loader with the help of wmic.exe process. This TTP is really a good indicator for you to hunt further for FIN7 or other attacker that known to used this technique.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` Processes.process = \"*os get*\" Processes.process=\"*/format:*\" Processes.process = \"*.xsl*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `xsl_script_execution_with_wmic_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html", + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046/", + "https://web.archive.org/web/20190814201250/https://subt0x11.blogspot.com/2018/04/wmicexe-whitelisting-bypass-hacking.html", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1220/T1220.md#atomic-test-3---wmic-bypass-using-local-xsl-file" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "XSL Script Execution With WMIC", + "analytic_story": [ + "FIN7", + "Suspicious WMI Use" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_macro_js_1/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ utilizing wmic to load a XSL script.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1220" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1220", + "mitre_attack_technique": "XSL Script Processing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Cobalt Group", + "Higaisa" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1220" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "FIN7", + "Suspicious WMI Use" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1220" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "XSL Script Execution With WMIC Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "XSL Script Execution With WMIC", + "file": "endpoint/xsl_script_execution_with_wmic.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_macro_js_1/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_wmic", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "xsl_script_execution_with_wmic_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/xsl_script_execution_with_wmic.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "WMI Permanent Event Subscription", + "id": "71bfdb13-f200-4c6c-b2c9-a2e07adf437d", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-10-23", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions.", + "search": "`wmi` EventCode=5861 Binding | rex field=Message \"Consumer =\\s+(?[^;|^$]+)\" | search consumer!=\"NTEventLogEventConsumer=\\\"SCM Event Log Consumer\\\"\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName, consumer, Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename ComputerName as dest | `wmi_permanent_event_subscription_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting the Windows WMI activity logs. This can be done by adding a stanza to inputs.conf on the system generating logs with a title of [WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational].", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, administrators may use event subscriptions for legitimate purposes.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "WMI Permanent Event Subscription", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious WMI Use" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1047" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.AT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "consumer", + "ComputerName" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1047" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.AT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious WMI Use" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1047" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.AT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wmi", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"wineventlog:microsoft-windows-wmi-activity/operational\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "wmi_permanent_event_subscription_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "WMI Temporary Event Subscription", + "id": "38cbd42c-1098-41bb-99cf-9d6d2b296d83", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-10-23", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for the creation of WMI temporary event subscriptions.", + "search": "`wmi` EventCode=5860 Temporary | rex field=Message \"NotificationQuery =\\s+(?[^;|^$]+)\" | search query!=\"SELECT * FROM Win32_ProcessStartTrace WHERE ProcessName = 'wsmprovhost.exe'\" AND query!=\"SELECT * FROM __InstanceOperationEvent WHERE TargetInstance ISA 'AntiVirusProduct' OR TargetInstance ISA 'FirewallProduct' OR TargetInstance ISA 'AntiSpywareProduct'\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName, query | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmi_temporary_event_subscription_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting the Windows WMI activity logs. This can be done by adding a stanza to inputs.conf on the system generating logs with a title of [WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational].", + "known_false_positives": "Some software may create WMI temporary event subscriptions for various purposes. The included search contains an exception for two of these that occur by default on Windows 10 systems. You may need to modify the search to create exceptions for other legitimate events.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "WMI Temporary Event Subscription", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious WMI Use" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1047" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.AT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "query" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1047" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.AT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious WMI Use" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "dest", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1047" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "PR.AT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wmi", + "definition": "sourcetype=\"wineventlog:microsoft-windows-wmi-activity/operational\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "wmi_temporary_event_subscription_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + }, + { + "name": "Get Parent Process Info", + "id": "fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41bf9", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-02-28", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "parent_process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Phishing Payloads", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_parent_process_info" + }, + { + "name": "Get Process Info", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd71", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-01", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the process running on a host which is under investigation. To gather the process info, enter the values for the process name in question and the destination IP address.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search process_name= $process_name$ | search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_process_info" + }, + { + "name": "Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host", + "id": "155e0571-7db6-42f2-aa62-9a3a4cf35c94", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-10-23", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries Sysmon WMI events for the host of interest.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode>18 EventCode<22 | rename host as dest | search dest=$dest$| table _time, dest, user, Name, Operation, EventType, Type, Query, Consumer, Filter", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be collecting Sysmon data using Sysmon version 6.1 or greater and have Sysmon configured to generate events for WMI activity. In addition, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA installed to properly parse the fields.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Suspicious WMI Use" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "user", + "Name", + "Operation", + "EventType", + "Type", + "Query", + "Consumer", + "Filter" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Zoom Child Processes", + "id": "aa3749a6-49c7-491e-a03f-4eaee5fe0258", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-04-13", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "description": "Attackers are using Zoom as an vector to increase privileges on a sytems. This story detects new child processes of zoom and provides investigative actions for this detection.", + "narrative": "Zoom is a leader in modern enterprise video communications and its usage has increased dramatically with a large amount of the population under stay-at-home orders due to the COVID-19 pandemic. With increased usage has come increased scrutiny and several security flaws have been found with this application on both Windows and macOS systems.\\\nCurrent detections focus on finding new child processes of this application on a per host basis. Investigative searches are included to gather information needed during an investigation.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.rapid7.com/2020/04/02/dispelling-zoom-bugbears-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-latest-zoom-vulnerabilities/", + "https://threatpost.com/two-zoom-zero-day-flaws-uncovered/154337/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Zoom Child Processes", + "analytic_story": "Suspicious Zoom Child Processes", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "Cobalt Group", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "PLATINUM", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "Whitefly", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", + "ESCU - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [ + "ESCU - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial", + "ESCU - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update" + ], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "David Dorsey", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe", + "id": "dcfd6b40-42f9-469d-a433-2e53f7486664", + "version": 6, + "date": "2020-11-10", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for executions of cmd.exe spawned by a process that is often abused by attackers and that does not typically launch cmd.exe.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |search [`prohibited_apps_launching_cmd`] | `detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts and populates the Endpoint data model with the resultant dataset. This search includes a lookup file, `prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.csv`, that contains a list of processes that should not be spawning cmd.exe. You can modify this lookup to better suit your environment. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "There are circumstances where an application may legitimately execute and interact with the Windows command-line interface. Investigate and modify the lookup file, as appropriate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious Zoom Child Processes", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/powershell_spawn_cmd/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ running prohibited applications.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.003" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious Zoom Child Processes", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059", + "T1059.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe", + "file": "endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/powershell_spawn_cmd/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "prohibited_apps_launching_cmd", + "definition": "| inputlookup prohibited_apps_launching_cmd | rename prohibited_applications as parent_process_name | eval parent_process_name=\"*\" . parent_process_name | table parent_process_name", + "description": "This macro outputs a list of process that should not be the parent process of cmd.exe" + }, + { + "name": "process_cmd", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom", + "id": "e91bd102-d630-4e76-ab73-7e3ba22c5961", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-05-20", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for child processes spawned by zoom.exe or zoom.us that has not previously been seen.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name values(Processes.parent_process_id) as parent_process_id values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.us) by Processes.process_id Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | lookup zoom_first_time_child_process dest as dest process_name as process_name OUTPUT firstTimeSeen | where isnull(firstTimeSeen) OR firstTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), \"`previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window`\") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | table firstTime dest, process_id, process_name, parent_process_id, parent_process_name |`first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial` to build the initial table of child processes and hostnames for this search to work. You should also schedule at the same interval as this search the second baseline search `Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old child processes. Please update the `previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window` macro to adjust the time window.", + "known_false_positives": "A new child process of zoom isn't malicious by that fact alone. Further investigation of the actions of the child process is needed to verify any malicious behavior is taken.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Zoom Child Processes" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1068/zoom_child_process/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Child process $process_name$ with $process_id$ spawned by zoom.exe or zoom.us which has not been previously on host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1068" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Attacker", + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process_id", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "Cobalt Group", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "PLATINUM", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "Whitefly", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1068" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Zoom Child Processes" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Attacker", + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process name" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial", + "id": "60b9c00f-a9d6-4e51-803c-5d63ea21b95b", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-05-20", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search returns the first and last time a process was seen per endpoint with a parent process of zoom.exe (Windows) or zoom.us (macOS). This table is then cached.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTimeSeen max(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.us) by Processes.process_name Processes.dest| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | table dest, process_name, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen | outputlookup zoom_first_time_child_process", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Zoom Child Processes" + ], + "deployments": [ + "90 Day Baseline" + ], + "detections": [ + "First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update", + "id": "80aea7fd-5da2-4533-b3c2-560533bfbaee", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-05-20", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search returns the first and last time a process was seen per endpoint with a parent process of zoom.exe (Windows) or zoom.us (macOS) within the last hour. It then updates this information with historical data and filters out proces_name and endpoint pairs that have not been seen within the specified time window. This updated table is outputed to disk.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTimeSeen max(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.us) by Processes.process_name Processes.dest| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | table firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, process_name, dest | inputlookup zoom_first_time_child_process append=t | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by process_name, dest | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), \"`previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_forget_window`\") | outputlookup zoom_first_time_child_process", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Zoom Child Processes" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Hourly Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1068" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window", + "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", + "description": "Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new zoom child processes" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "zoom_first_time_child_process", + "description": "A list of suspicious file names", + "collection": "zoom_first_time_child_process", + "fields_list": "_key, dest, process_name, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get Process File Activity", + "id": "6a9ad4d9-6ef2-4b85-953f-a37ab256acd5", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-11-06", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search returns the file activity for a specific process on a specific endpoint", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Filesystem.file_name) as file_name values(Filesystem.dest) as dest, values(Filesystem.process_name) as process_name from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.process_name Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.action, _time | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | search dest=$dest$ | search process_name=$process_name$ | table _time, process_name, dest, action, file_name, file_path", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest", + "process_name" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Suspicious Zoom Child Processes" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Filesystem.process_name", + "Filesystem.file_path", + "Filesystem.action" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_process_file_activity" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Trickbot", + "id": "16f93769-8342-44c0-9b1d-f131937cce8e", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-20", + "author": "Rod Soto, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the trickbot banking trojan, including looking for file writes associated with its payload, process injection, shellcode execution and data collection even in LDAP environment.", + "narrative": "trickbot banking trojan campaigns targeting banks and other vertical sectors.This malware is known in Microsoft Windows OS where target security Microsoft Defender to prevent its detection and removal. steal Verizon credentials and targeting banks using its multi component modules that collect and exfiltrate data.", + "references": [ + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trickbot", + "https://blog.checkpoint.com/2021/03/11/february-2021s-most-wanted-malware-trickbot-takes-over-following-emotet-shutdown/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Trickbot", + "analytic_story": "Trickbot", + "category": [ + "Malware" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Cobalt Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sharpshooter", + "Silence", + "Turla" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Operation Wocao", + "Orangeworm", + "Sandworm Team", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "FIN7", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Sidewinder", + "TA551" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "CopyKittens", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "MuddyWater", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "TA551" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1590", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Network Information", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "HAFNIUM" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1590.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "IP Addresses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Andariel", + "HAFNIUM" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1027", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackOasis", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dust Storm", + "Elderwood", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Group5", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Discovery", + "Execution", + "Initial Access", + "Lateral Movement", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation", + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Exploitation", + "Installation", + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Account Discovery With Net App - Rule", + "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", + "ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", + "ESCU - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule", + "ESCU - Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process - Rule", + "ESCU - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule", + "ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", + "ESCU - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule", + "ESCU - Powershell Remote Thread To Known Windows Process - Rule", + "ESCU - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", + "ESCU - Trickbot Named Pipe - Rule", + "ESCU - Wermgr Process Connecting To IP Check Web Services - Rule", + "ESCU - Wermgr Process Create Executable File - Rule", + "ESCU - Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "author_name": "Rod Soto", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Account Discovery With Net App", + "id": "339805ce-ac30-11eb-b87d-acde48001122", + "version": 3, + "date": "2021-09-16", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "this search is to detect a potential account discovery series of command used by several malware or attack to recon the target machine. This technique is also seen in some note worthy malware like trickbot where it runs a cmd process, or even drop its module that will execute the said series of net command. This series of command are good correlation search and indicator of attacker recon if seen in the machines within a none technical user or department (HR, finance, ceo and etc) network.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` AND (Processes.process=\"*user*\" OR Processes.process=\"*config*\" OR Processes.process=\"*view /all*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name | where count >=5 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `account_discovery_with_net_app_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product..", + "known_false_positives": "admin or power user may used this series of command.", + "references": [ + "https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/", + "https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/48414a33-3d66-4a46-afe5-c2003bb55ccf/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Account Discovery With Net App", + "analytic_story": [ + "Trickbot", + "IcedID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/infection/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 10, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Suspicious $process_name$ usage detected on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1087" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 5, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN6", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "MuddyWater", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sandworm Team", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1087" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Trickbot", + "IcedID" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 10, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 5 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 5 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process name" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1087.002", + "T1087" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Account Discovery With Net App Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Account Discovery With Net App", + "file": "endpoint/account_discovery_with_net_app.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/infection/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_net", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "account_discovery_with_net_app_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/account_discovery_with_net_app.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Attempt To Stop Security Service", + "id": "c8e349c6-b97c-486e-8949-bd7bcd1f3910", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for attempts to stop security-related services on the endpoint.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` OR Processes.process_name = sc.exe Processes.process=\"* stop *\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |lookup security_services_lookup service as process OUTPUTNEW category, description | search category=security | `attempt_to_stop_security_service_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified. Attempts to disable security-related services should be identified and understood.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md#atomic-test-14---disable-arbitrary-security-windows-service", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Attempt To Stop Security Service", + "analytic_story": [ + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Trickbot", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_defend_service_stop/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 40, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified attempting to disable security services on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 20, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Trickbot", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 40, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 20 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 20 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Attempt To Stop Security Service Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Attempt To Stop Security Service", + "file": "endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_defend_service_stop/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_net", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "attempt_to_stop_security_service_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "security_services_lookup", + "description": "A list of services that deal with security", + "filename": "security_services.csv", + "default_match": "false", + "match_type": "WILDCARD(service)", + "min_matches": 1 + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Cobalt Strike Named Pipes", + "id": "5876d429-0240-4709-8b93-ea8330b411b5", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-02-22", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of default or publicly known named pipes used with Cobalt Strike. A named pipe is a named, one-way or duplex pipe for communication between the pipe server and one or more pipe clients. Cobalt Strike uses named pipes in many ways and has default values used with the Artifact Kit and Malleable C2 Profiles. The following query assists with identifying these default named pipes. Each EDR product presents named pipes a little different. Consider taking the values and generating a query based on the product of choice. \\\nUpon triage, review the process performing the named pipe. If it is explorer.exe, It is possible it was injected into by another process. Review recent parallel processes to identify suspicious patterns or behaviors. A parallel process may have a network connection, review and follow the connection back to identify any file modifications.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventID=17 OR EventID=18 PipeName IN (\\\\msagent_*, \\\\wkssvc*, \\\\DserNamePipe*, \\\\srvsvc_*, \\\\mojo.*, \\\\postex_*, \\\\status_*, \\\\MSSE-*, \\\\spoolss_*, \\\\win_svc*, \\\\ntsvcs*, \\\\winsock*, \\\\UIA_PIPE*) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, process_name, process_id process_path, PipeName | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cobalt_strike_named_pipes_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "The idea of using named pipes with Cobalt Strike is to blend in. Therefore, some of the named pipes identified and added may cause false positives. Filter by process name or pipe name to reduce false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/ipc/named-pipes", + "https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-smb-beacon", + "https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2021/02/09/learn-pipe-fitting-for-all-of-your-offense-projects/", + "https://gist.github.com/MHaggis/6c600e524045a6d49c35291a21e10752", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Cobalt Strike Named Pipes", + "analytic_story": [ + "Cobalt Strike", + "Trickbot", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $Computer$ by user $user$ accessing known suspicious named pipes related to Cobalt Strike.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1055" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventID", + "PipeName", + "Computer", + "process_name", + "process_path", + "process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Cobalt Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sharpshooter", + "Silence", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1055" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Cobalt Strike", + "Trickbot", + "DarkSide Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 72 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 72 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1055" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Cobalt Strike Named Pipes Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Cobalt Strike Named Pipes", + "file": "endpoint/cobalt_strike_named_pipes.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "cobalt_strike_named_pipes_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/cobalt_strike_named_pipes.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share", + "id": "f63c34fe-a435-11eb-935a-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-11-18", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies executable files (.exe or .dll) being written to Windows administrative SMB shares (Admin$, IPC$, C$). This represents suspicious behavior as its commonly used by tools like like PsExec/PaExec and others to stage service binaries before creating and starting a Windows service on remote endpoints. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse administrative shares for lateral movement and remote code execution. The Trickbot malware family also implements this behavior to try to infect other machines in the infected network.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=5145 Relative_Target_Name IN (\"*.exe\",\"*.dll\") Object_Type=File Share_Name IN (\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\C$\",\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\IPC$\",\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\admin$\") Access_Mask= \"0x2\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by EventCode Share_Name Relative_Target_Name Object_Type Access_Mask user src_port Source_Address | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 5145 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required. Also enable the object Audit access success/failure in your group policy.", + "known_false_positives": "System Administrators may use looks like PsExec for troubleshooting or administrations tasks. However, this will typically come only from certain users and certain systems that can be added to an allow list.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002/", + "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2013/03/09/psexec-demystified/", + "https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/", + "https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement", + "Trickbot", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/exe_smbshare/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "$user$ dropped or created an executable file in known sensitive SMB share. Share name=$Share_Name$, Target name=$Relative_Target_Name$, and Access mask=$Access_Mask$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Share_Name", + "Relative_Target_Name", + "Object_Type", + "Access_Mask", + "user", + "src_port", + "Source_Address" + ], + "risk_score": 70, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Operation Wocao", + "Orangeworm", + "Sandworm Team", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement", + "Trickbot", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 70 + } + ], + "playbooks": [ + { + "name": "Delete Detected Files", + "id": "fc0edc96-ff2b-48b0-9a6f-63da6783fd63", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-03-29", + "author": "Philip Royer, Splunk", + "type": "Response", + "description": "This playbook acts upon events where a file has been determined to be malicious (ie webshells being dropped on an end host). Before deleting the file, we run a \"more\" command on the file in question to extract its contents. We then run a delete on the file in question.", + "how_to_implement": "This playbook reads and then deletes files stored with artifact:*.cef.filePath from hosts stored in artifact:*.cef.destinationAddress. Windows Remote Management must be enabled on the remote computer.", + "playbook": "delete_detected_files", + "references": [], + "app_list": [ + "Windows Remote Management" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "detections": [ + "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share" + ], + "platform_tags": [], + "playbook_fields": [ + "filePath", + "destinationAddress" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk SOAR" + ], + "detection_objects": [ + { + "name": "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share", + "id": "f63c34fe-a435-11eb-935a-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-11-18", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic identifies executable files (.exe or .dll) being written to Windows administrative SMB shares (Admin$, IPC$, C$). This represents suspicious behavior as its commonly used by tools like like PsExec/PaExec and others to stage service binaries before creating and starting a Windows service on remote endpoints. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse administrative shares for lateral movement and remote code execution. The Trickbot malware family also implements this behavior to try to infect other machines in the infected network.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=5145 Relative_Target_Name IN (\"*.exe\",\"*.dll\") Object_Type=File Share_Name IN (\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\C$\",\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\IPC$\",\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\admin$\") Access_Mask= \"0x2\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by EventCode Share_Name Relative_Target_Name Object_Type Access_Mask user src_port Source_Address | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 5145 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required. Also enable the object Audit access success/failure in your group policy.", + "known_false_positives": "System Administrators may use looks like PsExec for troubleshooting or administrations tasks. However, this will typically come only from certain users and certain systems that can be added to an allow list.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002/", + "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2013/03/09/psexec-demystified/", + "https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/", + "https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement", + "Trickbot", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/exe_smbshare/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "$user$ dropped or created an executable file in known sensitive SMB share. Share name=$Share_Name$, Target name=$Relative_Target_Name$, and Access mask=$Access_Mask$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Share_Name", + "Relative_Target_Name", + "Object_Type", + "Access_Mask", + "user", + "src_port", + "Source_Address" + ], + "risk_score": 70, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Operation Wocao", + "Orangeworm", + "Sandworm Team", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement", + "Trickbot", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 70 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share", + "file": "endpoint/executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/exe_smbshare/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ] + } + } + ], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share", + "file": "endpoint/executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/exe_smbshare/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process", + "id": "4aa5d062-e893-11eb-9eb2-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-07-19", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious mshta.exe process that spawn rundll32 or regsvr32 child process. This technique was seen in several malware nowadays like trickbot to load its initial .dll stage loader to execute and download the the actual trickbot payload.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name = \"mshta.exe\" `process_rundll32` OR `process_regsvr32` by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "limitted. this anomaly behavior is not commonly seen in clean host.", + "references": [ + "https://twitter.com/cyb3rops/status/1416050325870587910?s=21" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process", + "analytic_story": [ + "Trickbot", + "IcedID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/spear_phish/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "a mshta parent process $parent_process_name$ spawn child process $process_name$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.005" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "FIN7", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Sidewinder", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.005" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Trickbot", + "IcedID" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.005" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process", + "file": "endpoint/mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/spear_phish/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "process_regsvr32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=REGSVR32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Office Application Spawn rundll32 process", + "id": "958751e4-9c5f-11eb-b103-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-04-13", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "this detection was designed to identifies suspicious spawned process of known MS office application due to macro or malicious code. this technique can be seen in so many malware like trickbot that used MS office as its weapon or attack vector to initially infect the machines.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = \"winword.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"excel.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"powerpnt.exe\") AND `process_rundll32` by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.process Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_application_spawn_rundll32_process_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://any.run/malware-trends/trickbot", + "https://any.run/report/47561b4e949041eff0a0f4693c59c81726591779fe21183ae9185b5eb6a69847/aba3722a-b373-4dae-8273-8730fb40cdbe" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Office Application Spawn rundll32 process", + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments", + "Trickbot", + "IcedID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Office application spawning rundll32.exe on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments", + "Trickbot", + "IcedID" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 63 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Office Application Spawn rundll32 process Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Office Application Spawn rundll32 process", + "file": "endpoint/office_application_spawn_rundll32_process.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "office_application_spawn_rundll32_process_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_application_spawn_rundll32_process.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Office Document Executing Macro Code", + "id": "b12c89bc-9d06-11eb-a592-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-14", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "this detection was designed to identifies suspicious office documents that using macro code. Macro code is known to be one of the prevalent weaponization or attack vector of threat actor. This malicious macro code is embed to a office document as an attachment that may execute malicious payload, download malware payload or other malware component. It is really good practice to disable macro by default to avoid automatically execute macro code while opening or closing a office document files.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 process_name IN (\"WINWORD.EXE\", \"EXCEL.EXE\", \"POWERPNT.EXE\") ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\VBE7INTL.DLL\",\"*\\\\VBE7.DLL\", \"*\\\\VBEUI.DLL\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ImageLoaded) as AllImageLoaded count by Computer EventCode Image process_name ProcessId ProcessGuid | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_document_executing_macro_code_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and ImageLoaded (Like sysmon EventCode 7) from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Also be sure to include those monitored dll to your own sysmon config.", + "known_false_positives": "Normal Office Document macro use for automation", + "references": [ + "https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/386500/0/html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Office Document Executing Macro Code", + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments", + "Trickbot", + "IcedID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Office document executing a macro on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "ImageLoaded", + "AllImageLoaded", + "Computer", + "EventCode", + "Image", + "process_name", + "ProcessId", + "ProcessGuid", + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Dragonfly", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Spearphishing Attachments", + "Trickbot", + "IcedID" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 35 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1566", + "T1566.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Office Document Executing Macro Code Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Office Document Executing Macro Code", + "file": "endpoint/office_document_executing_macro_code.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "office_document_executing_macro_code_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_document_executing_macro_code.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Office Product Spawn CMD Process", + "id": "b8b19420-e892-11eb-9244-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-07-19", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "this search is to detect a suspicious office product process that spawn cmd child process. This is commonly seen in a ms office product having macro to execute shell command to download or execute malicious lolbin relative to its malicious code. This is seen in trickbot spear phishing doc where it execute shell cmd to run mshta payload.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = \"winword.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name= \"excel.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"powerpnt.exe\") `process_cmd` by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawn_cmd_process_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "IT or network admin may create an document automation that will run shell script.", + "references": [ + "https://twitter.com/cyb3rops/status/1416050325870587910?s=21" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Office Product Spawn CMD Process", + "analytic_story": [ + "Trickbot" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/spear_phish/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "an office product parent process $parent_process_name$ spawn child process $process_name$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.005" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "FIN7", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Sidewinder", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.005" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Trickbot" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.005" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Office Product Spawn CMD Process Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Office Product Spawn CMD Process", + "file": "endpoint/office_product_spawn_cmd_process.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/spear_phish/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_cmd", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "office_product_spawn_cmd_process_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawn_cmd_process.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Powershell Remote Thread To Known Windows Process", + "id": "ec102cb2-a0f5-11eb-9b38-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-19", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "this search is designed to detect suspicious powershell process that tries to inject code and to known/critical windows process and execute it using CreateRemoteThread. This technique is seen in several malware like trickbot and offensive tooling like cobaltstrike where it load a shellcode to svchost.exe to execute reverse shell to c2 and download another payload", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode = 8 process_name IN (\"powershell_ise.exe\", \"powershell.exe\") TargetImage IN (\"*\\\\svchost.exe\",\"*\\\\csrss.exe\" \"*\\\\gpupdate.exe\", \"*\\\\explorer.exe\",\"*\\\\services.exe\",\"*\\\\winlogon.exe\",\"*\\\\smss.exe\",\"*\\\\wininit.exe\",\"*\\\\userinit.exe\",\"*\\\\spoolsv.exe\",\"*\\\\taskhost.exe\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by SourceImage process_name SourceProcessId SourceProcessGuid TargetImage TargetProcessId NewThreadId StartAddress Computer EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, Create Remote thread from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of create remote thread may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/01/11/trickbot-still-alive-and-well/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Powershell Remote Thread To Known Windows Process", + "analytic_story": [ + "Trickbot" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/infection/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A suspicious powershell process $process_name$ that tries to create a remote thread on target process $TargetImage$ with eventcode $EventCode$ in host $Computer$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1055" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "SourceImage", + "process_name", + "SourceProcessId", + "SourceProcessGuid", + "TargetImage", + "TargetProcessId", + "NewThreadId", + "StartAddress", + "Computer", + "EventCode" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Cobalt Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sharpshooter", + "Silence", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1055" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Trickbot" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 63 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1055" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Powershell Remote Thread To Known Windows Process Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Powershell Remote Thread To Known Windows Process", + "file": "endpoint/powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/infection/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger", + "id": "75b00fd8-a0ff-11eb-8b31-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-19", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed with a Rundll32. This technique is common in new trickbot that uses rundll32 to load is trickbot downloader. The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\\Windows\\system32` and `C:\\Windows\\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.'", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message | search Command IN (\"*rundll32*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Task_Name, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden, Arguments | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the task schedule (Exa. Security Log EventCode 4698) endpoints. Tune and filter known instances of Task schedule used in your environment.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/", + "https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Trickbot", + "IcedID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/tasksched/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A schedule task process commandline rundll32 arguments $Arguments$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "dest", + "Task_Name", + "Command", + "Author", + "Enabled", + "Hidden", + "Arguments" + ], + "risk_score": 70, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Trickbot", + "IcedID" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 70 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger", + "file": "endpoint/schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/tasksched/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 StartW", + "id": "9319dda5-73f2-4d43-a85a-67ce961bddb7", + "version": 3, + "date": "2021-02-04", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe executing a DLL function name, Start and StartW, on the command line that is commonly observed with Cobalt Strike x86 and x64 DLL payloads. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64. Typically, the DLL will be written and loaded from a world writeable path or user location. In most instances it will not have a valid certificate (Unsigned). During investigation, review the parent process and other parallel application execution. Capture and triage the DLL in question. In the instance of Cobalt Strike, rundll32.exe is the default process it opens and injects shellcode into. This default process can be changed, but typically is not.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*start* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_startw_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use Start as a function and call it via the command line. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", + "https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-windows-executable", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32", + "https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 StartW", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", + "Cobalt Strike", + "Trickbot" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "rundll32.exe running with suspicious parameters on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "CopyKittens", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "MuddyWater", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", + "Cobalt Strike", + "Trickbot" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 35 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 35 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 StartW Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 StartW", + "file": "endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_rundll32_startw_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Trickbot Named Pipe", + "id": "1804b0a4-a682-11eb-8f68-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-26", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "this search is to detect potential trickbot infection through the create/connected named pipe to the system. This technique is used by trickbot to communicate to its c2 to post or get command during infection.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode IN (17,18) PipeName=\"\\\\pipe\\\\*lacesomepipe\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer user_id EventCode PipeName signature Image process_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `trickbot_named_pipe_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and pipename from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. .", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/", + "https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Trickbot Named Pipe", + "analytic_story": [ + "Trickbot" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/namedpipe/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Possible Trickbot namedpipe created on $Computer$ by $Image$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1055" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Image", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Computer", + "user_id", + "EventCode", + "PipeName", + "signature", + "Image", + "process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Cobalt Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sharpshooter", + "Silence", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1055" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Trickbot" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Image", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 42 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "Image", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1055" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Trickbot Named Pipe Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Trickbot Named Pipe", + "file": "endpoint/trickbot_named_pipe.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/namedpipe/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "trickbot_named_pipe_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/trickbot_named_pipe.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Wermgr Process Connecting To IP Check Web Services", + "id": "ed313326-a0f9-11eb-a89c-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-19", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "this search is designed to detect suspicious wermgr.exe process that tries to connect to known IP web services. This technique is know for trickbot and other trojan spy malware to recon the infected machine and look for its ip address without so much finger print on the commandline process. Since wermgr.exe is designed for error handling process of windows it is really suspicious that this process is trying to connect to this IP web services cause that maybe cause of some malicious code injection.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode =22 process_name = wermgr.exe QueryName IN (\"*wtfismyip.com\", \"*checkip.amazonaws.com\", \"*ipecho.net\", \"*ipinfo.io\", \"*api.ipify.org\", \"*icanhazip.com\", \"*ip.anysrc.com\",\"*api.ip.sb\", \"ident.me\", \"www.myexternalip.com\", \"*zen.spamhaus.org\", \"*cbl.abuseat.org\", \"*b.barracudacentral.org\",\"*dnsbl-1.uceprotect.net\", \"*spam.dnsbl.sorbs.net\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by process_path process_name process_id QueryName QueryStatus QueryResults Computer EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, dns query name process path , and query ststus from your endpoints like EventCode 22. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 12 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/", + "https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Wermgr Process Connecting To IP Check Web Services", + "analytic_story": [ + "Trickbot" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/infection/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Wermgr.exe process connecting IP location web services on $ComputerName$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1590", + "T1590.005" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "process_path", + "process_name", + "process_id", + "QueryName", + "QueryStatus", + "QueryResults", + "Computer", + "EventCode" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1590", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Network Information", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "HAFNIUM" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1590.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "IP Addresses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Andariel", + "HAFNIUM" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1590", + "T1590.005" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Trickbot" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1590", + "T1590.005" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Wermgr Process Connecting To IP Check Web Services Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Wermgr Process Connecting To IP Check Web Services", + "file": "endpoint/wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/infection/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Wermgr Process Create Executable File", + "id": "ab3bcce0-a105-11eb-973c-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-19", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "this search is designed to detect potential malicious wermgr.exe process that drops or create executable file. Since wermgr.exe is an application trigger when error encountered in a process, it is really un ussual to this process to drop executable file. This technique is commonly seen in trickbot malware where it injects it code to this process to execute it malicious behavior like downloading other payload", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=11 process_name = \"wermgr.exe\" TargetFilename = \"*.exe\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Image TargetFilename process_name dest EventCode ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wermgr_process_create_executable_file_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of wermgr.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/", + "https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Wermgr Process Create Executable File", + "analytic_story": [ + "Trickbot" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/infection/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Wermgr.exe writing executable files on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1027" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Image", + "TargetFilename", + "process_name", + "dest", + "EventCode", + "ProcessId" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1027", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackOasis", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dust Storm", + "Elderwood", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Group5", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1027" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Trickbot" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1027" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Wermgr Process Create Executable File Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Wermgr Process Create Executable File", + "file": "endpoint/wermgr_process_create_executable_file.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/infection/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "wermgr_process_create_executable_file_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wermgr_process_create_executable_file.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process", + "id": "e8fc95bc-a107-11eb-a978-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-04-19", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is designed to detect suspicious cmd and powershell process spawned by wermgr.exe process. This suspicious behavior are commonly seen in code injection technique technique like trickbot to execute a shellcode, dll modules to run malicious behavior.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as cmdline min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name = \"wermgr.exe\" `process_cmd` OR `process_powershell` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/", + "https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process", + "analytic_story": [ + "Trickbot" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/infection/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Wermgr.exe spawning suspicious processes on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Trickbot" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process", + "file": "endpoint/wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/infection/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_powershell", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "process_cmd", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [] + }, + { + "name": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", + "id": "270a67a6-55d8-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-01-12", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "description": "Monitor and detect behaviors used by attackers who leverage trusted developer utilities to execute malicious code.", + "narrative": "Adversaries may take advantage of trusted developer utilities to proxy execution of malicious payloads. There are many utilities used for software development related tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development, debugging, and reverse engineering. These utilities may often be signed with legitimate certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution of malicious code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application control solutions.\\\nThe searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe to execute malicious code.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", + "analytic_story": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "GALLIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Michael Haag", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename", + "id": "f0db4464-55d9-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 3, + "date": "2021-09-20", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies a renamed instance of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe. Microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v4.0.30319 and is rarely utilized. When investigating, identify the executed code on disk and review. A spawned child process from microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is uncommon. In any instance, microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe spawning from an Office product or any living off the land binary is highly suspect.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_microsoftworkflowcompiler` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe, triggering a false positive.", + "references": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md#atomic-test-6---microsoftworkflowcompilerexe-payload-execution" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename", + "analytic_story": [ + "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", + "Cobalt Strike", + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious renamed microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe binary ran on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1036", + "T1127", + "T1036.003" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "GALLIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036", + "T1127", + "T1036.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", + "Cobalt Strike", + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 63 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 63 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036", + "T1127", + "T1036.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename", + "file": "endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_microsoftworkflowcompiler", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage", + "id": "9bbc62e8-55d8-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-01-12", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe usage. microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v4.0.30319 and is rarely utilized. When investigating, identify the executed code on disk and review. It is not a commonly used process by many applications.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_microsoftworkflowcompiler` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, limited instances have been identified coming from native Microsoft utilities similar to SCCM.", + "references": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md#atomic-test-6---microsoftworkflowcompilerexe-payload-execution" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage", + "analytic_story": [ + "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe process ran on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1127" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1127" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 35 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 35 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1127" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage", + "file": "endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_microsoftworkflowcompiler", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [] + }, + { + "name": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild", + "id": "be3418e2-551b-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-01-21", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "description": "Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the msbuild.exe process to execute malicious code.", + "narrative": "Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio and is native to Windows. It handles XML formatted project files that define requirements for loading and building various platforms and configurations.\\\nThe inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# code to be inserted into an XML project file. MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application control defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution.\\\nThe searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging msbuild.exe to execute malicious code.\\\nTriage\\\nValidate execution\\\n1. Determine if MSBuild.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of MSBuild.exe and further PE metadata.\\\n1. Determine if script code was executed with MSBuild.\\\nSituational Awareness\\\nThe objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by MSBuild.exe.\\\n1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application?\\\n1. Module loads. Are the known MSBuild.exe modules being loaded by a non-standard application? Is MSbuild loading any suspicious .DLLs?\\\n1. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain.\\\nRetrieval of script code\\\nThe objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/001/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md", + "https://github.com/infosecn1nja/MaliciousMacroMSBuild", + "https://github.com/xorrior/RandomPS-Scripts/blob/master/Invoke-ExecuteMSBuild.ps1", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/", + "https://github.com/MHaggis/CBR-Queries/blob/master/msbuild.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild", + "analytic_story": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Frankenstein" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "GALLIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - MSBuild Suspicious Spawned By Script Process - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Spawn - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Michael Haag", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "MSBuild Suspicious Spawned By Script Process", + "id": "213b3148-24ea-11ec-93a2-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-10-04", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious child process of MSBuild spawned by Windows Script Host - cscript or wscript. This behavior or event are commonly seen and used by malware or adversaries to execute malicious msbuild process using malicious script in the compromised host. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any file modifications. MSBuild may load a script from the same path without having command-line arguments.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"wscript.exe\", \"cscript.exe\") AND `process_msbuild` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as developers do not spawn MSBuild via a WSH.", + "references": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/dc93ee63-050c-4ff8-b07e-8277af9ab939/#" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "MSBuild Suspicious Spawned By Script Process", + "analytic_story": [ + "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/regsvr32_silent/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Msbuild.exe process spawned by $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ executed by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1127.001", + "T1127" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Frankenstein" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1127.001", + "T1127" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1127.001", + "T1127" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "MSBuild Suspicious Spawned By Script Process Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "MSBuild Suspicious Spawned By Script Process", + "file": "endpoint/msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/regsvr32_silent/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_msbuild", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=msbuild.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSBuild.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious msbuild path", + "id": "f5198224-551c-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-01-12", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies msbuild.exe executing from a non-standard path. Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v4.0.30319 and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v4.0.30319. Instances of Visual Studio will run a copy of msbuild.exe. A moved instance of MSBuild is suspicious, however there are instances of build applications that will move or use a copy of MSBuild.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_msbuild` AND (Processes.process_path!=c:\\\\windows\\\\microsoft.net\\\\framework*\\\\v*\\\\*) by Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `suspicious_msbuild_path_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of msbuild.exe, triggering a false positive. Baselining of MSBuild.exe usage is recommended to better understand it's path usage. Visual Studio runs an instance out of a path that will need to be filtered on.", + "references": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious msbuild path", + "analytic_story": [ + "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild", + "Cobalt Strike", + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Msbuild.exe ran from an uncommon path on $dest$ execyted by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1036", + "T1127", + "T1036.003", + "T1127.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "GALLIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Frankenstein" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036", + "T1127", + "T1036.003", + "T1127.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild", + "Cobalt Strike", + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036", + "T1127", + "T1036.003", + "T1127.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Suspicious msbuild path Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious msbuild path", + "file": "endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_msbuild", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=msbuild.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSBuild.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_msbuild_path_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious MSBuild Rename", + "id": "4006adac-5937-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-01-12", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies renamed instances of msbuild.exe executing. Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v4.0.30319 and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v4.0.30319. During investigation, identify the code executed and what is executing a renamed instance of MSBuild.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_msbuild` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_msbuild_rename_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of msbuild, triggering a false positive.", + "references": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md", + "https://github.com/infosecn1nja/MaliciousMacroMSBuild/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious MSBuild Rename", + "analytic_story": [ + "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild", + "Cobalt Strike", + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious renamed msbuild.exe binary ran on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1036", + "T1127", + "T1036.003", + "T1127.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "GALLIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Frankenstein" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036", + "T1127", + "T1036.003", + "T1127.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild", + "Cobalt Strike", + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 63 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 63 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036", + "T1127", + "T1036.003", + "T1127.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Suspicious MSBuild Rename Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious MSBuild Rename", + "file": "endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_msbuild", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=msbuild.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSBuild.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_msbuild_rename_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious MSBuild Spawn", + "id": "a115fba6-5514-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-01-12", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning msbuild.exe. This behavior is indicative of a COM object being utilized to spawn msbuild from wmiprvse.exe. It is common for MSBuild.exe to be spawned from devenv.exe while using Visual Studio. In this instance, there will be command line arguments and file paths. In a malicious instance, MSBuild.exe will spawn from non-standard processes and have no command line arguments. For example, MSBuild.exe spawning from explorer.exe, powershell.exe is far less common and should be investigated.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe AND `process_msbuild` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_msbuild_spawn_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive.", + "references": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious MSBuild Spawn", + "analytic_story": [ + "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious msbuild.exe process executed on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1127", + "T1127.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Frankenstein" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1127", + "T1127.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 42 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 42 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1127", + "T1127.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Suspicious MSBuild Spawn Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious MSBuild Spawn", + "file": "endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_msbuild", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=msbuild.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSBuild.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_msbuild_spawn_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [] + }, + { + "name": "Unusual Processes", + "id": "f4368e3f-d59f-4192-84f6-748ac5a3ddb6", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-02-04", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "description": "Quickly identify systems running new or unusual processes in your environment that could be indicators of suspicious activity. Processes run from unusual locations, those with conspicuously long command lines, and rare executables are all examples of activities that may warrant deeper investigation.", + "narrative": "Being able to profile a host's processes within your environment can help you more quickly identify processes that seem out of place when compared to the rest of the population of hosts or asset types.\\\nThis Analytic Story lets you identify processes that are either a) not typically seen running or b) have some sort of suspicious command-line arguments associated with them. This Analytic Story will also help you identify the user running these processes and the associated process activity on the host.\\\nIn the event an unusual process is identified, it is imperative to better understand how that process was able to execute on the host, when it first executed, and whether other hosts are affected. This extra information may provide clues that can help the analyst further investigate any suspicious activity.", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/08/monitoring-windows-console-activity-part-two.html", + "https://www.splunk.com/pdfs/technical-briefs/advanced-threat-detection-and-response-tech-brief.pdf", + "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/logging/detecting-security-incidents-windows-workstation-event-logs-34262" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Unusual Processes", + "analytic_story": "Unusual Processes", + "category": [ + "Malware" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Match Legitimate Name or Location", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Darkhotel", + "FIN7", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Fox Kitten", + "Indrik Spider", + "Lazarus Group", + "Machete", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Sowbug", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Whitefly", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1595", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Active Scanning", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1016", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Higaisa", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN8", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "CopyKittens", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "MuddyWater", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "TA551" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "GALLIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.012", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Verclsid", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Mustang Panda", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1588.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Tool", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Resource Development" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Cleaver", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "CostaRicto", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Dragonfly", + "FIN10", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gorgon Group", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Patchwork", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Cobalt Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sharpshooter", + "Silence", + "Turla" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1134.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Parent PID Spoofing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1134", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Blue Mockingbird", + "FIN6" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access", + "Defense Evasion", + "Discovery", + "Execution", + "Initial Access", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation", + "Reconnaissance", + "Resource Development" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Command & Control", + "Exploitation", + "Installation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", + "ESCU - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", + "ESCU - Rundll32 Shimcache Flush - Rule", + "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious Copy on System32 - Rule", + "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", + "ESCU - Verclsid CLSID Execution - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows Remote Assistance Spawning Process - Rule", + "ESCU - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", + "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", + "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", + "ESCU - WinRM Spawning a Process - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [ + "ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK" + ], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Uncommon Processes On Endpoint", + "id": "29ccce64-a10c-4389-a45f-337cb29ba1f7", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-07-22", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for applications on the endpoint that you have marked as uncommon.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process Processes.process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `uncommon_processes` |`uncommon_processes_on_endpoint_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model. This search uses a lookup file `uncommon_processes_default.csv` to track various features of process names that are usually uncommon in most environments. Please consider updating `uncommon_processes_local.csv` to hunt for processes that are uncommon in your environment.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Uncommon Processes On Endpoint", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Unusual Processes" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1204.002" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1204.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Unusual Processes" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1204.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "uncommon_processes", + "definition": "lookup update=true lookup_uncommon_processes_default process_name as process_name outputnew uncommon_default,category_default,analytic_story_default,kill_chain_phase_default,mitre_attack_default | lookup update=true lookup_uncommon_processes_local process_name as process_name outputnew uncommon_local,category_local,analytic_story_local,kill_chain_phase_local,mitre_attack_local | eval uncommon = coalesce(uncommon_default, uncommon_local), analytic_story = coalesce(analytic_story_default, analytic_story_local), category=coalesce(category_default, category_local), kill_chain_phase=coalesce(kill_chain_phase_default, kill_chain_phase_local), mitre_attack=coalesce(mitre_attack_default, mitre_attack_local) | fields - analytic_story_default, analytic_story_local, category_default, category_local, kill_chain_phase_default, kill_chain_phase_local, mitre_attack_default, mitre_attack_local, uncommon_default, uncommon_local | search uncommon=true", + "description": "This macro limits the output to processes that have been marked as uncommon" + }, + { + "name": "uncommon_processes_on_endpoint_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Attacker Tools On Endpoint", + "id": "a51bfe1a-94f0-48cc-b4e4-16a110145893", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-11-04", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for execution of commonly used attacker tools on an endpoint.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.dest!=unknown Processes.user!=unknown by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | lookup attacker_tools attacker_tool_names AS process_name OUTPUT description | search description !=false| `attacker_tools_on_endpoint_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is usually generated via logs that report process tracking in your Windows audit settings.", + "known_false_positives": "Some administrator activity can be potentially triggered, please add those users to the filter macro.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Attacker Tools On Endpoint", + "analytic_story": [ + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "XMRig", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Unusual Processes" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1595/attacker_scan_tools/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An attacker tool $process_name$,listed in attacker_tools.csv is executed on host $dest$ by User $user$. This process $process_name$ is known to do- $description$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1036.005", + "T1036", + "T1003", + "T1595" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process", + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.parent_process" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Match Legitimate Name or Location", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Darkhotel", + "FIN7", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Fox Kitten", + "Indrik Spider", + "Lazarus Group", + "Machete", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Sowbug", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Whitefly", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1595", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Active Scanning", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036.005", + "T1036", + "T1003", + "T1595" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "XMRig", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Unusual Processes" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process", + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036.005", + "T1036", + "T1003", + "T1595" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Attacker Tools On Endpoint Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Attacker Tools On Endpoint", + "file": "endpoint/attacker_tools_on_endpoint.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1595/attacker_scan_tools/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "attacker_tools_on_endpoint_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "attacker_tools", + "description": "A list of tools used by attackers", + "filename": "attacker_tools.csv", + "default_match": "false", + "match_type": "WILDCARD(attacker_tool_names)", + "min_matches": 1, + "case_sensitive_match": "false" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/attacker_tools_on_endpoint.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery", + "id": "a51bfe1a-94f0-48cc-b1e4-16ae10145893", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-11-10", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for fast execution of processes used for system network configuration discovery on the endpoint.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where NOT Processes.user IN (\"\",\"unknown\") by Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.user _time | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | search `system_network_configuration_discovery_tools` | transaction dest connected=false maxpause=5m |where eventcount>=5 | table firstTime lastTime dest user process_name process parent_process eventcount | `detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the processes node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is usually generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry or that are populated via Windows event logs, after enabling process tracking in your Windows audit settings.", + "known_false_positives": "It is uncommon for normal users to execute a series of commands used for network discovery. System administrators often use scripts to execute these commands. These can generate false positives.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery", + "analytic_story": [ + "Unusual Processes" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1016/discovery_commands/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 40, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning multiple $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ typically not a normal behavior of the process.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1016" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 32, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1016", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Higaisa", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1016" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Unusual Processes" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery" + ], + "impact": 40, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 32 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 32 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1016" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery", + "file": "endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1016/discovery_commands/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "system_network_configuration_discovery_tools", + "definition": "(process_name= \"arp.exe\" OR process_name= \"at.exe\" OR process_name= \"attrib.exe\" OR process_name= \"cscript.exe\" OR process_name= \"dsquery.exe\" OR process_name= \"hostname.exe\" OR process_name= \"ipconfig.exe\" OR process_name= \"mimikatz.exe\" OR process_name= \"nbstat.exe\" OR process_name= \"net.exe\" OR process_name= \"netsh.exe\" OR process_name= \"nslookup.exe\" OR process_name= \"ping.exe\" OR process_name= \"quser.exe\" OR process_name= \"qwinsta.exe\" OR process_name= \"reg.exe\" OR process_name= \"runas.exe\" OR process_name= \"sc.exe\" OR process_name= \"schtasks.exe\" OR process_name= \"ssh.exe\" OR process_name= \"systeminfo.exe\" OR process_name= \"taskkill.exe\" OR process_name= \"telnet.exe\" OR process_name= \"tracert.exe\" OR process_name=\"wscript.exe\" OR process_name= \"xcopy.exe\")", + "description": "This macro is a list of process that can be used to discover the network configuration" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Rundll32 Shimcache Flush", + "id": "a913718a-25b6-11ec-96d3-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-10-05", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious rundll32 commandline to clear shim cache. This technique is a anti-forensic technique to clear the cache taht are one important artifacts in terms of digital forensic during attacks or incident. This TTP is a good indicator that someone tries to evade some tools and clear foothold on the machine.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` AND Processes.process = \"*apphelp.dll,ShimFlushCache*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_shimcache_flush_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://blueteamops.medium.com/shimcache-flush-89daff28d15e" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Rundll32 Shimcache Flush", + "analytic_story": [ + "Unusual Processes" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/shimcache_flush/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "rundll32 process execute $process$ to clear shim cache in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1112" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN8", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1112" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Unusual Processes" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 80 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1112" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Rundll32 Shimcache Flush Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Rundll32 Shimcache Flush", + "file": "endpoint/rundll32_shimcache_flush.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/shimcache_flush/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "rundll32_shimcache_flush_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/rundll32_shimcache_flush.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal", + "id": "6c135f8d-5e60-454e-80b7-c56eed739833", + "version": 6, + "date": "2022-02-08", + "author": "Michael Haag, David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading an export function by ordinal value. Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly, may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Utilizing ordinal values makes it a bit more complicated for analysts to understand the behavior until the DLL is reviewed.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"rundll32.+\\#\\d+\") | `rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives are possible with native utilities and third party applications. Filtering may be needed based on command-line, or add world writeable paths to restrict query.", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/07/qbot-likes-to-move-it-move-it/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal", + "analytic_story": [ + "Unusual Processes", + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/ordinal_windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation" + ], + "message": "A rundll32 process $process_name$ with ordinal parameter like this process commandline $process$ on host $dest$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "CopyKittens", + "Gamaredon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "MuddyWater", + "Sandworm Team", + "TA505", + "TA551" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Unusual Processes", + "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218", + "T1218.011" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal", + "file": "endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/ordinal_windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_rundll32", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Copy on System32", + "id": "ce633e56-25b2-11ec-9e76-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-10-05", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious copy of file from systemroot folder of the windows OS. This technique is commonly used by APT or other malware as part of execution (LOLBIN) to run its malicious code using the available legitimate tool in OS. this type of event may seen or may execute of normal user in some instance but this is really a anomaly that needs to be check within the network.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN(\"cmd.exe\", \"powershell*\",\"pwsh.exe\", \"sqlps.exe\", \"sqltoolsps.exe\", \"powershell_ise.exe\") AND `process_copy` AND Processes.process IN(\"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWow64\\\\*\") AND Processes.process = \"*copy*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `suspicious_copy_on_system32_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "every user may do this event but very un-ussual.", + "references": [ + "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/8da5b75b6380a41eee3a399c43dfe0d99eeefaa1fd21027a07b1ecaa4cd96fdd?environmentId=120" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Copy on System32", + "analytic_story": [ + "Unusual Processes" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/copy_sysmon/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "execution of copy exe to copy file from $process$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1036.003", + "T1036" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "GALLIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036.003", + "T1036" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Unusual Processes" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 63 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 63 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036.003", + "T1036" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Suspicious Copy on System32 Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious Copy on System32", + "file": "endpoint/suspicious_copy_on_system32.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/copy_sysmon/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_copy", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=copy.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=copy.exe OR Processes.process_name=xcopy.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=xcopy.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_copy_on_system32_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_copy_on_system32.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations", + "id": "a34aae96-ccf8-4aef-952c-3ea21444444d", + "version": 6, + "date": "2020-12-08", + "author": "David Dorsey, Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for system processes that typically execute from `C:\\Windows\\System32\\` or `C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64`. This may indicate a malicious process that is trying to hide as a legitimate process.\\\nThis detection utilizes a lookup that is deduped `system32` and `syswow64` directories from Server 2016 and Windows 10.\\\nDuring triage, review the parallel processes - what process moved the native Windows binary? identify any artifacts on disk and review. If a remote destination is contacted, what is the reputation?", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_path !=\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32*\" Processes.process_path !=\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_hash | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `is_windows_system_file` | `system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "This detection may require tuning based on third party applications utilizing native Windows binaries in non-standard paths.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.yaml", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Unusual Processes", + "Ransomware", + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "System process running from unexpected location on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1036", + "T1036.003" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Processes.process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_hash" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "GALLIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036", + "T1036.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Unusual Processes", + "Ransomware", + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Processes.process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "Processes.process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036", + "T1036.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations", + "file": "endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "is_windows_system_file", + "definition": "lookup update=true is_windows_system_file filename as process_name OUTPUT systemFile | search systemFile=true", + "description": "This macro limits the output to process names that are in the Windows System directory" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Verclsid CLSID Execution", + "id": "61e9a56a-20fa-11ec-8ba3-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-29", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a possible abuse of verclsid to execute malicious file through generate CLSID. This process is a normal application of windows to verify the CLSID COM object before it is instantiated by Windows Explorer. This hunting query can be a good pivot point to analyze what is he CLSID or COM object pointing too to check if it is a valid application or not.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_verclsid` AND Processes.process=\"*/S*\" Processes.process=\"*/C*\" AND Processes.process=\"*{*\" AND Processes.process=\"*}*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `verclsid_clsid_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "windows can used this application for its normal COM object validation.", + "references": [ + "https://gist.github.com/NickTyrer/0598b60112eaafe6d07789f7964290d5", + "https://bohops.com/2018/08/18/abusing-the-com-registry-structure-part-2-loading-techniques-for-evasion-and-persistence/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Verclsid CLSID Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Unusual Processes" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.012/verclsid_exec/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "process $process_name$ to execute possible clsid commandline $process$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1218.012", + "T1218" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.012", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Verclsid", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218.012", + "T1218" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Unusual Processes" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1218.012", + "T1218" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Verclsid CLSID Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Verclsid CLSID Execution", + "file": "endpoint/verclsid_clsid_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.012/verclsid_exec/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_verclsid", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=verclsid.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=verclsid.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "verclsid_clsid_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/verclsid_clsid_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path", + "id": "fddf3b56-7933-11ec-98a6-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-19", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies native .net binaries within the Windows operating system that may be abused by adversaries by moving it to a new directory. The analytic identifies the .net binary by using a lookup and compares the process name and original file name (internal name). The analytic utilizes a lookup with the is_net_windows_file macro to identify the binary process name and original file name. if one or the other matches an alert will be generated. Adversaries abuse these binaries as they are native to windows and native DotNet. Note that not all SDK (post install of Windows) are captured in the lookup.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where NOT (Processes.process_path IN (\"*\\\\Windows\\\\ADWS\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\system32*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\NetworkController\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SystemApps\\\\*\", \"*\\\\WinSxS\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Microsoft.NET\\\\*\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_path Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `is_net_windows_file` | `windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present and filtering may be required. Certain utilities will run from non-standard paths based on the third-party application in use.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.yaml", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path", + "analytic_story": [ + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Ransomware", + "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_installutil_path.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ from a non-standard path was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1036", + "T1036.003", + "T1218", + "T1218.004" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "GALLIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Mustang Panda", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036", + "T1036.003", + "T1218", + "T1218.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Ransomware", + "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036", + "T1036.003", + "T1218", + "T1218.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path", + "file": "endpoint/windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon_installutil_path.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_installutil_path.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "is_net_windows_file", + "definition": "lookup update=true is_net_windows_file filename as process_name OUTPUT netFile | lookup update=true is_net_windows_file originalFileName as original_file_name OUTPUT netFile | search netFile=true", + "description": "This macro limits the output to process names that are .net binaries on Windows Server 2016 and Windows 11." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path", + "id": "dcf74b22-7933-11ec-857c-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-19", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the Windows binary InstallUtil.exe running from a non-standard location. The analytic utilizes a macro for InstallUtil and identifies both the process_name and original_file_name.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` NOT (Processes.process_path IN (\"*\\\\Windows\\\\ADWS\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\system32*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\NetworkController\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SystemApps\\\\*\", \"*\\\\WinSxS\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Microsoft.NET\\\\*\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_hash | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present and filtering may be required. Certain utilities will run from non-standard paths based on the third-party application in use.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.yaml", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path", + "analytic_story": [ + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Ransomware", + "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_installutil_path.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ from a non-standard path was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1036", + "T1036.003", + "T1218", + "T1218.004" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "GALLIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Mustang Panda", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036", + "T1036.003", + "T1218", + "T1218.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Ransomware", + "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036", + "T1036.003", + "T1218", + "T1218.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path", + "file": "endpoint/windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon_installutil_path.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_installutil_path.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_installutil", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=installutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=InstallUtil.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun", + "id": "bb4f3090-7ae4-11ec-897f-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-21", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of AdvancedRun.exe. AdvancedRun.exe has similar capabilities as other remote programs like psexec. AdvancedRun may also ingest a configuration file with all settings defined and perform its activity. The analytic is written in a way to identify a renamed binary and also the common command-line arguments.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=advancedrun.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=advancedrun.exe) Processes.process IN (\"*EXEFilename*\",\"*/cfg*\",\"*RunAs*\", \"*WindowState*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_nirsoft_advancedrun_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as it is specific to AdvancedRun. Filter as needed based on legitimate usage.", + "references": [ + "http://www.nirsoft.net/utils/advanced_run.html", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun", + "analytic_story": [ + "Unusual Processes", + "Ransomware", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1588.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of advancedrun.exe, $process_name$, was spawned by $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1588.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 60, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1588.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Tool", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Resource Development" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Cleaver", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "CostaRicto", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Dragonfly", + "FIN10", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gorgon Group", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Patchwork", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1588.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Unusual Processes", + "Ransomware", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 60 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 60 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1588.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun", + "file": "endpoint/windows_nirsoft_advancedrun.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1588.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_nirsoft_advancedrun_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_nirsoft_advancedrun.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Remote Assistance Spawning Process", + "id": "ced50492-8849-11ec-9f68-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-07", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of Microsoft Remote Assistance, msra.exe, spawning PowerShell.exe or cmd.exe as a child process. Msra.exe by default has no command-line arguments and typically spawns itself. It will generate a network connection to the remote system that is connected. This behavior is indicative of another process injected into msra.exe. Review the parent process or cross process events to identify source.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=msra.exe `windows_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_remote_assistance_spawning_process_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, filter as needed. Add additional shells as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/07/qbot-likes-to-move-it-move-it/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Remote Assistance Spawning Process", + "analytic_story": [ + "Unusual Processes" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/msra/msra-windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$, generating behavior not common with msra.exe.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1055" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Cobalt Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sharpshooter", + "Silence", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1055" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Unusual Processes" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1055" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows Remote Assistance Spawning Process Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows Remote Assistance Spawning Process", + "file": "endpoint/windows_remote_assistance_spawning_process.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "msra-windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/msra/msra-windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "windows_shells", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe)", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_remote_assistance_spawning_process_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_remote_assistance_spawning_process.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process", + "id": "1f35e1da-267b-11ec-90a9-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-10-06", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies a suspicious spawned process by WScript or CScript process. This technique was a common technique used by adversaries and malware to execute different LOLBIN, other scripts like PowerShell or spawn a suspended process to inject its code as a defense evasion. This TTP may detect some normal script that using several application tool that are in the list of the child process it detects but a good pivot and indicator that a script is may execute suspicious code.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"cscript.exe\", \"wscript.exe\") Processes.process_name IN (\"regsvr32.exe\", \"rundll32.exe\",\"winhlp32.exe\",\"certutil.exe\",\"msbuild.exe\",\"cmd.exe\",\"powershell*\",\"wmic.exe\",\"mshta.exe\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may create vbs or js script that use several tool as part of its execution. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/8da5b75b6380a41eee3a399c43dfe0d99eeefaa1fd21027a07b1ecaa4cd96fdd?environmentId=120", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process", + "analytic_story": [ + "FIN7", + "Remcos", + "Unusual Processes", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/vbs_wscript/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "wscript or cscript parent process spawned $process_name$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1055", + "T1543", + "T1134.004", + "T1134" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Cobalt Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sharpshooter", + "Silence", + "Turla" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1134.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Parent PID Spoofing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1134", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Blue Mockingbird", + "FIN6" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1055", + "T1543", + "T1134.004", + "T1134" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "FIN7", + "Remcos", + "Unusual Processes", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1055", + "T1543", + "T1134.004", + "T1134" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process", + "file": "endpoint/wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/vbs_wscript/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Rare Executables", + "id": "44fddcb2-8d3b-454c-874e-7c6de5a4f7ac", + "version": 5, + "date": "2020-03-16", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search will return a table of rare processes, the names of the systems running them, and the users who initiated each process.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.dest) as dest values(Processes.user) as user min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name | rename Processes.process_name as process | rex field=user \"(?.*)\\\\\\\\(?.*)\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| search [| tstats count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name | rare Processes.process_name limit=30 | rename Processes.process_name as process| `filter_rare_process_allow_list`| table process ] | `detect_rare_executables_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts and populating the endpoint data model with the resultant dataset. The macro `filter_rare_process_allow_list` searches two lookup files for allowed processes. These consist of `rare_process_allow_list_default.csv` and `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv`. To add your own processes to the allow list, add them to `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv`. If you wish to remove an entry from the default lookup file, you will have to modify the macro itself to set the allow_list value for that process to false. You can modify the limit parameter and search scheduling to better suit your environment.", + "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate processes may be only rarely executed in your environment. As these are identified, update `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv` to filter them out of your search results.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Rare Executables", + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Unusual Processes", + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.PT", + "PR.DS", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_name" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.PT", + "PR.DS", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Unusual Processes", + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.PT", + "PR.DS", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "filter_rare_process_allow_list", + "definition": "lookup update=true lookup_rare_process_allow_list_default process as process OUTPUTNEW allow_list | where allow_list=\"false\" | lookup update=true lookup_rare_process_allow_list_local process as process OUTPUT allow_list | where allow_list=\"false\"", + "description": "This macro is intended to allow_list processes that have been definied as rare" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_rare_executables_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Unusually Long Command Line", + "id": "c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6a4264e7f", + "version": 5, + "date": "2020-12-08", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious activity on your hosts.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| eval processlen=len(process) | eventstats stdev(processlen) as stdev, avg(processlen) as avg by dest | stats max(processlen) as maxlen, values(stdev) as stdevperhost, values(avg) as avgperhost by dest, user, process_name, process | `unusually_long_command_line_filter` |eval threshold = 3 | where maxlen > ((threshold*stdevperhost) + avgperhost)", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships, from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the process field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate applications start with long command lines.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Unusually Long Command Line", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Unusual Processes", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Unusually long command line $Processes.process_name$ on $dest$", + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Processes.process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Unusual Processes", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Processes.process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 42 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "Processes.process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "unusually_long_command_line_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK", + "id": "57edaefa-a73b-45e5-bbae-f39c1473f941", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-05-08", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious activity on your hosts. This search leverages the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) to help identify command lines with lengths that are unusual for a given user.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| eval processlen=len(process) | search user!=unknown | apply cmdline_pdfmodel threshold=0.01 | rename \"IsOutlier(processlen)\" as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | table firstTime lastTime user dest process_name process processlen count | `unusually_long_command_line___mltk_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that monitors command lines and populates the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model. In addition, MLTK version >= 4.2 must be installed on your search heads, along with any required dependencies. Finally, the support search \"Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK\" must be executed before this detection search, as it builds an ML model over the historical data used by this search. It is important that this search is run in the same app context as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild the model with the latest data available in your environment.", + "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate applications use long command lines for installs or updates. You should review identified command lines for legitimacy. You may modify the first part of the search to omit legitimate command lines from consideration. If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider changing the value of threshold in the search to a smaller value. You should also periodically re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data. You may get unexpected results if the user identified in the results is not present in the data used to build the associated model.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Unusual Processes", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Unusual Processes", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", + "id": "d2a4d85b-fc6a-47a0-82f6-bc1ec2ebc459", + "version": 1, + "date": "2019-05-08", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model to characterize the length of the command lines observed for each user in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 30 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies outliers in the length of the command line.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as start_time max(_time) as end_time FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | search user!=unknown | `security_content_ctime(start_time)`| `security_content_ctime(end_time)`| eval processlen=len(process) | fit DensityFunction processlen by user into cmdline_pdfmodel", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint data model. In addition, you must have the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version >= 4.2 installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users in your environment, you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 30 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data. More information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Ransomware", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Unusual Processes" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Daily Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd.exe", + "Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "unusually_long_command_line___mltk_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "WinRM Spawning a Process", + "id": "a081836a-ba4d-11eb-8593-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-21", + "author": "Drew Church, Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious processes spawning from WinRM (wsmprovhost.exe). This analytic is related to potential exploitation of CVE-2021-31166. which is a kernel-mode device driver http.sys vulnerability. Current proof of concept code will blue-screen the operating system. However, http.sys used by many different Windows processes, including WinRM. In this case, identifying suspicious process create (child processes) from `wsmprovhost.exe` is what this analytic is identifying.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=wsmprovhost.exe Processes.process_name IN (\"cmd.exe\",\"sh.exe\",\"bash.exe\",\"powershell.exe\",\"pwsh.exe\",\"schtasks.exe\",\"certutil.exe\",\"whoami.exe\",\"bitsadmin.exe\",\"scp.exe\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winrm_spawning_a_process_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown. Add new processes or filter as needed. It is possible system management software may spawn processes from `wsmprovhost.exe`.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_access/win_susp_shell_spawn_from_winrm.yml", + "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/5/17/cve-2021-31166-a-wormable-code-execution-bug-in-httpsys", + "https://github.com/0vercl0k/CVE-2021-31166/blob/main/cve-2021-31166.py" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "WinRM Spawning a Process", + "analytic_story": [ + "Unusual Processes" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "dataset": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1190" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-31166" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Initial Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackTech", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Fox Kitten", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Night Dragon", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "Volatile Cedar", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Unusual Processes" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-31166" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1190" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "winrm_spawning_a_process_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/winrm_spawning_a_process.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + }, + { + "name": "Get Parent Process Info", + "id": "fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41bf9", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-02-28", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "parent_process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Phishing Payloads", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_parent_process_info" + }, + { + "name": "Get Process Info", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd71", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-01", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the process running on a host which is under investigation. To gather the process info, enter the values for the process name in question and the destination IP address.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search process_name= $process_name$ | search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_process_info" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "id": "826e6431-aeef-41b4-9fc0-6d0985d65a21", + "version": 1, + "date": "2017-09-15", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "description": "Leverage searches that detect cleartext network protocols that may leak credentials or should otherwise be encrypted.", + "narrative": "Various legacy protocols operate by default in the clear, without the protections of encryption. This potentially leaks sensitive information that can be exploited by passively sniffing network traffic. Depending on the protocol, this information could be highly sensitive, or could allow for session hijacking. In addition, these protocols send authentication information, which would allow for the harvesting of usernames and passwords that could potentially be used to authenticate and compromise secondary systems.", + "references": [ + "https://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "analytic_story": "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "category": [ + "Best Practices" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Security Monitoring", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [], + "datamodels": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Protocols passing authentication in cleartext", + "id": "6923cd64-17a0-453c-b945-81ac2d8c6db9", + "version": 3, + "date": "2021-08-19", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Traffic" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies cleartext protocols at risk of leaking sensitive information. Currently, this consists of legacy protocols such as telnet (port 23), POP3 (port 110), IMAP (port 143), and non-anonymous FTP (port 21) sessions. While some of these protocols may be used over SSL, they typically are found on different assigned ports in those instances.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.action!=blocked AND All_Traffic.transport=\"tcp\" AND (All_Traffic.dest_port=\"23\" OR All_Traffic.dest_port=\"143\" OR All_Traffic.dest_port=\"110\" OR (All_Traffic.dest_port=\"21\" AND All_Traffic.user != \"anonymous\")) by All_Traffic.user All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic, and populating the Network_Traffic data model. For more accurate result it's better to limit destination to organization private and public IP range, like All_Traffic.dest IN(192.168.0.0/16,172.16.0.0/12,10.0.0.0/8, x.x.x.x/22)", + "known_false_positives": "Some networks may use kerberized FTP or telnet servers, however, this is rare.", + "references": [ + "https://www.rackaid.com/blog/secure-your-email-and-file-transfers/", + "https://www.infosecmatter.com/capture-passwords-using-wireshark/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Protocols passing authentication in cleartext", + "analytic_story": [ + "Use of Cleartext Protocols" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 9", + "CIS 14" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "PR.AC", + "PR.DS" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "All_Traffic.transport", + "All_Traffic.dest_port", + "All_Traffic.user", + "All_Traffic.src", + "All_Traffic.dest", + "All_Traffic.action" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 9", + "CIS 14" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "PR.AC", + "PR.DS" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Use of Cleartext Protocols" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 9", + "CIS 14" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "PR.AC", + "PR.DS" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml", + "source": "network" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + }, + { + "name": "Get Process Information For Port Activity", + "id": "9925d08f-561e-4faa-8912-e3888a842341", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-01", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search will return information about the process associated with observed network traffic to a specific destination port from a specific host.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search dest=$dest$ | join dest type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Ports by Ports.process_id Ports.src Ports.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | search dest_port=$dest_port$ | rename src as dest]", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data that associates processes with network events and populate the Endpoint Datamodel", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest", + "dest_port" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Ports.process_id", + "Ports.src", + "Ports.dest_port" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_process_information_for_port_activity" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "WhisperGate", + "id": "0150e6e5-3171-442e-83f8-1ccd8599569b", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-19", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "description": "This analytic story contains detections that allow security analysts to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the destructive malware targeting Ukrainian organizations also known as \"WhisperGate\". This analytic story looks for suspicious process execution, command-line activity, downloads, DNS queries and more.", + "narrative": "WhisperGate/DEV-0586 is destructive malware operation found by MSTIC (Microsoft Threat Inteligence Center) targeting multiple organizations in Ukraine. This operation campaign consist of several malware component like the downloader that abuses discord platform, overwrite or destroy master boot record (MBR) of the targeted host, wiper and also windows defender evasion techniques.", + "references": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/", + "https://medium.com/s2wblog/analysis-of-destructive-malware-whispergate-targeting-ukraine-9d5d158f19f3" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "WhisperGate", + "analytic_story": "WhisperGate", + "category": [ + "Malware", + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Operation Wocao", + "Orangeworm", + "Sandworm Team", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN7", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "PROMETHIUM", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1027", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackOasis", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dust Storm", + "Elderwood", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Group5", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1497", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Darkhotel" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1497.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Time Based Evasion", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "FIN4", + "FIN7", + "Frankenstein", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Windshift" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "GALLIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Mustang Panda", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1588.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Tool", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Resource Development" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Cleaver", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "CostaRicto", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Dragonfly", + "FIN10", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gorgon Group", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Patchwork", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1561.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT37", + "APT38", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1561", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Cobalt Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sharpshooter", + "Silence", + "Turla" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1134.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Parent PID Spoofing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1134", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Blue Mockingbird", + "FIN6" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Discovery", + "Execution", + "Impact", + "Lateral Movement", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation", + "Resource Development" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Command & Control", + "Exploitation", + "Installation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule", + "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", + "ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", + "ESCU - Excessive File Deletion In WinDefender Folder - Rule", + "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", + "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule", + "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", + "ESCU - Ping Sleep Batch Command - Rule", + "ESCU - Powershell Remove Windows Defender Directory - Rule", + "ESCU - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule", + "ESCU - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows High File Deletion Frequency - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows NirSoft Utilities - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule", + "ESCU - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion", + "id": "773b66fe-4dd9-11ec-8289-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-25", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic will identify a suspicious process command-line related to Windows Defender exclusion feature. This command is abused by adversaries, malware authors and red teams to bypass Windows Defender Antivirus products by excluding folder path, file path, process and extensions. From its real time or schedule scan to execute their malicious code. This is a good indicator for defense evasion and to look further for events after this behavior.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process = \"*Add-MpPreference *\" OR Processes.process = \"*Set-MpPreference *\") AND Processes.process=\"*-exclusion*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "Admin or user may choose to use this windows features. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.html", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/cf1245de-06a7-4366-8209-8e3006f2bfe5/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion", + "analytic_story": [ + "Remcos", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/defender_exclusion_sysmon/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "exclusion command $process$ executed on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Remcos", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 64 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion", + "file": "endpoint/add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/defender_exclusion_sysmon/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Attempt To Stop Security Service", + "id": "c8e349c6-b97c-486e-8949-bd7bcd1f3910", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for attempts to stop security-related services on the endpoint.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` OR Processes.process_name = sc.exe Processes.process=\"* stop *\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |lookup security_services_lookup service as process OUTPUTNEW category, description | search category=security | `attempt_to_stop_security_service_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified. Attempts to disable security-related services should be identified and understood.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md#atomic-test-14---disable-arbitrary-security-windows-service", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Attempt To Stop Security Service", + "analytic_story": [ + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Trickbot", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_defend_service_stop/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 40, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified attempting to disable security services on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 20, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Trickbot", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 40, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 20 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 20 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Attempt To Stop Security Service Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Attempt To Stop Security Service", + "file": "endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_defend_service_stop/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_net", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "attempt_to_stop_security_service_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "security_services_lookup", + "description": "A list of services that deal with security", + "filename": "security_services.csv", + "default_match": "false", + "match_type": "WILDCARD(service)", + "min_matches": 1 + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", + "id": "54a6ed00-3256-11ec-b031-acde48001122", + "version": 3, + "date": "2022-01-18", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies command-line arguments where `cmd.exe /c` is used to execute a program. `cmd /c` is used to run commands in MS-DOS and terminate after command or process completion. This technique is commonly seen in adversaries and malware to execute batch command using different shell like PowerShell or different process other than `cmd.exe`. This is a good hunting query for suspicious command-line made by a script or relative process execute it.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` AND Processes.process=\"* /c *\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives may be high based on legitimate scripted code in any environment. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228", + "WhisperGate", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/cmd_carry_str_param/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting spawn a new process.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059.003", + "T1059" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 30, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Indrik Spider", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059.003", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID", + "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228", + "WhisperGate", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-44228" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 30 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 30 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059.003", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", + "file": "endpoint/cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/cmd_carry_str_param/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_cmd", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Excessive File Deletion In WinDefender Folder", + "id": "b5baa09a-7a05-11ec-8da4-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-20", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic will identify excessive file deletion events in the Windows Defender folder. This technique was seen in the WhisperGate malware campaign in which adversaries abused Nirsofts advancedrun.exe to gain administrative privilege to then execute PowerShell commands to delete files within the Windows Defender application folder. This behavior is a good indicator the offending process is trying to corrupt a Windows Defender installation.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=23 TargetFilename = \"*\\\\ProgramData\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender*\" | stats values(TargetFilename) as deleted_files min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by user EventCode Image ProcessID Computer |where count >=50 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_file_deletion_in_windefender_folder_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, TargetFilename, and ProcessID executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "Windows Defender AV updates may cause this alert. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Excessive File Deletion In WinDefender Folder", + "analytic_story": [ + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/excessive_file_del_in_windefender_dir/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "High frequency file deletion activity detected on host $Computer$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1485" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "deleted_files", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "TargetFilename", + "Computer", + "user", + "Image", + "ProcessID" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1485" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "WhisperGate" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "deleted_files", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "deleted_files", + "threat_object_type": "file name" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1485" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Excessive File Deletion In WinDefender Folder Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Excessive File Deletion In WinDefender Folder", + "file": "endpoint/excessive_file_deletion_in_windefender_folder.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/excessive_file_del_in_windefender_dir/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "excessive_file_deletion_in_windefender_folder_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excessive_file_deletion_in_windefender_folder.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", + "id": "a7e3f0f0-ae42-11eb-b245-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-06", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic will identify suspicious executable or scripts (known file extensions) in list of suspicious file path in Windows. This technique is used by adversaries to evade detection. The suspicious file path are known paths used in the wild and are not common to have executable or scripts.", + "search": "|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_name = *.exe OR Filesystem.file_name = *.dll OR Filesystem.file_name = *.sys OR Filesystem.file_name = *.com OR Filesystem.file_name = *.vbs OR Filesystem.file_name = *.vbe OR Filesystem.file_name = *.js OR Filesystem.file_name = *.ps1 OR Filesystem.file_name = *.bat OR Filesystem.file_name = *.cmd OR Filesystem.file_name = *.pif) AND ( Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\windows\\\\fonts\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\windows\\\\temp\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\users\\\\public\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\windows\\\\debug\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Users\\\\Administrator\\\\Music\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Windows\\\\servicing\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Users\\\\Default\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *Recycle.bin* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Windows\\\\Media\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Windows\\\\repair\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Temp* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\PerfLogs\\\\*) by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may allow creation of script or exe in the paths specified. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig", + "Remcos", + "WhisperGate", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious executable or scripts with file name $file_name$, $file_path$ and process_id $process_id$ executed in suspicious file path in Windows by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1036" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_id", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_name", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Other", + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.file_path", + "Filesystem.file_create_time", + "Filesystem.process_id", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.user" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig", + "Remcos", + "WhisperGate", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_id", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_name", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Other", + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_id", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "file_name", + "threat_object_type": "file name" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", + "file": "endpoint/executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters", + "id": "8ce07472-496f-11ec-ab3b-3e22fbd008af", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-18", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic looks for the presence of suspicious commandline parameters typically present when using Impacket tools. Impacket is a collection of python classes meant to be used with Microsoft network protocols. There are multiple scripts that leverage impacket libraries like `wmiexec.py`, `smbexec.py`, `dcomexec.py` and `atexec.py` used to execute commands on remote endpoints. By default, these scripts leverage administrative shares and hardcoded parameters that can be used as a signature to detect its use. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage Impackets tools for lateral movement and remote code execution.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process = \"*/c* \\\\\\\\127.0.0.1\\\\*\" OR Processes.process= \"*/c* 2>&1\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", + "known_false_positives": "Although uncommon, Administrators may leverage Impackets tools to start a process on remote systems for system administration or automation use cases.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005", + "https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket", + "https://vk9-sec.com/impacket-remote-code-execution-rce-on-windows-from-linux/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.003/impacket/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious command line parameters on $dest may represent a lateral movement attack with Impackets tools", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.002", + "T1021.003", + "T1047", + "T1543.003" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "Lazarus Group", + "Operation Wocao", + "Orangeworm", + "Sandworm Team", + "Threat Group-1314", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Lateral Movement" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Deep Panda", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Indrik Spider", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Sandworm Team", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN7", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "PROMETHIUM", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.002", + "T1021.003", + "T1047", + "T1543.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 63 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1021", + "T1021.002", + "T1021.003", + "T1047", + "T1543.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters", + "file": "endpoint/impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.003/impacket/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command", + "id": "c4db14d9-7909-48b4-a054-aa14d89dbb19", + "version": 7, + "date": "2022-01-18", + "author": "David Dorsey, Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of the EncodedCommand PowerShell parameter. This is typically used by Administrators to run complex scripts, but commonly used by adversaries to hide their code. \\\nThe analytic identifies all variations of EncodedCommand, as PowerShell allows the ability to shorten the parameter. For example enc, enco, encod and so forth. In addition, through our research it was identified that PowerShell will interpret different command switch types beyond the hyphen. We have added endash, emdash, horizontal bar, and forward slash. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel events to determine legitimacy. Tune as needed based on admin scripts in use. \\\nAlternatively, may use regex per matching here https://regexr.com/662ov.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"(?i)[\\-|\\/|–|—|―]e(nc*o*d*e*d*c*o*m*m*a*n*d*)*\\s+[^-]\") | `malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "System administrators may use this option, but it's not common.", + "references": [ + "https://regexr.com/662ov", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses/blob/master/TestHarnesses/T1059.001_PowerShell/OutPowerShellCommandLineParameter.ps1", + "https://ss64.com/ps/powershell.html", + "https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/1440758396534214658?s=20", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command", + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell", + "NOBELIUM Group", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 7", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1027/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Powershell.exe running potentially malicious encodede commands on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1027" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1027", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackOasis", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dust Storm", + "Elderwood", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Group5", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1027" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 7", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Malicious PowerShell", + "NOBELIUM Group", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 35 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1027" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 7", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command", + "file": "endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1027/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_powershell", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Ping Sleep Batch Command", + "id": "ce058d6c-79f2-11ec-b476-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-20", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic will identify the possible execution of ping sleep batch commands. This technique was seen in several malware samples and is used to trigger sleep times without explicitly calling sleep functions or commandlets. The goal is to delay the execution of malicious code and bypass detection or sandbox analysis. This detection can be a good indicator of a process delaying its execution for malicious purposes.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_ping` (Processes.parent_process = \"*ping*\" Processes.parent_process = *-n* Processes.parent_process=\"* Nul*\"Processes.parent_process=\"*>*\") OR (Processes.process = \"*ping*\" Processes.process = *-n* Processes.process=\"* Nul*\"Processes.process=\"*>*\") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ping_sleep_batch_command_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator may execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Ping Sleep Batch Command", + "analytic_story": [ + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1497.003/ping_sleep/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "suspicious $process$ commandline run in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1497", + "T1497.003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 36, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1497", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Darkhotel" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1497.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Time Based Evasion", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1497", + "T1497.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "WhisperGate" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 36 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 36 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1497", + "T1497.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Ping Sleep Batch Command Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Ping Sleep Batch Command", + "file": "endpoint/ping_sleep_batch_command.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1497.003/ping_sleep/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_ping", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=ping.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=ping.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "ping_sleep_batch_command_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/ping_sleep_batch_command.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Powershell Remove Windows Defender Directory", + "id": "adf47620-79fa-11ec-b248-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-18", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic will identify a suspicious PowerShell command used to delete the Windows Defender folder. This technique was seen used by the WhisperGate malware campaign where it used Nirsofts advancedrun.exe to gain administrative privileges to then execute a PowerShell command to delete the Windows Defender folder. This is a good indicator the offending process is trying corrupt a Windows Defender installation.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*rmdir *\" AND Message = \"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_remove_windows_defender_directory_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Powershell Remove Windows Defender Directory", + "analytic_story": [ + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/rmdir_defender_pwsh/powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 100, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "suspicious powershell script $Message$ was executed on the $ComputerName$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 90, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "WhisperGate" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 100, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 90 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 90 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Powershell Remove Windows Defender Directory Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Powershell Remove Windows Defender Directory", + "file": "endpoint/powershell_remove_windows_defender_directory.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/rmdir_defender_pwsh/powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "powershell_remove_windows_defender_directory_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_remove_windows_defender_directory.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands", + "id": "907ac95c-4dd9-11ec-ba2c-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-25", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic will detect a suspicious process commandline related to windows defender exclusion feature. This command is abused by adversaries, malware author and red teams to bypassed Windows Defender Anti-Virus product by excluding folder path, file path, process, extensions and etc. from its real time or schedule scan to execute their malicious code. This is a good indicator for defense evasion and to look further for events after this behavior.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Add-MpPreference *\" OR Message = \"*Set-MpPreference *\") AND Message = \"*-exclusion*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to use this windows features.", + "references": [ + "https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.html", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/cf1245de-06a7-4366-8209-8e3006f2bfe5/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands", + "analytic_story": [ + "Remcos", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/defender_exclusion_powershell/powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "exclusion command $Message$ executed on $ComputerName$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Remcos", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 64 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands", + "file": "endpoint/powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/defender_exclusion_powershell/powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Process Deleting Its Process File Path", + "id": "f7eda4bc-871c-11eb-b110-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-02-18", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This detection is to identify a suspicious process that tries to delete the process file path related to its process. This technique is known to be defense evasion once a certain condition of malware is satisfied or not. Clop ransomware use this technique where it will try to delete its process file path using a .bat command if the keyboard layout is not the layout it tries to infect.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=1 CommandLine = \"* /c *\" CommandLine = \"* del*\" Image = \"*\\\\cmd.exe\" | eval result = if(like(process,\"%\".parent_process.\"%\"), \"Found\", \"Not Found\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer user ParentImage ParentCommandLine Image CommandLine EventCode ProcessID result | where result = \"Found\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `process_deleting_its_process_file_path_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", + "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Process Deleting Its Process File Path", + "analytic_story": [ + "Clop Ransomware", + "Remcos", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A process $Image$ tries to delete its process path in commandline $cmdline$ as part of defense evasion in host $Computer$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1070" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "EventCode", + "Computer", + "user", + "ParentImage", + "ParentCommandLine", + "Image", + "cmdline", + "ProcessID", + "result", + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 60, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1070" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Clop Ransomware", + "Remcos", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 60 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 60 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1070" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Process Deleting Its Process File Path Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Process Deleting Its Process File Path", + "file": "endpoint/process_deleting_its_process_file_path.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "process_deleting_its_process_file_path_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/process_deleting_its_process_file_path.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services", + "id": "3cf0dc36-484d-11ec-a6bc-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-18", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic detects a suspicious process making a DNS query via known, abused text-paste web services, VoIP, instant messaging, and digital distribution platforms used to download external files. This technique is abused by adversaries, malware actors, and red teams to download a malicious file on the target host. This is a good TTP indicator for possible initial access techniques. A user will experience false positives if the following instant messaging is allowed or common applications like telegram or discord are allowed in the corporate network.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=22 QueryName IN (\"*pastebin*\", \"*discord*\", \"*telegram*\", \"*t.me*\") process_name IN (\"cmd.exe\", \"*powershell*\", \"pwsh.exe\", \"wscript.exe\", \"cscript.exe\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image QueryName QueryStatus process_name QueryResults Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "This detection relies on sysmon logs with the Event ID 22, DNS Query. We suggest you run this detection at least once a day over the last 14 days.", + "known_false_positives": "Noise and false positive can be seen if the following instant messaging is allowed to use within corporate network. In this case, a filter is needed.", + "references": [ + "https://urlhaus.abuse.ch/url/1798923/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services", + "analytic_story": [ + "Remcos", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_pastebin_download/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "suspicious process $process_name$ has a dns query in $QueryName$ on $Computer$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059.005", + "T1059" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Image", + "QueryName", + "QueryStatus", + "process_name", + "QueryResults", + "Computer" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "FIN4", + "FIN7", + "Frankenstein", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Windshift" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059.005", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Remcos", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059.005", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services", + "file": "endpoint/suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_pastebin_download/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Process File Path", + "id": "9be25988-ad82-11eb-a14f-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-05", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic will detect a suspicious process running in a file path where a process is not commonly seen and is most commonly used by malicious software. This behavior has been used by adversaries where they drop and run an exe in a path that is accessible without admin privileges.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\windows\\\\fonts\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\windows\\\\temp\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\users\\\\public\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\windows\\\\debug\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path.file_path = \"*\\\\Users\\\\Administrator\\\\Music\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path.file_path = \"*\\\\Windows\\\\servicing\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path.file_path = \"*\\\\Users\\\\Default\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path.file_path = \"*Recycle.bin*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Media\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"\\\\Windows\\\\repair\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\PerfLogs\\\\*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_path Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_process_file_path_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may allow execution of specific binaries in non-standard paths. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/hk/threat-encyclopedia/malware/trojan.ps1.powtran.a/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Process File Path", + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig", + "Remcos", + "WhisperGate", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicioues process $Processes.process_path.file_path$ running from suspicious location", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1543" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Processes.process_path.file_path", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1543" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig", + "Remcos", + "WhisperGate", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Processes.process_path.file_path", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 35 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "Processes.process_path.file_path", + "threat_object_type": "file name" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1543" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Suspicious Process File Path Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious Process File Path", + "file": "endpoint/suspicious_process_file_path.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_process_file_path_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_process_file_path.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query", + "id": "4d4332ae-792c-11ec-89c1-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-19", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies a process making a DNS query to Discord, a well known instant messaging and digital distribution platform. Discord can be abused by adversaries, as seen in the WhisperGate campaign, to host and download malicious. external files. A process resolving a Discord DNS name could be an indicator of malware trying to download files from Discord for further execution.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=22 QueryName IN (\"*discord*\") process_path != \"*\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Discord\\\\*\" AND process_path != \"*\\\\Program Files*\" AND process_name != \"discord.exe\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image QueryName QueryStatus process_name QueryResults Computer process_path | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "his detection relies on sysmon logs with the Event ID 22, DNS Query.", + "known_false_positives": "Noise and false positive can be seen if the following instant messaging is allowed to use within corporate network. In this case, a filter is needed.", + "references": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/", + "https://medium.com/s2wblog/analysis-of-destructive-malware-whispergate-targeting-ukraine-9d5d158f19f3", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query", + "analytic_story": [ + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/discord_dnsquery/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "suspicious process $process_name$ has a dns query in $QueryName$ on $Computer$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1059.005", + "T1059" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Image", + "QueryName", + "QueryStatus", + "process_name", + "QueryResults", + "Computer", + "process_path" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "FIN4", + "FIN7", + "Frankenstein", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Windshift" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Fox Kitten", + "Ke3chang", + "OilRig", + "Stealth Falcon", + "Whitefly", + "Windigo" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059.005", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "WhisperGate" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process name" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1059.005", + "T1059" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query", + "file": "endpoint/suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/discord_dnsquery/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path", + "id": "fddf3b56-7933-11ec-98a6-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-19", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies native .net binaries within the Windows operating system that may be abused by adversaries by moving it to a new directory. The analytic identifies the .net binary by using a lookup and compares the process name and original file name (internal name). The analytic utilizes a lookup with the is_net_windows_file macro to identify the binary process name and original file name. if one or the other matches an alert will be generated. Adversaries abuse these binaries as they are native to windows and native DotNet. Note that not all SDK (post install of Windows) are captured in the lookup.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where NOT (Processes.process_path IN (\"*\\\\Windows\\\\ADWS\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\system32*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\NetworkController\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SystemApps\\\\*\", \"*\\\\WinSxS\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Microsoft.NET\\\\*\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_path Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `is_net_windows_file` | `windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present and filtering may be required. Certain utilities will run from non-standard paths based on the third-party application in use.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.yaml", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path", + "analytic_story": [ + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Ransomware", + "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_installutil_path.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ from a non-standard path was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1036", + "T1036.003", + "T1218", + "T1218.004" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "GALLIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Mustang Panda", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036", + "T1036.003", + "T1218", + "T1218.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Ransomware", + "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036", + "T1036.003", + "T1218", + "T1218.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path", + "file": "endpoint/windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon_installutil_path.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_installutil_path.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "is_net_windows_file", + "definition": "lookup update=true is_net_windows_file filename as process_name OUTPUT netFile | lookup update=true is_net_windows_file originalFileName as original_file_name OUTPUT netFile | search netFile=true", + "description": "This macro limits the output to process names that are .net binaries on Windows Server 2016 and Windows 11." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows High File Deletion Frequency", + "id": "45b125c4-866f-11eb-a95a-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-03-16", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for high frequency of file deletion relative to process name and process id. These events usually happen when the ransomware tries to encrypt the files with the ransomware file extensions and sysmon treat the original files to be deleted as soon it was replace as encrypted data.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=23 TargetFilename IN (\"*.cmd\", \"*.ini\",\"*.gif\", \"*.jpg\", \"*.jpeg\", \"*.db\", \"*.ps1\", \"*.doc*\", \"*.xls*\", \"*.ppt*\", \"*.bmp\",\"*.zip\", \"*.rar\", \"*.7z\", \"*.chm\", \"*.png\", \"*.log\", \"*.vbs\", \"*.js\", \"*.vhd\", \"*.bak\", \"*.wbcat\", \"*.bkf\" , \"*.backup*\", \"*.dsk\", , \"*.win\") | stats values(TargetFilename) as deleted_files min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer user EventCode Image ProcessID |where count >=100 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_high_file_deletion_frequency_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the deleted target file name, process name and process id from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "user may delete bunch of pictures or files in a folder.", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", + "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows High File Deletion Frequency", + "analytic_story": [ + "Clop Ransomware", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "High frequency file deletion activity detected on host $Computer$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1485" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "deleted_files", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "EventCode", + "TargetFilename", + "Computer", + "user", + "Image", + "ProcessID", + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT38", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1485" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Clop Ransomware", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "deleted_files", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 72 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 72 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "deleted_files", + "threat_object_type": "file name" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1485" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows High File Deletion Frequency Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows High File Deletion Frequency", + "file": "endpoint/windows_high_file_deletion_frequency.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "windows_high_file_deletion_frequency_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_high_file_deletion_frequency.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path", + "id": "dcf74b22-7933-11ec-857c-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-19", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the Windows binary InstallUtil.exe running from a non-standard location. The analytic utilizes a macro for InstallUtil and identifies both the process_name and original_file_name.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` NOT (Processes.process_path IN (\"*\\\\Windows\\\\ADWS\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\system32*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\NetworkController\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SystemApps\\\\*\", \"*\\\\WinSxS\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Microsoft.NET\\\\*\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_hash | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present and filtering may be required. Certain utilities will run from non-standard paths based on the third-party application in use.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.yaml", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path", + "analytic_story": [ + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Ransomware", + "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_installutil_path.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ from a non-standard path was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1036", + "T1036.003", + "T1218", + "T1218.004" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "GALLIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Mustang Panda", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036", + "T1036.003", + "T1218", + "T1218.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Ransomware", + "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036", + "T1036.003", + "T1218", + "T1218.004" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path", + "file": "endpoint/windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon_installutil_path.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_installutil_path.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_installutil", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=installutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=InstallUtil.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun", + "id": "bb4f3090-7ae4-11ec-897f-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-21", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of AdvancedRun.exe. AdvancedRun.exe has similar capabilities as other remote programs like psexec. AdvancedRun may also ingest a configuration file with all settings defined and perform its activity. The analytic is written in a way to identify a renamed binary and also the common command-line arguments.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=advancedrun.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=advancedrun.exe) Processes.process IN (\"*EXEFilename*\",\"*/cfg*\",\"*RunAs*\", \"*WindowState*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_nirsoft_advancedrun_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as it is specific to AdvancedRun. Filter as needed based on legitimate usage.", + "references": [ + "http://www.nirsoft.net/utils/advanced_run.html", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun", + "analytic_story": [ + "Unusual Processes", + "Ransomware", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1588.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of advancedrun.exe, $process_name$, was spawned by $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1588.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 60, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1588.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Tool", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Resource Development" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Cleaver", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "CostaRicto", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Dragonfly", + "FIN10", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gorgon Group", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Patchwork", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1588.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Unusual Processes", + "Ransomware", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 60 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 60 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1588.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun", + "file": "endpoint/windows_nirsoft_advancedrun.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1588.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_nirsoft_advancedrun_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_nirsoft_advancedrun.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows NirSoft Utilities", + "id": "5b2f4596-7d4c-11ec-88a7-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-01-24", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following hunting analytic assists with identifying the proces execution of commonly used utilities from NirSoft. Potentially not adversary behavior, but worth identifying to know if the software is present and being used.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_path Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `is_nirsoft_software` | `windows_nirsoft_utilities_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present. Filtering may be required before setting to alert.", + "references": [ + "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A", + "http://www.nirsoft.net/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows NirSoft Utilities", + "analytic_story": [ + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1588.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ related to NiRSoft software usage.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1588.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1588.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Tool", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Resource Development" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT1", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Cleaver", + "Cobalt Group", + "CopyKittens", + "CostaRicto", + "DarkHydrus", + "DarkVishnya", + "Dragonfly", + "FIN10", + "FIN5", + "FIN6", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gorgon Group", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Leafminer", + "Magic Hound", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Patchwork", + "PittyTiger", + "Sandworm Team", + "Silence", + "Silent Librarian", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Thrip", + "Turla", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1588.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "WhisperGate" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1588.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows NirSoft Utilities Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows NirSoft Utilities", + "file": "endpoint/windows_nirsoft_utilities.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1588.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "is_nirsoft_software", + "definition": "lookup update=true is_nirsoft_software filename as process_name OUTPUT nirsoftFile | search nirsoftFile=true", + "description": "This macro is related to potentially identifiable software related to NirSoft. Remove or filter as needed based." + }, + { + "name": "windows_nirsoft_utilities_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_nirsoft_utilities.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive", + "id": "7b83f666-900c-11ec-a2d9-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-17", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to look for suspicious raw access read to drive where the master boot record is placed. This technique was seen in several attacks by adversaries or threat actor to wipe, encrypt or overwrite the master boot record code as part of their impact payload. This detection is a good indicator that there is a process try to read or write on MBR sector.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=9 Device = \\\\Device\\\\Harddisk0\\\\DR0 NOT (Image IN(\"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer Image Device ProcessGuid ProcessId EventDescription EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the raw access read event (like sysmon eventcode 9), process name and process guid from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "This event is really notable but we found minimal number of normal application from system32 folder like svchost.exe accessing it too. In this case we used 'system32' and 'syswow64' path as a filter for this detection.", + "references": [ + "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/threat-advisory-strt-ta02-destructive-software.html", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/technical-analysis-of-whispergate-malware/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive", + "analytic_story": [ + "WhisperGate", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1561.002/mbr_raw_access/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "process accessing MBR $device$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1561.002", + "T1561" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Computer", + "Image", + "Device", + "ProcessGuid", + "ProcessId", + "EventDescription", + "EventCode" + ], + "risk_score": 90, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1561.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT37", + "APT38", + "Lazarus Group", + "Sandworm Team" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1561", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1561.002", + "T1561" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "WhisperGate", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 90 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1561.002", + "T1561" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive", + "file": "endpoint/windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1561.002/mbr_raw_access/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process", + "id": "1f35e1da-267b-11ec-90a9-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-10-06", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies a suspicious spawned process by WScript or CScript process. This technique was a common technique used by adversaries and malware to execute different LOLBIN, other scripts like PowerShell or spawn a suspended process to inject its code as a defense evasion. This TTP may detect some normal script that using several application tool that are in the list of the child process it detects but a good pivot and indicator that a script is may execute suspicious code.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"cscript.exe\", \"wscript.exe\") Processes.process_name IN (\"regsvr32.exe\", \"rundll32.exe\",\"winhlp32.exe\",\"certutil.exe\",\"msbuild.exe\",\"cmd.exe\",\"powershell*\",\"wmic.exe\",\"mshta.exe\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may create vbs or js script that use several tool as part of its execution. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/8da5b75b6380a41eee3a399c43dfe0d99eeefaa1fd21027a07b1ecaa4cd96fdd?environmentId=120", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process", + "analytic_story": [ + "FIN7", + "Remcos", + "Unusual Processes", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/vbs_wscript/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "wscript or cscript parent process spawned $process_name$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1055", + "T1543", + "T1134.004", + "T1134" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Cobalt Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sharpshooter", + "Silence", + "Turla" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1134.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Parent PID Spoofing", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1134", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Blue Mockingbird", + "FIN6" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1055", + "T1543", + "T1134.004", + "T1134" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "FIN7", + "Remcos", + "Unusual Processes", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1055", + "T1543", + "T1134.004", + "T1134" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process", + "file": "endpoint/wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/vbs_wscript/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [] + }, + { + "name": "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "id": "56e24a28-5003-4047-b2db-e8f3c4618064", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-05-31", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "description": "Detect tactics used by malware to evade defenses on Windows endpoints. A few of these include suspicious `reg.exe` processes, files hidden with `attrib.exe` and disabling user-account control, among many others ", + "narrative": "Defense evasion is a tactic--identified in the MITRE ATT&CK framework--that adversaries employ in a variety of ways to bypass or defeat defensive security measures. There are many techniques enumerated by the MITRE ATT&CK framework that are applicable in this context. This Analytic Story includes searches designed to identify the use of such techniques on Windows platforms.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Defense_Evasion" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "analytic_story": "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1564.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Files and Directories", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "Lazarus Group", + "Mustang Panda", + "Rocke", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1027.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Compile After Delivery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Gamaredon Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Rocke" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1027", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackOasis", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dust Storm", + "Elderwood", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Group5", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN8", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1564", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Hide Artifacts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT37", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Evilnum", + "Honeybee", + "MuddyWater", + "Patchwork", + "Threat Group-3390" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT38", + "Carbanak", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1222", + "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1222.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Cobalt Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sharpshooter", + "Silence", + "Turla" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic-link Library Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Putter Panda", + "TA505", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Delivery", + "Exploitation", + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", + "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", + "ESCU - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule", + "ESCU - CSC Net On The Fly Compilation - Rule", + "ESCU - Disable Registry Tool - Rule", + "ESCU - Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry - Rule", + "ESCU - Disable Show Hidden Files - Rule", + "ESCU - Disable UAC Remote Restriction - Rule", + "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", + "ESCU - Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection - Rule", + "ESCU - Disabling CMD Application - Rule", + "ESCU - Disabling ControlPanel - Rule", + "ESCU - Disabling Firewall with Netsh - Rule", + "ESCU - Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature - Rule", + "ESCU - Disabling NoRun Windows App - Rule", + "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", + "ESCU - Disabling SystemRestore In Registry - Rule", + "ESCU - Disabling Task Manager - Rule", + "ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", + "ESCU - Excessive number of service control start as disabled - Rule", + "ESCU - Firewall Allowed Program Enable - Rule", + "ESCU - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule", + "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", + "ESCU - NET Profiler UAC bypass - Rule", + "ESCU - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule", + "ESCU - Sdclt UAC Bypass - Rule", + "ESCU - SilentCleanup UAC Bypass - Rule", + "ESCU - SLUI RunAs Elevated - Rule", + "ESCU - SLUI Spawning a Process - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", + "ESCU - UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows DISM Remove Defender - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows Event For Service Disabled - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows Rasautou DLL Execution - Rule", + "ESCU - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "David Dorsey", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys", + "id": "61a7d1e6-f5d4-41d9-a9be-39a1ffe69459", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-02-27", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The search looks for command-line arguments used to hide a file or directory using the reg add command.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = reg.exe Processes.process=\"*add*\" Processes.process=\"*Hidden*\" Processes.process=\"*REG_DWORD*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| regex process = \"(/d\\s+2)\" | `reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "None at the moment", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1564.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1564.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Files and Directories", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "Lazarus Group", + "Mustang Panda", + "Rocke", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1564.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1564.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Remote Registry Key modifications", + "id": "c9f4b923-f8af-4155-b697-1354f5dcbc5e", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-03-02", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search monitors for remote modifications to registry keys.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"\\\\\\\\*\" by Registry.dest , Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `remote_registry_key_modifications_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must populate the `Endpoint` data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. Deprecated because I don't think the logic is right.", + "known_false_positives": "This technique may be legitimately used by administrators to modify remote registries, so it's important to filter these events out.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Remote Registry Key modifications", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "remote_registry_key_modifications_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion", + "id": "773b66fe-4dd9-11ec-8289-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-25", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic will identify a suspicious process command-line related to Windows Defender exclusion feature. This command is abused by adversaries, malware authors and red teams to bypass Windows Defender Antivirus products by excluding folder path, file path, process and extensions. From its real time or schedule scan to execute their malicious code. This is a good indicator for defense evasion and to look further for events after this behavior.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process = \"*Add-MpPreference *\" OR Processes.process = \"*Set-MpPreference *\") AND Processes.process=\"*-exclusion*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "Admin or user may choose to use this windows features. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.html", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/cf1245de-06a7-4366-8209-8e3006f2bfe5/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion", + "analytic_story": [ + "Remcos", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/defender_exclusion_sysmon/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "exclusion command $process$ executed on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Remcos", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 64 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion", + "file": "endpoint/add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/defender_exclusion_sysmon/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "CSC Net On The Fly Compilation", + "id": "ea73128a-43ab-11ec-9753-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-12", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "this analytic is to detect a suspicious compile before delivery approach of .net compiler csc.exe. This technique was seen in several adversaries, malware and even in red teams to take advantage the csc.exe .net compiler tool to compile on the fly a malicious .net code to evade detection from security product. This is a good hunting query to check further the file or process created after this event and check the file path that passed to csc.exe which is the .net code. Aside from that, powershell is capable of using this compiler in executing .net code in a powershell script so filter on that case is needed.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_csc` Processes.process = \"*/noconfig*\" Processes.process = \"*/fullpaths*\" Processes.process = \"*@*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `csc_net_on_the_fly_compilation_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated powershell script taht execute .net code that may generate false positive. filter is needed.", + "references": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/ad4c3cda-41f2-4401-8dba-56cc2d245488/", + "https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2019/06/maicious-macro-that-compile-c-code-as.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "CSC Net On The Fly Compilation", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/vilsel/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "csc.exe with commandline $process$ to compile .net code on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1027.004", + "T1027" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1027.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Compile After Delivery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Gamaredon Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Rocke" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1027", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "BlackOasis", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dust Storm", + "Elderwood", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Group5", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leafminer", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Night Dragon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1027.004", + "T1027" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1027.004", + "T1027" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "CSC Net On The Fly Compilation Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "CSC Net On The Fly Compilation", + "file": "endpoint/csc_net_on_the_fly_compilation.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/vilsel/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_csc", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=csc.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=csc.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "csc_net_on_the_fly_compilation_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/csc_net_on_the_fly_compilation.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Disable Registry Tool", + "id": "cd2cf33c-9201-11eb-a10a-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-27", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search identifies modification of registry to disable the regedit or registry tools of the windows operating system. Since registry tool is a swiss knife in analyzing registry, malware such as RAT or trojan Spy disable this application to prevent the removal of their registry entry such as persistence, file less components and defense evasion.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System\\\\DisableRegistryTools\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disable_registry_tool_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "admin may disable this application for non technical user.", + "references": [ + "https://any.run/report/ea4ea08407d4ee72e009103a3b77e5a09412b722fdef67315ea63f22011152af/a866d7b1-c236-4f26-a391-5ae32213dfc4#registry" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Disable Registry Tool", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 40, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Disabled Registry Tools on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.registry_value_name" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 40, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 40 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Disable Registry Tool Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Disable Registry Tool", + "file": "endpoint/disable_registry_tool.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + }, + { + "file_name": "windows-system.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:System", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + }, + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "disable_registry_tool_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_registry_tool.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry", + "id": "39ebdc68-25b9-11ec-aec7-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-27", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious registry modification to disable security audit logs. This technique was shared by a researcher to disable Security logs of windows by adding this registry. The Windows will think it is WinPE and will not log any event to the Security Log", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Control\\\\MiniNt\\\\*\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disable_security_logs_using_minint_registry_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown.", + "references": [ + "https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1182516740955226112" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/minint_reg/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1112" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_value_data" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN8", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1112" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1112" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry", + "file": "endpoint/disable_security_logs_using_minint_registry.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/minint_reg/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "disable_security_logs_using_minint_registry_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_security_logs_using_minint_registry.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Disable Show Hidden Files", + "id": "6f3ccfa2-91fe-11eb-8f9b-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-27", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic is to identify a modification in the Windows registry to prevent users from seeing all the files with hidden attributes. This event or techniques are known on some worm and trojan spy malware that will drop hidden files on the infected machine.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\Advanced\\\\Hidden\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\Advanced\\\\HideFileExt\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\") OR (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\Advanced\\\\ShowSuperHidden\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000000\") by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disable_show_hidden_files_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://www.sophos.com/en-us/threat-center/threat-analyses/viruses-and-spyware/W32~Tiotua-P/detailed-analysis.aspx" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Disable Show Hidden Files", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 40, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Disabled 'Show Hidden Files' on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1564.001", + "T1562.001", + "T1564", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.registry_value_nam" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1564.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Files and Directories", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "Lazarus Group", + "Mustang Panda", + "Rocke", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1564", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Hide Artifacts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1564.001", + "T1562.001", + "T1564", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 40, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 40 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1564.001", + "T1562.001", + "T1564", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Disable Show Hidden Files Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Disable Show Hidden Files", + "file": "endpoint/disable_show_hidden_files.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + }, + { + "file_name": "windows-system.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:System", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + }, + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "disable_show_hidden_files_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_show_hidden_files.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Disable UAC Remote Restriction", + "id": "9928b732-210e-11ec-b65e-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-27", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable UAC remote restriction. This technique was well documented in Microsoft page where attacker may modify this registry value to bypassed UAC feature of windows host. This is a good indicator that some tries to bypassed UAC to suspicious process or gain privilege escalation.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System*\" Registry.registry_value_name=\"LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy\" Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000001\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disable_uac_remote_restriction_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "admin may set this policy for non-critical machine.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/windows-security/user-account-control-and-remote-restriction" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Disable UAC Remote Restriction", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.registry_value_data" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT37", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Evilnum", + "Honeybee", + "MuddyWater", + "Patchwork", + "Threat Group-3390" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Disable UAC Remote Restriction Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Disable UAC Remote Restriction", + "file": "endpoint/disable_uac_remote_restriction.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "disable_uac_remote_restriction_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_uac_remote_restriction.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring", + "id": "79439cae-9200-11eb-a4d3-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-27", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to identifies a modification in registry to disable the windows denfender real time behavior monitoring. This event or technique is commonly seen in RAT, bot, or Trojan to disable AV to evade detections.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableBehaviorMonitoring\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableOnAccessProtection\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableScanOnRealtimeEnable\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableRealtimeMonitoring\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableIOAVProtection\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableScriptScanning\" AND Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disable_windows_behavior_monitoring_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to disable this windows features.", + "references": [ + "https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Ransomware", + "Revil Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 40, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Windows Defender real time behavior monitoring disabled on $dest", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.registry_value_name" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Ransomware", + "Revil Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 40, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 40 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring", + "file": "endpoint/disable_windows_behavior_monitoring.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + }, + { + "file_name": "windows-system.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:System", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + }, + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "disable_windows_behavior_monitoring_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_windows_behavior_monitoring.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection", + "id": "664f0fd0-91ff-11eb-a56f-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-27", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following search identifies a modification of registry to disable the smartscreen protection of windows machine. This is windows feature provide an early warning system against website that might engage in phishing attack or malware distribution. This modification are seen in RAT malware to cover their tracks upon downloading other of its component or other payload.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\SmartScreenEnabled\" Registry.registry_value_data= \"Off\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disable_windows_smartscreen_protection_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to disable this windows features.", + "references": [ + "https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "The Windows Smartscreen was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.registry_value_nam" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection", + "file": "endpoint/disable_windows_smartscreen_protection.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + }, + { + "file_name": "windows-system.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:System", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + }, + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "disable_windows_smartscreen_protection_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_windows_smartscreen_protection.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Disabling CMD Application", + "id": "ff86077c-9212-11eb-a1e6-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-27", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "this search is to identify modification in registry to disable cmd prompt application. This technique is commonly seen in RAT, Trojan or WORM to prevent triaging or deleting there samples through cmd application which is one of the tool of analyst to traverse on directory and files.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\System\\\\DisableCMD\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_key_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `disabling_cmd_application_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "admin may disable this application for non technical user.", + "references": [ + "https://any.run/report/ea4ea08407d4ee72e009103a3b77e5a09412b722fdef67315ea63f22011152af/a866d7b1-c236-4f26-a391-5ae32213dfc4#registry" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Disabling CMD Application", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "The Windows command prompt was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.registry_value_name" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Disabling CMD Application Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Disabling CMD Application", + "file": "endpoint/disabling_cmd_application.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + }, + { + "file_name": "windows-system.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:System", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + }, + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "disabling_cmd_application_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disabling_cmd_application.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Disabling ControlPanel", + "id": "6ae0148e-9215-11eb-a94a-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-27", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "this search is to identify registry modification to disable control panel window. This technique is commonly seen in malware to prevent their artifacts , persistence removed on the infected machine.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\Explorer\\\\NoControlPanel\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_key_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `disabling_controlpanel_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "admin may disable this application for non technical user.", + "references": [ + "https://any.run/report/ea4ea08407d4ee72e009103a3b77e5a09412b722fdef67315ea63f22011152af/a866d7b1-c236-4f26-a391-5ae32213dfc4#registry" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Disabling ControlPanel", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "The Windows Control Panel was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.registry_value_name" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Disabling ControlPanel Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Disabling ControlPanel", + "file": "endpoint/disabling_controlpanel.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + }, + { + "file_name": "windows-system.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:System", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + }, + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "disabling_controlpanel_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disabling_controlpanel.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Disabling Firewall with Netsh", + "id": "6860a62c-9203-11eb-9e05-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-03-31", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to identifies suspicious firewall disabling using netsh application. this technique is commonly seen in malware that tries to communicate or download its component or other payload to its C2 server.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_netsh` Processes.process= \"*firewall*\" (Processes.process= \"*off*\" OR Processes.process= \"*disable*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_firewall_with_netsh_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "admin may disable firewall during testing or fixing network problem.", + "references": [ + "https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.htm" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Disabling Firewall with Netsh", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "The Windows Firewall was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Disabling Firewall with Netsh Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Disabling Firewall with Netsh", + "file": "endpoint/disabling_firewall_with_netsh.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + }, + { + "file_name": "windows-system.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:System", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + }, + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_netsh", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=netsh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=netsh.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "disabling_firewall_with_netsh_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disabling_firewall_with_netsh.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature", + "id": "83776de4-921a-11eb-868a-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-28", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to identify registry modification to disable folder options feature of windows to show hidden files, file extension and etc. This technique used by malware in combination if disabling show hidden files feature to hide their files and also to hide the file extension to lure the user base on file icons or fake file extensions.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\Explorer\\\\NoFolderOptions\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_key_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `disabling_folderoptions_windows_feature_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "admin may disable this application for non technical user.", + "references": [ + "https://any.run/report/ea4ea08407d4ee72e009103a3b77e5a09412b722fdef67315ea63f22011152af/a866d7b1-c236-4f26-a391-5ae32213dfc4#registry" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "The Windows Folder Options, to hide files, was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.registry_value_name" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature", + "file": "endpoint/disabling_folderoptions_windows_feature.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + }, + { + "file_name": "windows-system.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:System", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + }, + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlogE" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "disabling_folderoptions_windows_feature_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disabling_folderoptions_windows_feature.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Disabling NoRun Windows App", + "id": "de81bc46-9213-11eb-adc9-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-28", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to identify modification of registry to disable run application in window start menu. this application is known to be a helpful shortcut to windows OS user to run known application and also to execute some reg or batch script. This technique is used malware to make cleaning of its infection more harder by preventing known application run easily through run shortcut.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\Explorer\\\\NoRun\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_key_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `disabling_norun_windows_app_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "admin may disable this application for non technical user.", + "references": [ + "https://any.run/report/ea4ea08407d4ee72e009103a3b77e5a09412b722fdef67315ea63f22011152af/a866d7b1-c236-4f26-a391-5ae32213dfc4#registry", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/pum-optional-norun/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Disabling NoRun Windows App", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "The Windows registry was modified to disable run application in window start menu on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.registry_value_name" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Disabling NoRun Windows App Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Disabling NoRun Windows App", + "file": "endpoint/disabling_norun_windows_app.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + }, + { + "file_name": "windows-system.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:System", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + }, + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "disabling_norun_windows_app_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disabling_norun_windows_app.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Disabling Remote User Account Control", + "id": "bbc644bc-37df-4e1a-9c88-ec9a53e2038c", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-11-18", + "author": "David Dorsey, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The search looks for modifications to registry keys that control the enforcement of Windows User Account Control (UAC).", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System\\\\EnableLUA* Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000000\" by Registry.dest, Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `disabling_remote_user_account_control_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report registry modifications.", + "known_false_positives": "This registry key may be modified via administrators to implement a change in system policy. This type of change should be a very rare occurrence.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Disabling Remote User Account Control", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Remcos" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "The Windows registry keys that control the enforcement of Windows User Account Control (UAC) were modified on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.action" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT37", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Evilnum", + "Honeybee", + "MuddyWater", + "Patchwork", + "Threat Group-3390" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Remcos" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 42 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 42 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Disabling Remote User Account Control Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Disabling Remote User Account Control", + "file": "endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "disabling_remote_user_account_control_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Disabling SystemRestore In Registry", + "id": "f4f837e2-91fb-11eb-8bf6-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-28", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following search identifies the modification of registry related in disabling the system restore of a machine. This event or behavior are seen in some RAT malware to make the restore of the infected machine difficult and keep their infection on the box.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\SystemRestore\\\\DisableSR\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\SystemRestore\\\\DisableConfig\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_key_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `disabling_systemrestore_in_registry_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "in some cases admin can disable systemrestore on a machine.", + "references": [ + "https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Disabling SystemRestore In Registry", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "The Windows registry was modified to disable system restore on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.registry_value_name" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Disabling SystemRestore In Registry Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Disabling SystemRestore In Registry", + "file": "endpoint/disabling_systemrestore_in_registry.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + }, + { + "file_name": "windows-system.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:System", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + }, + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "disabling_systemrestore_in_registry_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disabling_systemrestore_in_registry.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Disabling Task Manager", + "id": "dac279bc-9202-11eb-b7fb-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-28", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to identifies modification of registry to disable the task manager of windows operating system. this event or technique are commonly seen in malware such as RAT, Trojan, TrojanSpy or worm to prevent the user to terminate their process.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System\\\\DisableTaskMgr\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_key_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `disabling_task_manager_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "admin may disable this application for non technical user.", + "references": [ + "https://any.run/report/ea4ea08407d4ee72e009103a3b77e5a09412b722fdef67315ea63f22011152af/a866d7b1-c236-4f26-a391-5ae32213dfc4#registry", + "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/05/threat-roundup-0424-0501.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Disabling Task Manager", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "The Windows Task Manager was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.registry_value_name" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 42 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 42 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Disabling Task Manager Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Disabling Task Manager", + "file": "endpoint/disabling_task_manager.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + }, + { + "file_name": "windows-system.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:System", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + }, + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "disabling_task_manager_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disabling_task_manager.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Eventvwr UAC Bypass", + "id": "9cf8fe08-7ad8-11eb-9819-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-28", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following search identifies Eventvwr bypass by identifying the registry modification into a specific path that eventvwr.msc looks to (but is not valid) upon execution. A successful attack will include a suspicious command to be executed upon eventvwr.msc loading. Upon triage, review the parallel processes that have executed. Identify any additional registry modifications on the endpoint that may look suspicious. Remediate as necessary.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*mscfile\\\\shell\\\\open\\\\command\\\\*\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `eventvwr_uac_bypass_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Some false positives may be present and will need to be filtered.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.md", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002", + "https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Eventvwr UAC Bypass", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "IcedID", + "Living Off The Land" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Registry values were modified to bypass UAC using Event Viewer on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.registry_value_name" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT37", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Evilnum", + "Honeybee", + "MuddyWater", + "Patchwork", + "Threat Group-3390" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "IcedID", + "Living Off The Land" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Eventvwr UAC Bypass Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Eventvwr UAC Bypass", + "file": "endpoint/eventvwr_uac_bypass.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "eventvwr_uac_bypass_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/eventvwr_uac_bypass.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Excessive number of service control start as disabled", + "id": "77592bec-d5cc-11eb-9e60-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-25", + "author": "Michael Hart, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This detection targets behaviors observed when threat actors have used sc.exe to modify services. We observed malware in a honey pot spawning numerous sc.exe processes in a short period of time, presumably to impair defenses, possibly to block others from compromising the same machine. This detection will alert when we see both an excessive number of sc.exe processes launched with specific commandline arguments to disable the start of certain services.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` distinct_count(Processes.process) as distinct_cmdlines values(Processes.process_id) as process_ids min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE Processes.process_name = \"sc.exe\" AND Processes.process=\"*start= disabled*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_id, _time span=30m | where distinct_cmdlines >= 8 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_number_of_service_control_start_as_disabled_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The complete process name with command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "Legitimate programs and administrators will execute sc.exe with the start disabled flag. It is possible, but unlikely from the telemetry of normal Windows operation we observed, that sc.exe will be called more than seven times in a short period of time.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/sc-create", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Excessive number of service control start as disabled", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/sc_service_start_disabled/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An excessive amount of $process_name$ was executed on $dest$ attempting to disable services.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Excessive number of service control start as disabled Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Excessive number of service control start as disabled", + "file": "endpoint/excessive_number_of_service_control_start_as_disabled.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/sc_service_start_disabled/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "excessive_number_of_service_control_start_as_disabled_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excessive_number_of_service_control_start_as_disabled.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Firewall Allowed Program Enable", + "id": "9a8f63a8-43ac-11ec-904c-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-12", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic detects a potential suspicious modification of firewall rule allowing to execute specific application. This technique was identified when an adversary and red teams to bypassed firewall file execution restriction in a targetted host. Take note that this event or command can run by administrator during testing or allowing legitimate tool or application.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*firewall*\" Processes.process = \"*allowedprogram*\" Processes.process = \"*add*\" Processes.process = \"*ENABLE*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `firewall_allowed_program_enable_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated or manual execution of this firewall rule that may generate false positives. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/ad4c3cda-41f2-4401-8dba-56cc2d245488/#" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Firewall Allowed Program Enable", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/vilsel/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "firewall allowed program commandline $process$ of $process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.004", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT38", + "Carbanak", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Operation Wocao", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.004", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.004", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Firewall Allowed Program Enable Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Firewall Allowed Program Enable", + "file": "endpoint/firewall_allowed_program_enable.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/vilsel/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "firewall_allowed_program_enable_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/firewall_allowed_program_enable.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "FodHelper UAC Bypass", + "id": "909f8fd8-7ac8-11eb-a1f3-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-03-01", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "Fodhelper.exe has a known UAC bypass as it attempts to look for specific registry keys upon execution, that do not exist. Therefore, an attacker can write its malicious commands in these registry keys to be executed by fodhelper.exe with the highest privilege. \\\n1. `HKCU:\\Software\\Classes\\ms-settings\\shell\\open\\command`\\\n1. `HKCU:\\Software\\Classes\\ms-settings\\shell\\open\\command\\DelegateExecute`\\\n1. `HKCU:\\Software\\Classes\\ms-settings\\shell\\open\\command\\(default)`\\\nUpon triage, fodhelper.exe will have a child process and read access will occur on the registry keys. Isolate the endpoint and review parallel processes for additional behavior.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=fodhelper.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `fodhelper_uac_bypass_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited to no false positives are expected.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.md", + "https://github.com/gushmazuko/WinBypass/blob/master/FodhelperBypass.ps1", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "FodHelper UAC Bypass", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "IcedID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspcious registy keys added by process fodhelper.exe (process_id- $process_id), with a parent_process of $parent_process_name$ that has been executed on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1112", + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Parent Process", + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 81, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN8", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT37", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Evilnum", + "Honeybee", + "MuddyWater", + "Patchwork", + "Threat Group-3390" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1112", + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "IcedID" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Parent Process", + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 81 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 81 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process name" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1112", + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "FodHelper UAC Bypass Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "FodHelper UAC Bypass", + "file": "endpoint/fodhelper_uac_bypass.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "fodhelper_uac_bypass_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/fodhelper_uac_bypass.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe", + "id": "6e5a3ae4-90a3-462d-9aa6-0119f638c0f1", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "Attackers leverage an existing Windows binary, attrib.exe, to mark specific as hidden by using specific flags so that the victim does not see the file. The search looks for specific command-line arguments to detect the use of attrib.exe to hide files.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) values(Processes.process) as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=attrib.exe (Processes.process=*+h*) by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "Some applications and users may legitimately use attrib.exe to interact with the files. ", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1222.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Attrib.exe with +h flag to hide files on $dest$ executed by $user$ is detected.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1222", + "T1222.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Attacker", + "Parent Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1222", + "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1222.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1222", + "T1222.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Attacker", + "Parent Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 72 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 72 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1222", + "T1222.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe", + "file": "endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1222.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "NET Profiler UAC bypass", + "id": "0252ca80-e30d-11eb-8aa3-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-02-18", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect modification of registry to bypass UAC windows feature. This technique is to add a payload dll path on .NET COR file path that will be loaded by mmc.exe as soon it was executed. This detection rely on monitoring the registry key and values in the detection area. It may happened that windows update some dll related to mmc.exe and add dll path in this registry. In this case filtering is needed.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Environment\\\\COR_PROFILER_PATH\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"*.dll\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `net_profiler_uac_bypass_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "limited false positive. It may trigger by some windows update that will modify this registry.", + "references": [ + "https://offsec.almond.consulting/UAC-bypass-dotnet.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "NET Profiler UAC bypass", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Defense Evasion", + "Scope:Inbound" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon2.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious modification of registry $registry_path$ with possible payload path $registry_value_name$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT37", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Evilnum", + "Honeybee", + "MuddyWater", + "Patchwork", + "Threat Group-3390" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Defense Evasion", + "Scope:Inbound" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 63 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "NET Profiler UAC bypass Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "NET Profiler UAC bypass", + "file": "endpoint/net_profiler_uac_bypass.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon2.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon2.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "net_profiler_uac_bypass_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/net_profiler_uac_bypass.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands", + "id": "907ac95c-4dd9-11ec-ba2c-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-25", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic will detect a suspicious process commandline related to windows defender exclusion feature. This command is abused by adversaries, malware author and red teams to bypassed Windows Defender Anti-Virus product by excluding folder path, file path, process, extensions and etc. from its real time or schedule scan to execute their malicious code. This is a good indicator for defense evasion and to look further for events after this behavior.", + "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Add-MpPreference *\" OR Message = \"*Set-MpPreference *\") AND Message = \"*-exclusion*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to use this windows features.", + "references": [ + "https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.html", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/cf1245de-06a7-4366-8209-8e3006f2bfe5/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands", + "analytic_story": [ + "Remcos", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/defender_exclusion_powershell/powershell.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "exclusion command $Message$ executed on $ComputerName$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "ComputerName", + "User" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Remcos", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "WhisperGate" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 64 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands", + "file": "endpoint/powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "powershell.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/defender_exclusion_powershell/powershell.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "powershell", + "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Sdclt UAC Bypass", + "id": "d71efbf6-da63-11eb-8c6e-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-01-28", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious sdclt.exe registry modification. This technique is commonly seen when attacker try to bypassed UAC by using sdclt.exe application by modifying some registry that sdclt.exe tries to open or query with payload file path on it to be executed.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\App Paths\\\\control.exe*\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\exefile\\\\shell\\\\runas\\\\command\\\\*\") (Registry.registry_value_name = \"(Default)\" OR Registry.registry_value_name = \"IsolatedCommand\") by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `sdclt_uac_bypass_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited to no false positives are expected.", + "references": [ + "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/17/fileless-uac-bypass-using-sdclt-exe/", + "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME", + "https://www.cyborgsecurity.com/cyborg_labs/threat-hunt-deep-dives-user-account-control-bypass-via-registry-modification/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Sdclt UAC Bypass", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Defense Evasion", + "Scope:Inbound" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious modification of registry $registry_path$ with possible payload path $registry_value_name$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT37", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Evilnum", + "Honeybee", + "MuddyWater", + "Patchwork", + "Threat Group-3390" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Defense Evasion", + "Scope:Inbound" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 63 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Sdclt UAC Bypass Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Sdclt UAC Bypass", + "file": "endpoint/sdclt_uac_bypass.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "sdclt_uac_bypass_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/sdclt_uac_bypass.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "SilentCleanup UAC Bypass", + "id": "56d7cfcc-da63-11eb-92d4-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-01-28", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry that may related to UAC bypassed. This registry will be trigger once the attacker abuse the silentcleanup task schedule to gain high privilege execution that will bypass User control account.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Environment\\\\windir\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"*.exe*\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `silentcleanup_uac_bypass_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME", + "https://www.intezer.com/blog/malware-analysis/klingon-rat-holding-on-for-dear-life/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "SilentCleanup UAC Bypass", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious modification of registry $registry_path$ with possible payload path $registry_value_name$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT37", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Evilnum", + "Honeybee", + "MuddyWater", + "Patchwork", + "Threat Group-3390" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 63 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "SilentCleanup UAC Bypass Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "SilentCleanup UAC Bypass", + "file": "endpoint/silentcleanup_uac_bypass.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "silentcleanup_uac_bypass_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/silentcleanup_uac_bypass.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "SLUI RunAs Elevated", + "id": "8d124810-b3e4-11eb-96c7-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the Microsoft Software Licensing User Interface Tool, `slui.exe`, elevating access using the `-verb runas` function. This particular bypass utilizes a registry key/value. Identified by two sources, the registry keys are `HKCU\\Software\\Classes\\exefile\\shell` and `HKCU\\Software\\Classes\\launcher.Systemsettings\\Shell\\open\\command`. To simulate this behavior, multiple POC are available. The analytic identifies the use of `runas` by `slui.exe`.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=slui.exe (Processes.process=*-verb* Processes.process=*runas*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `slui_runas_elevated_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives should be present as this is not commonly used by legitimate applications.", + "references": [ + "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/46998", + "https://medium.com/@mattharr0ey/privilege-escalation-uac-bypass-in-changepk-c40b92818d1b", + "https://gist.github.com/r00t-3xp10it/0c92cd554d3156fd74f6c25660ccc466", + "https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/windows/local/bypassuac_sluihijack/", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "SLUI RunAs Elevated", + "analytic_story": [ + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/slui/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A slui process $process_name$ with elevated commandline $process$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT37", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Evilnum", + "Honeybee", + "MuddyWater", + "Patchwork", + "Threat Group-3390" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 63 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 63 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "SLUI RunAs Elevated Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "SLUI RunAs Elevated", + "file": "endpoint/slui_runas_elevated.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/slui/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "slui_runas_elevated_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/slui_runas_elevated.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "SLUI Spawning a Process", + "id": "879c4330-b3e0-11eb-b1b1-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-13", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the Microsoft Software Licensing User Interface Tool, `slui.exe`, spawning a child process. This behavior is associated with publicly known UAC bypass. `slui.exe` is commonly associated with software updates and is most often spawned by `svchost.exe`. The `slui.exe` process should not have child processes, and any processes spawning from it will be running with elevated privileges. During triage, review the child process and additional parallel processes. Identify any file modifications that may have lead to the bypass.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=slui.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `slui_spawning_a_process_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Certain applications may spawn from `slui.exe` that are legitimate. Filtering will be needed to ensure proper monitoring.", + "references": [ + "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/46998", + "https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/windows/local/bypassuac_sluihijack/", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "SLUI Spawning a Process", + "analytic_story": [ + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/slui/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A slui process $parent_process_name$ spawning child process $process_name$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT37", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Evilnum", + "Honeybee", + "MuddyWater", + "Patchwork", + "Threat Group-3390" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "DarkSide Ransomware", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 63 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 63 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "SLUI Spawning a Process Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "SLUI Spawning a Process", + "file": "endpoint/slui_spawning_a_process.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/slui/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "slui_spawning_a_process_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/slui_spawning_a_process.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Reg exe Process", + "id": "a6b3ab4e-dd77-4213-95fa-fc94701995e0", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-07-22", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for reg.exe being launched from a command prompt not started by the user. When a user launches cmd.exe, the parent process is usually explorer.exe. This search filters out those instances.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name != explorer.exe Processes.process_name =cmd.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=cmd.exe Processes.process_name= reg.exe by Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename parent_process_id as process_id |dedup process_id| table process_id dest] | `suspicious_reg_exe_process_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "It's possible for system administrators to write scripts that exhibit this behavior. If this is the case, the search will need to be modified to filter them out.", + "references": [ + "https://car.mitre.org/wiki/CAR-2013-03-001" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Reg exe Process", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "DHS Report TA18-074A" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Suspicious $Processes.process_path.file_path$ process running with an uncommon parent process $Processes.parent_process_name$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1112" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Processes.process_path.file_path", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN8", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1112" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "DHS Report TA18-074A" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Processes.process_path.file_path", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 35 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "Processes.process_path.file_path", + "threat_object_type": "file name" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1112" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Suspicious Reg exe Process Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious Reg exe Process", + "file": "endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 5", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_reg_exe_process_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll", + "id": "7f04349c-e30d-11eb-bc7f-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-07-12", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious loaded unsigned dll by MMC.exe application. This technique is commonly seen in attacker that tries to bypassed UAC feature or gain privilege escalation. This is done by modifying some CLSID registry that will trigger the mmc.exe to load the dll path", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded = \"*.dll\" Image = \"*\\\\mmc.exe\" Signed=false Company != \"Microsoft Corporation\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded Signed ProcessId OriginalFileName Computer EventCode Company | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown. all of the dll loaded by mmc.exe is microsoft signed dll.", + "references": [ + "https://offsec.almond.consulting/UAC-bypass-dotnet.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Defense Evasion", + "Scope:Inbound" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon2.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious unsigned $ImageLoaded$ loaded by $Image$ on endpoint $Computer$ with EventCode $EventCode$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Image", + "ImageLoaded", + "Signed", + "ProcessId", + "OriginalFileName", + "Computer", + "EventCode", + "Company" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT37", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Evilnum", + "Honeybee", + "MuddyWater", + "Patchwork", + "Threat Group-3390" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Defense Evasion", + "Scope:Inbound" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 63 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll", + "file": "endpoint/uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon2.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon2.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry", + "id": "13395a44-4dd9-11ec-9df7-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-25", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic will detect a suspicious process that modify a registry related to windows defender exclusion feature. This registry is abused by adversaries, malware author and red teams to bypassed Windows Defender Anti-Virus product by excluding folder path, file path, process, extensions and etc. from its real time or schedule scan to execute their malicious code. This is a good indicator for a defense evasion and to look further for events after this behavior.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Exclusions\\\\*\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to use this windows features.", + "references": [ + "https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.html", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/cf1245de-06a7-4366-8209-8e3006f2bfe5/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry", + "analytic_story": [ + "Remcos", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/defender_exclusion_sysmon/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "exclusion registry $registry_path$ modified or added on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.registry_value_data" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Remcos", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 64 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry", + "file": "endpoint/windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/defender_exclusion_sysmon/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry", + "id": "23150a40-9301-4195-b802-5bb4f43067fb", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-03-02", + "author": "Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The search looks for the Registry Key DisableAntiSpyware set to disable. This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints. This particular behavior is typically executed when an ransomware actor gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. Endpoint should be isolated.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_value_name=\"DisableAntiSpyware\" AND Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000001\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_disableantispyware_registry_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node.", + "known_false_positives": "It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro to tune the search.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "message": "Windows DisableAntiSpyware registry key set to 'disabled' on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.registry_path" + ], + "risk_score": 24, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 24 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Delivery" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry", + "file": "endpoint/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_disableantispyware_registry_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows DISM Remove Defender", + "id": "8567da9e-47f0-11ec-99a9-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-17", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of the Windows Disk Image Utility, `dism.exe`, to remove Windows Defender. Adversaries may use `dism.exe` to disable Defender before completing their objective.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=dism.exe (Processes.process=\"*/online*\" AND Processes.process=\"*/disable-feature*\" AND Processes.process=\"*Windows-Defender*\" AND Processes.process=\"*/remove*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_dism_remove_defender_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate administrative tools leverage `dism.exe` to manipulate packages and features of the operating system. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/11/23/pysa-mespinoza-ransomware/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows DISM Remove Defender", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_dism.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to disable Windows Defender.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "access", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows DISM Remove Defender Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows DISM Remove Defender", + "file": "endpoint/windows_dism_remove_defender.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon_dism.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_dism.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_dism_remove_defender_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_dism_remove_defender.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Event For Service Disabled", + "id": "9c2620a8-94a1-11ec-b40c-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-23", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic will identify suspicious system event of services that was modified from start to disabled. This technique is seen where the adversary attempts to disable security app services, other malware services to evade the defense systems on the compromised host", + "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7040 Message = \"*service was changed from demand start to disabled.\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName EventCode Message User Sid | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_event_for_service_disabled_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints.", + "known_false_positives": "Windows service update may cause this event. In that scenario, filtering is needed.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Event For Service Disabled", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/olympic_destroyer/system.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Service was disabled on $Computer$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "ComputerName", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "User", + "Sid" + ], + "risk_score": 36, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 36 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows Event For Service Disabled Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows Event For Service Disabled", + "file": "endpoint/windows_event_for_service_disabled.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "system.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/olympic_destroyer/system.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:System", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_system", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "windows_event_for_service_disabled_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_event_for_service_disabled.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event", + "id": "c3f85976-94a5-11ec-9a58-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-23", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic will identify suspicious excessive number of system events of services that was modified from start to disabled. This technique is seen where the adversary attempts to disable security app services, other malware services oer serve as an destructive impact to complete the objective on the compromised system. One good example for this scenario is Olympic destroyer where it disable all active services in the compromised host as part of its destructive impact and defense evasion.", + "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7040 Message = \"*service was changed from demand start to disabled.\" | stats count values(Message) as MessageList dc(Message) as MessageCount min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName EventCode User Sid | where MessageCount >=10 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_excessive_disabled_services_event_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown", + "references": [ + "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/olympic_destroyer/system.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Service was disabled in $Computer$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "ComputerName", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "User", + "Sid" + ], + "risk_score": 81, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 81 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event", + "file": "endpoint/windows_excessive_disabled_services_event.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "system.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/olympic_destroyer/system.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:System", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_system", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "windows_excessive_disabled_services_event_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_excessive_disabled_services_event.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry", + "id": "b7548c2e-9a10-11ec-99e3-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-03-02", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to look for suspicious registry modification related to file compression color and information tips. This IOC was seen in hermetic wiper where it has a thread that will create this registry entry to change the color of compressed or encrypted files in NTFS file system as well as the pop up information tips. This is a good indicator that a process tries to modified one of the registry GlobalFolderOptions related to file compression attribution in terms of color in NTFS file system.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\Advanced*\" AND Registry.registry_value_name IN(\"ShowCompColor\", \"ShowInfoTip\") by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `windows_modify_show_compress_color_and_info_tip_registry_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Registry` node.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/02/threat-advisory-hermeticwiper.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/hermetic_wiper/globalfolderoptions_reg/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Registry modification in \"ShowCompColor\" and \"ShowInfoTips\" on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1112" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.dest Registry.user" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN8", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Silence", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1112" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1112" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry", + "file": "endpoint/windows_modify_show_compress_color_and_info_tip_registry.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/hermetic_wiper/globalfolderoptions_reg/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_modify_show_compress_color_and_info_tip_registry_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_modify_show_compress_color_and_info_tip_registry.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine", + "id": "e64399d4-94a8-11ec-a9da-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-23", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to look for process commandline that contains named pipe. This technique was seen in some adversaries, threat actor and malware like olympic destroyer to communicate to its other child processes after process injection that serve as defense evasion and privilege escalation. On the other hand this analytic may catch some normal process that using this technique for example browser application. In that scenario we include common process path we've seen during testing that cause false positive which is the program files. False positive may still be arise if the normal application is in other folder path.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*\\\\\\\\.\\\\pipe\\\\*\" NOT (Processes.process_path IN (\"*\\\\program files*\")) by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_process_with_namedpipe_commandline_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "Normal browser application may use this technique. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/olympic_destroyer/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Process with named pipe in $process$ on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1055" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id", + "Processes.process_guid" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Cobalt Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sharpshooter", + "Silence", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1055" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1055" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine", + "file": "endpoint/windows_process_with_namedpipe_commandline.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/olympic_destroyer/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_process_with_namedpipe_commandline_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_process_with_namedpipe_commandline.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Rasautou DLL Execution", + "id": "6f42b8be-8e96-11ec-ad5a-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-15", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the Windows Windows Remote Auto Dialer, rasautou.exe executing an arbitrary DLL. This technique is used to execute arbitrary shellcode or DLLs via the rasautou.exe LOLBin capability. During triage, review parent and child process behavior including file and image loads.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rasautou.exe Processes.process=\"* -d *\"AND Processes.process=\"* -p *\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_rasautou_dll_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives will be limited to applications that require Rasautou.exe to load a DLL from disk. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/mandiant/DueDLLigence", + "https://github.com/MHaggis/notes/blob/master/utilities/Invoke-SPLDLLigence.ps1", + "https://gist.github.com/NickTyrer/c6043e4b302d5424f701f15baf136513", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/10/staying-hidden-on-the-endpoint-evading-detection-with-shellcode.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Rasautou DLL Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055.001/rasautou/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to load a DLL in a suspicious manner.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1055.001", + "T1218", + "T1055" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic-link Library Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Putter Panda", + "TA505", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Cobalt Group", + "Honeybee", + "Kimsuky", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Sharpshooter", + "Silence", + "Turla" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1055.001", + "T1218", + "T1055" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1055.001", + "T1218", + "T1055" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows Rasautou DLL Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows Rasautou DLL Execution", + "file": "endpoint/windows_rasautou_dll_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055.001/rasautou/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_rasautou_dll_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_rasautou_dll_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "WSReset UAC Bypass", + "id": "8b5901bc-da63-11eb-be43-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-01-28", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry related to UAC bypass. This technique is to modify the registry in this detection, create a registry value with the path of the payload and run WSreset.exe to bypass User account Control.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\AppX82a6gwre4fdg3bt635tn5ctqjf8msdd2\\\\Shell\\\\open\\\\command*\" AND (Registry.registry_value_name = \"(Default)\" OR Registry.registry_value_name = \"DelegateExecute\") by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `wsreset_uac_bypass_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME", + "https://blog.morphisec.com/trickbot-uses-a-new-windows-10-uac-bypass" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "WSReset UAC Bypass", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Living Off The Land" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Defense Evasion", + "Scope:Inbound" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious modification of registry $registry_path$ with possible payload path $registry_value_name$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT37", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Evilnum", + "Honeybee", + "MuddyWater", + "Patchwork", + "Threat Group-3390" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Living Off The Land" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation", + "Stage:Defense Evasion", + "Scope:Inbound" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 63 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1548.002", + "T1548" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "WSReset UAC Bypass Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "WSReset UAC Bypass", + "file": "endpoint/wsreset_uac_bypass.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "wsreset_uac_bypass_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wsreset_uac_bypass.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + }, + { + "name": "Get Parent Process Info", + "id": "fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41bf9", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-02-28", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "parent_process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Phishing Payloads", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_parent_process_info" + }, + { + "name": "Get Process Info", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd71", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-01", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the process running on a host which is under investigation. To gather the process info, enter the values for the process name in question and the destination IP address.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search process_name= $process_name$ | search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_process_info" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Windows Discovery Techniques", + "id": "f7aba570-7d59-11eb-825e-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-03-04", + "author": "Michael Hart, Splunk", + "description": "Monitors for behaviors associated with adversaries discovering objects in the environment that can be leveraged in the progression of the attack.", + "narrative": "Attackers may not have much if any insight into their target's environment before the initial compromise. Once a foothold has been established, attackers will start enumerating objects in the environment (accounts, services, network shares, etc.) that can be used to achieve their objectives. This Analytic Story provides searches to help identify activities consistent with adversaries gaining knowledge of compromised Windows environments.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/", + "https://cyberd.us/penetration-testing", + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0521/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Discovery Techniques", + "analytic_story": "Windows Discovery Techniques", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Behavioral Analytics", + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "TA505" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Chimera", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "admin@338" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Michael Hart", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Net Localgroup Discovery", + "id": "54f5201e-155b-11ec-a6e2-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-14", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following hunting analytic will identify the use of localgroup discovery using `net localgroup`. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=net.exe OR Processes.process_name=net1.exe (Processes.process=\"*localgroup*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `net_localgroup_discovery_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present. Tune as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Net Localgroup Discovery", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery", + "Windows Discovery Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "message": "Local group discovery on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 15, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "TA505" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Chimera", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "admin@338" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Discovery", + "Windows Discovery Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Discovery", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 15 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 15 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1069", + "T1069.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Net Localgroup Discovery Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Net Localgroup Discovery", + "file": "endpoint/net_localgroup_discovery.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "net_localgroup_discovery_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/net_localgroup_discovery.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [] + }, + { + "name": "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350", + "id": "36dbb206-d073-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-07-28", + "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", + "description": "Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-1350, or SIGRed. Discovered by Checkpoint researchers, this vulnerability affects Windows 2003 to 2019, and is triggered by a malicious DNS response (only affects DNS over TCP). An attacker can use the malicious payload to cause a buffer overflow on the vulnerable system, leading to compromise. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify the large response payload for SIG and KEY DNS records which can be used for the exploit.", + "narrative": "When a client requests a DNS record for a particular domain, that request gets routed first through the client's locally configured DNS server, then to any DNS server(s) configured as forwarders, and then onto the target domain's own DNS server(s). If a attacker wanted to, they could host a malicious DNS server that responds to the initial request with a specially crafted large response (~65KB). This response would flow through to the client's local DNS server, which if not patched for CVE-2020-1350, would cause the buffer overflow. The detection searches in this Analytic Story use wire data to detect the malicious behavior. Searches for Splunk Stream and Zeek are included. The Splunk Stream search correlates across stream:dns and stream:tcp, while the Zeek search correlates across bro:dns:json and bro:conn:json. These correlations are required to pick up both the DNS record types (SIG and KEY) along with the payload size (>65KB).", + "references": [ + "https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/", + "https://support.microsoft.com/en-au/help/4569509/windows-dns-server-remote-code-execution-vulnerability" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350", + "analytic_story": "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1203", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Client Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT12", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Elderwood", + "Frankenstein", + "HAFNIUM", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Patchwork", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "TA459", + "The White Company", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "admin@338" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Network_Resolution" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Shannon Davis", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream", + "id": "babd8d10-d073-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-07-28", + "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search detects SIGRed via Splunk Stream.", + "search": "`stream_dns` | spath \"query_type{}\" | search \"query_type{}\" IN (SIG,KEY) | spath protocol_stack | search protocol_stack=\"ip:tcp:dns\" | append [search `stream_tcp` bytes_out>65000] | `detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream_filter` | stats count by flow_id | where count>1 | fields - count", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Splunk Stream DNS and Splunk Stream TCP. We are detecting SIG and KEY records via stream:dns and TCP payload over 65KB in size via stream:tcp. Replace the macro definitions ('stream:dns' and 'stream:tcp') with configurations for your Splunk environment.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1203" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "network", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1203", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Client Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT12", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Elderwood", + "Frankenstein", + "HAFNIUM", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Patchwork", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "TA459", + "The White Company", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "admin@338" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1203" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2020-1350" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "dest", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1203" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 12" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "stream_dns", + "definition": "sourcetype=stream:dns", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "stream_tcp", + "definition": "sourcetype=stream:tcp", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml", + "source": "network" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek", + "id": "c5c622e4-d073-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003", + "version": 1, + "date": "2020-07-28", + "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Network_Resolution" + ], + "description": "This search detects SIGRed via Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.query_type IN (SIG,KEY) by DNS.flow_id | rename DNS.flow_id as flow_id | append [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.bytes_in>65000 by All_Traffic.flow_id | rename All_Traffic.flow_id as flow_id] | `detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek_filter` | stats count by flow_id | where count>1 | fields - count ", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format. We are detecting SIG and KEY records via bro:dns:json and TCP payload over 65KB in size via bro:conn:json. The Network Resolution and Network Traffic datamodels are in use for this search.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1203" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "DNS.query_type", + "DNS.flow_id", + "All_Traffic.bytes_in", + "All_Traffic.flow_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1203", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Client Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT12", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT41", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Elderwood", + "Frankenstein", + "HAFNIUM", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Patchwork", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "TA459", + "The White Company", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "admin@338" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1203" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2020-1350" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "dest", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1203" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml", + "source": "network" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "id": "30552a76-ac78-48e4-b3c0-de4e34e9563d", + "version": 1, + "date": "2018-01-26", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "description": "Detect and investigate suspected abuse of file extensions and Windows file associations. Some of the malicious behaviors involved may include inserting spaces before file extensions or prepending the file extension with a different one, among other techniques.", + "narrative": "Attackers use a variety of techniques to entice users to run malicious code or to persist on an endpoint. One way to accomplish these goals is to leverage file extensions and the mechanism Windows uses to associate files with specific applications. \\\n Since its earliest days, Windows has used extensions to identify file types. Users have become familiar with these extensions and their application associations. For example, if users see that a file ends in `.doc` or `.docx`, they will assume that it is a Microsoft Word document and expect that double-clicking will open it using `winword.exe`. The user will typically also presume that the `.docx` file is safe. \\\n Attackers take advantage of this expectation by obfuscating the true file extension. They can accomplish this in a couple of ways. One technique involves inserting multiple spaces in the file name before the extension to hide the extension from the GUI, obscuring the true nature of the file. Another approach involves prepending the real extension with a different one. This is especially effective when Windows is configured to \"hide extensions for known file types.\" In this case, the real extension is not displayed, but the prepended one is, leading end users to believe the file is a different type than it actually is.\\\nChanging the association between a file extension and an application can allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code. The technique typically involves changing the association for an often-launched file type to associate instead with a malicious program the attacker has dropped on the endpoint. When the end user launches a file that has been manipulated in this way, it will execute the attacker's malware. It will also execute the application the end user expected to run, cleverly obscuring the fact that something suspicious has occurred.\\\nRun the searches in this story to detect and investigate suspicious behavior that may indicate abuse or manipulation of Windows file extensions and/or associations.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/12/file-extensions-2/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "analytic_story": "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "category": [ + "Malware" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "GALLIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Kimsuky" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", + "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Rico Valdez", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension", + "id": "ab0353e6-a956-420b-b724-a8b4846d5d5a", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-11-19", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for processes launched from files with at least five spaces in the name before the extension. This is typically done to obfuscate the file extension by pushing it outside of the default view.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_path) as process_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"* .*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process Processes.process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1036.003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM", + "PR.PT", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_name" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "GALLIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM", + "PR.PT", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM", + "PR.PT", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Changes to File Associations", + "id": "1b989a0e-0129-4446-a695-f193a5b746fc", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-07-22", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for changes to registry values that control Windows file associations, executed by a process that is not typical for legitimate, routine changes to this area.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name!=Explorer.exe AND Processes.process_name!=OpenWith.exe by Processes.process_id Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*\\\\Explorer\\\\FileExts* by Registry.process_id Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Registry\")` | table process_id dest registry_path]| `suspicious_changes_to_file_associations_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on registry changes that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Registry` nodes.", + "known_false_positives": "There may be other processes in your environment that users may legitimately use to modify file associations. If this is the case and you are finding false positives, you can modify the search to add those processes as exceptions.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Changes to File Associations", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1546.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM", + "PR.PT", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Kimsuky" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1546.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM", + "PR.PT", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1546.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM", + "PR.PT", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_changes_to_file_associations_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Execution of File with Multiple Extensions", + "id": "b06a555e-dce0-417d-a2eb-28a5d8d66ef7", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-11-18", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for processes launched from files that have double extensions in the file name. This is typically done to obscure the \"real\" file extension and make it appear as though the file being accessed is a data file, as opposed to executable content.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = *.doc.exe OR Processes.process = *.htm.exe OR Processes.process = *.html.exe OR Processes.process = *.txt.exe OR Processes.process = *.pdf.exe OR Processes.process = *.doc.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process Processes.parent_process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Execution of File with Multiple Extensions", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "process $process$ have double extensions in the file name is executed on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1036", + "T1036.003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM", + "PR.PT", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process", + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "GALLIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036", + "T1036.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM", + "PR.PT", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process", + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036", + "T1036.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM", + "PR.PT", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Execution of File with Multiple Extensions Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Execution of File with Multiple Extensions", + "file": "endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + }, + { + "name": "Get Parent Process Info", + "id": "fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41bf9", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-02-28", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "parent_process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Phishing Payloads", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_parent_process_info" + }, + { + "name": "Get Process Info", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd71", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-01", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the process running on a host which is under investigation. To gather the process info, enter the values for the process name in question and the destination IP address.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search process_name= $process_name$ | search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_process_info" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Windows Log Manipulation", + "id": "b6db2c60-a281-48b4-95f1-2cd99ed56835", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-12", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "description": "Adversaries often try to cover their tracks by manipulating Windows logs. Use these searches to help you monitor for suspicious activity surrounding log files--an essential component of an effective defense.", + "narrative": "Because attackers often modify system logs to cover their tracks and/or to thwart the investigative process, log monitoring is an industry-recognized best practice. While there are legitimate reasons to manipulate system logs, it is still worthwhile to keep track of who manipulated the logs, when they manipulated them, and in what way they manipulated them (determining which accesses, tools, or utilities were employed). Even if no malicious activity is detected, the knowledge of an attempt to manipulate system logs may be indicative of a broader security risk that should be thoroughly investigated.\\\nThe Analytic Story gives users two different ways to detect manipulation of Windows Event Logs and one way to detect deletion of the Update Sequence Number (USN) Change Journal. The story helps determine the history of the host and the users who have accessed it. Finally, the story aides in investigation by retrieving all the information on the process that caused these events (if the process has been identified).", + "references": [ + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", + "https://zeltser.com/security-incident-log-review-checklist/", + "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2013/01/re-introducing-usnjrnl.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Log Manipulation", + "analytic_story": "Windows Log Manipulation", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Security Monitoring", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN8", + "Indrik Spider", + "Operation Wocao" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Impact" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", + "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Rico Valdez", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Deleting Shadow Copies", + "id": "b89919ed-ee5f-492c-b139-95dbb162039e", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-11-09", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The vssadmin.exe utility is used to interact with the Volume Shadow Copy Service. Wmic is an interface to the Windows Management Instrumentation. This search looks for either of these tools being used to delete shadow copies.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=vssadmin.exe OR Processes.process_name=wmic.exe) Processes.process=*delete* Processes.process=*shadow* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `deleting_shadow_copies_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "vssadmin.exe and wmic.exe are standard applications shipped with modern versions of windows. They may be used by administrators to legitimately delete old backup copies, although this is typically rare.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Deleting Shadow Copies", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ransomware", + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 10" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to delete shadow copies.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1490" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 81, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1490" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 10" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Ransomware", + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 81 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 81 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1490" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 10" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Deleting Shadow Copies Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Deleting Shadow Copies", + "file": "endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "deleting_shadow_copies_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior", + "id": "2b85aa3d-f5f6-4c2e-a081-a09f6e1c2e40", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-06-17", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes Windows Event ID 1100 to identify when Windows event log service is shutdown. Note that this is a voluminous analytic that will require tuning or restricted to specific endpoints based on criticality. This event generates every time Windows Event Log service has shut down. It also generates during normal system shutdown. During triage, based on time of day and user, determine if this was planned. If not planned, follow through with reviewing parallel alerts and other data sources to determine what else may have occurred.", + "search": "(`wineventlog_security` EventCode=1100) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest Message EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_event_log_service_behavior_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows event logs from your hosts. In addition, the Splunk Windows TA is needed.", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible the Event Logging service gets shut down due to system errors or legitimately administration tasks. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-1100", + "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/defense-evasion/disabling-windows-event-logs-by-suspending-eventlog-service-threads", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/001/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1070.001/T1070.001.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Ransomware", + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 6" + ], + "confidence": 30, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 30, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "The Windows Event Log Service shutdown on $ComputerName$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1070", + "T1070.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "PR.IP", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "dest" + ], + "risk_score": 9, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN8", + "Indrik Spider", + "Operation Wocao" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1070", + "T1070.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 6" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "PR.IP", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Ransomware", + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 30, + "confidence": 30 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 9 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1070", + "T1070.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 6" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "PR.IP", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior", + "file": "endpoint/suspicious_event_log_service_behavior.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_event_log_service_behavior_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_event_log_service_behavior.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious wevtutil Usage", + "id": "2827c0fd-e1be-4868-ae25-59d28e0f9d4f", + "version": 4, + "date": "2021-10-11", + "author": "David Dorsey, Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The wevtutil.exe application is the windows event log utility. This searches for wevtutil.exe with parameters for clearing the application, security, setup, trace or system event logs.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wevtutil.exe Processes.process IN (\"* cl *\", \"*clear-log*\") (Processes.process=\"*System*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Security*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Setup*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Application*\" OR Processes.process=\"*trace*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_wevtutil_usage_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "The wevtutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows event log utility. Administrators may use it to manage Windows event logs.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1070.001/T1070.001.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious wevtutil Usage", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Ransomware", + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 6" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 40, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Wevtutil.exe being used to clear Event Logs on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1070.001", + "T1070" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "PR.IP", + "PR.PT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 28, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN8", + "Indrik Spider", + "Operation Wocao" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1070.001", + "T1070" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 6" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "PR.IP", + "PR.PT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Ransomware", + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 40, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 28 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 28 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1070.001", + "T1070" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 6" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "PR.IP", + "PR.PT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Suspicious wevtutil Usage Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious wevtutil Usage", + "file": "endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_wevtutil_usage_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "USN Journal Deletion", + "id": "b6e0ff70-b122-4227-9368-4cf322ab43c3", + "version": 2, + "date": "2018-12-03", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The fsutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows utility used to perform tasks related to the file allocation table (FAT) and NTFS file systems. The update sequence number (USN) change journal provides a log of all changes made to the files on the disk. This search looks for fsutil.exe deleting the USN journal.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=fsutil.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search process=\"*deletejournal*\" AND process=\"*usn*\" | `usn_journal_deletion_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "USN Journal Deletion", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 6", + "CIS 8", + "CIS 10" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Possible USN journal deletion on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1070" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.DP", + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 45, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1070" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 6", + "CIS 8", + "CIS 10" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.DP", + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 45 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1070" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 6", + "CIS 8", + "CIS 10" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM", + "PR.PT", + "DE.AE", + "DE.DP", + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "USN Journal Deletion Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "USN Journal Deletion", + "file": "endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "usn_journal_deletion_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Event Log Cleared", + "id": "ad517544-aff9-4c96-bd99-d6eb43bfbb6a", + "version": 6, + "date": "2020-07-06", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic utilizes Windows Security Event ID 1102 or System log event 104 to identify when a Windows event log is cleared. Note that this analytic will require tuning or restricted to specific endpoints based on criticality. During triage, based on time of day and user, determine if this was planned. If not planned, follow through with reviewing parallel alerts and other data sources to determine what else may have occurred.", + "search": "(`wineventlog_security` EventCode=1102) OR (`wineventlog_system` EventCode=104) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest Message EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_event_log_cleared_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows event logs from your hosts. In addition, the Splunk Windows TA is needed.", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible that these logs may be legitimately cleared by Administrators. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-1102", + "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/defense-evasion/disabling-windows-event-logs-by-suspending-eventlog-service-threads", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/001/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1070.001/T1070.001.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Event Log Cleared", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Ransomware", + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 6" + ], + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Windows event logs cleared on $dest$ via EventCode $EventCode$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1070", + "T1070.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "PR.IP", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "dest" + ], + "risk_score": 70, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Chimera", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN5", + "FIN8", + "Indrik Spider", + "Operation Wocao" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1070", + "T1070.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 6" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "PR.IP", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Ransomware", + "Clop Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 70 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1070", + "T1070.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 6" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.DP", + "PR.IP", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows Event Log Cleared Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows Event Log Cleared", + "file": "endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + }, + { + "file_name": "windows-system.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:System", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_system", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "windows_event_log_cleared_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + }, + { + "name": "Get Parent Process Info", + "id": "fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41bf9", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-02-28", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "parent_process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Phishing Payloads", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_parent_process_info" + }, + { + "name": "Get Process Info", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd71", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-01", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the process running on a host which is under investigation. To gather the process info, enter the values for the process name in question and the destination IP address.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search process_name= $process_name$ | search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_process_info" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "id": "30874d4f-20a1-488f-85ec-5d52ef74e3f9", + "version": 2, + "date": "2018-05-31", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "description": "Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on a Windows system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment.", + "narrative": "Maintaining persistence is one of the first steps taken by attackers after the initial compromise. Attackers leverage various custom and built-in tools to ensure survivability and persistent access within a compromised enterprise. This Analytic Story provides searches to help you identify various behaviors used by attackers to maintain persistent access to a Windows environment.", + "references": [ + "http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/19.html", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html", + "http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/common-malware-persistence-mechanisms/", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html", + "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dq2Hv7J9fvk" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "analytic_story": "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1564.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Files and Directories", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "Lazarus Group", + "Mustang Panda", + "Rocke", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.014", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Active Setup", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Kimsuky" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.009", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Path Interception by Unquoted Path", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.006", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Blocking", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1222", + "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1222.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1037", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Rocke" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1037.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Logon Script (Windows)", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "Cobalt Group" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.010", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Port Monitors", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Shimming", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "FIN7" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "Putter Panda", + "RTM", + "Rocke", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN7", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "PROMETHIUM", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CostaRicto", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Machete", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Screensaver", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Time Providers", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Exploitation", + "Installation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", + "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", + "ESCU - Active Setup Registry Autostart - Rule", + "ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", + "ESCU - Change Default File Association - Rule", + "ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", + "ESCU - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule", + "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", + "ESCU - Logon Script Event Trigger Execution - Rule", + "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", + "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", + "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", + "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", + "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", + "ESCU - Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments - Rule", + "ESCU - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule", + "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", + "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", + "ESCU - Screensaver Event Trigger Execution - Rule", + "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", + "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", + "ESCU - Time Provider Persistence Registry - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows Schtasks Create Run As System - Rule", + "ESCU - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule", + "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", + "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", + "ESCU - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule", + "ESCU - Print Processor Registry Autostart - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys", + "id": "61a7d1e6-f5d4-41d9-a9be-39a1ffe69459", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-02-27", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The search looks for command-line arguments used to hide a file or directory using the reg add command.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = reg.exe Processes.process=\"*add*\" Processes.process=\"*Hidden*\" Processes.process=\"*REG_DWORD*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| regex process = \"(/d\\s+2)\" | `reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "None at the moment", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1564.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1564.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Files and Directories", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "Lazarus Group", + "Mustang Panda", + "Rocke", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1564.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1564.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Remote Registry Key modifications", + "id": "c9f4b923-f8af-4155-b697-1354f5dcbc5e", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-03-02", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search monitors for remote modifications to registry keys.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"\\\\\\\\*\" by Registry.dest , Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `remote_registry_key_modifications_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must populate the `Endpoint` data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. Deprecated because I don't think the logic is right.", + "known_false_positives": "This technique may be legitimately used by administrators to modify remote registries, so it's important to filter these events out.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Remote Registry Key modifications", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low" + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "remote_registry_key_modifications_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Active Setup Registry Autostart", + "id": "f64579c0-203f-11ec-abcc-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-26", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of the active setup registry for persistence and privilege escalation. This technique was seen in several malware (poisonIvy), adware and APT to gain persistence to the compromised machine upon boot up. This TTP is a good indicator to further check the process id that do the modification since modification of this registry is not commonly done. check the legitimacy of the file and process involve in this rules to check if it is a valid setup installer that creating or modifying this registry.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_value_name= \"StubPath\" Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Active Setup\\\\Installed Components*\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `active_setup_registry_autostart_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "Active setup installer may add or modify this registry.", + "references": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Backdoor%3aWin32%2fPoisonivy.E", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/014/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Active Setup Registry Autostart", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/t1547.014/active_setup_stubpath/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1547.014", + "T1547" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_value_name" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.014", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Active Setup", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.014", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 64 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.014", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Active Setup Registry Autostart Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Active Setup Registry Autostart", + "file": "endpoint/active_setup_registry_autostart.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/t1547.014/active_setup_stubpath/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "active_setup_registry_autostart_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/active_setup_registry_autostart.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Certutil exe certificate extraction", + "id": "337a46be-600f-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-01-26", + "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for arguments to certutil.exe indicating the manipulation or extraction of Certificate. This certificate can then be used to sign new authentication tokens specially inside Federated environments such as Windows ADFS.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=certutil.exe Processes.process = \"*-exportPFX*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `certutil_exe_certificate_extraction_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Unless there are specific use cases, manipulating or exporting certificates using certutil is uncommon. Extraction of certificate has been observed during attacks such as Golden SAML and other campaigns targeting Federated services.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Certutil exe certificate extraction", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting export a certificate.", + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium" + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 63 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 63 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Certutil exe certificate extraction Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Certutil exe certificate extraction", + "file": "endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-7d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "certutil_exe_certificate_extraction_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Change Default File Association", + "id": "462d17d8-1f71-11ec-ad07-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-27", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is developed to detect suspicious registry modification to change the default file association of windows to malicious payload. This techninique was seen in some APT where it modify the default process to run file association, like .txt to notepad.exe. Instead notepad.exe it will point to a Script or other payload that will load malicious command to the compromised host.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path =\"*\\\\shell\\\\open\\\\command\\\\*\" Registry.registry_path = \"*HKCR\\\\*\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `change_default_file_association_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://dmcxblue.gitbook.io/red-team-notes-2-0/red-team-techniques/privilege-escalation/untitled-3/accessibility-features" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Change Default File Association", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.001/txtfile_reg/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1546.001", + "T1546" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_value_name" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Kimsuky" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1546.001", + "T1546" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1546.001", + "T1546" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Change Default File Association Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Change Default File Association", + "file": "endpoint/change_default_file_association.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.001/txtfile_reg/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "change_default_file_association_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/change_default_file_association.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe", + "id": "cbef820c-e1ff-407f-887f-0a9240a2d477", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-07-03", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The detection Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe is detecting the abuse of unquoted service paths, which is a popular technique for privilege escalation. ", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | rex field=process \"^.*?\\\\\\\\(?[^\\\\\\\\]*\\.(?:exe|bat|com|ps1))\" | eval process_name = lower(process_name) | eval service_process = lower(service_process) | where process_name != service_process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://medium.com/@SumitVerma101/windows-privilege-escalation-part-1-unquoted-service-path-c7a011a8d8ae" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1574.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to perform privilege escalation by using unquoted service paths.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1574.009", + "T1574" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.009", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Path Interception by Unquoted Path", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1574.009", + "T1574" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1574.009", + "T1574" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe", + "file": "endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-7d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1574.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "ETW Registry Disabled", + "id": "8ed523ac-276b-11ec-ac39-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-28", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a registry modification to disable ETW feature of windows. This technique is to evade EDR appliance to evade detections and hide its execution from audit logs.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\.NETFramework*\" Registry.registry_value_name = ETWEnabled Registry.registry_value_data=0x00000000 by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `etw_registry_disabled_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://gist.github.com/Cyb3rWard0g/a4a115fd3ab518a0e593525a379adee3" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "ETW Registry Disabled", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127/etw_disable/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.006", + "T1127", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.registry_value_data" + ], + "risk_score": 90, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.006", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Blocking", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.006", + "T1127", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 90 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 90 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.006", + "T1127", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "ETW Registry Disabled Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "ETW Registry Disabled", + "file": "endpoint/etw_registry_disabled.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127/etw_disable/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "etw_registry_disabled_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/etw_registry_disabled.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe", + "id": "6e5a3ae4-90a3-462d-9aa6-0119f638c0f1", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "Attackers leverage an existing Windows binary, attrib.exe, to mark specific as hidden by using specific flags so that the victim does not see the file. The search looks for specific command-line arguments to detect the use of attrib.exe to hide files.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) values(Processes.process) as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=attrib.exe (Processes.process=*+h*) by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "Some applications and users may legitimately use attrib.exe to interact with the files. ", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1222.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "Attrib.exe with +h flag to hide files on $dest$ executed by $user$ is detected.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1222", + "T1222.001" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Attacker", + "Parent Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1222", + "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1222.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1222", + "T1222.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Attacker", + "Parent Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 72 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 72 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1222", + "T1222.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe", + "file": "endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1222.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Logon Script Event Trigger Execution", + "id": "4c38c264-1f74-11ec-b5fa-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-27", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry entry to persist and gain privilege escalation upon booting up of compromised host. This technique was seen in several APT and malware where it modify UserInitMprLogonScript registry entry to its malicious payload to be executed upon boot up of the machine.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path IN (\"*\\\\Environment\\\\UserInitMprLogonScript\") by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `logon_script_event_trigger_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/001" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Logon Script Event Trigger Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1037.001/logonscript_reg/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1037", + "T1037.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_value_name" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1037", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Rocke" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1037.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Logon Script (Windows)", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "Cobalt Group" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1037", + "T1037.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1037", + "T1037.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Logon Script Event Trigger Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Logon Script Event Trigger Execution", + "file": "endpoint/logon_script_event_trigger_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1037.001/logonscript_reg/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "logon_script_event_trigger_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/logon_script_event_trigger_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors", + "id": "f5f6af30-7ba7-4295-bfe9-07de87c01bbc", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-01-28", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for registry activity associated with modifications to the registry key `HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors`. In this scenario, an attacker can load an arbitrary .dll into the print-monitor registry by giving the full path name to the after.dll. The system will execute the .dll with elevated (SYSTEM) permissions and will persist after reboot.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.action=modified AND Registry.registry_path=\"*CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Print\\\\Monitors*\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report registry modifications.", + "known_false_positives": "You will encounter noise from legitimate print-monitor registry entries.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 5" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.010/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.010/atomic_red_team/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "New print monitor added on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1547.010", + "T1547" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.AC" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.action", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.registry_value_name" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.010", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Port Monitors", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.010", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 5" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.AC" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 64 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.010", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 5" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "PR.AC" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors", + "file": "endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.010/atomic_red_team/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys", + "id": "8470d755-0c13-45b3-bd63-387a373c10cf", + "version": 5, + "date": "2020-11-26", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The search looks for reg.exe modifying registry keys that define Windows services and their configurations.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name values(Processes.user) as user FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=reg.exe Processes.process=*reg* Processes.process=*add* Processes.process=*Services* by Processes.process_id Processes.dest Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "It is unusual for a service to be created or modified by directly manipulating the registry. However, there may be legitimate instances of this behavior. It is important to validate and investigate, as appropriate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1574.011/change_registry_path_service/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 75, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation" + ], + "message": "A reg.exe process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1574.011", + "T1574" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP", + "PR.PT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 45, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1574.011", + "T1574" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP", + "PR.PT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 75, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 45 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 45 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1574.011", + "T1574" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP", + "PR.PT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys", + "file": "endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1574.011/change_registry_path_service/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases", + "id": "f5f6af30-7aa7-4295-bfe9-07fe87c01bbb", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-01-28", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for registry activity associated with application compatibility shims, which can be leveraged by attackers for various nefarious purposes.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*CurrentVersion\\\\AppCompatFlags\\\\Custom* OR Registry.registry_path=*CurrentVersion\\\\AppCompatFlags\\\\InstalledSDB* by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must populate the Change_Analysis data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection and response product, such as Carbon Black or other endpoint data sources such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "There are many legitimate applications that leverage shim databases for compatibility purposes for legacy applications", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to shim modication in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1546.011", + "T1546" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Shimming", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "FIN7" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1546.011", + "T1546" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1546.011", + "T1546" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases", + "file": "endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", + "id": "f5f6af30-7aa7-4295-bfe9-07fe87c01a4b", + "version": 7, + "date": "2022-01-26", + "author": "Jose Hernandez, David Dorsey, Teoderick Contreras, Rod Soto, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to launch an application or service at system startup.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\RunOnce OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\run* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentVersion\\\\Windows\\\\Appinit_Dlls* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Shell* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Notify* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Userinit* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\VmApplet* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\policies\\\\explorer\\\\run* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\runservices* OR Registry.registry_path=HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Netsh\\\\* OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Image File Execution Options*\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=Debugger) OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Security Packages\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\\\\OSConfig\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Security Packages\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\SilentProcessExit\\\\*\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*currentVersion\\\\Windows\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Load\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentVersion\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Svchost\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\"AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"BootExecute\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Software\\\\Run\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"auto_update\")) by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "There are many legitimate applications that must execute on system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Ransomware", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "IcedID", + "Remcos" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 95, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/atomic_red_team/t1547001-runonce.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to persistence in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1547.001", + "T1547" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user" + ], + "risk_score": 76, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT18", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Honeybee", + "Inception", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "Putter Panda", + "RTM", + "Rocke", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.001", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Ransomware", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "IcedID", + "Remcos" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 95 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 76 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 76 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.001", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", + "file": "endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services", + "id": "f0c693d8-2a89-4ce7-80b4-98fea4c3ea6d", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for arguments to sc.exe indicating the creation or modification of a Windows service.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = sc.exe (Processes.process=\"* create *\" OR Processes.process=\"* config *\") by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Using sc.exe to manipulate Windows services is uncommon. However, there may be legitimate instances of this behavior. It is important to validate and investigate as appropriate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Service Abuse", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation" + ], + "message": "A sc process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ to create of configure services in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1543.003", + "T1543" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP", + "PR.PT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN7", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "PROMETHIUM", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1543.003", + "T1543" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP", + "PR.PT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Service Abuse", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1543.003", + "T1543" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP", + "PR.PT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services", + "file": "endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments", + "id": "523c2684-a101-11eb-916b-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-19", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with an arguments \"HTTP\" string that are unique entry of malware or attack that uses lolbin to download other file or payload to the infected machine. The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\\Windows\\system32` and `C:\\Windows\\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.'", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message| search Arguments IN (\"*http*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Task_Name, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden, Arguments | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schedule_task_with_http_command_arguments_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the task schedule (Exa. Security Log EventCode 4698) endpoints. Tune and filter known instances of Task schedule used in your environment.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/92d7ef61-bfd7-4c92-bc15-322172b4ebec/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/tasksched/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A schedule task process commandline arguments $Arguments$ with http string on it in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "dest", + "Task_Name", + "Command", + "Author", + "Enabled", + "Hidden", + "Arguments" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 63 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments", + "file": "endpoint/schedule_task_with_http_command_arguments.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/tasksched/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "schedule_task_with_http_command_arguments_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/schedule_task_with_http_command_arguments.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger", + "id": "75b00fd8-a0ff-11eb-8b31-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-19", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed with a Rundll32. This technique is common in new trickbot that uses rundll32 to load is trickbot downloader. The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\\Windows\\system32` and `C:\\Windows\\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.'", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message | search Command IN (\"*rundll32*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Task_Name, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden, Arguments | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the task schedule (Exa. Security Log EventCode 4698) endpoints. Tune and filter known instances of Task schedule used in your environment.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/", + "https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Trickbot", + "IcedID" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/tasksched/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A schedule task process commandline rundll32 arguments $Arguments$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "dest", + "Task_Name", + "Command", + "Author", + "Enabled", + "Hidden", + "Arguments" + ], + "risk_score": 70, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Trickbot", + "IcedID" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 70 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger", + "file": "endpoint/schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/tasksched/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", + "id": "d5af132c-7c17-439c-9d31-13d55340f36c", + "version": 6, + "date": "2022-02-22", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation or deletion of a scheduled task using schtasks.exe with flags - create or delete being passed on the command-line. This has been associated with the Dragonfly threat actor, and the SUNBURST attack against Solarwinds. This analytic replaces \"Scheduled Task used in BadRabbit Ransomware\".", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe (Processes.process=*delete* OR Processes.process=*create*) by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible scripts or administrators may trigger this analytic. Filter as needed based on parent process, application.", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/21/qbot-and-zerologon-lead-to-full-domain-compromise/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", + "analytic_story": [ + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "NOBELIUM Group", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A schedule task process $process_name$ with create or delete commandline $process$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CostaRicto", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Machete", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "NOBELIUM Group", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", + "file": "endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Schtasks used for forcing a reboot", + "id": "1297fb80-f42a-4b4a-9c8a-88c066437cf6", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-12-07", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line that indicate that a forced reboot of system is scheduled.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe Processes.process=\"*shutdown*\" Processes.process=\"*/create *\" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may create jobs on systems forcing reboots to perform updates, maintenance, etc.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Schtasks used for forcing a reboot", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/schtask_shutdown/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A schedule task process $process_name$ with force reboot commandline $process$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CostaRicto", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Machete", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Schtasks used for forcing a reboot Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Schtasks used for forcing a reboot", + "file": "endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/schtask_shutdown/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Screensaver Event Trigger Execution", + "id": "58cea3ec-1f6d-11ec-8560-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-27", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is developed to detect possible event trigger execution through screensaver registry entry modification for persistence or privilege escalation. This technique was seen in several APT and malware where they put the malicious payload path to the SCRNSAVE.EXE registry key to redirect the execution to their malicious payload path. This TTP is a good indicator that some attacker may modify this entry for their persistence and privilege escalation.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Control Panel\\\\Desktop\\\\SCRNSAVE.EXE*\") by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `screensaver_event_trigger_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/002/", + "https://dmcxblue.gitbook.io/red-team-notes-2-0/red-team-techniques/privilege-escalation/untitled-3/screensaver" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Screensaver Event Trigger Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.002/scrnsave_reg/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1546", + "T1546.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_value_name" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Screensaver", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1546", + "T1546.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 72 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 72 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1546", + "T1546.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Screensaver Event Trigger Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Screensaver Event Trigger Execution", + "file": "endpoint/screensaver_event_trigger_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.002/scrnsave_reg/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "screensaver_event_trigger_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/screensaver_event_trigger_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Shim Database File Creation", + "id": "6e4c4588-ba2f-42fa-97e6-9f6f548eaa33", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-12-08", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for shim database files being written to default directories. The sdbinst.exe application is used to install shim database files (.sdb). According to Microsoft, a shim is a small library that transparently intercepts an API, changes the parameters passed, handles the operation itself, or redirects the operation elsewhere.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.action) values(Filesystem.file_hash) as file_hash values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path=*Windows\\\\AppPatch\\\\Custom* by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `shim_database_file_creation_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.", + "known_false_positives": "Because legitimate shim files are created and used all the time, this event, in itself, is not suspicious. However, if there are other correlating events, it may warrant further investigation.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Shim Database File Creation", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A process that possibly write shim database in $file_path$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1546.011", + "T1546" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_path", + "type": "File", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.file_hash", + "Filesystem.file_path", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Shimming", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "FIN7" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1546.011", + "T1546" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_path", + "type": "File", + "role": [ + "Other" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "file_path", + "threat_object_type": "file" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1546.011", + "T1546" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Shim Database File Creation Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Shim Database File Creation", + "file": "endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "shim_database_file_creation_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters", + "id": "404620de-46d8-48b6-90cc-8a8d7b0876a3", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-11-23", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search detects the process execution and arguments required to silently create a shim database. The sdbinst.exe application is used to install shim database files (.sdb). A shim is a small library which transparently intercepts an API, changes the parameters passed, handles the operation itself, or redirects the operation elsewhere.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = sdbinst.exe by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A process $process_name$ that possible create a shim db silently in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1546.011", + "T1546" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Shimming", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "FIN7" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1546.011", + "T1546" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 63 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 63 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1546.011", + "T1546" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters", + "file": "endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory", + "id": "7feb7972-7ac3-11eb-bac8-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-03-01", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following detection identifies Scheduled Tasks registering (creating a new task) a binary or script to run from a public directory which includes users\\public, \\programdata\\ and \\windows\\temp. Upon triage, review the binary or script in the command line for legitimacy, whether an approved binary/script or not. In addition, capture the binary or script in question and analyze for further behaviors. Identify the source and contain the endpoint.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe (Processes.process=*\\\\users\\\\public\\\\* OR Processes.process=*\\\\programdata\\\\* OR Processes.process=*windows\\\\temp*) Processes.process=*/create* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives may be present. Filter as needed by parent process or command line argument.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory", + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/schtasks/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious scheduled task registered on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CostaRicto", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Machete", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "User", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 35 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "User", + "risk_score": 35 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory", + "file": "endpoint/suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/schtasks/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Time Provider Persistence Registry", + "id": "5ba382c4-2105-11ec-8d8f-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-26", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of time provider registry for persistence and autostart. This technique can allow the attacker to persist on the compromised host and autostart as soon as the machine boot up. This TTP can be a good indicator of suspicious behavior since this registry is not commonly modified by normal user or even an admin.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path =\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services\\\\W32Time\\\\TimeProviders*\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `time_provider_persistence_registry_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://pentestlab.blog/2019/10/22/persistence-time-providers/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/003/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Time Provider Persistence Registry", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.003/timeprovider_reg/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1547.003", + "T1547" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_value_name" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Time Providers", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.003", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.003", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Time Provider Persistence Registry Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Time Provider Persistence Registry", + "file": "endpoint/time_provider_persistence_registry.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.003/timeprovider_reg/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "time_provider_persistence_registry_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/time_provider_persistence_registry.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Schtasks Create Run As System", + "id": "41a0e58e-884c-11ec-9976-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-07", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies Schtasks.exe creating a new task to start and run as an elevated user - SYSTEM. This is commonly used by adversaries to spawn a process in an elevated state.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_schtasks` Processes.process=\"*/create *\" AND Processes.process=\"*/ru *\" AND Processes.process=\"*system*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_schtasks_create_run_as_system_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives will be limited to legitimate applications creating a task to run as SYSTEM. Filter as needed based on parent process, or modify the query to have world writeable paths to restrict it.", + "references": [ + "https://pentestlab.blog/2019/11/04/persistence-scheduled-tasks/", + "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/persistence/t1053-schtask", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/07/qbot-likes-to-move-it-move-it/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Schtasks Create Run As System", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/schtask_system/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An $process_name$ was created on endpoint $dest$ attempting to spawn as SYSTEM.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 48, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CostaRicto", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Machete", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 48 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows Schtasks Create Run As System Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows Schtasks Create Run As System", + "file": "endpoint/windows_schtasks_create_run_as_system.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/schtask_system/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_schtasks", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=schtasks.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_schtasks_create_run_as_system_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_schtasks_create_run_as_system.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry", + "id": "25212358-948e-11ec-ad47-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2022-02-23", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to look for suspicious modification or creation of registry to have service entry. This technique is abused by adversaries or threat actor to persist, gain privileges in the machine or even lateral movement. This technique can be executed using reg.exe application or using windows API like for example the CrashOveride malware. This detection is a good indicator that a process is trying to create a service entry using registry ImagePath.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services*\" Registry.registry_value_name = ImagePath by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `windows_service_creation_using_registry_entry_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", + "known_false_positives": "Third party tools may used this technique to create services but not so common.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/36d49de4c8b00bf36054294b4a1fcbab3917d7c5/atomics/T1574.011/T1574.011.md" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry", + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1574.011/change_registry_path_service/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A Windows Service was created on a endpoint from $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1574.011" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_guid" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1574.011" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Active Directory Lateral Movement", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Lateral Movement", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 64 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1574.011" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry", + "file": "endpoint/windows_service_creation_using_registry_entry.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1574.011/change_registry_path_service/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "windows_service_creation_using_registry_entry_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_service_creation_using_registry_entry.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell", + "id": "203ef0ea-9bd8-11eb-8201-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-12", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed with a native Windows shell (PowerShell, Cmd, Wscript, Cscript).\\\nThe search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not.\\\nschtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\\Windows\\system32` and `C:\\Windows\\syswow64`.\\\nThe following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory.\\\nUpon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message | search Command IN (\"*powershell.exe*\", \"*wscript.exe*\", \"*cscript.exe*\", \"*cmd.exe*\", \"*sh.exe*\", \"*ksh.exe*\", \"*zsh.exe*\", \"*bash.exe*\", \"*scrcons.exe*\", \"*pwsh.exe*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Task_Name, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives are possible if legitimate applications are allowed to register tasks that call a shell to be spawned. Filter as needed based on command-line or processes that are used legitimately.", + "references": [ + "https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/irans-apt34-returns-with-an-updated-arsenal/", + "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4698", + "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/scheduled-task-job/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/taskschd/time-trigger-example--scripting-?redirectedfrom=MSDN" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A windows scheduled task was created (task name=$Task_Name$) on $dest$ by the following command: $Command$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Command", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "dest", + "Task_Name", + "Description", + "Command" + ], + "risk_score": 70, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CostaRicto", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Machete", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Command", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 70 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "Command", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell", + "file": "endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", + "id": "5d9c6eee-988c-11eb-8253-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-08", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed from a user writeable file path.\\\nThe search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not.\\\nschtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\\Windows\\system32` and `C:\\Windows\\syswow64`.\\\nThe following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory.\\\nUpon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or was it via TaskService. Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message | search Command IN (\"*\\\\users\\\\public\\\\*\", \"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Tasks\\\\*\", \"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Task_Name, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives are possible if legitimate applications are allowed to register tasks in public paths. Filter as needed based on paths that are used legitimately.", + "references": [ + "https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/irans-apt34-returns-with-an-updated-arsenal/", + "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4698", + "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/scheduled-task-job/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/taskschd/time-trigger-example--scripting-?redirectedfrom=MSDN", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/e26f1b2e-befa-483b-91d2-e18636e2faf3/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "IcedID", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/taskschedule/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A windows scheduled task was created (task name=$Task_Name$) on $dest$ by the following command: $Command$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Command", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "dest", + "Task_Name", + "Description", + "Command" + ], + "risk_score": 70, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CostaRicto", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Machete", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Ransomware", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "IcedID", + "Active Directory Lateral Movement" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Command", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Target" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Persistence", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 70 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "Command", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.005", + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", + "file": "endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/taskschedule/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started", + "id": "b3632472-310b-11ec-9aab-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-10-19", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following hunting analytic assists with identifying suspicious tasks that have been registered and ran in Windows using EventID 200 (action run) and 201 (action completed). It is recommended to filter based on ActionName by specifying specific paths not used in your environment. After some basic tuning, this may be effective in capturing evasive ways to register tasks on Windows. Review parallel events related to tasks being scheduled. EventID 106 will generate when a new task is generated, however, that does not mean it ran. Capture any files on disk and analyze.", + "search": "`wineventlog_task_scheduler` EventCode IN (\"200\",\"201\") | rename ComputerName as dest | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message dest EventCode category | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "Task Scheduler logs are required to be collected. Enable logging with inputs.conf by adding a stanza for [WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational] and renderXml=false. Note, not translating it in XML may require a proper extraction of specific items in the Message.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives will be present. Filter based on ActionName paths or specify keywords of interest.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1053.005/T1053.005.md", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started", + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/windows_taskschedule/windows-taskschedule.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A Scheduled Task was scheduled and ran on $dest$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053.005" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "TaskName", + "ActionName", + "EventID", + "dest", + "ProcessID" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "CostaRicto", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "FIN10", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Machete", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Silence", + "Stealth Falcon", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Wizard Spider", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.005" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "IcedID", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053.005" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started", + "file": "endpoint/winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-45d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-taskschedule.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/windows_taskschedule/windows-taskschedule.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational", + "sourcetype": "wineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_task_scheduler", + "definition": "source=\"WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational\"", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Print Processor Registry Autostart", + "id": "1f5b68aa-2037-11ec-898e-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-28", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification or new registry entry regarding print processor. This registry is known to be abuse by turla or other APT to gain persistence and privilege escalation to the compromised machine. This is done by adding the malicious dll payload on the new created key in this registry that will be executed as it restarted the spoolsv.exe process and services.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path =\"*\\\\Control\\\\Print\\\\Environments\\\\Windows x64\\\\Print Processors*\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `print_processor_registry_autostart_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "possible new printer installation may add driver component on this registry.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/012/", + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/05/21/no-game-over-winnti-group/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Print Processor Registry Autostart", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/print_reg/sysmon_print.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1547.012", + "T1547" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_value_name" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.012", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.012", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Print Processor Registry Autostart Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Print Processor Registry Autostart", + "file": "experimental/endpoint/print_processor_registry_autostart.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-365d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_print.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/print_reg/sysmon_print.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PrintService/Operational", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "print_processor_registry_autostart_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/print_processor_registry_autostart.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + }, + { + "name": "Get Parent Process Info", + "id": "fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41bf9", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-02-28", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "parent_process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Phishing Payloads", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_parent_process_info" + }, + { + "name": "Get Process Info", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd71", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-01", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the process running on a host which is under investigation. To gather the process info, enter the values for the process name in question and the destination IP address.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search process_name= $process_name$ | search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_process_info" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "id": "644e22d3-598a-429c-a007-16fdb802cae5", + "version": 2, + "date": "2020-02-04", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "description": "Monitor for and investigate activities that may be associated with a Windows privilege-escalation attack, including unusual processes running on endpoints, modified registry keys, and more.", + "narrative": "Privilege escalation is a \"land-and-expand\" technique, wherein an adversary gains an initial foothold on a host and then exploits its weaknesses to increase his privileges. The motivation is simple: certain actions on a Windows machine--such as installing software--may require higher-level privileges than those the attacker initially acquired. By increasing his privilege level, the attacker can gain the control required to carry out his malicious ends. This Analytic Story provides searches to detect and investigate behaviors that attackers may use to elevate their privileges in your environment.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "analytic_story": "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "category": [ + "Adversary Tactics" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.014", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Active Setup", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Kimsuky" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.006", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Blocking", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1558", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "FIN7", + "Operation Wocao", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1037", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Rocke" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1037.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Logon Script (Windows)", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "Cobalt Group" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Chimera", + "GALLIUM", + "Higaisa", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Patchwork", + "Sidewinder", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.008", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Accessibility Features", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "Deep Panda", + "Fox Kitten" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.012", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Image File Execution Options Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "TEMP.Veles" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1134", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Blue Mockingbird", + "FIN6" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1134.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Token Impersonation/Theft", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "FIN8" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Screensaver", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Time Providers", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "Cobalt Group", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "PLATINUM", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "Whitefly", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access", + "Defense Evasion", + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", + "ESCU - Active Setup Registry Autostart - Rule", + "ESCU - Change Default File Association - Rule", + "ESCU - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule", + "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", + "ESCU - Logon Script Event Trigger Execution - Rule", + "ESCU - MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary - Rule", + "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", + "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", + "ESCU - Runas Execution in CommandLine - Rule", + "ESCU - Screensaver Event Trigger Execution - Rule", + "ESCU - Time Provider Persistence Registry - Rule", + "ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", + "ESCU - Print Processor Registry Autostart - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "David Dorsey", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Uncommon Processes On Endpoint", + "id": "29ccce64-a10c-4389-a45f-337cb29ba1f7", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-07-22", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for applications on the endpoint that you have marked as uncommon.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process Processes.process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `uncommon_processes` |`uncommon_processes_on_endpoint_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model. This search uses a lookup file `uncommon_processes_default.csv` to track various features of process names that are usually uncommon in most environments. Please consider updating `uncommon_processes_local.csv` to hunt for processes that are uncommon in your environment.", + "known_false_positives": "None identified", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Uncommon Processes On Endpoint", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Unusual Processes" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1204.002" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT12", + "APT19", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT30", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Cobalt Group", + "Dark Caracal", + "DarkHydrus", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "FIN4", + "FIN6", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "Gallmaker", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Higaisa", + "Inception", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Machete", + "Magic Hound", + "Mofang", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "RTM", + "Rancor", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA459", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "The White Company", + "Tonto Team", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "Wizard Spider", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": true, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1204.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Unusual Processes" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "field", + "type": "Unknown", + "role": [ + "Unknown" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "field", + "threat_object_type": "unknown" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1204.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "uncommon_processes", + "definition": "lookup update=true lookup_uncommon_processes_default process_name as process_name outputnew uncommon_default,category_default,analytic_story_default,kill_chain_phase_default,mitre_attack_default | lookup update=true lookup_uncommon_processes_local process_name as process_name outputnew uncommon_local,category_local,analytic_story_local,kill_chain_phase_local,mitre_attack_local | eval uncommon = coalesce(uncommon_default, uncommon_local), analytic_story = coalesce(analytic_story_default, analytic_story_local), category=coalesce(category_default, category_local), kill_chain_phase=coalesce(kill_chain_phase_default, kill_chain_phase_local), mitre_attack=coalesce(mitre_attack_default, mitre_attack_local) | fields - analytic_story_default, analytic_story_local, category_default, category_local, kill_chain_phase_default, kill_chain_phase_local, mitre_attack_default, mitre_attack_local, uncommon_default, uncommon_local | search uncommon=true", + "description": "This macro limits the output to processes that have been marked as uncommon" + }, + { + "name": "uncommon_processes_on_endpoint_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml", + "source": "deprecated" + }, + { + "name": "Active Setup Registry Autostart", + "id": "f64579c0-203f-11ec-abcc-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-26", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of the active setup registry for persistence and privilege escalation. This technique was seen in several malware (poisonIvy), adware and APT to gain persistence to the compromised machine upon boot up. This TTP is a good indicator to further check the process id that do the modification since modification of this registry is not commonly done. check the legitimacy of the file and process involve in this rules to check if it is a valid setup installer that creating or modifying this registry.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_value_name= \"StubPath\" Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Active Setup\\\\Installed Components*\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `active_setup_registry_autostart_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "Active setup installer may add or modify this registry.", + "references": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Backdoor%3aWin32%2fPoisonivy.E", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/014/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Active Setup Registry Autostart", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/t1547.014/active_setup_stubpath/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1547.014", + "T1547" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_value_name" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.014", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Active Setup", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.014", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 64 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.014", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Active Setup Registry Autostart Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Active Setup Registry Autostart", + "file": "endpoint/active_setup_registry_autostart.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/t1547.014/active_setup_stubpath/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "active_setup_registry_autostart_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/active_setup_registry_autostart.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Change Default File Association", + "id": "462d17d8-1f71-11ec-ad07-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-27", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is developed to detect suspicious registry modification to change the default file association of windows to malicious payload. This techninique was seen in some APT where it modify the default process to run file association, like .txt to notepad.exe. Instead notepad.exe it will point to a Script or other payload that will load malicious command to the compromised host.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path =\"*\\\\shell\\\\open\\\\command\\\\*\" Registry.registry_path = \"*HKCR\\\\*\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `change_default_file_association_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://dmcxblue.gitbook.io/red-team-notes-2-0/red-team-techniques/privilege-escalation/untitled-3/accessibility-features" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Change Default File Association", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.001/txtfile_reg/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1546.001", + "T1546" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_value_name" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Kimsuky" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1546.001", + "T1546" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1546.001", + "T1546" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Change Default File Association Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Change Default File Association", + "file": "endpoint/change_default_file_association.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.001/txtfile_reg/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "change_default_file_association_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/change_default_file_association.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "ETW Registry Disabled", + "id": "8ed523ac-276b-11ec-ac39-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-28", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a registry modification to disable ETW feature of windows. This technique is to evade EDR appliance to evade detections and hide its execution from audit logs.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\.NETFramework*\" Registry.registry_value_name = ETWEnabled Registry.registry_value_data=0x00000000 by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `etw_registry_disabled_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://gist.github.com/Cyb3rWard0g/a4a115fd3ab518a0e593525a379adee3" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "ETW Registry Disabled", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127/etw_disable/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.006", + "T1127", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.registry_value_data" + ], + "risk_score": 90, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.006", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Blocking", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.006", + "T1127", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 90 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 90 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.006", + "T1127", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "ETW Registry Disabled Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "ETW Registry Disabled", + "file": "endpoint/etw_registry_disabled.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127/etw_disable/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "etw_registry_disabled_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/etw_registry_disabled.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption", + "id": "5cc67381-44fa-4111-8a37-7a230943f027", + "version": 4, + "date": "2022-02-09", + "author": "Jose Hernandez, Patrick Bareiss, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following analytic leverages Kerberos Event 4769, A Kerberos service ticket was requested, to identify a potential kerberoasting attack against Active Directory networks. Kerberoasting allows an adversary to request kerberos tickets for domain accounts typically used as service accounts and attempt to crack them offline allowing them to obtain privileged access to the domain. This analytic looks for a specific combination of the Ticket_Options field based on common kerberoasting tools. Defenders should be aware that it may be possible for a Kerberoast attack to use different Ticket_Options.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769 Service_Name!=\"*$\" (Ticket_Options=0x40810000 OR Ticket_Options=0x40800000 OR Ticket_Options=0x40810010) Ticket_Encryption_Type=0x17 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, service, service_id, Ticket_Encryption_Type, Ticket_Options | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", + "known_false_positives": "Older systems that support kerberos RC4 by default like NetApp may generate false positives. Filter as needed", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1208/T1208.md", + "https://www.trimarcsecurity.com/post/trimarcresearch-detecting-kerberoasting-activity" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 16" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/rubeus/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Potential kerberoasting attack via service principal name requests detected on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1558", + "T1558.003" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Ticket_Options", + "Ticket_Encryption_Type", + "dest", + "service", + "service_id" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1558", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "FIN7", + "Operation Wocao", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1558", + "T1558.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Credential Access" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 72 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1558", + "T1558.003" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8", + "CIS 16" + ], + "nist": [ + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption", + "file": "endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/rubeus/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog", + "update_timestamp": true + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Logon Script Event Trigger Execution", + "id": "4c38c264-1f74-11ec-b5fa-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-27", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry entry to persist and gain privilege escalation upon booting up of compromised host. This technique was seen in several APT and malware where it modify UserInitMprLogonScript registry entry to its malicious payload to be executed upon boot up of the machine.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path IN (\"*\\\\Environment\\\\UserInitMprLogonScript\") by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `logon_script_event_trigger_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/001" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Logon Script Event Trigger Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1037.001/logonscript_reg/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1037", + "T1037.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_value_name" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1037", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Rocke" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1037.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Logon Script (Windows)", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "Cobalt Group" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1037", + "T1037.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1037", + "T1037.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Logon Script Event Trigger Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Logon Script Event Trigger Execution", + "file": "endpoint/logon_script_event_trigger_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1037.001/logonscript_reg/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "logon_script_event_trigger_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/logon_script_event_trigger_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary", + "id": "ccb98a66-5851-11ec-b91c-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-12-08", + "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "The following hunting analytic identifies `msi.dll` being loaded by a binary not located in `system32`, `syswow64`, `winsxs` or `windows` paths. This behavior is most recently related to InstallerFileTakeOver, or CVE-2021-41379, and DLL side-loading. CVE-2021-41379 requires a binary to be dropped and `msi.dll` to be loaded by it. To Successful exploitation of this issue happens in four parts \\\n1. Generation of an MSI that will trigger bad behavior. \\\n1. Preparing a directory for MSI installation. \\\n1. Inducing an error state. \\\n1. Racing to introduce a junction and a symlink to trick msiexec.exe to modify the attacker specified file. \\\nIn addition, `msi.dll` has been abused in DLL side-loading attacks by being loaded by non-system binaries.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded=\"*\\\\msi.dll\" NOT (Image IN (\"*\\\\System32\\\\*\",\"*\\\\syswow64\\\\*\",\"*\\\\windows\\\\*\", \"*\\\\winsxs\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name Computer EventCode ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `msi_module_loaded_by_non_system_binary_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "It is possible some Administrative utilities will load msi.dll outside of normal system paths, filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://attackerkb.com/topics/7LstI2clmF/cve-2021-41379/rapid7-analysis", + "https://github.com/klinix5/InstallerFileTakeOver", + "https://github.com/mandiant/red_team_tool_countermeasures/blob/master/rules/PGF/supplemental/hxioc/msi.dll%20Hijack%20(Methodology).ioc" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Privilege Escalation" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "The following module $ImageLoaded$ was loaded by $Image$ outside of the normal system paths on endpoint $Computer$, potentally related to DLL side-loading.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1574.002", + "T1574" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Image", + "ImageLoaded", + "process_name", + "Computer", + "EventCode", + "ProcessId" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-41379" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BlackTech", + "Chimera", + "GALLIUM", + "Higaisa", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "Patchwork", + "Sidewinder", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1574.002", + "T1574" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Privilege Escalation" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 70, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2021-41379" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process name" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1574.002", + "T1574" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary", + "file": "endpoint/msi_module_loaded_by_non_system_binary.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1574.002/msi_module_load/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "msi_module_loaded_by_non_system_binary_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/msi_module_loaded_by_non_system_binary.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Overwriting Accessibility Binaries", + "id": "13c2f6c3-10c5-4deb-9ba1-7c4460ebe4ae", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "Microsoft Windows contains accessibility features that can be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in. An adversary can modify or replace these programs so they can get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system. This search looks for modifications to these binaries.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\sethc.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\utilman.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\osk.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\Magnify.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\Narrator.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\DisplaySwitch.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\AtBroker.exe*) by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `overwriting_accessibility_binaries_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.", + "known_false_positives": "Microsoft may provide updates to these binaries. Verify that these changes do not correspond with your normal software update cycle.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Overwriting Accessibility Binaries", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Privilege Escalation" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.008/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A suspicious file modification or replace in $file_path$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1546", + "T1546.008" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_path", + "type": "File", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.dest", + "Filesystem.file_path", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.008", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Accessibility Features", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT41", + "Axiom", + "Deep Panda", + "Fox Kitten" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1546", + "T1546.008" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Privilege Escalation" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_path", + "type": "File", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 72 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "file_path", + "threat_object_type": "file" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1546", + "T1546.008" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Overwriting Accessibility Binaries Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Overwriting Accessibility Binaries", + "file": "endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.008/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "overwriting_accessibility_binaries_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation", + "id": "c9f4b923-f8af-4155-b697-1354f5bcbc5e", + "version": 5, + "date": "2022-01-26", + "author": "David Dorsey, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to elevate privileges. The registry keys under \"Image File Execution Options\" are used to intercept calls to an executable and can be used to attach malicious binaries to benign system binaries.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=\"*Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Image File Execution Options*\") AND (Registry.registry_value_name=GlobalFlag OR Registry.registry_value_name=Debugger) by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "There are many legitimate applications that must execute upon system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task.", + "references": [ + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2015/12/an-introduction-to-image-file-execution-options/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 95, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.012/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to privilege escalation in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1546.012", + "T1546" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user" + ], + "risk_score": 76, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.012", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Image File Execution Options Injection", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "TEMP.Veles" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1546.012", + "T1546" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 95 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 76 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 76 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1546.012", + "T1546" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation", + "file": "endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.012/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Runas Execution in CommandLine", + "id": "4807e716-43a4-11ec-a0e7-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-11-12", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Hunting", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic look for a spawned runas.exe process with a administrator user option parameter. This parameter was abused by adversaries, malware author or even red teams to gain elevated privileges in target host. This is a good hunting query to figure out privilege escalation tactics that may used for different stages like lateral movement but take note that administrator may use this command in purpose so its better to see other event context before and after this analytic.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_runas` AND Processes.process = \"*/user:*\" AND Processes.process = \"*admin*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `runas_execution_in_commandline_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated or manual execute this command that may generate false positives. filter is needed.", + "references": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/ad4c3cda-41f2-4401-8dba-56cc2d245488/#" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Runas Execution in CommandLine", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Privilege Escalation" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/vilsel/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "elevated process using runas on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1134", + "T1134.001" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1134", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Blue Mockingbird", + "FIN6" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1134.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Token Impersonation/Theft", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "FIN8" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", + "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Hunting", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1134", + "T1134.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Privilege Escalation" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1134", + "T1134.001" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Runas Execution in CommandLine Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Runas Execution in CommandLine", + "file": "endpoint/runas_execution_in_commandline.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/vilsel/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "process_runas", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=runas.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=runas.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "runas_execution_in_commandline_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/runas_execution_in_commandline.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Screensaver Event Trigger Execution", + "id": "58cea3ec-1f6d-11ec-8560-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-27", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is developed to detect possible event trigger execution through screensaver registry entry modification for persistence or privilege escalation. This technique was seen in several APT and malware where they put the malicious payload path to the SCRNSAVE.EXE registry key to redirect the execution to their malicious payload path. This TTP is a good indicator that some attacker may modify this entry for their persistence and privilege escalation.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Control Panel\\\\Desktop\\\\SCRNSAVE.EXE*\") by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `screensaver_event_trigger_execution_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/002/", + "https://dmcxblue.gitbook.io/red-team-notes-2-0/red-team-techniques/privilege-escalation/untitled-3/screensaver" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Screensaver Event Trigger Execution", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.002/scrnsave_reg/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1546", + "T1546.002" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_value_name" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Screensaver", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1546", + "T1546.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 72 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 72 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1546", + "T1546.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Screensaver Event Trigger Execution Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Screensaver Event Trigger Execution", + "file": "endpoint/screensaver_event_trigger_execution.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.002/scrnsave_reg/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "screensaver_event_trigger_execution_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/screensaver_event_trigger_execution.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Time Provider Persistence Registry", + "id": "5ba382c4-2105-11ec-8d8f-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-26", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of time provider registry for persistence and autostart. This technique can allow the attacker to persist on the compromised host and autostart as soon as the machine boot up. This TTP can be a good indicator of suspicious behavior since this registry is not commonly modified by normal user or even an admin.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path =\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services\\\\W32Time\\\\TimeProviders*\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `time_provider_persistence_registry_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://pentestlab.blog/2019/10/22/persistence-time-providers/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/003/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Time Provider Persistence Registry", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.003/timeprovider_reg/sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1547.003", + "T1547" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_value_name" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Time Providers", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.003", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.003", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Time Provider Persistence Registry Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Time Provider Persistence Registry", + "file": "endpoint/time_provider_persistence_registry.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.003/timeprovider_reg/sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "time_provider_persistence_registry_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/time_provider_persistence_registry.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Child Processes of Spoolsv exe", + "id": "aa0c4aeb-5b18-41c4-8c07-f1442d7599df", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-03-16", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for child processes of spoolsv.exe. This activity is associated with a POC privilege-escalation exploit associated with CVE-2018-8440. Spoolsv.exe is the process associated with the Print Spooler service in Windows and typically runs as SYSTEM.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=spoolsv.exe AND Processes.process_name!=regsvr32.exe by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe_filter` ", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model. Update the `children_of_spoolsv_filter` macro to filter out legitimate child processes spawned by spoolsv.exe.", + "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate printer-related processes may show up as children of spoolsv.exe. You should confirm that any activity as legitimate and may be added as exclusions in the search.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Child Processes of Spoolsv exe", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Privilege Escalation" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 5", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1068" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.AC", + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "cve": [ + "CVE-2018-8440" + ], + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "Cobalt Group", + "FIN6", + "FIN8", + "PLATINUM", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Turla", + "Whitefly", + "ZIRCONIUM" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1068" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 5", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.AC", + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Privilege Escalation" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50, + "cve": [ + "CVE-2018-8440" + ] + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1068" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 5", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.AC", + "PR.PT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Print Processor Registry Autostart", + "id": "1f5b68aa-2037-11ec-898e-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-09-28", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification or new registry entry regarding print processor. This registry is known to be abuse by turla or other APT to gain persistence and privilege escalation to the compromised machine. This is done by adding the malicious dll payload on the new created key in this registry that will be executed as it restarted the spoolsv.exe process and services.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path =\"*\\\\Control\\\\Print\\\\Environments\\\\Windows x64\\\\Print Processors*\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `print_processor_registry_autostart_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "possible new printer installation may add driver component on this registry.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/012/", + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/05/21/no-game-over-winnti-group/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Print Processor Registry Autostart", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/print_reg/sysmon_print.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1547.012", + "T1547" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.dest", + "Registry.user", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_value_name" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.012", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1547.012", + "T1547" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Print Processor Registry Autostart Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Print Processor Registry Autostart", + "file": "experimental/endpoint/print_processor_registry_autostart.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-365d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "sysmon_print.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/print_reg/sysmon_print.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PrintService/Operational", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "print_processor_registry_autostart_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/print_processor_registry_autostart.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + }, + { + "name": "Get Parent Process Info", + "id": "fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41bf9", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-02-28", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "parent_process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Phishing Payloads", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_parent_process_info" + }, + { + "name": "Get Process Info", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd71", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-01", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the process running on a host which is under investigation. To gather the process info, enter the values for the process name in question and the destination IP address.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search process_name= $process_name$ | search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_process_info" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "Windows Service Abuse", + "id": "6dbd810e-f66d-414b-8dfc-e46de55cbfe2", + "version": 3, + "date": "2017-11-02", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "description": "Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence and the ability to load drivers or otherwise interact with the Windows kernel. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows services are being modified or created in a suspicious manner.", + "narrative": "The Windows operating system uses a services architecture to allow for running code in the background, similar to a UNIX daemon. Attackers will often leverage Windows services for persistence, hiding in plain sight, seeking the ability to run privileged code that can interact with the kernel. In many cases, attackers will create a new service to host their malicious code. Attackers have also been observed modifying unnecessary or unused services to point to their own code, as opposed to what was intended. In these cases, attackers often use tools to create or modify services in ways that are not typical for most environments, providing opportunities for detection.", + "references": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050", + "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Windows Service Abuse", + "analytic_story": "Windows Service Abuse", + "category": [ + "Malware" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN7", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "PROMETHIUM", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1569", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "FIN6", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Operation Wocao", + "Silence", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Installation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", + "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", + "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [ + "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", + "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task" + ], + "baseline_names": [ + "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial", + "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update" + ], + "author_company": "Splunk", + "author_name": "Rico Valdez", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys", + "id": "8470d755-0c13-45b3-bd63-387a373c10cf", + "version": 5, + "date": "2020-11-26", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The search looks for reg.exe modifying registry keys that define Windows services and their configurations.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name values(Processes.user) as user FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=reg.exe Processes.process=*reg* Processes.process=*add* Processes.process=*Services* by Processes.process_id Processes.dest Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "It is unusual for a service to be created or modified by directly manipulating the registry. However, there may be legitimate instances of this behavior. It is important to validate and investigate, as appropriate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1574.011/change_registry_path_service/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 75, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation" + ], + "message": "A reg.exe process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1574.011", + "T1574" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP", + "PR.PT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "risk_score": 45, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.011", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1574.011", + "T1574" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP", + "PR.PT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Windows Persistence Techniques" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 75, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 45 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 45 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1574.011", + "T1574" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP", + "PR.PT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys", + "file": "endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1574.011/change_registry_path_service/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services", + "id": "f0c693d8-2a89-4ce7-80b4-98fea4c3ea6d", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for arguments to sc.exe indicating the creation or modification of a Windows service.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = sc.exe (Processes.process=\"* create *\" OR Processes.process=\"* config *\") by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Using sc.exe to manipulate Windows services is uncommon. However, there may be legitimate instances of this behavior. It is important to validate and investigate as appropriate.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Service Abuse", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 8" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation" + ], + "message": "A sc process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ to create of configure services in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1543.003", + "T1543" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP", + "PR.PT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN7", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "PROMETHIUM", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1543.003", + "T1543" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP", + "PR.PT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.CM" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Service Abuse", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1543.003", + "T1543" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 3", + "CIS 5", + "CIS 8" + ], + "nist": [ + "PR.IP", + "PR.PT", + "PR.AC", + "PR.AT", + "DE.CM" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services", + "file": "endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "First Time Seen Running Windows Service", + "id": "823136f2-d755-4b6d-ae04-372b486a5808", + "version": 4, + "date": "2020-07-21", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search looks for the first and last time a Windows service is seen running in your environment. This table is then cached.", + "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rex field=Message \"The (?[-\\(\\)\\s\\w]+) service entered the (?\\w+) state\" | where state=\"running\" | lookup previously_seen_running_windows_services service as service OUTPUT firstTimeSeen | where isnull(firstTimeSeen) OR firstTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_windows_services_window`) | table _time dest service | `first_time_seen_running_windows_service_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM, you must be ingesting your Windows system event logs in order for this search to execute successfully. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial` to build the initial table of child processes and hostnames for this search to work. You should also schedule at the same interval as this search the second baseline search `Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old Windows Services. Please update the `previously_seen_windows_services_window` macro to adjust the time window. Please ensure that the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows is version 8.0.0 or above.", + "known_false_positives": "A previously unseen service is not necessarily malicious. Verify that the service is legitimate and that was installed by a legitimate process.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "First Time Seen Running Windows Service", + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2", + "CIS 9" + ], + "confidence": 50, + "context": [], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "tbd", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1569", + "T1569.002" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.AE" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message", + "dest" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1569", + "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Chimera", + "FIN6", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Operation Wocao", + "Silence", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": true, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1569", + "T1569.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2", + "CIS 9" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.AE" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [ + { + "name": "Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial", + "id": "64ce0ade-cb01-4678-bddd-d31c0b175394", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-06-23", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This collects the services that have been started across your entire enterprise.", + "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rex field=Message \"The (?[-\\(\\)\\s\\w]+) service entered the (?\\w+) state\" | where state=\"running\" | stats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen by service | outputlookup previously_seen_running_windows_services", + "how_to_implement": "While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM, you must be ingesting your Windows security-event logs for it to execute successfully. Please ensure that the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows is version 8.0.0 or above.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "deployments": [ + "90 Day Baseline" + ], + "detections": [ + "First Time Seen Running Windows Service" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + }, + { + "name": "Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update", + "id": "2e3bdd68-1863-46ee-81f8-87273eee7f1c", + "version": 3, + "date": "2020-06-23", + "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", + "type": "Baseline", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search returns the first and last time a Windows service was seen across your enterprise within the last hour. It then updates this information with historical data and filters out Windows services pairs that have not been seen within the specified time window. This updated table is then cached.", + "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rex field=Message \"The (?[-\\(\\)\\s\\w]+) service entered the (?\\w+) state\" | where state=\"running\" | stats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen by service | inputlookup previously_seen_running_windows_services append=t | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen, max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by service | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), \"`previously_seen_windows_service_forget_window`\") | outputlookup previously_seen_running_windows_services", + "how_to_implement": "While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM, you must be ingesting your Windows security-event logs for it to execute successfully. Please ensure that the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows is version 8.0.0 or above.", + "known_false_positives": "none", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "NOBELIUM Group" + ], + "deployments": [ + "Hourly Cache Updates" + ], + "detections": [ + "First Time Seen Running Windows Service" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "EventCode", + "Message" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", + "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Baseline" + } + } + } + ], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1569", + "T1569.002" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2", + "CIS 9" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS", + "PR.AC", + "DE.AE" + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "wineventlog_system", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "previously_seen_windows_services_window", + "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", + "description": "Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new Windows services" + }, + { + "name": "first_time_seen_running_windows_service_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "previously_seen_running_windows_services", + "description": "A placeholder for the list of Windows Services running", + "collection": "previously_seen_running_windows_services", + "fields_list": "_key, service, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [ + { + "name": "Get Notable History", + "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", + "version": 2, + "date": "2017-09-20", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [], + "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", + "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", + "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Cross Account Activity", + "AWS Cryptomining", + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "AWS User Monitoring", + "Account Monitoring and Controls", + "Apache Struts Vulnerability", + "Asset Tracking", + "Brand Monitoring", + "Cloud Cryptomining", + "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "DNS Amplification Attacks", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Dynamic DNS", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Host Redirection", + "JBoss Vulnerability", + "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor Backup Solution", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Monitor for Updates", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "Router and Infrastructure Security", + "SQL Injection", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", + "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", + "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious Emails", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", + "Unusual Processes", + "Use of Cleartext Protocols", + "Web Fraud Detection", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse", + "Data Exfiltration", + "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", + "Detect Zerologon Attack", + "GCP Cross Account Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", + "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", + "Ransomware Cloud", + "Ryuk Ransomware", + "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", + "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", + "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" + }, + { + "name": "Get Parent Process Info", + "id": "fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41bf9", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-02-28", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "parent_process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Phishing Payloads", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_parent_process_info" + }, + { + "name": "Get Process Info", + "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd71", + "version": 2, + "date": "2019-04-01", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "Investigation", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the process running on a host which is under investigation. To gather the process info, enter the values for the process name in question and the destination IP address.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search process_name= $process_name$ | search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint data model.", + "known_false_positives": "", + "references": [], + "inputs": [ + "process_name", + "dest" + ], + "tags": { + "analytic_story": [ + "AWS Network ACL Activity", + "Collection and Staging", + "Command & Control", + "DHS Report TA18-074A", + "Data Protection", + "Disabling Security Tools", + "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", + "Hidden Cobra Malware", + "Lateral Movement", + "Malicious PowerShell", + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "Netsh Abuse", + "Orangeworm Attack Group", + "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", + "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", + "Ransomware", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Suspicious AWS Traffic", + "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", + "Suspicious DNS Traffic", + "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", + "Suspicious WMI Use", + "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", + "Unusual Processes", + "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", + "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", + "Windows Log Manipulation", + "Windows Persistence Techniques", + "Windows Privilege Escalation", + "Windows Service Abuse" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Phantom" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest" + ], + "security_domain": "endpoint" + }, + "lowercase_name": "get_process_info" + } + ] + }, + { + "name": "XMRig", + "id": "06723e6a-6bd8-4817-ace2-5fb8a7b06628", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-07", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Rod Soto Splunk", + "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the xmrig monero, including looking for file writes associated with its payload, process command-line, defense evasion (killing services, deleting users, modifying files or folder permission, killing other malware or other coin miner) and hacking tools including Telegram as mean of command and control (C2) to download other files. Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems in order to solve resource intensive problems which may impact system and/or hosted service availability. One common purpose for Resource Hijacking is to validate transactions of cryptocurrency networks and earn virtual currency. Adversaries may consume enough system resources to negatively impact and/or cause affected machines to become unresponsive. (1) Servers and cloud-based (2) systems are common targets because of the high potential for available resources, but user endpoint systems may also be compromised and used for Resource Hijacking and cryptocurrency mining.", + "narrative": "XMRig is a high performance, open source, cross platform RandomX, KawPow, CryptoNight and AstroBWT unified CPU/GPU miner. This monero is seen in the wild on May 2017.", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/xmrig/xmrig", + "https://www.getmonero.org/resources/user-guides/mine-to-pool.html", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/", + "https://blog.checkpoint.com/2021/03/11/february-2021s-most-wanted-malware-trickbot-takes-over-following-emotet-shutdown/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "XMRig", + "analytic_story": "XMRig", + "category": [ + "Malware" + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Match Legitimate Name or Location", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Darkhotel", + "FIN7", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Fox Kitten", + "Indrik Spider", + "Lazarus Group", + "Machete", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Sowbug", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Whitefly", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1595", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Active Scanning", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1531", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1489", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Indrik Spider", + "Lazarus Group", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1222", + "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN7", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "PROMETHIUM", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ], + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control", + "Credential Access", + "Defense Evasion", + "Discovery", + "Execution", + "Impact", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation", + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "datamodels": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Actions on Objectives", + "Command & Control", + "Exploitation", + "Installation" + ] + }, + "detection_names": [ + "ESCU - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule", + "ESCU - Deleting Of Net Users - Rule", + "ESCU - Disable Windows App Hotkeys - Rule", + "ESCU - Disabling Net User Account - Rule", + "ESCU - Download Files Using Telegram - Rule", + "ESCU - Enumerate Users Local Group Using Telegram - Rule", + "ESCU - Excessive Attempt To Disable Services - Rule", + "ESCU - Excessive Service Stop Attempt - Rule", + "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Cacls App - Rule", + "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule", + "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Taskkill - Rule", + "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", + "ESCU - Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen - Rule", + "ESCU - Icacls Deny Command - Rule", + "ESCU - ICACLS Grant Command - Rule", + "ESCU - Modify ACL permission To Files Or Folder - Rule", + "ESCU - Process Kill Base On File Path - Rule", + "ESCU - Schtasks Run Task On Demand - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious Driver Loaded Path - Rule", + "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", + "ESCU - XMRIG Driver Loaded - Rule" + ], + "investigation_names": [], + "baseline_names": [], + "author_company": "Rod Soto Splunk", + "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", + "detections": [ + { + "name": "Attacker Tools On Endpoint", + "id": "a51bfe1a-94f0-48cc-b4e4-16a110145893", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-11-04", + "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This search looks for execution of commonly used attacker tools on an endpoint.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.dest!=unknown Processes.user!=unknown by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | lookup attacker_tools attacker_tool_names AS process_name OUTPUT description | search description !=false| `attacker_tools_on_endpoint_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is usually generated via logs that report process tracking in your Windows audit settings.", + "known_false_positives": "Some administrator activity can be potentially triggered, please add those users to the filter macro.", + "references": [], + "tags": { + "name": "Attacker Tools On Endpoint", + "analytic_story": [ + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "XMRig", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Unusual Processes" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2" + ], + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1595/attacker_scan_tools/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "message": "An attacker tool $process_name$,listed in attacker_tools.csv is executed on host $dest$ by User $user$. This process $process_name$ is known to do- $description$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1036.005", + "T1036", + "T1003", + "T1595" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process", + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.parent_process" + ], + "risk_score": 64, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.005", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Match Legitimate Name or Location", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT1", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Chimera", + "Darkhotel", + "FIN7", + "Ferocious Kitten", + "Fox Kitten", + "Indrik Spider", + "Lazarus Group", + "Machete", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Naikon", + "PROMETHIUM", + "Patchwork", + "Poseidon Group", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "Sowbug", + "TEMP.Veles", + "Transparent Tribe", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Whitefly", + "admin@338", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Credential Access" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT32", + "APT39", + "Axiom", + "Frankenstein", + "Leviathan", + "Poseidon Group", + "Sowbug", + "Suckfly", + "Tonto Team" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1595", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Active Scanning", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Reconnaissance" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036.005", + "T1036", + "T1003", + "T1595" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", + "XMRig", + "SamSam Ransomware", + "Unusual Processes" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process", + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Recon" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 64 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036.005", + "T1036", + "T1003", + "T1595" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Installation", + "Command & Control", + "Actions on Objectives" + ], + "cis20": [ + "CIS 2" + ], + "nist": [ + "ID.AM", + "PR.DS" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Attacker Tools On Endpoint Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Attacker Tools On Endpoint", + "file": "endpoint/attacker_tools_on_endpoint.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-30d", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1595/attacker_scan_tools/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "attacker_tools_on_endpoint_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [ + { + "name": "attacker_tools", + "description": "A list of tools used by attackers", + "filename": "attacker_tools.csv", + "default_match": "false", + "match_type": "WILDCARD(attacker_tool_names)", + "min_matches": 1, + "case_sensitive_match": "false" + } + ], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/attacker_tools_on_endpoint.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Deleting Of Net Users", + "id": "1c8c6f66-acce-11eb-aafb-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-05-04", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic will detect a suspicious net.exe/net1.exe command-line to delete a user on a system. This technique may be use by an administrator for legitimate purposes, however this behavior has been used in the wild to impair some user or deleting adversaries tracks created during its lateral movement additional systems. During triage, review parallel processes for additional behavior. Identify any other user accounts created before or after.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` AND Processes.process=\"*user*\" AND Processes.process=\"*/delete*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `deleting_of_net_users_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "System administrators or scripts may delete user accounts via this technique. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Deleting Of Net Users", + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 50, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to delete accounts.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1531" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 25, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1531", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1531" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 50, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 25 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1531" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Deleting Of Net Users Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Deleting Of Net Users", + "file": "endpoint/deleting_of_net_users.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_net", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "deleting_of_net_users_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/deleting_of_net_users.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Disable Windows App Hotkeys", + "id": "1490f224-ad8b-11eb-8c4f-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-27", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic detects a suspicious registry modification to disable Windows hotkey (shortcut keys) for native Windows applications. This technique is commonly used to disable certain or several Windows applications like `taskmgr.exe` and `cmd.exe`. This technique is used to impair the analyst in analyzing and removing the attacker implant in compromised systems.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Image File Execution Options\\\\*\" AND Registry.registry_value_data= \"HotKey Disabled\" AND Registry.registry_value_name = \"Debugger\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_key_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `disable_windows_app_hotkeys_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as CarbonBlack or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Disable Windows App Hotkeys", + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/hotkey_disabled_hidden_user/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 40, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Disabled 'Windows App Hotkeys' on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.dest Registry.user" + ], + "risk_score": 40, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 40, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 40 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Disable Windows App Hotkeys Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Disable Windows App Hotkeys", + "file": "endpoint/disable_windows_app_hotkeys.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/hotkey_disabled_hidden_user/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "disable_windows_app_hotkeys_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_windows_app_hotkeys.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Disabling Net User Account", + "id": "c0325326-acd6-11eb-98c2-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-05-04", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic will identify a suspicious command-line that disables a user account using the `net.exe` utility native to Windows. This technique may used by the adversaries to interrupt availability of such users to do their malicious act.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` AND Processes.process=\"*user*\" AND Processes.process=\"*/active:no*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_net_user_account_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Disabling Net User Account", + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 60, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified disabling a user account on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1531" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 42, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1531", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1531" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Parent Process" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Persistence" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 60 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 42 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 42 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1531" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Disabling Net User Account Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Disabling Net User Account", + "file": "endpoint/disabling_net_user_account.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_net", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "disabling_net_user_account_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disabling_net_user_account.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Download Files Using Telegram", + "id": "58194e28-ae5e-11eb-8912-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-06", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic will identify a suspicious download by the Telegram application on a Windows system. This behavior was identified on a honeypot where the adversary gained access, installed Telegram and followed through with downloading different network scanners (port, bruteforcer, masscan) to the system and later used to mapped the whole network and further move laterally.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode= 15 process_name = \"telegram.exe\" TargetFilename = \"*:Zone.Identifier\" |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer EventCode Image process_id TargetFilename Hash | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `download_files_using_telegram_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and TargetFilename from your endpoints or Events that monitor filestream events which is happened when process download something. (EventCode 15) If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "normal download of file in telegram app. (if it was a common app in network)", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Download Files Using Telegram", + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/minergate/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious files were downloaded with the Telegram application on $dest$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1105" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Computer", + "EventCode", + "Image", + "process_id", + "TargetFilename", + "Hash" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Command And Control" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT-C-36", + "APT18", + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT33", + "APT37", + "APT38", + "APT39", + "APT41", + "Ajax Security Team", + "Andariel", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "BackdoorDiplomacy", + "Chimera", + "Cobalt Group", + "Darkhotel", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Elderwood", + "Evilnum", + "FIN7", + "FIN8", + "Fox Kitten", + "Frankenstein", + "GALLIUM", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "HAFNIUM", + "IndigoZebra", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "Leviathan", + "Magic Hound", + "Molerats", + "MuddyWater", + "Mustang Panda", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "Operation Wocao", + "PLATINUM", + "Patchwork", + "Rancor", + "Rocke", + "Sandworm Team", + "Sharpshooter", + "Sidewinder", + "Silence", + "TA505", + "TA551", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tonto Team", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Turla", + "Volatile Cedar", + "WIRTE", + "Whitefly", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1105" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Download Files Using Telegram Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Download Files Using Telegram", + "file": "endpoint/download_files_using_telegram.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/minergate/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "download_files_using_telegram_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/download_files_using_telegram.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Enumerate Users Local Group Using Telegram", + "id": "fcd74532-ae54-11eb-a5ab-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-06", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic will detect a suspicious Telegram process enumerating all network users in a local group. This technique was seen in a Monero infected honeypot to mapped all the users on the compromised system. EventCode 4798 is generated when a process enumerates a user's security-enabled local groups on a computer or device.", + "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4798 Process_Name = \"*\\\\telegram.exe\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName EventCode Process_Name Process_ID Account_Name Account_Domain Logon_ID Security_ID Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `enumerate_users_local_group_using_telegram_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Task Schedule (Exa. Security Log EventCode 4798) endpoints. Tune and filter known instances of process like logonUI used in your environment.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4798" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Enumerate Users Local Group Using Telegram", + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/minergate/windows-security.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "The Telegram application has been identified enumerating local groups on $ComputerName$ by $user$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1087" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "ComputerName", + "EventCode", + "Process_Name", + "Process_ID", + "Account_Name", + "Account_Domain", + "Logon_ID", + "Security_ID", + "Message" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Discovery" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1087" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ComputerName", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "ComputerName", + "risk_score": 80 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1087" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Enumerate Users Local Group Using Telegram Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Enumerate Users Local Group Using Telegram", + "file": "endpoint/enumerate_users_local_group_using_telegram.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-security.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/minergate/windows-security.log", + "source": "WinEventLog:Security", + "sourcetype": "WinEventLog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "wineventlog_security", + "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "enumerate_users_local_group_using_telegram_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/enumerate_users_local_group_using_telegram.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Excessive Attempt To Disable Services", + "id": "8fa2a0f0-acd9-11eb-8994-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-04", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic will identify suspicious series of command-line to disable several services. This technique is seen where the adversary attempts to disable security app services or other malware services to complete the objective on the compromised system.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"sc.exe\" AND Processes.process=\"*config*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Disabled*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=1m | where count >=5 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_attempt_to_disable_services_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed sc.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Excessive Attempt To Disable Services", + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An excessive amount of $process_name$ was executed on $dest$ attempting to disable services.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1489" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1489", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Indrik Spider", + "Lazarus Group", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1489" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1489" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Excessive Attempt To Disable Services Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Excessive Attempt To Disable Services", + "file": "endpoint/excessive_attempt_to_disable_services.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "excessive_attempt_to_disable_services_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excessive_attempt_to_disable_services.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Excessive Service Stop Attempt", + "id": "ae8d3f4a-acd7-11eb-8846-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-05-04", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies suspicious series of attempt to kill multiple services on a system using either `net.exe` or `sc.exe`. This technique is use by adversaries to terminate security services or other related services to continue there objective and evade detections.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` OR Processes.process_name = \"sc.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"net1.exe\" AND Processes.process=\"*stop*\" OR Processes.process=\"*delete*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=1m | where count >=5 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_service_stop_attempt_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Excessive Service Stop Attempt", + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An excessive amount of $process_name$ was executed on $dest$ attempting to disable services.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1489" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1489", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "Indrik Spider", + "Lazarus Group", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1489" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig", + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1489" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Excessive Service Stop Attempt Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Excessive Service Stop Attempt", + "file": "endpoint/excessive_service_stop_attempt.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_net", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "excessive_service_stop_attempt_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excessive_service_stop_attempt.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Excessive Usage Of Cacls App", + "id": "0bdf6092-af17-11eb-939a-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-07", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies excessive usage of `cacls.exe`, `xcacls.exe` or `icacls.exe` application to change file or folder permission. This behavior is commonly seen where the adversary attempts to impair some users from deleting or accessing its malware components or artifact from the compromised system.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id values(Processes.process_name) as process_name count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"cacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"icacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"XCACLS.exe\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=1m | where count >=10 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_cacls_app_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators or administrative scripts may use this application. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Excessive Usage Of Cacls App", + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "An excessive amount of $process_name$ was executed on $dest$ attempting to modify permissions.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1222" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1222", + "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1222" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Child Process" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 80 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1222" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Excessive Usage Of Cacls App Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Excessive Usage Of Cacls App", + "file": "endpoint/excessive_usage_of_cacls_app.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "excessive_usage_of_cacls_app_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_cacls_app.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Excessive Usage Of Net App", + "id": "45e52536-ae42-11eb-b5c6-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-05-06", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies excessive usage of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` within a bucket of time (1 minute). This behavior was seen in a Monero incident where the adversary attempts to create many users, delete and disable users as part of its malicious behavior.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=1m | where count >=10 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_net_app_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "unknown. Filter as needed. Modify the time span as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Excessive Usage Of Net App", + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Scope:Local", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 40, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Excessive usage of net1.exe or net.exe within 1m, with command line $process$ has been detected on $dest$ by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1531" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 28, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1531", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Impact" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1531" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig", + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_name", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Scope:Local", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 40, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 28 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 28 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1531" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Excessive Usage Of Net App Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Excessive Usage Of Net App", + "file": "endpoint/excessive_usage_of_net_app.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_net", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "excessive_usage_of_net_app_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_net_app.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Excessive Usage Of Taskkill", + "id": "fe5bca48-accb-11eb-a67c-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-04", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "Anomaly", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies excessive usage of `taskkill.exe` application. This application is commonly used by adversaries to evade detections by killing security product processes or even other processes to evade detection.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"taskkill.exe\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=1m | where count >=10 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_taskkill_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed taskkill.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Excessive Usage Of Taskkill", + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 40, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Excessive usage of taskkill.exe with process id $process_id$ (more than 10 within 1m) has been detected on $dest$ with a parent process of $parent_process_name$.", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Parent Process", + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 28, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", + "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "Anomaly", + "product": "ESCU" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "parent_process_name", + "type": "Process Name", + "role": [ + "Parent Process", + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 40, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 28 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 28 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", + "threat_object_type": "process name" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Excessive Usage Of Taskkill Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Excessive Usage Of Taskkill", + "file": "endpoint/excessive_usage_of_taskkill.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "excessive_usage_of_taskkill_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_taskkill.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", + "id": "a7e3f0f0-ae42-11eb-b245-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-06", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic will identify suspicious executable or scripts (known file extensions) in list of suspicious file path in Windows. This technique is used by adversaries to evade detection. The suspicious file path are known paths used in the wild and are not common to have executable or scripts.", + "search": "|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_name = *.exe OR Filesystem.file_name = *.dll OR Filesystem.file_name = *.sys OR Filesystem.file_name = *.com OR Filesystem.file_name = *.vbs OR Filesystem.file_name = *.vbe OR Filesystem.file_name = *.js OR Filesystem.file_name = *.ps1 OR Filesystem.file_name = *.bat OR Filesystem.file_name = *.cmd OR Filesystem.file_name = *.pif) AND ( Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\windows\\\\fonts\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\windows\\\\temp\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\users\\\\public\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\windows\\\\debug\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Users\\\\Administrator\\\\Music\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Windows\\\\servicing\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Users\\\\Default\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *Recycle.bin* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Windows\\\\Media\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Windows\\\\repair\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Temp* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\PerfLogs\\\\*) by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may allow creation of script or exe in the paths specified. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig", + "Remcos", + "WhisperGate", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious executable or scripts with file name $file_name$, $file_path$ and process_id $process_id$ executed in suspicious file path in Windows by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1036" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_id", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_name", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Other", + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Filesystem.file_path", + "Filesystem.file_create_time", + "Filesystem.process_id", + "Filesystem.file_name", + "Filesystem.user" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT28", + "APT29", + "APT32", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "Dragonfly 2.0", + "Nomadic Octopus", + "OilRig", + "PLATINUM", + "TA551", + "Windshift", + "ZIRCONIUM", + "menuPass" + ] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig", + "Remcos", + "WhisperGate", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_id", + "type": "Process", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + }, + { + "name": "file_name", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Other", + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "process_id", + "threat_object_type": "process" + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "file_name", + "threat_object_type": "file name" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1036" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", + "file": "endpoint/executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen", + "id": "834ba832-ad89-11eb-937d-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2022-01-28", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies a suspicious registry modification to hide a user account on the Windows Login screen. This technique was seen in some tradecraft where the adversary will create a hidden user account with Admin privileges in login screen to avoid noticing by the user that they already compromise and to persist on that said machine.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\SpecialAccounts\\\\Userlist*\" AND Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000000\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `hide_user_account_from_sign_in_screen_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as CarbonBlack or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen", + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/hotkey_disabled_hidden_user/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious registry modification ($registry_value_name$) which is used go hide a user account on the Windows Login screen detected on $dest$ executed by $user$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "registry_value_name", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Registry.registry_key_name", + "Registry.registry_path", + "Registry.registry_value_name", + "Registry.dest Registry.user" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "registry_value_name", + "type": "Other", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 72 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 72 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "registry_value_name", + "threat_object_type": "other" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen", + "file": "endpoint/hide_user_account_from_sign_in_screen.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/hotkey_disabled_hidden_user/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "hide_user_account_from_sign_in_screen_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/hide_user_account_from_sign_in_screen.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Icacls Deny Command", + "id": "cf8d753e-a8fe-11eb-8f58-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-29", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies a potential adversary that changes the security permission of a specific file or directory. This technique is commonly seen in APT tradecraft or coinminer scripts. This behavior is meant to evade detection and prevent access to their component files.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"icacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"cacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"xcacls.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*/deny*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `icacls_deny_command_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed icacls.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown. It is possible some administrative scripts use ICacls. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Icacls Deny Command", + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 90, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Process name $process_name$ with deny argument executed by $user$ to change security permission of a specific file or directory on host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1222" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process" + ], + "risk_score": 72, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1222", + "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1222" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 90, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 72 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 72 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1222" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Icacls Deny Command Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Icacls Deny Command", + "file": "endpoint/icacls_deny_command.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "icacls_deny_command_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/icacls_deny_command.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "ICACLS Grant Command", + "id": "b1b1e316-accc-11eb-a9b4-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-04", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies potential adversaries that modify the security permission of a specific file or directory. This technique is commonly seen in APT tradecraft and coinminer scripts to evade detections and restrict access to their component files.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"icacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"cacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"xcacls.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*/grant*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `icacls_grant_command_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed icacls.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "ICACLS Grant Command", + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig", + "Ransomware" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 70, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Process name $process_name$ with grant argument executed by $user$ to change security permission of a specific file or directory on host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1222" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process" + ], + "risk_score": 49, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1222", + "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1222" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig", + "Ransomware" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 70 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 49 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 49 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1222" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "ICACLS Grant Command Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "ICACLS Grant Command", + "file": "endpoint/icacls_grant_command.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "icacls_grant_command_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/icacls_grant_command.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Modify ACL permission To Files Or Folder", + "id": "7e8458cc-acca-11eb-9e3f-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-04", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies suspicious modification of ACL permission to a files or folder to make it available to everyone. This technique may be used by the adversary to evade ACLs or protected files access. This changes is commonly configured by the file or directory owner with appropriate permission. This behavior is a good indicator if this command seen on a machine utilized by an account with no permission to do so.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"cacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"icacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"xcacls.exe\" AND (Processes.process = \"*/G everyone:*\" OR Processes.process = \"*/G SYSTEM:*\") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `modify_acl_permission_to_files_or_folder_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed cacls.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "administrators may use this command. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Modify ACL permission To Files Or Folder", + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 40, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious ACL permission modification on $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1222" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 32, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1222", + "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1222" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 40, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 32 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1222" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Modify ACL permission To Files Or Folder Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Modify ACL permission To Files Or Folder", + "file": "endpoint/modify_acl_permission_to_files_or_folder.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "modify_acl_permission_to_files_or_folder_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/modify_acl_permission_to_files_or_folder.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Process Kill Base On File Path", + "id": "5ffaa42c-acdb-11eb-9ad3-acde48001122", + "version": 2, + "date": "2021-05-04", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of `wmic.exe` using `delete` to remove a executable path. This is typically ran via a batch file during beginning stages of an adversary setting up for mining on an endpoint.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` AND Processes.process=\"*process*\" AND Processes.process=\"*executablepath*\" AND Processes.process=\"*delete*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `process_kill_base_on_file_path_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", + "known_false_positives": "Unknown.", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Process Kill Base On File Path", + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A process $process_name$ attempt to kill process by its file path using commandline $process$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.original_file_name", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.parent_process_path", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.parent_process_id" + ], + "risk_score": 56, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT29", + "BRONZE BUTLER", + "FIN6", + "Gamaredon Group", + "Gorgon Group", + "Indrik Spider", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "MuddyWater", + "Night Dragon", + "Putter Panda", + "Rocke", + "TeamTNT", + "Turla", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 56 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 56 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1562.001", + "T1562" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Process Kill Base On File Path Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Process Kill Base On File Path", + "file": "endpoint/process_kill_base_on_file_path.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "process_wmic", + "definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", + "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "process_kill_base_on_file_path_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/process_kill_base_on_file_path.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Schtasks Run Task On Demand", + "id": "bb37061e-af1f-11eb-a159-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-07", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies an on demand run of a Windows Schedule Task through shell or command-line. This technique has been used by adversaries that force to run their created Schedule Task as their persistence mechanism or for lateral movement as part of their malicious attack to the compromised machine.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"schtasks.exe\" Processes.process = \"*/run*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schtasks_run_task_on_demand_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed schtasks.exe may be used.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may use to debug Schedule Task entries. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Schtasks Run Task On Demand", + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 80, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 60, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A \"on demand\" execution of schedule task process $process_name$ using commandline $process$ in host $dest$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1053" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.process_id", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 48, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Execution", + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "user", + "type": "User", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution" + ], + "impact": 60, + "confidence": 80 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 48 + }, + { + "risk_object_type": "user", + "risk_object_field": "user", + "risk_score": 48 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1053" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Schtasks Run Task On Demand Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Schtasks Run Task On Demand", + "file": "endpoint/schtasks_run_task_on_demand.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "schtasks_run_task_on_demand_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/schtasks_run_task_on_demand.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Driver Loaded Path", + "id": "f880acd4-a8f1-11eb-a53b-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-29", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic will detect suspicious driver loaded paths. This technique is commonly used by malicious software like coin miners (xmrig) to register its malicious driver from notable directories where executable or drivers do not commonly exist. During triage, validate this driver is for legitimate business use. Review the metadata and certificate information. Unsigned drivers from non-standard paths is not normal, but occurs. In addition, review driver loads into `ntoskrnl.exe` for possible other drivers of interest. Long tail analyze drivers by path (outside of default, and in default) for further review.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=6 ImageLoaded = \"*.sys\" NOT (ImageLoaded IN(\"*\\\\WINDOWS\\\\inf\",\"*\\\\WINDOWS\\\\System32\\\\drivers\\\\*\", \"*\\\\WINDOWS\\\\System32\\\\DriverStore\\\\FileRepository\\\\*\")) | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer ImageLoaded Hashes IMPHASH Signature Signed | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_driver_loaded_path_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the driver loaded and Signature from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives will be present. Some applications do load drivers", + "references": [ + "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/hk/threat-encyclopedia/malware/trojan.ps1.powtran.a/", + "https://redcanary.com/blog/tracking-driver-inventory-to-expose-rootkits/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Driver Loaded Path", + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 90, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicious driver $ImageLoaded$ on $Computer$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1543.003", + "T1543" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ImageLoaded", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Computer", + "ImageLoaded", + "Hashes", + "IMPHASH", + "Signature", + "Signed" + ], + "risk_score": 63, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "medium", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN7", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "PROMETHIUM", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1543.003", + "T1543" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "ImageLoaded", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Defense Evasion" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 90 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 63 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "ImageLoaded", + "threat_object_type": "file name" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1543.003", + "T1543" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Suspicious Driver Loaded Path Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious Driver Loaded Path", + "file": "endpoint/suspicious_driver_loaded_path.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_driver_loaded_path_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_driver_loaded_path.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "Suspicious Process File Path", + "id": "9be25988-ad82-11eb-a14f-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-05-05", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "The following analytic will detect a suspicious process running in a file path where a process is not commonly seen and is most commonly used by malicious software. This behavior has been used by adversaries where they drop and run an exe in a path that is accessible without admin privileges.", + "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\windows\\\\fonts\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\windows\\\\temp\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\users\\\\public\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\windows\\\\debug\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path.file_path = \"*\\\\Users\\\\Administrator\\\\Music\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path.file_path = \"*\\\\Windows\\\\servicing\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path.file_path = \"*\\\\Users\\\\Default\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path.file_path = \"*Recycle.bin*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Media\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"\\\\Windows\\\\repair\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\PerfLogs\\\\*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_path Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_process_file_path_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", + "known_false_positives": "Administrators may allow execution of specific binaries in non-standard paths. Filter as needed.", + "references": [ + "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/hk/threat-encyclopedia/malware/trojan.ps1.powtran.a/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "Suspicious Process File Path", + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig", + "Remcos", + "WhisperGate", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "automated_detection_testing": "passed", + "confidence": 50, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 70, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "Suspicioues process $Processes.process_path.file_path$ running from suspicious location", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1543" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Processes.process_path.file_path", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Processes.process_name", + "Processes.process", + "Processes.parent_process_name", + "Processes.parent_process", + "Processes.process_path", + "Processes.dest", + "Processes.user" + ], + "risk_score": 35, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "low", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1543" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig", + "Remcos", + "WhisperGate", + "Hermetic Wiper" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "dest", + "type": "Endpoint", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + }, + { + "name": "Processes.process_path.file_path", + "type": "File Name", + "role": [ + "Attacker" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Execution", + "Stage:Initial Access" + ], + "impact": 70, + "confidence": 50 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "dest", + "risk_score": 35 + }, + { + "threat_object_field": "Processes.process_path.file_path", + "threat_object_type": "file name" + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1543" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "Suspicious Process File Path Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "Suspicious Process File Path", + "file": "endpoint/suspicious_process_file_path.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "security_content_summariesonly", + "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", + "description": "search data model's summaries only" + }, + { + "name": "suspicious_process_file_path_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_process_file_path.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + }, + { + "name": "XMRIG Driver Loaded", + "id": "90080fa6-a8df-11eb-91e4-acde48001122", + "version": 1, + "date": "2021-04-29", + "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", + "type": "TTP", + "datamodel": [ + "Endpoint" + ], + "description": "This analytic identifies XMRIG coinminer driver installation on the system. The XMRIG driver name by default is `WinRing0x64.sys`. This cpu miner is an open source project that is commonly abused by adversaries to infect and mine bitcoin.", + "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=6 Signature=\"Noriyuki MIYAZAKI\" OR ImageLoaded= \"*\\\\WinRing0x64.sys\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer ImageLoaded Hashes IMPHASH Signature Signed | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `xmrig_driver_loaded_filter`", + "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the driver loaded and Signature from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", + "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited.", + "references": [ + "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/hk/threat-encyclopedia/malware/trojan.ps1.powtran.a/" + ], + "tags": { + "name": "XMRIG Driver Loaded", + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig" + ], + "asset_type": "Endpoint", + "confidence": 100, + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "dataset": [ + "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" + ], + "impact": 80, + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "message": "A driver $ImageLoaded$ related to xmrig crytominer loaded in host $Computer$", + "mitre_attack_id": [ + "T1543.003", + "T1543" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "product": [ + "Splunk Enterprise", + "Splunk Enterprise Security", + "Splunk Cloud" + ], + "required_fields": [ + "_time", + "Computer", + "ImageLoaded", + "Hashes", + "IMPHASH", + "Signature", + "Signed" + ], + "risk_score": 80, + "security_domain": "endpoint", + "risk_severity": "high", + "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [ + "APT19", + "APT3", + "APT32", + "APT38", + "APT41", + "Blue Mockingbird", + "Carbanak", + "Cobalt Group", + "DarkVishnya", + "FIN7", + "Honeybee", + "Ke3chang", + "Kimsuky", + "Lazarus Group", + "PROMETHIUM", + "TeamTNT", + "Threat Group-3390", + "Tropic Trooper", + "Wizard Spider" + ] + }, + { + "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", + "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", + "mitre_attack_tactics": [ + "Persistence", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "mitre_attack_groups": [] + } + ] + }, + "deprecated": false, + "experimental": false, + "deployment": { + "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", + "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", + "date": "2021-12-21", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", + "scheduling": { + "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", + "earliest_time": "-70m@m", + "latest_time": "-10m@m", + "schedule_window": "auto" + }, + "notable": { + "rule_description": "%description%", + "rule_title": "%name%", + "nes_fields": [] + }, + "rba": { + "enabled": "true" + }, + "tags": { + "type": "TTP" + } + }, + "annotations": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1543.003", + "T1543" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ], + "analytic_story": [ + "XMRig" + ], + "observable": [ + { + "name": "Computer", + "type": "Hostname", + "role": [ + "Victim" + ] + } + ], + "context": [ + "Source:Endpoint", + "Stage:Privilege Escalation" + ], + "impact": 80, + "confidence": 100 + }, + "risk": [ + { + "risk_object_type": "system", + "risk_object_field": "Computer", + "risk_score": 80 + } + ], + "playbooks": [], + "baselines": [], + "mappings": { + "mitre_attack": [ + "T1543.003", + "T1543" + ], + "kill_chain_phases": [ + "Exploitation" + ] + }, + "test": { + "name": "XMRIG Driver Loaded Unit Test", + "tests": [ + { + "name": "XMRIG Driver Loaded", + "file": "endpoint/xmrig_driver_loaded.yml", + "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", + "earliest_time": "-24h", + "latest_time": "now", + "attack_data": [ + { + "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", + "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log", + "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", + "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "macros": [ + { + "name": "security_content_ctime", + "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", + "description": "convert epoch time to string", + "arguments": [ + "field" + ] + }, + { + "name": "sysmon", + "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", + "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." + }, + { + "name": "xmrig_driver_loaded_filter", + "definition": "search *", + "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." + } + ], + "lookups": [], + "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/xmrig_driver_loaded.yml", + "source": "endpoint" + } + ], + "investigations": [] + } +] \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/dist/escu/default/analyticstories.conf b/dist/escu/default/analyticstories.conf index 01860940b5..6d96180437 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/analyticstories.conf +++ b/dist/escu/default/analyticstories.conf @@ -1,1545 +1,30 @@ ############# # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content -# On Date: 2022-03-03T18:16:55 UTC +# On Date: 2022-03-14T11:11:42 UTC # Author: Splunk Security Research # Contact: research@splunk.com ############# -### STORIES ### - -[analytic_story://AWS Cross Account Activity] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2018-06-04 -version = 1 -references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another AWS account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity. -narrative = Amazon Web Services (AWS) admins manage access to AWS resources and services across the enterprise using AWS's Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage AWS users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as EC2 instances, the AWS Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\ -Herein lies the rub. In between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\ -This Analytic Story includes searches that will help you monitor your AWS CloudTrail logs for evidence of suspicious cross-account activity. For example, while accessing multiple AWS accounts and roles may be perfectly valid behavior, it may be suspicious when an account requests privileges of an account it has not accessed in the past. After identifying suspicious activities, you can use the provided investigative searches to help you probe more deeply. - -[analytic_story://AWS IAM Privilege Escalation] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2021-03-08 -version = 1 -references = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/", "https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/the-cloud-shadow-admin-threat-10-permissions-to-protect", "https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources - Rule", "ESCU - AWS CreateAccessKey - Rule", "ESCU - AWS CreateLoginProfile - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM Delete Policy - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM Failure Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS UpdateLoginProfile - Rule"] -description = This analytic story contains detections that query your AWS Cloudtrail for activities related to privilege escalation. -narrative = Amazon Web Services provides a neat feature called Identity and Access Management (IAM) that enables organizations to manage various AWS services and resources in a secure way. All IAM users have roles, groups and policies associated with them which governs and sets permissions to allow a user to access specific restrictions.\ -However, if these IAM policies are misconfigured and have specific combinations of weak permissions; it can allow attackers to escalate their privileges and further compromise the organization. Rhino Security Labs have published comprehensive blogs detailing various AWS Escalation methods. By using this as an inspiration, Splunk’s research team wants to highlight how these attack vectors look in AWS Cloudtrail logs and provide you with detection queries to uncover these potentially malicious events via this Analytic Story. \ - -[analytic_story://AWS Network ACL Activity] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2018-05-21 -version = 2 -references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/UserGuide/VPC_Appendix_NACLs.html", "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-help-prepare-for-ddos-attacks-by-reducing-your-attack-surface/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Lambda UpdateFunctionCode - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"] -description = Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it. -narrative = AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and operational/risk auditing of your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Management Console, AWS Command Line Interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your servers are not vulnerable to attacks. This analytic story contains detection searches that leverage CloudTrail logs from AWS to check for bad configurations and malicious activity in your AWS network access controls. - -[analytic_story://AWS Security Hub Alerts] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2020-08-04 -version = 1 -references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/security-hub/features/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task"] -description = This story is focused around detecting Security Hub alerts generated from AWS -narrative = AWS Security Hub collects and consolidates findings from AWS security services enabled in your environment, such as intrusion detection findings from Amazon GuardDuty, vulnerability scans from Amazon Inspector, S3 bucket policy findings from Amazon Macie, publicly accessible and cross-account resources from IAM Access Analyzer, and resources lacking WAF coverage from AWS Firewall Manager. - -[analytic_story://AWS User Monitoring] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2018-03-12 -version = 1 -references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - AWS Excessive Security Scanning - Rule", "ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"] -description = Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment. -narrative = It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it's all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable to attack. In fact, this was the very oversight that led to Tesla's cryptojacking attack in February, 2018.\ -In addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed for any new EC2 instances and increased bandwidth usage. \ -Fortunately, you can leverage Amazon Web Services (AWS) CloudTrail--a tool that helps you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing of your AWS account--to give you increased visibility into your user and resource activity by recording AWS Management Console actions and API calls. You can identify which users and accounts called AWS, the source IP address from which the calls were made, and when the calls occurred.\ -The detection searches in this Analytic Story are designed to help you uncover AWS API activities from users not listed in the identity table, as well as similar activities from disabled accounts. - -[analytic_story://Active Directory Discovery] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2021-08-20 -version = 1 -references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/", "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2535", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/003/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Mauricio Velazco"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - AdsiSearcher Account Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - DSQuery Domain Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Account Discovery With Net App - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Account Discovery with Dsquery - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Account Discovery with Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Controller Discovery with Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Dsquery - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Net - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Group Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule", "ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery With Net - Rule", "ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery With Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery with PowerView - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUser with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainPolicy with Powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get WMIObject Group Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Get WMIObject Group Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetAdComputer with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetAdComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetAdGroup with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetAdGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetCurrent User with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetCurrent User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetDomainController with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetDomainController with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetDomainGroup with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetDomainGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetLocalUser with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Local Account Discovery With Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - Local Account Discovery with Net - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Arp - Rule", "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Net - Rule", "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule", "ESCU - Network Discovery Using Route Windows App - Rule", "ESCU - Password Policy Discovery with Net - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Get LocalGroup Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Get LocalGroup Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule", "ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Dsquery - Rule", "ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Net - Rule", "ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN - Rule", "ESCU - System User Discovery With Query - Rule", "ESCU - System User Discovery With Whoami - Rule", "ESCU - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Wmic Group Discovery - Rule"] -description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Discovery and Reconnaissance within with Active Directory environments. -narrative = Discovery consists of techniques an adversay uses to gain knowledge about an internal environment or network. These techniques provide adversaries with situational awareness and allows them to have the necessary information before deciding how to act or who/what to target next.\ -Once an attacker obtains an initial foothold in an Active Directory environment, she is forced to engage in Discovery techniques in the initial phases of a breach to better understand and navigate the target network. Some examples include but are not limited to enumerating domain users, domain admins, computers, domain controllers, network shares, group policy objects, domain trusts, etc. - -[analytic_story://Active Directory Kerberos Attacks] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2022-02-02 -version = 1 -references = ["https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kerberos_(protocol)", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-kile/2a32282e-dd48-4ad9-a542-609804b02cc9", "https://m0chan.github.io/2019/07/31/How-To-Attack-Kerberos-101.html", "https://stealthbits.com/blog/cracking-active-directory-passwords-with-as-rep-roasting/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/004/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Mauricio Velazco"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser - Rule", "ESCU - Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With PowerView - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled in UserAccountControl - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Rubeus Command Line Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access - Rule", "ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN - Rule", "ESCU - Unusual Number of Kerberos Service Tickets Requested - Rule"] -description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Kerberos based attacks within with Active Directory environments. -narrative = Kerberos, initially named after Cerberus, the three-headed dog in Greek mythology, is a network authentication protocol that allows computers and users to prove their identity through a trusted third-party. This trusted third-party issues Kerberos tickets using symmetric encryption to allow users access to services and network resources based on their privilege level. Kerberos is the default authentication protocol used on Windows Active Directory networks since the introduction of Windows Server 2003. With Kerberos being the backbone of Windows authentication, it is commonly abused by adversaries across the different phases of a breach including initial access, privilege escalation, defense evasion, credential access, lateral movement, etc.\ This Analytic Story groups detection use cases in which the Kerberos protocol is abused. Defenders can leverage these analytics to detect and hunt for adversaries engaging in Kerberos based attacks. - -[analytic_story://Active Directory Lateral Movement] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2021-12-09 -version = 3 -references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/08/malware_lateral_move.html", "http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=videos/derbycon7/t405-hunting-lateral-movement-for-fun-and-profit-mauricio-velazco"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Mauricio Velazco Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ESCU - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule", "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name - Rule", "ESCU - Randomly Generated Windows Service Name - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and Winrs - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Short Lived Scheduled Task - Rule", "ESCU - Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested - Rule", "ESCU - Unusual Number of Remote Endpoint Authentication Events - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Created With Suspicious Service Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Creation on Remote Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Wmiprsve LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Wsmprovhost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"] -description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how attackers move laterally within an Active Directory environment. Since lateral movement is often a necessary step in a breach, it is important for cyber defenders to deploy detection coverage. /n**SOAR:** The following Splunk SOAR playbooks can be used in the response to this story's analytics: 'Delete Detected Files' -narrative = Once attackers gain a foothold within an enterprise, they will seek to expand their accesses and leverage techniques that facilitate lateral movement. Attackers will often spend quite a bit of time and effort moving laterally. Because lateral movement renders an attacker the most vulnerable to detection, it's an excellent focus for detection and investigation.\ -Indications of lateral movement in an Active Directory network can include the abuse of system utilities (such as `psexec.exe`), unauthorized use of remote desktop services, `file/admin$` shares, WMI, PowerShell, Service Control Manager, the DCOM protocol, WinRM or the abuse of scheduled tasks. Organizations must be extra vigilant in detecting lateral movement techniques and look for suspicious activity in and around high-value strategic network assets, such as Active Directory, which are often considered the primary target or "crown jewels" to a persistent threat actor.\ -An adversary can use lateral movement for multiple purposes, including remote execution of tools, pivoting to additional systems, obtaining access to specific information or files, access to additional credentials, exfiltrating data, or delivering a secondary effect. Adversaries may use legitimate credentials alongside inherent network and operating-system functionality to remotely connect to other systems and remain under the radar of network defenders.\ -If there is evidence of lateral movement, it is imperative for analysts to collect evidence of the associated offending hosts. For example, an attacker might leverage host A to gain access to host B. From there, the attacker may try to move laterally to host C. In this example, the analyst should gather as much information as possible from all three hosts. \ - It is also important to collect authentication logs for each host, to ensure that the offending accounts are well-documented. Analysts should account for all processes to ensure that the attackers did not install unauthorized software. - -[analytic_story://Active Directory Password Spraying] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2021-04-07 -version = 1 -references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/23/protecting-organization-password-spray-attacks/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/dn452415(v=ws.11)"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Mauricio Velazco"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Multiple Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Users Attempting To Authenticate Using Explicit Credentials - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Process - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Users Remotely Failing To Authenticate From Host - Rule"] -description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Password Spraying attacks within Active Directory environments. -narrative = In a password spraying attack, adversaries leverage one or a small list of commonly used / popular passwords against a large volume of usernames to acquire valid account credentials. Unlike a Brute Force attack that targets a specific user or small group of users with a large number of passwords, password spraying follows the opposite aproach and increases the chances of obtaining valid credentials while avoiding account lockouts. This allows adversaries to remain undetected if the target organization does not have the proper monitoring and detection controls in place.\ -Password Spraying can be leveraged by adversaries across different stages in an attack. It can be used to obtain an iniial access to an environment but can also be used to escalate privileges when access has been already achieved. In some scenarios, this technique capitalizes on a security policy most organizations implement, password rotation. As enterprise users change their passwords, it is possible some pick predictable, seasonal passwords such as `$CompanyNameWinter`, `Summer2021`, etc.\ -Specifically, this Analytic Story is focused on detecting possible Password Spraying attacks against Active Directory environments leveraging Windows Event Logs in the `Account Logon` and `Logon/Logoff` Advanced Audit Policy categories. It presents 9 detection analytics which can aid defenders in identifyng instances where one source user, source host or source process attempts to authenticate against a target or targets using a high, unsual, number of unique users. A user, host or process attempting to authenticate with multiple users is not common behavior for legitimate systems and should be monitored by security teams. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, remote administration tools, multi-user systems and missconfigured systems. These should be easily spotted when first implementing the detection and addded to an allow list or lookup table. The presented detections can also be used in Threat Hunting exercises. - -[analytic_story://Apache Struts Vulnerability] -category = Vulnerability -last_updated = 2018-12-06 -version = 1 -references = ["https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/blob/v3.2/dev/rules/REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA.conf"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule", "ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task"] -description = Detect and investigate activities--such as unusually long `Content-Type` length, suspicious java classes and web servers executing suspicious processes--consistent with attempts to exploit Apache Struts vulnerabilities. -narrative = In March of 2017, a remote code-execution vulnerability in the Jakarta Multipart parser in Apache Struts, a widely used open-source framework for creating Java web applications, was disclosed and assigned to CVE-2017-5638. About two months later, hackers exploited the flaw to carry out the world's 5th largest data breach. The target, credit giant Equifax, told investigators that it had become aware of the vulnerability two months before the attack. \ -The exploit involved manipulating the `Content-Type HTTP` header to execute commands embedded in the header.\ -This Analytic Story contains two different searches that help to identify activity that may be related to this issue. The first search looks for characteristics of the `Content-Type` header consistent with attempts to exploit the vulnerability. This should be a relatively pertinent indicator, as the `Content-Type` header is generally consistent and does not have a large degree of variation.\ -The second search looks for the execution of various commands typically entered on the command shell when an attacker first lands on a system. These commands are not generally executed on web servers during the course of day-to-day operation, but they may be used when the system is undergoing maintenance or troubleshooting.\ -First, it is helpful is to understand how often the notable event is generated, as well as the commonalities in some of these events. This may help determine whether this is a common occurrence that is of a lesser concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. It can also help to understand whether the issue is restricted to a single user or system or is broader in scope.\ -When looking at the target of the behavior illustrated by the event, you should note the sensitivity of the user and or/system to help determine the potential impact. It is also helpful to see what other events involving the target have occurred in the recent past. This can help tie different events together and give further situational awareness regarding the target.\ -Various types of information for external systems should be reviewed and (potentially) collected if the incident is, indeed, judged to be malicious. Information like this can be useful in generating your own threat intelligence to create alerts in the future.\ -Looking at the country, responsible party, and fully qualified domain names associated with the external IP address--as well as the registration information associated with those domain names, if they are frequently visited by others--can help you answer the question of "who," in regard to the external system. Answering that can help qualify the event and may serve useful for tracking. In addition, there are various sources that can provide some reputation information on the IP address or domain name, which can assist in determining if the event is malicious in nature. Finally, determining whether or not there are other events associated with the IP address may help connect some dots or show other events that should be brought into scope.\ -Gathering various data elements on the system of interest can sometimes help quickly determine that something suspicious may be happening. Some of these items include determining who else may have recently logged into the system, whether any unusual scheduled tasks exist, whether the system is communicating on suspicious ports, whether there are modifications to sensitive registry keys, and whether there are any known vulnerabilities on the system. This information can often highlight other activity commonly seen in attack scenarios or give more information about how the system may have been targeted.\ -hen a specific service or application is targeted, it is often helpful to know the associated version to help determine whether or not it is vulnerable to a specific exploit.\ -hen it is suspected there is an attack targeting a web server, it is helpful to look at some of the behavior of the web service to see if there is evidence that the service has been compromised. Some indications of this might be network connections to external resources, the web service spawning child processes that are not associated with typical behavior, and whether the service wrote any files that might be malicious in nature.\ -In the event that a suspicious file is found, we can review more information about it to help determine if it is, in fact, malicious. Identifying the file type, any processes that have the file open, what processes created and/or modified the file, and the number of systems that may have this file can help to determine if the file is malicious. Also, determining the file hash and checking it against reputation sources, such as VirusTotal, can sometimes quickly help determine whether it is malicious in nature.\ -Often, a simple inspection of a suspect process name and path can tell you if the system has been compromised. For example, if `svchost.exe` is found running from a location other than `C:\Windows\System32`, it is likely something malicious designed to hide in plain sight when simply reviewing process names. Similarly, if the process itself seems legitimate, but the parent process is running from the temporary browser cache, there may be activity initiated via a compromised website the user visited.\ -It can also be very helpful to examine various behaviors of the process of interest or the parent of the process that is of interest. For example, if it turns out that the process of interest is malicious, it would be good to see if the parent to that process spawned other processes that might also be worth further scrutiny. If a process is suspect, reviewing the network connections made around the time of the event and/or if the process spawned any child processes could be helpful in determining whether it is malicious or executing a malicious script. - -[analytic_story://Asset Tracking] -category = Best Practices -last_updated = 2017-09-13 -version = 1 -references = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/inventory-of-authorized-and-unauthorized-devices/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -description = Keep a careful inventory of every asset on your network to make it easier to detect rogue devices. Unauthorized/unmanaged devices could be an indication of malicious behavior that should be investigated further. -narrative = This Analytic Story is designed to help you develop a better understanding of what authorized and unauthorized devices are part of your enterprise. This story can help you better categorize and classify assets, providing critical business context and awareness of their assets during an incident. Information derived from this Analytic Story can be used to better inform and support other analytic stories. For successful detection, you will need to leverage the Assets and Identity Framework from Enterprise Security to populate your known assets. - -[analytic_story://BITS Jobs] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2021-03-26 -version = 1 -references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1197/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/bits/bitsadmin-tool"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - BITS Job Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer - Rule"] -description = Adversaries may abuse BITS jobs to persistently execute or clean up after malicious payloads. -narrative = Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, asynchronous file transfer mechanism exposed through Component Object Model (COM). BITS is commonly used by updaters, messengers, and other applications preferred to operate in the background (using available idle bandwidth) without interrupting other networked applications. File transfer tasks are implemented as BITS jobs, which contain a queue of one or more file operations. The interface to create and manage BITS jobs is accessible through PowerShell and the BITSAdmin tool. Adversaries may abuse BITS to download, execute, and even clean up after running malicious code. BITS tasks are self-contained in the BITS job database, without new files or registry modifications, and often permitted by host firewalls. BITS enabled execution may also enable persistence by creating long-standing jobs (the default maximum lifetime is 90 days and extendable) or invoking an arbitrary program when a job completes or errors (including after system reboots). - -[analytic_story://Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2021-01-27 -version = 1 -references = ["https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Shannon Davis"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery - Rule"] -description = Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2021-3156. Discovered by the Qualys Research Team, this vulnerability has been found to affect sudo across multiple Linux distributions (Ubuntu 20.04 and prior, Debian 10 and prior, Fedora 33 and prior). As this vulnerability was committed to code in July 2011, there will be many distributions affected. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows any unprivileged user to gain root privileges on the vulnerable host. -narrative = A non-privledged user is able to execute the sudoedit command to trigger a buffer overflow. After the successful buffer overflow, they are then able to gain root privileges on the affected host. The conditions needed to be run are a trailing "\" along with shell and edit flags. Monitoring the /var/log directory on Linux hosts using the Splunk Universal Forwarder will allow you to pick up this behavior when using the provided detection. - -[analytic_story://BlackMatter Ransomware] -category = Malware -last_updated = 2021-09-06 -version = 1 -references = ["https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/08/09/blackmatter-ransomware-emerges-from-the-shadow-of-darkside/", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/blackmatter-ransomware-gang-rises-from-the-ashes-of-darkside-revil/", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/ransomware/2021/07/blackmatter-a-new-ransomware-group-claims-link-to-darkside-revil/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Add DefaultUser And Password In Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Bcdedit Command Back To Normal Mode Boot - Rule", "ESCU - Change To Safe Mode With Network Config - Rule", "ESCU - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ESCU - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule"] -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the BlackMatter ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with BlackMatter, force safe mode boot, autadminlogon account registry modification and more. -narrative = BlackMatter ransomware campaigns targeting healthcare and other vertical sectors, involve the use of ransomware payloads along with exfiltration of data per HHS bulletin. Malicious actors demand payment for ransome of data and threaten deletion and exposure of exfiltrated data. - -[analytic_story://Brand Monitoring] -category = Abuse -last_updated = 2017-12-19 -version = 1 -references = ["https://www.zerofox.com/blog/what-is-digital-risk-monitoring/", "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/consumer/family-safety/what-is-typosquatting/", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/06/explained-typosquatting/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"] -description = Detect and investigate activity that may indicate that an adversary is using faux domains to mislead users into interacting with malicious infrastructure. Monitor DNS, email, and web traffic for permutations of your brand name. -narrative = While you can educate your users and customers about the risks and threats posed by typosquatting, phishing, and corporate espionage, human error is a persistent fact of life. Of course, your adversaries are all too aware of this reality and will happily leverage it for nefarious purposes whenever possible3phishing with lookalike addresses, embedding faux command-and-control domains in malware, and hosting malicious content on domains that closely mimic your corporate servers. This is where brand monitoring comes in.\ -You can use our adaptation of `DNSTwist`, together with the support searches in this Analytic Story, to generate permutations of specified brands and external domains. Splunk can monitor email, DNS requests, and web traffic for these permutations and provide you with early warnings and situational awareness--powerful elements of an effective defense.\ -Notable events will include IP addresses, URLs, and user data. Drilling down can provide you with even more actionable intelligence, including likely geographic information, contextual searches to help you scope the problem, and investigative searches. - -[analytic_story://Clop Ransomware] -category = Malware -last_updated = 2021-03-17 -version = 1 -references = ["https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/analyst-note-cl0p-tlp-white.pdf", "https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/115250/data-breach/qualys-clop-ransomware.html", "https://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/qualys-is-the-latest-victim-of-accellion-data-breach/d/d-id/1340323"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Clop Common Exec Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Clop Ransomware Known Service Name - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - High Process Termination Frequency - Rule", "ESCU - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule", "ESCU - Resize ShadowStorage volume - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Windows High File Deletion Frequency - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Created With Suspicious Service Path - Rule"] -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Clop ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Clope, encrypting network shares, deleting and resizing shadow volume storage, registry key modification, deleting of security logs, and more. -narrative = Clop ransomware campaigns targeting healthcare and other vertical sectors, involve the use of ransomware payloads along with exfiltration of data per HHS bulletin. Malicious actors demand payment for ransome of data and threaten deletion and exposure of exfiltrated data. - -[analytic_story://Cloud Cryptomining] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2019-10-02 -version = 1 -references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"] -description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior. -narrative = Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority. \ -Cryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS), Google Cloud Platform (GCP), and Azure. It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN. \ -When malicious miners appropriate a cloud instance, often spinning up hundreds of new instances, the costs can become astronomical for the account holder. So it is critically important to monitor your systems for suspicious activities that could indicate that your network has been infiltrated. \ -This Analytic Story is focused on detecting suspicious new instances in your cloud environment to help prevent cryptominers from gaining a foothold. It contains detection searches that will detect when a previously unused instance type or AMI is used. It also contains support searches to build lookup files to ensure proper execution of the detection searches. - -[analytic_story://Cloud Federated Credential Abuse] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2021-01-26 -version = 1 -references = ["https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal - Rule", "ESCU - AWS SAML Update identity provider - Rule", "ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703 - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule", "ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule"] -description = This analytical story addresses events that indicate abuse of cloud federated credentials. These credentials are usually extracted from endpoint desktop or servers specially those servers that provide federation services such as Windows Active Directory Federation Services. Identity Federation relies on objects such as Oauth2 tokens, cookies or SAML assertions in order to provide seamless access between cloud and perimeter environments. If these objects are either hijacked or forged then attackers will be able to pivot into victim's cloud environements. -narrative = This story is composed of detection searches based on endpoint that addresses the use of Mimikatz, Escalation of Privileges and Abnormal processes that may indicate the extraction of Federated directory objects such as passwords, Oauth2 tokens, certificates and keys. Cloud environment (AWS, Azure) related events are also addressed in specific cloud environment detection searches. - -[analytic_story://Cobalt Strike] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2021-02-16 -version = 1 -references = ["https://www.cobaltstrike.com/", "https://www.infocyte.com/blog/2020/09/02/cobalt-strike-the-new-favorite-among-thieves/", "https://bluescreenofjeff.com/2017-01-24-how-to-write-malleable-c2-profiles-for-cobalt-strike/", "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/09/coverage-strikes-back-cobalt-strike-paper.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/unauthorized-access-of-fireeye-red-team-tools.html", "https://github.com/MichaelKoczwara/Awesome-CobaltStrike-Defence", "https://github.com/zer0yu/Awesome-CobaltStrike"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Anomalous usage of 7zip - Rule", "ESCU - CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", "ESCU - DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ESCU - SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network - Rule", "ESCU - Services Escalate Exe - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule"] -description = Cobalt Strike is threat emulation software. Red teams and penetration testers use Cobalt Strike to demonstrate the risk of a breach and evaluate mature security programs. Most recently, Cobalt Strike has become the choice tool by threat groups due to its ease of use and extensibility. -narrative = This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from Cobalt Strike. Cobalt Strike has many ways to be enhanced by using aggressor scripts, malleable C2 profiles, default attack packages, and much more. For endpoint behavior, Cobalt Strike is most commonly identified via named pipes, spawn to processes, and DLL function names. Many additional variables are provided for in memory operation of the beacon implant. On the network, depending on the malleable C2 profile used, it is near infinite in the amount of ways to conceal the C2 traffic with Cobalt Strike. Not every query may be specific to Cobalt Strike the tool, but the methodologies and techniques used by it.\ -Splunk Threat Research reviewed all publicly available instances of Malleabe C2 Profiles and generated a list of the most commonly used spawnto and pipenames.\ -`Spawnto_x86` and `spawnto_x64` is the process that Cobalt Strike will spawn and injects shellcode into.\ -Pipename sets the named pipe name used in Cobalt Strikes Beacon SMB C2 traffic.\ -With that, new detections were generated focused on these spawnto processes spawning without command line arguments. Similar, the named pipes most commonly used by Cobalt Strike added as a detection. In generating content for Cobalt Strike, the following is considered:\ -- Is it normal for spawnto_ value to have no command line arguments? No command line arguments and a network connection?\ -- What is the default, or normal, process lineage for spawnto_ value?\ -- Does the spawnto_ value make network connections?\ -- Is it normal for spawnto_ value to load jscript, vbscript, Amsi.dll, and clr.dll?\ -While investigating a detection related to this Analytic Story, keep in mind the parent process, process path, and any file modifications that may occur. Tuning may need to occur to remove any false positives. - -[analytic_story://ColdRoot MacOS RAT] -category = Malware -last_updated = 2019-01-09 -version = 1 -references = ["https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/osxcoldroot-and-the-rat-invasion/", "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/coldroot-rat-still-undetectable-despite-being-uploaded-on-github-two-years-ago/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jose Hernandez"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task"] -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that relate to the ColdRoot Remote Access Trojan that affects MacOS. An example of some of these activities are changing sensative binaries in the MacOS sub-system, detecting process names and executables associated with the RAT, detecting when a keyboard tab is installed on a MacOS machine and more. -narrative = Conventional wisdom holds that Apple's MacOS operating system is significantly less vulnerable to attack than Windows machines. While that point is debatable, it is true that attacks against MacOS systems are much less common. However, this fact does not mean that Macs are impervious to breaches. To the contrary, research has shown that that Mac malware is increasing at an alarming rate. According to AV-test, in 2018, there were 86,865 new MacOS malware variants, up from 27,338 the year before—a 31% increase. In contrast, the independent research firm found that new Windows malware had increased from 65.17M to 76.86M during that same period, less than half the rate of growth. The bottom line is that while the numbers look a lot smaller than Windows, it's definitely time to take Mac security more seriously.\ -This Analytic Story addresses the ColdRoot remote access trojan (RAT), which was uploaded to Github in 2016, but was still escaping detection by the first quarter of 2018, when a new, more feature-rich variant was discovered masquerading as an Apple audio driver. Among other capabilities, the Pascal-based ColdRoot can heist passwords from users' keychains and remotely control infected machines without detection. In the initial report of his findings, Patrick Wardle, Chief Research Officer for Digita Security, explained that the new ColdRoot RAT could start and kill processes on the breached system, spawn new remote-desktop sessions, take screen captures and assemble them into a live stream of the victim's desktop, and more.\ -Searches in this Analytic Story leverage the capabilities of OSquery to address ColdRoot detection from several different angles, such as looking for the existence of associated files and processes, and monitoring for signs of an installed keylogger. - -[analytic_story://Collection and Staging] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2020-02-03 -version = 1 -references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Collection", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect Renamed 7-Zip - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed WinRAR - Rule", "ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] -description = Monitor for and investigate activities--such as suspicious writes to the Windows Recycling Bin or email servers sending high amounts of traffic to specific hosts, for example--that may indicate that an adversary is harvesting and exfiltrating sensitive data. -narrative = A common adversary goal is to identify and exfiltrate data of value from a target organization. This data may include email conversations and addresses, confidential company information, links to network design/infrastructure, important dates, and so on.\ - Attacks are composed of three activities: identification, collection, and staging data for exfiltration. Identification typically involves scanning systems and observing user activity. Collection can involve the transfer of large amounts of data from various repositories. Staging/preparation includes moving data to a central location and compressing (and optionally encoding and/or encrypting) it. All of these activities provide opportunities for defenders to identify their presence. \ -Use the searches to detect and monitor suspicious behavior related to these activities. - -[analytic_story://Command and Control] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2018-06-01 -version = 1 -references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Command_and_Control", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Command-and-control-servers-The-puppet-masters-that-govern-malware"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Lambda UpdateFunctionCode - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"] -description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged by attackers to establish and operate command and control channels. Implants installed by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions and send data back to the malicious operators. -narrative = Threat actors typically architect and implement an infrastructure to use in various ways during the course of their attack campaigns. In some cases, they leverage this infrastructure for scanning and performing reconnaissance activities. In others, they may use this infrastructure to launch actual attacks. One of the most important functions of this infrastructure is to establish servers that will communicate with implants on compromised endpoints. These servers establish a command and control channel that is used to proxy data between the compromised endpoint and the attacker. These channels relay commands from the attacker to the compromised endpoint and the output of those commands back to the attacker.\ -Because this communication is so critical for an adversary, they often use techniques designed to hide the true nature of the communications. There are many different techniques used to establish and communicate over these channels. This Analytic Story provides searches that look for a variety of the techniques used for these channels, as well as indications that these channels are active, by examining logs associated with border control devices and network-access control lists. - -[analytic_story://Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2020-02-20 -version = 1 -references = ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - GCP GCR container uploaded - Rule", "ESCU - New container uploaded to AWS ECR - Rule"] -description = Use the searches in this story to monitor your Kubernetes registry repositories for upload, and deployment of potentially vulnerable, backdoor, or implanted containers. These searches provide information on source users, destination path, container names and repository names. The searches provide context to address Mitre T1525 which refers to container implantation upload to a company's repository either in Amazon Elastic Container Registry, Google Container Registry and Azure Container Registry. -narrative = Container Registrys provide a way for organizations to keep customized images of their development and infrastructure environment in private. However if these repositories are misconfigured or priviledge users credentials are compromise, attackers can potentially upload implanted containers which can be deployed across the organization. These searches allow operator to monitor who, when and what was uploaded to container registry. - -[analytic_story://Credential Dumping] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2020-02-04 -version = 3 -references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Copy of ShadowCopy with Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Esentutl SAM Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Extraction of Registry Hives - Rule", "ESCU - Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ESCU - SAM Database File Access Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool - Rule", "ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task"] -description = Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords. The threat actors use these pilfered credentials to further escalate privileges and spread throughout a target environment. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to credential dumping. -narrative = Credential dumping—gathering credentials from a target system, often hashed or encrypted—is a common attack technique. Even though the credentials may not be in plain text, an attacker can still exfiltrate the data and set to cracking it offline, on their own systems. The threat actors target a variety of sources to extract them, including the Security Accounts Manager (SAM), Local Security Authority (LSA), NTDS from Domain Controllers, or the Group Policy Preference (GPP) files.\ -Once attackers obtain valid credentials, they use them to move throughout a target network with ease, discovering new systems and identifying assets of interest. Credentials obtained in this manner typically include those of privileged users, which may provide access to more sensitive information and system operations.\ -The detection searches in this Analytic Story monitor access to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process, the usage of shadowcopies for credential dumping and some other techniques for credential dumping. - -[analytic_story://DHS Report TA18-074A] -category = Malware -last_updated = 2020-01-22 -version = 2 -references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"] -description = Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more. -narrative = The frequency of nation-state cyber attacks has increased significantly over the last decade. Employing numerous tactics and techniques, these attacks continue to escalate in complexity. \ -There is a wide range of motivations for these state-sponsored hacks, including stealing valuable corporate, military, or diplomatic dataѿall of which could confer advantages in various arenas. They may also target critical infrastructure. \ -One joint Technical Alert (TA) issued by the Department of Homeland and the FBI in mid-March of 2018 attributed some cyber activity targeting utility infrastructure to operatives sponsored by the Russian government. The hackers executed spearfishing attacks, installed malware, employed watering-hole domains, and more. While they caused no physical damage, the attacks provoked fears that a nation-state could turn off water, redirect power, or compromise a nuclear power plant.\ -Suspicious activities--spikes in SMB traffic, processes that launch netsh (to modify the network configuration), suspicious registry modifications, and many more--may all be events you may wish to investigate further. While the use of these technique may be an indication that a nation-state actor is attempting to compromise your environment, it is important to note that these techniques are often employed by other groups, as well. - -[analytic_story://DNS Amplification Attacks] -category = Abuse -last_updated = 2016-09-13 -version = 1 -references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-088A", "https://www.imperva.com/learn/application-security/dns-amplification/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -description = DNS poses a serious threat as a Denial of Service (DOS) amplifier, if it responds to `ANY` queries. This Analytic Story can help you detect attackers who may be abusing your company's DNS infrastructure to launch amplification attacks, causing Denial of Service to other victims. -narrative = The Domain Name System (DNS) is the protocol used to map domain names to IP addresses. It has been proven to work very well for its intended function. However if DNS is misconfigured, servers can be abused by attackers to levy amplification or redirection attacks against victims. Because DNS responses to `ANY` queries are so much larger than the queries themselves--and can be made with a UDP packet, which does not require a handshake--attackers can spoof the source address of the packet and cause much more data to be sent to the victim than if they sent the traffic themselves. The `ANY` requests are will be larger than normal DNS server requests, due to the fact that the server provides significant details, such as MX records and associated IP addresses. A large volume of this traffic can result in a DOS on the victim's machine. This misconfiguration leads to two possible victims, the first being the DNS servers participating in an attack and the other being the hosts that are the targets of the DOS attack.\ -The search in this story can help you to detect if attackers are abusing your company's DNS infrastructure to launch DNS amplification attacks causing Denial of Service to other victims. - -[analytic_story://DNS Hijacking] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2020-02-04 -version = 1 -references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task"] -description = Secure your environment against DNS hijacks with searches that help you detect and investigate unauthorized changes to DNS records. -narrative = Dubbed the Achilles heel of the Internet (see https://www.f5.com/labs/articles/threat-intelligence/dns-is-still-the-achilles-heel-of-the-internet-25613), DNS plays a critical role in routing web traffic but is notoriously vulnerable to attack. One reason is its distributed nature. It relies on unstructured connections between millions of clients and servers over inherently insecure protocols.\ -The gravity and extent of the importance of securing DNS from attacks is undeniable. The fallout of compromised DNS can be disastrous. Not only can hackers bring down an entire business, they can intercept confidential information, emails, and login credentials, as well. \ -On January 22, 2019, the US Department of Homeland Security 2019's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) raised awareness of some high-profile DNS hijacking attacks against infrastructure, both in the United States and abroad. It issued Emergency Directive 19-01 (see https://cyber.dhs.gov/ed/19-01/), which summarized the activity and required government agencies to take the following four actions, all within 10 days: \ -1. For all .gov or other agency-managed domains, audit public DNS records on all authoritative and secondary DNS servers, verify that they resolve to the intended location or report them to CISA.\ -1. Update the passwords for all accounts on systems that can make changes to each agency 2019's DNS records.\ -1. Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all accounts on systems that can make changes to each agency's 2019 DNS records or, if impossible, provide CISA with the names of systems, the reasons why MFA cannot be enabled within the required timeline, and an ETA for when it can be enabled.\ -1. CISA will begin regular delivery of newly added certificates to Certificate Transparency (CT) logs for agency domains via the Cyber Hygiene service. Upon receipt, agencies must immediately begin monitoring CT log data for certificates issued that they did not request. If an agency confirms that a certificate was unauthorized, it must report the certificate to the issuing certificate authority and to CISA. Of course, it makes sense to put equivalent actions in place within your environment, as well. \ -In DNS hijacking, the attacker assumes control over an account or makes use of a DNS service exploit to make changes to DNS records. Once they gain access, attackers can substitute their own MX records, name-server records, and addresses, redirecting emails and traffic through their infrastructure, where they can read, copy, or modify information seen. They can also generate valid encryption certificates to help them avoid browser-certificate checks. In one notable attack on the Internet service provider, GoDaddy, the hackers altered Sender Policy Framework (SPF) records a relatively minor change that did not inflict excessive damage but allowed for more effective spam campaigns.\ -The searches in this Analytic Story help you detect and investigate activities that may indicate that DNS hijacking has taken place within your environment. - -[analytic_story://DarkSide Ransomware] -category = Malware -last_updated = 2021-05-12 -version = 1 -references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/the-darkside-of-the-ransomware-pipeline.htmlbig-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule", "ESCU - CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", "ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect RClone Command-Line Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed RClone - Rule", "ESCU - Extraction of Registry Hives - Rule", "ESCU - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule", "ESCU - SLUI RunAs Elevated - Rule", "ESCU - SLUI Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule"] -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the DarkSide Ransomware -narrative = This story addresses Darkside ransomware. This ransomware payload has many similarities to common ransomware however there are certain items particular to it. The creation of a .TXT log that shows every item being encrypted as well as the creation of ransomware notes and files adding a machine ID created based on CRC32 checksum algorithm. This ransomware payload leaves machines in minimal operation level,enough to browse the attackers websites. A customized URI with leaked information is presented to each victim.This is the ransomware payload that shut down the Colonial pipeline. The story is composed of several detection searches covering similar items to other ransomware payloads and those particular to Darkside payload. - -[analytic_story://Data Destruction] -category = Malware -last_updated = 2022-02-14 -version = 1 -references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485/", "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/09/unit42-xbash-combines-botnet-ransomware-coinmining-worm-targets-linux-windows/", "https://www.picussecurity.com/blog/a-brief-history-and-further-technical-analysis-of-sodinokibi-ransomware"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Linux DD File Overwrite - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule", "ESCU - Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule"] -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the data destruction, including deleting files, overwriting files, wiping disk and encrypting files. -narrative = Adversaries may use this technique to maximize the impact on the target organization in operations where network wide availability interruption is the goal. - -[analytic_story://Data Exfiltration] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2020-10-21 -version = 1 -references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Shannon Davis"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration - Rule", "ESCU - Detect shared ec2 snapshot - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule", "ESCU - Gdrive suspicious file sharing - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Mailsniper Invoke functions - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -description = The stealing of data by an adversary. -narrative = Exfiltration comes in many flavors. Adversaries can collect data over encrypted or non-encrypted channels. They can utilise Command and Control channels that are already in place to exfiltrate data. They can use both standard data transfer protocols such as FTP, SCP, etc to exfiltrate data. Or they can use non-standard protocols such as DNS, ICMP, etc with specially crafted fields to try and circumvent security technologies in place. - -[analytic_story://Data Protection] -category = Abuse -last_updated = 2017-09-14 -version = 1 -references = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/data-protection/", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/dns/splunk-detect-dns-tunneling-37022", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"] -description = Fortify your data-protection arsenal--while continuing to ensure data confidentiality and integrity--with searches that monitor for and help you investigate possible signs of data exfiltration. -narrative = Attackers can leverage a variety of resources to compromise or exfiltrate enterprise data. Common exfiltration techniques include remote-access channels via low-risk, high-payoff active-collections operations and close-access operations using insiders and removable media. While this Analytic Story is not a comprehensive listing of all the methods by which attackers can exfiltrate data, it provides a useful starting point. - -[analytic_story://Deobfuscate-Decode Files or Information] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2021-03-24 -version = 1 -references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - CertUtil With Decode Argument - Rule"] -description = Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. -narrative = An example of obfuscated files is `Certutil.exe` usage to encode a portable executable to a certificate file, which is base64 encoded, to hide the originating file. There are many utilities cross-platform to encode using XOR, using compressed .cab files to hide contents and scripting languages that may perform similar native Windows tasks. Triaging an event related will require the capability to review related process events and file modifications. Using a tool such as CyberChef will assist with identifying the encoding that was used, and potentially assist with decoding the contents. - -[analytic_story://Detect Zerologon Attack] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2020-09-18 -version = 1 -references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://github.com/SecuraBV/CVE-2020-1472", "https://www.secura.com/blog/zero-logon", "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Jose Hernandez, Stan Miskowicz, David Dorsey, Shannon Davis Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -description = Uncover activity related to the execution of Zerologon CVE-2020-11472, a technique wherein attackers target a Microsoft Windows Domain Controller to reset its computer account password. The result from this attack is attackers can now provide themselves high privileges and take over Domain Controller. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to reset Domain Controller Computer Account via exploit code remotely or via the use of tool Mimikatz as payload carrier. -narrative = This attack is a privilege escalation technique, where attacker targets a Netlogon secure channel connection to a domain controller, using Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC). This vulnerability exposes vulnerable Windows Domain Controllers to be targeted via unaunthenticated RPC calls which eventually reset Domain Contoller computer account ($) providing the attacker the opportunity to exfil domain controller credential secrets and assign themselve high privileges that can lead to domain controller and potentially complete network takeover. The detection searches in this Analytic Story use Windows Event viewer events and Sysmon events to detect attack execution, these searches monitor access to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process which is an indicator of the use of Mimikatz tool which has bee updated to carry this attack payload. - -[analytic_story://Dev Sec Ops] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2021-08-18 -version = 1 -references = ["https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Patrick Bareiss"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings High - Rule", "ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Low Informational Unknown - Rule", "ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Medium - Rule", "ESCU - AWS ECR Container Upload Outside Business Hours - Rule", "ESCU - AWS ECR Container Upload Unknown User - Rule", "ESCU - Circle CI Disable Security Job - Rule", "ESCU - Circle CI Disable Security Step - Rule", "ESCU - Correlation by Repository and Risk - Rule", "ESCU - Correlation by User and Risk - Rule", "ESCU - GSuite Email Suspicious Attachment - Rule", "ESCU - GitHub Dependabot Alert - Rule", "ESCU - GitHub Pull Request from Unknown User - Rule", "ESCU - Github Commit Changes In Master - Rule", "ESCU - Github Commit In Develop - Rule", "ESCU - Gsuite Drive Share In External Email - Rule", "ESCU - Gsuite Email Suspicious Subject With Attachment - Rule", "ESCU - Gsuite Email With Known Abuse Web Service Link - Rule", "ESCU - Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain - Rule", "ESCU - Gsuite Suspicious Shared File Name - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress RFI - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Scanner Image Pulling - Rule"] -description = This story is focused around detecting attacks on a DevSecOps lifeccycle which consists of the phases plan, code, build, test, release, deploy, operate and monitor. -narrative = DevSecOps is a collaborative framework, which thinks about application and infrastructure security from the start. This means that security tools are part of the continuous integration and continuous deployment pipeline. In this analytics story, we focused on detections around the tools used in this framework such as GitHub as a version control system, GDrive for the documentation, CircleCI as the CI/CD pipeline, Kubernetes as the container execution engine and multiple security tools such as Semgrep and Kube-Hunter. - -[analytic_story://Disabling Security Tools] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2020-02-04 -version = 2 -references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/11/vonteera-adware-uses-certificates-to-disable-anti-malware/", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Tools-Report.pdf"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] -description = Looks for activities and techniques associated with the disabling of security tools on a Windows system, such as suspicious `reg.exe` processes, processes launching netsh, and many others. -narrative = Attackers employ a variety of tactics in order to avoid detection and operate without barriers. This often involves modifying the configuration of security tools to get around them or explicitly disabling them to prevent them from running. This Analytic Story includes searches that look for activity consistent with attackers attempting to disable various security mechanisms. Such activity may involve monitoring for suspicious registry activity, as this is where much of the configuration for Windows and various other programs reside, or explicitly attempting to shut down security-related services. Other times, attackers attempt various tricks to prevent specific programs from running, such as adding the certificates with which the security tools are signed to a block list (which would prevent them from running). - -[analytic_story://Domain Trust Discovery] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2021-03-25 -version = 1 -references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - DSQuery Domain Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule"] -description = Adversaries may attempt to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities in Windows multi-domain/forest environments. -narrative = Domain trusts provide a mechanism for a domain to allow access to resources based on the authentication procedures of another domain. Domain trusts allow the users of the trusted domain to access resources in the trusting domain. The information discovered may help the adversary conduct SID-History Injection, Pass the Ticket, and Kerberoasting. Domain trusts can be enumerated using the DSEnumerateDomainTrusts() Win32 API call, .NET methods, and LDAP. The Windows utility Nltest is known to be used by adversaries to enumerate domain trusts. - -[analytic_story://Dynamic DNS] -category = Malware -last_updated = 2018-09-06 -version = 2 -references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"] -description = Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them avoid firewall blocks and deny lists. -narrative = Dynamic DNS services (DDNS) are legitimate low-cost or free services that allow users to rapidly update domain resolutions to IP infrastructure. While their usage can be benign, malicious actors can abuse DDNS to host harmful payloads or interactive-command-and-control infrastructure. These attackers will manually update or automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to IP addresses that circumvent firewall blocks and deny lists and frustrate a network defender's analytic and investigative processes. These searches will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains and then investigate more deeply, when appropriate. While this list of top-level dynamic domains is not exhaustive, it can be dynamically updated as new suspicious dynamic domains are identified. - -[analytic_story://Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ] -category = Malware -last_updated = 2020-01-27 -version = 1 -references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A", "https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf", "https://www.vkremez.com/2017/05/emotet-banking-trojan-malware-analysis.html"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"] -description = Detect rarely used executables, specific registry paths that may confer malware survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that the Emotet financial malware has compromised your environment. -narrative = The trojan downloader known as Emotet first surfaced in 2014, when it was discovered targeting the banking industry to steal credentials. However, according to a joint technical alert (TA) issued by three government agencies (https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A), Emotet has evolved far beyond those beginnings to become what a ThreatPost article called a threat-delivery service(see https://threatpost.com/emotet-malware-evolves-beyond-banking-to-threat-delivery-service/134342/). For example, in early 2018, Emotet was found to be using its loader function to spread the Quakbot and Ransomware variants. \ -According to the TA, the the malware continues to be among the most costly and destructive malware affecting the private and public sectors. Researchers have linked it to the threat group Mealybug, which has also been on the security communitys radar since 2014.\ -The searches in this Analytic Story will help you find executables that are rarely used in your environment, specific registry paths that malware often uses to ensure survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that Emotet or other malware has compromised your environment. - -[analytic_story://F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2020-08-02 -version = 1 -references = ["https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/about/news/f5-fixes-critical-vulnerability-discovered-by-positive-technologies-in-big-ip-application-delivery-controller/", "https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K52145254", "https://blog.cloudflare.com/cve-2020-5902-helping-to-protect-against-the-f5-tmui-rce-vulnerability/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Shannon Davis"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902 - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -description = Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-5902. Discovered by Positive Technologies researchers, this vulnerability affects F5 BIG-IP, BIG-IQ. and Traffix SDC devices (vulnerable versions in F5 support link below). This vulnerability allows unauthenticated users, along with authenticated users, who have access to the configuration utility to execute system commands, create/delete files, disable services, and/or execute Java code. This vulnerability can result in full system compromise. -narrative = A client is able to perform a remote code execution on an exposed and vulnerable system. The detection search in this Analytic Story uses syslog to detect the malicious behavior. Syslog is going to be the best detection method, as any systems using SSL to protect their management console will make detection via wire data difficult. The searches included used Splunk Connect For Syslog (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4740/), and used a custom destination port to help define the data as F5 data (covered in https://splunk-connect-for-syslog.readthedocs.io/en/master/sources/F5/) - -[analytic_story://FIN7] -category = Malware -last_updated = 2021-09-14 -version = 1 -references = ["https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIN7", "https://threatpost.com/fin7-windows-11-release/169206/", "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/jssloader-recoded-and-reloaded"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Check Elevated CMD using whoami - Rule", "ESCU - Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Jscript Execution Using Cscript App - Rule", "ESCU - MS Scripting Process Loading Ldap Module - Rule", "ESCU - MS Scripting Process Loading WMI Module - Rule", "ESCU - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Office Application Drop Executable - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App - Rule", "ESCU - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule", "ESCU - XSL Script Execution With WMIC - Rule"] -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the FIN7 JS Implant and JSSLoader, including looking for Image Loading of ldap and wmi modules, associated with its payload, data collection and script execution. -narrative = FIN7 is a Russian criminal advanced persistent threat group that has primarily targeted the U.S. retail, restaurant, and hospitality sectors since mid-2015. A portion of FIN7 is run out of the front company Combi Security. It has been called one of the most successful criminal hacking groups in the world. this passed few day FIN7 tools and implant are seen in the wild where its code is updated. the FIN& is known to use the spear phishing attack as a entry to targetted network or host that will drop its staging payload like the JS and JSSloader. Now this artifacts and implants seen downloading other malware like cobaltstrike and event ransomware to encrypt host. - -[analytic_story://GCP Cross Account Activity] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2020-09-01 -version = 1 -references = ["https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-service-accounts"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another GCP account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity. -narrative = Google Cloud Platform (GCP) admins manage access to GCP resources and services across the enterprise using GCP Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage GCP users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as Compute instances, the GCP Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are potentially assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\ -In between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\ -This Analytic Story includes searches that will help you monitor your GCP Audit logs logs for evidence of suspicious cross-account activity. For example, while accessing multiple GCP accounts and roles may be perfectly valid behavior, it may be suspicious when an account requests privileges of an account it has not accessed in the past. After identifying suspicious activities, you can use the provided investigative searches to help you probe more deeply. - -[analytic_story://HAFNIUM Group] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2021-03-03 -version = 1 -references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-hafnium-exchange-server-zero-day-activity-in-splunk.html", "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/", "https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/03/03/rapid7s-insightidr-enables-detection-and-response-to-microsoft-exchange-0-day/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Exchange Web Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine - Rule", "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Unified Messaging Service Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule"] -description = HAFNIUM group was identified by Microsoft as exploiting 4 Microsoft Exchange CVEs in the wild - CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858 and CVE-2021-27065. -narrative = On Tuesday, March 2, 2021, Microsoft released a set of security patches for its mail server, Microsoft Exchange. These patches respond to a group of vulnerabilities known to impact Exchange 2013, 2016, and 2019. It is important to note that an Exchange 2010 security update has also been issued, though the CVEs do not reference that version as being vulnerable.\ -While the CVEs do not shed much light on the specifics of the vulnerabilities or exploits, the first vulnerability (CVE-2021-26855) has a remote network attack vector that allows the attacker, a group Microsoft named HAFNIUM, to authenticate as the Exchange server. Three additional vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065) were also identified as part of this activity. When chained together along with CVE-2021-26855 for initial access, the attacker would have complete control over the Exchange server. This includes the ability to run code as SYSTEM and write to any path on the server.\ -The following Splunk detections assist with identifying the HAFNIUM groups tradecraft and methodology. - -[analytic_story://Hermetic Wiper] -category = Malware -last_updated = 2022-03-02 -version = 1 -references = ["https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/hermetic-wiper-ukraine-under-attack/", "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-057a"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Rod Soto, Michael Haag, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule", "ESCU - Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule"] -description = This analytic story contains detections that allow security analysts to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the destructive malware targeting Ukrainian organizations also known as "Hermetic Wiper". This analytic story looks for abuse of Regsvr32, executables written in administrative SMB Share, suspicious processes, disabling of memory crash dump and more. -narrative = Hermetic Wiper is destructive malware operation found by Sentinel One targeting multiple organizations in Ukraine. This malicious payload corrupts Master Boot Records, uses signed drivers and manipulates NTFS attributes for file destruction. - -[analytic_story://Hidden Cobra Malware] -category = Malware -last_updated = 2020-01-22 -version = 2 -references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/HIDDEN-COBRA-North-Korean-Malicious-Cyber-Activity", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"] -description = Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A. -narrative = North Korea's government-sponsored "cyber army" has been slowly building momentum and gaining sophistication over the last 15 years or so. As a result, the group's activity, which the US government refers to as "Hidden Cobra," has surreptitiously crept onto the collective radar as a preeminent global threat.\ -These state-sponsored actors are thought to be responsible for everything from a hack on a South Korean nuclear plant to an attack on Sony in anticipation of its release of the movie "The Interview" at the end of 2014. They're also notorious for cyberespionage. In recent years, the group seems to be focused on financial crimes, such as cryptojacking.\ -In June of 2018, The Department of Homeland Security, together with the FBI and other U.S. government partners, issued Technical Alert (TA-18-149A) to advise the public about two variants of North Korean malware. One variant, dubbed "Joanap," is a multi-stage peer-to-peer botnet that allows North Korean state actors to exfiltrate data, download and execute secondary payloads, and initialize proxy communications. The other variant, "Brambul," is a Windows32 SMB worm that is dropped into a victim network. When executed, the malware attempts to spread laterally within a victim's local subnet, connecting via the SMB protocol and initiating brute-force password attacks. It reports details to the Hidden Cobra actors via email, so they can use the information for secondary remote operations.\ -Among other searches in this Analytic Story is a detection search that looks for the creation or deletion of hidden shares, such as, "adnim$," which the Hidden Cobra malware creates on the target system. Another looks for the creation of three malicious files associated with the malware. You can also use a search in this story to investigate activity that indicates that malware is sending email back to the attackers. - -[analytic_story://IcedID] -category = Malware -last_updated = 2021-07-29 -version = 1 -references = ["https://threatpost.com/icedid-banking-trojan-surges-emotet/165314/", "https://app.any.run/tasks/48414a33-3d66-4a46-afe5-c2003bb55ccf/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Account Discovery With Net App - Rule", "ESCU - CHCP Command Execution - Rule", "ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread In Shell Application - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Schedule Task - Rule", "ESCU - Drop IcedID License dat - Rule", "ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - IcedID Exfiltrated Archived File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 DNSQuery - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files - Rule", "ESCU - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule", "ESCU - Sqlite Module In Temp Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 PluginInit - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule"] -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the IcedID banking trojan, including looking for file writes associated with its payload, process injection, shellcode execution and data collection. -narrative = IcedId banking trojan campaigns targeting banks and other vertical sectors.This malware is known in Microsoft Windows OS targetting browser such as firefox and chrom to steal banking information. It is also known to its unique payload downloaded in C2 where it can be a .png file that hides the core shellcode bot using steganography technique or gzip dat file that contains "license.dat" which is the actual core icedid bot. - -[analytic_story://Ingress Tool Transfer] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2021-03-24 -version = 1 -references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Curl Download and Bash Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Wget Download and Bash Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination - Rule"] -description = Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Files may be copied from an external adversary controlled system through the command and control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP. -narrative = Ingress tool transfer is a Technique under tactic Command and Control. Behaviors will include the use of living off the land binaries to download implants or binaries over alternate communication ports. It is imperative to baseline applications on endpoints to understand what generates network activity, to where, and what is its native behavior. These utilities, when abused, will write files to disk in world writeable paths.\ During triage, review the reputation of the remote public destination IP or domain. Capture any files written to disk and perform analysis. Review other parrallel processes for additional behaviors. - -[analytic_story://JBoss Vulnerability] -category = Vulnerability -last_updated = 2017-09-14 -version = 1 -references = ["http://www.deependresearch.org/2016/04/jboss-exploits-view-from-victim.html"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -description = In March of 2016, adversaries were seen using JexBoss--an open-source utility used for testing and exploiting JBoss application servers. These searches help detect evidence of these attacks, such as network connections to external resources or web services spawning atypical child processes, among others. -narrative = This Analytic Story looks for probing and exploitation attempts targeting JBoss application servers. While the vulnerabilities associated with this story are rather dated, they were leveraged in a spring 2016 campaign in connection with the Samsam ransomware variant. Incidents involving this ransomware are unique, in that they begin with attacks against vulnerable services, rather than the phishing or drive-by attacks more common with ransomware. In this case, vulnerable JBoss applications appear to be the target of choice.\ -It is helpful to understand how often a notable event generated by this story occurs, as well as the commonalities between some of these events, both of which may provide clues about whether this is a common occurrence of minimal concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. It may also help to understand whether the issue is restricted to a single user/system or whether it is broader in scope.\ -When looking at the target of the behavior uncovered by the event, you should note the sensitivity of the user and or/system to help determine the potential impact. It is also helpful to identify other recent events involving the target. This can help tie different events together and give further situational awareness regarding the target host.\ -Various types of information for external systems should be reviewed and, potentially, collected if the incident is, indeed, judged to be malicious. This data may be useful for generating your own threat intelligence, so you can create future alerts.\ -The following factors may assist you in determining whether the event is malicious: \ -1. Country of origin\ -1. Responsible party\ -1. Fully qualified domain names associated with the external IP address\ -1. Registration of fully qualified domain names associated with external IP address Determining whether it is a dynamic domain frequently visited by others and/or how third parties categorize it can also help you qualify and understand the event and possible motivation for the attack. In addition, there are various sources that may provide reputation information on the IP address or domain name, which can assist you in determining whether the event is malicious in nature. Finally, determining whether there are other events associated with the IP address may help connect data points or expose other historic events that might be brought back into scope.\ -Gathering various data on the system of interest can sometimes help quickly determine whether something suspicious is happening. Some of these items include determining who else may have logged into the system recently, whether any unusual scheduled tasks exist, whether the system is communicating on suspicious ports, whether there are modifications to sensitive registry keys, and/or whether there are any known vulnerabilities on the system. This information can often highlight other activity commonly seen in attack scenarios or give more information about how the system may have been targeted.\ -hen a specific service or application is targeted, it is often helpful to know the associated version, to help determine whether it is vulnerable to a specific exploit.\ -If you suspect an attack targeting a web server, it is helpful to look at some of the behavior of the web service to see if there is evidence that the service has been compromised. Some indications of this might be network connections to external resources, the web service spawning child processes that are not associated with typical behavior, and whether the service wrote any files that might be malicious in nature.\ -If a suspicious file is found, we can review more information about it to help determine if it is, in fact, malicious. Identifying the file type, any processes that opened the file, the processes that may have created and/or modified the file, and how many other systems potentially have this file can you determine whether the file is malicious. Also, determining the file hash and checking it against reputation sources, such as VirusTotal, can sometimes help you quickly determine if it is malicious in nature.\ -Often, a simple inspection of a suspect process name and path can tell you if the system has been compromised. For example, if svchost.exe is found running from a location other than `C:\Windows\System32`, it is likely something malicious designed to hide in plain sight when simply reviewing process names. \ -It can also be helpful to examine various behaviors of and the parent of the process of interest. For example, if it turns out the process of interest is malicious, it would be good to see whether the parent process spawned other processes that might also warrant further scrutiny. If a process is suspect, a review of the network connections made around the time of the event and noting whether the process has spawned any child processes could be helpful in determining whether it is malicious or executing a malicious script. - -[analytic_story://Kubernetes Scanning Activity] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2020-04-15 -version = 1 -references = ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP GCR container uploaded - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -description = This story addresses detection against Kubernetes cluster fingerprint scan and attack by providing information on items such as source ip, user agent, cluster names. -narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitve information and management priviledges of production workloads, microservices and applications. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious unauthenticated requests from the internet to kubernetes cluster. - -[analytic_story://Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2020-05-20 -version = 1 -references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -description = This story addresses detection and response of accounts acccesing Kubernetes cluster sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets providing information on items such as user user, group. object, namespace and authorization reason. -narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive objects within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes sensitive objects. - -[analytic_story://Linux Persistence Techniques] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2021-12-17 -version = 1 -references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/", "https://kifarunix.com/scheduling-tasks-using-at-command-in-linux/", "https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/at/", "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/uploads/CERTFR-2021-CTI-005.pdf"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Add User Account - Rule", "ESCU - Linux At Allow Config File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux At Application Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Change File Owner To Root - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Common Process For Elevation Control - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Doas Conf File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Doas Tool Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Linux File Creation In Profile Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Access To Credential Files - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Service Restarted - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Service Started Or Enabled - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Sudo OR Su Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Visudo Utility Execution - Rule"] -description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on a Linux system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment. -narrative = Maintaining persistence is one of the first steps taken by attackers after the initial compromise. Attackers leverage various custom and built-in tools to ensure survivability and persistent access within a compromised enterprise. This Analytic Story provides searches to help you identify various behaviors used by attackers to maintain persistent access to a Linux environment. - -[analytic_story://Linux Post-Exploitation] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2021-12-03 -version = 1 -references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/linux/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "no", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Linux Discovery Commands - Rule"] -description = This analytic story identifies popular Linux post exploitation tools such as autoSUID, LinEnum, LinPEAS, Linux Exploit Suggesters, MimiPenguin. -narrative = These tools allow operators find possible exploits or paths for privilege escalation based on SUID binaries, user permissions, kernel version and distro version. - -[analytic_story://Linux Privilege Escalation] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2021-12-17 -version = 1 -references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Add User Account - Rule", "ESCU - Linux At Allow Config File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux At Application Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Change File Owner To Root - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Common Process For Elevation Control - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Doas Conf File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Doas Tool Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Linux File Creation In Profile Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Access To Credential Files - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Service Restarted - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Service Started Or Enabled - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Sudo OR Su Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Visudo Utility Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Linux pkexec Privilege Escalation - Rule"] -description = Monitor for and investigate activities that may be associated with a Linux privilege-escalation attack, including unusual processes running on endpoints, schedule task, services, setuid, root execution and more. -narrative = Privilege escalation is a "land-and-expand" technique, wherein an adversary gains an initial foothold on a host and then exploits its weaknesses to increase his privileges. The motivation is simple: certain actions on a Linux machine--such as installing software--may require higher-level privileges than those the attacker initially acquired. By increasing his privilege level, the attacker can gain the control required to carry out his malicious ends. This Analytic Story provides searches to detect and investigate behaviors that attackers may use to elevate their privileges in your environment. - -[analytic_story://Living Off The Land] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2022-02-17 -version = 1 -references = ["https://lolbas-project.github.io/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Lou Stella"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution - Rule"] -description = Leverage searches that allow you to search for the presence of an attacker leveraging existing tooling within your environment. -narrative = Living Off The Land refers to an attacker methodology of using software already installed on their target host to achieve their goals. Many utilities that ship with Windows can be used to achieve various goals, with reduced chances of detection by an antivirus software. - -[analytic_story://Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2021-12-11 -version = 1 -references = ["https://mbechler.github.io/2021/12/10/PSA_Log4Shell_JNDI_Injection/", "https://www.fastly.com/blog/digging-deeper-into-log4shell-0day-rce-exploit-found-in-log4j", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/log4j2-vulnerability-analysis-and-mitigation-recommendations/", "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/log-jammin-log4j-2-rce.html"] -maintainers = [{"company": "no", "email": "-", "name": "Jose Hernandez"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Curl Download and Bash Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Hunting for Log4Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Java Class File download by Java User Agent - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Java Spawning Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 Exploitation - Rule", "ESCU - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Wget Download and Bash Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Java Spawning Shells - Rule"] -description = Log4Shell or CVE-2021-44228 is a Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability in the Apache Log4j library, a widely used and ubiquitous logging framework for Java. The vulnerability allows an attacker who can control log messages to execute arbitrary code loaded from attacker-controlled servers and we anticipate that most apps using the Log4j library will meet this condition. /n**SOAR:** The following Splunk SOAR playbooks can be used in the response to this story's analytics: 'Log4j Respond', 'Log4j Investigate', 'Log4j Splunk Investigation' -narrative = In late November 2021, Chen Zhaojun of Alibaba identified a remote code execution vulnerability. Previous work was seen in a 2016 Blackhat talk by Alvaro Munoz and Oleksandr Mirosh called ["A Journey from JNDI/LDAP Manipulation to Remote Code Execution Dream Land"](https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Munoz-A-Journey-From-JNDI-LDAP-Manipulation-To-RCE.pdf). Reported under the CVE ID : CVE-2021-44228, released to the public on December 10, 2021. The vulnerability is exploited through improper deserialization of user input passed into the framework. It permits remote code execution and it can allow an attacker to leak sensitive data, such as environment variables, or execute malicious software on the target system. - -[analytic_story://Malicious PowerShell] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2017-08-23 -version = 5 -references = ["https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malware-employs-powershell-to-infect-systems/", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Domain Enumeration - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via System Reflection Assembly - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Creating Thread Mutex - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Execute COM Object - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Processing Stream Of Data - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Using memory As Backing Store - Rule", "ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule", "ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Unloading AMSI via Reflection - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Recon Running Process Or Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] -description = Attackers are finding stealthy ways "live off the land," leveraging utilities and tools that come standard on the endpoint--such as PowerShell--to achieve their goals without downloading binary files. These searches can help you detect and investigate PowerShell command-line options that may be indicative of malicious intent. -narrative = The searches in this Analytic Story monitor for parameters often used for malicious purposes. It is helpful to understand how often the notable events generated by this story occur, as well as the commonalities between some of these events. These factors may provide clues about whether this is a common occurrence of minimal concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. Likewise, it is important to determine whether the issue is restricted to a single user/system or is broader in scope. \ -The following factors may assist you in determining whether the event is malicious: \ -1. Country of origin \ -1. Responsible party \ -1. Fully qualified domain names associated with the external IP address \ -1. Registration of fully qualified domain names associated with external IP address \ -Determining whether it is a dynamic domain frequently visited by others and/or how third parties categorize it can also help you answer some questions surrounding the attacker and details related to the external system. In addition, there are various sources--such as VirusTotal— that can provide some reputation information on the IP address or domain name, which can assist in determining whether the event is malicious. Finally, determining whether there are other events associated with the IP address may help connect data points or show other events that should be brought into scope. \ -Gathering data on the system of interest can sometimes help you quickly determine whether something suspicious is happening. Some of these items include finding out who else may have recently logged into the system, whether any unusual scheduled tasks exist, whether the system is communicating on suspicious ports, whether there are modifications to sensitive registry keys, and whether there are any known vulnerabilities on the system. This information can often highlight other activity commonly seen in attack scenarios or give more information about how the system may have been targeted. \ -Often, a simple inspection of the process name and path can tell you if the system has been compromised. For example, if `svchost.exe` is found running from a location other than `C:\Windows\System32`, it is likely something malicious designed to hide in plain sight when cursorily reviewing process names. Similarly, if the process itself seems legitimate, but the parent process is running from the temporary browser cache, that could be indicative of activity initiated via a compromised website a user visited. \ -It can also be very helpful to examine various behaviors of the process of interest or the parent of the process of interest. For example, if it turns out the process of interest is malicious, it would be good to see if the parent to that process spawned other processes that might be worth further scrutiny. If a process is suspect, a review of the network connections made in and around the time of the event and/or whether the process spawned any child processes could be helpful, as well. \ -In the event a system is suspected of having been compromised via a malicious website, we suggest reviewing the browsing activity from that system around the time of the event. If categories are given for the URLs visited, that can help you zero in on possible malicious sites. \ -Most recently we have added new content related to PowerShell Script Block logging, Windows EventCode 4104. Script block logging presents the deobfuscated and raw script executed on an endpoint. The analytics produced were tested against commonly used attack frameworks - PowerShell-Empire, Cobalt Strike and Covenant. In addition, we sampled publicly available samples that utilize PowerShell and validated coverage. The analytics are here to identify suspicious usage, cmdlets, or script values. 4104 events are enabled via the Windows registry and may generate a large volume of data if enabled globally. Enabling on critical systems or a limited set may be best. During triage of 4104 events, review parallel processes for other processes and command executed. Identify any file modifications and network communication and review accordingly. Fortunately, we get the full script to determine the level of threat identified. - -[analytic_story://Masquerading - Rename System Utilities] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2021-04-26 -version = 1 -references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Sdelete Application Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule"] -description = Adversaries may rename legitimate system utilities to try to evade security mechanisms concerning the usage of those utilities. -narrative = Security monitoring and control mechanisms may be in place for system utilities adversaries are capable of abusing. It may be possible to bypass those security mechanisms by renaming the utility prior to utilization (ex: rename rundll32.exe). An alternative case occurs when a legitimate utility is copied or moved to a different directory and renamed to avoid detections based on system utilities executing from non-standard paths.\ -The following content is here to assist with binaries within `system32` or `syswow64` being moved to a new location or an adversary bringing a the binary in to execute.\ -There will be false positives as some native Windows processes are moved or ran by third party applications from different paths. If file names are mismatched between the file name on disk and that of the binarys PE metadata, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries by looking to see if the InternalName, OriginalFilename, and or ProductName match what is expected could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. Do not focus on the possible names a file could have, but instead on the command-line arguments that are known to be used and are distinct because it will have a better rate of detection. - -[analytic_story://Meterpreter] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2021-06-08 -version = 1 -references = ["https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/about-meterpreter/", "https://doubleoctopus.com/security-wiki/threats-and-tools/meterpreter/", "https://www.rapid7.com/products/metasploit/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "no", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Hart"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Excessive number of distinct processes created in Windows Temp folder - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive number of taskhost processes - Rule"] -description = Meterpreter provides red teams, pen testers and threat actors interactive access to a compromised host to run commands, upload payloads, download files, and other actions. -narrative = This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from Meterpreter. Meterpreter is a Metasploit payload for remote execution that leverages DLL injection to make it extremely difficult to detect. Since the software runs in memory, no new processes are created upon injection. It also leverages encrypted communication channels.\ -Meterpreter enables the operator to remotely run commands on the target machine, upload payloads, download files, dump password hashes, and much more. It is difficult to determine from the forensic evidence what actions the operator performed. Splunk Research, however, has observed anomalous behaviors on the compromised hosts that seem to only appear when Meterpreter is executing various commands. With that, we have written new detections targeted to these detections.\ -While investigating a detection related to this analytic story, please bear in mind that the detections look for anomalies in system behavior. It will be imperative to look for other signs in the endpoint and network logs for lateral movement, discovery and other actions to confirm that the host was compromised and a remote actor used it to progress on their objectives. - -[analytic_story://Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2021-09-08 -version = 1 -references = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/09/windows-mshtml-zero-day-actively-exploited-mitigations-required/", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", "https://www.echotrail.io/insights/search/control.exe"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Control Loading from World Writable Directory - Rule", "ESCU - MSHTML Module Load in Office Product - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Writing cab or inf - Rule", "ESCU - Office Spawning Control - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory - Rule"] -description = CVE-2021-40444 is a remote code execution vulnerability in MSHTML, recently used to delivery targeted spearphishing documents. -narrative = Microsoft is aware of targeted attacks that attempt to exploit this vulnerability, CVE-2021-40444 by using specially-crafted Microsoft Office documents. MSHTML is a software component used to render web pages on Windows. Although it’s most commonly associated with Internet Explorer, it is also used in other software. CVE-2021-40444 received a CVSS score of 8.8 out of 10. MSHTML is the beating heart of Internet Explorer, the vulnerability also exists in that browser. Although given its limited use, there is little risk of infection by that vector. Microsoft Office applications use the MSHTML component to display web content in Office documents. The attack depends on MSHTML loading a specially crafted ActiveX control when the target opens a malicious Office document. The loaded ActiveX control can then run arbitrary code to infect the system with more malware. \ At the moment all supported Windows versions are vulnerable. Since there is no patch available yet, Microsoft proposes a few methods to block these attacks. \ -1. Disable the installation of all ActiveX controls in Internet Explorer via the registry. Previously-installed ActiveX controls will still run, but no new ones will be added, including malicious ones. \ -1. Open documents from the Internet in Protected View or Application Guard for Office, both of which prevent the current attack. This is a default setting but it may have been changed. - -[analytic_story://Monitor for Updates] -category = Best Practices -last_updated = 2017-09-15 -version = 1 -references = ["https://learn.cisecurity.org/20-controls-download"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - No Windows Updates in a time frame - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -description = Monitor your enterprise to ensure that your endpoints are being patched and updated. Adversaries notoriously exploit known vulnerabilities that could be mitigated by applying routine security patches. -narrative = It is a common best practice to ensure that endpoints are being patched and updated in a timely manner, in order to reduce the risk of compromise via a publicly disclosed vulnerability. Timely application of updates/patches is important to eliminate known vulnerabilities that may be exploited by various threat actors.\ -Searches in this analytic story are designed to help analysts monitor endpoints for system patches and/or updates. This helps analysts identify any systems that are not successfully updated in a timely matter.\ -Microsoft releases updates for Windows systems on a monthly cadence. They should be installed as soon as possible after following internal testing and validation procedures. Patches and updates for other systems or applications are typically released as needed. - -[analytic_story://NOBELIUM Group] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2020-12-14 -version = 2 -references = ["https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldmax-goldfinder-sibot-analyzing-nobelium-malware/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html", "https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Patrick Bareiss"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Anomalous usage of 7zip - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule", "ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule"] -description = Sunburst is a trojanized updates to SolarWinds Orion IT monitoring and management software. It was discovered by FireEye in December 2020. The actors behind this campaign gained access to numerous public and private organizations around the world. -narrative = This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) of the NOBELIUM Group. The threat actor behind sunburst compromised the SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll, is a SolarWinds digitally-signed component of the Orion software framework that contains a backdoor that communicates via HTTP to third party servers. The detections in this Analytic Story are focusing on the dll loading events, file create events and network events to detect This malware. - -[analytic_story://Netsh Abuse] -category = Abuse -last_updated = 2017-01-05 -version = 1 -references = ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/tn-archive/bb490939(v=technet.10)", "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html", "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] -description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the abuse of `netsh.exe`, which can disable local firewall settings or set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system. -narrative = It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage native Windows tools and functionality to execute commands for malicious reasons. One such tool on Windows OS is `netsh.exe`,a command-line scripting utility that allows you to--either locally or remotely--display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. `Netsh.exe` can be used to discover and disable local firewall settings. It can also be used to set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.\ -To get started, run the detection search to identify parent processes of `netsh.exe`. - -[analytic_story://Network Discovery] -category = Malware -last_updated = 2022-02-14 -version = 1 -references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016/", "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/ESET_Kobalos.pdf", "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/09/unit42-xbash-combines-botnet-ransomware-coinmining-worm-targets-linux-windows/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Linux System Network Discovery - Rule"] -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the network discovery, including looking for network configuration, settings such as IP, MAC address, firewall settings and many more. -narrative = Adversaries may use the information from System Network Configuration Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining certain access within the target network and what actions to do next. - -[analytic_story://Office 365 Detections] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2020-12-16 -version = 1 -references = ["https://i.blackhat.com/USA-20/Thursday/us-20-Bienstock-My-Cloud-Is-APTs-Cloud-Investigating-And-Defending-Office-365.pdf"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Patrick Bareiss"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Disable MFA - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule", "ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule", "ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule"] -description = This story is focused around detecting Office 365 Attacks. -narrative = More and more companies are using Microsofts Office 365 cloud offering. Therefore, we see more and more attacks against Office 365. This story provides various detections for Office 365 attacks. - -[analytic_story://Orangeworm Attack Group] -category = Malware -last_updated = 2020-01-22 -version = 2 -references = ["https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/orangeworm-targets-healthcare-us-europe-asia", "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/healthcare-targeted-by-hacker/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] -description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry. -narrative = In May of 2018, the attack group Orangeworm was implicated for installing a custom backdoor called Trojan.Kwampirs within large international healthcare corporations in the United States, Europe, and Asia. This malware provides the attackers with remote access to the target system, decrypting and extracting a copy of its main DLL payload from its resource section. Before writing the payload to disk, it inserts a randomly generated string into the middle of the decrypted payload in an attempt to evade hash-based detections.\ -Awareness of the Orangeworm group first surfaced in January, 2015. It has conducted targeted attacks against related industries, as well, such as pharmaceuticals and healthcare IT solution providers.\ -Healthcare may be a promising target, because it is notoriously behind in technology, often using older operating systems and neglecting to patch computers. Even so, the group was able to evade detection for a full three years. Sources say that the malware spread quickly within the target networks, infecting computers used to control medical devices, such as MRI and X-ray machines.\ -This Analytic Story is designed to help you detect and investigate suspicious activities that may be indicative of an Orangeworm attack. One detection search looks for command-line arguments. Another monitors for uses of sc.exe, a non-essential Windows file that can manipulate Windows services. One of the investigative searches helps you get more information on web hosts that you suspect have been compromised. - -[analytic_story://PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2021-08-31 -version = 1 -references = ["https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2021/07/27/microsoft-releases-guidance-mitigating-petitpotam-ntlm-relay", "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5005413-mitigating-ntlm-relay-attacks-on-active-directory-certificate-services-ad-cs-3612b773-4043-4aa9-b23d-b87910cd3429", "https://www.specterops.io/assets/resources/Certified_Pre-Owned.pdf", "https://github.com/topotam/PetitPotam/", "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/releases/tag/2.2.0-20210723", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-36942", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - PetitPotam Network Share Access Request - Rule", "ESCU - PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request - Rule"] -description = PetitPotam (CVE-2021-36942,) is a vulnerablity identified in Microsofts EFSRPC Protocol that can allow an unauthenticated account to escalate privileges to domain administrator given the right circumstances. -narrative = In June 2021, security researchers at SpecterOps released a blog post and white paper detailing several potential attack vectors against Active Directory Certificated Services (ADCS). ADCS is a Microsoft product that implements Public Key Infrastrucutre (PKI) functionality and can be used by organizations to provide and manage digital certiticates within Active Directory.\ In July 2021, a security researcher released PetitPotam, a tool that allows attackers to coerce Windows systems into authenticating to arbitrary endpoints.\ Combining PetitPotam with the identified ADCS attack vectors allows attackers to escalate privileges from an unauthenticated anonymous user to full domain admin privileges. - -[analytic_story://Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2020-01-22 -version = 1 -references = ["https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/scope-of-mudcarp-attacks-highlight-1/", "http://blog.amossys.fr/badflick-is-not-so-bad.html"] -maintainers = [{"company": "iDefense", "email": "-", "name": "iDefense Cyber Espionage Team"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] -description = Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques employed by the MUDCARP threat group. -narrative = This story was created as a joint effort between iDefense and Splunk.\ -iDefense analysts have recently discovered a Windows executable file that, upon execution, spoofs a decryption tool and then drops a file that appears to be the custom-built javascript backdoor, "Orz," which is associated with the threat actors known as MUDCARP (as well as "temp.Periscope" and "Leviathan"). The file is executed using Wscript.\ -The MUDCARP techniques include the use of the compressed-folders module from Microsoft, zipfldr.dll, with RouteTheCall export to run the malicious process or command. After a successful reboot, the malware is made persistent by a manipulating `[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run]'help'='c:\\windows\\system32\\rundll32.exe c:\\windows\\system32\\zipfldr.dll,RouteTheCall c:\\programdata\\winapp.exe'`. Though this technique is not exclusive to MUDCARP, it has been spotted in the group's arsenal of advanced techniques seen in the wild.\ -This Analytic Story searches for evidence of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that allow for the use of a endpoint detection-and-response (EDR) bypass technique to mask the true parent of a malicious process. It can also be set as a registry key for further sandbox evasion and to allow the malware to launch only after reboot.\ -If behavioral searches included in this story yield positive hits, iDefense recommends conducting IOC searches for the following:\ -\ -1. www.chemscalere[.]com\ -1. chemscalere[.]com\ -1. about.chemscalere[.]com\ -1. autoconfig.chemscalere[.]com\ -1. autodiscover.chemscalere[.]com\ -1. catalog.chemscalere[.]com\ -1. cpanel.chemscalere[.]com\ -1. db.chemscalere[.]com\ -1. ftp.chemscalere[.]com\ -1. mail.chemscalere[.]com\ -1. news.chemscalere[.]com\ -1. update.chemscalere[.]com\ -1. webmail.chemscalere[.]com\ -1. www.candlelightparty[.]org\ -1. candlelightparty[.]org\ -1. newapp.freshasianews[.]comIn addition, iDefense also recommends that organizations review their environments for activity related to the following hashes:\ -\ -1. cd195ee448a3657b5c2c2d13e9c7a2e2\ -1. b43ad826fe6928245d3c02b648296b43\ -1. 889a9b52566448231f112a5ce9b5dfaf\ -1. b8ec65dab97cdef3cd256cc4753f0c54\ -1. 04d83cd3813698de28cfbba326d7647c - -[analytic_story://PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527] -category = Vulnerability -last_updated = 2021-07-01 -version = 1 -references = ["https://github.com/cube0x0/CVE-2021-1675/", "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/fix-for-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675-exploit-to-keep-your-print-servers-running-while-a-patch-is-not-available/", "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/exploitable-critical-rce-vulnerability-allows-regular-users-to-fully-compromise-active-directory-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675/", "https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/ob6y02/critical_vulnerability_printnightmare_exposes"] -maintainers = [{"company": "no", "email": "-", "name": "Splunk Threat Research Team"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Print Spooler Adding A Printer Driver - Rule", "ESCU - Print Spooler Failed to Load a Plug-in - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ESCU - Spoolsv Spawning Rundll32 - Rule", "ESCU - Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules - Rule", "ESCU - Spoolsv Suspicious Process Access - Rule", "ESCU - Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule"] -description = The following analytic story identifies behaviors related PrintNightmare, or CVE-2021-34527 previously known as (CVE-2021-1675), to gain privilege escalation on the vulnerable machine. -narrative = This vulnerability affects the Print Spooler service, enabled by default on Windows systems, and allows adversaries to trick this service into installing a remotely hosted print driver using a low privileged user account. Successful exploitation effectively allows adversaries to execute code in the target system (Remote Code Execution) in the context of the Print Spooler service which runs with the highest privileges (Privilege Escalation). \ -The prerequisites for successful exploitation consist of: \ -1. Print Spooler service enabled on the target system \ -1. Network connectivity to the target system (initial access has been obtained) \ -1. Hash or password for a low privileged user ( or computer ) account. \ -In the most impactful scenario, an attacker would be able to leverage this vulnerability to obtain a SYSTEM shell on a domain controller and so escalate their privileges from a low privileged domain account to full domain access in the target environment as shown below. - -[analytic_story://Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch] -category = Best Practices -last_updated = 2017-09-11 -version = 1 -references = ["http://www.novetta.com/2015/02/advanced-methods-to-detect-advanced-cyber-attacks-protocol-abuse/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Allow Inbound Traffic In Firewall Rule - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Enable RDP In Other Port Number - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"] -description = Detect instances of prohibited network traffic allowed in the environment, as well as protocols running on non-standard ports. Both of these types of behaviors typically violate policy and can be leveraged by attackers. -narrative = A traditional security best practice is to control the ports, protocols, and services allowed within your environment. By limiting the services and protocols to those explicitly approved by policy, administrators can minimize the attack surface. The combined effect allows both network defenders and security controls to focus and not be mired in superfluous traffic or data types. Looking for deviations to policy can identify attacker activity that abuses services and protocols to run on alternate or non-standard ports in the attempt to avoid detection or frustrate forensic analysts. - -[analytic_story://ProxyShell] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2021-08-24 -version = 1 -references = ["https://y4y.space/2021/08/12/my-steps-of-reproducing-proxyshell/", "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/8/17/from-pwn2own-2021-a-new-attack-surface-on-microsoft-exchange-proxyshell", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FC6iHw258RI", "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-microsoft-exchange-servers-still-vulnerable-to-proxyshell-exploit#what-should-you-do", "https://i.blackhat.com/USA21/Wednesday-Handouts/us-21-ProxyLogon-Is-Just-The-Tip-Of-The-Iceberg-A-New-Attack-Surface-On-Microsoft-Exchange-Server.pdf"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect Exchange Web Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF - Rule", "ESCU - Exchange PowerShell Module Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Microsoft Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages - Rule", "ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule"] -description = ProxyShell is a chain of exploits targeting on-premise Microsoft Exchange Server - CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, and CVE-2021-31207. -narrative = During Pwn2Own April 2021, a security researcher demonstrated an attack chain targeting on-premise Microsoft Exchange Server. August 5th, the same researcher publicly released further details and demonstrated the attack chain. \ -1. CVE-2021-34473 - Pre-auth path confusion leads to ACL Bypass (Patched in April by KB5001779) \ -1. CVE-2021-34523 - Elevation of privilege on Exchange PowerShell backend (Patched in April by KB5001779) \ -1. CVE-2021-31207 - Post-auth Arbitrary-File-Write leads to RCE (Patched in May by KB5003435) \ -Upon successful exploitation, the remote attacker will have `SYSTEM` privileges on the Exchange Server. In addition to remote access/execution, the adversary may be able to run Exchange PowerShell Cmdlets to perform further actions. - -[analytic_story://Ransomware] -category = Malware -last_updated = 2020-02-04 -version = 1 -references = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/06/28/carbon-black-threat-research-technical-analysis-petya-notpetya-ransomware/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2017/06/27/closing-the-detection-to-mitigation-gap-or-to-petya-or-notpetya-whocares-.html"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - 7zip CommandLine To SMB Share Path - Rule", "ESCU - Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall - Rule", "ESCU - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule", "ESCU - Allow Operation with Consent Admin - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Conti Common Exec parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect RClone Command-Line Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed RClone - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound File Modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Disable AMSI Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable ETW Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Logs Using WevtUtil - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Service Stop Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID - Rule", "ESCU - Fsutil Zeroing File - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - ICACLS Grant Command - Rule", "ESCU - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Microsoft Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages - Rule", "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ESCU - Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading - Rule", "ESCU - Permission Modification using Takeown App - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Disable Security Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Execute COM Object - Rule", "ESCU - Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 DNSQuery - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Start Up During Safe Mode Boot - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Uninstall App Using MsiExec - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DiskCryptor Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Raccine Scheduled Task Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Rundll32 LockWorkStation - Response Task"] -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage, the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected locations, and many others. /n**SOAR:** The following Splunk SOAR playbooks can be used in the response to this story's analytics: 'Ransomware Investigate and Contain' -narrative = Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise. Attackers can deploy ransomware to enterprises through spearphishing campaigns and driveby downloads, as well as through traditional remote service-based exploitation. In the case of the WannaCry campaign, there was self-propagating wormable functionality that was used to maximize infection. Fortunately, organizations can apply several techniques--such as those in this Analytic Story--to detect and or mitigate the effects of ransomware. - -[analytic_story://Ransomware Cloud] -category = Malware -last_updated = 2020-10-27 -version = 1 -references = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/", "https://github.com/d1vious/git-wild-hunt", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgzNib37g0M"] -maintainers = [{"company": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware. These searches include cloud related objects that may be targeted by malicious actors via cloud providers own encryption features. -narrative = Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise.Cloud ransomware can be deployed by obtaining high privilege credentials from targeted users or resources. - -[analytic_story://Remcos] -category = Malware -last_updated = 2021-09-23 -version = 1 -references = ["https://success.trendmicro.com/solution/1123281-remcos-malware-information", "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0332/", "https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.remcos#:~:text=Remcos%20(acronym%20of%20Remote%20Control,used%20to%20remotely%20control%20computers.\u0026text=Remcos%20can%20be%20used%20for,been%20used%20in%20hacking%20campaigns."] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Jscript Execution Using Cscript App - Rule", "ESCU - Loading Of Dynwrapx Module - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious InProcServer32 Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Possible Browser Pass View Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule", "ESCU - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Process Writing DynamicWrapperX - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule", "ESCU - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule", "ESCU - Remcos RAT File Creation in Remcos Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Remcos client registry install entry - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Image Creation In Appdata Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious WAV file in Appdata Folder - Rule", "ESCU - System Info Gathering Using Dxdiag Application - Rule", "ESCU - Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Winhlp32 Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule"] -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Remcos RAT trojan, including looking for file writes associated with its payload, screencapture, registry modification, UAC bypassed, persistence and data collection.. -narrative = Remcos or Remote Control and Surveillance, marketed as a legitimate software for remotely managing Windows systems is now widely used in multiple malicious campaigns both APT and commodity malware by threat actors. - -[analytic_story://Revil Ransomware] -category = Malware -last_updated = 2021-06-04 -version = 1 -references = ["https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule", "ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ESCU - Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Disable Security Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule"] -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Revil ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Revil, encrypting network shares, deleting shadow volume storage, registry key modification, deleting of security logs, and more. -narrative = Revil ransomware is a RaaS,that a single group may operates and manges the development of this ransomware. It involve the use of ransomware payloads along with exfiltration of data. Malicious actors demand payment for ransome of data and threaten deletion and exposure of exfiltrated data. - -[analytic_story://Router and Infrastructure Security] -category = Best Practices -last_updated = 2017-09-12 -version = 1 -references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/09/the_new_route_toper.html", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/security-center/event-response/synful-knock.html"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule", "ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -description = Validate the security configuration of network infrastructure and verify that only authorized users and systems are accessing critical assets. Core routing and switching infrastructure are common strategic targets for attackers. -narrative = Networking devices, such as routers and switches, are often overlooked as resources that attackers will leverage to subvert an enterprise. Advanced threats actors have shown a proclivity to target these critical assets as a means to siphon and redirect network traffic, flash backdoored operating systems, and implement cryptographic weakened algorithms to more easily decrypt network traffic.\ -This Analytic Story helps you gain a better understanding of how your network devices are interacting with your hosts. By compromising your network devices, attackers can obtain direct access to the company's internal infrastructure— effectively increasing the attack surface and accessing private services/data. - -[analytic_story://Ryuk Ransomware] -category = Malware -last_updated = 2020-11-06 -version = 1 -references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-ryuk-using-splunk-attack-range.html", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-302a"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jose Hernandez"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Wake on LAN Command - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule", "ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Ryuk ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Ryuk, Stopping Security Access Manager, DisableAntiSpyware registry key modification, suspicious psexec use, and more. -narrative = Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released Alert (AA20-302A) on October 28th called “Ransomware Activity Targeting the Healthcare and Public Health Sector.” This alert details TTPs associated with ongoing and possible imminent attacks against the Healthcare sector, and is a joint advisory in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies. The objective of these malicious campaigns is to infiltrate targets in named sectors and to drop ransomware payloads, which will likely cause disruption of service and increase risk of actual harm to the health and safety of patients at hospitals, even with the aggravant of an ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. This document specifically refers to several crimeware exploitation frameworks, emphasizing the use of Ryuk ransomware as payload. The Ryuk ransomware payload is not new. It has been well documented and identified in multiple variants. Payloads need a carrier, and for Ryuk it has often been exploitation frameworks such as Cobalt Strike, or popular crimeware frameworks such as Emotet or Trickbot. - -[analytic_story://SQL Injection] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2017-09-19 -version = 1 -references = ["https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/66.html", "https://www.incapsula.com/web-application-security/sql-injection.html"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - SQL Injection with Long URLs - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to help you detect structured query language (SQL) injection attempts characterized by long URLs that contain malicious parameters. -narrative = It is very common for attackers to inject SQL parameters into vulnerable web applications, which then interpret the malicious SQL statements.\ -This Analytic Story contains a search designed to identify attempts by attackers to leverage this technique to compromise a host and gain a foothold in the target environment. - -[analytic_story://SamSam Ransomware] -category = Malware -last_updated = 2018-12-13 -version = 1 -references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/an-in-depth-analysis-of-samsam-ransomware-and-boss-spider/", "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/07/31/samsam-the-almost-6-million-ransomware/", "https://thehackernews.com/2018/07/samsam-ransomware-attacks.html"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"] -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the SamSam ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with SamSam, RDP brute force attacks, the presence of files with SamSam ransomware extensions, suspicious psexec use, and more. -narrative = The first version of the SamSam ransomware (a.k.a. Samas or SamsamCrypt) was launched in 2015 by a group of Iranian threat actors. The malicious software has affected and continues to affect thousands of victims and has raised almost $6M in ransom.\ -Although categorized under the heading of ransomware, SamSam campaigns have some importance distinguishing characteristics. Most notable is the fact that conventional ransomware is a numbers game. Perpetrators use a "spray-and-pray" approach with phishing campaigns or other mechanisms, charging a small ransom (typically under $1,000). The goal is to find a large number of victims willing to pay these mini-ransoms, adding up to a lucrative payday. They use relatively simple methods for infecting systems.\ -SamSam attacks are different beasts. They have become progressively more targeted and skillful than typical ransomware attacks. First, malicious actors break into a victim's network, surveil it, then run the malware manually. The attacks are tailored to cause maximum damage and the threat actors usually demand amounts in the tens of thousands of dollars.\ -In a typical attack on one large healthcare organization in 2018, the company ended up paying a ransom of four Bitcoins, then worth $56,707. Reports showed that access to the company's files was restored within two hours of paying the sum.\ -According to Sophos, SamSam previously leveraged RDP to gain access to targeted networks via brute force. SamSam is not spread automatically, like other malware. It requires skill because it forces the attacker to adapt their tactics to the individual environment. Next, the actors escalate their privileges to admin level. They scan the networks for worthy targets, using conventional tools, such as PsExec or PaExec, to deploy/execute, quickly encrypting files.\ -This Analytic Story includes searches designed to help detect and investigate signs of the SamSam ransomware, such as the creation of fileswrites to system32, writes with tell-tale extensions, batch files written to system32, and evidence of brute-force attacks via RDP. - -[analytic_story://Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2021-11-12 -version = 1 -references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/004/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule"] -description = Adversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. -narrative = InstallUtil is a command-line utility that allows for installation and uninstallation of resources by executing specific installer components specified in .NET binaries. InstallUtil is digitally signed by Microsoft and located in the .NET directories on a Windows system: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v\InstallUtil.exe and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v\InstallUtil.exe. \ -There are multiple ways to instantiate InstallUtil and they are all outlined within Atomic Red Team - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md. Two specific ways may be used and that includes invoking via installer assembly class constructor through .NET and via InstallUtil.exe. \ -Typically, adversaries will utilize the most commonly found way to invoke via InstallUtil Uninstall method. \ -Note that parallel processes, and parent process, play a role in how InstallUtil is being used. In particular, a developer using InstallUtil will spawn from VisualStudio. Adversaries, will spawn from non-standard processes like Explorer.exe, cmd.exe or PowerShell.exe. It's important to review the command-line to identify the DLL being loaded. \ -Parallel processes may also include csc.exe being used to compile a local `.cs` file. This file will be the input to the output. Developers usually do not build direct on the command shell, therefore this should raise suspicion. - -[analytic_story://Silver Sparrow] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2021-02-24 -version = 1 -references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/", "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/5-things-you-need-to-know-about-silver-sparrow/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage via OSquery - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior - Rule"] -description = Silver Sparrow, identified by Red Canary Intelligence, is a new forward looking MacOS (Intel and M1) malicious software downloader utilizing JavaScript for execution and a launchAgent to establish persistence. -narrative = Silver Sparrow works is a dropper and uses typical persistence mechanisms on a Mac. It is cross platform, covering both Intel and Apple M1 architecture. To this date, no implant has been downloaded for malicious purposes. During installation of the update.pkg or updater.pkg file, the malicious software utilizes JavaScript to generate files and scripts on disk for persistence.These files later download a implant from an S3 bucket every hour. This analytic assists with identifying different types of macOS malware families establishing LaunchAgent persistence. Per SentinelOne source, it is predicted that Silver Sparrow is likely selling itself as a mechanism to 3rd party “affiliates” or pay-per-install (PPI) partners, typically seen as commodity adware/malware. Additional indicators and behaviors may be found within the references. - -[analytic_story://Spearphishing Attachments] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2019-04-29 -version = 1 -references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/spear-phishing-campaign-targets-ukraine-government.html"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Splunk Research Team"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file - Rule", "ESCU - Excel Spawning PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Excel Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule", "ESCU - Gdrive suspicious file sharing - Rule", "ESCU - Gsuite suspicious calendar invite - Rule", "ESCU - MSHTML Module Load in Office Product - Rule", "ESCU - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Creating Schedule Task - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning CertUtil - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Writing cab or inf - Rule", "ESCU - Office Spawning Control - Rule", "ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule", "ESCU - Winword Spawning Cmd - Rule", "ESCU - Winword Spawning PowerShell - Rule"] -description = Detect signs of malicious payloads that may indicate that your environment has been breached via a phishing attack. -narrative = Despite its simplicity, phishing remains the most pervasive and dangerous cyberthreat. In fact, research shows that as many as [91% of all successful attacks](https://digitalguardian.com/blog/91-percent-cyber-attacks-start-phishing-email-heres-how-protect-against-phishing) are initiated via a phishing email. \ -As most people know, these emails use fraudulent domains, [email scraping](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), familiar contact names inserted as senders, and other tactics to lure targets into clicking a malicious link, opening an attachment with a [nefarious payload](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), or entering sensitive personal information that perpetrators may intercept. This attack technique requires a relatively low level of skill and allows adversaries to easily cast a wide net. Worse, because its success relies on the gullibility of humans, it's impossible to completely "automate" it out of your environment. However, you can use ES and ESCU to detect and investigate potentially malicious payloads injected into your environment subsequent to a phishing attack. \ -While any kind of file may contain a malicious payload, some are more likely to be perceived as benign (and thus more often escape notice) by the average victim—especially when the attacker sends an email that seems to be from one of their contacts. An example is Microsoft Office files. Most corporate users are familiar with documents with the following suffixes: .doc/.docx (MS Word), .xls/.xlsx (MS Excel), and .ppt/.pptx (MS PowerPoint), so they may click without a second thought, slashing a hole in their organizations' security. \ -Following is a typical series of events, according to an [article by Trend Micro](https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/rising-trend-attackers-using-lnk-files-download-malware/):\ -1. Attacker sends a phishing email. Recipient downloads the attached file, which is typically a .docx or .zip file with an embedded .lnk file\ -1. The .lnk file executes a PowerShell script\ -1. Powershell executes a reverse shell, rendering the exploit successful As a side note, adversaries are likely to use a tool like Empire to craft and obfuscate payloads and their post-injection activities, such as [exfiltration, lateral movement, and persistence](https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire).\ -This Analytic Story focuses on detecting signs that a malicious payload has been injected into your environment. For example, one search detects outlook.exe writing a .zip file. Another looks for suspicious .lnk files launching processes. - -[analytic_story://Suspicious AWS Login Activities] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2019-05-01 -version = 1 -references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"] -description = Monitor your AWS authentication events using your CloudTrail logs. Searches within this Analytic Story will help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious logins. -narrative = It is important to monitor and control who has access to your AWS infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins to your AWS infrastructure will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any EC2 instances created by the attacker. - -[analytic_story://Suspicious AWS S3 Activities] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2018-07-24 -version = 2 -references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cloud/public-aws-s3-buckets-writable/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"] -description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required. -narrative = As cloud computing has exploded, so has the number of creative attacks on virtual environments. And as the number-two cloud-service provider, Amazon Web Services (AWS) has certainly had its share.\ -Amazon's "shared responsibility" model dictates that the company has responsibility for the environment outside of the VM and the customer is responsible for the security inside of the S3 container. As such, it's important to stay vigilant for activities that may belie suspicious behavior inside of your environment.\ -Among things to look out for are S3 access from unfamiliar locations and by unfamiliar users. Some of the searches in this Analytic Story help you detect suspicious behavior and others help you investigate more deeply, when the situation warrants. - -[analytic_story://Suspicious AWS Traffic] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2018-05-07 -version = 1 -references = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/hiding-cloudcobalt-strike-beacon-c2-using-amazon-apis/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Lambda UpdateFunctionCode - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"] -description = Leverage these searches to monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as a spike in blocked outbound traffic in your virtual private cloud (VPC). -narrative = A virtual private cloud (VPC) is an on-demand managed cloud-computing service that isolates computing resources for each client. Inside the VPC container, the environment resembles a physical network. \ -Amazon's VPC service enables you to launch EC2 instances and leverage other Amazon resources. The traffic that flows in and out of this VPC can be controlled via network access-control rules and security groups. Amazon also has a feature called VPC Flow Logs that enables you to log IP traffic going to and from the network interfaces in your VPC. This data is stored using Amazon CloudWatch Logs.\ - Attackers may abuse the AWS infrastructure with insecure VPCs so they can co-opt AWS resources for command-and-control nodes, data exfiltration, and more. Once an EC2 instance is compromised, an attacker may initiate outbound network connections for malicious reasons. Monitoring these network traffic behaviors is crucial for understanding the type of traffic flowing in and out of your network and to alert you to suspicious activities.\ -The searches in this Analytic Story will monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors. - -[analytic_story://Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2020-06-04 -version = 1 -references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"] -description = Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity. -narrative = It is important to monitor and control who has access to your cloud infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any compute activity whether legitimate or otherwise.\ -This Analytic Story has data model versions of cloud searches leveraging Authentication data, including those looking for suspicious login activity, and cross-account activity for AWS. - -[analytic_story://Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2020-08-25 -version = 1 -references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect shared ec2 snapshot - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task"] -description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment. -narrative = Monitoring your cloud infrastructure logs allows you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the their cloud environments to ensure that your instances are not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your cloud compute instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities. - -[analytic_story://Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2018-08-20 -version = 1 -references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment. -narrative = Because most enterprise cloud infrastructure activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to add specific IPs to an allow list because they vary.\ -This Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further. - -[analytic_story://Suspicious Cloud User Activities] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2020-09-04 -version = 1 -references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Lambda UpdateFunctionCode - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"] -description = Detect and investigate suspicious activities by users and roles in your cloud environments. -narrative = It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it's all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable to attack. In fact, this was the very oversight that led to Tesla's cryptojacking attack in February, 2018.\ -In addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed for any new instances and increased bandwidth usage. - -[analytic_story://Suspicious Command-Line Executions] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2020-02-03 -version = 2 -references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059", "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/macro-malware", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Potentially malicious code on commandline - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] -description = Leveraging the Windows command-line interface (CLI) is one of the most common attack techniques--one that is also detailed in the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Use this Analytic Story to help you identify unusual or suspicious use of the CLI on Windows systems. -narrative = The ability to execute arbitrary commands via the Windows CLI is a primary goal for the adversary. With access to the shell, an attacker can easily run scripts and interact with the target system. Often, attackers may only have limited access to the shell or may obtain access in unusual ways. In addition, malware may execute and interact with the CLI in ways that would be considered unusual and inconsistent with typical user activity. This provides defenders with opportunities to identify suspicious use and investigate, as appropriate. This Analytic Story contains various searches to help identify this suspicious activity, as well as others to aid you in deeper investigation. - -[analytic_story://Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2021-02-11 -version = 1 -references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/htmlhelp/nf-htmlhelp-htmlhelpa"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect HTML Help Renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers - Rule"] -description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code. -narrative = Adversaries may abuse Compiled HTML files (.chm) to conceal malicious code. CHM files are commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTML Help system. CHM files are compressed compilations of various content such as HTML documents, images, and scripting/web related programming languages such VBA, JScript, Java, and ActiveX. CHM content is displayed using underlying components of the Internet Explorer browser loaded by the HTML Help executable program (hh.exe). \ -HH.exe relies upon hhctrl.ocx to load CHM topics.This will load upon execution of a chm file. \ -During investigation, review all parallel processes and child processes. It is possible for file modification events to occur and it is best to capture the CHM file and decompile it for further analysis. \ -Upon usage of InfoTech Storage Handlers, ms-its, its, mk, itss.dll will load. - -[analytic_story://Suspicious DNS Traffic] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2017-09-18 -version = 1 -references = ["http://blogs.splunk.com/2015/10/01/random-words-on-entropy-and-dns/", "http://www.darkreading.com/analytics/security-monitoring/got-malware-three-signs-revealed-in-dns-traffic/d/d-id/1139680", "https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/Threat-Vulnerability-Articles/What-are-suspicious-DNS-queries/ta-p/71454"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"] -description = Attackers often attempt to hide within or otherwise abuse the domain name system (DNS). You can thwart attempts to manipulate this omnipresent protocol by monitoring for these types of abuses. -narrative = Although DNS is one of the fundamental underlying protocols that make the Internet work, it is often ignored (perhaps because of its complexity and effectiveness). However, attackers have discovered ways to abuse the protocol to meet their objectives. One potential abuse involves manipulating DNS to hijack traffic and redirect it to an IP address under the attacker's control. This could inadvertently send users intending to visit google.com, for example, to an unrelated malicious website. Another technique involves using the DNS protocol for command-and-control activities with the attacker's malicious code or to covertly exfiltrate data. The searches within this Analytic Story look for these types of abuses. - -[analytic_story://Suspicious Emails] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2020-01-27 -version = 1 -references = ["https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/06/26/phishing-hits-a-new-level-of-quality/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -description = Email remains one of the primary means for attackers to gain an initial foothold within the modern enterprise. Detect and investigate suspicious emails in your environment with the help of the searches in this Analytic Story. -narrative = It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage targeted spearphishing campaigns and mass mailers to deliver weaponized email messages and attachments. Fortunately, there are a number of ways to monitor email data in Splunk to detect suspicious content.\ -Once a phishing message has been detected, the next steps are to answer the following questions: \ -1. Which users have received this or a similar message in the past?\ -1. When did the targeted campaign begin?\ -1. Have any users interacted with the content of the messages (by downloading an attachment or clicking on a malicious URL)?This Analytic Story provides detection searches to identify suspicious emails, as well as contextual and investigative searches to help answer some of these questions. - -[analytic_story://Suspicious GCP Storage Activities] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2020-08-05 -version = 1 -references = ["https://cloud.google.com/blog/product/gcp/4-steps-for-hardening-your-cloud-storage-buckets-taking-charge-of-your-security", "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/gcp/google-cloud-platform-gcp-bucket-enumeration/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Shannon Davis"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your GCP Storage buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open storage buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required. -narrative = Similar to other cloud providers, GCP operates on a shared responsibility model. This means the end user, you, are responsible for setting appropriate access control lists and permissions on your GCP resources.\ This Analytics Story concentrates on detecting things like open storage buckets (both read and write) along with storage bucket access from unfamiliar users and IP addresses. - -[analytic_story://Suspicious MSHTA Activity] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2021-01-20 -version = 2 -references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", "https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005/", "https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] -description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code. -narrative = One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the mshta.exe process, which loads Microsoft HTML applications (mshtml.dll) with the .hta suffix. In these cases, attackers use the trusted Windows utility to proxy execution of malicious files, whether an .hta application, javascript, or VBScript.\ -The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an attacker is leveraging mshta.exe to execute malicious code.\ -Triage\ -Validate execution \ -1. Determine if MSHTA.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of MSHTA.exe and further PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect.\ -1. Determine if script code was executed with MSHTA.\ -Situational Awareness\ -The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by MSHTA.exe.\ -1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application?\ -1. Module loads. Are the known MSHTA.exe modules being loaded by a non-standard application? Is MSHTA loading any suspicious .DLLs?\ -1. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain.\ -Retrieval of script code\ -The objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious. - -[analytic_story://Suspicious Okta Activity] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2020-04-02 -version = 1 -references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1078", "https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Credential_stuffing", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/answer/What-is-a-password-spraying-attack-and-how-does-it-work"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task"] -description = Monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities. Due to the Covid outbreak, many users are migrating over to leverage cloud services more and more. Okta is a popular tool to manage multiple users and the web-based applications they need to stay productive. The searches in this story will help monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities and associated user behaviors. -narrative = Okta is the leading single sign on (SSO) provider, allowing users to authenticate once to Okta, and from there access a variety of web-based applications. These applications are assigned to users and allow administrators to centrally manage which users are allowed to access which applications. It also provides centralized logging to help understand how the applications are used and by whom. \ -While SSO is a major convenience for users, it also provides attackers with an opportunity. If the attacker can gain access to Okta, they can access a variety of applications. As such monitoring the environment is important. \ -With people moving quickly to adopt web-based applications and ways to manage them, many are still struggling to understand how best to monitor these environments. This analytic story provides searches to help monitor this environment, and identify events and activity that warrant further investigation such as credential stuffing or password spraying attacks, and users logging in from multiple locations when travel is disallowed. - -[analytic_story://Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2021-02-11 -version = 1 -references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", "https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master/documentation/modules/evasion/windows/applocker_evasion_regasm_regsvcs.md", "https://oddvar.moe/2017/12/13/applocker-case-study-how-insecure-is-it-really-part-1/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect Regasm Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regasm with Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments - Rule"] -description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code. -narrative = Adversaries may abuse Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET Component Object Model (COM) assemblies. Both are digitally signed by Microsoft. The following queries assist with detecting suspicious and malicious usage of Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe. Upon reviewing usage of Regasm.exe Regsvcs.exe, review file modification events for possible script code written. Review parallel process events for csc.exe being utilized to compile script code. - -[analytic_story://Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2021-01-29 -version = 1 -references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious InProcServer32 Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule", "ESCU - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path - Rule"] -description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the regsvr32.exe process to execute malicious code. -narrative = One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the regsvr32.exe process. This particular bypass was popularized with "SquiblyDoo" using the "scrobj.dll" dll to load .sct scriptlets. This technique is still widely used by adversaries to bypass detection and prevention controls. The file extension of the DLL is irrelevant (it may load a .txt file extension for example). The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging regsvr32.exe to execute malicious code. Validate execution Determine if regsvr32.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of regsvr32.exe and further PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect. Determine if script code was executed with regsvr32. Situational Awareness - The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by regsvr32.exe. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application? Module loads. Is regsvr32 loading any suspicious .DLLs? Unsigned or signed from non-standard paths. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain. Retrieval of Script Code - confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious. - -[analytic_story://Suspicious Rundll32 Activity] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2021-02-03 -version = 1 -references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule"] -description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage rundll32.exe to execute arbitrary malicious code. -narrative = One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the rundll32.exe process. Natively, rundll32.exe will load DLLs and is a great example of a Living off the Land Binary. Rundll32.exe may load malicious DLLs by ordinals, function names or directly. The queries in this story focus on loading default DLLs, syssetup.dll, ieadvpack.dll, advpack.dll and setupapi.dll from disk that may be abused by adversaries. Additionally, two analytics developed to assist with identifying DLLRegisterServer, Start and StartW functions being called. The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging rundll32.exe to execute malicious code. - -[analytic_story://Suspicious WMI Use] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2018-10-23 -version = 2 -references = ["https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Graeber-Abusing-Windows-Management-Instrumentation-WMI-To-Build-A-Persistent%20Asynchronous-And-Fileless-Backdoor-wp.pdf", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/wmimplant_a_wmi_ba.html"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect WMI Event Subscription Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - WMIC XSL Execution via URL - Rule", "ESCU - Windows WMI Process Call Create - Rule", "ESCU - XSL Script Execution With WMIC - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task"] -description = Attackers are increasingly abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), a framework and associated utilities available on all modern Windows operating systems. Because WMI can be leveraged to manage both local and remote systems, it is important to identify the processes executed and the user context within which the activity occurred. -narrative = WMI is a Microsoft infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows operating systems. It includes of a set of utilities that can be leveraged to manage both local and remote Windows systems. Attackers are increasingly turning to WMI abuse in their efforts to conduct nefarious tasks, such as reconnaissance, detection of antivirus and virtual machines, code execution, lateral movement, persistence, and data exfiltration. The detection searches included in this Analytic Story are used to look for suspicious use of WMI commands that attackers may leverage to interact with remote systems. The searches specifically look for the use of WMI to run processes on remote systems. In the event that unauthorized WMI execution occurs, it will be important for analysts and investigators to determine the context of the event. These details may provide insights related to how WMI was used and to what end. - -[analytic_story://Suspicious Windows Registry Activities] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2018-05-31 -version = 1 -references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Disable UAC Remote Restriction - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] -description = Monitor and detect registry changes initiated from remote locations, which can be a sign that an attacker has infiltrated your system. -narrative = Attackers are developing increasingly sophisticated techniques for hijacking target servers, while evading detection. One such technique that has become progressively more common is registry modification.\ - The registry is a key component of the Windows operating system. It has a hierarchical database called "registry" that contains settings, options, and values for executables. Once the threat actor gains access to a machine, they can use reg.exe to modify their account to obtain administrator-level privileges, maintain persistence, and move laterally within the environment.\ - The searches in this story are designed to help you detect behaviors associated with manipulation of the Windows registry. - -[analytic_story://Suspicious Zoom Child Processes] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2020-04-13 -version = 1 -references = ["https://blog.rapid7.com/2020/04/02/dispelling-zoom-bugbears-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-latest-zoom-vulnerabilities/", "https://threatpost.com/two-zoom-zero-day-flaws-uncovered/154337/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task"] -description = Attackers are using Zoom as an vector to increase privileges on a sytems. This story detects new child processes of zoom and provides investigative actions for this detection. -narrative = Zoom is a leader in modern enterprise video communications and its usage has increased dramatically with a large amount of the population under stay-at-home orders due to the COVID-19 pandemic. With increased usage has come increased scrutiny and several security flaws have been found with this application on both Windows and macOS systems.\ -Current detections focus on finding new child processes of this application on a per host basis. Investigative searches are included to gather information needed during an investigation. - -[analytic_story://Trickbot] -category = Malware -last_updated = 2021-04-20 -version = 1 -references = ["https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trickbot", "https://blog.checkpoint.com/2021/03/11/february-2021s-most-wanted-malware-trickbot-takes-over-following-emotet-shutdown/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Account Discovery With Net App - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", "ESCU - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule", "ESCU - Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Remote Thread To Known Windows Process - Rule", "ESCU - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ESCU - Trickbot Named Pipe - Rule", "ESCU - Wermgr Process Connecting To IP Check Web Services - Rule", "ESCU - Wermgr Process Create Executable File - Rule", "ESCU - Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process - Rule"] -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the trickbot banking trojan, including looking for file writes associated with its payload, process injection, shellcode execution and data collection even in LDAP environment. -narrative = trickbot banking trojan campaigns targeting banks and other vertical sectors.This malware is known in Microsoft Windows OS where target security Microsoft Defender to prevent its detection and removal. steal Verizon credentials and targeting banks using its multi component modules that collect and exfiltrate data. - -[analytic_story://Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2021-01-12 -version = 1 -references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule"] -description = Monitor and detect behaviors used by attackers who leverage trusted developer utilities to execute malicious code. -narrative = Adversaries may take advantage of trusted developer utilities to proxy execution of malicious payloads. There are many utilities used for software development related tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development, debugging, and reverse engineering. These utilities may often be signed with legitimate certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution of malicious code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application control solutions.\ -The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe to execute malicious code. - -[analytic_story://Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2021-01-21 -version = 1 -references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/001/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md", "https://github.com/infosecn1nja/MaliciousMacroMSBuild", "https://github.com/xorrior/RandomPS-Scripts/blob/master/Invoke-ExecuteMSBuild.ps1", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/", "https://github.com/MHaggis/CBR-Queries/blob/master/msbuild.md"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - MSBuild Suspicious Spawned By Script Process - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule"] -description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the msbuild.exe process to execute malicious code. -narrative = Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio and is native to Windows. It handles XML formatted project files that define requirements for loading and building various platforms and configurations.\ -The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# code to be inserted into an XML project file. MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application control defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution.\ -The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging msbuild.exe to execute malicious code.\ -Triage\ -Validate execution\ -1. Determine if MSBuild.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of MSBuild.exe and further PE metadata.\ -1. Determine if script code was executed with MSBuild.\ -Situational Awareness\ -The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by MSBuild.exe.\ -1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application?\ -1. Module loads. Are the known MSBuild.exe modules being loaded by a non-standard application? Is MSbuild loading any suspicious .DLLs?\ -1. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain.\ -Retrieval of script code\ -The objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious. - -[analytic_story://Unusual Processes] -category = Malware -last_updated = 2020-02-04 -version = 2 -references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/08/monitoring-windows-console-activity-part-two.html", "https://www.splunk.com/pdfs/technical-briefs/advanced-threat-detection-and-response-tech-brief.pdf", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/logging/detecting-security-incidents-windows-workstation-event-logs-34262"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Shimcache Flush - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Copy on System32 - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Verclsid CLSID Execution - Rule", "ESCU - WinRM Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Remote Assistance Spawning Process - Rule", "ESCU - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] -description = Quickly identify systems running new or unusual processes in your environment that could be indicators of suspicious activity. Processes run from unusual locations, those with conspicuously long command lines, and rare executables are all examples of activities that may warrant deeper investigation. -narrative = Being able to profile a host's processes within your environment can help you more quickly identify processes that seem out of place when compared to the rest of the population of hosts or asset types.\ -This Analytic Story lets you identify processes that are either a) not typically seen running or b) have some sort of suspicious command-line arguments associated with them. This Analytic Story will also help you identify the user running these processes and the associated process activity on the host.\ -In the event an unusual process is identified, it is imperative to better understand how that process was able to execute on the host, when it first executed, and whether other hosts are affected. This extra information may provide clues that can help the analyst further investigate any suspicious activity. - -[analytic_story://Use of Cleartext Protocols] -category = Best Practices -last_updated = 2017-09-15 -version = 1 -references = ["https://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"] -description = Leverage searches that detect cleartext network protocols that may leak credentials or should otherwise be encrypted. -narrative = Various legacy protocols operate by default in the clear, without the protections of encryption. This potentially leaks sensitive information that can be exploited by passively sniffing network traffic. Depending on the protocol, this information could be highly sensitive, or could allow for session hijacking. In addition, these protocols send authentication information, which would allow for the harvesting of usernames and passwords that could potentially be used to authenticate and compromise secondary systems. - -[analytic_story://WhisperGate] -category = Malware -last_updated = 2022-01-19 -version = 1 -references = ["https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/", "https://medium.com/s2wblog/analysis-of-destructive-malware-whispergate-targeting-ukraine-9d5d158f19f3"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive File Deletion In WinDefender Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Ping Sleep Batch Command - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Remove Windows Defender Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule", "ESCU - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows High File Deletion Frequency - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun - Rule", "ESCU - Windows NirSoft Utilities - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule", "ESCU - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule"] -description = This analytic story contains detections that allow security analysts to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the destructive malware targeting Ukrainian organizations also known as "WhisperGate". This analytic story looks for suspicious process execution, command-line activity, downloads, DNS queries and more. -narrative = WhisperGate/DEV-0586 is destructive malware operation found by MSTIC (Microsoft Threat Inteligence Center) targeting multiple organizations in Ukraine. This operation campaign consist of several malware component like the downloader that abuses discord platform, overwrite or destroy master boot record (MBR) of the targeted host, wiper and also windows defender evasion techniques. - -[analytic_story://Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2020-07-28 -version = 1 -references = ["https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/", "https://support.microsoft.com/en-au/help/4569509/windows-dns-server-remote-code-execution-vulnerability"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Shannon Davis"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -description = Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-1350, or SIGRed. Discovered by Checkpoint researchers, this vulnerability affects Windows 2003 to 2019, and is triggered by a malicious DNS response (only affects DNS over TCP). An attacker can use the malicious payload to cause a buffer overflow on the vulnerable system, leading to compromise. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify the large response payload for SIG and KEY DNS records which can be used for the exploit. -narrative = When a client requests a DNS record for a particular domain, that request gets routed first through the client's locally configured DNS server, then to any DNS server(s) configured as forwarders, and then onto the target domain's own DNS server(s). If a attacker wanted to, they could host a malicious DNS server that responds to the initial request with a specially crafted large response (~65KB). This response would flow through to the client's local DNS server, which if not patched for CVE-2020-1350, would cause the buffer overflow. The detection searches in this Analytic Story use wire data to detect the malicious behavior. Searches for Splunk Stream and Zeek are included. The Splunk Stream search correlates across stream:dns and stream:tcp, while the Zeek search correlates across bro:dns:json and bro:conn:json. These correlations are required to pick up both the DNS record types (SIG and KEY) along with the payload size (>65KB). - -[analytic_story://Windows Defense Evasion Tactics] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2018-05-31 -version = 1 -references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Defense_Evasion"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule", "ESCU - CSC Net On The Fly Compilation - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Registry Tool - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Show Hidden Files - Rule", "ESCU - Disable UAC Remote Restriction - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling CMD Application - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling ControlPanel - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Firewall with Netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling NoRun Windows App - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling SystemRestore In Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Task Manager - Rule", "ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive number of service control start as disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Firewall Allowed Program Enable - Rule", "ESCU - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - NET Profiler UAC bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - SLUI RunAs Elevated - Rule", "ESCU - SLUI Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Sdclt UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - SilentCleanup UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll - Rule", "ESCU - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DISM Remove Defender - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event For Service Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Rasautou DLL Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] -description = Detect tactics used by malware to evade defenses on Windows endpoints. A few of these include suspicious `reg.exe` processes, files hidden with `attrib.exe` and disabling user-account control, among many others -narrative = Defense evasion is a tactic--identified in the MITRE ATT&CK framework--that adversaries employ in a variety of ways to bypass or defeat defensive security measures. There are many techniques enumerated by the MITRE ATT&CK framework that are applicable in this context. This Analytic Story includes searches designed to identify the use of such techniques on Windows platforms. - -[analytic_story://Windows File Extension and Association Abuse] -category = Malware -last_updated = 2018-01-26 -version = 1 -references = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/12/file-extensions-2/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] -description = Detect and investigate suspected abuse of file extensions and Windows file associations. Some of the malicious behaviors involved may include inserting spaces before file extensions or prepending the file extension with a different one, among other techniques. -narrative = Attackers use a variety of techniques to entice users to run malicious code or to persist on an endpoint. One way to accomplish these goals is to leverage file extensions and the mechanism Windows uses to associate files with specific applications. \ - Since its earliest days, Windows has used extensions to identify file types. Users have become familiar with these extensions and their application associations. For example, if users see that a file ends in `.doc` or `.docx`, they will assume that it is a Microsoft Word document and expect that double-clicking will open it using `winword.exe`. The user will typically also presume that the `.docx` file is safe. \ - Attackers take advantage of this expectation by obfuscating the true file extension. They can accomplish this in a couple of ways. One technique involves inserting multiple spaces in the file name before the extension to hide the extension from the GUI, obscuring the true nature of the file. Another approach involves prepending the real extension with a different one. This is especially effective when Windows is configured to "hide extensions for known file types." In this case, the real extension is not displayed, but the prepended one is, leading end users to believe the file is a different type than it actually is.\ -Changing the association between a file extension and an application can allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code. The technique typically involves changing the association for an often-launched file type to associate instead with a malicious program the attacker has dropped on the endpoint. When the end user launches a file that has been manipulated in this way, it will execute the attacker's malware. It will also execute the application the end user expected to run, cleverly obscuring the fact that something suspicious has occurred.\ -Run the searches in this story to detect and investigate suspicious behavior that may indicate abuse or manipulation of Windows file extensions and/or associations. - -[analytic_story://Windows Log Manipulation] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2017-09-12 -version = 2 -references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", "https://zeltser.com/security-incident-log-review-checklist/", "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2013/01/re-introducing-usnjrnl.html"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] -description = Adversaries often try to cover their tracks by manipulating Windows logs. Use these searches to help you monitor for suspicious activity surrounding log files--an essential component of an effective defense. -narrative = Because attackers often modify system logs to cover their tracks and/or to thwart the investigative process, log monitoring is an industry-recognized best practice. While there are legitimate reasons to manipulate system logs, it is still worthwhile to keep track of who manipulated the logs, when they manipulated them, and in what way they manipulated them (determining which accesses, tools, or utilities were employed). Even if no malicious activity is detected, the knowledge of an attempt to manipulate system logs may be indicative of a broader security risk that should be thoroughly investigated.\ -The Analytic Story gives users two different ways to detect manipulation of Windows Event Logs and one way to detect deletion of the Update Sequence Number (USN) Change Journal. The story helps determine the history of the host and the users who have accessed it. Finally, the story aides in investigation by retrieving all the information on the process that caused these events (if the process has been identified). - -[analytic_story://Windows Persistence Techniques] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2018-05-31 -version = 2 -references = ["http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/19.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html", "http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/common-malware-persistence-mechanisms/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dq2Hv7J9fvk"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Active Setup Registry Autostart - Rule", "ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ESCU - Change Default File Association - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Logon Script Event Trigger Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Print Processor Registry Autostart - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Screensaver Event Trigger Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Time Provider Persistence Registry - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Schtasks Create Run As System - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] -description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on a Windows system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment. -narrative = Maintaining persistence is one of the first steps taken by attackers after the initial compromise. Attackers leverage various custom and built-in tools to ensure survivability and persistent access within a compromised enterprise. This Analytic Story provides searches to help you identify various behaviors used by attackers to maintain persistent access to a Windows environment. - -[analytic_story://Windows Privilege Escalation] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2020-02-04 -version = 2 -references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Active Setup Registry Autostart - Rule", "ESCU - Change Default File Association - Rule", "ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Logon Script Event Trigger Execution - Rule", "ESCU - MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Print Processor Registry Autostart - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Runas Execution in CommandLine - Rule", "ESCU - Screensaver Event Trigger Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Time Provider Persistence Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] -description = Monitor for and investigate activities that may be associated with a Windows privilege-escalation attack, including unusual processes running on endpoints, modified registry keys, and more. -narrative = Privilege escalation is a "land-and-expand" technique, wherein an adversary gains an initial foothold on a host and then exploits its weaknesses to increase his privileges. The motivation is simple: certain actions on a Windows machine--such as installing software--may require higher-level privileges than those the attacker initially acquired. By increasing his privilege level, the attacker can gain the control required to carry out his malicious ends. This Analytic Story provides searches to detect and investigate behaviors that attackers may use to elevate their privileges in your environment. - -[analytic_story://Windows Service Abuse] -category = Malware -last_updated = 2017-11-02 -version = 3 -references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] -description = Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence and the ability to load drivers or otherwise interact with the Windows kernel. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows services are being modified or created in a suspicious manner. -narrative = The Windows operating system uses a services architecture to allow for running code in the background, similar to a UNIX daemon. Attackers will often leverage Windows services for persistence, hiding in plain sight, seeking the ability to run privileged code that can interact with the kernel. In many cases, attackers will create a new service to host their malicious code. Attackers have also been observed modifying unnecessary or unused services to point to their own code, as opposed to what was intended. In these cases, attackers often use tools to create or modify services in ways that are not typical for most environments, providing opportunities for detection. - -[analytic_story://XMRig] -category = Malware -last_updated = 2021-05-07 -version = 1 -references = ["https://github.com/xmrig/xmrig", "https://www.getmonero.org/resources/user-guides/mine-to-pool.html", "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/", "https://blog.checkpoint.com/2021/03/11/february-2021s-most-wanted-malware-trickbot-takes-over-following-emotet-shutdown/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Rod Soto Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Of Net Users - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows App Hotkeys - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Net User Account - Rule", "ESCU - Download Files Using Telegram - Rule", "ESCU - Enumerate Users Local Group Using Telegram - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Attempt To Disable Services - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Service Stop Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Cacls App - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Taskkill - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen - Rule", "ESCU - ICACLS Grant Command - Rule", "ESCU - Icacls Deny Command - Rule", "ESCU - Modify ACL permission To Files Or Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Process Kill Base On File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks Run Task On Demand - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Driver Loaded Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - XMRIG Driver Loaded - Rule"] -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the xmrig monero, including looking for file writes associated with its payload, process command-line, defense evasion (killing services, deleting users, modifying files or folder permission, killing other malware or other coin miner) and hacking tools including Telegram as mean of command and control (C2) to download other files. Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems in order to solve resource intensive problems which may impact system and/or hosted service availability. One common purpose for Resource Hijacking is to validate transactions of cryptocurrency networks and earn virtual currency. Adversaries may consume enough system resources to negatively impact and/or cause affected machines to become unresponsive. (1) Servers and cloud-based (2) systems are common targets because of the high potential for available resources, but user endpoint systems may also be compromised and used for Resource Hijacking and cryptocurrency mining. -narrative = XMRig is a high performance, open source, cross platform RandomX, KawPow, CryptoNight and AstroBWT unified CPU/GPU miner. This monero is seen in the wild on May 2017. - -[analytic_story://sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation] -category = Privilege Escalation -last_updated = 2021-12-20 -version = 1 -references = ["https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42278", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42287", "https://exploit.ph/cve-2021-42287-cve-2021-42278-weaponisation.html"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Mauricio Velazco"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Computer Account Name Change - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request - Rule"] -description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with the exploitation of the sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287) vulnerabilities. -narrative = On November 9, 2021, Microsoft released patches to address two vulnerabilities that affect Windows Active Directory networks, sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287). On December 10, 2021, security researchers Charlie Clark and Andrew Schwartz released a blog post where they shared how to weaponise these vulnerabilities in a target network an the initial detection opportunities. When successfully exploited, CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287 allow an adversary, who has stolen the credentials of a low priviled domain user, to obtain a Kerberos Service ticket for a Domain Controller computer account. The only requirement is to have network connectivity to a domain controller. This attack vector effectivelly allows attackers to escalate their privileges in an Active Directory from a regular domain user account and take control of a domain controller. While patches have been released to address these vulnerabilities, deploying detection controls for this attack may help help defenders identify attackers attempting exploitation. - -### END STORIES ### - ### DETECTIONS ### -[savedsearch://ESCU - 7zip CommandLine To SMB Share Path - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious 7z process with commandline pointing to SMB network share. This technique was seen in CONTI LEAK tools where it use 7z to archive a sensitive files and place it in network share tmp folder. This search is a good hunting query that may give analyst a hint why specific user try to archive a file pointing to SMB user which is un usual. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed 7z.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1560.001", "T1560"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule] type = detection asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen cities. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ - This search will fire any time a new city is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your city, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. +explanation = This search will detect a spike in the number of API calls made to your cloud infrastructure environment by a user. +how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User` to create the probability density function. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} +known_false_positives = providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule] type = detection asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen countries. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching over plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ - This search will fire any time a new country is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen IP addresses. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ - This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen regions. Region in this context is similar to a state in the United States. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ - This search will fire any time a new region is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your region, there should be few false positives. If you are located in regions where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. +explanation = This search will detect a spike in the number of API calls made to your cloud infrastructure environment about security groups by a user. +how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User` to create the probability density function model. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} +known_false_positives = providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources - Rule] @@ -1588,7 +73,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Account confidence = medium explanation = This search provides detection of KMS keys where action kms:Encrypt is accessible for everyone (also outside of your organization). This is an indicator that your account is compromised and the attacker uses the encryption key to compromise another company. how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs -annotations = {"mitre_attack": ["T1486"]} +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -1598,7 +83,7 @@ asset_type = S3 Bucket confidence = medium explanation = This search provides detection of users with KMS keys performing encryption specifically against S3 buckets. how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs -annotations = {"mitre_attack": ["T1486"]} +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"]} known_false_positives = bucket with S3 encryption providing_technologies = [] @@ -1652,16 +137,6 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmaps or secrets -how_to_implement = You must install Splunk Add-on for Amazon Web Services and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -known_false_positives = Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user and object context can provide guidance for detection. -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Excessive Security Scanning - Rule] type = detection asset_type = AWS Account @@ -1674,7 +149,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = AWS Account confidence = medium explanation = The following detection identifies excessive AccessDenied events within an hour timeframe. It is possible that an access key to AWS may have been stolen and is being misused to perform discovery events. In these instances, the access is not available with the key stolen therefore these events will be generated. how_to_implement = The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs. @@ -1684,7 +159,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = AWS Account confidence = medium explanation = The following detection identifies any malformed policy document exceptions with a status of `failure`. A malformed policy document exception occurs in instances where roles are attempted to be assumed, or brute forced. In a brute force attempt, using a tool like CloudSploit or Pacu, an attempt will look like `arn:aws:iam::111111111111:role/aws-service-role/rds.amazonaws.com/AWSServiceRoleForRDS`. Meaning, when an adversary is attempting to identify a role name, multiple failures will occur. This detection focuses on the errors of a remote attempt that is failing. how_to_implement = The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs. Set the `where count` greater than a value to identify suspicious activity in your environment. @@ -1694,7 +169,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - AWS IAM Delete Policy - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = AWS Account confidence = medium explanation = The following detection identifes when a policy is deleted on AWS. This does not identify whether successful or failed, but the error messages tell a story of suspicious attempts. There is a specific process to follow when deleting a policy. First, detach the policy from all users, groups, and roles that the policy is attached to, using DetachUserPolicy , DetachGroupPolicy , or DetachRolePolicy. how_to_implement = The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs. @@ -1704,7 +179,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - AWS IAM Failure Group Deletion - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = AWS Account confidence = medium explanation = This detection identifies failure attempts to delete groups. We want to identify when a group is attempting to be deleted, but either access is denied, there is a conflict or there is no group. This is indicative of administrators performing an action, but also could be suspicious behavior occurring. Review parallel IAM events - recently added users, new groups and so forth. how_to_implement = The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs. @@ -1714,7 +189,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = AWS Account confidence = medium explanation = The following query uses IAM events to track the success of a group being deleted on AWS. This is typically not indicative of malicious behavior, but a precurser to additional events thay may unfold. Review parallel IAM events - recently added users, new groups and so forth. Inversely, review failed attempts in a similar manner. how_to_implement = The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs. @@ -1758,7 +233,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Federated Account confidence = medium explanation = This search provides specific SAML access from specific Service Provider, user and targeted principal at AWS. This search provides specific information to detect abnormal access or potential credential hijack or forgery, specially in federated environments using SAML protocol inside the perimeter or cloud provider. how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs -annotations = {"mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} known_false_positives = Attacks using a Golden SAML or SAML assertion hijacks or forgeries are very difficult to detect as accessing cloud providers with these assertions looks exactly like normal access, however things such as source IP sourceIPAddress user, and principal targeted at receiving cloud provider along with endpoint credential access and abuse detection searches can provide the necessary context to detect these attacks. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1768,7 +243,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Federated Account confidence = medium explanation = This search provides detection of updates to SAML provider in AWS. Updates to SAML provider need to be monitored closely as they may indicate possible perimeter compromise of federated credentials, or backdoor access from another cloud provider set by attacker. how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs. -annotations = {"mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} known_false_positives = Updating a SAML provider or creating a new one may not necessarily be malicious however it needs to be closely monitored. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1792,476 +267,6 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created keys for another user. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where an abnormally high number of instances were successfully terminated by a user in a 10-minute window. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured with your AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify whether this search alerted on a human user. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user successfully terminates an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = This search will detect a spike in the number of API calls made to your cloud infrastructure environment by a user. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User` to create the probability density function. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} -known_false_positives = -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Cloud Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = This search finds for the number successfully destroyed cloud instances for every 4 hour block. This is split up between weekdays and the weekend. It then applies the probability densitiy model previously created and alerts on any outliers. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed` to create the probability density function. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within a cloud infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Cloud Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = This search finds for the number successfully created cloud instances for every 4 hour block. This is split up between weekdays and the weekend. It then applies the probability densitiy model previously created and alerts on any outliers. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched` to create the probability density function. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = This search will detect a spike in the number of API calls made to your cloud infrastructure environment about security groups by a user. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User` to create the probability density function model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} -known_false_positives = -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Windows -confidence = medium -explanation = Detect memory dumping of the LSASS process. -how_to_implement = This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 10 for lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators can create memory dumps for debugging purposes, but memory dumps of the LSASS process would be unusual. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Account Discovery With Net App - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = this search is to detect a potential account discovery series of command used by several malware or attack to recon the target machine. This technique is also seen in some note worthy malware like trickbot where it runs a cmd process, or even drop its module that will execute the said series of net command. This series of command are good correlation search and indicator of attacker recon if seen in the machines within a none technical user or department (HR, finance, ceo and etc) network. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"]} -known_false_positives = admin or power user may used this series of command. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Active Setup Registry Autostart - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of the active setup registry for persistence and privilege escalation. This technique was seen in several malware (poisonIvy), adware and APT to gain persistence to the compromised machine upon boot up. This TTP is a good indicator to further check the process id that do the modification since modification of this registry is not commonly done. check the legitimacy of the file and process involve in this rules to check if it is a valid setup installer that creating or modifying this registry. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.014", "T1547"]} -known_false_positives = Active setup installer may add or modify this registry. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Add DefaultUser And Password In Registry - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = this search is to detect a suspicious registry modification to implement auto admin logon to a host. This technique was seen in BlackMatter ransomware to automatically logon to the compromise host after triggering a safemode boot to continue encrypting the whole network. This behavior is not a common practice and really a suspicious TTP or alert need to be consider if found within then network premise. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1552.002", "T1552"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic will identify a suspicious process command-line related to Windows Defender exclusion feature. This command is abused by adversaries, malware authors and red teams to bypass Windows Defender Antivirus products by excluding folder path, file path, process and extensions. From its real time or schedule scan to execute their malicious code. This is a good indicator for defense evasion and to look further for events after this behavior. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"]} -known_false_positives = Admin or user may choose to use this windows features. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AdsiSearcher Account Discovery - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator being used to query Active Directory for domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `[Adsisearcher]` to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious modification of firewall to allow file and printer sharing. This technique was seen in ransomware to be able to discover more machine connected to the compromised host to encrypt more files -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007", "T1562"]} -known_false_positives = network admin may modify this firewall feature that may cause this rule to be triggered. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic detects a potential suspicious modification of firewall rule registry allowing inbound traffic in specific port with public profile. This technique was identified when an adversary wants to grant remote access to a machine by allowing the traffic in a firewall rule. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021"]} -known_false_positives = network admin may add/remove/modify public inbound firewall rule that may cause this rule to be triggered. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Allow Inbound Traffic In Firewall Rule - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell command to allow inbound traffic inbound to a specific local port within the public profile. This technique was seen in some attacker want to have a remote access to a machine by allowing the traffic in firewall rule. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the powershell logs from your endpoints. make sure you enable needed registry to monitor this event. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021"]} -known_false_positives = administrator may allow inbound traffic in certain network or machine. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious modification to the firewall to allow network discovery on a machine. This technique was seen in couple of ransomware (revil, reddot) to discover other machine connected to the compromised host to encrypt more files. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007", "T1562"]} -known_false_positives = network admin may modify this firewall feature that may cause this rule to be triggered. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Allow Operation with Consent Admin - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic identifies a potential privilege escalation attempt to perform malicious task. This registry modification is designed to allow the `Consent Admin` to perform an operation that requires elevation without consent or credentials. We also found this in some attacker to gain privilege escalation to the compromise machine. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster Pod -confidence = medium -explanation = This search provides detection information on unauthenticated requests against Kubernetes' Pods API -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on forAWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudWatch EKS Logs.Please also customize the `kubernetes_pods_aws_scan_fingerprint_detection` macro to filter out the false positives. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"]} -known_false_positives = Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, UA and source IPs and direct request to API provide context. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster -confidence = medium -explanation = This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster in AWS -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudWatch EKS Logs inputs. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"]} -known_false_positives = Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, UA and source IPs will provide context. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Anomalous usage of 7zip - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following detection identifies a 7z.exe spawned from `Rundll32.exe` or `Dllhost.exe`. It is assumed that the adversary has brought in `7z.exe` and `7z.dll`. It has been observed where an adversary will rename `7z.exe`. Additional coverage may be required to identify the behavior of renamed instances of `7z.exe`. During triage, identify the source of injection into `Rundll32.exe` or `Dllhost.exe`. Capture any files written to disk and analyze as needed. Review parallel processes for additional behaviors. Typically, archiving files will result in exfiltration. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1560.001", "T1560"]} -known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as this behavior is not normal for `rundll32.exe` or `dllhost.exe` to spawn and run 7zip. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a file using `DownloadFile` method. This particular method is utilized in many different PowerShell frameworks to download files and output to disk. Identify the source (IP/domain) and destination file and triage appropriately. If AMSI logging or PowerShell transaction logs are available, review for further details of the implant. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"]} -known_false_positives = False positives may be present and filtering will need to occur by parent process or command line argument. It may be required to modify this query to an EDR product for more granular coverage. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a file using `DownloadString` method. This particular method is utilized in many different PowerShell frameworks to download files and output to disk. Identify the source (IP/domain) and destination file and triage appropriately. If AMSI logging or PowerShell transaction logs are available, review for further details of the implant. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"]} -known_false_positives = False positives may be present and filtering will need to occur by parent process or command line argument. It may be required to modify this query to an EDR product for more granular coverage. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for execution of commonly used attacker tools on an endpoint. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is usually generated via logs that report process tracking in your Windows audit settings. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 2"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.005", "T1036", "T1003", "T1595"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} -known_false_positives = Some administrator activity can be potentially triggered, please add those users to the filter macro. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1553.004", "T1553"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = There may be legitimate reasons for administrators to add a certificate to the untrusted certificate store. In such cases, this will typically be done on a large number of systems. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for attempts to stop security-related services on the endpoint. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = None identified. Attempts to disable security-related services should be identified and understood. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = None identified. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = this search is to detect a suspicious registry modification to implement auto admin logon to a host. This technique was seen in BlackMatter ransomware to automatically logon to the compromise host after triggering a safemode boot to continue encrypting the whole network. This behavior is not a common practice and really a suspicious TTP or alert need to be consider if found within then network premise. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1552.002", "T1552"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for flags passed to bcdedit.exe modifications to the built-in Windows error recovery boot configurations. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent recovery. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. Tune based on parent process names. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators may modify the boot configuration. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - BITS Job Persistence - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service utility `bitsadmin.exe` scheduling a BITS job to persist on an endpoint. The query identifies the parameters used to create, resume or add a file to a BITS job. Typically seen combined in a oneliner or ran in sequence. If identified, review the BITS job created and capture any files written to disk. It is possible for BITS to be used to upload files and this may require further network data analysis to identify. You can use `bitsadmin /list /verbose` to list out the jobs during investigation. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1197"]} -known_false_positives = Limited false positives will be present. Typically, applications will use `BitsAdmin.exe`. Any filtering should be done based on command-line arguments (legitimate applications) or parent process. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service utility `bitsadmin.exe` using the `transfer` parameter to download a remote object. In addition, look for `download` or `upload` on the command-line, the switches are not required to perform a transfer. Capture any files downloaded. Review the reputation of the IP or domain used. Typically once executed, a follow on command will be used to execute the dropped file. Note that the network connection or file modification events related will not spawn or create from `bitsadmin.exe`, but the artifacts will appear in a parallel process of `svchost.exe` with a command-line similar to `svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s BITS`. It's important to review all parallel and child processes to capture any behaviors and artifacts. In some suspicious and malicious instances, BITS jobs will be created. You can use `bitsadmin /list /verbose` to list out the jobs during investigation. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1197", "T1105"]} -known_false_positives = Limited false positives, however it may be required to filter based on parent process name or network connection. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The search looks for a batch file (.bat) written to the Windows system directory tree. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204", "T1204.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = It is possible for this search to generate a notable event for a batch file write to a path that includes the string "system32", but is not the actual Windows system directory. As such, you should confirm the path of the batch file identified by the search. In addition, a false positive may be generated by an administrator copying a legitimate batch file in this directory tree. You should confirm that the activity is legitimate and modify the search to add exclusions, as necessary. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Bcdedit Command Back To Normal Mode Boot - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious bcdedit commandline to configure the host from safe mode back to normal boot configuration. This technique was seen in blackMatter ransomware where it force the compromised host to boot in safe mode to continue its encryption and bring back to normal boot using bcdedit deletevalue command. This TTP can be a good alert for host that booted from safe mode forcefully since it need to modify the boot configuration to bring it back to normal. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - CHCP Command Execution - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect execution of chcp.exe application. this utility is used to change the active code page of the console. This technique was seen in icedid malware to know the locale region/language/country of the compromise host. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed chcp.com may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"]} -known_false_positives = other tools or script may used this to change code page to UTF-* or others -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies command-line arguments where `cmd.exe /c` is used to execute a program. `cmd /c` is used to run commands in MS-DOS and terminate after command or process completion. This technique is commonly seen in adversaries and malware to execute batch command using different shell like PowerShell or different process other than `cmd.exe`. This is a good hunting query for suspicious command-line made by a script or relative process execute it. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003", "T1059"]} -known_false_positives = False positives may be high based on legitimate scripted code in any environment. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic identifies a common behavior by Cobalt Strike and other frameworks where the adversary will escalate privileges, either via `jump` (Cobalt Strike PTH) or `getsystem`, using named-pipe impersonation. A suspicious event will look like `cmd.exe /c echo 4sgryt3436 > \\.\Pipe\5erg53`. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.003", "T1543.003", "T1543"]} -known_false_positives = Unknown. It is possible filtering may be required to ensure fidelity. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic detects a potential process using COM Object like CMLUA or CMSTPLUA to bypass UAC. This technique has been used by ransomware adversaries to gain administrative privileges to its running process. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.003"]} -known_false_positives = Legitimate windows application that are not on the list loading this dll. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - CSC Net On The Fly Compilation - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = this analytic is to detect a suspicious compile before delivery approach of .net compiler csc.exe. This technique was seen in several adversaries, malware and even in red teams to take advantage the csc.exe .net compiler tool to compile on the fly a malicious .net code to evade detection from security product. This is a good hunting query to check further the file or process created after this event and check the file path that passed to csc.exe which is the .net code. Aside from that, powershell is capable of using this compiler in executing .net code in a powershell script so filter on that case is needed. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027.004", "T1027"]} -known_false_positives = A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated powershell script taht execute .net code that may generate false positive. filter is needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = Certutil.exe may download a file from a remote destination using `-urlcache`. This behavior does require a URL to be passed on the command-line. In addition, `-f` (force) and `-split` (Split embedded ASN.1 elements, and save to files) will be used. It is not entirely common for `certutil.exe` to contact public IP space. However, it is uncommon for `certutil.exe` to write files to world writeable paths.\ During triage, capture any files on disk and review. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain in question. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"]} -known_false_positives = Limited false positives in most environments, however tune as needed based on parent-child relationship or network connection. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = Certutil.exe may download a file from a remote destination using `-VerifyCtl`. This behavior does require a URL to be passed on the command-line. In addition, `-f` (force) and `-split` (Split embedded ASN.1 elements, and save to files) will be used. It is not entirely common for `certutil.exe` to contact public IP space. \ During triage, capture any files on disk and review. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain in question. Using `-VerifyCtl`, the file will either be written to the current working directory or `%APPDATA%\..\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\`. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"]} -known_false_positives = Limited false positives in most environments, however tune as needed based on parent-child relationship or network connection. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - CertUtil With Decode Argument - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = CertUtil.exe may be used to `encode` and `decode` a file, including PE and script code. Encoding will convert a file to base64 with `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----` and `-----END CERTIFICATE-----` tags. Malicious usage will include decoding a encoded file that was downloaded. Once decoded, it will be loaded by a parallel process. Note that there are two additional command switches that may be used - `encodehex` and `decodehex`. Similarly, the file will be encoded in HEX and later decoded for further execution. During triage, identify the source of the file being decoded. Review its contents or execution behavior for further analysis. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1140"]} -known_false_positives = Typically seen used to `encode` files, but it is possible to see legitimate use of `decode`. Filter based on parent-child relationship, file paths, endpoint or user. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for arguments to certutil.exe indicating the manipulation or extraction of Certificate. This certificate can then be used to sign new authentication tokens specially inside Federated environments such as Windows ADFS. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"]} -known_false_positives = Unless there are specific use cases, manipulating or exporting certificates using certutil is uncommon. Extraction of certificate has been observed during attacks such as Golden SAML and other campaigns targeting Federated services. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Change Default File Association - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic is developed to detect suspicious registry modification to change the default file association of windows to malicious payload. This techninique was seen in some APT where it modify the default process to run file association, like .txt to notepad.exe. Instead notepad.exe it will point to a Script or other payload that will load malicious command to the compromised host. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.001", "T1546"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Change To Safe Mode With Network Config - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious bcdedit commandline to configure the host to boot in safe mode with network config. This technique was seen in blackMatter ransomware where it force the compromised host to boot in safe mode to continue its encryption and bring back to normal boot using bcdedit deletevalue command. This TTP can be a good alert for host that booted from safe mode forcefully since it need to modify the boot configuration to bring it back to normal. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Check Elevated CMD using whoami - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious whoami execution to check if the cmd or shell instance process is with elevated privileges. This technique was seen in FIN7 js implant where it execute this as part of its data collection to the infected machine to check if the running shell cmd process is elevated or not. This TTP is really a good alert for known attacker that recon on the targetted host. This command is not so commonly executed by a normal user or even an admin to check if a process is elevated. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for child processes of spoolsv.exe. This activity is associated with a POC privilege-escalation exploit associated with CVE-2018-8440. Spoolsv.exe is the process associated with the Print Spooler service in Windows and typically runs as SYSTEM. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. Update the `children_of_spoolsv_filter` macro to filter out legitimate child processes spawned by spoolsv.exe. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Some legitimate printer-related processes may show up as children of spoolsv.exe. You should confirm that any activity as legitimate and may be added as exclusions in the search. -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Circle CI Disable Security Job - Rule] type = detection asset_type = CircleCI @@ -2282,55 +287,13 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = this search is to detect execution of `cipher.exe` to clear the unallocated sectors of a specific disk. This technique was seen in some ransomware to make it impossible to forensically recover deleted files. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070.004", "T1070"]} -known_false_positives = administrator may execute this app to manage disk -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search allows you to identify the endpoints that have connected to more than five DNS servers and made DNS Queries over the time frame of the search. -how_to_implement = This search requires that DNS data is being ingested and populating the `Network_Resolution` data model. This data can come from DNS logs or from solutions that parse network traffic for this data, such as Splunk Stream or Bro.\ -This search produces fields (`dest_count`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** Distinct DNS Connections, **Field:** dest_count\ -Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "PR.DS"]} -known_false_positives = It's possible that an enterprise has more than five DNS servers that are configured in a round-robin rotation. Please customize the search, as appropriate. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Clop Common Exec Parameter - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytics are designed to identifies some CLOP ransomware variant that using arguments to execute its main code or feature of its code. In this variant if the parameter is "runrun", CLOP ransomware will try to encrypt files in network shares and if it is "temp.dat", it will try to read from some stream pipe or file start encrypting files within the infected local machines. This technique can be also identified as an anti-sandbox technique to make its code non-responsive since it is waiting for some parameter to execute properly. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Obfuscation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204"]} -known_false_positives = Operators can execute third party tools using these parameters. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Clop Ransomware Known Service Name - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This detection is to identify the common service name created by the CLOP ransomware as part of its persistence and high privilege code execution in the infected machine. Ussually CLOP ransomware use StartServiceCtrlDispatcherW API in creating this service entry. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule] type = detection asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for new commands from each user role. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial` to build the initial table of user roles, commands, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_filter` -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} known_false_positives = . providing_technologies = [] @@ -2340,7 +303,7 @@ asset_type = Cloud Compute Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for cloud compute instances created by users who have not created them before. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting the appropriate cloud-infrastructure logs Run the "Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User" support search to create of baseline of previously seen users. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} known_false_positives = It's possible that a user will start to create compute instances for the first time, for any number of reasons. Verify with the user launching instances that this is the intended behavior. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2360,7 +323,7 @@ asset_type = Cloud Compute Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for cloud compute instances being created with previously unseen image IDs. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial` to build the initial table of images observed and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image_filter` macro. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} known_false_positives = After a new image is created, the first systems created with that image will cause this alert to fire. Verify that the image being used was created by a legitimate user. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2370,7 +333,7 @@ asset_type = Cloud Compute Instance confidence = medium explanation = Find EC2 instances being created with previously unseen instance types. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial` to build the initial table of instance types observed and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter` macro. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} known_false_positives = It is possible that an admin will create a new system using a new instance type that has never been used before. Verify with the creator that they intended to create the system with the new instance type. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2380,27 +343,17 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for cloud instances being modified by users who have not previously modified them. how_to_implement = This search has a dependency on other searches to create and update a baseline of users observed to be associated with this activity. The search "Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update" should be enabled for this detection to properly work. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} known_false_positives = It's possible that a new user will start to modify EC2 instances when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is modifying instances that this is the intended behavior. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Cloud Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. Enforcing network-access controls is one of the defensive mechanisms used by cloud administrators to restrict access to a cloud instance. After the attacker has gained control of the console by compromising an admin account, they can delete a network ACL and gain access to the instance from anywhere. This search will query the Change datamodel to detect users deleting network ACLs. Deprecated because it's a duplicate -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter` macro. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = It's possible that a user has legitimately deleted a network ACL. -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule] type = detection asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen cities. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city_filter` macro. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2411,7 +364,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen countries. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_country_filter` macro. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2422,7 +375,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen IP addresses. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter` macro. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2433,76 +386,11 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen regions. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region_filter` macro. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies a non-standard parent process (not matching CMD, PowerShell, or Explorer) spawning `ipconfig.exe` or `systeminfo.exe`. This particular behavior was seen in FIN7's JSSLoader .NET payload. This is also typically seen when an adversary is injected into another process performing different discovery techniques. This event stands out as a TTP since these tools are commonly executed with a shell application or Explorer parent, and not by another application. This TTP is a good indicator for an adversary gathering host information, but one possible false positive might be an automated tool used by a system administator. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.007"]} -known_false_positives = A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated host discovery application that may generate false positives. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of default or publicly known named pipes used with Cobalt Strike. A named pipe is a named, one-way or duplex pipe for communication between the pipe server and one or more pipe clients. Cobalt Strike uses named pipes in many ways and has default values used with the Artifact Kit and Malleable C2 Profiles. The following query assists with identifying these default named pipes. Each EDR product presents named pipes a little different. Consider taking the values and generating a query based on the product of choice. \ -Upon triage, review the process performing the named pipe. If it is explorer.exe, It is possible it was injected into by another process. Review recent parallel processes to identify suspicious patterns or behaviors. A parallel process may have a network connection, review and follow the connection back to identify any file modifications. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = The idea of using named pipes with Cobalt Strike is to blend in. Therefore, some of the named pipes identified and added may cause false positives. Filter by process name or pipe name to reduce false positives. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The search looks for file modifications with extensions commonly used by Ransomware -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.\ -This search produces fields (`query`,`query_length`,`count`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** Name, **Field:** Name\ -1. \ -1. **Label:** File Extension, **Field:** file_extension\ -Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = It is possible for a legitimate file with these extensions to be created. If this is a true ransomware attack, there will be a large number of files created with these extensions. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The search looks for files created with names matching those typically used in ransomware notes that tell the victim how to get their data back. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Filesystem data-model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system reads and writes. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = It's possible that a legitimate file could be created with the same name used by ransomware note files. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Conti Common Exec parameter - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects the suspicious commandline argument of revil ransomware to encrypt specific or all local drive and network shares of the compromised machine or host. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. The following Splunk SOAR playbook can be used to respond to this detection: Ransomware Investigate and Contain -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204"]} -known_false_positives = 3rd party tool may have commandline parameter that can trigger this detection. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Control Loading from World Writable Directory - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following detection identifies control.exe loading either a .cpl or .inf from a writable directory. This is related to CVE-2021-40444. During triage, review parallel processes, parent and child, for further suspicious behaviors. In addition, capture file modifications and analyze. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.002"]} -known_false_positives = Limited false positives will be present as control.exe does not natively load from writable paths as defined. One may add .cpl or .inf to the command-line if there is any false positives. Tune as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Correlation by Repository and Risk - Rule] type = detection asset_type = AWS Account @@ -2523,263 +411,6 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Create Remote Thread In Shell Application - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect suspicious process injection in command shell. This technique was seen in IcedID where it execute cmd.exe process to inject its shellcode as part of its execution as banking trojan. It is really uncommon to have a create remote thread execution in the following application. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Windows -confidence = medium -explanation = Detect remote thread creation into LSASS consistent with credential dumping. -how_to_implement = This search needs Sysmon Logs with a Sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 8 with lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Other tools can access LSASS for legitimate reasons and generate an event. In these cases, tweaking the search may help eliminate noise. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for the creation of local administrator accounts using net.exe . -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.001", "T1136"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators often leverage net.exe to create admin accounts. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for the creation or deletion of hidden shares using net.exe. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070", "T1070.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators often leverage net.exe to create or delete network shares. You should verify that the activity was intentional and is legitimate. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = Monitor for signs that Vssadmin or Wmic has been used to create a shadow copy. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.003", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Legitimate administrator usage of Vssadmin or Wmic will create false positives. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects the use of wmic and Powershell to create a shadow copy. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.003", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Legtimate administrator usage of wmic to create a shadow copy. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Windows -confidence = medium -explanation = Detect the hands on keyboard behavior of Windows Task Manager creating a process dump of lsass.exe. Upon this behavior occurring, a file write/modification will occur in the users profile under \AppData\Local\Temp. The dump file, lsass.dmp, cannot be renamed, however if the dump occurs more than once, it will be named lsass (2).dmp. -how_to_implement = This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 11 for detecting file create of lsass.dmp. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators can create memory dumps for debugging purposes, but memory dumps of the LSASS process would be unusual. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects credential dumping using copy command from a shadow copy. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.003", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects the creation of a symlink to a shadow copy. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.003", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Curl Download and Bash Execution - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of curl on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter. The following Splunk SOAR playbook can be used to respond to this detection: Log4j Investigate The following Splunk SOAR playbook can be used to respond to this detection: Log4j Respond -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"]} -known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies DLLHost.exe with no command line arguments with a network connection. It is unusual for DLLHost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. DLLHost.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `port` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} -known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate third party applications may use a moved copy of dllhost, triggering a false positive. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = this search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. This technique are seen in couple of malware and APT group to exfiltrated collected data in a infected machine or infected network. This detection is looking for unique use of nslookup where it tries to use specific record type, TXT, A, AAAA, that are commonly used by attacker and also the retry parameter which is designed to query C2 DNS multiple tries. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of nslookup.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048"]} -known_false_positives = admin nslookup usage -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search allows you to identify DNS requests that are unusually large for the record type being requested in your environment. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. In addition, the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or greater must be installed on your search heads, along with any required dependencies. Finally, the support search "Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK" must be executed before this detection search, because it builds a machine-learning (ML) model over the historical data used by this search. It is important that this search is run in the same app context as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild the model with the latest data available in your environment.\ -This search produces fields (`query`,`query_length`,`count`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** DNS Query, **Field:** query\ -1. \ -1. **Label:** DNS Query Length, **Field:** query_length\ -1. \ -1. **Label:** Number of events, **Field:** count\ -Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.004", "T1071"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider reducing the value for threshold in the search. You should also periodically re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search allows you to identify DNS requests and compute the standard deviation on the length of the names being resolved, then filter on two times the standard deviation to show you those queries that are unusually large for your environment. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1048"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = It's possible there can be long domain names that are legitimate. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search will detect DNS requests resolved by unauthorized DNS servers. Legitimate DNS servers should be identified in the Enterprise Security Assets and Identity Framework. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. It also requires that your DNS servers are identified correctly in the Assets and Identity table of Enterprise Security. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Legitimate DNS activity can be detected in this search. Investigate, verify and update the list of authorized DNS servers as appropriate. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search takes the DNS records and their answers results of the discovered_dns_records lookup and finds if any records have changed by searching DNS response from the Network_Resolution datamodel across the last day. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the `Network_Resolution` data model. It also requires that the `discover_dns_record` lookup table be populated by the included support search "Discover DNS record". \ - **Splunk>Phantom Playbook Integration**\ -If Splunk>Phantom is also configured in your environment, a Playbook called "DNS Hijack Enrichment" can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. The playbook takes in the DNS record changed and uses Geoip, whois, Censys and PassiveTotal to detect if DNS issuers changed. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/`, add the correct hostname to the "Phantom Instance" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search, and set the corresponding Playbook to active. \ -(Playbook Link:`https://my.phantom.us/4.2/playbook/dns-hijack-enrichment/`).\ - -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Legitimate DNS changes can be detected in this search. Investigate, verify and update the list of provided current answers for the domains in question as appropriate. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - DSQuery Domain Discovery - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies "dsquery.exe" execution with arguments looking for `TrustedDomain` query directly on the command-line. This is typically indicative of an Administrator or adversary perform domain trust discovery. Note that this query does not identify any other variations of "Dsquery.exe" usage.\ -Within this detection, it is assumed `dsquery.exe` is not moved or renamed.\ -The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process "dsquery.exe" and its parent process.\ -DSQuery.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64` and only on Server operating system.\ -The following DLL(s) are loaded when DSQuery.exe is launched `dsquery.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible dsquery is running within that process context in memory.\ -In addition to trust discovery, review parallel processes for additional behaviors performed. Identify the parent process and capture any files (batch files, for example) being used. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"]} -known_false_positives = Limited false positives. If there is a true false positive, filter based on command-line or parent process. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This following analytic detects PowerShell command to delete shadow copy using the WMIC PowerShell module. This technique was seen used by a recent adversary to deploy DarkSide Ransomware where it executed a child process of PowerShell to execute a hex encoded command to delete shadow copy. This hex encoded command was able to be decrypted by PowerShell log. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the powershell logs from your endpoints. make sure you enable needed registry to monitor this event. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Deleting Of Net Users - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic will detect a suspicious net.exe/net1.exe command-line to delete a user on a system. This technique may be use by an administrator for legitimate purposes, however this behavior has been used in the wild to impair some user or deleting adversaries tracks created during its lateral movement additional systems. During triage, review parallel processes for additional behavior. Identify any other user accounts created before or after. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1531"]} -known_false_positives = System administrators or scripts may delete user accounts via this technique. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The vssadmin.exe utility is used to interact with the Volume Shadow Copy Service. Wmic is an interface to the Windows Management Instrumentation. This search looks for either of these tools being used to delete shadow copies. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = vssadmin.exe and wmic.exe are standard applications shipped with modern versions of windows. They may be used by administrators to legitimately delete old backup copies, although this is typically rare. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user logged into the AWS account, is making API calls and has not enabled Multi Factor authentication. Multi factor authentication adds a layer of security by forcing the users to type a unique authentication code from an approved authentication device when they access AWS websites or services. AWS Best Practices recommend that you enable MFA for privileged IAM users. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. Leverage the support search `Create a list of approved AWS service accounts`: run it once every 30 days to create a list of service accounts and validate them.\ -This search produces fields (`eventName`,`userIdentity.type`,`userIdentity.arn`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** AWS Event Name, **Field:** eventName\ -1. \ -1. **Label:** AWS User ARN, **Field:** userIdentity.arn\ -1. \ -1. **Label:** AWS User Type, **Field:** userIdentity.type\ -Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "PR.AC"]} -known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure do not have multi factor authentication enabled. Please ignore the service accounts, if triggered and instead add them to the aws_service_accounts.csv file to fine tune the detection. It is also possible that the search detects users in your environment using Single Sign-On systems, since the MFA is not handled by AWS. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Infrastructure -confidence = medium -explanation = By enabling Dynamic ARP Inspection as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect ARP Poisoning attacks in the Infrastructure. -how_to_implement = This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with DHCP Snooping (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960x/software/15-0_2_EX/security/configuration_guide/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg_chapter_01101.html) and Dynamic ARP Inspection (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960x/software/15-2_2_e/security/configuration_guide/b_sec_1522e_2960x_cg/b_sec_1522e_2960x_cg_chapter_01111.html) and log with a severity level of minimum "5 - notification". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1557", "T1557.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} -known_false_positives = This search might be prone to high false positives if DHCP Snooping or ARP inspection has been incorrectly configured, or if a device normally sends many ARP packets (unlikely). -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for successful AWS CloudTrail activity by user accounts that are not listed in the identity table or `aws_service_accounts.csv`. It returns event names and count, as well as the first and last time a specific user or service is detected, grouped by users. Deprecated because managing this list can be quite hard. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You must also populate the `identity_lookup_expanded` lookup shipped with the Asset and Identity framework to be able to look up users in your identity table in Enterprise Security (ES). Leverage the support search called "Create a list of approved AWS service accounts": run it once every 30 days to create and validate a list of service accounts.\ -This search produces fields (`eventName`,`firstTime`,`lastTime`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** AWS Event Name, **Field:** eventName\ -1. \ -1. **Label:** First Time, **Field:** firstTime\ -1. \ -1. **Label:** Last Time, **Field:** lastTime\ -Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "ID.AM"]} -known_false_positives = It's likely that you'll find activity detected by users/service accounts that are not listed in the `identity_lookup_expanded` or ` aws_service_accounts.csv` file. If the user is a legitimate service account, update the `aws_service_accounts.csv` table with that entry. -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule] type = detection asset_type = AWS Instance @@ -2820,6 +451,1747 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate. providing_technologies = [] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = S3 Bucket +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public S3 bucket. +how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to the "All Users" group. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = S3 Bucket +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public S3 bucket over the aws cli. +how_to_implement = +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to the "All Users" group. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect shared ec2 snapshot - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = EC2 Snapshot +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic utilizes AWS CloudTrail events to identify when an EC2 snapshot permissions are modified to be shared with a different AWS account. This method is used by adversaries to exfiltrate the EC2 snapshot. +how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1537"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = It is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately shared a snapshot with others for a specific purpose. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = AWS Instance +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub alerts for an EC2 instance in 4 hours intervals +how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Security Hub inputs. The threshold_value should be tuned to your environment and schedule these searches according to the bucket span interval. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "nist": ["DE.DP"]} +known_false_positives = None +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Github Commit Changes In Master - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = GitHub +confidence = medium +explanation = This search is to detect a pushed or commit to master or main branch. This is to avoid unwanted modification to master without a review to the changes. Ideally in terms of devsecops the changes made in a branch and do a PR for review. of course in some cases admin of the project may did a changes directly to master branch +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to github logs having the fork, commit, push metadata that can be use to monitor the changes in a github project. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1199"]} +known_false_positives = admin can do changes directly to master branch +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Github Commit In Develop - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = GitHub +confidence = medium +explanation = This search is to detect a pushed or commit to develop branch. This is to avoid unwanted modification to develop without a review to the changes. Ideally in terms of devsecops the changes made in a branch and do a PR for review. of course in some cases admin of the project may did a changes directly to master branch +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to github logs having the fork, commit, push metadata that can be use to monitor the changes in a github project. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1199"]} +known_false_positives = admin can do changes directly to develop branch +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - GitHub Dependabot Alert - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = GitHub +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for Dependabot Alerts in Github logs. +how_to_implement = You must index GitHub logs. You can follow the url in reference to onboard GitHub logs. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1195.001", "T1195"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = unknown +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - GitHub Pull Request from Unknown User - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = GitHub +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for Pull Request from unknown user. +how_to_implement = You must index GitHub logs. You can follow the url in reference to onboard GitHub logs. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1195.001", "T1195"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = unknown +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Gsuite Drive Share In External Email - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = GSuite +confidence = medium +explanation = This search is to detect suspicious google drive or google docs files shared outside or externally. This behavior might be a good hunting query to monitor exfitration of data made by an attacker or insider to a targetted machine. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc. In order for the search to work for your environment, please edit the query to use your company specific email domain instead of `internal_test_email.com`. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1567.002", "T1567"]} +known_false_positives = network admin or normal user may share files to customer and external team. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - GSuite Email Suspicious Attachment - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = GSuite +confidence = medium +explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious attachment file extension in Gsuite email that may related to spear phishing attack. This file type is commonly used by malware to lure user to click on it to execute malicious code to compromised targetted machine. But this search can also catch some normal files related to this file type that maybe send by employee or network admin. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001", "T1566"]} +known_false_positives = network admin and normal user may send this file attachment as part of their day to day work. having a good protocol in attaching this file type to an e-mail may reduce the risk of having a spear phishing attack. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Gsuite Email Suspicious Subject With Attachment - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = GSuite +confidence = medium +explanation = This search is to detect a gsuite email contains suspicious subject having known file type used in spear phishing. This technique is a common and effective entry vector of attacker to compromise a network by luring the user to click or execute the suspicious attachment send from external email account because of the effective social engineering of subject related to delivery, bank and so on. On the other hand this detection may catch a normal email traffic related to legitimate transaction so better to check the email sender, spelling and etc. avoid click link or opening the attachment if you are not expecting this type of e-mail. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001", "T1566"]} +known_false_positives = normal user or normal transaction may contain the subject and file type attachment that this detection try to search. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Gsuite Email With Known Abuse Web Service Link - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = GSuite +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytics is to detect a gmail containing a link that are known to be abused by malware or attacker like pastebin, telegram and discord to deliver malicious payload. This event can encounter some normal email traffic within organization and external email that normally using this application and services. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001", "T1566"]} +known_false_positives = normal email contains this link that are known application within the organization or network can be catched by this detection. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = GSuite +confidence = medium +explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious outbound e-mail from internal email to external email domain. This can be a good hunting query to monitor insider or outbound email traffic for not common domain e-mail. The idea is to parse the domain of destination email check if there is a minimum outbound traffic < 20 with attachment. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1048"]} +known_false_positives = network admin and normal user may send this file attachment as part of their day to day work. having a good protocol in attaching this file type to an e-mail may reduce the risk of having a spear phishing attack. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Gsuite Suspicious Shared File Name - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = GSuite +confidence = medium +explanation = This search is to detect a shared file in google drive with suspicious file name that are commonly used by spear phishing campaign. This technique is very popular to lure the user by running a malicious document or click a malicious link within the shared file that will redirected to malicious website. This detection can also catch some normal email communication between organization and its external customer. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc. In order for the search to work for your environment, please edit the query to use your company specific email domain instead of `internal_test_email.com`. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001", "T1566"]} +known_false_positives = normal user or normal transaction may contain the subject and file type attachment that this detection try to search +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Kubernetes +confidence = medium +explanation = This search uses the Kubernetes logs from a nginx ingress controller to detect local file inclusion attacks. +how_to_implement = You must ingest Kubernetes logs through Splunk Connect for Kubernetes. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1212"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = unknown +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress RFI - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Kubernetes +confidence = medium +explanation = This search uses the Kubernetes logs from a nginx ingress controller to detect remote file inclusion attacks. +how_to_implement = You must ingest Kubernetes logs through Splunk Connect for Kubernetes. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1212"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = unknown +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Scanner Image Pulling - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Kubernetes +confidence = medium +explanation = This search uses the Kubernetes logs from Splunk Connect from Kubernetes to detect Kubernetes Security Scanner. +how_to_implement = You must ingest Kubernetes logs through Splunk Connect for Kubernetes. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = unknown +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Office 365 +confidence = medium +explanation = This search detects the creation of a new Federation setting by alerting about an specific event related to its creation. +how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003", "T1136"]} +known_false_positives = The creation of a new Federation is not necessarily malicious, however this events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a different cloud provider. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Office 365 +confidence = medium +explanation = This search detects the creation of a new Federation setting by alerting about an specific event related to its creation. +how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003", "T1136"]} +known_false_positives = The creation of a new Federation is not necessarily malicious, however these events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a different cloud provider. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Office 365 +confidence = medium +explanation = This search detects newly added IP addresses/CIDR blocks to the list of MFA Trusted IPs to bypass multi factor authentication. Attackers are often known to use this technique so that they can bypass the MFA system. +how_to_implement = You must install Splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007", "T1562"]} +known_false_positives = Unless it is a special case, it is uncommon to continually update Trusted IPs to MFA configuration. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Disable MFA - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Office 365 +confidence = medium +explanation = This search detects when multi factor authentication has been disabled, what entitiy performed the action and against what user +how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1556"]} +known_false_positives = Unless it is a special case, it is uncommon to disable MFA or Strong Authentication +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Office 365 +confidence = medium +explanation = This search detects when an excessive number of authentication failures occur this search also includes attempts against MFA prompt codes +how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110"]} +known_false_positives = The threshold for alert is above 10 attempts and this should reduce the number of false positives. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Office 365 +confidence = medium +explanation = This search detects accounts with high number of Single Sign ON (SSO) logon errors. Excessive logon errors may indicate attempts to bruteforce of password or single sign on token hijack or reuse. +how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1556"]} +known_false_positives = Logon errors may not be malicious in nature however it may indicate attempts to reuse a token or password obtained via credential access attack. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Office 365 +confidence = medium +explanation = This search detects the addition of a new Federated domain. +how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003", "T1136"]} +known_false_positives = The creation of a new Federated domain is not necessarily malicious, however these events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a similar or different cloud provider. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Office 365 +confidence = medium +explanation = This search detects when a user has performed an Ediscovery search or exported a PST file from the search. This PST file usually has sensitive information including email body content +how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114"]} +known_false_positives = PST export can be done for legitimate purposes but due to the sensitive nature of its content it must be monitored. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Office 365 +confidence = medium +explanation = This search detects when an admin configured a forwarding rule for multiple mailboxes to the same destination. +how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.003", "T1114"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +known_false_positives = unknown +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Office 365 +confidence = medium +explanation = This search detects the assignment of rights to accesss content from another mailbox. This is usually only assigned to a service account. +how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.002", "T1114"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +known_false_positives = Service Accounts +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Office 365 +confidence = medium +explanation = This search detects when multiple user configured a forwarding rule to the same destination. +how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.003", "T1114"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +known_false_positives = unknown +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = AWS Instance +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel +how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = AWS Instance +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. +how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = AWS Instance +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where an abnormally high number of instances were successfully terminated by a user in a 10-minute window. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. +how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured with your AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify whether this search alerted on a human user. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = AWS Instance +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user successfully terminates an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. +how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = AWS Instance +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen cities. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. +how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ + This search will fire any time a new city is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your city, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = AWS Instance +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen countries. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. +how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching over plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ + This search will fire any time a new country is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = AWS Instance +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen IP addresses. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. +how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ + This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = AWS Instance +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen regions. Region in this context is similar to a state in the United States. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. +how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ + This search will fire any time a new region is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your region, there should be few false positives. If you are located in regions where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search allows you to identify the endpoints that have connected to more than five DNS servers and made DNS Queries over the time frame of the search. +how_to_implement = This search requires that DNS data is being ingested and populating the `Network_Resolution` data model. This data can come from DNS logs or from solutions that parse network traffic for this data, such as Splunk Stream or Bro.\ +This search produces fields (`dest_count`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** Distinct DNS Connections, **Field:** dest_count\ +Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "PR.DS"]} +known_false_positives = It's possible that an enterprise has more than five DNS servers that are configured in a round-robin rotation. Please customize the search, as appropriate. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Cloud Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Instance +confidence = medium +explanation = Enforcing network-access controls is one of the defensive mechanisms used by cloud administrators to restrict access to a cloud instance. After the attacker has gained control of the console by compromising an admin account, they can delete a network ACL and gain access to the instance from anywhere. This search will query the Change datamodel to detect users deleting network ACLs. Deprecated because it's a duplicate +how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter` macro. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +known_false_positives = It's possible that a user has legitimately deleted a network ACL. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = AWS Instance +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user logged into the AWS account, is making API calls and has not enabled Multi Factor authentication. Multi factor authentication adds a layer of security by forcing the users to type a unique authentication code from an approved authentication device when they access AWS websites or services. AWS Best Practices recommend that you enable MFA for privileged IAM users. +how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. Leverage the support search `Create a list of approved AWS service accounts`: run it once every 30 days to create a list of service accounts and validate them.\ +This search produces fields (`eventName`,`userIdentity.type`,`userIdentity.arn`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** AWS Event Name, **Field:** eventName\ +1. \ +1. **Label:** AWS User ARN, **Field:** userIdentity.arn\ +1. \ +1. **Label:** AWS User Type, **Field:** userIdentity.type\ +Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "PR.AC"]} +known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure do not have multi factor authentication enabled. Please ignore the service accounts, if triggered and instead add them to the aws_service_accounts.csv file to fine tune the detection. It is also possible that the search detects users in your environment using Single Sign-On systems, since the MFA is not handled by AWS. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = AWS Instance +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for successful AWS CloudTrail activity by user accounts that are not listed in the identity table or `aws_service_accounts.csv`. It returns event names and count, as well as the first and last time a specific user or service is detected, grouped by users. Deprecated because managing this list can be quite hard. +how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You must also populate the `identity_lookup_expanded` lookup shipped with the Asset and Identity framework to be able to look up users in your identity table in Enterprise Security (ES). Leverage the support search called "Create a list of approved AWS service accounts": run it once every 30 days to create and validate a list of service accounts.\ +This search produces fields (`eventName`,`firstTime`,`lastTime`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** AWS Event Name, **Field:** eventName\ +1. \ +1. **Label:** First Time, **Field:** firstTime\ +1. \ +1. **Label:** Last Time, **Field:** lastTime\ +Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "ID.AM"]} +known_false_positives = It's likely that you'll find activity detected by users/service accounts that are not listed in the `identity_lookup_expanded` or ` aws_service_accounts.csv` file. If the user is a legitimate service account, update the `aws_service_accounts.csv` table with that entry. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2 - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for DNS requests for phishing domains that are leveraging EvilGinx tools to mimic websites. +how_to_implement = You need to ingest data from your DNS logs in the Network_Resolution datamodel. Specifically you must ingest the domain that is being queried and the IP of the host originating the request. Ideally, you should also be ingesting the answer to the query and the query type. This approach allows you to also create your own localized passive DNS capability which can aid you in future investigations. You will have to add legitimate domain names to the `legit_domains.csv` file shipped with the app. \ + **Splunk>Phantom Playbook Integration**\ +If Splunk>Phantom is also configured in your environment, a Playbook called `Lets Encrypt Domain Investigate` can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/`, add the correct hostname to the "Phantom Instance" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search, and set the corresponding Playbook to active. \ +(Playbook link:`https://my.phantom.us/4.2/playbook/lets-encrypt-domain-investigate/`).\ + +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Command \u0026 Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.003"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = If a known good domain is not listed in the legit_domains.csv file, then the search could give you false postives. Please update that lookup file to filter out DNS requests to legitimate domains. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search is used to detect attempts to use DNS tunneling, by calculating the length of responses to DNS TXT queries. Endpoints using DNS as a method of transmission for data exfiltration, command and control, or evasion of security controls can often be detected by noting unusually large volumes of DNS traffic. Deprecated because this detection should focus on DNS queries instead of DNS responses. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to ingest data from your DNS logs, or monitor DNS traffic using Stream, Bro or something similar. Specifically, this query requires that the DNS data model is populated with information regarding the DNS record type that is being returned as well as the data in the answer section of the protocol. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = It's possible that legitimate TXT record responses can be long enough to trigger this search. You can modify the packet threshold for this search to help mitigate false positives. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703 - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Windows +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for PowerShell requesting privileges consistent with credential dumping. Deprecated, looks like things changed from a logging perspective. +how_to_implement = You must be ingesting Windows Security logs. You must also enable the account change auditing here: http://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/7.0.2/Data/MonitorWindowseventlogdata. Additionally, this search requires you to enable your Group Management Audit Logs in your Local Windows Security Policy and to be ingesting those logs. More information on how to enable them can be found here: http://whatevernetworks.com/auditing-group-membership-changes-in-active-directory/. Finally, please make sure that the local administrator group name is "Administrators" to be able to look for the right group membership changes. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = The activity may be legitimate. PowerShell is often used by administrators to perform various tasks, and it's possible this event could be generated in those cases. In these cases, false positives should be fairly obvious and you may need to tweak the search to eliminate noise. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = AWS Instance +confidence = medium +explanation = This search detects new API calls that have either never been seen before or that have not been seen in the previous hour, where the identity type is `AssumedRole`. +how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously seen API call per user roles in AWS CloudTrail" support search once to create a history of previously seen user roles. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +known_false_positives = It is possible that there are legitimate user roles making new or infrequently used API calls in your infrastructure, causing the search to trigger. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = AWS Instance +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour. Deprecated now this search is updated to use the Authentication datamodel. +how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. Run the "Previously seen users in AWS CloudTrail" support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run "Update previously seen users in AWS CloudTrail" hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = AWS Instance +confidence = medium +explanation = This search will detect users creating spikes of API activity in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. +how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike.\ +This search produces fields (`eventName`,`numberOfApiCalls`,`uniqueApisCalled`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** AWS Event Name, **Field:** eventName\ +1. \ +1. **Label:** Number of API Calls, **Field:** numberOfApiCalls\ +1. \ +1. **Label:** Unique API Calls, **Field:** uniqueApisCalled\ +Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} +known_false_positives = +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = AWS Instance +confidence = medium +explanation = This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to network access-control lists (ACLs)in your AWS environment. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. +how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best when you run the "Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN" support search once to create a lookup file of previously seen Network ACL Activity. To add or remove API event names related to network ACLs, edit the macro `network_acl_events`. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} +known_false_positives = The false-positive rate may vary based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`. Please modify this according the your environment. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = AWS Instance +confidence = medium +explanation = This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to security groups in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. +how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike.This search works best when you run the "Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN" support search once to create a history of previously seen Security Group Activity. To add or remove API event names for security groups, edit the macro `security_group_api_calls`. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} +known_false_positives = Based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`, the false positive rate may vary. Please modify this according the your environment. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The search is used to detect hosts that generate Windows Event ID 4663 for successful attempts to write to or read from a removable storage and Event ID 4656 for failures, which occurs when a USB drive is plugged in. In this scenario we are querying the Change_Analysis data model to look for Windows Event ID 4656 or 4663 where the priority of the affected host is marked as high in the ES Assets and Identity Framework. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663 and 4656. Ensure that the field from the event logs is being mapped to the result_id field in the Change_Analysis data model. To minimize the alert volume, this search leverages the Assets and Identity framework to filter out events from those assets not marked high priority in the Enterprise Security Assets and Identity Framework. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.DS"]} +known_false_positives = Legitimate USB activity will also be detected. Please verify and investigate as appropriate. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for web connections to dynamic DNS providers. +how_to_implement = This search requires you to be ingesting web-traffic logs. You can obtain these logs from indexing data from a web proxy or by using a network-traffic-analysis tool, such as Bro or Splunk Stream. The web data model must contain the URL being requested, the IP address of the host initiating the request, and the destination IP. This search also leverages a lookup file, `dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv`, which contains a non-exhaustive list of dynamic DNS providers. Consider periodically updating this local lookup file with new domains.\ +This search produces fields (`isDynDNS`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** IsDynamicDNS, **Field:** isDynDNS\ +Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` Deprecated because duplicate. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.001"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "DE.DP"]} +known_false_positives = It is possible that list of dynamic DNS providers is outdated and/or that the URL being requested is legitimate. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search is used to detect DNS tunneling, by calculating the sum of the length of DNS queries and DNS answers. The search also filters out potential false positives by filtering out queries made to internal systems and the queries originating from internal DNS, Web, and Email servers. Endpoints using DNS as a method of transmission for data exfiltration, command and control, or evasion of security controls can often be detected by noting an unusually large volume of DNS traffic. \ +NOTE:Deprecated because existing detection is doing the same. This detection is replaced with two other variations, if you are using MLTK then you can use this search `ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule` or use the standard deviation version `ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule`, as an alternantive. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, we must ensure that DNS data is being ingested and mapped to the appropriate fields in the Network_Resolution data model. Fields like src_category are automatically provided by the Assets and Identity Framework shipped with Splunk Enterprise Security. You will need to ensure you are using the Assets and Identity Framework and populating the src_category field. You will also need to enable the `cim_corporate_web_domain_search()` macro which will essentially filter out the DNS queries made to the corporate web domains to reduce alert fatigue. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.DS"]} +known_false_positives = It's possible that normal DNS traffic will exhibit this behavior. If an alert is generated, please investigate and validate as appropriate. The threshold can also be modified to better suit your environment. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search will detect DNS requests resolved by unauthorized DNS servers. Legitimate DNS servers should be identified in the Enterprise Security Assets and Identity Framework. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. It also requires that your DNS servers are identified correctly in the Assets and Identity table of Enterprise Security. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = Legitimate DNS activity can be detected in this search. Investigate, verify and update the list of authorized DNS servers as appropriate. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The search takes the DNS records and their answers results of the discovered_dns_records lookup and finds if any records have changed by searching DNS response from the Network_Resolution datamodel across the last day. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the `Network_Resolution` data model. It also requires that the `discover_dns_record` lookup table be populated by the included support search "Discover DNS record". \ + **Splunk>Phantom Playbook Integration**\ +If Splunk>Phantom is also configured in your environment, a Playbook called "DNS Hijack Enrichment" can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. The playbook takes in the DNS record changed and uses Geoip, whois, Censys and PassiveTotal to detect if DNS issuers changed. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/`, add the correct hostname to the "Phantom Instance" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search, and set the corresponding Playbook to active. \ +(Playbook Link:`https://my.phantom.us/4.2/playbook/dns-hijack-enrichment/`).\ + +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = Legitimate DNS changes can be detected in this search. Investigate, verify and update the list of provided current answers for the domains in question as appropriate. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = Detect a renamed instance of procdump.exe dumping the lsass process. This query looks for both -mm and -ma usage. -mm will produce a mini dump file and -ma will write a dump file with all process memory. Both are highly suspect and should be reviewed. Modify the query as needed.\ +During triage, confirm this is procdump.exe executing. If it is the first time a Sysinternals utility has been ran, it is possible there will be a -accepteula on the command line. Review other endpoint data sources for cross process (injection) into lsass.exe. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = None identified. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = AWS Instance +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for EC2 instances being modified by users who have not previously modified them. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. +how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User" support search once to create a history of previously seen ARNs. To add or remove APIs that modify an EC2 instance, edit the macro `ec2_modification_api_calls`. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +known_false_positives = It's possible that a new user will start to modify EC2 instances when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is modifying instances that this is the intended behavior. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = AWS Instance +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where an instance is started in a particular region in the last one hour and then compares it to a lookup file of previously seen regions where an instance was started +how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. Run the "Previously seen AWS Regions" support search only once to create of baseline of previously seen regions. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +known_false_positives = It's possible that a user has unknowingly started an instance in a new region. Please verify that this activity is legitimate. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = AWS Instance +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen AMIs. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. +how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 AMIs" support search once to create a history of previously seen AMIs. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +known_false_positives = After a new AMI is created, the first systems created with that AMI will cause this alert to fire. Verify that the AMI being used was created by a legitimate user. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = AWS Instance +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen instance types. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. +how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types" support search once to create a history of previously seen instance types. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +known_false_positives = It is possible that an admin will create a new system using a new instance type never used before. Verify with the creator that they intended to create the system with the new instance type. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = AWS Instance +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for EC2 instances being created by users who have not created them before. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. +how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User" support search once to create a history of previously seen ARNs. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +known_false_positives = It's possible that a user will start to create EC2 instances when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is launching instances that this is the intended behavior. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for processes launched from files with at least five spaces in the name before the extension. This is typically done to obfuscate the file extension by pushing it outside of the default view. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT", "PR.IP"]} +known_false_positives = None identified. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search returns a list of hosts that have not successfully completed a backup in over a week. Deprecated because it's a infrastructure monitoring. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to first obtain data from your backup solution, either from the backup logs on your hosts, or from a central server responsible for performing the backups. If you do not use Netbackup, you can modify this search for your backup solution. Depending on how often you backup your systems, you may want to modify how far in the past to look for a successful backup, other than the default of seven days. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} +known_false_positives = None identified +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for command-line arguments that use a `/c` parameter to execute a command that has not previously been seen. +how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The complete process name with command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. Please make sure you run the support search "Previously seen command line arguments,"—which creates a lookup file called `previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments.csv`—a historical baseline of all command-line arguments. You must also validate this list. For the search to do accurate calculation, ensure the search scheduling is the same value as the `relative_time` evaluation function. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} +known_false_positives = Legitimate programs can also use command-line arguments to execute. Please verify the command-line arguments to check what command/program is being executed. We recommend customizing the `first_time_seen_cmd_line_filter` macro to exclude legitimate parent_process_name +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = GCP Account +confidence = medium +explanation = This search provides detection of accounts with high risk roles by projects. Compromised accounts with high risk roles can move laterally or even scalate privileges at different projects depending on organization schema. +how_to_implement = You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message logs +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} +known_false_positives = Accounts with high risk roles should be reduced to the minimum number needed, however specific tasks and setups may be simply expected behavior within organization +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = GCP Account +confidence = medium +explanation = This search provides detection of high risk permissions by resource and accounts. These are permissions that can allow attackers with compromised accounts to move laterally and escalate privileges. +how_to_implement = You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message logs +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} +known_false_positives = High risk permissions are part of any GCP environment, however it is important to track resource and accounts usage, this search may produce false positives. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = GCP Account +confidence = medium +explanation = This search provides detection of possible GCP Oauth token abuse. GCP Oauth token without time limit can be exfiltrated and reused for keeping access sessions alive without further control of authentication, allowing attackers to access and move laterally. +how_to_implement = You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message logs +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} +known_false_positives = GCP Oauth token abuse detection will only work if there are access policies in place along with audit logs. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - GCP GCR container uploaded - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = GCP GCR Container +confidence = medium +explanation = This search show information on uploaded containers including source user, account, action, bucket name event name, http user agent, message and destination path. +how_to_implement = You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later), then configure stackdriver and set a subpub subscription to be imported to Splunk. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model. Please also customize the `container_implant_gcp_detection_filter` macro to filter out the false positives. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1525"]} +known_false_positives = Uploading container is a normal behavior from developers or users with access to container registry. GCP GCR registers container upload as a Storage event, this search must be considered under the context of CONTAINER upload creation which automatically generates a bucket entry for destination path. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = GCP Kubernetes cluster +confidence = medium +explanation = This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster +how_to_implement = You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later), then configure stackdriver and set a Pub/Sub subscription to be imported to Splunk. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model.Customize the macro kubernetes_gcp_scan_fingerprint_attack_detection to filter out FPs. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"]} +known_false_positives = Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, User Agent and source IPs will provide context. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Identify New User Accounts - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Domain Server +confidence = medium +explanation = This detection search will help profile user accounts in your environment by identifying newly created accounts that have been added to your network in the past week. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be populating the Enterprise Security Identity_Management data model in the assets and identity framework. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.002"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} +known_false_positives = If the Identity_Management data model is not updated regularly, this search could give you false positive alerts. Please consider this and investigate appropriately. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster +confidence = medium +explanation = This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods by IP address, verb and decision +how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]} +known_false_positives = Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst must consider IP, verb and decision context when trying to detect maliciousness. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster +confidence = medium +explanation = This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences +how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]} +known_false_positives = Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster +confidence = medium +explanation = This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmaps or secrets +how_to_implement = You must install Splunk Add-on for Amazon Web Services and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]} +known_false_positives = Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user and object context can provide guidance for detection. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster +confidence = medium +explanation = This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets +how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]} +known_false_positives = Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation, however source IP, namespace and user group may indicate possible malicious use. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster +confidence = medium +explanation = This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status, this search can be extended by using top or rare operators to find trends or rarities in failure status, user agents, source IPs and request URI +how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]} +known_false_positives = This search can give false positives as there might be inherent issues with authentications and permissions at cluster. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster +confidence = medium +explanation = This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods and namespaces by IP address and verb +how_to_implement = You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]} +known_false_positives = Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst must consider IP and verb context when trying to detect maliciousness. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster +confidence = medium +explanation = This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding rare or top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences +how_to_implement = You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]} +known_false_positives = Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster +confidence = medium +explanation = This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets +how_to_implement = You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]} +known_false_positives = Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user and object context can provide guidance for detection. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster +confidence = medium +explanation = This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets +how_to_implement = You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]} +known_false_positives = Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation, however source IP, namespace and user group may indicate possible malicious use. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster +confidence = medium +explanation = This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status +how_to_implement = You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]} +known_false_positives = This search can give false positives as there might be inherent issues with authentications and permissions at cluster. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster +confidence = medium +explanation = This search provides information on rare Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context +how_to_implement = You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]} +known_false_positives = Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP, verb and Object can reveal potential malicious activity, specially suspicious IPs and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster +confidence = medium +explanation = This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via source IP user agent, request URI and response status data against Kubernetes cluster pod in Azure +how_to_implement = You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"]} +known_false_positives = Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but source IPs, userAgent, verb, request URI and response status will provide context. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster +confidence = medium +explanation = This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via source IP user agent, request URI and response status data against Kubernetes cluster in Azure +how_to_implement = You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"]} +known_false_positives = Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but source IPs, userAgent, verb, request URI and response status will provide context. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster +confidence = medium +explanation = This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences +how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub messaging service logs +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]} +known_false_positives = Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster +confidence = medium +explanation = This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods by IP address, verb and decision +how_to_implement = You must install splunk GCP add on. This search works with pubsub messaging service logs +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]} +known_false_positives = Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst must consider IP, verb and decision context when trying to detect maliciousness. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster +confidence = medium +explanation = This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmaps or secrets +how_to_implement = You must install splunk add on for GCP . This search works with pubsub messaging service logs. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]} +known_false_positives = Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user and object context can provide guidance for detection. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = GCP GKE EKS Kubernetes cluster +confidence = medium +explanation = This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets +how_to_implement = You must install splunk add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub messaging servicelogs. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]} +known_false_positives = Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation, however source IP, user agent, decision and reason may indicate possible malicious use. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster +confidence = medium +explanation = This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status, this search can be extended by using top or rare operators to find trends or rarities in failure status, user agents, source IPs and request URI +how_to_implement = You must install splunk add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub messaging service logs. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]} +known_false_positives = This search can give false positives as there might be inherent issues with authentications and permissions at cluster. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster +confidence = medium +explanation = This search provides information on anonymous Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context +how_to_implement = You must install splunk add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub messaging logs. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]} +known_false_positives = Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP, source user, user agent, object path, and authorization context can reveal potential malicious activity, specially anonymous suspicious IPs and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for PowerShell processes started with a base64 encoded command-line passed to it, with parameters to modify the execution policy for the process, and those that prevent the display of an interactive prompt to the user. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it overrides the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide itself from the user, and passes an encoded script to be run on the command-line. Deprecated because almost the same as Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command +how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} +known_false_positives = Legitimate process can have this combination of command-line options, but it's not common. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for DNS requests for faux domains similar to the domains that you want to have monitored for abuse. +how_to_implement = You need to ingest data from your DNS logs. Specifically you must ingest the domain that is being queried and the IP of the host originating the request. Ideally, you should also be ingesting the answer to the query and the query type. This approach allows you to also create your own localized passive DNS capability which can aid you in future investigations. You also need to have run the search "ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names", which creates the permutations of the domain that will be checked for. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"]} +known_false_positives = None at this time +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Open Redirect in Splunk Web - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Splunk Server +confidence = medium +explanation = This search allows you to look for evidence of exploitation for CVE-2016-4859, the Splunk Open Redirect Vulnerability. +how_to_implement = No extra steps needed to implement this search. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["ID.RA", "RS.MI", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = None identified +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for ColdRoot events from the osx-attacks osquery pack. +how_to_implement = In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from your osquery deployed agents with the [osx-attacks.conf](https://github.com/facebook/osquery/blob/experimental/packs/osx-attacks.conf#L599) pack enabled. Also the [TA-OSquery](https://github.com/d1vious/TA-osquery) must be deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the osquery data populate the Alerts data model +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command \u0026 Control"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.PT"]} +known_false_positives = There are no known false positives. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe to execute various commands via the netsh command-line utility. Netsh.exe is a command-line scripting utility that allows you to, either locally or remotely, display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. Netsh can be used as a persistence proxy technique to execute a helper .dll when netsh.exe is executed. In this search, we are looking for processes spawned by netsh.exe that are executing commands via the command line. Deprecated because we have another detection of the same type. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting logs with the process name, command-line arguments, and parent processes from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.004"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = It is unusual for netsh.exe to have any child processes in most environments. It makes sense to investigate the child process and verify whether the process spawned is legitimate. We explicitely exclude "C:\Program Files\rempl\sedlauncher.exe" process path since it is a legitimate process by Mircosoft. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for applications on the endpoint that you have marked as prohibited. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is usually generated via logs that report process tracking in your Windows audit settings. In addition, you must also have only the `process_name` (not the entire process path) marked as "prohibited" in the Enterprise Security `interesting processes` table. To include the process names marked as "prohibited", which is included with ES Content Updates, run the included search Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 2"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command \u0026 Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} +known_false_positives = None identified +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = +confidence = medium +explanation = The search looks for command-line arguments used to hide a file or directory using the reg add command. +how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1564.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = None at the moment +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search monitors for remote modifications to registry keys. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must populate the `Endpoint` data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. Deprecated because I don't think the logic is right. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = This technique may be legitimately used by administrators to modify remote registries, so it's important to filter these events out. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line that indicate that task names related to the execution of Bad Rabbit ransomware were created or deleted. Deprecated because we already have a similar detection +how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} +known_false_positives = No known false positives +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The search is used to detect systems that are still vulnerable to the Spectre and Meltdown vulnerabilities. +how_to_implement = The search requires that you are ingesting your vulnerability-scanner data and that it reports the CVE of the vulnerability identified. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 4"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "nist": ["ID.RA", "RS.MI", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = It is possible that your vulnerability scanner is not detecting that the patches have been applied. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Splunk Server +confidence = medium +explanation = This search allows you to look for evidence of exploitation for CVE-2018-11409, a Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure Bug. +how_to_implement = The REST endpoint that exposes system information is also necessary for the proper operation of Splunk clustering and instrumentation. Whitelisting your Splunk systems will reduce false positives. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["ID.RA", "RS.MI", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = Retrieving server information may be a legitimate API request. Verify that the attempt is a valid request for information. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for changes to registry values that control Windows file associations, executed by a process that is not typical for legitimate, routine changes to this area. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on registry changes that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Registry` nodes. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT", "PR.IP"]} +known_false_positives = There may be other processes in your environment that users may legitimately use to modify file associations. If this is the case and you are finding false positives, you can modify the search to add those processes as exceptions. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This detection looks for emails that are suspicious because of their sender, domain rareness, or behavior differences. This is an anomaly generated by Splunk User Behavior Analytics (UBA). +how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data from email logs and have Splunk integrated with UBA. This anomaly is raised by a UBA detection model called "SuspiciousEmailDetectionModel." Ensure that this model is enabled on your UBA instance. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} +known_false_positives = This detection model will alert on any sender domain that is seen for the first time. This could be a potential false positive. The next step is to investigate and add the URL to an allow list if you determine that it is a legitimate sender. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The search looks for files created with names that have been linked to malicious activity. +how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file system reads and writes. In addition, this search leverages an included lookup file that contains the names of the files to watch for, as well as a note to communicate why that file name is being monitored. This lookup file can be edited to add or remove file the file names you want to monitor. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = It's possible for a legitimate file to be created with the same name as one noted in the lookup file. Filenames listed in the lookup file should be unique enough that collisions are rare. Looking at the location of the file and the process responsible for the activity can help determine whether or not the activity is legitimate. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following hunting analytic identifies renamed instances of rundll32.exe executing. rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. During investigation, validate it is the legitimate rundll32.exe executing and what script content it is loading. This query relies on the original filename or internal name from the PE meta data. Expand the query as needed by looking for specific command line arguments outlined in other analytics. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1036", "T1218.011", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Windows +confidence = medium +explanation = This search detects writes to the 'System Volume Information' folder by something other than the System process. +how_to_implement = You need to be ingesting logs with both the process name and command-line from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = It is possible that other utilities or system processes may legitimately write to this folder. Investigate and modify the search to include exceptions as appropriate. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for applications on the endpoint that you have marked as uncommon. +how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. This search uses a lookup file `uncommon_processes_default.csv` to track various features of process names that are usually uncommon in most environments. Please consider updating `uncommon_processes_local.csv` to hunt for processes that are uncommon in your environment. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 2"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} +known_false_positives = None identified +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Windows +confidence = medium +explanation = This search detects loading of unsigned images by LSASS. Deprecated because too noisy. +how_to_implement = This search needs Sysmon Logs with a sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 7 with lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = Other tools could load images into LSASS for legitimate reason. But enterprise tools should always use signed DLLs. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search gives you the hosts where a backup was attempted and then failed. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to obtain data from your backup solution, either from the backup logs on your endpoints or from a central server responsible for performing the backups. If you do not use Netbackup, you can modify this search for your specific backup solution. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} +known_false_positives = None identified +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Account +confidence = medium +explanation = This search is used to identify the creation of multiple user accounts using the same email domain name. +how_to_implement = We start with a dataset that provides visibility into the email address used for the account creation. In this example, we are narrowing our search down to the single web page that hosts the Magento2 e-commerce platform (via URI) used for account creation, the single http content-type to grab only the user's clicks, and the http field that provides the username (form_data), for performance reasons. After we have the username and email domain, we look for numerous account creations per email domain. Common data sources used for this detection are customized Apache logs or Splunk Stream. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP"]} +known_false_positives = As is common with many fraud-related searches, we are usually looking to attribute risk or synthesize relevant context with loosely written detections that simply detect anamolous behavior. This search will need to be customized to fit your environment—improving its fidelity by counting based on something much more specific, such as a device ID that may be present in your dataset. Consideration for whether the large number of registrations are occuring from a first-time seen domain may also be important. Extending the search window to look further back in time, or even calculating the average per hour/day for each email domain to look for an anomalous spikes, will improve this search. You can also use Shannon entropy or Levenshtein Distance (both courtesy of URL Toolbox) to consider the randomness or similarity of the email name or email domain, as the names are often machine-generated. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = account +confidence = medium +explanation = This search is used to examine web sessions to identify those where the clicks are occurring too quickly for a human or are occurring with a near-perfect cadence (high periodicity or low standard deviation), resembling a script driven session. +how_to_implement = Start with a dataset that allows you to see clickstream data for each user click on the website. That data must have a time stamp and must contain a reference to the session identifier being used by the website. This ties the clicks together into clickstreams. This value is usually found in the http cookie. With a bit of tuning, a version of this search could be used in high-volume scenarios, such as scraping, crawling, application DDOS, credit-card testing, account takeover, etc. Common data sources used for this detection are customized Apache logs, customized IIS, and Splunk Stream. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 6"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = As is common with many fraud-related searches, we are usually looking to attribute risk or synthesize relevant context with loosly written detections that simply detect anamoluous behavior. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = account +confidence = medium +explanation = This search is used to identify user accounts that share a common password. +how_to_implement = We need to start with a dataset that allows us to see the values of usernames and passwords that users are submitting to the website hosting the Magento2 e-commerce platform (commonly found in the HTTP form_data field). A tokenized or hashed value of a password is acceptable and certainly preferable to a clear-text password. Common data sources used for this detection are customized Apache logs, customized IIS, and Splunk Stream. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "nist": ["DE.DP"]} +known_false_positives = As is common with many fraud-related searches, we are usually looking to attribute risk or synthesize relevant context with loosely written detections that simply detect anamoluous behavior. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The search looks for the Console Window Host process (connhost.exe) executed using the force flag -ForceV1. This is not regular behavior in the Windows OS and is often seen executed by the Ryuk Ransomware. DEPRECATED This event is actually seen in the windows 10 client of attack_range_local. After further testing we realized this is not specific to Ryuk. +how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records the process-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Processes data-model object. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = This process should not be ran forcefully, we have not see any false positives for this detection +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The search looks for modifications to the hosts file on all Windows endpoints across your environment. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records the file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint.Filesystem data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or by other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system reads and writes. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = There may be legitimate reasons for system administrators to add entries to this file. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - 7zip CommandLine To SMB Share Path - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious 7z process with commandline pointing to SMB network share. This technique was seen in CONTI LEAK tools where it use 7z to archive a sensitive files and place it in network share tmp folder. This search is a good hunting query that may give analyst a hint why specific user try to archive a file pointing to SMB user which is un usual. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed 7z.exe may be used. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1560.001", "T1560"]} +known_false_positives = unknown +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Windows +confidence = medium +explanation = Detect memory dumping of the LSASS process. +how_to_implement = This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 10 for lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = Administrators can create memory dumps for debugging purposes, but memory dumps of the LSASS process would be unusual. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Account Discovery With Net App - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = this search is to detect a potential account discovery series of command used by several malware or attack to recon the target machine. This technique is also seen in some note worthy malware like trickbot where it runs a cmd process, or even drop its module that will execute the said series of net command. This series of command are good correlation search and indicator of attacker recon if seen in the machines within a none technical user or department (HR, finance, ceo and etc) network. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"]} +known_false_positives = admin or power user may used this series of command. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Active Setup Registry Autostart - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of the active setup registry for persistence and privilege escalation. This technique was seen in several malware (poisonIvy), adware and APT to gain persistence to the compromised machine upon boot up. This TTP is a good indicator to further check the process id that do the modification since modification of this registry is not commonly done. check the legitimacy of the file and process involve in this rules to check if it is a valid setup installer that creating or modifying this registry. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.014", "T1547"]} +known_false_positives = Active setup installer may add or modify this registry. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Add DefaultUser And Password In Registry - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = this search is to detect a suspicious registry modification to implement auto admin logon to a host. This technique was seen in BlackMatter ransomware to automatically logon to the compromise host after triggering a safemode boot to continue encrypting the whole network. This behavior is not a common practice and really a suspicious TTP or alert need to be consider if found within then network premise. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1552.002", "T1552"]} +known_false_positives = unknown +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic will identify a suspicious process command-line related to Windows Defender exclusion feature. This command is abused by adversaries, malware authors and red teams to bypass Windows Defender Antivirus products by excluding folder path, file path, process and extensions. From its real time or schedule scan to execute their malicious code. This is a good indicator for defense evasion and to look further for events after this behavior. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"]} +known_false_positives = Admin or user may choose to use this windows features. Filter as needed. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - AdsiSearcher Account Discovery - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator being used to query Active Directory for domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `[Adsisearcher]` to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +how_to_implement = The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"]} +known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious modification of firewall to allow file and printer sharing. This technique was seen in ransomware to be able to discover more machine connected to the compromised host to encrypt more files +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007", "T1562"]} +known_false_positives = network admin may modify this firewall feature that may cause this rule to be triggered. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic detects a potential suspicious modification of firewall rule registry allowing inbound traffic in specific port with public profile. This technique was identified when an adversary wants to grant remote access to a machine by allowing the traffic in a firewall rule. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021"]} +known_false_positives = network admin may add/remove/modify public inbound firewall rule that may cause this rule to be triggered. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Allow Inbound Traffic In Firewall Rule - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell command to allow inbound traffic inbound to a specific local port within the public profile. This technique was seen in some attacker want to have a remote access to a machine by allowing the traffic in firewall rule. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the powershell logs from your endpoints. make sure you enable needed registry to monitor this event. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021"]} +known_false_positives = administrator may allow inbound traffic in certain network or machine. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious modification to the firewall to allow network discovery on a machine. This technique was seen in couple of ransomware (revil, reddot) to discover other machine connected to the compromised host to encrypt more files. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007", "T1562"]} +known_false_positives = network admin may modify this firewall feature that may cause this rule to be triggered. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Allow Operation with Consent Admin - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic identifies a potential privilege escalation attempt to perform malicious task. This registry modification is designed to allow the `Consent Admin` to perform an operation that requires elevation without consent or credentials. We also found this in some attacker to gain privilege escalation to the compromise machine. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548"]} +known_false_positives = unknown +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Anomalous usage of 7zip - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following detection identifies a 7z.exe spawned from `Rundll32.exe` or `Dllhost.exe`. It is assumed that the adversary has brought in `7z.exe` and `7z.dll`. It has been observed where an adversary will rename `7z.exe`. Additional coverage may be required to identify the behavior of renamed instances of `7z.exe`. During triage, identify the source of injection into `Rundll32.exe` or `Dllhost.exe`. Capture any files written to disk and analyze as needed. Review parallel processes for additional behaviors. Typically, archiving files will result in exfiltration. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1560.001", "T1560"]} +known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as this behavior is not normal for `rundll32.exe` or `dllhost.exe` to spawn and run 7zip. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a file using `DownloadFile` method. This particular method is utilized in many different PowerShell frameworks to download files and output to disk. Identify the source (IP/domain) and destination file and triage appropriately. If AMSI logging or PowerShell transaction logs are available, review for further details of the implant. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"]} +known_false_positives = False positives may be present and filtering will need to occur by parent process or command line argument. It may be required to modify this query to an EDR product for more granular coverage. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a file using `DownloadString` method. This particular method is utilized in many different PowerShell frameworks to download files and output to disk. Identify the source (IP/domain) and destination file and triage appropriately. If AMSI logging or PowerShell transaction logs are available, review for further details of the implant. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"]} +known_false_positives = False positives may be present and filtering will need to occur by parent process or command line argument. It may be required to modify this query to an EDR product for more granular coverage. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for execution of commonly used attacker tools on an endpoint. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is usually generated via logs that report process tracking in your Windows audit settings. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 2"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command \u0026 Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.005", "T1036", "T1003", "T1595"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} +known_false_positives = Some administrator activity can be potentially triggered, please add those users to the filter macro. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store +how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1553.004", "T1553"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} +known_false_positives = There may be legitimate reasons for administrators to add a certificate to the untrusted certificate store. In such cases, this will typically be done on a large number of systems. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for attempts to stop security-related services on the endpoint. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} +known_false_positives = None identified. Attempts to disable security-related services should be identified and understood. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = None identified. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = this search is to detect a suspicious registry modification to implement auto admin logon to a host. This technique was seen in BlackMatter ransomware to automatically logon to the compromise host after triggering a safemode boot to continue encrypting the whole network. This behavior is not a common practice and really a suspicious TTP or alert need to be consider if found within then network premise. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1552.002", "T1552"]} +known_false_positives = unknown +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The search looks for a batch file (.bat) written to the Windows system directory tree. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204", "T1204.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = It is possible for this search to generate a notable event for a batch file write to a path that includes the string "system32", but is not the actual Windows system directory. As such, you should confirm the path of the batch file identified by the search. In addition, a false positive may be generated by an administrator copying a legitimate batch file in this directory tree. You should confirm that the activity is legitimate and modify the search to add exclusions, as necessary. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Bcdedit Command Back To Normal Mode Boot - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious bcdedit commandline to configure the host from safe mode back to normal boot configuration. This technique was seen in blackMatter ransomware where it force the compromised host to boot in safe mode to continue its encryption and bring back to normal boot using bcdedit deletevalue command. This TTP can be a good alert for host that booted from safe mode forcefully since it need to modify the boot configuration to bring it back to normal. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"]} +known_false_positives = unknown +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for flags passed to bcdedit.exe modifications to the built-in Windows error recovery boot configurations. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent recovery. +how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. Tune based on parent process names. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} +known_false_positives = Administrators may modify the boot configuration. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - BITS Job Persistence - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service utility `bitsadmin.exe` scheduling a BITS job to persist on an endpoint. The query identifies the parameters used to create, resume or add a file to a BITS job. Typically seen combined in a oneliner or ran in sequence. If identified, review the BITS job created and capture any files written to disk. It is possible for BITS to be used to upload files and this may require further network data analysis to identify. You can use `bitsadmin /list /verbose` to list out the jobs during investigation. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1197"]} +known_false_positives = Limited false positives will be present. Typically, applications will use `BitsAdmin.exe`. Any filtering should be done based on command-line arguments (legitimate applications) or parent process. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service utility `bitsadmin.exe` using the `transfer` parameter to download a remote object. In addition, look for `download` or `upload` on the command-line, the switches are not required to perform a transfer. Capture any files downloaded. Review the reputation of the IP or domain used. Typically once executed, a follow on command will be used to execute the dropped file. Note that the network connection or file modification events related will not spawn or create from `bitsadmin.exe`, but the artifacts will appear in a parallel process of `svchost.exe` with a command-line similar to `svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s BITS`. It's important to review all parallel and child processes to capture any behaviors and artifacts. In some suspicious and malicious instances, BITS jobs will be created. You can use `bitsadmin /list /verbose` to list out the jobs during investigation. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1197", "T1105"]} +known_false_positives = Limited false positives, however it may be required to filter based on parent process name or network connection. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = Certutil.exe may download a file from a remote destination using `-urlcache`. This behavior does require a URL to be passed on the command-line. In addition, `-f` (force) and `-split` (Split embedded ASN.1 elements, and save to files) will be used. It is not entirely common for `certutil.exe` to contact public IP space. However, it is uncommon for `certutil.exe` to write files to world writeable paths.\ During triage, capture any files on disk and review. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain in question. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"]} +known_false_positives = Limited false positives in most environments, however tune as needed based on parent-child relationship or network connection. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = Certutil.exe may download a file from a remote destination using `-VerifyCtl`. This behavior does require a URL to be passed on the command-line. In addition, `-f` (force) and `-split` (Split embedded ASN.1 elements, and save to files) will be used. It is not entirely common for `certutil.exe` to contact public IP space. \ During triage, capture any files on disk and review. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain in question. Using `-VerifyCtl`, the file will either be written to the current working directory or `%APPDATA%\..\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\`. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"]} +known_false_positives = Limited false positives in most environments, however tune as needed based on parent-child relationship or network connection. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for arguments to certutil.exe indicating the manipulation or extraction of Certificate. This certificate can then be used to sign new authentication tokens specially inside Federated environments such as Windows ADFS. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"]} +known_false_positives = Unless there are specific use cases, manipulating or exporting certificates using certutil is uncommon. Extraction of certificate has been observed during attacks such as Golden SAML and other campaigns targeting Federated services. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - CertUtil With Decode Argument - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = CertUtil.exe may be used to `encode` and `decode` a file, including PE and script code. Encoding will convert a file to base64 with `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----` and `-----END CERTIFICATE-----` tags. Malicious usage will include decoding a encoded file that was downloaded. Once decoded, it will be loaded by a parallel process. Note that there are two additional command switches that may be used - `encodehex` and `decodehex`. Similarly, the file will be encoded in HEX and later decoded for further execution. During triage, identify the source of the file being decoded. Review its contents or execution behavior for further analysis. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1140"]} +known_false_positives = Typically seen used to `encode` files, but it is possible to see legitimate use of `decode`. Filter based on parent-child relationship, file paths, endpoint or user. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Change Default File Association - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic is developed to detect suspicious registry modification to change the default file association of windows to malicious payload. This techninique was seen in some APT where it modify the default process to run file association, like .txt to notepad.exe. Instead notepad.exe it will point to a Script or other payload that will load malicious command to the compromised host. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.001", "T1546"]} +known_false_positives = unknown +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Change To Safe Mode With Network Config - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious bcdedit commandline to configure the host to boot in safe mode with network config. This technique was seen in blackMatter ransomware where it force the compromised host to boot in safe mode to continue its encryption and bring back to normal boot using bcdedit deletevalue command. This TTP can be a good alert for host that booted from safe mode forcefully since it need to modify the boot configuration to bring it back to normal. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"]} +known_false_positives = unknown +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - CHCP Command Execution - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search is to detect execution of chcp.exe application. this utility is used to change the active code page of the console. This technique was seen in icedid malware to know the locale region/language/country of the compromise host. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed chcp.com may be used. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"]} +known_false_positives = other tools or script may used this to change code page to UTF-* or others +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Check Elevated CMD using whoami - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious whoami execution to check if the cmd or shell instance process is with elevated privileges. This technique was seen in FIN7 js implant where it execute this as part of its data collection to the infected machine to check if the running shell cmd process is elevated or not. This TTP is really a good alert for known attacker that recon on the targetted host. This command is not so commonly executed by a normal user or even an admin to check if a process is elevated. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"]} +known_false_positives = unknown +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = this search is to detect execution of `cipher.exe` to clear the unallocated sectors of a specific disk. This technique was seen in some ransomware to make it impossible to forensically recover deleted files. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070.004", "T1070"]} +known_false_positives = administrator may execute this app to manage disk +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Clop Common Exec Parameter - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytics are designed to identifies some CLOP ransomware variant that using arguments to execute its main code or feature of its code. In this variant if the parameter is "runrun", CLOP ransomware will try to encrypt files in network shares and if it is "temp.dat", it will try to read from some stream pipe or file start encrypting files within the infected local machines. This technique can be also identified as an anti-sandbox technique to make its code non-responsive since it is waiting for some parameter to execute properly. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204"]} +known_false_positives = Operators can execute third party tools using these parameters. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Clop Ransomware Known Service Name - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This detection is to identify the common service name created by the CLOP ransomware as part of its persistence and high privilege code execution in the infected machine. Ussually CLOP ransomware use StartServiceCtrlDispatcherW API in creating this service entry. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543"]} +known_false_positives = unknown +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic identifies command-line arguments where `cmd.exe /c` is used to execute a program. `cmd /c` is used to run commands in MS-DOS and terminate after command or process completion. This technique is commonly seen in adversaries and malware to execute batch command using different shell like PowerShell or different process other than `cmd.exe`. This is a good hunting query for suspicious command-line made by a script or relative process execute it. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003", "T1059"]} +known_false_positives = False positives may be high based on legitimate scripted code in any environment. Filter as needed. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic identifies a common behavior by Cobalt Strike and other frameworks where the adversary will escalate privileges, either via `jump` (Cobalt Strike PTH) or `getsystem`, using named-pipe impersonation. A suspicious event will look like `cmd.exe /c echo 4sgryt3436 > \\.\Pipe\5erg53`. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.003", "T1543.003", "T1543"]} +known_false_positives = Unknown. It is possible filtering may be required to ensure fidelity. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic identifies a non-standard parent process (not matching CMD, PowerShell, or Explorer) spawning `ipconfig.exe` or `systeminfo.exe`. This particular behavior was seen in FIN7's JSSLoader .NET payload. This is also typically seen when an adversary is injected into another process performing different discovery techniques. This event stands out as a TTP since these tools are commonly executed with a shell application or Explorer parent, and not by another application. This TTP is a good indicator for an adversary gathering host information, but one possible false positive might be an automated tool used by a system administator. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.007"]} +known_false_positives = A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated host discovery application that may generate false positives. Filter as needed. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic detects a potential process using COM Object like CMLUA or CMSTPLUA to bypass UAC. This technique has been used by ransomware adversaries to gain administrative privileges to its running process. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.003"]} +known_false_positives = Legitimate windows application that are not on the list loading this dll. Filter as needed. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of default or publicly known named pipes used with Cobalt Strike. A named pipe is a named, one-way or duplex pipe for communication between the pipe server and one or more pipe clients. Cobalt Strike uses named pipes in many ways and has default values used with the Artifact Kit and Malleable C2 Profiles. The following query assists with identifying these default named pipes. Each EDR product presents named pipes a little different. Consider taking the values and generating a query based on the product of choice. \ +Upon triage, review the process performing the named pipe. If it is explorer.exe, It is possible it was injected into by another process. Review recent parallel processes to identify suspicious patterns or behaviors. A parallel process may have a network connection, review and follow the connection back to identify any file modifications. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = The idea of using named pipes with Cobalt Strike is to blend in. Therefore, some of the named pipes identified and added may cause false positives. Filter by process name or pipe name to reduce false positives. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The search looks for file modifications with extensions commonly used by Ransomware +how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.\ +This search produces fields (`query`,`query_length`,`count`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** Name, **Field:** Name\ +1. \ +1. **Label:** File Extension, **Field:** file_extension\ +Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = It is possible for a legitimate file with these extensions to be created. If this is a true ransomware attack, there will be a large number of files created with these extensions. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The search looks for files created with names matching those typically used in ransomware notes that tell the victim how to get their data back. +how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Filesystem data-model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system reads and writes. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = It's possible that a legitimate file could be created with the same name used by ransomware note files. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Conti Common Exec parameter - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search detects the suspicious commandline argument of revil ransomware to encrypt specific or all local drive and network shares of the compromised machine or host. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204"]} +known_false_positives = 3rd party tool may have commandline parameter that can trigger this detection. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Control Loading from World Writable Directory - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following detection identifies control.exe loading either a .cpl or .inf from a writable directory. This is related to CVE-2021-40444. During triage, review parallel processes, parent and child, for further suspicious behaviors. In addition, capture file modifications and analyze. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.002"]} +known_false_positives = Limited false positives will be present as control.exe does not natively load from writable paths as defined. One may add .cpl or .inf to the command-line if there is any false positives. Tune as needed. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for the creation of local administrator accounts using net.exe . +how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.001", "T1136"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = Administrators often leverage net.exe to create admin accounts. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for the creation or deletion of hidden shares using net.exe. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070", "T1070.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = Administrators often leverage net.exe to create or delete network shares. You should verify that the activity was intentional and is legitimate. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Create Remote Thread In Shell Application - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search is to detect suspicious process injection in command shell. This technique was seen in IcedID where it execute cmd.exe process to inject its shellcode as part of its execution as banking trojan. It is really uncommon to have a create remote thread execution in the following application. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} +known_false_positives = unknown +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Windows +confidence = medium +explanation = Detect remote thread creation into LSASS consistent with credential dumping. +how_to_implement = This search needs Sysmon Logs with a Sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 8 with lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = Other tools can access LSASS for legitimate reasons and generate an event. In these cases, tweaking the search may help eliminate noise. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Windows +confidence = medium +explanation = Detect the hands on keyboard behavior of Windows Task Manager creating a process dump of lsass.exe. Upon this behavior occurring, a file write/modification will occur in the users profile under \AppData\Local\Temp. The dump file, lsass.dmp, cannot be renamed, however if the dump occurs more than once, it will be named lsass (2).dmp. +how_to_implement = This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 11 for detecting file create of lsass.dmp. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = Administrators can create memory dumps for debugging purposes, but memory dumps of the LSASS process would be unusual. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = Monitor for signs that Vssadmin or Wmic has been used to create a shadow copy. +how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.003", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = Legitimate administrator usage of Vssadmin or Wmic will create false positives. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search detects the use of wmic and Powershell to create a shadow copy. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.003", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = Legtimate administrator usage of wmic to create a shadow copy. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search detects credential dumping using copy command from a shadow copy. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.003", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = unknown +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search detects the creation of a symlink to a shadow copy. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.003", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = unknown +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - CSC Net On The Fly Compilation - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = this analytic is to detect a suspicious compile before delivery approach of .net compiler csc.exe. This technique was seen in several adversaries, malware and even in red teams to take advantage the csc.exe .net compiler tool to compile on the fly a malicious .net code to evade detection from security product. This is a good hunting query to check further the file or process created after this event and check the file path that passed to csc.exe which is the .net code. Aside from that, powershell is capable of using this compiler in executing .net code in a powershell script so filter on that case is needed. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027.004", "T1027"]} +known_false_positives = A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated powershell script taht execute .net code that may generate false positive. filter is needed. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Curl Download and Bash Execution - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of curl on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"]} +known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This following analytic detects PowerShell command to delete shadow copy using the WMIC PowerShell module. This technique was seen used by a recent adversary to deploy DarkSide Ransomware where it executed a child process of PowerShell to execute a hex encoded command to delete shadow copy. This hex encoded command was able to be decrypted by PowerShell log. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the powershell logs from your endpoints. make sure you enable needed registry to monitor this event. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"]} +known_false_positives = unknown +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Deleting Of Net Users - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic will detect a suspicious net.exe/net1.exe command-line to delete a user on a system. This technique may be use by an administrator for legitimate purposes, however this behavior has been used in the wild to impair some user or deleting adversaries tracks created during its lateral movement additional systems. During triage, review parallel processes for additional behavior. Identify any other user accounts created before or after. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1531"]} +known_false_positives = System administrators or scripts may delete user accounts via this technique. Filter as needed. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The vssadmin.exe utility is used to interact with the Volume Shadow Copy Service. Wmic is an interface to the Windows Management Instrumentation. This search looks for either of these tools being used to delete shadow copies. +how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} +known_false_positives = vssadmin.exe and wmic.exe are standard applications shipped with modern versions of windows. They may be used by administrators to legitimately delete old backup copies, although this is typically rare. +providing_technologies = [] + [savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule] type = detection asset_type = Endpoint @@ -2832,7 +2204,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Detect AzureHound Command-Line Arguments - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies the common command-line argument used by AzureHound `Invoke-AzureHound`. Being the script is FOSS, function names may be modified, but these changes are dependent upon the operator. In most instances the defaults are used. This analytic works to identify the common command-line attributes used. It does not cover the entirety of every argument in order to avoid false positives. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. @@ -2842,7 +2214,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Detect AzureHound File Modifications - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic is similar to SharpHound file modifications, but this instance covers the use of Invoke-AzureHound. AzureHound is the SharpHound equivilent but for Azure. It's possible this may never be seen in an environment as most attackers may execute this tool remotely. Once execution is complete, a zip file with a similar name will drop `20210601090751-azurecollection.zip`. In addition to the zip, multiple .json files will be written to disk, which are in the zip. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on file modifications that include the name of the process, and file, responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node. @@ -2850,49 +2222,9 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087. known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as the analytic is specific to a filename with extension .zip. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit -how_to_implement = Splunk Universal Forwarder running on Linux systems, capturing logs from the /var/log directory. The vulnerability is exposed when a non privledged user tries passing in a single \ character at the end of the command while using the shell and edit flags. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit -how_to_implement = Splunk Universal Forwarder running on Linux systems (tested on Centos and Ubuntu), where segfaults are being logged. This also captures instances where the exploit has been compiled into a binary. The detection looks for greater than 5 instances of sudoedit combined with segfault over your search time period on a single host -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = If sudoedit is throwing segfaults for other reasons this will pick those up too. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit -how_to_implement = OSQuery installed and configured to pick up process events (info at https://osquery.io) as well as using the Splunk OSQuery Add-on https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4402. The vulnerability is exposed when a non privledged user tries passing in a single \ character at the end of the command while using the shell and edit flags. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Windows -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for Event Code 4742 (Computer Change) or EventCode 4624 (An account was successfully logged on) with an anonymous account. -how_to_implement = This search requires audit computer account management to be enabled on the system in order to generate Event ID 4742. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Event Logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1210"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = None thus far found -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Copy of ShadowCopy with Script Block Logging - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ This analytic identifies `copy` or `[System.IO.File]::Copy` being used to capture the SAM, SYSTEM or SECURITY hives identified in script block. This will catch the most basic use cases for credentials being taken for offline cracking. \ @@ -2912,23 +2244,9 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Act known_false_positives = The activity may be legitimate. Other tools can access lsass for legitimate reasons, and it's possible this event could be generated in those cases. In these cases, false positives should be fairly obvious and you may need to tweak the search to eliminate noise. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2 - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for DNS requests for phishing domains that are leveraging EvilGinx tools to mimic websites. -how_to_implement = You need to ingest data from your DNS logs in the Network_Resolution datamodel. Specifically you must ingest the domain that is being queried and the IP of the host originating the request. Ideally, you should also be ingesting the answer to the query and the query type. This approach allows you to also create your own localized passive DNS capability which can aid you in future investigations. You will have to add legitimate domain names to the `legit_domains.csv` file shipped with the app. \ - **Splunk>Phantom Playbook Integration**\ -If Splunk>Phantom is also configured in your environment, a Playbook called `Lets Encrypt Domain Investigate` can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/`, add the correct hostname to the "Phantom Instance" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search, and set the corresponding Playbook to active. \ -(Playbook link:`https://my.phantom.us/4.2/playbook/lets-encrypt-domain-investigate/`).\ - -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.003"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = If a known good domain is not listed in the legit_domains.csv file, then the search could give you false postives. Please update that lookup file to filter out DNS requests to legitimate domains. -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ This analytic identifies the common PowerShell stager used by PowerShell-Empire. Each stager that may use PowerShell all uses the same pattern. The initial HTTP will be base64 encoded and use `system.net.webclient`. Note that some obfuscation may evade the analytic. \ @@ -2948,7 +2266,7 @@ how_to_implement = You must ingest your Windows security event logs in the `Chan If Splunk>Phantom is also configured in your environment, a Playbook called "Excessive Account Lockouts Enrichment and Response" can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. The Playbook executes the Contextual and Investigative searches in this Story, conducts additional information gathering on Windows endpoints, and takes a response action to shut down the affected endpoint. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/`, add the correct hostname to the "Phantom Instance" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search, and set the corresponding Playbook to active. \ (Playbook Link:`https://my.phantom.us/4.1/playbook/excessive-account-lockouts-enrichment-and-response/`).\ -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.002"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.002"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} known_false_positives = It's possible that a widely used system, such as a kiosk, could cause a large number of account lockouts. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2958,13 +2276,13 @@ asset_type = Windows confidence = medium explanation = This search detects user accounts that have been locked out a relatively high number of times in a short period. how_to_implement = ou must ingest your Windows security event logs in the `Change` datamodel under the nodename is `Account_Management`, for this search to execute successfully. Please consider updating the cron schedule and the count of lockouts you want to monitor, according to your environment. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.003"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.003"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} known_false_positives = It is possible that a legitimate user is experiencing an issue causing multiple account login failures leading to lockouts. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Exchange Web Shell - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following query identifies suspicious .aspx created in 3 paths identified by Microsoft as known drop locations for Exchange exploitation related to HAFNIUM group and recently disclosed vulnerablity named ProxyShell. Paths include: `\HttpProxy\owa\auth\`, `\inetpub\wwwroot\aspnet_client\`, and `\HttpProxy\OAB\`. Upon triage, the suspicious .aspx file will likely look obvious on the surface. inspect the contents for script code inside. Identify additional log sources, IIS included, to review source and other potential exploitation. It is often the case that a particular threat is only applicable to a specific subset of systems in your environment. Typically analytics to detect those threats are written without the benefit of being able to only target those systems as well. Writing analytics against all systems when those behaviors are limited to identifiable subsets of those systems is suboptimal. Consider the case ProxyShell vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Servers. With asset information, a hunter can limit their analytics to systems that have been identified as Exchange servers. A hunter may start with the theory that the exchange server is communicating with new systems that it has not previously. If this theory is run against all publicly facing systems, the amount of noise it will generate will likely render this theory untenable. However, using the asset information to limit this analytic to just the Exchange servers will reduce the noise allowing the hunter to focus only on the systems where this behavioral change is relevant. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node and `Filesystem` node. @@ -2972,26 +2290,6 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505", known_false_positives = The query is structured in a way that `action` (read, create) is not defined. Review the results of this query, filter, and tune as necessary. It may be necessary to generate this query specific to your endpoint product. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902 - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Network -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects remote code exploit attempts on F5 BIG-IP, BIG-IQ, and Traffix SDC devices -how_to_implement = To consistently detect exploit attempts on F5 devices using the vulnerabilities contained within CVE-2020-5902 it is recommended to ingest logs via syslog. As many BIG-IP devices will have SSL enabled on their management interfaces, detections via wire data may not pick anything up unless you are decrypting SSL traffic in order to inspect it. I am using a regex string from a Cloudflare mitigation technique to try and always catch the offending string (..;), along with the other exploit of using (hsqldb;). -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = GCP Storage Bucket -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks at GCP Storage bucket-access logs and detects new or previously unseen remote IP addresses that have successfully accessed a GCP Storage bucket. -how_to_implement = This search relies on the Splunk Add-on for Google Cloud Platform, setting up a Cloud Pub/Sub input, along with the relevant GCP PubSub topics and logging sink to capture GCP Storage Bucket events (https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/routing/overview). In order to capture public GCP Storage Bucket access logs, you must also enable storage bucket logging to your PubSub Topic as per https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/access-logs. These logs are deposited into the nominated Storage Bucket on an hourly basis and typically show up by 15 minutes past the hour. It is recommended to configure any saved searches or correlation searches in Enterprise Security to run on an hourly basis at 30 minutes past the hour (cron definition of 30 * * * *). A lookup table (previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip.csv) stores the previously seen access requests, and is used by this search to determine any newly seen IP addresses accessing the Storage Buckets. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = GCP Storage buckets can be accessed from any IP (if the ACLs are open to allow it), as long as it can make a successful connection. This will be a false postive, since the search is looking for a new IP within the past two hours. -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Detect HTML Help Renamed - Rule] type = detection asset_type = Endpoint @@ -3032,34 +2330,46 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives" known_false_positives = It is rare to see instances of InfoTech Storage Handlers being used, but it does happen in some legitimate instances. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = Infrastructure +asset_type = Windows confidence = medium -explanation = By enabling IPv6 First Hop Security as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect various attacks such as packet forging in the Infrastructure. -how_to_implement = This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with one or more First Hop Security measures such as RA Guard, DHCP Guard and/or device tracking. See References for more information. The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1557", "T1557.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} -known_false_positives = None currently known +explanation = This search looks for reading loaded Images unique to credential dumping with Mimikatz. Deprecated because mimikatz libraries changed and very noisy sysmon Event Code. +how_to_implement = This search needs Sysmon Logs and a sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 7 with powershell.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = Other tools can import the same DLLs. These tools should be part of a whitelist. False positives may be present with any process that authenticates or uses credentials, PowerShell included. Filter based on parent process. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule] type = detection asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for outbound ICMP packets with a packet size larger than 1,000 bytes. Various threat actors have been known to use ICMP as a command and control channel for their attack infrastructure. Large ICMP packets from an endpoint to a remote host may be indicative of this activity. -how_to_implement = In order to run this search effectively, we highly recommend that you leverage the Assets and Identity framework. It is important that you have a good understanding of how your network segments are designed and that you are able to distinguish internal from external address space. Add a category named `internal` to the CIDRs that host the company's assets in the `assets_by_cidr.csv` lookup file, which is located in `$SPLUNK_HOME/etc/apps/SA-IdentityManagement/lookups/`. More information on updating this lookup can be found here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.0.0/Admin/Addassetandidentitydata. This search also requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1095"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = ICMP packets are used in a variety of ways to help troubleshoot networking issues and ensure the proper flow of traffic. As such, it is possible that a large ICMP packet could be perfectly legitimate. If large ICMP packets are associated with command and control traffic, there will typically be a large number of these packets observed over time. If the search is providing a large number of false positives, you can modify the macro `detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets_filter` to adjust the byte threshold or add specific IP addresses to an allow list. +explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable no critical endpoints or all. \ +This analytic identifies common Mimikatz functions that may be identified in the script block, including `mimikatz`. This will catch the most basic use cases for Pass the Ticket, Pass the Hash and `-DumprCreds`. \ +During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003"]} +known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as the commands being identifies are quite specific to EventCode 4104 and Mimikatz. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule] type = detection asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search is used to detect attempts to use DNS tunneling, by calculating the length of responses to DNS TXT queries. Endpoints using DNS as a method of transmission for data exfiltration, command and control, or evasion of security controls can often be detected by noting unusually large volumes of DNS traffic. Deprecated because this detection should focus on DNS queries instead of DNS responses. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to ingest data from your DNS logs, or monitor DNS traffic using Stream, Bro or something similar. Specifically, this query requires that the DNS data model is populated with information regarding the DNS record type that is being returned as well as the data in the answer section of the protocol. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = It's possible that legitimate TXT record responses can be long enough to trigger this search. You can modify the packet threshold for this search to help mitigate false positives. +explanation = The following analytic identifies "mshta.exe" execution with inline protocol handlers. "JavaScript", "VBScript", and "About" are the only supported options when invoking HTA content directly on the command-line. The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process "mshta.exe" and its parent process. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic identifies renamed instances of mshta.exe executing. Mshta.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. This analytic utilizes the internal name of the PE to identify if is the legitimate mshta binary. Further analysis should be performed to review the executed content and validation it is the real mshta. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of mshta.exe, but never renamed, triggering a false positive. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule] @@ -3072,118 +2382,16 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre known_false_positives = It is possible legitimate applications may perform this behavior and will need to be filtered. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Windows -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for reading loaded Images unique to credential dumping with Mimikatz. Deprecated because mimikatz libraries changed and very noisy sysmon Event Code. -how_to_implement = This search needs Sysmon Logs and a sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 7 with powershell.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Other tools can import the same DLLs. These tools should be part of a whitelist. False positives may be present with any process that authenticates or uses credentials, PowerShell included. Filter based on parent process. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703 - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Windows -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for PowerShell requesting privileges consistent with credential dumping. Deprecated, looks like things changed from a logging perspective. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting Windows Security logs. You must also enable the account change auditing here: http://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/7.0.2/Data/MonitorWindowseventlogdata. Additionally, this search requires you to enable your Group Management Audit Logs in your Local Windows Security Policy and to be ingesting those logs. More information on how to enable them can be found here: http://whatevernetworks.com/auditing-group-membership-changes-in-active-directory/. Finally, please make sure that the local administrator group name is "Administrators" to be able to look for the right group membership changes. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = The activity may be legitimate. PowerShell is often used by administrators to perform various tasks, and it's possible this event could be generated in those cases. In these cases, false positives should be fairly obvious and you may need to tweak the search to eliminate noise. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable no critical endpoints or all. \ -This analytic identifies common Mimikatz functions that may be identified in the script block, including `mimikatz`. This will catch the most basic use cases for Pass the Ticket, Pass the Hash and `-DumprCreds`. \ -During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003"]} -known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as the commands being identifies are quite specific to EventCode 4104 and Mimikatz. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule] type = detection asset_type = Windows confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for newly created accounts that have been elevated to local administrators. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting Windows event logs using the Splunk Windows TA and collecting event code 4720 and 4732 -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.001", "T1136"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command \u0026 Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.001", "T1136"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = The activity may be legitimate. For this reason, it's best to verify the account with an administrator and ask whether there was a valid service request for the account creation. If your local administrator group name is not "Administrators", this search may generate an excessive number of false positives providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The search queries the authentication logs for assets that are categorized as routers in the ES Assets and Identity Framework, to identify connections that have not been seen before in the last 30 days. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must ensure the network router devices are categorized as "router" in the Assets and identity table. You must also populate the Authentication data model with logs related to users authenticating to routing infrastructure. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = Legitimate router connections may appear as new connections -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = GCP Storage Bucket -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for GCP PubSub events where a user has created an open/public GCP Storage bucket. -how_to_implement = This search relies on the Splunk Add-on for Google Cloud Platform, setting up a Cloud Pub/Sub input, along with the relevant GCP PubSub topics and logging sink to capture GCP Storage Bucket events (https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/routing/overview). -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that a GCP admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. That said, GCP strongly advises against granting full control to the "allUsers" group. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = S3 Bucket -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public S3 bucket over the aws cli. -how_to_implement = -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to the "All Users" group. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = S3 Bucket -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public S3 bucket. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to the "All Users" group. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = Malicious actors often abuse misconfigured LDAP servers or applications that use the LDAP servers in organizations. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. This search will help determine if you have any LDAP connections to IP addresses outside of private (RFC1918) address space. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format and should be mapped to the Network Traffic datamodels that are in use for this search. The following Splunk SOAR playbook can be used to respond to this detection: Log4j Investigate The following Splunk SOAR playbook can be used to respond to this detection: Log4j Respond -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190", "T1059"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Unknown at this moment. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. Please check those servers to verify if the activity is legitimate. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for outbound SMB connections made by hosts within your network to the Internet. SMB traffic is used for Windows file-sharing activity. One of the techniques often used by attackers involves retrieving the credential hash using an SMB request made to a compromised server controlled by the threat actor. -how_to_implement = In order to run this search effectively, we highly recommend that you leverage the Assets and Identity framework. It is important that you have good understanding of how your network segments are designed, and be able to distinguish internal from external address space. Add a category named `internal` to the CIDRs that host the companys assets in `assets_by_cidr.csv` lookup file, which is located in `$SPLUNK_HOME/etc/apps/SA-IdentityManagement/lookups/`. More information on updating this lookup can be found here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.0.0/Admin/Addassetandidentitydata. This search also requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.002", "T1071"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = It is likely that the outbound Server Message Block (SMB) traffic is legitimate, if the company's internal networks are not well-defined in the Assets and Identity Framework. Categorize the internal CIDR blocks as `internal` in the lookup file to avoid creating notable events for traffic destined to those CIDR blocks. Any other network connection that is going out to the Internet should be investigated and blocked. Best practices suggest preventing external communications of all SMB versions and related protocols at the network boundary. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for execution of process `outlook.exe` where the process is writing a `.zip` file to the disk. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} -known_false_positives = It is not uncommon for outlook to write legitimate zip files to the disk. -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule] type = detection asset_type = Endpoint @@ -3194,14 +2402,14 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives" known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = Infrastructure +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium -explanation = By enabling Port Security on a Cisco switch you can restrict input to an interface by limiting and identifying MAC addresses of the workstations that are allowed to access the port. When you assign secure MAC addresses to a secure port, the port does not forward packets with source addresses outside the group of defined addresses. If you limit the number of secure MAC addresses to one and assign a single secure MAC address, the workstation attached to that port is assured the full bandwidth of the port. If a port is configured as a secure port and the maximum number of secure MAC addresses is reached, when the MAC address of a workstation attempting to access the port is different from any of the identified secure MAC addresses, a security violation occurs. -how_to_implement = This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with Port Security and Error Disable for this to work (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst4500/12-2/25ew/configuration/guide/conf/port_sec.html) and log with a severity level of minimum "5 - notification". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Exploitation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1557", "T1557.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} -known_false_positives = This search might be prone to high false positives if you have malfunctioning devices connected to your ethernet ports or if end users periodically connect physical devices to the network. +explanation = This search looks for fast execution of processes used for system network configuration discovery on the endpoint. +how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the processes node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is usually generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry or that are populated via Windows event logs, after enabling process tracking in your Windows audit settings. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 2"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command \u0026 Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1016"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} +known_false_positives = It is uncommon for normal users to execute a series of commands used for network discovery. System administrators often use scripts to execute these commands. These can generate false positives. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule] @@ -3226,24 +2434,14 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Detect RClone Command-Line Usage - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic identifies commonly used command-line arguments used by `rclone.exe` to initiate a file transfer. Some arguments were negated as they are specific to the configuration used by adversaries. In particular, an adversary may list the files or directories of the remote file share using `ls` or `lsd`, which is not indicative of malicious behavior. During triage, at this stage of a ransomware event, exfiltration is about to occur or has already. Isolate the endpoint and continue investigating by review file modifications and parallel processes. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1020"]} +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1020"]} known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as this is restricted to the Rclone process name. Filter or tune the analytic as needed. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search will return a table of rare processes, the names of the systems running them, and the users who initiated each process. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts and populating the endpoint data model with the resultant dataset. The macro `filter_rare_process_allow_list` searches two lookup files for allowed processes. These consist of `rare_process_allow_list_default.csv` and `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv`. To add your own processes to the allow list, add them to `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv`. If you wish to remove an entry from the default lookup file, you will have to modify the macro itself to set the allow_list value for that process to false. You can modify the limit parameter and search scheduling to better suit your environment. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.PT", "PR.DS", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Some legitimate processes may be only rarely executed in your environment. As these are identified, update `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv` to filter them out of your search results. -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Regasm Spawning a Process - Rule] type = detection asset_type = Endpoint @@ -3317,54 +2515,44 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Renamed 7-Zip - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies renamed 7-Zip usage using Sysmon. At this stage of an attack, review parallel processes and file modifications for data that is staged or potentially have been exfiltrated. This analytic utilizes the OriginalFileName to capture the renamed process. During triage, validate this is the legitimate version of `7zip` by reviewing the PE metadata. In addition, review parallel processes for further suspicious behavior. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1560.001", "T1560"]} +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1560.001", "T1560"]} known_false_positives = Limited false positives, however this analytic will need to be modified for each environment if Sysmon is not used. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies renamed instances of `PsExec.exe` being utilized on an endpoint. Most instances, it is highly probable to capture `Psexec.exe` or other SysInternal utility usage with the command-line argument of `-accepteula`. During triage, validate this is the legitimate version of `PsExec` by reviewing the PE metadata. In addition, review parallel processes for further suspicious behavior. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Lateral Movement", "Execution"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569", "T1569.002"]} +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569", "T1569.002"]} known_false_positives = Limited false positives should be present. It is possible some third party applications may use older versions of PsExec, filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Renamed RClone - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies the usage of `rclone.exe`, renamed, being used to exfiltrate data to a remote destination. RClone has been used by multiple ransomware groups to exfiltrate data. In many instances, it will be downloaded from the legitimate site and executed accordingly. During triage, isolate the endpoint and begin to review parallel processes for additional behavior. At this stage, the adversary may have staged data to be exfiltrated. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1020"]} +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1020"]} known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as this analytic identifies renamed instances of `rclone.exe`. Filter as needed if there is a legitimate business use case. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Renamed WinRAR - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analtyic identifies renamed instances of `WinRAR.exe`. In most cases, it is not common for WinRAR to be used renamed, however it is common to be installed by a third party application and executed from a non-standard path. During triage, validate additional metadata from the binary that this is `WinRAR`. Review parallel processes and file modifications. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1560.001", "T1560"]} +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1560.001", "T1560"]} known_false_positives = Unknown. It is possible third party applications use renamed instances of WinRAR. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Infrastructure -confidence = medium -explanation = By enabling DHCP Snooping as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect unauthorized DHCP servers handing out DHCP leases to devices on the network (Man in the Middle attack). -how_to_implement = This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with DHCP Snooping enabled (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960x/software/15-0_2_EX/security/configuration_guide/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg_chapter_01101.html) and log with a severity level of minimum "5 - notification". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1557"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} -known_false_positives = This search might be prone to high false positives if DHCP Snooping has been incorrectly configured or in the unlikely event that the DHCP server has been moved to another network interface. -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack - Rule] type = detection asset_type = Endpoint @@ -3405,29 +2593,9 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = S3 Bucket -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks at S3 bucket-access logs and detects new or previously unseen remote IP addresses that have successfully accessed an S3 bucket. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your S3 access logs' inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen S3 Bucket Access by Remote IP" support search once to create a history of previously seen remote IPs and bucket names. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = S3 buckets can be accessed from any IP, as long as it can make a successful connection. This will be a false postive, since the search is looking for a new IP within the past hour -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Network -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for commands that the SNICat tool uses in the TLS SNI field. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting Zeek SSL data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format. We are detecting when any of the predefined SNICat commands are found within the server_name (SNI) field. These commands are LIST, LS, SIZE, LD, CB, EX, ALIVE, EXIT, WHERE, and finito. You can go further once this has been detected, and run other searches to decode the SNI data to prove or disprove if any data exfiltration has taken place. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1041"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = Unknown -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies common command-line arguments used by SharpHound `-collectionMethod` and `invoke-bloodhound`. Being the script is FOSS, function names may be modified, but these changes are dependent upon the operator. In most instances the defaults are used. This analytic works to identify the common command-line attributes used. It does not cover the entirety of every argument in order to avoid false positives. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. @@ -3437,7 +2605,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Detect SharpHound File Modifications - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = SharpHound is used as a reconnaissance collector, ingestor, for BloodHound. SharpHound will query the domain controller and begin gathering all the data related to the domain and trusts. For output, it will drop a .zip file upon completion following a typical pattern that is often not changed. This analytic focuses on the default file name scheme. Note that this may be evaded with different parameters within SharpHound, but that depends on the operator. `-randomizefilenames` and `-encryptzip` are two examples. In addition, executing SharpHound via .exe or .ps1 without any command-line arguments will still perform activity and dump output to the default filename. Example default filename `20210601181553_BloodHound.zip`. SharpHound creates multiple temp files following the same pattern `20210601182121_computers.json`, `domains.json`, `gpos.json`, `ous.json` and `users.json`. Tuning may be required, or remove these json's entirely if it is too noisy. During traige, review parallel processes for further suspicious behavior. Typically, the process executing the `.ps1` ingestor will be PowerShell. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on file modifications that include the name of the process, and file, responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node. @@ -3447,7 +2615,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Detect SharpHound Usage - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies SharpHound binary usage by using the original filena,e. In addition to renaming the PE, other coverage is available to detect command-line arguments. This particular analytic looks for the original_file_name of `SharpHound.exe` and the process name. It is possible older instances of SharpHound.exe have different original filenames. Dependent upon the operator, the code may be re-compiled and the attributes removed or changed to anything else. During triage, review the metadata of the binary in question. Review parallel processes for suspicious behavior. Identify the source of this binary. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. @@ -3455,122 +2623,6 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087. known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as this is specific to a file attribute not used by anything else. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Infrastructure -confidence = medium -explanation = Adversaries may abuse netbooting to load an unauthorized network device operating system from a Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) server. TFTP boot (netbooting) is commonly used by network administrators to load configuration-controlled network device images from a centralized management server. Netbooting is one option in the boot sequence and can be used to centralize, manage, and control device images. -how_to_implement = This search looks for Network Traffic events to TFTP, FTP or SSH/SCP ports from network devices. Make sure to tag any network devices as network, router or switch in order for this detection to work. If the TFTP traffic doesn't traverse a firewall nor packet inspection, these events will not be logged. This is typically an issue if the TFTP server is on the same subnet as the network device. There is also a chance of the network device loading software using a DHCP assigned IP address (netboot) which is not in the Asset inventory. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1542.005", "T1542"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} -known_false_positives = This search will also report any legitimate attempts of software downloads to network devices as well as outbound SSH sessions from network devices. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search will detect users creating spikes of API activity in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike.\ -This search produces fields (`eventName`,`numberOfApiCalls`,`uniqueApisCalled`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** AWS Event Name, **Field:** eventName\ -1. \ -1. **Label:** Number of API Calls, **Field:** numberOfApiCalls\ -1. \ -1. **Label:** Unique API Calls, **Field:** uniqueApisCalled\ -Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} -known_false_positives = -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub alerts for an EC2 instance in 4 hours intervals -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Security Hub inputs. The threshold_value should be tuned to your environment and schedule these searches according to the bucket span interval. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "nist": ["DE.DP"]} -known_false_positives = None -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub alerts for an AWS IAM User in 4 hours intervals. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Security Hub inputs. The threshold_value should be tuned to your environment and schedule these searches according to the bucket span interval. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = None -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to network access-control lists (ACLs)in your AWS environment. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best when you run the "Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN" support search once to create a lookup file of previously seen Network ACL Activity. To add or remove API event names related to network ACLs, edit the macro `network_acl_events`. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} -known_false_positives = The false-positive rate may vary based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`. Please modify this according the your environment. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = S3 Bucket -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects users creating spikes in API activity related to deletion of S3 buckets in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best when you run the "Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN" support search once to create a baseline of previously seen S3 bucket-deletion activity. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} -known_false_positives = Based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`, the false positive rate may vary. Please modify this according the your environment. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to security groups in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike.This search works best when you run the "Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN" support search once to create a history of previously seen Security Group Activity. To add or remove API event names for security groups, edit the macro `security_group_api_calls`. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} -known_false_positives = Based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`, the false positive rate may vary. Please modify this according the your environment. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = This search will detect spike in blocked outbound network connections originating from within your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your VPC Flow logs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the number of data points required to meet the definition of "spike." The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best when you run the "Baseline of Blocked Outbound Connection" support search once to create a history of previously seen blocked outbound connections. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} -known_false_positives = The false-positive rate may vary based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`. Additionally, false positives may result when AWS administrators roll out policies enforcing network blocks, causing sudden increases in the number of blocked outbound connections. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Infrastructure -confidence = medium -explanation = Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to automate data exfiltration over compromised network infrastructure. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some network devices and used for network analysis and may be configured to duplicate traffic and forward to one or more destinations for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring device. -how_to_implement = This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must log with a severity level of minimum "5 - notification". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices and that the devices have been configured according to the documentation of the Cisco Networks Add-on. Also note that an attacker may disable logging from the device prior to enabling traffic mirroring. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1200", "T1020", "T1498", "T1020.001"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} -known_false_positives = This search will return false positives for any legitimate traffic captures by network administrators. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search is used to detect hosts that generate Windows Event ID 4663 for successful attempts to write to or read from a removable storage and Event ID 4656 for failures, which occurs when a USB drive is plugged in. In this scenario we are querying the Change_Analysis data model to look for Windows Event ID 4656 or 4663 where the priority of the affected host is marked as high in the ES Assets and Identity Framework. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663 and 4656. Ensure that the field from the event logs is being mapped to the result_id field in the Change_Analysis data model. To minimize the alert volume, this search leverages the Assets and Identity framework to filter out events from those assets not marked high priority in the Enterprise Security Assets and Identity Framework. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.DS"]} -known_false_positives = Legitimate USB activity will also be detected. Please verify and investigate as appropriate. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Infrastructure -confidence = medium -explanation = By populating the organization's assets within the assets_by_str.csv, we will be able to detect unauthorized devices that are trying to connect with the organization's network by inspecting DHCP request packets, which are issued by devices when they attempt to obtain an IP address from the DHCP server. The MAC address associated with the source of the DHCP request is checked against the list of known devices, and reports on those that are not found. -how_to_implement = This search uses the Network_Sessions data model shipped with Enterprise Security. It leverages the Assets and Identity framework to populate the assets_by_str.csv file located in SA-IdentityManagement, which will contain a list of known authorized organizational assets including their MAC addresses. Ensure that all inventoried systems have their MAC address populated. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} -known_false_positives = This search might be prone to high false positives. Please consider this when conducting analysis or investigations. Authorized devices may be detected as unauthorized. If this is the case, verify the MAC address of the system responsible for the false positive and add it to the Assets and Identity framework with the proper information. -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule] type = detection asset_type = Endpoint @@ -3583,7 +2635,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Detect WMI Event Subscription Persistence - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscription to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions.\ All event subscriptions have three components \ @@ -3596,168 +2648,9 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.00 known_false_positives = It is possible some applications will create a consumer and may be required to be filtered. For tuning, add any additional LOLBin's for further depth of coverage. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects SIGRed via Splunk Stream. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting Splunk Stream DNS and Splunk Stream TCP. We are detecting SIG and KEY records via stream:dns and TCP payload over 65KB in size via stream:tcp. Replace the macro definitions ('stream:dns' and 'stream:tcp') with configurations for your Splunk environment. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1203"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects SIGRed via Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format. We are detecting SIG and KEY records via bro:dns:json and TCP payload over 65KB in size via bro:conn:json. The Network Resolution and Network Traffic datamodels are in use for this search. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1203"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Network -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects attempts to run exploits for the Zerologon CVE-2020-1472 vulnerability via Zeek RPC -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting Zeek DCE-RPC data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format. We are detecting when all three RPC operations (NetrServerReqChallenge, NetrServerAuthenticate3, NetrServerPasswordSet2) are splunk_security_essentials_app via bro:rpc:json. These three operations are then correlated on the Zeek UID field. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Web Server -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for specific GET or HEAD requests to web servers that are indicative of reconnaissance attempts to identify vulnerable JBoss servers. JexBoss is described as the exploit tool of choice for this malicious activity. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data from the web server or network traffic that contains web specific information, and populating the Web data model. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1082"]} -known_false_positives = It's possible for legitimate HTTP requests to be made to URLs containing the suspicious paths. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = Malicious actors often abuse legitimate Dynamic DNS services to host malicious payloads or interactive command and control nodes. Attackers will automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to countless IP addresses to circumvent firewall blocks, block lists as well as frustrate a network defenders analytic and investigative processes. This search will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains. -how_to_implement = First, you'll need to ingest data from your DNS operations. This can be done by ingesting logs from your server or data, collected passively by Splunk Stream or a similar solution. Specifically, data that contains the domain that is being queried and the IP of the host originating the request must be populating the `Network_Resolution` data model. This search also leverages a lookup file, `dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv`, which contains a non-exhaustive list of Dynamic DNS providers. Please consider updating the local lookup periodically by adding new domains to the list of `dynamic_dns_providers_local.csv`.\ -This search produces fields (query, answer, isDynDNS) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable event. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review. Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** DNS Query, **Field:** query\ -1. \ -1. **Label:** DNS Answer, **Field:** answer\ -1. \ -1. **Label:** IsDynamicDNS, **Field:** isDynDNS\ -Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1189"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Some users and applications may leverage Dynamic DNS to reach out to some domains on the Internet since dynamic DNS by itself is not malicious, however this activity must be verified. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Web Server -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is used to detect malicious HTTP requests crafted to exploit jmx-console in JBoss servers. The malicious requests have a long URL length, as the payload is embedded in the URL. -how_to_implement = You must ingest data from the web server or capture network data that contains web specific information with solutions such as Bro or Splunk Stream, and populating the Web data model -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 4", "CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["ID.RA", "PR.PT", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "PR.MA", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = No known false positives for this detection. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies "mshta.exe" execution with inline protocol handlers. "JavaScript", "VBScript", and "About" are the only supported options when invoking HTA content directly on the command-line. The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process "mshta.exe" and its parent process. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies renamed instances of mshta.exe executing. Mshta.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. This analytic utilizes the internal name of the PE to identify if is the legitimate mshta binary. Further analysis should be performed to review the executed content and validation it is the real mshta. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of mshta.exe, but never renamed, triggering a false positive. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search detects new API calls that have either never been seen before or that have not been seen in the previous hour, where the identity type is `AssumedRole`. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously seen API call per user roles in AWS CloudTrail" support search once to create a history of previously seen user roles. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -known_false_positives = It is possible that there are legitimate user roles making new or infrequently used API calls in your infrastructure, causing the search to trigger. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour. Deprecated now this search is updated to use the Authentication datamodel. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. Run the "Previously seen users in AWS CloudTrail" support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run "Update previously seen users in AWS CloudTrail" hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for fast execution of processes used for system network configuration discovery on the endpoint. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the processes node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is usually generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry or that are populated via Windows event logs, after enabling process tracking in your Windows audit settings. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 2"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1016"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} -known_false_positives = It is uncommon for normal users to execute a series of commands used for network discovery. System administrators often use scripts to execute these commands. These can generate false positives. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect shared ec2 snapshot - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = EC2 Snapshot -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic utilizes AWS CloudTrail events to identify when an EC2 snapshot permissions are modified to be shared with a different AWS account. This method is used by adversaries to exfiltrate the EC2 snapshot. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1537"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = It is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately shared a snapshot with others for a specific purpose. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for web connections to dynamic DNS providers. -how_to_implement = This search requires you to be ingesting web-traffic logs. You can obtain these logs from indexing data from a web proxy or by using a network-traffic-analysis tool, such as Bro or Splunk Stream. The web data model must contain the URL being requested, the IP address of the host initiating the request, and the destination IP. This search also leverages a lookup file, `dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv`, which contains a non-exhaustive list of dynamic DNS providers. Consider periodically updating this local lookup file with new domains.\ -This search produces fields (`isDynDNS`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** IsDynamicDNS, **Field:** isDynDNS\ -Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` Deprecated because duplicate. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.001"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "DE.DP"]} -known_false_positives = It is possible that list of dynamic DNS providers is outdated and/or that the URL being requested is legitimate. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search is used to detect DNS tunneling, by calculating the sum of the length of DNS queries and DNS answers. The search also filters out potential false positives by filtering out queries made to internal systems and the queries originating from internal DNS, Web, and Email servers. Endpoints using DNS as a method of transmission for data exfiltration, command and control, or evasion of security controls can often be detected by noting an unusually large volume of DNS traffic. \ -NOTE:Deprecated because existing detection is doing the same. This detection is replaced with two other variations, if you are using MLTK then you can use this search `ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule` or use the standard deviation version `ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule`, as an alternantive. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, we must ensure that DNS data is being ingested and mapped to the appropriate fields in the Network_Resolution data model. Fields like src_category are automatically provided by the Assets and Identity Framework shipped with Splunk Enterprise Security. You will need to ensure you are using the Assets and Identity Framework and populating the src_category field. You will also need to enable the `cim_corporate_web_domain_search()` macro which will essentially filter out the DNS queries made to the corporate web domains to reduce alert fatigue. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.DS"]} -known_false_positives = It's possible that normal DNS traffic will exhibit this behavior. If an alert is generated, please investigate and validate as appropriate. The threshold can also be modified to better suit your environment. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for specific command-line arguments that may indicate the execution of tools made by Nirsoft, which are legitimate, but may be abused by attackers. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1072"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = While legitimate, these NirSoft tools are prone to abuse. You should verfiy that the tool was used for a legitimate purpose. -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Disable AMSI Through Registry - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = this search is to identify modification in registry to disable AMSI windows feature to evade detections. This technique was seen in several ransomware, RAT and even APT to impaire defenses of the compromise machine and to be able to execute payload with minimal alert as much as possible. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. @@ -3767,7 +2660,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Disable Defender AntiVirus Registry - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This particular behavior is typically executed when an adversaries or malware gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution and to evade detections. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. Endpoint should be isolated. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the registry value name, registry path, and registry value data from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. @@ -3777,7 +2670,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Disable Defender BlockAtFirstSeen Feature - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable windows defender feature. This technique is to bypassed or evade detection from Windows Defender AV product specially the BlockAtFirstSeen feature where it block suspicious file first seen in the host. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the registry value name, registry path, and registry value data from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. @@ -3787,7 +2680,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Disable Defender Enhanced Notification - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable windows defender feature. This technique is to bypassed or evade detection from Windows Defender AV product specially the Enhanced Notification feature wher user or admin set to show or display alerts. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the registry value name, registry path, and registry value data executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. @@ -3797,7 +2690,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Disable Defender MpEngine Registry - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This particular behavior is typically executed when an adversaries or malware gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution and to evade detections. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. Endpoint should be isolated. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the registry value name, registry path, and registry value data from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. @@ -3807,7 +2700,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Disable Defender Spynet Reporting - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable windows defender feature. This technique is to bypassed or evade detection from Windows Defender AV product specially the spynet reporting for its telemetry. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the registry value name, registry path, and registry value data from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. @@ -3817,7 +2710,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Disable Defender Submit Samples Consent Feature - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = his analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable windows defender feature. This technique is to bypassed or evade detection from Windows Defender AV product specially the submit samples feature for further analysis.. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the registry value name, registry path, and registry value data from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. @@ -3827,7 +2720,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Disable ETW Through Registry - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = this search is to identify modification in registry to disable ETW windows feature to evade detections. This technique was seen in several ransomware, RAT and even APT to impaire defenses of the compromise machine and to be able to execute payload with minimal alert as much as possible. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. @@ -3837,7 +2730,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Disable Logs Using WevtUtil - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect execution of wevtutil.exe to disable logs. This technique was seen in several ransomware to disable the event logs to evade alerts and detections. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. @@ -3847,7 +2740,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Disable Registry Tool - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search identifies modification of registry to disable the regedit or registry tools of the windows operating system. Since registry tool is a swiss knife in analyzing registry, malware such as RAT or trojan Spy disable this application to prevent the removal of their registry entry such as persistence, file less components and defense evasion. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. @@ -3857,7 +2750,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Disable Schedule Task - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic is to detect a suspicious commandline to disable existing schedule task. This technique is used by adversaries or commodity malware like IceID to disable security application (AV products) in the targetted host to evade detections. This TTP is a good pivot to check further why and what other process run before and after this detection. check which process execute the commandline and what task is disabled. parent child process is quite valuable in this scenario too. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. @@ -3867,7 +2760,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic is to detect a suspicious registry modification to disable security audit logs. This technique was shared by a researcher to disable Security logs of windows by adding this registry. The Windows will think it is WinPE and will not log any event to the Security Log how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. @@ -3877,7 +2770,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Disable Show Hidden Files - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic is to identify a modification in the Windows registry to prevent users from seeing all the files with hidden attributes. This event or techniques are known on some worm and trojan spy malware that will drop hidden files on the infected machine. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. @@ -3887,7 +2780,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Disable UAC Remote Restriction - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable UAC remote restriction. This technique was well documented in Microsoft page where attacker may modify this registry value to bypassed UAC feature of windows host. This is a good indicator that some tries to bypassed UAC to suspicious process or gain privilege escalation. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. @@ -3897,7 +2790,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Disable Windows App Hotkeys - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic detects a suspicious registry modification to disable Windows hotkey (shortcut keys) for native Windows applications. This technique is commonly used to disable certain or several Windows applications like `taskmgr.exe` and `cmd.exe`. This technique is used to impair the analyst in analyzing and removing the attacker implant in compromised systems. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as CarbonBlack or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. @@ -3907,7 +2800,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search is to identifies a modification in registry to disable the windows denfender real time behavior monitoring. This event or technique is commonly seen in RAT, bot, or Trojan to disable AV to evade detections. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. @@ -3917,7 +2810,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following search identifies a modification of registry to disable the smartscreen protection of windows machine. This is windows feature provide an early warning system against website that might engage in phishing attack or malware distribution. This modification are seen in RAT malware to cover their tracks upon downloading other of its component or other payload. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. @@ -3927,27 +2820,27 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-ADUser` commandlet with specific parameters. `Get-ADUser` is part of the Active Directory PowerShell module used to manage Windows Active Directory networks. As the name suggests, `Get-ADUser` is used to query for domain users. With the appropiate parameters, Get-ADUser allows adversaries to discover domain accounts with Kerberos Pre Authentication disabled.\ Red Teams and adversaries alike use may abuse Get-ADUSer to enumerate these accounts and attempt to crack their passwords offline. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.004"]} +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.004"]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use search for accounts with Kerberos Pre Authentication disabled for legitimate purposes. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With PowerView - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainUser` commandlet with specific parameters. `Get-DomainUser` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows Active Directory networks. As the name suggests, `Get-DomainUser` is used to identify domain users and combining it with `-PreauthNotRequired` allows adversaries to discover domain accounts with Kerberos Pre Authentication disabled.\ Red Teams and adversaries alike use may leverage PowerView to enumerate these accounts and attempt to crack their passwords offline. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.004"]} +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.004"]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use PowerView for troubleshooting providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Disabling CMD Application - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = this search is to identify modification in registry to disable cmd prompt application. This technique is commonly seen in RAT, Trojan or WORM to prevent triaging or deleting there samples through cmd application which is one of the tool of analyst to traverse on directory and files. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. @@ -3957,7 +2850,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Disabling ControlPanel - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = this search is to identify registry modification to disable control panel window. This technique is commonly seen in malware to prevent their artifacts , persistence removed on the infected machine. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. @@ -3967,7 +2860,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Disabling Defender Services - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This particular behavior is typically executed when an adversaries or malware gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution and to evade detections. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. Endpoint should be isolated. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. @@ -3977,7 +2870,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Disabling Firewall with Netsh - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search is to identifies suspicious firewall disabling using netsh application. this technique is commonly seen in malware that tries to communicate or download its component or other payload to its C2 server. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. @@ -3987,7 +2880,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search is to identify registry modification to disable folder options feature of windows to show hidden files, file extension and etc. This technique used by malware in combination if disabling show hidden files feature to hide their files and also to hide the file extension to lure the user base on file icons or fake file extensions. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. @@ -3997,7 +2890,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Disabling Net User Account - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic will identify a suspicious command-line that disables a user account using the `net.exe` utility native to Windows. This technique may used by the adversaries to interrupt availability of such users to do their malicious act. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. @@ -4007,7 +2900,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Disabling NoRun Windows App - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search is to identify modification of registry to disable run application in window start menu. this application is known to be a helpful shortcut to windows OS user to run known application and also to execute some reg or batch script. This technique is used malware to make cleaning of its infection more harder by preventing known application run easily through run shortcut. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. @@ -4027,7 +2920,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Disabling SystemRestore In Registry - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following search identifies the modification of registry related in disabling the system restore of a machine. This event or behavior are seen in some RAT malware to make the restore of the infected machine difficult and keep their infection on the box. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. @@ -4037,7 +2930,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Disabling Task Manager - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search is to identifies modification of registry to disable the task manager of windows operating system. this event or technique are commonly seen in malware such as RAT, Trojan, TrojanSpy or worm to prevent the user to terminate their process. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. @@ -4045,19 +2938,29 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.00 known_false_positives = admin may disable this application for non technical user. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Domain Account Discovery With Net App - Rule] +[savedsearch://ESCU - DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain users. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use net.exe to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. +explanation = The following analytic identifies DLLHost.exe with no command line arguments with a network connection. It is unusual for DLLHost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. DLLHost.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `port` node. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} +known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate third party applications may use a moved copy of dllhost, triggering a false positive. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = this search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. This technique are seen in couple of malware and APT group to exfiltrated collected data in a infected machine or infected network. This detection is looking for unique use of nslookup where it tries to use specific record type, TXT, A, AAAA, that are commonly used by attacker and also the retry parameter which is designed to query C2 DNS multiple tries. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of nslookup.exe may be used. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048"]} +known_false_positives = admin nslookup usage providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Domain Account Discovery with Dsquery - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `dsquery.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover domain users. The `user` argument returns a list of all users registered in the domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike engage in remote system discovery for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. @@ -4065,9 +2968,19 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087. known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Domain Account Discovery With Net App - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain users. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use net.exe to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"]} +known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. +providing_technologies = [] + [savedsearch://ESCU - Domain Account Discovery with Wmic - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain users. Red Teams and adversaries alike use wmic.exe to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. @@ -4077,7 +2990,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `nltest.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The arguments `/dclist:` and '/dsgetdc:', can be used to return a list of all domain controllers. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use nltest.exe to identify domain controllers in a Windows Domain for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. @@ -4087,7 +3000,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Domain Controller Discovery with Wmic - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The arguments utilized in this command line return a list of all domain controllers in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike use *.exe to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. @@ -4095,9 +3008,19 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018" known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Domain Group Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator being used to query Active Directory for domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `[Adsisearcher]` to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.002"]} +known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use Adsisearcher for troubleshooting. +providing_technologies = [] + [savedsearch://ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Dsquery - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `dsquery.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The argument `group`, returns a list of all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use may leverage dsquery.exe to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. @@ -4107,7 +3030,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Net - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The argument `group /domain`, returns a list of all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. @@ -4117,7 +3040,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Wmic - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The arguments utilized in this command return a list of all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use wmic.exe to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. @@ -4125,19 +3048,9 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069" known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Domain Group Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator being used to query Active Directory for domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `[Adsisearcher]` to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.002"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use Adsisearcher for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Download Files Using Telegram - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic will identify a suspicious download by the Telegram application on a Windows system. This behavior was identified on a honeypot where the adversary gained access, installed Telegram and followed through with downloading different network scanners (port, bruteforcer, masscan) to the system and later used to mapped the whole network and further move laterally. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and TargetFilename from your endpoints or Events that monitor filestream events which is happened when process download something. (EventCode 15) If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. @@ -4147,7 +3060,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Drop IcedID License dat - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect dropping a suspicious file named as "license.dat" in %appdata%. This behavior seen in latest IcedID malware that contain the actual core bot that will be injected in other process to do banking stealing. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. @@ -4155,6 +3068,21 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204", known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] +[savedsearch://ESCU - DSQuery Domain Discovery - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic identifies "dsquery.exe" execution with arguments looking for `TrustedDomain` query directly on the command-line. This is typically indicative of an Administrator or adversary perform domain trust discovery. Note that this query does not identify any other variations of "Dsquery.exe" usage.\ +Within this detection, it is assumed `dsquery.exe` is not moved or renamed.\ +The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process "dsquery.exe" and its parent process.\ +DSQuery.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64` and only on Server operating system.\ +The following DLL(s) are loaded when DSQuery.exe is launched `dsquery.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible dsquery is running within that process context in memory.\ +In addition to trust discovery, review parallel processes for additional behaviors performed. Identify the parent process and capture any files (batch files, for example) being used. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"]} +known_false_positives = Limited false positives. If there is a true false positive, filter based on command-line or parent process. +providing_technologies = [] + [savedsearch://ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule] type = detection asset_type = Endpoint @@ -4176,80 +3104,9 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Act known_false_positives = None identified. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. Detect a renamed instance of procdump.exe dumping the lsass process. This query looks for both -mm and -ma usage. -mm will produce a mini dump file and -ma will write a dump file with all process memory. Both are highly suspect and should be reviewed. Modify the query as needed.\ -During triage, confirm this is procdump.exe executing. If it is the first time a Sysinternals utility has been ran, it is possible there will be a -accepteula on the command line. Review other endpoint data sources for cross process (injection) into lsass.exe. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = None identified. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for EC2 instances being modified by users who have not previously modified them. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User" support search once to create a history of previously seen ARNs. To add or remove APIs that modify an EC2 instance, edit the macro `ec2_modification_api_calls`. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -known_false_positives = It's possible that a new user will start to modify EC2 instances when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is modifying instances that this is the intended behavior. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where an instance is started in a particular region in the last one hour and then compares it to a lookup file of previously seen regions where an instance was started -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. Run the "Previously seen AWS Regions" support search only once to create of baseline of previously seen regions. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = It's possible that a user has unknowingly started an instance in a new region. Please verify that this activity is legitimate. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen AMIs. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 AMIs" support search once to create a history of previously seen AMIs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -known_false_positives = After a new AMI is created, the first systems created with that AMI will cause this alert to fire. Verify that the AMI being used was created by a legitimate user. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen instance types. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types" support search once to create a history of previously seen instance types. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -known_false_positives = It is possible that an admin will create a new system using a new instance type never used before. Verify with the creator that they intended to create the system with the new instance type. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for EC2 instances being created by users who have not created them before. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User" support search once to create a history of previously seen ARNs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -known_false_positives = It's possible that a user will start to create EC2 instances when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is launching instances that this is the intended behavior. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic is to detect a registry modification to disable ETW feature of windows. This technique is to evade EDR appliance to evade detections and hide its execution from audit logs. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.006", "T1127", "T1562"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery With Net - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for specific elevated domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate elevated domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery to identify high privileged users. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. @@ -4257,19 +3114,9 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069" known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery With Wmic - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for specific domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate elevated domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery to identify high privileged users. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.002"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery with PowerView - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainGroupMember` commandlet. `Get-DomainGroupMember` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. As the name suggests, `Get-DomainGroupMember` is used to list the members of an specific domain group. Red Teams and adversaries alike use PowerView to enumerate elevated domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery to identify high privileged users. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. @@ -4277,41 +3124,19 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069" known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerView for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery With Wmic - Rule] type = detection asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium -explanation = Attackers often use spaces as a means to obfuscate an attachment's file extension. This search looks for messages with email attachments that have many spaces within the file names. -how_to_implement = You need to ingest data from emails. Specifically, the sender's address and the file names of any attachments must be mapped to the Email data model. The threshold ratio is set to 10%, but this value can be configured to suit each environment. \ - **Splunk Phantom Playbook Integration**\ -If Splunk Phantom is also configured in your environment, a playbook called "Suspicious Email Attachment Investigate and Delete" can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/` and add the correct hostname to the "Phantom Instance" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search. The notable event will be sent to Phantom and the playbook will gather further information about the file attachment and its network behaviors. If Phantom finds malicious behavior and an analyst approves of the results, the email will be deleted from the user's inbox. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = None at this time -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The search looks at the change-analysis data model and detects email files created outside the normal Outlook directory. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records the file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint.Filesystem data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or by other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system reads and writes. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114", "T1114.001"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators and users sometimes prefer backing up their email data by moving the email files into a different folder. These attempts will be detected by the search. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for an increase of data transfers from your email server to your clients. This could be indicative of a malicious actor collecting data using your email server. -how_to_implement = This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model. Your email servers must be categorized as "email_server" for the search to work, as well. You may need to adjust the deviation_threshold and minimum_data_samples values based on the network traffic in your environment. The "deviation_threshold" field is a multiplying factor to control how much variation you're willing to tolerate. The "minimum_data_samples" field is the minimum number of connections of data samples required for the statistic to be valid. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114", "T1114.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = The false-positive rate will vary based on how you set the deviation_threshold and data_samples values. Our recommendation is to adjust these values based on your network traffic to and from your email servers. +explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for specific domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate elevated domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery to identify high privileged users. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.002"]} +known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Enable RDP In Other Port Number - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a modification to registry to enable rdp to a machine with different port number. This technique was seen in some atttacker tries to do lateral movement and remote access to a compromised machine to gain control of it. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. @@ -4321,7 +3146,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic is to detect a suspicious registry modification to enable plain text credential feature of windows. This technique was used by several malware and also by mimikatz to be able to dumpe the a plain text credential to the compromised or target host. This TTP is really a good indicator that someone wants to dump the crendential of the host so it must be a good pivot for credential dumping techniques. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. @@ -4331,7 +3156,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Enumerate Users Local Group Using Telegram - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic will detect a suspicious Telegram process enumerating all network users in a local group. This technique was seen in a Monero infected honeypot to mapped all the users on the compromised system. EventCode 4798 is generated when a process enumerates a user's security-enabled local groups on a computer or device. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Task Schedule (Exa. Security Log EventCode 4798) endpoints. Tune and filter known instances of process like logonUI used in your environment. @@ -4341,27 +3166,37 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Esentutl SAM Copy - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies the process - `esentutl.exe` - being used to capture credentials stored in ntds.dit or the SAM file on disk. During triage, review parallel processes and determine if legitimate activity. Upon determination of illegitimate activity, take further action to isolate and contain the threat. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002", "T1003"]} +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002", "T1003"]} known_false_positives = False positives should be limited. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] +[savedsearch://ESCU - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic is to detect a registry modification to disable ETW feature of windows. This technique is to evade EDR appliance to evade detections and hide its execution from audit logs. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.006", "T1127", "T1562"]} +known_false_positives = unknown +providing_technologies = [] + [savedsearch://ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following search identifies Eventvwr bypass by identifying the registry modification into a specific path that eventvwr.msc looks to (but is not valid) upon execution. A successful attack will include a suspicious command to be executed upon eventvwr.msc loading. Upon triage, review the parallel processes that have executed. Identify any additional registry modifications on the endpoint that may look suspicious. Remediate as necessary. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"]} +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"]} known_false_positives = Some false positives may be present and will need to be filtered. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Excel Spawning PowerShell - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following detection identifies Microsoft Excel spawning PowerShell. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with Excel.exe. Excel.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16` (version will vary). PowerShell spawning from Excel.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command executed will most likely be encoded and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. @@ -4371,7 +3206,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Excel Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following detection identifies Microsoft Excel spawning Windows Script Host - `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe`. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with Excel.exe. Excel.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16` (version will vary). `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` default location is `c:\windows\system32\` or c:windows\syswow64`. `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` spawning from Excel.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command-line executed will most likely be obfuscated and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. Review the reputation of the remote destination and block accordingly. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. @@ -4381,7 +3216,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Excessive Attempt To Disable Services - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic will identify suspicious series of command-line to disable several services. This technique is seen where the adversary attempts to disable security app services or other malware services to complete the objective on the compromised system. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed sc.exe may be used. @@ -4389,19 +3224,9 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1489"]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search identifies DNS query failures by counting the number of DNS responses that do not indicate success, and trigger on more than 50 occurrences. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you must ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.004", "T1071"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = It is possible legitimate traffic can trigger this rule. Please investigate as appropriate. The threshold for generating an event can also be customized to better suit your environment. -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Excessive File Deletion In WinDefender Folder - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic will identify excessive file deletion events in the Windows Defender folder. This technique was seen in the WhisperGate malware campaign in which adversaries abused Nirsofts advancedrun.exe to gain administrative privilege to then execute PowerShell commands to delete files within the Windows Defender application folder. This behavior is a good indicator the offending process is trying to corrupt a Windows Defender installation. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, TargetFilename, and ProcessID executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. @@ -4409,69 +3234,9 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exp known_false_positives = Windows Defender AV updates may cause this alert. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Excessive Service Stop Attempt - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic identifies suspicious series of attempt to kill multiple services on a system using either `net.exe` or `sc.exe`. This technique is use by adversaries to terminate security services or other related services to continue there objective and evade detections. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1489"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Cacls App - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies excessive usage of `cacls.exe`, `xcacls.exe` or `icacls.exe` application to change file or folder permission. This behavior is commonly seen where the adversary attempts to impair some users from deleting or accessing its malware components or artifact from the compromised system. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or administrative scripts may use this application. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic identifies excessive usage of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` within a bucket of time (1 minute). This behavior was seen in a Monero incident where the adversary attempts to create many users, delete and disable users as part of its malicious behavior. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1531"]} -known_false_positives = unknown. Filter as needed. Modify the time span as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious excessive usage of sc.exe in a host machine. This technique was seen in several ransomware , xmrig and other malware to create, modify, delete or disable a service may related to security application or to gain privilege escalation. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed taskkill.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569", "T1569.002"]} -known_false_positives = excessive execution of sc.exe is quite suspicious since it can modify or execute app in high privilege permission. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Taskkill - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic identifies excessive usage of `taskkill.exe` application. This application is commonly used by adversaries to evade detections by killing security product processes or even other processes to evade detection. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed taskkill.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"]} -known_false_positives = Unknown. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. This technique are seen in couple of malware and APT group to exfiltrated collected data in a infected machine or infected network. This detection is looking for unique use of nslookup where it tries to use specific record type (TXT, A, AAAA) that are commonly used by attacker and also the retry parameter which is designed to query C2 DNS multiple tries. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of nslookup.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Excessive number of distinct processes created in Windows Temp folder - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic will identify suspicious series of process executions. We have observed that post exploit framework tools like Koadic and Meterpreter will launch an excessive number of processes with distinct file paths from Windows\Temp to execute actions on objective. This behavior is extremely anomalous compared to typical application behaviors that use Windows\Temp. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the full process path in the process field of CIM's Process data model. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed sc.exe may be used. @@ -4481,7 +3246,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Excessive number of service control start as disabled - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This detection targets behaviors observed when threat actors have used sc.exe to modify services. We observed malware in a honey pot spawning numerous sc.exe processes in a short period of time, presumably to impair defenses, possibly to block others from compromising the same machine. This detection will alert when we see both an excessive number of sc.exe processes launched with specific commandline arguments to disable the start of certain services. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The complete process name with command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. @@ -4491,7 +3256,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Excessive number of taskhost processes - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This detection targets behaviors observed in post exploit kits like Meterpreter and Koadic that are run in memory. We have observed that these tools must invoke an excessive number of taskhost.exe and taskhostex.exe processes to complete various actions (discovery, lateral movement, etc.). It is extremely uncommon in the course of normal operations to see so many distinct taskhost and taskhostex processes running concurrently in a short time frame. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting events related to processes on the endpoints that include the name of the process and process id into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. @@ -4499,46 +3264,79 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"]} known_false_positives = Administrators, administrative actions or certain applications may run many instances of taskhost and taskhostex concurrently. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF - Rule] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Excessive Service Stop Attempt - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic identifies suspicious behavior related to ProxyShell against on-premise Microsoft Exchange servers. \ -Modification of this analytic is requried to ensure fields are mapped accordingly. \ -A suspicious event will have `PowerShell`, the method `POST` and `autodiscover.json`. This is indicative of accessing PowerShell on the back end of Exchange with SSRF. \ -An event will look similar to `POST /autodiscover/autodiscover.json a=dsxvu@fnsso.flq/powershell/?X-Rps-CAT=VgEAVAdXaW5kb3d...` (abbreviated) \ -Review the source attempting to perform this activity against your environment. In addition, review PowerShell logs and access recently granted to Exchange roles. -how_to_implement = The following analytic requires on-premise Exchange to be logging to Splunk using the TA - https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3225. Ensure logs are parsed correctly, or tune the analytic for your environment. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"]} -known_false_positives = Limited false positives, however, tune as needed. +explanation = This analytic identifies suspicious series of attempt to kill multiple services on a system using either `net.exe` or `sc.exe`. This technique is use by adversaries to terminate security services or other related services to continue there objective and evade detections. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1489"]} +known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Exchange PowerShell Module Usage - Rule] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Cacls App - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies the usage of Exchange PowerShell modules that were recently used for a proof of concept related to ProxyShell. Currently, there is no active data shared or data we could re-produce relate to this part of the ProxyShell chain of exploits. \ -Inherently, the usage of the modules is not malicious, but reviewing parallel processes, and user, of the session will assist with determining the intent. \ -Module - New-MailboxExportRequest will begin the process of exporting contents of a primary mailbox or archive to a .pst file. \ -Module - New-managementroleassignment can assign a management role to a management role group, management role assignment policy, user, or universal security group (USG). -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. +explanation = The following analytic identifies excessive usage of `cacls.exe`, `xcacls.exe` or `icacls.exe` application to change file or folder permission. This behavior is commonly seen where the adversary attempts to impair some users from deleting or accessing its malware components or artifact from the compromised system. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222"]} +known_false_positives = Administrators or administrative scripts may use this application. Filter as needed. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic identifies excessive usage of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` within a bucket of time (1 minute). This behavior was seen in a Monero incident where the adversary attempts to create many users, delete and disable users as part of its malicious behavior. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1531"]} +known_false_positives = unknown. Filter as needed. Modify the time span as needed. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. This technique are seen in couple of malware and APT group to exfiltrated collected data in a infected machine or infected network. This detection is looking for unique use of nslookup where it tries to use specific record type (TXT, A, AAAA) that are commonly used by attacker and also the retry parameter which is designed to query C2 DNS multiple tries. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of nslookup.exe may be used. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048"]} +known_false_positives = unknown +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious excessive usage of sc.exe in a host machine. This technique was seen in several ransomware , xmrig and other malware to create, modify, delete or disable a service may related to security application or to gain privilege escalation. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed taskkill.exe may be used. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569", "T1569.002"]} +known_false_positives = excessive execution of sc.exe is quite suspicious since it can modify or execute app in high privilege permission. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Taskkill - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic identifies excessive usage of `taskkill.exe` application. This application is commonly used by adversaries to evade detections by killing security product processes or even other processes to evade detection. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed taskkill.exe may be used. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"]} +known_false_positives = Unknown. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies executable files (.exe or .dll) being written to Windows administrative SMB shares (Admin$, IPC$, C$). This represents suspicious behavior as its commonly used by tools like like PsExec/PaExec and others to stage service binaries before creating and starting a Windows service on remote endpoints. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse administrative shares for lateral movement and remote code execution. The Trickbot malware family also implements this behavior to try to infect other machines in the infected network. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 5145 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required. Also enable the object Audit access success/failure in your group policy. The following Splunk SOAR playbook can be used to respond to this detection: Delete Detected Files -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.002"]} +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 5145 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required. Also enable the object Audit access success/failure in your group policy. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.002"]} known_false_positives = System Administrators may use looks like PsExec for troubleshooting or administrations tasks. However, this will typically come only from certain users and certain systems that can be added to an allow list. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic will identify suspicious executable or scripts (known file extensions) in list of suspicious file path in Windows. This technique is used by adversaries to evade detection. The suspicious file path are known paths used in the wild and are not common to have executable or scripts. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node. @@ -4548,7 +3346,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic will identify suspicious process of cscript.exe where it tries to execute javascript using jscript.encode CLSID (COM OBJ). This technique was seen in ransomware (reddot ransomware) where it execute javascript with this com object with combination of amsi disabling technique. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node. @@ -4556,16 +3354,6 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for processes launched from files with at least five spaces in the name before the extension. This is typically done to obfuscate the file extension by pushing it outside of the default view. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT", "PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = None identified. -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule] type = detection asset_type = Endpoint @@ -4576,19 +3364,9 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Ob known_false_positives = None identified. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search returns a list of hosts that have not successfully completed a backup in over a week. Deprecated because it's a infrastructure monitoring. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to first obtain data from your backup solution, either from the backup logs on your hosts, or from a central server responsible for performing the backups. If you do not use Netbackup, you can modify this search for your backup solution. Depending on how often you backup your systems, you may want to modify how far in the past to look for a successful backup, other than the default of seven days. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = None identified -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Extraction of Registry Hives - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of `reg.exe` exporting Windows Registry hives containing credentials. Adversaries may use this technique to export registry hives for offline credential access attacks. Typically found executed from a untrusted process or script. Upon execution, a file will be written to disk. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. @@ -4608,7 +3386,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Firewall Allowed Program Enable - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic detects a potential suspicious modification of firewall rule allowing to execute specific application. This technique was identified when an adversary and red teams to bypassed firewall file execution restriction in a targetted host. Take note that this event or command can run by administrator during testing or allowing legitimate tool or application. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. @@ -4616,39 +3394,9 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562. known_false_positives = A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated or manual execution of this firewall rule that may generate false positives. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for child processes spawned by zoom.exe or zoom.us that has not previously been seen. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial` to build the initial table of child processes and hostnames for this search to work. You should also schedule at the same interval as this search the second baseline search `Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old child processes. Please update the `previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window` macro to adjust the time window. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = A new child process of zoom isn't malicious by that fact alone. Further investigation of the actions of the child process is needed to verify any malicious behavior is taken. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for the first and last time a Windows service is seen running in your environment. This table is then cached. -how_to_implement = While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM, you must be ingesting your Windows system event logs in order for this search to execute successfully. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial` to build the initial table of child processes and hostnames for this search to work. You should also schedule at the same interval as this search the second baseline search `Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old Windows Services. Please update the `previously_seen_windows_services_window` macro to adjust the time window. Please ensure that the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows is version 8.0.0 or above. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569", "T1569.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = A previously unseen service is not necessarily malicious. Verify that the service is legitimate and that was installed by a legitimate process. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for command-line arguments that use a `/c` parameter to execute a command that has not previously been seen. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The complete process name with command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. Please make sure you run the support search "Previously seen command line arguments,"—which creates a lookup file called `previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments.csv`—a historical baseline of all command-line arguments. You must also validate this list. For the search to do accurate calculation, ensure the search scheduling is the same value as the `relative_time` evaluation function. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = Legitimate programs can also use command-line arguments to execute. Please verify the command-line arguments to check what command/program is being executed. We recommend customizing the `first_time_seen_cmd_line_filter` macro to exclude legitimate parent_process_name -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = Fodhelper.exe has a known UAC bypass as it attempts to look for specific registry keys upon execution, that do not exist. Therefore, an attacker can write its malicious commands in these registry keys to be executed by fodhelper.exe with the highest privilege. \ 1. `HKCU:\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command`\ @@ -4656,13 +3404,13 @@ explanation = Fodhelper.exe has a known UAC bypass as it attempts to look for sp 1. `HKCU:\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command\(default)`\ Upon triage, fodhelper.exe will have a child process and read access will occur on the registry keys. Isolate the endpoint and review parallel processes for additional behavior. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112", "T1548.002", "T1548"]} +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112", "T1548.002", "T1548"]} known_false_positives = Limited to no false positives are expected. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Fsutil Zeroing File - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious fsutil process to zeroing a target file. This technique was seen in lockbit ransomware where it tries to zero out its malware path as part of its defense evasion after encrypting the compromised host. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. @@ -4670,99 +3418,9 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070"]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = GCP Account -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides detection of accounts with high risk roles by projects. Compromised accounts with high risk roles can move laterally or even scalate privileges at different projects depending on organization schema. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message logs -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} -known_false_positives = Accounts with high risk roles should be reduced to the minimum number needed, however specific tasks and setups may be simply expected behavior within organization -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = GCP Account -confidence = medium -explanation = This search provides detection of GCPloit exploitation framework. This framework can be used to escalate privileges and move laterally from compromised high privilege accounts. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message logs -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} -known_false_positives = Payload.request.function.timeout value can possibly be match with other functions or requests however the source user and target request account may indicate an attempt to move laterally accross acounts or projects -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = GCP Account -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides detection of high risk permissions by resource and accounts. These are permissions that can allow attackers with compromised accounts to move laterally and escalate privileges. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message logs -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} -known_false_positives = High risk permissions are part of any GCP environment, however it is important to track resource and accounts usage, this search may produce false positives. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - GCP GCR container uploaded - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = GCP GCR Container -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search show information on uploaded containers including source user, account, action, bucket name event name, http user agent, message and destination path. -how_to_implement = You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later), then configure stackdriver and set a subpub subscription to be imported to Splunk. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model. Please also customize the `container_implant_gcp_detection_filter` macro to filter out the false positives. -annotations = {"mitre_attack": ["T1525"]} -known_false_positives = Uploading container is a normal behavior from developers or users with access to container registry. GCP GCR registers container upload as a Storage event, this search must be considered under the context of CONTAINER upload creation which automatically generates a bucket entry for destination path. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = GCP Kubernetes cluster -confidence = medium -explanation = This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster's pods -how_to_implement = You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later), then configure stackdriver and set a Pub/Sub subscription to be imported to Splunk. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"]} -known_false_positives = Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, User Agent, source IPs and pods will provide context. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = GCP Kubernetes cluster -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster -how_to_implement = You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later), then configure stackdriver and set a Pub/Sub subscription to be imported to Splunk. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model.Customize the macro kubernetes_gcp_scan_fingerprint_attack_detection to filter out FPs. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"]} -known_false_positives = Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, User Agent and source IPs will provide context. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies gpupdate.exe with no command line arguments and with a network connection. It is unusual for gpupdate.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. gpupdate.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} -known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - GSuite Email Suspicious Attachment - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious attachment file extension in Gsuite email that may related to spear phishing attack. This file type is commonly used by malware to lure user to click on it to execute malicious code to compromised targetted machine. But this search can also catch some normal files related to this file type that maybe send by employee or network admin. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001", "T1566"]} -known_false_positives = network admin and normal user may send this file attachment as part of their day to day work. having a good protocol in attaching this file type to an e-mail may reduce the risk of having a spear phishing attack. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Gdrive suspicious file sharing - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search can help the detection of compromised accounts or internal users sharing potentially malicious/classified documents with users outside your organization via GSuite file sharing . -how_to_implement = Need to implement Gsuite logging targeting Google suite drive activity. In order for the search to work for your environment please update `yourdomain.com` value in the query with the domain relavant for your organization. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566"]} -known_false_positives = This is an anomaly search, you must specify your domain in the parameters so it either filters outside domains or focus on internal domains. This search may also help investigate compromise of accounts. By looking at for example source ip addresses, document titles and abnormal number of shares and shared target users. -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` executing the Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. @@ -4772,7 +3430,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging. @@ -4782,7 +3440,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Get ADUser with PowerShell - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to enumerate domain users. The `Get-AdUser' commandlet returns a list of all domain users. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. @@ -4792,7 +3450,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-AdGUser` commandlet. The `Get-AdUser` commandlet is used to return a list of all domain users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging. @@ -4802,7 +3460,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` executing the Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. @@ -4812,7 +3470,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging. @@ -4822,7 +3480,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Get DomainPolicy with Powershell - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` executing the `Get-DomainPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. @@ -4832,7 +3490,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Get DomainPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get DomainPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging. @@ -4840,51 +3498,9 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201" known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to enumerate domain users. `Get-DomainUser` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainUser` commandlet. `GetDomainUser` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerView to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get WMIObject Group Discovery - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following hunting analytic identifies the use of `Get-WMIObject Win32_Group` being used with PowerShell to identify local groups on the endpoint. \ Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \ During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.001"]} -known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Tune as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get WMIObject Group Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ -This analytic identifies the usage of `Get-WMIObject Win32_Group`, which is typically used as a way to identify groups on the endpoint. Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \ -During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.001"]} -known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Tune as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic identifies Get-DomainTrust from PowerView in order to gather domain trust information. Typically, this is utilized within a script being executed and used to enumerate the domain trust information. This grants the adversary an understanding of how large or small the domain is. During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. @@ -4894,7 +3510,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ This analytic identifies Get-DomainTrust from PowerView in order to gather domain trust information. \ @@ -4904,9 +3520,29 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482" known_false_positives = It is possible certain system management frameworks utilize this command to gather trust information. providing_technologies = [] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to enumerate domain users. `Get-DomainUser` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"]} +known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainUser` commandlet. `GetDomainUser` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerView to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +how_to_implement = The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"]} +known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. +providing_technologies = [] + [savedsearch://ESCU - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic identifies Get-ForestTrust from PowerSploit in order to gather domain trust information. Typically, this is utilized within a script being executed and used to enumerate the domain trust information. This grants the adversary an understanding of how large or small the domain is. During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. @@ -4916,7 +3552,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ This analytic identifies Get-ForestTrust from PowerSploit in order to gather domain trust information. \ @@ -4926,9 +3562,31 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482" known_false_positives = UPDATE_KNOWN_FALSE_POSITIVES providing_technologies = [] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Get WMIObject Group Discovery - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following hunting analytic identifies the use of `Get-WMIObject Win32_Group` being used with PowerShell to identify local groups on the endpoint. \ Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \ During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.001"]} +known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Tune as needed. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Get WMIObject Group Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ +This analytic identifies the usage of `Get-WMIObject Win32_Group`, which is typically used as a way to identify groups on the endpoint. Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \ +During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.001"]} +known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Tune as needed. +providing_technologies = [] + [savedsearch://ESCU - GetAdComputer with PowerShell - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The `Get-AdComputer' commandlet returns a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. @@ -4938,7 +3596,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - GetAdComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-AdGroup` commandlet. The `Get-AdGroup` commandlet is used to return a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. @@ -4948,7 +3606,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - GetAdGroup with PowerShell - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The `Get-AdGroup` commandlnet is used to return a list of all groups available in a Windows Domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. @@ -4958,7 +3616,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - GetAdGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-AdGroup` commandlet. The `Get-AdGroup` commandlet is used to return a list of all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. @@ -4968,7 +3626,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - GetCurrent User with PowerShell - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powerhsell.exe` with command-line arguments that execute the `GetCurrent` method of the WindowsIdentity .NET class. This method returns an object that represents the current Windows user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. @@ -4978,7 +3636,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - GetCurrent User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `GetCurrent` method of the WindowsIdentity .NET class. This method returns an object that represents the current Windows user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. @@ -4988,7 +3646,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. `Get-DomainComputer` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. @@ -4998,7 +3656,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainComputer` commandlet. `GetDomainComputer` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerView to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. @@ -5008,7 +3666,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - GetDomainController with PowerShell - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. `Get-DomainController` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. @@ -5018,7 +3676,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - GetDomainController with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainController` commandlet. `Get-DomainController` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerView to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. @@ -5028,7 +3686,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - GetDomainGroup with PowerShell - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. `Get-DomainGroup` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. @@ -5038,7 +3696,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - GetDomainGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainGroup` commandlet. `Get-DomainGroup` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. As the name suggests, `Get-DomainGroup` is used to query domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this function to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. @@ -5048,7 +3706,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - GetLocalUser with PowerShell - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for local users. The `Get-LocalUser` commandlet is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. @@ -5058,7 +3716,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-LocalUser` commandlet. The `Get-LocalUser` commandlet is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. @@ -5068,7 +3726,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. The `Get-NetTcpConnection` commandlet lists the current TCP connections. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. @@ -5078,7 +3736,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-NetTcpconnection ` commandlet. This commandlet is used to return a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. @@ -5086,29 +3744,9 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1049" known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain users. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `-class ds_user` parameter can be used to return the full list of users in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI in this case, using PowerShell, to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet. The `DS_User` class parameter leverages WMI to query for all domain users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = he following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `DS_Computer` parameter can be used to return a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI in this case, using PowerShell, to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. @@ -5118,7 +3756,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet. The `DS_Computer` class parameter leverages WMI to query for all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. @@ -5128,7 +3766,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `-class ds_group` parameter can be used to return the full list of groups in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI in this case, using PowerShell, to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. @@ -5138,7 +3776,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet used with specific parameters . The `DS_Group` parameter leverages WMI to query for all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. @@ -5146,9 +3784,29 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069" known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] +[savedsearch://ESCU - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain users. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `-class ds_user` parameter can be used to return the full list of users in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI in this case, using PowerShell, to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"]} +known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet. The `DS_User` class parameter leverages WMI to query for all domain users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +how_to_implement = he following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"]} +known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. +providing_technologies = [] + [savedsearch://ESCU - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query local users. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `Win32_UserAccount` parameter is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. @@ -5158,7 +3816,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet used with specific parameters. The `Win32_UserAccount` parameter is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. @@ -5166,109 +3824,19 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087" known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - GitHub Dependabot Alert - Rule] +[savedsearch://ESCU - GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = GitHub +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for Dependabot Alerts in Github logs. -how_to_implement = You must index GitHub logs. You can follow the url in reference to onboard GitHub logs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1195.001", "T1195"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - GitHub Pull Request from Unknown User - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = GitHub -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for Pull Request from unknown user. -how_to_implement = You must index GitHub logs. You can follow the url in reference to onboard GitHub logs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1195.001", "T1195"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Github Commit Changes In Master - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a pushed or commit to master or main branch. This is to avoid unwanted modification to master without a review to the changes. Ideally in terms of devsecops the changes made in a branch and do a PR for review. of course in some cases admin of the project may did a changes directly to master branch -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to github logs having the fork, commit, push metadata that can be use to monitor the changes in a github project. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1199"]} -known_false_positives = admin can do changes directly to master branch -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Github Commit In Develop - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a pushed or commit to develop branch. This is to avoid unwanted modification to develop without a review to the changes. Ideally in terms of devsecops the changes made in a branch and do a PR for review. of course in some cases admin of the project may did a changes directly to master branch -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to github logs having the fork, commit, push metadata that can be use to monitor the changes in a github project. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1199"]} -known_false_positives = admin can do changes directly to develop branch -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Gsuite Drive Share In External Email - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect suspicious google drive or google docs files shared outside or externally. This behavior might be a good hunting query to monitor exfitration of data made by an attacker or insider to a targetted machine. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc. In order for the search to work for your environment, please edit the query to use your company specific email domain instead of `internal_test_email.com`. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1567.002", "T1567"]} -known_false_positives = network admin or normal user may share files to customer and external team. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Gsuite Email Suspicious Subject With Attachment - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a gsuite email contains suspicious subject having known file type used in spear phishing. This technique is a common and effective entry vector of attacker to compromise a network by luring the user to click or execute the suspicious attachment send from external email account because of the effective social engineering of subject related to delivery, bank and so on. On the other hand this detection may catch a normal email traffic related to legitimate transaction so better to check the email sender, spelling and etc. avoid click link or opening the attachment if you are not expecting this type of e-mail. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001", "T1566"]} -known_false_positives = normal user or normal transaction may contain the subject and file type attachment that this detection try to search. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Gsuite Email With Known Abuse Web Service Link - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytics is to detect a gmail containing a link that are known to be abused by malware or attacker like pastebin, telegram and discord to deliver malicious payload. This event can encounter some normal email traffic within organization and external email that normally using this application and services. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001", "T1566"]} -known_false_positives = normal email contains this link that are known application within the organization or network can be catched by this detection. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious outbound e-mail from internal email to external email domain. This can be a good hunting query to monitor insider or outbound email traffic for not common domain e-mail. The idea is to parse the domain of destination email check if there is a minimum outbound traffic < 20 with attachment. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1048"]} -known_false_positives = network admin and normal user may send this file attachment as part of their day to day work. having a good protocol in attaching this file type to an e-mail may reduce the risk of having a spear phishing attack. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Gsuite Suspicious Shared File Name - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a shared file in google drive with suspicious file name that are commonly used by spear phishing campaign. This technique is very popular to lure the user by running a malicious document or click a malicious link within the shared file that will redirected to malicious website. This detection can also catch some normal email communication between organization and its external customer. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc. In order for the search to work for your environment, please edit the query to use your company specific email domain instead of `internal_test_email.com`. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001", "T1566"]} -known_false_positives = normal user or normal transaction may contain the subject and file type attachment that this detection try to search -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Gsuite suspicious calendar invite - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search can help the detection of compromised accounts or internal users sending suspcious calendar invites via GSuite calendar. These invites may contain malicious links or attachments. -how_to_implement = In order to successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite (gsuite:calendar:json) having the file sharing metadata like file type, source owner, destination target user, description, etc. This search can also be made more specific by selecting specific emails, subdomains timeframe, organizational units, targeted user, etc. In order for the search to work for your environment please update `yourdomain.com` value in the query with the domain relavant for your organization. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566"]} -known_false_positives = This search will also produce normal activity statistics. Fields such as email, ip address, name, parameters.organizer_calendar_id, parameters.target_calendar_id and parameters.event_title may give away phishing intent.For more specific results use email parameter. +explanation = The following analytic identifies gpupdate.exe with no command line arguments and with a network connection. It is unusual for gpupdate.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. gpupdate.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} +known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic identifies a suspicious registry modification to hide a user account on the Windows Login screen. This technique was seen in some tradecraft where the adversary will create a hidden user account with Admin privileges in login screen to avoid noticing by the user that they already compromise and to persist on that said machine. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as CarbonBlack or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. @@ -5288,27 +3856,17 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic is to detect a suspicious high frequency copying/moving of files in network share as part of information sabotage. This anomaly event can be a good indicator of insider trying to sabotage data by transfering classified or internal files within network share to exfitrate it after or to lure evidence of insider attack to other user. This behavior may catch several noise if network share is a common place for classified or internal document processing. how_to_implement = o successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 5145 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required. Also enable the object Audit access success/failure in your group policy. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1537"]} +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1537"]} known_false_positives = this behavior may seen in normal transfer of file within network if network share is common place for sharing documents. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Office 365 -confidence = medium -explanation = This search will detect more than 5 login failures in Office365 Azure Active Directory from a single source IP address. Please adjust the threshold value of 5 as suited for your environment. -how_to_implement = -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.001", "T1110"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - High Process Termination Frequency - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytics are designed to indentify a high frequency of process termination on a machine which is a common behavior of ransomware malware before encrypting files. This technique is designed to avoid an exception error while accessing (docs, images, database and etc..) in the infected machine for encryption. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Image (process full path of terminated process) from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. @@ -5316,16 +3874,6 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"]} known_false_positives = admin or user tool that can terminate multiple process. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for an increase of data transfers from your email server to your clients. This could be indicative of a malicious actor collecting data using your email server. -how_to_implement = This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model. Your email servers must be categorized as "email_server" for the search to work, as well. You may need to adjust the deviation_threshold and minimum_data_samples values based on the network traffic in your environment. The "deviation_threshold" field is a multiplying factor to control how much variation you're willing to tolerate. The "minimum_data_samples" field is the minimum number of connections of data samples required for the statistic to be valid. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.002", "T1114"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = The false-positive rate will vary based on how you set the deviation_threshold and data_samples values. Our recommendation is to adjust these values based on your network traffic to and from your email servers. -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Hunting for Log4Shell - Rule] type = detection asset_type = Web Server @@ -5346,19 +3894,9 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"]} known_false_positives = It is highly possible you will find false positives, however, the base score is set to 2 for _any_ jndi found in raw logs. tune and change as needed, include any filtering. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - ICACLS Grant Command - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic identifies potential adversaries that modify the security permission of a specific file or directory. This technique is commonly seen in APT tradecraft and coinminer scripts to evade detections and restrict access to their component files. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed icacls.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222"]} -known_false_positives = Unknown. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Icacls Deny Command - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic identifies a potential adversary that changes the security permission of a specific file or directory. This technique is commonly seen in APT tradecraft or coinminer scripts. This behavior is meant to evade detection and prevent access to their component files. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed icacls.exe may be used. @@ -5366,9 +3904,19 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222"]} known_false_positives = Unknown. It is possible some administrative scripts use ICacls. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] +[savedsearch://ESCU - ICACLS Grant Command - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic identifies potential adversaries that modify the security permission of a specific file or directory. This technique is commonly seen in APT tradecraft and coinminer scripts to evade detections and restrict access to their component files. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed icacls.exe may be used. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222"]} +known_false_positives = Unknown. Filter as needed. +providing_technologies = [] + [savedsearch://ESCU - IcedID Exfiltrated Archived File Creation - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious file creation namely passff.tar and cookie.tar. This files are possible archived of stolen browser information like history and cookies in a compromised machine with IcedID. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. @@ -5376,33 +3924,23 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1560.00 known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Identify New User Accounts - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Domain Server -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This detection search will help profile user accounts in your environment by identifying newly created accounts that have been added to your network in the past week. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be populating the Enterprise Security Identity_Management data model in the assets and identity framework. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.002"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = If the Identity_Management data model is not updated regularly, this search could give you false positive alerts. Please consider this and investigate appropriately. -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the presence of suspicious commandline parameters typically present when using Impacket tools. Impacket is a collection of python classes meant to be used with Microsoft network protocols. There are multiple scripts that leverage impacket libraries like `wmiexec.py`, `smbexec.py`, `dcomexec.py` and `atexec.py` used to execute commands on remote endpoints. By default, these scripts leverage administrative shares and hardcoded parameters that can be used as a signature to detect its use. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage Impackets tools for lateral movement and remote code execution. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.002", "T1021.003", "T1047", "T1543.003"]} +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.002", "T1021.003", "T1047", "T1543.003"]} known_false_positives = Although uncommon, Administrators may leverage Impackets tools to start a process on remote systems for system administration or automation use cases. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the usage of the `Enter-PSSession`. This commandlet can be used to open an interactive session on a remote endpoint leveraging the WinRM protocol. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WinRM and `Enter-PSSession` for lateral movement and remote code execution. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup instructions can be found https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.006"]} +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.006"]} known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage WinRM and `Enter-PSSession` for administrative and troubleshooting tasks. This activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. In certain environments, tuning may not be possible. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5411,14 +3949,14 @@ type = detection asset_type = Web Server confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies a Java user agent performing a GET request for a .class file from the remote site. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting web or proxy logs, or ensure it is being filled by a proxy like device, into the Web Datamodel. For additional filtering, allow list private IP space or restrict by known good. The following Splunk SOAR playbook can be used to respond to this detection: Log4j Investigate The following Splunk SOAR playbook can be used to respond to this detection: Log4j Respond +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting web or proxy logs, or ensure it is being filled by a proxy like device, into the Web Datamodel. For additional filtering, allow list private IP space or restrict by known good. annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"]} known_false_positives = Filtering may be required in some instances, filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Jscript Execution Using Cscript App - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a execution of jscript using cscript process. Commonly when a user run jscript file it was executed by wscript.exe application. This technique was seen in FIN7 js implant to execute its malicious script using cscript process. This behavior is uncommon and a good artifacts to check further anomalies within the network how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. @@ -5432,33 +3970,33 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic leverages Kerberos Event 4769, A Kerberos service ticket was requested, to identify a potential kerberoasting attack against Active Directory networks. Kerberoasting allows an adversary to request kerberos tickets for domain accounts typically used as service accounts and attempt to crack them offline allowing them to obtain privileged access to the domain. This analytic looks for a specific combination of the Ticket_Options field based on common kerberoasting tools. Defenders should be aware that it may be possible for a Kerberoast attack to use different Ticket_Options. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = Older systems that support kerberos RC4 by default like NetApp may generate false positives. Filter as needed providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled in UserAccountControl - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic leverages Windows Security Event 4738, `A user account was changed`, to identify a change performed on a domain user object that disables Kerberos Pre-Authentication. Disabling the Pre Authentication flag in the UserAccountControl property allows an adversary to easily perform a brute force attack against the user's password offline leveraging the ASP REP Roasting technique. Red Teams and adversaries alike who have obtained privileges in an Active Directory network may use this technique as a backdoor or a way to escalate privileges. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `User Account Management` within `Account Management` needs to be enabled. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Intrusion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.004"]} +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.004"]} known_false_positives = Unknown. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled with PowerShell - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Set-ADAccountControl` commandlet with specific parameters. `Set-ADAccountControl` is part of the Active Directory PowerShell module used to manage Windows Active Directory networks. As the name suggests, `Set-ADAccountControl` is used to modify User Account Control values for an Active Directory domain account. With the appropiate parameters, Set-ADAccountControl allows adversaries to disable Kerberos Pre-Authentication for an account to to easily perform a brute force attack against the user's password offline leveraging the ASP REP Roasting technique. Red Teams and adversaries alike who have obtained privileges in an Active Directory network may use this technique as a backdoor or a way to escalate privileges. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Intrusion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.004"]} +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.004"]} known_false_positives = Although unlikely, Administrators may need to set this flag for legitimate purposes. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search detects a suspicioous termination of known services killed by ransomware before encrypting files in a compromised machine. This technique is commonly seen in most of ransomware now a days to avoid exception error while accessing the targetted files it wants to encrypts because of the open handle of those services to the targetted file. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the 7036 EventCode ScManager in System audit Logs from your endpoints. @@ -5466,299 +4004,69 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"]} known_false_positives = Admin activities or installing related updates may do a sudden stop to list of services we monitor. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -known_false_positives = Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods by IP address, verb and decision -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -known_false_positives = Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst must consider IP, verb and decision context when trying to detect maliciousness. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -known_false_positives = Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation, however source IP, namespace and user group may indicate possible malicious use. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status, this search can be extended by using top or rare operators to find trends or rarities in failure status, user agents, source IPs and request URI -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -known_false_positives = This search can give false positives as there might be inherent issues with authentications and permissions at cluster. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster -confidence = medium -explanation = This search provides information on anonymous Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -known_false_positives = Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP, verb and Object can reveal potential malicious activity, specially anonymous suspicious IPs and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding rare or top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences -how_to_implement = You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -known_false_positives = Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods and namespaces by IP address and verb -how_to_implement = You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -known_false_positives = Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst must consider IP and verb context when trying to detect maliciousness. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets -how_to_implement = You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -known_false_positives = Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user and object context can provide guidance for detection. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets -how_to_implement = You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -known_false_positives = Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation, however source IP, namespace and user group may indicate possible malicious use. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status -how_to_implement = You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -known_false_positives = This search can give false positives as there might be inherent issues with authentications and permissions at cluster. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on rare Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context -how_to_implement = You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -known_false_positives = Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP, verb and Object can reveal potential malicious activity, specially suspicious IPs and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via source IP user agent, request URI and response status data against Kubernetes cluster pod in Azure -how_to_implement = You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"]} -known_false_positives = Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but source IPs, userAgent, verb, request URI and response status will provide context. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via source IP user agent, request URI and response status data against Kubernetes cluster in Azure -how_to_implement = You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"]} -known_false_positives = Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but source IPs, userAgent, verb, request URI and response status will provide context. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub messaging service logs -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -known_false_positives = Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods by IP address, verb and decision -how_to_implement = You must install splunk GCP add on. This search works with pubsub messaging service logs -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -known_false_positives = Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst must consider IP, verb and decision context when trying to detect maliciousness. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmaps or secrets -how_to_implement = You must install splunk add on for GCP . This search works with pubsub messaging service logs. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -known_false_positives = Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user and object context can provide guidance for detection. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = GCP GKE EKS Kubernetes cluster -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets -how_to_implement = You must install splunk add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub messaging servicelogs. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -known_false_positives = Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation, however source IP, user agent, decision and reason may indicate possible malicious use. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status, this search can be extended by using top or rare operators to find trends or rarities in failure status, user agents, source IPs and request URI -how_to_implement = You must install splunk add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub messaging service logs. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -known_false_positives = This search can give false positives as there might be inherent issues with authentications and permissions at cluster. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on anonymous Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context -how_to_implement = You must install splunk add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub messaging logs. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -known_false_positives = Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP, source user, user agent, object path, and authorization context can reveal potential malicious activity, specially anonymous suspicious IPs and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Kubernetes -confidence = medium -explanation = This search uses the Kubernetes logs from a nginx ingress controller to detect local file inclusion attacks. -how_to_implement = You must ingest Kubernetes logs through Splunk Connect for Kubernetes. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1212"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress RFI - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Kubernetes -confidence = medium -explanation = This search uses the Kubernetes logs from a nginx ingress controller to detect remote file inclusion attacks. -how_to_implement = You must ingest Kubernetes logs through Splunk Connect for Kubernetes. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1212"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Scanner Image Pulling - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Kubernetes -confidence = medium -explanation = This search uses the Kubernetes logs from Splunk Connect from Kubernetes to detect Kubernetes Security Scanner. -how_to_implement = You must ingest Kubernetes logs through Splunk Connect for Kubernetes. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = DNS Servers -confidence = medium -explanation = The search is used to identify attempts to use your DNS Infrastructure for DDoS purposes via a DNS amplification attack leveraging ANY queries. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you must ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 11", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1498", "T1498.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = Legitimate ANY requests may trigger this search, however it is unusual to see a large volume of them under typical circumstances. You may modify the threshold in the search to better suit your environment. -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies a suspicious file creation in known cron table directories. This event is commonly abuse by malware, adversaries and red teamers to persist on the target or compromised host. crontab or cronjob is like a schedule task in windows environment where you can create an executable or script on the known crontab directories to run it base on its schedule. This Anomaly query is a good indicator to look further what file is added and who added the file if to consider it legitimate file. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.003", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.003", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can create file in crontab folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Add User Account - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for commands to create user accounts on the linux platform. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to persist on the targeted or compromised host by creating new user with an elevated privilege. This Hunting query may catch normal creation of user by administrator so filter is needed. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.001", "T1136"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.001", "T1136"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Linux At Allow Config File Creation - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies a suspicious file creation of /etc/at.allow or /etc/at.deny. These 2 files are commonly abused by malware, adversaries or red teamers to persist on the targeted or compromised host. These config files can restrict or allow user to execute "at" application (another schedule task application in linux). attacker can create a user or add the compromised username to that config file to execute "at" to schedule it malicious code. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator to investigate further the entry in created config file and who created it to verify if it is a false positive. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.003", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.003", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can create this file for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Linux At Application Execution - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies a suspicious process creation of At application. This process can be used by malware, adversaries and red teamers to create persistence entry to the targeted or compromised host with their malicious code. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator to investigate the event before and after this process execution, when it was executed and what schedule task it will execute. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.001", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.001", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use this application for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Change File Owner To Root - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for a commandline that change the file owner to root using chown utility tool. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to escalate privilege to the targeted or compromised host by changing the owner of their malicious file to root. This event is not so common in corporate network except from the administrator doing normal task that needs high privilege. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222.002", "T1222"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222.002", "T1222"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Common Process For Elevation Control - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic is to look for possible elevation control access using a common known process in linux platform to change the attribute and file ownership. This technique is commonly abused by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain persistence or privilege escalation on the target or compromised host. Tis common process is used to modify file attribute, file ownership or SUID. This tools can be used in legitimate purposes so filter is needed. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.001", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.001", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Linux DD File Overwrite - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic is to look for dd command to overwrite file. This technique was abused by adversaries or threat actor to destroy files or data on specific system or in a large number of host within network to interrupt host avilability, services and many more. This is also used to destroy data where it make the file irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files, data or local and remote drives. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. @@ -5768,267 +4076,277 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Doas Conf File Creation - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic is to detect the creation of doas.conf file in linux host platform. This configuration file can be use by doas utility tool to allow or permit standard users to perform tasks as root, the same way sudo does. This tool is developed as a minimalistic alternative to sudo application. This tool can be abused advesaries, attacker or malware to gain elevated privileges to the targeted or compromised host. On the other hand this can also be executed by administrator for a certain task that needs admin rights. In this case filter is needed. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Doas Tool Execution - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic is to detect the doas tool execution in linux host platform. This utility tool allow standard users to perform tasks as root, the same way sudo does. This tool is developed as a minimalistic alternative to sudo application. This tool can be abused advesaries, attacker or malware to gain elevated privileges to the targeted or compromised host. On the other hand this can also be executed by administrator for a certain task that needs admin rights. In this case filter is needed. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies a suspicious cronjobs modification using crontab edit parameter. This commandline parameter can be abuse by malware author, adversaries, and red red teamers to add cronjob entry to their malicious code to execute to the schedule they want. This event can also be executed by administrator or normal user for automation purposes so filter is needed. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.003", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.003", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use this application for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for suspicious file creation in kernel/driver directory in linux platform. This directory is known folder for all linux kernel module available within the system. so creation of file in this directory is a good indicator that there is a possible rootkit installation in the host machine. This technique was abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain high privileges to their malicious code such us in kernel level. Even this event is not so common administrator or legitimate 3rd party tool may install driver or linux kernel module as part of its installation. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.006", "T1547"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.006", "T1547"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can create file in this folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for suspicious file creation on init system directories for automatic execution of script or file upon boot up. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamer to persist on the targeted or compromised host. This behavior can be executed or use by an administrator or network operator to add script files or binary files as part of a task or automation. filter is needed. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1037.004", "T1037"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1037.004", "T1037"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can create file in this folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Linux File Creation In Profile Directory - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for suspicious file creation in /etc/profile.d directory to automatically execute scripts by shell upon boot up of a linux machine. This technique is commonly abused by adversaries, malware and red teamers as a persistence mechanism to the targeted or compromised host. This Anomaly detection is a good indicator that someone wants to run a code after boot up which can be done also by the administrator or network operator for automation purposes. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.004", "T1546"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.004", "T1546"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can create file in profile.d folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for inserting of linux kernel module using insmod utility function. This event can detect a installation of rootkit or malicious kernel module to gain elevated privileges to their malicious code and bypassed detections. This Anomaly detection is a good indicator that someone installing kernel module in a linux host either admin or adversaries. filter is needed in this scenario how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.006", "T1547"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.006", "T1547"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for possible installing a linux kernel module using modprobe utility function. This event can detect a installation of rootkit or malicious kernel module to gain elevated privileges to their malicious code and bypassed detections. This Anomaly detection is a good indicator that someone installing kernel module in a linux host either admin or adversaries. filter is needed in this scenario how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.006", "T1547"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.006", "T1547"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Java Spawning Shell - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies the process name of Java, Apache, or Tomcat spawning a Linux shell. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). The shells included in the macro are "sh", "ksh", "zsh", "bash", "dash", "rbash", "fish", "csh', "tcsh', "ion", "eshell". Upon triage, review parallel processes and command-line arguments to determine legitimacy. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. Ensure EDR product is mapping OS Linux to the datamodel properly. Add any additional java process names for your environment to the analytic as needed. The following Splunk SOAR playbook can be used to respond to this detection: Log4j Investigate The following Splunk SOAR playbook can be used to respond to this detection: Log4j Respond +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. Ensure EDR product is mapping OS Linux to the datamodel properly. Add any additional java process names for your environment to the analytic as needed. annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"]} known_false_positives = Filtering may be required on internal developer build systems or classify assets as web facing and restrict the analytic based on asset type. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic is to look for suspicious command lines that may add entry to /etc/sudoers with NOPASSWD attribute in linux platform. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain elevated privilege to the targeted or compromised host. /etc/sudoers file controls who can run what commands users can execute on the machines and can also control whether user need a password to execute particular commands. This file is composed of aliases (basically variables) and user specifications. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. providing_technologies = [] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux pkexec Privilege Escalation - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic identifies `pkexec` spawning with no command-line arguments. A vulnerability in Polkit's pkexec component identified as CVE-2021-4034 (PwnKit) which is present in the default configuration of all major Linux distributions and can be exploited to gain full root privileges on the system. +how_to_implement = Depending on the EDR product in use, there are multiple ways to "null" the command-line field, Processes.process. Two that may be useful `process="(^.{0}$)"` or `| where isnull(process)`. To generate data for this behavior, Sysmon for Linux was utilized. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"]} +known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as needed. +providing_technologies = [] + [savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic is to look for suspicious process command-line that might be accessing or modifying sshd_config. This file is the ssh configuration file that might be modify by threat actors or adversaries to redirect port connection, allow user using authorized key generated during attack. This anomaly detection might catch noise from administrator auditing or modifying ssh configuration file. In this scenario filter is needed how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098.004", "T1098"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098.004", "T1098"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Possible Access To Credential Files - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic is to detect a possible attempt to dump or access the content of /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow to enable offline credential cracking. "etc/passwd" store user information within linux OS while "etc/shadow" contain the user passwords hash. Adversaries and threat actors may attempt to access this to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator of possible credential dumping technique but it might catch some normal administrator automation scripts or during credential auditing. In this scenario filter is needed. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.008", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.008", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic is to detect a possible access or modification of /etc/sudoers file. "/etc/sudoers" file controls who can run what command as what users on what machine and can also control whether a specific user need a password for particular commands. adversaries and threat actors abuse this file to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation during attack on targeted host. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for suspicious commandline that may use to append user entry to /etc/at.allow or /etc/at.deny. These 2 files are commonly abused by malware, adversaries or red teamers to persist on the targeted or compromised host. These config file can restrict user that can only execute at application (another schedule task application in linux). attacker can create a user or add the compromised username to that config file to execute at to schedule it malicious code. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator to investigate further the entry in created config file and who created it to verify if it is a false positive. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.001", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.001", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for suspicious command-lines that can be possibly used to modify user profile files to automatically execute scripts/executables by shell upon reboot of the machine. This technique is commonly abused by adversaries, malware and red teamers as persistence mechanism to the targeted or compromised host. This Anomaly detection is a good indicator that someone wants to run code after reboot which can be done also by the administrator or network operator for automation purposes. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.004", "T1546"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.004", "T1546"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for possible suspicious commandline that may use to append a code to any existing cronjob files for persistence or privilege escalation. This technique is commonly abused by malware, adversaries and red teamers to automatically execute their code within a existing or sometimes in normal cronjob script file. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.003", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.003", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for possible modification of cronjobs file using editor. This event is can be seen in normal user but can also be a good hunting indicator for unwanted user modifying cronjobs for possible persistence or privilege escalation. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.003", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.003", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic is to look for possible ssh key file creation on ~/.ssh/ folder. This technique is commonly abused by threat actors and adversaries to gain persistence and privilege escalation to the targeted host. by creating ssh private and public key and passing the public key to the attacker server. threat actor can access remotely the machine using openssh daemon service. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098.004", "T1098"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098.004", "T1098"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can create file in ~/.ssh folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic is to detect a suspicious command that may hijack a library function in linux platform. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain privileges and persist on the machine. This detection pertains to loading a dll to hijack or hook a library function of specific program using LD_PRELOAD command. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.006", "T1574"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.006", "T1574"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for suspicious file creation in systemd timer directory in linux platform. systemd is a system and service manager for Linux distributions. From the Windows perspective, this process fulfills the duties of wininit.exe and services.exe combined. At the risk of simplifying the functionality of systemd, it initializes a Linux system and starts relevant services that are defined in service unit files. Adversaries, malware and red teamers may abuse this this feature by stashing systemd service file to persist on the targetted or compromised host. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.006", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.006", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can create file in systemd folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Service Restarted - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for restarted or re-enable services in linux platform. This technique can be executed or performed using systemctl or service tool application. Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Administrator may also create a legitimated service for a specific tool or normal application as part of task or automation, in this scenario it is suggested to look for the service path of the actual script or executable that register as service and who created the service for further verification. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and commandline executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.006", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.006", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Service Started Or Enabled - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for created or enable services in linux platform. This technique can be executed or performed using systemctl or service tool application. Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Administrator may also create a legitimated service for a specific tool or normal application as part of task or automation, in this scenario it is suggested to look for the service path of the actual script or executable that register as service and who created the service for further verification. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.006", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.006", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for suspicious chmod utility execution to enable SUID bit. This allows a user to temporarily gain root access, usually in order to run a program. For example, only the root account is allowed to change the password information contained in the password database; If the SUID bit appears as an s, the file's owner also has execute permission to the file; if it appears as an S, the file's owner does not have execute permission. The second specialty permission is the SGID, or set group id bit. It is similar to the SUID bit, except it can temporarily change group membership, usually to execute a program. The SGID bit is set if an s or an S appears in the group section of permissions. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.001", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.001", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for suspicious setcap utility execution to enable SUID bit. This allows a user to temporarily gain root access, usually in order to run a program. For example, only the root account is allowed to change the password information contained in the password database; If the SUID bit appears as an s, the file's owner also has execute permission to the file; if it appears as an S, the file's owner does not have execute permission. The second specialty permission is the SGID, or set group id bit. It is similar to the SUID bit, except it can temporarily change group membership, usually to execute a program. The SGID bit is set if an s or an S appears in the group section of permissions. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.001", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.001", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Sudo OR Su Execution - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic is to detect the execution of sudo or su command in linux operating system. The "sudo" command allows a system administrator to delegate authority to give certain users (or groups of users) the ability to run some (or all) commands as root or another user while providing an audit trail of the commands and their arguments. This command is commonly abused by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to elevate privileges to the targeted host. This command can be executed by administrator for legitimate purposes or to execute process that need admin privileges, In this scenario filter is needed. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic is to looks for file creation of sudoers.tmp file cause by editing /etc/sudoers using visudo or editor in linux platform. This technique may abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain elevated privilege to targeted or compromised host. /etc/sudoers file controls who can run what commands as what users on what machines and can also control special things such as whether you need a password for particular commands. The file is composed of aliases (basically variables) and user specifications (which control who can run what). how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Linux System Network Discovery - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic is to look for possible enumeration of local network configuration. This technique is commonly used as part of recon of adversaries or threat actor to know some network information for its next or further attack. This anomaly detections may capture normal event made by administrator during auditing or testing network connection of specific host or network to network. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. @@ -6038,27 +4356,17 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Visudo Utility Execution - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic is to looks for suspicious commandline that add entry to /etc/sudoers by using visudo utility tool in linux platform. This technique may abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain elevated privilege to targeted or compromised host. /etc/sudoers file controls who can run what commands as what users on what machines and can also control special things such as whether you need a password for particular commands. The file is composed of aliases (basically variables) and user specifications (which control who can run what). how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux pkexec Privilege Escalation - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies `pkexec` spawning with no command-line arguments. A vulnerability in Polkit's pkexec component identified as CVE-2021-4034 (PwnKit) which is present in the default configuration of all major Linux distributions and can be exploited to gain full root privileges on the system. -how_to_implement = Depending on the EDR product in use, there are multiple ways to "null" the command-line field, Processes.process. Two that may be useful `process="(^.{0}$)"` or `| where isnull(process)`. To generate data for this behavior, Sysmon for Linux was utilized. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"]} -known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Loading Of Dynwrapx Module - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = DynamicWrapperX is an ActiveX component that can be used in a script to call Windows API functions, but it requires the dynwrapx.dll to be installed and registered. With that, registering or loading dynwrapx.dll to a host is highly suspicious. In most instances when it is used maliciously, the best way to triage is to review parallel processes and pivot on the process_guid. Review the registry for any suspicious modifications meant to load dynwrapx.dll. Identify any suspicious module loads of dynwrapx.dll. This detection will return and identify the processes that invoke vbs/wscript/cscript. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on processes that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. @@ -6066,19 +4374,9 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055", known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, however it is possible to filter by Processes.process_name and specific processes (ex. wscript.exe). Filter as needed. This may need modification based on EDR telemetry and how it brings in registry data. For example, removal of (Default). providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Local Account Discovery With Wmic - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for local users. The argument `useraccount` is used to leverage WMI to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087", "T1087.001"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Local Account Discovery with Net - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for local users. The two arguments `user` and 'users', return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. @@ -6086,39 +4384,29 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087" known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Local Account Discovery With Wmic - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for local users. The argument `useraccount` is used to leverage WMI to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087", "T1087.001"]} +known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. +providing_technologies = [] + [savedsearch://ESCU - Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 Exploitation - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This correlation find exploitation of Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 against systems using detections from Splunk Security Content Analytic Story. It does this by calculating the distinct count of MITRE ATT&CK tactics from Log4Shell detections fired. If the count is larger than 2 or more distinct MITRE ATT&CK tactics we assume high problability of exploitation. The Analytic story breaks down into 3 major phases of a Log4Shell exploitation, specifically 1. Initial Payload delivery eg. `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}` 2. Call back to malicious LDAP server eg. Exploit.class 3. Post Exploitation Activity/Lateral Movement using Powershell or similar T1562.001 Each of these phases fall into different MITRE ATT&CK Tactics (Initial Access, Execution, Command and Control), by looking into 2 or more phases showing up in detections triggerd is how this correlation search finds exploitation. If we get a notable from this correlation search the best way to triage it is by investigating the affected systems against Log4Shell exploitation using Splunk SOAR playbooks. how_to_implement = To implement this correlation search a user needs to enable all detections in the Log4Shell Analytic Story and confirm it is generation risk events. A simple search `index=risk analyticstories="Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"` should contain events. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Exploitation", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105", "T1190", "T1059"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105", "T1190", "T1059"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = There are no known false positive for this search, but it could contain false positives as multiple detections can trigger and not have successful exploitation. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we first limit the scope of our search to the Web Datamodel and use the `| from datamodel` function to benefit from schema accelerated searching capabilities, mainly because the second part of the detection is pretty heavy, it runs a regex across all _raw events that looks for `${jndi:ldap://` pattern across all potential web fields available to the raw data, like http headers for example. If you see results for this detection, it means that there was a attempt at a injection, which could be a reconnaissance activity or a valid expliotation attempt, but this does not exactly mean that the host was indeed successfully exploited. -how_to_implement = This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx. The following Splunk SOAR playbook can be used to respond to this detection: Log4j Investigate The following Splunk SOAR playbook can be used to respond to this detection: Log4j Respond -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we match the invocation function with a network connection to a malicious ip address. -how_to_implement = This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx. The following Splunk SOAR playbook can be used to respond to this detection: Log4j Investigate The following Splunk SOAR playbook can be used to respond to this detection: Log4j Respond -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives. -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Logon Script Event Trigger Execution - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry entry to persist and gain privilege escalation upon booting up of compromised host. This technique was seen in several APT and malware where it modify UserInitMprLogonScript registry entry to its malicious payload to be executed upon boot up of the machine. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. @@ -6126,74 +4414,9 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1037", known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - MS Scripting Process Loading Ldap Module - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious MS scripting process such as wscript.exe or cscript.exe that loading ldap module to process ldap query. This behavior was seen in FIN7 implant where it uses javascript to execute ldap query to parse host information that will send to its C2 server. this anomaly detections is a good initial step to hunt further a suspicious ldap query or ldap related events to the host that may give you good information regarding ldap or AD information processing or might be a attacker. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.007"]} -known_false_positives = automation scripting language may used by network operator to do ldap query. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - MS Scripting Process Loading WMI Module - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious MS scripting process such as wscript.exe or cscript.exe that loading wmi module to process wmi query. This behavior was seen in FIN7 implant where it uses javascript to execute wmi query to parse host information that will send to its C2 server. this anomaly detections is a good initial step to hunt further a suspicious wmi query or wmi related events to the host that may give you good information regarding process that are commonly using wmi query or modules or might be an attacker using this technique. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.007"]} -known_false_positives = automation scripting language may used by network operator to do ldap query. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - MSBuild Suspicious Spawned By Script Process - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic is to detect a suspicious child process of MSBuild spawned by Windows Script Host - cscript or wscript. This behavior or event are commonly seen and used by malware or adversaries to execute malicious msbuild process using malicious script in the compromised host. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any file modifications. MSBuild may load a script from the same path without having command-line arguments. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1127.001", "T1127"]} -known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as developers do not spawn MSBuild via a WSH. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - MSHTML Module Load in Office Product - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following detection identifies the module load of mshtml.dll into an Office product. This behavior has been related to CVE-2021-40444, whereas the malicious document will load ActiveX, which activates the MSHTML component. The vulnerability resides in the MSHTML component. During triage, identify parallel processes and capture any file modifications for analysis. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process names and image loads from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"]} -known_false_positives = Limited false positives will be present, however, tune as necessary. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following hunting analytic identifies `msi.dll` being loaded by a binary not located in `system32`, `syswow64`, `winsxs` or `windows` paths. This behavior is most recently related to InstallerFileTakeOver, or CVE-2021-41379, and DLL side-loading. CVE-2021-41379 requires a binary to be dropped and `msi.dll` to be loaded by it. To Successful exploitation of this issue happens in four parts \ -1. Generation of an MSI that will trigger bad behavior. \ -1. Preparing a directory for MSI installation. \ -1. Inducing an error state. \ -1. Racing to introduce a junction and a symlink to trick msiexec.exe to modify the attacker specified file. \ -In addition, `msi.dll` has been abused in DLL side-loading attacks by being loaded by non-system binaries. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.002", "T1574"]} -known_false_positives = It is possible some Administrative utilities will load msi.dll outside of normal system paths, filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - MacOS - Re-opened Applications - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for processes referencing the plist files that determine which applications are re-opened when a user reboots their machine. -how_to_implement = In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest process data from your osquery deployed agents with the [splunk.conf](https://github.com/splunk/TA-osquery/blob/master/config/splunk.conf) pack enabled. Also the [TA-OSquery](https://github.com/splunk/TA-osquery) must be deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the data populate the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command and Control"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = At this stage, there are no known false positives. During testing, no process events refering the com.apple.loginwindow.plist files were observed during normal operation of re-opening applications on reboot. Therefore, it can be asumed that any occurences of this in the process events would be worth investigating. In the event that the legitimate modification by the system of these files is in fact logged to the process log, then the process_name of that process can be added to an allow list. -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Mailsniper Invoke functions - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect known mailsniper.ps1 functions executed in a machine. This technique was seen in some attacker to harvest some sensitive e-mail in a compromised exchange server. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the powershell logs from your endpoints. make sure you enable needed registry to monitor this event. @@ -6203,7 +4426,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Malicious InProcServer32 Modification - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies a process modifying the registry with a known malicious CLSID under InProcServer32. Most COM classes are registered with the operating system and are identified by a GUID that represents the Class Identifier (CLSID) within the registry (usually under HKLM\\Software\\Classes\\CLSID or HKCU\\Software\\Classes\\CLSID). Behind the implementation of a COM class is the server (some binary) that is referenced within registry keys under the CLSID. The LocalServer32 key represents a path to an executable (exe) implementation, and the InprocServer32 key represents a path to a dynamic link library (DLL) implementation (Bohops). During triage, review parallel processes for suspicious activity. Pivot on the process GUID to see the full timeline of events. Analyze the value and look for file modifications. Being this is looking for inprocserver32, a DLL found in the value will most likely be loaded by a parallel process. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. @@ -6211,6 +4434,16 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.01 known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, filter as needed. In our test case, Remcos used regsvr32.exe to modify the registry. It may be required, dependent upon the EDR tool producing registry events, to remove (Default) from the command-line. providing_technologies = [] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Malicious Powershell Executed As A Service - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This detection is to identify the abuse the Windows SC.exe to execute malicious commands or payloads via PowerShell. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows System logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569", "T1569.002"]} +known_false_positives = Creating a hidden powershell service is rare and could key off of those instances. +providing_technologies = [] + [savedsearch://ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule] type = detection asset_type = Endpoint @@ -6220,7 +4453,7 @@ The analytic identifies all variations of EncodedCommand, as PowerShell allows t During triage, review parallel events to determine legitimacy. Tune as needed based on admin scripts in use. \ Alternatively, may use regex per matching here https://regexr.com/662ov. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} known_false_positives = System administrators may use this option, but it's not common. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6230,73 +4463,43 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for PowerShell processes started with parameters used to bypass the local execution policy for scripts. These parameters are often observed in attacks leveraging PowerShell scripts as they override the default PowerShell execution policy. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} known_false_positives = There may be legitimate reasons to bypass the PowerShell execution policy. The PowerShell script being run with this parameter should be validated to ensure that it is legitimate. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for PowerShell processes started with a base64 encoded command-line passed to it, with parameters to modify the execution policy for the process, and those that prevent the display of an interactive prompt to the user. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it overrides the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide itself from the user, and passes an encoded script to be run on the command-line. Deprecated because almost the same as Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = Legitimate process can have this combination of command-line options, but it's not common. -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule] type = detection asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for PowerShell processes launched with arguments that have characters indicative of obfuscation on the command-line. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} known_false_positives = These characters might be legitimately on the command-line, but it is not common. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Malicious Powershell Executed As A Service - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This detection is to identify the abuse the Windows SC.exe to execute malicious commands or payloads via PowerShell. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows System logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569", "T1569.002"]} -known_false_positives = Creating a hidden powershell service is rare and could key off of those instances. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Microsoft Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following query identifies suspicious .aspx created in 3 paths identified by Microsoft as known drop locations for Exchange exploitation related to HAFNIUM group and recently disclosed vulnerablity named ProxyShell. Paths include: `\HttpProxy\owa\auth\`, `\inetpub\wwwroot\aspnet_client\`, and `\HttpProxy\OAB\`. The analytic is limited to process name MSExchangeMailboxReplication.exe, which typically does not write .aspx files to disk. Upon triage, the suspicious .aspx file will likely look obvious on the surface. inspect the contents for script code inside. Identify additional log sources, IIS included, to review source and other potential exploitation. It is often the case that a particular threat is only applicable to a specific subset of systems in your environment. Typically analytics to detect those threats are written without the benefit of being able to only target those systems as well. Writing analytics against all systems when those behaviors are limited to identifiable subsets of those systems is suboptimal. Consider the case ProxyShell vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Servers. With asset information, a hunter can limit their analytics to systems that have been identified as Exchange servers. A hunter may start with the theory that the exchange server is communicating with new systems that it has not previously. If this theory is run against all publicly facing systems, the amount of noise it will generate will likely render this theory untenable. However, using the asset information to limit this analytic to just the Exchange servers will reduce the noise allowing the hunter to focus only on the systems where this behavioral change is relevant. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node and `Filesystem` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505", "T1505.003", "T1190"]} -known_false_positives = The query is structured in a way that `action` (read, create) is not defined. Review the results of this query, filter, and tune as necessary. It may be necessary to generate this query specific to your endpoint product. -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic looks for the use of Mimikatz command line parameters leveraged to execute pass the ticket attacks. Red teams and adversaries alike may use the pass the ticket technique using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Defenders should be aware that adversaries may customize the source code of Mimikatz and modify the command line parameters. This would effectively bypass this analytic. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1550", "T1550.003"]} +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1550", "T1550.003"]} known_false_positives = Although highly unlikely, legitimate applications may use the same command line parameters as Mimikatz. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies `mmc.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the DCOM protocol and the MMC20 COM object, the executed command is spawned as a child processs of `mmc.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of mmc.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.003"]} +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.003"]} known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic identifies suspicious modification of registry to deface or change the wallpaper of a compromised machines as part of its payload. This technique was commonly seen in ransomware like REVIL where it create a bitmap file contain a note that the machine was compromised and make it as a wallpaper. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Image, TargetObject registry key, registry Details from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. @@ -6306,7 +4509,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Modify ACL permission To Files Or Folder - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic identifies suspicious modification of ACL permission to a files or folder to make it available to everyone. This technique may be used by the adversary to evade ACLs or protected files access. This changes is commonly configured by the file or directory owner with appropriate permission. This behavior is a good indicator if this command seen on a machine utilized by an account with no permission to do so. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed cacls.exe may be used. @@ -6314,26 +4517,6 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222"]} known_false_positives = administrators may use this command. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for DNS requests for faux domains similar to the domains that you want to have monitored for abuse. -how_to_implement = You need to ingest data from your DNS logs. Specifically you must ingest the domain that is being queried and the IP of the host originating the request. Ideally, you should also be ingesting the answer to the query and the query type. This approach allows you to also create your own localized passive DNS capability which can aid you in future investigations. You also need to have run the search "ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names", which creates the permutations of the domain that will be checked for. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"]} -known_false_positives = None at this time -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for emails claiming to be sent from a domain similar to one that you want to have monitored for abuse. -how_to_implement = You need to ingest email header data. Specifically the sender's address (src_user) must be populated. You also need to have run the search "ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names", which creates the permutations of the domain that will be checked for. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = None at this time -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule] type = detection asset_type = Endpoint @@ -6344,19 +4527,39 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Ob known_false_positives = You will encounter noise from legitimate print-monitor registry entries. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule] +[savedsearch://ESCU - MS Scripting Process Loading Ldap Module - Rule] type = detection asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for Web requests to faux domains similar to the one that you want to have monitored for abuse. -how_to_implement = You need to ingest data from your web traffic. This can be accomplished by indexing data from a web proxy, or using a network traffic analysis tool, such as Bro or Splunk Stream. You also need to have run the search "ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names", which creates the permutations of the domain that will be checked for. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = None at this time +explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious MS scripting process such as wscript.exe or cscript.exe that loading ldap module to process ldap query. This behavior was seen in FIN7 implant where it uses javascript to execute ldap query to parse host information that will send to its C2 server. this anomaly detections is a good initial step to hunt further a suspicious ldap query or ldap related events to the host that may give you good information regarding ldap or AD information processing or might be a attacker. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.007"]} +known_false_positives = automation scripting language may used by network operator to do ldap query. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - MS Scripting Process Loading WMI Module - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious MS scripting process such as wscript.exe or cscript.exe that loading wmi module to process wmi query. This behavior was seen in FIN7 implant where it uses javascript to execute wmi query to parse host information that will send to its C2 server. this anomaly detections is a good initial step to hunt further a suspicious wmi query or wmi related events to the host that may give you good information regarding process that are commonly using wmi query or modules or might be an attacker using this technique. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.007"]} +known_false_positives = automation scripting language may used by network operator to do ldap query. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - MSBuild Suspicious Spawned By Script Process - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic is to detect a suspicious child process of MSBuild spawned by Windows Script Host - cscript or wscript. This behavior or event are commonly seen and used by malware or adversaries to execute malicious msbuild process using malicious script in the compromised host. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any file modifications. MSBuild may load a script from the same path without having command-line arguments. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1127.001", "T1127"]} +known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as developers do not spawn MSBuild via a WSH. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious mshta.exe process that spawn rundll32 or regsvr32 child process. This technique was seen in several malware nowadays like trickbot to load its initial .dll stage loader to execute and download the the actual trickbot payload. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. @@ -6364,9 +4567,34 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", known_false_positives = limitted. this anomaly behavior is not commonly seen in clean host. providing_technologies = [] +[savedsearch://ESCU - MSHTML Module Load in Office Product - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following detection identifies the module load of mshtml.dll into an Office product. This behavior has been related to CVE-2021-40444, whereas the malicious document will load ActiveX, which activates the MSHTML component. The vulnerability resides in the MSHTML component. During triage, identify parallel processes and capture any file modifications for analysis. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process names and image loads from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"]} +known_false_positives = Limited false positives will be present, however, tune as necessary. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following hunting analytic identifies `msi.dll` being loaded by a binary not located in `system32`, `syswow64`, `winsxs` or `windows` paths. This behavior is most recently related to InstallerFileTakeOver, or CVE-2021-41379, and DLL side-loading. CVE-2021-41379 requires a binary to be dropped and `msi.dll` to be loaded by it. To Successful exploitation of this issue happens in four parts \ +1. Generation of an MSI that will trigger bad behavior. \ +1. Preparing a directory for MSI installation. \ +1. Inducing an error state. \ +1. Racing to introduce a junction and a symlink to trick msiexec.exe to modify the attacker specified file. \ +In addition, `msi.dll` has been abused in DLL side-loading attacks by being loaded by non-system binaries. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.002", "T1574"]} +known_false_positives = It is possible some Administrative utilities will load msi.dll outside of normal system paths, filter as needed. +providing_technologies = [] + [savedsearch://ESCU - Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious creation of msmpeng.exe or mpsvc.dll in non default windows defender folder. This technique was seen couple days ago with revil ransomware in Kaseya Supply chain. The approach is to drop an old version of msmpeng.exe to load the actual payload name as mspvc.dll which will load the revil ransomware to the compromise machine how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node. @@ -6374,19 +4602,9 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.00 known_false_positives = quite minimal false positive expected. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is designed to detect high frequency of archive files data exfiltration through HTTP POST method protocol. This are one of the common techniques used by APT or trojan spy after doing the data collection like screenshot, recording, sensitive data to the infected machines. The attacker may execute archiving command to the collected data, save it a temp folder with a hidden attribute then send it to its C2 through HTTP POST. Sometimes adversaries will rename the archive files or encode/encrypt to cover their tracks. This detection can detect a renamed archive files transfer to HTTP POST since it checks the request body header. Unfortunately this detection cannot support archive that was encrypted or encoded before doing the exfiltration. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the stream HTTP logs or network logs that catch network traffic. Make sure that the http-request-body, payload, or request field is enabled in stream http configuration. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1048"]} -known_false_positives = Normal archive transfer via HTTP protocol may trip this detection. -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Multiple Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple disabled domain users using the Kerberos protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using Kerberos to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. As attackers progress in a breach, mistakes will be made. In certain scenarios, adversaries may execute a password spraying attack against disabled users. Event 4768 is generated every time the Key Distribution Center issues a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). Failure code `0x12` stands for `clients credentials have been revoked` (account disabled, expired or locked out).\ The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ @@ -6399,7 +4617,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple invalid domain users using the Kerberos protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using Kerberos to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. As attackers progress in a breach, mistakes will be made. In certain scenarios, adversaries may execute a password spraying attack using an invalid list of users. Event 4768 is generated every time the Key Distribution Center issues a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). Failure code 0x6 stands for `client not found in Kerberos database` (the attempted user is not a valid domain user).\ The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ @@ -6412,7 +4630,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple invalid users using the NTLM protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using NTLM to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. As attackers progress in a breach, mistakes will be made. In certain scenarios, adversaries may execute a password spraying attack using an invalid list of users. Event 4776 is generated on the computer that is authoritative for the provided credentials. For domain accounts, the domain controller is authoritative. For local accounts, the local computer is authoritative. Error code 0xC0000064 stands for `The username you typed does not exist` (the attempted user is a legitimate domain user).\ The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ @@ -6423,19 +4641,9 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.00 known_false_positives = A host failing to authenticate with multiple invalid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners and missconfigured systems. If this detection triggers on a host other than a Domain Controller, the behavior could represent a password spraying attack against the host's local accounts. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Infrastructure -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects Okta login failures due to bad credentials for multiple users originating from the same ip address. -how_to_implement = This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being ingested in your Splunk deployment. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = A single public IP address servicing multiple legitmate users may trigger this search. In addition, the threshold of 5 distinct users may be too low for your needs. You may modify the included filter macro `multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip_filter` to raise the threshold or except specific IP adresses from triggering this search. -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Multiple Users Attempting To Authenticate Using Explicit Credentials - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies a source user failing to authenticate with multiple users using explicit credentials on a host. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4648 is generated when a process attempts an account logon by explicitly specifying that accounts credentials. This event generates on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations.\ The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ @@ -6448,7 +4656,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple valid users using the Kerberos protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using Kerberos to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4771 is generated when the Key Distribution Center fails to issue a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). Failure code 0x18 stands for `wrong password provided` (the attempted user is a legitimate domain user).\ The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ @@ -6461,7 +4669,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple valid users using the NTLM protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using NTLM to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4776 is generated on the computer that is authoritative for the provided credentials. For domain accounts, the domain controller is authoritative. For local accounts, the local computer is authoritative. Error code 0xC000006A means: misspelled or bad password (the attempted user is a legitimate domain user).\ The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ @@ -6474,7 +4682,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Process - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies a source process name failing to authenticate with multiple users. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4625 generates on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations when an account fails to logon. Logon Type 2 describes an iteractive logon attempt.\ The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ @@ -6487,7 +4695,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Multiple Users Remotely Failing To Authenticate From Host - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies a source host failing to authenticate against a remote host with multiple users. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4625 documents each and every failed attempt to logon to the local computer. This event generates on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations. Logon Type 3 describes an remote authentication attempt.\ The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ @@ -6498,9 +4706,19 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.00 known_false_positives = A host failing to authenticate with multiple valid users against a remote host is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, remote administration tools, missconfigyred systems, etc. providing_technologies = [] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following hunting analytic will identify the use of localgroup discovery using `net localgroup`. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.001"]} +known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Tune as needed. +providing_technologies = [] + [savedsearch://ESCU - NET Profiler UAC bypass - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect modification of registry to bypass UAC windows feature. This technique is to add a payload dll path on .NET COR file path that will be loaded by mmc.exe as soon it was executed. This detection rely on monitoring the registry key and values in the detection area. It may happened that windows update some dll related to mmc.exe and add dll path in this registry. In this case filtering is needed. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. @@ -6508,6 +4726,56 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.00 known_false_positives = limited false positive. It may trigger by some windows update that will modify this registry. providing_technologies = [] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Arp - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `arp.exe` utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use arp.exe for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1049"]} +known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Net - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use net.exe for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1049"]} +known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `netstat.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use netstat.exe for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1049"]} +known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Network Discovery Using Route Windows App - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic look for a spawned process of route.exe windows application. Adversaries and red teams alike abuse this application the recon or do a network discovery on a target host. but one possible false positive might be an automated tool used by a system administator or a powershell script in amazon ec2 config services. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1016", "T1016.001"]} +known_false_positives = A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated host discovery application that may generate false positives or an amazon ec2 script that uses this application. Filter as needed. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This query detects the Nishang Invoke-PowerShellTCPOneLine utility that spawns a call back to a remote command and control server. This is a powershell oneliner. In addition, this will capture on the command-line additional utilities used by Nishang. Triage the endpoint and identify any parallel processes that look suspicious. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain contacted by the powershell process. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"]} +known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present. Filter as needed based on initial analysis. +providing_technologies = [] + [savedsearch://ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule] type = detection asset_type = Endpoint @@ -6518,89 +4786,9 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre known_false_positives = Administrators may use nltest for troubleshooting purposes, otherwise, rarely used. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following hunting analytic will identify the use of localgroup discovery using `net localgroup`. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.001"]} -known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Tune as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Arp - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `arp.exe` utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use arp.exe for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1049"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Net - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use net.exe for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1049"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `netstat.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use netstat.exe for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1049"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Network Discovery Using Route Windows App - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic look for a spawned process of route.exe windows application. Adversaries and red teams alike abuse this application the recon or do a network discovery on a target host. but one possible false positive might be an automated tool used by a system administator or a powershell script in amazon ec2 config services. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1016", "T1016.001"]} -known_false_positives = A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated host discovery application that may generate false positives or an amazon ec2 script that uses this application. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - New container uploaded to AWS ECR - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS ECR container -confidence = medium -explanation = This searches show information on uploaded containers including source user, image id, source IP user type, http user agent, region, first time, last time of operation (PutImage). These searches are based on Cloud Infrastructure Data Model. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model. Please also customize the `container_implant_aws_detection_filter` macro to filter out the false positives. -annotations = {"mitre_attack": ["T1525"]} -known_false_positives = Uploading container is a normal behavior from developers or users with access to container registry. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This query detects the Nishang Invoke-PowerShellTCPOneLine utility that spawns a call back to a remote command and control server. This is a powershell oneliner. In addition, this will capture on the command-line additional utilities used by Nishang. Triage the endpoint and identify any parallel processes that look suspicious. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain contacted by the powershell process. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"]} -known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present. Filter as needed based on initial analysis. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - No Windows Updates in a time frame - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for Windows endpoints that have not generated an event indicating a successful Windows update in the last 60 days. Windows updates are typically released monthly and applied shortly thereafter. An endpoint that has not successfully applied an update in this time frame indicates the endpoint is not regularly being patched for some reason. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, it requires that the 'Update' data model is being populated. This can be accomplished by ingesting Windows events or the Windows Update log via a universal forwarder on the Windows endpoints you wish to monitor. The Windows add-on should be also be installed and configured to properly parse Windows events in Splunk. There may be other data sources which can populate this data model, including vulnerability management systems. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 18"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.MA"]} -known_false_positives = None identified -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect an anomaly event of non-chrome process accessing the files in chrome user default folder. This folder contains all the sqlite database of the chrome browser related to users login, history, cookies and etc. Most of the RAT, trojan spy as well as FIN7 jssloader try to parse the those sqlite database to collect information on the compromised host. This SACL Event (4663) need to be enabled to tthe firefox profile directory to be eable to use this. Since you monitoring this access to the folder a noise coming from firefox need to be filter and also sqlite db browser and explorer .exe to make this detection more stable. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663. For 4663, enable "Audit Object Access" in Group Policy. Then check the two boxes listed for both "Success" and "Failure." @@ -6610,7 +4798,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect an anomaly event of non-firefox process accessing the files in profile folder. This folder contains all the sqlite database of the firefox browser related to users login, history, cookies and etc. Most of the RAT, trojan spy as well as FIN7 jssloader try to parse the those sqlite database to collect information on the compromised host. This SACL Event (4663) need to be enabled to tthe firefox profile directory to be eable to use this. Since you monitoring this access to the folder a noise coming from firefox need to be filter and also sqlite db browser and explorer .exe to make this detection more stable. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663. For 4663, enable "Audit Object Access" in Group Policy. Then check the two boxes listed for both "Success" and "Failure." @@ -6630,119 +4818,9 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on O known_false_positives = Highly possible Server Administrators will troubleshoot with ntdsutil.exe, generating false positives. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Office 365 -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects the creation of a new Federation setting by alerting about an specific event related to its creation. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003", "T1136"]} -known_false_positives = The creation of a new Federation is not necessarily malicious, however this events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a different cloud provider. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Office 365 -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects the creation of a new Federation setting by alerting about an specific event related to its creation. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003", "T1136"]} -known_false_positives = The creation of a new Federation is not necessarily malicious, however these events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a different cloud provider. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Office 365 -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects newly added IP addresses/CIDR blocks to the list of MFA Trusted IPs to bypass multi factor authentication. Attackers are often known to use this technique so that they can bypass the MFA system. -how_to_implement = You must install Splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007", "T1562"]} -known_false_positives = Unless it is a special case, it is uncommon to continually update Trusted IPs to MFA configuration. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Disable MFA - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Office 365 -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects when multi factor authentication has been disabled, what entitiy performed the action and against what user -how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1556"]} -known_false_positives = Unless it is a special case, it is uncommon to disable MFA or Strong Authentication -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Office 365 -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects when an excessive number of authentication failures occur this search also includes attempts against MFA prompt codes -how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Not Applicable"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110"]} -known_false_positives = The threshold for alert is above 10 attempts and this should reduce the number of false positives. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Office 365 -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects accounts with high number of Single Sign ON (SSO) logon errors. Excessive logon errors may indicate attempts to bruteforce of password or single sign on token hijack or reuse. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1556"]} -known_false_positives = Logon errors may not be malicious in nature however it may indicate attempts to reuse a token or password obtained via credential access attack. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Office 365 -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects the addition of a new Federated domain. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003", "T1136"]} -known_false_positives = The creation of a new Federated domain is not necessarily malicious, however these events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a similar or different cloud provider. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Office 365 -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects when a user has performed an Ediscovery search or exported a PST file from the search. This PST file usually has sensitive information including email body content -how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114"]} -known_false_positives = PST export can be done for legitimate purposes but due to the sensitive nature of its content it must be monitored. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Office 365 -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects when an admin configured a forwarding rule for multiple mailboxes to the same destination. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.003", "T1114"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Office 365 -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects the assignment of rights to accesss content from another mailbox. This is usually only assigned to a service account. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.002", "T1114"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = Service Accounts -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Office 365 -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects when multiple user configured a forwarding rule to the same destination. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.003", "T1114"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Office Application Drop Executable - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious MS office application that drop or create executables or script in the host. This behavior is commonly seen in spear phishing office attachment where it drop malicious files or script to compromised the host. It might be some normal macro may drop script or tools as part of automation but still this behavior is reallly suspicious and not commonly seen in normal office application how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. @@ -6752,7 +4830,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = this detection was designed to identifies suspicious spawned process of known MS office application due to macro or malicious code. this technique can be seen in so many malware like IcedID that used MS office as its weapon or attack vector to initially infect the machines. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. @@ -6762,7 +4840,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = this detection was designed to identifies suspicious spawned process of known MS office application due to macro or malicious code. this technique can be seen in so many malware like trickbot that used MS office as its weapon or attack vector to initially infect the machines. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. @@ -6772,7 +4850,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Office Document Creating Schedule Task - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = this search detects a potential malicious office document that create schedule task entry through macro VBA api or through loading taskschd.dll. This technique was seen in so many malicious macro malware that create persistence , beaconing using task schedule malware entry The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it's possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.' how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and ImageLoaded (Like sysmon EventCode 7) from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Also be sure to include those monitored dll to your own sysmon config. @@ -6782,7 +4860,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = this detection was designed to identifies suspicious office documents that using macro code. Macro code is known to be one of the prevalent weaponization or attack vector of threat actor. This malicious macro code is embed to a office document as an attachment that may execute malicious payload, download malware payload or other malware component. It is really good practice to disable macro by default to avoid automatically execute macro code while opening or closing a office document files. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and ImageLoaded (Like sysmon EventCode 7) from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Also be sure to include those monitored dll to your own sysmon config. @@ -6792,7 +4870,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect potential malicious office document executing lolbin child process to download payload or other malware. Since most of the attacker abused the capability of office document to execute living on land application to blend it to the normal noise in the infected machine to cover its track. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances office application and browser may be used. @@ -6802,7 +4880,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = this search is to detect a suspicious office product process that spawn cmd child process. This is commonly seen in a ms office product having macro to execute shell command to download or execute malicious lolbin relative to its malicious code. This is seen in trickbot spear phishing doc where it execute shell cmd to run mshta payload. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. @@ -6812,7 +4890,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `bitsadmin.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `bitsadmin.exe` will contain a URL to a remote destination or similar command-line arguments as transfer, Download, priority, Foreground. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `bitsadmin.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `bitsadmin.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. @@ -6822,7 +4900,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Office Product Spawning CertUtil - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `certutil.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `certutil.exe` will contain a URL to a remote destination. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `certutil.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `certutil.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. @@ -6832,7 +4910,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `mshta.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `mshta.exe` will contain the `hta` file locally, or a URL to the remote destination. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `mshta.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `mshta.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. @@ -6842,7 +4920,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by IcedID malware family. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `rundll32.exe` without a `.dll` file extension. In malicious instances, the command-line of `rundll32.exe` will look like `rundll32 ..\oepddl.igk2,DllRegisterServer`. In addition, Threat Research has released a detection identifying the use of `DllRegisterServer` on the command-line of `rundll32.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze the `DLL` that was dropped to disk. The Office Product will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. @@ -6852,7 +4930,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Office Product Spawning Wmic - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by Ursnif malware family. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `wmic.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `wmic.exe` will contain `wmic process call create`. In addition, Threat Research has released a detection identifying the use of `wmic process call create` on the command-line of `wmic.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `wmic.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. @@ -6862,7 +4940,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Office Product Writing cab or inf - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies behavior related to CVE-2021-40444. Whereas the malicious document will load ActiveX and download the remote payload (.inf, .cab). During triage, review parallel processes and further activity on endpoint to identify additional patterns. Retrieve the file modifications and analyze further. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node and `Filesystem` node. @@ -6872,7 +4950,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Office Spawning Control - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following detection identifies control.exe spawning from an office product. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `control.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `control.exe` will contain a file path to a .cpl or .inf, related to CVE-2021-40444. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. review parallel and child processes to identify further suspicious behavior how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. @@ -6880,62 +4958,12 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", known_false_positives = Limited false positives should be present. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Infrastructure -confidence = medium -explanation = Detect Okta user lockout events -how_to_implement = This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being ingested in your Splunk deployment. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = None. Account lockouts should be followed up on to determine if the actual user was the one who caused the lockout, or if it was an unauthorized actor. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Infrastructure -confidence = medium -explanation = Detect failed Okta SSO events -how_to_implement = This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being ingested in your Splunk deployment. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = There may be a faulty config preventing legitmate users from accessing apps they should have access to. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Infrastructure -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects logins from the same user from different cities in a 24 hour period. -how_to_implement = This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being ingested in your Splunk deployment. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Users in your enviornment may legitmately be travelling and loggin in from different locations. This search is useful for those users that should *not* be travelling for some reason, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. The search also relies on the geographical information being populated in the Okta logs. It is also possible that a connection from another region may be attributed to a login from a remote VPN endpoint. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Open Redirect in Splunk Web - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Splunk Server -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search allows you to look for evidence of exploitation for CVE-2016-4859, the Splunk Open Redirect Vulnerability. -how_to_implement = No extra steps needed to implement this search. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["ID.RA", "RS.MI", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = None identified -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports - Rule] type = detection asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for ColdRoot events from the osx-attacks osquery pack. -how_to_implement = In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from your osquery deployed agents with the [osx-attacks.conf](https://github.com/facebook/osquery/blob/experimental/packs/osx-attacks.conf#L599) pack enabled. Also the [TA-OSquery](https://github.com/d1vious/TA-osquery) must be deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the osquery data populate the Alerts data model -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command and Control"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.PT"]} -known_false_positives = There are no known false positives. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium explanation = A required step while exploiting the CVE-2021-44228-Log4j vulnerability is that the victim server will perform outbound connections to attacker-controlled infrastructure. This is required as part of the JNDI lookup as well as for retrieving the second stage .class payload. The following analytic identifies the Java process reaching out to default ports used by the LDAP and RMI protocols. This behavior could represent successfull exploitation. Note that adversaries can easily decide to use arbitrary ports for these protocols and potentially bypass this detection. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. The following Splunk SOAR playbook can be used to respond to this detection: Log4j Investigate The following Splunk SOAR playbook can be used to respond to this detection: Log4j Respond +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"]} known_false_positives = Legitimate Java applications may use perform outbound connections to these ports. Filter as needed providing_technologies = [] @@ -6952,7 +4980,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Password Policy Discovery with Net - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command line arguments used to obtain the domain password policy. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `net.exe` for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. @@ -6962,7 +4990,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Permission Modification using Takeown App - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a modification of file or directory permission using takeown.exe windows app. This technique was seen in some ransomware that take the ownership of a folder or files to encrypt or delete it. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. @@ -6972,30 +5000,30 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - PetitPotam Network Share Access Request - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes Windows Event Code 5145, "A network share object was checked to see whether client can be granted desired access". During our research into PetitPotam, CVE-2021-36942, we identified the ocurrence of this event on the target host with specific values. \ To enable 5145 events via Group Policy - Computer Configuration->Polices->Windows Settings->Security Settings->Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Expand this node, go to Object Access (Audit Polices->Object Access), then select the Setting Audit Detailed File Share Audit \ It is possible this is not enabled by default and may need to be reviewed and enabled. \ During triage, review parallel security events to identify further suspicious activity. how_to_implement = Windows Event Code 5145 is required to utilize this analytic and it may not be enabled in most environments. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1187"]} +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1187"]} known_false_positives = False positives have been limited when the Anonymous Logon is used for Account Name. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifes Event Code 4768, A `Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested`, successfull occurs. This behavior has been identified to assist with detecting PetitPotam, CVE-2021-36942. Once an attacer obtains a computer certificate by abusing Active Directory Certificate Services in combination with PetitPotam, the next step would be to leverage the certificate for malicious purposes. One way of doing this is to request a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket using a tool like Rubeus. This request will generate a 4768 event with some unusual fields depending on the environment. This analytic will require tuning, we recommend filtering Account_Name to Domain Controllers for your environment. how_to_implement = The following analytic requires Event Code 4768. Ensure that it is logging no Domain Controllers and appearing in Splunk. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003"]} +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003"]} known_false_positives = False positives are possible if the environment is using certificates for authentication. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Ping Sleep Batch Command - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic will identify the possible execution of ping sleep batch commands. This technique was seen in several malware samples and is used to trigger sleep times without explicitly calling sleep functions or commandlets. The goal is to delay the execution of malicious code and bypass detection or sandbox analysis. This detection can be a good indicator of a process delaying its execution for malicious purposes. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. @@ -7003,19 +5031,9 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exp known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator may execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect potential plain HTTP POST method data exfiltration. This network traffic is commonly used by trickbot, trojanspy, keylogger or APT adversary where arguments or commands are sent in plain text to the remote C2 server using HTTP POST method as part of data exfiltration. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the stream HTTP logs or network logs that catch network traffic. Make sure that the http-request-body, payload, or request field is enabled. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1048"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Possible Browser Pass View Parameter - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic will detect if a suspicious process contains a commandline parameter related to a web browser credential dumper. This technique is used by Remcos RAT malware which uses the Nirsoft webbrowserpassview.exe application to dump web browser credentials. Remcos uses the "/stext" command line to dump the credentials in text format. This Hunting query is a good indicator of hosts suffering from possible Remcos RAT infection. Since the hunting query is based on the parameter command and the possible path where it will save the text credential information, it may catch normal tools that are using the same command and behavior. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. @@ -7025,17 +5043,17 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic assists with identifying a PowerShell process spawned as a child or grand child process of commonly abused processes during lateral movement techniques including `services.exe`, `wmiprsve.exe`, `svchost.exe`, `wsmprovhost.exe` and `mmc.exe`. Legitimate Windows features such as the Service Control Manager, Windows Management Instrumentation, Task Scheduler, Windows Remote Management and the DCOM protocol can be abused to start a process on a remote endpoint. Looking for PowerShell spawned out of this processes may reveal a lateral movement attack. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse these services during a breach for lateral movement and remote code execution. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement", "Malicious PowerShell"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.003", "T1021.006", "T1047", "T1053.005", "T1543.003", "T1059.001"]} +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.003", "T1021.006", "T1047", "T1053.005", "T1543.003", "T1059.001"]} known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may spawn PowerShell as a child process of the the identified processes. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Potentially malicious code on commandline - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic uses a pretrained machine learning text classifier to detect potentially malicious commandlines. The model identifies unusual combinations of keywords found in samples of commandlines where adversaries executed powershell code, primarily for C2 communication. For example, adversaries will leverage IO capabilities such as "streamreader" and "webclient", threading capabilties such as "mutex" locks, programmatic constructs like "function" and "catch", and cryptographic operations like "computehash". Although observing one of these keywords in a commandline script is possible, combinations of keywords observed in attack data are not typically found in normal usage of the commandline. The model will output a score where all values above zero are suspicious, anything greater than one particularly so. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. You will also need to install the Machine Learning Toolkit version 5.3 or above to apply the pretrained model. @@ -7043,73 +5061,29 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.00 known_false_positives = This model is an anomaly detector that identifies usage of APIs and scripting constructs that are correllated with malicious activity. These APIs and scripting constructs are part of the programming langauge and advanced scripts may generate false positives. providing_technologies = [] +[savedsearch://ESCU - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following Hunting analytic assists with identifying suspicious PowerShell execution using Script Block Logging, or EventCode 4104. This analytic is not meant to be ran hourly, but occasionally to identify malicious or suspicious PowerShell. This analytic is a combination of work completed by Alex Teixeira and Splunk Threat Research Team. +how_to_implement = The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"]} +known_false_positives = Limited false positives. May filter as needed. +providing_technologies = [] + [savedsearch://ESCU - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule] type = detection asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following hunting analytic identifies PowerShell commands utilizing the WindowStyle parameter to hide the window on the compromised endpoint. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it is overriding the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide its activity from the user, and connects to the Internet. Removed in this version of the query is New-Object. The analytic identifies all variations of WindowStyle, as PowerShell allows the ability to shorten the parameter. For example w, win, windowsty and so forth. In addition, through our research it was identified that PowerShell will interpret different command switch types beyond the hyphen. We have added endash, emdash, horizontal bar, and forward slash. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} known_false_positives = Legitimate process can have this combination of command-line options, but it's not common. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following Hunting analytic assists with identifying suspicious PowerShell execution using Script Block Logging, or EventCode 4104. This analytic is not meant to be ran hourly, but occasionally to identify malicious or suspicious PowerShell. This analytic is a combination of work completed by Alex Teixeira and Splunk Threat Research Team. -how_to_implement = The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"]} -known_false_positives = Limited false positives. May filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - PowerShell Domain Enumeration - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ -This analytic identifies specific PowerShell modules typically used to enumerate an organizations domain or users. \ -During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"]} -known_false_positives = It is possible there will be false positives, filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - PowerShell Get LocalGroup Discovery - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following hunting analytic identifies the use of `get-localgroup` being used with PowerShell to identify local groups on the endpoint. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.001"]} -known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Tune as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via System Reflection Assembly - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable no critical endpoints or all. \ -This analytic identifies the use of PowerShell loading .net assembly via reflection. This is commonly found in malicious PowerShell usage, including Empire and Cobalt Strike. In addition, the `load(` value may be modifed by removing `(` and it will identify more events to review. \ -During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"]} -known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as day to day scripts do not use this method. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = Start-BitsTransfer is the PowerShell "version" of BitsAdmin.exe. Similar functionality is present. This technique variation is not as commonly used by adversaries, but has been abused in the past. Lesser known uses include the ability to set the `-TransferType` to `Upload` for exfiltration of files. In an instance where `Upload` is used, it is highly possible files will be archived. During triage, review parallel processes and process lineage. Capture any files on disk and review. For the remote domain or IP, what is the reputation? -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1197"]} -known_false_positives = Limited false positives. It is possible administrators will utilize Start-BitsTransfer for administrative tasks, otherwise filter based parent process or command-line arguments. -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Powershell Creating Thread Mutex - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is using the `mutex` function. This function is commonly seen in some obfuscated PowerShell scripts to make sure that only one instance of there process is running on a compromise machine. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. @@ -7119,7 +5093,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Powershell Disable Security Monitoring - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search is to identifies a modification in registry to disable the windows denfender real time behavior monitoring. This event or technique is commonly seen in RAT, bot, or Trojan to disable AV to evade detections. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. @@ -7127,9 +5101,21 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.00 known_false_positives = Limited false positives. However, tune based on scripts that may perform this action. providing_technologies = [] +[savedsearch://ESCU - PowerShell Domain Enumeration - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ +This analytic identifies specific PowerShell modules typically used to enumerate an organizations domain or users. \ +During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"]} +known_false_positives = It is possible there will be false positives, filter as needed. +providing_technologies = [] + [savedsearch://ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious enabling of smb1protocol through "powershell.exe". This technique was seen in some ransomware (like reddot) where it enable smb share to do the lateral movement and encrypt other files within the compromise network system. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the powershell logs from your endpoints. make sure you enable needed registry to monitor this event. @@ -7139,7 +5125,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Powershell Execute COM Object - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a COM CLSID execution through powershell. This technique was seen in several adversaries and malware like ransomware conti where it has a feature to execute command using COM Object. This technique may use by network operator at some cases but a good indicator if some application want to gain privilege escalation or bypass uac. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. @@ -7149,7 +5135,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable no critical endpoints or all. \ This analytic identifies `GetProcAddress` in the script block. This is not normal to be used by most PowerShell scripts and is typically unsafe/malicious. Many attack toolkits use GetProcAddress to obtain code execution. \ @@ -7162,20 +5148,30 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ This analytic identifies `FromBase64String` within the script block. A typical malicious instance will include additional code. \ Command example - `[Byte[]]$var_code = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String(38uqIyMjQ6rG....` \ During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1027", "T1059.001"]} +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1027", "T1059.001"]} known_false_positives = False positives should be limited. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] +[savedsearch://ESCU - PowerShell Get LocalGroup Discovery - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following hunting analytic identifies the use of `get-localgroup` being used with PowerShell to identify local groups on the endpoint. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.001"]} +known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Tune as needed. +providing_technologies = [] + [savedsearch://ESCU - Powershell Get LocalGroup Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ This analytic identifies PowerShell cmdlet - `get-localgroup` being ran. Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \ @@ -7185,9 +5181,21 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069" known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Tune as needed. providing_technologies = [] +[savedsearch://ESCU - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via System Reflection Assembly - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable no critical endpoints or all. \ +This analytic identifies the use of PowerShell loading .net assembly via reflection. This is commonly found in malicious PowerShell usage, including Empire and Cobalt Strike. In addition, the `load(` value may be modifed by removing `(` and it will identify more events to review. \ +During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"]} +known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as day to day scripts do not use this method. +providing_technologies = [] + [savedsearch://ESCU - Powershell Processing Stream Of Data - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is processing compressed stream data. This is typically found in obfuscated PowerShell or PowerShell executing embedded .NET or binary files that are stream flattened and will be deflated durnig execution. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. @@ -7197,7 +5205,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Powershell Remote Thread To Known Windows Process - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = this search is designed to detect suspicious powershell process that tries to inject code and to known/critical windows process and execute it using CreateRemoteThread. This technique is seen in several malware like trickbot and offensive tooling like cobaltstrike where it load a shellcode to svchost.exe to execute reverse shell to c2 and download another payload how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, Create Remote thread from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of create remote thread may be used. @@ -7207,7 +5215,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Powershell Remove Windows Defender Directory - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic will identify a suspicious PowerShell command used to delete the Windows Defender folder. This technique was seen used by the WhisperGate malware campaign where it used Nirsofts advancedrun.exe to gain administrative privileges to then execute a PowerShell command to delete the Windows Defender folder. This is a good indicator the offending process is trying corrupt a Windows Defender installation. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. @@ -7215,9 +5223,19 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exp known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] +[savedsearch://ESCU - PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = Start-BitsTransfer is the PowerShell "version" of BitsAdmin.exe. Similar functionality is present. This technique variation is not as commonly used by adversaries, but has been abused in the past. Lesser known uses include the ability to set the `-TransferType` to `Upload` for exfiltration of files. In an instance where `Upload` is used, it is highly possible files will be archived. During triage, review parallel processes and process lineage. Capture any files on disk and review. For the remote domain or IP, what is the reputation? +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1197"]} +known_false_positives = Limited false positives. It is possible administrators will utilize Start-BitsTransfer for administrative tasks, otherwise filter based parent process or command-line arguments. +providing_technologies = [] + [savedsearch://ESCU - Powershell Using memory As Backing Store - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is using memory stream as new object backstore. The malicious PowerShell script will contain stream flate data and will be decompressed in memory to run or drop the actual payload. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. @@ -7227,7 +5245,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic will detect a suspicious process commandline related to windows defender exclusion feature. This command is abused by adversaries, malware author and red teams to bypassed Windows Defender Anti-Virus product by excluding folder path, file path, process, extensions and etc. from its real time or schedule scan to execute their malicious code. This is a good indicator for defense evasion and to look further for events after this behavior. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. @@ -7237,7 +5255,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious bcdedit.exe execution to ignore all failures. This technique was used by ransomware to prevent the compromise machine automatically boot in repair mode. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed bcdedit.exe may be used. @@ -7245,19 +5263,9 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"]} known_false_positives = Administrators may modify the boot configuration ignore failure during testing and debugging. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Print Processor Registry Autostart - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification or new registry entry regarding print processor. This registry is known to be abuse by turla or other APT to gain persistence and privilege escalation to the compromised machine. This is done by adding the malicious dll payload on the new created key in this registry that will be executed as it restarted the spoolsv.exe process and services. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012", "T1547"]} -known_false_positives = possible new printer installation may add driver component on this registry. -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Print Spooler Adding A Printer Driver - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies new printer drivers being load by utilizing the Windows PrintService operational logs, EventCode 316. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. \ Within the proof of concept code, the following event will occur - "Printer driver 1234 for Windows x64 Version-3 was added or updated. Files:- UNIDRV.DLL, kernelbase.dll, evil.dll. No user action is required." \ @@ -7269,7 +5277,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Print Spooler Failed to Load a Plug-in - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies driver load errors utilizing the Windows PrintService Admin logs. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. \ Within the proof of concept code, the following error will occur - "The print spooler failed to load a plug-in module C:\Windows\system32\spool\DRIVERS\x64\3\meterpreter.dll, error code 0x45A. See the event user data for context information." \ @@ -7292,7 +5300,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This detection is to identify a suspicious process that tries to delete the process file path related to its process. This technique is known to be defense evasion once a certain condition of malware is satisfied or not. Clop ransomware use this technique where it will try to delete its process file path using a .bat command if the keyboard layout is not the layout it tries to infect. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. @@ -7312,7 +5320,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Process Kill Base On File Path - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of `wmic.exe` using `delete` to remove a executable path. This is typically ran via a batch file during beginning stages of an adversary setting up for mining on an endpoint. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. @@ -7322,7 +5330,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Process Writing DynamicWrapperX - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = DynamicWrapperX is an ActiveX component that can be used in a script to call Windows API functions, but it requires the dynwrapx.dll to be installed and registered. With that, a binary writing dynwrapx.dll to disk and registering it into the registry is highly suspect. Why is it needed? In most malicious instances, it will be written to disk at a non-standard location. During triage, review parallel processes and pivot on the process_guid. Review the registry for any suspicious modifications meant to load dynwrapx.dll. Identify any suspicious module loads of dynwrapx.dll. This will identify the process that will invoke vbs/wscript/cscript. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. @@ -7330,26 +5338,6 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, however it is possible to filter by Processes.process_name and specific processes (ex. wscript.exe). Filter as needed. This may need modification based on EDR telemetry and how it brings in registry data. For example, removal of (Default). providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for processes in an MacOS system that is tapping keyboard events in MacOS, and essentially monitoring all keystrokes made by a user. This is a common technique used by RATs to log keystrokes from a victim, although it can also be used by legitimate processes like Siri to react on human input -how_to_implement = In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from your osquery deployed agents with the [osx-attacks.conf](https://github.com/facebook/osquery/blob/experimental/packs/osx-attacks.conf#L599) pack enabled. Also the [TA-OSquery](https://github.com/d1vious/TA-osquery) must be deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the osquery data populate the Alerts data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "nist": ["DE.DP"]} -known_false_positives = There might be some false positives as keyboard event taps are used by processes like Siri and Zoom video chat, for some good examples of processes to exclude please see [this](https://github.com/facebook/osquery/pull/5345#issuecomment-454639161) comment. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe to execute various commands via the netsh command-line utility. Netsh.exe is a command-line scripting utility that allows you to, either locally or remotely, display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. Netsh can be used as a persistence proxy technique to execute a helper .dll when netsh.exe is executed. In this search, we are looking for processes spawned by netsh.exe that are executing commands via the command line. Deprecated because we have another detection of the same type. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting logs with the process name, command-line arguments, and parent processes from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.004"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = It is unusual for netsh.exe to have any child processes in most environments. It makes sense to investigate the child process and verify whether the process spawned is legitimate. We explicitely exclude "C:\Program Files\rempl\sedlauncher.exe" process path since it is a legitimate process by Mircosoft. -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule] type = detection asset_type = Endpoint @@ -7360,79 +5348,19 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives" known_false_positives = Some VPN applications are known to launch netsh.exe. Outside of these instances, it is unusual for an executable to launch netsh.exe and run commands. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for network traffic defined by port and transport layer protocol in the Enterprise Security lookup table "lookup_interesting_ports", that is marked as prohibited, and has an associated 'allow' action in the Network_Traffic data model. This could be indicative of a misconfigured network device. -how_to_implement = In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from firewalls or other network control devices that mediate the traffic allowed into an environment. This is necessary so that the search can identify an 'action' taken on the traffic of interest. The search requires the Network_Traffic data model be populated. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC"]} -known_false_positives = None identified -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for applications on the endpoint that you have marked as prohibited. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is usually generated via logs that report process tracking in your Windows audit settings. In addition, you must also have only the `process_name` (not the entire process path) marked as "prohibited" in the Enterprise Security `interesting processes` table. To include the process names marked as "prohibited", which is included with ES Content Updates, run the included search Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 2"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} -known_false_positives = None identified -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for network traffic on common ports where a higher layer protocol does not match the port that is being used. For example, this search should identify cases where protocols other than HTTP are running on TCP port 80. This can be used by attackers to circumvent firewall restrictions, or as an attempt to hide malicious communications over ports and protocols that are typically allowed and not well inspected. -how_to_implement = Running this search properly requires a technology that can inspect network traffic and identify common protocols. Technologies such as Bro and Palo Alto Networks firewalls are two examples that will identify protocols via inspection, and not just assume a specific protocol based on the transport protocol and ports. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1048"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC"]} -known_false_positives = None identified -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies cleartext protocols at risk of leaking sensitive information. Currently, this consists of legacy protocols such as telnet (port 23), POP3 (port 110), IMAP (port 143), and non-anonymous FTP (port 21) sessions. While some of these protocols may be used over SSL, they typically are found on different assigned ports in those instances. -how_to_implement = This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic, and populating the Network_Traffic data model. For more accurate result it's better to limit destination to organization private and public IP range, like All_Traffic.dest IN(192.168.0.0/16,172.16.0.0/12,10.0.0.0/8, x.x.x.x/22) -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]} -known_false_positives = Some networks may use kerberized FTP or telnet servers, however, this is rare. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following hunting analytic leverages Event ID 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify the creation of a Scheduled Task with a suspicious, high entropy, Task Name. To achieve this, this analytic also leverages the `ut_shannon` function from the URL ToolBox Splunk application. Red teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler to create and start a remote Scheduled Task and obtain remote code execution. To achieve this goal, tools like Impacket or Crapmapexec, typically create a Scheduled Task with a random task name on the victim host. This hunting analytic may help defenders identify Scheduled Tasks created as part of a lateral movement attack. The entropy threshold `ut_shannon > 3` should be customized by users. The Command field can be used to determine if the task has malicious intent or not. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA as well as the URL ToolBox application are also required. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053", "T1053.005"]} -known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may use random Scheduled Task names. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Randomly Generated Windows Service Name - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following hunting analytic leverages Event ID 7045, `A new service was installed in the system`, to identify the installation of a Windows Service with a suspicious, high entropy, Service Name. To achieve this, this analytic also leverages the `ut_shannon` function from the URL ToolBox Splunk application. Red teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Service Control Manager to create and start a remote Windows Service and obtain remote code execution. To achieve this goal, some tools like Metasploit, Cobalt Strike and Impacket, typically create a Windows Service with a random service name on the victim host. This hunting analytic may help defenders identify Windows Services installed as part of a lateral movement attack. The entropy threshold `ut_shannon > 3` should be customized by users. The Service_File_Name field can be used to determine if the Windows Service has malicious intent or not. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints. The Windows TA as well as the URL ToolBox application are also required. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543", "T1543.003"]} -known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may use random Windows Service names. -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytics identifies a big number of instance of ransomware notes (filetype e.g .txt, .html, .hta) file creation to the infected machine. This behavior is a good sensor if the ransomware note filename is quite new for security industry or the ransomware note filename is not in your ransomware lookup table list for monitoring. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Obfuscation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"]} +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 performing checks to identify anti-virus products installed on the endpoint. This technique is commonly found in malware and APT events where the adversary will map all running security applications or services. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. @@ -7442,7 +5370,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell via EventCode 4104, where WMI is performing an event query looking for running processes or running services. This technique is commonly found where the adversary will identify services and system information on the compromised machine. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. @@ -7452,7 +5380,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious commandline designed to delete files or directory recursive using batch command. This technique was seen in ransomware (reddot) where it it tries to delete the files in recycle bin to impaire user from recovering deleted files. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. @@ -7470,14 +5398,14 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Inst known_false_positives = It is unusual for a service to be created or modified by directly manipulating the registry. However, there may be legitimate instances of this behavior. It is important to validate and investigate, as appropriate. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search looks for command-line arguments used to hide a file or directory using the reg add command. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1564.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = None at the moment +explanation = This search looks for registry activity associated with application compatibility shims, which can be leveraged by attackers for various nefarious purposes. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must populate the Change_Analysis data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection and response product, such as Carbon Black or other endpoint data sources such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.011", "T1546"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = There are many legitimate applications that leverage shim databases for compatibility purposes for legacy applications providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule] @@ -7492,7 +5420,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to elevate privileges. The registry keys under "Image File Execution Options" are used to intercept calls to an executable and can be used to attach malicious binaries to benign system binaries. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. @@ -7500,19 +5428,9 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives" known_false_positives = There are many legitimate applications that must execute upon system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for registry activity associated with application compatibility shims, which can be leveraged by attackers for various nefarious purposes. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must populate the Change_Analysis data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection and response product, such as Carbon Black or other endpoint data sources such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.011", "T1546"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = There are many legitimate applications that leverage shim databases for compatibility purposes for legacy applications -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic is to detect a loading of dll using regsvr32 application with silent parameter and dllinstall execution. This technique was seen in several RAT malware similar to remcos, njrat and adversaries to load their malicious DLL on the compromised machine. This TTP may executed by normal 3rd party application so it is better to pivot by the parent process, parent command-line and command-line of the file that execute this regsvr32. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. @@ -7522,7 +5440,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies Regsvr32.exe utilizing the silent switch to load DLLs. This technique has most recently been seen in IcedID campaigns to load its initial dll that will download the 2nd stage loader that will download and decrypt the config payload. The switch type may be either a hyphen `-` or forward slash `/`. This behavior is typically found with `-s`, and it is possible there are more switch types that may be used. \ During triage, review parallel processes and capture any artifacts that may have landed on disk. Isolate and contain the endpoint as necessary. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. @@ -7530,19 +5448,9 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", known_false_positives = minimal. but network operator can use this application to load dll. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Remcos RAT File Creation in Remcos Folder - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect file creation in remcos folder in appdata which is the keylog and clipboard logs that will be send to its c2 server. This is really a good TTP indicator that there is a remcos rat in the system that do keylogging, clipboard grabbing and audio recording. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1113"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Remcos client registry install entry - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search detects registry key license at host where Remcos RAT agent is installed. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. @@ -7550,56 +5458,66 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Remcos RAT File Creation in Remcos Folder - Rule] type = detection asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for RDP application network traffic and filters any source/destination pair generating more than twice the standard deviation of the average traffic. -how_to_implement = You must ensure that your network traffic data is populating the Network_Traffic data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 9", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = RDP gateways may have unusually high amounts of traffic from all other hosts' RDP applications in the network. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for network traffic on TCP/3389, the default port used by remote desktop. While remote desktop traffic is not uncommon on a network, it is usually associated with known hosts. This search will ignore common RDP sources and common RDP destinations so you can focus on the uncommon uses of remote desktop on your network. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to identify systems that commonly originate remote desktop traffic and that commonly receive remote desktop traffic. You can use the included support search "Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic" to identify systems that originate the traffic and the search "Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic" to identify systems that receive a lot of remote desktop traffic. After identifying these systems, you will need to add the "common_rdp_source" or "common_rdp_destination" category to that system depending on the usage, using the Enterprise Security Assets and Identities framework. This can be done by adding an entry in the assets.csv file located in SA-IdentityManagement/lookups. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 9", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = Remote Desktop may be used legitimately by users on the network. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for the remote desktop process mstsc.exe running on systems upon which it doesn't typically run. This is accomplished by filtering out all systems that are noted in the `common_rdp_source category` in the Assets and Identity framework. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. The search requires you to identify systems that do not commonly use remote desktop. You can use the included support search "Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop" to identify these systems. After identifying them, you will need to add the "common_rdp_source" category to that system using the Enterprise Security Assets and Identities framework. This can be done by adding an entry in the assets.csv file located in `SA-IdentityManagement/lookups`. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 9", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = Remote Desktop may be used legitimately by users on the network. +explanation = This search is to detect file creation in remcos folder in appdata which is the keylog and clipboard logs that will be send to its c2 server. This is really a good TTP indicator that there is a remcos rat in the system that do keylogging, clipboard grabbing and audio recording. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1113"]} +known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the DCOM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of ShellExecute and ExecuteShellCommand. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse DCOM and `powershell.exe` for lateral movement and remote code execution. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.003"]} +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.003"]} known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage DCOM to start a process on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell Script Block - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of PowerShell with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the DCOM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of ShellExecute and ExecuteShellCommand. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse DCOM for lateral movement and remote code execution. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup instructions can be found https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.003"]} +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.003"]} known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage DCOM to start a process on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. providing_technologies = [] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the WinRM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of the `Invoke-Command` commandlet. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WinRM and `powershell.exe` for lateral movement and remote code execution. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.006"]} +known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage WinRM and `Invoke-Command` to start a process on remote systems for system administration or automation use cases. However, this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell Script Block - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of PowerShell with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the WinRM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of the `Invoke-Command` commandlet. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WinRM for lateral movement and remote code execution. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup instructions can be found https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.006"]} +known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage WinRM and `Invoke-Command` to start a process on remote systems for system administration or automation use cases. This activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. In certain environments, tuning may not be possible. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and Winrs - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `winrs.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the WinRM protocol and this binary for lateral movement and remote code execution. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.006"]} +known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage WinRM and WinRs to start a process on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. +providing_technologies = [] + [savedsearch://ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule] type = detection asset_type = Endpoint @@ -7612,67 +5530,27 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` leveraging the `Invoke-WmiMethod` commandlet complemented with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing WMI. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WMI and `powershell.exe` for lateral movement and remote code execution. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"]} +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"]} known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage WWMI and powershell.exe to start a process on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell Script Block - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Invoke-WmiMethod` commandlet with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing WMI. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WMI and this commandlet for lateral movement and remote code execution. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup instructions can be found https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"]} +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"]} known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage WWMI and powershell.exe to start a process on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the WinRM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of the `Invoke-Command` commandlet. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WinRM and `powershell.exe` for lateral movement and remote code execution. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.006"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage WinRM and `Invoke-Command` to start a process on remote systems for system administration or automation use cases. However, this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell Script Block - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of PowerShell with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the WinRM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of the `Invoke-Command` commandlet. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WinRM for lateral movement and remote code execution. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup instructions can be found https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.006"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage WinRM and `Invoke-Command` to start a process on remote systems for system administration or automation use cases. This activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. In certain environments, tuning may not be possible. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and Winrs - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `winrs.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the WinRM protocol and this binary for lateral movement and remote code execution. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.006"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage WinRM and WinRs to start a process on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search monitors for remote modifications to registry keys. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must populate the `Endpoint` data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. Deprecated because I don't think the logic is right. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = This technique may be legitimately used by administrators to modify remote registries, so it's important to filter these events out. -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator being used to query Active Directory for domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `[Adsisearcher]` to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. @@ -7682,7 +5560,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Dsquery - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `dsquery.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The `computer` argument returns a list of all computers registered in the domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike engage in remote system discovery for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. @@ -7692,7 +5570,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Net - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The argument `domain computers /domain` returns a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. @@ -7702,7 +5580,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Wmic - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The arguments utilized in this command return a list of all the systems registered in the domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI and wmic.exe to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. @@ -7722,7 +5600,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Resize ShadowStorage volume - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytics identifies the resizing of shadowstorage by ransomware malware to avoid the shadow volumes being made again. this technique is an alternative by ransomware attacker than deleting the shadowstorage which is known alert in defensive team. one example of ransomware that use this technique is CLOP ransomware where it drops a .bat file that will resize the shadowstorage to minimum size as much as possible how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. @@ -7732,7 +5610,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic identifies suspicious commandline parameter that are commonly used by REVIL ransomware to encrypts the compromise machine. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. @@ -7742,7 +5620,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Revil Registry Entry - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic identifies suspicious modification in registry entry to keep some malware data during its infection. This technique seen in several apt implant, malware and ransomware like REVIL where it keep some information like the random generated file extension it uses for all the encrypted files and ransomware notes file name in the compromised host. how_to_implement = to successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Image, TargetObject registry key, registry Details from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. @@ -7752,24 +5630,114 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Rubeus Command Line Parameters - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = Rubeus is a C# toolset for raw Kerberos interaction and abuses. It is heavily adapted from Benjamin Delpys Kekeo project and Vincent LE TOUXs MakeMeEnterpriseAdmin project. This analytic looks for the use of Rubeus command line arguments utilized in common Kerberos attacks like exporting and importing tickets, forging silver and golden tickets, requesting a TGT or TGS, kerberoasting, password spraying, etc. Red teams and adversaries alike use Rubeus for Kerberos attacks within Active Directory networks. Defenders should be aware that adversaries may customize the source code of Rubeus and modify the command line parameters. This would effectively bypass this analytic. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1550", "T1550.003", "T1558", "T1558.003", "T1558.004"]} +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1550", "T1550.003", "T1558", "T1558.003", "T1558.004"]} known_false_positives = Although unlikely, legitimate applications may use the same command line parameters as Rubeus. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic looks for a process accessing the winlogon.exe system process. The Splunk Threat Research team identified this behavior when using the Rubeus tool to monitor for and export kerberos tickets from memory. Before being able to export tickets. Rubeus will try to escalate privileges to SYSTEM by obtaining a handle to winlogon.exe before trying to monitor for kerberos tickets. Exporting tickets from memory is typically the first step for pass the ticket attacks. Red teams and adversaries alike may use the pass the ticket technique using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Defenders should be aware that adversaries may customize the source code of Rubeus to potentially bypass this analytic. how_to_implement = This search needs Sysmon Logs and a sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 10. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1550", "T1550.003"]} +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1550", "T1550.003"]} known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may obtain a handle for winlogon.exe. Filter as needed providing_technologies = [] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Runas Execution in CommandLine - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic look for a spawned runas.exe process with a administrator user option parameter. This parameter was abused by adversaries, malware author or even red teams to gain elevated privileges in target host. This is a good hunting query to figure out privilege escalation tactics that may used for different stages like lateral movement but take note that administrator may use this command in purpose so its better to see other event context before and after this analytic. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1134", "T1134.001"]} +known_false_positives = A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated or manual execute this command that may generate false positives. filter is needed. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following hunting detection identifies rundll32.exe with `control_rundll` within the command-line, loading a .cpl or another file type. Developed in relation to CVE-2021-40444. Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. \ This is written to be a bit more broad by not including .cpl. \ During triage, review parallel processes to identify any further suspicious behavior. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"]} +known_false_positives = This is a hunting detection, meant to provide a understanding of how voluminous control_rundll is within the environment. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following detection identifies rundll32.exe with `control_rundll` within the command-line, loading a .cpl or another file type from windows\temp, programdata, or appdata. Developed in relation to CVE-2021-40444. Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. This is written to be a bit more broad by not including .cpl. The paths are specified, add more as needed. During triage, review parallel processes to identify any further suspicious behavior. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"]} +known_false_positives = This may be tuned, or a new one related, by adding .cpl to command-line. However, it's important to look for both. Tune/filter as needed. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic identifies the suspicious Remote Thread execution of rundll32.exe process to cmd.exe process. This technique was seen in IcedID malware to execute its malicious code in normal process for defense evasion and to steal sensitive information the the compromised host. browser process. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the SourceImage, TargetImage, and EventCode executions from your endpoints related to create remote thread or injecting codes. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} +known_false_positives = unknown +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic identifies the suspicious Remote Thread execution of rundll32.exe process to "firefox.exe" and "chrome.exe" browser. This technique was seen in IcedID malware where it hooks the browser to parse banking information as user used the targetted browser process. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the SourceImage, TargetImage, and EventCode executions from your endpoints related to create remote thread or injecting codes. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} +known_false_positives = unknown +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Rundll32 DNSQuery - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe process having a http connection and do a dns query in some web domain. This technique was seen in IcedID malware where the rundll32 that execute its payload will contact amazon.com to check internet connect and to communicate to its C&C server to download config and other file component. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and eventcode = 22 dnsquery executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"]} +known_false_positives = unknown +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32 process that drops executable (.exe or .dll) files. this behavior seen in rundll32 process of IcedID that tries to drop copy of itself in temp folder or download executable drop it either appdata or programdata as part of its execution. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, TargetFilename, and eventcode 11 executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"]} +known_false_positives = unknown +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Rundll32 Shimcache Flush - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic is to detect a suspicious rundll32 commandline to clear shim cache. This technique is a anti-forensic technique to clear the cache taht are one important artifacts in terms of digital forensic during attacks or incident. This TTP is a good indicator that someone tries to evade some tools and clear foothold on the machine. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"]} +known_false_positives = unknown +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments and performing a network connection. It is unusual for rundll32.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `port` node. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"]} +known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive. +providing_technologies = [] + [savedsearch://ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule] type = detection asset_type = Endpoint @@ -7780,96 +5748,6 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre known_false_positives = False positives are possible with native utilities and third party applications. Filtering may be needed based on command-line, or add world writeable paths to restrict query. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Runas Execution in CommandLine - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic look for a spawned runas.exe process with a administrator user option parameter. This parameter was abused by adversaries, malware author or even red teams to gain elevated privileges in target host. This is a good hunting query to figure out privilege escalation tactics that may used for different stages like lateral movement but take note that administrator may use this command in purpose so its better to see other event context before and after this analytic. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1134", "T1134.001"]} -known_false_positives = A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated or manual execute this command that may generate false positives. filter is needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following hunting detection identifies rundll32.exe with `control_rundll` within the command-line, loading a .cpl or another file type. Developed in relation to CVE-2021-40444. Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. \ This is written to be a bit more broad by not including .cpl. \ During triage, review parallel processes to identify any further suspicious behavior. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"]} -known_false_positives = This is a hunting detection, meant to provide a understanding of how voluminous control_rundll is within the environment. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following detection identifies rundll32.exe with `control_rundll` within the command-line, loading a .cpl or another file type from windows\temp, programdata, or appdata. Developed in relation to CVE-2021-40444. Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. This is written to be a bit more broad by not including .cpl. The paths are specified, add more as needed. During triage, review parallel processes to identify any further suspicious behavior. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"]} -known_false_positives = This may be tuned, or a new one related, by adding .cpl to command-line. However, it's important to look for both. Tune/filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic identifies the suspicious Remote Thread execution of rundll32.exe process to cmd.exe process. This technique was seen in IcedID malware to execute its malicious code in normal process for defense evasion and to steal sensitive information the the compromised host. browser process. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the SourceImage, TargetImage, and EventCode executions from your endpoints related to create remote thread or injecting codes. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic identifies the suspicious Remote Thread execution of rundll32.exe process to "firefox.exe" and "chrome.exe" browser. This technique was seen in IcedID malware where it hooks the browser to parse banking information as user used the targetted browser process. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the SourceImage, TargetImage, and EventCode executions from your endpoints related to create remote thread or injecting codes. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Rundll32 DNSQuery - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe process having a http connection and do a dns query in some web domain. This technique was seen in IcedID malware where the rundll32 that execute its payload will contact amazon.com to check internet connect and to communicate to its C&C server to download config and other file component. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and eventcode = 22 dnsquery executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32 process that drops executable (.exe or .dll) files. this behavior seen in rundll32 process of IcedID that tries to drop copy of itself in temp folder or download executable drop it either appdata or programdata as part of its execution. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, TargetFilename, and eventcode 11 executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Rundll32 Shimcache Flush - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic is to detect a suspicious rundll32 commandline to clear shim cache. This technique is a anti-forensic technique to clear the cache taht are one important artifacts in terms of digital forensic during attacks or incident. This TTP is a good indicator that someone tries to evade some tools and clear foothold on the machine. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments and performing a network connection. It is unusual for rundll32.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `port` node. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"]} -known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive. -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule] type = detection asset_type = Endpoint @@ -7882,17 +5760,17 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Ryuk Wake on LAN Command - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This Splunk query identifies the use of Wake-on-LAN utilized by Ryuk ransomware. The Ryuk Ransomware uses the Wake-on-Lan feature to turn on powered off devices on a compromised network to have greater success encrypting them. This is a high fidelity indicator of Ryuk ransomware executing on an endpoint. Upon triage, isolate the endpoint. Additional file modification events will be within the users profile (\appdata\roaming) and in public directories (users\public\). Review all Scheduled Tasks on the isolated endpoint and across the fleet. Suspicious Scheduled Tasks will include a path to a unknown binary and those endpoints should be isolated until triaged. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.003"]} +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.003"]} known_false_positives = Limited to no known false positives. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - SAM Database File Access Attempt - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies access to SAM, SYSTEM or SECURITY databases' within the file path of `windows\system32\config` using Windows Security EventCode 4663. This particular behavior is related to credential access, an attempt to either use a Shadow Copy or recent CVE-2021-36934 to access the SAM database. The Security Account Manager (SAM) is a database file in Windows XP, Windows Vista, Windows 7, 8.1 and 10 that stores users' passwords. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663. For 4663, enable "Audit Object Access" in Group Policy. Then check the two boxes listed for both "Success" and "Failure." @@ -7900,59 +5778,6 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.00 known_false_positives = Natively, `dllhost.exe` will access the files. Every environment will have additional native processes that do as well. Filter by process_name. As an aside, one can remove process_name entirely and add `Object_Name=*ShadowCopy*`. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - SLUI RunAs Elevated - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies the Microsoft Software Licensing User Interface Tool, `slui.exe`, elevating access using the `-verb runas` function. This particular bypass utilizes a registry key/value. Identified by two sources, the registry keys are `HKCU\Software\Classes\exefile\shell` and `HKCU\Software\Classes\launcher.Systemsettings\Shell\open\command`. To simulate this behavior, multiple POC are available. The analytic identifies the use of `runas` by `slui.exe`. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"]} -known_false_positives = Limited false positives should be present as this is not commonly used by legitimate applications. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - SLUI Spawning a Process - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies the Microsoft Software Licensing User Interface Tool, `slui.exe`, spawning a child process. This behavior is associated with publicly known UAC bypass. `slui.exe` is commonly associated with software updates and is most often spawned by `svchost.exe`. The `slui.exe` process should not have child processes, and any processes spawning from it will be running with elevated privileges. During triage, review the child process and additional parallel processes. Identify any file modifications that may have lead to the bypass. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"]} -known_false_positives = Certain applications may spawn from `slui.exe` that are legitimate. Filtering will be needed to ensure proper monitoring. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for spikes in the number of Server Message Block (SMB) traffic connections. -how_to_implement = This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic logs and populating the `Network_Traffic` data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = A file server may experience high-demand loads that could cause this analytic to trigger. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search uses the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) to identify spikes in the number of Server Message Block (SMB) connections. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. In addition, the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or greater must be installed on your search heads, along with any required dependencies. Finally, the support search "Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK" must be executed before this detection search, because it builds a machine-learning (ML) model over the historical data used by this search. It is important that this search is run in the same app context as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild the model with the latest data available in your environment.\ -This search produces a field (Number of events,count) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. This field contributes additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following field, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry): \ -1. **Label:** Number of events, **Field:** count\ -Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review is found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider reducing the value of the threshold in the search. You should also periodically re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data. Please update the `smb_traffic_spike_mltk_filter` macro to filter out false positive results -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - SQL Injection with Long URLs - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Database Server -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for long URLs that have several SQL commands visible within them. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be monitoring network communications to your web servers or ingesting your HTTP logs and populating the Web data model. You must also identify your web servers in the Enterprise Security assets table. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 13", "CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "ID.RA", "PR.PT", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = It's possible that legitimate traffic will have long URLs or long user agent strings and that common SQL commands may be found within the URL. Please investigate as appropriate. -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule] type = detection asset_type = Endpoint @@ -7975,7 +5800,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - SchCache Change By App Connect And Create ADSI Object - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic is to detect an application try to connect and create ADSI Object to do LDAP query. Every time an application connects to the directory and attempts to create an ADSI object, the Active Directory Schema is checked for changes. If it has changed since the last connection, the schema is downloaded and stored in a cache on the local computer either in %LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\SchCache or %systemroot%\SchCache. We found this a good anomaly use case to detect suspicious application like blackmatter ransomware that use ADS object api to execute ldap query. having a good list of ldap or normal AD query tool used within the network is a good start to reduce the noise. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. @@ -7985,7 +5810,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with an arguments "HTTP" string that are unique entry of malware or attack that uses lolbin to download other file or payload to the infected machine. The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.' how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the task schedule (Exa. Security Log EventCode 4698) endpoints. Tune and filter known instances of Task schedule used in your environment. @@ -7995,7 +5820,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed with a Rundll32. This technique is common in new trickbot that uses rundll32 to load is trickbot downloader. The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.' how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the task schedule (Exa. Security Log EventCode 4698) endpoints. Tune and filter known instances of Task schedule used in your environment. @@ -8005,11 +5830,11 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `at.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to create a Scheduled Task on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution. The `at.exe` binary internally leverages the AT protocol which was deprecated starting with Windows 8 and Windows Server 2012 but may still work on previous versions of Windows. Furthermore, attackers may enable this protocol on demand by changing a sytem registry key. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053", "T1053.002"]} +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053", "T1053.002"]} known_false_positives = Administrators may create scheduled tasks on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. providing_technologies = [] @@ -8025,27 +5850,17 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `schtasks.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to start a Scheduled Task on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053", "T1053.005"]} +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053", "T1053.005"]} known_false_positives = Administrators may start scheduled tasks on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line that indicate that task names related to the execution of Bad Rabbit ransomware were created or deleted. Deprecated because we already have a similar detection -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = No known false positives -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Schtasks Run Task On Demand - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic identifies an on demand run of a Windows Schedule Task through shell or command-line. This technique has been used by adversaries that force to run their created Schedule Task as their persistence mechanism or for lateral movement as part of their malicious attack to the compromised machine. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed schtasks.exe may be used. @@ -8075,7 +5890,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Screensaver Event Trigger Execution - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic is developed to detect possible event trigger execution through screensaver registry entry modification for persistence or privilege escalation. This technique was seen in several APT and malware where they put the malicious payload path to the SCRNSAVE.EXE registry key to redirect the execution to their malicious payload path. This TTP is a good indicator that some attacker may modify this entry for their persistence and privilege escalation. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. @@ -8095,7 +5910,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Sdclt UAC Bypass - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious sdclt.exe registry modification. This technique is commonly seen when attacker try to bypassed UAC by using sdclt.exe application by modifying some registry that sdclt.exe tries to open or query with payload file path on it to be executed. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. @@ -8105,7 +5920,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Sdelete Application Execution - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic is to detect the execution of sdelete.exe application sysinternal tools. This tool is one of the most use tool of malware and adversaries to remove or clear their tracks and artifact in the targetted host. This tool is designed to delete securely a file in file system that remove the forensic evidence on the machine. A good TTP query to check why user execute this application which is not a common practice. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. @@ -8115,7 +5930,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies searchprotocolhost.exe with no command line arguments and with a network connection. It is unusual for searchprotocolhost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. searchprotocolhost.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `ports` node. @@ -8125,7 +5940,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic detects a potential usage of secretsdump.py tool for dumping credentials (ntlm hash) from a copy of ntds.dit and SAM.Security,SYSTEM registrry hive. This technique was seen in some attacker that dump ntlm hashes offline after having a copy of ntds.dit and SAM/SYSTEM/SECURITY registry hive. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. @@ -8135,7 +5950,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies `powershell.exe` usage, using Script Block Logging EventCode 4104, related to querying the domain for Service Principle Names. typically, this is a precursor activity related to kerberoasting or the silver ticket attack. \ What is a ServicePrincipleName? \ @@ -8143,13 +5958,13 @@ A service principal name (SPN) is a unique identifier of a service instance. SPN The following analytic identifies the use of KerberosRequestorSecurityToken class within the script block. Using .NET System.IdentityModel.Tokens.KerberosRequestorSecurityToken class in PowerShell is the equivelant of using setspn.exe. \ During triage, review parallel processes for further suspicious activity. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558.003"]} +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558.003"]} known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, however filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies `setspn.exe` usage related to querying the domain for Service Principle Names. typically, this is a precursor activity related to kerberoasting or the silver ticket attack. \ What is a ServicePrincipleName? \ @@ -8160,27 +5975,27 @@ Values \ 1. -F = perform queries at the forest, rather than domain level 1. -T = perform query on the specified domain or forest (when -F is also used) 1. -Q = query for existence of SPN \ During triage, review parallel processes for further suspicious activity. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation", "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558.003"]} +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558.003"]} known_false_positives = False positives may be caused by Administrators resetting SPNs or querying for SPNs. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Services Escalate Exe - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of `svc-exe` with Cobalt Strike. The behavior typically follows after an adversary has already gained initial access and is escalating privileges. Using `svc-exe`, a randomly named binary will be downloaded from the remote Teamserver and placed on disk within `C:\Windows\400619a.exe`. Following, the binary will be added to the registry under key `HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\400619a\` with multiple keys and values added to look like a legitimate service. Upon loading, `services.exe` will spawn the randomly named binary from `\\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\400619a.exe`. The process lineage is completed with `400619a.exe` spawning rundll32.exe, which is the default `spawnto_` value for Cobalt Strike. The `spawnto_` value is arbitrary and may be any process on disk (typically system32/syswow64 binary). The `spawnto_` process will also contain a network connection. During triage, review parallel procesess and identify any additional file modifications. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548"]} +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548"]} known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as `services.exe` should never spawn a process from `ADMIN$`. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies `services.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the Service Control Manager and creating a remote malicious service, the executed command is spawned as a child process of `services.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of services.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543", "T1543.003"]} +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543", "T1543.003"]} known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -8216,11 +6031,11 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Short Lived Scheduled Task - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic leverages Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created` and Windows Security EventCode 4699, `A scheduled task was deleted` to identify scheduled tasks created and deleted in less than 30 seconds. This behavior may represent a lateral movement attack abusing the Task Scheduler to obtain code execution. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005"]} +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005"]} known_false_positives = Although uncommon, legitimate applications may create and delete a Scheduled Task within 30 seconds. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -8230,13 +6045,13 @@ asset_type = Windows confidence = medium explanation = This search detects accounts that were created and deleted in a short time period. how_to_implement = This search requires you to have enabled your Group Management Audit Logs in your Local Windows Security Policy and be ingesting those logs. More information on how to enable them can be found here: http://whatevernetworks.com/auditing-group-membership-changes-in-active-directory/ -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.001", "T1136"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.001", "T1136"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} known_false_positives = It is possible that an administrator created and deleted an account in a short time period. Verifying activity with an administrator is advised. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - SilentCleanup UAC Bypass - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry that may related to UAC bypassed. This registry will be trigger once the attacker abuse the silentcleanup task schedule to gain high privilege execution that will bypass User control account. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. @@ -8254,39 +6069,29 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 2"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives" known_false_positives = Single-letter executables are not always malicious. Investigate this activity with your normal incident-response process. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems - Rule] +[savedsearch://ESCU - SLUI RunAs Elevated - Rule] type = detection asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search is used to detect systems that are still vulnerable to the Spectre and Meltdown vulnerabilities. -how_to_implement = The search requires that you are ingesting your vulnerability-scanner data and that it reports the CVE of the vulnerability identified. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 4"], "nist": ["ID.RA", "RS.MI", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = It is possible that your vulnerability scanner is not detecting that the patches have been applied. +explanation = The following analytic identifies the Microsoft Software Licensing User Interface Tool, `slui.exe`, elevating access using the `-verb runas` function. This particular bypass utilizes a registry key/value. Identified by two sources, the registry keys are `HKCU\Software\Classes\exefile\shell` and `HKCU\Software\Classes\launcher.Systemsettings\Shell\open\command`. To simulate this behavior, multiple POC are available. The analytic identifies the use of `runas` by `slui.exe`. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"]} +known_false_positives = Limited false positives should be present as this is not commonly used by legitimate applications. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule] +[savedsearch://ESCU - SLUI Spawning a Process - Rule] type = detection asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium -explanation = The search looks for a sharp increase in the number of files written to a particular host -how_to_implement = In order to implement this search, you must populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection and response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the file system. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = It is important to understand that if you happen to install any new applications on your hosts or are copying a large number of files, you can expect to see a large increase of file modifications. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Splunk Server -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search allows you to look for evidence of exploitation for CVE-2018-11409, a Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure Bug. -how_to_implement = The REST endpoint that exposes system information is also necessary for the proper operation of Splunk clustering and instrumentation. Whitelisting your Splunk systems will reduce false positives. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["ID.RA", "RS.MI", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Retrieving server information may be a legitimate API request. Verify that the attempt is a valid request for information. +explanation = The following analytic identifies the Microsoft Software Licensing User Interface Tool, `slui.exe`, spawning a child process. This behavior is associated with publicly known UAC bypass. `slui.exe` is commonly associated with software updates and is most often spawned by `svchost.exe`. The `slui.exe` process should not have child processes, and any processes spawning from it will be running with elevated privileges. During triage, review the child process and additional parallel processes. Identify any file modifications that may have lead to the bypass. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"]} +known_false_positives = Certain applications may spawn from `slui.exe` that are legitimate. Filtering will be needed to ensure proper monitoring. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Spoolsv Spawning Rundll32 - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies a suspicious child process, `rundll32.exe`, with no command-line arguments being spawned from `spoolsv.exe`. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. Typically, this is not normal behavior for `spoolsv.exe` to spawn a process. During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. @@ -8296,7 +6101,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect suspicious loading of dll in specific path relative to printnightmare exploitation. In this search we try to detect the loaded modules made by spoolsv.exe after the exploitation. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. @@ -8306,7 +6111,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Spoolsv Suspicious Process Access - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic identifies a suspicious behavior related to PrintNightmare, or CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675), to gain privilege escalation on the vulnerable machine. This exploit attacks a critical Windows Print Spooler Vulnerability to elevate privilege. This detection is to look for suspicious process access made by the spoolsv.exe that may related to the attack. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with process access event where SourceImage, TargetImage, GrantedAccess and CallTrace executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of spoolsv.exe. @@ -8316,7 +6121,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies a `.dll` being written by `spoolsv.exe`. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. Typically, this is not normal behavior for `spoolsv.exe` to write a `.dll`. Current POC code used will write the suspicious DLL to disk within a path of `\spool\drivers\x64\`. During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node and `Filesystem` node. @@ -8326,7 +6131,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Sysmon - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies a `.dll` being written by `spoolsv.exe`. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously(CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. Typically, this is not normal behavior for `spoolsv.exe` to write a `.dll`. Current POC code used will write the suspicious DLL to disk within a path of `\spool\drivers\x64\`. During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. @@ -8336,7 +6141,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Sqlite Module In Temp Folder - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious file creation of sqlite3.dll in %temp% folder. This behavior was seen in IcedID malware where it download sqlite module to parse browser database like for chrome or firefox to stole browser information related to bank, credit card or credentials. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. @@ -8346,7 +6151,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Start Up During Safe Mode Boot - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a modification or registry add to the safeboot registry as an autostart mechanism. This technique was seen in some ransomware to automatically execute its code upon a safe mode boot. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. @@ -8354,49 +6159,19 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.00 known_false_positives = updated windows application needed in safe boot may used this registry providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Windows -confidence = medium -explanation = The malware sunburst will load the malicious dll by SolarWinds.BusinessLayerHost.exe. After a period of 12-14 days, the malware will attempt to resolve a subdomain of avsvmcloud.com. This detections will correlate both events. -how_to_implement = This detection relies on sysmon logs with the Event ID 7, Driver loaded. Please tune your sysmon config that you DriverLoad event for SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll is captured by Sysmon. Additionally, you need sysmon logs for Event ID 22, DNS Query. We suggest to run this detection at least once a day over the last 14 days. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1203"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search aims to detect the Supernova webshell used in the SUNBURST attack. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be monitoring web traffic to your Solarwinds Orion. The logs should be ingested into splunk and populating/mapped to the Web data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 13", "CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "ID.RA", "PR.PT", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = There might be false positives associted with this detection since items like args as a web argument is pretty generic. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Computer Account Name Change - Rule] type = detection asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for changes to registry values that control Windows file associations, executed by a process that is not typical for legitimate, routine changes to this area. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on registry changes that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Registry` nodes. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT", "PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = There may be other processes in your environment that users may legitimately use to modify file associations. If this is the case and you are finding false positives, you can modify the search to add those processes as exceptions. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Computer Account Name Change - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium explanation = As part of the sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287) exploitation chain, adversaries need to create a new computer account name and rename it to match the name of a domain controller account without the ending '$'. In Windows Active Directory environments, computer account names always end with `$`. This analytic leverages Event Id 4781, `The name of an account was changed`, to identify a computer account rename event with a suspicious name that does not terminate with `$`. This behavior could represent an exploitation attempt of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287 for privilege escalation. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows event logs from your hosts. In addition, the Splunk Windows TA is needed. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.002"]} +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.002"]} known_false_positives = Renaming a computer account name to a name that not end with '$' is highly unsual and may not have any legitimate scenarios. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Copy on System32 - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic is to detect a suspicious copy of file from systemroot folder of the windows OS. This technique is commonly used by APT or other malware as part of execution (LOLBIN) to run its malicious code using the available legitimate tool in OS. this type of event may seen or may execute of normal user in some instance but this is really a anomaly that needs to be check within the network. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. @@ -8404,19 +6179,9 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.00 known_false_positives = every user may do this event but very un-ussual. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of a curl contacting suspicious remote domains to checkin to command and control servers or download further implants. In the context of Silver Sparrow, curl is identified contacting s3.amazonaws.com. This particular behavior is common with MacOS adware-malicious software. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"]} -known_false_positives = Unknown. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies DLLHost.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for DLLHost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. DLLHost.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. @@ -8426,7 +6191,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Driver Loaded Path - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic will detect suspicious driver loaded paths. This technique is commonly used by malicious software like coin miners (xmrig) to register its malicious driver from notable directories where executable or drivers do not commonly exist. During triage, validate this driver is for legitimate business use. Review the metadata and certificate information. Unsigned drivers from non-standard paths is not normal, but occurs. In addition, review driver loads into `ntoskrnl.exe` for possible other drivers of interest. Long tail analyze drivers by path (outside of default, and in default) for further review. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the driver loaded and Signature from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. @@ -8434,28 +6199,6 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.00 known_false_positives = Limited false positives will be present. Some applications do load drivers providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This detection looks for emails that are suspicious because of their sender, domain rareness, or behavior differences. This is an anomaly generated by Splunk User Behavior Analytics (UBA). -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data from email logs and have Splunk integrated with UBA. This anomaly is raised by a UBA detection model called "SuspiciousEmailDetectionModel." Ensure that this model is enabled on your UBA instance. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = This detection model will alert on any sender domain that is seen for the first time. This could be a potential false positive. The next step is to investigate and add the URL to an allow list if you determine that it is a legitimate sender. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for emails that have attachments with suspicious file extensions. -how_to_implement = You need to ingest data from emails. Specifically, the sender's address and the file names of any attachments must be mapped to the Email data model. \ - **Splunk Phantom Playbook Integration**\ -If Splunk Phantom is also configured in your environment, a Playbook called "Suspicious Email Attachment Investigate and Delete" can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/`, and add the correct hostname to the "Phantom Instance" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search. The notable event will be sent to Phantom and the playbook will gather further information about the file attachment and its network behaviors. If Phantom finds malicious behavior and an analyst approves of the results, the email will be deleted from the user's inbox. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001", "T1566"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = None identified -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule] type = detection asset_type = Endpoint @@ -8466,19 +6209,9 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Acti known_false_positives = It is possible the Event Logging service gets shut down due to system errors or legitimately administration tasks. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search looks for files created with names that have been linked to malicious activity. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file system reads and writes. In addition, this search leverages an included lookup file that contains the names of the files to watch for, as well as a note to communicate why that file name is being monitored. This lookup file can be edited to add or remove file the file names you want to monitor. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = It's possible for a legitimate file to be created with the same name as one noted in the lookup file. Filenames listed in the lookup file should be unique enough that collisions are rare. Looking at the location of the file and the process responsible for the activity can help determine whether or not the activity is legitimate. -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies gpupdate.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for gpupdate.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. gpupdate.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. @@ -8488,7 +6221,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe commandline to execute dll file. This technique was seen in IcedID malware to load its payload dll with the following parameter to load encrypted dll payload which is the license.dat. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. @@ -8498,7 +6231,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Image Creation In Appdata Folder - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious creation of image in appdata folder made by process that also has a file reference in appdata folder. This technique was seen in remcos rat that capture screenshot of the compromised machine and place it in the appdata and will be send to its C2 server. This TTP is really a good indicator to check that process because it is in suspicious folder path and image files are not commonly created by user in this folder path. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. @@ -8506,29 +6239,19 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1113"]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule] type = detection asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for suspicious Java classes that are often used to exploit remote command execution in common Java frameworks, such as Apache Struts. -how_to_implement = In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from your web-traffic appliances that serve or sit in the path of your Struts application servers. This can be accomplished by indexing data from a web proxy, or by using network traffic-analysis tools, such as Splunk Stream or Bro. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = There are no known false positives. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium explanation = As part of the sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287) exploitation chain, adversaries will request and obtain a Kerberos Service Ticket (TGS) with a domain controller computer account as the Service Name. This Service Ticket can be then used to take control of the domain controller on the final part of the attack. This analytic leverages Event Id 4769, `A Kerberos service ticket was requested`, to identify an unusual TGS request where the Account_Name requesting the ticket matches the Service_Name field. This behavior could represent an exploitation attempt of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287 for privilege escalation. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.002"]} +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.002"]} known_false_positives = We have tested this detection logic with ~2 million 4769 events and did not identify false positives. However, they may be possible in certain environments. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Linux Discovery Commands - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search, detects execution of suspicious bash commands from various commonly leveraged bash scripts like (AutoSUID, LinEnum, LinPeas) to perform discovery of possible paths of privilege execution, password files, vulnerable directories, executables and file permissions on a Linux host.\ The search logic specifically looks for high number of distinct commands run in a short period of time. @@ -8537,6 +6260,36 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.00 known_false_positives = Unless an administrator is using these commands to troubleshoot or audit a system, the execution of these commands should be monitored. providing_technologies = [] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic identifies a renamed instance of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe. Microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319 and is rarely utilized. When investigating, identify the executed code on disk and review. A spawned child process from microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is uncommon. In any instance, microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe spawning from an Office product or any living off the land binary is highly suspect. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1127", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe, triggering a false positive. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic identifies microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe usage. microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319 and is rarely utilized. When investigating, identify the executed code on disk and review. It is not a commonly used process by many applications. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1127"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = Although unlikely, limited instances have been identified coming from native Microsoft utilities similar to SCCM. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic identifies msbuild.exe executing from a non-standard path. Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319 and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319. Instances of Visual Studio will run a copy of msbuild.exe. A moved instance of MSBuild is suspicious, however there are instances of build applications that will move or use a copy of MSBuild. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1127", "T1036.003", "T1127.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = Some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of msbuild.exe, triggering a false positive. Baselining of MSBuild.exe usage is recommended to better understand it's path usage. Visual Studio runs an instance out of a path that will need to be filtered on. +providing_technologies = [] + [savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule] type = detection asset_type = Endpoint @@ -8557,6 +6310,1664 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive. providing_technologies = [] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic identifies child processes spawning from "mshta.exe". The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, parent process "mshta.exe" and its child process. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning mshta.exe. This behavior is indicative of a DCOM object being utilized to spawn mshta from wmiprvse.exe or svchost.exe. In this instance, adversaries may use LethalHTA that will spawn mshta.exe from svchost.exe. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic detects a suspicious process making a DNS query via known, abused text-paste web services, VoIP, instant messaging, and digital distribution platforms used to download external files. This technique is abused by adversaries, malware actors, and red teams to download a malicious file on the target host. This is a good TTP indicator for possible initial access techniques. A user will experience false positives if the following instant messaging is allowed or common applications like telegram or discord are allowed in the corporate network. +how_to_implement = This detection relies on sysmon logs with the Event ID 22, DNS Query. We suggest you run this detection at least once a day over the last 14 days. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.005", "T1059"]} +known_false_positives = Noise and false positive can be seen if the following instant messaging is allowed to use within corporate network. In this case, a filter is needed. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic will detect a suspicious process running in a file path where a process is not commonly seen and is most commonly used by malicious software. This behavior has been used by adversaries where they drop and run an exe in a path that is accessible without admin privileges. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543"]} +known_false_positives = Administrators may allow execution of specific binaries in non-standard paths. Filter as needed. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic identifies a process making a DNS query to Discord, a well known instant messaging and digital distribution platform. Discord can be abused by adversaries, as seen in the WhisperGate campaign, to host and download malicious. external files. A process resolving a Discord DNS name could be an indicator of malware trying to download files from Discord for further execution. +how_to_implement = his detection relies on sysmon logs with the Event ID 22, DNS Query. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.005", "T1059"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = Noise and false positive can be seen if the following instant messaging is allowed to use within corporate network. In this case, a filter is needed. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for reg.exe being launched from a command prompt not started by the user. When a user launches cmd.exe, the parent process is usually explorer.exe. This search filters out those instances. +how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = It's possible for system administrators to write scripts that exhibit this behavior. If this is the case, the search will need to be modified to filter them out. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code by using non-standard file extensions to load malciious DLLs. Upon investigating, look for network connections to remote destinations (internal or external). Review additional parrallel processes and child processes for additional activity. +how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. Tune the query by filtering additional extensions found to be used by legitimate processes. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.010"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = Limited false positives with the query restricted to specified paths. Add more world writeable paths as tuning continues. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe using dllregisterserver on the command line to load a DLL. When a DLL is registered, the DllRegisterServer method entry point in the DLL is invoked. This is typically seen when a DLL is being registered on the system. Not every instance is considered malicious, but it will capture malicious use of it. During investigation, review the parent process and parrellel processes executing. Capture the DLL being loaded and inspect further. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = This is likely to produce false positives and will require some filtering. Tune the query by adding command line paths to known good DLLs, or filtering based on parent process names. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 PluginInit - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe process with plugininit parameter. This technique is commonly seen in IceID malware to execute its initial dll stager to download another payload to the compromised machine. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"]} +known_false_positives = third party application may used this dll export name to execute function. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe executing a DLL function name, Start and StartW, on the command line that is commonly observed with Cobalt Strike x86 and x64 DLL payloads. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. Typically, the DLL will be written and loaded from a world writeable path or user location. In most instances it will not have a valid certificate (Unsigned). During investigation, review the parent process and other parallel application execution. Capture and triage the DLL in question. In the instance of Cobalt Strike, rundll32.exe is the default process it opens and injects shellcode into. This default process can be changed, but typically is not. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use Start as a function and call it via the command line. Filter as needed. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for rundll32.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following detection identifies Scheduled Tasks registering (creating a new task) a binary or script to run from a public directory which includes users\public, \programdata\ and \windows\temp. Upon triage, review the binary or script in the command line for legitimacy, whether an approved binary/script or not. In addition, capture the binary or script in question and analyze for further behaviors. Identify the source and contain the endpoint. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1053"]} +known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present. Filter as needed by parent process or command line argument. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic identifies searchprotocolhost.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for searchprotocolhost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. searchprotocolhost.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} +known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = As part of the sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287) exploitation chain, adversaries will need to request a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) on behalf of the newly created and renamed computer account. The TGT request will be preceded by a computer account name event. This analytic leverages Event Id 4781, `The name of an account was changed` and event Id 4768 `A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested` to correlate a sequence of events where the new computer account on event id 4781 matches the request account on event id 4768. This behavior could represent an exploitation attempt of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287 for privilege escalation. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.002"]} +known_false_positives = A computer account name change event inmediately followed by a kerberos TGT request with matching fields is unsual. However, legitimate behavior may trigger it. Filter as needed. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious WAV file in Appdata Folder - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic is to detect a suspicious creation of .wav file in appdata folder. This behavior was seen in Remcos RAT malware where it put the audio recording in the appdata\audio folde as part of data collection. this recording can be send to its C2 server as part of its exfiltration to the compromised machine. creation of wav files in this folder path is not a ussual disk place used by user to save audio format file. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, file_name, file_path and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1113"]} +known_false_positives = unknown +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The wevtutil.exe application is the windows event log utility. This searches for wevtutil.exe with parameters for clearing the application, security, setup, trace or system event logs. +how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070.001", "T1070"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.AE"]} +known_false_positives = The wevtutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows event log utility. Administrators may use it to manage Windows event logs. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Windows +confidence = medium +explanation = This search detects writes to the recycle bin by a process other than explorer.exe. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on filesystem and process logs responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem` nodes. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = Because the Recycle Bin is a hidden folder in modern versions of Windows, it would be unusual for a process other than explorer.exe to write to it. Incidents should be investigated as appropriate. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic identifies `svchost.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the Task Scheduler and creating a malicious remote scheduled task, the executed command is spawned as a child process of `svchost.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of svchost.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053", "T1053.005"]} +known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - System Info Gathering Using Dxdiag Application - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic is to detect a suspicious dxdiag.exe process command-line execution. Dxdiag is used to collect the system info of the target host. This technique has been used by Remcos RATS, various actors, and other malware to collect information as part of the recon or collection phase of an attack. This behavior should rarely be seen in a corporate network, but this command line can be used by a network administrator to audit host machine specifications. Thus in some rare cases, this detection will contain false positives in its results. To triage further, analyze what commands were passed after it pipes out the result to a file for further processing. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1592"]} +known_false_positives = This commandline can be used by a network administrator to audit host machine specifications. Thus, a filter is needed. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - System Information Discovery Detection - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Windows +confidence = medium +explanation = Detect system information discovery techniques used by attackers to understand configurations of the system to further exploit it. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1082"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = Administrators debugging servers +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for system processes that typically execute from `C:\Windows\System32\` or `C:\Windows\SysWOW64`. This may indicate a malicious process that is trying to hide as a legitimate process.\ +This detection utilizes a lookup that is deduped `system32` and `syswow64` directories from Server 2016 and Windows 10.\ +During triage, review the parallel processes - what process moved the native Windows binary? identify any artifacts on disk and review. If a remote destination is contacted, what is the reputation? +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = This detection may require tuning based on third party applications utilizing native Windows binaries in non-standard paths. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - System User Discovery With Query - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `query.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover the logged user. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage `query.exe` to identify system users on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"]} +known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - System User Discovery With Whoami - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `whoami.exe` without any arguments. This windows native binary prints out the current logged user. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage `whoami.exe` to identify system users on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"]} +known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Time Provider Persistence Registry - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of time provider registry for persistence and autostart. This technique can allow the attacker to persist on the compromised host and autostart as soon as the machine boot up. This TTP can be a good indicator of suspicious behavior since this registry is not commonly modified by normal user or even an admin. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.003", "T1547"]} +known_false_positives = unknown +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Trickbot Named Pipe - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = this search is to detect potential trickbot infection through the create/connected named pipe to the system. This technique is used by trickbot to communicate to its c2 to post or get command during infection. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and pipename from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. . +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} +known_false_positives = unknown +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious loaded unsigned dll by MMC.exe application. This technique is commonly seen in attacker that tries to bypassed UAC feature or gain privilege escalation. This is done by modifying some CLSID registry that will trigger the mmc.exe to load the dll path +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"]} +known_false_positives = unknown. all of the dll loaded by mmc.exe is microsoft signed dll. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search is to detect a possible uac bypass using the colorui.dll COM Object. this technique was seen in so many malware and ransomware like lockbit where it make use of the colorui.dll COM CLSID to bypass UAC. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.003"]} +known_false_positives = not so common. but 3rd part app may load this dll. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Unified Messaging Service Spawning a Process - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This detection identifies Microsoft Exchange Server's Unified Messaging services, umworkerprocess.exe and umservice.exe, spawning a child process, indicating possible exploitation of CVE-2021-26857 vulnerability. The query filters out werfault.exe and wermgr.exe mostly due to potential false positives, however, if there is an excessive amount of "wermgr.exe" or "WerFault.exe" failures, it may be due to the active exploitation. During triage, identify any additional suspicious parallel processes. Identify any recent out of place file modifications. Review Exchange logs following Microsofts guide. To contain, perform egress filtering or restrict public access to Exchange. In final, patch the vulnerablity and monitor. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"]} +known_false_positives = Unknown. Tune out child processes as needed to limit volume of false positives. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Uninstall App Using MsiExec - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious un-installation of application using msiexec. This technique was seen in conti leak tool and script where it tries to uninstall AV product using this commandline. This commandline to uninstall product is not a common practice in enterprise network. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.007", "T1218"]} +known_false_positives = unknown. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = +confidence = medium +explanation = Attackers often disable security tools to avoid detection. This search looks for the usage of process `fltMC.exe` to unload a Sysmon Driver that will stop sysmon from collecting the data. +how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. This search is also shipped with `unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter` macro, update this macro to filter out false positives. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Unloading AMSI via Reflection - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ +This analytic identifies the behavior of AMSI being tampered with. Implemented natively in many frameworks, the command will look similar to `SEtValuE($Null,(New-OBJEct COLlECtionS.GenerIC.HAshSEt{[StrINg]))}$ReF=[ReF].AsSeMbLY.GeTTyPe("System.Management.Automation.Amsi"+"Utils")` taken from Powershell-Empire. \ +During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562"]} +known_false_positives = Potential for some third party applications to disable AMSI upon invocation. Filter as needed. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Unusual Number of Kerberos Service Tickets Requested - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following hunting analytic leverages Kerberos Event 4769, A Kerberos service ticket was requested, to identify a potential kerberoasting attack against Active Directory networks. Kerberoasting allows an adversary to request kerberos tickets for domain accounts typically used as service accounts and attempt to crack them offline allowing them to obtain privileged access to the domain.\ +The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number service ticket requests. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.003"]} +known_false_positives = An single endpoint requesting a large number of kerberos service tickets is not common behavior. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, administration systems and missconfigured systems. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments that leverage PowerShell environment variables to identify the current logged user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"]} +known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell Script Block - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the use of PowerShell environment variables to identify the current logged user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"]} +known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The fsutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows utility used to perform tasks related to the file allocation table (FAT) and NTFS file systems. The update sequence number (USN) change journal provides a log of all changes made to the files on the disk. This search looks for fsutil.exe deleting the USN journal. +how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8", "CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.DP", "PR.IP"]} +known_false_positives = None identified +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic is to detect a suspicious wscript commandline to execute vbscript. This technique was seen in several malware to execute malicious vbs file using wscript application. commonly vbs script is associated to cscript process and this can be a technique to evade process parent child detections or even some av script emulation system. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.005", "T1059"]} +known_false_positives = unknown +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Verclsid CLSID Execution - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic is to detect a possible abuse of verclsid to execute malicious file through generate CLSID. This process is a normal application of windows to verify the CLSID COM object before it is instantiated by Windows Explorer. This hunting query can be a good pivot point to analyze what is he CLSID or COM object pointing too to check if it is a valid application or not. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.012", "T1218"]} +known_false_positives = windows can used this application for its normal COM object validation. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This query identifies a shell, PowerShell.exe or Cmd.exe, spawning from W3WP.exe, or IIS. In addition to IIS logs, this behavior with an EDR product will capture potential webshell activity, similar to the HAFNIUM Group abusing CVEs, on publicly available Exchange mail servers. During triage, review the parent process and child process of the shell being spawned. Review the command-line arguments and any file modifications that may occur. Identify additional parallel process, child processes, that may highlight further commands executed. After triaging, work to contain the threat and patch the system that is vulnerable. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505", "T1505.003"]} +known_false_positives = Baseline your environment before production. It is possible build systems using IIS will spawn cmd.exe to perform a software build. Filter as needed. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for flags passed to wbadmin.exe (Windows Backup Administrator Tool) that delete backup files. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent recovery. +how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. Tune based on parent process names. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} +known_false_positives = Administrators may modify the boot configuration. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = this search is designed to detect potential malicious process loading COM object to wbemprox.dll, +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.003"]} +known_false_positives = legitimate process that are not in the exception list may trigger this event. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Wermgr Process Connecting To IP Check Web Services - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = this search is designed to detect suspicious wermgr.exe process that tries to connect to known IP web services. This technique is know for trickbot and other trojan spy malware to recon the infected machine and look for its ip address without so much finger print on the commandline process. Since wermgr.exe is designed for error handling process of windows it is really suspicious that this process is trying to connect to this IP web services cause that maybe cause of some malicious code injection. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, dns query name process path , and query ststus from your endpoints like EventCode 22. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 12 of the Sysmon TA. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1590", "T1590.005"]} +known_false_positives = unknown +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Wermgr Process Create Executable File - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = this search is designed to detect potential malicious wermgr.exe process that drops or create executable file. Since wermgr.exe is an application trigger when error encountered in a process, it is really un ussual to this process to drop executable file. This technique is commonly seen in trickbot malware where it injects it code to this process to execute it malicious behavior like downloading other payload +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of wermgr.exe may be used. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027"]} +known_false_positives = unknown +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search is designed to detect suspicious cmd and powershell process spawned by wermgr.exe process. This suspicious behavior are commonly seen in code injection technique technique like trickbot to execute a shellcode, dll modules to run malicious behavior. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"]} +known_false_positives = unknown +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Wget Download and Bash Execution - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of wget on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"]} +known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for the execution of `adfind.exe` with command-line arguments that it uses by default. Specifically the filter or search functions. It also considers the arguments necessary like objectcategory, see readme for more details: https://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/usage.htm. This has been seen used before by Wizard Spider, FIN6 and actors whom also launched SUNBURST. AdFind.exe is usually used a recon tool to enumare a domain controller. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = administrators rarely use adfind, usually not used for legitimate reasons +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of Windows Curl.exe downloading a file to a suspicious location. \ +-O or --output is used when a file is to be downloaded and placed in a specified location. \ +During triage, review parallel processes for further behavior. In addition, identify if the download was successful. If a file was downloaded, capture and analyze. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"]} +known_false_positives = It is possible Administrators or super users will use Curl for legitimate purposes. Filter as needed. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of Windows Curl.exe uploading a file to a remote destination. \ +`-T` or `--upload-file` is used when a file is to be uploaded to a remotge destination. \ +`-d` or `--data` POST is the HTTP method that was invented to send data to a receiving web application, and it is, for example, how most common HTML forms on the web work. \ +HTTP multipart formposts are done with `-F`, but this appears to not be compatible with the Windows version of Curl. Will update if identified adversary tradecraft. \ +Adversaries may use one of the three methods based on the remote destination and what they are attempting to upload (zip vs txt). During triage, review parallel processes for further behavior. In addition, identify if the upload was successful in network logs. If a file was uploaded, isolate the endpoint and review. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"]} +known_false_positives = False positives may be limited to source control applications and may be required to be filtered out. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic will detect a suspicious process that modify a registry related to windows defender exclusion feature. This registry is abused by adversaries, malware author and red teams to bypassed Windows Defender Anti-Virus product by excluding folder path, file path, process, extensions and etc. from its real time or schedule scan to execute their malicious code. This is a good indicator for a defense evasion and to look further for events after this behavior. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"]} +known_false_positives = admin or user may choose to use this windows features. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic identifies a process that is attempting to disable the ability on Windows to generate a memory crash dump. This was recently identified being utilized by HermeticWiper. To disable crash dumps, the value must be set to 0. This feature is typically modified to perform a memory crash dump when a computer stops unexpectedly because of a Stop error (also known as a blue screen, system crash, or bug check). +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` and `Registry` node. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = unknown +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The search looks for the Registry Key DisableAntiSpyware set to disable. This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints. This particular behavior is typically executed when an ransomware actor gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. Endpoint should be isolated. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro to tune the search. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows DiskCryptor Usage - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic identifies DiskCryptor process name of dcrypt.exe or internal name dcinst.exe. This utility has been utilized by adversaries to encrypt disks manually during an operation. In addition, during install, a dcrypt.sys driver is installed and requires a reboot in order to take effect. There are no command-line arguments used. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"]} +known_false_positives = It is possible false positives may be present based on the internal name dcinst.exe, filter as needed. It may be worthy to alert on the service name. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = DiskShadow.exe is a Microsoft Signed binary present on Windows Server. It has a scripting mode intended for complex scripted backup operations. This feature also allows for execution of arbitrary unsigned code. This analytic looks for the usage of the scripting mode flags in executions of DiskShadow. During triage, compare to known backup behavior in your environment and then review the scripts called by diskshadow. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on processes that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition,confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = Administrators using the DiskShadow tool in their infrastructure as a main backup tool with scripts will cause false positives that can be filtered with `windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution_filter` +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows DISM Remove Defender - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of the Windows Disk Image Utility, `dism.exe`, to remove Windows Defender. Adversaries may use `dism.exe` to disable Defender before completing their objective. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"]} +known_false_positives = Some legitimate administrative tools leverage `dism.exe` to manipulate packages and features of the operating system. Filter as needed. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic identifies native .net binaries within the Windows operating system that may be abused by adversaries by moving it to a new directory. The analytic identifies the .net binary by using a lookup and compares the process name and original file name (internal name). The analytic utilizes a lookup with the is_net_windows_file macro to identify the binary process name and original file name. if one or the other matches an alert will be generated. Adversaries abuse these binaries as they are native to windows and native DotNet. Note that not all SDK (post install of Windows) are captured in the lookup. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1036.003", "T1218", "T1218.004"]} +known_false_positives = False positives may be present and filtering may be required. Certain utilities will run from non-standard paths based on the third-party application in use. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Event For Service Disabled - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic will identify suspicious system event of services that was modified from start to disabled. This technique is seen where the adversary attempts to disable security app services, other malware services to evade the defense systems on the compromised host +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = Windows service update may cause this event. In that scenario, filtering is needed. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic utilizes Windows Security Event ID 1102 or System log event 104 to identify when a Windows event log is cleared. Note that this analytic will require tuning or restricted to specific endpoints based on criticality. During triage, based on time of day and user, determine if this was planned. If not planned, follow through with reviewing parallel alerts and other data sources to determine what else may have occurred. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows event logs from your hosts. In addition, the Splunk Windows TA is needed. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070", "T1070.001"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "PR.IP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.AE"]} +known_false_positives = It is possible that these logs may be legitimately cleared by Administrators. Filter as needed. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic will identify suspicious excessive number of system events of services that was modified from start to disabled. This technique is seen where the adversary attempts to disable security app services, other malware services oer serve as an destructive impact to complete the objective on the compromised system. One good example for this scenario is Olympic destroyer where it disable all active services in the compromised host as part of its destructive impact and defense evasion. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = Unknown +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic is to look for suspicious file creation in the critical folder like "System32\Drivers" folder without file extension. This artifacts was seen in latest hermeticwiper where it drops its driver component in Driver Directory both the compressed(without file extension) and the actual driver component (with .sys file extension). This TTP is really a good indication that a host might be compromised by this destructive malware that wipes the boot sector of the system. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = Unknown at this point +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows High File Deletion Frequency - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for high frequency of file deletion relative to process name and process id. These events usually happen when the ransomware tries to encrypt the files with the ransomware file extensions and sysmon treat the original files to be deleted as soon it was replace as encrypted data. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the deleted target file name, process name and process id from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485"]} +known_false_positives = user may delete bunch of pictures or files in a folder. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following hunting analytic identifies all processes requesting access into Lsass.exe. his behavior may be related to credential dumping or applications requiring access to credentials. Triaging this event will require understanding the GrantedAccess from the SourceImage. In addition, whether the account is privileged or not. Review the process requesting permissions and review parallel processes. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Enabling EventCode 10 TargetProcess lsass.exe is required. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = False positives will occur based on GrantedAccess and SourceUser, filter based on source image as needed. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary loading `vaultcli.dll` and Samlib.dll`. This technique may be used to execute code to bypassing application control and capture credentials by utilizing a tool like MimiKatz. \ +When `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \ +If used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \ +During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and module loads from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.004", "T1218"]} +known_false_positives = Typically this will not trigger as by it's very nature InstallUtil does not need credentials. Filter as needed. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic identifies the Windows binary InstallUtil.exe running from a non-standard location. The analytic utilizes a macro for InstallUtil and identifies both the process_name and original_file_name. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1036.003", "T1218", "T1218.004"]} +known_false_positives = False positives may be present and filtering may be required. Certain utilities will run from non-standard paths based on the third-party application in use. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary making a remote network connection. This technique may be used to download and execute code while bypassing application control. \ +When `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \ +If used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \ +During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Ports` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.004", "T1218"]} +known_false_positives = Limited false positives should be present as InstallUtil is not typically used to download remote files. Filter as needed based on Developers requirements. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary. This will execute code while bypassing application control using the `/u` (uninstall) switch. \ +InstallUtil uses the functions install and uninstall within the System.Configuration.Install namespace to process .net assembly. Install function requires admin privileges, however, uninstall function can be run as an unprivileged user.\ +When `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \ +If used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \ +During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.004", "T1218"]} +known_false_positives = Limited false positives should be present. Filter as needed by parent process or application. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary making a remote network connection. This technique may be used to download and execute code while bypassing application control using the `/u` (uninstall) switch. \ +InstallUtil uses the functions install and uninstall within the System.Configuration.Install namespace to process .net assembly. Install function requires admin privileges, however, uninstall function can be run as an unprivileged user.\ +When `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \ +If used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \ +During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Ports` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.004", "T1218"]} +known_false_positives = Limited false positives should be present as InstallUtil is not typically used to download remote files. Filter as needed based on Developers requirements. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary passing a HTTP request on the command-line. This technique may be used to download and execute code while bypassing application control. \ +When `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \ +If used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \ +During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.004", "T1218"]} +known_false_positives = Limited false positives should be present as InstallUtil is not typically used to download remote files. Filter as needed based on Developers requirements. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic is to look for suspicious registry modification related to file compression color and information tips. This IOC was seen in hermetic wiper where it has a thread that will create this registry entry to change the color of compressed or encrypted files in NTFS file system as well as the pop up information tips. This is a good indicator that a process tries to modified one of the registry GlobalFolderOptions related to file compression attribution in terms of color in NTFS file system. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Registry` node. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = unknown +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of AdvancedRun.exe. AdvancedRun.exe has similar capabilities as other remote programs like psexec. AdvancedRun may also ingest a configuration file with all settings defined and perform its activity. The analytic is written in a way to identify a renamed binary and also the common command-line arguments. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1588.002"]} +known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as it is specific to AdvancedRun. Filter as needed based on legitimate usage. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows NirSoft Utilities - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following hunting analytic assists with identifying the proces execution of commonly used utilities from NirSoft. Potentially not adversary behavior, but worth identifying to know if the software is present and being used. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1588.002"]} +known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Filtering may be required before setting to alert. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic identifies non SYSTEM accounts requesting access to lsass.exe. This behavior may be related to credential dumping or applications requiring access to credentials. Triaging this event will require understanding the GrantedAccess from the SourceImage. In addition, whether the account is privileged or not. Review the process requesting permissions and review parallel processes. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Enabling EventCode 10 TargetProcess lsass.exe is required. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = False positives will occur based on legitimate application requests, filter based on source image as needed. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic is an enhanced version of two previous analytics that identifies common GrantedAccess permission requests and CallTrace DLLs in order to detect credential dumping. \ +GrantedAccess is the requested permissions by the SourceImage into the TargetImage. \ +CallTrace Stack trace of where open process is called. Included is the DLL and the relative virtual address of the functions in the call stack right before the open process call. \ +dbgcore.dll or dbghelp.dll are two core Windows debug DLLs that have minidump functions which provide a way for applications to produce crashdump files that contain a useful subset of the entire process context. \ +The idea behind using ntdll.dll is to blend in by using native api of ntdll.dll. For example in sekurlsa module there are many ntdll exported api, like RtlCopyMemory, used to execute this module which is related to lsass dumping. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Enabling EventCode 10 TargetProcess lsass.exe is required. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = False positives will occur based on GrantedAccess 0x1010 and 0x1400, filter based on source image as needed or remove them. Concern is Cobalt Strike usage of Mimikatz will generate 0x1010 initially, but later be caught. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic is to look for process commandline that contains named pipe. This technique was seen in some adversaries, threat actor and malware like olympic destroyer to communicate to its other child processes after process injection that serve as defense evasion and privilege escalation. On the other hand this analytic may catch some normal process that using this technique for example browser application. In that scenario we include common process path we've seen during testing that cause false positive which is the program files. False positive may still be arise if the normal application is in other folder path. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = Normal browser application may use this technique. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Raccine Scheduled Task Deletion - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic identifies the Raccine Rules Updater scheduled task being deleted. Adversaries may attempt to remove this task in order to prevent the update of Raccine. Raccine is a "ransomware vaccine" created by security researcher Florian Roth, designed to intercept and prevent precursors and active ransomware behavior. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]} +known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, however filter as needed. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Rasautou DLL Execution - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic identifies the Windows Windows Remote Auto Dialer, rasautou.exe executing an arbitrary DLL. This technique is used to execute arbitrary shellcode or DLLs via the rasautou.exe LOLBin capability. During triage, review parent and child process behavior including file and image loads. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055.001", "T1218", "T1055"]} +known_false_positives = False positives will be limited to applications that require Rasautou.exe to load a DLL from disk. Filter as needed. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic is to look for suspicious raw access read to device disk partition of the host machine. This technique was seen in several attacks by adversaries or threat actor to wipe, encrypt or overwrite the boot sector of each partition as part of their impact payload for example the "hermeticwiper" malware. This detection is a good indicator that there is a process try to read or write on boot sector. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the raw access read event (like sysmon eventcode 9), process name and process guid from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1561.002", "T1561"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = This event is really notable but we found minimal number of normal application from system32 folder like svchost.exe accessing it too. In this case we used 'system32' and 'syswow64' path as a filter for this detection. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic is to look for suspicious raw access read to drive where the master boot record is placed. This technique was seen in several attacks by adversaries or threat actor to wipe, encrypt or overwrite the master boot record code as part of their impact payload. This detection is a good indicator that there is a process try to read or write on MBR sector. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the raw access read event (like sysmon eventcode 9), process name and process guid from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1561.002", "T1561"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = This event is really notable but we found minimal number of normal application from system32 folder like svchost.exe accessing it too. In this case we used 'system32' and 'syswow64' path as a filter for this detection. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Remote Assistance Spawning Process - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of Microsoft Remote Assistance, msra.exe, spawning PowerShell.exe or cmd.exe as a child process. Msra.exe by default has no command-line arguments and typically spawns itself. It will generate a network connection to the remote system that is connected. This behavior is indicative of another process injected into msra.exe. Review the parent process or cross process events to identify source. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} +known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, filter as needed. Add additional shells as needed. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Schtasks Create Run As System - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic identifies Schtasks.exe creating a new task to start and run as an elevated user - SYSTEM. This is commonly used by adversaries to spawn a process in an elevated state. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1053"]} +known_false_positives = False positives will be limited to legitimate applications creating a task to run as SYSTEM. Filter as needed based on parent process, or modify the query to have world writeable paths to restrict it. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The search looks for a Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) was stopped via command-line. This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints. +how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records the process-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Processes data-model object. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1489"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = SAM is a critical windows service, stopping it would cause major issues on an endpoint this makes false positive rare. AlthoughNo false positives have been identified. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Service Created With Suspicious Service Path - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytc uses Windows Event Id 7045, `New Service Was Installed`, to identify the creation of a Windows Service where the service binary path path is located in a non-common Service folder in Windows. Red Teams and adversaries alike may create malicious Services for lateral movement or remote code execution as well as persistence and execution. The Clop ransomware has also been seen in the wild abusing Windows services. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569", "T1569.002"]} +known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may install services with uncommon services paths. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Service Created Within Public Path - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytc uses Windows Event Id 7045, `New Service Was Installed`, to identify the creation of a Windows Service where the service binary path is located in public paths. This behavior could represent the installation of a malicious service. Red Teams and adversaries alike may create malicious Services for lateral movement or remote code execution +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543", "T1543.003"]} +known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may install services with uncommon services paths. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Service Creation on Remote Endpoint - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `sc.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to create a Windows Service on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Service Control Manager for lateral movement and remote code execution. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543", "T1543.003"]} +known_false_positives = Administrators may create Windows Services on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic is to look for suspicious modification or creation of registry to have service entry. This technique is abused by adversaries or threat actor to persist, gain privileges in the machine or even lateral movement. This technique can be executed using reg.exe application or using windows API like for example the CrashOveride malware. This detection is a good indicator that a process is trying to create a service entry using registry ImagePath. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = Third party tools may used this technique to create services but not so common. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Service Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `sc.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to start a Windows Service on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Service Control Manager for lateral movement and remote code execution. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543", "T1543.003"]} +known_false_positives = Administrators may start Windows Services on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows WMI Process Call Create - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic is to look for wmi commandlines to execute or create process. This technique was used by adversaries or threat actor to execute their malicious payload in local or remote host. This hunting query is a good pivot to start to look further which process trigger the wmi or what process it execute locally or remotely. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = Administrators may execute this command for testing or auditing. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed with a native Windows shell (PowerShell, Cmd, Wscript, Cscript).\ +The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not.\ +schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64`.\ +The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory.\ +Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1053"]} +known_false_positives = False positives are possible if legitimate applications are allowed to register tasks that call a shell to be spawned. Filter as needed based on command-line or processes that are used legitimately. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed from a user writeable file path.\ +The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not.\ +schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64`.\ +The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory.\ +Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or was it via TaskService. Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1053"]} +known_false_positives = False positives are possible if legitimate applications are allowed to register tasks in public paths. Filter as needed based on paths that are used legitimately. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following hunting analytic assists with identifying suspicious tasks that have been registered and ran in Windows using EventID 200 (action run) and 201 (action completed). It is recommended to filter based on ActionName by specifying specific paths not used in your environment. After some basic tuning, this may be effective in capturing evasive ways to register tasks on Windows. Review parallel events related to tasks being scheduled. EventID 106 will generate when a new task is generated, however, that does not mean it ran. Capture any files on disk and analyze. +how_to_implement = Task Scheduler logs are required to be collected. Enable logging with inputs.conf by adding a stanza for [WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational] and renderXml=false. Note, not translating it in XML may require a proper extraction of specific items in the Message. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005"]} +known_false_positives = False positives will be present. Filter based on ActionName paths or specify keywords of interest. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Winhlp32 Spawning a Process - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic identifies winhlp32.exe, found natively in `c:\windows\`, spawning a child process that loads a file out of appdata, programdata, or temp. Winhlp32.exe has a rocky past in that multiple vulnerabilities were found and added to MetaSploit. WinHlp32.exe is required to display 32-bit Help files that have the ".hlp" file name extension. This particular instance is related to a Remcos sample where dynwrapx.dll is added to the registry under inprocserver32, and later module loaded by winhlp32.exe to spawn wscript.exe and load a vbs or file from disk. During triage, review parallel processes to identify further suspicious behavior. Review module loads for unsuspecting unsigned modules. Capture any file modifications and analyze. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} +known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as winhlp32.exe is typically not used with the latest flavors of Windows OS. However, filter as needed. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Winword Spawning Cmd - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following detection identifies Microsoft Word spawning `cmd.exe`. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with winword.exe. Winword.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16` (version will vary). Cmd.exe spawning from winword.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command-line will indicate what is being executed. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. It is possible that COM is utilized to trampoline the child process to `explorer.exe` or `wmiprvse.exe`. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"]} +known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Winword Spawning PowerShell - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following detection identifies Microsoft Word spawning PowerShell. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with winword.exe. Winword.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16` (version will vary). PowerShell spawning from winword.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command executed will most likely be encoded and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"]} +known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Winword Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following detection identifies Microsoft Winword.exe spawning Windows Script Host - `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe`. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with Winword.exe. Winword.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16` (version will vary). `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` default location is `c:\windows\system32\` or c:windows\syswow64\`. `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` spawning from Winword.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command-line executed will most likely be obfuscated and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. Review the reputation of the remote destination and block accordingly. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"]} +known_false_positives = There will be limited false positives and it will be different for every environment. Tune by child process or command-line as needed. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions. The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscription to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions.\ +All event subscriptions have three components \ +1. Filter - WQL Query for the events we want. EventID = 19 \ +1. Consumer - An action to take upon triggering the filter. EventID = 20 \ +1. Binding - Registers a filter to a consumer. EventID = 21 \ +Monitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding. It may be pertinent to review all 3 to identify the flow of execution. In addition, EventCode 4104 may assist with any other PowerShell script usage that registered the subscription. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be collecting Sysmon data using Sysmon version 6.1 or greater and have Sysmon configured to generate alerts for WMI activity (eventID= 19, 20, 21). In addition, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA installed to properly parse the fields. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.003", "T1546"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} +known_false_positives = Although unlikely, administrators may use event subscriptions for legitimate purposes. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - WMI Recon Running Process Or Services - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104, where WMI is performing an event query looking for running processes or running services. This technique is commonly found in malware and APT events where the adversary will map all running security applications or services on the compromised machine. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1592"]} +known_false_positives = network administrator may used this command for checking purposes +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Wmic Group Discovery - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following hunting analytic identifies the use of `wmic.exe` enumerating local groups on the endpoint. \ +Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \ +During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.001"]} +known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Wmic NonInteractive App Uninstallation - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic is to detect a suspicious wmic commandlined that uninstall application non interactively. This technique was seen in IceID to uninstall av products to the compromised host to bypassed and evade detections. This Hunting query maybe a good indicator that some process tries to uninstall application using wmic which is not a common behavior. This approach may seen in some script or third part appication to uninstall their application but it is a good thing to check what it uninstall and why. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"]} +known_false_positives = third party application may use this approach to uninstall there application +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - WMIC XSL Execution via URL - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic identifies `wmic.exe` loading a remote XSL (eXtensible Stylesheet Language) script. This originally was identified by Casey Smith, dubbed Squiblytwo, as an application control bypass. Many adversaries will utilize this technique to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file. This technique can also execute local/remote scripts and, similar to its Regsvr32 "Squiblydoo" counterpart, leverages a trusted, built-in Windows tool. Adversaries may abuse any alias in Windows Management Instrumentation provided they utilize the /FORMAT switch. Upon identifying a suspicious execution, review for confirmed network connnection and script download. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1220"]} +known_false_positives = False positives are limited as legitimate applications typically do not download files or xsl using WMIC. Filter as needed. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Wmiprsve LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic identifies `wmiprsve.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), the executed command is spawned as a child process of `wmiprvse.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of wmiprvse.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"]} +known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic identifies a suspicious spawned process by WScript or CScript process. This technique was a common technique used by adversaries and malware to execute different LOLBIN, other scripts like PowerShell or spawn a suspended process to inject its code as a defense evasion. This TTP may detect some normal script that using several application tool that are in the list of the child process it detects but a good pivot and indicator that a script is may execute suspicious code. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055", "T1543", "T1134.004", "T1134"]} +known_false_positives = Administrators may create vbs or js script that use several tool as part of its execution. Filter as needed. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Wsmprovhost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic identifies `Wsmprovhost.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the Windows Remote Management (WinRm) protocol, the executed command is spawned as a child processs of `Wsmprovhost.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of Wsmprovhost.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.006"]} +known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry related to UAC bypass. This technique is to modify the registry in this detection, create a registry value with the path of the payload and run WSreset.exe to bypass User account Control. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"]} +known_false_positives = unknown +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - XMRIG Driver Loaded - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic identifies XMRIG coinminer driver installation on the system. The XMRIG driver name by default is `WinRing0x64.sys`. This cpu miner is an open source project that is commonly abused by adversaries to infect and mine bitcoin. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the driver loaded and Signature from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.003", "T1543"]} +known_false_positives = False positives should be limited. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - XSL Script Execution With WMIC - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious wmic.exe process or renamed wmic process to execute malicious xsl file. This technique was seen in FIN7 to execute its malicous jscript using the .xsl as the loader with the help of wmic.exe process. This TTP is really a good indicator for you to hunt further for FIN7 or other attacker that known to used this technique. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1220"]} +known_false_positives = unknown +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The search queries the authentication logs for assets that are categorized as routers in the ES Assets and Identity Framework, to identify connections that have not been seen before in the last 30 days. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must ensure the network router devices are categorized as "router" in the Assets and identity table. You must also populate the Authentication data model with logs related to users authenticating to routing infrastructure. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} +known_false_positives = Legitimate router connections may appear as new connections +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = Attackers often use spaces as a means to obfuscate an attachment's file extension. This search looks for messages with email attachments that have many spaces within the file names. +how_to_implement = You need to ingest data from emails. Specifically, the sender's address and the file names of any attachments must be mapped to the Email data model. The threshold ratio is set to 10%, but this value can be configured to suit each environment. \ + **Splunk Phantom Playbook Integration**\ +If Splunk Phantom is also configured in your environment, a playbook called "Suspicious Email Attachment Investigate and Delete" can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/` and add the correct hostname to the "Phantom Instance" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search. The notable event will be sent to Phantom and the playbook will gather further information about the file attachment and its network behaviors. If Phantom finds malicious behavior and an analyst approves of the results, the email will be deleted from the user's inbox. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} +known_false_positives = None at this time +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The search looks at the change-analysis data model and detects email files created outside the normal Outlook directory. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records the file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint.Filesystem data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or by other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system reads and writes. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114", "T1114.001"]} +known_false_positives = Administrators and users sometimes prefer backing up their email data by moving the email files into a different folder. These attempts will be detected by the search. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for an increase of data transfers from your email server to your clients. This could be indicative of a malicious actor collecting data using your email server. +how_to_implement = This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model. Your email servers must be categorized as "email_server" for the search to work, as well. You may need to adjust the deviation_threshold and minimum_data_samples values based on the network traffic in your environment. The "deviation_threshold" field is a multiplying factor to control how much variation you're willing to tolerate. The "minimum_data_samples" field is the minimum number of connections of data samples required for the statistic to be valid. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114", "T1114.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"]} +known_false_positives = The false-positive rate will vary based on how you set the deviation_threshold and data_samples values. Our recommendation is to adjust these values based on your network traffic to and from your email servers. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for emails claiming to be sent from a domain similar to one that you want to have monitored for abuse. +how_to_implement = You need to ingest email header data. Specifically the sender's address (src_user) must be populated. You also need to have run the search "ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names", which creates the permutations of the domain that will be checked for. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} +known_false_positives = None at this time +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Infrastructure +confidence = medium +explanation = This search detects Okta login failures due to bad credentials for multiple users originating from the same ip address. +how_to_implement = This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being ingested in your Splunk deployment. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = A single public IP address servicing multiple legitmate users may trigger this search. In addition, the threshold of 5 distinct users may be too low for your needs. You may modify the included filter macro `multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip_filter` to raise the threshold or except specific IP adresses from triggering this search. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - No Windows Updates in a time frame - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for Windows endpoints that have not generated an event indicating a successful Windows update in the last 60 days. Windows updates are typically released monthly and applied shortly thereafter. An endpoint that has not successfully applied an update in this time frame indicates the endpoint is not regularly being patched for some reason. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, it requires that the 'Update' data model is being populated. This can be accomplished by ingesting Windows events or the Windows Update log via a universal forwarder on the Windows endpoints you wish to monitor. The Windows add-on should be also be installed and configured to properly parse Windows events in Splunk. There may be other data sources which can populate this data model, including vulnerability management systems. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.MA"]} +known_false_positives = None identified +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Infrastructure +confidence = medium +explanation = Detect Okta user lockout events +how_to_implement = This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being ingested in your Splunk deployment. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = None. Account lockouts should be followed up on to determine if the actual user was the one who caused the lockout, or if it was an unauthorized actor. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Infrastructure +confidence = medium +explanation = Detect failed Okta SSO events +how_to_implement = This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being ingested in your Splunk deployment. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = There may be a faulty config preventing legitmate users from accessing apps they should have access to. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Infrastructure +confidence = medium +explanation = This search detects logins from the same user from different cities in a 24 hour period. +how_to_implement = This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being ingested in your Splunk deployment. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = Users in your enviornment may legitmately be travelling and loggin in from different locations. This search is useful for those users that should *not* be travelling for some reason, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. The search also relies on the geographical information being populated in the Okta logs. It is also possible that a connection from another region may be attributed to a login from a remote VPN endpoint. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for emails that have attachments with suspicious file extensions. +how_to_implement = You need to ingest data from emails. Specifically, the sender's address and the file names of any attachments must be mapped to the Email data model. \ + **Splunk Phantom Playbook Integration**\ +If Splunk Phantom is also configured in your environment, a Playbook called "Suspicious Email Attachment Investigate and Delete" can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/`, and add the correct hostname to the "Phantom Instance" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search. The notable event will be sent to Phantom and the playbook will gather further information about the file attachment and its network behaviors. If Phantom finds malicious behavior and an analyst approves of the results, the email will be deleted from the user's inbox. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001", "T1566"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.IP"]} +known_false_positives = None identified +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for suspicious Java classes that are often used to exploit remote command execution in common Java frameworks, such as Apache Struts. +how_to_implement = In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from your web-traffic appliances that serve or sit in the path of your Struts application servers. This can be accomplished by indexing data from a web proxy, or by using network traffic-analysis tools, such as Splunk Stream or Bro. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]} +known_false_positives = There are no known false positives. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Web Server +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for suspicious processes on all systems labeled as web servers. +how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. In addition, web servers will need to be identified in the Assets and Identity Framework of Enterprise Security. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1082"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} +known_false_positives = Some of these processes may be used legitimately on web servers during maintenance or other administrative tasks. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Cloud Instance +confidence = medium +explanation = This search finds for the number successfully destroyed cloud instances for every 4 hour block. This is split up between weekdays and the weekend. It then applies the probability densitiy model previously created and alerts on any outliers. +how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed` to create the probability density function. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within a cloud infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Cloud Instance +confidence = medium +explanation = This search finds for the number successfully created cloud instances for every 4 hour block. This is split up between weekdays and the weekend. It then applies the probability densitiy model previously created and alerts on any outliers. +how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched` to create the probability density function. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster +confidence = medium +explanation = This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster in AWS +how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudWatch EKS Logs inputs. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"]} +known_false_positives = Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, UA and source IPs will provide context. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster Pod +confidence = medium +explanation = This search provides detection information on unauthenticated requests against Kubernetes' Pods API +how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on forAWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudWatch EKS Logs.Please also customize the `kubernetes_pods_aws_scan_fingerprint_detection` macro to filter out the false positives. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"]} +known_false_positives = Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, UA and source IPs and direct request to API provide context. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = AWS Account +confidence = medium +explanation = This search provides detection of an user attaching itself to a different role trust policy. This can be used for lateral movement and escalation of privileges. +how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add-on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} +known_false_positives = Attach to policy can create a lot of noise. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse (i.e status=failure). The search can provide context for common users attaching themselves to higher privilege policies or even newly created policies. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = AWS Account +confidence = medium +explanation = This search provides detection of accounts creating permanent keys. Permanent keys are not created by default and they are only needed for programmatic calls. Creation of Permanent key is an important event to monitor. +how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} +known_false_positives = Not all permanent key creations are malicious. If there is a policy of rotating keys this search can be adjusted to provide better context. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = AWS Account +confidence = medium +explanation = This search provides detection of role creation by IAM users. Role creation is an event by itself if user is creating a new role with trust policies different than the available in AWS and it can be used for lateral movement and escalation of privileges. +how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add-on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} +known_false_positives = CreateRole is not very common in common users. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse. In general AWS provides plenty of trust policies that fit most use cases. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = AWS Account +confidence = medium +explanation = This search provides detection of suspicious use of sts:AssumeRole. These tokens can be created on the go and used by attackers to move laterally and escalate privileges. +how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} +known_false_positives = Sts:AssumeRole can be very noisy as it is a standard mechanism to provide cross account and cross resources access. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = AWS Account +confidence = medium +explanation = This search provides detection of suspicious use of sts:GetSessionToken. These tokens can be created on the go and used by attackers to move laterally and escalate privileges. +how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add-on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1550"]} +known_false_positives = Sts:GetSessionToken can be very noisy as in certain environments numerous calls of this type can be executed. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse. In specific environments the use of field requestParameters.serialNumber will need to be used. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = GCP Storage Bucket +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks at GCP Storage bucket-access logs and detects new or previously unseen remote IP addresses that have successfully accessed a GCP Storage bucket. +how_to_implement = This search relies on the Splunk Add-on for Google Cloud Platform, setting up a Cloud Pub/Sub input, along with the relevant GCP PubSub topics and logging sink to capture GCP Storage Bucket events (https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/routing/overview). In order to capture public GCP Storage Bucket access logs, you must also enable storage bucket logging to your PubSub Topic as per https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/access-logs. These logs are deposited into the nominated Storage Bucket on an hourly basis and typically show up by 15 minutes past the hour. It is recommended to configure any saved searches or correlation searches in Enterprise Security to run on an hourly basis at 30 minutes past the hour (cron definition of 30 * * * *). A lookup table (previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip.csv) stores the previously seen access requests, and is used by this search to determine any newly seen IP addresses accessing the Storage Buckets. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = GCP Storage buckets can be accessed from any IP (if the ACLs are open to allow it), as long as it can make a successful connection. This will be a false postive, since the search is looking for a new IP within the past two hours. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = GCP Storage Bucket +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for GCP PubSub events where a user has created an open/public GCP Storage bucket. +how_to_implement = This search relies on the Splunk Add-on for Google Cloud Platform, setting up a Cloud Pub/Sub input, along with the relevant GCP PubSub topics and logging sink to capture GCP Storage Bucket events (https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/routing/overview). +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that a GCP admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. That said, GCP strongly advises against granting full control to the "allUsers" group. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = S3 Bucket +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks at S3 bucket-access logs and detects new or previously unseen remote IP addresses that have successfully accessed an S3 bucket. +how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your S3 access logs' inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen S3 Bucket Access by Remote IP" support search once to create a history of previously seen remote IPs and bucket names. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = S3 buckets can be accessed from any IP, as long as it can make a successful connection. This will be a false postive, since the search is looking for a new IP within the past hour +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = AWS Instance +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub alerts for an AWS IAM User in 4 hours intervals. +how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Security Hub inputs. The threshold_value should be tuned to your environment and schedule these searches according to the bucket span interval. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +known_false_positives = None +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = AWS Instance +confidence = medium +explanation = This search will detect spike in blocked outbound network connections originating from within your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. +how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your VPC Flow logs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the number of data points required to meet the definition of "spike." The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best when you run the "Baseline of Blocked Outbound Connection" support search once to create a history of previously seen blocked outbound connections. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command \u0026 Control"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} +known_false_positives = The false-positive rate may vary based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`. Additionally, false positives may result when AWS administrators roll out policies enforcing network blocks, causing sudden increases in the number of blocked outbound connections. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = S3 Bucket +confidence = medium +explanation = This search detects users creating spikes in API activity related to deletion of S3 buckets in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. +how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best when you run the "Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN" support search once to create a baseline of previously seen S3 bucket-deletion activity. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} +known_false_positives = Based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`, the false positive rate may vary. Please modify this according the your environment. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = GCP Account +confidence = medium +explanation = This search provides detection of GCPloit exploitation framework. This framework can be used to escalate privileges and move laterally from compromised high privilege accounts. +how_to_implement = You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message logs +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} +known_false_positives = Payload.request.function.timeout value can possibly be match with other functions or requests however the source user and target request account may indicate an attempt to move laterally accross acounts or projects +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = GCP Kubernetes cluster +confidence = medium +explanation = This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster's pods +how_to_implement = You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later), then configure stackdriver and set a Pub/Sub subscription to be imported to Splunk. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"]} +known_false_positives = Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, User Agent, source IPs and pods will provide context. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Gdrive suspicious file sharing - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = GDrive +confidence = medium +explanation = This search can help the detection of compromised accounts or internal users sharing potentially malicious/classified documents with users outside your organization via GSuite file sharing . +how_to_implement = Need to implement Gsuite logging targeting Google suite drive activity. In order for the search to work for your environment please update `yourdomain.com` value in the query with the domain relavant for your organization. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566"]} +known_false_positives = This is an anomaly search, you must specify your domain in the parameters so it either filters outside domains or focus on internal domains. This search may also help investigate compromise of accounts. By looking at for example source ip addresses, document titles and abnormal number of shares and shared target users. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Gsuite suspicious calendar invite - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = GSuite +confidence = medium +explanation = This search can help the detection of compromised accounts or internal users sending suspcious calendar invites via GSuite calendar. These invites may contain malicious links or attachments. +how_to_implement = In order to successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite (gsuite:calendar:json) having the file sharing metadata like file type, source owner, destination target user, description, etc. This search can also be made more specific by selecting specific emails, subdomains timeframe, organizational units, targeted user, etc. In order for the search to work for your environment please update `yourdomain.com` value in the query with the domain relavant for your organization. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566"]} +known_false_positives = This search will also produce normal activity statistics. Fields such as email, ip address, name, parameters.organizer_calendar_id, parameters.target_calendar_id and parameters.event_title may give away phishing intent.For more specific results use email parameter. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Office 365 +confidence = medium +explanation = This search will detect more than 5 login failures in Office365 Azure Active Directory from a single source IP address. Please adjust the threshold value of 5 as suited for your environment. +how_to_implement = +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.001", "T1110"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +known_false_positives = unknown +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Kubernetes +confidence = medium +explanation = This search provides information on anonymous Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context +how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]} +known_false_positives = Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP, verb and Object can reveal potential malicious activity, specially anonymous suspicious IPs and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - New container uploaded to AWS ECR - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = AWS ECR container +confidence = medium +explanation = This searches show information on uploaded containers including source user, image id, source IP user type, http user agent, region, first time, last time of operation (PutImage). These searches are based on Cloud Infrastructure Data Model. +how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model. Please also customize the `container_implant_aws_detection_filter` macro to filter out the false positives. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1525"]} +known_false_positives = Uploading container is a normal behavior from developers or users with access to container registry. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for child processes of spoolsv.exe. This activity is associated with a POC privilege-escalation exploit associated with CVE-2018-8440. Spoolsv.exe is the process associated with the Print Spooler service in Windows and typically runs as SYSTEM. +how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. Update the `children_of_spoolsv_filter` macro to filter out legitimate child processes spawned by spoolsv.exe. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = Some legitimate printer-related processes may show up as children of spoolsv.exe. You should confirm that any activity as legitimate and may be added as exclusions in the search. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit +how_to_implement = Splunk Universal Forwarder running on Linux systems, capturing logs from the /var/log directory. The vulnerability is exposed when a non privledged user tries passing in a single \ character at the end of the command while using the shell and edit flags. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = unknown +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit +how_to_implement = Splunk Universal Forwarder running on Linux systems (tested on Centos and Ubuntu), where segfaults are being logged. This also captures instances where the exploit has been compiled into a binary. The detection looks for greater than 5 instances of sudoedit combined with segfault over your search time period on a single host +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = If sudoedit is throwing segfaults for other reasons this will pick those up too. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit +how_to_implement = OSQuery installed and configured to pick up process events (info at https://osquery.io) as well as using the Splunk OSQuery Add-on https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4402. The vulnerability is exposed when a non privledged user tries passing in a single \ character at the end of the command while using the shell and edit flags. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = unknown +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Windows +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for Event Code 4742 (Computer Change) or EventCode 4624 (An account was successfully logged on) with an anonymous account. +how_to_implement = This search requires audit computer account management to be enabled on the system in order to generate Event ID 4742. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Event Logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1210"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = None thus far found +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for execution of process `outlook.exe` where the process is writing a `.zip` file to the disk. +how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} +known_false_positives = It is not uncommon for outlook to write legitimate zip files to the disk. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search will return a table of rare processes, the names of the systems running them, and the users who initiated each process. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts and populating the endpoint data model with the resultant dataset. The macro `filter_rare_process_allow_list` searches two lookup files for allowed processes. These consist of `rare_process_allow_list_default.csv` and `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv`. To add your own processes to the allow list, add them to `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv`. If you wish to remove an entry from the default lookup file, you will have to modify the macro itself to set the allow_list value for that process to false. You can modify the limit parameter and search scheduling to better suit your environment. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command \u0026 Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.PT", "PR.DS", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = Some legitimate processes may be only rarely executed in your environment. As these are identified, update `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv` to filter them out of your search results. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for specific command-line arguments that may indicate the execution of tools made by Nirsoft, which are legitimate, but may be abused by attackers. +how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1072"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} +known_false_positives = While legitimate, these NirSoft tools are prone to abuse. You should verfiy that the tool was used for a legitimate purpose. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic identifies suspicious behavior related to ProxyShell against on-premise Microsoft Exchange servers. \ +Modification of this analytic is requried to ensure fields are mapped accordingly. \ +A suspicious event will have `PowerShell`, the method `POST` and `autodiscover.json`. This is indicative of accessing PowerShell on the back end of Exchange with SSRF. \ +An event will look similar to `POST /autodiscover/autodiscover.json a=dsxvu@fnsso.flq/powershell/?X-Rps-CAT=VgEAVAdXaW5kb3d...` (abbreviated) \ +Review the source attempting to perform this activity against your environment. In addition, review PowerShell logs and access recently granted to Exchange roles. +how_to_implement = The following analytic requires on-premise Exchange to be logging to Splunk using the TA - https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3225. Ensure logs are parsed correctly, or tune the analytic for your environment. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"]} +known_false_positives = Limited false positives, however, tune as needed. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Exchange PowerShell Module Usage - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic identifies the usage of Exchange PowerShell modules that were recently used for a proof of concept related to ProxyShell. Currently, there is no active data shared or data we could re-produce relate to this part of the ProxyShell chain of exploits. \ +Inherently, the usage of the modules is not malicious, but reviewing parallel processes, and user, of the session will assist with determining the intent. \ +Module - New-MailboxExportRequest will begin the process of exporting contents of a primary mailbox or archive to a .pst file. \ +Module - New-managementroleassignment can assign a management role to a management role group, management role assignment policy, user, or universal security group (USG). +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"]} +known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for child processes spawned by zoom.exe or zoom.us that has not previously been seen. +how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial` to build the initial table of child processes and hostnames for this search to work. You should also schedule at the same interval as this search the second baseline search `Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old child processes. Please update the `previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window` macro to adjust the time window. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} +known_false_positives = A new child process of zoom isn't malicious by that fact alone. Further investigation of the actions of the child process is needed to verify any malicious behavior is taken. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for the first and last time a Windows service is seen running in your environment. This table is then cached. +how_to_implement = While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM, you must be ingesting your Windows system event logs in order for this search to execute successfully. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial` to build the initial table of child processes and hostnames for this search to work. You should also schedule at the same interval as this search the second baseline search `Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old Windows Services. Please update the `previously_seen_windows_services_window` macro to adjust the time window. Please ensure that the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows is version 8.0.0 or above. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569", "T1569.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.AE"]} +known_false_positives = A previously unseen service is not necessarily malicious. Verify that the service is legitimate and that was installed by a legitimate process. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - MacOS - Re-opened Applications - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for processes referencing the plist files that determine which applications are re-opened when a user reboots their machine. +how_to_implement = In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest process data from your osquery deployed agents with the [splunk.conf](https://github.com/splunk/TA-osquery/blob/master/config/splunk.conf) pack enabled. Also the [TA-OSquery](https://github.com/splunk/TA-osquery) must be deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the data populate the Endpoint data model. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command \u0026 Control"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = At this stage, there are no known false positives. During testing, no process events refering the com.apple.loginwindow.plist files were observed during normal operation of re-opening applications on reboot. Therefore, it can be asumed that any occurences of this in the process events would be worth investigating. In the event that the legitimate modification by the system of these files is in fact logged to the process log, then the process_name of that process can be added to an allow list. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Microsoft Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following query identifies suspicious .aspx created in 3 paths identified by Microsoft as known drop locations for Exchange exploitation related to HAFNIUM group and recently disclosed vulnerablity named ProxyShell. Paths include: `\HttpProxy\owa\auth\`, `\inetpub\wwwroot\aspnet_client\`, and `\HttpProxy\OAB\`. The analytic is limited to process name MSExchangeMailboxReplication.exe, which typically does not write .aspx files to disk. Upon triage, the suspicious .aspx file will likely look obvious on the surface. inspect the contents for script code inside. Identify additional log sources, IIS included, to review source and other potential exploitation. It is often the case that a particular threat is only applicable to a specific subset of systems in your environment. Typically analytics to detect those threats are written without the benefit of being able to only target those systems as well. Writing analytics against all systems when those behaviors are limited to identifiable subsets of those systems is suboptimal. Consider the case ProxyShell vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Servers. With asset information, a hunter can limit their analytics to systems that have been identified as Exchange servers. A hunter may start with the theory that the exchange server is communicating with new systems that it has not previously. If this theory is run against all publicly facing systems, the amount of noise it will generate will likely render this theory untenable. However, using the asset information to limit this analytic to just the Exchange servers will reduce the noise allowing the hunter to focus only on the systems where this behavioral change is relevant. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node and `Filesystem` node. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505", "T1505.003", "T1190"]} +known_false_positives = The query is structured in a way that `action` (read, create) is not defined. Review the results of this query, filter, and tune as necessary. It may be necessary to generate this query specific to your endpoint product. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Print Processor Registry Autostart - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification or new registry entry regarding print processor. This registry is known to be abuse by turla or other APT to gain persistence and privilege escalation to the compromised machine. This is done by adding the malicious dll payload on the new created key in this registry that will be executed as it restarted the spoolsv.exe process and services. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012", "T1547"]} +known_false_positives = possible new printer installation may add driver component on this registry. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for processes in an MacOS system that is tapping keyboard events in MacOS, and essentially monitoring all keystrokes made by a user. This is a common technique used by RATs to log keystrokes from a victim, although it can also be used by legitimate processes like Siri to react on human input +how_to_implement = In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from your osquery deployed agents with the [osx-attacks.conf](https://github.com/facebook/osquery/blob/experimental/packs/osx-attacks.conf#L599) pack enabled. Also the [TA-OSquery](https://github.com/d1vious/TA-osquery) must be deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the osquery data populate the Alerts data model. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control"], "nist": ["DE.DP"]} +known_false_positives = There might be some false positives as keyboard event taps are used by processes like Siri and Zoom video chat, for some good examples of processes to exclude please see [this](https://github.com/facebook/osquery/pull/5345#issuecomment-454639161) comment. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following hunting analytic leverages Event ID 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify the creation of a Scheduled Task with a suspicious, high entropy, Task Name. To achieve this, this analytic also leverages the `ut_shannon` function from the URL ToolBox Splunk application. Red teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler to create and start a remote Scheduled Task and obtain remote code execution. To achieve this goal, tools like Impacket or Crapmapexec, typically create a Scheduled Task with a random task name on the victim host. This hunting analytic may help defenders identify Scheduled Tasks created as part of a lateral movement attack. The entropy threshold `ut_shannon > 3` should be customized by users. The Command field can be used to determine if the task has malicious intent or not. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA as well as the URL ToolBox application are also required. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053", "T1053.005"]} +known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may use random Scheduled Task names. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Randomly Generated Windows Service Name - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following hunting analytic leverages Event ID 7045, `A new service was installed in the system`, to identify the installation of a Windows Service with a suspicious, high entropy, Service Name. To achieve this, this analytic also leverages the `ut_shannon` function from the URL ToolBox Splunk application. Red teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Service Control Manager to create and start a remote Windows Service and obtain remote code execution. To achieve this goal, some tools like Metasploit, Cobalt Strike and Impacket, typically create a Windows Service with a random service name on the victim host. This hunting analytic may help defenders identify Windows Services installed as part of a lateral movement attack. The entropy threshold `ut_shannon > 3` should be customized by users. The Service_File_Name field can be used to determine if the Windows Service has malicious intent or not. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints. The Windows TA as well as the URL ToolBox application are also required. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543", "T1543.003"]} +known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may use random Windows Service names. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for the remote desktop process mstsc.exe running on systems upon which it doesn't typically run. This is accomplished by filtering out all systems that are noted in the `common_rdp_source category` in the Assets and Identity framework. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. The search requires you to identify systems that do not commonly use remote desktop. You can use the included support search "Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop" to identify these systems. After identifying them, you will need to add the "common_rdp_source" category to that system using the Enterprise Security Assets and Identities framework. This can be done by adding an entry in the assets.csv file located in `SA-IdentityManagement/lookups`. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 9", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} +known_false_positives = Remote Desktop may be used legitimately by users on the network. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The search looks for a sharp increase in the number of files written to a particular host +how_to_implement = In order to implement this search, you must populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection and response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the file system. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = It is important to understand that if you happen to install any new applications on your hosts or are copying a large number of files, you can expect to see a large increase of file modifications. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Windows +confidence = medium +explanation = The malware sunburst will load the malicious dll by SolarWinds.BusinessLayerHost.exe. After a period of 12-14 days, the malware will attempt to resolve a subdomain of avsvmcloud.com. This detections will correlate both events. +how_to_implement = This detection relies on sysmon logs with the Event ID 7, Driver loaded. Please tune your sysmon config that you DriverLoad event for SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll is captured by Sysmon. Additionally, you need sysmon logs for Event ID 22, DNS Query. We suggest to run this detection at least once a day over the last 14 days. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1203"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = unknown +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of a curl contacting suspicious remote domains to checkin to command and control servers or download further implants. In the context of Silver Sparrow, curl is identified contacting s3.amazonaws.com. This particular behavior is common with MacOS adware-malicious software. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"]} +known_false_positives = Unknown. Filter as needed. +providing_technologies = [] + [savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage - Rule] type = detection asset_type = Endpoint @@ -8591,106 +8002,6 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": [ known_false_positives = Some legitimate applications may use PlistBuddy to create or modify property lists and possibly generate false positives. Review the property list being modified or created to confirm. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic detects a suspicious process making a DNS query via known, abused text-paste web services, VoIP, instant messaging, and digital distribution platforms used to download external files. This technique is abused by adversaries, malware actors, and red teams to download a malicious file on the target host. This is a good TTP indicator for possible initial access techniques. A user will experience false positives if the following instant messaging is allowed or common applications like telegram or discord are allowed in the corporate network. -how_to_implement = This detection relies on sysmon logs with the Event ID 22, DNS Query. We suggest you run this detection at least once a day over the last 14 days. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.005", "T1059"]} -known_false_positives = Noise and false positive can be seen if the following instant messaging is allowed to use within corporate network. In this case, a filter is needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic will detect a suspicious process running in a file path where a process is not commonly seen and is most commonly used by malicious software. This behavior has been used by adversaries where they drop and run an exe in a path that is accessible without admin privileges. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators may allow execution of specific binaries in non-standard paths. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic identifies a process making a DNS query to Discord, a well known instant messaging and digital distribution platform. Discord can be abused by adversaries, as seen in the WhisperGate campaign, to host and download malicious. external files. A process resolving a Discord DNS name could be an indicator of malware trying to download files from Discord for further execution. -how_to_implement = his detection relies on sysmon logs with the Event ID 22, DNS Query. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.005", "T1059"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Noise and false positive can be seen if the following instant messaging is allowed to use within corporate network. In this case, a filter is needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for reg.exe being launched from a command prompt not started by the user. When a user launches cmd.exe, the parent process is usually explorer.exe. This search filters out those instances. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = It's possible for system administrators to write scripts that exhibit this behavior. If this is the case, the search will need to be modified to filter them out. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code by using non-standard file extensions to load malciious DLLs. Upon investigating, look for network connections to remote destinations (internal or external). Review additional parrallel processes and child processes for additional activity. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. Tune the query by filtering additional extensions found to be used by legitimate processes. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.010"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Limited false positives with the query restricted to specified paths. Add more world writeable paths as tuning continues. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 PluginInit - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe process with plugininit parameter. This technique is commonly seen in IceID malware to execute its initial dll stager to download another payload to the compromised machine. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"]} -known_false_positives = third party application may used this dll export name to execute function. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following hunting analytic identifies renamed instances of rundll32.exe executing. rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. During investigation, validate it is the legitimate rundll32.exe executing and what script content it is loading. This query relies on the original filename or internal name from the PE meta data. Expand the query as needed by looking for specific command line arguments outlined in other analytics. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1036", "T1218.011", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe executing a DLL function name, Start and StartW, on the command line that is commonly observed with Cobalt Strike x86 and x64 DLL payloads. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. Typically, the DLL will be written and loaded from a world writeable path or user location. In most instances it will not have a valid certificate (Unsigned). During investigation, review the parent process and other parallel application execution. Capture and triage the DLL in question. In the instance of Cobalt Strike, rundll32.exe is the default process it opens and injects shellcode into. This default process can be changed, but typically is not. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use Start as a function and call it via the command line. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe using dllregisterserver on the command line to load a DLL. When a DLL is registered, the DllRegisterServer method entry point in the DLL is invoked. This is typically seen when a DLL is being registered on the system. Not every instance is considered malicious, but it will capture malicious use of it. During investigation, review the parent process and parrellel processes executing. Capture the DLL being loaded and inspect further. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = This is likely to produce false positives and will require some filtering. Tune the query by adding command line paths to known good DLLs, or filtering based on parent process names. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for rundll32.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive. -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior - Rule] type = detection asset_type = Endpoint @@ -8701,350 +8012,25 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": [ known_false_positives = Unknown. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following detection identifies Scheduled Tasks registering (creating a new task) a binary or script to run from a public directory which includes users\public, \programdata\ and \windows\temp. Upon triage, review the binary or script in the command line for legitimacy, whether an approved binary/script or not. In addition, capture the binary or script in question and analyze for further behaviors. Identify the source and contain the endpoint. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1053"]} -known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present. Filter as needed by parent process or command line argument. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies searchprotocolhost.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for searchprotocolhost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. searchprotocolhost.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} -known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = As part of the sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287) exploitation chain, adversaries will need to request a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) on behalf of the newly created and renamed computer account. The TGT request will be preceded by a computer account name event. This analytic leverages Event Id 4781, `The name of an account was changed` and event Id 4768 `A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested` to correlate a sequence of events where the new computer account on event id 4781 matches the request account on event id 4768. This behavior could represent an exploitation attempt of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287 for privilege escalation. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.002"]} -known_false_positives = A computer account name change event inmediately followed by a kerberos TGT request with matching fields is unsual. However, legitimate behavior may trigger it. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious WAV file in Appdata Folder - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic is to detect a suspicious creation of .wav file in appdata folder. This behavior was seen in Remcos RAT malware where it put the audio recording in the appdata\audio folde as part of data collection. this recording can be send to its C2 server as part of its exfiltration to the compromised machine. creation of wav files in this folder path is not a ussual disk place used by user to save audio format file. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, file_name, file_path and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1113"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies a renamed instance of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe. Microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319 and is rarely utilized. When investigating, identify the executed code on disk and review. A spawned child process from microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is uncommon. In any instance, microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe spawning from an Office product or any living off the land binary is highly suspect. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1127", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe, triggering a false positive. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe usage. microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319 and is rarely utilized. When investigating, identify the executed code on disk and review. It is not a commonly used process by many applications. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1127"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Although unlikely, limited instances have been identified coming from native Microsoft utilities similar to SCCM. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies msbuild.exe executing from a non-standard path. Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319 and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319. Instances of Visual Studio will run a copy of msbuild.exe. A moved instance of MSBuild is suspicious, however there are instances of build applications that will move or use a copy of MSBuild. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1127", "T1036.003", "T1127.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of msbuild.exe, triggering a false positive. Baselining of MSBuild.exe usage is recommended to better understand it's path usage. Visual Studio runs an instance out of a path that will need to be filtered on. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies child processes spawning from "mshta.exe". The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, parent process "mshta.exe" and its child process. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning mshta.exe. This behavior is indicative of a DCOM object being utilized to spawn mshta from wmiprvse.exe or svchost.exe. In this instance, adversaries may use LethalHTA that will spawn mshta.exe from svchost.exe. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The wevtutil.exe application is the windows event log utility. This searches for wevtutil.exe with parameters for clearing the application, security, setup, trace or system event logs. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070.001", "T1070"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = The wevtutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows event log utility. Administrators may use it to manage Windows event logs. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Windows -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search detects writes to the 'System Volume Information' folder by something other than the System process. -how_to_implement = You need to be ingesting logs with both the process name and command-line from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = It is possible that other utilities or system processes may legitimately write to this folder. Investigate and modify the search to include exceptions as appropriate. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Windows -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects writes to the recycle bin by a process other than explorer.exe. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on filesystem and process logs responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem` nodes. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Because the Recycle Bin is a hidden folder in modern versions of Windows, it would be unusual for a process other than explorer.exe to write to it. Incidents should be investigated as appropriate. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies `svchost.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the Task Scheduler and creating a malicious remote scheduled task, the executed command is spawned as a child process of `svchost.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of svchost.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053", "T1053.005"]} -known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - System Info Gathering Using Dxdiag Application - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic is to detect a suspicious dxdiag.exe process command-line execution. Dxdiag is used to collect the system info of the target host. This technique has been used by Remcos RATS, various actors, and other malware to collect information as part of the recon or collection phase of an attack. This behavior should rarely be seen in a corporate network, but this command line can be used by a network administrator to audit host machine specifications. Thus in some rare cases, this detection will contain false positives in its results. To triage further, analyze what commands were passed after it pipes out the result to a file for further processing. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1592"]} -known_false_positives = This commandline can be used by a network administrator to audit host machine specifications. Thus, a filter is needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - System Information Discovery Detection - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Windows -confidence = medium -explanation = Detect system information discovery techniques used by attackers to understand configurations of the system to further exploit it. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1082"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators debugging servers -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for system processes that typically execute from `C:\Windows\System32\` or `C:\Windows\SysWOW64`. This may indicate a malicious process that is trying to hide as a legitimate process.\ -This detection utilizes a lookup that is deduped `system32` and `syswow64` directories from Server 2016 and Windows 10.\ -During triage, review the parallel processes - what process moved the native Windows binary? identify any artifacts on disk and review. If a remote destination is contacted, what is the reputation? -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = This detection may require tuning based on third party applications utilizing native Windows binaries in non-standard paths. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - System User Discovery With Query - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `query.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover the logged user. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage `query.exe` to identify system users on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - System User Discovery With Whoami - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `whoami.exe` without any arguments. This windows native binary prints out the current logged user. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage `whoami.exe` to identify system users on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for network traffic identified as The Onion Router (TOR), a benign anonymity network which can be abused for a variety of nefarious purposes. -how_to_implement = In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from firewalls or other network control devices that mediate the traffic allowed into an environment. This is necessary so that the search can identify an 'action' taken on the traffic of interest. The search requires the Network_Traffic data model be populated. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071", "T1071.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = None at this time -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Time Provider Persistence Registry - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of time provider registry for persistence and autostart. This technique can allow the attacker to persist on the compromised host and autostart as soon as the machine boot up. This TTP can be a good indicator of suspicious behavior since this registry is not commonly modified by normal user or even an admin. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.003", "T1547"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Trickbot Named Pipe - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = this search is to detect potential trickbot infection through the create/connected named pipe to the system. This technique is used by trickbot to communicate to its c2 to post or get command during infection. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and pipename from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. . -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious loaded unsigned dll by MMC.exe application. This technique is commonly seen in attacker that tries to bypassed UAC feature or gain privilege escalation. This is done by modifying some CLSID registry that will trigger the mmc.exe to load the dll path -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"]} -known_false_positives = unknown. all of the dll loaded by mmc.exe is microsoft signed dll. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a possible uac bypass using the colorui.dll COM Object. this technique was seen in so many malware and ransomware like lockbit where it make use of the colorui.dll COM CLSID to bypass UAC. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.003"]} -known_false_positives = not so common. but 3rd part app may load this dll. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The fsutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows utility used to perform tasks related to the file allocation table (FAT) and NTFS file systems. The update sequence number (USN) change journal provides a log of all changes made to the files on the disk. This search looks for fsutil.exe deleting the USN journal. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8", "CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.DP", "PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = None identified -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for applications on the endpoint that you have marked as uncommon. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. This search uses a lookup file `uncommon_processes_default.csv` to track various features of process names that are usually uncommon in most environments. Please consider updating `uncommon_processes_local.csv` to hunt for processes that are uncommon in your environment. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 2"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} -known_false_positives = None identified -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Unified Messaging Service Spawning a Process - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This detection identifies Microsoft Exchange Server's Unified Messaging services, umworkerprocess.exe and umservice.exe, spawning a child process, indicating possible exploitation of CVE-2021-26857 vulnerability. The query filters out werfault.exe and wermgr.exe mostly due to potential false positives, however, if there is an excessive amount of "wermgr.exe" or "WerFault.exe" failures, it may be due to the active exploitation. During triage, identify any additional suspicious parallel processes. Identify any recent out of place file modifications. Review Exchange logs following Microsofts guide. To contain, perform egress filtering or restrict public access to Exchange. In final, patch the vulnerablity and monitor. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"]} -known_false_positives = Unknown. Tune out child processes as needed to limit volume of false positives. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Uninstall App Using MsiExec - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious un-installation of application using msiexec. This technique was seen in conti leak tool and script where it tries to uninstall AV product using this commandline. This commandline to uninstall product is not a common practice in enterprise network. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.007", "T1218"]} -known_false_positives = unknown. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = Attackers often disable security tools to avoid detection. This search looks for the usage of process `fltMC.exe` to unload a Sysmon Driver that will stop sysmon from collecting the data. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. This search is also shipped with `unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter` macro, update this macro to filter out false positives. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Unloading AMSI via Reflection - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ -This analytic identifies the behavior of AMSI being tampered with. Implemented natively in many frameworks, the command will look similar to `SEtValuE($Null,(New-OBJEct COLlECtionS.GenerIC.HAshSEt{[StrINg]))}$ReF=[ReF].AsSeMbLY.GeTTyPe("System.Management.Automation.Amsi"+"Utils")` taken from Powershell-Empire. \ -During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562"]} -known_false_positives = Potential for some third party applications to disable AMSI upon invocation. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Windows -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search detects loading of unsigned images by LSASS. Deprecated because too noisy. -how_to_implement = This search needs Sysmon Logs with a sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 7 with lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Other tools could load images into LSASS for legitimate reason. But enterprise tools should always use signed DLLs. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search gives you the hosts where a backup was attempted and then failed. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to obtain data from your backup solution, either from the backup logs on your endpoints or from a central server responsible for performing the backups. If you do not use Netbackup, you can modify this search for your specific backup solution. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = None identified -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following hunting analytic leverages Event ID 4769, `A Kerberos service ticket was requested`, to identify an unusual number of computer service ticket requests from one source. When a domain joined endpoint connects to a remote endpoint, it first will request a Kerberos Ticket with the computer name as the Service Name. An endpoint requesting a large number of computer service tickets for different endpoints could represent malicious behavior like lateral movement, malware staging, reconnaissance, etc.\ The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of service requests. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time, the calculation of the `upperBound` field as well as the Outlier calculation. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Exploitation", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} known_false_positives = An single endpoint requesting a large number of computer service tickets is not common behavior. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, administration systeams and missconfigured systems. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Unusual Number of Kerberos Service Tickets Requested - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following hunting analytic leverages Kerberos Event 4769, A Kerberos service ticket was requested, to identify a potential kerberoasting attack against Active Directory networks. Kerberoasting allows an adversary to request kerberos tickets for domain accounts typically used as service accounts and attempt to crack them offline allowing them to obtain privileged access to the domain.\ -The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number service ticket requests. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.003"]} -known_false_positives = An single endpoint requesting a large number of kerberos service tickets is not common behavior. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, administration systems and missconfigured systems. -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - Unusual Number of Remote Endpoint Authentication Events - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following hunting analytic leverages Event ID 4624, `An account was successfully logged on`, to identify an unusual number of remote authentication attempts coming from one source. An endpoint authenticating to a large number of remote endpoints could represent malicious behavior like lateral movement, malware staging, reconnaissance, etc.\ The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual high number of authentication events. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time, the calculation of the `upperBound` field as well as the Outlier calculation. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Event Logs from domain controllers aas well as member servers and workstations. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Logon` within `Logon/Logoff` needs to be enabled. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} known_false_positives = An single endpoint authenticating to a large number of hosts is not common behavior. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, jump servers and missconfigured systems. providing_technologies = [] @@ -9068,74 +8054,24 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives" known_false_positives = Some legitimate applications use long command lines for installs or updates. You should review identified command lines for legitimacy. You may modify the first part of the search to omit legitimate command lines from consideration. If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider changing the value of threshold in the search to a smaller value. You should also periodically re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data. You may get unexpected results if the user identified in the results is not present in the data used to build the associated model. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Web Server -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for unusually long strings in the Content-Type http header that the client sends the server. -how_to_implement = This particular search leverages data extracted from Stream:HTTP. You must configure the http stream using the Splunk Stream App on your Splunk Stream deployment server to extract the cs_content_type field. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 18", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["ID.RA", "RS.MI", "PR.PT", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "PR.MA", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Very few legitimate Content-Type fields will have a length greater than 100 characters. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments that leverage PowerShell environment variables to identify the current logged user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell Script Block - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the use of PowerShell environment variables to identify the current logged user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic is to detect a suspicious wscript commandline to execute vbscript. This technique was seen in several malware to execute malicious vbs file using wscript application. commonly vbs script is associated to cscript process and this can be a technique to evade process parent child detections or even some av script emulation system. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.005", "T1059"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Verclsid CLSID Execution - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic is to detect a possible abuse of verclsid to execute malicious file through generate CLSID. This process is a normal application of windows to verify the CLSID COM object before it is instantiated by Windows Explorer. This hunting query can be a good pivot point to analyze what is he CLSID or COM object pointing too to check if it is a valid application or not. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.012", "T1218"]} -known_false_positives = windows can used this application for its normal COM object validation. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This query identifies a shell, PowerShell.exe or Cmd.exe, spawning from W3WP.exe, or IIS. In addition to IIS logs, this behavior with an EDR product will capture potential webshell activity, similar to the HAFNIUM Group abusing CVEs, on publicly available Exchange mail servers. During triage, review the parent process and child process of the shell being spawned. Review the command-line arguments and any file modifications that may occur. Identify additional parallel process, child processes, that may highlight further commands executed. After triaging, work to contain the threat and patch the system that is vulnerable. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505", "T1505.003"]} -known_false_positives = Baseline your environment before production. It is possible build systems using IIS will spawn cmd.exe to perform a software build. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Java Spawning Shells - Rule] type = detection asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for flags passed to wbadmin.exe (Windows Backup Administrator Tool) that delete backup files. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent recovery. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. Tune based on parent process names. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators may modify the boot configuration. +explanation = The following analytic identifies the process name of java.exe and w3wp.exe spawning a Windows shell. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). The shells included in the macro are "cmd.exe", "powershell.exe". Upon triage, review parallel processes and command-line arguments to determine legitimacy. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. Restrict the analytic to publicly facing endpoints to reduce false positives. Add any additional identified web application process name to the query. Add any further Windows process names to the macro (ex. LOLBins) to further expand this query. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"]} +known_false_positives = Filtering may be required on internal developer build systems or classify assets as web facing and restrict the analytic based on that. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - WinRM Spawning a Process - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic identifies suspicious processes spawning from WinRM (wsmprovhost.exe). This analytic is related to potential exploitation of CVE-2021-31166. which is a kernel-mode device driver http.sys vulnerability. Current proof of concept code will blue-screen the operating system. However, http.sys used by many different Windows processes, including WinRM. In this case, identifying suspicious process create (child processes) from `wsmprovhost.exe` is what this analytic is identifying. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"]} +known_false_positives = Unknown. Add new processes or filter as needed. It is possible system management software may spawn processes from `wsmprovhost.exe`. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule] @@ -9148,31 +8084,6 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Ob known_false_positives = Although unlikely, administrators may use event subscriptions for legitimate purposes. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions. The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscription to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions.\ -All event subscriptions have three components \ -1. Filter - WQL Query for the events we want. EventID = 19 \ -1. Consumer - An action to take upon triggering the filter. EventID = 20 \ -1. Binding - Registers a filter to a consumer. EventID = 21 \ -Monitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding. It may be pertinent to review all 3 to identify the flow of execution. In addition, EventCode 4104 may assist with any other PowerShell script usage that registered the subscription. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be collecting Sysmon data using Sysmon version 6.1 or greater and have Sysmon configured to generate alerts for WMI activity (eventID= 19, 20, 21). In addition, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA installed to properly parse the fields. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.003", "T1546"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = Although unlikely, administrators may use event subscriptions for legitimate purposes. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - WMI Recon Running Process Or Services - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104, where WMI is performing an event query looking for running processes or running services. This technique is commonly found in malware and APT events where the adversary will map all running security applications or services on the compromised machine. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1592"]} -known_false_positives = network administrator may used this command for checking purposes -providing_technologies = [] - [savedsearch://ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule] type = detection asset_type = Endpoint @@ -9183,807 +8094,2096 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Ob known_false_positives = Some software may create WMI temporary event subscriptions for various purposes. The included search contains an exception for two of these that occur by default on Windows 10 systems. You may need to modify the search to create exceptions for other legitimate events. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - WMIC XSL Execution via URL - Rule] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Infrastructure confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies `wmic.exe` loading a remote XSL (eXtensible Stylesheet Language) script. This originally was identified by Casey Smith, dubbed Squiblytwo, as an application control bypass. Many adversaries will utilize this technique to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file. This technique can also execute local/remote scripts and, similar to its Regsvr32 "Squiblydoo" counterpart, leverages a trusted, built-in Windows tool. Adversaries may abuse any alias in Windows Management Instrumentation provided they utilize the /FORMAT switch. Upon identifying a suspicious execution, review for confirmed network connnection and script download. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1220"]} -known_false_positives = False positives are limited as legitimate applications typically do not download files or xsl using WMIC. Filter as needed. +explanation = By enabling Dynamic ARP Inspection as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect ARP Poisoning attacks in the Infrastructure. +how_to_implement = This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with DHCP Snooping (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960x/software/15-0_2_EX/security/configuration_guide/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg_chapter_01101.html) and Dynamic ARP Inspection (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960x/software/15-2_2_e/security/configuration_guide/b_sec_1522e_2960x_cg/b_sec_1522e_2960x_cg_chapter_01111.html) and log with a severity level of minimum "5 - notification". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1557", "T1557.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} +known_false_positives = This search might be prone to high false positives if DHCP Snooping or ARP inspection has been incorrectly configured, or if a device normally sends many ARP packets (unlikely). providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Infrastructure confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry related to UAC bypass. This technique is to modify the registry in this detection, create a registry value with the path of the payload and run WSreset.exe to bypass User account Control. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"]} -known_false_positives = unknown +explanation = By enabling IPv6 First Hop Security as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect various attacks such as packet forging in the Infrastructure. +how_to_implement = This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with one or more First Hop Security measures such as RA Guard, DHCP Guard and/or device tracking. See References for more information. The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1557", "T1557.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} +known_false_positives = None currently known providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = this search is designed to detect potential malicious process loading COM object to wbemprox.dll, -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.003"]} -known_false_positives = legitimate process that are not in the exception list may trigger this event. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Account -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search is used to identify the creation of multiple user accounts using the same email domain name. -how_to_implement = We start with a dataset that provides visibility into the email address used for the account creation. In this example, we are narrowing our search down to the single web page that hosts the Magento2 e-commerce platform (via URI) used for account creation, the single http content-type to grab only the user's clicks, and the http field that provides the username (form_data), for performance reasons. After we have the username and email domain, we look for numerous account creations per email domain. Common data sources used for this detection are customized Apache logs or Splunk Stream. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP"]} -known_false_positives = As is common with many fraud-related searches, we are usually looking to attribute risk or synthesize relevant context with loosely written detections that simply detect anamolous behavior. This search will need to be customized to fit your environment—improving its fidelity by counting based on something much more specific, such as a device ID that may be present in your dataset. Consideration for whether the large number of registrations are occuring from a first-time seen domain may also be important. Extending the search window to look further back in time, or even calculating the average per hour/day for each email domain to look for an anomalous spikes, will improve this search. You can also use Shannon entropy or Levenshtein Distance (both courtesy of URL Toolbox) to consider the randomness or similarity of the email name or email domain, as the names are often machine-generated. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = account -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search is used to examine web sessions to identify those where the clicks are occurring too quickly for a human or are occurring with a near-perfect cadence (high periodicity or low standard deviation), resembling a script driven session. -how_to_implement = Start with a dataset that allows you to see clickstream data for each user click on the website. That data must have a time stamp and must contain a reference to the session identifier being used by the website. This ties the clicks together into clickstreams. This value is usually found in the http cookie. With a bit of tuning, a version of this search could be used in high-volume scenarios, such as scraping, crawling, application DDOS, credit-card testing, account takeover, etc. Common data sources used for this detection are customized Apache logs, customized IIS, and Splunk Stream. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 6"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = As is common with many fraud-related searches, we are usually looking to attribute risk or synthesize relevant context with loosly written detections that simply detect anamoluous behavior. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = account -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search is used to identify user accounts that share a common password. -how_to_implement = We need to start with a dataset that allows us to see the values of usernames and passwords that users are submitting to the website hosting the Magento2 e-commerce platform (commonly found in the HTTP form_data field). A tokenized or hashed value of a password is acceptable and certainly preferable to a clear-text password. Common data sources used for this detection are customized Apache logs, customized IIS, and Splunk Stream. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "nist": ["DE.DP"]} -known_false_positives = As is common with many fraud-related searches, we are usually looking to attribute risk or synthesize relevant context with loosely written detections that simply detect anamoluous behavior. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Web Server -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for suspicious processes on all systems labeled as web servers. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. In addition, web servers will need to be identified in the Assets and Identity Framework of Enterprise Security. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1082"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = Some of these processes may be used legitimately on web servers during maintenance or other administrative tasks. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Wermgr Process Connecting To IP Check Web Services - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = this search is designed to detect suspicious wermgr.exe process that tries to connect to known IP web services. This technique is know for trickbot and other trojan spy malware to recon the infected machine and look for its ip address without so much finger print on the commandline process. Since wermgr.exe is designed for error handling process of windows it is really suspicious that this process is trying to connect to this IP web services cause that maybe cause of some malicious code injection. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, dns query name process path , and query ststus from your endpoints like EventCode 22. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 12 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1590", "T1590.005"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Wermgr Process Create Executable File - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = this search is designed to detect potential malicious wermgr.exe process that drops or create executable file. Since wermgr.exe is an application trigger when error encountered in a process, it is really un ussual to this process to drop executable file. This technique is commonly seen in trickbot malware where it injects it code to this process to execute it malicious behavior like downloading other payload -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of wermgr.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is designed to detect suspicious cmd and powershell process spawned by wermgr.exe process. This suspicious behavior are commonly seen in code injection technique technique like trickbot to execute a shellcode, dll modules to run malicious behavior. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Wget Download and Bash Execution - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of wget on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter. The following Splunk SOAR playbook can be used to respond to this detection: Log4j Investigate The following Splunk SOAR playbook can be used to respond to this detection: Log4j Respond -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"]} -known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed from a user writeable file path.\ -The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not.\ -schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64`.\ -The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory.\ -Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or was it via TaskService. Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1053"]} -known_false_positives = False positives are possible if legitimate applications are allowed to register tasks in public paths. Filter as needed based on paths that are used legitimately. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed with a native Windows shell (PowerShell, Cmd, Wscript, Cscript).\ -The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not.\ -schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64`.\ -The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory.\ -Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1053"]} -known_false_positives = False positives are possible if legitimate applications are allowed to register tasks that call a shell to be spawned. Filter as needed based on command-line or processes that are used legitimately. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following hunting analytic assists with identifying suspicious tasks that have been registered and ran in Windows using EventID 200 (action run) and 201 (action completed). It is recommended to filter based on ActionName by specifying specific paths not used in your environment. After some basic tuning, this may be effective in capturing evasive ways to register tasks on Windows. Review parallel events related to tasks being scheduled. EventID 106 will generate when a new task is generated, however, that does not mean it ran. Capture any files on disk and analyze. -how_to_implement = Task Scheduler logs are required to be collected. Enable logging with inputs.conf by adding a stanza for [WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational] and renderXml=false. Note, not translating it in XML may require a proper extraction of specific items in the Message. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005"]} -known_false_positives = False positives will be present. Filter based on ActionName paths or specify keywords of interest. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - WinRM Spawning a Process - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies suspicious processes spawning from WinRM (wsmprovhost.exe). This analytic is related to potential exploitation of CVE-2021-31166. which is a kernel-mode device driver http.sys vulnerability. Current proof of concept code will blue-screen the operating system. However, http.sys used by many different Windows processes, including WinRM. In this case, identifying suspicious process create (child processes) from `wsmprovhost.exe` is what this analytic is identifying. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation", "Denial of Service"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"]} -known_false_positives = Unknown. Add new processes or filter as needed. It is possible system management software may spawn processes from `wsmprovhost.exe`. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule] type = detection asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for the execution of `adfind.exe` with command-line arguments that it uses by default. Specifically the filter or search functions. It also considers the arguments necessary like objectcategory, see readme for more details: https://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/usage.htm. This has been seen used before by Wizard Spider, FIN6 and actors whom also launched SUNBURST. AdFind.exe is usually used a recon tool to enumare a domain controller. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = administrators rarely use adfind, usually not used for legitimate reasons +explanation = This search looks for outbound ICMP packets with a packet size larger than 1,000 bytes. Various threat actors have been known to use ICMP as a command and control channel for their attack infrastructure. Large ICMP packets from an endpoint to a remote host may be indicative of this activity. +how_to_implement = In order to run this search effectively, we highly recommend that you leverage the Assets and Identity framework. It is important that you have a good understanding of how your network segments are designed and that you are able to distinguish internal from external address space. Add a category named `internal` to the CIDRs that host the company's assets in the `assets_by_cidr.csv` lookup file, which is located in `$SPLUNK_HOME/etc/apps/SA-IdentityManagement/lookups/`. More information on updating this lookup can be found here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.0.0/Admin/Addassetandidentitydata. This search also requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1095"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]} +known_false_positives = ICMP packets are used in a variety of ways to help troubleshoot networking issues and ensure the proper flow of traffic. As such, it is possible that a large ICMP packet could be perfectly legitimate. If large ICMP packets are associated with command and control traffic, there will typically be a large number of these packets observed over time. If the search is providing a large number of false positives, you can modify the macro `detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets_filter` to adjust the byte threshold or add specific IP addresses to an allow list. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of Windows Curl.exe downloading a file to a suspicious location. \ --O or --output is used when a file is to be downloaded and placed in a specified location. \ -During triage, review parallel processes for further behavior. In addition, identify if the download was successful. If a file was downloaded, capture and analyze. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"]} -known_false_positives = It is possible Administrators or super users will use Curl for legitimate purposes. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of Windows Curl.exe uploading a file to a remote destination. \ -`-T` or `--upload-file` is used when a file is to be uploaded to a remotge destination. \ -`-d` or `--data` POST is the HTTP method that was invented to send data to a receiving web application, and it is, for example, how most common HTML forms on the web work. \ -HTTP multipart formposts are done with `-F`, but this appears to not be compatible with the Windows version of Curl. Will update if identified adversary tradecraft. \ -Adversaries may use one of the three methods based on the remote destination and what they are attempting to upload (zip vs txt). During triage, review parallel processes for further behavior. In addition, identify if the upload was successful in network logs. If a file was uploaded, isolate the endpoint and review. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"]} -known_false_positives = False positives may be limited to source control applications and may be required to be filtered out. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows DISM Remove Defender - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of the Windows Disk Image Utility, `dism.exe`, to remove Windows Defender. Adversaries may use `dism.exe` to disable Defender before completing their objective. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"]} -known_false_positives = Some legitimate administrative tools leverage `dism.exe` to manipulate packages and features of the operating system. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic will detect a suspicious process that modify a registry related to windows defender exclusion feature. This registry is abused by adversaries, malware author and red teams to bypassed Windows Defender Anti-Virus product by excluding folder path, file path, process, extensions and etc. from its real time or schedule scan to execute their malicious code. This is a good indicator for a defense evasion and to look further for events after this behavior. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"]} -known_false_positives = admin or user may choose to use this windows features. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies a process that is attempting to disable the ability on Windows to generate a memory crash dump. This was recently identified being utilized by HermeticWiper. To disable crash dumps, the value must be set to 0. This feature is typically modified to perform a memory crash dump when a computer stops unexpectedly because of a Stop error (also known as a blue screen, system crash, or bug check). -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` and `Registry` node. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule] type = detection asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium -explanation = The search looks for the Registry Key DisableAntiSpyware set to disable. This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints. This particular behavior is typically executed when an ransomware actor gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. Endpoint should be isolated. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro to tune the search. +explanation = This search looks for outbound SMB connections made by hosts within your network to the Internet. SMB traffic is used for Windows file-sharing activity. One of the techniques often used by attackers involves retrieving the credential hash using an SMB request made to a compromised server controlled by the threat actor. +how_to_implement = In order to run this search effectively, we highly recommend that you leverage the Assets and Identity framework. It is important that you have good understanding of how your network segments are designed, and be able to distinguish internal from external address space. Add a category named `internal` to the CIDRs that host the companys assets in `assets_by_cidr.csv` lookup file, which is located in `$SPLUNK_HOME/etc/apps/SA-IdentityManagement/lookups/`. More information on updating this lookup can be found here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.0.0/Admin/Addassetandidentitydata. This search also requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command \u0026 Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.002", "T1071"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = It is likely that the outbound Server Message Block (SMB) traffic is legitimate, if the company's internal networks are not well-defined in the Assets and Identity Framework. Categorize the internal CIDR blocks as `internal` in the lookup file to avoid creating notable events for traffic destined to those CIDR blocks. Any other network connection that is going out to the Internet should be investigated and blocked. Best practices suggest preventing external communications of all SMB versions and related protocols at the network boundary. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows DiskCryptor Usage - Rule] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Infrastructure confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies DiskCryptor process name of dcrypt.exe or internal name dcinst.exe. This utility has been utilized by adversaries to encrypt disks manually during an operation. In addition, during install, a dcrypt.sys driver is installed and requires a reboot in order to take effect. There are no command-line arguments used. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"]} -known_false_positives = It is possible false positives may be present based on the internal name dcinst.exe, filter as needed. It may be worthy to alert on the service name. +explanation = By enabling Port Security on a Cisco switch you can restrict input to an interface by limiting and identifying MAC addresses of the workstations that are allowed to access the port. When you assign secure MAC addresses to a secure port, the port does not forward packets with source addresses outside the group of defined addresses. If you limit the number of secure MAC addresses to one and assign a single secure MAC address, the workstation attached to that port is assured the full bandwidth of the port. If a port is configured as a secure port and the maximum number of secure MAC addresses is reached, when the MAC address of a workstation attempting to access the port is different from any of the identified secure MAC addresses, a security violation occurs. +how_to_implement = This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with Port Security and Error Disable for this to work (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst4500/12-2/25ew/configuration/guide/conf/port_sec.html) and log with a severity level of minimum "5 - notification". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Exploitation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1557", "T1557.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} +known_false_positives = This search might be prone to high false positives if you have malfunctioning devices connected to your ethernet ports or if end users periodically connect physical devices to the network. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution - Rule] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Infrastructure confidence = medium -explanation = DiskShadow.exe is a Microsoft Signed binary present on Windows Server. It has a scripting mode intended for complex scripted backup operations. This feature also allows for execution of arbitrary unsigned code. This analytic looks for the usage of the scripting mode flags in executions of DiskShadow. During triage, compare to known backup behavior in your environment and then review the scripts called by diskshadow. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on processes that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition,confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators using the DiskShadow tool in their infrastructure as a main backup tool with scripts will cause false positives that can be filtered with `windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution_filter` +explanation = By enabling DHCP Snooping as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect unauthorized DHCP servers handing out DHCP leases to devices on the network (Man in the Middle attack). +how_to_implement = This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with DHCP Snooping enabled (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960x/software/15-0_2_EX/security/configuration_guide/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg_chapter_01101.html) and log with a severity level of minimum "5 - notification". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1557"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} +known_false_positives = This search might be prone to high false positives if DHCP Snooping has been incorrectly configured or in the unlikely event that the DHCP server has been moved to another network interface. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Network confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies native .net binaries within the Windows operating system that may be abused by adversaries by moving it to a new directory. The analytic identifies the .net binary by using a lookup and compares the process name and original file name (internal name). The analytic utilizes a lookup with the is_net_windows_file macro to identify the binary process name and original file name. if one or the other matches an alert will be generated. Adversaries abuse these binaries as they are native to windows and native DotNet. Note that not all SDK (post install of Windows) are captured in the lookup. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1036.003", "T1218", "T1218.004"]} -known_false_positives = False positives may be present and filtering may be required. Certain utilities will run from non-standard paths based on the third-party application in use. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Event For Service Disabled - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic will identify suspicious system event of services that was modified from start to disabled. This technique is seen where the adversary attempts to disable security app services, other malware services to evade the defense systems on the compromised host -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Windows service update may cause this event. In that scenario, filtering is needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic utilizes Windows Security Event ID 1102 or System log event 104 to identify when a Windows event log is cleared. Note that this analytic will require tuning or restricted to specific endpoints based on criticality. During triage, based on time of day and user, determine if this was planned. If not planned, follow through with reviewing parallel alerts and other data sources to determine what else may have occurred. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows event logs from your hosts. In addition, the Splunk Windows TA is needed. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070", "T1070.001"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "PR.IP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = It is possible that these logs may be legitimately cleared by Administrators. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic will identify suspicious excessive number of system events of services that was modified from start to disabled. This technique is seen where the adversary attempts to disable security app services, other malware services oer serve as an destructive impact to complete the objective on the compromised system. One good example for this scenario is Olympic destroyer where it disable all active services in the compromised host as part of its destructive impact and defense evasion. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +explanation = This search looks for commands that the SNICat tool uses in the TLS SNI field. +how_to_implement = You must be ingesting Zeek SSL data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format. We are detecting when any of the predefined SNICat commands are found within the server_name (SNI) field. These commands are LIST, LS, SIZE, LD, CB, EX, ALIVE, EXIT, WHERE, and finito. You can go further once this has been detected, and run other searches to decode the SNI data to prove or disprove if any data exfiltration has taken place. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1041"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"]} known_false_positives = Unknown providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder - Rule] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Infrastructure confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic is to look for suspicious file creation in the critical folder like "System32\Drivers" folder without file extension. This artifacts was seen in latest hermeticwiper where it drops its driver component in Driver Directory both the compressed(without file extension) and the actual driver component (with .sys file extension). This TTP is really a good indication that a host might be compromised by this destructive malware that wipes the boot sector of the system. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Unknown at this point +explanation = Adversaries may abuse netbooting to load an unauthorized network device operating system from a Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) server. TFTP boot (netbooting) is commonly used by network administrators to load configuration-controlled network device images from a centralized management server. Netbooting is one option in the boot sequence and can be used to centralize, manage, and control device images. +how_to_implement = This search looks for Network Traffic events to TFTP, FTP or SSH/SCP ports from network devices. Make sure to tag any network devices as network, router or switch in order for this detection to work. If the TFTP traffic doesn't traverse a firewall nor packet inspection, these events will not be logged. This is typically an issue if the TFTP server is on the same subnet as the network device. There is also a chance of the network device loading software using a DHCP assigned IP address (netboot) which is not in the Asset inventory. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1542.005", "T1542"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} +known_false_positives = This search will also report any legitimate attempts of software downloads to network devices as well as outbound SSH sessions from network devices. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows High File Deletion Frequency - Rule] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Infrastructure confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for high frequency of file deletion relative to process name and process id. These events usually happen when the ransomware tries to encrypt the files with the ransomware file extensions and sysmon treat the original files to be deleted as soon it was replace as encrypted data. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the deleted target file name, process name and process id from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485"]} -known_false_positives = user may delete bunch of pictures or files in a folder. +explanation = Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to automate data exfiltration over compromised network infrastructure. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some network devices and used for network analysis and may be configured to duplicate traffic and forward to one or more destinations for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring device. +how_to_implement = This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must log with a severity level of minimum "5 - notification". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices and that the devices have been configured according to the documentation of the Cisco Networks Add-on. Also note that an attacker may disable logging from the device prior to enabling traffic mirroring. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1200", "T1020", "T1498", "T1020.001"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} +known_false_positives = This search will return false positives for any legitimate traffic captures by network administrators. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Infrastructure confidence = medium -explanation = The following hunting analytic identifies all processes requesting access into Lsass.exe. his behavior may be related to credential dumping or applications requiring access to credentials. Triaging this event will require understanding the GrantedAccess from the SourceImage. In addition, whether the account is privileged or not. Review the process requesting permissions and review parallel processes. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Enabling EventCode 10 TargetProcess lsass.exe is required. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = False positives will occur based on GrantedAccess and SourceUser, filter based on source image as needed. +explanation = By populating the organization's assets within the assets_by_str.csv, we will be able to detect unauthorized devices that are trying to connect with the organization's network by inspecting DHCP request packets, which are issued by devices when they attempt to obtain an IP address from the DHCP server. The MAC address associated with the source of the DHCP request is checked against the list of known devices, and reports on those that are not found. +how_to_implement = This search uses the Network_Sessions data model shipped with Enterprise Security. It leverages the Assets and Identity framework to populate the assets_by_str.csv file located in SA-IdentityManagement, which will contain a list of known authorized organizational assets including their MAC addresses. Ensure that all inventoried systems have their MAC address populated. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} +known_false_positives = This search might be prone to high false positives. Please consider this when conducting analysis or investigations. Authorized devices may be detected as unauthorized. If this is the case, verify the MAC address of the system responsible for the false positive and add it to the Assets and Identity framework with the proper information. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft - Rule] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary loading `vaultcli.dll` and Samlib.dll`. This technique may be used to execute code to bypassing application control and capture credentials by utilizing a tool like MimiKatz. \ -When `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \ -If used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \ -During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and module loads from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.004", "T1218"]} -known_false_positives = Typically this will not trigger as by it's very nature InstallUtil does not need credentials. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary making a remote network connection. This technique may be used to download and execute code while bypassing application control. \ -When `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \ -If used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \ -During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Ports` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.004", "T1218"]} -known_false_positives = Limited false positives should be present as InstallUtil is not typically used to download remote files. Filter as needed based on Developers requirements. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary passing a HTTP request on the command-line. This technique may be used to download and execute code while bypassing application control. \ -When `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \ -If used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \ -During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.004", "T1218"]} -known_false_positives = Limited false positives should be present as InstallUtil is not typically used to download remote files. Filter as needed based on Developers requirements. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary. This will execute code while bypassing application control using the `/u` (uninstall) switch. \ -InstallUtil uses the functions install and uninstall within the System.Configuration.Install namespace to process .net assembly. Install function requires admin privileges, however, uninstall function can be run as an unprivileged user.\ -When `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \ -If used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \ -During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.004", "T1218"]} -known_false_positives = Limited false positives should be present. Filter as needed by parent process or application. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary making a remote network connection. This technique may be used to download and execute code while bypassing application control using the `/u` (uninstall) switch. \ -InstallUtil uses the functions install and uninstall within the System.Configuration.Install namespace to process .net assembly. Install function requires admin privileges, however, uninstall function can be run as an unprivileged user.\ -When `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \ -If used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \ -During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Ports` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.004", "T1218"]} -known_false_positives = Limited false positives should be present as InstallUtil is not typically used to download remote files. Filter as needed based on Developers requirements. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies the Windows binary InstallUtil.exe running from a non-standard location. The analytic utilizes a macro for InstallUtil and identifies both the process_name and original_file_name. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1036.003", "T1218", "T1218.004"]} -known_false_positives = False positives may be present and filtering may be required. Certain utilities will run from non-standard paths based on the third-party application in use. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Java Spawning Shells - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies the process name of java.exe and w3wp.exe spawning a Windows shell. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). The shells included in the macro are "cmd.exe", "powershell.exe". Upon triage, review parallel processes and command-line arguments to determine legitimacy. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. Restrict the analytic to publicly facing endpoints to reduce false positives. Add any additional identified web application process name to the query. Add any further Windows process names to the macro (ex. LOLBins) to further expand this query. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"]} -known_false_positives = Filtering may be required on internal developer build systems or classify assets as web facing and restrict the analytic based on that. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic is to look for suspicious registry modification related to file compression color and information tips. This IOC was seen in hermetic wiper where it has a thread that will create this registry entry to change the color of compressed or encrypted files in NTFS file system as well as the pop up information tips. This is a good indicator that a process tries to modified one of the registry GlobalFolderOptions related to file compression attribution in terms of color in NTFS file system. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Registry` node. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +explanation = This search detects SIGRed via Splunk Stream. +how_to_implement = You must be ingesting Splunk Stream DNS and Splunk Stream TCP. We are detecting SIG and KEY records via stream:dns and TCP payload over 65KB in size via stream:tcp. Replace the macro definitions ('stream:dns' and 'stream:tcp') with configurations for your Splunk environment. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1203"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of AdvancedRun.exe. AdvancedRun.exe has similar capabilities as other remote programs like psexec. AdvancedRun may also ingest a configuration file with all settings defined and perform its activity. The analytic is written in a way to identify a renamed binary and also the common command-line arguments. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1588.002"]} -known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as it is specific to AdvancedRun. Filter as needed based on legitimate usage. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows NirSoft Utilities - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following hunting analytic assists with identifying the proces execution of commonly used utilities from NirSoft. Potentially not adversary behavior, but worth identifying to know if the software is present and being used. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1588.002"]} -known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Filtering may be required before setting to alert. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies non SYSTEM accounts requesting access to lsass.exe. This behavior may be related to credential dumping or applications requiring access to credentials. Triaging this event will require understanding the GrantedAccess from the SourceImage. In addition, whether the account is privileged or not. Review the process requesting permissions and review parallel processes. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Enabling EventCode 10 TargetProcess lsass.exe is required. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = False positives will occur based on legitimate application requests, filter based on source image as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic is an enhanced version of two previous analytics that identifies common GrantedAccess permission requests and CallTrace DLLs in order to detect credential dumping. \ -GrantedAccess is the requested permissions by the SourceImage into the TargetImage. \ -CallTrace Stack trace of where open process is called. Included is the DLL and the relative virtual address of the functions in the call stack right before the open process call. \ -dbgcore.dll or dbghelp.dll are two core Windows debug DLLs that have minidump functions which provide a way for applications to produce crashdump files that contain a useful subset of the entire process context. \ -The idea behind using ntdll.dll is to blend in by using native api of ntdll.dll. For example in sekurlsa module there are many ntdll exported api, like RtlCopyMemory, used to execute this module which is related to lsass dumping. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Enabling EventCode 10 TargetProcess lsass.exe is required. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = False positives will occur based on GrantedAccess 0x1010 and 0x1400, filter based on source image as needed or remove them. Concern is Cobalt Strike usage of Mimikatz will generate 0x1010 initially, but later be caught. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic is to look for process commandline that contains named pipe. This technique was seen in some adversaries, threat actor and malware like olympic destroyer to communicate to its other child processes after process injection that serve as defense evasion and privilege escalation. On the other hand this analytic may catch some normal process that using this technique for example browser application. In that scenario we include common process path we've seen during testing that cause false positive which is the program files. False positive may still be arise if the normal application is in other folder path. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Normal browser application may use this technique. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Raccine Scheduled Task Deletion - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies the Raccine Rules Updater scheduled task being deleted. Adversaries may attempt to remove this task in order to prevent the update of Raccine. Raccine is a "ransomware vaccine" created by security researcher Florian Roth, designed to intercept and prevent precursors and active ransomware behavior. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]} -known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, however filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Rasautou DLL Execution - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies the Windows Windows Remote Auto Dialer, rasautou.exe executing an arbitrary DLL. This technique is used to execute arbitrary shellcode or DLLs via the rasautou.exe LOLBin capability. During triage, review parent and child process behavior including file and image loads. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055.001", "T1218", "T1055"]} -known_false_positives = False positives will be limited to applications that require Rasautou.exe to load a DLL from disk. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic is to look for suspicious raw access read to device disk partition of the host machine. This technique was seen in several attacks by adversaries or threat actor to wipe, encrypt or overwrite the boot sector of each partition as part of their impact payload for example the "hermeticwiper" malware. This detection is a good indicator that there is a process try to read or write on boot sector. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the raw access read event (like sysmon eventcode 9), process name and process guid from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1561.002", "T1561"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = This event is really notable but we found minimal number of normal application from system32 folder like svchost.exe accessing it too. In this case we used 'system32' and 'syswow64' path as a filter for this detection. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic is to look for suspicious raw access read to drive where the master boot record is placed. This technique was seen in several attacks by adversaries or threat actor to wipe, encrypt or overwrite the master boot record code as part of their impact payload. This detection is a good indicator that there is a process try to read or write on MBR sector. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the raw access read event (like sysmon eventcode 9), process name and process guid from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1561.002", "T1561"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = This event is really notable but we found minimal number of normal application from system32 folder like svchost.exe accessing it too. In this case we used 'system32' and 'syswow64' path as a filter for this detection. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Remote Assistance Spawning Process - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of Microsoft Remote Assistance, msra.exe, spawning PowerShell.exe or cmd.exe as a child process. Msra.exe by default has no command-line arguments and typically spawns itself. It will generate a network connection to the remote system that is connected. This behavior is indicative of another process injected into msra.exe. Review the parent process or cross process events to identify source. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} -known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, filter as needed. Add additional shells as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Schtasks Create Run As System - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies Schtasks.exe creating a new task to start and run as an elevated user - SYSTEM. This is commonly used by adversaries to spawn a process in an elevated state. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1053"]} -known_false_positives = False positives will be limited to legitimate applications creating a task to run as SYSTEM. Filter as needed based on parent process, or modify the query to have world writeable paths to restrict it. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule] type = detection asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium -explanation = The search looks for a Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) was stopped via command-line. This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records the process-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Processes data-model object. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1489"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = SAM is a critical windows service, stopping it would cause major issues on an endpoint this makes false positive rare. AlthoughNo false positives have been identified. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Service Created With Suspicious Service Path - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytc uses Windows Event Id 7045, `New Service Was Installed`, to identify the creation of a Windows Service where the service binary path path is located in a non-common Service folder in Windows. Red Teams and adversaries alike may create malicious Services for lateral movement or remote code execution as well as persistence and execution. The Clop ransomware has also been seen in the wild abusing Windows services. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569", "T1569.002"]} -known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may install services with uncommon services paths. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Service Created Within Public Path - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytc uses Windows Event Id 7045, `New Service Was Installed`, to identify the creation of a Windows Service where the service binary path is located in public paths. This behavior could represent the installation of a malicious service. Red Teams and adversaries alike may create malicious Services for lateral movement or remote code execution -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543", "T1543.003"]} -known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may install services with uncommon services paths. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic is to look for suspicious modification or creation of registry to have service entry. This technique is abused by adversaries or threat actor to persist, gain privileges in the machine or even lateral movement. This technique can be executed using reg.exe application or using windows API like for example the CrashOveride malware. This detection is a good indicator that a process is trying to create a service entry using registry ImagePath. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Third party tools may used this technique to create services but not so common. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Service Creation on Remote Endpoint - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `sc.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to create a Windows Service on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Service Control Manager for lateral movement and remote code execution. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543", "T1543.003"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators may create Windows Services on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Service Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `sc.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to start a Windows Service on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Service Control Manager for lateral movement and remote code execution. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543", "T1543.003"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators may start Windows Services on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows WMI Process Call Create - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic is to look for wmi commandlines to execute or create process. This technique was used by adversaries or threat actor to execute their malicious payload in local or remote host. This hunting query is a good pivot to start to look further which process trigger the wmi or what process it execute locally or remotely. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators may execute this command for testing or auditing. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search looks for the Console Window Host process (connhost.exe) executed using the force flag -ForceV1. This is not regular behavior in the Windows OS and is often seen executed by the Ryuk Ransomware. DEPRECATED This event is actually seen in the windows 10 client of attack_range_local. After further testing we realized this is not specific to Ryuk. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records the process-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Processes data-model object. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = This process should not be ran forcefully, we have not see any false positives for this detection -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search looks for modifications to the hosts file on all Windows endpoints across your environment. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records the file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint.Filesystem data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or by other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system reads and writes. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = There may be legitimate reasons for system administrators to add entries to this file. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Winhlp32 Spawning a Process - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies winhlp32.exe, found natively in `c:\windows\`, spawning a child process that loads a file out of appdata, programdata, or temp. Winhlp32.exe has a rocky past in that multiple vulnerabilities were found and added to MetaSploit. WinHlp32.exe is required to display 32-bit Help files that have the ".hlp" file name extension. This particular instance is related to a Remcos sample where dynwrapx.dll is added to the registry under inprocserver32, and later module loaded by winhlp32.exe to spawn wscript.exe and load a vbs or file from disk. During triage, review parallel processes to identify further suspicious behavior. Review module loads for unsuspecting unsigned modules. Capture any file modifications and analyze. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} -known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as winhlp32.exe is typically not used with the latest flavors of Windows OS. However, filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Winword Spawning Cmd - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following detection identifies Microsoft Word spawning `cmd.exe`. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with winword.exe. Winword.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16` (version will vary). Cmd.exe spawning from winword.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command-line will indicate what is being executed. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. It is possible that COM is utilized to trampoline the child process to `explorer.exe` or `wmiprvse.exe`. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"]} -known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Winword Spawning PowerShell - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following detection identifies Microsoft Word spawning PowerShell. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with winword.exe. Winword.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16` (version will vary). PowerShell spawning from winword.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command executed will most likely be encoded and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"]} -known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Winword Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following detection identifies Microsoft Winword.exe spawning Windows Script Host - `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe`. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with Winword.exe. Winword.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16` (version will vary). `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` default location is `c:\windows\system32\` or c:windows\syswow64\`. `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` spawning from Winword.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command-line executed will most likely be obfuscated and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. Review the reputation of the remote destination and block accordingly. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"]} -known_false_positives = There will be limited false positives and it will be different for every environment. Tune by child process or command-line as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Wmic Group Discovery - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following hunting analytic identifies the use of `wmic.exe` enumerating local groups on the endpoint. \ -Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \ -During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.001"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Wmic NonInteractive App Uninstallation - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic is to detect a suspicious wmic commandlined that uninstall application non interactively. This technique was seen in IceID to uninstall av products to the compromised host to bypassed and evade detections. This Hunting query maybe a good indicator that some process tries to uninstall application using wmic which is not a common behavior. This approach may seen in some script or third part appication to uninstall their application but it is a good thing to check what it uninstall and why. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"]} -known_false_positives = third party application may use this approach to uninstall there application -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Wmiprsve LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies `wmiprsve.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), the executed command is spawned as a child process of `wmiprvse.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of wmiprvse.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"]} -known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic identifies a suspicious spawned process by WScript or CScript process. This technique was a common technique used by adversaries and malware to execute different LOLBIN, other scripts like PowerShell or spawn a suspended process to inject its code as a defense evasion. This TTP may detect some normal script that using several application tool that are in the list of the child process it detects but a good pivot and indicator that a script is may execute suspicious code. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055", "T1543", "T1134.004", "T1134"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators may create vbs or js script that use several tool as part of its execution. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Wsmprovhost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies `Wsmprovhost.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the Windows Remote Management (WinRm) protocol, the executed command is spawned as a child processs of `Wsmprovhost.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of Wsmprovhost.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.006"]} -known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - XMRIG Driver Loaded - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic identifies XMRIG coinminer driver installation on the system. The XMRIG driver name by default is `WinRing0x64.sys`. This cpu miner is an open source project that is commonly abused by adversaries to infect and mine bitcoin. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the driver loaded and Signature from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.003", "T1543"]} -known_false_positives = False positives should be limited. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - XSL Script Execution With WMIC - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious wmic.exe process or renamed wmic process to execute malicious xsl file. This technique was seen in FIN7 to execute its malicous jscript using the .xsl as the loader with the help of wmic.exe process. This TTP is really a good indicator for you to hunt further for FIN7 or other attacker that known to used this technique. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1220"]} +explanation = This search detects SIGRed via Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data. +how_to_implement = You must be ingesting Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format. We are detecting SIG and KEY records via bro:dns:json and TCP payload over 65KB in size via bro:conn:json. The Network Resolution and Network Traffic datamodels are in use for this search. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1203"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = AWS Account +asset_type = Network confidence = medium -explanation = This search provides detection of an user attaching itself to a different role trust policy. This can be used for lateral movement and escalation of privileges. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add-on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} -known_false_positives = Attach to policy can create a lot of noise. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse (i.e status=failure). The search can provide context for common users attaching themselves to higher privilege policies or even newly created policies. +explanation = This search detects attempts to run exploits for the Zerologon CVE-2020-1472 vulnerability via Zeek RPC +how_to_implement = You must be ingesting Zeek DCE-RPC data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format. We are detecting when all three RPC operations (NetrServerReqChallenge, NetrServerAuthenticate3, NetrServerPasswordSet2) are splunk_security_essentials_app via bro:rpc:json. These three operations are then correlated on the Zeek UID field. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule] +[savedsearch://ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = AWS Account +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium -explanation = This search provides detection of accounts creating permanent keys. Permanent keys are not created by default and they are only needed for programmatic calls. Creation of Permanent key is an important event to monitor. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} -known_false_positives = Not all permanent key creations are malicious. If there is a policy of rotating keys this search can be adjusted to provide better context. +explanation = This search allows you to identify DNS requests that are unusually large for the record type being requested in your environment. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. In addition, the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or greater must be installed on your search heads, along with any required dependencies. Finally, the support search "Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK" must be executed before this detection search, because it builds a machine-learning (ML) model over the historical data used by this search. It is important that this search is run in the same app context as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild the model with the latest data available in your environment.\ +This search produces fields (`query`,`query_length`,`count`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** DNS Query, **Field:** query\ +1. \ +1. **Label:** DNS Query Length, **Field:** query_length\ +1. \ +1. **Label:** Number of events, **Field:** count\ +Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.004", "T1071"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider reducing the value for threshold in the search. You should also periodically re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = AWS Account +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium -explanation = This search provides detection of role creation by IAM users. Role creation is an event by itself if user is creating a new role with trust policies different than the available in AWS and it can be used for lateral movement and escalation of privileges. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add-on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} -known_false_positives = CreateRole is not very common in common users. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse. In general AWS provides plenty of trust policies that fit most use cases. +explanation = This search identifies DNS query failures by counting the number of DNS responses that do not indicate success, and trigger on more than 50 occurrences. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you must ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.004", "T1071"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = It is possible legitimate traffic can trigger this rule. Please investigate as appropriate. The threshold for generating an event can also be customized to better suit your environment. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = AWS Account +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium -explanation = This search provides detection of suspicious use of sts:AssumeRole. These tokens can be created on the go and used by attackers to move laterally and escalate privileges. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} -known_false_positives = Sts:AssumeRole can be very noisy as it is a standard mechanism to provide cross account and cross resources access. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse. +explanation = This search looks for an increase of data transfers from your email server to your clients. This could be indicative of a malicious actor collecting data using your email server. +how_to_implement = This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model. Your email servers must be categorized as "email_server" for the search to work, as well. You may need to adjust the deviation_threshold and minimum_data_samples values based on the network traffic in your environment. The "deviation_threshold" field is a multiplying factor to control how much variation you're willing to tolerate. The "minimum_data_samples" field is the minimum number of connections of data samples required for the statistic to be valid. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.002", "T1114"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"]} +known_false_positives = The false-positive rate will vary based on how you set the deviation_threshold and data_samples values. Our recommendation is to adjust these values based on your network traffic to and from your email servers. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = AWS Account +asset_type = DNS Servers confidence = medium -explanation = This search provides detection of suspicious use of sts:GetSessionToken. These tokens can be created on the go and used by attackers to move laterally and escalate privileges. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add-on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1550"]} -known_false_positives = Sts:GetSessionToken can be very noisy as in certain environments numerous calls of this type can be executed. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse. In specific environments the use of field requestParameters.serialNumber will need to be used. +explanation = The search is used to identify attempts to use your DNS Infrastructure for DDoS purposes via a DNS amplification attack leveraging ANY queries. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you must ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 11", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1498", "T1498.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "PR.IP"]} +known_false_positives = Legitimate ANY requests may trigger this search, however it is unusual to see a large volume of them under typical circumstances. You may modify the threshold in the search to better suit your environment. providing_technologies = [] -[savedsearch://ESCU - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule] type = detection -asset_type = GCP Account +asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides detection of possible GCP Oauth token abuse. GCP Oauth token without time limit can be exfiltrated and reused for keeping access sessions alive without further control of authentication, allowing attackers to access and move laterally. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message logs -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} -known_false_positives = GCP Oauth token abuse detection will only work if there are access policies in place along with audit logs. +explanation = This search looks for network traffic defined by port and transport layer protocol in the Enterprise Security lookup table "lookup_interesting_ports", that is marked as prohibited, and has an associated 'allow' action in the Network_Traffic data model. This could be indicative of a misconfigured network device. +how_to_implement = In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from firewalls or other network control devices that mediate the traffic allowed into an environment. This is necessary so that the search can identify an 'action' taken on the traffic of interest. The search requires the Network_Traffic data model be populated. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Command \u0026 Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC"]} +known_false_positives = None identified +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for network traffic on common ports where a higher layer protocol does not match the port that is being used. For example, this search should identify cases where protocols other than HTTP are running on TCP port 80. This can be used by attackers to circumvent firewall restrictions, or as an attempt to hide malicious communications over ports and protocols that are typically allowed and not well inspected. +how_to_implement = Running this search properly requires a technology that can inspect network traffic and identify common protocols. Technologies such as Bro and Palo Alto Networks firewalls are two examples that will identify protocols via inspection, and not just assume a specific protocol based on the transport protocol and ports. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1048"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC"]} +known_false_positives = None identified +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic identifies cleartext protocols at risk of leaking sensitive information. Currently, this consists of legacy protocols such as telnet (port 23), POP3 (port 110), IMAP (port 143), and non-anonymous FTP (port 21) sessions. While some of these protocols may be used over SSL, they typically are found on different assigned ports in those instances. +how_to_implement = This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic, and populating the Network_Traffic data model. For more accurate result it's better to limit destination to organization private and public IP range, like All_Traffic.dest IN(192.168.0.0/16,172.16.0.0/12,10.0.0.0/8, x.x.x.x/22) +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]} +known_false_positives = Some networks may use kerberized FTP or telnet servers, however, this is rare. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for RDP application network traffic and filters any source/destination pair generating more than twice the standard deviation of the average traffic. +how_to_implement = You must ensure that your network traffic data is populating the Network_Traffic data model. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 9", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} +known_false_positives = RDP gateways may have unusually high amounts of traffic from all other hosts' RDP applications in the network. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for network traffic on TCP/3389, the default port used by remote desktop. While remote desktop traffic is not uncommon on a network, it is usually associated with known hosts. This search will ignore common RDP sources and common RDP destinations so you can focus on the uncommon uses of remote desktop on your network. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to identify systems that commonly originate remote desktop traffic and that commonly receive remote desktop traffic. You can use the included support search "Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic" to identify systems that originate the traffic and the search "Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic" to identify systems that receive a lot of remote desktop traffic. After identifying these systems, you will need to add the "common_rdp_source" or "common_rdp_destination" category to that system depending on the usage, using the Enterprise Security Assets and Identities framework. This can be done by adding an entry in the assets.csv file located in SA-IdentityManagement/lookups. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 9", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} +known_false_positives = Remote Desktop may be used legitimately by users on the network. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for spikes in the number of Server Message Block (SMB) traffic connections. +how_to_implement = This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic logs and populating the `Network_Traffic` data model. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = A file server may experience high-demand loads that could cause this analytic to trigger. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search uses the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) to identify spikes in the number of Server Message Block (SMB) connections. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. In addition, the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or greater must be installed on your search heads, along with any required dependencies. Finally, the support search "Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK" must be executed before this detection search, because it builds a machine-learning (ML) model over the historical data used by this search. It is important that this search is run in the same app context as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild the model with the latest data available in your environment.\ +This search produces a field (Number of events,count) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. This field contributes additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following field, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry): \ +1. **Label:** Number of events, **Field:** count\ +Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review is found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider reducing the value of the threshold in the search. You should also periodically re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data. Please update the `smb_traffic_spike_mltk_filter` macro to filter out false positive results +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for network traffic identified as The Onion Router (TOR), a benign anonymity network which can be abused for a variety of nefarious purposes. +how_to_implement = In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from firewalls or other network control devices that mediate the traffic allowed into an environment. This is necessary so that the search can identify an 'action' taken on the traffic of interest. The search requires the Network_Traffic data model be populated. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071", "T1071.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]} +known_false_positives = None at this time +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Web Server +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for unusually long strings in the Content-Type http header that the client sends the server. +how_to_implement = This particular search leverages data extracted from Stream:HTTP. You must configure the http stream using the Splunk Stream App on your Splunk Stream deployment server to extract the cs_content_type field. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 18", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["ID.RA", "RS.MI", "PR.PT", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "PR.MA", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = Very few legitimate Content-Type fields will have a length greater than 100 characters. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Web Server +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for specific GET or HEAD requests to web servers that are indicative of reconnaissance attempts to identify vulnerable JBoss servers. JexBoss is described as the exploit tool of choice for this malicious activity. +how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data from the web server or network traffic that contains web specific information, and populating the Web data model. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1082"]} +known_false_positives = It's possible for legitimate HTTP requests to be made to URLs containing the suspicious paths. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902 - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Network +confidence = medium +explanation = This search detects remote code exploit attempts on F5 BIG-IP, BIG-IQ, and Traffix SDC devices +how_to_implement = To consistently detect exploit attempts on F5 devices using the vulnerabilities contained within CVE-2020-5902 it is recommended to ingest logs via syslog. As many BIG-IP devices will have SSL enabled on their management interfaces, detections via wire data may not pick anything up unless you are decrypting SSL traffic in order to inspect it. I am using a regex string from a Cloudflare mitigation technique to try and always catch the offending string (..;), along with the other exploit of using (hsqldb;). +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = unknown +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Web Server +confidence = medium +explanation = This search is used to detect malicious HTTP requests crafted to exploit jmx-console in JBoss servers. The malicious requests have a long URL length, as the payload is embedded in the URL. +how_to_implement = You must ingest data from the web server or capture network data that contains web specific information with solutions such as Bro or Splunk Stream, and populating the Web data model +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 4", "CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["ID.RA", "PR.PT", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "PR.MA", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = No known false positives for this detection. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for Web requests to faux domains similar to the one that you want to have monitored for abuse. +how_to_implement = You need to ingest data from your web traffic. This can be accomplished by indexing data from a web proxy, or using a network traffic analysis tool, such as Bro or Splunk Stream. You also need to have run the search "ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names", which creates the permutations of the domain that will be checked for. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} +known_false_positives = None at this time +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - SQL Injection with Long URLs - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Database Server +confidence = medium +explanation = This search looks for long URLs that have several SQL commands visible within them. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be monitoring network communications to your web servers or ingesting your HTTP logs and populating the Web data model. You must also identify your web servers in the Enterprise Security assets table. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 13", "CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "ID.RA", "PR.PT", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = It's possible that legitimate traffic will have long URLs or long user agent strings and that common SQL commands may be found within the URL. Please investigate as appropriate. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Web Server +confidence = medium +explanation = This search aims to detect the Supernova webshell used in the SUNBURST attack. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be monitoring web traffic to your Solarwinds Orion. The logs should be ingested into splunk and populating/mapped to the Web data model. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 13", "CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "ID.RA", "PR.PT", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = There might be false positives associted with this detection since items like args as a web argument is pretty generic. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = Malicious actors often abuse legitimate Dynamic DNS services to host malicious payloads or interactive command and control nodes. Attackers will automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to countless IP addresses to circumvent firewall blocks, block lists as well as frustrate a network defenders analytic and investigative processes. This search will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains. +how_to_implement = First, you'll need to ingest data from your DNS operations. This can be done by ingesting logs from your server or data, collected passively by Splunk Stream or a similar solution. Specifically, data that contains the domain that is being queried and the IP of the host originating the request must be populating the `Network_Resolution` data model. This search also leverages a lookup file, `dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv`, which contains a non-exhaustive list of Dynamic DNS providers. Please consider updating the local lookup periodically by adding new domains to the list of `dynamic_dns_providers_local.csv`.\ +This search produces fields (query, answer, isDynDNS) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable event. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review. Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** DNS Query, **Field:** query\ +1. \ +1. **Label:** DNS Answer, **Field:** answer\ +1. \ +1. **Label:** IsDynamicDNS, **Field:** isDynDNS\ +Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1189"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = Some users and applications may leverage Dynamic DNS to reach out to some domains on the Internet since dynamic DNS by itself is not malicious, however this activity must be verified. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = Malicious actors often abuse misconfigured LDAP servers or applications that use the LDAP servers in organizations. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. This search will help determine if you have any LDAP connections to IP addresses outside of private (RFC1918) address space. +how_to_implement = You must be ingesting Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format and should be mapped to the Network Traffic datamodels that are in use for this search. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190", "T1059"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = Unknown at this moment. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. Please check those servers to verify if the activity is legitimate. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search allows you to identify DNS requests and compute the standard deviation on the length of the names being resolved, then filter on two times the standard deviation to show you those queries that are unusually large for your environment. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1048"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = It's possible there can be long domain names that are legitimate. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search is designed to detect high frequency of archive files data exfiltration through HTTP POST method protocol. This are one of the common techniques used by APT or trojan spy after doing the data collection like screenshot, recording, sensitive data to the infected machines. The attacker may execute archiving command to the collected data, save it a temp folder with a hidden attribute then send it to its C2 through HTTP POST. Sometimes adversaries will rename the archive files or encode/encrypt to cover their tracks. This detection can detect a renamed archive files transfer to HTTP POST since it checks the request body header. Unfortunately this detection cannot support archive that was encrypted or encoded before doing the exfiltration. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the stream HTTP logs or network logs that catch network traffic. Make sure that the http-request-body, payload, or request field is enabled in stream http configuration. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1048"]} +known_false_positives = Normal archive transfer via HTTP protocol may trip this detection. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search is to detect potential plain HTTP POST method data exfiltration. This network traffic is commonly used by trickbot, trojanspy, keylogger or APT adversary where arguments or commands are sent in plain text to the remote C2 server using HTTP POST method as part of data exfiltration. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the stream HTTP logs or network logs that catch network traffic. Make sure that the http-request-body, payload, or request field is enabled. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1048"]} +known_false_positives = unknown +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we first limit the scope of our search to the Web Datamodel and use the `| from datamodel` function to benefit from schema accelerated searching capabilities, mainly because the second part of the detection is pretty heavy, it runs a regex across all _raw events that looks for `${jndi:ldap://` pattern across all potential web fields available to the raw data, like http headers for example. If you see results for this detection, it means that there was a attempt at a injection, which could be a reconnaissance activity or a valid expliotation attempt, but this does not exactly mean that the host was indeed successfully exploited. +how_to_implement = This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we match the invocation function with a network connection to a malicious ip address. +how_to_implement = This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives. providing_technologies = [] ### END DETECTIONS ### +### STORIES ### + +[analytic_story://IcedID] +category = Malware +last_updated = 2021-07-29 +version = 1 +references = ["https://threatpost.com/icedid-banking-trojan-surges-emotet/165314/", "https://app.any.run/tasks/48414a33-3d66-4a46-afe5-c2003bb55ccf/"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Account Discovery With Net App - Rule", "ESCU - CHCP Command Execution - Rule", "ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread In Shell Application - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Schedule Task - Rule", "ESCU - Drop IcedID License dat - Rule", "ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - IcedID Exfiltrated Archived File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 DNSQuery - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files - Rule", "ESCU - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule", "ESCU - Sqlite Module In Temp Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 PluginInit - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule"] +description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the IcedID banking trojan, including looking for file writes associated with its payload, process injection, shellcode execution and data collection. +narrative = IcedId banking trojan campaigns targeting banks and other vertical sectors.This malware is known in Microsoft Windows OS targetting browser such as firefox and chrom to steal banking information. It is also known to its unique payload downloaded in C2 where it can be a .png file that hides the core shellcode bot using steganography technique or gzip dat file that contains "license.dat" which is the actual core icedid bot. + +[analytic_story://Active Directory Discovery] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2021-08-20 +version = 1 +references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/", "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2535", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/003/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Mauricio Velazco"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - AdsiSearcher Account Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Account Discovery with Dsquery - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Account Discovery With Net App - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Account Discovery with Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Controller Discovery with Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Group Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Dsquery - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Net - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - DSQuery Domain Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery With Net - Rule", "ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery with PowerView - Rule", "ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery With Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUser with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainPolicy with Powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get WMIObject Group Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Get WMIObject Group Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - GetAdComputer with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetAdComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetAdGroup with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetAdGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetCurrent User with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetCurrent User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetDomainController with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetDomainController with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetDomainGroup with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetDomainGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetLocalUser with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Local Account Discovery with Net - Rule", "ESCU - Local Account Discovery With Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Arp - Rule", "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Net - Rule", "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule", "ESCU - Network Discovery Using Route Windows App - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Password Policy Discovery with Net - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Get LocalGroup Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Get LocalGroup Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule", "ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Dsquery - Rule", "ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Net - Rule", "ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN - Rule", "ESCU - System User Discovery With Query - Rule", "ESCU - System User Discovery With Whoami - Rule", "ESCU - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Wmic Group Discovery - Rule"] +description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Discovery and Reconnaissance within with Active Directory environments. +narrative = Discovery consists of techniques an adversay uses to gain knowledge about an internal environment or network. These techniques provide adversaries with situational awareness and allows them to have the necessary information before deciding how to act or who/what to target next.\ +Once an attacker obtains an initial foothold in an Active Directory environment, she is forced to engage in Discovery techniques in the initial phases of a breach to better understand and navigate the target network. Some examples include but are not limited to enumerating domain users, domain admins, computers, domain controllers, network shares, group policy objects, domain trusts, etc. + +[analytic_story://Active Directory Kerberos Attacks] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2022-02-02 +version = 1 +references = ["https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kerberos_(protocol)", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-kile/2a32282e-dd48-4ad9-a542-609804b02cc9", "https://m0chan.github.io/2019/07/31/How-To-Attack-Kerberos-101.html", "https://stealthbits.com/blog/cracking-active-directory-passwords-with-as-rep-roasting/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/004/"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Mauricio Velazco"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser - Rule", "ESCU - Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With PowerView - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled in UserAccountControl - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Rubeus Command Line Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access - Rule", "ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN - Rule", "ESCU - Unusual Number of Kerberos Service Tickets Requested - Rule"] +description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Kerberos based attacks within with Active Directory environments. +narrative = Kerberos, initially named after Cerberus, the three-headed dog in Greek mythology, is a network authentication protocol that allows computers and users to prove their identity through a trusted third-party. This trusted third-party issues Kerberos tickets using symmetric encryption to allow users access to services and network resources based on their privilege level. Kerberos is the default authentication protocol used on Windows Active Directory networks since the introduction of Windows Server 2003. With Kerberos being the backbone of Windows authentication, it is commonly abused by adversaries across the different phases of a breach including initial access, privilege escalation, defense evasion, credential access, lateral movement, etc.\ This Analytic Story groups detection use cases in which the Kerberos protocol is abused. Defenders can leverage these analytics to detect and hunt for adversaries engaging in Kerberos based attacks. + +[analytic_story://Active Directory Lateral Movement] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2021-12-09 +version = 3 +references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/08/malware_lateral_move.html", "http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=videos/derbycon7/t405-hunting-lateral-movement-for-fun-and-profit-mauricio-velazco"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Mauricio Velazco Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ESCU - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule", "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and Winrs - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Short Lived Scheduled Task - Rule", "ESCU - Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Created With Suspicious Service Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Creation on Remote Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - Wmiprsve LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Wsmprovhost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name - Rule", "ESCU - Randomly Generated Windows Service Name - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested - Rule", "ESCU - Unusual Number of Remote Endpoint Authentication Events - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"] +description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how attackers move laterally within an Active Directory environment. Since lateral movement is often a necessary step in a breach, it is important for cyber defenders to deploy detection coverage. +narrative = Once attackers gain a foothold within an enterprise, they will seek to expand their accesses and leverage techniques that facilitate lateral movement. Attackers will often spend quite a bit of time and effort moving laterally. Because lateral movement renders an attacker the most vulnerable to detection, it's an excellent focus for detection and investigation.\ +Indications of lateral movement in an Active Directory network can include the abuse of system utilities (such as `psexec.exe`), unauthorized use of remote desktop services, `file/admin$` shares, WMI, PowerShell, Service Control Manager, the DCOM protocol, WinRM or the abuse of scheduled tasks. Organizations must be extra vigilant in detecting lateral movement techniques and look for suspicious activity in and around high-value strategic network assets, such as Active Directory, which are often considered the primary target or "crown jewels" to a persistent threat actor.\ +An adversary can use lateral movement for multiple purposes, including remote execution of tools, pivoting to additional systems, obtaining access to specific information or files, access to additional credentials, exfiltrating data, or delivering a secondary effect. Adversaries may use legitimate credentials alongside inherent network and operating-system functionality to remotely connect to other systems and remain under the radar of network defenders.\ +If there is evidence of lateral movement, it is imperative for analysts to collect evidence of the associated offending hosts. For example, an attacker might leverage host A to gain access to host B. From there, the attacker may try to move laterally to host C. In this example, the analyst should gather as much information as possible from all three hosts. \ + It is also important to collect authentication logs for each host, to ensure that the offending accounts are well-documented. Analysts should account for all processes to ensure that the attackers did not install unauthorized software. + +[analytic_story://Active Directory Password Spraying] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2021-04-07 +version = 1 +references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/23/protecting-organization-password-spray-attacks/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/dn452415(v=ws.11)"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Mauricio Velazco"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Multiple Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Users Attempting To Authenticate Using Explicit Credentials - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Process - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Users Remotely Failing To Authenticate From Host - Rule"] +description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Password Spraying attacks within Active Directory environments. +narrative = In a password spraying attack, adversaries leverage one or a small list of commonly used / popular passwords against a large volume of usernames to acquire valid account credentials. Unlike a Brute Force attack that targets a specific user or small group of users with a large number of passwords, password spraying follows the opposite aproach and increases the chances of obtaining valid credentials while avoiding account lockouts. This allows adversaries to remain undetected if the target organization does not have the proper monitoring and detection controls in place.\ +Password Spraying can be leveraged by adversaries across different stages in an attack. It can be used to obtain an iniial access to an environment but can also be used to escalate privileges when access has been already achieved. In some scenarios, this technique capitalizes on a security policy most organizations implement, password rotation. As enterprise users change their passwords, it is possible some pick predictable, seasonal passwords such as `$CompanyNameWinter`, `Summer2021`, etc.\ +Specifically, this Analytic Story is focused on detecting possible Password Spraying attacks against Active Directory environments leveraging Windows Event Logs in the `Account Logon` and `Logon/Logoff` Advanced Audit Policy categories. It presents 9 detection analytics which can aid defenders in identifyng instances where one source user, source host or source process attempts to authenticate against a target or targets using a high, unsual, number of unique users. A user, host or process attempting to authenticate with multiple users is not common behavior for legitimate systems and should be monitored by security teams. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, remote administration tools, multi-user systems and missconfigured systems. These should be easily spotted when first implementing the detection and addded to an allow list or lookup table. The presented detections can also be used in Threat Hunting exercises. + +[analytic_story://Apache Struts Vulnerability] +category = Vulnerability +last_updated = 2018-12-06 +version = 1 +references = ["https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/blob/v3.2/dev/rules/REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA.conf"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task"] +description = Detect and investigate activities--such as unusually long `Content-Type` length, suspicious java classes and web servers executing suspicious processes--consistent with attempts to exploit Apache Struts vulnerabilities. +narrative = In March of 2017, a remote code-execution vulnerability in the Jakarta Multipart parser in Apache Struts, a widely used open-source framework for creating Java web applications, was disclosed and assigned to CVE-2017-5638. About two months later, hackers exploited the flaw to carry out the world's 5th largest data breach. The target, credit giant Equifax, told investigators that it had become aware of the vulnerability two months before the attack. \ +The exploit involved manipulating the `Content-Type HTTP` header to execute commands embedded in the header.\ +This Analytic Story contains two different searches that help to identify activity that may be related to this issue. The first search looks for characteristics of the `Content-Type` header consistent with attempts to exploit the vulnerability. This should be a relatively pertinent indicator, as the `Content-Type` header is generally consistent and does not have a large degree of variation.\ +The second search looks for the execution of various commands typically entered on the command shell when an attacker first lands on a system. These commands are not generally executed on web servers during the course of day-to-day operation, but they may be used when the system is undergoing maintenance or troubleshooting.\ +First, it is helpful is to understand how often the notable event is generated, as well as the commonalities in some of these events. This may help determine whether this is a common occurrence that is of a lesser concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. It can also help to understand whether the issue is restricted to a single user or system or is broader in scope.\ +When looking at the target of the behavior illustrated by the event, you should note the sensitivity of the user and or/system to help determine the potential impact. It is also helpful to see what other events involving the target have occurred in the recent past. This can help tie different events together and give further situational awareness regarding the target.\ +Various types of information for external systems should be reviewed and (potentially) collected if the incident is, indeed, judged to be malicious. Information like this can be useful in generating your own threat intelligence to create alerts in the future.\ +Looking at the country, responsible party, and fully qualified domain names associated with the external IP address--as well as the registration information associated with those domain names, if they are frequently visited by others--can help you answer the question of "who," in regard to the external system. Answering that can help qualify the event and may serve useful for tracking. In addition, there are various sources that can provide some reputation information on the IP address or domain name, which can assist in determining if the event is malicious in nature. Finally, determining whether or not there are other events associated with the IP address may help connect some dots or show other events that should be brought into scope.\ +Gathering various data elements on the system of interest can sometimes help quickly determine that something suspicious may be happening. Some of these items include determining who else may have recently logged into the system, whether any unusual scheduled tasks exist, whether the system is communicating on suspicious ports, whether there are modifications to sensitive registry keys, and whether there are any known vulnerabilities on the system. This information can often highlight other activity commonly seen in attack scenarios or give more information about how the system may have been targeted.\ +hen a specific service or application is targeted, it is often helpful to know the associated version to help determine whether or not it is vulnerable to a specific exploit.\ +hen it is suspected there is an attack targeting a web server, it is helpful to look at some of the behavior of the web service to see if there is evidence that the service has been compromised. Some indications of this might be network connections to external resources, the web service spawning child processes that are not associated with typical behavior, and whether the service wrote any files that might be malicious in nature.\ +In the event that a suspicious file is found, we can review more information about it to help determine if it is, in fact, malicious. Identifying the file type, any processes that have the file open, what processes created and/or modified the file, and the number of systems that may have this file can help to determine if the file is malicious. Also, determining the file hash and checking it against reputation sources, such as VirusTotal, can sometimes quickly help determine whether it is malicious in nature.\ +Often, a simple inspection of a suspect process name and path can tell you if the system has been compromised. For example, if `svchost.exe` is found running from a location other than `C:\Windows\System32`, it is likely something malicious designed to hide in plain sight when simply reviewing process names. Similarly, if the process itself seems legitimate, but the parent process is running from the temporary browser cache, there may be activity initiated via a compromised website the user visited.\ +It can also be very helpful to examine various behaviors of the process of interest or the parent of the process that is of interest. For example, if it turns out that the process of interest is malicious, it would be good to see if the parent to that process spawned other processes that might also be worth further scrutiny. If a process is suspect, reviewing the network connections made around the time of the event and/or if the process spawned any child processes could be helpful in determining whether it is malicious or executing a malicious script. + +[analytic_story://Asset Tracking] +category = Best Practices +last_updated = 2017-09-13 +version = 1 +references = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/inventory-of-authorized-and-unauthorized-devices/"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule", "ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] +description = Keep a careful inventory of every asset on your network to make it easier to detect rogue devices. Unauthorized/unmanaged devices could be an indication of malicious behavior that should be investigated further. +narrative = This Analytic Story is designed to help you develop a better understanding of what authorized and unauthorized devices are part of your enterprise. This story can help you better categorize and classify assets, providing critical business context and awareness of their assets during an incident. Information derived from this Analytic Story can be used to better inform and support other analytic stories. For successful detection, you will need to leverage the Assets and Identity Framework from Enterprise Security to populate your known assets. + +[analytic_story://AWS Cross Account Activity] +category = Cloud Security +last_updated = 2018-06-04 +version = 1 +references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] +description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another AWS account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity. +narrative = Amazon Web Services (AWS) admins manage access to AWS resources and services across the enterprise using AWS's Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage AWS users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as EC2 instances, the AWS Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\ +Herein lies the rub. In between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\ +This Analytic Story includes searches that will help you monitor your AWS CloudTrail logs for evidence of suspicious cross-account activity. For example, while accessing multiple AWS accounts and roles may be perfectly valid behavior, it may be suspicious when an account requests privileges of an account it has not accessed in the past. After identifying suspicious activities, you can use the provided investigative searches to help you probe more deeply. + +[analytic_story://AWS IAM Privilege Escalation] +category = Cloud Security +last_updated = 2021-03-08 +version = 1 +references = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/", "https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/the-cloud-shadow-admin-threat-10-permissions-to-protect", "https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources - Rule", "ESCU - AWS CreateAccessKey - Rule", "ESCU - AWS CreateLoginProfile - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM Delete Policy - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM Failure Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS UpdateLoginProfile - Rule"] +description = This analytic story contains detections that query your AWS Cloudtrail for activities related to privilege escalation. +narrative = Amazon Web Services provides a neat feature called Identity and Access Management (IAM) that enables organizations to manage various AWS services and resources in a secure way. All IAM users have roles, groups and policies associated with them which governs and sets permissions to allow a user to access specific restrictions.\ +However, if these IAM policies are misconfigured and have specific combinations of weak permissions; it can allow attackers to escalate their privileges and further compromise the organization. Rhino Security Labs have published comprehensive blogs detailing various AWS Escalation methods. By using this as an inspiration, Splunks research team wants to highlight how these attack vectors look in AWS Cloudtrail logs and provide you with detection queries to uncover these potentially malicious events via this Analytic Story. + +[analytic_story://AWS Network ACL Activity] +category = Cloud Security +last_updated = 2018-05-21 +version = 2 +references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/UserGuide/VPC_Appendix_NACLs.html", "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-help-prepare-for-ddos-attacks-by-reducing-your-attack-surface/"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"] +description = Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it. +narrative = AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and operational/risk auditing of your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Management Console, AWS Command Line Interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your servers are not vulnerable to attacks. This analytic story contains detection searches that leverage CloudTrail logs from AWS to check for bad configurations and malicious activity in your AWS network access controls. + +[analytic_story://AWS Security Hub Alerts] +category = Cloud Security +last_updated = 2020-08-04 +version = 1 +references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/security-hub/features/"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task"] +description = This story is focused around detecting Security Hub alerts generated from AWS +narrative = AWS Security Hub collects and consolidates findings from AWS security services enabled in your environment, such as intrusion detection findings from Amazon GuardDuty, vulnerability scans from Amazon Inspector, S3 bucket policy findings from Amazon Macie, publicly accessible and cross-account resources from IAM Access Analyzer, and resources lacking WAF coverage from AWS Firewall Manager. + +[analytic_story://AWS User Monitoring] +category = Cloud Security +last_updated = 2018-03-12 +version = 1 +references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - AWS Excessive Security Scanning - Rule", "ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"] +description = Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment. +narrative = It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it's all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable to attack. In fact, this was the very oversight that led to Tesla's cryptojacking attack in February, 2018.\ +In addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed for any new EC2 instances and increased bandwidth usage. \ +Fortunately, you can leverage Amazon Web Services (AWS) CloudTrail--a tool that helps you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing of your AWS account--to give you increased visibility into your user and resource activity by recording AWS Management Console actions and API calls. You can identify which users and accounts called AWS, the source IP address from which the calls were made, and when the calls occurred.\ +The detection searches in this Analytic Story are designed to help you uncover AWS API activities from users not listed in the identity table, as well as similar activities from disabled accounts. + +[analytic_story://Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2021-01-27 +version = 1 +references = ["https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Shannon Davis"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery - Rule"] +description = Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2021-3156. Discovered by the Qualys Research Team, this vulnerability has been found to affect sudo across multiple Linux distributions (Ubuntu 20.04 and prior, Debian 10 and prior, Fedora 33 and prior). As this vulnerability was committed to code in July 2011, there will be many distributions affected. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows any unprivileged user to gain root privileges on the vulnerable host. +narrative = A non-privledged user is able to execute the sudoedit command to trigger a buffer overflow. After the successful buffer overflow, they are then able to gain root privileges on the affected host. The conditions needed to be run are a trailing "\" along with shell and edit flags. Monitoring the /var/log directory on Linux hosts using the Splunk Universal Forwarder will allow you to pick up this behavior when using the provided detection. + +[analytic_story://BITS Jobs] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2021-03-26 +version = 1 +references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1197/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/bits/bitsadmin-tool"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - BITS Job Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer - Rule"] +description = Adversaries may abuse BITS jobs to persistently execute or clean up after malicious payloads. +narrative = Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, asynchronous file transfer mechanism exposed through Component Object Model (COM). BITS is commonly used by updaters, messengers, and other applications preferred to operate in the background (using available idle bandwidth) without interrupting other networked applications. File transfer tasks are implemented as BITS jobs, which contain a queue of one or more file operations. The interface to create and manage BITS jobs is accessible through PowerShell and the BITSAdmin tool. Adversaries may abuse BITS to download, execute, and even clean up after running malicious code. BITS tasks are self-contained in the BITS job database, without new files or registry modifications, and often permitted by host firewalls. BITS enabled execution may also enable persistence by creating long-standing jobs (the default maximum lifetime is 90 days and extendable) or invoking an arbitrary program when a job completes or errors (including after system reboots). + +[analytic_story://Brand Monitoring] +category = Abuse +last_updated = 2017-12-19 +version = 1 +references = ["https://www.zerofox.com/blog/what-is-digital-risk-monitoring/", "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/consumer/family-safety/what-is-typosquatting/", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/06/explained-typosquatting/"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"] +description = Detect and investigate activity that may indicate that an adversary is using faux domains to mislead users into interacting with malicious infrastructure. Monitor DNS, email, and web traffic for permutations of your brand name. +narrative = While you can educate your users and customers about the risks and threats posed by typosquatting, phishing, and corporate espionage, human error is a persistent fact of life. Of course, your adversaries are all too aware of this reality and will happily leverage it for nefarious purposes whenever possible3phishing with lookalike addresses, embedding faux command-and-control domains in malware, and hosting malicious content on domains that closely mimic your corporate servers. This is where brand monitoring comes in.\ +You can use our adaptation of `DNSTwist`, together with the support searches in this Analytic Story, to generate permutations of specified brands and external domains. Splunk can monitor email, DNS requests, and web traffic for these permutations and provide you with early warnings and situational awareness--powerful elements of an effective defense.\ +Notable events will include IP addresses, URLs, and user data. Drilling down can provide you with even more actionable intelligence, including likely geographic information, contextual searches to help you scope the problem, and investigative searches. + +[analytic_story://Cloud Cryptomining] +category = Cloud Security +last_updated = 2019-10-02 +version = 1 +references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"] +description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior. +narrative = Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority. \ +Cryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS), Google Cloud Platform (GCP), and Azure. It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN. \ +When malicious miners appropriate a cloud instance, often spinning up hundreds of new instances, the costs can become astronomical for the account holder. So it is critically important to monitor your systems for suspicious activities that could indicate that your network has been infiltrated. \ +This Analytic Story is focused on detecting suspicious new instances in your cloud environment to help prevent cryptominers from gaining a foothold. It contains detection searches that will detect when a previously unused instance type or AMI is used. It also contains support searches to build lookup files to ensure proper execution of the detection searches. + +[analytic_story://Cloud Federated Credential Abuse] +category = Cloud Security +last_updated = 2021-01-26 +version = 1 +references = ["https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal - Rule", "ESCU - AWS SAML Update identity provider - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule", "ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703 - Rule", "ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule"] +description = This analytical story addresses events that indicate abuse of cloud federated credentials. These credentials are usually extracted from endpoint desktop or servers specially those servers that provide federation services such as Windows Active Directory Federation Services. Identity Federation relies on objects such as Oauth2 tokens, cookies or SAML assertions in order to provide seamless access between cloud and perimeter environments. If these objects are either hijacked or forged then attackers will be able to pivot into victim's cloud environements. +narrative = This story is composed of detection searches based on endpoint that addresses the use of Mimikatz, Escalation of Privileges and Abnormal processes that may indicate the extraction of Federated directory objects such as passwords, Oauth2 tokens, certificates and keys. Cloud environment (AWS, Azure) related events are also addressed in specific cloud environment detection searches. + +[analytic_story://Cobalt Strike] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2021-02-16 +version = 1 +references = ["https://www.cobaltstrike.com/", "https://www.infocyte.com/blog/2020/09/02/cobalt-strike-the-new-favorite-among-thieves/", "https://bluescreenofjeff.com/2017-01-24-how-to-write-malleable-c2-profiles-for-cobalt-strike/", "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/09/coverage-strikes-back-cobalt-strike-paper.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/unauthorized-access-of-fireeye-red-team-tools.html", "https://github.com/MichaelKoczwara/Awesome-CobaltStrike-Defence", "https://github.com/zer0yu/Awesome-CobaltStrike"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Anomalous usage of 7zip - Rule", "ESCU - CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ESCU - GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ESCU - SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network - Rule", "ESCU - Services Escalate Exe - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule"] +description = Cobalt Strike is threat emulation software. Red teams and penetration testers use Cobalt Strike to demonstrate the risk of a breach and evaluate mature security programs. Most recently, Cobalt Strike has become the choice tool by threat groups due to its ease of use and extensibility. +narrative = This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from Cobalt Strike. Cobalt Strike has many ways to be enhanced by using aggressor scripts, malleable C2 profiles, default attack packages, and much more. For endpoint behavior, Cobalt Strike is most commonly identified via named pipes, spawn to processes, and DLL function names. Many additional variables are provided for in memory operation of the beacon implant. On the network, depending on the malleable C2 profile used, it is near infinite in the amount of ways to conceal the C2 traffic with Cobalt Strike. Not every query may be specific to Cobalt Strike the tool, but the methodologies and techniques used by it.\ +Splunk Threat Research reviewed all publicly available instances of Malleabe C2 Profiles and generated a list of the most commonly used spawnto and pipenames.\ +`Spawnto_x86` and `spawnto_x64` is the process that Cobalt Strike will spawn and injects shellcode into.\ +Pipename sets the named pipe name used in Cobalt Strikes Beacon SMB C2 traffic.\ +With that, new detections were generated focused on these spawnto processes spawning without command line arguments. Similar, the named pipes most commonly used by Cobalt Strike added as a detection. In generating content for Cobalt Strike, the following is considered:\ +- Is it normal for spawnto_ value to have no command line arguments? No command line arguments and a network connection?\ +- What is the default, or normal, process lineage for spawnto_ value?\ +- Does the spawnto_ value make network connections?\ +- Is it normal for spawnto_ value to load jscript, vbscript, Amsi.dll, and clr.dll?\ +While investigating a detection related to this Analytic Story, keep in mind the parent process, process path, and any file modifications that may occur. Tuning may need to occur to remove any false positives. + +[analytic_story://ColdRoot MacOS RAT] +category = Malware +last_updated = 2019-01-09 +version = 1 +references = ["https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/osxcoldroot-and-the-rat-invasion/", "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/coldroot-rat-still-undetectable-despite-being-uploaded-on-github-two-years-ago/"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jose Hernandez"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - MacOS - Re-opened Applications - Rule", "ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task"] +description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that relate to the ColdRoot Remote Access Trojan that affects MacOS. An example of some of these activities are changing sensative binaries in the MacOS sub-system, detecting process names and executables associated with the RAT, detecting when a keyboard tab is installed on a MacOS machine and more. +narrative = Conventional wisdom holds that Apple's MacOS operating system is significantly less vulnerable to attack than Windows machines. While that point is debatable, it is true that attacks against MacOS systems are much less common. However, this fact does not mean that Macs are impervious to breaches. To the contrary, research has shown that that Mac malware is increasing at an alarming rate. According to AV-test, in 2018, there were 86,865 new MacOS malware variants, up from 27,338 the year before—a 31% increase. In contrast, the independent research firm found that new Windows malware had increased from 65.17M to 76.86M during that same period, less than half the rate of growth. The bottom line is that while the numbers look a lot smaller than Windows, it's definitely time to take Mac security more seriously.\ +This Analytic Story addresses the ColdRoot remote access trojan (RAT), which was uploaded to Github in 2016, but was still escaping detection by the first quarter of 2018, when a new, more feature-rich variant was discovered masquerading as an Apple audio driver. Among other capabilities, the Pascal-based ColdRoot can heist passwords from users' keychains and remotely control infected machines without detection. In the initial report of his findings, Patrick Wardle, Chief Research Officer for Digita Security, explained that the new ColdRoot RAT could start and kill processes on the breached system, spawn new remote-desktop sessions, take screen captures and assemble them into a live stream of the victim's desktop, and more.\ +Searches in this Analytic Story leverage the capabilities of OSquery to address ColdRoot detection from several different angles, such as looking for the existence of associated files and processes, and monitoring for signs of an installed keylogger. + +[analytic_story://Collection and Staging] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2020-02-03 +version = 1 +references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Collection", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed 7-Zip - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed WinRAR - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule", "ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] +description = Monitor for and investigate activities--such as suspicious writes to the Windows Recycling Bin or email servers sending high amounts of traffic to specific hosts, for example--that may indicate that an adversary is harvesting and exfiltrating sensitive data. +narrative = A common adversary goal is to identify and exfiltrate data of value from a target organization. This data may include email conversations and addresses, confidential company information, links to network design/infrastructure, important dates, and so on.\ + Attacks are composed of three activities: identification, collection, and staging data for exfiltration. Identification typically involves scanning systems and observing user activity. Collection can involve the transfer of large amounts of data from various repositories. Staging/preparation includes moving data to a central location and compressing (and optionally encoding and/or encrypting) it. All of these activities provide opportunities for defenders to identify their presence. \ +Use the searches to detect and monitor suspicious behavior related to these activities. + +[analytic_story://Command and Control] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2018-06-01 +version = 1 +references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Command_and_Control", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Command-and-control-servers-The-puppet-masters-that-govern-malware"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = [] +description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged by attackers to establish and operate command and control channels. Implants installed by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions and send data back to the malicious operators. +narrative = Threat actors typically architect and implement an infrastructure to use in various ways during the course of their attack campaigns. In some cases, they leverage this infrastructure for scanning and performing reconnaissance activities. In others, they may use this infrastructure to launch actual attacks. One of the most important functions of this infrastructure is to establish servers that will communicate with implants on compromised endpoints. These servers establish a command and control channel that is used to proxy data between the compromised endpoint and the attacker. These channels relay commands from the attacker to the compromised endpoint and the output of those commands back to the attacker.\ +Because this communication is so critical for an adversary, they often use techniques designed to hide the true nature of the communications. There are many different techniques used to establish and communicate over these channels. This Analytic Story provides searches that look for a variety of the techniques used for these channels, as well as indications that these channels are active, by examining logs associated with border control devices and network-access control lists. + +[analytic_story://Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation] +category = Cloud Security +last_updated = 2020-02-20 +version = 1 +references = ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - GCP GCR container uploaded - Rule", "ESCU - New container uploaded to AWS ECR - Rule"] +description = Use the searches in this story to monitor your Kubernetes registry repositories for upload, and deployment of potentially vulnerable, backdoor, or implanted containers. These searches provide information on source users, destination path, container names and repository names. The searches provide context to address Mitre T1525 which refers to container implantation upload to a company's repository either in Amazon Elastic Container Registry, Google Container Registry and Azure Container Registry. +narrative = Container Registrys provide a way for organizations to keep customized images of their development and infrastructure environment in private. However if these repositories are misconfigured or priviledge users credentials are compromise, attackers can potentially upload implanted containers which can be deployed across the organization. These searches allow operator to monitor who, when and what was uploaded to container registry. + +[analytic_story://Credential Dumping] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2020-02-04 +version = 3 +references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Copy of ShadowCopy with Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", "ESCU - Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Esentutl SAM Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Extraction of Registry Hives - Rule", "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ESCU - SAM Database File Access Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool - Rule", "ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task"] +description = Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords. The threat actors use these pilfered credentials to further escalate privileges and spread throughout a target environment. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to credential dumping. +narrative = Credential dumping—gathering credentials from a target system, often hashed or encrypted—is a common attack technique. Even though the credentials may not be in plain text, an attacker can still exfiltrate the data and set to cracking it offline, on their own systems. The threat actors target a variety of sources to extract them, including the Security Accounts Manager (SAM), Local Security Authority (LSA), NTDS from Domain Controllers, or the Group Policy Preference (GPP) files.\ +Once attackers obtain valid credentials, they use them to move throughout a target network with ease, discovering new systems and identifying assets of interest. Credentials obtained in this manner typically include those of privileged users, which may provide access to more sensitive information and system operations.\ +The detection searches in this Analytic Story monitor access to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process, the usage of shadowcopies for credential dumping and some other techniques for credential dumping. + +[analytic_story://Data Destruction] +category = Malware +last_updated = 2022-02-14 +version = 1 +references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485/", "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/09/unit42-xbash-combines-botnet-ransomware-coinmining-worm-targets-linux-windows/", "https://www.picussecurity.com/blog/a-brief-history-and-further-technical-analysis-of-sodinokibi-ransomware"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Linux DD File Overwrite - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule", "ESCU - Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule"] +description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the data destruction, including deleting files, overwriting files, wiping disk and encrypting files. +narrative = Adversaries may use this technique to maximize the impact on the target organization in operations where network wide availability interruption is the goal. + +[analytic_story://Data Exfiltration] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2020-10-21 +version = 1 +references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Shannon Davis"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Detect shared ec2 snapshot - Rule", "ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule", "ESCU - Mailsniper Invoke functions - Rule", "ESCU - Gdrive suspicious file sharing - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] +description = The stealing of data by an adversary. +narrative = Exfiltration comes in many flavors. Adversaries can collect data over encrypted or non-encrypted channels. They can utilise Command and Control channels that are already in place to exfiltrate data. They can use both standard data transfer protocols such as FTP, SCP, etc to exfiltrate data. Or they can use non-standard protocols such as DNS, ICMP, etc with specially crafted fields to try and circumvent security technologies in place. + +[analytic_story://Data Protection] +category = Abuse +last_updated = 2017-09-14 +version = 1 +references = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/data-protection/", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/dns/splunk-detect-dns-tunneling-37022", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"] +description = Fortify your data-protection arsenal--while continuing to ensure data confidentiality and integrity--with searches that monitor for and help you investigate possible signs of data exfiltration. +narrative = Attackers can leverage a variety of resources to compromise or exfiltrate enterprise data. Common exfiltration techniques include remote-access channels via low-risk, high-payoff active-collections operations and close-access operations using insiders and removable media. While this Analytic Story is not a comprehensive listing of all the methods by which attackers can exfiltrate data, it provides a useful starting point. + +[analytic_story://Deobfuscate-Decode Files or Information] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2021-03-24 +version = 1 +references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140/"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - CertUtil With Decode Argument - Rule"] +description = Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. +narrative = An example of obfuscated files is `Certutil.exe` usage to encode a portable executable to a certificate file, which is base64 encoded, to hide the originating file. There are many utilities cross-platform to encode using XOR, using compressed .cab files to hide contents and scripting languages that may perform similar native Windows tasks. Triaging an event related will require the capability to review related process events and file modifications. Using a tool such as CyberChef will assist with identifying the encoding that was used, and potentially assist with decoding the contents. + +[analytic_story://AWS Cryptomining] +category = Cloud Security +last_updated = 2018-03-08 +version = 1 +references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"] +description = Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior. +narrative = Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority. \ +Cryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS). It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN. \ +When malicious miners appropriate a cloud instance, often spinning up hundreds of new instances, the costs can become astronomical for the account holder. So, it is critically important to monitor your systems for suspicious activities that could indicate that your network has been infiltrated. \ +This Analytic Story is focused on detecting suspicious new instances in your EC2 environment to help prevent such a disaster. It contains detection searches that will detect when a previously unused instance type or AMI is used. It also contains support searches to build lookup files to ensure proper execution of the detection searches. + +[analytic_story://AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities] +category = Cloud Security +last_updated = 2018-03-16 +version = 1 +references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task"] +description = Monitor your AWS provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your network. +narrative = Because most enterprise AWS activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to add specific IPs to an allow list because they vary. \ +This Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further. + +[analytic_story://Common Phishing Frameworks] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2019-04-29 +version = 1 +references = ["https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1192/", "https://breakdev.org/evilginx-advanced-phishing-with-two-factor-authentication-bypass/"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Splunk Research Team"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2 - Rule", "ESCU - Get Certificate logs for a domain - Response Task"] +description = Detect DNS and web requests to fake websites generated by the EvilGinx2 toolkit. These websites are designed to fool unwitting users who have clicked on a malicious link in a phishing email. +narrative = As most people know, these emails use fraudulent domains, [email scraping](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), familiar contact names inserted as senders, and other tactics to lure targets into clicking a malicious link, opening an attachment with a [nefarious payload](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), or entering sensitive personal information that perpetrators may intercept. This attack technique requires a relatively low level of skill and allows adversaries to easily cast a wide net. Because phishing is a technique that relies on human psychology, you will never be able to eliminate this vulnerability 100%. But you can use automated detection to significantly reduce the risks.\ +This Analytic Story focuses on detecting signs of MiTM attacks enabled by [EvilGinx2](https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2), a toolkit that sets up a transparent proxy between the targeted site and the user. In this way, the attacker is able to intercept credentials and two-factor identification tokens. It employs a proxy template to allow a registered domain to impersonate targeted sites, such as Linkedin, Amazon, Okta, Github, Twitter, Instagram, Reddit, Office 365, and others. It can even register SSL certificates and camouflage them via a URL shortener, making them difficult to detect. Searches in this story look for signs of MiTM attacks enabled by EvilGinx2. + +[analytic_story://Host Redirection] +category = Abuse +last_updated = 2017-09-14 +version = 1 +references = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/09/hosts-file-hijacks/"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] +description = Detect evidence of tactics used to redirect traffic from a host to a destination other than the one intended--potentially one that is part of an adversary's attack infrastructure. An example is redirecting communications regarding patches and updates or misleading users into visiting a malicious website. +narrative = Attackers will often attempt to manipulate client communications for nefarious purposes. In some cases, an attacker may endeavor to modify a local host file to redirect communications with resources (such as antivirus or system-update services) to prevent clients from receiving patches or updates. In other cases, an attacker might use this tactic to have the client connect to a site that looks like the intended site, but instead installs malware or collects information from the victim. Additionally, an attacker may redirect a victim in order to execute a MITM attack and observe communications. + +[analytic_story://Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity] +category = Cloud Security +last_updated = 2020-05-20 +version = 1 +references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] +description = This story addresses detection and response around Sensitive Role usage within a Kubernetes clusters against cluster resources and namespaces. +narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive roles within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes role activities + +[analytic_story://Monitor Backup Solution] +category = Best Practices +last_updated = 2017-09-12 +version = 1 +references = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/03/04/tracking-locky-ransomware-using-carbon-black/"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule", "ESCU - All backup logs for host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] +description = Address common concerns when monitoring your backup processes. These searches can help you reduce risks from ransomware, device theft, or denial of physical access to a host by backing up data on endpoints. +narrative = Having backups is a standard best practice that helps ensure continuity of business operations. Having mature backup processes can also help you reduce the risks of many security-related incidents and streamline your response processes. The detection searches in this Analytic Story will help you identify systems that have backup failures, as well as systems that have not been backed up for an extended period of time. The story will also return the notable event history and all of the backup logs for an endpoint. + +[analytic_story://Monitor for Unauthorized Software] +category = Best Practices +last_updated = 2017-09-15 +version = 1 +references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] +description = Identify and investigate prohibited/unauthorized software or processes that may be concealing malicious behavior within your environment. +narrative = It is critical to identify unauthorized software and processes running on enterprise endpoints and determine whether they are likely to be malicious. This Analytic Story requires the user to populate the Interesting Processes table within Enterprise Security with prohibited processes. An included support search will augment this data, adding information on processes thought to be malicious. This search requires data from endpoint detection-and-response solutions, endpoint data sources (such as Sysmon), or Windows Event Logs--assuming that the Active Directory administrator has enabled process tracking within the System Event Audit Logs.\ +It is important to investigate any software identified as suspicious, in order to understand how it was installed or executed. Analyzing authentication logs or any historic notable events might elicit additional investigative leads of interest. For best results, schedule the search to run every two weeks. + +[analytic_story://Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities] +category = Vulnerability +last_updated = 2018-01-08 +version = 1 +references = ["https://meltdownattack.com/"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] +description = Assess and mitigate your systems' vulnerability to Spectre and Meltdown exploitation with the searches in this Analytic Story. +narrative = Meltdown and Spectre exploit critical vulnerabilities in modern CPUs that allow unintended access to data in memory. This Analytic Story will help you identify the systems can be patched for these vulnerabilities, as well as those that still need to be patched. + +[analytic_story://Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability] +category = Vulnerability +last_updated = 2017-09-19 +version = 1 +references = ["http://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAPQ6#announce", "https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-4859"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Open Redirect in Splunk Web - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] +description = Keeping your Splunk deployment up to date is critical and may help you reduce the risk of CVE-2016-4859, an open-redirection vulnerability within some older versions of Splunk Enterprise. The detection search will help ensure that users are being properly authenticated and not being redirected to malicious domains. +narrative = This Analytic Story is associated with CVE-2016-4859, an open-redirect vulnerability in the following versions of Splunk Enterprise:\ +\ +1. Splunk Enterprise 6.4.x, prior to 6.4.3\ +1. Splunk Enterprise 6.3.x, prior to 6.3.6\ +1. Splunk Enterprise 6.2.x, prior to 6.2.10\ +1. Splunk Enterprise 6.1.x, prior to 6.1.11\ +1. Splunk Enterprise 6.0.x, prior to 6.0.12\ +1. Splunk Enterprise 5.0.x, prior to 5.0.16\ +1. Splunk Light, prior to 6.4.3CVE-2016-4859 allows attackers to redirect users to arbitrary web sites and conduct phishing attacks via unspecified vectors. (Credit: Noriaki Iwasaki, Cyber Defense Institute, Inc.).\ +It is important to ensure that your Splunk deployment is being kept up to date and is properly configured. This detection search allows analysts to monitor internal logs to ensure users are properly authenticated and cannot be redirected to any malicious third-party websites. + +[analytic_story://Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409] +category = Vulnerability +last_updated = 2018-06-14 +version = 1 +references = ["https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409", "https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings", "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44865/"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task"] +description = Reduce the risk of CVE-2018-11409, an information disclosure vulnerability within some older versions of Splunk Enterprise, with searches designed to help ensure that your Splunk system does not leak information to authenticated users. +narrative = Although there have been no reports of it being exploited, Splunk Enterprise versions through 7.0.1 reportedly have a vulnerability that may expose information through a REST endpoint (read more here: https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings). NIST has included it in its vulnerability database (read more here: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409). The REST endpoint that exposes system information is also necessary for the proper operation of Splunk clustering and instrumentation. Customers should upgrade to the latest version to reduce the risk of this vulnerability.\ +Splunk Enterprise exposes partial information about the host operating system, hardware, and Splunk license. Splunk Enterprise before 6.6.0 exposes this information without authentication. Splunk Enterprise 6.6.0 and later exposes this information only to authenticated Splunk users. Based on the information exposure, Splunk characterizes this issue as a low severity impact.\ +Read more in Splunk's official response: https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings.\ +A detection search within this Analytic Story looks for vulnerabilities described in CVE-2018-11409: Information Exposure (https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409). If it turns up activities that may be specific, you can use the included investigative searches to return information regarding web activity and network traffic by src_ip. + +[analytic_story://Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities] +category = Cloud Security +last_updated = 2018-02-09 +version = 1 +references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"] +description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply, when the information warrants it. +narrative = AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing within your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Console, AWS command-line interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your EC2 instances are not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your AWS EC2 instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities. + +[analytic_story://Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications] +category = Cloud Security +last_updated = 2018-04-09 +version = 1 +references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] +description = Identify unusual changes to your AWS EC2 instances that may indicate malicious activity. Modifications to your EC2 instances by previously unseen users is an example of an activity that may warrant further investigation. +narrative = A common attack technique is to infiltrate a cloud instance and make modifications. The adversary can then secure access to your infrastructure or hide their activities. So it's important to stay alert to changes that may indicate that your environment has been compromised. \ + Searches within this Analytic Story can help you detect the presence of a threat by monitoring for EC2 instances that have been created or changed--either by users that have never previously performed these activities or by known users who modify or create instances in a way that have not been done before. This story also provides investigative searches that help you go deeper once you detect suspicious behavior. + +[analytic_story://Web Fraud Detection] +category = Abuse +last_updated = 2018-10-08 +version = 1 +references = ["https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-fraud-schemes/internet-fraud", "https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2017-internet-crime-report-released-050718"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jim Apger"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task"] +description = Monitor your environment for activity consistent with common attack techniques bad actors use when attempting to compromise web servers or other web-related assets. +narrative = The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) defines Internet fraud as the use of Internet services or software with Internet access to defraud victims or to otherwise take advantage of them. According to the Bureau, Internet crime schemes are used to steal millions of dollars each year from victims and continue to plague the Internet through various methods. The agency includes phishing scams, data breaches, Denial of Service (DOS) attacks, email account compromise, malware, spoofing, and ransomware in this category.\ +These crimes are not the fraud itself, but rather the attack techniques commonly employed by fraudsters in their pursuit of data that enables them to commit malicious actssuch as obtaining and using stolen credit cards. They represent a serious problem that is steadily increasing and not likely to go away anytime soon.\ +When developing a strategy for preventing fraud in your environment, its important to look across all of your web services for evidence that attackers are abusing enterprise resources to enumerate systems, harvest data for secondary fraudulent activity, or abuse terms of service.This Analytic Story looks for evidence of common Internet attack techniques that could be indicative of web fraud in your environmentincluding account harvesting, anomalous user clickspeed, and password sharing across accounts, to name just a few.\ +The account-harvesting search focuses on web pages used for user-account registration. It detects the creation of a large number of user accounts using the same email domain name, a type of activity frequently seen in advance of a fraud campaign.\ +The anomalous clickspeed search looks for users who are moving through your website at a faster-than-normal speed or with a perfect click cadence (high periodicity or low standard deviation), which could indicate that the user is a script, not an actual human.\ +Another search detects incidents wherein a single password is used across multiple accounts, which may indicate that a fraudster has infiltrated your environment and embedded a common password within a script. + +[analytic_story://Detect Zerologon Attack] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2020-09-18 +version = 1 +references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://github.com/SecuraBV/CVE-2020-1472", "https://www.secura.com/blog/zero-logon", "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Jose Hernandez, Stan Miskowicz, David Dorsey, Shannon Davis Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] +description = Uncover activity related to the execution of Zerologon CVE-2020-11472, a technique wherein attackers target a Microsoft Windows Domain Controller to reset its computer account password. The result from this attack is attackers can now provide themselves high privileges and take over Domain Controller. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to reset Domain Controller Computer Account via exploit code remotely or via the use of tool Mimikatz as payload carrier. +narrative = This attack is a privilege escalation technique, where attacker targets a Netlogon secure channel connection to a domain controller, using Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC). This vulnerability exposes vulnerable Windows Domain Controllers to be targeted via unaunthenticated RPC calls which eventually reset Domain Contoller computer account ($) providing the attacker the opportunity to exfil domain controller credential secrets and assign themselve high privileges that can lead to domain controller and potentially complete network takeover. The detection searches in this Analytic Story use Windows Event viewer events and Sysmon events to detect attack execution, these searches monitor access to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process which is an indicator of the use of Mimikatz tool which has bee updated to carry this attack payload. + +[analytic_story://Dev Sec Ops] +category = Cloud Security +last_updated = 2021-08-18 +version = 1 +references = ["https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Patrick Bareiss"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings High - Rule", "ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Low Informational Unknown - Rule", "ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Medium - Rule", "ESCU - AWS ECR Container Upload Outside Business Hours - Rule", "ESCU - AWS ECR Container Upload Unknown User - Rule", "ESCU - Circle CI Disable Security Job - Rule", "ESCU - Circle CI Disable Security Step - Rule", "ESCU - Correlation by Repository and Risk - Rule", "ESCU - Correlation by User and Risk - Rule", "ESCU - Github Commit Changes In Master - Rule", "ESCU - Github Commit In Develop - Rule", "ESCU - GitHub Dependabot Alert - Rule", "ESCU - GitHub Pull Request from Unknown User - Rule", "ESCU - Gsuite Drive Share In External Email - Rule", "ESCU - GSuite Email Suspicious Attachment - Rule", "ESCU - Gsuite Email Suspicious Subject With Attachment - Rule", "ESCU - Gsuite Email With Known Abuse Web Service Link - Rule", "ESCU - Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain - Rule", "ESCU - Gsuite Suspicious Shared File Name - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress RFI - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Scanner Image Pulling - Rule"] +description = This story is focused around detecting attacks on a DevSecOps lifeccycle which consists of the phases plan, code, build, test, release, deploy, operate and monitor. +narrative = DevSecOps is a collaborative framework, which thinks about application and infrastructure security from the start. This means that security tools are part of the continuous integration and continuous deployment pipeline. In this analytics story, we focused on detections around the tools used in this framework such as GitHub as a version control system, GDrive for the documentation, CircleCI as the CI/CD pipeline, Kubernetes as the container execution engine and multiple security tools such as Semgrep and Kube-Hunter. + +[analytic_story://DHS Report TA18-074A] +category = Malware +last_updated = 2020-01-22 +version = 2 +references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"] +description = Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more. +narrative = The frequency of nation-state cyber attacks has increased significantly over the last decade. Employing numerous tactics and techniques, these attacks continue to escalate in complexity. \ +There is a wide range of motivations for these state-sponsored hacks, including stealing valuable corporate, military, or diplomatic dataѿall of which could confer advantages in various arenas. They may also target critical infrastructure. \ +One joint Technical Alert (TA) issued by the Department of Homeland and the FBI in mid-March of 2018 attributed some cyber activity targeting utility infrastructure to operatives sponsored by the Russian government. The hackers executed spearfishing attacks, installed malware, employed watering-hole domains, and more. While they caused no physical damage, the attacks provoked fears that a nation-state could turn off water, redirect power, or compromise a nuclear power plant.\ +Suspicious activities--spikes in SMB traffic, processes that launch netsh (to modify the network configuration), suspicious registry modifications, and many more--may all be events you may wish to investigate further. While the use of these technique may be an indication that a nation-state actor is attempting to compromise your environment, it is important to note that these techniques are often employed by other groups, as well. + +[analytic_story://Disabling Security Tools] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2020-02-04 +version = 2 +references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/11/vonteera-adware-uses-certificates-to-disable-anti-malware/", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Tools-Report.pdf"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] +description = Looks for activities and techniques associated with the disabling of security tools on a Windows system, such as suspicious `reg.exe` processes, processes launching netsh, and many others. +narrative = Attackers employ a variety of tactics in order to avoid detection and operate without barriers. This often involves modifying the configuration of security tools to get around them or explicitly disabling them to prevent them from running. This Analytic Story includes searches that look for activity consistent with attackers attempting to disable various security mechanisms. Such activity may involve monitoring for suspicious registry activity, as this is where much of the configuration for Windows and various other programs reside, or explicitly attempting to shut down security-related services. Other times, attackers attempt various tricks to prevent specific programs from running, such as adding the certificates with which the security tools are signed to a block list (which would prevent them from running). + +[analytic_story://DNS Amplification Attacks] +category = Abuse +last_updated = 2016-09-13 +version = 1 +references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-088A", "https://www.imperva.com/learn/application-security/dns-amplification/"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] +description = DNS poses a serious threat as a Denial of Service (DOS) amplifier, if it responds to `ANY` queries. This Analytic Story can help you detect attackers who may be abusing your company's DNS infrastructure to launch amplification attacks, causing Denial of Service to other victims. +narrative = The Domain Name System (DNS) is the protocol used to map domain names to IP addresses. It has been proven to work very well for its intended function. However if DNS is misconfigured, servers can be abused by attackers to levy amplification or redirection attacks against victims. Because DNS responses to `ANY` queries are so much larger than the queries themselves--and can be made with a UDP packet, which does not require a handshake--attackers can spoof the source address of the packet and cause much more data to be sent to the victim than if they sent the traffic themselves. The `ANY` requests are will be larger than normal DNS server requests, due to the fact that the server provides significant details, such as MX records and associated IP addresses. A large volume of this traffic can result in a DOS on the victim's machine. This misconfiguration leads to two possible victims, the first being the DNS servers participating in an attack and the other being the hosts that are the targets of the DOS attack.\ +The search in this story can help you to detect if attackers are abusing your company's DNS infrastructure to launch DNS amplification attacks causing Denial of Service to other victims. + +[analytic_story://DNS Hijacking] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2020-02-04 +version = 1 +references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task"] +description = Secure your environment against DNS hijacks with searches that help you detect and investigate unauthorized changes to DNS records. +narrative = Dubbed the Achilles heel of the Internet (see https://www.f5.com/labs/articles/threat-intelligence/dns-is-still-the-achilles-heel-of-the-internet-25613), DNS plays a critical role in routing web traffic but is notoriously vulnerable to attack. One reason is its distributed nature. It relies on unstructured connections between millions of clients and servers over inherently insecure protocols.\ +The gravity and extent of the importance of securing DNS from attacks is undeniable. The fallout of compromised DNS can be disastrous. Not only can hackers bring down an entire business, they can intercept confidential information, emails, and login credentials, as well. \ +On January 22, 2019, the US Department of Homeland Security 2019's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) raised awareness of some high-profile DNS hijacking attacks against infrastructure, both in the United States and abroad. It issued Emergency Directive 19-01 (see https://cyber.dhs.gov/ed/19-01/), which summarized the activity and required government agencies to take the following four actions, all within 10 days: \ +1. For all .gov or other agency-managed domains, audit public DNS records on all authoritative and secondary DNS servers, verify that they resolve to the intended location or report them to CISA.\ +1. Update the passwords for all accounts on systems that can make changes to each agency 2019's DNS records.\ +1. Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all accounts on systems that can make changes to each agency's 2019 DNS records or, if impossible, provide CISA with the names of systems, the reasons why MFA cannot be enabled within the required timeline, and an ETA for when it can be enabled.\ +1. CISA will begin regular delivery of newly added certificates to Certificate Transparency (CT) logs for agency domains via the Cyber Hygiene service. Upon receipt, agencies must immediately begin monitoring CT log data for certificates issued that they did not request. If an agency confirms that a certificate was unauthorized, it must report the certificate to the issuing certificate authority and to CISA. Of course, it makes sense to put equivalent actions in place within your environment, as well. \ +In DNS hijacking, the attacker assumes control over an account or makes use of a DNS service exploit to make changes to DNS records. Once they gain access, attackers can substitute their own MX records, name-server records, and addresses, redirecting emails and traffic through their infrastructure, where they can read, copy, or modify information seen. They can also generate valid encryption certificates to help them avoid browser-certificate checks. In one notable attack on the Internet service provider, GoDaddy, the hackers altered Sender Policy Framework (SPF) records a relatively minor change that did not inflict excessive damage but allowed for more effective spam campaigns.\ +The searches in this Analytic Story help you detect and investigate activities that may indicate that DNS hijacking has taken place within your environment. + +[analytic_story://sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation] +category = Privilege Escalation +last_updated = 2021-12-20 +version = 1 +references = ["https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42278", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42287", "https://exploit.ph/cve-2021-42287-cve-2021-42278-weaponisation.html"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Mauricio Velazco"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Computer Account Name Change - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request - Rule"] +description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with the exploitation of the sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287) vulnerabilities. +narrative = On November 9, 2021, Microsoft released patches to address two vulnerabilities that affect Windows Active Directory networks, sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287). On December 10, 2021, security researchers Charlie Clark and Andrew Schwartz released a blog post where they shared how to weaponise these vulnerabilities in a target network an the initial detection opportunities. When successfully exploited, CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287 allow an adversary, who has stolen the credentials of a low priviled domain user, to obtain a Kerberos Service ticket for a Domain Controller computer account. The only requirement is to have network connectivity to a domain controller. This attack vector effectivelly allows attackers to escalate their privileges in an Active Directory from a regular domain user account and take control of a domain controller. While patches have been released to address these vulnerabilities, deploying detection controls for this attack may help help defenders identify attackers attempting exploitation. + +[analytic_story://Domain Trust Discovery] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2021-03-25 +version = 1 +references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482/"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - DSQuery Domain Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule"] +description = Adversaries may attempt to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities in Windows multi-domain/forest environments. +narrative = Domain trusts provide a mechanism for a domain to allow access to resources based on the authentication procedures of another domain. Domain trusts allow the users of the trusted domain to access resources in the trusting domain. The information discovered may help the adversary conduct SID-History Injection, Pass the Ticket, and Kerberoasting. Domain trusts can be enumerated using the DSEnumerateDomainTrusts() Win32 API call, .NET methods, and LDAP. The Windows utility Nltest is known to be used by adversaries to enumerate domain trusts. + +[analytic_story://Dynamic DNS] +category = Malware +last_updated = 2018-09-06 +version = 2 +references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"] +description = Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them avoid firewall blocks and deny lists. +narrative = Dynamic DNS services (DDNS) are legitimate low-cost or free services that allow users to rapidly update domain resolutions to IP infrastructure. While their usage can be benign, malicious actors can abuse DDNS to host harmful payloads or interactive-command-and-control infrastructure. These attackers will manually update or automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to IP addresses that circumvent firewall blocks and deny lists and frustrate a network defender's analytic and investigative processes. These searches will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains and then investigate more deeply, when appropriate. While this list of top-level dynamic domains is not exhaustive, it can be dynamically updated as new suspicious dynamic domains are identified. + +[analytic_story://Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ] +category = Malware +last_updated = 2020-01-27 +version = 1 +references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A", "https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf", "https://www.vkremez.com/2017/05/emotet-banking-trojan-malware-analysis.html"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"] +description = Detect rarely used executables, specific registry paths that may confer malware survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that the Emotet financial malware has compromised your environment. +narrative = The trojan downloader known as Emotet first surfaced in 2014, when it was discovered targeting the banking industry to steal credentials. However, according to a joint technical alert (TA) issued by three government agencies (https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A), Emotet has evolved far beyond those beginnings to become what a ThreatPost article called a threat-delivery service(see https://threatpost.com/emotet-malware-evolves-beyond-banking-to-threat-delivery-service/134342/). For example, in early 2018, Emotet was found to be using its loader function to spread the Quakbot and Ransomware variants. \ +According to the TA, the the malware continues to be among the most costly and destructive malware affecting the private and public sectors. Researchers have linked it to the threat group Mealybug, which has also been on the security communitys radar since 2014.\ +The searches in this Analytic Story will help you find executables that are rarely used in your environment, specific registry paths that malware often uses to ensure survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that Emotet or other malware has compromised your environment. + +[analytic_story://F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2020-08-02 +version = 1 +references = ["https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/about/news/f5-fixes-critical-vulnerability-discovered-by-positive-technologies-in-big-ip-application-delivery-controller/", "https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K52145254", "https://blog.cloudflare.com/cve-2020-5902-helping-to-protect-against-the-f5-tmui-rce-vulnerability/"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Shannon Davis"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902 - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] +description = Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-5902. Discovered by Positive Technologies researchers, this vulnerability affects F5 BIG-IP, BIG-IQ. and Traffix SDC devices (vulnerable versions in F5 support link below). This vulnerability allows unauthenticated users, along with authenticated users, who have access to the configuration utility to execute system commands, create/delete files, disable services, and/or execute Java code. This vulnerability can result in full system compromise. +narrative = A client is able to perform a remote code execution on an exposed and vulnerable system. The detection search in this Analytic Story uses syslog to detect the malicious behavior. Syslog is going to be the best detection method, as any systems using SSL to protect their management console will make detection via wire data difficult. The searches included used Splunk Connect For Syslog (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4740/), and used a custom destination port to help define the data as F5 data (covered in https://splunk-connect-for-syslog.readthedocs.io/en/master/sources/F5/) + +[analytic_story://FIN7] +category = Malware +last_updated = 2021-09-14 +version = 1 +references = ["https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIN7", "https://threatpost.com/fin7-windows-11-release/169206/", "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/jssloader-recoded-and-reloaded"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Check Elevated CMD using whoami - Rule", "ESCU - Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Jscript Execution Using Cscript App - Rule", "ESCU - MS Scripting Process Loading Ldap Module - Rule", "ESCU - MS Scripting Process Loading WMI Module - Rule", "ESCU - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Office Application Drop Executable - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App - Rule", "ESCU - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule", "ESCU - XSL Script Execution With WMIC - Rule"] +description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the FIN7 JS Implant and JSSLoader, including looking for Image Loading of ldap and wmi modules, associated with its payload, data collection and script execution. +narrative = FIN7 is a Russian criminal advanced persistent threat group that has primarily targeted the U.S. retail, restaurant, and hospitality sectors since mid-2015. A portion of FIN7 is run out of the front company Combi Security. It has been called one of the most successful criminal hacking groups in the world. this passed few day FIN7 tools and implant are seen in the wild where its code is updated. the FIN& is known to use the spear phishing attack as a entry to targetted network or host that will drop its staging payload like the JS and JSSloader. Now this artifacts and implants seen downloading other malware like cobaltstrike and event ransomware to encrypt host. + +[analytic_story://GCP Cross Account Activity] +category = Cloud Security +last_updated = 2020-09-01 +version = 1 +references = ["https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-service-accounts"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule", "ESCU - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] +description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another GCP account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity. +narrative = Google Cloud Platform (GCP) admins manage access to GCP resources and services across the enterprise using GCP Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage GCP users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as Compute instances, the GCP Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are potentially assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\ +In between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\ +This Analytic Story includes searches that will help you monitor your GCP Audit logs logs for evidence of suspicious cross-account activity. For example, while accessing multiple GCP accounts and roles may be perfectly valid behavior, it may be suspicious when an account requests privileges of an account it has not accessed in the past. After identifying suspicious activities, you can use the provided investigative searches to help you probe more deeply. + +[analytic_story://HAFNIUM Group] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2021-03-03 +version = 1 +references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-hafnium-exchange-server-zero-day-activity-in-splunk.html", "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/", "https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/03/03/rapid7s-insightidr-enables-detection-and-response-to-microsoft-exchange-0-day/"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Exchange Web Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine - Rule", "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Unified Messaging Service Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule"] +description = HAFNIUM group was identified by Microsoft as exploiting 4 Microsoft Exchange CVEs in the wild - CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858 and CVE-2021-27065. +narrative = On Tuesday, March 2, 2021, Microsoft released a set of security patches for its mail server, Microsoft Exchange. These patches respond to a group of vulnerabilities known to impact Exchange 2013, 2016, and 2019. It is important to note that an Exchange 2010 security update has also been issued, though the CVEs do not reference that version as being vulnerable.\ +While the CVEs do not shed much light on the specifics of the vulnerabilities or exploits, the first vulnerability (CVE-2021-26855) has a remote network attack vector that allows the attacker, a group Microsoft named HAFNIUM, to authenticate as the Exchange server. Three additional vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065) were also identified as part of this activity. When chained together along with CVE-2021-26855 for initial access, the attacker would have complete control over the Exchange server. This includes the ability to run code as SYSTEM and write to any path on the server.\ +The following Splunk detections assist with identifying the HAFNIUM groups tradecraft and methodology. + +[analytic_story://Hermetic Wiper] +category = Malware +last_updated = 2022-03-02 +version = 1 +references = ["https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/hermetic-wiper-ukraine-under-attack/", "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-057a"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Rod Soto, Michael Haag, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule", "ESCU - Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule"] +description = This analytic story contains detections that allow security analysts to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the destructive malware targeting Ukrainian organizations also known as "Hermetic Wiper". This analytic story looks for abuse of Regsvr32, executables written in administrative SMB Share, suspicious processes, disabling of memory crash dump and more. +narrative = Hermetic Wiper is destructive malware operation found by Sentinel One targeting multiple organizations in Ukraine. This malicious payload corrupts Master Boot Records, uses signed drivers and manipulates NTFS attributes for file destruction. + +[analytic_story://Hidden Cobra Malware] +category = Malware +last_updated = 2020-01-22 +version = 2 +references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/HIDDEN-COBRA-North-Korean-Malicious-Cyber-Activity", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"] +description = Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A. +narrative = North Korea's government-sponsored "cyber army" has been slowly building momentum and gaining sophistication over the last 15 years or so. As a result, the group's activity, which the US government refers to as "Hidden Cobra," has surreptitiously crept onto the collective radar as a preeminent global threat.\ +These state-sponsored actors are thought to be responsible for everything from a hack on a South Korean nuclear plant to an attack on Sony in anticipation of its release of the movie "The Interview" at the end of 2014. They're also notorious for cyberespionage. In recent years, the group seems to be focused on financial crimes, such as cryptojacking.\ +In June of 2018, The Department of Homeland Security, together with the FBI and other U.S. government partners, issued Technical Alert (TA-18-149A) to advise the public about two variants of North Korean malware. One variant, dubbed "Joanap," is a multi-stage peer-to-peer botnet that allows North Korean state actors to exfiltrate data, download and execute secondary payloads, and initialize proxy communications. The other variant, "Brambul," is a Windows32 SMB worm that is dropped into a victim network. When executed, the malware attempts to spread laterally within a victim's local subnet, connecting via the SMB protocol and initiating brute-force password attacks. It reports details to the Hidden Cobra actors via email, so they can use the information for secondary remote operations.\ +Among other searches in this Analytic Story is a detection search that looks for the creation or deletion of hidden shares, such as, "adnim$," which the Hidden Cobra malware creates on the target system. Another looks for the creation of three malicious files associated with the malware. You can also use a search in this story to investigate activity that indicates that malware is sending email back to the attackers. + +[analytic_story://Information Sabotage] +category = Abuse +last_updated = 2021-11-17 +version = 1 +references = ["https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/blog/insider-threat-deep-dive-it-sabotage/"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share - Rule"] +description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might correlate to insider threat specially in terms of information sabotage. +narrative = Information sabotage is the type of crime many people associate with insider threat. Where the current or former employees, contractors, or business partners intentionally exceeded or misused an authorized level of access to networks, systems, or data with the intention of harming a specific individual, the organization, or the organization's data, systems, and/or daily business operations. + +[analytic_story://Ingress Tool Transfer] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2021-03-24 +version = 1 +references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Curl Download and Bash Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Wget Download and Bash Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule"] +description = Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Files may be copied from an external adversary controlled system through the command and control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP. +narrative = Ingress tool transfer is a Technique under tactic Command and Control. Behaviors will include the use of living off the land binaries to download implants or binaries over alternate communication ports. It is imperative to baseline applications on endpoints to understand what generates network activity, to where, and what is its native behavior. These utilities, when abused, will write files to disk in world writeable paths.\ During triage, review the reputation of the remote public destination IP or domain. Capture any files written to disk and perform analysis. Review other parrallel processes for additional behaviors. + +[analytic_story://JBoss Vulnerability] +category = Vulnerability +last_updated = 2017-09-14 +version = 1 +references = ["http://www.deependresearch.org/2016/04/jboss-exploits-view-from-victim.html"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] +description = In March of 2016, adversaries were seen using JexBoss--an open-source utility used for testing and exploiting JBoss application servers. These searches help detect evidence of these attacks, such as network connections to external resources or web services spawning atypical child processes, among others. +narrative = This Analytic Story looks for probing and exploitation attempts targeting JBoss application servers. While the vulnerabilities associated with this story are rather dated, they were leveraged in a spring 2016 campaign in connection with the Samsam ransomware variant. Incidents involving this ransomware are unique, in that they begin with attacks against vulnerable services, rather than the phishing or drive-by attacks more common with ransomware. In this case, vulnerable JBoss applications appear to be the target of choice.\ +It is helpful to understand how often a notable event generated by this story occurs, as well as the commonalities between some of these events, both of which may provide clues about whether this is a common occurrence of minimal concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. It may also help to understand whether the issue is restricted to a single user/system or whether it is broader in scope.\ +When looking at the target of the behavior uncovered by the event, you should note the sensitivity of the user and or/system to help determine the potential impact. It is also helpful to identify other recent events involving the target. This can help tie different events together and give further situational awareness regarding the target host.\ +Various types of information for external systems should be reviewed and, potentially, collected if the incident is, indeed, judged to be malicious. This data may be useful for generating your own threat intelligence, so you can create future alerts.\ +The following factors may assist you in determining whether the event is malicious: \ +1. Country of origin\ +1. Responsible party\ +1. Fully qualified domain names associated with the external IP address\ +1. Registration of fully qualified domain names associated with external IP address Determining whether it is a dynamic domain frequently visited by others and/or how third parties categorize it can also help you qualify and understand the event and possible motivation for the attack. In addition, there are various sources that may provide reputation information on the IP address or domain name, which can assist you in determining whether the event is malicious in nature. Finally, determining whether there are other events associated with the IP address may help connect data points or expose other historic events that might be brought back into scope.\ +Gathering various data on the system of interest can sometimes help quickly determine whether something suspicious is happening. Some of these items include determining who else may have logged into the system recently, whether any unusual scheduled tasks exist, whether the system is communicating on suspicious ports, whether there are modifications to sensitive registry keys, and/or whether there are any known vulnerabilities on the system. This information can often highlight other activity commonly seen in attack scenarios or give more information about how the system may have been targeted.\ +hen a specific service or application is targeted, it is often helpful to know the associated version, to help determine whether it is vulnerable to a specific exploit.\ +If you suspect an attack targeting a web server, it is helpful to look at some of the behavior of the web service to see if there is evidence that the service has been compromised. Some indications of this might be network connections to external resources, the web service spawning child processes that are not associated with typical behavior, and whether the service wrote any files that might be malicious in nature.\ +If a suspicious file is found, we can review more information about it to help determine if it is, in fact, malicious. Identifying the file type, any processes that opened the file, the processes that may have created and/or modified the file, and how many other systems potentially have this file can you determine whether the file is malicious. Also, determining the file hash and checking it against reputation sources, such as VirusTotal, can sometimes help you quickly determine if it is malicious in nature.\ +Often, a simple inspection of a suspect process name and path can tell you if the system has been compromised. For example, if svchost.exe is found running from a location other than `C:\Windows\System32`, it is likely something malicious designed to hide in plain sight when simply reviewing process names. \ +It can also be helpful to examine various behaviors of and the parent of the process of interest. For example, if it turns out the process of interest is malicious, it would be good to see whether the parent process spawned other processes that might also warrant further scrutiny. If a process is suspect, a review of the network connections made around the time of the event and noting whether the process has spawned any child processes could be helpful in determining whether it is malicious or executing a malicious script. + +[analytic_story://Kubernetes Scanning Activity] +category = Cloud Security +last_updated = 2020-04-15 +version = 1 +references = ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] +description = This story addresses detection against Kubernetes cluster fingerprint scan and attack by providing information on items such as source ip, user agent, cluster names. +narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitve information and management priviledges of production workloads, microservices and applications. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious unauthenticated requests from the internet to kubernetes cluster. + +[analytic_story://Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity] +category = Cloud Security +last_updated = 2020-05-20 +version = 1 +references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] +description = This story addresses detection and response of accounts acccesing Kubernetes cluster sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets providing information on items such as user user, group. object, namespace and authorization reason. +narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive objects within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes sensitive objects. + +[analytic_story://Linux Persistence Techniques] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2021-12-17 +version = 1 +references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/", "https://kifarunix.com/scheduling-tasks-using-at-command-in-linux/", "https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/at/", "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/uploads/CERTFR-2021-CTI-005.pdf"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Add User Account - Rule", "ESCU - Linux At Allow Config File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux At Application Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Change File Owner To Root - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Common Process For Elevation Control - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Doas Conf File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Doas Tool Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Linux File Creation In Profile Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Access To Credential Files - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Service Restarted - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Service Started Or Enabled - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Sudo OR Su Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Visudo Utility Execution - Rule"] +description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on a Linux system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment. +narrative = Maintaining persistence is one of the first steps taken by attackers after the initial compromise. Attackers leverage various custom and built-in tools to ensure survivability and persistent access within a compromised enterprise. This Analytic Story provides searches to help you identify various behaviors used by attackers to maintain persistent access to a Linux environment. + +[analytic_story://Linux Post-Exploitation] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2021-12-03 +version = 1 +references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/linux/"] +maintainers = [{"company": "no", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Linux Discovery Commands - Rule"] +description = This analytic story identifies popular Linux post exploitation tools such as autoSUID, LinEnum, LinPEAS, Linux Exploit Suggesters, MimiPenguin. +narrative = These tools allow operators find possible exploits or paths for privilege escalation based on SUID binaries, user permissions, kernel version and distro version. + +[analytic_story://Linux Privilege Escalation] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2021-12-17 +version = 1 +references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Add User Account - Rule", "ESCU - Linux At Allow Config File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux At Application Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Change File Owner To Root - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Common Process For Elevation Control - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Doas Conf File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Doas Tool Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Linux File Creation In Profile Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux pkexec Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Access To Credential Files - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Service Restarted - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Service Started Or Enabled - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Sudo OR Su Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Visudo Utility Execution - Rule"] +description = Monitor for and investigate activities that may be associated with a Linux privilege-escalation attack, including unusual processes running on endpoints, schedule task, services, setuid, root execution and more. +narrative = Privilege escalation is a "land-and-expand" technique, wherein an adversary gains an initial foothold on a host and then exploits its weaknesses to increase his privileges. The motivation is simple: certain actions on a Linux machine--such as installing software--may require higher-level privileges than those the attacker initially acquired. By increasing his privilege level, the attacker can gain the control required to carry out his malicious ends. This Analytic Story provides searches to detect and investigate behaviors that attackers may use to elevate their privileges in your environment. + +[analytic_story://Living Off The Land] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2022-02-17 +version = 1 +references = ["https://lolbas-project.github.io/"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Lou Stella"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution - Rule", "ESCU - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule"] +description = Leverage searches that allow you to search for the presence of an attacker leveraging existing tooling within your environment. +narrative = Living Off The Land refers to an attacker methodology of using software already installed on their target host to achieve their goals. Many utilities that ship with Windows can be used to achieve various goals, with reduced chances of detection by an antivirus software. + +[analytic_story://Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2021-12-11 +version = 1 +references = ["https://mbechler.github.io/2021/12/10/PSA_Log4Shell_JNDI_Injection/", "https://www.fastly.com/blog/digging-deeper-into-log4shell-0day-rce-exploit-found-in-log4j", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/log4j2-vulnerability-analysis-and-mitigation-recommendations/", "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/log-jammin-log4j-2-rce.html"] +maintainers = [{"company": "no", "email": "-", "name": "Jose Hernandez"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Curl Download and Bash Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Hunting for Log4Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Java Class File download by Java User Agent - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Java Spawning Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 Exploitation - Rule", "ESCU - Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Wget Download and Bash Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Java Spawning Shells - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection - Rule"] +description = Log4Shell or CVE-2021-44228 is a Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability in the Apache Log4j library, a widely used and ubiquitous logging framework for Java. The vulnerability allows an attacker who can control log messages to execute arbitrary code loaded from attacker-controlled servers and we anticipate that most apps using the Log4j library will meet this condition. +narrative = In late November 2021, Chen Zhaojun of Alibaba identified a remote code execution vulnerability. Previous work was seen in a 2016 Blackhat talk by Alvaro Munoz and Oleksandr Mirosh called ["A Journey from JNDI/LDAP Manipulation to Remote Code Execution Dream Land"](https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Munoz-A-Journey-From-JNDI-LDAP-Manipulation-To-RCE.pdf). Reported under the CVE ID : CVE-2021-44228, released to the public on December 10, 2021. The vulnerability is exploited through improper deserialization of user input passed into the framework. It permits remote code execution and it can allow an attacker to leak sensitive data, such as environment variables, or execute malicious software on the target system. + +[analytic_story://Malicious PowerShell] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2017-08-23 +version = 5 +references = ["https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malware-employs-powershell-to-infect-systems/", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Creating Thread Mutex - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Domain Enumeration - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Execute COM Object - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via System Reflection Assembly - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Processing Stream Of Data - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Using memory As Backing Store - Rule", "ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule", "ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Unloading AMSI via Reflection - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Recon Running Process Or Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] +description = Attackers are finding stealthy ways "live off the land," leveraging utilities and tools that come standard on the endpoint--such as PowerShell--to achieve their goals without downloading binary files. These searches can help you detect and investigate PowerShell command-line options that may be indicative of malicious intent. +narrative = The searches in this Analytic Story monitor for parameters often used for malicious purposes. It is helpful to understand how often the notable events generated by this story occur, as well as the commonalities between some of these events. These factors may provide clues about whether this is a common occurrence of minimal concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. Likewise, it is important to determine whether the issue is restricted to a single user/system or is broader in scope. \ +The following factors may assist you in determining whether the event is malicious: \ +1. Country of origin \ +1. Responsible party \ +1. Fully qualified domain names associated with the external IP address \ +1. Registration of fully qualified domain names associated with external IP address \ +Determining whether it is a dynamic domain frequently visited by others and/or how third parties categorize it can also help you answer some questions surrounding the attacker and details related to the external system. In addition, there are various sources--such as VirusTotal— that can provide some reputation information on the IP address or domain name, which can assist in determining whether the event is malicious. Finally, determining whether there are other events associated with the IP address may help connect data points or show other events that should be brought into scope. \ +Gathering data on the system of interest can sometimes help you quickly determine whether something suspicious is happening. Some of these items include finding out who else may have recently logged into the system, whether any unusual scheduled tasks exist, whether the system is communicating on suspicious ports, whether there are modifications to sensitive registry keys, and whether there are any known vulnerabilities on the system. This information can often highlight other activity commonly seen in attack scenarios or give more information about how the system may have been targeted. \ +Often, a simple inspection of the process name and path can tell you if the system has been compromised. For example, if `svchost.exe` is found running from a location other than `C:\Windows\System32`, it is likely something malicious designed to hide in plain sight when cursorily reviewing process names. Similarly, if the process itself seems legitimate, but the parent process is running from the temporary browser cache, that could be indicative of activity initiated via a compromised website a user visited. \ +It can also be very helpful to examine various behaviors of the process of interest or the parent of the process of interest. For example, if it turns out the process of interest is malicious, it would be good to see if the parent to that process spawned other processes that might be worth further scrutiny. If a process is suspect, a review of the network connections made in and around the time of the event and/or whether the process spawned any child processes could be helpful, as well. \ +In the event a system is suspected of having been compromised via a malicious website, we suggest reviewing the browsing activity from that system around the time of the event. If categories are given for the URLs visited, that can help you zero in on possible malicious sites. \ +Most recently we have added new content related to PowerShell Script Block logging, Windows EventCode 4104. Script block logging presents the deobfuscated and raw script executed on an endpoint. The analytics produced were tested against commonly used attack frameworks - PowerShell-Empire, Cobalt Strike and Covenant. In addition, we sampled publicly available samples that utilize PowerShell and validated coverage. The analytics are here to identify suspicious usage, cmdlets, or script values. 4104 events are enabled via the Windows registry and may generate a large volume of data if enabled globally. Enabling on critical systems or a limited set may be best. During triage of 4104 events, review parallel processes for other processes and command executed. Identify any file modifications and network communication and review accordingly. Fortunately, we get the full script to determine the level of threat identified. + +[analytic_story://Masquerading - Rename System Utilities] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2021-04-26 +version = 1 +references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Sdelete Application Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule"] +description = Adversaries may rename legitimate system utilities to try to evade security mechanisms concerning the usage of those utilities. +narrative = Security monitoring and control mechanisms may be in place for system utilities adversaries are capable of abusing. It may be possible to bypass those security mechanisms by renaming the utility prior to utilization (ex: rename rundll32.exe). An alternative case occurs when a legitimate utility is copied or moved to a different directory and renamed to avoid detections based on system utilities executing from non-standard paths.\ +The following content is here to assist with binaries within `system32` or `syswow64` being moved to a new location or an adversary bringing a the binary in to execute.\ +There will be false positives as some native Windows processes are moved or ran by third party applications from different paths. If file names are mismatched between the file name on disk and that of the binarys PE metadata, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries by looking to see if the InternalName, OriginalFilename, and or ProductName match what is expected could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. Do not focus on the possible names a file could have, but instead on the command-line arguments that are known to be used and are distinct because it will have a better rate of detection. + +[analytic_story://Meterpreter] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2021-06-08 +version = 1 +references = ["https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/about-meterpreter/", "https://doubleoctopus.com/security-wiki/threats-and-tools/meterpreter/", "https://www.rapid7.com/products/metasploit/"] +maintainers = [{"company": "no", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Hart"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Excessive number of distinct processes created in Windows Temp folder - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive number of taskhost processes - Rule"] +description = Meterpreter provides red teams, pen testers and threat actors interactive access to a compromised host to run commands, upload payloads, download files, and other actions. +narrative = This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from Meterpreter. Meterpreter is a Metasploit payload for remote execution that leverages DLL injection to make it extremely difficult to detect. Since the software runs in memory, no new processes are created upon injection. It also leverages encrypted communication channels.\ +Meterpreter enables the operator to remotely run commands on the target machine, upload payloads, download files, dump password hashes, and much more. It is difficult to determine from the forensic evidence what actions the operator performed. Splunk Research, however, has observed anomalous behaviors on the compromised hosts that seem to only appear when Meterpreter is executing various commands. With that, we have written new detections targeted to these detections.\ +While investigating a detection related to this analytic story, please bear in mind that the detections look for anomalies in system behavior. It will be imperative to look for other signs in the endpoint and network logs for lateral movement, discovery and other actions to confirm that the host was compromised and a remote actor used it to progress on their objectives. + +[analytic_story://Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2021-09-08 +version = 1 +references = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/09/windows-mshtml-zero-day-actively-exploited-mitigations-required/", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", "https://www.echotrail.io/insights/search/control.exe"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Control Loading from World Writable Directory - Rule", "ESCU - MSHTML Module Load in Office Product - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Writing cab or inf - Rule", "ESCU - Office Spawning Control - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory - Rule"] +description = CVE-2021-40444 is a remote code execution vulnerability in MSHTML, recently used to delivery targeted spearphishing documents. +narrative = Microsoft is aware of targeted attacks that attempt to exploit this vulnerability, CVE-2021-40444 by using specially-crafted Microsoft Office documents. MSHTML is a software component used to render web pages on Windows. Although it is 2019s most commonly associated with Internet Explorer, it is also used in other software. CVE-2021-40444 received a CVSS score of 8.8 out of 10. MSHTML is the beating heart of Internet Explorer, the vulnerability also exists in that browser. Although given its limited use, there is little risk of infection by that vector. Microsoft Office applications use the MSHTML component to display web content in Office documents. The attack depends on MSHTML loading a specially crafted ActiveX control when the target opens a malicious Office document. The loaded ActiveX control can then run arbitrary code to infect the system with more malware. At the moment all supported Windows versions are vulnerable. Since there is no patch available yet, Microsoft proposes a few methods to block these attacks. \ +1. Disable the installation of all ActiveX controls in Internet Explorer via the registry. Previously-installed ActiveX controls will still run, but no new ones will be added, including malicious ones. Open documents from the Internet in Protected View or Application Guard for Office, both of which prevent the current attack. This is a default setting but it may have been changed. + +[analytic_story://Monitor for Updates] +category = Best Practices +last_updated = 2017-09-15 +version = 1 +references = ["https://learn.cisecurity.org/20-controls-download"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - No Windows Updates in a time frame - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] +description = Monitor your enterprise to ensure that your endpoints are being patched and updated. Adversaries notoriously exploit known vulnerabilities that could be mitigated by applying routine security patches. +narrative = It is a common best practice to ensure that endpoints are being patched and updated in a timely manner, in order to reduce the risk of compromise via a publicly disclosed vulnerability. Timely application of updates/patches is important to eliminate known vulnerabilities that may be exploited by various threat actors.\ +Searches in this analytic story are designed to help analysts monitor endpoints for system patches and/or updates. This helps analysts identify any systems that are not successfully updated in a timely matter.\ +Microsoft releases updates for Windows systems on a monthly cadence. They should be installed as soon as possible after following internal testing and validation procedures. Patches and updates for other systems or applications are typically released as needed. + +[analytic_story://Netsh Abuse] +category = Abuse +last_updated = 2017-01-05 +version = 1 +references = ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/tn-archive/bb490939(v=technet.10)", "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html", "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] +description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the abuse of `netsh.exe`, which can disable local firewall settings or set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system. +narrative = It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage native Windows tools and functionality to execute commands for malicious reasons. One such tool on Windows OS is `netsh.exe`,a command-line scripting utility that allows you to--either locally or remotely--display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. `Netsh.exe` can be used to discover and disable local firewall settings. It can also be used to set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.\ +To get started, run the detection search to identify parent processes of `netsh.exe`. + +[analytic_story://Network Discovery] +category = Malware +last_updated = 2022-02-14 +version = 1 +references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016/", "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/ESET_Kobalos.pdf", "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/09/unit42-xbash-combines-botnet-ransomware-coinmining-worm-targets-linux-windows/"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Linux System Network Discovery - Rule"] +description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the network discovery, including looking for network configuration, settings such as IP, MAC address, firewall settings and many more. +narrative = Adversaries may use the information from System Network Configuration Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining certain access within the target network and what actions to do next. + +[analytic_story://NOBELIUM Group] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2020-12-14 +version = 2 +references = ["https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldmax-goldfinder-sibot-analyzing-nobelium-malware/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html", "https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Patrick Bareiss"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Anomalous usage of 7zip - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule"] +description = Sunburst is a trojanized updates to SolarWinds Orion IT monitoring and management software. It was discovered by FireEye in December 2020. The actors behind this campaign gained access to numerous public and private organizations around the world. +narrative = This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) of the NOBELIUM Group. The threat actor behind sunburst compromised the SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll, is a SolarWinds digitally-signed component of the Orion software framework that contains a backdoor that communicates via HTTP to third party servers. The detections in this Analytic Story are focusing on the dll loading events, file create events and network events to detect This malware. + +[analytic_story://Office 365 Detections] +category = Cloud Security +last_updated = 2020-12-16 +version = 1 +references = ["https://i.blackhat.com/USA-20/Thursday/us-20-Bienstock-My-Cloud-Is-APTs-Cloud-Investigating-And-Defending-Office-365.pdf"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Patrick Bareiss"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Disable MFA - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule", "ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule", "ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule"] +description = This story is focused around detecting Office 365 Attacks. +narrative = More and more companies are using Microsofts Office 365 cloud offering. Therefore, we see more and more attacks against Office 365. This story provides various detections for Office 365 attacks. + +[analytic_story://Orangeworm Attack Group] +category = Malware +last_updated = 2020-01-22 +version = 2 +references = ["https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/orangeworm-targets-healthcare-us-europe-asia", "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/healthcare-targeted-by-hacker/"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] +description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry. +narrative = In May of 2018, the attack group Orangeworm was implicated for installing a custom backdoor called Trojan.Kwampirs within large international healthcare corporations in the United States, Europe, and Asia. This malware provides the attackers with remote access to the target system, decrypting and extracting a copy of its main DLL payload from its resource section. Before writing the payload to disk, it inserts a randomly generated string into the middle of the decrypted payload in an attempt to evade hash-based detections.\ +Awareness of the Orangeworm group first surfaced in January, 2015. It has conducted targeted attacks against related industries, as well, such as pharmaceuticals and healthcare IT solution providers.\ +Healthcare may be a promising target, because it is notoriously behind in technology, often using older operating systems and neglecting to patch computers. Even so, the group was able to evade detection for a full three years. Sources say that the malware spread quickly within the target networks, infecting computers used to control medical devices, such as MRI and X-ray machines.\ +This Analytic Story is designed to help you detect and investigate suspicious activities that may be indicative of an Orangeworm attack. One detection search looks for command-line arguments. Another monitors for uses of sc.exe, a non-essential Windows file that can manipulate Windows services. One of the investigative searches helps you get more information on web hosts that you suspect have been compromised. + +[analytic_story://PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2021-08-31 +version = 1 +references = ["https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2021/07/27/microsoft-releases-guidance-mitigating-petitpotam-ntlm-relay", "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5005413-mitigating-ntlm-relay-attacks-on-active-directory-certificate-services-ad-cs-3612b773-4043-4aa9-b23d-b87910cd3429", "https://www.specterops.io/assets/resources/Certified_Pre-Owned.pdf", "https://github.com/topotam/PetitPotam/", "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/releases/tag/2.2.0-20210723", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-36942", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187/"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - PetitPotam Network Share Access Request - Rule", "ESCU - PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request - Rule"] +description = PetitPotam (CVE-2021-36942,) is a vulnerablity identified in Microsofts EFSRPC Protocol that can allow an unauthenticated account to escalate privileges to domain administrator given the right circumstances. +narrative = In June 2021, security researchers at SpecterOps released a blog post and white paper detailing several potential attack vectors against Active Directory Certificated Services (ADCS). ADCS is a Microsoft product that implements Public Key Infrastrucutre (PKI) functionality and can be used by organizations to provide and manage digital certiticates within Active Directory.\ In July 2021, a security researcher released PetitPotam, a tool that allows attackers to coerce Windows systems into authenticating to arbitrary endpoints.\ Combining PetitPotam with the identified ADCS attack vectors allows attackers to escalate privileges from an unauthenticated anonymous user to full domain admin privileges. + +[analytic_story://Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2020-01-22 +version = 1 +references = ["https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/scope-of-mudcarp-attacks-highlight-1/", "http://blog.amossys.fr/badflick-is-not-so-bad.html"] +maintainers = [{"company": "iDefense", "email": "-", "name": "iDefense Cyber Espionage Team"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] +description = Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques employed by the MUDCARP threat group. +narrative = This story was created as a joint effort between iDefense and Splunk.\ +iDefense analysts have recently discovered a Windows executable file that, upon execution, spoofs a decryption tool and then drops a file that appears to be the custom-built javascript backdoor, "Orz," which is associated with the threat actors known as MUDCARP (as well as "temp.Periscope" and "Leviathan"). The file is executed using Wscript.\ +The MUDCARP techniques include the use of the compressed-folders module from Microsoft, zipfldr.dll, with RouteTheCall export to run the malicious process or command. After a successful reboot, the malware is made persistent by a manipulating `[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run]'help'='c:\\windows\\system32\\rundll32.exe c:\\windows\\system32\\zipfldr.dll,RouteTheCall c:\\programdata\\winapp.exe'`. Though this technique is not exclusive to MUDCARP, it has been spotted in the group's arsenal of advanced techniques seen in the wild.\ +This Analytic Story searches for evidence of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that allow for the use of a endpoint detection-and-response (EDR) bypass technique to mask the true parent of a malicious process. It can also be set as a registry key for further sandbox evasion and to allow the malware to launch only after reboot.\ +If behavioral searches included in this story yield positive hits, iDefense recommends conducting IOC searches for the following:\ +\ +1. www.chemscalere[.]com\ +1. chemscalere[.]com\ +1. about.chemscalere[.]com\ +1. autoconfig.chemscalere[.]com\ +1. autodiscover.chemscalere[.]com\ +1. catalog.chemscalere[.]com\ +1. cpanel.chemscalere[.]com\ +1. db.chemscalere[.]com\ +1. ftp.chemscalere[.]com\ +1. mail.chemscalere[.]com\ +1. news.chemscalere[.]com\ +1. update.chemscalere[.]com\ +1. webmail.chemscalere[.]com\ +1. www.candlelightparty[.]org\ +1. candlelightparty[.]org\ +1. newapp.freshasianews[.]comIn addition, iDefense also recommends that organizations review their environments for activity related to the following hashes:\ +\ +1. cd195ee448a3657b5c2c2d13e9c7a2e2\ +1. b43ad826fe6928245d3c02b648296b43\ +1. 889a9b52566448231f112a5ce9b5dfaf\ +1. b8ec65dab97cdef3cd256cc4753f0c54\ +1. 04d83cd3813698de28cfbba326d7647c + +[analytic_story://PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527] +category = Vulnerability +last_updated = 2021-07-01 +version = 1 +references = ["https://github.com/cube0x0/CVE-2021-1675/", "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/fix-for-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675-exploit-to-keep-your-print-servers-running-while-a-patch-is-not-available/", "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/exploitable-critical-rce-vulnerability-allows-regular-users-to-fully-compromise-active-directory-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675/", "https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/ob6y02/critical_vulnerability_printnightmare_exposes"] +maintainers = [{"company": "no", "email": "-", "name": "Splunk Threat Research Team"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Print Spooler Adding A Printer Driver - Rule", "ESCU - Print Spooler Failed to Load a Plug-in - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ESCU - Spoolsv Spawning Rundll32 - Rule", "ESCU - Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules - Rule", "ESCU - Spoolsv Suspicious Process Access - Rule", "ESCU - Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule"] +description = The following analytic story identifies behaviors related PrintNightmare, or CVE-2021-34527 previously known as (CVE-2021-1675), to gain privilege escalation on the vulnerable machine. +narrative = This vulnerability affects the Print Spooler service, enabled by default on Windows systems, and allows adversaries to trick this service into installing a remotely hosted print driver using a low privileged user account. Successful exploitation effectively allows adversaries to execute code in the target system (Remote Code Execution) in the context of the Print Spooler service which runs with the highest privileges (Privilege Escalation). \ +The prerequisites for successful exploitation consist of: \ +1. Print Spooler service enabled on the target system \ +1. Network connectivity to the target system (initial access has been obtained) \ +1. Hash or password for a low privileged user ( or computer ) account. \ +In the most impactful scenario, an attacker would be able to leverage this vulnerability to obtain a SYSTEM shell on a domain controller and so escalate their privileges from a low privileged domain account to full domain access in the target environment as shown below. + +[analytic_story://Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch] +category = Best Practices +last_updated = 2017-09-11 +version = 1 +references = ["http://www.novetta.com/2015/02/advanced-methods-to-detect-advanced-cyber-attacks-protocol-abuse/"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Allow Inbound Traffic In Firewall Rule - Rule", "ESCU - Enable RDP In Other Port Number - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"] +description = Detect instances of prohibited network traffic allowed in the environment, as well as protocols running on non-standard ports. Both of these types of behaviors typically violate policy and can be leveraged by attackers. +narrative = A traditional security best practice is to control the ports, protocols, and services allowed within your environment. By limiting the services and protocols to those explicitly approved by policy, administrators can minimize the attack surface. The combined effect allows both network defenders and security controls to focus and not be mired in superfluous traffic or data types. Looking for deviations to policy can identify attacker activity that abuses services and protocols to run on alternate or non-standard ports in the attempt to avoid detection or frustrate forensic analysts. + +[analytic_story://ProxyShell] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2021-08-24 +version = 1 +references = ["https://y4y.space/2021/08/12/my-steps-of-reproducing-proxyshell/", "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/8/17/from-pwn2own-2021-a-new-attack-surface-on-microsoft-exchange-proxyshell", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FC6iHw258RI", "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-microsoft-exchange-servers-still-vulnerable-to-proxyshell-exploit#what-should-you-do", "https://i.blackhat.com/USA21/Wednesday-Handouts/us-21-ProxyLogon-Is-Just-The-Tip-Of-The-Iceberg-A-New-Attack-Surface-On-Microsoft-Exchange-Server.pdf"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Detect Exchange Web Shell - Rule", "ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF - Rule", "ESCU - Exchange PowerShell Module Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Microsoft Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages - Rule"] +description = ProxyShell is a chain of exploits targeting on-premise Microsoft Exchange Server - CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, and CVE-2021-31207. +narrative = During Pwn2Own April 2021, a security researcher demonstrated an attack chain targeting on-premise Microsoft Exchange Server. August 5th, the same researcher publicly released further details and demonstrated the attack chain. CVE-2021-34473 Pre-auth path confusion leads to ACL Bypass (Patched in April by KB5001779) CVE-2021-34523 - Elevation of privilege on Exchange PowerShell backend (Patched in April by KB5001779) . CVE-2021-31207 - Post-auth Arbitrary-File-Write leads to RCE (Patched in May by KB5003435) Upon successful exploitation, the remote attacker will have SYSTEM privileges on the Exchange Server. In addition to remote access/execution, the adversary may be able to run Exchange PowerShell Cmdlets to perform further actions. + +[analytic_story://Ransomware] +category = Malware +last_updated = 2020-02-04 +version = 1 +references = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/06/28/carbon-black-threat-research-technical-analysis-petya-notpetya-ransomware/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2017/06/27/closing-the-detection-to-mitigation-gap-or-to-petya-or-notpetya-whocares-.html"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - 7zip CommandLine To SMB Share Path - Rule", "ESCU - Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall - Rule", "ESCU - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule", "ESCU - Allow Operation with Consent Admin - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App - Rule", "ESCU - CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Conti Common Exec parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect RClone Command-Line Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed RClone - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound File Modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Disable AMSI Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable ETW Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Logs Using WevtUtil - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Service Stop Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID - Rule", "ESCU - Fsutil Zeroing File - Rule", "ESCU - ICACLS Grant Command - Rule", "ESCU - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ESCU - Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading - Rule", "ESCU - Permission Modification using Takeown App - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Disable Security Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Execute COM Object - Rule", "ESCU - Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit - Rule", "ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Start Up During Safe Mode Boot - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object - Rule", "ESCU - Uninstall App Using MsiExec - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DiskCryptor Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Raccine Scheduled Task Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - Microsoft Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Rundll32 LockWorkStation - Response Task"] +description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage, the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected locations, and many others. +narrative = Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise. Attackers can deploy ransomware to enterprises through spearphishing campaigns and driveby downloads, as well as through traditional remote service-based exploitation. In the case of the WannaCry campaign, there was self-propagating wormable functionality that was used to maximize infection. Fortunately, organizations can apply several techniques--such as those in this Analytic Story--to detect and or mitigate the effects of ransomware. + +[analytic_story://BlackMatter Ransomware] +category = Malware +last_updated = 2021-09-06 +version = 1 +references = ["https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/08/09/blackmatter-ransomware-emerges-from-the-shadow-of-darkside/", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/blackmatter-ransomware-gang-rises-from-the-ashes-of-darkside-revil/", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/ransomware/2021/07/blackmatter-a-new-ransomware-group-claims-link-to-darkside-revil/"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Add DefaultUser And Password In Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Bcdedit Command Back To Normal Mode Boot - Rule", "ESCU - Change To Safe Mode With Network Config - Rule", "ESCU - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ESCU - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule"] +description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the BlackMatter ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with BlackMatter, force safe mode boot, autadminlogon account registry modification and more. +narrative = BlackMatter ransomware campaigns targeting healthcare and other vertical sectors, involve the use of ransomware payloads along with exfiltration of data per HHS bulletin. Malicious actors demand payment for ransome of data and threaten deletion and exposure of exfiltrated data. + +[analytic_story://Clop Ransomware] +category = Malware +last_updated = 2021-03-17 +version = 1 +references = ["https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/analyst-note-cl0p-tlp-white.pdf", "https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/115250/data-breach/qualys-clop-ransomware.html", "https://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/qualys-is-the-latest-victim-of-accellion-data-breach/d/d-id/1340323"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Clop Common Exec Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Clop Ransomware Known Service Name - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - High Process Termination Frequency - Rule", "ESCU - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule", "ESCU - Resize ShadowStorage volume - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Windows High File Deletion Frequency - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Created With Suspicious Service Path - Rule"] +description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Clop ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Clope, encrypting network shares, deleting and resizing shadow volume storage, registry key modification, deleting of security logs, and more. +narrative = Clop ransomware campaigns targeting healthcare and other vertical sectors, involve the use of ransomware payloads along with exfiltration of data per HHS bulletin. Malicious actors demand payment for ransome of data and threaten deletion and exposure of exfiltrated data. + +[analytic_story://Ransomware Cloud] +category = Malware +last_updated = 2020-10-27 +version = 1 +references = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/", "https://github.com/d1vious/git-wild-hunt", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgzNib37g0M"] +maintainers = [{"company": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] +description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware. These searches include cloud related objects that may be targeted by malicious actors via cloud providers own encryption features. +narrative = Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise.Cloud ransomware can be deployed by obtaining high privilege credentials from targeted users or resources. + +[analytic_story://DarkSide Ransomware] +category = Malware +last_updated = 2021-05-12 +version = 1 +references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/the-darkside-of-the-ransomware-pipeline.htmlbig-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", "ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect RClone Command-Line Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed RClone - Rule", "ESCU - Extraction of Registry Hives - Rule", "ESCU - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule", "ESCU - SLUI RunAs Elevated - Rule", "ESCU - SLUI Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule"] +description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the DarkSide Ransomware +narrative = This story addresses Darkside ransomware. This ransomware payload has many similarities to common ransomware however there are certain items particular to it. The creation of a .TXT log that shows every item being encrypted as well as the creation of ransomware notes and files adding a machine ID created based on CRC32 checksum algorithm. This ransomware payload leaves machines in minimal operation level,enough to browse the attackers websites. A customized URI with leaked information is presented to each victim.This is the ransomware payload that shut down the Colonial pipeline. The story is composed of several detection searches covering similar items to other ransomware payloads and those particular to Darkside payload. + +[analytic_story://Revil Ransomware] +category = Malware +last_updated = 2021-06-04 +version = 1 +references = ["https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule", "ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ESCU - Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Disable Security Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule"] +description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Revil ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Revil, encrypting network shares, deleting shadow volume storage, registry key modification, deleting of security logs, and more. +narrative = Revil ransomware is a RaaS,that a single group may operates and manges the development of this ransomware. It involve the use of ransomware payloads along with exfiltration of data. Malicious actors demand payment for ransome of data and threaten deletion and exposure of exfiltrated data. + +[analytic_story://Ryuk Ransomware] +category = Malware +last_updated = 2020-11-06 +version = 1 +references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-ryuk-using-splunk-attack-range.html", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-302a"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jose Hernandez"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Wake on LAN Command - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] +description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Ryuk ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Ryuk, Stopping Security Access Manager, DisableAntiSpyware registry key modification, suspicious psexec use, and more. +narrative = Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released Alert (AA20-302A) on October 28th called Ransomware Activity Targeting the Healthcare and Public Health Sector. This alert details TTPs associated with ongoing and possible imminent attacks against the Healthcare sector, and is a joint advisory in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies. The objective of these malicious campaigns is to infiltrate targets in named sectors and to drop ransomware payloads, which will likely cause disruption of service and increase risk of actual harm to the health and safety of patients at hospitals, even with the aggravant of an ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. This document specifically refers to several crimeware exploitation frameworks, emphasizing the use of Ryuk ransomware as payload. The Ryuk ransomware payload is not new. It has been well documented and identified in multiple variants. Payloads need a carrier, and for Ryuk it has often been exploitation frameworks such as Cobalt Strike, or popular crimeware frameworks such as Emotet or Trickbot. + +[analytic_story://SamSam Ransomware] +category = Malware +last_updated = 2018-12-13 +version = 1 +references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/an-in-depth-analysis-of-samsam-ransomware-and-boss-spider/", "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/07/31/samsam-the-almost-6-million-ransomware/", "https://thehackernews.com/2018/07/samsam-ransomware-attacks.html"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"] +description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the SamSam ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with SamSam, RDP brute force attacks, the presence of files with SamSam ransomware extensions, suspicious psexec use, and more. +narrative = The first version of the SamSam ransomware (a.k.a. Samas or SamsamCrypt) was launched in 2015 by a group of Iranian threat actors. The malicious software has affected and continues to affect thousands of victims and has raised almost $6M in ransom.\ +Although categorized under the heading of ransomware, SamSam campaigns have some importance distinguishing characteristics. Most notable is the fact that conventional ransomware is a numbers game. Perpetrators use a "spray-and-pray" approach with phishing campaigns or other mechanisms, charging a small ransom (typically under $1,000). The goal is to find a large number of victims willing to pay these mini-ransoms, adding up to a lucrative payday. They use relatively simple methods for infecting systems.\ +SamSam attacks are different beasts. They have become progressively more targeted and skillful than typical ransomware attacks. First, malicious actors break into a victim's network, surveil it, then run the malware manually. The attacks are tailored to cause maximum damage and the threat actors usually demand amounts in the tens of thousands of dollars.\ +In a typical attack on one large healthcare organization in 2018, the company ended up paying a ransom of four Bitcoins, then worth $56,707. Reports showed that access to the company's files was restored within two hours of paying the sum.\ +According to Sophos, SamSam previously leveraged RDP to gain access to targeted networks via brute force. SamSam is not spread automatically, like other malware. It requires skill because it forces the attacker to adapt their tactics to the individual environment. Next, the actors escalate their privileges to admin level. They scan the networks for worthy targets, using conventional tools, such as PsExec or PaExec, to deploy/execute, quickly encrypting files.\ +This Analytic Story includes searches designed to help detect and investigate signs of the SamSam ransomware, such as the creation of fileswrites to system32, writes with tell-tale extensions, batch files written to system32, and evidence of brute-force attacks via RDP. + +[analytic_story://Remcos] +category = Malware +last_updated = 2021-09-23 +version = 1 +references = ["https://success.trendmicro.com/solution/1123281-remcos-malware-information", "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0332/", "https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.remcos#:~:text=Remcos%20(acronym%20of%20Remote%20Control,used%20to%20remotely%20control%20computers.\u0026text=Remcos%20can%20be%20used%20for,been%20used%20in%20hacking%20campaigns."] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Jscript Execution Using Cscript App - Rule", "ESCU - Loading Of Dynwrapx Module - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious InProcServer32 Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Possible Browser Pass View Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule", "ESCU - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Process Writing DynamicWrapperX - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule", "ESCU - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule", "ESCU - Remcos client registry install entry - Rule", "ESCU - Remcos RAT File Creation in Remcos Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Image Creation In Appdata Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious WAV file in Appdata Folder - Rule", "ESCU - System Info Gathering Using Dxdiag Application - Rule", "ESCU - Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Winhlp32 Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule"] +description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Remcos RAT trojan, including looking for file writes associated with its payload, screencapture, registry modification, UAC bypassed, persistence and data collection.. +narrative = Remcos or Remote Control and Surveillance, marketed as a legitimate software for remotely managing Windows systems is now widely used in multiple malicious campaigns both APT and commodity malware by threat actors. + +[analytic_story://Router and Infrastructure Security] +category = Best Practices +last_updated = 2017-09-12 +version = 1 +references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/09/the_new_route_toper.html", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/security-center/event-response/synful-knock.html"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule", "ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] +description = Validate the security configuration of network infrastructure and verify that only authorized users and systems are accessing critical assets. Core routing and switching infrastructure are common strategic targets for attackers. +narrative = Networking devices, such as routers and switches, are often overlooked as resources that attackers will leverage to subvert an enterprise. Advanced threats actors have shown a proclivity to target these critical assets as a means to siphon and redirect network traffic, flash backdoored operating systems, and implement cryptographic weakened algorithms to more easily decrypt network traffic.\ +This Analytic Story helps you gain a better understanding of how your network devices are interacting with your hosts. By compromising your network devices, attackers can obtain direct access to the company's internal infrastructure— effectively increasing the attack surface and accessing private services/data. + +[analytic_story://Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2021-11-12 +version = 1 +references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/004/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line - Rule"] +description = Adversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. +narrative = InstallUtil is a command-line utility that allows for installation and uninstallation of resources by executing specific installer components specified in .NET binaries. InstallUtil is digitally signed by Microsoft and located in the .NET directories on a Windows system: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v\InstallUtil.exe and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v\InstallUtil.exe. \ +There are multiple ways to instantiate InstallUtil and they are all outlined within Atomic Red Team - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md. Two specific ways may be used and that includes invoking via installer assembly class constructor through .NET and via InstallUtil.exe. \ +Typically, adversaries will utilize the most commonly found way to invoke via InstallUtil Uninstall method. \ +Note that parallel processes, and parent process, play a role in how InstallUtil is being used. In particular, a developer using InstallUtil will spawn from VisualStudio. Adversaries, will spawn from non-standard processes like Explorer.exe, cmd.exe or PowerShell.exe. It's important to review the command-line to identify the DLL being loaded. \ +Parallel processes may also include csc.exe being used to compile a local `.cs` file. This file will be the input to the output. Developers usually do not build direct on the command shell, therefore this should raise suspicion. + +[analytic_story://Silver Sparrow] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2021-02-24 +version = 1 +references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/", "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/5-things-you-need-to-know-about-silver-sparrow/"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage via OSquery - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior - Rule"] +description = Silver Sparrow, identified by Red Canary Intelligence, is a new forward looking MacOS (Intel and M1) malicious software downloader utilizing JavaScript for execution and a launchAgent to establish persistence. +narrative = Silver Sparrow works is a dropper and uses typical persistence mechanisms on a Mac. It is cross platform, covering both Intel and Apple M1 architecture. To this date, no implant has been downloaded for malicious purposes. During installation of the update.pkg or updater.pkg file, the malicious software utilizes JavaScript to generate files and scripts on disk for persistence.These files later download a implant from an S3 bucket every hour. This analytic assists with identifying different types of macOS malware families establishing LaunchAgent persistence. Per SentinelOne source, it is predicted that Silver Sparrow is likely selling itself as a mechanism to 3rd party Caffiliates or pay-per-install (PPI) partners, typically seen as commodity adware/malware. Additional indicators and behaviors may be found within the references. + +[analytic_story://Spearphishing Attachments] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2019-04-29 +version = 1 +references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/spear-phishing-campaign-targets-ukraine-government.html"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Splunk Research Team"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Excel Spawning PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Excel Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule", "ESCU - MSHTML Module Load in Office Product - Rule", "ESCU - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Creating Schedule Task - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning CertUtil - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Writing cab or inf - Rule", "ESCU - Office Spawning Control - Rule", "ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule", "ESCU - Winword Spawning Cmd - Rule", "ESCU - Winword Spawning PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Gdrive suspicious file sharing - Rule", "ESCU - Gsuite suspicious calendar invite - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file - Rule"] +description = Detect signs of malicious payloads that may indicate that your environment has been breached via a phishing attack. +narrative = Despite its simplicity, phishing remains the most pervasive and dangerous cyberthreat. In fact, research shows that as many as [91% of all successful attacks](https://digitalguardian.com/blog/91-percent-cyber-attacks-start-phishing-email-heres-how-protect-against-phishing) are initiated via a phishing email. \ +As most people know, these emails use fraudulent domains, [email scraping](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), familiar contact names inserted as senders, and other tactics to lure targets into clicking a malicious link, opening an attachment with a [nefarious payload](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), or entering sensitive personal information that perpetrators may intercept. This attack technique requires a relatively low level of skill and allows adversaries to easily cast a wide net. Worse, because its success relies on the gullibility of humans, it's impossible to completely "automate" it out of your environment. However, you can use ES and ESCU to detect and investigate potentially malicious payloads injected into your environment subsequent to a phishing attack. \ +While any kind of file may contain a malicious payload, some are more likely to be perceived as benign (and thus more often escape notice) by the average victim—especially when the attacker sends an email that seems to be from one of their contacts. An example is Microsoft Office files. Most corporate users are familiar with documents with the following suffixes: .doc/.docx (MS Word), .xls/.xlsx (MS Excel), and .ppt/.pptx (MS PowerPoint), so they may click without a second thought, slashing a hole in their organizations' security. \ +Following is a typical series of events, according to an [article by Trend Micro](https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/rising-trend-attackers-using-lnk-files-download-malware/):\ +1. Attacker sends a phishing email. Recipient downloads the attached file, which is typically a .docx or .zip file with an embedded .lnk file\ +1. The .lnk file executes a PowerShell script\ +1. Powershell executes a reverse shell, rendering the exploit successful As a side note, adversaries are likely to use a tool like Empire to craft and obfuscate payloads and their post-injection activities, such as [exfiltration, lateral movement, and persistence](https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire).\ +This Analytic Story focuses on detecting signs that a malicious payload has been injected into your environment. For example, one search detects outlook.exe writing a .zip file. Another looks for suspicious .lnk files launching processes. + +[analytic_story://SQL Injection] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2017-09-19 +version = 1 +references = ["https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/66.html", "https://www.incapsula.com/web-application-security/sql-injection.html"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - SQL Injection with Long URLs - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] +description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to help you detect structured query language (SQL) injection attempts characterized by long URLs that contain malicious parameters. +narrative = It is very common for attackers to inject SQL parameters into vulnerable web applications, which then interpret the malicious SQL statements.\ +This Analytic Story contains a search designed to identify attempts by attackers to leverage this technique to compromise a host and gain a foothold in the target environment. + +[analytic_story://Suspicious AWS Login Activities] +category = Cloud Security +last_updated = 2019-05-01 +version = 1 +references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"] +description = Monitor your AWS authentication events using your CloudTrail logs. Searches within this Analytic Story will help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious logins. +narrative = It is important to monitor and control who has access to your AWS infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins to your AWS infrastructure will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any EC2 instances created by the attacker. + +[analytic_story://Suspicious AWS S3 Activities] +category = Cloud Security +last_updated = 2018-07-24 +version = 2 +references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cloud/public-aws-s3-buckets-writable/"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule", "ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"] +description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required. +narrative = As cloud computing has exploded, so has the number of creative attacks on virtual environments. And as the number-two cloud-service provider, Amazon Web Services (AWS) has certainly had its share.\ +Amazon's "shared responsibility" model dictates that the company has responsibility for the environment outside of the VM and the customer is responsible for the security inside of the S3 container. As such, it's important to stay vigilant for activities that may belie suspicious behavior inside of your environment.\ +Among things to look out for are S3 access from unfamiliar locations and by unfamiliar users. Some of the searches in this Analytic Story help you detect suspicious behavior and others help you investigate more deeply, when the situation warrants. + +[analytic_story://Suspicious AWS Traffic] +category = Cloud Security +last_updated = 2018-05-07 +version = 1 +references = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/hiding-cloudcobalt-strike-beacon-c2-using-amazon-apis/"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"] +description = Leverage these searches to monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as a spike in blocked outbound traffic in your virtual private cloud (VPC). +narrative = A virtual private cloud (VPC) is an on-demand managed cloud-computing service that isolates computing resources for each client. Inside the VPC container, the environment resembles a physical network. \ +Amazon's VPC service enables you to launch EC2 instances and leverage other Amazon resources. The traffic that flows in and out of this VPC can be controlled via network access-control rules and security groups. Amazon also has a feature called VPC Flow Logs that enables you to log IP traffic going to and from the network interfaces in your VPC. This data is stored using Amazon CloudWatch Logs.\ + Attackers may abuse the AWS infrastructure with insecure VPCs so they can co-opt AWS resources for command-and-control nodes, data exfiltration, and more. Once an EC2 instance is compromised, an attacker may initiate outbound network connections for malicious reasons. Monitoring these network traffic behaviors is crucial for understanding the type of traffic flowing in and out of your network and to alert you to suspicious activities.\ +The searches in this Analytic Story will monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors. + +[analytic_story://Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities] +category = Cloud Security +last_updated = 2020-06-04 +version = 1 +references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"] +description = Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity. +narrative = It is important to monitor and control who has access to your cloud infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any compute activity whether legitimate or otherwise.\ +This Analytic Story has data model versions of cloud searches leveraging Authentication data, including those looking for suspicious login activity, and cross-account activity for AWS. + +[analytic_story://Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities] +category = Cloud Security +last_updated = 2020-08-25 +version = 1 +references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect shared ec2 snapshot - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task"] +description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment. +narrative = Monitoring your cloud infrastructure logs allows you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the their cloud environments to ensure that your instances are not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your cloud compute instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities. + +[analytic_story://Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities] +category = Cloud Security +last_updated = 2018-08-20 +version = 1 +references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] +description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment. +narrative = Because most enterprise cloud infrastructure activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to add specific IPs to an allow list because they vary.\ +This Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further. + +[analytic_story://Suspicious Cloud User Activities] +category = Cloud Security +last_updated = 2020-09-04 +version = 1 +references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Lambda UpdateFunctionCode - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"] +description = Detect and investigate suspicious activities by users and roles in your cloud environments. +narrative = It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it's all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable to attack. In fact, this was the very oversight that led to Tesla's cryptojacking attack in February, 2018.\ +In addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed for any new instances and increased bandwidth usage. + +[analytic_story://Suspicious Command-Line Executions] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2020-02-03 +version = 2 +references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059", "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/macro-malware", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Potentially malicious code on commandline - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] +description = Leveraging the Windows command-line interface (CLI) is one of the most common attack techniques--one that is also detailed in the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Use this Analytic Story to help you identify unusual or suspicious use of the CLI on Windows systems. +narrative = The ability to execute arbitrary commands via the Windows CLI is a primary goal for the adversary. With access to the shell, an attacker can easily run scripts and interact with the target system. Often, attackers may only have limited access to the shell or may obtain access in unusual ways. In addition, malware may execute and interact with the CLI in ways that would be considered unusual and inconsistent with typical user activity. This provides defenders with opportunities to identify suspicious use and investigate, as appropriate. This Analytic Story contains various searches to help identify this suspicious activity, as well as others to aid you in deeper investigation. + +[analytic_story://Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2021-02-11 +version = 1 +references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/htmlhelp/nf-htmlhelp-htmlhelpa"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Detect HTML Help Renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers - Rule"] +description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code. +narrative = Adversaries may abuse Compiled HTML files (.chm) to conceal malicious code. CHM files are commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTML Help system. CHM files are compressed compilations of various content such as HTML documents, images, and scripting/web related programming languages such VBA, JScript, Java, and ActiveX. CHM content is displayed using underlying components of the Internet Explorer browser loaded by the HTML Help executable program (hh.exe). \ +HH.exe relies upon hhctrl.ocx to load CHM topics.This will load upon execution of a chm file. \ +During investigation, review all parallel processes and child processes. It is possible for file modification events to occur and it is best to capture the CHM file and decompile it for further analysis. \ +Upon usage of InfoTech Storage Handlers, ms-its, its, mk, itss.dll will load. + +[analytic_story://Suspicious DNS Traffic] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2017-09-18 +version = 1 +references = ["http://blogs.splunk.com/2015/10/01/random-words-on-entropy-and-dns/", "http://www.darkreading.com/analytics/security-monitoring/got-malware-three-signs-revealed-in-dns-traffic/d/d-id/1139680", "https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/Threat-Vulnerability-Articles/What-are-suspicious-DNS-queries/ta-p/71454"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"] +description = Attackers often attempt to hide within or otherwise abuse the domain name system (DNS). You can thwart attempts to manipulate this omnipresent protocol by monitoring for these types of abuses. +narrative = Although DNS is one of the fundamental underlying protocols that make the Internet work, it is often ignored (perhaps because of its complexity and effectiveness). However, attackers have discovered ways to abuse the protocol to meet their objectives. One potential abuse involves manipulating DNS to hijack traffic and redirect it to an IP address under the attacker's control. This could inadvertently send users intending to visit google.com, for example, to an unrelated malicious website. Another technique involves using the DNS protocol for command-and-control activities with the attacker's malicious code or to covertly exfiltrate data. The searches within this Analytic Story look for these types of abuses. + +[analytic_story://Suspicious Emails] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2020-01-27 +version = 1 +references = ["https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/06/26/phishing-hits-a-new-level-of-quality/"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] +description = Email remains one of the primary means for attackers to gain an initial foothold within the modern enterprise. Detect and investigate suspicious emails in your environment with the help of the searches in this Analytic Story. +narrative = It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage targeted spearphishing campaigns and mass mailers to deliver weaponized email messages and attachments. Fortunately, there are a number of ways to monitor email data in Splunk to detect suspicious content.\ +Once a phishing message has been detected, the next steps are to answer the following questions: \ +1. Which users have received this or a similar message in the past?\ +1. When did the targeted campaign begin?\ +1. Have any users interacted with the content of the messages (by downloading an attachment or clicking on a malicious URL)?This Analytic Story provides detection searches to identify suspicious emails, as well as contextual and investigative searches to help answer some of these questions. + +[analytic_story://Suspicious GCP Storage Activities] +category = Cloud Security +last_updated = 2020-08-05 +version = 1 +references = ["https://cloud.google.com/blog/product/gcp/4-steps-for-hardening-your-cloud-storage-buckets-taking-charge-of-your-security", "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/gcp/google-cloud-platform-gcp-bucket-enumeration/"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Shannon Davis"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] +description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your GCP Storage buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open storage buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required. +narrative = Similar to other cloud providers, GCP operates on a shared responsibility model. This means the end user, you, are responsible for setting appropriate access control lists and permissions on your GCP resources.\ This Analytics Story concentrates on detecting things like open storage buckets (both read and write) along with storage bucket access from unfamiliar users and IP addresses. + +[analytic_story://Suspicious MSHTA Activity] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2021-01-20 +version = 2 +references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", "https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005/", "https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] +description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code. +narrative = One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the mshta.exe process, which loads Microsoft HTML applications (mshtml.dll) with the .hta suffix. In these cases, attackers use the trusted Windows utility to proxy execution of malicious files, whether an .hta application, javascript, or VBScript.\ +The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an attacker is leveraging mshta.exe to execute malicious code.\ +Triage\ +Validate execution \ +1. Determine if MSHTA.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of MSHTA.exe and further PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect.\ +1. Determine if script code was executed with MSHTA.\ +Situational Awareness\ +The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by MSHTA.exe.\ +1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application?\ +1. Module loads. Are the known MSHTA.exe modules being loaded by a non-standard application? Is MSHTA loading any suspicious .DLLs?\ +1. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain.\ +Retrieval of script code\ +The objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious. + +[analytic_story://Suspicious Okta Activity] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2020-04-02 +version = 1 +references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1078", "https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Credential_stuffing", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/answer/What-is-a-password-spraying-attack-and-how-does-it-work"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task"] +description = Monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities. Due to the Covid outbreak, many users are migrating over to leverage cloud services more and more. Okta is a popular tool to manage multiple users and the web-based applications they need to stay productive. The searches in this story will help monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities and associated user behaviors. +narrative = Okta is the leading single sign on (SSO) provider, allowing users to authenticate once to Okta, and from there access a variety of web-based applications. These applications are assigned to users and allow administrators to centrally manage which users are allowed to access which applications. It also provides centralized logging to help understand how the applications are used and by whom. \ +While SSO is a major convenience for users, it also provides attackers with an opportunity. If the attacker can gain access to Okta, they can access a variety of applications. As such monitoring the environment is important. \ +With people moving quickly to adopt web-based applications and ways to manage them, many are still struggling to understand how best to monitor these environments. This analytic story provides searches to help monitor this environment, and identify events and activity that warrant further investigation such as credential stuffing or password spraying attacks, and users logging in from multiple locations when travel is disallowed. + +[analytic_story://Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2021-02-11 +version = 1 +references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", "https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master/documentation/modules/evasion/windows/applocker_evasion_regasm_regsvcs.md", "https://oddvar.moe/2017/12/13/applocker-case-study-how-insecure-is-it-really-part-1/"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Detect Regasm Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regasm with Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments - Rule"] +description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code. +narrative = Adversaries may abuse Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET Component Object Model (COM) assemblies. Both are digitally signed by Microsoft. The following queries assist with detecting suspicious and malicious usage of Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe. Upon reviewing usage of Regasm.exe Regsvcs.exe, review file modification events for possible script code written. Review parallel process events for csc.exe being utilized to compile script code. + +[analytic_story://Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2021-01-29 +version = 1 +references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious InProcServer32 Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule", "ESCU - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path - Rule"] +description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the regsvr32.exe process to execute malicious code. +narrative = One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the regsvr32.exe process. This particular bypass was popularized with "SquiblyDoo" using the "scrobj.dll" dll to load .sct scriptlets. This technique is still widely used by adversaries to bypass detection and prevention controls. The file extension of the DLL is irrelevant (it may load a .txt file extension for example). The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging regsvr32.exe to execute malicious code. Validate execution Determine if regsvr32.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of regsvr32.exe and further PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect. Determine if script code was executed with regsvr32. Situational Awareness - The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by regsvr32.exe. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application? Module loads. Is regsvr32 loading any suspicious .DLLs? Unsigned or signed from non-standard paths. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain. Retrieval of Script Code - confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious. + +[analytic_story://Suspicious Rundll32 Activity] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2021-02-03 +version = 1 +references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule"] +description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage rundll32.exe to execute arbitrary malicious code. +narrative = One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the rundll32.exe process. Natively, rundll32.exe will load DLLs and is a great example of a Living off the Land Binary. Rundll32.exe may load malicious DLLs by ordinals, function names or directly. The queries in this story focus on loading default DLLs, syssetup.dll, ieadvpack.dll, advpack.dll and setupapi.dll from disk that may be abused by adversaries. Additionally, two analytics developed to assist with identifying DLLRegisterServer, Start and StartW functions being called. The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging rundll32.exe to execute malicious code. + +[analytic_story://Suspicious Windows Registry Activities] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2018-05-31 +version = 1 +references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Disable UAC Remote Restriction - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] +description = Monitor and detect registry changes initiated from remote locations, which can be a sign that an attacker has infiltrated your system. +narrative = Attackers are developing increasingly sophisticated techniques for hijacking target servers, while evading detection. One such technique that has become progressively more common is registry modification.\ + The registry is a key component of the Windows operating system. It has a hierarchical database called "registry" that contains settings, options, and values for executables. Once the threat actor gains access to a machine, they can use reg.exe to modify their account to obtain administrator-level privileges, maintain persistence, and move laterally within the environment.\ + The searches in this story are designed to help you detect behaviors associated with manipulation of the Windows registry. + +[analytic_story://Suspicious WMI Use] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2018-10-23 +version = 2 +references = ["https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Graeber-Abusing-Windows-Management-Instrumentation-WMI-To-Build-A-Persistent%20Asynchronous-And-Fileless-Backdoor-wp.pdf", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/wmimplant_a_wmi_ba.html"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Detect WMI Event Subscription Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Windows WMI Process Call Create - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - WMIC XSL Execution via URL - Rule", "ESCU - XSL Script Execution With WMIC - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task"] +description = Attackers are increasingly abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), a framework and associated utilities available on all modern Windows operating systems. Because WMI can be leveraged to manage both local and remote systems, it is important to identify the processes executed and the user context within which the activity occurred. +narrative = WMI is a Microsoft infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows operating systems. It includes of a set of utilities that can be leveraged to manage both local and remote Windows systems. Attackers are increasingly turning to WMI abuse in their efforts to conduct nefarious tasks, such as reconnaissance, detection of antivirus and virtual machines, code execution, lateral movement, persistence, and data exfiltration. The detection searches included in this Analytic Story are used to look for suspicious use of WMI commands that attackers may leverage to interact with remote systems. The searches specifically look for the use of WMI to run processes on remote systems. In the event that unauthorized WMI execution occurs, it will be important for analysts and investigators to determine the context of the event. These details may provide insights related to how WMI was used and to what end. + +[analytic_story://Suspicious Zoom Child Processes] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2020-04-13 +version = 1 +references = ["https://blog.rapid7.com/2020/04/02/dispelling-zoom-bugbears-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-latest-zoom-vulnerabilities/", "https://threatpost.com/two-zoom-zero-day-flaws-uncovered/154337/"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task"] +description = Attackers are using Zoom as an vector to increase privileges on a sytems. This story detects new child processes of zoom and provides investigative actions for this detection. +narrative = Zoom is a leader in modern enterprise video communications and its usage has increased dramatically with a large amount of the population under stay-at-home orders due to the COVID-19 pandemic. With increased usage has come increased scrutiny and several security flaws have been found with this application on both Windows and macOS systems.\ +Current detections focus on finding new child processes of this application on a per host basis. Investigative searches are included to gather information needed during an investigation. + +[analytic_story://Trickbot] +category = Malware +last_updated = 2021-04-20 +version = 1 +references = ["https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trickbot", "https://blog.checkpoint.com/2021/03/11/february-2021s-most-wanted-malware-trickbot-takes-over-following-emotet-shutdown/"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Account Discovery With Net App - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", "ESCU - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule", "ESCU - Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Remote Thread To Known Windows Process - Rule", "ESCU - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ESCU - Trickbot Named Pipe - Rule", "ESCU - Wermgr Process Connecting To IP Check Web Services - Rule", "ESCU - Wermgr Process Create Executable File - Rule", "ESCU - Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process - Rule"] +description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the trickbot banking trojan, including looking for file writes associated with its payload, process injection, shellcode execution and data collection even in LDAP environment. +narrative = trickbot banking trojan campaigns targeting banks and other vertical sectors.This malware is known in Microsoft Windows OS where target security Microsoft Defender to prevent its detection and removal. steal Verizon credentials and targeting banks using its multi component modules that collect and exfiltrate data. + +[analytic_story://Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2021-01-12 +version = 1 +references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler/"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule"] +description = Monitor and detect behaviors used by attackers who leverage trusted developer utilities to execute malicious code. +narrative = Adversaries may take advantage of trusted developer utilities to proxy execution of malicious payloads. There are many utilities used for software development related tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development, debugging, and reverse engineering. These utilities may often be signed with legitimate certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution of malicious code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application control solutions.\ +The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe to execute malicious code. + +[analytic_story://Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2021-01-21 +version = 1 +references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/001/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md", "https://github.com/infosecn1nja/MaliciousMacroMSBuild", "https://github.com/xorrior/RandomPS-Scripts/blob/master/Invoke-ExecuteMSBuild.ps1", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/", "https://github.com/MHaggis/CBR-Queries/blob/master/msbuild.md"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - MSBuild Suspicious Spawned By Script Process - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Spawn - Rule"] +description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the msbuild.exe process to execute malicious code. +narrative = Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio and is native to Windows. It handles XML formatted project files that define requirements for loading and building various platforms and configurations.\ +The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# code to be inserted into an XML project file. MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application control defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution.\ +The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging msbuild.exe to execute malicious code.\ +Triage\ +Validate execution\ +1. Determine if MSBuild.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of MSBuild.exe and further PE metadata.\ +1. Determine if script code was executed with MSBuild.\ +Situational Awareness\ +The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by MSBuild.exe.\ +1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application?\ +1. Module loads. Are the known MSBuild.exe modules being loaded by a non-standard application? Is MSbuild loading any suspicious .DLLs?\ +1. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain.\ +Retrieval of script code\ +The objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious. + +[analytic_story://Unusual Processes] +category = Malware +last_updated = 2020-02-04 +version = 2 +references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/08/monitoring-windows-console-activity-part-two.html", "https://www.splunk.com/pdfs/technical-briefs/advanced-threat-detection-and-response-tech-brief.pdf", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/logging/detecting-security-incidents-windows-workstation-event-logs-34262"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Shimcache Flush - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Copy on System32 - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Verclsid CLSID Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Remote Assistance Spawning Process - Rule", "ESCU - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - WinRM Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] +description = Quickly identify systems running new or unusual processes in your environment that could be indicators of suspicious activity. Processes run from unusual locations, those with conspicuously long command lines, and rare executables are all examples of activities that may warrant deeper investigation. +narrative = Being able to profile a host's processes within your environment can help you more quickly identify processes that seem out of place when compared to the rest of the population of hosts or asset types.\ +This Analytic Story lets you identify processes that are either a) not typically seen running or b) have some sort of suspicious command-line arguments associated with them. This Analytic Story will also help you identify the user running these processes and the associated process activity on the host.\ +In the event an unusual process is identified, it is imperative to better understand how that process was able to execute on the host, when it first executed, and whether other hosts are affected. This extra information may provide clues that can help the analyst further investigate any suspicious activity. + +[analytic_story://Use of Cleartext Protocols] +category = Best Practices +last_updated = 2017-09-15 +version = 1 +references = ["https://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"] +description = Leverage searches that detect cleartext network protocols that may leak credentials or should otherwise be encrypted. +narrative = Various legacy protocols operate by default in the clear, without the protections of encryption. This potentially leaks sensitive information that can be exploited by passively sniffing network traffic. Depending on the protocol, this information could be highly sensitive, or could allow for session hijacking. In addition, these protocols send authentication information, which would allow for the harvesting of usernames and passwords that could potentially be used to authenticate and compromise secondary systems. + +[analytic_story://WhisperGate] +category = Malware +last_updated = 2022-01-19 +version = 1 +references = ["https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/", "https://medium.com/s2wblog/analysis-of-destructive-malware-whispergate-targeting-ukraine-9d5d158f19f3"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive File Deletion In WinDefender Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Ping Sleep Batch Command - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Remove Windows Defender Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule", "ESCU - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows High File Deletion Frequency - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun - Rule", "ESCU - Windows NirSoft Utilities - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule", "ESCU - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule"] +description = This analytic story contains detections that allow security analysts to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the destructive malware targeting Ukrainian organizations also known as "WhisperGate". This analytic story looks for suspicious process execution, command-line activity, downloads, DNS queries and more. +narrative = WhisperGate/DEV-0586 is destructive malware operation found by MSTIC (Microsoft Threat Inteligence Center) targeting multiple organizations in Ukraine. This operation campaign consist of several malware component like the downloader that abuses discord platform, overwrite or destroy master boot record (MBR) of the targeted host, wiper and also windows defender evasion techniques. + +[analytic_story://Windows Defense Evasion Tactics] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2018-05-31 +version = 1 +references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Defense_Evasion"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule", "ESCU - CSC Net On The Fly Compilation - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Registry Tool - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Show Hidden Files - Rule", "ESCU - Disable UAC Remote Restriction - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling CMD Application - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling ControlPanel - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Firewall with Netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling NoRun Windows App - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling SystemRestore In Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Task Manager - Rule", "ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive number of service control start as disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Firewall Allowed Program Enable - Rule", "ESCU - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - NET Profiler UAC bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule", "ESCU - Sdclt UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - SilentCleanup UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - SLUI RunAs Elevated - Rule", "ESCU - SLUI Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DISM Remove Defender - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event For Service Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Rasautou DLL Execution - Rule", "ESCU - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] +description = Detect tactics used by malware to evade defenses on Windows endpoints. A few of these include suspicious `reg.exe` processes, files hidden with `attrib.exe` and disabling user-account control, among many others +narrative = Defense evasion is a tactic--identified in the MITRE ATT&CK framework--that adversaries employ in a variety of ways to bypass or defeat defensive security measures. There are many techniques enumerated by the MITRE ATT&CK framework that are applicable in this context. This Analytic Story includes searches designed to identify the use of such techniques on Windows platforms. + +[analytic_story://Windows Discovery Techniques] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2021-03-04 +version = 1 +references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/", "https://cyberd.us/penetration-testing", "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0521/"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Hart"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule"] +description = Monitors for behaviors associated with adversaries discovering objects in the environment that can be leveraged in the progression of the attack. +narrative = Attackers may not have much if any insight into their target's environment before the initial compromise. Once a foothold has been established, attackers will start enumerating objects in the environment (accounts, services, network shares, etc.) that can be used to achieve their objectives. This Analytic Story provides searches to help identify activities consistent with adversaries gaining knowledge of compromised Windows environments. + +[analytic_story://Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2020-07-28 +version = 1 +references = ["https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/", "https://support.microsoft.com/en-au/help/4569509/windows-dns-server-remote-code-execution-vulnerability"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Shannon Davis"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] +description = Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-1350, or SIGRed. Discovered by Checkpoint researchers, this vulnerability affects Windows 2003 to 2019, and is triggered by a malicious DNS response (only affects DNS over TCP). An attacker can use the malicious payload to cause a buffer overflow on the vulnerable system, leading to compromise. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify the large response payload for SIG and KEY DNS records which can be used for the exploit. +narrative = When a client requests a DNS record for a particular domain, that request gets routed first through the client's locally configured DNS server, then to any DNS server(s) configured as forwarders, and then onto the target domain's own DNS server(s). If a attacker wanted to, they could host a malicious DNS server that responds to the initial request with a specially crafted large response (~65KB). This response would flow through to the client's local DNS server, which if not patched for CVE-2020-1350, would cause the buffer overflow. The detection searches in this Analytic Story use wire data to detect the malicious behavior. Searches for Splunk Stream and Zeek are included. The Splunk Stream search correlates across stream:dns and stream:tcp, while the Zeek search correlates across bro:dns:json and bro:conn:json. These correlations are required to pick up both the DNS record types (SIG and KEY) along with the payload size (>65KB). + +[analytic_story://Windows File Extension and Association Abuse] +category = Malware +last_updated = 2018-01-26 +version = 1 +references = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/12/file-extensions-2/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] +description = Detect and investigate suspected abuse of file extensions and Windows file associations. Some of the malicious behaviors involved may include inserting spaces before file extensions or prepending the file extension with a different one, among other techniques. +narrative = Attackers use a variety of techniques to entice users to run malicious code or to persist on an endpoint. One way to accomplish these goals is to leverage file extensions and the mechanism Windows uses to associate files with specific applications. \ + Since its earliest days, Windows has used extensions to identify file types. Users have become familiar with these extensions and their application associations. For example, if users see that a file ends in `.doc` or `.docx`, they will assume that it is a Microsoft Word document and expect that double-clicking will open it using `winword.exe`. The user will typically also presume that the `.docx` file is safe. \ + Attackers take advantage of this expectation by obfuscating the true file extension. They can accomplish this in a couple of ways. One technique involves inserting multiple spaces in the file name before the extension to hide the extension from the GUI, obscuring the true nature of the file. Another approach involves prepending the real extension with a different one. This is especially effective when Windows is configured to "hide extensions for known file types." In this case, the real extension is not displayed, but the prepended one is, leading end users to believe the file is a different type than it actually is.\ +Changing the association between a file extension and an application can allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code. The technique typically involves changing the association for an often-launched file type to associate instead with a malicious program the attacker has dropped on the endpoint. When the end user launches a file that has been manipulated in this way, it will execute the attacker's malware. It will also execute the application the end user expected to run, cleverly obscuring the fact that something suspicious has occurred.\ +Run the searches in this story to detect and investigate suspicious behavior that may indicate abuse or manipulation of Windows file extensions and/or associations. + +[analytic_story://Windows Log Manipulation] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2017-09-12 +version = 2 +references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", "https://zeltser.com/security-incident-log-review-checklist/", "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2013/01/re-introducing-usnjrnl.html"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] +description = Adversaries often try to cover their tracks by manipulating Windows logs. Use these searches to help you monitor for suspicious activity surrounding log files--an essential component of an effective defense. +narrative = Because attackers often modify system logs to cover their tracks and/or to thwart the investigative process, log monitoring is an industry-recognized best practice. While there are legitimate reasons to manipulate system logs, it is still worthwhile to keep track of who manipulated the logs, when they manipulated them, and in what way they manipulated them (determining which accesses, tools, or utilities were employed). Even if no malicious activity is detected, the knowledge of an attempt to manipulate system logs may be indicative of a broader security risk that should be thoroughly investigated.\ +The Analytic Story gives users two different ways to detect manipulation of Windows Event Logs and one way to detect deletion of the Update Sequence Number (USN) Change Journal. The story helps determine the history of the host and the users who have accessed it. Finally, the story aides in investigation by retrieving all the information on the process that caused these events (if the process has been identified). + +[analytic_story://Windows Persistence Techniques] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2018-05-31 +version = 2 +references = ["http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/19.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html", "http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/common-malware-persistence-mechanisms/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dq2Hv7J9fvk"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Active Setup Registry Autostart - Rule", "ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ESCU - Change Default File Association - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Logon Script Event Trigger Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Screensaver Event Trigger Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Time Provider Persistence Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Schtasks Create Run As System - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule", "ESCU - Print Processor Registry Autostart - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] +description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on a Windows system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment. +narrative = Maintaining persistence is one of the first steps taken by attackers after the initial compromise. Attackers leverage various custom and built-in tools to ensure survivability and persistent access within a compromised enterprise. This Analytic Story provides searches to help you identify various behaviors used by attackers to maintain persistent access to a Windows environment. + +[analytic_story://Windows Privilege Escalation] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2020-02-04 +version = 2 +references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Active Setup Registry Autostart - Rule", "ESCU - Change Default File Association - Rule", "ESCU - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Logon Script Event Trigger Execution - Rule", "ESCU - MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Runas Execution in CommandLine - Rule", "ESCU - Screensaver Event Trigger Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Time Provider Persistence Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Print Processor Registry Autostart - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] +description = Monitor for and investigate activities that may be associated with a Windows privilege-escalation attack, including unusual processes running on endpoints, modified registry keys, and more. +narrative = Privilege escalation is a "land-and-expand" technique, wherein an adversary gains an initial foothold on a host and then exploits its weaknesses to increase his privileges. The motivation is simple: certain actions on a Windows machine--such as installing software--may require higher-level privileges than those the attacker initially acquired. By increasing his privilege level, the attacker can gain the control required to carry out his malicious ends. This Analytic Story provides searches to detect and investigate behaviors that attackers may use to elevate their privileges in your environment. + +[analytic_story://Windows Service Abuse] +category = Malware +last_updated = 2017-11-02 +version = 3 +references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] +description = Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence and the ability to load drivers or otherwise interact with the Windows kernel. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows services are being modified or created in a suspicious manner. +narrative = The Windows operating system uses a services architecture to allow for running code in the background, similar to a UNIX daemon. Attackers will often leverage Windows services for persistence, hiding in plain sight, seeking the ability to run privileged code that can interact with the kernel. In many cases, attackers will create a new service to host their malicious code. Attackers have also been observed modifying unnecessary or unused services to point to their own code, as opposed to what was intended. In these cases, attackers often use tools to create or modify services in ways that are not typical for most environments, providing opportunities for detection. + +[analytic_story://XMRig] +category = Malware +last_updated = 2021-05-07 +version = 1 +references = ["https://github.com/xmrig/xmrig", "https://www.getmonero.org/resources/user-guides/mine-to-pool.html", "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/", "https://blog.checkpoint.com/2021/03/11/february-2021s-most-wanted-malware-trickbot-takes-over-following-emotet-shutdown/"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Rod Soto Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Of Net Users - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows App Hotkeys - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Net User Account - Rule", "ESCU - Download Files Using Telegram - Rule", "ESCU - Enumerate Users Local Group Using Telegram - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Attempt To Disable Services - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Service Stop Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Cacls App - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Taskkill - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen - Rule", "ESCU - Icacls Deny Command - Rule", "ESCU - ICACLS Grant Command - Rule", "ESCU - Modify ACL permission To Files Or Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Process Kill Base On File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks Run Task On Demand - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Driver Loaded Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - XMRIG Driver Loaded - Rule"] +description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the xmrig monero, including looking for file writes associated with its payload, process command-line, defense evasion (killing services, deleting users, modifying files or folder permission, killing other malware or other coin miner) and hacking tools including Telegram as mean of command and control (C2) to download other files. Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems in order to solve resource intensive problems which may impact system and/or hosted service availability. One common purpose for Resource Hijacking is to validate transactions of cryptocurrency networks and earn virtual currency. Adversaries may consume enough system resources to negatively impact and/or cause affected machines to become unresponsive. (1) Servers and cloud-based (2) systems are common targets because of the high potential for available resources, but user endpoint systems may also be compromised and used for Resource Hijacking and cryptocurrency mining. +narrative = XMRig is a high performance, open source, cross platform RandomX, KawPow, CryptoNight and AstroBWT unified CPU/GPU miner. This monero is seen in the wild on May 2017. + +### END STORIES ### + ### RESPONSE TASKS ### +[savedsearch://ESCU - All backup logs for host - Response Task] +type = investigation +explanation = none +how_to_implement = The successfully implement this search you must first send your backup logs to Splunk. +known_false_positives = not defined +earliest_time_offset = 14400 +latest_time_offset = 0 + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task] +type = investigation +explanation = none +how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Cloud Watch EKS inputs. +known_false_positives = not defined +earliest_time_offset = 14400 +latest_time_offset = 0 + [savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none @@ -9992,7 +10192,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task] +[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. @@ -10000,7 +10200,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task] +[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. @@ -10032,22 +10232,6 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - All backup logs for host - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = The successfully implement this search you must first send your backup logs to Splunk. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Cloud Watch EKS inputs. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - [savedsearch://ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none @@ -10256,7 +10440,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. @@ -10264,7 +10448,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. @@ -10288,7 +10472,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = You must be ingesting Okta logs @@ -10296,7 +10480,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = You must be ingesting Okta logs @@ -10368,4 +10552,5 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -### END RESPONSE TASKS ### + +### END RESPONSE TASKS ### \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/dist/escu/default/collections.conf b/dist/escu/default/collections.conf index be32b05b58..c351373c61 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/collections.conf +++ b/dist/escu/default/collections.conf @@ -1,18 +1,138 @@ ############# # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content -# On Date: 2022-03-03T18:16:55 UTC +# On Date: 2022-03-14T11:11:42 UTC # Author: Splunk Security Research # Contact: research@splunk.com ############# +[__mlspl_unusual_commandline_detection] +enforceTypes = false +replicate = false + [api_call_by_user_baseline] enforceTypes = false replicate = false +[attacker_tools] +enforceTypes = false +replicate = false + +[aws_service_accounts] +enforceTypes = false +replicate = false + +[baseline_blocked_outbound_connections] +enforceTypes = false +replicate = false + +[brandMonitoring_lookup] +enforceTypes = false +replicate = false + [cloud_instances_enough_data] enforceTypes = false replicate = false +[csc_lookup] +enforceTypes = false +replicate = false + +[discovered_dns_records] +enforceTypes = false +replicate = false + +[domains] +enforceTypes = false +replicate = false + +[dynamic_dns_providers_default] +enforceTypes = false +replicate = false + +[dynamic_dns_providers_local] +enforceTypes = false +replicate = false + +[escu_search_id_lookup] +enforceTypes = false +replicate = false + +[images_to_repository] +enforceTypes = false +replicate = false + +[is_net_windows_file] +enforceTypes = false +replicate = false + +[is_nirsoft_software] +enforceTypes = false +replicate = false + +[is_suspicious_file_extension_lookup] +enforceTypes = false +replicate = false + +[is_windows_system_file] +enforceTypes = false +replicate = false + +[legit_domains] +enforceTypes = false +replicate = false + +[linux_tool_discovery_process] +enforceTypes = false +replicate = false + +[local_file_inclusion_paths] +enforceTypes = false +replicate = false + +[lookup_rare_process_allow_list_default] +enforceTypes = false +replicate = false + +[lookup_rare_process_allow_list_local] +enforceTypes = false +replicate = false + +[lookup_uncommon_processes_default] +enforceTypes = false +replicate = false + +[lookup_uncommon_processes_local] +enforceTypes = false +replicate = false + +[mandatory_job_for_workflow] +enforceTypes = false +replicate = false + +[mandatory_step_for_job] +enforceTypes = false +replicate = false + +[network_acl_activity_baseline] +enforceTypes = false +replicate = false + +[previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip] +enforceTypes = false +replicate = false + +[previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles] +enforceTypes = false +replicate = false + +[previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity] +enforceTypes = false +replicate = false + +[previously_seen_aws_regions] +enforceTypes = false +replicate = false + [previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role] enforceTypes = false replicate = false @@ -41,6 +161,18 @@ replicate = false enforceTypes = false replicate = false +[previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments] +enforceTypes = false +replicate = false + +[previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user] +enforceTypes = false +replicate = false + +[previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip] +enforceTypes = false +replicate = false + [previously_seen_running_windows_services] enforceTypes = false replicate = false @@ -49,6 +181,42 @@ replicate = false enforceTypes = false replicate = false +[prohibited_apps_launching_cmd] +enforceTypes = false +replicate = false + +[prohibited_processes] +enforceTypes = false +replicate = false + +[prohibited_softwares] +enforceTypes = false +replicate = false + +[ransomware_extensions_lookup] +enforceTypes = false +replicate = false + +[ransomware_notes_lookup] +enforceTypes = false +replicate = false + +[s3_deletion_baseline] +enforceTypes = false +replicate = false + +[security_group_activity_baseline] +enforceTypes = false +replicate = false + +[security_services_lookup] +enforceTypes = false +replicate = false + +[suspicious_writes_lookup] +enforceTypes = false +replicate = false + [zoom_first_time_child_process] enforceTypes = false replicate = false diff --git a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_all_backup_logs_for_host___response_task.xml b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_all_backup_logs_for_host___response_task.xml index ff600822c3..cdba0f5925 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_all_backup_logs_for_host___response_task.xml +++ b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_all_backup_logs_for_host___response_task.xml @@ -1,3 +1,9 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2022-03-14T11:11:42 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# @@ -6,4 +12,4 @@
- \ No newline at end of file + diff --git a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task.xml b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task.xml index cfe74bbb0c..0c798ca5ce 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task.xml +++ b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task.xml @@ -1,3 +1,9 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2022-03-14T11:11:42 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# @@ -6,4 +12,4 @@
- \ No newline at end of file + diff --git a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task.xml b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task.xml index 36daa00e39..c73d9ee750 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task.xml +++ b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task.xml @@ -1,9 +1,15 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2022-03-14T11:11:42 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# - `aws_securityhub_firehose` "findings{}.Resources{}.Type"=AWSEC2Instance | rex field=findings{}.Resources{}.Id .*instance/(?&lt;instance&gt;.*)| rename instance as dest| search dest = $dest$ |rename findings{}.* as * | rename Remediation.Recommendation.Text as Remediation | table dest Title ProductArn Description FirstObservedAt RecordState Remediation + `aws_securityhub_firehose` "findings{}.Resources{}.Type"=AWSEC2Instance | rex field=findings{}.Resources{}.Id .*instance/(?<instance>.*)| rename instance as dest| search dest = $dest$ |rename findings{}.* as * | rename Remediation.Recommendation.Text as Remediation | table dest Title ProductArn Description FirstObservedAt RecordState Remediation
- \ No newline at end of file + diff --git a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid___response_task.xml b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid___response_task.xml index 63e01d294e..2a08954627 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid___response_task.xml +++ b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid___response_task.xml @@ -1,3 +1,9 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2022-03-14T11:11:42 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# @@ -6,4 +12,4 @@
- \ No newline at end of file + diff --git a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task.xml b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task.xml index 15cf90672f..0dc7961783 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task.xml +++ b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task.xml @@ -1,3 +1,9 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2022-03-14T11:11:42 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# @@ -6,4 +12,4 @@
- \ No newline at end of file + diff --git a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task.xml b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task.xml index b2f195cebe..44e317e4fa 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task.xml +++ b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task.xml @@ -1,3 +1,9 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2022-03-14T11:11:42 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# @@ -6,4 +12,4 @@
- \ No newline at end of file + diff --git a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task.xml b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task.xml index e9e385a4e7..77462f86ef 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task.xml +++ b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task.xml @@ -1,3 +1,9 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2022-03-14T11:11:42 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# @@ -6,4 +12,4 @@
- \ No newline at end of file + diff --git a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname___response_task.xml b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname___response_task.xml index f5173a4552..4454a42cd1 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname___response_task.xml +++ b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname___response_task.xml @@ -1,3 +1,9 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2022-03-14T11:11:42 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# @@ -6,4 +12,4 @@
- \ No newline at end of file + diff --git a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task.xml b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task.xml index 7e26b67a72..b4075ac53e 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task.xml +++ b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task.xml @@ -1,3 +1,9 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2022-03-14T11:11:42 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# @@ -6,4 +12,4 @@
- \ No newline at end of file + diff --git a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_city___response_task.xml b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_city___response_task.xml index ceea0d7351..fd24d7ac7c 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_city___response_task.xml +++ b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_city___response_task.xml @@ -1,3 +1,9 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2022-03-14T11:11:43 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# @@ -6,4 +12,4 @@
- \ No newline at end of file + diff --git a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_country___response_task.xml b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_country___response_task.xml index a50f7b59ba..8b105edcd5 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_country___response_task.xml +++ b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_country___response_task.xml @@ -1,3 +1,9 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2022-03-14T11:11:43 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# @@ -6,4 +12,4 @@
- \ No newline at end of file + diff --git a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task.xml b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task.xml index cacfa09bdd..58acef2b54 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task.xml +++ b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task.xml @@ -1,3 +1,9 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2022-03-14T11:11:43 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# @@ -6,4 +12,4 @@
- \ No newline at end of file + diff --git a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_region___response_task.xml b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_region___response_task.xml index 4b8751652c..b5b5c5bc4e 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_region___response_task.xml +++ b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_region___response_task.xml @@ -1,3 +1,9 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2022-03-14T11:11:43 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# @@ -6,4 +12,4 @@
- \ No newline at end of file + diff --git a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint___response_task.xml b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint___response_task.xml index ae1d493be1..84884c6bfa 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint___response_task.xml +++ b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint___response_task.xml @@ -1,3 +1,9 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2022-03-14T11:11:43 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# @@ -6,4 +12,4 @@
- \ No newline at end of file + diff --git a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain___response_task.xml b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain___response_task.xml index 8c08f47588..fb582eb2b1 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain___response_task.xml +++ b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain___response_task.xml @@ -1,3 +1,9 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2022-03-14T11:11:43 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# @@ -6,4 +12,4 @@
- \ No newline at end of file + diff --git a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task.xml b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task.xml index 1039a71369..e47b9ab59f 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task.xml +++ b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task.xml @@ -1,3 +1,9 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2022-03-14T11:11:43 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# @@ -6,4 +12,4 @@
- \ No newline at end of file + diff --git a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task.xml b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task.xml index 0819c617f8..ca4a6e9d09 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task.xml +++ b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task.xml @@ -1,9 +1,15 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2022-03-14T11:11:43 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# - | tstats allow_old_summaries=true sum(All_Traffic.bytes_out) as "bytes_out" sum(All_Traffic.bytes_in) as "bytes_in" from datamodel=Network_Traffic where nodename=All_Traffic All_Traffic.dest_port=53 by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest| `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | rename src as src_ip | rename dest as dest_ip | search src_ip=$src_ip$ | search dest_ip = $dest_ip | eval ratio = (bytes_out/bytes_in) | table ratio + | tstats allow_old_summaries=true sum(All_Traffic.bytes_out) as "bytes_out" sum(All_Traffic.bytes_in) as "bytes_in" from datamodel=Network_Traffic where nodename=All_Traffic All_Traffic.dest_port=53 by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest| `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | rename src as src_ip | rename dest as dest_ip | search src_ip=$src_ip$ | search dest_ip = $dest_ip | eval ratio = (bytes_out/bytes_in) | table ratio
- \ No newline at end of file + diff --git a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task.xml b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task.xml index f8a0008d65..bd8b913968 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task.xml +++ b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task.xml @@ -1,9 +1,15 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2022-03-14T11:11:43 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# - `aws_description` | dedup id sortby -_time |rename id as instanceId| search instanceId=$instanceId$ | spath output=tags path=tags | eval tags=mvzip(key,value," = "), ip_address=if((ip_address == "null"),private_ip_address,ip_address) | table id, tags.Name, aws_account_id, placement, instance_type, key_name, ip_address, launch_time, state, vpc_id, subnet_id, tags | rename aws_account_id as "Account ID", id as ID, instance_type as Type, ip_address as "IP Address", key_name as "Key Pair", launch_time as "Launch Time", placement as "Availability Zone", state as State, subnet_id as Subnet, "tags.Name" as Name, vpc_id as VPC + `aws_description` | dedup id sortby -_time |rename id as instanceId| search instanceId=$instanceId$ | spath output=tags path=tags | eval tags=mvzip(key,value," = "), ip_address=if((ip_address == "null"),private_ip_address,ip_address) | table id, tags.Name, aws_account_id, placement, instance_type, key_name, ip_address, launch_time, state, vpc_id, subnet_id, tags | rename aws_account_id as "Account ID", id as ID, instance_type as Type, ip_address as "IP Address", key_name as "Key Pair", launch_time as "Launch Time", placement as "Availability Zone", state as State, subnet_id as Subnet, "tags.Name" as Name, vpc_id as VPC
- \ No newline at end of file + diff --git a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task.xml b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task.xml index 9f9c47d148..d00a673b2d 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task.xml +++ b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task.xml @@ -1,3 +1,9 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2022-03-14T11:11:43 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# @@ -6,4 +12,4 @@
- \ No newline at end of file + diff --git a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_email_info___response_task.xml b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_email_info___response_task.xml index 6afb5067bf..a1eace0738 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_email_info___response_task.xml +++ b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_email_info___response_task.xml @@ -1,3 +1,9 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2022-03-14T11:11:43 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# @@ -6,4 +12,4 @@
- \ No newline at end of file + diff --git a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task.xml b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task.xml index 21a977f746..6b74e7b519 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task.xml +++ b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task.xml @@ -1,3 +1,9 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2022-03-14T11:11:43 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# @@ -6,4 +12,4 @@
- \ No newline at end of file + diff --git a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address___response_task.xml b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address___response_task.xml index 8934821532..a4ff31de0d 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address___response_task.xml +++ b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address___response_task.xml @@ -1,3 +1,9 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2022-03-14T11:11:43 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# @@ -6,4 +12,4 @@
- \ No newline at end of file + diff --git a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task.xml b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task.xml index 6a57997f34..9779eb78a7 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task.xml +++ b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task.xml @@ -1,3 +1,9 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2022-03-14T11:11:43 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# @@ -6,4 +12,4 @@
- \ No newline at end of file + diff --git a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint___response_task.xml b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint___response_task.xml index 45fba221b9..9109f8973a 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint___response_task.xml +++ b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint___response_task.xml @@ -1,9 +1,15 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2022-03-14T11:11:43 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# - `wineventlog_security` (signature_id=4718 OR signature_id=4717) dest=$dest$ | rename user as "Account Modified" | table _time, dest, "Account Modified", Access_Right, signature + `wineventlog_security` (signature_id=4718 OR signature_id=4717) dest=$dest$ | rename user as "Account Modified" | table _time, dest, "Account Modified", Access_Right, signature
- \ No newline at end of file + diff --git a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user___response_task.xml b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user___response_task.xml index 02b2abb67c..48e9dab63a 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user___response_task.xml +++ b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user___response_task.xml @@ -1,9 +1,15 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2022-03-14T11:11:43 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# - `wineventlog_security` (signature_id=4718 OR signature_id=4717) user=$user$ | rename user as "Account Modified" | table _time, dest, "Account Modified", Access_Right, signature + `wineventlog_security` (signature_id=4718 OR signature_id=4717) user=$user$ | rename user as "Account Modified" | table _time, dest, "Account Modified", Access_Right, signature
- \ No newline at end of file + diff --git a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task.xml b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task.xml index 6f831fb1b2..ac5bc4e9f5 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task.xml +++ b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task.xml @@ -1,3 +1,9 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2022-03-14T11:11:43 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# @@ -6,4 +12,4 @@
- \ No newline at end of file + diff --git a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task.xml b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task.xml index 7e8a3cf62b..a9e4f061d2 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task.xml +++ b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task.xml @@ -1,9 +1,15 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2022-03-14T11:11:43 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# - | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` + | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
- \ No newline at end of file + diff --git a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_file_activity___response_task.xml b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_file_activity___response_task.xml index 0e2a6bed04..d22590b049 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_file_activity___response_task.xml +++ b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_file_activity___response_task.xml @@ -1,3 +1,9 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2022-03-14T11:11:43 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# @@ -6,4 +12,4 @@
- \ No newline at end of file + diff --git a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task.xml b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task.xml index 43466d76b1..6efbe79b30 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task.xml +++ b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task.xml @@ -1,9 +1,15 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2022-03-14T11:11:43 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# - | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | search process_name= $process_name$ | search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` + | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | search process_name= $process_name$ | search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
- \ No newline at end of file + diff --git a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task.xml b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task.xml index 84de4cf84d..92f150daca 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task.xml +++ b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task.xml @@ -1,3 +1,9 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2022-03-14T11:11:43 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# @@ -6,4 +12,4 @@
- \ No newline at end of file + diff --git a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task.xml b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task.xml index 754ae13844..890bbb29f8 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task.xml +++ b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task.xml @@ -1,3 +1,9 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2022-03-14T11:11:43 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# @@ -6,4 +12,4 @@
- \ No newline at end of file + diff --git a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host___response_task.xml b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host___response_task.xml index e3fa8fe2b6..b52c502daf 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host___response_task.xml +++ b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host___response_task.xml @@ -1,9 +1,15 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2022-03-14T11:11:43 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# - `sysmon` EventCode&gt;18 EventCode&lt;22 | rename host as dest | search dest=$dest$| table _time, dest, user, Name, Operation, EventType, Type, Query, Consumer, Filter + `sysmon` EventCode>18 EventCode<22 | rename host as dest | search dest=$dest$| table _time, dest, user, Name, Operation, EventType, Type, Query, Consumer, Filter
- \ No newline at end of file + diff --git a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_web_session_information_via_session_id___response_task.xml b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_web_session_information_via_session_id___response_task.xml index 6bf51e95b3..2e1cfa7a02 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_web_session_information_via_session_id___response_task.xml +++ b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_web_session_information_via_session_id___response_task.xml @@ -1,3 +1,9 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2022-03-14T11:11:43 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# @@ -6,4 +12,4 @@
- \ No newline at end of file + diff --git a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task.xml b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task.xml index 5d4532640b..7a24c7269c 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task.xml +++ b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task.xml @@ -1,3 +1,9 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2022-03-14T11:11:43 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# @@ -6,4 +12,4 @@
- \ No newline at end of file + diff --git a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field___response_task.xml b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field___response_task.xml index a1d5f61415..c65dd92f6e 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field___response_task.xml +++ b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field___response_task.xml @@ -1,3 +1,9 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2022-03-14T11:11:43 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# @@ -6,4 +12,4 @@
- \ No newline at end of file + diff --git a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations___response_task.xml b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations___response_task.xml index dc1b1c0837..de121a9c96 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations___response_task.xml +++ b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations___response_task.xml @@ -1,9 +1,15 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2022-03-14T11:11:43 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# - | tstats count `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as first_login latest(_time) as last_login dc(Authentication.dest) AS distinct_count_dest values(Authentication.dest) AS Authentication.dest values(Authentication.app) AS Authentication.app from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.action=failure by Authentication.user | where distinct_count_dest &gt; 1 | `security_content_ctime(first_login)` | `security_content_ctime(last_login)` | `drop_dm_object_name("Authentication")` | search user=$user$ + | tstats count `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as first_login latest(_time) as last_login dc(Authentication.dest) AS distinct_count_dest values(Authentication.dest) AS Authentication.dest values(Authentication.app) AS Authentication.app from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.action=failure by Authentication.user | where distinct_count_dest > 1 | `security_content_ctime(first_login)` | `security_content_ctime(last_login)` | `drop_dm_object_name("Authentication")` | search user=$user$
- \ No newline at end of file + diff --git a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip___response_task.xml b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip___response_task.xml index 448e215f7d..2cd7906f92 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip___response_task.xml +++ b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip___response_task.xml @@ -1,3 +1,9 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2022-03-14T11:11:43 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# @@ -6,4 +12,4 @@
- \ No newline at end of file + diff --git a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_app___response_task.xml b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_app___response_task.xml index 68b6518ba8..78cf3a680c 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_app___response_task.xml +++ b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_app___response_task.xml @@ -1,3 +1,9 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2022-03-14T11:11:43 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# @@ -6,4 +12,4 @@
- \ No newline at end of file + diff --git a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts___response_task.xml b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts___response_task.xml index 88738e76b8..5e059f17e0 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts___response_task.xml +++ b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts___response_task.xml @@ -1,3 +1,9 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2022-03-14T11:11:43 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# @@ -6,4 +12,4 @@
- \ No newline at end of file + diff --git a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts___response_task.xml b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts___response_task.xml index 855aa761f6..14156f5935 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts___response_task.xml +++ b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts___response_task.xml @@ -1,9 +1,15 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2022-03-14T11:11:43 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# - `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 OR EventCode=4769 | rex field=user "(?&lt;new_user&gt;[^\@]+)" | stats count BY new_user, dest, EventCode | stats max(count) AS max_count sum(count) AS sum_count BY new_user, dest| search dest=$dest$ | where sum_count/max_count!=2 | rename new_user AS user + `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 OR EventCode=4769 | rex field=user "(?<new_user>[^\@]+)" | stats count BY new_user, dest, EventCode | stats max(count) AS max_count sum(count) AS sum_count BY new_user, dest| search dest=$dest$ | where sum_count/max_count!=2 | rename new_user AS user
- \ No newline at end of file + diff --git a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_previous_unseen_user___response_task.xml b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_previous_unseen_user___response_task.xml index 67dad067a7..ba1a8571f0 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_previous_unseen_user___response_task.xml +++ b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_previous_unseen_user___response_task.xml @@ -1,9 +1,15 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2022-03-14T11:11:43 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# - | tstats count `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as first_login latest(_time) as last_login values(Authentication.dest) AS Authentication.dest values(Authentication.app) AS Authentication.app values(Authentication.action) AS Authentication.action from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.action=success by _time, Authentication.user | bucket _time span=30d | stats count min(first_login) as first_login max(last_login) as last_login values(Authentication.dest) AS Authentication.dest by Authentication.user | where count=1 | where first_login &gt;= relative_time(now(), "-30d") | `security_content_ctime(first_login)` | `security_content_ctime(last_login)` | `drop_dm_object_name("Authentication")` | search dest=$dest$ + | tstats count `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as first_login latest(_time) as last_login values(Authentication.dest) AS Authentication.dest values(Authentication.app) AS Authentication.app values(Authentication.action) AS Authentication.action from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.action=success by _time, Authentication.user | bucket _time span=30d | stats count min(first_login) as first_login max(last_login) as last_login values(Authentication.dest) AS Authentication.dest by Authentication.user | where count=1 | where first_login >= relative_time(now(), "-30d") | `security_content_ctime(first_login)` | `security_content_ctime(last_login)` | `drop_dm_object_name("Authentication")` | search dest=$dest$
- \ No newline at end of file + diff --git a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task.xml b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task.xml index 38a99d2eff..9e498ffdf6 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task.xml +++ b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task.xml @@ -1,9 +1,15 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2022-03-14T11:11:43 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# - | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature_id=4624 Authentication.app=win:remote by Authentication.src Authentication.dest Authentication.app Authentication.user Authentication.signature Authentication.src_nt_domain | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("Authentication")` | search dest=$dest$ | table firstTime lastTime src src_nt_domain dest user app count | sort count + | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature_id=4624 Authentication.app=win:remote by Authentication.src Authentication.dest Authentication.app Authentication.user Authentication.signature Authentication.src_nt_domain | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("Authentication")` | search dest=$dest$ | table firstTime lastTime src src_nt_domain dest user app count | sort count
- \ No newline at end of file + diff --git a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header___response_task.xml b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header___response_task.xml index ad936107fb..b356a5b21b 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header___response_task.xml +++ b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header___response_task.xml @@ -1,9 +1,15 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2022-03-14T11:11:43 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# - `stream_http` | search src_ip=$src_ip$ | search dest_ip=$dest_ip$ | eval cs_content_type_length = len(cs_content_type) | search cs_content_type_length &gt; 100 | rex field="cs_content_type" (?&lt;suspicious_strings&gt;cmd.exe) | eval suspicious_strings_found=if(match(cs_content_type, "application"), "True", "False") | rename suspicious_strings_found AS "Suspicious Content-Type Found" | fields "Suspicious Content-Type Found", dest_ip, src_ip, suspicious_strings, cs_content_type, cs_content_type_length, url + `stream_http` | search src_ip=$src_ip$ | search dest_ip=$dest_ip$ | eval cs_content_type_length = len(cs_content_type) | search cs_content_type_length > 100 | rex field="cs_content_type" (?<suspicious_strings>cmd.exe) | eval suspicious_strings_found=if(match(cs_content_type, "application"), "True", "False") | rename suspicious_strings_found AS "Suspicious Content-Type Found" | fields "Suspicious Content-Type Found", dest_ip, src_ip, suspicious_strings, cs_content_type, cs_content_type_length, url
- \ No newline at end of file + diff --git a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_okta___response_task.xml b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_okta___response_task.xml index da8f2f9beb..b7af204f5f 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_okta___response_task.xml +++ b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_okta___response_task.xml @@ -1,3 +1,9 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2022-03-14T11:11:43 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# @@ -6,4 +12,4 @@
- \ No newline at end of file + diff --git a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_web_posts_from_src___response_task.xml b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_web_posts_from_src___response_task.xml index b53ec1c193..9aa77a115b 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_web_posts_from_src___response_task.xml +++ b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_web_posts_from_src___response_task.xml @@ -1,9 +1,15 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2022-03-14T11:11:43 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# - | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Web.url) as url from datamodel=Web by Web.src,Web.http_user_agent,Web.http_method | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")`| search http_method, "POST" | search src=$src$ + | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Web.url) as url from datamodel=Web by Web.src,Web.http_user_agent,Web.http_method | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")`| search http_method, "POST" | search src=$src$
- \ No newline at end of file + diff --git a/dist/escu/default/es_investigations.conf b/dist/escu/default/es_investigations.conf index 8916203c2a..f4e25087ae 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/es_investigations.conf +++ b/dist/escu/default/es_investigations.conf @@ -1,808 +1,767 @@ - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_cross_account_activity] -label = AWS Cross Account Activity -description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another AWS account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_iam_privilege_escalation] -label = AWS IAM Privilege Escalation -description = This analytic story contains detections that query your AWS Cloudtrail for activities related to privilege escalation. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_network_acl_activity] -label = AWS Network ACL Activity -description = Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_security_hub_alerts] -label = AWS Security Hub Alerts -description = This story is focused around detecting Security Hub alerts generated from AWS -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_user_monitoring] -label = AWS User Monitoring -description = Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_active_directory_discovery] -label = Active Directory Discovery -description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Discovery and Reconnaissance within with Active Directory environments. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_active_directory_kerberos_attacks] -label = Active Directory Kerberos Attacks -description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Kerberos based attacks within with Active Directory environments. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_active_directory_lateral_movement] -label = Active Directory Lateral Movement -description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how attackers move laterally within an Active Directory environment. Since lateral movement is often a necessary step in a breach, it is important for cyber defenders to deploy detection coverage. /n**SOAR:** The following Splunk SOAR playbooks can be used in the response to this story's analytics: 'Delete Detected Files' -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_active_directory_password_spraying] -label = Active Directory Password Spraying -description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Password Spraying attacks within Active Directory environments. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_apache_struts_vulnerability] -label = Apache Struts Vulnerability -description = Detect and investigate activities--such as unusually long `Content-Type` length, suspicious java classes and web servers executing suspicious processes--consistent with attempts to exploit Apache Struts vulnerabilities. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_posts_from_src___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_asset_tracking] -label = Asset Tracking -description = Keep a careful inventory of every asset on your network to make it easier to detect rogue devices. Unauthorized/unmanaged devices could be an indication of malicious behavior that should be investigated further. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_bits_jobs] -label = BITS Jobs -description = Adversaries may abuse BITS jobs to persistently execute or clean up after malicious payloads. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156] -label = Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 -description = Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2021-3156. Discovered by the Qualys Research Team, this vulnerability has been found to affect sudo across multiple Linux distributions (Ubuntu 20.04 and prior, Debian 10 and prior, Fedora 33 and prior). As this vulnerability was committed to code in July 2011, there will be many distributions affected. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows any unprivileged user to gain root privileges on the vulnerable host. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_blackmatter_ransomware] -label = BlackMatter Ransomware -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the BlackMatter ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with BlackMatter, force safe mode boot, autadminlogon account registry modification and more. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_brand_monitoring] -label = Brand Monitoring -description = Detect and investigate activity that may indicate that an adversary is using faux domains to mislead users into interacting with malicious infrastructure. Monitor DNS, email, and web traffic for permutations of your brand name. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_email_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_clop_ransomware] -label = Clop Ransomware -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Clop ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Clope, encrypting network shares, deleting and resizing shadow volume storage, registry key modification, deleting of security logs, and more. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_cloud_cryptomining] -label = Cloud Cryptomining -description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_cloud_federated_credential_abuse] -label = Cloud Federated Credential Abuse -description = This analytical story addresses events that indicate abuse of cloud federated credentials. These credentials are usually extracted from endpoint desktop or servers specially those servers that provide federation services such as Windows Active Directory Federation Services. Identity Federation relies on objects such as Oauth2 tokens, cookies or SAML assertions in order to provide seamless access between cloud and perimeter environments. If these objects are either hijacked or forged then attackers will be able to pivot into victim's cloud environements. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_cobalt_strike] -label = Cobalt Strike -description = Cobalt Strike is threat emulation software. Red teams and penetration testers use Cobalt Strike to demonstrate the risk of a breach and evaluate mature security programs. Most recently, Cobalt Strike has become the choice tool by threat groups due to its ease of use and extensibility. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_coldroot_macos_rat] -label = ColdRoot MacOS RAT -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that relate to the ColdRoot Remote Access Trojan that affects MacOS. An example of some of these activities are changing sensative binaries in the MacOS sub-system, detecting process names and executables associated with the RAT, detecting when a keyboard tab is installed on a MacOS machine and more. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_collection_and_staging] -label = Collection and Staging -description = Monitor for and investigate activities--such as suspicious writes to the Windows Recycling Bin or email servers sending high amounts of traffic to specific hosts, for example--that may indicate that an adversary is harvesting and exfiltrating sensitive data. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_command_and_control] -label = Command and Control -description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged by attackers to establish and operate command and control channels. Implants installed by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions and send data back to the malicious operators. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_container_implantation_monitoring_and_investigation] -label = Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation -description = Use the searches in this story to monitor your Kubernetes registry repositories for upload, and deployment of potentially vulnerable, backdoor, or implanted containers. These searches provide information on source users, destination path, container names and repository names. The searches provide context to address Mitre T1525 which refers to container implantation upload to a company's repository either in Amazon Elastic Container Registry, Google Container Registry and Azure Container Registry. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_credential_dumping] -label = Credential Dumping -description = Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords. The threat actors use these pilfered credentials to further escalate privileges and spread throughout a target environment. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to credential dumping. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_previous_unseen_user___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_dhs_report_ta18_074a] -label = DHS Report TA18-074A -description = Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_file_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_dns_amplification_attacks] -label = DNS Amplification Attacks -description = DNS poses a serious threat as a Denial of Service (DOS) amplifier, if it responds to `ANY` queries. This Analytic Story can help you detect attackers who may be abusing your company's DNS infrastructure to launch amplification attacks, causing Denial of Service to other victims. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_dns_hijacking] -label = DNS Hijacking -description = Secure your environment against DNS hijacks with searches that help you detect and investigate unauthorized changes to DNS records. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_darkside_ransomware] -label = DarkSide Ransomware -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the DarkSide Ransomware -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_data_destruction] -label = Data Destruction -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the data destruction, including deleting files, overwriting files, wiping disk and encrypting files. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_data_exfiltration] -label = Data Exfiltration -description = The stealing of data by an adversary. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_data_protection] -label = Data Protection -description = Fortify your data-protection arsenal--while continuing to ensure data confidentiality and integrity--with searches that monitor for and help you investigate possible signs of data exfiltration. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_deobfuscate_decode_files_or_information] -label = Deobfuscate-Decode Files or Information -description = Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_detect_zerologon_attack] -label = Detect Zerologon Attack -description = Uncover activity related to the execution of Zerologon CVE-2020-11472, a technique wherein attackers target a Microsoft Windows Domain Controller to reset its computer account password. The result from this attack is attackers can now provide themselves high privileges and take over Domain Controller. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to reset Domain Controller Computer Account via exploit code remotely or via the use of tool Mimikatz as payload carrier. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_dev_sec_ops] -label = Dev Sec Ops -description = This story is focused around detecting attacks on a DevSecOps lifeccycle which consists of the phases plan, code, build, test, release, deploy, operate and monitor. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_disabling_security_tools] -label = Disabling Security Tools -description = Looks for activities and techniques associated with the disabling of security tools on a Windows system, such as suspicious `reg.exe` processes, processes launching netsh, and many others. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_domain_trust_discovery] -label = Domain Trust Discovery -description = Adversaries may attempt to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities in Windows multi-domain/forest environments. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_dynamic_dns] -label = Dynamic DNS -description = Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them avoid firewall blocks and deny lists. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18_201a_] -label = Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A -description = Detect rarely used executables, specific registry paths that may confer malware survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that the Emotet financial malware has compromised your environment. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902] -label = F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902 -description = Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-5902. Discovered by Positive Technologies researchers, this vulnerability affects F5 BIG-IP, BIG-IQ. and Traffix SDC devices (vulnerable versions in F5 support link below). This vulnerability allows unauthenticated users, along with authenticated users, who have access to the configuration utility to execute system commands, create/delete files, disable services, and/or execute Java code. This vulnerability can result in full system compromise. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_fin7] -label = FIN7 -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the FIN7 JS Implant and JSSLoader, including looking for Image Loading of ldap and wmi modules, associated with its payload, data collection and script execution. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_gcp_cross_account_activity] -label = GCP Cross Account Activity -description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another GCP account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_hafnium_group] -label = HAFNIUM Group -description = HAFNIUM group was identified by Microsoft as exploiting 4 Microsoft Exchange CVEs in the wild - CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858 and CVE-2021-27065. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_hermetic_wiper] -label = Hermetic Wiper -description = This analytic story contains detections that allow security analysts to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the destructive malware targeting Ukrainian organizations also known as "Hermetic Wiper". This analytic story looks for abuse of Regsvr32, executables written in administrative SMB Share, suspicious processes, disabling of memory crash dump and more. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_hidden_cobra_malware] -label = Hidden Cobra Malware -description = Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_icedid] -label = IcedID -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the IcedID banking trojan, including looking for file writes associated with its payload, process injection, shellcode execution and data collection. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_ingress_tool_transfer] -label = Ingress Tool Transfer -description = Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Files may be copied from an external adversary controlled system through the command and control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_jboss_vulnerability] -label = JBoss Vulnerability -description = In March of 2016, adversaries were seen using JexBoss--an open-source utility used for testing and exploiting JBoss application servers. These searches help detect evidence of these attacks, such as network connections to external resources or web services spawning atypical child processes, among others. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_kubernetes_scanning_activity] -label = Kubernetes Scanning Activity -description = This story addresses detection against Kubernetes cluster fingerprint scan and attack by providing information on items such as source ip, user agent, cluster names. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity] -label = Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity -description = This story addresses detection and response of accounts acccesing Kubernetes cluster sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets providing information on items such as user user, group. object, namespace and authorization reason. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_linux_persistence_techniques] -label = Linux Persistence Techniques -description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on a Linux system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_linux_post_exploitation] -label = Linux Post-Exploitation -description = This analytic story identifies popular Linux post exploitation tools such as autoSUID, LinEnum, LinPEAS, Linux Exploit Suggesters, MimiPenguin. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_linux_privilege_escalation] -label = Linux Privilege Escalation -description = Monitor for and investigate activities that may be associated with a Linux privilege-escalation attack, including unusual processes running on endpoints, schedule task, services, setuid, root execution and more. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_living_off_the_land] -label = Living Off The Land -description = Leverage searches that allow you to search for the presence of an attacker leveraging existing tooling within your environment. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_log4shell_cve_2021_44228] -label = Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 -description = Log4Shell or CVE-2021-44228 is a Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability in the Apache Log4j library, a widely used and ubiquitous logging framework for Java. The vulnerability allows an attacker who can control log messages to execute arbitrary code loaded from attacker-controlled servers and we anticipate that most apps using the Log4j library will meet this condition. /n**SOAR:** The following Splunk SOAR playbooks can be used in the response to this story's analytics: 'Log4j Respond', 'Log4j Investigate', 'Log4j Splunk Investigation' -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_malicious_powershell] -label = Malicious PowerShell -description = Attackers are finding stealthy ways "live off the land," leveraging utilities and tools that come standard on the endpoint--such as PowerShell--to achieve their goals without downloading binary files. These searches can help you detect and investigate PowerShell command-line options that may be indicative of malicious intent. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_masquerading___rename_system_utilities] -label = Masquerading - Rename System Utilities -description = Adversaries may rename legitimate system utilities to try to evade security mechanisms concerning the usage of those utilities. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_meterpreter] -label = Meterpreter -description = Meterpreter provides red teams, pen testers and threat actors interactive access to a compromised host to run commands, upload payloads, download files, and other actions. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_microsoft_mshtml_remote_code_execution_cve_2021_40444] -label = Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444 -description = CVE-2021-40444 is a remote code execution vulnerability in MSHTML, recently used to delivery targeted spearphishing documents. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_monitor_for_updates] -label = Monitor for Updates -description = Monitor your enterprise to ensure that your endpoints are being patched and updated. Adversaries notoriously exploit known vulnerabilities that could be mitigated by applying routine security patches. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_nobelium_group] -label = NOBELIUM Group -description = Sunburst is a trojanized updates to SolarWinds Orion IT monitoring and management software. It was discovered by FireEye in December 2020. The actors behind this campaign gained access to numerous public and private organizations around the world. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_netsh_abuse] -label = Netsh Abuse -description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the abuse of `netsh.exe`, which can disable local firewall settings or set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_network_discovery] -label = Network Discovery -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the network discovery, including looking for network configuration, settings such as IP, MAC address, firewall settings and many more. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_office_365_detections] -label = Office 365 Detections -description = This story is focused around detecting Office 365 Attacks. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_orangeworm_attack_group] -label = Orangeworm Attack Group -description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_petitpotam_ntlm_relay_on_active_directory_certificate_services] -label = PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services -description = PetitPotam (CVE-2021-36942,) is a vulnerablity identified in Microsofts EFSRPC Protocol that can allow an unauthenticated account to escalate privileges to domain administrator given the right circumstances. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_possible_backdoor_activity_associated_with_mudcarp_espionage_campaigns] -label = Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns -description = Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques employed by the MUDCARP threat group. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_printnightmare_cve_2021_34527] -label = PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527 -description = The following analytic story identifies behaviors related PrintNightmare, or CVE-2021-34527 previously known as (CVE-2021-1675), to gain privilege escalation on the vulnerable machine. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch] -label = Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch -description = Detect instances of prohibited network traffic allowed in the environment, as well as protocols running on non-standard ports. Both of these types of behaviors typically violate policy and can be leveraged by attackers. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_proxyshell] -label = ProxyShell -description = ProxyShell is a chain of exploits targeting on-premise Microsoft Exchange Server - CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, and CVE-2021-31207. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_ransomware] -label = Ransomware -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage, the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected locations, and many others. /n**SOAR:** The following Splunk SOAR playbooks can be used in the response to this story's analytics: 'Ransomware Investigate and Contain' -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_rundll32_lockworkstation___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_ransomware_cloud] -label = Ransomware Cloud -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware. These searches include cloud related objects that may be targeted by malicious actors via cloud providers own encryption features. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_remcos] -label = Remcos -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Remcos RAT trojan, including looking for file writes associated with its payload, screencapture, registry modification, UAC bypassed, persistence and data collection.. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_revil_ransomware] -label = Revil Ransomware -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Revil ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Revil, encrypting network shares, deleting shadow volume storage, registry key modification, deleting of security logs, and more. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_router_and_infrastructure_security] -label = Router and Infrastructure Security -description = Validate the security configuration of network infrastructure and verify that only authorized users and systems are accessing critical assets. Core routing and switching infrastructure are common strategic targets for attackers. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_ryuk_ransomware] -label = Ryuk Ransomware -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Ryuk ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Ryuk, Stopping Security Access Manager, DisableAntiSpyware registry key modification, suspicious psexec use, and more. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_sql_injection] -label = SQL Injection -description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to help you detect structured query language (SQL) injection attempts characterized by long URLs that contain malicious parameters. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_samsam_ransomware] -label = SamSam Ransomware -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the SamSam ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with SamSam, RDP brute force attacks, the presence of files with SamSam ransomware extensions, suspicious psexec use, and more. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_signed_binary_proxy_execution_installutil] -label = Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil -description = Adversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_silver_sparrow] -label = Silver Sparrow -description = Silver Sparrow, identified by Red Canary Intelligence, is a new forward looking MacOS (Intel and M1) malicious software downloader utilizing JavaScript for execution and a launchAgent to establish persistence. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_spearphishing_attachments] -label = Spearphishing Attachments -description = Detect signs of malicious payloads that may indicate that your environment has been breached via a phishing attack. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_aws_login_activities] -label = Suspicious AWS Login Activities -description = Monitor your AWS authentication events using your CloudTrail logs. Searches within this Analytic Story will help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious logins. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_aws_s3_activities] -label = Suspicious AWS S3 Activities -description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_aws_traffic] -label = Suspicious AWS Traffic -description = Leverage these searches to monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as a spike in blocked outbound traffic in your virtual private cloud (VPC). -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities] -label = Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities -description = Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_cloud_instance_activities] -label = Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities -description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_cloud_provisioning_activities] -label = Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities -description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_cloud_user_activities] -label = Suspicious Cloud User Activities -description = Detect and investigate suspicious activities by users and roles in your cloud environments. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_command_line_executions] -label = Suspicious Command-Line Executions -description = Leveraging the Windows command-line interface (CLI) is one of the most common attack techniques--one that is also detailed in the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Use this Analytic Story to help you identify unusual or suspicious use of the CLI on Windows systems. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_compiled_html_activity] -label = Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity -description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_dns_traffic] -label = Suspicious DNS Traffic -description = Attackers often attempt to hide within or otherwise abuse the domain name system (DNS). You can thwart attempts to manipulate this omnipresent protocol by monitoring for these types of abuses. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_emails] -label = Suspicious Emails -description = Email remains one of the primary means for attackers to gain an initial foothold within the modern enterprise. Detect and investigate suspicious emails in your environment with the help of the searches in this Analytic Story. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_email_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_gcp_storage_activities] -label = Suspicious GCP Storage Activities -description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your GCP Storage buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open storage buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_mshta_activity] -label = Suspicious MSHTA Activity -description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_okta_activity] -label = Suspicious Okta Activity -description = Monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities. Due to the Covid outbreak, many users are migrating over to leverage cloud services more and more. Okta is a popular tool to manage multiple users and the web-based applications they need to stay productive. The searches in this story will help monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities and associated user behaviors. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_app___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_okta___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_regsvcs_regasm_activity] -label = Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity -description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_regsvr32_activity] -label = Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity -description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the regsvr32.exe process to execute malicious code. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_rundll32_activity] -label = Suspicious Rundll32 Activity -description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage rundll32.exe to execute arbitrary malicious code. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_wmi_use] -label = Suspicious WMI Use -description = Attackers are increasingly abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), a framework and associated utilities available on all modern Windows operating systems. Because WMI can be leveraged to manage both local and remote systems, it is important to identify the processes executed and the user context within which the activity occurred. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_windows_registry_activities] -label = Suspicious Windows Registry Activities -description = Monitor and detect registry changes initiated from remote locations, which can be a sign that an attacker has infiltrated your system. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_zoom_child_processes] -label = Suspicious Zoom Child Processes -description = Attackers are using Zoom as an vector to increase privileges on a sytems. This story detects new child processes of zoom and provides investigative actions for this detection. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_file_activity___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_trickbot] -label = Trickbot -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the trickbot banking trojan, including looking for file writes associated with its payload, process injection, shellcode execution and data collection even in LDAP environment. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution] -label = Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution -description = Monitor and detect behaviors used by attackers who leverage trusted developer utilities to execute malicious code. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild] -label = Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild -description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the msbuild.exe process to execute malicious code. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_unusual_processes] -label = Unusual Processes -description = Quickly identify systems running new or unusual processes in your environment that could be indicators of suspicious activity. Processes run from unusual locations, those with conspicuously long command lines, and rare executables are all examples of activities that may warrant deeper investigation. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_use_of_cleartext_protocols] -label = Use of Cleartext Protocols -description = Leverage searches that detect cleartext network protocols that may leak credentials or should otherwise be encrypted. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_whispergate] -label = WhisperGate -description = This analytic story contains detections that allow security analysts to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the destructive malware targeting Ukrainian organizations also known as "WhisperGate". This analytic story looks for suspicious process execution, command-line activity, downloads, DNS queries and more. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_dns_sigred_cve_2020_1350] -label = Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350 -description = Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-1350, or SIGRed. Discovered by Checkpoint researchers, this vulnerability affects Windows 2003 to 2019, and is triggered by a malicious DNS response (only affects DNS over TCP). An attacker can use the malicious payload to cause a buffer overflow on the vulnerable system, leading to compromise. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify the large response payload for SIG and KEY DNS records which can be used for the exploit. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_defense_evasion_tactics] -label = Windows Defense Evasion Tactics -description = Detect tactics used by malware to evade defenses on Windows endpoints. A few of these include suspicious `reg.exe` processes, files hidden with `attrib.exe` and disabling user-account control, among many others -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse] -label = Windows File Extension and Association Abuse -description = Detect and investigate suspected abuse of file extensions and Windows file associations. Some of the malicious behaviors involved may include inserting spaces before file extensions or prepending the file extension with a different one, among other techniques. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_log_manipulation] -label = Windows Log Manipulation -description = Adversaries often try to cover their tracks by manipulating Windows logs. Use these searches to help you monitor for suspicious activity surrounding log files--an essential component of an effective defense. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_persistence_techniques] -label = Windows Persistence Techniques -description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on a Windows system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_privilege_escalation] -label = Windows Privilege Escalation -description = Monitor for and investigate activities that may be associated with a Windows privilege-escalation attack, including unusual processes running on endpoints, modified registry keys, and more. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_service_abuse] -label = Windows Service Abuse -description = Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence and the ability to load drivers or otherwise interact with the Windows kernel. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows services are being modified or created in a suspicious manner. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_xmrig] -label = XMRig -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the xmrig monero, including looking for file writes associated with its payload, process command-line, defense evasion (killing services, deleting users, modifying files or folder permission, killing other malware or other coin miner) and hacking tools including Telegram as mean of command and control (C2) to download other files. Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems in order to solve resource intensive problems which may impact system and/or hosted service availability. One common purpose for Resource Hijacking is to validate transactions of cryptocurrency networks and earn virtual currency. Adversaries may consume enough system resources to negatively impact and/or cause affected machines to become unresponsive. (1) Servers and cloud-based (2) systems are common targets because of the high potential for available resources, but user endpoint systems may also be compromised and used for Resource Hijacking and cryptocurrency mining. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - -[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_samaccountname_spoofing_and_domain_controller_impersonation] -label = sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation -description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with the exploitation of the sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287) vulnerabilities. -disabled = 0 - -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] - +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2022-03-14T11:11:42 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# + +[panel://workbench_panel_all_backup_logs_for_host___response_task] +label = All backup logs for host +description = Retrieve the backup logs for the last 2 weeks for a specific host in order to investigate why backups are not completing successfully. +disabled = 0 +tokens = {\ + "dest": {\ + "valuePrefix": "\"",\ + "valueSuffix": "\"",\ + "delimiter": " OR dest=",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "asset",\ + "default": "null"\ + }\ +}\ + + +[panel://workbench_panel_amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task] +label = Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip +description = This search provides investigation data about requests via user agent, authentication request URI, verb and cluster name data against Kubernetes cluster from a specific IP address +disabled = 0 +tokens = {\ + "src_ip": {\ + "valuePrefix": "\"",\ + "valueSuffix": "\"",\ + "delimiter": " OR src_ip=",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "file",\ + "default": "null"\ + }\ +}\ + + +[panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task] +label = AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest +description = This search retrieves the all the alerts created by AWS Security Hub for a specific dest(instance_id). +disabled = 0 +tokens = {\ + "dest": {\ + "valuePrefix": "\"",\ + "valueSuffix": "\"",\ + "delimiter": " OR dest=",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "asset",\ + "default": "null"\ + }\ +}\ + + +[panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid___response_task] +label = AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId +description = This search retrieves the times, ARN, source IPs, AWS regions, event names, and the result of the event for specific credentials. +disabled = 0 +tokens = {\ + "accessKeyId": {\ + "valuePrefix": "\"",\ + "valueSuffix": "\"",\ + "delimiter": " OR accessKeyId=",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "file",\ + "default": "null"\ + }\ +}\ + + +[panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task] +label = AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN +description = This search lists all the logged CloudTrail activities by a specific user ARN and will create a table containing the source of the user, the region of the activity, the name and type of the event, the action taken, and all the user's identity information. +disabled = 0 +tokens = {\ + "user": {\ + "valuePrefix": "\"",\ + "valueSuffix": "\"",\ + "delimiter": " OR user=",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "identity",\ + "default": "null"\ + }\ +}\ + + +[panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task] +label = AWS Network ACL Details from ID +description = This search queries AWS description logs and returns all the information about a specific network ACL via network ACL ID +disabled = 0 +tokens = {\ + "networkAclId": {\ + "valuePrefix": "\"",\ + "valueSuffix": "\"",\ + "delimiter": " OR networkAclId=",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "file",\ + "default": "null"\ + }\ +}\ + + +[panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task] +label = AWS Network Interface details via resourceId +description = This search queries AWS configuration logs and returns the information about a specific network interface via network interface ID. The information will include the ARN of the network interface, its relationships with other AWS resources, the public and the private IP associated with the network interface. +disabled = 0 +tokens = {\ + "resourceId": {\ + "valuePrefix": "\"",\ + "valueSuffix": "\"",\ + "delimiter": " OR resourceId=",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "file",\ + "default": "null"\ + }\ +}\ + + +[panel://workbench_panel_aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname___response_task] +label = AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName +description = This search queries AWS configuration logs and returns the information about a specific S3 bucket. The information returned includes the time the S3 bucket was created, the resource ID, the region it belongs to, the value of action performed, AWS account ID, and configuration values of the access-control lists associated with the bucket. +disabled = 0 +tokens = {\ + "bucketName": {\ + "valuePrefix": "\"",\ + "valueSuffix": "\"",\ + "delimiter": " OR bucketName=",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "file",\ + "default": "null"\ + }\ +}\ + + +[panel://workbench_panel_gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task] +label = GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip +description = This search provides investigation data about requests via user agent, authentication request URI, resource path and cluster name data against Kubernetes cluster from a specific IP address +disabled = 0 +tokens = {\ + "src_ip": {\ + "valuePrefix": "\"",\ + "valueSuffix": "\"",\ + "delimiter": " OR src_ip=",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "file",\ + "default": "null"\ + }\ +}\ + + +[panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_city___response_task] +label = Get All AWS Activity From City +description = This search retrieves all the activity from a specific city and will create a table containing the time, city, ARN, username, the type of user, the source IP address, the AWS region the activity was in, the API called, and whether or not the API call was successful. +disabled = 0 +tokens = {\ + "City": {\ + "valuePrefix": "\"",\ + "valueSuffix": "\"",\ + "delimiter": " OR City=",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "file",\ + "default": "null"\ + }\ +}\ + + +[panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_country___response_task] +label = Get All AWS Activity From Country +description = This search retrieves all the activity from a specific country and will create a table containing the time, country, ARN, username, the type of user, the source IP address, the AWS region the activity was in, the API called, and whether or not the API call was successful. +disabled = 0 +tokens = {\ + "Country": {\ + "valuePrefix": "\"",\ + "valueSuffix": "\"",\ + "delimiter": " OR Country=",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "file",\ + "default": "null"\ + }\ +}\ + + +[panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task] +label = Get All AWS Activity From IP Address +description = This search retrieves all the activity from a specific IP address and will create a table containing the time, ARN, username, the type of user, the IP address, the AWS region the activity was in, the API called, and whether or not the API call was successful. +disabled = 0 +tokens = {\ + "src_ip": {\ + "valuePrefix": "\"",\ + "valueSuffix": "\"",\ + "delimiter": " OR src_ip=",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "file",\ + "default": "null"\ + }\ +}\ + + +[panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_region___response_task] +label = Get All AWS Activity From Region +description = This search retrieves all the activity from a specific geographic region and will create a table containing the time, geographic region, ARN, username, the type of user, the source IP address, the AWS region the activity was in, the API called, and whether or not the API call was successful. +disabled = 0 +tokens = {\ + "Region": {\ + "valuePrefix": "\"",\ + "valueSuffix": "\"",\ + "delimiter": " OR Region=",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "file",\ + "default": "null"\ + }\ +}\ + + +[panel://workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint___response_task] +label = Get Backup Logs For Endpoint +description = This search will tell you the backup status from your netbackup_logs of a specific endpoint for the last week. +disabled = 0 +tokens = {\ + "dest": {\ + "valuePrefix": "\"",\ + "valueSuffix": "\"",\ + "delimiter": " OR dest=",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "asset",\ + "default": "null"\ + }\ +}\ + + +[panel://workbench_panel_get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain___response_task] +label = Get Certificate logs for a domain +description = This search queries the Certificates datamodel and give you all the information for a specific domain. Please note that the certificates issued by "Let's Encrypt" are widely used by attackers. +disabled = 0 +tokens = {\ + "domain": {\ + "valuePrefix": "\"",\ + "valueSuffix": "\"",\ + "delimiter": " OR domain=",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "file",\ + "default": "null"\ + }\ +}\ + + +[panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task] +label = Get DNS Server History for a host +description = While investigating any detections it is important to understand which and how many DNS servers a host has connected to in the past. This search uses data that is tagged as DNS and gives you a count and list of DNS servers that a particular host has connected to the previous 24 hours. +disabled = 0 +tokens = {\ + "src_ip": {\ + "valuePrefix": "\"",\ + "valueSuffix": "\"",\ + "delimiter": " OR src_ip=",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "file",\ + "default": "null"\ + }\ +}\ + + +[panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task] +label = Get DNS traffic ratio +description = This search calculates the ratio of DNS traffic originating and coming from a host to a list of DNS servers over the last 24 hours. A high value of this ratio could be very useful to quickly understand if a src_ip (host) is sending a high volume of data out via port 53, could be an indicator of data exfiltration via DNS. +disabled = 0 +tokens = {\ + "src_ip": {\ + "valuePrefix": "\"",\ + "valueSuffix": "\"",\ + "delimiter": " OR src_ip=",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "file",\ + "default": "null"\ + }\ +}\ + + +[panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task] +label = Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId +description = This search queries AWS description logs and returns all the information about a specific instance via the instanceId field +disabled = 0 +tokens = {\ + "instanceId": {\ + "valuePrefix": "\"",\ + "valueSuffix": "\"",\ + "delimiter": " OR instanceId=",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "file",\ + "default": "null"\ + }\ +}\ + + +[panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task] +label = Get EC2 Launch Details +description = This search returns some of the launch details for a EC2 instance. +disabled = 0 +tokens = {\ + "dest": {\ + "valuePrefix": "\"",\ + "valueSuffix": "\"",\ + "delimiter": " OR dest=",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "asset",\ + "default": "null"\ + }\ +}\ + + +[panel://workbench_panel_get_email_info___response_task] +label = Get Email Info +description = This search returns all the information Splunk might have collected a specific email message over the last 2 hours. +disabled = 0 +tokens = {\ + "message_id": {\ + "valuePrefix": "\"",\ + "valueSuffix": "\"",\ + "delimiter": " OR message_id=",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "file",\ + "default": "null"\ + }\ +}\ + + +[panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task] +label = Get Emails From Specific Sender +description = This search returns all the emails from a specific sender over the last 24 and next hours. +disabled = 0 +tokens = {\ + "src_user": {\ + "valuePrefix": "\"",\ + "valueSuffix": "\"",\ + "delimiter": " OR src_user=",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "file",\ + "default": "null"\ + }\ +}\ + + +[panel://workbench_panel_get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address___response_task] +label = Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address +description = This search allows you to gather more context around a notable which has detected a new device connecting to your network. Use this search to determine the first and last occurrences of the suspicious device attempting to connect with your network. +disabled = 0 +tokens = {\ + "src_mac": {\ + "valuePrefix": "\"",\ + "valueSuffix": "\"",\ + "delimiter": " OR src_mac=",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "file",\ + "default": "null"\ + }\ +}\ + + +[panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task] +label = Get History Of Email Sources +description = This search returns a list of all email sources seen in the 48 hours prior to the notable event to 24 hours after, and the number of emails from each source. +disabled = 0 +tokens = {\ + "src": {\ + "valuePrefix": "\"",\ + "valueSuffix": "\"",\ + "delimiter": " OR src=",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "file",\ + "default": "null"\ + }\ +}\ + + +[panel://workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint___response_task] +label = Get Logon Rights Modifications For Endpoint +description = This search allows you to retrieve any modifications to logon rights associated with a specific host. +disabled = 0 +tokens = {\ + "dest": {\ + "valuePrefix": "\"",\ + "valueSuffix": "\"",\ + "delimiter": " OR dest=",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "asset",\ + "default": "null"\ + }\ +}\ + + +[panel://workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user___response_task] +label = Get Logon Rights Modifications For User +description = This search allows you to retrieve any modifications to logon rights for a specific user account. +disabled = 0 +tokens = {\ + "user": {\ + "valuePrefix": "\"",\ + "valueSuffix": "\"",\ + "delimiter": " OR user=",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "identity",\ + "default": "null"\ + }\ +}\ + + +[panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task] +label = Get Notable History +description = This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation. +disabled = 0 +tokens = {\ + "dest": {\ + "valuePrefix": "\"",\ + "valueSuffix": "\"",\ + "delimiter": " OR dest=",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "asset",\ + "default": "null"\ + }\ +}\ + + +[panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task] +label = Get Parent Process Info +description = This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest +disabled = 0 +tokens = {\ + "parent_process_name": {\ + "valuePrefix": "\"",\ + "valueSuffix": "\"",\ + "delimiter": " OR parent_process_name=",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "file",\ + "default": "null"\ + },\ + "dest": {\ + "valuePrefix": "\"",\ + "valueSuffix": "\"",\ + "delimiter": " OR dest=",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "asset",\ + "default": "null"\ + }\ +}\ + + +[panel://workbench_panel_get_process_file_activity___response_task] +label = Get Process File Activity +description = This search returns the file activity for a specific process on a specific endpoint +disabled = 0 +tokens = {\ + "dest": {\ + "valuePrefix": "\"",\ + "valueSuffix": "\"",\ + "delimiter": " OR dest=",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "asset",\ + "default": "null"\ + },\ + "process_name": {\ + "valuePrefix": "\"",\ + "valueSuffix": "\"",\ + "delimiter": " OR process_name=",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "file",\ + "default": "null"\ + }\ +}\ + + +[panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task] +label = Get Process Info +description = This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the process running on a host which is under investigation. To gather the process info, enter the values for the process name in question and the destination IP address. +disabled = 0 +tokens = {\ + "process_name": {\ + "valuePrefix": "\"",\ + "valueSuffix": "\"",\ + "delimiter": " OR process_name=",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "file",\ + "default": "null"\ + },\ + "dest": {\ + "valuePrefix": "\"",\ + "valueSuffix": "\"",\ + "delimiter": " OR dest=",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "asset",\ + "default": "null"\ + }\ +}\ + + +[panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task] +label = Get Process Information For Port Activity +description = This search will return information about the process associated with observed network traffic to a specific destination port from a specific host. +disabled = 0 +tokens = {\ + "dest": {\ + "valuePrefix": "\"",\ + "valueSuffix": "\"",\ + "delimiter": " OR dest=",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "asset",\ + "default": "null"\ + },\ + "dest_port": {\ + "valuePrefix": "\"",\ + "valueSuffix": "\"",\ + "delimiter": " OR dest_port=",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "file",\ + "default": "null"\ + }\ +}\ + + +[panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task] +label = Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic +description = While investigating, an analyst will want to know what process and parent_process is responsible for generating suspicious DNS traffic. Use the following search and enter the value of `dest` in the search to get specific details on the process responsible for creating the DNS traffic. +disabled = 0 +tokens = {\ + "dest": {\ + "valuePrefix": "\"",\ + "valueSuffix": "\"",\ + "delimiter": " OR dest=",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "asset",\ + "default": "null"\ + }\ +}\ + + +[panel://workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host___response_task] +label = Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host +description = This search queries Sysmon WMI events for the host of interest. +disabled = 0 +tokens = {\ + "dest": {\ + "valuePrefix": "\"",\ + "valueSuffix": "\"",\ + "delimiter": " OR dest=",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "asset",\ + "default": "null"\ + }\ +}\ + + +[panel://workbench_panel_get_web_session_information_via_session_id___response_task] +label = Get Web Session Information via session id +description = This search helps an analyst investigate a notable event to find out more about a specific web session. The search looks for a specific web session ID in the HTTP web traffic and outputs the URL and user agents, grouped by source IP address and HTTP status code. +disabled = 0 +tokens = {\ + "session_id": {\ + "valuePrefix": "\"",\ + "valueSuffix": "\"",\ + "delimiter": " OR session_id=",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "file",\ + "default": "null"\ + }\ +}\ + + +[panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task] +label = Investigate AWS activities via region name +description = This search lists all the user activities logged by CloudTrail for a specific region in question and will create a table of the values of parameters requested, the type of the event and the response from the AWS API by each user +disabled = 0 +tokens = {\ + "vendor_region": {\ + "valuePrefix": "\"",\ + "valueSuffix": "\"",\ + "delimiter": " OR vendor_region=",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "file",\ + "default": "null"\ + }\ +}\ + + +[panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field___response_task] +label = Investigate AWS User Activities by user field +description = This search lists all the logged CloudTrail activities by a specific user and will create a table containing the source of the user, the region of the activity, the name and type of the event, the action taken, and the user's identity information. +disabled = 0 +tokens = {\ + "user": {\ + "valuePrefix": "\"",\ + "valueSuffix": "\"",\ + "delimiter": " OR user=",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "identity",\ + "default": "null"\ + }\ +}\ + + +[panel://workbench_panel_investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations___response_task] +label = Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations +description = This search returns failed logins to multiple destinations by user. +disabled = 0 +tokens = {\ + "user": {\ + "valuePrefix": "\"",\ + "valueSuffix": "\"",\ + "delimiter": " OR user=",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "identity",\ + "default": "null"\ + }\ +}\ + + +[panel://workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip___response_task] +label = Investigate Network Traffic From src ip +description = This search allows you to find all the network traffic from a specific IP address. +disabled = 0 +tokens = {\ + "src_ip": {\ + "valuePrefix": "\"",\ + "valueSuffix": "\"",\ + "delimiter": " OR src_ip=",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "file",\ + "default": "null"\ + }\ +}\ + + +[panel://workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_app___response_task] +label = Investigate Okta Activity by app +description = This search returns all okta events associated with a specific app +disabled = 0 +tokens = {\ + "app": {\ + "valuePrefix": "\"",\ + "valueSuffix": "\"",\ + "delimiter": " OR app=",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "file",\ + "default": "null"\ + }\ +}\ + + +[panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts___response_task] +label = Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts +description = This search hunts for dumped NTLM hashes used for pass the hash. +disabled = 0 +tokens = {\ + "dest": {\ + "valuePrefix": "\"",\ + "valueSuffix": "\"",\ + "delimiter": " OR dest=",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "asset",\ + "default": "null"\ + }\ +}\ + + +[panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts___response_task] +label = Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts +description = This search hunts for dumped kerberos ticket from LSASS memory. +disabled = 0 +tokens = {\ + "dest": {\ + "valuePrefix": "\"",\ + "valueSuffix": "\"",\ + "delimiter": " OR dest=",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "asset",\ + "default": "null"\ + }\ +}\ + + +[panel://workbench_panel_investigate_previous_unseen_user___response_task] +label = Investigate Previous Unseen User +description = This search returns previous unseen user, which didn't log in for 30 days. +disabled = 0 +tokens = {\ + "dest": {\ + "valuePrefix": "\"",\ + "valueSuffix": "\"",\ + "delimiter": " OR dest=",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "asset",\ + "default": "null"\ + }\ +}\ + + +[panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task] +label = Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications +description = This search returns the source, destination, and user for all successful remote-desktop authentications. A successful authentication after a brute-force attack on a destination machine is suspicious behavior. +disabled = 0 +tokens = {\ + "dest": {\ + "valuePrefix": "\"",\ + "valueSuffix": "\"",\ + "delimiter": " OR dest=",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "asset",\ + "default": "null"\ + }\ +}\ + + +[panel://workbench_panel_investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header___response_task] +label = Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header +description = This search helps an analyst investigate a notable event related to a potential Apache Struts exploitation. To investigate, we will want to isolate and analyze the "payload" or the commands that were passed to the vulnerable hosts by creating a few regular expressions to carve out the commands focusing on common keywords from the payload, such as cmd.exe, /bin/bash and whois. The search returns these suspicious strings found in the HTTP logs of the system of interest. +disabled = 0 +tokens = {\ + "src_ip": {\ + "valuePrefix": "\"",\ + "valueSuffix": "\"",\ + "delimiter": " OR src_ip=",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "file",\ + "default": "null"\ + },\ + "dest_ip": {\ + "valuePrefix": "\"",\ + "valueSuffix": "\"",\ + "delimiter": " OR dest_ip=",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "file",\ + "default": "null"\ + }\ +}\ + + +[panel://workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_okta___response_task] +label = Investigate User Activities In Okta +description = This search returns all okta events by a specific user +disabled = 0 +tokens = {\ + "user": {\ + "valuePrefix": "\"",\ + "valueSuffix": "\"",\ + "delimiter": " OR user=",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "identity",\ + "default": "null"\ + }\ +}\ + + +[panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_posts_from_src___response_task] +label = Investigate Web POSTs From src +description = This investigative search retrieves POST requests from a specified source IP or hostname. Identifying the POST requests, as well as their associated destination URLs and user agent(s), may help you scope and characterize the suspicious traffic. +disabled = 0 +tokens = {\ + "src": {\ + "valuePrefix": "\"",\ + "valueSuffix": "\"",\ + "delimiter": " OR src=",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "file",\ + "default": "null"\ + }\ +}\ diff --git a/dist/escu/default/macros.conf b/dist/escu/default/macros.conf index 4a217aac16..36822f43cd 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/macros.conf +++ b/dist/escu/default/macros.conf @@ -1,10 +1,3310 @@ ############# # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content -# On Date: 2022-03-03T18:16:55 UTC +# On Date: 2022-03-14T11:11:42 UTC # Author: Splunk Security Research # Contact: research@splunk.com ############# +[abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[aws_create_policy_version_to_allow_all_resources_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[aws_createaccesskey_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[aws_createloginprofile_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_high_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_low_informational_unknown_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_medium_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[aws_ecr_container_upload_outside_business_hours_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[aws_excessive_security_scanning_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[aws_iam_delete_policy_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[aws_iam_failure_group_deletion_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[aws_iam_successful_group_deletion_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[aws_lambda_updatefunctioncode_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[aws_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[aws_saml_update_identity_provider_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[aws_setdefaultpolicyversion_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[aws_updateloginprofile_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[circle_ci_disable_security_job_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[circle_ci_disable_security_step_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[cloud_instance_modified_by_previously_unseen_user_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_country_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[correlation_by_repository_and_risk_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[correlation_by_user_and_risk_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_new_open_s3_buckets_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_shared_ec2_snapshot_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[github_commit_changes_in_master_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[github_commit_in_develop_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[github_dependabot_alert_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[github_pull_request_from_unknown_user_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[gsuite_drive_share_in_external_email_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[gsuite_email_suspicious_attachment_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[gsuite_email_suspicious_subject_with_attachment_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[gsuite_email_with_known_abuse_web_service_link_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[gsuite_outbound_email_with_attachment_to_external_domain_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[gsuite_suspicious_shared_file_name_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[kubernetes_nginx_ingress_lfi_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[kubernetes_nginx_ingress_rfi_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[kubernetes_scanner_image_pulling_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[o365_added_service_principal_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[o365_disable_mfa_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[o365_new_federated_domain_added_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[o365_pst_export_alert_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[o365_suspicious_rights_delegation_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_long_dns_txt_record_response_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_new_user_aws_console_login_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_spike_in_security_group_activity_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_usb_device_insertion_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detection_of_dns_tunnels_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[dns_record_changed_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[first_time_seen_command_line_argument_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[gcp_gcr_container_uploaded_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[identify_new_user_accounts_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[aws_eks_kubernetes_cluster_sensitive_object_access_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[kubernetes_gcp_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[open_redirect_in_splunk_web_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[osquery_pack___coldroot_detection_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[processes_created_by_netsh_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[prohibited_software_on_endpoint_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[remote_registry_key_modifications_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[suspicious_changes_to_file_associations_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[suspicious_email___uba_anomaly_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[suspicious_file_write_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[suspicious_rundll32_rename_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[uncommon_processes_on_endpoint_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[unsuccessful_netbackup_backups_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[web_fraud___account_harvesting_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[windows_connhost_exe_started_forcefully_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[windows_hosts_file_modification_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[7zip_commandline_to_smb_share_path_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[account_discovery_with_net_app_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[active_setup_registry_autostart_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[add_defaultuser_and_password_in_registry_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[adsisearcher_account_discovery_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[allow_inbound_traffic_by_firewall_rule_registry_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[allow_inbound_traffic_in_firewall_rule_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[allow_network_discovery_in_firewall_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[allow_operation_with_consent_admin_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[anomalous_usage_of_7zip_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[any_powershell_downloadfile_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[any_powershell_downloadstring_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[attacker_tools_on_endpoint_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[attempt_to_stop_security_service_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[auto_admin_logon_registry_entry_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[batch_file_write_to_system32_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[bcdedit_command_back_to_normal_mode_boot_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[bits_job_persistence_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[bitsadmin_download_file_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[certutil_exe_certificate_extraction_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[certutil_with_decode_argument_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[change_default_file_association_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[change_to_safe_mode_with_network_config_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[chcp_command_execution_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[check_elevated_cmd_using_whoami_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[clop_common_exec_parameter_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[clop_ransomware_known_service_name_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[cmd_echo_pipe___escalation_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[cmdline_tool_not_executed_in_cmd_shell_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[cobalt_strike_named_pipes_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[common_ransomware_extensions_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[common_ransomware_notes_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[conti_common_exec_parameter_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[control_loading_from_world_writable_directory_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[create_remote_thread_in_shell_application_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[create_remote_thread_into_lsass_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[creation_of_shadow_copy_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[csc_net_on_the_fly_compilation_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[deleting_of_net_users_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[deleting_shadow_copies_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_azurehound_command_line_arguments_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_azurehound_file_modifications_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_copy_of_shadowcopy_with_script_block_logging_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_empire_with_powershell_script_block_logging_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_exchange_web_shell_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_html_help_renamed_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_html_help_spawn_child_process_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_html_help_url_in_command_line_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_mimikatz_with_powershell_script_block_logging_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_mshta_renamed_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_mshta_url_in_command_line_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_new_local_admin_account_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_rclone_command_line_usage_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_regasm_spawning_a_process_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_regasm_with_network_connection_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_regsvcs_spawning_a_process_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_renamed_7_zip_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_renamed_psexec_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_renamed_rclone_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_renamed_winrar_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_sharphound_command_line_arguments_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_sharphound_file_modifications_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_sharphound_usage_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[disable_amsi_through_registry_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[disable_defender_antivirus_registry_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[disable_defender_blockatfirstseen_feature_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[disable_defender_enhanced_notification_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[disable_defender_mpengine_registry_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[disable_defender_spynet_reporting_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[disable_defender_submit_samples_consent_feature_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[disable_etw_through_registry_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[disable_logs_using_wevtutil_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[disable_registry_tool_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[disable_schedule_task_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[disable_security_logs_using_minint_registry_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[disable_show_hidden_files_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[disable_uac_remote_restriction_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[disable_windows_app_hotkeys_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[disable_windows_behavior_monitoring_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[disable_windows_smartscreen_protection_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[disabled_kerberos_pre_authentication_discovery_with_get_aduser_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[disabled_kerberos_pre_authentication_discovery_with_powerview_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[disabling_cmd_application_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[disabling_controlpanel_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[disabling_defender_services_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[disabling_firewall_with_netsh_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[disabling_folderoptions_windows_feature_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[disabling_net_user_account_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[disabling_norun_windows_app_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[disabling_remote_user_account_control_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[disabling_systemrestore_in_registry_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[disabling_task_manager_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[dllhost_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[domain_account_discovery_with_dsquery_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[domain_account_discovery_with_net_app_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[domain_account_discovery_with_wmic_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[domain_controller_discovery_with_nltest_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[domain_controller_discovery_with_wmic_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[domain_group_discovery_with_adsisearcher_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[domain_group_discovery_with_dsquery_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[domain_group_discovery_with_net_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[domain_group_discovery_with_wmic_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[download_files_using_telegram_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[drop_icedid_license_dat_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[dsquery_domain_discovery_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[dump_lsass_via_procdump_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[elevated_group_discovery_with_net_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[elevated_group_discovery_with_powerview_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[elevated_group_discovery_with_wmic_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[enable_rdp_in_other_port_number_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[enable_wdigest_uselogoncredential_registry_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[enumerate_users_local_group_using_telegram_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[esentutl_sam_copy_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[etw_registry_disabled_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[eventvwr_uac_bypass_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[excel_spawning_powershell_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[excel_spawning_windows_script_host_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[excessive_attempt_to_disable_services_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[excessive_file_deletion_in_windefender_folder_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[excessive_number_of_distinct_processes_created_in_windows_temp_folder_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[excessive_number_of_service_control_start_as_disabled_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[excessive_number_of_taskhost_processes_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[excessive_service_stop_attempt_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[excessive_usage_of_cacls_app_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[excessive_usage_of_net_app_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[excessive_usage_of_taskkill_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[execute_javascript_with_jscript_com_clsid_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[extraction_of_registry_hives_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[file_with_samsam_extension_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[firewall_allowed_program_enable_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[fodhelper_uac_bypass_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[fsutil_zeroing_file_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[get_aduser_with_powershell_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[get_aduser_with_powershell_script_block_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[get_domaintrust_with_powershell_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[get_domaintrust_with_powershell_script_block_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[get_domainuser_with_powershell_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[get_domainuser_with_powershell_script_block_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[get_foresttrust_with_powershell_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[get_foresttrust_with_powershell_script_block_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[get_wmiobject_group_discovery_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[get_wmiobject_group_discovery_with_script_block_logging_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[getadcomputer_with_powershell_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[getadcomputer_with_powershell_script_block_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[getadgroup_with_powershell_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[getadgroup_with_powershell_script_block_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[getcurrent_user_with_powershell_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[getcurrent_user_with_powershell_script_block_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_script_block_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_script_block_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[getdomaingroup_with_powershell_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[getdomaingroup_with_powershell_script_block_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[getlocaluser_with_powershell_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[getlocaluser_with_powershell_script_block_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_script_block_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_script_block_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_script_block_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_script_block_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_script_block_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[gpupdate_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[hide_user_account_from_sign_in_screen_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[high_frequency_copy_of_files_in_network_share_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[high_process_termination_frequency_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[hunting_for_log4shell_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[icacls_deny_command_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[icacls_grant_command_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[interactive_session_on_remote_endpoint_with_powershell_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[jscript_execution_using_cscript_app_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_in_useraccountcontrol_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_with_powershell_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[known_services_killed_by_ransomware_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[linux_add_files_in_known_crontab_directories_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[linux_add_user_account_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[linux_at_allow_config_file_creation_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[linux_at_application_execution_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[linux_change_file_owner_to_root_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[linux_common_process_for_elevation_control_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[linux_dd_file_overwrite_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[linux_doas_conf_file_creation_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[linux_doas_tool_execution_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[linux_edit_cron_table_parameter_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[linux_file_created_in_kernel_driver_directory_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[linux_file_creation_in_init_boot_directory_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[linux_file_creation_in_profile_directory_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[linux_insert_kernel_module_using_insmod_utility_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[linux_install_kernel_module_using_modprobe_utility_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[linux_java_spawning_shell_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[linux_nopasswd_entry_in_sudoers_file_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[linux_pkexec_privilege_escalation_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[linux_possible_access_or_modification_of_sshd_config_file_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[linux_possible_access_to_credential_files_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[linux_possible_access_to_sudoers_file_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[linux_possible_append_command_to_profile_config_file_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[linux_possible_ssh_key_file_creation_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[linux_preload_hijack_library_calls_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[linux_service_file_created_in_systemd_directory_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[linux_service_restarted_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[linux_service_started_or_enabled_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[linux_setuid_using_chmod_utility_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[linux_setuid_using_setcap_utility_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[linux_sudo_or_su_execution_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[linux_sudoers_tmp_file_creation_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[linux_system_network_discovery_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[linux_visudo_utility_execution_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[loading_of_dynwrapx_module_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[local_account_discovery_with_net_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[local_account_discovery_with_wmic_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[log4shell_cve_2021_44228_exploitation_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[logon_script_event_trigger_execution_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[mailsniper_invoke_functions_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[malicious_inprocserver32_modification_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[malicious_powershell_executed_as_a_service_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[mimikatz_passtheticket_commandline_parameters_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[mmc_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[modification_of_wallpaper_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[modify_acl_permission_to_files_or_folder_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[mshtml_module_load_in_office_product_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[msi_module_loaded_by_non_system_binary_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[multiple_disabled_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[multiple_users_attempting_to_authenticate_using_explicit_credentials_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_process_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[multiple_users_remotely_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[net_localgroup_discovery_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[net_profiler_uac_bypass_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[network_connection_discovery_with_arp_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[network_connection_discovery_with_net_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[network_connection_discovery_with_netstat_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[network_discovery_using_route_windows_app_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[nishang_powershelltcponeline_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[nltest_domain_trust_discovery_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[ntdsutil_export_ntds_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[office_application_drop_executable_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[office_application_spawn_rundll32_process_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[office_document_creating_schedule_task_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[office_document_executing_macro_code_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[office_document_spawned_child_process_to_download_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[office_product_spawn_cmd_process_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[office_product_spawning_bitsadmin_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[office_product_spawning_certutil_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[office_product_spawning_mshta_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[office_product_spawning_wmic_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[office_product_writing_cab_or_inf_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[office_spawning_control_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[overwriting_accessibility_binaries_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[password_policy_discovery_with_net_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[permission_modification_using_takeown_app_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[petitpotam_network_share_access_request_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[ping_sleep_batch_command_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[possible_browser_pass_view_parameter_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[potentially_malicious_code_on_commandline_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[powershell_4104_hunting_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[powershell___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[powershell_creating_thread_mutex_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[powershell_disable_security_monitoring_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[powershell_domain_enumeration_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[powershell_execute_com_object_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[powershell_fileless_process_injection_via_getprocaddress_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[powershell_fileless_script_contains_base64_encoded_content_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_with_script_block_logging_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[powershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_system_reflection_assembly_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[powershell_processing_stream_of_data_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[powershell_remove_windows_defender_directory_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[powershell_start_bitstransfer_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[prevent_automatic_repair_mode_using_bcdedit_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[print_spooler_adding_a_printer_driver_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[print_spooler_failed_to_load_a_plug_in_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[process_deleting_its_process_file_path_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[process_execution_via_wmi_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[process_kill_base_on_file_path_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[process_writing_dynamicwrapperx_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[processes_launching_netsh_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[ransomware_notes_bulk_creation_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[recon_using_wmi_class_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[remcos_client_registry_install_entry_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[remcos_rat_file_creation_in_remcos_folder_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_script_block_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_script_block_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_winrs_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_script_block_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[remote_system_discovery_with_adsisearcher_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[remote_system_discovery_with_dsquery_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[remote_system_discovery_with_net_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[remote_system_discovery_with_wmic_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[remote_wmi_command_attempt_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[resize_shadowstorage_volume_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[revil_common_exec_parameter_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[revil_registry_entry_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[rubeus_command_line_parameters_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[rubeus_kerberos_ticket_exports_through_winlogon_access_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[runas_execution_in_commandline_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[rundll32_control_rundll_hunt_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[rundll32_dnsquery_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[rundll32_shimcache_flush_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[ryuk_test_files_detected_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[ryuk_wake_on_lan_command_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[sam_database_file_access_attempt_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[samsam_test_file_write_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[schcache_change_by_app_connect_and_create_adsi_object_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[schedule_task_with_http_command_arguments_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[scheduled_task_creation_on_remote_endpoint_using_at_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[scheduled_task_initiation_on_remote_endpoint_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[schtasks_run_task_on_demand_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[screensaver_event_trigger_execution_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[script_execution_via_wmi_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[sdclt_uac_bypass_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[sdelete_application_execution_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[searchprotocolhost_with_no_command_line_with_network_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[secretdumps_offline_ntds_dumping_tool_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[services_escalate_exe_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[services_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[shim_database_file_creation_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[short_lived_scheduled_task_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[short_lived_windows_accounts_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[silentcleanup_uac_bypass_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[single_letter_process_on_endpoint_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[slui_runas_elevated_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[slui_spawning_a_process_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[spoolsv_spawning_rundll32_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[spoolsv_suspicious_process_access_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[spoolsv_writing_a_dll_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[spoolsv_writing_a_dll___sysmon_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[sqlite_module_in_temp_folder_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[start_up_during_safe_mode_boot_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[suspicious_computer_account_name_change_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[suspicious_copy_on_system32_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[suspicious_driver_loaded_path_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[suspicious_event_log_service_behavior_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[suspicious_image_creation_in_appdata_folder_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[suspicious_kerberos_service_ticket_request_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[suspicious_linux_discovery_commands_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[suspicious_msbuild_path_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[suspicious_msbuild_rename_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[suspicious_msbuild_spawn_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[suspicious_mshta_child_process_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[suspicious_mshta_spawn_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[suspicious_process_file_path_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[suspicious_reg_exe_process_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[suspicious_rundll32_plugininit_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[suspicious_rundll32_startw_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[suspicious_searchprotocolhost_no_command_line_arguments_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[suspicious_ticket_granting_ticket_request_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[suspicious_wav_file_in_appdata_folder_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[suspicious_wevtutil_usage_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[svchost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[system_information_discovery_detection_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[system_user_discovery_with_query_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[system_user_discovery_with_whoami_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[time_provider_persistence_registry_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[trickbot_named_pipe_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[unified_messaging_service_spawning_a_process_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[uninstall_app_using_msiexec_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[unloading_amsi_via_reflection_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[unusual_number_of_kerberos_service_tickets_requested_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_script_block_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[usn_journal_deletion_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[vbscript_execution_using_wscript_app_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[verclsid_clsid_execution_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[w3wp_spawning_shell_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[wbadmin_delete_system_backups_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[wbemprox_com_object_execution_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[wermgr_process_create_executable_file_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[windows_adfind_exe_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[windows_disable_memory_crash_dump_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[windows_disableantispyware_registry_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[windows_diskcryptor_usage_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[windows_dism_remove_defender_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[windows_event_for_service_disabled_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[windows_event_log_cleared_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[windows_excessive_disabled_services_event_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[windows_file_without_extension_in_critical_folder_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[windows_high_file_deletion_frequency_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[windows_hunting_system_account_targeting_lsass_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[windows_installutil_credential_theft_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[windows_installutil_remote_network_connection_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[windows_installutil_uninstall_option_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[windows_installutil_url_in_command_line_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[windows_modify_show_compress_color_and_info_tip_registry_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[windows_nirsoft_advancedrun_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[windows_nirsoft_utilities_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[windows_non_system_account_targeting_lsass_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[windows_possible_credential_dumping_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[windows_process_with_namedpipe_commandline_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[windows_raccine_scheduled_task_deletion_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[windows_rasautou_dll_execution_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[windows_remote_assistance_spawning_process_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[windows_schtasks_create_run_as_system_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[windows_security_account_manager_stopped_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[windows_service_created_within_public_path_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[windows_service_creation_on_remote_endpoint_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[windows_service_creation_using_registry_entry_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[windows_service_initiation_on_remote_endpoint_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[windows_wmi_process_call_create_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[winhlp32_spawning_a_process_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[winword_spawning_cmd_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[winword_spawning_powershell_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[winword_spawning_windows_script_host_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[wmi_recon_running_process_or_services_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[wmic_group_discovery_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[wmic_noninteractive_app_uninstallation_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[wmic_xsl_execution_via_url_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[wmiprsve_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[wsmprovhost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[wsreset_uac_bypass_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[xmrig_driver_loaded_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[xsl_script_execution_with_wmic_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[monitor_email_for_brand_abuse_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[okta_account_lockout_events_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[okta_failed_sso_attempts_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[suspicious_email_attachment_extensions_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[suspicious_java_classes_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_destroyed_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_launched_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[aws_detect_permanent_key_creation_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[aws_detect_role_creation_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[gcp_detect_gcploit_framework_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[gdrive_suspicious_file_sharing_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[gsuite_suspicious_calendar_invite_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_outlook_exe_writing_a_zip_file_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_rare_executables_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[exchange_powershell_abuse_via_ssrf_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[exchange_powershell_module_usage_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[first_time_seen_running_windows_service_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[macos___re_opened_applications_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[microsoft_exchange_mailbox_replication_service_writing_active_server_pages_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[print_processor_registry_autostart_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[processes_tapping_keyboard_events_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[randomly_generated_scheduled_task_name_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[randomly_generated_windows_service_name_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[remote_desktop_process_running_on_system_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[spike_in_file_writes_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[suspicious_curl_network_connection_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_via_osquery_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[suspicious_sqlite3_lsquarantine_behavior_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[unusual_number_of_computer_service_tickets_requested_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[unusual_number_of_remote_endpoint_authentication_events_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[unusually_long_command_line_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[unusually_long_command_line___mltk_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[windows_java_spawning_shells_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[winrm_spawning_a_process_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[wmi_permanent_event_subscription_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[wmi_temporary_event_subscription_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_arp_poisoning_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_outbound_smb_traffic_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_port_security_violation_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_rogue_dhcp_server_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_software_download_to_network_device_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_traffic_mirroring_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_zerologon_via_zeek_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[dns_query_length_outliers___mltk_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[excessive_dns_failures_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[large_volume_of_dns_any_queries_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[prohibited_network_traffic_allowed_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[protocol_or_port_mismatch_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[remote_desktop_network_bruteforce_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[remote_desktop_network_traffic_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[smb_traffic_spike_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[smb_traffic_spike___mltk_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[tor_traffic_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[unusually_long_content_type_length_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[sql_injection_with_long_urls_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[supernova_webshell_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + [aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks] definition = sourcetype="aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks" @@ -547,3743 +3847,3 @@ description = customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcet definition = index=zeek sourcetype="zeek:ssl:json" description = customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent. -[7zip_commandline_to_smb_share_path_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[aws_create_policy_version_to_allow_all_resources_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[aws_createaccesskey_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[aws_createloginprofile_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_high_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_low_informational_unknown_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_medium_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[aws_ecr_container_upload_outside_business_hours_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[aws_eks_kubernetes_cluster_sensitive_object_access_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[aws_excessive_security_scanning_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[aws_iam_delete_policy_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[aws_iam_failure_group_deletion_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[aws_iam_successful_group_deletion_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[aws_lambda_updatefunctioncode_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[aws_network_acl_details_from_id_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[aws_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[aws_saml_update_identity_provider_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[aws_setdefaultpolicyversion_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[aws_updateloginprofile_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_destroyed_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_launched_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[account_discovery_with_net_app_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[active_setup_registry_autostart_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[add_defaultuser_and_password_in_registry_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[add_prohibited_processes_to_enterprise_security_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[adsisearcher_account_discovery_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[all_backup_logs_for_host_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[allow_inbound_traffic_by_firewall_rule_registry_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[allow_inbound_traffic_in_firewall_rule_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[allow_network_discovery_in_firewall_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[allow_operation_with_consent_admin_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[anomalous_usage_of_7zip_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[any_powershell_downloadfile_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[any_powershell_downloadstring_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[attacker_tools_on_endpoint_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[attempt_to_stop_security_service_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[auto_admin_logon_registry_entry_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[bits_job_persistence_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[bitsadmin_download_file_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[baseline_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_per_user_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[baseline_of_cloud_instances_destroyed_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[baseline_of_cloud_instances_launched_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[baseline_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls_per_user_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[baseline_of_api_calls_per_user_arn_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[baseline_of_command_line_length___mltk_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[baseline_of_dns_query_length___mltk_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[baseline_of_network_acl_activity_by_arn_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[baseline_of_s3_bucket_deletion_activity_by_arn_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[baseline_of_smb_traffic___mltk_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[baseline_of_security_group_activity_by_arn_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[baseline_of_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_aws_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[batch_file_write_to_system32_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[bcdedit_command_back_to_normal_mode_boot_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[chcp_command_execution_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[cmd_echo_pipe___escalation_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[csc_net_on_the_fly_compilation_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[certutil_with_decode_argument_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[certutil_exe_certificate_extraction_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[change_default_file_association_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[change_to_safe_mode_with_network_config_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[check_elevated_cmd_using_whoami_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[circle_ci_disable_security_job_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[circle_ci_disable_security_step_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[clop_common_exec_parameter_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[clop_ransomware_known_service_name_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[cloud_instance_modified_by_previously_unseen_user_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_country_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[cmdline_tool_not_executed_in_cmd_shell_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[cobalt_strike_named_pipes_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[common_ransomware_extensions_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[common_ransomware_notes_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[conti_common_exec_parameter_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[control_loading_from_world_writable_directory_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[correlation_by_repository_and_risk_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[correlation_by_user_and_risk_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[count_of_unique_ips_connecting_to_ports_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[count_of_assets_by_category_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[create_remote_thread_in_shell_application_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[create_remote_thread_into_lsass_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[create_a_list_of_approved_aws_service_accounts_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[creation_of_shadow_copy_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[dllhost_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[dns_query_length_outliers___mltk_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[dns_record_changed_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[dnstwist_domain_names_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[dsquery_domain_discovery_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[deleting_of_net_users_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[deleting_shadow_copies_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_arp_poisoning_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_azurehound_command_line_arguments_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_azurehound_file_modifications_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_copy_of_shadowcopy_with_script_block_logging_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_empire_with_powershell_script_block_logging_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_exchange_web_shell_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_html_help_renamed_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_html_help_spawn_child_process_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_html_help_url_in_command_line_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_long_dns_txt_record_response_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_mshta_url_in_command_line_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_mimikatz_with_powershell_script_block_logging_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_new_local_admin_account_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_new_open_s3_buckets_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_outbound_smb_traffic_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_outlook_exe_writing_a_zip_file_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_port_security_violation_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_rclone_command_line_usage_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_rare_executables_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_regasm_spawning_a_process_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_regasm_with_network_connection_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_regsvcs_spawning_a_process_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_renamed_7_zip_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_renamed_psexec_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_renamed_rclone_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_renamed_winrar_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_rogue_dhcp_server_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_sharphound_command_line_arguments_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_sharphound_file_modifications_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_sharphound_usage_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_software_download_to_network_device_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_spike_in_security_group_activity_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_traffic_mirroring_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_usb_device_insertion_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_zerologon_via_zeek_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_mshta_renamed_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_new_user_aws_console_login_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_shared_ec2_snapshot_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detection_of_dns_tunnels_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[disable_amsi_through_registry_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[disable_defender_antivirus_registry_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[disable_defender_blockatfirstseen_feature_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[disable_defender_enhanced_notification_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[disable_defender_mpengine_registry_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[disable_defender_spynet_reporting_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[disable_defender_submit_samples_consent_feature_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[disable_etw_through_registry_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[disable_logs_using_wevtutil_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[disable_registry_tool_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[disable_schedule_task_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[disable_security_logs_using_minint_registry_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[disable_show_hidden_files_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[disable_uac_remote_restriction_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[disable_windows_app_hotkeys_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[disable_windows_behavior_monitoring_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[disable_windows_smartscreen_protection_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[disabled_kerberos_pre_authentication_discovery_with_get_aduser_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[disabled_kerberos_pre_authentication_discovery_with_powerview_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[disabling_cmd_application_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[disabling_controlpanel_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[disabling_defender_services_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[disabling_firewall_with_netsh_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[disabling_folderoptions_windows_feature_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[disabling_net_user_account_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[disabling_norun_windows_app_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[disabling_remote_user_account_control_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[disabling_systemrestore_in_registry_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[disabling_task_manager_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[discover_dns_records_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[domain_account_discovery_with_net_app_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[domain_account_discovery_with_dsquery_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[domain_account_discovery_with_wmic_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[domain_controller_discovery_with_nltest_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[domain_controller_discovery_with_wmic_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[domain_group_discovery_with_dsquery_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[domain_group_discovery_with_net_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[domain_group_discovery_with_wmic_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[domain_group_discovery_with_adsisearcher_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[download_files_using_telegram_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[drop_icedid_license_dat_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[dump_lsass_via_procdump_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[etw_registry_disabled_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[elevated_group_discovery_with_net_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[elevated_group_discovery_with_wmic_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[elevated_group_discovery_with_powerview_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[enable_rdp_in_other_port_number_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[enable_wdigest_uselogoncredential_registry_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[enumerate_users_local_group_using_telegram_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[esentutl_sam_copy_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[eventvwr_uac_bypass_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[excel_spawning_powershell_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[excel_spawning_windows_script_host_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[excessive_attempt_to_disable_services_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[excessive_dns_failures_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[excessive_file_deletion_in_windefender_folder_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[excessive_service_stop_attempt_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[excessive_usage_of_cacls_app_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[excessive_usage_of_net_app_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[excessive_usage_of_taskkill_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[excessive_number_of_distinct_processes_created_in_windows_temp_folder_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[excessive_number_of_service_control_start_as_disabled_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[excessive_number_of_taskhost_processes_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[exchange_powershell_abuse_via_ssrf_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[exchange_powershell_module_usage_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[execute_javascript_with_jscript_com_clsid_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[extraction_of_registry_hives_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[file_with_samsam_extension_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[firewall_allowed_program_enable_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[first_time_seen_running_windows_service_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[first_time_seen_command_line_argument_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[fodhelper_uac_bypass_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[fsutil_zeroing_file_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[gcp_detect_gcploit_framework_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[gcp_gcr_container_uploaded_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[gpupdate_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[gsuite_email_suspicious_attachment_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[gdrive_suspicious_file_sharing_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[get_aduser_with_powershell_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[get_aduser_with_powershell_script_block_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[get_all_aws_activity_from_city_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[get_all_aws_activity_from_country_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[get_all_aws_activity_from_region_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[get_backup_logs_for_endpoint_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[get_dns_server_history_for_a_host_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[get_dns_traffic_ratio_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[get_domainuser_with_powershell_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[get_domainuser_with_powershell_script_block_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[get_ec2_launch_details_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[get_email_info_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[get_emails_from_specific_sender_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[get_history_of_email_sources_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[get_notable_history_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[get_parent_process_info_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[get_process_file_activity_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[get_process_info_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[get_process_information_for_port_activity_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[get_wmiobject_group_discovery_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[get_wmiobject_group_discovery_with_script_block_logging_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[get_web_session_information_via_session_id_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[get_domaintrust_with_powershell_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[get_domaintrust_with_powershell_script_block_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[get_foresttrust_with_powershell_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[get_foresttrust_with_powershell_script_block_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[getadcomputer_with_powershell_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[getadcomputer_with_powershell_script_block_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[getadgroup_with_powershell_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[getadgroup_with_powershell_script_block_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[getcurrent_user_with_powershell_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[getcurrent_user_with_powershell_script_block_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_script_block_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_script_block_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[getdomaingroup_with_powershell_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[getdomaingroup_with_powershell_script_block_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[getlocaluser_with_powershell_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[getlocaluser_with_powershell_script_block_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_script_block_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_script_block_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_script_block_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_script_block_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_script_block_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[github_dependabot_alert_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[github_pull_request_from_unknown_user_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[github_commit_changes_in_master_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[github_commit_in_develop_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[gsuite_drive_share_in_external_email_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[gsuite_email_suspicious_subject_with_attachment_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[gsuite_email_with_known_abuse_web_service_link_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[gsuite_outbound_email_with_attachment_to_external_domain_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[gsuite_suspicious_shared_file_name_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[gsuite_suspicious_calendar_invite_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[hide_user_account_from_sign_in_screen_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[high_frequency_copy_of_files_in_network_share_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[high_process_termination_frequency_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[hunting_for_log4shell_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[icacls_grant_command_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[icacls_deny_command_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[identify_new_user_accounts_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[identify_systems_creating_remote_desktop_traffic_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[identify_systems_receiving_remote_desktop_traffic_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[identify_systems_using_remote_desktop_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[interactive_session_on_remote_endpoint_with_powershell_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[investigate_okta_activity_by_app_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[investigate_previous_unseen_user_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[investigate_user_activities_in_okta_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[investigate_web_posts_from_src_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[jscript_execution_using_cscript_app_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_in_useraccountcontrol_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_with_powershell_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[known_services_killed_by_ransomware_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[kubernetes_gcp_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[kubernetes_nginx_ingress_lfi_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[kubernetes_nginx_ingress_rfi_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[kubernetes_scanner_image_pulling_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[large_volume_of_dns_any_queries_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[linux_add_files_in_known_crontab_directories_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[linux_add_user_account_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[linux_at_allow_config_file_creation_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[linux_at_application_execution_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[linux_change_file_owner_to_root_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[linux_common_process_for_elevation_control_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[linux_dd_file_overwrite_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[linux_doas_conf_file_creation_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[linux_doas_tool_execution_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[linux_edit_cron_table_parameter_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[linux_file_created_in_kernel_driver_directory_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[linux_file_creation_in_init_boot_directory_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[linux_file_creation_in_profile_directory_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[linux_insert_kernel_module_using_insmod_utility_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[linux_install_kernel_module_using_modprobe_utility_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[linux_java_spawning_shell_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[linux_nopasswd_entry_in_sudoers_file_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[linux_possible_access_or_modification_of_sshd_config_file_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[linux_possible_access_to_credential_files_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[linux_possible_access_to_sudoers_file_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[linux_possible_append_command_to_profile_config_file_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[linux_possible_ssh_key_file_creation_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[linux_preload_hijack_library_calls_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[linux_service_file_created_in_systemd_directory_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[linux_service_restarted_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[linux_service_started_or_enabled_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[linux_setuid_using_chmod_utility_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[linux_setuid_using_setcap_utility_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[linux_sudo_or_su_execution_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[linux_sudoers_tmp_file_creation_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[linux_system_network_discovery_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[linux_visudo_utility_execution_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[linux_pkexec_privilege_escalation_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[loading_of_dynwrapx_module_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[local_account_discovery_with_wmic_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[local_account_discovery_with_net_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[log4shell_cve_2021_44228_exploitation_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[logon_script_event_trigger_execution_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[mshtml_module_load_in_office_product_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[msi_module_loaded_by_non_system_binary_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[macos___re_opened_applications_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[mailsniper_invoke_functions_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[malicious_inprocserver32_modification_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[malicious_powershell_executed_as_a_service_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[microsoft_exchange_mailbox_replication_service_writing_active_server_pages_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[mimikatz_passtheticket_commandline_parameters_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[mmc_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[modification_of_wallpaper_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[modify_acl_permission_to_files_or_folder_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[monitor_email_for_brand_abuse_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[monitor_successful_backups_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[monitor_unsuccessful_backups_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[multiple_disabled_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[multiple_users_attempting_to_authenticate_using_explicit_credentials_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_process_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[multiple_users_remotely_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[net_profiler_uac_bypass_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[nltest_domain_trust_discovery_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[net_localgroup_discovery_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[network_connection_discovery_with_arp_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[network_connection_discovery_with_net_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[network_connection_discovery_with_netstat_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[network_discovery_using_route_windows_app_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[nishang_powershelltcponeline_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[ntdsutil_export_ntds_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[o365_added_service_principal_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[o365_disable_mfa_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[o365_new_federated_domain_added_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[o365_pst_export_alert_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[o365_suspicious_rights_delegation_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[office_application_drop_executable_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[office_application_spawn_rundll32_process_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[office_document_creating_schedule_task_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[office_document_executing_macro_code_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[office_document_spawned_child_process_to_download_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[office_product_spawn_cmd_process_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[office_product_spawning_bitsadmin_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[office_product_spawning_certutil_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[office_product_spawning_mshta_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[office_product_spawning_wmic_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[office_product_writing_cab_or_inf_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[office_spawning_control_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[okta_account_lockout_events_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[okta_failed_sso_attempts_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[open_redirect_in_splunk_web_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[osquery_pack___coldroot_detection_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[overwriting_accessibility_binaries_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[password_policy_discovery_with_net_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[permission_modification_using_takeown_app_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[petitpotam_network_share_access_request_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[ping_sleep_batch_command_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[possible_browser_pass_view_parameter_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[potentially_malicious_code_on_commandline_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[powershell___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[powershell_4104_hunting_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[powershell_domain_enumeration_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[powershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_system_reflection_assembly_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[powershell_start_bitstransfer_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[powershell_creating_thread_mutex_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[powershell_disable_security_monitoring_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[powershell_execute_com_object_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[powershell_fileless_process_injection_via_getprocaddress_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[powershell_fileless_script_contains_base64_encoded_content_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_with_script_block_logging_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[powershell_processing_stream_of_data_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[powershell_remove_windows_defender_directory_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[prevent_automatic_repair_mode_using_bcdedit_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity___initial_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity___update_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[previously_seen_aws_provisioning_activity_sources_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[previously_seen_aws_regions_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role___initial_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role___update_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user___initial_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user___update_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[previously_seen_cloud_compute_images___initial_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[previously_seen_cloud_compute_images___update_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types___initial_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types___update_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user___initial_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user___update_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources___initial_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources___update_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[previously_seen_cloud_regions___initial_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[previously_seen_cloud_regions___update_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[previously_seen_ec2_amis_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[previously_seen_ec2_instance_types_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[previously_seen_running_windows_services___initial_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[previously_seen_running_windows_services___update_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail___update_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail___initial_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[previously_seen_zoom_child_processes___initial_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[previously_seen_zoom_child_processes___update_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[previously_seen_api_call_per_user_roles_in_cloudtrail_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[previously_seen_s3_bucket_access_by_remote_ip_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[previously_seen_command_line_arguments_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[print_processor_registry_autostart_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[print_spooler_adding_a_printer_driver_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[print_spooler_failed_to_load_a_plug_in_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[process_deleting_its_process_file_path_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[process_execution_via_wmi_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[process_kill_base_on_file_path_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[process_writing_dynamicwrapperx_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[processes_tapping_keyboard_events_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[processes_created_by_netsh_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[processes_launching_netsh_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[prohibited_network_traffic_allowed_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[prohibited_software_on_endpoint_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[protocol_or_port_mismatch_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[randomly_generated_scheduled_task_name_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[randomly_generated_windows_service_name_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[ransomware_notes_bulk_creation_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[recon_using_wmi_class_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[remcos_rat_file_creation_in_remcos_folder_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[remcos_client_registry_install_entry_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[remote_desktop_network_bruteforce_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[remote_desktop_network_traffic_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[remote_desktop_process_running_on_system_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_script_block_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_script_block_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_script_block_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_winrs_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[remote_registry_key_modifications_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[remote_system_discovery_with_adsisearcher_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[remote_system_discovery_with_dsquery_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[remote_system_discovery_with_net_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[remote_system_discovery_with_wmic_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[remote_wmi_command_attempt_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[resize_shadowstorage_volume_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[revil_common_exec_parameter_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[revil_registry_entry_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[rubeus_command_line_parameters_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[rubeus_kerberos_ticket_exports_through_winlogon_access_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[runas_execution_in_commandline_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[rundll32_control_rundll_hunt_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[rundll32_dnsquery_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[rundll32_lockworkstation_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[rundll32_shimcache_flush_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[ryuk_test_files_detected_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[ryuk_wake_on_lan_command_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[sam_database_file_access_attempt_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[slui_runas_elevated_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[slui_spawning_a_process_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[smb_traffic_spike_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[smb_traffic_spike___mltk_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[sql_injection_with_long_urls_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[samsam_test_file_write_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[schcache_change_by_app_connect_and_create_adsi_object_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[schedule_task_with_http_command_arguments_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[scheduled_task_creation_on_remote_endpoint_using_at_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[scheduled_task_initiation_on_remote_endpoint_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[schtasks_run_task_on_demand_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[screensaver_event_trigger_execution_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[script_execution_via_wmi_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[sdclt_uac_bypass_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[sdelete_application_execution_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[searchprotocolhost_with_no_command_line_with_network_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[secretdumps_offline_ntds_dumping_tool_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[services_escalate_exe_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[services_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[shim_database_file_creation_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[short_lived_scheduled_task_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[short_lived_windows_accounts_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[silentcleanup_uac_bypass_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[single_letter_process_on_endpoint_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[spike_in_file_writes_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[spoolsv_spawning_rundll32_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[spoolsv_suspicious_process_access_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[spoolsv_writing_a_dll_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[spoolsv_writing_a_dll___sysmon_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[sqlite_module_in_temp_folder_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[start_up_during_safe_mode_boot_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[supernova_webshell_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[suspicious_changes_to_file_associations_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[suspicious_computer_account_name_change_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[suspicious_copy_on_system32_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[suspicious_curl_network_connection_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[suspicious_driver_loaded_path_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[suspicious_email___uba_anomaly_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[suspicious_email_attachment_extensions_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[suspicious_event_log_service_behavior_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[suspicious_file_write_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[suspicious_image_creation_in_appdata_folder_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[suspicious_java_classes_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[suspicious_kerberos_service_ticket_request_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[suspicious_linux_discovery_commands_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[suspicious_msbuild_rename_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[suspicious_msbuild_spawn_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_via_osquery_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[suspicious_process_file_path_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[suspicious_reg_exe_process_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[suspicious_rundll32_plugininit_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[suspicious_rundll32_rename_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[suspicious_rundll32_startw_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[suspicious_sqlite3_lsquarantine_behavior_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[suspicious_searchprotocolhost_no_command_line_arguments_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[suspicious_ticket_granting_ticket_request_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[suspicious_wav_file_in_appdata_folder_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[suspicious_msbuild_path_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[suspicious_mshta_child_process_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[suspicious_mshta_spawn_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[suspicious_wevtutil_usage_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[svchost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[system_information_discovery_detection_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[system_user_discovery_with_query_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[system_user_discovery_with_whoami_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[systems_ready_for_spectre_meltdown_windows_patch_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[tor_traffic_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[time_provider_persistence_registry_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[trickbot_named_pipe_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[usn_journal_deletion_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[uncommon_processes_on_endpoint_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[unified_messaging_service_spawning_a_process_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[uninstall_app_using_msiexec_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[unloading_amsi_via_reflection_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[unsuccessful_netbackup_backups_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[unusual_number_of_computer_service_tickets_requested_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[unusual_number_of_kerberos_service_tickets_requested_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[unusual_number_of_remote_endpoint_authentication_events_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[unusually_long_command_line_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[unusually_long_command_line___mltk_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[unusually_long_content_type_length_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[update_previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_script_block_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[vbscript_execution_using_wscript_app_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[verclsid_clsid_execution_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[w3wp_spawning_shell_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[wbadmin_delete_system_backups_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[wmi_permanent_event_subscription_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[wmi_recon_running_process_or_services_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[wmi_temporary_event_subscription_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[wmic_xsl_execution_via_url_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[wsreset_uac_bypass_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[wbemprox_com_object_execution_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[web_fraud___account_harvesting_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[wermgr_process_create_executable_file_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[winrm_spawning_a_process_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[windows_adfind_exe_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[windows_dism_remove_defender_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[windows_disable_memory_crash_dump_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[windows_disableantispyware_registry_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[windows_diskcryptor_usage_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[windows_event_for_service_disabled_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[windows_event_log_cleared_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[windows_excessive_disabled_services_event_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[windows_file_without_extension_in_critical_folder_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[windows_high_file_deletion_frequency_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[windows_hunting_system_account_targeting_lsass_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[windows_installutil_credential_theft_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[windows_installutil_remote_network_connection_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[windows_installutil_url_in_command_line_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[windows_installutil_uninstall_option_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[windows_java_spawning_shells_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[windows_modify_show_compress_color_and_info_tip_registry_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[windows_nirsoft_advancedrun_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[windows_nirsoft_utilities_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[windows_non_system_account_targeting_lsass_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[windows_possible_credential_dumping_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[windows_process_with_namedpipe_commandline_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[windows_raccine_scheduled_task_deletion_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[windows_rasautou_dll_execution_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[windows_remote_assistance_spawning_process_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[windows_schtasks_create_run_as_system_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[windows_security_account_manager_stopped_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[windows_service_created_within_public_path_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[windows_service_creation_using_registry_entry_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[windows_service_creation_on_remote_endpoint_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[windows_service_initiation_on_remote_endpoint_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[windows_updates_install_failures_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[windows_updates_install_successes_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[windows_wmi_process_call_create_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[windows_connhost_exe_started_forcefully_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[windows_hosts_file_modification_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[winhlp32_spawning_a_process_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[winword_spawning_cmd_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[winword_spawning_powershell_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[winword_spawning_windows_script_host_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[wmic_group_discovery_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[wmic_noninteractive_app_uninstallation_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[wmiprsve_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[wsmprovhost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[xmrig_driver_loaded_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[xsl_script_execution_with_wmic_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[aws_detect_permanent_key_creation_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[aws_detect_role_creation_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - -[gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse_filter] -definition = search * -description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. - diff --git a/dist/escu/default/savedsearches.conf b/dist/escu/default/savedsearches.conf index cb9809c1ef..62e14c2658 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/savedsearches.conf +++ b/dist/escu/default/savedsearches.conf @@ -1,47 +1,40 @@ ############# # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content -# On Date: 2022-03-03T18:16:54 UTC +# On Date: 2022-03-14T11:11:42 UTC # Author: Splunk Security Research # Contact: research@splunk.com ############# - ### ESCU DETECTIONS ### -[ESCU - 7zip CommandLine To SMB Share Path - Rule] +[ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search is to detect a suspicious 7z process with commandline pointing to SMB network share. This technique was seen in CONTI LEAK tools where it use 7z to archive a sensitive files and place it in network share tmp folder. This search is a good hunting query that may give analyst a hint why specific user try to archive a file pointing to SMB user which is un usual. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1560.001", "T1560"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious 7z process with commandline pointing to SMB network share. This technique was seen in CONTI LEAK tools where it use 7z to archive a sensitive files and place it in network share tmp folder. This search is a good hunting query that may give analyst a hint why specific user try to archive a file pointing to SMB user which is un usual. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed 7z.exe may be used. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-17 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-17 +description = This search will detect a spike in the number of API calls made to your cloud infrastructure environment by a user. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Change"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search will detect a spike in the number of API calls made to your cloud infrastructure environment by a user. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User` to create the probability density function. +action.escu.known_false_positives = +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-09-07 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-07 action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - 7zip CommandLine To SMB Share Path - Rule +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud User Activities"] action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = archive process $process_name$ with suspicious cmdline $process$ in host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}, {"threat_object_field": "SourceImage", "threat_object_type": "process name"}] +action.risk.param._risk_message = user $user$ has made $api_calls$ api calls, violating the dynamic threshold of $expected_upper_threshold$ with the following command $command$. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 15}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - 7zip CommandLine To SMB Share Path - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1560.001", "T1560"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "SourceImage", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "process name"}]} +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud User Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious 7z process with commandline pointing to SMB network share. This technique was seen in CONTI LEAK tools where it use 7z to archive a sensitive files and place it in network share tmp folder. This search is a good hunting query that may give analyst a hint why specific user try to archive a file pointing to SMB user which is un usual. -action.notable.param.rule_title = 7zip CommandLine To SMB Share Path -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -51,44 +44,37 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name ="7z.exe" OR Processes.process_name = "7za.exe" OR Processes.original_file_name = "7z.exe" OR Processes.original_file_name = "7za.exe") AND (Processes.process="*\\C$\\*" OR Processes.process="*\\Admin$\\*" OR Processes.process="*\\IPC$\\*") by Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `7zip_commandline_to_smb_share_path_filter` +search = | tstats count as api_calls values(All_Changes.command) as command from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.user!=unknown All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%w") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | join user HourOfDay isWeekend [ summary cloud_excessive_api_calls_v1] | where cardinality >=16 | apply cloud_excessive_api_calls_v1 threshold=0.005 | rename "IsOutlier(api_calls)" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1 | eval expected_upper_threshold = mvindex(split(mvindex(BoundaryRanges, -1), ":"), 0) | where api_calls > expected_upper_threshold | eval distance_from_threshold = api_calls - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, command, api_calls, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_filter` -[ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule] +[ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen cities. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen cities. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources. -action.escu.known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ - This search will fire any time a new city is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your city, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. -action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-16 -action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-16 +description = This search will detect a spike in the number of API calls made to your cloud infrastructure environment about security groups by a user. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Change"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search will detect a spike in the number of API calls made to your cloud infrastructure environment about security groups by a user. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User` to create the probability density function model. +action.escu.known_false_positives = +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-09-07 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-07 action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud User Activities"] action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = -action.risk.param._risk = [] +action.risk.param._risk_message = user $user$ has made $api_calls$ api calls related to security groups, violating the dynamic threshold of $expected_upper_threshold$ with the following command $command$. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 15}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud User Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:Inbound", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen cities. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -action.notable.param.rule_title = AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -98,133 +84,7 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search City=* [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search City=* | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by City | eval newCity=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newCity=1 | table City] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip, City, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city_filter` - -[ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen countries. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen countries. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources. -action.escu.known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching over plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ - This search will fire any time a new country is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. -action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-16 -action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-16 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen countries. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -action.notable.param.rule_title = AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Country=* [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Country=* | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by Country | eval newCountry=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newCountry=1 | table Country] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip, Country, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country_filter` - -[ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen IP addresses. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen IP addresses. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources. -action.escu.known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ - This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. -action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-16 -action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-16 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen IP addresses. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -action.notable.param.rule_title = AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Country=* | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress | eval newIP=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newIP=1 | table sourceIPAddress] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter` - -[ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen regions. Region in this context is similar to a state in the United States. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen regions. Region in this context is similar to a state in the United States. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources. -action.escu.known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ - This search will fire any time a new region is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your region, there should be few false positives. If you are located in regions where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. -action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-16 -action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-16 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen regions. Region in this context is similar to a state in the United States. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -action.notable.param.rule_title = AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Region=* [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Region=* | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by Region | eval newRegion=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newRegion=1 | table Region] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip, Region, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region_filter` +search = | tstats count as security_group_api_calls values(All_Changes.command) as command from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.object_category=firewall AND All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%w") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | join user HourOfDay isWeekend [ summary cloud_excessive_security_group_api_calls_v1] | where cardinality >=16 | apply cloud_excessive_security_group_api_calls_v1 threshold=0.005 | rename "IsOutlier(security_group_api_calls)" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1 | eval expected_upper_threshold = mvindex(split(mvindex(BoundaryRanges, -1), ":"), 0) | where security_group_api_calls > expected_upper_threshold | eval distance_from_threshold = security_group_api_calls - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, command, security_group_api_calls, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls_filter` [ESCU - AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources - Rule] action.escu = 0 @@ -240,7 +100,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2021-02-22 action.escu.confidence = high action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"] action.risk = 1 @@ -255,6 +115,12 @@ action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources - Rule action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user created a policy version that allows them to access any resource in their account +action.notable.param.rule_title = AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources +action.notable.param.security_domain = network +action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -280,7 +146,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-19 action.escu.confidence = high action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS CreateAccessKey - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"] action.risk = 1 @@ -320,7 +186,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-19 action.escu.confidence = high action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS CreateLoginProfile - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"] action.risk = 1 @@ -335,6 +201,12 @@ action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS CreateLoginProfile - Rule action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003", "T1136"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src_ip", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "user_arn", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user A(victim A) creates a login profile for user B, followed by a AWS Console login event from user B from the same src_ip as user B. This correlated event can be indicative of privilege escalation since both events happened from the same src_ip +action.notable.param.rule_title = AWS CreateLoginProfile +action.notable.param.security_domain = network +action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -360,7 +232,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-28 action.escu.confidence = high action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"] action.risk = 1 @@ -390,7 +262,7 @@ search = | tstats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel= action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = This search provides detection of KMS keys where action kms:Encrypt is accessible for everyone (also outside of your organization). This is an indicator that your account is compromised and the attacker uses the encryption key to compromise another company. -action.escu.mappings = {"mitre_attack": ["T1486"]} +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"]} action.escu.data_models = [] action.escu.eli5 = This search provides detection of KMS keys where action kms:Encrypt is accessible for everyone (also outside of your organization). This is an indicator that your account is compromised and the attacker uses the encryption key to compromise another company. action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs @@ -400,7 +272,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-11 action.escu.confidence = high action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware Cloud"] action.risk = 1 @@ -413,8 +285,14 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware Cloud"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 50, "mitre_attack": ["T1486"], "observable": [{"name": "userIdentity.principalId", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware Cloud"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"], "observable": [{"name": "userIdentity.principalId", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search provides detection of KMS keys where action kms:Encrypt is accessible for everyone (also outside of your organization). This is an indicator that your account is compromised and the attacker uses the encryption key to compromise another company. +action.notable.param.rule_title = AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA +action.notable.param.security_domain = threat +action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -430,7 +308,7 @@ search = `cloudtrail` eventName=CreateKey OR eventName=PutKeyPolicy | spath inpu action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = This search provides detection of users with KMS keys performing encryption specifically against S3 buckets. -action.escu.mappings = {"mitre_attack": ["T1486"]} +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"]} action.escu.data_models = [] action.escu.eli5 = This search provides detection of users with KMS keys performing encryption specifically against S3 buckets. action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs @@ -440,7 +318,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-11 action.escu.confidence = high action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware Cloud"] action.risk = 1 @@ -453,7 +331,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware Cloud"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 30, "mitre_attack": ["T1486"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest_file", "role": ["Target"], "type": "File"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware Cloud"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest_file", "role": ["Target"], "type": "File"}]} schedule_window = auto alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true @@ -480,12 +358,12 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-17 action.escu.confidence = high action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings High - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"] +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Dev Sec Ops"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = Vulnerabilities with severity high found in image $image$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "image", "threat_object_type": "system"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 70}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -493,9 +371,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings High - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.003", "T1204"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "image", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "System"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.003", "T1204"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). You need to activate image scanning in order to get the event DescribeImageScanFindings with the results. action.notable.param.rule_title = AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings High action.notable.param.security_domain = network @@ -525,12 +404,12 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-17 action.escu.confidence = high action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Low Informational Unknown - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"] +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Dev Sec Ops"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = Vulnerabilities with severity high found in repository $repositoryName$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "repositoryName", "threat_object_type": "system"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 7}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -538,13 +417,8 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Low Informational Unknown - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.003", "T1204"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "repositoryName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "System"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.003", "T1204"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). You need to activate image scanning in order to get the event DescribeImageScanFindings with the results. -action.notable.param.rule_title = AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Low Informational Unknown -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -570,12 +444,12 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-17 action.escu.confidence = high action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Medium - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"] +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Dev Sec Ops"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = Vulnerabilities with severity high found in image $image$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "image", "threat_object_type": "system"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 21}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -583,13 +457,8 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Medium - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.003", "T1204"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "image", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "System"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.003", "T1204"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). You need to activate image scanning in order to get the event DescribeImageScanFindings with the results. -action.notable.param.rule_title = AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Medium -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -615,7 +484,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-19 action.escu.confidence = high action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS ECR Container Upload Outside Business Hours - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"] +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Dev Sec Ops"] action.risk = 1 @@ -628,13 +497,8 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS ECR Container Upload Outside Business Hours - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.003", "T1204"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src_ip", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.003", "T1204"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src_ip", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). A upload of a new container is normally done during business hours. When done outside business hours, we want to take a look into it. -action.notable.param.rule_title = AWS ECR Container Upload Outside Business Hours -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -660,7 +524,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-19 action.escu.confidence = high action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS ECR Container Upload Unknown User - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"] +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Dev Sec Ops"] action.risk = 1 @@ -673,13 +537,8 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS ECR Container Upload Unknown User - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.003", "T1204"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src_ip", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.003", "T1204"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src_ip", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). A upload of a new container is normally done from only a few known users. When the user was never seen before, we should have a closer look into the event. -action.notable.param.rule_title = AWS ECR Container Upload Unknown User -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -691,46 +550,6 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = `cloudtrail` eventSource=ecr.amazonaws.com eventName=PutImage NOT `aws_ecr_users` | rename requestParameters.* as * | rename repositoryName AS image | eval phase="release" | eval severity="high" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by awsRegion, eventName, eventSource, user, userName, src_ip, imageTag, registryId, image, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user_filter` -[ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmaps or secrets -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmaps or secrets -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install Splunk Add-on for Amazon Web Services and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user and object context can provide guidance for detection. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-06-23 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-06-23 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmaps or secrets -action.notable.param.rule_title = AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access -action.notable.param.security_domain = threat -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` objectRef.resource=secrets OR configmaps sourceIPs{}!=::1 sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1 |table sourceIPs{} user.username user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace objectRef.name annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |dedup user.username user.groups{} |`aws_eks_kubernetes_cluster_sensitive_object_access_filter` - [ESCU - AWS Excessive Security Scanning - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -745,7 +564,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-13 action.escu.confidence = high action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Excessive Security Scanning - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS User Monitoring"] action.risk = 1 @@ -760,6 +579,12 @@ action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS Excessive Security Scanning - Rule action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS User Monitoring"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:Inbound", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events and analyse the amount of eventNames which starts with Describe by a single user. This indicates that this user scans the configuration of your AWS cloud environment. +action.notable.param.rule_title = AWS Excessive Security Scanning +action.notable.param.security_domain = network +action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -785,7 +610,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-12 action.escu.confidence = high action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS"] +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud User Activities"] action.risk = 1 @@ -825,7 +650,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-01 action.escu.confidence = high action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS"] +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"] action.risk = 1 @@ -840,6 +665,12 @@ action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force - Rule action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:Inbound", "Stage:Credential Access", "Other:Policy Violation"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1580", "T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "src", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "user_arn", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following detection identifies any malformed policy document exceptions with a status of `failure`. A malformed policy document exception occurs in instances where roles are attempted to be assumed, or brute forced. In a brute force attempt, using a tool like CloudSploit or Pacu, an attempt will look like `arn:aws:iam::111111111111:role/aws-service-role/rds.amazonaws.com/AWSServiceRoleForRDS`. Meaning, when an adversary is attempting to identify a role name, multiple failures will occur. This detection focuses on the errors of a remote attempt that is failing. +action.notable.param.rule_title = AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force +action.notable.param.security_domain = access +action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -865,7 +696,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-01 action.escu.confidence = high action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS IAM Delete Policy - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS"] +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"] action.risk = 1 @@ -905,7 +736,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-01 action.escu.confidence = high action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS IAM Failure Group Deletion - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS"] +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"] action.risk = 1 @@ -945,7 +776,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-31 action.escu.confidence = high action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS"] +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"] action.risk = 1 @@ -1000,11 +831,6 @@ action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS Lambda UpdateFunctionCode - Rule action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud User Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src_ip", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "user_arn", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is designed to detect IAM users attempting to update/modify AWS lambda code via the AWS CLI to gain persistence, futher access into your AWS environment and to facilitate planting backdoors. In this instance, an attacker may upload malicious code/binary to a lambda function which will be executed automatically when the funnction is triggered. -action.notable.param.rule_title = AWS Lambda UpdateFunctionCode -action.notable.param.security_domain = cloud -action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -1030,7 +856,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-11 action.escu.confidence = high action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Network ACL Activity"] action.risk = 1 @@ -1045,6 +871,12 @@ action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Network ACL Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 11"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "src", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "userName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "requestParameters.cidrBlock", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "IP Address"}]} schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The search looks for AWS CloudTrail events to detect if any network ACLs were created with all the ports open to a specified CIDR. +action.notable.param.rule_title = AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports +action.notable.param.security_domain = network +action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -1070,7 +902,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-12 action.escu.confidence = high action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Network ACL Activity"] action.risk = 1 @@ -1100,7 +932,7 @@ search = `cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteNetworkAclEntry requestParameters.egress=f action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = This search provides specific SAML access from specific Service Provider, user and targeted principal at AWS. This search provides specific information to detect abnormal access or potential credential hijack or forgery, specially in federated environments using SAML protocol inside the perimeter or cloud provider. -action.escu.mappings = {"mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} action.escu.data_models = [] action.escu.eli5 = This search provides specific SAML access from specific Service Provider, user and targeted principal at AWS. This search provides specific information to detect abnormal access or potential credential hijack or forgery, specially in federated environments using SAML protocol inside the perimeter or cloud provider. action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs @@ -1110,7 +942,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-26 action.escu.confidence = high action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"] action.risk = 1 @@ -1123,7 +955,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Stage:Credential Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 80, "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "observable": [{"name": "sourceIPAddress", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "recipientAccountId", "role": ["Victim", "Target"], "type": "Other"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Stage:Credential Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "observable": [{"name": "sourceIPAddress", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "recipientAccountId", "role": ["Victim", "Target"], "type": "Other"}]} schedule_window = auto alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true @@ -1140,7 +972,7 @@ search = `cloudtrail` eventName=Assumerolewithsaml | stats count min(_time) as f action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = This search provides detection of updates to SAML provider in AWS. Updates to SAML provider need to be monitored closely as they may indicate possible perimeter compromise of federated credentials, or backdoor access from another cloud provider set by attacker. -action.escu.mappings = {"mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} action.escu.data_models = [] action.escu.eli5 = This search provides detection of updates to SAML provider in AWS. Updates to SAML provider need to be monitored closely as they may indicate possible perimeter compromise of federated credentials, or backdoor access from another cloud provider set by attacker. action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs. @@ -1150,7 +982,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-26 action.escu.confidence = high action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS SAML Update identity provider - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"] action.risk = 1 @@ -1163,8 +995,14 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS SAML Update identity provider - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 80, "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "observable": [{"name": "sourceIPAddress", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "userIdentity.principalId", "role": ["Victim", "Target"], "type": "User"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "observable": [{"name": "sourceIPAddress", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "userIdentity.principalId", "role": ["Victim", "Target"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search provides detection of updates to SAML provider in AWS. Updates to SAML provider need to be monitored closely as they may indicate possible perimeter compromise of federated credentials, or backdoor access from another cloud provider set by attacker. +action.notable.param.rule_title = AWS SAML Update identity provider +action.notable.param.security_domain = threat +action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -1190,7 +1028,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-02 action.escu.confidence = high action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"] action.risk = 1 @@ -1205,6 +1043,12 @@ action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion - Rule action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Stage:Credential Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "user_arn", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user has set a default policy versions. Attackers have been know to use this technique for Privilege Escalation in case the previous versions of the policy had permissions to access more resources than the current version of the policy +action.notable.param.rule_title = AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion +action.notable.param.security_domain = threat +action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -1230,7 +1074,7 @@ action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-19 action.escu.confidence = high action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS UpdateLoginProfile - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"] action.risk = 1 @@ -1243,8 +1087,14 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS UpdateLoginProfile - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003", "T1136"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "user_arn", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003", "T1136"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "user_arn", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user A who has already permission to update login profile, makes an API call to update login profile for another user B . Attackers have been know to use this technique for Privilege Escalation in case new victim(user B) has more permissions than old victim(user B) +action.notable.param.rule_title = AWS UpdateLoginProfile +action.notable.param.security_domain = threat +action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -1256,13 +1106,1947 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = `cloudtrail` eventName = UpdateLoginProfile userAgent !=console.amazonaws.com errorCode = success| search userIdentity.userName!=requestParameters.userName | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by requestParameters.userName src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.userName user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|`aws_updateloginprofile_filter` +[ESCU - Circle CI Disable Security Job - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for disable security job in CircleCI pipeline. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1554"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for disable security job in CircleCI pipeline. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must index CircleCI logs. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-02 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-02 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Circle CI Disable Security Job - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Dev Sec Ops"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = disable security job $mandatory_job$ in workflow $workflow_name$ from user $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 72}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Circle CI Disable Security Job - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Application Log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1554"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `circleci` | rename vcs.committer_name as user vcs.subject as commit_message vcs.url as url workflows.* as * | stats values(job_name) as job_names by workflow_id workflow_name user commit_message url branch | lookup mandatory_job_for_workflow workflow_name OUTPUTNEW job_name AS mandatory_job | search mandatory_job=* | eval mandatory_job_executed=if(like(job_names, "%".mandatory_job."%"), 1, 0) | where mandatory_job_executed=0 | eval phase="build" | rex field=url "(?[^\/]*\/[^\/]*)$" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `circle_ci_disable_security_job_filter` + +[ESCU - Circle CI Disable Security Step - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for disable security step in CircleCI pipeline. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1554"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for disable security step in CircleCI pipeline. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must index CircleCI logs. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-01 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-01 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Circle CI Disable Security Step - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Dev Sec Ops"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = disable security step $mandatory_step$ in job $job_name$ from user $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 72}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Circle CI Disable Security Step - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Application Log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1554"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `circleci` | rename workflows.job_id AS job_id | join job_id [ | search `circleci` | stats values(name) as step_names count by job_id job_name ] | stats count by step_names job_id job_name vcs.committer_name vcs.subject vcs.url owners{} | rename vcs.* as * , owners{} as user | lookup mandatory_step_for_job job_name OUTPUTNEW step_name AS mandatory_step | search mandatory_step=* | eval mandatory_step_executed=if(like(step_names, "%".mandatory_step."%"), 1, 0) | where mandatory_step_executed=0 | rex field=url "(?[^\/]*\/[^\/]*)$" | eval phase="build" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `circle_ci_disable_security_step_filter` + +[ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for new commands from each user role. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Change"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for new commands from each user role. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial` to build the initial table of user roles, commands, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_filter` +action.escu.known_false_positives = . +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-09-04 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-04 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud User Activities"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = User $user$ of type AssumedRole attempting to execute new API calls $command$ that have not been seen before +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 36}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud User Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Recon", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.user_type=AssumedRole AND All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user, All_Changes.command All_Changes.object | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role user as user, command as command OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenUserApiCall=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenUserApiCall) OR firstTimeSeenUserApiCall > relative_time(now(),"-24h@h") | table firstTime, user, object, command |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_filter` + +[ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for cloud compute instances created by users who have not created them before. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Change"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for cloud compute instances created by users who have not created them before. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting the appropriate cloud-infrastructure logs Run the "Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User" support search to create of baseline of previously seen users. +action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible that a user will start to create compute instances for the first time, for any number of reasons. Verify with the user launching instances that this is the intended behavior. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-13 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-13 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Cloud Cryptomining"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = User $user$ is creating a new instance $dest$ for the first time +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 18}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 18}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Cryptomining"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Recon", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object) as dest from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.user All_Changes.vendor_region | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user user as user OUTPUTNEW firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenUser=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenUser) OR firstTimeSeenUser > relative_time(now(), "-24h@h") | table firstTime, user, dest, count vendor_region | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user_filter` + +[ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks at cloud-infrastructure events where an instance is created in any region within the last hour and then compares it to a lookup file of previously seen regions where instances have been created. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Change"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks at cloud-infrastructure events where an instance is created in any region within the last hour and then compares it to a lookup file of previously seen regions where instances have been created. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial` to build the initial table of images observed and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region_filter` macro. +action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible that a user has unknowingly started an instance in a new region. Please verify that this activity is legitimate. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-09-02 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-02 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Cloud Cryptomining"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = User $user$ is creating an instance $dest$ in a new region for the first time +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 42}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Cryptomining"], "cis20": ["CIS 12"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id) as dest, count from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.vendor_region, All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_regions vendor_region as vendor_region OUTPUTNEW firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenRegion=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenRegion) OR firstTimeSeenRegion > relative_time(now(), "-24h@h") | table firstTime, user, dest, count , vendor_region | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region_filter` + +[ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for cloud compute instances being created with previously unseen image IDs. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Change"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for cloud compute instances being created with previously unseen image IDs. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial` to build the initial table of images observed and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image_filter` macro. +action.escu.known_false_positives = After a new image is created, the first systems created with that image will cause this alert to fire. Verify that the image being used was created by a legitimate user. +action.escu.creation_date = 2018-10-12 +action.escu.modification_date = 2018-10-12 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Cloud Cryptomining"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = User $user$ is creating an instance $dest$ with an image that has not been previously seen. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 36}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 36}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Cryptomining"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id) as dest from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.image_id, All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | `drop_dm_object_name("Instance_Changes")` | where image_id != "unknown" | lookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_images image_id as image_id OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenImage=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenImage) OR firstTimeSeenImage > relative_time(now(), "-24h@h") | table firstTime, user, image_id, count, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image_filter` + +[ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = Find EC2 instances being created with previously unseen instance types. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Change"] +action.escu.eli5 = Find EC2 instances being created with previously unseen instance types. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial` to build the initial table of instance types observed and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter` macro. +action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible that an admin will create a new system using a new instance type that has never been used before. Verify with the creator that they intended to create the system with the new instance type. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-09-12 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-12 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Cloud Cryptomining"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = User $user$ is creating an instance $dest$ with an instance type $instance_type$ that has not been previously seen. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 30}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 30}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Cryptomining"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id) as dest, count from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.instance_type, All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | `drop_dm_object_name("Instance_Changes")` | where instance_type != "unknown" | lookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types instance_type as instance_type OUTPUTNEW firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenInstanceType=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenInstanceType) OR firstTimeSeenInstanceType > relative_time(now(), "-24h@h") | table firstTime, user, dest, count, instance_type | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter` + +[ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for cloud instances being modified by users who have not previously modified them. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Change"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for cloud instances being modified by users who have not previously modified them. +action.escu.how_to_implement = This search has a dependency on other searches to create and update a baseline of users observed to be associated with this activity. The search "Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update" should be enabled for this detection to properly work. +action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible that a new user will start to modify EC2 instances when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is modifying instances that this is the intended behavior. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-29 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-29 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = User $user$ is modifying an instance $dest$ for the first time. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 42}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id values(All_Changes.command) as command from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=modified All_Changes.change_type=EC2 All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user user as user OUTPUTNEW firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenUser=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenUser) OR firstTimeSeenUser > relative_time(now(), "-24h@h") | table firstTime user command object_id count | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_instance_modified_by_previously_unseen_user_filter` + +[ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen cities. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Change"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen cities. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city_filter` macro. +action.escu.known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ + This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-10-09 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-09 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = User $user$ is starting or creating an instance $dest$ for the first time in City $City$ from IP address $src$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 18}, {"risk_object_field": "src", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 18}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 18}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "src", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(City) | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources City as City OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenCity=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenCity) OR firstTimeSeenCity > relative_time(now(), `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window`) | table firstTime, src, City, user, object, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city_filter` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` + +[ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen countries. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Change"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen countries. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_country_filter` macro. +action.escu.known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ + This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-10-09 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-09 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = User $user$ is starting or creating an instance $object$ for the first time in Country $Country$ from IP address $src$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 42}, {"risk_object_field": "src", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}, {"risk_object_field": "object", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "src", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "object", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(Country) | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources Country as Country OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenCountry=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenCountry) OR firstTimeSeenCountry > relative_time(now(), "-24h@h") | table firstTime, src, Country, user, object, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_country_filter` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` + +[ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen IP addresses. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Change"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen IP addresses. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter` macro. +action.escu.known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ + This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-08-16 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-16 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = User $user$ is starting or creating an instance $object_id$ for the first time from IP address $src$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 42}, {"risk_object_field": "src", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}, {"risk_object_field": "object_id", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "src", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "object_id", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime, values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources src as src OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenSrc=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenSrc) OR firstTimeSeenSrc > relative_time(now(), `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window`) | table firstTime, src, user, object_id, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` + +[ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen regions. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Change"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen regions. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region_filter` macro. +action.escu.known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ + This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-08-16 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-16 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = User $user$ is starting or creating an instance $object$ for the first time in region $Region$ from IP address $src$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 42}, {"risk_object_field": "src", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}, {"risk_object_field": "object", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "src", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "object", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(Region) | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources Region as Region OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenRegion=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenRegion) OR firstTimeSeenRegion > relative_time(now(), `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window`) | table firstTime, src, Region, user, object, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region_filter` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` + +[ESCU - Correlation by Repository and Risk - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search correlations detections by repository and risk_score +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.003", "T1204"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search correlations detections by repository and risk_score +action.escu.how_to_implement = For Dev Sec Ops POC +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-06 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-06 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Correlation by Repository and Risk - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Dev Sec Ops"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Correlation triggered for user $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 70}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Correlation by Repository and Risk - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.003", "T1204"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search correlations detections by repository and risk_score +action.notable.param.rule_title = Correlation by Repository and Risk +action.notable.param.security_domain = network +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `signals` | fillnull | stats sum(risk_score) as risk_score values(source) as signals values(user) as user by repository | sort - risk_score | where risk_score > 80 | `correlation_by_repository_and_risk_filter` + +[ESCU - Correlation by User and Risk - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search correlations detections by user and risk_score +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.003", "T1204"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search correlations detections by user and risk_score +action.escu.how_to_implement = For Dev Sec Ops POC +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-06 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-06 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Correlation by User and Risk - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Dev Sec Ops"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Correlation triggered for user $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 70}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Correlation by User and Risk - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.003", "T1204"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search correlations detections by user and risk_score +action.notable.param.rule_title = Correlation by User and Risk +action.notable.param.security_domain = network +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `signals` | fillnull | stats sum(risk_score) as risk_score values(source) as signals values(repository) as repository by user | sort - risk_score | where risk_score > 80 | `correlation_by_user_and_risk_filter` + +[ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Authentication"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. +action.escu.known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-05-28 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-28 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = User $user$ is logging into the AWS console for the first time +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 30}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | join user type=outer [ inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) as earliestseen by user] | eval userStatus=if(earliestseen >= relative_time(now(), "-24h@h") OR isnull(earliestseen), "First Time Logging into AWS Console", "Previously Seen User") | where userStatus="First Time Logging into AWS Console" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user_filter` + +[ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Authentication"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter` macro. +action.escu.known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-10-07 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-07 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities", "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = User $user$ is logging into the AWS console from City $City$ for the first time +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 18}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities", "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | table firstTime lastTime user City | join user type=outer [| inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) AS earliestseen by user City | fields earliestseen user City] | eval userCity=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-24h@h"), "New City","Previously Seen City") | eval userStatus=if(earliestseen >= relative_time(now(), "-24h@h") OR isnull(earliestseen), "New User","Old User") | where userCity = "New City" AND userStatus != "Old User" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime lastTime user City userStatus userCity | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter` + +[ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Authentication"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter` macro. +action.escu.known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-10-07 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-07 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities", "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = User $user$ is logging into the AWS console from Country $Country$ for the first time +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 42}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities", "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | table firstTime lastTime user Country | join user type=outer [| inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) AS earliestseen by user Country | fields earliestseen user Country] | eval userCountry=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-24h@h"), "New Country","Previously Seen Country") | eval userStatus=if(earliestseen >= relative_time(now(),"-24h@h") OR isnull(earliestseen), "New User","Old User") | where userCountry = "New Country" AND userStatus != "Old User" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime lastTime user Country userStatus userCountry | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter` + +[ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Authentication"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter` macro. +action.escu.known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-10-07 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-07 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities", "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = User $user$ is logging into the AWS console from Region $Region$ for the first time +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 36}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities", "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | table firstTime lastTime user Region | join user type=outer [| inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) AS earliestseen by user Region | fields earliestseen user Region] | eval userRegion=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-24h@h"), "New Region","Previously Seen Region") | eval userStatus=if(earliestseen >= relative_time(now(), "-24h@h") OR isnull(earliestseen), "New User","Old User") | where userRegion = "New Region" AND userStatus != "Old User" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime lastTime user Region userStatus userRegion | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter` + +[ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public S3 bucket. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public S3 bucket. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk. +action.escu.known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to the "All Users" group. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-19 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-19 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = User $user_arn$ has created an open/public bucket $bucketName$ with the following permissions $permission$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user_arn", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 48}, {"threat_object_field": "bucketName", "threat_object_type": "other"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user_arn", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "bucketName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Other"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public S3 bucket. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect New Open S3 buckets +action.notable.param.security_domain = threat +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `cloudtrail` eventSource=s3.amazonaws.com eventName=PutBucketAcl | rex field=_raw "(?{.+})" | spath input=json_field output=grantees path=requestParameters.AccessControlPolicy.AccessControlList.Grant{} | search grantees=* | mvexpand grantees | spath input=grantees output=uri path=Grantee.URI | spath input=grantees output=permission path=Permission | search uri IN ("http://acs.amazonaws.com/groups/global/AllUsers","http://acs.amazonaws.com/groups/global/AuthenticatedUsers") | search permission IN ("READ","READ_ACP","WRITE","WRITE_ACP","FULL_CONTROL") | rename requestParameters.bucketName AS bucketName | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user_arn userIdentity.principalId userAgent uri permission bucketName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_new_open_s3_buckets_filter` + +[ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public S3 bucket over the aws cli. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public S3 bucket over the aws cli. +action.escu.how_to_implement = +action.escu.known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to the "All Users" group. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-19 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-19 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = User $userIdentity.userName$ has created an open/public bucket $bucketName$ using AWS CLI with the following permissions - $requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read$ $requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read-acp$ $requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write$ $requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write-acp$ $requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-full-control$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "userIdentity.userName", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 48}, {"threat_object_field": "bucketName", "threat_object_type": "other"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "userIdentity.userName", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "bucketName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Other"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public S3 bucket over the aws cli. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI +action.notable.param.security_domain = threat +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `cloudtrail` eventSource="s3.amazonaws.com" (userAgent="[aws-cli*" OR userAgent=aws-cli* ) eventName=PutBucketAcl OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read-acp IN ("*AuthenticatedUsers","*AllUsers") OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write IN ("*AuthenticatedUsers","*AllUsers") OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write-acp IN ("*AuthenticatedUsers","*AllUsers") OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-full-control IN ("*AuthenticatedUsers","*AllUsers") | rename requestParameters.bucketName AS bucketName | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by userIdentity.userName userIdentity.principalId userAgent bucketName requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read-acp requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write-acp requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-full-control | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli_filter` + +[ESCU - Detect shared ec2 snapshot - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic utilizes AWS CloudTrail events to identify when an EC2 snapshot permissions are modified to be shared with a different AWS account. This method is used by adversaries to exfiltrate the EC2 snapshot. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1537"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes AWS CloudTrail events to identify when an EC2 snapshot permissions are modified to be shared with a different AWS account. This method is used by adversaries to exfiltrate the EC2 snapshot. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs. +action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately shared a snapshot with others for a specific purpose. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-20 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-20 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect shared ec2 snapshot - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", "Data Exfiltration"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = AWS EC2 snapshot from account $aws_account_id$ is shared with $requested_account_id$ by user $user_arn$ from $src_ip$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user_arn", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 48}, {"risk_object_field": "src_ip", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 48}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect shared ec2 snapshot - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", "Data Exfiltration"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1537"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user_arn", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "src_ip", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes AWS CloudTrail events to identify when an EC2 snapshot permissions are modified to be shared with a different AWS account. This method is used by adversaries to exfiltrate the EC2 snapshot. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect shared ec2 snapshot +action.notable.param.security_domain = threat +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `cloudtrail` eventName=ModifySnapshotAttribute | rename requestParameters.createVolumePermission.add.items{}.userId as requested_account_id | search requested_account_id != NULL | eval match=if(requested_account_id==aws_account_id,"Match","No Match") | table _time user_arn src_ip requestParameters.attributeType requested_account_id aws_account_id match vendor_region user_agent | where match = "No Match" | `detect_shared_ec2_snapshot_filter` + +[ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub alerts for an EC2 instance in 4 hours intervals +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "nist": ["DE.DP"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub alerts for an EC2 instance in 4 hours intervals +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Security Hub inputs. The threshold_value should be tuned to your environment and schedule these searches according to the bucket span interval. +action.escu.known_false_positives = None +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-26 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-26 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Security Hub Alerts"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Spike in AWS security Hub alerts with title $Title$ for EC2 instance $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Security Hub Alerts"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "nist": ["DE.DP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `aws_securityhub_finding` "Resources{}.Type"=AWSEC2Instance | bucket span=4h _time | stats count AS alerts values(Title) as Title values(Types{}) as Types values(vendor_account) as vendor_account values(vendor_region) as vendor_region values(severity) as severity by _time dest | eventstats avg(alerts) as total_alerts_avg, stdev(alerts) as total_alerts_stdev | eval threshold_value = 3 | eval isOutlier=if(alerts > total_alerts_avg+(total_alerts_stdev * threshold_value), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | table _time dest alerts Title Types vendor_account vendor_region severity isOutlier total_alerts_avg | `detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance_filter` + +[ESCU - Github Commit Changes In Master - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search is to detect a pushed or commit to master or main branch. This is to avoid unwanted modification to master without a review to the changes. Ideally in terms of devsecops the changes made in a branch and do a PR for review. of course in some cases admin of the project may did a changes directly to master branch +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1199"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a pushed or commit to master or main branch. This is to avoid unwanted modification to master without a review to the changes. Ideally in terms of devsecops the changes made in a branch and do a PR for review. of course in some cases admin of the project may did a changes directly to master branch +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to github logs having the fork, commit, push metadata that can be use to monitor the changes in a github project. +action.escu.known_false_positives = admin can do changes directly to master branch +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-20 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-20 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Github Commit Changes In Master - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Dev Sec Ops"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = suspicious commit by $commit.commit.author.email$ to main branch +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "commit.commit.author.email", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 9}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Github Commit Changes In Master - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Application Log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1199"], "observable": [{"name": "commit.commit.author.email", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `github` branches{}.name = main OR branches{}.name = master | eval severity="low" | eval phase="code" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by commit.author.html_url commit.commit.author.email commit.author.login commit.commit.message repository.pushed_at commit.commit.committer.date, phase, severity | eval phase="code" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `github_commit_changes_in_master_filter` + +[ESCU - Github Commit In Develop - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search is to detect a pushed or commit to develop branch. This is to avoid unwanted modification to develop without a review to the changes. Ideally in terms of devsecops the changes made in a branch and do a PR for review. of course in some cases admin of the project may did a changes directly to master branch +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1199"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a pushed or commit to develop branch. This is to avoid unwanted modification to develop without a review to the changes. Ideally in terms of devsecops the changes made in a branch and do a PR for review. of course in some cases admin of the project may did a changes directly to master branch +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to github logs having the fork, commit, push metadata that can be use to monitor the changes in a github project. +action.escu.known_false_positives = admin can do changes directly to develop branch +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-01 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-01 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Github Commit In Develop - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Dev Sec Ops"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = suspicious commit by $commit.commit.author.email$ to develop branch +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "commit.commit.author.email", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 9}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Github Commit In Develop - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Application Log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1199"], "observable": [{"name": "commit.commit.author.email", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `github` branches{}.name = main OR branches{}.name = develop | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by commit.author.html_url commit.commit.author.email commit.author.login commit.commit.message repository.pushed_at commit.commit.committer.date | eval phase="code" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `github_commit_in_develop_filter` + +[ESCU - GitHub Dependabot Alert - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for Dependabot Alerts in Github logs. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1195.001", "T1195"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for Dependabot Alerts in Github logs. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must index GitHub logs. You can follow the url in reference to onboard GitHub logs. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-01 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-01 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GitHub Dependabot Alert - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Dev Sec Ops"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Vulnerabilities found in packages used by GitHub repository $repository$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "repository", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GitHub Dependabot Alert - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Application Log", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1195.001", "T1195"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "repository", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `github` alert.id=* action=create | rename repository.full_name as repository, repository.html_url as repository_url sender.login as user | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by action alert.affected_package_name alert.affected_range alert.created_at alert.external_identifier alert.external_reference alert.fixed_in alert.severity repository repository_url user | eval phase="code" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `github_dependabot_alert_filter` + +[ESCU - GitHub Pull Request from Unknown User - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for Pull Request from unknown user. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1195.001", "T1195"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for Pull Request from unknown user. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must index GitHub logs. You can follow the url in reference to onboard GitHub logs. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-01 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-01 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GitHub Pull Request from Unknown User - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Dev Sec Ops"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Vulnerabilities found in packages used by GitHub repository $repository$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "repository", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GitHub Pull Request from Unknown User - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Application Log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1195.001", "T1195"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "repository", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `github` check_suite.pull_requests{}.id=* | stats count by check_suite.head_commit.author.name repository.full_name check_suite.pull_requests{}.head.ref check_suite.head_commit.message | rename check_suite.head_commit.author.name as user repository.full_name as repository check_suite.pull_requests{}.head.ref as ref_head check_suite.head_commit.message as commit_message | search NOT `github_known_users` | eval phase="code" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `github_pull_request_from_unknown_user_filter` + +[ESCU - Gsuite Drive Share In External Email - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search is to detect suspicious google drive or google docs files shared outside or externally. This behavior might be a good hunting query to monitor exfitration of data made by an attacker or insider to a targetted machine. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1567.002", "T1567"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect suspicious google drive or google docs files shared outside or externally. This behavior might be a good hunting query to monitor exfitration of data made by an attacker or insider to a targetted machine. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc. In order for the search to work for your environment, please edit the query to use your company specific email domain instead of `internal_test_email.com`. +action.escu.known_false_positives = network admin or normal user may share files to customer and external team. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-16 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-16 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Gsuite Drive Share In External Email - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Dev Sec Ops"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = suspicious share gdrive from $parameters.owner$ to $email$ namely as $parameters.doc_title$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "parameters.owner", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 72}, {"risk_object_field": "email", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 72}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Gsuite Drive Share In External Email - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1567.002", "T1567"], "observable": [{"name": "parameters.owner", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "email", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `gsuite_drive` NOT (email IN("", "null")) | rex field=parameters.owner "[^@]+@(?[^@]+)" | rex field=email "[^@]+@(?[^@]+)" | where src_domain = "internal_test_email.com" and not dest_domain = "internal_test_email.com" | eval phase="plan" | eval severity="low" | stats values(parameters.doc_title) as doc_title, values(parameters.doc_type) as doc_types, values(email) as dst_email_list, values(parameters.visibility) as visibility, values(parameters.doc_id) as doc_id, count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by parameters.owner ip_address phase severity | rename parameters.owner as user ip_address as src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_drive_share_in_external_email_filter` + +[ESCU - GSuite Email Suspicious Attachment - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search is to detect a suspicious attachment file extension in Gsuite email that may related to spear phishing attack. This file type is commonly used by malware to lure user to click on it to execute malicious code to compromised targetted machine. But this search can also catch some normal files related to this file type that maybe send by employee or network admin. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001", "T1566"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious attachment file extension in Gsuite email that may related to spear phishing attack. This file type is commonly used by malware to lure user to click on it to execute malicious code to compromised targetted machine. But this search can also catch some normal files related to this file type that maybe send by employee or network admin. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc. +action.escu.known_false_positives = network admin and normal user may send this file attachment as part of their day to day work. having a good protocol in attaching this file type to an e-mail may reduce the risk of having a spear phishing attack. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-16 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-16 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GSuite Email Suspicious Attachment - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Dev Sec Ops"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = suspicious email from $source.address$ to $destination{}.address$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "source.address", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 49}, {"risk_object_field": "destination{}.address", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 49}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GSuite Email Suspicious Attachment - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001", "T1566"], "observable": [{"name": "source.address", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "destination{}.address", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `gsuite_gmail` "attachment{}.file_extension_type" IN ("pl", "py", "rb", "sh", "bat", "exe", "dll", "cpl", "com", "js", "vbs", "ps1", "reg","swf", "cmd", "go") | eval phase="plan" | eval severity="medium" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(attachment{}.file_extension_type) as email_attachments, values(attachment{}.sha256) as attachment_sha256, values(payload_size) as payload_size by destination{}.service num_message_attachments subject destination{}.address source.address phase severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_email_suspicious_attachment_filter` + +[ESCU - Gsuite Email Suspicious Subject With Attachment - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search is to detect a gsuite email contains suspicious subject having known file type used in spear phishing. This technique is a common and effective entry vector of attacker to compromise a network by luring the user to click or execute the suspicious attachment send from external email account because of the effective social engineering of subject related to delivery, bank and so on. On the other hand this detection may catch a normal email traffic related to legitimate transaction so better to check the email sender, spelling and etc. avoid click link or opening the attachment if you are not expecting this type of e-mail. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001", "T1566"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a gsuite email contains suspicious subject having known file type used in spear phishing. This technique is a common and effective entry vector of attacker to compromise a network by luring the user to click or execute the suspicious attachment send from external email account because of the effective social engineering of subject related to delivery, bank and so on. On the other hand this detection may catch a normal email traffic related to legitimate transaction so better to check the email sender, spelling and etc. avoid click link or opening the attachment if you are not expecting this type of e-mail. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc. +action.escu.known_false_positives = normal user or normal transaction may contain the subject and file type attachment that this detection try to search. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-19 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-19 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Gsuite Email Suspicious Subject With Attachment - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Dev Sec Ops"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = suspicious email from $source.address$ to $destination{}.address$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "source.address", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Gsuite Email Suspicious Subject With Attachment - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001", "T1566"], "observable": [{"name": "source.address", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `gsuite_gmail` num_message_attachments > 0 subject IN ("*dhl*", "* ups *", "*delivery*", "*parcel*", "*label*", "*invoice*", "*postal*", "* fedex *", "* usps *", "* express *", "*shipment*", "*Banking/Tax*","*shipment*", "*new order*") attachment{}.file_extension_type IN ("doc", "docx", "xls", "xlsx", "ppt", "pptx", "pdf", "zip", "rar", "html","htm","hta") | rex field=source.from_header_address "[^@]+@(?[^@]+)" | rex field=destination{}.address "[^@]+@(?[^@]+)" | where not source_domain="internal_test_email.com" and dest_domain="internal_test_email.com" | eval phase="plan" | eval severity="medium" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(attachment{}.file_extension_type) as email_attachments, values(attachment{}.sha256) as attachment_sha256, values(payload_size) as payload_size by destination{}.service num_message_attachments subject destination{}.address source.address phase severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_email_suspicious_subject_with_attachment_filter` + +[ESCU - Gsuite Email With Known Abuse Web Service Link - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytics is to detect a gmail containing a link that are known to be abused by malware or attacker like pastebin, telegram and discord to deliver malicious payload. This event can encounter some normal email traffic within organization and external email that normally using this application and services. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001", "T1566"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytics is to detect a gmail containing a link that are known to be abused by malware or attacker like pastebin, telegram and discord to deliver malicious payload. This event can encounter some normal email traffic within organization and external email that normally using this application and services. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc. +action.escu.known_false_positives = normal email contains this link that are known application within the organization or network can be catched by this detection. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-23 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-23 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Gsuite Email With Known Abuse Web Service Link - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Dev Sec Ops"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = suspicious email from $source.address$ to $destination{}.address$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "source.address", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Gsuite Email With Known Abuse Web Service Link - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001", "T1566"], "observable": [{"name": "source.address", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `gsuite_gmail` "link_domain{}" IN ("*pastebin.com*", "*discord*", "*telegram*","t.me") | rex field=source.from_header_address "[^@]+@(?[^@]+)" | rex field=destination{}.address "[^@]+@(?[^@]+)" | where not source_domain="internal_test_email.com" and dest_domain="internal_test_email.com" | eval phase="plan" | eval severity="low" |stats values(link_domain{}) as link_domains min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by is_spam source.address source.from_header_address subject destination{}.address phase severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_email_with_known_abuse_web_service_link_filter` + +[ESCU - Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search is to detect a suspicious outbound e-mail from internal email to external email domain. This can be a good hunting query to monitor insider or outbound email traffic for not common domain e-mail. The idea is to parse the domain of destination email check if there is a minimum outbound traffic < 20 with attachment. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1048"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious outbound e-mail from internal email to external email domain. This can be a good hunting query to monitor insider or outbound email traffic for not common domain e-mail. The idea is to parse the domain of destination email check if there is a minimum outbound traffic < 20 with attachment. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc. +action.escu.known_false_positives = network admin and normal user may send this file attachment as part of their day to day work. having a good protocol in attaching this file type to an e-mail may reduce the risk of having a spear phishing attack. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-17 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-17 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Dev Sec Ops"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = suspicious email from $source.address$ to $destination{}.address$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "source.address", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 9}, {"risk_object_field": "destination{}.address", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 9}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1048"], "observable": [{"name": "source.address", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "destination{}.address", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `gsuite_gmail` num_message_attachments > 0 | rex field=source.from_header_address "[^@]+@(?[^@]+)" | rex field=destination{}.address "[^@]+@(?[^@]+)" | where source_domain="internal_test_email.com" and not dest_domain="internal_test_email.com" | eval phase="plan" | eval severity="low" | stats values(subject) as subject, values(source.from_header_address) as src_domain_list, count as numEvents, dc(source.from_header_address) as numSrcAddresses, min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest_domain phase severity | where numSrcAddresses < 20 |sort - numSrcAddresses | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_outbound_email_with_attachment_to_external_domain_filter` + +[ESCU - Gsuite Suspicious Shared File Name - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search is to detect a shared file in google drive with suspicious file name that are commonly used by spear phishing campaign. This technique is very popular to lure the user by running a malicious document or click a malicious link within the shared file that will redirected to malicious website. This detection can also catch some normal email communication between organization and its external customer. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001", "T1566"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a shared file in google drive with suspicious file name that are commonly used by spear phishing campaign. This technique is very popular to lure the user by running a malicious document or click a malicious link within the shared file that will redirected to malicious website. This detection can also catch some normal email communication between organization and its external customer. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc. In order for the search to work for your environment, please edit the query to use your company specific email domain instead of `internal_test_email.com`. +action.escu.known_false_positives = normal user or normal transaction may contain the subject and file type attachment that this detection try to search +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-23 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-23 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Gsuite Suspicious Shared File Name - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Dev Sec Ops"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = suspicious share gdrive from $parameters.owner$ to $email$ namely as $parameters.doc_title$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "parameters.owner", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 21}, {"risk_object_field": "email", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 21}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Gsuite Suspicious Shared File Name - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001", "T1566"], "observable": [{"name": "parameters.owner", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "email", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `gsuite_drive` parameters.owner_is_team_drive=false "parameters.doc_title" IN ("*dhl*", "* ups *", "*delivery*", "*parcel*", "*label*", "*invoice*", "*postal*", "*fedex*", "* usps *", "* express *", "*shipment*", "*Banking/Tax*","*shipment*", "*new order*") parameters.doc_type IN ("document","pdf", "msexcel", "msword", "spreadsheet", "presentation") | rex field=parameters.owner "[^@]+@(?[^@]+)" | rex field=parameters.target_user "[^@]+@(?[^@]+)" | where not source_domain="internal_test_email.com" and dest_domain="internal_test_email.com" | eval phase="plan" | eval severity="low" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by email parameters.owner parameters.target_user parameters.doc_title parameters.doc_type phase severity | rename parameters.target_user AS user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_suspicious_shared_file_name_filter` + +[ESCU - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search uses the Kubernetes logs from a nginx ingress controller to detect local file inclusion attacks. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1212"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search uses the Kubernetes logs from a nginx ingress controller to detect local file inclusion attacks. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must ingest Kubernetes logs through Splunk Connect for Kubernetes. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-20 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-20 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Dev Sec Ops"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Local File Inclusion Attack detected on $host$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "src_ip", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1212"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src_ip", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search uses the Kubernetes logs from a nginx ingress controller to detect local file inclusion attacks. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI +action.notable.param.security_domain = network +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `kubernetes_container_controller` | rex field=_raw "^(?\S+)\s+-\s+-\s+\[(?[^\]]*)\]\s\"(?[^\"]*)\"\s(?\S*)\s(?\S*)\s\"(?[^\"]*)\"\s\"(?[^\"]*)\"\s(?\S*)\s(?\S*)\s\[(?[^\]]*)\]\s\[(?[^\]]*)\]\s(?\S*)\s(?\S*)\s(?\S*)\s(?\S*)\s(?\S*)" | lookup local_file_inclusion_paths local_file_inclusion_paths AS request OUTPUT lfi_path | search lfi_path=yes | rename remote_addr AS src_ip, upstream_status as status, proxy_upstream_name as proxy | rex field=request "^(?\S+)\s(?\S+)\s" | eval phase="operate" | eval severity="high" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by src_ip, status, url, http_method, host, http_user_agent, proxy, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `kubernetes_nginx_ingress_lfi_filter` + +[ESCU - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress RFI - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search uses the Kubernetes logs from a nginx ingress controller to detect remote file inclusion attacks. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1212"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search uses the Kubernetes logs from a nginx ingress controller to detect remote file inclusion attacks. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must ingest Kubernetes logs through Splunk Connect for Kubernetes. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-23 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-23 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress RFI - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Dev Sec Ops"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Remote File Inclusion Attack detected on $host$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "src_ip", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress RFI - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1212"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src_ip", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search uses the Kubernetes logs from a nginx ingress controller to detect remote file inclusion attacks. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Kubernetes Nginx Ingress RFI +action.notable.param.security_domain = network +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `kubernetes_container_controller` | rex field=_raw "^(?\S+)\s+-\s+-\s+\[(?[^\]]*)\]\s\"(?[^\"]*)\"\s(?\S*)\s(?\S*)\s\"(?[^\"]*)\"\s\"(?[^\"]*)\"\s(?\S*)\s(?\S*)\s\[(?[^\]]*)\]\s\[(?[^\]]*)\]\s(?\S*)\s(?\S*)\s(?\S*)\s(?\S*)\s(?\S*)" | rex field=request "^(?\S+)?\s(?\S+)\s" | rex field=url "(?\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3})" | search dest_ip=* | rename remote_addr AS src_ip, upstream_status as status, proxy_upstream_name as proxy | eval phase="operate" | eval severity="medium" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by src_ip, dest_ip status, url, http_method, host, http_user_agent, proxy, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `kubernetes_nginx_ingress_rfi_filter` + +[ESCU - Kubernetes Scanner Image Pulling - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search uses the Kubernetes logs from Splunk Connect from Kubernetes to detect Kubernetes Security Scanner. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search uses the Kubernetes logs from Splunk Connect from Kubernetes to detect Kubernetes Security Scanner. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must ingest Kubernetes logs through Splunk Connect for Kubernetes. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-24 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-24 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Scanner Image Pulling - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Dev Sec Ops"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Kubernetes Scanner image pulled on host $host$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "host", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 81}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Kubernetes Scanner Image Pulling - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "host", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search uses the Kubernetes logs from Splunk Connect from Kubernetes to detect Kubernetes Security Scanner. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Kubernetes Scanner Image Pulling +action.notable.param.security_domain = network +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `kube_objects_events` object.message IN ("Pulling image *kube-hunter*", "Pulling image *kube-bench*", "Pulling image *kube-recon*", "Pulling image *kube-recon*") | rename object.* AS * | rename involvedObject.* AS * | rename source.host AS host | eval phase="operate" | eval severity="high" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by host, name, namespace, kind, reason, message, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `kubernetes_scanner_image_pulling_filter` + +[ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search detects the creation of a new Federation setting by alerting about an specific event related to its creation. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003", "T1136"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search detects the creation of a new Federation setting by alerting about an specific event related to its creation. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity +action.escu.known_false_positives = The creation of a new Federation is not necessarily malicious, however this events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a different cloud provider. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-26 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-26 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Office 365 Detections", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = User $Actor.ID$ has created a new federation setting on $dest$ from IP Address $ActorIpAddress$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ActorIpAddress", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 18}, {"risk_object_field": "Actor.ID", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 18}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 18}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003", "T1136"], "observable": [{"name": "ActorIpAddress", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "Actor.ID", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search detects the creation of a new Federation setting by alerting about an specific event related to its creation. +action.notable.param.rule_title = O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User +action.notable.param.security_domain = threat +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation="Add app role assignment grant to user." | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Actor{}.ID) as Actor.ID values(Actor{}.Type) as Actor.Type by ActorIpAddress dest ResultStatus | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user_filter` + +[ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search detects the creation of a new Federation setting by alerting about an specific event related to its creation. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003", "T1136"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search detects the creation of a new Federation setting by alerting about an specific event related to its creation. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity +action.escu.known_false_positives = The creation of a new Federation is not necessarily malicious, however these events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a different cloud provider. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-03 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-03 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Office 365 Detections", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = User $Actor.ID$ created a new federation setting on $Target.ID$ and added service principal credentials from IP Address $ActorIpAddress$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ActorIpAddress", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}, {"risk_object_field": "Target.ID", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003", "T1136"], "observable": [{"name": "ActorIpAddress", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "Target.ID", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search detects the creation of a new Federation setting by alerting about an specific event related to its creation. +action.notable.param.rule_title = O365 Added Service Principal +action.notable.param.security_domain = threat +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation="Add service principal credentials." | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Actor{}.ID) as Actor.ID values(ModifiedProperties{}.Name) as ModifiedProperties.Name values(ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue) as ModifiedProperties.NewValue values(Target{}.ID) as Target.ID by ActorIpAddress Operation | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_added_service_principal_filter` + +[ESCU - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search detects newly added IP addresses/CIDR blocks to the list of MFA Trusted IPs to bypass multi factor authentication. Attackers are often known to use this technique so that they can bypass the MFA system. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007", "T1562"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search detects newly added IP addresses/CIDR blocks to the list of MFA Trusted IPs to bypass multi factor authentication. Attackers are often known to use this technique so that they can bypass the MFA system. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install Splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity +action.escu.known_false_positives = Unless it is a special case, it is uncommon to continually update Trusted IPs to MFA configuration. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-03 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-03 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Office 365 Detections"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = User $user_id$ has added new IP addresses $ip_addresses_new_added$ to a list of trusted IPs to bypass MFA +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ip_addresses_new_added", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}, {"risk_object_field": "user_id", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 42}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "ip_addresses_new_added", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "user_id", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search detects newly added IP addresses/CIDR blocks to the list of MFA Trusted IPs to bypass multi factor authentication. Attackers are often known to use this technique so that they can bypass the MFA system. +action.notable.param.rule_title = O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP +action.notable.param.security_domain = threat +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `o365_management_activity` Operation="Set Company Information." ModifiedProperties{}.Name=StrongAuthenticationPolicy | rex max_match=100 field=ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue "(?\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\/\d{1,2})" | rex max_match=100 field=ModifiedProperties{}.OldValue "(?\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\/\d{1,2})" | eval ip_addresses_old=if(isnotnull(ip_addresses_old),ip_addresses_old,"0") | mvexpand ip_addresses_new_added | where isnull(mvfind(ip_addresses_old,ip_addresses_new_added)) |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ip_addresses_old) as ip_addresses_old by user ip_addresses_new_added Operation Workload vendor_account status user_id action | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip_filter` + +[ESCU - O365 Disable MFA - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search detects when multi factor authentication has been disabled, what entitiy performed the action and against what user +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1556"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search detects when multi factor authentication has been disabled, what entitiy performed the action and against what user +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity +action.escu.known_false_positives = Unless it is a special case, it is uncommon to disable MFA or Strong Authentication +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-03 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-03 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Disable MFA - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Office 365 Detections"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = User $user$ has executed an operation $Operation$ for this destination $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 64}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 Disable MFA - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1556"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search detects when multi factor authentication has been disabled, what entitiy performed the action and against what user +action.notable.param.rule_title = O365 Disable MFA +action.notable.param.security_domain = threat +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `o365_management_activity` Operation="Disable Strong Authentication." | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by UserType Operation UserId ResultStatus |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_disable_mfa_filter` + +[ESCU - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search detects when an excessive number of authentication failures occur this search also includes attempts against MFA prompt codes +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search detects when an excessive number of authentication failures occur this search also includes attempts against MFA prompt codes +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity +action.escu.known_false_positives = The threshold for alert is above 10 attempts and this should reduce the number of false positives. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-18 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-18 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Office 365 Detections"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = User $user$ has caused excessive number of authentication failures from $src_ip$ using UserAgent $UserAgent$. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "src_ip", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 64}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "src_ip", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory UserAuthenticationMethod=* status=failure | stats count earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime values(UserAuthenticationMethod) AS UserAuthenticationMethod values(UserAgent) AS UserAgent values(status) AS status values(src_ip) AS src_ip by user | where count > 10 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert_filter` + +[ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search detects accounts with high number of Single Sign ON (SSO) logon errors. Excessive logon errors may indicate attempts to bruteforce of password or single sign on token hijack or reuse. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1556"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search detects accounts with high number of Single Sign ON (SSO) logon errors. Excessive logon errors may indicate attempts to bruteforce of password or single sign on token hijack or reuse. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity +action.escu.known_false_positives = Logon errors may not be malicious in nature however it may indicate attempts to reuse a token or password obtained via credential access attack. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-26 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-26 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Office 365 Detections", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = User $UserId$ has caused excessive number of SSO logon errors from $ActorIpAddress$ using UserAgent $UserAgent$. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ActorIpAddress", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}, {"risk_object_field": "UserId", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 64}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1556"], "observable": [{"name": "ActorIpAddress", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "UserId", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory LogonError=SsoArtifactInvalidOrExpired | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by LogonError ActorIpAddress UserAgent UserId | where count > 5 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors_filter` + +[ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search detects the addition of a new Federated domain. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003", "T1136"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search detects the addition of a new Federated domain. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity. +action.escu.known_false_positives = The creation of a new Federated domain is not necessarily malicious, however these events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a similar or different cloud provider. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-26 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-26 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Office 365 Detections", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = User $UserId$ has added a new federated domaain $Parameters.Value$ for $OrganizationName$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "OrganizationName", "threat_object_type": "other"}, {"risk_object_field": "UserId", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 64}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003", "T1136"], "observable": [{"name": "OrganizationName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Other"}, {"name": "UserId", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search detects the addition of a new Federated domain. +action.notable.param.rule_title = O365 New Federated Domain Added +action.notable.param.security_domain = threat +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `o365_management_activity` Workload=Exchange Operation="Add-FederatedDomain" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Parameters{}.Value) as Parameters.Value by ObjectId Operation OrganizationName OriginatingServer UserId UserKey | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_new_federated_domain_added_filter` + +[ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search detects when a user has performed an Ediscovery search or exported a PST file from the search. This PST file usually has sensitive information including email body content +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search detects when a user has performed an Ediscovery search or exported a PST file from the search. This PST file usually has sensitive information including email body content +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity +action.escu.known_false_positives = PST export can be done for legitimate purposes but due to the sensitive nature of its content it must be monitored. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-12-16 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-12-16 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Office 365 Detections", "Data Exfiltration"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = User $Source$ has exported a PST file from the search using this operation- $Operation$ with a severity of $Severity$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Source", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 48}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections", "Data Exfiltration"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114"], "observable": [{"name": "Source", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search detects when a user has performed an Ediscovery search or exported a PST file from the search. This PST file usually has sensitive information including email body content +action.notable.param.rule_title = O365 PST export alert +action.notable.param.security_domain = threat +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `o365_management_activity` Category=ThreatManagement Name="eDiscovery search started or exported" | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by Source Severity AlertEntityId Operation Name |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_pst_export_alert_filter` + +[ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search detects when an admin configured a forwarding rule for multiple mailboxes to the same destination. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.003", "T1114"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search detects when an admin configured a forwarding rule for multiple mailboxes to the same destination. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-12-16 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-12-16 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Office 365 Detections", "Data Exfiltration"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = User $user$ has configured a forwarding rule for multiple mailboxes to the same destination $ForwardingAddress$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 48}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections", "Data Exfiltration"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.003", "T1114"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `o365_management_activity` Operation=Set-Mailbox | spath input=Parameters | rename Identity AS src_user | search ForwardingAddress=* | stats dc(src_user) AS count_src_user earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(src_user) AS src_user values(user) AS user by ForwardingAddress | where count_src_user > 1 |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding_filter` + +[ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search detects the assignment of rights to accesss content from another mailbox. This is usually only assigned to a service account. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.002", "T1114"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search detects the assignment of rights to accesss content from another mailbox. This is usually only assigned to a service account. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity +action.escu.known_false_positives = Service Accounts +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-12-15 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-12-15 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Office 365 Detections"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = User $user$ has delegated suspicious rights $AccessRights$ to user $dest_user$ that allow access to sensitive +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 48}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Stage:Exfiltration", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.002", "T1114"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search detects the assignment of rights to accesss content from another mailbox. This is usually only assigned to a service account. +action.notable.param.rule_title = O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation +action.notable.param.security_domain = threat +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `o365_management_activity` Operation=Add-MailboxPermission | spath input=Parameters | rename User AS src_user, Identity AS dest_user | search AccessRights=FullAccess OR AccessRights=SendAs OR AccessRights=SendOnBehalf | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user src_user dest_user Operation AccessRights |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`o365_suspicious_rights_delegation_filter` + +[ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search detects when multiple user configured a forwarding rule to the same destination. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.003", "T1114"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search detects when multiple user configured a forwarding rule to the same destination. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-12-16 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-12-16 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Office 365 Detections", "Data Exfiltration"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = User $user$ configured multiple users $src_user$ with a count of $count_src_user$, a forwarding rule to same destination $ForwardingSmtpAddress$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 48}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections", "Data Exfiltration"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Stage:Exfiltration", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.003", "T1114"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "ForwardingSmtpAddress", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Email Address"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `o365_management_activity` Operation=Set-Mailbox | spath input=Parameters | rename Identity AS src_user | search ForwardingSmtpAddress=* | stats dc(src_user) AS count_src_user earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(src_user) AS src_user values(user) AS user by ForwardingSmtpAddress | where count_src_user > 1 |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding_filter` + [ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment. action.escu.known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user. action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 @@ -1274,8 +3058,8 @@ action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splun action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cryptomining", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"] action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = -action.risk.param._risk = [] +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -1283,13 +3067,8 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cryptomining", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cryptomining", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel -action.notable.param.rule_title = Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -1304,10 +3083,10 @@ search = `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | bucket span=10m [ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment. action.escu.known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user. action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 @@ -1319,8 +3098,8 @@ action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splun action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cryptomining", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"] action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = -action.risk.param._risk = [] +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -1328,14 +3107,8 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cryptomining", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cryptomining", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -1350,10 +3123,10 @@ search = `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success `abnormally_high_ [ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where an abnormally high number of instances were successfully terminated by a user in a 10-minute window. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where an abnormally high number of instances were successfully terminated by a user in a 10-minute window. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where an abnormally high number of instances were successfully terminated by a user in a 10-minute window. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where an abnormally high number of instances were successfully terminated by a user in a 10-minute window. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. action.escu.known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured with your AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify whether this search alerted on a human user. action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 @@ -1364,18 +3137,18 @@ action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where an abnormally high number of instances were successfully terminated by a user in a 10-minute window. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -1390,10 +3163,10 @@ search = `cloudtrail` eventName=TerminateInstances errorCode=success | bucket sp [ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user successfully terminates an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user successfully terminates an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user successfully terminates an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user successfully terminates an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment. action.escu.known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user. action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 @@ -1404,19 +3177,18 @@ action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user successfully terminates an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -1428,34 +3200,606 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = `cloudtrail` eventName=TerminateInstances errorCode=success `abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk_filter` | bucket span=10m _time | stats count as instances_terminated by _time src_user | apply ec2_excessive_terminateinstances_v1 | rename "IsOutlier(instances_terminated)" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1 -[ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule] +[ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search will detect a spike in the number of API calls made to your cloud infrastructure environment by a user. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Change"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search will detect a spike in the number of API calls made to your cloud infrastructure environment by a user. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User` to create the probability density function. +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen cities. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen cities. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources. +action.escu.known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ + This search will fire any time a new city is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your city, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. +action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-16 +action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-16 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search City=* [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search City=* | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by City | eval newCity=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newCity=1 | table City] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip, City, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city_filter` + +[ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen countries. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen countries. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources. +action.escu.known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching over plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ + This search will fire any time a new country is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. +action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-16 +action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-16 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Country=* [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Country=* | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by Country | eval newCountry=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newCountry=1 | table Country] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip, Country, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country_filter` + +[ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen IP addresses. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen IP addresses. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources. +action.escu.known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ + This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. +action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-16 +action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-16 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Country=* | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress | eval newIP=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newIP=1 | table sourceIPAddress] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter` + +[ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen regions. Region in this context is similar to a state in the United States. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen regions. Region in this context is similar to a state in the United States. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources. +action.escu.known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ + This search will fire any time a new region is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your region, there should be few false positives. If you are located in regions where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. +action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-16 +action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-16 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Region=* [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Region=* | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by Region | eval newRegion=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newRegion=1 | table Region] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip, Region, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region_filter` + +[ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search allows you to identify the endpoints that have connected to more than five DNS servers and made DNS Queries over the time frame of the search. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "PR.DS"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Resolution"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search allows you to identify the endpoints that have connected to more than five DNS servers and made DNS Queries over the time frame of the search. +action.escu.how_to_implement = This search requires that DNS data is being ingested and populating the `Network_Resolution` data model. This data can come from DNS logs or from solutions that parse network traffic for this data, such as Splunk Stream or Bro.\ +This search produces fields (`dest_count`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** Distinct DNS Connections, **Field:** dest_count\ +Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` +action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible that an enterprise has more than five DNS servers that are configured in a round-robin rotation. Please customize the search, as appropriate. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["DNS Hijacking", "Command \u0026 Control", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Host Redirection"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DNS Hijacking", "Command \u0026 Control", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Host Redirection"], "cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search allows you to identify the endpoints that have connected to more than five DNS servers and made DNS Queries over the time frame of the search. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers +action.notable.param.security_domain = network +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count, values(DNS.dest) AS dest dc(DNS.dest) as dest_count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.message_type=QUERY by DNS.src | `drop_dm_object_name("Network_Resolution")` |where dest_count > 5 | `clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers_filter` + +[ESCU - Cloud Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. Enforcing network-access controls is one of the defensive mechanisms used by cloud administrators to restrict access to a cloud instance. After the attacker has gained control of the console by compromising an admin account, they can delete a network ACL and gain access to the instance from anywhere. This search will query the Change datamodel to detect users deleting network ACLs. Deprecated because it's a duplicate +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = Enforcing network-access controls is one of the defensive mechanisms used by cloud administrators to restrict access to a cloud instance. After the attacker has gained control of the console by compromising an admin account, they can delete a network ACL and gain access to the instance from anywhere. This search will query the Change datamodel to detect users deleting network ACLs. Deprecated because it's a duplicate +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter` macro. +action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible that a user has legitimately deleted a network ACL. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-09-08 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-08 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Cloud Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Cloud Network ACL Activity"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Cloud Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Network ACL Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 11"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteNetworkAcl|rename userIdentity.arn as arn | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(errorMessage) values(errorCode) values(userAgent) values(userIdentity.*) by src userName arn eventName | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter` + +[ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user logged into the AWS account, is making API calls and has not enabled Multi Factor authentication. Multi factor authentication adds a layer of security by forcing the users to type a unique authentication code from an approved authentication device when they access AWS websites or services. AWS Best Practices recommend that you enable MFA for privileged IAM users. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "PR.AC"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user logged into the AWS account, is making API calls and has not enabled Multi Factor authentication. Multi factor authentication adds a layer of security by forcing the users to type a unique authentication code from an approved authentication device when they access AWS websites or services. AWS Best Practices recommend that you enable MFA for privileged IAM users. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. Leverage the support search `Create a list of approved AWS service accounts`: run it once every 30 days to create a list of service accounts and validate them.\ +This search produces fields (`eventName`,`userIdentity.type`,`userIdentity.arn`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** AWS Event Name, **Field:** eventName\ +1. \ +1. **Label:** AWS User ARN, **Field:** userIdentity.arn\ +1. \ +1. **Label:** AWS User Type, **Field:** userIdentity.type\ +Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` +action.escu.known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure do not have multi factor authentication enabled. Please ignore the service accounts, if triggered and instead add them to the aws_service_accounts.csv file to fine tune the detection. It is also possible that the search detects users in your environment using Single Sign-On systems, since the MFA is not handled by AWS. +action.escu.creation_date = 2018-05-17 +action.escu.modification_date = 2018-05-17 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS User Monitoring"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS User Monitoring"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "PR.AC"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `cloudtrail` userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.mfaAuthenticated=false | search NOT [| inputlookup aws_service_accounts | fields identity | rename identity as user]| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(eventName) as eventName by userIdentity.arn userIdentity.type user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa_filter` + +[ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for successful AWS CloudTrail activity by user accounts that are not listed in the identity table or `aws_service_accounts.csv`. It returns event names and count, as well as the first and last time a specific user or service is detected, grouped by users. Deprecated because managing this list can be quite hard. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "ID.AM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for successful AWS CloudTrail activity by user accounts that are not listed in the identity table or `aws_service_accounts.csv`. It returns event names and count, as well as the first and last time a specific user or service is detected, grouped by users. Deprecated because managing this list can be quite hard. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You must also populate the `identity_lookup_expanded` lookup shipped with the Asset and Identity framework to be able to look up users in your identity table in Enterprise Security (ES). Leverage the support search called "Create a list of approved AWS service accounts": run it once every 30 days to create and validate a list of service accounts.\ +This search produces fields (`eventName`,`firstTime`,`lastTime`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** AWS Event Name, **Field:** eventName\ +1. \ +1. **Label:** First Time, **Field:** firstTime\ +1. \ +1. **Label:** Last Time, **Field:** lastTime\ +Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` +action.escu.known_false_positives = It's likely that you'll find activity detected by users/service accounts that are not listed in the `identity_lookup_expanded` or ` aws_service_accounts.csv` file. If the user is a legitimate service account, update the `aws_service_accounts.csv` table with that entry. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS User Monitoring"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS User Monitoring"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `cloudtrail` errorCode=success | rename userName as identity | search NOT [| inputlookup identity_lookup_expanded | fields identity] | search NOT [| inputlookup aws_service_accounts | fields identity] | rename identity as user | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(eventName) as eventName by user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts_filter` + +[ESCU - Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2 - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for DNS requests for phishing domains that are leveraging EvilGinx tools to mimic websites. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Command \u0026 Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.003"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Resolution"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for DNS requests for phishing domains that are leveraging EvilGinx tools to mimic websites. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You need to ingest data from your DNS logs in the Network_Resolution datamodel. Specifically you must ingest the domain that is being queried and the IP of the host originating the request. Ideally, you should also be ingesting the answer to the query and the query type. This approach allows you to also create your own localized passive DNS capability which can aid you in future investigations. You will have to add legitimate domain names to the `legit_domains.csv` file shipped with the app. \ + **Splunk>Phantom Playbook Integration**\ +If Splunk>Phantom is also configured in your environment, a Playbook called `Lets Encrypt Domain Investigate` can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/`, add the correct hostname to the "Phantom Instance" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search, and set the corresponding Playbook to active. \ +(Playbook link:`https://my.phantom.us/4.2/playbook/lets-encrypt-domain-investigate/`).\ + +action.escu.known_false_positives = If a known good domain is not listed in the legit_domains.csv file, then the search could give you false postives. Please update that lookup file to filter out DNS requests to legitimate domains. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2 - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Common Phishing Frameworks"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2 - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Common Phishing Frameworks"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 7"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Command \u0026 Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.003"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for DNS requests for phishing domains that are leveraging EvilGinx tools to mimic websites. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2 +action.notable.param.security_domain = network +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(DNS.answer) as answer from datamodel=Network_Resolution.DNS by DNS.dest DNS.src DNS.query host | `drop_dm_object_name(DNS)`| rex field=query ".*?(?[^./:]+\.(\S{2,3}|\S{2,3}.\S{2,3}))$" | stats count values(query) as query by domain dest src answer| search `evilginx_phishlets_amazon` OR `evilginx_phishlets_facebook` OR `evilginx_phishlets_github` OR `evilginx_phishlets_0365` OR `evilginx_phishlets_outlook` OR `evilginx_phishlets_aws` OR `evilginx_phishlets_google` | search NOT [ inputlookup legit_domains.csv | fields domain]| join domain type=outer [| tstats count `security_content_summariesonly` values(Web.url) as url from datamodel=Web.Web by Web.dest Web.site | rename "Web.*" as * | rex field=site ".*?(?[^./:]+\.(\S{2,3}|\S{2,3}.\S{2,3}))$" | table dest domain url] | table count src dest query answer domain url | `detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2_filter` + +[ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search is used to detect attempts to use DNS tunneling, by calculating the length of responses to DNS TXT queries. Endpoints using DNS as a method of transmission for data exfiltration, command and control, or evasion of security controls can often be detected by noting unusually large volumes of DNS traffic. Deprecated because this detection should focus on DNS queries instead of DNS responses. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Resolution"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is used to detect attempts to use DNS tunneling, by calculating the length of responses to DNS TXT queries. Endpoints using DNS as a method of transmission for data exfiltration, command and control, or evasion of security controls can often be detected by noting unusually large volumes of DNS traffic. Deprecated because this detection should focus on DNS queries instead of DNS responses. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to ingest data from your DNS logs, or monitor DNS traffic using Stream, Bro or something similar. Specifically, this query requires that the DNS data model is populated with information regarding the DNS record type that is being returned as well as the data in the answer section of the protocol. +action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible that legitimate TXT record responses can be long enough to trigger this search. You can modify the packet threshold for this search to help mitigate false positives. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Command \u0026 Control"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Command \u0026 Control"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is used to detect attempts to use DNS tunneling, by calculating the length of responses to DNS TXT queries. Endpoints using DNS as a method of transmission for data exfiltration, command and control, or evasion of security controls can often be detected by noting unusually large volumes of DNS traffic. Deprecated because this detection should focus on DNS queries instead of DNS responses. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response +action.notable.param.security_domain = network +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.message_type=response AND DNS.record_type=TXT by DNS.src DNS.dest DNS.answer DNS.record_type | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` | eval anslen=len(answer) | search anslen>100 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename src as "Source IP", dest as "Destination IP", answer as "DNS Answer" anslen as "Answer Length" record_type as "DNS Record Type" firstTime as "First Time" lastTime as "Last Time" count as Count | table "Source IP" "Destination IP" "DNS Answer" "DNS Record Type" "Answer Length" Count "First Time" "Last Time" | `detect_long_dns_txt_record_response_filter` + +[ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703 - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for PowerShell requesting privileges consistent with credential dumping. Deprecated, looks like things changed from a logging perspective. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for PowerShell requesting privileges consistent with credential dumping. Deprecated, looks like things changed from a logging perspective. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting Windows Security logs. You must also enable the account change auditing here: http://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/7.0.2/Data/MonitorWindowseventlogdata. Additionally, this search requires you to enable your Group Management Audit Logs in your Local Windows Security Policy and to be ingesting those logs. More information on how to enable them can be found here: http://whatevernetworks.com/auditing-group-membership-changes-in-active-directory/. Finally, please make sure that the local administrator group name is "Administrators" to be able to look for the right group membership changes. +action.escu.known_false_positives = The activity may be legitimate. PowerShell is often used by administrators to perform various tasks, and it's possible this event could be generated in those cases. In these cases, false positives should be fairly obvious and you may need to tweak the search to eliminate noise. +action.escu.creation_date = 2019-02-27 +action.escu.modification_date = 2019-02-27 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703 - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703 - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for PowerShell requesting privileges consistent with credential dumping. Deprecated, looks like things changed from a logging perspective. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703 +action.notable.param.security_domain = access +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `wineventlog_security` signature_id=4703 Process_Name=*powershell.exe | rex field=Message "Enabled Privileges:\s+(?\w+)\s+Disabled Privileges:" | where privs="SeDebugPrivilege" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Process_Name, privs, Process_ID, Message | rename privs as "Enabled Privilege" | rename Process_Name as process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703_filter` + +[ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search detects new API calls that have either never been seen before or that have not been seen in the previous hour, where the identity type is `AssumedRole`. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search detects new API calls that have either never been seen before or that have not been seen in the previous hour, where the identity type is `AssumedRole`. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously seen API call per user roles in AWS CloudTrail" support search once to create a history of previously seen user roles. +action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible that there are legitimate user roles making new or infrequently used API calls in your infrastructure, causing the search to trigger. +action.escu.creation_date = 2018-04-16 +action.escu.modification_date = 2018-04-16 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS User Monitoring"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS User Monitoring"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall errorCode=success userIdentity.type=AssumedRole [search `cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall errorCode=success userIdentity.type=AssumedRole | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by userName eventName | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles | stats min(earliest) as earliest, max(latest) as latest by userName eventName | outputlookup previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles| eval newApiCallfromUserRole=if(earliest>=relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newApiCallfromUserRole=1 | `security_content_ctime(earliest)` | `security_content_ctime(latest)` | table eventName userName] |rename userName as user| stats values(eventName) earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by user | `security_content_ctime(earliest)` | `security_content_ctime(latest)` | `detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles_filter` + +[ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour. Deprecated now this search is updated to use the Authentication datamodel. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour. Deprecated now this search is updated to use the Authentication datamodel. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. Run the "Previously seen users in AWS CloudTrail" support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run "Update previously seen users in AWS CloudTrail" hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. +action.escu.known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user | eval userStatus=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), "First Time Logging into AWS Console","Previously Seen User") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| where userStatus ="First Time Logging into AWS Console" | `detect_new_user_aws_console_login_filter` + +[ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search will detect users creating spikes of API activity in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search will detect users creating spikes of API activity in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike.\ +This search produces fields (`eventName`,`numberOfApiCalls`,`uniqueApisCalled`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** AWS Event Name, **Field:** eventName\ +1. \ +1. **Label:** Number of API Calls, **Field:** numberOfApiCalls\ +1. \ +1. **Label:** Unique API Calls, **Field:** uniqueApisCalled\ +Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` action.escu.known_false_positives = -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-09-07 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-07 +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud User Activities"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS User Monitoring"] action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = user $user$ has made $api_calls$ api calls, violating the dynamic threshold of $expected_upper_threshold$ with the following command $command$. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 15}] +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud User Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS User Monitoring"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} schedule_window = auto alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true @@ -1466,36 +3810,36 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = | tstats count as api_calls values(All_Changes.command) as command from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.user!=unknown All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%w") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | join user HourOfDay isWeekend [ summary cloud_excessive_api_calls_v1] | where cardinality >=16 | apply cloud_excessive_api_calls_v1 threshold=0.005 | rename "IsOutlier(api_calls)" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1 | eval expected_upper_threshold = mvindex(split(mvindex(BoundaryRanges, -1), ":"), 0) | where api_calls > expected_upper_threshold | eval distance_from_threshold = api_calls - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, command, api_calls, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_filter` +search = `cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall [search `cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | stats count as apiCalls by arn | inputlookup api_call_by_user_baseline append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) as * by arn | rename apiCalls as latestCount | eval newAvgApiCalls=avgApiCalls + (latestCount-avgApiCalls)/720 | eval newStdevApiCalls=sqrt(((pow(stdevApiCalls, 2)*719 + (latestCount-newAvgApiCalls)*(latestCount-avgApiCalls))/720)) | eval avgApiCalls=coalesce(newAvgApiCalls, avgApiCalls), stdevApiCalls=coalesce(newStdevApiCalls, stdevApiCalls), numDataPoints=if(isnull(latestCount), numDataPoints, numDataPoints+1) | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup api_call_by_user_baseline | eval dataPointThreshold = 15, deviationThreshold = 3 | eval isSpike=if((latestCount > avgApiCalls+deviationThreshold*stdevApiCalls) AND numDataPoints > dataPointThreshold, 1, 0) | where isSpike=1 | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | stats values(eventName) as eventName, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName) as uniqueApisCalled by user | `detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity_filter` -[ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule] +[ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search finds for the number successfully destroyed cloud instances for every 4 hour block. This is split up between weekdays and the weekend. It then applies the probability densitiy model previously created and alerts on any outliers. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Change"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search finds for the number successfully destroyed cloud instances for every 4 hour block. This is split up between weekdays and the weekend. It then applies the probability densitiy model previously created and alerts on any outliers. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed` to create the probability density function. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within a cloud infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-08-21 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-21 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to network access-control lists (ACLs)in your AWS environment. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to network access-control lists (ACLs)in your AWS environment. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best when you run the "Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN" support search once to create a lookup file of previously seen Network ACL Activity. To add or remove API event names related to network ACLs, edit the macro `network_acl_events`. +action.escu.known_false_positives = The false-positive rate may vary based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`. Please modify this according the your environment. +action.escu.creation_date = 2018-05-21 +action.escu.modification_date = 2018-05-21 action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Network ACL Activity"] action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = -action.risk.param._risk = [] +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Network ACL Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 11"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} schedule_window = auto alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true @@ -1506,36 +3850,36 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = | tstats count as instances_destroyed values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=deleted AND All_Changes.status=success AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%w") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | join HourOfDay isWeekend [summary cloud_excessive_instances_destroyed_v1] | where cardinality >=16 | apply cloud_excessive_instances_destroyed_v1 threshold=0.005 | rename "IsOutlier(instances_destroyed)" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1 | eval expected_upper_threshold = mvindex(split(mvindex(BoundaryRanges, -1), ":"), 0) | eval distance_from_threshold = instances_destroyed - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, instances_destroyed, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold, object_id | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_destroyed_filter` +search = `cloudtrail` `network_acl_events` [search `cloudtrail` `network_acl_events` | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | stats count as apiCalls by arn | inputlookup network_acl_activity_baseline append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) as * by arn | rename apiCalls as latestCount | eval newAvgApiCalls=avgApiCalls + (latestCount-avgApiCalls)/720 | eval newStdevApiCalls=sqrt(((pow(stdevApiCalls, 2)*719 + (latestCount-newAvgApiCalls)*(latestCount-avgApiCalls))/720)) | eval avgApiCalls=coalesce(newAvgApiCalls, avgApiCalls), stdevApiCalls=coalesce(newStdevApiCalls, stdevApiCalls), numDataPoints=if(isnull(latestCount), numDataPoints, numDataPoints+1) | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup network_acl_activity_baseline | eval dataPointThreshold = 15, deviationThreshold = 3 | eval isSpike=if((latestCount > avgApiCalls+deviationThreshold*stdevApiCalls) AND numDataPoints > dataPointThreshold, 1, 0) | where isSpike=1 | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | stats values(eventName) as eventNames, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName) as uniqueApisCalled by user | `detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity_filter` -[ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule] +[ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search finds for the number successfully created cloud instances for every 4 hour block. This is split up between weekdays and the weekend. It then applies the probability densitiy model previously created and alerts on any outliers. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Change"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search finds for the number successfully created cloud instances for every 4 hour block. This is split up between weekdays and the weekend. It then applies the probability densitiy model previously created and alerts on any outliers. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched` to create the probability density function. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-08-21 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-21 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to security groups in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to security groups in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike.This search works best when you run the "Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN" support search once to create a history of previously seen Security Group Activity. To add or remove API event names for security groups, edit the macro `security_group_api_calls`. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`, the false positive rate may vary. Please modify this according the your environment. +action.escu.creation_date = 2018-04-18 +action.escu.modification_date = 2018-04-18 action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Cloud Cryptomining", "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS User Monitoring"] action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = -action.risk.param._risk = [] +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Cryptomining", "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS User Monitoring"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} schedule_window = auto alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true @@ -1546,36 +3890,277 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = | tstats count as instances_launched values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=created) AND All_Changes.status=success AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%w") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | join HourOfDay isWeekend [summary cloud_excessive_instances_created_v1] | where cardinality >=16 | apply cloud_excessive_instances_created_v1 threshold=0.005 | rename "IsOutlier(instances_launched)" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1 | eval expected_upper_threshold = mvindex(split(mvindex(BoundaryRanges, -1), ":"), 0) | eval distance_from_threshold = instances_launched - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, instances_launched, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold, object_id | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_launched_filter` +search = `cloudtrail` `security_group_api_calls` [search `cloudtrail` `security_group_api_calls` | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | stats count as apiCalls by arn | inputlookup security_group_activity_baseline append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) as * by arn | rename apiCalls as latestCount | eval newAvgApiCalls=avgApiCalls + (latestCount-avgApiCalls)/720 | eval newStdevApiCalls=sqrt(((pow(stdevApiCalls, 2)*719 + (latestCount-newAvgApiCalls)*(latestCount-avgApiCalls))/720)) | eval avgApiCalls=coalesce(newAvgApiCalls, avgApiCalls), stdevApiCalls=coalesce(newStdevApiCalls, stdevApiCalls), numDataPoints=if(isnull(latestCount), numDataPoints, numDataPoints+1) | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup security_group_activity_baseline | eval dataPointThreshold = 15, deviationThreshold = 3 | eval isSpike=if((latestCount > avgApiCalls+deviationThreshold*stdevApiCalls) AND numDataPoints > dataPointThreshold, 1, 0) | where isSpike=1 | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | stats values(eventName) as eventNames, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName) as uniqueApisCalled by user | `detect_spike_in_security_group_activity_filter` -[ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule] +[ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search will detect a spike in the number of API calls made to your cloud infrastructure environment about security groups by a user. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Change"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search will detect a spike in the number of API calls made to your cloud infrastructure environment about security groups by a user. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User` to create the probability density function model. -action.escu.known_false_positives = -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-09-07 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-07 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search is used to detect hosts that generate Windows Event ID 4663 for successful attempts to write to or read from a removable storage and Event ID 4656 for failures, which occurs when a USB drive is plugged in. In this scenario we are querying the Change_Analysis data model to look for Windows Event ID 4656 or 4663 where the priority of the affected host is marked as high in the ES Assets and Identity Framework. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.DS"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Change_Analysis"] +action.escu.eli5 = The search is used to detect hosts that generate Windows Event ID 4663 for successful attempts to write to or read from a removable storage and Event ID 4656 for failures, which occurs when a USB drive is plugged in. In this scenario we are querying the Change_Analysis data model to look for Windows Event ID 4656 or 4663 where the priority of the affected host is marked as high in the ES Assets and Identity Framework. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663 and 4656. Ensure that the field from the event logs is being mapped to the result_id field in the Change_Analysis data model. To minimize the alert volume, this search leverages the Assets and Identity framework to filter out events from those assets not marked high priority in the Enterprise Security Assets and Identity Framework. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate USB activity will also be detected. Please verify and investigate as appropriate. +action.escu.creation_date = 2017-11-27 +action.escu.modification_date = 2017-11-27 action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud User Activities"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Data Protection"] action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = user $user$ has made $api_calls$ api calls related to security groups, violating the dynamic threshold of $expected_upper_threshold$ with the following command $command$. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 15}] +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud User Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:Inbound", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Detect USB device insertion - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Protection"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The search is used to detect hosts that generate Windows Event ID 4663 for successful attempts to write to or read from a removable storage and Event ID 4656 for failures, which occurs when a USB drive is plugged in. In this scenario we are querying the Change_Analysis data model to look for Windows Event ID 4656 or 4663 where the priority of the affected host is marked as high in the ES Assets and Identity Framework. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect USB device insertion +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) AS earliest latest(_time) AS latest from datamodel=Change_Analysis where (nodename = All_Changes) All_Changes.result="Removable Storage device" (All_Changes.result_id=4663 OR All_Changes.result_id=4656) (All_Changes.src_priority=high) by All_Changes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")`| `security_content_ctime(earliest)`| `security_content_ctime(latest)` | `detect_usb_device_insertion_filter` + +[ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for web connections to dynamic DNS providers. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.001"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "DE.DP"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Web"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for web connections to dynamic DNS providers. +action.escu.how_to_implement = This search requires you to be ingesting web-traffic logs. You can obtain these logs from indexing data from a web proxy or by using a network-traffic-analysis tool, such as Bro or Splunk Stream. The web data model must contain the URL being requested, the IP address of the host initiating the request, and the destination IP. This search also leverages a lookup file, `dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv`, which contains a non-exhaustive list of dynamic DNS providers. Consider periodically updating this local lookup file with new domains.\ +This search produces fields (`isDynDNS`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** IsDynamicDNS, **Field:** isDynDNS\ +Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` Deprecated because duplicate. +action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible that list of dynamic DNS providers is outdated and/or that the URL being requested is legitimate. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Dynamic DNS"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dynamic DNS"], "cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.001"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "DE.DP"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for web connections to dynamic DNS providers. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers +action.notable.param.security_domain = network +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Web.url) as url min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Web where Web.status=200 by Web.src Web.dest Web.status | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `dynamic_dns_web_traffic` | `detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter` + +[ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search is used to detect DNS tunneling, by calculating the sum of the length of DNS queries and DNS answers. The search also filters out potential false positives by filtering out queries made to internal systems and the queries originating from internal DNS, Web, and Email servers. Endpoints using DNS as a method of transmission for data exfiltration, command and control, or evasion of security controls can often be detected by noting an unusually large volume of DNS traffic. \ +NOTE:Deprecated because existing detection is doing the same. This detection is replaced with two other variations, if you are using MLTK then you can use this search `ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule` or use the standard deviation version `ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule`, as an alternantive. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.DS"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Resolution"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is used to detect DNS tunneling, by calculating the sum of the length of DNS queries and DNS answers. The search also filters out potential false positives by filtering out queries made to internal systems and the queries originating from internal DNS, Web, and Email servers. Endpoints using DNS as a method of transmission for data exfiltration, command and control, or evasion of security controls can often be detected by noting an unusually large volume of DNS traffic. \ +NOTE:Deprecated because existing detection is doing the same. This detection is replaced with two other variations, if you are using MLTK then you can use this search `ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule` or use the standard deviation version `ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule`, as an alternantive. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, we must ensure that DNS data is being ingested and mapped to the appropriate fields in the Network_Resolution data model. Fields like src_category are automatically provided by the Assets and Identity Framework shipped with Splunk Enterprise Security. You will need to ensure you are using the Assets and Identity Framework and populating the src_category field. You will also need to enable the `cim_corporate_web_domain_search()` macro which will essentially filter out the DNS queries made to the corporate web domains to reduce alert fatigue. +action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible that normal DNS traffic will exhibit this behavior. If an alert is generated, please investigate and validate as appropriate. The threshold can also be modified to better suit your environment. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-15 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-15 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Data Protection", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Command \u0026 Control"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Protection", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Command \u0026 Control"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is used to detect DNS tunneling, by calculating the sum of the length of DNS queries and DNS answers. The search also filters out potential false positives by filtering out queries made to internal systems and the queries originating from internal DNS, Web, and Email servers. Endpoints using DNS as a method of transmission for data exfiltration, command and control, or evasion of security controls can often be detected by noting an unusually large volume of DNS traffic. \ +NOTE:Deprecated because existing detection is doing the same. This detection is replaced with two other variations, if you are using MLTK then you can use this search `ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule` or use the standard deviation version `ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule`, as an alternantive. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Detection of DNS Tunnels +action.notable.param.security_domain = network +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc("DNS.query") as count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where nodename=DNS "DNS.message_type"="QUERY" NOT (`cim_corporate_web_domain_search("DNS.query")`) NOT "DNS.query"="*.in-addr.arpa" NOT ("DNS.src_category"="svc_infra_dns" OR "DNS.src_category"="svc_infra_webproxy" OR "DNS.src_category"="svc_infra_email*" ) by "DNS.src","DNS.query" | rename "DNS.src" as src "DNS.query" as message | eval length=len(message) | stats sum(length) as length by src | append [ tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc("DNS.answer") as count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where nodename=DNS "DNS.message_type"="QUERY" NOT (`cim_corporate_web_domain_search("DNS.query")`) NOT "DNS.query"="*.in-addr.arpa" NOT ("DNS.src_category"="svc_infra_dns" OR "DNS.src_category"="svc_infra_webproxy" OR "DNS.src_category"="svc_infra_email*" ) by "DNS.src","DNS.answer" | rename "DNS.src" as src "DNS.answer" as message | eval message=if(message=="unknown","", message) | eval length=len(message) | stats sum(length) as length by src ] | stats sum(length) as length by src | where length > 10000 | `detection_of_dns_tunnels_filter` + +[ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search will detect DNS requests resolved by unauthorized DNS servers. Legitimate DNS servers should be identified in the Enterprise Security Assets and Identity Framework. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Resolution"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search will detect DNS requests resolved by unauthorized DNS servers. Legitimate DNS servers should be identified in the Enterprise Security Assets and Identity Framework. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. It also requires that your DNS servers are identified correctly in the Assets and Identity table of Enterprise Security. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate DNS activity can be detected in this search. Investigate, verify and update the list of authorized DNS servers as appropriate. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["DNS Hijacking", "Command \u0026 Control", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Host Redirection"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DNS Hijacking", "Command \u0026 Control", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Host Redirection"], "cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search will detect DNS requests resolved by unauthorized DNS servers. Legitimate DNS servers should be identified in the Enterprise Security Assets and Identity Framework. +action.notable.param.rule_title = DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers +action.notable.param.security_domain = network +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.dest_category != dns_server AND DNS.src_category != dns_server by DNS.src DNS.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` | `dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers_filter` + +[ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search takes the DNS records and their answers results of the discovered_dns_records lookup and finds if any records have changed by searching DNS response from the Network_Resolution datamodel across the last day. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Resolution"] +action.escu.eli5 = The search takes the DNS records and their answers results of the discovered_dns_records lookup and finds if any records have changed by searching DNS response from the Network_Resolution datamodel across the last day. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the `Network_Resolution` data model. It also requires that the `discover_dns_record` lookup table be populated by the included support search "Discover DNS record". \ + **Splunk>Phantom Playbook Integration**\ +If Splunk>Phantom is also configured in your environment, a Playbook called "DNS Hijack Enrichment" can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. The playbook takes in the DNS record changed and uses Geoip, whois, Censys and PassiveTotal to detect if DNS issuers changed. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/`, add the correct hostname to the "Phantom Instance" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search, and set the corresponding Playbook to active. \ +(Playbook Link:`https://my.phantom.us/4.2/playbook/dns-hijack-enrichment/`).\ + +action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate DNS changes can be detected in this search. Investigate, verify and update the list of provided current answers for the domains in question as appropriate. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["DNS Hijacking"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - DNS record changed - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DNS Hijacking"], "cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The search takes the DNS records and their answers results of the discovered_dns_records lookup and finds if any records have changed by searching DNS response from the Network_Resolution datamodel across the last day. +action.notable.param.rule_title = DNS record changed +action.notable.param.security_domain = network +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | inputlookup discovered_dns_records | rename answer as discovered_answer | join domain[|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.record_type) as type, values(DNS.answer) as current_answer values(DNS.src) as src from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.message_type=RESPONSE DNS.answer!="unknown" DNS.answer!="" by DNS.query | rename DNS.query as query | where query!="unknown" | rex field=query "(?\w+\.\w+?)(?:$|/)"] | makemv delim=" " answer | makemv delim=" " type | sort -count | table count,src,domain,type,query,current_answer,discovered_answer | makemv current_answer | mvexpand current_answer | makemv discovered_answer | eval n=mvfind(discovered_answer, current_answer) | where isnull(n) | `dns_record_changed_filter` + +[ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. Detect a renamed instance of procdump.exe dumping the lsass process. This query looks for both -mm and -ma usage. -mm will produce a mini dump file and -ma will write a dump file with all process memory. Both are highly suspect and should be reviewed. Modify the query as needed.\ +During triage, confirm this is procdump.exe executing. If it is the first time a Sysinternals utility has been ran, it is possible there will be a -accepteula on the command line. Review other endpoint data sources for cross process (injection) into lsass.exe. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = Detect a renamed instance of procdump.exe dumping the lsass process. This query looks for both -mm and -ma usage. -mm will produce a mini dump file and -ma will write a dump file with all process memory. Both are highly suspect and should be reviewed. Modify the query as needed.\ +During triage, confirm this is procdump.exe executing. If it is the first time a Sysinternals utility has been ran, it is possible there will be a -accepteula on the command line. Review other endpoint data sources for cross process (injection) into lsass.exe. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = None identified. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-02-01 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-02-01 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Credential Dumping", "HAFNIUM Group"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$, attempting to dump lsass.exe. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "HAFNIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true @@ -1586,7 +4171,2429 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = | tstats count as security_group_api_calls values(All_Changes.command) as command from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.object_category=firewall AND All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%w") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | join user HourOfDay isWeekend [ summary cloud_excessive_security_group_api_calls_v1] | where cardinality >=16 | apply cloud_excessive_security_group_api_calls_v1 threshold=0.005 | rename "IsOutlier(security_group_api_calls)" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1 | eval expected_upper_threshold = mvindex(split(mvindex(BoundaryRanges, -1), ":"), 0) | where security_group_api_calls > expected_upper_threshold | eval distance_from_threshold = security_group_api_calls - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, command, security_group_api_calls, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls_filter` +search = `sysmon` OriginalFileName=procdump process_name!=procdump*.exe EventID=1 (CommandLine=*-ma* OR CommandLine=*-mm*) CommandLine=*lsass* | rename Computer as dest | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, parent_process_name, process_name, OriginalFileName, CommandLine | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename_filter` + +[ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for EC2 instances being modified by users who have not previously modified them. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for EC2 instances being modified by users who have not previously modified them. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User" support search once to create a history of previously seen ARNs. To add or remove APIs that modify an EC2 instance, edit the macro `ec2_modification_api_calls`. +action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible that a new user will start to modify EC2 instances when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is modifying instances that this is the intended behavior. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `cloudtrail` `ec2_modification_api_calls` [search `cloudtrail` `ec2_modification_api_calls` errorCode=success | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by userIdentity.arn | rename userIdentity.arn as arn | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by arn | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user | eval newUser=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newUser=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=dest responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | table _time, user, dest | `ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user_filter` + +[ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where an instance is started in a particular region in the last one hour and then compares it to a lookup file of previously seen regions where an instance was started +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where an instance is started in a particular region in the last one hour and then compares it to a lookup file of previously seen regions where an instance was started +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. Run the "Previously seen AWS Regions" support search only once to create of baseline of previously seen regions. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. +action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible that a user has unknowingly started an instance in a new region. Please verify that this activity is legitimate. +action.escu.creation_date = 2018-02-23 +action.escu.modification_date = 2018-02-23 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cryptomining", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cryptomining", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 12"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `cloudtrail` earliest=-1h StartInstances | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by awsRegion | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_aws_regions.csv | stats min(earliest) as earliest max(latest) as latest by awsRegion | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_regions.csv | eval regionStatus=if(earliest >= relative_time(now(),"-1d@d"), "Instance Started in a New Region","Previously Seen Region") | `security_content_ctime(earliest)` | `security_content_ctime(latest)` | where regionStatus="Instance Started in a New Region" | `ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region_filter` + +[ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen AMIs. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen AMIs. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 AMIs" support search once to create a history of previously seen AMIs. +action.escu.known_false_positives = After a new AMI is created, the first systems created with that AMI will cause this alert to fire. Verify that the AMI being used was created by a legitimate user. +action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-12 +action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-12 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cryptomining"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cryptomining"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId | rename requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId as amiID | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_ec2_amis.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by amiID | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_amis.csv | eval newAMI=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where newAMI=1 | rename amiID as requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId | table requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId] | rename requestParameters.instanceType as instanceType, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as dest, userIdentity.arn as arn, requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId as amiID | table firstTime, lastTime, arn, amiID, dest, instanceType | `ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami_filter` + +[ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen instance types. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen instance types. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types" support search once to create a history of previously seen instance types. +action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible that an admin will create a new system using a new instance type never used before. Verify with the creator that they intended to create the system with the new instance type. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-02-07 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-02-07 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cryptomining"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cryptomining"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | fillnull value="m1.small" requestParameters.instanceType | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by requestParameters.instanceType | rename requestParameters.instanceType as instanceType | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.csv | stats min(earliest) as earliest max(latest) as latest by instanceType | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.csv | eval newType=if(earliest >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | `security_content_ctime(earliest)` | `security_content_ctime(latest)` | where newType=1 | rename instanceType as requestParameters.instanceType | table requestParameters.instanceType] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename requestParameters.instanceType as instanceType, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as dest | table _time, user, dest, instanceType | `ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter` + +[ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for EC2 instances being created by users who have not created them before. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for EC2 instances being created by users who have not created them before. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User" support search once to create a history of previously seen ARNs. +action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible that a user will start to create EC2 instances when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is launching instances that this is the intended behavior. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cryptomining", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cryptomining", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by userIdentity.arn | rename userIdentity.arn as arn | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by arn | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.csv | eval newUser=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newUser=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | rename requestParameters.instanceType as instanceType, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as dest, userIdentity.arn as user | table _time, user, dest, instanceType | `ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user_filter` + +[ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for processes launched from files with at least five spaces in the name before the extension. This is typically done to obfuscate the file extension by pushing it outside of the default view. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT", "PR.IP"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for processes launched from files with at least five spaces in the name before the extension. This is typically done to obfuscate the file extension by pushing it outside of the default view. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +action.escu.known_false_positives = None identified. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-11-19 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-19 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for processes launched from files with at least five spaces in the name before the extension. This is typically done to obfuscate the file extension by pushing it outside of the default view. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_path) as process_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = "* .*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process Processes.process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension_filter` + +[ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search returns a list of hosts that have not successfully completed a backup in over a week. Deprecated because it's a infrastructure monitoring. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search returns a list of hosts that have not successfully completed a backup in over a week. Deprecated because it's a infrastructure monitoring. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to first obtain data from your backup solution, either from the backup logs on your hosts, or from a central server responsible for performing the backups. If you do not use Netbackup, you can modify this search for your backup solution. Depending on how often you backup your systems, you may want to modify how far in the past to look for a successful backup, other than the default of seven days. +action.escu.known_false_positives = None identified +action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-12 +action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-12 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Monitor Backup Solution"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Monitor Backup Solution"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `netbackup` MESSAGE="Disk/Partition backup completed successfully." | stats latest(_time) as latestTime by COMPUTERNAME | `security_content_ctime(latestTime)` | rename COMPUTERNAME as dest | eval isOutlier=if(latestTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | table latestTime, dest | `extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups_filter` + +[ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for command-line arguments that use a `/c` parameter to execute a command that has not previously been seen. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for command-line arguments that use a `/c` parameter to execute a command that has not previously been seen. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The complete process name with command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. Please make sure you run the support search "Previously seen command line arguments,"—which creates a lookup file called `previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments.csv`—a historical baseline of all command-line arguments. You must also validate this list. For the search to do accurate calculation, ensure the search scheduling is the same value as the `relative_time` evaluation function. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate programs can also use command-line arguments to execute. Please verify the command-line arguments to check what command/program is being executed. We recommend customizing the `first_time_seen_cmd_line_filter` macro to exclude legitimate parent_process_name +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["DHS Report TA18-074A", "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Hidden Cobra Malware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - First time seen command line argument - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DHS Report TA18-074A", "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Hidden Cobra Malware"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = cmd.exe Processes.process = "* /c *" by Processes.process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = cmd.exe Processes.process = "* /c *" by Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by process | outputlookup previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments | eval newCmdLineArgument=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newCmdLineArgument=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table process] | `first_time_seen_command_line_argument_filter` + +[ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides detection of accounts with high risk roles by projects. Compromised accounts with high risk roles can move laterally or even scalate privileges at different projects depending on organization schema. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search provides detection of accounts with high risk roles by projects. Compromised accounts with high risk roles can move laterally or even scalate privileges at different projects depending on organization schema. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message logs +action.escu.known_false_positives = Accounts with high risk roles should be reduced to the minimum number needed, however specific tasks and setups may be simply expected behavior within organization +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-10-09 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-09 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["GCP Cross Account Activity"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["GCP Cross Account Activity"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.request.policy.bindings{}.role=roles/owner OR roles/editor OR roles/iam.serviceAccountUser OR roles/iam.serviceAccountAdmin OR roles/iam.serviceAccountTokenCreator OR roles/dataflow.developer OR roles/dataflow.admin OR roles/composer.admin OR roles/dataproc.admin OR roles/dataproc.editor | table data.resource.type data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.resource data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.role data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.members{} | `gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project_filter` + +[ESCU - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides detection of high risk permissions by resource and accounts. These are permissions that can allow attackers with compromised accounts to move laterally and escalate privileges. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search provides detection of high risk permissions by resource and accounts. These are permissions that can allow attackers with compromised accounts to move laterally and escalate privileges. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message logs +action.escu.known_false_positives = High risk permissions are part of any GCP environment, however it is important to track resource and accounts usage, this search may produce false positives. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-10-09 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-09 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["GCP Cross Account Activity"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["GCP Cross Account Activity"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission=iam.serviceAccounts.getaccesstoken OR iam.serviceAccounts.setIamPolicy OR iam.serviceAccounts.actas OR dataflow.jobs.create OR composer.environments.create OR dataproc.clusters.create |table data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.members{} data.resource.labels.project_id | `gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account_filter` + +[ESCU - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides detection of possible GCP Oauth token abuse. GCP Oauth token without time limit can be exfiltrated and reused for keeping access sessions alive without further control of authentication, allowing attackers to access and move laterally. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search provides detection of possible GCP Oauth token abuse. GCP Oauth token without time limit can be exfiltrated and reused for keeping access sessions alive without further control of authentication, allowing attackers to access and move laterally. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message logs +action.escu.known_false_positives = GCP Oauth token abuse detection will only work if there are access policies in place along with audit logs. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-09-01 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-01 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["GCP Cross Account Activity"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["GCP Cross Account Activity"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `google_gcp_pubsub_message` type.googleapis.com/google.cloud.audit.AuditLog |table protoPayload.@type protoPayload.status.details{}.@type protoPayload.status.details{}.violations{}.callerIp protoPayload.status.details{}.violations{}.type protoPayload.status.message | `gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse_filter` + +[ESCU - GCP GCR container uploaded - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search show information on uploaded containers including source user, account, action, bucket name event name, http user agent, message and destination path. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1525"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search show information on uploaded containers including source user, account, action, bucket name event name, http user agent, message and destination path. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later), then configure stackdriver and set a subpub subscription to be imported to Splunk. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model. Please also customize the `container_implant_gcp_detection_filter` macro to filter out the false positives. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Uploading container is a normal behavior from developers or users with access to container registry. GCP GCR registers container upload as a Storage event, this search must be considered under the context of CONTAINER upload creation which automatically generates a bucket entry for destination path. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-02-20 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-02-20 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GCP GCR container uploaded - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - GCP GCR container uploaded - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1525"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = |tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Cloud_Infrastructure.Storage where Storage.event_name=storage.objects.create by Storage.src_user Storage.account Storage.action Storage.bucket_name Storage.event_name Storage.http_user_agent Storage.msg Storage.object_path | `drop_dm_object_name("Storage")` | `gcp_gcr_container_uploaded_filter` + +[ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later), then configure stackdriver and set a Pub/Sub subscription to be imported to Splunk. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model.Customize the macro kubernetes_gcp_scan_fingerprint_attack_detection to filter out FPs. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, User Agent and source IPs will provide context. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-04-15 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-04-15 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster +action.notable.param.rule_title = GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection +action.notable.param.security_domain = threat +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp!=127.0.0.1 data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp!=::1 "data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision"=forbid "data.protoPayload.status.message"=PERMISSION_DENIED data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail="system:anonymous" | rename data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp as src_ip | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(data.protoPayload.methodName) as method_name values(data.protoPayload.resourceName) as resource_name values(data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent) as http_user_agent by src_ip data.resource.labels.cluster_name | rename data.resource.labels.cluster_name as cluster_name| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection_filter` + +[ESCU - Identify New User Accounts - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This detection search will help profile user accounts in your environment by identifying newly created accounts that have been added to your network in the past week. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.002"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This detection search will help profile user accounts in your environment by identifying newly created accounts that have been added to your network in the past week. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be populating the Enterprise Security Identity_Management data model in the assets and identity framework. +action.escu.known_false_positives = If the Identity_Management data model is not updated regularly, this search could give you false positive alerts. Please consider this and investigate appropriately. +action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-12 +action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-12 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Identify New User Accounts - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Account Monitoring and Controls"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Identify New User Accounts - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Account Monitoring and Controls"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.002"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | from datamodel Identity_Management.All_Identities | eval empStatus=case((now()-startDate)<604800, "Accounts created in last week") | search empStatus="Accounts created in last week"| `security_content_ctime(endDate)` | `security_content_ctime(startDate)`| table identity empStatus endDate startDate | `identify_new_user_accounts_filter` + +[ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods by IP address, verb and decision +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods by IP address, verb and decision +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs +action.escu.known_false_positives = Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst must consider IP, verb and decision context when trying to detect maliciousness. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-06-23 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-06-23 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts objectRef.resource=pods | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision | top sourceIPs{} user.username verb annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision |`kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_filter` + +[ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs +action.escu.known_false_positives = Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-06-23 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-06-23 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason=* | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | stats count by user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | rare user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |`kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account_filter` + +[ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmaps or secrets +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmaps or secrets +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install Splunk Add-on for Amazon Web Services and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user and object context can provide guidance for detection. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-06-23 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-06-23 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` objectRef.resource=secrets OR configmaps sourceIPs{}!=::1 sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1 |table sourceIPs{} user.username user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace objectRef.name annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |dedup user.username user.groups{} |`aws_eks_kubernetes_cluster_sensitive_object_access_filter` + +[ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation, however source IP, namespace and user group may indicate possible malicious use. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-06-23 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-06-23 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` objectRef.resource=clusterroles OR clusterrolebindings sourceIPs{}!=::1 sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1 | table sourceIPs{} user.username user.groups{} objectRef.namespace requestURI annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | dedup user.username user.groups{} |`kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter` + +[ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status, this search can be extended by using top or rare operators to find trends or rarities in failure status, user agents, source IPs and request URI +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status, this search can be extended by using top or rare operators to find trends or rarities in failure status, user agents, source IPs and request URI +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs. +action.escu.known_false_positives = This search can give false positives as there might be inherent issues with authentications and permissions at cluster. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-06-23 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-06-23 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts responseStatus.status = Failure | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb responseStatus.status requestURI | `kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter` + +[ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods and namespaces by IP address and verb +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods and namespaces by IP address and verb +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics +action.escu.known_false_positives = Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst must consider IP and verb context when trying to detect maliciousness. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-05-26 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-26 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts* OR user.username=system.anonymous OR annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision=allow | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb responseStatus.reason responseStatus.status properties.pod objectRef.namespace | top sourceIPs{} user.username verb responseStatus.status properties.pod objectRef.namespace |`kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace_filter` + +[ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding rare or top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding rare or top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics +action.escu.known_false_positives = Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-05-26 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-26 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason=* | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |stats count by user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | rare user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |`kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account_filter` + +[ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics +action.escu.known_false_positives = Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user and object context can provide guidance for detection. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-05-20 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-20 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log| search objectRef.resource=secrets OR configmaps user.username=system.anonymous OR annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision=allow |table user.username user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace objectRef.name annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |dedup user.username user.groups{} |`kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access_filter` + +[ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics +action.escu.known_false_positives = Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation, however source IP, namespace and user group may indicate possible malicious use. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-05-20 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-20 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log| search objectRef.resource=clusterroles OR clusterrolebindings | table sourceIPs{} user.username user.groups{} objectRef.namespace requestURI annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | dedup user.username user.groups{} |`kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter` + +[ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics +action.escu.known_false_positives = This search can give false positives as there might be inherent issues with authentications and permissions at cluster. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-05-20 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-20 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts* responseStatus.reason=Forbidden | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb responseStatus.reason responseStatus.status properties.pod objectRef.namespace |`kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter` + +[ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on rare Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search provides information on rare Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics +action.escu.known_false_positives = Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP, verb and Object can reveal potential malicious activity, specially suspicious IPs and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-05-26 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-26 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | spath input=responseObject.metadata.annotations.kubectl.kubernetes.io/last-applied-configuration | search userAgent=kubectl* sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1 sourceIPs{}!=::1 | table sourceIPs{} verb userAgent user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace requestURI | rare sourceIPs{} verb userAgent user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace requestURI |`kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter` + +[ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via source IP user agent, request URI and response status data against Kubernetes cluster pod in Azure +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via source IP user agent, request URI and response status data against Kubernetes cluster pod in Azure +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics +action.escu.known_false_positives = Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but source IPs, userAgent, verb, request URI and response status will provide context. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-05-20 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-20 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search responseStatus.code=401 | table sourceIPs{} userAgent verb requestURI responseStatus.reason properties.pod |`kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint_filter` + +[ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via source IP user agent, request URI and response status data against Kubernetes cluster in Azure +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via source IP user agent, request URI and response status data against Kubernetes cluster in Azure +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics +action.escu.known_false_positives = Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but source IPs, userAgent, verb, request URI and response status will provide context. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-05-19 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-19 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search responseStatus.code=401 | table sourceIPs{} userAgent verb requestURI responseStatus.reason |`kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint_filter` + +[ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub messaging service logs +action.escu.known_false_positives = Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-11 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-11 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason=ClusterRoleBinding OR Clusterrole | table src_ip src_user data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason | rare src_user data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account_filter` + +[ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods by IP address, verb and decision +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods by IP address, verb and decision +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk GCP add on. This search works with pubsub messaging service logs +action.escu.known_false_positives = Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst must consider IP, verb and decision context when trying to detect maliciousness. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-10 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-10 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.request.spec.group{}=system:serviceaccounts | table src_ip src_user http_user_agent data.protoPayload.request.spec.nonResourceAttributes.verb data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision data.protoPayload.response.spec.resourceAttributes.resource | top src_ip src_user http_user_agent data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision data.protoPayload.response.spec.resourceAttributes.resource |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_filter` + +[ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmaps or secrets +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmaps or secrets +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk add on for GCP . This search works with pubsub messaging service logs. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user and object context can provide guidance for detection. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-11 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-11 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.resource=configmaps OR secrets | table data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp src_user data.resource.labels.cluster_name data.protoPayload.request.metadata.namespace data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision | dedup data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp src_user data.resource.labels.cluster_name |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access_filter` + +[ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub messaging servicelogs. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation, however source IP, user agent, decision and reason may indicate possible malicious use. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-11 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-11 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason=ClusterRoleBinding OR Clusterrole dest=apis/rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1 src_ip!=::1 | table src_ip src_user http_user_agent data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason | dedup src_ip src_user |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter` + +[ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status, this search can be extended by using top or rare operators to find trends or rarities in failure status, user agents, source IPs and request URI +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status, this search can be extended by using top or rare operators to find trends or rarities in failure status, user agents, source IPs and request URI +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub messaging service logs. +action.escu.known_false_positives = This search can give false positives as there might be inherent issues with authentications and permissions at cluster. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-06-23 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-06-23 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `google_gcp_pubsub_message` system:serviceaccounts data.protoPayload.response.status.allowed!=* | table src_ip src_user http_user_agent data.protoPayload.response.spec.resourceAttributes.namespace data.resource.labels.cluster_name data.protoPayload.response.spec.resourceAttributes.verb data.protoPayload.request.status.allowed data.protoPayload.response.status.reason data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision | dedup src_ip src_user | `kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter` + +[ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on anonymous Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search provides information on anonymous Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub messaging logs. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP, source user, user agent, object path, and authorization context can reveal potential malicious activity, specially anonymous suspicious IPs and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-11 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-11 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent=kubectl* src_user=system:unsecured OR src_user=system:anonymous | table src_ip src_user data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.granted object_path |dedup src_ip src_user |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter` + +[ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for PowerShell processes started with a base64 encoded command-line passed to it, with parameters to modify the execution policy for the process, and those that prevent the display of an interactive prompt to the user. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it overrides the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide itself from the user, and passes an encoded script to be run on the command-line. Deprecated because almost the same as Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for PowerShell processes started with a base64 encoded command-line passed to it, with parameters to modify the execution policy for the process, and those that prevent the display of an interactive prompt to the user. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it overrides the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide itself from the user, and passes an encoded script to be run on the command-line. Deprecated because almost the same as Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate process can have this combination of command-line options, but it's not common. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-19 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-19 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for PowerShell processes started with a base64 encoded command-line passed to it, with parameters to modify the execution policy for the process, and those that prevent the display of an interactive prompt to the user. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it overrides the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide itself from the user, and passes an encoded script to be run on the command-line. Deprecated because almost the same as Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command +action.notable.param.rule_title = Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=powershell.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| search (process=*-EncodedCommand* OR process=*-enc*) process=*-Exec* | `malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments_filter` + +[ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for DNS requests for faux domains similar to the domains that you want to have monitored for abuse. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Resolution"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for DNS requests for faux domains similar to the domains that you want to have monitored for abuse. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You need to ingest data from your DNS logs. Specifically you must ingest the domain that is being queried and the IP of the host originating the request. Ideally, you should also be ingesting the answer to the query and the query type. This approach allows you to also create your own localized passive DNS capability which can aid you in future investigations. You also need to have run the search "ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names", which creates the permutations of the domain that will be checked for. +action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time +action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-23 +action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-23 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Brand Monitoring"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Brand Monitoring"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for DNS requests for faux domains similar to the domains that you want to have monitored for abuse. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse +action.notable.param.security_domain = network +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(DNS.answer) as IPs min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.src, DNS.query | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `brand_abuse_dns` | `monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse_filter` + +[ESCU - Open Redirect in Splunk Web - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search allows you to look for evidence of exploitation for CVE-2016-4859, the Splunk Open Redirect Vulnerability. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["ID.RA", "RS.MI", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search allows you to look for evidence of exploitation for CVE-2016-4859, the Splunk Open Redirect Vulnerability. +action.escu.how_to_implement = No extra steps needed to implement this search. +action.escu.known_false_positives = None identified +action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-19 +action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-19 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Open Redirect in Splunk Web - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Open Redirect in Splunk Web - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 18"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "cve": ["CVE-2016-4859"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["ID.RA", "RS.MI", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search allows you to look for evidence of exploitation for CVE-2016-4859, the Splunk Open Redirect Vulnerability. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Open Redirect in Splunk Web +action.notable.param.security_domain = network +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = index=_internal sourcetype=splunk_web_access return_to="/%09/*" | `open_redirect_in_splunk_web_filter` + +[ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for ColdRoot events from the osx-attacks osquery pack. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command \u0026 Control"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.PT"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for ColdRoot events from the osx-attacks osquery pack. +action.escu.how_to_implement = In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from your osquery deployed agents with the [osx-attacks.conf](https://github.com/facebook/osquery/blob/experimental/packs/osx-attacks.conf#L599) pack enabled. Also the [TA-OSquery](https://github.com/d1vious/TA-osquery) must be deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the osquery data populate the Alerts data model +action.escu.known_false_positives = There are no known false positives. +action.escu.creation_date = 2019-01-29 +action.escu.modification_date = 2019-01-29 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["ColdRoot MacOS RAT"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["ColdRoot MacOS RAT"], "cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command \u0026 Control"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.PT"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for ColdRoot events from the osx-attacks osquery pack. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection +action.notable.param.security_domain = threat +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | from datamodel Alerts.Alerts | search app=osquery:results (name=pack_osx-attacks_OSX_ColdRoot_RAT_Launchd OR name=pack_osx-attacks_OSX_ColdRoot_RAT_Files) | rename columns.path as path | bucket _time span=30s | stats count(path) by _time, host, user, path | `osquery_pack___coldroot_detection_filter` + +[ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe to execute various commands via the netsh command-line utility. Netsh.exe is a command-line scripting utility that allows you to, either locally or remotely, display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. Netsh can be used as a persistence proxy technique to execute a helper .dll when netsh.exe is executed. In this search, we are looking for processes spawned by netsh.exe that are executing commands via the command line. Deprecated because we have another detection of the same type. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.004"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe to execute various commands via the netsh command-line utility. Netsh.exe is a command-line scripting utility that allows you to, either locally or remotely, display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. Netsh can be used as a persistence proxy technique to execute a helper .dll when netsh.exe is executed. In this search, we are looking for processes spawned by netsh.exe that are executing commands via the command line. Deprecated because we have another detection of the same type. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting logs with the process name, command-line arguments, and parent processes from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +action.escu.known_false_positives = It is unusual for netsh.exe to have any child processes in most environments. It makes sense to investigate the child process and verify whether the process spawned is legitimate. We explicitely exclude "C:\Program Files\rempl\sedlauncher.exe" process path since it is a legitimate process by Mircosoft. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-11-23 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-23 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Netsh Abuse"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Processes created by netsh - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Netsh Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.004"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe to execute various commands via the netsh command-line utility. Netsh.exe is a command-line scripting utility that allows you to, either locally or remotely, display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. Netsh can be used as a persistence proxy technique to execute a helper .dll when netsh.exe is executed. In this search, we are looking for processes spawned by netsh.exe that are executing commands via the command line. Deprecated because we have another detection of the same type. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Processes created by netsh +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=netsh.exe by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `processes_created_by_netsh_filter` + +[ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for applications on the endpoint that you have marked as prohibited. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command \u0026 Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for applications on the endpoint that you have marked as prohibited. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is usually generated via logs that report process tracking in your Windows audit settings. In addition, you must also have only the `process_name` (not the entire process path) marked as "prohibited" in the Enterprise Security `interesting processes` table. To include the process names marked as "prohibited", which is included with ES Content Updates, run the included search Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security. +action.escu.known_false_positives = None identified +action.escu.creation_date = 2019-10-11 +action.escu.modification_date = 2019-10-11 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Monitor for Unauthorized Software", "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "SamSam Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Monitor for Unauthorized Software", "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "SamSam Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 2"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command \u0026 Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `prohibited_softwares` | `prohibited_software_on_endpoint_filter` + +[ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search looks for command-line arguments used to hide a file or directory using the reg add command. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1564.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The search looks for command-line arguments used to hide a file or directory using the reg add command. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. +action.escu.known_false_positives = None at the moment +action.escu.creation_date = 2019-02-27 +action.escu.modification_date = 2019-02-27 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows Persistence Techniques"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1564.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The search looks for command-line arguments used to hide a file or directory using the reg add command. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = reg.exe Processes.process="*add*" Processes.process="*Hidden*" Processes.process="*REG_DWORD*" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| regex process = "(/d\s+2)" | `reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys_filter` + +[ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search monitors for remote modifications to registry keys. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search monitors for remote modifications to registry keys. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must populate the `Endpoint` data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. Deprecated because I don't think the logic is right. +action.escu.known_false_positives = This technique may be legitimately used by administrators to modify remote registries, so it's important to filter these events out. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-03-02 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-03-02 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows Persistence Techniques"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search monitors for remote modifications to registry keys. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Remote Registry Key modifications +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path="\\\\*" by Registry.dest , Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `remote_registry_key_modifications_filter` + +[ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line that indicate that task names related to the execution of Bad Rabbit ransomware were created or deleted. Deprecated because we already have a similar detection +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line that indicate that task names related to the execution of Bad Rabbit ransomware were created or deleted. Deprecated because we already have a similar detection +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. +action.escu.known_false_positives = No known false positives +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 3"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line that indicate that task names related to the execution of Bad Rabbit ransomware were created or deleted. Deprecated because we already have a similar detection +action.notable.param.rule_title = Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process) as process from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe (Processes.process= "*create*" OR Processes.process= "*delete*") by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search (process=*rhaegal* OR process=*drogon* OR *viserion_*) | `scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware_filter` + +[ESCU - Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search is used to detect systems that are still vulnerable to the Spectre and Meltdown vulnerabilities. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 4"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "nist": ["ID.RA", "RS.MI", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Vulnerabilities"] +action.escu.eli5 = The search is used to detect systems that are still vulnerable to the Spectre and Meltdown vulnerabilities. +action.escu.how_to_implement = The search requires that you are ingesting your vulnerability-scanner data and that it reports the CVE of the vulnerability identified. +action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible that your vulnerability scanner is not detecting that the patches have been applied. +action.escu.creation_date = 2017-01-07 +action.escu.modification_date = 2017-01-07 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 4"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "cve": ["CVE-2017-5753"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "nist": ["ID.RA", "RS.MI", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The search is used to detect systems that are still vulnerable to the Spectre and Meltdown vulnerabilities. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Vulnerabilities where Vulnerabilities.cve ="CVE-2017-5753" OR Vulnerabilities.cve ="CVE-2017-5715" OR Vulnerabilities.cve ="CVE-2017-5754" by Vulnerabilities.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Vulnerabilities)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems_filter` + +[ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search allows you to look for evidence of exploitation for CVE-2018-11409, a Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure Bug. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["ID.RA", "RS.MI", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search allows you to look for evidence of exploitation for CVE-2018-11409, a Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure Bug. +action.escu.how_to_implement = The REST endpoint that exposes system information is also necessary for the proper operation of Splunk clustering and instrumentation. Whitelisting your Splunk systems will reduce false positives. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Retrieving server information may be a legitimate API request. Verify that the attempt is a valid request for information. +action.escu.creation_date = 2018-06-14 +action.escu.modification_date = 2018-06-14 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 18"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "cve": ["CVE-2018-11409"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["ID.RA", "RS.MI", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search allows you to look for evidence of exploitation for CVE-2018-11409, a Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure Bug. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure +action.notable.param.security_domain = network +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = index=_internal sourcetype=splunkd_ui_access server-info | search clientip!=127.0.0.1 uri_path="*raw/services/server/info/server-info" | rename clientip as src_ip, splunk_server as dest | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime, values(uri) as uri, values(useragent) as http_user_agent, values(user) as user by src_ip, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure_filter` + +[ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for changes to registry values that control Windows file associations, executed by a process that is not typical for legitimate, routine changes to this area. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT", "PR.IP"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for changes to registry values that control Windows file associations, executed by a process that is not typical for legitimate, routine changes to this area. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on registry changes that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Registry` nodes. +action.escu.known_false_positives = There may be other processes in your environment that users may legitimately use to modify file associations. If this is the case and you are finding false positives, you can modify the search to add those processes as exceptions. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-22 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-22 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for changes to registry values that control Windows file associations, executed by a process that is not typical for legitimate, routine changes to this area. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious Changes to File Associations +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name!=Explorer.exe AND Processes.process_name!=OpenWith.exe by Processes.process_id Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*\\Explorer\\FileExts* by Registry.process_id Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Registry")` | table process_id dest registry_path]| `suspicious_changes_to_file_associations_filter` + +[ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This detection looks for emails that are suspicious because of their sender, domain rareness, or behavior differences. This is an anomaly generated by Splunk User Behavior Analytics (UBA). +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["UEBA"] +action.escu.eli5 = This detection looks for emails that are suspicious because of their sender, domain rareness, or behavior differences. This is an anomaly generated by Splunk User Behavior Analytics (UBA). +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data from email logs and have Splunk integrated with UBA. This anomaly is raised by a UBA detection model called "SuspiciousEmailDetectionModel." Ensure that this model is enabled on your UBA instance. +action.escu.known_false_positives = This detection model will alert on any sender domain that is seen for the first time. This could be a potential false positive. The next step is to investigate and add the URL to an allow list if you determine that it is a legitimate sender. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-22 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-22 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Emails"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Emails"], "cis20": ["CIS 7"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = |tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(All_UEBA_Events.category) as category from datamodel=UEBA where nodename=All_UEBA_Events.UEBA_Anomalies All_UEBA_Events.UEBA_Anomalies.uba_model = "SuspiciousEmailDetectionModel" by All_UEBA_Events.description All_UEBA_Events.severity All_UEBA_Events.user All_UEBA_Events.uba_event_type All_UEBA_Events.link All_UEBA_Events.signature All_UEBA_Events.url All_UEBA_Events.UEBA_Anomalies.uba_model | `drop_dm_object_name(All_UEBA_Events)` | `drop_dm_object_name(UEBA_Anomalies)`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_email___uba_anomaly_filter` + +[ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search looks for files created with names that have been linked to malicious activity. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The search looks for files created with names that have been linked to malicious activity. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file system reads and writes. In addition, this search leverages an included lookup file that contains the names of the files to watch for, as well as a note to communicate why that file name is being monitored. This lookup file can be edited to add or remove file the file names you want to monitor. +action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible for a legitimate file to be created with the same name as one noted in the lookup file. Filenames listed in the lookup file should be unique enough that collisions are rare. Looking at the location of the file and the process responsible for the activity can help determine whether or not the activity is legitimate. +action.escu.creation_date = 2019-04-25 +action.escu.modification_date = 2019-04-25 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Hidden Cobra Malware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Suspicious File Write - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Hidden Cobra Malware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.action) as action values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `suspicious_writes` | `suspicious_file_write_filter` + +[ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following hunting analytic identifies renamed instances of rundll32.exe executing. rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. During investigation, validate it is the legitimate rundll32.exe executing and what script content it is loading. This query relies on the original filename or internal name from the PE meta data. Expand the query as needed by looking for specific command line arguments outlined in other analytics. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1036", "T1218.011", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following hunting analytic identifies renamed instances of rundll32.exe executing. rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. During investigation, validate it is the legitimate rundll32.exe executing and what script content it is loading. This query relies on the original filename or internal name from the PE meta data. Expand the query as needed by looking for specific command line arguments outlined in other analytics. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-01 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-01 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious renamed rundll32.exe binary ran on $dest$ by $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 63}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1036", "T1218.011", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_rename_filter` + +[ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search detects writes to the 'System Volume Information' folder by something other than the System process. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search detects writes to the 'System Volume Information' folder by something other than the System process. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You need to be ingesting logs with both the process name and command-line from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible that other utilities or system processes may legitimately write to this folder. Investigate and modify the search to include exceptions as appropriate. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-22 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-22 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Collection and Staging"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Collection and Staging"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = (`sysmon` OR tag=process) EventCode=11 process_id!=4 file_path=*System\ Volume\ Information* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Image, file_path | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information_filter` + +[ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for applications on the endpoint that you have marked as uncommon. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for applications on the endpoint that you have marked as uncommon. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. This search uses a lookup file `uncommon_processes_default.csv` to track various features of process names that are usually uncommon in most environments. Please consider updating `uncommon_processes_local.csv` to hunt for processes that are uncommon in your environment. +action.escu.known_false_positives = None identified +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-22 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-22 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Privilege Escalation", "Unusual Processes"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation", "Unusual Processes"], "cis20": ["CIS 2"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process Processes.process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `uncommon_processes` |`uncommon_processes_on_endpoint_filter` + +[ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search detects loading of unsigned images by LSASS. Deprecated because too noisy. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search detects loading of unsigned images by LSASS. Deprecated because too noisy. +action.escu.how_to_implement = This search needs Sysmon Logs with a sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 7 with lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Other tools could load images into LSASS for legitimate reason. But enterprise tools should always use signed DLLs. +action.escu.creation_date = 2019-12-06 +action.escu.modification_date = 2019-12-06 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Credential Dumping"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search detects loading of unsigned images by LSASS. Deprecated because too noisy. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `sysmon` EventID=7 Image=*lsass.exe Signed=false | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, Image, ImageLoaded, Signed, SHA1 | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass_filter` + +[ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search gives you the hosts where a backup was attempted and then failed. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search gives you the hosts where a backup was attempted and then failed. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to obtain data from your backup solution, either from the backup logs on your endpoints or from a central server responsible for performing the backups. If you do not use Netbackup, you can modify this search for your specific backup solution. +action.escu.known_false_positives = None identified +action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-12 +action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-12 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Monitor Backup Solution"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Monitor Backup Solution"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `netbackup` | stats latest(_time) as latestTime by COMPUTERNAME, MESSAGE | search MESSAGE="An error occurred, failed to backup." | `security_content_ctime(latestTime)` | rename COMPUTERNAME as dest, MESSAGE as signature | table latestTime, dest, signature | `unsuccessful_netbackup_backups_filter` + +[ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search is used to identify the creation of multiple user accounts using the same email domain name. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is used to identify the creation of multiple user accounts using the same email domain name. +action.escu.how_to_implement = We start with a dataset that provides visibility into the email address used for the account creation. In this example, we are narrowing our search down to the single web page that hosts the Magento2 e-commerce platform (via URI) used for account creation, the single http content-type to grab only the user's clicks, and the http field that provides the username (form_data), for performance reasons. After we have the username and email domain, we look for numerous account creations per email domain. Common data sources used for this detection are customized Apache logs or Splunk Stream. +action.escu.known_false_positives = As is common with many fraud-related searches, we are usually looking to attribute risk or synthesize relevant context with loosely written detections that simply detect anamolous behavior. This search will need to be customized to fit your environment—improving its fidelity by counting based on something much more specific, such as a device ID that may be present in your dataset. Consideration for whether the large number of registrations are occuring from a first-time seen domain may also be important. Extending the search window to look further back in time, or even calculating the average per hour/day for each email domain to look for an anomalous spikes, will improve this search. You can also use Shannon entropy or Levenshtein Distance (both courtesy of URL Toolbox) to consider the randomness or similarity of the email name or email domain, as the names are often machine-generated. +action.escu.creation_date = 2018-10-08 +action.escu.modification_date = 2018-10-08 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Web Fraud Detection"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Web Fraud Detection"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is used to identify the creation of multiple user accounts using the same email domain name. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Web Fraud - Account Harvesting +action.notable.param.security_domain = threat +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `stream_http` http_content_type=text* uri="/magento2/customer/account/loginPost/" | rex field=cookie "form_key=(?\w+)" | rex field=form_data "login\[username\]=(?[^&|^$]+)" | search Username=* | rex field=Username "@(?.*)" | stats dc(Username) as UniqueUsernames list(Username) as src_user by email_domain | where UniqueUsernames> 25 | `web_fraud___account_harvesting_filter` + +[ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search is used to examine web sessions to identify those where the clicks are occurring too quickly for a human or are occurring with a near-perfect cadence (high periodicity or low standard deviation), resembling a script driven session. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 6"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is used to examine web sessions to identify those where the clicks are occurring too quickly for a human or are occurring with a near-perfect cadence (high periodicity or low standard deviation), resembling a script driven session. +action.escu.how_to_implement = Start with a dataset that allows you to see clickstream data for each user click on the website. That data must have a time stamp and must contain a reference to the session identifier being used by the website. This ties the clicks together into clickstreams. This value is usually found in the http cookie. With a bit of tuning, a version of this search could be used in high-volume scenarios, such as scraping, crawling, application DDOS, credit-card testing, account takeover, etc. Common data sources used for this detection are customized Apache logs, customized IIS, and Splunk Stream. +action.escu.known_false_positives = As is common with many fraud-related searches, we are usually looking to attribute risk or synthesize relevant context with loosly written detections that simply detect anamoluous behavior. +action.escu.creation_date = 2018-10-08 +action.escu.modification_date = 2018-10-08 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Web Fraud Detection"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Web Fraud Detection"], "cis20": ["CIS 6"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `stream_http` http_content_type=text* | rex field=cookie "form_key=(?\w+)" | streamstats window=2 current=1 range(_time) as TimeDelta by session_id | where TimeDelta>0 |stats count stdev(TimeDelta) as ClickSpeedStdDev avg(TimeDelta) as ClickSpeedAvg by session_id | where count>5 AND (ClickSpeedStdDev<.5 OR ClickSpeedAvg<.5) | `web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed_filter` + +[ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search is used to identify user accounts that share a common password. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "nist": ["DE.DP"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is used to identify user accounts that share a common password. +action.escu.how_to_implement = We need to start with a dataset that allows us to see the values of usernames and passwords that users are submitting to the website hosting the Magento2 e-commerce platform (commonly found in the HTTP form_data field). A tokenized or hashed value of a password is acceptable and certainly preferable to a clear-text password. Common data sources used for this detection are customized Apache logs, customized IIS, and Splunk Stream. +action.escu.known_false_positives = As is common with many fraud-related searches, we are usually looking to attribute risk or synthesize relevant context with loosely written detections that simply detect anamoluous behavior. +action.escu.creation_date = 2018-10-08 +action.escu.modification_date = 2018-10-08 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Web Fraud Detection"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Web Fraud Detection"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "nist": ["DE.DP"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `stream_http` http_content_type=text* uri=/magento2/customer/account/loginPost* | rex field=form_data "login\[username\]=(?[^&|^$]+)" | rex field=form_data "login\[password\]=(?[^&|^$]+)" | stats dc(Username) as UniqueUsernames values(Username) as user list(src_ip) as src_ip by Password|where UniqueUsernames>5 | `web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts_filter` + +[ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search looks for the Console Window Host process (connhost.exe) executed using the force flag -ForceV1. This is not regular behavior in the Windows OS and is often seen executed by the Ryuk Ransomware. DEPRECATED This event is actually seen in the windows 10 client of attack_range_local. After further testing we realized this is not specific to Ryuk. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The search looks for the Console Window Host process (connhost.exe) executed using the force flag -ForceV1. This is not regular behavior in the Windows OS and is often seen executed by the Ryuk Ransomware. DEPRECATED This event is actually seen in the windows 10 client of attack_range_local. After further testing we realized this is not specific to Ryuk. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records the process-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Processes data-model object. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data. +action.escu.known_false_positives = This process should not be ran forcefully, we have not see any false positives for this detection +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-11-06 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-06 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ryuk Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The search looks for the Console Window Host process (connhost.exe) executed using the force flag -ForceV1. This is not regular behavior in the Windows OS and is often seen executed by the Ryuk Ransomware. DEPRECATED This event is actually seen in the windows 10 client of attack_range_local. After further testing we realized this is not specific to Ryuk. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows connhost exe started forcefully +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE Processes.process="*C:\\Windows\\system32\\conhost.exe* 0xffffffff *-ForceV1*" by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_connhost_exe_started_forcefully_filter` + +[ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search looks for modifications to the hosts file on all Windows endpoints across your environment. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The search looks for modifications to the hosts file on all Windows endpoints across your environment. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records the file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint.Filesystem data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or by other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system reads and writes. +action.escu.known_false_positives = There may be legitimate reasons for system administrators to add entries to this file. +action.escu.creation_date = 2018-11-02 +action.escu.modification_date = 2018-11-02 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Host Redirection"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Windows hosts file modification - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Host Redirection"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The search looks for modifications to the hosts file on all Windows endpoints across your environment. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows hosts file modification +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | search Filesystem.file_name=hosts AND Filesystem.file_path=*Windows\\System32\\* | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `windows_hosts_file_modification_filter` + +[ESCU - 7zip CommandLine To SMB Share Path - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search is to detect a suspicious 7z process with commandline pointing to SMB network share. This technique was seen in CONTI LEAK tools where it use 7z to archive a sensitive files and place it in network share tmp folder. This search is a good hunting query that may give analyst a hint why specific user try to archive a file pointing to SMB user which is un usual. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1560.001", "T1560"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious 7z process with commandline pointing to SMB network share. This technique was seen in CONTI LEAK tools where it use 7z to archive a sensitive files and place it in network share tmp folder. This search is a good hunting query that may give analyst a hint why specific user try to archive a file pointing to SMB user which is un usual. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed 7z.exe may be used. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-17 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-17 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - 7zip CommandLine To SMB Share Path - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = archive process $process_name$ with suspicious cmdline $process$ in host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}, {"threat_object_field": "SourceImage", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - 7zip CommandLine To SMB Share Path - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1560.001", "T1560"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "SourceImage", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name ="7z.exe" OR Processes.process_name = "7za.exe" OR Processes.original_file_name = "7z.exe" OR Processes.original_file_name = "7za.exe") AND (Processes.process="*\\C$\\*" OR Processes.process="*\\Admin$\\*" OR Processes.process="*\\IPC$\\*") by Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `7zip_commandline_to_smb_share_path_filter` [ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule] action.escu = 0 @@ -1618,7 +6625,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "TargetImage", "role": ["Target"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = Detect memory dumping of the LSASS process. action.notable.param.rule_title = Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -1661,10 +6668,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Account Discovery With Net App - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Trickbot", "IcedID"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Process"], "type": "Process Name"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Trickbot", "IcedID"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process Name"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = this search is to detect a potential account discovery series of command used by several malware or attack to recon the target machine. This technique is also seen in some note worthy malware like trickbot where it runs a cmd process, or even drop its module that will execute the said series of net command. This series of command are good correlation search and indicator of attacker recon if seen in the machines within a none technical user or department (HR, finance, ceo and etc) network. action.notable.param.rule_title = Account Discovery With Net App action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -1685,7 +6692,7 @@ action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of the active setup registry for persistence and privilege escalation. This technique was seen in several malware (poisonIvy), adware and APT to gain persistence to the compromised machine upon boot up. This TTP is a good indicator to further check the process id that do the modification since modification of this registry is not commonly done. check the legitimacy of the file and process involve in this rules to check if it is a valid setup installer that creating or modifying this registry. action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.014", "T1547"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of the active setup registry for persistence and privilege escalation. This technique was seen in several malware (poisonIvy), adware and APT to gain persistence to the compromised machine upon boot up. This TTP is a good indicator to further check the process id that do the modification since modification of this registry is not commonly done. check the legitimacy of the file and process involve in this rules to check if it is a valid setup installer that creating or modifying this registry. action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. action.escu.known_false_positives = Active setup installer may add or modify this registry. @@ -1707,10 +6714,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Active Setup Registry Autostart - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Privilege Escalation Persistence"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.014", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.014", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of the active setup registry for persistence and privilege escalation. This technique was seen in several malware (poisonIvy), adware and APT to gain persistence to the compromised machine upon boot up. This TTP is a good indicator to further check the process id that do the modification since modification of this registry is not commonly done. check the legitimacy of the file and process involve in this rules to check if it is a valid setup installer that creating or modifying this registry. action.notable.param.rule_title = Active Setup Registry Autostart action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -1755,12 +6762,6 @@ action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Add DefaultUser And Password In Registry - Rule action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackMatter Ransomware"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1552.002", "T1552"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = this search is to detect a suspicious registry modification to implement auto admin logon to a host. This technique was seen in BlackMatter ransomware to automatically logon to the compromise host after triggering a safemode boot to continue encrypting the whole network. This behavior is not a common practice and really a suspicious TTP or alert need to be consider if found within then network premise. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Add DefaultUser And Password In Registry -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -1802,7 +6803,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Remcos", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "WhisperGate"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic will identify a suspicious process command-line related to Windows Defender exclusion feature. This command is abused by adversaries, malware authors and red teams to bypass Windows Defender Antivirus products by excluding folder path, file path, process and extensions. From its real time or schedule scan to execute their malicious code. This is a good indicator for defense evasion and to look further for events after this behavior. action.notable.param.rule_title = Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -1845,9 +6846,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AdsiSearcher Account Discovery - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Reconnaissance"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator being used to query Active Directory for domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `[Adsisearcher]` to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. action.notable.param.rule_title = AdsiSearcher Account Discovery action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -1880,15 +6882,20 @@ action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007", "T1562"]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious modification of firewall to allow file and printer sharing. This technique was seen in ransomware to be able to discover more machine connected to the compromised host to encrypt more files action.notable.param.rule_title = Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -1934,7 +6941,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule R action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic detects a potential suspicious modification of firewall rule registry allowing inbound traffic in specific port with public profile. This technique was identified when an adversary wants to grant remote access to a machine by allowing the traffic in a firewall rule. action.notable.param.rule_title = Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -1955,7 +6962,7 @@ action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell command to allow inbound traffic inbound to a specific local port within the public profile. This technique was seen in some attacker want to have a remote access to a machine by allowing the traffic in firewall rule. action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell command to allow inbound traffic inbound to a specific local port within the public profile. This technique was seen in some attacker want to have a remote access to a machine by allowing the traffic in firewall rule. action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the powershell logs from your endpoints. make sure you enable needed registry to monitor this event. action.escu.known_false_positives = administrator may allow inbound traffic in certain network or machine. @@ -1980,6 +6987,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Allow Inbound Traffic In Firewall Rule - action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell command to allow inbound traffic inbound to a specific local port within the public profile. This technique was seen in some attacker want to have a remote access to a machine by allowing the traffic in firewall rule. action.notable.param.rule_title = Allow Inbound Traffic In Firewall Rule action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -2012,15 +7020,20 @@ action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007", "T1562"]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious modification to the firewall to allow network discovery on a machine. This technique was seen in couple of ransomware (revil, reddot) to discover other machine connected to the compromised host to encrypt more files. action.notable.param.rule_title = Allow Network Discovery In Firewall action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -2041,7 +7054,7 @@ action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = This analytic identifies a potential privilege escalation attempt to perform malicious task. This registry modification is designed to allow the `Consent Admin` to perform an operation that requires elevation without consent or credentials. We also found this in some attacker to gain privilege escalation to the compromise machine. action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] action.escu.eli5 = This analytic identifies a potential privilege escalation attempt to perform malicious task. This registry modification is designed to allow the `Consent Admin` to perform an operation that requires elevation without consent or credentials. We also found this in some attacker to gain privilege escalation to the compromise machine. action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown @@ -2066,7 +7079,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Allow Operation with Consent Admin - Rul action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic identifies a potential privilege escalation attempt to perform malicious task. This registry modification is designed to allow the `Consent Admin` to perform an operation that requires elevation without consent or credentials. We also found this in some attacker to gain privilege escalation to the compromise machine. action.notable.param.rule_title = Allow Operation with Consent Admin action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -2082,91 +7095,11 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System*" Registry.registry_value_name = ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin Registry.registry_value_data = "0x00000000" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `allow_operation_with_consent_admin_filter` -[ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search provides detection information on unauthenticated requests against Kubernetes' Pods API -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search provides detection information on unauthenticated requests against Kubernetes' Pods API -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on forAWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudWatch EKS Logs.Please also customize the `kubernetes_pods_aws_scan_fingerprint_detection` macro to filter out the false positives. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, UA and source IPs and direct request to API provide context. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-04-15 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-04-15 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search provides detection information on unauthenticated requests against Kubernetes' Pods API -action.notable.param.rule_title = Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection -action.notable.param.security_domain = threat -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` "user.username"="system:anonymous" verb=list objectRef.resource=pods requestURI="/api/v1/pods" | rename source as cluster_name sourceIPs{} as src_ip | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(responseStatus.reason) values(responseStatus.code) values(userAgent) values(verb) values(requestURI) by src_ip cluster_name user.username user.groups{} | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection_filter` - -[ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster in AWS -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster in AWS -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudWatch EKS Logs inputs. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, UA and source IPs will provide context. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-04-15 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-04-15 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster in AWS -action.notable.param.rule_title = Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection -action.notable.param.security_domain = threat -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` "user.username"="system:anonymous" userAgent!="AWS Security Scanner" | rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(responseStatus.reason) values(source) as cluster_name values(responseStatus.code) values(userAgent) as http_user_agent values(verb) values(requestURI) by src_ip user.username user.groups{} | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection_filter` - [ESCU - Anomalous usage of 7zip - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = The following detection identifies a 7z.exe spawned from `Rundll32.exe` or `Dllhost.exe`. It is assumed that the adversary has brought in `7z.exe` and `7z.dll`. It has been observed where an adversary will rename `7z.exe`. Additional coverage may be required to identify the behavior of renamed instances of `7z.exe`. During triage, identify the source of injection into `Rundll32.exe` or `Dllhost.exe`. Capture any files written to disk and analyze as needed. Review parallel processes for additional behaviors. Typically, archiving files will result in exfiltration. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1560.001", "T1560"]} +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1560.001", "T1560"]} action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] action.escu.eli5 = The following detection identifies a 7z.exe spawned from `Rundll32.exe` or `Dllhost.exe`. It is assumed that the adversary has brought in `7z.exe` and `7z.dll`. It has been observed where an adversary will rename `7z.exe`. Additional coverage may be required to identify the behavior of renamed instances of `7z.exe`. During triage, identify the source of injection into `Rundll32.exe` or `Dllhost.exe`. Capture any files written to disk and analyze as needed. Review parallel processes for additional behaviors. Typically, archiving files will result in exfiltration. action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. @@ -2181,7 +7114,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Cobalt Strike", "NOBELIUM Group"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior is indicative of suspicious loading of 7zip. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 64}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 64}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -2189,14 +7122,8 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Anomalous usage of 7zip - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike", "NOBELIUM Group"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1560.001", "T1560"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike", "NOBELIUM Group"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1560.001", "T1560"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following detection identifies a 7z.exe spawned from `Rundll32.exe` or `Dllhost.exe`. It is assumed that the adversary has brought in `7z.exe` and `7z.dll`. It has been observed where an adversary will rename `7z.exe`. Additional coverage may be required to identify the behavior of renamed instances of `7z.exe`. During triage, identify the source of injection into `Rundll32.exe` or `Dllhost.exe`. Capture any files written to disk and analyze as needed. Review parallel processes for additional behaviors. Typically, archiving files will result in exfiltration. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Anomalous usage of 7zip -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -2227,7 +7154,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell", "Ingress Tool Transfer", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior identifies the use of DownloadFile within PowerShell. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 56}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 56}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -2235,10 +7162,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "Ingress Tool Transfer", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exploitation"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "Ingress Tool Transfer", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a file using `DownloadFile` method. This particular method is utilized in many different PowerShell frameworks to download files and output to disk. Identify the source (IP/domain) and destination file and triage appropriately. If AMSI logging or PowerShell transaction logs are available, review for further details of the implant. action.notable.param.rule_title = Any Powershell DownloadFile action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -2273,7 +7200,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell", "HAFNIUM Group", "Ingress Tool Transfer"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior identifies the use of DownloadString within PowerShell. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 56}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 56}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -2281,10 +7208,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "HAFNIUM Group", "Ingress Tool Transfer"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "HAFNIUM Group", "Ingress Tool Transfer"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a file using `DownloadString` method. This particular method is utilized in many different PowerShell frameworks to download files and output to disk. Identify the source (IP/domain) and destination file and triage appropriately. If AMSI logging or PowerShell transaction logs are available, review for further details of the implant. action.notable.param.rule_title = Any Powershell DownloadString action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -2304,7 +7231,7 @@ search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = This search looks for execution of commonly used attacker tools on an endpoint. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.005", "T1036", "T1003", "T1595"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command \u0026 Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.005", "T1036", "T1003", "T1595"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for execution of commonly used attacker tools on an endpoint. action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is usually generated via logs that report process tracking in your Windows audit settings. @@ -2319,7 +7246,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Monitor for Unauthorized Software", "XMRig", "SamSam Ransomware", "Unusual Processes"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = An attacker tool $process_name$,listed in attacker_tools.csv is executed on host $dest$ by User $user$. This process $process_name$ is known to do- $description$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 64}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 64}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -2327,10 +7254,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Monitor for Unauthorized Software", "XMRig", "SamSam Ransomware", "Unusual Processes"], "cis20": ["CIS 2"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exploitation", "Stage:Recon", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.005", "T1036", "T1003", "T1595"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process", "Attacker"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Monitor for Unauthorized Software", "XMRig", "SamSam Ransomware", "Unusual Processes"], "cis20": ["CIS 2"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command \u0026 Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.005", "T1036", "T1003", "T1595"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process", "Attacker"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for execution of commonly used attacker tools on an endpoint. action.notable.param.rule_title = Attacker Tools On Endpoint action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -2365,7 +7292,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Disabling Security Tools"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified attempting to add a certificate to the store on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 35}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 35}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 35}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 35}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -2373,10 +7300,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Disabling Security Tools"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1553.004", "T1553"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Disabling Security Tools"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1553.004", "T1553"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store action.notable.param.rule_title = Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -2411,7 +7338,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Disabling Security Tools", "Trickbot", "WhisperGate"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified attempting to disable security services on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 20}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 20}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 20}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 20}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -2419,10 +7346,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Disabling Security Tools", "Trickbot", "WhisperGate"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Disabling Security Tools", "Trickbot", "WhisperGate"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for attempts to stop security-related services on the endpoint. action.notable.param.rule_title = Attempt To Stop Security Service action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -2457,7 +7384,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Credential Dumping", "DarkSide Ransomware"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to export the registry keys. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 90}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 90}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 90}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 90}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -2465,10 +7392,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline. action.notable.param.rule_title = Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -2514,7 +7441,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry - Rule action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackMatter Ransomware"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1552.002", "T1552"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = this search is to detect a suspicious registry modification to implement auto admin logon to a host. This technique was seen in BlackMatter ransomware to automatically logon to the compromise host after triggering a safemode boot to continue encrypting the whole network. This behavior is not a common practice and really a suspicious TTP or alert need to be consider if found within then network premise. action.notable.param.rule_title = Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -2530,150 +7457,12 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon*" AND Registry.registry_value_name=AutoAdminLogon AND Registry.registry_value_data=1 by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `auto_admin_logon_registry_entry_filter` -[ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for flags passed to bcdedit.exe modifications to the built-in Windows error recovery boot configurations. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent recovery. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for flags passed to bcdedit.exe modifications to the built-in Windows error recovery boot configurations. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent recovery. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. Tune based on parent process names. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may modify the boot configuration. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-12-21 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-12-21 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ryuk Ransomware", "Ransomware"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting disable the ability to recover the endpoint. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Impact"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for flags passed to bcdedit.exe modifications to the built-in Windows error recovery boot configurations. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent recovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = bcdedit.exe Processes.process="*recoveryenabled*" (Processes.process="* no*") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification_filter` - -[ESCU - BITS Job Persistence - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service utility `bitsadmin.exe` scheduling a BITS job to persist on an endpoint. The query identifies the parameters used to create, resume or add a file to a BITS job. Typically seen combined in a oneliner or ran in sequence. If identified, review the BITS job created and capture any files written to disk. It is possible for BITS to be used to upload files and this may require further network data analysis to identify. You can use `bitsadmin /list /verbose` to list out the jobs during investigation. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1197"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service utility `bitsadmin.exe` scheduling a BITS job to persist on an endpoint. The query identifies the parameters used to create, resume or add a file to a BITS job. Typically seen combined in a oneliner or ran in sequence. If identified, review the BITS job created and capture any files written to disk. It is possible for BITS to be used to upload files and this may require further network data analysis to identify. You can use `bitsadmin /list /verbose` to list out the jobs during investigation. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives will be present. Typically, applications will use `BitsAdmin.exe`. Any filtering should be done based on command-line arguments (legitimate applications) or parent process. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-16 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-16 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - BITS Job Persistence - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["BITS Jobs"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to persist using BITS. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 56}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - BITS Job Persistence - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BITS Jobs"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1197"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service utility `bitsadmin.exe` scheduling a BITS job to persist on an endpoint. The query identifies the parameters used to create, resume or add a file to a BITS job. Typically seen combined in a oneliner or ran in sequence. If identified, review the BITS job created and capture any files written to disk. It is possible for BITS to be used to upload files and this may require further network data analysis to identify. You can use `bitsadmin /list /verbose` to list out the jobs during investigation. -action.notable.param.rule_title = BITS Job Persistence -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_bitsadmin` Processes.process IN (*create*, *addfile*, *setnotifyflags*, *setnotifycmdline*, *setminretrydelay*, *setcustomheaders*, *resume* ) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `bits_job_persistence_filter` - -[ESCU - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service utility `bitsadmin.exe` using the `transfer` parameter to download a remote object. In addition, look for `download` or `upload` on the command-line, the switches are not required to perform a transfer. Capture any files downloaded. Review the reputation of the IP or domain used. Typically once executed, a follow on command will be used to execute the dropped file. Note that the network connection or file modification events related will not spawn or create from `bitsadmin.exe`, but the artifacts will appear in a parallel process of `svchost.exe` with a command-line similar to `svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s BITS`. It's important to review all parallel and child processes to capture any behaviors and artifacts. In some suspicious and malicious instances, BITS jobs will be created. You can use `bitsadmin /list /verbose` to list out the jobs during investigation. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1197", "T1105"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service utility `bitsadmin.exe` using the `transfer` parameter to download a remote object. In addition, look for `download` or `upload` on the command-line, the switches are not required to perform a transfer. Capture any files downloaded. Review the reputation of the IP or domain used. Typically once executed, a follow on command will be used to execute the dropped file. Note that the network connection or file modification events related will not spawn or create from `bitsadmin.exe`, but the artifacts will appear in a parallel process of `svchost.exe` with a command-line similar to `svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s BITS`. It's important to review all parallel and child processes to capture any behaviors and artifacts. In some suspicious and malicious instances, BITS jobs will be created. You can use `bitsadmin /list /verbose` to list out the jobs during investigation. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives, however it may be required to filter based on parent process name or network connection. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-16 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-16 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ingress Tool Transfer", "BITS Jobs", "DarkSide Ransomware"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to download a file. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 49}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ingress Tool Transfer", "BITS Jobs", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1197", "T1105"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service utility `bitsadmin.exe` using the `transfer` parameter to download a remote object. In addition, look for `download` or `upload` on the command-line, the switches are not required to perform a transfer. Capture any files downloaded. Review the reputation of the IP or domain used. Typically once executed, a follow on command will be used to execute the dropped file. Note that the network connection or file modification events related will not spawn or create from `bitsadmin.exe`, but the artifacts will appear in a parallel process of `svchost.exe` with a command-line similar to `svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s BITS`. It's important to review all parallel and child processes to capture any behaviors and artifacts. In some suspicious and malicious instances, BITS jobs will be created. You can use `bitsadmin /list /verbose` to list out the jobs during investigation. -action.notable.param.rule_title = BITSAdmin Download File -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_bitsadmin` Processes.process=*transfer* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `bitsadmin_download_file_filter` - [ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = The search looks for a batch file (.bat) written to the Windows system directory tree. action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204", "T1204.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] action.escu.eli5 = The search looks for a batch file (.bat) written to the Windows system directory tree. action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible for this search to generate a notable event for a batch file write to a path that includes the string "system32", but is not the actual Windows system directory. As such, you should confirm the path of the batch file identified by the search. In addition, a false positive may be generated by an administrator copying a legitimate batch file in this directory tree. You should confirm that the activity is legitimate and modify the search to add exclusions, as necessary. @@ -2698,7 +7487,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204", "T1204.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "file_name", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "File Name"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = The search looks for a batch file (.bat) written to the Windows system directory tree. action.notable.param.rule_title = Batch File Write to System32 action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -2741,10 +7530,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Bcdedit Command Back To Normal Mode Boot - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackMatter Ransomware"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Impact"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackMatter Ransomware"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious bcdedit commandline to configure the host from safe mode back to normal boot configuration. This technique was seen in blackMatter ransomware where it force the compromised host to boot in safe mode to continue its encryption and bring back to normal boot using bcdedit deletevalue command. This TTP can be a good alert for host that booted from safe mode forcefully since it need to modify the boot configuration to bring it back to normal. action.notable.param.rule_title = Bcdedit Command Back To Normal Mode Boot action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -2760,39 +7549,39 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = bcdedit.exe Processes.process="*/deletevalue*" Processes.process="*{current}*" Processes.process="*safeboot*" by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user |`drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `bcdedit_command_back_to_normal_mode_boot_filter` -[ESCU - CHCP Command Execution - Rule] +[ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search is to detect execution of chcp.exe application. this utility is used to change the active code page of the console. This technique was seen in icedid malware to know the locale region/language/country of the compromise host. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"]} +description = This search looks for flags passed to bcdedit.exe modifications to the built-in Windows error recovery boot configurations. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent recovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect execution of chcp.exe application. this utility is used to change the active code page of the console. This technique was seen in icedid malware to know the locale region/language/country of the compromise host. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed chcp.com may be used. -action.escu.known_false_positives = other tools or script may used this to change code page to UTF-* or others -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-27 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-27 +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for flags passed to bcdedit.exe modifications to the built-in Windows error recovery boot configurations. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent recovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. Tune based on parent process names. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may modify the boot configuration. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-12-21 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-12-21 action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - CHCP Command Execution - Rule +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["IcedID"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ryuk Ransomware", "Ransomware"] action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = parent process $parent_process_name$ spawning chcp process $process_name$ with parent command line $parent_process$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 9}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 9}] +action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting disable the ability to recover the endpoint. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - CHCP Command Execution - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect execution of chcp.exe application. this utility is used to change the active code page of the console. This technique was seen in icedid malware to know the locale region/language/country of the compromise host. -action.notable.param.rule_title = CHCP Command Execution +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for flags passed to bcdedit.exe modifications to the built-in Windows error recovery boot configurations. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent recovery. +action.notable.param.rule_title = BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 @@ -2804,41 +7593,41 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=chcp.com Processes.parent_process_name = cmd.exe Processes.parent_process=*/c* by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `chcp_command_execution_filter` +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = bcdedit.exe Processes.process="*recoveryenabled*" (Processes.process="* no*") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification_filter` -[ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule] +[ESCU - BITS Job Persistence - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies command-line arguments where `cmd.exe /c` is used to execute a program. `cmd /c` is used to run commands in MS-DOS and terminate after command or process completion. This technique is commonly seen in adversaries and malware to execute batch command using different shell like PowerShell or different process other than `cmd.exe`. This is a good hunting query for suspicious command-line made by a script or relative process execute it. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003", "T1059"]} +description = The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service utility `bitsadmin.exe` scheduling a BITS job to persist on an endpoint. The query identifies the parameters used to create, resume or add a file to a BITS job. Typically seen combined in a oneliner or ran in sequence. If identified, review the BITS job created and capture any files written to disk. It is possible for BITS to be used to upload files and this may require further network data analysis to identify. You can use `bitsadmin /list /verbose` to list out the jobs during investigation. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1197"]} action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies command-line arguments where `cmd.exe /c` is used to execute a program. `cmd /c` is used to run commands in MS-DOS and terminate after command or process completion. This technique is commonly seen in adversaries and malware to execute batch command using different shell like PowerShell or different process other than `cmd.exe`. This is a good hunting query for suspicious command-line made by a script or relative process execute it. +action.escu.eli5 = The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service utility `bitsadmin.exe` scheduling a BITS job to persist on an endpoint. The query identifies the parameters used to create, resume or add a file to a BITS job. Typically seen combined in a oneliner or ran in sequence. If identified, review the BITS job created and capture any files written to disk. It is possible for BITS to be used to upload files and this may require further network data analysis to identify. You can use `bitsadmin /list /verbose` to list out the jobs during investigation. action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be high based on legitimate scripted code in any environment. Filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-18 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-18 +action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives will be present. Typically, applications will use `BitsAdmin.exe`. Any filtering should be done based on command-line arguments (legitimate applications) or parent process. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-16 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-16 action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - BITS Job Persistence - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["IcedID", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228", "WhisperGate", "Hermetic Wiper"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["BITS Jobs"] action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting spawn a new process. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 30}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 30}] +action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to persist using BITS. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 56}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228", "WhisperGate", "Hermetic Wiper"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003", "T1059"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - BITS Job Persistence - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BITS Jobs"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1197"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies command-line arguments where `cmd.exe /c` is used to execute a program. `cmd /c` is used to run commands in MS-DOS and terminate after command or process completion. This technique is commonly seen in adversaries and malware to execute batch command using different shell like PowerShell or different process other than `cmd.exe`. This is a good hunting query for suspicious command-line made by a script or relative process execute it. -action.notable.param.rule_title = CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service utility `bitsadmin.exe` scheduling a BITS job to persist on an endpoint. The query identifies the parameters used to create, resume or add a file to a BITS job. Typically seen combined in a oneliner or ran in sequence. If identified, review the BITS job created and capture any files written to disk. It is possible for BITS to be used to upload files and this may require further network data analysis to identify. You can use `bitsadmin /list /verbose` to list out the jobs during investigation. +action.notable.param.rule_title = BITS Job Persistence action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 @@ -2850,41 +7639,41 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` AND Processes.process="* /c *" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter_filter` +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_bitsadmin` Processes.process IN (*create*, *addfile*, *setnotifyflags*, *setnotifycmdline*, *setminretrydelay*, *setcustomheaders*, *resume* ) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `bits_job_persistence_filter` -[ESCU - CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation - Rule] +[ESCU - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic identifies a common behavior by Cobalt Strike and other frameworks where the adversary will escalate privileges, either via `jump` (Cobalt Strike PTH) or `getsystem`, using named-pipe impersonation. A suspicious event will look like `cmd.exe /c echo 4sgryt3436 > \\.\Pipe\5erg53`. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.003", "T1543.003", "T1543"]} +description = The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service utility `bitsadmin.exe` using the `transfer` parameter to download a remote object. In addition, look for `download` or `upload` on the command-line, the switches are not required to perform a transfer. Capture any files downloaded. Review the reputation of the IP or domain used. Typically once executed, a follow on command will be used to execute the dropped file. Note that the network connection or file modification events related will not spawn or create from `bitsadmin.exe`, but the artifacts will appear in a parallel process of `svchost.exe` with a command-line similar to `svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s BITS`. It's important to review all parallel and child processes to capture any behaviors and artifacts. In some suspicious and malicious instances, BITS jobs will be created. You can use `bitsadmin /list /verbose` to list out the jobs during investigation. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1197", "T1105"]} action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic identifies a common behavior by Cobalt Strike and other frameworks where the adversary will escalate privileges, either via `jump` (Cobalt Strike PTH) or `getsystem`, using named-pipe impersonation. A suspicious event will look like `cmd.exe /c echo 4sgryt3436 > \\.\Pipe\5erg53`. +action.escu.eli5 = The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service utility `bitsadmin.exe` using the `transfer` parameter to download a remote object. In addition, look for `download` or `upload` on the command-line, the switches are not required to perform a transfer. Capture any files downloaded. Review the reputation of the IP or domain used. Typically once executed, a follow on command will be used to execute the dropped file. Note that the network connection or file modification events related will not spawn or create from `bitsadmin.exe`, but the artifacts will appear in a parallel process of `svchost.exe` with a command-line similar to `svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s BITS`. It's important to review all parallel and child processes to capture any behaviors and artifacts. In some suspicious and malicious instances, BITS jobs will be created. You can use `bitsadmin /list /verbose` to list out the jobs during investigation. action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown. It is possible filtering may be required to ensure fidelity. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-05-20 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-05-20 +action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives, however it may be required to filter based on parent process name or network connection. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-16 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-16 action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation - Rule +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Cobalt Strike"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ingress Tool Transfer", "BITS Jobs", "DarkSide Ransomware"] action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ potentially performing privilege escalation using named pipes related to Cobalt Strike and other frameworks. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 64}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to download a file. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 49}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.003", "T1543.003", "T1543"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ingress Tool Transfer", "BITS Jobs", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1197", "T1105"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic identifies a common behavior by Cobalt Strike and other frameworks where the adversary will escalate privileges, either via `jump` (Cobalt Strike PTH) or `getsystem`, using named-pipe impersonation. A suspicious event will look like `cmd.exe /c echo 4sgryt3436 > \\.\Pipe\5erg53`. -action.notable.param.rule_title = CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service utility `bitsadmin.exe` using the `transfer` parameter to download a remote object. In addition, look for `download` or `upload` on the command-line, the switches are not required to perform a transfer. Capture any files downloaded. Review the reputation of the IP or domain used. Typically once executed, a follow on command will be used to execute the dropped file. Note that the network connection or file modification events related will not spawn or create from `bitsadmin.exe`, but the artifacts will appear in a parallel process of `svchost.exe` with a command-line similar to `svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s BITS`. It's important to review all parallel and child processes to capture any behaviors and artifacts. In some suspicious and malicious instances, BITS jobs will be created. You can use `bitsadmin /list /verbose` to list out the jobs during investigation. +action.notable.param.rule_title = BITSAdmin Download File action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 @@ -2896,98 +7685,7 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` OR Processes.process=*%comspec%* (Processes.process=*echo* AND Processes.process=*pipe*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmd_echo_pipe___escalation_filter` - -[ESCU - CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic detects a potential process using COM Object like CMLUA or CMSTPLUA to bypass UAC. This technique has been used by ransomware adversaries to gain administrative privileges to its running process. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.003"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic detects a potential process using COM Object like CMLUA or CMSTPLUA to bypass UAC. This technique has been used by ransomware adversaries to gain administrative privileges to its running process. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate windows application that are not on the list loading this dll. Filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-05-13 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-05-13 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Ransomware"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = The following module $ImageLoaded$ was loaded by a non-standard application on endpoint $Computer$ by user $user$. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "ImageLoaded", "threat_object_type": "other"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "ImageLoaded", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Other"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic detects a potential process using COM Object like CMLUA or CMSTPLUA to bypass UAC. This technique has been used by ransomware adversaries to gain administrative privileges to its running process. -action.notable.param.rule_title = CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded IN ("*\\CMLUA.dll", "*\\CMSTPLUA.dll", "*\\CMLUAUTIL.dll") NOT(process_name IN("CMSTP.exe", "CMMGR32.exe")) NOT(Image IN("*\\windows\\*", "*\\program files*")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name Computer EventCode Signed ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass_filter` - -[ESCU - CSC Net On The Fly Compilation - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = this analytic is to detect a suspicious compile before delivery approach of .net compiler csc.exe. This technique was seen in several adversaries, malware and even in red teams to take advantage the csc.exe .net compiler tool to compile on the fly a malicious .net code to evade detection from security product. This is a good hunting query to check further the file or process created after this event and check the file path that passed to csc.exe which is the .net code. Aside from that, powershell is capable of using this compiler in executing .net code in a powershell script so filter on that case is needed. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027.004", "T1027"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = this analytic is to detect a suspicious compile before delivery approach of .net compiler csc.exe. This technique was seen in several adversaries, malware and even in red teams to take advantage the csc.exe .net compiler tool to compile on the fly a malicious .net code to evade detection from security product. This is a good hunting query to check further the file or process created after this event and check the file path that passed to csc.exe which is the .net code. Aside from that, powershell is capable of using this compiler in executing .net code in a powershell script so filter on that case is needed. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated powershell script taht execute .net code that may generate false positive. filter is needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-12 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-12 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - CSC Net On The Fly Compilation - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = csc.exe with commandline $process$ to compile .net code on $dest$ by $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - CSC Net On The Fly Compilation - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027.004", "T1027"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = this analytic is to detect a suspicious compile before delivery approach of .net compiler csc.exe. This technique was seen in several adversaries, malware and even in red teams to take advantage the csc.exe .net compiler tool to compile on the fly a malicious .net code to evade detection from security product. This is a good hunting query to check further the file or process created after this event and check the file path that passed to csc.exe which is the .net code. Aside from that, powershell is capable of using this compiler in executing .net code in a powershell script so filter on that case is needed. -action.notable.param.rule_title = CSC Net On The Fly Compilation -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_csc` Processes.process = "*/noconfig*" Processes.process = "*/fullpaths*" Processes.process = "*@*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `csc_net_on_the_fly_compilation_filter` +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_bitsadmin` Processes.process=*transfer* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `bitsadmin_download_file_filter` [ESCU - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule] action.escu = 0 @@ -3008,7 +7706,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ingress Tool Transfer", "DarkSide Ransomware"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to download a file. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 90}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 90}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 90}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 90}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -3016,10 +7714,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ingress Tool Transfer", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Command and Control"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ingress Tool Transfer", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Command And Control"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = Certutil.exe may download a file from a remote destination using `-urlcache`. This behavior does require a URL to be passed on the command-line. In addition, `-f` (force) and `-split` (Split embedded ASN.1 elements, and save to files) will be used. It is not entirely common for `certutil.exe` to contact public IP space. However, it is uncommon for `certutil.exe` to write files to world writeable paths.\ During triage, capture any files on disk and review. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain in question. action.notable.param.rule_title = CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -3054,7 +7752,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ingress Tool Transfer", "DarkSide Ransomware"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to download a file. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 90}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 90}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 90}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 90}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -3062,10 +7760,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ingress Tool Transfer", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Command and Control"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ingress Tool Transfer", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Command And Control"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = Certutil.exe may download a file from a remote destination using `-VerifyCtl`. This behavior does require a URL to be passed on the command-line. In addition, `-f` (force) and `-split` (Split embedded ASN.1 elements, and save to files) will be used. It is not entirely common for `certutil.exe` to contact public IP space. \ During triage, capture any files on disk and review. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain in question. Using `-VerifyCtl`, the file will either be written to the current working directory or `%APPDATA%\..\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\`. action.notable.param.rule_title = CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -3081,52 +7779,6 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_certutil` (Processes.process=*verifyctl* Processes.process=*split*) OR Processes.process=*verifyctl* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments_filter` -[ESCU - CertUtil With Decode Argument - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = CertUtil.exe may be used to `encode` and `decode` a file, including PE and script code. Encoding will convert a file to base64 with `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----` and `-----END CERTIFICATE-----` tags. Malicious usage will include decoding a encoded file that was downloaded. Once decoded, it will be loaded by a parallel process. Note that there are two additional command switches that may be used - `encodehex` and `decodehex`. Similarly, the file will be encoded in HEX and later decoded for further execution. During triage, identify the source of the file being decoded. Review its contents or execution behavior for further analysis. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1140"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = CertUtil.exe may be used to `encode` and `decode` a file, including PE and script code. Encoding will convert a file to base64 with `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----` and `-----END CERTIFICATE-----` tags. Malicious usage will include decoding a encoded file that was downloaded. Once decoded, it will be loaded by a parallel process. Note that there are two additional command switches that may be used - `encodehex` and `decodehex`. Similarly, the file will be encoded in HEX and later decoded for further execution. During triage, identify the source of the file being decoded. Review its contents or execution behavior for further analysis. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Typically seen used to `encode` files, but it is possible to see legitimate use of `decode`. Filter based on parent-child relationship, file paths, endpoint or user. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-23 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-23 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - CertUtil With Decode Argument - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Deobfuscate-Decode Files or Information"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to decode a file. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 40}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 40}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - CertUtil With Decode Argument - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Deobfuscate-Decode Files or Information"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1140"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = CertUtil.exe may be used to `encode` and `decode` a file, including PE and script code. Encoding will convert a file to base64 with `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----` and `-----END CERTIFICATE-----` tags. Malicious usage will include decoding a encoded file that was downloaded. Once decoded, it will be loaded by a parallel process. Note that there are two additional command switches that may be used - `encodehex` and `decodehex`. Similarly, the file will be encoded in HEX and later decoded for further execution. During triage, identify the source of the file being decoded. Review its contents or execution behavior for further analysis. -action.notable.param.rule_title = CertUtil With Decode Argument -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_certutil` Processes.process=*decode* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `certutil_with_decode_argument_filter` - [ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -3146,7 +7798,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting export a certificate. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 63}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 63}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -3154,10 +7806,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for arguments to certutil.exe indicating the manipulation or extraction of Certificate. This certificate can then be used to sign new authentication tokens specially inside Federated environments such as Windows ADFS. action.notable.param.rule_title = Certutil exe certificate extraction action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -3173,12 +7825,58 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=certutil.exe Processes.process = "*-exportPFX*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `certutil_exe_certificate_extraction_filter` +[ESCU - CertUtil With Decode Argument - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = CertUtil.exe may be used to `encode` and `decode` a file, including PE and script code. Encoding will convert a file to base64 with `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----` and `-----END CERTIFICATE-----` tags. Malicious usage will include decoding a encoded file that was downloaded. Once decoded, it will be loaded by a parallel process. Note that there are two additional command switches that may be used - `encodehex` and `decodehex`. Similarly, the file will be encoded in HEX and later decoded for further execution. During triage, identify the source of the file being decoded. Review its contents or execution behavior for further analysis. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1140"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = CertUtil.exe may be used to `encode` and `decode` a file, including PE and script code. Encoding will convert a file to base64 with `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----` and `-----END CERTIFICATE-----` tags. Malicious usage will include decoding a encoded file that was downloaded. Once decoded, it will be loaded by a parallel process. Note that there are two additional command switches that may be used - `encodehex` and `decodehex`. Similarly, the file will be encoded in HEX and later decoded for further execution. During triage, identify the source of the file being decoded. Review its contents or execution behavior for further analysis. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Typically seen used to `encode` files, but it is possible to see legitimate use of `decode`. Filter based on parent-child relationship, file paths, endpoint or user. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-23 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-23 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - CertUtil With Decode Argument - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Deobfuscate-Decode Files or Information"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to decode a file. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 40}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 40}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - CertUtil With Decode Argument - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Deobfuscate-Decode Files or Information"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1140"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = CertUtil.exe may be used to `encode` and `decode` a file, including PE and script code. Encoding will convert a file to base64 with `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----` and `-----END CERTIFICATE-----` tags. Malicious usage will include decoding a encoded file that was downloaded. Once decoded, it will be loaded by a parallel process. Note that there are two additional command switches that may be used - `encodehex` and `decodehex`. Similarly, the file will be encoded in HEX and later decoded for further execution. During triage, identify the source of the file being decoded. Review its contents or execution behavior for further analysis. +action.notable.param.rule_title = CertUtil With Decode Argument +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_certutil` Processes.process=*decode* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `certutil_with_decode_argument_filter` + [ESCU - Change Default File Association - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = This analytic is developed to detect suspicious registry modification to change the default file association of windows to malicious payload. This techninique was seen in some APT where it modify the default process to run file association, like .txt to notepad.exe. Instead notepad.exe it will point to a Script or other payload that will load malicious command to the compromised host. action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.001", "T1546"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is developed to detect suspicious registry modification to change the default file association of windows to malicious payload. This techninique was seen in some APT where it modify the default process to run file association, like .txt to notepad.exe. Instead notepad.exe it will point to a Script or other payload that will load malicious command to the compromised host. action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown @@ -3200,10 +7898,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Change Default File Association - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Privilege Escalation Persistence"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.001", "T1546"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.001", "T1546"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is developed to detect suspicious registry modification to change the default file association of windows to malicious payload. This techninique was seen in some APT where it modify the default process to run file association, like .txt to notepad.exe. Instead notepad.exe it will point to a Script or other payload that will load malicious command to the compromised host. action.notable.param.rule_title = Change Default File Association action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -3246,10 +7944,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Change To Safe Mode With Network Config - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackMatter Ransomware"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Impact"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackMatter Ransomware"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious bcdedit commandline to configure the host to boot in safe mode with network config. This technique was seen in blackMatter ransomware where it force the compromised host to boot in safe mode to continue its encryption and bring back to normal boot using bcdedit deletevalue command. This TTP can be a good alert for host that booted from safe mode forcefully since it need to modify the boot configuration to bring it back to normal. action.notable.param.rule_title = Change To Safe Mode With Network Config action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -3265,6 +7963,52 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = bcdedit.exe Processes.process="*/set*" Processes.process="*{current}*" Processes.process="*safeboot*" Processes.process="*network*" by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user |`drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `change_to_safe_mode_with_network_config_filter` +[ESCU - CHCP Command Execution - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search is to detect execution of chcp.exe application. this utility is used to change the active code page of the console. This technique was seen in icedid malware to know the locale region/language/country of the compromise host. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect execution of chcp.exe application. this utility is used to change the active code page of the console. This technique was seen in icedid malware to know the locale region/language/country of the compromise host. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed chcp.com may be used. +action.escu.known_false_positives = other tools or script may used this to change code page to UTF-* or others +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-27 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-27 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - CHCP Command Execution - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["IcedID"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = parent process $parent_process_name$ spawning chcp process $process_name$ with parent command line $parent_process$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 9}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 9}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - CHCP Command Execution - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect execution of chcp.exe application. this utility is used to change the active code page of the console. This technique was seen in icedid malware to know the locale region/language/country of the compromise host. +action.notable.param.rule_title = CHCP Command Execution +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=chcp.com Processes.parent_process_name = cmd.exe Processes.parent_process=*/c* by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `chcp_command_execution_filter` + [ESCU - Check Elevated CMD using whoami - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -3295,7 +8039,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Check Elevated CMD using whoami - Rule action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["FIN7"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious whoami execution to check if the cmd or shell instance process is with elevated privileges. This technique was seen in FIN7 js implant where it execute this as part of its data collection to the infected machine to check if the running shell cmd process is elevated or not. This TTP is really a good alert for known attacker that recon on the targetted host. This command is not so commonly executed by a normal user or even an admin to check if a process is elevated. action.notable.param.rule_title = Check Elevated CMD using whoami action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -3311,139 +8055,6 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = "*whoami*" Processes.process = "*/group*" Processes.process = "* find *" Processes.process = "*12288*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `check_elevated_cmd_using_whoami_filter` -[ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for child processes of spoolsv.exe. This activity is associated with a POC privilege-escalation exploit associated with CVE-2018-8440. Spoolsv.exe is the process associated with the Print Spooler service in Windows and typically runs as SYSTEM. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for child processes of spoolsv.exe. This activity is associated with a POC privilege-escalation exploit associated with CVE-2018-8440. Spoolsv.exe is the process associated with the Print Spooler service in Windows and typically runs as SYSTEM. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. Update the `children_of_spoolsv_filter` macro to filter out legitimate child processes spawned by spoolsv.exe. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Some legitimate printer-related processes may show up as children of spoolsv.exe. You should confirm that any activity as legitimate and may be added as exclusions in the search. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-03-16 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-03-16 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Privilege Escalation"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "cve": ["CVE-2018-8440"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for child processes of spoolsv.exe. This activity is associated with a POC privilege-escalation exploit associated with CVE-2018-8440. Spoolsv.exe is the process associated with the Print Spooler service in Windows and typically runs as SYSTEM. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Child Processes of Spoolsv exe -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=spoolsv.exe AND Processes.process_name!=regsvr32.exe by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe_filter` - -[ESCU - Circle CI Disable Security Job - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for disable security job in CircleCI pipeline. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1554"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for disable security job in CircleCI pipeline. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must index CircleCI logs. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-02 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-02 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Circle CI Disable Security Job - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Dev Sec Ops"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = disable security job $mandatory_job$ in workflow $workflow_name$ from user $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 72}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Circle CI Disable Security Job - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1554"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for disable security job in CircleCI pipeline. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Circle CI Disable Security Job -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `circleci` | rename vcs.committer_name as user vcs.subject as commit_message vcs.url as url workflows.* as * | stats values(job_name) as job_names by workflow_id workflow_name user commit_message url branch | lookup mandatory_job_for_workflow workflow_name OUTPUTNEW job_name AS mandatory_job | search mandatory_job=* | eval mandatory_job_executed=if(like(job_names, "%".mandatory_job."%"), 1, 0) | where mandatory_job_executed=0 | eval phase="build" | rex field=url "(?[^\/]*\/[^\/]*)$" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `circle_ci_disable_security_job_filter` - -[ESCU - Circle CI Disable Security Step - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for disable security step in CircleCI pipeline. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1554"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for disable security step in CircleCI pipeline. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must index CircleCI logs. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-01 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-01 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Circle CI Disable Security Step - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Dev Sec Ops"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = disable security step $mandatory_step$ in job $job_name$ from user $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 72}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Circle CI Disable Security Step - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1554"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for disable security step in CircleCI pipeline. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Circle CI Disable Security Step -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `circleci` | rename workflows.job_id AS job_id | join job_id [ | search `circleci` | stats values(name) as step_names count by job_id job_name ] | stats count by step_names job_id job_name vcs.committer_name vcs.subject vcs.url owners{} | rename vcs.* as * , owners{} as user | lookup mandatory_step_for_job job_name OUTPUTNEW step_name AS mandatory_step | search mandatory_step=* | eval mandatory_step_executed=if(like(step_names, "%".mandatory_step."%"), 1, 0) | where mandatory_step_executed=0 | rex field=url "(?[^\/]*\/[^\/]*)$" | eval phase="build" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `circle_ci_disable_security_step_filter` - [ESCU - Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -3463,7 +8074,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to clear the unallocated sectors of a specific disk. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 90}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 90}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 90}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 90}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -3471,10 +8082,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Impact"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070.004", "T1070"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070.004", "T1070"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = this search is to detect execution of `cipher.exe` to clear the unallocated sectors of a specific disk. This technique was seen in some ransomware to make it impossible to forensically recover deleted files. action.notable.param.rule_title = Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -3490,54 +8101,11 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "cipher.exe" Processes.process = "*/w:*" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app_filter` -[ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search allows you to identify the endpoints that have connected to more than five DNS servers and made DNS Queries over the time frame of the search. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "PR.DS"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Resolution"] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search allows you to identify the endpoints that have connected to more than five DNS servers and made DNS Queries over the time frame of the search. -action.escu.how_to_implement = This search requires that DNS data is being ingested and populating the `Network_Resolution` data model. This data can come from DNS logs or from solutions that parse network traffic for this data, such as Splunk Stream or Bro.\ -This search produces fields (`dest_count`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** Distinct DNS Connections, **Field:** dest_count\ -Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` -action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible that an enterprise has more than five DNS servers that are configured in a round-robin rotation. Please customize the search, as appropriate. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["DNS Hijacking", "Command and Control", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Host Redirection"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DNS Hijacking", "Command and Control", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Host Redirection"], "cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "PR.DS"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest', 'src'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search allows you to identify the endpoints that have connected to more than five DNS servers and made DNS Queries over the time frame of the search. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count, values(DNS.dest) AS dest dc(DNS.dest) as dest_count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.message_type=QUERY by DNS.src | `drop_dm_object_name("Network_Resolution")` |where dest_count > 5 | `clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers_filter` - [ESCU - Clop Common Exec Parameter - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = The following analytics are designed to identifies some CLOP ransomware variant that using arguments to execute its main code or feature of its code. In this variant if the parameter is "runrun", CLOP ransomware will try to encrypt files in network shares and if it is "temp.dat", it will try to read from some stream pipe or file start encrypting files within the infected local machines. This technique can be also identified as an anti-sandbox technique to make its code non-responsive since it is waiting for some parameter to execute properly. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Obfuscation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204"]} +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204"]} action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] action.escu.eli5 = The following analytics are designed to identifies some CLOP ransomware variant that using arguments to execute its main code or feature of its code. In this variant if the parameter is "runrun", CLOP ransomware will try to encrypt files in network shares and if it is "temp.dat", it will try to read from some stream pipe or file start encrypting files within the infected local machines. This technique can be also identified as an anti-sandbox technique to make its code non-responsive since it is waiting for some parameter to execute properly. action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. @@ -3552,7 +8120,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Clop Ransomware"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting using arguments to execute its main code or feature of its code related to Clop ransomware. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 100}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 100}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 100}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 100}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -3560,10 +8128,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Clop Common Exec Parameter - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Obfuscation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytics are designed to identifies some CLOP ransomware variant that using arguments to execute its main code or feature of its code. In this variant if the parameter is "runrun", CLOP ransomware will try to encrypt files in network shares and if it is "temp.dat", it will try to read from some stream pipe or file start encrypting files within the infected local machines. This technique can be also identified as an anti-sandbox technique to make its code non-responsive since it is waiting for some parameter to execute properly. action.notable.param.rule_title = Clop Common Exec Parameter action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -3583,8 +8151,8 @@ search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = This detection is to identify the common service name created by the CLOP ransomware as part of its persistence and high privilege code execution in the infected machine. Ussually CLOP ransomware use StartServiceCtrlDispatcherW API in creating this service entry. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] action.escu.eli5 = This detection is to identify the common service name created by the CLOP ransomware as part of its persistence and high privilege code execution in the infected machine. Ussually CLOP ransomware use StartServiceCtrlDispatcherW API in creating this service entry. action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints. action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown @@ -3598,7 +8166,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Clop Ransomware"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ executing known Clop Ransomware service names. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 100}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 100}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 100}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 100}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -3606,9 +8174,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Clop Ransomware Known Service Name - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This detection is to identify the common service name created by the CLOP ransomware as part of its persistence and high privilege code execution in the infected machine. Ussually CLOP ransomware use StartServiceCtrlDispatcherW API in creating this service entry. action.notable.param.rule_title = Clop Ransomware Known Service Name action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -3624,275 +8193,80 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 Service_Name IN ("SecurityCenterIBM", "WinCheckDRVs") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Service_File_Name Service_Name Service_Start_Type Service_Type | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `clop_ransomware_known_service_name_filter` -[ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule] +[ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for new commands from each user role. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Change"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for new commands from each user role. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial` to build the initial table of user roles, commands, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_filter` -action.escu.known_false_positives = . -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-09-04 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-04 +description = The following analytic identifies command-line arguments where `cmd.exe /c` is used to execute a program. `cmd /c` is used to run commands in MS-DOS and terminate after command or process completion. This technique is commonly seen in adversaries and malware to execute batch command using different shell like PowerShell or different process other than `cmd.exe`. This is a good hunting query for suspicious command-line made by a script or relative process execute it. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003", "T1059"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies command-line arguments where `cmd.exe /c` is used to execute a program. `cmd /c` is used to run commands in MS-DOS and terminate after command or process completion. This technique is commonly seen in adversaries and malware to execute batch command using different shell like PowerShell or different process other than `cmd.exe`. This is a good hunting query for suspicious command-line made by a script or relative process execute it. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be high based on legitimate scripted code in any environment. Filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-18 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-18 action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud User Activities"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = User $user$ of type AssumedRole attempting to execute new API calls $command$ that have not been seen before -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 36}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud User Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Recon", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 60, "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.user_type=AssumedRole AND All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user, All_Changes.command All_Changes.object | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role user as user, command as command OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenUserApiCall=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenUserApiCall) OR firstTimeSeenUserApiCall > relative_time(now(),"-24h@h") | table firstTime, user, object, command |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_filter` - -[ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for cloud compute instances created by users who have not created them before. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Change"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for cloud compute instances created by users who have not created them before. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting the appropriate cloud-infrastructure logs Run the "Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User" support search to create of baseline of previously seen users. -action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible that a user will start to create compute instances for the first time, for any number of reasons. Verify with the user launching instances that this is the intended behavior. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-13 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-13 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Cloud Cryptomining"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = User $user$ is creating a new instance $dest$ for the first time -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 18}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 18}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Cryptomining"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Recon", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 30, "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object) as dest from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.user All_Changes.vendor_region | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user user as user OUTPUTNEW firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenUser=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenUser) OR firstTimeSeenUser > relative_time(now(), "-24h@h") | table firstTime, user, dest, count vendor_region | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user_filter` - -[ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks at cloud-infrastructure events where an instance is created in any region within the last hour and then compares it to a lookup file of previously seen regions where instances have been created. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Change"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks at cloud-infrastructure events where an instance is created in any region within the last hour and then compares it to a lookup file of previously seen regions where instances have been created. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial` to build the initial table of images observed and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region_filter` macro. -action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible that a user has unknowingly started an instance in a new region. Please verify that this activity is legitimate. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-09-02 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-02 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Cloud Cryptomining"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = User $user$ is creating an instance $dest$ in a new region for the first time -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 42}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Cryptomining"], "cis20": ["CIS 12"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "user"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id) as dest, count from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.vendor_region, All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_regions vendor_region as vendor_region OUTPUTNEW firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenRegion=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenRegion) OR firstTimeSeenRegion > relative_time(now(), "-24h@h") | table firstTime, user, dest, count , vendor_region | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region_filter` - -[ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for cloud compute instances being created with previously unseen image IDs. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Change"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for cloud compute instances being created with previously unseen image IDs. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial` to build the initial table of images observed and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image_filter` macro. -action.escu.known_false_positives = After a new image is created, the first systems created with that image will cause this alert to fire. Verify that the image being used was created by a legitimate user. -action.escu.creation_date = 2018-10-12 -action.escu.modification_date = 2018-10-12 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Cloud Cryptomining"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = User $user$ is creating an instance $dest$ with an image that has not been previously seen. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 36}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 36}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Cryptomining"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 60, "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id) as dest from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.image_id, All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | `drop_dm_object_name("Instance_Changes")` | where image_id != "unknown" | lookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_images image_id as image_id OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenImage=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenImage) OR firstTimeSeenImage > relative_time(now(), "-24h@h") | table firstTime, user, image_id, count, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image_filter` - -[ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = Find EC2 instances being created with previously unseen instance types. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Change"] -action.escu.eli5 = Find EC2 instances being created with previously unseen instance types. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial` to build the initial table of instance types observed and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter` macro. -action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible that an admin will create a new system using a new instance type that has never been used before. Verify with the creator that they intended to create the system with the new instance type. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-09-12 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-12 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Cloud Cryptomining"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = User $user$ is creating an instance $dest$ with an instance type $instance_type$ that has not been previously seen. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 30}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 30}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Cryptomining"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 50, "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id) as dest, count from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.instance_type, All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | `drop_dm_object_name("Instance_Changes")` | where instance_type != "unknown" | lookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types instance_type as instance_type OUTPUTNEW firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenInstanceType=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenInstanceType) OR firstTimeSeenInstanceType > relative_time(now(), "-24h@h") | table firstTime, user, dest, count, instance_type | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter` - -[ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for cloud instances being modified by users who have not previously modified them. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Change"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for cloud instances being modified by users who have not previously modified them. -action.escu.how_to_implement = This search has a dependency on other searches to create and update a baseline of users observed to be associated with this activity. The search "Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update" should be enabled for this detection to properly work. -action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible that a new user will start to modify EC2 instances when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is modifying instances that this is the intended behavior. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-29 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-29 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = User $user$ is modifying an instance $dest$ for the first time. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 42}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id values(All_Changes.command) as command from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=modified All_Changes.change_type=EC2 All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user user as user OUTPUTNEW firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenUser=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenUser) OR firstTimeSeenUser > relative_time(now(), "-24h@h") | table firstTime user command object_id count | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_instance_modified_by_previously_unseen_user_filter` - -[ESCU - Cloud Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. Enforcing network-access controls is one of the defensive mechanisms used by cloud administrators to restrict access to a cloud instance. After the attacker has gained control of the console by compromising an admin account, they can delete a network ACL and gain access to the instance from anywhere. This search will query the Change datamodel to detect users deleting network ACLs. Deprecated because it's a duplicate -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. Enforcing network-access controls is one of the defensive mechanisms used by cloud administrators to restrict access to a cloud instance. After the attacker has gained control of the console by compromising an admin account, they can delete a network ACL and gain access to the instance from anywhere. This search will query the Change datamodel to detect users deleting network ACLs. Deprecated because it's a duplicate -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter` macro. -action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible that a user has legitimately deleted a network ACL. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-09-08 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-08 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Cloud Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Cloud Network ACL Activity"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["IcedID", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228", "WhisperGate", "Hermetic Wiper"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting spawn a new process. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 30}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 30}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Cloud Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Network ACL Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228", "WhisperGate", "Hermetic Wiper"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003", "T1059"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` AND Processes.process="* /c *" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter_filter` + +[ESCU - CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic identifies a common behavior by Cobalt Strike and other frameworks where the adversary will escalate privileges, either via `jump` (Cobalt Strike PTH) or `getsystem`, using named-pipe impersonation. A suspicious event will look like `cmd.exe /c echo 4sgryt3436 > \\.\Pipe\5erg53`. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.003", "T1543.003", "T1543"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic identifies a common behavior by Cobalt Strike and other frameworks where the adversary will escalate privileges, either via `jump` (Cobalt Strike PTH) or `getsystem`, using named-pipe impersonation. A suspicious event will look like `cmd.exe /c echo 4sgryt3436 > \\.\Pipe\5erg53`. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown. It is possible filtering may be required to ensure fidelity. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-05-20 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-05-20 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Cobalt Strike"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ potentially performing privilege escalation using named pipes related to Cobalt Strike and other frameworks. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 64}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.003", "T1543.003", "T1543"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['src'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. Enforcing network-access controls is one of the defensive mechanisms used by cloud administrators to restrict access to a cloud instance. After the attacker has gained control of the console by compromising an admin account, they can delete a network ACL and gain access to the instance from anywhere. This search will query the Change datamodel to detect users deleting network ACLs. Deprecated because it's a duplicate -action.notable.param.rule_title = Cloud Network Access Control List Deleted -action.notable.param.security_domain = network +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic identifies a common behavior by Cobalt Strike and other frameworks where the adversary will escalate privileges, either via `jump` (Cobalt Strike PTH) or `getsystem`, using named-pipe impersonation. A suspicious event will look like `cmd.exe /c echo 4sgryt3436 > \\.\Pipe\5erg53`. +action.notable.param.rule_title = CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true @@ -3903,171 +8277,7 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = `cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteNetworkAcl|rename userIdentity.arn as arn | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(errorMessage) values(errorCode) values(userAgent) values(userIdentity.*) by src userName arn eventName | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter` - -[ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen cities. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Change"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen cities. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city_filter` macro. -action.escu.known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ - This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-10-09 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-09 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = User $user$ is starting or creating an instance $dest$ for the first time in City $City$ from IP address $src$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 18}, {"risk_object_field": "src", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 18}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 18}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 30, "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "src", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(City) | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources City as City OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenCity=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenCity) OR firstTimeSeenCity > relative_time(now(), `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window`) | table firstTime, src, City, user, object, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city_filter` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` - -[ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen countries. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Change"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen countries. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_country_filter` macro. -action.escu.known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ - This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-10-09 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-09 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = User $user$ is starting or creating an instance $object$ for the first time in Country $Country$ from IP address $src$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 42}, {"risk_object_field": "src", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}, {"risk_object_field": "object", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "src", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "object", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(Country) | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources Country as Country OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenCountry=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenCountry) OR firstTimeSeenCountry > relative_time(now(), "-24h@h") | table firstTime, src, Country, user, object, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_country_filter` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` - -[ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen IP addresses. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Change"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen IP addresses. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter` macro. -action.escu.known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ - This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-08-16 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-16 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = User $user$ is starting or creating an instance $object_id$ for the first time from IP address $src$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 42}, {"risk_object_field": "src", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}, {"risk_object_field": "object_id", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "src", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "object_id", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime, values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources src as src OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenSrc=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenSrc) OR firstTimeSeenSrc > relative_time(now(), `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window`) | table firstTime, src, user, object_id, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` - -[ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen regions. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Change"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen regions. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region_filter` macro. -action.escu.known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ - This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-08-16 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-16 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = User $user$ is starting or creating an instance $object$ for the first time in region $Region$ from IP address $src$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 42}, {"risk_object_field": "src", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}, {"risk_object_field": "object", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "src", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "object", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(Region) | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources Region as Region OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenRegion=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenRegion) OR firstTimeSeenRegion > relative_time(now(), `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window`) | table firstTime, src, Region, user, object, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region_filter` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` OR Processes.process=*%comspec%* (Processes.process=*echo* AND Processes.process=*pipe*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmd_echo_pipe___escalation_filter` [ESCU - Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell - Rule] action.escu = 0 @@ -4088,7 +8298,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["FIN7"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = A non-standard parent process $parent_process_name$ spawned child process $process_name$ to execute command-line tool on $dest$. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 56}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 56}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -4096,10 +8306,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["FIN7"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.007"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["FIN7"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.007"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies a non-standard parent process (not matching CMD, PowerShell, or Explorer) spawning `ipconfig.exe` or `systeminfo.exe`. This particular behavior was seen in FIN7's JSSLoader .NET payload. This is also typically seen when an adversary is injected into another process performing different discovery techniques. This event stands out as a TTP since these tools are commonly executed with a shell application or Explorer parent, and not by another application. This TTP is a good indicator for an adversary gathering host information, but one possible false positive might be an automated tool used by a system administator. action.notable.param.rule_title = Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -4115,6 +8325,52 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = "ipconfig.exe" OR Processes.process_name = "systeminfo.exe") AND NOT (Processes.parent_process_name = "cmd.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "powershell*" OR Processes.parent_process_name="pwsh.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "explorer.exe") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmdline_tool_not_executed_in_cmd_shell_filter` +[ESCU - CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic detects a potential process using COM Object like CMLUA or CMSTPLUA to bypass UAC. This technique has been used by ransomware adversaries to gain administrative privileges to its running process. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.003"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic detects a potential process using COM Object like CMLUA or CMSTPLUA to bypass UAC. This technique has been used by ransomware adversaries to gain administrative privileges to its running process. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate windows application that are not on the list loading this dll. Filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-05-13 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-05-13 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = The following module $ImageLoaded$ was loaded by a non-standard application on endpoint $Computer$ by user $user$. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "ImageLoaded", "threat_object_type": "other"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "ImageLoaded", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Other"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic detects a potential process using COM Object like CMLUA or CMSTPLUA to bypass UAC. This technique has been used by ransomware adversaries to gain administrative privileges to its running process. +action.notable.param.rule_title = CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded IN ("*\\CMLUA.dll", "*\\CMSTPLUA.dll", "*\\CMLUAUTIL.dll") NOT(process_name IN("CMSTP.exe", "CMMGR32.exe")) NOT(Image IN("*\\windows\\*", "*\\program files*")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name Computer EventCode Signed ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass_filter` + [ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -4147,7 +8403,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike", "Trickbot", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the use of default or publicly known named pipes used with Cobalt Strike. A named pipe is a named, one-way or duplex pipe for communication between the pipe server and one or more pipe clients. Cobalt Strike uses named pipes in many ways and has default values used with the Artifact Kit and Malleable C2 Profiles. The following query assists with identifying these default named pipes. Each EDR product presents named pipes a little different. Consider taking the values and generating a query based on the product of choice. \ Upon triage, review the process performing the named pipe. If it is explorer.exe, It is possible it was injected into by another process. Review recent parallel processes to identify suspicious patterns or behaviors. A parallel process may have a network connection, review and follow the connection back to identify any file modifications. action.notable.param.rule_title = Cobalt Strike Named Pipes @@ -4197,12 +8453,6 @@ action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "file_name", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "File Name"}]} schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The search looks for file modifications with extensions commonly used by Ransomware -action.notable.param.rule_title = Common Ransomware Extensions -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -4243,12 +8493,6 @@ action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "file_name", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "File Name"}]} schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The search looks for files created with names matching those typically used in ransomware notes that tell the victim how to get their data back. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Common Ransomware Notes -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -4267,7 +8511,7 @@ description = This search detects the suspicious commandline argument of revil r action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204"]} action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] action.escu.eli5 = This search detects the suspicious commandline argument of revil ransomware to encrypt specific or all local drive and network shares of the compromised machine or host. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. The following Splunk SOAR playbook can be used to respond to this detection: Ransomware Investigate and Contain +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. action.escu.known_false_positives = 3rd party tool may have commandline parameter that can trigger this detection. action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-02 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-02 @@ -4279,7 +8523,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ executing specific Conti Ransomware related parameters. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 64}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 64}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -4287,10 +8531,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Conti Common Exec parameter - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This search detects the suspicious commandline argument of revil ransomware to encrypt specific or all local drive and network shares of the compromised machine or host. action.notable.param.rule_title = Conti Common Exec parameter action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -4325,7 +8569,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a suspicious file from disk. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -4333,10 +8577,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Control Loading from World Writable Directory - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.002"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.002"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = The following detection identifies control.exe loading either a .cpl or .inf from a writable directory. This is related to CVE-2021-40444. During triage, review parallel processes, parent and child, for further suspicious behaviors. In addition, capture file modifications and analyze. action.notable.param.rule_title = Control Loading from World Writable Directory action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -4352,40 +8596,40 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=control.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=CONTROL.EXE) AND Processes.process IN ("*\\appdata\\*", "*\\windows\\temp\\*", "*\\programdata\\*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `control_loading_from_world_writable_directory_filter` -[ESCU - Correlation by Repository and Risk - Rule] +[ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search correlations detections by repository and risk_score -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.003", "T1204"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search correlations detections by repository and risk_score -action.escu.how_to_implement = For Dev Sec Ops POC -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-06 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-06 +description = This search looks for the creation of local administrator accounts using net.exe . +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.001", "T1136"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for the creation of local administrator accounts using net.exe . +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators often leverage net.exe to create admin accounts. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-08 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-08 action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Correlation by Repository and Risk - Rule +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"] +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Dev Sec Ops"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["DHS Report TA18-074A"] action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Correlation triggered for user $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 70}] +action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to add a user to the local Administrators group. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 30}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 30}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Correlation by Repository and Risk - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.003", "T1204"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DHS Report TA18-074A"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.001", "T1136"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search correlations detections by repository and risk_score -action.notable.param.rule_title = Correlation by Repository and Risk -action.notable.param.security_domain = network +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for the creation of local administrator accounts using net.exe . +action.notable.param.rule_title = Create local admin accounts using net exe +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true @@ -4396,42 +8640,42 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = `signals` | fillnull | stats sum(risk_score) as risk_score values(source) as signals values(user) as user by repository | sort - risk_score | where risk_score > 80 | `correlation_by_repository_and_risk_filter` +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.user) as user values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=net.exe OR Processes.process_name=net1.exe) AND Processes.process=*/add* AND (Processes.process=*administrators* OR Processes.process=*administratoren* OR Processes.process=*administrateurs* OR Processes.process=*administrador* OR Processes.process=*amministratori* OR Processes.process=*administratorer*) by Processes.process Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe_filter` -[ESCU - Correlation by User and Risk - Rule] +[ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search correlations detections by user and risk_score -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.003", "T1204"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search correlations detections by user and risk_score -action.escu.how_to_implement = For Dev Sec Ops POC -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-06 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-06 +description = This search looks for the creation or deletion of hidden shares using net.exe. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070", "T1070.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for the creation or deletion of hidden shares using net.exe. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators often leverage net.exe to create or delete network shares. You should verify that the activity was intentional and is legitimate. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-09-16 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-16 action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Correlation by User and Risk - Rule +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"] +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Dev Sec Ops"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Hidden Cobra Malware"] action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Correlation triggered for user $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 70}] +action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ enumerating Windows file shares. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Correlation by User and Risk - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.003", "T1204"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Hidden Cobra Malware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070", "T1070.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search correlations detections by user and risk_score -action.notable.param.rule_title = Correlation by User and Risk -action.notable.param.security_domain = network +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for the creation or deletion of hidden shares using net.exe. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Create or delete windows shares using net exe +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true @@ -4442,14 +8686,14 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = `signals` | fillnull | stats sum(risk_score) as risk_score values(source) as signals values(repository) as repository by user | sort - risk_score | where risk_score > 80 | `correlation_by_user_and_risk_filter` +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.user) as user values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` by Processes.process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search process=*share* | `create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe_filter` [ESCU - Create Remote Thread In Shell Application - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = This search is to detect suspicious process injection in command shell. This technique was seen in IcedID where it execute cmd.exe process to inject its shellcode as part of its execution as banking trojan. It is really uncommon to have a create remote thread execution in the following application. action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect suspicious process injection in command shell. This technique was seen in IcedID where it execute cmd.exe process to inject its shellcode as part of its execution as banking trojan. It is really uncommon to have a create remote thread execution in the following application. action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown @@ -4463,7 +8707,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["IcedID"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = process $SourceImage$ create a remote thread to shell app process $TargetImage$ in host $Computer$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 70}, {"threat_object_field": "SourceImage", "threat_object_type": "process name"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 70}, {"threat_object_field": "SourceImage", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -4471,9 +8715,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Create Remote Thread In Shell Application - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "SourceImage", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "process name"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "SourceImage", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect suspicious process injection in command shell. This technique was seen in IcedID where it execute cmd.exe process to inject its shellcode as part of its execution as banking trojan. It is really uncommon to have a create remote thread execution in the following application. action.notable.param.rule_title = Create Remote Thread In Shell Application action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -4519,7 +8764,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "TargetImage", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Other"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = Detect remote thread creation into LSASS consistent with credential dumping. action.notable.param.rule_title = Create Remote Thread into LSASS action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -4535,39 +8780,39 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = `sysmon` EventID=8 TargetImage=*lsass.exe | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, EventCode, TargetImage, TargetProcessId | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `create_remote_thread_into_lsass_filter` -[ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule] +[ESCU - Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for the creation of local administrator accounts using net.exe . -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.001", "T1136"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for the creation of local administrator accounts using net.exe . -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators often leverage net.exe to create admin accounts. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-08 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-08 +description = Detect the hands on keyboard behavior of Windows Task Manager creating a process dump of lsass.exe. Upon this behavior occurring, a file write/modification will occur in the users profile under \AppData\Local\Temp. The dump file, lsass.dmp, cannot be renamed, however if the dump occurs more than once, it will be named lsass (2).dmp. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = Detect the hands on keyboard behavior of Windows Task Manager creating a process dump of lsass.exe. Upon this behavior occurring, a file write/modification will occur in the users profile under \AppData\Local\Temp. The dump file, lsass.dmp, cannot be renamed, however if the dump occurs more than once, it will be named lsass (2).dmp. +action.escu.how_to_implement = This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 11 for detecting file create of lsass.dmp. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators can create memory dumps for debugging purposes, but memory dumps of the LSASS process would be unusual. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-02-03 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-02-03 action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["DHS Report TA18-074A"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Credential Dumping"] action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to add a user to the local Administrators group. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 30}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 30}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_message = $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $Computer$ writing $TargetFilename$ to disk. This behavior is related to dumping credentials via Task Manager. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "TargetFilename", "threat_object_type": "file name"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DHS Report TA18-074A"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.001", "T1136"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "TargetFilename", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "File Name"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for the creation of local administrator accounts using net.exe . -action.notable.param.rule_title = Create local admin accounts using net exe +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = Detect the hands on keyboard behavior of Windows Task Manager creating a process dump of lsass.exe. Upon this behavior occurring, a file write/modification will occur in the users profile under \AppData\Local\Temp. The dump file, lsass.dmp, cannot be renamed, however if the dump occurs more than once, it will be named lsass (2).dmp. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 @@ -4579,53 +8824,7 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.user) as user values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=net.exe OR Processes.process_name=net1.exe) AND Processes.process=*/add* AND (Processes.process=*administrators* OR Processes.process=*administratoren* OR Processes.process=*administrateurs* OR Processes.process=*administrador* OR Processes.process=*amministratori* OR Processes.process=*administratorer*) by Processes.process Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe_filter` - -[ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for the creation or deletion of hidden shares using net.exe. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070", "T1070.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for the creation or deletion of hidden shares using net.exe. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators often leverage net.exe to create or delete network shares. You should verify that the activity was intentional and is legitimate. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-09-16 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-16 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Hidden Cobra Malware"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ enumerating Windows file shares. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Hidden Cobra Malware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070", "T1070.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for the creation or deletion of hidden shares using net.exe. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Create or delete windows shares using net exe -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.user) as user values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` by Processes.process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search process=*share* | `create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe_filter` +search = `sysmon` EventID=11 process_name=taskmgr.exe TargetFilename=*lsass*.dmp | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, object_category, process_name, TargetFilename | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr_filter` [ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule] action.escu = 0 @@ -4646,7 +8845,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Credential Dumping"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to create a shadow copy to perform offline password cracking. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 81}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 81}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 81}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 81}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -4654,10 +8853,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.003", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.003", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = Monitor for signs that Vssadmin or Wmic has been used to create a shadow copy. action.notable.param.rule_title = Creation of Shadow Copy action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -4692,7 +8891,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Credential Dumping"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to create a shadow copy to perform offline password cracking. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 81}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 81}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 81}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 81}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -4700,10 +8899,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.003", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.003", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This search detects the use of wmic and Powershell to create a shadow copy. action.notable.param.rule_title = Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -4719,52 +8918,6 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` OR `process_powershell` Processes.process=*shadowcopy* Processes.process=*create* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell_filter` -[ESCU - Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = Detect the hands on keyboard behavior of Windows Task Manager creating a process dump of lsass.exe. Upon this behavior occurring, a file write/modification will occur in the users profile under \AppData\Local\Temp. The dump file, lsass.dmp, cannot be renamed, however if the dump occurs more than once, it will be named lsass (2).dmp. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = Detect the hands on keyboard behavior of Windows Task Manager creating a process dump of lsass.exe. Upon this behavior occurring, a file write/modification will occur in the users profile under \AppData\Local\Temp. The dump file, lsass.dmp, cannot be renamed, however if the dump occurs more than once, it will be named lsass (2).dmp. -action.escu.how_to_implement = This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 11 for detecting file create of lsass.dmp. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators can create memory dumps for debugging purposes, but memory dumps of the LSASS process would be unusual. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-02-03 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-02-03 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Credential Dumping"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $Computer$ writing $TargetFilename$ to disk. This behavior is related to dumping credentials via Task Manager. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "TargetFilename", "threat_object_type": "file name"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "TargetFilename", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "File Name"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = Detect the hands on keyboard behavior of Windows Task Manager creating a process dump of lsass.exe. Upon this behavior occurring, a file write/modification will occur in the users profile under \AppData\Local\Temp. The dump file, lsass.dmp, cannot be renamed, however if the dump occurs more than once, it will be named lsass (2).dmp. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `sysmon` EventID=11 process_name=taskmgr.exe TargetFilename=*lsass*.dmp | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, object_category, process_name, TargetFilename | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr_filter` - [ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -4784,7 +8937,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Credential Dumping"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to copy SAM and NTDS.dit for offline password cracking. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 81}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 81}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 81}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 81}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -4792,10 +8945,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.003", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.003", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This search detects credential dumping using copy command from a shadow copy. action.notable.param.rule_title = Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -4830,7 +8983,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Credential Dumping"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to create symlink to a shadow copy to grab credentials. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 81}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 81}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 81}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 81}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -4838,10 +8991,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.003", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.003", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This search detects the creation of a symlink to a shadow copy. action.notable.param.rule_title = Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -4857,6 +9010,46 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` Processes.process=*mklink* Processes.process=*HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy_filter` +[ESCU - CSC Net On The Fly Compilation - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = this analytic is to detect a suspicious compile before delivery approach of .net compiler csc.exe. This technique was seen in several adversaries, malware and even in red teams to take advantage the csc.exe .net compiler tool to compile on the fly a malicious .net code to evade detection from security product. This is a good hunting query to check further the file or process created after this event and check the file path that passed to csc.exe which is the .net code. Aside from that, powershell is capable of using this compiler in executing .net code in a powershell script so filter on that case is needed. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027.004", "T1027"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = this analytic is to detect a suspicious compile before delivery approach of .net compiler csc.exe. This technique was seen in several adversaries, malware and even in red teams to take advantage the csc.exe .net compiler tool to compile on the fly a malicious .net code to evade detection from security product. This is a good hunting query to check further the file or process created after this event and check the file path that passed to csc.exe which is the .net code. Aside from that, powershell is capable of using this compiler in executing .net code in a powershell script so filter on that case is needed. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated powershell script taht execute .net code that may generate false positive. filter is needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-12 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-12 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - CSC Net On The Fly Compilation - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = csc.exe with commandline $process$ to compile .net code on $dest$ by $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - CSC Net On The Fly Compilation - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027.004", "T1027"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_csc` Processes.process = "*/noconfig*" Processes.process = "*/fullpaths*" Processes.process = "*@*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `csc_net_on_the_fly_compilation_filter` + [ESCU - Curl Download and Bash Execution - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -4864,7 +9057,7 @@ description = The following analytic identifies the use of curl on Linux or MacO action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"]} action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the use of curl on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter. The following Splunk SOAR playbook can be used to respond to this detection: Log4j Investigate The following Splunk SOAR playbook can be used to respond to this detection: Log4j Respond +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter. action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required. action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-10 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-10 @@ -4887,7 +9080,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Curl Download and Bash Execution - Rule action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ingress Tool Transfer", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the use of curl on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j. action.notable.param.rule_title = Curl Download and Bash Execution action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -4903,343 +9096,12 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=curl (Processes.process="*-s *") OR (Processes.process="*|*" AND Processes.process="*bash*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter` -[ESCU - DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies DLLHost.exe with no command line arguments with a network connection. It is unusual for DLLHost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. DLLHost.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies DLLHost.exe with no command line arguments with a network connection. It is unusual for DLLHost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. DLLHost.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `port` node. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate third party applications may use a moved copy of dllhost, triggering a false positive. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-13 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-13 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Cobalt Strike"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = The process $process_name$ was spawned by $parent_image$ without any command-line arguments on $dest$ by $user$. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 49}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_image", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_image", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies DLLHost.exe with no command line arguments with a network connection. It is unusual for DLLHost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. DLLHost.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -action.notable.param.rule_title = DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=dllhost.exe by _time span=1h Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process="(dllhost\.exe.{0,4}$)" | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port !="0" by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_guid connection_to_CNC dest_port | `dllhost_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter` - -[ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = this search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. This technique are seen in couple of malware and APT group to exfiltrated collected data in a infected machine or infected network. This detection is looking for unique use of nslookup where it tries to use specific record type, TXT, A, AAAA, that are commonly used by attacker and also the retry parameter which is designed to query C2 DNS multiple tries. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = this search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. This technique are seen in couple of malware and APT group to exfiltrated collected data in a infected machine or infected network. This detection is looking for unique use of nslookup where it tries to use specific record type, TXT, A, AAAA, that are commonly used by attacker and also the retry parameter which is designed to query C2 DNS multiple tries. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of nslookup.exe may be used. -action.escu.known_false_positives = admin nslookup usage -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-15 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-15 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Dynamic DNS", "Command and Control", "Data Exfiltration"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ performing activity related to DNS exfiltration. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 72}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Dynamic DNS", "Command and Control", "Data Exfiltration"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = this search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. This technique are seen in couple of malware and APT group to exfiltrated collected data in a infected machine or infected network. This detection is looking for unique use of nslookup where it tries to use specific record type, TXT, A, AAAA, that are commonly used by attacker and also the retry parameter which is designed to query C2 DNS multiple tries. -action.notable.param.rule_title = DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "nslookup.exe" Processes.process = "*-querytype=*" OR Processes.process="*-qt=*" OR Processes.process="*-q=*" OR Processes.process="-type=*" OR Processes.process="*-retry=*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app_filter` - -[ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search allows you to identify DNS requests that are unusually large for the record type being requested in your environment. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.004", "T1071"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Resolution"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search allows you to identify DNS requests that are unusually large for the record type being requested in your environment. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. In addition, the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or greater must be installed on your search heads, along with any required dependencies. Finally, the support search "Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK" must be executed before this detection search, because it builds a machine-learning (ML) model over the historical data used by this search. It is important that this search is run in the same app context as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild the model with the latest data available in your environment.\ -This search produces fields (`query`,`query_length`,`count`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** DNS Query, **Field:** query\ -1. \ -1. **Label:** DNS Query Length, **Field:** query_length\ -1. \ -1. **Label:** Number of events, **Field:** count\ -Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` -action.escu.known_false_positives = If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider reducing the value for threshold in the search. You should also periodically re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-01-22 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-01-22 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Hidden Cobra Malware", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Command and Control"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Hidden Cobra Malware", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Command and Control"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.004", "T1071"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest', 'src'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search allows you to identify DNS requests that are unusually large for the record type being requested in your environment. -action.notable.param.rule_title = DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as start_time max(_time) as end_time values(DNS.src) as src values(DNS.dest) as dest from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query DNS.record_type | search DNS.record_type=* | `drop_dm_object_name(DNS)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | eval query_length = len(query) | apply dns_query_pdfmodel threshold=0.01 | rename "IsOutlier(query_length)" as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | sort -query_length | table start_time end_time query record_type count src dest query_length | `dns_query_length_outliers___mltk_filter` - -[ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search allows you to identify DNS requests and compute the standard deviation on the length of the names being resolved, then filter on two times the standard deviation to show you those queries that are unusually large for your environment. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1048"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Resolution"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search allows you to identify DNS requests and compute the standard deviation on the length of the names being resolved, then filter on two times the standard deviation to show you those queries that are unusually large for your environment. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. -action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible there can be long domain names that are legitimate. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-06 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-06 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Hidden Cobra Malware", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Command and Control"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A dns query $query$ with 2 time standard deviation of name len of the dns query in host $host$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "host", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"threat_object_field": "query", "threat_object_type": "dnsquery"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Hidden Cobra Malware", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Command and Control"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1048"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "host", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "query", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "dnsquery"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search allows you to identify DNS requests and compute the standard deviation on the length of the names being resolved, then filter on two times the standard deviation to show you those queries that are unusually large for your environment. -action.notable.param.rule_title = DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where NOT DNS.message_type IN("Pointer","PTR") by DNS.query | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` | eval tlds=split(query,".") | eval tld=mvindex(tlds,-1) | eval tld_len=len(tld) | search tld_len<=24 | eval query_length = len(query) | table query query_length record_type count | eventstats stdev(query_length) AS stdev avg(query_length) AS avg p50(query_length) AS p50| where query_length>(avg+stdev*2) | eval z_score=(query_length-avg)/stdev | `dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation_filter` - -[ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search will detect DNS requests resolved by unauthorized DNS servers. Legitimate DNS servers should be identified in the Enterprise Security Assets and Identity Framework. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Resolution"] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search will detect DNS requests resolved by unauthorized DNS servers. Legitimate DNS servers should be identified in the Enterprise Security Assets and Identity Framework. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. It also requires that your DNS servers are identified correctly in the Assets and Identity table of Enterprise Security. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate DNS activity can be detected in this search. Investigate, verify and update the list of authorized DNS servers as appropriate. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["DNS Hijacking", "Command and Control", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Host Redirection"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DNS Hijacking", "Command and Control", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Host Redirection"], "cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest', 'src'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search will detect DNS requests resolved by unauthorized DNS servers. Legitimate DNS servers should be identified in the Enterprise Security Assets and Identity Framework. -action.notable.param.rule_title = DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.dest_category != dns_server AND DNS.src_category != dns_server by DNS.src DNS.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` | `dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers_filter` - -[ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search takes the DNS records and their answers results of the discovered_dns_records lookup and finds if any records have changed by searching DNS response from the Network_Resolution datamodel across the last day. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Resolution"] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search takes the DNS records and their answers results of the discovered_dns_records lookup and finds if any records have changed by searching DNS response from the Network_Resolution datamodel across the last day. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the `Network_Resolution` data model. It also requires that the `discover_dns_record` lookup table be populated by the included support search "Discover DNS record". \ - **Splunk>Phantom Playbook Integration**\ -If Splunk>Phantom is also configured in your environment, a Playbook called "DNS Hijack Enrichment" can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. The playbook takes in the DNS record changed and uses Geoip, whois, Censys and PassiveTotal to detect if DNS issuers changed. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/`, add the correct hostname to the "Phantom Instance" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search, and set the corresponding Playbook to active. \ -(Playbook Link:`https://my.phantom.us/4.2/playbook/dns-hijack-enrichment/`).\ - -action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate DNS changes can be detected in this search. Investigate, verify and update the list of provided current answers for the domains in question as appropriate. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["DNS Hijacking"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - DNS record changed - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DNS Hijacking"], "cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['src'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search takes the DNS records and their answers results of the discovered_dns_records lookup and finds if any records have changed by searching DNS response from the Network_Resolution datamodel across the last day. -action.notable.param.rule_title = DNS record changed -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | inputlookup discovered_dns_records | rename answer as discovered_answer | join domain[|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.record_type) as type, values(DNS.answer) as current_answer values(DNS.src) as src from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.message_type=RESPONSE DNS.answer!="unknown" DNS.answer!="" by DNS.query | rename DNS.query as query | where query!="unknown" | rex field=query "(?\w+\.\w+?)(?:$|/)"] | makemv delim=" " answer | makemv delim=" " type | sort -count | table count,src,domain,type,query,current_answer,discovered_answer | makemv current_answer | mvexpand current_answer | makemv discovered_answer | eval n=mvfind(discovered_answer, current_answer) | where isnull(n) | `dns_record_changed_filter` - -[ESCU - DSQuery Domain Discovery - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies "dsquery.exe" execution with arguments looking for `TrustedDomain` query directly on the command-line. This is typically indicative of an Administrator or adversary perform domain trust discovery. Note that this query does not identify any other variations of "Dsquery.exe" usage.\ -Within this detection, it is assumed `dsquery.exe` is not moved or renamed.\ -The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process "dsquery.exe" and its parent process.\ -DSQuery.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64` and only on Server operating system.\ -The following DLL(s) are loaded when DSQuery.exe is launched `dsquery.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible dsquery is running within that process context in memory.\ -In addition to trust discovery, review parallel processes for additional behaviors performed. Identify the parent process and capture any files (batch files, for example) being used. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies "dsquery.exe" execution with arguments looking for `TrustedDomain` query directly on the command-line. This is typically indicative of an Administrator or adversary perform domain trust discovery. Note that this query does not identify any other variations of "Dsquery.exe" usage.\ -Within this detection, it is assumed `dsquery.exe` is not moved or renamed.\ -The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process "dsquery.exe" and its parent process.\ -DSQuery.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64` and only on Server operating system.\ -The following DLL(s) are loaded when DSQuery.exe is launched `dsquery.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible dsquery is running within that process context in memory.\ -In addition to trust discovery, review parallel processes for additional behaviors performed. Identify the parent process and capture any files (batch files, for example) being used. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives. If there is a true false positive, filter based on command-line or parent process. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-31 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-31 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - DSQuery Domain Discovery - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Domain Trust Discovery", "Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified performing domain discovery on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 72}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - DSQuery Domain Discovery - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Domain Trust Discovery", "Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies "dsquery.exe" execution with arguments looking for `TrustedDomain` query directly on the command-line. This is typically indicative of an Administrator or adversary perform domain trust discovery. Note that this query does not identify any other variations of "Dsquery.exe" usage.\ -Within this detection, it is assumed `dsquery.exe` is not moved or renamed.\ -The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process "dsquery.exe" and its parent process.\ -DSQuery.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64` and only on Server operating system.\ -The following DLL(s) are loaded when DSQuery.exe is launched `dsquery.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible dsquery is running within that process context in memory.\ -In addition to trust discovery, review parallel processes for additional behaviors performed. Identify the parent process and capture any files (batch files, for example) being used. -action.notable.param.rule_title = DSQuery Domain Discovery -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=dsquery.exe Processes.process=*trustedDomain* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dsquery_domain_discovery_filter` - [ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = This following analytic detects PowerShell command to delete shadow copy using the WMIC PowerShell module. This technique was seen used by a recent adversary to deploy DarkSide Ransomware where it executed a child process of PowerShell to execute a hex encoded command to delete shadow copy. This hex encoded command was able to be decrypted by PowerShell log. action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] action.escu.eli5 = This following analytic detects PowerShell command to delete shadow copy using the WMIC PowerShell module. This technique was seen used by a recent adversary to deploy DarkSide Ransomware where it executed a child process of PowerShell to execute a hex encoded command to delete shadow copy. This hex encoded command was able to be decrypted by PowerShell log. action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the powershell logs from your endpoints. make sure you enable needed registry to monitor this event. action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown @@ -5264,6 +9126,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"], "observable": [{"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This following analytic detects PowerShell command to delete shadow copy using the WMIC PowerShell module. This technique was seen used by a recent adversary to deploy DarkSide Ransomware where it executed a child process of PowerShell to execute a hex encoded command to delete shadow copy. This hex encoded command was able to be decrypted by PowerShell log. action.notable.param.rule_title = Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -5298,7 +9161,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["XMRig"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to delete accounts. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -5306,10 +9169,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deleting Of Net Users - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1531"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1531"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic will detect a suspicious net.exe/net1.exe command-line to delete a user on a system. This technique may be use by an administrator for legitimate purposes, however this behavior has been used in the wild to impair some user or deleting adversaries tracks created during its lateral movement additional systems. During triage, review parallel processes for additional behavior. Identify any other user accounts created before or after. action.notable.param.rule_title = Deleting Of Net Users action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -5344,7 +9207,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Log Manipulation", "SamSam Ransomware", "Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to delete shadow copies. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 81}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 81}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 81}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 81}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -5352,10 +9215,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Log Manipulation", "SamSam Ransomware", "Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Log Manipulation", "SamSam Ransomware", "Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = The vssadmin.exe utility is used to interact with the Volume Shadow Copy Service. Wmic is an interface to the Windows Management Instrumentation. This search looks for either of these tools being used to delete shadow copies. action.notable.param.rule_title = Deleting Shadow Copies action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -5371,311 +9234,6 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=vssadmin.exe OR Processes.process_name=wmic.exe) Processes.process=*delete* Processes.process=*shadow* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `deleting_shadow_copies_filter` -[ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user logged into the AWS account, is making API calls and has not enabled Multi Factor authentication. Multi factor authentication adds a layer of security by forcing the users to type a unique authentication code from an approved authentication device when they access AWS websites or services. AWS Best Practices recommend that you enable MFA for privileged IAM users. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "PR.AC"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user logged into the AWS account, is making API calls and has not enabled Multi Factor authentication. Multi factor authentication adds a layer of security by forcing the users to type a unique authentication code from an approved authentication device when they access AWS websites or services. AWS Best Practices recommend that you enable MFA for privileged IAM users. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. Leverage the support search `Create a list of approved AWS service accounts`: run it once every 30 days to create a list of service accounts and validate them.\ -This search produces fields (`eventName`,`userIdentity.type`,`userIdentity.arn`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** AWS Event Name, **Field:** eventName\ -1. \ -1. **Label:** AWS User ARN, **Field:** userIdentity.arn\ -1. \ -1. **Label:** AWS User Type, **Field:** userIdentity.type\ -Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` -action.escu.known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure do not have multi factor authentication enabled. Please ignore the service accounts, if triggered and instead add them to the aws_service_accounts.csv file to fine tune the detection. It is also possible that the search detects users in your environment using Single Sign-On systems, since the MFA is not handled by AWS. -action.escu.creation_date = 2018-05-17 -action.escu.modification_date = 2018-05-17 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS User Monitoring"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = -action.risk.param._risk = [] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS User Monitoring"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "PR.AC"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user logged into the AWS account, is making API calls and has not enabled Multi Factor authentication. Multi factor authentication adds a layer of security by forcing the users to type a unique authentication code from an approved authentication device when they access AWS websites or services. AWS Best Practices recommend that you enable MFA for privileged IAM users. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect API activity from users without MFA -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `cloudtrail` userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.mfaAuthenticated=false | search NOT [| inputlookup aws_service_accounts | fields identity | rename identity as user]| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(eventName) as eventName by userIdentity.arn userIdentity.type user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa_filter` - -[ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = By enabling Dynamic ARP Inspection as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect ARP Poisoning attacks in the Infrastructure. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1557", "T1557.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = By enabling Dynamic ARP Inspection as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect ARP Poisoning attacks in the Infrastructure. -action.escu.how_to_implement = This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with DHCP Snooping (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960x/software/15-0_2_EX/security/configuration_guide/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg_chapter_01101.html) and Dynamic ARP Inspection (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960x/software/15-2_2_e/security/configuration_guide/b_sec_1522e_2960x_cg/b_sec_1522e_2960x_cg_chapter_01111.html) and log with a severity level of minimum "5 - notification". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices. -action.escu.known_false_positives = This search might be prone to high false positives if DHCP Snooping or ARP inspection has been incorrectly configured, or if a device normally sends many ARP packets (unlikely). -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-08-11 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-11 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Router and Infrastructure Security"] -cron_schedule = 59 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Router and Infrastructure Security"], "cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1557", "T1557.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['src_interface', 'firstTime', 'lastTime', 'count'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = ARP Poisoning has been detected on interface $src_interface$ on host $orig_host$. This may be an indication of a MITM attack. -action.notable.param.rule_title = ARP Poisoning Detected on $orig_host$ -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `cisco_networks` facility="PM" mnemonic="ERR_DISABLE" disable_cause="arp-inspection" | eval src_interface=src_int_prefix_long+src_int_suffix | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime count BY host src_interface | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `detect_arp_poisoning_filter` - -[ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for successful AWS CloudTrail activity by user accounts that are not listed in the identity table or `aws_service_accounts.csv`. It returns event names and count, as well as the first and last time a specific user or service is detected, grouped by users. Deprecated because managing this list can be quite hard. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "ID.AM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for successful AWS CloudTrail activity by user accounts that are not listed in the identity table or `aws_service_accounts.csv`. It returns event names and count, as well as the first and last time a specific user or service is detected, grouped by users. Deprecated because managing this list can be quite hard. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You must also populate the `identity_lookup_expanded` lookup shipped with the Asset and Identity framework to be able to look up users in your identity table in Enterprise Security (ES). Leverage the support search called "Create a list of approved AWS service accounts": run it once every 30 days to create and validate a list of service accounts.\ -This search produces fields (`eventName`,`firstTime`,`lastTime`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** AWS Event Name, **Field:** eventName\ -1. \ -1. **Label:** First Time, **Field:** firstTime\ -1. \ -1. **Label:** Last Time, **Field:** lastTime\ -Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` -action.escu.known_false_positives = It's likely that you'll find activity detected by users/service accounts that are not listed in the `identity_lookup_expanded` or ` aws_service_accounts.csv` file. If the user is a legitimate service account, update the `aws_service_accounts.csv` table with that entry. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS User Monitoring"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = -action.risk.param._risk = [] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS User Monitoring"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "ID.AM"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for successful AWS CloudTrail activity by user accounts that are not listed in the identity table or `aws_service_accounts.csv`. It returns event names and count, as well as the first and last time a specific user or service is detected, grouped by users. Deprecated because managing this list can be quite hard. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts -action.notable.param.security_domain = access -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `cloudtrail` errorCode=success | rename userName as identity | search NOT [| inputlookup identity_lookup_expanded | fields identity] | search NOT [| inputlookup aws_service_accounts | fields identity] | rename identity as user | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(eventName) as eventName by user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts_filter` - -[ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Authentication"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. -action.escu.known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-05-28 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-28 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = User $user$ is logging into the AWS console for the first time -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 30}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | join user type=outer [ inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) as earliestseen by user] | eval userStatus=if(earliestseen >= relative_time(now(), "-24h@h") OR isnull(earliestseen), "First Time Logging into AWS Console", "Previously Seen User") | where userStatus="First Time Logging into AWS Console" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user_filter` - -[ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Authentication"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter` macro. -action.escu.known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-10-07 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-07 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities", "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = User $user$ is logging into the AWS console from City $City$ for the first time -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 18}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities", "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | table firstTime lastTime user City | join user type=outer [| inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) AS earliestseen by user City | fields earliestseen user City] | eval userCity=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-24h@h"), "New City","Previously Seen City") | eval userStatus=if(earliestseen >= relative_time(now(), "-24h@h") OR isnull(earliestseen), "New User","Old User") | where userCity = "New City" AND userStatus != "Old User" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime lastTime user City userStatus userCity | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter` - -[ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Authentication"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter` macro. -action.escu.known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-10-07 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-07 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities", "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = User $user$ is logging into the AWS console from Country $Country$ for the first time -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 42}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities", "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | table firstTime lastTime user Country | join user type=outer [| inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) AS earliestseen by user Country | fields earliestseen user Country] | eval userCountry=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-24h@h"), "New Country","Previously Seen Country") | eval userStatus=if(earliestseen >= relative_time(now(),"-24h@h") OR isnull(earliestseen), "New User","Old User") | where userCountry = "New Country" AND userStatus != "Old User" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime lastTime user Country userStatus userCountry | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter` - -[ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Authentication"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter` macro. -action.escu.known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-10-07 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-07 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities", "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = User $user$ is logging into the AWS console from Region $Region$ for the first time -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 36}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities", "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | table firstTime lastTime user Region | join user type=outer [| inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) AS earliestseen by user Region | fields earliestseen user Region] | eval userRegion=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-24h@h"), "New Region","Previously Seen Region") | eval userStatus=if(earliestseen >= relative_time(now(), "-24h@h") OR isnull(earliestseen), "New User","Old User") | where userRegion = "New Region" AND userStatus != "Old User" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime lastTime user Region userStatus userRegion | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter` - [ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -5706,7 +9264,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1550", "T1550.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "EventCode", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Other"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for specific authentication events from the Windows Security Event logs to detect potential attempts at using the Pass-the-Hash technique. action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks action.notable.param.security_domain = access @@ -5741,7 +9299,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Discovery Techniques"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ using AzureHound to enumerate AzureAD. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -5749,10 +9307,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect AzureHound Command-Line Arguments - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Discovery Techniques"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1069.001", "T1482", "T1087.001", "T1087", "T1069.002", "T1069"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Discovery Techniques"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1069.001", "T1482", "T1087.001", "T1087", "T1069.002", "T1069"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the common command-line argument used by AzureHound `Invoke-AzureHound`. Being the script is FOSS, function names may be modified, but these changes are dependent upon the operator. In most instances the defaults are used. This analytic works to identify the common command-line attributes used. It does not cover the entirety of every argument in order to avoid false positives. action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect AzureHound Command-Line Arguments action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -5798,7 +9356,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect AzureHound File Modifications - R action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Discovery Techniques"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1069.001", "T1482", "T1087.001", "T1087", "T1069.002", "T1069"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "file_name", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "File Name"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic is similar to SharpHound file modifications, but this instance covers the use of Invoke-AzureHound. AzureHound is the SharpHound equivilent but for Azure. It's possible this may never be seen in an environment as most attackers may execute this tool remotely. Once execution is complete, a zip file with a similar name will drop `20210601090751-azurecollection.zip`. In addition to the zip, multiple .json files will be written to disk, which are in the zip. action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect AzureHound File Modifications action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -5814,172 +9372,6 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN ("*-azurecollection.zip", "*-azprivroleadminrights.json", "*-azglobaladminrights.json", "*-azcloudappadmins.json", "*-azapplicationadmins.json") by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_azurehound_file_modifications_filter` -[ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit -action.escu.how_to_implement = Splunk Universal Forwarder running on Linux systems, capturing logs from the /var/log directory. The vulnerability is exposed when a non privledged user tries passing in a single \ character at the end of the command while using the shell and edit flags. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-27 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-27 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 16"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-3156"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `linux_hosts` | search "sudoedit -s \\" | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_filter` - -[ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit -action.escu.how_to_implement = Splunk Universal Forwarder running on Linux systems (tested on Centos and Ubuntu), where segfaults are being logged. This also captures instances where the exploit has been compiled into a binary. The detection looks for greater than 5 instances of sudoedit combined with segfault over your search time period on a single host -action.escu.known_false_positives = If sudoedit is throwing segfaults for other reasons this will pick those up too. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-29 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-29 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 16"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-3156"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `linux_hosts` | search sudoedit segfault | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by host | search count > 5 | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault_filter` - -[ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit -action.escu.how_to_implement = OSQuery installed and configured to pick up process events (info at https://osquery.io) as well as using the Splunk OSQuery Add-on https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4402. The vulnerability is exposed when a non privledged user tries passing in a single \ character at the end of the command while using the shell and edit flags. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-28 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-28 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 16"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-3156"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `osquery_process` | search "columns.cmdline"="sudoedit -s \\*" | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery_filter` - -[ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for Event Code 4742 (Computer Change) or EventCode 4624 (An account was successfully logged on) with an anonymous account. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1210"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for Event Code 4742 (Computer Change) or EventCode 4624 (An account was successfully logged on) with an anonymous account. -action.escu.how_to_implement = This search requires audit computer account management to be enabled on the system in order to generate Event ID 4742. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Event Logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. -action.escu.known_false_positives = None thus far found -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-09-18 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-18 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Detect Zerologon Attack"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = The following $EventCode$ occurred on $dest$ by $user$ with Logon Type 3, which may be indicative of the an account or group being changed by an anonymous account. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 49}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}, {"threat_object_field": "EventCode", "threat_object_type": "other"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Detect Zerologon Attack"], "cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "cve": ["CVE-2020-1472"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1210"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "EventCode", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Other"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for Event Code 4742 (Computer Change) or EventCode 4624 (An account was successfully logged on) with an anonymous account. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 OR EventCode=4742 TargetUserName="ANONYMOUS LOGON" LogonType=3 | stats count values(host) as host, values(TargetDomainName) as Domain, values(user) as user | `detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account_filter` - [ESCU - Detect Copy of ShadowCopy with Script Block Logging - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -6014,6 +9406,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Copy of ShadowCopy with Script Bl action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-36934"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ This analytic identifies `copy` or `[System.IO.File]::Copy` being used to capture the SAM, SYSTEM or SECURITY hives identified in script block. This will catch the most basic use cases for credentials being taken for offline cracking. \ During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. @@ -6061,7 +9454,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "Detect Zerologon Attack"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "source_image", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Other"}, {"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "TargetImage", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Other"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for reading lsass memory consistent with credential dumping. action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -6077,51 +9470,6 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = `sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe (GrantedAccess=0x1010 OR GrantedAccess=0x1410) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, SourceImage, SourceProcessId, TargetImage, TargetProcessId, EventCode, GrantedAccess | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access_filter` -[ESCU - Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2 - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for DNS requests for phishing domains that are leveraging EvilGinx tools to mimic websites. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.003"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Resolution"] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for DNS requests for phishing domains that are leveraging EvilGinx tools to mimic websites. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You need to ingest data from your DNS logs in the Network_Resolution datamodel. Specifically you must ingest the domain that is being queried and the IP of the host originating the request. Ideally, you should also be ingesting the answer to the query and the query type. This approach allows you to also create your own localized passive DNS capability which can aid you in future investigations. You will have to add legitimate domain names to the `legit_domains.csv` file shipped with the app. \ - **Splunk>Phantom Playbook Integration**\ -If Splunk>Phantom is also configured in your environment, a Playbook called `Lets Encrypt Domain Investigate` can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/`, add the correct hostname to the "Phantom Instance" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search, and set the corresponding Playbook to active. \ -(Playbook link:`https://my.phantom.us/4.2/playbook/lets-encrypt-domain-investigate/`).\ - -action.escu.known_false_positives = If a known good domain is not listed in the legit_domains.csv file, then the search could give you false postives. Please update that lookup file to filter out DNS requests to legitimate domains. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2 - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Common Phishing Frameworks"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2 - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Common Phishing Frameworks"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.003"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest', 'src'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for DNS requests for phishing domains that are leveraging EvilGinx tools to mimic websites. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2 -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(DNS.answer) as answer from datamodel=Network_Resolution.DNS by DNS.dest DNS.src DNS.query host | `drop_dm_object_name(DNS)`| rex field=query ".*?(?[^./:]+\.(\S{2,3}|\S{2,3}.\S{2,3}))$" | stats count values(query) as query by domain dest src answer| search `evilginx_phishlets_amazon` OR `evilginx_phishlets_facebook` OR `evilginx_phishlets_github` OR `evilginx_phishlets_0365` OR `evilginx_phishlets_outlook` OR `evilginx_phishlets_aws` OR `evilginx_phishlets_google` | search NOT [ inputlookup legit_domains.csv | fields domain]| join domain type=outer [| tstats count `security_content_summariesonly` values(Web.url) as url from datamodel=Web.Web by Web.dest Web.site | rename "Web.*" as * | rex field=site ".*?(?[^./:]+\.(\S{2,3}|\S{2,3}.\S{2,3}))$" | table dest domain url] | table count src dest query answer domain url | `detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2_filter` - [ESCU - Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -6156,6 +9504,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Blo action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ This analytic identifies the common PowerShell stager used by PowerShell-Empire. Each stager that may use PowerShell all uses the same pattern. The initial HTTP will be base64 encoded and use `system.net.webclient`. Note that some obfuscation may evade the analytic. \ During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. @@ -6177,7 +9526,7 @@ search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message=*system.net.webclient* AND Messag action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = This search identifies endpoints that have caused a relatively high number of account lockouts in a short period. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.002"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.002"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} action.escu.data_models = ["Change"] action.escu.eli5 = This search identifies endpoints that have caused a relatively high number of account lockouts in a short period. action.escu.how_to_implement = You must ingest your Windows security event logs in the `Change` datamodel under the nodename is `Account_Management`, for this search to execute successfully. Please consider updating the cron schedule and the count of lockouts you want to monitor, according to your environment. \ @@ -6204,14 +9553,8 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Excessive Account Lockouts From Endpoint - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Account Monitoring and Controls"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 60, "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.002"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Account Monitoring and Controls"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.002"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search identifies endpoints that have caused a relatively high number of account lockouts in a short period. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Excessive Account Lockouts From Endpoint -action.notable.param.security_domain = access -action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -6227,7 +9570,7 @@ search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = This search detects user accounts that have been locked out a relatively high number of times in a short period. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.003"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.003"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} action.escu.data_models = ["Change"] action.escu.eli5 = This search detects user accounts that have been locked out a relatively high number of times in a short period. action.escu.how_to_implement = ou must ingest your Windows security event logs in the `Change` datamodel under the nodename is `Account_Management`, for this search to execute successfully. Please consider updating the cron schedule and the count of lockouts you want to monitor, according to your environment. @@ -6250,14 +9593,8 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Excessive User Account Lockouts - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Account Monitoring and Controls"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 60, "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.003"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "result", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Other"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Account Monitoring and Controls"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.003"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "result", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Other"}]} schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search detects user accounts that have been locked out a relatively high number of times in a short period. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Excessive User Account Lockouts -action.notable.param.security_domain = access -action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -6274,7 +9611,7 @@ action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = The following query identifies suspicious .aspx created in 3 paths identified by Microsoft as known drop locations for Exchange exploitation related to HAFNIUM group and recently disclosed vulnerablity named ProxyShell. Paths include: `\HttpProxy\owa\auth\`, `\inetpub\wwwroot\aspnet_client\`, and `\HttpProxy\OAB\`. Upon triage, the suspicious .aspx file will likely look obvious on the surface. inspect the contents for script code inside. Identify additional log sources, IIS included, to review source and other potential exploitation. It is often the case that a particular threat is only applicable to a specific subset of systems in your environment. Typically analytics to detect those threats are written without the benefit of being able to only target those systems as well. Writing analytics against all systems when those behaviors are limited to identifiable subsets of those systems is suboptimal. Consider the case ProxyShell vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Servers. With asset information, a hunter can limit their analytics to systems that have been identified as Exchange servers. A hunter may start with the theory that the exchange server is communicating with new systems that it has not previously. If this theory is run against all publicly facing systems, the amount of noise it will generate will likely render this theory untenable. However, using the asset information to limit this analytic to just the Exchange servers will reduce the noise allowing the hunter to focus only on the systems where this behavioral change is relevant. action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505", "T1505.003", "T1190"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] action.escu.eli5 = The following query identifies suspicious .aspx created in 3 paths identified by Microsoft as known drop locations for Exchange exploitation related to HAFNIUM group and recently disclosed vulnerablity named ProxyShell. Paths include: `\HttpProxy\owa\auth\`, `\inetpub\wwwroot\aspnet_client\`, and `\HttpProxy\OAB\`. Upon triage, the suspicious .aspx file will likely look obvious on the surface. inspect the contents for script code inside. Identify additional log sources, IIS included, to review source and other potential exploitation. It is often the case that a particular threat is only applicable to a specific subset of systems in your environment. Typically analytics to detect those threats are written without the benefit of being able to only target those systems as well. Writing analytics against all systems when those behaviors are limited to identifiable subsets of those systems is suboptimal. Consider the case ProxyShell vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Servers. With asset information, a hunter can limit their analytics to systems that have been identified as Exchange servers. A hunter may start with the theory that the exchange server is communicating with new systems that it has not previously. If this theory is run against all publicly facing systems, the amount of noise it will generate will likely render this theory untenable. However, using the asset information to limit this analytic to just the Exchange servers will reduce the noise allowing the hunter to focus only on the systems where this behavioral change is relevant. action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node and `Filesystem` node. action.escu.known_false_positives = The query is structured in a way that `action` (read, create) is not defined. Review the results of this query, filter, and tune as necessary. It may be necessary to generate this query specific to your endpoint product. @@ -6296,10 +9633,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Exchange Web Shell - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["HAFNIUM Group", "ProxyShell"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exploitation"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505", "T1505.003", "T1190"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "file_name", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "File Name"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["HAFNIUM Group", "ProxyShell"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505", "T1505.003", "T1190"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "file_name", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "File Name"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = The following query identifies suspicious .aspx created in 3 paths identified by Microsoft as known drop locations for Exchange exploitation related to HAFNIUM group and recently disclosed vulnerablity named ProxyShell. Paths include: `\HttpProxy\owa\auth\`, `\inetpub\wwwroot\aspnet_client\`, and `\HttpProxy\OAB\`. Upon triage, the suspicious .aspx file will likely look obvious on the surface. inspect the contents for script code inside. Identify additional log sources, IIS included, to review source and other potential exploitation. It is often the case that a particular threat is only applicable to a specific subset of systems in your environment. Typically analytics to detect those threats are written without the benefit of being able to only target those systems as well. Writing analytics against all systems when those behaviors are limited to identifiable subsets of those systems is suboptimal. Consider the case ProxyShell vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Servers. With asset information, a hunter can limit their analytics to systems that have been identified as Exchange servers. A hunter may start with the theory that the exchange server is communicating with new systems that it has not previously. If this theory is run against all publicly facing systems, the amount of noise it will generate will likely render this theory untenable. However, using the asset information to limit this analytic to just the Exchange servers will reduce the noise allowing the hunter to focus only on the systems where this behavioral change is relevant. action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Exchange Web Shell action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -6315,86 +9652,6 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=System by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN ("*\\HttpProxy\\owa\\auth\\*", "*\\inetpub\\wwwroot\\aspnet_client\\*", "*\\HttpProxy\\OAB\\*") Filesystem.file_name="*.aspx" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process] | dedup file_create_time | table dest file_create_time, file_name, file_path, process_name | `detect_exchange_web_shell_filter` -[ESCU - Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902 - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search detects remote code exploit attempts on F5 BIG-IP, BIG-IQ, and Traffix SDC devices -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search detects remote code exploit attempts on F5 BIG-IP, BIG-IQ, and Traffix SDC devices -action.escu.how_to_implement = To consistently detect exploit attempts on F5 devices using the vulnerabilities contained within CVE-2020-5902 it is recommended to ingest logs via syslog. As many BIG-IP devices will have SSL enabled on their management interfaces, detections via wire data may not pick anything up unless you are decrypting SSL traffic in order to inspect it. I am using a regex string from a Cloudflare mitigation technique to try and always catch the offending string (..;), along with the other exploit of using (hsqldb;). -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-08-02 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-02 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902 - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902 - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 11"], "cve": ["CVE-2020-5902"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search detects remote code exploit attempts on F5 BIG-IP, BIG-IQ, and Traffix SDC devices -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902 -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `f5_bigip_rogue` | regex _raw="(hsqldb;|.*\\.\\.;.*)" | search `detect_f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902_filter` - -[ESCU - Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks at GCP Storage bucket-access logs and detects new or previously unseen remote IP addresses that have successfully accessed a GCP Storage bucket. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks at GCP Storage bucket-access logs and detects new or previously unseen remote IP addresses that have successfully accessed a GCP Storage bucket. -action.escu.how_to_implement = This search relies on the Splunk Add-on for Google Cloud Platform, setting up a Cloud Pub/Sub input, along with the relevant GCP PubSub topics and logging sink to capture GCP Storage Bucket events (https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/routing/overview). In order to capture public GCP Storage Bucket access logs, you must also enable storage bucket logging to your PubSub Topic as per https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/access-logs. These logs are deposited into the nominated Storage Bucket on an hourly basis and typically show up by 15 minutes past the hour. It is recommended to configure any saved searches or correlation searches in Enterprise Security to run on an hourly basis at 30 minutes past the hour (cron definition of 30 * * * *). A lookup table (previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip.csv) stores the previously seen access requests, and is used by this search to determine any newly seen IP addresses accessing the Storage Buckets. -action.escu.known_false_positives = GCP Storage buckets can be accessed from any IP (if the ACLs are open to allow it), as long as it can make a successful connection. This will be a false postive, since the search is looking for a new IP within the past two hours. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-08-10 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-10 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious GCP Storage Activities"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious GCP Storage Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks at GCP Storage bucket-access logs and detects new or previously unseen remote IP addresses that have successfully accessed a GCP Storage bucket. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `google_gcp_pubsub_message` | multikv | rename sc_status_ as status | rename cs_object_ as bucket_name | rename c_ip_ as remote_ip | rename cs_uri_ as request_uri | rename cs_method_ as operation | search status="\"200\"" | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by bucket_name remote_ip operation request_uri | table firstTime, lastTime, bucket_name, remote_ip, operation, request_uri | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by bucket_name remote_ip operation request_uri | outputlookup previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip | eval newIP=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(),"-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newIP=1 | eval first_time=strftime(firstTime,"%m/%d/%y %H:%M:%S") | eval last_time=strftime(lastTime,"%m/%d/%y %H:%M:%S") | table first_time last_time bucket_name remote_ip operation request_uri | `detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip_filter` - [ESCU - Detect HTML Help Renamed - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -6414,7 +9671,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -6422,14 +9679,8 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect HTML Help Renamed - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies a renamed instance of hh.exe (HTML Help) executing a Compiled HTML Help (CHM). This particular technique will load Windows script code from a compiled help file. CHM files may contain nearly any file type embedded, but only execute html/htm. Upon a successful execution, the following script engines may be used for execution - JScript, VBScript, VBScript.Encode, JScript.Encode, JScript.Compact. Analyst may identify vbscript.dll or jscript.dll loading into hh.exe upon execution. The "htm" and "html" file extensions were the only extensions observed to be supported for the execution of Shortcut commands or WSH script code. During investigation, identify script content origination. Validate it is the legitimate version of hh.exe by reviewing the PE metadata. hh.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect HTML Help Renamed -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -6460,7 +9711,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ spawning a child process, typically not normal behavior. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -6468,10 +9719,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies hh.exe (HTML Help) execution of a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) that spawns a child process. This particular technique will load Windows script code from a compiled help file. CHM files may contain nearly any file type embedded, but only execute html/htm. Upon a successful execution, the following script engines may be used for execution - JScript, VBScript, VBScript.Encode, JScript.Encode, JScript.Compact. Analyst may identify vbscript.dll or jscript.dll loading into hh.exe upon execution. The "htm" and "html" file extensions were the only extensions observed to be supported for the execution of Shortcut commands or WSH script code. During investigation, identify script content origination. Review child process events and investigate further. hh.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -6506,7 +9757,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_proces_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ contacting a remote destination to potentally download a malicious payload. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 90}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 90}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 90}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 90}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -6514,10 +9765,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies hh.exe (HTML Help) execution of a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) file from a remote url. This particular technique will load Windows script code from a compiled help file. CHM files may contain nearly any file type embedded, but only execute html/htm. Upon a successful execution, the following script engines may be used for execution - JScript, VBScript, VBScript.Encode, JScript.Encode, JScript.Compact. Analyst may identify vbscript.dll or jscript.dll loading into hh.exe upon execution. The "htm" and "html" file extensions were the only extensions observed to be supported for the execution of Shortcut commands or WSH script code. During investigation, identify script content origination. Review reputation of remote IP and domain. Some instances, it is worth decompiling the .chm file to review its original contents. hh.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -6563,7 +9814,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies hh.exe (HTML Help) execution of a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) file using InfoTech Storage Handlers. This particular technique will load Windows script code from a compiled help file, using InfoTech Storage Handlers. itss.dll will load upon execution. Three InfoTech Storage handlers are supported - ms-its, its, mk:@MSITStore. ITSS may be used to launch a specific html/htm file from within a CHM file. CHM files may contain nearly any file type embedded. Upon a successful execution, the following script engines may be used for execution - JScript, VBScript, VBScript.Encode, JScript.Encode, JScript.Compact. Analyst may identify vbscript.dll or jscript.dll loading into hh.exe upon execution. The "htm" and "html" file extensions were the only extensions observed to be supported for the execution of Shortcut commands or WSH script code. During investigation, identify script content origination. hh.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -6579,173 +9830,6 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_hh` Processes.process IN ("*its:*", "*mk:@MSITStore:*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers_filter` -[ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = By enabling IPv6 First Hop Security as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect various attacks such as packet forging in the Infrastructure. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1557", "T1557.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = By enabling IPv6 First Hop Security as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect various attacks such as packet forging in the Infrastructure. -action.escu.how_to_implement = This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with one or more First Hop Security measures such as RA Guard, DHCP Guard and/or device tracking. See References for more information. The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices. -action.escu.known_false_positives = None currently known -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-10-28 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-28 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Router and Infrastructure Security"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Router and Infrastructure Security"], "cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1557", "T1557.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = By enabling IPv6 First Hop Security as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect various attacks such as packet forging in the Infrastructure. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `cisco_networks` facility="SISF" mnemonic IN ("IP_THEFT","MAC_THEFT","MAC_AND_IP_THEFT","PAK_DROP") | eval src_interface=src_int_prefix_long+src_int_suffix | eval dest_interface=dest_int_prefix_long+dest_int_suffix | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime values(src_mac) AS src_mac values(src_vlan) AS src_vlan values(mnemonic) AS mnemonic values(vendor_explanation) AS vendor_explanation values(src_ip) AS src_ip values(dest_ip) AS dest_ip values(dest_interface) AS dest_interface values(action) AS action count BY host src_interface | table host src_interface dest_interface src_mac src_ip dest_ip src_vlan mnemonic vendor_explanation action count | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats_filter` - -[ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for outbound ICMP packets with a packet size larger than 1,000 bytes. Various threat actors have been known to use ICMP as a command and control channel for their attack infrastructure. Large ICMP packets from an endpoint to a remote host may be indicative of this activity. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1095"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Traffic"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for outbound ICMP packets with a packet size larger than 1,000 bytes. Various threat actors have been known to use ICMP as a command and control channel for their attack infrastructure. Large ICMP packets from an endpoint to a remote host may be indicative of this activity. -action.escu.how_to_implement = In order to run this search effectively, we highly recommend that you leverage the Assets and Identity framework. It is important that you have a good understanding of how your network segments are designed and that you are able to distinguish internal from external address space. Add a category named `internal` to the CIDRs that host the company's assets in the `assets_by_cidr.csv` lookup file, which is located in `$SPLUNK_HOME/etc/apps/SA-IdentityManagement/lookups/`. More information on updating this lookup can be found here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.0.0/Admin/Addassetandidentitydata. This search also requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model -action.escu.known_false_positives = ICMP packets are used in a variety of ways to help troubleshoot networking issues and ensure the proper flow of traffic. As such, it is possible that a large ICMP packet could be perfectly legitimate. If large ICMP packets are associated with command and control traffic, there will typically be a large number of these packets observed over time. If the search is providing a large number of false positives, you can modify the macro `detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets_filter` to adjust the byte threshold or add specific IP addresses to an allow list. -action.escu.creation_date = 2018-06-01 -action.escu.modification_date = 2018-06-01 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Command and Control"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Command and Control"], "cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1095"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for outbound ICMP packets with a packet size larger than 1,000 bytes. Various threat actors have been known to use ICMP as a command and control channel for their attack infrastructure. Large ICMP packets from an endpoint to a remote host may be indicative of this activity. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Traffic.action) values(All_Traffic.bytes) from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.action !=blocked All_Traffic.dest_category !=internal (All_Traffic.protocol=icmp OR All_Traffic.transport=icmp) All_Traffic.bytes > 1000 by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | search ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets_filter` - -[ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search is used to detect attempts to use DNS tunneling, by calculating the length of responses to DNS TXT queries. Endpoints using DNS as a method of transmission for data exfiltration, command and control, or evasion of security controls can often be detected by noting unusually large volumes of DNS traffic. Deprecated because this detection should focus on DNS queries instead of DNS responses. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Resolution"] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search is used to detect attempts to use DNS tunneling, by calculating the length of responses to DNS TXT queries. Endpoints using DNS as a method of transmission for data exfiltration, command and control, or evasion of security controls can often be detected by noting unusually large volumes of DNS traffic. Deprecated because this detection should focus on DNS queries instead of DNS responses. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to ingest data from your DNS logs, or monitor DNS traffic using Stream, Bro or something similar. Specifically, this query requires that the DNS data model is populated with information regarding the DNS record type that is being returned as well as the data in the answer section of the protocol. -action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible that legitimate TXT record responses can be long enough to trigger this search. You can modify the packet threshold for this search to help mitigate false positives. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Command and Control"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Command and Control"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest', 'src'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search is used to detect attempts to use DNS tunneling, by calculating the length of responses to DNS TXT queries. Endpoints using DNS as a method of transmission for data exfiltration, command and control, or evasion of security controls can often be detected by noting unusually large volumes of DNS traffic. Deprecated because this detection should focus on DNS queries instead of DNS responses. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.message_type=response AND DNS.record_type=TXT by DNS.src DNS.dest DNS.answer DNS.record_type | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` | eval anslen=len(answer) | search anslen>100 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename src as "Source IP", dest as "Destination IP", answer as "DNS Answer" anslen as "Answer Length" record_type as "DNS Record Type" firstTime as "First Time" lastTime as "Last Time" count as Count | table "Source IP" "Destination IP" "DNS Answer" "DNS Record Type" "Answer Length" Count "First Time" "Last Time" | `detect_long_dns_txt_record_response_filter` - -[ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic identifies when Microsoft HTML Application Host (mshta.exe) utility is used to make remote http connections. Adversaries may use mshta.exe to proxy the download and execution of remote .hta files. The analytic identifies command line arguments of http and https being used. This technique is commonly used by malicious software to bypass preventative controls. The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process "rundll32.exe" and its parent process. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic identifies when Microsoft HTML Application Host (mshta.exe) utility is used to make remote http connections. Adversaries may use mshta.exe to proxy the download and execution of remote .hta files. The analytic identifies command line arguments of http and https being used. This technique is commonly used by malicious software to bypass preventative controls. The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process "rundll32.exe" and its parent process. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible legitimate applications may perform this behavior and will need to be filtered. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-16 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-16 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious MSHTA Activity"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $est$ by user $user$ attempting to access a remote destination to download an additional payload. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious MSHTA Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic identifies when Microsoft HTML Application Host (mshta.exe) utility is used to make remote http connections. Adversaries may use mshta.exe to proxy the download and execution of remote .hta files. The analytic identifies command line arguments of http and https being used. This technique is commonly used by malicious software to bypass preventative controls. The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process "rundll32.exe" and its parent process. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_mshta` (Processes.process="*http://*" OR Processes.process="*https://*") by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mshta_url_in_command_line_filter` - [ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -6765,7 +9849,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Credential Dumping", "Detect Zerologon Attack", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", "DarkSide Ransomware"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = A process, $Image$, has loaded $ImageLoaded$ that are typically related to credential dumping on $Computer$. Review for further details. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 64}, {"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}, {"threat_object_field": "ImageLoaded", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "Image", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 64}, {"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}, {"threat_object_field": "ImageLoaded", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "Image", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -6773,10 +9857,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "Detect Zerologon Attack", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "ImageLoaded", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "Image", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "Detect Zerologon Attack", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "ImageLoaded", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "Image", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for reading loaded Images unique to credential dumping with Mimikatz. Deprecated because mimikatz libraries changed and very noisy sysmon Event Code. action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -6792,46 +9876,6 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = `sysmon` EventCode=7 | stats values(ImageLoaded) as ImageLoaded values(ProcessId) as ProcessId by Computer, Image | search ImageLoaded=*WinSCard.dll ImageLoaded=*cryptdll.dll ImageLoaded=*hid.dll ImageLoaded=*samlib.dll ImageLoaded=*vaultcli.dll | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images_filter` -[ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703 - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for PowerShell requesting privileges consistent with credential dumping. Deprecated, looks like things changed from a logging perspective. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for PowerShell requesting privileges consistent with credential dumping. Deprecated, looks like things changed from a logging perspective. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting Windows Security logs. You must also enable the account change auditing here: http://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/7.0.2/Data/MonitorWindowseventlogdata. Additionally, this search requires you to enable your Group Management Audit Logs in your Local Windows Security Policy and to be ingesting those logs. More information on how to enable them can be found here: http://whatevernetworks.com/auditing-group-membership-changes-in-active-directory/. Finally, please make sure that the local administrator group name is "Administrators" to be able to look for the right group membership changes. -action.escu.known_false_positives = The activity may be legitimate. PowerShell is often used by administrators to perform various tasks, and it's possible this event could be generated in those cases. In these cases, false positives should be fairly obvious and you may need to tweak the search to eliminate noise. -action.escu.creation_date = 2019-02-27 -action.escu.modification_date = 2019-02-27 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703 - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703 - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for PowerShell requesting privileges consistent with credential dumping. Deprecated, looks like things changed from a logging perspective. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703 -action.notable.param.security_domain = access -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `wineventlog_security` signature_id=4703 Process_Name=*powershell.exe | rex field=Message "Enabled Privileges:\s+(?\w+)\s+Disabled Privileges:" | where privs="SeDebugPrivilege" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Process_Name, privs, Process_ID, Message | rename privs as "Enabled Privilege" | rename Process_Name as process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703_filter` - [ESCU - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -6866,6 +9910,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script B action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003"], "observable": [{"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable no critical endpoints or all. \ This analytic identifies common Mimikatz functions that may be identified in the script block, including `mimikatz`. This will catch the most basic use cases for Pass the Ticket, Pass the Hash and `-DumprCreds`. \ During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. @@ -6883,11 +9928,143 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message IN (*mimikatz*, *-dumpcr*, *sekurlsa::pth*, *kerberos::ptt*, *kerberos::golden*) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode ComputerName User EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mimikatz_with_powershell_script_block_logging_filter` +[ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies "mshta.exe" execution with inline protocol handlers. "JavaScript", "VBScript", and "About" are the only supported options when invoking HTA content directly on the command-line. The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process "mshta.exe" and its parent process. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies "mshta.exe" execution with inline protocol handlers. "JavaScript", "VBScript", and "About" are the only supported options when invoking HTA content directly on the command-line. The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process "mshta.exe" and its parent process. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-16 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-16 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious MSHTA Activity"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ executing with inline HTA, indicative of defense evasion. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 90}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 90}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious MSHTA Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies "mshta.exe" execution with inline protocol handlers. "JavaScript", "VBScript", and "About" are the only supported options when invoking HTA content directly on the command-line. The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process "mshta.exe" and its parent process. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect mshta inline hta execution +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_mshta` (Processes.process=*vbscript* OR Processes.process=*javascript* OR Processes.process=*about*) by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution_filter` + +[ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies renamed instances of mshta.exe executing. Mshta.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. This analytic utilizes the internal name of the PE to identify if is the legitimate mshta binary. Further analysis should be performed to review the executed content and validation it is the real mshta. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies renamed instances of mshta.exe executing. Mshta.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. This analytic utilizes the internal name of the PE to identify if is the legitimate mshta binary. Further analysis should be performed to review the executed content and validation it is the real mshta. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of mshta.exe, but never renamed, triggering a false positive. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-16 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-16 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious MSHTA Activity"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious MSHTA Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_mshta` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mshta_renamed_filter` + +[ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic identifies when Microsoft HTML Application Host (mshta.exe) utility is used to make remote http connections. Adversaries may use mshta.exe to proxy the download and execution of remote .hta files. The analytic identifies command line arguments of http and https being used. This technique is commonly used by malicious software to bypass preventative controls. The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process "rundll32.exe" and its parent process. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic identifies when Microsoft HTML Application Host (mshta.exe) utility is used to make remote http connections. Adversaries may use mshta.exe to proxy the download and execution of remote .hta files. The analytic identifies command line arguments of http and https being used. This technique is commonly used by malicious software to bypass preventative controls. The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process "rundll32.exe" and its parent process. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible legitimate applications may perform this behavior and will need to be filtered. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-16 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-16 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious MSHTA Activity"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $est$ by user $user$ attempting to access a remote destination to download an additional payload. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious MSHTA Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic identifies when Microsoft HTML Application Host (mshta.exe) utility is used to make remote http connections. Adversaries may use mshta.exe to proxy the download and execution of remote .hta files. The analytic identifies command line arguments of http and https being used. This technique is commonly used by malicious software to bypass preventative controls. The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process "rundll32.exe" and its parent process. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_mshta` (Processes.process="*http://*" OR Processes.process="*https://*") by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mshta_url_in_command_line_filter` + [ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = This search looks for newly created accounts that have been elevated to local administrators. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.001", "T1136"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command \u0026 Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.001", "T1136"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} action.escu.data_models = [] action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for newly created accounts that have been elevated to local administrators. action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting Windows event logs using the Splunk Windows TA and collecting event code 4720 and 4732 @@ -6910,10 +10087,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DHS Report TA18-074A", "HAFNIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.001", "T1136"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DHS Report TA18-074A", "HAFNIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command \u0026 Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.001", "T1136"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for newly created accounts that have been elevated to local administrators. action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect New Local Admin account action.notable.param.security_domain = access @@ -6929,294 +10106,6 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4720 OR (EventCode=4732 Group_Name=Administrators) | transaction member_id connected=false maxspan=180m | rename member_id as user | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_new_local_admin_account_filter` -[ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The search queries the authentication logs for assets that are categorized as routers in the ES Assets and Identity Framework, to identify connections that have not been seen before in the last 30 days. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Authentication"] -action.escu.eli5 = The search queries the authentication logs for assets that are categorized as routers in the ES Assets and Identity Framework, to identify connections that have not been seen before in the last 30 days. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must ensure the network router devices are categorized as "router" in the Assets and identity table. You must also populate the Authentication data model with logs related to users authenticating to routing infrastructure. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate router connections may appear as new connections -action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-12 -action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-12 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Router and Infrastructure Security"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Router and Infrastructure Security"], "cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The search queries the authentication logs for assets that are categorized as routers in the ES Assets and Identity Framework, to identify connections that have not been seen before in the last 30 days. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect New Login Attempts to Routers -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.dest_category=router by Authentication.dest Authentication.user| eval isOutlier=if(earliest >= relative_time(now(), "-30d@d"), 1, 0) | where isOutlier=1| `security_content_ctime(earliest)`| `security_content_ctime(latest)` | `drop_dm_object_name("Authentication")` | `detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers_filter` - -[ESCU - Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for GCP PubSub events where a user has created an open/public GCP Storage bucket. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for GCP PubSub events where a user has created an open/public GCP Storage bucket. -action.escu.how_to_implement = This search relies on the Splunk Add-on for Google Cloud Platform, setting up a Cloud Pub/Sub input, along with the relevant GCP PubSub topics and logging sink to capture GCP Storage Bucket events (https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/routing/overview). -action.escu.known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that a GCP admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. That said, GCP strongly advises against granting full control to the "allUsers" group. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-08-05 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-05 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious GCP Storage Activities"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious GCP Storage Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'src'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for GCP PubSub events where a user has created an open/public GCP Storage bucket. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.resource.type=gcs_bucket data.protoPayload.methodName=storage.setIamPermissions | spath output=action path=data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.action | spath output=user path=data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail | spath output=location path=data.protoPayload.resourceLocation.currentLocations{} | spath output=src path=data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp | spath output=bucketName path=data.protoPayload.resourceName | spath output=role path=data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.role | spath output=member path=data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.member | search (member=allUsers AND action=ADD) | table _time, bucketName, src, user, location, action, role, member | search `detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets_filter` - -[ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public S3 bucket over the aws cli. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public S3 bucket over the aws cli. -action.escu.how_to_implement = -action.escu.known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to the "All Users" group. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-19 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-19 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = User $userIdentity.userName$ has created an open/public bucket $bucketName$ using AWS CLI with the following permissions - $requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read$ $requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read-acp$ $requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write$ $requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write-acp$ $requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-full-control$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "userIdentity.userName", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 48}, {"threat_object_field": "bucketName", "threat_object_type": "other"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "userIdentity.userName", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "bucketName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Other"}]} -schedule_window = auto -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `cloudtrail` eventSource="s3.amazonaws.com" (userAgent="[aws-cli*" OR userAgent=aws-cli* ) eventName=PutBucketAcl OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read-acp IN ("*AuthenticatedUsers","*AllUsers") OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write IN ("*AuthenticatedUsers","*AllUsers") OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write-acp IN ("*AuthenticatedUsers","*AllUsers") OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-full-control IN ("*AuthenticatedUsers","*AllUsers") | rename requestParameters.bucketName AS bucketName | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by userIdentity.userName userIdentity.principalId userAgent bucketName requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read-acp requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write-acp requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-full-control | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli_filter` - -[ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public S3 bucket. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public S3 bucket. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk. -action.escu.known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to the "All Users" group. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-19 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-19 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = User $user_arn$ has created an open/public bucket $bucketName$ with the following permissions $permission$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user_arn", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 48}, {"threat_object_field": "bucketName", "threat_object_type": "other"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user_arn", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "bucketName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Other"}]} -schedule_window = auto -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `cloudtrail` eventSource=s3.amazonaws.com eventName=PutBucketAcl | rex field=_raw "(?{.+})" | spath input=json_field output=grantees path=requestParameters.AccessControlPolicy.AccessControlList.Grant{} | search grantees=* | mvexpand grantees | spath input=grantees output=uri path=Grantee.URI | spath input=grantees output=permission path=Permission | search uri IN ("http://acs.amazonaws.com/groups/global/AllUsers","http://acs.amazonaws.com/groups/global/AuthenticatedUsers") | search permission IN ("READ","READ_ACP","WRITE","WRITE_ACP","FULL_CONTROL") | rename requestParameters.bucketName AS bucketName | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user_arn userIdentity.principalId userAgent uri permission bucketName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_new_open_s3_buckets_filter` - -[ESCU - Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = Malicious actors often abuse misconfigured LDAP servers or applications that use the LDAP servers in organizations. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. This search will help determine if you have any LDAP connections to IP addresses outside of private (RFC1918) address space. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190", "T1059"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Traffic"] -action.escu.eli5 = Malicious actors often abuse misconfigured LDAP servers or applications that use the LDAP servers in organizations. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. This search will help determine if you have any LDAP connections to IP addresses outside of private (RFC1918) address space. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format and should be mapped to the Network Traffic datamodels that are in use for this search. The following Splunk SOAR playbook can be used to respond to this detection: Log4j Investigate The following Splunk SOAR playbook can be used to respond to this detection: Log4j Respond -action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown at this moment. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. Please check those servers to verify if the activity is legitimate. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-13 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-13 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = An outbound LDAP connection from $src_ip$ in your infrastructure connecting to dest ip $dest_ip$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "src_ip", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"risk_object_field": "dest_ip", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190", "T1059"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src_ip", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "dest_ip", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = Malicious actors often abuse misconfigured LDAP servers or applications that use the LDAP servers in organizations. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. This search will help determine if you have any LDAP connections to IP addresses outside of private (RFC1918) address space. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats earliest(_time) as earliest_time latest(_time) as latest_time values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port = 389 OR All_Traffic.dest_port = 636 AND NOT (All_Traffic.dest_ip = 10.0.0.0/8 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=192.168.0.0/16 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip = 172.16.0.0/12) by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip |`drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | where src_ip != dest_ip | `security_content_ctime(latest_time)` | `security_content_ctime(earliest_time)` |`detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter` - -[ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for outbound SMB connections made by hosts within your network to the Internet. SMB traffic is used for Windows file-sharing activity. One of the techniques often used by attackers involves retrieving the credential hash using an SMB request made to a compromised server controlled by the threat actor. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.002", "T1071"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Traffic"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for outbound SMB connections made by hosts within your network to the Internet. SMB traffic is used for Windows file-sharing activity. One of the techniques often used by attackers involves retrieving the credential hash using an SMB request made to a compromised server controlled by the threat actor. -action.escu.how_to_implement = In order to run this search effectively, we highly recommend that you leverage the Assets and Identity framework. It is important that you have good understanding of how your network segments are designed, and be able to distinguish internal from external address space. Add a category named `internal` to the CIDRs that host the companys assets in `assets_by_cidr.csv` lookup file, which is located in `$SPLUNK_HOME/etc/apps/SA-IdentityManagement/lookups/`. More information on updating this lookup can be found here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.0.0/Admin/Addassetandidentitydata. This search also requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model -action.escu.known_false_positives = It is likely that the outbound Server Message Block (SMB) traffic is legitimate, if the company's internal networks are not well-defined in the Assets and Identity Framework. Categorize the internal CIDR blocks as `internal` in the lookup file to avoid creating notable events for traffic destined to those CIDR blocks. Any other network connection that is going out to the Internet should be investigated and blocked. Best practices suggest preventing external communications of all SMB versions and related protocols at the network boundary. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Hidden Cobra Malware", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "NOBELIUM Group"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Hidden Cobra Malware", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "NOBELIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.002", "T1071"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for outbound SMB connections made by hosts within your network to the Internet. SMB traffic is used for Windows file-sharing activity. One of the techniques often used by attackers involves retrieving the credential hash using an SMB request made to a compromised server controlled by the threat actor. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Outbound SMB Traffic -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as start_time latest(_time) as end_time values(All_Traffic.action) as action values(All_Traffic.app) as app values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as dest_port values(sourcetype) as sourcetype count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where ((All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app="smb") AND NOT (All_Traffic.action="blocked" OR All_Traffic.dest_category="internal" OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=192.168.0.0/16 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=100.64.0.0/10)) by All_Traffic.src_ip | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | `security_content_ctime(start_time)` | `security_content_ctime(end_time)` | `detect_outbound_smb_traffic_filter` - -[ESCU - Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for execution of process `outlook.exe` where the process is writing a `.zip` file to the disk. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for execution of process `outlook.exe` where the process is writing a `.zip` file to the disk. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. -action.escu.known_false_positives = It is not uncommon for outlook to write legitimate zip files to the disk. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spearphishing Attachments"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for execution of process `outlook.exe` where the process is writing a `.zip` file to the disk. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=outlook.exe OR Processes.process_name=explorer.exe by _time span=5m Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_id Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename process_id as malicious_id| rename parent_process_id as outlook_id| join malicious_id type=inner[| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path values(Filesystem.file_name) as file_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_path=*zip* OR Filesystem.file_name=*.lnk ) AND (Filesystem.file_path=C:\\Users* OR Filesystem.file_path=*Local\\Temp*) by _time span=5m Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_hash Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename process_id as malicious_id| fields malicious_id outlook_id dest file_path file_name file_hash count file_id] | table firstTime lastTime user malicious_id outlook_id process_name parent_process_name file_name file_path | where file_name != "" | `detect_outlook_exe_writing_a_zip_file_filter` - [ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -7236,7 +10125,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Persistence Techniques"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to perform privilege escalation by using unquoted service paths. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 49}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 49}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -7244,10 +10133,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.009", "T1574"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.009", "T1574"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = The detection Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe is detecting the abuse of unquoted service paths, which is a popular technique for privilege escalation. action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -7263,34 +10152,40 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | rex field=process "^.*?\\\\(?[^\\\\]*\.(?:exe|bat|com|ps1))" | eval process_name = lower(process_name) | eval service_process = lower(service_process) | where process_name != service_process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe_filter` -[ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule] +[ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = By enabling Port Security on a Cisco switch you can restrict input to an interface by limiting and identifying MAC addresses of the workstations that are allowed to access the port. When you assign secure MAC addresses to a secure port, the port does not forward packets with source addresses outside the group of defined addresses. If you limit the number of secure MAC addresses to one and assign a single secure MAC address, the workstation attached to that port is assured the full bandwidth of the port. If a port is configured as a secure port and the maximum number of secure MAC addresses is reached, when the MAC address of a workstation attempting to access the port is different from any of the identified secure MAC addresses, a security violation occurs. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Exploitation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1557", "T1557.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = By enabling Port Security on a Cisco switch you can restrict input to an interface by limiting and identifying MAC addresses of the workstations that are allowed to access the port. When you assign secure MAC addresses to a secure port, the port does not forward packets with source addresses outside the group of defined addresses. If you limit the number of secure MAC addresses to one and assign a single secure MAC address, the workstation attached to that port is assured the full bandwidth of the port. If a port is configured as a secure port and the maximum number of secure MAC addresses is reached, when the MAC address of a workstation attempting to access the port is different from any of the identified secure MAC addresses, a security violation occurs. -action.escu.how_to_implement = This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with Port Security and Error Disable for this to work (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst4500/12-2/25ew/configuration/guide/conf/port_sec.html) and log with a severity level of minimum "5 - notification". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices. -action.escu.known_false_positives = This search might be prone to high false positives if you have malfunctioning devices connected to your ethernet ports or if end users periodically connect physical devices to the network. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-10-28 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-28 +description = This search looks for fast execution of processes used for system network configuration discovery on the endpoint. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command \u0026 Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1016"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for fast execution of processes used for system network configuration discovery on the endpoint. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the processes node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is usually generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry or that are populated via Windows event logs, after enabling process tracking in your Windows audit settings. +action.escu.known_false_positives = It is uncommon for normal users to execute a series of commands used for network discovery. System administrators often use scripts to execute these commands. These can generate false positives. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-11-10 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-10 action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Router and Infrastructure Security"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Unusual Processes"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning multiple $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ typically not a normal behavior of the process. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 32}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 32}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Router and Infrastructure Security"], "cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Exploitation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1557", "T1557.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Unusual Processes"], "cis20": ["CIS 2"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command \u0026 Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1016"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = By enabling Port Security on a Cisco switch you can restrict input to an interface by limiting and identifying MAC addresses of the workstations that are allowed to access the port. When you assign secure MAC addresses to a secure port, the port does not forward packets with source addresses outside the group of defined addresses. If you limit the number of secure MAC addresses to one and assign a single secure MAC address, the workstation attached to that port is assured the full bandwidth of the port. If a port is configured as a secure port and the maximum number of secure MAC addresses is reached, when the MAC address of a workstation attempting to access the port is different from any of the identified secure MAC addresses, a security violation occurs. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Port Security Violation -action.notable.param.security_domain = network +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for fast execution of processes used for system network configuration discovery on the endpoint. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true @@ -7301,7 +10196,7 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = `cisco_networks` (facility="PM" mnemonic="ERR_DISABLE" disable_cause="psecure-violation") OR (facility="PORT_SECURITY" mnemonic="PSECURE_VIOLATION" OR mnemonic="PSECURE_VIOLATION_VLAN") | eval src_interface=src_int_prefix_long+src_int_suffix | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime values(disable_cause) AS disable_cause values(src_mac) AS src_mac values(src_vlan) AS src_vlan values(action) AS action count by host src_interface | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_port_security_violation_filter` +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where NOT Processes.user IN ("","unknown") by Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.user _time | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | search `system_network_configuration_discovery_tools` | transaction dest connected=false maxpause=5m |where eventcount>=5 | table firstTime lastTime dest user process_name process parent_process eventcount | `detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery_filter` [ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule] action.escu = 0 @@ -7322,7 +10217,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "Suspicious Zoom Child Processes", "NOBELIUM Group"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ running prohibited applications. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -7330,14 +10225,8 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "Suspicious Zoom Child Processes", "NOBELIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "Suspicious Zoom Child Processes", "NOBELIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for executions of cmd.exe spawned by a process that is often abused by attackers and that does not typically launch cmd.exe. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -7368,7 +10257,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["SamSam Ransomware", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "HAFNIUM Group", "DarkSide Ransomware", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ running the utility for possibly the first time. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 35}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 35}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 35}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 35}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -7376,10 +10265,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "HAFNIUM Group", "DarkSide Ransomware", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "HAFNIUM Group", "DarkSide Ransomware", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for events where `PsExec.exe` is run with the `accepteula` flag in the command line. PsExec is a built-in Windows utility that enables you to execute processes on other systems. It is fully interactive for console applications. This tool is widely used for launching interactive command prompts on remote systems. Threat actors leverage this extensively for executing code on compromised systems. If an attacker is running PsExec for the first time, they will be prompted to accept the end-user license agreement (EULA), which can be passed as the argument `accepteula` within the command line. action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -7399,7 +10288,7 @@ search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = This analytic identifies commonly used command-line arguments used by `rclone.exe` to initiate a file transfer. Some arguments were negated as they are specific to the configuration used by adversaries. In particular, an adversary may list the files or directories of the remote file share using `ls` or `lsd`, which is not indicative of malicious behavior. During triage, at this stage of a ransomware event, exfiltration is about to occur or has already. Isolate the endpoint and continue investigating by review file modifications and parallel processes. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1020"]} +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1020"]} action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] action.escu.eli5 = This analytic identifies commonly used command-line arguments used by `rclone.exe` to initiate a file transfer. Some arguments were negated as they are specific to the configuration used by adversaries. In particular, an adversary may list the files or directories of the remote file share using `ls` or `lsd`, which is not indicative of malicious behavior. During triage, at this stage of a ransomware event, exfiltration is about to occur or has already. Isolate the endpoint and continue investigating by review file modifications and parallel processes. action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. @@ -7414,7 +10303,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Ransomware"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to connect to a remote cloud service to move files or folders. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 35}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 35}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 35}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 35}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -7422,10 +10311,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect RClone Command-Line Usage - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1020"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1020"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic identifies commonly used command-line arguments used by `rclone.exe` to initiate a file transfer. Some arguments were negated as they are specific to the configuration used by adversaries. In particular, an adversary may list the files or directories of the remote file share using `ls` or `lsd`, which is not indicative of malicious behavior. During triage, at this stage of a ransomware event, exfiltration is about to occur or has already. Isolate the endpoint and continue investigating by review file modifications and parallel processes. action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect RClone Command-Line Usage action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -7441,47 +10330,6 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rclone` Processes.process IN ("*copy*", "*mega*", "*pcloud*", "*ftp*", "*--config*", "*--progress*", "*--no-check-certificate*", "*--ignore-existing*", "*--auto-confirm*", "*--transfers*", "*--multi-thread-streams*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rclone_command_line_usage_filter` -[ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search will return a table of rare processes, the names of the systems running them, and the users who initiated each process. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.PT", "PR.DS", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search will return a table of rare processes, the names of the systems running them, and the users who initiated each process. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts and populating the endpoint data model with the resultant dataset. The macro `filter_rare_process_allow_list` searches two lookup files for allowed processes. These consist of `rare_process_allow_list_default.csv` and `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv`. To add your own processes to the allow list, add them to `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv`. If you wish to remove an entry from the default lookup file, you will have to modify the macro itself to set the allow_list value for that process to false. You can modify the limit parameter and search scheduling to better suit your environment. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Some legitimate processes may be only rarely executed in your environment. As these are identified, update `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv` to filter them out of your search results. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-03-16 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-03-16 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Unusual Processes", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Unusual Processes", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.PT", "PR.DS", "DE.CM"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search will return a table of rare processes, the names of the systems running them, and the users who initiated each process. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Rare Executables -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.dest) as dest values(Processes.user) as user min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name | rename Processes.process_name as process | rex field=user "(?.*)\\\\(?.*)" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| search [| tstats count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name | rare Processes.process_name limit=30 | rename Processes.process_name as process| `filter_rare_process_allow_list`| table process ] | `detect_rare_executables_filter` - [ESCU - Detect Regasm Spawning a Process - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -7501,7 +10349,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ spawning a child process, typically not normal behavior for $parent_process_name$. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 64}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 64}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -7509,10 +10357,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Regasm Spawning a Process - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.009"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.009"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies regasm.exe spawning a process. This particular technique has been used in the wild to bypass application control products. Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe are signed by Microsoft. Spawning of a child process is rare from either process and should be investigated further. During investigation, identify and retrieve the content being loaded. Review parallel processes for additional suspicious behavior. Gather any other file modifications and review accordingly. regsvcs.exe and regasm.exe are natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe. action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Regasm Spawning a Process action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -7558,7 +10406,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Regasm with Network Connection - action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.009"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies regasm.exe with a network connection to a public IP address, exluding private IP space. This particular technique has been used in the wild to bypass application control products. Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe are signed by Microsoft. By contacting a remote command and control server, the adversary will have the ability to escalate privileges and complete the objectives. During investigation, identify and retrieve the content being loaded. Review parallel processes for additional suspicious behavior. Gather any other file modifications and review accordingly. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain and block as needed. regsvcs.exe and regasm.exe are natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe. action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Regasm with Network Connection action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -7579,7 +10427,7 @@ action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = The following analytic identifies regasm.exe with no command line arguments. This particular behavior occurs when another process injects into regasm.exe, no command line arguments will be present. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Regasm.exe are natively found in `C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe` and `C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe`. action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.009"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies regasm.exe with no command line arguments. This particular behavior occurs when another process injects into regasm.exe, no command line arguments will be present. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Regasm.exe are natively found in `C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe` and `C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe`. action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, limited instances of regasm.exe or may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage. @@ -7593,7 +10441,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = The process $process_name$ was spawned by $parent_process_name$ without any command-line arguments on $dest$ by $user$. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 49}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 49}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -7601,10 +10449,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.009"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.009"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies regasm.exe with no command line arguments. This particular behavior occurs when another process injects into regasm.exe, no command line arguments will be present. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Regasm.exe are natively found in `C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe` and `C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe`. action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -7639,7 +10487,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ typically not normal for this process. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 64}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 64}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -7647,10 +10495,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.009"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.009"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies regsvcs.exe spawning a process. This particular technique has been used in the wild to bypass application control products. Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe are signed by Microsoft. Spawning of a child process is rare from either process and should be investigated further. During investigation, identify and retrieve the content being loaded. Review parallel processes for additional suspicious behavior. Gather any other file modifications and review accordingly. regsvcs.exe and regasm.exe are natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe. action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -7696,7 +10544,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection - action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.009"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies Regsvcs.exe with a network connection to a public IP address, exluding private IP space. This particular technique has been used in the wild to bypass application control products. Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe are signed by Microsoft. By contacting a remote command and control server, the adversary will have the ability to escalate privileges and complete the objectives. During investigation, identify and retrieve the content being loaded. Review parallel processes for additional suspicious behavior. Gather any other file modifications and review accordingly. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain and block as needed. regsvcs.exe and regasm.exe are natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe. action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection action.notable.param.security_domain = Endpoint @@ -7717,7 +10565,7 @@ action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = The following analytic identifies regsvcs.exe with no command line arguments. This particular behavior occurs when another process injects into regsvcs.exe, no command line arguments will be present. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Regasm.exe are natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe. action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.009"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies regsvcs.exe with no command line arguments. This particular behavior occurs when another process injects into regsvcs.exe, no command line arguments will be present. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Regasm.exe are natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe. action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, limited instances of regsvcs.exe may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage. @@ -7731,7 +10579,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = The process $process_name$ was spawned by $parent_process_name$ without any command-line arguments on $dest$ by $user$. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 49}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 49}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -7739,10 +10587,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.009"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.009"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies regsvcs.exe with no command line arguments. This particular behavior occurs when another process injects into regsvcs.exe, no command line arguments will be present. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Regasm.exe are natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe. action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -7779,7 +10627,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", "Cobalt Strike"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ in an attempt to bypass detection and preventative controls was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -7787,10 +10635,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", "Cobalt Strike"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.010"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", "Cobalt Strike"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.010"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. Regsvr32.exe is also a Microsoft signed binary.This variation of the technique is often referred to as a "Squiblydoo" attack. \ Upon investigating, look for network connections to remote destinations (internal or external). Be cautious to modify the query to look for "scrobj.dll", the ".dll" is not required to load scrobj. "scrobj.dll" will be loaded by "regsvr32.exe" upon execution. action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass @@ -7811,7 +10659,7 @@ search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = The following analytic identifies renamed 7-Zip usage using Sysmon. At this stage of an attack, review parallel processes and file modifications for data that is staged or potentially have been exfiltrated. This analytic utilizes the OriginalFileName to capture the renamed process. During triage, validate this is the legitimate version of `7zip` by reviewing the PE metadata. In addition, review parallel processes for further suspicious behavior. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1560.001", "T1560"]} +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1560.001", "T1560"]} action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies renamed 7-Zip usage using Sysmon. At this stage of an attack, review parallel processes and file modifications for data that is staged or potentially have been exfiltrated. This analytic utilizes the OriginalFileName to capture the renamed process. During triage, validate this is the legitimate version of `7zip` by reviewing the PE metadata. In addition, review parallel processes for further suspicious behavior. action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. @@ -7826,7 +10674,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Collection and Staging"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 27}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 27}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 27}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 27}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -7834,14 +10682,8 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Renamed 7-Zip - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Collection and Staging"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1560.001", "T1560"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Collection and Staging"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1560.001", "T1560"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies renamed 7-Zip usage using Sysmon. At this stage of an attack, review parallel processes and file modifications for data that is staged or potentially have been exfiltrated. This analytic utilizes the OriginalFileName to capture the renamed process. During triage, validate this is the legitimate version of `7zip` by reviewing the PE metadata. In addition, review parallel processes for further suspicious behavior. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Renamed 7-Zip -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -7857,7 +10699,7 @@ search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = The following analytic identifies renamed instances of `PsExec.exe` being utilized on an endpoint. Most instances, it is highly probable to capture `Psexec.exe` or other SysInternal utility usage with the command-line argument of `-accepteula`. During triage, validate this is the legitimate version of `PsExec` by reviewing the PE metadata. In addition, review parallel processes for further suspicious behavior. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Lateral Movement", "Execution"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569", "T1569.002"]} +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569", "T1569.002"]} action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies renamed instances of `PsExec.exe` being utilized on an endpoint. Most instances, it is highly probable to capture `Psexec.exe` or other SysInternal utility usage with the command-line argument of `-accepteula`. During triage, validate this is the legitimate version of `PsExec` by reviewing the PE metadata. In addition, review parallel processes for further suspicious behavior. action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. @@ -7872,7 +10714,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["SamSam Ransomware", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "HAFNIUM Group", "DarkSide Ransomware", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 27}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 27}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 27}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 27}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -7880,14 +10722,8 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "HAFNIUM Group", "DarkSide Ransomware", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Lateral Movement", "Execution"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569", "T1569.002"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "HAFNIUM Group", "DarkSide Ransomware", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569", "T1569.002"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies renamed instances of `PsExec.exe` being utilized on an endpoint. Most instances, it is highly probable to capture `Psexec.exe` or other SysInternal utility usage with the command-line argument of `-accepteula`. During triage, validate this is the legitimate version of `PsExec` by reviewing the PE metadata. In addition, review parallel processes for further suspicious behavior. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Renamed PSExec -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -7903,8 +10739,8 @@ search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = The following analytic identifies the usage of `rclone.exe`, renamed, being used to exfiltrate data to a remote destination. RClone has been used by multiple ransomware groups to exfiltrate data. In many instances, it will be downloaded from the legitimate site and executed accordingly. During triage, isolate the endpoint and begin to review parallel processes for additional behavior. At this stage, the adversary may have staged data to be exfiltrated. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1020"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1020"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the usage of `rclone.exe`, renamed, being used to exfiltrate data to a remote destination. RClone has been used by multiple ransomware groups to exfiltrate data. In many instances, it will be downloaded from the legitimate site and executed accordingly. During triage, isolate the endpoint and begin to review parallel processes for additional behavior. At this stage, the adversary may have staged data to be exfiltrated. action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as this analytic identifies renamed instances of `rclone.exe`. Filter as needed if there is a legitimate business use case. @@ -7918,7 +10754,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Ransomware"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 27}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 27}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 27}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 27}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -7926,14 +10762,8 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Renamed RClone - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1020"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1020"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the usage of `rclone.exe`, renamed, being used to exfiltrate data to a remote destination. RClone has been used by multiple ransomware groups to exfiltrate data. In many instances, it will be downloaded from the legitimate site and executed accordingly. During triage, isolate the endpoint and begin to review parallel processes for additional behavior. At this stage, the adversary may have staged data to be exfiltrated. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Renamed RClone -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -7949,7 +10779,7 @@ search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = The following analtyic identifies renamed instances of `WinRAR.exe`. In most cases, it is not common for WinRAR to be used renamed, however it is common to be installed by a third party application and executed from a non-standard path. During triage, validate additional metadata from the binary that this is `WinRAR`. Review parallel processes and file modifications. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1560.001", "T1560"]} +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1560.001", "T1560"]} action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] action.escu.eli5 = The following analtyic identifies renamed instances of `WinRAR.exe`. In most cases, it is not common for WinRAR to be used renamed, however it is common to be installed by a third party application and executed from a non-standard path. During triage, validate additional metadata from the binary that this is `WinRAR`. Review parallel processes and file modifications. action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. @@ -7964,7 +10794,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Collection and Staging"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 27}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 27}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 27}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 27}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -7972,14 +10802,8 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Renamed WinRAR - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Collection and Staging"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1560.001", "T1560"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Collection and Staging"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1560.001", "T1560"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analtyic identifies renamed instances of `WinRAR.exe`. In most cases, it is not common for WinRAR to be used renamed, however it is common to be installed by a third party application and executed from a non-standard path. During triage, validate additional metadata from the binary that this is `WinRAR`. Review parallel processes and file modifications. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Renamed WinRAR -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -7991,47 +10815,6 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.original_file_name=WinRAR.exe (Processes.process_name!=rar.exe OR Processes.process_name!=winrar.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_renamed_winrar_filter` -[ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = By enabling DHCP Snooping as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect unauthorized DHCP servers handing out DHCP leases to devices on the network (Man in the Middle attack). -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1557"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = By enabling DHCP Snooping as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect unauthorized DHCP servers handing out DHCP leases to devices on the network (Man in the Middle attack). -action.escu.how_to_implement = This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with DHCP Snooping enabled (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960x/software/15-0_2_EX/security/configuration_guide/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg_chapter_01101.html) and log with a severity level of minimum "5 - notification". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices. -action.escu.known_false_positives = This search might be prone to high false positives if DHCP Snooping has been incorrectly configured or in the unlikely event that the DHCP server has been moved to another network interface. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-08-11 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-11 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Router and Infrastructure Security"] -cron_schedule = 59 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Router and Infrastructure Security"], "cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1557"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['src_mac', 'firstTime', 'lastTime', 'count', 'message_type'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = DHCP Snooping has detected a Rogue DHCP Server on $orig_host$ from $src_mac$. This may be an indication of a MITM attack. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Rogue DHCP Server Detected on $orig_host$ -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `cisco_networks` facility="DHCP_SNOOPING" mnemonic="DHCP_SNOOPING_UNTRUSTED_PORT" | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime count values(message_type) AS message_type values(src_mac) AS src_mac BY host | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `detect_rogue_dhcp_server_filter` - [ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -8051,7 +10834,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ loading advpack.dll and ieadvpack.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -8059,10 +10842,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading advpack.dll and ieadvpack.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line. This particular technique will load script code from a file. Upon a successful execution, the following module loads may occur - clr.dll, jscript.dll and scrobj.dll. During investigation, identify script content origination. Generally, a child process will spawn from rundll32.exe, but that may be bypassed based on script code contents. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. During investigation, review any network connections and obtain the script content executed. It's possible other files are on disk. action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -8097,7 +10880,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ loading setupapi.dll and iesetupapi.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -8105,10 +10888,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading setupapi.dll and iesetupapi.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line. This particular technique will load script code from a file. Upon a successful execution, the following module loads may occur - clr.dll, jscript.dll and scrobj.dll. During investigation, identify script content origination. Generally, a child process will spawn from rundll32.exe, but that may be bypassed based on script code contents. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. During investigation, review any network connections and obtain the script content executed. It's possible other files are on disk. action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -8143,7 +10926,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ loading syssetup.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -8151,10 +10934,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading syssetup.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line. This particular technique will load script code from a file. Upon a successful execution, the following module loads may occur - clr.dll, jscript.dll and scrobj.dll. During investigation, identify script content origination. Generally, a child process will spawn from rundll32.exe, but that may be bypassed based on script code contents. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. During investigation, review any network connections and obtain the script content executed. It's possible other files are on disk. action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -8200,7 +10983,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - R action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "NOBELIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies "rundll32.exe" execution with inline protocol handlers. "JavaScript", "VBScript", and "About" are the only supported options when invoking HTA content directly on the command-line. This type of behavior is commonly observed with fileless malware or application whitelisting bypass techniques. The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process "rundll32.exe" and its parent process. action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -8216,91 +10999,6 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` (Processes.process=*vbscript* OR Processes.process=*javascript* OR Processes.process=*about*) by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution_filter` -[ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks at S3 bucket-access logs and detects new or previously unseen remote IP addresses that have successfully accessed an S3 bucket. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks at S3 bucket-access logs and detects new or previously unseen remote IP addresses that have successfully accessed an S3 bucket. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your S3 access logs' inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen S3 Bucket Access by Remote IP" support search once to create a history of previously seen remote IPs and bucket names. -action.escu.known_false_positives = S3 buckets can be accessed from any IP, as long as it can make a successful connection. This will be a false postive, since the search is looking for a new IP within the past hour -action.escu.creation_date = 2018-06-28 -action.escu.modification_date = 2018-06-28 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = -action.risk.param._risk = [] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks at S3 bucket-access logs and detects new or previously unseen remote IP addresses that have successfully accessed an S3 bucket. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect S3 access from a new IP -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200 [search `aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200 | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by bucket_name remote_ip | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by bucket_name remote_ip | outputlookup previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip.csv | eval newIP=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newIP=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table bucket_name remote_ip]| iplocation remote_ip |rename remote_ip as src_ip | table _time bucket_name src_ip City Country operation request_uri | `detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip_filter` - -[ESCU - Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for commands that the SNICat tool uses in the TLS SNI field. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1041"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for commands that the SNICat tool uses in the TLS SNI field. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting Zeek SSL data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format. We are detecting when any of the predefined SNICat commands are found within the server_name (SNI) field. These commands are LIST, LS, SIZE, LD, CB, EX, ALIVE, EXIT, WHERE, and finito. You can go further once this has been detected, and run other searches to decode the SNI data to prove or disprove if any data exfiltration has taken place. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-10-21 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-21 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Data Exfiltration"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Exfiltration"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1041"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for commands that the SNICat tool uses in the TLS SNI field. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `zeek_ssl` | rex field=server_name "(?(LIST|LS|SIZE|LD|CB|CD|EX|ALIVE|EXIT|WHERE|finito)-[A-Za-z0-9]{16}\.)" | stats count by src_ip dest_ip server_name snicat | where count>0 | table src_ip dest_ip server_name snicat | `detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration_filter` - [ESCU - Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -8331,7 +11029,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Discovery Techniques", "Ransomware"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1069.001", "T1482", "T1087.001", "T1087", "T1069.002", "T1069"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies common command-line arguments used by SharpHound `-collectionMethod` and `invoke-bloodhound`. Being the script is FOSS, function names may be modified, but these changes are dependent upon the operator. In most instances the defaults are used. This analytic works to identify the common command-line attributes used. It does not cover the entirety of every argument in order to avoid false positives. action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -8377,7 +11075,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect SharpHound File Modifications - R action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Discovery Techniques", "Ransomware"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1069.001", "T1482", "T1087.001", "T1087", "T1069.002", "T1069"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = SharpHound is used as a reconnaissance collector, ingestor, for BloodHound. SharpHound will query the domain controller and begin gathering all the data related to the domain and trusts. For output, it will drop a .zip file upon completion following a typical pattern that is often not changed. This analytic focuses on the default file name scheme. Note that this may be evaded with different parameters within SharpHound, but that depends on the operator. `-randomizefilenames` and `-encryptzip` are two examples. In addition, executing SharpHound via .exe or .ps1 without any command-line arguments will still perform activity and dump output to the default filename. Example default filename `20210601181553_BloodHound.zip`. SharpHound creates multiple temp files following the same pattern `20210601182121_computers.json`, `domains.json`, `gpos.json`, `ous.json` and `users.json`. Tuning may be required, or remove these json's entirely if it is too noisy. During traige, review parallel processes for further suspicious behavior. Typically, the process executing the `.ps1` ingestor will be PowerShell. action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect SharpHound File Modifications action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -8423,7 +11121,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect SharpHound Usage - Rule action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Discovery Techniques", "Ransomware"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1069.001", "T1482", "T1087.001", "T1087", "T1069.002", "T1069"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies SharpHound binary usage by using the original filena,e. In addition to renaming the PE, other coverage is available to detect command-line arguments. This particular analytic looks for the original_file_name of `SharpHound.exe` and the process name. It is possible older instances of SharpHound.exe have different original filenames. Dependent upon the operator, the code may be re-compiled and the attributes removed or changed to anything else. During triage, review the metadata of the binary in question. Review parallel processes for suspicious behavior. Identify the source of this binary. action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect SharpHound Usage action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -8439,484 +11137,6 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=sharphound.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=SharpHound.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_sharphound_usage_filter` -[ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = Adversaries may abuse netbooting to load an unauthorized network device operating system from a Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) server. TFTP boot (netbooting) is commonly used by network administrators to load configuration-controlled network device images from a centralized management server. Netbooting is one option in the boot sequence and can be used to centralize, manage, and control device images. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1542.005", "T1542"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Traffic"] -action.escu.eli5 = Adversaries may abuse netbooting to load an unauthorized network device operating system from a Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) server. TFTP boot (netbooting) is commonly used by network administrators to load configuration-controlled network device images from a centralized management server. Netbooting is one option in the boot sequence and can be used to centralize, manage, and control device images. -action.escu.how_to_implement = This search looks for Network Traffic events to TFTP, FTP or SSH/SCP ports from network devices. Make sure to tag any network devices as network, router or switch in order for this detection to work. If the TFTP traffic doesn't traverse a firewall nor packet inspection, these events will not be logged. This is typically an issue if the TFTP server is on the same subnet as the network device. There is also a chance of the network device loading software using a DHCP assigned IP address (netboot) which is not in the Asset inventory. -action.escu.known_false_positives = This search will also report any legitimate attempts of software downloads to network devices as well as outbound SSH sessions from network devices. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-10-28 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-28 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Router and Infrastructure Security"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Router and Infrastructure Security"], "cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1542.005", "T1542"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest', 'src'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = Adversaries may abuse netbooting to load an unauthorized network device operating system from a Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) server. TFTP boot (netbooting) is commonly used by network administrators to load configuration-controlled network device images from a centralized management server. Netbooting is one option in the boot sequence and can be used to centralize, manage, and control device images. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Software Download To Network Device -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where (All_Traffic.transport=udp AND All_Traffic.dest_port=69) OR (All_Traffic.transport=tcp AND All_Traffic.dest_port=21) OR (All_Traffic.transport=tcp AND All_Traffic.dest_port=22) AND All_Traffic.dest_category!=common_software_repo_destination AND All_Traffic.src_category=network OR All_Traffic.src_category=router OR All_Traffic.src_category=switch by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_software_download_to_network_device_filter` - -[ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search will detect users creating spikes of API activity in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search will detect users creating spikes of API activity in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike.\ -This search produces fields (`eventName`,`numberOfApiCalls`,`uniqueApisCalled`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** AWS Event Name, **Field:** eventName\ -1. \ -1. **Label:** Number of API Calls, **Field:** numberOfApiCalls\ -1. \ -1. **Label:** Unique API Calls, **Field:** uniqueApisCalled\ -Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` -action.escu.known_false_positives = -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS User Monitoring"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = -action.risk.param._risk = [] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS User Monitoring"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search will detect users creating spikes of API activity in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Spike in AWS API Activity -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall [search `cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | stats count as apiCalls by arn | inputlookup api_call_by_user_baseline append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) as * by arn | rename apiCalls as latestCount | eval newAvgApiCalls=avgApiCalls + (latestCount-avgApiCalls)/720 | eval newStdevApiCalls=sqrt(((pow(stdevApiCalls, 2)*719 + (latestCount-newAvgApiCalls)*(latestCount-avgApiCalls))/720)) | eval avgApiCalls=coalesce(newAvgApiCalls, avgApiCalls), stdevApiCalls=coalesce(newStdevApiCalls, stdevApiCalls), numDataPoints=if(isnull(latestCount), numDataPoints, numDataPoints+1) | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup api_call_by_user_baseline | eval dataPointThreshold = 15, deviationThreshold = 3 | eval isSpike=if((latestCount > avgApiCalls+deviationThreshold*stdevApiCalls) AND numDataPoints > dataPointThreshold, 1, 0) | where isSpike=1 | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | stats values(eventName) as eventName, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName) as uniqueApisCalled by user | `detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity_filter` - -[ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub alerts for an EC2 instance in 4 hours intervals -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "nist": ["DE.DP"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub alerts for an EC2 instance in 4 hours intervals -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Security Hub inputs. The threshold_value should be tuned to your environment and schedule these searches according to the bucket span interval. -action.escu.known_false_positives = None -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-26 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-26 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Security Hub Alerts"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Spike in AWS security Hub alerts with title $Title$ for EC2 instance $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Security Hub Alerts"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 30, "nist": ["DE.DP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `aws_securityhub_finding` "Resources{}.Type"=AWSEC2Instance | bucket span=4h _time | stats count AS alerts values(Title) as Title values(Types{}) as Types values(vendor_account) as vendor_account values(vendor_region) as vendor_region values(severity) as severity by _time dest | eventstats avg(alerts) as total_alerts_avg, stdev(alerts) as total_alerts_stdev | eval threshold_value = 3 | eval isOutlier=if(alerts > total_alerts_avg+(total_alerts_stdev * threshold_value), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | table _time dest alerts Title Types vendor_account vendor_region severity isOutlier total_alerts_avg | `detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance_filter` - -[ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub alerts for an AWS IAM User in 4 hours intervals. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub alerts for an AWS IAM User in 4 hours intervals. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Security Hub inputs. The threshold_value should be tuned to your environment and schedule these searches according to the bucket span interval. -action.escu.known_false_positives = None -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-26 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-26 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Security Hub Alerts"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Security Hub Alerts"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub alerts for an AWS IAM User in 4 hours intervals. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `aws_securityhub_finding` "findings{}.Resources{}.Type"= AwsIamUser | rename findings{}.Resources{}.Id as user | bucket span=4h _time | stats count AS alerts by _time user | eventstats avg(alerts) as total_launched_avg, stdev(alerts) as total_launched_stdev | eval threshold_value = 2 | eval isOutlier=if(alerts > total_launched_avg+(total_launched_stdev * threshold_value), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | table _time user alerts |`detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user_filter` - -[ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to network access-control lists (ACLs)in your AWS environment. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to network access-control lists (ACLs)in your AWS environment. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best when you run the "Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN" support search once to create a lookup file of previously seen Network ACL Activity. To add or remove API event names related to network ACLs, edit the macro `network_acl_events`. -action.escu.known_false_positives = The false-positive rate may vary based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`. Please modify this according the your environment. -action.escu.creation_date = 2018-05-21 -action.escu.modification_date = 2018-05-21 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Network ACL Activity"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = -action.risk.param._risk = [] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Network ACL Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to network access-control lists (ACLs)in your AWS environment. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `cloudtrail` `network_acl_events` [search `cloudtrail` `network_acl_events` | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | stats count as apiCalls by arn | inputlookup network_acl_activity_baseline append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) as * by arn | rename apiCalls as latestCount | eval newAvgApiCalls=avgApiCalls + (latestCount-avgApiCalls)/720 | eval newStdevApiCalls=sqrt(((pow(stdevApiCalls, 2)*719 + (latestCount-newAvgApiCalls)*(latestCount-avgApiCalls))/720)) | eval avgApiCalls=coalesce(newAvgApiCalls, avgApiCalls), stdevApiCalls=coalesce(newStdevApiCalls, stdevApiCalls), numDataPoints=if(isnull(latestCount), numDataPoints, numDataPoints+1) | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup network_acl_activity_baseline | eval dataPointThreshold = 15, deviationThreshold = 3 | eval isSpike=if((latestCount > avgApiCalls+deviationThreshold*stdevApiCalls) AND numDataPoints > dataPointThreshold, 1, 0) | where isSpike=1 | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | stats values(eventName) as eventNames, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName) as uniqueApisCalled by user | `detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity_filter` - -[ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search detects users creating spikes in API activity related to deletion of S3 buckets in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search detects users creating spikes in API activity related to deletion of S3 buckets in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best when you run the "Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN" support search once to create a baseline of previously seen S3 bucket-deletion activity. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`, the false positive rate may vary. Please modify this according the your environment. -action.escu.creation_date = 2018-11-27 -action.escu.modification_date = 2018-11-27 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = -action.risk.param._risk = [] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search detects users creating spikes in API activity related to deletion of S3 buckets in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteBucket [search `cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteBucket | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | stats count as apiCalls by arn | inputlookup s3_deletion_baseline append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) as * by arn | rename apiCalls as latestCount | eval newAvgApiCalls=avgApiCalls + (latestCount-avgApiCalls)/720 | eval newStdevApiCalls=sqrt(((pow(stdevApiCalls, 2)*719 + (latestCount-newAvgApiCalls)*(latestCount-avgApiCalls))/720)) | eval avgApiCalls=coalesce(newAvgApiCalls, avgApiCalls), stdevApiCalls=coalesce(newStdevApiCalls, stdevApiCalls), numDataPoints=if(isnull(latestCount), numDataPoints, numDataPoints+1) | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup s3_deletion_baseline | eval dataPointThreshold = 15, deviationThreshold = 3 | eval isSpike=if((latestCount > avgApiCalls+deviationThreshold*stdevApiCalls) AND numDataPoints > dataPointThreshold, 1, 0) | where isSpike=1 | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | spath output=bucketName path=requestParameters.bucketName | stats values(bucketName) as bucketName, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName) as uniqueApisCalled by user | `detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion_filter` - -[ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to security groups in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to security groups in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike.This search works best when you run the "Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN" support search once to create a history of previously seen Security Group Activity. To add or remove API event names for security groups, edit the macro `security_group_api_calls`. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`, the false positive rate may vary. Please modify this according the your environment. -action.escu.creation_date = 2018-04-18 -action.escu.modification_date = 2018-04-18 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS User Monitoring"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = -action.risk.param._risk = [] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS User Monitoring"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to security groups in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Spike in Security Group Activity -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `cloudtrail` `security_group_api_calls` [search `cloudtrail` `security_group_api_calls` | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | stats count as apiCalls by arn | inputlookup security_group_activity_baseline append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) as * by arn | rename apiCalls as latestCount | eval newAvgApiCalls=avgApiCalls + (latestCount-avgApiCalls)/720 | eval newStdevApiCalls=sqrt(((pow(stdevApiCalls, 2)*719 + (latestCount-newAvgApiCalls)*(latestCount-avgApiCalls))/720)) | eval avgApiCalls=coalesce(newAvgApiCalls, avgApiCalls), stdevApiCalls=coalesce(newStdevApiCalls, stdevApiCalls), numDataPoints=if(isnull(latestCount), numDataPoints, numDataPoints+1) | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup security_group_activity_baseline | eval dataPointThreshold = 15, deviationThreshold = 3 | eval isSpike=if((latestCount > avgApiCalls+deviationThreshold*stdevApiCalls) AND numDataPoints > dataPointThreshold, 1, 0) | where isSpike=1 | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | stats values(eventName) as eventNames, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName) as uniqueApisCalled by user | `detect_spike_in_security_group_activity_filter` - -[ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search will detect spike in blocked outbound network connections originating from within your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search will detect spike in blocked outbound network connections originating from within your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your VPC Flow logs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the number of data points required to meet the definition of "spike." The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best when you run the "Baseline of Blocked Outbound Connection" support search once to create a history of previously seen blocked outbound connections. -action.escu.known_false_positives = The false-positive rate may vary based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`. Additionally, false positives may result when AWS administrators roll out policies enforcing network blocks, causing sudden increases in the number of blocked outbound connections. -action.escu.creation_date = 2018-05-07 -action.escu.modification_date = 2018-05-07 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Network ACL Activity", "Suspicious AWS Traffic", "Command and Control"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = -action.risk.param._risk = [] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Network ACL Activity", "Suspicious AWS Traffic", "Command and Control"], "cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search will detect spike in blocked outbound network connections originating from within your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow` action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR src_ip=192.168.0.0/16) ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16) [search `cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow` action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR src_ip=192.168.0.0/16) ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16) | stats count as numberOfBlockedConnections by src_ip | inputlookup baseline_blocked_outbound_connections append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) as * by src_ip | rename numberOfBlockedConnections as latestCount | eval newAvgBlockedConnections=avgBlockedConnections + (latestCount-avgBlockedConnections)/720 | eval newStdevBlockedConnections=sqrt(((pow(stdevBlockedConnections, 2)*719 + (latestCount-newAvgBlockedConnections)*(latestCount-avgBlockedConnections))/720)) | eval avgBlockedConnections=coalesce(newAvgBlockedConnections, avgBlockedConnections), stdevBlockedConnections=coalesce(newStdevBlockedConnections, stdevBlockedConnections), numDataPoints=if(isnull(latestCount), numDataPoints, numDataPoints+1) | table src_ip, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgBlockedConnections, stdevBlockedConnections | outputlookup baseline_blocked_outbound_connections | eval dataPointThreshold = 5, deviationThreshold = 3 | eval isSpike=if((latestCount > avgBlockedConnections+deviationThreshold*stdevBlockedConnections) AND numDataPoints > dataPointThreshold, 1, 0) | where isSpike=1 | table src_ip] | stats values(dest_ip) as "Blocked Destination IPs", values(interface_id) as "resourceId" count as numberOfBlockedConnections, dc(dest_ip) as uniqueDestConnections by src_ip | `detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws_filter` - -[ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to automate data exfiltration over compromised network infrastructure. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some network devices and used for network analysis and may be configured to duplicate traffic and forward to one or more destinations for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring device. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1200", "T1020", "T1498", "T1020.001"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to automate data exfiltration over compromised network infrastructure. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some network devices and used for network analysis and may be configured to duplicate traffic and forward to one or more destinations for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring device. -action.escu.how_to_implement = This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must log with a severity level of minimum "5 - notification". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices and that the devices have been configured according to the documentation of the Cisco Networks Add-on. Also note that an attacker may disable logging from the device prior to enabling traffic mirroring. -action.escu.known_false_positives = This search will return false positives for any legitimate traffic captures by network administrators. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-10-28 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-28 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Router and Infrastructure Security"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Router and Infrastructure Security"], "cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1200", "T1020", "T1498", "T1020.001"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to automate data exfiltration over compromised network infrastructure. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some network devices and used for network analysis and may be configured to duplicate traffic and forward to one or more destinations for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring device. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Traffic Mirroring -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `cisco_networks` (facility="MIRROR" mnemonic="ETH_SPAN_SESSION_UP") OR (facility="SPAN" mnemonic="SESSION_UP") OR (facility="SPAN" mnemonic="PKTCAP_START") OR (mnemonic="CFGLOG_LOGGEDCMD" command="monitor session*") | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime count BY host facility mnemonic | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_traffic_mirroring_filter` - -[ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search is used to detect hosts that generate Windows Event ID 4663 for successful attempts to write to or read from a removable storage and Event ID 4656 for failures, which occurs when a USB drive is plugged in. In this scenario we are querying the Change_Analysis data model to look for Windows Event ID 4656 or 4663 where the priority of the affected host is marked as high in the ES Assets and Identity Framework. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.DS"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Change_Analysis"] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search is used to detect hosts that generate Windows Event ID 4663 for successful attempts to write to or read from a removable storage and Event ID 4656 for failures, which occurs when a USB drive is plugged in. In this scenario we are querying the Change_Analysis data model to look for Windows Event ID 4656 or 4663 where the priority of the affected host is marked as high in the ES Assets and Identity Framework. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663 and 4656. Ensure that the field from the event logs is being mapped to the result_id field in the Change_Analysis data model. To minimize the alert volume, this search leverages the Assets and Identity framework to filter out events from those assets not marked high priority in the Enterprise Security Assets and Identity Framework. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate USB activity will also be detected. Please verify and investigate as appropriate. -action.escu.creation_date = 2017-11-27 -action.escu.modification_date = 2017-11-27 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Data Protection"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Detect USB device insertion - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Protection"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.DS"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search is used to detect hosts that generate Windows Event ID 4663 for successful attempts to write to or read from a removable storage and Event ID 4656 for failures, which occurs when a USB drive is plugged in. In this scenario we are querying the Change_Analysis data model to look for Windows Event ID 4656 or 4663 where the priority of the affected host is marked as high in the ES Assets and Identity Framework. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect USB device insertion -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) AS earliest latest(_time) AS latest from datamodel=Change_Analysis where (nodename = All_Changes) All_Changes.result="Removable Storage device" (All_Changes.result_id=4663 OR All_Changes.result_id=4656) (All_Changes.src_priority=high) by All_Changes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")`| `security_content_ctime(earliest)`| `security_content_ctime(latest)` | `detect_usb_device_insertion_filter` - -[ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = By populating the organization's assets within the assets_by_str.csv, we will be able to detect unauthorized devices that are trying to connect with the organization's network by inspecting DHCP request packets, which are issued by devices when they attempt to obtain an IP address from the DHCP server. The MAC address associated with the source of the DHCP request is checked against the list of known devices, and reports on those that are not found. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Sessions"] -action.escu.eli5 = By populating the organization's assets within the assets_by_str.csv, we will be able to detect unauthorized devices that are trying to connect with the organization's network by inspecting DHCP request packets, which are issued by devices when they attempt to obtain an IP address from the DHCP server. The MAC address associated with the source of the DHCP request is checked against the list of known devices, and reports on those that are not found. -action.escu.how_to_implement = This search uses the Network_Sessions data model shipped with Enterprise Security. It leverages the Assets and Identity framework to populate the assets_by_str.csv file located in SA-IdentityManagement, which will contain a list of known authorized organizational assets including their MAC addresses. Ensure that all inventoried systems have their MAC address populated. -action.escu.known_false_positives = This search might be prone to high false positives. Please consider this when conducting analysis or investigations. Authorized devices may be detected as unauthorized. If this is the case, verify the MAC address of the system responsible for the false positive and add it to the Assets and Identity framework with the proper information. -action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-13 -action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-13 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Asset Tracking"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Asset Tracking"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = By populating the organization's assets within the assets_by_str.csv, we will be able to detect unauthorized devices that are trying to connect with the organization's network by inspecting DHCP request packets, which are issued by devices when they attempt to obtain an IP address from the DHCP server. The MAC address associated with the source of the DHCP request is checked against the list of known devices, and reports on those that are not found. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Sessions where nodename=All_Sessions.DHCP All_Sessions.signature=DHCPREQUEST by All_Sessions.src_ip All_Sessions.dest_mac | dedup All_Sessions.dest_mac| `drop_dm_object_name("Network_Sessions")`|`drop_dm_object_name("All_Sessions")` | search NOT [| inputlookup asset_lookup_by_str |rename mac as dest_mac | fields + dest_mac] | `detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address_filter` - [ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -8947,7 +11167,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script I action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Suspicious Command-Line Executions"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for the execution of the cscript.exe or wscript.exe processes, with a parent of cmd.exe. The search will return the count, the first and last time this execution was seen on a machine, the user, and the destination of the machine action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -9003,6 +11223,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect WMI Event Subscription Persistenc action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.003", "T1546"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscription to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions.\ All event subscriptions have three components \ 1. Filter - WQL Query for the events we want. EventID equals 19 \ @@ -9023,652 +11244,6 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = `sysmon` EventID=20 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer User Destination | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence_filter` -[ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search detects SIGRed via Splunk Stream. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1203"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search detects SIGRed via Splunk Stream. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting Splunk Stream DNS and Splunk Stream TCP. We are detecting SIG and KEY records via stream:dns and TCP payload over 65KB in size via stream:tcp. Replace the macro definitions ('stream:dns' and 'stream:tcp') with configurations for your Splunk environment. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-28 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-28 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "cve": ["CVE-2020-1350"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1203"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search detects SIGRed via Splunk Stream. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `stream_dns` | spath "query_type{}" | search "query_type{}" IN (SIG,KEY) | spath protocol_stack | search protocol_stack="ip:tcp:dns" | append [search `stream_tcp` bytes_out>65000] | `detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream_filter` | stats count by flow_id | where count>1 | fields - count - -[ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search detects SIGRed via Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1203"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Resolution"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search detects SIGRed via Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format. We are detecting SIG and KEY records via bro:dns:json and TCP payload over 65KB in size via bro:conn:json. The Network Resolution and Network Traffic datamodels are in use for this search. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-28 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-28 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "cve": ["CVE-2020-1350"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1203"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search detects SIGRed via Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.query_type IN (SIG,KEY) by DNS.flow_id | rename DNS.flow_id as flow_id | append [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.bytes_in>65000 by All_Traffic.flow_id | rename All_Traffic.flow_id as flow_id] | `detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek_filter` | stats count by flow_id | where count>1 | fields - count - -[ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search detects attempts to run exploits for the Zerologon CVE-2020-1472 vulnerability via Zeek RPC -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search detects attempts to run exploits for the Zerologon CVE-2020-1472 vulnerability via Zeek RPC -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting Zeek DCE-RPC data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format. We are detecting when all three RPC operations (NetrServerReqChallenge, NetrServerAuthenticate3, NetrServerPasswordSet2) are splunk_security_essentials_app via bro:rpc:json. These three operations are then correlated on the Zeek UID field. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-09-15 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-15 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Detect Zerologon Attack"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Detect Zerologon Attack"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 11"], "cve": ["CVE-2020-1472"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search detects attempts to run exploits for the Zerologon CVE-2020-1472 vulnerability via Zeek RPC -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Zerologon via Zeek -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `zeek_rpc` operation IN (NetrServerPasswordSet2,NetrServerReqChallenge,NetrServerAuthenticate3) | bin span=5m _time | stats values(operation) dc(operation) as opscount count(eval(operation=="NetrServerReqChallenge")) as challenge count(eval(operation=="NetrServerAuthenticate3")) as authcount count(eval(operation=="NetrServerPasswordSet2")) as passcount count as totalcount by _time,src_ip,dest_ip | search opscount=3 authcount>4 passcount>0 | search `detect_zerologon_via_zeek_filter` - -[ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for specific GET or HEAD requests to web servers that are indicative of reconnaissance attempts to identify vulnerable JBoss servers. JexBoss is described as the exploit tool of choice for this malicious activity. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1082"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Web"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for specific GET or HEAD requests to web servers that are indicative of reconnaissance attempts to identify vulnerable JBoss servers. JexBoss is described as the exploit tool of choice for this malicious activity. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data from the web server or network traffic that contains web specific information, and populating the Web data model. -action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible for legitimate HTTP requests to be made to URLs containing the suspicious paths. -action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-23 -action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-23 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["JBoss Vulnerability", "SamSam Ransomware"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["JBoss Vulnerability", "SamSam Ransomware"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1082"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for specific GET or HEAD requests to web servers that are indicative of reconnaissance attempts to identify vulnerable JBoss servers. JexBoss is described as the exploit tool of choice for this malicious activity. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where (Web.http_method="GET" OR Web.http_method="HEAD") AND (Web.url="*/web-console/ServerInfo.jsp*" OR Web.url="*web-console*" OR Web.url="*jmx-console*" OR Web.url = "*invoker*") by Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.src, Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers_filter` - -[ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = Malicious actors often abuse legitimate Dynamic DNS services to host malicious payloads or interactive command and control nodes. Attackers will automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to countless IP addresses to circumvent firewall blocks, block lists as well as frustrate a network defenders analytic and investigative processes. This search will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1189"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Resolution"] -action.escu.eli5 = Malicious actors often abuse legitimate Dynamic DNS services to host malicious payloads or interactive command and control nodes. Attackers will automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to countless IP addresses to circumvent firewall blocks, block lists as well as frustrate a network defenders analytic and investigative processes. This search will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains. -action.escu.how_to_implement = First, you'll need to ingest data from your DNS operations. This can be done by ingesting logs from your server or data, collected passively by Splunk Stream or a similar solution. Specifically, data that contains the domain that is being queried and the IP of the host originating the request must be populating the `Network_Resolution` data model. This search also leverages a lookup file, `dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv`, which contains a non-exhaustive list of Dynamic DNS providers. Please consider updating the local lookup periodically by adding new domains to the list of `dynamic_dns_providers_local.csv`.\ -This search produces fields (query, answer, isDynDNS) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable event. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review. Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** DNS Query, **Field:** query\ -1. \ -1. **Label:** DNS Answer, **Field:** answer\ -1. \ -1. **Label:** IsDynamicDNS, **Field:** isDynDNS\ -Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` -action.escu.known_false_positives = Some users and applications may leverage Dynamic DNS to reach out to some domains on the Internet since dynamic DNS by itself is not malicious, however this activity must be verified. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-14 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-14 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Data Protection", "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "DNS Hijacking", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Dynamic DNS", "Command and Control"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A dns query $query$ from your infra connecting to suspicious domain in host $host$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "host", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"threat_object_field": "query", "threat_object_type": "dnsquery"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Protection", "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "DNS Hijacking", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Dynamic DNS", "Command and Control"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Initial Access"}], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1189"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "host", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "query", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "dnsquery"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = Malicious actors often abuse legitimate Dynamic DNS services to host malicious payloads or interactive command and control nodes. Attackers will automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to countless IP addresses to circumvent firewall blocks, block lists as well as frustrate a network defenders analytic and investigative processes. This search will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.answer) as answer min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query host | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `dynamic_dns_providers` | `detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter` - -[ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search is used to detect malicious HTTP requests crafted to exploit jmx-console in JBoss servers. The malicious requests have a long URL length, as the payload is embedded in the URL. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 4", "CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["ID.RA", "PR.PT", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "PR.MA", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Web"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search is used to detect malicious HTTP requests crafted to exploit jmx-console in JBoss servers. The malicious requests have a long URL length, as the payload is embedded in the URL. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must ingest data from the web server or capture network data that contains web specific information with solutions such as Bro or Splunk Stream, and populating the Web data model -action.escu.known_false_positives = No known false positives for this detection. -action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-23 -action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-23 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["JBoss Vulnerability", "SamSam Ransomware"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["JBoss Vulnerability", "SamSam Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 4", "CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["ID.RA", "PR.PT", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "PR.MA", "DE.CM"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is used to detect malicious HTTP requests crafted to exploit jmx-console in JBoss servers. The malicious requests have a long URL length, as the payload is embedded in the URL. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where (Web.http_method="GET" OR Web.http_method="HEAD") by Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest | search Web.url="*jmx-console/HtmlAdaptor?action=invokeOpByName&name=jboss.admin*import*" AND Web.url_length > 200 | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table src, dest_ip, http_method, url, firstTime, lastTime | `detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers_filter` - -[ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies "mshta.exe" execution with inline protocol handlers. "JavaScript", "VBScript", and "About" are the only supported options when invoking HTA content directly on the command-line. The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process "mshta.exe" and its parent process. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies "mshta.exe" execution with inline protocol handlers. "JavaScript", "VBScript", and "About" are the only supported options when invoking HTA content directly on the command-line. The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process "mshta.exe" and its parent process. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-16 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-16 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious MSHTA Activity"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ executing with inline HTA, indicative of defense evasion. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 90}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 90}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious MSHTA Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies "mshta.exe" execution with inline protocol handlers. "JavaScript", "VBScript", and "About" are the only supported options when invoking HTA content directly on the command-line. The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process "mshta.exe" and its parent process. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect mshta inline hta execution -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_mshta` (Processes.process=*vbscript* OR Processes.process=*javascript* OR Processes.process=*about*) by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution_filter` - -[ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies renamed instances of mshta.exe executing. Mshta.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. This analytic utilizes the internal name of the PE to identify if is the legitimate mshta binary. Further analysis should be performed to review the executed content and validation it is the real mshta. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies renamed instances of mshta.exe executing. Mshta.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. This analytic utilizes the internal name of the PE to identify if is the legitimate mshta binary. Further analysis should be performed to review the executed content and validation it is the real mshta. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of mshta.exe, but never renamed, triggering a false positive. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-16 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-16 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious MSHTA Activity"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious MSHTA Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies renamed instances of mshta.exe executing. Mshta.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. This analytic utilizes the internal name of the PE to identify if is the legitimate mshta binary. Further analysis should be performed to review the executed content and validation it is the real mshta. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect mshta renamed -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_mshta` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mshta_renamed_filter` - -[ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search detects new API calls that have either never been seen before or that have not been seen in the previous hour, where the identity type is `AssumedRole`. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search detects new API calls that have either never been seen before or that have not been seen in the previous hour, where the identity type is `AssumedRole`. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously seen API call per user roles in AWS CloudTrail" support search once to create a history of previously seen user roles. -action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible that there are legitimate user roles making new or infrequently used API calls in your infrastructure, causing the search to trigger. -action.escu.creation_date = 2018-04-16 -action.escu.modification_date = 2018-04-16 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS User Monitoring"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = -action.risk.param._risk = [] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS User Monitoring"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search detects new API calls that have either never been seen before or that have not been seen in the previous hour, where the identity type is `AssumedRole`. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect new API calls from user roles -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall errorCode=success userIdentity.type=AssumedRole [search `cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall errorCode=success userIdentity.type=AssumedRole | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by userName eventName | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles | stats min(earliest) as earliest, max(latest) as latest by userName eventName | outputlookup previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles| eval newApiCallfromUserRole=if(earliest>=relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newApiCallfromUserRole=1 | `security_content_ctime(earliest)` | `security_content_ctime(latest)` | table eventName userName] |rename userName as user| stats values(eventName) earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by user | `security_content_ctime(earliest)` | `security_content_ctime(latest)` | `detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles_filter` - -[ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour. Deprecated now this search is updated to use the Authentication datamodel. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour. Deprecated now this search is updated to use the Authentication datamodel. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. Run the "Previously seen users in AWS CloudTrail" support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run "Update previously seen users in AWS CloudTrail" hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. -action.escu.known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour. Deprecated now this search is updated to use the Authentication datamodel. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect new user AWS Console Login -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user | eval userStatus=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), "First Time Logging into AWS Console","Previously Seen User") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| where userStatus ="First Time Logging into AWS Console" | `detect_new_user_aws_console_login_filter` - -[ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for fast execution of processes used for system network configuration discovery on the endpoint. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1016"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for fast execution of processes used for system network configuration discovery on the endpoint. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the processes node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is usually generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry or that are populated via Windows event logs, after enabling process tracking in your Windows audit settings. -action.escu.known_false_positives = It is uncommon for normal users to execute a series of commands used for network discovery. System administrators often use scripts to execute these commands. These can generate false positives. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-11-10 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-10 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Unusual Processes"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning multiple $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ typically not a normal behavior of the process. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 32}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 32}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Unusual Processes"], "cis20": ["CIS 2"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1016"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for fast execution of processes used for system network configuration discovery on the endpoint. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where NOT Processes.user IN ("","unknown") by Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.user _time | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | search `system_network_configuration_discovery_tools` | transaction dest connected=false maxpause=5m |where eventcount>=5 | table firstTime lastTime dest user process_name process parent_process eventcount | `detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery_filter` - -[ESCU - Detect shared ec2 snapshot - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic utilizes AWS CloudTrail events to identify when an EC2 snapshot permissions are modified to be shared with a different AWS account. This method is used by adversaries to exfiltrate the EC2 snapshot. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1537"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes AWS CloudTrail events to identify when an EC2 snapshot permissions are modified to be shared with a different AWS account. This method is used by adversaries to exfiltrate the EC2 snapshot. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs. -action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately shared a snapshot with others for a specific purpose. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-20 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-20 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect shared ec2 snapshot - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", "Data Exfiltration"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = AWS EC2 snapshot from account $aws_account_id$ is shared with $requested_account_id$ by user $user_arn$ from $src_ip$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user_arn", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 48}, {"risk_object_field": "src_ip", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 48}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect shared ec2 snapshot - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", "Data Exfiltration"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1537"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user_arn", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "src_ip", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}]} -schedule_window = auto -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `cloudtrail` eventName=ModifySnapshotAttribute | rename requestParameters.createVolumePermission.add.items{}.userId as requested_account_id | search requested_account_id != NULL | eval match=if(requested_account_id==aws_account_id,"Match","No Match") | table _time user_arn src_ip requestParameters.attributeType requested_account_id aws_account_id match vendor_region user_agent | where match = "No Match" | `detect_shared_ec2_snapshot_filter` - -[ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for web connections to dynamic DNS providers. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.001"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "DE.DP"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Web"] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for web connections to dynamic DNS providers. -action.escu.how_to_implement = This search requires you to be ingesting web-traffic logs. You can obtain these logs from indexing data from a web proxy or by using a network-traffic-analysis tool, such as Bro or Splunk Stream. The web data model must contain the URL being requested, the IP address of the host initiating the request, and the destination IP. This search also leverages a lookup file, `dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv`, which contains a non-exhaustive list of dynamic DNS providers. Consider periodically updating this local lookup file with new domains.\ -This search produces fields (`isDynDNS`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** IsDynamicDNS, **Field:** isDynDNS\ -Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` Deprecated because duplicate. -action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible that list of dynamic DNS providers is outdated and/or that the URL being requested is legitimate. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Dynamic DNS"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dynamic DNS"], "cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.001"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "DE.DP"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest', 'src'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for web connections to dynamic DNS providers. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Web.url) as url min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Web where Web.status=200 by Web.src Web.dest Web.status | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `dynamic_dns_web_traffic` | `detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter` - -[ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search is used to detect DNS tunneling, by calculating the sum of the length of DNS queries and DNS answers. The search also filters out potential false positives by filtering out queries made to internal systems and the queries originating from internal DNS, Web, and Email servers. Endpoints using DNS as a method of transmission for data exfiltration, command and control, or evasion of security controls can often be detected by noting an unusually large volume of DNS traffic. \ -NOTE:Deprecated because existing detection is doing the same. This detection is replaced with two other variations, if you are using MLTK then you can use this search `ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule` or use the standard deviation version `ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule`, as an alternantive. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.DS"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Resolution"] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search is used to detect DNS tunneling, by calculating the sum of the length of DNS queries and DNS answers. The search also filters out potential false positives by filtering out queries made to internal systems and the queries originating from internal DNS, Web, and Email servers. Endpoints using DNS as a method of transmission for data exfiltration, command and control, or evasion of security controls can often be detected by noting an unusually large volume of DNS traffic. \ -NOTE:Deprecated because existing detection is doing the same. This detection is replaced with two other variations, if you are using MLTK then you can use this search `ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule` or use the standard deviation version `ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule`, as an alternantive. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, we must ensure that DNS data is being ingested and mapped to the appropriate fields in the Network_Resolution data model. Fields like src_category are automatically provided by the Assets and Identity Framework shipped with Splunk Enterprise Security. You will need to ensure you are using the Assets and Identity Framework and populating the src_category field. You will also need to enable the `cim_corporate_web_domain_search()` macro which will essentially filter out the DNS queries made to the corporate web domains to reduce alert fatigue. -action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible that normal DNS traffic will exhibit this behavior. If an alert is generated, please investigate and validate as appropriate. The threshold can also be modified to better suit your environment. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-15 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-15 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Data Protection", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Command and Control"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Protection", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Command and Control"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.DS"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['src'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search is used to detect DNS tunneling, by calculating the sum of the length of DNS queries and DNS answers. The search also filters out potential false positives by filtering out queries made to internal systems and the queries originating from internal DNS, Web, and Email servers. Endpoints using DNS as a method of transmission for data exfiltration, command and control, or evasion of security controls can often be detected by noting an unusually large volume of DNS traffic. \ -NOTE:Deprecated because existing detection is doing the same. This detection is replaced with two other variations, if you are using MLTK then you can use this search `ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule` or use the standard deviation version `ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule`, as an alternantive. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detection of DNS Tunnels -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc("DNS.query") as count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where nodename=DNS "DNS.message_type"="QUERY" NOT (`cim_corporate_web_domain_search("DNS.query")`) NOT "DNS.query"="*.in-addr.arpa" NOT ("DNS.src_category"="svc_infra_dns" OR "DNS.src_category"="svc_infra_webproxy" OR "DNS.src_category"="svc_infra_email*" ) by "DNS.src","DNS.query" | rename "DNS.src" as src "DNS.query" as message | eval length=len(message) | stats sum(length) as length by src | append [ tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc("DNS.answer") as count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where nodename=DNS "DNS.message_type"="QUERY" NOT (`cim_corporate_web_domain_search("DNS.query")`) NOT "DNS.query"="*.in-addr.arpa" NOT ("DNS.src_category"="svc_infra_dns" OR "DNS.src_category"="svc_infra_webproxy" OR "DNS.src_category"="svc_infra_email*" ) by "DNS.src","DNS.answer" | rename "DNS.src" as src "DNS.answer" as message | eval message=if(message=="unknown","", message) | eval length=len(message) | stats sum(length) as length by src ] | stats sum(length) as length by src | where length > 10000 | `detection_of_dns_tunnels_filter` - -[ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for specific command-line arguments that may indicate the execution of tools made by Nirsoft, which are legitimate, but may be abused by attackers. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1072"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for specific command-line arguments that may indicate the execution of tools made by Nirsoft, which are legitimate, but may be abused by attackers. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -action.escu.known_false_positives = While legitimate, these NirSoft tools are prone to abuse. You should verfiy that the tool was used for a legitimate purpose. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A "] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A "], "cis20": ["CIS 3"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1072"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for specific command-line arguments that may indicate the execution of tools made by Nirsoft, which are legitimate, but may be abused by attackers. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Detection of tools built by NirSoft -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) values(Processes.process) as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process="* /stext *" OR Processes.process="* /scomma *" ) by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft_filter` - [ESCU - Disable AMSI Through Registry - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -9686,15 +11261,20 @@ action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Disable AMSI Through Registry +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disable AMSI Through Registry - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = this search is to identify modification in registry to disable AMSI windows feature to evade detections. This technique was seen in several ransomware, RAT and even APT to impaire defenses of the compromise machine and to be able to execute payload with minimal alert as much as possible. action.notable.param.rule_title = Disable AMSI Through Registry action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -9737,10 +11317,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disable Defender AntiVirus Registry - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IceID"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IceID"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This particular behavior is typically executed when an adversaries or malware gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution and to evade detections. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. Endpoint should be isolated. action.notable.param.rule_title = Disable Defender AntiVirus Registry action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -9783,10 +11363,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disable Defender BlockAtFirstSeen Feature - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IceID"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IceID"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable windows defender feature. This technique is to bypassed or evade detection from Windows Defender AV product specially the BlockAtFirstSeen feature where it block suspicious file first seen in the host. action.notable.param.rule_title = Disable Defender BlockAtFirstSeen Feature action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -9829,10 +11409,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disable Defender Enhanced Notification - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IceID"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IceID"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable windows defender feature. This technique is to bypassed or evade detection from Windows Defender AV product specially the Enhanced Notification feature wher user or admin set to show or display alerts. action.notable.param.rule_title = Disable Defender Enhanced Notification action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -9875,10 +11455,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disable Defender MpEngine Registry - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IceID"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IceID"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This particular behavior is typically executed when an adversaries or malware gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution and to evade detections. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. Endpoint should be isolated. action.notable.param.rule_title = Disable Defender MpEngine Registry action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -9921,10 +11501,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disable Defender Spynet Reporting - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IceID"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IceID"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable windows defender feature. This technique is to bypassed or evade detection from Windows Defender AV product specially the spynet reporting for its telemetry. action.notable.param.rule_title = Disable Defender Spynet Reporting action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -9967,10 +11547,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disable Defender Submit Samples Consent Feature - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IceID"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IceID"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = his analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable windows defender feature. This technique is to bypassed or evade detection from Windows Defender AV product specially the submit samples feature for further analysis.. action.notable.param.rule_title = Disable Defender Submit Samples Consent Feature action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -10003,15 +11583,20 @@ action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Disable ETW Through Registry +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disable ETW Through Registry - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = this search is to identify modification in registry to disable ETW windows feature to evade detections. This technique was seen in several ransomware, RAT and even APT to impaire defenses of the compromise machine and to be able to execute payload with minimal alert as much as possible. action.notable.param.rule_title = Disable ETW Through Registry action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -10054,10 +11639,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disable Logs Using WevtUtil - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "confidence": 80, "context": [{"Source": "Endpoint"}, {"Stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070", "T1070.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070", "T1070.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect execution of wevtutil.exe to disable logs. This technique was seen in several ransomware to disable the event logs to evade alerts and detections. action.notable.param.rule_title = Disable Logs Using WevtUtil action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -10103,7 +11688,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disable Registry Tool - Rule action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This search identifies modification of registry to disable the regedit or registry tools of the windows operating system. Since registry tool is a swiss knife in analyzing registry, malware such as RAT or trojan Spy disable this application to prevent the removal of their registry entry such as persistence, file less components and defense evasion. action.notable.param.rule_title = Disable Registry Tool action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -10149,7 +11734,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disable Schedule Task - Rule action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious commandline to disable existing schedule task. This technique is used by adversaries or commodity malware like IceID to disable security application (AV products) in the targetted host to evade detections. This TTP is a good pivot to check further why and what other process run before and after this detection. check which process execute the commandline and what task is disabled. parent child process is quite valuable in this scenario too. action.notable.param.rule_title = Disable Schedule Task action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -10170,7 +11755,7 @@ action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious registry modification to disable security audit logs. This technique was shared by a researcher to disable Security logs of windows by adding this registry. The Windows will think it is WinPE and will not log any event to the Security Log action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to detect a suspicious registry modification to disable security audit logs. This technique was shared by a researcher to disable Security logs of windows by adding this registry. The Windows will think it is WinPE and will not log any event to the Security Log action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown. @@ -10192,10 +11777,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious registry modification to disable security audit logs. This technique was shared by a researcher to disable Security logs of windows by adding this registry. The Windows will think it is WinPE and will not log any event to the Security Log action.notable.param.rule_title = Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -10241,7 +11826,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disable Show Hidden Files - Rule action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1564.001", "T1562.001", "T1564", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic is to identify a modification in the Windows registry to prevent users from seeing all the files with hidden attributes. This event or techniques are known on some worm and trojan spy malware that will drop hidden files on the infected machine. action.notable.param.rule_title = Disable Show Hidden Files action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -10262,7 +11847,7 @@ action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable UAC remote restriction. This technique was well documented in Microsoft page where attacker may modify this registry value to bypassed UAC feature of windows host. This is a good indicator that some tries to bypassed UAC to suspicious process or gain privilege escalation. action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable UAC remote restriction. This technique was well documented in Microsoft page where attacker may modify this registry value to bypassed UAC feature of windows host. This is a good indicator that some tries to bypassed UAC to suspicious process or gain privilege escalation. action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. action.escu.known_false_positives = admin may set this policy for non-critical machine. @@ -10284,10 +11869,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disable UAC Remote Restriction - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Privilege Escalation Persistence"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable UAC remote restriction. This technique was well documented in Microsoft page where attacker may modify this registry value to bypassed UAC feature of windows host. This is a good indicator that some tries to bypassed UAC to suspicious process or gain privilege escalation. action.notable.param.rule_title = Disable UAC Remote Restriction action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -10308,7 +11893,7 @@ action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = This analytic detects a suspicious registry modification to disable Windows hotkey (shortcut keys) for native Windows applications. This technique is commonly used to disable certain or several Windows applications like `taskmgr.exe` and `cmd.exe`. This technique is used to impair the analyst in analyzing and removing the attacker implant in compromised systems. action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] action.escu.eli5 = This analytic detects a suspicious registry modification to disable Windows hotkey (shortcut keys) for native Windows applications. This technique is commonly used to disable certain or several Windows applications like `taskmgr.exe` and `cmd.exe`. This technique is used to impair the analyst in analyzing and removing the attacker implant in compromised systems. action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as CarbonBlack or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown @@ -10333,7 +11918,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disable Windows App Hotkeys - Rule action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic detects a suspicious registry modification to disable Windows hotkey (shortcut keys) for native Windows applications. This technique is commonly used to disable certain or several Windows applications like `taskmgr.exe` and `cmd.exe`. This technique is used to impair the analyst in analyzing and removing the attacker implant in compromised systems. action.notable.param.rule_title = Disable Windows App Hotkeys action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -10376,10 +11961,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "confidence": 100, "context": [{"Source": "Endpoint"}, {"Stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to identifies a modification in registry to disable the windows denfender real time behavior monitoring. This event or technique is commonly seen in RAT, bot, or Trojan to disable AV to evade detections. action.notable.param.rule_title = Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -10425,7 +12010,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection - action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = The following search identifies a modification of registry to disable the smartscreen protection of windows machine. This is windows feature provide an early warning system against website that might engage in phishing attack or malware distribution. This modification are seen in RAT malware to cover their tracks upon downloading other of its component or other payload. action.notable.param.rule_title = Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -10445,7 +12030,7 @@ search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-ADUser` commandlet with specific parameters. `Get-ADUser` is part of the Active Directory PowerShell module used to manage Windows Active Directory networks. As the name suggests, `Get-ADUser` is used to query for domain users. With the appropiate parameters, Get-ADUser allows adversaries to discover domain accounts with Kerberos Pre Authentication disabled.\ Red Teams and adversaries alike use may abuse Get-ADUSer to enumerate these accounts and attempt to crack their passwords offline. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.004"]} +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.004"]} action.escu.data_models = [] action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-ADUser` commandlet with specific parameters. `Get-ADUser` is part of the Active Directory PowerShell module used to manage Windows Active Directory networks. As the name suggests, `Get-ADUser` is used to query for domain users. With the appropiate parameters, Get-ADUser allows adversaries to discover domain accounts with Kerberos Pre Authentication disabled.\ Red Teams and adversaries alike use may abuse Get-ADUSer to enumerate these accounts and attempt to crack their passwords offline. action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. @@ -10468,9 +12053,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.004"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.004"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-ADUser` commandlet with specific parameters. `Get-ADUser` is part of the Active Directory PowerShell module used to manage Windows Active Directory networks. As the name suggests, `Get-ADUser` is used to query for domain users. With the appropiate parameters, Get-ADUser allows adversaries to discover domain accounts with Kerberos Pre Authentication disabled.\ Red Teams and adversaries alike use may abuse Get-ADUSer to enumerate these accounts and attempt to crack their passwords offline. action.notable.param.rule_title = Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -10490,7 +12076,7 @@ search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = "*Get-ADUser*" AND Message="*41 action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainUser` commandlet with specific parameters. `Get-DomainUser` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows Active Directory networks. As the name suggests, `Get-DomainUser` is used to identify domain users and combining it with `-PreauthNotRequired` allows adversaries to discover domain accounts with Kerberos Pre Authentication disabled.\ Red Teams and adversaries alike use may leverage PowerView to enumerate these accounts and attempt to crack their passwords offline. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.004"]} +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.004"]} action.escu.data_models = [] action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainUser` commandlet with specific parameters. `Get-DomainUser` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows Active Directory networks. As the name suggests, `Get-DomainUser` is used to identify domain users and combining it with `-PreauthNotRequired` allows adversaries to discover domain accounts with Kerberos Pre Authentication disabled.\ Red Teams and adversaries alike use may leverage PowerView to enumerate these accounts and attempt to crack their passwords offline. action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. @@ -10513,9 +12099,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With PowerView - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.004"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.004"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainUser` commandlet with specific parameters. `Get-DomainUser` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows Active Directory networks. As the name suggests, `Get-DomainUser` is used to identify domain users and combining it with `-PreauthNotRequired` allows adversaries to discover domain accounts with Kerberos Pre Authentication disabled.\ Red Teams and adversaries alike use may leverage PowerView to enumerate these accounts and attempt to crack their passwords offline. action.notable.param.rule_title = Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With PowerView action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -10561,7 +12148,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disabling CMD Application - Rule action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = this search is to identify modification in registry to disable cmd prompt application. This technique is commonly seen in RAT, Trojan or WORM to prevent triaging or deleting there samples through cmd application which is one of the tool of analyst to traverse on directory and files. action.notable.param.rule_title = Disabling CMD Application action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -10607,7 +12194,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disabling ControlPanel - Rule action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = this search is to identify registry modification to disable control panel window. This technique is commonly seen in malware to prevent their artifacts , persistence removed on the infected machine. action.notable.param.rule_title = Disabling ControlPanel action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -10650,10 +12237,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disabling Defender Services - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IceID"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IceID"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This particular behavior is typically executed when an adversaries or malware gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution and to evade detections. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. Endpoint should be isolated. action.notable.param.rule_title = Disabling Defender Services action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -10699,7 +12286,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disabling Firewall with Netsh - Rule action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to identifies suspicious firewall disabling using netsh application. this technique is commonly seen in malware that tries to communicate or download its component or other payload to its C2 server. action.notable.param.rule_title = Disabling Firewall with Netsh action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -10745,7 +12332,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to identify registry modification to disable folder options feature of windows to show hidden files, file extension and etc. This technique used by malware in combination if disabling show hidden files feature to hide their files and also to hide the file extension to lure the user base on file icons or fake file extensions. action.notable.param.rule_title = Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -10780,7 +12367,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["XMRig"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified disabling a user account on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 42}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 42}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -10788,10 +12375,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disabling Net User Account - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1531"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1531"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic will identify a suspicious command-line that disables a user account using the `net.exe` utility native to Windows. This technique may used by the adversaries to interrupt availability of such users to do their malicious act. action.notable.param.rule_title = Disabling Net User Account action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -10837,7 +12424,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disabling NoRun Windows App - Rule action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to identify modification of registry to disable run application in window start menu. this application is known to be a helpful shortcut to windows OS user to run known application and also to execute some reg or batch script. This technique is used malware to make cleaning of its infection more harder by preventing known application run easily through run shortcut. action.notable.param.rule_title = Disabling NoRun Windows App action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -10883,7 +12470,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Remcos"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = The search looks for modifications to registry keys that control the enforcement of Windows User Account Control (UAC). action.notable.param.rule_title = Disabling Remote User Account Control action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -10929,7 +12516,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disabling SystemRestore In Registry - Ru action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = The following search identifies the modification of registry related in disabling the system restore of a machine. This event or behavior are seen in some RAT malware to make the restore of the infected machine difficult and keep their infection on the box. action.notable.param.rule_title = Disabling SystemRestore In Registry action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -10975,7 +12562,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disabling Task Manager - Rule action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to identifies modification of registry to disable the task manager of windows operating system. this event or technique are commonly seen in malware such as RAT, Trojan, TrojanSpy or worm to prevent the user to terminate their process. action.notable.param.rule_title = Disabling Task Manager action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -10991,39 +12578,39 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\DisableTaskMgr" Registry.registry_value_data = "0x00000001" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_key_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `disabling_task_manager_filter` -[ESCU - Domain Account Discovery With Net App - Rule] +[ESCU - DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain users. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use net.exe to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"]} +description = The following analytic identifies DLLHost.exe with no command line arguments with a network connection. It is unusual for DLLHost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. DLLHost.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain users. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use net.exe to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-24 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-24 +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies DLLHost.exe with no command line arguments with a network connection. It is unusual for DLLHost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. DLLHost.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `port` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate third party applications may use a moved copy of dllhost, triggering a false positive. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-13 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-13 action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Domain Account Discovery With Net App - Rule +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Cobalt Strike"] action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_message = The process $process_name$ was spawned by $parent_image$ without any command-line arguments on $dest$ by $user$. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 49}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_image", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Domain Account Discovery With Net App - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_image", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain users. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use net.exe to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Domain Account Discovery With Net App +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies DLLHost.exe with no command line arguments with a network connection. It is unusual for DLLHost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. DLLHost.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. +action.notable.param.rule_title = DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 @@ -11035,7 +12622,53 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` AND Processes.process = "* user*" AND Processes.process = "*/do*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_account_discovery_with_net_app_filter` +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=dllhost.exe by _time span=1h Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process="(dllhost\.exe.{0,4}$)" | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port !="0" by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_guid connection_to_CNC dest_port | `dllhost_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter` + +[ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = this search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. This technique are seen in couple of malware and APT group to exfiltrated collected data in a infected machine or infected network. This detection is looking for unique use of nslookup where it tries to use specific record type, TXT, A, AAAA, that are commonly used by attacker and also the retry parameter which is designed to query C2 DNS multiple tries. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = this search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. This technique are seen in couple of malware and APT group to exfiltrated collected data in a infected machine or infected network. This detection is looking for unique use of nslookup where it tries to use specific record type, TXT, A, AAAA, that are commonly used by attacker and also the retry parameter which is designed to query C2 DNS multiple tries. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of nslookup.exe may be used. +action.escu.known_false_positives = admin nslookup usage +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-15 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-15 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Dynamic DNS", "Command \u0026 Control", "Data Exfiltration"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ performing activity related to DNS exfiltration. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 72}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Dynamic DNS", "Command \u0026 Control", "Data Exfiltration"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = this search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. This technique are seen in couple of malware and APT group to exfiltrated collected data in a infected machine or infected network. This detection is looking for unique use of nslookup where it tries to use specific record type, TXT, A, AAAA, that are commonly used by attacker and also the retry parameter which is designed to query C2 DNS multiple tries. +action.notable.param.rule_title = DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "nslookup.exe" Processes.process = "*-querytype=*" OR Processes.process="*-qt=*" OR Processes.process="*-q=*" OR Processes.process="-type=*" OR Processes.process="*-retry=*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app_filter` [ESCU - Domain Account Discovery with Dsquery - Rule] action.escu = 0 @@ -11056,7 +12689,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -11064,12 +12697,52 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Domain Account Discovery with Dsquery - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name="dsquery.exe" AND Processes.process = "*user*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_account_discovery_with_dsquery_filter` + +[ESCU - Domain Account Discovery With Net App - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain users. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use net.exe to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain users. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use net.exe to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-24 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-24 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Domain Account Discovery With Net App - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Domain Account Discovery With Net App - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `dsquery.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover domain users. The `user` argument returns a list of all users registered in the domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike engage in remote system discovery for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Domain Account Discovery with Dsquery +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain users. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use net.exe to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Domain Account Discovery With Net App action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 @@ -11081,7 +12754,7 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name="dsquery.exe" AND Processes.process = "*user*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_account_discovery_with_dsquery_filter` +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` AND Processes.process = "* user*" AND Processes.process = "*/do*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_account_discovery_with_net_app_filter` [ESCU - Domain Account Discovery with Wmic - Rule] action.escu = 0 @@ -11102,7 +12775,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -11110,10 +12783,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Domain Account Discovery with Wmic - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain users. Red Teams and adversaries alike use wmic.exe to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. action.notable.param.rule_title = Domain Account Discovery with Wmic action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -11159,7 +12832,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `nltest.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The arguments `/dclist:` and '/dsgetdc:', can be used to return a list of all domain controllers. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use nltest.exe to identify domain controllers in a Windows Domain for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. action.notable.param.rule_title = Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -11204,10 +12877,50 @@ action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Domain Controller Discovery with Wmic - Rule action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="wmic.exe") (Processes.process="" OR Processes.process="*DomainControllerAddress*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_controller_discovery_with_wmic_filter` + +[ESCU - Domain Group Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator being used to query Active Directory for domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `[Adsisearcher]` to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.002"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator being used to query Active Directory for domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `[Adsisearcher]` to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use Adsisearcher for troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-25 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-25 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Domain Group Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Domain group discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 18}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Domain Group Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The arguments utilized in this command line return a list of all domain controllers in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike use *.exe to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Domain Controller Discovery with Wmic +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator being used to query Active Directory for domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `[Adsisearcher]` to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Domain Group Discovery with Adsisearcher action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 @@ -11219,7 +12932,7 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="wmic.exe") (Processes.process="" OR Processes.process="*DomainControllerAddress*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_controller_discovery_with_wmic_filter` +search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = "*[adsisearcher]*" AND Message = "*(objectcategory=group)*" AND Message = "*findAll()*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `domain_group_discovery_with_adsisearcher_filter` [ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Dsquery - Rule] action.escu = 0 @@ -11250,12 +12963,6 @@ action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Dsquery - Rule action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `dsquery.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The argument `group`, returns a list of all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use may leverage dsquery.exe to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Domain Group Discovery With Dsquery -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -11296,12 +13003,6 @@ action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Net - Rule action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The argument `group /domain`, returns a list of all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Domain Group Discovery With Net -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -11342,12 +13043,6 @@ action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Wmic - Rule action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The arguments utilized in this command return a list of all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use wmic.exe to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Domain Group Discovery With Wmic -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -11359,57 +13054,12 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="wmic.exe") (Processes.process=*/NAMESPACE:\\\\root\\directory\\ldap* AND Processes.process=*ds_group* AND Processes.process="*GET ds_samaccountname*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_group_discovery_with_wmic_filter` -[ESCU - Domain Group Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator being used to query Active Directory for domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `[Adsisearcher]` to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.002"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator being used to query Active Directory for domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `[Adsisearcher]` to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use Adsisearcher for troubleshooting. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-25 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-25 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Domain Group Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Domain group discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 18}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Domain Group Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator being used to query Active Directory for domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `[Adsisearcher]` to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Domain Group Discovery with Adsisearcher -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = "*[adsisearcher]*" AND Message = "*(objectcategory=group)*" AND Message = "*findAll()*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `domain_group_discovery_with_adsisearcher_filter` - [ESCU - Download Files Using Telegram - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = The following analytic will identify a suspicious download by the Telegram application on a Windows system. This behavior was identified on a honeypot where the adversary gained access, installed Telegram and followed through with downloading different network scanners (port, bruteforcer, masscan) to the system and later used to mapped the whole network and further move laterally. action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic will identify a suspicious download by the Telegram application on a Windows system. This behavior was identified on a honeypot where the adversary gained access, installed Telegram and followed through with downloading different network scanners (port, bruteforcer, masscan) to the system and later used to mapped the whole network and further move laterally. action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and TargetFilename from your endpoints or Events that monitor filestream events which is happened when process download something. (EventCode 15) If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. action.escu.known_false_positives = normal download of file in telegram app. (if it was a common app in network) @@ -11434,6 +13084,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Download Files Using Telegram - Rule action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic will identify a suspicious download by the Telegram application on a Windows system. This behavior was identified on a honeypot where the adversary gained access, installed Telegram and followed through with downloading different network scanners (port, bruteforcer, masscan) to the system and later used to mapped the whole network and further move laterally. action.notable.param.rule_title = Download Files Using Telegram action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -11454,7 +13105,7 @@ action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = This search is to detect dropping a suspicious file named as "license.dat" in %appdata%. This behavior seen in latest IcedID malware that contain the actual core bot that will be injected in other process to do banking stealing. action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204", "T1204.002"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect dropping a suspicious file named as "license.dat" in %appdata%. This behavior seen in latest IcedID malware that contain the actual core bot that will be injected in other process to do banking stealing. action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown @@ -11468,7 +13119,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["IcedID"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = process $SourceImage$ create a file $TargetImage$ in host $Computer$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}, {"threat_object_field": "SourceImage", "threat_object_type": "process name"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}, {"threat_object_field": "SourceImage", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -11476,11 +13127,67 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Drop IcedID License dat - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204", "T1204.002"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "SourceImage", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "process name"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204", "T1204.002"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "SourceImage", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `sysmon` EventCode= 11 TargetFilename = "*\\license.dat" AND (TargetFilename="*\\appdata\\*" OR TargetFilename="*\\programdata\\*") |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by TargetFilename EventCode process_id process_name Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_icedid_license_dat_filter` + +[ESCU - DSQuery Domain Discovery - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies "dsquery.exe" execution with arguments looking for `TrustedDomain` query directly on the command-line. This is typically indicative of an Administrator or adversary perform domain trust discovery. Note that this query does not identify any other variations of "Dsquery.exe" usage.\ +Within this detection, it is assumed `dsquery.exe` is not moved or renamed.\ +The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process "dsquery.exe" and its parent process.\ +DSQuery.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64` and only on Server operating system.\ +The following DLL(s) are loaded when DSQuery.exe is launched `dsquery.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible dsquery is running within that process context in memory.\ +In addition to trust discovery, review parallel processes for additional behaviors performed. Identify the parent process and capture any files (batch files, for example) being used. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies "dsquery.exe" execution with arguments looking for `TrustedDomain` query directly on the command-line. This is typically indicative of an Administrator or adversary perform domain trust discovery. Note that this query does not identify any other variations of "Dsquery.exe" usage.\ +Within this detection, it is assumed `dsquery.exe` is not moved or renamed.\ +The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process "dsquery.exe" and its parent process.\ +DSQuery.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64` and only on Server operating system.\ +The following DLL(s) are loaded when DSQuery.exe is launched `dsquery.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible dsquery is running within that process context in memory.\ +In addition to trust discovery, review parallel processes for additional behaviors performed. Identify the parent process and capture any files (batch files, for example) being used. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives. If there is a true false positive, filter based on command-line or parent process. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-31 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-31 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - DSQuery Domain Discovery - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Domain Trust Discovery", "Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified performing domain discovery on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 72}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - DSQuery Domain Discovery - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Domain Trust Discovery", "Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect dropping a suspicious file named as "license.dat" in %appdata%. This behavior seen in latest IcedID malware that contain the actual core bot that will be injected in other process to do banking stealing. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Drop IcedID License dat +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies "dsquery.exe" execution with arguments looking for `TrustedDomain` query directly on the command-line. This is typically indicative of an Administrator or adversary perform domain trust discovery. Note that this query does not identify any other variations of "Dsquery.exe" usage.\ +Within this detection, it is assumed `dsquery.exe` is not moved or renamed.\ +The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process "dsquery.exe" and its parent process.\ +DSQuery.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64` and only on Server operating system.\ +The following DLL(s) are loaded when DSQuery.exe is launched `dsquery.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible dsquery is running within that process context in memory.\ +In addition to trust discovery, review parallel processes for additional behaviors performed. Identify the parent process and capture any files (batch files, for example) being used. +action.notable.param.rule_title = DSQuery Domain Discovery action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 @@ -11492,7 +13199,7 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = `sysmon` EventCode= 11 TargetFilename = "*\\license.dat" AND (TargetFilename="*\\appdata\\*" OR TargetFilename="*\\programdata\\*") |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by TargetFilename EventCode process_id process_name Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_icedid_license_dat_filter` +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=dsquery.exe Processes.process=*trustedDomain* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dsquery_domain_discovery_filter` [ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule] action.escu = 0 @@ -11513,7 +13220,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Credential Dumping", "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "HAFNIUM Group"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified accessing credentials using comsvcs.dll on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -11521,10 +13228,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "HAFNIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "HAFNIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = Detect the usage of comsvcs.dll for dumping the lsass process. action.notable.param.rule_title = Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -11561,7 +13268,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Credential Dumping", "HAFNIUM Group"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified attempting to dump lsass.exe on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -11569,10 +13276,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "HAFNIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "HAFNIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = Detect procdump.exe dumping the lsass process. This query looks for both -mm and -ma usage. -mm will produce a mini dump file and -ma will write a dump file with all process memory. Both are highly suspect and should be reviewed. This query does not monitor for the internal name (original_file_name=procdump) of the PE or look for procdump64.exe. Modify the query as needed.\ During triage, confirm this is procdump.exe executing. If it is the first time a Sysinternals utility has been ran, it is possible there will be a -accepteula on the command line. Review other endpoint data sources for cross process (injection) into lsass.exe. action.notable.param.rule_title = Dump LSASS via procdump @@ -11589,314 +13296,6 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_procdump` (Processes.process=*-ma* OR Processes.process=*-mm*) Processes.process=*lsass* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dump_lsass_via_procdump_filter` -[ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. Detect a renamed instance of procdump.exe dumping the lsass process. This query looks for both -mm and -ma usage. -mm will produce a mini dump file and -ma will write a dump file with all process memory. Both are highly suspect and should be reviewed. Modify the query as needed.\ -During triage, confirm this is procdump.exe executing. If it is the first time a Sysinternals utility has been ran, it is possible there will be a -accepteula on the command line. Review other endpoint data sources for cross process (injection) into lsass.exe. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. Detect a renamed instance of procdump.exe dumping the lsass process. This query looks for both -mm and -ma usage. -mm will produce a mini dump file and -ma will write a dump file with all process memory. Both are highly suspect and should be reviewed. Modify the query as needed.\ -During triage, confirm this is procdump.exe executing. If it is the first time a Sysinternals utility has been ran, it is possible there will be a -accepteula on the command line. Review other endpoint data sources for cross process (injection) into lsass.exe. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -action.escu.known_false_positives = None identified. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-02-01 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-02-01 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Credential Dumping", "HAFNIUM Group"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$, attempting to dump lsass.exe. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "HAFNIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. Detect a renamed instance of procdump.exe dumping the lsass process. This query looks for both -mm and -ma usage. -mm will produce a mini dump file and -ma will write a dump file with all process memory. Both are highly suspect and should be reviewed. Modify the query as needed.\ -During triage, confirm this is procdump.exe executing. If it is the first time a Sysinternals utility has been ran, it is possible there will be a -accepteula on the command line. Review other endpoint data sources for cross process (injection) into lsass.exe. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Dump LSASS via procdump Rename -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `sysmon` OriginalFileName=procdump process_name!=procdump*.exe EventID=1 (CommandLine=*-ma* OR CommandLine=*-mm*) CommandLine=*lsass* | rename Computer as dest | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, parent_process_name, process_name, OriginalFileName, CommandLine | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename_filter` - -[ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for EC2 instances being modified by users who have not previously modified them. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for EC2 instances being modified by users who have not previously modified them. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User" support search once to create a history of previously seen ARNs. To add or remove APIs that modify an EC2 instance, edit the macro `ec2_modification_api_calls`. -action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible that a new user will start to modify EC2 instances when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is modifying instances that this is the intended behavior. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = -action.risk.param._risk = [] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for EC2 instances being modified by users who have not previously modified them. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -action.notable.param.rule_title = EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `cloudtrail` `ec2_modification_api_calls` [search `cloudtrail` `ec2_modification_api_calls` errorCode=success | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by userIdentity.arn | rename userIdentity.arn as arn | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by arn | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user | eval newUser=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newUser=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=dest responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | table _time, user, dest | `ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user_filter` - -[ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where an instance is started in a particular region in the last one hour and then compares it to a lookup file of previously seen regions where an instance was started -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where an instance is started in a particular region in the last one hour and then compares it to a lookup file of previously seen regions where an instance was started -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. Run the "Previously seen AWS Regions" support search only once to create of baseline of previously seen regions. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible that a user has unknowingly started an instance in a new region. Please verify that this activity is legitimate. -action.escu.creation_date = 2018-02-23 -action.escu.modification_date = 2018-02-23 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cryptomining", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = -action.risk.param._risk = [] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cryptomining", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where an instance is started in a particular region in the last one hour and then compares it to a lookup file of previously seen regions where an instance was started -action.notable.param.rule_title = EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `cloudtrail` earliest=-1h StartInstances | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by awsRegion | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_aws_regions.csv | stats min(earliest) as earliest max(latest) as latest by awsRegion | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_regions.csv | eval regionStatus=if(earliest >= relative_time(now(),"-1d@d"), "Instance Started in a New Region","Previously Seen Region") | `security_content_ctime(earliest)` | `security_content_ctime(latest)` | where regionStatus="Instance Started in a New Region" | `ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region_filter` - -[ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen AMIs. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen AMIs. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 AMIs" support search once to create a history of previously seen AMIs. -action.escu.known_false_positives = After a new AMI is created, the first systems created with that AMI will cause this alert to fire. Verify that the AMI being used was created by a legitimate user. -action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-12 -action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-12 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cryptomining"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cryptomining"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen AMIs. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -action.notable.param.rule_title = EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId | rename requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId as amiID | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_ec2_amis.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by amiID | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_amis.csv | eval newAMI=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where newAMI=1 | rename amiID as requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId | table requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId] | rename requestParameters.instanceType as instanceType, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as dest, userIdentity.arn as arn, requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId as amiID | table firstTime, lastTime, arn, amiID, dest, instanceType | `ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami_filter` - -[ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen instance types. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen instance types. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types" support search once to create a history of previously seen instance types. -action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible that an admin will create a new system using a new instance type never used before. Verify with the creator that they intended to create the system with the new instance type. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-02-07 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-02-07 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cryptomining"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cryptomining"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen instance types. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -action.notable.param.rule_title = EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | fillnull value="m1.small" requestParameters.instanceType | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by requestParameters.instanceType | rename requestParameters.instanceType as instanceType | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.csv | stats min(earliest) as earliest max(latest) as latest by instanceType | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.csv | eval newType=if(earliest >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | `security_content_ctime(earliest)` | `security_content_ctime(latest)` | where newType=1 | rename instanceType as requestParameters.instanceType | table requestParameters.instanceType] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename requestParameters.instanceType as instanceType, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as dest | table _time, user, dest, instanceType | `ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter` - -[ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for EC2 instances being created by users who have not created them before. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for EC2 instances being created by users who have not created them before. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User" support search once to create a history of previously seen ARNs. -action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible that a user will start to create EC2 instances when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is launching instances that this is the intended behavior. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cryptomining", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cryptomining", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for EC2 instances being created by users who have not created them before. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -action.notable.param.rule_title = EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by userIdentity.arn | rename userIdentity.arn as arn | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by arn | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.csv | eval newUser=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newUser=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | rename requestParameters.instanceType as instanceType, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as dest, userIdentity.arn as user | table _time, user, dest, instanceType | `ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user_filter` - -[ESCU - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic is to detect a registry modification to disable ETW feature of windows. This technique is to evade EDR appliance to evade detections and hide its execution from audit logs. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.006", "T1127", "T1562"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to detect a registry modification to disable ETW feature of windows. This technique is to evade EDR appliance to evade detections and hide its execution from audit logs. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-28 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-28 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 90}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 90}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Privilege Escalation Persistence"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.006", "T1127", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to detect a registry modification to disable ETW feature of windows. This technique is to evade EDR appliance to evade detections and hide its execution from audit logs. -action.notable.param.rule_title = ETW Registry Disabled -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path="*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\.NETFramework*" Registry.registry_value_name = ETWEnabled Registry.registry_value_data=0x00000000 by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `etw_registry_disabled_filter` - [ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery With Net - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -11927,7 +13326,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery With Net - Rule action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for specific elevated domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate elevated domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery to identify high privileged users. action.notable.param.rule_title = Elevated Group Discovery With Net action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -11943,6 +13342,46 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="net.exe" OR Processes.process_name="net1.exe") (Processes.process="*group*" AND Processes.process="*/do*") (Processes.process="*Domain Admins*" OR Processes.process="*Enterprise Admins*" OR Processes.process="*Schema Admins*" OR Processes.process="*Account Operators*" OR Processes.process="*Server Operators*" OR Processes.process="*Protected Users*" OR Processes.process="*Dns Admins*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `elevated_group_discovery_with_net_filter` +[ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery with PowerView - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainGroupMember` commandlet. `Get-DomainGroupMember` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. As the name suggests, `Get-DomainGroupMember` is used to list the members of an specific domain group. Red Teams and adversaries alike use PowerView to enumerate elevated domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery to identify high privileged users. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.002"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainGroupMember` commandlet. `Get-DomainGroupMember` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. As the name suggests, `Get-DomainGroupMember` is used to list the members of an specific domain group. Red Teams and adversaries alike use PowerView to enumerate elevated domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery to identify high privileged users. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerView for troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-25 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-25 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery with PowerView - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Elevated group discovery using PowerView on $dest$ by $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 21}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery with PowerView - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = "*Get-DomainGroupMember*") AND Message IN ("*Domain Admins*","*Enterprise Admins*", "*Schema Admins*", "*Account Operators*" , "*Server Operators*", "*Protected Users*", "*Dns Admins*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `elevated_group_discovery_with_powerview_filter` + [ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery With Wmic - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -11973,7 +13412,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery With Wmic - Rul action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for specific domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate elevated domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery to identify high privileged users. action.notable.param.rule_title = Elevated Group Discovery With Wmic action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -11989,180 +13428,12 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="wmic.exe") (Processes.process=*/NAMESPACE:\\\\root\\directory\\ldap*) (Processes.process="*Domain Admins*" OR Processes.process="*Enterprise Admins*" OR Processes.process="*Schema Admins*" OR Processes.process="*Account Operators*" OR Processes.process="*Server Operators*" OR Processes.process="*Protected Users*" OR Processes.process="*Dns Admins*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `elevated_group_discovery_with_wmic_filter` -[ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery with PowerView - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainGroupMember` commandlet. `Get-DomainGroupMember` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. As the name suggests, `Get-DomainGroupMember` is used to list the members of an specific domain group. Red Teams and adversaries alike use PowerView to enumerate elevated domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery to identify high privileged users. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.002"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainGroupMember` commandlet. `Get-DomainGroupMember` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. As the name suggests, `Get-DomainGroupMember` is used to list the members of an specific domain group. Red Teams and adversaries alike use PowerView to enumerate elevated domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery to identify high privileged users. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerView for troubleshooting. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-25 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-25 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery with PowerView - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Elevated group discovery using PowerView on $dest$ by $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 21}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery with PowerView - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainGroupMember` commandlet. `Get-DomainGroupMember` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. As the name suggests, `Get-DomainGroupMember` is used to list the members of an specific domain group. Red Teams and adversaries alike use PowerView to enumerate elevated domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery to identify high privileged users. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Elevated Group Discovery with PowerView -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = "*Get-DomainGroupMember*") AND Message IN ("*Domain Admins*","*Enterprise Admins*", "*Schema Admins*", "*Account Operators*" , "*Server Operators*", "*Protected Users*", "*Dns Admins*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `elevated_group_discovery_with_powerview_filter` - -[ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = Attackers often use spaces as a means to obfuscate an attachment's file extension. This search looks for messages with email attachments that have many spaces within the file names. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Email"] -action.escu.eli5 = Attackers often use spaces as a means to obfuscate an attachment's file extension. This search looks for messages with email attachments that have many spaces within the file names. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You need to ingest data from emails. Specifically, the sender's address and the file names of any attachments must be mapped to the Email data model. The threshold ratio is set to 10%, but this value can be configured to suit each environment. \ - **Splunk Phantom Playbook Integration**\ -If Splunk Phantom is also configured in your environment, a playbook called "Suspicious Email Attachment Investigate and Delete" can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/` and add the correct hostname to the "Phantom Instance" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search. The notable event will be sent to Phantom and the playbook will gather further information about the file attachment and its network behaviors. If Phantom finds malicious behavior and an analyst approves of the results, the email will be deleted from the user's inbox. -action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time -action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-19 -action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-19 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Suspicious Emails"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Suspicious Emails"], "cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = Attackers often use spaces as a means to obfuscate an attachment's file extension. This search looks for messages with email attachments that have many spaces within the file names. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(All_Email.recipient) as recipient_address min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Email where All_Email.file_name="*" by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.file_name All_Email.message_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Email")` | eval space_ratio = (mvcount(split(file_name," "))-1)/len(file_name) | search space_ratio >= 0.1 | rex field=recipient_address "(?.*)@" | `email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces_filter` - -[ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The search looks at the change-analysis data model and detects email files created outside the normal Outlook directory. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114", "T1114.001"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The search looks at the change-analysis data model and detects email files created outside the normal Outlook directory. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records the file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint.Filesystem data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or by other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system reads and writes. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators and users sometimes prefer backing up their email data by moving the email files into a different folder. These attempts will be detected by the search. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Collection and Staging"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Collection and Staging"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114", "T1114.001"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The search looks at the change-analysis data model and detects email files created outside the normal Outlook directory. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Email files written outside of the Outlook directory -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_name=*.pst OR Filesystem.file_name=*.ost) Filesystem.file_path != "C:\\Users\\*\\My Documents\\Outlook Files\\*" Filesystem.file_path!="C:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Outlook*" by Filesystem.action Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Filesystem")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory_filter` - -[ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for an increase of data transfers from your email server to your clients. This could be indicative of a malicious actor collecting data using your email server. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114", "T1114.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Traffic"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for an increase of data transfers from your email server to your clients. This could be indicative of a malicious actor collecting data using your email server. -action.escu.how_to_implement = This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model. Your email servers must be categorized as "email_server" for the search to work, as well. You may need to adjust the deviation_threshold and minimum_data_samples values based on the network traffic in your environment. The "deviation_threshold" field is a multiplying factor to control how much variation you're willing to tolerate. The "minimum_data_samples" field is the minimum number of connections of data samples required for the statistic to be valid. -action.escu.known_false_positives = The false-positive rate will vary based on how you set the deviation_threshold and data_samples values. Our recommendation is to adjust these values based on your network traffic to and from your email servers. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Collection and Staging", "HAFNIUM Group"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Collection and Staging", "HAFNIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114", "T1114.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for an increase of data transfers from your email server to your clients. This could be indicative of a malicious actor collecting data using your email server. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` sum(All_Traffic.bytes_out) as bytes_out from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.src_category=email_server by All_Traffic.dest_ip _time span=1d | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | eventstats avg(bytes_out) as avg_bytes_out stdev(bytes_out) as stdev_bytes_out | eventstats count as num_data_samples avg(eval(if(_time < relative_time(now(), "@d"), bytes_out, null))) as per_source_avg_bytes_out stdev(eval(if(_time < relative_time(now(), "@d"), bytes_out, null))) as per_source_stdev_bytes_out by dest_ip | eval minimum_data_samples = 4, deviation_threshold = 3 | where num_data_samples >= minimum_data_samples AND bytes_out > (avg_bytes_out + (deviation_threshold * stdev_bytes_out)) AND bytes_out > (per_source_avg_bytes_out + (deviation_threshold * per_source_stdev_bytes_out)) AND _time >= relative_time(now(), "@d") | eval num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average = round(abs(bytes_out - avg_bytes_out) / stdev_bytes_out, 2), num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average = round(abs(bytes_out - per_source_avg_bytes_out) / per_source_stdev_bytes_out, 2) | table dest_ip, _time, bytes_out, avg_bytes_out, per_source_avg_bytes_out, num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average, num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average | `email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts_filter` - [ESCU - Enable RDP In Other Port Number - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = This search is to detect a modification to registry to enable rdp to a machine with different port number. This technique was seen in some atttacker tries to do lateral movement and remote access to a compromised machine to gain control of it. action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a modification to registry to enable rdp to a machine with different port number. This technique was seen in some atttacker tries to do lateral movement and remote access to a compromised machine to gain control of it. action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown @@ -12187,7 +13458,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Enable RDP In Other Port Number - Rule action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a modification to registry to enable rdp to a machine with different port number. This technique was seen in some atttacker tries to do lateral movement and remote access to a compromised machine to gain control of it. action.notable.param.rule_title = Enable RDP In Other Port Number action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -12208,7 +13479,7 @@ action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious registry modification to enable plain text credential feature of windows. This technique was used by several malware and also by mimikatz to be able to dumpe the a plain text credential to the compromised or target host. This TTP is really a good indicator that someone wants to dump the crendential of the host so it must be a good pivot for credential dumping techniques. action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112", "T1003"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to detect a suspicious registry modification to enable plain text credential feature of windows. This technique was used by several malware and also by mimikatz to be able to dumpe the a plain text credential to the compromised or target host. This TTP is really a good indicator that someone wants to dump the crendential of the host so it must be a good pivot for credential dumping techniques. action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown @@ -12233,7 +13504,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Regist action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112", "T1003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious registry modification to enable plain text credential feature of windows. This technique was used by several malware and also by mimikatz to be able to dumpe the a plain text credential to the compromised or target host. This TTP is really a good indicator that someone wants to dump the crendential of the host so it must be a good pivot for credential dumping techniques. action.notable.param.rule_title = Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -12254,7 +13525,7 @@ action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = This analytic will detect a suspicious Telegram process enumerating all network users in a local group. This technique was seen in a Monero infected honeypot to mapped all the users on the compromised system. EventCode 4798 is generated when a process enumerates a user's security-enabled local groups on a computer or device. action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] action.escu.eli5 = This analytic will detect a suspicious Telegram process enumerating all network users in a local group. This technique was seen in a Monero infected honeypot to mapped all the users on the compromised system. EventCode 4798 is generated when a process enumerates a user's security-enabled local groups on a computer or device. action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Task Schedule (Exa. Security Log EventCode 4798) endpoints. Tune and filter known instances of process like logonUI used in your environment. action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown @@ -12279,6 +13550,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Enumerate Users Local Group Using Telegr action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic will detect a suspicious Telegram process enumerating all network users in a local group. This technique was seen in a Monero infected honeypot to mapped all the users on the compromised system. EventCode 4798 is generated when a process enumerates a user's security-enabled local groups on a computer or device. action.notable.param.rule_title = Enumerate Users Local Group Using Telegram action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -12298,7 +13570,7 @@ search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4798 Process_Name = "*\\telegram.exe" action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = The following analytic identifies the process - `esentutl.exe` - being used to capture credentials stored in ntds.dit or the SAM file on disk. During triage, review parallel processes and determine if legitimate activity. Upon determination of illegitimate activity, take further action to isolate and contain the threat. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002", "T1003"]} +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002", "T1003"]} action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the process - `esentutl.exe` - being used to capture credentials stored in ntds.dit or the SAM file on disk. During triage, review parallel processes and determine if legitimate activity. Upon determination of illegitimate activity, take further action to isolate and contain the threat. action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. @@ -12313,7 +13585,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Credential Dumping"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user user$ attempting to capture credentials for offline cracking or observability. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -12321,14 +13593,8 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Esentutl SAM Copy - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the process - `esentutl.exe` - being used to capture credentials stored in ntds.dit or the SAM file on disk. During triage, review parallel processes and determine if legitimate activity. Upon determination of illegitimate activity, take further action to isolate and contain the threat. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Esentutl SAM Copy -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -12340,12 +13606,58 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_esentutl` Processes.process IN ("*ntds*", "*SAM*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `esentutl_sam_copy_filter` +[ESCU - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic is to detect a registry modification to disable ETW feature of windows. This technique is to evade EDR appliance to evade detections and hide its execution from audit logs. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.006", "T1127", "T1562"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to detect a registry modification to disable ETW feature of windows. This technique is to evade EDR appliance to evade detections and hide its execution from audit logs. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-28 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-28 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 90}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 90}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.006", "T1127", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to detect a registry modification to disable ETW feature of windows. This technique is to evade EDR appliance to evade detections and hide its execution from audit logs. +action.notable.param.rule_title = ETW Registry Disabled +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path="*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\.NETFramework*" Registry.registry_value_name = ETWEnabled Registry.registry_value_data=0x00000000 by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `etw_registry_disabled_filter` + [ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = The following search identifies Eventvwr bypass by identifying the registry modification into a specific path that eventvwr.msc looks to (but is not valid) upon execution. A successful attack will include a suspicious command to be executed upon eventvwr.msc loading. Upon triage, review the parallel processes that have executed. Identify any additional registry modifications on the endpoint that may look suspicious. Remediate as necessary. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] action.escu.eli5 = The following search identifies Eventvwr bypass by identifying the registry modification into a specific path that eventvwr.msc looks to (but is not valid) upon execution. A successful attack will include a suspicious command to be executed upon eventvwr.msc loading. Upon triage, review the parallel processes that have executed. Identify any additional registry modifications on the endpoint that may look suspicious. Remediate as necessary. action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. action.escu.known_false_positives = Some false positives may be present and will need to be filtered. @@ -12367,10 +13679,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "IcedID", "Living Off The Land"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "IcedID", "Living Off The Land"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = The following search identifies Eventvwr bypass by identifying the registry modification into a specific path that eventvwr.msc looks to (but is not valid) upon execution. A successful attack will include a suspicious command to be executed upon eventvwr.msc loading. Upon triage, review the parallel processes that have executed. Identify any additional registry modifications on the endpoint that may look suspicious. Remediate as necessary. action.notable.param.rule_title = Eventvwr UAC Bypass action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -12405,7 +13717,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spearphishing Attachments"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$, indicating potential suspicious macro execution. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -12413,10 +13725,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Excel Spawning PowerShell - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = The following detection identifies Microsoft Excel spawning PowerShell. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with Excel.exe. Excel.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16` (version will vary). PowerShell spawning from Excel.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command executed will most likely be encoded and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. action.notable.param.rule_title = Excel Spawning PowerShell action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -12451,7 +13763,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spearphishing Attachments"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$, indicating potential suspicious macro execution. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -12459,10 +13771,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Excel Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = The following detection identifies Microsoft Excel spawning Windows Script Host - `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe`. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with Excel.exe. Excel.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16` (version will vary). `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` default location is `c:\windows\system32\` or c:windows\syswow64`. `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` spawning from Excel.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command-line executed will most likely be obfuscated and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. Review the reputation of the remote destination and block accordingly. action.notable.param.rule_title = Excel Spawning Windows Script Host action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -12507,12 +13819,6 @@ action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Excessive Attempt To Disable Services - Rule action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1489"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic will identify suspicious series of command-line to disable several services. This technique is seen where the adversary attempts to disable security app services or other malware services to complete the objective on the compromised system. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Excessive Attempt To Disable Services -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -12524,52 +13830,12 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "sc.exe" AND Processes.process="*config*" OR Processes.process="*Disabled*" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=1m | where count >=5 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_attempt_to_disable_services_filter` -[ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search identifies DNS query failures by counting the number of DNS responses that do not indicate success, and trigger on more than 50 occurrences. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.004", "T1071"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Resolution"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search identifies DNS query failures by counting the number of DNS responses that do not indicate success, and trigger on more than 50 occurrences. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you must ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. -action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible legitimate traffic can trigger this rule. Please investigate as appropriate. The threshold for generating an event can also be customized to better suit your environment. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Command and Control"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Command and Control"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.004", "T1071"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search identifies DNS query failures by counting the number of DNS responses that do not indicate success, and trigger on more than 50 occurrences. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Excessive DNS Failures -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values("DNS.query") as queries from datamodel=Network_Resolution where nodename=DNS "DNS.reply_code"!="No Error" "DNS.reply_code"!="NoError" DNS.reply_code!="unknown" NOT "DNS.query"="*.arpa" "DNS.query"="*.*" by "DNS.src","DNS.query"| `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")`| lookup cim_corporate_web_domain_lookup domain as query OUTPUT domain| where isnull(domain)| lookup update=true alexa_lookup_by_str domain as query OUTPUT rank| where isnull(rank)| stats sum(count) as count mode(queries) as queries by src| `get_asset(src)`| where count>50 | `excessive_dns_failures_filter` - [ESCU - Excessive File Deletion In WinDefender Folder - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = This analytic will identify excessive file deletion events in the Windows Defender folder. This technique was seen in the WhisperGate malware campaign in which adversaries abused Nirsofts advancedrun.exe to gain administrative privilege to then execute PowerShell commands to delete files within the Windows Defender application folder. This behavior is a good indicator the offending process is trying to corrupt a Windows Defender installation. action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] action.escu.eli5 = This analytic will identify excessive file deletion events in the Windows Defender folder. This technique was seen in the WhisperGate malware campaign in which adversaries abused Nirsofts advancedrun.exe to gain administrative privilege to then execute PowerShell commands to delete files within the Windows Defender application folder. This behavior is a good indicator the offending process is trying to corrupt a Windows Defender installation. action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, TargetFilename, and ProcessID executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. action.escu.known_false_positives = Windows Defender AV updates may cause this alert. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. @@ -12594,7 +13860,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Excessive File Deletion In WinDefender F action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["WhisperGate"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "deleted_files", "role": ["Target"], "type": "File Name"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic will identify excessive file deletion events in the Windows Defender folder. This technique was seen in the WhisperGate malware campaign in which adversaries abused Nirsofts advancedrun.exe to gain administrative privilege to then execute PowerShell commands to delete files within the Windows Defender application folder. This behavior is a good indicator the offending process is trying to corrupt a Windows Defender installation. action.notable.param.rule_title = Excessive File Deletion In WinDefender Folder action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -12610,6 +13876,126 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = `sysmon` EventCode=23 TargetFilename = "*\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender*" | stats values(TargetFilename) as deleted_files min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by user EventCode Image ProcessID Computer |where count >=50 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_file_deletion_in_windefender_folder_filter` +[ESCU - Excessive number of distinct processes created in Windows Temp folder - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic will identify suspicious series of process executions. We have observed that post exploit framework tools like Koadic and Meterpreter will launch an excessive number of processes with distinct file paths from Windows\Temp to execute actions on objective. This behavior is extremely anomalous compared to typical application behaviors that use Windows\Temp. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic will identify suspicious series of process executions. We have observed that post exploit framework tools like Koadic and Meterpreter will launch an excessive number of processes with distinct file paths from Windows\Temp to execute actions on objective. This behavior is extremely anomalous compared to typical application behaviors that use Windows\Temp. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the full process path in the process field of CIM's Process data model. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed sc.exe may be used. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Many benign applications will create processes from executables in Windows\Temp, although unlikely to exceed the given threshold. Filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-28 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-28 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Excessive number of distinct processes created in Windows Temp folder - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Meterpreter"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Multiple processes were executed out of windows\temp within a short amount of time on $dest$. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Excessive number of distinct processes created in Windows Temp folder - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Meterpreter"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process distinct_count(Processes.process) as distinct_process_count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_path = "*\\Windows\\Temp\\*" by Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=20m | where distinct_process_count > 37 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_number_of_distinct_processes_created_in_windows_temp_folder_filter` + +[ESCU - Excessive number of service control start as disabled - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This detection targets behaviors observed when threat actors have used sc.exe to modify services. We observed malware in a honey pot spawning numerous sc.exe processes in a short period of time, presumably to impair defenses, possibly to block others from compromising the same machine. This detection will alert when we see both an excessive number of sc.exe processes launched with specific commandline arguments to disable the start of certain services. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This detection targets behaviors observed when threat actors have used sc.exe to modify services. We observed malware in a honey pot spawning numerous sc.exe processes in a short period of time, presumably to impair defenses, possibly to block others from compromising the same machine. This detection will alert when we see both an excessive number of sc.exe processes launched with specific commandline arguments to disable the start of certain services. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The complete process name with command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate programs and administrators will execute sc.exe with the start disabled flag. It is possible, but unlikely from the telemetry of normal Windows operation we observed, that sc.exe will be called more than seven times in a short period of time. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-25 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-25 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Excessive number of service control start as disabled - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = An excessive amount of $process_name$ was executed on $dest$ attempting to disable services. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Excessive number of service control start as disabled - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` distinct_count(Processes.process) as distinct_cmdlines values(Processes.process_id) as process_ids min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE Processes.process_name = "sc.exe" AND Processes.process="*start= disabled*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_id, _time span=30m | where distinct_cmdlines >= 8 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_number_of_service_control_start_as_disabled_filter` + +[ESCU - Excessive number of taskhost processes - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This detection targets behaviors observed in post exploit kits like Meterpreter and Koadic that are run in memory. We have observed that these tools must invoke an excessive number of taskhost.exe and taskhostex.exe processes to complete various actions (discovery, lateral movement, etc.). It is extremely uncommon in the course of normal operations to see so many distinct taskhost and taskhostex processes running concurrently in a short time frame. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This detection targets behaviors observed in post exploit kits like Meterpreter and Koadic that are run in memory. We have observed that these tools must invoke an excessive number of taskhost.exe and taskhostex.exe processes to complete various actions (discovery, lateral movement, etc.). It is extremely uncommon in the course of normal operations to see so many distinct taskhost and taskhostex processes running concurrently in a short time frame. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting events related to processes on the endpoints that include the name of the process and process id into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators, administrative actions or certain applications may run many instances of taskhost and taskhostex concurrently. Filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-07 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-07 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Excessive number of taskhost processes - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Meterpreter"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = An excessive amount of $process_name$ was executed on $dest$ indicative of suspicious behavior. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Excessive number of taskhost processes - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Meterpreter"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process_id) as process_ids min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE Processes.process_name = "taskhost.exe" OR Processes.process_name = "taskhostex.exe" BY Processes.dest Processes.process_name _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | eval pid_count=mvcount(process_ids) | eval taskhost_count_=if(process_name == "taskhost.exe", pid_count, 0) | eval taskhostex_count_=if(process_name == "taskhostex.exe", pid_count, 0) | stats sum(taskhost_count_) as taskhost_count, sum(taskhostex_count_) as taskhostex_count by _time, dest, firstTime, lastTime | where taskhost_count > 10 and taskhostex_count > 10 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_number_of_taskhost_processes_filter` + [ESCU - Excessive Service Stop Attempt - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -12639,12 +14025,6 @@ action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Excessive Service Stop Attempt - Rule action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig", "Ransomware"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1489"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic identifies suspicious series of attempt to kill multiple services on a system using either `net.exe` or `sc.exe`. This technique is use by adversaries to terminate security services or other related services to continue there objective and evade detections. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Excessive Service Stop Attempt -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -12685,12 +14065,6 @@ action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Cacls App - Rule action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies excessive usage of `cacls.exe`, `xcacls.exe` or `icacls.exe` application to change file or folder permission. This behavior is commonly seen where the adversary attempts to impair some users from deleting or accessing its malware components or artifact from the compromised system. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Excessive Usage Of Cacls App -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -12721,7 +14095,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["XMRig", "Ransomware"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = Excessive usage of net1.exe or net.exe within 1m, with command line $process$ has been detected on $dest$ by $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 28}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 28}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process name"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 28}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 28}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -12729,14 +14103,8 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig", "Ransomware"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Scope:Local", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1531"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Process", "Attacker"], "type": "Process Name"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig", "Ransomware"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Scope:Local", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1531"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic identifies excessive usage of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` within a bucket of time (1 minute). This behavior was seen in a Monero incident where the adversary attempts to create many users, delete and disable users as part of its malicious behavior. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Excessive Usage Of Net App -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -12748,12 +14116,52 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=1m | where count >=10 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_net_app_filter` +[ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. This technique are seen in couple of malware and APT group to exfiltrated collected data in a infected machine or infected network. This detection is looking for unique use of nslookup where it tries to use specific record type (TXT, A, AAAA) that are commonly used by attacker and also the retry parameter which is designed to query C2 DNS multiple tries. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. This technique are seen in couple of malware and APT group to exfiltrated collected data in a infected machine or infected network. This detection is looking for unique use of nslookup where it tries to use specific record type (TXT, A, AAAA) that are commonly used by attacker and also the retry parameter which is designed to query C2 DNS multiple tries. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of nslookup.exe may be used. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-21 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-21 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Dynamic DNS", "Command \u0026 Control", "Data Exfiltration"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Excessive usage of nslookup.exe has been detected on $Computer$. This detection is triggered as as it violates the dynamic threshold +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 28}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Dynamic DNS", "Command \u0026 Control", "Data Exfiltration"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Scope:Local", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `sysmon` EventCode = 1 process_name = "nslookup.exe" | bucket _time span=15m | stats count as numNsLookup by Computer, _time | eventstats avg(numNsLookup) as avgNsLookup, stdev(numNsLookup) as stdNsLookup, count as numSlots by Computer | eval upperThreshold=(avgNsLookup + stdNsLookup *3) | eval isOutlier=if(avgNsLookup > 20 and avgNsLookup >= upperThreshold, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app_filter` + [ESCU - Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = This search is to detect a suspicious excessive usage of sc.exe in a host machine. This technique was seen in several ransomware , xmrig and other malware to create, modify, delete or disable a service may related to security application or to gain privilege escalation. action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569", "T1569.002"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious excessive usage of sc.exe in a host machine. This technique was seen in several ransomware , xmrig and other malware to create, modify, delete or disable a service may related to security application or to gain privilege escalation. action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed taskkill.exe may be used. action.escu.known_false_positives = excessive execution of sc.exe is quite suspicious since it can modify or execute app in high privilege permission. @@ -12765,18 +14173,18 @@ action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569", "T1569.002"]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Scope:Local", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569", "T1569.002"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious excessive usage of sc.exe in a host machine. This technique was seen in several ransomware , xmrig and other malware to create, modify, delete or disable a service may related to security application or to gain privilege escalation. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -12817,12 +14225,6 @@ action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Taskkill - Rule action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process", "Attacker"], "type": "Process Name"}]} schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic identifies excessive usage of `taskkill.exe` application. This application is commonly used by adversaries to evade detections by killing security product processes or even other processes to evade detection. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Excessive Usage Of Taskkill -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -12834,38 +14236,39 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "taskkill.exe" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=1m | where count >=10 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_taskkill_filter` -[ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule] +[ESCU - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. This technique are seen in couple of malware and APT group to exfiltrated collected data in a infected machine or infected network. This detection is looking for unique use of nslookup where it tries to use specific record type (TXT, A, AAAA) that are commonly used by attacker and also the retry parameter which is designed to query C2 DNS multiple tries. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048"]} +description = The following analytic identifies executable files (.exe or .dll) being written to Windows administrative SMB shares (Admin$, IPC$, C$). This represents suspicious behavior as its commonly used by tools like like PsExec/PaExec and others to stage service binaries before creating and starting a Windows service on remote endpoints. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse administrative shares for lateral movement and remote code execution. The Trickbot malware family also implements this behavior to try to infect other machines in the infected network. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.002"]} action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. This technique are seen in couple of malware and APT group to exfiltrated collected data in a infected machine or infected network. This detection is looking for unique use of nslookup where it tries to use specific record type (TXT, A, AAAA) that are commonly used by attacker and also the retry parameter which is designed to query C2 DNS multiple tries. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of nslookup.exe may be used. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-21 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-21 +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies executable files (.exe or .dll) being written to Windows administrative SMB shares (Admin$, IPC$, C$). This represents suspicious behavior as its commonly used by tools like like PsExec/PaExec and others to stage service binaries before creating and starting a Windows service on remote endpoints. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse administrative shares for lateral movement and remote code execution. The Trickbot malware family also implements this behavior to try to infect other machines in the infected network. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 5145 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required. Also enable the object Audit access success/failure in your group policy. +action.escu.known_false_positives = System Administrators may use looks like PsExec for troubleshooting or administrations tasks. However, this will typically come only from certain users and certain systems that can be added to an allow list. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-18 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-18 action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Dynamic DNS", "Command and Control", "Data Exfiltration"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "Trickbot", "Hermetic Wiper"] action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Excessive usage of nslookup.exe has been detected on $Computer$. This detection is triggered as as it violates the dynamic threshold -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 28}] +action.risk.param._risk_message = $user$ dropped or created an executable file in known sensitive SMB share. Share name=$Share_Name$, Target name=$Relative_Target_Name$, and Access mask=$Access_Mask$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 70}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Dynamic DNS", "Command and Control", "Data Exfiltration"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Scope:Local", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "Trickbot", "Hermetic Wiper"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.002"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. This technique are seen in couple of malware and APT group to exfiltrated collected data in a infected machine or infected network. This detection is looking for unique use of nslookup where it tries to use specific record type (TXT, A, AAAA) that are commonly used by attacker and also the retry parameter which is designed to query C2 DNS multiple tries. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies executable files (.exe or .dll) being written to Windows administrative SMB shares (Admin$, IPC$, C$). This represents suspicious behavior as its commonly used by tools like like PsExec/PaExec and others to stage service binaries before creating and starting a Windows service on remote endpoints. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse administrative shares for lateral movement and remote code execution. The Trickbot malware family also implements this behavior to try to infect other machines in the infected network. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 @@ -12877,41 +14280,41 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = `sysmon` EventCode = 1 process_name = "nslookup.exe" | bucket _time span=15m | stats count as numNsLookup by Computer, _time | eventstats avg(numNsLookup) as avgNsLookup, stdev(numNsLookup) as stdNsLookup, count as numSlots by Computer | eval upperThreshold=(avgNsLookup + stdNsLookup *3) | eval isOutlier=if(avgNsLookup > 20 and avgNsLookup >= upperThreshold, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app_filter` +search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=5145 Relative_Target_Name IN ("*.exe","*.dll") Object_Type=File Share_Name IN ("\\\\*\\C$","\\\\*\\IPC$","\\\\*\\admin$") Access_Mask= "0x2" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by EventCode Share_Name Relative_Target_Name Object_Type Access_Mask user src_port Source_Address | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share_filter` -[ESCU - Excessive number of distinct processes created in Windows Temp folder - Rule] +[ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic will identify suspicious series of process executions. We have observed that post exploit framework tools like Koadic and Meterpreter will launch an excessive number of processes with distinct file paths from Windows\Temp to execute actions on objective. This behavior is extremely anomalous compared to typical application behaviors that use Windows\Temp. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"]} +description = This analytic will identify suspicious executable or scripts (known file extensions) in list of suspicious file path in Windows. This technique is used by adversaries to evade detection. The suspicious file path are known paths used in the wild and are not common to have executable or scripts. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036"]} action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic will identify suspicious series of process executions. We have observed that post exploit framework tools like Koadic and Meterpreter will launch an excessive number of processes with distinct file paths from Windows\Temp to execute actions on objective. This behavior is extremely anomalous compared to typical application behaviors that use Windows\Temp. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the full process path in the process field of CIM's Process data model. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed sc.exe may be used. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Many benign applications will create processes from executables in Windows\Temp, although unlikely to exceed the given threshold. Filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-28 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-28 +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic will identify suspicious executable or scripts (known file extensions) in list of suspicious file path in Windows. This technique is used by adversaries to evade detection. The suspicious file path are known paths used in the wild and are not common to have executable or scripts. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may allow creation of script or exe in the paths specified. Filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-05-06 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-05-06 action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Excessive number of distinct processes created in Windows Temp folder - Rule +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Meterpreter"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["XMRig", "Remcos", "WhisperGate", "Hermetic Wiper"] action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Multiple processes were executed out of windows\temp within a short amount of time on $dest$. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}] +action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious executable or scripts with file name $file_name$, $file_path$ and process_id $process_id$ executed in suspicious file path in Windows by $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 56}, {"threat_object_field": "process_id", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "file_name", "threat_object_type": "file name"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Excessive number of distinct processes created in Windows Temp folder - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Meterpreter"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig", "Remcos", "WhisperGate", "Hermetic Wiper"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "process_id", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "file_name", "role": ["Other", "Attacker"], "type": "File Name"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic will identify suspicious series of process executions. We have observed that post exploit framework tools like Koadic and Meterpreter will launch an excessive number of processes with distinct file paths from Windows\Temp to execute actions on objective. This behavior is extremely anomalous compared to typical application behaviors that use Windows\Temp. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Excessive number of distinct processes created in Windows Temp folder +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic will identify suspicious executable or scripts (known file extensions) in list of suspicious file path in Windows. This technique is used by adversaries to evade detection. The suspicious file path are known paths used in the wild and are not common to have executable or scripts. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 @@ -12923,27 +14326,4603 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process distinct_count(Processes.process) as distinct_process_count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_path = "*\\Windows\\Temp\\*" by Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=20m | where distinct_process_count > 37 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_number_of_distinct_processes_created_in_windows_temp_folder_filter` +search = |tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_name = *.exe OR Filesystem.file_name = *.dll OR Filesystem.file_name = *.sys OR Filesystem.file_name = *.com OR Filesystem.file_name = *.vbs OR Filesystem.file_name = *.vbe OR Filesystem.file_name = *.js OR Filesystem.file_name = *.ps1 OR Filesystem.file_name = *.bat OR Filesystem.file_name = *.cmd OR Filesystem.file_name = *.pif) AND ( Filesystem.file_path = *\\windows\\fonts\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\windows\\temp\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\users\\public\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\windows\\debug\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\Users\\Administrator\\Music\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\Windows\\servicing\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\Users\\Default\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *Recycle.bin* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\Windows\\Media\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\Windows\\repair\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\AppData\\Local\\Temp* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\PerfLogs\\*) by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path_filter` -[ESCU - Excessive number of service control start as disabled - Rule] +[ESCU - Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This detection targets behaviors observed when threat actors have used sc.exe to modify services. We observed malware in a honey pot spawning numerous sc.exe processes in a short period of time, presumably to impair defenses, possibly to block others from compromising the same machine. This detection will alert when we see both an excessive number of sc.exe processes launched with specific commandline arguments to disable the start of certain services. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This detection targets behaviors observed when threat actors have used sc.exe to modify services. We observed malware in a honey pot spawning numerous sc.exe processes in a short period of time, presumably to impair defenses, possibly to block others from compromising the same machine. This detection will alert when we see both an excessive number of sc.exe processes launched with specific commandline arguments to disable the start of certain services. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The complete process name with command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate programs and administrators will execute sc.exe with the start disabled flag. It is possible, but unlikely from the telemetry of normal Windows operation we observed, that sc.exe will be called more than seven times in a short period of time. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-25 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-25 +description = This analytic will identify suspicious process of cscript.exe where it tries to execute javascript using jscript.encode CLSID (COM OBJ). This technique was seen in ransomware (reddot ransomware) where it execute javascript with this com object with combination of amsi disabling technique. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.005"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic will identify suspicious process of cscript.exe where it tries to execute javascript using jscript.encode CLSID (COM OBJ). This technique was seen in ransomware (reddot ransomware) where it execute javascript with this com object with combination of amsi disabling technique. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-22 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-22 action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Excessive number of service control start as disabled - Rule +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious process of cscript.exe with a parent process $parent_process_name$ where it tries to execute javascript using jscript.encode CLSID (COM OBJ), detected on $dest$ by $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 56}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"threat_object_field": "process_id", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process name"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.005"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "process_id", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process", "Attacker"], "type": "Process Name"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic will identify suspicious process of cscript.exe where it tries to execute javascript using jscript.encode CLSID (COM OBJ). This technique was seen in ransomware (reddot ransomware) where it execute javascript with this com object with combination of amsi disabling technique. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "cscript.exe" Processes.process="*-e:{F414C262-6AC0-11CF-B6D1-00AA00BBBB58}*" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `execute_javascript_with_jscript_com_clsid_filter` + +[ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for processes launched from files that have double extensions in the file name. This is typically done to obscure the "real" file extension and make it appear as though the file being accessed is a data file, as opposed to executable content. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT", "PR.IP"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for processes launched from files that have double extensions in the file name. This is typically done to obscure the "real" file extension and make it appear as though the file being accessed is a data file, as opposed to executable content. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = None identified. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-11-18 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-18 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = process $process$ have double extensions in the file name is executed on $dest$ by $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 56}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"threat_object_field": "process", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "process", "role": ["Parent Process", "Attacker"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for processes launched from files that have double extensions in the file name. This is typically done to obscure the "real" file extension and make it appear as though the file being accessed is a data file, as opposed to executable content. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Execution of File with Multiple Extensions +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = *.doc.exe OR Processes.process = *.htm.exe OR Processes.process = *.html.exe OR Processes.process = *.txt.exe OR Processes.process = *.pdf.exe OR Processes.process = *.doc.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process Processes.parent_process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions_filter` + +[ESCU - Extraction of Registry Hives - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies the use of `reg.exe` exporting Windows Registry hives containing credentials. Adversaries may use this technique to export registry hives for offline credential access attacks. Typically found executed from a untrusted process or script. Upon execution, a file will be written to disk. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002", "T1003"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the use of `reg.exe` exporting Windows Registry hives containing credentials. Adversaries may use this technique to export registry hives for offline credential access attacks. Typically found executed from a untrusted process or script. Upon execution, a file will be written to disk. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible some agent based products will generate false positives. Filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-09 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-09 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Extraction of Registry Hives - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Credential Dumping"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious use of `reg.exe` exporting Windows Registry hives containing credentials executed on $dest$ by user $user$, with a parent process of $parent_process_id$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 56}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_id", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Extraction of Registry Hives - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Credential Dumping"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "parent_process_id", "role": ["Parent Process", "Attacker"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the use of `reg.exe` exporting Windows Registry hives containing credentials. Adversaries may use this technique to export registry hives for offline credential access attacks. Typically found executed from a untrusted process or script. Upon execution, a file will be written to disk. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Extraction of Registry Hives +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` (Processes.process=*save* OR Processes.process=*export*) AND (Processes.process="*\sam *" OR Processes.process="*\system *" OR Processes.process="*\security *") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `extraction_of_registry_hives_filter` + +[ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The search looks for file writes with extensions consistent with a SamSam ransomware attack. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The search looks for file writes with extensions consistent with a SamSam ransomware attack. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data-model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Because these extensions are not typically used in normal operations, you should investigate all results. +action.escu.creation_date = 2018-12-14 +action.escu.modification_date = 2018-12-14 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["SamSam Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = File writes $file_name$ with extensions consistent with a SamSam ransomware attack seen on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 90}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 90}, {"threat_object_field": "file_name", "threat_object_type": "file name"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "file_name", "role": ["Other", "Attacker"], "type": "File Name"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The search looks for file writes with extensions consistent with a SamSam ransomware attack. +action.notable.param.rule_title = File with Samsam Extension +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| rex field=file_name "(?\.[^\.]+)$" | search file_extension=.stubbin OR file_extension=.berkshire OR file_extension=.satoshi OR file_extension=.sophos OR file_extension=.keyxml | `file_with_samsam_extension_filter` + +[ESCU - Firewall Allowed Program Enable - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic detects a potential suspicious modification of firewall rule allowing to execute specific application. This technique was identified when an adversary and red teams to bypassed firewall file execution restriction in a targetted host. Take note that this event or command can run by administrator during testing or allowing legitimate tool or application. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.004", "T1562"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic detects a potential suspicious modification of firewall rule allowing to execute specific application. This technique was identified when an adversary and red teams to bypassed firewall file execution restriction in a targetted host. Take note that this event or command can run by administrator during testing or allowing legitimate tool or application. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated or manual execution of this firewall rule that may generate false positives. Filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-12 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-12 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Firewall Allowed Program Enable - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"] action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = An excessive amount of $process_name$ was executed on $dest$ attempting to disable services. +action.risk.param._risk_message = firewall allowed program commandline $process$ of $process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Firewall Allowed Program Enable - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.004", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = "*firewall*" Processes.process = "*allowedprogram*" Processes.process = "*add*" Processes.process = "*ENABLE*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `firewall_allowed_program_enable_filter` + +[ESCU - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = Fodhelper.exe has a known UAC bypass as it attempts to look for specific registry keys upon execution, that do not exist. Therefore, an attacker can write its malicious commands in these registry keys to be executed by fodhelper.exe with the highest privilege. \ +1. `HKCU:\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command`\ +1. `HKCU:\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command\DelegateExecute`\ +1. `HKCU:\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command\(default)`\ +Upon triage, fodhelper.exe will have a child process and read access will occur on the registry keys. Isolate the endpoint and review parallel processes for additional behavior. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112", "T1548.002", "T1548"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = Fodhelper.exe has a known UAC bypass as it attempts to look for specific registry keys upon execution, that do not exist. Therefore, an attacker can write its malicious commands in these registry keys to be executed by fodhelper.exe with the highest privilege. \ +1. `HKCU:\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command`\ +1. `HKCU:\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command\DelegateExecute`\ +1. `HKCU:\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command\(default)`\ +Upon triage, fodhelper.exe will have a child process and read access will occur on the registry keys. Isolate the endpoint and review parallel processes for additional behavior. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited to no false positives are expected. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-01 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-01 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "IcedID"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspcious registy keys added by process fodhelper.exe (process_id- $process_id), with a parent_process of $parent_process_name$ that has been executed on $dest$ by $user$. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 81}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 81}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process name"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "IcedID"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112", "T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process", "Attacker"], "type": "Process Name"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = Fodhelper.exe has a known UAC bypass as it attempts to look for specific registry keys upon execution, that do not exist. Therefore, an attacker can write its malicious commands in these registry keys to be executed by fodhelper.exe with the highest privilege. \ +1. `HKCU:\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command`\ +1. `HKCU:\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command\DelegateExecute`\ +1. `HKCU:\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command\(default)`\ +Upon triage, fodhelper.exe will have a child process and read access will occur on the registry keys. Isolate the endpoint and review parallel processes for additional behavior. +action.notable.param.rule_title = FodHelper UAC Bypass +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=fodhelper.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `fodhelper_uac_bypass_filter` + +[ESCU - Fsutil Zeroing File - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search is to detect a suspicious fsutil process to zeroing a target file. This technique was seen in lockbit ransomware where it tries to zero out its malware path as part of its defense evasion after encrypting the compromised host. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious fsutil process to zeroing a target file. This technique was seen in lockbit ransomware where it tries to zero out its malware path as part of its defense evasion after encrypting the compromised host. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-11 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-11 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Fsutil Zeroing File - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Possible file data deletion on $dest$ using $process$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 54}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Fsutil Zeroing File - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious fsutil process to zeroing a target file. This technique was seen in lockbit ransomware where it tries to zero out its malware path as part of its defense evasion after encrypting the compromised host. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Fsutil Zeroing File +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=fsutil.exe Processes.process="*setzerodata*" by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.process Processes.parent_process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `fsutil_zeroing_file_filter` + +[ESCU - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` executing the Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` executing the Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-26 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-26 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 9}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 9}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="cmd.exe" OR Processes.process_name="powershell*") AND Processes.process = "*Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_filter` + +[ESCU - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-26 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-26 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = powershell process having commandline $Message$ to query domain password policy +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 9}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 9}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message ="*Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter` + +[ESCU - Get ADUser with PowerShell - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to enumerate domain users. The `Get-AdUser' commandlet returns a list of all domain users. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to enumerate domain users. The `Get-AdUser' commandlet returns a list of all domain users. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-24 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-24 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get ADUser with PowerShell - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Get ADUser with PowerShell - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="cmd.exe" OR Processes.process_name="powershell*") AND Processes.process = "*Get-ADUser*" AND Processes.process = "*-filter*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_aduser_with_powershell_filter` + +[ESCU - Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-AdGUser` commandlet. The `Get-AdUser` commandlet is used to return a list of all domain users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-AdGUser` commandlet. The `Get-AdUser` commandlet is used to return a list of all domain users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-24 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-24 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = powershell process having commandline $Message$ for user enumeration +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = "*get-aduser*" Message = "*-filter*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_aduser_with_powershell_script_block_filter` + +[ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` executing the Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` executing the Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-26 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-26 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` executing the Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="cmd.exe" OR Processes.process_name="powershell*") AND Processes.process = "*Get-ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_filter` + +[ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-26 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-26 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = powershell process having commandline $Message$ to query domain user password policy. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 9}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 9}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message ="*Get-ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter` + +[ESCU - Get DomainPolicy with Powershell - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` executing the `Get-DomainPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` executing the `Get-DomainPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-26 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-26 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get DomainPolicy with Powershell - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 30}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 30}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Get DomainPolicy with Powershell - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` executing the `Get-DomainPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Get DomainPolicy with Powershell +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="cmd.exe" OR Processes.process_name="powershell*") AND Processes.process = "*Get-DomainPolicy*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_filter` + +[ESCU - Get DomainPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get DomainPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get DomainPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-26 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-26 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get DomainPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = powershell process having commandline $Message$ to query domain policy. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 30}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 30}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Get DomainPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get DomainPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Get DomainPolicy with Powershell Script Block +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message ="*Get-DomainPolicy*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter` + +[ESCU - Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic identifies Get-DomainTrust from PowerView in order to gather domain trust information. Typically, this is utilized within a script being executed and used to enumerate the domain trust information. This grants the adversary an understanding of how large or small the domain is. During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic identifies Get-DomainTrust from PowerView in order to gather domain trust information. Typically, this is utilized within a script being executed and used to enumerate the domain trust information. This grants the adversary an understanding of how large or small the domain is. During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives as this requires an active Administrator or adversary to bring in, import, and execute. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-24 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-24 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious PowerShell Get-DomainTrust was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 12}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 12}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 40, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic identifies Get-DomainTrust from PowerView in order to gather domain trust information. Typically, this is utilized within a script being executed and used to enumerate the domain trust information. This grants the adversary an understanding of how large or small the domain is. During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=*get-domaintrust* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domaintrust_with_powershell_filter` + +[ESCU - Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ +This analytic identifies Get-DomainTrust from PowerView in order to gather domain trust information. \ +During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ +This analytic identifies Get-DomainTrust from PowerView in order to gather domain trust information. \ +During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. +action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible certain system management frameworks utilize this command to gather trust information. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-24 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-24 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell Script Block - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious PowerShell Get-DomainTrust was identified on endpoint $ComputerName$ by user $user$. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 12}, {"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 12}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell Script Block - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 40, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ +This analytic identifies Get-DomainTrust from PowerView in order to gather domain trust information. \ +During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell Script Block +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = "*get-foresttrust*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message ComputerName User EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domaintrust_with_powershell_script_block_filter` + +[ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to enumerate domain users. `Get-DomainUser` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to enumerate domain users. `Get-DomainUser` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-24 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-24 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to enumerate domain users. `Get-DomainUser` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Get DomainUser with PowerShell +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="cmd.exe" OR Processes.process_name="powershell*") AND Processes.process = "*Get-DomainUser*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domainuser_with_powershell_filter` + +[ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainUser` commandlet. `GetDomainUser` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerView to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainUser` commandlet. `GetDomainUser` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerView to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-24 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-24 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = powershell process having commandline $Message$ for user enumeration +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainUser` commandlet. `GetDomainUser` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerView to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = "*Get-DomainUser*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domainuser_with_powershell_script_block_filter` + +[ESCU - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic identifies Get-ForestTrust from PowerSploit in order to gather domain trust information. Typically, this is utilized within a script being executed and used to enumerate the domain trust information. This grants the adversary an understanding of how large or small the domain is. During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic identifies Get-ForestTrust from PowerSploit in order to gather domain trust information. Typically, this is utilized within a script being executed and used to enumerate the domain trust information. This grants the adversary an understanding of how large or small the domain is. During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives as this requires an active Administrator or adversary to bring in, import, and execute. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-02 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-02 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious PowerShell Get-ForestTrust was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 12}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 12}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 40, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic identifies Get-ForestTrust from PowerSploit in order to gather domain trust information. Typically, this is utilized within a script being executed and used to enumerate the domain trust information. This grants the adversary an understanding of how large or small the domain is. During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=cmd.exe Processes.process=*get-foresttrust* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_foresttrust_with_powershell_filter` + +[ESCU - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ +This analytic identifies Get-ForestTrust from PowerSploit in order to gather domain trust information. \ +During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ +This analytic identifies Get-ForestTrust from PowerSploit in order to gather domain trust information. \ +During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. +action.escu.known_false_positives = UPDATE_KNOWN_FALSE_POSITIVES +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-02 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-02 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell Script Block - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious PowerShell Get-ForestTrust was identified on endpoint $ComputerName$ by user $User$. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 12}, {"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 12}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell Script Block - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 40, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"], "observable": [{"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ +This analytic identifies Get-ForestTrust from PowerSploit in order to gather domain trust information. \ +During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell Script Block +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = "*get-foresttrust*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message OpCode ComputerName User EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_foresttrust_with_powershell_script_block_filter` + +[ESCU - Get WMIObject Group Discovery - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following hunting analytic identifies the use of `Get-WMIObject Win32_Group` being used with PowerShell to identify local groups on the endpoint. \ Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \ During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.001"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following hunting analytic identifies the use of `Get-WMIObject Win32_Group` being used with PowerShell to identify local groups on the endpoint. \ Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \ During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Tune as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-14 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-14 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get WMIObject Group Discovery - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = System group discovery on $dest$ by $user$. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 15}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Get WMIObject Group Discovery - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR processes.process_name=cmd.exe) (Processes.process="*Get-WMIObject*" AND Processes.process="*Win32_Group*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_wmiobject_group_discovery_filter` + +[ESCU - Get WMIObject Group Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ +This analytic identifies the usage of `Get-WMIObject Win32_Group`, which is typically used as a way to identify groups on the endpoint. Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \ +During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.001"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ +This analytic identifies the usage of `Get-WMIObject Win32_Group`, which is typically used as a way to identify groups on the endpoint. Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \ +During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. +action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Tune as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-14 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-14 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get WMIObject Group Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = System group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 15}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Get WMIObject Group Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = "*Get-WMIObject*" AND Message = "*Win32_Group*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message OpCode ComputerName User EventCode| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_wmiobject_group_discovery_with_script_block_logging_filter` + +[ESCU - GetAdComputer with PowerShell - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The `Get-AdComputer' commandlet returns a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The `Get-AdComputer' commandlet returns a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-07 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-07 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetAdComputer with PowerShell - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetAdComputer with PowerShell - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="powershell.exe") (Processes.process=*Get-AdComputer*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getadcomputer_with_powershell_filter` + +[ESCU - GetAdComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-AdGroup` commandlet. The `Get-AdGroup` commandlet is used to return a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-AdGroup` commandlet. The `Get-AdGroup` commandlet is used to return a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-01 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-01 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetAdComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetAdComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = "*Get-AdComputer*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getadcomputer_with_powershell_script_block_filter` + +[ESCU - GetAdGroup with PowerShell - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The `Get-AdGroup` commandlnet is used to return a list of all groups available in a Windows Domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.002"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The `Get-AdGroup` commandlnet is used to return a list of all groups available in a Windows Domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-25 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-25 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetAdGroup with PowerShell - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetAdGroup with PowerShell - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="powershell.exe") (Processes.process=*Get-AdGroup*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getadgroup_with_powershell_filter` + +[ESCU - GetAdGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-AdGroup` commandlet. The `Get-AdGroup` commandlet is used to return a list of all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.002"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-AdGroup` commandlet. The `Get-AdGroup` commandlet is used to return a list of all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-25 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-25 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetAdGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Domain group discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetAdGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = "*Get-ADGroup*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getadgroup_with_powershell_script_block_filter` + +[ESCU - GetCurrent User with PowerShell - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powerhsell.exe` with command-line arguments that execute the `GetCurrent` method of the WindowsIdentity .NET class. This method returns an object that represents the current Windows user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `powerhsell.exe` with command-line arguments that execute the `GetCurrent` method of the WindowsIdentity .NET class. This method returns an object that represents the current Windows user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-13 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-13 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetCurrent User with PowerShell - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = System user discovery on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetCurrent User with PowerShell - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="powershell.exe") (Processes.process=*System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity* OR Processes.process=*GetCurrent()*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getcurrent_user_with_powershell_filter` + +[ESCU - GetCurrent User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `GetCurrent` method of the WindowsIdentity .NET class. This method returns an object that represents the current Windows user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `GetCurrent` method of the WindowsIdentity .NET class. This method returns an object that represents the current Windows user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-13 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-13 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetCurrent User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = System user discovery on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetCurrent User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = "*[System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]*" AND Message = "*GetCurrent()*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getcurrent_user_with_powershell_script_block_filter` + +[ESCU - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. `Get-DomainComputer` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. `Get-DomainComputer` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use PowerView for troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-07 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-07 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 24}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. `Get-DomainComputer` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.notable.param.rule_title = GetDomainComputer with PowerShell +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="powershell.exe") (Processes.process=*Get-DomainComputer*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_filter` + +[ESCU - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainComputer` commandlet. `GetDomainComputer` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerView to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainComputer` commandlet. `GetDomainComputer` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerView to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use PowerView for troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-02 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-02 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Remote system discovery with PowerView on $dest$ by $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 24}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainComputer` commandlet. `GetDomainComputer` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerView to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.notable.param.rule_title = GetDomainComputer with PowerShell Script Block +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = "*Get-DomainComputer*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_script_block_filter` + +[ESCU - GetDomainController with PowerShell - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. `Get-DomainController` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. `Get-DomainController` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use PowerView for troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-07 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-07 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetDomainController with PowerShell - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Remote system discovery using PowerView on $dest$ by $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 24}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetDomainController with PowerShell - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="powershell.exe") (Processes.process=*Get-DomainController*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_filter` + +[ESCU - GetDomainController with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainController` commandlet. `Get-DomainController` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerView to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainController` commandlet. `Get-DomainController` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerView to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-02 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-02 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetDomainController with PowerShell Script Block - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Remote system discovery with PowerView on $dest$ by $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 24}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetDomainController with PowerShell Script Block - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainController` commandlet. `Get-DomainController` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerView to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.notable.param.rule_title = GetDomainController with PowerShell Script Block +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = "*Get-DomainController*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_script_block_filter` + +[ESCU - GetDomainGroup with PowerShell - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. `Get-DomainGroup` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.002"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. `Get-DomainGroup` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-25 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-25 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetDomainGroup with PowerShell - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Domain group discovery with PowerView on $dest$ by $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetDomainGroup with PowerShell - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. `Get-DomainGroup` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.notable.param.rule_title = GetDomainGroup with PowerShell +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="powershell.exe") (Processes.process=*Get-DomainGroup*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getdomaingroup_with_powershell_filter` + +[ESCU - GetDomainGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainGroup` commandlet. `Get-DomainGroup` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. As the name suggests, `Get-DomainGroup` is used to query domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this function to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.002"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainGroup` commandlet. `Get-DomainGroup` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. As the name suggests, `Get-DomainGroup` is used to query domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this function to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerView functions for troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-26 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-26 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetDomainGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Domain group discovery enumeration using PowerView on $dest$ by $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetDomainGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainGroup` commandlet. `Get-DomainGroup` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. As the name suggests, `Get-DomainGroup` is used to query domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this function to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.notable.param.rule_title = GetDomainGroup with PowerShell Script Block +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = "*Get-DomainGroup*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getdomaingroup_with_powershell_script_block_filter` + +[ESCU - GetLocalUser with PowerShell - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for local users. The `Get-LocalUser` commandlet is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087", "T1087.001"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for local users. The `Get-LocalUser` commandlet is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-23 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-23 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetLocalUser with PowerShell - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Local user discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetLocalUser with PowerShell - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087", "T1087.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="powershell.exe") (Processes.process=*Get-LocalUser*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getlocaluser_with_powershell_filter` + +[ESCU - GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-LocalUser` commandlet. The `Get-LocalUser` commandlet is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087", "T1087.001"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-LocalUser` commandlet. The `Get-LocalUser` commandlet is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-23 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-23 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Local user discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087", "T1087.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = "*Get-LocalUser*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getlocaluser_with_powershell_script_block_filter` + +[ESCU - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. The `Get-NetTcpConnection` commandlet lists the current TCP connections. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1049"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. The `Get-NetTcpConnection` commandlet lists the current TCP connections. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-25 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-25 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1049"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="powershell.exe") (Processes.process=*Get-NetTcpConnection*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_filter` + +[ESCU - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-NetTcpconnection ` commandlet. This commandlet is used to return a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1049"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-NetTcpconnection ` commandlet. This commandlet is used to return a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-10 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-10 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell Script Block - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell Script Block - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1049"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = "*Get-NetTcpconnection*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_script_block_filter` + +[ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `DS_Computer` parameter can be used to return a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI in this case, using PowerShell, to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `DS_Computer` parameter can be used to return a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI in this case, using PowerShell, to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-07 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-07 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Remote system discovery enumeration using WMI on $dest$ by $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 21}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `DS_Computer` parameter can be used to return a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI in this case, using PowerShell, to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.notable.param.rule_title = GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="powershell.exe") (Processes.process=*Get-WmiObject* AND Processes.process="*namespace root\\directory\\ldap*" AND Processes.process="*class ds_computer*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_filter` + +[ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet. The `DS_Computer` class parameter leverages WMI to query for all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet. The `DS_Computer` class parameter leverages WMI to query for all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-01 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-01 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet. The `DS_Computer` class parameter leverages WMI to query for all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.notable.param.rule_title = GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell Script Block +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message=*Get-WmiObject* AND Message="*namespace root\\directory\\ldap*" AND Message="*class ds_computer*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_script_block_filter` + +[ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `-class ds_group` parameter can be used to return the full list of groups in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI in this case, using PowerShell, to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.002"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `-class ds_group` parameter can be used to return the full list of groups in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI in this case, using PowerShell, to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-25 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-25 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `-class ds_group` parameter can be used to return the full list of groups in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI in this case, using PowerShell, to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.notable.param.rule_title = GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="powershell.exe") (Processes.process=*Get-WmiObject* AND Processes.process="*namespace root\\directory\\ldap*" AND Processes.process="*class ds_group*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_filter` + +[ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet used with specific parameters . The `DS_Group` parameter leverages WMI to query for all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.002"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet used with specific parameters . The `DS_Group` parameter leverages WMI to query for all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-25 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-25 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell Script Block - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Domain group discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell Script Block - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet used with specific parameters . The `DS_Group` parameter leverages WMI to query for all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.notable.param.rule_title = GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell Script Block +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message=*Get-WmiObject* AND Message="*namespace root\\directory\\ldap*" AND Message="*class ds_group*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_script_block_filter` + +[ESCU - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain users. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `-class ds_user` parameter can be used to return the full list of users in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI in this case, using PowerShell, to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain users. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `-class ds_user` parameter can be used to return the full list of users in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI in this case, using PowerShell, to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-24 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-24 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain users. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `-class ds_user` parameter can be used to return the full list of users in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI in this case, using PowerShell, to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.notable.param.rule_title = GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="cmd.exe" OR Processes.process_name="powershell*") AND Processes.process = "*get-wmiobject*" AND Processes.process = "*ds_user*" AND Processes.process = "*root\\directory\\ldap*" AND Processes.process = "*-namespace*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_filter` + +[ESCU - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet. The `DS_User` class parameter leverages WMI to query for all domain users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet. The `DS_User` class parameter leverages WMI to query for all domain users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = he following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-24 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-24 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = powershell process having commandline $Message$ for user enumeration +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet. The `DS_User` class parameter leverages WMI to query for all domain users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.notable.param.rule_title = GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell Script Block +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = "*get-wmiobject*" Message = "*ds_user*" Message = "*-namespace*" Message = "*root\\directory\\ldap*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_script_block_filter` + +[ESCU - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query local users. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `Win32_UserAccount` parameter is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087", "T1087.001"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query local users. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `Win32_UserAccount` parameter is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-23 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-23 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Local user discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087", "T1087.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="powershell.exe") (Processes.process=*Get-WmiObject* AND Processes.process=*Win32_UserAccount*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_filter` + +[ESCU - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet used with specific parameters. The `Win32_UserAccount` parameter is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087", "T1087.001"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet used with specific parameters. The `Win32_UserAccount` parameter is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-23 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-23 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Local user discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087", "T1087.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message="*Get-WmiObject*" AND Message="*Win32_UserAccount*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_script_block_filter` + +[ESCU - GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies gpupdate.exe with no command line arguments and with a network connection. It is unusual for gpupdate.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. gpupdate.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies gpupdate.exe with no command line arguments and with a network connection. It is unusual for gpupdate.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. gpupdate.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-19 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-19 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Cobalt Strike"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Process gpupdate.exe with parent_process $parent_process_name$ is executed on $dest$ by user $user$, followed by an outbound network connection to $connection_to_CNC$ on port $dest_port$. This behaviour is seen with cobaltstrike. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 81}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 81}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process name"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Command And Control"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process", "Attacker"], "type": "Process Name"}, {"name": "connection_to_CNC", "role": ["Other"], "type": "IP Address"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies gpupdate.exe with no command line arguments and with a network connection. It is unusual for gpupdate.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. gpupdate.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. +action.notable.param.rule_title = GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=gpupdate.exe by _time span=1h Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process="(gpupdate\.exe.{0,4}$)" | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port !="0" by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port| `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_guid connection_to_CNC dest_port | `gpupdate_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter` + +[ESCU - Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic identifies a suspicious registry modification to hide a user account on the Windows Login screen. This technique was seen in some tradecraft where the adversary will create a hidden user account with Admin privileges in login screen to avoid noticing by the user that they already compromise and to persist on that said machine. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic identifies a suspicious registry modification to hide a user account on the Windows Login screen. This technique was seen in some tradecraft where the adversary will create a hidden user account with Admin privileges in login screen to avoid noticing by the user that they already compromise and to persist on that said machine. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as CarbonBlack or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown. Filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-28 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-28 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["XMRig"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious registry modification ($registry_value_name$) which is used go hide a user account on the Windows Login screen detected on $dest$ executed by $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 72}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}, {"threat_object_field": "registry_value_name", "threat_object_type": "other"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "registry_value_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Other"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic identifies a suspicious registry modification to hide a user account on the Windows Login screen. This technique was seen in some tradecraft where the adversary will create a hidden user account with Admin privileges in login screen to avoid noticing by the user that they already compromise and to persist on that said machine. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path="*\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\SpecialAccounts\\Userlist*" AND Registry.registry_value_data = "0x00000000" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `hide_user_account_from_sign_in_screen_filter` + +[ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = Attackers leverage an existing Windows binary, attrib.exe, to mark specific as hidden by using specific flags so that the victim does not see the file. The search looks for specific command-line arguments to detect the use of attrib.exe to hide files. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222", "T1222.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = Attackers leverage an existing Windows binary, attrib.exe, to mark specific as hidden by using specific flags so that the victim does not see the file. The search looks for specific command-line arguments to detect the use of attrib.exe to hide files. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Some applications and users may legitimately use attrib.exe to interact with the files. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Persistence Techniques"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Attrib.exe with +h flag to hide files on $dest$ executed by $user$ is detected. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 72}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process", "threat_object_type": "other"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222", "T1222.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "parent_process", "role": ["Attacker", "Parent Process"], "type": "Other"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = Attackers leverage an existing Windows binary, attrib.exe, to mark specific as hidden by using specific flags so that the victim does not see the file. The search looks for specific command-line arguments to detect the use of attrib.exe to hide files. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) values(Processes.process) as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=attrib.exe (Processes.process=*+h*) by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe_filter` + +[ESCU - High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious high frequency copying/moving of files in network share as part of information sabotage. This anomaly event can be a good indicator of insider trying to sabotage data by transfering classified or internal files within network share to exfitrate it after or to lure evidence of insider attack to other user. This behavior may catch several noise if network share is a common place for classified or internal document processing. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1537"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to detect a suspicious high frequency copying/moving of files in network share as part of information sabotage. This anomaly event can be a good indicator of insider trying to sabotage data by transfering classified or internal files within network share to exfitrate it after or to lure evidence of insider attack to other user. This behavior may catch several noise if network share is a common place for classified or internal document processing. +action.escu.how_to_implement = o successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 5145 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required. Also enable the object Audit access success/failure in your group policy. +action.escu.known_false_positives = this behavior may seen in normal transfer of file within network if network share is common place for sharing documents. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-16 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-16 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Information Sabotage"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = high frequency copy of document in network share $Share_Name$ from $Source_Address$ by $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 9}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Information Sabotage"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1537"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=5145 Relative_Target_Name IN ("*.doc","*.docx","*.xls","*.xlsx","*.ppt","*.pptx","*.log","*.txt","*.db","*.7z","*.zip","*.rar","*.tar","*.gz","*.jpg","*.gif","*.png","*.bmp","*.pdf","*.rtf","*.key") Object_Type=File Share_Name IN ("\\\\*\\C$","\\\\*\\IPC$","\\\\*\\admin$") Access_Mask= "0x2" | bucket _time span=5m | stats values(Relative_Target_Name) as valRelativeTargetName, values(Share_Name) as valShareName, values(Object_Type) as valObjectType, values(Access_Mask) as valAccessmask, values(src_port) as valSrcPort, values(Source_Address) as valSrcAddress count as numShareName by dest, _time, EventCode, user | eventstats avg(numShareName) as avgShareName, stdev(numShareName) as stdShareName, count as numSlots by dest, _time, EventCode, user | eval upperThreshold=(avgShareName + stdShareName *3) | eval isOutlier=if(avgShareName > 20 and avgShareName >= upperThreshold, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `high_frequency_copy_of_files_in_network_share_filter` + +[ESCU - High Process Termination Frequency - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytics are designed to indentify a high frequency of process termination on a machine which is a common behavior of ransomware malware before encrypting files. This technique is designed to avoid an exception error while accessing (docs, images, database and etc..) in the infected machine for encryption. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytics are designed to indentify a high frequency of process termination on a machine which is a common behavior of ransomware malware before encrypting files. This technique is designed to avoid an exception error while accessing (docs, images, database and etc..) in the infected machine for encryption. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Image (process full path of terminated process) from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +action.escu.known_false_positives = admin or user tool that can terminate multiple process. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-16 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-16 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - High Process Termination Frequency - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Clop Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = High frequency process termination (more than 15 processes within 3s) detected on host $Computer$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}, {"threat_object_field": "proc_terminated", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - High Process Termination Frequency - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "proc_terminated", "role": ["Target"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `sysmon` EventCode=5 |bin _time span=3s |stats values(Image) as proc_terminated min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer EventCode ProcessID | where count >= 15 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `high_process_termination_frequency_filter` + +[ESCU - Hunting for Log4Shell - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following hunting query assists with quickly assessing CVE-2021-44228, or Log4Shell, activity mapped to the Web Datamodel. This is a combination query attempting to identify, score and dashboard. Because the Log4Shell vulnerability requires the string to be in the logs, this will work to identify the activity anywhere in the HTTP headers using _raw. Modify the first line to use the same pattern matching against other log sources. Scoring is based on a simple rubric of 0-5. 5 being the best match, and less than 5 meant to identify additional patterns that will equate to a higher total score. \ +The first jndi match identifies the standard pattern of `{jndi:` \ +jndi_fastmatch is meant to identify any jndi in the logs. The score is set low and is meant to be the "base" score used later. \ +jndi_proto is a protocol match that identifies `jndi` and one of `ldap, ldaps, rmi, dns, nis, iiop, corba, nds, http, https.` \ +all_match is a very well written regex by https://gist.github.com/Schvenn that identifies nearly all patterns of this attack behavior. \ +env works to identify environment variables in the header, meant to capture `AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID`, `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY` and `env`. \ +uri_detect is string match looking for the common uri paths currently being scanned/abused in the wild. \ +keywords matches on enumerated values that, like `$ctx:loginId`, that may be found in the header used by the adversary. \ +lookup matching is meant to catch some basic obfuscation that has been identified using upper, lower and date. \ +Scoring will then occur based on any findings. The base score is meant to be 2 , created by jndi_fastmatch. Everything else is meant to increase that score. \ +Finally, a simple table is created to show the scoring and the _raw field. Sort based on score or columns of interest. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Web"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following hunting query assists with quickly assessing CVE-2021-44228, or Log4Shell, activity mapped to the Web Datamodel. This is a combination query attempting to identify, score and dashboard. Because the Log4Shell vulnerability requires the string to be in the logs, this will work to identify the activity anywhere in the HTTP headers using _raw. Modify the first line to use the same pattern matching against other log sources. Scoring is based on a simple rubric of 0-5. 5 being the best match, and less than 5 meant to identify additional patterns that will equate to a higher total score. \ +The first jndi match identifies the standard pattern of `{jndi:` \ +jndi_fastmatch is meant to identify any jndi in the logs. The score is set low and is meant to be the "base" score used later. \ +jndi_proto is a protocol match that identifies `jndi` and one of `ldap, ldaps, rmi, dns, nis, iiop, corba, nds, http, https.` \ +all_match is a very well written regex by https://gist.github.com/Schvenn that identifies nearly all patterns of this attack behavior. \ +env works to identify environment variables in the header, meant to capture `AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID`, `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY` and `env`. \ +uri_detect is string match looking for the common uri paths currently being scanned/abused in the wild. \ +keywords matches on enumerated values that, like `$ctx:loginId`, that may be found in the header used by the adversary. \ +lookup matching is meant to catch some basic obfuscation that has been identified using upper, lower and date. \ +Scoring will then occur based on any findings. The base score is meant to be 2 , created by jndi_fastmatch. Everything else is meant to increase that score. \ +Finally, a simple table is created to show the scoring and the _raw field. Sort based on score or columns of interest. +action.escu.how_to_implement = Out of the box, the Web datamodel is required to be pre-filled. However, tested was performed against raw httpd access logs. Change the first line to any dataset to pass the regex's against. +action.escu.known_false_positives = It is highly possible you will find false positives, however, the base score is set to 2 for _any_ jndi found in raw logs. tune and change as needed, include any filtering. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-14 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-14 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Hunting for Log4Shell - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Hunting for Log4Shell exploitation has occurred. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 40}, {"threat_object_field": "http_method", "threat_object_type": "other"}, {"threat_object_field": "src", "threat_object_type": "other"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Hunting for Log4Shell - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Scope:Network"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "http_method", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Other"}, {"name": "src", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Other"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | from datamodel Web.Web | eval jndi=if(match(_raw, "(\{|%7B)[jJnNdDiI]{4}:"),4,0) | eval jndi_fastmatch=if(match(_raw, "[jJnNdDiI]{4}"),2,0) | eval jndi_proto=if(match(_raw,"(?i)jndi:(ldap[s]?|rmi|dns|nis|iiop|corba|nds|http|https):"),5,0) | eval all_match = if(match(_raw, "(?i)(%(25){0,}20|\s)*(%(25){0,}24|\$)(%(25){0,}20|\s)*(%(25){0,}7B|{)(%(25){0,}20|\s)*(%(25){0,}(6A|4A)|J)(%(25){0,}(6E|4E)|N)(%(25){0,}(64|44)|D)(%(25){0,}(69|49)|I)(%(25){0,}20|\s)*(%(25){0,}3A|:)[\w\%]+(%(25){1,}3A|:)(%(25){1,}2F|\/)[^\n]+"),5,0) | eval env_var = if(match(_raw, "env:") OR match(_raw, "env:AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID") OR match(_raw, "env:AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY"),5,0) | eval uridetect = if(match(_raw, "(?i)Basic\/Command\/Base64|Basic\/ReverseShell|Basic\/TomcatMemshell|Basic\/JBossMemshell|Basic\/WebsphereMemshell|Basic\/SpringMemshell|Basic\/Command|Deserialization\/CommonsCollectionsK|Deserialization\/CommonsBeanutils|Deserialization\/Jre8u20\/TomcatMemshell|Deserialization\/CVE_2020_2555\/WeblogicMemshell|TomcatBypass|GroovyBypass|WebsphereBypass"),4,0) | eval keywords = if(match(_raw,"(?i)\$\{ctx\:loginId\}|\$\{map\:type\}|\$\{filename\}|\$\{date\:MM-dd-yyyy\}|\$\{docker\:containerId\}|\$\{docker\:containerName\}|\$\{docker\:imageName\}|\$\{env\:USER\}|\$\{event\:Marker\}|\$\{mdc\:UserId\}|\$\{java\:runtime\}|\$\{java\:vm\}|\$\{java\:os\}|\$\{jndi\:logging/context-name\}|\$\{hostName\}|\$\{docker\:containerId\}|\$\{k8s\:accountName\}|\$\{k8s\:clusterName\}|\$\{k8s\:containerId\}|\$\{k8s\:containerName\}|\$\{k8s\:host\}|\$\{k8s\:labels.app\}|\$\{k8s\:labels.podTemplateHash\}|\$\{k8s\:masterUrl\}|\$\{k8s\:namespaceId\}|\$\{k8s\:namespaceName\}|\$\{k8s\:podId\}|\$\{k8s\:podIp\}|\$\{k8s\:podName\}|\$\{k8s\:imageId\}|\$\{k8s\:imageName\}|\$\{log4j\:configLocation\}|\$\{log4j\:configParentLocation\}|\$\{spring\:spring.application.name\}|\$\{main\:myString\}|\$\{main\:0\}|\$\{main\:1\}|\$\{main\:2\}|\$\{main\:3\}|\$\{main\:4\}|\$\{main\:bar\}|\$\{name\}|\$\{marker\}|\$\{marker\:name\}|\$\{spring\:profiles.active[0]|\$\{sys\:logPath\}|\$\{web\:rootDir\}|\$\{sys\:user.name\}"),4,0) | eval obf = if(match(_raw, "(\$|%24)[^ /]*({|%7b)[^ /]*(j|%6a)[^ /]*(n|%6e)[^ /]*(d|%64)[^ /]*(i|%69)[^ /]*(:|%3a)[^ /]*(:|%3a)[^ /]*(/|%2f)"),5,0) | eval lookups = if(match(_raw, "(?i)({|%7b)(main|sys|k8s|spring|lower|upper|env|date|sd)"),4,0) | addtotals fieldname=Score, jndi, jndi_proto, env_var, uridetect, all_match, jndi_fastmatch, keywords, obf, lookups | where Score > 2 | stats values(Score) by jndi, jndi_proto, env_var, uridetect, all_match, jndi_fastmatch, keywords, lookups, obf, _raw | `hunting_for_log4shell_filter` + +[ESCU - Icacls Deny Command - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic identifies a potential adversary that changes the security permission of a specific file or directory. This technique is commonly seen in APT tradecraft or coinminer scripts. This behavior is meant to evade detection and prevent access to their component files. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic identifies a potential adversary that changes the security permission of a specific file or directory. This technique is commonly seen in APT tradecraft or coinminer scripts. This behavior is meant to evade detection and prevent access to their component files. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed icacls.exe may be used. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown. It is possible some administrative scripts use ICacls. Filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-29 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-29 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Icacls Deny Command - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["XMRig"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Process name $process_name$ with deny argument executed by $user$ to change security permission of a specific file or directory on host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 72}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Icacls Deny Command - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic identifies a potential adversary that changes the security permission of a specific file or directory. This technique is commonly seen in APT tradecraft or coinminer scripts. This behavior is meant to evade detection and prevent access to their component files. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Icacls Deny Command +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "icacls.exe" OR Processes.process_name = "cacls.exe" OR Processes.process_name = "xcacls.exe" AND Processes.process = "*/deny*" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `icacls_deny_command_filter` + +[ESCU - ICACLS Grant Command - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic identifies potential adversaries that modify the security permission of a specific file or directory. This technique is commonly seen in APT tradecraft and coinminer scripts to evade detections and restrict access to their component files. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic identifies potential adversaries that modify the security permission of a specific file or directory. This technique is commonly seen in APT tradecraft and coinminer scripts to evade detections and restrict access to their component files. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed icacls.exe may be used. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown. Filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-05-04 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-05-04 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - ICACLS Grant Command - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["XMRig", "Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Process name $process_name$ with grant argument executed by $user$ to change security permission of a specific file or directory on host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 49}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - ICACLS Grant Command - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig", "Ransomware"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic identifies potential adversaries that modify the security permission of a specific file or directory. This technique is commonly seen in APT tradecraft and coinminer scripts to evade detections and restrict access to their component files. +action.notable.param.rule_title = ICACLS Grant Command +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "icacls.exe" OR Processes.process_name = "cacls.exe" OR Processes.process_name = "xcacls.exe" AND Processes.process = "*/grant*" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `icacls_grant_command_filter` + +[ESCU - IcedID Exfiltrated Archived File Creation - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search is to detect a suspicious file creation namely passff.tar and cookie.tar. This files are possible archived of stolen browser information like history and cookies in a compromised machine with IcedID. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1560.001", "T1560"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious file creation namely passff.tar and cookie.tar. This files are possible archived of stolen browser information like history and cookies in a compromised machine with IcedID. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-30 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-30 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - IcedID Exfiltrated Archived File Creation - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["IcedID"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = process $SourceImage$ create a file $TargetImage$ in host $Computer$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}, {"threat_object_field": "SourceImage", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - IcedID Exfiltrated Archived File Creation - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1560.001", "T1560"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "SourceImage", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `sysmon` EventCode= 11 (TargetFilename = "*\\passff.tar" OR TargetFilename = "*\\cookie.tar") |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by TargetFilename EventCode process_id process_name Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation_filter` + +[ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for the presence of suspicious commandline parameters typically present when using Impacket tools. Impacket is a collection of python classes meant to be used with Microsoft network protocols. There are multiple scripts that leverage impacket libraries like `wmiexec.py`, `smbexec.py`, `dcomexec.py` and `atexec.py` used to execute commands on remote endpoints. By default, these scripts leverage administrative shares and hardcoded parameters that can be used as a signature to detect its use. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage Impackets tools for lateral movement and remote code execution. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.002", "T1021.003", "T1047", "T1543.003"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the presence of suspicious commandline parameters typically present when using Impacket tools. Impacket is a collection of python classes meant to be used with Microsoft network protocols. There are multiple scripts that leverage impacket libraries like `wmiexec.py`, `smbexec.py`, `dcomexec.py` and `atexec.py` used to execute commands on remote endpoints. By default, these scripts leverage administrative shares and hardcoded parameters that can be used as a signature to detect its use. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage Impackets tools for lateral movement and remote code execution. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Although uncommon, Administrators may leverage Impackets tools to start a process on remote systems for system administration or automation use cases. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-18 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-18 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "WhisperGate"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious command line parameters on $dest may represent a lateral movement attack with Impackets tools +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "WhisperGate"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.002", "T1021.003", "T1047", "T1543.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the presence of suspicious commandline parameters typically present when using Impacket tools. Impacket is a collection of python classes meant to be used with Microsoft network protocols. There are multiple scripts that leverage impacket libraries like `wmiexec.py`, `smbexec.py`, `dcomexec.py` and `atexec.py` used to execute commands on remote endpoints. By default, these scripts leverage administrative shares and hardcoded parameters that can be used as a signature to detect its use. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage Impackets tools for lateral movement and remote code execution. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process = "*/c* \\\\127.0.0.1\\*" OR Processes.process= "*/c* 2>&1") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters_filter` + +[ESCU - Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the usage of the `Enter-PSSession`. This commandlet can be used to open an interactive session on a remote endpoint leveraging the WinRM protocol. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WinRM and `Enter-PSSession` for lateral movement and remote code execution. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.006"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the usage of the `Enter-PSSession`. This commandlet can be used to open an interactive session on a remote endpoint leveraging the WinRM protocol. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WinRM and `Enter-PSSession` for lateral movement and remote code execution. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup instructions can be found https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage WinRM and `Enter-PSSession` for administrative and troubleshooting tasks. This activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. In certain environments, tuning may not be possible. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-18 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-18 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = An interactive session was opened on a remote endpoint from $ComputerName +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 45}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.006"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the usage of the `Enter-PSSession`. This commandlet can be used to open an interactive session on a remote endpoint leveraging the WinRM protocol. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WinRM and `Enter-PSSession` for lateral movement and remote code execution. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message="*Enter-PSSession*" AND Message="*-ComputerName*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `interactive_session_on_remote_endpoint_with_powershell_filter` + +[ESCU - Java Class File download by Java User Agent - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies a Java user agent performing a GET request for a .class file from the remote site. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Web"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies a Java user agent performing a GET request for a .class file from the remote site. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting web or proxy logs, or ensure it is being filled by a proxy like device, into the Web Datamodel. For additional filtering, allow list private IP space or restrict by known good. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Filtering may be required in some instances, filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-13 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-13 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Java Class File download by Java User Agent - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A Java user agent $http_user_agent$ was performing a $http_method$ to retrieve a remote class file. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 40}, {"threat_object_field": "http_user_agent", "threat_object_type": "other"}, {"threat_object_field": "http_method", "threat_object_type": "other"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Java Class File download by Java User Agent - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Scope:Network"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "http_user_agent", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Other"}, {"name": "http_method", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Other"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies a Java user agent performing a GET request for a .class file from the remote site. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). +action.notable.param.rule_title = Java Class File download by Java User Agent +action.notable.param.security_domain = network +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_user_agent="*Java*" Web.http_method="GET" Web.url="*.class*" by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter` + +[ESCU - Jscript Execution Using Cscript App - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search is to detect a execution of jscript using cscript process. Commonly when a user run jscript file it was executed by wscript.exe application. This technique was seen in FIN7 js implant to execute its malicious script using cscript process. This behavior is uncommon and a good artifacts to check further anomalies within the network +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.007"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a execution of jscript using cscript process. Commonly when a user run jscript file it was executed by wscript.exe application. This technique was seen in FIN7 js implant to execute its malicious script using cscript process. This behavior is uncommon and a good artifacts to check further anomalies within the network +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-13 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-13 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Jscript Execution Using Cscript App - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["FIN7", "Remcos"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Process name $process_name$ with commandline $process$ to execute jscript in $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 49}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Jscript Execution Using Cscript App - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["FIN7", "Remcos"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.007"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a execution of jscript using cscript process. Commonly when a user run jscript file it was executed by wscript.exe application. This technique was seen in FIN7 js implant to execute its malicious script using cscript process. This behavior is uncommon and a good artifacts to check further anomalies within the network +action.notable.param.rule_title = Jscript Execution Using Cscript App +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = "cscript.exe" AND Processes.parent_process = "*//e:jscript*") OR (Processes.process_name = "cscript.exe" AND Processes.process = "*//e:jscript*") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `jscript_execution_using_cscript_app_filter` + +[ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic leverages Kerberos Event 4769, A Kerberos service ticket was requested, to identify a potential kerberoasting attack against Active Directory networks. Kerberoasting allows an adversary to request kerberos tickets for domain accounts typically used as service accounts and attempt to crack them offline allowing them to obtain privileged access to the domain. This analytic looks for a specific combination of the Ticket_Options field based on common kerberoasting tools. Defenders should be aware that it may be possible for a Kerberoast attack to use different Ticket_Options. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic leverages Kerberos Event 4769, A Kerberos service ticket was requested, to identify a potential kerberoasting attack against Active Directory networks. Kerberoasting allows an adversary to request kerberos tickets for domain accounts typically used as service accounts and attempt to crack them offline allowing them to obtain privileged access to the domain. This analytic looks for a specific combination of the Ticket_Options field based on common kerberoasting tools. Defenders should be aware that it may be possible for a Kerberoast attack to use different Ticket_Options. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Older systems that support kerberos RC4 by default like NetApp may generate false positives. Filter as needed +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-09 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-09 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Privilege Escalation", "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Potential kerberoasting attack via service principal name requests detected on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation", "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic leverages Kerberos Event 4769, A Kerberos service ticket was requested, to identify a potential kerberoasting attack against Active Directory networks. Kerberoasting allows an adversary to request kerberos tickets for domain accounts typically used as service accounts and attempt to crack them offline allowing them to obtain privileged access to the domain. This analytic looks for a specific combination of the Ticket_Options field based on common kerberoasting tools. Defenders should be aware that it may be possible for a Kerberoast attack to use different Ticket_Options. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769 Service_Name!="*$" (Ticket_Options=0x40810000 OR Ticket_Options=0x40800000 OR Ticket_Options=0x40810010) Ticket_Encryption_Type=0x17 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, service, service_id, Ticket_Encryption_Type, Ticket_Options | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption_filter` + +[ESCU - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled in UserAccountControl - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic leverages Windows Security Event 4738, `A user account was changed`, to identify a change performed on a domain user object that disables Kerberos Pre-Authentication. Disabling the Pre Authentication flag in the UserAccountControl property allows an adversary to easily perform a brute force attack against the user's password offline leveraging the ASP REP Roasting technique. Red Teams and adversaries alike who have obtained privileges in an Active Directory network may use this technique as a backdoor or a way to escalate privileges. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.004"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic leverages Windows Security Event 4738, `A user account was changed`, to identify a change performed on a domain user object that disables Kerberos Pre-Authentication. Disabling the Pre Authentication flag in the UserAccountControl property allows an adversary to easily perform a brute force attack against the user's password offline leveraging the ASP REP Roasting technique. Red Teams and adversaries alike who have obtained privileges in an Active Directory network may use this technique as a backdoor or a way to escalate privileges. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `User Account Management` within `Account Management` needs to be enabled. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-22 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-22 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled in UserAccountControl - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Kerberos Pre Authentication was Disabled for $Account_Name$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 45}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled in UserAccountControl - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.004"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic leverages Windows Security Event 4738, `A user account was changed`, to identify a change performed on a domain user object that disables Kerberos Pre-Authentication. Disabling the Pre Authentication flag in the UserAccountControl property allows an adversary to easily perform a brute force attack against the user's password offline leveraging the ASP REP Roasting technique. Red Teams and adversaries alike who have obtained privileges in an Active Directory network may use this technique as a backdoor or a way to escalate privileges. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled in UserAccountControl +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4738 MSADChangedAttributes="*Don't Require Preauth' - Enabled*" | table EventCode, Account_Name, Security_ID, MSADChangedAttributes | `kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_in_useraccountcontrol_filter` + +[ESCU - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled with PowerShell - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Set-ADAccountControl` commandlet with specific parameters. `Set-ADAccountControl` is part of the Active Directory PowerShell module used to manage Windows Active Directory networks. As the name suggests, `Set-ADAccountControl` is used to modify User Account Control values for an Active Directory domain account. With the appropiate parameters, Set-ADAccountControl allows adversaries to disable Kerberos Pre-Authentication for an account to to easily perform a brute force attack against the user's password offline leveraging the ASP REP Roasting technique. Red Teams and adversaries alike who have obtained privileges in an Active Directory network may use this technique as a backdoor or a way to escalate privileges. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.004"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Set-ADAccountControl` commandlet with specific parameters. `Set-ADAccountControl` is part of the Active Directory PowerShell module used to manage Windows Active Directory networks. As the name suggests, `Set-ADAccountControl` is used to modify User Account Control values for an Active Directory domain account. With the appropiate parameters, Set-ADAccountControl allows adversaries to disable Kerberos Pre-Authentication for an account to to easily perform a brute force attack against the user's password offline leveraging the ASP REP Roasting technique. Red Teams and adversaries alike who have obtained privileges in an Active Directory network may use this technique as a backdoor or a way to escalate privileges. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, Administrators may need to set this flag for legitimate purposes. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-23 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-23 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled with PowerShell - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Kerberos Pre Authentication was Disabled using PowerShell on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 45}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled with PowerShell - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.004"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Set-ADAccountControl` commandlet with specific parameters. `Set-ADAccountControl` is part of the Active Directory PowerShell module used to manage Windows Active Directory networks. As the name suggests, `Set-ADAccountControl` is used to modify User Account Control values for an Active Directory domain account. With the appropiate parameters, Set-ADAccountControl allows adversaries to disable Kerberos Pre-Authentication for an account to to easily perform a brute force attack against the user's password offline leveraging the ASP REP Roasting technique. Red Teams and adversaries alike who have obtained privileges in an Active Directory network may use this technique as a backdoor or a way to escalate privileges. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled with PowerShell +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = "*Set-ADAccountControl*" AND Message="*DoesNotRequirePreAuth:$true*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_with_powershell_filter` + +[ESCU - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search detects a suspicioous termination of known services killed by ransomware before encrypting files in a compromised machine. This technique is commonly seen in most of ransomware now a days to avoid exception error while accessing the targetted files it wants to encrypts because of the open handle of those services to the targetted file. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search detects a suspicioous termination of known services killed by ransomware before encrypting files in a compromised machine. This technique is commonly seen in most of ransomware now a days to avoid exception error while accessing the targetted files it wants to encrypts because of the open handle of those services to the targetted file. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the 7036 EventCode ScManager in System audit Logs from your endpoints. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Admin activities or installing related updates may do a sudden stop to list of services we monitor. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-04 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-04 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware", "BlackMatter Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Known services $Message$ terminated by a potential ransomware on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}, {"threat_object_field": "Message", "threat_object_type": "other"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "BlackMatter Ransomware"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "Message", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Other"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search detects a suspicioous termination of known services killed by ransomware before encrypting files in a compromised machine. This technique is commonly seen in most of ransomware now a days to avoid exception error while accessing the targetted files it wants to encrypts because of the open handle of those services to the targetted file. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Known Services Killed by Ransomware +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 Message IN ("*Volume Shadow Copy*","*VSS*", "*backup*", "*sophos*", "*sql*", "*memtas*", "*mepocs*", "*veeam*", "*svc$*") Message="*service entered the stopped state*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message dest Type | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `known_services_killed_by_ransomware_filter` + +[ESCU - Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies a suspicious file creation in known cron table directories. This event is commonly abuse by malware, adversaries and red teamers to persist on the target or compromised host. crontab or cronjob is like a schedule task in windows environment where you can create an executable or script on the known crontab directories to run it base on its schedule. This Anomaly query is a good indicator to look further what file is added and who added the file if to consider it legitimate file. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.003", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies a suspicious file creation in known cron table directories. This event is commonly abuse by malware, adversaries and red teamers to persist on the target or compromised host. crontab or cronjob is like a schedule task in windows environment where you can create an executable or script on the known crontab directories to run it base on its schedule. This Anomaly query is a good indicator to look further what file is added and who added the file if to consider it legitimate file. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can create file in crontab folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-17 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-17 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = a file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.003", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN ("*/etc/cron*", "*/var/spool/cron/*") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_add_files_in_known_crontab_directories_filter` + +[ESCU - Linux Add User Account - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for commands to create user accounts on the linux platform. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to persist on the targeted or compromised host by creating new user with an elevated privilege. This Hunting query may catch normal creation of user by administrator so filter is needed. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.001", "T1136"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for commands to create user accounts on the linux platform. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to persist on the targeted or compromised host by creating new user with an elevated privilege. This Hunting query may catch normal creation of user by administrator so filter is needed. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-21 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-21 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Add User Account - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A commandline $process$ that may create user account on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Add User Account - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.001", "T1136"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN ("useradd", "adduser") OR Processes.process IN ("*useradd *", "*adduser *") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_add_user_account_filter` + +[ESCU - Linux At Allow Config File Creation - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies a suspicious file creation of /etc/at.allow or /etc/at.deny. These 2 files are commonly abused by malware, adversaries or red teamers to persist on the targeted or compromised host. These config files can restrict or allow user to execute "at" application (another schedule task application in linux). attacker can create a user or add the compromised username to that config file to execute "at" to schedule it malicious code. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator to investigate further the entry in created config file and who created it to verify if it is a false positive. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.003", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies a suspicious file creation of /etc/at.allow or /etc/at.deny. These 2 files are commonly abused by malware, adversaries or red teamers to persist on the targeted or compromised host. These config files can restrict or allow user to execute "at" application (another schedule task application in linux). attacker can create a user or add the compromised username to that config file to execute "at" to schedule it malicious code. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator to investigate further the entry in created config file and who created it to verify if it is a false positive. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can create this file for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-17 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-17 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux At Allow Config File Creation - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux At Allow Config File Creation - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.003", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN ("*/etc/at.allow", "*/etc/at.deny") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_at_allow_config_file_creation_filter` + +[ESCU - Linux At Application Execution - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies a suspicious process creation of At application. This process can be used by malware, adversaries and red teamers to create persistence entry to the targeted or compromised host with their malicious code. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator to investigate the event before and after this process execution, when it was executed and what schedule task it will execute. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.001", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies a suspicious process creation of At application. This process can be used by malware, adversaries and red teamers to create persistence entry to the targeted or compromised host with their malicious code. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator to investigate the event before and after this process execution, when it was executed and what schedule task it will execute. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use this application for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-17 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-17 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux At Application Execution - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = At application was executed in $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 9}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux At Application Execution - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.001", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN ("at", "atd") OR Processes.parent_process_name IN ("at", "atd") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_at_application_execution_filter` + +[ESCU - Linux Change File Owner To Root - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for a commandline that change the file owner to root using chown utility tool. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to escalate privilege to the targeted or compromised host by changing the owner of their malicious file to root. This event is not so common in corporate network except from the administrator doing normal task that needs high privilege. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222.002", "T1222"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for a commandline that change the file owner to root using chown utility tool. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to escalate privilege to the targeted or compromised host by changing the owner of their malicious file to root. This event is not so common in corporate network except from the administrator doing normal task that needs high privilege. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-21 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-21 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Change File Owner To Root - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A commandline $process$ that may change ownership to root on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Change File Owner To Root - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222.002", "T1222"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = chown OR Processes.process = "*chown *") AND Processes.process = "* root *" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_change_file_owner_to_root_filter` + +[ESCU - Linux Common Process For Elevation Control - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic is to look for possible elevation control access using a common known process in linux platform to change the attribute and file ownership. This technique is commonly abused by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain persistence or privilege escalation on the target or compromised host. Tis common process is used to modify file attribute, file ownership or SUID. This tools can be used in legitimate purposes so filter is needed. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.001", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to look for possible elevation control access using a common known process in linux platform to change the attribute and file ownership. This technique is commonly abused by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain persistence or privilege escalation on the target or compromised host. Tis common process is used to modify file attribute, file ownership or SUID. This tools can be used in legitimate purposes so filter is needed. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-23 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-23 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Common Process For Elevation Control - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A commandline $process$ with process $process_name$ on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 9}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Common Process For Elevation Control - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.001", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN ("chmod", "chown", "fchmod", "fchmodat", "fchown", "fchownat", "fremovexattr", "fsetxattr", "lchown", "lremovexattr", "lsetxattr", "removexattr", "setuid", "setgid", "setreuid", "setregid", "chattr") OR Processes.process IN ("*chmod *", "*chown *", "*fchmod *", "*fchmodat *", "*fchown *", "*fchownat *", "*fremovexattr *", "*fsetxattr *", "*lchown *", "*lremovexattr *", "*lsetxattr *", "*removexattr *", "*setuid *", "*setgid *", "*setreuid *", "*setregid *", "*setcap *", "*chattr *") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_common_process_for_elevation_control_filter` + +[ESCU - Linux DD File Overwrite - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic is to look for dd command to overwrite file. This technique was abused by adversaries or threat actor to destroy files or data on specific system or in a large number of host within network to interrupt host avilability, services and many more. This is also used to destroy data where it make the file irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files, data or local and remote drives. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to look for dd command to overwrite file. This technique was abused by adversaries or threat actor to destroy files or data on specific system or in a large number of host within network to interrupt host avilability, services and many more. This is also used to destroy data where it make the file irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files, data or local and remote drives. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-14 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-14 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux DD File Overwrite - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Data Destruction"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A commandline $process$ executed on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux DD File Overwrite - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Destruction"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to look for dd command to overwrite file. This technique was abused by adversaries or threat actor to destroy files or data on specific system or in a large number of host within network to interrupt host avilability, services and many more. This is also used to destroy data where it make the file irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files, data or local and remote drives. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Linux DD File Overwrite +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "dd" AND Processes.process = "*of=*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_dd_file_overwrite_filter` + +[ESCU - Linux Doas Conf File Creation - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic is to detect the creation of doas.conf file in linux host platform. This configuration file can be use by doas utility tool to allow or permit standard users to perform tasks as root, the same way sudo does. This tool is developed as a minimalistic alternative to sudo application. This tool can be abused advesaries, attacker or malware to gain elevated privileges to the targeted or compromised host. On the other hand this can also be executed by administrator for a certain task that needs admin rights. In this case filter is needed. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to detect the creation of doas.conf file in linux host platform. This configuration file can be use by doas utility tool to allow or permit standard users to perform tasks as root, the same way sudo does. This tool is developed as a minimalistic alternative to sudo application. This tool can be abused advesaries, attacker or malware to gain elevated privileges to the targeted or compromised host. On the other hand this can also be executed by administrator for a certain task that needs admin rights. In this case filter is needed. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-05 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-05 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Doas Conf File Creation - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Doas Conf File Creation - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN ("*/etc/doas.conf") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_doas_conf_file_creation_filter` + +[ESCU - Linux Doas Tool Execution - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic is to detect the doas tool execution in linux host platform. This utility tool allow standard users to perform tasks as root, the same way sudo does. This tool is developed as a minimalistic alternative to sudo application. This tool can be abused advesaries, attacker or malware to gain elevated privileges to the targeted or compromised host. On the other hand this can also be executed by administrator for a certain task that needs admin rights. In this case filter is needed. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to detect the doas tool execution in linux host platform. This utility tool allow standard users to perform tasks as root, the same way sudo does. This tool is developed as a minimalistic alternative to sudo application. This tool can be abused advesaries, attacker or malware to gain elevated privileges to the targeted or compromised host. On the other hand this can also be executed by administrator for a certain task that needs admin rights. In this case filter is needed. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-05 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-05 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Doas Tool Execution - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A doas $process_name$ with commandline $process$ was executed on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Doas Tool Execution - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "doas" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_doas_tool_execution_filter` + +[ESCU - Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies a suspicious cronjobs modification using crontab edit parameter. This commandline parameter can be abuse by malware author, adversaries, and red red teamers to add cronjob entry to their malicious code to execute to the schedule they want. This event can also be executed by administrator or normal user for automation purposes so filter is needed. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.003", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies a suspicious cronjobs modification using crontab edit parameter. This commandline parameter can be abuse by malware author, adversaries, and red red teamers to add cronjob entry to their malicious code to execute to the schedule they want. This event can also be executed by administrator or normal user for automation purposes so filter is needed. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use this application for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-17 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-17 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A possible crontab edit command $process$ executed on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 9}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.003", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = crontab Processes.process = "*crontab *" Processes.process = "* -e*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_edit_cron_table_parameter_filter` + +[ESCU - Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for suspicious file creation in kernel/driver directory in linux platform. This directory is known folder for all linux kernel module available within the system. so creation of file in this directory is a good indicator that there is a possible rootkit installation in the host machine. This technique was abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain high privileges to their malicious code such us in kernel level. Even this event is not so common administrator or legitimate 3rd party tool may install driver or linux kernel module as part of its installation. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.006", "T1547"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for suspicious file creation in kernel/driver directory in linux platform. This directory is known folder for all linux kernel module available within the system. so creation of file in this directory is a good indicator that there is a possible rootkit installation in the host machine. This technique was abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain high privileges to their malicious code such us in kernel level. Even this event is not so common administrator or legitimate 3rd party tool may install driver or linux kernel module as part of its installation. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can create file in this folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-22 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-22 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.006", "T1547"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN ("*/kernel/drivers/*") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_file_created_in_kernel_driver_directory_filter` + +[ESCU - Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for suspicious file creation on init system directories for automatic execution of script or file upon boot up. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamer to persist on the targeted or compromised host. This behavior can be executed or use by an administrator or network operator to add script files or binary files as part of a task or automation. filter is needed. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1037.004", "T1037"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for suspicious file creation on init system directories for automatic execution of script or file upon boot up. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamer to persist on the targeted or compromised host. This behavior can be executed or use by an administrator or network operator to add script files or binary files as part of a task or automation. filter is needed. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can create file in this folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-20 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-20 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1037.004", "T1037"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN ("*/etc/init.d/*", "*/etc/rc.d/*", "*/sbin/init.d/*", "*/etc/rc.local*") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_file_creation_in_init_boot_directory_filter` + +[ESCU - Linux File Creation In Profile Directory - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for suspicious file creation in /etc/profile.d directory to automatically execute scripts by shell upon boot up of a linux machine. This technique is commonly abused by adversaries, malware and red teamers as a persistence mechanism to the targeted or compromised host. This Anomaly detection is a good indicator that someone wants to run a code after boot up which can be done also by the administrator or network operator for automation purposes. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.004", "T1546"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for suspicious file creation in /etc/profile.d directory to automatically execute scripts by shell upon boot up of a linux machine. This technique is commonly abused by adversaries, malware and red teamers as a persistence mechanism to the targeted or compromised host. This Anomaly detection is a good indicator that someone wants to run a code after boot up which can be done also by the administrator or network operator for automation purposes. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can create file in profile.d folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-20 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-20 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux File Creation In Profile Directory - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux File Creation In Profile Directory - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.004", "T1546"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN ("*/etc/profile.d/*") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_file_creation_in_profile_directory_filter` + +[ESCU - Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for inserting of linux kernel module using insmod utility function. This event can detect a installation of rootkit or malicious kernel module to gain elevated privileges to their malicious code and bypassed detections. This Anomaly detection is a good indicator that someone installing kernel module in a linux host either admin or adversaries. filter is needed in this scenario +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.006", "T1547"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for inserting of linux kernel module using insmod utility function. This event can detect a installation of rootkit or malicious kernel module to gain elevated privileges to their malicious code and bypassed detections. This Anomaly detection is a good indicator that someone installing kernel module in a linux host either admin or adversaries. filter is needed in this scenario +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-22 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-22 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A commandline $process$ that may install kernel module on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.006", "T1547"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN("kmod", "sudo") AND Processes.process = *insmod* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_insert_kernel_module_using_insmod_utility_filter` + +[ESCU - Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for possible installing a linux kernel module using modprobe utility function. This event can detect a installation of rootkit or malicious kernel module to gain elevated privileges to their malicious code and bypassed detections. This Anomaly detection is a good indicator that someone installing kernel module in a linux host either admin or adversaries. filter is needed in this scenario +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.006", "T1547"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for possible installing a linux kernel module using modprobe utility function. This event can detect a installation of rootkit or malicious kernel module to gain elevated privileges to their malicious code and bypassed detections. This Anomaly detection is a good indicator that someone installing kernel module in a linux host either admin or adversaries. filter is needed in this scenario +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-22 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-22 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A commandline $process$ that may install kernel module on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.006", "T1547"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN("kmod", "sudo") AND Processes.process = *modprobe* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_install_kernel_module_using_modprobe_utility_filter` + +[ESCU - Linux Java Spawning Shell - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies the process name of Java, Apache, or Tomcat spawning a Linux shell. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). The shells included in the macro are "sh", "ksh", "zsh", "bash", "dash", "rbash", "fish", "csh', "tcsh', "ion", "eshell". Upon triage, review parallel processes and command-line arguments to determine legitimacy. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the process name of Java, Apache, or Tomcat spawning a Linux shell. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). The shells included in the macro are "sh", "ksh", "zsh", "bash", "dash", "rbash", "fish", "csh', "tcsh', "ion", "eshell". Upon triage, review parallel processes and command-line arguments to determine legitimacy. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. Ensure EDR product is mapping OS Linux to the datamodel properly. Add any additional java process names for your environment to the analytic as needed. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Filtering may be required on internal developer build systems or classify assets as web facing and restrict the analytic based on asset type. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-13 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-13 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Java Spawning Shell - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ spawning a Linux shell, potentially indicative of exploitation. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 40}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Java Spawning Shell - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the process name of Java, Apache, or Tomcat spawning a Linux shell. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). The shells included in the macro are "sh", "ksh", "zsh", "bash", "dash", "rbash", "fish", "csh', "tcsh', "ion", "eshell". Upon triage, review parallel processes and command-line arguments to determine legitimacy. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Linux Java Spawning Shell +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=java OR Processes.parent_process_name=apache OR Processes.parent_process_name=tomcat `linux_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_java_spawning_shell_filter` + +[ESCU - Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic is to look for suspicious command lines that may add entry to /etc/sudoers with NOPASSWD attribute in linux platform. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain elevated privilege to the targeted or compromised host. /etc/sudoers file controls who can run what commands users can execute on the machines and can also control whether user need a password to execute particular commands. This file is composed of aliases (basically variables) and user specifications. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to look for suspicious command lines that may add entry to /etc/sudoers with NOPASSWD attribute in linux platform. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain elevated privilege to the targeted or compromised host. /etc/sudoers file controls who can run what commands users can execute on the machines and can also control whether user need a password to execute particular commands. This file is composed of aliases (basically variables) and user specifications. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-21 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-21 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = a commandline $process$ executed on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = "*NOPASSWD:*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_nopasswd_entry_in_sudoers_file_filter` + +[ESCU - Linux pkexec Privilege Escalation - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies `pkexec` spawning with no command-line arguments. A vulnerability in Polkit's pkexec component identified as CVE-2021-4034 (PwnKit) which is present in the default configuration of all major Linux distributions and can be exploited to gain full root privileges on the system. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies `pkexec` spawning with no command-line arguments. A vulnerability in Polkit's pkexec component identified as CVE-2021-4034 (PwnKit) which is present in the default configuration of all major Linux distributions and can be exploited to gain full root privileges on the system. +action.escu.how_to_implement = Depending on the EDR product in use, there are multiple ways to "null" the command-line field, Processes.process. Two that may be useful `process="(^.{0}$)"` or `| where isnull(process)`. To generate data for this behavior, Sysmon for Linux was utilized. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-28 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-28 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux pkexec Privilege Escalation - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ related to a local privilege escalation in polkit pkexec. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 56}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux pkexec Privilege Escalation - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-4034"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies `pkexec` spawning with no command-line arguments. A vulnerability in Polkit's pkexec component identified as CVE-2021-4034 (PwnKit) which is present in the default configuration of all major Linux distributions and can be exploited to gain full root privileges on the system. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Linux pkexec Privilege Escalation +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=pkexec by _time Processes.dest Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process="(^.{1}$)" | `linux_pkexec_privilege_escalation_filter` + +[ESCU - Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic is to look for suspicious process command-line that might be accessing or modifying sshd_config. This file is the ssh configuration file that might be modify by threat actors or adversaries to redirect port connection, allow user using authorized key generated during attack. This anomaly detection might catch noise from administrator auditing or modifying ssh configuration file. In this scenario filter is needed +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098.004", "T1098"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to look for suspicious process command-line that might be accessing or modifying sshd_config. This file is the ssh configuration file that might be modify by threat actors or adversaries to redirect port connection, allow user using authorized key generated during attack. This anomaly detection might catch noise from administrator auditing or modifying ssh configuration file. In this scenario filter is needed +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-11 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-11 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = a commandline $process$ executed on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098.004", "T1098"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN("cat", "nano*","vim*", "vi*") AND Processes.process IN("*/etc/ssh/sshd_config") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_access_or_modification_of_sshd_config_file_filter` + +[ESCU - Linux Possible Access To Credential Files - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic is to detect a possible attempt to dump or access the content of /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow to enable offline credential cracking. "etc/passwd" store user information within linux OS while "etc/shadow" contain the user passwords hash. Adversaries and threat actors may attempt to access this to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator of possible credential dumping technique but it might catch some normal administrator automation scripts or during credential auditing. In this scenario filter is needed. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.008", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to detect a possible attempt to dump or access the content of /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow to enable offline credential cracking. "etc/passwd" store user information within linux OS while "etc/shadow" contain the user passwords hash. Adversaries and threat actors may attempt to access this to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator of possible credential dumping technique but it might catch some normal administrator automation scripts or during credential auditing. In this scenario filter is needed. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-10 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-10 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Possible Access To Credential Files - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A commandline $process$ executed on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Possible Access To Credential Files - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.008", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN("cat", "nano*","vim*", "vi*") AND Processes.process IN("*/etc/shadow*", "*/etc/passwd*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_access_to_credential_files_filter` + +[ESCU - Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic is to detect a possible access or modification of /etc/sudoers file. "/etc/sudoers" file controls who can run what command as what users on what machine and can also control whether a specific user need a password for particular commands. adversaries and threat actors abuse this file to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation during attack on targeted host. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to detect a possible access or modification of /etc/sudoers file. "/etc/sudoers" file controls who can run what command as what users on what machine and can also control whether a specific user need a password for particular commands. adversaries and threat actors abuse this file to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation during attack on targeted host. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. +action.escu.known_false_positives = administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-10 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-10 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A commandline $process$ executed on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN("cat", "nano*","vim*", "vi*") AND Processes.process IN("*/etc/sudoers*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_access_to_sudoers_file_filter` + +[ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for suspicious commandline that may use to append user entry to /etc/at.allow or /etc/at.deny. These 2 files are commonly abused by malware, adversaries or red teamers to persist on the targeted or compromised host. These config file can restrict user that can only execute at application (another schedule task application in linux). attacker can create a user or add the compromised username to that config file to execute at to schedule it malicious code. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator to investigate further the entry in created config file and who created it to verify if it is a false positive. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.001", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for suspicious commandline that may use to append user entry to /etc/at.allow or /etc/at.deny. These 2 files are commonly abused by malware, adversaries or red teamers to persist on the targeted or compromised host. These config file can restrict user that can only execute at application (another schedule task application in linux). attacker can create a user or add the compromised username to that config file to execute at to schedule it malicious code. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator to investigate further the entry in created config file and who created it to verify if it is a false positive. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-17 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-17 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A commandline $process$ that may modify at allow config file in $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 9}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.001", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = "*echo*" AND Processes.process IN("*/etc/at.allow", "*/etc/at.deny") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file_filter` + +[ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for suspicious command-lines that can be possibly used to modify user profile files to automatically execute scripts/executables by shell upon reboot of the machine. This technique is commonly abused by adversaries, malware and red teamers as persistence mechanism to the targeted or compromised host. This Anomaly detection is a good indicator that someone wants to run code after reboot which can be done also by the administrator or network operator for automation purposes. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.004", "T1546"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for suspicious command-lines that can be possibly used to modify user profile files to automatically execute scripts/executables by shell upon reboot of the machine. This technique is commonly abused by adversaries, malware and red teamers as persistence mechanism to the targeted or compromised host. This Anomaly detection is a good indicator that someone wants to run code after reboot which can be done also by the administrator or network operator for automation purposes. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-20 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-20 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = a commandline $process$ that may modify profile files in $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.004", "T1546"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = "*echo*" AND Processes.process IN("*~/.bashrc", "*~/.bash_profile", "*/etc/profile", "~/.bash_login", "*~/.profile", "~/.bash_logout") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_append_command_to_profile_config_file_filter` + +[ESCU - Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for possible suspicious commandline that may use to append a code to any existing cronjob files for persistence or privilege escalation. This technique is commonly abused by malware, adversaries and red teamers to automatically execute their code within a existing or sometimes in normal cronjob script file. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.003", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for possible suspicious commandline that may use to append a code to any existing cronjob files for persistence or privilege escalation. This technique is commonly abused by malware, adversaries and red teamers to automatically execute their code within a existing or sometimes in normal cronjob script file. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-17 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-17 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A commandline $process$ that may modify cronjob file in $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.003", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = "*echo*" AND Processes.process IN("*/etc/cron*", "*/var/spool/cron/*", "*/etc/anacrontab*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file_filter` + +[ESCU - Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for possible modification of cronjobs file using editor. This event is can be seen in normal user but can also be a good hunting indicator for unwanted user modifying cronjobs for possible persistence or privilege escalation. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.003", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for possible modification of cronjobs file using editor. This event is can be seen in normal user but can also be a good hunting indicator for unwanted user modifying cronjobs for possible persistence or privilege escalation. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-17 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-17 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A commandline $process$ that may modify cronjob file using editor in $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 6}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 20, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.003", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name IN("nano","vim.basic") OR Processes.process IN ("*nano *", "*vi *", "*vim *")) AND Processes.process IN("*/etc/cron*", "*/var/spool/cron/*", "*/etc/anacrontab*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor_filter` + +[ESCU - Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic is to look for possible ssh key file creation on ~/.ssh/ folder. This technique is commonly abused by threat actors and adversaries to gain persistence and privilege escalation to the targeted host. by creating ssh private and public key and passing the public key to the attacker server. threat actor can access remotely the machine using openssh daemon service. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098.004", "T1098"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to look for possible ssh key file creation on ~/.ssh/ folder. This technique is commonly abused by threat actors and adversaries to gain persistence and privilege escalation to the targeted host. by creating ssh private and public key and passing the public key to the attacker server. threat actor can access remotely the machine using openssh daemon service. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can create file in ~/.ssh folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-11 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-11 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 36}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098.004", "T1098"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN ("*/.ssh*") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_possible_ssh_key_file_creation_filter` + +[ESCU - Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious command that may hijack a library function in linux platform. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain privileges and persist on the machine. This detection pertains to loading a dll to hijack or hook a library function of specific program using LD_PRELOAD command. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.006", "T1574"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to detect a suspicious command that may hijack a library function in linux platform. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain privileges and persist on the machine. This detection pertains to loading a dll to hijack or hook a library function of specific program using LD_PRELOAD command. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-22 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-22 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A commandline $process$ that may hijack library function on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.006", "T1574"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious command that may hijack a library function in linux platform. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain privileges and persist on the machine. This detection pertains to loading a dll to hijack or hook a library function of specific program using LD_PRELOAD command. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = "*LD_PRELOAD*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_preload_hijack_library_calls_filter` + +[ESCU - Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for suspicious file creation in systemd timer directory in linux platform. systemd is a system and service manager for Linux distributions. From the Windows perspective, this process fulfills the duties of wininit.exe and services.exe combined. At the risk of simplifying the functionality of systemd, it initializes a Linux system and starts relevant services that are defined in service unit files. Adversaries, malware and red teamers may abuse this this feature by stashing systemd service file to persist on the targetted or compromised host. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.006", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for suspicious file creation in systemd timer directory in linux platform. systemd is a system and service manager for Linux distributions. From the Windows perspective, this process fulfills the duties of wininit.exe and services.exe combined. At the risk of simplifying the functionality of systemd, it initializes a Linux system and starts relevant services that are defined in service unit files. Adversaries, malware and red teamers may abuse this this feature by stashing systemd service file to persist on the targetted or compromised host. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can create file in systemd folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-20 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-20 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A service file named as $file_path$ is created in systemd folder on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.006", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name = *.service Filesystem.file_path IN ("*/etc/systemd/system*", "*/lib/systemd/system*", "*/usr/lib/systemd/system*", "*/run/systemd/system*", "*~/.config/systemd/*", "*~/.local/share/systemd/*","*/etc/systemd/user*", "*/lib/systemd/user*", "*/usr/lib/systemd/user*", "*/run/systemd/user*") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_service_file_created_in_systemd_directory_filter` + +[ESCU - Linux Service Restarted - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for restarted or re-enable services in linux platform. This technique can be executed or performed using systemctl or service tool application. Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Administrator may also create a legitimated service for a specific tool or normal application as part of task or automation, in this scenario it is suggested to look for the service path of the actual script or executable that register as service and who created the service for further verification. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.006", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for restarted or re-enable services in linux platform. This technique can be executed or performed using systemctl or service tool application. Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Administrator may also create a legitimated service for a specific tool or normal application as part of task or automation, in this scenario it is suggested to look for the service path of the actual script or executable that register as service and who created the service for further verification. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and commandline executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-20 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-20 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Service Restarted - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A commandline $process$ that may create or start a service on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Service Restarted - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.006", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name IN ("systemctl", "service") OR Processes.process IN ("*systemctl *", "*service *")) Processes.process IN ("*restart*", "*reload*", "*reenable*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_service_restarted_filter` + +[ESCU - Linux Service Started Or Enabled - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for created or enable services in linux platform. This technique can be executed or performed using systemctl or service tool application. Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Administrator may also create a legitimated service for a specific tool or normal application as part of task or automation, in this scenario it is suggested to look for the service path of the actual script or executable that register as service and who created the service for further verification. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.006", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for created or enable services in linux platform. This technique can be executed or performed using systemctl or service tool application. Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Administrator may also create a legitimated service for a specific tool or normal application as part of task or automation, in this scenario it is suggested to look for the service path of the actual script or executable that register as service and who created the service for further verification. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-20 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-20 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Service Started Or Enabled - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = a commandline $process$ that may create or start a service on $dest +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Service Started Or Enabled - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.006", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name IN ("systemctl", "service") OR Processes.process IN ("*systemctl *", "*service *")) Processes.process IN ("* start *", "* enable *") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_service_started_or_enabled_filter` + +[ESCU - Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for suspicious chmod utility execution to enable SUID bit. This allows a user to temporarily gain root access, usually in order to run a program. For example, only the root account is allowed to change the password information contained in the password database; If the SUID bit appears as an s, the file's owner also has execute permission to the file; if it appears as an S, the file's owner does not have execute permission. The second specialty permission is the SGID, or set group id bit. It is similar to the SUID bit, except it can temporarily change group membership, usually to execute a program. The SGID bit is set if an s or an S appears in the group section of permissions. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.001", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for suspicious chmod utility execution to enable SUID bit. This allows a user to temporarily gain root access, usually in order to run a program. For example, only the root account is allowed to change the password information contained in the password database; If the SUID bit appears as an s, the file's owner also has execute permission to the file; if it appears as an S, the file's owner does not have execute permission. The second specialty permission is the SGID, or set group id bit. It is similar to the SUID bit, except it can temporarily change group membership, usually to execute a program. The SGID bit is set if an s or an S appears in the group section of permissions. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-21 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-21 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = a commandline $process$ that may set suid or sgid on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.001", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE (Processes.process_name = chmod OR Processes.process = "*chmod *") AND Processes.process IN("* g+s *", "* u+s *", "* 4777 *", "* 4577 *") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_setuid_using_chmod_utility_filter` + +[ESCU - Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for suspicious setcap utility execution to enable SUID bit. This allows a user to temporarily gain root access, usually in order to run a program. For example, only the root account is allowed to change the password information contained in the password database; If the SUID bit appears as an s, the file's owner also has execute permission to the file; if it appears as an S, the file's owner does not have execute permission. The second specialty permission is the SGID, or set group id bit. It is similar to the SUID bit, except it can temporarily change group membership, usually to execute a program. The SGID bit is set if an s or an S appears in the group section of permissions. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.001", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for suspicious setcap utility execution to enable SUID bit. This allows a user to temporarily gain root access, usually in order to run a program. For example, only the root account is allowed to change the password information contained in the password database; If the SUID bit appears as an s, the file's owner also has execute permission to the file; if it appears as an S, the file's owner does not have execute permission. The second specialty permission is the SGID, or set group id bit. It is similar to the SUID bit, except it can temporarily change group membership, usually to execute a program. The SGID bit is set if an s or an S appears in the group section of permissions. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-21 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-21 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A commandline $process$ that may set suid or sgid on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.001", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = setcap OR Processes.process = "*setcap *") AND Processes.process IN ("* cap_setuid=ep *", "* cap_setuid+ep *", "* cap_net_bind_service+p *", "* cap_net_raw+ep *", "* cap_dac_read_search+ep *") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_setuid_using_setcap_utility_filter` + +[ESCU - Linux Sudo OR Su Execution - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic is to detect the execution of sudo or su command in linux operating system. The "sudo" command allows a system administrator to delegate authority to give certain users (or groups of users) the ability to run some (or all) commands as root or another user while providing an audit trail of the commands and their arguments. This command is commonly abused by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to elevate privileges to the targeted host. This command can be executed by administrator for legitimate purposes or to execute process that need admin privileges, In this scenario filter is needed. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to detect the execution of sudo or su command in linux operating system. The "sudo" command allows a system administrator to delegate authority to give certain users (or groups of users) the ability to run some (or all) commands as root or another user while providing an audit trail of the commands and their arguments. This command is commonly abused by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to elevate privileges to the targeted host. This command can be executed by administrator for legitimate purposes or to execute process that need admin privileges, In this scenario filter is needed. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-04 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-04 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Sudo OR Su Execution - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A commandline $process$ that execute sudo or su in $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 9}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Sudo OR Su Execution - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN ("sudo", "su") OR Processes.parent_process_name IN ("sudo", "su") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_sudo_or_su_execution_filter` + +[ESCU - Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic is to looks for file creation of sudoers.tmp file cause by editing /etc/sudoers using visudo or editor in linux platform. This technique may abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain elevated privilege to targeted or compromised host. /etc/sudoers file controls who can run what commands as what users on what machines and can also control special things such as whether you need a password for particular commands. The file is composed of aliases (basically variables) and user specifications (which control who can run what). +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to looks for file creation of sudoers.tmp file cause by editing /etc/sudoers using visudo or editor in linux platform. This technique may abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain elevated privilege to targeted or compromised host. /etc/sudoers file controls who can run what commands as what users on what machines and can also control special things such as whether you need a password for particular commands. The file is composed of aliases (basically variables) and user specifications (which control who can run what). +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. +action.escu.known_false_positives = administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-23 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-23 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN ("*sudoers.tmp*") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_sudoers_tmp_file_creation_filter` + +[ESCU - Linux System Network Discovery - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic is to look for possible enumeration of local network configuration. This technique is commonly used as part of recon of adversaries or threat actor to know some network information for its next or further attack. This anomaly detections may capture normal event made by administrator during auditing or testing network connection of specific host or network to network. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1016"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to look for possible enumeration of local network configuration. This technique is commonly used as part of recon of adversaries or threat actor to know some network information for its next or further attack. This anomaly detections may capture normal event made by administrator during auditing or testing network connection of specific host or network to network. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-11 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-11 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux System Network Discovery - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Network Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A commandline $process$ executed on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 9}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux System Network Discovery - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Network Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1016"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name_list values(Processes.process) as process_list values(Processes.process_id) as process_id_list values(Processes.parent_process_id) as parent_process_id_list values(Processes.process_guid) as process_guid_list dc(Processes.process_name) as process_name_count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN ("arp", "ifconfig", "ip", "netstat", "firewall-cmd", "ufw", "iptables", "ss", "route") by _time span=30m Processes.dest Processes.user | where process_name_count >=4 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`| `linux_system_network_discovery_filter` + +[ESCU - Linux Visudo Utility Execution - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic is to looks for suspicious commandline that add entry to /etc/sudoers by using visudo utility tool in linux platform. This technique may abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain elevated privilege to targeted or compromised host. /etc/sudoers file controls who can run what commands as what users on what machines and can also control special things such as whether you need a password for particular commands. The file is composed of aliases (basically variables) and user specifications (which control who can run what). +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to looks for suspicious commandline that add entry to /etc/sudoers by using visudo utility tool in linux platform. This technique may abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain elevated privilege to targeted or compromised host. /etc/sudoers file controls who can run what commands as what users on what machines and can also control special things such as whether you need a password for particular commands. The file is composed of aliases (basically variables) and user specifications (which control who can run what). +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-21 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-21 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Visudo Utility Execution - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A commandline $process$ executed on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 16}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Visudo Utility Execution - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 40, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = visudo by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_visudo_utility_execution_filter` + +[ESCU - Loading Of Dynwrapx Module - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = DynamicWrapperX is an ActiveX component that can be used in a script to call Windows API functions, but it requires the dynwrapx.dll to be installed and registered. With that, registering or loading dynwrapx.dll to a host is highly suspicious. In most instances when it is used maliciously, the best way to triage is to review parallel processes and pivot on the process_guid. Review the registry for any suspicious modifications meant to load dynwrapx.dll. Identify any suspicious module loads of dynwrapx.dll. This detection will return and identify the processes that invoke vbs/wscript/cscript. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055", "T1055.001"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = DynamicWrapperX is an ActiveX component that can be used in a script to call Windows API functions, but it requires the dynwrapx.dll to be installed and registered. With that, registering or loading dynwrapx.dll to a host is highly suspicious. In most instances when it is used maliciously, the best way to triage is to review parallel processes and pivot on the process_guid. Review the registry for any suspicious modifications meant to load dynwrapx.dll. Identify any suspicious module loads of dynwrapx.dll. This detection will return and identify the processes that invoke vbs/wscript/cscript. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on processes that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, however it is possible to filter by Processes.process_name and specific processes (ex. wscript.exe). Filter as needed. This may need modification based on EDR telemetry and how it brings in registry data. For example, removal of (Default). +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-18 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-18 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Loading Of Dynwrapx Module - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Remcos"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = dynwrapx.dll loaded by process $process_name$ on $Computer$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Loading Of Dynwrapx Module - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055", "T1055.001"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = DynamicWrapperX is an ActiveX component that can be used in a script to call Windows API functions, but it requires the dynwrapx.dll to be installed and registered. With that, registering or loading dynwrapx.dll to a host is highly suspicious. In most instances when it is used maliciously, the best way to triage is to review parallel processes and pivot on the process_guid. Review the registry for any suspicious modifications meant to load dynwrapx.dll. Identify any suspicious module loads of dynwrapx.dll. This detection will return and identify the processes that invoke vbs/wscript/cscript. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Loading Of Dynwrapx Module +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `sysmon` EventCode=7 (ImageLoaded = "*\\dynwrapx.dll" OR OriginalFileName = "dynwrapx.dll" OR Product = "DynamicWrapperX") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded OriginalFileName Product process_name Computer EventCode Signed ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `loading_of_dynwrapx_module_filter` + +[ESCU - Local Account Discovery with Net - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for local users. The two arguments `user` and 'users', return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087", "T1087.001"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for local users. The two arguments `user` and 'users', return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-16 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-16 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Local Account Discovery with Net - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Local user discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Local Account Discovery with Net - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087", "T1087.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` (Processes.process=*user OR Processes.process=*users) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `local_account_discovery_with_net_filter` + +[ESCU - Local Account Discovery With Wmic - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for local users. The argument `useraccount` is used to leverage WMI to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087", "T1087.001"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for local users. The argument `useraccount` is used to leverage WMI to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-16 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-16 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Local Account Discovery With Wmic - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Local user discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Local Account Discovery With Wmic - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087", "T1087.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` (Processes.process=*useraccount*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `local_account_discovery_with_wmic_filter` + +[ESCU - Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 Exploitation - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This correlation find exploitation of Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 against systems using detections from Splunk Security Content Analytic Story. It does this by calculating the distinct count of MITRE ATT&CK tactics from Log4Shell detections fired. If the count is larger than 2 or more distinct MITRE ATT&CK tactics we assume high problability of exploitation. The Analytic story breaks down into 3 major phases of a Log4Shell exploitation, specifically 1. Initial Payload delivery eg. `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}` 2. Call back to malicious LDAP server eg. Exploit.class 3. Post Exploitation Activity/Lateral Movement using Powershell or similar T1562.001 Each of these phases fall into different MITRE ATT&CK Tactics (Initial Access, Execution, Command and Control), by looking into 2 or more phases showing up in detections triggerd is how this correlation search finds exploitation. If we get a notable from this correlation search the best way to triage it is by investigating the affected systems against Log4Shell exploitation using Splunk SOAR playbooks. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105", "T1190", "T1059"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Risk"] +action.escu.eli5 = This correlation find exploitation of Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 against systems using detections from Splunk Security Content Analytic Story. It does this by calculating the distinct count of MITRE ATT&CK tactics from Log4Shell detections fired. If the count is larger than 2 or more distinct MITRE ATT&CK tactics we assume high problability of exploitation. The Analytic story breaks down into 3 major phases of a Log4Shell exploitation, specifically 1. Initial Payload delivery eg. `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}` 2. Call back to malicious LDAP server eg. Exploit.class 3. Post Exploitation Activity/Lateral Movement using Powershell or similar T1562.001 Each of these phases fall into different MITRE ATT&CK Tactics (Initial Access, Execution, Command and Control), by looking into 2 or more phases showing up in detections triggerd is how this correlation search finds exploitation. If we get a notable from this correlation search the best way to triage it is by investigating the affected systems against Log4Shell exploitation using Splunk SOAR playbooks. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To implement this correlation search a user needs to enable all detections in the Log4Shell Analytic Story and confirm it is generation risk events. A simple search `index=risk analyticstories="Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"` should contain events. +action.escu.known_false_positives = There are no known false positive for this search, but it could contain false positives as multiple detections can trigger and not have successful exploitation. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-26 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-26 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 Exploitation - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Log4Shell Exploitation detected against $affected_systems$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "affected_systems", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 Exploitation - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105", "T1190", "T1059"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "affected_systems", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This correlation find exploitation of Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 against systems using detections from Splunk Security Content Analytic Story. It does this by calculating the distinct count of MITRE ATT&CK tactics from Log4Shell detections fired. If the count is larger than 2 or more distinct MITRE ATT&CK tactics we assume high problability of exploitation. The Analytic story breaks down into 3 major phases of a Log4Shell exploitation, specifically 1. Initial Payload delivery eg. `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}` 2. Call back to malicious LDAP server eg. Exploit.class 3. Post Exploitation Activity/Lateral Movement using Powershell or similar T1562.001 Each of these phases fall into different MITRE ATT&CK Tactics (Initial Access, Execution, Command and Control), by looking into 2 or more phases showing up in detections triggerd is how this correlation search finds exploitation. If we get a notable from this correlation search the best way to triage it is by investigating the affected systems against Log4Shell exploitation using Splunk SOAR playbooks. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 Exploitation +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk where All_Risk.analyticstories="Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" All_Risk.risk_object_type="system" by All_Risk.risk_object All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic source | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Risk)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | stats values(risk_object) as affected_systems values(source) as detection_name values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as tactics values(firstTime) as firstTime values(lastTime) as lastTime dc(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as distinct_tactics | where distinct_tactics >= 2 | `log4shell_cve_2021_44228_exploitation_filter` + +[ESCU - Logon Script Event Trigger Execution - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry entry to persist and gain privilege escalation upon booting up of compromised host. This technique was seen in several APT and malware where it modify UserInitMprLogonScript registry entry to its malicious payload to be executed upon boot up of the machine. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1037", "T1037.001"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry entry to persist and gain privilege escalation upon booting up of compromised host. This technique was seen in several APT and malware where it modify UserInitMprLogonScript registry entry to its malicious payload to be executed upon boot up of the machine. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-27 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-27 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Logon Script Event Trigger Execution - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Logon Script Event Trigger Execution - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1037", "T1037.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry entry to persist and gain privilege escalation upon booting up of compromised host. This technique was seen in several APT and malware where it modify UserInitMprLogonScript registry entry to its malicious payload to be executed upon boot up of the machine. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Logon Script Event Trigger Execution +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path IN ("*\\Environment\\UserInitMprLogonScript") by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `logon_script_event_trigger_execution_filter` + +[ESCU - Mailsniper Invoke functions - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search is to detect known mailsniper.ps1 functions executed in a machine. This technique was seen in some attacker to harvest some sensitive e-mail in a compromised exchange server. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114", "T1114.001"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect known mailsniper.ps1 functions executed in a machine. This technique was seen in some attacker to harvest some sensitive e-mail in a compromised exchange server. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the powershell logs from your endpoints. make sure you enable needed registry to monitor this event. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-05-19 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-05-19 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Mailsniper Invoke functions - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Data Exfiltration"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = mailsniper.ps1 functions $Message$ executed on a $ComputerName$ by user $user$. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 72}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Mailsniper Invoke functions - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Exfiltration"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114", "T1114.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect known mailsniper.ps1 functions executed in a machine. This technique was seen in some attacker to harvest some sensitive e-mail in a compromised exchange server. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Mailsniper Invoke functions +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message IN ("*Invoke-GlobalO365MailSearch*", "*Invoke-GlobalMailSearch*", "*Invoke-SelfSearch*", "*Invoke-PasswordSprayOWA*", "*Invoke-PasswordSprayEWS*","*Invoke-DomainHarvestOWA*", "*Invoke-UsernameHarvestOWA*","*Invoke-OpenInboxFinder*","*Invoke-InjectGEventAPI*","*Invoke-InjectGEvent*","*Invoke-SearchGmail*", "*Invoke-MonitorCredSniper*", "*Invoke-AddGmailRule*","*Invoke-PasswordSprayEAS*","*Invoke-UsernameHarvestEAS*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mailsniper_invoke_functions_filter` + +[ESCU - Malicious InProcServer32 Modification - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies a process modifying the registry with a known malicious CLSID under InProcServer32. Most COM classes are registered with the operating system and are identified by a GUID that represents the Class Identifier (CLSID) within the registry (usually under HKLM\\Software\\Classes\\CLSID or HKCU\\Software\\Classes\\CLSID). Behind the implementation of a COM class is the server (some binary) that is referenced within registry keys under the CLSID. The LocalServer32 key represents a path to an executable (exe) implementation, and the InprocServer32 key represents a path to a dynamic link library (DLL) implementation (Bohops). During triage, review parallel processes for suspicious activity. Pivot on the process GUID to see the full timeline of events. Analyze the value and look for file modifications. Being this is looking for inprocserver32, a DLL found in the value will most likely be loaded by a parallel process. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.010", "T1112"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies a process modifying the registry with a known malicious CLSID under InProcServer32. Most COM classes are registered with the operating system and are identified by a GUID that represents the Class Identifier (CLSID) within the registry (usually under HKLM\\Software\\Classes\\CLSID or HKCU\\Software\\Classes\\CLSID). Behind the implementation of a COM class is the server (some binary) that is referenced within registry keys under the CLSID. The LocalServer32 key represents a path to an executable (exe) implementation, and the InprocServer32 key represents a path to a dynamic link library (DLL) implementation (Bohops). During triage, review parallel processes for suspicious activity. Pivot on the process GUID to see the full timeline of events. Analyze the value and look for file modifications. Being this is looking for inprocserver32, a DLL found in the value will most likely be loaded by a parallel process. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, filter as needed. In our test case, Remcos used regsvr32.exe to modify the registry. It may be required, dependent upon the EDR tool producing registry events, to remove (Default) from the command-line. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-05 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-05 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Malicious InProcServer32 Modification - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", "Remcos"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = The $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ modifying the registry with a known malicious clsid under InProcServer32. action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 @@ -12951,13 +18930,13 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * * dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Excessive number of service control start as disabled - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Malicious InProcServer32 Modification - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", "Remcos"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.010", "T1112"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This detection targets behaviors observed when threat actors have used sc.exe to modify services. We observed malware in a honey pot spawning numerous sc.exe processes in a short period of time, presumably to impair defenses, possibly to block others from compromising the same machine. This detection will alert when we see both an excessive number of sc.exe processes launched with specific commandline arguments to disable the start of certain services. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Excessive number of service control start as disabled +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies a process modifying the registry with a known malicious CLSID under InProcServer32. Most COM classes are registered with the operating system and are identified by a GUID that represents the Class Identifier (CLSID) within the registry (usually under HKLM\\Software\\Classes\\CLSID or HKCU\\Software\\Classes\\CLSID). Behind the implementation of a COM class is the server (some binary) that is referenced within registry keys under the CLSID. The LocalServer32 key represents a path to an executable (exe) implementation, and the InprocServer32 key represents a path to a dynamic link library (DLL) implementation (Bohops). During triage, review parallel processes for suspicious activity. Pivot on the process GUID to see the full timeline of events. Analyze the value and look for file modifications. Being this is looking for inprocserver32, a DLL found in the value will most likely be loaded by a parallel process. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Malicious InProcServer32 Modification action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 @@ -12969,27 +18948,2369 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` distinct_count(Processes.process) as distinct_cmdlines values(Processes.process_id) as process_ids min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE Processes.process_name = "sc.exe" AND Processes.process="*start= disabled*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_id, _time span=30m | where distinct_cmdlines >= 8 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_number_of_service_control_start_as_disabled_filter` +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_guid Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\CLSID\\{89565275-A714-4a43-912E-978B935EDCCC}\\InProcServer32\\(Default)" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest Registry.process_guid Registry.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | fields _time dest registry_path registry_key_name registry_value_name process_name process_path process process_guid user] | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, process_name registry_path registry_key_name registry_value_name user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_inprocserver32_modification_filter` -[ESCU - Excessive number of taskhost processes - Rule] +[ESCU - Malicious Powershell Executed As A Service - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This detection targets behaviors observed in post exploit kits like Meterpreter and Koadic that are run in memory. We have observed that these tools must invoke an excessive number of taskhost.exe and taskhostex.exe processes to complete various actions (discovery, lateral movement, etc.). It is extremely uncommon in the course of normal operations to see so many distinct taskhost and taskhostex processes running concurrently in a short time frame. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This detection targets behaviors observed in post exploit kits like Meterpreter and Koadic that are run in memory. We have observed that these tools must invoke an excessive number of taskhost.exe and taskhostex.exe processes to complete various actions (discovery, lateral movement, etc.). It is extremely uncommon in the course of normal operations to see so many distinct taskhost and taskhostex processes running concurrently in a short time frame. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting events related to processes on the endpoints that include the name of the process and process id into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators, administrative actions or certain applications may run many instances of taskhost and taskhostex concurrently. Filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-07 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-07 +description = This detection is to identify the abuse the Windows SC.exe to execute malicious commands or payloads via PowerShell. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569", "T1569.002"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This detection is to identify the abuse the Windows SC.exe to execute malicious commands or payloads via PowerShell. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows System logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Creating a hidden powershell service is rare and could key off of those instances. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-07 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-07 action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Excessive number of taskhost processes - Rule +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Malicious Powershell Executed As A Service - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Meterpreter"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious Powershell"] action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = An excessive amount of $process_name$ was executed on $dest$ indicative of suspicious behavior. +action.risk.param._risk_message = Identifies the abuse the Windows SC.exe to execute malicious powerShell as a service $Service_File_Name$ by $user$ on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 72}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Malicious Powershell Executed As A Service - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious Powershell"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569", "T1569.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This detection is to identify the abuse the Windows SC.exe to execute malicious commands or payloads via PowerShell. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Malicious Powershell Executed As A Service +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 | eval l_Service_File_Name=lower(Service_File_Name) | regex l_Service_File_Name="powershell[.\s]|powershell_ise[.\s]|pwsh[.\s]|psexec[.\s]" | regex l_Service_File_Name="-nop[rofile\s]+|-w[indowstyle]*\s+hid[den]*|-noe[xit\s]+|-enc[odedcommand\s]+" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Service_File_Name Service_Name Service_Start_Type Service_Type Service_Account user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_powershell_executed_as_a_service_filter` + +[ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies the use of the EncodedCommand PowerShell parameter. This is typically used by Administrators to run complex scripts, but commonly used by adversaries to hide their code. \ +The analytic identifies all variations of EncodedCommand, as PowerShell allows the ability to shorten the parameter. For example enc, enco, encod and so forth. In addition, through our research it was identified that PowerShell will interpret different command switch types beyond the hyphen. We have added endash, emdash, horizontal bar, and forward slash. \ +During triage, review parallel events to determine legitimacy. Tune as needed based on admin scripts in use. \ +Alternatively, may use regex per matching here https://regexr.com/662ov. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the use of the EncodedCommand PowerShell parameter. This is typically used by Administrators to run complex scripts, but commonly used by adversaries to hide their code. \ +The analytic identifies all variations of EncodedCommand, as PowerShell allows the ability to shorten the parameter. For example enc, enco, encod and so forth. In addition, through our research it was identified that PowerShell will interpret different command switch types beyond the hyphen. We have added endash, emdash, horizontal bar, and forward slash. \ +During triage, review parallel events to determine legitimacy. Tune as needed based on admin scripts in use. \ +Alternatively, may use regex per matching here https://regexr.com/662ov. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = System administrators may use this option, but it's not common. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-18 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-18 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell", "NOBELIUM Group", "WhisperGate"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Powershell.exe running potentially malicious encodede commands on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 35}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "NOBELIUM Group", "WhisperGate"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,"(?i)[\-|\/|||]e(nc*o*d*e*d*c*o*m*m*a*n*d*)*\s+[^-]") | `malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command_filter` + +[ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for PowerShell processes started with parameters used to bypass the local execution policy for scripts. These parameters are often observed in attacks leveraging PowerShell scripts as they override the default PowerShell execution policy. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for PowerShell processes started with parameters used to bypass the local execution policy for scripts. These parameters are often observed in attacks leveraging PowerShell scripts as they override the default PowerShell execution policy. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = There may be legitimate reasons to bypass the PowerShell execution policy. The PowerShell script being run with this parameter should be validated to ensure that it is legitimate. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["DHS Report TA18-074A", "HAFNIUM Group"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = PowerShell local execution policy bypass attempt on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DHS Report TA18-074A", "HAFNIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for PowerShell processes started with parameters used to bypass the local execution policy for scripts. These parameters are often observed in attacks leveraging PowerShell scripts as they override the default PowerShell execution policy. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process_id) as process_id, values(Processes.parent_process_id) as parent_process_id values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process="* -ex*" OR Processes.process="* bypass *") by Processes.process_id, Processes.user, Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass_filter` + +[ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for PowerShell processes launched with arguments that have characters indicative of obfuscation on the command-line. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for PowerShell processes launched with arguments that have characters indicative of obfuscation on the command-line. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = These characters might be legitimately on the command-line, but it is not common. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-19 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-19 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Powershell.exe running with potential obfuscated arguments on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for PowerShell processes launched with arguments that have characters indicative of obfuscation on the command-line. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| eval num_obfuscation = (mvcount(split(process,"`"))-1) + (mvcount(split(process, "^"))-1) + (mvcount(split(process, "'"))-1) | `malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques_filter` | search num_obfuscation > 10 + +[ESCU - Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic looks for the use of Mimikatz command line parameters leveraged to execute pass the ticket attacks. Red teams and adversaries alike may use the pass the ticket technique using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Defenders should be aware that adversaries may customize the source code of Mimikatz and modify the command line parameters. This would effectively bypass this analytic. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1550", "T1550.003"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic looks for the use of Mimikatz command line parameters leveraged to execute pass the ticket attacks. Red teams and adversaries alike may use the pass the ticket technique using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Defenders should be aware that adversaries may customize the source code of Mimikatz and modify the command line parameters. This would effectively bypass this analytic. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Although highly unlikely, legitimate applications may use the same command line parameters as Mimikatz. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-01 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-01 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Mimikatz command line parameters for pass the ticket attacks were used on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 36}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 36}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1550", "T1550.003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic looks for the use of Mimikatz command line parameters leveraged to execute pass the ticket attacks. Red teams and adversaries alike may use the pass the ticket technique using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Defenders should be aware that adversaries may customize the source code of Mimikatz and modify the command line parameters. This would effectively bypass this analytic. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process = "*sekurlsa::tickets /export*" OR Processes.process = "*kerberos::ptt*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mimikatz_passtheticket_commandline_parameters_filter` + +[ESCU - Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies `mmc.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the DCOM protocol and the MMC20 COM object, the executed command is spawned as a child processs of `mmc.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of mmc.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.003"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies `mmc.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the DCOM protocol and the MMC20 COM object, the executed command is spawned as a child processs of `mmc.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of mmc.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-23 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-23 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Mmc.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 54}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies `mmc.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the DCOM protocol and the MMC20 COM object, the executed command is spawned as a child processs of `mmc.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of mmc.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=mmc.exe) (Processes.process_name IN ("Regsvcs.exe", "Ftp.exe", "OfflineScannerShell.exe", "Rasautou.exe", "Schtasks.exe", "Xwizard.exe", "Dllhost.exe", "Pnputil.exe", "Atbroker.exe", "Pcwrun.exe", "Ttdinject.exe","Mshta.exe", "Bitsadmin.exe", "Certoc.exe", "Ieexec.exe", "Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe", "Runscripthelper.exe", "Forfiles.exe", "Msbuild.exe", "Register-cimprovider.exe", "Tttracer.exe", "Ie4uinit.exe", "Bash.exe", "Hh.exe", "SettingSyncHost.exe", "Cmstp.exe", "Mmc.exe", "Stordiag.exe", "Scriptrunner.exe", "Odbcconf.exe", "Extexport.exe", "Msdt.exe", "WorkFolders.exe", "Diskshadow.exe", "Mavinject.exe", "Regasm.exe", "Gpscript.exe", "Rundll32.exe", "Regsvr32.exe", "Msiexec.exe", "Wuauclt.exe", "Presentationhost.exe", "Wmic.exe", "Runonce.exe", "Syncappvpublishingserver.exe", "Verclsid.exe", "Infdefaultinstall.exe", "Explorer.exe", "Installutil.exe", "Netsh.exe", "Wab.exe", "Dnscmd.exe", "At.exe", "Pcalua.exe", "Msconfig.exe")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mmc_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter` + +[ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic identifies suspicious modification of registry to deface or change the wallpaper of a compromised machines as part of its payload. This technique was commonly seen in ransomware like REVIL where it create a bitmap file contain a note that the machine was compromised and make it as a wallpaper. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1491"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic identifies suspicious modification of registry to deface or change the wallpaper of a compromised machines as part of its payload. This technique was commonly seen in ransomware like REVIL where it create a bitmap file contain a note that the machine was compromised and make it as a wallpaper. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Image, TargetObject registry key, registry Details from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +action.escu.known_false_positives = 3rd party tool may used to changed the wallpaper of the machine +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-02 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-02 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware", "BlackMatter Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Wallpaper modification on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 54}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware", "BlackMatter Ransomware"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1491"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic identifies suspicious modification of registry to deface or change the wallpaper of a compromised machines as part of its payload. This technique was commonly seen in ransomware like REVIL where it create a bitmap file contain a note that the machine was compromised and make it as a wallpaper. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Modification Of Wallpaper +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `sysmon` EventCode =13 (TargetObject= "*\\Control Panel\\Desktop\\Wallpaper" AND Image != "*\\explorer.exe") OR (TargetObject= "*\\Control Panel\\Desktop\\Wallpaper" AND Details = "*\\temp\\*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Image TargetObject Details Computer process_guid process_id user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `modification_of_wallpaper_filter` + +[ESCU - Modify ACL permission To Files Or Folder - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic identifies suspicious modification of ACL permission to a files or folder to make it available to everyone. This technique may be used by the adversary to evade ACLs or protected files access. This changes is commonly configured by the file or directory owner with appropriate permission. This behavior is a good indicator if this command seen on a machine utilized by an account with no permission to do so. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic identifies suspicious modification of ACL permission to a files or folder to make it available to everyone. This technique may be used by the adversary to evade ACLs or protected files access. This changes is commonly configured by the file or directory owner with appropriate permission. This behavior is a good indicator if this command seen on a machine utilized by an account with no permission to do so. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed cacls.exe may be used. +action.escu.known_false_positives = administrators may use this command. Filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-05-04 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-05-04 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Modify ACL permission To Files Or Folder - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["XMRig"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious ACL permission modification on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 32}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Modify ACL permission To Files Or Folder - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic identifies suspicious modification of ACL permission to a files or folder to make it available to everyone. This technique may be used by the adversary to evade ACLs or protected files access. This changes is commonly configured by the file or directory owner with appropriate permission. This behavior is a good indicator if this command seen on a machine utilized by an account with no permission to do so. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Modify ACL permission To Files Or Folder +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "cacls.exe" OR Processes.process_name = "icacls.exe" OR Processes.process_name = "xcacls.exe" AND (Processes.process = "*/G everyone:*" OR Processes.process = "*/G SYSTEM:*") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `modify_acl_permission_to_files_or_folder_filter` + +[ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for registry activity associated with modifications to the registry key `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors`. In this scenario, an attacker can load an arbitrary .dll into the print-monitor registry by giving the full path name to the after.dll. The system will execute the .dll with elevated (SYSTEM) permissions and will persist after reboot. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.010", "T1547"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for registry activity associated with modifications to the registry key `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors`. In this scenario, an attacker can load an arbitrary .dll into the print-monitor registry by giving the full path name to the after.dll. The system will execute the .dll with elevated (SYSTEM) permissions and will persist after reboot. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report registry modifications. +action.escu.known_false_positives = You will encounter noise from legitimate print-monitor registry entries. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-01-28 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-01-28 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows Persistence Techniques"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = New print monitor added on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 5"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.010", "T1547"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for registry activity associated with modifications to the registry key `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors`. In this scenario, an attacker can load an arbitrary .dll into the print-monitor registry by giving the full path name to the after.dll. The system will execute the .dll with elevated (SYSTEM) permissions and will persist after reboot. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.action=modified AND Registry.registry_path="*CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors*" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors_filter` + +[ESCU - MS Scripting Process Loading Ldap Module - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search is to detect a suspicious MS scripting process such as wscript.exe or cscript.exe that loading ldap module to process ldap query. This behavior was seen in FIN7 implant where it uses javascript to execute ldap query to parse host information that will send to its C2 server. this anomaly detections is a good initial step to hunt further a suspicious ldap query or ldap related events to the host that may give you good information regarding ldap or AD information processing or might be a attacker. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.007"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious MS scripting process such as wscript.exe or cscript.exe that loading ldap module to process ldap query. This behavior was seen in FIN7 implant where it uses javascript to execute ldap query to parse host information that will send to its C2 server. this anomaly detections is a good initial step to hunt further a suspicious ldap query or ldap related events to the host that may give you good information regarding ldap or AD information processing or might be a attacker. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. +action.escu.known_false_positives = automation scripting language may used by network operator to do ldap query. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-13 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-13 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - MS Scripting Process Loading Ldap Module - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["FIN7"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = $process_name$ loading ldap modules $ImageLoaded$ in $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 9}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - MS Scripting Process Loading Ldap Module - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["FIN7"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.007"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `sysmon` EventCode =7 Image IN ("*\\wscript.exe", "*\\cscript.exe") ImageLoaded IN ("*\\Wldap32.dll", "*\\adsldp.dll", "*\\adsldpc.dll") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Image EventCode process_name ProcessId ProcessGuid Computer ImageLoaded | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module_filter` + +[ESCU - MS Scripting Process Loading WMI Module - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search is to detect a suspicious MS scripting process such as wscript.exe or cscript.exe that loading wmi module to process wmi query. This behavior was seen in FIN7 implant where it uses javascript to execute wmi query to parse host information that will send to its C2 server. this anomaly detections is a good initial step to hunt further a suspicious wmi query or wmi related events to the host that may give you good information regarding process that are commonly using wmi query or modules or might be an attacker using this technique. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.007"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious MS scripting process such as wscript.exe or cscript.exe that loading wmi module to process wmi query. This behavior was seen in FIN7 implant where it uses javascript to execute wmi query to parse host information that will send to its C2 server. this anomaly detections is a good initial step to hunt further a suspicious wmi query or wmi related events to the host that may give you good information regarding process that are commonly using wmi query or modules or might be an attacker using this technique. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. +action.escu.known_false_positives = automation scripting language may used by network operator to do ldap query. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-13 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-13 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - MS Scripting Process Loading WMI Module - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["FIN7"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = $process_name$ loading wmi modules $ImageLoaded$ in $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 9}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - MS Scripting Process Loading WMI Module - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["FIN7"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.007"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `sysmon` EventCode =7 Image IN ("*\\wscript.exe", "*\\cscript.exe") ImageLoaded IN ("*\\fastprox.dll", "*\\wbemdisp.dll", "*\\wbemprox.dll", "*\\wbemsvc.dll" , "*\\wmiutils.dll", "*\\wbemcomn.dll") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Image EventCode process_name ProcessId ProcessGuid Computer ImageLoaded | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module_filter` + +[ESCU - MSBuild Suspicious Spawned By Script Process - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious child process of MSBuild spawned by Windows Script Host - cscript or wscript. This behavior or event are commonly seen and used by malware or adversaries to execute malicious msbuild process using malicious script in the compromised host. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any file modifications. MSBuild may load a script from the same path without having command-line arguments. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1127.001", "T1127"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to detect a suspicious child process of MSBuild spawned by Windows Script Host - cscript or wscript. This behavior or event are commonly seen and used by malware or adversaries to execute malicious msbuild process using malicious script in the compromised host. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any file modifications. MSBuild may load a script from the same path without having command-line arguments. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as developers do not spawn MSBuild via a WSH. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-04 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-04 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - MSBuild Suspicious Spawned By Script Process - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Msbuild.exe process spawned by $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ executed by $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 49}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - MSBuild Suspicious Spawned By Script Process - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1127.001", "T1127"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious child process of MSBuild spawned by Windows Script Host - cscript or wscript. This behavior or event are commonly seen and used by malware or adversaries to execute malicious msbuild process using malicious script in the compromised host. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any file modifications. MSBuild may load a script from the same path without having command-line arguments. +action.notable.param.rule_title = MSBuild Suspicious Spawned By Script Process +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("wscript.exe", "cscript.exe") AND `process_msbuild` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process_filter` + +[ESCU - Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search is to detect a suspicious mshta.exe process that spawn rundll32 or regsvr32 child process. This technique was seen in several malware nowadays like trickbot to load its initial .dll stage loader to execute and download the the actual trickbot payload. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.005"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious mshta.exe process that spawn rundll32 or regsvr32 child process. This technique was seen in several malware nowadays like trickbot to load its initial .dll stage loader to execute and download the the actual trickbot payload. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = limitted. this anomaly behavior is not commonly seen in clean host. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-19 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-19 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Trickbot", "IcedID"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = a mshta parent process $parent_process_name$ spawn child process $process_name$ in host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 56}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Trickbot", "IcedID"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious mshta.exe process that spawn rundll32 or regsvr32 child process. This technique was seen in several malware nowadays like trickbot to load its initial .dll stage loader to execute and download the the actual trickbot payload. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name = "mshta.exe" `process_rundll32` OR `process_regsvr32` by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process_filter` + +[ESCU - MSHTML Module Load in Office Product - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following detection identifies the module load of mshtml.dll into an Office product. This behavior has been related to CVE-2021-40444, whereas the malicious document will load ActiveX, which activates the MSHTML component. The vulnerability resides in the MSHTML component. During triage, identify parallel processes and capture any file modifications for analysis. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following detection identifies the module load of mshtml.dll into an Office product. This behavior has been related to CVE-2021-40444, whereas the malicious document will load ActiveX, which activates the MSHTML component. The vulnerability resides in the MSHTML component. During triage, identify parallel processes and capture any file modifications for analysis. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process names and image loads from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives will be present, however, tune as necessary. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-09 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-09 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - MSHTML Module Load in Office Product - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ loading mshtml.dll. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - MSHTML Module Load in Office Product - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following detection identifies the module load of mshtml.dll into an Office product. This behavior has been related to CVE-2021-40444, whereas the malicious document will load ActiveX, which activates the MSHTML component. The vulnerability resides in the MSHTML component. During triage, identify parallel processes and capture any file modifications for analysis. +action.notable.param.rule_title = MSHTML Module Load in Office Product +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `sysmon` EventID=7 process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe","wordpad.exe","wordview.exe") ImageLoaded IN ("*\\mshtml.dll", "*\\Microsoft.mshtml.dll","*\\IE.Interop.MSHTML.dll","*\\MshtmlDac.dll","*\\MshtmlDed.dll","*\\MshtmlDer.dll") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, process_name, ImageLoaded, OriginalFileName, process_id | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mshtml_module_load_in_office_product_filter` + +[ESCU - MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following hunting analytic identifies `msi.dll` being loaded by a binary not located in `system32`, `syswow64`, `winsxs` or `windows` paths. This behavior is most recently related to InstallerFileTakeOver, or CVE-2021-41379, and DLL side-loading. CVE-2021-41379 requires a binary to be dropped and `msi.dll` to be loaded by it. To Successful exploitation of this issue happens in four parts \ +1. Generation of an MSI that will trigger bad behavior. \ +1. Preparing a directory for MSI installation. \ +1. Inducing an error state. \ +1. Racing to introduce a junction and a symlink to trick msiexec.exe to modify the attacker specified file. \ +In addition, `msi.dll` has been abused in DLL side-loading attacks by being loaded by non-system binaries. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.002", "T1574"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following hunting analytic identifies `msi.dll` being loaded by a binary not located in `system32`, `syswow64`, `winsxs` or `windows` paths. This behavior is most recently related to InstallerFileTakeOver, or CVE-2021-41379, and DLL side-loading. CVE-2021-41379 requires a binary to be dropped and `msi.dll` to be loaded by it. To Successful exploitation of this issue happens in four parts \ +1. Generation of an MSI that will trigger bad behavior. \ +1. Preparing a directory for MSI installation. \ +1. Inducing an error state. \ +1. Racing to introduce a junction and a symlink to trick msiexec.exe to modify the attacker specified file. \ +In addition, `msi.dll` has been abused in DLL side-loading attacks by being loaded by non-system binaries. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible some Administrative utilities will load msi.dll outside of normal system paths, filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-08 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-08 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Privilege Escalation"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = The following module $ImageLoaded$ was loaded by $Image$ outside of the normal system paths on endpoint $Computer$, potentally related to DLL side-loading. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process name"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-41379"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.002", "T1574"], "observable": [{"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process Name"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded="*\\msi.dll" NOT (Image IN ("*\\System32\\*","*\\syswow64\\*","*\\windows\\*", "*\\winsxs\\*")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name Computer EventCode ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `msi_module_loaded_by_non_system_binary_filter` + +[ESCU - Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search is to detect a suspicious creation of msmpeng.exe or mpsvc.dll in non default windows defender folder. This technique was seen couple days ago with revil ransomware in Kaseya Supply chain. The approach is to drop an old version of msmpeng.exe to load the actual payload name as mspvc.dll which will load the revil ransomware to the compromise machine +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.002", "T1574"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious creation of msmpeng.exe or mpsvc.dll in non default windows defender folder. This technique was seen couple days ago with revil ransomware in Kaseya Supply chain. The approach is to drop an old version of msmpeng.exe to load the actual payload name as mspvc.dll which will load the revil ransomware to the compromise machine +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = quite minimal false positive expected. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-05 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-05 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.002", "T1574"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious creation of msmpeng.exe or mpsvc.dll in non default windows defender folder. This technique was seen couple days ago with revil ransomware in Kaseya Supply chain. The approach is to drop an old version of msmpeng.exe to load the actual payload name as mspvc.dll which will load the revil ransomware to the compromise machine +action.notable.param.rule_title = Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = |tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_name = "msmpeng.exe" OR Filesystem.file_name = "mpsvc.dll") AND Filesystem.file_path != "*\\Program Files\\windows defender\\*" by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading_filter` + +[ESCU - Multiple Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple disabled domain users using the Kerberos protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using Kerberos to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. As attackers progress in a breach, mistakes will be made. In certain scenarios, adversaries may execute a password spraying attack against disabled users. Event 4768 is generated every time the Key Distribution Center issues a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). Failure code `0x12` stands for `clients credentials have been revoked` (account disabled, expired or locked out).\ +The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ +This detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\ +The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source ip and attempted user accounts. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003", "T1110"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple disabled domain users using the Kerberos protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using Kerberos to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. As attackers progress in a breach, mistakes will be made. In certain scenarios, adversaries may execute a password spraying attack against disabled users. Event 4768 is generated every time the Key Distribution Center issues a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). Failure code `0x12` stands for `clients credentials have been revoked` (account disabled, expired or locked out).\ +The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ +This detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\ +The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source ip and attempted user accounts. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled. +action.escu.known_false_positives = A host failing to authenticate with multiple disabled domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, multi-user systems missconfigured systems. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-14 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-14 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Multiple Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Password Spraying", "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Potential Kerberos based password spraying attack from $Client_Address$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Client_Address", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Multiple Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying", "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "Client_Address", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 Account_Name!="*$" Result_Code=0x12 | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Account_Name) AS unique_accounts values(Account_Name) as tried_accounts by _time, Client_Address | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Client_Address | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_disabled_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos_filter` + +[ESCU - Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple invalid domain users using the Kerberos protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using Kerberos to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. As attackers progress in a breach, mistakes will be made. In certain scenarios, adversaries may execute a password spraying attack using an invalid list of users. Event 4768 is generated every time the Key Distribution Center issues a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). Failure code 0x6 stands for `client not found in Kerberos database` (the attempted user is not a valid domain user).\ +The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ +This detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\ +The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source ip and attempted user accounts. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003", "T1110"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple invalid domain users using the Kerberos protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using Kerberos to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. As attackers progress in a breach, mistakes will be made. In certain scenarios, adversaries may execute a password spraying attack using an invalid list of users. Event 4768 is generated every time the Key Distribution Center issues a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). Failure code 0x6 stands for `client not found in Kerberos database` (the attempted user is not a valid domain user).\ +The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ +This detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\ +The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source ip and attempted user accounts. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled. +action.escu.known_false_positives = A host failing to authenticate with multiple invalid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, multi-user systems and missconfigured systems. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-14 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-14 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Password Spraying", "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Potential Kerberos based password spraying attack from $Client_Address$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Client_Address", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying", "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "Client_Address", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 Result_Code=0x6 Account_Name!="*$" | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Account_Name) AS unique_accounts values(Account_Name) as tried_accounts by _time, Client_Address | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Client_Address | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos_filter` + +[ESCU - Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple invalid users using the NTLM protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using NTLM to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. As attackers progress in a breach, mistakes will be made. In certain scenarios, adversaries may execute a password spraying attack using an invalid list of users. Event 4776 is generated on the computer that is authoritative for the provided credentials. For domain accounts, the domain controller is authoritative. For local accounts, the local computer is authoritative. Error code 0xC0000064 stands for `The username you typed does not exist` (the attempted user is a legitimate domain user).\ +The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ +This detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\ +The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source workstation name and attempted user accounts. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003", "T1110"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple invalid users using the NTLM protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using NTLM to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. As attackers progress in a breach, mistakes will be made. In certain scenarios, adversaries may execute a password spraying attack using an invalid list of users. Event 4776 is generated on the computer that is authoritative for the provided credentials. For domain accounts, the domain controller is authoritative. For local accounts, the local computer is authoritative. Error code 0xC0000064 stands for `The username you typed does not exist` (the attempted user is a legitimate domain user).\ +The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ +This detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\ +The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source workstation name and attempted user accounts. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Credential Validation' within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled. +action.escu.known_false_positives = A host failing to authenticate with multiple invalid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners and missconfigured systems. If this detection triggers on a host other than a Domain Controller, the behavior could represent a password spraying attack against the host's local accounts. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-15 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-15 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Password Spraying"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Potential NTLM based password spraying attack from $Source_Workstation$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Source_Workstation", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "Source_Workstation", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4776 Logon_Account!="*$" 0xC0000064 action=failure | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Logon_Account) AS unique_accounts values(Logon_Account) as tried_accounts by _time, Source_Workstation | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Source_Workstation | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm_filter` + +[ESCU - Multiple Users Attempting To Authenticate Using Explicit Credentials - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies a source user failing to authenticate with multiple users using explicit credentials on a host. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4648 is generated when a process attempts an account logon by explicitly specifying that accounts credentials. This event generates on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations.\ +The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ +This detection will trigger on the potenfially malicious host, perhaps controlled via a trojan or operated by an insider threat, from where a password spraying attack is being executed.\ +The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source account, attempted user accounts and the endpoint were the behavior was identified. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003", "T1110"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies a source user failing to authenticate with multiple users using explicit credentials on a host. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4648 is generated when a process attempts an account logon by explicitly specifying that accounts credentials. This event generates on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations.\ +The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ +This detection will trigger on the potenfially malicious host, perhaps controlled via a trojan or operated by an insider threat, from where a password spraying attack is being executed.\ +The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source account, attempted user accounts and the endpoint were the behavior was identified. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Event Logs from domain controllers as well as member servers and workstations. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Logon` within `Logon/Logoff` needs to be enabled. +action.escu.known_false_positives = A source user failing attempting to authenticate multiple users on a host is not a common behavior for regular systems. Some applications, however, may exhibit this behavior in which case sets of users hosts can be added to an allow list. Possible false positive scenarios include systems where several users connect to like Mail servers, identity providers, remote desktop services, Citrix, etc. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-13 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-13 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Multiple Users Attempting To Authenticate Using Explicit Credentials - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Password Spraying"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Potential password spraying attack from $ComputerName$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Multiple Users Attempting To Authenticate Using Explicit Credentials - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4648 | bucket span=2m _time | eval Source_Account = mvindex(Account_Name, 0) | eval Destination_Account = mvindex(Account_Name, 1) | search Source_Account != "*$" Source_Account !="-" Destination_Account !="*$" | stats dc(Destination_Account) AS unique_accounts values(Destination_Account) as tried_account by _time, ComputerName, Source_Account | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by ComputerName | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_users_attempting_to_authenticate_using_explicit_credentials_filter` + +[ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple valid users using the Kerberos protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using Kerberos to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4771 is generated when the Key Distribution Center fails to issue a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). Failure code 0x18 stands for `wrong password provided` (the attempted user is a legitimate domain user).\ +The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ +This detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\ +The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source ip and attempted user accounts. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003", "T1110"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple valid users using the Kerberos protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using Kerberos to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4771 is generated when the Key Distribution Center fails to issue a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). Failure code 0x18 stands for `wrong password provided` (the attempted user is a legitimate domain user).\ +The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ +This detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\ +The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source ip and attempted user accounts. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled. +action.escu.known_false_positives = A host failing to authenticate with multiple valid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, missconfigured systems and multi-user systems like Citrix farms. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-08 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-08 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Password Spraying", "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Potential Kerberos based password spraying attack from $Client_Address$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Client_Address", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying", "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "Client_Address", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4771 Failure_Code=0x18 Account_Name!="*$" | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Account_Name) AS unique_accounts values(Account_Name) as tried_accounts by _time, Client_Address | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Client_Address | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos_filter` + +[ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple valid users using the NTLM protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using NTLM to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4776 is generated on the computer that is authoritative for the provided credentials. For domain accounts, the domain controller is authoritative. For local accounts, the local computer is authoritative. Error code 0xC000006A means: misspelled or bad password (the attempted user is a legitimate domain user).\ +The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ +This detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\ +The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source workstation name and attempted user accounts. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003", "T1110"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple valid users using the NTLM protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using NTLM to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4776 is generated on the computer that is authoritative for the provided credentials. For domain accounts, the domain controller is authoritative. For local accounts, the local computer is authoritative. Error code 0xC000006A means: misspelled or bad password (the attempted user is a legitimate domain user).\ +The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ +This detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\ +The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source workstation name and attempted user accounts. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Credential Validation` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled. +action.escu.known_false_positives = A host failing to authenticate with multiple valid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners and missconfigured systems. If this detection triggers on a host other than a Domain Controller, the behavior could represent a password spraying attack against the host's local accounts. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-13 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-13 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Password Spraying"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Potential NTLM based password spraying attack from $Source_Workstation$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Source_Workstation", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "Source_Workstation", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4776 Logon_Account!="*$" 0xC000006A action=failure | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Logon_Account) AS unique_accounts values(Logon_Account) as tried_accounts by _time, Source_Workstation | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Source_Workstation | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm_filter` + +[ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Process - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies a source process name failing to authenticate with multiple users. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4625 generates on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations when an account fails to logon. Logon Type 2 describes an iteractive logon attempt.\ +The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ +This detection will trigger on the potenfially malicious host, perhaps controlled via a trojan or operated by an insider threat, from where a password spraying attack is being executed. This could be a domain controller as well as a member server or workstation.\ +The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source process name, source account and attempted user accounts. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003", "T1110"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies a source process name failing to authenticate with multiple users. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4625 generates on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations when an account fails to logon. Logon Type 2 describes an iteractive logon attempt.\ +The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ +This detection will trigger on the potenfially malicious host, perhaps controlled via a trojan or operated by an insider threat, from where a password spraying attack is being executed. This could be a domain controller as well as a member server or workstation.\ +The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source process name, source account and attempted user accounts. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Event Logs from domain controllers aas well as member servers and workstations. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Logon` within `Logon/Logoff` needs to be enabled. +action.escu.known_false_positives = A process failing to authenticate with multiple users is not a common behavior for legitimate user sessions. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners and missconfigured systems. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-13 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-13 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Process - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Password Spraying"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Potential password spraying attack from $ComputerName$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Process - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4625 Logon_Type=2 Caller_Process_Name!="-" | bucket span=2m _time | eval Source_Account = mvindex(Account_Name, 0) | eval Destination_Account = mvindex(Account_Name, 1) | stats dc(Destination_Account) AS unique_accounts values(Account_Name) as tried_accounts by _time, Caller_Process_Name, Source_Account, ComputerName | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Caller_Process_Name, Source_Account, ComputerName | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_process_filter` + +[ESCU - Multiple Users Remotely Failing To Authenticate From Host - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies a source host failing to authenticate against a remote host with multiple users. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4625 documents each and every failed attempt to logon to the local computer. This event generates on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations. Logon Type 3 describes an remote authentication attempt.\ +The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ +This detection will trigger on the host that is the target of the password spraying attack. This could be a domain controller as well as a member server or workstation.\ +The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source process name, source account and attempted user accounts. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003", "T1110"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies a source host failing to authenticate against a remote host with multiple users. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4625 documents each and every failed attempt to logon to the local computer. This event generates on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations. Logon Type 3 describes an remote authentication attempt.\ +The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ +This detection will trigger on the host that is the target of the password spraying attack. This could be a domain controller as well as a member server or workstation.\ +The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source process name, source account and attempted user accounts. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Event Logs from domain controllers as as well as member servers and workstations. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Logon` within `Logon/Logoff` needs to be enabled. +action.escu.known_false_positives = A host failing to authenticate with multiple valid users against a remote host is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, remote administration tools, missconfigyred systems, etc. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-13 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-13 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Multiple Users Remotely Failing To Authenticate From Host - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Password Spraying"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Potential password spraying attack on $ComputerName$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Multiple Users Remotely Failing To Authenticate From Host - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4625 Logon_Type=3 Source_Network_Address!="-" | bucket span=2m _time | eval Destination_Account = mvindex(Account_Name, 1) | stats dc(Destination_Account) AS unique_accounts values(Destination_Account) as tried_accounts by _time, Source_Network_Address, ComputerName | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Source_Network_Address, ComputerName | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_users_remotely_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_filter` + +[ESCU - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following hunting analytic will identify the use of localgroup discovery using `net localgroup`. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.001"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following hunting analytic will identify the use of localgroup discovery using `net localgroup`. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Tune as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-14 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-14 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery", "Windows Discovery Techniques"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Local group discovery on $dest$ by $user$. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 15}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery", "Windows Discovery Techniques"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=net.exe OR Processes.process_name=net1.exe (Processes.process="*localgroup*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `net_localgroup_discovery_filter` + +[ESCU - NET Profiler UAC bypass - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search is to detect modification of registry to bypass UAC windows feature. This technique is to add a payload dll path on .NET COR file path that will be loaded by mmc.exe as soon it was executed. This detection rely on monitoring the registry key and values in the detection area. It may happened that windows update some dll related to mmc.exe and add dll path in this registry. In this case filtering is needed. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect modification of registry to bypass UAC windows feature. This technique is to add a payload dll path on .NET COR file path that will be loaded by mmc.exe as soon it was executed. This detection rely on monitoring the registry key and values in the detection area. It may happened that windows update some dll related to mmc.exe and add dll path in this registry. In this case filtering is needed. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. +action.escu.known_false_positives = limited false positive. It may trigger by some windows update that will modify this registry. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-18 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-18 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - NET Profiler UAC bypass - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious modification of registry $registry_path$ with possible payload path $registry_value_name$ in $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - NET Profiler UAC bypass - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Inbound"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect modification of registry to bypass UAC windows feature. This technique is to add a payload dll path on .NET COR file path that will be loaded by mmc.exe as soon it was executed. This detection rely on monitoring the registry key and values in the detection area. It may happened that windows update some dll related to mmc.exe and add dll path in this registry. In this case filtering is needed. +action.notable.param.rule_title = NET Profiler UAC bypass +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\Environment\\COR_PROFILER_PATH" Registry.registry_value_data = "*.dll" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `net_profiler_uac_bypass_filter` + +[ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Arp - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for the execution of `arp.exe` utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use arp.exe for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1049"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `arp.exe` utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use arp.exe for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-10 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-10 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Arp - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Arp - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1049"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="arp.exe") (Processes.process=*-a*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `network_connection_discovery_with_arp_filter` + +[ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Net - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use net.exe for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1049"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use net.exe for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-10 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-10 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Net - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Net - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1049"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="net.exe" OR Processes.process_name="net1.exe") (Processes.process=*use*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `network_connection_discovery_with_net_filter` + +[ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for the execution of `netstat.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use netstat.exe for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1049"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `netstat.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use netstat.exe for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-10 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-10 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1049"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="netstat.exe") (Processes.process=*-a*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `network_connection_discovery_with_netstat_filter` + +[ESCU - Network Discovery Using Route Windows App - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic look for a spawned process of route.exe windows application. Adversaries and red teams alike abuse this application the recon or do a network discovery on a target host. but one possible false positive might be an automated tool used by a system administator or a powershell script in amazon ec2 config services. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1016", "T1016.001"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic look for a spawned process of route.exe windows application. Adversaries and red teams alike abuse this application the recon or do a network discovery on a target host. but one possible false positive might be an automated tool used by a system administator or a powershell script in amazon ec2 config services. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated host discovery application that may generate false positives or an amazon ec2 script that uses this application. Filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-12 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-12 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Network Discovery Using Route Windows App - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 9}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Network Discovery Using Route Windows App - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1016", "T1016.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_route` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `network_discovery_using_route_windows_app_filter` + +[ESCU - Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This query detects the Nishang Invoke-PowerShellTCPOneLine utility that spawns a call back to a remote command and control server. This is a powershell oneliner. In addition, this will capture on the command-line additional utilities used by Nishang. Triage the endpoint and identify any parallel processes that look suspicious. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain contacted by the powershell process. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This query detects the Nishang Invoke-PowerShellTCPOneLine utility that spawns a call back to a remote command and control server. This is a powershell oneliner. In addition, this will capture on the command-line additional utilities used by Nishang. Triage the endpoint and identify any parallel processes that look suspicious. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain contacted by the powershell process. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present. Filter as needed based on initial analysis. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-03 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-03 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["HAFNIUM Group"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Possible Nishang Invoke-PowerShellTCPOneLine behavior on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["HAFNIUM Group"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Command And Control"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This query detects the Nishang Invoke-PowerShellTCPOneLine utility that spawns a call back to a remote command and control server. This is a powershell oneliner. In addition, this will capture on the command-line additional utilities used by Nishang. Triage the endpoint and identify any parallel processes that look suspicious. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain contacted by the powershell process. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process=*Net.Sockets.TCPClient* AND Processes.process=*System.Text.ASCIIEncoding*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `nishang_powershelltcponeline_filter` + +[ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for the execution of `nltest.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for Domain Trust information. Two arguments `/domain trusts`, returns a list of trusted domains, and `/all_trusts`, returns all trusted domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike use NLTest.exe to enumerate the current domain to assist with further understanding where to pivot next. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for the execution of `nltest.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for Domain Trust information. Two arguments `/domain trusts`, returns a list of trusted domains, and `/all_trusts`, returns all trusted domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike use NLTest.exe to enumerate the current domain to assist with further understanding where to pivot next. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may use nltest for troubleshooting purposes, otherwise, rarely used. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-25 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-25 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ryuk Ransomware", "Domain Trust Discovery", "IcedID", "Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Domain trust discovery execution on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware", "Domain Trust Discovery", "IcedID", "Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for the execution of `nltest.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for Domain Trust information. Two arguments `/domain trusts`, returns a list of trusted domains, and `/all_trusts`, returns all trusted domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike use NLTest.exe to enumerate the current domain to assist with further understanding where to pivot next. +action.notable.param.rule_title = NLTest Domain Trust Discovery +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=nltest.exe OR Processes.process_name!=nltest.exe) (Processes.process=*/domain_trusts* OR Processes.process=*/all_trusts*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `nltest_domain_trust_discovery_filter` + +[ESCU - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search is to detect an anomaly event of non-chrome process accessing the files in chrome user default folder. This folder contains all the sqlite database of the chrome browser related to users login, history, cookies and etc. Most of the RAT, trojan spy as well as FIN7 jssloader try to parse the those sqlite database to collect information on the compromised host. This SACL Event (4663) need to be enabled to tthe firefox profile directory to be eable to use this. Since you monitoring this access to the folder a noise coming from firefox need to be filter and also sqlite db browser and explorer .exe to make this detection more stable. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1555", "T1555.003"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect an anomaly event of non-chrome process accessing the files in chrome user default folder. This folder contains all the sqlite database of the chrome browser related to users login, history, cookies and etc. Most of the RAT, trojan spy as well as FIN7 jssloader try to parse the those sqlite database to collect information on the compromised host. This SACL Event (4663) need to be enabled to tthe firefox profile directory to be eable to use this. Since you monitoring this access to the folder a noise coming from firefox need to be filter and also sqlite db browser and explorer .exe to make this detection more stable. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663. For 4663, enable "Audit Object Access" in Group Policy. Then check the two boxes listed for both "Success" and "Failure." +action.escu.known_false_positives = other browser not listed related to firefox may catch by this rule. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-15 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-15 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["FIN7", "Remcos"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = a non firefox browser process $process_name$ accessing $Object_Name$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 35}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 35}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["FIN7", "Remcos"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1555", "T1555.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 NOT (process_name IN ("*\\chrome.exe", "*\\explorer.exe", "*sql*")) Object_Name="*\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data\\Default*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Object_Name Object_Type process_name Access_Mask Accesses process_id EventCode dest user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir_filter` + +[ESCU - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search is to detect an anomaly event of non-firefox process accessing the files in profile folder. This folder contains all the sqlite database of the firefox browser related to users login, history, cookies and etc. Most of the RAT, trojan spy as well as FIN7 jssloader try to parse the those sqlite database to collect information on the compromised host. This SACL Event (4663) need to be enabled to tthe firefox profile directory to be eable to use this. Since you monitoring this access to the folder a noise coming from firefox need to be filter and also sqlite db browser and explorer .exe to make this detection more stable. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1555", "T1555.003"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect an anomaly event of non-firefox process accessing the files in profile folder. This folder contains all the sqlite database of the firefox browser related to users login, history, cookies and etc. Most of the RAT, trojan spy as well as FIN7 jssloader try to parse the those sqlite database to collect information on the compromised host. This SACL Event (4663) need to be enabled to tthe firefox profile directory to be eable to use this. Since you monitoring this access to the folder a noise coming from firefox need to be filter and also sqlite db browser and explorer .exe to make this detection more stable. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663. For 4663, enable "Audit Object Access" in Group Policy. Then check the two boxes listed for both "Success" and "Failure." +action.escu.known_false_positives = other browser not listed related to firefox may catch by this rule. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-15 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-15 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["FIN7", "Remcos"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = a non firefox browser process $process_name$ accessing $Object_Name$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 35}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 35}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["FIN7", "Remcos"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1555", "T1555.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 NOT (process_name IN ("*\\firefox.exe", "*\\explorer.exe", "*sql*")) Object_Name="*\\AppData\\Roaming\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Object_Name Object_Type process_name Access_Mask Accesses process_id EventCode dest user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir_filter` + +[ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = Monitor for signs that Ntdsutil is being used to Extract Active Directory database - NTDS.dit, typically used for offline password cracking. It may be used in normal circumstances with no command line arguments or shorthand variations of more common arguments. Ntdsutil.exe is typically seen run on a Windows Server. Typical command used to dump ntds.dit \ +ntdsutil "ac i ntds" "ifm" "create full C:\Temp" q q \ +This technique uses "Install from Media" (IFM), which will extract a copy of the Active Directory database. A successful export of the Active Directory database will yield a file modification named ntds.dit to the destination. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.003", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = Monitor for signs that Ntdsutil is being used to Extract Active Directory database - NTDS.dit, typically used for offline password cracking. It may be used in normal circumstances with no command line arguments or shorthand variations of more common arguments. Ntdsutil.exe is typically seen run on a Windows Server. Typical command used to dump ntds.dit \ +ntdsutil "ac i ntds" "ifm" "create full C:\Temp" q q \ +This technique uses "Install from Media" (IFM), which will extract a copy of the Active Directory database. A successful export of the Active Directory database will yield a file modification named ntds.dit to the destination. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Highly possible Server Administrators will troubleshoot with ntdsutil.exe, generating false positives. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-28 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-28 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Credential Dumping", "HAFNIUM Group"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Active Directory NTDS export on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 50}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "HAFNIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.003", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = Monitor for signs that Ntdsutil is being used to Extract Active Directory database - NTDS.dit, typically used for offline password cracking. It may be used in normal circumstances with no command line arguments or shorthand variations of more common arguments. Ntdsutil.exe is typically seen run on a Windows Server. Typical command used to dump ntds.dit \ +ntdsutil "ac i ntds" "ifm" "create full C:\Temp" q q \ +This technique uses "Install from Media" (IFM), which will extract a copy of the Active Directory database. A successful export of the Active Directory database will yield a file modification named ntds.dit to the destination. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Ntdsutil Export NTDS +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=ntdsutil.exe Processes.process=*ntds* Processes.process=*create*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ntdsutil_export_ntds_filter` + +[ESCU - Office Application Drop Executable - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search is to detect a suspicious MS office application that drop or create executables or script in the host. This behavior is commonly seen in spear phishing office attachment where it drop malicious files or script to compromised the host. It might be some normal macro may drop script or tools as part of automation but still this behavior is reallly suspicious and not commonly seen in normal office application +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious MS office application that drop or create executables or script in the host. This behavior is commonly seen in spear phishing office attachment where it drop malicious files or script to compromised the host. It might be some normal macro may drop script or tools as part of automation but still this behavior is reallly suspicious and not commonly seen in normal office application +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. +action.escu.known_false_positives = office macro for automation may do this behavior +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-13 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-13 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Office Application Drop Executable - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["FIN7"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = process $process_name$ drops a file $TargetFilename$ in host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Office Application Drop Executable - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["FIN7"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious MS office application that drop or create executables or script in the host. This behavior is commonly seen in spear phishing office attachment where it drop malicious files or script to compromised the host. It might be some normal macro may drop script or tools as part of automation but still this behavior is reallly suspicious and not commonly seen in normal office application +action.notable.param.rule_title = Office Application Drop Executable +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe","wordpad.exe","wordview.exe") by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN ("*.exe","*.dll","*.pif","*.scr","*.js","*.vbs","*.vbe","*.ps1") by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process proc_guid] | dedup file_create_time | table dest, process_name, process, file_create_time, file_name, file_path, proc_guid | `office_application_drop_executable_filter` + +[ESCU - Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = this detection was designed to identifies suspicious spawned process of known MS office application due to macro or malicious code. this technique can be seen in so many malware like IcedID that used MS office as its weapon or attack vector to initially infect the machines. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = this detection was designed to identifies suspicious spawned process of known MS office application due to macro or malicious code. this technique can be seen in so many malware like IcedID that used MS office as its weapon or attack vector to initially infect the machines. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-30 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-30 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["IcedID"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Office application spawning regsvr32.exe on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = this detection was designed to identifies suspicious spawned process of known MS office application due to macro or malicious code. this technique can be seen in so many malware like IcedID that used MS office as its weapon or attack vector to initially infect the machines. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = "winword.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "excel.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "powerpnt.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "outlook.exe") `process_regsvr32` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process_filter` + +[ESCU - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = this detection was designed to identifies suspicious spawned process of known MS office application due to macro or malicious code. this technique can be seen in so many malware like trickbot that used MS office as its weapon or attack vector to initially infect the machines. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = this detection was designed to identifies suspicious spawned process of known MS office application due to macro or malicious code. this technique can be seen in so many malware like trickbot that used MS office as its weapon or attack vector to initially infect the machines. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-13 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-13 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Trickbot", "IcedID"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Office application spawning rundll32.exe on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Trickbot", "IcedID"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = this detection was designed to identifies suspicious spawned process of known MS office application due to macro or malicious code. this technique can be seen in so many malware like trickbot that used MS office as its weapon or attack vector to initially infect the machines. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Office Application Spawn rundll32 process +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = "winword.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "excel.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "powerpnt.exe") AND `process_rundll32` by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.process Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_application_spawn_rundll32_process_filter` + +[ESCU - Office Document Creating Schedule Task - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = this search detects a potential malicious office document that create schedule task entry through macro VBA api or through loading taskschd.dll. This technique was seen in so many malicious macro malware that create persistence , beaconing using task schedule malware entry The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it's possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.' +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = this search detects a potential malicious office document that create schedule task entry through macro VBA api or through loading taskschd.dll. This technique was seen in so many malicious macro malware that create persistence , beaconing using task schedule malware entry The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it's possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.' +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and ImageLoaded (Like sysmon EventCode 7) from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Also be sure to include those monitored dll to your own sysmon config. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-14 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-14 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Office Document Creating Schedule Task - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spearphishing Attachments"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Office document creating a schedule task on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Office Document Creating Schedule Task - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = this search detects a potential malicious office document that create schedule task entry through macro VBA api or through loading taskschd.dll. This technique was seen in so many malicious macro malware that create persistence , beaconing using task schedule malware entry The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it's possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.' +action.notable.param.rule_title = Office Document Creating Schedule Task +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `sysmon` EventCode=7 process_name IN ("WINWORD.EXE", "EXCEL.EXE", "POWERPNT.EXE") ImageLoaded = "*\\taskschd.dll" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ImageLoaded) as AllImageLoaded count by Computer EventCode Image process_name ProcessId ProcessGuid | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_document_creating_schedule_task_filter` + +[ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = this detection was designed to identifies suspicious office documents that using macro code. Macro code is known to be one of the prevalent weaponization or attack vector of threat actor. This malicious macro code is embed to a office document as an attachment that may execute malicious payload, download malware payload or other malware component. It is really good practice to disable macro by default to avoid automatically execute macro code while opening or closing a office document files. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = this detection was designed to identifies suspicious office documents that using macro code. Macro code is known to be one of the prevalent weaponization or attack vector of threat actor. This malicious macro code is embed to a office document as an attachment that may execute malicious payload, download malware payload or other malware component. It is really good practice to disable macro by default to avoid automatically execute macro code while opening or closing a office document files. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and ImageLoaded (Like sysmon EventCode 7) from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Also be sure to include those monitored dll to your own sysmon config. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Normal Office Document macro use for automation +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-14 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-14 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Trickbot", "IcedID"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Office document executing a macro on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 35}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Trickbot", "IcedID"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = this detection was designed to identifies suspicious office documents that using macro code. Macro code is known to be one of the prevalent weaponization or attack vector of threat actor. This malicious macro code is embed to a office document as an attachment that may execute malicious payload, download malware payload or other malware component. It is really good practice to disable macro by default to avoid automatically execute macro code while opening or closing a office document files. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Office Document Executing Macro Code +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `sysmon` EventCode=7 process_name IN ("WINWORD.EXE", "EXCEL.EXE", "POWERPNT.EXE") ImageLoaded IN ("*\\VBE7INTL.DLL","*\\VBE7.DLL", "*\\VBEUI.DLL") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ImageLoaded) as AllImageLoaded count by Computer EventCode Image process_name ProcessId ProcessGuid | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_document_executing_macro_code_filter` + +[ESCU - Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search is to detect potential malicious office document executing lolbin child process to download payload or other malware. Since most of the attacker abused the capability of office document to execute living on land application to blend it to the normal noise in the infected machine to cover its track. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect potential malicious office document executing lolbin child process to download payload or other malware. Since most of the attacker abused the capability of office document to execute living on land application to blend it to the normal noise in the infected machine to cover its track. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances office application and browser may be used. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Default browser not in the filter list. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-20 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-20 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spearphishing Attachments"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Office document spawning suspicious child process on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 35}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect potential malicious office document executing lolbin child process to download payload or other malware. Since most of the attacker abused the capability of office document to execute living on land application to blend it to the normal noise in the infected machine to cover its track. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe") Processes.process IN ("*http:*","*https:*") NOT (Processes.original_file_name IN("firefox.exe", "chrome.exe","iexplore.exe","msedge.exe")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_document_spawned_child_process_to_download_filter` + +[ESCU - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = this search is to detect a suspicious office product process that spawn cmd child process. This is commonly seen in a ms office product having macro to execute shell command to download or execute malicious lolbin relative to its malicious code. This is seen in trickbot spear phishing doc where it execute shell cmd to run mshta payload. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.005"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = this search is to detect a suspicious office product process that spawn cmd child process. This is commonly seen in a ms office product having macro to execute shell command to download or execute malicious lolbin relative to its malicious code. This is seen in trickbot spear phishing doc where it execute shell cmd to run mshta payload. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = IT or network admin may create an document automation that will run shell script. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-19 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-19 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Trickbot"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = an office product parent process $parent_process_name$ spawn child process $process_name$ in host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 56}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Trickbot"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = this search is to detect a suspicious office product process that spawn cmd child process. This is commonly seen in a ms office product having macro to execute shell command to download or execute malicious lolbin relative to its malicious code. This is seen in trickbot spear phishing doc where it execute shell cmd to run mshta payload. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Office Product Spawn CMD Process +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = "winword.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name= "excel.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "powerpnt.exe") `process_cmd` by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawn_cmd_process_filter` + +[ESCU - Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `bitsadmin.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `bitsadmin.exe` will contain a URL to a remote destination or similar command-line arguments as transfer, Download, priority, Foreground. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `bitsadmin.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `bitsadmin.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `bitsadmin.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `bitsadmin.exe` will contain a URL to a remote destination or similar command-line arguments as transfer, Download, priority, Foreground. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `bitsadmin.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `bitsadmin.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = No false positives known. Filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-26 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-26 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spearphishing Attachments"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ in host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `bitsadmin.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `bitsadmin.exe` will contain a URL to a remote destination or similar command-line arguments as transfer, Download, priority, Foreground. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `bitsadmin.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `bitsadmin.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe") `process_bitsadmin` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_bitsadmin_filter` + +[ESCU - Office Product Spawning CertUtil - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `certutil.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `certutil.exe` will contain a URL to a remote destination. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `certutil.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `certutil.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `certutil.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `certutil.exe` will contain a URL to a remote destination. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `certutil.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `certutil.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = No false positives known. Filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-26 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-26 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Office Product Spawning CertUtil - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spearphishing Attachments"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ in host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process name"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Office Product Spawning CertUtil - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Process Name"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `certutil.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `certutil.exe` will contain a URL to a remote destination. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `certutil.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `certutil.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Office Product Spawning CertUtil +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe") `process_certutil` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_certutil_filter` + +[ESCU - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `mshta.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `mshta.exe` will contain the `hta` file locally, or a URL to the remote destination. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `mshta.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `mshta.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `mshta.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `mshta.exe` will contain the `hta` file locally, or a URL to the remote destination. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `mshta.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `mshta.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = No false positives known. Filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-26 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-26 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spearphishing Attachments", "IcedID"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ in host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "IcedID"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `mshta.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `mshta.exe` will contain the `hta` file locally, or a URL to the remote destination. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `mshta.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `mshta.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Office Product Spawning MSHTA +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe") `process_mshta` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_mshta_filter` + +[ESCU - Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by IcedID malware family. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `rundll32.exe` without a `.dll` file extension. In malicious instances, the command-line of `rundll32.exe` will look like `rundll32 ..\oepddl.igk2,DllRegisterServer`. In addition, Threat Research has released a detection identifying the use of `DllRegisterServer` on the command-line of `rundll32.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze the `DLL` that was dropped to disk. The Office Product will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by IcedID malware family. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `rundll32.exe` without a `.dll` file extension. In malicious instances, the command-line of `rundll32.exe` will look like `rundll32 ..\oepddl.igk2,DllRegisterServer`. In addition, Threat Research has released a detection identifying the use of `DllRegisterServer` on the command-line of `rundll32.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze the `DLL` that was dropped to disk. The Office Product will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-22 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-22 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spearphishing Attachments"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ and no dll commandline $process$ in host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by IcedID malware family. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `rundll32.exe` without a `.dll` file extension. In malicious instances, the command-line of `rundll32.exe` will look like `rundll32 ..\oepddl.igk2,DllRegisterServer`. In addition, Threat Research has released a detection identifying the use of `DllRegisterServer` on the command-line of `rundll32.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze the `DLL` that was dropped to disk. The Office Product will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe") `process_rundll32` (Processes.process!=*.dll*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll_filter` + +[ESCU - Office Product Spawning Wmic - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by Ursnif malware family. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `wmic.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `wmic.exe` will contain `wmic process call create`. In addition, Threat Research has released a detection identifying the use of `wmic process call create` on the command-line of `wmic.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `wmic.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by Ursnif malware family. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `wmic.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `wmic.exe` will contain `wmic process call create`. In addition, Threat Research has released a detection identifying the use of `wmic process call create` on the command-line of `wmic.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `wmic.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = No false positives known. Filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-16 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-16 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Office Product Spawning Wmic - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spearphishing Attachments", "FIN7"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ in host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process name"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Office Product Spawning Wmic - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "FIN7"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Process Name"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by Ursnif malware family. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `wmic.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `wmic.exe` will contain `wmic process call create`. In addition, Threat Research has released a detection identifying the use of `wmic process call create` on the command-line of `wmic.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `wmic.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Office Product Spawning Wmic +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe") `process_wmic` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_wmic_filter` + +[ESCU - Office Product Writing cab or inf - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies behavior related to CVE-2021-40444. Whereas the malicious document will load ActiveX and download the remote payload (.inf, .cab). During triage, review parallel processes and further activity on endpoint to identify additional patterns. Retrieve the file modifications and analyze further. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies behavior related to CVE-2021-40444. Whereas the malicious document will load ActiveX and download the remote payload (.inf, .cab). During triage, review parallel processes and further activity on endpoint to identify additional patterns. Retrieve the file modifications and analyze further. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node and `Filesystem` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = The query is structured in a way that `action` (read, create) is not defined. Review the results of this query, filter, and tune as necessary. It may be necessary to generate this query specific to your endpoint product. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-10 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-10 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Office Product Writing cab or inf - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $process_name$ was identified on $dest$ writing an inf or cab file to this. This is not typical of $process_name$. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Office Product Writing cab or inf - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies behavior related to CVE-2021-40444. Whereas the malicious document will load ActiveX and download the remote payload (.inf, .cab). During triage, review parallel processes and further activity on endpoint to identify additional patterns. Retrieve the file modifications and analyze further. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Office Product Writing cab or inf +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe","wordpad.exe","wordview.exe") by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN ("*.inf","*.cab") by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process] | dedup file_create_time | table dest, process_name, process, file_create_time, file_name, file_path | `office_product_writing_cab_or_inf_filter` + +[ESCU - Office Spawning Control - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following detection identifies control.exe spawning from an office product. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `control.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `control.exe` will contain a file path to a .cpl or .inf, related to CVE-2021-40444. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. review parallel and child processes to identify further suspicious behavior +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following detection identifies control.exe spawning from an office product. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `control.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `control.exe` will contain a file path to a .cpl or .inf, related to CVE-2021-40444. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. review parallel and child processes to identify further suspicious behavior +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives should be present. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-08 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-08 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Office Spawning Control - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ clicking a suspicious attachment. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Office Spawning Control - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following detection identifies control.exe spawning from an office product. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `control.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `control.exe` will contain a file path to a .cpl or .inf, related to CVE-2021-40444. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. review parallel and child processes to identify further suspicious behavior +action.notable.param.rule_title = Office Spawning Control +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe","wordpad.exe","wordview.exe") Processes.process_name=control.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `office_spawning_control_filter` + +[ESCU - Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = A required step while exploiting the CVE-2021-44228-Log4j vulnerability is that the victim server will perform outbound connections to attacker-controlled infrastructure. This is required as part of the JNDI lookup as well as for retrieving the second stage .class payload. The following analytic identifies the Java process reaching out to default ports used by the LDAP and RMI protocols. This behavior could represent successfull exploitation. Note that adversaries can easily decide to use arbitrary ports for these protocols and potentially bypass this detection. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = A required step while exploiting the CVE-2021-44228-Log4j vulnerability is that the victim server will perform outbound connections to attacker-controlled infrastructure. This is required as part of the JNDI lookup as well as for retrieving the second stage .class payload. The following analytic identifies the Java process reaching out to default ports used by the LDAP and RMI protocols. This behavior could represent successfull exploitation. Note that adversaries can easily decide to use arbitrary ports for these protocols and potentially bypass this detection. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate Java applications may use perform outbound connections to these ports. Filter as needed +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-13 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-13 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Java performed outbound connections to default ports of LDAP or RMI on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 54}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = A required step while exploiting the CVE-2021-44228-Log4j vulnerability is that the victim server will perform outbound connections to attacker-controlled infrastructure. This is required as part of the JNDI lookup as well as for retrieving the second stage .class payload. The following analytic identifies the Java process reaching out to default ports used by the LDAP and RMI protocols. This behavior could represent successfull exploitation. Note that adversaries can easily decide to use arbitrary ports for these protocols and potentially bypass this detection. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="java.exe" OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe) by _time Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where (Ports.dest_port= 389 OR Ports.dest_port= 636 OR Ports.dest_port = 1389 OR Ports.dest_port = 1099 ) by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port| `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process connection_to_CNC dest_port | `outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter` + +[ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = Microsoft Windows contains accessibility features that can be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in. An adversary can modify or replace these programs so they can get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system. This search looks for modifications to these binaries. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546", "T1546.008"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = Microsoft Windows contains accessibility features that can be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in. An adversary can modify or replace these programs so they can get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system. This search looks for modifications to these binaries. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Microsoft may provide updates to these binaries. Verify that these changes do not correspond with your normal software update cycle. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Privilege Escalation"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A suspicious file modification or replace in $file_path$ in host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}, {"threat_object_field": "file_path", "threat_object_type": "file"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546", "T1546.008"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "file_path", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "File"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = Microsoft Windows contains accessibility features that can be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in. An adversary can modify or replace these programs so they can get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system. This search looks for modifications to these binaries. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Overwriting Accessibility Binaries +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_path=*\\Windows\\System32\\sethc.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\Windows\\System32\\utilman.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\Windows\\System32\\osk.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\Windows\\System32\\Magnify.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\Windows\\System32\\Narrator.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\Windows\\System32\\DisplaySwitch.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\Windows\\System32\\AtBroker.exe*) by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `overwriting_accessibility_binaries_filter` + +[ESCU - Password Policy Discovery with Net - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command line arguments used to obtain the domain password policy. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `net.exe` for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command line arguments used to obtain the domain password policy. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `net.exe` for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-26 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-26 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Password Policy Discovery with Net - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 9}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 9}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Password Policy Discovery with Net - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="net.exe" OR Processes.process_name="net1.exe") AND Processes.process = "*accounts*" AND Processes.process = "*/domain*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `password_policy_discovery_with_net_filter` + +[ESCU - Permission Modification using Takeown App - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search is to detect a modification of file or directory permission using takeown.exe windows app. This technique was seen in some ransomware that take the ownership of a folder or files to encrypt or delete it. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a modification of file or directory permission using takeown.exe windows app. This technique was seen in some ransomware that take the ownership of a folder or files to encrypt or delete it. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +action.escu.known_false_positives = takeown.exe is a normal windows application that may used by network operator. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-10 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-10 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Permission Modification using Takeown App - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A suspicious of execution of $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ and commandline $process$ to modify permission of directory or files in host $dest$ action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 @@ -12997,13 +21318,13 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * * dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Excessive number of taskhost processes - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Meterpreter"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Permission Modification using Takeown App - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This detection targets behaviors observed in post exploit kits like Meterpreter and Koadic that are run in memory. We have observed that these tools must invoke an excessive number of taskhost.exe and taskhostex.exe processes to complete various actions (discovery, lateral movement, etc.). It is extremely uncommon in the course of normal operations to see so many distinct taskhost and taskhostex processes running concurrently in a short time frame. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Excessive number of taskhost processes +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a modification of file or directory permission using takeown.exe windows app. This technique was seen in some ransomware that take the ownership of a folder or files to encrypt or delete it. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Permission Modification using Takeown App action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 @@ -13015,7 +21336,12433 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process_id) as process_ids min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE Processes.process_name = "taskhost.exe" OR Processes.process_name = "taskhostex.exe" BY Processes.dest Processes.process_name _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | eval pid_count=mvcount(process_ids) | eval taskhost_count_=if(process_name == "taskhost.exe", pid_count, 0) | eval taskhostex_count_=if(process_name == "taskhostex.exe", pid_count, 0) | stats sum(taskhost_count_) as taskhost_count, sum(taskhostex_count_) as taskhostex_count by _time, dest, firstTime, lastTime | where taskhost_count > 10 and taskhostex_count > 10 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_number_of_taskhost_processes_filter` +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "takeown.exe" Processes.process = "*/f*" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `permission_modification_using_takeown_app_filter` + +[ESCU - PetitPotam Network Share Access Request - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic utilizes Windows Event Code 5145, "A network share object was checked to see whether client can be granted desired access". During our research into PetitPotam, CVE-2021-36942, we identified the ocurrence of this event on the target host with specific values. \ +To enable 5145 events via Group Policy - Computer Configuration->Polices->Windows Settings->Security Settings->Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Expand this node, go to Object Access (Audit Polices->Object Access), then select the Setting Audit Detailed File Share Audit \ +It is possible this is not enabled by default and may need to be reviewed and enabled. \ +During triage, review parallel security events to identify further suspicious activity. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1187"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes Windows Event Code 5145, "A network share object was checked to see whether client can be granted desired access". During our research into PetitPotam, CVE-2021-36942, we identified the ocurrence of this event on the target host with specific values. \ +To enable 5145 events via Group Policy - Computer Configuration->Polices->Windows Settings->Security Settings->Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Expand this node, go to Object Access (Audit Polices->Object Access), then select the Setting Audit Detailed File Share Audit \ +It is possible this is not enabled by default and may need to be reviewed and enabled. \ +During triage, review parallel security events to identify further suspicious activity. +action.escu.how_to_implement = Windows Event Code 5145 is required to utilize this analytic and it may not be enabled in most environments. +action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives have been limited when the Anonymous Logon is used for Account Name. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-31 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-31 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - PetitPotam Network Share Access Request - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A remote host is enumerating a $dest$ to identify permissions. This is a precursor event to CVE-2021-36942, PetitPotam. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - PetitPotam Network Share Access Request - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-36942"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1187"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes Windows Event Code 5145, "A network share object was checked to see whether client can be granted desired access". During our research into PetitPotam, CVE-2021-36942, we identified the ocurrence of this event on the target host with specific values. \ +To enable 5145 events via Group Policy - Computer Configuration->Polices->Windows Settings->Security Settings->Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Expand this node, go to Object Access (Audit Polices->Object Access), then select the Setting Audit Detailed File Share Audit \ +It is possible this is not enabled by default and may need to be reviewed and enabled. \ +During triage, review parallel security events to identify further suspicious activity. +action.notable.param.rule_title = PetitPotam Network Share Access Request +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `wineventlog_security` Account_Name="ANONYMOUS LOGON" EventCode=5145 Relative_Target_Name=lsarpc | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Security_ID, Share_Name, Source_Address, Accesses, Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `petitpotam_network_share_access_request_filter` + +[ESCU - PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifes Event Code 4768, A `Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested`, successfull occurs. This behavior has been identified to assist with detecting PetitPotam, CVE-2021-36942. Once an attacer obtains a computer certificate by abusing Active Directory Certificate Services in combination with PetitPotam, the next step would be to leverage the certificate for malicious purposes. One way of doing this is to request a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket using a tool like Rubeus. This request will generate a 4768 event with some unusual fields depending on the environment. This analytic will require tuning, we recommend filtering Account_Name to Domain Controllers for your environment. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifes Event Code 4768, A `Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested`, successfull occurs. This behavior has been identified to assist with detecting PetitPotam, CVE-2021-36942. Once an attacer obtains a computer certificate by abusing Active Directory Certificate Services in combination with PetitPotam, the next step would be to leverage the certificate for malicious purposes. One way of doing this is to request a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket using a tool like Rubeus. This request will generate a 4768 event with some unusual fields depending on the environment. This analytic will require tuning, we recommend filtering Account_Name to Domain Controllers for your environment. +action.escu.how_to_implement = The following analytic requires Event Code 4768. Ensure that it is logging no Domain Controllers and appearing in Splunk. +action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are possible if the environment is using certificates for authentication. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-31 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-31 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A Kerberos TGT was requested in a non-standard manner against $dest$, potentially related to CVE-2021-36942, PetitPotam. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-36942"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifes Event Code 4768, A `Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested`, successfull occurs. This behavior has been identified to assist with detecting PetitPotam, CVE-2021-36942. Once an attacer obtains a computer certificate by abusing Active Directory Certificate Services in combination with PetitPotam, the next step would be to leverage the certificate for malicious purposes. One way of doing this is to request a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket using a tool like Rubeus. This request will generate a 4768 event with some unusual fields depending on the environment. This analytic will require tuning, we recommend filtering Account_Name to Domain Controllers for your environment. +action.notable.param.rule_title = PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 Client_Address!="::1" Certificate_Thumbprint!="" Account_Name=*$ | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Account_Name, Client_Address, action, Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request_filter` + +[ESCU - Ping Sleep Batch Command - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic will identify the possible execution of ping sleep batch commands. This technique was seen in several malware samples and is used to trigger sleep times without explicitly calling sleep functions or commandlets. The goal is to delay the execution of malicious code and bypass detection or sandbox analysis. This detection can be a good indicator of a process delaying its execution for malicious purposes. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1497", "T1497.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic will identify the possible execution of ping sleep batch commands. This technique was seen in several malware samples and is used to trigger sleep times without explicitly calling sleep functions or commandlets. The goal is to delay the execution of malicious code and bypass detection or sandbox analysis. This detection can be a good indicator of a process delaying its execution for malicious purposes. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator may execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-20 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-20 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Ping Sleep Batch Command - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["WhisperGate"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = suspicious $process$ commandline run in $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 36}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 36}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Ping Sleep Batch Command - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["WhisperGate"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1497", "T1497.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_ping` (Processes.parent_process = "*ping*" Processes.parent_process = *-n* Processes.parent_process="* Nul*"Processes.parent_process="*>*") OR (Processes.process = "*ping*" Processes.process = *-n* Processes.process="* Nul*"Processes.process="*>*") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ping_sleep_batch_command_filter` + +[ESCU - Possible Browser Pass View Parameter - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic will detect if a suspicious process contains a commandline parameter related to a web browser credential dumper. This technique is used by Remcos RAT malware which uses the Nirsoft webbrowserpassview.exe application to dump web browser credentials. Remcos uses the "/stext" command line to dump the credentials in text format. This Hunting query is a good indicator of hosts suffering from possible Remcos RAT infection. Since the hunting query is based on the parameter command and the possible path where it will save the text credential information, it may catch normal tools that are using the same command and behavior. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1555.003", "T1555"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic will detect if a suspicious process contains a commandline parameter related to a web browser credential dumper. This technique is used by Remcos RAT malware which uses the Nirsoft webbrowserpassview.exe application to dump web browser credentials. Remcos uses the "/stext" command line to dump the credentials in text format. This Hunting query is a good indicator of hosts suffering from possible Remcos RAT infection. Since the hunting query is based on the parameter command and the possible path where it will save the text credential information, it may catch normal tools that are using the same command and behavior. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +action.escu.known_false_positives = False positive is quite limited. Filter is needed +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-22 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-22 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Possible Browser Pass View Parameter - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Remcos"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = suspicious process $process_name$ contains commandline $process$ on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 16}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 16}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Possible Browser Pass View Parameter - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "confidence": 40, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1555.003", "T1555"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process IN ("*/stext *", "*/shtml *", "*/LoadPasswordsIE*", "*/LoadPasswordsFirefox*", "*/LoadPasswordsChrome*", "*/LoadPasswordsOpera*", "*/LoadPasswordsSafari*" , "*/UseOperaPasswordFile*", "*/OperaPasswordFile*","*/stab*", "*/scomma*", "*/stabular*", "*/shtml*", "*/sverhtml*", "*/sxml*", "*/skeepass*" ) AND Processes.process IN ("*\\temp\\*", "*\\users\\public\\*", "*\\programdata\\*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `possible_browser_pass_view_parameter_filter` + +[ESCU - Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic assists with identifying a PowerShell process spawned as a child or grand child process of commonly abused processes during lateral movement techniques including `services.exe`, `wmiprsve.exe`, `svchost.exe`, `wsmprovhost.exe` and `mmc.exe`. Legitimate Windows features such as the Service Control Manager, Windows Management Instrumentation, Task Scheduler, Windows Remote Management and the DCOM protocol can be abused to start a process on a remote endpoint. Looking for PowerShell spawned out of this processes may reveal a lateral movement attack. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse these services during a breach for lateral movement and remote code execution. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.003", "T1021.006", "T1047", "T1053.005", "T1543.003", "T1059.001"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic assists with identifying a PowerShell process spawned as a child or grand child process of commonly abused processes during lateral movement techniques including `services.exe`, `wmiprsve.exe`, `svchost.exe`, `wsmprovhost.exe` and `mmc.exe`. Legitimate Windows features such as the Service Control Manager, Windows Management Instrumentation, Task Scheduler, Windows Remote Management and the DCOM protocol can be abused to start a process on a remote endpoint. Looking for PowerShell spawned out of this processes may reveal a lateral movement attack. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse these services during a breach for lateral movement and remote code execution. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may spawn PowerShell as a child process of the the identified processes. Filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-29 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-29 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "Malicious PowerShell"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A PowerShell process was spawned as a child process of typically abused processes on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 45}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.003", "T1021.006", "T1047", "T1053.005", "T1543.003", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic assists with identifying a PowerShell process spawned as a child or grand child process of commonly abused processes during lateral movement techniques including `services.exe`, `wmiprsve.exe`, `svchost.exe`, `wsmprovhost.exe` and `mmc.exe`. Legitimate Windows features such as the Service Control Manager, Windows Management Instrumentation, Task Scheduler, Windows Remote Management and the DCOM protocol can be abused to start a process on a remote endpoint. Looking for PowerShell spawned out of this processes may reveal a lateral movement attack. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse these services during a breach for lateral movement and remote code execution. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=svchost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=wsmprovhost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=mmc.exe) (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR (Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process=*powershell.exe*) OR Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR (Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process=*pwsh.exe*)) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn_filter` + +[ESCU - Potentially malicious code on commandline - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic uses a pretrained machine learning text classifier to detect potentially malicious commandlines. The model identifies unusual combinations of keywords found in samples of commandlines where adversaries executed powershell code, primarily for C2 communication. For example, adversaries will leverage IO capabilities such as "streamreader" and "webclient", threading capabilties such as "mutex" locks, programmatic constructs like "function" and "catch", and cryptographic operations like "computehash". Although observing one of these keywords in a commandline script is possible, combinations of keywords observed in attack data are not typically found in normal usage of the commandline. The model will output a score where all values above zero are suspicious, anything greater than one particularly so. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic uses a pretrained machine learning text classifier to detect potentially malicious commandlines. The model identifies unusual combinations of keywords found in samples of commandlines where adversaries executed powershell code, primarily for C2 communication. For example, adversaries will leverage IO capabilities such as "streamreader" and "webclient", threading capabilties such as "mutex" locks, programmatic constructs like "function" and "catch", and cryptographic operations like "computehash". Although observing one of these keywords in a commandline script is possible, combinations of keywords observed in attack data are not typically found in normal usage of the commandline. The model will output a score where all values above zero are suspicious, anything greater than one particularly so. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. You will also need to install the Machine Learning Toolkit version 5.3 or above to apply the pretrained model. +action.escu.known_false_positives = This model is an anomaly detector that identifies usage of APIs and scripting constructs that are correllated with malicious activity. These APIs and scripting constructs are part of the programming langauge and advanced scripts may generate false positives. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-14 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-14 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Potentially malicious code on commandline - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Command-Line Executions"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Unusual command-line execution with hallmarks of malicious activity run by $user$ found on $dest$ with commandline $process$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 12}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 12}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Potentially malicious code on commandline - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Command-Line Executions"], "confidence": 20, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel="Endpoint.Processes" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | where len(process) > 200 | `potentially_malicious_code_on_cmdline_tokenize_score` | apply unusual_commandline_detection | eval score='predicted(unusual_cmdline_logits)', process=orig_process | fields - unusual_cmdline* predicted(unusual_cmdline_logits) orig_process | where score > 0.5 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `potentially_malicious_code_on_commandline_filter` + +[ESCU - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following Hunting analytic assists with identifying suspicious PowerShell execution using Script Block Logging, or EventCode 4104. This analytic is not meant to be ran hourly, but occasionally to identify malicious or suspicious PowerShell. This analytic is a combination of work completed by Alex Teixeira and Splunk Threat Research Team. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following Hunting analytic assists with identifying suspicious PowerShell execution using Script Block Logging, or EventCode 4104. This analytic is not meant to be ran hourly, but occasionally to identify malicious or suspicious PowerShell. This analytic is a combination of work completed by Alex Teixeira and Splunk Threat Research Team. +action.escu.how_to_implement = The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives. May filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-18 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-18 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ executing suspicious commands. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 | eval DoIt = if(match(Message,"(?i)(\$doit)"), "4", 0) | eval enccom=if(match(Message,"[A-Za-z0-9+\/]{44,}([A-Za-z0-9+\/]{4}|[A-Za-z0-9+\/]{3}=|[A-Za-z0-9+\/]{2}==)") OR match(Message, "(?i)[-]e(nc*o*d*e*d*c*o*m*m*a*n*d*)*\s+[^-]"),4,0) | eval suspcmdlet=if(match(Message, "(?i)Add-Exfiltration|Add-Persistence|Add-RegBackdoor|Add-ScrnSaveBackdoor|Check-VM|Do-Exfiltration|Enabled-DuplicateToken|Exploit-Jboss|Find-Fruit|Find-GPOLocation|Find-TrustedDocuments|Get-ApplicationHost|Get-ChromeDump|Get-ClipboardContents|Get-FoxDump|Get-GPPPassword|Get-IndexedItem|Get-Keystrokes|LSASecret|Get-PassHash|Get-RegAlwaysInstallElevated|Get-RegAutoLogon|Get-RickAstley|Get-Screenshot|Get-SecurityPackages|Get-ServiceFilePermission|Get-ServicePermission|Get-ServiceUnquoted|Get-SiteListPassword|Get-System|Get-TimedScreenshot|Get-UnattendedInstallFile|Get-Unconstrained|Get-VaultCredential|Get-VulnAutoRun|Get-VulnSchTask|Gupt-Backdoor|HTTP-Login|Install-SSP|Install-ServiceBinary|Invoke-ACLScanner|Invoke-ADSBackdoor|Invoke-ARPScan|Invoke-AllChecks|Invoke-BackdoorLNK|Invoke-BypassUAC|Invoke-CredentialInjection|Invoke-DCSync|Invoke-DllInjection|Invoke-DowngradeAccount|Invoke-EgressCheck|Invoke-Inveigh|Invoke-InveighRelay|Invoke-Mimikittenz|Invoke-NetRipper|Invoke-NinjaCopy|Invoke-PSInject|Invoke-Paranoia|Invoke-PortScan|Invoke-PoshRat|Invoke-PostExfil|Invoke-PowerDump|Invoke-PowerShellTCP|Invoke-PsExec|Invoke-PsUaCme|Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection|Invoke-ReverseDNSLookup|Invoke-RunAs|Invoke-SMBScanner|Invoke-SSHCommand|Invoke-Service|Invoke-Shellcode|Invoke-Tater|Invoke-ThunderStruck|Invoke-Token|Invoke-UserHunter|Invoke-VoiceTroll|Invoke-WScriptBypassUAC|Invoke-WinEnum|MailRaider|New-HoneyHash|Out-Minidump|Port-Scan|PowerBreach|PowerUp|PowerView|Remove-Update|Set-MacAttribute|Set-Wallpaper|Show-TargetScreen|Start-CaptureServer|VolumeShadowCopyTools|NEEEEWWW|(Computer|User)Property|CachedRDPConnection|get-net\S+|invoke-\S+hunter|Install-Service|get-\S+(credent|password)|remoteps|Kerberos.*(policy|ticket)|netfirewall|Uninstall-Windows|Verb\s+Runas|AmsiBypass|nishang|Invoke-Interceptor|EXEonRemote|NetworkRelay|PowerShelludp|PowerShellIcmp|CreateShortcut|copy-vss|invoke-dll|invoke-mass|out-shortcut|Invoke-ShellCommand"),1,0) | eval base64 = if(match(lower(Message),"frombase64"), "4", 0) | eval empire=if(match(lower(Message),"system.net.webclient") AND match(lower(Message), "frombase64string") ,5,0) | eval mimikatz=if(match(lower(Message),"mimikatz") OR match(lower(Message), "-dumpcr") OR match(lower(Message), "SEKURLSA::Pth") OR match(lower(Message), "kerberos::ptt") OR match(lower(Message), "kerberos::golden") ,5,0) | eval iex = if(match(lower(Message),"iex"), "2", 0) | eval webclient=if(match(lower(Message),"http") OR match(lower(Message),"web(client|request)") OR match(lower(Message),"socket") OR match(lower(Message),"download(file|string)") OR match(lower(Message),"bitstransfer") OR match(lower(Message),"internetexplorer.application") OR match(lower(Message),"xmlhttp"),5,0) | eval get = if(match(lower(Message),"get-"), "1", 0) | eval rundll32 = if(match(lower(Message),"rundll32"), "4", 0) | eval suspkeywrd=if(match(Message, "(?i)(bitstransfer|mimik|metasp|AssemblyBuilderAccess|Reflection\.Assembly|shellcode|injection|cnvert|shell\.application|start-process|Rc4ByteStream|System\.Security\.Cryptography|lsass\.exe|localadmin|LastLoggedOn|hijack|BackupPrivilege|ngrok|comsvcs|backdoor|brute.?force|Port.?Scan|Exfiltration|exploit|DisableRealtimeMonitoring|beacon)"),1,0) | eval syswow64 = if(match(lower(Message),"syswow64"), "3", 0) | eval httplocal = if(match(lower(Message),"http://127.0.0.1"), "4", 0) | eval reflection = if(match(lower(Message),"reflection"), "1", 0) | eval invokewmi=if(match(lower(Message), "(?i)(wmiobject|WMIMethod|RemoteWMI|PowerShellWmi|wmicommand)"),5,0) | eval downgrade=if(match(Message, "(?i)([-]ve*r*s*i*o*n*\s+2)") OR match(lower(Message),"powershell -version"),3,0) | eval compressed=if(match(Message, "(?i)GZipStream|::Decompress|IO.Compression|write-zip|(expand|compress)-Archive"),5,0) | eval invokecmd = if(match(lower(Message),"invoke-command"), "4", 0) | addtotals fieldname=Score DoIt, enccom, suspcmdlet, suspkeywrd, compressed, downgrade, mimikatz, iex, empire, rundll32, webclient, syswow64, httplocal, reflection, invokewmi, invokecmd, base64, get | stats values(Score) by DoIt, enccom, compressed, downgrade, iex, mimikatz, rundll32, empire, webclient, syswow64, httplocal, reflection, invokewmi, invokecmd, base64, get, suspcmdlet, suspkeywrd | `powershell_4104_hunting_filter` + +[ESCU - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following hunting analytic identifies PowerShell commands utilizing the WindowStyle parameter to hide the window on the compromised endpoint. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it is overriding the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide its activity from the user, and connects to the Internet. Removed in this version of the query is New-Object. The analytic identifies all variations of WindowStyle, as PowerShell allows the ability to shorten the parameter. For example w, win, windowsty and so forth. In addition, through our research it was identified that PowerShell will interpret different command switch types beyond the hyphen. We have added endash, emdash, horizontal bar, and forward slash. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following hunting analytic identifies PowerShell commands utilizing the WindowStyle parameter to hide the window on the compromised endpoint. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it is overriding the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide its activity from the user, and connects to the Internet. Removed in this version of the query is New-Object. The analytic identifies all variations of WindowStyle, as PowerShell allows the ability to shorten the parameter. For example w, win, windowsty and so forth. In addition, through our research it was identified that PowerShell will interpret different command switch types beyond the hyphen. We have added endash, emdash, horizontal bar, and forward slash. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate process can have this combination of command-line options, but it's not common. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-12 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-12 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "HAFNIUM Group", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = PowerShell processes $process$ started with parameters to modify the execution policy of the run, run in a hidden window, and connect to the Internet on host $dest$ executed by user $user$. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 81}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 81}, {"threat_object_field": "process", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "HAFNIUM Group", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Command And Control"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "process", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,"(?i)[\-|\/|||]w(in*d*o*w*s*t*y*l*e*)*\s+[^-]") | `powershell___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window_filter` + +[ESCU - Powershell Creating Thread Mutex - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is using the `mutex` function. This function is commonly seen in some obfuscated PowerShell scripts to make sure that only one instance of there process is running on a compromise machine. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027", "T1027.005"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is using the `mutex` function. This function is commonly seen in some obfuscated PowerShell scripts to make sure that only one instance of there process is running on a compromise machine. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. +action.escu.known_false_positives = powershell developer may used this function in their script for instance checking too. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-10 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-10 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Powershell Creating Thread Mutex - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A suspicious powershell script contains Thread Mutex in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 40}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 40}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Powershell Creating Thread Mutex - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027", "T1027.005"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is using the `mutex` function. This function is commonly seen in some obfuscated PowerShell scripts to make sure that only one instance of there process is running on a compromise machine. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Powershell Creating Thread Mutex +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = "*Threading.Mutex*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_creating_thread_mutex_filter` + +[ESCU - Powershell Disable Security Monitoring - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search is to identifies a modification in registry to disable the windows denfender real time behavior monitoring. This event or technique is commonly seen in RAT, bot, or Trojan to disable AV to evade detections. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is to identifies a modification in registry to disable the windows denfender real time behavior monitoring. This event or technique is commonly seen in RAT, bot, or Trojan to disable AV to evade detections. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives. However, tune based on scripts that may perform this action. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-05 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-05 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Powershell Disable Security Monitoring - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Powershell Disable Security Monitoring - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to identifies a modification in registry to disable the windows denfender real time behavior monitoring. This event or technique is commonly seen in RAT, bot, or Trojan to disable AV to evade detections. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Powershell Disable Security Monitoring +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process="*set-mppreference*" AND Processes.process IN ("*disablerealtimemonitoring*","*disableioavprotection*","*disableintrusionpreventionsystem*","*disablescriptscanning*","*disableblockatfirstseen*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_disable_security_monitoring_filter` + +[ESCU - PowerShell Domain Enumeration - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ +This analytic identifies specific PowerShell modules typically used to enumerate an organizations domain or users. \ +During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ +This analytic identifies specific PowerShell modules typically used to enumerate an organizations domain or users. \ +During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. +action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible there will be false positives, filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-10 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-10 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - PowerShell Domain Enumeration - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A suspicious powershell script contains domain enumeration command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 42}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - PowerShell Domain Enumeration - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ +This analytic identifies specific PowerShell modules typically used to enumerate an organizations domain or users. \ +During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. +action.notable.param.rule_title = PowerShell Domain Enumeration +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message IN (*get-netdomaintrust*, *get-netforesttrust*, *get-addomain*, *get-adgroupmember*, *get-domainuser*) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_domain_enumeration_filter` + +[ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search is to detect a suspicious enabling of smb1protocol through "powershell.exe". This technique was seen in some ransomware (like reddot) where it enable smb share to do the lateral movement and encrypt other files within the compromise network system. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027", "T1027.005"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious enabling of smb1protocol through "powershell.exe". This technique was seen in some ransomware (like reddot) where it enable smb share to do the lateral movement and encrypt other files within the compromise network system. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the powershell logs from your endpoints. make sure you enable needed registry to monitor this event. +action.escu.known_false_positives = network operator may enable or disable this windows feature. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-22 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-22 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell", "Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "Ransomware"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027", "T1027.005"], "observable": [{"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious enabling of smb1protocol through "powershell.exe". This technique was seen in some ransomware (like reddot) where it enable smb share to do the lateral movement and encrypt other files within the compromise network system. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = "*Enable-WindowsOptionalFeature*" Message = "*SMB1Protocol*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature_filter` + +[ESCU - Powershell Execute COM Object - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search is to detect a COM CLSID execution through powershell. This technique was seen in several adversaries and malware like ransomware conti where it has a feature to execute command using COM Object. This technique may use by network operator at some cases but a good indicator if some application want to gain privilege escalation or bypass uac. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.015", "T1546"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a COM CLSID execution through powershell. This technique was seen in several adversaries and malware like ransomware conti where it has a feature to execute command using COM Object. This technique may use by network operator at some cases but a good indicator if some application want to gain privilege escalation or bypass uac. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +action.escu.known_false_positives = network operrator may use this command. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-10 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-10 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Powershell Execute COM Object - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell", "Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A suspicious powershell script contains COM CLSID command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 5}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 5}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Powershell Execute COM Object - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "Ransomware"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.015", "T1546"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a COM CLSID execution through powershell. This technique was seen in several adversaries and malware like ransomware conti where it has a feature to execute command using COM Object. This technique may use by network operator at some cases but a good indicator if some application want to gain privilege escalation or bypass uac. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Powershell Execute COM Object +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = "*CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromCLSID*" OR Message = "*CreateInstance([Type]::GetTypeFromProgID*"| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_execute_com_object_filter` + +[ESCU - Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable no critical endpoints or all. \ +This analytic identifies `GetProcAddress` in the script block. This is not normal to be used by most PowerShell scripts and is typically unsafe/malicious. Many attack toolkits use GetProcAddress to obtain code execution. \ +In use, `$var_gpa = $var_unsafe_native_methods.GetMethod(GetProcAddress` and later referenced/executed elsewhere. \ +During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1055", "T1059.001"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable no critical endpoints or all. \ +This analytic identifies `GetProcAddress` in the script block. This is not normal to be used by most PowerShell scripts and is typically unsafe/malicious. Many attack toolkits use GetProcAddress to obtain code execution. \ +In use, `$var_gpa = $var_unsafe_native_methods.GetMethod(GetProcAddress` and later referenced/executed elsewhere. \ +During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives. Filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-08 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-08 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A suspicious powershell script contains GetProcAddress API in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 48}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 48}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1055", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable no critical endpoints or all. \ +This analytic identifies `GetProcAddress` in the script block. This is not normal to be used by most PowerShell scripts and is typically unsafe/malicious. Many attack toolkits use GetProcAddress to obtain code execution. \ +In use, `$var_gpa = $var_unsafe_native_methods.GetMethod(GetProcAddress` and later referenced/executed elsewhere. \ +During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message=*getprocaddress* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode ComputerName User EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_fileless_process_injection_via_getprocaddress_filter` + +[ESCU - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ +This analytic identifies `FromBase64String` within the script block. A typical malicious instance will include additional code. \ +Command example - `[Byte[]]$var_code = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String(38uqIyMjQ6rG....` \ +During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1027", "T1059.001"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ +This analytic identifies `FromBase64String` within the script block. A typical malicious instance will include additional code. \ +Command example - `[Byte[]]$var_code = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String(38uqIyMjQ6rG....` \ +During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. +action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited. Filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-08 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-08 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A suspicious powershell script contains base64 command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 56}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1027", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ +This analytic identifies `FromBase64String` within the script block. A typical malicious instance will include additional code. \ +Command example - `[Byte[]]$var_code = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String(38uqIyMjQ6rG....` \ +During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message=*frombase64string* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode ComputerName User EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_fileless_script_contains_base64_encoded_content_filter` + +[ESCU - PowerShell Get LocalGroup Discovery - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following hunting analytic identifies the use of `get-localgroup` being used with PowerShell to identify local groups on the endpoint. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.001"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following hunting analytic identifies the use of `get-localgroup` being used with PowerShell to identify local groups on the endpoint. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Tune as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-14 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-14 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - PowerShell Get LocalGroup Discovery - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Local group discovery on $dest$ by $user$. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 15}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - PowerShell Get LocalGroup Discovery - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=cmd.exe) (Processes.process="*get-localgroup*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_filter` + +[ESCU - Powershell Get LocalGroup Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ +This analytic identifies PowerShell cmdlet - `get-localgroup` being ran. Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \ +During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.001"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ +This analytic identifies PowerShell cmdlet - `get-localgroup` being ran. Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \ +During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. +action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Tune as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-14 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-14 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Powershell Get LocalGroup Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Local group discovery on $dest$ by $user$. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 15}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Powershell Get LocalGroup Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = "*get-localgroup*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message OpCode ComputerName User EventCode| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_with_script_block_logging_filter` + +[ESCU - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via System Reflection Assembly - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable no critical endpoints or all. \ +This analytic identifies the use of PowerShell loading .net assembly via reflection. This is commonly found in malicious PowerShell usage, including Empire and Cobalt Strike. In addition, the `load(` value may be modifed by removing `(` and it will identify more events to review. \ +During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable no critical endpoints or all. \ +This analytic identifies the use of PowerShell loading .net assembly via reflection. This is commonly found in malicious PowerShell usage, including Empire and Cobalt Strike. In addition, the `load(` value may be modifed by removing `(` and it will identify more events to review. \ +During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. +action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as day to day scripts do not use this method. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-10 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-10 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via System Reflection Assembly - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A suspicious powershell script contains reflective class assembly command in $Message$ to load .net code in memory with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 56}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via System Reflection Assembly - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable no critical endpoints or all. \ +This analytic identifies the use of PowerShell loading .net assembly via reflection. This is commonly found in malicious PowerShell usage, including Empire and Cobalt Strike. In addition, the `load(` value may be modifed by removing `(` and it will identify more events to review. \ +During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. +action.notable.param.rule_title = PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via System Reflection Assembly +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message IN ("*[system.reflection.assembly]::load(*","*[reflection.assembly]*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode ComputerName User EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_system_reflection_assembly_filter` + +[ESCU - Powershell Processing Stream Of Data - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is processing compressed stream data. This is typically found in obfuscated PowerShell or PowerShell executing embedded .NET or binary files that are stream flattened and will be deflated durnig execution. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is processing compressed stream data. This is typically found in obfuscated PowerShell or PowerShell executing embedded .NET or binary files that are stream flattened and will be deflated durnig execution. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. +action.escu.known_false_positives = powershell may used this function to process compressed data. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-10 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-10 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Powershell Processing Stream Of Data - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A suspicious powershell script contains stream command in $Message$ commonly for processing compressed or to decompressed binary file with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 40}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 40}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Powershell Processing Stream Of Data - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is processing compressed stream data. This is typically found in obfuscated PowerShell or PowerShell executing embedded .NET or binary files that are stream flattened and will be deflated durnig execution. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Powershell Processing Stream Of Data +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = "*IO.Compression.*" OR Message = "*IO.StreamReader*" OR Message = "*]::Decompress*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_processing_stream_of_data_filter` + +[ESCU - Powershell Remote Thread To Known Windows Process - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = this search is designed to detect suspicious powershell process that tries to inject code and to known/critical windows process and execute it using CreateRemoteThread. This technique is seen in several malware like trickbot and offensive tooling like cobaltstrike where it load a shellcode to svchost.exe to execute reverse shell to c2 and download another payload +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = this search is designed to detect suspicious powershell process that tries to inject code and to known/critical windows process and execute it using CreateRemoteThread. This technique is seen in several malware like trickbot and offensive tooling like cobaltstrike where it load a shellcode to svchost.exe to execute reverse shell to c2 and download another payload +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, Create Remote thread from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of create remote thread may be used. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-19 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-19 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Powershell Remote Thread To Known Windows Process - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Trickbot"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A suspicious powershell process $process_name$ that tries to create a remote thread on target process $TargetImage$ with eventcode $EventCode$ in host $Computer$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Powershell Remote Thread To Known Windows Process - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Trickbot"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = this search is designed to detect suspicious powershell process that tries to inject code and to known/critical windows process and execute it using CreateRemoteThread. This technique is seen in several malware like trickbot and offensive tooling like cobaltstrike where it load a shellcode to svchost.exe to execute reverse shell to c2 and download another payload +action.notable.param.rule_title = Powershell Remote Thread To Known Windows Process +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `sysmon` EventCode = 8 process_name IN ("powershell_ise.exe", "powershell.exe") TargetImage IN ("*\\svchost.exe","*\\csrss.exe" "*\\gpupdate.exe", "*\\explorer.exe","*\\services.exe","*\\winlogon.exe","*\\smss.exe","*\\wininit.exe","*\\userinit.exe","*\\spoolsv.exe","*\\taskhost.exe") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by SourceImage process_name SourceProcessId SourceProcessGuid TargetImage TargetProcessId NewThreadId StartAddress Computer EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process_filter` + +[ESCU - Powershell Remove Windows Defender Directory - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic will identify a suspicious PowerShell command used to delete the Windows Defender folder. This technique was seen used by the WhisperGate malware campaign where it used Nirsofts advancedrun.exe to gain administrative privileges to then execute a PowerShell command to delete the Windows Defender folder. This is a good indicator the offending process is trying corrupt a Windows Defender installation. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic will identify a suspicious PowerShell command used to delete the Windows Defender folder. This technique was seen used by the WhisperGate malware campaign where it used Nirsofts advancedrun.exe to gain administrative privileges to then execute a PowerShell command to delete the Windows Defender folder. This is a good indicator the offending process is trying corrupt a Windows Defender installation. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-18 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-18 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Powershell Remove Windows Defender Directory - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["WhisperGate"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = suspicious powershell script $Message$ was executed on the $ComputerName$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 90}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 90}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Powershell Remove Windows Defender Directory - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["WhisperGate"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic will identify a suspicious PowerShell command used to delete the Windows Defender folder. This technique was seen used by the WhisperGate malware campaign where it used Nirsofts advancedrun.exe to gain administrative privileges to then execute a PowerShell command to delete the Windows Defender folder. This is a good indicator the offending process is trying corrupt a Windows Defender installation. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Powershell Remove Windows Defender Directory +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = "*rmdir *" AND Message = "*\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_remove_windows_defender_directory_filter` + +[ESCU - PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = Start-BitsTransfer is the PowerShell "version" of BitsAdmin.exe. Similar functionality is present. This technique variation is not as commonly used by adversaries, but has been abused in the past. Lesser known uses include the ability to set the `-TransferType` to `Upload` for exfiltration of files. In an instance where `Upload` is used, it is highly possible files will be archived. During triage, review parallel processes and process lineage. Capture any files on disk and review. For the remote domain or IP, what is the reputation? +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1197"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = Start-BitsTransfer is the PowerShell "version" of BitsAdmin.exe. Similar functionality is present. This technique variation is not as commonly used by adversaries, but has been abused in the past. Lesser known uses include the ability to set the `-TransferType` to `Upload` for exfiltration of files. In an instance where `Upload` is used, it is highly possible files will be archived. During triage, review parallel processes and process lineage. Capture any files on disk and review. For the remote domain or IP, what is the reputation? +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives. It is possible administrators will utilize Start-BitsTransfer for administrative tasks, otherwise filter based parent process or command-line arguments. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-29 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-29 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["BITS Jobs"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A suspicious process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ that are related to bittransfer functionality in host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 56}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BITS Jobs"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1197"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = Start-BitsTransfer is the PowerShell "version" of BitsAdmin.exe. Similar functionality is present. This technique variation is not as commonly used by adversaries, but has been abused in the past. Lesser known uses include the ability to set the `-TransferType` to `Upload` for exfiltration of files. In an instance where `Upload` is used, it is highly possible files will be archived. During triage, review parallel processes and process lineage. Capture any files on disk and review. For the remote domain or IP, what is the reputation? +action.notable.param.rule_title = PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process=*start-bitstransfer* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_start_bitstransfer_filter` + +[ESCU - Powershell Using memory As Backing Store - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is using memory stream as new object backstore. The malicious PowerShell script will contain stream flate data and will be decompressed in memory to run or drop the actual payload. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1140"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is using memory stream as new object backstore. The malicious PowerShell script will contain stream flate data and will be decompressed in memory to run or drop the actual payload. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. +action.escu.known_false_positives = powershell may used this function to store out object into memory. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-10 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-10 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Powershell Using memory As Backing Store - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A suspicious powershell script contains memorystream command in $Message$ as new object backstore with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 40}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 40}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Powershell Using memory As Backing Store - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1140"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is using memory stream as new object backstore. The malicious PowerShell script will contain stream flate data and will be decompressed in memory to run or drop the actual payload. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Powershell Using memory As Backing Store +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = "*New-Object IO.MemoryStream*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store_filter` + +[ESCU - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic will detect a suspicious process commandline related to windows defender exclusion feature. This command is abused by adversaries, malware author and red teams to bypassed Windows Defender Anti-Virus product by excluding folder path, file path, process, extensions and etc. from its real time or schedule scan to execute their malicious code. This is a good indicator for defense evasion and to look further for events after this behavior. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic will detect a suspicious process commandline related to windows defender exclusion feature. This command is abused by adversaries, malware author and red teams to bypassed Windows Defender Anti-Virus product by excluding folder path, file path, process, extensions and etc. from its real time or schedule scan to execute their malicious code. This is a good indicator for defense evasion and to look further for events after this behavior. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. +action.escu.known_false_positives = admin or user may choose to use this windows features. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-25 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-25 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Remcos", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "WhisperGate"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = exclusion command $Message$ executed on $ComputerName$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 64}, {"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Remcos", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "WhisperGate"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic will detect a suspicious process commandline related to windows defender exclusion feature. This command is abused by adversaries, malware author and red teams to bypassed Windows Defender Anti-Virus product by excluding folder path, file path, process, extensions and etc. from its real time or schedule scan to execute their malicious code. This is a good indicator for defense evasion and to look further for events after this behavior. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = "*Add-MpPreference *" OR Message = "*Set-MpPreference *") AND Message = "*-exclusion*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands_filter` + +[ESCU - Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search is to detect a suspicious bcdedit.exe execution to ignore all failures. This technique was used by ransomware to prevent the compromise machine automatically boot in repair mode. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious bcdedit.exe execution to ignore all failures. This technique was used by ransomware to prevent the compromise machine automatically boot in repair mode. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed bcdedit.exe may be used. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may modify the boot configuration ignore failure during testing and debugging. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-10 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-10 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A suspicious process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ contains commandline $process$ to ignore all bcdedit execution failure in host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 56}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious bcdedit.exe execution to ignore all failures. This technique was used by ransomware to prevent the compromise machine automatically boot in repair mode. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "bcdedit.exe" Processes.process = "*bootstatuspolicy*" Processes.process = "*ignoreallfailures*" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `prevent_automatic_repair_mode_using_bcdedit_filter` + +[ESCU - Print Spooler Adding A Printer Driver - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies new printer drivers being load by utilizing the Windows PrintService operational logs, EventCode 316. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. \ +Within the proof of concept code, the following event will occur - "Printer driver 1234 for Windows x64 Version-3 was added or updated. Files:- UNIDRV.DLL, kernelbase.dll, evil.dll. No user action is required." \ +During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events and review the source of where the exploitation began. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012", "T1547"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies new printer drivers being load by utilizing the Windows PrintService operational logs, EventCode 316. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. \ +Within the proof of concept code, the following event will occur - "Printer driver 1234 for Windows x64 Version-3 was added or updated. Files:- UNIDRV.DLL, kernelbase.dll, evil.dll. No user action is required." \ +During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events and review the source of where the exploitation began. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You will need to ensure PrintService Admin and Operational logs are being logged to Splunk from critical or all systems. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown. This may require filtering. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-01 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-01 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Print Spooler Adding A Printer Driver - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious print driver was loaded on endpoint $ComputerName$. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Print Spooler Adding A Printer Driver - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Inbound"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527", "CVE-2021-1675"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies new printer drivers being load by utilizing the Windows PrintService operational logs, EventCode 316. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. \ +Within the proof of concept code, the following event will occur - "Printer driver 1234 for Windows x64 Version-3 was added or updated. Files:- UNIDRV.DLL, kernelbase.dll, evil.dll. No user action is required." \ +During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events and review the source of where the exploitation began. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Print Spooler Adding A Printer Driver +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `printservice` EventCode=316 category = "Adding a printer driver" Message = "*kernelbase.dll,*" Message = "*UNIDRV.DLL,*" Message = "*.DLL.*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode EventCode ComputerName Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `print_spooler_adding_a_printer_driver_filter` + +[ESCU - Print Spooler Failed to Load a Plug-in - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies driver load errors utilizing the Windows PrintService Admin logs. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. \ +Within the proof of concept code, the following error will occur - "The print spooler failed to load a plug-in module C:\Windows\system32\spool\DRIVERS\x64\3\meterpreter.dll, error code 0x45A. See the event user data for context information." \ +The analytic is based on file path and failure to load the plug-in. \ +During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012", "T1547"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies driver load errors utilizing the Windows PrintService Admin logs. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. \ +Within the proof of concept code, the following error will occur - "The print spooler failed to load a plug-in module C:\Windows\system32\spool\DRIVERS\x64\3\meterpreter.dll, error code 0x45A. See the event user data for context information." \ +The analytic is based on file path and failure to load the plug-in. \ +During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You will need to ensure PrintService Admin and Operational logs are being logged to Splunk from critical or all systems. +action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are unknown and filtering may be required. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-01 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-01 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Print Spooler Failed to Load a Plug-in - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious printer spooler errors have occured on endpoint $ComputerName$ with EventCode $EventCode$. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Print Spooler Failed to Load a Plug-in - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Inbound"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527", "CVE-2021-1675"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies driver load errors utilizing the Windows PrintService Admin logs. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. \ +Within the proof of concept code, the following error will occur - "The print spooler failed to load a plug-in module C:\Windows\system32\spool\DRIVERS\x64\3\meterpreter.dll, error code 0x45A. See the event user data for context information." \ +The analytic is based on file path and failure to load the plug-in. \ +During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Print Spooler Failed to Load a Plug-in +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `printservice` ((ErrorCode="0x45A" (EventCode="808" OR EventCode="4909")) OR ("The print spooler failed to load a plug-in module" OR "\\drivers\\x64\\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode EventCode ComputerName Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `print_spooler_failed_to_load_a_plug_in_filter` + +[ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for a process launching an `*.lnk` file under `C:\User*` or `*\Local\Temp\*`. This is common behavior used by various spear phishing tools. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for a process launching an `*.lnk` file under `C:\User*` or `*\Local\Temp\*`. This is common behavior used by various spear phishing tools. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. +action.escu.known_false_positives = This detection should yield little or no false positive results. It is uncommon for LNK files to be executed from temporary or user directories. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-26 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-26 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spearphishing Attachments"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A process $process_name$ that launching .lnk file in $file_path$ in host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 63}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for a process launching an `*.lnk` file under `C:\User*` or `*\Local\Temp\*`. This is common behavior used by various spear phishing tools. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location +action.notable.param.security_domain = network +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name="*.lnk" AND (Filesystem.file_path="C:\\User\\*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*\\Temp\\*") by _time span=1h Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.file_hash Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | rename process_guid as lnk_guid | join lnk_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=* by _time span=1h Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | rename parent_process_guid as lnk_guid | fields _time lnk_guid process_id dest process_name process_path process] | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime, lastTime, lnk_guid, process_id, user, dest, file_name, file_path, process_name, process, process_path, file_hash | `process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location_filter` + +[ESCU - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This detection is to identify a suspicious process that tries to delete the process file path related to its process. This technique is known to be defense evasion once a certain condition of malware is satisfied or not. Clop ransomware use this technique where it will try to delete its process file path using a .bat command if the keyboard layout is not the layout it tries to infect. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This detection is to identify a suspicious process that tries to delete the process file path related to its process. This technique is known to be defense evasion once a certain condition of malware is satisfied or not. Clop ransomware use this technique where it will try to delete its process file path using a .bat command if the keyboard layout is not the layout it tries to infect. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-18 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-18 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Clop Ransomware", "Remcos", "WhisperGate"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A process $Image$ tries to delete its process path in commandline $cmdline$ as part of defense evasion in host $Computer$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 60}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 60}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware", "Remcos", "WhisperGate"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This detection is to identify a suspicious process that tries to delete the process file path related to its process. This technique is known to be defense evasion once a certain condition of malware is satisfied or not. Clop ransomware use this technique where it will try to delete its process file path using a .bat command if the keyboard layout is not the layout it tries to infect. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Process Deleting Its Process File Path +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `sysmon` EventCode=1 CommandLine = "* /c *" CommandLine = "* del*" Image = "*\\cmd.exe" | eval result = if(like(process,"%".parent_process."%"), "Found", "Not Found") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer user ParentImage ParentCommandLine Image CommandLine EventCode ProcessID result | where result = "Found" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `process_deleting_its_process_file_path_filter` + +[ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies `WmiPrvSE.exe` spawning a process. This typically occurs when a process is instantiated from a local or remote process using `wmic.exe`. During triage, review parallel processes for suspicious behavior or commands executed. Review the process and command-line spawning from `wmiprvse.exe`. Contain and remediate the endpoint as necessary. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies `WmiPrvSE.exe` spawning a process. This typically occurs when a process is instantiated from a local or remote process using `wmic.exe`. During triage, review parallel processes for suspicious behavior or commands executed. Review the process and command-line spawning from `wmiprvse.exe`. Contain and remediate the endpoint as necessary. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, administrators may use wmi to execute commands for legitimate purposes. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-03-16 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-03-16 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious WMI Use"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A remote instance execution of wmic.exe that will spawn $parent_process_name$ in host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 49}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies `WmiPrvSE.exe` spawning a process. This typically occurs when a process is instantiated from a local or remote process using `wmic.exe`. During triage, review parallel processes for suspicious behavior or commands executed. Review the process and command-line spawning from `wmiprvse.exe`. Contain and remediate the endpoint as necessary. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Process Execution via WMI +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=WmiPrvSE.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `process_execution_via_wmi_filter` + +[ESCU - Process Kill Base On File Path - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies the use of `wmic.exe` using `delete` to remove a executable path. This is typically ran via a batch file during beginning stages of an adversary setting up for mining on an endpoint. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the use of `wmic.exe` using `delete` to remove a executable path. This is typically ran via a batch file during beginning stages of an adversary setting up for mining on an endpoint. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-05-04 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-05-04 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Process Kill Base On File Path - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["XMRig"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A process $process_name$ attempt to kill process by its file path using commandline $process$ in host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 56}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Process Kill Base On File Path - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the use of `wmic.exe` using `delete` to remove a executable path. This is typically ran via a batch file during beginning stages of an adversary setting up for mining on an endpoint. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Process Kill Base On File Path +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` AND Processes.process="*process*" AND Processes.process="*executablepath*" AND Processes.process="*delete*" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `process_kill_base_on_file_path_filter` + +[ESCU - Process Writing DynamicWrapperX - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = DynamicWrapperX is an ActiveX component that can be used in a script to call Windows API functions, but it requires the dynwrapx.dll to be installed and registered. With that, a binary writing dynwrapx.dll to disk and registering it into the registry is highly suspect. Why is it needed? In most malicious instances, it will be written to disk at a non-standard location. During triage, review parallel processes and pivot on the process_guid. Review the registry for any suspicious modifications meant to load dynwrapx.dll. Identify any suspicious module loads of dynwrapx.dll. This will identify the process that will invoke vbs/wscript/cscript. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1559.001"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = DynamicWrapperX is an ActiveX component that can be used in a script to call Windows API functions, but it requires the dynwrapx.dll to be installed and registered. With that, a binary writing dynwrapx.dll to disk and registering it into the registry is highly suspect. Why is it needed? In most malicious instances, it will be written to disk at a non-standard location. During triage, review parallel processes and pivot on the process_guid. Review the registry for any suspicious modifications meant to load dynwrapx.dll. Identify any suspicious module loads of dynwrapx.dll. This will identify the process that will invoke vbs/wscript/cscript. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, however it is possible to filter by Processes.process_name and specific processes (ex. wscript.exe). Filter as needed. This may need modification based on EDR telemetry and how it brings in registry data. For example, removal of (Default). +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-05 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-05 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Process Writing DynamicWrapperX - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Remcos"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ downloading the DynamicWrapperX dll. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Process Writing DynamicWrapperX - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1559.001"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_guid Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name="dynwrapx.dll" by _time Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time process_guid file_path file_name file_create_time user dest process_name] | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest process_name process_guid file_name file_path file_create_time user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `process_writing_dynamicwrapperx_filter` + +[ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe. Netsh is a command-line scripting utility that allows you to, either locally or remotely, display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. Netsh can be used as a persistence proxy technique to execute a helper DLL when netsh.exe is executed. In this search, we are looking for processes spawned by netsh.exe and executing commands via the command line. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.004", "T1562"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe. Netsh is a command-line scripting utility that allows you to, either locally or remotely, display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. Netsh can be used as a persistence proxy technique to execute a helper DLL when netsh.exe is executed. In this search, we are looking for processes spawned by netsh.exe and executing commands via the command line. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Some VPN applications are known to launch netsh.exe. Outside of these instances, it is unusual for an executable to launch netsh.exe and run commands. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-16 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-16 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Netsh Abuse", "Disabling Security Tools", "DHS Report TA18-074A"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A process $process_name$ that tries to execute netsh commandline $process$ in host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 42}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Netsh Abuse", "Disabling Security Tools", "DHS Report TA18-074A"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.004", "T1562"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe. Netsh is a command-line scripting utility that allows you to, either locally or remotely, display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. Netsh can be used as a persistence proxy technique to execute a helper DLL when netsh.exe is executed. In this search, we are looking for processes spawned by netsh.exe and executing commands via the command line. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Processes launching netsh +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) AS Processes.process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_netsh` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest |`drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`processes_launching_netsh_filter` + +[ESCU - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytics identifies a big number of instance of ransomware notes (filetype e.g .txt, .html, .hta) file creation to the infected machine. This behavior is a good sensor if the ransomware note filename is quite new for security industry or the ransomware note filename is not in your ransomware lookup table list for monitoring. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytics identifies a big number of instance of ransomware notes (filetype e.g .txt, .html, .hta) file creation to the infected machine. This behavior is a good sensor if the ransomware note filename is quite new for security industry or the ransomware note filename is not in your ransomware lookup table list for monitoring. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-12 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-12 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Clop Ransomware", "DarkSide Ransomware", "BlackMatter Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A high frequency file creation of $file_name$ in different file path in host $Computer$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 81}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 81}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware", "DarkSide Ransomware", "BlackMatter Ransomware"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `sysmon` EventCode=11 file_name IN ("*\.txt","*\.html","*\.hta") |bin _time span=10s | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(TargetFilename) as unique_readme_path_count values(TargetFilename) as list_of_readme_path by Computer Image file_name | where unique_readme_path_count >= 15 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ransomware_notes_bulk_creation_filter` + +[ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 performing checks to identify anti-virus products installed on the endpoint. This technique is commonly found in malware and APT events where the adversary will map all running security applications or services. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1592"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 performing checks to identify anti-virus products installed on the endpoint. This technique is commonly found in malware and APT events where the adversary will map all running security applications or services. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. +action.escu.known_false_positives = network administrator may used this command for checking purposes +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-10 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-10 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware", "Malicious PowerShell"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A suspicious powershell script contains AV recon command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 56}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1592"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 performing checks to identify anti-virus products installed on the endpoint. This technique is commonly found in malware and APT events where the adversary will map all running security applications or services. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = "*SELECT*" OR Message = "*WMIC*") AND (Message = "*AntiVirusProduct*" OR Message = "*AntiSpywareProduct*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi_filter` + +[ESCU - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell via EventCode 4104, where WMI is performing an event query looking for running processes or running services. This technique is commonly found where the adversary will identify services and system information on the compromised machine. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1592"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell via EventCode 4104, where WMI is performing an event query looking for running processes or running services. This technique is commonly found where the adversary will identify services and system information on the compromised machine. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. +action.escu.known_false_positives = network administrator may used this command for checking purposes +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-10 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-10 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A suspicious powershell script contains host recon command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 60}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 60}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 75, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1592"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell via EventCode 4104, where WMI is performing an event query looking for running processes or running services. This technique is commonly found where the adversary will identify services and system information on the compromised machine. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Recon Using WMI Class +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message= "*SELECT*" OR Message= "*Get-WmiObject*") AND (Message= "*Win32_Bios*" OR Message= "*Win32_OperatingSystem*" OR Message= "*Win32_Processor*" OR Message= "*Win32_ComputerSystem*" OR Message= "*Win32_ComputerSystemProduct*" OR Message= "*Win32_ShadowCopy*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `recon_using_wmi_class_filter` + +[ESCU - Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search is to detect a suspicious commandline designed to delete files or directory recursive using batch command. This technique was seen in ransomware (reddot) where it it tries to delete the files in recycle bin to impaire user from recovering deleted files. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070.004", "T1070"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious commandline designed to delete files or directory recursive using batch command. This technique was seen in ransomware (reddot) where it it tries to delete the files in recycle bin to impaire user from recovering deleted files. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = network operator may use this batch command to delete recursively a directory or files within directory +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-22 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-22 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070.004", "T1070"], "observable": [{"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious commandline designed to delete files or directory recursive using batch command. This technique was seen in ransomware (reddot) where it it tries to delete the files in recycle bin to impaire user from recovering deleted files. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` Processes.process=*/c* Processes.process=* rd * Processes.process="*/s*" Processes.process="*/q*" by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.dest |`drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd_filter` + +[ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The search looks for reg.exe modifying registry keys that define Windows services and their configurations. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.011", "T1574"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The search looks for reg.exe modifying registry keys that define Windows services and their configurations. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. +action.escu.known_false_positives = It is unusual for a service to be created or modified by directly manipulating the registry. However, there may be legitimate instances of this behavior. It is important to validate and investigate, as appropriate. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-11-26 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-26 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Service Abuse", "Windows Persistence Techniques"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A reg.exe process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 45}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 45}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Service Abuse", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 75, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.011", "T1574"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The search looks for reg.exe modifying registry keys that define Windows services and their configurations. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name values(Processes.user) as user FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=reg.exe Processes.process=*reg* Processes.process=*add* Processes.process=*Services* by Processes.process_id Processes.dest Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys_filter` + +[ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for registry activity associated with application compatibility shims, which can be leveraged by attackers for various nefarious purposes. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.011", "T1546"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for registry activity associated with application compatibility shims, which can be leveraged by attackers for various nefarious purposes. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must populate the Change_Analysis data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection and response product, such as Carbon Black or other endpoint data sources such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. +action.escu.known_false_positives = There are many legitimate applications that leverage shim databases for compatibility purposes for legacy applications +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-01-28 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-01-28 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows Persistence Techniques"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to shim modication in host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 56}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.011", "T1546"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for registry activity associated with application compatibility shims, which can be leveraged by attackers for various nefarious purposes. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*CurrentVersion\\AppCompatFlags\\Custom* OR Registry.registry_path=*CurrentVersion\\AppCompatFlags\\InstalledSDB* by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases_filter` + +[ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to launch an application or service at system startup. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.001", "T1547"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to launch an application or service at system startup. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. +action.escu.known_false_positives = There are many legitimate applications that must execute on system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-26 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-26 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Ransomware", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "IcedID", "Remcos"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to persistence in host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 76}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 76}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Ransomware", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "IcedID", "Remcos"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 95, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.001", "T1547"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to launch an application or service at system startup. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Registry Keys Used For Persistence +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce OR Registry.registry_path=*\\currentversion\\run* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\currentVersion\\Windows\\Appinit_Dlls* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Shell* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Notify* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Userinit* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\VmApplet* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\currentversion\\policies\\explorer\\run* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\currentversion\\runservices* OR Registry.registry_path=HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Netsh\\* OR (Registry.registry_path="*Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options*" AND Registry.registry_key_name=Debugger) OR (Registry.registry_path="*\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa" AND Registry.registry_key_name="Security Packages") OR (Registry.registry_path="*\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\OSConfig" AND Registry.registry_key_name="Security Packages") OR (Registry.registry_path="*\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\SilentProcessExit\\*") OR (Registry.registry_path="*currentVersion\\Windows" AND Registry.registry_key_name="Load") OR (Registry.registry_path="*\\CurrentVersion" AND Registry.registry_key_name="Svchost") OR (Registry.registry_path="*\\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager"AND Registry.registry_key_name="BootExecute") OR (Registry.registry_path="*\\Software\\Run" AND Registry.registry_key_name="auto_update")) by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter` + +[ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to elevate privileges. The registry keys under "Image File Execution Options" are used to intercept calls to an executable and can be used to attach malicious binaries to benign system binaries. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.012", "T1546"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to elevate privileges. The registry keys under "Image File Execution Options" are used to intercept calls to an executable and can be used to attach malicious binaries to benign system binaries. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. +action.escu.known_false_positives = There are many legitimate applications that must execute upon system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-26 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-26 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Privilege Escalation", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to privilege escalation in host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 76}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 76}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 95, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.012", "T1546"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to elevate privileges. The registry keys under "Image File Execution Options" are used to intercept calls to an executable and can be used to attach malicious binaries to benign system binaries. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path="*Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options*") AND (Registry.registry_value_name=GlobalFlag OR Registry.registry_value_name=Debugger) by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation_filter` + +[ESCU - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic is to detect a loading of dll using regsvr32 application with silent parameter and dllinstall execution. This technique was seen in several RAT malware similar to remcos, njrat and adversaries to load their malicious DLL on the compromised machine. This TTP may executed by normal 3rd party application so it is better to pivot by the parent process, parent command-line and command-line of the file that execute this regsvr32. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.010"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to detect a loading of dll using regsvr32 application with silent parameter and dllinstall execution. This technique was seen in several RAT malware similar to remcos, njrat and adversaries to load their malicious DLL on the compromised machine. This TTP may executed by normal 3rd party application so it is better to pivot by the parent process, parent command-line and command-line of the file that execute this regsvr32. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Other third part application may used this parameter but not so common in base windows environment. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-04 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-04 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", "Remcos", "Hermetic Wiper"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a DLL using the silent and dllinstall parameter. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 36}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 36}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", "Remcos", "Hermetic Wiper"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.010"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` AND Processes.process="*/i*" by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,"(?i)[\-|\/][Ss]{1}") | `regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading_filter` + +[ESCU - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies Regsvr32.exe utilizing the silent switch to load DLLs. This technique has most recently been seen in IcedID campaigns to load its initial dll that will download the 2nd stage loader that will download and decrypt the config payload. The switch type may be either a hyphen `-` or forward slash `/`. This behavior is typically found with `-s`, and it is possible there are more switch types that may be used. \ During triage, review parallel processes and capture any artifacts that may have landed on disk. Isolate and contain the endpoint as necessary. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.010"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies Regsvr32.exe utilizing the silent switch to load DLLs. This technique has most recently been seen in IcedID campaigns to load its initial dll that will download the 2nd stage loader that will download and decrypt the config payload. The switch type may be either a hyphen `-` or forward slash `/`. This behavior is typically found with `-s`, and it is possible there are more switch types that may be used. \ During triage, review parallel processes and capture any artifacts that may have landed on disk. Isolate and contain the endpoint as necessary. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = minimal. but network operator can use this application to load dll. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-27 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-27 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["IcedID", "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", "Remcos"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a DLL using the silent parameter. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 56}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID", "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", "Remcos"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.010"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,"(?i)[\-|\/][Ss]{1}") | `regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline_filter` + +[ESCU - Remcos client registry install entry - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search detects registry key license at host where Remcos RAT agent is installed. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search detects registry key license at host where Remcos RAT agent is installed. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-26 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-26 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remcos client registry install entry - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Remcos"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A registry entry $registry_path$ with registry keyname $registry_key_name$ related to Remcos RAT in host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 90}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Remcos client registry install entry - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search detects registry key license at host where Remcos RAT agent is installed. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Remcos client registry install entry +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_key_name=*\\Software\\Remcos*) by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data |`remcos_client_registry_install_entry_filter` + +[ESCU - Remcos RAT File Creation in Remcos Folder - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search is to detect file creation in remcos folder in appdata which is the keylog and clipboard logs that will be send to its c2 server. This is really a good TTP indicator that there is a remcos rat in the system that do keylogging, clipboard grabbing and audio recording. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1113"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect file creation in remcos folder in appdata which is the keylog and clipboard logs that will be send to its c2 server. This is really a good TTP indicator that there is a remcos rat in the system that do keylogging, clipboard grabbing and audio recording. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-21 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-21 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remcos RAT File Creation in Remcos Folder - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Remcos"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = file $file_name$ created in $file_path$ of $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 100}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Remcos RAT File Creation in Remcos Folder - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1113"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect file creation in remcos folder in appdata which is the keylog and clipboard logs that will be send to its c2 server. This is really a good TTP indicator that there is a remcos rat in the system that do keylogging, clipboard grabbing and audio recording. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Remcos RAT File Creation in Remcos Folder +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = |tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN ("*.dat") Filesystem.file_path = "*\\remcos\\*" by _time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remcos_rat_file_creation_in_remcos_folder_filter` + +[ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the DCOM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of ShellExecute and ExecuteShellCommand. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse DCOM and `powershell.exe` for lateral movement and remote code execution. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.003"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the DCOM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of ShellExecute and ExecuteShellCommand. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse DCOM and `powershell.exe` for lateral movement and remote code execution. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage DCOM to start a process on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-15 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-15 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A process was started on a remote endpoint from $dest by abusing DCOM using PowerShell.exe +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the DCOM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of ShellExecute and ExecuteShellCommand. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse DCOM and `powershell.exe` for lateral movement and remote code execution. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process="*Document.ActiveView.ExecuteShellCommand*" OR Processes.process="*Document.Application.ShellExecute*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_filter` + +[ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell Script Block - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of PowerShell with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the DCOM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of ShellExecute and ExecuteShellCommand. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse DCOM for lateral movement and remote code execution. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.003"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of PowerShell with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the DCOM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of ShellExecute and ExecuteShellCommand. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse DCOM for lateral movement and remote code execution. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup instructions can be found https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage DCOM to start a process on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-15 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-15 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell Script Block - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A process was started on a remote endpoint from $ComputerName by abusing WMI using PowerShell.exe +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell Script Block - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.003"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of PowerShell with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the DCOM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of ShellExecute and ExecuteShellCommand. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse DCOM for lateral movement and remote code execution. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell Script Block +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message="*Document.Application.ShellExecute*" OR Message="*Document.ActiveView.ExecuteShellCommand*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_script_block_filter` + +[ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the WinRM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of the `Invoke-Command` commandlet. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WinRM and `powershell.exe` for lateral movement and remote code execution. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.006"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the WinRM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of the `Invoke-Command` commandlet. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WinRM and `powershell.exe` for lateral movement and remote code execution. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage WinRM and `Invoke-Command` to start a process on remote systems for system administration or automation use cases. However, this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-16 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-16 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A process was started on a remote endpoint from $dest by abusing WinRM using PowerShell.exe +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 45}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.006"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the WinRM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of the `Invoke-Command` commandlet. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WinRM and `powershell.exe` for lateral movement and remote code execution. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process="*Invoke-Command*" AND Processes.process="*-ComputerName*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_filter` + +[ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell Script Block - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of PowerShell with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the WinRM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of the `Invoke-Command` commandlet. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WinRM for lateral movement and remote code execution. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.006"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of PowerShell with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the WinRM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of the `Invoke-Command` commandlet. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WinRM for lateral movement and remote code execution. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup instructions can be found https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage WinRM and `Invoke-Command` to start a process on remote systems for system administration or automation use cases. This activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. In certain environments, tuning may not be possible. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-16 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-16 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell Script Block - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A process was started on a remote endpoint from $ComputerName by abusing WinRM using PowerShell.exe +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 45}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell Script Block - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.006"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of PowerShell with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the WinRM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of the `Invoke-Command` commandlet. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WinRM for lateral movement and remote code execution. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell Script Block +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message="*Invoke-Command*" AND Message="*-ComputerName*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_script_block_filter` + +[ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and Winrs - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for the execution of `winrs.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the WinRM protocol and this binary for lateral movement and remote code execution. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.006"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `winrs.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the WinRM protocol and this binary for lateral movement and remote code execution. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage WinRM and WinRs to start a process on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-11 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-11 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and Winrs - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A process was started on a remote endpoint from $dest +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 54}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and Winrs - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.006"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `winrs.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the WinRM protocol and this binary for lateral movement and remote code execution. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and Winrs +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=winrs.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=winrs.exe) (Processes.process="*-r:*" OR Processes.process="*-remote:*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_winrs_filter` + +[ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic identifies wmic.exe being launched with parameters to spawn a process on a remote system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WMI and this binary for lateral movement and remote code execution. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic identifies wmic.exe being launched with parameters to spawn a process on a remote system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WMI and this binary for lateral movement and remote code execution. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = The wmic.exe utility is a benign Windows application. It may be used legitimately by Administrators with these parameters for remote system administration, but it's relatively uncommon. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-12 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-12 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware", "Suspicious WMI Use", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A wmic.exe process $process$ contain process spawn commandline $process$ in host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 49}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Suspicious WMI Use", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic identifies wmic.exe being launched with parameters to spawn a process on a remote system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WMI and this binary for lateral movement and remote code execution. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Remote Process Instantiation via WMI +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` (Processes.process="*/node:*" AND Processes.process="*process*" AND Processes.process="*call*" AND Processes.process="*create*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_filter` + +[ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` leveraging the `Invoke-WmiMethod` commandlet complemented with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing WMI. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WMI and `powershell.exe` for lateral movement and remote code execution. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` leveraging the `Invoke-WmiMethod` commandlet complemented with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing WMI. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WMI and `powershell.exe` for lateral movement and remote code execution. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage WWMI and powershell.exe to start a process on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-15 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-15 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A process was started on a remote endpoint from $dest by abusing WMI using PowerShell.exe +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` leveraging the `Invoke-WmiMethod` commandlet complemented with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing WMI. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WMI and `powershell.exe` for lateral movement and remote code execution. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process="*Invoke-WmiMethod*" AND Processes.process="*-CN*" AND Processes.process="*-Class Win32_Process*" AND Processes.process="*-Name create*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_filter` + +[ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell Script Block - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Invoke-WmiMethod` commandlet with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing WMI. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WMI and this commandlet for lateral movement and remote code execution. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Invoke-WmiMethod` commandlet with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing WMI. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WMI and this commandlet for lateral movement and remote code execution. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup instructions can be found https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage WWMI and powershell.exe to start a process on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-15 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-15 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell Script Block - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A process was started on a remote endpoint from $ComputerName by abusing WMI using PowerShell.exe +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell Script Block - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Invoke-WmiMethod` commandlet with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing WMI. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WMI and this commandlet for lateral movement and remote code execution. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell Script Block +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message="*Invoke-WmiMethod*" AND Message="*-CN*" AND Message="*-Class Win32_Process*" AND Message="*-Name create*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_script_block_filter` + +[ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator being used to query Active Directory for domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `[Adsisearcher]` to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator being used to query Active Directory for domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `[Adsisearcher]` to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use Adsisearcher for troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-01 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-01 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator being used to query Active Directory for domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `[Adsisearcher]` to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Remote System Discovery with Adsisearcher +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = "*[adsisearcher]*" AND Message = "*objectclass=computer*" AND Message = "*findAll()*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `remote_system_discovery_with_adsisearcher_filter` + +[ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Dsquery - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for the execution of `dsquery.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The `computer` argument returns a list of all computers registered in the domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike engage in remote system discovery for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `dsquery.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The `computer` argument returns a list of all computers registered in the domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike engage in remote system discovery for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-31 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-31 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Dsquery - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Dsquery - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="dsquery.exe") (Processes.process="*computer*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_system_discovery_with_dsquery_filter` + +[ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Net - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The argument `domain computers /domain` returns a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The argument `domain computers /domain` returns a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-30 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-30 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Net - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Net - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="net.exe" OR Processes.process_name="net1.exe") (Processes.process="*domain computers*" AND Processes.process=*/do*) OR (Processes.process="*view*" AND Processes.process=*/do*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_system_discovery_with_net_filter` + +[ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Wmic - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The arguments utilized in this command return a list of all the systems registered in the domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI and wmic.exe to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The arguments utilized in this command return a list of all the systems registered in the domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI and wmic.exe to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-01 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-01 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Wmic - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Wmic - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The arguments utilized in this command return a list of all the systems registered in the domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI and wmic.exe to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Remote System Discovery with Wmic +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="wmic.exe") (Processes.process=*/NAMESPACE:\\\\root\\directory\\ldap* AND Processes.process=*ds_computer* AND Processes.process="*GET ds_samaccountname*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_system_discovery_with_wmic_filter` + +[ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies usage of `wmic.exe` spawning a local or remote process, identified by the `node` switch. During triage, review parallel processes for additional commands executed. Look for any file modifications before and after `wmic.exe` execution. In addition, identify the remote endpoint and confirm execution or file modifications. Contain and isolate the endpoint as needed. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies usage of `wmic.exe` spawning a local or remote process, identified by the `node` switch. During triage, review parallel processes for additional commands executed. Look for any file modifications before and after `wmic.exe` execution. In addition, identify the remote endpoint and confirm execution or file modifications. Contain and isolate the endpoint as needed. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. Deprecated because duplicate of Remote Process Instantiation via WMI. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may use this legitimately to gather info from remote systems. Filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2018-12-03 +action.escu.modification_date = 2018-12-03 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious WMI Use"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A wmic.exe process $process$ contain node commandline $process$ in host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 36}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 36}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies usage of `wmic.exe` spawning a local or remote process, identified by the `node` switch. During triage, review parallel processes for additional commands executed. Look for any file modifications before and after `wmic.exe` execution. In addition, identify the remote endpoint and confirm execution or file modifications. Contain and isolate the endpoint as needed. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Remote WMI Command Attempt +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` Processes.process=*node* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_wmi_command_attempt_filter` + +[ESCU - Resize ShadowStorage volume - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytics identifies the resizing of shadowstorage by ransomware malware to avoid the shadow volumes being made again. this technique is an alternative by ransomware attacker than deleting the shadowstorage which is known alert in defensive team. one example of ransomware that use this technique is CLOP ransomware where it drops a .bat file that will resize the shadowstorage to minimum size as much as possible +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytics identifies the resizing of shadowstorage by ransomware malware to avoid the shadow volumes being made again. this technique is an alternative by ransomware attacker than deleting the shadowstorage which is known alert in defensive team. one example of ransomware that use this technique is CLOP ransomware where it drops a .bat file that will resize the shadowstorage to minimum size as much as possible +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +action.escu.known_false_positives = network admin can resize the shadowstorage for valid purposes. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-12 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-12 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Resize ShadowStorage volume - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Clop Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A process $parent_process_name$ attempt to resize shadow copy with commandline $process$ in host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 72}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Resize ShadowStorage volume - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytics identifies the resizing of shadowstorage by ransomware malware to avoid the shadow volumes being made again. this technique is an alternative by ransomware attacker than deleting the shadowstorage which is known alert in defensive team. one example of ransomware that use this technique is CLOP ransomware where it drops a .bat file that will resize the shadowstorage to minimum size as much as possible +action.notable.param.rule_title = Resize ShadowStorage volume +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as cmdline values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process values(Processes.process_name) as process_name min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name = "cmd.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "powershell.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "powershell_ise.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "wmic.exe" Processes.process_name = "vssadmin.exe" Processes.process="*resize*" Processes.process="*shadowstorage*" Processes.process="*/maxsize*" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `resize_shadowstorage_volume_filter` + +[ESCU - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic identifies suspicious commandline parameter that are commonly used by REVIL ransomware to encrypts the compromise machine. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic identifies suspicious commandline parameter that are commonly used by REVIL ransomware to encrypts the compromise machine. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +action.escu.known_false_positives = third party tool may have same command line parameters as revil ransomware. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-02 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-02 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ related to revil ransomware in host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 54}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 54}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic identifies suspicious commandline parameter that are commonly used by REVIL ransomware to encrypts the compromise machine. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Revil Common Exec Parameter +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = "* -nolan *" OR Processes.process = "* -nolocal *" OR Processes.process = "* -fast *" OR Processes.process = "* -full *" by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `revil_common_exec_parameter_filter` + +[ESCU - Revil Registry Entry - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic identifies suspicious modification in registry entry to keep some malware data during its infection. This technique seen in several apt implant, malware and ransomware like REVIL where it keep some information like the random generated file extension it uses for all the encrypted files and ransomware notes file name in the compromised host. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic identifies suspicious modification in registry entry to keep some malware data during its infection. This technique seen in several apt implant, malware and ransomware like REVIL where it keep some information like the random generated file extension it uses for all the encrypted files and ransomware notes file name in the compromised host. +action.escu.how_to_implement = to successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Image, TargetObject registry key, registry Details from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-26 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-26 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Revil Registry Entry - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A registry entry $registry_path$ with registry value $registry_value_name$ and $registry_value_name$ related to revil ransomware in host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 60}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 60}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Revil Registry Entry - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic identifies suspicious modification in registry entry to keep some malware data during its infection. This technique seen in several apt implant, malware and ransomware like REVIL where it keep some information like the random generated file extension it uses for all the encrypted files and ransomware notes file name in the compromised host. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Revil Registry Entry +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path="*\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\Facebook_Assistant\\*" OR Registry.registry_path="*\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\BlackLivesMatter*") by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `revil_registry_entry_filter` + +[ESCU - Rubeus Command Line Parameters - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = Rubeus is a C# toolset for raw Kerberos interaction and abuses. It is heavily adapted from Benjamin Delpys Kekeo project and Vincent LE TOUXs MakeMeEnterpriseAdmin project. This analytic looks for the use of Rubeus command line arguments utilized in common Kerberos attacks like exporting and importing tickets, forging silver and golden tickets, requesting a TGT or TGS, kerberoasting, password spraying, etc. Red teams and adversaries alike use Rubeus for Kerberos attacks within Active Directory networks. Defenders should be aware that adversaries may customize the source code of Rubeus and modify the command line parameters. This would effectively bypass this analytic. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1550", "T1550.003", "T1558", "T1558.003", "T1558.004"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = Rubeus is a C# toolset for raw Kerberos interaction and abuses. It is heavily adapted from Benjamin Delpys Kekeo project and Vincent LE TOUXs MakeMeEnterpriseAdmin project. This analytic looks for the use of Rubeus command line arguments utilized in common Kerberos attacks like exporting and importing tickets, forging silver and golden tickets, requesting a TGT or TGS, kerberoasting, password spraying, etc. Red teams and adversaries alike use Rubeus for Kerberos attacks within Active Directory networks. Defenders should be aware that adversaries may customize the source code of Rubeus and modify the command line parameters. This would effectively bypass this analytic. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, legitimate applications may use the same command line parameters as Rubeus. Filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-01 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-01 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Rubeus Command Line Parameters - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Rubeus command line parameters were used on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 36}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 36}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Rubeus Command Line Parameters - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1550", "T1550.003", "T1558", "T1558.003", "T1558.004"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = Rubeus is a C# toolset for raw Kerberos interaction and abuses. It is heavily adapted from Benjamin Delpys Kekeo project and Vincent LE TOUXs MakeMeEnterpriseAdmin project. This analytic looks for the use of Rubeus command line arguments utilized in common Kerberos attacks like exporting and importing tickets, forging silver and golden tickets, requesting a TGT or TGS, kerberoasting, password spraying, etc. Red teams and adversaries alike use Rubeus for Kerberos attacks within Active Directory networks. Defenders should be aware that adversaries may customize the source code of Rubeus and modify the command line parameters. This would effectively bypass this analytic. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Rubeus Command Line Parameters +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process = "*ptt /ticket*" OR Processes.process = "* monitor*" OR Processes.process ="* asktgt* /user:*" OR Processes.process ="* asktgs* /service:*" OR Processes.process ="* golden* /user:*" OR Processes.process ="* silver* /service:*" OR Processes.process ="* kerberoast*" OR Processes.process ="* asreproast*" OR Processes.process = "* renew* /ticket:*" OR Processes.process = "* brute* /password:*" OR Processes.process = "* brute* /passwords:*" OR Processes.process ="* harvest*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rubeus_command_line_parameters_filter` + +[ESCU - Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic looks for a process accessing the winlogon.exe system process. The Splunk Threat Research team identified this behavior when using the Rubeus tool to monitor for and export kerberos tickets from memory. Before being able to export tickets. Rubeus will try to escalate privileges to SYSTEM by obtaining a handle to winlogon.exe before trying to monitor for kerberos tickets. Exporting tickets from memory is typically the first step for pass the ticket attacks. Red teams and adversaries alike may use the pass the ticket technique using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Defenders should be aware that adversaries may customize the source code of Rubeus to potentially bypass this analytic. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1550", "T1550.003"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic looks for a process accessing the winlogon.exe system process. The Splunk Threat Research team identified this behavior when using the Rubeus tool to monitor for and export kerberos tickets from memory. Before being able to export tickets. Rubeus will try to escalate privileges to SYSTEM by obtaining a handle to winlogon.exe before trying to monitor for kerberos tickets. Exporting tickets from memory is typically the first step for pass the ticket attacks. Red teams and adversaries alike may use the pass the ticket technique using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Defenders should be aware that adversaries may customize the source code of Rubeus to potentially bypass this analytic. +action.escu.how_to_implement = This search needs Sysmon Logs and a sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 10. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may obtain a handle for winlogon.exe. Filter as needed +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-07 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-07 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Winlogon.exe was accessed by $SourceImage$ on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 36}, {"threat_object_field": "TargetImage", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1550", "T1550.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "TargetImage", "role": ["Target"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic looks for a process accessing the winlogon.exe system process. The Splunk Threat Research team identified this behavior when using the Rubeus tool to monitor for and export kerberos tickets from memory. Before being able to export tickets. Rubeus will try to escalate privileges to SYSTEM by obtaining a handle to winlogon.exe before trying to monitor for kerberos tickets. Exporting tickets from memory is typically the first step for pass the ticket attacks. Red teams and adversaries alike may use the pass the ticket technique using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Defenders should be aware that adversaries may customize the source code of Rubeus to potentially bypass this analytic. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=C:\\Windows\\system32\\winlogon.exe (GrantedAccess=0x1f3fff) (SourceImage!=C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe AND SourceImage!=C:\\Windows\\system32\\lsass.exe AND SourceImage!=C:\\Windows\\system32\\LogonUI.exe AND SourceImage!=C:\\Windows\\system32\\smss.exe AND SourceImage!=C:\\Windows\\system32\\wbem\\wmiprvse.exe) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, SourceImage, SourceProcessId, TargetImage, TargetProcessId, EventCode, GrantedAccess | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rubeus_kerberos_ticket_exports_through_winlogon_access_filter` + +[ESCU - Runas Execution in CommandLine - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic look for a spawned runas.exe process with a administrator user option parameter. This parameter was abused by adversaries, malware author or even red teams to gain elevated privileges in target host. This is a good hunting query to figure out privilege escalation tactics that may used for different stages like lateral movement but take note that administrator may use this command in purpose so its better to see other event context before and after this analytic. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1134", "T1134.001"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic look for a spawned runas.exe process with a administrator user option parameter. This parameter was abused by adversaries, malware author or even red teams to gain elevated privileges in target host. This is a good hunting query to figure out privilege escalation tactics that may used for different stages like lateral movement but take note that administrator may use this command in purpose so its better to see other event context before and after this analytic. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated or manual execute this command that may generate false positives. filter is needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-12 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-12 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Runas Execution in CommandLine - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Privilege Escalation"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = elevated process using runas on $dest$ by $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Runas Execution in CommandLine - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1134", "T1134.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_runas` AND Processes.process = "*/user:*" AND Processes.process = "*admin*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `runas_execution_in_commandline_filter` + +[ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following hunting detection identifies rundll32.exe with `control_rundll` within the command-line, loading a .cpl or another file type. Developed in relation to CVE-2021-40444. Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. \ This is written to be a bit more broad by not including .cpl. \ During triage, review parallel processes to identify any further suspicious behavior. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following hunting detection identifies rundll32.exe with `control_rundll` within the command-line, loading a .cpl or another file type. Developed in relation to CVE-2021-40444. Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. \ This is written to be a bit more broad by not including .cpl. \ During triage, review parallel processes to identify any further suspicious behavior. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = This is a hunting detection, meant to provide a understanding of how voluminous control_rundll is within the environment. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-08 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-08 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a suspicious file from disk. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 15}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*Control_RunDLL* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_control_rundll_hunt_filter` + +[ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following detection identifies rundll32.exe with `control_rundll` within the command-line, loading a .cpl or another file type from windows\temp, programdata, or appdata. Developed in relation to CVE-2021-40444. Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. This is written to be a bit more broad by not including .cpl. The paths are specified, add more as needed. During triage, review parallel processes to identify any further suspicious behavior. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following detection identifies rundll32.exe with `control_rundll` within the command-line, loading a .cpl or another file type from windows\temp, programdata, or appdata. Developed in relation to CVE-2021-40444. Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. This is written to be a bit more broad by not including .cpl. The paths are specified, add more as needed. During triage, review parallel processes to identify any further suspicious behavior. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = This may be tuned, or a new one related, by adding .cpl to command-line. However, it's important to look for both. Tune/filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-08 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-08 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a suspicious file from disk. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following detection identifies rundll32.exe with `control_rundll` within the command-line, loading a .cpl or another file type from windows\temp, programdata, or appdata. Developed in relation to CVE-2021-40444. Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. This is written to be a bit more broad by not including .cpl. The paths are specified, add more as needed. During triage, review parallel processes to identify any further suspicious behavior. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*Control_RunDLL* AND Processes.process IN ("*\\appdata\\*", "*\\windows\\temp\\*", "*\\programdata\\*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory_filter` + +[ESCU - Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic identifies the suspicious Remote Thread execution of rundll32.exe process to cmd.exe process. This technique was seen in IcedID malware to execute its malicious code in normal process for defense evasion and to steal sensitive information the the compromised host. browser process. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic identifies the suspicious Remote Thread execution of rundll32.exe process to cmd.exe process. This technique was seen in IcedID malware to execute its malicious code in normal process for defense evasion and to steal sensitive information the the compromised host. browser process. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the SourceImage, TargetImage, and EventCode executions from your endpoints related to create remote thread or injecting codes. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-29 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-29 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["IcedID"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = rundl32 process $SourceImage$ create a remote thread to process $TargetImage$ in host $Computer$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"threat_object_field": "SourceImage", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "SourceImage", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic identifies the suspicious Remote Thread execution of rundll32.exe process to cmd.exe process. This technique was seen in IcedID malware to execute its malicious code in normal process for defense evasion and to steal sensitive information the the compromised host. browser process. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `sysmon` EventCode=8 SourceImage = "*\\rundll32.exe" TargetImage = "*.exe" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by SourceImage TargetImage TargetProcessId SourceProcessId StartAddress EventCode Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process_filter` + +[ESCU - Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic identifies the suspicious Remote Thread execution of rundll32.exe process to "firefox.exe" and "chrome.exe" browser. This technique was seen in IcedID malware where it hooks the browser to parse banking information as user used the targetted browser process. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic identifies the suspicious Remote Thread execution of rundll32.exe process to "firefox.exe" and "chrome.exe" browser. This technique was seen in IcedID malware where it hooks the browser to parse banking information as user used the targetted browser process. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the SourceImage, TargetImage, and EventCode executions from your endpoints related to create remote thread or injecting codes. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-26 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-26 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["IcedID"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = rundl32 process $SourceImage$ create a remote thread to browser process $TargetImage$ in host $Computer$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 70}, {"threat_object_field": "SourceImage", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "SourceImage", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic identifies the suspicious Remote Thread execution of rundll32.exe process to "firefox.exe" and "chrome.exe" browser. This technique was seen in IcedID malware where it hooks the browser to parse banking information as user used the targetted browser process. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `sysmon` EventCode=8 SourceImage = "*\\rundll32.exe" TargetImage IN ("*\\firefox.exe", "*\\chrome.exe", "*\\iexplore.exe","*\\microsoftedgecp.exe") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by SourceImage TargetImage TargetProcessId SourceProcessId StartAddress EventCode Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser_filter` + +[ESCU - Rundll32 DNSQuery - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe process having a http connection and do a dns query in some web domain. This technique was seen in IcedID malware where the rundll32 that execute its payload will contact amazon.com to check internet connect and to communicate to its C&C server to download config and other file component. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe process having a http connection and do a dns query in some web domain. This technique was seen in IcedID malware where the rundll32 that execute its payload will contact amazon.com to check internet connect and to communicate to its C&C server to download config and other file component. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and eventcode = 22 dnsquery executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-18 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-18 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Rundll32 DNSQuery - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["IcedID"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = rundll32 process $process_name$ having a dns query to $QueryName$ in host $Computer$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Rundll32 DNSQuery - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe process having a http connection and do a dns query in some web domain. This technique was seen in IcedID malware where the rundll32 that execute its payload will contact amazon.com to check internet connect and to communicate to its C&C server to download config and other file component. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Rundll32 DNSQuery +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `sysmon` EventCode=22 process_name="rundll32.exe" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image QueryName QueryStatus ProcessId Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_dnsquery_filter` + +[ESCU - Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32 process that drops executable (.exe or .dll) files. this behavior seen in rundll32 process of IcedID that tries to drop copy of itself in temp folder or download executable drop it either appdata or programdata as part of its execution. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32 process that drops executable (.exe or .dll) files. this behavior seen in rundll32 process of IcedID that tries to drop copy of itself in temp folder or download executable drop it either appdata or programdata as part of its execution. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, TargetFilename, and eventcode 11 executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-26 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-26 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["IcedID"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = rundll32 process $process_name$ drops a file $TargetFilename$ in host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32 process that drops executable (.exe or .dll) files. this behavior seen in rundll32 process of IcedID that tries to drop copy of itself in temp folder or download executable drop it either appdata or programdata as part of its execution. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `sysmon` EventCode=11 process_name="rundll32.exe" TargetFilename IN ("*.exe", "*.dll",) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image TargetFilename ProcessGuid dest user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files_filter` + +[ESCU - Rundll32 Shimcache Flush - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious rundll32 commandline to clear shim cache. This technique is a anti-forensic technique to clear the cache taht are one important artifacts in terms of digital forensic during attacks or incident. This TTP is a good indicator that someone tries to evade some tools and clear foothold on the machine. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to detect a suspicious rundll32 commandline to clear shim cache. This technique is a anti-forensic technique to clear the cache taht are one important artifacts in terms of digital forensic during attacks or incident. This TTP is a good indicator that someone tries to evade some tools and clear foothold on the machine. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-05 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-05 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Rundll32 Shimcache Flush - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Unusual Processes"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = rundll32 process execute $process$ to clear shim cache in $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Rundll32 Shimcache Flush - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Unusual Processes"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious rundll32 commandline to clear shim cache. This technique is a anti-forensic technique to clear the cache taht are one important artifacts in terms of digital forensic during attacks or incident. This TTP is a good indicator that someone tries to evade some tools and clear foothold on the machine. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Rundll32 Shimcache Flush +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` AND Processes.process = "*apphelp.dll,ShimFlushCache*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_shimcache_flush_filter` + +[ESCU - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments and performing a network connection. It is unusual for rundll32.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments and performing a network connection. It is unusual for rundll32.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `port` node. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-13 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-13 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Cobalt Strike", "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A rundll32 process $process_name$ with no commandline argument like this process commandline $process$ in host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 70}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process name"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Cobalt Strike", "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Process Name"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments and performing a network connection. It is unusual for rundll32.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` by _time span=1h Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process="(rundll32\.exe.{0,4}$)" | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port !="0" by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port| `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_guid connection_to_CNC dest_port | `rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter` + +[ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading an export function by ordinal value. Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly, may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Utilizing ordinal values makes it a bit more complicated for analysts to understand the behavior until the DLL is reviewed. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading an export function by ordinal value. Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly, may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Utilizing ordinal values makes it a bit more complicated for analysts to understand the behavior until the DLL is reviewed. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are possible with native utilities and third party applications. Filtering may be needed based on command-line, or add world writeable paths to restrict query. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-08 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-08 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Unusual Processes", "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A rundll32 process $process_name$ with ordinal parameter like this process commandline $process$ on host $dest$. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 49}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Unusual Processes", "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading an export function by ordinal value. Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly, may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Utilizing ordinal values makes it a bit more complicated for analysts to understand the behavior until the DLL is reviewed. +action.notable.param.rule_title = RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,"rundll32.+\#\d+") | `rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal_filter` + +[ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The search looks for files that contain the key word *Ryuk* under any folder in the C drive, which is consistent with Ryuk propagation. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The search looks for files that contain the key word *Ryuk* under any folder in the C drive, which is consistent with Ryuk propagation. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Filesystem data-model object. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data. +action.escu.known_false_positives = If there are files with this keywoord as file names it might trigger false possitives, please make use of our filters to tune out potential FPs. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-11-06 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-06 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ryuk Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A creation of ryuk test file $file_path$ in host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 70}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 70}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The search looks for files that contain the key word *Ryuk* under any folder in the C drive, which is consistent with Ryuk propagation. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Ryuk Test Files Detected +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem WHERE "Filesystem.file_path"=C:\\*Ryuk* BY "Filesystem.dest", "Filesystem.user", "Filesystem.file_path" | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `ryuk_test_files_detected_filter` + +[ESCU - Ryuk Wake on LAN Command - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This Splunk query identifies the use of Wake-on-LAN utilized by Ryuk ransomware. The Ryuk Ransomware uses the Wake-on-Lan feature to turn on powered off devices on a compromised network to have greater success encrypting them. This is a high fidelity indicator of Ryuk ransomware executing on an endpoint. Upon triage, isolate the endpoint. Additional file modification events will be within the users profile (\appdata\roaming) and in public directories (users\public\). Review all Scheduled Tasks on the isolated endpoint and across the fleet. Suspicious Scheduled Tasks will include a path to a unknown binary and those endpoints should be isolated until triaged. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.003"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This Splunk query identifies the use of Wake-on-LAN utilized by Ryuk ransomware. The Ryuk Ransomware uses the Wake-on-Lan feature to turn on powered off devices on a compromised network to have greater success encrypting them. This is a high fidelity indicator of Ryuk ransomware executing on an endpoint. Upon triage, isolate the endpoint. Additional file modification events will be within the users profile (\appdata\roaming) and in public directories (users\public\). Review all Scheduled Tasks on the isolated endpoint and across the fleet. Suspicious Scheduled Tasks will include a path to a unknown binary and those endpoints should be isolated until triaged. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited to no known false positives. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-01 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-01 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Ryuk Wake on LAN Command - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ryuk Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A process $process_name$ with wake on LAN commandline $process$ in host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 63}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Ryuk Wake on LAN Command - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This Splunk query identifies the use of Wake-on-LAN utilized by Ryuk ransomware. The Ryuk Ransomware uses the Wake-on-Lan feature to turn on powered off devices on a compromised network to have greater success encrypting them. This is a high fidelity indicator of Ryuk ransomware executing on an endpoint. Upon triage, isolate the endpoint. Additional file modification events will be within the users profile (\appdata\roaming) and in public directories (users\public\). Review all Scheduled Tasks on the isolated endpoint and across the fleet. Suspicious Scheduled Tasks will include a path to a unknown binary and those endpoints should be isolated until triaged. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Ryuk Wake on LAN Command +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process="*8 LAN*" OR Processes.process="*9 REP*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ryuk_wake_on_lan_command_filter` + +[ESCU - SAM Database File Access Attempt - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies access to SAM, SYSTEM or SECURITY databases' within the file path of `windows\system32\config` using Windows Security EventCode 4663. This particular behavior is related to credential access, an attempt to either use a Shadow Copy or recent CVE-2021-36934 to access the SAM database. The Security Account Manager (SAM) is a database file in Windows XP, Windows Vista, Windows 7, 8.1 and 10 that stores users' passwords. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002", "T1003"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies access to SAM, SYSTEM or SECURITY databases' within the file path of `windows\system32\config` using Windows Security EventCode 4663. This particular behavior is related to credential access, an attempt to either use a Shadow Copy or recent CVE-2021-36934 to access the SAM database. The Security Account Manager (SAM) is a database file in Windows XP, Windows Vista, Windows 7, 8.1 and 10 that stores users' passwords. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663. For 4663, enable "Audit Object Access" in Group Policy. Then check the two boxes listed for both "Success" and "Failure." +action.escu.known_false_positives = Natively, `dllhost.exe` will access the files. Every environment will have additional native processes that do as well. Filter by process_name. As an aside, one can remove process_name entirely and add `Object_Name=*ShadowCopy*`. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-23 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-23 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - SAM Database File Access Attempt - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Credential Dumping"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = The following process $process_name$ accessed the object $Object_Name$ attempting to gain access to credentials on $dest$ by user $user$. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "Object_Name", "threat_object_type": "file"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - SAM Database File Access Attempt - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-36934"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "Object_Name", "role": ["Other"], "type": "File"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `wineventlog_security` (EventCode=4663) process_name!=*\\dllhost.exe Object_Name IN ("*\\Windows\\System32\\config\\SAM*","*\\Windows\\System32\\config\\SYSTEM*","*\\Windows\\System32\\config\\SECURITY*") | stats values(Accesses) count by process_name Object_Name dest user | `sam_database_file_access_attempt_filter` + +[ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The search looks for a file named "test.txt" written to the windows system directory tree, which is consistent with Samsam propagation. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The search looks for a file named "test.txt" written to the windows system directory tree, which is consistent with Samsam propagation. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records the file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data-model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data. +action.escu.known_false_positives = No false positives have been identified. +action.escu.creation_date = 2018-12-14 +action.escu.modification_date = 2018-12-14 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["SamSam Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A samsam ransomware test file creation in $file_path$ in host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 12}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 12}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 20, "context": ["Source:Endpoint"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The search looks for a file named "test.txt" written to the windows system directory tree, which is consistent with Samsam propagation. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Samsam Test File Write +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_name) as file_name from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path=*\\windows\\system32\\test.txt by Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `samsam_test_file_write_filter` + +[ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for arguments to sc.exe indicating the creation or modification of a Windows service. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.003", "T1543"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for arguments to sc.exe indicating the creation or modification of a Windows service. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Using sc.exe to manipulate Windows services is uncommon. However, there may be legitimate instances of this behavior. It is important to validate and investigate as appropriate. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Service Abuse", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Disabling Security Tools", "NOBELIUM Group"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A sc process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ to create of configure services in host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 56}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Service Abuse", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Disabling Security Tools", "NOBELIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.003", "T1543"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for arguments to sc.exe indicating the creation or modification of a Windows service. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = sc.exe (Processes.process="* create *" OR Processes.process="* config *") by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services_filter` + +[ESCU - SchCache Change By App Connect And Create ADSI Object - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic is to detect an application try to connect and create ADSI Object to do LDAP query. Every time an application connects to the directory and attempts to create an ADSI object, the Active Directory Schema is checked for changes. If it has changed since the last connection, the schema is downloaded and stored in a cache on the local computer either in %LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\SchCache or %systemroot%\SchCache. We found this a good anomaly use case to detect suspicious application like blackmatter ransomware that use ADS object api to execute ldap query. having a good list of ldap or normal AD query tool used within the network is a good start to reduce the noise. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to detect an application try to connect and create ADSI Object to do LDAP query. Every time an application connects to the directory and attempts to create an ADSI object, the Active Directory Schema is checked for changes. If it has changed since the last connection, the schema is downloaded and stored in a cache on the local computer either in %LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\SchCache or %systemroot%\SchCache. We found this a good anomaly use case to detect suspicious application like blackmatter ransomware that use ADS object api to execute ldap query. having a good list of ldap or normal AD query tool used within the network is a good start to reduce the noise. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +action.escu.known_false_positives = normal application like mmc.exe and other ldap query tool may trigger this detections. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-07 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-07 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - SchCache Change By App Connect And Create ADSI Object - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["blackMatter ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = process $Image$ create a file $TargetFilename$ in host $Computer$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - SchCache Change By App Connect And Create ADSI Object - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["blackMatter ransomware"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `sysmon` EventCode=11 TargetFilename = "*\\Windows\\SchCache\\*" TargetFilename = "*.sch*" NOT (Image IN ("*\\Windows\\system32\\mmc.exe")) |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image TargetFilename EventCode process_id process_name Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schcache_change_by_app_connect_and_create_adsi_object_filter` + +[ESCU - Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with an arguments "HTTP" string that are unique entry of malware or attack that uses lolbin to download other file or payload to the infected machine. The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.' +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with an arguments "HTTP" string that are unique entry of malware or attack that uses lolbin to download other file or payload to the infected machine. The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.' +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the task schedule (Exa. Security Log EventCode 4698) endpoints. Tune and filter known instances of Task schedule used in your environment. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-19 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-19 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Persistence Techniques"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A schedule task process commandline arguments $Arguments$ with http string on it in host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with an arguments "HTTP" string that are unique entry of malware or attack that uses lolbin to download other file or payload to the infected machine. The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.' +action.notable.param.rule_title = Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message| search Arguments IN ("*http*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Task_Name, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden, Arguments | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schedule_task_with_http_command_arguments_filter` + +[ESCU - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed with a Rundll32. This technique is common in new trickbot that uses rundll32 to load is trickbot downloader. The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.' +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed with a Rundll32. This technique is common in new trickbot that uses rundll32 to load is trickbot downloader. The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.' +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the task schedule (Exa. Security Log EventCode 4698) endpoints. Tune and filter known instances of Task schedule used in your environment. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-19 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-19 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Trickbot", "IcedID"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A schedule task process commandline rundll32 arguments $Arguments$ in host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 70}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Trickbot", "IcedID"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed with a Rundll32. This technique is common in new trickbot that uses rundll32 to load is trickbot downloader. The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.' +action.notable.param.rule_title = Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message | search Command IN ("*rundll32*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Task_Name, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden, Arguments | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger_filter` + +[ESCU - Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for the execution of `at.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to create a Scheduled Task on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution. The `at.exe` binary internally leverages the AT protocol which was deprecated starting with Windows 8 and Windows Server 2012 but may still work on previous versions of Windows. Furthermore, attackers may enable this protocol on demand by changing a sytem registry key. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053", "T1053.002"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `at.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to create a Scheduled Task on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution. The `at.exe` binary internally leverages the AT protocol which was deprecated starting with Windows 8 and Windows Server 2012 but may still work on previous versions of Windows. Furthermore, attackers may enable this protocol on demand by changing a sytem registry key. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may create scheduled tasks on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-11 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-11 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A Windows Scheduled Task was created on a remote endpoint from $dest +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 54}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053", "T1053.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `at.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to create a Scheduled Task on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution. The `at.exe` binary internally leverages the AT protocol which was deprecated starting with Windows 8 and Windows Server 2012 but may still work on previous versions of Windows. Furthermore, attackers may enable this protocol on demand by changing a sytem registry key. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=at.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=at.exe) (Processes.process=*\\\\*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `scheduled_task_creation_on_remote_endpoint_using_at_filter` + +[ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies the creation or deletion of a scheduled task using schtasks.exe with flags - create or delete being passed on the command-line. This has been associated with the Dragonfly threat actor, and the SUNBURST attack against Solarwinds. This analytic replaces "Scheduled Task used in BadRabbit Ransomware". +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the creation or deletion of a scheduled task using schtasks.exe with flags - create or delete being passed on the command-line. This has been associated with the Dragonfly threat actor, and the SUNBURST attack against Solarwinds. This analytic replaces "Scheduled Task used in BadRabbit Ransomware". +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible scripts or administrators may trigger this analytic. Filter as needed based on parent process, application. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-22 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-22 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["DHS Report TA18-074A", "NOBELIUM Group", "Windows Persistence Techniques"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A schedule task process $process_name$ with create or delete commandline $process$ in host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 56}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DHS Report TA18-074A", "NOBELIUM Group", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the creation or deletion of a scheduled task using schtasks.exe with flags - create or delete being passed on the command-line. This has been associated with the Dragonfly threat actor, and the SUNBURST attack against Solarwinds. This analytic replaces "Scheduled Task used in BadRabbit Ransomware". +action.notable.param.rule_title = Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe (Processes.process=*delete* OR Processes.process=*create*) by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd_filter` + +[ESCU - Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for the execution of `schtasks.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to start a Scheduled Task on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053", "T1053.005"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `schtasks.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to start a Scheduled Task on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may start scheduled tasks on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-11 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-11 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A Windows Scheduled Task was ran on a remote endpoint from $dest +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 54}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053", "T1053.005"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `schtasks.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to start a Scheduled Task on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=schtasks.exe) (Processes.process=*/s* AND Processes.process=*/run*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `scheduled_task_initiation_on_remote_endpoint_filter` + +[ESCU - Schtasks Run Task On Demand - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic identifies an on demand run of a Windows Schedule Task through shell or command-line. This technique has been used by adversaries that force to run their created Schedule Task as their persistence mechanism or for lateral movement as part of their malicious attack to the compromised machine. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic identifies an on demand run of a Windows Schedule Task through shell or command-line. This technique has been used by adversaries that force to run their created Schedule Task as their persistence mechanism or for lateral movement as part of their malicious attack to the compromised machine. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed schtasks.exe may be used. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may use to debug Schedule Task entries. Filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-05-07 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-05-07 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Schtasks Run Task On Demand - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["XMRig"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A "on demand" execution of schedule task process $process_name$ using commandline $process$ in host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 48}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 48}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Schtasks Run Task On Demand - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic identifies an on demand run of a Windows Schedule Task through shell or command-line. This technique has been used by adversaries that force to run their created Schedule Task as their persistence mechanism or for lateral movement as part of their malicious attack to the compromised machine. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Schtasks Run Task On Demand +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "schtasks.exe" Processes.process = "*/run*" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schtasks_run_task_on_demand_filter` + +[ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for the execution of `schtasks.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to create a Scheduled Task on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `schtasks.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to create a Scheduled Task on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may create scheduled tasks on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. It is important to validate and investigate as appropriate. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-11 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-11 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "NOBELIUM Group"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A schedule task process $process_name$ with remote job commandline $process$ in host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Processes.dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}, {"risk_object_field": "Processes.user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 63}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "NOBELIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 3"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "Processes.dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "Processes.user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `schtasks.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to create a Scheduled Task on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Schtasks scheduling job on remote system +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = schtasks.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=schtasks.exe) (Processes.process="*/create*" AND Processes.process="*/s*") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system_filter` + +[ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line that indicate that a forced reboot of system is scheduled. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line that indicate that a forced reboot of system is scheduled. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may create jobs on systems forcing reboots to perform updates, maintenance, etc. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-12-07 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-12-07 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A schedule task process $process_name$ with force reboot commandline $process$ in host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 56}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 3"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line that indicate that a forced reboot of system is scheduled. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Schtasks used for forcing a reboot +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe Processes.process="*shutdown*" Processes.process="*/create *" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot_filter` + +[ESCU - Screensaver Event Trigger Execution - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic is developed to detect possible event trigger execution through screensaver registry entry modification for persistence or privilege escalation. This technique was seen in several APT and malware where they put the malicious payload path to the SCRNSAVE.EXE registry key to redirect the execution to their malicious payload path. This TTP is a good indicator that some attacker may modify this entry for their persistence and privilege escalation. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546", "T1546.002"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is developed to detect possible event trigger execution through screensaver registry entry modification for persistence or privilege escalation. This technique was seen in several APT and malware where they put the malicious payload path to the SCRNSAVE.EXE registry key to redirect the execution to their malicious payload path. This TTP is a good indicator that some attacker may modify this entry for their persistence and privilege escalation. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-27 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-27 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Screensaver Event Trigger Execution - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 72}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Screensaver Event Trigger Execution - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546", "T1546.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is developed to detect possible event trigger execution through screensaver registry entry modification for persistence or privilege escalation. This technique was seen in several APT and malware where they put the malicious payload path to the SCRNSAVE.EXE registry key to redirect the execution to their malicious payload path. This TTP is a good indicator that some attacker may modify this entry for their persistence and privilege escalation. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Screensaver Event Trigger Execution +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path="*\\Control Panel\\Desktop\\SCRNSAVE.EXE*") by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `screensaver_event_trigger_execution_filter` + +[ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for scripts launched via WMI. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for scripts launched via WMI. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, administrators may use wmi to launch scripts for legitimate purposes. Filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-03-16 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-03-16 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious WMI Use"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A wmic.exe process $process_name$ taht execute script in host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 36}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 36}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for scripts launched via WMI. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Script Execution via WMI +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=scrcons.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `script_execution_via_wmi_filter` + +[ESCU - Sdclt UAC Bypass - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search is to detect a suspicious sdclt.exe registry modification. This technique is commonly seen when attacker try to bypassed UAC by using sdclt.exe application by modifying some registry that sdclt.exe tries to open or query with payload file path on it to be executed. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious sdclt.exe registry modification. This technique is commonly seen when attacker try to bypassed UAC by using sdclt.exe application by modifying some registry that sdclt.exe tries to open or query with payload file path on it to be executed. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited to no false positives are expected. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-01-28 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-01-28 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Sdclt UAC Bypass - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious modification of registry $registry_path$ with possible payload path $registry_value_name$ in $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Sdclt UAC Bypass - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Inbound"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious sdclt.exe registry modification. This technique is commonly seen when attacker try to bypassed UAC by using sdclt.exe application by modifying some registry that sdclt.exe tries to open or query with payload file path on it to be executed. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Sdclt UAC Bypass +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path= "*\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\App Paths\\control.exe*" OR Registry.registry_path= "*\\exefile\\shell\\runas\\command\\*") (Registry.registry_value_name = "(Default)" OR Registry.registry_value_name = "IsolatedCommand") by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `sdclt_uac_bypass_filter` + +[ESCU - Sdelete Application Execution - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic is to detect the execution of sdelete.exe application sysinternal tools. This tool is one of the most use tool of malware and adversaries to remove or clear their tracks and artifact in the targetted host. This tool is designed to delete securely a file in file system that remove the forensic evidence on the machine. A good TTP query to check why user execute this application which is not a common practice. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485", "T1070.004", "T1070"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to detect the execution of sdelete.exe application sysinternal tools. This tool is one of the most use tool of malware and adversaries to remove or clear their tracks and artifact in the targetted host. This tool is designed to delete securely a file in file system that remove the forensic evidence on the machine. A good TTP query to check why user execute this application which is not a common practice. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = user may execute and use this application +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-06 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-06 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Sdelete Application Execution - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = sdelete process $process_name$ executed in $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 49}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Sdelete Application Execution - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485", "T1070.004", "T1070"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to detect the execution of sdelete.exe application sysinternal tools. This tool is one of the most use tool of malware and adversaries to remove or clear their tracks and artifact in the targetted host. This tool is designed to delete securely a file in file system that remove the forensic evidence on the machine. A good TTP query to check why user execute this application which is not a common practice. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Sdelete Application Execution +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_sdelete` by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sdelete_application_execution_filter` + +[ESCU - SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies searchprotocolhost.exe with no command line arguments and with a network connection. It is unusual for searchprotocolhost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. searchprotocolhost.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies searchprotocolhost.exe with no command line arguments and with a network connection. It is unusual for searchprotocolhost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. searchprotocolhost.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `ports` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-13 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-13 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Cobalt Strike"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A searchprotocolhost.exe process $process_name$ with no commandline in host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 70}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process name"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Process Name"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies searchprotocolhost.exe with no command line arguments and with a network connection. It is unusual for searchprotocolhost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. searchprotocolhost.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. +action.notable.param.rule_title = SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=searchprotocolhost.exe by _time span=1h Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process="(searchprotocolhost\.exe.{0,4}$)" | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port !="0" by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_guid connection_to_CNC dest_port | `searchprotocolhost_with_no_command_line_with_network_filter` + +[ESCU - SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic detects a potential usage of secretsdump.py tool for dumping credentials (ntlm hash) from a copy of ntds.dit and SAM.Security,SYSTEM registrry hive. This technique was seen in some attacker that dump ntlm hashes offline after having a copy of ntds.dit and SAM/SYSTEM/SECURITY registry hive. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.003", "T1003"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic detects a potential usage of secretsdump.py tool for dumping credentials (ntlm hash) from a copy of ntds.dit and SAM.Security,SYSTEM registrry hive. This technique was seen in some attacker that dump ntlm hashes offline after having a copy of ntds.dit and SAM/SYSTEM/SECURITY registry hive. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-05-26 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-05-26 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Credential Dumping"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A secretdump process $process_name$ with secretdump commandline $process$ to dump credentials in host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.003", "T1003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic detects a potential usage of secretsdump.py tool for dumping credentials (ntlm hash) from a copy of ntds.dit and SAM.Security,SYSTEM registrry hive. This technique was seen in some attacker that dump ntlm hashes offline after having a copy of ntds.dit and SAM/SYSTEM/SECURITY registry hive. +action.notable.param.rule_title = SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "python*.exe" Processes.process = "*.py*" Processes.process = "*-ntds*" (Processes.process = "*-system*" OR Processes.process = "*-sam*" OR Processes.process = "*-security*" OR Processes.process = "*-bootkey*") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `secretdumps_offline_ntds_dumping_tool_filter` + +[ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies `powershell.exe` usage, using Script Block Logging EventCode 4104, related to querying the domain for Service Principle Names. typically, this is a precursor activity related to kerberoasting or the silver ticket attack. \ +What is a ServicePrincipleName? \ +A service principal name (SPN) is a unique identifier of a service instance. SPNs are used by Kerberos authentication to associate a service instance with a service logon account. This allows a client application to request that the service authenticate an account even if the client does not have the account name.\ +The following analytic identifies the use of KerberosRequestorSecurityToken class within the script block. Using .NET System.IdentityModel.Tokens.KerberosRequestorSecurityToken class in PowerShell is the equivelant of using setspn.exe. \ +During triage, review parallel processes for further suspicious activity. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558.003"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies `powershell.exe` usage, using Script Block Logging EventCode 4104, related to querying the domain for Service Principle Names. typically, this is a precursor activity related to kerberoasting or the silver ticket attack. \ +What is a ServicePrincipleName? \ +A service principal name (SPN) is a unique identifier of a service instance. SPNs are used by Kerberos authentication to associate a service instance with a service logon account. This allows a client application to request that the service authenticate an account even if the client does not have the account name.\ +The following analytic identifies the use of KerberosRequestorSecurityToken class within the script block. Using .NET System.IdentityModel.Tokens.KerberosRequestorSecurityToken class in PowerShell is the equivelant of using setspn.exe. \ +During triage, review parallel processes for further suspicious activity. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. +action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, however filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-14 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-14 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery", "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to identify service principle names. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery", "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558.003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies `powershell.exe` usage, using Script Block Logging EventCode 4104, related to querying the domain for Service Principle Names. typically, this is a precursor activity related to kerberoasting or the silver ticket attack. \ +What is a ServicePrincipleName? \ +A service principal name (SPN) is a unique identifier of a service instance. SPNs are used by Kerberos authentication to associate a service instance with a service logon account. This allows a client application to request that the service authenticate an account even if the client does not have the account name.\ +The following analytic identifies the use of KerberosRequestorSecurityToken class within the script block. Using .NET System.IdentityModel.Tokens.KerberosRequestorSecurityToken class in PowerShell is the equivelant of using setspn.exe. \ +During triage, review parallel processes for further suspicious activity. +action.notable.param.rule_title = ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message="*KerberosRequestorSecurityToken*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message OpCode ComputerName User EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell_filter` + +[ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies `setspn.exe` usage related to querying the domain for Service Principle Names. typically, this is a precursor activity related to kerberoasting or the silver ticket attack. \ +What is a ServicePrincipleName? \ +A service principal name (SPN) is a unique identifier of a service instance. SPNs are used by Kerberos authentication to associate a service instance with a service logon account. This allows a client application to request that the service authenticate an account even if the client does not have the account name.\ +Example usage includes the following \ +1. setspn -T offense -Q */* 1. setspn -T attackrange.local -F -Q MSSQLSvc/* 1. setspn -Q */* > allspns.txt 1. setspn -q \ +Values \ +1. -F = perform queries at the forest, rather than domain level 1. -T = perform query on the specified domain or forest (when -F is also used) 1. -Q = query for existence of SPN \ +During triage, review parallel processes for further suspicious activity. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558.003"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies `setspn.exe` usage related to querying the domain for Service Principle Names. typically, this is a precursor activity related to kerberoasting or the silver ticket attack. \ +What is a ServicePrincipleName? \ +A service principal name (SPN) is a unique identifier of a service instance. SPNs are used by Kerberos authentication to associate a service instance with a service logon account. This allows a client application to request that the service authenticate an account even if the client does not have the account name.\ +Example usage includes the following \ +1. setspn -T offense -Q */* 1. setspn -T attackrange.local -F -Q MSSQLSvc/* 1. setspn -Q */* > allspns.txt 1. setspn -q \ +Values \ +1. -F = perform queries at the forest, rather than domain level 1. -T = perform query on the specified domain or forest (when -F is also used) 1. -Q = query for existence of SPN \ +During triage, review parallel processes for further suspicious activity. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be caused by Administrators resetting SPNs or querying for SPNs. Filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-14 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-14 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery", "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to identify service principle names. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery", "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558.003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies `setspn.exe` usage related to querying the domain for Service Principle Names. typically, this is a precursor activity related to kerberoasting or the silver ticket attack. \ +What is a ServicePrincipleName? \ +A service principal name (SPN) is a unique identifier of a service instance. SPNs are used by Kerberos authentication to associate a service instance with a service logon account. This allows a client application to request that the service authenticate an account even if the client does not have the account name.\ +Example usage includes the following \ +1. setspn -T offense -Q */* 1. setspn -T attackrange.local -F -Q MSSQLSvc/* 1. setspn -Q */* > allspns.txt 1. setspn -q \ +Values \ +1. -F = perform queries at the forest, rather than domain level 1. -T = perform query on the specified domain or forest (when -F is also used) 1. -Q = query for existence of SPN \ +During triage, review parallel processes for further suspicious activity. +action.notable.param.rule_title = ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_setspn` (Processes.process="*-t*" AND Processes.process="*-f*") OR (Processes.process="*-q*" AND Processes.process="**/**") OR (Processes.process="*-q*") OR (Processes.process="*-s*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn_filter` + +[ESCU - Services Escalate Exe - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies the use of `svc-exe` with Cobalt Strike. The behavior typically follows after an adversary has already gained initial access and is escalating privileges. Using `svc-exe`, a randomly named binary will be downloaded from the remote Teamserver and placed on disk within `C:\Windows\400619a.exe`. Following, the binary will be added to the registry under key `HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\400619a\` with multiple keys and values added to look like a legitimate service. Upon loading, `services.exe` will spawn the randomly named binary from `\\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\400619a.exe`. The process lineage is completed with `400619a.exe` spawning rundll32.exe, which is the default `spawnto_` value for Cobalt Strike. The `spawnto_` value is arbitrary and may be any process on disk (typically system32/syswow64 binary). The `spawnto_` process will also contain a network connection. During triage, review parallel procesess and identify any additional file modifications. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the use of `svc-exe` with Cobalt Strike. The behavior typically follows after an adversary has already gained initial access and is escalating privileges. Using `svc-exe`, a randomly named binary will be downloaded from the remote Teamserver and placed on disk within `C:\Windows\400619a.exe`. Following, the binary will be added to the registry under key `HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\400619a\` with multiple keys and values added to look like a legitimate service. Upon loading, `services.exe` will spawn the randomly named binary from `\\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\400619a.exe`. The process lineage is completed with `400619a.exe` spawning rundll32.exe, which is the default `spawnto_` value for Cobalt Strike. The `spawnto_` value is arbitrary and may be any process on disk (typically system32/syswow64 binary). The `spawnto_` process will also contain a network connection. During triage, review parallel procesess and identify any additional file modifications. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. +action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as `services.exe` should never spawn a process from `ADMIN$`. Filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-05-18 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-05-18 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Services Escalate Exe - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Cobalt Strike"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A service process $parent_process_name$ with process path $process_path$ in host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Processes.dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 76}, {"risk_object_field": "Processes.user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 76}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Services Escalate Exe - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike"], "confidence": 95, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "Processes.dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "Processes.user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the use of `svc-exe` with Cobalt Strike. The behavior typically follows after an adversary has already gained initial access and is escalating privileges. Using `svc-exe`, a randomly named binary will be downloaded from the remote Teamserver and placed on disk within `C:\Windows\400619a.exe`. Following, the binary will be added to the registry under key `HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\400619a\` with multiple keys and values added to look like a legitimate service. Upon loading, `services.exe` will spawn the randomly named binary from `\\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\400619a.exe`. The process lineage is completed with `400619a.exe` spawning rundll32.exe, which is the default `spawnto_` value for Cobalt Strike. The `spawnto_` value is arbitrary and may be any process on disk (typically system32/syswow64 binary). The `spawnto_` process will also contain a network connection. During triage, review parallel procesess and identify any additional file modifications. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Services Escalate Exe +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe Processes.process_path=*admin$* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `services_escalate_exe_filter` + +[ESCU - Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies `services.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the Service Control Manager and creating a remote malicious service, the executed command is spawned as a child process of `services.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of services.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543", "T1543.003"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies `services.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the Service Control Manager and creating a remote malicious service, the executed command is spawned as a child process of `services.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of services.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-22 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-22 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Services.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 54}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543", "T1543.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies `services.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the Service Control Manager and creating a remote malicious service, the executed command is spawned as a child process of `services.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of services.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe) (Processes.process_name IN ("Regsvcs.exe", "Ftp.exe", "OfflineScannerShell.exe", "Rasautou.exe", "Schtasks.exe", "Xwizard.exe", "Dllhost.exe", "Pnputil.exe", "Atbroker.exe", "Pcwrun.exe", "Ttdinject.exe","Mshta.exe", "Bitsadmin.exe", "Certoc.exe", "Ieexec.exe", "Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe", "Runscripthelper.exe", "Forfiles.exe", "Msbuild.exe", "Register-cimprovider.exe", "Tttracer.exe", "Ie4uinit.exe", "Bash.exe", "Hh.exe", "SettingSyncHost.exe", "Cmstp.exe", "Mmc.exe", "Stordiag.exe", "Scriptrunner.exe", "Odbcconf.exe", "Extexport.exe", "Msdt.exe", "WorkFolders.exe", "Diskshadow.exe", "Mavinject.exe", "Regasm.exe", "Gpscript.exe", "Rundll32.exe", "Regsvr32.exe", "Msiexec.exe", "Wuauclt.exe", "Presentationhost.exe", "Wmic.exe", "Runonce.exe", "Syncappvpublishingserver.exe", "Verclsid.exe", "Infdefaultinstall.exe", "Explorer.exe", "Installutil.exe", "Netsh.exe", "Wab.exe", "Dnscmd.exe", "At.exe", "Pcalua.exe", "Msconfig.exe")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `services_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter` + +[ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = Monitor for changes of the ExecutionPolicy in the registry to the values "unrestricted" or "bypass," which allows the execution of malicious scripts. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = Monitor for changes of the ExecutionPolicy in the registry to the values "unrestricted" or "bypass," which allows the execution of malicious scripts. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Registry node. You must also be ingesting logs with the fields registry_path, registry_key_name, and registry_value_name from your endpoints. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may attempt to change the default execution policy on a system for a variety of reasons. However, setting the policy to "unrestricted" or "bypass" as this search is designed to identify, would be unusual. Hits should be reviewed and investigated as appropriate. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-18 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-18 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell", "Credential Dumping", "HAFNIUM Group"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A registry modification in $registry_path$ with reg key $registry_key_name$ and reg value $registry_value_name$ in host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 48}, {"threat_object_field": "registry_path", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "Credential Dumping", "HAFNIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "registry_path", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = Monitor for changes of the ExecutionPolicy in the registry to the values "unrestricted" or "bypass," which allows the execution of malicious scripts. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*Software\\Microsoft\\Powershell\\1\\ShellIds\\Microsoft.PowerShell* Registry.registry_value_name=ExecutionPolicy (Registry.registry_value_data=Unrestricted OR Registry.registry_value_data=Bypass) by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass_filter` + +[ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for shim database files being written to default directories. The sdbinst.exe application is used to install shim database files (.sdb). According to Microsoft, a shim is a small library that transparently intercepts an API, changes the parameters passed, handles the operation itself, or redirects the operation elsewhere. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.011", "T1546"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for shim database files being written to default directories. The sdbinst.exe application is used to install shim database files (.sdb). According to Microsoft, a shim is a small library that transparently intercepts an API, changes the parameters passed, handles the operation itself, or redirects the operation elsewhere. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Because legitimate shim files are created and used all the time, this event, in itself, is not suspicious. However, if there are other correlating events, it may warrant further investigation. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-12-08 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-12-08 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Persistence Techniques"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A process that possibly write shim database in $file_path$ in host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"threat_object_field": "file_path", "threat_object_type": "file"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.011", "T1546"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "file_path", "role": ["Other"], "type": "File"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for shim database files being written to default directories. The sdbinst.exe application is used to install shim database files (.sdb). According to Microsoft, a shim is a small library that transparently intercepts an API, changes the parameters passed, handles the operation itself, or redirects the operation elsewhere. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Shim Database File Creation +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.action) values(Filesystem.file_hash) as file_hash values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path=*Windows\\AppPatch\\Custom* by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `shim_database_file_creation_filter` + +[ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search detects the process execution and arguments required to silently create a shim database. The sdbinst.exe application is used to install shim database files (.sdb). A shim is a small library which transparently intercepts an API, changes the parameters passed, handles the operation itself, or redirects the operation elsewhere. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.011", "T1546"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search detects the process execution and arguments required to silently create a shim database. The sdbinst.exe application is used to install shim database files (.sdb). A shim is a small library which transparently intercepts an API, changes the parameters passed, handles the operation itself, or redirects the operation elsewhere. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. +action.escu.known_false_positives = None identified +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-11-23 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-23 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Persistence Techniques"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A process $process_name$ that possible create a shim db silently in host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 63}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.011", "T1546"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search detects the process execution and arguments required to silently create a shim database. The sdbinst.exe application is used to install shim database files (.sdb). A shim is a small library which transparently intercepts an API, changes the parameters passed, handles the operation itself, or redirects the operation elsewhere. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = sdbinst.exe by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters_filter` + +[ESCU - Short Lived Scheduled Task - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic leverages Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created` and Windows Security EventCode 4699, `A scheduled task was deleted` to identify scheduled tasks created and deleted in less than 30 seconds. This behavior may represent a lateral movement attack abusing the Task Scheduler to obtain code execution. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic leverages Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created` and Windows Security EventCode 4699, `A scheduled task was deleted` to identify scheduled tasks created and deleted in less than 30 seconds. This behavior may represent a lateral movement attack abusing the Task Scheduler to obtain code execution. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Although uncommon, legitimate applications may create and delete a Scheduled Task within 30 seconds. Filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-03 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-03 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Short Lived Scheduled Task - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A windows scheduled task was created and deleted in 30 seconds on $ComputerName$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 81}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Short Lived Scheduled Task - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic leverages Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created` and Windows Security EventCode 4699, `A scheduled task was deleted` to identify scheduled tasks created and deleted in less than 30 seconds. This behavior may represent a lateral movement attack abusing the Task Scheduler to obtain code execution. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Short Lived Scheduled Task +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 OR EventCode=4699 | xmlkv Message | transaction Task_Name startswith=(EventCode=4698) endswith=(EventCode=4699) | eval short_lived=case((duration<30),"TRUE") | search short_lived = TRUE | table _time, ComputerName, Account_Name, Command, Task_Name, short_lived | `short_lived_scheduled_task_filter` + +[ESCU - Short Lived Windows Accounts - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search detects accounts that were created and deleted in a short time period. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.001", "T1136"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Change"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search detects accounts that were created and deleted in a short time period. +action.escu.how_to_implement = This search requires you to have enabled your Group Management Audit Logs in your Local Windows Security Policy and be ingesting those logs. More information on how to enable them can be found here: http://whatevernetworks.com/auditing-group-membership-changes-in-active-directory/ +action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible that an administrator created and deleted an account in a short time period. Verifying activity with an administrator is advised. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-06 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-06 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Short Lived Windows Accounts - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Account Monitoring and Controls"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A user account created or delete shortly in host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 63}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Short Lived Windows Accounts - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Account Monitoring and Controls"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.001", "T1136"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search detects accounts that were created and deleted in a short time period. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Short Lived Windows Accounts +action.notable.param.security_domain = access +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Changes.result_id) as result_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.result_id=4720 OR All_Changes.result_id=4726 by _time span=4h All_Changes.user All_Changes.dest | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | search result_id = 4720 result_id=4726 | transaction user connected=false maxspan=240m | table firstTime lastTime count user dest result_id | `short_lived_windows_accounts_filter` + +[ESCU - SilentCleanup UAC Bypass - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry that may related to UAC bypassed. This registry will be trigger once the attacker abuse the silentcleanup task schedule to gain high privilege execution that will bypass User control account. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry that may related to UAC bypassed. This registry will be trigger once the attacker abuse the silentcleanup task schedule to gain high privilege execution that will bypass User control account. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-01-28 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-01-28 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - SilentCleanup UAC Bypass - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious modification of registry $registry_path$ with possible payload path $registry_value_name$ in $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - SilentCleanup UAC Bypass - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry that may related to UAC bypassed. This registry will be trigger once the attacker abuse the silentcleanup task schedule to gain high privilege execution that will bypass User control account. +action.notable.param.rule_title = SilentCleanup UAC Bypass +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\Environment\\windir" Registry.registry_value_data = "*.exe*" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `silentcleanup_uac_bypass_filter` + +[ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for process names that consist only of a single letter. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204", "T1204.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for process names that consist only of a single letter. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Single-letter executables are not always malicious. Investigate this activity with your normal incident-response process. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-12-08 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-12-08 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["DHS Report TA18-074A"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A suspicious process $process_name$ with single letter in host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 63}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DHS Report TA18-074A"], "cis20": ["CIS 2"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204", "T1204.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for process names that consist only of a single letter. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Single Letter Process On Endpoint +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process, Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | eval process_name_length = len(process_name), endExe = if(substr(process_name, -4) == ".exe", 1, 0) | search process_name_length=5 AND endExe=1 | table count, firstTime, lastTime, dest, user, process, process_name | `single_letter_process_on_endpoint_filter` + +[ESCU - SLUI RunAs Elevated - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies the Microsoft Software Licensing User Interface Tool, `slui.exe`, elevating access using the `-verb runas` function. This particular bypass utilizes a registry key/value. Identified by two sources, the registry keys are `HKCU\Software\Classes\exefile\shell` and `HKCU\Software\Classes\launcher.Systemsettings\Shell\open\command`. To simulate this behavior, multiple POC are available. The analytic identifies the use of `runas` by `slui.exe`. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the Microsoft Software Licensing User Interface Tool, `slui.exe`, elevating access using the `-verb runas` function. This particular bypass utilizes a registry key/value. Identified by two sources, the registry keys are `HKCU\Software\Classes\exefile\shell` and `HKCU\Software\Classes\launcher.Systemsettings\Shell\open\command`. To simulate this behavior, multiple POC are available. The analytic identifies the use of `runas` by `slui.exe`. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives should be present as this is not commonly used by legitimate applications. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-05-13 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-05-13 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - SLUI RunAs Elevated - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A slui process $process_name$ with elevated commandline $process$ in host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - SLUI RunAs Elevated - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the Microsoft Software Licensing User Interface Tool, `slui.exe`, elevating access using the `-verb runas` function. This particular bypass utilizes a registry key/value. Identified by two sources, the registry keys are `HKCU\Software\Classes\exefile\shell` and `HKCU\Software\Classes\launcher.Systemsettings\Shell\open\command`. To simulate this behavior, multiple POC are available. The analytic identifies the use of `runas` by `slui.exe`. +action.notable.param.rule_title = SLUI RunAs Elevated +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=slui.exe (Processes.process=*-verb* Processes.process=*runas*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `slui_runas_elevated_filter` + +[ESCU - SLUI Spawning a Process - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies the Microsoft Software Licensing User Interface Tool, `slui.exe`, spawning a child process. This behavior is associated with publicly known UAC bypass. `slui.exe` is commonly associated with software updates and is most often spawned by `svchost.exe`. The `slui.exe` process should not have child processes, and any processes spawning from it will be running with elevated privileges. During triage, review the child process and additional parallel processes. Identify any file modifications that may have lead to the bypass. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the Microsoft Software Licensing User Interface Tool, `slui.exe`, spawning a child process. This behavior is associated with publicly known UAC bypass. `slui.exe` is commonly associated with software updates and is most often spawned by `svchost.exe`. The `slui.exe` process should not have child processes, and any processes spawning from it will be running with elevated privileges. During triage, review the child process and additional parallel processes. Identify any file modifications that may have lead to the bypass. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Certain applications may spawn from `slui.exe` that are legitimate. Filtering will be needed to ensure proper monitoring. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-05-13 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-05-13 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - SLUI Spawning a Process - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A slui process $parent_process_name$ spawning child process $process_name$ in host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 63}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - SLUI Spawning a Process - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the Microsoft Software Licensing User Interface Tool, `slui.exe`, spawning a child process. This behavior is associated with publicly known UAC bypass. `slui.exe` is commonly associated with software updates and is most often spawned by `svchost.exe`. The `slui.exe` process should not have child processes, and any processes spawning from it will be running with elevated privileges. During triage, review the child process and additional parallel processes. Identify any file modifications that may have lead to the bypass. +action.notable.param.rule_title = SLUI Spawning a Process +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=slui.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `slui_spawning_a_process_filter` + +[ESCU - Spoolsv Spawning Rundll32 - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies a suspicious child process, `rundll32.exe`, with no command-line arguments being spawned from `spoolsv.exe`. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. Typically, this is not normal behavior for `spoolsv.exe` to spawn a process. During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012", "T1547"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies a suspicious child process, `rundll32.exe`, with no command-line arguments being spawned from `spoolsv.exe`. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. Typically, this is not normal behavior for `spoolsv.exe` to spawn a process. During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives have been identified. There are limited instances where `rundll32.exe` may be spawned by a legitimate print driver. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-01 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-01 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Spoolsv Spawning Rundll32 - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = $parent_process$ has spawned $process_name$ on endpoint $ComputerName$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_id", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_id", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Spoolsv Spawning Rundll32 - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Local"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "parent_process_id", "role": ["Parent Process", "Attacker"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_id", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies a suspicious child process, `rundll32.exe`, with no command-line arguments being spawned from `spoolsv.exe`. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. Typically, this is not normal behavior for `spoolsv.exe` to spawn a process. During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Spoolsv Spawning Rundll32 +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=spoolsv.exe `process_rundll32` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spoolsv_spawning_rundll32_filter` + +[ESCU - Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search is to detect suspicious loading of dll in specific path relative to printnightmare exploitation. In this search we try to detect the loaded modules made by spoolsv.exe after the exploitation. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012", "T1547"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect suspicious loading of dll in specific path relative to printnightmare exploitation. In this search we try to detect the loaded modules made by spoolsv.exe after the exploitation. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-01 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-01 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = $Image$ with process id $process_id$ has loaded a driver from $ImageLoaded$ on endpoint $Computer$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}, {"threat_object_field": "process_id", "threat_object_type": "process name"}, {"threat_object_field": "ImageLoaded", "threat_object_type": "file"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Local"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "process_id", "role": ["Parent Process", "Attacker"], "type": "Process Name"}, {"name": "ImageLoaded", "role": ["Other"], "type": "File"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect suspicious loading of dll in specific path relative to printnightmare exploitation. In this search we try to detect the loaded modules made by spoolsv.exe after the exploitation. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `sysmon` EventCode=7 Image ="*\\spoolsv.exe" ImageLoaded="*\\Windows\\System32\\spool\\drivers\\x64\\*" ImageLoaded = "*.dll" | stats dc(ImageLoaded) as countImgloaded values(ImageLoaded) as ImgLoaded count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image Computer process_id EventCode | where countImgloaded >= 3 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules_filter` + +[ESCU - Spoolsv Suspicious Process Access - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic identifies a suspicious behavior related to PrintNightmare, or CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675), to gain privilege escalation on the vulnerable machine. This exploit attacks a critical Windows Print Spooler Vulnerability to elevate privilege. This detection is to look for suspicious process access made by the spoolsv.exe that may related to the attack. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic identifies a suspicious behavior related to PrintNightmare, or CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675), to gain privilege escalation on the vulnerable machine. This exploit attacks a critical Windows Print Spooler Vulnerability to elevate privilege. This detection is to look for suspicious process access made by the spoolsv.exe that may related to the attack. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with process access event where SourceImage, TargetImage, GrantedAccess and CallTrace executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of spoolsv.exe. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown. Filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-01 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-01 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Spoolsv Suspicious Process Access - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = $SourceImage$ was GrantedAccess open access to $TargetImage$ on endpoint $Computer$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}, {"threat_object_field": "ProcessID", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "TargetImage", "threat_object_type": "process name"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Spoolsv Suspicious Process Access - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Local"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "ProcessID", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "TargetImage", "role": ["Target"], "type": "Process Name"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic identifies a suspicious behavior related to PrintNightmare, or CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675), to gain privilege escalation on the vulnerable machine. This exploit attacks a critical Windows Print Spooler Vulnerability to elevate privilege. This detection is to look for suspicious process access made by the spoolsv.exe that may related to the attack. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Spoolsv Suspicious Process Access +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `sysmon` EventCode=10 SourceImage = "*\\spoolsv.exe" CallTrace = "*\\Windows\\system32\\spool\\DRIVERS\\x64\\*" TargetImage IN ("*\\rundll32.exe", "*\\spoolsv.exe") GrantedAccess = 0x1fffff | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer SourceImage TargetImage GrantedAccess CallTrace EventCode ProcessID| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spoolsv_suspicious_process_access_filter` + +[ESCU - Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies a `.dll` being written by `spoolsv.exe`. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. Typically, this is not normal behavior for `spoolsv.exe` to write a `.dll`. Current POC code used will write the suspicious DLL to disk within a path of `\spool\drivers\x64\`. During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012", "T1547"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies a `.dll` being written by `spoolsv.exe`. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. Typically, this is not normal behavior for `spoolsv.exe` to write a `.dll`. Current POC code used will write the suspicious DLL to disk within a path of `\spool\drivers\x64\`. During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node and `Filesystem` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-01 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-01 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = $process_name$ has been identified writing dll's to $file_path$ on endpoint $dest$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}, {"threat_object_field": "process_id", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "file_path", "threat_object_type": "file"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "process_id", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "file_path", "role": ["Other"], "type": "File"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies a `.dll` being written by `spoolsv.exe`. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. Typically, this is not normal behavior for `spoolsv.exe` to write a `.dll`. Current POC code used will write the suspicious DLL to disk within a path of `\spool\drivers\x64\`. During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Spoolsv Writing a DLL +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=spoolsv.exe by _time Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path="*\\spool\\drivers\\x64\\*" Filesystem.file_name="*.dll" by _time Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process] | dedup file_create_time | table dest file_create_time, file_name, file_path, process_name | `spoolsv_writing_a_dll_filter` + +[ESCU - Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Sysmon - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies a `.dll` being written by `spoolsv.exe`. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously(CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. Typically, this is not normal behavior for `spoolsv.exe` to write a `.dll`. Current POC code used will write the suspicious DLL to disk within a path of `\spool\drivers\x64\`. During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012", "T1547"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies a `.dll` being written by `spoolsv.exe`. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously(CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. Typically, this is not normal behavior for `spoolsv.exe` to write a `.dll`. Current POC code used will write the suspicious DLL to disk within a path of `\spool\drivers\x64\`. During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives. Filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-01 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-01 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Sysmon - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = $process_name$ has been identified writing dll's to $file_path$ on endpoint $dest$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}, {"threat_object_field": "process_id", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "file_path", "threat_object_type": "file"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Sysmon - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Local"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "process_id", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "file_path", "role": ["Other"], "type": "File"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies a `.dll` being written by `spoolsv.exe`. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously(CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. Typically, this is not normal behavior for `spoolsv.exe` to write a `.dll`. Current POC code used will write the suspicious DLL to disk within a path of `\spool\drivers\x64\`. During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Sysmon +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `sysmon` EventID=11 process_name=spoolsv.exe file_path="*\\spool\\drivers\\x64\\*" file_name=*.dll | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, UserID, process_name, file_path, file_name, TargetFilename, process_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spoolsv_writing_a_dll___sysmon_filter` + +[ESCU - Sqlite Module In Temp Folder - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search is to detect a suspicious file creation of sqlite3.dll in %temp% folder. This behavior was seen in IcedID malware where it download sqlite module to parse browser database like for chrome or firefox to stole browser information related to bank, credit card or credentials. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1005"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious file creation of sqlite3.dll in %temp% folder. This behavior was seen in IcedID malware where it download sqlite module to parse browser database like for chrome or firefox to stole browser information related to bank, credit card or credentials. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-03 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-03 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Sqlite Module In Temp Folder - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["IcedID"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = process $SourceImage$ create a file $TargetImage$ in host $Computer$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 9}, {"threat_object_field": "SourceImage", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Sqlite Module In Temp Folder - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1005"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "SourceImage", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious file creation of sqlite3.dll in %temp% folder. This behavior was seen in IcedID malware where it download sqlite module to parse browser database like for chrome or firefox to stole browser information related to bank, credit card or credentials. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Sqlite Module In Temp Folder +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `sysmon` EventCode=11 (TargetFilename = "*\\sqlite32.dll" OR TargetFilename = "*\\sqlite64.dll") (TargetFilename = "*\\temp\\*") |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by process_name TargetFilename EventCode ProcessId Image | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sqlite_module_in_temp_folder_filter` + +[ESCU - Start Up During Safe Mode Boot - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search is to detect a modification or registry add to the safeboot registry as an autostart mechanism. This technique was seen in some ransomware to automatically execute its code upon a safe mode boot. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.001", "T1547"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a modification or registry add to the safeboot registry as an autostart mechanism. This technique was seen in some ransomware to automatically execute its code upon a safe mode boot. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. +action.escu.known_false_positives = updated windows application needed in safe boot may used this registry +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-26 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-26 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Start Up During Safe Mode Boot - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Safeboot registry $registry_path$ was added or modified with a new value $registry_value_name$ on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Start Up During Safe Mode Boot - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.001", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a modification or registry add to the safeboot registry as an autostart mechanism. This technique was seen in some ransomware to automatically execute its code upon a safe mode boot. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Start Up During Safe Mode Boot +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path="*\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\SafeBoot\\Minimal\*" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `start_up_during_safe_mode_boot_filter` + +[ESCU - Suspicious Computer Account Name Change - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = As part of the sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287) exploitation chain, adversaries need to create a new computer account name and rename it to match the name of a domain controller account without the ending '$'. In Windows Active Directory environments, computer account names always end with `$`. This analytic leverages Event Id 4781, `The name of an account was changed`, to identify a computer account rename event with a suspicious name that does not terminate with `$`. This behavior could represent an exploitation attempt of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287 for privilege escalation. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.002"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = As part of the sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287) exploitation chain, adversaries need to create a new computer account name and rename it to match the name of a domain controller account without the ending '$'. In Windows Active Directory environments, computer account names always end with `$`. This analytic leverages Event Id 4781, `The name of an account was changed`, to identify a computer account rename event with a suspicious name that does not terminate with `$`. This behavior could represent an exploitation attempt of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287 for privilege escalation. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows event logs from your hosts. In addition, the Splunk Windows TA is needed. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Renaming a computer account name to a name that not end with '$' is highly unsual and may not have any legitimate scenarios. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-20 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-20 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Computer Account Name Change - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A computer account $Old_Account_Name$ was renamed with a suspicious computer name +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 70}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Computer Account Name Change - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-42287", "CVE-2021-42278"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.002"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = As part of the sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287) exploitation chain, adversaries need to create a new computer account name and rename it to match the name of a domain controller account without the ending '$'. In Windows Active Directory environments, computer account names always end with `$`. This analytic leverages Event Id 4781, `The name of an account was changed`, to identify a computer account rename event with a suspicious name that does not terminate with `$`. This behavior could represent an exploitation attempt of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287 for privilege escalation. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious Computer Account Name Change +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4781 Old_Account_Name="*$" New_Account_Name!="*$" | table _time, ComputerName, Account_Name, Old_Account_Name, New_Account_Name | `suspicious_computer_account_name_change_filter` + +[ESCU - Suspicious Copy on System32 - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious copy of file from systemroot folder of the windows OS. This technique is commonly used by APT or other malware as part of execution (LOLBIN) to run its malicious code using the available legitimate tool in OS. this type of event may seen or may execute of normal user in some instance but this is really a anomaly that needs to be check within the network. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003", "T1036"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to detect a suspicious copy of file from systemroot folder of the windows OS. This technique is commonly used by APT or other malware as part of execution (LOLBIN) to run its malicious code using the available legitimate tool in OS. this type of event may seen or may execute of normal user in some instance but this is really a anomaly that needs to be check within the network. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = every user may do this event but very un-ussual. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-05 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-05 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Copy on System32 - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Unusual Processes"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = execution of copy exe to copy file from $process$ in $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 63}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Copy on System32 - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Unusual Processes"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003", "T1036"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious copy of file from systemroot folder of the windows OS. This technique is commonly used by APT or other malware as part of execution (LOLBIN) to run its malicious code using the available legitimate tool in OS. this type of event may seen or may execute of normal user in some instance but this is really a anomaly that needs to be check within the network. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious Copy on System32 +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN("cmd.exe", "powershell*","pwsh.exe", "sqlps.exe", "sqltoolsps.exe", "powershell_ise.exe") AND `process_copy` AND Processes.process IN("*\\Windows\\System32\*", "*\\Windows\\SysWow64\\*") AND Processes.process = "*copy*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `suspicious_copy_on_system32_filter` + +[ESCU - Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies DLLHost.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for DLLHost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. DLLHost.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies DLLHost.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for DLLHost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. DLLHost.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-20 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-20 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Cobalt Strike"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious dllhost.exe process with no command line arguments executed on $dest$ by $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 49}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies DLLHost.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for DLLHost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. DLLHost.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_dllhost` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process="(dllhost\.exe.{0,4}$)" | `suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments_filter` + +[ESCU - Suspicious Driver Loaded Path - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic will detect suspicious driver loaded paths. This technique is commonly used by malicious software like coin miners (xmrig) to register its malicious driver from notable directories where executable or drivers do not commonly exist. During triage, validate this driver is for legitimate business use. Review the metadata and certificate information. Unsigned drivers from non-standard paths is not normal, but occurs. In addition, review driver loads into `ntoskrnl.exe` for possible other drivers of interest. Long tail analyze drivers by path (outside of default, and in default) for further review. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.003", "T1543"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic will detect suspicious driver loaded paths. This technique is commonly used by malicious software like coin miners (xmrig) to register its malicious driver from notable directories where executable or drivers do not commonly exist. During triage, validate this driver is for legitimate business use. Review the metadata and certificate information. Unsigned drivers from non-standard paths is not normal, but occurs. In addition, review driver loads into `ntoskrnl.exe` for possible other drivers of interest. Long tail analyze drivers by path (outside of default, and in default) for further review. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the driver loaded and Signature from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives will be present. Some applications do load drivers +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-29 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-29 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Driver Loaded Path - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["XMRig"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious driver $ImageLoaded$ on $Computer$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}, {"threat_object_field": "ImageLoaded", "threat_object_type": "file name"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Driver Loaded Path - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.003", "T1543"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "ImageLoaded", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "File Name"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic will detect suspicious driver loaded paths. This technique is commonly used by malicious software like coin miners (xmrig) to register its malicious driver from notable directories where executable or drivers do not commonly exist. During triage, validate this driver is for legitimate business use. Review the metadata and certificate information. Unsigned drivers from non-standard paths is not normal, but occurs. In addition, review driver loads into `ntoskrnl.exe` for possible other drivers of interest. Long tail analyze drivers by path (outside of default, and in default) for further review. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious Driver Loaded Path +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `sysmon` EventCode=6 ImageLoaded = "*.sys" NOT (ImageLoaded IN("*\\WINDOWS\\inf","*\\WINDOWS\\System32\\drivers\\*", "*\\WINDOWS\\System32\\DriverStore\\FileRepository\\*")) | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer ImageLoaded Hashes IMPHASH Signature Signed | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_driver_loaded_path_filter` + +[ESCU - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic utilizes Windows Event ID 1100 to identify when Windows event log service is shutdown. Note that this is a voluminous analytic that will require tuning or restricted to specific endpoints based on criticality. This event generates every time Windows Event Log service has shut down. It also generates during normal system shutdown. During triage, based on time of day and user, determine if this was planned. If not planned, follow through with reviewing parallel alerts and other data sources to determine what else may have occurred. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070", "T1070.001"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "PR.IP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.AE"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes Windows Event ID 1100 to identify when Windows event log service is shutdown. Note that this is a voluminous analytic that will require tuning or restricted to specific endpoints based on criticality. This event generates every time Windows Event Log service has shut down. It also generates during normal system shutdown. During triage, based on time of day and user, determine if this was planned. If not planned, follow through with reviewing parallel alerts and other data sources to determine what else may have occurred. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows event logs from your hosts. In addition, the Splunk Windows TA is needed. +action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible the Event Logging service gets shut down due to system errors or legitimately administration tasks. Filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-17 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-17 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Log Manipulation", "Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = The Windows Event Log Service shutdown on $ComputerName$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 9}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Log Manipulation", "Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070", "T1070.001"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "PR.IP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes Windows Event ID 1100 to identify when Windows event log service is shutdown. Note that this is a voluminous analytic that will require tuning or restricted to specific endpoints based on criticality. This event generates every time Windows Event Log service has shut down. It also generates during normal system shutdown. During triage, based on time of day and user, determine if this was planned. If not planned, follow through with reviewing parallel alerts and other data sources to determine what else may have occurred. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = (`wineventlog_security` EventCode=1100) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest Message EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_event_log_service_behavior_filter` + +[ESCU - Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies gpupdate.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for gpupdate.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. gpupdate.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies gpupdate.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for gpupdate.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. gpupdate.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-20 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-20 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Cobalt Strike"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious gpupdate.exe process with no command line arguments executed on $dest$ by $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 49}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies gpupdate.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for gpupdate.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. gpupdate.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_gpupdate` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process="(gpupdate\.exe.{0,4}$)" | `suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments_filter` + +[ESCU - Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe commandline to execute dll file. This technique was seen in IcedID malware to load its payload dll with the following parameter to load encrypted dll payload which is the license.dat. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe commandline to execute dll file. This technique was seen in IcedID malware to load its payload dll with the following parameter to load encrypted dll payload which is the license.dat. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = limitted. this parameter is not commonly used by windows application but can be used by the network operator. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-26 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-26 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["IcedID"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = rundll32 process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe commandline to execute dll file. This technique was seen in IcedID malware to load its payload dll with the following parameter to load encrypted dll payload which is the license.dat. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*/i:* by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline_filter` + +[ESCU - Suspicious Image Creation In Appdata Folder - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search is to detect a suspicious creation of image in appdata folder made by process that also has a file reference in appdata folder. This technique was seen in remcos rat that capture screenshot of the compromised machine and place it in the appdata and will be send to its C2 server. This TTP is really a good indicator to check that process because it is in suspicious folder path and image files are not commonly created by user in this folder path. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1113"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious creation of image in appdata folder made by process that also has a file reference in appdata folder. This technique was seen in remcos rat that capture screenshot of the compromised machine and place it in the appdata and will be send to its C2 server. This TTP is really a good indicator to check that process because it is in suspicious folder path and image files are not commonly created by user in this folder path. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-21 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-21 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Image Creation In Appdata Folder - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Remcos"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = process $process_name$ creating image file $file_path$ in $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Image Creation In Appdata Folder - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1113"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious creation of image in appdata folder made by process that also has a file reference in appdata folder. This technique was seen in remcos rat that capture screenshot of the compromised machine and place it in the appdata and will be send to its C2 server. This TTP is really a good indicator to check that process because it is in suspicious folder path and image files are not commonly created by user in this folder path. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious Image Creation In Appdata Folder +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=*.exe Processes.process_path="*\\appdata\\Roaming\\*" by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN ("*.png","*.jpg","*.bmp","*.gif","*.tiff") Filesystem.file_path = "*\\appdata\\Roaming\\*" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process] | `suspicious_image_creation_in_appdata_folder_filter` + +[ESCU - Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = As part of the sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287) exploitation chain, adversaries will request and obtain a Kerberos Service Ticket (TGS) with a domain controller computer account as the Service Name. This Service Ticket can be then used to take control of the domain controller on the final part of the attack. This analytic leverages Event Id 4769, `A Kerberos service ticket was requested`, to identify an unusual TGS request where the Account_Name requesting the ticket matches the Service_Name field. This behavior could represent an exploitation attempt of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287 for privilege escalation. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.002"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = As part of the sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287) exploitation chain, adversaries will request and obtain a Kerberos Service Ticket (TGS) with a domain controller computer account as the Service Name. This Service Ticket can be then used to take control of the domain controller on the final part of the attack. This analytic leverages Event Id 4769, `A Kerberos service ticket was requested`, to identify an unusual TGS request where the Account_Name requesting the ticket matches the Service_Name field. This behavior could represent an exploitation attempt of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287 for privilege escalation. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled. +action.escu.known_false_positives = We have tested this detection logic with ~2 million 4769 events and did not identify false positives. However, they may be possible in certain environments. Filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-20 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-20 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket was requested by $Account_Name$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 60}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-42287", "CVE-2021-42278"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.002"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = As part of the sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287) exploitation chain, adversaries will request and obtain a Kerberos Service Ticket (TGS) with a domain controller computer account as the Service Name. This Service Ticket can be then used to take control of the domain controller on the final part of the attack. This analytic leverages Event Id 4769, `A Kerberos service ticket was requested`, to identify an unusual TGS request where the Account_Name requesting the ticket matches the Service_Name field. This behavior could represent an exploitation attempt of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287 for privilege escalation. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769 | eval isSuspicious = if(lower(Service_Name) = lower(mvindex(split(Account_Name,"@"),0)+"$"),1,0) | where isSuspicious = 1 | table _time, Client_Address, Account_Name, Service_Name, Failure_Code, isSuspicious | `suspicious_kerberos_service_ticket_request_filter` + +[ESCU - Suspicious Linux Discovery Commands - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search, detects execution of suspicious bash commands from various commonly leveraged bash scripts like (AutoSUID, LinEnum, LinPeas) to perform discovery of possible paths of privilege execution, password files, vulnerable directories, executables and file permissions on a Linux host.\ +The search logic specifically looks for high number of distinct commands run in a short period of time. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.004"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search, detects execution of suspicious bash commands from various commonly leveraged bash scripts like (AutoSUID, LinEnum, LinPeas) to perform discovery of possible paths of privilege execution, password files, vulnerable directories, executables and file permissions on a Linux host.\ +The search logic specifically looks for high number of distinct commands run in a short period of time. +action.escu.how_to_implement = This detection search is based on Splunk add-on for Microsoft Sysmon-Linux.(https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/6176/). Please install this add-on to parse fields correctly and execute detection search. Consider customizing the time window and threshold values according to your environment. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Unless an administrator is using these commands to troubleshoot or audit a system, the execution of these commands should be monitored. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-06 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-06 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Linux Discovery Commands - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Post-Exploitation"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious Linux Discovery Commands detected on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 81}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Linux Discovery Commands - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Post-Exploitation"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.004"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search, detects execution of suspicious bash commands from various commonly leveraged bash scripts like (AutoSUID, LinEnum, LinPeas) to perform discovery of possible paths of privilege execution, password files, vulnerable directories, executables and file permissions on a Linux host.\ +The search logic specifically looks for high number of distinct commands run in a short period of time. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious Linux Discovery Commands +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) values(Processes.process_name) values(Processes.parent_process_name) dc(Processes.process) as distinct_commands dc(Processes.process_name) as distinct_process_names min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where [|inputlookup linux_tool_discovery_process.csv | rename process as Processes.process |table Processes.process] by _time span=5m Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| where distinct_commands > 40 AND distinct_process_names > 3| `suspicious_linux_discovery_commands_filter` + +[ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies a renamed instance of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe. Microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319 and is rarely utilized. When investigating, identify the executed code on disk and review. A spawned child process from microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is uncommon. In any instance, microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe spawning from an Office product or any living off the land binary is highly suspect. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1127", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies a renamed instance of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe. Microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319 and is rarely utilized. When investigating, identify the executed code on disk and review. A spawned child process from microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is uncommon. In any instance, microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe spawning from an Office product or any living off the land binary is highly suspect. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe, triggering a false positive. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-20 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-20 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "Cobalt Strike", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious renamed microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe binary ran on $dest$ by $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 63}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "Cobalt Strike", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1127", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_microsoftworkflowcompiler` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename_filter` + +[ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe usage. microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319 and is rarely utilized. When investigating, identify the executed code on disk and review. It is not a commonly used process by many applications. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1127"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe usage. microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319 and is rarely utilized. When investigating, identify the executed code on disk and review. It is not a commonly used process by many applications. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, limited instances have been identified coming from native Microsoft utilities similar to SCCM. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-12 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-12 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe process ran on $dest$ by $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 35}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 35}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1127"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe usage. microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319 and is rarely utilized. When investigating, identify the executed code on disk and review. It is not a commonly used process by many applications. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_microsoftworkflowcompiler` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage_filter` + +[ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies msbuild.exe executing from a non-standard path. Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319 and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319. Instances of Visual Studio will run a copy of msbuild.exe. A moved instance of MSBuild is suspicious, however there are instances of build applications that will move or use a copy of MSBuild. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1127", "T1036.003", "T1127.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies msbuild.exe executing from a non-standard path. Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319 and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319. Instances of Visual Studio will run a copy of msbuild.exe. A moved instance of MSBuild is suspicious, however there are instances of build applications that will move or use a copy of MSBuild. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of msbuild.exe, triggering a false positive. Baselining of MSBuild.exe usage is recommended to better understand it's path usage. Visual Studio runs an instance out of a path that will need to be filtered on. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-12 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-12 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild", "Cobalt Strike", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Msbuild.exe ran from an uncommon path on $dest$ execyted by $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 49}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild", "Cobalt Strike", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1127", "T1036.003", "T1127.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies msbuild.exe executing from a non-standard path. Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319 and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319. Instances of Visual Studio will run a copy of msbuild.exe. A moved instance of MSBuild is suspicious, however there are instances of build applications that will move or use a copy of MSBuild. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious msbuild path +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_msbuild` AND (Processes.process_path!=c:\\windows\\microsoft.net\\framework*\\v*\\*) by Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `suspicious_msbuild_path_filter` + +[ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies renamed instances of msbuild.exe executing. Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319 and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319. During investigation, identify the code executed and what is executing a renamed instance of MSBuild. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1127", "T1036.003", "T1127.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies renamed instances of msbuild.exe executing. Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319 and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319. During investigation, identify the code executed and what is executing a renamed instance of MSBuild. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of msbuild, triggering a false positive. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-12 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-12 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild", "Cobalt Strike", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious renamed msbuild.exe binary ran on $dest$ by $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 63}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild", "Cobalt Strike", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1127", "T1036.003", "T1127.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies renamed instances of msbuild.exe executing. Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319 and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319. During investigation, identify the code executed and what is executing a renamed instance of MSBuild. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious MSBuild Rename +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_msbuild` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_msbuild_rename_filter` + +[ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Spawn - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning msbuild.exe. This behavior is indicative of a COM object being utilized to spawn msbuild from wmiprvse.exe. It is common for MSBuild.exe to be spawned from devenv.exe while using Visual Studio. In this instance, there will be command line arguments and file paths. In a malicious instance, MSBuild.exe will spawn from non-standard processes and have no command line arguments. For example, MSBuild.exe spawning from explorer.exe, powershell.exe is far less common and should be investigated. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1127", "T1127.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning msbuild.exe. This behavior is indicative of a COM object being utilized to spawn msbuild from wmiprvse.exe. It is common for MSBuild.exe to be spawned from devenv.exe while using Visual Studio. In this instance, there will be command line arguments and file paths. In a malicious instance, MSBuild.exe will spawn from non-standard processes and have no command line arguments. For example, MSBuild.exe spawning from explorer.exe, powershell.exe is far less common and should be investigated. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-12 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-12 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Spawn - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious msbuild.exe process executed on $dest$ by $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 42}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Spawn - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1127", "T1127.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning msbuild.exe. This behavior is indicative of a COM object being utilized to spawn msbuild from wmiprvse.exe. It is common for MSBuild.exe to be spawned from devenv.exe while using Visual Studio. In this instance, there will be command line arguments and file paths. In a malicious instance, MSBuild.exe will spawn from non-standard processes and have no command line arguments. For example, MSBuild.exe spawning from explorer.exe, powershell.exe is far less common and should be investigated. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious MSBuild Spawn +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe AND `process_msbuild` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_msbuild_spawn_filter` + +[ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies child processes spawning from "mshta.exe". The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, parent process "mshta.exe" and its child process. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies child processes spawning from "mshta.exe". The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, parent process "mshta.exe" and its child process. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-12 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-12 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious MSHTA Activity"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = suspicious mshta child process detected on host $dest$ by user $user$. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 40}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 40}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process", "threat_object_type": "process name"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious MSHTA Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "parent_process", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process Name"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies child processes spawning from "mshta.exe". The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, parent process "mshta.exe" and its child process. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious mshta child process +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=mshta.exe AND (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=colorcpl.exe OR Processes.process_name=msbuild.exe OR Processes.process_name=microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe OR Processes.process_name=searchprotocolhost.exe OR Processes.process_name=scrcons.exe OR Processes.process_name=cscript.exe OR Processes.process_name=wscript.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=cmd.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_mshta_child_process_filter` + +[ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning mshta.exe. This behavior is indicative of a DCOM object being utilized to spawn mshta from wmiprvse.exe or svchost.exe. In this instance, adversaries may use LethalHTA that will spawn mshta.exe from svchost.exe. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning mshta.exe. This behavior is indicative of a DCOM object being utilized to spawn mshta from wmiprvse.exe or svchost.exe. In this instance, adversaries may use LethalHTA that will spawn mshta.exe from svchost.exe. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-20 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-20 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious MSHTA Activity"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = mshta.exe spawned by wmiprvse.exe on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious MSHTA Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning mshta.exe. This behavior is indicative of a DCOM object being utilized to spawn mshta from wmiprvse.exe or svchost.exe. In this instance, adversaries may use LethalHTA that will spawn mshta.exe from svchost.exe. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious mshta spawn +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=svchost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe) AND `process_mshta` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.user Processes.original_file_name| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_mshta_spawn_filter` + +[ESCU - Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic detects a suspicious process making a DNS query via known, abused text-paste web services, VoIP, instant messaging, and digital distribution platforms used to download external files. This technique is abused by adversaries, malware actors, and red teams to download a malicious file on the target host. This is a good TTP indicator for possible initial access techniques. A user will experience false positives if the following instant messaging is allowed or common applications like telegram or discord are allowed in the corporate network. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.005", "T1059"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic detects a suspicious process making a DNS query via known, abused text-paste web services, VoIP, instant messaging, and digital distribution platforms used to download external files. This technique is abused by adversaries, malware actors, and red teams to download a malicious file on the target host. This is a good TTP indicator for possible initial access techniques. A user will experience false positives if the following instant messaging is allowed or common applications like telegram or discord are allowed in the corporate network. +action.escu.how_to_implement = This detection relies on sysmon logs with the Event ID 22, DNS Query. We suggest you run this detection at least once a day over the last 14 days. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Noise and false positive can be seen if the following instant messaging is allowed to use within corporate network. In this case, a filter is needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-18 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-18 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Remcos", "WhisperGate"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = suspicious process $process_name$ has a dns query in $QueryName$ on $Computer$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Remcos", "WhisperGate"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.005", "T1059"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic detects a suspicious process making a DNS query via known, abused text-paste web services, VoIP, instant messaging, and digital distribution platforms used to download external files. This technique is abused by adversaries, malware actors, and red teams to download a malicious file on the target host. This is a good TTP indicator for possible initial access techniques. A user will experience false positives if the following instant messaging is allowed or common applications like telegram or discord are allowed in the corporate network. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `sysmon` EventCode=22 QueryName IN ("*pastebin*", "*discord*", "*telegram*", "*t.me*") process_name IN ("cmd.exe", "*powershell*", "pwsh.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image QueryName QueryStatus process_name QueryResults Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services_filter` + +[ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic will detect a suspicious process running in a file path where a process is not commonly seen and is most commonly used by malicious software. This behavior has been used by adversaries where they drop and run an exe in a path that is accessible without admin privileges. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic will detect a suspicious process running in a file path where a process is not commonly seen and is most commonly used by malicious software. This behavior has been used by adversaries where they drop and run an exe in a path that is accessible without admin privileges. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may allow execution of specific binaries in non-standard paths. Filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-05-05 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-05-05 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["XMRig", "Remcos", "WhisperGate", "Hermetic Wiper"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicioues process $Processes.process_path.file_path$ running from suspicious location +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 35}, {"threat_object_field": "Processes.process_path.file_path", "threat_object_type": "file name"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig", "Remcos", "WhisperGate", "Hermetic Wiper"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "Processes.process_path.file_path", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "File Name"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic will detect a suspicious process running in a file path where a process is not commonly seen and is most commonly used by malicious software. This behavior has been used by adversaries where they drop and run an exe in a path that is accessible without admin privileges. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious Process File Path +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_path = "*\\windows\\fonts\\*" OR Processes.process_path = "*\\windows\\temp\\*" OR Processes.process_path = "*\\users\\public\\*" OR Processes.process_path = "*\\windows\\debug\\*" OR Processes.process_path.file_path = "*\\Users\\Administrator\\Music\\*" OR Processes.process_path.file_path = "*\\Windows\\servicing\\*" OR Processes.process_path.file_path = "*\\Users\\Default\\*" OR Processes.process_path.file_path = "*Recycle.bin*" OR Processes.process_path = "*\\Windows\\Media\\*" OR Processes.process_path = "\\Windows\\repair\\*" OR Processes.process_path = "*\\temp\\*" OR Processes.process_path = "*\\PerfLogs\\*" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_path Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_process_file_path_filter` + +[ESCU - Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic identifies a process making a DNS query to Discord, a well known instant messaging and digital distribution platform. Discord can be abused by adversaries, as seen in the WhisperGate campaign, to host and download malicious. external files. A process resolving a Discord DNS name could be an indicator of malware trying to download files from Discord for further execution. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.005", "T1059"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic identifies a process making a DNS query to Discord, a well known instant messaging and digital distribution platform. Discord can be abused by adversaries, as seen in the WhisperGate campaign, to host and download malicious. external files. A process resolving a Discord DNS name could be an indicator of malware trying to download files from Discord for further execution. +action.escu.how_to_implement = his detection relies on sysmon logs with the Event ID 22, DNS Query. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Noise and false positive can be seen if the following instant messaging is allowed to use within corporate network. In this case, a filter is needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-19 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-19 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["WhisperGate"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = suspicious process $process_name$ has a dns query in $QueryName$ on $Computer$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process name"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["WhisperGate"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.005", "T1059"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Process Name"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `sysmon` EventCode=22 QueryName IN ("*discord*") process_path != "*\\AppData\\Local\\Discord\\*" AND process_path != "*\\Program Files*" AND process_name != "discord.exe" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image QueryName QueryStatus process_name QueryResults Computer process_path | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query_filter` + +[ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for reg.exe being launched from a command prompt not started by the user. When a user launches cmd.exe, the parent process is usually explorer.exe. This search filters out those instances. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for reg.exe being launched from a command prompt not started by the user. When a user launches cmd.exe, the parent process is usually explorer.exe. This search filters out those instances. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. +action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible for system administrators to write scripts that exhibit this behavior. If this is the case, the search will need to be modified to filter them out. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-22 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-22 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Disabling Security Tools", "DHS Report TA18-074A"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious $Processes.process_path.file_path$ process running with an uncommon parent process $Processes.parent_process_name$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 35}, {"threat_object_field": "Processes.process_path.file_path", "threat_object_type": "file name"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Disabling Security Tools", "DHS Report TA18-074A"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "Processes.process_path.file_path", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "File Name"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for reg.exe being launched from a command prompt not started by the user. When a user launches cmd.exe, the parent process is usually explorer.exe. This search filters out those instances. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious Reg exe Process +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name != explorer.exe Processes.process_name =cmd.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=cmd.exe Processes.process_name= reg.exe by Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename parent_process_id as process_id |dedup process_id| table process_id dest] | `suspicious_reg_exe_process_filter` + +[ESCU - Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code by using non-standard file extensions to load malciious DLLs. Upon investigating, look for network connections to remote destinations (internal or external). Review additional parrallel processes and child processes for additional activity. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.010"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code by using non-standard file extensions to load malciious DLLs. Upon investigating, look for network connections to remote destinations (internal or external). Review additional parrallel processes and child processes for additional activity. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. Tune the query by filtering additional extensions found to be used by legitimate processes. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives with the query restricted to specified paths. Add more world writeable paths as tuning continues. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-28 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-28 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", "Iceid"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious $Processes.process_path.file_path$ process potentially loading malicious code +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 35}, {"threat_object_field": "Processes.process_path.file_path", "threat_object_type": "file name"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", "Iceid"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.010"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "Processes.process_path.file_path", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "File Name"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code by using non-standard file extensions to load malciious DLLs. Upon investigating, look for network connections to remote destinations (internal or external). Review additional parrallel processes and child processes for additional activity. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` (Processes.process=*appdata* OR Processes.process=*programdata* OR Processes.process=*windows\temp*) (Processes.process!=*.dll Processes.process!=*.ax Processes.process!=*.ocx) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path_filter` + +[ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe using dllregisterserver on the command line to load a DLL. When a DLL is registered, the DllRegisterServer method entry point in the DLL is invoked. This is typically seen when a DLL is being registered on the system. Not every instance is considered malicious, but it will capture malicious use of it. During investigation, review the parent process and parrellel processes executing. Capture the DLL being loaded and inspect further. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe using dllregisterserver on the command line to load a DLL. When a DLL is registered, the DllRegisterServer method entry point in the DLL is invoked. This is typically seen when a DLL is being registered on the system. Not every instance is considered malicious, but it will capture malicious use of it. During investigation, review the parent process and parrellel processes executing. Capture the DLL being loaded and inspect further. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = This is likely to produce false positives and will require some filtering. Tune the query by adding command line paths to known good DLLs, or filtering based on parent process names. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-02-09 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-02-09 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = $Processes.process_path.file_path$ process potentially loading malicious code +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 35}, {"threat_object_field": "Processes.process_path.file_path", "threat_object_type": "file name"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "Processes.process_path.file_path", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "File Name"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe using dllregisterserver on the command line to load a DLL. When a DLL is registered, the DllRegisterServer method entry point in the DLL is invoked. This is typically seen when a DLL is being registered on the system. Not every instance is considered malicious, but it will capture malicious use of it. During investigation, review the parent process and parrellel processes executing. Capture the DLL being loaded and inspect further. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*dllregisterserver* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver_filter` + +[ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 PluginInit - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe process with plugininit parameter. This technique is commonly seen in IceID malware to execute its initial dll stager to download another payload to the compromised machine. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe process with plugininit parameter. This technique is commonly seen in IceID malware to execute its initial dll stager to download another payload to the compromised machine. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = third party application may used this dll export name to execute function. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-26 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-26 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 PluginInit - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["IcedID"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = rundll32 process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 PluginInit - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe process with plugininit parameter. This technique is commonly seen in IceID malware to execute its initial dll stager to download another payload to the compromised machine. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious Rundll32 PluginInit +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*PluginInit* by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_plugininit_filter` + +[ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe executing a DLL function name, Start and StartW, on the command line that is commonly observed with Cobalt Strike x86 and x64 DLL payloads. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. Typically, the DLL will be written and loaded from a world writeable path or user location. In most instances it will not have a valid certificate (Unsigned). During investigation, review the parent process and other parallel application execution. Capture and triage the DLL in question. In the instance of Cobalt Strike, rundll32.exe is the default process it opens and injects shellcode into. This default process can be changed, but typically is not. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe executing a DLL function name, Start and StartW, on the command line that is commonly observed with Cobalt Strike x86 and x64 DLL payloads. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. Typically, the DLL will be written and loaded from a world writeable path or user location. In most instances it will not have a valid certificate (Unsigned). During investigation, review the parent process and other parallel application execution. Capture and triage the DLL in question. In the instance of Cobalt Strike, rundll32.exe is the default process it opens and injects shellcode into. This default process can be changed, but typically is not. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use Start as a function and call it via the command line. Filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-02-04 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-02-04 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Cobalt Strike", "Trickbot"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = rundll32.exe running with suspicious parameters on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 35}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 35}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Cobalt Strike", "Trickbot"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe executing a DLL function name, Start and StartW, on the command line that is commonly observed with Cobalt Strike x86 and x64 DLL payloads. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. Typically, the DLL will be written and loaded from a world writeable path or user location. In most instances it will not have a valid certificate (Unsigned). During investigation, review the parent process and other parallel application execution. Capture and triage the DLL in question. In the instance of Cobalt Strike, rundll32.exe is the default process it opens and injects shellcode into. This default process can be changed, but typically is not. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious Rundll32 StartW +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*start* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_startw_filter` + +[ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for rundll32.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for rundll32.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-20 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-20 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Cobalt Strike", "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious rundll32.exe process with no command line arguments executed on $dest$ by $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 49}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Cobalt Strike", "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for rundll32.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process="(rundll32\.exe.{0,4}$)" | `suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments_filter` + +[ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following detection identifies Scheduled Tasks registering (creating a new task) a binary or script to run from a public directory which includes users\public, \programdata\ and \windows\temp. Upon triage, review the binary or script in the command line for legitimacy, whether an approved binary/script or not. In addition, capture the binary or script in question and analyze for further behaviors. Identify the source and contain the endpoint. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1053"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following detection identifies Scheduled Tasks registering (creating a new task) a binary or script to run from a public directory which includes users\public, \programdata\ and \windows\temp. Upon triage, review the binary or script in the command line for legitimacy, whether an approved binary/script or not. In addition, capture the binary or script in question and analyze for further behaviors. Identify the source and contain the endpoint. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present. Filter as needed by parent process or command line argument. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-01 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-01 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Windows Persistence Techniques"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious scheduled task registered on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 35}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 35}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe (Processes.process=*\\users\\public\\* OR Processes.process=*\\programdata\\* OR Processes.process=*windows\\temp*) Processes.process=*/create* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory_filter` + +[ESCU - Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies searchprotocolhost.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for searchprotocolhost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. searchprotocolhost.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies searchprotocolhost.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for searchprotocolhost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. searchprotocolhost.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-20 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-20 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Cobalt Strike"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious searchprotocolhost.exe process with no command line arguments executed on $dest$ by $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 49}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies searchprotocolhost.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for searchprotocolhost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. searchprotocolhost.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=searchprotocolhost.exe by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process="(searchprotocolhost\.exe.{0,4}$)" | `suspicious_searchprotocolhost_no_command_line_arguments_filter` + +[ESCU - Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = As part of the sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287) exploitation chain, adversaries will need to request a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) on behalf of the newly created and renamed computer account. The TGT request will be preceded by a computer account name event. This analytic leverages Event Id 4781, `The name of an account was changed` and event Id 4768 `A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested` to correlate a sequence of events where the new computer account on event id 4781 matches the request account on event id 4768. This behavior could represent an exploitation attempt of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287 for privilege escalation. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.002"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = As part of the sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287) exploitation chain, adversaries will need to request a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) on behalf of the newly created and renamed computer account. The TGT request will be preceded by a computer account name event. This analytic leverages Event Id 4781, `The name of an account was changed` and event Id 4768 `A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested` to correlate a sequence of events where the new computer account on event id 4781 matches the request account on event id 4768. This behavior could represent an exploitation attempt of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287 for privilege escalation. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled. +action.escu.known_false_positives = A computer account name change event inmediately followed by a kerberos TGT request with matching fields is unsual. However, legitimate behavior may trigger it. Filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-21 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-21 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A suspicious TGT was requested was requested +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 60}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.002"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `wineventlog_security` (EventCode=4781 Old_Account_Name="*$" New_Account_Name!="*$") OR (EventCode=4768 Account_Name!="*$") | eval RenamedComputerAccount = coalesce(New_Account_Name, mvindex(Account_Name,0)) | transaction RenamedComputerAccount startswith=(EventCode=4781) endswith=(EventCode=4768) | eval short_lived=case((duration<2),"TRUE") | search short_lived = TRUE | table _time, ComputerName, EventCode, Account_Name,RenamedComputerAccount, short_lived |`suspicious_ticket_granting_ticket_request_filter` + +[ESCU - Suspicious WAV file in Appdata Folder - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious creation of .wav file in appdata folder. This behavior was seen in Remcos RAT malware where it put the audio recording in the appdata\audio folde as part of data collection. this recording can be send to its C2 server as part of its exfiltration to the compromised machine. creation of wav files in this folder path is not a ussual disk place used by user to save audio format file. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1113"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to detect a suspicious creation of .wav file in appdata folder. This behavior was seen in Remcos RAT malware where it put the audio recording in the appdata\audio folde as part of data collection. this recording can be send to its C2 server as part of its exfiltration to the compromised machine. creation of wav files in this folder path is not a ussual disk place used by user to save audio format file. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, file_name, file_path and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-21 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-21 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious WAV file in Appdata Folder - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Remcos"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = process $process_name$ creating image file $file_path$ in $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious WAV file in Appdata Folder - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1113"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious creation of .wav file in appdata folder. This behavior was seen in Remcos RAT malware where it put the audio recording in the appdata\audio folde as part of data collection. this recording can be send to its C2 server as part of its exfiltration to the compromised machine. creation of wav files in this folder path is not a ussual disk place used by user to save audio format file. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious WAV file in Appdata Folder +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=*.exe Processes.process_path="*\\appdata\\Roaming\\*" by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN ("*.wav") Filesystem.file_path = "*\\appdata\\Roaming\\*" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields file_name file_path process_name process_path process dest file_create_time _time ] | `suspicious_wav_file_in_appdata_folder_filter` + +[ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The wevtutil.exe application is the windows event log utility. This searches for wevtutil.exe with parameters for clearing the application, security, setup, trace or system event logs. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070.001", "T1070"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.AE"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The wevtutil.exe application is the windows event log utility. This searches for wevtutil.exe with parameters for clearing the application, security, setup, trace or system event logs. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. +action.escu.known_false_positives = The wevtutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows event log utility. Administrators may use it to manage Windows event logs. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-11 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-11 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Log Manipulation", "Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Wevtutil.exe being used to clear Event Logs on $dest$ by $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 28}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 28}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Log Manipulation", "Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070.001", "T1070"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The wevtutil.exe application is the windows event log utility. This searches for wevtutil.exe with parameters for clearing the application, security, setup, trace or system event logs. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious wevtutil Usage +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wevtutil.exe Processes.process IN ("* cl *", "*clear-log*") (Processes.process="*System*" OR Processes.process="*Security*" OR Processes.process="*Setup*" OR Processes.process="*Application*" OR Processes.process="*trace*") by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_wevtutil_usage_filter` + +[ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search detects writes to the recycle bin by a process other than explorer.exe. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search detects writes to the recycle bin by a process other than explorer.exe. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on filesystem and process logs responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem` nodes. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Because the Recycle Bin is a hidden folder in modern versions of Windows, it would be unusual for a process other than explorer.exe to write to it. Incidents should be investigated as appropriate. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-22 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-22 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Collection and Staging"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin process $Processes.process_name$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 28}, {"threat_object_field": "Processes.process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Collection and Staging"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "Processes.process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search detects writes to the recycle bin by a process other than explorer.exe. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path values(Filesystem.file_name) as file_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path = "*$Recycle.Bin*" by Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Filesystem")`| search [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.user) as user values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name != "explorer.exe" by Processes.process_id Processes.dest| `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | table process_id dest] | `suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin_filter` + +[ESCU - Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies `svchost.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the Task Scheduler and creating a malicious remote scheduled task, the executed command is spawned as a child process of `svchost.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of svchost.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053", "T1053.005"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies `svchost.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the Task Scheduler and creating a malicious remote scheduled task, the executed command is spawned as a child process of `svchost.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of svchost.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-22 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-22 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Svchost.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 54}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053", "T1053.005"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies `svchost.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the Task Scheduler and creating a malicious remote scheduled task, the executed command is spawned as a child process of `svchost.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of svchost.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=svchost.exe) (Processes.process_name IN ("Regsvcs.exe", "Ftp.exe", "OfflineScannerShell.exe", "Rasautou.exe", "Schtasks.exe", "Xwizard.exe", "Pnputil.exe", "Atbroker.exe", "Pcwrun.exe", "Ttdinject.exe","Mshta.exe", "Bitsadmin.exe", "Certoc.exe", "Ieexec.exe", "Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe", "Runscripthelper.exe", "Forfiles.exe", "Msbuild.exe", "Register-cimprovider.exe", "Tttracer.exe", "Ie4uinit.exe", "Bash.exe", "Hh.exe", "SettingSyncHost.exe", "Cmstp.exe", "Stordiag.exe", "Scriptrunner.exe", "Odbcconf.exe", "Extexport.exe", "Msdt.exe", "WorkFolders.exe", "Diskshadow.exe", "Mavinject.exe", "Regasm.exe", "Gpscript.exe", "Regsvr32.exe", "Msiexec.exe", "Wuauclt.exe", "Presentationhost.exe", "Wmic.exe", "Runonce.exe", "Syncappvpublishingserver.exe", "Verclsid.exe", "Infdefaultinstall.exe", "Installutil.exe", "Netsh.exe", "Wab.exe", "Dnscmd.exe", "At.exe", "Pcalua.exe", "Msconfig.exe")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `svchost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter` + +[ESCU - System Info Gathering Using Dxdiag Application - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious dxdiag.exe process command-line execution. Dxdiag is used to collect the system info of the target host. This technique has been used by Remcos RATS, various actors, and other malware to collect information as part of the recon or collection phase of an attack. This behavior should rarely be seen in a corporate network, but this command line can be used by a network administrator to audit host machine specifications. Thus in some rare cases, this detection will contain false positives in its results. To triage further, analyze what commands were passed after it pipes out the result to a file for further processing. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1592"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to detect a suspicious dxdiag.exe process command-line execution. Dxdiag is used to collect the system info of the target host. This technique has been used by Remcos RATS, various actors, and other malware to collect information as part of the recon or collection phase of an attack. This behavior should rarely be seen in a corporate network, but this command line can be used by a network administrator to audit host machine specifications. Thus in some rare cases, this detection will contain false positives in its results. To triage further, analyze what commands were passed after it pipes out the result to a file for further processing. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = This commandline can be used by a network administrator to audit host machine specifications. Thus, a filter is needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-19 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-19 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - System Info Gathering Using Dxdiag Application - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Remcos"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = dxdiag.exe process with commandline $process$ on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - System Info Gathering Using Dxdiag Application - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1592"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_dxdiag` AND Processes.process = "* /t *" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application_filter` + +[ESCU - System Information Discovery Detection - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = Detect system information discovery techniques used by attackers to understand configurations of the system to further exploit it. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1082"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = Detect system information discovery techniques used by attackers to understand configurations of the system to further exploit it. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators debugging servers +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-07 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-07 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - System Information Discovery Detection - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Discovery Techniques"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Potential system information discovery behavior on $dest$ by $User$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 15}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - System Information Discovery Detection - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Discovery Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Recon", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1082"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = Detect system information discovery techniques used by attackers to understand configurations of the system to further exploit it. +action.notable.param.rule_title = System Information Discovery Detection +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process="*wmic* qfe*" OR Processes.process=*systeminfo* OR Processes.process=*hostname*) by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | eventstats dc(process) as dc_processes_by_dest by dest | where dc_processes_by_dest > 2 | stats values(process) as process min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user, dest parent_process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `system_information_discovery_detection_filter` + +[ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for system processes that typically execute from `C:\Windows\System32\` or `C:\Windows\SysWOW64`. This may indicate a malicious process that is trying to hide as a legitimate process.\ +This detection utilizes a lookup that is deduped `system32` and `syswow64` directories from Server 2016 and Windows 10.\ +During triage, review the parallel processes - what process moved the native Windows binary? identify any artifacts on disk and review. If a remote destination is contacted, what is the reputation? +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for system processes that typically execute from `C:\Windows\System32\` or `C:\Windows\SysWOW64`. This may indicate a malicious process that is trying to hide as a legitimate process.\ +This detection utilizes a lookup that is deduped `system32` and `syswow64` directories from Server 2016 and Windows 10.\ +During triage, review the parallel processes - what process moved the native Windows binary? identify any artifacts on disk and review. If a remote destination is contacted, what is the reputation? +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = This detection may require tuning based on third party applications utilizing native Windows binaries in non-standard paths. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-12-08 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-12-08 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Unusual Processes", "Ransomware", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = System process running from unexpected location on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}, {"threat_object_field": "Processes.process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Unusual Processes", "Ransomware", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "Processes.process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for system processes that typically execute from `C:\Windows\System32\` or `C:\Windows\SysWOW64`. This may indicate a malicious process that is trying to hide as a legitimate process.\ +This detection utilizes a lookup that is deduped `system32` and `syswow64` directories from Server 2016 and Windows 10.\ +During triage, review the parallel processes - what process moved the native Windows binary? identify any artifacts on disk and review. If a remote destination is contacted, what is the reputation? +action.notable.param.rule_title = System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_path !="C:\\Windows\\System32*" Processes.process_path !="C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_hash | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `is_windows_system_file` | `system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations_filter` + +[ESCU - System User Discovery With Query - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for the execution of `query.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover the logged user. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage `query.exe` to identify system users on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `query.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover the logged user. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage `query.exe` to identify system users on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-13 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-13 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - System User Discovery With Query - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = System user discovery on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - System User Discovery With Query - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="query.exe") (Processes.process=*user*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `system_user_discovery_with_query_filter` + +[ESCU - System User Discovery With Whoami - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for the execution of `whoami.exe` without any arguments. This windows native binary prints out the current logged user. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage `whoami.exe` to identify system users on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `whoami.exe` without any arguments. This windows native binary prints out the current logged user. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage `whoami.exe` to identify system users on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-13 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-13 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - System User Discovery With Whoami - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = System user discovery on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - System User Discovery With Whoami - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="whoami.exe") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `system_user_discovery_with_whoami_filter` + +[ESCU - Time Provider Persistence Registry - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of time provider registry for persistence and autostart. This technique can allow the attacker to persist on the compromised host and autostart as soon as the machine boot up. This TTP can be a good indicator of suspicious behavior since this registry is not commonly modified by normal user or even an admin. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.003", "T1547"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of time provider registry for persistence and autostart. This technique can allow the attacker to persist on the compromised host and autostart as soon as the machine boot up. This TTP can be a good indicator of suspicious behavior since this registry is not commonly modified by normal user or even an admin. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-26 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-26 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Time Provider Persistence Registry - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Time Provider Persistence Registry - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.003", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of time provider registry for persistence and autostart. This technique can allow the attacker to persist on the compromised host and autostart as soon as the machine boot up. This TTP can be a good indicator of suspicious behavior since this registry is not commonly modified by normal user or even an admin. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Time Provider Persistence Registry +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path ="*\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\W32Time\\TimeProviders*" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `time_provider_persistence_registry_filter` + +[ESCU - Trickbot Named Pipe - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = this search is to detect potential trickbot infection through the create/connected named pipe to the system. This technique is used by trickbot to communicate to its c2 to post or get command during infection. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = this search is to detect potential trickbot infection through the create/connected named pipe to the system. This technique is used by trickbot to communicate to its c2 to post or get command during infection. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and pipename from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. . +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-26 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-26 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Trickbot Named Pipe - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Trickbot"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Possible Trickbot namedpipe created on $Computer$ by $Image$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}, {"threat_object_field": "Image", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Trickbot Named Pipe - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Trickbot"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "Image", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = this search is to detect potential trickbot infection through the create/connected named pipe to the system. This technique is used by trickbot to communicate to its c2 to post or get command during infection. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Trickbot Named Pipe +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `sysmon` EventCode IN (17,18) PipeName="\\pipe\\*lacesomepipe" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer user_id EventCode PipeName signature Image process_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `trickbot_named_pipe_filter` + +[ESCU - UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search is to detect a suspicious loaded unsigned dll by MMC.exe application. This technique is commonly seen in attacker that tries to bypassed UAC feature or gain privilege escalation. This is done by modifying some CLSID registry that will trigger the mmc.exe to load the dll path +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious loaded unsigned dll by MMC.exe application. This technique is commonly seen in attacker that tries to bypassed UAC feature or gain privilege escalation. This is done by modifying some CLSID registry that will trigger the mmc.exe to load the dll path +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown. all of the dll loaded by mmc.exe is microsoft signed dll. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-12 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-12 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious unsigned $ImageLoaded$ loaded by $Image$ on endpoint $Computer$ with EventCode $EventCode$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Inbound"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious loaded unsigned dll by MMC.exe application. This technique is commonly seen in attacker that tries to bypassed UAC feature or gain privilege escalation. This is done by modifying some CLSID registry that will trigger the mmc.exe to load the dll path +action.notable.param.rule_title = UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded = "*.dll" Image = "*\\mmc.exe" Signed=false Company != "Microsoft Corporation" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded Signed ProcessId OriginalFileName Computer EventCode Company | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll_filter` + +[ESCU - UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search is to detect a possible uac bypass using the colorui.dll COM Object. this technique was seen in so many malware and ransomware like lockbit where it make use of the colorui.dll COM CLSID to bypass UAC. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.003"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a possible uac bypass using the colorui.dll COM Object. this technique was seen in so many malware and ransomware like lockbit where it make use of the colorui.dll COM CLSID to bypass UAC. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +action.escu.known_false_positives = not so common. but 3rd part app may load this dll. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-13 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-13 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = The following module $ImageLoaded$ was loaded by a non-standard application on endpoint $Computer$ by user $user$. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 48}, {"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 48}, {"threat_object_field": "ImageLoaded", "threat_object_type": "other"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "ImageLoaded", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Other"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a possible uac bypass using the colorui.dll COM Object. this technique was seen in so many malware and ransomware like lockbit where it make use of the colorui.dll COM CLSID to bypass UAC. +action.notable.param.rule_title = UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded="*\\colorui.dll" process_name != "colorcpl.exe" NOT(Image IN("*\\windows\\*", "*\\program files*")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name Computer EventCode Signed ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object_filter` + +[ESCU - Unified Messaging Service Spawning a Process - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This detection identifies Microsoft Exchange Server's Unified Messaging services, umworkerprocess.exe and umservice.exe, spawning a child process, indicating possible exploitation of CVE-2021-26857 vulnerability. The query filters out werfault.exe and wermgr.exe mostly due to potential false positives, however, if there is an excessive amount of "wermgr.exe" or "WerFault.exe" failures, it may be due to the active exploitation. During triage, identify any additional suspicious parallel processes. Identify any recent out of place file modifications. Review Exchange logs following Microsofts guide. To contain, perform egress filtering or restrict public access to Exchange. In final, patch the vulnerablity and monitor. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This detection identifies Microsoft Exchange Server's Unified Messaging services, umworkerprocess.exe and umservice.exe, spawning a child process, indicating possible exploitation of CVE-2021-26857 vulnerability. The query filters out werfault.exe and wermgr.exe mostly due to potential false positives, however, if there is an excessive amount of "wermgr.exe" or "WerFault.exe" failures, it may be due to the active exploitation. During triage, identify any additional suspicious parallel processes. Identify any recent out of place file modifications. Review Exchange logs following Microsofts guide. To contain, perform egress filtering or restrict public access to Exchange. In final, patch the vulnerablity and monitor. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown. Tune out child processes as needed to limit volume of false positives. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-02 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-02 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Unified Messaging Service Spawning a Process - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["HAFNIUM Group"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Possible CVE-2021-26857 exploitation on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Unified Messaging Service Spawning a Process - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["HAFNIUM Group"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-26857"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This detection identifies Microsoft Exchange Server's Unified Messaging services, umworkerprocess.exe and umservice.exe, spawning a child process, indicating possible exploitation of CVE-2021-26857 vulnerability. The query filters out werfault.exe and wermgr.exe mostly due to potential false positives, however, if there is an excessive amount of "wermgr.exe" or "WerFault.exe" failures, it may be due to the active exploitation. During triage, identify any additional suspicious parallel processes. Identify any recent out of place file modifications. Review Exchange logs following Microsofts guide. To contain, perform egress filtering or restrict public access to Exchange. In final, patch the vulnerablity and monitor. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Unified Messaging Service Spawning a Process +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name="umworkerprocess.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name="UMService.exe" (Processes.process_name!="wermgr.exe" OR Processes.process_name!="werfault.exe") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `unified_messaging_service_spawning_a_process_filter` + +[ESCU - Uninstall App Using MsiExec - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search is to detect a suspicious un-installation of application using msiexec. This technique was seen in conti leak tool and script where it tries to uninstall AV product using this commandline. This commandline to uninstall product is not a common practice in enterprise network. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.007", "T1218"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious un-installation of application using msiexec. This technique was seen in conti leak tool and script where it tries to uninstall AV product using this commandline. This commandline to uninstall product is not a common practice in enterprise network. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-09 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-09 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Uninstall App Using MsiExec - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = process $process_name$ with a cmdline $process$ in host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 30}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Uninstall App Using MsiExec - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.007", "T1218"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious un-installation of application using msiexec. This technique was seen in conti leak tool and script where it tries to uninstall AV product using this commandline. This commandline to uninstall product is not a common practice in enterprise network. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Uninstall App Using MsiExec +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=msiexec.exe Processes.process= "* /qn *" Processes.process= "*/X*" Processes.process= "*REBOOT=*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `uninstall_app_using_msiexec_filter` + +[ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = Attackers often disable security tools to avoid detection. This search looks for the usage of process `fltMC.exe` to unload a Sysmon Driver that will stop sysmon from collecting the data. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = Attackers often disable security tools to avoid detection. This search looks for the usage of process `fltMC.exe` to unload a Sysmon Driver that will stop sysmon from collecting the data. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. This search is also shipped with `unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter` macro, update this macro to filter out false positives. +action.escu.known_false_positives = +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-22 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-22 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Disabling Security Tools"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Possible Sysmon filter driver unloading on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 45}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Disabling Security Tools"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = Attackers often disable security tools to avoid detection. This search looks for the usage of process `fltMC.exe` to unload a Sysmon Driver that will stop sysmon from collecting the data. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Unload Sysmon Filter Driver +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime values(Processes.process) as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=fltMC.exe AND Processes.process=*unload* AND Processes.process=*SysmonDrv* by Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter`| table firstTime lastTime dest user count process_name process_id parent_process_name process + +[ESCU - Unloading AMSI via Reflection - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ +This analytic identifies the behavior of AMSI being tampered with. Implemented natively in many frameworks, the command will look similar to `SEtValuE($Null,(New-OBJEct COLlECtionS.GenerIC.HAshSEt{[StrINg]))}$ReF=[ReF].AsSeMbLY.GeTTyPe("System.Management.Automation.Amsi"+"Utils")` taken from Powershell-Empire. \ +During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ +This analytic identifies the behavior of AMSI being tampered with. Implemented natively in many frameworks, the command will look similar to `SEtValuE($Null,(New-OBJEct COLlECtionS.GenerIC.HAshSEt{[StrINg]))}$ReF=[ReF].AsSeMbLY.GeTTyPe("System.Management.Automation.Amsi"+"Utils")` taken from Powershell-Empire. \ +During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Potential for some third party applications to disable AMSI upon invocation. Filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-09 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-09 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Unloading AMSI via Reflection - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Possible AMSI Unloading via Reflection using PowerShell on $ComputerName$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Unloading AMSI via Reflection - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ +This analytic identifies the behavior of AMSI being tampered with. Implemented natively in many frameworks, the command will look similar to `SEtValuE($Null,(New-OBJEct COLlECtionS.GenerIC.HAshSEt{[StrINg]))}$ReF=[ReF].AsSeMbLY.GeTTyPe("System.Management.Automation.Amsi"+"Utils")` taken from Powershell-Empire. \ +During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Unloading AMSI via Reflection +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message=*system.management.automation.amsi* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode ComputerName User EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `unloading_amsi_via_reflection_filter` + +[ESCU - Unusual Number of Kerberos Service Tickets Requested - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following hunting analytic leverages Kerberos Event 4769, A Kerberos service ticket was requested, to identify a potential kerberoasting attack against Active Directory networks. Kerberoasting allows an adversary to request kerberos tickets for domain accounts typically used as service accounts and attempt to crack them offline allowing them to obtain privileged access to the domain.\ +The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number service ticket requests. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.003"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following hunting analytic leverages Kerberos Event 4769, A Kerberos service ticket was requested, to identify a potential kerberoasting attack against Active Directory networks. Kerberoasting allows an adversary to request kerberos tickets for domain accounts typically used as service accounts and attempt to crack them offline allowing them to obtain privileged access to the domain.\ +The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number service ticket requests. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled. +action.escu.known_false_positives = An single endpoint requesting a large number of kerberos service tickets is not common behavior. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, administration systems and missconfigured systems. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-08 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-08 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Unusual Number of Kerberos Service Tickets Requested - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Client_Address", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 36}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Unusual Number of Kerberos Service Tickets Requested - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.003"], "observable": [{"name": "Client_Address", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769 Service_Name!="*$" Ticket_Encryption_Type=0x17 | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Service_Name) AS unique_services values(Service_Name) as requested_services by _time, Client_Address | eventstats avg(unique_services) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_services) as comp_std by Client_Address | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_services > 2 and unique_services >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `unusual_number_of_kerberos_service_tickets_requested_filter` + +[ESCU - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments that leverage PowerShell environment variables to identify the current logged user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments that leverage PowerShell environment variables to identify the current logged user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-13 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-13 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = System user discovery on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="powershell.exe") (Processes.process="*$env:UserName*" OR Processes.process="*[System.Environment]::UserName*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_filter` + +[ESCU - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell Script Block - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the use of PowerShell environment variables to identify the current logged user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the use of PowerShell environment variables to identify the current logged user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-13 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-13 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell Script Block - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = System user discovery on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell Script Block - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = "*$env:UserName*" OR Message = "*[System.Environment]::UserName*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_script_block_filter` + +[ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The fsutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows utility used to perform tasks related to the file allocation table (FAT) and NTFS file systems. The update sequence number (USN) change journal provides a log of all changes made to the files on the disk. This search looks for fsutil.exe deleting the USN journal. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8", "CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.DP", "PR.IP"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The fsutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows utility used to perform tasks related to the file allocation table (FAT) and NTFS file systems. The update sequence number (USN) change journal provides a log of all changes made to the files on the disk. This search looks for fsutil.exe deleting the USN journal. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. +action.escu.known_false_positives = None identified +action.escu.creation_date = 2018-12-03 +action.escu.modification_date = 2018-12-03 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Log Manipulation", "Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Possible USN journal deletion on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 45}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Log Manipulation", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8", "CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.DP", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The fsutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows utility used to perform tasks related to the file allocation table (FAT) and NTFS file systems. The update sequence number (USN) change journal provides a log of all changes made to the files on the disk. This search looks for fsutil.exe deleting the USN journal. +action.notable.param.rule_title = USN Journal Deletion +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=fsutil.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search process="*deletejournal*" AND process="*usn*" | `usn_journal_deletion_filter` + +[ESCU - Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious wscript commandline to execute vbscript. This technique was seen in several malware to execute malicious vbs file using wscript application. commonly vbs script is associated to cscript process and this can be a technique to evade process parent child detections or even some av script emulation system. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.005", "T1059"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to detect a suspicious wscript commandline to execute vbscript. This technique was seen in several malware to execute malicious vbs file using wscript application. commonly vbs script is associated to cscript process and this can be a technique to evade process parent child detections or even some av script emulation system. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-01 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-01 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["FIN7", "Remcos"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Process name $process_name$ with commandline $process$ to execute vbsscript +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 49}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["FIN7", "Remcos"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.005", "T1059"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious wscript commandline to execute vbscript. This technique was seen in several malware to execute malicious vbs file using wscript application. commonly vbs script is associated to cscript process and this can be a technique to evade process parent child detections or even some av script emulation system. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = "wscript.exe" AND Processes.parent_process = "*//e:vbscript*") OR (Processes.process_name = "wscript.exe" AND Processes.process = "*//e:vbscript*") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `vbscript_execution_using_wscript_app_filter` + +[ESCU - Verclsid CLSID Execution - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic is to detect a possible abuse of verclsid to execute malicious file through generate CLSID. This process is a normal application of windows to verify the CLSID COM object before it is instantiated by Windows Explorer. This hunting query can be a good pivot point to analyze what is he CLSID or COM object pointing too to check if it is a valid application or not. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.012", "T1218"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to detect a possible abuse of verclsid to execute malicious file through generate CLSID. This process is a normal application of windows to verify the CLSID COM object before it is instantiated by Windows Explorer. This hunting query can be a good pivot point to analyze what is he CLSID or COM object pointing too to check if it is a valid application or not. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = windows can used this application for its normal COM object validation. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-29 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-29 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Verclsid CLSID Execution - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Unusual Processes"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = process $process_name$ to execute possible clsid commandline $process$ in $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Verclsid CLSID Execution - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Unusual Processes"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.012", "T1218"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_verclsid` AND Processes.process="*/S*" Processes.process="*/C*" AND Processes.process="*{*" AND Processes.process="*}*" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `verclsid_clsid_execution_filter` + +[ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This query identifies a shell, PowerShell.exe or Cmd.exe, spawning from W3WP.exe, or IIS. In addition to IIS logs, this behavior with an EDR product will capture potential webshell activity, similar to the HAFNIUM Group abusing CVEs, on publicly available Exchange mail servers. During triage, review the parent process and child process of the shell being spawned. Review the command-line arguments and any file modifications that may occur. Identify additional parallel process, child processes, that may highlight further commands executed. After triaging, work to contain the threat and patch the system that is vulnerable. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505", "T1505.003"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This query identifies a shell, PowerShell.exe or Cmd.exe, spawning from W3WP.exe, or IIS. In addition to IIS logs, this behavior with an EDR product will capture potential webshell activity, similar to the HAFNIUM Group abusing CVEs, on publicly available Exchange mail servers. During triage, review the parent process and child process of the shell being spawned. Review the command-line arguments and any file modifications that may occur. Identify additional parallel process, child processes, that may highlight further commands executed. After triaging, work to contain the threat and patch the system that is vulnerable. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Baseline your environment before production. It is possible build systems using IIS will spawn cmd.exe to perform a software build. Filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-03 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-03 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["HAFNIUM Group", "ProxyShell"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Possible Web Shell execution on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["HAFNIUM Group", "ProxyShell"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523", "CVE-2021-31207"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505", "T1505.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This query identifies a shell, PowerShell.exe or Cmd.exe, spawning from W3WP.exe, or IIS. In addition to IIS logs, this behavior with an EDR product will capture potential webshell activity, similar to the HAFNIUM Group abusing CVEs, on publicly available Exchange mail servers. During triage, review the parent process and child process of the shell being spawned. Review the command-line arguments and any file modifications that may occur. Identify additional parallel process, child processes, that may highlight further commands executed. After triaging, work to contain the threat and patch the system that is vulnerable. +action.notable.param.rule_title = W3WP Spawning Shell +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=w3wp.exe AND `process_cmd` OR `process_powershell` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `w3wp_spawning_shell_filter` + +[ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for flags passed to wbadmin.exe (Windows Backup Administrator Tool) that delete backup files. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent recovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for flags passed to wbadmin.exe (Windows Backup Administrator Tool) that delete backup files. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent recovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. Tune based on parent process names. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may modify the boot configuration. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-22 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-22 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ryuk Ransomware", "Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = System backups deletion on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for flags passed to wbadmin.exe (Windows Backup Administrator Tool) that delete backup files. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent recovery. +action.notable.param.rule_title = WBAdmin Delete System Backups +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wbadmin.exe Processes.process="*delete*" AND (Processes.process="*catalog*" OR Processes.process="*systemstatebackup*") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `wbadmin_delete_system_backups_filter` + +[ESCU - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = this search is designed to detect potential malicious process loading COM object to wbemprox.dll, +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.003"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = this search is designed to detect potential malicious process loading COM object to wbemprox.dll, +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +action.escu.known_false_positives = legitimate process that are not in the exception list may trigger this event. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-02 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-02 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious COM Object Execution on $Computer$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 35}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.003"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = this search is designed to detect potential malicious process loading COM object to wbemprox.dll, +action.notable.param.rule_title = Wbemprox COM Object Execution +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded IN ("*\\fastprox.dll", "*\\wbemprox.dll", "*\\wbemcomn.dll") NOT (process_name IN ("wmiprvse.exe", "WmiApSrv.exe", "unsecapp.exe")) NOT(Image IN("*\\windows\\*","*\\program files*", "*\\wbem\\*")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name Computer EventCode Signed ProcessId Hashes IMPHASH | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wbemprox_com_object_execution_filter` + +[ESCU - Wermgr Process Connecting To IP Check Web Services - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = this search is designed to detect suspicious wermgr.exe process that tries to connect to known IP web services. This technique is know for trickbot and other trojan spy malware to recon the infected machine and look for its ip address without so much finger print on the commandline process. Since wermgr.exe is designed for error handling process of windows it is really suspicious that this process is trying to connect to this IP web services cause that maybe cause of some malicious code injection. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1590", "T1590.005"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = this search is designed to detect suspicious wermgr.exe process that tries to connect to known IP web services. This technique is know for trickbot and other trojan spy malware to recon the infected machine and look for its ip address without so much finger print on the commandline process. Since wermgr.exe is designed for error handling process of windows it is really suspicious that this process is trying to connect to this IP web services cause that maybe cause of some malicious code injection. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, dns query name process path , and query ststus from your endpoints like EventCode 22. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 12 of the Sysmon TA. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-19 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-19 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Wermgr Process Connecting To IP Check Web Services - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Trickbot"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Wermgr.exe process connecting IP location web services on $ComputerName$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Wermgr Process Connecting To IP Check Web Services - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Trickbot"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1590", "T1590.005"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = this search is designed to detect suspicious wermgr.exe process that tries to connect to known IP web services. This technique is know for trickbot and other trojan spy malware to recon the infected machine and look for its ip address without so much finger print on the commandline process. Since wermgr.exe is designed for error handling process of windows it is really suspicious that this process is trying to connect to this IP web services cause that maybe cause of some malicious code injection. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Wermgr Process Connecting To IP Check Web Services +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `sysmon` EventCode =22 process_name = wermgr.exe QueryName IN ("*wtfismyip.com", "*checkip.amazonaws.com", "*ipecho.net", "*ipinfo.io", "*api.ipify.org", "*icanhazip.com", "*ip.anysrc.com","*api.ip.sb", "ident.me", "www.myexternalip.com", "*zen.spamhaus.org", "*cbl.abuseat.org", "*b.barracudacentral.org","*dnsbl-1.uceprotect.net", "*spam.dnsbl.sorbs.net") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by process_path process_name process_id QueryName QueryStatus QueryResults Computer EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services_filter` + +[ESCU - Wermgr Process Create Executable File - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = this search is designed to detect potential malicious wermgr.exe process that drops or create executable file. Since wermgr.exe is an application trigger when error encountered in a process, it is really un ussual to this process to drop executable file. This technique is commonly seen in trickbot malware where it injects it code to this process to execute it malicious behavior like downloading other payload +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = this search is designed to detect potential malicious wermgr.exe process that drops or create executable file. Since wermgr.exe is an application trigger when error encountered in a process, it is really un ussual to this process to drop executable file. This technique is commonly seen in trickbot malware where it injects it code to this process to execute it malicious behavior like downloading other payload +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of wermgr.exe may be used. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-19 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-19 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Wermgr Process Create Executable File - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Trickbot"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Wermgr.exe writing executable files on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Wermgr Process Create Executable File - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Trickbot"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = this search is designed to detect potential malicious wermgr.exe process that drops or create executable file. Since wermgr.exe is an application trigger when error encountered in a process, it is really un ussual to this process to drop executable file. This technique is commonly seen in trickbot malware where it injects it code to this process to execute it malicious behavior like downloading other payload +action.notable.param.rule_title = Wermgr Process Create Executable File +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `sysmon` EventCode=11 process_name = "wermgr.exe" TargetFilename = "*.exe" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Image TargetFilename process_name dest EventCode ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wermgr_process_create_executable_file_filter` + +[ESCU - Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search is designed to detect suspicious cmd and powershell process spawned by wermgr.exe process. This suspicious behavior are commonly seen in code injection technique technique like trickbot to execute a shellcode, dll modules to run malicious behavior. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is designed to detect suspicious cmd and powershell process spawned by wermgr.exe process. This suspicious behavior are commonly seen in code injection technique technique like trickbot to execute a shellcode, dll modules to run malicious behavior. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-19 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-19 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Trickbot"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Wermgr.exe spawning suspicious processes on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Trickbot"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is designed to detect suspicious cmd and powershell process spawned by wermgr.exe process. This suspicious behavior are commonly seen in code injection technique technique like trickbot to execute a shellcode, dll modules to run malicious behavior. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as cmdline min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name = "wermgr.exe" `process_cmd` OR `process_powershell` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process_filter` + +[ESCU - Wget Download and Bash Execution - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies the use of wget on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the use of wget on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter. +action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-11 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-11 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Wget Download and Bash Execution - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ingress Tool Transfer", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Wget Download and Bash Execution - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ingress Tool Transfer", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the use of wget on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Wget Download and Bash Execution +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wget (Processes.process="*-q *" OR Processes.process="*--quiet*" AND Processes.process="*-O- *") OR (Processes.process="*|*" AND Processes.process="*bash*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter` + +[ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for the execution of `adfind.exe` with command-line arguments that it uses by default. Specifically the filter or search functions. It also considers the arguments necessary like objectcategory, see readme for more details: https://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/usage.htm. This has been seen used before by Wizard Spider, FIN6 and actors whom also launched SUNBURST. AdFind.exe is usually used a recon tool to enumare a domain controller. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for the execution of `adfind.exe` with command-line arguments that it uses by default. Specifically the filter or search functions. It also considers the arguments necessary like objectcategory, see readme for more details: https://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/usage.htm. This has been seen used before by Wizard Spider, FIN6 and actors whom also launched SUNBURST. AdFind.exe is usually used a recon tool to enumare a domain controller. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +action.escu.known_false_positives = administrators rarely use adfind, usually not used for legitimate reasons +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-03 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-03 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["NOBELIUM Group", "Domain Trust Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Windows AdFind Exe +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["NOBELIUM Group", "Domain Trust Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for the execution of `adfind.exe` with command-line arguments that it uses by default. Specifically the filter or search functions. It also considers the arguments necessary like objectcategory, see readme for more details: https://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/usage.htm. This has been seen used before by Wizard Spider, FIN6 and actors whom also launched SUNBURST. AdFind.exe is usually used a recon tool to enumare a domain controller. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows AdFind Exe +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process="* -f *" OR Processes.process="* -b *") AND (Processes.process=*objectcategory* OR Processes.process="* -gcb *" OR Processes.process="* -sc *") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_adfind_exe_filter` + +[ESCU - Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies the use of Windows Curl.exe downloading a file to a suspicious location. \ +-O or --output is used when a file is to be downloaded and placed in a specified location. \ +During triage, review parallel processes for further behavior. In addition, identify if the download was successful. If a file was downloaded, capture and analyze. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the use of Windows Curl.exe downloading a file to a suspicious location. \ +-O or --output is used when a file is to be downloaded and placed in a specified location. \ +During triage, review parallel processes for further behavior. In addition, identify if the download was successful. If a file was downloaded, capture and analyze. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible Administrators or super users will use Curl for legitimate purposes. Filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-19 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-19 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["IceID", "Ingress Tool Transfer"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ to download a file to a suspicious directory. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IceID", "Ingress Tool Transfer"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the use of Windows Curl.exe downloading a file to a suspicious location. \ +-O or --output is used when a file is to be downloaded and placed in a specified location. \ +During triage, review parallel processes for further behavior. In addition, identify if the download was successful. If a file was downloaded, capture and analyze. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_curl` Processes.process IN ("*-O *","*--output*") Processes.process IN ("*\\appdata\\*","*\\programdata\\*","*\\public\\*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path_filter` + +[ESCU - Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies the use of Windows Curl.exe uploading a file to a remote destination. \ +`-T` or `--upload-file` is used when a file is to be uploaded to a remotge destination. \ +`-d` or `--data` POST is the HTTP method that was invented to send data to a receiving web application, and it is, for example, how most common HTML forms on the web work. \ +HTTP multipart formposts are done with `-F`, but this appears to not be compatible with the Windows version of Curl. Will update if identified adversary tradecraft. \ +Adversaries may use one of the three methods based on the remote destination and what they are attempting to upload (zip vs txt). During triage, review parallel processes for further behavior. In addition, identify if the upload was successful in network logs. If a file was uploaded, isolate the endpoint and review. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the use of Windows Curl.exe uploading a file to a remote destination. \ +`-T` or `--upload-file` is used when a file is to be uploaded to a remotge destination. \ +`-d` or `--data` POST is the HTTP method that was invented to send data to a receiving web application, and it is, for example, how most common HTML forms on the web work. \ +HTTP multipart formposts are done with `-F`, but this appears to not be compatible with the Windows version of Curl. Will update if identified adversary tradecraft. \ +Adversaries may use one of the three methods based on the remote destination and what they are attempting to upload (zip vs txt). During triage, review parallel processes for further behavior. In addition, identify if the upload was successful in network logs. If a file was uploaded, isolate the endpoint and review. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be limited to source control applications and may be required to be filtered out. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-10 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-10 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ingress Tool Transfer"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ uploading a file to a remote destination. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ingress Tool Transfer"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the use of Windows Curl.exe uploading a file to a remote destination. \ +`-T` or `--upload-file` is used when a file is to be uploaded to a remotge destination. \ +`-d` or `--data` POST is the HTTP method that was invented to send data to a receiving web application, and it is, for example, how most common HTML forms on the web work. \ +HTTP multipart formposts are done with `-F`, but this appears to not be compatible with the Windows version of Curl. Will update if identified adversary tradecraft. \ +Adversaries may use one of the three methods based on the remote destination and what they are attempting to upload (zip vs txt). During triage, review parallel processes for further behavior. In addition, identify if the upload was successful in network logs. If a file was uploaded, isolate the endpoint and review. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_curl` Processes.process IN ("*-T *","*--upload-file *", "*-d *", "*--data *", "*-F *") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination_filter` + +[ESCU - Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic will detect a suspicious process that modify a registry related to windows defender exclusion feature. This registry is abused by adversaries, malware author and red teams to bypassed Windows Defender Anti-Virus product by excluding folder path, file path, process, extensions and etc. from its real time or schedule scan to execute their malicious code. This is a good indicator for a defense evasion and to look further for events after this behavior. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic will detect a suspicious process that modify a registry related to windows defender exclusion feature. This registry is abused by adversaries, malware author and red teams to bypassed Windows Defender Anti-Virus product by excluding folder path, file path, process, extensions and etc. from its real time or schedule scan to execute their malicious code. This is a good indicator for a defense evasion and to look further for events after this behavior. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. +action.escu.known_false_positives = admin or user may choose to use this windows features. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-25 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-25 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Remcos", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = exclusion registry $registry_path$ modified or added on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 64}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Remcos", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic will detect a suspicious process that modify a registry related to windows defender exclusion feature. This registry is abused by adversaries, malware author and red teams to bypassed Windows Defender Anti-Virus product by excluding folder path, file path, process, extensions and etc. from its real time or schedule scan to execute their malicious code. This is a good indicator for a defense evasion and to look further for events after this behavior. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = "*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Exclusions\\*" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry_filter` + +[ESCU - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies a process that is attempting to disable the ability on Windows to generate a memory crash dump. This was recently identified being utilized by HermeticWiper. To disable crash dumps, the value must be set to 0. This feature is typically modified to perform a memory crash dump when a computer stops unexpectedly because of a Stop error (also known as a blue screen, system crash, or bug check). +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies a process that is attempting to disable the ability on Windows to generate a memory crash dump. This was recently identified being utilized by HermeticWiper. To disable crash dumps, the value must be set to 0. This feature is typically modified to perform a memory crash dump when a computer stops unexpectedly because of a Stop error (also known as a blue screen, system crash, or bug check). +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` and `Registry` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-25 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-25 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Data Destruction", "Ransomware", "Hermetic Wiper"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A process $process_name$ was identified attempting to disable memory crash dumps on $dest$. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 90}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 90}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "Ransomware", "Hermetic Wiper"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies a process that is attempting to disable the ability on Windows to generate a memory crash dump. This was recently identified being utilized by HermeticWiper. To disable crash dumps, the value must be set to 0. This feature is typically modified to perform a memory crash dump when a computer stops unexpectedly because of a Stop error (also known as a blue screen, system crash, or bug check). +action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path="*\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\CrashControl\\CrashDumpEnabled") AND Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000000" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process process_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process process_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `windows_disable_memory_crash_dump_filter` + +[ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The search looks for the Registry Key DisableAntiSpyware set to disable. This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints. This particular behavior is typically executed when an ransomware actor gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. Endpoint should be isolated. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The search looks for the Registry Key DisableAntiSpyware set to disable. This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints. This particular behavior is typically executed when an ransomware actor gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. Endpoint should be isolated. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro to tune the search. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-02 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-02 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ryuk Ransomware", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Windows DisableAntiSpyware registry key set to 'disabled' on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 24}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The search looks for the Registry Key DisableAntiSpyware set to disable. This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints. This particular behavior is typically executed when an ransomware actor gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. Endpoint should be isolated. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_value_name="DisableAntiSpyware" AND Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000001" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_disableantispyware_registry_filter` + +[ESCU - Windows DiskCryptor Usage - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies DiskCryptor process name of dcrypt.exe or internal name dcinst.exe. This utility has been utilized by adversaries to encrypt disks manually during an operation. In addition, during install, a dcrypt.sys driver is installed and requires a reboot in order to take effect. There are no command-line arguments used. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies DiskCryptor process name of dcrypt.exe or internal name dcinst.exe. This utility has been utilized by adversaries to encrypt disks manually during an operation. In addition, during install, a dcrypt.sys driver is installed and requires a reboot in order to take effect. There are no command-line arguments used. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible false positives may be present based on the internal name dcinst.exe, filter as needed. It may be worthy to alert on the service name. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-15 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-15 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows DiskCryptor Usage - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to encrypt disks. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 35}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 35}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows DiskCryptor Usage - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="dcrypt.exe" OR Processes.original_file_name=dcinst.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_diskcryptor_usage_filter` + +[ESCU - Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = DiskShadow.exe is a Microsoft Signed binary present on Windows Server. It has a scripting mode intended for complex scripted backup operations. This feature also allows for execution of arbitrary unsigned code. This analytic looks for the usage of the scripting mode flags in executions of DiskShadow. During triage, compare to known backup behavior in your environment and then review the scripts called by diskshadow. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = DiskShadow.exe is a Microsoft Signed binary present on Windows Server. It has a scripting mode intended for complex scripted backup operations. This feature also allows for execution of arbitrary unsigned code. This analytic looks for the usage of the scripting mode flags in executions of DiskShadow. During triage, compare to known backup behavior in your environment and then review the scripts called by diskshadow. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on processes that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition,confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators using the DiskShadow tool in their infrastructure as a main backup tool with scripts will cause false positives that can be filtered with `windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution_filter` +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-15 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-15 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Living Off The Land"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Possible Signed Binary Proxy Execution on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = DiskShadow.exe is a Microsoft Signed binary present on Windows Server. It has a scripting mode intended for complex scripted backup operations. This feature also allows for execution of arbitrary unsigned code. This analytic looks for the usage of the scripting mode flags in executions of DiskShadow. During triage, compare to known backup behavior in your environment and then review the scripts called by diskshadow. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_diskshadow` (Processes.process=*-s* OR Processes.process=*/s*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution_filter` + +[ESCU - Windows DISM Remove Defender - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies the use of the Windows Disk Image Utility, `dism.exe`, to remove Windows Defender. Adversaries may use `dism.exe` to disable Defender before completing their objective. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the use of the Windows Disk Image Utility, `dism.exe`, to remove Windows Defender. Adversaries may use `dism.exe` to disable Defender before completing their objective. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Some legitimate administrative tools leverage `dism.exe` to manipulate packages and features of the operating system. Filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-17 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-17 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows DISM Remove Defender - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to disable Windows Defender. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows DISM Remove Defender - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the use of the Windows Disk Image Utility, `dism.exe`, to remove Windows Defender. Adversaries may use `dism.exe` to disable Defender before completing their objective. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows DISM Remove Defender +action.notable.param.security_domain = access +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=dism.exe (Processes.process="*/online*" AND Processes.process="*/disable-feature*" AND Processes.process="*Windows-Defender*" AND Processes.process="*/remove*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_dism_remove_defender_filter` + +[ESCU - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies native .net binaries within the Windows operating system that may be abused by adversaries by moving it to a new directory. The analytic identifies the .net binary by using a lookup and compares the process name and original file name (internal name). The analytic utilizes a lookup with the is_net_windows_file macro to identify the binary process name and original file name. if one or the other matches an alert will be generated. Adversaries abuse these binaries as they are native to windows and native DotNet. Note that not all SDK (post install of Windows) are captured in the lookup. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1036.003", "T1218", "T1218.004"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies native .net binaries within the Windows operating system that may be abused by adversaries by moving it to a new directory. The analytic identifies the .net binary by using a lookup and compares the process name and original file name (internal name). The analytic utilizes a lookup with the is_net_windows_file macro to identify the binary process name and original file name. if one or the other matches an alert will be generated. Adversaries abuse these binaries as they are native to windows and native DotNet. Note that not all SDK (post install of Windows) are captured in the lookup. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present and filtering may be required. Certain utilities will run from non-standard paths based on the third-party application in use. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-19 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-19 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", "Unusual Processes", "Ransomware", "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", "WhisperGate"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ from a non-standard path was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 49}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", "Unusual Processes", "Ransomware", "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", "WhisperGate"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1036.003", "T1218", "T1218.004"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies native .net binaries within the Windows operating system that may be abused by adversaries by moving it to a new directory. The analytic identifies the .net binary by using a lookup and compares the process name and original file name (internal name). The analytic utilizes a lookup with the is_net_windows_file macro to identify the binary process name and original file name. if one or the other matches an alert will be generated. Adversaries abuse these binaries as they are native to windows and native DotNet. Note that not all SDK (post install of Windows) are captured in the lookup. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where NOT (Processes.process_path IN ("*\\Windows\\ADWS\\*","*\\Windows\\SysWOW64*", "*\\Windows\\system32*", "*\\Windows\\NetworkController\\*", "*\\Windows\\SystemApps\\*", "*\\WinSxS\\*", "*\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\*")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_path Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `is_net_windows_file` | `windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path_filter` + +[ESCU - Windows Event For Service Disabled - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic will identify suspicious system event of services that was modified from start to disabled. This technique is seen where the adversary attempts to disable security app services, other malware services to evade the defense systems on the compromised host +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic will identify suspicious system event of services that was modified from start to disabled. This technique is seen where the adversary attempts to disable security app services, other malware services to evade the defense systems on the compromised host +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Windows service update may cause this event. In that scenario, filtering is needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-23 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-23 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Event For Service Disabled - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Service was disabled on $Computer$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 36}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Event For Service Disabled - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7040 Message = "*service was changed from demand start to disabled." | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName EventCode Message User Sid | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_event_for_service_disabled_filter` + +[ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic utilizes Windows Security Event ID 1102 or System log event 104 to identify when a Windows event log is cleared. Note that this analytic will require tuning or restricted to specific endpoints based on criticality. During triage, based on time of day and user, determine if this was planned. If not planned, follow through with reviewing parallel alerts and other data sources to determine what else may have occurred. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070", "T1070.001"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "PR.IP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.AE"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes Windows Security Event ID 1102 or System log event 104 to identify when a Windows event log is cleared. Note that this analytic will require tuning or restricted to specific endpoints based on criticality. During triage, based on time of day and user, determine if this was planned. If not planned, follow through with reviewing parallel alerts and other data sources to determine what else may have occurred. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows event logs from your hosts. In addition, the Splunk Windows TA is needed. +action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible that these logs may be legitimately cleared by Administrators. Filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-06 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-06 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Log Manipulation", "Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Windows event logs cleared on $dest$ via EventCode $EventCode$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 70}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Log Manipulation", "Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070", "T1070.001"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "PR.IP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes Windows Security Event ID 1102 or System log event 104 to identify when a Windows event log is cleared. Note that this analytic will require tuning or restricted to specific endpoints based on criticality. During triage, based on time of day and user, determine if this was planned. If not planned, follow through with reviewing parallel alerts and other data sources to determine what else may have occurred. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Event Log Cleared +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = (`wineventlog_security` EventCode=1102) OR (`wineventlog_system` EventCode=104) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest Message EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_event_log_cleared_filter` + +[ESCU - Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic will identify suspicious excessive number of system events of services that was modified from start to disabled. This technique is seen where the adversary attempts to disable security app services, other malware services oer serve as an destructive impact to complete the objective on the compromised system. One good example for this scenario is Olympic destroyer where it disable all active services in the compromised host as part of its destructive impact and defense evasion. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic will identify suspicious excessive number of system events of services that was modified from start to disabled. This technique is seen where the adversary attempts to disable security app services, other malware services oer serve as an destructive impact to complete the objective on the compromised system. One good example for this scenario is Olympic destroyer where it disable all active services in the compromised host as part of its destructive impact and defense evasion. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-23 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-23 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Service was disabled in $Computer$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 81}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic will identify suspicious excessive number of system events of services that was modified from start to disabled. This technique is seen where the adversary attempts to disable security app services, other malware services oer serve as an destructive impact to complete the objective on the compromised system. One good example for this scenario is Olympic destroyer where it disable all active services in the compromised host as part of its destructive impact and defense evasion. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7040 Message = "*service was changed from demand start to disabled." | stats count values(Message) as MessageList dc(Message) as MessageCount min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName EventCode User Sid | where MessageCount >=10 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_excessive_disabled_services_event_filter` + +[ESCU - Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic is to look for suspicious file creation in the critical folder like "System32\Drivers" folder without file extension. This artifacts was seen in latest hermeticwiper where it drops its driver component in Driver Directory both the compressed(without file extension) and the actual driver component (with .sys file extension). This TTP is really a good indication that a host might be compromised by this destructive malware that wipes the boot sector of the system. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to look for suspicious file creation in the critical folder like "System32\Drivers" folder without file extension. This artifacts was seen in latest hermeticwiper where it drops its driver component in Driver Directory both the compressed(without file extension) and the actual driver component (with .sys file extension). This TTP is really a good indication that a host might be compromised by this destructive malware that wipes the boot sector of the system. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown at this point +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-25 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-25 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Data Destruction", "Hermetic Wiper"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Driver file with out file extension drop in $file_path$ in $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 90}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "Hermetic Wiper"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to look for suspicious file creation in the critical folder like "System32\Drivers" folder without file extension. This artifacts was seen in latest hermeticwiper where it drops its driver component in Driver Directory both the compressed(without file extension) and the actual driver component (with .sys file extension). This TTP is really a good indication that a host might be compromised by this destructive malware that wipes the boot sector of the system. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN ("*\\System32\\drivers\\*", "*\\syswow64\\drivers\\*") by _time span=5m Filesystem.dest Filesystem.user Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_create_time | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | rex field="file_name" "\.(?[^\.]*$)" | where isnull(extension) | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=5m Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_guid Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`] | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest process_name process_guid file_name file_path file_create_time user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_file_without_extension_in_critical_folder_filter` + +[ESCU - Windows High File Deletion Frequency - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for high frequency of file deletion relative to process name and process id. These events usually happen when the ransomware tries to encrypt the files with the ransomware file extensions and sysmon treat the original files to be deleted as soon it was replace as encrypted data. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for high frequency of file deletion relative to process name and process id. These events usually happen when the ransomware tries to encrypt the files with the ransomware file extensions and sysmon treat the original files to be deleted as soon it was replace as encrypted data. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the deleted target file name, process name and process id from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +action.escu.known_false_positives = user may delete bunch of pictures or files in a folder. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-16 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-16 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows High File Deletion Frequency - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Clop Ransomware", "WhisperGate"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = High frequency file deletion activity detected on host $Computer$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 72}, {"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}, {"threat_object_field": "deleted_files", "threat_object_type": "file name"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows High File Deletion Frequency - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware", "WhisperGate"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "deleted_files", "role": ["Target"], "type": "File Name"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `sysmon` EventCode=23 TargetFilename IN ("*.cmd", "*.ini","*.gif", "*.jpg", "*.jpeg", "*.db", "*.ps1", "*.doc*", "*.xls*", "*.ppt*", "*.bmp","*.zip", "*.rar", "*.7z", "*.chm", "*.png", "*.log", "*.vbs", "*.js", "*.vhd", "*.bak", "*.wbcat", "*.bkf" , "*.backup*", "*.dsk", , "*.win") | stats values(TargetFilename) as deleted_files min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer user EventCode Image ProcessID |where count >=100 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_high_file_deletion_frequency_filter` + +[ESCU - Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following hunting analytic identifies all processes requesting access into Lsass.exe. his behavior may be related to credential dumping or applications requiring access to credentials. Triaging this event will require understanding the GrantedAccess from the SourceImage. In addition, whether the account is privileged or not. Review the process requesting permissions and review parallel processes. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following hunting analytic identifies all processes requesting access into Lsass.exe. his behavior may be related to credential dumping or applications requiring access to credentials. Triaging this event will require understanding the GrantedAccess from the SourceImage. In addition, whether the account is privileged or not. Review the process requesting permissions and review parallel processes. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Enabling EventCode 10 TargetProcess lsass.exe is required. +action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will occur based on GrantedAccess and SourceUser, filter based on source image as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-12 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-12 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Credential Dumping"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A process, $SourceImage$, has loaded $ImageLoaded$ that are typically related to credential dumping on $dest$. Review for further details. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 64}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}, {"threat_object_field": "ImageLoaded", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "SourceImage", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "ImageLoaded", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "SourceImage", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, TargetImage, GrantedAccess, SourceImage, SourceProcessId, SourceUser, TargetUser | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_hunting_system_account_targeting_lsass_filter` + +[ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary loading `vaultcli.dll` and Samlib.dll`. This technique may be used to execute code to bypassing application control and capture credentials by utilizing a tool like MimiKatz. \ +When `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \ +If used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \ +During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.004", "T1218"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary loading `vaultcli.dll` and Samlib.dll`. This technique may be used to execute code to bypassing application control and capture credentials by utilizing a tool like MimiKatz. \ +When `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \ +If used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \ +During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and module loads from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Typically this will not trigger as by it's very nature InstallUtil does not need credentials. Filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-12 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-12 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ loading samlib.dll and vaultcli.dll to potentially capture credentials in memory. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.004", "T1218"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary loading `vaultcli.dll` and Samlib.dll`. This technique may be used to execute code to bypassing application control and capture credentials by utilizing a tool like MimiKatz. \ +When `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \ +If used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \ +During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `sysmon` EventCode=7 process_name=installutil.exe ImageLoaded IN ("*\\samlib.dll", "*\\vaultcli.dll") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, process_name, ImageLoaded, OriginalFileName, process_id | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_installutil_credential_theft_filter` + +[ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies the Windows binary InstallUtil.exe running from a non-standard location. The analytic utilizes a macro for InstallUtil and identifies both the process_name and original_file_name. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1036.003", "T1218", "T1218.004"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the Windows binary InstallUtil.exe running from a non-standard location. The analytic utilizes a macro for InstallUtil and identifies both the process_name and original_file_name. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present and filtering may be required. Certain utilities will run from non-standard paths based on the third-party application in use. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-19 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-19 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", "Unusual Processes", "Ransomware", "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", "WhisperGate"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ from a non-standard path was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 49}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", "Unusual Processes", "Ransomware", "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", "WhisperGate"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1036.003", "T1218", "T1218.004"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the Windows binary InstallUtil.exe running from a non-standard location. The analytic utilizes a macro for InstallUtil and identifies both the process_name and original_file_name. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` NOT (Processes.process_path IN ("*\\Windows\\ADWS\\*","*\\Windows\\SysWOW64*", "*\\Windows\\system32*", "*\\Windows\\NetworkController\\*", "*\\Windows\\SystemApps\\*", "*\\WinSxS\\*", "*\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\*")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_hash | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path_filter` + +[ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary making a remote network connection. This technique may be used to download and execute code while bypassing application control. \ +When `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \ +If used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \ +During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.004", "T1218"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary making a remote network connection. This technique may be used to download and execute code while bypassing application control. \ +When `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \ +If used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \ +During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Ports` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives should be present as InstallUtil is not typically used to download remote files. Filter as needed based on Developers requirements. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-12 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-12 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ generating a remote download. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.004", "T1218"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary making a remote network connection. This technique may be used to download and execute code while bypassing application control. \ +When `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \ +If used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \ +During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` by _time span=1h Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_guid [ | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port !="0" by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_guid connection_to_CNC dest_port | `windows_installutil_remote_network_connection_filter` + +[ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary. This will execute code while bypassing application control using the `/u` (uninstall) switch. \ +InstallUtil uses the functions install and uninstall within the System.Configuration.Install namespace to process .net assembly. Install function requires admin privileges, however, uninstall function can be run as an unprivileged user.\ +When `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \ +If used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \ +During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.004", "T1218"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary. This will execute code while bypassing application control using the `/u` (uninstall) switch. \ +InstallUtil uses the functions install and uninstall within the System.Configuration.Install namespace to process .net assembly. Install function requires admin privileges, however, uninstall function can be run as an unprivileged user.\ +When `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \ +If used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \ +During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives should be present. Filter as needed by parent process or application. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-12 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-12 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ performing an uninstall. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.004", "T1218"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary. This will execute code while bypassing application control using the `/u` (uninstall) switch. \ +InstallUtil uses the functions install and uninstall within the System.Configuration.Install namespace to process .net assembly. Install function requires admin privileges, however, uninstall function can be run as an unprivileged user.\ +When `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \ +If used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \ +During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` Processes.process IN ("*/u*", "*uninstall*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_installutil_uninstall_option_filter` + +[ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary making a remote network connection. This technique may be used to download and execute code while bypassing application control using the `/u` (uninstall) switch. \ +InstallUtil uses the functions install and uninstall within the System.Configuration.Install namespace to process .net assembly. Install function requires admin privileges, however, uninstall function can be run as an unprivileged user.\ +When `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \ +If used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \ +During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.004", "T1218"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary making a remote network connection. This technique may be used to download and execute code while bypassing application control using the `/u` (uninstall) switch. \ +InstallUtil uses the functions install and uninstall within the System.Configuration.Install namespace to process .net assembly. Install function requires admin privileges, however, uninstall function can be run as an unprivileged user.\ +When `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \ +If used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \ +During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Ports` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives should be present as InstallUtil is not typically used to download remote files. Filter as needed based on Developers requirements. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-12 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-12 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ performing an uninstall. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.004", "T1218"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary making a remote network connection. This technique may be used to download and execute code while bypassing application control using the `/u` (uninstall) switch. \ +InstallUtil uses the functions install and uninstall within the System.Configuration.Install namespace to process .net assembly. Install function requires admin privileges, however, uninstall function can be run as an unprivileged user.\ +When `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \ +If used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \ +During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` Processes.process IN ("*/u*", "*uninstall*") by _time span=1h Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_guid [ | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port !="0" by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name original_file_name process_path process process_guid connection_to_CNC dest_port | `windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network_filter` + +[ESCU - Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary passing a HTTP request on the command-line. This technique may be used to download and execute code while bypassing application control. \ +When `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \ +If used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \ +During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.004", "T1218"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary passing a HTTP request on the command-line. This technique may be used to download and execute code while bypassing application control. \ +When `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \ +If used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \ +During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives should be present as InstallUtil is not typically used to download remote files. Filter as needed based on Developers requirements. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-12 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-12 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ passing a URL on the command-line. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.004", "T1218"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary passing a HTTP request on the command-line. This technique may be used to download and execute code while bypassing application control. \ +When `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \ +If used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \ +During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` Processes.process IN ("*http://*","*https://*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_installutil_url_in_command_line_filter` + +[ESCU - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic is to look for suspicious registry modification related to file compression color and information tips. This IOC was seen in hermetic wiper where it has a thread that will create this registry entry to change the color of compressed or encrypted files in NTFS file system as well as the pop up information tips. This is a good indicator that a process tries to modified one of the registry GlobalFolderOptions related to file compression attribution in terms of color in NTFS file system. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to look for suspicious registry modification related to file compression color and information tips. This IOC was seen in hermetic wiper where it has a thread that will create this registry entry to change the color of compressed or encrypted files in NTFS file system as well as the pop up information tips. This is a good indicator that a process tries to modified one of the registry GlobalFolderOptions related to file compression attribution in terms of color in NTFS file system. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Registry` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-03-02 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-03-02 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Hermetic Wiper"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Registry modification in "ShowCompColor" and "ShowInfoTips" on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Hermetic Wiper"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to look for suspicious registry modification related to file compression color and information tips. This IOC was seen in hermetic wiper where it has a thread that will create this registry entry to change the color of compressed or encrypted files in NTFS file system as well as the pop up information tips. This is a good indicator that a process tries to modified one of the registry GlobalFolderOptions related to file compression attribution in terms of color in NTFS file system. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = "*\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Advanced*" AND Registry.registry_value_name IN("ShowCompColor", "ShowInfoTip") by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `windows_modify_show_compress_color_and_info_tip_registry_filter` + +[ESCU - Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies the use of AdvancedRun.exe. AdvancedRun.exe has similar capabilities as other remote programs like psexec. AdvancedRun may also ingest a configuration file with all settings defined and perform its activity. The analytic is written in a way to identify a renamed binary and also the common command-line arguments. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1588.002"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the use of AdvancedRun.exe. AdvancedRun.exe has similar capabilities as other remote programs like psexec. AdvancedRun may also ingest a configuration file with all settings defined and perform its activity. The analytic is written in a way to identify a renamed binary and also the common command-line arguments. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as it is specific to AdvancedRun. Filter as needed based on legitimate usage. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-21 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-21 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Unusual Processes", "Ransomware", "WhisperGate"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of advancedrun.exe, $process_name$, was spawned by $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 60}, {"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 60}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Unusual Processes", "Ransomware", "WhisperGate"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1588.002"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the use of AdvancedRun.exe. AdvancedRun.exe has similar capabilities as other remote programs like psexec. AdvancedRun may also ingest a configuration file with all settings defined and perform its activity. The analytic is written in a way to identify a renamed binary and also the common command-line arguments. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=advancedrun.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=advancedrun.exe) Processes.process IN ("*EXEFilename*","*/cfg*","*RunAs*", "*WindowState*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_nirsoft_advancedrun_filter` + +[ESCU - Windows NirSoft Utilities - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following hunting analytic assists with identifying the proces execution of commonly used utilities from NirSoft. Potentially not adversary behavior, but worth identifying to know if the software is present and being used. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1588.002"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following hunting analytic assists with identifying the proces execution of commonly used utilities from NirSoft. Potentially not adversary behavior, but worth identifying to know if the software is present and being used. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Filtering may be required before setting to alert. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-24 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-24 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows NirSoft Utilities - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["WhisperGate"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ related to NiRSoft software usage. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows NirSoft Utilities - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["WhisperGate"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1588.002"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_path Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `is_nirsoft_software` | `windows_nirsoft_utilities_filter` + +[ESCU - Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies non SYSTEM accounts requesting access to lsass.exe. This behavior may be related to credential dumping or applications requiring access to credentials. Triaging this event will require understanding the GrantedAccess from the SourceImage. In addition, whether the account is privileged or not. Review the process requesting permissions and review parallel processes. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies non SYSTEM accounts requesting access to lsass.exe. This behavior may be related to credential dumping or applications requiring access to credentials. Triaging this event will require understanding the GrantedAccess from the SourceImage. In addition, whether the account is privileged or not. Review the process requesting permissions and review parallel processes. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Enabling EventCode 10 TargetProcess lsass.exe is required. +action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will occur based on legitimate application requests, filter based on source image as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-12 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-12 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Credential Dumping"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A process, $SourceImage$, has loaded $ImageLoaded$ that are typically related to credential dumping on $dest$. Review for further details. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 64}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}, {"threat_object_field": "ImageLoaded", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "SourceImage", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "ImageLoaded", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "SourceImage", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies non SYSTEM accounts requesting access to lsass.exe. This behavior may be related to credential dumping or applications requiring access to credentials. Triaging this event will require understanding the GrantedAccess from the SourceImage. In addition, whether the account is privileged or not. Review the process requesting permissions and review parallel processes. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe SourceUser!="NT AUTHORITY\\*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, TargetImage, GrantedAccess, SourceImage, SourceProcessId, SourceUser, TargetUser | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_non_system_account_targeting_lsass_filter` + +[ESCU - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic is an enhanced version of two previous analytics that identifies common GrantedAccess permission requests and CallTrace DLLs in order to detect credential dumping. \ +GrantedAccess is the requested permissions by the SourceImage into the TargetImage. \ +CallTrace Stack trace of where open process is called. Included is the DLL and the relative virtual address of the functions in the call stack right before the open process call. \ +dbgcore.dll or dbghelp.dll are two core Windows debug DLLs that have minidump functions which provide a way for applications to produce crashdump files that contain a useful subset of the entire process context. \ +The idea behind using ntdll.dll is to blend in by using native api of ntdll.dll. For example in sekurlsa module there are many ntdll exported api, like RtlCopyMemory, used to execute this module which is related to lsass dumping. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic is an enhanced version of two previous analytics that identifies common GrantedAccess permission requests and CallTrace DLLs in order to detect credential dumping. \ +GrantedAccess is the requested permissions by the SourceImage into the TargetImage. \ +CallTrace Stack trace of where open process is called. Included is the DLL and the relative virtual address of the functions in the call stack right before the open process call. \ +dbgcore.dll or dbghelp.dll are two core Windows debug DLLs that have minidump functions which provide a way for applications to produce crashdump files that contain a useful subset of the entire process context. \ +The idea behind using ntdll.dll is to blend in by using native api of ntdll.dll. For example in sekurlsa module there are many ntdll exported api, like RtlCopyMemory, used to execute this module which is related to lsass dumping. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Enabling EventCode 10 TargetProcess lsass.exe is required. +action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will occur based on GrantedAccess 0x1010 and 0x1400, filter based on source image as needed or remove them. Concern is Cobalt Strike usage of Mimikatz will generate 0x1010 initially, but later be caught. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-27 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-27 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Credential Dumping", "Detect Zerologon Attack", "DarkSide Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A process, $SourceImage$, has loaded $ImageLoaded$ that are typically related to credential dumping on $dest$. Review for further details. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 64}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}, {"threat_object_field": "ImageLoaded", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "SourceImage", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "Detect Zerologon Attack", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "ImageLoaded", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "SourceImage", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic is an enhanced version of two previous analytics that identifies common GrantedAccess permission requests and CallTrace DLLs in order to detect credential dumping. \ +GrantedAccess is the requested permissions by the SourceImage into the TargetImage. \ +CallTrace Stack trace of where open process is called. Included is the DLL and the relative virtual address of the functions in the call stack right before the open process call. \ +dbgcore.dll or dbghelp.dll are two core Windows debug DLLs that have minidump functions which provide a way for applications to produce crashdump files that contain a useful subset of the entire process context. \ +The idea behind using ntdll.dll is to blend in by using native api of ntdll.dll. For example in sekurlsa module there are many ntdll exported api, like RtlCopyMemory, used to execute this module which is related to lsass dumping. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Possible Credential Dumping +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe GrantedAccess IN ("0x01000", "0x1010", "0x1038", "0x40", "0x1400", "0x1fffff", "0x1410", "0x143a", "0x1438", "0x1000") CallTrace IN ("*dbgcore.dll*", "*dbghelp.dll*", "*ntdll.dll*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, TargetImage, GrantedAccess, SourceImage, SourceProcessId, SourceUser, TargetUser | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_possible_credential_dumping_filter` + +[ESCU - Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic is to look for process commandline that contains named pipe. This technique was seen in some adversaries, threat actor and malware like olympic destroyer to communicate to its other child processes after process injection that serve as defense evasion and privilege escalation. On the other hand this analytic may catch some normal process that using this technique for example browser application. In that scenario we include common process path we've seen during testing that cause false positive which is the program files. False positive may still be arise if the normal application is in other folder path. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to look for process commandline that contains named pipe. This technique was seen in some adversaries, threat actor and malware like olympic destroyer to communicate to its other child processes after process injection that serve as defense evasion and privilege escalation. On the other hand this analytic may catch some normal process that using this technique for example browser application. In that scenario we include common process path we've seen during testing that cause false positive which is the program files. False positive may still be arise if the normal application is in other folder path. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Normal browser application may use this technique. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-23 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-23 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Process with named pipe in $process$ on $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = "*\\\\.\\pipe\\*" NOT (Processes.process_path IN ("*\\program files*")) by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_process_with_namedpipe_commandline_filter` + +[ESCU - Windows Raccine Scheduled Task Deletion - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies the Raccine Rules Updater scheduled task being deleted. Adversaries may attempt to remove this task in order to prevent the update of Raccine. Raccine is a "ransomware vaccine" created by security researcher Florian Roth, designed to intercept and prevent precursors and active ransomware behavior. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the Raccine Rules Updater scheduled task being deleted. Adversaries may attempt to remove this task in order to prevent the update of Raccine. Raccine is a "ransomware vaccine" created by security researcher Florian Roth, designed to intercept and prevent precursors and active ransomware behavior. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, however filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-07 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-07 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Raccine Scheduled Task Deletion - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user user$ attempting to disable Raccines scheduled task. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Raccine Scheduled Task Deletion - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the Raccine Rules Updater scheduled task being deleted. Adversaries may attempt to remove this task in order to prevent the update of Raccine. Raccine is a "ransomware vaccine" created by security researcher Florian Roth, designed to intercept and prevent precursors and active ransomware behavior. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Raccine Scheduled Task Deletion +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe Processes.process="*delete*" AND Processes.process="*Raccine*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_raccine_scheduled_task_deletion_filter` + +[ESCU - Windows Rasautou DLL Execution - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies the Windows Windows Remote Auto Dialer, rasautou.exe executing an arbitrary DLL. This technique is used to execute arbitrary shellcode or DLLs via the rasautou.exe LOLBin capability. During triage, review parent and child process behavior including file and image loads. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055.001", "T1218", "T1055"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the Windows Windows Remote Auto Dialer, rasautou.exe executing an arbitrary DLL. This technique is used to execute arbitrary shellcode or DLLs via the rasautou.exe LOLBin capability. During triage, review parent and child process behavior including file and image loads. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will be limited to applications that require Rasautou.exe to load a DLL from disk. Filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-15 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-15 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Rasautou DLL Execution - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to load a DLL in a suspicious manner. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Rasautou DLL Execution - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055.001", "T1218", "T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the Windows Windows Remote Auto Dialer, rasautou.exe executing an arbitrary DLL. This technique is used to execute arbitrary shellcode or DLLs via the rasautou.exe LOLBin capability. During triage, review parent and child process behavior including file and image loads. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Rasautou DLL Execution +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rasautou.exe Processes.process="* -d *"AND Processes.process="* -p *" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_rasautou_dll_execution_filter` + +[ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic is to look for suspicious raw access read to device disk partition of the host machine. This technique was seen in several attacks by adversaries or threat actor to wipe, encrypt or overwrite the boot sector of each partition as part of their impact payload for example the "hermeticwiper" malware. This detection is a good indicator that there is a process try to read or write on boot sector. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1561.002", "T1561"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to look for suspicious raw access read to device disk partition of the host machine. This technique was seen in several attacks by adversaries or threat actor to wipe, encrypt or overwrite the boot sector of each partition as part of their impact payload for example the "hermeticwiper" malware. This detection is a good indicator that there is a process try to read or write on boot sector. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the raw access read event (like sysmon eventcode 9), process name and process guid from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +action.escu.known_false_positives = This event is really notable but we found minimal number of normal application from system32 folder like svchost.exe accessing it too. In this case we used 'system32' and 'syswow64' path as a filter for this detection. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-25 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-25 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Data Destruction", "Hermetic Wiper"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Process accessing disk partition $device$ in $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 90}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "Hermetic Wiper"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1561.002", "T1561"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `sysmon` EventCode=9 Device = \\Device\\HarddiskVolume* NOT (Image IN("*\\Windows\\System32\\*", "*\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\*")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image Device ProcessGuid ProcessId EventDescription EventCode Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition_filter` + +[ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic is to look for suspicious raw access read to drive where the master boot record is placed. This technique was seen in several attacks by adversaries or threat actor to wipe, encrypt or overwrite the master boot record code as part of their impact payload. This detection is a good indicator that there is a process try to read or write on MBR sector. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1561.002", "T1561"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to look for suspicious raw access read to drive where the master boot record is placed. This technique was seen in several attacks by adversaries or threat actor to wipe, encrypt or overwrite the master boot record code as part of their impact payload. This detection is a good indicator that there is a process try to read or write on MBR sector. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the raw access read event (like sysmon eventcode 9), process name and process guid from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +action.escu.known_false_positives = This event is really notable but we found minimal number of normal application from system32 folder like svchost.exe accessing it too. In this case we used 'system32' and 'syswow64' path as a filter for this detection. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-17 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-17 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["WhisperGate", "Hermetic Wiper"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = process accessing MBR $device$ in $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 90}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["WhisperGate", "Hermetic Wiper"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1561.002", "T1561"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to look for suspicious raw access read to drive where the master boot record is placed. This technique was seen in several attacks by adversaries or threat actor to wipe, encrypt or overwrite the master boot record code as part of their impact payload. This detection is a good indicator that there is a process try to read or write on MBR sector. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `sysmon` EventCode=9 Device = \\Device\\Harddisk0\\DR0 NOT (Image IN("*\\Windows\\System32\\*", "*\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\*")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer Image Device ProcessGuid ProcessId EventDescription EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive_filter` + +[ESCU - Windows Remote Assistance Spawning Process - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies the use of Microsoft Remote Assistance, msra.exe, spawning PowerShell.exe or cmd.exe as a child process. Msra.exe by default has no command-line arguments and typically spawns itself. It will generate a network connection to the remote system that is connected. This behavior is indicative of another process injected into msra.exe. Review the parent process or cross process events to identify source. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the use of Microsoft Remote Assistance, msra.exe, spawning PowerShell.exe or cmd.exe as a child process. Msra.exe by default has no command-line arguments and typically spawns itself. It will generate a network connection to the remote system that is connected. This behavior is indicative of another process injected into msra.exe. Review the parent process or cross process events to identify source. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, filter as needed. Add additional shells as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-07 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-07 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Remote Assistance Spawning Process - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Unusual Processes"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$, generating behavior not common with msra.exe. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Remote Assistance Spawning Process - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Unusual Processes"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the use of Microsoft Remote Assistance, msra.exe, spawning PowerShell.exe or cmd.exe as a child process. Msra.exe by default has no command-line arguments and typically spawns itself. It will generate a network connection to the remote system that is connected. This behavior is indicative of another process injected into msra.exe. Review the parent process or cross process events to identify source. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Remote Assistance Spawning Process +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=msra.exe `windows_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_remote_assistance_spawning_process_filter` + +[ESCU - Windows Schtasks Create Run As System - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies Schtasks.exe creating a new task to start and run as an elevated user - SYSTEM. This is commonly used by adversaries to spawn a process in an elevated state. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1053"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies Schtasks.exe creating a new task to start and run as an elevated user - SYSTEM. This is commonly used by adversaries to spawn a process in an elevated state. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will be limited to legitimate applications creating a task to run as SYSTEM. Filter as needed based on parent process, or modify the query to have world writeable paths to restrict it. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-07 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-07 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Schtasks Create Run As System - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Persistence Techniques"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = An $process_name$ was created on endpoint $dest$ attempting to spawn as SYSTEM. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 48}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Schtasks Create Run As System - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies Schtasks.exe creating a new task to start and run as an elevated user - SYSTEM. This is commonly used by adversaries to spawn a process in an elevated state. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Schtasks Create Run As System +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_schtasks` Processes.process="*/create *" AND Processes.process="*/ru *" AND Processes.process="*system*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_schtasks_create_run_as_system_filter` + +[ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The search looks for a Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) was stopped via command-line. This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1489"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The search looks for a Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) was stopped via command-line. This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records the process-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Processes data-model object. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data. +action.escu.known_false_positives = SAM is a critical windows service, stopping it would cause major issues on an endpoint this makes false positive rare. AlthoughNo false positives have been identified. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-11-06 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-06 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ryuk Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = The Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) was stopped via cli by $user$ on $dest$ by this command: $processs$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 70}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 70}, {"threat_object_field": "process", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1489"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "process", "role": ["Target"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The search looks for a Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) was stopped via command-line. This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Security Account Manager Stopped +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE ("Processes.process_name"="net*.exe" "Processes.process"="*stop \"samss\"*") BY "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process" | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_security_account_manager_stopped_filter` + +[ESCU - Windows Service Created With Suspicious Service Path - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytc uses Windows Event Id 7045, `New Service Was Installed`, to identify the creation of a Windows Service where the service binary path path is located in a non-common Service folder in Windows. Red Teams and adversaries alike may create malicious Services for lateral movement or remote code execution as well as persistence and execution. The Clop ransomware has also been seen in the wild abusing Windows services. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569", "T1569.002"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytc uses Windows Event Id 7045, `New Service Was Installed`, to identify the creation of a Windows Service where the service binary path path is located in a non-common Service folder in Windows. Red Teams and adversaries alike may create malicious Services for lateral movement or remote code execution as well as persistence and execution. The Clop ransomware has also been seen in the wild abusing Windows services. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may install services with uncommon services paths. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-22 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-22 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Service Created With Suspicious Service Path - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Clop Ransomware", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A service $Service_File_Name$ was created from a non-standard path using $Service_Name$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "Service_File_Name", "threat_object_type": "other"}, {"threat_object_field": "Service_Name", "threat_object_type": "other"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Service Created With Suspicious Service Path - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569", "T1569.002"], "observable": [{"name": "Service_File_Name", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Other"}, {"name": "Service_Name", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Other"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytc uses Windows Event Id 7045, `New Service Was Installed`, to identify the creation of a Windows Service where the service binary path path is located in a non-common Service folder in Windows. Red Teams and adversaries alike may create malicious Services for lateral movement or remote code execution as well as persistence and execution. The Clop ransomware has also been seen in the wild abusing Windows services. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Service Created With Suspicious Service Path +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 Service_File_Name = "*\.exe" NOT (Service_File_Name IN ("C:\\Windows\\*", "C:\\Program File*", "C:\\Programdata\\*", "%systemroot%\\*")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Service_File_Name Service_Name Service_Start_Type Service_Type | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path_filter` + +[ESCU - Windows Service Created Within Public Path - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytc uses Windows Event Id 7045, `New Service Was Installed`, to identify the creation of a Windows Service where the service binary path is located in public paths. This behavior could represent the installation of a malicious service. Red Teams and adversaries alike may create malicious Services for lateral movement or remote code execution +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543", "T1543.003"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytc uses Windows Event Id 7045, `New Service Was Installed`, to identify the creation of a Windows Service where the service binary path is located in public paths. This behavior could represent the installation of a malicious service. Red Teams and adversaries alike may create malicious Services for lateral movement or remote code execution +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may install services with uncommon services paths. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-22 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-22 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Service Created Within Public Path - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A Windows Service $Service_File_Name$ with a public path was created on $ComputerName +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "Service_File_Name", "threat_object_type": "other"}, {"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 54}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Service Created Within Public Path - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543", "T1543.003"], "observable": [{"name": "Service_File_Name", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Other"}, {"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytc uses Windows Event Id 7045, `New Service Was Installed`, to identify the creation of a Windows Service where the service binary path is located in public paths. This behavior could represent the installation of a malicious service. Red Teams and adversaries alike may create malicious Services for lateral movement or remote code execution +action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Service Created Within Public Path +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 Service_File_Name = "*\.exe" NOT (Service_File_Name IN ("C:\\Windows\\*", "C:\\Program File*", "C:\\Programdata\\*", "%systemroot%\\*")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName EventCode Service_File_Name Service_Name Service_Start_Type Service_Type | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_created_within_public_path_filter` + +[ESCU - Windows Service Creation on Remote Endpoint - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for the execution of `sc.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to create a Windows Service on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Service Control Manager for lateral movement and remote code execution. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543", "T1543.003"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `sc.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to create a Windows Service on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Service Control Manager for lateral movement and remote code execution. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may create Windows Services on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-10 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-10 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Service Creation on Remote Endpoint - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A Windows Service was created on a remote endpoint from $dest +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 54}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Service Creation on Remote Endpoint - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543", "T1543.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `sc.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to create a Windows Service on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Service Control Manager for lateral movement and remote code execution. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Service Creation on Remote Endpoint +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=sc.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=sc.exe) (Processes.process=*\\\\* AND Processes.process=*create* AND Processes.process=*binpath*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_creation_on_remote_endpoint_filter` + +[ESCU - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic is to look for suspicious modification or creation of registry to have service entry. This technique is abused by adversaries or threat actor to persist, gain privileges in the machine or even lateral movement. This technique can be executed using reg.exe application or using windows API like for example the CrashOveride malware. This detection is a good indicator that a process is trying to create a service entry using registry ImagePath. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to look for suspicious modification or creation of registry to have service entry. This technique is abused by adversaries or threat actor to persist, gain privileges in the machine or even lateral movement. This technique can be executed using reg.exe application or using windows API like for example the CrashOveride malware. This detection is a good indicator that a process is trying to create a service entry using registry ImagePath. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Third party tools may used this technique to create services but not so common. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-23 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-23 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows Persistence Techniques"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A Windows Service was created on a endpoint from $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to look for suspicious modification or creation of registry to have service entry. This technique is abused by adversaries or threat actor to persist, gain privileges in the machine or even lateral movement. This technique can be executed using reg.exe application or using windows API like for example the CrashOveride malware. This detection is a good indicator that a process is trying to create a service entry using registry ImagePath. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path="*\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services*" Registry.registry_value_name = ImagePath by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `windows_service_creation_using_registry_entry_filter` + +[ESCU - Windows Service Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for the execution of `sc.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to start a Windows Service on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Service Control Manager for lateral movement and remote code execution. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543", "T1543.003"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `sc.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to start a Windows Service on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Service Control Manager for lateral movement and remote code execution. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may start Windows Services on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-10 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-10 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Service Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A Windows Service was started on a remote endpoint from $dest +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 54}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Service Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543", "T1543.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `sc.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to start a Windows Service on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Service Control Manager for lateral movement and remote code execution. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Service Initiation on Remote Endpoint +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=sc.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=sc.exe) (Processes.process=*\\\\* AND Processes.process=*start*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_initiation_on_remote_endpoint_filter` + +[ESCU - Windows WMI Process Call Create - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic is to look for wmi commandlines to execute or create process. This technique was used by adversaries or threat actor to execute their malicious payload in local or remote host. This hunting query is a good pivot to start to look further which process trigger the wmi or what process it execute locally or remotely. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to look for wmi commandlines to execute or create process. This technique was used by adversaries or threat actor to execute their malicious payload in local or remote host. This hunting query is a good pivot to start to look further which process trigger the wmi or what process it execute locally or remotely. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may execute this command for testing or auditing. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-22 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-22 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows WMI Process Call Create - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious WMI Use"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = process with $process$ commandline executed in $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows WMI Process Call Create - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` Processes.process = "* process *" Processes.process = "* call *" Processes.process = "* create *" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_wmi_process_call_create_filter` + +[ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed with a native Windows shell (PowerShell, Cmd, Wscript, Cscript).\ +The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not.\ +schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64`.\ +The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory.\ +Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1053"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed with a native Windows shell (PowerShell, Cmd, Wscript, Cscript).\ +The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not.\ +schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64`.\ +The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory.\ +Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required. +action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are possible if legitimate applications are allowed to register tasks that call a shell to be spawned. Filter as needed based on command-line or processes that are used legitimately. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-12 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-12 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A windows scheduled task was created (task name=$Task_Name$) on $dest$ by the following command: $Command$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 70}, {"threat_object_field": "Command", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "Command", "role": ["Target"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed with a native Windows shell (PowerShell, Cmd, Wscript, Cscript).\ +The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not.\ +schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64`.\ +The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory.\ +Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source. +action.notable.param.rule_title = WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message | search Command IN ("*powershell.exe*", "*wscript.exe*", "*cscript.exe*", "*cmd.exe*", "*sh.exe*", "*ksh.exe*", "*zsh.exe*", "*bash.exe*", "*scrcons.exe*", "*pwsh.exe*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Task_Name, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell_filter` + +[ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed from a user writeable file path.\ +The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not.\ +schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64`.\ +The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory.\ +Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or was it via TaskService. Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1053"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed from a user writeable file path.\ +The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not.\ +schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64`.\ +The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory.\ +Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or was it via TaskService. Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required. +action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are possible if legitimate applications are allowed to register tasks in public paths. Filter as needed based on paths that are used legitimately. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-08 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-08 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "IcedID", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A windows scheduled task was created (task name=$Task_Name$) on $dest$ by the following command: $Command$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 70}, {"threat_object_field": "Command", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "IcedID", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "Command", "role": ["Target"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed from a user writeable file path.\ +The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not.\ +schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64`.\ +The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory.\ +Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or was it via TaskService. Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source. +action.notable.param.rule_title = WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message | search Command IN ("*\\users\\public\\*", "*\\programdata\\*", "*\\temp\\*", "*\\Windows\\Tasks\\*", "*\\appdata\\*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Task_Name, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path_filter` + +[ESCU - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following hunting analytic assists with identifying suspicious tasks that have been registered and ran in Windows using EventID 200 (action run) and 201 (action completed). It is recommended to filter based on ActionName by specifying specific paths not used in your environment. After some basic tuning, this may be effective in capturing evasive ways to register tasks on Windows. Review parallel events related to tasks being scheduled. EventID 106 will generate when a new task is generated, however, that does not mean it ran. Capture any files on disk and analyze. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following hunting analytic assists with identifying suspicious tasks that have been registered and ran in Windows using EventID 200 (action run) and 201 (action completed). It is recommended to filter based on ActionName by specifying specific paths not used in your environment. After some basic tuning, this may be effective in capturing evasive ways to register tasks on Windows. Review parallel events related to tasks being scheduled. EventID 106 will generate when a new task is generated, however, that does not mean it ran. Capture any files on disk and analyze. +action.escu.how_to_implement = Task Scheduler logs are required to be collected. Enable logging with inputs.conf by adding a stanza for [WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational] and renderXml=false. Note, not translating it in XML may require a proper extraction of specific items in the Message. +action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will be present. Filter based on ActionName paths or specify keywords of interest. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-19 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-19 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["IcedID", "Windows Persistence Techniques"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A Scheduled Task was scheduled and ran on $dest$. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `wineventlog_task_scheduler` EventCode IN ("200","201") | rename ComputerName as dest | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message dest EventCode category | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started_filter` + +[ESCU - Winhlp32 Spawning a Process - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies winhlp32.exe, found natively in `c:\windows\`, spawning a child process that loads a file out of appdata, programdata, or temp. Winhlp32.exe has a rocky past in that multiple vulnerabilities were found and added to MetaSploit. WinHlp32.exe is required to display 32-bit Help files that have the ".hlp" file name extension. This particular instance is related to a Remcos sample where dynwrapx.dll is added to the registry under inprocserver32, and later module loaded by winhlp32.exe to spawn wscript.exe and load a vbs or file from disk. During triage, review parallel processes to identify further suspicious behavior. Review module loads for unsuspecting unsigned modules. Capture any file modifications and analyze. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies winhlp32.exe, found natively in `c:\windows\`, spawning a child process that loads a file out of appdata, programdata, or temp. Winhlp32.exe has a rocky past in that multiple vulnerabilities were found and added to MetaSploit. WinHlp32.exe is required to display 32-bit Help files that have the ".hlp" file name extension. This particular instance is related to a Remcos sample where dynwrapx.dll is added to the registry under inprocserver32, and later module loaded by winhlp32.exe to spawn wscript.exe and load a vbs or file from disk. During triage, review parallel processes to identify further suspicious behavior. Review module loads for unsuspecting unsigned modules. Capture any file modifications and analyze. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as winhlp32.exe is typically not used with the latest flavors of Windows OS. However, filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-05 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-05 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Winhlp32 Spawning a Process - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Remcos"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$, and is not typical activity for this process. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Winhlp32 Spawning a Process - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies winhlp32.exe, found natively in `c:\windows\`, spawning a child process that loads a file out of appdata, programdata, or temp. Winhlp32.exe has a rocky past in that multiple vulnerabilities were found and added to MetaSploit. WinHlp32.exe is required to display 32-bit Help files that have the ".hlp" file name extension. This particular instance is related to a Remcos sample where dynwrapx.dll is added to the registry under inprocserver32, and later module loaded by winhlp32.exe to spawn wscript.exe and load a vbs or file from disk. During triage, review parallel processes to identify further suspicious behavior. Review module loads for unsuspecting unsigned modules. Capture any file modifications and analyze. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Winhlp32 Spawning a Process +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=winhlp32.exe Processes.process IN ("*\\appdata\\*","*\\programdata\\*", "*\\temp\\*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winhlp32_spawning_a_process_filter` + +[ESCU - Winword Spawning Cmd - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following detection identifies Microsoft Word spawning `cmd.exe`. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with winword.exe. Winword.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16` (version will vary). Cmd.exe spawning from winword.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command-line will indicate what is being executed. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. It is possible that COM is utilized to trampoline the child process to `explorer.exe` or `wmiprvse.exe`. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following detection identifies Microsoft Word spawning `cmd.exe`. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with winword.exe. Winword.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16` (version will vary). Cmd.exe spawning from winword.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command-line will indicate what is being executed. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. It is possible that COM is utilized to trampoline the child process to `explorer.exe` or `wmiprvse.exe`. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-22 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-22 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Winword Spawning Cmd - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spearphishing Attachments"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$ launched command: $process_name$ which is very common in spearphishing attacks. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 70}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 70}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Winword Spawning Cmd - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Target"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following detection identifies Microsoft Word spawning `cmd.exe`. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with winword.exe. Winword.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16` (version will vary). Cmd.exe spawning from winword.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command-line will indicate what is being executed. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. It is possible that COM is utilized to trampoline the child process to `explorer.exe` or `wmiprvse.exe`. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Winword Spawning Cmd +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=winword.exe `process_cmd` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winword_spawning_cmd_filter` + +[ESCU - Winword Spawning PowerShell - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following detection identifies Microsoft Word spawning PowerShell. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with winword.exe. Winword.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16` (version will vary). PowerShell spawning from winword.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command executed will most likely be encoded and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following detection identifies Microsoft Word spawning PowerShell. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with winword.exe. Winword.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16` (version will vary). PowerShell spawning from winword.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command executed will most likely be encoded and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-12 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-12 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Winword Spawning PowerShell - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spearphishing Attachments"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$ launched the following powershell process: $process_name$ which is very common in spearphishing attacks +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 70}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 70}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Winword Spawning PowerShell - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Target"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following detection identifies Microsoft Word spawning PowerShell. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with winword.exe. Winword.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16` (version will vary). PowerShell spawning from winword.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command executed will most likely be encoded and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Winword Spawning PowerShell +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name="winword.exe" `process_powershell` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winword_spawning_powershell_filter` + +[ESCU - Winword Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following detection identifies Microsoft Winword.exe spawning Windows Script Host - `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe`. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with Winword.exe. Winword.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16` (version will vary). `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` default location is `c:\windows\system32\` or c:windows\syswow64\`. `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` spawning from Winword.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command-line executed will most likely be obfuscated and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. Review the reputation of the remote destination and block accordingly. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following detection identifies Microsoft Winword.exe spawning Windows Script Host - `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe`. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with Winword.exe. Winword.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16` (version will vary). `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` default location is `c:\windows\system32\` or c:windows\syswow64\`. `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` spawning from Winword.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command-line executed will most likely be obfuscated and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. Review the reputation of the remote destination and block accordingly. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = There will be limited false positives and it will be different for every environment. Tune by child process or command-line as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-12 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-12 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Winword Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spearphishing Attachment"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = User $user$ on $dest$ spawned Windows Script Host from Winword.exe +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 70}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 70}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Winword Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachment"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Target"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following detection identifies Microsoft Winword.exe spawning Windows Script Host - `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe`. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with Winword.exe. Winword.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16` (version will vary). `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` default location is `c:\windows\system32\` or c:windows\syswow64\`. `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` spawning from Winword.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command-line executed will most likely be obfuscated and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. Review the reputation of the remote destination and block accordingly. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Winword Spawning Windows Script Host +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name="winword.exe" Processes.process_name IN ("cscript.exe", "wscript.exe") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winword_spawning_windows_script_host_filter` + +[ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions. The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscription to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions.\ +All event subscriptions have three components \ +1. Filter - WQL Query for the events we want. EventID = 19 \ +1. Consumer - An action to take upon triggering the filter. EventID = 20 \ +1. Binding - Registers a filter to a consumer. EventID = 21 \ +Monitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding. It may be pertinent to review all 3 to identify the flow of execution. In addition, EventCode 4104 may assist with any other PowerShell script usage that registered the subscription. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.003", "T1546"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions. The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscription to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions.\ +All event subscriptions have three components \ +1. Filter - WQL Query for the events we want. EventID = 19 \ +1. Consumer - An action to take upon triggering the filter. EventID = 20 \ +1. Binding - Registers a filter to a consumer. EventID = 21 \ +Monitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding. It may be pertinent to review all 3 to identify the flow of execution. In addition, EventCode 4104 may assist with any other PowerShell script usage that registered the subscription. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be collecting Sysmon data using Sysmon version 6.1 or greater and have Sysmon configured to generate alerts for WMI activity (eventID= 19, 20, 21). In addition, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA installed to properly parse the fields. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, administrators may use event subscriptions for legitimate purposes. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-12-08 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-12-08 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious WMI Use"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = User $user$ on $host$ executed the following suspicious WMI query: $Query$. Filter: $filter$. Consumer: $Consumer$. EventCode: $EventCode$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "host", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 30}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 30}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.003", "T1546"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "host", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions. The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscription to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions.\ +All event subscriptions have three components \ +1. Filter - WQL Query for the events we want. EventID = 19 \ +1. Consumer - An action to take upon triggering the filter. EventID = 20 \ +1. Binding - Registers a filter to a consumer. EventID = 21 \ +Monitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding. It may be pertinent to review all 3 to identify the flow of execution. In addition, EventCode 4104 may assist with any other PowerShell script usage that registered the subscription. +action.notable.param.rule_title = WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `sysmon` EventCode=21 | rename host as dest | table _time, dest, user, Operation, EventType, Query, Consumer, Filter | `wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon_filter` + +[ESCU - WMI Recon Running Process Or Services - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104, where WMI is performing an event query looking for running processes or running services. This technique is commonly found in malware and APT events where the adversary will map all running security applications or services on the compromised machine. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1592"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104, where WMI is performing an event query looking for running processes or running services. This technique is commonly found in malware and APT events where the adversary will map all running security applications or services on the compromised machine. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. +action.escu.known_false_positives = network administrator may used this command for checking purposes +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-14 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-14 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - WMI Recon Running Process Or Services - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious powerShell script execution by $user$ on $ComputerName$ via EventCode 4104, where WMI is performing an event query looking for running processes or running services +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 30}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 30}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - WMI Recon Running Process Or Services - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1592"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104, where WMI is performing an event query looking for running processes or running services. This technique is commonly found in malware and APT events where the adversary will map all running security applications or services on the compromised machine. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. +action.notable.param.rule_title = WMI Recon Running Process Or Services +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message= "*SELECT*" AND (Message="*Win32_Process*" OR Message="*Win32_Service*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmi_recon_running_process_or_services_filter` + +[ESCU - Wmic Group Discovery - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following hunting analytic identifies the use of `wmic.exe` enumerating local groups on the endpoint. \ +Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \ +During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.001"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following hunting analytic identifies the use of `wmic.exe` enumerating local groups on the endpoint. \ +Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \ +During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-14 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-14 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Wmic Group Discovery - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Local group discovery on $dest$ by $user$. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 15}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Wmic Group Discovery - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wmic.exe (Processes.process="*group get name*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmic_group_discovery_filter` + +[ESCU - Wmic NonInteractive App Uninstallation - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious wmic commandlined that uninstall application non interactively. This technique was seen in IceID to uninstall av products to the compromised host to bypassed and evade detections. This Hunting query maybe a good indicator that some process tries to uninstall application using wmic which is not a common behavior. This approach may seen in some script or third part appication to uninstall their application but it is a good thing to check what it uninstall and why. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to detect a suspicious wmic commandlined that uninstall application non interactively. This technique was seen in IceID to uninstall av products to the compromised host to bypassed and evade detections. This Hunting query maybe a good indicator that some process tries to uninstall application using wmic which is not a common behavior. This approach may seen in some script or third part appication to uninstall their application but it is a good thing to check what it uninstall and why. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +action.escu.known_false_positives = third party application may use this approach to uninstall there application +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-20 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-20 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Wmic NonInteractive App Uninstallation - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["IceID"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = wmic $process$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Wmic NonInteractive App Uninstallation - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IceID"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Target"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wmic.exe Processes.process="* product *" Processes.process="*where name*" Processes.process="*call uninstall*" Processes.process="*/nointeractive*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmic_noninteractive_app_uninstallation_filter` + +[ESCU - WMIC XSL Execution via URL - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies `wmic.exe` loading a remote XSL (eXtensible Stylesheet Language) script. This originally was identified by Casey Smith, dubbed Squiblytwo, as an application control bypass. Many adversaries will utilize this technique to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file. This technique can also execute local/remote scripts and, similar to its Regsvr32 "Squiblydoo" counterpart, leverages a trusted, built-in Windows tool. Adversaries may abuse any alias in Windows Management Instrumentation provided they utilize the /FORMAT switch. Upon identifying a suspicious execution, review for confirmed network connnection and script download. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1220"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies `wmic.exe` loading a remote XSL (eXtensible Stylesheet Language) script. This originally was identified by Casey Smith, dubbed Squiblytwo, as an application control bypass. Many adversaries will utilize this technique to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file. This technique can also execute local/remote scripts and, similar to its Regsvr32 "Squiblydoo" counterpart, leverages a trusted, built-in Windows tool. Adversaries may abuse any alias in Windows Management Instrumentation provided they utilize the /FORMAT switch. Upon identifying a suspicious execution, review for confirmed network connnection and script download. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are limited as legitimate applications typically do not download files or xsl using WMIC. Filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-11 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-11 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - WMIC XSL Execution via URL - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious WMI Use"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ utilizing wmic to download a remote XSL script. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - WMIC XSL Execution via URL - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1220"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies `wmic.exe` loading a remote XSL (eXtensible Stylesheet Language) script. This originally was identified by Casey Smith, dubbed Squiblytwo, as an application control bypass. Many adversaries will utilize this technique to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file. This technique can also execute local/remote scripts and, similar to its Regsvr32 "Squiblydoo" counterpart, leverages a trusted, built-in Windows tool. Adversaries may abuse any alias in Windows Management Instrumentation provided they utilize the /FORMAT switch. Upon identifying a suspicious execution, review for confirmed network connnection and script download. +action.notable.param.rule_title = WMIC XSL Execution via URL +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` Processes.process IN ("*http://*", "*https://*") Processes.process="*/format:*" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmic_xsl_execution_via_url_filter` + +[ESCU - Wmiprsve LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies `wmiprsve.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), the executed command is spawned as a child process of `wmiprvse.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of wmiprvse.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies `wmiprsve.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), the executed command is spawned as a child process of `wmiprvse.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of wmiprvse.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-22 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-22 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Wmiprsve LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Wmiprsve.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest$. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 54}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Wmiprsve LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies `wmiprsve.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), the executed command is spawned as a child process of `wmiprvse.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of wmiprvse.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Wmiprsve LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe) (Processes.process_name IN ("Regsvcs.exe", "Ftp.exe", "OfflineScannerShell.exe", "Rasautou.exe", "Schtasks.exe", "Xwizard.exe", "Dllhost.exe", "Pnputil.exe", "Atbroker.exe", "Pcwrun.exe", "Ttdinject.exe","Mshta.exe", "Bitsadmin.exe", "Certoc.exe", "Ieexec.exe", "Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe", "Runscripthelper.exe", "Forfiles.exe", "Msbuild.exe", "Register-cimprovider.exe", "Tttracer.exe", "Ie4uinit.exe", "Bash.exe", "Hh.exe", "SettingSyncHost.exe", "Cmstp.exe", "Mmc.exe", "Stordiag.exe", "Scriptrunner.exe", "Odbcconf.exe", "Extexport.exe", "Msdt.exe", "WorkFolders.exe", "Diskshadow.exe", "Mavinject.exe", "Regasm.exe", "Gpscript.exe", "Rundll32.exe", "Regsvr32.exe", "Msiexec.exe", "Wuauclt.exe", "Presentationhost.exe", "Wmic.exe", "Runonce.exe", "Syncappvpublishingserver.exe", "Verclsid.exe", "Infdefaultinstall.exe", "Explorer.exe", "Installutil.exe", "Netsh.exe", "Wab.exe", "Dnscmd.exe", "At.exe", "Pcalua.exe", "Msconfig.exe")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmiprsve_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter` + +[ESCU - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic identifies a suspicious spawned process by WScript or CScript process. This technique was a common technique used by adversaries and malware to execute different LOLBIN, other scripts like PowerShell or spawn a suspended process to inject its code as a defense evasion. This TTP may detect some normal script that using several application tool that are in the list of the child process it detects but a good pivot and indicator that a script is may execute suspicious code. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055", "T1543", "T1134.004", "T1134"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic identifies a suspicious spawned process by WScript or CScript process. This technique was a common technique used by adversaries and malware to execute different LOLBIN, other scripts like PowerShell or spawn a suspended process to inject its code as a defense evasion. This TTP may detect some normal script that using several application tool that are in the list of the child process it detects but a good pivot and indicator that a script is may execute suspicious code. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may create vbs or js script that use several tool as part of its execution. Filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-06 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-06 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["FIN7", "Remcos", "Unusual Processes", "WhisperGate"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = wscript or cscript parent process spawned $process_name$ in $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 49}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["FIN7", "Remcos", "Unusual Processes", "WhisperGate"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055", "T1543", "T1134.004", "T1134"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic identifies a suspicious spawned process by WScript or CScript process. This technique was a common technique used by adversaries and malware to execute different LOLBIN, other scripts like PowerShell or spawn a suspended process to inject its code as a defense evasion. This TTP may detect some normal script that using several application tool that are in the list of the child process it detects but a good pivot and indicator that a script is may execute suspicious code. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("cscript.exe", "wscript.exe") Processes.process_name IN ("regsvr32.exe", "rundll32.exe","winhlp32.exe","certutil.exe","msbuild.exe","cmd.exe","powershell*","wmic.exe","mshta.exe") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process_filter` + +[ESCU - Wsmprovhost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies `Wsmprovhost.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the Windows Remote Management (WinRm) protocol, the executed command is spawned as a child processs of `Wsmprovhost.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of Wsmprovhost.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.006"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies `Wsmprovhost.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the Windows Remote Management (WinRm) protocol, the executed command is spawned as a child processs of `Wsmprovhost.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of Wsmprovhost.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-22 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-22 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Wsmprovhost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Wsmprovhost.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest$. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 54}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Wsmprovhost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.006"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies `Wsmprovhost.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the Windows Remote Management (WinRm) protocol, the executed command is spawned as a child processs of `Wsmprovhost.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of Wsmprovhost.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Wsmprovhost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=wsmprovhost.exe) (Processes.process_name IN ("Regsvcs.exe", "Ftp.exe", "OfflineScannerShell.exe", "Rasautou.exe", "Schtasks.exe", "Xwizard.exe", "Dllhost.exe", "Pnputil.exe", "Atbroker.exe", "Pcwrun.exe", "Ttdinject.exe","Mshta.exe", "Bitsadmin.exe", "Certoc.exe", "Ieexec.exe", "Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe", "Runscripthelper.exe", "Forfiles.exe", "Msbuild.exe", "Register-cimprovider.exe", "Tttracer.exe", "Ie4uinit.exe", "Bash.exe", "Hh.exe", "SettingSyncHost.exe", "Cmstp.exe", "Mmc.exe", "Stordiag.exe", "Scriptrunner.exe", "Odbcconf.exe", "Extexport.exe", "Msdt.exe", "WorkFolders.exe", "Diskshadow.exe", "Mavinject.exe", "Regasm.exe", "Gpscript.exe", "Rundll32.exe", "Regsvr32.exe", "Msiexec.exe", "Wuauclt.exe", "Presentationhost.exe", "Wmic.exe", "Runonce.exe", "Syncappvpublishingserver.exe", "Verclsid.exe", "Infdefaultinstall.exe", "Explorer.exe", "Installutil.exe", "Netsh.exe", "Wab.exe", "Dnscmd.exe", "At.exe", "Pcalua.exe", "Msconfig.exe")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `wsmprovhost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter` + +[ESCU - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry related to UAC bypass. This technique is to modify the registry in this detection, create a registry value with the path of the payload and run WSreset.exe to bypass User account Control. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry related to UAC bypass. This technique is to modify the registry in this detection, create a registry value with the path of the payload and run WSreset.exe to bypass User account Control. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-01-28 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-01-28 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Living Off The Land"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious modification of registry $registry_path$ with possible payload path $registry_value_name$ in $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Living Off The Land"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Inbound"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry related to UAC bypass. This technique is to modify the registry in this detection, create a registry value with the path of the payload and run WSreset.exe to bypass User account Control. +action.notable.param.rule_title = WSReset UAC Bypass +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\AppX82a6gwre4fdg3bt635tn5ctqjf8msdd2\\Shell\\open\\command*" AND (Registry.registry_value_name = "(Default)" OR Registry.registry_value_name = "DelegateExecute") by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `wsreset_uac_bypass_filter` + +[ESCU - XMRIG Driver Loaded - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This analytic identifies XMRIG coinminer driver installation on the system. The XMRIG driver name by default is `WinRing0x64.sys`. This cpu miner is an open source project that is commonly abused by adversaries to infect and mine bitcoin. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.003", "T1543"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This analytic identifies XMRIG coinminer driver installation on the system. The XMRIG driver name by default is `WinRing0x64.sys`. This cpu miner is an open source project that is commonly abused by adversaries to infect and mine bitcoin. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the driver loaded and Signature from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-29 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-29 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - XMRIG Driver Loaded - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["XMRig"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A driver $ImageLoaded$ related to xmrig crytominer loaded in host $Computer$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - XMRIG Driver Loaded - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.003", "T1543"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic identifies XMRIG coinminer driver installation on the system. The XMRIG driver name by default is `WinRing0x64.sys`. This cpu miner is an open source project that is commonly abused by adversaries to infect and mine bitcoin. +action.notable.param.rule_title = XMRIG Driver Loaded +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `sysmon` EventCode=6 Signature="Noriyuki MIYAZAKI" OR ImageLoaded= "*\\WinRing0x64.sys" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer ImageLoaded Hashes IMPHASH Signature Signed | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `xmrig_driver_loaded_filter` + +[ESCU - XSL Script Execution With WMIC - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search is to detect a suspicious wmic.exe process or renamed wmic process to execute malicious xsl file. This technique was seen in FIN7 to execute its malicous jscript using the .xsl as the loader with the help of wmic.exe process. This TTP is really a good indicator for you to hunt further for FIN7 or other attacker that known to used this technique. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1220"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious wmic.exe process or renamed wmic process to execute malicious xsl file. This technique was seen in FIN7 to execute its malicous jscript using the .xsl as the loader with the help of wmic.exe process. This TTP is really a good indicator for you to hunt further for FIN7 or other attacker that known to used this technique. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-13 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-13 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - XSL Script Execution With WMIC - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["FIN7", "Suspicious WMI Use"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ utilizing wmic to load a XSL script. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 49}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - XSL Script Execution With WMIC - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["FIN7", "Suspicious WMI Use"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1220"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious wmic.exe process or renamed wmic process to execute malicious xsl file. This technique was seen in FIN7 to execute its malicous jscript using the .xsl as the loader with the help of wmic.exe process. This TTP is really a good indicator for you to hunt further for FIN7 or other attacker that known to used this technique. +action.notable.param.rule_title = XSL Script Execution With WMIC +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` Processes.process = "*os get*" Processes.process="*/format:*" Processes.process = "*.xsl*" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `xsl_script_execution_with_wmic_filter` + +[ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The search queries the authentication logs for assets that are categorized as routers in the ES Assets and Identity Framework, to identify connections that have not been seen before in the last 30 days. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Authentication"] +action.escu.eli5 = The search queries the authentication logs for assets that are categorized as routers in the ES Assets and Identity Framework, to identify connections that have not been seen before in the last 30 days. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must ensure the network router devices are categorized as "router" in the Assets and identity table. You must also populate the Authentication data model with logs related to users authenticating to routing infrastructure. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate router connections may appear as new connections +action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-12 +action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-12 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Router and Infrastructure Security"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Router and Infrastructure Security"], "cis20": ["CIS 11"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The search queries the authentication logs for assets that are categorized as routers in the ES Assets and Identity Framework, to identify connections that have not been seen before in the last 30 days. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect New Login Attempts to Routers +action.notable.param.security_domain = network +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.dest_category=router by Authentication.dest Authentication.user| eval isOutlier=if(earliest >= relative_time(now(), "-30d@d"), 1, 0) | where isOutlier=1| `security_content_ctime(earliest)`| `security_content_ctime(latest)` | `drop_dm_object_name("Authentication")` | `detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers_filter` + +[ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = Attackers often use spaces as a means to obfuscate an attachment's file extension. This search looks for messages with email attachments that have many spaces within the file names. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Email"] +action.escu.eli5 = Attackers often use spaces as a means to obfuscate an attachment's file extension. This search looks for messages with email attachments that have many spaces within the file names. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You need to ingest data from emails. Specifically, the sender's address and the file names of any attachments must be mapped to the Email data model. The threshold ratio is set to 10%, but this value can be configured to suit each environment. \ + **Splunk Phantom Playbook Integration**\ +If Splunk Phantom is also configured in your environment, a playbook called "Suspicious Email Attachment Investigate and Delete" can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/` and add the correct hostname to the "Phantom Instance" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search. The notable event will be sent to Phantom and the playbook will gather further information about the file attachment and its network behaviors. If Phantom finds malicious behavior and an analyst approves of the results, the email will be deleted from the user's inbox. +action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time +action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-19 +action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-19 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Suspicious Emails"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Suspicious Emails"], "cis20": ["CIS 7"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(All_Email.recipient) as recipient_address min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Email where All_Email.file_name="*" by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.file_name All_Email.message_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Email")` | eval space_ratio = (mvcount(split(file_name," "))-1)/len(file_name) | search space_ratio >= 0.1 | rex field=recipient_address "(?.*)@" | `email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces_filter` + +[ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The search looks at the change-analysis data model and detects email files created outside the normal Outlook directory. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114", "T1114.001"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The search looks at the change-analysis data model and detects email files created outside the normal Outlook directory. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records the file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint.Filesystem data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or by other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system reads and writes. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators and users sometimes prefer backing up their email data by moving the email files into a different folder. These attempts will be detected by the search. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Collection and Staging"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Collection and Staging"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114", "T1114.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The search looks at the change-analysis data model and detects email files created outside the normal Outlook directory. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Email files written outside of the Outlook directory +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_name=*.pst OR Filesystem.file_name=*.ost) Filesystem.file_path != "C:\\Users\\*\\My Documents\\Outlook Files\\*" Filesystem.file_path!="C:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Outlook*" by Filesystem.action Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Filesystem")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory_filter` + +[ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for an increase of data transfers from your email server to your clients. This could be indicative of a malicious actor collecting data using your email server. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114", "T1114.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Traffic"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for an increase of data transfers from your email server to your clients. This could be indicative of a malicious actor collecting data using your email server. +action.escu.how_to_implement = This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model. Your email servers must be categorized as "email_server" for the search to work, as well. You may need to adjust the deviation_threshold and minimum_data_samples values based on the network traffic in your environment. The "deviation_threshold" field is a multiplying factor to control how much variation you're willing to tolerate. The "minimum_data_samples" field is the minimum number of connections of data samples required for the statistic to be valid. +action.escu.known_false_positives = The false-positive rate will vary based on how you set the deviation_threshold and data_samples values. Our recommendation is to adjust these values based on your network traffic to and from your email servers. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Collection and Staging", "HAFNIUM Group"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Collection and Staging", "HAFNIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 7"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114", "T1114.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` sum(All_Traffic.bytes_out) as bytes_out from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.src_category=email_server by All_Traffic.dest_ip _time span=1d | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | eventstats avg(bytes_out) as avg_bytes_out stdev(bytes_out) as stdev_bytes_out | eventstats count as num_data_samples avg(eval(if(_time < relative_time(now(), "@d"), bytes_out, null))) as per_source_avg_bytes_out stdev(eval(if(_time < relative_time(now(), "@d"), bytes_out, null))) as per_source_stdev_bytes_out by dest_ip | eval minimum_data_samples = 4, deviation_threshold = 3 | where num_data_samples >= minimum_data_samples AND bytes_out > (avg_bytes_out + (deviation_threshold * stdev_bytes_out)) AND bytes_out > (per_source_avg_bytes_out + (deviation_threshold * per_source_stdev_bytes_out)) AND _time >= relative_time(now(), "@d") | eval num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average = round(abs(bytes_out - avg_bytes_out) / stdev_bytes_out, 2), num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average = round(abs(bytes_out - per_source_avg_bytes_out) / per_source_stdev_bytes_out, 2) | table dest_ip, _time, bytes_out, avg_bytes_out, per_source_avg_bytes_out, num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average, num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average | `email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts_filter` + +[ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for emails claiming to be sent from a domain similar to one that you want to have monitored for abuse. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Email"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for emails claiming to be sent from a domain similar to one that you want to have monitored for abuse. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You need to ingest email header data. Specifically the sender's address (src_user) must be populated. You also need to have run the search "ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names", which creates the permutations of the domain that will be checked for. +action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time +action.escu.creation_date = 2018-01-05 +action.escu.modification_date = 2018-01-05 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Brand Monitoring", "Suspicious Emails"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Brand Monitoring", "Suspicious Emails"], "cis20": ["CIS 7"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for emails claiming to be sent from a domain similar to one that you want to have monitored for abuse. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Monitor Email For Brand Abuse +action.notable.param.security_domain = network +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Email.recipient) as recipients, min(_time) as firstTime, max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Email by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.message_id | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Email")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | eval temp=split(src_user, "@") | eval email_domain=mvindex(temp, 1) | lookup update=true brandMonitoring_lookup domain as email_domain OUTPUT domain_abuse | search domain_abuse=true | table message_id, src_user, email_domain, recipients, firstTime, lastTime | `monitor_email_for_brand_abuse_filter` + +[ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search detects Okta login failures due to bad credentials for multiple users originating from the same ip address. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search detects Okta login failures due to bad credentials for multiple users originating from the same ip address. +action.escu.how_to_implement = This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being ingested in your Splunk deployment. +action.escu.known_false_positives = A single public IP address servicing multiple legitmate users may trigger this search. In addition, the threshold of 5 distinct users may be too low for your needs. You may modify the included filter macro `multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip_filter` to raise the threshold or except specific IP adresses from triggering this search. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Okta Activity"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Okta Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search detects Okta login failures due to bad credentials for multiple users originating from the same ip address. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP +action.notable.param.security_domain = access +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `okta` outcome.reason=INVALID_CREDENTIALS | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(user) as distinct_users values(user) as users by src_ip, displayMessage, outcome.reason, country, state, city | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search distinct_users > 5| `multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip_filter` + +[ESCU - No Windows Updates in a time frame - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for Windows endpoints that have not generated an event indicating a successful Windows update in the last 60 days. Windows updates are typically released monthly and applied shortly thereafter. An endpoint that has not successfully applied an update in this time frame indicates the endpoint is not regularly being patched for some reason. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.MA"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Updates"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for Windows endpoints that have not generated an event indicating a successful Windows update in the last 60 days. Windows updates are typically released monthly and applied shortly thereafter. An endpoint that has not successfully applied an update in this time frame indicates the endpoint is not regularly being patched for some reason. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, it requires that the 'Update' data model is being populated. This can be accomplished by ingesting Windows events or the Windows Update log via a universal forwarder on the Windows endpoints you wish to monitor. The Windows add-on should be also be installed and configured to properly parse Windows events in Splunk. There may be other data sources which can populate this data model, including vulnerability management systems. +action.escu.known_false_positives = None identified +action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-15 +action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-15 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - No Windows Updates in a time frame - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Monitor for Updates"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - No Windows Updates in a time frame - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Monitor for Updates"], "cis20": ["CIS 18"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.MA"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Updates where Updates.status=Installed Updates.vendor_product="Microsoft Windows" by Updates.dest Updates.status Updates.vendor_product | rename Updates.dest as Host | rename Updates.status as "Update Status" | rename Updates.vendor_product as Product | eval isOutlier=if(lastTime <= relative_time(now(), "-60d@d"), 1, 0) | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search isOutlier=1 | rename lastTime as "Last Update Time", | table Host, "Update Status", Product, "Last Update Time" | `no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame_filter` + +[ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = Detect Okta user lockout events +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = Detect Okta user lockout events +action.escu.how_to_implement = This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being ingested in your Splunk deployment. +action.escu.known_false_positives = None. Account lockouts should be followed up on to determine if the actual user was the one who caused the lockout, or if it was an unauthorized actor. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Okta Activity"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Okta Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `okta` displayMessage="Max sign in attempts exceeded" | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | table _time, user, country, state, city, src_ip | `okta_account_lockout_events_filter` + +[ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = Detect failed Okta SSO events +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = Detect failed Okta SSO events +action.escu.how_to_implement = This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being ingested in your Splunk deployment. +action.escu.known_false_positives = There may be a faulty config preventing legitmate users from accessing apps they should have access to. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Okta Activity"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Okta Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `okta` displayMessage="User attempted unauthorized access to app" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(app) as Apps count by user, result ,displayMessage, src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_failed_sso_attempts_filter` + +[ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search detects logins from the same user from different cities in a 24 hour period. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search detects logins from the same user from different cities in a 24 hour period. +action.escu.how_to_implement = This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being ingested in your Splunk deployment. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Users in your enviornment may legitmately be travelling and loggin in from different locations. This search is useful for those users that should *not* be travelling for some reason, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. The search also relies on the geographical information being populated in the Okta logs. It is also possible that a connection from another region may be attributed to a login from a remote VPN endpoint. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Okta Activity"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Okta Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `okta` displayMessage="User login to Okta" client.geographicalContext.city!=null | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(client.geographicalContext.city) as locations values(client.geographicalContext.city) as cities values(client.geographicalContext.state) as states by user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities_filter` | search locations > 1 + +[ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for emails that have attachments with suspicious file extensions. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001", "T1566"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.IP"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Email"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for emails that have attachments with suspicious file extensions. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You need to ingest data from emails. Specifically, the sender's address and the file names of any attachments must be mapped to the Email data model. \ + **Splunk Phantom Playbook Integration**\ +If Splunk Phantom is also configured in your environment, a Playbook called "Suspicious Email Attachment Investigate and Delete" can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/`, and add the correct hostname to the "Phantom Instance" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search. The notable event will be sent to Phantom and the playbook will gather further information about the file attachment and its network behaviors. If Phantom finds malicious behavior and an analyst approves of the results, the email will be deleted from the user's inbox. +action.escu.known_false_positives = None identified +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-22 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-22 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Suspicious Emails"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Suspicious Emails"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 12"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001", "T1566"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Email where All_Email.file_name="*" by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.file_name All_Email.message_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Email")` | `suspicious_email_attachments` | `suspicious_email_attachment_extensions_filter` + +[ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for suspicious Java classes that are often used to exploit remote command execution in common Java frameworks, such as Apache Struts. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for suspicious Java classes that are often used to exploit remote command execution in common Java frameworks, such as Apache Struts. +action.escu.how_to_implement = In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from your web-traffic appliances that serve or sit in the path of your Struts application servers. This can be accomplished by indexing data from a web proxy, or by using network traffic-analysis tools, such as Splunk Stream or Bro. +action.escu.known_false_positives = There are no known false positives. +action.escu.creation_date = 2018-12-06 +action.escu.modification_date = 2018-12-06 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Apache Struts Vulnerability"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Apache Struts Vulnerability"], "cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 12"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `stream_http` http_method=POST http_content_length>1 | regex form_data="(?i)java\.lang\.(?:runtime|processbuilder)" | rename src_ip as src | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime, values(url) as uri, values(status) as status, values(http_user_agent) as http_user_agent by src, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_java_classes_filter` + +[ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for suspicious processes on all systems labeled as web servers. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1082"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for suspicious processes on all systems labeled as web servers. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. In addition, web servers will need to be identified in the Assets and Identity Framework of Enterprise Security. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Some of these processes may be used legitimately on web servers during maintenance or other administrative tasks. +action.escu.creation_date = 2019-04-01 +action.escu.modification_date = 2019-04-01 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Apache Struts Vulnerability"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Apache Struts Vulnerability"], "cis20": ["CIS 3"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1082"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for suspicious processes on all systems labeled as web servers. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.dest_category="web_server" AND (Processes.process="*whoami*" OR Processes.process="*ping*" OR Processes.process="*iptables*" OR Processes.process="*wget*" OR Processes.process="*service*" OR Processes.process="*curl*") by Processes.process Processes.process_name, Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes_filter` + +[ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search finds for the number successfully destroyed cloud instances for every 4 hour block. This is split up between weekdays and the weekend. It then applies the probability densitiy model previously created and alerts on any outliers. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Change"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search finds for the number successfully destroyed cloud instances for every 4 hour block. This is split up between weekdays and the weekend. It then applies the probability densitiy model previously created and alerts on any outliers. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed` to create the probability density function. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within a cloud infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-08-21 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-21 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats count as instances_destroyed values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=deleted AND All_Changes.status=success AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%w") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | join HourOfDay isWeekend [summary cloud_excessive_instances_destroyed_v1] | where cardinality >=16 | apply cloud_excessive_instances_destroyed_v1 threshold=0.005 | rename "IsOutlier(instances_destroyed)" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1 | eval expected_upper_threshold = mvindex(split(mvindex(BoundaryRanges, -1), ":"), 0) | eval distance_from_threshold = instances_destroyed - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, instances_destroyed, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold, object_id | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_destroyed_filter` + +[ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search finds for the number successfully created cloud instances for every 4 hour block. This is split up between weekdays and the weekend. It then applies the probability densitiy model previously created and alerts on any outliers. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Change"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search finds for the number successfully created cloud instances for every 4 hour block. This is split up between weekdays and the weekend. It then applies the probability densitiy model previously created and alerts on any outliers. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched` to create the probability density function. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-08-21 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-21 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Cloud Cryptomining", "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Cryptomining", "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats count as instances_launched values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=created) AND All_Changes.status=success AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%w") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | join HourOfDay isWeekend [summary cloud_excessive_instances_created_v1] | where cardinality >=16 | apply cloud_excessive_instances_created_v1 threshold=0.005 | rename "IsOutlier(instances_launched)" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1 | eval expected_upper_threshold = mvindex(split(mvindex(BoundaryRanges, -1), ":"), 0) | eval distance_from_threshold = instances_launched - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, instances_launched, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold, object_id | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_launched_filter` + +[ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster in AWS +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster in AWS +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudWatch EKS Logs inputs. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, UA and source IPs will provide context. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-04-15 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-04-15 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` "user.username"="system:anonymous" userAgent!="AWS Security Scanner" | rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(responseStatus.reason) values(source) as cluster_name values(responseStatus.code) values(userAgent) as http_user_agent values(verb) values(requestURI) by src_ip user.username user.groups{} | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection_filter` + +[ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search provides detection information on unauthenticated requests against Kubernetes' Pods API +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search provides detection information on unauthenticated requests against Kubernetes' Pods API +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on forAWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudWatch EKS Logs.Please also customize the `kubernetes_pods_aws_scan_fingerprint_detection` macro to filter out the false positives. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, UA and source IPs and direct request to API provide context. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-04-15 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-04-15 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` "user.username"="system:anonymous" verb=list objectRef.resource=pods requestURI="/api/v1/pods" | rename source as cluster_name sourceIPs{} as src_ip | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(responseStatus.reason) values(responseStatus.code) values(userAgent) values(verb) values(requestURI) by src_ip cluster_name user.username user.groups{} | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection_filter` + +[ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search provides detection of an user attaching itself to a different role trust policy. This can be used for lateral movement and escalation of privileges. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search provides detection of an user attaching itself to a different role trust policy. This can be used for lateral movement and escalation of privileges. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add-on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs +action.escu.known_false_positives = Attach to policy can create a lot of noise. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse (i.e status=failure). The search can provide context for common users attaching themselves to higher privilege policies or even newly created policies. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-27 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-27 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cross Account Activity"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cross Account Activity"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` attach policy| spath requestParameters.policyArn | table sourceIPAddress user_access_key userIdentity.arn userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.arn eventName errorCode errorMessage status action requestParameters.policyArn userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.mfaAuthenticated userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.creationDate | `aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy_filter` + +[ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search provides detection of accounts creating permanent keys. Permanent keys are not created by default and they are only needed for programmatic calls. Creation of Permanent key is an important event to monitor. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search provides detection of accounts creating permanent keys. Permanent keys are not created by default and they are only needed for programmatic calls. Creation of Permanent key is an important event to monitor. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs +action.escu.known_false_positives = Not all permanent key creations are malicious. If there is a policy of rotating keys this search can be adjusted to provide better context. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-27 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-27 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cross Account Activity"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cross Account Activity"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` CreateAccessKey | spath eventName | search eventName=CreateAccessKey "userIdentity.type"=IAMUser | table sourceIPAddress userName userIdentity.type userAgent action status responseElements.accessKey.createDate responseElements.accessKey.status responseElements.accessKey.accessKeyId |`aws_detect_permanent_key_creation_filter` + +[ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search provides detection of role creation by IAM users. Role creation is an event by itself if user is creating a new role with trust policies different than the available in AWS and it can be used for lateral movement and escalation of privileges. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search provides detection of role creation by IAM users. Role creation is an event by itself if user is creating a new role with trust policies different than the available in AWS and it can be used for lateral movement and escalation of privileges. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add-on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs +action.escu.known_false_positives = CreateRole is not very common in common users. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse. In general AWS provides plenty of trust policies that fit most use cases. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-27 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-27 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cross Account Activity"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cross Account Activity"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` event_name=CreateRole action=created userIdentity.type=AssumedRole requestParameters.description=Allows* | table sourceIPAddress userIdentity.principalId userIdentity.arn action event_name awsRegion http_user_agent mfa_auth msg requestParameters.roleName requestParameters.description responseElements.role.arn responseElements.role.createDate | `aws_detect_role_creation_filter` + +[ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search provides detection of suspicious use of sts:AssumeRole. These tokens can be created on the go and used by attackers to move laterally and escalate privileges. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search provides detection of suspicious use of sts:AssumeRole. These tokens can be created on the go and used by attackers to move laterally and escalate privileges. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs +action.escu.known_false_positives = Sts:AssumeRole can be very noisy as it is a standard mechanism to provide cross account and cross resources access. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-27 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-27 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cross Account Activity"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cross Account Activity"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `cloudtrail` user_type=AssumedRole userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.type=Role | table sourceIPAddress userIdentity.arn user_agent user_access_key status action requestParameters.roleName responseElements.role.roleName responseElements.role.createDate | `aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse_filter` + +[ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search provides detection of suspicious use of sts:GetSessionToken. These tokens can be created on the go and used by attackers to move laterally and escalate privileges. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1550"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search provides detection of suspicious use of sts:GetSessionToken. These tokens can be created on the go and used by attackers to move laterally and escalate privileges. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add-on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs +action.escu.known_false_positives = Sts:GetSessionToken can be very noisy as in certain environments numerous calls of this type can be executed. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse. In specific environments the use of field requestParameters.serialNumber will need to be used. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-27 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-27 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cross Account Activity"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cross Account Activity"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1550"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` ASIA userIdentity.type=IAMUser| spath eventName | search eventName=GetSessionToken | table sourceIPAddress eventTime userIdentity.arn userName userAgent user_type status region | `aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse_filter` + +[ESCU - Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks at GCP Storage bucket-access logs and detects new or previously unseen remote IP addresses that have successfully accessed a GCP Storage bucket. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks at GCP Storage bucket-access logs and detects new or previously unseen remote IP addresses that have successfully accessed a GCP Storage bucket. +action.escu.how_to_implement = This search relies on the Splunk Add-on for Google Cloud Platform, setting up a Cloud Pub/Sub input, along with the relevant GCP PubSub topics and logging sink to capture GCP Storage Bucket events (https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/routing/overview). In order to capture public GCP Storage Bucket access logs, you must also enable storage bucket logging to your PubSub Topic as per https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/access-logs. These logs are deposited into the nominated Storage Bucket on an hourly basis and typically show up by 15 minutes past the hour. It is recommended to configure any saved searches or correlation searches in Enterprise Security to run on an hourly basis at 30 minutes past the hour (cron definition of 30 * * * *). A lookup table (previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip.csv) stores the previously seen access requests, and is used by this search to determine any newly seen IP addresses accessing the Storage Buckets. +action.escu.known_false_positives = GCP Storage buckets can be accessed from any IP (if the ACLs are open to allow it), as long as it can make a successful connection. This will be a false postive, since the search is looking for a new IP within the past two hours. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-08-10 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-10 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious GCP Storage Activities"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "dest", "threat_object_type": "other"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious GCP Storage Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 14"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Other"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `google_gcp_pubsub_message` | multikv | rename sc_status_ as status | rename cs_object_ as bucket_name | rename c_ip_ as remote_ip | rename cs_uri_ as request_uri | rename cs_method_ as operation | search status="\"200\"" | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by bucket_name remote_ip operation request_uri | table firstTime, lastTime, bucket_name, remote_ip, operation, request_uri | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by bucket_name remote_ip operation request_uri | outputlookup previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip | eval newIP=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(),"-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newIP=1 | eval first_time=strftime(firstTime,"%m/%d/%y %H:%M:%S") | eval last_time=strftime(lastTime,"%m/%d/%y %H:%M:%S") | table first_time last_time bucket_name remote_ip operation request_uri | `detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip_filter` + +[ESCU - Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for GCP PubSub events where a user has created an open/public GCP Storage bucket. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for GCP PubSub events where a user has created an open/public GCP Storage bucket. +action.escu.how_to_implement = This search relies on the Splunk Add-on for Google Cloud Platform, setting up a Cloud Pub/Sub input, along with the relevant GCP PubSub topics and logging sink to capture GCP Storage Bucket events (https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/routing/overview). +action.escu.known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that a GCP admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. That said, GCP strongly advises against granting full control to the "allUsers" group. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-08-05 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-05 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious GCP Storage Activities"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious GCP Storage Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for GCP PubSub events where a user has created an open/public GCP Storage bucket. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets +action.notable.param.security_domain = network +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.resource.type=gcs_bucket data.protoPayload.methodName=storage.setIamPermissions | spath output=action path=data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.action | spath output=user path=data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail | spath output=location path=data.protoPayload.resourceLocation.currentLocations{} | spath output=src path=data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp | spath output=bucketName path=data.protoPayload.resourceName | spath output=role path=data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.role | spath output=member path=data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.member | search (member=allUsers AND action=ADD) | table _time, bucketName, src, user, location, action, role, member | search `detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets_filter` + +[ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks at S3 bucket-access logs and detects new or previously unseen remote IP addresses that have successfully accessed an S3 bucket. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks at S3 bucket-access logs and detects new or previously unseen remote IP addresses that have successfully accessed an S3 bucket. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your S3 access logs' inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen S3 Bucket Access by Remote IP" support search once to create a history of previously seen remote IPs and bucket names. +action.escu.known_false_positives = S3 buckets can be accessed from any IP, as long as it can make a successful connection. This will be a false postive, since the search is looking for a new IP within the past hour +action.escu.creation_date = 2018-06-28 +action.escu.modification_date = 2018-06-28 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "dest", "threat_object_type": "other"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 14"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Other"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200 [search `aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200 | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by bucket_name remote_ip | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by bucket_name remote_ip | outputlookup previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip.csv | eval newIP=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newIP=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table bucket_name remote_ip]| iplocation remote_ip |rename remote_ip as src_ip | table _time bucket_name src_ip City Country operation request_uri | `detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip_filter` + +[ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub alerts for an AWS IAM User in 4 hours intervals. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub alerts for an AWS IAM User in 4 hours intervals. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Security Hub inputs. The threshold_value should be tuned to your environment and schedule these searches according to the bucket span interval. +action.escu.known_false_positives = None +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-26 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-26 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Security Hub Alerts"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Security Hub Alerts"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `aws_securityhub_finding` "findings{}.Resources{}.Type"= AwsIamUser | rename findings{}.Resources{}.Id as user | bucket span=4h _time | stats count AS alerts by _time user | eventstats avg(alerts) as total_launched_avg, stdev(alerts) as total_launched_stdev | eval threshold_value = 2 | eval isOutlier=if(alerts > total_launched_avg+(total_launched_stdev * threshold_value), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | table _time user alerts |`detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user_filter` + +[ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search will detect spike in blocked outbound network connections originating from within your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command \u0026 Control"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search will detect spike in blocked outbound network connections originating from within your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your VPC Flow logs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the number of data points required to meet the definition of "spike." The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best when you run the "Baseline of Blocked Outbound Connection" support search once to create a history of previously seen blocked outbound connections. +action.escu.known_false_positives = The false-positive rate may vary based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`. Additionally, false positives may result when AWS administrators roll out policies enforcing network blocks, causing sudden increases in the number of blocked outbound connections. +action.escu.creation_date = 2018-05-07 +action.escu.modification_date = 2018-05-07 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Network ACL Activity", "Suspicious AWS Traffic", "Command \u0026 Control"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Network ACL Activity", "Suspicious AWS Traffic", "Command \u0026 Control"], "cis20": ["CIS 11"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command \u0026 Control"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow` action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR src_ip=192.168.0.0/16) ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16) [search `cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow` action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR src_ip=192.168.0.0/16) ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16) | stats count as numberOfBlockedConnections by src_ip | inputlookup baseline_blocked_outbound_connections append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) as * by src_ip | rename numberOfBlockedConnections as latestCount | eval newAvgBlockedConnections=avgBlockedConnections + (latestCount-avgBlockedConnections)/720 | eval newStdevBlockedConnections=sqrt(((pow(stdevBlockedConnections, 2)*719 + (latestCount-newAvgBlockedConnections)*(latestCount-avgBlockedConnections))/720)) | eval avgBlockedConnections=coalesce(newAvgBlockedConnections, avgBlockedConnections), stdevBlockedConnections=coalesce(newStdevBlockedConnections, stdevBlockedConnections), numDataPoints=if(isnull(latestCount), numDataPoints, numDataPoints+1) | table src_ip, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgBlockedConnections, stdevBlockedConnections | outputlookup baseline_blocked_outbound_connections | eval dataPointThreshold = 5, deviationThreshold = 3 | eval isSpike=if((latestCount > avgBlockedConnections+deviationThreshold*stdevBlockedConnections) AND numDataPoints > dataPointThreshold, 1, 0) | where isSpike=1 | table src_ip] | stats values(dest_ip) as "Blocked Destination IPs", values(interface_id) as "resourceId" count as numberOfBlockedConnections, dc(dest_ip) as uniqueDestConnections by src_ip | `detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws_filter` + +[ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search detects users creating spikes in API activity related to deletion of S3 buckets in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search detects users creating spikes in API activity related to deletion of S3 buckets in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best when you run the "Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN" support search once to create a baseline of previously seen S3 bucket-deletion activity. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`, the false positive rate may vary. Please modify this according the your environment. +action.escu.creation_date = 2018-11-27 +action.escu.modification_date = 2018-11-27 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteBucket [search `cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteBucket | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | stats count as apiCalls by arn | inputlookup s3_deletion_baseline append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) as * by arn | rename apiCalls as latestCount | eval newAvgApiCalls=avgApiCalls + (latestCount-avgApiCalls)/720 | eval newStdevApiCalls=sqrt(((pow(stdevApiCalls, 2)*719 + (latestCount-newAvgApiCalls)*(latestCount-avgApiCalls))/720)) | eval avgApiCalls=coalesce(newAvgApiCalls, avgApiCalls), stdevApiCalls=coalesce(newStdevApiCalls, stdevApiCalls), numDataPoints=if(isnull(latestCount), numDataPoints, numDataPoints+1) | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup s3_deletion_baseline | eval dataPointThreshold = 15, deviationThreshold = 3 | eval isSpike=if((latestCount > avgApiCalls+deviationThreshold*stdevApiCalls) AND numDataPoints > dataPointThreshold, 1, 0) | where isSpike=1 | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | spath output=bucketName path=requestParameters.bucketName | stats values(bucketName) as bucketName, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName) as uniqueApisCalled by user | `detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion_filter` + +[ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search provides detection of GCPloit exploitation framework. This framework can be used to escalate privileges and move laterally from compromised high privilege accounts. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search provides detection of GCPloit exploitation framework. This framework can be used to escalate privileges and move laterally from compromised high privilege accounts. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message logs +action.escu.known_false_positives = Payload.request.function.timeout value can possibly be match with other functions or requests however the source user and target request account may indicate an attempt to move laterally accross acounts or projects +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-10-08 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-08 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["GCP Cross Account Activity"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["GCP Cross Account Activity"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search provides detection of GCPloit exploitation framework. This framework can be used to escalate privileges and move laterally from compromised high privilege accounts. +action.notable.param.rule_title = GCP Detect gcploit framework +action.notable.param.security_domain = threat +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.request.function.timeout=539s | table src src_user data.resource.labels.project_id data.protoPayload.request.function.serviceAccountEmail data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission data.protoPayload.request.location http_user_agent | `gcp_detect_gcploit_framework_filter` + +[ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster's pods +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster's pods +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later), then configure stackdriver and set a Pub/Sub subscription to be imported to Splunk. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, User Agent, source IPs and pods will provide context. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-17 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-17 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `google_gcp_pubsub_message` category=kube-audit |spath input=properties.log |search responseStatus.code=401 |table sourceIPs{} userAgent verb requestURI responseStatus.reason properties.pod | `gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection_filter` + +[ESCU - Gdrive suspicious file sharing - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search can help the detection of compromised accounts or internal users sharing potentially malicious/classified documents with users outside your organization via GSuite file sharing . +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search can help the detection of compromised accounts or internal users sharing potentially malicious/classified documents with users outside your organization via GSuite file sharing . +action.escu.how_to_implement = Need to implement Gsuite logging targeting Google suite drive activity. In order for the search to work for your environment please update `yourdomain.com` value in the query with the domain relavant for your organization. +action.escu.known_false_positives = This is an anomaly search, you must specify your domain in the parameters so it either filters outside domains or focus on internal domains. This search may also help investigate compromise of accounts. By looking at for example source ip addresses, document titles and abnormal number of shares and shared target users. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-24 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-24 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Gdrive suspicious file sharing - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Data Exfiltration"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Gdrive suspicious file sharing - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Data Exfiltration"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `gsuite_drive` name=change_user_access | rename parameters.* as * | search email = "*@yourdomain.com" target_user != "*@yourdomain.com" | stats count values(owner) as owner values(target_user) as target values(doc_type) as doc_type values(doc_title) as doc_title dc(target_user) as distinct_target by src_ip email | where distinct_target > 50 | `gdrive_suspicious_file_sharing_filter` + +[ESCU - Gsuite suspicious calendar invite - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search can help the detection of compromised accounts or internal users sending suspcious calendar invites via GSuite calendar. These invites may contain malicious links or attachments. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search can help the detection of compromised accounts or internal users sending suspcious calendar invites via GSuite calendar. These invites may contain malicious links or attachments. +action.escu.how_to_implement = In order to successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite (gsuite:calendar:json) having the file sharing metadata like file type, source owner, destination target user, description, etc. This search can also be made more specific by selecting specific emails, subdomains timeframe, organizational units, targeted user, etc. In order for the search to work for your environment please update `yourdomain.com` value in the query with the domain relavant for your organization. +action.escu.known_false_positives = This search will also produce normal activity statistics. Fields such as email, ip address, name, parameters.organizer_calendar_id, parameters.target_calendar_id and parameters.event_title may give away phishing intent.For more specific results use email parameter. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-24 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-24 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Gsuite suspicious calendar invite - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spearphishing Attachments"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "dest", "threat_object_type": "other"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Gsuite suspicious calendar invite - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Other"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `gsuite_calendar` |bin span=5m _time |rename parameters.* as * |search target_calendar_id!=null email="*yourdomain.com"| stats count values(target_calendar_id) values(event_title) values(event_guest) by email _time | where count >100| `gsuite_suspicious_calendar_invite_filter` + +[ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search will detect more than 5 login failures in Office365 Azure Active Directory from a single source IP address. Please adjust the threshold value of 5 as suited for your environment. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.001", "T1110"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search will detect more than 5 login failures in Office365 Azure Active Directory from a single source IP address. Please adjust the threshold value of 5 as suited for your environment. +action.escu.how_to_implement = +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-12-16 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-12-16 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Office 365 Detections"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.001", "T1110"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `o365_management_activity` Operation=UserLoginFailed record_type=AzureActiveDirectoryStsLogon app=AzureActiveDirectory | stats count dc(user) as accounts_locked values(user) as user values(LogonError) as LogonError values(authentication_method) as authentication_method values(signature) as signature values(UserAgent) as UserAgent by src_ip record_type Operation app | search accounts_locked >= 5| `high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source_filter` + +[ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search provides information on anonymous Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search provides information on anonymous Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP, verb and Object can reveal potential malicious activity, specially anonymous suspicious IPs and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-06-23 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-06-23 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` userAgent=kubectl* sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1 sourceIPs{}!=::1 src_user=system:anonymous | table src_ip src_user verb userAgent requestURI | stats count by src_ip src_user verb userAgent requestURI |`kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter` + +[ESCU - New container uploaded to AWS ECR - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This searches show information on uploaded containers including source user, image id, source IP user type, http user agent, region, first time, last time of operation (PutImage). These searches are based on Cloud Infrastructure Data Model. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1525"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This searches show information on uploaded containers including source user, image id, source IP user type, http user agent, region, first time, last time of operation (PutImage). These searches are based on Cloud Infrastructure Data Model. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model. Please also customize the `container_implant_aws_detection_filter` macro to filter out the false positives. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Uploading container is a normal behavior from developers or users with access to container registry. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-02-20 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-02-20 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - New container uploaded to AWS ECR - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - New container uploaded to AWS ECR - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1525"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Cloud_Infrastructure.Compute where Compute.user_type!="AssumeRole" AND Compute.http_user_agent="AWS Internal" AND Compute.event_name="PutImage" by Compute.image_id Compute.src_user Compute.src Compute.region Compute.msg Compute.user_type | `drop_dm_object_name("Compute")` | `new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr_filter` + +[ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for child processes of spoolsv.exe. This activity is associated with a POC privilege-escalation exploit associated with CVE-2018-8440. Spoolsv.exe is the process associated with the Print Spooler service in Windows and typically runs as SYSTEM. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for child processes of spoolsv.exe. This activity is associated with a POC privilege-escalation exploit associated with CVE-2018-8440. Spoolsv.exe is the process associated with the Print Spooler service in Windows and typically runs as SYSTEM. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. Update the `children_of_spoolsv_filter` macro to filter out legitimate child processes spawned by spoolsv.exe. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Some legitimate printer-related processes may show up as children of spoolsv.exe. You should confirm that any activity as legitimate and may be added as exclusions in the search. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-03-16 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-03-16 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Privilege Escalation"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "cve": ["CVE-2018-8440"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for child processes of spoolsv.exe. This activity is associated with a POC privilege-escalation exploit associated with CVE-2018-8440. Spoolsv.exe is the process associated with the Print Spooler service in Windows and typically runs as SYSTEM. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Child Processes of Spoolsv exe +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=spoolsv.exe AND Processes.process_name!=regsvr32.exe by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe_filter` + +[ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit +action.escu.how_to_implement = Splunk Universal Forwarder running on Linux systems, capturing logs from the /var/log directory. The vulnerability is exposed when a non privledged user tries passing in a single \ character at the end of the command while using the shell and edit flags. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-27 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-27 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "dest", "threat_object_type": "other"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "cve": ["CVE-2021-3156"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Other"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit +action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `linux_hosts` | search "sudoedit -s \\" | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_filter` + +[ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit +action.escu.how_to_implement = Splunk Universal Forwarder running on Linux systems (tested on Centos and Ubuntu), where segfaults are being logged. This also captures instances where the exploit has been compiled into a binary. The detection looks for greater than 5 instances of sudoedit combined with segfault over your search time period on a single host +action.escu.known_false_positives = If sudoedit is throwing segfaults for other reasons this will pick those up too. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-29 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-29 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "dest", "threat_object_type": "other"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "cve": ["CVE-2021-3156"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Other"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit +action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `linux_hosts` | search sudoedit segfault | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by host | search count > 5 | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault_filter` + +[ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit +action.escu.how_to_implement = OSQuery installed and configured to pick up process events (info at https://osquery.io) as well as using the Splunk OSQuery Add-on https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4402. The vulnerability is exposed when a non privledged user tries passing in a single \ character at the end of the command while using the shell and edit flags. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-28 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-28 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "dest", "threat_object_type": "other"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "cve": ["CVE-2021-3156"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Other"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit +action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `osquery_process` | search "columns.cmdline"="sudoedit -s \\*" | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery_filter` + +[ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for Event Code 4742 (Computer Change) or EventCode 4624 (An account was successfully logged on) with an anonymous account. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1210"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for Event Code 4742 (Computer Change) or EventCode 4624 (An account was successfully logged on) with an anonymous account. +action.escu.how_to_implement = This search requires audit computer account management to be enabled on the system in order to generate Event ID 4742. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Event Logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. +action.escu.known_false_positives = None thus far found +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-09-18 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-18 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Detect Zerologon Attack"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = The following $EventCode$ occurred on $dest$ by $user$ with Logon Type 3, which may be indicative of the an account or group being changed by an anonymous account. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 49}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}, {"threat_object_field": "EventCode", "threat_object_type": "other"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Detect Zerologon Attack"], "cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "cve": ["CVE-2020-1472"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1210"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "EventCode", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Other"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 OR EventCode=4742 TargetUserName="ANONYMOUS LOGON" LogonType=3 | stats count values(host) as host, values(TargetDomainName) as Domain, values(user) as user | `detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account_filter` + +[ESCU - Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for execution of process `outlook.exe` where the process is writing a `.zip` file to the disk. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for execution of process `outlook.exe` where the process is writing a `.zip` file to the disk. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. +action.escu.known_false_positives = It is not uncommon for outlook to write legitimate zip files to the disk. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spearphishing Attachments"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for execution of process `outlook.exe` where the process is writing a `.zip` file to the disk. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file +action.notable.param.security_domain = network +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=outlook.exe OR Processes.process_name=explorer.exe by _time span=5m Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_id Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename process_id as malicious_id| rename parent_process_id as outlook_id| join malicious_id type=inner[| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path values(Filesystem.file_name) as file_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_path=*zip* OR Filesystem.file_name=*.lnk ) AND (Filesystem.file_path=C:\\Users* OR Filesystem.file_path=*Local\\Temp*) by _time span=5m Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_hash Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename process_id as malicious_id| fields malicious_id outlook_id dest file_path file_name file_hash count file_id] | table firstTime lastTime user malicious_id outlook_id process_name parent_process_name file_name file_path | where file_name != "" | `detect_outlook_exe_writing_a_zip_file_filter` + +[ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search will return a table of rare processes, the names of the systems running them, and the users who initiated each process. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command \u0026 Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.PT", "PR.DS", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search will return a table of rare processes, the names of the systems running them, and the users who initiated each process. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts and populating the endpoint data model with the resultant dataset. The macro `filter_rare_process_allow_list` searches two lookup files for allowed processes. These consist of `rare_process_allow_list_default.csv` and `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv`. To add your own processes to the allow list, add them to `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv`. If you wish to remove an entry from the default lookup file, you will have to modify the macro itself to set the allow_list value for that process to false. You can modify the limit parameter and search scheduling to better suit your environment. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Some legitimate processes may be only rarely executed in your environment. As these are identified, update `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv` to filter them out of your search results. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-03-16 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-03-16 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Unusual Processes", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Unusual Processes", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command \u0026 Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.PT", "PR.DS", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.dest) as dest values(Processes.user) as user min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name | rename Processes.process_name as process | rex field=user "(?.*)\\\\(?.*)" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| search [| tstats count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name | rare Processes.process_name limit=30 | rename Processes.process_name as process| `filter_rare_process_allow_list`| table process ] | `detect_rare_executables_filter` + +[ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for specific command-line arguments that may indicate the execution of tools made by Nirsoft, which are legitimate, but may be abused by attackers. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1072"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for specific command-line arguments that may indicate the execution of tools made by Nirsoft, which are legitimate, but may be abused by attackers. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. +action.escu.known_false_positives = While legitimate, these NirSoft tools are prone to abuse. You should verfiy that the tool was used for a legitimate purpose. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A "] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A "], "cis20": ["CIS 3"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1072"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for specific command-line arguments that may indicate the execution of tools made by Nirsoft, which are legitimate, but may be abused by attackers. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Detection of tools built by NirSoft +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) values(Processes.process) as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process="* /stext *" OR Processes.process="* /scomma *" ) by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft_filter` [ESCU - Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF - Rule] action.escu = 0 @@ -13055,6 +33802,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF - Rul action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["ProxyShell"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic identifies suspicious behavior related to ProxyShell against on-premise Microsoft Exchange servers. \ Modification of this analytic is requried to ensure fields are mapped accordingly. \ A suspicious event will have `PowerShell`, the method `POST` and `autodiscover.json`. This is indicative of accessing PowerShell on the back end of Exchange with SSRF. \ @@ -13110,6 +33858,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Exchange PowerShell Module Usage - Rule action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["ProxyShell"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the usage of Exchange PowerShell modules that were recently used for a proof of concept related to ProxyShell. Currently, there is no active data shared or data we could re-produce relate to this part of the ProxyShell chain of exploits. \ Inherently, the usage of the modules is not malicious, but reviewing parallel processes, and user, of the session will assist with determining the intent. \ Module - New-MailboxExportRequest will begin the process of exporting contents of a primary mailbox or archive to a .pst file. \ @@ -13128,410 +33877,6 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message IN ("*New-MailboxExportRequest*", "*New-ManagementRoleAssignment*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Path Message OpCode ComputerName User EventCode| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `exchange_powershell_module_usage_filter` -[ESCU - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies executable files (.exe or .dll) being written to Windows administrative SMB shares (Admin$, IPC$, C$). This represents suspicious behavior as its commonly used by tools like like PsExec/PaExec and others to stage service binaries before creating and starting a Windows service on remote endpoints. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse administrative shares for lateral movement and remote code execution. The Trickbot malware family also implements this behavior to try to infect other machines in the infected network. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.002"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies executable files (.exe or .dll) being written to Windows administrative SMB shares (Admin$, IPC$, C$). This represents suspicious behavior as its commonly used by tools like like PsExec/PaExec and others to stage service binaries before creating and starting a Windows service on remote endpoints. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse administrative shares for lateral movement and remote code execution. The Trickbot malware family also implements this behavior to try to infect other machines in the infected network. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 5145 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required. Also enable the object Audit access success/failure in your group policy. The following Splunk SOAR playbook can be used to respond to this detection: Delete Detected Files -action.escu.known_false_positives = System Administrators may use looks like PsExec for troubleshooting or administrations tasks. However, this will typically come only from certain users and certain systems that can be added to an allow list. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-18 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-18 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "Trickbot", "Hermetic Wiper"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = $user$ dropped or created an executable file in known sensitive SMB share. Share name=$Share_Name$, Target name=$Relative_Target_Name$, and Access mask=$Access_Mask$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 70}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "Trickbot", "Hermetic Wiper"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.002"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies executable files (.exe or .dll) being written to Windows administrative SMB shares (Admin$, IPC$, C$). This represents suspicious behavior as its commonly used by tools like like PsExec/PaExec and others to stage service binaries before creating and starting a Windows service on remote endpoints. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse administrative shares for lateral movement and remote code execution. The Trickbot malware family also implements this behavior to try to infect other machines in the infected network. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=5145 Relative_Target_Name IN ("*.exe","*.dll") Object_Type=File Share_Name IN ("\\\\*\\C$","\\\\*\\IPC$","\\\\*\\admin$") Access_Mask= "0x2" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by EventCode Share_Name Relative_Target_Name Object_Type Access_Mask user src_port Source_Address | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share_filter` - -[ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic will identify suspicious executable or scripts (known file extensions) in list of suspicious file path in Windows. This technique is used by adversaries to evade detection. The suspicious file path are known paths used in the wild and are not common to have executable or scripts. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic will identify suspicious executable or scripts (known file extensions) in list of suspicious file path in Windows. This technique is used by adversaries to evade detection. The suspicious file path are known paths used in the wild and are not common to have executable or scripts. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may allow creation of script or exe in the paths specified. Filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-05-06 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-05-06 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["XMRig", "Remcos", "WhisperGate", "Hermetic Wiper"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious executable or scripts with file name $file_name$, $file_path$ and process_id $process_id$ executed in suspicious file path in Windows by $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 56}, {"threat_object_field": "process_id", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "file_name", "threat_object_type": "file name"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig", "Remcos", "WhisperGate", "Hermetic Wiper"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "process_id", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "file_name", "role": ["Other", "Attacker"], "type": "File Name"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic will identify suspicious executable or scripts (known file extensions) in list of suspicious file path in Windows. This technique is used by adversaries to evade detection. The suspicious file path are known paths used in the wild and are not common to have executable or scripts. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = |tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_name = *.exe OR Filesystem.file_name = *.dll OR Filesystem.file_name = *.sys OR Filesystem.file_name = *.com OR Filesystem.file_name = *.vbs OR Filesystem.file_name = *.vbe OR Filesystem.file_name = *.js OR Filesystem.file_name = *.ps1 OR Filesystem.file_name = *.bat OR Filesystem.file_name = *.cmd OR Filesystem.file_name = *.pif) AND ( Filesystem.file_path = *\\windows\\fonts\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\windows\\temp\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\users\\public\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\windows\\debug\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\Users\\Administrator\\Music\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\Windows\\servicing\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\Users\\Default\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *Recycle.bin* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\Windows\\Media\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\Windows\\repair\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\AppData\\Local\\Temp* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\PerfLogs\\*) by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path_filter` - -[ESCU - Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic will identify suspicious process of cscript.exe where it tries to execute javascript using jscript.encode CLSID (COM OBJ). This technique was seen in ransomware (reddot ransomware) where it execute javascript with this com object with combination of amsi disabling technique. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.005"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic will identify suspicious process of cscript.exe where it tries to execute javascript using jscript.encode CLSID (COM OBJ). This technique was seen in ransomware (reddot ransomware) where it execute javascript with this com object with combination of amsi disabling technique. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-22 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-22 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious process of cscript.exe with a parent process $parent_process_name$ where it tries to execute javascript using jscript.encode CLSID (COM OBJ), detected on $dest$ by $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 56}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"threat_object_field": "process_id", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process name"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.005"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "process_id", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process", "Attacker"], "type": "Process Name"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic will identify suspicious process of cscript.exe where it tries to execute javascript using jscript.encode CLSID (COM OBJ). This technique was seen in ransomware (reddot ransomware) where it execute javascript with this com object with combination of amsi disabling technique. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "cscript.exe" Processes.process="*-e:{F414C262-6AC0-11CF-B6D1-00AA00BBBB58}*" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `execute_javascript_with_jscript_com_clsid_filter` - -[ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for processes launched from files with at least five spaces in the name before the extension. This is typically done to obfuscate the file extension by pushing it outside of the default view. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT", "PR.IP"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for processes launched from files with at least five spaces in the name before the extension. This is typically done to obfuscate the file extension by pushing it outside of the default view. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -action.escu.known_false_positives = None identified. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-11-19 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-19 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT", "PR.IP"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for processes launched from files with at least five spaces in the name before the extension. This is typically done to obfuscate the file extension by pushing it outside of the default view. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_path) as process_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = "* .*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process Processes.process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension_filter` - -[ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for processes launched from files that have double extensions in the file name. This is typically done to obscure the "real" file extension and make it appear as though the file being accessed is a data file, as opposed to executable content. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT", "PR.IP"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for processes launched from files that have double extensions in the file name. This is typically done to obscure the "real" file extension and make it appear as though the file being accessed is a data file, as opposed to executable content. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. -action.escu.known_false_positives = None identified. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-11-18 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-18 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = process $process$ have double extensions in the file name is executed on $dest$ by $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 56}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"threat_object_field": "process", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "process", "role": ["Parent Process", "Attacker"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for processes launched from files that have double extensions in the file name. This is typically done to obscure the "real" file extension and make it appear as though the file being accessed is a data file, as opposed to executable content. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Execution of File with Multiple Extensions -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = *.doc.exe OR Processes.process = *.htm.exe OR Processes.process = *.html.exe OR Processes.process = *.txt.exe OR Processes.process = *.pdf.exe OR Processes.process = *.doc.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process Processes.parent_process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions_filter` - -[ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search returns a list of hosts that have not successfully completed a backup in over a week. Deprecated because it's a infrastructure monitoring. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search returns a list of hosts that have not successfully completed a backup in over a week. Deprecated because it's a infrastructure monitoring. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to first obtain data from your backup solution, either from the backup logs on your hosts, or from a central server responsible for performing the backups. If you do not use Netbackup, you can modify this search for your backup solution. Depending on how often you backup your systems, you may want to modify how far in the past to look for a successful backup, other than the default of seven days. -action.escu.known_false_positives = None identified -action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-12 -action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-12 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Monitor Backup Solution"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Monitor Backup Solution"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search returns a list of hosts that have not successfully completed a backup in over a week. Deprecated because it's a infrastructure monitoring. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `netbackup` MESSAGE="Disk/Partition backup completed successfully." | stats latest(_time) as latestTime by COMPUTERNAME | `security_content_ctime(latestTime)` | rename COMPUTERNAME as dest | eval isOutlier=if(latestTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | table latestTime, dest | `extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups_filter` - -[ESCU - Extraction of Registry Hives - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies the use of `reg.exe` exporting Windows Registry hives containing credentials. Adversaries may use this technique to export registry hives for offline credential access attacks. Typically found executed from a untrusted process or script. Upon execution, a file will be written to disk. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002", "T1003"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the use of `reg.exe` exporting Windows Registry hives containing credentials. Adversaries may use this technique to export registry hives for offline credential access attacks. Typically found executed from a untrusted process or script. Upon execution, a file will be written to disk. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible some agent based products will generate false positives. Filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-09 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-09 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Extraction of Registry Hives - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Credential Dumping"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious use of `reg.exe` exporting Windows Registry hives containing credentials executed on $dest$ by user $user$, with a parent process of $parent_process_id$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 56}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_id", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Extraction of Registry Hives - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Credential Dumping"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "parent_process_id", "role": ["Parent Process", "Attacker"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the use of `reg.exe` exporting Windows Registry hives containing credentials. Adversaries may use this technique to export registry hives for offline credential access attacks. Typically found executed from a untrusted process or script. Upon execution, a file will be written to disk. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Extraction of Registry Hives -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` (Processes.process=*save* OR Processes.process=*export*) AND (Processes.process="*\sam *" OR Processes.process="*\system *" OR Processes.process="*\security *") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `extraction_of_registry_hives_filter` - -[ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The search looks for file writes with extensions consistent with a SamSam ransomware attack. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The search looks for file writes with extensions consistent with a SamSam ransomware attack. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data-model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Because these extensions are not typically used in normal operations, you should investigate all results. -action.escu.creation_date = 2018-12-14 -action.escu.modification_date = 2018-12-14 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["SamSam Ransomware"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = File writes $file_name$ with extensions consistent with a SamSam ransomware attack seen on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 90}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 90}, {"threat_object_field": "file_name", "threat_object_type": "file name"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "file_name", "role": ["Other", "Attacker"], "type": "File Name"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The search looks for file writes with extensions consistent with a SamSam ransomware attack. -action.notable.param.rule_title = File with Samsam Extension -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| rex field=file_name "(?\.[^\.]+)$" | search file_extension=.stubbin OR file_extension=.berkshire OR file_extension=.satoshi OR file_extension=.sophos OR file_extension=.keyxml | `file_with_samsam_extension_filter` - -[ESCU - Firewall Allowed Program Enable - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic detects a potential suspicious modification of firewall rule allowing to execute specific application. This technique was identified when an adversary and red teams to bypassed firewall file execution restriction in a targetted host. Take note that this event or command can run by administrator during testing or allowing legitimate tool or application. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.004", "T1562"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic detects a potential suspicious modification of firewall rule allowing to execute specific application. This technique was identified when an adversary and red teams to bypassed firewall file execution restriction in a targetted host. Take note that this event or command can run by administrator during testing or allowing legitimate tool or application. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated or manual execution of this firewall rule that may generate false positives. Filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-12 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-12 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Firewall Allowed Program Enable - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = firewall allowed program commandline $process$ of $process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Firewall Allowed Program Enable - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.004", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic detects a potential suspicious modification of firewall rule allowing to execute specific application. This technique was identified when an adversary and red teams to bypassed firewall file execution restriction in a targetted host. Take note that this event or command can run by administrator during testing or allowing legitimate tool or application. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Firewall Allowed Program Enable -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = "*firewall*" Processes.process = "*allowedprogram*" Processes.process = "*add*" Processes.process = "*ENABLE*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `firewall_allowed_program_enable_filter` - [ESCU - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -13561,12 +33906,6 @@ action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Zoom Child Processes"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker", "Child Process"], "type": "Process Name"}]} schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for child processes spawned by zoom.exe or zoom.us that has not previously been seen. -action.notable.param.rule_title = First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -13595,19 +33934,18 @@ action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Service Abuse", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "NOBELIUM Group"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Service Abuse", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "NOBELIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569", "T1569.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.AE"]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Service Abuse", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "NOBELIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 9"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569", "T1569.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for the first and last time a Windows service is seen running in your environment. This table is then cached. -action.notable.param.rule_title = First Time Seen Running Windows Service -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -13619,6856 +33957,11 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rex field=Message "The (?[-\(\)\s\w]+) service entered the (?\w+) state" | where state="running" | lookup previously_seen_running_windows_services service as service OUTPUT firstTimeSeen | where isnull(firstTimeSeen) OR firstTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_windows_services_window`) | table _time dest service | `first_time_seen_running_windows_service_filter` -[ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for command-line arguments that use a `/c` parameter to execute a command that has not previously been seen. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for command-line arguments that use a `/c` parameter to execute a command that has not previously been seen. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The complete process name with command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. Please make sure you run the support search "Previously seen command line arguments,"—which creates a lookup file called `previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments.csv`—a historical baseline of all command-line arguments. You must also validate this list. For the search to do accurate calculation, ensure the search scheduling is the same value as the `relative_time` evaluation function. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate programs can also use command-line arguments to execute. Please verify the command-line arguments to check what command/program is being executed. We recommend customizing the `first_time_seen_cmd_line_filter` macro to exclude legitimate parent_process_name -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["DHS Report TA18-074A", "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Hidden Cobra Malware"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - First time seen command line argument - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DHS Report TA18-074A", "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Hidden Cobra Malware"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for command-line arguments that use a `/c` parameter to execute a command that has not previously been seen. -action.notable.param.rule_title = First time seen command line argument -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = cmd.exe Processes.process = "* /c *" by Processes.process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = cmd.exe Processes.process = "* /c *" by Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by process | outputlookup previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments | eval newCmdLineArgument=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newCmdLineArgument=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table process] | `first_time_seen_command_line_argument_filter` - -[ESCU - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = Fodhelper.exe has a known UAC bypass as it attempts to look for specific registry keys upon execution, that do not exist. Therefore, an attacker can write its malicious commands in these registry keys to be executed by fodhelper.exe with the highest privilege. \ -1. `HKCU:\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command`\ -1. `HKCU:\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command\DelegateExecute`\ -1. `HKCU:\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command\(default)`\ -Upon triage, fodhelper.exe will have a child process and read access will occur on the registry keys. Isolate the endpoint and review parallel processes for additional behavior. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112", "T1548.002", "T1548"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = Fodhelper.exe has a known UAC bypass as it attempts to look for specific registry keys upon execution, that do not exist. Therefore, an attacker can write its malicious commands in these registry keys to be executed by fodhelper.exe with the highest privilege. \ -1. `HKCU:\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command`\ -1. `HKCU:\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command\DelegateExecute`\ -1. `HKCU:\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command\(default)`\ -Upon triage, fodhelper.exe will have a child process and read access will occur on the registry keys. Isolate the endpoint and review parallel processes for additional behavior. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited to no false positives are expected. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-01 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-01 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "IcedID"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspcious registy keys added by process fodhelper.exe (process_id- $process_id), with a parent_process of $parent_process_name$ that has been executed on $dest$ by $user$. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 81}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 81}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process name"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "IcedID"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112", "T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process", "Attacker"], "type": "Process Name"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = Fodhelper.exe has a known UAC bypass as it attempts to look for specific registry keys upon execution, that do not exist. Therefore, an attacker can write its malicious commands in these registry keys to be executed by fodhelper.exe with the highest privilege. \ -1. `HKCU:\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command`\ -1. `HKCU:\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command\DelegateExecute`\ -1. `HKCU:\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command\(default)`\ -Upon triage, fodhelper.exe will have a child process and read access will occur on the registry keys. Isolate the endpoint and review parallel processes for additional behavior. -action.notable.param.rule_title = FodHelper UAC Bypass -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=fodhelper.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `fodhelper_uac_bypass_filter` - -[ESCU - Fsutil Zeroing File - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search is to detect a suspicious fsutil process to zeroing a target file. This technique was seen in lockbit ransomware where it tries to zero out its malware path as part of its defense evasion after encrypting the compromised host. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious fsutil process to zeroing a target file. This technique was seen in lockbit ransomware where it tries to zero out its malware path as part of its defense evasion after encrypting the compromised host. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-11 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-11 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Fsutil Zeroing File - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Possible file data deletion on $dest$ using $process$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 54}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Fsutil Zeroing File - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious fsutil process to zeroing a target file. This technique was seen in lockbit ransomware where it tries to zero out its malware path as part of its defense evasion after encrypting the compromised host. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Fsutil Zeroing File -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=fsutil.exe Processes.process="*setzerodata*" by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.process Processes.parent_process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `fsutil_zeroing_file_filter` - -[ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides detection of accounts with high risk roles by projects. Compromised accounts with high risk roles can move laterally or even scalate privileges at different projects depending on organization schema. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides detection of accounts with high risk roles by projects. Compromised accounts with high risk roles can move laterally or even scalate privileges at different projects depending on organization schema. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message logs -action.escu.known_false_positives = Accounts with high risk roles should be reduced to the minimum number needed, however specific tasks and setups may be simply expected behavior within organization -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-10-09 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-09 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["GCP Cross Account Activity"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["GCP Cross Account Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides detection of accounts with high risk roles by projects. Compromised accounts with high risk roles can move laterally or even scalate privileges at different projects depending on organization schema. -action.notable.param.rule_title = GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project -action.notable.param.security_domain = threat -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.request.policy.bindings{}.role=roles/owner OR roles/editor OR roles/iam.serviceAccountUser OR roles/iam.serviceAccountAdmin OR roles/iam.serviceAccountTokenCreator OR roles/dataflow.developer OR roles/dataflow.admin OR roles/composer.admin OR roles/dataproc.admin OR roles/dataproc.editor | table data.resource.type data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.resource data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.role data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.members{} | `gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project_filter` - -[ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search provides detection of GCPloit exploitation framework. This framework can be used to escalate privileges and move laterally from compromised high privilege accounts. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search provides detection of GCPloit exploitation framework. This framework can be used to escalate privileges and move laterally from compromised high privilege accounts. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message logs -action.escu.known_false_positives = Payload.request.function.timeout value can possibly be match with other functions or requests however the source user and target request account may indicate an attempt to move laterally accross acounts or projects -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-10-08 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-08 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["GCP Cross Account Activity"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["GCP Cross Account Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'src'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search provides detection of GCPloit exploitation framework. This framework can be used to escalate privileges and move laterally from compromised high privilege accounts. -action.notable.param.rule_title = GCP Detect gcploit framework -action.notable.param.security_domain = threat -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.request.function.timeout=539s | table src src_user data.resource.labels.project_id data.protoPayload.request.function.serviceAccountEmail data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission data.protoPayload.request.location http_user_agent | `gcp_detect_gcploit_framework_filter` - -[ESCU - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides detection of high risk permissions by resource and accounts. These are permissions that can allow attackers with compromised accounts to move laterally and escalate privileges. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides detection of high risk permissions by resource and accounts. These are permissions that can allow attackers with compromised accounts to move laterally and escalate privileges. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message logs -action.escu.known_false_positives = High risk permissions are part of any GCP environment, however it is important to track resource and accounts usage, this search may produce false positives. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-10-09 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-09 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["GCP Cross Account Activity"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["GCP Cross Account Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides detection of high risk permissions by resource and accounts. These are permissions that can allow attackers with compromised accounts to move laterally and escalate privileges. -action.notable.param.rule_title = GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account -action.notable.param.security_domain = threat -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission=iam.serviceAccounts.getaccesstoken OR iam.serviceAccounts.setIamPolicy OR iam.serviceAccounts.actas OR dataflow.jobs.create OR composer.environments.create OR dataproc.clusters.create |table data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.members{} data.resource.labels.project_id | `gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account_filter` - -[ESCU - GCP GCR container uploaded - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search show information on uploaded containers including source user, account, action, bucket name event name, http user agent, message and destination path. -action.escu.mappings = {"mitre_attack": ["T1525"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search show information on uploaded containers including source user, account, action, bucket name event name, http user agent, message and destination path. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later), then configure stackdriver and set a subpub subscription to be imported to Splunk. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model. Please also customize the `container_implant_gcp_detection_filter` macro to filter out the false positives. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Uploading container is a normal behavior from developers or users with access to container registry. GCP GCR registers container upload as a Storage event, this search must be considered under the context of CONTAINER upload creation which automatically generates a bucket entry for destination path. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-02-20 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-02-20 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GCP GCR container uploaded - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - GCP GCR container uploaded - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1525"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search show information on uploaded containers including source user, account, action, bucket name event name, http user agent, message and destination path. -action.notable.param.rule_title = GCP GCR container uploaded -action.notable.param.security_domain = threat -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = |tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Cloud_Infrastructure.Storage where Storage.event_name=storage.objects.create by Storage.src_user Storage.account Storage.action Storage.bucket_name Storage.event_name Storage.http_user_agent Storage.msg Storage.object_path | `drop_dm_object_name("Storage")` | `gcp_gcr_container_uploaded_filter` - -[ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster's pods -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster's pods -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later), then configure stackdriver and set a Pub/Sub subscription to be imported to Splunk. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, User Agent, source IPs and pods will provide context. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-17 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-17 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster's pods -action.notable.param.rule_title = GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection -action.notable.param.security_domain = threat -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `google_gcp_pubsub_message` category=kube-audit |spath input=properties.log |search responseStatus.code=401 |table sourceIPs{} userAgent verb requestURI responseStatus.reason properties.pod | `gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection_filter` - -[ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later), then configure stackdriver and set a Pub/Sub subscription to be imported to Splunk. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model.Customize the macro kubernetes_gcp_scan_fingerprint_attack_detection to filter out FPs. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, User Agent and source IPs will provide context. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-04-15 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-04-15 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster -action.notable.param.rule_title = GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection -action.notable.param.security_domain = threat -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp!=127.0.0.1 data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp!=::1 "data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision"=forbid "data.protoPayload.status.message"=PERMISSION_DENIED data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail="system:anonymous" | rename data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp as src_ip | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(data.protoPayload.methodName) as method_name values(data.protoPayload.resourceName) as resource_name values(data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent) as http_user_agent by src_ip data.resource.labels.cluster_name | rename data.resource.labels.cluster_name as cluster_name| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection_filter` - -[ESCU - GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies gpupdate.exe with no command line arguments and with a network connection. It is unusual for gpupdate.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. gpupdate.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies gpupdate.exe with no command line arguments and with a network connection. It is unusual for gpupdate.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. gpupdate.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-19 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-19 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Cobalt Strike"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Process gpupdate.exe with parent_process $parent_process_name$ is executed on $dest$ by user $user$, followed by an outbound network connection to $connection_to_CNC$ on port $dest_port$. This behaviour is seen with cobaltstrike. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 81}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 81}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process name"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Command And Control"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process", "Attacker"], "type": "Process Name"}, {"name": "connection_to_CNC", "role": ["Other"], "type": "IP Address"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies gpupdate.exe with no command line arguments and with a network connection. It is unusual for gpupdate.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. gpupdate.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -action.notable.param.rule_title = GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=gpupdate.exe by _time span=1h Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process="(gpupdate\.exe.{0,4}$)" | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port !="0" by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port| `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_guid connection_to_CNC dest_port | `gpupdate_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter` - -[ESCU - GSuite Email Suspicious Attachment - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search is to detect a suspicious attachment file extension in Gsuite email that may related to spear phishing attack. This file type is commonly used by malware to lure user to click on it to execute malicious code to compromised targetted machine. But this search can also catch some normal files related to this file type that maybe send by employee or network admin. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001", "T1566"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious attachment file extension in Gsuite email that may related to spear phishing attack. This file type is commonly used by malware to lure user to click on it to execute malicious code to compromised targetted machine. But this search can also catch some normal files related to this file type that maybe send by employee or network admin. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc. -action.escu.known_false_positives = network admin and normal user may send this file attachment as part of their day to day work. having a good protocol in attaching this file type to an e-mail may reduce the risk of having a spear phishing attack. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-16 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-16 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GSuite Email Suspicious Attachment - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Dev Sec Ops"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = suspicious email from $source.address$ to $destination{}.address$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "source.address", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 49}, {"risk_object_field": "destination{}.address", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 49}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GSuite Email Suspicious Attachment - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001", "T1566"], "observable": [{"name": "source.address", "role": ["attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "destination{}.address", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious attachment file extension in Gsuite email that may related to spear phishing attack. This file type is commonly used by malware to lure user to click on it to execute malicious code to compromised targetted machine. But this search can also catch some normal files related to this file type that maybe send by employee or network admin. -action.notable.param.rule_title = GSuite Email Suspicious Attachment -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `gsuite_gmail` "attachment{}.file_extension_type" IN ("pl", "py", "rb", "sh", "bat", "exe", "dll", "cpl", "com", "js", "vbs", "ps1", "reg","swf", "cmd", "go") | eval phase="plan" | eval severity="medium" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(attachment{}.file_extension_type) as email_attachments, values(attachment{}.sha256) as attachment_sha256, values(payload_size) as payload_size by destination{}.service num_message_attachments subject destination{}.address source.address phase severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_email_suspicious_attachment_filter` - -[ESCU - Gdrive suspicious file sharing - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search can help the detection of compromised accounts or internal users sharing potentially malicious/classified documents with users outside your organization via GSuite file sharing . -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search can help the detection of compromised accounts or internal users sharing potentially malicious/classified documents with users outside your organization via GSuite file sharing . -action.escu.how_to_implement = Need to implement Gsuite logging targeting Google suite drive activity. In order for the search to work for your environment please update `yourdomain.com` value in the query with the domain relavant for your organization. -action.escu.known_false_positives = This is an anomaly search, you must specify your domain in the parameters so it either filters outside domains or focus on internal domains. This search may also help investigate compromise of accounts. By looking at for example source ip addresses, document titles and abnormal number of shares and shared target users. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-24 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-24 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Gdrive suspicious file sharing - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Data Exfiltration"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Gdrive suspicious file sharing - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Data Exfiltration"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search can help the detection of compromised accounts or internal users sharing potentially malicious/classified documents with users outside your organization via GSuite file sharing . -action.notable.param.rule_title = Gdrive suspicious file sharing -action.notable.param.security_domain = threat -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `gsuite_drive` name=change_user_access | rename parameters.* as * | search email = "*@yourdomain.com" target_user != "*@yourdomain.com" | stats count values(owner) as owner values(target_user) as target values(doc_type) as doc_type values(doc_title) as doc_title dc(target_user) as distinct_target by src_ip email | where distinct_target > 50 | `gdrive_suspicious_file_sharing_filter` - -[ESCU - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` executing the Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` executing the Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-26 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-26 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 9}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 9}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` executing the Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="cmd.exe" OR Processes.process_name="powershell*") AND Processes.process = "*Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_filter` - -[ESCU - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.how_to_implement = The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-26 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-26 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = powershell process having commandline $Message$ to query domain password policy -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 9}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 9}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Reconnaissance"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message ="*Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter` - -[ESCU - Get ADUser with PowerShell - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to enumerate domain users. The `Get-AdUser' commandlet returns a list of all domain users. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to enumerate domain users. The `Get-AdUser' commandlet returns a list of all domain users. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-24 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-24 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get ADUser with PowerShell - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Get ADUser with PowerShell - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to enumerate domain users. The `Get-AdUser' commandlet returns a list of all domain users. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Get ADUser with PowerShell -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="cmd.exe" OR Processes.process_name="powershell*") AND Processes.process = "*Get-ADUser*" AND Processes.process = "*-filter*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_aduser_with_powershell_filter` - -[ESCU - Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-AdGUser` commandlet. The `Get-AdUser` commandlet is used to return a list of all domain users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-AdGUser` commandlet. The `Get-AdUser` commandlet is used to return a list of all domain users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.how_to_implement = The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-24 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-24 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = powershell process having commandline $Message$ for user enumeration -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Reconnaissance"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-AdGUser` commandlet. The `Get-AdUser` commandlet is used to return a list of all domain users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = "*get-aduser*" Message = "*-filter*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_aduser_with_powershell_script_block_filter` - -[ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` executing the Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` executing the Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-26 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-26 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` executing the Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="cmd.exe" OR Processes.process_name="powershell*") AND Processes.process = "*Get-ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_filter` - -[ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.how_to_implement = The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-26 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-26 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = powershell process having commandline $Message$ to query domain user password policy. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 9}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 9}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Reconnaissance"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message ="*Get-ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter` - -[ESCU - Get DomainPolicy with Powershell - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` executing the `Get-DomainPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` executing the `Get-DomainPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-26 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-26 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get DomainPolicy with Powershell - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 30}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 30}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Get DomainPolicy with Powershell - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` executing the `Get-DomainPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Get DomainPolicy with Powershell -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="cmd.exe" OR Processes.process_name="powershell*") AND Processes.process = "*Get-DomainPolicy*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_filter` - -[ESCU - Get DomainPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get DomainPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get DomainPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.how_to_implement = The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-26 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-26 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get DomainPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = powershell process having commandline $Message$ to query domain policy. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 30}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 30}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Get DomainPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Reconnaissance"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get DomainPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Get DomainPolicy with Powershell Script Block -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message ="*Get-DomainPolicy*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter` - -[ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to enumerate domain users. `Get-DomainUser` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to enumerate domain users. `Get-DomainUser` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-24 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-24 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to enumerate domain users. `Get-DomainUser` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Get DomainUser with PowerShell -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="cmd.exe" OR Processes.process_name="powershell*") AND Processes.process = "*Get-DomainUser*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domainuser_with_powershell_filter` - -[ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainUser` commandlet. `GetDomainUser` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerView to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainUser` commandlet. `GetDomainUser` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerView to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.how_to_implement = The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-24 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-24 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = powershell process having commandline $Message$ for user enumeration -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Reconnaissance"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainUser` commandlet. `GetDomainUser` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerView to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = "*Get-DomainUser*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domainuser_with_powershell_script_block_filter` - -[ESCU - Get WMIObject Group Discovery - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following hunting analytic identifies the use of `Get-WMIObject Win32_Group` being used with PowerShell to identify local groups on the endpoint. \ Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \ During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.001"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following hunting analytic identifies the use of `Get-WMIObject Win32_Group` being used with PowerShell to identify local groups on the endpoint. \ Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \ During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Tune as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-14 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-14 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get WMIObject Group Discovery - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = System group discovery on $dest$ by $user$. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 15}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Get WMIObject Group Discovery - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following hunting analytic identifies the use of `Get-WMIObject Win32_Group` being used with PowerShell to identify local groups on the endpoint. \ Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \ During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Get WMIObject Group Discovery -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR processes.process_name=cmd.exe) (Processes.process="*Get-WMIObject*" AND Processes.process="*Win32_Group*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_wmiobject_group_discovery_filter` - -[ESCU - Get WMIObject Group Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ -This analytic identifies the usage of `Get-WMIObject Win32_Group`, which is typically used as a way to identify groups on the endpoint. Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \ -During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.001"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ -This analytic identifies the usage of `Get-WMIObject Win32_Group`, which is typically used as a way to identify groups on the endpoint. Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \ -During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Tune as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-14 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-14 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get WMIObject Group Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = System group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 15}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Get WMIObject Group Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ -This analytic identifies the usage of `Get-WMIObject Win32_Group`, which is typically used as a way to identify groups on the endpoint. Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \ -During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Get WMIObject Group Discovery with Script Block Logging -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = "*Get-WMIObject*" AND Message = "*Win32_Group*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message OpCode ComputerName User EventCode| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_wmiobject_group_discovery_with_script_block_logging_filter` - -[ESCU - Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic identifies Get-DomainTrust from PowerView in order to gather domain trust information. Typically, this is utilized within a script being executed and used to enumerate the domain trust information. This grants the adversary an understanding of how large or small the domain is. During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic identifies Get-DomainTrust from PowerView in order to gather domain trust information. Typically, this is utilized within a script being executed and used to enumerate the domain trust information. This grants the adversary an understanding of how large or small the domain is. During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives as this requires an active Administrator or adversary to bring in, import, and execute. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-24 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-24 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious PowerShell Get-DomainTrust was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 12}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 12}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 40, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic identifies Get-DomainTrust from PowerView in order to gather domain trust information. Typically, this is utilized within a script being executed and used to enumerate the domain trust information. This grants the adversary an understanding of how large or small the domain is. During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=*get-domaintrust* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domaintrust_with_powershell_filter` - -[ESCU - Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ -This analytic identifies Get-DomainTrust from PowerView in order to gather domain trust information. \ -During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ -This analytic identifies Get-DomainTrust from PowerView in order to gather domain trust information. \ -During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible certain system management frameworks utilize this command to gather trust information. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-24 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-24 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell Script Block - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious PowerShell Get-DomainTrust was identified on endpoint $ComputerName$ by user $user$. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 12}, {"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 12}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell Script Block - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 40, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ -This analytic identifies Get-DomainTrust from PowerView in order to gather domain trust information. \ -During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell Script Block -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = "*get-foresttrust*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message ComputerName User EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domaintrust_with_powershell_script_block_filter` - -[ESCU - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic identifies Get-ForestTrust from PowerSploit in order to gather domain trust information. Typically, this is utilized within a script being executed and used to enumerate the domain trust information. This grants the adversary an understanding of how large or small the domain is. During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic identifies Get-ForestTrust from PowerSploit in order to gather domain trust information. Typically, this is utilized within a script being executed and used to enumerate the domain trust information. This grants the adversary an understanding of how large or small the domain is. During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives as this requires an active Administrator or adversary to bring in, import, and execute. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-02 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-02 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious PowerShell Get-ForestTrust was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 12}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 12}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 40, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic identifies Get-ForestTrust from PowerSploit in order to gather domain trust information. Typically, this is utilized within a script being executed and used to enumerate the domain trust information. This grants the adversary an understanding of how large or small the domain is. During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=cmd.exe Processes.process=*get-foresttrust* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_foresttrust_with_powershell_filter` - -[ESCU - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ -This analytic identifies Get-ForestTrust from PowerSploit in order to gather domain trust information. \ -During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ -This analytic identifies Get-ForestTrust from PowerSploit in order to gather domain trust information. \ -During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -action.escu.known_false_positives = UPDATE_KNOWN_FALSE_POSITIVES -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-02 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-02 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell Script Block - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious PowerShell Get-ForestTrust was identified on endpoint $ComputerName$ by user $User$. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 12}, {"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 12}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell Script Block - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 40, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"], "observable": [{"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ -This analytic identifies Get-ForestTrust from PowerSploit in order to gather domain trust information. \ -During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell Script Block -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = "*get-foresttrust*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message OpCode ComputerName User EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_foresttrust_with_powershell_script_block_filter` - -[ESCU - GetAdComputer with PowerShell - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The `Get-AdComputer' commandlet returns a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The `Get-AdComputer' commandlet returns a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-07 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-07 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetAdComputer with PowerShell - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetAdComputer with PowerShell - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The `Get-AdComputer' commandlet returns a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = GetAdComputer with PowerShell -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="powershell.exe") (Processes.process=*Get-AdComputer*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getadcomputer_with_powershell_filter` - -[ESCU - GetAdComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-AdGroup` commandlet. The `Get-AdGroup` commandlet is used to return a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-AdGroup` commandlet. The `Get-AdGroup` commandlet is used to return a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-01 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-01 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetAdComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetAdComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-AdGroup` commandlet. The `Get-AdGroup` commandlet is used to return a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = GetAdComputer with PowerShell Script Block -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = "*Get-AdComputer*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getadcomputer_with_powershell_script_block_filter` - -[ESCU - GetAdGroup with PowerShell - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The `Get-AdGroup` commandlnet is used to return a list of all groups available in a Windows Domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.002"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The `Get-AdGroup` commandlnet is used to return a list of all groups available in a Windows Domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-25 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-25 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetAdGroup with PowerShell - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetAdGroup with PowerShell - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The `Get-AdGroup` commandlnet is used to return a list of all groups available in a Windows Domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = GetAdGroup with PowerShell -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="powershell.exe") (Processes.process=*Get-AdGroup*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getadgroup_with_powershell_filter` - -[ESCU - GetAdGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-AdGroup` commandlet. The `Get-AdGroup` commandlet is used to return a list of all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.002"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-AdGroup` commandlet. The `Get-AdGroup` commandlet is used to return a list of all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-25 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-25 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetAdGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Domain group discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetAdGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-AdGroup` commandlet. The `Get-AdGroup` commandlet is used to return a list of all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = GetAdGroup with PowerShell Script Block -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = "*Get-ADGroup*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getadgroup_with_powershell_script_block_filter` - -[ESCU - GetCurrent User with PowerShell - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powerhsell.exe` with command-line arguments that execute the `GetCurrent` method of the WindowsIdentity .NET class. This method returns an object that represents the current Windows user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `powerhsell.exe` with command-line arguments that execute the `GetCurrent` method of the WindowsIdentity .NET class. This method returns an object that represents the current Windows user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-13 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-13 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetCurrent User with PowerShell - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = System user discovery on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetCurrent User with PowerShell - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powerhsell.exe` with command-line arguments that execute the `GetCurrent` method of the WindowsIdentity .NET class. This method returns an object that represents the current Windows user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = GetCurrent User with PowerShell -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="powershell.exe") (Processes.process=*System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity* OR Processes.process=*GetCurrent()*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getcurrent_user_with_powershell_filter` - -[ESCU - GetCurrent User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `GetCurrent` method of the WindowsIdentity .NET class. This method returns an object that represents the current Windows user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `GetCurrent` method of the WindowsIdentity .NET class. This method returns an object that represents the current Windows user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-13 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-13 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetCurrent User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = System user discovery on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetCurrent User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `GetCurrent` method of the WindowsIdentity .NET class. This method returns an object that represents the current Windows user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = GetCurrent User with PowerShell Script Block -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = "*[System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]*" AND Message = "*GetCurrent()*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getcurrent_user_with_powershell_script_block_filter` - -[ESCU - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. `Get-DomainComputer` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. `Get-DomainComputer` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use PowerView for troubleshooting. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-07 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-07 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 24}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. `Get-DomainComputer` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = GetDomainComputer with PowerShell -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="powershell.exe") (Processes.process=*Get-DomainComputer*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_filter` - -[ESCU - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainComputer` commandlet. `GetDomainComputer` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerView to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainComputer` commandlet. `GetDomainComputer` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerView to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use PowerView for troubleshooting. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-02 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-02 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Remote system discovery with PowerView on $dest$ by $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 24}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainComputer` commandlet. `GetDomainComputer` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerView to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = GetDomainComputer with PowerShell Script Block -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = "*Get-DomainComputer*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_script_block_filter` - -[ESCU - GetDomainController with PowerShell - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. `Get-DomainController` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. `Get-DomainController` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use PowerView for troubleshooting. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-07 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-07 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetDomainController with PowerShell - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Remote system discovery using PowerView on $dest$ by $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 24}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetDomainController with PowerShell - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. `Get-DomainController` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = GetDomainController with PowerShell -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="powershell.exe") (Processes.process=*Get-DomainController*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_filter` - -[ESCU - GetDomainController with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainController` commandlet. `Get-DomainController` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerView to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainController` commandlet. `Get-DomainController` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerView to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-02 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-02 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetDomainController with PowerShell Script Block - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Remote system discovery with PowerView on $dest$ by $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 24}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetDomainController with PowerShell Script Block - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainController` commandlet. `Get-DomainController` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerView to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = GetDomainController with PowerShell Script Block -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = "*Get-DomainController*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_script_block_filter` - -[ESCU - GetDomainGroup with PowerShell - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. `Get-DomainGroup` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.002"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. `Get-DomainGroup` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-25 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-25 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetDomainGroup with PowerShell - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Domain group discovery with PowerView on $dest$ by $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetDomainGroup with PowerShell - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. `Get-DomainGroup` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = GetDomainGroup with PowerShell -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="powershell.exe") (Processes.process=*Get-DomainGroup*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getdomaingroup_with_powershell_filter` - -[ESCU - GetDomainGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainGroup` commandlet. `Get-DomainGroup` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. As the name suggests, `Get-DomainGroup` is used to query domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this function to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.002"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainGroup` commandlet. `Get-DomainGroup` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. As the name suggests, `Get-DomainGroup` is used to query domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this function to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerView functions for troubleshooting. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-26 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-26 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetDomainGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Domain group discovery enumeration using PowerView on $dest$ by $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetDomainGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainGroup` commandlet. `Get-DomainGroup` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. As the name suggests, `Get-DomainGroup` is used to query domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this function to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = GetDomainGroup with PowerShell Script Block -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = "*Get-DomainGroup*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getdomaingroup_with_powershell_script_block_filter` - -[ESCU - GetLocalUser with PowerShell - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for local users. The `Get-LocalUser` commandlet is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087", "T1087.001"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for local users. The `Get-LocalUser` commandlet is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-23 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-23 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetLocalUser with PowerShell - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Local user discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetLocalUser with PowerShell - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087", "T1087.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for local users. The `Get-LocalUser` commandlet is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = GetLocalUser with PowerShell -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="powershell.exe") (Processes.process=*Get-LocalUser*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getlocaluser_with_powershell_filter` - -[ESCU - GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-LocalUser` commandlet. The `Get-LocalUser` commandlet is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087", "T1087.001"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-LocalUser` commandlet. The `Get-LocalUser` commandlet is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-23 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-23 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Local user discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087", "T1087.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-LocalUser` commandlet. The `Get-LocalUser` commandlet is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = "*Get-LocalUser*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getlocaluser_with_powershell_script_block_filter` - -[ESCU - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. The `Get-NetTcpConnection` commandlet lists the current TCP connections. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1049"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. The `Get-NetTcpConnection` commandlet lists the current TCP connections. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-25 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-25 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1049"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. The `Get-NetTcpConnection` commandlet lists the current TCP connections. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="powershell.exe") (Processes.process=*Get-NetTcpConnection*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_filter` - -[ESCU - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-NetTcpconnection ` commandlet. This commandlet is used to return a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1049"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-NetTcpconnection ` commandlet. This commandlet is used to return a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-10 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-10 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell Script Block - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell Script Block - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1049"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-NetTcpconnection ` commandlet. This commandlet is used to return a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell Script Block -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = "*Get-NetTcpconnection*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_script_block_filter` - -[ESCU - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain users. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `-class ds_user` parameter can be used to return the full list of users in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI in this case, using PowerShell, to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain users. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `-class ds_user` parameter can be used to return the full list of users in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI in this case, using PowerShell, to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-24 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-24 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain users. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `-class ds_user` parameter can be used to return the full list of users in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI in this case, using PowerShell, to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="cmd.exe" OR Processes.process_name="powershell*") AND Processes.process = "*get-wmiobject*" AND Processes.process = "*ds_user*" AND Processes.process = "*root\\directory\\ldap*" AND Processes.process = "*-namespace*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_filter` - -[ESCU - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet. The `DS_User` class parameter leverages WMI to query for all domain users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet. The `DS_User` class parameter leverages WMI to query for all domain users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.how_to_implement = he following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-24 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-24 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = powershell process having commandline $Message$ for user enumeration -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Reconnaissance"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet. The `DS_User` class parameter leverages WMI to query for all domain users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell Script Block -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = "*get-wmiobject*" Message = "*ds_user*" Message = "*-namespace*" Message = "*root\\directory\\ldap*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_script_block_filter` - -[ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `DS_Computer` parameter can be used to return a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI in this case, using PowerShell, to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `DS_Computer` parameter can be used to return a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI in this case, using PowerShell, to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-07 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-07 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Remote system discovery enumeration using WMI on $dest$ by $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 21}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `DS_Computer` parameter can be used to return a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI in this case, using PowerShell, to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="powershell.exe") (Processes.process=*Get-WmiObject* AND Processes.process="*namespace root\\directory\\ldap*" AND Processes.process="*class ds_computer*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_filter` - -[ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet. The `DS_Computer` class parameter leverages WMI to query for all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet. The `DS_Computer` class parameter leverages WMI to query for all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-01 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-01 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet. The `DS_Computer` class parameter leverages WMI to query for all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell Script Block -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message=*Get-WmiObject* AND Message="*namespace root\\directory\\ldap*" AND Message="*class ds_computer*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_script_block_filter` - -[ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `-class ds_group` parameter can be used to return the full list of groups in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI in this case, using PowerShell, to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.002"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `-class ds_group` parameter can be used to return the full list of groups in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI in this case, using PowerShell, to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-25 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-25 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `-class ds_group` parameter can be used to return the full list of groups in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI in this case, using PowerShell, to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="powershell.exe") (Processes.process=*Get-WmiObject* AND Processes.process="*namespace root\\directory\\ldap*" AND Processes.process="*class ds_group*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_filter` - -[ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet used with specific parameters . The `DS_Group` parameter leverages WMI to query for all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.002"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet used with specific parameters . The `DS_Group` parameter leverages WMI to query for all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-25 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-25 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell Script Block - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Domain group discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell Script Block - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet used with specific parameters . The `DS_Group` parameter leverages WMI to query for all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell Script Block -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message=*Get-WmiObject* AND Message="*namespace root\\directory\\ldap*" AND Message="*class ds_group*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_script_block_filter` - -[ESCU - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query local users. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `Win32_UserAccount` parameter is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087", "T1087.001"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query local users. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `Win32_UserAccount` parameter is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-23 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-23 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Local user discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087", "T1087.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query local users. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `Win32_UserAccount` parameter is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="powershell.exe") (Processes.process=*Get-WmiObject* AND Processes.process=*Win32_UserAccount*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_filter` - -[ESCU - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet used with specific parameters. The `Win32_UserAccount` parameter is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087", "T1087.001"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet used with specific parameters. The `Win32_UserAccount` parameter is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-23 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-23 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Local user discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087", "T1087.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet used with specific parameters. The `Win32_UserAccount` parameter is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message="*Get-WmiObject*" AND Message="*Win32_UserAccount*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_script_block_filter` - -[ESCU - GitHub Dependabot Alert - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for Dependabot Alerts in Github logs. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1195.001", "T1195"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for Dependabot Alerts in Github logs. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must index GitHub logs. You can follow the url in reference to onboard GitHub logs. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-01 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-01 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GitHub Dependabot Alert - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Dev Sec Ops"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Vulnerabilities found in packages used by GitHub repository $repository$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "repository", "threat_object_type": "system"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GitHub Dependabot Alert - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1195.001", "T1195"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "repository", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "System"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for Dependabot Alerts in Github logs. -action.notable.param.rule_title = GitHub Dependabot Alert -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `github` alert.id=* action=create | rename repository.full_name as repository, repository.html_url as repository_url sender.login as user | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by action alert.affected_package_name alert.affected_range alert.created_at alert.external_identifier alert.external_reference alert.fixed_in alert.severity repository repository_url user | eval phase="code" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `github_dependabot_alert_filter` - -[ESCU - GitHub Pull Request from Unknown User - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for Pull Request from unknown user. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1195.001", "T1195"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for Pull Request from unknown user. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must index GitHub logs. You can follow the url in reference to onboard GitHub logs. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-01 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-01 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GitHub Pull Request from Unknown User - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Dev Sec Ops"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Vulnerabilities found in packages used by GitHub repository $repository$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "repository", "threat_object_type": "system"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GitHub Pull Request from Unknown User - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1195.001", "T1195"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "repository", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "System"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for Pull Request from unknown user. -action.notable.param.rule_title = GitHub Pull Request from Unknown User -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `github` check_suite.pull_requests{}.id=* | stats count by check_suite.head_commit.author.name repository.full_name check_suite.pull_requests{}.head.ref check_suite.head_commit.message | rename check_suite.head_commit.author.name as user repository.full_name as repository check_suite.pull_requests{}.head.ref as ref_head check_suite.head_commit.message as commit_message | search NOT `github_known_users` | eval phase="code" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `github_pull_request_from_unknown_user_filter` - -[ESCU - Github Commit Changes In Master - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search is to detect a pushed or commit to master or main branch. This is to avoid unwanted modification to master without a review to the changes. Ideally in terms of devsecops the changes made in a branch and do a PR for review. of course in some cases admin of the project may did a changes directly to master branch -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1199"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a pushed or commit to master or main branch. This is to avoid unwanted modification to master without a review to the changes. Ideally in terms of devsecops the changes made in a branch and do a PR for review. of course in some cases admin of the project may did a changes directly to master branch -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to github logs having the fork, commit, push metadata that can be use to monitor the changes in a github project. -action.escu.known_false_positives = admin can do changes directly to master branch -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-20 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-20 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Github Commit Changes In Master - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Dev Sec Ops"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = suspicious commit by $commit.commit.author.email$ to main branch -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "commit.commit.author.email", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 9}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Github Commit Changes In Master - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1199"], "observable": [{"name": "commit.commit.author.email", "role": ["attacker"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a pushed or commit to master or main branch. This is to avoid unwanted modification to master without a review to the changes. Ideally in terms of devsecops the changes made in a branch and do a PR for review. of course in some cases admin of the project may did a changes directly to master branch -action.notable.param.rule_title = Github Commit Changes In Master -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `github` branches{}.name = main OR branches{}.name = master | eval severity="low" | eval phase="code" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by commit.author.html_url commit.commit.author.email commit.author.login commit.commit.message repository.pushed_at commit.commit.committer.date, phase, severity | eval phase="code" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `github_commit_changes_in_master_filter` - -[ESCU - Github Commit In Develop - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search is to detect a pushed or commit to develop branch. This is to avoid unwanted modification to develop without a review to the changes. Ideally in terms of devsecops the changes made in a branch and do a PR for review. of course in some cases admin of the project may did a changes directly to master branch -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1199"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a pushed or commit to develop branch. This is to avoid unwanted modification to develop without a review to the changes. Ideally in terms of devsecops the changes made in a branch and do a PR for review. of course in some cases admin of the project may did a changes directly to master branch -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to github logs having the fork, commit, push metadata that can be use to monitor the changes in a github project. -action.escu.known_false_positives = admin can do changes directly to develop branch -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-01 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-01 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Github Commit In Develop - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Dev Sec Ops"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = suspicious commit by $commit.commit.author.email$ to develop branch -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "commit.commit.author.email", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 9}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Github Commit In Develop - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1199"], "observable": [{"name": "commit.commit.author.email", "role": ["attacker"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a pushed or commit to develop branch. This is to avoid unwanted modification to develop without a review to the changes. Ideally in terms of devsecops the changes made in a branch and do a PR for review. of course in some cases admin of the project may did a changes directly to master branch -action.notable.param.rule_title = Github Commit In Develop -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `github` branches{}.name = main OR branches{}.name = develop | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by commit.author.html_url commit.commit.author.email commit.author.login commit.commit.message repository.pushed_at commit.commit.committer.date | eval phase="code" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `github_commit_in_develop_filter` - -[ESCU - Gsuite Drive Share In External Email - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search is to detect suspicious google drive or google docs files shared outside or externally. This behavior might be a good hunting query to monitor exfitration of data made by an attacker or insider to a targetted machine. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1567.002", "T1567"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect suspicious google drive or google docs files shared outside or externally. This behavior might be a good hunting query to monitor exfitration of data made by an attacker or insider to a targetted machine. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc. In order for the search to work for your environment, please edit the query to use your company specific email domain instead of `internal_test_email.com`. -action.escu.known_false_positives = network admin or normal user may share files to customer and external team. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-16 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-16 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Gsuite Drive Share In External Email - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Dev Sec Ops"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = suspicious share gdrive from $parameters.owner$ to $email$ namely as $parameters.doc_title$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "parameters.owner", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 72}, {"risk_object_field": "email", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 72}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Gsuite Drive Share In External Email - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1567.002", "T1567"], "observable": [{"name": "parameters.owner", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "email", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect suspicious google drive or google docs files shared outside or externally. This behavior might be a good hunting query to monitor exfitration of data made by an attacker or insider to a targetted machine. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Gsuite Drive Share In External Email -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `gsuite_drive` NOT (email IN("", "null")) | rex field=parameters.owner "[^@]+@(?[^@]+)" | rex field=email "[^@]+@(?[^@]+)" | where src_domain = "internal_test_email.com" and not dest_domain = "internal_test_email.com" | eval phase="plan" | eval severity="low" | stats values(parameters.doc_title) as doc_title, values(parameters.doc_type) as doc_types, values(email) as dst_email_list, values(parameters.visibility) as visibility, values(parameters.doc_id) as doc_id, count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by parameters.owner ip_address phase severity | rename parameters.owner as user ip_address as src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_drive_share_in_external_email_filter` - -[ESCU - Gsuite Email Suspicious Subject With Attachment - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search is to detect a gsuite email contains suspicious subject having known file type used in spear phishing. This technique is a common and effective entry vector of attacker to compromise a network by luring the user to click or execute the suspicious attachment send from external email account because of the effective social engineering of subject related to delivery, bank and so on. On the other hand this detection may catch a normal email traffic related to legitimate transaction so better to check the email sender, spelling and etc. avoid click link or opening the attachment if you are not expecting this type of e-mail. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001", "T1566"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a gsuite email contains suspicious subject having known file type used in spear phishing. This technique is a common and effective entry vector of attacker to compromise a network by luring the user to click or execute the suspicious attachment send from external email account because of the effective social engineering of subject related to delivery, bank and so on. On the other hand this detection may catch a normal email traffic related to legitimate transaction so better to check the email sender, spelling and etc. avoid click link or opening the attachment if you are not expecting this type of e-mail. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc. -action.escu.known_false_positives = normal user or normal transaction may contain the subject and file type attachment that this detection try to search. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-19 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-19 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Gsuite Email Suspicious Subject With Attachment - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Dev Sec Ops"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = suspicious email from $source.address$ to $destination{}.address$ -action.risk.param._risk = [] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Gsuite Email Suspicious Subject With Attachment - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001", "T1566"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a gsuite email contains suspicious subject having known file type used in spear phishing. This technique is a common and effective entry vector of attacker to compromise a network by luring the user to click or execute the suspicious attachment send from external email account because of the effective social engineering of subject related to delivery, bank and so on. On the other hand this detection may catch a normal email traffic related to legitimate transaction so better to check the email sender, spelling and etc. avoid click link or opening the attachment if you are not expecting this type of e-mail. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Gsuite Email Suspicious Subject With Attachment -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `gsuite_gmail` num_message_attachments > 0 subject IN ("*dhl*", "* ups *", "*delivery*", "*parcel*", "*label*", "*invoice*", "*postal*", "* fedex *", "* usps *", "* express *", "*shipment*", "*Banking/Tax*","*shipment*", "*new order*") attachment{}.file_extension_type IN ("doc", "docx", "xls", "xlsx", "ppt", "pptx", "pdf", "zip", "rar", "html","htm","hta") | rex field=source.from_header_address "[^@]+@(?[^@]+)" | rex field=destination{}.address "[^@]+@(?[^@]+)" | where not source_domain="internal_test_email.com" and dest_domain="internal_test_email.com" | eval phase="plan" | eval severity="medium" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(attachment{}.file_extension_type) as email_attachments, values(attachment{}.sha256) as attachment_sha256, values(payload_size) as payload_size by destination{}.service num_message_attachments subject destination{}.address source.address phase severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_email_suspicious_subject_with_attachment_filter` - -[ESCU - Gsuite Email With Known Abuse Web Service Link - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytics is to detect a gmail containing a link that are known to be abused by malware or attacker like pastebin, telegram and discord to deliver malicious payload. This event can encounter some normal email traffic within organization and external email that normally using this application and services. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001", "T1566"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytics is to detect a gmail containing a link that are known to be abused by malware or attacker like pastebin, telegram and discord to deliver malicious payload. This event can encounter some normal email traffic within organization and external email that normally using this application and services. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc. -action.escu.known_false_positives = normal email contains this link that are known application within the organization or network can be catched by this detection. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-23 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-23 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Gsuite Email With Known Abuse Web Service Link - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Dev Sec Ops"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = suspicious email from $source.address$ to $destination{}.address$ -action.risk.param._risk = [] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Gsuite Email With Known Abuse Web Service Link - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001", "T1566"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytics is to detect a gmail containing a link that are known to be abused by malware or attacker like pastebin, telegram and discord to deliver malicious payload. This event can encounter some normal email traffic within organization and external email that normally using this application and services. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Gsuite Email With Known Abuse Web Service Link -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `gsuite_gmail` "link_domain{}" IN ("*pastebin.com*", "*discord*", "*telegram*","t.me") | rex field=source.from_header_address "[^@]+@(?[^@]+)" | rex field=destination{}.address "[^@]+@(?[^@]+)" | where not source_domain="internal_test_email.com" and dest_domain="internal_test_email.com" | eval phase="plan" | eval severity="low" |stats values(link_domain{}) as link_domains min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by is_spam source.address source.from_header_address subject destination{}.address phase severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_email_with_known_abuse_web_service_link_filter` - -[ESCU - Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search is to detect a suspicious outbound e-mail from internal email to external email domain. This can be a good hunting query to monitor insider or outbound email traffic for not common domain e-mail. The idea is to parse the domain of destination email check if there is a minimum outbound traffic < 20 with attachment. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1048"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious outbound e-mail from internal email to external email domain. This can be a good hunting query to monitor insider or outbound email traffic for not common domain e-mail. The idea is to parse the domain of destination email check if there is a minimum outbound traffic < 20 with attachment. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc. -action.escu.known_false_positives = network admin and normal user may send this file attachment as part of their day to day work. having a good protocol in attaching this file type to an e-mail may reduce the risk of having a spear phishing attack. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-17 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-17 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Dev Sec Ops"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = suspicious email from $source.address$ to $destination{}.address$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "source.address", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 9}, {"risk_object_field": "destination{}.address", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 9}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1048"], "observable": [{"name": "source.address", "role": ["attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "destination{}.address", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious outbound e-mail from internal email to external email domain. This can be a good hunting query to monitor insider or outbound email traffic for not common domain e-mail. The idea is to parse the domain of destination email check if there is a minimum outbound traffic < 20 with attachment. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `gsuite_gmail` num_message_attachments > 0 | rex field=source.from_header_address "[^@]+@(?[^@]+)" | rex field=destination{}.address "[^@]+@(?[^@]+)" | where source_domain="internal_test_email.com" and not dest_domain="internal_test_email.com" | eval phase="plan" | eval severity="low" | stats values(subject) as subject, values(source.from_header_address) as src_domain_list, count as numEvents, dc(source.from_header_address) as numSrcAddresses, min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest_domain phase severity | where numSrcAddresses < 20 |sort - numSrcAddresses | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_outbound_email_with_attachment_to_external_domain_filter` - -[ESCU - Gsuite Suspicious Shared File Name - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search is to detect a shared file in google drive with suspicious file name that are commonly used by spear phishing campaign. This technique is very popular to lure the user by running a malicious document or click a malicious link within the shared file that will redirected to malicious website. This detection can also catch some normal email communication between organization and its external customer. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001", "T1566"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a shared file in google drive with suspicious file name that are commonly used by spear phishing campaign. This technique is very popular to lure the user by running a malicious document or click a malicious link within the shared file that will redirected to malicious website. This detection can also catch some normal email communication between organization and its external customer. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc. In order for the search to work for your environment, please edit the query to use your company specific email domain instead of `internal_test_email.com`. -action.escu.known_false_positives = normal user or normal transaction may contain the subject and file type attachment that this detection try to search -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-23 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-23 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Gsuite Suspicious Shared File Name - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Dev Sec Ops"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = suspicious share gdrive from $parameters.owner$ to $email$ namely as $parameters.doc_title$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "parameters.owner", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 21}, {"risk_object_field": "email", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 21}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Gsuite Suspicious Shared File Name - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001", "T1566"], "observable": [{"name": "parameters.owner", "role": ["attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "email", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a shared file in google drive with suspicious file name that are commonly used by spear phishing campaign. This technique is very popular to lure the user by running a malicious document or click a malicious link within the shared file that will redirected to malicious website. This detection can also catch some normal email communication between organization and its external customer. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Gsuite Suspicious Shared File Name -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `gsuite_drive` parameters.owner_is_team_drive=false "parameters.doc_title" IN ("*dhl*", "* ups *", "*delivery*", "*parcel*", "*label*", "*invoice*", "*postal*", "*fedex*", "* usps *", "* express *", "*shipment*", "*Banking/Tax*","*shipment*", "*new order*") parameters.doc_type IN ("document","pdf", "msexcel", "msword", "spreadsheet", "presentation") | rex field=parameters.owner "[^@]+@(?[^@]+)" | rex field=parameters.target_user "[^@]+@(?[^@]+)" | where not source_domain="internal_test_email.com" and dest_domain="internal_test_email.com" | eval phase="plan" | eval severity="low" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by email parameters.owner parameters.target_user parameters.doc_title parameters.doc_type phase severity | rename parameters.target_user AS user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_suspicious_shared_file_name_filter` - -[ESCU - Gsuite suspicious calendar invite - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search can help the detection of compromised accounts or internal users sending suspcious calendar invites via GSuite calendar. These invites may contain malicious links or attachments. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search can help the detection of compromised accounts or internal users sending suspcious calendar invites via GSuite calendar. These invites may contain malicious links or attachments. -action.escu.how_to_implement = In order to successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite (gsuite:calendar:json) having the file sharing metadata like file type, source owner, destination target user, description, etc. This search can also be made more specific by selecting specific emails, subdomains timeframe, organizational units, targeted user, etc. In order for the search to work for your environment please update `yourdomain.com` value in the query with the domain relavant for your organization. -action.escu.known_false_positives = This search will also produce normal activity statistics. Fields such as email, ip address, name, parameters.organizer_calendar_id, parameters.target_calendar_id and parameters.event_title may give away phishing intent.For more specific results use email parameter. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-24 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-24 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Gsuite suspicious calendar invite - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spearphishing Attachments"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Gsuite suspicious calendar invite - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search can help the detection of compromised accounts or internal users sending suspcious calendar invites via GSuite calendar. These invites may contain malicious links or attachments. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Gsuite suspicious calendar invite -action.notable.param.security_domain = threat -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `gsuite_calendar` |bin span=5m _time |rename parameters.* as * |search target_calendar_id!=null email="*yourdomain.com"| stats count values(target_calendar_id) values(event_title) values(event_guest) by email _time | where count >100| `gsuite_suspicious_calendar_invite_filter` - -[ESCU - Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic identifies a suspicious registry modification to hide a user account on the Windows Login screen. This technique was seen in some tradecraft where the adversary will create a hidden user account with Admin privileges in login screen to avoid noticing by the user that they already compromise and to persist on that said machine. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic identifies a suspicious registry modification to hide a user account on the Windows Login screen. This technique was seen in some tradecraft where the adversary will create a hidden user account with Admin privileges in login screen to avoid noticing by the user that they already compromise and to persist on that said machine. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as CarbonBlack or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown. Filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-28 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-28 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["XMRig"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious registry modification ($registry_value_name$) which is used go hide a user account on the Windows Login screen detected on $dest$ executed by $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 72}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}, {"threat_object_field": "registry_value_name", "threat_object_type": "other"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "registry_value_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Other"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic identifies a suspicious registry modification to hide a user account on the Windows Login screen. This technique was seen in some tradecraft where the adversary will create a hidden user account with Admin privileges in login screen to avoid noticing by the user that they already compromise and to persist on that said machine. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path="*\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\SpecialAccounts\\Userlist*" AND Registry.registry_value_data = "0x00000000" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `hide_user_account_from_sign_in_screen_filter` - -[ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = Attackers leverage an existing Windows binary, attrib.exe, to mark specific as hidden by using specific flags so that the victim does not see the file. The search looks for specific command-line arguments to detect the use of attrib.exe to hide files. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222", "T1222.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = Attackers leverage an existing Windows binary, attrib.exe, to mark specific as hidden by using specific flags so that the victim does not see the file. The search looks for specific command-line arguments to detect the use of attrib.exe to hide files. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Some applications and users may legitimately use attrib.exe to interact with the files. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Persistence Techniques"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Attrib.exe with +h flag to hide files on $dest$ executed by $user$ is detected. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 72}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process", "threat_object_type": "other"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222", "T1222.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "parent_process", "role": ["Attacker", "Parent Process"], "type": "Other"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = Attackers leverage an existing Windows binary, attrib.exe, to mark specific as hidden by using specific flags so that the victim does not see the file. The search looks for specific command-line arguments to detect the use of attrib.exe to hide files. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) values(Processes.process) as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=attrib.exe (Processes.process=*+h*) by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe_filter` - -[ESCU - High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious high frequency copying/moving of files in network share as part of information sabotage. This anomaly event can be a good indicator of insider trying to sabotage data by transfering classified or internal files within network share to exfitrate it after or to lure evidence of insider attack to other user. This behavior may catch several noise if network share is a common place for classified or internal document processing. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1537"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to detect a suspicious high frequency copying/moving of files in network share as part of information sabotage. This anomaly event can be a good indicator of insider trying to sabotage data by transfering classified or internal files within network share to exfitrate it after or to lure evidence of insider attack to other user. This behavior may catch several noise if network share is a common place for classified or internal document processing. -action.escu.how_to_implement = o successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 5145 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required. Also enable the object Audit access success/failure in your group policy. -action.escu.known_false_positives = this behavior may seen in normal transfer of file within network if network share is common place for sharing documents. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-16 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-16 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Information Sabotage"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = high frequency copy of document in network share $Share_Name$ from $Source_Address$ by $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 9}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Information Sabotage"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1537"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious high frequency copying/moving of files in network share as part of information sabotage. This anomaly event can be a good indicator of insider trying to sabotage data by transfering classified or internal files within network share to exfitrate it after or to lure evidence of insider attack to other user. This behavior may catch several noise if network share is a common place for classified or internal document processing. -action.notable.param.rule_title = High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=5145 Relative_Target_Name IN ("*.doc","*.docx","*.xls","*.xlsx","*.ppt","*.pptx","*.log","*.txt","*.db","*.7z","*.zip","*.rar","*.tar","*.gz","*.jpg","*.gif","*.png","*.bmp","*.pdf","*.rtf","*.key") Object_Type=File Share_Name IN ("\\\\*\\C$","\\\\*\\IPC$","\\\\*\\admin$") Access_Mask= "0x2" | bucket _time span=5m | stats values(Relative_Target_Name) as valRelativeTargetName, values(Share_Name) as valShareName, values(Object_Type) as valObjectType, values(Access_Mask) as valAccessmask, values(src_port) as valSrcPort, values(Source_Address) as valSrcAddress count as numShareName by dest, _time, EventCode, user | eventstats avg(numShareName) as avgShareName, stdev(numShareName) as stdShareName, count as numSlots by dest, _time, EventCode, user | eval upperThreshold=(avgShareName + stdShareName *3) | eval isOutlier=if(avgShareName > 20 and avgShareName >= upperThreshold, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `high_frequency_copy_of_files_in_network_share_filter` - -[ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search will detect more than 5 login failures in Office365 Azure Active Directory from a single source IP address. Please adjust the threshold value of 5 as suited for your environment. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.001", "T1110"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search will detect more than 5 login failures in Office365 Azure Active Directory from a single source IP address. Please adjust the threshold value of 5 as suited for your environment. -action.escu.how_to_implement = -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-12-16 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-12-16 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Office 365 Detections"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.001", "T1110"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search will detect more than 5 login failures in Office365 Azure Active Directory from a single source IP address. Please adjust the threshold value of 5 as suited for your environment. -action.notable.param.rule_title = High Number of Login Failures from a single source -action.notable.param.security_domain = threat -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `o365_management_activity` Operation=UserLoginFailed record_type=AzureActiveDirectoryStsLogon app=AzureActiveDirectory | stats count dc(user) as accounts_locked values(user) as user values(LogonError) as LogonError values(authentication_method) as authentication_method values(signature) as signature values(UserAgent) as UserAgent by src_ip record_type Operation app | search accounts_locked >= 5| `high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source_filter` - -[ESCU - High Process Termination Frequency - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytics are designed to indentify a high frequency of process termination on a machine which is a common behavior of ransomware malware before encrypting files. This technique is designed to avoid an exception error while accessing (docs, images, database and etc..) in the infected machine for encryption. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytics are designed to indentify a high frequency of process termination on a machine which is a common behavior of ransomware malware before encrypting files. This technique is designed to avoid an exception error while accessing (docs, images, database and etc..) in the infected machine for encryption. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Image (process full path of terminated process) from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -action.escu.known_false_positives = admin or user tool that can terminate multiple process. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-16 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-16 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - High Process Termination Frequency - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Clop Ransomware"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = High frequency process termination (more than 15 processes within 3s) detected on host $Computer$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}, {"threat_object_field": "proc_terminated", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - High Process Termination Frequency - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "proc_terminated", "role": ["Target"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytics are designed to indentify a high frequency of process termination on a machine which is a common behavior of ransomware malware before encrypting files. This technique is designed to avoid an exception error while accessing (docs, images, database and etc..) in the infected machine for encryption. -action.notable.param.rule_title = High Process Termination Frequency -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `sysmon` EventCode=5 |bin _time span=3s |stats values(Image) as proc_terminated min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer EventCode ProcessID | where count >= 15 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `high_process_termination_frequency_filter` - -[ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for an increase of data transfers from your email server to your clients. This could be indicative of a malicious actor collecting data using your email server. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.002", "T1114"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Traffic"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for an increase of data transfers from your email server to your clients. This could be indicative of a malicious actor collecting data using your email server. -action.escu.how_to_implement = This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model. Your email servers must be categorized as "email_server" for the search to work, as well. You may need to adjust the deviation_threshold and minimum_data_samples values based on the network traffic in your environment. The "deviation_threshold" field is a multiplying factor to control how much variation you're willing to tolerate. The "minimum_data_samples" field is the minimum number of connections of data samples required for the statistic to be valid. -action.escu.known_false_positives = The false-positive rate will vary based on how you set the deviation_threshold and data_samples values. Our recommendation is to adjust these values based on your network traffic to and from your email servers. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Collection and Staging"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Collection and Staging"], "cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.002", "T1114"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for an increase of data transfers from your email server to your clients. This could be indicative of a malicious actor collecting data using your email server. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` sum(All_Traffic.bytes_in) as bytes_in from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_category=email_server by All_Traffic.src_ip _time span=1d | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | eventstats avg(bytes_in) as avg_bytes_in stdev(bytes_in) as stdev_bytes_in | eventstats count as num_data_samples avg(eval(if(_time < relative_time(now(), "@d"), bytes_in, null))) as per_source_avg_bytes_in stdev(eval(if(_time < relative_time(now(), "@d"), bytes_in, null))) as per_source_stdev_bytes_in by src_ip | eval minimum_data_samples = 4, deviation_threshold = 3 | where num_data_samples >= minimum_data_samples AND bytes_in > (avg_bytes_in + (deviation_threshold * stdev_bytes_in)) AND bytes_in > (per_source_avg_bytes_in + (deviation_threshold * per_source_stdev_bytes_in)) AND _time >= relative_time(now(), "@d") | eval num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average = round(abs(bytes_in - avg_bytes_in) / stdev_bytes_in, 2), num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average = round(abs(bytes_in - per_source_avg_bytes_in) / per_source_stdev_bytes_in, 2) | table src_ip, _time, bytes_in, avg_bytes_in, per_source_avg_bytes_in, num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average, num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average | `hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server_filter` - -[ESCU - Hunting for Log4Shell - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following hunting query assists with quickly assessing CVE-2021-44228, or Log4Shell, activity mapped to the Web Datamodel. This is a combination query attempting to identify, score and dashboard. Because the Log4Shell vulnerability requires the string to be in the logs, this will work to identify the activity anywhere in the HTTP headers using _raw. Modify the first line to use the same pattern matching against other log sources. Scoring is based on a simple rubric of 0-5. 5 being the best match, and less than 5 meant to identify additional patterns that will equate to a higher total score. \ -The first jndi match identifies the standard pattern of `{jndi:` \ -jndi_fastmatch is meant to identify any jndi in the logs. The score is set low and is meant to be the "base" score used later. \ -jndi_proto is a protocol match that identifies `jndi` and one of `ldap, ldaps, rmi, dns, nis, iiop, corba, nds, http, https.` \ -all_match is a very well written regex by https://gist.github.com/Schvenn that identifies nearly all patterns of this attack behavior. \ -env works to identify environment variables in the header, meant to capture `AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID`, `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY` and `env`. \ -uri_detect is string match looking for the common uri paths currently being scanned/abused in the wild. \ -keywords matches on enumerated values that, like `$ctx:loginId`, that may be found in the header used by the adversary. \ -lookup matching is meant to catch some basic obfuscation that has been identified using upper, lower and date. \ -Scoring will then occur based on any findings. The base score is meant to be 2 , created by jndi_fastmatch. Everything else is meant to increase that score. \ -Finally, a simple table is created to show the scoring and the _raw field. Sort based on score or columns of interest. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following hunting query assists with quickly assessing CVE-2021-44228, or Log4Shell, activity mapped to the Web Datamodel. This is a combination query attempting to identify, score and dashboard. Because the Log4Shell vulnerability requires the string to be in the logs, this will work to identify the activity anywhere in the HTTP headers using _raw. Modify the first line to use the same pattern matching against other log sources. Scoring is based on a simple rubric of 0-5. 5 being the best match, and less than 5 meant to identify additional patterns that will equate to a higher total score. \ -The first jndi match identifies the standard pattern of `{jndi:` \ -jndi_fastmatch is meant to identify any jndi in the logs. The score is set low and is meant to be the "base" score used later. \ -jndi_proto is a protocol match that identifies `jndi` and one of `ldap, ldaps, rmi, dns, nis, iiop, corba, nds, http, https.` \ -all_match is a very well written regex by https://gist.github.com/Schvenn that identifies nearly all patterns of this attack behavior. \ -env works to identify environment variables in the header, meant to capture `AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID`, `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY` and `env`. \ -uri_detect is string match looking for the common uri paths currently being scanned/abused in the wild. \ -keywords matches on enumerated values that, like `$ctx:loginId`, that may be found in the header used by the adversary. \ -lookup matching is meant to catch some basic obfuscation that has been identified using upper, lower and date. \ -Scoring will then occur based on any findings. The base score is meant to be 2 , created by jndi_fastmatch. Everything else is meant to increase that score. \ -Finally, a simple table is created to show the scoring and the _raw field. Sort based on score or columns of interest. -action.escu.how_to_implement = Out of the box, the Web datamodel is required to be pre-filled. However, tested was performed against raw httpd access logs. Change the first line to any dataset to pass the regex's against. -action.escu.known_false_positives = It is highly possible you will find false positives, however, the base score is set to 2 for _any_ jndi found in raw logs. tune and change as needed, include any filtering. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-14 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-14 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Hunting for Log4Shell - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Hunting for Log4Shell exploitation has occurred. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 40}, {"threat_object_field": "http_method", "threat_object_type": "other"}, {"threat_object_field": "src", "threat_object_type": "other"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Hunting for Log4Shell - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:network"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "http_method", "role": ["other"], "type": "Other"}, {"name": "src", "role": ["other"], "type": "Other"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following hunting query assists with quickly assessing CVE-2021-44228, or Log4Shell, activity mapped to the Web Datamodel. This is a combination query attempting to identify, score and dashboard. Because the Log4Shell vulnerability requires the string to be in the logs, this will work to identify the activity anywhere in the HTTP headers using _raw. Modify the first line to use the same pattern matching against other log sources. Scoring is based on a simple rubric of 0-5. 5 being the best match, and less than 5 meant to identify additional patterns that will equate to a higher total score. \ -The first jndi match identifies the standard pattern of `{jndi:` \ -jndi_fastmatch is meant to identify any jndi in the logs. The score is set low and is meant to be the "base" score used later. \ -jndi_proto is a protocol match that identifies `jndi` and one of `ldap, ldaps, rmi, dns, nis, iiop, corba, nds, http, https.` \ -all_match is a very well written regex by https://gist.github.com/Schvenn that identifies nearly all patterns of this attack behavior. \ -env works to identify environment variables in the header, meant to capture `AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID`, `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY` and `env`. \ -uri_detect is string match looking for the common uri paths currently being scanned/abused in the wild. \ -keywords matches on enumerated values that, like `$ctx:loginId`, that may be found in the header used by the adversary. \ -lookup matching is meant to catch some basic obfuscation that has been identified using upper, lower and date. \ -Scoring will then occur based on any findings. The base score is meant to be 2 , created by jndi_fastmatch. Everything else is meant to increase that score. \ -Finally, a simple table is created to show the scoring and the _raw field. Sort based on score or columns of interest. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Hunting for Log4Shell -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | from datamodel Web.Web | eval jndi=if(match(_raw, "(\{|%7B)[jJnNdDiI]{4}:"),4,0) | eval jndi_fastmatch=if(match(_raw, "[jJnNdDiI]{4}"),2,0) | eval jndi_proto=if(match(_raw,"(?i)jndi:(ldap[s]?|rmi|dns|nis|iiop|corba|nds|http|https):"),5,0) | eval all_match = if(match(_raw, "(?i)(%(25){0,}20|\s)*(%(25){0,}24|\$)(%(25){0,}20|\s)*(%(25){0,}7B|{)(%(25){0,}20|\s)*(%(25){0,}(6A|4A)|J)(%(25){0,}(6E|4E)|N)(%(25){0,}(64|44)|D)(%(25){0,}(69|49)|I)(%(25){0,}20|\s)*(%(25){0,}3A|:)[\w\%]+(%(25){1,}3A|:)(%(25){1,}2F|\/)[^\n]+"),5,0) | eval env_var = if(match(_raw, "env:") OR match(_raw, "env:AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID") OR match(_raw, "env:AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY"),5,0) | eval uridetect = if(match(_raw, "(?i)Basic\/Command\/Base64|Basic\/ReverseShell|Basic\/TomcatMemshell|Basic\/JBossMemshell|Basic\/WebsphereMemshell|Basic\/SpringMemshell|Basic\/Command|Deserialization\/CommonsCollectionsK|Deserialization\/CommonsBeanutils|Deserialization\/Jre8u20\/TomcatMemshell|Deserialization\/CVE_2020_2555\/WeblogicMemshell|TomcatBypass|GroovyBypass|WebsphereBypass"),4,0) | eval keywords = if(match(_raw,"(?i)\$\{ctx\:loginId\}|\$\{map\:type\}|\$\{filename\}|\$\{date\:MM-dd-yyyy\}|\$\{docker\:containerId\}|\$\{docker\:containerName\}|\$\{docker\:imageName\}|\$\{env\:USER\}|\$\{event\:Marker\}|\$\{mdc\:UserId\}|\$\{java\:runtime\}|\$\{java\:vm\}|\$\{java\:os\}|\$\{jndi\:logging/context-name\}|\$\{hostName\}|\$\{docker\:containerId\}|\$\{k8s\:accountName\}|\$\{k8s\:clusterName\}|\$\{k8s\:containerId\}|\$\{k8s\:containerName\}|\$\{k8s\:host\}|\$\{k8s\:labels.app\}|\$\{k8s\:labels.podTemplateHash\}|\$\{k8s\:masterUrl\}|\$\{k8s\:namespaceId\}|\$\{k8s\:namespaceName\}|\$\{k8s\:podId\}|\$\{k8s\:podIp\}|\$\{k8s\:podName\}|\$\{k8s\:imageId\}|\$\{k8s\:imageName\}|\$\{log4j\:configLocation\}|\$\{log4j\:configParentLocation\}|\$\{spring\:spring.application.name\}|\$\{main\:myString\}|\$\{main\:0\}|\$\{main\:1\}|\$\{main\:2\}|\$\{main\:3\}|\$\{main\:4\}|\$\{main\:bar\}|\$\{name\}|\$\{marker\}|\$\{marker\:name\}|\$\{spring\:profiles.active[0]|\$\{sys\:logPath\}|\$\{web\:rootDir\}|\$\{sys\:user.name\}"),4,0) | eval obf = if(match(_raw, "(\$|%24)[^ /]*({|%7b)[^ /]*(j|%6a)[^ /]*(n|%6e)[^ /]*(d|%64)[^ /]*(i|%69)[^ /]*(:|%3a)[^ /]*(:|%3a)[^ /]*(/|%2f)"),5,0) | eval lookups = if(match(_raw, "(?i)({|%7b)(main|sys|k8s|spring|lower|upper|env|date|sd)"),4,0) | addtotals fieldname=Score, jndi, jndi_proto, env_var, uridetect, all_match, jndi_fastmatch, keywords, obf, lookups | where Score > 2 | stats values(Score) by jndi, jndi_proto, env_var, uridetect, all_match, jndi_fastmatch, keywords, lookups, obf, _raw | `hunting_for_log4shell_filter` - -[ESCU - ICACLS Grant Command - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic identifies potential adversaries that modify the security permission of a specific file or directory. This technique is commonly seen in APT tradecraft and coinminer scripts to evade detections and restrict access to their component files. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic identifies potential adversaries that modify the security permission of a specific file or directory. This technique is commonly seen in APT tradecraft and coinminer scripts to evade detections and restrict access to their component files. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed icacls.exe may be used. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown. Filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-05-04 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-05-04 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - ICACLS Grant Command - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["XMRig", "Ransomware"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Process name $process_name$ with grant argument executed by $user$ to change security permission of a specific file or directory on host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 49}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - ICACLS Grant Command - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig", "Ransomware"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic identifies potential adversaries that modify the security permission of a specific file or directory. This technique is commonly seen in APT tradecraft and coinminer scripts to evade detections and restrict access to their component files. -action.notable.param.rule_title = ICACLS Grant Command -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "icacls.exe" OR Processes.process_name = "cacls.exe" OR Processes.process_name = "xcacls.exe" AND Processes.process = "*/grant*" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `icacls_grant_command_filter` - -[ESCU - Icacls Deny Command - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic identifies a potential adversary that changes the security permission of a specific file or directory. This technique is commonly seen in APT tradecraft or coinminer scripts. This behavior is meant to evade detection and prevent access to their component files. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic identifies a potential adversary that changes the security permission of a specific file or directory. This technique is commonly seen in APT tradecraft or coinminer scripts. This behavior is meant to evade detection and prevent access to their component files. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed icacls.exe may be used. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown. It is possible some administrative scripts use ICacls. Filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-29 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-29 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Icacls Deny Command - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["XMRig"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Process name $process_name$ with deny argument executed by $user$ to change security permission of a specific file or directory on host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 72}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Icacls Deny Command - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic identifies a potential adversary that changes the security permission of a specific file or directory. This technique is commonly seen in APT tradecraft or coinminer scripts. This behavior is meant to evade detection and prevent access to their component files. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Icacls Deny Command -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "icacls.exe" OR Processes.process_name = "cacls.exe" OR Processes.process_name = "xcacls.exe" AND Processes.process = "*/deny*" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `icacls_deny_command_filter` - -[ESCU - IcedID Exfiltrated Archived File Creation - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search is to detect a suspicious file creation namely passff.tar and cookie.tar. This files are possible archived of stolen browser information like history and cookies in a compromised machine with IcedID. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1560.001", "T1560"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious file creation namely passff.tar and cookie.tar. This files are possible archived of stolen browser information like history and cookies in a compromised machine with IcedID. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-30 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-30 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - IcedID Exfiltrated Archived File Creation - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["IcedID"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = process $SourceImage$ create a file $TargetImage$ in host $Computer$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}, {"threat_object_field": "SourceImage", "threat_object_type": "process name"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - IcedID Exfiltrated Archived File Creation - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1560.001", "T1560"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "SourceImage", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "process name"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious file creation namely passff.tar and cookie.tar. This files are possible archived of stolen browser information like history and cookies in a compromised machine with IcedID. -action.notable.param.rule_title = IcedID Exfiltrated Archived File Creation -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `sysmon` EventCode= 11 (TargetFilename = "*\\passff.tar" OR TargetFilename = "*\\cookie.tar") |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by TargetFilename EventCode process_id process_name Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation_filter` - -[ESCU - Identify New User Accounts - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This detection search will help profile user accounts in your environment by identifying newly created accounts that have been added to your network in the past week. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.002"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This detection search will help profile user accounts in your environment by identifying newly created accounts that have been added to your network in the past week. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be populating the Enterprise Security Identity_Management data model in the assets and identity framework. -action.escu.known_false_positives = If the Identity_Management data model is not updated regularly, this search could give you false positive alerts. Please consider this and investigate appropriately. -action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-12 -action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-12 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Identify New User Accounts - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Account Monitoring and Controls"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Identify New User Accounts - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Account Monitoring and Controls"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.002"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This detection search will help profile user accounts in your environment by identifying newly created accounts that have been added to your network in the past week. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Identify New User Accounts -action.notable.param.security_domain = access -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | from datamodel Identity_Management.All_Identities | eval empStatus=case((now()-startDate)<604800, "Accounts created in last week") | search empStatus="Accounts created in last week"| `security_content_ctime(endDate)` | `security_content_ctime(startDate)`| table identity empStatus endDate startDate | `identify_new_user_accounts_filter` - -[ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for the presence of suspicious commandline parameters typically present when using Impacket tools. Impacket is a collection of python classes meant to be used with Microsoft network protocols. There are multiple scripts that leverage impacket libraries like `wmiexec.py`, `smbexec.py`, `dcomexec.py` and `atexec.py` used to execute commands on remote endpoints. By default, these scripts leverage administrative shares and hardcoded parameters that can be used as a signature to detect its use. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage Impackets tools for lateral movement and remote code execution. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.002", "T1021.003", "T1047", "T1543.003"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the presence of suspicious commandline parameters typically present when using Impacket tools. Impacket is a collection of python classes meant to be used with Microsoft network protocols. There are multiple scripts that leverage impacket libraries like `wmiexec.py`, `smbexec.py`, `dcomexec.py` and `atexec.py` used to execute commands on remote endpoints. By default, these scripts leverage administrative shares and hardcoded parameters that can be used as a signature to detect its use. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage Impackets tools for lateral movement and remote code execution. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Although uncommon, Administrators may leverage Impackets tools to start a process on remote systems for system administration or automation use cases. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-18 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-18 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "WhisperGate"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious command line parameters on $dest may represent a lateral movement attack with Impackets tools -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "WhisperGate"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.002", "T1021.003", "T1047", "T1543.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the presence of suspicious commandline parameters typically present when using Impacket tools. Impacket is a collection of python classes meant to be used with Microsoft network protocols. There are multiple scripts that leverage impacket libraries like `wmiexec.py`, `smbexec.py`, `dcomexec.py` and `atexec.py` used to execute commands on remote endpoints. By default, these scripts leverage administrative shares and hardcoded parameters that can be used as a signature to detect its use. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage Impackets tools for lateral movement and remote code execution. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process = "*/c* \\\\127.0.0.1\\*" OR Processes.process= "*/c* 2>&1") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters_filter` - -[ESCU - Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the usage of the `Enter-PSSession`. This commandlet can be used to open an interactive session on a remote endpoint leveraging the WinRM protocol. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WinRM and `Enter-PSSession` for lateral movement and remote code execution. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.006"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the usage of the `Enter-PSSession`. This commandlet can be used to open an interactive session on a remote endpoint leveraging the WinRM protocol. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WinRM and `Enter-PSSession` for lateral movement and remote code execution. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup instructions can be found https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage WinRM and `Enter-PSSession` for administrative and troubleshooting tasks. This activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. In certain environments, tuning may not be possible. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-18 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-18 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = An interactive session was opened on a remote endpoint from $ComputerName -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 45}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.006"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the usage of the `Enter-PSSession`. This commandlet can be used to open an interactive session on a remote endpoint leveraging the WinRM protocol. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WinRM and `Enter-PSSession` for lateral movement and remote code execution. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message="*Enter-PSSession*" AND Message="*-ComputerName*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `interactive_session_on_remote_endpoint_with_powershell_filter` - -[ESCU - Java Class File download by Java User Agent - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies a Java user agent performing a GET request for a .class file from the remote site. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Web"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies a Java user agent performing a GET request for a .class file from the remote site. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting web or proxy logs, or ensure it is being filled by a proxy like device, into the Web Datamodel. For additional filtering, allow list private IP space or restrict by known good. The following Splunk SOAR playbook can be used to respond to this detection: Log4j Investigate The following Splunk SOAR playbook can be used to respond to this detection: Log4j Respond -action.escu.known_false_positives = Filtering may be required in some instances, filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-13 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-13 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Java Class File download by Java User Agent - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A Java user agent $http_user_agent$ was performing a $http_method$ to retrieve a remote class file. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 40}, {"threat_object_field": "http_user_agent", "threat_object_type": "other"}, {"threat_object_field": "http_method", "threat_object_type": "other"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Java Class File download by Java User Agent - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:network"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "http_user_agent", "role": ["other"], "type": "Other"}, {"name": "http_method", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Other"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies a Java user agent performing a GET request for a .class file from the remote site. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). -action.notable.param.rule_title = Java Class File download by Java User Agent -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_user_agent="*Java*" Web.http_method="GET" Web.url="*.class*" by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter` - -[ESCU - Jscript Execution Using Cscript App - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search is to detect a execution of jscript using cscript process. Commonly when a user run jscript file it was executed by wscript.exe application. This technique was seen in FIN7 js implant to execute its malicious script using cscript process. This behavior is uncommon and a good artifacts to check further anomalies within the network -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.007"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a execution of jscript using cscript process. Commonly when a user run jscript file it was executed by wscript.exe application. This technique was seen in FIN7 js implant to execute its malicious script using cscript process. This behavior is uncommon and a good artifacts to check further anomalies within the network -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-13 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-13 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Jscript Execution Using Cscript App - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["FIN7", "Remcos"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Process name $process_name$ with commandline $process$ to execute jscript in $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 49}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Jscript Execution Using Cscript App - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["FIN7", "Remcos"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.007"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a execution of jscript using cscript process. Commonly when a user run jscript file it was executed by wscript.exe application. This technique was seen in FIN7 js implant to execute its malicious script using cscript process. This behavior is uncommon and a good artifacts to check further anomalies within the network -action.notable.param.rule_title = Jscript Execution Using Cscript App -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = "cscript.exe" AND Processes.parent_process = "*//e:jscript*") OR (Processes.process_name = "cscript.exe" AND Processes.process = "*//e:jscript*") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `jscript_execution_using_cscript_app_filter` - -[ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic leverages Kerberos Event 4769, A Kerberos service ticket was requested, to identify a potential kerberoasting attack against Active Directory networks. Kerberoasting allows an adversary to request kerberos tickets for domain accounts typically used as service accounts and attempt to crack them offline allowing them to obtain privileged access to the domain. This analytic looks for a specific combination of the Ticket_Options field based on common kerberoasting tools. Defenders should be aware that it may be possible for a Kerberoast attack to use different Ticket_Options. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic leverages Kerberos Event 4769, A Kerberos service ticket was requested, to identify a potential kerberoasting attack against Active Directory networks. Kerberoasting allows an adversary to request kerberos tickets for domain accounts typically used as service accounts and attempt to crack them offline allowing them to obtain privileged access to the domain. This analytic looks for a specific combination of the Ticket_Options field based on common kerberoasting tools. Defenders should be aware that it may be possible for a Kerberoast attack to use different Ticket_Options. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Older systems that support kerberos RC4 by default like NetApp may generate false positives. Filter as needed -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-09 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-09 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Privilege Escalation", "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Potential kerberoasting attack via service principal name requests detected on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation", "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic leverages Kerberos Event 4769, A Kerberos service ticket was requested, to identify a potential kerberoasting attack against Active Directory networks. Kerberoasting allows an adversary to request kerberos tickets for domain accounts typically used as service accounts and attempt to crack them offline allowing them to obtain privileged access to the domain. This analytic looks for a specific combination of the Ticket_Options field based on common kerberoasting tools. Defenders should be aware that it may be possible for a Kerberoast attack to use different Ticket_Options. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769 Service_Name!="*$" (Ticket_Options=0x40810000 OR Ticket_Options=0x40800000 OR Ticket_Options=0x40810010) Ticket_Encryption_Type=0x17 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, service, service_id, Ticket_Encryption_Type, Ticket_Options | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption_filter` - -[ESCU - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled in UserAccountControl - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic leverages Windows Security Event 4738, `A user account was changed`, to identify a change performed on a domain user object that disables Kerberos Pre-Authentication. Disabling the Pre Authentication flag in the UserAccountControl property allows an adversary to easily perform a brute force attack against the user's password offline leveraging the ASP REP Roasting technique. Red Teams and adversaries alike who have obtained privileges in an Active Directory network may use this technique as a backdoor or a way to escalate privileges. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Intrusion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.004"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic leverages Windows Security Event 4738, `A user account was changed`, to identify a change performed on a domain user object that disables Kerberos Pre-Authentication. Disabling the Pre Authentication flag in the UserAccountControl property allows an adversary to easily perform a brute force attack against the user's password offline leveraging the ASP REP Roasting technique. Red Teams and adversaries alike who have obtained privileges in an Active Directory network may use this technique as a backdoor or a way to escalate privileges. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `User Account Management` within `Account Management` needs to be enabled. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-22 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-22 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled in UserAccountControl - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Kerberos Pre Authentication was Disabled for $Account_Name$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 45}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled in UserAccountControl - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:PrivilegeEscalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Intrusion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.004"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic leverages Windows Security Event 4738, `A user account was changed`, to identify a change performed on a domain user object that disables Kerberos Pre-Authentication. Disabling the Pre Authentication flag in the UserAccountControl property allows an adversary to easily perform a brute force attack against the user's password offline leveraging the ASP REP Roasting technique. Red Teams and adversaries alike who have obtained privileges in an Active Directory network may use this technique as a backdoor or a way to escalate privileges. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled in UserAccountControl -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4738 MSADChangedAttributes="*Don't Require Preauth' - Enabled*" | table EventCode, Account_Name, Security_ID, MSADChangedAttributes | `kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_in_useraccountcontrol_filter` - -[ESCU - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled with PowerShell - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Set-ADAccountControl` commandlet with specific parameters. `Set-ADAccountControl` is part of the Active Directory PowerShell module used to manage Windows Active Directory networks. As the name suggests, `Set-ADAccountControl` is used to modify User Account Control values for an Active Directory domain account. With the appropiate parameters, Set-ADAccountControl allows adversaries to disable Kerberos Pre-Authentication for an account to to easily perform a brute force attack against the user's password offline leveraging the ASP REP Roasting technique. Red Teams and adversaries alike who have obtained privileges in an Active Directory network may use this technique as a backdoor or a way to escalate privileges. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Intrusion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.004"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Set-ADAccountControl` commandlet with specific parameters. `Set-ADAccountControl` is part of the Active Directory PowerShell module used to manage Windows Active Directory networks. As the name suggests, `Set-ADAccountControl` is used to modify User Account Control values for an Active Directory domain account. With the appropiate parameters, Set-ADAccountControl allows adversaries to disable Kerberos Pre-Authentication for an account to to easily perform a brute force attack against the user's password offline leveraging the ASP REP Roasting technique. Red Teams and adversaries alike who have obtained privileges in an Active Directory network may use this technique as a backdoor or a way to escalate privileges. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, Administrators may need to set this flag for legitimate purposes. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-23 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-23 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled with PowerShell - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Kerberos Pre Authentication was Disabled using PowerShell on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 45}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled with PowerShell - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:PrivilegeEscalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Intrusion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.004"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Set-ADAccountControl` commandlet with specific parameters. `Set-ADAccountControl` is part of the Active Directory PowerShell module used to manage Windows Active Directory networks. As the name suggests, `Set-ADAccountControl` is used to modify User Account Control values for an Active Directory domain account. With the appropiate parameters, Set-ADAccountControl allows adversaries to disable Kerberos Pre-Authentication for an account to to easily perform a brute force attack against the user's password offline leveraging the ASP REP Roasting technique. Red Teams and adversaries alike who have obtained privileges in an Active Directory network may use this technique as a backdoor or a way to escalate privileges. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled with PowerShell -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = "*Set-ADAccountControl*" AND Message="*DoesNotRequirePreAuth:$true*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_with_powershell_filter` - -[ESCU - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search detects a suspicioous termination of known services killed by ransomware before encrypting files in a compromised machine. This technique is commonly seen in most of ransomware now a days to avoid exception error while accessing the targetted files it wants to encrypts because of the open handle of those services to the targetted file. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search detects a suspicioous termination of known services killed by ransomware before encrypting files in a compromised machine. This technique is commonly seen in most of ransomware now a days to avoid exception error while accessing the targetted files it wants to encrypts because of the open handle of those services to the targetted file. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the 7036 EventCode ScManager in System audit Logs from your endpoints. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Admin activities or installing related updates may do a sudden stop to list of services we monitor. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-04 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-04 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware", "BlackMatter Ransomware"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Known services $Message$ terminated by a potential ransomware on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}, {"threat_object_field": "Message", "threat_object_type": "other"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "BlackMatter Ransomware"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "Message", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Other"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search detects a suspicioous termination of known services killed by ransomware before encrypting files in a compromised machine. This technique is commonly seen in most of ransomware now a days to avoid exception error while accessing the targetted files it wants to encrypts because of the open handle of those services to the targetted file. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Known Services Killed by Ransomware -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 Message IN ("*Volume Shadow Copy*","*VSS*", "*backup*", "*sophos*", "*sql*", "*memtas*", "*mepocs*", "*veeam*", "*svc$*") Message="*service entered the stopped state*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message dest Type | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `known_services_killed_by_ransomware_filter` - -[ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs -action.escu.known_false_positives = Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-06-23 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-06-23 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences -action.notable.param.rule_title = Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account -action.notable.param.security_domain = threat -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason=* | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | stats count by user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | rare user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |`kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account_filter` - -[ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods by IP address, verb and decision -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods by IP address, verb and decision -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs -action.escu.known_false_positives = Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst must consider IP, verb and decision context when trying to detect maliciousness. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-06-23 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-06-23 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods by IP address, verb and decision -action.notable.param.rule_title = Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod -action.notable.param.security_domain = threat -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts objectRef.resource=pods | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision | top sourceIPs{} user.username verb annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision |`kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_filter` - -[ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation, however source IP, namespace and user group may indicate possible malicious use. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-06-23 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-06-23 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets -action.notable.param.rule_title = Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access -action.notable.param.security_domain = threat -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` objectRef.resource=clusterroles OR clusterrolebindings sourceIPs{}!=::1 sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1 | table sourceIPs{} user.username user.groups{} objectRef.namespace requestURI annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | dedup user.username user.groups{} |`kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter` - -[ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status, this search can be extended by using top or rare operators to find trends or rarities in failure status, user agents, source IPs and request URI -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status, this search can be extended by using top or rare operators to find trends or rarities in failure status, user agents, source IPs and request URI -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs. -action.escu.known_false_positives = This search can give false positives as there might be inherent issues with authentications and permissions at cluster. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-06-23 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-06-23 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status, this search can be extended by using top or rare operators to find trends or rarities in failure status, user agents, source IPs and request URI -action.notable.param.rule_title = Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access -action.notable.param.security_domain = threat -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts responseStatus.status = Failure | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb responseStatus.status requestURI | `kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter` - -[ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search provides information on anonymous Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search provides information on anonymous Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP, verb and Object can reveal potential malicious activity, specially anonymous suspicious IPs and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-06-23 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-06-23 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search provides information on anonymous Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context -action.notable.param.rule_title = Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls -action.notable.param.security_domain = threat -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` userAgent=kubectl* sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1 sourceIPs{}!=::1 src_user=system:anonymous | table src_ip src_user verb userAgent requestURI | stats count by src_ip src_user verb userAgent requestURI |`kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter` - -[ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding rare or top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding rare or top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics -action.escu.known_false_positives = Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-05-26 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-26 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding rare or top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences -action.notable.param.rule_title = Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account -action.notable.param.security_domain = threat -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason=* | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |stats count by user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | rare user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |`kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account_filter` - -[ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods and namespaces by IP address and verb -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods and namespaces by IP address and verb -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics -action.escu.known_false_positives = Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst must consider IP and verb context when trying to detect maliciousness. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-05-26 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-26 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods and namespaces by IP address and verb -action.notable.param.rule_title = Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace -action.notable.param.security_domain = threat -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts* OR user.username=system.anonymous OR annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision=allow | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb responseStatus.reason responseStatus.status properties.pod objectRef.namespace | top sourceIPs{} user.username verb responseStatus.status properties.pod objectRef.namespace |`kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace_filter` - -[ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics -action.escu.known_false_positives = Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user and object context can provide guidance for detection. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-05-20 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-20 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets -action.notable.param.rule_title = Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access -action.notable.param.security_domain = threat -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log| search objectRef.resource=secrets OR configmaps user.username=system.anonymous OR annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision=allow |table user.username user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace objectRef.name annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |dedup user.username user.groups{} |`kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access_filter` - -[ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics -action.escu.known_false_positives = Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation, however source IP, namespace and user group may indicate possible malicious use. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-05-20 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-20 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets -action.notable.param.rule_title = Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access -action.notable.param.security_domain = threat -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log| search objectRef.resource=clusterroles OR clusterrolebindings | table sourceIPs{} user.username user.groups{} objectRef.namespace requestURI annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | dedup user.username user.groups{} |`kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter` - -[ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics -action.escu.known_false_positives = This search can give false positives as there might be inherent issues with authentications and permissions at cluster. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-05-20 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-20 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status -action.notable.param.rule_title = Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access -action.notable.param.security_domain = threat -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts* responseStatus.reason=Forbidden | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb responseStatus.reason responseStatus.status properties.pod objectRef.namespace |`kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter` - -[ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on rare Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on rare Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics -action.escu.known_false_positives = Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP, verb and Object can reveal potential malicious activity, specially suspicious IPs and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-05-26 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-26 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on rare Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context -action.notable.param.rule_title = Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls -action.notable.param.security_domain = threat -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | spath input=responseObject.metadata.annotations.kubectl.kubernetes.io/last-applied-configuration | search userAgent=kubectl* sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1 sourceIPs{}!=::1 | table sourceIPs{} verb userAgent user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace requestURI | rare sourceIPs{} verb userAgent user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace requestURI |`kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter` - -[ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via source IP user agent, request URI and response status data against Kubernetes cluster pod in Azure -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via source IP user agent, request URI and response status data against Kubernetes cluster pod in Azure -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics -action.escu.known_false_positives = Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but source IPs, userAgent, verb, request URI and response status will provide context. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-05-20 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-20 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via source IP user agent, request URI and response status data against Kubernetes cluster pod in Azure -action.notable.param.rule_title = Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint -action.notable.param.security_domain = threat -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search responseStatus.code=401 | table sourceIPs{} userAgent verb requestURI responseStatus.reason properties.pod |`kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint_filter` - -[ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via source IP user agent, request URI and response status data against Kubernetes cluster in Azure -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via source IP user agent, request URI and response status data against Kubernetes cluster in Azure -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics -action.escu.known_false_positives = Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but source IPs, userAgent, verb, request URI and response status will provide context. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-05-19 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-19 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via source IP user agent, request URI and response status data against Kubernetes cluster in Azure -action.notable.param.rule_title = Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint -action.notable.param.security_domain = threat -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search responseStatus.code=401 | table sourceIPs{} userAgent verb requestURI responseStatus.reason |`kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint_filter` - -[ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub messaging service logs -action.escu.known_false_positives = Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-11 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-11 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences -action.notable.param.rule_title = Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account -action.notable.param.security_domain = threat -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason=ClusterRoleBinding OR Clusterrole | table src_ip src_user data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason | rare src_user data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account_filter` - -[ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods by IP address, verb and decision -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods by IP address, verb and decision -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk GCP add on. This search works with pubsub messaging service logs -action.escu.known_false_positives = Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst must consider IP, verb and decision context when trying to detect maliciousness. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-10 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-10 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods by IP address, verb and decision -action.notable.param.rule_title = Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod -action.notable.param.security_domain = threat -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.request.spec.group{}=system:serviceaccounts | table src_ip src_user http_user_agent data.protoPayload.request.spec.nonResourceAttributes.verb data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision data.protoPayload.response.spec.resourceAttributes.resource | top src_ip src_user http_user_agent data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision data.protoPayload.response.spec.resourceAttributes.resource |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_filter` - -[ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmaps or secrets -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmaps or secrets -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk add on for GCP . This search works with pubsub messaging service logs. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user and object context can provide guidance for detection. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-11 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-11 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmaps or secrets -action.notable.param.rule_title = Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access -action.notable.param.security_domain = threat -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.resource=configmaps OR secrets | table data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp src_user data.resource.labels.cluster_name data.protoPayload.request.metadata.namespace data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision | dedup data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp src_user data.resource.labels.cluster_name |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access_filter` - -[ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub messaging servicelogs. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation, however source IP, user agent, decision and reason may indicate possible malicious use. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-11 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-11 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets -action.notable.param.rule_title = Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access -action.notable.param.security_domain = threat -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason=ClusterRoleBinding OR Clusterrole dest=apis/rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1 src_ip!=::1 | table src_ip src_user http_user_agent data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason | dedup src_ip src_user |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter` - -[ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status, this search can be extended by using top or rare operators to find trends or rarities in failure status, user agents, source IPs and request URI -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status, this search can be extended by using top or rare operators to find trends or rarities in failure status, user agents, source IPs and request URI -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub messaging service logs. -action.escu.known_false_positives = This search can give false positives as there might be inherent issues with authentications and permissions at cluster. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-06-23 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-06-23 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status, this search can be extended by using top or rare operators to find trends or rarities in failure status, user agents, source IPs and request URI -action.notable.param.rule_title = Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access -action.notable.param.security_domain = threat -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `google_gcp_pubsub_message` system:serviceaccounts data.protoPayload.response.status.allowed!=* | table src_ip src_user http_user_agent data.protoPayload.response.spec.resourceAttributes.namespace data.resource.labels.cluster_name data.protoPayload.response.spec.resourceAttributes.verb data.protoPayload.request.status.allowed data.protoPayload.response.status.reason data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision | dedup src_ip src_user | `kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter` - -[ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on anonymous Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on anonymous Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub messaging logs. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP, source user, user agent, object path, and authorization context can reveal potential malicious activity, specially anonymous suspicious IPs and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-11 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-11 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on anonymous Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context -action.notable.param.rule_title = Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls -action.notable.param.security_domain = threat -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent=kubectl* src_user=system:unsecured OR src_user=system:anonymous | table src_ip src_user data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.granted object_path |dedup src_ip src_user |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter` - -[ESCU - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search uses the Kubernetes logs from a nginx ingress controller to detect local file inclusion attacks. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1212"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search uses the Kubernetes logs from a nginx ingress controller to detect local file inclusion attacks. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must ingest Kubernetes logs through Splunk Connect for Kubernetes. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-20 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-20 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Dev Sec Ops"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Local File Inclusion Attack detected on $host$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "src_ip", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1212"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src_ip", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search uses the Kubernetes logs from a nginx ingress controller to detect local file inclusion attacks. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `kubernetes_container_controller` | rex field=_raw "^(?\S+)\s+-\s+-\s+\[(?[^\]]*)\]\s\"(?[^\"]*)\"\s(?\S*)\s(?\S*)\s\"(?[^\"]*)\"\s\"(?[^\"]*)\"\s(?\S*)\s(?\S*)\s\[(?[^\]]*)\]\s\[(?[^\]]*)\]\s(?\S*)\s(?\S*)\s(?\S*)\s(?\S*)\s(?\S*)" | lookup local_file_inclusion_paths local_file_inclusion_paths AS request OUTPUT lfi_path | search lfi_path=yes | rename remote_addr AS src_ip, upstream_status as status, proxy_upstream_name as proxy | rex field=request "^(?\S+)\s(?\S+)\s" | eval phase="operate" | eval severity="high" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by src_ip, status, url, http_method, host, http_user_agent, proxy, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `kubernetes_nginx_ingress_lfi_filter` - -[ESCU - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress RFI - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search uses the Kubernetes logs from a nginx ingress controller to detect remote file inclusion attacks. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1212"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search uses the Kubernetes logs from a nginx ingress controller to detect remote file inclusion attacks. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must ingest Kubernetes logs through Splunk Connect for Kubernetes. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-23 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-23 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress RFI - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Dev Sec Ops"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Remote File Inclusion Attack detected on $host$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "src_ip", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress RFI - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1212"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src_ip", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search uses the Kubernetes logs from a nginx ingress controller to detect remote file inclusion attacks. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Kubernetes Nginx Ingress RFI -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `kubernetes_container_controller` | rex field=_raw "^(?\S+)\s+-\s+-\s+\[(?[^\]]*)\]\s\"(?[^\"]*)\"\s(?\S*)\s(?\S*)\s\"(?[^\"]*)\"\s\"(?[^\"]*)\"\s(?\S*)\s(?\S*)\s\[(?[^\]]*)\]\s\[(?[^\]]*)\]\s(?\S*)\s(?\S*)\s(?\S*)\s(?\S*)\s(?\S*)" | rex field=request "^(?\S+)?\s(?\S+)\s" | rex field=url "(?\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3})" | search dest_ip=* | rename remote_addr AS src_ip, upstream_status as status, proxy_upstream_name as proxy | eval phase="operate" | eval severity="medium" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by src_ip, dest_ip status, url, http_method, host, http_user_agent, proxy, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `kubernetes_nginx_ingress_rfi_filter` - -[ESCU - Kubernetes Scanner Image Pulling - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search uses the Kubernetes logs from Splunk Connect from Kubernetes to detect Kubernetes Security Scanner. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search uses the Kubernetes logs from Splunk Connect from Kubernetes to detect Kubernetes Security Scanner. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must ingest Kubernetes logs through Splunk Connect for Kubernetes. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-24 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-24 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Scanner Image Pulling - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Dev Sec Ops Analytics"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Dev Sec Ops"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Kubernetes Scanner image pulled on host $host$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "host", "threat_object_type": "entity"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Kubernetes Scanner Image Pulling - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "host", "type": "Entity"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search uses the Kubernetes logs from Splunk Connect from Kubernetes to detect Kubernetes Security Scanner. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Kubernetes Scanner Image Pulling -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `kube_objects_events` object.message IN ("Pulling image *kube-hunter*", "Pulling image *kube-bench*", "Pulling image *kube-recon*", "Pulling image *kube-recon*") | rename object.* AS * | rename involvedObject.* AS * | rename source.host AS host | eval phase="operate" | eval severity="high" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by host, name, namespace, kind, reason, message, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `kubernetes_scanner_image_pulling_filter` - -[ESCU - Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The search is used to identify attempts to use your DNS Infrastructure for DDoS purposes via a DNS amplification attack leveraging ANY queries. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1498", "T1498.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "PR.IP"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Resolution"] -action.escu.eli5 = The search is used to identify attempts to use your DNS Infrastructure for DDoS purposes via a DNS amplification attack leveraging ANY queries. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you must ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate ANY requests may trigger this search, however it is unusual to see a large volume of them under typical circumstances. You may modify the threshold in the search to better suit your environment. -action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-20 -action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-20 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["DNS Amplification Attacks"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DNS Amplification Attacks"], "cis20": ["CIS 11", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1498", "T1498.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "PR.IP"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The search is used to identify attempts to use your DNS Infrastructure for DDoS purposes via a DNS amplification attack leveraging ANY queries. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where nodename=DNS "DNS.message_type"="QUERY" "DNS.record_type"="ANY" by "DNS.dest" | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` | where count>200 | `large_volume_of_dns_any_queries_filter` - -[ESCU - Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies a suspicious file creation in known cron table directories. This event is commonly abuse by malware, adversaries and red teamers to persist on the target or compromised host. crontab or cronjob is like a schedule task in windows environment where you can create an executable or script on the known crontab directories to run it base on its schedule. This Anomaly query is a good indicator to look further what file is added and who added the file if to consider it legitimate file. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.003", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies a suspicious file creation in known cron table directories. This event is commonly abuse by malware, adversaries and red teamers to persist on the target or compromised host. crontab or cronjob is like a schedule task in windows environment where you can create an executable or script on the known crontab directories to run it base on its schedule. This Anomaly query is a good indicator to look further what file is added and who added the file if to consider it legitimate file. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can create file in crontab folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-17 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-17 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = a file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.003", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies a suspicious file creation in known cron table directories. This event is commonly abuse by malware, adversaries and red teamers to persist on the target or compromised host. crontab or cronjob is like a schedule task in windows environment where you can create an executable or script on the known crontab directories to run it base on its schedule. This Anomaly query is a good indicator to look further what file is added and who added the file if to consider it legitimate file. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN ("*/etc/cron*", "*/var/spool/cron/*") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_add_files_in_known_crontab_directories_filter` - -[ESCU - Linux Add User Account - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for commands to create user accounts on the linux platform. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to persist on the targeted or compromised host by creating new user with an elevated privilege. This Hunting query may catch normal creation of user by administrator so filter is needed. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.001", "T1136"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for commands to create user accounts on the linux platform. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to persist on the targeted or compromised host by creating new user with an elevated privilege. This Hunting query may catch normal creation of user by administrator so filter is needed. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-21 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-21 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Add User Account - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A commandline $process$ that may create user account on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Add User Account - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.001", "T1136"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for commands to create user accounts on the linux platform. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to persist on the targeted or compromised host by creating new user with an elevated privilege. This Hunting query may catch normal creation of user by administrator so filter is needed. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Linux Add User Account -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN ("useradd", "adduser") OR Processes.process IN ("*useradd *", "*adduser *") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_add_user_account_filter` - -[ESCU - Linux At Allow Config File Creation - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies a suspicious file creation of /etc/at.allow or /etc/at.deny. These 2 files are commonly abused by malware, adversaries or red teamers to persist on the targeted or compromised host. These config files can restrict or allow user to execute "at" application (another schedule task application in linux). attacker can create a user or add the compromised username to that config file to execute "at" to schedule it malicious code. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator to investigate further the entry in created config file and who created it to verify if it is a false positive. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.003", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies a suspicious file creation of /etc/at.allow or /etc/at.deny. These 2 files are commonly abused by malware, adversaries or red teamers to persist on the targeted or compromised host. These config files can restrict or allow user to execute "at" application (another schedule task application in linux). attacker can create a user or add the compromised username to that config file to execute "at" to schedule it malicious code. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator to investigate further the entry in created config file and who created it to verify if it is a false positive. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can create this file for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-17 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-17 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux At Allow Config File Creation - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux At Allow Config File Creation - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.003", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies a suspicious file creation of /etc/at.allow or /etc/at.deny. These 2 files are commonly abused by malware, adversaries or red teamers to persist on the targeted or compromised host. These config files can restrict or allow user to execute "at" application (another schedule task application in linux). attacker can create a user or add the compromised username to that config file to execute "at" to schedule it malicious code. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator to investigate further the entry in created config file and who created it to verify if it is a false positive. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Linux At Allow Config File Creation -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN ("*/etc/at.allow", "*/etc/at.deny") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_at_allow_config_file_creation_filter` - -[ESCU - Linux At Application Execution - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies a suspicious process creation of At application. This process can be used by malware, adversaries and red teamers to create persistence entry to the targeted or compromised host with their malicious code. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator to investigate the event before and after this process execution, when it was executed and what schedule task it will execute. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.001", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies a suspicious process creation of At application. This process can be used by malware, adversaries and red teamers to create persistence entry to the targeted or compromised host with their malicious code. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator to investigate the event before and after this process execution, when it was executed and what schedule task it will execute. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use this application for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-17 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-17 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux At Application Execution - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = At application was executed in $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 9}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux At Application Execution - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.001", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies a suspicious process creation of At application. This process can be used by malware, adversaries and red teamers to create persistence entry to the targeted or compromised host with their malicious code. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator to investigate the event before and after this process execution, when it was executed and what schedule task it will execute. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Linux At Application Execution -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN ("at", "atd") OR Processes.parent_process_name IN ("at", "atd") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_at_application_execution_filter` - -[ESCU - Linux Change File Owner To Root - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for a commandline that change the file owner to root using chown utility tool. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to escalate privilege to the targeted or compromised host by changing the owner of their malicious file to root. This event is not so common in corporate network except from the administrator doing normal task that needs high privilege. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222.002", "T1222"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for a commandline that change the file owner to root using chown utility tool. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to escalate privilege to the targeted or compromised host by changing the owner of their malicious file to root. This event is not so common in corporate network except from the administrator doing normal task that needs high privilege. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-21 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-21 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Change File Owner To Root - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A commandline $process$ that may change ownership to root on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Change File Owner To Root - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222.002", "T1222"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for a commandline that change the file owner to root using chown utility tool. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to escalate privilege to the targeted or compromised host by changing the owner of their malicious file to root. This event is not so common in corporate network except from the administrator doing normal task that needs high privilege. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Linux Change File Owner To Root -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = chown OR Processes.process = "*chown *") AND Processes.process = "* root *" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_change_file_owner_to_root_filter` - -[ESCU - Linux Common Process For Elevation Control - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic is to look for possible elevation control access using a common known process in linux platform to change the attribute and file ownership. This technique is commonly abused by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain persistence or privilege escalation on the target or compromised host. Tis common process is used to modify file attribute, file ownership or SUID. This tools can be used in legitimate purposes so filter is needed. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.001", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to look for possible elevation control access using a common known process in linux platform to change the attribute and file ownership. This technique is commonly abused by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain persistence or privilege escalation on the target or compromised host. Tis common process is used to modify file attribute, file ownership or SUID. This tools can be used in legitimate purposes so filter is needed. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-23 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-23 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Common Process For Elevation Control - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A commandline $process$ with process $process_name$ on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 9}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Common Process For Elevation Control - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.001", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to look for possible elevation control access using a common known process in linux platform to change the attribute and file ownership. This technique is commonly abused by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain persistence or privilege escalation on the target or compromised host. Tis common process is used to modify file attribute, file ownership or SUID. This tools can be used in legitimate purposes so filter is needed. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Linux Common Process For Elevation Control -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN ("chmod", "chown", "fchmod", "fchmodat", "fchown", "fchownat", "fremovexattr", "fsetxattr", "lchown", "lremovexattr", "lsetxattr", "removexattr", "setuid", "setgid", "setreuid", "setregid", "chattr") OR Processes.process IN ("*chmod *", "*chown *", "*fchmod *", "*fchmodat *", "*fchown *", "*fchownat *", "*fremovexattr *", "*fsetxattr *", "*lchown *", "*lremovexattr *", "*lsetxattr *", "*removexattr *", "*setuid *", "*setgid *", "*setreuid *", "*setregid *", "*setcap *", "*chattr *") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_common_process_for_elevation_control_filter` - -[ESCU - Linux DD File Overwrite - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic is to look for dd command to overwrite file. This technique was abused by adversaries or threat actor to destroy files or data on specific system or in a large number of host within network to interrupt host avilability, services and many more. This is also used to destroy data where it make the file irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files, data or local and remote drives. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to look for dd command to overwrite file. This technique was abused by adversaries or threat actor to destroy files or data on specific system or in a large number of host within network to interrupt host avilability, services and many more. This is also used to destroy data where it make the file irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files, data or local and remote drives. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-14 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-14 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux DD File Overwrite - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Data Destruction"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A commandline $process$ executed on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux DD File Overwrite - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Destruction"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Impact"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to look for dd command to overwrite file. This technique was abused by adversaries or threat actor to destroy files or data on specific system or in a large number of host within network to interrupt host avilability, services and many more. This is also used to destroy data where it make the file irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files, data or local and remote drives. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Linux DD File Overwrite -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "dd" AND Processes.process = "*of=*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_dd_file_overwrite_filter` - -[ESCU - Linux Doas Conf File Creation - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic is to detect the creation of doas.conf file in linux host platform. This configuration file can be use by doas utility tool to allow or permit standard users to perform tasks as root, the same way sudo does. This tool is developed as a minimalistic alternative to sudo application. This tool can be abused advesaries, attacker or malware to gain elevated privileges to the targeted or compromised host. On the other hand this can also be executed by administrator for a certain task that needs admin rights. In this case filter is needed. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to detect the creation of doas.conf file in linux host platform. This configuration file can be use by doas utility tool to allow or permit standard users to perform tasks as root, the same way sudo does. This tool is developed as a minimalistic alternative to sudo application. This tool can be abused advesaries, attacker or malware to gain elevated privileges to the targeted or compromised host. On the other hand this can also be executed by administrator for a certain task that needs admin rights. In this case filter is needed. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-05 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-05 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Doas Conf File Creation - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Doas Conf File Creation - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to detect the creation of doas.conf file in linux host platform. This configuration file can be use by doas utility tool to allow or permit standard users to perform tasks as root, the same way sudo does. This tool is developed as a minimalistic alternative to sudo application. This tool can be abused advesaries, attacker or malware to gain elevated privileges to the targeted or compromised host. On the other hand this can also be executed by administrator for a certain task that needs admin rights. In this case filter is needed. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Linux Doas Conf File Creation -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN ("*/etc/doas.conf") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_doas_conf_file_creation_filter` - -[ESCU - Linux Doas Tool Execution - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic is to detect the doas tool execution in linux host platform. This utility tool allow standard users to perform tasks as root, the same way sudo does. This tool is developed as a minimalistic alternative to sudo application. This tool can be abused advesaries, attacker or malware to gain elevated privileges to the targeted or compromised host. On the other hand this can also be executed by administrator for a certain task that needs admin rights. In this case filter is needed. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to detect the doas tool execution in linux host platform. This utility tool allow standard users to perform tasks as root, the same way sudo does. This tool is developed as a minimalistic alternative to sudo application. This tool can be abused advesaries, attacker or malware to gain elevated privileges to the targeted or compromised host. On the other hand this can also be executed by administrator for a certain task that needs admin rights. In this case filter is needed. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-05 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-05 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Doas Tool Execution - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A doas $process_name$ with commandline $process$ was executed on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Doas Tool Execution - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to detect the doas tool execution in linux host platform. This utility tool allow standard users to perform tasks as root, the same way sudo does. This tool is developed as a minimalistic alternative to sudo application. This tool can be abused advesaries, attacker or malware to gain elevated privileges to the targeted or compromised host. On the other hand this can also be executed by administrator for a certain task that needs admin rights. In this case filter is needed. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Linux Doas Tool Execution -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "doas" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_doas_tool_execution_filter` - -[ESCU - Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies a suspicious cronjobs modification using crontab edit parameter. This commandline parameter can be abuse by malware author, adversaries, and red red teamers to add cronjob entry to their malicious code to execute to the schedule they want. This event can also be executed by administrator or normal user for automation purposes so filter is needed. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.003", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies a suspicious cronjobs modification using crontab edit parameter. This commandline parameter can be abuse by malware author, adversaries, and red red teamers to add cronjob entry to their malicious code to execute to the schedule they want. This event can also be executed by administrator or normal user for automation purposes so filter is needed. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use this application for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-17 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-17 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A possible crontab edit command $process$ executed on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 9}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.003", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies a suspicious cronjobs modification using crontab edit parameter. This commandline parameter can be abuse by malware author, adversaries, and red red teamers to add cronjob entry to their malicious code to execute to the schedule they want. This event can also be executed by administrator or normal user for automation purposes so filter is needed. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = crontab Processes.process = "*crontab *" Processes.process = "* -e*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_edit_cron_table_parameter_filter` - -[ESCU - Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for suspicious file creation in kernel/driver directory in linux platform. This directory is known folder for all linux kernel module available within the system. so creation of file in this directory is a good indicator that there is a possible rootkit installation in the host machine. This technique was abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain high privileges to their malicious code such us in kernel level. Even this event is not so common administrator or legitimate 3rd party tool may install driver or linux kernel module as part of its installation. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.006", "T1547"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for suspicious file creation in kernel/driver directory in linux platform. This directory is known folder for all linux kernel module available within the system. so creation of file in this directory is a good indicator that there is a possible rootkit installation in the host machine. This technique was abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain high privileges to their malicious code such us in kernel level. Even this event is not so common administrator or legitimate 3rd party tool may install driver or linux kernel module as part of its installation. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can create file in this folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-22 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-22 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.006", "T1547"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for suspicious file creation in kernel/driver directory in linux platform. This directory is known folder for all linux kernel module available within the system. so creation of file in this directory is a good indicator that there is a possible rootkit installation in the host machine. This technique was abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain high privileges to their malicious code such us in kernel level. Even this event is not so common administrator or legitimate 3rd party tool may install driver or linux kernel module as part of its installation. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN ("*/kernel/drivers/*") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_file_created_in_kernel_driver_directory_filter` - -[ESCU - Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for suspicious file creation on init system directories for automatic execution of script or file upon boot up. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamer to persist on the targeted or compromised host. This behavior can be executed or use by an administrator or network operator to add script files or binary files as part of a task or automation. filter is needed. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1037.004", "T1037"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for suspicious file creation on init system directories for automatic execution of script or file upon boot up. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamer to persist on the targeted or compromised host. This behavior can be executed or use by an administrator or network operator to add script files or binary files as part of a task or automation. filter is needed. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can create file in this folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-20 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-20 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1037.004", "T1037"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for suspicious file creation on init system directories for automatic execution of script or file upon boot up. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamer to persist on the targeted or compromised host. This behavior can be executed or use by an administrator or network operator to add script files or binary files as part of a task or automation. filter is needed. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN ("*/etc/init.d/*", "*/etc/rc.d/*", "*/sbin/init.d/*", "*/etc/rc.local*") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_file_creation_in_init_boot_directory_filter` - -[ESCU - Linux File Creation In Profile Directory - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for suspicious file creation in /etc/profile.d directory to automatically execute scripts by shell upon boot up of a linux machine. This technique is commonly abused by adversaries, malware and red teamers as a persistence mechanism to the targeted or compromised host. This Anomaly detection is a good indicator that someone wants to run a code after boot up which can be done also by the administrator or network operator for automation purposes. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.004", "T1546"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for suspicious file creation in /etc/profile.d directory to automatically execute scripts by shell upon boot up of a linux machine. This technique is commonly abused by adversaries, malware and red teamers as a persistence mechanism to the targeted or compromised host. This Anomaly detection is a good indicator that someone wants to run a code after boot up which can be done also by the administrator or network operator for automation purposes. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can create file in profile.d folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-20 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-20 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux File Creation In Profile Directory - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux File Creation In Profile Directory - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.004", "T1546"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for suspicious file creation in /etc/profile.d directory to automatically execute scripts by shell upon boot up of a linux machine. This technique is commonly abused by adversaries, malware and red teamers as a persistence mechanism to the targeted or compromised host. This Anomaly detection is a good indicator that someone wants to run a code after boot up which can be done also by the administrator or network operator for automation purposes. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Linux File Creation In Profile Directory -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN ("*/etc/profile.d/*") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_file_creation_in_profile_directory_filter` - -[ESCU - Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for inserting of linux kernel module using insmod utility function. This event can detect a installation of rootkit or malicious kernel module to gain elevated privileges to their malicious code and bypassed detections. This Anomaly detection is a good indicator that someone installing kernel module in a linux host either admin or adversaries. filter is needed in this scenario -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.006", "T1547"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for inserting of linux kernel module using insmod utility function. This event can detect a installation of rootkit or malicious kernel module to gain elevated privileges to their malicious code and bypassed detections. This Anomaly detection is a good indicator that someone installing kernel module in a linux host either admin or adversaries. filter is needed in this scenario -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-22 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-22 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A commandline $process$ that may install kernel module on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.006", "T1547"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for inserting of linux kernel module using insmod utility function. This event can detect a installation of rootkit or malicious kernel module to gain elevated privileges to their malicious code and bypassed detections. This Anomaly detection is a good indicator that someone installing kernel module in a linux host either admin or adversaries. filter is needed in this scenario -action.notable.param.rule_title = Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN("kmod", "sudo") AND Processes.process = *insmod* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_insert_kernel_module_using_insmod_utility_filter` - -[ESCU - Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for possible installing a linux kernel module using modprobe utility function. This event can detect a installation of rootkit or malicious kernel module to gain elevated privileges to their malicious code and bypassed detections. This Anomaly detection is a good indicator that someone installing kernel module in a linux host either admin or adversaries. filter is needed in this scenario -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.006", "T1547"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for possible installing a linux kernel module using modprobe utility function. This event can detect a installation of rootkit or malicious kernel module to gain elevated privileges to their malicious code and bypassed detections. This Anomaly detection is a good indicator that someone installing kernel module in a linux host either admin or adversaries. filter is needed in this scenario -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-22 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-22 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A commandline $process$ that may install kernel module on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.006", "T1547"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for possible installing a linux kernel module using modprobe utility function. This event can detect a installation of rootkit or malicious kernel module to gain elevated privileges to their malicious code and bypassed detections. This Anomaly detection is a good indicator that someone installing kernel module in a linux host either admin or adversaries. filter is needed in this scenario -action.notable.param.rule_title = Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN("kmod", "sudo") AND Processes.process = *modprobe* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_install_kernel_module_using_modprobe_utility_filter` - -[ESCU - Linux Java Spawning Shell - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies the process name of Java, Apache, or Tomcat spawning a Linux shell. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). The shells included in the macro are "sh", "ksh", "zsh", "bash", "dash", "rbash", "fish", "csh', "tcsh', "ion", "eshell". Upon triage, review parallel processes and command-line arguments to determine legitimacy. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the process name of Java, Apache, or Tomcat spawning a Linux shell. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). The shells included in the macro are "sh", "ksh", "zsh", "bash", "dash", "rbash", "fish", "csh', "tcsh', "ion", "eshell". Upon triage, review parallel processes and command-line arguments to determine legitimacy. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. Ensure EDR product is mapping OS Linux to the datamodel properly. Add any additional java process names for your environment to the analytic as needed. The following Splunk SOAR playbook can be used to respond to this detection: Log4j Investigate The following Splunk SOAR playbook can be used to respond to this detection: Log4j Respond -action.escu.known_false_positives = Filtering may be required on internal developer build systems or classify assets as web facing and restrict the analytic based on asset type. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-13 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-13 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Java Spawning Shell - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ spawning a Linux shell, potentially indicative of exploitation. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 40}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Java Spawning Shell - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the process name of Java, Apache, or Tomcat spawning a Linux shell. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). The shells included in the macro are "sh", "ksh", "zsh", "bash", "dash", "rbash", "fish", "csh', "tcsh', "ion", "eshell". Upon triage, review parallel processes and command-line arguments to determine legitimacy. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Linux Java Spawning Shell -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=java OR Processes.parent_process_name=apache OR Processes.parent_process_name=tomcat `linux_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_java_spawning_shell_filter` - -[ESCU - Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic is to look for suspicious command lines that may add entry to /etc/sudoers with NOPASSWD attribute in linux platform. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain elevated privilege to the targeted or compromised host. /etc/sudoers file controls who can run what commands users can execute on the machines and can also control whether user need a password to execute particular commands. This file is composed of aliases (basically variables) and user specifications. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to look for suspicious command lines that may add entry to /etc/sudoers with NOPASSWD attribute in linux platform. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain elevated privilege to the targeted or compromised host. /etc/sudoers file controls who can run what commands users can execute on the machines and can also control whether user need a password to execute particular commands. This file is composed of aliases (basically variables) and user specifications. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-21 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-21 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = a commandline $process$ executed on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to look for suspicious command lines that may add entry to /etc/sudoers with NOPASSWD attribute in linux platform. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain elevated privilege to the targeted or compromised host. /etc/sudoers file controls who can run what commands users can execute on the machines and can also control whether user need a password to execute particular commands. This file is composed of aliases (basically variables) and user specifications. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = "*NOPASSWD:*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_nopasswd_entry_in_sudoers_file_filter` - -[ESCU - Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic is to look for suspicious process command-line that might be accessing or modifying sshd_config. This file is the ssh configuration file that might be modify by threat actors or adversaries to redirect port connection, allow user using authorized key generated during attack. This anomaly detection might catch noise from administrator auditing or modifying ssh configuration file. In this scenario filter is needed -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098.004", "T1098"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to look for suspicious process command-line that might be accessing or modifying sshd_config. This file is the ssh configuration file that might be modify by threat actors or adversaries to redirect port connection, allow user using authorized key generated during attack. This anomaly detection might catch noise from administrator auditing or modifying ssh configuration file. In this scenario filter is needed -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-11 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-11 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = a commandline $process$ executed on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098.004", "T1098"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to look for suspicious process command-line that might be accessing or modifying sshd_config. This file is the ssh configuration file that might be modify by threat actors or adversaries to redirect port connection, allow user using authorized key generated during attack. This anomaly detection might catch noise from administrator auditing or modifying ssh configuration file. In this scenario filter is needed -action.notable.param.rule_title = Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN("cat", "nano*","vim*", "vi*") AND Processes.process IN("*/etc/ssh/sshd_config") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_access_or_modification_of_sshd_config_file_filter` - -[ESCU - Linux Possible Access To Credential Files - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic is to detect a possible attempt to dump or access the content of /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow to enable offline credential cracking. "etc/passwd" store user information within linux OS while "etc/shadow" contain the user passwords hash. Adversaries and threat actors may attempt to access this to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator of possible credential dumping technique but it might catch some normal administrator automation scripts or during credential auditing. In this scenario filter is needed. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.008", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to detect a possible attempt to dump or access the content of /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow to enable offline credential cracking. "etc/passwd" store user information within linux OS while "etc/shadow" contain the user passwords hash. Adversaries and threat actors may attempt to access this to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator of possible credential dumping technique but it might catch some normal administrator automation scripts or during credential auditing. In this scenario filter is needed. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-10 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-10 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Possible Access To Credential Files - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A commandline $process$ executed on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Possible Access To Credential Files - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.008", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to detect a possible attempt to dump or access the content of /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow to enable offline credential cracking. "etc/passwd" store user information within linux OS while "etc/shadow" contain the user passwords hash. Adversaries and threat actors may attempt to access this to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator of possible credential dumping technique but it might catch some normal administrator automation scripts or during credential auditing. In this scenario filter is needed. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Linux Possible Access To Credential Files -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN("cat", "nano*","vim*", "vi*") AND Processes.process IN("*/etc/shadow*", "*/etc/passwd*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_access_to_credential_files_filter` - -[ESCU - Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic is to detect a possible access or modification of /etc/sudoers file. "/etc/sudoers" file controls who can run what command as what users on what machine and can also control whether a specific user need a password for particular commands. adversaries and threat actors abuse this file to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation during attack on targeted host. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to detect a possible access or modification of /etc/sudoers file. "/etc/sudoers" file controls who can run what command as what users on what machine and can also control whether a specific user need a password for particular commands. adversaries and threat actors abuse this file to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation during attack on targeted host. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -action.escu.known_false_positives = administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-10 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-10 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A commandline $process$ executed on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to detect a possible access or modification of /etc/sudoers file. "/etc/sudoers" file controls who can run what command as what users on what machine and can also control whether a specific user need a password for particular commands. adversaries and threat actors abuse this file to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation during attack on targeted host. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN("cat", "nano*","vim*", "vi*") AND Processes.process IN("*/etc/sudoers*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_access_to_sudoers_file_filter` - -[ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for suspicious commandline that may use to append user entry to /etc/at.allow or /etc/at.deny. These 2 files are commonly abused by malware, adversaries or red teamers to persist on the targeted or compromised host. These config file can restrict user that can only execute at application (another schedule task application in linux). attacker can create a user or add the compromised username to that config file to execute at to schedule it malicious code. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator to investigate further the entry in created config file and who created it to verify if it is a false positive. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.001", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for suspicious commandline that may use to append user entry to /etc/at.allow or /etc/at.deny. These 2 files are commonly abused by malware, adversaries or red teamers to persist on the targeted or compromised host. These config file can restrict user that can only execute at application (another schedule task application in linux). attacker can create a user or add the compromised username to that config file to execute at to schedule it malicious code. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator to investigate further the entry in created config file and who created it to verify if it is a false positive. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-17 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-17 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A commandline $process$ that may modify at allow config file in $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 9}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.001", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for suspicious commandline that may use to append user entry to /etc/at.allow or /etc/at.deny. These 2 files are commonly abused by malware, adversaries or red teamers to persist on the targeted or compromised host. These config file can restrict user that can only execute at application (another schedule task application in linux). attacker can create a user or add the compromised username to that config file to execute at to schedule it malicious code. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator to investigate further the entry in created config file and who created it to verify if it is a false positive. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = "*echo*" AND Processes.process IN("*/etc/at.allow", "*/etc/at.deny") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file_filter` - -[ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for suspicious command-lines that can be possibly used to modify user profile files to automatically execute scripts/executables by shell upon reboot of the machine. This technique is commonly abused by adversaries, malware and red teamers as persistence mechanism to the targeted or compromised host. This Anomaly detection is a good indicator that someone wants to run code after reboot which can be done also by the administrator or network operator for automation purposes. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.004", "T1546"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for suspicious command-lines that can be possibly used to modify user profile files to automatically execute scripts/executables by shell upon reboot of the machine. This technique is commonly abused by adversaries, malware and red teamers as persistence mechanism to the targeted or compromised host. This Anomaly detection is a good indicator that someone wants to run code after reboot which can be done also by the administrator or network operator for automation purposes. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-20 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-20 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = a commandline $process$ that may modify profile files in $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation Persistence", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.004", "T1546"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for suspicious command-lines that can be possibly used to modify user profile files to automatically execute scripts/executables by shell upon reboot of the machine. This technique is commonly abused by adversaries, malware and red teamers as persistence mechanism to the targeted or compromised host. This Anomaly detection is a good indicator that someone wants to run code after reboot which can be done also by the administrator or network operator for automation purposes. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = "*echo*" AND Processes.process IN("*~/.bashrc", "*~/.bash_profile", "*/etc/profile", "~/.bash_login", "*~/.profile", "~/.bash_logout") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_append_command_to_profile_config_file_filter` - -[ESCU - Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for possible suspicious commandline that may use to append a code to any existing cronjob files for persistence or privilege escalation. This technique is commonly abused by malware, adversaries and red teamers to automatically execute their code within a existing or sometimes in normal cronjob script file. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.003", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for possible suspicious commandline that may use to append a code to any existing cronjob files for persistence or privilege escalation. This technique is commonly abused by malware, adversaries and red teamers to automatically execute their code within a existing or sometimes in normal cronjob script file. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-17 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-17 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A commandline $process$ that may modify cronjob file in $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.003", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for possible suspicious commandline that may use to append a code to any existing cronjob files for persistence or privilege escalation. This technique is commonly abused by malware, adversaries and red teamers to automatically execute their code within a existing or sometimes in normal cronjob script file. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = "*echo*" AND Processes.process IN("*/etc/cron*", "*/var/spool/cron/*", "*/etc/anacrontab*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file_filter` - -[ESCU - Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for possible modification of cronjobs file using editor. This event is can be seen in normal user but can also be a good hunting indicator for unwanted user modifying cronjobs for possible persistence or privilege escalation. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.003", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for possible modification of cronjobs file using editor. This event is can be seen in normal user but can also be a good hunting indicator for unwanted user modifying cronjobs for possible persistence or privilege escalation. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-17 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-17 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A commandline $process$ that may modify cronjob file using editor in $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 6}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 20, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.003", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for possible modification of cronjobs file using editor. This event is can be seen in normal user but can also be a good hunting indicator for unwanted user modifying cronjobs for possible persistence or privilege escalation. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name IN("nano","vim.basic") OR Processes.process IN ("*nano *", "*vi *", "*vim *")) AND Processes.process IN("*/etc/cron*", "*/var/spool/cron/*", "*/etc/anacrontab*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor_filter` - -[ESCU - Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic is to look for possible ssh key file creation on ~/.ssh/ folder. This technique is commonly abused by threat actors and adversaries to gain persistence and privilege escalation to the targeted host. by creating ssh private and public key and passing the public key to the attacker server. threat actor can access remotely the machine using openssh daemon service. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098.004", "T1098"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to look for possible ssh key file creation on ~/.ssh/ folder. This technique is commonly abused by threat actors and adversaries to gain persistence and privilege escalation to the targeted host. by creating ssh private and public key and passing the public key to the attacker server. threat actor can access remotely the machine using openssh daemon service. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can create file in ~/.ssh folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-11 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-11 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 36}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098.004", "T1098"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to look for possible ssh key file creation on ~/.ssh/ folder. This technique is commonly abused by threat actors and adversaries to gain persistence and privilege escalation to the targeted host. by creating ssh private and public key and passing the public key to the attacker server. threat actor can access remotely the machine using openssh daemon service. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN ("*/.ssh*") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_possible_ssh_key_file_creation_filter` - -[ESCU - Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious command that may hijack a library function in linux platform. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain privileges and persist on the machine. This detection pertains to loading a dll to hijack or hook a library function of specific program using LD_PRELOAD command. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.006", "T1574"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to detect a suspicious command that may hijack a library function in linux platform. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain privileges and persist on the machine. This detection pertains to loading a dll to hijack or hook a library function of specific program using LD_PRELOAD command. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-22 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-22 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A commandline $process$ that may hijack library function on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.006", "T1574"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious command that may hijack a library function in linux platform. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain privileges and persist on the machine. This detection pertains to loading a dll to hijack or hook a library function of specific program using LD_PRELOAD command. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = "*LD_PRELOAD*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_preload_hijack_library_calls_filter` - -[ESCU - Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for suspicious file creation in systemd timer directory in linux platform. systemd is a system and service manager for Linux distributions. From the Windows perspective, this process fulfills the duties of wininit.exe and services.exe combined. At the risk of simplifying the functionality of systemd, it initializes a Linux system and starts relevant services that are defined in service unit files. Adversaries, malware and red teamers may abuse this this feature by stashing systemd service file to persist on the targetted or compromised host. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.006", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for suspicious file creation in systemd timer directory in linux platform. systemd is a system and service manager for Linux distributions. From the Windows perspective, this process fulfills the duties of wininit.exe and services.exe combined. At the risk of simplifying the functionality of systemd, it initializes a Linux system and starts relevant services that are defined in service unit files. Adversaries, malware and red teamers may abuse this this feature by stashing systemd service file to persist on the targetted or compromised host. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can create file in systemd folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-20 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-20 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A service file named as $file_path$ is created in systemd folder on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.006", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for suspicious file creation in systemd timer directory in linux platform. systemd is a system and service manager for Linux distributions. From the Windows perspective, this process fulfills the duties of wininit.exe and services.exe combined. At the risk of simplifying the functionality of systemd, it initializes a Linux system and starts relevant services that are defined in service unit files. Adversaries, malware and red teamers may abuse this this feature by stashing systemd service file to persist on the targetted or compromised host. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name = *.service Filesystem.file_path IN ("*/etc/systemd/system*", "*/lib/systemd/system*", "*/usr/lib/systemd/system*", "*/run/systemd/system*", "*~/.config/systemd/*", "*~/.local/share/systemd/*","*/etc/systemd/user*", "*/lib/systemd/user*", "*/usr/lib/systemd/user*", "*/run/systemd/user*") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_service_file_created_in_systemd_directory_filter` - -[ESCU - Linux Service Restarted - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for restarted or re-enable services in linux platform. This technique can be executed or performed using systemctl or service tool application. Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Administrator may also create a legitimated service for a specific tool or normal application as part of task or automation, in this scenario it is suggested to look for the service path of the actual script or executable that register as service and who created the service for further verification. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.006", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for restarted or re-enable services in linux platform. This technique can be executed or performed using systemctl or service tool application. Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Administrator may also create a legitimated service for a specific tool or normal application as part of task or automation, in this scenario it is suggested to look for the service path of the actual script or executable that register as service and who created the service for further verification. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and commandline executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-20 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-20 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Service Restarted - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A commandline $process$ that may create or start a service on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Service Restarted - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.006", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for restarted or re-enable services in linux platform. This technique can be executed or performed using systemctl or service tool application. Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Administrator may also create a legitimated service for a specific tool or normal application as part of task or automation, in this scenario it is suggested to look for the service path of the actual script or executable that register as service and who created the service for further verification. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Linux Service Restarted -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name IN ("systemctl", "service") OR Processes.process IN ("*systemctl *", "*service *")) Processes.process IN ("*restart*", "*reload*", "*reenable*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_service_restarted_filter` - -[ESCU - Linux Service Started Or Enabled - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for created or enable services in linux platform. This technique can be executed or performed using systemctl or service tool application. Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Administrator may also create a legitimated service for a specific tool or normal application as part of task or automation, in this scenario it is suggested to look for the service path of the actual script or executable that register as service and who created the service for further verification. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.006", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for created or enable services in linux platform. This technique can be executed or performed using systemctl or service tool application. Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Administrator may also create a legitimated service for a specific tool or normal application as part of task or automation, in this scenario it is suggested to look for the service path of the actual script or executable that register as service and who created the service for further verification. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-20 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-20 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Service Started Or Enabled - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = a commandline $process$ that may create or start a service on $dest -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Service Started Or Enabled - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.006", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for created or enable services in linux platform. This technique can be executed or performed using systemctl or service tool application. Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Administrator may also create a legitimated service for a specific tool or normal application as part of task or automation, in this scenario it is suggested to look for the service path of the actual script or executable that register as service and who created the service for further verification. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Linux Service Started Or Enabled -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name IN ("systemctl", "service") OR Processes.process IN ("*systemctl *", "*service *")) Processes.process IN ("* start *", "* enable *") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_service_started_or_enabled_filter` - -[ESCU - Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for suspicious chmod utility execution to enable SUID bit. This allows a user to temporarily gain root access, usually in order to run a program. For example, only the root account is allowed to change the password information contained in the password database; If the SUID bit appears as an s, the file's owner also has execute permission to the file; if it appears as an S, the file's owner does not have execute permission. The second specialty permission is the SGID, or set group id bit. It is similar to the SUID bit, except it can temporarily change group membership, usually to execute a program. The SGID bit is set if an s or an S appears in the group section of permissions. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.001", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for suspicious chmod utility execution to enable SUID bit. This allows a user to temporarily gain root access, usually in order to run a program. For example, only the root account is allowed to change the password information contained in the password database; If the SUID bit appears as an s, the file's owner also has execute permission to the file; if it appears as an S, the file's owner does not have execute permission. The second specialty permission is the SGID, or set group id bit. It is similar to the SUID bit, except it can temporarily change group membership, usually to execute a program. The SGID bit is set if an s or an S appears in the group section of permissions. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-21 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-21 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = a commandline $process$ that may set suid or sgid on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.001", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for suspicious chmod utility execution to enable SUID bit. This allows a user to temporarily gain root access, usually in order to run a program. For example, only the root account is allowed to change the password information contained in the password database; If the SUID bit appears as an s, the file's owner also has execute permission to the file; if it appears as an S, the file's owner does not have execute permission. The second specialty permission is the SGID, or set group id bit. It is similar to the SUID bit, except it can temporarily change group membership, usually to execute a program. The SGID bit is set if an s or an S appears in the group section of permissions. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE (Processes.process_name = chmod OR Processes.process = "*chmod *") AND Processes.process IN("* g+s *", "* u+s *", "* 4777 *", "* 4577 *") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_setuid_using_chmod_utility_filter` - -[ESCU - Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for suspicious setcap utility execution to enable SUID bit. This allows a user to temporarily gain root access, usually in order to run a program. For example, only the root account is allowed to change the password information contained in the password database; If the SUID bit appears as an s, the file's owner also has execute permission to the file; if it appears as an S, the file's owner does not have execute permission. The second specialty permission is the SGID, or set group id bit. It is similar to the SUID bit, except it can temporarily change group membership, usually to execute a program. The SGID bit is set if an s or an S appears in the group section of permissions. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.001", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for suspicious setcap utility execution to enable SUID bit. This allows a user to temporarily gain root access, usually in order to run a program. For example, only the root account is allowed to change the password information contained in the password database; If the SUID bit appears as an s, the file's owner also has execute permission to the file; if it appears as an S, the file's owner does not have execute permission. The second specialty permission is the SGID, or set group id bit. It is similar to the SUID bit, except it can temporarily change group membership, usually to execute a program. The SGID bit is set if an s or an S appears in the group section of permissions. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-21 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-21 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A commandline $process$ that may set suid or sgid on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.001", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for suspicious setcap utility execution to enable SUID bit. This allows a user to temporarily gain root access, usually in order to run a program. For example, only the root account is allowed to change the password information contained in the password database; If the SUID bit appears as an s, the file's owner also has execute permission to the file; if it appears as an S, the file's owner does not have execute permission. The second specialty permission is the SGID, or set group id bit. It is similar to the SUID bit, except it can temporarily change group membership, usually to execute a program. The SGID bit is set if an s or an S appears in the group section of permissions. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = setcap OR Processes.process = "*setcap *") AND Processes.process IN ("* cap_setuid=ep *", "* cap_setuid+ep *", "* cap_net_bind_service+p *", "* cap_net_raw+ep *", "* cap_dac_read_search+ep *") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_setuid_using_setcap_utility_filter` - -[ESCU - Linux Sudo OR Su Execution - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic is to detect the execution of sudo or su command in linux operating system. The "sudo" command allows a system administrator to delegate authority to give certain users (or groups of users) the ability to run some (or all) commands as root or another user while providing an audit trail of the commands and their arguments. This command is commonly abused by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to elevate privileges to the targeted host. This command can be executed by administrator for legitimate purposes or to execute process that need admin privileges, In this scenario filter is needed. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to detect the execution of sudo or su command in linux operating system. The "sudo" command allows a system administrator to delegate authority to give certain users (or groups of users) the ability to run some (or all) commands as root or another user while providing an audit trail of the commands and their arguments. This command is commonly abused by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to elevate privileges to the targeted host. This command can be executed by administrator for legitimate purposes or to execute process that need admin privileges, In this scenario filter is needed. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-04 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-04 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Sudo OR Su Execution - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A commandline $process$ that execute sudo or su in $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 9}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Sudo OR Su Execution - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to detect the execution of sudo or su command in linux operating system. The "sudo" command allows a system administrator to delegate authority to give certain users (or groups of users) the ability to run some (or all) commands as root or another user while providing an audit trail of the commands and their arguments. This command is commonly abused by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to elevate privileges to the targeted host. This command can be executed by administrator for legitimate purposes or to execute process that need admin privileges, In this scenario filter is needed. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Linux Sudo OR Su Execution -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN ("sudo", "su") OR Processes.parent_process_name IN ("sudo", "su") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_sudo_or_su_execution_filter` - -[ESCU - Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic is to looks for file creation of sudoers.tmp file cause by editing /etc/sudoers using visudo or editor in linux platform. This technique may abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain elevated privilege to targeted or compromised host. /etc/sudoers file controls who can run what commands as what users on what machines and can also control special things such as whether you need a password for particular commands. The file is composed of aliases (basically variables) and user specifications (which control who can run what). -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to looks for file creation of sudoers.tmp file cause by editing /etc/sudoers using visudo or editor in linux platform. This technique may abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain elevated privilege to targeted or compromised host. /etc/sudoers file controls who can run what commands as what users on what machines and can also control special things such as whether you need a password for particular commands. The file is composed of aliases (basically variables) and user specifications (which control who can run what). -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -action.escu.known_false_positives = administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-23 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-23 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to looks for file creation of sudoers.tmp file cause by editing /etc/sudoers using visudo or editor in linux platform. This technique may abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain elevated privilege to targeted or compromised host. /etc/sudoers file controls who can run what commands as what users on what machines and can also control special things such as whether you need a password for particular commands. The file is composed of aliases (basically variables) and user specifications (which control who can run what). -action.notable.param.rule_title = Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN ("*sudoers.tmp*") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_sudoers_tmp_file_creation_filter` - -[ESCU - Linux System Network Discovery - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic is to look for possible enumeration of local network configuration. This technique is commonly used as part of recon of adversaries or threat actor to know some network information for its next or further attack. This anomaly detections may capture normal event made by administrator during auditing or testing network connection of specific host or network to network. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1016"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to look for possible enumeration of local network configuration. This technique is commonly used as part of recon of adversaries or threat actor to know some network information for its next or further attack. This anomaly detections may capture normal event made by administrator during auditing or testing network connection of specific host or network to network. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-11 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-11 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux System Network Discovery - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Network Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A commandline $process$ executed on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 9}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux System Network Discovery - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Network Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconaissance"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1016"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to look for possible enumeration of local network configuration. This technique is commonly used as part of recon of adversaries or threat actor to know some network information for its next or further attack. This anomaly detections may capture normal event made by administrator during auditing or testing network connection of specific host or network to network. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Linux System Network Discovery -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name_list values(Processes.process) as process_list values(Processes.process_id) as process_id_list values(Processes.parent_process_id) as parent_process_id_list values(Processes.process_guid) as process_guid_list dc(Processes.process_name) as process_name_count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN ("arp", "ifconfig", "ip", "netstat", "firewall-cmd", "ufw", "iptables", "ss", "route") by _time span=30m Processes.dest Processes.user | where process_name_count >=4 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`| `linux_system_network_discovery_filter` - -[ESCU - Linux Visudo Utility Execution - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic is to looks for suspicious commandline that add entry to /etc/sudoers by using visudo utility tool in linux platform. This technique may abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain elevated privilege to targeted or compromised host. /etc/sudoers file controls who can run what commands as what users on what machines and can also control special things such as whether you need a password for particular commands. The file is composed of aliases (basically variables) and user specifications (which control who can run what). -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to looks for suspicious commandline that add entry to /etc/sudoers by using visudo utility tool in linux platform. This technique may abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain elevated privilege to targeted or compromised host. /etc/sudoers file controls who can run what commands as what users on what machines and can also control special things such as whether you need a password for particular commands. The file is composed of aliases (basically variables) and user specifications (which control who can run what). -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-21 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-21 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Visudo Utility Execution - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A commandline $process$ executed on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 16}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Visudo Utility Execution - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 40, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to looks for suspicious commandline that add entry to /etc/sudoers by using visudo utility tool in linux platform. This technique may abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain elevated privilege to targeted or compromised host. /etc/sudoers file controls who can run what commands as what users on what machines and can also control special things such as whether you need a password for particular commands. The file is composed of aliases (basically variables) and user specifications (which control who can run what). -action.notable.param.rule_title = Linux Visudo Utility Execution -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = visudo by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_visudo_utility_execution_filter` - -[ESCU - Linux pkexec Privilege Escalation - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies `pkexec` spawning with no command-line arguments. A vulnerability in Polkit's pkexec component identified as CVE-2021-4034 (PwnKit) which is present in the default configuration of all major Linux distributions and can be exploited to gain full root privileges on the system. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies `pkexec` spawning with no command-line arguments. A vulnerability in Polkit's pkexec component identified as CVE-2021-4034 (PwnKit) which is present in the default configuration of all major Linux distributions and can be exploited to gain full root privileges on the system. -action.escu.how_to_implement = Depending on the EDR product in use, there are multiple ways to "null" the command-line field, Processes.process. Two that may be useful `process="(^.{0}$)"` or `| where isnull(process)`. To generate data for this behavior, Sysmon for Linux was utilized. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-28 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-28 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux pkexec Privilege Escalation - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Privilege Escalation"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ related to a local privilege escalation in polkit pkexec. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 56}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux pkexec Privilege Escalation - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-4034"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies `pkexec` spawning with no command-line arguments. A vulnerability in Polkit's pkexec component identified as CVE-2021-4034 (PwnKit) which is present in the default configuration of all major Linux distributions and can be exploited to gain full root privileges on the system. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Linux pkexec Privilege Escalation -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=pkexec by _time Processes.dest Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process="(^.{1}$)" | `linux_pkexec_privilege_escalation_filter` - -[ESCU - Loading Of Dynwrapx Module - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = DynamicWrapperX is an ActiveX component that can be used in a script to call Windows API functions, but it requires the dynwrapx.dll to be installed and registered. With that, registering or loading dynwrapx.dll to a host is highly suspicious. In most instances when it is used maliciously, the best way to triage is to review parallel processes and pivot on the process_guid. Review the registry for any suspicious modifications meant to load dynwrapx.dll. Identify any suspicious module loads of dynwrapx.dll. This detection will return and identify the processes that invoke vbs/wscript/cscript. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055", "T1055.001"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = DynamicWrapperX is an ActiveX component that can be used in a script to call Windows API functions, but it requires the dynwrapx.dll to be installed and registered. With that, registering or loading dynwrapx.dll to a host is highly suspicious. In most instances when it is used maliciously, the best way to triage is to review parallel processes and pivot on the process_guid. Review the registry for any suspicious modifications meant to load dynwrapx.dll. Identify any suspicious module loads of dynwrapx.dll. This detection will return and identify the processes that invoke vbs/wscript/cscript. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on processes that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, however it is possible to filter by Processes.process_name and specific processes (ex. wscript.exe). Filter as needed. This may need modification based on EDR telemetry and how it brings in registry data. For example, removal of (Default). -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-18 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-18 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Loading Of Dynwrapx Module - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Remcos"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = dynwrapx.dll loaded by process $process_name$ on $Computer$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Loading Of Dynwrapx Module - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055", "T1055.001"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = DynamicWrapperX is an ActiveX component that can be used in a script to call Windows API functions, but it requires the dynwrapx.dll to be installed and registered. With that, registering or loading dynwrapx.dll to a host is highly suspicious. In most instances when it is used maliciously, the best way to triage is to review parallel processes and pivot on the process_guid. Review the registry for any suspicious modifications meant to load dynwrapx.dll. Identify any suspicious module loads of dynwrapx.dll. This detection will return and identify the processes that invoke vbs/wscript/cscript. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Loading Of Dynwrapx Module -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `sysmon` EventCode=7 (ImageLoaded = "*\\dynwrapx.dll" OR OriginalFileName = "dynwrapx.dll" OR Product = "DynamicWrapperX") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded OriginalFileName Product process_name Computer EventCode Signed ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `loading_of_dynwrapx_module_filter` - -[ESCU - Local Account Discovery With Wmic - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for local users. The argument `useraccount` is used to leverage WMI to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087", "T1087.001"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for local users. The argument `useraccount` is used to leverage WMI to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-16 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-16 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Local Account Discovery With Wmic - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Local user discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Local Account Discovery With Wmic - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087", "T1087.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for local users. The argument `useraccount` is used to leverage WMI to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Local Account Discovery With Wmic -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` (Processes.process=*useraccount*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `local_account_discovery_with_wmic_filter` - -[ESCU - Local Account Discovery with Net - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for local users. The two arguments `user` and 'users', return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087", "T1087.001"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for local users. The two arguments `user` and 'users', return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-16 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-16 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Local Account Discovery with Net - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Local user discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Local Account Discovery with Net - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087", "T1087.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for local users. The two arguments `user` and 'users', return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Local Account Discovery with Net -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` (Processes.process=*user OR Processes.process=*users) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `local_account_discovery_with_net_filter` - -[ESCU - Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 Exploitation - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This correlation find exploitation of Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 against systems using detections from Splunk Security Content Analytic Story. It does this by calculating the distinct count of MITRE ATT&CK tactics from Log4Shell detections fired. If the count is larger than 2 or more distinct MITRE ATT&CK tactics we assume high problability of exploitation. The Analytic story breaks down into 3 major phases of a Log4Shell exploitation, specifically 1. Initial Payload delivery eg. `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}` 2. Call back to malicious LDAP server eg. Exploit.class 3. Post Exploitation Activity/Lateral Movement using Powershell or similar T1562.001 Each of these phases fall into different MITRE ATT&CK Tactics (Initial Access, Execution, Command and Control), by looking into 2 or more phases showing up in detections triggerd is how this correlation search finds exploitation. If we get a notable from this correlation search the best way to triage it is by investigating the affected systems against Log4Shell exploitation using Splunk SOAR playbooks. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Exploitation", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105", "T1190", "T1059"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Risk"] -action.escu.eli5 = This correlation find exploitation of Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 against systems using detections from Splunk Security Content Analytic Story. It does this by calculating the distinct count of MITRE ATT&CK tactics from Log4Shell detections fired. If the count is larger than 2 or more distinct MITRE ATT&CK tactics we assume high problability of exploitation. The Analytic story breaks down into 3 major phases of a Log4Shell exploitation, specifically 1. Initial Payload delivery eg. `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}` 2. Call back to malicious LDAP server eg. Exploit.class 3. Post Exploitation Activity/Lateral Movement using Powershell or similar T1562.001 Each of these phases fall into different MITRE ATT&CK Tactics (Initial Access, Execution, Command and Control), by looking into 2 or more phases showing up in detections triggerd is how this correlation search finds exploitation. If we get a notable from this correlation search the best way to triage it is by investigating the affected systems against Log4Shell exploitation using Splunk SOAR playbooks. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To implement this correlation search a user needs to enable all detections in the Log4Shell Analytic Story and confirm it is generation risk events. A simple search `index=risk analyticstories="Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"` should contain events. -action.escu.known_false_positives = There are no known false positive for this search, but it could contain false positives as multiple detections can trigger and not have successful exploitation. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-26 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-26 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 Exploitation - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Log4Shell Exploitation detected against $affected_systems$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "affected_systems", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 Exploitation - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": null, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Exploitation", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105", "T1190", "T1059"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "affected_systems", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This correlation find exploitation of Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 against systems using detections from Splunk Security Content Analytic Story. It does this by calculating the distinct count of MITRE ATT&CK tactics from Log4Shell detections fired. If the count is larger than 2 or more distinct MITRE ATT&CK tactics we assume high problability of exploitation. The Analytic story breaks down into 3 major phases of a Log4Shell exploitation, specifically 1. Initial Payload delivery eg. `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}` 2. Call back to malicious LDAP server eg. Exploit.class 3. Post Exploitation Activity/Lateral Movement using Powershell or similar T1562.001 Each of these phases fall into different MITRE ATT&CK Tactics (Initial Access, Execution, Command and Control), by looking into 2 or more phases showing up in detections triggerd is how this correlation search finds exploitation. If we get a notable from this correlation search the best way to triage it is by investigating the affected systems against Log4Shell exploitation using Splunk SOAR playbooks. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 Exploitation -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk where All_Risk.analyticstories="Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" All_Risk.risk_object_type="system" by All_Risk.risk_object All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic source | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Risk)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | stats values(risk_object) as affected_systems values(source) as detection_name values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as tactics values(firstTime) as firstTime values(lastTime) as lastTime dc(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as distinct_tactics | where distinct_tactics >= 2 | `log4shell_cve_2021_44228_exploitation_filter` - -[ESCU - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we first limit the scope of our search to the Web Datamodel and use the `| from datamodel` function to benefit from schema accelerated searching capabilities, mainly because the second part of the detection is pretty heavy, it runs a regex across all _raw events that looks for `${jndi:ldap://` pattern across all potential web fields available to the raw data, like http headers for example. If you see results for this detection, it means that there was a attempt at a injection, which could be a reconnaissance activity or a valid expliotation attempt, but this does not exactly mean that the host was indeed successfully exploited. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we first limit the scope of our search to the Web Datamodel and use the `| from datamodel` function to benefit from schema accelerated searching capabilities, mainly because the second part of the detection is pretty heavy, it runs a regex across all _raw events that looks for `${jndi:ldap://` pattern across all potential web fields available to the raw data, like http headers for example. If you see results for this detection, it means that there was a attempt at a injection, which could be a reconnaissance activity or a valid expliotation attempt, but this does not exactly mean that the host was indeed successfully exploited. -action.escu.how_to_implement = This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx. The following Splunk SOAR playbook can be used to respond to this detection: Log4j Investigate The following Splunk SOAR playbook can be used to respond to this detection: Log4j Respond -action.escu.known_false_positives = If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-13 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-13 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 15}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Application Log", "Stage:Execution"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we first limit the scope of our search to the Web Datamodel and use the `| from datamodel` function to benefit from schema accelerated searching capabilities, mainly because the second part of the detection is pretty heavy, it runs a regex across all _raw events that looks for `${jndi:ldap://` pattern across all potential web fields available to the raw data, like http headers for example. If you see results for this detection, it means that there was a attempt at a injection, which could be a reconnaissance activity or a valid expliotation attempt, but this does not exactly mean that the host was indeed successfully exploited. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt -action.notable.param.security_domain = threat -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | from datamodel Web.Web | regex _raw="[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\:|\%3A|\/|\%2F)\w+(\:\/\/|\%3A\%2F\%2F)(\$\{.*?\}(\.)?)?" | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter` - -[ESCU - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we match the invocation function with a network connection to a malicious ip address. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Traffic"] -action.escu.eli5 = CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we match the invocation function with a network connection to a malicious ip address. -action.escu.how_to_implement = This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx. The following Splunk SOAR playbook can be used to respond to this detection: Log4j Investigate The following Splunk SOAR playbook can be used to respond to this detection: Log4j Respond -action.escu.known_false_positives = If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-13 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-13 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 15}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Application Log", "Stage:Execution"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we match the invocation function with a network connection to a malicious ip address. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection -action.notable.param.security_domain = threat -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | from datamodel Web.Web | rex field=_raw max_match=0 "[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\:|\%3A|\/|\%2F)(?\w+)(\:\/\/|\%3A\%2F\%2F)(\$\{.*?\}(\.)?)?(?[a-zA-Z0-9\.\-\_\$]+)" | join affected_host type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic by All_Traffic.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename dest AS affected_host] | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter` - -[ESCU - Logon Script Event Trigger Execution - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry entry to persist and gain privilege escalation upon booting up of compromised host. This technique was seen in several APT and malware where it modify UserInitMprLogonScript registry entry to its malicious payload to be executed upon boot up of the machine. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1037", "T1037.001"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry entry to persist and gain privilege escalation upon booting up of compromised host. This technique was seen in several APT and malware where it modify UserInitMprLogonScript registry entry to its malicious payload to be executed upon boot up of the machine. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-27 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-27 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Logon Script Event Trigger Execution - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Logon Script Event Trigger Execution - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Privilege Escalation Persistence"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1037", "T1037.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry entry to persist and gain privilege escalation upon booting up of compromised host. This technique was seen in several APT and malware where it modify UserInitMprLogonScript registry entry to its malicious payload to be executed upon boot up of the machine. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Logon Script Event Trigger Execution -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path IN ("*\\Environment\\UserInitMprLogonScript") by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `logon_script_event_trigger_execution_filter` - -[ESCU - MS Scripting Process Loading Ldap Module - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search is to detect a suspicious MS scripting process such as wscript.exe or cscript.exe that loading ldap module to process ldap query. This behavior was seen in FIN7 implant where it uses javascript to execute ldap query to parse host information that will send to its C2 server. this anomaly detections is a good initial step to hunt further a suspicious ldap query or ldap related events to the host that may give you good information regarding ldap or AD information processing or might be a attacker. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.007"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious MS scripting process such as wscript.exe or cscript.exe that loading ldap module to process ldap query. This behavior was seen in FIN7 implant where it uses javascript to execute ldap query to parse host information that will send to its C2 server. this anomaly detections is a good initial step to hunt further a suspicious ldap query or ldap related events to the host that may give you good information regarding ldap or AD information processing or might be a attacker. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. -action.escu.known_false_positives = automation scripting language may used by network operator to do ldap query. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-13 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-13 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - MS Scripting Process Loading Ldap Module - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["FIN7"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = $process_name$ loading ldap modules $ImageLoaded$ in $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 9}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - MS Scripting Process Loading Ldap Module - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["FIN7"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.007"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious MS scripting process such as wscript.exe or cscript.exe that loading ldap module to process ldap query. This behavior was seen in FIN7 implant where it uses javascript to execute ldap query to parse host information that will send to its C2 server. this anomaly detections is a good initial step to hunt further a suspicious ldap query or ldap related events to the host that may give you good information regarding ldap or AD information processing or might be a attacker. -action.notable.param.rule_title = MS Scripting Process Loading Ldap Module -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `sysmon` EventCode =7 Image IN ("*\\wscript.exe", "*\\cscript.exe") ImageLoaded IN ("*\\Wldap32.dll", "*\\adsldp.dll", "*\\adsldpc.dll") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Image EventCode process_name ProcessId ProcessGuid Computer ImageLoaded | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module_filter` - -[ESCU - MS Scripting Process Loading WMI Module - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search is to detect a suspicious MS scripting process such as wscript.exe or cscript.exe that loading wmi module to process wmi query. This behavior was seen in FIN7 implant where it uses javascript to execute wmi query to parse host information that will send to its C2 server. this anomaly detections is a good initial step to hunt further a suspicious wmi query or wmi related events to the host that may give you good information regarding process that are commonly using wmi query or modules or might be an attacker using this technique. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.007"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious MS scripting process such as wscript.exe or cscript.exe that loading wmi module to process wmi query. This behavior was seen in FIN7 implant where it uses javascript to execute wmi query to parse host information that will send to its C2 server. this anomaly detections is a good initial step to hunt further a suspicious wmi query or wmi related events to the host that may give you good information regarding process that are commonly using wmi query or modules or might be an attacker using this technique. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. -action.escu.known_false_positives = automation scripting language may used by network operator to do ldap query. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-13 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-13 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - MS Scripting Process Loading WMI Module - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["FIN7"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = $process_name$ loading wmi modules $ImageLoaded$ in $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 9}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - MS Scripting Process Loading WMI Module - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["FIN7"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.007"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious MS scripting process such as wscript.exe or cscript.exe that loading wmi module to process wmi query. This behavior was seen in FIN7 implant where it uses javascript to execute wmi query to parse host information that will send to its C2 server. this anomaly detections is a good initial step to hunt further a suspicious wmi query or wmi related events to the host that may give you good information regarding process that are commonly using wmi query or modules or might be an attacker using this technique. -action.notable.param.rule_title = MS Scripting Process Loading WMI Module -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `sysmon` EventCode =7 Image IN ("*\\wscript.exe", "*\\cscript.exe") ImageLoaded IN ("*\\fastprox.dll", "*\\wbemdisp.dll", "*\\wbemprox.dll", "*\\wbemsvc.dll" , "*\\wmiutils.dll", "*\\wbemcomn.dll") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Image EventCode process_name ProcessId ProcessGuid Computer ImageLoaded | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module_filter` - -[ESCU - MSBuild Suspicious Spawned By Script Process - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious child process of MSBuild spawned by Windows Script Host - cscript or wscript. This behavior or event are commonly seen and used by malware or adversaries to execute malicious msbuild process using malicious script in the compromised host. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any file modifications. MSBuild may load a script from the same path without having command-line arguments. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1127.001", "T1127"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to detect a suspicious child process of MSBuild spawned by Windows Script Host - cscript or wscript. This behavior or event are commonly seen and used by malware or adversaries to execute malicious msbuild process using malicious script in the compromised host. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any file modifications. MSBuild may load a script from the same path without having command-line arguments. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as developers do not spawn MSBuild via a WSH. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-04 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-04 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - MSBuild Suspicious Spawned By Script Process - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Msbuild.exe process spawned by $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ executed by $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 49}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - MSBuild Suspicious Spawned By Script Process - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1127.001", "T1127"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious child process of MSBuild spawned by Windows Script Host - cscript or wscript. This behavior or event are commonly seen and used by malware or adversaries to execute malicious msbuild process using malicious script in the compromised host. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any file modifications. MSBuild may load a script from the same path without having command-line arguments. -action.notable.param.rule_title = MSBuild Suspicious Spawned By Script Process -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("wscript.exe", "cscript.exe") AND `process_msbuild` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process_filter` - -[ESCU - MSHTML Module Load in Office Product - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following detection identifies the module load of mshtml.dll into an Office product. This behavior has been related to CVE-2021-40444, whereas the malicious document will load ActiveX, which activates the MSHTML component. The vulnerability resides in the MSHTML component. During triage, identify parallel processes and capture any file modifications for analysis. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following detection identifies the module load of mshtml.dll into an Office product. This behavior has been related to CVE-2021-40444, whereas the malicious document will load ActiveX, which activates the MSHTML component. The vulnerability resides in the MSHTML component. During triage, identify parallel processes and capture any file modifications for analysis. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process names and image loads from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives will be present, however, tune as necessary. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-09 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-09 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - MSHTML Module Load in Office Product - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ loading mshtml.dll. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - MSHTML Module Load in Office Product - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following detection identifies the module load of mshtml.dll into an Office product. This behavior has been related to CVE-2021-40444, whereas the malicious document will load ActiveX, which activates the MSHTML component. The vulnerability resides in the MSHTML component. During triage, identify parallel processes and capture any file modifications for analysis. -action.notable.param.rule_title = MSHTML Module Load in Office Product -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `sysmon` EventID=7 process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe","wordpad.exe","wordview.exe") ImageLoaded IN ("*\\mshtml.dll", "*\\Microsoft.mshtml.dll","*\\IE.Interop.MSHTML.dll","*\\MshtmlDac.dll","*\\MshtmlDed.dll","*\\MshtmlDer.dll") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, process_name, ImageLoaded, OriginalFileName, process_id | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mshtml_module_load_in_office_product_filter` - -[ESCU - MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following hunting analytic identifies `msi.dll` being loaded by a binary not located in `system32`, `syswow64`, `winsxs` or `windows` paths. This behavior is most recently related to InstallerFileTakeOver, or CVE-2021-41379, and DLL side-loading. CVE-2021-41379 requires a binary to be dropped and `msi.dll` to be loaded by it. To Successful exploitation of this issue happens in four parts \ -1. Generation of an MSI that will trigger bad behavior. \ -1. Preparing a directory for MSI installation. \ -1. Inducing an error state. \ -1. Racing to introduce a junction and a symlink to trick msiexec.exe to modify the attacker specified file. \ -In addition, `msi.dll` has been abused in DLL side-loading attacks by being loaded by non-system binaries. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.002", "T1574"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following hunting analytic identifies `msi.dll` being loaded by a binary not located in `system32`, `syswow64`, `winsxs` or `windows` paths. This behavior is most recently related to InstallerFileTakeOver, or CVE-2021-41379, and DLL side-loading. CVE-2021-41379 requires a binary to be dropped and `msi.dll` to be loaded by it. To Successful exploitation of this issue happens in four parts \ -1. Generation of an MSI that will trigger bad behavior. \ -1. Preparing a directory for MSI installation. \ -1. Inducing an error state. \ -1. Racing to introduce a junction and a symlink to trick msiexec.exe to modify the attacker specified file. \ -In addition, `msi.dll` has been abused in DLL side-loading attacks by being loaded by non-system binaries. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible some Administrative utilities will load msi.dll outside of normal system paths, filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-08 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-08 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Privilege Escalation"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = The following module $ImageLoaded$ was loaded by $Image$ outside of the normal system paths on endpoint $Computer$, potentally related to DLL side-loading. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"threat_object_field": "ImageLoaded", "threat_object_type": "other"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.002", "T1574"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "ImageLoaded", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Other"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following hunting analytic identifies `msi.dll` being loaded by a binary not located in `system32`, `syswow64`, `winsxs` or `windows` paths. This behavior is most recently related to InstallerFileTakeOver, or CVE-2021-41379, and DLL side-loading. CVE-2021-41379 requires a binary to be dropped and `msi.dll` to be loaded by it. To Successful exploitation of this issue happens in four parts \ -1. Generation of an MSI that will trigger bad behavior. \ -1. Preparing a directory for MSI installation. \ -1. Inducing an error state. \ -1. Racing to introduce a junction and a symlink to trick msiexec.exe to modify the attacker specified file. \ -In addition, `msi.dll` has been abused in DLL side-loading attacks by being loaded by non-system binaries. -action.notable.param.rule_title = MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded="*\\msi.dll" NOT (Image IN ("*\\System32\\*","*\\syswow64\\*","*\\windows\\*", "*\\winsxs\\*")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name Computer EventCode ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `msi_module_loaded_by_non_system_binary_filter` - [ESCU - MacOS - Re-opened Applications - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = This search looks for processes referencing the plist files that determine which applications are re-opened when a user reboots their machine. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command and Control"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command \u0026 Control"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM"]} action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for processes referencing the plist files that determine which applications are re-opened when a user reboots their machine. action.escu.how_to_implement = In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest process data from your osquery deployed agents with the [splunk.conf](https://github.com/splunk/TA-osquery/blob/master/config/splunk.conf) pack enabled. Also the [TA-OSquery](https://github.com/splunk/TA-osquery) must be deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the data populate the Endpoint data model. @@ -20480,16 +33973,21 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - MacOS - Re-opened Applications - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["ColdRoot MacOS RAT"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - MacOS - Re-opened Applications - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command and Control"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM"]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["ColdRoot MacOS RAT"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command \u0026 Control"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for processes referencing the plist files that determine which applications are re-opened when a user reboots their machine. action.notable.param.rule_title = MacOS - Re-opened Applications action.notable.param.security_domain = threat @@ -20505,337 +34003,12 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process="*com.apple.loginwindow*" by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `macos___re_opened_applications_filter` -[ESCU - Mailsniper Invoke functions - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search is to detect known mailsniper.ps1 functions executed in a machine. This technique was seen in some attacker to harvest some sensitive e-mail in a compromised exchange server. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114", "T1114.001"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect known mailsniper.ps1 functions executed in a machine. This technique was seen in some attacker to harvest some sensitive e-mail in a compromised exchange server. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the powershell logs from your endpoints. make sure you enable needed registry to monitor this event. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-05-19 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-05-19 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Mailsniper Invoke functions - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Data Exfiltration"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = mailsniper.ps1 functions $Message$ executed on a $ComputerName$ by user $user$. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 72}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Mailsniper Invoke functions - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Exfiltration"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114", "T1114.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect known mailsniper.ps1 functions executed in a machine. This technique was seen in some attacker to harvest some sensitive e-mail in a compromised exchange server. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Mailsniper Invoke functions -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message IN ("*Invoke-GlobalO365MailSearch*", "*Invoke-GlobalMailSearch*", "*Invoke-SelfSearch*", "*Invoke-PasswordSprayOWA*", "*Invoke-PasswordSprayEWS*","*Invoke-DomainHarvestOWA*", "*Invoke-UsernameHarvestOWA*","*Invoke-OpenInboxFinder*","*Invoke-InjectGEventAPI*","*Invoke-InjectGEvent*","*Invoke-SearchGmail*", "*Invoke-MonitorCredSniper*", "*Invoke-AddGmailRule*","*Invoke-PasswordSprayEAS*","*Invoke-UsernameHarvestEAS*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mailsniper_invoke_functions_filter` - -[ESCU - Malicious InProcServer32 Modification - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies a process modifying the registry with a known malicious CLSID under InProcServer32. Most COM classes are registered with the operating system and are identified by a GUID that represents the Class Identifier (CLSID) within the registry (usually under HKLM\\Software\\Classes\\CLSID or HKCU\\Software\\Classes\\CLSID). Behind the implementation of a COM class is the server (some binary) that is referenced within registry keys under the CLSID. The LocalServer32 key represents a path to an executable (exe) implementation, and the InprocServer32 key represents a path to a dynamic link library (DLL) implementation (Bohops). During triage, review parallel processes for suspicious activity. Pivot on the process GUID to see the full timeline of events. Analyze the value and look for file modifications. Being this is looking for inprocserver32, a DLL found in the value will most likely be loaded by a parallel process. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.010", "T1112"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies a process modifying the registry with a known malicious CLSID under InProcServer32. Most COM classes are registered with the operating system and are identified by a GUID that represents the Class Identifier (CLSID) within the registry (usually under HKLM\\Software\\Classes\\CLSID or HKCU\\Software\\Classes\\CLSID). Behind the implementation of a COM class is the server (some binary) that is referenced within registry keys under the CLSID. The LocalServer32 key represents a path to an executable (exe) implementation, and the InprocServer32 key represents a path to a dynamic link library (DLL) implementation (Bohops). During triage, review parallel processes for suspicious activity. Pivot on the process GUID to see the full timeline of events. Analyze the value and look for file modifications. Being this is looking for inprocserver32, a DLL found in the value will most likely be loaded by a parallel process. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, filter as needed. In our test case, Remcos used regsvr32.exe to modify the registry. It may be required, dependent upon the EDR tool producing registry events, to remove (Default) from the command-line. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-05 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-05 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Malicious InProcServer32 Modification - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", "Remcos"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = The $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ modifying the registry with a known malicious clsid under InProcServer32. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Malicious InProcServer32 Modification - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", "Remcos"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.010", "T1112"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies a process modifying the registry with a known malicious CLSID under InProcServer32. Most COM classes are registered with the operating system and are identified by a GUID that represents the Class Identifier (CLSID) within the registry (usually under HKLM\\Software\\Classes\\CLSID or HKCU\\Software\\Classes\\CLSID). Behind the implementation of a COM class is the server (some binary) that is referenced within registry keys under the CLSID. The LocalServer32 key represents a path to an executable (exe) implementation, and the InprocServer32 key represents a path to a dynamic link library (DLL) implementation (Bohops). During triage, review parallel processes for suspicious activity. Pivot on the process GUID to see the full timeline of events. Analyze the value and look for file modifications. Being this is looking for inprocserver32, a DLL found in the value will most likely be loaded by a parallel process. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Malicious InProcServer32 Modification -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_guid Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\CLSID\\{89565275-A714-4a43-912E-978B935EDCCC}\\InProcServer32\\(Default)" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest Registry.process_guid Registry.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | fields _time dest registry_path registry_key_name registry_value_name process_name process_path process process_guid user] | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, process_name registry_path registry_key_name registry_value_name user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_inprocserver32_modification_filter` - -[ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies the use of the EncodedCommand PowerShell parameter. This is typically used by Administrators to run complex scripts, but commonly used by adversaries to hide their code. \ -The analytic identifies all variations of EncodedCommand, as PowerShell allows the ability to shorten the parameter. For example enc, enco, encod and so forth. In addition, through our research it was identified that PowerShell will interpret different command switch types beyond the hyphen. We have added endash, emdash, horizontal bar, and forward slash. \ -During triage, review parallel events to determine legitimacy. Tune as needed based on admin scripts in use. \ -Alternatively, may use regex per matching here https://regexr.com/662ov. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the use of the EncodedCommand PowerShell parameter. This is typically used by Administrators to run complex scripts, but commonly used by adversaries to hide their code. \ -The analytic identifies all variations of EncodedCommand, as PowerShell allows the ability to shorten the parameter. For example enc, enco, encod and so forth. In addition, through our research it was identified that PowerShell will interpret different command switch types beyond the hyphen. We have added endash, emdash, horizontal bar, and forward slash. \ -During triage, review parallel events to determine legitimacy. Tune as needed based on admin scripts in use. \ -Alternatively, may use regex per matching here https://regexr.com/662ov. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = System administrators may use this option, but it's not common. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-18 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-18 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell", "NOBELIUM Group", "WhisperGate"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Powershell.exe running potentially malicious encodede commands on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 35}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "NOBELIUM Group", "WhisperGate"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the use of the EncodedCommand PowerShell parameter. This is typically used by Administrators to run complex scripts, but commonly used by adversaries to hide their code. \ -The analytic identifies all variations of EncodedCommand, as PowerShell allows the ability to shorten the parameter. For example enc, enco, encod and so forth. In addition, through our research it was identified that PowerShell will interpret different command switch types beyond the hyphen. We have added endash, emdash, horizontal bar, and forward slash. \ -During triage, review parallel events to determine legitimacy. Tune as needed based on admin scripts in use. \ -Alternatively, may use regex per matching here https://regexr.com/662ov. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,"(?i)[\-|\/|–|—|―]e(nc*o*d*e*d*c*o*m*m*a*n*d*)*\s+[^-]") | `malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command_filter` - -[ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for PowerShell processes started with parameters used to bypass the local execution policy for scripts. These parameters are often observed in attacks leveraging PowerShell scripts as they override the default PowerShell execution policy. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for PowerShell processes started with parameters used to bypass the local execution policy for scripts. These parameters are often observed in attacks leveraging PowerShell scripts as they override the default PowerShell execution policy. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = There may be legitimate reasons to bypass the PowerShell execution policy. The PowerShell script being run with this parameter should be validated to ensure that it is legitimate. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["DHS Report TA18-074A", "HAFNIUM Group"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = PowerShell local execution policy bypass attempt on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DHS Report TA18-074A", "HAFNIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for PowerShell processes started with parameters used to bypass the local execution policy for scripts. These parameters are often observed in attacks leveraging PowerShell scripts as they override the default PowerShell execution policy. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process_id) as process_id, values(Processes.parent_process_id) as parent_process_id values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process="* -ex*" OR Processes.process="* bypass *") by Processes.process_id, Processes.user, Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass_filter` - -[ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for PowerShell processes started with a base64 encoded command-line passed to it, with parameters to modify the execution policy for the process, and those that prevent the display of an interactive prompt to the user. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it overrides the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide itself from the user, and passes an encoded script to be run on the command-line. Deprecated because almost the same as Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for PowerShell processes started with a base64 encoded command-line passed to it, with parameters to modify the execution policy for the process, and those that prevent the display of an interactive prompt to the user. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it overrides the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide itself from the user, and passes an encoded script to be run on the command-line. Deprecated because almost the same as Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate process can have this combination of command-line options, but it's not common. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-19 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-19 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for PowerShell processes started with a base64 encoded command-line passed to it, with parameters to modify the execution policy for the process, and those that prevent the display of an interactive prompt to the user. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it overrides the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide itself from the user, and passes an encoded script to be run on the command-line. Deprecated because almost the same as Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command -action.notable.param.rule_title = Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=powershell.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| search (process=*-EncodedCommand* OR process=*-enc*) process=*-Exec* | `malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments_filter` - -[ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for PowerShell processes launched with arguments that have characters indicative of obfuscation on the command-line. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for PowerShell processes launched with arguments that have characters indicative of obfuscation on the command-line. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = These characters might be legitimately on the command-line, but it is not common. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-19 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-19 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Powershell.exe running with potential obfuscated arguments on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for PowerShell processes launched with arguments that have characters indicative of obfuscation on the command-line. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| eval num_obfuscation = (mvcount(split(process,"`"))-1) + (mvcount(split(process, "^"))-1) + (mvcount(split(process, "'"))-1) | `malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques_filter` | search num_obfuscation > 10 - -[ESCU - Malicious Powershell Executed As A Service - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This detection is to identify the abuse the Windows SC.exe to execute malicious commands or payloads via PowerShell. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569", "T1569.002"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This detection is to identify the abuse the Windows SC.exe to execute malicious commands or payloads via PowerShell. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows System logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Creating a hidden powershell service is rare and could key off of those instances. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-07 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-07 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Malicious Powershell Executed As A Service - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious Powershell"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Identifies the abuse the Windows SC.exe to execute malicious powerShell as a service $Service_File_Name$ by $user$ on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 72}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Malicious Powershell Executed As A Service - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious Powershell"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569", "T1569.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This detection is to identify the abuse the Windows SC.exe to execute malicious commands or payloads via PowerShell. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Malicious Powershell Executed As A Service -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 | eval l_Service_File_Name=lower(Service_File_Name) | regex l_Service_File_Name="powershell[.\s]|powershell_ise[.\s]|pwsh[.\s]|psexec[.\s]" | regex l_Service_File_Name="-nop[rofile\s]+|-w[indowstyle]*\s+hid[den]*|-noe[xit\s]+|-enc[odedcommand\s]+" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Service_File_Name Service_Name Service_Start_Type Service_Type Service_Account user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_powershell_executed_as_a_service_filter` - [ESCU - Microsoft Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = The following query identifies suspicious .aspx created in 3 paths identified by Microsoft as known drop locations for Exchange exploitation related to HAFNIUM group and recently disclosed vulnerablity named ProxyShell. Paths include: `\HttpProxy\owa\auth\`, `\inetpub\wwwroot\aspnet_client\`, and `\HttpProxy\OAB\`. The analytic is limited to process name MSExchangeMailboxReplication.exe, which typically does not write .aspx files to disk. Upon triage, the suspicious .aspx file will likely look obvious on the surface. inspect the contents for script code inside. Identify additional log sources, IIS included, to review source and other potential exploitation. It is often the case that a particular threat is only applicable to a specific subset of systems in your environment. Typically analytics to detect those threats are written without the benefit of being able to only target those systems as well. Writing analytics against all systems when those behaviors are limited to identifiable subsets of those systems is suboptimal. Consider the case ProxyShell vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Servers. With asset information, a hunter can limit their analytics to systems that have been identified as Exchange servers. A hunter may start with the theory that the exchange server is communicating with new systems that it has not previously. If this theory is run against all publicly facing systems, the amount of noise it will generate will likely render this theory untenable. However, using the asset information to limit this analytic to just the Exchange servers will reduce the noise allowing the hunter to focus only on the systems where this behavioral change is relevant. action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505", "T1505.003", "T1190"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] action.escu.eli5 = The following query identifies suspicious .aspx created in 3 paths identified by Microsoft as known drop locations for Exchange exploitation related to HAFNIUM group and recently disclosed vulnerablity named ProxyShell. Paths include: `\HttpProxy\owa\auth\`, `\inetpub\wwwroot\aspnet_client\`, and `\HttpProxy\OAB\`. The analytic is limited to process name MSExchangeMailboxReplication.exe, which typically does not write .aspx files to disk. Upon triage, the suspicious .aspx file will likely look obvious on the surface. inspect the contents for script code inside. Identify additional log sources, IIS included, to review source and other potential exploitation. It is often the case that a particular threat is only applicable to a specific subset of systems in your environment. Typically analytics to detect those threats are written without the benefit of being able to only target those systems as well. Writing analytics against all systems when those behaviors are limited to identifiable subsets of those systems is suboptimal. Consider the case ProxyShell vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Servers. With asset information, a hunter can limit their analytics to systems that have been identified as Exchange servers. A hunter may start with the theory that the exchange server is communicating with new systems that it has not previously. If this theory is run against all publicly facing systems, the amount of noise it will generate will likely render this theory untenable. However, using the asset information to limit this analytic to just the Exchange servers will reduce the noise allowing the hunter to focus only on the systems where this behavioral change is relevant. action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node and `Filesystem` node. action.escu.known_false_positives = The query is structured in a way that `action` (read, create) is not defined. Review the results of this query, filter, and tune as necessary. It may be necessary to generate this query specific to your endpoint product. @@ -20857,10 +34030,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Microsoft Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["ProxyShell", "Ransomware"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exploitation"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505", "T1505.003", "T1190"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "file_name", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "File Name"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["ProxyShell", "Ransomware"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505", "T1505.003", "T1190"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "file_name", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "File Name"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = The following query identifies suspicious .aspx created in 3 paths identified by Microsoft as known drop locations for Exchange exploitation related to HAFNIUM group and recently disclosed vulnerablity named ProxyShell. Paths include: `\HttpProxy\owa\auth\`, `\inetpub\wwwroot\aspnet_client\`, and `\HttpProxy\OAB\`. The analytic is limited to process name MSExchangeMailboxReplication.exe, which typically does not write .aspx files to disk. Upon triage, the suspicious .aspx file will likely look obvious on the surface. inspect the contents for script code inside. Identify additional log sources, IIS included, to review source and other potential exploitation. It is often the case that a particular threat is only applicable to a specific subset of systems in your environment. Typically analytics to detect those threats are written without the benefit of being able to only target those systems as well. Writing analytics against all systems when those behaviors are limited to identifiable subsets of those systems is suboptimal. Consider the case ProxyShell vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Servers. With asset information, a hunter can limit their analytics to systems that have been identified as Exchange servers. A hunter may start with the theory that the exchange server is communicating with new systems that it has not previously. If this theory is run against all publicly facing systems, the amount of noise it will generate will likely render this theory untenable. However, using the asset information to limit this analytic to just the Exchange servers will reduce the noise allowing the hunter to focus only on the systems where this behavioral change is relevant. action.notable.param.rule_title = Microsoft Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -20876,4241 +34049,12 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=MSExchangeMailboxReplication.exe by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process_guid Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN ("*\\HttpProxy\\owa\\auth\\*", "*\\inetpub\\wwwroot\\aspnet_client\\*", "*\\HttpProxy\\OAB\\*") Filesystem.file_name="*.aspx" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process process_guid] | dedup file_create_time | table dest file_create_time, file_name, file_path, process_name | `microsoft_exchange_mailbox_replication_service_writing_active_server_pages_filter` -[ESCU - Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic looks for the use of Mimikatz command line parameters leveraged to execute pass the ticket attacks. Red teams and adversaries alike may use the pass the ticket technique using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Defenders should be aware that adversaries may customize the source code of Mimikatz and modify the command line parameters. This would effectively bypass this analytic. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1550", "T1550.003"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic looks for the use of Mimikatz command line parameters leveraged to execute pass the ticket attacks. Red teams and adversaries alike may use the pass the ticket technique using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Defenders should be aware that adversaries may customize the source code of Mimikatz and modify the command line parameters. This would effectively bypass this analytic. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Although highly unlikely, legitimate applications may use the same command line parameters as Mimikatz. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-01 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-01 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Mimikatz command line parameters for pass the ticket attacks were used on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 36}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 36}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:PrivilegeEscalation"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1550", "T1550.003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic looks for the use of Mimikatz command line parameters leveraged to execute pass the ticket attacks. Red teams and adversaries alike may use the pass the ticket technique using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Defenders should be aware that adversaries may customize the source code of Mimikatz and modify the command line parameters. This would effectively bypass this analytic. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process = "*sekurlsa::tickets /export*" OR Processes.process = "*kerberos::ptt*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mimikatz_passtheticket_commandline_parameters_filter` - -[ESCU - Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies `mmc.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the DCOM protocol and the MMC20 COM object, the executed command is spawned as a child processs of `mmc.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of mmc.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.003"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies `mmc.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the DCOM protocol and the MMC20 COM object, the executed command is spawned as a child processs of `mmc.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of mmc.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-23 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-23 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Mmc.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 54}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies `mmc.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the DCOM protocol and the MMC20 COM object, the executed command is spawned as a child processs of `mmc.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of mmc.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=mmc.exe) (Processes.process_name IN ("Regsvcs.exe", "Ftp.exe", "OfflineScannerShell.exe", "Rasautou.exe", "Schtasks.exe", "Xwizard.exe", "Dllhost.exe", "Pnputil.exe", "Atbroker.exe", "Pcwrun.exe", "Ttdinject.exe","Mshta.exe", "Bitsadmin.exe", "Certoc.exe", "Ieexec.exe", "Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe", "Runscripthelper.exe", "Forfiles.exe", "Msbuild.exe", "Register-cimprovider.exe", "Tttracer.exe", "Ie4uinit.exe", "Bash.exe", "Hh.exe", "SettingSyncHost.exe", "Cmstp.exe", "Mmc.exe", "Stordiag.exe", "Scriptrunner.exe", "Odbcconf.exe", "Extexport.exe", "Msdt.exe", "WorkFolders.exe", "Diskshadow.exe", "Mavinject.exe", "Regasm.exe", "Gpscript.exe", "Rundll32.exe", "Regsvr32.exe", "Msiexec.exe", "Wuauclt.exe", "Presentationhost.exe", "Wmic.exe", "Runonce.exe", "Syncappvpublishingserver.exe", "Verclsid.exe", "Infdefaultinstall.exe", "Explorer.exe", "Installutil.exe", "Netsh.exe", "Wab.exe", "Dnscmd.exe", "At.exe", "Pcalua.exe", "Msconfig.exe")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mmc_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter` - -[ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic identifies suspicious modification of registry to deface or change the wallpaper of a compromised machines as part of its payload. This technique was commonly seen in ransomware like REVIL where it create a bitmap file contain a note that the machine was compromised and make it as a wallpaper. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1491"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic identifies suspicious modification of registry to deface or change the wallpaper of a compromised machines as part of its payload. This technique was commonly seen in ransomware like REVIL where it create a bitmap file contain a note that the machine was compromised and make it as a wallpaper. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Image, TargetObject registry key, registry Details from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -action.escu.known_false_positives = 3rd party tool may used to changed the wallpaper of the machine -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-02 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-02 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware", "BlackMatter Ransomware"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Wallpaper modification on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 54}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware", "BlackMatter Ransomware"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1491"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic identifies suspicious modification of registry to deface or change the wallpaper of a compromised machines as part of its payload. This technique was commonly seen in ransomware like REVIL where it create a bitmap file contain a note that the machine was compromised and make it as a wallpaper. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Modification Of Wallpaper -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `sysmon` EventCode =13 (TargetObject= "*\\Control Panel\\Desktop\\Wallpaper" AND Image != "*\\explorer.exe") OR (TargetObject= "*\\Control Panel\\Desktop\\Wallpaper" AND Details = "*\\temp\\*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Image TargetObject Details Computer process_guid process_id user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `modification_of_wallpaper_filter` - -[ESCU - Modify ACL permission To Files Or Folder - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic identifies suspicious modification of ACL permission to a files or folder to make it available to everyone. This technique may be used by the adversary to evade ACLs or protected files access. This changes is commonly configured by the file or directory owner with appropriate permission. This behavior is a good indicator if this command seen on a machine utilized by an account with no permission to do so. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic identifies suspicious modification of ACL permission to a files or folder to make it available to everyone. This technique may be used by the adversary to evade ACLs or protected files access. This changes is commonly configured by the file or directory owner with appropriate permission. This behavior is a good indicator if this command seen on a machine utilized by an account with no permission to do so. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed cacls.exe may be used. -action.escu.known_false_positives = administrators may use this command. Filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-05-04 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-05-04 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Modify ACL permission To Files Or Folder - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["XMRig"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious ACL permission modification on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 32}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Modify ACL permission To Files Or Folder - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic identifies suspicious modification of ACL permission to a files or folder to make it available to everyone. This technique may be used by the adversary to evade ACLs or protected files access. This changes is commonly configured by the file or directory owner with appropriate permission. This behavior is a good indicator if this command seen on a machine utilized by an account with no permission to do so. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Modify ACL permission To Files Or Folder -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "cacls.exe" OR Processes.process_name = "icacls.exe" OR Processes.process_name = "xcacls.exe" AND (Processes.process = "*/G everyone:*" OR Processes.process = "*/G SYSTEM:*") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `modify_acl_permission_to_files_or_folder_filter` - -[ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for DNS requests for faux domains similar to the domains that you want to have monitored for abuse. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Resolution"] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for DNS requests for faux domains similar to the domains that you want to have monitored for abuse. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You need to ingest data from your DNS logs. Specifically you must ingest the domain that is being queried and the IP of the host originating the request. Ideally, you should also be ingesting the answer to the query and the query type. This approach allows you to also create your own localized passive DNS capability which can aid you in future investigations. You also need to have run the search "ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names", which creates the permutations of the domain that will be checked for. -action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time -action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-23 -action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-23 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Brand Monitoring"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Brand Monitoring"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for DNS requests for faux domains similar to the domains that you want to have monitored for abuse. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(DNS.answer) as IPs min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.src, DNS.query | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `brand_abuse_dns` | `monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse_filter` - -[ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for emails claiming to be sent from a domain similar to one that you want to have monitored for abuse. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Email"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for emails claiming to be sent from a domain similar to one that you want to have monitored for abuse. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You need to ingest email header data. Specifically the sender's address (src_user) must be populated. You also need to have run the search "ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names", which creates the permutations of the domain that will be checked for. -action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time -action.escu.creation_date = 2018-01-05 -action.escu.modification_date = 2018-01-05 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Brand Monitoring", "Suspicious Emails"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Brand Monitoring", "Suspicious Emails"], "cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for emails claiming to be sent from a domain similar to one that you want to have monitored for abuse. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Monitor Email For Brand Abuse -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Email.recipient) as recipients, min(_time) as firstTime, max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Email by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.message_id | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Email")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | eval temp=split(src_user, "@") | eval email_domain=mvindex(temp, 1) | lookup update=true brandMonitoring_lookup domain as email_domain OUTPUT domain_abuse | search domain_abuse=true | table message_id, src_user, email_domain, recipients, firstTime, lastTime | `monitor_email_for_brand_abuse_filter` - -[ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for registry activity associated with modifications to the registry key `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors`. In this scenario, an attacker can load an arbitrary .dll into the print-monitor registry by giving the full path name to the after.dll. The system will execute the .dll with elevated (SYSTEM) permissions and will persist after reboot. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.010", "T1547"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for registry activity associated with modifications to the registry key `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors`. In this scenario, an attacker can load an arbitrary .dll into the print-monitor registry by giving the full path name to the after.dll. The system will execute the .dll with elevated (SYSTEM) permissions and will persist after reboot. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report registry modifications. -action.escu.known_false_positives = You will encounter noise from legitimate print-monitor registry entries. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-01-28 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-01-28 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows Persistence Techniques"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = New print monitor added on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 5"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.010", "T1547"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for registry activity associated with modifications to the registry key `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors`. In this scenario, an attacker can load an arbitrary .dll into the print-monitor registry by giving the full path name to the after.dll. The system will execute the .dll with elevated (SYSTEM) permissions and will persist after reboot. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.action=modified AND Registry.registry_path="*CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors*" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors_filter` - -[ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for Web requests to faux domains similar to the one that you want to have monitored for abuse. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Web"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for Web requests to faux domains similar to the one that you want to have monitored for abuse. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You need to ingest data from your web traffic. This can be accomplished by indexing data from a web proxy, or using a network traffic analysis tool, such as Bro or Splunk Stream. You also need to have run the search "ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names", which creates the permutations of the domain that will be checked for. -action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time -action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-23 -action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-23 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Brand Monitoring"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Brand Monitoring"], "cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['src'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for Web requests to faux domains similar to the one that you want to have monitored for abuse. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Web.url) as urls min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Web by Web.src | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `brand_abuse_web` | `monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse_filter` - -[ESCU - Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search is to detect a suspicious mshta.exe process that spawn rundll32 or regsvr32 child process. This technique was seen in several malware nowadays like trickbot to load its initial .dll stage loader to execute and download the the actual trickbot payload. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.005"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious mshta.exe process that spawn rundll32 or regsvr32 child process. This technique was seen in several malware nowadays like trickbot to load its initial .dll stage loader to execute and download the the actual trickbot payload. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = limitted. this anomaly behavior is not commonly seen in clean host. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-19 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-19 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Trickbot", "IcedID"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = a mshta parent process $parent_process_name$ spawn child process $process_name$ in host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 56}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Trickbot", "IcedID"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "executions"}], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious mshta.exe process that spawn rundll32 or regsvr32 child process. This technique was seen in several malware nowadays like trickbot to load its initial .dll stage loader to execute and download the the actual trickbot payload. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name = "mshta.exe" `process_rundll32` OR `process_regsvr32` by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process_filter` - -[ESCU - Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search is to detect a suspicious creation of msmpeng.exe or mpsvc.dll in non default windows defender folder. This technique was seen couple days ago with revil ransomware in Kaseya Supply chain. The approach is to drop an old version of msmpeng.exe to load the actual payload name as mspvc.dll which will load the revil ransomware to the compromise machine -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.002", "T1574"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious creation of msmpeng.exe or mpsvc.dll in non default windows defender folder. This technique was seen couple days ago with revil ransomware in Kaseya Supply chain. The approach is to drop an old version of msmpeng.exe to load the actual payload name as mspvc.dll which will load the revil ransomware to the compromise machine -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node. -action.escu.known_false_positives = quite minimal false positive expected. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-05 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-05 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.002", "T1574"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious creation of msmpeng.exe or mpsvc.dll in non default windows defender folder. This technique was seen couple days ago with revil ransomware in Kaseya Supply chain. The approach is to drop an old version of msmpeng.exe to load the actual payload name as mspvc.dll which will load the revil ransomware to the compromise machine -action.notable.param.rule_title = Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = |tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_name = "msmpeng.exe" OR Filesystem.file_name = "mpsvc.dll") AND Filesystem.file_path != "*\\Program Files\\windows defender\\*" by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading_filter` - -[ESCU - Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search is designed to detect high frequency of archive files data exfiltration through HTTP POST method protocol. This are one of the common techniques used by APT or trojan spy after doing the data collection like screenshot, recording, sensitive data to the infected machines. The attacker may execute archiving command to the collected data, save it a temp folder with a hidden attribute then send it to its C2 through HTTP POST. Sometimes adversaries will rename the archive files or encode/encrypt to cover their tracks. This detection can detect a renamed archive files transfer to HTTP POST since it checks the request body header. Unfortunately this detection cannot support archive that was encrypted or encoded before doing the exfiltration. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1048"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search is designed to detect high frequency of archive files data exfiltration through HTTP POST method protocol. This are one of the common techniques used by APT or trojan spy after doing the data collection like screenshot, recording, sensitive data to the infected machines. The attacker may execute archiving command to the collected data, save it a temp folder with a hidden attribute then send it to its C2 through HTTP POST. Sometimes adversaries will rename the archive files or encode/encrypt to cover their tracks. This detection can detect a renamed archive files transfer to HTTP POST since it checks the request body header. Unfortunately this detection cannot support archive that was encrypted or encoded before doing the exfiltration. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the stream HTTP logs or network logs that catch network traffic. Make sure that the http-request-body, payload, or request field is enabled in stream http configuration. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Normal archive transfer via HTTP protocol may trip this detection. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-21 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-21 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Command and Control", "Data Exfiltration"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A http post $http_method$ sending packet with possible archive bytes header 4form_data$ in uri path $uri_path$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "uri_path", "threat_object_type": "uripath"}, {"threat_object_field": "form_data", "threat_object_type": "formdata"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Command and Control", "Data Exfiltration"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1048"], "observable": [{"name": "uri_path", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "UriPath"}, {"name": "form_data", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "formdata"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is designed to detect high frequency of archive files data exfiltration through HTTP POST method protocol. This are one of the common techniques used by APT or trojan spy after doing the data collection like screenshot, recording, sensitive data to the infected machines. The attacker may execute archiving command to the collected data, save it a temp folder with a hidden attribute then send it to its C2 through HTTP POST. Sometimes adversaries will rename the archive files or encode/encrypt to cover their tracks. This detection can detect a renamed archive files transfer to HTTP POST since it checks the request body header. Unfortunately this detection cannot support archive that was encrypted or encoded before doing the exfiltration. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `stream_http` http_method=POST |eval archive_hdr1=substr(form_data,1,2) | eval archive_hdr2 = substr(form_data,1,4) |stats values(form_data) as http_request_body min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by http_method http_user_agent uri_path url bytes_in bytes_out archive_hdr1 archive_hdr2 |where count >20 AND (archive_hdr1 = "7z" OR archive_hdr1 = "PK" OR archive_hdr2="Rar!") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic_filter` - -[ESCU - Multiple Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple disabled domain users using the Kerberos protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using Kerberos to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. As attackers progress in a breach, mistakes will be made. In certain scenarios, adversaries may execute a password spraying attack against disabled users. Event 4768 is generated every time the Key Distribution Center issues a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). Failure code `0x12` stands for `clients credentials have been revoked` (account disabled, expired or locked out).\ -The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ -This detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\ -The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source ip and attempted user accounts. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003", "T1110"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple disabled domain users using the Kerberos protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using Kerberos to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. As attackers progress in a breach, mistakes will be made. In certain scenarios, adversaries may execute a password spraying attack against disabled users. Event 4768 is generated every time the Key Distribution Center issues a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). Failure code `0x12` stands for `clients credentials have been revoked` (account disabled, expired or locked out).\ -The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ -This detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\ -The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source ip and attempted user accounts. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled. -action.escu.known_false_positives = A host failing to authenticate with multiple disabled domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, multi-user systems missconfigured systems. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-14 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-14 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Multiple Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Password Spraying", "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Potential Kerberos based password spraying attack from $Client_Address$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Client_Address", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Multiple Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying", "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "Client_Address", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple disabled domain users using the Kerberos protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using Kerberos to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. As attackers progress in a breach, mistakes will be made. In certain scenarios, adversaries may execute a password spraying attack against disabled users. Event 4768 is generated every time the Key Distribution Center issues a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). Failure code `0x12` stands for `clients credentials have been revoked` (account disabled, expired or locked out).\ -The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ -This detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\ -The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source ip and attempted user accounts. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Multiple Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 Account_Name!="*$" Result_Code=0x12 | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Account_Name) AS unique_accounts values(Account_Name) as tried_accounts by _time, Client_Address | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Client_Address | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_disabled_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos_filter` - -[ESCU - Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple invalid domain users using the Kerberos protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using Kerberos to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. As attackers progress in a breach, mistakes will be made. In certain scenarios, adversaries may execute a password spraying attack using an invalid list of users. Event 4768 is generated every time the Key Distribution Center issues a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). Failure code 0x6 stands for `client not found in Kerberos database` (the attempted user is not a valid domain user).\ -The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ -This detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\ -The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source ip and attempted user accounts. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003", "T1110"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple invalid domain users using the Kerberos protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using Kerberos to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. As attackers progress in a breach, mistakes will be made. In certain scenarios, adversaries may execute a password spraying attack using an invalid list of users. Event 4768 is generated every time the Key Distribution Center issues a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). Failure code 0x6 stands for `client not found in Kerberos database` (the attempted user is not a valid domain user).\ -The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ -This detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\ -The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source ip and attempted user accounts. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled. -action.escu.known_false_positives = A host failing to authenticate with multiple invalid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, multi-user systems and missconfigured systems. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-14 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-14 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Password Spraying", "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Potential Kerberos based password spraying attack from $Client_Address$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Client_Address", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying", "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "Client_Address", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple invalid domain users using the Kerberos protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using Kerberos to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. As attackers progress in a breach, mistakes will be made. In certain scenarios, adversaries may execute a password spraying attack using an invalid list of users. Event 4768 is generated every time the Key Distribution Center issues a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). Failure code 0x6 stands for `client not found in Kerberos database` (the attempted user is not a valid domain user).\ -The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ -This detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\ -The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source ip and attempted user accounts. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 Result_Code=0x6 Account_Name!="*$" | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Account_Name) AS unique_accounts values(Account_Name) as tried_accounts by _time, Client_Address | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Client_Address | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos_filter` - -[ESCU - Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple invalid users using the NTLM protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using NTLM to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. As attackers progress in a breach, mistakes will be made. In certain scenarios, adversaries may execute a password spraying attack using an invalid list of users. Event 4776 is generated on the computer that is authoritative for the provided credentials. For domain accounts, the domain controller is authoritative. For local accounts, the local computer is authoritative. Error code 0xC0000064 stands for `The username you typed does not exist` (the attempted user is a legitimate domain user).\ -The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ -This detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\ -The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source workstation name and attempted user accounts. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003", "T1110"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple invalid users using the NTLM protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using NTLM to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. As attackers progress in a breach, mistakes will be made. In certain scenarios, adversaries may execute a password spraying attack using an invalid list of users. Event 4776 is generated on the computer that is authoritative for the provided credentials. For domain accounts, the domain controller is authoritative. For local accounts, the local computer is authoritative. Error code 0xC0000064 stands for `The username you typed does not exist` (the attempted user is a legitimate domain user).\ -The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ -This detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\ -The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source workstation name and attempted user accounts. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Credential Validation' within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled. -action.escu.known_false_positives = A host failing to authenticate with multiple invalid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners and missconfigured systems. If this detection triggers on a host other than a Domain Controller, the behavior could represent a password spraying attack against the host's local accounts. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-15 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-15 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Password Spraying"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Potential NTLM based password spraying attack from $Source_Workstation$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Source_Workstation", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "Source_Workstation", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple invalid users using the NTLM protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using NTLM to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. As attackers progress in a breach, mistakes will be made. In certain scenarios, adversaries may execute a password spraying attack using an invalid list of users. Event 4776 is generated on the computer that is authoritative for the provided credentials. For domain accounts, the domain controller is authoritative. For local accounts, the local computer is authoritative. Error code 0xC0000064 stands for `The username you typed does not exist` (the attempted user is a legitimate domain user).\ -The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ -This detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\ -The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source workstation name and attempted user accounts. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4776 Logon_Account!="*$" 0xC0000064 action=failure | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Logon_Account) AS unique_accounts values(Logon_Account) as tried_accounts by _time, Source_Workstation | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Source_Workstation | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm_filter` - -[ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search detects Okta login failures due to bad credentials for multiple users originating from the same ip address. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search detects Okta login failures due to bad credentials for multiple users originating from the same ip address. -action.escu.how_to_implement = This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being ingested in your Splunk deployment. -action.escu.known_false_positives = A single public IP address servicing multiple legitmate users may trigger this search. In addition, the threshold of 5 distinct users may be too low for your needs. You may modify the included filter macro `multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip_filter` to raise the threshold or except specific IP adresses from triggering this search. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Okta Activity"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Okta Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search detects Okta login failures due to bad credentials for multiple users originating from the same ip address. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP -action.notable.param.security_domain = access -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `okta` outcome.reason=INVALID_CREDENTIALS | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(user) as distinct_users values(user) as users by src_ip, displayMessage, outcome.reason, country, state, city | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search distinct_users > 5| `multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip_filter` - -[ESCU - Multiple Users Attempting To Authenticate Using Explicit Credentials - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies a source user failing to authenticate with multiple users using explicit credentials on a host. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4648 is generated when a process attempts an account logon by explicitly specifying that accounts credentials. This event generates on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations.\ -The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ -This detection will trigger on the potenfially malicious host, perhaps controlled via a trojan or operated by an insider threat, from where a password spraying attack is being executed.\ -The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source account, attempted user accounts and the endpoint were the behavior was identified. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003", "T1110"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies a source user failing to authenticate with multiple users using explicit credentials on a host. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4648 is generated when a process attempts an account logon by explicitly specifying that accounts credentials. This event generates on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations.\ -The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ -This detection will trigger on the potenfially malicious host, perhaps controlled via a trojan or operated by an insider threat, from where a password spraying attack is being executed.\ -The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source account, attempted user accounts and the endpoint were the behavior was identified. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Event Logs from domain controllers as well as member servers and workstations. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Logon` within `Logon/Logoff` needs to be enabled. -action.escu.known_false_positives = A source user failing attempting to authenticate multiple users on a host is not a common behavior for regular systems. Some applications, however, may exhibit this behavior in which case sets of users hosts can be added to an allow list. Possible false positive scenarios include systems where several users connect to like Mail servers, identity providers, remote desktop services, Citrix, etc. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-13 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-13 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Multiple Users Attempting To Authenticate Using Explicit Credentials - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Password Spraying"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Potential password spraying attack from $ComputerName$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Multiple Users Attempting To Authenticate Using Explicit Credentials - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies a source user failing to authenticate with multiple users using explicit credentials on a host. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4648 is generated when a process attempts an account logon by explicitly specifying that accounts credentials. This event generates on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations.\ -The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ -This detection will trigger on the potenfially malicious host, perhaps controlled via a trojan or operated by an insider threat, from where a password spraying attack is being executed.\ -The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source account, attempted user accounts and the endpoint were the behavior was identified. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Multiple Users Attempting To Authenticate Using Explicit Credentials -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4648 | bucket span=2m _time | eval Source_Account = mvindex(Account_Name, 0) | eval Destination_Account = mvindex(Account_Name, 1) | search Source_Account != "*$" Source_Account !="-" Destination_Account !="*$" | stats dc(Destination_Account) AS unique_accounts values(Destination_Account) as tried_account by _time, ComputerName, Source_Account | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by ComputerName | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_users_attempting_to_authenticate_using_explicit_credentials_filter` - -[ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple valid users using the Kerberos protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using Kerberos to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4771 is generated when the Key Distribution Center fails to issue a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). Failure code 0x18 stands for `wrong password provided` (the attempted user is a legitimate domain user).\ -The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ -This detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\ -The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source ip and attempted user accounts. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003", "T1110"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple valid users using the Kerberos protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using Kerberos to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4771 is generated when the Key Distribution Center fails to issue a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). Failure code 0x18 stands for `wrong password provided` (the attempted user is a legitimate domain user).\ -The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ -This detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\ -The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source ip and attempted user accounts. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled. -action.escu.known_false_positives = A host failing to authenticate with multiple valid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, missconfigured systems and multi-user systems like Citrix farms. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-08 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-08 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Password Spraying", "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Potential Kerberos based password spraying attack from $Client_Address$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Client_Address", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying", "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "Client_Address", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple valid users using the Kerberos protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using Kerberos to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4771 is generated when the Key Distribution Center fails to issue a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). Failure code 0x18 stands for `wrong password provided` (the attempted user is a legitimate domain user).\ -The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ -This detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\ -The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source ip and attempted user accounts. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4771 Failure_Code=0x18 Account_Name!="*$" | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Account_Name) AS unique_accounts values(Account_Name) as tried_accounts by _time, Client_Address | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Client_Address | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos_filter` - -[ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple valid users using the NTLM protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using NTLM to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4776 is generated on the computer that is authoritative for the provided credentials. For domain accounts, the domain controller is authoritative. For local accounts, the local computer is authoritative. Error code 0xC000006A means: misspelled or bad password (the attempted user is a legitimate domain user).\ -The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ -This detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\ -The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source workstation name and attempted user accounts. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003", "T1110"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple valid users using the NTLM protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using NTLM to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4776 is generated on the computer that is authoritative for the provided credentials. For domain accounts, the domain controller is authoritative. For local accounts, the local computer is authoritative. Error code 0xC000006A means: misspelled or bad password (the attempted user is a legitimate domain user).\ -The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ -This detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\ -The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source workstation name and attempted user accounts. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Credential Validation` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled. -action.escu.known_false_positives = A host failing to authenticate with multiple valid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners and missconfigured systems. If this detection triggers on a host other than a Domain Controller, the behavior could represent a password spraying attack against the host's local accounts. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-13 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-13 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Password Spraying"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Potential NTLM based password spraying attack from $Source_Workstation$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Source_Workstation", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "Source_Workstation", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple valid users using the NTLM protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using NTLM to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4776 is generated on the computer that is authoritative for the provided credentials. For domain accounts, the domain controller is authoritative. For local accounts, the local computer is authoritative. Error code 0xC000006A means: misspelled or bad password (the attempted user is a legitimate domain user).\ -The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ -This detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\ -The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source workstation name and attempted user accounts. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4776 Logon_Account!="*$" 0xC000006A action=failure | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Logon_Account) AS unique_accounts values(Logon_Account) as tried_accounts by _time, Source_Workstation | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Source_Workstation | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm_filter` - -[ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Process - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies a source process name failing to authenticate with multiple users. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4625 generates on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations when an account fails to logon. Logon Type 2 describes an iteractive logon attempt.\ -The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ -This detection will trigger on the potenfially malicious host, perhaps controlled via a trojan or operated by an insider threat, from where a password spraying attack is being executed. This could be a domain controller as well as a member server or workstation.\ -The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source process name, source account and attempted user accounts. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003", "T1110"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies a source process name failing to authenticate with multiple users. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4625 generates on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations when an account fails to logon. Logon Type 2 describes an iteractive logon attempt.\ -The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ -This detection will trigger on the potenfially malicious host, perhaps controlled via a trojan or operated by an insider threat, from where a password spraying attack is being executed. This could be a domain controller as well as a member server or workstation.\ -The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source process name, source account and attempted user accounts. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Event Logs from domain controllers aas well as member servers and workstations. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Logon` within `Logon/Logoff` needs to be enabled. -action.escu.known_false_positives = A process failing to authenticate with multiple users is not a common behavior for legitimate user sessions. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners and missconfigured systems. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-13 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-13 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Process - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Password Spraying"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Potential password spraying attack from $ComputerName$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Process - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies a source process name failing to authenticate with multiple users. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4625 generates on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations when an account fails to logon. Logon Type 2 describes an iteractive logon attempt.\ -The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ -This detection will trigger on the potenfially malicious host, perhaps controlled via a trojan or operated by an insider threat, from where a password spraying attack is being executed. This could be a domain controller as well as a member server or workstation.\ -The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source process name, source account and attempted user accounts. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Process -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4625 Logon_Type=2 Caller_Process_Name!="-" | bucket span=2m _time | eval Source_Account = mvindex(Account_Name, 0) | eval Destination_Account = mvindex(Account_Name, 1) | stats dc(Destination_Account) AS unique_accounts values(Account_Name) as tried_accounts by _time, Caller_Process_Name, Source_Account, ComputerName | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Caller_Process_Name, Source_Account, ComputerName | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_process_filter` - -[ESCU - Multiple Users Remotely Failing To Authenticate From Host - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies a source host failing to authenticate against a remote host with multiple users. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4625 documents each and every failed attempt to logon to the local computer. This event generates on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations. Logon Type 3 describes an remote authentication attempt.\ -The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ -This detection will trigger on the host that is the target of the password spraying attack. This could be a domain controller as well as a member server or workstation.\ -The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source process name, source account and attempted user accounts. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003", "T1110"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies a source host failing to authenticate against a remote host with multiple users. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4625 documents each and every failed attempt to logon to the local computer. This event generates on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations. Logon Type 3 describes an remote authentication attempt.\ -The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ -This detection will trigger on the host that is the target of the password spraying attack. This could be a domain controller as well as a member server or workstation.\ -The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source process name, source account and attempted user accounts. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Event Logs from domain controllers as as well as member servers and workstations. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Logon` within `Logon/Logoff` needs to be enabled. -action.escu.known_false_positives = A host failing to authenticate with multiple valid users against a remote host is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, remote administration tools, missconfigyred systems, etc. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-13 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-13 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Multiple Users Remotely Failing To Authenticate From Host - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Password Spraying"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Potential password spraying attack on $ComputerName$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Multiple Users Remotely Failing To Authenticate From Host - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies a source host failing to authenticate against a remote host with multiple users. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4625 documents each and every failed attempt to logon to the local computer. This event generates on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations. Logon Type 3 describes an remote authentication attempt.\ -The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ -This detection will trigger on the host that is the target of the password spraying attack. This could be a domain controller as well as a member server or workstation.\ -The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source process name, source account and attempted user accounts. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Multiple Users Remotely Failing To Authenticate From Host -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4625 Logon_Type=3 Source_Network_Address!="-" | bucket span=2m _time | eval Destination_Account = mvindex(Account_Name, 1) | stats dc(Destination_Account) AS unique_accounts values(Destination_Account) as tried_accounts by _time, Source_Network_Address, ComputerName | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Source_Network_Address, ComputerName | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_users_remotely_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_filter` - -[ESCU - NET Profiler UAC bypass - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search is to detect modification of registry to bypass UAC windows feature. This technique is to add a payload dll path on .NET COR file path that will be loaded by mmc.exe as soon it was executed. This detection rely on monitoring the registry key and values in the detection area. It may happened that windows update some dll related to mmc.exe and add dll path in this registry. In this case filtering is needed. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect modification of registry to bypass UAC windows feature. This technique is to add a payload dll path on .NET COR file path that will be loaded by mmc.exe as soon it was executed. This detection rely on monitoring the registry key and values in the detection area. It may happened that windows update some dll related to mmc.exe and add dll path in this registry. In this case filtering is needed. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. -action.escu.known_false_positives = limited false positive. It may trigger by some windows update that will modify this registry. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-18 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-18 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - NET Profiler UAC bypass - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious modification of registry $registry_path$ with possible payload path $registry_value_name$ in $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - NET Profiler UAC bypass - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence,", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Incoming"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect modification of registry to bypass UAC windows feature. This technique is to add a payload dll path on .NET COR file path that will be loaded by mmc.exe as soon it was executed. This detection rely on monitoring the registry key and values in the detection area. It may happened that windows update some dll related to mmc.exe and add dll path in this registry. In this case filtering is needed. -action.notable.param.rule_title = NET Profiler UAC bypass -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\Environment\\COR_PROFILER_PATH" Registry.registry_value_data = "*.dll" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `net_profiler_uac_bypass_filter` - -[ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for the execution of `nltest.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for Domain Trust information. Two arguments `/domain trusts`, returns a list of trusted domains, and `/all_trusts`, returns all trusted domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike use NLTest.exe to enumerate the current domain to assist with further understanding where to pivot next. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for the execution of `nltest.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for Domain Trust information. Two arguments `/domain trusts`, returns a list of trusted domains, and `/all_trusts`, returns all trusted domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike use NLTest.exe to enumerate the current domain to assist with further understanding where to pivot next. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may use nltest for troubleshooting purposes, otherwise, rarely used. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-25 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-25 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ryuk Ransomware", "Domain Trust Discovery", "IcedID", "Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Domain trust discovery execution on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware", "Domain Trust Discovery", "IcedID", "Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for the execution of `nltest.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for Domain Trust information. Two arguments `/domain trusts`, returns a list of trusted domains, and `/all_trusts`, returns all trusted domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike use NLTest.exe to enumerate the current domain to assist with further understanding where to pivot next. -action.notable.param.rule_title = NLTest Domain Trust Discovery -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=nltest.exe OR Processes.process_name!=nltest.exe) (Processes.process=*/domain_trusts* OR Processes.process=*/all_trusts*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `nltest_domain_trust_discovery_filter` - -[ESCU - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following hunting analytic will identify the use of localgroup discovery using `net localgroup`. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.001"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following hunting analytic will identify the use of localgroup discovery using `net localgroup`. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Tune as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-14 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-14 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery", "Windows Discovery Techniques"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Local group discovery on $dest$ by $user$. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 15}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery", "Windows Discovery Techniques"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following hunting analytic will identify the use of localgroup discovery using `net localgroup`. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Net Localgroup Discovery -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=net.exe OR Processes.process_name=net1.exe (Processes.process="*localgroup*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `net_localgroup_discovery_filter` - -[ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Arp - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for the execution of `arp.exe` utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use arp.exe for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1049"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `arp.exe` utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use arp.exe for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-10 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-10 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Arp - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Arp - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1049"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `arp.exe` utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use arp.exe for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Network Connection Discovery With Arp -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="arp.exe") (Processes.process=*-a*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `network_connection_discovery_with_arp_filter` - -[ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Net - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use net.exe for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1049"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use net.exe for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-10 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-10 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Net - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Net - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1049"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use net.exe for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Network Connection Discovery With Net -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="net.exe" OR Processes.process_name="net1.exe") (Processes.process=*use*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `network_connection_discovery_with_net_filter` - -[ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for the execution of `netstat.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use netstat.exe for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1049"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `netstat.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use netstat.exe for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-10 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-10 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1049"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `netstat.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use netstat.exe for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Network Connection Discovery With Netstat -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="netstat.exe") (Processes.process=*-a*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `network_connection_discovery_with_netstat_filter` - -[ESCU - Network Discovery Using Route Windows App - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic look for a spawned process of route.exe windows application. Adversaries and red teams alike abuse this application the recon or do a network discovery on a target host. but one possible false positive might be an automated tool used by a system administator or a powershell script in amazon ec2 config services. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1016", "T1016.001"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic look for a spawned process of route.exe windows application. Adversaries and red teams alike abuse this application the recon or do a network discovery on a target host. but one possible false positive might be an automated tool used by a system administator or a powershell script in amazon ec2 config services. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated host discovery application that may generate false positives or an amazon ec2 script that uses this application. Filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-12 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-12 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Network Discovery Using Route Windows App - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 9}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Network Discovery Using Route Windows App - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1016", "T1016.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic look for a spawned process of route.exe windows application. Adversaries and red teams alike abuse this application the recon or do a network discovery on a target host. but one possible false positive might be an automated tool used by a system administator or a powershell script in amazon ec2 config services. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Network Discovery Using Route Windows App -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_route` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `network_discovery_using_route_windows_app_filter` - -[ESCU - New container uploaded to AWS ECR - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This searches show information on uploaded containers including source user, image id, source IP user type, http user agent, region, first time, last time of operation (PutImage). These searches are based on Cloud Infrastructure Data Model. -action.escu.mappings = {"mitre_attack": ["T1525"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This searches show information on uploaded containers including source user, image id, source IP user type, http user agent, region, first time, last time of operation (PutImage). These searches are based on Cloud Infrastructure Data Model. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model. Please also customize the `container_implant_aws_detection_filter` macro to filter out the false positives. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Uploading container is a normal behavior from developers or users with access to container registry. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-02-20 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-02-20 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - New container uploaded to AWS ECR - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - New container uploaded to AWS ECR - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1525"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'src'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This searches show information on uploaded containers including source user, image id, source IP user type, http user agent, region, first time, last time of operation (PutImage). These searches are based on Cloud Infrastructure Data Model. -action.notable.param.rule_title = New container uploaded to AWS ECR -action.notable.param.security_domain = threat -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Cloud_Infrastructure.Compute where Compute.user_type!="AssumeRole" AND Compute.http_user_agent="AWS Internal" AND Compute.event_name="PutImage" by Compute.image_id Compute.src_user Compute.src Compute.region Compute.msg Compute.user_type | `drop_dm_object_name("Compute")` | `new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr_filter` - -[ESCU - Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This query detects the Nishang Invoke-PowerShellTCPOneLine utility that spawns a call back to a remote command and control server. This is a powershell oneliner. In addition, this will capture on the command-line additional utilities used by Nishang. Triage the endpoint and identify any parallel processes that look suspicious. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain contacted by the powershell process. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This query detects the Nishang Invoke-PowerShellTCPOneLine utility that spawns a call back to a remote command and control server. This is a powershell oneliner. In addition, this will capture on the command-line additional utilities used by Nishang. Triage the endpoint and identify any parallel processes that look suspicious. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain contacted by the powershell process. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present. Filter as needed based on initial analysis. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-03 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-03 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["HAFNIUM Group"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Possible Nishang Invoke-PowerShellTCPOneLine behavior on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["HAFNIUM Group"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Command and Control"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This query detects the Nishang Invoke-PowerShellTCPOneLine utility that spawns a call back to a remote command and control server. This is a powershell oneliner. In addition, this will capture on the command-line additional utilities used by Nishang. Triage the endpoint and identify any parallel processes that look suspicious. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain contacted by the powershell process. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process=*Net.Sockets.TCPClient* AND Processes.process=*System.Text.ASCIIEncoding*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `nishang_powershelltcponeline_filter` - -[ESCU - No Windows Updates in a time frame - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for Windows endpoints that have not generated an event indicating a successful Windows update in the last 60 days. Windows updates are typically released monthly and applied shortly thereafter. An endpoint that has not successfully applied an update in this time frame indicates the endpoint is not regularly being patched for some reason. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 18"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.MA"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Updates"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for Windows endpoints that have not generated an event indicating a successful Windows update in the last 60 days. Windows updates are typically released monthly and applied shortly thereafter. An endpoint that has not successfully applied an update in this time frame indicates the endpoint is not regularly being patched for some reason. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, it requires that the 'Update' data model is being populated. This can be accomplished by ingesting Windows events or the Windows Update log via a universal forwarder on the Windows endpoints you wish to monitor. The Windows add-on should be also be installed and configured to properly parse Windows events in Splunk. There may be other data sources which can populate this data model, including vulnerability management systems. -action.escu.known_false_positives = None identified -action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-15 -action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-15 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - No Windows Updates in a time frame - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Monitor for Updates"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - No Windows Updates in a time frame - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Monitor for Updates"], "cis20": ["CIS 18"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.MA"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for Windows endpoints that have not generated an event indicating a successful Windows update in the last 60 days. Windows updates are typically released monthly and applied shortly thereafter. An endpoint that has not successfully applied an update in this time frame indicates the endpoint is not regularly being patched for some reason. -action.notable.param.rule_title = No Windows Updates in a time frame -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Updates where Updates.status=Installed Updates.vendor_product="Microsoft Windows" by Updates.dest Updates.status Updates.vendor_product | rename Updates.dest as Host | rename Updates.status as "Update Status" | rename Updates.vendor_product as Product | eval isOutlier=if(lastTime <= relative_time(now(), "-60d@d"), 1, 0) | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search isOutlier=1 | rename lastTime as "Last Update Time", | table Host, "Update Status", Product, "Last Update Time" | `no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame_filter` - -[ESCU - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search is to detect an anomaly event of non-chrome process accessing the files in chrome user default folder. This folder contains all the sqlite database of the chrome browser related to users login, history, cookies and etc. Most of the RAT, trojan spy as well as FIN7 jssloader try to parse the those sqlite database to collect information on the compromised host. This SACL Event (4663) need to be enabled to tthe firefox profile directory to be eable to use this. Since you monitoring this access to the folder a noise coming from firefox need to be filter and also sqlite db browser and explorer .exe to make this detection more stable. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1555", "T1555.003"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect an anomaly event of non-chrome process accessing the files in chrome user default folder. This folder contains all the sqlite database of the chrome browser related to users login, history, cookies and etc. Most of the RAT, trojan spy as well as FIN7 jssloader try to parse the those sqlite database to collect information on the compromised host. This SACL Event (4663) need to be enabled to tthe firefox profile directory to be eable to use this. Since you monitoring this access to the folder a noise coming from firefox need to be filter and also sqlite db browser and explorer .exe to make this detection more stable. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663. For 4663, enable "Audit Object Access" in Group Policy. Then check the two boxes listed for both "Success" and "Failure." -action.escu.known_false_positives = other browser not listed related to firefox may catch by this rule. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-15 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-15 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["FIN7", "Remcos"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = a non firefox browser process $process_name$ accessing $Object_Name$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 35}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 35}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["FIN7", "Remcos"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1555", "T1555.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect an anomaly event of non-chrome process accessing the files in chrome user default folder. This folder contains all the sqlite database of the chrome browser related to users login, history, cookies and etc. Most of the RAT, trojan spy as well as FIN7 jssloader try to parse the those sqlite database to collect information on the compromised host. This SACL Event (4663) need to be enabled to tthe firefox profile directory to be eable to use this. Since you monitoring this access to the folder a noise coming from firefox need to be filter and also sqlite db browser and explorer .exe to make this detection more stable. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 NOT (process_name IN ("*\\chrome.exe", "*\\explorer.exe", "*sql*")) Object_Name="*\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data\\Default*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Object_Name Object_Type process_name Access_Mask Accesses process_id EventCode dest user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir_filter` - -[ESCU - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search is to detect an anomaly event of non-firefox process accessing the files in profile folder. This folder contains all the sqlite database of the firefox browser related to users login, history, cookies and etc. Most of the RAT, trojan spy as well as FIN7 jssloader try to parse the those sqlite database to collect information on the compromised host. This SACL Event (4663) need to be enabled to tthe firefox profile directory to be eable to use this. Since you monitoring this access to the folder a noise coming from firefox need to be filter and also sqlite db browser and explorer .exe to make this detection more stable. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1555", "T1555.003"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect an anomaly event of non-firefox process accessing the files in profile folder. This folder contains all the sqlite database of the firefox browser related to users login, history, cookies and etc. Most of the RAT, trojan spy as well as FIN7 jssloader try to parse the those sqlite database to collect information on the compromised host. This SACL Event (4663) need to be enabled to tthe firefox profile directory to be eable to use this. Since you monitoring this access to the folder a noise coming from firefox need to be filter and also sqlite db browser and explorer .exe to make this detection more stable. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663. For 4663, enable "Audit Object Access" in Group Policy. Then check the two boxes listed for both "Success" and "Failure." -action.escu.known_false_positives = other browser not listed related to firefox may catch by this rule. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-15 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-15 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["FIN7", "Remcos"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = a non firefox browser process $process_name$ accessing $Object_Name$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 35}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 35}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["FIN7", "Remcos"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1555", "T1555.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect an anomaly event of non-firefox process accessing the files in profile folder. This folder contains all the sqlite database of the firefox browser related to users login, history, cookies and etc. Most of the RAT, trojan spy as well as FIN7 jssloader try to parse the those sqlite database to collect information on the compromised host. This SACL Event (4663) need to be enabled to tthe firefox profile directory to be eable to use this. Since you monitoring this access to the folder a noise coming from firefox need to be filter and also sqlite db browser and explorer .exe to make this detection more stable. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 NOT (process_name IN ("*\\firefox.exe", "*\\explorer.exe", "*sql*")) Object_Name="*\\AppData\\Roaming\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Object_Name Object_Type process_name Access_Mask Accesses process_id EventCode dest user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir_filter` - -[ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = Monitor for signs that Ntdsutil is being used to Extract Active Directory database - NTDS.dit, typically used for offline password cracking. It may be used in normal circumstances with no command line arguments or shorthand variations of more common arguments. Ntdsutil.exe is typically seen run on a Windows Server. Typical command used to dump ntds.dit \ -ntdsutil "ac i ntds" "ifm" "create full C:\Temp" q q \ -This technique uses "Install from Media" (IFM), which will extract a copy of the Active Directory database. A successful export of the Active Directory database will yield a file modification named ntds.dit to the destination. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.003", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = Monitor for signs that Ntdsutil is being used to Extract Active Directory database - NTDS.dit, typically used for offline password cracking. It may be used in normal circumstances with no command line arguments or shorthand variations of more common arguments. Ntdsutil.exe is typically seen run on a Windows Server. Typical command used to dump ntds.dit \ -ntdsutil "ac i ntds" "ifm" "create full C:\Temp" q q \ -This technique uses "Install from Media" (IFM), which will extract a copy of the Active Directory database. A successful export of the Active Directory database will yield a file modification named ntds.dit to the destination. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Highly possible Server Administrators will troubleshoot with ntdsutil.exe, generating false positives. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-28 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-28 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Credential Dumping", "HAFNIUM Group"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Active Directory NTDS export on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 50}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "HAFNIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.003", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = Monitor for signs that Ntdsutil is being used to Extract Active Directory database - NTDS.dit, typically used for offline password cracking. It may be used in normal circumstances with no command line arguments or shorthand variations of more common arguments. Ntdsutil.exe is typically seen run on a Windows Server. Typical command used to dump ntds.dit \ -ntdsutil "ac i ntds" "ifm" "create full C:\Temp" q q \ -This technique uses "Install from Media" (IFM), which will extract a copy of the Active Directory database. A successful export of the Active Directory database will yield a file modification named ntds.dit to the destination. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Ntdsutil Export NTDS -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=ntdsutil.exe Processes.process=*ntds* Processes.process=*create*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ntdsutil_export_ntds_filter` - -[ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search detects the creation of a new Federation setting by alerting about an specific event related to its creation. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003", "T1136"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search detects the creation of a new Federation setting by alerting about an specific event related to its creation. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity -action.escu.known_false_positives = The creation of a new Federation is not necessarily malicious, however this events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a different cloud provider. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-26 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-26 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Office 365 Detections", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = User $Actor.ID$ has created a new federation setting on $dest$ from IP Address $ActorIpAddress$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ActorIpAddress", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 18}, {"risk_object_field": "Actor.ID", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 18}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 18}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003", "T1136"], "observable": [{"name": "ActorIpAddress", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "Actor.ID", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation="Add app role assignment grant to user." | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Actor{}.ID) as Actor.ID values(Actor{}.Type) as Actor.Type by ActorIpAddress dest ResultStatus | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user_filter` - -[ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search detects the creation of a new Federation setting by alerting about an specific event related to its creation. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003", "T1136"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search detects the creation of a new Federation setting by alerting about an specific event related to its creation. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity -action.escu.known_false_positives = The creation of a new Federation is not necessarily malicious, however these events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a different cloud provider. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-03 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-03 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Office 365 Detections", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = User $Actor.ID$ created a new federation setting on $Target.ID$ and added service principal credentials from IP Address $ActorIpAddress$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ActorIpAddress", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}, {"risk_object_field": "Target.ID", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003", "T1136"], "observable": [{"name": "ActorIpAddress", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "Target.ID", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation="Add service principal credentials." | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Actor{}.ID) as Actor.ID values(ModifiedProperties{}.Name) as ModifiedProperties.Name values(ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue) as ModifiedProperties.NewValue values(Target{}.ID) as Target.ID by ActorIpAddress Operation | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_added_service_principal_filter` - -[ESCU - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search detects newly added IP addresses/CIDR blocks to the list of MFA Trusted IPs to bypass multi factor authentication. Attackers are often known to use this technique so that they can bypass the MFA system. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007", "T1562"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search detects newly added IP addresses/CIDR blocks to the list of MFA Trusted IPs to bypass multi factor authentication. Attackers are often known to use this technique so that they can bypass the MFA system. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install Splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity -action.escu.known_false_positives = Unless it is a special case, it is uncommon to continually update Trusted IPs to MFA configuration. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-03 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-03 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Office 365 Detections"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = User $user_id$ has added new IP addresses $ip_addresses_new_added$ to a list of trusted IPs to bypass MFA -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ip_addresses_new_added", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}, {"risk_object_field": "user_id", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 42}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "ip_addresses_new_added", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "user_id", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `o365_management_activity` Operation="Set Company Information." ModifiedProperties{}.Name=StrongAuthenticationPolicy | rex max_match=100 field=ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue "(?\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\/\d{1,2})" | rex max_match=100 field=ModifiedProperties{}.OldValue "(?\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\/\d{1,2})" | eval ip_addresses_old=if(isnotnull(ip_addresses_old),ip_addresses_old,"0") | mvexpand ip_addresses_new_added | where isnull(mvfind(ip_addresses_old,ip_addresses_new_added)) |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ip_addresses_old) as ip_addresses_old by user ip_addresses_new_added Operation Workload vendor_account status user_id action | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip_filter` - -[ESCU - O365 Disable MFA - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search detects when multi factor authentication has been disabled, what entitiy performed the action and against what user -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1556"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search detects when multi factor authentication has been disabled, what entitiy performed the action and against what user -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity -action.escu.known_false_positives = Unless it is a special case, it is uncommon to disable MFA or Strong Authentication -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-03 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-03 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Disable MFA - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Office 365 Detections"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = User $user$ has executed an operation $Operation$ for this destination $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 64}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 Disable MFA - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1556"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `o365_management_activity` Operation="Disable Strong Authentication." | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by UserType Operation UserId ResultStatus |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_disable_mfa_filter` - -[ESCU - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search detects when an excessive number of authentication failures occur this search also includes attempts against MFA prompt codes -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Not Applicable"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search detects when an excessive number of authentication failures occur this search also includes attempts against MFA prompt codes -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity -action.escu.known_false_positives = The threshold for alert is above 10 attempts and this should reduce the number of false positives. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-18 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-18 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Office 365 Detections"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = User $user$ has caused excessive number of authentication failures from $src_ip$ using UserAgent $UserAgent$. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "src_ip", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 64}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Not Applicable"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "src_ip", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory UserAuthenticationMethod=* status=failure | stats count earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime values(UserAuthenticationMethod) AS UserAuthenticationMethod values(UserAgent) AS UserAgent values(status) AS status values(src_ip) AS src_ip by user | where count > 10 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert_filter` - -[ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search detects accounts with high number of Single Sign ON (SSO) logon errors. Excessive logon errors may indicate attempts to bruteforce of password or single sign on token hijack or reuse. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1556"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search detects accounts with high number of Single Sign ON (SSO) logon errors. Excessive logon errors may indicate attempts to bruteforce of password or single sign on token hijack or reuse. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity -action.escu.known_false_positives = Logon errors may not be malicious in nature however it may indicate attempts to reuse a token or password obtained via credential access attack. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-26 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-26 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Office 365 Detections", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = User $UserId$ has caused excessive number of SSO logon errors from $ActorIpAddress$ using UserAgent $UserAgent$. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ActorIpAddress", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}, {"risk_object_field": "UserId", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 64}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1556"], "observable": [{"name": "ActorIpAddress", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "UserId", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory LogonError=SsoArtifactInvalidOrExpired | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by LogonError ActorIpAddress UserAgent UserId | where count > 5 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors_filter` - -[ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search detects the addition of a new Federated domain. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003", "T1136"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search detects the addition of a new Federated domain. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity. -action.escu.known_false_positives = The creation of a new Federated domain is not necessarily malicious, however these events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a similar or different cloud provider. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-26 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-26 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Office 365 Detections", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = User $UserId$ has added a new federated domaain $Parameters.Value$ for $OrganizationName$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "OrganizationName", "threat_object_type": "other"}, {"risk_object_field": "UserId", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 64}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003", "T1136"], "observable": [{"name": "OrganizationName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Other"}, {"name": "UserId", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `o365_management_activity` Workload=Exchange Operation="Add-FederatedDomain" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Parameters{}.Value) as Parameters.Value by ObjectId Operation OrganizationName OriginatingServer UserId UserKey | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_new_federated_domain_added_filter` - -[ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search detects when a user has performed an Ediscovery search or exported a PST file from the search. This PST file usually has sensitive information including email body content -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search detects when a user has performed an Ediscovery search or exported a PST file from the search. This PST file usually has sensitive information including email body content -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity -action.escu.known_false_positives = PST export can be done for legitimate purposes but due to the sensitive nature of its content it must be monitored. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-12-16 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-12-16 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Office 365 Detections", "Data Exfiltration"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = User $Source$ has exported a PST file from the search using this operation- $Operation$ with a severity of $Severity$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Source", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 48}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections", "Data Exfiltration"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114"], "observable": [{"name": "Source", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `o365_management_activity` Category=ThreatManagement Name="eDiscovery search started or exported" | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by Source Severity AlertEntityId Operation Name |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_pst_export_alert_filter` - -[ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search detects when an admin configured a forwarding rule for multiple mailboxes to the same destination. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.003", "T1114"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search detects when an admin configured a forwarding rule for multiple mailboxes to the same destination. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-12-16 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-12-16 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Office 365 Detections", "Data Exfiltration"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = User $user$ has configured a forwarding rule for multiple mailboxes to the same destination $ForwardingAddress$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 48}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections", "Data Exfiltration"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.003", "T1114"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `o365_management_activity` Operation=Set-Mailbox | spath input=Parameters | rename Identity AS src_user | search ForwardingAddress=* | stats dc(src_user) AS count_src_user earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(src_user) AS src_user values(user) AS user by ForwardingAddress | where count_src_user > 1 |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding_filter` - -[ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search detects the assignment of rights to accesss content from another mailbox. This is usually only assigned to a service account. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.002", "T1114"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search detects the assignment of rights to accesss content from another mailbox. This is usually only assigned to a service account. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity -action.escu.known_false_positives = Service Accounts -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-12-15 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-12-15 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Office 365 Detections"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = User $user$ has delegated suspicious rights $AccessRights$ to user $dest_user$ that allow access to sensitive -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 48}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Stage:Exfiltration", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.002", "T1114"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `o365_management_activity` Operation=Add-MailboxPermission | spath input=Parameters | rename User AS src_user, Identity AS dest_user | search AccessRights=FullAccess OR AccessRights=SendAs OR AccessRights=SendOnBehalf | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user src_user dest_user Operation AccessRights |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`o365_suspicious_rights_delegation_filter` - -[ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search detects when multiple user configured a forwarding rule to the same destination. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.003", "T1114"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search detects when multiple user configured a forwarding rule to the same destination. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-12-16 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-12-16 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Office 365 Detections", "Data Exfiltration"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = User $user$ configured multiple users $src_user$ with a count of $count_src_user$, a forwarding rule to same destination $ForwardingSmtpAddress$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 48}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections", "Data Exfiltration"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Stage:Exfiltration", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.003", "T1114"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "ForwardingSmtpAddress", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Email Address"}]} -schedule_window = auto -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `o365_management_activity` Operation=Set-Mailbox | spath input=Parameters | rename Identity AS src_user | search ForwardingSmtpAddress=* | stats dc(src_user) AS count_src_user earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(src_user) AS src_user values(user) AS user by ForwardingSmtpAddress | where count_src_user > 1 |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding_filter` - -[ESCU - Office Application Drop Executable - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search is to detect a suspicious MS office application that drop or create executables or script in the host. This behavior is commonly seen in spear phishing office attachment where it drop malicious files or script to compromised the host. It might be some normal macro may drop script or tools as part of automation but still this behavior is reallly suspicious and not commonly seen in normal office application -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious MS office application that drop or create executables or script in the host. This behavior is commonly seen in spear phishing office attachment where it drop malicious files or script to compromised the host. It might be some normal macro may drop script or tools as part of automation but still this behavior is reallly suspicious and not commonly seen in normal office application -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. -action.escu.known_false_positives = office macro for automation may do this behavior -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-13 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-13 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Office Application Drop Executable - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["FIN7"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = process $process_name$ drops a file $TargetFilename$ in host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process name"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Office Application Drop Executable - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["FIN7"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:recon"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "process name"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious MS office application that drop or create executables or script in the host. This behavior is commonly seen in spear phishing office attachment where it drop malicious files or script to compromised the host. It might be some normal macro may drop script or tools as part of automation but still this behavior is reallly suspicious and not commonly seen in normal office application -action.notable.param.rule_title = Office Application Drop Executable -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe","wordpad.exe","wordview.exe") by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN ("*.exe","*.dll","*.pif","*.scr","*.js","*.vbs","*.vbe","*.ps1") by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process proc_guid] | dedup file_create_time | table dest, process_name, process, file_create_time, file_name, file_path, proc_guid | `office_application_drop_executable_filter` - -[ESCU - Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = this detection was designed to identifies suspicious spawned process of known MS office application due to macro or malicious code. this technique can be seen in so many malware like IcedID that used MS office as its weapon or attack vector to initially infect the machines. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = this detection was designed to identifies suspicious spawned process of known MS office application due to macro or malicious code. this technique can be seen in so many malware like IcedID that used MS office as its weapon or attack vector to initially infect the machines. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-30 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-30 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["IcedID"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Office application spawning regsvr32.exe on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = this detection was designed to identifies suspicious spawned process of known MS office application due to macro or malicious code. this technique can be seen in so many malware like IcedID that used MS office as its weapon or attack vector to initially infect the machines. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = "winword.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "excel.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "powerpnt.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "outlook.exe") `process_regsvr32` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process_filter` - -[ESCU - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = this detection was designed to identifies suspicious spawned process of known MS office application due to macro or malicious code. this technique can be seen in so many malware like trickbot that used MS office as its weapon or attack vector to initially infect the machines. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = this detection was designed to identifies suspicious spawned process of known MS office application due to macro or malicious code. this technique can be seen in so many malware like trickbot that used MS office as its weapon or attack vector to initially infect the machines. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-13 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-13 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Trickbot", "IcedID"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Office application spawning rundll32.exe on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Trickbot", "IcedID"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = this detection was designed to identifies suspicious spawned process of known MS office application due to macro or malicious code. this technique can be seen in so many malware like trickbot that used MS office as its weapon or attack vector to initially infect the machines. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Office Application Spawn rundll32 process -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = "winword.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "excel.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "powerpnt.exe") AND `process_rundll32` by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.process Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_application_spawn_rundll32_process_filter` - -[ESCU - Office Document Creating Schedule Task - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = this search detects a potential malicious office document that create schedule task entry through macro VBA api or through loading taskschd.dll. This technique was seen in so many malicious macro malware that create persistence , beaconing using task schedule malware entry The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it's possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.' -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = this search detects a potential malicious office document that create schedule task entry through macro VBA api or through loading taskschd.dll. This technique was seen in so many malicious macro malware that create persistence , beaconing using task schedule malware entry The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it's possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.' -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and ImageLoaded (Like sysmon EventCode 7) from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Also be sure to include those monitored dll to your own sysmon config. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-14 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-14 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Office Document Creating Schedule Task - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spearphishing Attachments"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Office document creating a schedule task on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Office Document Creating Schedule Task - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = this search detects a potential malicious office document that create schedule task entry through macro VBA api or through loading taskschd.dll. This technique was seen in so many malicious macro malware that create persistence , beaconing using task schedule malware entry The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it's possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.' -action.notable.param.rule_title = Office Document Creating Schedule Task -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `sysmon` EventCode=7 process_name IN ("WINWORD.EXE", "EXCEL.EXE", "POWERPNT.EXE") ImageLoaded = "*\\taskschd.dll" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ImageLoaded) as AllImageLoaded count by Computer EventCode Image process_name ProcessId ProcessGuid | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_document_creating_schedule_task_filter` - -[ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = this detection was designed to identifies suspicious office documents that using macro code. Macro code is known to be one of the prevalent weaponization or attack vector of threat actor. This malicious macro code is embed to a office document as an attachment that may execute malicious payload, download malware payload or other malware component. It is really good practice to disable macro by default to avoid automatically execute macro code while opening or closing a office document files. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = this detection was designed to identifies suspicious office documents that using macro code. Macro code is known to be one of the prevalent weaponization or attack vector of threat actor. This malicious macro code is embed to a office document as an attachment that may execute malicious payload, download malware payload or other malware component. It is really good practice to disable macro by default to avoid automatically execute macro code while opening or closing a office document files. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and ImageLoaded (Like sysmon EventCode 7) from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Also be sure to include those monitored dll to your own sysmon config. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Normal Office Document macro use for automation -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-14 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-14 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Trickbot", "IcedID"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Office document executing a macro on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 35}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Trickbot", "IcedID"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = this detection was designed to identifies suspicious office documents that using macro code. Macro code is known to be one of the prevalent weaponization or attack vector of threat actor. This malicious macro code is embed to a office document as an attachment that may execute malicious payload, download malware payload or other malware component. It is really good practice to disable macro by default to avoid automatically execute macro code while opening or closing a office document files. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Office Document Executing Macro Code -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `sysmon` EventCode=7 process_name IN ("WINWORD.EXE", "EXCEL.EXE", "POWERPNT.EXE") ImageLoaded IN ("*\\VBE7INTL.DLL","*\\VBE7.DLL", "*\\VBEUI.DLL") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ImageLoaded) as AllImageLoaded count by Computer EventCode Image process_name ProcessId ProcessGuid | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_document_executing_macro_code_filter` - -[ESCU - Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search is to detect potential malicious office document executing lolbin child process to download payload or other malware. Since most of the attacker abused the capability of office document to execute living on land application to blend it to the normal noise in the infected machine to cover its track. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect potential malicious office document executing lolbin child process to download payload or other malware. Since most of the attacker abused the capability of office document to execute living on land application to blend it to the normal noise in the infected machine to cover its track. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances office application and browser may be used. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Default browser not in the filter list. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-20 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-20 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spearphishing Attachments"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Office document spawning suspicious child process on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 35}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect potential malicious office document executing lolbin child process to download payload or other malware. Since most of the attacker abused the capability of office document to execute living on land application to blend it to the normal noise in the infected machine to cover its track. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe") Processes.process IN ("*http:*","*https:*") NOT (Processes.original_file_name IN("firefox.exe", "chrome.exe","iexplore.exe","msedge.exe")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_document_spawned_child_process_to_download_filter` - -[ESCU - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = this search is to detect a suspicious office product process that spawn cmd child process. This is commonly seen in a ms office product having macro to execute shell command to download or execute malicious lolbin relative to its malicious code. This is seen in trickbot spear phishing doc where it execute shell cmd to run mshta payload. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.005"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = this search is to detect a suspicious office product process that spawn cmd child process. This is commonly seen in a ms office product having macro to execute shell command to download or execute malicious lolbin relative to its malicious code. This is seen in trickbot spear phishing doc where it execute shell cmd to run mshta payload. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = IT or network admin may create an document automation that will run shell script. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-19 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-19 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Trickbot"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = an office product parent process $parent_process_name$ spawn child process $process_name$ in host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 56}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Trickbot"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "executions"}], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = this search is to detect a suspicious office product process that spawn cmd child process. This is commonly seen in a ms office product having macro to execute shell command to download or execute malicious lolbin relative to its malicious code. This is seen in trickbot spear phishing doc where it execute shell cmd to run mshta payload. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Office Product Spawn CMD Process -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = "winword.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name= "excel.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "powerpnt.exe") `process_cmd` by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawn_cmd_process_filter` - -[ESCU - Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `bitsadmin.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `bitsadmin.exe` will contain a URL to a remote destination or similar command-line arguments as transfer, Download, priority, Foreground. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `bitsadmin.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `bitsadmin.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `bitsadmin.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `bitsadmin.exe` will contain a URL to a remote destination or similar command-line arguments as transfer, Download, priority, Foreground. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `bitsadmin.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `bitsadmin.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = No false positives known. Filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-26 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-26 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spearphishing Attachments"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ in host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process_name"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "recon"}], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "process_name"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `bitsadmin.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `bitsadmin.exe` will contain a URL to a remote destination or similar command-line arguments as transfer, Download, priority, Foreground. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `bitsadmin.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `bitsadmin.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe") `process_bitsadmin` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_bitsadmin_filter` - -[ESCU - Office Product Spawning CertUtil - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `certutil.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `certutil.exe` will contain a URL to a remote destination. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `certutil.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `certutil.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `certutil.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `certutil.exe` will contain a URL to a remote destination. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `certutil.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `certutil.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = No false positives known. Filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-26 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-26 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Office Product Spawning CertUtil - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spearphishing Attachments"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ in host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process_name"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Office Product Spawning CertUtil - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "recon"}], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "process_name"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `certutil.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `certutil.exe` will contain a URL to a remote destination. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `certutil.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `certutil.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Office Product Spawning CertUtil -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe") `process_certutil` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_certutil_filter` - -[ESCU - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `mshta.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `mshta.exe` will contain the `hta` file locally, or a URL to the remote destination. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `mshta.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `mshta.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `mshta.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `mshta.exe` will contain the `hta` file locally, or a URL to the remote destination. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `mshta.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `mshta.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = No false positives known. Filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-26 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-26 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spearphishing Attachments", "IcedID"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ in host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process_name"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "IcedID"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "recon"}], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "process_name"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `mshta.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `mshta.exe` will contain the `hta` file locally, or a URL to the remote destination. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `mshta.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `mshta.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Office Product Spawning MSHTA -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe") `process_mshta` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_mshta_filter` - -[ESCU - Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by IcedID malware family. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `rundll32.exe` without a `.dll` file extension. In malicious instances, the command-line of `rundll32.exe` will look like `rundll32 ..\oepddl.igk2,DllRegisterServer`. In addition, Threat Research has released a detection identifying the use of `DllRegisterServer` on the command-line of `rundll32.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze the `DLL` that was dropped to disk. The Office Product will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by IcedID malware family. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `rundll32.exe` without a `.dll` file extension. In malicious instances, the command-line of `rundll32.exe` will look like `rundll32 ..\oepddl.igk2,DllRegisterServer`. In addition, Threat Research has released a detection identifying the use of `DllRegisterServer` on the command-line of `rundll32.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze the `DLL` that was dropped to disk. The Office Product will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-22 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-22 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spearphishing Attachments"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ and no dll commandline $process$ in host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process name"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "recon"}], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "process name"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by IcedID malware family. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `rundll32.exe` without a `.dll` file extension. In malicious instances, the command-line of `rundll32.exe` will look like `rundll32 ..\oepddl.igk2,DllRegisterServer`. In addition, Threat Research has released a detection identifying the use of `DllRegisterServer` on the command-line of `rundll32.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze the `DLL` that was dropped to disk. The Office Product will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe") `process_rundll32` (Processes.process!=*.dll*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll_filter` - -[ESCU - Office Product Spawning Wmic - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by Ursnif malware family. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `wmic.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `wmic.exe` will contain `wmic process call create`. In addition, Threat Research has released a detection identifying the use of `wmic process call create` on the command-line of `wmic.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `wmic.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by Ursnif malware family. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `wmic.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `wmic.exe` will contain `wmic process call create`. In addition, Threat Research has released a detection identifying the use of `wmic process call create` on the command-line of `wmic.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `wmic.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = No false positives known. Filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-16 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-16 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Office Product Spawning Wmic - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spearphishing Attachments", "FIN7"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ in host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process_name"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Office Product Spawning Wmic - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "FIN7"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "recon"}], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "process_name"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by Ursnif malware family. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `wmic.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `wmic.exe` will contain `wmic process call create`. In addition, Threat Research has released a detection identifying the use of `wmic process call create` on the command-line of `wmic.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `wmic.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Office Product Spawning Wmic -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe") `process_wmic` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_wmic_filter` - -[ESCU - Office Product Writing cab or inf - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies behavior related to CVE-2021-40444. Whereas the malicious document will load ActiveX and download the remote payload (.inf, .cab). During triage, review parallel processes and further activity on endpoint to identify additional patterns. Retrieve the file modifications and analyze further. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies behavior related to CVE-2021-40444. Whereas the malicious document will load ActiveX and download the remote payload (.inf, .cab). During triage, review parallel processes and further activity on endpoint to identify additional patterns. Retrieve the file modifications and analyze further. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node and `Filesystem` node. -action.escu.known_false_positives = The query is structured in a way that `action` (read, create) is not defined. Review the results of this query, filter, and tune as necessary. It may be necessary to generate this query specific to your endpoint product. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-10 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-10 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Office Product Writing cab or inf - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $process_name$ was identified on $dest$ writing an inf or cab file to this. This is not typical of $process_name$. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Office Product Writing cab or inf - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies behavior related to CVE-2021-40444. Whereas the malicious document will load ActiveX and download the remote payload (.inf, .cab). During triage, review parallel processes and further activity on endpoint to identify additional patterns. Retrieve the file modifications and analyze further. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Office Product Writing cab or inf -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe","wordpad.exe","wordview.exe") by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN ("*.inf","*.cab") by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process] | dedup file_create_time | table dest, process_name, process, file_create_time, file_name, file_path | `office_product_writing_cab_or_inf_filter` - -[ESCU - Office Spawning Control - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following detection identifies control.exe spawning from an office product. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `control.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `control.exe` will contain a file path to a .cpl or .inf, related to CVE-2021-40444. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. review parallel and child processes to identify further suspicious behavior -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following detection identifies control.exe spawning from an office product. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `control.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `control.exe` will contain a file path to a .cpl or .inf, related to CVE-2021-40444. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. review parallel and child processes to identify further suspicious behavior -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives should be present. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-08 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-08 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Office Spawning Control - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ clicking a suspicious attachment. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Office Spawning Control - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following detection identifies control.exe spawning from an office product. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `control.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `control.exe` will contain a file path to a .cpl or .inf, related to CVE-2021-40444. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. review parallel and child processes to identify further suspicious behavior -action.notable.param.rule_title = Office Spawning Control -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe","wordpad.exe","wordview.exe") Processes.process_name=control.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `office_spawning_control_filter` - -[ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = Detect Okta user lockout events -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = Detect Okta user lockout events -action.escu.how_to_implement = This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being ingested in your Splunk deployment. -action.escu.known_false_positives = None. Account lockouts should be followed up on to determine if the actual user was the one who caused the lockout, or if it was an unauthorized actor. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Okta Activity"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Okta Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = Detect Okta user lockout events -action.notable.param.rule_title = Okta Account Lockout Events -action.notable.param.security_domain = access -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `okta` displayMessage="Max sign in attempts exceeded" | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | table _time, user, country, state, city, src_ip | `okta_account_lockout_events_filter` - -[ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = Detect failed Okta SSO events -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = Detect failed Okta SSO events -action.escu.how_to_implement = This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being ingested in your Splunk deployment. -action.escu.known_false_positives = There may be a faulty config preventing legitmate users from accessing apps they should have access to. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Okta Activity"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Okta Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = Detect failed Okta SSO events -action.notable.param.rule_title = Okta Failed SSO Attempts -action.notable.param.security_domain = access -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `okta` displayMessage="User attempted unauthorized access to app" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(app) as Apps count by user, result ,displayMessage, src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_failed_sso_attempts_filter` - -[ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search detects logins from the same user from different cities in a 24 hour period. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search detects logins from the same user from different cities in a 24 hour period. -action.escu.how_to_implement = This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being ingested in your Splunk deployment. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Users in your enviornment may legitmately be travelling and loggin in from different locations. This search is useful for those users that should *not* be travelling for some reason, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. The search also relies on the geographical information being populated in the Okta logs. It is also possible that a connection from another region may be attributed to a login from a remote VPN endpoint. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Okta Activity"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Okta Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search detects logins from the same user from different cities in a 24 hour period. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities -action.notable.param.security_domain = access -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `okta` displayMessage="User login to Okta" client.geographicalContext.city!=null | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(client.geographicalContext.city) as locations values(client.geographicalContext.city) as cities values(client.geographicalContext.state) as states by user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities_filter` | search locations > 1 - -[ESCU - Open Redirect in Splunk Web - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search allows you to look for evidence of exploitation for CVE-2016-4859, the Splunk Open Redirect Vulnerability. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["ID.RA", "RS.MI", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search allows you to look for evidence of exploitation for CVE-2016-4859, the Splunk Open Redirect Vulnerability. -action.escu.how_to_implement = No extra steps needed to implement this search. -action.escu.known_false_positives = None identified -action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-19 -action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-19 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Open Redirect in Splunk Web - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Open Redirect in Splunk Web - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 18"], "cve": ["CVE-2016-4859"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["ID.RA", "RS.MI", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search allows you to look for evidence of exploitation for CVE-2016-4859, the Splunk Open Redirect Vulnerability. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Open Redirect in Splunk Web -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = index=_internal sourcetype=splunk_web_access return_to="/%09/*" | `open_redirect_in_splunk_web_filter` - -[ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for ColdRoot events from the osx-attacks osquery pack. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command and Control"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.PT"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for ColdRoot events from the osx-attacks osquery pack. -action.escu.how_to_implement = In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from your osquery deployed agents with the [osx-attacks.conf](https://github.com/facebook/osquery/blob/experimental/packs/osx-attacks.conf#L599) pack enabled. Also the [TA-OSquery](https://github.com/d1vious/TA-osquery) must be deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the osquery data populate the Alerts data model -action.escu.known_false_positives = There are no known false positives. -action.escu.creation_date = 2019-01-29 -action.escu.modification_date = 2019-01-29 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["ColdRoot MacOS RAT"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["ColdRoot MacOS RAT"], "cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command and Control"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.PT"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for ColdRoot events from the osx-attacks osquery pack. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection -action.notable.param.security_domain = threat -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | from datamodel Alerts.Alerts | search app=osquery:results (name=pack_osx-attacks_OSX_ColdRoot_RAT_Launchd OR name=pack_osx-attacks_OSX_ColdRoot_RAT_Files) | rename columns.path as path | bucket _time span=30s | stats count(path) by _time, host, user, path | `osquery_pack___coldroot_detection_filter` - -[ESCU - Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = A required step while exploiting the CVE-2021-44228-Log4j vulnerability is that the victim server will perform outbound connections to attacker-controlled infrastructure. This is required as part of the JNDI lookup as well as for retrieving the second stage .class payload. The following analytic identifies the Java process reaching out to default ports used by the LDAP and RMI protocols. This behavior could represent successfull exploitation. Note that adversaries can easily decide to use arbitrary ports for these protocols and potentially bypass this detection. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = A required step while exploiting the CVE-2021-44228-Log4j vulnerability is that the victim server will perform outbound connections to attacker-controlled infrastructure. This is required as part of the JNDI lookup as well as for retrieving the second stage .class payload. The following analytic identifies the Java process reaching out to default ports used by the LDAP and RMI protocols. This behavior could represent successfull exploitation. Note that adversaries can easily decide to use arbitrary ports for these protocols and potentially bypass this detection. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. The following Splunk SOAR playbook can be used to respond to this detection: Log4j Investigate The following Splunk SOAR playbook can be used to respond to this detection: Log4j Respond -action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate Java applications may use perform outbound connections to these ports. Filter as needed -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-13 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-13 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Java performed outbound connections to default ports of LDAP or RMI on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 54}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = A required step while exploiting the CVE-2021-44228-Log4j vulnerability is that the victim server will perform outbound connections to attacker-controlled infrastructure. This is required as part of the JNDI lookup as well as for retrieving the second stage .class payload. The following analytic identifies the Java process reaching out to default ports used by the LDAP and RMI protocols. This behavior could represent successfull exploitation. Note that adversaries can easily decide to use arbitrary ports for these protocols and potentially bypass this detection. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="java.exe" OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe) by _time Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where (Ports.dest_port= 389 OR Ports.dest_port= 636 OR Ports.dest_port = 1389 OR Ports.dest_port = 1099 ) by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port| `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process connection_to_CNC dest_port | `outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter` - -[ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = Microsoft Windows contains accessibility features that can be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in. An adversary can modify or replace these programs so they can get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system. This search looks for modifications to these binaries. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546", "T1546.008"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = Microsoft Windows contains accessibility features that can be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in. An adversary can modify or replace these programs so they can get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system. This search looks for modifications to these binaries. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Microsoft may provide updates to these binaries. Verify that these changes do not correspond with your normal software update cycle. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Privilege Escalation"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A suspicious file modification or replace in $file_path$ in host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}, {"threat_object_field": "file_path", "threat_object_type": "file_path"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "privilege escalation"}], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546", "T1546.008"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "file_path", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "file_path"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = Microsoft Windows contains accessibility features that can be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in. An adversary can modify or replace these programs so they can get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system. This search looks for modifications to these binaries. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Overwriting Accessibility Binaries -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_path=*\\Windows\\System32\\sethc.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\Windows\\System32\\utilman.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\Windows\\System32\\osk.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\Windows\\System32\\Magnify.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\Windows\\System32\\Narrator.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\Windows\\System32\\DisplaySwitch.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\Windows\\System32\\AtBroker.exe*) by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `overwriting_accessibility_binaries_filter` - -[ESCU - Password Policy Discovery with Net - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command line arguments used to obtain the domain password policy. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `net.exe` for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command line arguments used to obtain the domain password policy. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `net.exe` for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-26 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-26 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Password Policy Discovery with Net - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 9}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 9}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Password Policy Discovery with Net - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command line arguments used to obtain the domain password policy. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `net.exe` for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Password Policy Discovery with Net -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="net.exe" OR Processes.process_name="net1.exe") AND Processes.process = "*accounts*" AND Processes.process = "*/domain*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `password_policy_discovery_with_net_filter` - -[ESCU - Permission Modification using Takeown App - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search is to detect a modification of file or directory permission using takeown.exe windows app. This technique was seen in some ransomware that take the ownership of a folder or files to encrypt or delete it. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a modification of file or directory permission using takeown.exe windows app. This technique was seen in some ransomware that take the ownership of a folder or files to encrypt or delete it. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -action.escu.known_false_positives = takeown.exe is a normal windows application that may used by network operator. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-10 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-10 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Permission Modification using Takeown App - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A suspicious of execution of $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ and commandline $process$ to modify permission of directory or files in host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process name"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Permission Modification using Takeown App - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "process name"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a modification of file or directory permission using takeown.exe windows app. This technique was seen in some ransomware that take the ownership of a folder or files to encrypt or delete it. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Permission Modification using Takeown App -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "takeown.exe" Processes.process = "*/f*" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `permission_modification_using_takeown_app_filter` - -[ESCU - PetitPotam Network Share Access Request - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic utilizes Windows Event Code 5145, "A network share object was checked to see whether client can be granted desired access". During our research into PetitPotam, CVE-2021-36942, we identified the ocurrence of this event on the target host with specific values. \ -To enable 5145 events via Group Policy - Computer Configuration->Polices->Windows Settings->Security Settings->Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Expand this node, go to Object Access (Audit Polices->Object Access), then select the Setting Audit Detailed File Share Audit \ -It is possible this is not enabled by default and may need to be reviewed and enabled. \ -During triage, review parallel security events to identify further suspicious activity. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1187"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes Windows Event Code 5145, "A network share object was checked to see whether client can be granted desired access". During our research into PetitPotam, CVE-2021-36942, we identified the ocurrence of this event on the target host with specific values. \ -To enable 5145 events via Group Policy - Computer Configuration->Polices->Windows Settings->Security Settings->Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Expand this node, go to Object Access (Audit Polices->Object Access), then select the Setting Audit Detailed File Share Audit \ -It is possible this is not enabled by default and may need to be reviewed and enabled. \ -During triage, review parallel security events to identify further suspicious activity. -action.escu.how_to_implement = Windows Event Code 5145 is required to utilize this analytic and it may not be enabled in most environments. -action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives have been limited when the Anonymous Logon is used for Account Name. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-31 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-31 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - PetitPotam Network Share Access Request - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A remote host is enumerating a $dest$ to identify permissions. This is a precursor event to CVE-2021-36942, PetitPotam. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - PetitPotam Network Share Access Request - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-36942"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1187"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes Windows Event Code 5145, "A network share object was checked to see whether client can be granted desired access". During our research into PetitPotam, CVE-2021-36942, we identified the ocurrence of this event on the target host with specific values. \ -To enable 5145 events via Group Policy - Computer Configuration->Polices->Windows Settings->Security Settings->Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Expand this node, go to Object Access (Audit Polices->Object Access), then select the Setting Audit Detailed File Share Audit \ -It is possible this is not enabled by default and may need to be reviewed and enabled. \ -During triage, review parallel security events to identify further suspicious activity. -action.notable.param.rule_title = PetitPotam Network Share Access Request -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `wineventlog_security` Account_Name="ANONYMOUS LOGON" EventCode=5145 Relative_Target_Name=lsarpc | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Security_ID, Share_Name, Source_Address, Accesses, Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `petitpotam_network_share_access_request_filter` - -[ESCU - PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifes Event Code 4768, A `Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested`, successfull occurs. This behavior has been identified to assist with detecting PetitPotam, CVE-2021-36942. Once an attacer obtains a computer certificate by abusing Active Directory Certificate Services in combination with PetitPotam, the next step would be to leverage the certificate for malicious purposes. One way of doing this is to request a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket using a tool like Rubeus. This request will generate a 4768 event with some unusual fields depending on the environment. This analytic will require tuning, we recommend filtering Account_Name to Domain Controllers for your environment. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifes Event Code 4768, A `Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested`, successfull occurs. This behavior has been identified to assist with detecting PetitPotam, CVE-2021-36942. Once an attacer obtains a computer certificate by abusing Active Directory Certificate Services in combination with PetitPotam, the next step would be to leverage the certificate for malicious purposes. One way of doing this is to request a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket using a tool like Rubeus. This request will generate a 4768 event with some unusual fields depending on the environment. This analytic will require tuning, we recommend filtering Account_Name to Domain Controllers for your environment. -action.escu.how_to_implement = The following analytic requires Event Code 4768. Ensure that it is logging no Domain Controllers and appearing in Splunk. -action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are possible if the environment is using certificates for authentication. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-31 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-31 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A Kerberos TGT was requested in a non-standard manner against $dest$, potentially related to CVE-2021-36942, PetitPotam. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-36942"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifes Event Code 4768, A `Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested`, successfull occurs. This behavior has been identified to assist with detecting PetitPotam, CVE-2021-36942. Once an attacer obtains a computer certificate by abusing Active Directory Certificate Services in combination with PetitPotam, the next step would be to leverage the certificate for malicious purposes. One way of doing this is to request a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket using a tool like Rubeus. This request will generate a 4768 event with some unusual fields depending on the environment. This analytic will require tuning, we recommend filtering Account_Name to Domain Controllers for your environment. -action.notable.param.rule_title = PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 Client_Address!="::1" Certificate_Thumbprint!="" Account_Name=*$ | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Account_Name, Client_Address, action, Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request_filter` - -[ESCU - Ping Sleep Batch Command - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic will identify the possible execution of ping sleep batch commands. This technique was seen in several malware samples and is used to trigger sleep times without explicitly calling sleep functions or commandlets. The goal is to delay the execution of malicious code and bypass detection or sandbox analysis. This detection can be a good indicator of a process delaying its execution for malicious purposes. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1497", "T1497.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic will identify the possible execution of ping sleep batch commands. This technique was seen in several malware samples and is used to trigger sleep times without explicitly calling sleep functions or commandlets. The goal is to delay the execution of malicious code and bypass detection or sandbox analysis. This detection can be a good indicator of a process delaying its execution for malicious purposes. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator may execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-20 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-20 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Ping Sleep Batch Command - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["WhisperGate"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = suspicious $process$ commandline run in $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 36}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 36}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Ping Sleep Batch Command - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["WhisperGate"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1497", "T1497.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic will identify the possible execution of ping sleep batch commands. This technique was seen in several malware samples and is used to trigger sleep times without explicitly calling sleep functions or commandlets. The goal is to delay the execution of malicious code and bypass detection or sandbox analysis. This detection can be a good indicator of a process delaying its execution for malicious purposes. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Ping Sleep Batch Command -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_ping` (Processes.parent_process = "*ping*" Processes.parent_process = *-n* Processes.parent_process="* Nul*"Processes.parent_process="*>*") OR (Processes.process = "*ping*" Processes.process = *-n* Processes.process="* Nul*"Processes.process="*>*") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ping_sleep_batch_command_filter` - -[ESCU - Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search is to detect potential plain HTTP POST method data exfiltration. This network traffic is commonly used by trickbot, trojanspy, keylogger or APT adversary where arguments or commands are sent in plain text to the remote C2 server using HTTP POST method as part of data exfiltration. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1048"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect potential plain HTTP POST method data exfiltration. This network traffic is commonly used by trickbot, trojanspy, keylogger or APT adversary where arguments or commands are sent in plain text to the remote C2 server using HTTP POST method as part of data exfiltration. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the stream HTTP logs or network logs that catch network traffic. Make sure that the http-request-body, payload, or request field is enabled. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-22 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-22 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Command and Control", "Data Exfiltration"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A http post $http_method$ sending packet with plain text of information $form_data$ in uri path $uri_path$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "uri_path", "threat_object_type": "uripath"}, {"threat_object_field": "form_data", "threat_object_type": "formdata"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Command and Control", "Data Exfiltration"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1048"], "observable": [{"name": "uri_path", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "UriPath"}, {"name": "form_data", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "formdata"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect potential plain HTTP POST method data exfiltration. This network traffic is commonly used by trickbot, trojanspy, keylogger or APT adversary where arguments or commands are sent in plain text to the remote C2 server using HTTP POST method as part of data exfiltration. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `stream_http` http_method=POST form_data IN ("*wermgr.exe*","*svchost.exe*", "*name=\"proclist\"*","*ipconfig*", "*name=\"sysinfo\"*", "*net view*") |stats values(form_data) as http_request_body min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by http_method http_user_agent uri_path url bytes_in bytes_out | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data_filter` - -[ESCU - Possible Browser Pass View Parameter - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic will detect if a suspicious process contains a commandline parameter related to a web browser credential dumper. This technique is used by Remcos RAT malware which uses the Nirsoft webbrowserpassview.exe application to dump web browser credentials. Remcos uses the "/stext" command line to dump the credentials in text format. This Hunting query is a good indicator of hosts suffering from possible Remcos RAT infection. Since the hunting query is based on the parameter command and the possible path where it will save the text credential information, it may catch normal tools that are using the same command and behavior. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1555.003", "T1555"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic will detect if a suspicious process contains a commandline parameter related to a web browser credential dumper. This technique is used by Remcos RAT malware which uses the Nirsoft webbrowserpassview.exe application to dump web browser credentials. Remcos uses the "/stext" command line to dump the credentials in text format. This Hunting query is a good indicator of hosts suffering from possible Remcos RAT infection. Since the hunting query is based on the parameter command and the possible path where it will save the text credential information, it may catch normal tools that are using the same command and behavior. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -action.escu.known_false_positives = False positive is quite limited. Filter is needed -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-22 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-22 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Possible Browser Pass View Parameter - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Remcos"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = suspicious process $process_name$ contains commandline $process$ on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 16}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 16}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Possible Browser Pass View Parameter - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "confidence": 40, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1555.003", "T1555"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic will detect if a suspicious process contains a commandline parameter related to a web browser credential dumper. This technique is used by Remcos RAT malware which uses the Nirsoft webbrowserpassview.exe application to dump web browser credentials. Remcos uses the "/stext" command line to dump the credentials in text format. This Hunting query is a good indicator of hosts suffering from possible Remcos RAT infection. Since the hunting query is based on the parameter command and the possible path where it will save the text credential information, it may catch normal tools that are using the same command and behavior. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Possible Browser Pass View Parameter -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process IN ("*/stext *", "*/shtml *", "*/LoadPasswordsIE*", "*/LoadPasswordsFirefox*", "*/LoadPasswordsChrome*", "*/LoadPasswordsOpera*", "*/LoadPasswordsSafari*" , "*/UseOperaPasswordFile*", "*/OperaPasswordFile*","*/stab*", "*/scomma*", "*/stabular*", "*/shtml*", "*/sverhtml*", "*/sxml*", "*/skeepass*" ) AND Processes.process IN ("*\\temp\\*", "*\\users\\public\\*", "*\\programdata\\*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `possible_browser_pass_view_parameter_filter` - -[ESCU - Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic assists with identifying a PowerShell process spawned as a child or grand child process of commonly abused processes during lateral movement techniques including `services.exe`, `wmiprsve.exe`, `svchost.exe`, `wsmprovhost.exe` and `mmc.exe`. Legitimate Windows features such as the Service Control Manager, Windows Management Instrumentation, Task Scheduler, Windows Remote Management and the DCOM protocol can be abused to start a process on a remote endpoint. Looking for PowerShell spawned out of this processes may reveal a lateral movement attack. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse these services during a breach for lateral movement and remote code execution. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement", "Malicious PowerShell"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.003", "T1021.006", "T1047", "T1053.005", "T1543.003", "T1059.001"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic assists with identifying a PowerShell process spawned as a child or grand child process of commonly abused processes during lateral movement techniques including `services.exe`, `wmiprsve.exe`, `svchost.exe`, `wsmprovhost.exe` and `mmc.exe`. Legitimate Windows features such as the Service Control Manager, Windows Management Instrumentation, Task Scheduler, Windows Remote Management and the DCOM protocol can be abused to start a process on a remote endpoint. Looking for PowerShell spawned out of this processes may reveal a lateral movement attack. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse these services during a breach for lateral movement and remote code execution. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may spawn PowerShell as a child process of the the identified processes. Filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-29 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-29 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "Malicious PowerShell"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A PowerShell process was spawned as a child process of typically abused processes on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 45}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement", "Malicious PowerShell"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.003", "T1021.006", "T1047", "T1053.005", "T1543.003", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic assists with identifying a PowerShell process spawned as a child or grand child process of commonly abused processes during lateral movement techniques including `services.exe`, `wmiprsve.exe`, `svchost.exe`, `wsmprovhost.exe` and `mmc.exe`. Legitimate Windows features such as the Service Control Manager, Windows Management Instrumentation, Task Scheduler, Windows Remote Management and the DCOM protocol can be abused to start a process on a remote endpoint. Looking for PowerShell spawned out of this processes may reveal a lateral movement attack. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse these services during a breach for lateral movement and remote code execution. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=svchost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=wsmprovhost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=mmc.exe) (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR (Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process=*powershell.exe*) OR Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR (Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process=*pwsh.exe*)) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn_filter` - -[ESCU - Potentially malicious code on commandline - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic uses a pretrained machine learning text classifier to detect potentially malicious commandlines. The model identifies unusual combinations of keywords found in samples of commandlines where adversaries executed powershell code, primarily for C2 communication. For example, adversaries will leverage IO capabilities such as "streamreader" and "webclient", threading capabilties such as "mutex" locks, programmatic constructs like "function" and "catch", and cryptographic operations like "computehash". Although observing one of these keywords in a commandline script is possible, combinations of keywords observed in attack data are not typically found in normal usage of the commandline. The model will output a score where all values above zero are suspicious, anything greater than one particularly so. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["\"Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic uses a pretrained machine learning text classifier to detect potentially malicious commandlines. The model identifies unusual combinations of keywords found in samples of commandlines where adversaries executed powershell code, primarily for C2 communication. For example, adversaries will leverage IO capabilities such as "streamreader" and "webclient", threading capabilties such as "mutex" locks, programmatic constructs like "function" and "catch", and cryptographic operations like "computehash". Although observing one of these keywords in a commandline script is possible, combinations of keywords observed in attack data are not typically found in normal usage of the commandline. The model will output a score where all values above zero are suspicious, anything greater than one particularly so. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. You will also need to install the Machine Learning Toolkit version 5.3 or above to apply the pretrained model. -action.escu.known_false_positives = This model is an anomaly detector that identifies usage of APIs and scripting constructs that are correllated with malicious activity. These APIs and scripting constructs are part of the programming langauge and advanced scripts may generate false positives. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-14 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-14 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Potentially malicious code on commandline - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Command-Line Executions"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Unusual command-line execution with hallmarks of malicious activity run by $user$ found on $dest$ with commandline $process$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 12}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 12}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Potentially malicious code on commandline - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Command-Line Executions"], "confidence": 20, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Execution"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic uses a pretrained machine learning text classifier to detect potentially malicious commandlines. The model identifies unusual combinations of keywords found in samples of commandlines where adversaries executed powershell code, primarily for C2 communication. For example, adversaries will leverage IO capabilities such as "streamreader" and "webclient", threading capabilties such as "mutex" locks, programmatic constructs like "function" and "catch", and cryptographic operations like "computehash". Although observing one of these keywords in a commandline script is possible, combinations of keywords observed in attack data are not typically found in normal usage of the commandline. The model will output a score where all values above zero are suspicious, anything greater than one particularly so. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Potentially malicious code on commandline -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel="Endpoint.Processes" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | where len(process) > 200 | `potentially_malicious_code_on_cmdline_tokenize_score` | apply unusual_commandline_detection | eval score='predicted(unusual_cmdline_logits)', process=orig_process | fields - unusual_cmdline* predicted(unusual_cmdline_logits) orig_process | where score > 0.5 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `potentially_malicious_code_on_commandline_filter` - -[ESCU - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following hunting analytic identifies PowerShell commands utilizing the WindowStyle parameter to hide the window on the compromised endpoint. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it is overriding the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide its activity from the user, and connects to the Internet. Removed in this version of the query is New-Object. The analytic identifies all variations of WindowStyle, as PowerShell allows the ability to shorten the parameter. For example w, win, windowsty and so forth. In addition, through our research it was identified that PowerShell will interpret different command switch types beyond the hyphen. We have added endash, emdash, horizontal bar, and forward slash. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following hunting analytic identifies PowerShell commands utilizing the WindowStyle parameter to hide the window on the compromised endpoint. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it is overriding the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide its activity from the user, and connects to the Internet. Removed in this version of the query is New-Object. The analytic identifies all variations of WindowStyle, as PowerShell allows the ability to shorten the parameter. For example w, win, windowsty and so forth. In addition, through our research it was identified that PowerShell will interpret different command switch types beyond the hyphen. We have added endash, emdash, horizontal bar, and forward slash. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate process can have this combination of command-line options, but it's not common. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-12 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-12 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "HAFNIUM Group", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = PowerShell processes $process$ started with parameters to modify the execution policy of the run, run in a hidden window, and connect to the Internet on host $dest$ executed by user $user$. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 81}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 81}, {"threat_object_field": "process", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "HAFNIUM Group", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Command And Control"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "process", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following hunting analytic identifies PowerShell commands utilizing the WindowStyle parameter to hide the window on the compromised endpoint. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it is overriding the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide its activity from the user, and connects to the Internet. Removed in this version of the query is New-Object. The analytic identifies all variations of WindowStyle, as PowerShell allows the ability to shorten the parameter. For example w, win, windowsty and so forth. In addition, through our research it was identified that PowerShell will interpret different command switch types beyond the hyphen. We have added endash, emdash, horizontal bar, and forward slash. -action.notable.param.rule_title = PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,"(?i)[\-|\/|–|—|―]w(in*d*o*w*s*t*y*l*e*)*\s+[^-]") | `powershell___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window_filter` - -[ESCU - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following Hunting analytic assists with identifying suspicious PowerShell execution using Script Block Logging, or EventCode 4104. This analytic is not meant to be ran hourly, but occasionally to identify malicious or suspicious PowerShell. This analytic is a combination of work completed by Alex Teixeira and Splunk Threat Research Team. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following Hunting analytic assists with identifying suspicious PowerShell execution using Script Block Logging, or EventCode 4104. This analytic is not meant to be ran hourly, but occasionally to identify malicious or suspicious PowerShell. This analytic is a combination of work completed by Alex Teixeira and Splunk Threat Research Team. -action.escu.how_to_implement = The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives. May filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-18 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-18 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ executing suspicious commands. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following Hunting analytic assists with identifying suspicious PowerShell execution using Script Block Logging, or EventCode 4104. This analytic is not meant to be ran hourly, but occasionally to identify malicious or suspicious PowerShell. This analytic is a combination of work completed by Alex Teixeira and Splunk Threat Research Team. -action.notable.param.rule_title = PowerShell 4104 Hunting -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 | eval DoIt = if(match(Message,"(?i)(\$doit)"), "4", 0) | eval enccom=if(match(Message,"[A-Za-z0-9+\/]{44,}([A-Za-z0-9+\/]{4}|[A-Za-z0-9+\/]{3}=|[A-Za-z0-9+\/]{2}==)") OR match(Message, "(?i)[-]e(nc*o*d*e*d*c*o*m*m*a*n*d*)*\s+[^-]"),4,0) | eval suspcmdlet=if(match(Message, "(?i)Add-Exfiltration|Add-Persistence|Add-RegBackdoor|Add-ScrnSaveBackdoor|Check-VM|Do-Exfiltration|Enabled-DuplicateToken|Exploit-Jboss|Find-Fruit|Find-GPOLocation|Find-TrustedDocuments|Get-ApplicationHost|Get-ChromeDump|Get-ClipboardContents|Get-FoxDump|Get-GPPPassword|Get-IndexedItem|Get-Keystrokes|LSASecret|Get-PassHash|Get-RegAlwaysInstallElevated|Get-RegAutoLogon|Get-RickAstley|Get-Screenshot|Get-SecurityPackages|Get-ServiceFilePermission|Get-ServicePermission|Get-ServiceUnquoted|Get-SiteListPassword|Get-System|Get-TimedScreenshot|Get-UnattendedInstallFile|Get-Unconstrained|Get-VaultCredential|Get-VulnAutoRun|Get-VulnSchTask|Gupt-Backdoor|HTTP-Login|Install-SSP|Install-ServiceBinary|Invoke-ACLScanner|Invoke-ADSBackdoor|Invoke-ARPScan|Invoke-AllChecks|Invoke-BackdoorLNK|Invoke-BypassUAC|Invoke-CredentialInjection|Invoke-DCSync|Invoke-DllInjection|Invoke-DowngradeAccount|Invoke-EgressCheck|Invoke-Inveigh|Invoke-InveighRelay|Invoke-Mimikittenz|Invoke-NetRipper|Invoke-NinjaCopy|Invoke-PSInject|Invoke-Paranoia|Invoke-PortScan|Invoke-PoshRat|Invoke-PostExfil|Invoke-PowerDump|Invoke-PowerShellTCP|Invoke-PsExec|Invoke-PsUaCme|Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection|Invoke-ReverseDNSLookup|Invoke-RunAs|Invoke-SMBScanner|Invoke-SSHCommand|Invoke-Service|Invoke-Shellcode|Invoke-Tater|Invoke-ThunderStruck|Invoke-Token|Invoke-UserHunter|Invoke-VoiceTroll|Invoke-WScriptBypassUAC|Invoke-WinEnum|MailRaider|New-HoneyHash|Out-Minidump|Port-Scan|PowerBreach|PowerUp|PowerView|Remove-Update|Set-MacAttribute|Set-Wallpaper|Show-TargetScreen|Start-CaptureServer|VolumeShadowCopyTools|NEEEEWWW|(Computer|User)Property|CachedRDPConnection|get-net\S+|invoke-\S+hunter|Install-Service|get-\S+(credent|password)|remoteps|Kerberos.*(policy|ticket)|netfirewall|Uninstall-Windows|Verb\s+Runas|AmsiBypass|nishang|Invoke-Interceptor|EXEonRemote|NetworkRelay|PowerShelludp|PowerShellIcmp|CreateShortcut|copy-vss|invoke-dll|invoke-mass|out-shortcut|Invoke-ShellCommand"),1,0) | eval base64 = if(match(lower(Message),"frombase64"), "4", 0) | eval empire=if(match(lower(Message),"system.net.webclient") AND match(lower(Message), "frombase64string") ,5,0) | eval mimikatz=if(match(lower(Message),"mimikatz") OR match(lower(Message), "-dumpcr") OR match(lower(Message), "SEKURLSA::Pth") OR match(lower(Message), "kerberos::ptt") OR match(lower(Message), "kerberos::golden") ,5,0) | eval iex = if(match(lower(Message),"iex"), "2", 0) | eval webclient=if(match(lower(Message),"http") OR match(lower(Message),"web(client|request)") OR match(lower(Message),"socket") OR match(lower(Message),"download(file|string)") OR match(lower(Message),"bitstransfer") OR match(lower(Message),"internetexplorer.application") OR match(lower(Message),"xmlhttp"),5,0) | eval get = if(match(lower(Message),"get-"), "1", 0) | eval rundll32 = if(match(lower(Message),"rundll32"), "4", 0) | eval suspkeywrd=if(match(Message, "(?i)(bitstransfer|mimik|metasp|AssemblyBuilderAccess|Reflection\.Assembly|shellcode|injection|cnvert|shell\.application|start-process|Rc4ByteStream|System\.Security\.Cryptography|lsass\.exe|localadmin|LastLoggedOn|hijack|BackupPrivilege|ngrok|comsvcs|backdoor|brute.?force|Port.?Scan|Exfiltration|exploit|DisableRealtimeMonitoring|beacon)"),1,0) | eval syswow64 = if(match(lower(Message),"syswow64"), "3", 0) | eval httplocal = if(match(lower(Message),"http://127.0.0.1"), "4", 0) | eval reflection = if(match(lower(Message),"reflection"), "1", 0) | eval invokewmi=if(match(lower(Message), "(?i)(wmiobject|WMIMethod|RemoteWMI|PowerShellWmi|wmicommand)"),5,0) | eval downgrade=if(match(Message, "(?i)([-]ve*r*s*i*o*n*\s+2)") OR match(lower(Message),"powershell -version"),3,0) | eval compressed=if(match(Message, "(?i)GZipStream|::Decompress|IO.Compression|write-zip|(expand|compress)-Archive"),5,0) | eval invokecmd = if(match(lower(Message),"invoke-command"), "4", 0) | addtotals fieldname=Score DoIt, enccom, suspcmdlet, suspkeywrd, compressed, downgrade, mimikatz, iex, empire, rundll32, webclient, syswow64, httplocal, reflection, invokewmi, invokecmd, base64, get | stats values(Score) by DoIt, enccom, compressed, downgrade, iex, mimikatz, rundll32, empire, webclient, syswow64, httplocal, reflection, invokewmi, invokecmd, base64, get, suspcmdlet, suspkeywrd | `powershell_4104_hunting_filter` - -[ESCU - PowerShell Domain Enumeration - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ -This analytic identifies specific PowerShell modules typically used to enumerate an organizations domain or users. \ -During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ -This analytic identifies specific PowerShell modules typically used to enumerate an organizations domain or users. \ -During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible there will be false positives, filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-10 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-10 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - PowerShell Domain Enumeration - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A suspicious powershell script contains domain enumeration command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 42}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - PowerShell Domain Enumeration - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "recon"}], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ -This analytic identifies specific PowerShell modules typically used to enumerate an organizations domain or users. \ -During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -action.notable.param.rule_title = PowerShell Domain Enumeration -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message IN (*get-netdomaintrust*, *get-netforesttrust*, *get-addomain*, *get-adgroupmember*, *get-domainuser*) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_domain_enumeration_filter` - -[ESCU - PowerShell Get LocalGroup Discovery - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following hunting analytic identifies the use of `get-localgroup` being used with PowerShell to identify local groups on the endpoint. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.001"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following hunting analytic identifies the use of `get-localgroup` being used with PowerShell to identify local groups on the endpoint. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Tune as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-14 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-14 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - PowerShell Get LocalGroup Discovery - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Local group discovery on $dest$ by $user$. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 15}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - PowerShell Get LocalGroup Discovery - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following hunting analytic identifies the use of `get-localgroup` being used with PowerShell to identify local groups on the endpoint. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior. -action.notable.param.rule_title = PowerShell Get LocalGroup Discovery -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=cmd.exe) (Processes.process="*get-localgroup*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_filter` - -[ESCU - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via System Reflection Assembly - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable no critical endpoints or all. \ -This analytic identifies the use of PowerShell loading .net assembly via reflection. This is commonly found in malicious PowerShell usage, including Empire and Cobalt Strike. In addition, the `load(` value may be modifed by removing `(` and it will identify more events to review. \ -During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable no critical endpoints or all. \ -This analytic identifies the use of PowerShell loading .net assembly via reflection. This is commonly found in malicious PowerShell usage, including Empire and Cobalt Strike. In addition, the `load(` value may be modifed by removing `(` and it will identify more events to review. \ -During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as day to day scripts do not use this method. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-10 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-10 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via System Reflection Assembly - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A suspicious powershell script contains reflective class assembly command in $Message$ to load .net code in memory with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 56}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via System Reflection Assembly - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable no critical endpoints or all. \ -This analytic identifies the use of PowerShell loading .net assembly via reflection. This is commonly found in malicious PowerShell usage, including Empire and Cobalt Strike. In addition, the `load(` value may be modifed by removing `(` and it will identify more events to review. \ -During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -action.notable.param.rule_title = PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via System Reflection Assembly -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message IN ("*[system.reflection.assembly]::load(*","*[reflection.assembly]*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode ComputerName User EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_system_reflection_assembly_filter` - -[ESCU - PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = Start-BitsTransfer is the PowerShell "version" of BitsAdmin.exe. Similar functionality is present. This technique variation is not as commonly used by adversaries, but has been abused in the past. Lesser known uses include the ability to set the `-TransferType` to `Upload` for exfiltration of files. In an instance where `Upload` is used, it is highly possible files will be archived. During triage, review parallel processes and process lineage. Capture any files on disk and review. For the remote domain or IP, what is the reputation? -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1197"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = Start-BitsTransfer is the PowerShell "version" of BitsAdmin.exe. Similar functionality is present. This technique variation is not as commonly used by adversaries, but has been abused in the past. Lesser known uses include the ability to set the `-TransferType` to `Upload` for exfiltration of files. In an instance where `Upload` is used, it is highly possible files will be archived. During triage, review parallel processes and process lineage. Capture any files on disk and review. For the remote domain or IP, what is the reputation? -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives. It is possible administrators will utilize Start-BitsTransfer for administrative tasks, otherwise filter based parent process or command-line arguments. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-29 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-29 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["BITS Jobs"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A suspicious process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ that are related to bittransfer functionality in host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 56}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BITS Jobs"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}, "Persistence"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1197"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = Start-BitsTransfer is the PowerShell "version" of BitsAdmin.exe. Similar functionality is present. This technique variation is not as commonly used by adversaries, but has been abused in the past. Lesser known uses include the ability to set the `-TransferType` to `Upload` for exfiltration of files. In an instance where `Upload` is used, it is highly possible files will be archived. During triage, review parallel processes and process lineage. Capture any files on disk and review. For the remote domain or IP, what is the reputation? -action.notable.param.rule_title = PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process=*start-bitstransfer* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_start_bitstransfer_filter` - -[ESCU - Powershell Creating Thread Mutex - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is using the `mutex` function. This function is commonly seen in some obfuscated PowerShell scripts to make sure that only one instance of there process is running on a compromise machine. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027", "T1027.005"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is using the `mutex` function. This function is commonly seen in some obfuscated PowerShell scripts to make sure that only one instance of there process is running on a compromise machine. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -action.escu.known_false_positives = powershell developer may used this function in their script for instance checking too. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-10 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-10 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Powershell Creating Thread Mutex - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A suspicious powershell script contains Thread Mutex in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 40}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 40}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Powershell Creating Thread Mutex - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027", "T1027.005"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is using the `mutex` function. This function is commonly seen in some obfuscated PowerShell scripts to make sure that only one instance of there process is running on a compromise machine. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Powershell Creating Thread Mutex -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = "*Threading.Mutex*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_creating_thread_mutex_filter` - -[ESCU - Powershell Disable Security Monitoring - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search is to identifies a modification in registry to disable the windows denfender real time behavior monitoring. This event or technique is commonly seen in RAT, bot, or Trojan to disable AV to evade detections. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search is to identifies a modification in registry to disable the windows denfender real time behavior monitoring. This event or technique is commonly seen in RAT, bot, or Trojan to disable AV to evade detections. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives. However, tune based on scripts that may perform this action. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-05 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-05 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Powershell Disable Security Monitoring - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Powershell Disable Security Monitoring - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to identifies a modification in registry to disable the windows denfender real time behavior monitoring. This event or technique is commonly seen in RAT, bot, or Trojan to disable AV to evade detections. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Powershell Disable Security Monitoring -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process="*set-mppreference*" AND Processes.process IN ("*disablerealtimemonitoring*","*disableioavprotection*","*disableintrusionpreventionsystem*","*disablescriptscanning*","*disableblockatfirstseen*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_disable_security_monitoring_filter` - -[ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search is to detect a suspicious enabling of smb1protocol through "powershell.exe". This technique was seen in some ransomware (like reddot) where it enable smb share to do the lateral movement and encrypt other files within the compromise network system. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027", "T1027.005"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious enabling of smb1protocol through "powershell.exe". This technique was seen in some ransomware (like reddot) where it enable smb share to do the lateral movement and encrypt other files within the compromise network system. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the powershell logs from your endpoints. make sure you enable needed registry to monitor this event. -action.escu.known_false_positives = network operator may enable or disable this windows feature. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-22 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-22 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell", "Ransomware"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "Ransomware"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027", "T1027.005"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious enabling of smb1protocol through "powershell.exe". This technique was seen in some ransomware (like reddot) where it enable smb share to do the lateral movement and encrypt other files within the compromise network system. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = "*Enable-WindowsOptionalFeature*" Message = "*SMB1Protocol*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature_filter` - -[ESCU - Powershell Execute COM Object - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search is to detect a COM CLSID execution through powershell. This technique was seen in several adversaries and malware like ransomware conti where it has a feature to execute command using COM Object. This technique may use by network operator at some cases but a good indicator if some application want to gain privilege escalation or bypass uac. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.015", "T1546"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a COM CLSID execution through powershell. This technique was seen in several adversaries and malware like ransomware conti where it has a feature to execute command using COM Object. This technique may use by network operator at some cases but a good indicator if some application want to gain privilege escalation or bypass uac. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -action.escu.known_false_positives = network operrator may use this command. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-10 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-10 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Powershell Execute COM Object - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell", "Ransomware"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A suspicious powershell script contains COM CLSID command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 5}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 5}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Powershell Execute COM Object - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "Ransomware"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.015", "T1546"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a COM CLSID execution through powershell. This technique was seen in several adversaries and malware like ransomware conti where it has a feature to execute command using COM Object. This technique may use by network operator at some cases but a good indicator if some application want to gain privilege escalation or bypass uac. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Powershell Execute COM Object -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = "*CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromCLSID*" OR Message = "*CreateInstance([Type]::GetTypeFromProgID*"| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_execute_com_object_filter` - -[ESCU - Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable no critical endpoints or all. \ -This analytic identifies `GetProcAddress` in the script block. This is not normal to be used by most PowerShell scripts and is typically unsafe/malicious. Many attack toolkits use GetProcAddress to obtain code execution. \ -In use, `$var_gpa = $var_unsafe_native_methods.GetMethod(GetProcAddress` and later referenced/executed elsewhere. \ -During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1055", "T1059.001"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable no critical endpoints or all. \ -This analytic identifies `GetProcAddress` in the script block. This is not normal to be used by most PowerShell scripts and is typically unsafe/malicious. Many attack toolkits use GetProcAddress to obtain code execution. \ -In use, `$var_gpa = $var_unsafe_native_methods.GetMethod(GetProcAddress` and later referenced/executed elsewhere. \ -During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives. Filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-08 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-08 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A suspicious powershell script contains GetProcAddress API in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 48}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 48}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "recon"}], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1055", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable no critical endpoints or all. \ -This analytic identifies `GetProcAddress` in the script block. This is not normal to be used by most PowerShell scripts and is typically unsafe/malicious. Many attack toolkits use GetProcAddress to obtain code execution. \ -In use, `$var_gpa = $var_unsafe_native_methods.GetMethod(GetProcAddress` and later referenced/executed elsewhere. \ -During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message=*getprocaddress* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode ComputerName User EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_fileless_process_injection_via_getprocaddress_filter` - -[ESCU - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ -This analytic identifies `FromBase64String` within the script block. A typical malicious instance will include additional code. \ -Command example - `[Byte[]]$var_code = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String(38uqIyMjQ6rG....` \ -During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1027", "T1059.001"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ -This analytic identifies `FromBase64String` within the script block. A typical malicious instance will include additional code. \ -Command example - `[Byte[]]$var_code = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String(38uqIyMjQ6rG....` \ -During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited. Filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-08 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-08 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A suspicious powershell script contains base64 command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 56}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1027", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ -This analytic identifies `FromBase64String` within the script block. A typical malicious instance will include additional code. \ -Command example - `[Byte[]]$var_code = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String(38uqIyMjQ6rG....` \ -During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message=*frombase64string* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode ComputerName User EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_fileless_script_contains_base64_encoded_content_filter` - -[ESCU - Powershell Get LocalGroup Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ -This analytic identifies PowerShell cmdlet - `get-localgroup` being ran. Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \ -During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.001"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ -This analytic identifies PowerShell cmdlet - `get-localgroup` being ran. Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \ -During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Tune as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-14 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-14 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Powershell Get LocalGroup Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Local group discovery on $dest$ by $user$. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 15}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Powershell Get LocalGroup Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ -This analytic identifies PowerShell cmdlet - `get-localgroup` being ran. Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \ -During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Powershell Get LocalGroup Discovery with Script Block Logging -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = "*get-localgroup*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message OpCode ComputerName User EventCode| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_with_script_block_logging_filter` - -[ESCU - Powershell Processing Stream Of Data - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is processing compressed stream data. This is typically found in obfuscated PowerShell or PowerShell executing embedded .NET or binary files that are stream flattened and will be deflated durnig execution. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is processing compressed stream data. This is typically found in obfuscated PowerShell or PowerShell executing embedded .NET or binary files that are stream flattened and will be deflated durnig execution. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -action.escu.known_false_positives = powershell may used this function to process compressed data. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-10 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-10 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Powershell Processing Stream Of Data - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A suspicious powershell script contains stream command in $Message$ commonly for processing compressed or to decompressed binary file with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 40}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 40}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Powershell Processing Stream Of Data - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is processing compressed stream data. This is typically found in obfuscated PowerShell or PowerShell executing embedded .NET or binary files that are stream flattened and will be deflated durnig execution. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Powershell Processing Stream Of Data -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = "*IO.Compression.*" OR Message = "*IO.StreamReader*" OR Message = "*]::Decompress*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_processing_stream_of_data_filter` - -[ESCU - Powershell Remote Thread To Known Windows Process - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = this search is designed to detect suspicious powershell process that tries to inject code and to known/critical windows process and execute it using CreateRemoteThread. This technique is seen in several malware like trickbot and offensive tooling like cobaltstrike where it load a shellcode to svchost.exe to execute reverse shell to c2 and download another payload -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = this search is designed to detect suspicious powershell process that tries to inject code and to known/critical windows process and execute it using CreateRemoteThread. This technique is seen in several malware like trickbot and offensive tooling like cobaltstrike where it load a shellcode to svchost.exe to execute reverse shell to c2 and download another payload -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, Create Remote thread from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of create remote thread may be used. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-19 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-19 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Powershell Remote Thread To Known Windows Process - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Trickbot"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A suspicious powershell process $process_name$ that tries to create a remote thread on target process $TargetImage$ with eventcode $EventCode$ in host $Computer$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process name"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Powershell Remote Thread To Known Windows Process - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Trickbot"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}, "Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "process name"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = this search is designed to detect suspicious powershell process that tries to inject code and to known/critical windows process and execute it using CreateRemoteThread. This technique is seen in several malware like trickbot and offensive tooling like cobaltstrike where it load a shellcode to svchost.exe to execute reverse shell to c2 and download another payload -action.notable.param.rule_title = Powershell Remote Thread To Known Windows Process -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `sysmon` EventCode = 8 process_name IN ("powershell_ise.exe", "powershell.exe") TargetImage IN ("*\\svchost.exe","*\\csrss.exe" "*\\gpupdate.exe", "*\\explorer.exe","*\\services.exe","*\\winlogon.exe","*\\smss.exe","*\\wininit.exe","*\\userinit.exe","*\\spoolsv.exe","*\\taskhost.exe") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by SourceImage process_name SourceProcessId SourceProcessGuid TargetImage TargetProcessId NewThreadId StartAddress Computer EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process_filter` - -[ESCU - Powershell Remove Windows Defender Directory - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic will identify a suspicious PowerShell command used to delete the Windows Defender folder. This technique was seen used by the WhisperGate malware campaign where it used Nirsofts advancedrun.exe to gain administrative privileges to then execute a PowerShell command to delete the Windows Defender folder. This is a good indicator the offending process is trying corrupt a Windows Defender installation. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic will identify a suspicious PowerShell command used to delete the Windows Defender folder. This technique was seen used by the WhisperGate malware campaign where it used Nirsofts advancedrun.exe to gain administrative privileges to then execute a PowerShell command to delete the Windows Defender folder. This is a good indicator the offending process is trying corrupt a Windows Defender installation. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-18 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-18 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Powershell Remove Windows Defender Directory - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["WhisperGate"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = suspicious powershell script $Message$ was executed on the $ComputerName$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 90}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 90}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Powershell Remove Windows Defender Directory - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["WhisperGate"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic will identify a suspicious PowerShell command used to delete the Windows Defender folder. This technique was seen used by the WhisperGate malware campaign where it used Nirsofts advancedrun.exe to gain administrative privileges to then execute a PowerShell command to delete the Windows Defender folder. This is a good indicator the offending process is trying corrupt a Windows Defender installation. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Powershell Remove Windows Defender Directory -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = "*rmdir *" AND Message = "*\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_remove_windows_defender_directory_filter` - -[ESCU - Powershell Using memory As Backing Store - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is using memory stream as new object backstore. The malicious PowerShell script will contain stream flate data and will be decompressed in memory to run or drop the actual payload. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1140"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is using memory stream as new object backstore. The malicious PowerShell script will contain stream flate data and will be decompressed in memory to run or drop the actual payload. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -action.escu.known_false_positives = powershell may used this function to store out object into memory. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-10 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-10 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Powershell Using memory As Backing Store - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A suspicious powershell script contains memorystream command in $Message$ as new object backstore with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 40}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 40}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Powershell Using memory As Backing Store - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1140"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is using memory stream as new object backstore. The malicious PowerShell script will contain stream flate data and will be decompressed in memory to run or drop the actual payload. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Powershell Using memory As Backing Store -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = "*New-Object IO.MemoryStream*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store_filter` - -[ESCU - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic will detect a suspicious process commandline related to windows defender exclusion feature. This command is abused by adversaries, malware author and red teams to bypassed Windows Defender Anti-Virus product by excluding folder path, file path, process, extensions and etc. from its real time or schedule scan to execute their malicious code. This is a good indicator for defense evasion and to look further for events after this behavior. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic will detect a suspicious process commandline related to windows defender exclusion feature. This command is abused by adversaries, malware author and red teams to bypassed Windows Defender Anti-Virus product by excluding folder path, file path, process, extensions and etc. from its real time or schedule scan to execute their malicious code. This is a good indicator for defense evasion and to look further for events after this behavior. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. -action.escu.known_false_positives = admin or user may choose to use this windows features. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-25 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-25 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Remcos", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "WhisperGate"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = exclusion command $Message$ executed on $ComputerName$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 64}, {"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Remcos", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "WhisperGate"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic will detect a suspicious process commandline related to windows defender exclusion feature. This command is abused by adversaries, malware author and red teams to bypassed Windows Defender Anti-Virus product by excluding folder path, file path, process, extensions and etc. from its real time or schedule scan to execute their malicious code. This is a good indicator for defense evasion and to look further for events after this behavior. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = "*Add-MpPreference *" OR Message = "*Set-MpPreference *") AND Message = "*-exclusion*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands_filter` - -[ESCU - Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search is to detect a suspicious bcdedit.exe execution to ignore all failures. This technique was used by ransomware to prevent the compromise machine automatically boot in repair mode. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious bcdedit.exe execution to ignore all failures. This technique was used by ransomware to prevent the compromise machine automatically boot in repair mode. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed bcdedit.exe may be used. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may modify the boot configuration ignore failure during testing and debugging. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-10 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-10 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A suspicious process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ contains commandline $process$ to ignore all bcdedit execution failure in host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 56}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Impact"}], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious bcdedit.exe execution to ignore all failures. This technique was used by ransomware to prevent the compromise machine automatically boot in repair mode. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "bcdedit.exe" Processes.process = "*bootstatuspolicy*" Processes.process = "*ignoreallfailures*" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `prevent_automatic_repair_mode_using_bcdedit_filter` - [ESCU - Print Processor Registry Autostart - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification or new registry entry regarding print processor. This registry is known to be abuse by turla or other APT to gain persistence and privilege escalation to the compromised machine. This is done by adding the malicious dll payload on the new created key in this registry that will be executed as it restarted the spoolsv.exe process and services. action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012", "T1547"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification or new registry entry regarding print processor. This registry is known to be abuse by turla or other APT to gain persistence and privilege escalation to the compromised machine. This is done by adding the malicious dll payload on the new created key in this registry that will be executed as it restarted the spoolsv.exe process and services. action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. action.escu.known_false_positives = possible new printer installation may add driver component on this registry. @@ -25132,10 +34076,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Print Processor Registry Autostart - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Privilege Escalation Persistence"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification or new registry entry regarding print processor. This registry is known to be abuse by turla or other APT to gain persistence and privilege escalation to the compromised machine. This is done by adding the malicious dll payload on the new created key in this registry that will be executed as it restarted the spoolsv.exe process and services. action.notable.param.rule_title = Print Processor Registry Autostart action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -25151,346 +34095,11 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path ="*\\Control\\Print\\Environments\\Windows x64\\Print Processors*" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `print_processor_registry_autostart_filter` -[ESCU - Print Spooler Adding A Printer Driver - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies new printer drivers being load by utilizing the Windows PrintService operational logs, EventCode 316. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. \ -Within the proof of concept code, the following event will occur - "Printer driver 1234 for Windows x64 Version-3 was added or updated. Files:- UNIDRV.DLL, kernelbase.dll, evil.dll. No user action is required." \ -During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events and review the source of where the exploitation began. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012", "T1547"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies new printer drivers being load by utilizing the Windows PrintService operational logs, EventCode 316. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. \ -Within the proof of concept code, the following event will occur - "Printer driver 1234 for Windows x64 Version-3 was added or updated. Files:- UNIDRV.DLL, kernelbase.dll, evil.dll. No user action is required." \ -During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events and review the source of where the exploitation began. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You will need to ensure PrintService Admin and Operational logs are being logged to Splunk from critical or all systems. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown. This may require filtering. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-01 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-01 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Print Spooler Adding A Printer Driver - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious print driver was loaded on endpoint $ComputerName$. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Print Spooler Adding A Printer Driver - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence,", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Incoming"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527", "CVE-2021-1675"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies new printer drivers being load by utilizing the Windows PrintService operational logs, EventCode 316. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. \ -Within the proof of concept code, the following event will occur - "Printer driver 1234 for Windows x64 Version-3 was added or updated. Files:- UNIDRV.DLL, kernelbase.dll, evil.dll. No user action is required." \ -During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events and review the source of where the exploitation began. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Print Spooler Adding A Printer Driver -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `printservice` EventCode=316 category = "Adding a printer driver" Message = "*kernelbase.dll,*" Message = "*UNIDRV.DLL,*" Message = "*.DLL.*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode EventCode ComputerName Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `print_spooler_adding_a_printer_driver_filter` - -[ESCU - Print Spooler Failed to Load a Plug-in - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies driver load errors utilizing the Windows PrintService Admin logs. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. \ -Within the proof of concept code, the following error will occur - "The print spooler failed to load a plug-in module C:\Windows\system32\spool\DRIVERS\x64\3\meterpreter.dll, error code 0x45A. See the event user data for context information." \ -The analytic is based on file path and failure to load the plug-in. \ -During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012", "T1547"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies driver load errors utilizing the Windows PrintService Admin logs. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. \ -Within the proof of concept code, the following error will occur - "The print spooler failed to load a plug-in module C:\Windows\system32\spool\DRIVERS\x64\3\meterpreter.dll, error code 0x45A. See the event user data for context information." \ -The analytic is based on file path and failure to load the plug-in. \ -During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You will need to ensure PrintService Admin and Operational logs are being logged to Splunk from critical or all systems. -action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are unknown and filtering may be required. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-01 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-01 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Print Spooler Failed to Load a Plug-in - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious printer spooler errors have occured on endpoint $ComputerName$ with EventCode $EventCode$. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Print Spooler Failed to Load a Plug-in - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence,", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Incoming"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527", "CVE-2021-1675"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies driver load errors utilizing the Windows PrintService Admin logs. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. \ -Within the proof of concept code, the following error will occur - "The print spooler failed to load a plug-in module C:\Windows\system32\spool\DRIVERS\x64\3\meterpreter.dll, error code 0x45A. See the event user data for context information." \ -The analytic is based on file path and failure to load the plug-in. \ -During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Print Spooler Failed to Load a Plug-in -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `printservice` ((ErrorCode="0x45A" (EventCode="808" OR EventCode="4909")) OR ("The print spooler failed to load a plug-in module" OR "\\drivers\\x64\\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode EventCode ComputerName Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `print_spooler_failed_to_load_a_plug_in_filter` - -[ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for a process launching an `*.lnk` file under `C:\User*` or `*\Local\Temp\*`. This is common behavior used by various spear phishing tools. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for a process launching an `*.lnk` file under `C:\User*` or `*\Local\Temp\*`. This is common behavior used by various spear phishing tools. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. -action.escu.known_false_positives = This detection should yield little or no false positive results. It is uncommon for LNK files to be executed from temporary or user directories. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-26 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-26 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spearphishing Attachments"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A process $process_name$ that launching .lnk file in $file_path$ in host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 63}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Initial Access"}], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for a process launching an `*.lnk` file under `C:\User*` or `*\Local\Temp\*`. This is common behavior used by various spear phishing tools. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name="*.lnk" AND (Filesystem.file_path="C:\\User\\*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*\\Temp\\*") by _time span=1h Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.file_hash Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | rename process_guid as lnk_guid | join lnk_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=* by _time span=1h Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | rename parent_process_guid as lnk_guid | fields _time lnk_guid process_id dest process_name process_path process] | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime, lastTime, lnk_guid, process_id, user, dest, file_name, file_path, process_name, process, process_path, file_hash | `process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location_filter` - -[ESCU - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This detection is to identify a suspicious process that tries to delete the process file path related to its process. This technique is known to be defense evasion once a certain condition of malware is satisfied or not. Clop ransomware use this technique where it will try to delete its process file path using a .bat command if the keyboard layout is not the layout it tries to infect. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This detection is to identify a suspicious process that tries to delete the process file path related to its process. This technique is known to be defense evasion once a certain condition of malware is satisfied or not. Clop ransomware use this technique where it will try to delete its process file path using a .bat command if the keyboard layout is not the layout it tries to infect. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-18 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-18 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Clop Ransomware", "Remcos", "WhisperGate"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A process $Image$ tries to delete its process path in commandline $cmdline$ as part of defense evasion in host $Computer$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 60}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 60}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware", "Remcos", "WhisperGate"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This detection is to identify a suspicious process that tries to delete the process file path related to its process. This technique is known to be defense evasion once a certain condition of malware is satisfied or not. Clop ransomware use this technique where it will try to delete its process file path using a .bat command if the keyboard layout is not the layout it tries to infect. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Process Deleting Its Process File Path -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `sysmon` EventCode=1 CommandLine = "* /c *" CommandLine = "* del*" Image = "*\\cmd.exe" | eval result = if(like(process,"%".parent_process."%"), "Found", "Not Found") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer user ParentImage ParentCommandLine Image CommandLine EventCode ProcessID result | where result = "Found" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `process_deleting_its_process_file_path_filter` - -[ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies `WmiPrvSE.exe` spawning a process. This typically occurs when a process is instantiated from a local or remote process using `wmic.exe`. During triage, review parallel processes for suspicious behavior or commands executed. Review the process and command-line spawning from `wmiprvse.exe`. Contain and remediate the endpoint as necessary. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies `WmiPrvSE.exe` spawning a process. This typically occurs when a process is instantiated from a local or remote process using `wmic.exe`. During triage, review parallel processes for suspicious behavior or commands executed. Review the process and command-line spawning from `wmiprvse.exe`. Contain and remediate the endpoint as necessary. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, administrators may use wmi to execute commands for legitimate purposes. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-03-16 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-03-16 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious WMI Use"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A remote instance execution of wmic.exe that will spawn $parent_process_name$ in host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 49}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies `WmiPrvSE.exe` spawning a process. This typically occurs when a process is instantiated from a local or remote process using `wmic.exe`. During triage, review parallel processes for suspicious behavior or commands executed. Review the process and command-line spawning from `wmiprvse.exe`. Contain and remediate the endpoint as necessary. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Process Execution via WMI -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=WmiPrvSE.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `process_execution_via_wmi_filter` - -[ESCU - Process Kill Base On File Path - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies the use of `wmic.exe` using `delete` to remove a executable path. This is typically ran via a batch file during beginning stages of an adversary setting up for mining on an endpoint. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the use of `wmic.exe` using `delete` to remove a executable path. This is typically ran via a batch file during beginning stages of an adversary setting up for mining on an endpoint. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-05-04 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-05-04 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Process Kill Base On File Path - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["XMRig"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A process $process_name$ attempt to kill process by its file path using commandline $process$ in host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 56}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Process Kill Base On File Path - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the use of `wmic.exe` using `delete` to remove a executable path. This is typically ran via a batch file during beginning stages of an adversary setting up for mining on an endpoint. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Process Kill Base On File Path -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` AND Processes.process="*process*" AND Processes.process="*executablepath*" AND Processes.process="*delete*" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `process_kill_base_on_file_path_filter` - -[ESCU - Process Writing DynamicWrapperX - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = DynamicWrapperX is an ActiveX component that can be used in a script to call Windows API functions, but it requires the dynwrapx.dll to be installed and registered. With that, a binary writing dynwrapx.dll to disk and registering it into the registry is highly suspect. Why is it needed? In most malicious instances, it will be written to disk at a non-standard location. During triage, review parallel processes and pivot on the process_guid. Review the registry for any suspicious modifications meant to load dynwrapx.dll. Identify any suspicious module loads of dynwrapx.dll. This will identify the process that will invoke vbs/wscript/cscript. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1559.001"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = DynamicWrapperX is an ActiveX component that can be used in a script to call Windows API functions, but it requires the dynwrapx.dll to be installed and registered. With that, a binary writing dynwrapx.dll to disk and registering it into the registry is highly suspect. Why is it needed? In most malicious instances, it will be written to disk at a non-standard location. During triage, review parallel processes and pivot on the process_guid. Review the registry for any suspicious modifications meant to load dynwrapx.dll. Identify any suspicious module loads of dynwrapx.dll. This will identify the process that will invoke vbs/wscript/cscript. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, however it is possible to filter by Processes.process_name and specific processes (ex. wscript.exe). Filter as needed. This may need modification based on EDR telemetry and how it brings in registry data. For example, removal of (Default). -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-05 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-05 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Process Writing DynamicWrapperX - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Remcos"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ downloading the DynamicWrapperX dll. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Process Writing DynamicWrapperX - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1559.001"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = DynamicWrapperX is an ActiveX component that can be used in a script to call Windows API functions, but it requires the dynwrapx.dll to be installed and registered. With that, a binary writing dynwrapx.dll to disk and registering it into the registry is highly suspect. Why is it needed? In most malicious instances, it will be written to disk at a non-standard location. During triage, review parallel processes and pivot on the process_guid. Review the registry for any suspicious modifications meant to load dynwrapx.dll. Identify any suspicious module loads of dynwrapx.dll. This will identify the process that will invoke vbs/wscript/cscript. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Process Writing DynamicWrapperX -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_guid Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name="dynwrapx.dll" by _time Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time process_guid file_path file_name file_create_time user dest process_name] | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest process_name process_guid file_name file_path file_create_time user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `process_writing_dynamicwrapperx_filter` - [ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = This search looks for processes in an MacOS system that is tapping keyboard events in MacOS, and essentially monitoring all keystrokes made by a user. This is a common technique used by RATs to log keystrokes from a victim, although it can also be used by legitimate processes like Siri to react on human input -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "nist": ["DE.DP"]} +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control"], "nist": ["DE.DP"]} action.escu.data_models = [] action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for processes in an MacOS system that is tapping keyboard events in MacOS, and essentially monitoring all keystrokes made by a user. This is a common technique used by RATs to log keystrokes from a victim, although it can also be used by legitimate processes like Siri to react on human input action.escu.how_to_implement = In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from your osquery deployed agents with the [osx-attacks.conf](https://github.com/facebook/osquery/blob/experimental/packs/osx-attacks.conf#L599) pack enabled. Also the [TA-OSquery](https://github.com/d1vious/TA-osquery) must be deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the osquery data populate the Alerts data model. @@ -25503,14 +34112,20 @@ action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["ColdRoot MacOS RAT"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "dest", "threat_object_type": "other"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["ColdRoot MacOS RAT"], "cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "nist": ["DE.DP"]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["ColdRoot MacOS RAT"], "cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control"], "nist": ["DE.DP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Other"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for processes in an MacOS system that is tapping keyboard events in MacOS, and essentially monitoring all keystrokes made by a user. This is a common technique used by RATs to log keystrokes from a victim, although it can also be used by legitimate processes like Siri to react on human input action.notable.param.rule_title = Processes Tapping Keyboard Events action.notable.param.security_domain = threat @@ -25526,260 +34141,11 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = | from datamodel Alerts.Alerts | search app=osquery:results name=pack_osx-attacks_Keyboard_Event_Taps | rename columns.cmdline as cmd, columns.name as process_name, columns.pid as process_id| dedup host,process_name | table host,process_name, cmd, process_id | `processes_tapping_keyboard_events_filter` -[ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe to execute various commands via the netsh command-line utility. Netsh.exe is a command-line scripting utility that allows you to, either locally or remotely, display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. Netsh can be used as a persistence proxy technique to execute a helper .dll when netsh.exe is executed. In this search, we are looking for processes spawned by netsh.exe that are executing commands via the command line. Deprecated because we have another detection of the same type. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.004"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe to execute various commands via the netsh command-line utility. Netsh.exe is a command-line scripting utility that allows you to, either locally or remotely, display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. Netsh can be used as a persistence proxy technique to execute a helper .dll when netsh.exe is executed. In this search, we are looking for processes spawned by netsh.exe that are executing commands via the command line. Deprecated because we have another detection of the same type. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting logs with the process name, command-line arguments, and parent processes from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -action.escu.known_false_positives = It is unusual for netsh.exe to have any child processes in most environments. It makes sense to investigate the child process and verify whether the process spawned is legitimate. We explicitely exclude "C:\Program Files\rempl\sedlauncher.exe" process path since it is a legitimate process by Mircosoft. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-11-23 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-23 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Netsh Abuse"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Processes created by netsh - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Netsh Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.004"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe to execute various commands via the netsh command-line utility. Netsh.exe is a command-line scripting utility that allows you to, either locally or remotely, display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. Netsh can be used as a persistence proxy technique to execute a helper .dll when netsh.exe is executed. In this search, we are looking for processes spawned by netsh.exe that are executing commands via the command line. Deprecated because we have another detection of the same type. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Processes created by netsh -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=netsh.exe by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `processes_created_by_netsh_filter` - -[ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe. Netsh is a command-line scripting utility that allows you to, either locally or remotely, display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. Netsh can be used as a persistence proxy technique to execute a helper DLL when netsh.exe is executed. In this search, we are looking for processes spawned by netsh.exe and executing commands via the command line. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.004", "T1562"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe. Netsh is a command-line scripting utility that allows you to, either locally or remotely, display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. Netsh can be used as a persistence proxy technique to execute a helper DLL when netsh.exe is executed. In this search, we are looking for processes spawned by netsh.exe and executing commands via the command line. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Some VPN applications are known to launch netsh.exe. Outside of these instances, it is unusual for an executable to launch netsh.exe and run commands. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-16 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-16 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Netsh Abuse", "Disabling Security Tools", "DHS Report TA18-074A"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A process $process_name$ that tries to execute netsh commandline $process$ in host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 42}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Netsh Abuse", "Disabling Security Tools", "DHS Report TA18-074A"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.004", "T1562"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe. Netsh is a command-line scripting utility that allows you to, either locally or remotely, display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. Netsh can be used as a persistence proxy technique to execute a helper DLL when netsh.exe is executed. In this search, we are looking for processes spawned by netsh.exe and executing commands via the command line. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Processes launching netsh -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) AS Processes.process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_netsh` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest |`drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`processes_launching_netsh_filter` - -[ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for network traffic defined by port and transport layer protocol in the Enterprise Security lookup table "lookup_interesting_ports", that is marked as prohibited, and has an associated 'allow' action in the Network_Traffic data model. This could be indicative of a misconfigured network device. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Traffic"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for network traffic defined by port and transport layer protocol in the Enterprise Security lookup table "lookup_interesting_ports", that is marked as prohibited, and has an associated 'allow' action in the Network_Traffic data model. This could be indicative of a misconfigured network device. -action.escu.how_to_implement = In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from firewalls or other network control devices that mediate the traffic allowed into an environment. This is necessary so that the search can identify an 'action' taken on the traffic of interest. The search requires the Network_Traffic data model be populated. -action.escu.known_false_positives = None identified -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Ransomware", "Command and Control"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Ransomware", "Command and Control"], "cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for network traffic defined by port and transport layer protocol in the Enterprise Security lookup table "lookup_interesting_ports", that is marked as prohibited, and has an associated 'allow' action in the Network_Traffic data model. This could be indicative of a misconfigured network device. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.action = allowed by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip All_Traffic.dest_port All_Traffic.action | lookup update=true interesting_ports_lookup dest_port as All_Traffic.dest_port OUTPUT app is_prohibited note transport | search is_prohibited=true | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | `prohibited_network_traffic_allowed_filter` - -[ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for applications on the endpoint that you have marked as prohibited. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for applications on the endpoint that you have marked as prohibited. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is usually generated via logs that report process tracking in your Windows audit settings. In addition, you must also have only the `process_name` (not the entire process path) marked as "prohibited" in the Enterprise Security `interesting processes` table. To include the process names marked as "prohibited", which is included with ES Content Updates, run the included search Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security. -action.escu.known_false_positives = None identified -action.escu.creation_date = 2019-10-11 -action.escu.modification_date = 2019-10-11 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Monitor for Unauthorized Software", "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "SamSam Ransomware"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Monitor for Unauthorized Software", "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "SamSam Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 2"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for applications on the endpoint that you have marked as prohibited. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Prohibited Software On Endpoint -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `prohibited_softwares` | `prohibited_software_on_endpoint_filter` - -[ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for network traffic on common ports where a higher layer protocol does not match the port that is being used. For example, this search should identify cases where protocols other than HTTP are running on TCP port 80. This can be used by attackers to circumvent firewall restrictions, or as an attempt to hide malicious communications over ports and protocols that are typically allowed and not well inspected. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1048"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Traffic"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for network traffic on common ports where a higher layer protocol does not match the port that is being used. For example, this search should identify cases where protocols other than HTTP are running on TCP port 80. This can be used by attackers to circumvent firewall restrictions, or as an attempt to hide malicious communications over ports and protocols that are typically allowed and not well inspected. -action.escu.how_to_implement = Running this search properly requires a technology that can inspect network traffic and identify common protocols. Technologies such as Bro and Palo Alto Networks firewalls are two examples that will identify protocols via inspection, and not just assume a specific protocol based on the transport protocol and ports. -action.escu.known_false_positives = None identified -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Command and Control"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Command and Control"], "cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1048"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for network traffic on common ports where a higher layer protocol does not match the port that is being used. For example, this search should identify cases where protocols other than HTTP are running on TCP port 80. This can be used by attackers to circumvent firewall restrictions, or as an attempt to hide malicious communications over ports and protocols that are typically allowed and not well inspected. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Protocol or Port Mismatch -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where (All_Traffic.app=dns NOT All_Traffic.dest_port=53) OR ((All_Traffic.app=web-browsing OR All_Traffic.app=http) NOT (All_Traffic.dest_port=80 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=8080 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=8000)) OR (All_Traffic.app=ssl NOT (All_Traffic.dest_port=443 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=8443)) OR (All_Traffic.app=smtp NOT All_Traffic.dest_port=25) by All_Traffic.src_ip, All_Traffic.dest_ip, All_Traffic.app, All_Traffic.dest_port |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | `protocol_or_port_mismatch_filter` - -[ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies cleartext protocols at risk of leaking sensitive information. Currently, this consists of legacy protocols such as telnet (port 23), POP3 (port 110), IMAP (port 143), and non-anonymous FTP (port 21) sessions. While some of these protocols may be used over SSL, they typically are found on different assigned ports in those instances. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Traffic"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies cleartext protocols at risk of leaking sensitive information. Currently, this consists of legacy protocols such as telnet (port 23), POP3 (port 110), IMAP (port 143), and non-anonymous FTP (port 21) sessions. While some of these protocols may be used over SSL, they typically are found on different assigned ports in those instances. -action.escu.how_to_implement = This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic, and populating the Network_Traffic data model. For more accurate result it's better to limit destination to organization private and public IP range, like All_Traffic.dest IN(192.168.0.0/16,172.16.0.0/12,10.0.0.0/8, x.x.x.x/22) -action.escu.known_false_positives = Some networks may use kerberized FTP or telnet servers, however, this is rare. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-19 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-19 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Use of Cleartext Protocols"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Use of Cleartext Protocols"], "cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest', 'src'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies cleartext protocols at risk of leaking sensitive information. Currently, this consists of legacy protocols such as telnet (port 23), POP3 (port 110), IMAP (port 143), and non-anonymous FTP (port 21) sessions. While some of these protocols may be used over SSL, they typically are found on different assigned ports in those instances. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Protocols passing authentication in cleartext -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.action!=blocked AND All_Traffic.transport="tcp" AND (All_Traffic.dest_port="23" OR All_Traffic.dest_port="143" OR All_Traffic.dest_port="110" OR (All_Traffic.dest_port="21" AND All_Traffic.user != "anonymous")) by All_Traffic.user All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | `protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext_filter` - [ESCU - Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = The following hunting analytic leverages Event ID 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify the creation of a Scheduled Task with a suspicious, high entropy, Task Name. To achieve this, this analytic also leverages the `ut_shannon` function from the URL ToolBox Splunk application. Red teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler to create and start a remote Scheduled Task and obtain remote code execution. To achieve this goal, tools like Impacket or Crapmapexec, typically create a Scheduled Task with a random task name on the victim host. This hunting analytic may help defenders identify Scheduled Tasks created as part of a lateral movement attack. The entropy threshold `ut_shannon > 3` should be customized by users. The Command field can be used to determine if the task has malicious intent or not. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053", "T1053.005"]} +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053", "T1053.005"]} action.escu.data_models = [] action.escu.eli5 = The following hunting analytic leverages Event ID 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify the creation of a Scheduled Task with a suspicious, high entropy, Task Name. To achieve this, this analytic also leverages the `ut_shannon` function from the URL ToolBox Splunk application. Red teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler to create and start a remote Scheduled Task and obtain remote code execution. To achieve this goal, tools like Impacket or Crapmapexec, typically create a Scheduled Task with a random task name on the victim host. This hunting analytic may help defenders identify Scheduled Tasks created as part of a lateral movement attack. The entropy threshold `ut_shannon > 3` should be customized by users. The Command field can be used to determine if the task has malicious intent or not. action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA as well as the URL ToolBox application are also required. @@ -25802,13 +34168,8 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053", "T1053.005"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053", "T1053.005"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following hunting analytic leverages Event ID 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify the creation of a Scheduled Task with a suspicious, high entropy, Task Name. To achieve this, this analytic also leverages the `ut_shannon` function from the URL ToolBox Splunk application. Red teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler to create and start a remote Scheduled Task and obtain remote code execution. To achieve this goal, tools like Impacket or Crapmapexec, typically create a Scheduled Task with a random task name on the victim host. This hunting analytic may help defenders identify Scheduled Tasks created as part of a lateral movement attack. The entropy threshold `ut_shannon > 3` should be customized by users. The Command field can be used to determine if the task has malicious intent or not. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -25824,7 +34185,7 @@ search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message | lookup ut_shan action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = The following hunting analytic leverages Event ID 7045, `A new service was installed in the system`, to identify the installation of a Windows Service with a suspicious, high entropy, Service Name. To achieve this, this analytic also leverages the `ut_shannon` function from the URL ToolBox Splunk application. Red teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Service Control Manager to create and start a remote Windows Service and obtain remote code execution. To achieve this goal, some tools like Metasploit, Cobalt Strike and Impacket, typically create a Windows Service with a random service name on the victim host. This hunting analytic may help defenders identify Windows Services installed as part of a lateral movement attack. The entropy threshold `ut_shannon > 3` should be customized by users. The Service_File_Name field can be used to determine if the Windows Service has malicious intent or not. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543", "T1543.003"]} +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543", "T1543.003"]} action.escu.data_models = [] action.escu.eli5 = The following hunting analytic leverages Event ID 7045, `A new service was installed in the system`, to identify the installation of a Windows Service with a suspicious, high entropy, Service Name. To achieve this, this analytic also leverages the `ut_shannon` function from the URL ToolBox Splunk application. Red teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Service Control Manager to create and start a remote Windows Service and obtain remote code execution. To achieve this goal, some tools like Metasploit, Cobalt Strike and Impacket, typically create a Windows Service with a random service name on the victim host. This hunting analytic may help defenders identify Windows Services installed as part of a lateral movement attack. The entropy threshold `ut_shannon > 3` should be customized by users. The Service_File_Name field can be used to determine if the Windows Service has malicious intent or not. action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints. The Windows TA as well as the URL ToolBox application are also required. @@ -25847,13 +34208,8 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Randomly Generated Windows Service Name - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543", "T1543.003"], "observable": [{"name": "Service_File_Name", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Other"}, {"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543", "T1543.003"], "observable": [{"name": "Service_File_Name", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Other"}, {"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following hunting analytic leverages Event ID 7045, `A new service was installed in the system`, to identify the installation of a Windows Service with a suspicious, high entropy, Service Name. To achieve this, this analytic also leverages the `ut_shannon` function from the URL ToolBox Splunk application. Red teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Service Control Manager to create and start a remote Windows Service and obtain remote code execution. To achieve this goal, some tools like Metasploit, Cobalt Strike and Impacket, typically create a Windows Service with a random service name on the victim host. This hunting analytic may help defenders identify Windows Services installed as part of a lateral movement attack. The entropy threshold `ut_shannon > 3` should be customized by users. The Service_File_Name field can be used to determine if the Windows Service has malicious intent or not. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Randomly Generated Windows Service Name -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -25865,673 +34221,6 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 | lookup ut_shannon_lookup word as Service_Name | where ut_shannon > 3 | table EventCode ComputerName Service_Name ut_shannon Service_Start_Type Service_Type Service_File_Name | `randomly_generated_windows_service_name_filter` -[ESCU - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytics identifies a big number of instance of ransomware notes (filetype e.g .txt, .html, .hta) file creation to the infected machine. This behavior is a good sensor if the ransomware note filename is quite new for security industry or the ransomware note filename is not in your ransomware lookup table list for monitoring. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Obfuscation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytics identifies a big number of instance of ransomware notes (filetype e.g .txt, .html, .hta) file creation to the infected machine. This behavior is a good sensor if the ransomware note filename is quite new for security industry or the ransomware note filename is not in your ransomware lookup table list for monitoring. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-12 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-12 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Clop Ransomware", "DarkSide Ransomware", "BlackMatter Ransomware"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A high frequency file creation of $file_name$ in different file path in host $Computer$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 81}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 81}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware", "DarkSide Ransomware", "BlackMatter Ransomware"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Impact"}], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Obfuscation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytics identifies a big number of instance of ransomware notes (filetype e.g .txt, .html, .hta) file creation to the infected machine. This behavior is a good sensor if the ransomware note filename is quite new for security industry or the ransomware note filename is not in your ransomware lookup table list for monitoring. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Ransomware Notes bulk creation -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `sysmon` EventCode=11 file_name IN ("*\.txt","*\.html","*\.hta") |bin _time span=10s | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(TargetFilename) as unique_readme_path_count values(TargetFilename) as list_of_readme_path by Computer Image file_name | where unique_readme_path_count >= 15 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ransomware_notes_bulk_creation_filter` - -[ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 performing checks to identify anti-virus products installed on the endpoint. This technique is commonly found in malware and APT events where the adversary will map all running security applications or services. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1592"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 performing checks to identify anti-virus products installed on the endpoint. This technique is commonly found in malware and APT events where the adversary will map all running security applications or services. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -action.escu.known_false_positives = network administrator may used this command for checking purposes -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-10 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-10 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware", "Malicious PowerShell"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A suspicious powershell script contains AV recon command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 56}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Reconnaissance"}], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1592"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 performing checks to identify anti-virus products installed on the endpoint. This technique is commonly found in malware and APT events where the adversary will map all running security applications or services. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = "*SELECT*" OR Message = "*WMIC*") AND (Message = "*AntiVirusProduct*" OR Message = "*AntiSpywareProduct*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi_filter` - -[ESCU - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell via EventCode 4104, where WMI is performing an event query looking for running processes or running services. This technique is commonly found where the adversary will identify services and system information on the compromised machine. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1592"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell via EventCode 4104, where WMI is performing an event query looking for running processes or running services. This technique is commonly found where the adversary will identify services and system information on the compromised machine. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -action.escu.known_false_positives = network administrator may used this command for checking purposes -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-10 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-10 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A suspicious powershell script contains host recon command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 60}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 60}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Reconnaissance"}], "impact": 75, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1592"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell via EventCode 4104, where WMI is performing an event query looking for running processes or running services. This technique is commonly found where the adversary will identify services and system information on the compromised machine. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Recon Using WMI Class -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message= "*SELECT*" OR Message= "*Get-WmiObject*") AND (Message= "*Win32_Bios*" OR Message= "*Win32_OperatingSystem*" OR Message= "*Win32_Processor*" OR Message= "*Win32_ComputerSystem*" OR Message= "*Win32_ComputerSystemProduct*" OR Message= "*Win32_ShadowCopy*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `recon_using_wmi_class_filter` - -[ESCU - Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search is to detect a suspicious commandline designed to delete files or directory recursive using batch command. This technique was seen in ransomware (reddot) where it it tries to delete the files in recycle bin to impaire user from recovering deleted files. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070.004", "T1070"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious commandline designed to delete files or directory recursive using batch command. This technique was seen in ransomware (reddot) where it it tries to delete the files in recycle bin to impaire user from recovering deleted files. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = network operator may use this batch command to delete recursively a directory or files within directory -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-22 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-22 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070.004", "T1070"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious commandline designed to delete files or directory recursive using batch command. This technique was seen in ransomware (reddot) where it it tries to delete the files in recycle bin to impaire user from recovering deleted files. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` Processes.process=*/c* Processes.process=* rd * Processes.process="*/s*" Processes.process="*/q*" by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.dest |`drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd_filter` - -[ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The search looks for reg.exe modifying registry keys that define Windows services and their configurations. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.011", "T1574"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The search looks for reg.exe modifying registry keys that define Windows services and their configurations. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. -action.escu.known_false_positives = It is unusual for a service to be created or modified by directly manipulating the registry. However, there may be legitimate instances of this behavior. It is important to validate and investigate, as appropriate. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-11-26 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-26 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Service Abuse", "Windows Persistence Techniques"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A reg.exe process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 45}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 45}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Service Abuse", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Persistence"}, "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "impact": 75, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.011", "T1574"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The search looks for reg.exe modifying registry keys that define Windows services and their configurations. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name values(Processes.user) as user FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=reg.exe Processes.process=*reg* Processes.process=*add* Processes.process=*Services* by Processes.process_id Processes.dest Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys_filter` - -[ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search looks for command-line arguments used to hide a file or directory using the reg add command. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1564.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search looks for command-line arguments used to hide a file or directory using the reg add command. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -action.escu.known_false_positives = None at the moment -action.escu.creation_date = 2019-02-27 -action.escu.modification_date = 2019-02-27 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows Persistence Techniques"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1564.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search looks for command-line arguments used to hide a file or directory using the reg add command. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = reg.exe Processes.process="*add*" Processes.process="*Hidden*" Processes.process="*REG_DWORD*" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| regex process = "(/d\s+2)" | `reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys_filter` - -[ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to launch an application or service at system startup. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.001", "T1547"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to launch an application or service at system startup. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. -action.escu.known_false_positives = There are many legitimate applications that must execute on system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-26 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-26 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Ransomware", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "IcedID", "Remcos"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to persistence in host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 76}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 76}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Ransomware", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "IcedID", "Remcos"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 95, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Persistence"}, "Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.001", "T1547"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to launch an application or service at system startup. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Registry Keys Used For Persistence -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce OR Registry.registry_path=*\\currentversion\\run* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\currentVersion\\Windows\\Appinit_Dlls* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Shell* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Notify* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Userinit* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\VmApplet* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\currentversion\\policies\\explorer\\run* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\currentversion\\runservices* OR Registry.registry_path=HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Netsh\\* OR (Registry.registry_path="*Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options*" AND Registry.registry_key_name=Debugger) OR (Registry.registry_path="*\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa" AND Registry.registry_key_name="Security Packages") OR (Registry.registry_path="*\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\OSConfig" AND Registry.registry_key_name="Security Packages") OR (Registry.registry_path="*\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\SilentProcessExit\\*") OR (Registry.registry_path="*currentVersion\\Windows" AND Registry.registry_key_name="Load") OR (Registry.registry_path="*\\CurrentVersion" AND Registry.registry_key_name="Svchost") OR (Registry.registry_path="*\\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager"AND Registry.registry_key_name="BootExecute") OR (Registry.registry_path="*\\Software\\Run" AND Registry.registry_key_name="auto_update")) by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter` - -[ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to elevate privileges. The registry keys under "Image File Execution Options" are used to intercept calls to an executable and can be used to attach malicious binaries to benign system binaries. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.012", "T1546"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to elevate privileges. The registry keys under "Image File Execution Options" are used to intercept calls to an executable and can be used to attach malicious binaries to benign system binaries. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. -action.escu.known_false_positives = There are many legitimate applications that must execute upon system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-26 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-26 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Privilege Escalation", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to privilege escalation in host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 76}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 76}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 95, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Persistence"}, "Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.012", "T1546"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to elevate privileges. The registry keys under "Image File Execution Options" are used to intercept calls to an executable and can be used to attach malicious binaries to benign system binaries. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path="*Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options*") AND (Registry.registry_value_name=GlobalFlag OR Registry.registry_value_name=Debugger) by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation_filter` - -[ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for registry activity associated with application compatibility shims, which can be leveraged by attackers for various nefarious purposes. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.011", "T1546"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for registry activity associated with application compatibility shims, which can be leveraged by attackers for various nefarious purposes. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must populate the Change_Analysis data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection and response product, such as Carbon Black or other endpoint data sources such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. -action.escu.known_false_positives = There are many legitimate applications that leverage shim databases for compatibility purposes for legacy applications -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-01-28 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-01-28 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows Persistence Techniques"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to shim modication in host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 56}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Privilege Escalation"}, "Persistence"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.011", "T1546"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for registry activity associated with application compatibility shims, which can be leveraged by attackers for various nefarious purposes. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*CurrentVersion\\AppCompatFlags\\Custom* OR Registry.registry_path=*CurrentVersion\\AppCompatFlags\\InstalledSDB* by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases_filter` - -[ESCU - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic is to detect a loading of dll using regsvr32 application with silent parameter and dllinstall execution. This technique was seen in several RAT malware similar to remcos, njrat and adversaries to load their malicious DLL on the compromised machine. This TTP may executed by normal 3rd party application so it is better to pivot by the parent process, parent command-line and command-line of the file that execute this regsvr32. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.010"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to detect a loading of dll using regsvr32 application with silent parameter and dllinstall execution. This technique was seen in several RAT malware similar to remcos, njrat and adversaries to load their malicious DLL on the compromised machine. This TTP may executed by normal 3rd party application so it is better to pivot by the parent process, parent command-line and command-line of the file that execute this regsvr32. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Other third part application may used this parameter but not so common in base windows environment. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-04 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-04 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", "Remcos", "Hermetic Wiper"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a DLL using the silent and dllinstall parameter. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 36}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 36}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", "Remcos", "Hermetic Wiper"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.010"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to detect a loading of dll using regsvr32 application with silent parameter and dllinstall execution. This technique was seen in several RAT malware similar to remcos, njrat and adversaries to load their malicious DLL on the compromised machine. This TTP may executed by normal 3rd party application so it is better to pivot by the parent process, parent command-line and command-line of the file that execute this regsvr32. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` AND Processes.process="*/i*" by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,"(?i)[\-|\/][Ss]{1}") | `regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading_filter` - -[ESCU - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies Regsvr32.exe utilizing the silent switch to load DLLs. This technique has most recently been seen in IcedID campaigns to load its initial dll that will download the 2nd stage loader that will download and decrypt the config payload. The switch type may be either a hyphen `-` or forward slash `/`. This behavior is typically found with `-s`, and it is possible there are more switch types that may be used. \ During triage, review parallel processes and capture any artifacts that may have landed on disk. Isolate and contain the endpoint as necessary. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.010"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies Regsvr32.exe utilizing the silent switch to load DLLs. This technique has most recently been seen in IcedID campaigns to load its initial dll that will download the 2nd stage loader that will download and decrypt the config payload. The switch type may be either a hyphen `-` or forward slash `/`. This behavior is typically found with `-s`, and it is possible there are more switch types that may be used. \ During triage, review parallel processes and capture any artifacts that may have landed on disk. Isolate and contain the endpoint as necessary. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = minimal. but network operator can use this application to load dll. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-27 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-27 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["IcedID", "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", "Remcos"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a DLL using the silent parameter. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 56}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID", "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", "Remcos"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.010"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies Regsvr32.exe utilizing the silent switch to load DLLs. This technique has most recently been seen in IcedID campaigns to load its initial dll that will download the 2nd stage loader that will download and decrypt the config payload. The switch type may be either a hyphen `-` or forward slash `/`. This behavior is typically found with `-s`, and it is possible there are more switch types that may be used. \ During triage, review parallel processes and capture any artifacts that may have landed on disk. Isolate and contain the endpoint as necessary. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,"(?i)[\-|\/][Ss]{1}") | `regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline_filter` - -[ESCU - Remcos RAT File Creation in Remcos Folder - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search is to detect file creation in remcos folder in appdata which is the keylog and clipboard logs that will be send to its c2 server. This is really a good TTP indicator that there is a remcos rat in the system that do keylogging, clipboard grabbing and audio recording. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1113"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect file creation in remcos folder in appdata which is the keylog and clipboard logs that will be send to its c2 server. This is really a good TTP indicator that there is a remcos rat in the system that do keylogging, clipboard grabbing and audio recording. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-21 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-21 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remcos RAT File Creation in Remcos Folder - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Remcos"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = file $file_name$ created in $file_path$ of $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 100}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Remcos RAT File Creation in Remcos Folder - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1113"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect file creation in remcos folder in appdata which is the keylog and clipboard logs that will be send to its c2 server. This is really a good TTP indicator that there is a remcos rat in the system that do keylogging, clipboard grabbing and audio recording. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Remcos RAT File Creation in Remcos Folder -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = |tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN ("*.dat") Filesystem.file_path = "*\\remcos\\*" by _time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remcos_rat_file_creation_in_remcos_folder_filter` - -[ESCU - Remcos client registry install entry - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search detects registry key license at host where Remcos RAT agent is installed. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search detects registry key license at host where Remcos RAT agent is installed. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-26 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-26 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remcos client registry install entry - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Remcos"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A registry entry $registry_path$ with registry keyname $registry_key_name$ related to Remcos RAT in host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 90}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Remcos client registry install entry - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search detects registry key license at host where Remcos RAT agent is installed. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Remcos client registry install entry -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_key_name=*\\Software\\Remcos*) by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data |`remcos_client_registry_install_entry_filter` - -[ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for RDP application network traffic and filters any source/destination pair generating more than twice the standard deviation of the average traffic. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 9", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Traffic"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for RDP application network traffic and filters any source/destination pair generating more than twice the standard deviation of the average traffic. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must ensure that your network traffic data is populating the Network_Traffic data model. -action.escu.known_false_positives = RDP gateways may have unusually high amounts of traffic from all other hosts' RDP applications in the network. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 9", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest', 'src'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for RDP application network traffic and filters any source/destination pair generating more than twice the standard deviation of the average traffic. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.app=rdp by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | eventstats stdev(count) AS stdev avg(count) AS avg p50(count) AS p50 | where count>(avg + stdev*2) | rename All_Traffic.src AS src All_Traffic.dest AS dest | table firstTime lastTime src dest count avg p50 stdev | `remote_desktop_network_bruteforce_filter` - -[ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for network traffic on TCP/3389, the default port used by remote desktop. While remote desktop traffic is not uncommon on a network, it is usually associated with known hosts. This search will ignore common RDP sources and common RDP destinations so you can focus on the uncommon uses of remote desktop on your network. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 9", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Traffic"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for network traffic on TCP/3389, the default port used by remote desktop. While remote desktop traffic is not uncommon on a network, it is usually associated with known hosts. This search will ignore common RDP sources and common RDP destinations so you can focus on the uncommon uses of remote desktop on your network. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to identify systems that commonly originate remote desktop traffic and that commonly receive remote desktop traffic. You can use the included support search "Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic" to identify systems that originate the traffic and the search "Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic" to identify systems that receive a lot of remote desktop traffic. After identifying these systems, you will need to add the "common_rdp_source" or "common_rdp_destination" category to that system depending on the usage, using the Enterprise Security Assets and Identities framework. This can be done by adding an entry in the assets.csv file located in SA-IdentityManagement/lookups. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Remote Desktop may be used legitimately by users on the network. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-07 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-07 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 9", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest', 'src'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for network traffic on TCP/3389, the default port used by remote desktop. While remote desktop traffic is not uncommon on a network, it is usually associated with known hosts. This search will ignore common RDP sources and common RDP destinations so you can focus on the uncommon uses of remote desktop on your network. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Remote Desktop Network Traffic -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=3389 AND All_Traffic.dest_category!=common_rdp_destination AND All_Traffic.src_category!=common_rdp_source by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_desktop_network_traffic_filter` - [ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -26549,19 +34238,18 @@ action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Hidden Cobra Malware", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Hidden Cobra Malware", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 9", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Hidden Cobra Malware", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 9", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for the remote desktop process mstsc.exe running on systems upon which it doesn't typically run. This is accomplished by filtering out all systems that are noted in the `common_rdp_source category` in the Assets and Identity framework. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Remote Desktop Process Running On System -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -26573,3080 +34261,6 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=*mstsc.exe AND Processes.dest_category!=common_rdp_source by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `remote_desktop_process_running_on_system_filter` -[ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the DCOM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of ShellExecute and ExecuteShellCommand. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse DCOM and `powershell.exe` for lateral movement and remote code execution. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.003"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the DCOM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of ShellExecute and ExecuteShellCommand. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse DCOM and `powershell.exe` for lateral movement and remote code execution. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage DCOM to start a process on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-15 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-15 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A process was started on a remote endpoint from $dest by abusing DCOM using PowerShell.exe -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the DCOM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of ShellExecute and ExecuteShellCommand. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse DCOM and `powershell.exe` for lateral movement and remote code execution. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process="*Document.ActiveView.ExecuteShellCommand*" OR Processes.process="*Document.Application.ShellExecute*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_filter` - -[ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell Script Block - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of PowerShell with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the DCOM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of ShellExecute and ExecuteShellCommand. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse DCOM for lateral movement and remote code execution. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.003"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of PowerShell with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the DCOM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of ShellExecute and ExecuteShellCommand. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse DCOM for lateral movement and remote code execution. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup instructions can be found https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage DCOM to start a process on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-15 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-15 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell Script Block - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A process was started on a remote endpoint from $ComputerName by abusing WMI using PowerShell.exe -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell Script Block - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.003"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of PowerShell with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the DCOM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of ShellExecute and ExecuteShellCommand. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse DCOM for lateral movement and remote code execution. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell Script Block -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message="*Document.Application.ShellExecute*" OR Message="*Document.ActiveView.ExecuteShellCommand*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_script_block_filter` - -[ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic identifies wmic.exe being launched with parameters to spawn a process on a remote system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WMI and this binary for lateral movement and remote code execution. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic identifies wmic.exe being launched with parameters to spawn a process on a remote system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WMI and this binary for lateral movement and remote code execution. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = The wmic.exe utility is a benign Windows application. It may be used legitimately by Administrators with these parameters for remote system administration, but it's relatively uncommon. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-12 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-12 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware", "Suspicious WMI Use", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A wmic.exe process $process$ contain process spawn commandline $process$ in host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 49}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Suspicious WMI Use", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic identifies wmic.exe being launched with parameters to spawn a process on a remote system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WMI and this binary for lateral movement and remote code execution. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Remote Process Instantiation via WMI -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` (Processes.process="*/node:*" AND Processes.process="*process*" AND Processes.process="*call*" AND Processes.process="*create*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_filter` - -[ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` leveraging the `Invoke-WmiMethod` commandlet complemented with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing WMI. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WMI and `powershell.exe` for lateral movement and remote code execution. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` leveraging the `Invoke-WmiMethod` commandlet complemented with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing WMI. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WMI and `powershell.exe` for lateral movement and remote code execution. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage WWMI and powershell.exe to start a process on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-15 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-15 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A process was started on a remote endpoint from $dest by abusing WMI using PowerShell.exe -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` leveraging the `Invoke-WmiMethod` commandlet complemented with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing WMI. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WMI and `powershell.exe` for lateral movement and remote code execution. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process="*Invoke-WmiMethod*" AND Processes.process="*-CN*" AND Processes.process="*-Class Win32_Process*" AND Processes.process="*-Name create*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_filter` - -[ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell Script Block - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Invoke-WmiMethod` commandlet with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing WMI. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WMI and this commandlet for lateral movement and remote code execution. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Invoke-WmiMethod` commandlet with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing WMI. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WMI and this commandlet for lateral movement and remote code execution. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup instructions can be found https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage WWMI and powershell.exe to start a process on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-15 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-15 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell Script Block - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A process was started on a remote endpoint from $ComputerName by abusing WMI using PowerShell.exe -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell Script Block - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Invoke-WmiMethod` commandlet with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing WMI. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WMI and this commandlet for lateral movement and remote code execution. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell Script Block -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message="*Invoke-WmiMethod*" AND Message="*-CN*" AND Message="*-Class Win32_Process*" AND Message="*-Name create*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_script_block_filter` - -[ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the WinRM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of the `Invoke-Command` commandlet. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WinRM and `powershell.exe` for lateral movement and remote code execution. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.006"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the WinRM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of the `Invoke-Command` commandlet. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WinRM and `powershell.exe` for lateral movement and remote code execution. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage WinRM and `Invoke-Command` to start a process on remote systems for system administration or automation use cases. However, this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-16 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-16 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A process was started on a remote endpoint from $dest by abusing WinRM using PowerShell.exe -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 45}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.006"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the WinRM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of the `Invoke-Command` commandlet. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WinRM and `powershell.exe` for lateral movement and remote code execution. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process="*Invoke-Command*" AND Processes.process="*-ComputerName*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_filter` - -[ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell Script Block - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of PowerShell with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the WinRM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of the `Invoke-Command` commandlet. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WinRM for lateral movement and remote code execution. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.006"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of PowerShell with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the WinRM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of the `Invoke-Command` commandlet. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WinRM for lateral movement and remote code execution. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup instructions can be found https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage WinRM and `Invoke-Command` to start a process on remote systems for system administration or automation use cases. This activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. In certain environments, tuning may not be possible. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-16 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-16 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell Script Block - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A process was started on a remote endpoint from $ComputerName by abusing WinRM using PowerShell.exe -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 45}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell Script Block - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.006"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of PowerShell with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the WinRM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of the `Invoke-Command` commandlet. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WinRM for lateral movement and remote code execution. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell Script Block -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message="*Invoke-Command*" AND Message="*-ComputerName*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_script_block_filter` - -[ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and Winrs - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for the execution of `winrs.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the WinRM protocol and this binary for lateral movement and remote code execution. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.006"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `winrs.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the WinRM protocol and this binary for lateral movement and remote code execution. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage WinRM and WinRs to start a process on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-11 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-11 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and Winrs - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A process was started on a remote endpoint from $dest -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 54}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and Winrs - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.006"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `winrs.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the WinRM protocol and this binary for lateral movement and remote code execution. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and Winrs -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=winrs.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=winrs.exe) (Processes.process="*-r:*" OR Processes.process="*-remote:*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_winrs_filter` - -[ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search monitors for remote modifications to registry keys. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search monitors for remote modifications to registry keys. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must populate the `Endpoint` data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. Deprecated because I don't think the logic is right. -action.escu.known_false_positives = This technique may be legitimately used by administrators to modify remote registries, so it's important to filter these events out. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-03-02 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-03-02 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows Persistence Techniques"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search monitors for remote modifications to registry keys. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Remote Registry Key modifications -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path="\\\\*" by Registry.dest , Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `remote_registry_key_modifications_filter` - -[ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator being used to query Active Directory for domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `[Adsisearcher]` to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator being used to query Active Directory for domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `[Adsisearcher]` to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use Adsisearcher for troubleshooting. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-01 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-01 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator being used to query Active Directory for domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `[Adsisearcher]` to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Remote System Discovery with Adsisearcher -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = "*[adsisearcher]*" AND Message = "*objectclass=computer*" AND Message = "*findAll()*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `remote_system_discovery_with_adsisearcher_filter` - -[ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Dsquery - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for the execution of `dsquery.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The `computer` argument returns a list of all computers registered in the domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike engage in remote system discovery for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `dsquery.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The `computer` argument returns a list of all computers registered in the domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike engage in remote system discovery for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-31 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-31 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Dsquery - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Dsquery - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `dsquery.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The `computer` argument returns a list of all computers registered in the domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike engage in remote system discovery for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Remote System Discovery with Dsquery -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="dsquery.exe") (Processes.process="*computer*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_system_discovery_with_dsquery_filter` - -[ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Net - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The argument `domain computers /domain` returns a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The argument `domain computers /domain` returns a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-30 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-30 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Net - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Net - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The argument `domain computers /domain` returns a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Remote System Discovery with Net -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="net.exe" OR Processes.process_name="net1.exe") (Processes.process="*domain computers*" AND Processes.process=*/do*) OR (Processes.process="*view*" AND Processes.process=*/do*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_system_discovery_with_net_filter` - -[ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Wmic - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The arguments utilized in this command return a list of all the systems registered in the domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI and wmic.exe to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The arguments utilized in this command return a list of all the systems registered in the domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI and wmic.exe to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-01 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-01 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Wmic - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Wmic - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The arguments utilized in this command return a list of all the systems registered in the domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI and wmic.exe to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Remote System Discovery with Wmic -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="wmic.exe") (Processes.process=*/NAMESPACE:\\\\root\\directory\\ldap* AND Processes.process=*ds_computer* AND Processes.process="*GET ds_samaccountname*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_system_discovery_with_wmic_filter` - -[ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies usage of `wmic.exe` spawning a local or remote process, identified by the `node` switch. During triage, review parallel processes for additional commands executed. Look for any file modifications before and after `wmic.exe` execution. In addition, identify the remote endpoint and confirm execution or file modifications. Contain and isolate the endpoint as needed. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies usage of `wmic.exe` spawning a local or remote process, identified by the `node` switch. During triage, review parallel processes for additional commands executed. Look for any file modifications before and after `wmic.exe` execution. In addition, identify the remote endpoint and confirm execution or file modifications. Contain and isolate the endpoint as needed. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. Deprecated because duplicate of Remote Process Instantiation via WMI. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may use this legitimately to gather info from remote systems. Filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2018-12-03 -action.escu.modification_date = 2018-12-03 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious WMI Use"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A wmic.exe process $process$ contain node commandline $process$ in host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 36}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 36}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies usage of `wmic.exe` spawning a local or remote process, identified by the `node` switch. During triage, review parallel processes for additional commands executed. Look for any file modifications before and after `wmic.exe` execution. In addition, identify the remote endpoint and confirm execution or file modifications. Contain and isolate the endpoint as needed. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Remote WMI Command Attempt -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` Processes.process=*node* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_wmi_command_attempt_filter` - -[ESCU - Resize ShadowStorage volume - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytics identifies the resizing of shadowstorage by ransomware malware to avoid the shadow volumes being made again. this technique is an alternative by ransomware attacker than deleting the shadowstorage which is known alert in defensive team. one example of ransomware that use this technique is CLOP ransomware where it drops a .bat file that will resize the shadowstorage to minimum size as much as possible -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytics identifies the resizing of shadowstorage by ransomware malware to avoid the shadow volumes being made again. this technique is an alternative by ransomware attacker than deleting the shadowstorage which is known alert in defensive team. one example of ransomware that use this technique is CLOP ransomware where it drops a .bat file that will resize the shadowstorage to minimum size as much as possible -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -action.escu.known_false_positives = network admin can resize the shadowstorage for valid purposes. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-12 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-12 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Resize ShadowStorage volume - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Clop Ransomware"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A process $parent_process_name$ attempt to resize shadow copy with commandline $process$ in host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 72}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Resize ShadowStorage volume - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Impact"}], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytics identifies the resizing of shadowstorage by ransomware malware to avoid the shadow volumes being made again. this technique is an alternative by ransomware attacker than deleting the shadowstorage which is known alert in defensive team. one example of ransomware that use this technique is CLOP ransomware where it drops a .bat file that will resize the shadowstorage to minimum size as much as possible -action.notable.param.rule_title = Resize ShadowStorage volume -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as cmdline values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process values(Processes.process_name) as process_name min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name = "cmd.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "powershell.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "powershell_ise.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "wmic.exe" Processes.process_name = "vssadmin.exe" Processes.process="*resize*" Processes.process="*shadowstorage*" Processes.process="*/maxsize*" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `resize_shadowstorage_volume_filter` - -[ESCU - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic identifies suspicious commandline parameter that are commonly used by REVIL ransomware to encrypts the compromise machine. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic identifies suspicious commandline parameter that are commonly used by REVIL ransomware to encrypts the compromise machine. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -action.escu.known_false_positives = third party tool may have same command line parameters as revil ransomware. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-02 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-02 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ related to revil ransomware in host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 54}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 54}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic identifies suspicious commandline parameter that are commonly used by REVIL ransomware to encrypts the compromise machine. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Revil Common Exec Parameter -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = "* -nolan *" OR Processes.process = "* -nolocal *" OR Processes.process = "* -fast *" OR Processes.process = "* -full *" by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `revil_common_exec_parameter_filter` - -[ESCU - Revil Registry Entry - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic identifies suspicious modification in registry entry to keep some malware data during its infection. This technique seen in several apt implant, malware and ransomware like REVIL where it keep some information like the random generated file extension it uses for all the encrypted files and ransomware notes file name in the compromised host. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic identifies suspicious modification in registry entry to keep some malware data during its infection. This technique seen in several apt implant, malware and ransomware like REVIL where it keep some information like the random generated file extension it uses for all the encrypted files and ransomware notes file name in the compromised host. -action.escu.how_to_implement = to successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Image, TargetObject registry key, registry Details from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-26 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-26 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Revil Registry Entry - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A registry entry $registry_path$ with registry value $registry_value_name$ and $registry_value_name$ related to revil ransomware in host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 60}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 60}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Revil Registry Entry - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic identifies suspicious modification in registry entry to keep some malware data during its infection. This technique seen in several apt implant, malware and ransomware like REVIL where it keep some information like the random generated file extension it uses for all the encrypted files and ransomware notes file name in the compromised host. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Revil Registry Entry -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path="*\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\Facebook_Assistant\\*" OR Registry.registry_path="*\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\BlackLivesMatter*") by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `revil_registry_entry_filter` - -[ESCU - Rubeus Command Line Parameters - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = Rubeus is a C# toolset for raw Kerberos interaction and abuses. It is heavily adapted from Benjamin Delpys Kekeo project and Vincent LE TOUXs MakeMeEnterpriseAdmin project. This analytic looks for the use of Rubeus command line arguments utilized in common Kerberos attacks like exporting and importing tickets, forging silver and golden tickets, requesting a TGT or TGS, kerberoasting, password spraying, etc. Red teams and adversaries alike use Rubeus for Kerberos attacks within Active Directory networks. Defenders should be aware that adversaries may customize the source code of Rubeus and modify the command line parameters. This would effectively bypass this analytic. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1550", "T1550.003", "T1558", "T1558.003", "T1558.004"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = Rubeus is a C# toolset for raw Kerberos interaction and abuses. It is heavily adapted from Benjamin Delpys Kekeo project and Vincent LE TOUXs MakeMeEnterpriseAdmin project. This analytic looks for the use of Rubeus command line arguments utilized in common Kerberos attacks like exporting and importing tickets, forging silver and golden tickets, requesting a TGT or TGS, kerberoasting, password spraying, etc. Red teams and adversaries alike use Rubeus for Kerberos attacks within Active Directory networks. Defenders should be aware that adversaries may customize the source code of Rubeus and modify the command line parameters. This would effectively bypass this analytic. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, legitimate applications may use the same command line parameters as Rubeus. Filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-01 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-01 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Rubeus Command Line Parameters - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Rubeus command line parameters were used on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 36}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 36}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Rubeus Command Line Parameters - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1550", "T1550.003", "T1558", "T1558.003", "T1558.004"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = Rubeus is a C# toolset for raw Kerberos interaction and abuses. It is heavily adapted from Benjamin Delpys Kekeo project and Vincent LE TOUXs MakeMeEnterpriseAdmin project. This analytic looks for the use of Rubeus command line arguments utilized in common Kerberos attacks like exporting and importing tickets, forging silver and golden tickets, requesting a TGT or TGS, kerberoasting, password spraying, etc. Red teams and adversaries alike use Rubeus for Kerberos attacks within Active Directory networks. Defenders should be aware that adversaries may customize the source code of Rubeus and modify the command line parameters. This would effectively bypass this analytic. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Rubeus Command Line Parameters -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process = "*ptt /ticket*" OR Processes.process = "* monitor*" OR Processes.process ="* asktgt* /user:*" OR Processes.process ="* asktgs* /service:*" OR Processes.process ="* golden* /user:*" OR Processes.process ="* silver* /service:*" OR Processes.process ="* kerberoast*" OR Processes.process ="* asreproast*" OR Processes.process = "* renew* /ticket:*" OR Processes.process = "* brute* /password:*" OR Processes.process = "* brute* /passwords:*" OR Processes.process ="* harvest*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rubeus_command_line_parameters_filter` - -[ESCU - Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic looks for a process accessing the winlogon.exe system process. The Splunk Threat Research team identified this behavior when using the Rubeus tool to monitor for and export kerberos tickets from memory. Before being able to export tickets. Rubeus will try to escalate privileges to SYSTEM by obtaining a handle to winlogon.exe before trying to monitor for kerberos tickets. Exporting tickets from memory is typically the first step for pass the ticket attacks. Red teams and adversaries alike may use the pass the ticket technique using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Defenders should be aware that adversaries may customize the source code of Rubeus to potentially bypass this analytic. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1550", "T1550.003"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic looks for a process accessing the winlogon.exe system process. The Splunk Threat Research team identified this behavior when using the Rubeus tool to monitor for and export kerberos tickets from memory. Before being able to export tickets. Rubeus will try to escalate privileges to SYSTEM by obtaining a handle to winlogon.exe before trying to monitor for kerberos tickets. Exporting tickets from memory is typically the first step for pass the ticket attacks. Red teams and adversaries alike may use the pass the ticket technique using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Defenders should be aware that adversaries may customize the source code of Rubeus to potentially bypass this analytic. -action.escu.how_to_implement = This search needs Sysmon Logs and a sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 10. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may obtain a handle for winlogon.exe. Filter as needed -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-07 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-07 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Winlogon.exe was accessed by $SourceImage$ on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 36}, {"threat_object_field": "TargetImage", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1550", "T1550.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "TargetImage", "role": ["Target"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic looks for a process accessing the winlogon.exe system process. The Splunk Threat Research team identified this behavior when using the Rubeus tool to monitor for and export kerberos tickets from memory. Before being able to export tickets. Rubeus will try to escalate privileges to SYSTEM by obtaining a handle to winlogon.exe before trying to monitor for kerberos tickets. Exporting tickets from memory is typically the first step for pass the ticket attacks. Red teams and adversaries alike may use the pass the ticket technique using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Defenders should be aware that adversaries may customize the source code of Rubeus to potentially bypass this analytic. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=C:\\Windows\\system32\\winlogon.exe (GrantedAccess=0x1f3fff) (SourceImage!=C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe AND SourceImage!=C:\\Windows\\system32\\lsass.exe AND SourceImage!=C:\\Windows\\system32\\LogonUI.exe AND SourceImage!=C:\\Windows\\system32\\smss.exe AND SourceImage!=C:\\Windows\\system32\\wbem\\wmiprvse.exe) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, SourceImage, SourceProcessId, TargetImage, TargetProcessId, EventCode, GrantedAccess | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rubeus_kerberos_ticket_exports_through_winlogon_access_filter` - -[ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading an export function by ordinal value. Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly, may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Utilizing ordinal values makes it a bit more complicated for analysts to understand the behavior until the DLL is reviewed. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading an export function by ordinal value. Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly, may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Utilizing ordinal values makes it a bit more complicated for analysts to understand the behavior until the DLL is reviewed. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are possible with native utilities and third party applications. Filtering may be needed based on command-line, or add world writeable paths to restrict query. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-08 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-08 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Unusual Processes", "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A rundll32 process $process_name$ with ordinal parameter like this process commandline $process$ on host $dest$. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 49}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Unusual Processes", "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading an export function by ordinal value. Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly, may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Utilizing ordinal values makes it a bit more complicated for analysts to understand the behavior until the DLL is reviewed. -action.notable.param.rule_title = RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,"rundll32.+\#\d+") | `rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal_filter` - -[ESCU - Runas Execution in CommandLine - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic look for a spawned runas.exe process with a administrator user option parameter. This parameter was abused by adversaries, malware author or even red teams to gain elevated privileges in target host. This is a good hunting query to figure out privilege escalation tactics that may used for different stages like lateral movement but take note that administrator may use this command in purpose so its better to see other event context before and after this analytic. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1134", "T1134.001"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic look for a spawned runas.exe process with a administrator user option parameter. This parameter was abused by adversaries, malware author or even red teams to gain elevated privileges in target host. This is a good hunting query to figure out privilege escalation tactics that may used for different stages like lateral movement but take note that administrator may use this command in purpose so its better to see other event context before and after this analytic. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated or manual execute this command that may generate false positives. filter is needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-12 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-12 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Runas Execution in CommandLine - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Privilege Escalation"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = elevated process using runas on $dest$ by $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Runas Execution in CommandLine - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1134", "T1134.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic look for a spawned runas.exe process with a administrator user option parameter. This parameter was abused by adversaries, malware author or even red teams to gain elevated privileges in target host. This is a good hunting query to figure out privilege escalation tactics that may used for different stages like lateral movement but take note that administrator may use this command in purpose so its better to see other event context before and after this analytic. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Runas Execution in CommandLine -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_runas` AND Processes.process = "*/user:*" AND Processes.process = "*admin*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `runas_execution_in_commandline_filter` - -[ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following hunting detection identifies rundll32.exe with `control_rundll` within the command-line, loading a .cpl or another file type. Developed in relation to CVE-2021-40444. Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. \ This is written to be a bit more broad by not including .cpl. \ During triage, review parallel processes to identify any further suspicious behavior. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following hunting detection identifies rundll32.exe with `control_rundll` within the command-line, loading a .cpl or another file type. Developed in relation to CVE-2021-40444. Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. \ This is written to be a bit more broad by not including .cpl. \ During triage, review parallel processes to identify any further suspicious behavior. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = This is a hunting detection, meant to provide a understanding of how voluminous control_rundll is within the environment. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-08 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-08 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a suspicious file from disk. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 15}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following hunting detection identifies rundll32.exe with `control_rundll` within the command-line, loading a .cpl or another file type. Developed in relation to CVE-2021-40444. Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. \ This is written to be a bit more broad by not including .cpl. \ During triage, review parallel processes to identify any further suspicious behavior. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*Control_RunDLL* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_control_rundll_hunt_filter` - -[ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following detection identifies rundll32.exe with `control_rundll` within the command-line, loading a .cpl or another file type from windows\temp, programdata, or appdata. Developed in relation to CVE-2021-40444. Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. This is written to be a bit more broad by not including .cpl. The paths are specified, add more as needed. During triage, review parallel processes to identify any further suspicious behavior. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following detection identifies rundll32.exe with `control_rundll` within the command-line, loading a .cpl or another file type from windows\temp, programdata, or appdata. Developed in relation to CVE-2021-40444. Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. This is written to be a bit more broad by not including .cpl. The paths are specified, add more as needed. During triage, review parallel processes to identify any further suspicious behavior. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = This may be tuned, or a new one related, by adding .cpl to command-line. However, it's important to look for both. Tune/filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-08 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-08 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a suspicious file from disk. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following detection identifies rundll32.exe with `control_rundll` within the command-line, loading a .cpl or another file type from windows\temp, programdata, or appdata. Developed in relation to CVE-2021-40444. Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. This is written to be a bit more broad by not including .cpl. The paths are specified, add more as needed. During triage, review parallel processes to identify any further suspicious behavior. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*Control_RunDLL* AND Processes.process IN ("*\\appdata\\*", "*\\windows\\temp\\*", "*\\programdata\\*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory_filter` - -[ESCU - Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic identifies the suspicious Remote Thread execution of rundll32.exe process to cmd.exe process. This technique was seen in IcedID malware to execute its malicious code in normal process for defense evasion and to steal sensitive information the the compromised host. browser process. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic identifies the suspicious Remote Thread execution of rundll32.exe process to cmd.exe process. This technique was seen in IcedID malware to execute its malicious code in normal process for defense evasion and to steal sensitive information the the compromised host. browser process. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the SourceImage, TargetImage, and EventCode executions from your endpoints related to create remote thread or injecting codes. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-29 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-29 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["IcedID"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = rundl32 process $SourceImage$ create a remote thread to process $TargetImage$ in host $Computer$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"threat_object_field": "SourceImage", "threat_object_type": "process name"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "SourceImage", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "process name"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic identifies the suspicious Remote Thread execution of rundll32.exe process to cmd.exe process. This technique was seen in IcedID malware to execute its malicious code in normal process for defense evasion and to steal sensitive information the the compromised host. browser process. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `sysmon` EventCode=8 SourceImage = "*\\rundll32.exe" TargetImage = "*.exe" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by SourceImage TargetImage TargetProcessId SourceProcessId StartAddress EventCode Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process_filter` - -[ESCU - Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic identifies the suspicious Remote Thread execution of rundll32.exe process to "firefox.exe" and "chrome.exe" browser. This technique was seen in IcedID malware where it hooks the browser to parse banking information as user used the targetted browser process. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic identifies the suspicious Remote Thread execution of rundll32.exe process to "firefox.exe" and "chrome.exe" browser. This technique was seen in IcedID malware where it hooks the browser to parse banking information as user used the targetted browser process. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the SourceImage, TargetImage, and EventCode executions from your endpoints related to create remote thread or injecting codes. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-26 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-26 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["IcedID"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = rundl32 process $SourceImage$ create a remote thread to browser process $TargetImage$ in host $Computer$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 70}, {"threat_object_field": "SourceImage", "threat_object_type": "process name"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "SourceImage", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "process name"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic identifies the suspicious Remote Thread execution of rundll32.exe process to "firefox.exe" and "chrome.exe" browser. This technique was seen in IcedID malware where it hooks the browser to parse banking information as user used the targetted browser process. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `sysmon` EventCode=8 SourceImage = "*\\rundll32.exe" TargetImage IN ("*\\firefox.exe", "*\\chrome.exe", "*\\iexplore.exe","*\\microsoftedgecp.exe") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by SourceImage TargetImage TargetProcessId SourceProcessId StartAddress EventCode Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser_filter` - -[ESCU - Rundll32 DNSQuery - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe process having a http connection and do a dns query in some web domain. This technique was seen in IcedID malware where the rundll32 that execute its payload will contact amazon.com to check internet connect and to communicate to its C&C server to download config and other file component. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe process having a http connection and do a dns query in some web domain. This technique was seen in IcedID malware where the rundll32 that execute its payload will contact amazon.com to check internet connect and to communicate to its C&C server to download config and other file component. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and eventcode = 22 dnsquery executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-18 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-18 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Rundll32 DNSQuery - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["IcedID"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = rundll32 process $process_name$ having a dns query to $QueryName$ in host $Computer$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process name"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Rundll32 DNSQuery - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "process name"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe process having a http connection and do a dns query in some web domain. This technique was seen in IcedID malware where the rundll32 that execute its payload will contact amazon.com to check internet connect and to communicate to its C&C server to download config and other file component. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Rundll32 DNSQuery -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `sysmon` EventCode=22 process_name="rundll32.exe" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image QueryName QueryStatus ProcessId Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_dnsquery_filter` - -[ESCU - Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32 process that drops executable (.exe or .dll) files. this behavior seen in rundll32 process of IcedID that tries to drop copy of itself in temp folder or download executable drop it either appdata or programdata as part of its execution. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32 process that drops executable (.exe or .dll) files. this behavior seen in rundll32 process of IcedID that tries to drop copy of itself in temp folder or download executable drop it either appdata or programdata as part of its execution. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, TargetFilename, and eventcode 11 executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-26 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-26 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["IcedID"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = rundll32 process $process_name$ drops a file $TargetFilename$ in host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process name"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "process name"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32 process that drops executable (.exe or .dll) files. this behavior seen in rundll32 process of IcedID that tries to drop copy of itself in temp folder or download executable drop it either appdata or programdata as part of its execution. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `sysmon` EventCode=11 process_name="rundll32.exe" TargetFilename IN ("*.exe", "*.dll",) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image TargetFilename ProcessGuid dest user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files_filter` - -[ESCU - Rundll32 Shimcache Flush - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious rundll32 commandline to clear shim cache. This technique is a anti-forensic technique to clear the cache taht are one important artifacts in terms of digital forensic during attacks or incident. This TTP is a good indicator that someone tries to evade some tools and clear foothold on the machine. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to detect a suspicious rundll32 commandline to clear shim cache. This technique is a anti-forensic technique to clear the cache taht are one important artifacts in terms of digital forensic during attacks or incident. This TTP is a good indicator that someone tries to evade some tools and clear foothold on the machine. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-05 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-05 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Rundll32 Shimcache Flush - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Unusual Processes"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = rundll32 process execute $process$ to clear shim cache in $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Rundll32 Shimcache Flush - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Unusual Processes"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious rundll32 commandline to clear shim cache. This technique is a anti-forensic technique to clear the cache taht are one important artifacts in terms of digital forensic during attacks or incident. This TTP is a good indicator that someone tries to evade some tools and clear foothold on the machine. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Rundll32 Shimcache Flush -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` AND Processes.process = "*apphelp.dll,ShimFlushCache*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_shimcache_flush_filter` - -[ESCU - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments and performing a network connection. It is unusual for rundll32.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments and performing a network connection. It is unusual for rundll32.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `port` node. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-13 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-13 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Cobalt Strike", "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A rundll32 process $process_name$ with no commandline argument like this process commandline $process$ in host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 70}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "processname"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Cobalt Strike", "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "processname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments and performing a network connection. It is unusual for rundll32.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` by _time span=1h Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process="(rundll32\.exe.{0,4}$)" | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port !="0" by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port| `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_guid connection_to_CNC dest_port | `rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter` - -[ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The search looks for files that contain the key word *Ryuk* under any folder in the C drive, which is consistent with Ryuk propagation. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The search looks for files that contain the key word *Ryuk* under any folder in the C drive, which is consistent with Ryuk propagation. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Filesystem data-model object. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data. -action.escu.known_false_positives = If there are files with this keywoord as file names it might trigger false possitives, please make use of our filters to tune out potential FPs. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-11-06 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-06 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ryuk Ransomware"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A creation of ryuk test file $file_path$ in host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 70}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 70}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Impact"}], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The search looks for files that contain the key word *Ryuk* under any folder in the C drive, which is consistent with Ryuk propagation. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Ryuk Test Files Detected -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem WHERE "Filesystem.file_path"=C:\\*Ryuk* BY "Filesystem.dest", "Filesystem.user", "Filesystem.file_path" | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `ryuk_test_files_detected_filter` - -[ESCU - Ryuk Wake on LAN Command - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This Splunk query identifies the use of Wake-on-LAN utilized by Ryuk ransomware. The Ryuk Ransomware uses the Wake-on-Lan feature to turn on powered off devices on a compromised network to have greater success encrypting them. This is a high fidelity indicator of Ryuk ransomware executing on an endpoint. Upon triage, isolate the endpoint. Additional file modification events will be within the users profile (\appdata\roaming) and in public directories (users\public\). Review all Scheduled Tasks on the isolated endpoint and across the fleet. Suspicious Scheduled Tasks will include a path to a unknown binary and those endpoints should be isolated until triaged. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.003"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This Splunk query identifies the use of Wake-on-LAN utilized by Ryuk ransomware. The Ryuk Ransomware uses the Wake-on-Lan feature to turn on powered off devices on a compromised network to have greater success encrypting them. This is a high fidelity indicator of Ryuk ransomware executing on an endpoint. Upon triage, isolate the endpoint. Additional file modification events will be within the users profile (\appdata\roaming) and in public directories (users\public\). Review all Scheduled Tasks on the isolated endpoint and across the fleet. Suspicious Scheduled Tasks will include a path to a unknown binary and those endpoints should be isolated until triaged. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited to no known false positives. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-01 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-01 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Ryuk Wake on LAN Command - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ryuk Ransomware"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A process $process_name$ with wake on LAN commandline $process$ in host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 63}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Ryuk Wake on LAN Command - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This Splunk query identifies the use of Wake-on-LAN utilized by Ryuk ransomware. The Ryuk Ransomware uses the Wake-on-Lan feature to turn on powered off devices on a compromised network to have greater success encrypting them. This is a high fidelity indicator of Ryuk ransomware executing on an endpoint. Upon triage, isolate the endpoint. Additional file modification events will be within the users profile (\appdata\roaming) and in public directories (users\public\). Review all Scheduled Tasks on the isolated endpoint and across the fleet. Suspicious Scheduled Tasks will include a path to a unknown binary and those endpoints should be isolated until triaged. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Ryuk Wake on LAN Command -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process="*8 LAN*" OR Processes.process="*9 REP*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ryuk_wake_on_lan_command_filter` - -[ESCU - SAM Database File Access Attempt - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies access to SAM, SYSTEM or SECURITY databases' within the file path of `windows\system32\config` using Windows Security EventCode 4663. This particular behavior is related to credential access, an attempt to either use a Shadow Copy or recent CVE-2021-36934 to access the SAM database. The Security Account Manager (SAM) is a database file in Windows XP, Windows Vista, Windows 7, 8.1 and 10 that stores users' passwords. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002", "T1003"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies access to SAM, SYSTEM or SECURITY databases' within the file path of `windows\system32\config` using Windows Security EventCode 4663. This particular behavior is related to credential access, an attempt to either use a Shadow Copy or recent CVE-2021-36934 to access the SAM database. The Security Account Manager (SAM) is a database file in Windows XP, Windows Vista, Windows 7, 8.1 and 10 that stores users' passwords. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663. For 4663, enable "Audit Object Access" in Group Policy. Then check the two boxes listed for both "Success" and "Failure." -action.escu.known_false_positives = Natively, `dllhost.exe` will access the files. Every environment will have additional native processes that do as well. Filter by process_name. As an aside, one can remove process_name entirely and add `Object_Name=*ShadowCopy*`. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-23 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-23 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - SAM Database File Access Attempt - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Credential Dumping"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = The following process $process_name$ accessed the object $Object_Name$ attempting to gain access to credentials on $dest$ by user $user$. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "Object_Name", "threat_object_type": "file"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - SAM Database File Access Attempt - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-36934"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "Object_Name", "role": ["Other"], "type": "File"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies access to SAM, SYSTEM or SECURITY databases' within the file path of `windows\system32\config` using Windows Security EventCode 4663. This particular behavior is related to credential access, an attempt to either use a Shadow Copy or recent CVE-2021-36934 to access the SAM database. The Security Account Manager (SAM) is a database file in Windows XP, Windows Vista, Windows 7, 8.1 and 10 that stores users' passwords. -action.notable.param.rule_title = SAM Database File Access Attempt -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `wineventlog_security` (EventCode=4663) process_name!=*\\dllhost.exe Object_Name IN ("*\\Windows\\System32\\config\\SAM*","*\\Windows\\System32\\config\\SYSTEM*","*\\Windows\\System32\\config\\SECURITY*") | stats values(Accesses) count by process_name Object_Name dest user | `sam_database_file_access_attempt_filter` - -[ESCU - SLUI RunAs Elevated - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies the Microsoft Software Licensing User Interface Tool, `slui.exe`, elevating access using the `-verb runas` function. This particular bypass utilizes a registry key/value. Identified by two sources, the registry keys are `HKCU\Software\Classes\exefile\shell` and `HKCU\Software\Classes\launcher.Systemsettings\Shell\open\command`. To simulate this behavior, multiple POC are available. The analytic identifies the use of `runas` by `slui.exe`. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the Microsoft Software Licensing User Interface Tool, `slui.exe`, elevating access using the `-verb runas` function. This particular bypass utilizes a registry key/value. Identified by two sources, the registry keys are `HKCU\Software\Classes\exefile\shell` and `HKCU\Software\Classes\launcher.Systemsettings\Shell\open\command`. To simulate this behavior, multiple POC are available. The analytic identifies the use of `runas` by `slui.exe`. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives should be present as this is not commonly used by legitimate applications. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-05-13 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-05-13 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - SLUI RunAs Elevated - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A slui process $process_name$ with elevated commandline $process$ in host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - SLUI RunAs Elevated - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Privilege Escalation"}], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the Microsoft Software Licensing User Interface Tool, `slui.exe`, elevating access using the `-verb runas` function. This particular bypass utilizes a registry key/value. Identified by two sources, the registry keys are `HKCU\Software\Classes\exefile\shell` and `HKCU\Software\Classes\launcher.Systemsettings\Shell\open\command`. To simulate this behavior, multiple POC are available. The analytic identifies the use of `runas` by `slui.exe`. -action.notable.param.rule_title = SLUI RunAs Elevated -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=slui.exe (Processes.process=*-verb* Processes.process=*runas*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `slui_runas_elevated_filter` - -[ESCU - SLUI Spawning a Process - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies the Microsoft Software Licensing User Interface Tool, `slui.exe`, spawning a child process. This behavior is associated with publicly known UAC bypass. `slui.exe` is commonly associated with software updates and is most often spawned by `svchost.exe`. The `slui.exe` process should not have child processes, and any processes spawning from it will be running with elevated privileges. During triage, review the child process and additional parallel processes. Identify any file modifications that may have lead to the bypass. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the Microsoft Software Licensing User Interface Tool, `slui.exe`, spawning a child process. This behavior is associated with publicly known UAC bypass. `slui.exe` is commonly associated with software updates and is most often spawned by `svchost.exe`. The `slui.exe` process should not have child processes, and any processes spawning from it will be running with elevated privileges. During triage, review the child process and additional parallel processes. Identify any file modifications that may have lead to the bypass. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Certain applications may spawn from `slui.exe` that are legitimate. Filtering will be needed to ensure proper monitoring. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-05-13 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-05-13 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - SLUI Spawning a Process - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A slui process $parent_process_name$ spawning child process $process_name$ in host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 63}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - SLUI Spawning a Process - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Privilege Escalation"}], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the Microsoft Software Licensing User Interface Tool, `slui.exe`, spawning a child process. This behavior is associated with publicly known UAC bypass. `slui.exe` is commonly associated with software updates and is most often spawned by `svchost.exe`. The `slui.exe` process should not have child processes, and any processes spawning from it will be running with elevated privileges. During triage, review the child process and additional parallel processes. Identify any file modifications that may have lead to the bypass. -action.notable.param.rule_title = SLUI Spawning a Process -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=slui.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `slui_spawning_a_process_filter` - -[ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for spikes in the number of Server Message Block (SMB) traffic connections. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Traffic"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for spikes in the number of Server Message Block (SMB) traffic connections. -action.escu.how_to_implement = This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic logs and populating the `Network_Traffic` data model. -action.escu.known_false_positives = A file server may experience high-demand loads that could cause this analytic to trigger. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-22 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-22 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Ransomware", "DHS Report TA18-074A"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Ransomware", "DHS Report TA18-074A"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['src'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for spikes in the number of Server Message Block (SMB) traffic connections. -action.notable.param.rule_title = SMB Traffic Spike -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb by _time span=1h, All_Traffic.src | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | eventstats max(_time) as maxtime | stats count as num_data_samples max(eval(if(_time >= relative_time(maxtime, "-70m@m"), count, null))) as count avg(eval(if(_time upperBound AND num_data_samples >=50, 1, 0) | where isOutlier=1 | table src count | `smb_traffic_spike_filter` - -[ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search uses the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) to identify spikes in the number of Server Message Block (SMB) connections. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Traffic"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search uses the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) to identify spikes in the number of Server Message Block (SMB) connections. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. In addition, the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or greater must be installed on your search heads, along with any required dependencies. Finally, the support search "Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK" must be executed before this detection search, because it builds a machine-learning (ML) model over the historical data used by this search. It is important that this search is run in the same app context as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild the model with the latest data available in your environment.\ -This search produces a field (Number of events,count) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. This field contributes additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following field, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry): \ -1. **Label:** Number of events, **Field:** count\ -Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review is found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` -action.escu.known_false_positives = If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider reducing the value of the threshold in the search. You should also periodically re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data. Please update the `smb_traffic_spike_mltk_filter` macro to filter out false positive results -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-22 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-22 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Ransomware", "DHS Report TA18-074A"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Ransomware", "DHS Report TA18-074A"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest', 'src'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search uses the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) to identify spikes in the number of Server Message Block (SMB) connections. -action.notable.param.rule_title = SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as port from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb by _time span=1h, All_Traffic.src | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%A") | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | apply smb_pdfmodel threshold=0.001 | rename "IsOutlier(count)" as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | sort -count | table _time src dest port count | `smb_traffic_spike___mltk_filter` - -[ESCU - SQL Injection with Long URLs - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for long URLs that have several SQL commands visible within them. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 13", "CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "ID.RA", "PR.PT", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Web"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for long URLs that have several SQL commands visible within them. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be monitoring network communications to your web servers or ingesting your HTTP logs and populating the Web data model. You must also identify your web servers in the Enterprise Security assets table. -action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible that legitimate traffic will have long URLs or long user agent strings and that common SQL commands may be found within the URL. Please investigate as appropriate. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - SQL Injection with Long URLs - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["SQL Injection"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - SQL Injection with Long URLs - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["SQL Injection"], "cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 13", "CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "ID.RA", "PR.PT", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest', 'src'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for long URLs that have several SQL commands visible within them. -action.notable.param.rule_title = SQL Injection with Long URLs -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Web where Web.dest_category=web_server AND (Web.url_length > 1024 OR Web.http_user_agent_length > 200) by Web.src Web.dest Web.url Web.url_length Web.http_user_agent | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | eval num_sql_cmds=mvcount(split(url, "alter%20table")) + mvcount(split(url, "between")) + mvcount(split(url, "create%20table")) + mvcount(split(url, "create%20database")) + mvcount(split(url, "create%20index")) + mvcount(split(url, "create%20view")) + mvcount(split(url, "delete")) + mvcount(split(url, "drop%20database")) + mvcount(split(url, "drop%20index")) + mvcount(split(url, "drop%20table")) + mvcount(split(url, "exists")) + mvcount(split(url, "exec")) + mvcount(split(url, "group%20by")) + mvcount(split(url, "having")) + mvcount(split(url, "insert%20into")) + mvcount(split(url, "inner%20join")) + mvcount(split(url, "left%20join")) + mvcount(split(url, "right%20join")) + mvcount(split(url, "full%20join")) + mvcount(split(url, "select")) + mvcount(split(url, "distinct")) + mvcount(split(url, "select%20top")) + mvcount(split(url, "union")) + mvcount(split(url, "xp_cmdshell")) - 24 | where num_sql_cmds > 3 | `sql_injection_with_long_urls_filter` - -[ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The search looks for a file named "test.txt" written to the windows system directory tree, which is consistent with Samsam propagation. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The search looks for a file named "test.txt" written to the windows system directory tree, which is consistent with Samsam propagation. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records the file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data-model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data. -action.escu.known_false_positives = No false positives have been identified. -action.escu.creation_date = 2018-12-14 -action.escu.modification_date = 2018-12-14 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["SamSam Ransomware"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A samsam ransomware test file creation in $file_path$ in host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 12}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 12}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 20, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Impact"}], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The search looks for a file named "test.txt" written to the windows system directory tree, which is consistent with Samsam propagation. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Samsam Test File Write -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_name) as file_name from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path=*\\windows\\system32\\test.txt by Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `samsam_test_file_write_filter` - -[ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for arguments to sc.exe indicating the creation or modification of a Windows service. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.003", "T1543"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for arguments to sc.exe indicating the creation or modification of a Windows service. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Using sc.exe to manipulate Windows services is uncommon. However, there may be legitimate instances of this behavior. It is important to validate and investigate as appropriate. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Service Abuse", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Disabling Security Tools", "NOBELIUM Group"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A sc process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ to create of configure services in host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 56}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Service Abuse", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Disabling Security Tools", "NOBELIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Persistence"}, "Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.003", "T1543"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for arguments to sc.exe indicating the creation or modification of a Windows service. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = sc.exe (Processes.process="* create *" OR Processes.process="* config *") by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services_filter` - -[ESCU - SchCache Change By App Connect And Create ADSI Object - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic is to detect an application try to connect and create ADSI Object to do LDAP query. Every time an application connects to the directory and attempts to create an ADSI object, the Active Directory Schema is checked for changes. If it has changed since the last connection, the schema is downloaded and stored in a cache on the local computer either in %LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\SchCache or %systemroot%\SchCache. We found this a good anomaly use case to detect suspicious application like blackmatter ransomware that use ADS object api to execute ldap query. having a good list of ldap or normal AD query tool used within the network is a good start to reduce the noise. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to detect an application try to connect and create ADSI Object to do LDAP query. Every time an application connects to the directory and attempts to create an ADSI object, the Active Directory Schema is checked for changes. If it has changed since the last connection, the schema is downloaded and stored in a cache on the local computer either in %LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\SchCache or %systemroot%\SchCache. We found this a good anomaly use case to detect suspicious application like blackmatter ransomware that use ADS object api to execute ldap query. having a good list of ldap or normal AD query tool used within the network is a good start to reduce the noise. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -action.escu.known_false_positives = normal application like mmc.exe and other ldap query tool may trigger this detections. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-07 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-07 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - SchCache Change By App Connect And Create ADSI Object - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["blackMatter ransomware"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = process $Image$ create a file $TargetFilename$ in host $Computer$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - SchCache Change By App Connect And Create ADSI Object - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["blackMatter ransomware"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to detect an application try to connect and create ADSI Object to do LDAP query. Every time an application connects to the directory and attempts to create an ADSI object, the Active Directory Schema is checked for changes. If it has changed since the last connection, the schema is downloaded and stored in a cache on the local computer either in %LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\SchCache or %systemroot%\SchCache. We found this a good anomaly use case to detect suspicious application like blackmatter ransomware that use ADS object api to execute ldap query. having a good list of ldap or normal AD query tool used within the network is a good start to reduce the noise. -action.notable.param.rule_title = SchCache Change By App Connect And Create ADSI Object -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `sysmon` EventCode=11 TargetFilename = "*\\Windows\\SchCache\\*" TargetFilename = "*.sch*" NOT (Image IN ("*\\Windows\\system32\\mmc.exe")) |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image TargetFilename EventCode process_id process_name Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schcache_change_by_app_connect_and_create_adsi_object_filter` - -[ESCU - Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with an arguments "HTTP" string that are unique entry of malware or attack that uses lolbin to download other file or payload to the infected machine. The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.' -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with an arguments "HTTP" string that are unique entry of malware or attack that uses lolbin to download other file or payload to the infected machine. The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.' -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the task schedule (Exa. Security Log EventCode 4698) endpoints. Tune and filter known instances of Task schedule used in your environment. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-19 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-19 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Persistence Techniques"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A schedule task process commandline arguments $Arguments$ with http string on it in host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}, {"threat_object_field": "Arguments", "threat_object_type": "arguments"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}, "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "Arguments", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Arguments"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with an arguments "HTTP" string that are unique entry of malware or attack that uses lolbin to download other file or payload to the infected machine. The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.' -action.notable.param.rule_title = Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message| search Arguments IN ("*http*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Task_Name, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden, Arguments | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schedule_task_with_http_command_arguments_filter` - -[ESCU - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed with a Rundll32. This technique is common in new trickbot that uses rundll32 to load is trickbot downloader. The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.' -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed with a Rundll32. This technique is common in new trickbot that uses rundll32 to load is trickbot downloader. The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.' -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the task schedule (Exa. Security Log EventCode 4698) endpoints. Tune and filter known instances of Task schedule used in your environment. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-19 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-19 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Trickbot", "IcedID"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A schedule task process commandline rundll32 arguments $Arguments$ in host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 70}, {"threat_object_field": "Arguments", "threat_object_type": "arguments"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Trickbot", "IcedID"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "Arguments", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Arguments"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed with a Rundll32. This technique is common in new trickbot that uses rundll32 to load is trickbot downloader. The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.' -action.notable.param.rule_title = Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message | search Command IN ("*rundll32*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Task_Name, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden, Arguments | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger_filter` - -[ESCU - Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for the execution of `at.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to create a Scheduled Task on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution. The `at.exe` binary internally leverages the AT protocol which was deprecated starting with Windows 8 and Windows Server 2012 but may still work on previous versions of Windows. Furthermore, attackers may enable this protocol on demand by changing a sytem registry key. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053", "T1053.002"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `at.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to create a Scheduled Task on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution. The `at.exe` binary internally leverages the AT protocol which was deprecated starting with Windows 8 and Windows Server 2012 but may still work on previous versions of Windows. Furthermore, attackers may enable this protocol on demand by changing a sytem registry key. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may create scheduled tasks on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-11 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-11 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A Windows Scheduled Task was created on a remote endpoint from $dest -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 54}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053", "T1053.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `at.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to create a Scheduled Task on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution. The `at.exe` binary internally leverages the AT protocol which was deprecated starting with Windows 8 and Windows Server 2012 but may still work on previous versions of Windows. Furthermore, attackers may enable this protocol on demand by changing a sytem registry key. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=at.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=at.exe) (Processes.process=*\\\\*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `scheduled_task_creation_on_remote_endpoint_using_at_filter` - -[ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies the creation or deletion of a scheduled task using schtasks.exe with flags - create or delete being passed on the command-line. This has been associated with the Dragonfly threat actor, and the SUNBURST attack against Solarwinds. This analytic replaces "Scheduled Task used in BadRabbit Ransomware". -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the creation or deletion of a scheduled task using schtasks.exe with flags - create or delete being passed on the command-line. This has been associated with the Dragonfly threat actor, and the SUNBURST attack against Solarwinds. This analytic replaces "Scheduled Task used in BadRabbit Ransomware". -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible scripts or administrators may trigger this analytic. Filter as needed based on parent process, application. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-22 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-22 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["DHS Report TA18-074A", "NOBELIUM Group", "Windows Persistence Techniques"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A schedule task process $process_name$ with create or delete commandline $process$ in host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 56}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DHS Report TA18-074A", "NOBELIUM Group", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}, "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the creation or deletion of a scheduled task using schtasks.exe with flags - create or delete being passed on the command-line. This has been associated with the Dragonfly threat actor, and the SUNBURST attack against Solarwinds. This analytic replaces "Scheduled Task used in BadRabbit Ransomware". -action.notable.param.rule_title = Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe (Processes.process=*delete* OR Processes.process=*create*) by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd_filter` - -[ESCU - Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for the execution of `schtasks.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to start a Scheduled Task on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053", "T1053.005"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `schtasks.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to start a Scheduled Task on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may start scheduled tasks on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-11 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-11 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A Windows Scheduled Task was ran on a remote endpoint from $dest -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 54}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053", "T1053.005"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `schtasks.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to start a Scheduled Task on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=schtasks.exe) (Processes.process=*/s* AND Processes.process=*/run*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `scheduled_task_initiation_on_remote_endpoint_filter` - -[ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line that indicate that task names related to the execution of Bad Rabbit ransomware were created or deleted. Deprecated because we already have a similar detection -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line that indicate that task names related to the execution of Bad Rabbit ransomware were created or deleted. Deprecated because we already have a similar detection -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -action.escu.known_false_positives = No known false positives -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 3"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line that indicate that task names related to the execution of Bad Rabbit ransomware were created or deleted. Deprecated because we already have a similar detection -action.notable.param.rule_title = Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process) as process from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe (Processes.process= "*create*" OR Processes.process= "*delete*") by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search (process=*rhaegal* OR process=*drogon* OR *viserion_*) | `scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware_filter` - -[ESCU - Schtasks Run Task On Demand - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic identifies an on demand run of a Windows Schedule Task through shell or command-line. This technique has been used by adversaries that force to run their created Schedule Task as their persistence mechanism or for lateral movement as part of their malicious attack to the compromised machine. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic identifies an on demand run of a Windows Schedule Task through shell or command-line. This technique has been used by adversaries that force to run their created Schedule Task as their persistence mechanism or for lateral movement as part of their malicious attack to the compromised machine. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed schtasks.exe may be used. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may use to debug Schedule Task entries. Filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-05-07 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-05-07 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Schtasks Run Task On Demand - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["XMRig"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A "on demand" execution of schedule task process $process_name$ using commandline $process$ in host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 48}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 48}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Schtasks Run Task On Demand - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}, "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic identifies an on demand run of a Windows Schedule Task through shell or command-line. This technique has been used by adversaries that force to run their created Schedule Task as their persistence mechanism or for lateral movement as part of their malicious attack to the compromised machine. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Schtasks Run Task On Demand -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "schtasks.exe" Processes.process = "*/run*" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schtasks_run_task_on_demand_filter` - -[ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for the execution of `schtasks.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to create a Scheduled Task on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `schtasks.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to create a Scheduled Task on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may create scheduled tasks on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. It is important to validate and investigate as appropriate. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-11 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-11 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "NOBELIUM Group"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A schedule task process $process_name$ with remote job commandline $process$ in host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Processes.dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}, {"risk_object_field": "Processes.user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 63}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "NOBELIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 3"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}, "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "Processes.dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "Processes.user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `schtasks.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to create a Scheduled Task on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Schtasks scheduling job on remote system -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = schtasks.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=schtasks.exe) (Processes.process="*/create*" AND Processes.process="*/s*") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system_filter` - -[ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line that indicate that a forced reboot of system is scheduled. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line that indicate that a forced reboot of system is scheduled. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may create jobs on systems forcing reboots to perform updates, maintenance, etc. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-12-07 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-12-07 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Ransomware"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A schedule task process $process_name$ with force reboot commandline $process$ in host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 56}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 3"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}, "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line that indicate that a forced reboot of system is scheduled. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Schtasks used for forcing a reboot -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe Processes.process="*shutdown*" Processes.process="*/create *" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot_filter` - -[ESCU - Screensaver Event Trigger Execution - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic is developed to detect possible event trigger execution through screensaver registry entry modification for persistence or privilege escalation. This technique was seen in several APT and malware where they put the malicious payload path to the SCRNSAVE.EXE registry key to redirect the execution to their malicious payload path. This TTP is a good indicator that some attacker may modify this entry for their persistence and privilege escalation. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546", "T1546.002"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is developed to detect possible event trigger execution through screensaver registry entry modification for persistence or privilege escalation. This technique was seen in several APT and malware where they put the malicious payload path to the SCRNSAVE.EXE registry key to redirect the execution to their malicious payload path. This TTP is a good indicator that some attacker may modify this entry for their persistence and privilege escalation. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-27 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-27 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Screensaver Event Trigger Execution - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 72}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Screensaver Event Trigger Execution - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Privilege Escalation Persistence"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546", "T1546.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is developed to detect possible event trigger execution through screensaver registry entry modification for persistence or privilege escalation. This technique was seen in several APT and malware where they put the malicious payload path to the SCRNSAVE.EXE registry key to redirect the execution to their malicious payload path. This TTP is a good indicator that some attacker may modify this entry for their persistence and privilege escalation. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Screensaver Event Trigger Execution -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path="*\\Control Panel\\Desktop\\SCRNSAVE.EXE*") by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `screensaver_event_trigger_execution_filter` - -[ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for scripts launched via WMI. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for scripts launched via WMI. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, administrators may use wmi to launch scripts for legitimate purposes. Filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-03-16 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-03-16 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious WMI Use"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A wmic.exe process $process_name$ taht execute script in host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 36}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 36}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for scripts launched via WMI. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Script Execution via WMI -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=scrcons.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `script_execution_via_wmi_filter` - -[ESCU - Sdclt UAC Bypass - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search is to detect a suspicious sdclt.exe registry modification. This technique is commonly seen when attacker try to bypassed UAC by using sdclt.exe application by modifying some registry that sdclt.exe tries to open or query with payload file path on it to be executed. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious sdclt.exe registry modification. This technique is commonly seen when attacker try to bypassed UAC by using sdclt.exe application by modifying some registry that sdclt.exe tries to open or query with payload file path on it to be executed. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited to no false positives are expected. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-01-28 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-01-28 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Sdclt UAC Bypass - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious modification of registry $registry_path$ with possible payload path $registry_value_name$ in $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Sdclt UAC Bypass - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence,", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Incoming"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious sdclt.exe registry modification. This technique is commonly seen when attacker try to bypassed UAC by using sdclt.exe application by modifying some registry that sdclt.exe tries to open or query with payload file path on it to be executed. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Sdclt UAC Bypass -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path= "*\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\App Paths\\control.exe*" OR Registry.registry_path= "*\\exefile\\shell\\runas\\command\\*") (Registry.registry_value_name = "(Default)" OR Registry.registry_value_name = "IsolatedCommand") by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `sdclt_uac_bypass_filter` - -[ESCU - Sdelete Application Execution - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic is to detect the execution of sdelete.exe application sysinternal tools. This tool is one of the most use tool of malware and adversaries to remove or clear their tracks and artifact in the targetted host. This tool is designed to delete securely a file in file system that remove the forensic evidence on the machine. A good TTP query to check why user execute this application which is not a common practice. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485", "T1070.004", "T1070"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to detect the execution of sdelete.exe application sysinternal tools. This tool is one of the most use tool of malware and adversaries to remove or clear their tracks and artifact in the targetted host. This tool is designed to delete securely a file in file system that remove the forensic evidence on the machine. A good TTP query to check why user execute this application which is not a common practice. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = user may execute and use this application -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-06 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-06 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Sdelete Application Execution - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = sdelete process $process_name$ executed in $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 49}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Sdelete Application Execution - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485", "T1070.004", "T1070"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to detect the execution of sdelete.exe application sysinternal tools. This tool is one of the most use tool of malware and adversaries to remove or clear their tracks and artifact in the targetted host. This tool is designed to delete securely a file in file system that remove the forensic evidence on the machine. A good TTP query to check why user execute this application which is not a common practice. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Sdelete Application Execution -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_sdelete` by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sdelete_application_execution_filter` - -[ESCU - SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies searchprotocolhost.exe with no command line arguments and with a network connection. It is unusual for searchprotocolhost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. searchprotocolhost.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies searchprotocolhost.exe with no command line arguments and with a network connection. It is unusual for searchprotocolhost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. searchprotocolhost.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `ports` node. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-13 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-13 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Cobalt Strike"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A searchprotocolhost.exe process $process_name$ with no commandline in host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 70}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "processname"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}, "Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "processname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies searchprotocolhost.exe with no command line arguments and with a network connection. It is unusual for searchprotocolhost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. searchprotocolhost.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -action.notable.param.rule_title = SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=searchprotocolhost.exe by _time span=1h Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process="(searchprotocolhost\.exe.{0,4}$)" | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port !="0" by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_guid connection_to_CNC dest_port | `searchprotocolhost_with_no_command_line_with_network_filter` - -[ESCU - SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic detects a potential usage of secretsdump.py tool for dumping credentials (ntlm hash) from a copy of ntds.dit and SAM.Security,SYSTEM registrry hive. This technique was seen in some attacker that dump ntlm hashes offline after having a copy of ntds.dit and SAM/SYSTEM/SECURITY registry hive. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.003", "T1003"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic detects a potential usage of secretsdump.py tool for dumping credentials (ntlm hash) from a copy of ntds.dit and SAM.Security,SYSTEM registrry hive. This technique was seen in some attacker that dump ntlm hashes offline after having a copy of ntds.dit and SAM/SYSTEM/SECURITY registry hive. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-05-26 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-05-26 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Credential Dumping"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A secretdump process $process_name$ with secretdump commandline $process$ to dump credentials in host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Credential Access"}], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.003", "T1003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic detects a potential usage of secretsdump.py tool for dumping credentials (ntlm hash) from a copy of ntds.dit and SAM.Security,SYSTEM registrry hive. This technique was seen in some attacker that dump ntlm hashes offline after having a copy of ntds.dit and SAM/SYSTEM/SECURITY registry hive. -action.notable.param.rule_title = SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "python*.exe" Processes.process = "*.py*" Processes.process = "*-ntds*" (Processes.process = "*-system*" OR Processes.process = "*-sam*" OR Processes.process = "*-security*" OR Processes.process = "*-bootkey*") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `secretdumps_offline_ntds_dumping_tool_filter` - -[ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies `powershell.exe` usage, using Script Block Logging EventCode 4104, related to querying the domain for Service Principle Names. typically, this is a precursor activity related to kerberoasting or the silver ticket attack. \ -What is a ServicePrincipleName? \ -A service principal name (SPN) is a unique identifier of a service instance. SPNs are used by Kerberos authentication to associate a service instance with a service logon account. This allows a client application to request that the service authenticate an account even if the client does not have the account name.\ -The following analytic identifies the use of KerberosRequestorSecurityToken class within the script block. Using .NET System.IdentityModel.Tokens.KerberosRequestorSecurityToken class in PowerShell is the equivelant of using setspn.exe. \ -During triage, review parallel processes for further suspicious activity. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558.003"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies `powershell.exe` usage, using Script Block Logging EventCode 4104, related to querying the domain for Service Principle Names. typically, this is a precursor activity related to kerberoasting or the silver ticket attack. \ -What is a ServicePrincipleName? \ -A service principal name (SPN) is a unique identifier of a service instance. SPNs are used by Kerberos authentication to associate a service instance with a service logon account. This allows a client application to request that the service authenticate an account even if the client does not have the account name.\ -The following analytic identifies the use of KerberosRequestorSecurityToken class within the script block. Using .NET System.IdentityModel.Tokens.KerberosRequestorSecurityToken class in PowerShell is the equivelant of using setspn.exe. \ -During triage, review parallel processes for further suspicious activity. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, however filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-14 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-14 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery", "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to identify service principle names. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery", "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558.003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies `powershell.exe` usage, using Script Block Logging EventCode 4104, related to querying the domain for Service Principle Names. typically, this is a precursor activity related to kerberoasting or the silver ticket attack. \ -What is a ServicePrincipleName? \ -A service principal name (SPN) is a unique identifier of a service instance. SPNs are used by Kerberos authentication to associate a service instance with a service logon account. This allows a client application to request that the service authenticate an account even if the client does not have the account name.\ -The following analytic identifies the use of KerberosRequestorSecurityToken class within the script block. Using .NET System.IdentityModel.Tokens.KerberosRequestorSecurityToken class in PowerShell is the equivelant of using setspn.exe. \ -During triage, review parallel processes for further suspicious activity. -action.notable.param.rule_title = ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message="*KerberosRequestorSecurityToken*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message OpCode ComputerName User EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell_filter` - -[ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies `setspn.exe` usage related to querying the domain for Service Principle Names. typically, this is a precursor activity related to kerberoasting or the silver ticket attack. \ -What is a ServicePrincipleName? \ -A service principal name (SPN) is a unique identifier of a service instance. SPNs are used by Kerberos authentication to associate a service instance with a service logon account. This allows a client application to request that the service authenticate an account even if the client does not have the account name.\ -Example usage includes the following \ -1. setspn -T offense -Q */* 1. setspn -T attackrange.local -F -Q MSSQLSvc/* 1. setspn -Q */* > allspns.txt 1. setspn -q \ -Values \ -1. -F = perform queries at the forest, rather than domain level 1. -T = perform query on the specified domain or forest (when -F is also used) 1. -Q = query for existence of SPN \ -During triage, review parallel processes for further suspicious activity. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation", "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558.003"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies `setspn.exe` usage related to querying the domain for Service Principle Names. typically, this is a precursor activity related to kerberoasting or the silver ticket attack. \ -What is a ServicePrincipleName? \ -A service principal name (SPN) is a unique identifier of a service instance. SPNs are used by Kerberos authentication to associate a service instance with a service logon account. This allows a client application to request that the service authenticate an account even if the client does not have the account name.\ -Example usage includes the following \ -1. setspn -T offense -Q */* 1. setspn -T attackrange.local -F -Q MSSQLSvc/* 1. setspn -Q */* > allspns.txt 1. setspn -q \ -Values \ -1. -F = perform queries at the forest, rather than domain level 1. -T = perform query on the specified domain or forest (when -F is also used) 1. -Q = query for existence of SPN \ -During triage, review parallel processes for further suspicious activity. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be caused by Administrators resetting SPNs or querying for SPNs. Filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-14 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-14 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery", "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to identify service principle names. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery", "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation", "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558.003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies `setspn.exe` usage related to querying the domain for Service Principle Names. typically, this is a precursor activity related to kerberoasting or the silver ticket attack. \ -What is a ServicePrincipleName? \ -A service principal name (SPN) is a unique identifier of a service instance. SPNs are used by Kerberos authentication to associate a service instance with a service logon account. This allows a client application to request that the service authenticate an account even if the client does not have the account name.\ -Example usage includes the following \ -1. setspn -T offense -Q */* 1. setspn -T attackrange.local -F -Q MSSQLSvc/* 1. setspn -Q */* > allspns.txt 1. setspn -q \ -Values \ -1. -F = perform queries at the forest, rather than domain level 1. -T = perform query on the specified domain or forest (when -F is also used) 1. -Q = query for existence of SPN \ -During triage, review parallel processes for further suspicious activity. -action.notable.param.rule_title = ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_setspn` (Processes.process="*-t*" AND Processes.process="*-f*") OR (Processes.process="*-q*" AND Processes.process="**/**") OR (Processes.process="*-q*") OR (Processes.process="*-s*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn_filter` - -[ESCU - Services Escalate Exe - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies the use of `svc-exe` with Cobalt Strike. The behavior typically follows after an adversary has already gained initial access and is escalating privileges. Using `svc-exe`, a randomly named binary will be downloaded from the remote Teamserver and placed on disk within `C:\Windows\400619a.exe`. Following, the binary will be added to the registry under key `HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\400619a\` with multiple keys and values added to look like a legitimate service. Upon loading, `services.exe` will spawn the randomly named binary from `\\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\400619a.exe`. The process lineage is completed with `400619a.exe` spawning rundll32.exe, which is the default `spawnto_` value for Cobalt Strike. The `spawnto_` value is arbitrary and may be any process on disk (typically system32/syswow64 binary). The `spawnto_` process will also contain a network connection. During triage, review parallel procesess and identify any additional file modifications. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the use of `svc-exe` with Cobalt Strike. The behavior typically follows after an adversary has already gained initial access and is escalating privileges. Using `svc-exe`, a randomly named binary will be downloaded from the remote Teamserver and placed on disk within `C:\Windows\400619a.exe`. Following, the binary will be added to the registry under key `HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\400619a\` with multiple keys and values added to look like a legitimate service. Upon loading, `services.exe` will spawn the randomly named binary from `\\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\400619a.exe`. The process lineage is completed with `400619a.exe` spawning rundll32.exe, which is the default `spawnto_` value for Cobalt Strike. The `spawnto_` value is arbitrary and may be any process on disk (typically system32/syswow64 binary). The `spawnto_` process will also contain a network connection. During triage, review parallel procesess and identify any additional file modifications. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. -action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as `services.exe` should never spawn a process from `ADMIN$`. Filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-05-18 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-05-18 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Services Escalate Exe - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Cobalt Strike"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A service process $parent_process_name$ with process path $process_path$ in host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Processes.dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 76}, {"risk_object_field": "Processes.user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 76}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Services Escalate Exe - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike"], "confidence": 95, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Privilege Escalation"}, "Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "Processes.dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "Processes.user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the use of `svc-exe` with Cobalt Strike. The behavior typically follows after an adversary has already gained initial access and is escalating privileges. Using `svc-exe`, a randomly named binary will be downloaded from the remote Teamserver and placed on disk within `C:\Windows\400619a.exe`. Following, the binary will be added to the registry under key `HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\400619a\` with multiple keys and values added to look like a legitimate service. Upon loading, `services.exe` will spawn the randomly named binary from `\\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\400619a.exe`. The process lineage is completed with `400619a.exe` spawning rundll32.exe, which is the default `spawnto_` value for Cobalt Strike. The `spawnto_` value is arbitrary and may be any process on disk (typically system32/syswow64 binary). The `spawnto_` process will also contain a network connection. During triage, review parallel procesess and identify any additional file modifications. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Services Escalate Exe -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe Processes.process_path=*admin$* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `services_escalate_exe_filter` - -[ESCU - Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies `services.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the Service Control Manager and creating a remote malicious service, the executed command is spawned as a child process of `services.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of services.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543", "T1543.003"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies `services.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the Service Control Manager and creating a remote malicious service, the executed command is spawned as a child process of `services.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of services.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-22 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-22 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Services.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 54}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543", "T1543.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies `services.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the Service Control Manager and creating a remote malicious service, the executed command is spawned as a child process of `services.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of services.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe) (Processes.process_name IN ("Regsvcs.exe", "Ftp.exe", "OfflineScannerShell.exe", "Rasautou.exe", "Schtasks.exe", "Xwizard.exe", "Dllhost.exe", "Pnputil.exe", "Atbroker.exe", "Pcwrun.exe", "Ttdinject.exe","Mshta.exe", "Bitsadmin.exe", "Certoc.exe", "Ieexec.exe", "Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe", "Runscripthelper.exe", "Forfiles.exe", "Msbuild.exe", "Register-cimprovider.exe", "Tttracer.exe", "Ie4uinit.exe", "Bash.exe", "Hh.exe", "SettingSyncHost.exe", "Cmstp.exe", "Mmc.exe", "Stordiag.exe", "Scriptrunner.exe", "Odbcconf.exe", "Extexport.exe", "Msdt.exe", "WorkFolders.exe", "Diskshadow.exe", "Mavinject.exe", "Regasm.exe", "Gpscript.exe", "Rundll32.exe", "Regsvr32.exe", "Msiexec.exe", "Wuauclt.exe", "Presentationhost.exe", "Wmic.exe", "Runonce.exe", "Syncappvpublishingserver.exe", "Verclsid.exe", "Infdefaultinstall.exe", "Explorer.exe", "Installutil.exe", "Netsh.exe", "Wab.exe", "Dnscmd.exe", "At.exe", "Pcalua.exe", "Msconfig.exe")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `services_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter` - -[ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = Monitor for changes of the ExecutionPolicy in the registry to the values "unrestricted" or "bypass," which allows the execution of malicious scripts. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = Monitor for changes of the ExecutionPolicy in the registry to the values "unrestricted" or "bypass," which allows the execution of malicious scripts. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Registry node. You must also be ingesting logs with the fields registry_path, registry_key_name, and registry_value_name from your endpoints. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may attempt to change the default execution policy on a system for a variety of reasons. However, setting the policy to "unrestricted" or "bypass" as this search is designed to identify, would be unusual. Hits should be reviewed and investigated as appropriate. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-18 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-18 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell", "Credential Dumping", "HAFNIUM Group"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A registry modification in $registry_path$ with reg key $registry_key_name$ and reg value $registry_value_name$ in host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 48}, {"threat_object_field": "registry_path", "threat_object_type": "registrypath"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "Credential Dumping", "HAFNIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "registry_path", "role": ["Others"], "type": "RegistryPath"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = Monitor for changes of the ExecutionPolicy in the registry to the values "unrestricted" or "bypass," which allows the execution of malicious scripts. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*Software\\Microsoft\\Powershell\\1\\ShellIds\\Microsoft.PowerShell* Registry.registry_value_name=ExecutionPolicy (Registry.registry_value_data=Unrestricted OR Registry.registry_value_data=Bypass) by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass_filter` - -[ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for shim database files being written to default directories. The sdbinst.exe application is used to install shim database files (.sdb). According to Microsoft, a shim is a small library that transparently intercepts an API, changes the parameters passed, handles the operation itself, or redirects the operation elsewhere. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.011", "T1546"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for shim database files being written to default directories. The sdbinst.exe application is used to install shim database files (.sdb). According to Microsoft, a shim is a small library that transparently intercepts an API, changes the parameters passed, handles the operation itself, or redirects the operation elsewhere. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Because legitimate shim files are created and used all the time, this event, in itself, is not suspicious. However, if there are other correlating events, it may warrant further investigation. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-12-08 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-12-08 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Persistence Techniques"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A process that possibly write shim database in $file_path$ in host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"threat_object_field": "file_path", "threat_object_type": "file path"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Privilege Escalation"}, "Persistence"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.011", "T1546"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "file_path", "role": ["Others"], "type": "file path"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for shim database files being written to default directories. The sdbinst.exe application is used to install shim database files (.sdb). According to Microsoft, a shim is a small library that transparently intercepts an API, changes the parameters passed, handles the operation itself, or redirects the operation elsewhere. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Shim Database File Creation -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.action) values(Filesystem.file_hash) as file_hash values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path=*Windows\\AppPatch\\Custom* by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `shim_database_file_creation_filter` - -[ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search detects the process execution and arguments required to silently create a shim database. The sdbinst.exe application is used to install shim database files (.sdb). A shim is a small library which transparently intercepts an API, changes the parameters passed, handles the operation itself, or redirects the operation elsewhere. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.011", "T1546"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search detects the process execution and arguments required to silently create a shim database. The sdbinst.exe application is used to install shim database files (.sdb). A shim is a small library which transparently intercepts an API, changes the parameters passed, handles the operation itself, or redirects the operation elsewhere. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -action.escu.known_false_positives = None identified -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-11-23 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-23 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Persistence Techniques"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A process $process_name$ that possible create a shim db silently in host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 63}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Privilege Escalation"}, "Persistence"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.011", "T1546"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search detects the process execution and arguments required to silently create a shim database. The sdbinst.exe application is used to install shim database files (.sdb). A shim is a small library which transparently intercepts an API, changes the parameters passed, handles the operation itself, or redirects the operation elsewhere. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = sdbinst.exe by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters_filter` - -[ESCU - Short Lived Scheduled Task - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic leverages Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created` and Windows Security EventCode 4699, `A scheduled task was deleted` to identify scheduled tasks created and deleted in less than 30 seconds. This behavior may represent a lateral movement attack abusing the Task Scheduler to obtain code execution. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic leverages Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created` and Windows Security EventCode 4699, `A scheduled task was deleted` to identify scheduled tasks created and deleted in less than 30 seconds. This behavior may represent a lateral movement attack abusing the Task Scheduler to obtain code execution. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Although uncommon, legitimate applications may create and delete a Scheduled Task within 30 seconds. Filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-03 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-03 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Short Lived Scheduled Task - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A windows scheduled task was created and deleted in 30 seconds on $ComputerName$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 81}, {"threat_object_field": "Command", "threat_object_type": "command"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Short Lived Scheduled Task - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "Command", "role": ["Target"], "type": "Command"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic leverages Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created` and Windows Security EventCode 4699, `A scheduled task was deleted` to identify scheduled tasks created and deleted in less than 30 seconds. This behavior may represent a lateral movement attack abusing the Task Scheduler to obtain code execution. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Short Lived Scheduled Task -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 OR EventCode=4699 | xmlkv Message | transaction Task_Name startswith=(EventCode=4698) endswith=(EventCode=4699) | eval short_lived=case((duration<30),"TRUE") | search short_lived = TRUE | table _time, ComputerName, Account_Name, Command, Task_Name, short_lived | `short_lived_scheduled_task_filter` - -[ESCU - Short Lived Windows Accounts - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search detects accounts that were created and deleted in a short time period. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.001", "T1136"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Change"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search detects accounts that were created and deleted in a short time period. -action.escu.how_to_implement = This search requires you to have enabled your Group Management Audit Logs in your Local Windows Security Policy and be ingesting those logs. More information on how to enable them can be found here: http://whatevernetworks.com/auditing-group-membership-changes-in-active-directory/ -action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible that an administrator created and deleted an account in a short time period. Verifying activity with an administrator is advised. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-06 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-06 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Short Lived Windows Accounts - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Account Monitoring and Controls"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A user account created or delete shortly in host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 63}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Short Lived Windows Accounts - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Account Monitoring and Controls"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Persistence"}], "impact": 70, "mitre_attack": ["T1136.001", "T1136"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search detects accounts that were created and deleted in a short time period. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Short Lived Windows Accounts -action.notable.param.security_domain = access -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Changes.result_id) as result_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.result_id=4720 OR All_Changes.result_id=4726 by _time span=4h All_Changes.user All_Changes.dest | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | search result_id = 4720 result_id=4726 | transaction user connected=false maxspan=240m | table firstTime lastTime count user dest result_id | `short_lived_windows_accounts_filter` - -[ESCU - SilentCleanup UAC Bypass - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry that may related to UAC bypassed. This registry will be trigger once the attacker abuse the silentcleanup task schedule to gain high privilege execution that will bypass User control account. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry that may related to UAC bypassed. This registry will be trigger once the attacker abuse the silentcleanup task schedule to gain high privilege execution that will bypass User control account. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-01-28 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-01-28 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - SilentCleanup UAC Bypass - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious modification of registry $registry_path$ with possible payload path $registry_value_name$ in $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - SilentCleanup UAC Bypass - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence,", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Incoming"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry that may related to UAC bypassed. This registry will be trigger once the attacker abuse the silentcleanup task schedule to gain high privilege execution that will bypass User control account. -action.notable.param.rule_title = SilentCleanup UAC Bypass -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\Environment\\windir" Registry.registry_value_data = "*.exe*" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `silentcleanup_uac_bypass_filter` - -[ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for process names that consist only of a single letter. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204", "T1204.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for process names that consist only of a single letter. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Single-letter executables are not always malicious. Investigate this activity with your normal incident-response process. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-12-08 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-12-08 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["DHS Report TA18-074A"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A suspicious process $process_name$ with single letter in host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 63}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DHS Report TA18-074A"], "cis20": ["CIS 2"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204", "T1204.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for process names that consist only of a single letter. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Single Letter Process On Endpoint -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process, Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | eval process_name_length = len(process_name), endExe = if(substr(process_name, -4) == ".exe", 1, 0) | search process_name_length=5 AND endExe=1 | table count, firstTime, lastTime, dest, user, process, process_name | `single_letter_process_on_endpoint_filter` - -[ESCU - Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search is used to detect systems that are still vulnerable to the Spectre and Meltdown vulnerabilities. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 4"], "nist": ["ID.RA", "RS.MI", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Vulnerabilities"] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search is used to detect systems that are still vulnerable to the Spectre and Meltdown vulnerabilities. -action.escu.how_to_implement = The search requires that you are ingesting your vulnerability-scanner data and that it reports the CVE of the vulnerability identified. -action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible that your vulnerability scanner is not detecting that the patches have been applied. -action.escu.creation_date = 2017-01-07 -action.escu.modification_date = 2017-01-07 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 4"], "cve": ["CVE-2017-5753"], "nist": ["ID.RA", "RS.MI", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search is used to detect systems that are still vulnerable to the Spectre and Meltdown vulnerabilities. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Vulnerabilities where Vulnerabilities.cve ="CVE-2017-5753" OR Vulnerabilities.cve ="CVE-2017-5715" OR Vulnerabilities.cve ="CVE-2017-5754" by Vulnerabilities.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Vulnerabilities)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems_filter` - [ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -29664,19 +34278,18 @@ action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The search looks for a sharp increase in the number of files written to a particular host -action.notable.param.rule_title = Spike in File Writes -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -29688,365 +34301,6 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.action=created by _time span=1h, Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | eventstats max(_time) as maxtime | stats count as num_data_samples max(eval(if(_time >= relative_time(maxtime, "-1d@d"), count, null))) as "count" avg(eval(if(_time upperBound) AND num_data_samples >=20, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `spike_in_file_writes_filter` -[ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search allows you to look for evidence of exploitation for CVE-2018-11409, a Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure Bug. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["ID.RA", "RS.MI", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search allows you to look for evidence of exploitation for CVE-2018-11409, a Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure Bug. -action.escu.how_to_implement = The REST endpoint that exposes system information is also necessary for the proper operation of Splunk clustering and instrumentation. Whitelisting your Splunk systems will reduce false positives. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Retrieving server information may be a legitimate API request. Verify that the attempt is a valid request for information. -action.escu.creation_date = 2018-06-14 -action.escu.modification_date = 2018-06-14 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 18"], "cve": ["CVE-2018-11409"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["ID.RA", "RS.MI", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search allows you to look for evidence of exploitation for CVE-2018-11409, a Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure Bug. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = index=_internal sourcetype=splunkd_ui_access server-info | search clientip!=127.0.0.1 uri_path="*raw/services/server/info/server-info" | rename clientip as src_ip, splunk_server as dest | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime, values(uri) as uri, values(useragent) as http_user_agent, values(user) as user by src_ip, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure_filter` - -[ESCU - Spoolsv Spawning Rundll32 - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies a suspicious child process, `rundll32.exe`, with no command-line arguments being spawned from `spoolsv.exe`. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. Typically, this is not normal behavior for `spoolsv.exe` to spawn a process. During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012", "T1547"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies a suspicious child process, `rundll32.exe`, with no command-line arguments being spawned from `spoolsv.exe`. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. Typically, this is not normal behavior for `spoolsv.exe` to spawn a process. During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives have been identified. There are limited instances where `rundll32.exe` may be spawned by a legitimate print driver. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-01 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-01 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Spoolsv Spawning Rundll32 - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = $parent_process$ has spawned $process_name$ on endpoint $ComputerName$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_id", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_id", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Spoolsv Spawning Rundll32 - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Local"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "parent_process_id", "role": ["Parent Process", "Attacker"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_id", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies a suspicious child process, `rundll32.exe`, with no command-line arguments being spawned from `spoolsv.exe`. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. Typically, this is not normal behavior for `spoolsv.exe` to spawn a process. During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Spoolsv Spawning Rundll32 -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=spoolsv.exe `process_rundll32` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spoolsv_spawning_rundll32_filter` - -[ESCU - Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search is to detect suspicious loading of dll in specific path relative to printnightmare exploitation. In this search we try to detect the loaded modules made by spoolsv.exe after the exploitation. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012", "T1547"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect suspicious loading of dll in specific path relative to printnightmare exploitation. In this search we try to detect the loaded modules made by spoolsv.exe after the exploitation. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-01 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-01 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = $Image$ with process id $process_id$ has loaded a driver from $ImageLoaded$ on endpoint $Computer$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}, {"threat_object_field": "process_id", "threat_object_type": "process name"}, {"threat_object_field": "ImageLoaded", "threat_object_type": "file"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Local"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "process_id", "role": ["Parent Process", "Attacker"], "type": "Process Name"}, {"name": "ImageLoaded", "role": ["Other"], "type": "File"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect suspicious loading of dll in specific path relative to printnightmare exploitation. In this search we try to detect the loaded modules made by spoolsv.exe after the exploitation. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `sysmon` EventCode=7 Image ="*\\spoolsv.exe" ImageLoaded="*\\Windows\\System32\\spool\\drivers\\x64\\*" ImageLoaded = "*.dll" | stats dc(ImageLoaded) as countImgloaded values(ImageLoaded) as ImgLoaded count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image Computer process_id EventCode | where countImgloaded >= 3 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules_filter` - -[ESCU - Spoolsv Suspicious Process Access - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic identifies a suspicious behavior related to PrintNightmare, or CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675), to gain privilege escalation on the vulnerable machine. This exploit attacks a critical Windows Print Spooler Vulnerability to elevate privilege. This detection is to look for suspicious process access made by the spoolsv.exe that may related to the attack. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic identifies a suspicious behavior related to PrintNightmare, or CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675), to gain privilege escalation on the vulnerable machine. This exploit attacks a critical Windows Print Spooler Vulnerability to elevate privilege. This detection is to look for suspicious process access made by the spoolsv.exe that may related to the attack. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with process access event where SourceImage, TargetImage, GrantedAccess and CallTrace executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of spoolsv.exe. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown. Filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-01 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-01 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Spoolsv Suspicious Process Access - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = $SourceImage$ was GrantedAccess open access to $TargetImage$ on endpoint $Computer$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}, {"threat_object_field": "ProcessID", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "TargetImage", "threat_object_type": "process name"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Spoolsv Suspicious Process Access - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Local"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "ProcessID", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "TargetImage", "role": ["Target"], "type": "Process Name"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic identifies a suspicious behavior related to PrintNightmare, or CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675), to gain privilege escalation on the vulnerable machine. This exploit attacks a critical Windows Print Spooler Vulnerability to elevate privilege. This detection is to look for suspicious process access made by the spoolsv.exe that may related to the attack. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Spoolsv Suspicious Process Access -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `sysmon` EventCode=10 SourceImage = "*\\spoolsv.exe" CallTrace = "*\\Windows\\system32\\spool\\DRIVERS\\x64\\*" TargetImage IN ("*\\rundll32.exe", "*\\spoolsv.exe") GrantedAccess = 0x1fffff | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer SourceImage TargetImage GrantedAccess CallTrace EventCode ProcessID| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spoolsv_suspicious_process_access_filter` - -[ESCU - Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies a `.dll` being written by `spoolsv.exe`. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. Typically, this is not normal behavior for `spoolsv.exe` to write a `.dll`. Current POC code used will write the suspicious DLL to disk within a path of `\spool\drivers\x64\`. During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012", "T1547"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies a `.dll` being written by `spoolsv.exe`. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. Typically, this is not normal behavior for `spoolsv.exe` to write a `.dll`. Current POC code used will write the suspicious DLL to disk within a path of `\spool\drivers\x64\`. During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node and `Filesystem` node. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-01 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-01 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = $process_name$ has been identified writing dll's to $file_path$ on endpoint $dest$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}, {"threat_object_field": "process_id", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "file_path", "threat_object_type": "file"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "process_id", "role": ["Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "file_path", "role": ["Other"], "type": "File"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies a `.dll` being written by `spoolsv.exe`. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. Typically, this is not normal behavior for `spoolsv.exe` to write a `.dll`. Current POC code used will write the suspicious DLL to disk within a path of `\spool\drivers\x64\`. During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Spoolsv Writing a DLL -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=spoolsv.exe by _time Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path="*\\spool\\drivers\\x64\\*" Filesystem.file_name="*.dll" by _time Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process] | dedup file_create_time | table dest file_create_time, file_name, file_path, process_name | `spoolsv_writing_a_dll_filter` - -[ESCU - Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Sysmon - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies a `.dll` being written by `spoolsv.exe`. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously(CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. Typically, this is not normal behavior for `spoolsv.exe` to write a `.dll`. Current POC code used will write the suspicious DLL to disk within a path of `\spool\drivers\x64\`. During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012", "T1547"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies a `.dll` being written by `spoolsv.exe`. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously(CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. Typically, this is not normal behavior for `spoolsv.exe` to write a `.dll`. Current POC code used will write the suspicious DLL to disk within a path of `\spool\drivers\x64\`. During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives. Filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-01 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-01 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Sysmon - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = $process_name$ has been identified writing dll's to $file_path$ on endpoint $dest$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}, {"threat_object_field": "process_id", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "file_path", "threat_object_type": "file"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Sysmon - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Local"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "process_id", "role": ["Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "file_path", "role": ["Other"], "type": "File"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies a `.dll` being written by `spoolsv.exe`. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously(CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. Typically, this is not normal behavior for `spoolsv.exe` to write a `.dll`. Current POC code used will write the suspicious DLL to disk within a path of `\spool\drivers\x64\`. During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Sysmon -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `sysmon` EventID=11 process_name=spoolsv.exe file_path="*\\spool\\drivers\\x64\\*" file_name=*.dll | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, UserID, process_name, file_path, file_name, TargetFilename, process_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spoolsv_writing_a_dll___sysmon_filter` - -[ESCU - Sqlite Module In Temp Folder - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search is to detect a suspicious file creation of sqlite3.dll in %temp% folder. This behavior was seen in IcedID malware where it download sqlite module to parse browser database like for chrome or firefox to stole browser information related to bank, credit card or credentials. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1005"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious file creation of sqlite3.dll in %temp% folder. This behavior was seen in IcedID malware where it download sqlite module to parse browser database like for chrome or firefox to stole browser information related to bank, credit card or credentials. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-03 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-03 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Sqlite Module In Temp Folder - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["IcedID"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = process $SourceImage$ create a file $TargetImage$ in host $Computer$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 9}, {"threat_object_field": "SourceImage", "threat_object_type": "process name"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Sqlite Module In Temp Folder - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1005"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "SourceImage", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "process name"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious file creation of sqlite3.dll in %temp% folder. This behavior was seen in IcedID malware where it download sqlite module to parse browser database like for chrome or firefox to stole browser information related to bank, credit card or credentials. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Sqlite Module In Temp Folder -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `sysmon` EventCode=11 (TargetFilename = "*\\sqlite32.dll" OR TargetFilename = "*\\sqlite64.dll") (TargetFilename = "*\\temp\\*") |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by process_name TargetFilename EventCode ProcessId Image | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sqlite_module_in_temp_folder_filter` - -[ESCU - Start Up During Safe Mode Boot - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search is to detect a modification or registry add to the safeboot registry as an autostart mechanism. This technique was seen in some ransomware to automatically execute its code upon a safe mode boot. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.001", "T1547"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a modification or registry add to the safeboot registry as an autostart mechanism. This technique was seen in some ransomware to automatically execute its code upon a safe mode boot. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. -action.escu.known_false_positives = updated windows application needed in safe boot may used this registry -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-26 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-26 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Start Up During Safe Mode Boot - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Safeboot registry $registry_path$ was added or modified with a new value $registry_value_name$ on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Start Up During Safe Mode Boot - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.001", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a modification or registry add to the safeboot registry as an autostart mechanism. This technique was seen in some ransomware to automatically execute its code upon a safe mode boot. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Start Up During Safe Mode Boot -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path="*\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\SafeBoot\\Minimal\*" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `start_up_during_safe_mode_boot_filter` - [ESCU - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -30064,15 +34318,20 @@ action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["NOBELIUM Group"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["NOBELIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1203"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["NOBELIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1203"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = The malware sunburst will load the malicious dll by SolarWinds.BusinessLayerHost.exe. After a period of 12-14 days, the malware will attempt to resolve a subdomain of avsvmcloud.com. This detections will correlate both events. action.notable.param.rule_title = Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -30088,179 +34347,6 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = (`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded=*SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll) OR (`sysmon` EventCode=22 QueryName=*avsvmcloud.com) | eventstats dc(EventCode) AS dc_events | where dc_events=2 | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ImageLoaded) AS ImageLoaded values(QueryName) AS QueryName by host | rename host as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event_filter` -[ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search aims to detect the Supernova webshell used in the SUNBURST attack. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 13", "CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "ID.RA", "PR.PT", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Web"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search aims to detect the Supernova webshell used in the SUNBURST attack. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be monitoring web traffic to your Solarwinds Orion. The logs should be ingested into splunk and populating/mapped to the Web data model. -action.escu.known_false_positives = There might be false positives associted with this detection since items like args as a web argument is pretty generic. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-06 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-06 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["NOBELIUM Group"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["NOBELIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 13", "CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "ID.RA", "PR.PT", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest', 'src'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search aims to detect the Supernova webshell used in the SUNBURST attack. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Supernova Webshell -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Web.Web where web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*codes* OR Web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*clazz* OR Web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*method* OR Web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*args* by Web.src Web.dest Web.url Web.vendor_product Web.user Web.http_user_agent _time span=1s | `supernova_webshell_filter` - -[ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for changes to registry values that control Windows file associations, executed by a process that is not typical for legitimate, routine changes to this area. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT", "PR.IP"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for changes to registry values that control Windows file associations, executed by a process that is not typical for legitimate, routine changes to this area. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on registry changes that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Registry` nodes. -action.escu.known_false_positives = There may be other processes in your environment that users may legitimately use to modify file associations. If this is the case and you are finding false positives, you can modify the search to add those processes as exceptions. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-22 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-22 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT", "PR.IP"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for changes to registry values that control Windows file associations, executed by a process that is not typical for legitimate, routine changes to this area. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious Changes to File Associations -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name!=Explorer.exe AND Processes.process_name!=OpenWith.exe by Processes.process_id Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*\\Explorer\\FileExts* by Registry.process_id Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Registry")` | table process_id dest registry_path]| `suspicious_changes_to_file_associations_filter` - -[ESCU - Suspicious Computer Account Name Change - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = As part of the sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287) exploitation chain, adversaries need to create a new computer account name and rename it to match the name of a domain controller account without the ending '$'. In Windows Active Directory environments, computer account names always end with `$`. This analytic leverages Event Id 4781, `The name of an account was changed`, to identify a computer account rename event with a suspicious name that does not terminate with `$`. This behavior could represent an exploitation attempt of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287 for privilege escalation. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.002"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = As part of the sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287) exploitation chain, adversaries need to create a new computer account name and rename it to match the name of a domain controller account without the ending '$'. In Windows Active Directory environments, computer account names always end with `$`. This analytic leverages Event Id 4781, `The name of an account was changed`, to identify a computer account rename event with a suspicious name that does not terminate with `$`. This behavior could represent an exploitation attempt of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287 for privilege escalation. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows event logs from your hosts. In addition, the Splunk Windows TA is needed. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Renaming a computer account name to a name that not end with '$' is highly unsual and may not have any legitimate scenarios. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-20 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-20 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Computer Account Name Change - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A computer account $Old_Account_Name$ was renamed with a suspicious computer name -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 70}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Computer Account Name Change - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-42287", "CVE-2021-42278"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.002"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = As part of the sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287) exploitation chain, adversaries need to create a new computer account name and rename it to match the name of a domain controller account without the ending '$'. In Windows Active Directory environments, computer account names always end with `$`. This analytic leverages Event Id 4781, `The name of an account was changed`, to identify a computer account rename event with a suspicious name that does not terminate with `$`. This behavior could represent an exploitation attempt of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287 for privilege escalation. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious Computer Account Name Change -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4781 Old_Account_Name="*$" New_Account_Name!="*$" | table _time, ComputerName, Account_Name, Old_Account_Name, New_Account_Name | `suspicious_computer_account_name_change_filter` - -[ESCU - Suspicious Copy on System32 - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious copy of file from systemroot folder of the windows OS. This technique is commonly used by APT or other malware as part of execution (LOLBIN) to run its malicious code using the available legitimate tool in OS. this type of event may seen or may execute of normal user in some instance but this is really a anomaly that needs to be check within the network. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003", "T1036"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to detect a suspicious copy of file from systemroot folder of the windows OS. This technique is commonly used by APT or other malware as part of execution (LOLBIN) to run its malicious code using the available legitimate tool in OS. this type of event may seen or may execute of normal user in some instance but this is really a anomaly that needs to be check within the network. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = every user may do this event but very un-ussual. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-05 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-05 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Copy on System32 - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Unusual Processes"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = execution of copy exe to copy file from $process$ in $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 63}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Copy on System32 - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Unusual Processes"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003", "T1036"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious copy of file from systemroot folder of the windows OS. This technique is commonly used by APT or other malware as part of execution (LOLBIN) to run its malicious code using the available legitimate tool in OS. this type of event may seen or may execute of normal user in some instance but this is really a anomaly that needs to be check within the network. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious Copy on System32 -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN("cmd.exe", "powershell*","pwsh.exe", "sqlps.exe", "sqltoolsps.exe", "powershell_ise.exe") AND `process_copy` AND Processes.process IN("*\\Windows\\System32\*", "*\\Windows\\SysWow64\\*") AND Processes.process = "*copy*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `suspicious_copy_on_system32_filter` - [ESCU - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -30278,15 +34364,20 @@ action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Silver Sparrow", "Ingress Tool Transfer"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Silver Sparrow", "Ingress Tool Transfer"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Silver Sparrow", "Ingress Tool Transfer"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the use of a curl contacting suspicious remote domains to checkin to command and control servers or download further implants. In the context of Silver Sparrow, curl is identified contacting s3.amazonaws.com. This particular behavior is common with MacOS adware-malicious software. action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious Curl Network Connection action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -30302,632 +34393,6 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=curl Processes.process=s3.amazonaws.com by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_curl_network_connection_filter` -[ESCU - Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies DLLHost.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for DLLHost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. DLLHost.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies DLLHost.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for DLLHost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. DLLHost.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-20 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-20 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Cobalt Strike"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious dllhost.exe process with no command line arguments executed on $dest$ by $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 49}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies DLLHost.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for DLLHost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. DLLHost.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_dllhost` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process="(dllhost\.exe.{0,4}$)" | `suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments_filter` - -[ESCU - Suspicious Driver Loaded Path - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic will detect suspicious driver loaded paths. This technique is commonly used by malicious software like coin miners (xmrig) to register its malicious driver from notable directories where executable or drivers do not commonly exist. During triage, validate this driver is for legitimate business use. Review the metadata and certificate information. Unsigned drivers from non-standard paths is not normal, but occurs. In addition, review driver loads into `ntoskrnl.exe` for possible other drivers of interest. Long tail analyze drivers by path (outside of default, and in default) for further review. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.003", "T1543"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic will detect suspicious driver loaded paths. This technique is commonly used by malicious software like coin miners (xmrig) to register its malicious driver from notable directories where executable or drivers do not commonly exist. During triage, validate this driver is for legitimate business use. Review the metadata and certificate information. Unsigned drivers from non-standard paths is not normal, but occurs. In addition, review driver loads into `ntoskrnl.exe` for possible other drivers of interest. Long tail analyze drivers by path (outside of default, and in default) for further review. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the driver loaded and Signature from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives will be present. Some applications do load drivers -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-29 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-29 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Driver Loaded Path - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["XMRig"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious driver $ImageLoaded$ on $Computer$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}, {"threat_object_field": "ImageLoaded", "threat_object_type": "file name"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Driver Loaded Path - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.003", "T1543"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "ImageLoaded", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "File Name"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic will detect suspicious driver loaded paths. This technique is commonly used by malicious software like coin miners (xmrig) to register its malicious driver from notable directories where executable or drivers do not commonly exist. During triage, validate this driver is for legitimate business use. Review the metadata and certificate information. Unsigned drivers from non-standard paths is not normal, but occurs. In addition, review driver loads into `ntoskrnl.exe` for possible other drivers of interest. Long tail analyze drivers by path (outside of default, and in default) for further review. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious Driver Loaded Path -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `sysmon` EventCode=6 ImageLoaded = "*.sys" NOT (ImageLoaded IN("*\\WINDOWS\\inf","*\\WINDOWS\\System32\\drivers\\*", "*\\WINDOWS\\System32\\DriverStore\\FileRepository\\*")) | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer ImageLoaded Hashes IMPHASH Signature Signed | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_driver_loaded_path_filter` - -[ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This detection looks for emails that are suspicious because of their sender, domain rareness, or behavior differences. This is an anomaly generated by Splunk User Behavior Analytics (UBA). -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["UEBA"] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This detection looks for emails that are suspicious because of their sender, domain rareness, or behavior differences. This is an anomaly generated by Splunk User Behavior Analytics (UBA). -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data from email logs and have Splunk integrated with UBA. This anomaly is raised by a UBA detection model called "SuspiciousEmailDetectionModel." Ensure that this model is enabled on your UBA instance. -action.escu.known_false_positives = This detection model will alert on any sender domain that is seen for the first time. This could be a potential false positive. The next step is to investigate and add the URL to an allow list if you determine that it is a legitimate sender. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-22 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-22 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Emails"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Emails"], "cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This detection looks for emails that are suspicious because of their sender, domain rareness, or behavior differences. This is an anomaly generated by Splunk User Behavior Analytics (UBA). -action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly -action.notable.param.security_domain = threat -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = |tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(All_UEBA_Events.category) as category from datamodel=UEBA where nodename=All_UEBA_Events.UEBA_Anomalies All_UEBA_Events.UEBA_Anomalies.uba_model = "SuspiciousEmailDetectionModel" by All_UEBA_Events.description All_UEBA_Events.severity All_UEBA_Events.user All_UEBA_Events.uba_event_type All_UEBA_Events.link All_UEBA_Events.signature All_UEBA_Events.url All_UEBA_Events.UEBA_Anomalies.uba_model | `drop_dm_object_name(All_UEBA_Events)` | `drop_dm_object_name(UEBA_Anomalies)`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_email___uba_anomaly_filter` - -[ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for emails that have attachments with suspicious file extensions. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001", "T1566"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.IP"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Email"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for emails that have attachments with suspicious file extensions. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You need to ingest data from emails. Specifically, the sender's address and the file names of any attachments must be mapped to the Email data model. \ - **Splunk Phantom Playbook Integration**\ -If Splunk Phantom is also configured in your environment, a Playbook called "Suspicious Email Attachment Investigate and Delete" can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/`, and add the correct hostname to the "Phantom Instance" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search. The notable event will be sent to Phantom and the playbook will gather further information about the file attachment and its network behaviors. If Phantom finds malicious behavior and an analyst approves of the results, the email will be deleted from the user's inbox. -action.escu.known_false_positives = None identified -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-22 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-22 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Suspicious Emails"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Suspicious Emails"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001", "T1566"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.IP"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for emails that have attachments with suspicious file extensions. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Email where All_Email.file_name="*" by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.file_name All_Email.message_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Email")` | `suspicious_email_attachments` | `suspicious_email_attachment_extensions_filter` - -[ESCU - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic utilizes Windows Event ID 1100 to identify when Windows event log service is shutdown. Note that this is a voluminous analytic that will require tuning or restricted to specific endpoints based on criticality. This event generates every time Windows Event Log service has shut down. It also generates during normal system shutdown. During triage, based on time of day and user, determine if this was planned. If not planned, follow through with reviewing parallel alerts and other data sources to determine what else may have occurred. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070", "T1070.001"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "PR.IP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.AE"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes Windows Event ID 1100 to identify when Windows event log service is shutdown. Note that this is a voluminous analytic that will require tuning or restricted to specific endpoints based on criticality. This event generates every time Windows Event Log service has shut down. It also generates during normal system shutdown. During triage, based on time of day and user, determine if this was planned. If not planned, follow through with reviewing parallel alerts and other data sources to determine what else may have occurred. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows event logs from your hosts. In addition, the Splunk Windows TA is needed. -action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible the Event Logging service gets shut down due to system errors or legitimately administration tasks. Filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-17 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-17 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Log Manipulation", "Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = The Windows Event Log Service shutdown on $ComputerName$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 9}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Log Manipulation", "Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070", "T1070.001"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "PR.IP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes Windows Event ID 1100 to identify when Windows event log service is shutdown. Note that this is a voluminous analytic that will require tuning or restricted to specific endpoints based on criticality. This event generates every time Windows Event Log service has shut down. It also generates during normal system shutdown. During triage, based on time of day and user, determine if this was planned. If not planned, follow through with reviewing parallel alerts and other data sources to determine what else may have occurred. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = (`wineventlog_security` EventCode=1100) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest Message EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_event_log_service_behavior_filter` - -[ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search looks for files created with names that have been linked to malicious activity. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search looks for files created with names that have been linked to malicious activity. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file system reads and writes. In addition, this search leverages an included lookup file that contains the names of the files to watch for, as well as a note to communicate why that file name is being monitored. This lookup file can be edited to add or remove file the file names you want to monitor. -action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible for a legitimate file to be created with the same name as one noted in the lookup file. Filenames listed in the lookup file should be unique enough that collisions are rare. Looking at the location of the file and the process responsible for the activity can help determine whether or not the activity is legitimate. -action.escu.creation_date = 2019-04-25 -action.escu.modification_date = 2019-04-25 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Hidden Cobra Malware"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Suspicious File Write - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Hidden Cobra Malware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search looks for files created with names that have been linked to malicious activity. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious File Write -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.action) as action values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `suspicious_writes` | `suspicious_file_write_filter` - -[ESCU - Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies gpupdate.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for gpupdate.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. gpupdate.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies gpupdate.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for gpupdate.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. gpupdate.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-20 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-20 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Cobalt Strike"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious gpupdate.exe process with no command line arguments executed on $dest$ by $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 49}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies gpupdate.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for gpupdate.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. gpupdate.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_gpupdate` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process="(gpupdate\.exe.{0,4}$)" | `suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments_filter` - -[ESCU - Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe commandline to execute dll file. This technique was seen in IcedID malware to load its payload dll with the following parameter to load encrypted dll payload which is the license.dat. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe commandline to execute dll file. This technique was seen in IcedID malware to load its payload dll with the following parameter to load encrypted dll payload which is the license.dat. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = limitted. this parameter is not commonly used by windows application but can be used by the network operator. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-26 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-26 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["IcedID"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = rundll32 process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process name"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "process name"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe commandline to execute dll file. This technique was seen in IcedID malware to load its payload dll with the following parameter to load encrypted dll payload which is the license.dat. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*/i:* by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline_filter` - -[ESCU - Suspicious Image Creation In Appdata Folder - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search is to detect a suspicious creation of image in appdata folder made by process that also has a file reference in appdata folder. This technique was seen in remcos rat that capture screenshot of the compromised machine and place it in the appdata and will be send to its C2 server. This TTP is really a good indicator to check that process because it is in suspicious folder path and image files are not commonly created by user in this folder path. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1113"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious creation of image in appdata folder made by process that also has a file reference in appdata folder. This technique was seen in remcos rat that capture screenshot of the compromised machine and place it in the appdata and will be send to its C2 server. This TTP is really a good indicator to check that process because it is in suspicious folder path and image files are not commonly created by user in this folder path. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-21 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-21 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Image Creation In Appdata Folder - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Remcos"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = process $process_name$ creating image file $file_path$ in $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process name"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Image Creation In Appdata Folder - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1113"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "process name"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious creation of image in appdata folder made by process that also has a file reference in appdata folder. This technique was seen in remcos rat that capture screenshot of the compromised machine and place it in the appdata and will be send to its C2 server. This TTP is really a good indicator to check that process because it is in suspicious folder path and image files are not commonly created by user in this folder path. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious Image Creation In Appdata Folder -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=*.exe Processes.process_path="*\\appdata\\Roaming\\*" by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN ("*.png","*.jpg","*.bmp","*.gif","*.tiff") Filesystem.file_path = "*\\appdata\\Roaming\\*" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process] | `suspicious_image_creation_in_appdata_folder_filter` - -[ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for suspicious Java classes that are often used to exploit remote command execution in common Java frameworks, such as Apache Struts. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for suspicious Java classes that are often used to exploit remote command execution in common Java frameworks, such as Apache Struts. -action.escu.how_to_implement = In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from your web-traffic appliances that serve or sit in the path of your Struts application servers. This can be accomplished by indexing data from a web proxy, or by using network traffic-analysis tools, such as Splunk Stream or Bro. -action.escu.known_false_positives = There are no known false positives. -action.escu.creation_date = 2018-12-06 -action.escu.modification_date = 2018-12-06 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Apache Struts Vulnerability"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Apache Struts Vulnerability"], "cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest', 'src'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for suspicious Java classes that are often used to exploit remote command execution in common Java frameworks, such as Apache Struts. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious Java Classes -action.notable.param.security_domain = threat -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `stream_http` http_method=POST http_content_length>1 | regex form_data="(?i)java\.lang\.(?:runtime|processbuilder)" | rename src_ip as src | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime, values(url) as uri, values(status) as status, values(http_user_agent) as http_user_agent by src, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_java_classes_filter` - -[ESCU - Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = As part of the sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287) exploitation chain, adversaries will request and obtain a Kerberos Service Ticket (TGS) with a domain controller computer account as the Service Name. This Service Ticket can be then used to take control of the domain controller on the final part of the attack. This analytic leverages Event Id 4769, `A Kerberos service ticket was requested`, to identify an unusual TGS request where the Account_Name requesting the ticket matches the Service_Name field. This behavior could represent an exploitation attempt of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287 for privilege escalation. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.002"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = As part of the sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287) exploitation chain, adversaries will request and obtain a Kerberos Service Ticket (TGS) with a domain controller computer account as the Service Name. This Service Ticket can be then used to take control of the domain controller on the final part of the attack. This analytic leverages Event Id 4769, `A Kerberos service ticket was requested`, to identify an unusual TGS request where the Account_Name requesting the ticket matches the Service_Name field. This behavior could represent an exploitation attempt of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287 for privilege escalation. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled. -action.escu.known_false_positives = We have tested this detection logic with ~2 million 4769 events and did not identify false positives. However, they may be possible in certain environments. Filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-20 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-20 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket was requested by $Account_Name$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 60}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-42287", "CVE-2021-42278"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.002"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = As part of the sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287) exploitation chain, adversaries will request and obtain a Kerberos Service Ticket (TGS) with a domain controller computer account as the Service Name. This Service Ticket can be then used to take control of the domain controller on the final part of the attack. This analytic leverages Event Id 4769, `A Kerberos service ticket was requested`, to identify an unusual TGS request where the Account_Name requesting the ticket matches the Service_Name field. This behavior could represent an exploitation attempt of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287 for privilege escalation. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769 | eval isSuspicious = if(lower(Service_Name) = lower(mvindex(split(Account_Name,"@"),0)+"$"),1,0) | where isSuspicious = 1 | table _time, Client_Address, Account_Name, Service_Name, Failure_Code, isSuspicious | `suspicious_kerberos_service_ticket_request_filter` - -[ESCU - Suspicious Linux Discovery Commands - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search, detects execution of suspicious bash commands from various commonly leveraged bash scripts like (AutoSUID, LinEnum, LinPeas) to perform discovery of possible paths of privilege execution, password files, vulnerable directories, executables and file permissions on a Linux host.\ -The search logic specifically looks for high number of distinct commands run in a short period of time. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.004"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search, detects execution of suspicious bash commands from various commonly leveraged bash scripts like (AutoSUID, LinEnum, LinPeas) to perform discovery of possible paths of privilege execution, password files, vulnerable directories, executables and file permissions on a Linux host.\ -The search logic specifically looks for high number of distinct commands run in a short period of time. -action.escu.how_to_implement = This detection search is based on Splunk add-on for Microsoft Sysmon-Linux.(https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/6176/). Please install this add-on to parse fields correctly and execute detection search. Consider customizing the time window and threshold values according to your environment. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Unless an administrator is using these commands to troubleshoot or audit a system, the execution of these commands should be monitored. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-06 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-06 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Linux Discovery Commands - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Linux Post-Exploitation"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious Linux Discovery Commands detected on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 81}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Linux Discovery Commands - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Post-Exploitation"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.004"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search, detects execution of suspicious bash commands from various commonly leveraged bash scripts like (AutoSUID, LinEnum, LinPeas) to perform discovery of possible paths of privilege execution, password files, vulnerable directories, executables and file permissions on a Linux host.\ -The search logic specifically looks for high number of distinct commands run in a short period of time. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious Linux Discovery Commands -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) values(Processes.process_name) values(Processes.parent_process_name) dc(Processes.process) as distinct_commands dc(Processes.process_name) as distinct_process_names min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where [|inputlookup linux_tool_discovery_process.csv | rename process as Processes.process |table Processes.process] by _time span=5m Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| where distinct_commands > 40 AND distinct_process_names > 3| `suspicious_linux_discovery_commands_filter` - -[ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies renamed instances of msbuild.exe executing. Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319 and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319. During investigation, identify the code executed and what is executing a renamed instance of MSBuild. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1127", "T1036.003", "T1127.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies renamed instances of msbuild.exe executing. Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319 and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319. During investigation, identify the code executed and what is executing a renamed instance of MSBuild. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of msbuild, triggering a false positive. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-12 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-12 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild", "Cobalt Strike", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious renamed msbuild.exe binary ran on $dest$ by $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 63}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild", "Cobalt Strike", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1127", "T1036.003", "T1127.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies renamed instances of msbuild.exe executing. Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319 and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319. During investigation, identify the code executed and what is executing a renamed instance of MSBuild. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious MSBuild Rename -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_msbuild` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_msbuild_rename_filter` - -[ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Spawn - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning msbuild.exe. This behavior is indicative of a COM object being utilized to spawn msbuild from wmiprvse.exe. It is common for MSBuild.exe to be spawned from devenv.exe while using Visual Studio. In this instance, there will be command line arguments and file paths. In a malicious instance, MSBuild.exe will spawn from non-standard processes and have no command line arguments. For example, MSBuild.exe spawning from explorer.exe, powershell.exe is far less common and should be investigated. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1127", "T1127.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning msbuild.exe. This behavior is indicative of a COM object being utilized to spawn msbuild from wmiprvse.exe. It is common for MSBuild.exe to be spawned from devenv.exe while using Visual Studio. In this instance, there will be command line arguments and file paths. In a malicious instance, MSBuild.exe will spawn from non-standard processes and have no command line arguments. For example, MSBuild.exe spawning from explorer.exe, powershell.exe is far less common and should be investigated. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-12 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-12 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Spawn - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious msbuild.exe process executed on $dest$ by $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 42}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Spawn - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1127", "T1127.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning msbuild.exe. This behavior is indicative of a COM object being utilized to spawn msbuild from wmiprvse.exe. It is common for MSBuild.exe to be spawned from devenv.exe while using Visual Studio. In this instance, there will be command line arguments and file paths. In a malicious instance, MSBuild.exe will spawn from non-standard processes and have no command line arguments. For example, MSBuild.exe spawning from explorer.exe, powershell.exe is far less common and should be investigated. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious MSBuild Spawn -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe AND `process_msbuild` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_msbuild_spawn_filter` - [ESCU - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -30959,15 +34424,20 @@ action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Silver Sparrow"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Silver Sparrow"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.001", "T1543"]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Silver Sparrow"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.001", "T1543"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the use of a native MacOS utility, PlistBuddy, creating or modifying a properly list (.plist) file. In the instance of Silver Sparrow, the following commands were executed:\ - PlistBuddy -c "Add :Label string init_verx" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \ - PlistBuddy -c "Add :RunAtLoad bool true" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \ @@ -31021,14 +34491,20 @@ action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Silver Sparrow"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "dest", "threat_object_type": "other"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage via OSquery - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Silver Sparrow"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.001", "T1543"]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Silver Sparrow"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.001", "T1543"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Other"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the use of a native MacOS utility, PlistBuddy, creating or modifying a properly list (.plist) file. In the instance of Silver Sparrow, the following commands were executed:\ - PlistBuddy -c "Add :Label string init_verx" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \ - PlistBuddy -c "Add :RunAtLoad bool true" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \ @@ -31051,464 +34527,6 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = `osquery_process` "columns.cmdline"="*LaunchAgents*" OR "columns.cmdline"="*RunAtLoad*" OR "columns.cmdline"="*true*" | `suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_via_osquery_filter` -[ESCU - Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic detects a suspicious process making a DNS query via known, abused text-paste web services, VoIP, instant messaging, and digital distribution platforms used to download external files. This technique is abused by adversaries, malware actors, and red teams to download a malicious file on the target host. This is a good TTP indicator for possible initial access techniques. A user will experience false positives if the following instant messaging is allowed or common applications like telegram or discord are allowed in the corporate network. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.005", "T1059"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic detects a suspicious process making a DNS query via known, abused text-paste web services, VoIP, instant messaging, and digital distribution platforms used to download external files. This technique is abused by adversaries, malware actors, and red teams to download a malicious file on the target host. This is a good TTP indicator for possible initial access techniques. A user will experience false positives if the following instant messaging is allowed or common applications like telegram or discord are allowed in the corporate network. -action.escu.how_to_implement = This detection relies on sysmon logs with the Event ID 22, DNS Query. We suggest you run this detection at least once a day over the last 14 days. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Noise and false positive can be seen if the following instant messaging is allowed to use within corporate network. In this case, a filter is needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-18 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-18 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Remcos", "WhisperGate"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = suspicious process $process_name$ has a dns query in $QueryName$ on $Computer$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process name"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Remcos", "WhisperGate"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.005", "T1059"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "process name"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic detects a suspicious process making a DNS query via known, abused text-paste web services, VoIP, instant messaging, and digital distribution platforms used to download external files. This technique is abused by adversaries, malware actors, and red teams to download a malicious file on the target host. This is a good TTP indicator for possible initial access techniques. A user will experience false positives if the following instant messaging is allowed or common applications like telegram or discord are allowed in the corporate network. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `sysmon` EventCode=22 QueryName IN ("*pastebin*", "*discord*", "*telegram*", "*t.me*") process_name IN ("cmd.exe", "*powershell*", "pwsh.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image QueryName QueryStatus process_name QueryResults Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services_filter` - -[ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic will detect a suspicious process running in a file path where a process is not commonly seen and is most commonly used by malicious software. This behavior has been used by adversaries where they drop and run an exe in a path that is accessible without admin privileges. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic will detect a suspicious process running in a file path where a process is not commonly seen and is most commonly used by malicious software. This behavior has been used by adversaries where they drop and run an exe in a path that is accessible without admin privileges. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may allow execution of specific binaries in non-standard paths. Filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-05-05 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-05-05 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["XMRig", "Remcos", "WhisperGate", "Hermetic Wiper"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicioues process $Processes.process_path.file_path$ running from suspicious location -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 35}, {"threat_object_field": "Processes.process_path.file_path", "threat_object_type": "file name"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig", "Remcos", "WhisperGate", "Hermetic Wiper"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "Processes.process_path.file_path", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "File Name"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic will detect a suspicious process running in a file path where a process is not commonly seen and is most commonly used by malicious software. This behavior has been used by adversaries where they drop and run an exe in a path that is accessible without admin privileges. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious Process File Path -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_path = "*\\windows\\fonts\\*" OR Processes.process_path = "*\\windows\\temp\\*" OR Processes.process_path = "*\\users\\public\\*" OR Processes.process_path = "*\\windows\\debug\\*" OR Processes.process_path.file_path = "*\\Users\\Administrator\\Music\\*" OR Processes.process_path.file_path = "*\\Windows\\servicing\\*" OR Processes.process_path.file_path = "*\\Users\\Default\\*" OR Processes.process_path.file_path = "*Recycle.bin*" OR Processes.process_path = "*\\Windows\\Media\\*" OR Processes.process_path = "\\Windows\\repair\\*" OR Processes.process_path = "*\\temp\\*" OR Processes.process_path = "*\\PerfLogs\\*" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_path Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_process_file_path_filter` - -[ESCU - Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic identifies a process making a DNS query to Discord, a well known instant messaging and digital distribution platform. Discord can be abused by adversaries, as seen in the WhisperGate campaign, to host and download malicious. external files. A process resolving a Discord DNS name could be an indicator of malware trying to download files from Discord for further execution. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.005", "T1059"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic identifies a process making a DNS query to Discord, a well known instant messaging and digital distribution platform. Discord can be abused by adversaries, as seen in the WhisperGate campaign, to host and download malicious. external files. A process resolving a Discord DNS name could be an indicator of malware trying to download files from Discord for further execution. -action.escu.how_to_implement = his detection relies on sysmon logs with the Event ID 22, DNS Query. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Noise and false positive can be seen if the following instant messaging is allowed to use within corporate network. In this case, a filter is needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-19 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-19 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["WhisperGate"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = suspicious process $process_name$ has a dns query in $QueryName$ on $Computer$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process name"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["WhisperGate"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.005", "T1059"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "process name"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic identifies a process making a DNS query to Discord, a well known instant messaging and digital distribution platform. Discord can be abused by adversaries, as seen in the WhisperGate campaign, to host and download malicious. external files. A process resolving a Discord DNS name could be an indicator of malware trying to download files from Discord for further execution. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `sysmon` EventCode=22 QueryName IN ("*discord*") process_path != "*\\AppData\\Local\\Discord\\*" AND process_path != "*\\Program Files*" AND process_name != "discord.exe" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image QueryName QueryStatus process_name QueryResults Computer process_path | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query_filter` - -[ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for reg.exe being launched from a command prompt not started by the user. When a user launches cmd.exe, the parent process is usually explorer.exe. This search filters out those instances. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for reg.exe being launched from a command prompt not started by the user. When a user launches cmd.exe, the parent process is usually explorer.exe. This search filters out those instances. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible for system administrators to write scripts that exhibit this behavior. If this is the case, the search will need to be modified to filter them out. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-22 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-22 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Disabling Security Tools", "DHS Report TA18-074A"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious $Processes.process_path.file_path$ process running with an uncommon parent process $Processes.parent_process_name$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 35}, {"threat_object_field": "Processes.process_path.file_path", "threat_object_type": "file name"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Disabling Security Tools", "DHS Report TA18-074A"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "Processes.process_path.file_path", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "File Name"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for reg.exe being launched from a command prompt not started by the user. When a user launches cmd.exe, the parent process is usually explorer.exe. This search filters out those instances. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious Reg exe Process -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name != explorer.exe Processes.process_name =cmd.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=cmd.exe Processes.process_name= reg.exe by Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename parent_process_id as process_id |dedup process_id| table process_id dest] | `suspicious_reg_exe_process_filter` - -[ESCU - Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code by using non-standard file extensions to load malciious DLLs. Upon investigating, look for network connections to remote destinations (internal or external). Review additional parrallel processes and child processes for additional activity. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.010"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code by using non-standard file extensions to load malciious DLLs. Upon investigating, look for network connections to remote destinations (internal or external). Review additional parrallel processes and child processes for additional activity. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. Tune the query by filtering additional extensions found to be used by legitimate processes. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives with the query restricted to specified paths. Add more world writeable paths as tuning continues. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-28 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-28 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", "Iceid"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious $Processes.process_path.file_path$ process potentially loading malicious code -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 35}, {"threat_object_field": "Processes.process_path.file_path", "threat_object_type": "file name"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", "Iceid"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.010"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "Processes.process_path.file_path", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "File Name"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code by using non-standard file extensions to load malciious DLLs. Upon investigating, look for network connections to remote destinations (internal or external). Review additional parrallel processes and child processes for additional activity. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` (Processes.process=*appdata* OR Processes.process=*programdata* OR Processes.process=*windows\temp*) (Processes.process!=*.dll Processes.process!=*.ax Processes.process!=*.ocx) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path_filter` - -[ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 PluginInit - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe process with plugininit parameter. This technique is commonly seen in IceID malware to execute its initial dll stager to download another payload to the compromised machine. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe process with plugininit parameter. This technique is commonly seen in IceID malware to execute its initial dll stager to download another payload to the compromised machine. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = third party application may used this dll export name to execute function. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-26 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-26 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 PluginInit - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["IcedID"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = rundll32 process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process name"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 PluginInit - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "process name"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe process with plugininit parameter. This technique is commonly seen in IceID malware to execute its initial dll stager to download another payload to the compromised machine. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious Rundll32 PluginInit -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*PluginInit* by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_plugininit_filter` - -[ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following hunting analytic identifies renamed instances of rundll32.exe executing. rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. During investigation, validate it is the legitimate rundll32.exe executing and what script content it is loading. This query relies on the original filename or internal name from the PE meta data. Expand the query as needed by looking for specific command line arguments outlined in other analytics. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1036", "T1218.011", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following hunting analytic identifies renamed instances of rundll32.exe executing. rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. During investigation, validate it is the legitimate rundll32.exe executing and what script content it is loading. This query relies on the original filename or internal name from the PE meta data. Expand the query as needed by looking for specific command line arguments outlined in other analytics. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-01 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-01 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious renamed rundll32.exe binary ran on $dest$ by $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 63}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1036", "T1218.011", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following hunting analytic identifies renamed instances of rundll32.exe executing. rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. During investigation, validate it is the legitimate rundll32.exe executing and what script content it is loading. This query relies on the original filename or internal name from the PE meta data. Expand the query as needed by looking for specific command line arguments outlined in other analytics. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious Rundll32 Rename -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_rename_filter` - -[ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe executing a DLL function name, Start and StartW, on the command line that is commonly observed with Cobalt Strike x86 and x64 DLL payloads. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. Typically, the DLL will be written and loaded from a world writeable path or user location. In most instances it will not have a valid certificate (Unsigned). During investigation, review the parent process and other parallel application execution. Capture and triage the DLL in question. In the instance of Cobalt Strike, rundll32.exe is the default process it opens and injects shellcode into. This default process can be changed, but typically is not. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe executing a DLL function name, Start and StartW, on the command line that is commonly observed with Cobalt Strike x86 and x64 DLL payloads. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. Typically, the DLL will be written and loaded from a world writeable path or user location. In most instances it will not have a valid certificate (Unsigned). During investigation, review the parent process and other parallel application execution. Capture and triage the DLL in question. In the instance of Cobalt Strike, rundll32.exe is the default process it opens and injects shellcode into. This default process can be changed, but typically is not. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use Start as a function and call it via the command line. Filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-02-04 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-02-04 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Cobalt Strike", "Trickbot"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = rundll32.exe running with suspicious parameters on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 35}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 35}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Cobalt Strike", "Trickbot"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe executing a DLL function name, Start and StartW, on the command line that is commonly observed with Cobalt Strike x86 and x64 DLL payloads. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. Typically, the DLL will be written and loaded from a world writeable path or user location. In most instances it will not have a valid certificate (Unsigned). During investigation, review the parent process and other parallel application execution. Capture and triage the DLL in question. In the instance of Cobalt Strike, rundll32.exe is the default process it opens and injects shellcode into. This default process can be changed, but typically is not. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious Rundll32 StartW -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*start* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_startw_filter` - -[ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe using dllregisterserver on the command line to load a DLL. When a DLL is registered, the DllRegisterServer method entry point in the DLL is invoked. This is typically seen when a DLL is being registered on the system. Not every instance is considered malicious, but it will capture malicious use of it. During investigation, review the parent process and parrellel processes executing. Capture the DLL being loaded and inspect further. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe using dllregisterserver on the command line to load a DLL. When a DLL is registered, the DllRegisterServer method entry point in the DLL is invoked. This is typically seen when a DLL is being registered on the system. Not every instance is considered malicious, but it will capture malicious use of it. During investigation, review the parent process and parrellel processes executing. Capture the DLL being loaded and inspect further. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = This is likely to produce false positives and will require some filtering. Tune the query by adding command line paths to known good DLLs, or filtering based on parent process names. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-02-09 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-02-09 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = $Processes.process_path.file_path$ process potentially loading malicious code -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 35}, {"threat_object_field": "Processes.process_path.file_path", "threat_object_type": "file name"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "Processes.process_path.file_path", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "File Name"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe using dllregisterserver on the command line to load a DLL. When a DLL is registered, the DllRegisterServer method entry point in the DLL is invoked. This is typically seen when a DLL is being registered on the system. Not every instance is considered malicious, but it will capture malicious use of it. During investigation, review the parent process and parrellel processes executing. Capture the DLL being loaded and inspect further. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*dllregisterserver* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver_filter` - -[ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for rundll32.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for rundll32.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-20 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-20 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Cobalt Strike", "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious rundll32.exe process with no command line arguments executed on $dest$ by $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 49}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Cobalt Strike", "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for rundll32.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process="(rundll32\.exe.{0,4}$)" | `suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments_filter` - [ESCU - Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -31526,15 +34544,20 @@ action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Silver Sparrow"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Silver Sparrow"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1074"]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Silver Sparrow"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1074"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the use of a SQLite3 querying the MacOS preferences to identify the original URL the pkg was downloaded from. This particular behavior is common with MacOS adware-malicious software. Upon triage, review other processes in parallel for suspicious activity. Identify any recent package installations. action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -31550,1417 +34573,12 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=sqlite3 Processes.process=*LSQuarantine* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_sqlite3_lsquarantine_behavior_filter` -[ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following detection identifies Scheduled Tasks registering (creating a new task) a binary or script to run from a public directory which includes users\public, \programdata\ and \windows\temp. Upon triage, review the binary or script in the command line for legitimacy, whether an approved binary/script or not. In addition, capture the binary or script in question and analyze for further behaviors. Identify the source and contain the endpoint. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1053"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following detection identifies Scheduled Tasks registering (creating a new task) a binary or script to run from a public directory which includes users\public, \programdata\ and \windows\temp. Upon triage, review the binary or script in the command line for legitimacy, whether an approved binary/script or not. In addition, capture the binary or script in question and analyze for further behaviors. Identify the source and contain the endpoint. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present. Filter as needed by parent process or command line argument. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-01 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-01 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Windows Persistence Techniques"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious scheduled task registered on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 35}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 35}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following detection identifies Scheduled Tasks registering (creating a new task) a binary or script to run from a public directory which includes users\public, \programdata\ and \windows\temp. Upon triage, review the binary or script in the command line for legitimacy, whether an approved binary/script or not. In addition, capture the binary or script in question and analyze for further behaviors. Identify the source and contain the endpoint. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe (Processes.process=*\\users\\public\\* OR Processes.process=*\\programdata\\* OR Processes.process=*windows\\temp*) Processes.process=*/create* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory_filter` - -[ESCU - Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies searchprotocolhost.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for searchprotocolhost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. searchprotocolhost.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies searchprotocolhost.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for searchprotocolhost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. searchprotocolhost.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-20 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-20 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Cobalt Strike"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious searchprotocolhost.exe process with no command line arguments executed on $dest$ by $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 49}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies searchprotocolhost.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for searchprotocolhost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. searchprotocolhost.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=searchprotocolhost.exe by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process="(searchprotocolhost\.exe.{0,4}$)" | `suspicious_searchprotocolhost_no_command_line_arguments_filter` - -[ESCU - Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = As part of the sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287) exploitation chain, adversaries will need to request a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) on behalf of the newly created and renamed computer account. The TGT request will be preceded by a computer account name event. This analytic leverages Event Id 4781, `The name of an account was changed` and event Id 4768 `A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested` to correlate a sequence of events where the new computer account on event id 4781 matches the request account on event id 4768. This behavior could represent an exploitation attempt of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287 for privilege escalation. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.002"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = As part of the sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287) exploitation chain, adversaries will need to request a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) on behalf of the newly created and renamed computer account. The TGT request will be preceded by a computer account name event. This analytic leverages Event Id 4781, `The name of an account was changed` and event Id 4768 `A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested` to correlate a sequence of events where the new computer account on event id 4781 matches the request account on event id 4768. This behavior could represent an exploitation attempt of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287 for privilege escalation. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled. -action.escu.known_false_positives = A computer account name change event inmediately followed by a kerberos TGT request with matching fields is unsual. However, legitimate behavior may trigger it. Filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-21 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-21 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A suspicious TGT was requested was requested -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 60}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.002"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = As part of the sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287) exploitation chain, adversaries will need to request a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) on behalf of the newly created and renamed computer account. The TGT request will be preceded by a computer account name event. This analytic leverages Event Id 4781, `The name of an account was changed` and event Id 4768 `A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested` to correlate a sequence of events where the new computer account on event id 4781 matches the request account on event id 4768. This behavior could represent an exploitation attempt of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287 for privilege escalation. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `wineventlog_security` (EventCode=4781 Old_Account_Name="*$" New_Account_Name!="*$") OR (EventCode=4768 Account_Name!="*$") | eval RenamedComputerAccount = coalesce(New_Account_Name, mvindex(Account_Name,0)) | transaction RenamedComputerAccount startswith=(EventCode=4781) endswith=(EventCode=4768) | eval short_lived=case((duration<2),"TRUE") | search short_lived = TRUE | table _time, ComputerName, EventCode, Account_Name,RenamedComputerAccount, short_lived |`suspicious_ticket_granting_ticket_request_filter` - -[ESCU - Suspicious WAV file in Appdata Folder - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious creation of .wav file in appdata folder. This behavior was seen in Remcos RAT malware where it put the audio recording in the appdata\audio folde as part of data collection. this recording can be send to its C2 server as part of its exfiltration to the compromised machine. creation of wav files in this folder path is not a ussual disk place used by user to save audio format file. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1113"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to detect a suspicious creation of .wav file in appdata folder. This behavior was seen in Remcos RAT malware where it put the audio recording in the appdata\audio folde as part of data collection. this recording can be send to its C2 server as part of its exfiltration to the compromised machine. creation of wav files in this folder path is not a ussual disk place used by user to save audio format file. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, file_name, file_path and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-21 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-21 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious WAV file in Appdata Folder - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Remcos"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = process $process_name$ creating image file $file_path$ in $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process name"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious WAV file in Appdata Folder - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1113"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "process name"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious creation of .wav file in appdata folder. This behavior was seen in Remcos RAT malware where it put the audio recording in the appdata\audio folde as part of data collection. this recording can be send to its C2 server as part of its exfiltration to the compromised machine. creation of wav files in this folder path is not a ussual disk place used by user to save audio format file. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious WAV file in Appdata Folder -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=*.exe Processes.process_path="*\\appdata\\Roaming\\*" by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN ("*.wav") Filesystem.file_path = "*\\appdata\\Roaming\\*" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields file_name file_path process_name process_path process dest file_create_time _time ] | `suspicious_wav_file_in_appdata_folder_filter` - -[ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies a renamed instance of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe. Microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319 and is rarely utilized. When investigating, identify the executed code on disk and review. A spawned child process from microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is uncommon. In any instance, microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe spawning from an Office product or any living off the land binary is highly suspect. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1127", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies a renamed instance of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe. Microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319 and is rarely utilized. When investigating, identify the executed code on disk and review. A spawned child process from microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is uncommon. In any instance, microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe spawning from an Office product or any living off the land binary is highly suspect. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe, triggering a false positive. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-20 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-20 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "Cobalt Strike", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious renamed microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe binary ran on $dest$ by $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 63}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "Cobalt Strike", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1127", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies a renamed instance of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe. Microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319 and is rarely utilized. When investigating, identify the executed code on disk and review. A spawned child process from microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is uncommon. In any instance, microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe spawning from an Office product or any living off the land binary is highly suspect. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_microsoftworkflowcompiler` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename_filter` - -[ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe usage. microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319 and is rarely utilized. When investigating, identify the executed code on disk and review. It is not a commonly used process by many applications. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1127"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe usage. microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319 and is rarely utilized. When investigating, identify the executed code on disk and review. It is not a commonly used process by many applications. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, limited instances have been identified coming from native Microsoft utilities similar to SCCM. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-12 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-12 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe process ran on $dest$ by $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 35}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 35}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1127"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe usage. microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319 and is rarely utilized. When investigating, identify the executed code on disk and review. It is not a commonly used process by many applications. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_microsoftworkflowcompiler` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage_filter` - -[ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies msbuild.exe executing from a non-standard path. Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319 and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319. Instances of Visual Studio will run a copy of msbuild.exe. A moved instance of MSBuild is suspicious, however there are instances of build applications that will move or use a copy of MSBuild. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1127", "T1036.003", "T1127.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies msbuild.exe executing from a non-standard path. Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319 and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319. Instances of Visual Studio will run a copy of msbuild.exe. A moved instance of MSBuild is suspicious, however there are instances of build applications that will move or use a copy of MSBuild. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of msbuild.exe, triggering a false positive. Baselining of MSBuild.exe usage is recommended to better understand it's path usage. Visual Studio runs an instance out of a path that will need to be filtered on. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-12 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-12 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild", "Cobalt Strike", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Msbuild.exe ran from an uncommon path on $dest$ execyted by $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 49}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild", "Cobalt Strike", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1127", "T1036.003", "T1127.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies msbuild.exe executing from a non-standard path. Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319 and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319. Instances of Visual Studio will run a copy of msbuild.exe. A moved instance of MSBuild is suspicious, however there are instances of build applications that will move or use a copy of MSBuild. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious msbuild path -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_msbuild` AND (Processes.process_path!=c:\\windows\\microsoft.net\\framework*\\v*\\*) by Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `suspicious_msbuild_path_filter` - -[ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies child processes spawning from "mshta.exe". The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, parent process "mshta.exe" and its child process. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies child processes spawning from "mshta.exe". The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, parent process "mshta.exe" and its child process. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-12 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-12 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious MSHTA Activity"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = suspicious mshta child process detected on host $dest$ by user $user$. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 40}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 40}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process", "threat_object_type": "process name"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious MSHTA Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "parent_process", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process Name"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies child processes spawning from "mshta.exe". The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, parent process "mshta.exe" and its child process. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious mshta child process -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=mshta.exe AND (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=colorcpl.exe OR Processes.process_name=msbuild.exe OR Processes.process_name=microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe OR Processes.process_name=searchprotocolhost.exe OR Processes.process_name=scrcons.exe OR Processes.process_name=cscript.exe OR Processes.process_name=wscript.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=cmd.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_mshta_child_process_filter` - -[ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning mshta.exe. This behavior is indicative of a DCOM object being utilized to spawn mshta from wmiprvse.exe or svchost.exe. In this instance, adversaries may use LethalHTA that will spawn mshta.exe from svchost.exe. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning mshta.exe. This behavior is indicative of a DCOM object being utilized to spawn mshta from wmiprvse.exe or svchost.exe. In this instance, adversaries may use LethalHTA that will spawn mshta.exe from svchost.exe. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-20 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-20 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious MSHTA Activity"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = mshta.exe spawned by wmiprvse.exe on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious MSHTA Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning mshta.exe. This behavior is indicative of a DCOM object being utilized to spawn mshta from wmiprvse.exe or svchost.exe. In this instance, adversaries may use LethalHTA that will spawn mshta.exe from svchost.exe. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious mshta spawn -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=svchost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe) AND `process_mshta` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.user Processes.original_file_name| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_mshta_spawn_filter` - -[ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The wevtutil.exe application is the windows event log utility. This searches for wevtutil.exe with parameters for clearing the application, security, setup, trace or system event logs. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070.001", "T1070"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.AE"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The wevtutil.exe application is the windows event log utility. This searches for wevtutil.exe with parameters for clearing the application, security, setup, trace or system event logs. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -action.escu.known_false_positives = The wevtutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows event log utility. Administrators may use it to manage Windows event logs. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-11 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-11 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Log Manipulation", "Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Wevtutil.exe being used to clear Event Logs on $dest$ by $user$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 28}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 28}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Log Manipulation", "Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070.001", "T1070"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The wevtutil.exe application is the windows event log utility. This searches for wevtutil.exe with parameters for clearing the application, security, setup, trace or system event logs. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious wevtutil Usage -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wevtutil.exe Processes.process IN ("* cl *", "*clear-log*") (Processes.process="*System*" OR Processes.process="*Security*" OR Processes.process="*Setup*" OR Processes.process="*Application*" OR Processes.process="*trace*") by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_wevtutil_usage_filter` - -[ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search detects writes to the 'System Volume Information' folder by something other than the System process. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search detects writes to the 'System Volume Information' folder by something other than the System process. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You need to be ingesting logs with both the process name and command-line from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible that other utilities or system processes may legitimately write to this folder. Investigate and modify the search to include exceptions as appropriate. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-22 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-22 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Collection and Staging"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Collection and Staging"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search detects writes to the 'System Volume Information' folder by something other than the System process. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious writes to System Volume Information -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = (`sysmon` OR tag=process) EventCode=11 process_id!=4 file_path=*System\ Volume\ Information* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Image, file_path | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information_filter` - -[ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search detects writes to the recycle bin by a process other than explorer.exe. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search detects writes to the recycle bin by a process other than explorer.exe. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on filesystem and process logs responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem` nodes. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Because the Recycle Bin is a hidden folder in modern versions of Windows, it would be unusual for a process other than explorer.exe to write to it. Incidents should be investigated as appropriate. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-22 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-22 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Collection and Staging"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin process $Processes.process_name$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 28}, {"threat_object_field": "Processes.process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Collection and Staging"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 40, "mitre_attack": ["T1036"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "Processes.process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search detects writes to the recycle bin by a process other than explorer.exe. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path values(Filesystem.file_name) as file_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path = "*$Recycle.Bin*" by Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Filesystem")`| search [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.user) as user values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name != "explorer.exe" by Processes.process_id Processes.dest| `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | table process_id dest] | `suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin_filter` - -[ESCU - Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies `svchost.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the Task Scheduler and creating a malicious remote scheduled task, the executed command is spawned as a child process of `svchost.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of svchost.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053", "T1053.005"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies `svchost.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the Task Scheduler and creating a malicious remote scheduled task, the executed command is spawned as a child process of `svchost.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of svchost.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-22 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-22 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Svchost.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 54}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053", "T1053.005"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies `svchost.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the Task Scheduler and creating a malicious remote scheduled task, the executed command is spawned as a child process of `svchost.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of svchost.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=svchost.exe) (Processes.process_name IN ("Regsvcs.exe", "Ftp.exe", "OfflineScannerShell.exe", "Rasautou.exe", "Schtasks.exe", "Xwizard.exe", "Pnputil.exe", "Atbroker.exe", "Pcwrun.exe", "Ttdinject.exe","Mshta.exe", "Bitsadmin.exe", "Certoc.exe", "Ieexec.exe", "Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe", "Runscripthelper.exe", "Forfiles.exe", "Msbuild.exe", "Register-cimprovider.exe", "Tttracer.exe", "Ie4uinit.exe", "Bash.exe", "Hh.exe", "SettingSyncHost.exe", "Cmstp.exe", "Stordiag.exe", "Scriptrunner.exe", "Odbcconf.exe", "Extexport.exe", "Msdt.exe", "WorkFolders.exe", "Diskshadow.exe", "Mavinject.exe", "Regasm.exe", "Gpscript.exe", "Regsvr32.exe", "Msiexec.exe", "Wuauclt.exe", "Presentationhost.exe", "Wmic.exe", "Runonce.exe", "Syncappvpublishingserver.exe", "Verclsid.exe", "Infdefaultinstall.exe", "Installutil.exe", "Netsh.exe", "Wab.exe", "Dnscmd.exe", "At.exe", "Pcalua.exe", "Msconfig.exe")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `svchost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter` - -[ESCU - System Info Gathering Using Dxdiag Application - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious dxdiag.exe process command-line execution. Dxdiag is used to collect the system info of the target host. This technique has been used by Remcos RATS, various actors, and other malware to collect information as part of the recon or collection phase of an attack. This behavior should rarely be seen in a corporate network, but this command line can be used by a network administrator to audit host machine specifications. Thus in some rare cases, this detection will contain false positives in its results. To triage further, analyze what commands were passed after it pipes out the result to a file for further processing. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1592"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to detect a suspicious dxdiag.exe process command-line execution. Dxdiag is used to collect the system info of the target host. This technique has been used by Remcos RATS, various actors, and other malware to collect information as part of the recon or collection phase of an attack. This behavior should rarely be seen in a corporate network, but this command line can be used by a network administrator to audit host machine specifications. Thus in some rare cases, this detection will contain false positives in its results. To triage further, analyze what commands were passed after it pipes out the result to a file for further processing. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = This commandline can be used by a network administrator to audit host machine specifications. Thus, a filter is needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-19 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-19 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - System Info Gathering Using Dxdiag Application - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Remcos"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = dxdiag.exe process with commandline $process$ on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - System Info Gathering Using Dxdiag Application - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Reconnaissance"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1592"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious dxdiag.exe process command-line execution. Dxdiag is used to collect the system info of the target host. This technique has been used by Remcos RATS, various actors, and other malware to collect information as part of the recon or collection phase of an attack. This behavior should rarely be seen in a corporate network, but this command line can be used by a network administrator to audit host machine specifications. Thus in some rare cases, this detection will contain false positives in its results. To triage further, analyze what commands were passed after it pipes out the result to a file for further processing. -action.notable.param.rule_title = System Info Gathering Using Dxdiag Application -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_dxdiag` AND Processes.process = "* /t *" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application_filter` - -[ESCU - System Information Discovery Detection - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = Detect system information discovery techniques used by attackers to understand configurations of the system to further exploit it. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1082"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = Detect system information discovery techniques used by attackers to understand configurations of the system to further exploit it. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators debugging servers -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-07 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-07 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - System Information Discovery Detection - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Discovery Techniques"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Potential system information discovery behavior on $dest$ by $User$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 15}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - System Information Discovery Detection - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Discovery Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Recon", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1082"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = Detect system information discovery techniques used by attackers to understand configurations of the system to further exploit it. -action.notable.param.rule_title = System Information Discovery Detection -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process="*wmic* qfe*" OR Processes.process=*systeminfo* OR Processes.process=*hostname*) by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | eventstats dc(process) as dc_processes_by_dest by dest | where dc_processes_by_dest > 2 | stats values(process) as process min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user, dest parent_process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `system_information_discovery_detection_filter` - -[ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for system processes that typically execute from `C:\Windows\System32\` or `C:\Windows\SysWOW64`. This may indicate a malicious process that is trying to hide as a legitimate process.\ -This detection utilizes a lookup that is deduped `system32` and `syswow64` directories from Server 2016 and Windows 10.\ -During triage, review the parallel processes - what process moved the native Windows binary? identify any artifacts on disk and review. If a remote destination is contacted, what is the reputation? -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for system processes that typically execute from `C:\Windows\System32\` or `C:\Windows\SysWOW64`. This may indicate a malicious process that is trying to hide as a legitimate process.\ -This detection utilizes a lookup that is deduped `system32` and `syswow64` directories from Server 2016 and Windows 10.\ -During triage, review the parallel processes - what process moved the native Windows binary? identify any artifacts on disk and review. If a remote destination is contacted, what is the reputation? -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -action.escu.known_false_positives = This detection may require tuning based on third party applications utilizing native Windows binaries in non-standard paths. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-12-08 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-12-08 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Unusual Processes", "Ransomware", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = System process running from unexpected location on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}, {"threat_object_field": "Processes.process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Unusual Processes", "Ransomware", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "Processes.process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for system processes that typically execute from `C:\Windows\System32\` or `C:\Windows\SysWOW64`. This may indicate a malicious process that is trying to hide as a legitimate process.\ -This detection utilizes a lookup that is deduped `system32` and `syswow64` directories from Server 2016 and Windows 10.\ -During triage, review the parallel processes - what process moved the native Windows binary? identify any artifacts on disk and review. If a remote destination is contacted, what is the reputation? -action.notable.param.rule_title = System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_path !="C:\\Windows\\System32*" Processes.process_path !="C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_hash | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `is_windows_system_file` | `system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations_filter` - -[ESCU - System User Discovery With Query - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for the execution of `query.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover the logged user. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage `query.exe` to identify system users on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `query.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover the logged user. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage `query.exe` to identify system users on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-13 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-13 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - System User Discovery With Query - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = System user discovery on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - System User Discovery With Query - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `query.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover the logged user. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage `query.exe` to identify system users on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = System User Discovery With Query -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="query.exe") (Processes.process=*user*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `system_user_discovery_with_query_filter` - -[ESCU - System User Discovery With Whoami - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for the execution of `whoami.exe` without any arguments. This windows native binary prints out the current logged user. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage `whoami.exe` to identify system users on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `whoami.exe` without any arguments. This windows native binary prints out the current logged user. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage `whoami.exe` to identify system users on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-13 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-13 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - System User Discovery With Whoami - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = System user discovery on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - System User Discovery With Whoami - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `whoami.exe` without any arguments. This windows native binary prints out the current logged user. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage `whoami.exe` to identify system users on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = System User Discovery With Whoami -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="whoami.exe") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `system_user_discovery_with_whoami_filter` - -[ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for network traffic identified as The Onion Router (TOR), a benign anonymity network which can be abused for a variety of nefarious purposes. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071", "T1071.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Traffic"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for network traffic identified as The Onion Router (TOR), a benign anonymity network which can be abused for a variety of nefarious purposes. -action.escu.how_to_implement = In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from firewalls or other network control devices that mediate the traffic allowed into an environment. This is necessary so that the search can identify an 'action' taken on the traffic of interest. The search requires the Network_Traffic data model be populated. -action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-22 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-22 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Ransomware", "Command and Control", "NOBELIUM Group"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Ransomware", "Command and Control", "NOBELIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071", "T1071.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for network traffic identified as The Onion Router (TOR), a benign anonymity network which can be abused for a variety of nefarious purposes. -action.notable.param.rule_title = TOR Traffic -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.app=tor AND All_Traffic.action=allowed by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip All_Traffic.dest_port All_Traffic.action | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | `tor_traffic_filter` - -[ESCU - Time Provider Persistence Registry - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of time provider registry for persistence and autostart. This technique can allow the attacker to persist on the compromised host and autostart as soon as the machine boot up. This TTP can be a good indicator of suspicious behavior since this registry is not commonly modified by normal user or even an admin. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.003", "T1547"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of time provider registry for persistence and autostart. This technique can allow the attacker to persist on the compromised host and autostart as soon as the machine boot up. This TTP can be a good indicator of suspicious behavior since this registry is not commonly modified by normal user or even an admin. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-26 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-26 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Time Provider Persistence Registry - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Time Provider Persistence Registry - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Privilege Escalation Persistence"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.003", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of time provider registry for persistence and autostart. This technique can allow the attacker to persist on the compromised host and autostart as soon as the machine boot up. This TTP can be a good indicator of suspicious behavior since this registry is not commonly modified by normal user or even an admin. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Time Provider Persistence Registry -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path ="*\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\W32Time\\TimeProviders*" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `time_provider_persistence_registry_filter` - -[ESCU - Trickbot Named Pipe - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = this search is to detect potential trickbot infection through the create/connected named pipe to the system. This technique is used by trickbot to communicate to its c2 to post or get command during infection. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = this search is to detect potential trickbot infection through the create/connected named pipe to the system. This technique is used by trickbot to communicate to its c2 to post or get command during infection. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and pipename from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. . -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-26 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-26 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Trickbot Named Pipe - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Trickbot"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Possible Trickbot namedpipe created on $Computer$ by $Image$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}, {"threat_object_field": "Image", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Trickbot Named Pipe - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Trickbot"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "Image", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = this search is to detect potential trickbot infection through the create/connected named pipe to the system. This technique is used by trickbot to communicate to its c2 to post or get command during infection. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Trickbot Named Pipe -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `sysmon` EventCode IN (17,18) PipeName="\\pipe\\*lacesomepipe" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer user_id EventCode PipeName signature Image process_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `trickbot_named_pipe_filter` - -[ESCU - UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search is to detect a suspicious loaded unsigned dll by MMC.exe application. This technique is commonly seen in attacker that tries to bypassed UAC feature or gain privilege escalation. This is done by modifying some CLSID registry that will trigger the mmc.exe to load the dll path -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious loaded unsigned dll by MMC.exe application. This technique is commonly seen in attacker that tries to bypassed UAC feature or gain privilege escalation. This is done by modifying some CLSID registry that will trigger the mmc.exe to load the dll path -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown. all of the dll loaded by mmc.exe is microsoft signed dll. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-12 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-12 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious unsigned $ImageLoaded$ loaded by $Image$ on endpoint $Computer$ with EventCode $EventCode$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence,", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Incoming"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious loaded unsigned dll by MMC.exe application. This technique is commonly seen in attacker that tries to bypassed UAC feature or gain privilege escalation. This is done by modifying some CLSID registry that will trigger the mmc.exe to load the dll path -action.notable.param.rule_title = UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded = "*.dll" Image = "*\\mmc.exe" Signed=false Company != "Microsoft Corporation" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded Signed ProcessId OriginalFileName Computer EventCode Company | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll_filter` - -[ESCU - UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search is to detect a possible uac bypass using the colorui.dll COM Object. this technique was seen in so many malware and ransomware like lockbit where it make use of the colorui.dll COM CLSID to bypass UAC. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.003"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a possible uac bypass using the colorui.dll COM Object. this technique was seen in so many malware and ransomware like lockbit where it make use of the colorui.dll COM CLSID to bypass UAC. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -action.escu.known_false_positives = not so common. but 3rd part app may load this dll. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-13 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-13 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = The following module $ImageLoaded$ was loaded by a non-standard application on endpoint $Computer$ by user $user$. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 48}, {"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 48}, {"threat_object_field": "ImageLoaded", "threat_object_type": "other"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "ImageLoaded", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Other"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a possible uac bypass using the colorui.dll COM Object. this technique was seen in so many malware and ransomware like lockbit where it make use of the colorui.dll COM CLSID to bypass UAC. -action.notable.param.rule_title = UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded="*\\colorui.dll" process_name != "colorcpl.exe" NOT(Image IN("*\\windows\\*", "*\\program files*")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name Computer EventCode Signed ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object_filter` - -[ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The fsutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows utility used to perform tasks related to the file allocation table (FAT) and NTFS file systems. The update sequence number (USN) change journal provides a log of all changes made to the files on the disk. This search looks for fsutil.exe deleting the USN journal. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8", "CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.DP", "PR.IP"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The fsutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows utility used to perform tasks related to the file allocation table (FAT) and NTFS file systems. The update sequence number (USN) change journal provides a log of all changes made to the files on the disk. This search looks for fsutil.exe deleting the USN journal. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -action.escu.known_false_positives = None identified -action.escu.creation_date = 2018-12-03 -action.escu.modification_date = 2018-12-03 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Log Manipulation", "Ransomware"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Possible USN journal deletion on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 45}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Log Manipulation", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8", "CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.DP", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The fsutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows utility used to perform tasks related to the file allocation table (FAT) and NTFS file systems. The update sequence number (USN) change journal provides a log of all changes made to the files on the disk. This search looks for fsutil.exe deleting the USN journal. -action.notable.param.rule_title = USN Journal Deletion -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=fsutil.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search process="*deletejournal*" AND process="*usn*" | `usn_journal_deletion_filter` - -[ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for applications on the endpoint that you have marked as uncommon. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for applications on the endpoint that you have marked as uncommon. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. This search uses a lookup file `uncommon_processes_default.csv` to track various features of process names that are usually uncommon in most environments. Please consider updating `uncommon_processes_local.csv` to hunt for processes that are uncommon in your environment. -action.escu.known_false_positives = None identified -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-22 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-22 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Privilege Escalation", "Unusual Processes"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation", "Unusual Processes"], "cis20": ["CIS 2"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for applications on the endpoint that you have marked as uncommon. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Uncommon Processes On Endpoint -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process Processes.process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `uncommon_processes` |`uncommon_processes_on_endpoint_filter` - -[ESCU - Unified Messaging Service Spawning a Process - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This detection identifies Microsoft Exchange Server's Unified Messaging services, umworkerprocess.exe and umservice.exe, spawning a child process, indicating possible exploitation of CVE-2021-26857 vulnerability. The query filters out werfault.exe and wermgr.exe mostly due to potential false positives, however, if there is an excessive amount of "wermgr.exe" or "WerFault.exe" failures, it may be due to the active exploitation. During triage, identify any additional suspicious parallel processes. Identify any recent out of place file modifications. Review Exchange logs following Microsofts guide. To contain, perform egress filtering or restrict public access to Exchange. In final, patch the vulnerablity and monitor. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This detection identifies Microsoft Exchange Server's Unified Messaging services, umworkerprocess.exe and umservice.exe, spawning a child process, indicating possible exploitation of CVE-2021-26857 vulnerability. The query filters out werfault.exe and wermgr.exe mostly due to potential false positives, however, if there is an excessive amount of "wermgr.exe" or "WerFault.exe" failures, it may be due to the active exploitation. During triage, identify any additional suspicious parallel processes. Identify any recent out of place file modifications. Review Exchange logs following Microsofts guide. To contain, perform egress filtering or restrict public access to Exchange. In final, patch the vulnerablity and monitor. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown. Tune out child processes as needed to limit volume of false positives. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-02 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-02 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Unified Messaging Service Spawning a Process - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["HAFNIUM Group"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Possible CVE-2021-26857 exploitation on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Unified Messaging Service Spawning a Process - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["HAFNIUM Group"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-26857"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This detection identifies Microsoft Exchange Server's Unified Messaging services, umworkerprocess.exe and umservice.exe, spawning a child process, indicating possible exploitation of CVE-2021-26857 vulnerability. The query filters out werfault.exe and wermgr.exe mostly due to potential false positives, however, if there is an excessive amount of "wermgr.exe" or "WerFault.exe" failures, it may be due to the active exploitation. During triage, identify any additional suspicious parallel processes. Identify any recent out of place file modifications. Review Exchange logs following Microsofts guide. To contain, perform egress filtering or restrict public access to Exchange. In final, patch the vulnerablity and monitor. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Unified Messaging Service Spawning a Process -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name="umworkerprocess.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name="UMService.exe" (Processes.process_name!="wermgr.exe" OR Processes.process_name!="werfault.exe") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `unified_messaging_service_spawning_a_process_filter` - -[ESCU - Uninstall App Using MsiExec - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search is to detect a suspicious un-installation of application using msiexec. This technique was seen in conti leak tool and script where it tries to uninstall AV product using this commandline. This commandline to uninstall product is not a common practice in enterprise network. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.007", "T1218"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious un-installation of application using msiexec. This technique was seen in conti leak tool and script where it tries to uninstall AV product using this commandline. This commandline to uninstall product is not a common practice in enterprise network. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-09 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-09 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Uninstall App Using MsiExec - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = process $process_name$ with a cmdline $process$ in host $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 30}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process name"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Uninstall App Using MsiExec - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.007", "T1218"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "process name"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious un-installation of application using msiexec. This technique was seen in conti leak tool and script where it tries to uninstall AV product using this commandline. This commandline to uninstall product is not a common practice in enterprise network. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Uninstall App Using MsiExec -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=msiexec.exe Processes.process= "* /qn *" Processes.process= "*/X*" Processes.process= "*REBOOT=*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `uninstall_app_using_msiexec_filter` - -[ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = Attackers often disable security tools to avoid detection. This search looks for the usage of process `fltMC.exe` to unload a Sysmon Driver that will stop sysmon from collecting the data. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = Attackers often disable security tools to avoid detection. This search looks for the usage of process `fltMC.exe` to unload a Sysmon Driver that will stop sysmon from collecting the data. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. This search is also shipped with `unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter` macro, update this macro to filter out false positives. -action.escu.known_false_positives = -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-22 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-22 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Disabling Security Tools"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Possible Sysmon filter driver unloading on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 45}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Disabling Security Tools"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = Attackers often disable security tools to avoid detection. This search looks for the usage of process `fltMC.exe` to unload a Sysmon Driver that will stop sysmon from collecting the data. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Unload Sysmon Filter Driver -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime values(Processes.process) as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=fltMC.exe AND Processes.process=*unload* AND Processes.process=*SysmonDrv* by Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter`| table firstTime lastTime dest user count process_name process_id parent_process_name process - -[ESCU - Unloading AMSI via Reflection - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ -This analytic identifies the behavior of AMSI being tampered with. Implemented natively in many frameworks, the command will look similar to `SEtValuE($Null,(New-OBJEct COLlECtionS.GenerIC.HAshSEt{[StrINg]))}$ReF=[ReF].AsSeMbLY.GeTTyPe("System.Management.Automation.Amsi"+"Utils")` taken from Powershell-Empire. \ -During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ -This analytic identifies the behavior of AMSI being tampered with. Implemented natively in many frameworks, the command will look similar to `SEtValuE($Null,(New-OBJEct COLlECtionS.GenerIC.HAshSEt{[StrINg]))}$ReF=[ReF].AsSeMbLY.GeTTyPe("System.Management.Automation.Amsi"+"Utils")` taken from Powershell-Empire. \ -During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Potential for some third party applications to disable AMSI upon invocation. Filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-09 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-09 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Unloading AMSI via Reflection - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Possible AMSI Unloading via Reflection using PowerShell on $ComputerName$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Unloading AMSI via Reflection - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ -This analytic identifies the behavior of AMSI being tampered with. Implemented natively in many frameworks, the command will look similar to `SEtValuE($Null,(New-OBJEct COLlECtionS.GenerIC.HAshSEt{[StrINg]))}$ReF=[ReF].AsSeMbLY.GeTTyPe("System.Management.Automation.Amsi"+"Utils")` taken from Powershell-Empire. \ -During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Unloading AMSI via Reflection -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message=*system.management.automation.amsi* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode ComputerName User EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `unloading_amsi_via_reflection_filter` - -[ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search detects loading of unsigned images by LSASS. Deprecated because too noisy. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search detects loading of unsigned images by LSASS. Deprecated because too noisy. -action.escu.how_to_implement = This search needs Sysmon Logs with a sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 7 with lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Other tools could load images into LSASS for legitimate reason. But enterprise tools should always use signed DLLs. -action.escu.creation_date = 2019-12-06 -action.escu.modification_date = 2019-12-06 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Credential Dumping"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search detects loading of unsigned images by LSASS. Deprecated because too noisy. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `sysmon` EventID=7 Image=*lsass.exe Signed=false | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, Image, ImageLoaded, Signed, SHA1 | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass_filter` - -[ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search gives you the hosts where a backup was attempted and then failed. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search gives you the hosts where a backup was attempted and then failed. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to obtain data from your backup solution, either from the backup logs on your endpoints or from a central server responsible for performing the backups. If you do not use Netbackup, you can modify this search for your specific backup solution. -action.escu.known_false_positives = None identified -action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-12 -action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-12 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Monitor Backup Solution"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Monitor Backup Solution"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search gives you the hosts where a backup was attempted and then failed. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Unsuccessful Netbackup backups -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `netbackup` | stats latest(_time) as latestTime by COMPUTERNAME, MESSAGE | search MESSAGE="An error occurred, failed to backup." | `security_content_ctime(latestTime)` | rename COMPUTERNAME as dest, MESSAGE as signature | table latestTime, dest, signature | `unsuccessful_netbackup_backups_filter` - [ESCU - Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = The following hunting analytic leverages Event ID 4769, `A Kerberos service ticket was requested`, to identify an unusual number of computer service ticket requests from one source. When a domain joined endpoint connects to a remote endpoint, it first will request a Kerberos Ticket with the computer name as the Service Name. An endpoint requesting a large number of computer service tickets for different endpoints could represent malicious behavior like lateral movement, malware staging, reconnaissance, etc.\ The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of service requests. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time, the calculation of the `upperBound` field as well as the Outlier calculation. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Exploitation", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} action.escu.data_models = [] action.escu.eli5 = The following hunting analytic leverages Event ID 4769, `A Kerberos service ticket was requested`, to identify an unusual number of computer service ticket requests from one source. When a domain joined endpoint connects to a remote endpoint, it first will request a Kerberos Ticket with the computer name as the Service Name. An endpoint requesting a large number of computer service tickets for different endpoints could represent malicious behavior like lateral movement, malware staging, reconnaissance, etc.\ The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of service requests. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time, the calculation of the `upperBound` field as well as the Outlier calculation. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ @@ -32975,7 +34593,7 @@ action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splun action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"] action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = None +action.risk.param._risk_message = action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Client_Address", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 @@ -32984,14 +34602,8 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Exploitation", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "observable": [{"name": "Client_Address", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "observable": [{"name": "Client_Address", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following hunting analytic leverages Event ID 4769, `A Kerberos service ticket was requested`, to identify an unusual number of computer service ticket requests from one source. When a domain joined endpoint connects to a remote endpoint, it first will request a Kerberos Ticket with the computer name as the Service Name. An endpoint requesting a large number of computer service tickets for different endpoints could represent malicious behavior like lateral movement, malware staging, reconnaissance, etc.\ -The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of service requests. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time, the calculation of the `upperBound` field as well as the Outlier calculation. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ -action.notable.param.rule_title = Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -33003,60 +34615,12 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769 Service_Name="*$" Account_Name!="*$*" | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Service_Name) AS unique_targets values(Service_Name) as host_targets by _time, Client_Address, Account_Name | eventstats avg(unique_targets) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_targets) as comp_std by Client_Address, Account_Name | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_targets >10 and unique_targets >= upperBound, 1, 0) | `unusual_number_of_computer_service_tickets_requested_filter` -[ESCU - Unusual Number of Kerberos Service Tickets Requested - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following hunting analytic leverages Kerberos Event 4769, A Kerberos service ticket was requested, to identify a potential kerberoasting attack against Active Directory networks. Kerberoasting allows an adversary to request kerberos tickets for domain accounts typically used as service accounts and attempt to crack them offline allowing them to obtain privileged access to the domain.\ -The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number service ticket requests. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.003"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following hunting analytic leverages Kerberos Event 4769, A Kerberos service ticket was requested, to identify a potential kerberoasting attack against Active Directory networks. Kerberoasting allows an adversary to request kerberos tickets for domain accounts typically used as service accounts and attempt to crack them offline allowing them to obtain privileged access to the domain.\ -The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number service ticket requests. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled. -action.escu.known_false_positives = An single endpoint requesting a large number of kerberos service tickets is not common behavior. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, administration systems and missconfigured systems. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-08 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-08 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Unusual Number of Kerberos Service Tickets Requested - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = None -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Client_Address", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 36}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Unusual Number of Kerberos Service Tickets Requested - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.003"], "observable": [{"name": "Client_Address", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following hunting analytic leverages Kerberos Event 4769, A Kerberos service ticket was requested, to identify a potential kerberoasting attack against Active Directory networks. Kerberoasting allows an adversary to request kerberos tickets for domain accounts typically used as service accounts and attempt to crack them offline allowing them to obtain privileged access to the domain.\ -The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number service ticket requests. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Unusual Number of Kerberos Service Tickets Requested -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769 Service_Name!="*$" Ticket_Encryption_Type=0x17 | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Service_Name) AS unique_services values(Service_Name) as requested_services by _time, Client_Address | eventstats avg(unique_services) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_services) as comp_std by Client_Address | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_services > 2 and unique_services >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `unusual_number_of_kerberos_service_tickets_requested_filter` - [ESCU - Unusual Number of Remote Endpoint Authentication Events - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = The following hunting analytic leverages Event ID 4624, `An account was successfully logged on`, to identify an unusual number of remote authentication attempts coming from one source. An endpoint authenticating to a large number of remote endpoints could represent malicious behavior like lateral movement, malware staging, reconnaissance, etc.\ The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual high number of authentication events. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time, the calculation of the `upperBound` field as well as the Outlier calculation. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} action.escu.data_models = [] action.escu.eli5 = The following hunting analytic leverages Event ID 4624, `An account was successfully logged on`, to identify an unusual number of remote authentication attempts coming from one source. An endpoint authenticating to a large number of remote endpoints could represent malicious behavior like lateral movement, malware staging, reconnaissance, etc.\ The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual high number of authentication events. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time, the calculation of the `upperBound` field as well as the Outlier calculation. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ @@ -33071,7 +34635,7 @@ action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splun action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"] action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = None +action.risk.param._risk_message = action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 @@ -33080,14 +34644,8 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Unusual Number of Remote Endpoint Authentication Events - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following hunting analytic leverages Event ID 4624, `An account was successfully logged on`, to identify an unusual number of remote authentication attempts coming from one source. An endpoint authenticating to a large number of remote endpoints could represent malicious behavior like lateral movement, malware staging, reconnaissance, etc.\ -The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual high number of authentication events. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time, the calculation of the `upperBound` field as well as the Outlier calculation. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ -action.notable.param.rule_title = Unusual Number of Remote Endpoint Authentication Events -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -33128,12 +34686,6 @@ action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Unusual Processes", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "Processes.process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious activity on your hosts. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Unusually Long Command Line -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -33162,19 +34714,18 @@ action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Unusual Processes", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Unusual Processes", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Unusual Processes", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious activity on your hosts. This search leverages the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) to help identify command lines with lengths that are unusual for a given user. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -33186,2266 +34737,6 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| eval processlen=len(process) | search user!=unknown | apply cmdline_pdfmodel threshold=0.01 | rename "IsOutlier(processlen)" as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | table firstTime lastTime user dest process_name process processlen count | `unusually_long_command_line___mltk_filter` -[ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for unusually long strings in the Content-Type http header that the client sends the server. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 18", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["ID.RA", "RS.MI", "PR.PT", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "PR.MA", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for unusually long strings in the Content-Type http header that the client sends the server. -action.escu.how_to_implement = This particular search leverages data extracted from Stream:HTTP. You must configure the http stream using the Splunk Stream App on your Splunk Stream deployment server to extract the cs_content_type field. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Very few legitimate Content-Type fields will have a length greater than 100 characters. -action.escu.creation_date = 2017-10-13 -action.escu.modification_date = 2017-10-13 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Apache Struts Vulnerability"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Apache Struts Vulnerability"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 18", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["ID.RA", "RS.MI", "PR.PT", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "PR.MA", "DE.CM"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for unusually long strings in the Content-Type http header that the client sends the server. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Unusually Long Content-Type Length -action.notable.param.security_domain = network -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `stream_http` | eval cs_content_type_length = len(cs_content_type) | where cs_content_type_length > 100 | table endtime src_ip dest_ip cs_content_type_length cs_content_type url | `unusually_long_content_type_length_filter` - -[ESCU - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments that leverage PowerShell environment variables to identify the current logged user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments that leverage PowerShell environment variables to identify the current logged user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-13 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-13 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = System user discovery on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments that leverage PowerShell environment variables to identify the current logged user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="powershell.exe") (Processes.process="*$env:UserName*" OR Processes.process="*[System.Environment]::UserName*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_filter` - -[ESCU - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell Script Block - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the use of PowerShell environment variables to identify the current logged user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the use of PowerShell environment variables to identify the current logged user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-13 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-13 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell Script Block - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = System user discovery on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell Script Block - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the use of PowerShell environment variables to identify the current logged user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell Script Block -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = "*$env:UserName*" OR Message = "*[System.Environment]::UserName*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_script_block_filter` - -[ESCU - Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious wscript commandline to execute vbscript. This technique was seen in several malware to execute malicious vbs file using wscript application. commonly vbs script is associated to cscript process and this can be a technique to evade process parent child detections or even some av script emulation system. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.005", "T1059"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to detect a suspicious wscript commandline to execute vbscript. This technique was seen in several malware to execute malicious vbs file using wscript application. commonly vbs script is associated to cscript process and this can be a technique to evade process parent child detections or even some av script emulation system. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-01 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-01 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["FIN7", "Remcos"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Process name $process_name$ with commandline $process$ to execute vbsscript -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 49}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["FIN7", "Remcos"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.005", "T1059"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious wscript commandline to execute vbscript. This technique was seen in several malware to execute malicious vbs file using wscript application. commonly vbs script is associated to cscript process and this can be a technique to evade process parent child detections or even some av script emulation system. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = "wscript.exe" AND Processes.parent_process = "*//e:vbscript*") OR (Processes.process_name = "wscript.exe" AND Processes.process = "*//e:vbscript*") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `vbscript_execution_using_wscript_app_filter` - -[ESCU - Verclsid CLSID Execution - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic is to detect a possible abuse of verclsid to execute malicious file through generate CLSID. This process is a normal application of windows to verify the CLSID COM object before it is instantiated by Windows Explorer. This hunting query can be a good pivot point to analyze what is he CLSID or COM object pointing too to check if it is a valid application or not. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.012", "T1218"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to detect a possible abuse of verclsid to execute malicious file through generate CLSID. This process is a normal application of windows to verify the CLSID COM object before it is instantiated by Windows Explorer. This hunting query can be a good pivot point to analyze what is he CLSID or COM object pointing too to check if it is a valid application or not. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = windows can used this application for its normal COM object validation. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-29 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-29 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Verclsid CLSID Execution - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Unusual Processes"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = process $process_name$ to execute possible clsid commandline $process$ in $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Verclsid CLSID Execution - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Unusual Processes"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.012", "T1218"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to detect a possible abuse of verclsid to execute malicious file through generate CLSID. This process is a normal application of windows to verify the CLSID COM object before it is instantiated by Windows Explorer. This hunting query can be a good pivot point to analyze what is he CLSID or COM object pointing too to check if it is a valid application or not. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Verclsid CLSID Execution -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_verclsid` AND Processes.process="*/S*" Processes.process="*/C*" AND Processes.process="*{*" AND Processes.process="*}*" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `verclsid_clsid_execution_filter` - -[ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This query identifies a shell, PowerShell.exe or Cmd.exe, spawning from W3WP.exe, or IIS. In addition to IIS logs, this behavior with an EDR product will capture potential webshell activity, similar to the HAFNIUM Group abusing CVEs, on publicly available Exchange mail servers. During triage, review the parent process and child process of the shell being spawned. Review the command-line arguments and any file modifications that may occur. Identify additional parallel process, child processes, that may highlight further commands executed. After triaging, work to contain the threat and patch the system that is vulnerable. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505", "T1505.003"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This query identifies a shell, PowerShell.exe or Cmd.exe, spawning from W3WP.exe, or IIS. In addition to IIS logs, this behavior with an EDR product will capture potential webshell activity, similar to the HAFNIUM Group abusing CVEs, on publicly available Exchange mail servers. During triage, review the parent process and child process of the shell being spawned. Review the command-line arguments and any file modifications that may occur. Identify additional parallel process, child processes, that may highlight further commands executed. After triaging, work to contain the threat and patch the system that is vulnerable. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Baseline your environment before production. It is possible build systems using IIS will spawn cmd.exe to perform a software build. Filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-03 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-03 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["HAFNIUM Group", "ProxyShell"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Possible Web Shell execution on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["HAFNIUM Group", "ProxyShell"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523", "CVE-2021-31207"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505", "T1505.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This query identifies a shell, PowerShell.exe or Cmd.exe, spawning from W3WP.exe, or IIS. In addition to IIS logs, this behavior with an EDR product will capture potential webshell activity, similar to the HAFNIUM Group abusing CVEs, on publicly available Exchange mail servers. During triage, review the parent process and child process of the shell being spawned. Review the command-line arguments and any file modifications that may occur. Identify additional parallel process, child processes, that may highlight further commands executed. After triaging, work to contain the threat and patch the system that is vulnerable. -action.notable.param.rule_title = W3WP Spawning Shell -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=w3wp.exe AND `process_cmd` OR `process_powershell` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `w3wp_spawning_shell_filter` - -[ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for flags passed to wbadmin.exe (Windows Backup Administrator Tool) that delete backup files. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent recovery. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for flags passed to wbadmin.exe (Windows Backup Administrator Tool) that delete backup files. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent recovery. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. Tune based on parent process names. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may modify the boot configuration. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-22 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-22 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ryuk Ransomware", "Ransomware"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = System backups deletion on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for flags passed to wbadmin.exe (Windows Backup Administrator Tool) that delete backup files. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent recovery. -action.notable.param.rule_title = WBAdmin Delete System Backups -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wbadmin.exe Processes.process="*delete*" AND (Processes.process="*catalog*" OR Processes.process="*systemstatebackup*") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `wbadmin_delete_system_backups_filter` - -[ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting the Windows WMI activity logs. This can be done by adding a stanza to inputs.conf on the system generating logs with a title of [WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational]. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, administrators may use event subscriptions for legitimate purposes. -action.escu.creation_date = 2018-10-23 -action.escu.modification_date = 2018-10-23 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious WMI Use"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions. -action.notable.param.rule_title = WMI Permanent Event Subscription -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `wmi` EventCode=5861 Binding | rex field=Message "Consumer =\s+(?[^;|^$]+)" | search consumer!="NTEventLogEventConsumer=\"SCM Event Log Consumer\"" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName, consumer, Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename ComputerName as dest | `wmi_permanent_event_subscription_filter` - -[ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions. The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscription to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions.\ -All event subscriptions have three components \ -1. Filter - WQL Query for the events we want. EventID = 19 \ -1. Consumer - An action to take upon triggering the filter. EventID = 20 \ -1. Binding - Registers a filter to a consumer. EventID = 21 \ -Monitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding. It may be pertinent to review all 3 to identify the flow of execution. In addition, EventCode 4104 may assist with any other PowerShell script usage that registered the subscription. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.003", "T1546"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions. The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscription to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions.\ -All event subscriptions have three components \ -1. Filter - WQL Query for the events we want. EventID = 19 \ -1. Consumer - An action to take upon triggering the filter. EventID = 20 \ -1. Binding - Registers a filter to a consumer. EventID = 21 \ -Monitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding. It may be pertinent to review all 3 to identify the flow of execution. In addition, EventCode 4104 may assist with any other PowerShell script usage that registered the subscription. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be collecting Sysmon data using Sysmon version 6.1 or greater and have Sysmon configured to generate alerts for WMI activity (eventID= 19, 20, 21). In addition, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA installed to properly parse the fields. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, administrators may use event subscriptions for legitimate purposes. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-12-08 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-12-08 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious WMI Use"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = User $user$ on $host$ executed the following suspicious WMI query: $Query$. Filter: $filter$. Consumer: $Consumer$. EventCode: $EventCode$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "host", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 30}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 30}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.003", "T1546"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "host", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions. The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscription to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions.\ -All event subscriptions have three components \ -1. Filter - WQL Query for the events we want. EventID = 19 \ -1. Consumer - An action to take upon triggering the filter. EventID = 20 \ -1. Binding - Registers a filter to a consumer. EventID = 21 \ -Monitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding. It may be pertinent to review all 3 to identify the flow of execution. In addition, EventCode 4104 may assist with any other PowerShell script usage that registered the subscription. -action.notable.param.rule_title = WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `sysmon` EventCode=21 | rename host as dest | table _time, dest, user, Operation, EventType, Query, Consumer, Filter | `wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon_filter` - -[ESCU - WMI Recon Running Process Or Services - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104, where WMI is performing an event query looking for running processes or running services. This technique is commonly found in malware and APT events where the adversary will map all running security applications or services on the compromised machine. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1592"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104, where WMI is performing an event query looking for running processes or running services. This technique is commonly found in malware and APT events where the adversary will map all running security applications or services on the compromised machine. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -action.escu.known_false_positives = network administrator may used this command for checking purposes -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-14 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-14 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - WMI Recon Running Process Or Services - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious powerShell script execution by $user$ on $ComputerName$ via EventCode 4104, where WMI is performing an event query looking for running processes or running services -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 30}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 30}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - WMI Recon Running Process Or Services - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1592"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104, where WMI is performing an event query looking for running processes or running services. This technique is commonly found in malware and APT events where the adversary will map all running security applications or services on the compromised machine. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. -action.notable.param.rule_title = WMI Recon Running Process Or Services -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message= "*SELECT*" AND (Message="*Win32_Process*" OR Message="*Win32_Service*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmi_recon_running_process_or_services_filter` - -[ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for the creation of WMI temporary event subscriptions. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for the creation of WMI temporary event subscriptions. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting the Windows WMI activity logs. This can be done by adding a stanza to inputs.conf on the system generating logs with a title of [WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational]. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Some software may create WMI temporary event subscriptions for various purposes. The included search contains an exception for two of these that occur by default on Windows 10 systems. You may need to modify the search to create exceptions for other legitimate events. -action.escu.creation_date = 2018-10-23 -action.escu.modification_date = 2018-10-23 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious WMI Use"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for the creation of WMI temporary event subscriptions. -action.notable.param.rule_title = WMI Temporary Event Subscription -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `wmi` EventCode=5860 Temporary | rex field=Message "NotificationQuery =\s+(?[^;|^$]+)" | search query!="SELECT * FROM Win32_ProcessStartTrace WHERE ProcessName = 'wsmprovhost.exe'" AND query!="SELECT * FROM __InstanceOperationEvent WHERE TargetInstance ISA 'AntiVirusProduct' OR TargetInstance ISA 'FirewallProduct' OR TargetInstance ISA 'AntiSpywareProduct'" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName, query | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmi_temporary_event_subscription_filter` - -[ESCU - WMIC XSL Execution via URL - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies `wmic.exe` loading a remote XSL (eXtensible Stylesheet Language) script. This originally was identified by Casey Smith, dubbed Squiblytwo, as an application control bypass. Many adversaries will utilize this technique to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file. This technique can also execute local/remote scripts and, similar to its Regsvr32 "Squiblydoo" counterpart, leverages a trusted, built-in Windows tool. Adversaries may abuse any alias in Windows Management Instrumentation provided they utilize the /FORMAT switch. Upon identifying a suspicious execution, review for confirmed network connnection and script download. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1220"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies `wmic.exe` loading a remote XSL (eXtensible Stylesheet Language) script. This originally was identified by Casey Smith, dubbed Squiblytwo, as an application control bypass. Many adversaries will utilize this technique to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file. This technique can also execute local/remote scripts and, similar to its Regsvr32 "Squiblydoo" counterpart, leverages a trusted, built-in Windows tool. Adversaries may abuse any alias in Windows Management Instrumentation provided they utilize the /FORMAT switch. Upon identifying a suspicious execution, review for confirmed network connnection and script download. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are limited as legitimate applications typically do not download files or xsl using WMIC. Filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-11 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-11 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - WMIC XSL Execution via URL - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious WMI Use"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ utilizing wmic to download a remote XSL script. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - WMIC XSL Execution via URL - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1220"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies `wmic.exe` loading a remote XSL (eXtensible Stylesheet Language) script. This originally was identified by Casey Smith, dubbed Squiblytwo, as an application control bypass. Many adversaries will utilize this technique to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file. This technique can also execute local/remote scripts and, similar to its Regsvr32 "Squiblydoo" counterpart, leverages a trusted, built-in Windows tool. Adversaries may abuse any alias in Windows Management Instrumentation provided they utilize the /FORMAT switch. Upon identifying a suspicious execution, review for confirmed network connnection and script download. -action.notable.param.rule_title = WMIC XSL Execution via URL -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` Processes.process IN ("*http://*", "*https://*") Processes.process="*/format:*" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmic_xsl_execution_via_url_filter` - -[ESCU - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry related to UAC bypass. This technique is to modify the registry in this detection, create a registry value with the path of the payload and run WSreset.exe to bypass User account Control. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry related to UAC bypass. This technique is to modify the registry in this detection, create a registry value with the path of the payload and run WSreset.exe to bypass User account Control. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-01-28 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-01-28 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Living Off The Land"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious modification of registry $registry_path$ with possible payload path $registry_value_name$ in $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 63}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Living Off The Land"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Incoming"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry related to UAC bypass. This technique is to modify the registry in this detection, create a registry value with the path of the payload and run WSreset.exe to bypass User account Control. -action.notable.param.rule_title = WSReset UAC Bypass -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\AppX82a6gwre4fdg3bt635tn5ctqjf8msdd2\\Shell\\open\\command*" AND (Registry.registry_value_name = "(Default)" OR Registry.registry_value_name = "DelegateExecute") by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `wsreset_uac_bypass_filter` - -[ESCU - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = this search is designed to detect potential malicious process loading COM object to wbemprox.dll, -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.003"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = this search is designed to detect potential malicious process loading COM object to wbemprox.dll, -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -action.escu.known_false_positives = legitimate process that are not in the exception list may trigger this event. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-02 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-02 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious COM Object Execution on $Computer$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 35}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.003"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = this search is designed to detect potential malicious process loading COM object to wbemprox.dll, -action.notable.param.rule_title = Wbemprox COM Object Execution -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded IN ("*\\fastprox.dll", "*\\wbemprox.dll", "*\\wbemcomn.dll") NOT (process_name IN ("wmiprvse.exe", "WmiApSrv.exe", "unsecapp.exe")) NOT(Image IN("*\\windows\\*","*\\program files*", "*\\wbem\\*")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name Computer EventCode Signed ProcessId Hashes IMPHASH | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wbemprox_com_object_execution_filter` - -[ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search is used to identify the creation of multiple user accounts using the same email domain name. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search is used to identify the creation of multiple user accounts using the same email domain name. -action.escu.how_to_implement = We start with a dataset that provides visibility into the email address used for the account creation. In this example, we are narrowing our search down to the single web page that hosts the Magento2 e-commerce platform (via URI) used for account creation, the single http content-type to grab only the user's clicks, and the http field that provides the username (form_data), for performance reasons. After we have the username and email domain, we look for numerous account creations per email domain. Common data sources used for this detection are customized Apache logs or Splunk Stream. -action.escu.known_false_positives = As is common with many fraud-related searches, we are usually looking to attribute risk or synthesize relevant context with loosely written detections that simply detect anamolous behavior. This search will need to be customized to fit your environment—improving its fidelity by counting based on something much more specific, such as a device ID that may be present in your dataset. Consideration for whether the large number of registrations are occuring from a first-time seen domain may also be important. Extending the search window to look further back in time, or even calculating the average per hour/day for each email domain to look for an anomalous spikes, will improve this search. You can also use Shannon entropy or Levenshtein Distance (both courtesy of URL Toolbox) to consider the randomness or similarity of the email name or email domain, as the names are often machine-generated. -action.escu.creation_date = 2018-10-08 -action.escu.modification_date = 2018-10-08 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Web Fraud Detection"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Web Fraud Detection"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search is used to identify the creation of multiple user accounts using the same email domain name. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Web Fraud - Account Harvesting -action.notable.param.security_domain = threat -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `stream_http` http_content_type=text* uri="/magento2/customer/account/loginPost/" | rex field=cookie "form_key=(?\w+)" | rex field=form_data "login\[username\]=(?[^&|^$]+)" | search Username=* | rex field=Username "@(?.*)" | stats dc(Username) as UniqueUsernames list(Username) as src_user by email_domain | where UniqueUsernames> 25 | `web_fraud___account_harvesting_filter` - -[ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search is used to examine web sessions to identify those where the clicks are occurring too quickly for a human or are occurring with a near-perfect cadence (high periodicity or low standard deviation), resembling a script driven session. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 6"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search is used to examine web sessions to identify those where the clicks are occurring too quickly for a human or are occurring with a near-perfect cadence (high periodicity or low standard deviation), resembling a script driven session. -action.escu.how_to_implement = Start with a dataset that allows you to see clickstream data for each user click on the website. That data must have a time stamp and must contain a reference to the session identifier being used by the website. This ties the clicks together into clickstreams. This value is usually found in the http cookie. With a bit of tuning, a version of this search could be used in high-volume scenarios, such as scraping, crawling, application DDOS, credit-card testing, account takeover, etc. Common data sources used for this detection are customized Apache logs, customized IIS, and Splunk Stream. -action.escu.known_false_positives = As is common with many fraud-related searches, we are usually looking to attribute risk or synthesize relevant context with loosly written detections that simply detect anamoluous behavior. -action.escu.creation_date = 2018-10-08 -action.escu.modification_date = 2018-10-08 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Web Fraud Detection"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Web Fraud Detection"], "cis20": ["CIS 6"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search is used to examine web sessions to identify those where the clicks are occurring too quickly for a human or are occurring with a near-perfect cadence (high periodicity or low standard deviation), resembling a script driven session. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed -action.notable.param.security_domain = threat -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `stream_http` http_content_type=text* | rex field=cookie "form_key=(?\w+)" | streamstats window=2 current=1 range(_time) as TimeDelta by session_id | where TimeDelta>0 |stats count stdev(TimeDelta) as ClickSpeedStdDev avg(TimeDelta) as ClickSpeedAvg by session_id | where count>5 AND (ClickSpeedStdDev<.5 OR ClickSpeedAvg<.5) | `web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed_filter` - -[ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search is used to identify user accounts that share a common password. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "nist": ["DE.DP"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search is used to identify user accounts that share a common password. -action.escu.how_to_implement = We need to start with a dataset that allows us to see the values of usernames and passwords that users are submitting to the website hosting the Magento2 e-commerce platform (commonly found in the HTTP form_data field). A tokenized or hashed value of a password is acceptable and certainly preferable to a clear-text password. Common data sources used for this detection are customized Apache logs, customized IIS, and Splunk Stream. -action.escu.known_false_positives = As is common with many fraud-related searches, we are usually looking to attribute risk or synthesize relevant context with loosely written detections that simply detect anamoluous behavior. -action.escu.creation_date = 2018-10-08 -action.escu.modification_date = 2018-10-08 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Web Fraud Detection"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Web Fraud Detection"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "nist": ["DE.DP"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search is used to identify user accounts that share a common password. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts -action.notable.param.security_domain = threat -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `stream_http` http_content_type=text* uri=/magento2/customer/account/loginPost* | rex field=form_data "login\[username\]=(?[^&|^$]+)" | rex field=form_data "login\[password\]=(?[^&|^$]+)" | stats dc(Username) as UniqueUsernames values(Username) as user list(src_ip) as src_ip by Password|where UniqueUsernames>5 | `web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts_filter` - -[ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for suspicious processes on all systems labeled as web servers. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1082"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for suspicious processes on all systems labeled as web servers. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. In addition, web servers will need to be identified in the Assets and Identity Framework of Enterprise Security. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Some of these processes may be used legitimately on web servers during maintenance or other administrative tasks. -action.escu.creation_date = 2019-04-01 -action.escu.modification_date = 2019-04-01 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Apache Struts Vulnerability"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Apache Struts Vulnerability"], "cis20": ["CIS 3"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1082"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for suspicious processes on all systems labeled as web servers. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.dest_category="web_server" AND (Processes.process="*whoami*" OR Processes.process="*ping*" OR Processes.process="*iptables*" OR Processes.process="*wget*" OR Processes.process="*service*" OR Processes.process="*curl*") by Processes.process Processes.process_name, Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes_filter` - -[ESCU - Wermgr Process Connecting To IP Check Web Services - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = this search is designed to detect suspicious wermgr.exe process that tries to connect to known IP web services. This technique is know for trickbot and other trojan spy malware to recon the infected machine and look for its ip address without so much finger print on the commandline process. Since wermgr.exe is designed for error handling process of windows it is really suspicious that this process is trying to connect to this IP web services cause that maybe cause of some malicious code injection. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1590", "T1590.005"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = this search is designed to detect suspicious wermgr.exe process that tries to connect to known IP web services. This technique is know for trickbot and other trojan spy malware to recon the infected machine and look for its ip address without so much finger print on the commandline process. Since wermgr.exe is designed for error handling process of windows it is really suspicious that this process is trying to connect to this IP web services cause that maybe cause of some malicious code injection. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, dns query name process path , and query ststus from your endpoints like EventCode 22. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 12 of the Sysmon TA. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-19 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-19 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Wermgr Process Connecting To IP Check Web Services - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Trickbot"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Wermgr.exe process connecting IP location web services on $ComputerName$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Wermgr Process Connecting To IP Check Web Services - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Trickbot"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1590", "T1590.005"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = this search is designed to detect suspicious wermgr.exe process that tries to connect to known IP web services. This technique is know for trickbot and other trojan spy malware to recon the infected machine and look for its ip address without so much finger print on the commandline process. Since wermgr.exe is designed for error handling process of windows it is really suspicious that this process is trying to connect to this IP web services cause that maybe cause of some malicious code injection. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Wermgr Process Connecting To IP Check Web Services -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `sysmon` EventCode =22 process_name = wermgr.exe QueryName IN ("*wtfismyip.com", "*checkip.amazonaws.com", "*ipecho.net", "*ipinfo.io", "*api.ipify.org", "*icanhazip.com", "*ip.anysrc.com","*api.ip.sb", "ident.me", "www.myexternalip.com", "*zen.spamhaus.org", "*cbl.abuseat.org", "*b.barracudacentral.org","*dnsbl-1.uceprotect.net", "*spam.dnsbl.sorbs.net") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by process_path process_name process_id QueryName QueryStatus QueryResults Computer EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services_filter` - -[ESCU - Wermgr Process Create Executable File - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = this search is designed to detect potential malicious wermgr.exe process that drops or create executable file. Since wermgr.exe is an application trigger when error encountered in a process, it is really un ussual to this process to drop executable file. This technique is commonly seen in trickbot malware where it injects it code to this process to execute it malicious behavior like downloading other payload -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = this search is designed to detect potential malicious wermgr.exe process that drops or create executable file. Since wermgr.exe is an application trigger when error encountered in a process, it is really un ussual to this process to drop executable file. This technique is commonly seen in trickbot malware where it injects it code to this process to execute it malicious behavior like downloading other payload -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of wermgr.exe may be used. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-19 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-19 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Wermgr Process Create Executable File - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Trickbot"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Wermgr.exe writing executable files on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Wermgr Process Create Executable File - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Trickbot"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = this search is designed to detect potential malicious wermgr.exe process that drops or create executable file. Since wermgr.exe is an application trigger when error encountered in a process, it is really un ussual to this process to drop executable file. This technique is commonly seen in trickbot malware where it injects it code to this process to execute it malicious behavior like downloading other payload -action.notable.param.rule_title = Wermgr Process Create Executable File -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `sysmon` EventCode=11 process_name = "wermgr.exe" TargetFilename = "*.exe" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Image TargetFilename process_name dest EventCode ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wermgr_process_create_executable_file_filter` - -[ESCU - Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search is designed to detect suspicious cmd and powershell process spawned by wermgr.exe process. This suspicious behavior are commonly seen in code injection technique technique like trickbot to execute a shellcode, dll modules to run malicious behavior. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search is designed to detect suspicious cmd and powershell process spawned by wermgr.exe process. This suspicious behavior are commonly seen in code injection technique technique like trickbot to execute a shellcode, dll modules to run malicious behavior. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-19 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-19 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Trickbot"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Wermgr.exe spawning suspicious processes on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Trickbot"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is designed to detect suspicious cmd and powershell process spawned by wermgr.exe process. This suspicious behavior are commonly seen in code injection technique technique like trickbot to execute a shellcode, dll modules to run malicious behavior. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as cmdline min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name = "wermgr.exe" `process_cmd` OR `process_powershell` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process_filter` - -[ESCU - Wget Download and Bash Execution - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies the use of wget on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the use of wget on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter. The following Splunk SOAR playbook can be used to respond to this detection: Log4j Investigate The following Splunk SOAR playbook can be used to respond to this detection: Log4j Respond -action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-11 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-11 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Wget Download and Bash Execution - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ingress Tool Transfer", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Wget Download and Bash Execution - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ingress Tool Transfer", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the use of wget on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Wget Download and Bash Execution -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wget (Processes.process="*-q *" OR Processes.process="*--quiet*" AND Processes.process="*-O- *") OR (Processes.process="*|*" AND Processes.process="*bash*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter` - -[ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed from a user writeable file path.\ -The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not.\ -schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64`.\ -The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory.\ -Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or was it via TaskService. Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1053"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed from a user writeable file path.\ -The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not.\ -schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64`.\ -The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory.\ -Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or was it via TaskService. Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required. -action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are possible if legitimate applications are allowed to register tasks in public paths. Filter as needed based on paths that are used legitimately. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-08 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-08 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "IcedID", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A windows scheduled task was created (task name=$Task_Name$) on $dest$ by the following command: $Command$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 70}, {"threat_object_field": "Command", "threat_object_type": "command"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "IcedID", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "Command", "role": ["Target"], "type": "Command"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed from a user writeable file path.\ -The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not.\ -schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64`.\ -The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory.\ -Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or was it via TaskService. Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source. -action.notable.param.rule_title = WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message | search Command IN ("*\\users\\public\\*", "*\\programdata\\*", "*\\temp\\*", "*\\Windows\\Tasks\\*", "*\\appdata\\*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Task_Name, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path_filter` - -[ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed with a native Windows shell (PowerShell, Cmd, Wscript, Cscript).\ -The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not.\ -schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64`.\ -The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory.\ -Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1053"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed with a native Windows shell (PowerShell, Cmd, Wscript, Cscript).\ -The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not.\ -schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64`.\ -The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory.\ -Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required. -action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are possible if legitimate applications are allowed to register tasks that call a shell to be spawned. Filter as needed based on command-line or processes that are used legitimately. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-12 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-12 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A windows scheduled task was created (task name=$Task_Name$) on $dest$ by the following command: $Command$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 70}, {"threat_object_field": "Command", "threat_object_type": "command"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "Command", "role": ["Target"], "type": "Command"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed with a native Windows shell (PowerShell, Cmd, Wscript, Cscript).\ -The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not.\ -schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64`.\ -The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory.\ -Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source. -action.notable.param.rule_title = WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message | search Command IN ("*powershell.exe*", "*wscript.exe*", "*cscript.exe*", "*cmd.exe*", "*sh.exe*", "*ksh.exe*", "*zsh.exe*", "*bash.exe*", "*scrcons.exe*", "*pwsh.exe*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Task_Name, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell_filter` - -[ESCU - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following hunting analytic assists with identifying suspicious tasks that have been registered and ran in Windows using EventID 200 (action run) and 201 (action completed). It is recommended to filter based on ActionName by specifying specific paths not used in your environment. After some basic tuning, this may be effective in capturing evasive ways to register tasks on Windows. Review parallel events related to tasks being scheduled. EventID 106 will generate when a new task is generated, however, that does not mean it ran. Capture any files on disk and analyze. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following hunting analytic assists with identifying suspicious tasks that have been registered and ran in Windows using EventID 200 (action run) and 201 (action completed). It is recommended to filter based on ActionName by specifying specific paths not used in your environment. After some basic tuning, this may be effective in capturing evasive ways to register tasks on Windows. Review parallel events related to tasks being scheduled. EventID 106 will generate when a new task is generated, however, that does not mean it ran. Capture any files on disk and analyze. -action.escu.how_to_implement = Task Scheduler logs are required to be collected. Enable logging with inputs.conf by adding a stanza for [WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational] and renderXml=false. Note, not translating it in XML may require a proper extraction of specific items in the Message. -action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will be present. Filter based on ActionName paths or specify keywords of interest. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-19 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-19 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["IcedID", "Windows Persistence Techniques"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A Scheduled Task was scheduled and ran on $dest$. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following hunting analytic assists with identifying suspicious tasks that have been registered and ran in Windows using EventID 200 (action run) and 201 (action completed). It is recommended to filter based on ActionName by specifying specific paths not used in your environment. After some basic tuning, this may be effective in capturing evasive ways to register tasks on Windows. Review parallel events related to tasks being scheduled. EventID 106 will generate when a new task is generated, however, that does not mean it ran. Capture any files on disk and analyze. -action.notable.param.rule_title = WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `wineventlog_task_scheduler` EventCode IN ("200","201") | rename ComputerName as dest | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message dest EventCode category | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started_filter` - -[ESCU - WinRM Spawning a Process - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies suspicious processes spawning from WinRM (wsmprovhost.exe). This analytic is related to potential exploitation of CVE-2021-31166. which is a kernel-mode device driver http.sys vulnerability. Current proof of concept code will blue-screen the operating system. However, http.sys used by many different Windows processes, including WinRM. In this case, identifying suspicious process create (child processes) from `wsmprovhost.exe` is what this analytic is identifying. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation", "Denial of Service"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies suspicious processes spawning from WinRM (wsmprovhost.exe). This analytic is related to potential exploitation of CVE-2021-31166. which is a kernel-mode device driver http.sys vulnerability. Current proof of concept code will blue-screen the operating system. However, http.sys used by many different Windows processes, including WinRM. In this case, identifying suspicious process create (child processes) from `wsmprovhost.exe` is what this analytic is identifying. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown. Add new processes or filter as needed. It is possible system management software may spawn processes from `wsmprovhost.exe`. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-05-21 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-05-21 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - WinRM Spawning a Process - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Unusual Processes"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - WinRM Spawning a Process - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Unusual Processes"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-31166"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation", "Denial of Service"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies suspicious processes spawning from WinRM (wsmprovhost.exe). This analytic is related to potential exploitation of CVE-2021-31166. which is a kernel-mode device driver http.sys vulnerability. Current proof of concept code will blue-screen the operating system. However, http.sys used by many different Windows processes, including WinRM. In this case, identifying suspicious process create (child processes) from `wsmprovhost.exe` is what this analytic is identifying. -action.notable.param.rule_title = WinRM Spawning a Process -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=wsmprovhost.exe Processes.process_name IN ("cmd.exe","sh.exe","bash.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","schtasks.exe","certutil.exe","whoami.exe","bitsadmin.exe","scp.exe") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winrm_spawning_a_process_filter` - -[ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for the execution of `adfind.exe` with command-line arguments that it uses by default. Specifically the filter or search functions. It also considers the arguments necessary like objectcategory, see readme for more details: https://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/usage.htm. This has been seen used before by Wizard Spider, FIN6 and actors whom also launched SUNBURST. AdFind.exe is usually used a recon tool to enumare a domain controller. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for the execution of `adfind.exe` with command-line arguments that it uses by default. Specifically the filter or search functions. It also considers the arguments necessary like objectcategory, see readme for more details: https://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/usage.htm. This has been seen used before by Wizard Spider, FIN6 and actors whom also launched SUNBURST. AdFind.exe is usually used a recon tool to enumare a domain controller. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -action.escu.known_false_positives = administrators rarely use adfind, usually not used for legitimate reasons -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-03 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-03 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["NOBELIUM Group", "Domain Trust Discovery"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["NOBELIUM Group", "Domain Trust Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for the execution of `adfind.exe` with command-line arguments that it uses by default. Specifically the filter or search functions. It also considers the arguments necessary like objectcategory, see readme for more details: https://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/usage.htm. This has been seen used before by Wizard Spider, FIN6 and actors whom also launched SUNBURST. AdFind.exe is usually used a recon tool to enumare a domain controller. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows AdFind Exe -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process="* -f *" OR Processes.process="* -b *") AND (Processes.process=*objectcategory* OR Processes.process="* -gcb *" OR Processes.process="* -sc *") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_adfind_exe_filter` - -[ESCU - Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies the use of Windows Curl.exe downloading a file to a suspicious location. \ --O or --output is used when a file is to be downloaded and placed in a specified location. \ -During triage, review parallel processes for further behavior. In addition, identify if the download was successful. If a file was downloaded, capture and analyze. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the use of Windows Curl.exe downloading a file to a suspicious location. \ --O or --output is used when a file is to be downloaded and placed in a specified location. \ -During triage, review parallel processes for further behavior. In addition, identify if the download was successful. If a file was downloaded, capture and analyze. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible Administrators or super users will use Curl for legitimate purposes. Filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-19 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-19 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["IceID", "Ingress Tool Transfer"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ to download a file to a suspicious directory. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IceID", "Ingress Tool Transfer"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the use of Windows Curl.exe downloading a file to a suspicious location. \ --O or --output is used when a file is to be downloaded and placed in a specified location. \ -During triage, review parallel processes for further behavior. In addition, identify if the download was successful. If a file was downloaded, capture and analyze. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_curl` Processes.process IN ("*-O *","*--output*") Processes.process IN ("*\\appdata\\*","*\\programdata\\*","*\\public\\*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path_filter` - -[ESCU - Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies the use of Windows Curl.exe uploading a file to a remote destination. \ -`-T` or `--upload-file` is used when a file is to be uploaded to a remotge destination. \ -`-d` or `--data` POST is the HTTP method that was invented to send data to a receiving web application, and it is, for example, how most common HTML forms on the web work. \ -HTTP multipart formposts are done with `-F`, but this appears to not be compatible with the Windows version of Curl. Will update if identified adversary tradecraft. \ -Adversaries may use one of the three methods based on the remote destination and what they are attempting to upload (zip vs txt). During triage, review parallel processes for further behavior. In addition, identify if the upload was successful in network logs. If a file was uploaded, isolate the endpoint and review. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the use of Windows Curl.exe uploading a file to a remote destination. \ -`-T` or `--upload-file` is used when a file is to be uploaded to a remotge destination. \ -`-d` or `--data` POST is the HTTP method that was invented to send data to a receiving web application, and it is, for example, how most common HTML forms on the web work. \ -HTTP multipart formposts are done with `-F`, but this appears to not be compatible with the Windows version of Curl. Will update if identified adversary tradecraft. \ -Adversaries may use one of the three methods based on the remote destination and what they are attempting to upload (zip vs txt). During triage, review parallel processes for further behavior. In addition, identify if the upload was successful in network logs. If a file was uploaded, isolate the endpoint and review. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be limited to source control applications and may be required to be filtered out. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-10 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-10 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ingress Tool Transfer"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ uploading a file to a remote destination. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ingress Tool Transfer"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the use of Windows Curl.exe uploading a file to a remote destination. \ -`-T` or `--upload-file` is used when a file is to be uploaded to a remotge destination. \ -`-d` or `--data` POST is the HTTP method that was invented to send data to a receiving web application, and it is, for example, how most common HTML forms on the web work. \ -HTTP multipart formposts are done with `-F`, but this appears to not be compatible with the Windows version of Curl. Will update if identified adversary tradecraft. \ -Adversaries may use one of the three methods based on the remote destination and what they are attempting to upload (zip vs txt). During triage, review parallel processes for further behavior. In addition, identify if the upload was successful in network logs. If a file was uploaded, isolate the endpoint and review. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_curl` Processes.process IN ("*-T *","*--upload-file *", "*-d *", "*--data *", "*-F *") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination_filter` - -[ESCU - Windows DISM Remove Defender - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies the use of the Windows Disk Image Utility, `dism.exe`, to remove Windows Defender. Adversaries may use `dism.exe` to disable Defender before completing their objective. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the use of the Windows Disk Image Utility, `dism.exe`, to remove Windows Defender. Adversaries may use `dism.exe` to disable Defender before completing their objective. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Some legitimate administrative tools leverage `dism.exe` to manipulate packages and features of the operating system. Filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-17 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-17 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows DISM Remove Defender - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to disable Windows Defender. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows DISM Remove Defender - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the use of the Windows Disk Image Utility, `dism.exe`, to remove Windows Defender. Adversaries may use `dism.exe` to disable Defender before completing their objective. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows DISM Remove Defender -action.notable.param.security_domain = access -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=dism.exe (Processes.process="*/online*" AND Processes.process="*/disable-feature*" AND Processes.process="*Windows-Defender*" AND Processes.process="*/remove*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_dism_remove_defender_filter` - -[ESCU - Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic will detect a suspicious process that modify a registry related to windows defender exclusion feature. This registry is abused by adversaries, malware author and red teams to bypassed Windows Defender Anti-Virus product by excluding folder path, file path, process, extensions and etc. from its real time or schedule scan to execute their malicious code. This is a good indicator for a defense evasion and to look further for events after this behavior. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic will detect a suspicious process that modify a registry related to windows defender exclusion feature. This registry is abused by adversaries, malware author and red teams to bypassed Windows Defender Anti-Virus product by excluding folder path, file path, process, extensions and etc. from its real time or schedule scan to execute their malicious code. This is a good indicator for a defense evasion and to look further for events after this behavior. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. -action.escu.known_false_positives = admin or user may choose to use this windows features. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-25 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-25 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Remcos", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = exclusion registry $registry_path$ modified or added on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 64}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Remcos", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic will detect a suspicious process that modify a registry related to windows defender exclusion feature. This registry is abused by adversaries, malware author and red teams to bypassed Windows Defender Anti-Virus product by excluding folder path, file path, process, extensions and etc. from its real time or schedule scan to execute their malicious code. This is a good indicator for a defense evasion and to look further for events after this behavior. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = "*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Exclusions\\*" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry_filter` - -[ESCU - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies a process that is attempting to disable the ability on Windows to generate a memory crash dump. This was recently identified being utilized by HermeticWiper. To disable crash dumps, the value must be set to 0. This feature is typically modified to perform a memory crash dump when a computer stops unexpectedly because of a Stop error (also known as a blue screen, system crash, or bug check). -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies a process that is attempting to disable the ability on Windows to generate a memory crash dump. This was recently identified being utilized by HermeticWiper. To disable crash dumps, the value must be set to 0. This feature is typically modified to perform a memory crash dump when a computer stops unexpectedly because of a Stop error (also known as a blue screen, system crash, or bug check). -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` and `Registry` node. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-25 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-25 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Data Destruction", "Ransomware", "Hermetic Wiper"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A process $process_name$ was identified attempting to disable memory crash dumps on $dest$. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 90}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 90}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "Ransomware", "Hermetic Wiper"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies a process that is attempting to disable the ability on Windows to generate a memory crash dump. This was recently identified being utilized by HermeticWiper. To disable crash dumps, the value must be set to 0. This feature is typically modified to perform a memory crash dump when a computer stops unexpectedly because of a Stop error (also known as a blue screen, system crash, or bug check). -action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path="*\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\CrashControl\\CrashDumpEnabled") AND Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000000" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process process_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process process_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `windows_disable_memory_crash_dump_filter` - -[ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The search looks for the Registry Key DisableAntiSpyware set to disable. This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints. This particular behavior is typically executed when an ransomware actor gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. Endpoint should be isolated. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The search looks for the Registry Key DisableAntiSpyware set to disable. This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints. This particular behavior is typically executed when an ransomware actor gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. Endpoint should be isolated. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. -action.escu.known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro to tune the search. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-02 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-02 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ryuk Ransomware", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Windows DisableAntiSpyware registry key set to 'disabled' on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 24}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The search looks for the Registry Key DisableAntiSpyware set to disable. This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints. This particular behavior is typically executed when an ransomware actor gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. Endpoint should be isolated. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_value_name="DisableAntiSpyware" AND Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000001" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_disableantispyware_registry_filter` - -[ESCU - Windows DiskCryptor Usage - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies DiskCryptor process name of dcrypt.exe or internal name dcinst.exe. This utility has been utilized by adversaries to encrypt disks manually during an operation. In addition, during install, a dcrypt.sys driver is installed and requires a reboot in order to take effect. There are no command-line arguments used. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies DiskCryptor process name of dcrypt.exe or internal name dcinst.exe. This utility has been utilized by adversaries to encrypt disks manually during an operation. In addition, during install, a dcrypt.sys driver is installed and requires a reboot in order to take effect. There are no command-line arguments used. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible false positives may be present based on the internal name dcinst.exe, filter as needed. It may be worthy to alert on the service name. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-15 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-15 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows DiskCryptor Usage - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to encrypt disks. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 35}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 35}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows DiskCryptor Usage - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies DiskCryptor process name of dcrypt.exe or internal name dcinst.exe. This utility has been utilized by adversaries to encrypt disks manually during an operation. In addition, during install, a dcrypt.sys driver is installed and requires a reboot in order to take effect. There are no command-line arguments used. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows DiskCryptor Usage -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="dcrypt.exe" OR Processes.original_file_name=dcinst.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_diskcryptor_usage_filter` - -[ESCU - Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = DiskShadow.exe is a Microsoft Signed binary present on Windows Server. It has a scripting mode intended for complex scripted backup operations. This feature also allows for execution of arbitrary unsigned code. This analytic looks for the usage of the scripting mode flags in executions of DiskShadow. During triage, compare to known backup behavior in your environment and then review the scripts called by diskshadow. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = DiskShadow.exe is a Microsoft Signed binary present on Windows Server. It has a scripting mode intended for complex scripted backup operations. This feature also allows for execution of arbitrary unsigned code. This analytic looks for the usage of the scripting mode flags in executions of DiskShadow. During triage, compare to known backup behavior in your environment and then review the scripts called by diskshadow. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on processes that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition,confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators using the DiskShadow tool in their infrastructure as a main backup tool with scripts will cause false positives that can be filtered with `windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution_filter` -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-15 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-15 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Living Off The Land"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Possible Signed Binary Proxy Execution on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = DiskShadow.exe is a Microsoft Signed binary present on Windows Server. It has a scripting mode intended for complex scripted backup operations. This feature also allows for execution of arbitrary unsigned code. This analytic looks for the usage of the scripting mode flags in executions of DiskShadow. During triage, compare to known backup behavior in your environment and then review the scripts called by diskshadow. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_diskshadow` (Processes.process=*-s* OR Processes.process=*/s*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution_filter` - -[ESCU - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies native .net binaries within the Windows operating system that may be abused by adversaries by moving it to a new directory. The analytic identifies the .net binary by using a lookup and compares the process name and original file name (internal name). The analytic utilizes a lookup with the is_net_windows_file macro to identify the binary process name and original file name. if one or the other matches an alert will be generated. Adversaries abuse these binaries as they are native to windows and native DotNet. Note that not all SDK (post install of Windows) are captured in the lookup. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1036.003", "T1218", "T1218.004"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies native .net binaries within the Windows operating system that may be abused by adversaries by moving it to a new directory. The analytic identifies the .net binary by using a lookup and compares the process name and original file name (internal name). The analytic utilizes a lookup with the is_net_windows_file macro to identify the binary process name and original file name. if one or the other matches an alert will be generated. Adversaries abuse these binaries as they are native to windows and native DotNet. Note that not all SDK (post install of Windows) are captured in the lookup. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present and filtering may be required. Certain utilities will run from non-standard paths based on the third-party application in use. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-19 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-19 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", "Unusual Processes", "Ransomware", "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", "WhisperGate"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ from a non-standard path was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 49}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", "Unusual Processes", "Ransomware", "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", "WhisperGate"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1036.003", "T1218", "T1218.004"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies native .net binaries within the Windows operating system that may be abused by adversaries by moving it to a new directory. The analytic identifies the .net binary by using a lookup and compares the process name and original file name (internal name). The analytic utilizes a lookup with the is_net_windows_file macro to identify the binary process name and original file name. if one or the other matches an alert will be generated. Adversaries abuse these binaries as they are native to windows and native DotNet. Note that not all SDK (post install of Windows) are captured in the lookup. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where NOT (Processes.process_path IN ("*\\Windows\\ADWS\\*","*\\Windows\\SysWOW64*", "*\\Windows\\system32*", "*\\Windows\\NetworkController\\*", "*\\Windows\\SystemApps\\*", "*\\WinSxS\\*", "*\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\*")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_path Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `is_net_windows_file` | `windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path_filter` - -[ESCU - Windows Event For Service Disabled - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic will identify suspicious system event of services that was modified from start to disabled. This technique is seen where the adversary attempts to disable security app services, other malware services to evade the defense systems on the compromised host -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic will identify suspicious system event of services that was modified from start to disabled. This technique is seen where the adversary attempts to disable security app services, other malware services to evade the defense systems on the compromised host -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Windows service update may cause this event. In that scenario, filtering is needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-23 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-23 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Event For Service Disabled - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Service was disabled on $Computer$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 36}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Event For Service Disabled - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic will identify suspicious system event of services that was modified from start to disabled. This technique is seen where the adversary attempts to disable security app services, other malware services to evade the defense systems on the compromised host -action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Event For Service Disabled -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7040 Message = "*service was changed from demand start to disabled." | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName EventCode Message User Sid | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_event_for_service_disabled_filter` - -[ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic utilizes Windows Security Event ID 1102 or System log event 104 to identify when a Windows event log is cleared. Note that this analytic will require tuning or restricted to specific endpoints based on criticality. During triage, based on time of day and user, determine if this was planned. If not planned, follow through with reviewing parallel alerts and other data sources to determine what else may have occurred. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070", "T1070.001"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "PR.IP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.AE"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes Windows Security Event ID 1102 or System log event 104 to identify when a Windows event log is cleared. Note that this analytic will require tuning or restricted to specific endpoints based on criticality. During triage, based on time of day and user, determine if this was planned. If not planned, follow through with reviewing parallel alerts and other data sources to determine what else may have occurred. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows event logs from your hosts. In addition, the Splunk Windows TA is needed. -action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible that these logs may be legitimately cleared by Administrators. Filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-06 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-06 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Log Manipulation", "Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Windows event logs cleared on $dest$ via EventCode $EventCode$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 70}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Log Manipulation", "Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070", "T1070.001"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "PR.IP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes Windows Security Event ID 1102 or System log event 104 to identify when a Windows event log is cleared. Note that this analytic will require tuning or restricted to specific endpoints based on criticality. During triage, based on time of day and user, determine if this was planned. If not planned, follow through with reviewing parallel alerts and other data sources to determine what else may have occurred. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Event Log Cleared -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = (`wineventlog_security` EventCode=1102) OR (`wineventlog_system` EventCode=104) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest Message EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_event_log_cleared_filter` - -[ESCU - Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic will identify suspicious excessive number of system events of services that was modified from start to disabled. This technique is seen where the adversary attempts to disable security app services, other malware services oer serve as an destructive impact to complete the objective on the compromised system. One good example for this scenario is Olympic destroyer where it disable all active services in the compromised host as part of its destructive impact and defense evasion. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic will identify suspicious excessive number of system events of services that was modified from start to disabled. This technique is seen where the adversary attempts to disable security app services, other malware services oer serve as an destructive impact to complete the objective on the compromised system. One good example for this scenario is Olympic destroyer where it disable all active services in the compromised host as part of its destructive impact and defense evasion. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-23 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-23 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Service was disabled in $Computer$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 81}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic will identify suspicious excessive number of system events of services that was modified from start to disabled. This technique is seen where the adversary attempts to disable security app services, other malware services oer serve as an destructive impact to complete the objective on the compromised system. One good example for this scenario is Olympic destroyer where it disable all active services in the compromised host as part of its destructive impact and defense evasion. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7040 Message = "*service was changed from demand start to disabled." | stats count values(Message) as MessageList dc(Message) as MessageCount min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName EventCode User Sid | where MessageCount >=10 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_excessive_disabled_services_event_filter` - -[ESCU - Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic is to look for suspicious file creation in the critical folder like "System32\Drivers" folder without file extension. This artifacts was seen in latest hermeticwiper where it drops its driver component in Driver Directory both the compressed(without file extension) and the actual driver component (with .sys file extension). This TTP is really a good indication that a host might be compromised by this destructive malware that wipes the boot sector of the system. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to look for suspicious file creation in the critical folder like "System32\Drivers" folder without file extension. This artifacts was seen in latest hermeticwiper where it drops its driver component in Driver Directory both the compressed(without file extension) and the actual driver component (with .sys file extension). This TTP is really a good indication that a host might be compromised by this destructive malware that wipes the boot sector of the system. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown at this point -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-25 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-25 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Data Destruction", "Hermetic Wiper"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Driver file with out file extension drop in $file_path$ in $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 90}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "Hermetic Wiper"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to look for suspicious file creation in the critical folder like "System32\Drivers" folder without file extension. This artifacts was seen in latest hermeticwiper where it drops its driver component in Driver Directory both the compressed(without file extension) and the actual driver component (with .sys file extension). This TTP is really a good indication that a host might be compromised by this destructive malware that wipes the boot sector of the system. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN ("*\\System32\\drivers\\*", "*\\syswow64\\drivers\\*") by _time span=5m Filesystem.dest Filesystem.user Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_create_time | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | rex field="file_name" "\.(?[^\.]*$)" | where isnull(extension) | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=5m Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_guid Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`] | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest process_name process_guid file_name file_path file_create_time user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_file_without_extension_in_critical_folder_filter` - -[ESCU - Windows High File Deletion Frequency - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for high frequency of file deletion relative to process name and process id. These events usually happen when the ransomware tries to encrypt the files with the ransomware file extensions and sysmon treat the original files to be deleted as soon it was replace as encrypted data. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for high frequency of file deletion relative to process name and process id. These events usually happen when the ransomware tries to encrypt the files with the ransomware file extensions and sysmon treat the original files to be deleted as soon it was replace as encrypted data. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the deleted target file name, process name and process id from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -action.escu.known_false_positives = user may delete bunch of pictures or files in a folder. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-16 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-16 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows High File Deletion Frequency - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Clop Ransomware", "WhisperGate"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = High frequency file deletion activity detected on host $Computer$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 72}, {"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}, {"threat_object_field": "deleted_files", "threat_object_type": "file name"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows High File Deletion Frequency - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware", "WhisperGate"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "deleted_files", "role": ["Target"], "type": "File Name"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for high frequency of file deletion relative to process name and process id. These events usually happen when the ransomware tries to encrypt the files with the ransomware file extensions and sysmon treat the original files to be deleted as soon it was replace as encrypted data. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows High File Deletion Frequency -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `sysmon` EventCode=23 TargetFilename IN ("*.cmd", "*.ini","*.gif", "*.jpg", "*.jpeg", "*.db", "*.ps1", "*.doc*", "*.xls*", "*.ppt*", "*.bmp","*.zip", "*.rar", "*.7z", "*.chm", "*.png", "*.log", "*.vbs", "*.js", "*.vhd", "*.bak", "*.wbcat", "*.bkf" , "*.backup*", "*.dsk", , "*.win") | stats values(TargetFilename) as deleted_files min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer user EventCode Image ProcessID |where count >=100 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_high_file_deletion_frequency_filter` - -[ESCU - Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following hunting analytic identifies all processes requesting access into Lsass.exe. his behavior may be related to credential dumping or applications requiring access to credentials. Triaging this event will require understanding the GrantedAccess from the SourceImage. In addition, whether the account is privileged or not. Review the process requesting permissions and review parallel processes. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following hunting analytic identifies all processes requesting access into Lsass.exe. his behavior may be related to credential dumping or applications requiring access to credentials. Triaging this event will require understanding the GrantedAccess from the SourceImage. In addition, whether the account is privileged or not. Review the process requesting permissions and review parallel processes. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Enabling EventCode 10 TargetProcess lsass.exe is required. -action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will occur based on GrantedAccess and SourceUser, filter based on source image as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-12 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-12 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Credential Dumping"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A process, $SourceImage$, has loaded $ImageLoaded$ that are typically related to credential dumping on $dest$. Review for further details. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 64}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}, {"threat_object_field": "ImageLoaded", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "SourceImage", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "ImageLoaded", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "SourceImage", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following hunting analytic identifies all processes requesting access into Lsass.exe. his behavior may be related to credential dumping or applications requiring access to credentials. Triaging this event will require understanding the GrantedAccess from the SourceImage. In addition, whether the account is privileged or not. Review the process requesting permissions and review parallel processes. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, TargetImage, GrantedAccess, SourceImage, SourceProcessId, SourceUser, TargetUser | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_hunting_system_account_targeting_lsass_filter` - -[ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary loading `vaultcli.dll` and Samlib.dll`. This technique may be used to execute code to bypassing application control and capture credentials by utilizing a tool like MimiKatz. \ -When `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \ -If used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \ -During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.004", "T1218"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary loading `vaultcli.dll` and Samlib.dll`. This technique may be used to execute code to bypassing application control and capture credentials by utilizing a tool like MimiKatz. \ -When `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \ -If used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \ -During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and module loads from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Typically this will not trigger as by it's very nature InstallUtil does not need credentials. Filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-12 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-12 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ loading samlib.dll and vaultcli.dll to potentially capture credentials in memory. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.004", "T1218"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary loading `vaultcli.dll` and Samlib.dll`. This technique may be used to execute code to bypassing application control and capture credentials by utilizing a tool like MimiKatz. \ -When `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \ -If used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \ -During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `sysmon` EventCode=7 process_name=installutil.exe ImageLoaded IN ("*\\samlib.dll", "*\\vaultcli.dll") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, process_name, ImageLoaded, OriginalFileName, process_id | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_installutil_credential_theft_filter` - -[ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary making a remote network connection. This technique may be used to download and execute code while bypassing application control. \ -When `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \ -If used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \ -During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.004", "T1218"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary making a remote network connection. This technique may be used to download and execute code while bypassing application control. \ -When `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \ -If used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \ -During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Ports` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives should be present as InstallUtil is not typically used to download remote files. Filter as needed based on Developers requirements. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-12 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-12 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ generating a remote download. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.004", "T1218"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary making a remote network connection. This technique may be used to download and execute code while bypassing application control. \ -When `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \ -If used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \ -During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` by _time span=1h Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_guid [ | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port !="0" by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_guid connection_to_CNC dest_port | `windows_installutil_remote_network_connection_filter` - -[ESCU - Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary passing a HTTP request on the command-line. This technique may be used to download and execute code while bypassing application control. \ -When `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \ -If used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \ -During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.004", "T1218"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary passing a HTTP request on the command-line. This technique may be used to download and execute code while bypassing application control. \ -When `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \ -If used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \ -During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives should be present as InstallUtil is not typically used to download remote files. Filter as needed based on Developers requirements. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-12 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-12 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ passing a URL on the command-line. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.004", "T1218"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary passing a HTTP request on the command-line. This technique may be used to download and execute code while bypassing application control. \ -When `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \ -If used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \ -During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` Processes.process IN ("*http://*","*https://*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_installutil_url_in_command_line_filter` - -[ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary. This will execute code while bypassing application control using the `/u` (uninstall) switch. \ -InstallUtil uses the functions install and uninstall within the System.Configuration.Install namespace to process .net assembly. Install function requires admin privileges, however, uninstall function can be run as an unprivileged user.\ -When `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \ -If used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \ -During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.004", "T1218"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary. This will execute code while bypassing application control using the `/u` (uninstall) switch. \ -InstallUtil uses the functions install and uninstall within the System.Configuration.Install namespace to process .net assembly. Install function requires admin privileges, however, uninstall function can be run as an unprivileged user.\ -When `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \ -If used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \ -During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives should be present. Filter as needed by parent process or application. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-12 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-12 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ performing an uninstall. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.004", "T1218"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary. This will execute code while bypassing application control using the `/u` (uninstall) switch. \ -InstallUtil uses the functions install and uninstall within the System.Configuration.Install namespace to process .net assembly. Install function requires admin privileges, however, uninstall function can be run as an unprivileged user.\ -When `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \ -If used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \ -During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` Processes.process IN ("*/u*", "*uninstall*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_installutil_uninstall_option_filter` - -[ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary making a remote network connection. This technique may be used to download and execute code while bypassing application control using the `/u` (uninstall) switch. \ -InstallUtil uses the functions install and uninstall within the System.Configuration.Install namespace to process .net assembly. Install function requires admin privileges, however, uninstall function can be run as an unprivileged user.\ -When `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \ -If used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \ -During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.004", "T1218"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary making a remote network connection. This technique may be used to download and execute code while bypassing application control using the `/u` (uninstall) switch. \ -InstallUtil uses the functions install and uninstall within the System.Configuration.Install namespace to process .net assembly. Install function requires admin privileges, however, uninstall function can be run as an unprivileged user.\ -When `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \ -If used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \ -During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Ports` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives should be present as InstallUtil is not typically used to download remote files. Filter as needed based on Developers requirements. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-12 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-12 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ performing an uninstall. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.004", "T1218"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary making a remote network connection. This technique may be used to download and execute code while bypassing application control using the `/u` (uninstall) switch. \ -InstallUtil uses the functions install and uninstall within the System.Configuration.Install namespace to process .net assembly. Install function requires admin privileges, however, uninstall function can be run as an unprivileged user.\ -When `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \ -If used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \ -During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` Processes.process IN ("*/u*", "*uninstall*") by _time span=1h Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_guid [ | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port !="0" by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name original_file_name process_path process process_guid connection_to_CNC dest_port | `windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network_filter` - -[ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies the Windows binary InstallUtil.exe running from a non-standard location. The analytic utilizes a macro for InstallUtil and identifies both the process_name and original_file_name. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1036.003", "T1218", "T1218.004"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the Windows binary InstallUtil.exe running from a non-standard location. The analytic utilizes a macro for InstallUtil and identifies both the process_name and original_file_name. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present and filtering may be required. Certain utilities will run from non-standard paths based on the third-party application in use. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-19 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-19 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", "Unusual Processes", "Ransomware", "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", "WhisperGate"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ from a non-standard path was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 49}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", "Unusual Processes", "Ransomware", "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", "WhisperGate"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1036.003", "T1218", "T1218.004"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the Windows binary InstallUtil.exe running from a non-standard location. The analytic utilizes a macro for InstallUtil and identifies both the process_name and original_file_name. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` NOT (Processes.process_path IN ("*\\Windows\\ADWS\\*","*\\Windows\\SysWOW64*", "*\\Windows\\system32*", "*\\Windows\\NetworkController\\*", "*\\Windows\\SystemApps\\*", "*\\WinSxS\\*", "*\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\*")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_hash | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path_filter` - [ESCU - Windows Java Spawning Shells - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -35465,7 +34756,7 @@ action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ spawning a Windows shell, potentially indicative of exploitation. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 40}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 40}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * @@ -35473,10 +34764,10 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Java Spawning Shells - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the process name of java.exe and w3wp.exe spawning a Windows shell. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). The shells included in the macro are "cmd.exe", "powershell.exe". Upon triage, review parallel processes and command-line arguments to determine legitimacy. action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Java Spawning Shells action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint @@ -35492,860 +34783,25 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=java.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=w3wp.exe `windows_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_java_spawning_shells_filter` -[ESCU - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule] +[ESCU - WinRM Spawning a Process - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic is to look for suspicious registry modification related to file compression color and information tips. This IOC was seen in hermetic wiper where it has a thread that will create this registry entry to change the color of compressed or encrypted files in NTFS file system as well as the pop up information tips. This is a good indicator that a process tries to modified one of the registry GlobalFolderOptions related to file compression attribution in terms of color in NTFS file system. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +description = The following analytic identifies suspicious processes spawning from WinRM (wsmprovhost.exe). This analytic is related to potential exploitation of CVE-2021-31166. which is a kernel-mode device driver http.sys vulnerability. Current proof of concept code will blue-screen the operating system. However, http.sys used by many different Windows processes, including WinRM. In this case, identifying suspicious process create (child processes) from `wsmprovhost.exe` is what this analytic is identifying. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"]} action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to look for suspicious registry modification related to file compression color and information tips. This IOC was seen in hermetic wiper where it has a thread that will create this registry entry to change the color of compressed or encrypted files in NTFS file system as well as the pop up information tips. This is a good indicator that a process tries to modified one of the registry GlobalFolderOptions related to file compression attribution in terms of color in NTFS file system. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Registry` node. -action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-03-02 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-03-02 +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies suspicious processes spawning from WinRM (wsmprovhost.exe). This analytic is related to potential exploitation of CVE-2021-31166. which is a kernel-mode device driver http.sys vulnerability. Current proof of concept code will blue-screen the operating system. However, http.sys used by many different Windows processes, including WinRM. In this case, identifying suspicious process create (child processes) from `wsmprovhost.exe` is what this analytic is identifying. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown. Add new processes or filter as needed. It is possible system management software may spawn processes from `wsmprovhost.exe`. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-05-21 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-05-21 action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Hermetic Wiper"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Registry modification in "ShowCompColor" and "ShowInfoTips" on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Hermetic Wiper"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to look for suspicious registry modification related to file compression color and information tips. This IOC was seen in hermetic wiper where it has a thread that will create this registry entry to change the color of compressed or encrypted files in NTFS file system as well as the pop up information tips. This is a good indicator that a process tries to modified one of the registry GlobalFolderOptions related to file compression attribution in terms of color in NTFS file system. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = "*\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Advanced*" AND Registry.registry_value_name IN("ShowCompColor", "ShowInfoTip") by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `windows_modify_show_compress_color_and_info_tip_registry_filter` - -[ESCU - Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies the use of AdvancedRun.exe. AdvancedRun.exe has similar capabilities as other remote programs like psexec. AdvancedRun may also ingest a configuration file with all settings defined and perform its activity. The analytic is written in a way to identify a renamed binary and also the common command-line arguments. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1588.002"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the use of AdvancedRun.exe. AdvancedRun.exe has similar capabilities as other remote programs like psexec. AdvancedRun may also ingest a configuration file with all settings defined and perform its activity. The analytic is written in a way to identify a renamed binary and also the common command-line arguments. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as it is specific to AdvancedRun. Filter as needed based on legitimate usage. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-21 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-21 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Unusual Processes", "Ransomware", "WhisperGate"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of advancedrun.exe, $process_name$, was spawned by $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 60}, {"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 60}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Unusual Processes", "Ransomware", "WhisperGate"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1588.002"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the use of AdvancedRun.exe. AdvancedRun.exe has similar capabilities as other remote programs like psexec. AdvancedRun may also ingest a configuration file with all settings defined and perform its activity. The analytic is written in a way to identify a renamed binary and also the common command-line arguments. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=advancedrun.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=advancedrun.exe) Processes.process IN ("*EXEFilename*","*/cfg*","*RunAs*", "*WindowState*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_nirsoft_advancedrun_filter` - -[ESCU - Windows NirSoft Utilities - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following hunting analytic assists with identifying the proces execution of commonly used utilities from NirSoft. Potentially not adversary behavior, but worth identifying to know if the software is present and being used. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1588.002"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following hunting analytic assists with identifying the proces execution of commonly used utilities from NirSoft. Potentially not adversary behavior, but worth identifying to know if the software is present and being used. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Filtering may be required before setting to alert. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-24 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-24 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows NirSoft Utilities - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["WhisperGate"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ related to NiRSoft software usage. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows NirSoft Utilities - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["WhisperGate"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1588.002"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following hunting analytic assists with identifying the proces execution of commonly used utilities from NirSoft. Potentially not adversary behavior, but worth identifying to know if the software is present and being used. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows NirSoft Utilities -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_path Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `is_nirsoft_software` | `windows_nirsoft_utilities_filter` - -[ESCU - Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies non SYSTEM accounts requesting access to lsass.exe. This behavior may be related to credential dumping or applications requiring access to credentials. Triaging this event will require understanding the GrantedAccess from the SourceImage. In addition, whether the account is privileged or not. Review the process requesting permissions and review parallel processes. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies non SYSTEM accounts requesting access to lsass.exe. This behavior may be related to credential dumping or applications requiring access to credentials. Triaging this event will require understanding the GrantedAccess from the SourceImage. In addition, whether the account is privileged or not. Review the process requesting permissions and review parallel processes. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Enabling EventCode 10 TargetProcess lsass.exe is required. -action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will occur based on legitimate application requests, filter based on source image as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-12 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-12 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Credential Dumping"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A process, $SourceImage$, has loaded $ImageLoaded$ that are typically related to credential dumping on $dest$. Review for further details. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 64}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}, {"threat_object_field": "ImageLoaded", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "SourceImage", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "ImageLoaded", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "SourceImage", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies non SYSTEM accounts requesting access to lsass.exe. This behavior may be related to credential dumping or applications requiring access to credentials. Triaging this event will require understanding the GrantedAccess from the SourceImage. In addition, whether the account is privileged or not. Review the process requesting permissions and review parallel processes. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe SourceUser!="NT AUTHORITY\\*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, TargetImage, GrantedAccess, SourceImage, SourceProcessId, SourceUser, TargetUser | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_non_system_account_targeting_lsass_filter` - -[ESCU - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic is an enhanced version of two previous analytics that identifies common GrantedAccess permission requests and CallTrace DLLs in order to detect credential dumping. \ -GrantedAccess is the requested permissions by the SourceImage into the TargetImage. \ -CallTrace Stack trace of where open process is called. Included is the DLL and the relative virtual address of the functions in the call stack right before the open process call. \ -dbgcore.dll or dbghelp.dll are two core Windows debug DLLs that have minidump functions which provide a way for applications to produce crashdump files that contain a useful subset of the entire process context. \ -The idea behind using ntdll.dll is to blend in by using native api of ntdll.dll. For example in sekurlsa module there are many ntdll exported api, like RtlCopyMemory, used to execute this module which is related to lsass dumping. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic is an enhanced version of two previous analytics that identifies common GrantedAccess permission requests and CallTrace DLLs in order to detect credential dumping. \ -GrantedAccess is the requested permissions by the SourceImage into the TargetImage. \ -CallTrace Stack trace of where open process is called. Included is the DLL and the relative virtual address of the functions in the call stack right before the open process call. \ -dbgcore.dll or dbghelp.dll are two core Windows debug DLLs that have minidump functions which provide a way for applications to produce crashdump files that contain a useful subset of the entire process context. \ -The idea behind using ntdll.dll is to blend in by using native api of ntdll.dll. For example in sekurlsa module there are many ntdll exported api, like RtlCopyMemory, used to execute this module which is related to lsass dumping. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Enabling EventCode 10 TargetProcess lsass.exe is required. -action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will occur based on GrantedAccess 0x1010 and 0x1400, filter based on source image as needed or remove them. Concern is Cobalt Strike usage of Mimikatz will generate 0x1010 initially, but later be caught. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-27 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-27 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Credential Dumping", "Detect Zerologon Attack", "DarkSide Ransomware"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A process, $SourceImage$, has loaded $ImageLoaded$ that are typically related to credential dumping on $dest$. Review for further details. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 64}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}, {"threat_object_field": "ImageLoaded", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "SourceImage", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "Detect Zerologon Attack", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "ImageLoaded", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "SourceImage", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic is an enhanced version of two previous analytics that identifies common GrantedAccess permission requests and CallTrace DLLs in order to detect credential dumping. \ -GrantedAccess is the requested permissions by the SourceImage into the TargetImage. \ -CallTrace Stack trace of where open process is called. Included is the DLL and the relative virtual address of the functions in the call stack right before the open process call. \ -dbgcore.dll or dbghelp.dll are two core Windows debug DLLs that have minidump functions which provide a way for applications to produce crashdump files that contain a useful subset of the entire process context. \ -The idea behind using ntdll.dll is to blend in by using native api of ntdll.dll. For example in sekurlsa module there are many ntdll exported api, like RtlCopyMemory, used to execute this module which is related to lsass dumping. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Possible Credential Dumping -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe GrantedAccess IN ("0x01000", "0x1010", "0x1038", "0x40", "0x1400", "0x1fffff", "0x1410", "0x143a", "0x1438", "0x1000") CallTrace IN ("*dbgcore.dll*", "*dbghelp.dll*", "*ntdll.dll*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, TargetImage, GrantedAccess, SourceImage, SourceProcessId, SourceUser, TargetUser | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_possible_credential_dumping_filter` - -[ESCU - Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic is to look for process commandline that contains named pipe. This technique was seen in some adversaries, threat actor and malware like olympic destroyer to communicate to its other child processes after process injection that serve as defense evasion and privilege escalation. On the other hand this analytic may catch some normal process that using this technique for example browser application. In that scenario we include common process path we've seen during testing that cause false positive which is the program files. False positive may still be arise if the normal application is in other folder path. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to look for process commandline that contains named pipe. This technique was seen in some adversaries, threat actor and malware like olympic destroyer to communicate to its other child processes after process injection that serve as defense evasion and privilege escalation. On the other hand this analytic may catch some normal process that using this technique for example browser application. In that scenario we include common process path we've seen during testing that cause false positive which is the program files. False positive may still be arise if the normal application is in other folder path. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Normal browser application may use this technique. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-23 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-23 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Process with named pipe in $process$ on $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to look for process commandline that contains named pipe. This technique was seen in some adversaries, threat actor and malware like olympic destroyer to communicate to its other child processes after process injection that serve as defense evasion and privilege escalation. On the other hand this analytic may catch some normal process that using this technique for example browser application. In that scenario we include common process path we've seen during testing that cause false positive which is the program files. False positive may still be arise if the normal application is in other folder path. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = "*\\\\.\\pipe\\*" NOT (Processes.process_path IN ("*\\program files*")) by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_process_with_namedpipe_commandline_filter` - -[ESCU - Windows Raccine Scheduled Task Deletion - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies the Raccine Rules Updater scheduled task being deleted. Adversaries may attempt to remove this task in order to prevent the update of Raccine. Raccine is a "ransomware vaccine" created by security researcher Florian Roth, designed to intercept and prevent precursors and active ransomware behavior. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the Raccine Rules Updater scheduled task being deleted. Adversaries may attempt to remove this task in order to prevent the update of Raccine. Raccine is a "ransomware vaccine" created by security researcher Florian Roth, designed to intercept and prevent precursors and active ransomware behavior. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, however filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-07 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-07 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Raccine Scheduled Task Deletion - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user user$ attempting to disable Raccines scheduled task. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Raccine Scheduled Task Deletion - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the Raccine Rules Updater scheduled task being deleted. Adversaries may attempt to remove this task in order to prevent the update of Raccine. Raccine is a "ransomware vaccine" created by security researcher Florian Roth, designed to intercept and prevent precursors and active ransomware behavior. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Raccine Scheduled Task Deletion -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe Processes.process="*delete*" AND Processes.process="*Raccine*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_raccine_scheduled_task_deletion_filter` - -[ESCU - Windows Rasautou DLL Execution - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies the Windows Windows Remote Auto Dialer, rasautou.exe executing an arbitrary DLL. This technique is used to execute arbitrary shellcode or DLLs via the rasautou.exe LOLBin capability. During triage, review parent and child process behavior including file and image loads. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055.001", "T1218", "T1055"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the Windows Windows Remote Auto Dialer, rasautou.exe executing an arbitrary DLL. This technique is used to execute arbitrary shellcode or DLLs via the rasautou.exe LOLBin capability. During triage, review parent and child process behavior including file and image loads. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will be limited to applications that require Rasautou.exe to load a DLL from disk. Filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-15 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-15 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Rasautou DLL Execution - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to load a DLL in a suspicious manner. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Rasautou DLL Execution - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055.001", "T1218", "T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the Windows Windows Remote Auto Dialer, rasautou.exe executing an arbitrary DLL. This technique is used to execute arbitrary shellcode or DLLs via the rasautou.exe LOLBin capability. During triage, review parent and child process behavior including file and image loads. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Rasautou DLL Execution -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rasautou.exe Processes.process="* -d *"AND Processes.process="* -p *" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_rasautou_dll_execution_filter` - -[ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic is to look for suspicious raw access read to device disk partition of the host machine. This technique was seen in several attacks by adversaries or threat actor to wipe, encrypt or overwrite the boot sector of each partition as part of their impact payload for example the "hermeticwiper" malware. This detection is a good indicator that there is a process try to read or write on boot sector. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1561.002", "T1561"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to look for suspicious raw access read to device disk partition of the host machine. This technique was seen in several attacks by adversaries or threat actor to wipe, encrypt or overwrite the boot sector of each partition as part of their impact payload for example the "hermeticwiper" malware. This detection is a good indicator that there is a process try to read or write on boot sector. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the raw access read event (like sysmon eventcode 9), process name and process guid from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -action.escu.known_false_positives = This event is really notable but we found minimal number of normal application from system32 folder like svchost.exe accessing it too. In this case we used 'system32' and 'syswow64' path as a filter for this detection. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-25 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-25 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Data Destruction", "Hermetic Wiper"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Process accessing disk partition $device$ in $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 90}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "Hermetic Wiper"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Impact"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1561.002", "T1561"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to look for suspicious raw access read to device disk partition of the host machine. This technique was seen in several attacks by adversaries or threat actor to wipe, encrypt or overwrite the boot sector of each partition as part of their impact payload for example the "hermeticwiper" malware. This detection is a good indicator that there is a process try to read or write on boot sector. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `sysmon` EventCode=9 Device = \\Device\\HarddiskVolume* NOT (Image IN("*\\Windows\\System32\\*", "*\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\*")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image Device ProcessGuid ProcessId EventDescription EventCode Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition_filter` - -[ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic is to look for suspicious raw access read to drive where the master boot record is placed. This technique was seen in several attacks by adversaries or threat actor to wipe, encrypt or overwrite the master boot record code as part of their impact payload. This detection is a good indicator that there is a process try to read or write on MBR sector. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1561.002", "T1561"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to look for suspicious raw access read to drive where the master boot record is placed. This technique was seen in several attacks by adversaries or threat actor to wipe, encrypt or overwrite the master boot record code as part of their impact payload. This detection is a good indicator that there is a process try to read or write on MBR sector. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the raw access read event (like sysmon eventcode 9), process name and process guid from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -action.escu.known_false_positives = This event is really notable but we found minimal number of normal application from system32 folder like svchost.exe accessing it too. In this case we used 'system32' and 'syswow64' path as a filter for this detection. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-17 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-17 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["WhisperGate", "Hermetic Wiper"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = process accessing MBR $device$ in $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 90}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["WhisperGate", "Hermetic Wiper"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Impact"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1561.002", "T1561"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to look for suspicious raw access read to drive where the master boot record is placed. This technique was seen in several attacks by adversaries or threat actor to wipe, encrypt or overwrite the master boot record code as part of their impact payload. This detection is a good indicator that there is a process try to read or write on MBR sector. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `sysmon` EventCode=9 Device = \\Device\\Harddisk0\\DR0 NOT (Image IN("*\\Windows\\System32\\*", "*\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\*")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer Image Device ProcessGuid ProcessId EventDescription EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive_filter` - -[ESCU - Windows Remote Assistance Spawning Process - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies the use of Microsoft Remote Assistance, msra.exe, spawning PowerShell.exe or cmd.exe as a child process. Msra.exe by default has no command-line arguments and typically spawns itself. It will generate a network connection to the remote system that is connected. This behavior is indicative of another process injected into msra.exe. Review the parent process or cross process events to identify source. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the use of Microsoft Remote Assistance, msra.exe, spawning PowerShell.exe or cmd.exe as a child process. Msra.exe by default has no command-line arguments and typically spawns itself. It will generate a network connection to the remote system that is connected. This behavior is indicative of another process injected into msra.exe. Review the parent process or cross process events to identify source. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, filter as needed. Add additional shells as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-07 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-07 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Remote Assistance Spawning Process - Rule +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - WinRM Spawning a Process - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.analytic_story = ["Unusual Processes"] action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$, generating behavior not common with msra.exe. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Remote Assistance Spawning Process - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Unusual Processes"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the use of Microsoft Remote Assistance, msra.exe, spawning PowerShell.exe or cmd.exe as a child process. Msra.exe by default has no command-line arguments and typically spawns itself. It will generate a network connection to the remote system that is connected. This behavior is indicative of another process injected into msra.exe. Review the parent process or cross process events to identify source. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Remote Assistance Spawning Process -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=msra.exe `windows_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_remote_assistance_spawning_process_filter` - -[ESCU - Windows Schtasks Create Run As System - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies Schtasks.exe creating a new task to start and run as an elevated user - SYSTEM. This is commonly used by adversaries to spawn a process in an elevated state. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1053"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies Schtasks.exe creating a new task to start and run as an elevated user - SYSTEM. This is commonly used by adversaries to spawn a process in an elevated state. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will be limited to legitimate applications creating a task to run as SYSTEM. Filter as needed based on parent process, or modify the query to have world writeable paths to restrict it. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-07 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-07 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Schtasks Create Run As System - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Persistence Techniques"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = An $process_name$ was created on endpoint $dest$ attempting to spawn as SYSTEM. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 48}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Schtasks Create Run As System - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies Schtasks.exe creating a new task to start and run as an elevated user - SYSTEM. This is commonly used by adversaries to spawn a process in an elevated state. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Schtasks Create Run As System -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_schtasks` Processes.process="*/create *" AND Processes.process="*/ru *" AND Processes.process="*system*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_schtasks_create_run_as_system_filter` - -[ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The search looks for a Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) was stopped via command-line. This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1489"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The search looks for a Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) was stopped via command-line. This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records the process-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Processes data-model object. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data. -action.escu.known_false_positives = SAM is a critical windows service, stopping it would cause major issues on an endpoint this makes false positive rare. AlthoughNo false positives have been identified. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-11-06 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-06 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ryuk Ransomware"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = The Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) was stopped via cli by $user$ on $dest$ by this command: $processs$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 70}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 70}, {"threat_object_field": "process", "threat_object_type": "process"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1489"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "process", "role": ["Target"], "type": "Process"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The search looks for a Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) was stopped via command-line. This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Security Account Manager Stopped -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE ("Processes.process_name"="net*.exe" "Processes.process"="*stop \"samss\"*") BY "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process" | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_security_account_manager_stopped_filter` - -[ESCU - Windows Service Created With Suspicious Service Path - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytc uses Windows Event Id 7045, `New Service Was Installed`, to identify the creation of a Windows Service where the service binary path path is located in a non-common Service folder in Windows. Red Teams and adversaries alike may create malicious Services for lateral movement or remote code execution as well as persistence and execution. The Clop ransomware has also been seen in the wild abusing Windows services. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569", "T1569.002"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytc uses Windows Event Id 7045, `New Service Was Installed`, to identify the creation of a Windows Service where the service binary path path is located in a non-common Service folder in Windows. Red Teams and adversaries alike may create malicious Services for lateral movement or remote code execution as well as persistence and execution. The Clop ransomware has also been seen in the wild abusing Windows services. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may install services with uncommon services paths. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-22 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-22 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Service Created With Suspicious Service Path - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Clop Ransomware", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A service $Service_File_Name$ was created from a non-standard path using $Service_Name$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "Service_File_Name", "threat_object_type": "other"}, {"threat_object_field": "Service_Name", "threat_object_type": "other"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Service Created With Suspicious Service Path - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569", "T1569.002"], "observable": [{"name": "Service_File_Name", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Other"}, {"name": "Service_Name", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Other"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytc uses Windows Event Id 7045, `New Service Was Installed`, to identify the creation of a Windows Service where the service binary path path is located in a non-common Service folder in Windows. Red Teams and adversaries alike may create malicious Services for lateral movement or remote code execution as well as persistence and execution. The Clop ransomware has also been seen in the wild abusing Windows services. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Service Created With Suspicious Service Path -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 Service_File_Name = "*\.exe" NOT (Service_File_Name IN ("C:\\Windows\\*", "C:\\Program File*", "C:\\Programdata\\*", "%systemroot%\\*")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Service_File_Name Service_Name Service_Start_Type Service_Type | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path_filter` - -[ESCU - Windows Service Created Within Public Path - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytc uses Windows Event Id 7045, `New Service Was Installed`, to identify the creation of a Windows Service where the service binary path is located in public paths. This behavior could represent the installation of a malicious service. Red Teams and adversaries alike may create malicious Services for lateral movement or remote code execution -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543", "T1543.003"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytc uses Windows Event Id 7045, `New Service Was Installed`, to identify the creation of a Windows Service where the service binary path is located in public paths. This behavior could represent the installation of a malicious service. Red Teams and adversaries alike may create malicious Services for lateral movement or remote code execution -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may install services with uncommon services paths. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-22 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-22 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Service Created Within Public Path - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A Windows Service $Service_File_Name$ with a public path was created on $ComputerName -action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "Service_File_Name", "threat_object_type": "other"}, {"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 54}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Service Created Within Public Path - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543", "T1543.003"], "observable": [{"name": "Service_File_Name", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Other"}, {"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytc uses Windows Event Id 7045, `New Service Was Installed`, to identify the creation of a Windows Service where the service binary path is located in public paths. This behavior could represent the installation of a malicious service. Red Teams and adversaries alike may create malicious Services for lateral movement or remote code execution -action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Service Created Within Public Path -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 Service_File_Name = "*\.exe" NOT (Service_File_Name IN ("C:\\Windows\\*", "C:\\Program File*", "C:\\Programdata\\*", "%systemroot%\\*")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName EventCode Service_File_Name Service_Name Service_Start_Type Service_Type | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_created_within_public_path_filter` - -[ESCU - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic is to look for suspicious modification or creation of registry to have service entry. This technique is abused by adversaries or threat actor to persist, gain privileges in the machine or even lateral movement. This technique can be executed using reg.exe application or using windows API like for example the CrashOveride malware. This detection is a good indicator that a process is trying to create a service entry using registry ImagePath. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to look for suspicious modification or creation of registry to have service entry. This technique is abused by adversaries or threat actor to persist, gain privileges in the machine or even lateral movement. This technique can be executed using reg.exe application or using windows API like for example the CrashOveride malware. This detection is a good indicator that a process is trying to create a service entry using registry ImagePath. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Third party tools may used this technique to create services but not so common. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-23 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-23 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows Persistence Techniques"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A Windows Service was created on a endpoint from $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to look for suspicious modification or creation of registry to have service entry. This technique is abused by adversaries or threat actor to persist, gain privileges in the machine or even lateral movement. This technique can be executed using reg.exe application or using windows API like for example the CrashOveride malware. This detection is a good indicator that a process is trying to create a service entry using registry ImagePath. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path="*\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services*" Registry.registry_value_name = ImagePath by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `windows_service_creation_using_registry_entry_filter` - -[ESCU - Windows Service Creation on Remote Endpoint - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for the execution of `sc.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to create a Windows Service on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Service Control Manager for lateral movement and remote code execution. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543", "T1543.003"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `sc.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to create a Windows Service on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Service Control Manager for lateral movement and remote code execution. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may create Windows Services on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-10 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-10 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Service Creation on Remote Endpoint - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A Windows Service was created on a remote endpoint from $dest -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 54}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Service Creation on Remote Endpoint - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543", "T1543.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `sc.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to create a Windows Service on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Service Control Manager for lateral movement and remote code execution. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Service Creation on Remote Endpoint -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=sc.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=sc.exe) (Processes.process=*\\\\* AND Processes.process=*create* AND Processes.process=*binpath*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_creation_on_remote_endpoint_filter` - -[ESCU - Windows Service Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic looks for the execution of `sc.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to start a Windows Service on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Service Control Manager for lateral movement and remote code execution. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543", "T1543.003"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the execution of `sc.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to start a Windows Service on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Service Control Manager for lateral movement and remote code execution. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may start Windows Services on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-10 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-10 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Service Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A Windows Service was started on a remote endpoint from $dest -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 54}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Service Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543", "T1543.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the execution of `sc.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to start a Windows Service on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Service Control Manager for lateral movement and remote code execution. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Service Initiation on Remote Endpoint -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=sc.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=sc.exe) (Processes.process=*\\\\* AND Processes.process=*start*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_initiation_on_remote_endpoint_filter` - -[ESCU - Windows WMI Process Call Create - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic is to look for wmi commandlines to execute or create process. This technique was used by adversaries or threat actor to execute their malicious payload in local or remote host. This hunting query is a good pivot to start to look further which process trigger the wmi or what process it execute locally or remotely. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to look for wmi commandlines to execute or create process. This technique was used by adversaries or threat actor to execute their malicious payload in local or remote host. This hunting query is a good pivot to start to look further which process trigger the wmi or what process it execute locally or remotely. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may execute this command for testing or auditing. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-22 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-22 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows WMI Process Call Create - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious WMI Use"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = process with $process$ commandline executed in $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 @@ -36353,13 +34809,13 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * * dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows WMI Process Call Create - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - WinRM Spawning a Process - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Unusual Processes"], "confidence": 50, "cve": ["CVE-2021-31166"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to look for wmi commandlines to execute or create process. This technique was used by adversaries or threat actor to execute their malicious payload in local or remote host. This hunting query is a good pivot to start to look further which process trigger the wmi or what process it execute locally or remotely. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows WMI Process Call Create +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies suspicious processes spawning from WinRM (wsmprovhost.exe). This analytic is related to potential exploitation of CVE-2021-31166. which is a kernel-mode device driver http.sys vulnerability. Current proof of concept code will blue-screen the operating system. However, http.sys used by many different Windows processes, including WinRM. In this case, identifying suspicious process create (child processes) from `wsmprovhost.exe` is what this analytic is identifying. +action.notable.param.rule_title = WinRM Spawning a Process action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 @@ -36371,36 +34827,41 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` Processes.process = "* process *" Processes.process = "* call *" Processes.process = "* create *" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_wmi_process_call_create_filter` +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=wsmprovhost.exe Processes.process_name IN ("cmd.exe","sh.exe","bash.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","schtasks.exe","certutil.exe","whoami.exe","bitsadmin.exe","scp.exe") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winrm_spawning_a_process_filter` -[ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule] +[ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search looks for the Console Window Host process (connhost.exe) executed using the force flag -ForceV1. This is not regular behavior in the Windows OS and is often seen executed by the Ryuk Ransomware. DEPRECATED This event is actually seen in the windows 10 client of attack_range_local. After further testing we realized this is not specific to Ryuk. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +description = This search looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search looks for the Console Window Host process (connhost.exe) executed using the force flag -ForceV1. This is not regular behavior in the Windows OS and is often seen executed by the Ryuk Ransomware. DEPRECATED This event is actually seen in the windows 10 client of attack_range_local. After further testing we realized this is not specific to Ryuk. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records the process-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Processes data-model object. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data. -action.escu.known_false_positives = This process should not be ran forcefully, we have not see any false positives for this detection -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-11-06 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-06 +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting the Windows WMI activity logs. This can be done by adding a stanza to inputs.conf on the system generating logs with a title of [WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational]. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, administrators may use event subscriptions for legitimate purposes. +action.escu.creation_date = 2018-10-23 +action.escu.modification_date = 2018-10-23 action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ryuk Ransomware"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious WMI Use"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search looks for the Console Window Host process (connhost.exe) executed using the force flag -ForceV1. This is not regular behavior in the Windows OS and is often seen executed by the Ryuk Ransomware. DEPRECATED This event is actually seen in the windows 10 client of attack_range_local. After further testing we realized this is not specific to Ryuk. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows connhost exe started forcefully +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions. +action.notable.param.rule_title = WMI Permanent Event Subscription action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 @@ -36412,82 +34873,41 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE Processes.process="*C:\\Windows\\system32\\conhost.exe* 0xffffffff *-ForceV1*" by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_connhost_exe_started_forcefully_filter` +search = `wmi` EventCode=5861 Binding | rex field=Message "Consumer =\s+(?[^;|^$]+)" | search consumer!="NTEventLogEventConsumer=\"SCM Event Log Consumer\"" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName, consumer, Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename ComputerName as dest | `wmi_permanent_event_subscription_filter` -[ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule] +[ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search looks for modifications to the hosts file on all Windows endpoints across your environment. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} +description = This search looks for the creation of WMI temporary event subscriptions. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search looks for modifications to the hosts file on all Windows endpoints across your environment. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records the file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint.Filesystem data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or by other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system reads and writes. -action.escu.known_false_positives = There may be legitimate reasons for system administrators to add entries to this file. -action.escu.creation_date = 2018-11-02 -action.escu.modification_date = 2018-11-02 +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for the creation of WMI temporary event subscriptions. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting the Windows WMI activity logs. This can be done by adding a stanza to inputs.conf on the system generating logs with a title of [WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational]. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Some software may create WMI temporary event subscriptions for various purposes. The included search contains an exception for two of these that occur by default on Windows 10 systems. You may need to modify the search to create exceptions for other legitimate events. +action.escu.creation_date = 2018-10-23 +action.escu.modification_date = 2018-10-23 action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Host Redirection"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Windows hosts file modification - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Host Redirection"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search looks for modifications to the hosts file on all Windows endpoints across your environment. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows hosts file modification -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | search Filesystem.file_name=hosts AND Filesystem.file_path=*Windows\\System32\\* | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `windows_hosts_file_modification_filter` - -[ESCU - Winhlp32 Spawning a Process - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies winhlp32.exe, found natively in `c:\windows\`, spawning a child process that loads a file out of appdata, programdata, or temp. Winhlp32.exe has a rocky past in that multiple vulnerabilities were found and added to MetaSploit. WinHlp32.exe is required to display 32-bit Help files that have the ".hlp" file name extension. This particular instance is related to a Remcos sample where dynwrapx.dll is added to the registry under inprocserver32, and later module loaded by winhlp32.exe to spawn wscript.exe and load a vbs or file from disk. During triage, review parallel processes to identify further suspicious behavior. Review module loads for unsuspecting unsigned modules. Capture any file modifications and analyze. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies winhlp32.exe, found natively in `c:\windows\`, spawning a child process that loads a file out of appdata, programdata, or temp. Winhlp32.exe has a rocky past in that multiple vulnerabilities were found and added to MetaSploit. WinHlp32.exe is required to display 32-bit Help files that have the ".hlp" file name extension. This particular instance is related to a Remcos sample where dynwrapx.dll is added to the registry under inprocserver32, and later module loaded by winhlp32.exe to spawn wscript.exe and load a vbs or file from disk. During triage, review parallel processes to identify further suspicious behavior. Review module loads for unsuspecting unsigned modules. Capture any file modifications and analyze. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as winhlp32.exe is typically not used with the latest flavors of Windows OS. However, filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-05 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-05 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Winhlp32 Spawning a Process - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Remcos"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious WMI Use"] action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$, and is not typical activity for this process. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "dest", "threat_object_type": "other"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Winhlp32 Spawning a Process - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Other"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies winhlp32.exe, found natively in `c:\windows\`, spawning a child process that loads a file out of appdata, programdata, or temp. Winhlp32.exe has a rocky past in that multiple vulnerabilities were found and added to MetaSploit. WinHlp32.exe is required to display 32-bit Help files that have the ".hlp" file name extension. This particular instance is related to a Remcos sample where dynwrapx.dll is added to the registry under inprocserver32, and later module loaded by winhlp32.exe to spawn wscript.exe and load a vbs or file from disk. During triage, review parallel processes to identify further suspicious behavior. Review module loads for unsuspecting unsigned modules. Capture any file modifications and analyze. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Winhlp32 Spawning a Process +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for the creation of WMI temporary event subscriptions. +action.notable.param.rule_title = WMI Temporary Event Subscription action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 @@ -36499,42 +34919,42 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=winhlp32.exe Processes.process IN ("*\\appdata\\*","*\\programdata\\*", "*\\temp\\*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winhlp32_spawning_a_process_filter` +search = `wmi` EventCode=5860 Temporary | rex field=Message "NotificationQuery =\s+(?[^;|^$]+)" | search query!="SELECT * FROM Win32_ProcessStartTrace WHERE ProcessName = 'wsmprovhost.exe'" AND query!="SELECT * FROM __InstanceOperationEvent WHERE TargetInstance ISA 'AntiVirusProduct' OR TargetInstance ISA 'FirewallProduct' OR TargetInstance ISA 'AntiSpywareProduct'" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName, query | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmi_temporary_event_subscription_filter` -[ESCU - Winword Spawning Cmd - Rule] +[ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following detection identifies Microsoft Word spawning `cmd.exe`. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with winword.exe. Winword.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16` (version will vary). Cmd.exe spawning from winword.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command-line will indicate what is being executed. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. It is possible that COM is utilized to trampoline the child process to `explorer.exe` or `wmiprvse.exe`. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following detection identifies Microsoft Word spawning `cmd.exe`. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with winword.exe. Winword.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16` (version will vary). Cmd.exe spawning from winword.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command-line will indicate what is being executed. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. It is possible that COM is utilized to trampoline the child process to `explorer.exe` or `wmiprvse.exe`. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-22 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-22 +description = By enabling Dynamic ARP Inspection as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect ARP Poisoning attacks in the Infrastructure. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1557", "T1557.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = By enabling Dynamic ARP Inspection as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect ARP Poisoning attacks in the Infrastructure. +action.escu.how_to_implement = This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with DHCP Snooping (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960x/software/15-0_2_EX/security/configuration_guide/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg_chapter_01101.html) and Dynamic ARP Inspection (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960x/software/15-2_2_e/security/configuration_guide/b_sec_1522e_2960x_cg/b_sec_1522e_2960x_cg_chapter_01111.html) and log with a severity level of minimum "5 - notification". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices. +action.escu.known_false_positives = This search might be prone to high false positives if DHCP Snooping or ARP inspection has been incorrectly configured, or if a device normally sends many ARP packets (unlikely). +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-08-11 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-11 action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Winword Spawning Cmd - Rule +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spearphishing Attachments"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Router and Infrastructure Security"] action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$ launched command: $process_name$ which is very common in spearphishing attacks. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 70}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 70}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "dest", "threat_object_type": "other"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Winword Spawning Cmd - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Target"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Router and Infrastructure Security"], "cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1557", "T1557.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Other"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following detection identifies Microsoft Word spawning `cmd.exe`. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with winword.exe. Winword.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16` (version will vary). Cmd.exe spawning from winword.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command-line will indicate what is being executed. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. It is possible that COM is utilized to trampoline the child process to `explorer.exe` or `wmiprvse.exe`. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Winword Spawning Cmd -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = By enabling Dynamic ARP Inspection as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect ARP Poisoning attacks in the Infrastructure. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect ARP Poisoning +action.notable.param.security_domain = network action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true @@ -36545,42 +34965,42 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=winword.exe `process_cmd` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winword_spawning_cmd_filter` +search = `cisco_networks` facility="PM" mnemonic="ERR_DISABLE" disable_cause="arp-inspection" | eval src_interface=src_int_prefix_long+src_int_suffix | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime count BY host src_interface | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `detect_arp_poisoning_filter` -[ESCU - Winword Spawning PowerShell - Rule] +[ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following detection identifies Microsoft Word spawning PowerShell. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with winword.exe. Winword.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16` (version will vary). PowerShell spawning from winword.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command executed will most likely be encoded and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following detection identifies Microsoft Word spawning PowerShell. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with winword.exe. Winword.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16` (version will vary). PowerShell spawning from winword.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command executed will most likely be encoded and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-12 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-12 +description = By enabling IPv6 First Hop Security as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect various attacks such as packet forging in the Infrastructure. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1557", "T1557.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = By enabling IPv6 First Hop Security as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect various attacks such as packet forging in the Infrastructure. +action.escu.how_to_implement = This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with one or more First Hop Security measures such as RA Guard, DHCP Guard and/or device tracking. See References for more information. The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices. +action.escu.known_false_positives = None currently known +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-10-28 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-28 action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Winword Spawning PowerShell - Rule +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spearphishing Attachments"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Router and Infrastructure Security"] action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$ launched the following powershell process: $process_name$ which is very common in spearphishing attacks -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 70}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 70}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Winword Spawning PowerShell - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Target"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Router and Infrastructure Security"], "cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1557", "T1557.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following detection identifies Microsoft Word spawning PowerShell. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with winword.exe. Winword.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16` (version will vary). PowerShell spawning from winword.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command executed will most likely be encoded and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Winword Spawning PowerShell -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = By enabling IPv6 First Hop Security as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect various attacks such as packet forging in the Infrastructure. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats +action.notable.param.security_domain = network action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true @@ -36591,42 +35011,42 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name="winword.exe" `process_powershell` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winword_spawning_powershell_filter` +search = `cisco_networks` facility="SISF" mnemonic IN ("IP_THEFT","MAC_THEFT","MAC_AND_IP_THEFT","PAK_DROP") | eval src_interface=src_int_prefix_long+src_int_suffix | eval dest_interface=dest_int_prefix_long+dest_int_suffix | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime values(src_mac) AS src_mac values(src_vlan) AS src_vlan values(mnemonic) AS mnemonic values(vendor_explanation) AS vendor_explanation values(src_ip) AS src_ip values(dest_ip) AS dest_ip values(dest_interface) AS dest_interface values(action) AS action count BY host src_interface | table host src_interface dest_interface src_mac src_ip dest_ip src_vlan mnemonic vendor_explanation action count | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats_filter` -[ESCU - Winword Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule] +[ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following detection identifies Microsoft Winword.exe spawning Windows Script Host - `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe`. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with Winword.exe. Winword.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16` (version will vary). `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` default location is `c:\windows\system32\` or c:windows\syswow64\`. `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` spawning from Winword.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command-line executed will most likely be obfuscated and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. Review the reputation of the remote destination and block accordingly. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following detection identifies Microsoft Winword.exe spawning Windows Script Host - `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe`. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with Winword.exe. Winword.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16` (version will vary). `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` default location is `c:\windows\system32\` or c:windows\syswow64\`. `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` spawning from Winword.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command-line executed will most likely be obfuscated and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. Review the reputation of the remote destination and block accordingly. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -action.escu.known_false_positives = There will be limited false positives and it will be different for every environment. Tune by child process or command-line as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-12 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-12 +description = This search looks for outbound ICMP packets with a packet size larger than 1,000 bytes. Various threat actors have been known to use ICMP as a command and control channel for their attack infrastructure. Large ICMP packets from an endpoint to a remote host may be indicative of this activity. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1095"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Traffic"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for outbound ICMP packets with a packet size larger than 1,000 bytes. Various threat actors have been known to use ICMP as a command and control channel for their attack infrastructure. Large ICMP packets from an endpoint to a remote host may be indicative of this activity. +action.escu.how_to_implement = In order to run this search effectively, we highly recommend that you leverage the Assets and Identity framework. It is important that you have a good understanding of how your network segments are designed and that you are able to distinguish internal from external address space. Add a category named `internal` to the CIDRs that host the company's assets in the `assets_by_cidr.csv` lookup file, which is located in `$SPLUNK_HOME/etc/apps/SA-IdentityManagement/lookups/`. More information on updating this lookup can be found here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.0.0/Admin/Addassetandidentitydata. This search also requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model +action.escu.known_false_positives = ICMP packets are used in a variety of ways to help troubleshoot networking issues and ensure the proper flow of traffic. As such, it is possible that a large ICMP packet could be perfectly legitimate. If large ICMP packets are associated with command and control traffic, there will typically be a large number of these packets observed over time. If the search is providing a large number of false positives, you can modify the macro `detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets_filter` to adjust the byte threshold or add specific IP addresses to an allow list. +action.escu.creation_date = 2018-06-01 +action.escu.modification_date = 2018-06-01 action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Winword Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spearphishing Attachment"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Command \u0026 Control"] action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = User $user$ on $dest$ spawned Windows Script Host from Winword.exe -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 70}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 70}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Winword Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachment"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Target"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Command \u0026 Control"], "cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1095"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following detection identifies Microsoft Winword.exe spawning Windows Script Host - `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe`. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with Winword.exe. Winword.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16` (version will vary). `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` default location is `c:\windows\system32\` or c:windows\syswow64\`. `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` spawning from Winword.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command-line executed will most likely be obfuscated and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. Review the reputation of the remote destination and block accordingly. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Winword Spawning Windows Script Host -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for outbound ICMP packets with a packet size larger than 1,000 bytes. Various threat actors have been known to use ICMP as a command and control channel for their attack infrastructure. Large ICMP packets from an endpoint to a remote host may be indicative of this activity. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets +action.notable.param.security_domain = network action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true @@ -36637,48 +35057,42 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name="winword.exe" Processes.process_name IN ("cscript.exe", "wscript.exe") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winword_spawning_windows_script_host_filter` +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Traffic.action) values(All_Traffic.bytes) from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.action !=blocked All_Traffic.dest_category !=internal (All_Traffic.protocol=icmp OR All_Traffic.transport=icmp) All_Traffic.bytes > 1000 by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | search ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets_filter` -[ESCU - Wmic Group Discovery - Rule] +[ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following hunting analytic identifies the use of `wmic.exe` enumerating local groups on the endpoint. \ -Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \ -During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.001"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following hunting analytic identifies the use of `wmic.exe` enumerating local groups on the endpoint. \ -Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \ -During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-14 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-14 +description = This search looks for outbound SMB connections made by hosts within your network to the Internet. SMB traffic is used for Windows file-sharing activity. One of the techniques often used by attackers involves retrieving the credential hash using an SMB request made to a compromised server controlled by the threat actor. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command \u0026 Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.002", "T1071"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Traffic"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for outbound SMB connections made by hosts within your network to the Internet. SMB traffic is used for Windows file-sharing activity. One of the techniques often used by attackers involves retrieving the credential hash using an SMB request made to a compromised server controlled by the threat actor. +action.escu.how_to_implement = In order to run this search effectively, we highly recommend that you leverage the Assets and Identity framework. It is important that you have good understanding of how your network segments are designed, and be able to distinguish internal from external address space. Add a category named `internal` to the CIDRs that host the companys assets in `assets_by_cidr.csv` lookup file, which is located in `$SPLUNK_HOME/etc/apps/SA-IdentityManagement/lookups/`. More information on updating this lookup can be found here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.0.0/Admin/Addassetandidentitydata. This search also requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model +action.escu.known_false_positives = It is likely that the outbound Server Message Block (SMB) traffic is legitimate, if the company's internal networks are not well-defined in the Assets and Identity Framework. Categorize the internal CIDR blocks as `internal` in the lookup file to avoid creating notable events for traffic destined to those CIDR blocks. Any other network connection that is going out to the Internet should be investigated and blocked. Best practices suggest preventing external communications of all SMB versions and related protocols at the network boundary. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Wmic Group Discovery - Rule +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Discovery"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Hidden Cobra Malware", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "NOBELIUM Group"] action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Local group discovery on $dest$ by $user$. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 15}] +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Wmic Group Discovery - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Hidden Cobra Malware", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "NOBELIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 12"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command \u0026 Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.002", "T1071"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following hunting analytic identifies the use of `wmic.exe` enumerating local groups on the endpoint. \ -Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \ -During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Wmic Group Discovery -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for outbound SMB connections made by hosts within your network to the Internet. SMB traffic is used for Windows file-sharing activity. One of the techniques often used by attackers involves retrieving the credential hash using an SMB request made to a compromised server controlled by the threat actor. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Outbound SMB Traffic +action.notable.param.security_domain = network action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true @@ -36689,42 +35103,42 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wmic.exe (Processes.process="*group get name*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmic_group_discovery_filter` +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as start_time latest(_time) as end_time values(All_Traffic.action) as action values(All_Traffic.app) as app values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as dest_port values(sourcetype) as sourcetype count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where ((All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app="smb") AND NOT (All_Traffic.action="blocked" OR All_Traffic.dest_category="internal" OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=192.168.0.0/16 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=100.64.0.0/10)) by All_Traffic.src_ip | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | `security_content_ctime(start_time)` | `security_content_ctime(end_time)` | `detect_outbound_smb_traffic_filter` -[ESCU - Wmic NonInteractive App Uninstallation - Rule] +[ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious wmic commandlined that uninstall application non interactively. This technique was seen in IceID to uninstall av products to the compromised host to bypassed and evade detections. This Hunting query maybe a good indicator that some process tries to uninstall application using wmic which is not a common behavior. This approach may seen in some script or third part appication to uninstall their application but it is a good thing to check what it uninstall and why. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to detect a suspicious wmic commandlined that uninstall application non interactively. This technique was seen in IceID to uninstall av products to the compromised host to bypassed and evade detections. This Hunting query maybe a good indicator that some process tries to uninstall application using wmic which is not a common behavior. This approach may seen in some script or third part appication to uninstall their application but it is a good thing to check what it uninstall and why. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -action.escu.known_false_positives = third party application may use this approach to uninstall there application -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-20 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-20 +description = By enabling Port Security on a Cisco switch you can restrict input to an interface by limiting and identifying MAC addresses of the workstations that are allowed to access the port. When you assign secure MAC addresses to a secure port, the port does not forward packets with source addresses outside the group of defined addresses. If you limit the number of secure MAC addresses to one and assign a single secure MAC address, the workstation attached to that port is assured the full bandwidth of the port. If a port is configured as a secure port and the maximum number of secure MAC addresses is reached, when the MAC address of a workstation attempting to access the port is different from any of the identified secure MAC addresses, a security violation occurs. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Exploitation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1557", "T1557.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = By enabling Port Security on a Cisco switch you can restrict input to an interface by limiting and identifying MAC addresses of the workstations that are allowed to access the port. When you assign secure MAC addresses to a secure port, the port does not forward packets with source addresses outside the group of defined addresses. If you limit the number of secure MAC addresses to one and assign a single secure MAC address, the workstation attached to that port is assured the full bandwidth of the port. If a port is configured as a secure port and the maximum number of secure MAC addresses is reached, when the MAC address of a workstation attempting to access the port is different from any of the identified secure MAC addresses, a security violation occurs. +action.escu.how_to_implement = This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with Port Security and Error Disable for this to work (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst4500/12-2/25ew/configuration/guide/conf/port_sec.html) and log with a severity level of minimum "5 - notification". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices. +action.escu.known_false_positives = This search might be prone to high false positives if you have malfunctioning devices connected to your ethernet ports or if end users periodically connect physical devices to the network. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-10-28 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-28 action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Wmic NonInteractive App Uninstallation - Rule +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["IceID"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Router and Infrastructure Security"] action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = wmic $process$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "dest", "threat_object_type": "other"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Wmic NonInteractive App Uninstallation - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IceID"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Target"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Router and Infrastructure Security"], "cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Exploitation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1557", "T1557.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Other"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious wmic commandlined that uninstall application non interactively. This technique was seen in IceID to uninstall av products to the compromised host to bypassed and evade detections. This Hunting query maybe a good indicator that some process tries to uninstall application using wmic which is not a common behavior. This approach may seen in some script or third part appication to uninstall their application but it is a good thing to check what it uninstall and why. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Wmic NonInteractive App Uninstallation -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = By enabling Port Security on a Cisco switch you can restrict input to an interface by limiting and identifying MAC addresses of the workstations that are allowed to access the port. When you assign secure MAC addresses to a secure port, the port does not forward packets with source addresses outside the group of defined addresses. If you limit the number of secure MAC addresses to one and assign a single secure MAC address, the workstation attached to that port is assured the full bandwidth of the port. If a port is configured as a secure port and the maximum number of secure MAC addresses is reached, when the MAC address of a workstation attempting to access the port is different from any of the identified secure MAC addresses, a security violation occurs. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Port Security Violation +action.notable.param.security_domain = network action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true @@ -36735,41 +35149,317 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wmic.exe Processes.process="* product *" Processes.process="*where name*" Processes.process="*call uninstall*" Processes.process="*/nointeractive*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmic_noninteractive_app_uninstallation_filter` +search = `cisco_networks` (facility="PM" mnemonic="ERR_DISABLE" disable_cause="psecure-violation") OR (facility="PORT_SECURITY" mnemonic="PSECURE_VIOLATION" OR mnemonic="PSECURE_VIOLATION_VLAN") | eval src_interface=src_int_prefix_long+src_int_suffix | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime values(disable_cause) AS disable_cause values(src_mac) AS src_mac values(src_vlan) AS src_vlan values(action) AS action count by host src_interface | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_port_security_violation_filter` -[ESCU - Wmiprsve LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule] +[ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies `wmiprsve.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), the executed command is spawned as a child process of `wmiprvse.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of wmiprvse.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies `wmiprsve.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), the executed command is spawned as a child process of `wmiprvse.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of wmiprvse.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-22 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-22 +description = By enabling DHCP Snooping as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect unauthorized DHCP servers handing out DHCP leases to devices on the network (Man in the Middle attack). +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1557"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = By enabling DHCP Snooping as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect unauthorized DHCP servers handing out DHCP leases to devices on the network (Man in the Middle attack). +action.escu.how_to_implement = This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with DHCP Snooping enabled (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960x/software/15-0_2_EX/security/configuration_guide/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg_chapter_01101.html) and log with a severity level of minimum "5 - notification". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices. +action.escu.known_false_positives = This search might be prone to high false positives if DHCP Snooping has been incorrectly configured or in the unlikely event that the DHCP server has been moved to another network interface. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-08-11 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-11 action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Wmiprsve LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Router and Infrastructure Security"] action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Wmiprsve.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest$. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 54}] +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "dest", "threat_object_type": "other"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Wmiprsve LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Router and Infrastructure Security"], "cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1557"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Other"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies `wmiprsve.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), the executed command is spawned as a child process of `wmiprvse.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of wmiprvse.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Wmiprsve LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = By enabling DHCP Snooping as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect unauthorized DHCP servers handing out DHCP leases to devices on the network (Man in the Middle attack). +action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Rogue DHCP Server +action.notable.param.security_domain = network +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `cisco_networks` facility="DHCP_SNOOPING" mnemonic="DHCP_SNOOPING_UNTRUSTED_PORT" | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime count values(message_type) AS message_type values(src_mac) AS src_mac BY host | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `detect_rogue_dhcp_server_filter` + +[ESCU - Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for commands that the SNICat tool uses in the TLS SNI field. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1041"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for commands that the SNICat tool uses in the TLS SNI field. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting Zeek SSL data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format. We are detecting when any of the predefined SNICat commands are found within the server_name (SNI) field. These commands are LIST, LS, SIZE, LD, CB, EX, ALIVE, EXIT, WHERE, and finito. You can go further once this has been detected, and run other searches to decode the SNI data to prove or disprove if any data exfiltration has taken place. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-10-21 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-21 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Data Exfiltration"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Exfiltration"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1041"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for commands that the SNICat tool uses in the TLS SNI field. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration +action.notable.param.security_domain = network +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `zeek_ssl` | rex field=server_name "(?(LIST|LS|SIZE|LD|CB|CD|EX|ALIVE|EXIT|WHERE|finito)-[A-Za-z0-9]{16}\.)" | stats count by src_ip dest_ip server_name snicat | where count>0 | table src_ip dest_ip server_name snicat | `detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration_filter` + +[ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = Adversaries may abuse netbooting to load an unauthorized network device operating system from a Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) server. TFTP boot (netbooting) is commonly used by network administrators to load configuration-controlled network device images from a centralized management server. Netbooting is one option in the boot sequence and can be used to centralize, manage, and control device images. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1542.005", "T1542"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Traffic"] +action.escu.eli5 = Adversaries may abuse netbooting to load an unauthorized network device operating system from a Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) server. TFTP boot (netbooting) is commonly used by network administrators to load configuration-controlled network device images from a centralized management server. Netbooting is one option in the boot sequence and can be used to centralize, manage, and control device images. +action.escu.how_to_implement = This search looks for Network Traffic events to TFTP, FTP or SSH/SCP ports from network devices. Make sure to tag any network devices as network, router or switch in order for this detection to work. If the TFTP traffic doesn't traverse a firewall nor packet inspection, these events will not be logged. This is typically an issue if the TFTP server is on the same subnet as the network device. There is also a chance of the network device loading software using a DHCP assigned IP address (netboot) which is not in the Asset inventory. +action.escu.known_false_positives = This search will also report any legitimate attempts of software downloads to network devices as well as outbound SSH sessions from network devices. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-10-28 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-28 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Router and Infrastructure Security"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Router and Infrastructure Security"], "cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1542.005", "T1542"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = Adversaries may abuse netbooting to load an unauthorized network device operating system from a Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) server. TFTP boot (netbooting) is commonly used by network administrators to load configuration-controlled network device images from a centralized management server. Netbooting is one option in the boot sequence and can be used to centralize, manage, and control device images. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Software Download To Network Device +action.notable.param.security_domain = network +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where (All_Traffic.transport=udp AND All_Traffic.dest_port=69) OR (All_Traffic.transport=tcp AND All_Traffic.dest_port=21) OR (All_Traffic.transport=tcp AND All_Traffic.dest_port=22) AND All_Traffic.dest_category!=common_software_repo_destination AND All_Traffic.src_category=network OR All_Traffic.src_category=router OR All_Traffic.src_category=switch by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_software_download_to_network_device_filter` + +[ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to automate data exfiltration over compromised network infrastructure. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some network devices and used for network analysis and may be configured to duplicate traffic and forward to one or more destinations for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring device. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1200", "T1020", "T1498", "T1020.001"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to automate data exfiltration over compromised network infrastructure. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some network devices and used for network analysis and may be configured to duplicate traffic and forward to one or more destinations for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring device. +action.escu.how_to_implement = This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must log with a severity level of minimum "5 - notification". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices and that the devices have been configured according to the documentation of the Cisco Networks Add-on. Also note that an attacker may disable logging from the device prior to enabling traffic mirroring. +action.escu.known_false_positives = This search will return false positives for any legitimate traffic captures by network administrators. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-10-28 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-28 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Router and Infrastructure Security"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "dest", "threat_object_type": "other"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Router and Infrastructure Security"], "cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1200", "T1020", "T1498", "T1020.001"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Other"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to automate data exfiltration over compromised network infrastructure. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some network devices and used for network analysis and may be configured to duplicate traffic and forward to one or more destinations for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring device. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Traffic Mirroring +action.notable.param.security_domain = network +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `cisco_networks` (facility="MIRROR" mnemonic="ETH_SPAN_SESSION_UP") OR (facility="SPAN" mnemonic="SESSION_UP") OR (facility="SPAN" mnemonic="PKTCAP_START") OR (mnemonic="CFGLOG_LOGGEDCMD" command="monitor session*") | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime count BY host facility mnemonic | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_traffic_mirroring_filter` + +[ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = By populating the organization's assets within the assets_by_str.csv, we will be able to detect unauthorized devices that are trying to connect with the organization's network by inspecting DHCP request packets, which are issued by devices when they attempt to obtain an IP address from the DHCP server. The MAC address associated with the source of the DHCP request is checked against the list of known devices, and reports on those that are not found. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Sessions"] +action.escu.eli5 = By populating the organization's assets within the assets_by_str.csv, we will be able to detect unauthorized devices that are trying to connect with the organization's network by inspecting DHCP request packets, which are issued by devices when they attempt to obtain an IP address from the DHCP server. The MAC address associated with the source of the DHCP request is checked against the list of known devices, and reports on those that are not found. +action.escu.how_to_implement = This search uses the Network_Sessions data model shipped with Enterprise Security. It leverages the Assets and Identity framework to populate the assets_by_str.csv file located in SA-IdentityManagement, which will contain a list of known authorized organizational assets including their MAC addresses. Ensure that all inventoried systems have their MAC address populated. +action.escu.known_false_positives = This search might be prone to high false positives. Please consider this when conducting analysis or investigations. Authorized devices may be detected as unauthorized. If this is the case, verify the MAC address of the system responsible for the false positive and add it to the Assets and Identity framework with the proper information. +action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-13 +action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-13 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Asset Tracking"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Asset Tracking"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = By populating the organization's assets within the assets_by_str.csv, we will be able to detect unauthorized devices that are trying to connect with the organization's network by inspecting DHCP request packets, which are issued by devices when they attempt to obtain an IP address from the DHCP server. The MAC address associated with the source of the DHCP request is checked against the list of known devices, and reports on those that are not found. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address +action.notable.param.security_domain = network +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Sessions where nodename=All_Sessions.DHCP All_Sessions.signature=DHCPREQUEST by All_Sessions.src_ip All_Sessions.dest_mac | dedup All_Sessions.dest_mac| `drop_dm_object_name("Network_Sessions")`|`drop_dm_object_name("All_Sessions")` | search NOT [| inputlookup asset_lookup_by_str |rename mac as dest_mac | fields + dest_mac] | `detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address_filter` + +[ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search detects SIGRed via Splunk Stream. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1203"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search detects SIGRed via Splunk Stream. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting Splunk Stream DNS and Splunk Stream TCP. We are detecting SIG and KEY records via stream:dns and TCP payload over 65KB in size via stream:tcp. Replace the macro definitions ('stream:dns' and 'stream:tcp') with configurations for your Splunk environment. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-28 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-28 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "dest", "threat_object_type": "other"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "confidence": 50, "cve": ["CVE-2020-1350"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1203"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Other"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search detects SIGRed via Splunk Stream. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream +action.notable.param.security_domain = network +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `stream_dns` | spath "query_type{}" | search "query_type{}" IN (SIG,KEY) | spath protocol_stack | search protocol_stack="ip:tcp:dns" | append [search `stream_tcp` bytes_out>65000] | `detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream_filter` | stats count by flow_id | where count>1 | fields - count + +[ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search detects SIGRed via Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1203"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Resolution"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search detects SIGRed via Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format. We are detecting SIG and KEY records via bro:dns:json and TCP payload over 65KB in size via bro:conn:json. The Network Resolution and Network Traffic datamodels are in use for this search. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-28 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-28 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "dest", "threat_object_type": "other"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "cve": ["CVE-2020-1350"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1203"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Other"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search detects SIGRed via Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 @@ -36781,43 +35471,1004 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe) (Processes.process_name IN ("Regsvcs.exe", "Ftp.exe", "OfflineScannerShell.exe", "Rasautou.exe", "Schtasks.exe", "Xwizard.exe", "Dllhost.exe", "Pnputil.exe", "Atbroker.exe", "Pcwrun.exe", "Ttdinject.exe","Mshta.exe", "Bitsadmin.exe", "Certoc.exe", "Ieexec.exe", "Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe", "Runscripthelper.exe", "Forfiles.exe", "Msbuild.exe", "Register-cimprovider.exe", "Tttracer.exe", "Ie4uinit.exe", "Bash.exe", "Hh.exe", "SettingSyncHost.exe", "Cmstp.exe", "Mmc.exe", "Stordiag.exe", "Scriptrunner.exe", "Odbcconf.exe", "Extexport.exe", "Msdt.exe", "WorkFolders.exe", "Diskshadow.exe", "Mavinject.exe", "Regasm.exe", "Gpscript.exe", "Rundll32.exe", "Regsvr32.exe", "Msiexec.exe", "Wuauclt.exe", "Presentationhost.exe", "Wmic.exe", "Runonce.exe", "Syncappvpublishingserver.exe", "Verclsid.exe", "Infdefaultinstall.exe", "Explorer.exe", "Installutil.exe", "Netsh.exe", "Wab.exe", "Dnscmd.exe", "At.exe", "Pcalua.exe", "Msconfig.exe")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmiprsve_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter` +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.query_type IN (SIG,KEY) by DNS.flow_id | rename DNS.flow_id as flow_id | append [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.bytes_in>65000 by All_Traffic.flow_id | rename All_Traffic.flow_id as flow_id] | `detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek_filter` | stats count by flow_id | where count>1 | fields - count -[ESCU - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule] +[ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic identifies a suspicious spawned process by WScript or CScript process. This technique was a common technique used by adversaries and malware to execute different LOLBIN, other scripts like PowerShell or spawn a suspended process to inject its code as a defense evasion. This TTP may detect some normal script that using several application tool that are in the list of the child process it detects but a good pivot and indicator that a script is may execute suspicious code. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055", "T1543", "T1134.004", "T1134"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic identifies a suspicious spawned process by WScript or CScript process. This technique was a common technique used by adversaries and malware to execute different LOLBIN, other scripts like PowerShell or spawn a suspended process to inject its code as a defense evasion. This TTP may detect some normal script that using several application tool that are in the list of the child process it detects but a good pivot and indicator that a script is may execute suspicious code. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may create vbs or js script that use several tool as part of its execution. Filter as needed. +description = This search detects attempts to run exploits for the Zerologon CVE-2020-1472 vulnerability via Zeek RPC +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search detects attempts to run exploits for the Zerologon CVE-2020-1472 vulnerability via Zeek RPC +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting Zeek DCE-RPC data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format. We are detecting when all three RPC operations (NetrServerReqChallenge, NetrServerAuthenticate3, NetrServerPasswordSet2) are splunk_security_essentials_app via bro:rpc:json. These three operations are then correlated on the Zeek UID field. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-09-15 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-15 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Detect Zerologon Attack"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Detect Zerologon Attack"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 11"], "confidence": 50, "cve": ["CVE-2020-1472"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search detects attempts to run exploits for the Zerologon CVE-2020-1472 vulnerability via Zeek RPC +action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Zerologon via Zeek +action.notable.param.security_domain = network +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `zeek_rpc` operation IN (NetrServerPasswordSet2,NetrServerReqChallenge,NetrServerAuthenticate3) | bin span=5m _time | stats values(operation) dc(operation) as opscount count(eval(operation=="NetrServerReqChallenge")) as challenge count(eval(operation=="NetrServerAuthenticate3")) as authcount count(eval(operation=="NetrServerPasswordSet2")) as passcount count as totalcount by _time,src_ip,dest_ip | search opscount=3 authcount>4 passcount>0 | search `detect_zerologon_via_zeek_filter` + +[ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search allows you to identify DNS requests that are unusually large for the record type being requested in your environment. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.004", "T1071"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Resolution"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search allows you to identify DNS requests that are unusually large for the record type being requested in your environment. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. In addition, the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or greater must be installed on your search heads, along with any required dependencies. Finally, the support search "Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK" must be executed before this detection search, because it builds a machine-learning (ML) model over the historical data used by this search. It is important that this search is run in the same app context as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild the model with the latest data available in your environment.\ +This search produces fields (`query`,`query_length`,`count`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** DNS Query, **Field:** query\ +1. \ +1. **Label:** DNS Query Length, **Field:** query_length\ +1. \ +1. **Label:** Number of events, **Field:** count\ +Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` +action.escu.known_false_positives = If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider reducing the value for threshold in the search. You should also periodically re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-01-22 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-01-22 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Hidden Cobra Malware", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Command \u0026 Control"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Hidden Cobra Malware", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Command \u0026 Control"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.004", "T1071"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as start_time max(_time) as end_time values(DNS.src) as src values(DNS.dest) as dest from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query DNS.record_type | search DNS.record_type=* | `drop_dm_object_name(DNS)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | eval query_length = len(query) | apply dns_query_pdfmodel threshold=0.01 | rename "IsOutlier(query_length)" as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | sort -query_length | table start_time end_time query record_type count src dest query_length | `dns_query_length_outliers___mltk_filter` + +[ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search identifies DNS query failures by counting the number of DNS responses that do not indicate success, and trigger on more than 50 occurrences. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.004", "T1071"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Resolution"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search identifies DNS query failures by counting the number of DNS responses that do not indicate success, and trigger on more than 50 occurrences. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you must ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. +action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible legitimate traffic can trigger this rule. Please investigate as appropriate. The threshold for generating an event can also be customized to better suit your environment. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Command \u0026 Control"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "dest", "threat_object_type": "other"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Command \u0026 Control"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.004", "T1071"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Other"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values("DNS.query") as queries from datamodel=Network_Resolution where nodename=DNS "DNS.reply_code"!="No Error" "DNS.reply_code"!="NoError" DNS.reply_code!="unknown" NOT "DNS.query"="*.arpa" "DNS.query"="*.*" by "DNS.src","DNS.query"| `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")`| lookup cim_corporate_web_domain_lookup domain as query OUTPUT domain| where isnull(domain)| lookup update=true alexa_lookup_by_str domain as query OUTPUT rank| where isnull(rank)| stats sum(count) as count mode(queries) as queries by src| `get_asset(src)`| where count>50 | `excessive_dns_failures_filter` + +[ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for an increase of data transfers from your email server to your clients. This could be indicative of a malicious actor collecting data using your email server. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.002", "T1114"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Traffic"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for an increase of data transfers from your email server to your clients. This could be indicative of a malicious actor collecting data using your email server. +action.escu.how_to_implement = This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model. Your email servers must be categorized as "email_server" for the search to work, as well. You may need to adjust the deviation_threshold and minimum_data_samples values based on the network traffic in your environment. The "deviation_threshold" field is a multiplying factor to control how much variation you're willing to tolerate. The "minimum_data_samples" field is the minimum number of connections of data samples required for the statistic to be valid. +action.escu.known_false_positives = The false-positive rate will vary based on how you set the deviation_threshold and data_samples values. Our recommendation is to adjust these values based on your network traffic to and from your email servers. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Collection and Staging"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Collection and Staging"], "cis20": ["CIS 7"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.002", "T1114"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` sum(All_Traffic.bytes_in) as bytes_in from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_category=email_server by All_Traffic.src_ip _time span=1d | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | eventstats avg(bytes_in) as avg_bytes_in stdev(bytes_in) as stdev_bytes_in | eventstats count as num_data_samples avg(eval(if(_time < relative_time(now(), "@d"), bytes_in, null))) as per_source_avg_bytes_in stdev(eval(if(_time < relative_time(now(), "@d"), bytes_in, null))) as per_source_stdev_bytes_in by src_ip | eval minimum_data_samples = 4, deviation_threshold = 3 | where num_data_samples >= minimum_data_samples AND bytes_in > (avg_bytes_in + (deviation_threshold * stdev_bytes_in)) AND bytes_in > (per_source_avg_bytes_in + (deviation_threshold * per_source_stdev_bytes_in)) AND _time >= relative_time(now(), "@d") | eval num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average = round(abs(bytes_in - avg_bytes_in) / stdev_bytes_in, 2), num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average = round(abs(bytes_in - per_source_avg_bytes_in) / per_source_stdev_bytes_in, 2) | table src_ip, _time, bytes_in, avg_bytes_in, per_source_avg_bytes_in, num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average, num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average | `hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server_filter` + +[ESCU - Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The search is used to identify attempts to use your DNS Infrastructure for DDoS purposes via a DNS amplification attack leveraging ANY queries. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1498", "T1498.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "PR.IP"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Resolution"] +action.escu.eli5 = The search is used to identify attempts to use your DNS Infrastructure for DDoS purposes via a DNS amplification attack leveraging ANY queries. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you must ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate ANY requests may trigger this search, however it is unusual to see a large volume of them under typical circumstances. You may modify the threshold in the search to better suit your environment. +action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-20 +action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-20 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["DNS Amplification Attacks"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DNS Amplification Attacks"], "cis20": ["CIS 11", "CIS 12"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1498", "T1498.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where nodename=DNS "DNS.message_type"="QUERY" "DNS.record_type"="ANY" by "DNS.dest" | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` | where count>200 | `large_volume_of_dns_any_queries_filter` + +[ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for network traffic defined by port and transport layer protocol in the Enterprise Security lookup table "lookup_interesting_ports", that is marked as prohibited, and has an associated 'allow' action in the Network_Traffic data model. This could be indicative of a misconfigured network device. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Command \u0026 Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Traffic"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for network traffic defined by port and transport layer protocol in the Enterprise Security lookup table "lookup_interesting_ports", that is marked as prohibited, and has an associated 'allow' action in the Network_Traffic data model. This could be indicative of a misconfigured network device. +action.escu.how_to_implement = In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from firewalls or other network control devices that mediate the traffic allowed into an environment. This is necessary so that the search can identify an 'action' taken on the traffic of interest. The search requires the Network_Traffic data model be populated. +action.escu.known_false_positives = None identified +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Ransomware", "Command \u0026 Control"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Ransomware", "Command \u0026 Control"], "cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Command \u0026 Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for network traffic defined by port and transport layer protocol in the Enterprise Security lookup table "lookup_interesting_ports", that is marked as prohibited, and has an associated 'allow' action in the Network_Traffic data model. This could be indicative of a misconfigured network device. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed +action.notable.param.security_domain = network +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.action = allowed by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip All_Traffic.dest_port All_Traffic.action | lookup update=true interesting_ports_lookup dest_port as All_Traffic.dest_port OUTPUT app is_prohibited note transport | search is_prohibited=true | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | `prohibited_network_traffic_allowed_filter` + +[ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for network traffic on common ports where a higher layer protocol does not match the port that is being used. For example, this search should identify cases where protocols other than HTTP are running on TCP port 80. This can be used by attackers to circumvent firewall restrictions, or as an attempt to hide malicious communications over ports and protocols that are typically allowed and not well inspected. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1048"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Traffic"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for network traffic on common ports where a higher layer protocol does not match the port that is being used. For example, this search should identify cases where protocols other than HTTP are running on TCP port 80. This can be used by attackers to circumvent firewall restrictions, or as an attempt to hide malicious communications over ports and protocols that are typically allowed and not well inspected. +action.escu.how_to_implement = Running this search properly requires a technology that can inspect network traffic and identify common protocols. Technologies such as Bro and Palo Alto Networks firewalls are two examples that will identify protocols via inspection, and not just assume a specific protocol based on the transport protocol and ports. +action.escu.known_false_positives = None identified +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Command \u0026 Control"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Command \u0026 Control"], "cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1048"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where (All_Traffic.app=dns NOT All_Traffic.dest_port=53) OR ((All_Traffic.app=web-browsing OR All_Traffic.app=http) NOT (All_Traffic.dest_port=80 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=8080 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=8000)) OR (All_Traffic.app=ssl NOT (All_Traffic.dest_port=443 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=8443)) OR (All_Traffic.app=smtp NOT All_Traffic.dest_port=25) by All_Traffic.src_ip, All_Traffic.dest_ip, All_Traffic.app, All_Traffic.dest_port |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | `protocol_or_port_mismatch_filter` + +[ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies cleartext protocols at risk of leaking sensitive information. Currently, this consists of legacy protocols such as telnet (port 23), POP3 (port 110), IMAP (port 143), and non-anonymous FTP (port 21) sessions. While some of these protocols may be used over SSL, they typically are found on different assigned ports in those instances. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Traffic"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies cleartext protocols at risk of leaking sensitive information. Currently, this consists of legacy protocols such as telnet (port 23), POP3 (port 110), IMAP (port 143), and non-anonymous FTP (port 21) sessions. While some of these protocols may be used over SSL, they typically are found on different assigned ports in those instances. +action.escu.how_to_implement = This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic, and populating the Network_Traffic data model. For more accurate result it's better to limit destination to organization private and public IP range, like All_Traffic.dest IN(192.168.0.0/16,172.16.0.0/12,10.0.0.0/8, x.x.x.x/22) +action.escu.known_false_positives = Some networks may use kerberized FTP or telnet servers, however, this is rare. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-19 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-19 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Use of Cleartext Protocols"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Use of Cleartext Protocols"], "cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 14"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies cleartext protocols at risk of leaking sensitive information. Currently, this consists of legacy protocols such as telnet (port 23), POP3 (port 110), IMAP (port 143), and non-anonymous FTP (port 21) sessions. While some of these protocols may be used over SSL, they typically are found on different assigned ports in those instances. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Protocols passing authentication in cleartext +action.notable.param.security_domain = network +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.action!=blocked AND All_Traffic.transport="tcp" AND (All_Traffic.dest_port="23" OR All_Traffic.dest_port="143" OR All_Traffic.dest_port="110" OR (All_Traffic.dest_port="21" AND All_Traffic.user != "anonymous")) by All_Traffic.user All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | `protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext_filter` + +[ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for RDP application network traffic and filters any source/destination pair generating more than twice the standard deviation of the average traffic. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 9", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Traffic"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for RDP application network traffic and filters any source/destination pair generating more than twice the standard deviation of the average traffic. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must ensure that your network traffic data is populating the Network_Traffic data model. +action.escu.known_false_positives = RDP gateways may have unusually high amounts of traffic from all other hosts' RDP applications in the network. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 9", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for RDP application network traffic and filters any source/destination pair generating more than twice the standard deviation of the average traffic. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce +action.notable.param.security_domain = network +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.app=rdp by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | eventstats stdev(count) AS stdev avg(count) AS avg p50(count) AS p50 | where count>(avg + stdev*2) | rename All_Traffic.src AS src All_Traffic.dest AS dest | table firstTime lastTime src dest count avg p50 stdev | `remote_desktop_network_bruteforce_filter` + +[ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for network traffic on TCP/3389, the default port used by remote desktop. While remote desktop traffic is not uncommon on a network, it is usually associated with known hosts. This search will ignore common RDP sources and common RDP destinations so you can focus on the uncommon uses of remote desktop on your network. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 9", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Traffic"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for network traffic on TCP/3389, the default port used by remote desktop. While remote desktop traffic is not uncommon on a network, it is usually associated with known hosts. This search will ignore common RDP sources and common RDP destinations so you can focus on the uncommon uses of remote desktop on your network. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to identify systems that commonly originate remote desktop traffic and that commonly receive remote desktop traffic. You can use the included support search "Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic" to identify systems that originate the traffic and the search "Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic" to identify systems that receive a lot of remote desktop traffic. After identifying these systems, you will need to add the "common_rdp_source" or "common_rdp_destination" category to that system depending on the usage, using the Enterprise Security Assets and Identities framework. This can be done by adding an entry in the assets.csv file located in SA-IdentityManagement/lookups. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Remote Desktop may be used legitimately by users on the network. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-07 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-07 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 9", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=3389 AND All_Traffic.dest_category!=common_rdp_destination AND All_Traffic.src_category!=common_rdp_source by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_desktop_network_traffic_filter` + +[ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for spikes in the number of Server Message Block (SMB) traffic connections. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Traffic"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for spikes in the number of Server Message Block (SMB) traffic connections. +action.escu.how_to_implement = This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic logs and populating the `Network_Traffic` data model. +action.escu.known_false_positives = A file server may experience high-demand loads that could cause this analytic to trigger. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-22 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-22 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Ransomware", "DHS Report TA18-074A"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Ransomware", "DHS Report TA18-074A"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb by _time span=1h, All_Traffic.src | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | eventstats max(_time) as maxtime | stats count as num_data_samples max(eval(if(_time >= relative_time(maxtime, "-70m@m"), count, null))) as count avg(eval(if(_time upperBound AND num_data_samples >=50, 1, 0) | where isOutlier=1 | table src count | `smb_traffic_spike_filter` + +[ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search uses the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) to identify spikes in the number of Server Message Block (SMB) connections. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Traffic"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search uses the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) to identify spikes in the number of Server Message Block (SMB) connections. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. In addition, the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or greater must be installed on your search heads, along with any required dependencies. Finally, the support search "Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK" must be executed before this detection search, because it builds a machine-learning (ML) model over the historical data used by this search. It is important that this search is run in the same app context as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild the model with the latest data available in your environment.\ +This search produces a field (Number of events,count) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. This field contributes additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following field, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry): \ +1. **Label:** Number of events, **Field:** count\ +Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review is found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` +action.escu.known_false_positives = If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider reducing the value of the threshold in the search. You should also periodically re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data. Please update the `smb_traffic_spike_mltk_filter` macro to filter out false positive results +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-22 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-22 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Ransomware", "DHS Report TA18-074A"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Ransomware", "DHS Report TA18-074A"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as port from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb by _time span=1h, All_Traffic.src | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%A") | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | apply smb_pdfmodel threshold=0.001 | rename "IsOutlier(count)" as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | sort -count | table _time src dest port count | `smb_traffic_spike___mltk_filter` + +[ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for network traffic identified as The Onion Router (TOR), a benign anonymity network which can be abused for a variety of nefarious purposes. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071", "T1071.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Traffic"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for network traffic identified as The Onion Router (TOR), a benign anonymity network which can be abused for a variety of nefarious purposes. +action.escu.how_to_implement = In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from firewalls or other network control devices that mediate the traffic allowed into an environment. This is necessary so that the search can identify an 'action' taken on the traffic of interest. The search requires the Network_Traffic data model be populated. +action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-22 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-22 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Ransomware", "Command \u0026 Control", "NOBELIUM Group"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Ransomware", "Command \u0026 Control", "NOBELIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071", "T1071.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for network traffic identified as The Onion Router (TOR), a benign anonymity network which can be abused for a variety of nefarious purposes. +action.notable.param.rule_title = TOR Traffic +action.notable.param.security_domain = network +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.app=tor AND All_Traffic.action=allowed by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip All_Traffic.dest_port All_Traffic.action | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | `tor_traffic_filter` + +[ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for unusually long strings in the Content-Type http header that the client sends the server. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 18", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["ID.RA", "RS.MI", "PR.PT", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "PR.MA", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for unusually long strings in the Content-Type http header that the client sends the server. +action.escu.how_to_implement = This particular search leverages data extracted from Stream:HTTP. You must configure the http stream using the Splunk Stream App on your Splunk Stream deployment server to extract the cs_content_type field. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Very few legitimate Content-Type fields will have a length greater than 100 characters. +action.escu.creation_date = 2017-10-13 +action.escu.modification_date = 2017-10-13 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Apache Struts Vulnerability"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Apache Struts Vulnerability"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 18", "CIS 12"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["ID.RA", "RS.MI", "PR.PT", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "PR.MA", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `stream_http` | eval cs_content_type_length = len(cs_content_type) | where cs_content_type_length > 100 | table endtime src_ip dest_ip cs_content_type_length cs_content_type url | `unusually_long_content_type_length_filter` + +[ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for specific GET or HEAD requests to web servers that are indicative of reconnaissance attempts to identify vulnerable JBoss servers. JexBoss is described as the exploit tool of choice for this malicious activity. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1082"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Web"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for specific GET or HEAD requests to web servers that are indicative of reconnaissance attempts to identify vulnerable JBoss servers. JexBoss is described as the exploit tool of choice for this malicious activity. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data from the web server or network traffic that contains web specific information, and populating the Web data model. +action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible for legitimate HTTP requests to be made to URLs containing the suspicious paths. +action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-23 +action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-23 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["JBoss Vulnerability", "SamSam Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["JBoss Vulnerability", "SamSam Ransomware"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1082"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for specific GET or HEAD requests to web servers that are indicative of reconnaissance attempts to identify vulnerable JBoss servers. JexBoss is described as the exploit tool of choice for this malicious activity. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers +action.notable.param.security_domain = network +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where (Web.http_method="GET" OR Web.http_method="HEAD") AND (Web.url="*/web-console/ServerInfo.jsp*" OR Web.url="*web-console*" OR Web.url="*jmx-console*" OR Web.url = "*invoker*") by Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.src, Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers_filter` + +[ESCU - Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902 - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search detects remote code exploit attempts on F5 BIG-IP, BIG-IQ, and Traffix SDC devices +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search detects remote code exploit attempts on F5 BIG-IP, BIG-IQ, and Traffix SDC devices +action.escu.how_to_implement = To consistently detect exploit attempts on F5 devices using the vulnerabilities contained within CVE-2020-5902 it is recommended to ingest logs via syslog. As many BIG-IP devices will have SSL enabled on their management interfaces, detections via wire data may not pick anything up unless you are decrypting SSL traffic in order to inspect it. I am using a regex string from a Cloudflare mitigation technique to try and always catch the offending string (..;), along with the other exploit of using (hsqldb;). +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-08-02 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-02 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902 - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "dest", "threat_object_type": "other"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902 - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 11"], "confidence": 50, "cve": ["CVE-2020-5902"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Other"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search detects remote code exploit attempts on F5 BIG-IP, BIG-IQ, and Traffix SDC devices +action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902 +action.notable.param.security_domain = network +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `f5_bigip_rogue` | regex _raw="(hsqldb;|.*\\.\\.;.*)" | search `detect_f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902_filter` + +[ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search is used to detect malicious HTTP requests crafted to exploit jmx-console in JBoss servers. The malicious requests have a long URL length, as the payload is embedded in the URL. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 4", "CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["ID.RA", "PR.PT", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "PR.MA", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Web"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is used to detect malicious HTTP requests crafted to exploit jmx-console in JBoss servers. The malicious requests have a long URL length, as the payload is embedded in the URL. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must ingest data from the web server or capture network data that contains web specific information with solutions such as Bro or Splunk Stream, and populating the Web data model +action.escu.known_false_positives = No known false positives for this detection. +action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-23 +action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-23 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["JBoss Vulnerability", "SamSam Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["JBoss Vulnerability", "SamSam Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 4", "CIS 18"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["ID.RA", "PR.PT", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "PR.MA", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is used to detect malicious HTTP requests crafted to exploit jmx-console in JBoss servers. The malicious requests have a long URL length, as the payload is embedded in the URL. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers +action.notable.param.security_domain = network +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where (Web.http_method="GET" OR Web.http_method="HEAD") by Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest | search Web.url="*jmx-console/HtmlAdaptor?action=invokeOpByName&name=jboss.admin*import*" AND Web.url_length > 200 | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table src, dest_ip, http_method, url, firstTime, lastTime | `detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers_filter` + +[ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for Web requests to faux domains similar to the one that you want to have monitored for abuse. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Web"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for Web requests to faux domains similar to the one that you want to have monitored for abuse. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You need to ingest data from your web traffic. This can be accomplished by indexing data from a web proxy, or using a network traffic analysis tool, such as Bro or Splunk Stream. You also need to have run the search "ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names", which creates the permutations of the domain that will be checked for. +action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time +action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-23 +action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-23 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Brand Monitoring"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "src", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Brand Monitoring"], "cis20": ["CIS 7"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "src", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for Web requests to faux domains similar to the one that you want to have monitored for abuse. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse +action.notable.param.security_domain = network +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Web.url) as urls min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Web by Web.src | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `brand_abuse_web` | `monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse_filter` + +[ESCU - SQL Injection with Long URLs - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search looks for long URLs that have several SQL commands visible within them. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 13", "CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "ID.RA", "PR.PT", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Web"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for long URLs that have several SQL commands visible within them. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be monitoring network communications to your web servers or ingesting your HTTP logs and populating the Web data model. You must also identify your web servers in the Enterprise Security assets table. +action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible that legitimate traffic will have long URLs or long user agent strings and that common SQL commands may be found within the URL. Please investigate as appropriate. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - SQL Injection with Long URLs - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["SQL Injection"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - SQL Injection with Long URLs - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["SQL Injection"], "cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 13", "CIS 18"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "ID.RA", "PR.PT", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for long URLs that have several SQL commands visible within them. +action.notable.param.rule_title = SQL Injection with Long URLs +action.notable.param.security_domain = network +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Web where Web.dest_category=web_server AND (Web.url_length > 1024 OR Web.http_user_agent_length > 200) by Web.src Web.dest Web.url Web.url_length Web.http_user_agent | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | eval num_sql_cmds=mvcount(split(url, "alter%20table")) + mvcount(split(url, "between")) + mvcount(split(url, "create%20table")) + mvcount(split(url, "create%20database")) + mvcount(split(url, "create%20index")) + mvcount(split(url, "create%20view")) + mvcount(split(url, "delete")) + mvcount(split(url, "drop%20database")) + mvcount(split(url, "drop%20index")) + mvcount(split(url, "drop%20table")) + mvcount(split(url, "exists")) + mvcount(split(url, "exec")) + mvcount(split(url, "group%20by")) + mvcount(split(url, "having")) + mvcount(split(url, "insert%20into")) + mvcount(split(url, "inner%20join")) + mvcount(split(url, "left%20join")) + mvcount(split(url, "right%20join")) + mvcount(split(url, "full%20join")) + mvcount(split(url, "select")) + mvcount(split(url, "distinct")) + mvcount(split(url, "select%20top")) + mvcount(split(url, "union")) + mvcount(split(url, "xp_cmdshell")) - 24 | where num_sql_cmds > 3 | `sql_injection_with_long_urls_filter` + +[ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search aims to detect the Supernova webshell used in the SUNBURST attack. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 13", "CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "ID.RA", "PR.PT", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Web"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search aims to detect the Supernova webshell used in the SUNBURST attack. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be monitoring web traffic to your Solarwinds Orion. The logs should be ingested into splunk and populating/mapped to the Web data model. +action.escu.known_false_positives = There might be false positives associted with this detection since items like args as a web argument is pretty generic. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-06 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-06 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["NOBELIUM Group"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["NOBELIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 13", "CIS 18"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "ID.RA", "PR.PT", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search aims to detect the Supernova webshell used in the SUNBURST attack. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Supernova Webshell +action.notable.param.security_domain = network +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Web.Web where web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*codes* OR Web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*clazz* OR Web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*method* OR Web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*args* by Web.src Web.dest Web.url Web.vendor_product Web.user Web.http_user_agent _time span=1s | `supernova_webshell_filter` + +[ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = Malicious actors often abuse legitimate Dynamic DNS services to host malicious payloads or interactive command and control nodes. Attackers will automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to countless IP addresses to circumvent firewall blocks, block lists as well as frustrate a network defenders analytic and investigative processes. This search will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1189"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Resolution"] +action.escu.eli5 = Malicious actors often abuse legitimate Dynamic DNS services to host malicious payloads or interactive command and control nodes. Attackers will automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to countless IP addresses to circumvent firewall blocks, block lists as well as frustrate a network defenders analytic and investigative processes. This search will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains. +action.escu.how_to_implement = First, you'll need to ingest data from your DNS operations. This can be done by ingesting logs from your server or data, collected passively by Splunk Stream or a similar solution. Specifically, data that contains the domain that is being queried and the IP of the host originating the request must be populating the `Network_Resolution` data model. This search also leverages a lookup file, `dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv`, which contains a non-exhaustive list of Dynamic DNS providers. Please consider updating the local lookup periodically by adding new domains to the list of `dynamic_dns_providers_local.csv`.\ +This search produces fields (query, answer, isDynDNS) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable event. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review. Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** DNS Query, **Field:** query\ +1. \ +1. **Label:** DNS Answer, **Field:** answer\ +1. \ +1. **Label:** IsDynamicDNS, **Field:** isDynDNS\ +Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` +action.escu.known_false_positives = Some users and applications may leverage Dynamic DNS to reach out to some domains on the Internet since dynamic DNS by itself is not malicious, however this activity must be verified. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-14 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-14 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Data Protection", "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "DNS Hijacking", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Dynamic DNS", "Command \u0026 Control"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A dns query $query$ from your infra connecting to suspicious domain in host $host$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "host", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Protection", "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "DNS Hijacking", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Dynamic DNS", "Command \u0026 Control"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1189"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "host", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = Malicious actors often abuse legitimate Dynamic DNS services to host malicious payloads or interactive command and control nodes. Attackers will automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to countless IP addresses to circumvent firewall blocks, block lists as well as frustrate a network defenders analytic and investigative processes. This search will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers +action.notable.param.security_domain = network +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.answer) as answer min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query host | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `dynamic_dns_providers` | `detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter` + +[ESCU - Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = Malicious actors often abuse misconfigured LDAP servers or applications that use the LDAP servers in organizations. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. This search will help determine if you have any LDAP connections to IP addresses outside of private (RFC1918) address space. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190", "T1059"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Traffic"] +action.escu.eli5 = Malicious actors often abuse misconfigured LDAP servers or applications that use the LDAP servers in organizations. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. This search will help determine if you have any LDAP connections to IP addresses outside of private (RFC1918) address space. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format and should be mapped to the Network Traffic datamodels that are in use for this search. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown at this moment. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. Please check those servers to verify if the activity is legitimate. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-13 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-13 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = An outbound LDAP connection from $src_ip$ in your infrastructure connecting to dest ip $dest_ip$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "src_ip", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"risk_object_field": "dest_ip", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190", "T1059"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src_ip", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "dest_ip", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats earliest(_time) as earliest_time latest(_time) as latest_time values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port = 389 OR All_Traffic.dest_port = 636 AND NOT (All_Traffic.dest_ip = 10.0.0.0/8 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=192.168.0.0/16 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip = 172.16.0.0/12) by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip |`drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | where src_ip != dest_ip | `security_content_ctime(latest_time)` | `security_content_ctime(earliest_time)` |`detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter` + +[ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search allows you to identify DNS requests and compute the standard deviation on the length of the names being resolved, then filter on two times the standard deviation to show you those queries that are unusually large for your environment. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1048"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Resolution"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search allows you to identify DNS requests and compute the standard deviation on the length of the names being resolved, then filter on two times the standard deviation to show you those queries that are unusually large for your environment. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. +action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible there can be long domain names that are legitimate. action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-06 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-06 action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["FIN7", "Remcos", "Unusual Processes", "WhisperGate"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Hidden Cobra Malware", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Command \u0026 Control"] action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = wscript or cscript parent process spawned $process_name$ in $dest$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 49}] +action.risk.param._risk_message = A dns query $query$ with 2 time standard deviation of name len of the dns query in host $host$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "host", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["FIN7", "Remcos", "Unusual Processes", "WhisperGate"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055", "T1543", "T1134.004", "T1134"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Hidden Cobra Malware", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Command \u0026 Control"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1048"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "host", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic identifies a suspicious spawned process by WScript or CScript process. This technique was a common technique used by adversaries and malware to execute different LOLBIN, other scripts like PowerShell or spawn a suspended process to inject its code as a defense evasion. This TTP may detect some normal script that using several application tool that are in the list of the child process it detects but a good pivot and indicator that a script is may execute suspicious code. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -36827,42 +36478,42 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("cscript.exe", "wscript.exe") Processes.process_name IN ("regsvr32.exe", "rundll32.exe","winhlp32.exe","certutil.exe","msbuild.exe","cmd.exe","powershell*","wmic.exe","mshta.exe") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process_filter` +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where NOT DNS.message_type IN("Pointer","PTR") by DNS.query | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` | eval tlds=split(query,".") | eval tld=mvindex(tlds,-1) | eval tld_len=len(tld) | search tld_len<=24 | eval query_length = len(query) | table query query_length record_type count | eventstats stdev(query_length) AS stdev avg(query_length) AS avg p50(query_length) AS p50| where query_length>(avg+stdev*2) | eval z_score=(query_length-avg)/stdev | `dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation_filter` -[ESCU - Wsmprovhost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule] +[ESCU - Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = The following analytic identifies `Wsmprovhost.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the Windows Remote Management (WinRm) protocol, the executed command is spawned as a child processs of `Wsmprovhost.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of Wsmprovhost.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.006"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies `Wsmprovhost.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the Windows Remote Management (WinRm) protocol, the executed command is spawned as a child processs of `Wsmprovhost.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of Wsmprovhost.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-22 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-22 +description = This search is designed to detect high frequency of archive files data exfiltration through HTTP POST method protocol. This are one of the common techniques used by APT or trojan spy after doing the data collection like screenshot, recording, sensitive data to the infected machines. The attacker may execute archiving command to the collected data, save it a temp folder with a hidden attribute then send it to its C2 through HTTP POST. Sometimes adversaries will rename the archive files or encode/encrypt to cover their tracks. This detection can detect a renamed archive files transfer to HTTP POST since it checks the request body header. Unfortunately this detection cannot support archive that was encrypted or encoded before doing the exfiltration. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1048"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Traffic"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is designed to detect high frequency of archive files data exfiltration through HTTP POST method protocol. This are one of the common techniques used by APT or trojan spy after doing the data collection like screenshot, recording, sensitive data to the infected machines. The attacker may execute archiving command to the collected data, save it a temp folder with a hidden attribute then send it to its C2 through HTTP POST. Sometimes adversaries will rename the archive files or encode/encrypt to cover their tracks. This detection can detect a renamed archive files transfer to HTTP POST since it checks the request body header. Unfortunately this detection cannot support archive that was encrypted or encoded before doing the exfiltration. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the stream HTTP logs or network logs that catch network traffic. Make sure that the http-request-body, payload, or request field is enabled in stream http configuration. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Normal archive transfer via HTTP protocol may trip this detection. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-21 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-21 action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Wsmprovhost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Command \u0026 Control", "Data Exfiltration"] action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = Wsmprovhost.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest$. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 54}] +action.risk.param._risk_message = A http post $http_method$ sending packet with possible archive bytes header 4form_data$ in uri path $uri_path$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "uri_path", "threat_object_type": "url"}, {"threat_object_field": "form_data", "threat_object_type": "other"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Wsmprovhost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.006"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Command \u0026 Control", "Data Exfiltration"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1048"], "observable": [{"name": "uri_path", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "URL"}, {"name": "form_data", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Other"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies `Wsmprovhost.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the Windows Remote Management (WinRm) protocol, the executed command is spawned as a child processs of `Wsmprovhost.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of Wsmprovhost.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Wsmprovhost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is designed to detect high frequency of archive files data exfiltration through HTTP POST method protocol. This are one of the common techniques used by APT or trojan spy after doing the data collection like screenshot, recording, sensitive data to the infected machines. The attacker may execute archiving command to the collected data, save it a temp folder with a hidden attribute then send it to its C2 through HTTP POST. Sometimes adversaries will rename the archive files or encode/encrypt to cover their tracks. This detection can detect a renamed archive files transfer to HTTP POST since it checks the request body header. Unfortunately this detection cannot support archive that was encrypted or encoded before doing the exfiltration. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic +action.notable.param.security_domain = network action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true @@ -36873,87 +36524,42 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=wsmprovhost.exe) (Processes.process_name IN ("Regsvcs.exe", "Ftp.exe", "OfflineScannerShell.exe", "Rasautou.exe", "Schtasks.exe", "Xwizard.exe", "Dllhost.exe", "Pnputil.exe", "Atbroker.exe", "Pcwrun.exe", "Ttdinject.exe","Mshta.exe", "Bitsadmin.exe", "Certoc.exe", "Ieexec.exe", "Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe", "Runscripthelper.exe", "Forfiles.exe", "Msbuild.exe", "Register-cimprovider.exe", "Tttracer.exe", "Ie4uinit.exe", "Bash.exe", "Hh.exe", "SettingSyncHost.exe", "Cmstp.exe", "Mmc.exe", "Stordiag.exe", "Scriptrunner.exe", "Odbcconf.exe", "Extexport.exe", "Msdt.exe", "WorkFolders.exe", "Diskshadow.exe", "Mavinject.exe", "Regasm.exe", "Gpscript.exe", "Rundll32.exe", "Regsvr32.exe", "Msiexec.exe", "Wuauclt.exe", "Presentationhost.exe", "Wmic.exe", "Runonce.exe", "Syncappvpublishingserver.exe", "Verclsid.exe", "Infdefaultinstall.exe", "Explorer.exe", "Installutil.exe", "Netsh.exe", "Wab.exe", "Dnscmd.exe", "At.exe", "Pcalua.exe", "Msconfig.exe")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `wsmprovhost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter` +search = `stream_http` http_method=POST |eval archive_hdr1=substr(form_data,1,2) | eval archive_hdr2 = substr(form_data,1,4) |stats values(form_data) as http_request_body min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by http_method http_user_agent uri_path url bytes_in bytes_out archive_hdr1 archive_hdr2 |where count >20 AND (archive_hdr1 = "7z" OR archive_hdr1 = "PK" OR archive_hdr2="Rar!") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic_filter` -[ESCU - XMRIG Driver Loaded - Rule] +[ESCU - Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This analytic identifies XMRIG coinminer driver installation on the system. The XMRIG driver name by default is `WinRing0x64.sys`. This cpu miner is an open source project that is commonly abused by adversaries to infect and mine bitcoin. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.003", "T1543"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This analytic identifies XMRIG coinminer driver installation on the system. The XMRIG driver name by default is `WinRing0x64.sys`. This cpu miner is an open source project that is commonly abused by adversaries to infect and mine bitcoin. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the driver loaded and Signature from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-29 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-29 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - XMRIG Driver Loaded - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["XMRig"] -action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = A driver $ImageLoaded$ related to xmrig crytominer loaded in host $Computer$ -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Computer", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "ImageLoaded", "threat_object_type": "imageloaded"}] -action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 -action.risk.param.verbose = 0 -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - XMRIG Driver Loaded - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Privilege Escalation"}, "Persistence"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.003", "T1543"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "ImageLoaded", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "ImageLoaded"}]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic identifies XMRIG coinminer driver installation on the system. The XMRIG driver name by default is `WinRing0x64.sys`. This cpu miner is an open source project that is commonly abused by adversaries to infect and mine bitcoin. -action.notable.param.rule_title = XMRIG Driver Loaded -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `sysmon` EventCode=6 Signature="Noriyuki MIYAZAKI" OR ImageLoaded= "*\\WinRing0x64.sys" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer ImageLoaded Hashes IMPHASH Signature Signed | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `xmrig_driver_loaded_filter` - -[ESCU - XSL Script Execution With WMIC - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search is to detect a suspicious wmic.exe process or renamed wmic process to execute malicious xsl file. This technique was seen in FIN7 to execute its malicous jscript using the .xsl as the loader with the help of wmic.exe process. This TTP is really a good indicator for you to hunt further for FIN7 or other attacker that known to used this technique. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1220"]} -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious wmic.exe process or renamed wmic process to execute malicious xsl file. This technique was seen in FIN7 to execute its malicous jscript using the .xsl as the loader with the help of wmic.exe process. This TTP is really a good indicator for you to hunt further for FIN7 or other attacker that known to used this technique. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. +description = This search is to detect potential plain HTTP POST method data exfiltration. This network traffic is commonly used by trickbot, trojanspy, keylogger or APT adversary where arguments or commands are sent in plain text to the remote C2 server using HTTP POST method as part of data exfiltration. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1048"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Traffic"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect potential plain HTTP POST method data exfiltration. This network traffic is commonly used by trickbot, trojanspy, keylogger or APT adversary where arguments or commands are sent in plain text to the remote C2 server using HTTP POST method as part of data exfiltration. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the stream HTTP logs or network logs that catch network traffic. Make sure that the http-request-body, payload, or request field is enabled. action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-13 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-13 +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-22 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-22 action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - XSL Script Execution With WMIC - Rule +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["FIN7", "Suspicious WMI Use"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Command \u0026 Control", "Data Exfiltration"] action.risk = 1 -action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ utilizing wmic to load a XSL script. -action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 49}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "parent process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_message = A http post $http_method$ sending packet with plain text of information $form_data$ in uri path $uri_path$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "uri_path", "threat_object_type": "url"}, {"threat_object_field": "form_data", "threat_object_type": "other"}] action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - XSL Script Execution With WMIC - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["FIN7", "Suspicious WMI Use"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1220"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Command \u0026 Control", "Data Exfiltration"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1048"], "observable": [{"name": "uri_path", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "URL"}, {"name": "form_data", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Other"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious wmic.exe process or renamed wmic process to execute malicious xsl file. This technique was seen in FIN7 to execute its malicous jscript using the .xsl as the loader with the help of wmic.exe process. This TTP is really a good indicator for you to hunt further for FIN7 or other attacker that known to used this technique. -action.notable.param.rule_title = XSL Script Execution With WMIC -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect potential plain HTTP POST method data exfiltration. This network traffic is commonly used by trickbot, trojanspy, keylogger or APT adversary where arguments or commands are sent in plain text to the remote C2 server using HTTP POST method as part of data exfiltration. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data +action.notable.param.security_domain = network action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true @@ -36964,37 +36570,37 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` Processes.process = "*os get*" Processes.process="*/format:*" Processes.process = "*.xsl*" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `xsl_script_execution_with_wmic_filter` +search = `stream_http` http_method=POST form_data IN ("*wermgr.exe*","*svchost.exe*", "*name=\"proclist\"*","*ipconfig*", "*name=\"sysinfo\"*", "*net view*") |stats values(form_data) as http_request_body min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by http_method http_user_agent uri_path url bytes_in bytes_out | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data_filter` -[ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule] +[ESCU - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search provides detection of an user attaching itself to a different role trust policy. This can be used for lateral movement and escalation of privileges. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search provides detection of an user attaching itself to a different role trust policy. This can be used for lateral movement and escalation of privileges. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add-on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs -action.escu.known_false_positives = Attach to policy can create a lot of noise. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse (i.e status=failure). The search can provide context for common users attaching themselves to higher privilege policies or even newly created policies. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-27 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-27 +description = CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we first limit the scope of our search to the Web Datamodel and use the `| from datamodel` function to benefit from schema accelerated searching capabilities, mainly because the second part of the detection is pretty heavy, it runs a regex across all _raw events that looks for `${jndi:ldap://` pattern across all potential web fields available to the raw data, like http headers for example. If you see results for this detection, it means that there was a attempt at a injection, which could be a reconnaissance activity or a valid expliotation attempt, but this does not exactly mean that the host was indeed successfully exploited. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Web"] +action.escu.eli5 = CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we first limit the scope of our search to the Web Datamodel and use the `| from datamodel` function to benefit from schema accelerated searching capabilities, mainly because the second part of the detection is pretty heavy, it runs a regex across all _raw events that looks for `${jndi:ldap://` pattern across all potential web fields available to the raw data, like http headers for example. If you see results for this detection, it means that there was a attempt at a injection, which could be a reconnaissance activity or a valid expliotation attempt, but this does not exactly mean that the host was indeed successfully exploited. +action.escu.how_to_implement = This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx. +action.escu.known_false_positives = If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-13 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-13 action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cross Account Activity"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 15}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cross Account Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Application Log", "Stage:Execution"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search provides detection of an user attaching itself to a different role trust policy. This can be used for lateral movement and escalation of privileges. -action.notable.param.rule_title = aws detect attach to role policy -action.notable.param.security_domain = threat -action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -37004,37 +36610,37 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = `aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` attach policy| spath requestParameters.policyArn | table sourceIPAddress user_access_key userIdentity.arn userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.arn eventName errorCode errorMessage status action requestParameters.policyArn userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.mfaAuthenticated userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.creationDate | `aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy_filter` +search = | from datamodel Web.Web | regex _raw="[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\:|\%3A|\/|\%2F)\w+(\:\/\/|\%3A\%2F\%2F)(\$\{.*?\}(\.)?)?" | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter` -[ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule] +[ESCU - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search provides detection of accounts creating permanent keys. Permanent keys are not created by default and they are only needed for programmatic calls. Creation of Permanent key is an important event to monitor. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search provides detection of accounts creating permanent keys. Permanent keys are not created by default and they are only needed for programmatic calls. Creation of Permanent key is an important event to monitor. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs -action.escu.known_false_positives = Not all permanent key creations are malicious. If there is a policy of rotating keys this search can be adjusted to provide better context. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-27 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-27 +description = CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we match the invocation function with a network connection to a malicious ip address. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Traffic", "Web"] +action.escu.eli5 = CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we match the invocation function with a network connection to a malicious ip address. +action.escu.how_to_implement = This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx. +action.escu.known_false_positives = If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives. +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-13 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-13 action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cross Account Activity"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 15}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 15}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 cron_schedule = 0 * * * * dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cross Account Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Application Log", "Stage:Execution"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search provides detection of accounts creating permanent keys. Permanent keys are not created by default and they are only needed for programmatic calls. Creation of Permanent key is an important event to monitor. -action.notable.param.rule_title = aws detect permanent key creation -action.notable.param.security_domain = threat -action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -37044,194 +36650,33 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = `aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` CreateAccessKey | spath eventName | search eventName=CreateAccessKey "userIdentity.type"=IAMUser | table sourceIPAddress userName userIdentity.type userAgent action status responseElements.accessKey.createDate responseElements.accessKey.status responseElements.accessKey.accessKeyId |`aws_detect_permanent_key_creation_filter` - -[ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search provides detection of role creation by IAM users. Role creation is an event by itself if user is creating a new role with trust policies different than the available in AWS and it can be used for lateral movement and escalation of privileges. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search provides detection of role creation by IAM users. Role creation is an event by itself if user is creating a new role with trust policies different than the available in AWS and it can be used for lateral movement and escalation of privileges. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add-on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs -action.escu.known_false_positives = CreateRole is not very common in common users. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse. In general AWS provides plenty of trust policies that fit most use cases. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-27 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-27 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cross Account Activity"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cross Account Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search provides detection of role creation by IAM users. Role creation is an event by itself if user is creating a new role with trust policies different than the available in AWS and it can be used for lateral movement and escalation of privileges. -action.notable.param.rule_title = aws detect role creation -action.notable.param.security_domain = threat -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` event_name=CreateRole action=created userIdentity.type=AssumedRole requestParameters.description=Allows* | table sourceIPAddress userIdentity.principalId userIdentity.arn action event_name awsRegion http_user_agent mfa_auth msg requestParameters.roleName requestParameters.description responseElements.role.arn responseElements.role.createDate | `aws_detect_role_creation_filter` - -[ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search provides detection of suspicious use of sts:AssumeRole. These tokens can be created on the go and used by attackers to move laterally and escalate privileges. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search provides detection of suspicious use of sts:AssumeRole. These tokens can be created on the go and used by attackers to move laterally and escalate privileges. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs -action.escu.known_false_positives = Sts:AssumeRole can be very noisy as it is a standard mechanism to provide cross account and cross resources access. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-27 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-27 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cross Account Activity"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cross Account Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search provides detection of suspicious use of sts:AssumeRole. These tokens can be created on the go and used by attackers to move laterally and escalate privileges. -action.notable.param.rule_title = aws detect sts assume role abuse -action.notable.param.security_domain = threat -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `cloudtrail` user_type=AssumedRole userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.type=Role | table sourceIPAddress userIdentity.arn user_agent user_access_key status action requestParameters.roleName responseElements.role.roleName responseElements.role.createDate | `aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse_filter` - -[ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search provides detection of suspicious use of sts:GetSessionToken. These tokens can be created on the go and used by attackers to move laterally and escalate privileges. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1550"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search provides detection of suspicious use of sts:GetSessionToken. These tokens can be created on the go and used by attackers to move laterally and escalate privileges. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add-on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs -action.escu.known_false_positives = Sts:GetSessionToken can be very noisy as in certain environments numerous calls of this type can be executed. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse. In specific environments the use of field requestParameters.serialNumber will need to be used. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-27 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-27 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cross Account Activity"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cross Account Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1550"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search provides detection of suspicious use of sts:GetSessionToken. These tokens can be created on the go and used by attackers to move laterally and escalate privileges. -action.notable.param.rule_title = aws detect sts get session token abuse -action.notable.param.security_domain = threat -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` ASIA userIdentity.type=IAMUser| spath eventName | search eventName=GetSessionToken | table sourceIPAddress eventTime userIdentity.arn userName userAgent user_type status region | `aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse_filter` - -[ESCU - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides detection of possible GCP Oauth token abuse. GCP Oauth token without time limit can be exfiltrated and reused for keeping access sessions alive without further control of authentication, allowing attackers to access and move laterally. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides detection of possible GCP Oauth token abuse. GCP Oauth token without time limit can be exfiltrated and reused for keeping access sessions alive without further control of authentication, allowing attackers to access and move laterally. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message logs -action.escu.known_false_positives = GCP Oauth token abuse detection will only work if there are access policies in place along with audit logs. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-09-01 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-01 -action.escu.confidence = high -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule -action.escu.search_type = detection -action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["GCP Cross Account Activity"] -cron_schedule = 0 * * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 -action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["GCP Cross Account Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} -schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides detection of possible GCP Oauth token abuse. GCP Oauth token without time limit can be exfiltrated and reused for keeping access sessions alive without further control of authentication, allowing attackers to access and move laterally. -action.notable.param.rule_title = gcp detect oauth token abuse -action.notable.param.security_domain = threat -action.notable.param.severity = high -alert.digest_mode = 1 -disabled = true -enableSched = 1 -allow_skew = 100% -counttype = number of events -relation = greater than -quantity = 0 -realtime_schedule = 0 -is_visible = false -search = `google_gcp_pubsub_message` type.googleapis.com/google.cloud.audit.AuditLog |table protoPayload.@type protoPayload.status.details{}.@type protoPayload.status.details{}.violations{}.callerIp protoPayload.status.details{}.violations{}.type protoPayload.status.message | `gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse_filter` +search = | from datamodel Web.Web | rex field=_raw max_match=0 "[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\:|\%3A|\/|\%2F)(?\w+)(\:\/\/|\%3A\%2F\%2F)(\$\{.*?\}(\.)?)?(?[a-zA-Z0-9\.\-\_\$]+)" | join affected_host type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic by All_Traffic.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename dest AS affected_host] | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter` ### END ESCU DETECTIONS ### - ### ESCU BASELINES ### -[ESCU - Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security] +[ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = support -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search takes the existing interesting process table from ES, filters out any existing additions added by ESCU and then updates the table with processes identified by ESCU that should be prohibited on your endpoints. -action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-15 -action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-15 -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", "SamSam Ransomware"] +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS +description = This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and the standard deviation of the number of outbound connections blocked in your VPC flow logs by each source IP address (IP address of your EC2 instances). Also recorded is the number of data points for each source IP. This table outputs to a lookup file to allow the detection search to operate quickly. +action.escu.creation_date = 2018-05-07 +action.escu.modification_date = 2018-05-07 +action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Network ACL Activity", "Command \u0026 Control", "Suspicious AWS Traffic"] action.escu.data_models = [] -cron_schedule = 10 0 * * * +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m schedule_window = auto action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search takes the existing interesting process table from ES, filters out any existing additions added by ESCU and then updates the table with processes identified by ESCU that should be prohibited on your endpoints. -action.escu.how_to_implement = This search should be run on each new install of ESCU. +action.escu.eli5 = This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and the standard deviation of the number of outbound connections blocked in your VPC flow logs by each source IP address (IP address of your EC2 instances). Also recorded is the number of data points for each source IP. This table outputs to a lookup file to allow the detection search to operate quickly. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your `VPC flow logs.`. disabled = true is_visible = false -search = | inputlookup prohibited_processes | search note!=ESCU* | inputlookup append=T prohibited_processes | fillnull value=* dest dest_pci_domain | fillnull value=false is_required is_secure | fillnull value=true is_prohibited | outputlookup prohibited_processes | stats count +search = `cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow` action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR src_ip=192.168.0.0/16) ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16) | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as numberOfBlockedConnections by _time, src_ip | stats count(numberOfBlockedConnections) as numDataPoints, latest(numberOfBlockedConnections) as latestCount, avg(numberOfBlockedConnections) as avgBlockedConnections, stdev(numberOfBlockedConnections) as stdevBlockedConnections by src_ip | table src_ip, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgBlockedConnections, stdevBlockedConnections | outputlookup baseline_blocked_outbound_connections | stats count [ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User] action.escu = 0 @@ -37243,10 +36688,10 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2020-09-07 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-07 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud User Activities"] action.escu.data_models = ["Change"] -cron_schedule = 0 2 * * 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -90d@d -dispatch.latest_time = -1d@d +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m schedule_window = auto action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.eli5 = This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many API calls are performed by each user. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model and the model is rebuilt weekly. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of instances created in a small time window. @@ -37265,10 +36710,10 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2020-08-25 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-25 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", "Cloud Cryptomining"] action.escu.data_models = ["Change"] -cron_schedule = 0 2 * * 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -90d@d -dispatch.latest_time = -1d@d +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m schedule_window = auto action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.eli5 = This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many instances are destroyed in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model and the model is rebuilt weekly. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of instances destroyed in a small time window. @@ -37288,10 +36733,10 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2020-08-14 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-14 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Cloud Cryptomining", "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities"] action.escu.data_models = ["Change"] -cron_schedule = 0 2 * * 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -90d@d -dispatch.latest_time = -1d@d +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m schedule_window = auto action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.eli5 = This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many instances are created in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model and the model is rebuilt weekly. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of instances created in a small time window. @@ -37311,10 +36756,10 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2020-09-07 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-07 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud User Activities"] action.escu.data_models = ["Change"] -cron_schedule = 0 2 * * 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -90d@d -dispatch.latest_time = -1d@d +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m schedule_window = auto action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.eli5 = This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many API calls for security groups are performed by each user. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model and the model is rebuilt weekly. @@ -37323,28 +36768,6 @@ disabled = true is_visible = false search = | tstats count as security_group_api_calls from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.object_category=firewall All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%w") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | table _time security_group_api_calls, user, HourOfDay, isWeekend | eventstats dc(security_group_api_calls) as security_group_api_calls by user, HourOfDay, isWeekend | where security_group_api_calls >= 1 | fit DensityFunction security_group_api_calls by "user,HourOfDay,isWeekend" into cloud_excessive_security_group_api_calls_v1 dist=norm show_density=true -[ESCU - Baseline of API Calls per User ARN] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -action.escu.search_type = support -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Baseline of API Calls per User ARN -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and the standard deviation of the number of API calls made by each user. Also recorded is the number of data points for each user. This table is then outputted to a lookup file to allow the detection search to operate quickly. -action.escu.creation_date = 2018-04-09 -action.escu.modification_date = 2018-04-09 -action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS User Monitoring"] -action.escu.data_models = [] -cron_schedule = 10 0 * * * -enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -schedule_window = auto -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and the standard deviation of the number of API calls made by each user. Also recorded is the number of data points for each user. This table is then outputted to a lookup file to allow the detection search to operate quickly. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. -disabled = true -is_visible = false -search = `cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as apiCalls by _time, arn | stats count(apiCalls) as numDataPoints, latest(apiCalls) as latestCount, avg(apiCalls) as avgApiCalls, stdev(apiCalls) as stdevApiCalls by arn | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup api_call_by_user_baseline | stats count - [ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -37355,9 +36778,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2019-05-08 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-05-08 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Ransomware", "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "Unusual Processes"] action.escu.data_models = [] -cron_schedule = 10 0 * * * +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m schedule_window = auto action.escu.providing_technologies = [] @@ -37375,11 +36798,11 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK description = This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model to characterize the length of the DNS queries for each DNS record type observed in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 30 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which uses it to identify outliers in the length of the DNS query. action.escu.creation_date = 2019-05-08 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-05-08 -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Command and Control", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Suspicious DNS Traffic"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Command \u0026 Control", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Suspicious DNS Traffic"] action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Resolution"] -cron_schedule = 10 0 * * * +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m schedule_window = auto action.escu.providing_technologies = [] @@ -37389,54 +36812,6 @@ disabled = true is_visible = false search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query DNS.record_type | search DNS.record_type=* | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` | eval query_length = len(query) | fit DensityFunction query_length by record_type into dns_query_pdfmodel -[ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -action.escu.search_type = support -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many RunInstances users do in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of RunInstances performed by a user in a small time window. -action.escu.creation_date = 2019-11-14 -action.escu.modification_date = 2019-11-14 -action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cryptomining", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"] -action.escu.data_models = [] -cron_schedule = 10 0 * * * -enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -schedule_window = auto -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many RunInstances users do in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of RunInstances performed by a user in a small time window. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.\ -In addition, you must have the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version >= 4.2 installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users in your environment, you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 30 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data.\ -More information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`. -disabled = true -is_visible = false -search = `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success `ec2_excessive_runinstances_mltk_input_filter` | bucket span=10m _time | stats count as instances_launched by _time src_user | fit DensityFunction instances_launched threshold=0.0005 into ec2_excessive_runinstances_v1 - -[ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -action.escu.search_type = support -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many TerminateInstances users do in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of TerminateInstances performed by a user in a small time window. -action.escu.creation_date = 2019-11-14 -action.escu.modification_date = 2019-11-14 -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"] -action.escu.data_models = [] -cron_schedule = 10 0 * * * -enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -schedule_window = auto -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many TerminateInstances users do in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of TerminateInstances performed by a user in a small time window. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.\ -In addition, you must have the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version >= 4.2 installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users in your environment, you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 30 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data.\ -More information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`. -disabled = true -is_visible = false -search = `cloudtrail` eventName=TerminateInstances errorCode=success `ec2_excessive_terminateinstances_mltk_input_filter` | bucket span=10m _time | stats count as instances_terminated by _time src_user | fit DensityFunction instances_terminated threshold=0.0005 into ec2_excessive_terminateinstances_v1 - [ESCU - Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -37447,9 +36822,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2018-05-21 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-05-21 action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Network ACL Activity"] action.escu.data_models = [] -cron_schedule = 10 0 * * * +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m schedule_window = auto action.escu.providing_technologies = [] @@ -37469,9 +36844,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2018-07-17 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-07-17 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"] action.escu.data_models = [] -cron_schedule = 10 0 * * * +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m schedule_window = auto action.escu.providing_technologies = [] @@ -37481,28 +36856,6 @@ disabled = true is_visible = false search = `cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteBucket | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as apiCalls by _time, arn | stats count(apiCalls) as numDataPoints, latest(apiCalls) as latestCount, avg(apiCalls) as avgApiCalls, stdev(apiCalls) as stdevApiCalls by arn | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup s3_deletion_baseline | stats count -[ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -action.escu.search_type = support -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK -description = This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model to characterize the number of SMB connections observed each hour for every day of week. By default, the search uses the last 30 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search to identify outliers in the number of SMB connections for that hour and day of the week. -action.escu.creation_date = 2019-05-08 -action.escu.modification_date = 2019-05-08 -action.escu.analytic_story = ["DHS Report TA18-074A", "Disabling Security Tools", "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Netsh Abuse", "Ransomware"] -action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Traffic"] -cron_schedule = 10 0 * * * -enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -schedule_window = auto -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model to characterize the number of SMB connections observed each hour for every day of week. By default, the search uses the last 30 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search to identify outliers in the number of SMB connections for that hour and day of the week. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model. In addition, you must have the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version >= 4.2 installed, along with any required dependencies. To improve your results, you may consider adding "src" to the by clause, which will build the model for each unique source in your enviornment. However, if you have a large number of hosts in your environment, this search may be very resource intensive. In this case, you may need to raise the value of max_inputs and/or max_groups in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 30 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data. More information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`. -disabled = true -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb by _time span=10m, All_Traffic.src | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%A") | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | fit DensityFunction count by "HourOfDay,DayOfWeek" into smb_pdfmodel - [ESCU - Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -37513,9 +36866,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2018-04-17 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-04-17 action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS User Monitoring"] action.escu.data_models = [] -cron_schedule = 10 0 * * * +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m schedule_window = auto action.escu.providing_technologies = [] @@ -37525,49 +36878,27 @@ disabled = true is_visible = false search = `cloudtrail` `security_group_api_calls` | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as apiCalls by _time, arn | stats count(apiCalls) as numDataPoints, latest(apiCalls) as latestCount, avg(apiCalls) as avgApiCalls, stdev(apiCalls) as stdevApiCalls by arn | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup security_group_activity_baseline | stats count -[ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS] +[ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = support -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS -description = This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and the standard deviation of the number of outbound connections blocked in your VPC flow logs by each source IP address (IP address of your EC2 instances). Also recorded is the number of data points for each source IP. This table outputs to a lookup file to allow the detection search to operate quickly. -action.escu.creation_date = 2018-05-07 -action.escu.modification_date = 2018-05-07 -action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Network ACL Activity", "Command and Control", "Suspicious AWS Traffic"] -action.escu.data_models = [] -cron_schedule = 10 0 * * * -enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -schedule_window = auto -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and the standard deviation of the number of outbound connections blocked in your VPC flow logs by each source IP address (IP address of your EC2 instances). Also recorded is the number of data points for each source IP. This table outputs to a lookup file to allow the detection search to operate quickly. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your `VPC flow logs.`. -disabled = true -is_visible = false -search = `cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow` action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR src_ip=192.168.0.0/16) ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16) | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as numberOfBlockedConnections by _time, src_ip | stats count(numberOfBlockedConnections) as numDataPoints, latest(numberOfBlockedConnections) as latestCount, avg(numberOfBlockedConnections) as avgBlockedConnections, stdev(numberOfBlockedConnections) as stdevBlockedConnections by src_ip | table src_ip, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgBlockedConnections, stdevBlockedConnections | outputlookup baseline_blocked_outbound_connections | stats count - -[ESCU - Count of Unique IPs Connecting to Ports] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -action.escu.search_type = support -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Count of Unique IPs Connecting to Ports -description = The search counts the number of times a connection was observed to each destination port, and the number of unique source IPs connecting to them. -action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-13 -action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-13 -action.escu.analytic_story = [] +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK +description = This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model to characterize the number of SMB connections observed each hour for every day of week. By default, the search uses the last 30 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search to identify outliers in the number of SMB connections for that hour and day of the week. +action.escu.creation_date = 2019-05-08 +action.escu.modification_date = 2019-05-08 +action.escu.analytic_story = ["DHS Report TA18-074A", "Disabling Security Tools", "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Netsh Abuse", "Ransomware"] action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Traffic"] -cron_schedule = 10 0 * * * +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m schedule_window = auto action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.eli5 = The search counts the number of times a connection was observed to each destination port, and the number of unique source IPs connecting to them. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting network traffic, and populating the Network_Traffic data model. +action.escu.eli5 = This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model to characterize the number of SMB connections observed each hour for every day of week. By default, the search uses the last 30 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search to identify outliers in the number of SMB connections for that hour and day of the week. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model. In addition, you must have the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version >= 4.2 installed, along with any required dependencies. To improve your results, you may consider adding "src" to the by clause, which will build the model for each unique source in your enviornment. However, if you have a large number of hosts in your environment, this search may be very resource intensive. In this case, you may need to raise the value of max_inputs and/or max_groups in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 30 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data. More information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`. disabled = true is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count dc(All_Traffic.src) as numberOfUniqueHosts from datamodel=Network_Traffic by All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | sort - count +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb by _time span=10m, All_Traffic.src | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%A") | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | fit DensityFunction count by "HourOfDay,DayOfWeek" into smb_pdfmodel [ESCU - Count of assets by category] action.escu = 0 @@ -37579,9 +36910,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-13 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-13 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Asset Tracking"] action.escu.data_models = [] -cron_schedule = 10 0 * * * +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m schedule_window = auto action.escu.providing_technologies = [] @@ -37591,6 +36922,28 @@ disabled = true is_visible = false search = | from datamodel Identity_Management.All_Assets | stats count values(nt_host) by category | sort -count +[ESCU - Count of Unique IPs Connecting to Ports] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +action.escu.search_type = support +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Count of Unique IPs Connecting to Ports +description = The search counts the number of times a connection was observed to each destination port, and the number of unique source IPs connecting to them. +action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-13 +action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-13 +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Ransomware", "Command \u0026 Control"] +action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Traffic"] +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +enableSched = 1 +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +schedule_window = auto +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The search counts the number of times a connection was observed to each destination port, and the number of unique source IPs connecting to them. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting network traffic, and populating the Network_Traffic data model. +disabled = true +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count dc(All_Traffic.src) as numberOfUniqueHosts from datamodel=Network_Traffic by All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | sort - count + [ESCU - Create a list of approved AWS service accounts] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -37601,9 +36954,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2018-12-03 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-12-03 action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS User Monitoring"] action.escu.data_models = [] -cron_schedule = 10 0 * * * +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m schedule_window = auto action.escu.providing_technologies = [] @@ -37613,27 +36966,251 @@ disabled = true is_visible = false search = `cloudtrail` errorCode=success | rename userName as identity | search NOT [inputlookup identity_lookup_expanded | fields identity] | stats count by identity | table identity | outputlookup aws_service_accounts | stats count -[ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names] +[ESCU - Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = support -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names -description = This search creates permutations of your existing domains, removes the valid domain names and stores them in a specified lookup file so they can be checked for in the associated detection searches. -action.escu.creation_date = 2018-10-08 -action.escu.modification_date = 2018-10-08 -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Brand Monitoring", "Suspicious Emails"] +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security +description = This search takes the existing interesting process table from ES, filters out any existing additions added by ESCU and then updates the table with processes identified by ESCU that should be prohibited on your endpoints. +action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-15 +action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-15 +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", "SamSam Ransomware"] action.escu.data_models = [] -cron_schedule = 10 0 * * * +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m schedule_window = auto action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search creates permutations of your existing domains, removes the valid domain names and stores them in a specified lookup file so they can be checked for in the associated detection searches. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to update the file called domains.csv in the DA-ESS-SOC/lookup directory. Or `cim_corporate_email_domains.csv` and `cim_corporate_web_domains.csv` from **Splunk\_SA\_CIM**. +action.escu.eli5 = This search takes the existing interesting process table from ES, filters out any existing additions added by ESCU and then updates the table with processes identified by ESCU that should be prohibited on your endpoints. +action.escu.how_to_implement = This search should be run on each new install of ESCU. disabled = true is_visible = false -search = | dnstwist domainlist=domains.csv | `remove_valid_domains` | eval domain_abuse="true" | table domain, domain_abuse | outputlookup brandMonitoring_lookup | stats count +search = | inputlookup prohibited_processes | search note!=ESCU* | inputlookup append=T prohibited_processes | fillnull value=* dest dest_pci_domain | fillnull value=false is_required is_secure | fillnull value=true is_prohibited | outputlookup prohibited_processes | stats count + +[ESCU - Baseline of API Calls per User ARN] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +action.escu.search_type = support +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Baseline of API Calls per User ARN +description = This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and the standard deviation of the number of API calls made by each user. Also recorded is the number of data points for each user. This table is then outputted to a lookup file to allow the detection search to operate quickly. +action.escu.creation_date = 2018-04-09 +action.escu.modification_date = 2018-04-09 +action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS User Monitoring"] +action.escu.data_models = [] +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +enableSched = 1 +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +schedule_window = auto +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and the standard deviation of the number of API calls made by each user. Also recorded is the number of data points for each user. This table is then outputted to a lookup file to allow the detection search to operate quickly. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. +disabled = true +is_visible = false +search = `cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as apiCalls by _time, arn | stats count(apiCalls) as numDataPoints, latest(apiCalls) as latestCount, avg(apiCalls) as avgApiCalls, stdev(apiCalls) as stdevApiCalls by arn | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup api_call_by_user_baseline | stats count + +[ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +action.escu.search_type = support +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK +description = This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many RunInstances users do in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of RunInstances performed by a user in a small time window. +action.escu.creation_date = 2019-11-14 +action.escu.modification_date = 2019-11-14 +action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cryptomining", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"] +action.escu.data_models = [] +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +enableSched = 1 +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +schedule_window = auto +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many RunInstances users do in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of RunInstances performed by a user in a small time window. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.\ +In addition, you must have the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version >= 4.2 installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users in your environment, you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 30 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data.\ +More information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`. +disabled = true +is_visible = false +search = `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success `ec2_excessive_runinstances_mltk_input_filter` | bucket span=10m _time | stats count as instances_launched by _time src_user | fit DensityFunction instances_launched threshold=0.0005 into ec2_excessive_runinstances_v1 + +[ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +action.escu.search_type = support +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK +description = This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many TerminateInstances users do in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of TerminateInstances performed by a user in a small time window. +action.escu.creation_date = 2019-11-14 +action.escu.modification_date = 2019-11-14 +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"] +action.escu.data_models = [] +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +enableSched = 1 +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +schedule_window = auto +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many TerminateInstances users do in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of TerminateInstances performed by a user in a small time window. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.\ +In addition, you must have the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version >= 4.2 installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users in your environment, you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 30 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data.\ +More information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`. +disabled = true +is_visible = false +search = `cloudtrail` eventName=TerminateInstances errorCode=success `ec2_excessive_terminateinstances_mltk_input_filter` | bucket span=10m _time | stats count as instances_terminated by _time src_user | fit DensityFunction instances_terminated threshold=0.0005 into ec2_excessive_terminateinstances_v1 + +[ESCU - Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +action.escu.search_type = support +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail +description = This search looks for successful API calls made by different user roles, then creates a baseline of the earliest and latest times we have encountered this user role. It also returns the name of the API call in our dataset--grouped by user role and name of the API call--that occurred within the last 30 days. In this support search, we are only looking for events where the user identity is Assumed Role. +action.escu.creation_date = 2018-04-16 +action.escu.modification_date = 2018-04-16 +action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS User Monitoring"] +action.escu.data_models = [] +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +enableSched = 1 +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +schedule_window = auto +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for successful API calls made by different user roles, then creates a baseline of the earliest and latest times we have encountered this user role. It also returns the name of the API call in our dataset--grouped by user role and name of the API call--that occurred within the last 30 days. In this support search, we are only looking for events where the user identity is Assumed Role. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Please validate the user role entries in `previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles.csv`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search. +disabled = true +is_visible = false +search = `cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall errorCode=success userIdentity.type=AssumedRole | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by userName eventName | outputlookup previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles | stats count + +[ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +action.escu.search_type = support +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources +description = This search builds a table of the first and last times seen for every IP address (along with its physical location) previously associated with cloud-provisioning activity. This is broadly defined as any event that runs or creates something. +action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-16 +action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-16 +action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities"] +action.escu.data_models = [] +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +enableSched = 1 +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +schedule_window = auto +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search builds a table of the first and last times seen for every IP address (along with its physical location) previously associated with cloud-provisioning activity. This is broadly defined as any event that runs or creates something. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. +disabled = true +is_visible = false +search = `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats count + +[ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 AMIs] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +action.escu.search_type = support +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 AMIs +description = This search builds a table of previously seen AMIs used to launch EC2 instances +action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-12 +action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-12 +action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cryptomining"] +action.escu.data_models = [] +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +enableSched = 1 +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +schedule_window = auto +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search builds a table of previously seen AMIs used to launch EC2 instances +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. +disabled = true +is_visible = false +search = `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | rename requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId as amiID | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by amiID | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_amis.csv | stats count + +[ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +action.escu.search_type = support +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types +description = This search builds a table of previously seen EC2 instance types +action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-08 +action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-08 +action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cryptomining"] +action.escu.data_models = [] +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +enableSched = 1 +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +schedule_window = auto +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search builds a table of previously seen EC2 instance types +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. +disabled = true +is_visible = false +search = `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | rename requestParameters.instanceType as instanceType | fillnull value="m1.small" instanceType | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by instanceType | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.csv | stats count + +[ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +action.escu.search_type = support +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User +description = This search builds a table of previously seen ARNs that have launched a EC2 instance. +action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-15 +action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-15 +action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cryptomining", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"] +action.escu.data_models = [] +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +enableSched = 1 +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +schedule_window = auto +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search builds a table of previously seen ARNs that have launched a EC2 instance. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. +disabled = true +is_visible = false +search = `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | rename userIdentity.arn as arn | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by arn | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.csv | stats count + +[ESCU - Previously seen users in CloudTrail] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +action.escu.search_type = support +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously seen users in CloudTrail +description = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then creates a baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last 30 days. NOTE - This baseline search is deprecated and has been updated to use the Authentication Datamodel +action.escu.creation_date = 2018-04-30 +action.escu.modification_date = 2018-04-30 +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities"] +action.escu.data_models = [] +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +enableSched = 1 +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +schedule_window = auto +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then creates a baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last 30 days. NOTE - This baseline search is deprecated and has been updated to use the Authentication Datamodel +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Please validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search. +disabled = true +is_visible = false +search = `cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | iplocation src | eval City=if(City LIKE "",src,City),Region=if(Region LIKE "",src,Region) | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail | stats count + +[ESCU - Update previously seen users in CloudTrail] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +action.escu.search_type = support +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Update previously seen users in CloudTrail +description = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last hour. NOTE - This baseline search is deprecated and has been updated to use the Authentication Datamodel +action.escu.creation_date = 2018-04-30 +action.escu.modification_date = 2018-04-30 +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities"] +action.escu.data_models = [] +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +enableSched = 1 +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +schedule_window = auto +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last hour. NOTE - This baseline search is deprecated and has been updated to use the Authentication Datamodel +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Please validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search. +disabled = true +is_visible = false +search = `cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | iplocation src | eval City=if(City LIKE "",src,City),Region=if(Region LIKE "",src,Region) | stats earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime by user src City Region Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail [ESCU - Discover DNS records] action.escu = 0 @@ -37645,9 +37222,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2019-02-14 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-02-14 action.escu.analytic_story = ["DNS Hijacking"] action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Resolution"] -cron_schedule = 10 0 * * * +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m schedule_window = auto action.escu.providing_technologies = [] @@ -37657,6 +37234,28 @@ disabled = true is_visible = false search = | inputlookup cim_corporate_email_domains.csv | inputlookup append=T cim_corporate_web_domains.csv | inputlookup append=T cim_cloud_domains.csv | eval domain = trim(replace(domain, "\*", "")) | join domain [|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.record_type) as type, values(DNS.answer) as answer from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.message_type=RESPONSE DNS.answer!="unknown" DNS.answer!="" by DNS.query | rename DNS.query as query | where query!="unknown" | rex field=query "(?\w+\.\w+?)(?:$|/)"] | makemv delim=" " answer | makemv delim=" " type | sort -count | table count,domain,type,query,answer | outputlookup createinapp=true discovered_dns_records +[ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +action.escu.search_type = support +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names +description = This search creates permutations of your existing domains, removes the valid domain names and stores them in a specified lookup file so they can be checked for in the associated detection searches. +action.escu.creation_date = 2018-10-08 +action.escu.modification_date = 2018-10-08 +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Brand Monitoring", "Suspicious Emails"] +action.escu.data_models = [] +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +enableSched = 1 +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +schedule_window = auto +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search creates permutations of your existing domains, removes the valid domain names and stores them in a specified lookup file so they can be checked for in the associated detection searches. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to update the file called domains.csv in the DA-ESS-SOC/lookup directory. Or `cim_corporate_email_domains.csv` and `cim_corporate_web_domains.csv` from **Splunk\_SA\_CIM**. +disabled = true +is_visible = false +search = | dnstwist domainlist=domains.csv | `remove_valid_domains` | eval domain_abuse="true" | table domain, domain_abuse | outputlookup brandMonitoring_lookup | stats count + [ESCU - Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -37665,11 +37264,11 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop T description = This search counts the numbers of times the system has generated remote desktop traffic. action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-15 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-15 -action.escu.analytic_story = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"] action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Traffic"] -cron_schedule = 10 0 * * * +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m schedule_window = auto action.escu.providing_technologies = [] @@ -37687,11 +37286,11 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop description = This search counts the numbers of times the system has created remote desktop traffic action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-15 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-15 -action.escu.analytic_story = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"] action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Traffic"] -cron_schedule = 10 0 * * * +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m schedule_window = auto action.escu.providing_technologies = [] @@ -37709,11 +37308,11 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop description = This search counts the numbers of times the remote desktop process, mstsc.exe, has run on each system. action.escu.creation_date = 2019-04-01 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-04-01 -action.escu.analytic_story = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"] action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -cron_schedule = 10 0 * * * +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m schedule_window = auto action.escu.providing_technologies = [] @@ -37733,9 +37332,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-12 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-12 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Monitor Backup Solution"] action.escu.data_models = [] -cron_schedule = 10 0 * * * +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m schedule_window = auto action.escu.providing_technologies = [] @@ -37755,9 +37354,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-12 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-12 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Monitor Backup Solution"] action.escu.data_models = [] -cron_schedule = 10 0 * * * +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m schedule_window = auto action.escu.providing_technologies = [] @@ -37777,9 +37376,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2018-06-04 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-06-04 action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cross Account Activity"] action.escu.data_models = [] -cron_schedule = 10 0 * * * +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m schedule_window = auto action.escu.providing_technologies = [] @@ -37799,10 +37398,10 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2020-08-15 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-15 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"] action.escu.data_models = ["Authentication"] -cron_schedule = 0 1 1 1,4,7,10 * +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -90d@d -dispatch.latest_time = -1d@d +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m schedule_window = auto action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for **AssumeRole** events where the requesting account differs from the requested account, then writes these relationships to a lookup file. @@ -37821,9 +37420,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2020-08-15 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-15 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"] action.escu.data_models = ["Authentication"] -cron_schedule = 10 0 * * * +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m schedule_window = auto action.escu.providing_technologies = [] @@ -37833,28 +37432,6 @@ disabled = true is_visible = false search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=AssumeRole by Authentication.vendor_account Authentication.user Authentication.src Authentication.user_role | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | rex field=user_role "arn:aws:sts:*:(?.*):" | where vendor_account != dest_account | rename vendor_account as requestingAccountId dest_account as requestedAccountId | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by requestingAccountId requestedAccountId | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity -[ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -action.escu.search_type = support -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search builds a table of the first and last times seen for every IP address (along with its physical location) previously associated with cloud-provisioning activity. This is broadly defined as any event that runs or creates something. -action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-16 -action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-16 -action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities"] -action.escu.data_models = [] -cron_schedule = 10 0 * * * -enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -schedule_window = auto -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search builds a table of the first and last times seen for every IP address (along with its physical location) previously associated with cloud-provisioning activity. This is broadly defined as any event that runs or creates something. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. -disabled = true -is_visible = false -search = `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats count - [ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -37865,9 +37442,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2018-01-08 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-01-08 action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cryptomining", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"] action.escu.data_models = [] -cron_schedule = 10 0 * * * +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m schedule_window = auto action.escu.providing_technologies = [] @@ -37887,10 +37464,10 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2020-09-03 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-03 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud User Activities"] action.escu.data_models = ["Change"] -cron_schedule = 0 1 1 1,4,7,10 * +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -90d@d -dispatch.latest_time = -1d@d +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m schedule_window = auto action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.eli5 = This search builds a table of the first and last times seen for every user role and command combination. This is broadly defined as any event that runs or creates something. This table is then cached. @@ -37909,9 +37486,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2020-09-03 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-03 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud User Activities"] action.escu.data_models = ["Change"] -cron_schedule = 10 0 * * * +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m schedule_window = auto action.escu.providing_technologies = [] @@ -37931,7 +37508,7 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2020-08-15 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-15 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Cloud Cryptomining"] action.escu.data_models = ["Change"] -cron_schedule = 55 * * * * +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * enableSched = 1 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m @@ -37953,9 +37530,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2020-08-15 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-15 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Cloud Cryptomining"] action.escu.data_models = ["Change"] -cron_schedule = 10 0 * * * +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m schedule_window = auto action.escu.providing_technologies = [] @@ -37975,10 +37552,10 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2020-10-08 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-08 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Cloud Cryptomining"] action.escu.data_models = ["Change"] -cron_schedule = 0 1 1 1,4,7,10 * +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -90d@d -dispatch.latest_time = -1d@d +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m schedule_window = auto action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.eli5 = This search builds a table of previously seen images used to launch cloud compute instances @@ -37997,9 +37574,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2020-08-12 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-12 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Cloud Cryptomining"] action.escu.data_models = ["Change"] -cron_schedule = 10 0 * * * +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m schedule_window = auto action.escu.providing_technologies = [] @@ -38019,10 +37596,10 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2020-9-03 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-9-03 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Cloud Cryptomining"] action.escu.data_models = ["Change"] -cron_schedule = 0 1 1 1,4,7,10 * +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -90d@d -dispatch.latest_time = -1d@d +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m schedule_window = auto action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.eli5 = This search builds a table of previously seen cloud compute instance types @@ -38041,9 +37618,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2020-9-03 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-9-03 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Cloud Cryptomining"] action.escu.data_models = ["Change"] -cron_schedule = 10 0 * * * +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m schedule_window = auto action.escu.providing_technologies = [] @@ -38063,10 +37640,10 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-29 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-29 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities"] action.escu.data_models = ["Change"] -cron_schedule = 0 1 1 1,4,7,10 * +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -90d@d -dispatch.latest_time = -1d@d +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m schedule_window = auto action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.eli5 = This search builds a table of previously seen users that have modified a cloud instance. @@ -38085,9 +37662,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-29 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-29 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities"] action.escu.data_models = ["Change"] -cron_schedule = 10 0 * * * +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m schedule_window = auto action.escu.providing_technologies = [] @@ -38107,10 +37684,10 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2020-08-19 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-19 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities"] action.escu.data_models = ["Change"] -cron_schedule = 0 1 1 1,4,7,10 * +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -90d@d -dispatch.latest_time = -1d@d +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m schedule_window = auto action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.eli5 = This search builds a table of the first and last times seen for every IP address (along with its physical location) previously associated with cloud-provisioning activity. This is broadly defined as any event that runs or creates something. This table is then cached. @@ -38129,9 +37706,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2020-08-20 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-20 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities"] action.escu.data_models = ["Change"] -cron_schedule = 10 0 * * * +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m schedule_window = auto action.escu.providing_technologies = [] @@ -38151,10 +37728,10 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2020-09-02 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-02 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Cloud Cryptomining"] action.escu.data_models = ["Change"] -cron_schedule = 0 1 1 1,4,7,10 * +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -90d@d -dispatch.latest_time = -1d@d +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m schedule_window = auto action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for cloud compute events where a compute instance is started and creates a baseline of most recent time, `lastTime` and the first time `firstTime` we've seen this region in our dataset grouped by the region for the last 30 days @@ -38173,9 +37750,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2020-09-02 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-02 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Cloud Cryptomining"] action.escu.data_models = ["Change"] -cron_schedule = 10 0 * * * +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m schedule_window = auto action.escu.providing_technologies = [] @@ -38185,71 +37762,27 @@ disabled = true is_visible = false search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.vendor_region | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cloud_regions | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by vendor_region | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_region_forget_window`) | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-14d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_regions | stats count -[ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 AMIs] +[ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = support -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 AMIs -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search builds a table of previously seen AMIs used to launch EC2 instances -action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-12 -action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-12 -action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cryptomining"] -action.escu.data_models = [] -cron_schedule = 10 0 * * * +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments +description = This search looks for command-line arguments where `cmd.exe /c` is used to execute a program, then creates a baseline of the earliest and latest times we have encountered this command-line argument in our dataset within the last 30 days. +action.escu.creation_date = 2019-03-01 +action.escu.modification_date = 2019-03-01 +action.escu.analytic_story = ["DHS Report TA18-074A", "Disabling Security Tools", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Netsh Abuse", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "IcedID"] +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m schedule_window = auto action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search builds a table of previously seen AMIs used to launch EC2 instances -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for command-line arguments where `cmd.exe /c` is used to execute a program, then creates a baseline of the earliest and latest times we have encountered this command-line argument in our dataset within the last 30 days. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The complete process name with command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. disabled = true is_visible = false -search = `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | rename requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId as amiID | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by amiID | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_amis.csv | stats count - -[ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -action.escu.search_type = support -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search builds a table of previously seen EC2 instance types -action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-08 -action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-08 -action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cryptomining"] -action.escu.data_models = [] -cron_schedule = 10 0 * * * -enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -schedule_window = auto -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search builds a table of previously seen EC2 instance types -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. -disabled = true -is_visible = false -search = `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | rename requestParameters.instanceType as instanceType | fillnull value="m1.small" instanceType | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by instanceType | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.csv | stats count - -[ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -action.escu.search_type = support -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search builds a table of previously seen ARNs that have launched a EC2 instance. -action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-15 -action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-15 -action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cryptomining", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"] -action.escu.data_models = [] -cron_schedule = 10 0 * * * -enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -schedule_window = auto -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search builds a table of previously seen ARNs that have launched a EC2 instance. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. -disabled = true -is_visible = false -search = `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | rename userIdentity.arn as arn | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by arn | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.csv | stats count +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process="* /c *" by Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` [ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Modifications By User] action.escu = 0 @@ -38261,9 +37794,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2018-04-05 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-04-05 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications"] action.escu.data_models = [] -cron_schedule = 10 0 * * * +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m schedule_window = auto action.escu.providing_technologies = [] @@ -38283,10 +37816,10 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2020-06-23 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-06-23 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Orangeworm Attack Group", "Windows Service Abuse", "NOBELIUM Group"] action.escu.data_models = [] -cron_schedule = 0 1 1 1,4,7,10 * +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -90d@d -dispatch.latest_time = -1d@d +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m schedule_window = auto action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.eli5 = This collects the services that have been started across your entire enterprise. @@ -38305,7 +37838,7 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2020-06-23 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-06-23 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Orangeworm Attack Group", "Windows Service Abuse", "NOBELIUM Group"] action.escu.data_models = [] -cron_schedule = 55 * * * * +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * enableSched = 1 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m @@ -38317,27 +37850,27 @@ disabled = true is_visible = false search = `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rex field=Message "The (?[-\(\)\s\w]+) service entered the (?\w+) state" | where state="running" | stats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen by service | inputlookup previously_seen_running_windows_services append=t | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen, max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by service | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), "`previously_seen_windows_service_forget_window`") | outputlookup previously_seen_running_windows_services -[ESCU - Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update] +[ESCU - Previously seen S3 bucket access by remote IP] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = support -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update -description = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by user, within the last hour. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-05-28 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-28 -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"] -action.escu.data_models = ["Authentication"] -cron_schedule = 10 0 * * * +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously seen S3 bucket access by remote IP +description = This search looks for successful access to S3 buckets from remote IP addresses, then creates a baseline of the earliest and latest times we have encountered this remote IP within the last 30 days. In this support search, we are only looking for S3 access events where the HTTP response code from AWS is "200" +action.escu.creation_date = 2018-06-28 +action.escu.modification_date = 2018-06-28 +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"] +action.escu.data_models = [] +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m schedule_window = auto action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by user, within the last hour. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`, which is a lookup file created by this support search. +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for successful access to S3 buckets from remote IP addresses, then creates a baseline of the earliest and latest times we have encountered this remote IP within the last 30 days. In this support search, we are only looking for S3 access events where the HTTP response code from AWS is "200" +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your S3 access-logs inputs. You must validate the remote IP and bucket name entries in `previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip.csv`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search. disabled = true is_visible = false -search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | rename Authentication.user as user Authentication.src as src | table user src City Region Country firstTime lastTime | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins +search = `aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200 | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by bucket_name remote_ip | outputlookup previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip | stats count [ESCU - Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial] action.escu = 0 @@ -38349,10 +37882,10 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2020-05-28 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-28 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"] action.escu.data_models = ["Authentication"] -cron_schedule = 0 1 1 1,4,7,10 * +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -90d@d -dispatch.latest_time = -1d@d +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m schedule_window = auto action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then creates a baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by username, within the last 30 days. @@ -38361,6 +37894,28 @@ disabled = true is_visible = false search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | rename Authentication.user as user Authentication.src as src | table user src City Region Country firstTime lastTime | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats count +[ESCU - Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +action.escu.search_type = support +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update +description = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by user, within the last hour. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-05-28 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-28 +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"] +action.escu.data_models = ["Authentication"] +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +enableSched = 1 +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +schedule_window = auto +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by user, within the last hour. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`, which is a lookup file created by this support search. +disabled = true +is_visible = false +search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | rename Authentication.user as user Authentication.src as src | table user src City Region Country firstTime lastTime | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins + [ESCU - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -38371,10 +37926,10 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2020-05-20 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-20 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Zoom Child Processes"] action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -cron_schedule = 0 1 1 1,4,7,10 * +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -90d@d -dispatch.latest_time = -1d@d +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m schedule_window = auto action.escu.providing_technologies = [] action.escu.eli5 = This search returns the first and last time a process was seen per endpoint with a parent process of zoom.exe (Windows) or zoom.us (macOS). This table is then cached. @@ -38393,7 +37948,7 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2020-05-20 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-20 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Zoom Child Processes"] action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -cron_schedule = 55 * * * * +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * enableSched = 1 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m @@ -38405,94 +37960,6 @@ disabled = true is_visible = false search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTimeSeen max(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.us) by Processes.process_name Processes.dest| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | table firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, process_name, dest | inputlookup zoom_first_time_child_process append=t | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by process_name, dest | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), "`previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_forget_window`") | outputlookup zoom_first_time_child_process -[ESCU - Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -action.escu.search_type = support -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for successful API calls made by different user roles, then creates a baseline of the earliest and latest times we have encountered this user role. It also returns the name of the API call in our dataset--grouped by user role and name of the API call--that occurred within the last 30 days. In this support search, we are only looking for events where the user identity is Assumed Role. -action.escu.creation_date = 2018-04-16 -action.escu.modification_date = 2018-04-16 -action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS User Monitoring"] -action.escu.data_models = [] -cron_schedule = 10 0 * * * -enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -schedule_window = auto -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for successful API calls made by different user roles, then creates a baseline of the earliest and latest times we have encountered this user role. It also returns the name of the API call in our dataset--grouped by user role and name of the API call--that occurred within the last 30 days. In this support search, we are only looking for events where the user identity is Assumed Role. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Please validate the user role entries in `previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles.csv`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search. -disabled = true -is_visible = false -search = `cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall errorCode=success userIdentity.type=AssumedRole | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by userName eventName | outputlookup previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles | stats count - -[ESCU - Previously seen S3 bucket access by remote IP] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -action.escu.search_type = support -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously seen S3 bucket access by remote IP -description = This search looks for successful access to S3 buckets from remote IP addresses, then creates a baseline of the earliest and latest times we have encountered this remote IP within the last 30 days. In this support search, we are only looking for S3 access events where the HTTP response code from AWS is "200" -action.escu.creation_date = 2018-06-28 -action.escu.modification_date = 2018-06-28 -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"] -action.escu.data_models = [] -cron_schedule = 10 0 * * * -enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -schedule_window = auto -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for successful access to S3 buckets from remote IP addresses, then creates a baseline of the earliest and latest times we have encountered this remote IP within the last 30 days. In this support search, we are only looking for S3 access events where the HTTP response code from AWS is "200" -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your S3 access-logs inputs. You must validate the remote IP and bucket name entries in `previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip.csv`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search. -disabled = true -is_visible = false -search = `aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200 | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by bucket_name remote_ip | outputlookup previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip | stats count - -[ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -action.escu.search_type = support -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments -description = This search looks for command-line arguments where `cmd.exe /c` is used to execute a program, then creates a baseline of the earliest and latest times we have encountered this command-line argument in our dataset within the last 30 days. -action.escu.creation_date = 2019-03-01 -action.escu.modification_date = 2019-03-01 -action.escu.analytic_story = ["DHS Report TA18-074A", "Disabling Security Tools", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Netsh Abuse", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "IcedID"] -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -cron_schedule = 10 0 * * * -enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -schedule_window = auto -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for command-line arguments where `cmd.exe /c` is used to execute a program, then creates a baseline of the earliest and latest times we have encountered this command-line argument in our dataset within the last 30 days. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The complete process name with command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -disabled = true -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process="* /c *" by Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` - -[ESCU - Previously seen users in CloudTrail] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -action.escu.search_type = support -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously seen users in CloudTrail -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then creates a baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last 30 days. NOTE - This baseline search is deprecated and has been updated to use the Authentication Datamodel -action.escu.creation_date = 2018-04-30 -action.escu.modification_date = 2018-04-30 -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities"] -action.escu.data_models = [] -cron_schedule = 10 0 * * * -enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -schedule_window = auto -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then creates a baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last 30 days. NOTE - This baseline search is deprecated and has been updated to use the Authentication Datamodel -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Please validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search. -disabled = true -is_visible = false -search = `cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | iplocation src | eval City=if(City LIKE "",src,City),Region=if(Region LIKE "",src,Region) | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail | stats count - [ESCU - Systems Ready for Spectre-Meltdown Windows Patch] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -38502,10 +37969,10 @@ description = Some AV applications can cause the Spectre/Meltdown patch for Wind action.escu.creation_date = 2018-01-08 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-01-08 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities"] -action.escu.data_models = [] -cron_schedule = 10 0 * * * +action.escu.data_models = ["Change"] +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m schedule_window = auto action.escu.providing_technologies = [] @@ -38515,28 +37982,6 @@ disabled = true is_visible = false search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Change_Analysis.All_Changes where All_Changes.object_category=registry AND (All_Changes.object_path="HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\QualityCompat*") by All_Changes.dest, All_Changes.command, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.object_path | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` -[ESCU - Update previously seen users in CloudTrail] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -action.escu.search_type = support -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Update previously seen users in CloudTrail -description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last hour. NOTE - This baseline search is deprecated and has been updated to use the Authentication Datamodel -action.escu.creation_date = 2018-04-30 -action.escu.modification_date = 2018-04-30 -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities"] -action.escu.data_models = [] -cron_schedule = 10 0 * * * -enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m -dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m -schedule_window = auto -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last hour. NOTE - This baseline search is deprecated and has been updated to use the Authentication Datamodel -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Please validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search. -disabled = true -is_visible = false -search = `cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | iplocation src | eval City=if(City LIKE "",src,City),Region=if(Region LIKE "",src,Region) | stats earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime by user src City Region Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail - [ESCU - Windows Updates Install Failures] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -38545,11 +37990,11 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Updates Install Failures description = This search is intended to give you a feel for how often Windows updates fail to install in your environment. Fluctuations in these numbers will allow you to determine when you should be concerned. action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-14 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-14 -action.escu.analytic_story = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Monitor for Updates"] action.escu.data_models = [] -cron_schedule = 10 0 * * * +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m schedule_window = auto action.escu.providing_technologies = [] @@ -38567,11 +38012,11 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Updates Install Successes description = This search is intended to give you a feel for how often successful Windows updates are applied in your environments. Fluctuations in these numbers will allow you to determine when you should be concerned. action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-14 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-14 -action.escu.analytic_story = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Monitor for Updates"] action.escu.data_models = [] -cron_schedule = 10 0 * * * +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m schedule_window = auto action.escu.providing_technologies = [] @@ -38585,132 +38030,6 @@ search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc(Updates.dest) as count FRO ### ESCU RESPONSE TASKS ### -[ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task -description = This search retrieves the all the alerts created by AWS Security Hub for a specific dest(instance_id). -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-06-08 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-06-08 -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Cloud Compute Instance", "Cloud Cryptomining", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities"] -action.escu.earliest_time_offset = 3600 -action.escu.latest_time_offset = 86400 -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search retrieves the all the alerts created by AWS Security Hub for a specific dest(instance_id). -action.escu.how_to_implement = none -action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time -disabled = true -schedule_window = auto -is_visible = false -search = `aws_securityhub_firehose` "findings{}.Resources{}.Type"=AWSEC2Instance | rex field=findings{}.Resources{}.Id .*instance/(?.*)| rename instance as dest| search dest = $dest$ |rename findings{}.* as * | rename Remediation.Recommendation.Text as Remediation | table dest Title ProductArn Description FirstObservedAt RecordState Remediation - -[ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task -description = This search lists all the logged CloudTrail activities by a specific user ARN and will create a table containing the source of the user, the region of the activity, the name and type of the event, the action taken, and all the user's identity information. -action.escu.creation_date = 2019-04-30 -action.escu.modification_date = 2019-04-30 -action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cryptomining", "AWS Network ACL Activity", "Cloud Cryptomining", "Command and Control", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", "Suspicious AWS Traffic", "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", "Suspicious Cloud User Activities", "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities", "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", "AWS Security Hub Alerts"] -action.escu.earliest_time_offset = 3600 -action.escu.latest_time_offset = 86400 -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search lists all the logged CloudTrail activities by a specific user ARN and will create a table containing the source of the user, the region of the activity, the name and type of the event, the action taken, and all the user's identity information. -action.escu.how_to_implement = none -action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time -disabled = true -schedule_window = auto -is_visible = false -search = `cloudtrail` | search user=$user$| table _time userIdentity.type userIdentity.userName userIdentity.arn aws_account_id src awsRegion eventName eventType - -[ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task -description = This search retrieves the times, ARN, source IPs, AWS regions, event names, and the result of the event for specific credentials. -action.escu.creation_date = 2018-06-08 -action.escu.modification_date = 2018-06-08 -action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cross Account Activity"] -action.escu.earliest_time_offset = 3600 -action.escu.latest_time_offset = 86400 -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search retrieves the times, ARN, source IPs, AWS regions, event names, and the result of the event for specific credentials. -action.escu.how_to_implement = none -action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time -disabled = true -schedule_window = auto -is_visible = false -search = `cloudtrail` | rename userIdentity.accessKeyId as accessKeyId| search accessKeyId=$accessKeyId$ | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode, errorMessage - -[ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task -description = This search queries AWS description logs and returns all the information about a specific network ACL via network ACL ID -action.escu.creation_date = 2017-01-22 -action.escu.modification_date = 2017-01-22 -action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Network ACL Activity", "Command and Control", "Suspicious AWS Traffic"] -action.escu.earliest_time_offset = 3600 -action.escu.latest_time_offset = 86400 -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search queries AWS description logs and returns all the information about a specific network ACL via network ACL ID -action.escu.how_to_implement = none -action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time -disabled = true -schedule_window = auto -is_visible = false -search = `aws_description` | rename id as networkAclId | search networkAclId=$networkAclId$ | table id account_id vpc_id network_acl_entries{}.* - -[ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task -description = This search queries AWS configuration logs and returns the information about a specific network interface via network interface ID. The information will include the ARN of the network interface, its relationships with other AWS resources, the public and the private IP associated with the network interface. -action.escu.creation_date = 2018-05-07 -action.escu.modification_date = 2018-05-07 -action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Network ACL Activity", "Command and Control", "Suspicious AWS Traffic"] -action.escu.earliest_time_offset = 3600 -action.escu.latest_time_offset = 86400 -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search queries AWS configuration logs and returns the information about a specific network interface via network interface ID. The information will include the ARN of the network interface, its relationships with other AWS resources, the public and the private IP associated with the network interface. -action.escu.how_to_implement = none -action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time -disabled = true -schedule_window = auto -is_visible = false -search = `aws_config` resourceId=$resourceId$ | table _time ARN relationships{}.resourceType relationships{}.name relationships{}.resourceId configuration.privateIpAddresses{}.privateIpAddress configuration.privateIpAddresses{}.association.publicIp - -[ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task -description = This search queries AWS configuration logs and returns the information about a specific S3 bucket. The information returned includes the time the S3 bucket was created, the resource ID, the region it belongs to, the value of action performed, AWS account ID, and configuration values of the access-control lists associated with the bucket. -action.escu.creation_date = 2018-06-26 -action.escu.modification_date = 2018-06-26 -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"] -action.escu.earliest_time_offset = 3600 -action.escu.latest_time_offset = 86400 -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search queries AWS configuration logs and returns the information about a specific S3 bucket. The information returned includes the time the S3 bucket was created, the resource ID, the region it belongs to, the value of action performed, AWS account ID, and configuration values of the access-control lists associated with the bucket. -action.escu.how_to_implement = none -action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time -disabled = true -schedule_window = auto -is_visible = false -search = `aws_config` | rename resourceId as bucketName |search bucketName=$bucketName$ | table resourceCreationTime bucketName vendor_region action aws_account_id supplementaryConfiguration.AccessControlList - [ESCU - All backup logs for host - Response Task] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -38753,6 +38072,132 @@ schedule_window = auto is_visible = false search = `aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` |rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip |search src_ip=$src_ip$ | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user.username) values(requestURI) values(verb) values(userAgent) by source annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision src_ip +[ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +action.escu.search_type = investigative +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task +description = This search retrieves the all the alerts created by AWS Security Hub for a specific dest(instance_id). +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-06-08 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-06-08 +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Cloud Compute Instance", "Cloud Cryptomining", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities"] +action.escu.earliest_time_offset = 3600 +action.escu.latest_time_offset = 86400 +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search retrieves the all the alerts created by AWS Security Hub for a specific dest(instance_id). +action.escu.how_to_implement = none +action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time +disabled = true +schedule_window = auto +is_visible = false +search = `aws_securityhub_firehose` "findings{}.Resources{}.Type"=AWSEC2Instance | rex field=findings{}.Resources{}.Id .*instance/(?.*)| rename instance as dest| search dest = $dest$ |rename findings{}.* as * | rename Remediation.Recommendation.Text as Remediation | table dest Title ProductArn Description FirstObservedAt RecordState Remediation + +[ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +action.escu.search_type = investigative +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task +description = This search retrieves the times, ARN, source IPs, AWS regions, event names, and the result of the event for specific credentials. +action.escu.creation_date = 2018-06-08 +action.escu.modification_date = 2018-06-08 +action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cross Account Activity"] +action.escu.earliest_time_offset = 3600 +action.escu.latest_time_offset = 86400 +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search retrieves the times, ARN, source IPs, AWS regions, event names, and the result of the event for specific credentials. +action.escu.how_to_implement = none +action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time +disabled = true +schedule_window = auto +is_visible = false +search = `cloudtrail` | rename userIdentity.accessKeyId as accessKeyId| search accessKeyId=$accessKeyId$ | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode, errorMessage + +[ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +action.escu.search_type = investigative +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task +description = This search lists all the logged CloudTrail activities by a specific user ARN and will create a table containing the source of the user, the region of the activity, the name and type of the event, the action taken, and all the user's identity information. +action.escu.creation_date = 2019-04-30 +action.escu.modification_date = 2019-04-30 +action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cryptomining", "AWS Network ACL Activity", "Cloud Cryptomining", "Command \u0026 Control", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", "Suspicious AWS Traffic", "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", "Suspicious Cloud User Activities", "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities", "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", "AWS Security Hub Alerts"] +action.escu.earliest_time_offset = 3600 +action.escu.latest_time_offset = 86400 +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search lists all the logged CloudTrail activities by a specific user ARN and will create a table containing the source of the user, the region of the activity, the name and type of the event, the action taken, and all the user's identity information. +action.escu.how_to_implement = none +action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time +disabled = true +schedule_window = auto +is_visible = false +search = `cloudtrail` | search user=$user$| table _time userIdentity.type userIdentity.userName userIdentity.arn aws_account_id src awsRegion eventName eventType + +[ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +action.escu.search_type = investigative +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task +description = This search queries AWS description logs and returns all the information about a specific network ACL via network ACL ID +action.escu.creation_date = 2017-01-22 +action.escu.modification_date = 2017-01-22 +action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Network ACL Activity", "Command \u0026 Control", "Suspicious AWS Traffic"] +action.escu.earliest_time_offset = 3600 +action.escu.latest_time_offset = 86400 +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search queries AWS description logs and returns all the information about a specific network ACL via network ACL ID +action.escu.how_to_implement = none +action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time +disabled = true +schedule_window = auto +is_visible = false +search = `aws_description` | rename id as networkAclId | search networkAclId=$networkAclId$ | table id account_id vpc_id network_acl_entries{}.* + +[ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +action.escu.search_type = investigative +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task +description = This search queries AWS configuration logs and returns the information about a specific network interface via network interface ID. The information will include the ARN of the network interface, its relationships with other AWS resources, the public and the private IP associated with the network interface. +action.escu.creation_date = 2018-05-07 +action.escu.modification_date = 2018-05-07 +action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Network ACL Activity", "Command \u0026 Control", "Suspicious AWS Traffic"] +action.escu.earliest_time_offset = 3600 +action.escu.latest_time_offset = 86400 +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search queries AWS configuration logs and returns the information about a specific network interface via network interface ID. The information will include the ARN of the network interface, its relationships with other AWS resources, the public and the private IP associated with the network interface. +action.escu.how_to_implement = none +action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time +disabled = true +schedule_window = auto +is_visible = false +search = `aws_config` resourceId=$resourceId$ | table _time ARN relationships{}.resourceType relationships{}.name relationships{}.resourceId configuration.privateIpAddresses{}.privateIpAddress configuration.privateIpAddresses{}.association.publicIp + +[ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +action.escu.search_type = investigative +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task +description = This search queries AWS configuration logs and returns the information about a specific S3 bucket. The information returned includes the time the S3 bucket was created, the resource ID, the region it belongs to, the value of action performed, AWS account ID, and configuration values of the access-control lists associated with the bucket. +action.escu.creation_date = 2018-06-26 +action.escu.modification_date = 2018-06-26 +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"] +action.escu.earliest_time_offset = 3600 +action.escu.latest_time_offset = 86400 +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search queries AWS configuration logs and returns the information about a specific S3 bucket. The information returned includes the time the S3 bucket was created, the resource ID, the region it belongs to, the value of action performed, AWS account ID, and configuration values of the access-control lists associated with the bucket. +action.escu.how_to_implement = none +action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time +disabled = true +schedule_window = auto +is_visible = false +search = `aws_config` | rename resourceId as bucketName |search bucketName=$bucketName$ | table resourceCreationTime bucketName vendor_region action aws_account_id supplementaryConfiguration.AccessControlList + [ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -38824,7 +38269,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Res description = This search retrieves all the activity from a specific IP address and will create a table containing the time, ARN, username, the type of user, the IP address, the AWS region the activity was in, the API called, and whether or not the API call was successful. action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-19 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-19 -action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Network ACL Activity", "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities", "Command and Control", "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", "Suspicious AWS Traffic", "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Network ACL Activity", "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities", "Command \u0026 Control", "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", "Suspicious AWS Traffic", "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities"] action.escu.earliest_time_offset = 3600 action.escu.latest_time_offset = 86400 action.escu.providing_technologies = [] @@ -38908,7 +38353,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Respon description = While investigating any detections it is important to understand which and how many DNS servers a host has connected to in the past. This search uses data that is tagged as DNS and gives you a count and list of DNS servers that a particular host has connected to the previous 24 hours. action.escu.creation_date = 2017-11-09 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-11-09 -action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Network ACL Activity", "Command and Control", "DNS Hijacking", "Data Protection", "Dynamic DNS", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Host Redirection", "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Suspicious AWS Traffic", "Suspicious DNS Traffic"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Network ACL Activity", "Command \u0026 Control", "DNS Hijacking", "Data Protection", "Dynamic DNS", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Host Redirection", "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Suspicious AWS Traffic", "Suspicious DNS Traffic"] action.escu.earliest_time_offset = 3600 action.escu.latest_time_offset = 86400 action.escu.providing_technologies = [] @@ -38929,7 +38374,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task description = This search calculates the ratio of DNS traffic originating and coming from a host to a list of DNS servers over the last 24 hours. A high value of this ratio could be very useful to quickly understand if a src_ip (host) is sending a high volume of data out via port 53, could be an indicator of data exfiltration via DNS. action.escu.creation_date = 2017-11-09 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-11-09 -action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Network ACL Activity", "Command and Control", "Data Protection", "Dynamic DNS", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Suspicious AWS Traffic", "Suspicious DNS Traffic"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Network ACL Activity", "Command \u0026 Control", "Data Protection", "Dynamic DNS", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Suspicious AWS Traffic", "Suspicious DNS Traffic"] action.escu.earliest_time_offset = 3600 action.escu.latest_time_offset = 86400 action.escu.providing_technologies = [] @@ -39118,7 +38563,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task description = This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation. action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-20 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-20 -action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cross Account Activity", "AWS Cryptomining", "AWS Network ACL Activity", "AWS User Monitoring", "Account Monitoring and Controls", "Apache Struts Vulnerability", "Asset Tracking", "Brand Monitoring", "Cloud Cryptomining", "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", "Collection and Staging", "Command and Control", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "DNS Amplification Attacks", "Data Protection", "Disabling Security Tools", "Dynamic DNS", "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Host Redirection", "JBoss Vulnerability", "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", "Lateral Movement", "Malicious PowerShell", "Monitor Backup Solution", "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", "Monitor for Updates", "Netsh Abuse", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Ransomware", "Router and Infrastructure Security", "SQL Injection", "SamSam Ransomware", "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", "Suspicious AWS Traffic", "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Suspicious Emails", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "Suspicious WMI Use", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", "Unusual Processes", "Use of Cleartext Protocols", "Web Fraud Detection", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", "Windows Log Manipulation", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation", "Windows Service Abuse", "Data Exfiltration", "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", "Detect Zerologon Attack", "GCP Cross Account Activity", "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", "Ransomware Cloud", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cross Account Activity", "AWS Cryptomining", "AWS Network ACL Activity", "AWS User Monitoring", "Account Monitoring and Controls", "Apache Struts Vulnerability", "Asset Tracking", "Brand Monitoring", "Cloud Cryptomining", "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", "Collection and Staging", "Command \u0026 Control", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "DNS Amplification Attacks", "Data Protection", "Disabling Security Tools", "Dynamic DNS", "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Host Redirection", "JBoss Vulnerability", "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", "Lateral Movement", "Malicious PowerShell", "Monitor Backup Solution", "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", "Monitor for Updates", "Netsh Abuse", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Ransomware", "Router and Infrastructure Security", "SQL Injection", "SamSam Ransomware", "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", "Suspicious AWS Traffic", "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Suspicious Emails", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "Suspicious WMI Use", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", "Unusual Processes", "Use of Cleartext Protocols", "Web Fraud Detection", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", "Windows Log Manipulation", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation", "Windows Service Abuse", "Data Exfiltration", "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", "Detect Zerologon Attack", "GCP Cross Account Activity", "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", "Ransomware Cloud", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350"] action.escu.earliest_time_offset = 3600 action.escu.latest_time_offset = 86400 action.escu.providing_technologies = [] @@ -39143,7 +38588,7 @@ action.escu.analytic_story = ["Hidden Cobra Malware"] action.escu.earliest_time_offset = 3600 action.escu.latest_time_offset = 86400 action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.data_models = ["Email"] action.escu.eli5 = This search returns the information of the users that sent emails to the accounts controlled by the Hidden Cobra Threat Actors: specifically to `misswang8107@gmail.com`, and from `redhat@gmail.com`. action.escu.how_to_implement = none action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time @@ -39160,11 +38605,11 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task description = This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest action.escu.creation_date = 2019-02-28 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-02-28 -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Collection and Staging", "Command and Control", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "Disabling Security Tools", "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Lateral Movement", "Malicious PowerShell", "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", "Netsh Abuse", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "Phishing Payloads", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Ransomware", "SamSam Ransomware", "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "Suspicious WMI Use", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Unusual Processes", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", "Windows Log Manipulation", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation", "Windows Service Abuse"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Collection and Staging", "Command \u0026 Control", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "Disabling Security Tools", "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Lateral Movement", "Malicious PowerShell", "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", "Netsh Abuse", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "Phishing Payloads", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Ransomware", "SamSam Ransomware", "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "Suspicious WMI Use", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Unusual Processes", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", "Windows Log Manipulation", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation", "Windows Service Abuse"] action.escu.earliest_time_offset = 3600 action.escu.latest_time_offset = 86400 action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] action.escu.eli5 = This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest action.escu.how_to_implement = none action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time @@ -39202,11 +38647,11 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task description = This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the process running on a host which is under investigation. To gather the process info, enter the values for the process name in question and the destination IP address. action.escu.creation_date = 2019-04-01 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-04-01 -action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Network ACL Activity", "Collection and Staging", "Command and Control", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "Data Protection", "Disabling Security Tools", "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Lateral Movement", "Malicious PowerShell", "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", "Netsh Abuse", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Ransomware", "SamSam Ransomware", "Suspicious AWS Traffic", "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "Suspicious WMI Use", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Unusual Processes", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", "Windows Log Manipulation", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation", "Windows Service Abuse"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Network ACL Activity", "Collection and Staging", "Command \u0026 Control", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "Data Protection", "Disabling Security Tools", "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Lateral Movement", "Malicious PowerShell", "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", "Netsh Abuse", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Ransomware", "SamSam Ransomware", "Suspicious AWS Traffic", "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "Suspicious WMI Use", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Unusual Processes", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", "Windows Log Manipulation", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation", "Windows Service Abuse"] action.escu.earliest_time_offset = 3600 action.escu.latest_time_offset = 86400 action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] action.escu.eli5 = This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the process running on a host which is under investigation. To gather the process info, enter the values for the process name in question and the destination IP address. action.escu.how_to_implement = none action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time @@ -39223,7 +38668,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity description = This search will return information about the process associated with observed network traffic to a specific destination port from a specific host. action.escu.creation_date = 2019-04-01 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-04-01 -action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Network ACL Activity", "Command and Control", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Lateral Movement", "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Ransomware", "SamSam Ransomware", "Suspicious AWS Traffic", "Use of Cleartext Protocols"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Network ACL Activity", "Command \u0026 Control", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Lateral Movement", "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Ransomware", "SamSam Ransomware", "Suspicious AWS Traffic", "Use of Cleartext Protocols"] action.escu.earliest_time_offset = 3600 action.escu.latest_time_offset = 86400 action.escu.providing_technologies = [] @@ -39244,7 +38689,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffi description = While investigating, an analyst will want to know what process and parent_process is responsible for generating suspicious DNS traffic. Use the following search and enter the value of `dest` in the search to get specific details on the process responsible for creating the DNS traffic. action.escu.creation_date = 2019-04-01 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-04-01 -action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Network ACL Activity", "Brand Monitoring", "Command and Control", "Data Protection", "Dynamic DNS", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Suspicious AWS Traffic", "Suspicious DNS Traffic"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Network ACL Activity", "Brand Monitoring", "Command \u0026 Control", "Data Protection", "Dynamic DNS", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Suspicious AWS Traffic", "Suspicious DNS Traffic"] action.escu.earliest_time_offset = 3600 action.escu.latest_time_offset = 86400 action.escu.providing_technologies = [] @@ -39299,27 +38744,6 @@ schedule_window = auto is_visible = false search = `stream_http` session_id = $session_id$ | stats values(url) values(http_user_agent) by src_ip status -[ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task -description = This search lists all the logged CloudTrail activities by a specific user and will create a table containing the source of the user, the region of the activity, the name and type of the event, the action taken, and the user's identity information. -action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-12 -action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-12 -action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS User Monitoring", "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"] -action.escu.earliest_time_offset = 3600 -action.escu.latest_time_offset = 86400 -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search lists all the logged CloudTrail activities by a specific user and will create a table containing the source of the user, the region of the activity, the name and type of the event, the action taken, and the user's identity information. -action.escu.how_to_implement = none -action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time -disabled = true -schedule_window = auto -is_visible = false -search = `cloudtrail` user=$user$ | table _time userIdentity.type userIdentity.userName userIdentity.arn aws_account_id src awsRegion eventName eventType - [ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -39341,6 +38765,27 @@ schedule_window = auto is_visible = false search = `cloudtrail` vendor_region=$vendor_region$| rename requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as instanceId | stats values(eventName) by user instanceId vendor_region +[ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +action.escu.search_type = investigative +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task +description = This search lists all the logged CloudTrail activities by a specific user and will create a table containing the source of the user, the region of the activity, the name and type of the event, the action taken, and the user's identity information. +action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-12 +action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-12 +action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS User Monitoring", "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"] +action.escu.earliest_time_offset = 3600 +action.escu.latest_time_offset = 86400 +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search lists all the logged CloudTrail activities by a specific user and will create a table containing the source of the user, the region of the activity, the name and type of the event, the action taken, and the user's identity information. +action.escu.how_to_implement = none +action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time +disabled = true +schedule_window = auto +is_visible = false +search = `cloudtrail` user=$user$ | table _time userIdentity.type userIdentity.userName userIdentity.arn aws_account_id src awsRegion eventName eventType + [ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -39374,7 +38819,7 @@ action.escu.analytic_story = ["ColdRoot MacOS RAT", "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerabi action.escu.earliest_time_offset = 3600 action.escu.latest_time_offset = 86400 action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Traffic"] action.escu.eli5 = This search allows you to find all the network traffic from a specific IP address. action.escu.how_to_implement = none action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time @@ -39383,27 +38828,6 @@ schedule_window = auto is_visible = false search = | from datamodel Network_Traffic.All_Traffic | search src_ip=$src_ip$ -[ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task -description = This search returns all okta events from a specific IP address. -action.escu.creation_date = 2020-04-02 -action.escu.modification_date = 2020-04-02 -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Okta Activity"] -action.escu.earliest_time_offset = 3600 -action.escu.latest_time_offset = 86400 -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search returns all okta events from a specific IP address. -action.escu.how_to_implement = none -action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time -disabled = true -schedule_window = auto -is_visible = false -search = `okta` src_ip={src_ip} | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | table _time, user, displayMessage, app, src_ip, state, city, result, outcome.reason - [ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -39425,6 +38849,27 @@ schedule_window = auto is_visible = false search = `okta` app=$app$ | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | table _time, user, displayMessage, app, src_ip, state, city, result, outcome.reason +[ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +action.escu.search_type = investigative +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task +description = This search returns all okta events from a specific IP address. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-04-02 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-04-02 +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Okta Activity"] +action.escu.earliest_time_offset = 3600 +action.escu.latest_time_offset = 86400 +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search returns all okta events from a specific IP address. +action.escu.how_to_implement = none +action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time +disabled = true +schedule_window = auto +is_visible = false +search = `okta` src_ip={src_ip} | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | table _time, user, displayMessage, app, src_ip, state, city, result, outcome.reason + [ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 diff --git a/dist/escu/default/transforms.conf b/dist/escu/default/transforms.conf index f6a757ccdb..ad68afc211 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/transforms.conf +++ b/dist/escu/default/transforms.conf @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ ############# # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content -# On Date: 2022-03-03T18:16:54 UTC +# On Date: 2022-03-14T11:11:42 UTC # Author: Splunk Security Research # Contact: research@splunk.com ############# @@ -10,12 +10,17 @@ filename = __mlspl_unusual_commandline_detection.mlmodel default_match = false case_sensitive_match = false # description = An MLTK model for detecting malicious commandlines +match_type = None min_matches = 1 +fields_list = None [api_call_by_user_baseline] -collection = api_call_by_user_baseline -external_type = kvstore +filename = None +default_match = None +case_sensitive_match = None # description = A collection that will contain the baseline information for number of AWS API calls per user +match_type = None +min_matches = None fields_list = arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls [attacker_tools] @@ -25,94 +30,151 @@ case_sensitive_match = false # description = A list of tools used by attackers match_type = WILDCARD(attacker_tool_names) min_matches = 1 +fields_list = None [aws_service_accounts] filename = aws_service_accounts.csv +default_match = None +case_sensitive_match = None # description = A lookup file that will contain AWS Service accounts +match_type = None +min_matches = None +fields_list = None [baseline_blocked_outbound_connections] filename = baseline_blocked_outbound_connections.csv +default_match = None +case_sensitive_match = None # description = A lookup file that will contain the baseline information for number of blocked outbound connections +match_type = None +min_matches = None +fields_list = None [brandMonitoring_lookup] filename = brand_monitoring.csv default_match = false +case_sensitive_match = None # description = A file that contains look-a-like domains for brands that you want to monitor match_type = WILDCARD(domain) min_matches = 1 +fields_list = None [cloud_instances_enough_data] -collection = cloud_instances_enough_data -external_type = kvstore +filename = None default_match = false +case_sensitive_match = None # description = A lookup to determine if you have a sufficient amount of time has passed to collect cloud instance data for behavioral searches match_type = WILDCARD(filter) +min_matches = None fields_list = _key, filter, enough_data [csc_lookup] filename = csc_lookup.csv +default_match = None +case_sensitive_match = None # description = The CSC control numbers and names +match_type = None min_matches = 1 +fields_list = None [discovered_dns_records] filename = discovered_dns_records.csv default_match = false +case_sensitive_match = None # description = A placeholder for a list of discovered DNS records generated by the baseline discover_dns_records +match_type = None min_matches = 1 +fields_list = None [domains] filename = domains.csv +default_match = None +case_sensitive_match = None # description = A list of domains that can be ignored +match_type = None +min_matches = None +fields_list = None [dynamic_dns_providers_default] filename = dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv +default_match = None case_sensitive_match = false # description = A list of dynammic dns providers that should not be modified match_type = WILDCARD(dynamic_dns_domains) +min_matches = None +fields_list = None [dynamic_dns_providers_local] filename = dynamic_dns_providers_local.csv +default_match = None case_sensitive_match = false # description = A list of dynammic dns providers that can be modified match_type = WILDCARD(dynamic_dns_domains) +min_matches = None +fields_list = None [escu_search_id_lookup] filename = escu_search_id.csv +default_match = None +case_sensitive_match = None # description = A placeholder lookup file to hold information for ESCU Usage dashboard +match_type = None +min_matches = None +fields_list = None [images_to_repository] filename = images_to_repository.csv +default_match = None +case_sensitive_match = None # description = Mapping images to repositories +match_type = None +min_matches = None +fields_list = None [is_net_windows_file] filename = is_net_windows_file.csv default_match = false case_sensitive_match = false # description = A full baseline of executable files in \Windows\, including sub-directories from Server 2016 and Windows 11. Certain .net binaries may not have been captured due to different Windows SDK's or developer utilities not installed during baseline. +match_type = None min_matches = 1 +fields_list = None [is_nirsoft_software] filename = is_nirsoft_software.csv default_match = false case_sensitive_match = false # description = A subset of utilities provided by NirSoft that may be used by adversaries. +match_type = None min_matches = 1 +fields_list = None [is_suspicious_file_extension_lookup] filename = is_suspicious_file_extension_lookup.csv +default_match = None +case_sensitive_match = None # description = A list of suspicious extensions for email attachments match_type = WILDCARD(file_name) +min_matches = None +fields_list = None [is_windows_system_file] filename = is_windows_system_file.csv default_match = false case_sensitive_match = false # description = A full baseline of executable files in Windows\System32 and Windows\Syswow64, including sub-directories from Server 2016 and Windows 10. +match_type = None min_matches = 1 +fields_list = None [legit_domains] filename = legit_domains.csv +default_match = None +case_sensitive_match = None # description = A list of legit domains to be used as an ignore list for possible phishing sites +match_type = None +min_matches = None +fields_list = None [linux_tool_discovery_process] filename = linux_tool_discovery_process.csv @@ -121,6 +183,7 @@ case_sensitive_match = false # description = A list of suspicious bash commonly used by attackers via scripts match_type = WILDCARD(process) min_matches = 1 +fields_list = None [local_file_inclusion_paths] filename = local_file_inclusion_paths.csv @@ -129,6 +192,7 @@ case_sensitive_match = false # description = A list of interesting files in a local file inclusion attack match_type = WILDCARD(local_file_inclusion_paths) min_matches = 1 +fields_list = None [lookup_rare_process_allow_list_default] filename = rare_process_allow_list_default.csv @@ -137,6 +201,7 @@ case_sensitive_match = false # description = A list of rare processes that are legitimate that is provided by Splunk match_type = WILDCARD(process) min_matches = 1 +fields_list = None [lookup_rare_process_allow_list_local] filename = rare_process_allow_list_local.csv @@ -145,129 +210,223 @@ case_sensitive_match = false # description = A list of rare processes that are legitimate provided by the end user match_type = WILDCARD(process) min_matches = 1 +fields_list = None [lookup_uncommon_processes_default] filename = uncommon_processes_default.csv +default_match = None case_sensitive_match = false # description = A list of processes that are not common match_type = WILDCARD(process) +min_matches = None +fields_list = None [lookup_uncommon_processes_local] filename = uncommon_processes_local.csv +default_match = None case_sensitive_match = false # description = A list of processes that are not common match_type = WILDCARD(process) +min_matches = None +fields_list = None [mandatory_job_for_workflow] filename = mandatory_job_for_workflow.csv +default_match = None +case_sensitive_match = None # description = A lookup file that will be used to define the mandatory job for workflow +match_type = None +min_matches = None +fields_list = None [mandatory_step_for_job] filename = mandatory_step_for_job.csv +default_match = None +case_sensitive_match = None # description = A lookup file that will be used to define the mandatory step for job +match_type = None +min_matches = None +fields_list = None [network_acl_activity_baseline] filename = network_acl_activity_baseline.csv +default_match = None +case_sensitive_match = None # description = A lookup file that will contain the baseline information for number of AWS Network ACL Activity +match_type = None +min_matches = None +fields_list = None [previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip] filename = previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip.csv +default_match = None +case_sensitive_match = None # description = A placeholder for a list of IPs that have access S3 +match_type = None +min_matches = None +fields_list = None [previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles] filename = previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles.csv +default_match = None +case_sensitive_match = None # description = A placeholder for a list of AWS API calls for each user role +match_type = None +min_matches = None +fields_list = None [previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity] filename = previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.csv +default_match = None +case_sensitive_match = None # description = A placeholder for a list of AWS accounts and assumed roles +match_type = None +min_matches = None +fields_list = None [previously_seen_aws_regions] filename = previously_seen_aws_regions.csv default_match = false +case_sensitive_match = None # description = A place holder for a list of used AWS regions +match_type = None min_matches = 1 +fields_list = None [previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role] -collection = previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role -external_type = kvstore +filename = None +default_match = None +case_sensitive_match = None # description = A table of users, commands, and the first and last time that they have been seen +match_type = None +min_matches = None fields_list = _key, user, command, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data [previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user] -collection = previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user -external_type = kvstore +filename = None +default_match = None +case_sensitive_match = None # description = A table of previously seen users creating cloud instances +match_type = None +min_matches = None fields_list = _key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, user, enough_data [previously_seen_cloud_compute_images] -collection = previously_seen_cloud_compute_images -external_type = kvstore +filename = None +default_match = None +case_sensitive_match = None # description = A table of previously seen Cloud image IDs +match_type = None +min_matches = None fields_list = _key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, image_id, enough_data [previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types] -collection = previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types -external_type = kvstore +filename = None +default_match = None +case_sensitive_match = None # description = A place holder for a list of used cloud compute instance types +match_type = None +min_matches = None fields_list = _key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, instance_type, enough_data [previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user] -collection = previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user -external_type = kvstore +filename = None +default_match = None +case_sensitive_match = None # description = A table of users seen making instance modifications, and the first and last time that the activity was observed +match_type = None +min_matches = None fields_list = _key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, user, enough_data [previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources] -collection = previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources -external_type = kvstore +filename = None +default_match = None +case_sensitive_match = None # description = A table of source IPs, geographic locations, and the first and last time that they have that done cloud provisioning activities +match_type = None +min_matches = None fields_list = _key, src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data [previously_seen_cloud_regions] -collection = previously_seen_cloud_regions -external_type = kvstore +filename = None +default_match = None +case_sensitive_match = None # description = A table of vendor_region values and the first and last time that they have been observed in cloud provisioning activities +match_type = None +min_matches = None fields_list = _key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, vendor_region, enough_data [previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments] filename = previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments.csv +default_match = None +case_sensitive_match = None # description = A placeholder for a list of cmd line arugments that been seen before +match_type = None +min_matches = None +fields_list = None [previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user] filename = previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user.csv +default_match = None +case_sensitive_match = None # description = A place holder for a list of AWS EC2 modifications done by each user +match_type = None +min_matches = None +fields_list = None [previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip] filename = previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip.csv default_match = false +case_sensitive_match = None # description = A place holder for a list of GCP storage access from remote IPs +match_type = None min_matches = 1 +fields_list = None [previously_seen_running_windows_services] -collection = previously_seen_running_windows_services -external_type = kvstore +filename = None +default_match = None +case_sensitive_match = None # description = A placeholder for the list of Windows Services running +match_type = None +min_matches = None fields_list = _key, service, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen [previously_seen_users_console_logins] -collection = previously_seen_users_console_logins -external_type = kvstore +filename = None +default_match = None +case_sensitive_match = None # description = A table of users seen doing console logins, and the first and last time that the activity was observed +match_type = None +min_matches = None fields_list = _key, firstTime, lastTime, user, src, City, Region, Country [prohibited_apps_launching_cmd] filename = prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.csv +default_match = None +case_sensitive_match = None # description = A list of processes that should not be launching cmd.exe match_type = WILDCARD(prohibited_applications) +min_matches = None +fields_list = None [prohibited_processes] filename = prohibited_processes.csv +default_match = None +case_sensitive_match = None # description = A list of processes that have been marked as prohibited +match_type = None +min_matches = None +fields_list = None [prohibited_softwares] filename = prohibited_softwares.csv +default_match = None +case_sensitive_match = None # description = A list of processes that have been marked as prohibited +match_type = None +min_matches = None +fields_list = None [ransomware_extensions_lookup] filename = ransomware_extensions.csv @@ -276,40 +435,60 @@ case_sensitive_match = false # description = A list of file extensions that are associated with ransomware match_type = WILDCARD(Extensions) min_matches = 1 +fields_list = None [ransomware_notes_lookup] filename = ransomware_notes.csv default_match = false +case_sensitive_match = None # description = A list of file names that are ransomware note files match_type = WILDCARD(ransomware_notes) min_matches = 1 +fields_list = None [s3_deletion_baseline] filename = s3_deletion_baseline.csv +default_match = None +case_sensitive_match = None # description = A placeholder for the baseline information for AWS S3 deletions +match_type = None +min_matches = None +fields_list = None [security_group_activity_baseline] filename = security_group_activity_baseline.csv +default_match = None +case_sensitive_match = None # description = A placeholder for the baseline information for AWS security groups +match_type = None +min_matches = None +fields_list = None [security_services_lookup] filename = security_services.csv default_match = false +case_sensitive_match = None # description = A list of services that deal with security match_type = WILDCARD(service) min_matches = 1 +fields_list = None [suspicious_writes_lookup] filename = suspicious_files.csv default_match = false +case_sensitive_match = None # description = A list of suspicious file names match_type = WILDCARD(file) min_matches = 1 +fields_list = None [zoom_first_time_child_process] -collection = zoom_first_time_child_process -external_type = kvstore +filename = None +default_match = None +case_sensitive_match = None # description = A list of suspicious file names +match_type = None +min_matches = None fields_list = _key, dest, process_name, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen diff --git a/dist/escu/default/workflow_actions.conf b/dist/escu/default/workflow_actions.conf index 8b13789179..42785bdeaf 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/workflow_actions.conf +++ b/dist/escu/default/workflow_actions.conf @@ -1 +1,372 @@ +############# +# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content +# On Date: 2022-03-14T11:11:42 UTC +# Author: Splunk Security Research +# Contact: research@splunk.com +############# + +[workbench_panel_all_backup_logs_for_host___response_task] +label = Workbench - All backup logs for host +type = link +fields = dest +display_location = field_menu +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_all_backup_logs_for_host___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.target = blank +link.method = get + +[workbench_panel_amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task] +label = Workbench - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip +type = link +fields = src_ip +display_location = field_menu +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.target = blank +link.method = get + +[workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task] +label = Workbench - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest +type = link +fields = dest +display_location = field_menu +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.target = blank +link.method = get + +[workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid___response_task] +label = Workbench - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId +type = link +fields = accessKeyId +display_location = field_menu +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.target = blank +link.method = get + +[workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task] +label = Workbench - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN +type = link +fields = user +display_location = field_menu +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_identity=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.target = blank +link.method = get + +[workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task] +label = Workbench - AWS Network ACL Details from ID +type = link +fields = networkAclId +display_location = field_menu +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.target = blank +link.method = get + +[workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task] +label = Workbench - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId +type = link +fields = resourceId +display_location = field_menu +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.target = blank +link.method = get + +[workbench_panel_aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname___response_task] +label = Workbench - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName +type = link +fields = bucketName +display_location = field_menu +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.target = blank +link.method = get + +[workbench_panel_gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task] +label = Workbench - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip +type = link +fields = src_ip +display_location = field_menu +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.target = blank +link.method = get + +[workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_city___response_task] +label = Workbench - Get All AWS Activity From City +type = link +fields = City +display_location = field_menu +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_city___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.target = blank +link.method = get + +[workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_country___response_task] +label = Workbench - Get All AWS Activity From Country +type = link +fields = Country +display_location = field_menu +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_country___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.target = blank +link.method = get + +[workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task] +label = Workbench - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address +type = link +fields = src_ip +display_location = field_menu +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.target = blank +link.method = get + +[workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_region___response_task] +label = Workbench - Get All AWS Activity From Region +type = link +fields = Region +display_location = field_menu +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_region___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.target = blank +link.method = get + +[workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint___response_task] +label = Workbench - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint +type = link +fields = dest +display_location = field_menu +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.target = blank +link.method = get + +[workbench_panel_get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain___response_task] +label = Workbench - Get Certificate logs for a domain +type = link +fields = domain +display_location = field_menu +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.target = blank +link.method = get + +[workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task] +label = Workbench - Get DNS Server History for a host +type = link +fields = src_ip +display_location = field_menu +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.target = blank +link.method = get + +[workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task] +label = Workbench - Get DNS traffic ratio +type = link +fields = src_ip +display_location = field_menu +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.target = blank +link.method = get + +[workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task] +label = Workbench - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId +type = link +fields = instanceId +display_location = field_menu +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.target = blank +link.method = get + +[workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task] +label = Workbench - Get EC2 Launch Details +type = link +fields = dest +display_location = field_menu +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.target = blank +link.method = get + +[workbench_panel_get_email_info___response_task] +label = Workbench - Get Email Info +type = link +fields = message_id +display_location = field_menu +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_email_info___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.target = blank +link.method = get + +[workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task] +label = Workbench - Get Emails From Specific Sender +type = link +fields = src_user +display_location = field_menu +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.target = blank +link.method = get + +[workbench_panel_get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address___response_task] +label = Workbench - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address +type = link +fields = src_mac +display_location = field_menu +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.target = blank +link.method = get + +[workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task] +label = Workbench - Get History Of Email Sources +type = link +fields = src +display_location = field_menu +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.target = blank +link.method = get + +[workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint___response_task] +label = Workbench - Get Logon Rights Modifications For Endpoint +type = link +fields = dest +display_location = field_menu +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.target = blank +link.method = get + +[workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user___response_task] +label = Workbench - Get Logon Rights Modifications For User +type = link +fields = user +display_location = field_menu +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_identity=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.target = blank +link.method = get + +[workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task] +label = Workbench - Get Notable History +type = link +fields = dest +display_location = field_menu +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.target = blank +link.method = get + + + + + +[workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task] +label = Workbench - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic +type = link +fields = dest +display_location = field_menu +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.target = blank +link.method = get + +[workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host___response_task] +label = Workbench - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host +type = link +fields = dest +display_location = field_menu +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.target = blank +link.method = get + +[workbench_panel_get_web_session_information_via_session_id___response_task] +label = Workbench - Get Web Session Information via session id +type = link +fields = session_id +display_location = field_menu +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_web_session_information_via_session_id___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.target = blank +link.method = get + +[workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task] +label = Workbench - Investigate AWS activities via region name +type = link +fields = vendor_region +display_location = field_menu +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.target = blank +link.method = get + +[workbench_panel_investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field___response_task] +label = Workbench - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field +type = link +fields = user +display_location = field_menu +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_identity=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.target = blank +link.method = get + +[workbench_panel_investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations___response_task] +label = Workbench - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations +type = link +fields = user +display_location = field_menu +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_identity=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.target = blank +link.method = get + +[workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip___response_task] +label = Workbench - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip +type = link +fields = src_ip +display_location = field_menu +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.target = blank +link.method = get + +[workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_app___response_task] +label = Workbench - Investigate Okta Activity by app +type = link +fields = app +display_location = field_menu +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_app___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.target = blank +link.method = get + +[workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts___response_task] +label = Workbench - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts +type = link +fields = dest +display_location = field_menu +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.target = blank +link.method = get + +[workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts___response_task] +label = Workbench - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts +type = link +fields = dest +display_location = field_menu +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.target = blank +link.method = get + +[workbench_panel_investigate_previous_unseen_user___response_task] +label = Workbench - Investigate Previous Unseen User +type = link +fields = dest +display_location = field_menu +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_previous_unseen_user___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.target = blank +link.method = get + +[workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task] +label = Workbench - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications +type = link +fields = dest +display_location = field_menu +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.target = blank +link.method = get + + +[workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_okta___response_task] +label = Workbench - Investigate User Activities In Okta +type = link +fields = user +display_location = field_menu +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_identity=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_okta___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.target = blank +link.method = get + +[workbench_panel_investigate_web_posts_from_src___response_task] +label = Workbench - Investigate Web POSTs From src +type = link +fields = src +display_location = field_menu +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_web_posts_from_src___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.target = blank +link.method = get diff --git a/dist/ssa/complex/ssa___potential_pass_the_token_or_hash_observed_at_the_destination_device.yml b/dist/ssa/complex/ssa___potential_pass_the_token_or_hash_observed_at_the_destination_device.yml index d9faf6f008..db66eff45f 100644 --- a/dist/ssa/complex/ssa___potential_pass_the_token_or_hash_observed_at_the_destination_device.yml +++ b/dist/ssa/complex/ssa___potential_pass_the_token_or_hash_observed_at_the_destination_device.yml @@ -1,25 +1,10 @@ -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk -datamodel: -- Authentication -date: '2021-11-30' +name: Potential Pass the Token or Hash Observed at the Destination Device +id: 82e76b80-5cdb-4899-9b43-85dbe777b36d +version: 3 description: This detection identifies potential Pass the Token or Pass the Hash credential stealing. We detect the main side effect of these attacks, which is a transition from the dominant Kerberos logins to rare NTLM logins for a given user, as reported by a detination device. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from endpoint devices, - i.e., destinations of interest. Please make sure that event ID 4624 is being logged. -id: 82e76b80-5cdb-4899-9b43-85dbe777b36d -known_false_positives: Environments in which NTLM is used extremely rarely and for - benign purposes (such as a rare use of SMB shares). -name: Potential Pass the Token or Hash Observed at the Destination Device -product: -- Splunk Behavioral Analytics -references: -- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002/ -- https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/psexec-pass-hash/ -risk_message: Potential lateral movement and credential stealing via Pass the Token - or Pass the Hash techniques. Operation is performed via credentials of the account - $dest_user_id$ and observed by the destination device $dest_device_id$ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where "Authentication" IN(_datamodels) | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), dest_user=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_primary_artifact"), "string", @@ -50,25 +35,21 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where "Authentication" IN(_datamode endNTLMTime]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from endpoint devices, + i.e., destinations of interest. Please make sure that event ID 4624 is being logged. +known_false_positives: Environments in which NTLM is used extremely rarely and for + benign purposes (such as a rare use of SMB shares). +references: +- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002/ +- https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/psexec-pass-hash/ tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Lateral Movement - asset_type: Windows cis20: - CIS 16 - CIS 20 - confidence: 90 - context: - - Source:AD - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Credential Access - - Stage:Lateral Movement - impact: 80 kill_chain_phases: - - Lateral Movement - message: Potential lateral movement and credential stealing via Pass the Token or - Pass the Hash techniques. Operation is performed via credentials of the account - $dest_user_id$ and observed by the destination device $dest_device_id$ + - Exploitation mitre_attack_id: - T1550 - T1550.002 @@ -77,17 +58,6 @@ tags: - PR.AT - PR.AC - PR.IP - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - role: - - Actor - type: User - - name: dest_device_id - role: - - Other - type: Hostname - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics required_fields: - _time - signature_id @@ -95,21 +65,15 @@ tags: - dest_user_id - dest_device_id - authentication_method - risk_score: 72 - risk_severity: medium security_domain: endpoint + risk_severity: medium test: - name: Potential Pass the Token or Hash Observed at the Destination Device - SSA - Unit test + name: Potential Pass the Token or Hash Observed at the Destination Device Unit Test tests: - - attack_data: - - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1550.002/extracts_from_real_data/ptt_pth_kerb_ntlm_anon_dest_dataset.log - file_name: ptt_pth_kerb_ntlm_anon_dest_dataset.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - description: Test Pass the Hash or Pass the Token Detection Observed by a Destination - Device + - name: Potential Pass the Token or Hash Observed at the Destination Device file: endpoint/ssa___potential_pass_the_token_or_hash_observed_at_the_destination_device.yml - name: Potential Pass the Token or Hash Observed at the Destination Device pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' -type: TTP -version: 3 + attack_data: + - file_name: ptt_pth_kerb_ntlm_anon_dest_dataset.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1550.002/extracts_from_real_data/ptt_pth_kerb_ntlm_anon_dest_dataset.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/dist/ssa/complex/ssa___potential_pass_the_token_or_hash_observed_by_an_event_collecting_device.yml b/dist/ssa/complex/ssa___potential_pass_the_token_or_hash_observed_by_an_event_collecting_device.yml index e099727893..35758d3d09 100644 --- a/dist/ssa/complex/ssa___potential_pass_the_token_or_hash_observed_by_an_event_collecting_device.yml +++ b/dist/ssa/complex/ssa___potential_pass_the_token_or_hash_observed_by_an_event_collecting_device.yml @@ -1,27 +1,11 @@ -author: Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk -datamodel: -- Authentication -date: '2021-11-05' +name: Potential Pass the Token or Hash Observed by an Event Collecting Device +id: 1058ba3e-a698-49bc-a1e5-7cedece4ea87 +version: 2 description: This detection identifies potential Pass the Token or Pass the Hash credential stealing. We detect the main side effect of these attacks, which is a transition from the dominant Kerberos logins to rare NTLM logins for a given user, as reported by an event-collecting device (i.e., a specific domain controller or an endpoint destination). -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest - - at least from domain controllers. Please make sure that event ID 4624 is being - logged. -id: 1058ba3e-a698-49bc-a1e5-7cedece4ea87 -known_false_positives: Environments in which NTLM is used extremely rarely and for - benign purposes (such as a rare use of SMB shares). -name: Potential Pass the Token or Hash Observed by an Event Collecting Device -product: -- Splunk Behavioral Analytics -references: -- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002/ -- https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/psexec-pass-hash/ -risk_message: Potential lateral movement and credential stealing via Pass the Token - or Pass the Hash techniques. Operation is performed via credentials of the account - $dest_user_id$ and observed by the logging device $origin_device_id$ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where "Authentication" IN(_datamodels) | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), @@ -51,25 +35,22 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where "Authentication" IN(_datamode endTime, "detection_start_time", startNTLMTime, "detection_end_time", endNTLMTime]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest + - at least from domain controllers. Please make sure that event ID 4624 is being + logged. +known_false_positives: Environments in which NTLM is used extremely rarely and for + benign purposes (such as a rare use of SMB shares). +references: +- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002/ +- https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/psexec-pass-hash/ tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Lateral Movement - asset_type: Windows cis20: - CIS 16 - CIS 20 - confidence: 80 - context: - - Source:AD - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Credential Access - - Stage:Lateral Movement - impact: 80 kill_chain_phases: - - Lateral Movement - message: Potential lateral movement and credential stealing via Pass the Token or - Pass the Hash techniques. Operation is performed via credentials of the account - $dest_user_id$ and observed by the logging device $origin_device_id$ + - Exploitation mitre_attack_id: - T1550 - T1550.002 @@ -78,17 +59,6 @@ tags: - PR.AT - PR.AC - PR.IP - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - role: - - Actor - type: User - - name: origin_device_id - role: - - Other - type: Hostname - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics required_fields: - _time - signature_id @@ -96,21 +66,16 @@ tags: - dest_user_id - origin_device_id - authentication_method - risk_score: 64 - risk_severity: medium security_domain: endpoint + risk_severity: medium test: - name: Potential Pass the Token or Hash Observed by an Event Collecting Device - - SSA Unit test + name: Potential Pass the Token or Hash Observed by an Event Collecting Device Unit + Test tests: - - attack_data: - - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1550.002/extracts_from_real_data/ptt_pth_kerb_ntlm_anon_DC_dataset.log - file_name: ptt_pth_kerb_ntlm_anon_DC_dataset.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - description: Test Pass the Hash or Pass the Token Detection Observed by an Event - Collecting Device - file: endpoint/ssa___potential_pass_the_token_or_hash_observed_by_an_event_collecting_device.yml - name: Potential Pass the Token or Hash Observed by an Event Collecting Device + - name: Potential Pass the Token or Hash Observed by an Event Collecting Device + file: endpoint/ssa___ptt_pth_kerb_ntlm_origin_device.yml pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' -type: TTP -version: 2 + attack_data: + - file_name: ptt_pth_kerb_ntlm_anon_DC_dataset.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1550.002/extracts_from_real_data/ptt_pth_kerb_ntlm_anon_DC_dataset.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/dist/ssa/complex/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml b/dist/ssa/complex/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml index 365e0f6863..b996ebc893 100644 --- a/dist/ssa/complex/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml +++ b/dist/ssa/complex/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml @@ -1,24 +1,9 @@ -author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -date: '2020-08-25' +name: Unusual LOLBAS in short period of time +id: 59c0dd70-169c-4900-9a1f-bfcf13302f93 +version: 2 description: Attacker activity may compromise executing several LOLBAS applications in conjunction to accomplish their objectives. We are looking for more than usual LOLBAS applications over a window of time, by building profiles per machine. -how_to_implement: Collect endpoint data such as sysmon or 4688 events. -id: 59c0dd70-169c-4900-9a1f-bfcf13302f93 -known_false_positives: 'Some administrative tasks may involve multiple use of LOLBAS - applications in a short period of time. This might trigger false positives at the - beginning when it hasn''t collected yet enough data to construct the baseline. - - ' -name: Unusual LOLBAS in short period of time -product: -- Splunk Behavioral Analytics -references: -- https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/tree/master/yml/OSBinaries -risk_message: A system process $process_name$ with commandline $cmd_line$ spawn iin - short period of time in host $dest_device_id$ search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval device=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string", null)), timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, @@ -53,53 +38,40 @@ search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval device=ucast(map_get(input_ev window=2419200000L | where label AND quantile>0.99 | eval start_time = window_start, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend(device), body=create_map(["lolbas_counter", lolbas_counter, "quantile", quantile, "device", device]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: Collect endpoint data such as sysmon or 4688 events. +known_false_positives: 'Some administrative tasks may involve multiple use of LOLBAS + applications in a short period of time. This might trigger false positives at the + beginning when it hasn''t collected yet enough data to construct the baseline. + + ' +references: +- https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/tree/master/yml/OSBinaries tags: analytic_story: - Unusual Processes cis20: - CIS 8 - confidence: 50 - context: - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Defense Evasion - impact: 50 kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation - message: A system process $process_name$ with commandline $cmd_line$ spawn iin short - period of time in host $dest_device_id$ mitre_attack_id: - T1059 - T1053 nist: - PR.PT - DE.CM - observable: - - name: dest_device_id - role: - - Victim - type: Hostname - - name: process_name - role: - - Others - type: processname - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics required_fields: - dest_device_id - _time - process_name - risk_score: 25 - risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint + risk_severity: low test: - name: Unusual LOLBAS in short period of time - SSA Unit Test + name: Unusual LOLBAS in short period of time Unit Test tests: - - attack_data: - - data: https://ssa-test-dataset.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/T1059.all.labeled.lolbas-test.json - file_name: T1059.all.labeled.lolbas-test.json - description: Test more than usual lolbas being executed in a short period of time + - name: Unusual LOLBAS in short period of time file: endpoint/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml - name: Unusual LOLBAS in short period of time pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' -type: Anomaly -version: 2 + attack_data: + - file_name: T1059.all.labeled.lolbas-test.json + data: https://ssa-test-dataset.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/T1059.all.labeled.lolbas-test.json + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___anomalous_usage_of_archive_tools.yml b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___anomalous_usage_of_archive_tools.yml index acf8f36911..1901740dbd 100644 --- a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___anomalous_usage_of_archive_tools.yml +++ b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___anomalous_usage_of_archive_tools.yml @@ -1,23 +1,8 @@ -author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -date: '2021-11-22' +name: Anomalous usage of Archive Tools +id: 63614a58-10e2-4c6c-ae81-ea1113681439 +version: 1 description: The following detection identifies the usage of archive tools from the command line. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information - on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from - your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -id: 63614a58-10e2-4c6c-ae81-ea1113681439 -known_false_positives: False positives can be ligitmate usage of archive tools from - the command line. -name: Anomalous usage of Archive Tools -product: -- Splunk Behavioral Analytics -references: -- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/001/ -risk_message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified - on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior is indicative of suspicious loading - of 7zip. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event,"_time"), "string", null)), process=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string", @@ -27,51 +12,36 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "event_id"), "string", null) | where process_name IS NOT NULL AND parent_process_name IS NOT NULL | where like(process_name, "7z%") OR process_name="WinRAR.exe" OR like(process_name, "winzip%") | where like(parent_process_name, - "%cmd.exe") OR like(parent_process_name, "%powershell.exe") | eval start_time=timestamp, - end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), - "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)), - body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "process_name", process_name, "parent_process_name", - parent_process_name, "process_path", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();' + "%cmd.exe") OR like(parent_process_name, "%powershell.exe") | eval body=create_map("category_id", 101, "class_id", 101000, "detection_start_time", start_time, + "detection_end_time", end_time, "device_entities", [create_map("uid", ucast(map_get(input_event, "enrichments.device_entities.device.uid"), "string", null), "type_id", 0)], + "disposition_id", 1, "end_time", end_time, "event_id", 10100001, "event_time", timestamp, + "finding", create_map("confidence", 60, "confidence_id", 2, + "context_ids", [10, 49], "impact", 70, "impact_id", 4, + "kill_chain_phase", Exploitation, "kill_chain_phase_id", 4, + "risk_level", Medium, "risk_level_id", 2, "type_id", 1, "ref_event_uid", event_id), + "message", An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior is indicative of suspicious loading of 7zip., "metadata", create_map("log_name", Endpoint_Processes, "version", + "1.0.0"), "observables", , "origin", create_map("product", create_map("name", "Splunk Behavioral Analytics")), + "rule", create_map("name", "Anomalous usage of Archive Tools", "uid", "63614a58-10e2-4c6c-ae81-ea1113681439", "version", "1"), "start_time", start_time, "time", start_time, + "user_entities", [create_map("uid", ucast(map_get(input_event, "enrichments.user_entities.user.uid"),"string", null))]) + | into write_ssa_finding_events();' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information + on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from + your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +known_false_positives: False positives can be ligitmate usage of archive tools from + the command line. +references: +- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/001/ tags: analytic_story: - Cobalt Strike - NOBELIUM Group cis20: [] - confidence: 60 - context: - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Collection - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1560.001/archive_tools/windows-security.log - impact: 70 kill_chain_phases: - - Actions on Objective - message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified - on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior is indicative of suspicious loading - of 7zip. + - Exploitation mitre_attack_id: - T1560.001 - T1560 nist: [] - observable: - - name: user - role: - - Victim - type: User - - name: dest - role: - - Victim - type: Hostname - - name: parent_process_name - role: - - Parent Process - type: Parent Process - - name: process_name - role: - - Child Process - type: Process - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics required_fields: - _time - Processes.process_name @@ -80,19 +50,15 @@ tags: - Processes.user - Processes.parent_process_name - Processes.parent_process - risk_score: 42 - risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint + risk_severity: low test: name: Anomalous usage of Archive Tools Unit Test tests: - - attack_data: - - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1560.001/archive_tools/windows-security.log - file_name: security.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - description: Test for Anomalous usage of Archive Tools + - name: Anomalous usage of Archive Tools file: endpoint/ssa___anomalous_usage_of_archive_tools.yml - name: Anomalous usage of Archive Tools pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' -type: Anomaly -version: 1 + attack_data: + - file_name: security.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1560.001/archive_tools/windows-security.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___attempt_to_delete_services.yml b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___attempt_to_delete_services.yml index 55beba0c65..aebe900c07 100644 --- a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___attempt_to_delete_services.yml +++ b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___attempt_to_delete_services.yml @@ -1,27 +1,11 @@ -author: Teoderick Contreras, splunk -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -date: '2021-11-24' +name: Attempt To Delete Services +id: a0c8c292-d01a-11eb-aa18-acde48001122 +version: 3 description: The following analytic identifies Windows Service Control, `sc.exe`, attempting to delete a service. This is typically identified in parallel with other instances of service enumeration of attempts to stop a service and then delete it. Adversaries utilize this technique to terminate security services or other related services to continue there objective and evade detections. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting - logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your - endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the - Sysmon TA. -id: a0c8c292-d01a-11eb-aa18-acde48001122 -known_false_positives: It is possible administrative scripts may start/stop/delete - services. Filter as needed. -name: Attempt To Delete Services -product: -- Splunk Behavioral Analytics -references: -- https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/ -- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1543.003/T1543.003.md -risk_message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified - on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to delete a service. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), @@ -34,6 +18,15 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name", process_name, "parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "process_path", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting + logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your + endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the + Sysmon TA. +known_false_positives: It is possible administrative scripts may start/stop/delete + services. Filter as needed. +references: +- https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/ +- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1543.003/T1543.003.md tags: analytic_story: - XMRig @@ -41,18 +34,8 @@ tags: cis20: - CIS 8 - CIS 13 - confidence: 60 - context: - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Privilege Escalation - - Stage:Persistence - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/ssa_data1/sc_del.log - impact: 60 kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation - message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified - on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to delete a service. mitre_attack_id: - T1489 - T1543 @@ -60,25 +43,6 @@ tags: nist: - PR.DS - PR.IP - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - role: - - Victim - type: User - - name: dest_device_id - role: - - Victim - type: Hostname - - name: parent_process_name - role: - - Parent Process - type: Parent Process - - name: process_name - role: - - Child Process - type: Process - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics required_fields: - _time - dest_device_id @@ -88,19 +52,15 @@ tags: - dest_user_id - process - cmd_line - risk_score: 36 - risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint + risk_severity: low test: - name: Attempt To delete Services Unit Test + name: Attempt To Delete Services Unit Test tests: - - attack_data: - - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/ssa_data1/sc_del.log - file_name: sc_del.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - description: Test for usage of sc.exe to delete a service + - name: Attempt To Delete Services file: endpoint/ssa___attempt_to_delete_services.yml - name: Attempt To delete Services pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' -type: TTP -version: 3 + attack_data: + - file_name: sc_del.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/ssa_data1/sc_del.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___attempt_to_disable_services.yml b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___attempt_to_disable_services.yml index 2883a9240b..bdd059f566 100644 --- a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___attempt_to_disable_services.yml +++ b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___attempt_to_disable_services.yml @@ -1,28 +1,11 @@ -author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -date: '2021-11-24' +name: Attempt To Disable Services +id: afb31de4-d023-11eb-98d5-acde48001122 +version: 3 description: The following analytic identifies Windows Service Control, `sc.exe`, attempting to disable a service. This is typically identified in parallel with other instances of service enumeration of attempts to stop a service and then disable it. Adversaries utilize this technique to terminate security services or other related services to continue there objective and evade detections. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting - logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your - endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the - Sysmon TA. -id: afb31de4-d023-11eb-98d5-acde48001122 -known_false_positives: It is possible administrative scripts may start/stop/delete - services. Filter as needed. -name: Attempt To Disable Services -product: -- Splunk Behavioral Analytics -references: -- https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/ -- https://app.any.run/tasks/c0f98850-af65-4352-9746-fbebadee4f05/ -- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md#atomic-test-14---disable-arbitrary-security-windows-service -risk_message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified - on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to disable a service. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval _datamodels=ucast(map_get(input_event, "_datamodels"), "collection", []), body={} | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), @@ -36,6 +19,16 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval _datamodels=ucast(map_get(inpu "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name", process_name, "parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "process_path", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting + logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your + endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the + Sysmon TA. +known_false_positives: It is possible administrative scripts may start/stop/delete + services. Filter as needed. +references: +- https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/ +- https://app.any.run/tasks/c0f98850-af65-4352-9746-fbebadee4f05/ +- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md#atomic-test-14---disable-arbitrary-security-windows-service tags: analytic_story: - XMRig @@ -43,42 +36,13 @@ tags: cis20: - CIS 9 - CIS 8 - confidence: 60 - context: - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Privilege Escalation - - Stage:Persistence - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/ssa_data1/sc_disable.log - impact: 60 kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation - message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified - on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to disable a service. mitre_attack_id: - T1489 nist: - PR.DS - PR.IP - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - role: - - Victim - type: User - - name: dest_device_id - role: - - Victim - type: Hostname - - name: parent_process_name - role: - - Parent Process - type: Parent Process - - name: process_name - role: - - Child Process - type: Process - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics required_fields: - _time - dest_device_id @@ -87,19 +51,15 @@ tags: - process_path - dest_user_id - process - risk_score: 36 - risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint + risk_severity: low test: name: Attempt To Disable Services Unit Test tests: - - attack_data: - - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/ssa_data1/sc_disable.log - file_name: sc_disable.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - description: Test for usage of sc.exe to disable a service + - name: Attempt To Disable Services file: endpoint/ssa___attempt_to_disable_services.yml - name: Attempt To Disable Services pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' -type: TTP -version: 3 + attack_data: + - file_name: sc_disable.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/ssa_data1/sc_disable.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml index 4eddb98760..8b42b91453 100644 --- a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml +++ b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml @@ -1,24 +1,9 @@ -author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -date: '2021-11-29' +name: Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe +id: 14038953-e5f2-4daf-acff-5452062baf03 +version: 2 description: The following analytic identifies the use of `reg.exe` attempting to export Windows registry keys that contain hashed credentials. Adversaries will utilize this technique to capture and perform offline password cracking. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting - logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your - endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the - Sysmon TA. -id: 14038953-e5f2-4daf-acff-5452062baf03 -known_false_positives: None identified. -name: Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe -product: -- Splunk Behavioral Analytics -references: -- https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/55a17c65f9f56c2220000b62701765422b46125d/detections/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml -- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets -risk_message: An attempt to save registry keys storing credentials has been performed - on $dest_device_id$ by $dest_user_id$ via process $process_name$. search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)) | eval process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string", null)), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), @@ -33,44 +18,28 @@ search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(ma = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend(dest_device_id, dest_user_id), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name", process_name]) | into write_ssa_detected_events(); ' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting + logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your + endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the + Sysmon TA. +known_false_positives: None identified. +references: +- https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/55a17c65f9f56c2220000b62701765422b46125d/detections/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml +- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets tags: analytic_story: - Credential Dumping - asset_type: Endpoint cis20: - CIS 3 - CIS 5 - CIS 16 - confidence: 90 - context: - - Source:AD - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Credential Access - impact: 70 kill_chain_phases: - Actions on Objectives - message: An attempt to save registry keys storing credentials has been performed - on $dest_device_id$ by $dest_user_id$ via process $process_name$. mitre_attack_id: - T1003 - T1003.002 nist: - DE.CM - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - role: - - Actor - type: User - - name: dest_device_id - role: - - Victim - type: Hostname - - name: process_name - role: - - Child Process - type: process - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics required_fields: - process_name - _time @@ -78,19 +47,15 @@ tags: - dest_user_id - process - cmd_line - risk_score: 63 - risk_severity: medium security_domain: endpoint + risk_severity: medium test: - name: Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - SSA Unit test + name: Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe Unit Test tests: - - attack_data: - - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log - file_name: windows-security.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - description: Test credential dumping detections + - name: Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe file: endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml - name: Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' -type: TTP -version: 2 + attack_data: + - file_name: windows-security.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml index 9f56496923..7ab53c507b 100644 --- a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml +++ b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml @@ -1,23 +1,9 @@ -author: Michael Haag, Splunk -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -date: '2021-12-07' +name: BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification +id: 76d79d6e-25bb-40f6-b3b2-e0a6b7e5ea13 +version: 1 description: This search looks for flags passed to bcdedit.exe modifications to the built-in Windows error recovery boot configurations. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent recovery. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information - on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from - your endpoints into the `Endpoint_Processess` datamodel. -id: 76d79d6e-25bb-40f6-b3b2-e0a6b7e5ea13 -known_false_positives: Administrators may modify the boot configuration. -name: BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification -product: -- Splunk Behavioral Analytics -references: -- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1490/T1490.md#atomic-test-4---windows---disable-windows-recovery-console-repair -risk_message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified - on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting disable the ability - to recover the endpoint. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), @@ -31,47 +17,24 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name", process_name, "parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "process_path", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information + on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from + your endpoints into the `Endpoint_Processess` datamodel. +known_false_positives: Administrators may modify the boot configuration. +references: +- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1490/T1490.md#atomic-test-4---windows---disable-windows-recovery-console-repair tags: analytic_story: - Ryuk Ransomware - Ransomware cis20: - CIS 8 - confidence: 80 - context: - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Impact - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-security_bcdedit_wbadmin.log - impact: 100 kill_chain_phases: - Actions on Objectives - message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified - on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting disable the ability - to recover the endpoint. mitre_attack_id: - T1490 nist: - PR.IP - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - role: - - Victim - type: User - - name: dest_device_id - role: - - Victim - type: Hostname - - name: parent_process_name - role: - - Parent Process - type: Parent Process - - name: process_name - role: - - Child Process - type: Process - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics required_fields: - _time - dest_device_id @@ -81,19 +44,15 @@ tags: - dest_user_id - process - cmd_line - risk_score: 80 - risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint + risk_severity: high test: - name: BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - SSA Unit Test + name: BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification Unit Test tests: - - attack_data: - - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-security_bcdedit_wbadmin.log - file_name: windows-security_bcdedit_wbadmin.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - description: Test detection of BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification + - name: BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification file: endpoint/ssa___bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml - name: BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' -type: TTP -version: 1 + attack_data: + - file_name: windows-security_bcdedit_wbadmin.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-security_bcdedit_wbadmin.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app.yml b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app.yml index 534b55d47f..b068b2917e 100644 --- a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app.yml +++ b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app.yml @@ -1,24 +1,9 @@ -author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -date: '2021-12-20' +name: Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App +id: 8f907d90-6173-11ec-9c23-acde48001122 +version: 1 description: this search is to detect execution of `cipher.exe` to clear the unallocated sectors of a specific disk. This technique was seen in some ransomware to make it impossible to forensically recover deleted files. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information - on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from - your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -id: 8f907d90-6173-11ec-9c23-acde48001122 -known_false_positives: administrator may execute this app to manage disk -name: Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App -product: -- Splunk Behavioral Analytics -references: -- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/vatet-pyxie-defray777/3/ -- https://www.sophos.com/en-us/medialibrary/PDFs/technical-papers/sophoslabs-ransomware-behavior-report.pdf -risk_message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified - on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to clear the unallocated sectors of - a specific disk. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), @@ -31,6 +16,13 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name", process_name, "parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "process_path", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information + on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from + your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +known_false_positives: administrator may execute this app to manage disk +references: +- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/vatet-pyxie-defray777/3/ +- https://www.sophos.com/en-us/medialibrary/PDFs/technical-papers/sophoslabs-ransomware-behavior-report.pdf tags: analytic_story: - Ransomware @@ -38,43 +30,14 @@ tags: cis20: - CIS 14 - CIS 16 - confidence: 100 - context: - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Impact - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.004/cipher/security.log - impact: 90 kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation - message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified - on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to clear the unallocated sectors - of a specific disk. mitre_attack_id: - T1070.004 - T1070 nist: - PR.AC - PR.IP - observable: - - name: user - role: - - Victim - type: User - - name: dest - role: - - Victim - type: Hostname - - name: parent_process_name - role: - - Parent Process - type: Parent Process - - name: process_name - role: - - Child Process - type: Process - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics required_fields: - _time - Processes.dest @@ -88,19 +51,15 @@ tags: - Processes.parent_process_path - Processes.process_path - Processes.parent_process_id - risk_score: 90 - risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint + risk_severity: high test: name: Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher - SSA Unit test tests: - - attack_data: - - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.004/cipher/security.log - file_name: security.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - description: Test detection of Cipher Application execution + - name: Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App file: endpoint/ssa___clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app.yml - name: Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' -type: TTP -version: 1 + attack_data: + - file_name: security.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.004/cipher/security.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___delete_a_net_user.yml b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___delete_a_net_user.yml index 94ea805594..2217216c2c 100644 --- a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___delete_a_net_user.yml +++ b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___delete_a_net_user.yml @@ -1,28 +1,12 @@ -author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -date: '2021-11-30' +name: Delete A Net User +id: 8776d79c-d26e-11eb-9a56-acde48001122 +version: 3 description: This analytic will detect a suspicious net.exe/net1.exe command-line to delete a user on a system. This technique may be use by an administrator for legitimate purposes, however this behavior has been used in the wild to impair some user or deleting adversaries tracks created during its lateral movement additional systems. During triage, review parallel processes for additional behavior. Identify any other user accounts created before or after. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting - logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your - endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the - Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed net.exe may be used. -id: 8776d79c-d26e-11eb-9a56-acde48001122 -known_false_positives: System administrators or scripts may delete user accounts via - this technique. Filter as needed. -name: Delete A Net User -product: -- Splunk Behavioral Analytics -references: -- https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/ -risk_message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified - on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to delete a user - account. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), @@ -35,6 +19,14 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name", process_name, "parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "process_path", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting + logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your + endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the + Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed net.exe may be used. +known_false_positives: System administrators or scripts may delete user accounts via + this technique. Filter as needed. +references: +- https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/ tags: analytic_story: - XMRig @@ -42,43 +34,13 @@ tags: cis20: - CIS 4 - CIS 16 - confidence: 70 - context: - - Source:Endpoint - - stage:Defense Evasion - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/ssa_data1/net_user_del.log - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1531/atomic_red_team/security.log - impact: 70 kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation - message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified - on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to delete a user - account. mitre_attack_id: - T1531 nist: - PR.AC - PR.IP - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - role: - - Victim - type: User - - name: dest_device_id - role: - - Victim - type: Hostname - - name: parent_process_name - role: - - Parent Process - type: Parent Process - - name: process_name - role: - - Child Process - type: Process - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics required_fields: - _time - dest_device_id @@ -88,22 +50,18 @@ tags: - dest_user_id - process - cmd_line - risk_score: 49 - risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint + risk_severity: low test: name: Delete A Net User Unit Test tests: - - attack_data: - - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/ssa_data1/net_user_del.log - file_name: net_user_del.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1531/atomic_red_team/security.log - file_name: security.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - description: Test for usage of net.exe or net1.exe to delete net user + - name: Delete A Net User file: endpoint/ssa___delete_a_net_user.yml - name: Delete A Net User pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' -type: Anomaly -version: 3 + attack_data: + - file_name: net_user_del.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/ssa_data1/net_user_del.log + source: WinEventLog:Security + - file_name: security.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1531/atomic_red_team/security.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___deny_permission_using_cacls_utility.yml b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___deny_permission_using_cacls_utility.yml index 386d96d6e2..29c9a012d1 100644 --- a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___deny_permission_using_cacls_utility.yml +++ b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___deny_permission_using_cacls_utility.yml @@ -1,25 +1,10 @@ -author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -date: '2021-11-29' +name: Deny Permission using Cacls Utility +id: b76eae28-cd25-11eb-9c92-acde48001122 +version: 3 description: The following analytic identifies the use of `cacls.exe`, `icacls.exe` or `xcacls.exe` placing the deny permission on a file or directory. Adversaries perform this behavior to prevent responders from reviewing or gaining access to adversary files on disk. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting - logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your - endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the - Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed icacls.exe may be used. -id: b76eae28-cd25-11eb-9c92-acde48001122 -known_false_positives: System administrators may use cacls utilities but this is not - a common practice. Filter as needed. -name: Deny Permission using Cacls Utility -product: -- Splunk Behavioral Analytics -references: -- https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/ -risk_message: A cacls process $process_name$ with commandline $cmd_line$ try to deny - a permission of a file or directory in host $dest_device_id$ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string", null), @@ -32,39 +17,27 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name", process_name, "parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "process_path", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting + logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your + endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the + Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed icacls.exe may be used. +known_false_positives: System administrators may use cacls utilities but this is not + a common practice. Filter as needed. +references: +- https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/ tags: analytic_story: - XMRig cis20: - CIS 14 - CIS 16 - confidence: 70 - context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Defense Evasion - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1222.001/ssa_cacls/all_icalc.log - impact: 50 kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation - message: A cacls process $process_name$ with commandline $cmd_line$ try to deny - a permission of a file or directory in host $dest_device_id$ mitre_attack_id: - T1222 nist: - PR.AC - PR.IP - observable: - - name: dest_device_id - role: - - Victim - type: Hostname - - name: dest_user_id - role: - - Victim - type: user - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics required_fields: - _time - dest_device_id @@ -74,19 +47,15 @@ tags: - dest_user_id - process - cmd_line - risk_score: 35 - risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint + risk_severity: low test: name: Deny Permission using Cacls Utility Unit Test tests: - - attack_data: - - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1222.001/ssa_cacls/all_icalc.log - file_name: all_icalc.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - description: Test for usage of cacls deny permission to a file(s) or folder(s) + - name: Deny Permission using Cacls Utility file: endpoint/ssa___deny_permission_using_cacls_utility.yml - name: Deny Permission using Cacls Utility pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' -type: TTP -version: 3 + attack_data: + - file_name: all_icalc.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1222.001/ssa_cacls/all_icalc.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml index 9150df75c7..449ccca1b0 100644 --- a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml +++ b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml @@ -1,24 +1,9 @@ -author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -date: '2021-11-29' +name: Detect Dump LSASS Memory using comsvcs +id: 76bb9e35-f314-4c3d-a385-83c72a13ce4e +version: 2 description: The following analytic identifies credential dumping using comsvcs.dll with `regsvr32.exe`. This technique is common with adversaries who would like to dump the memory of lsass.exe and perform offline password cracking. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, - including Windows command line logging. You can see how we test this with [Event - Code 4688](https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4688a) - on the [attack_range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range/blob/develop/ansible/roles/windows_common/tasks/windows-enable-4688-cmd-line-audit.yml). -id: 76bb9e35-f314-4c3d-a385-83c72a13ce4e -known_false_positives: False positives should be limited, filter as needed. -name: Detect Dump LSASS Memory using comsvcs -product: -- Splunk Behavioral Analytics -references: -- https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf -- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md#atomic-test-3---dump-lsassexe-memory-using-comsvcsdll -risk_message: A dump of lsass.exe was attempted using comsvcs.dll on endpoint $dest_device_id$ - by user $dest_device_user$. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval tenant=ucast(map_get(input_event, "_tenant"), "string", null), machine=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), @@ -29,60 +14,42 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval tenant=ucast(map_get(input_eve | eval start_time = timestamp, end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend(machine), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "process_name", process_name, "process", process]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, + including Windows command line logging. You can see how we test this with [Event + Code 4688](https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4688a) + on the [attack_range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range/blob/develop/ansible/roles/windows_common/tasks/windows-enable-4688-cmd-line-audit.yml). +known_false_positives: False positives should be limited, filter as needed. +references: +- https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf +- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md#atomic-test-3---dump-lsassexe-memory-using-comsvcsdll tags: analytic_story: - Credential Dumping - asset_type: Endpoint cis20: - CIS 8 - CIS 16 - confidence: 100 - context: - - Source:AD - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Credential Access - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log - impact: 70 kill_chain_phases: - Actions on Objectives - message: A dump of lsass.exe was attempted using comsvcs.dll on endpoint $dest_device_id$ - by user $dest_device_user$. mitre_attack_id: - T1003.003 - T1003 nist: - DE.CM - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - role: - - Actor - type: User - - name: dest_device_id - role: - - Victim - type: Hostname - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics required_fields: - process_name - _tenant - _time - dest_device_id - process - risk_score: 70 - risk_severity: medium security_domain: endpoint + risk_severity: medium test: - name: Detect Dump LSASS Memory using comsvcs - SSA Unit Test + name: Detect Dump LSASS Memory using comsvcs Unit Test tests: - - attack_data: - - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log - file_name: windows-security.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - description: Test credential dumping detections + - name: Detect Dump LSASS Memory using comsvcs file: endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml - name: Detect Dump LSASS Memory using comsvcs pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' -type: TTP -version: 2 + attack_data: + - file_name: windows-security.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml index 9be3a7d033..c61e45042e 100644 --- a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml +++ b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml @@ -1,81 +1,47 @@ -author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -date: '2020-11-10' +name: Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe +id: c10a18cb-fd80-4ffa-a844-25026e0a0c94 +version: 3 description: The following analytic identifies parent processes, browsers, Windows terminal applications, Office Products and Java spawning cmd.exe. By its very nature, many applications spawn cmd.exe natively or built into macros. Much of this will need to be tuned to further enhance the risk. -how_to_implement: In order to successfully implement this analytic, you will need - endpoint process data from a EDR product or Sysmon. This search has been modified - to process raw sysmon data from attack_range's nxlogs on DSP. -id: c10a18cb-fd80-4ffa-a844-25026e0a0c94 -known_false_positives: There are circumstances where an application may legitimately - execute and interact with the Windows command-line interface. -name: Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe -product: -- Splunk Behavioral Analytics -references: -- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/ -risk_message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified - on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$, producing a suspicious event - that warrants investigating. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, - "_time"), "string", null)) | eval process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), - "string", null), parent_process=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "parent_process_name"), - "string", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"),"string", + "_time"), "string", null)) | eval process_name = ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), + "string", null), parent_process_name = lower(ucast(input_event.parent_process_name, + "string", null)), cmd_line = lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"),"string", null)), dest_user_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), dest_device_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event,"event_id"), - "string", null) | where process_name="cmd.exe" | rex field=parent_process "(?[^\\\\]+)$" + "string", null) | where process_name="cmd.exe" | rex field=parent_process_name "(?[^\\\\]+)$" | where ParentBaseFileName="winword.exe" OR ParentBaseFileName="excel.exe" OR ParentBaseFileName="outlook.exe" OR ParentBaseFileName="powerpnt.exe" OR ParentBaseFileName="visio.exe" OR ParentBaseFileName="mspub.exe" OR ParentBaseFileName="acrobat.exe" OR ParentBaseFileName="acrord32.exe" OR ParentBaseFileName="iexplore.exe" OR ParentBaseFileName="opera.exe" OR ParentBaseFileName="firefox.exe" OR (ParentBaseFileName="java.exe" - AND (cmd_line IS NULL OR (cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)patch1-Hotfix1a/)=false))) + AND (parent_process_name IS NOT NULL AND match_regex(parent_process_name, /(?i)patch1-Hotfix1a/)=false)) OR ParentBaseFileName="powershell.exe" OR (ParentBaseFileName="chrome.exe" AND (cmd_line - IS NULL OR (cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND NOT like(cmd_line, "%chrome-extension%")))) + IS NULL OR (cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)chrome-extension/)=false))) | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(dest_device_id, dest_user_id), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "process_name", process_name, - "parent_process_name", parent_process, "cmd_line", cmd_line]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();' + "parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "cmd_line", cmd_line, "ParentBaseFileName", + ParentBaseFileName]) | into write_ssa_detected_events()' +how_to_implement: In order to successfully implement this analytic, you will need + endpoint process data from a EDR product or Sysmon. This search has been modified + to process raw sysmon data from attack_range's nxlogs on DSP. +known_false_positives: There are circumstances where an application may legitimately + execute and interact with the Windows command-line interface. +references: +- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/ tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious Command-Line Executions cis20: - CIS 8 - confidence: 50 - context: - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Defense Evasion - impact: 70 kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation - message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified - on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$, producing a suspicious event - that warrants investigating. mitre_attack_id: - T1059 nist: - PR.PT - DE.CM - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - role: - - Actor - type: User - - name: dest_device_id - role: - - Victim - type: Hostname - - name: parent_process_name - role: - - Parent Process - type: Parent Process - - name: process_name - role: - - Child Process - type: Process - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics required_fields: - process_name - parent_process_name @@ -83,19 +49,15 @@ tags: - dest_device_id - dest_user_id - cmd_line - risk_score: 35 - risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint + risk_severity: low test: name: Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe Unit Test tests: - - attack_data: - - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/powershell_spawn_cmd/windows-security.log - file_name: windows-security.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - description: Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe + - name: Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe file: endpoint/ssa___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.yml - name: Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' -type: Anomaly -version: 2 + attack_data: + - file_name: windows-security.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/powershell_spawn_cmd/windows-security.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___detect_rclone_command-line_usage.yml b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___detect_rclone_command_line_usage.yml similarity index 71% rename from dist/ssa/srs/ssa___detect_rclone_command-line_usage.yml rename to dist/ssa/srs/ssa___detect_rclone_command_line_usage.yml index 6dc4492876..86cd481727 100644 --- a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___detect_rclone_command-line_usage.yml +++ b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___detect_rclone_command_line_usage.yml @@ -1,7 +1,6 @@ -author: Michael Haag, Splunk -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -date: '2021-12-03' +name: Detect RClone Command-Line Usage +id: e8b74268-5454-11ec-a799-acde48001122 +version: 1 description: This analytic identifies commonly used command-line arguments used by `rclone.exe` to initiate a file transfer. Some arguments were negated as they are specific to the configuration used by adversaries. In particular, an adversary may @@ -9,23 +8,6 @@ description: This analytic identifies commonly used command-line arguments used is not indicative of malicious behavior. During triage, at this stage of a ransomware event, exfiltration is about to occur or has already. Isolate the endpoint and continue investigating by review file modifications and parallel processes. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information - on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from - your endpoints into the `Endpoint_Processess` datamodel. -id: e8b74268-5454-11ec-a799-acde48001122 -known_false_positives: False positives should be limited as this is restricted to - the Rclone process name. Filter or tune the analytic as needed. -name: Detect RClone Command-Line Usage -product: -- Splunk Behavioral Analytics -references: -- https://redcanary.com/blog/rclone-mega-extortion/ -- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html -- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/ -- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/11/29/continuing-the-bazar-ransomware-story/ -risk_message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified - on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to connect to a remote - cloud service to move files or folders. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where "Endpoint_Processes" IN(_datamodels) | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, @@ -43,46 +25,26 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where "Endpoint_Processes" IN(_data | eval body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name", process_name, "parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "process_path", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information + on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from + your endpoints into the `Endpoint_Processess` datamodel. +known_false_positives: False positives should be limited as this is restricted to + the Rclone process name. Filter or tune the analytic as needed. +references: +- https://redcanary.com/blog/rclone-mega-extortion/ +- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html +- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/ +- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/11/29/continuing-the-bazar-ransomware-story/ tags: analytic_story: - DarkSide Ransomware - Ransomware - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: [] - confidence: 70 - context: - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Exfiltration - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1020/windows-security.log - impact: 50 kill_chain_phases: - - Exfiltration - message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified - on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to connect to a - remote cloud service to move files or folders. + - Exploitation mitre_attack_id: - T1020 nist: [] - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - role: - - Victim - type: User - - name: dest_device_id - role: - - Victim - type: Hostname - - name: parent_process_name - role: - - Parent Process - type: Parent Process - - name: process_name - role: - - Child Process - type: Process - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics required_fields: - _time - dest_device_id @@ -92,18 +54,15 @@ tags: - dest_user_id - process - cmd_line - risk_score: 35 - risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint + risk_severity: low test: name: Detect RClone Command-Line Usage Unit Test tests: - - attack_data: - - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1020/windows-security.log - file_name: windows-security.log - source: WinEventLog:Security + - name: Detect RClone Command-Line Usage file: endpoint/ssa___detect_rclone_command_line_usage.yml - name: Detect RClone Command-Line Usage pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' -type: TTP -version: 1 + attack_data: + - file_name: windows-security.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1020/windows-security.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___disable_net_user_account.yml b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___disable_net_user_account.yml index 812802e59c..547279b582 100644 --- a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___disable_net_user_account.yml +++ b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___disable_net_user_account.yml @@ -1,26 +1,10 @@ -author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -date: '2021-11-30' +name: Disable Net User Account +id: ba858b08-d26c-11eb-af9b-acde48001122 +version: 3 description: This analytic will identify a suspicious command-line that disables a user account using the native `net.exe` or `net1.exe` utility to Windows. This technique may used by the adversaries to interrupt availability of accounts and continue the impact against the organization. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting - logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your - endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the - Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed net.exe/net1.exe may be - used. -id: ba858b08-d26c-11eb-af9b-acde48001122 -known_false_positives: System administrators or automated scripts may disable an account - but not a common practice. Filter as needed. -name: Disable Net User Account -product: -- Splunk Behavioral Analytics -references: -- https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/ -risk_message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified - on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to disable accounts. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), @@ -34,6 +18,15 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name", process_name, "parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "process_path", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting + logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your + endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the + Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed net.exe/net1.exe may be + used. +known_false_positives: System administrators or automated scripts may disable an account + but not a common practice. Filter as needed. +references: +- https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/ tags: analytic_story: - XMRig @@ -41,42 +34,14 @@ tags: cis20: - CIS 4 - CIS 16 - confidence: 70 - context: - - Source:Endpoint - - stage:Defense Evasion - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/ssa_data1/net_user_dis.log - impact: 70 kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation - message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified - on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to disable accounts. mitre_attack_id: - T1489 - T1078 nist: - PR.AC - PR.IP - observable: - - name: user - role: - - Victim - type: User - - name: dest_device_id - role: - - Victim - type: Hostname - - name: parent_process_name - role: - - Parent Process - type: Parent Process - - name: process_name - role: - - Child Process - type: Process - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics required_fields: - _time - dest_device_id @@ -86,19 +51,15 @@ tags: - dest_user_id - process - cmd_line - risk_score: 49 - risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint + risk_severity: low test: name: Disable Net User Account Unit Test tests: - - attack_data: - - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/ssa_data1/net_user_dis.log - file_name: net_user_dis.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - description: Test for usage of net.exe or net1.exe to disable net user + - name: Disable Net User Account file: endpoint/ssa___disable_net_user_account.yml - name: Disable Net User Account pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' -type: TTP -version: 3 + attack_data: + - file_name: net_user_dis.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/ssa_data1/net_user_dis.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app.yml b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app.yml index 3368c2bc10..0db340530b 100644 --- a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app.yml +++ b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app.yml @@ -1,29 +1,12 @@ -author: Michael Haag, Splunk -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -date: '2021-12-07' +name: DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App +id: 2452e632-9e0d-11eb-34ba-acde48001122 +version: 1 description: This search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. This technique are seen in couple of malware and APT group to exfiltrated collected data in a infected machine or infected network. This detection is looking for unique use of nslookup where it tries to use specific record type, TXT, A, AAAA, that are commonly used by attacker and also the retry parameter which is designed to query C2 DNS multiple tries. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information - on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from - your endpoints into the `Endpoint_Processess` datamodel. -id: 2452e632-9e0d-11eb-34ba-acde48001122 -known_false_positives: It is possible for some legitimate administrative utilities - to use similar cmd_line parameters. Filter as needed. -name: DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App -product: -- Splunk Behavioral Analytics -references: -- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7_spear_phishing.html -- https://www.varonis.com/blog/dns-tunneling/ -- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/ -risk_message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified - on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ performing activity related - to DNS exfiltration. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where "Endpoint_Processes" IN(_datamodels) | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, @@ -38,48 +21,27 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where "Endpoint_Processes" IN(_data "string", null)) | eval body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name", process_name, "parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "process_path", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information + on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from + your endpoints into the `Endpoint_Processess` datamodel. +known_false_positives: It is possible for some legitimate administrative utilities + to use similar cmd_line parameters. Filter as needed. +references: +- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7_spear_phishing.html +- https://www.varonis.com/blog/dns-tunneling/ +- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/ tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious DNS Traffic - Dynamic DNS - - Command and Control + - Command & Control - Data Exfiltration - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: [] - confidence: 80 - context: - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Exfiltration - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/nslookup_exfil/windows-security.log - impact: 90 kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation - message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified - on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ performing activity related - to DNS exfiltration. mitre_attack_id: - T1048 nist: [] - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - role: - - Victim - type: User - - name: dest_device_id - role: - - Victim - type: Hostname - - name: parent_process_name - role: - - Parent Process - type: Parent Process - - name: process_name - role: - - Child Process - type: Process - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics required_fields: - _time - dest_device_id @@ -89,18 +51,15 @@ tags: - dest_user_id - process - cmd_line - risk_score: 72 - risk_severity: medium security_domain: endpoint + risk_severity: medium test: name: DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App Unit Test tests: - - attack_data: - - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/nslookup_exfil/windows-security.log - file_name: windows-security.log - source: WinEventLog:Security + - name: DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App file: endpoint/ssa_dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app.yml - name: DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' -type: TTP -version: 1 + attack_data: + - file_name: windows-security.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/nslookup_exfil/windows-security.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___fsutil_zeroing_file.yml b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___fsutil_zeroing_file.yml index 9af81d412f..0c1c3bb568 100644 --- a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___fsutil_zeroing_file.yml +++ b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___fsutil_zeroing_file.yml @@ -1,25 +1,9 @@ -author: Michael Haag, Splunk -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -date: '2021-12-07' +name: Fsutil Zeroing File +id: f792cdc9-43ee-4429-a3c0-ffce4fed1a85 +version: 1 description: This search is to detect a suspicious fsutil process to zeroing a target file. This technique was seen in lockbit ransomware where it tries to zero out its malware path as part of its defense evasion after encrypting the compromised host. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting - logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your - endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the - Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed net.exe may be used. -id: f792cdc9-43ee-4429-a3c0-ffce4fed1a85 -known_false_positives: System administrators or scripts may delete user accounts via - this technique. Filter as needed. -name: Fsutil Zeroing File -product: -- Splunk Behavioral Analytics -references: -- https://app.any.run/tasks/e0ac072d-58c9-4f53-8a3b-3e491c7ac5db/ -- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/fsutil-file -risk_message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified - on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ atempting to perform file deletion. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), @@ -32,44 +16,24 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map "dest_device_id"), "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name", process_name, "parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "process_path", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting + logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your + endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the + Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed net.exe may be used. +known_false_positives: System administrators or scripts may delete user accounts via + this technique. Filter as needed. +references: +- https://app.any.run/tasks/e0ac072d-58c9-4f53-8a3b-3e491c7ac5db/ +- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/fsutil-file tags: analytic_story: - Ransomware cis20: [] - confidence: 90 - context: - - Source:Endpoint - - stage:Defense Evasion - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070/fsutil_file_zero/windows-security.log - impact: 60 kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation - message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified - on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ atempting to perform file - deletion. mitre_attack_id: - T1070 nist: [] - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - role: - - Victim - type: User - - name: dest_device_id - role: - - Victim - type: Hostname - - name: parent_process_name - role: - - Parent Process - type: Parent Process - - name: process_name - role: - - Child Process - type: Process - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics required_fields: - _time - dest_device_id @@ -79,19 +43,15 @@ tags: - dest_user_id - process - cmd_line - risk_score: 54 - risk_severity: medium security_domain: endpoint + risk_severity: medium test: - name: FSUtil Zeroing File - SSA Unit Test + name: Fsutil Zeroing File Unit Test tests: - - attack_data: - - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070/fsutil_file_zero/windows-security.log - file_name: windows-security.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - description: Test detection of FSUtil Zeroing File + - name: Fsutil Zeroing File file: endpoint/ssa___fsutil_zeroing_file.yml - name: FSUtil Zeroing File pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' -type: TTP -version: 1 + attack_data: + - file_name: windows-sysmon.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070/fsutil_file_zero/windows-sysmon.log + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational diff --git a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___grant_permission_using_cacls_utility.yml b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___grant_permission_using_cacls_utility.yml index 0a402223ab..b037795f9f 100644 --- a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___grant_permission_using_cacls_utility.yml +++ b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___grant_permission_using_cacls_utility.yml @@ -1,25 +1,10 @@ -author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -date: '2021-11-30' +name: Grant Permission Using Cacls Utility +id: c6da561a-cd29-11eb-ae65-acde48001122 +version: 3 description: The following analytic identifies the use of `cacls.exe`, `icacls.exe` or `xcacls.exe` placing the grant permission on a file or directory. Adversaries perform this behavior to allow components of their files to run, however it allows responders to review or gaining access to adversary files on disk. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting - logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your - endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the - Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed icacls.exe may be used. -id: c6da561a-cd29-11eb-ae65-acde48001122 -known_false_positives: System administrators may use cacls utilities but this is not - a common practice. Filter as needed. -name: Grant Permission Using Cacls Utility -product: -- Splunk Behavioral Analytics -references: -- https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/ -risk_message: A cacls process $process_name$ with commandline $cmd_line$ try to grant - user a permission to a file or directory in host $dest_device_id$ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string", null), @@ -32,39 +17,27 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name", process_name, "parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "process_path", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting + logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your + endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the + Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed icacls.exe may be used. +known_false_positives: System administrators may use cacls utilities but this is not + a common practice. Filter as needed. +references: +- https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/ tags: analytic_story: - XMRig cis20: - CIS 14 - CIS 16 - confidence: 70 - context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Defense Evasion - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1222.001/ssa_cacls/all_icalc.log - impact: 50 kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation - message: A cacls process $process_name$ with commandline $cmd_line$ try to grant - user a permission to a file or directory in host $dest_device_id$ mitre_attack_id: - T1222 nist: - PR.AC - PR.IP - observable: - - name: dest_device_id - role: - - Victim - type: Hostname - - name: dest_user_id - role: - - Victim - type: user - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics required_fields: - _time - dest_device_id @@ -74,19 +47,15 @@ tags: - dest_user_id - process - cmd_line - risk_score: 35 - risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint + risk_severity: low test: name: Grant Permission Using Cacls Utility Unit Test tests: - - attack_data: - - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1222.001/ssa_cacls/all_icalc.log - file_name: all_icalc.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - description: Test for usage of cacls grant permission to a file(s) or folder(s) + - name: Grant Permission Using Cacls Utility file: endpoint/ssa___grant_permission_using_cacls_utility.yml - name: Grant Permission Using Cacls Utility pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' -type: TTP -version: 3 + attack_data: + - file_name: all_icalc.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1222.001/ssa_cacls/all_icalc.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml index ff8ea81ccc..d4bbf1d5aa 100644 --- a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml +++ b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml @@ -1,26 +1,10 @@ -author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -date: '2021-12-20' +name: Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe +id: 028e4406-6176-11ec-aec2-acde48001122 +version: 1 description: Attackers leverage an existing Windows binary, attrib.exe, to mark specific as hidden by using specific flags so that the victim does not see the file. The search looks for specific command-line arguments to detect the use of attrib.exe to hide files. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your - hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be - ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. - The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data - model. -id: 028e4406-6176-11ec-aec2-acde48001122 -known_false_positives: 'Some applications and users may legitimately use attrib.exe - to interact with the files. ' -name: Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe -product: -- Splunk Behavioral Analytics -references: -- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/attrib -risk_message: Attrib.exe with +h flag to hide files on $dest$ executed by $user$ is - detected. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), @@ -33,6 +17,15 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name", process_name, "parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "process_path", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your + hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be + ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. + The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data + model. +known_false_positives: 'Some applications and users may legitimately use attrib.exe + to interact with the files. ' +references: +- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/attrib tags: analytic_story: - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics @@ -41,54 +34,25 @@ tags: cis20: - CIS 14 - CIS 16 - confidence: 90 - context: - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Defense Evasion - - Stage:Persistence - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1222.001/attrib_hidden/security.log - impact: 80 kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation - message: Attrib.exe with +h flag to hide files on $dest$ executed by $user$ is detected. mitre_attack_id: - T1222.001 - T1222 nist: - PR.AC - PR.IP - observable: - - name: user - role: - - Victim - type: User - - name: dest - role: - - Victim - type: Endpoint - - name: parent_process - role: - - Attacker - - Parent Process - type: Other - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics required_fields: - _time - risk_score: 72 - risk_severity: medium security_domain: endpoint + risk_severity: medium test: name: Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - SSA Unit test tests: - - attack_data: - - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1222.001/attrib_hidden/security.log - file_name: security.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - description: Test detection of attrib Application execution + - name: Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe file: endpoint/ssa___hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml - name: Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' -type: TTP -version: 1 + attack_data: + - file_name: security.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1222.001/attrib_hidden/security.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___modify_acls_permission_of_files_or_folders.yml b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___modify_acls_permission_of_files_or_folders.yml index 4cc6ea8c55..1d5b1fabca 100644 --- a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___modify_acls_permission_of_files_or_folders.yml +++ b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___modify_acls_permission_of_files_or_folders.yml @@ -1,27 +1,12 @@ -author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -date: '2021-11-30' +name: Modify ACLs Permission Of Files Or Folders +id: 9ae9a48a-cdbe-11eb-875a-acde48001122 +version: 2 description: This analytic identifies suspicious modification of ACL permission to a files or folder to make it available to everyone or to a specific user. This technique may be used by the adversary to evade ACLs or protected files access. This changes is commonly configured by the file or directory owner with appropriate permission. This behavior raises suspicion if this command is seen on an endpoint utilized by an account with no permission to do so. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting - logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your - endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the - Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed cacls.exe may be used. -id: 9ae9a48a-cdbe-11eb-875a-acde48001122 -known_false_positives: System administrators may use this windows utility. filter - is needed. -name: Modify ACLs Permission Of Files Or Folders -product: -- Splunk Behavioral Analytics -references: -- https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/ -risk_message: A cacls process $process_name$ with commandline $cmd_line$ try to modify - a permission of a file or directory in host $dest_device_id$ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string", null), @@ -35,39 +20,27 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name", process_name, "parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "process_path", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting + logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your + endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the + Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed cacls.exe may be used. +known_false_positives: System administrators may use this windows utility. filter + is needed. +references: +- https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/ tags: analytic_story: - XMRig cis20: - CIS 8 - CIS 13 - confidence: 70 - context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Defense Evasion - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1222.001/ssa_cacls/all_icalc.log - impact: 50 kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation - message: A cacls process $process_name$ with commandline $cmd_line$ try to modify - a permission of a file or directory in host $dest_device_id$ mitre_attack_id: - T1222 nist: - PR.DS - PR.IP - observable: - - name: dest_device_id - role: - - Victim - type: Hostname - - name: dest_user_id - role: - - Victim - type: user - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics required_fields: - _time - dest_device_id @@ -77,20 +50,15 @@ tags: - dest_user_id - process - cmd_line - risk_score: 35 - risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint + risk_severity: low test: name: Modify ACLs Permission Of Files Or Folders Unit Test tests: - - attack_data: - - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1222.001/ssa_cacls/all_icalc.log - file_name: all_icalc.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - description: Test for modifying permission of a file(s) or folder(s) using cacls - utility. + - name: Modify ACLs Permission Of Files Or Folders file: endpoint/ssa___modify_acls_permission_of_files_or_folders.yml - name: Modify ACLs Permission Of Files Or Folders pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' -type: Anomaly -version: 2 + attack_data: + - file_name: all_icalc.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1222.001/ssa_cacls/all_icalc.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___resize_shadowstorage_volume.yml b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___resize_shadowstorage_volume.yml index 661ec73714..d0f8bf116e 100644 --- a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___resize_shadowstorage_volume.yml +++ b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___resize_shadowstorage_volume.yml @@ -1,27 +1,10 @@ -author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -date: '2021-11-30' +name: Resize Shadowstorage Volume +id: dbc30554-d27e-11eb-9e5e-acde48001122 +version: 3 description: The following analytic identifies the resizing of shadowstorage using vssadmin.exe to avoid the shadow volumes being made again. This technique is typically found used by adversaries during a ransomware event and a precursor to deleting the shadowstorage. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting - logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your - endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the - Sysmon TA. -id: dbc30554-d27e-11eb-9e5e-acde48001122 -known_false_positives: System administrators may resize the shadowstorage for valid - purposes. Filter as needed. -name: Resize Shadowstorage Volume -product: -- Splunk Behavioral Analytics -references: -- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html -- https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html -risk_message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified - on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to create a shadow - copy to perform offline password cracking. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), @@ -35,6 +18,15 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name", process_name, "parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "process_path", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting + logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your + endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the + Sysmon TA. +known_false_positives: System administrators may resize the shadowstorage for valid + purposes. Filter as needed. +references: +- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html +- https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html tags: analytic_story: - Clop Ransomware @@ -42,42 +34,13 @@ tags: cis20: - CIS 10 - CIS 13 - confidence: 80 - context: - - Source:Endpoint - - stage:Defense Evasion - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/ssa_data1/windows-security.log - impact: 80 kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation - message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified - on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to create a shadow - copy to perform offline password cracking. mitre_attack_id: - T1489 nist: - PR.DS - PR.IP - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - role: - - Victim - type: User - - name: dest_device_id - role: - - Victim - type: Hostname - - name: parent_process - role: - - Parent Process - type: Parent Process - - name: process_name - role: - - Child Process - type: Process - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics required_fields: - _time - dest_device_id @@ -87,19 +50,15 @@ tags: - dest_user_id - process - cmd_line - risk_score: 64 - risk_severity: medium security_domain: endpoint + risk_severity: medium test: name: Resize Shadowstorage Volume Unit Test tests: - - attack_data: - - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/ssa_data1/windows-security.log - file_name: windows-security.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - description: Test for resizing the shadow storage of a machine + - name: Resize Shadowstorage Volume file: endpoint/ssa___resize_shadowstorage_volume.yml - name: Resize Shadowstorage Volume pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' -type: TTP -version: 3 + attack_data: + - file_name: windows-security.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/ssa_data1/windows-security.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___sdelete_application_execution.yml b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___sdelete_application_execution.yml index 10c0009209..4d6b945ed1 100644 --- a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___sdelete_application_execution.yml +++ b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___sdelete_application_execution.yml @@ -1,27 +1,11 @@ -author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -date: '2021-11-15' +name: Sdelete Application Execution +id: fcc52b9a-4616-11ec-8454-acde48001122 +version: 1 description: This analytic will detect the execution of sdelete.exe attempting to delete potentially important files that may related to adversary or insider threats to destroy evidence or information sabotage. Sdelete is a SysInternals utility meant to securely delete files on disk. This tool is commonly used to clear tracks and artifact on the targeted host. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information - on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from - your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, - confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the - endpoint product. -id: fcc52b9a-4616-11ec-8454-acde48001122 -known_false_positives: False positives should be limited, filter as needed. -name: Sdelete Application Execution -product: -- Splunk Behavioral Analytics -references: -- https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/ -- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1485/T1485.md -risk_message: Sdelete process $process_name$ executed on $dest_device_id$ attempting - to permanently delete files by $dest_user_id$. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event,"_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string", @@ -44,45 +28,26 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name", process_name, "process_path", process_path, "parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "parent_cmd_line", parent_cmd_line]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information + on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from + your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, + confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the + endpoint product. +known_false_positives: False positives should be limited, filter as needed. +references: +- https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/ +- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1485/T1485.md tags: analytic_story: - Information Sabotage cis20: [] - confidence: 70 - context: - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Execution - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/sdelete/security.log - impact: 60 kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation - message: Sdelete process $process_name$ executed on $dest_device_id$ attempting - to permanently delete files by $dest_user_id$. mitre_attack_id: - T1485 - T1070.004 - T1070 nist: [] - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - role: - - Victim - type: User - - name: dest_device_id - role: - - Victim - type: Hostname - - name: parent_process - role: - - Parent Process - type: Parent Process - - name: process_name - role: - - Child Process - type: Process - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics required_fields: - _time - dest @@ -94,19 +59,15 @@ tags: - process_id - process_path - cmd_line - risk_score: 42 - risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint + risk_severity: low test: name: Sdelete Application Execution Unit Test tests: - - attack_data: - - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/sdelete/security.log - file_name: security.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - description: Test for sdelete execution command + - name: Sdelete Application Execution file: endpoint/ssa___sdelete_application_execution.yml - name: Sdelete Application Execution pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' -type: Anomaly -version: 1 + attack_data: + - file_name: security.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/sdelete/security.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___system_process_running_from_unexpected_location.yml b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___system_process_running_from_unexpected_location.yml index 1db9eb83e5..f96f630ae5 100644 --- a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___system_process_running_from_unexpected_location.yml +++ b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___system_process_running_from_unexpected_location.yml @@ -1,22 +1,12 @@ -author: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -date: '2020-08-25' +name: System Process Running from Unexpected Location +id: 28179107-099a-464a-94d3-08301e6c055f +version: 3 description: An attacker tries might try to use different version of a system command without overriding original, or they might try to avoid some detection running the process from a different folder. This detection checks that a list of system processes run inside C:\\Windows\System32 or C:\\Windows\SysWOW64 The list of system processes has been extracted from https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/is_windows_system_file.csv and the original detection https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml -how_to_implement: Collect endpoint data such as sysmon or 4688 events. -id: 28179107-099a-464a-94d3-08301e6c055f -known_false_positives: None -name: System Process Running from Unexpected Location -product: -- Splunk Behavioral Analytics -references: [] -risk_message: A system process $process_name$ with commandline $cmd_line$ spawn in - non-default folder path in host $dest_device_id$ search: ' $ssa_input = | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval device=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null), user=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", @@ -234,58 +224,37 @@ search: ' $ssa_input = | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval device=ucast(map AND match_regex(process_path, /(?i)\\windows\\syswow64/)=false | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(device, user), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "process_path", process_path, "process_name", process_name]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: Collect endpoint data such as sysmon or 4688 events. +known_false_positives: None +references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics - Masquerading - Rename System Utilities cis20: - CIS 8 - confidence: 80 - context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Defense Evasion - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036/system_process_running_unexpected_location/windows-security.log - impact: 70 kill_chain_phases: - Actions on Objectives - message: A system process $process_name$ with commandline $cmd_line$ spawn in non-default - folder path in host $dest_device_id$ mitre_attack_id: - T1036 nist: - PR.PT - DE.CM - observable: - - name: dest_device_id - role: - - Victim - type: Hostname - - name: dest_user_id - role: - - Victim - type: user - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics required_fields: - dest_device_id - process_name - _time - dest_user_id - process_path - risk_score: 56 - risk_severity: medium security_domain: endpoint + risk_severity: medium test: - name: System Process Running from Unexpected Location - SSA Unit Test + name: System Process Running from Unexpected Location Unit Test tests: - - attack_data: - - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036/system_process_running_unexpected_location/windows-security.log - file_name: windows-security.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - description: Test System Process Running from an unexpected location + - name: System Process Running from Unexpected Location file: endpoint/ssa___system_process_running_from_unexpected_location.yml - name: System Process Running from Unexpected Location pass_condition: '@count_eq(1)' -type: Anomaly -version: 3 + attack_data: + - file_name: windows-security.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036/system_process_running_unexpected_location/windows-security.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___tcp_command_and_scripting_interpreter_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___tcp_command_and_scripting_interpreter_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml index 5fe63a798b..1ba0316e93 100644 --- a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___tcp_command_and_scripting_interpreter_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml +++ b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___tcp_command_and_scripting_interpreter_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml @@ -1,29 +1,11 @@ -author: Jose Hernandez, Michael Haag, Splunk -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -date: '2022-02-17' +name: TCP Command and Scripting Interpreter Outbound LDAP Traffic +id: 4d16a90c-d1a9-4d17-8156-d0db0c73c449 +version: 1 description: Malicious actors often abuse misconfigured LDAP servers or applications that use the LDAP servers in organizations. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. This search will help determine if you have any LDAP connections to IP addresses outside of private (RFC1918) address space. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information - on network traffic, specifically data that populates the Network_Traffic datamodel. - To develop this analytic we used specifically Zeek/Bro conn.log and PAN Traffic - events. -id: 4d16a90c-d1a9-4d17-8156-d0db0c73c449 -known_false_positives: Unknown at this moment. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be - allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. Please check those servers to - verify if the activity is legitimate. -name: TCP Command and Scripting Interpreter Outbound LDAP Traffic -product: -- Splunk Behavioral Analytics -references: -- https://www.govcert.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/ -- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/simulating-detecting-and-responding-to-log4shell-with-splunk.html -- https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-356a -risk_message: An outbound LDAP connection from $src_ip$ in your infrastructure connecting - to dest ip $dest_ip$ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), dest_port=map_get(input_event, "dest_port"), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "event_id"), "string", null), dest_ip=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_ips"), @@ -34,43 +16,29 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "dest_port", dest_port, "dest_ip", dest_ip]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information + on network traffic, specifically data that populates the Network_Traffic datamodel. + To develop this analytic we used specifically Zeek/Bro conn.log and PAN Traffic + events. +known_false_positives: Unknown at this moment. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be + allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. Please check those servers to + verify if the activity is legitimate. +references: +- https://www.govcert.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/ +- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/simulating-detecting-and-responding-to-log4shell-with-splunk.html +- https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-356a tags: analytic_story: - Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 cis20: - CIS 13 - confidence: 70 - context: - - Scope:Outbound - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Execution - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059/log4shell_ldap_traffic/pantraffic.log - impact: 50 kill_chain_phases: - - Execution - message: An outbound LDAP connection from $src_ip$ in your infrastructure connecting - to dest ip $dest_ip$ + - Exploitation mitre_attack_id: - T1059 nist: - PR.PT - DE.CM - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - role: - - Victim - type: User - - name: dest_device_id - role: - - Victim - type: Hostname - - name: parent_process_name - role: - - Parent Process - type: Parent Process - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics required_fields: - _time - dest_device_id @@ -80,20 +48,15 @@ tags: - dest_user_id - process - cmd_line - risk_score: 35 - risk_severity: low security_domain: network + risk_severity: low test: name: TCP Command and Scripting Interpreter Outbound LDAP Traffic Unit Test tests: - - attack_data: - - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059/log4shell_ldap_traffic/pantraffic.log - file_name: pantraffic.txt - source: pan:traffic - sourcetype: pan:traffic - description: Test PAN Traffic Logs LDAP outbound connection + - name: TCP Command and Scripting Interpreter Outbound LDAP Traffic file: network/ssa___tcp_command_and_scripting_interpreter_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml - name: PAN Traffic Logs pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' -type: Anomaly -version: 1 + attack_data: + - file_name: pantraffic.txt + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059/log4shell_ldap_traffic/pantraffic.log + source: pan:traffic diff --git a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml index e5242f4757..7d6fada37f 100644 --- a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml +++ b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml @@ -1,26 +1,9 @@ -author: Michael Haag, Splunk -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -date: '2021-12-07' +name: WBAdmin Delete System Backups +id: 71efbf52-4dbb-4c00-a520-306aa546cbb7 +version: 1 description: This search looks for flags passed to wbadmin.exe (Windows Backup Administrator Tool) that delete backup files. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent recovery. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information - on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from - your endpoints into the `Endpoint_Processess` datamodel. -id: 71efbf52-4dbb-4c00-a520-306aa546cbb7 -known_false_positives: Administrators may modify the boot configuration. -name: WBAdmin Delete System Backups -product: -- Splunk Behavioral Analytics -references: -- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1490/T1490.md -- https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/08/ryuks-return/ -- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/ -- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wbadmin -risk_message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified - on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to delete system - backups. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), @@ -34,48 +17,28 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name", process_name, "parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "process_path", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information + on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from + your endpoints into the `Endpoint_Processess` datamodel. +known_false_positives: Administrators may modify the boot configuration. +references: +- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1490/T1490.md +- https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/08/ryuks-return/ +- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/ +- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wbadmin tags: analytic_story: - Ryuk Ransomware - Ransomware cis20: - CIS 8 - confidence: 50 - context: - - Source:Endpoint - - stage:Defense Evasion - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-security_bcdedit_wbadmin.log - impact: 30 kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation - message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified - on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to delete system - backups. mitre_attack_id: - T1490 nist: - PR.AC - PR.IP - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - role: - - Victim - type: User - - name: dest_device_id - role: - - Victim - type: Hostname - - name: parent_process_name - role: - - Parent Process - type: Parent Process - - name: process_name - role: - - Child Process - type: Process - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics required_fields: - _time - dest_device_id @@ -85,19 +48,15 @@ tags: - dest_user_id - process - cmd_line - risk_score: 15 - risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint + risk_severity: low test: - name: WBAdmin Delete System Backups - SSA Unit Test + name: WBAdmin Delete System Backups Unit Test tests: - - attack_data: - - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-security_bcdedit_wbadmin.log - file_name: windows-security_bcdedit_wbadmin.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - description: Test detection of WBAdmin Delete System Backups + - name: WBAdmin Delete System Backups file: endpoint/ssa___wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml - name: WBAdmin Delete System Backups pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' -type: TTP -version: 1 + attack_data: + - file_name: windows-sysmon.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational diff --git a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___wevtutil_usage_to_clear_logs.yml b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___wevtutil_usage_to_clear_logs.yml index fd47c8e3f1..2e461702b1 100644 --- a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___wevtutil_usage_to_clear_logs.yml +++ b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___wevtutil_usage_to_clear_logs.yml @@ -1,25 +1,9 @@ -author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -date: '2021-06-15' +name: WevtUtil Usage To Clear Logs +id: 5438113c-cdd9-11eb-93b8-acde48001122 +version: 2 description: The wevtutil.exe application is the windows event log utility. This searches for wevtutil.exe with parameters for clearing the application, security, setup, powershell, sysmon, or system event logs. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your - hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be - ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. - The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data - model. -id: 5438113c-cdd9-11eb-93b8-acde48001122 -known_false_positives: The wevtutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows event - log utility. Administrators may use it to manage Windows event logs. -name: WevtUtil Usage To Clear Logs -product: -- Splunk Behavioral Analytics -references: -- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-clop-ransomware.html -risk_message: A wevtutil process $process_name$ with commandline $cmd_line$ to clear - event logs in host $dest_device_id$ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where "Endpoint_Processes" IN(_datamodels) | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, @@ -35,6 +19,15 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where "Endpoint_Processes" IN(_data "string", null)) | eval body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name", process_name, "parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "process_path", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your + hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be + ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. + The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data + model. +known_false_positives: The wevtutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows event + log utility. Administrators may use it to manage Windows event logs. +references: +- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-clop-ransomware.html tags: analytic_story: - Windows Log Manipulation @@ -43,34 +36,14 @@ tags: cis20: - CIS 8 - CIS 13 - confidence: 90 - context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Defense Evasion - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/ssa_wevtutil/clear_evt.log - impact: 70 kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation - message: A wevtutil process $process_name$ with commandline $cmd_line$ to clear - event logs in host $dest_device_id$ mitre_attack_id: - T1070 - T1070.001 nist: - PR.DS - PR.IP - observable: - - name: dest_device_id - role: - - Victim - type: Hostname - - name: dest_user_id - role: - - Victim - type: user - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics required_fields: - _time - dest_device_id @@ -79,19 +52,15 @@ tags: - process_path - dest_user_id - process - risk_score: 63 - risk_severity: medium security_domain: endpoint + risk_severity: medium test: name: WevtUtil Usage To Clear Logs Unit Test tests: - - attack_data: - - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/ssa_wevtutil/clear_evt.log - file_name: clear_evt.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - description: Test for wevtutil clear logs command + - name: WevtUtil Usage To Clear Logs file: endpoint/ssa___wevtutil_usage_to_clear_logs.yml - name: WevtUtil Usage To Clear Logs pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' -type: TTP -version: 2 + attack_data: + - file_name: clear_evt.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/ssa_wevtutil/clear_evt.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___wevtutil_usage_to_disable_logs.yml b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___wevtutil_usage_to_disable_logs.yml index c52db9ce28..635099699f 100644 --- a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___wevtutil_usage_to_disable_logs.yml +++ b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___wevtutil_usage_to_disable_logs.yml @@ -1,25 +1,9 @@ -author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -date: '2021-06-15' +name: Wevtutil Usage To Disable Logs +id: a4bdc944-cdd9-11eb-ac97-acde48001122 +version: 2 description: This search is to detect execution of wevtutil.exe to disable logs. This technique was seen in several ransomware to disable the event logs to evade alerts and detections in compromised host. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your - hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be - ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. - The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data - model. -id: a4bdc944-cdd9-11eb-ac97-acde48001122 -known_false_positives: network operator may disable audit event logs for debugging - purposes. -name: Wevtutil Usage To Disable Logs -product: -- Splunk Behavioral Analytics -references: -- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-ransom-x-ransomware-used-in-texas-txdot-cyberattack/ -risk_message: A wevtutil process $process_name$ with commandline $cmd_line$ to disable - event logs in host $dest_device_id$ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where "Endpoint_Processes" IN(_datamodels) | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, @@ -32,6 +16,15 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where "Endpoint_Processes" IN(_data "dest_device_id"), "string", null)) | eval body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name", process_name, "parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "process_path", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your + hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be + ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. + The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data + model. +known_false_positives: network operator may disable audit event logs for debugging + purposes. +references: +- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-ransom-x-ransomware-used-in-texas-txdot-cyberattack/ tags: analytic_story: - Windows Log Manipulation @@ -39,34 +32,14 @@ tags: cis20: - CIS 8 - CIS 13 - confidence: 90 - context: - - source:endpoint - - stage: Defense Evasion - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/ssa_wevtutil/disable_evt.log - impact: 70 kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation - message: A wevtutil process $process_name$ with commandline $cmd_line$ to disable - event logs in host $dest_device_id$ mitre_attack_id: - T1070 - T1070.001 nist: - PR.DS - PR.IP - observable: - - name: dest_device_id - role: - - Victim - type: Hostname - - name: dest_user_id - role: - - Victim - type: user - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics required_fields: - _time - dest_device_id @@ -75,19 +48,15 @@ tags: - process_path - dest_user_id - process - risk_score: 63 - risk_severity: medium security_domain: endpoint + risk_severity: medium test: name: Wevtutil Usage To Disable Logs Unit Test tests: - - attack_data: - - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/ssa_wevtutil/disable_evt.log - file_name: disable_evt.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - description: Test for wevtutil disable logs command + - name: Wevtutil Usage To Disable Logs file: endpoint/ssa___wevtutil_usage_to_disable_logs.yml - name: Wevtutil Usage To Disable Logs pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' -type: TTP -version: 2 + attack_data: + - file_name: disable_evt.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/ssa_wevtutil/disable_evt.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_bits_job_persistence.yml b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_bits_job_persistence.yml index 174f8227ff..e74510cc1b 100644 --- a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_bits_job_persistence.yml +++ b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_bits_job_persistence.yml @@ -1,7 +1,6 @@ -author: Michael Haag, Splunk -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -date: '2022-02-15' +name: Windows Bits Job Persistence +id: 1e25e97a-8ea4-11ec-9767-acde48001122 +version: 1 description: The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service utility `bitsadmin.exe` scheduling a BITS job to persist on an endpoint. The query identifies the parameters used to create, resume or add a file to a BITS @@ -9,25 +8,6 @@ description: The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Tra the BITS job created and capture any files written to disk. It is possible for BITS to be used to upload files and this may require further network data analysis to identify. You can use `bitsadmin /list /verbose` to list out the jobs during investigation. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information - on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from - your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, - confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the - endpoint product. -id: 1e25e97a-8ea4-11ec-9767-acde48001122 -known_false_positives: Limited false positives will be present. Typically, applications - will use `BitsAdmin.exe`. Any filtering should be done based on command-line arguments - (legitimate applications) or parent process. -name: Windows Bits Job Persistence -product: -- Splunk Behavioral Analytics -references: -- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1197/ -- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/bitsadmin -- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1197/T1197.md#atomic-test-3---persist-download--execute -- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Bitsadmin/ -risk_message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified - on endpoint $dest$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to persist using BITS. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where "Endpoint_Processes" IN(_datamodels) | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, @@ -43,43 +23,29 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where "Endpoint_Processes" IN(_data "string", null)) | eval body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name", process_name, "parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "process_path", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information + on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from + your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, + confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the + endpoint product. +known_false_positives: Limited false positives will be present. Typically, applications + will use `BitsAdmin.exe`. Any filtering should be done based on command-line arguments + (legitimate applications) or parent process. +references: +- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1197/ +- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/bitsadmin +- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1197/T1197.md#atomic-test-3---persist-download--execute +- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Bitsadmin/ tags: analytic_story: - BITS Jobs - Living Off The Land - automated_detection_testing: passed - confidence: 80 - context: - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Persistence - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1197/atomic_red_team/bits-windows-security.log - impact: 70 + cis20: null kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation - message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified - on endpoint $dest$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to persist using BITS. mitre_attack_id: - T1197 - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - role: - - Victim - type: User - - name: dest_device_id - role: - - Victim - type: Hostname - - name: parent_process_name - role: - - Parent Process - type: Parent Process - - name: process_name - role: - - Child Process - type: Process - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics + nist: null required_fields: - _time - dest_device_id @@ -89,18 +55,15 @@ tags: - dest_user_id - process - cmd_line - risk_score: 56 - risk_severity: medium security_domain: endpoint + risk_severity: medium test: name: Windows Bits Job Persistence Unit Test tests: - - attack_data: - - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1197/atomic_red_team/bits-windows-security.log - file_name: bits-windows-security.log - source: WinEventLog:Security + - name: Windows Bits Job Persistence file: endpoint/ssa___windows_bits_job_persistence.yml - name: Windows Bits Job Persistence pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' -type: TTP -version: 1 + attack_data: + - file_name: bits-windows-security.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1197/atomic_red_team/bits-windows-security.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_bitsadmin_download_file.yml b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_bitsadmin_download_file.yml index 8f504a9a0b..618b60249e 100644 --- a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_bitsadmin_download_file.yml +++ b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_bitsadmin_download_file.yml @@ -1,7 +1,6 @@ -author: Michael Haag, Splunk -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -date: '2022-02-16' +name: Windows Bitsadmin Download File +id: d76e8188-8f5a-11ec-ace4-acde48001122 +version: 1 description: The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service utility `bitsadmin.exe` using the `transfer` parameter to download a remote object. In addition, look for `download` or `upload` on the command-line, the switches @@ -14,24 +13,6 @@ description: The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Tra and child processes to capture any behaviors and artifacts. In some suspicious and malicious instances, BITS jobs will be created. You can use `bitsadmin /list /verbose` to list out the jobs during investigation. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information - on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from - your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, - confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the - endpoint product. -id: d76e8188-8f5a-11ec-ace4-acde48001122 -known_false_positives: Limited false positives, however it may be required to filter - based on parent process name or network connection. -name: Windows Bitsadmin Download File -product: -- Splunk Behavioral Analytics -references: -- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/8eb52117b748d378325f7719554a896e37bccec7/atomics/T1105/T1105.md#atomic-test-9---windows---bitsadmin-bits-download -- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/bc705cb7aaa5f26f2d96585fac8e4c7052df0ff9/atomics/T1197/T1197.md -- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/bits/bitsadmin-tool -- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/ -risk_message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified - on endpoint $dest$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to download a file. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where "Endpoint_Processes" IN(_datamodels) | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, @@ -44,46 +25,31 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where "Endpoint_Processes" IN(_data "dest_device_id"), "string", null)) | eval body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name", process_name, "parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "process_path", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information + on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from + your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, + confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the + endpoint product. +known_false_positives: Limited false positives, however it may be required to filter + based on parent process name or network connection. +references: +- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/8eb52117b748d378325f7719554a896e37bccec7/atomics/T1105/T1105.md#atomic-test-9---windows---bitsadmin-bits-download +- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/bc705cb7aaa5f26f2d96585fac8e4c7052df0ff9/atomics/T1197/T1197.md +- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/bits/bitsadmin-tool +- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/ tags: analytic_story: - Ingress Tool Transfer - BITS Jobs - DarkSide Ransomware - Living Off The Land - automated_detection_testing: passed - confidence: 70 - context: - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Defense Evasion - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1197/atomic_red_team/bits-windows-security.log - impact: 70 + cis20: null kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation - message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified - on endpoint $dest$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to download a file. mitre_attack_id: - T1197 - T1105 - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - role: - - Victim - type: User - - name: dest_device_id - role: - - Victim - type: Hostname - - name: parent_process_name - role: - - Parent Process - type: Parent Process - - name: process_name - role: - - Child Process - type: Process - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics + nist: null required_fields: - _time - dest_device_id @@ -93,18 +59,15 @@ tags: - dest_user_id - process - cmd_line - risk_score: 49 - risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint + risk_severity: low test: name: Windows Bitsadmin Download File Unit Test tests: - - attack_data: - - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1197/atomic_red_team/bits-windows-security.log - file_name: bits-windows-security.log - source: WinEventLog:Security + - name: Windows Bitsadmin Download File file: endpoint/ssa___windows_bitsadmin_download_file.yml - name: Windows Bitsadmin Download File pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' -type: TTP -version: 1 + attack_data: + - file_name: bits-windows-security.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1197/atomic_red_team/bits-windows-security.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_certutil_decode_file.yml b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_certutil_decode_file.yml index b1d9df05f7..a66da327f2 100644 --- a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_certutil_decode_file.yml +++ b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_certutil_decode_file.yml @@ -1,7 +1,6 @@ -author: Michael Haag, Splunk -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -date: '2022-02-16' +name: Windows CertUtil Decode File +id: b06983f4-8f72-11ec-ab50-acde48001122 +version: 1 description: CertUtil.exe may be used to `encode` and `decode` a file, including PE and script code. Encoding will convert a file to base64 with `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----` and `-----END CERTIFICATE-----` tags. Malicious usage will include decoding a encoded @@ -10,26 +9,6 @@ description: CertUtil.exe may be used to `encode` and `decode` a file, including and `decodehex`. Similarly, the file will be encoded in HEX and later decoded for further execution. During triage, identify the source of the file being decoded. Review its contents or execution behavior for further analysis. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information - on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from - your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, - confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the - endpoint product. -id: b06983f4-8f72-11ec-ab50-acde48001122 -known_false_positives: Typically seen used to `encode` files, but it is possible to - see legitimate use of `decode`. Filter based on parent-child relationship, file - paths, endpoint or user. -name: Windows CertUtil Decode File -product: -- Splunk Behavioral Analytics -references: -- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140/ -- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1140/T1140.md -- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/certutil -- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/certutilexe-could-allow-attackers-to-download-malware-while-bypassing-av/ -risk_message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified - on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to decode a file - on disk. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where "Endpoint_Processes" IN(_datamodels) | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, @@ -42,44 +21,29 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where "Endpoint_Processes" IN(_data "dest_device_id"), "string", null)) | eval body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name", process_name, "parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "process_path", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information + on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from + your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, + confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the + endpoint product. +known_false_positives: Typically seen used to `encode` files, but it is possible to + see legitimate use of `decode`. Filter based on parent-child relationship, file + paths, endpoint or user. +references: +- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140/ +- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1140/T1140.md +- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/certutil +- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/certutilexe-could-allow-attackers-to-download-malware-while-bypassing-av/ tags: analytic_story: - Deobfuscate-Decode Files or Information - Living Off The Land - automated_detection_testing: passed - confidence: 80 - context: - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Execution - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/ master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1140/atomic_red_team/encode-windows-security.log - impact: 50 + cis20: null kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation - message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified - on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to decode a file - on disk. mitre_attack_id: - T1140 - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - role: - - Victim - type: User - - name: dest_device_id - role: - - Victim - type: Hostname - - name: parent_process_name - role: - - Parent Process - type: Parent Process - - name: process_name - role: - - Child Process - type: Process - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics + nist: null required_fields: - _time - dest_device_id @@ -89,18 +53,15 @@ tags: - dest_user_id - process - cmd_line - risk_score: 40 - risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint + risk_severity: low test: name: Windows CertUtil Decode File Unit Test tests: - - attack_data: - - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1140/atomic_red_team/encode-windows-security.log - file_name: windows-security.log - source: WinEventLog:Security + - name: Windows CertUtil Decode File file: endpoint/ssa___windows_certutil_decode_file.yml - name: Windows CertUtil Decode File pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' -type: TTP -version: 1 + attack_data: + - file_name: windows-security.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1140/atomic_red_team/encode-windows-security.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_certutil_urlcache_download.yml b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_certutil_urlcache_download.yml index 02ae17f5a1..6f90885e09 100644 --- a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_certutil_urlcache_download.yml +++ b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_certutil_urlcache_download.yml @@ -1,7 +1,6 @@ -author: Michael Haag, Splunk -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -date: '2022-02-16' +name: Windows CertUtil URLCache Download +id: 8cb1ad38-8f6d-11ec-87a3-acde48001122 +version: 1 description: Certutil.exe may download a file from a remote destination using `-urlcache`. This behavior does require a URL to be passed on the command-line. In addition, `-f` (force) and `-split` (Split embedded ASN.1 elements, and save to files) will @@ -9,21 +8,6 @@ description: Certutil.exe may download a file from a remote destination using `- However, it is uncommon for `certutil.exe` to write files to world writeable paths.\ During triage, capture any files on disk and review. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain in question. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information - on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from - your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -id: 8cb1ad38-8f6d-11ec-87a3-acde48001122 -known_false_positives: Limited false positives in most environments, however tune - as needed based on parent-child relationship or network connection. -name: Windows CertUtil URLCache Download -product: -- Splunk Behavioral Analytics -references: -- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/ -- https://www.avira.com/en/blog/certutil-abused-by-attackers-to-spread-threats -- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/10/certutil-qualms-they-came-to-drop-fombs.html -risk_message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified - on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to download a file. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where "Endpoint_Processes" IN(_datamodels) | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, @@ -37,44 +21,26 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where "Endpoint_Processes" IN(_data "string", null)) | eval body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name", process_name, "parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "process_path", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information + on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from + your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +known_false_positives: Limited false positives in most environments, however tune + as needed based on parent-child relationship or network connection. +references: +- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/ +- https://www.avira.com/en/blog/certutil-abused-by-attackers-to-spread-threats +- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/10/certutil-qualms-they-came-to-drop-fombs.html tags: analytic_story: - Ingress Tool Transfer - DarkSide Ransomware - Living Off The Land - automated_detection_testing: passed - confidence: 100 - context: - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Command and Control - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/T1105-windows-security.log - impact: 90 + cis20: null kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation - message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified - on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to download a file. mitre_attack_id: - T1105 - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - role: - - Victim - type: User - - name: dest_device_id - role: - - Victim - type: Hostname - - name: parent_process_name - role: - - Parent Process - type: Parent Process - - name: process_name - role: - - Child Process - type: Process - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics + nist: null required_fields: - _time - dest_device_id @@ -84,18 +50,15 @@ tags: - dest_user_id - process - cmd_line - risk_score: 90 - risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint + risk_severity: high test: name: Windows CertUtil URLCache Download Unit Test tests: - - attack_data: - - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/T1105-windows-security.log - file_name: T1105-windows-security.log - source: WinEventLog:Security + - name: Windows CertUtil URLCache Download file: endpoint/ssa___windows_certutil_urlcache_download.yml - name: Windows CertUtil URLCache Download pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' -type: TTP -version: 1 + attack_data: + - file_name: T1105-windows-security.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/T1105-windows-security.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_certutil_verifyctl_download.yml b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_certutil_verifyctl_download.yml index 78fbe31f70..5ebeb7e74f 100644 --- a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_certutil_verifyctl_download.yml +++ b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_certutil_verifyctl_download.yml @@ -1,7 +1,6 @@ -author: Michael Haag, Splunk -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -date: '2022-02-16' +name: Windows CertUtil VerifyCtl Download +id: 9ac29c40-8f6b-11ec-b19a-acde48001122 +version: 1 description: 'Certutil.exe may download a file from a remote destination using `-VerifyCtl`. This behavior does require a URL to be passed on the command-line. In addition, `-f` (force) and `-split` (Split embedded ASN.1 elements, and save to files) will @@ -9,22 +8,6 @@ description: 'Certutil.exe may download a file from a remote destination using ` \ During triage, capture any files on disk and review. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain in question. Using `-VerifyCtl`, the file will either be written to the current working directory or `%APPDATA%\..\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\`. ' -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information - on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from - your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -id: 9ac29c40-8f6b-11ec-b19a-acde48001122 -known_false_positives: Limited false positives in most environments, however tune - as needed based on parent-child relationship or network connection. -name: Windows CertUtil VerifyCtl Download -product: -- Splunk Behavioral Analytics -references: -- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/ -- https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2020/08/23/certutil-one-more-gui-lolbin/ -- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc732443(v=ws.11)#-verifyctl -- https://www.avira.com/en/blog/certutil-abused-by-attackers-to-spread-threats -risk_message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified - on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to download a file. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where "Endpoint_Processes" IN(_datamodels) | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, @@ -38,44 +21,27 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where "Endpoint_Processes" IN(_data "string", null)) | eval body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name", process_name, "parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "process_path", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information + on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from + your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. +known_false_positives: Limited false positives in most environments, however tune + as needed based on parent-child relationship or network connection. +references: +- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/ +- https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2020/08/23/certutil-one-more-gui-lolbin/ +- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc732443(v=ws.11)#-verifyctl +- https://www.avira.com/en/blog/certutil-abused-by-attackers-to-spread-threats tags: analytic_story: - Ingress Tool Transfer - DarkSide Ransomware - Living Off The Land - automated_detection_testing: passed - confidence: 100 - context: - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Command and Control - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/T1105-windows-security.log - impact: 90 + cis20: null kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation - message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified - on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to download a file. mitre_attack_id: - T1105 - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - role: - - Victim - type: User - - name: dest_device_id - role: - - Victim - type: Hostname - - name: parent_process_name - role: - - Parent Process - type: Parent Process - - name: process_name - role: - - Child Process - type: Process - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics + nist: null required_fields: - _time - dest_device_id @@ -85,18 +51,15 @@ tags: - dest_user_id - process - cmd_line - risk_score: 90 - risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint + risk_severity: high test: name: Windows CertUtil VerifyCtl Download Unit Test tests: - - attack_data: - - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/T1105-windows-security.log - file_name: T1105-windows-security.log - source: WinEventLog:Security + - name: Windows CertUtil VerifyCtl Download file: endpoint/ssa___windows_certutil_verifyctl_download_.yml - name: Windows CertUtil VerifyCtl Download pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' -type: TTP -version: 1 + attack_data: + - file_name: T1105-windows-security.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/T1105-windows-security.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination.yml b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination.yml index 2883aa9f5d..89f7971a3b 100644 --- a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination.yml +++ b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination.yml @@ -1,7 +1,6 @@ -author: Michael Haag, Splunk -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -date: '2021-12-03' +name: Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination +id: cc8d046a-543b-11ec-b864-acde48001122 +version: 1 description: 'The following analytic identifies the use of Windows Curl.exe uploading a file to a remote destination. \ @@ -20,22 +19,6 @@ description: 'The following analytic identifies the use of Windows Curl.exe uplo what they are attempting to upload (zip vs txt). During triage, review parallel processes for further behavior. In addition, identify if the upload was successful in network logs. If a file was uploaded, isolate the endpoint and review.' -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information - on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from - your endpoints into the `Endpoint_Processess` datamodel. -id: cc8d046a-543b-11ec-b864-acde48001122 -known_false_positives: False positives may be limited to source control applications - and may be required to be filtered out. -name: Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination -product: -- Splunk Behavioral Analytics -references: -- https://everything.curl.dev/usingcurl/uploads -- https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/containers/tar-and-curl-come-to-windows/ba-p/382409 -- https://twitter.com/d1r4c/status/1279042657508081664?s=20 -risk_message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified - on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ uploading a file to a remote - destination. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where "Endpoint_Processes" IN(_datamodels) | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, @@ -52,45 +35,24 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where "Endpoint_Processes" IN(_data "string", null)) | eval body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name", process_name, "parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "process_path", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information + on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from + your endpoints into the `Endpoint_Processess` datamodel. +known_false_positives: False positives may be limited to source control applications + and may be required to be filtered out. +references: +- https://everything.curl.dev/usingcurl/uploads +- https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/containers/tar-and-curl-come-to-windows/ba-p/382409 +- https://twitter.com/d1r4c/status/1279042657508081664?s=20 tags: analytic_story: - Ingress Tool Transfer - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: [] - confidence: 100 - context: - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Defense Evasion - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log - impact: 80 kill_chain_phases: - - Exfiltration - message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified - on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ uploading a file to a remote - destination. + - Exploitation mitre_attack_id: - T1105 nist: [] - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - role: - - Victim - type: User - - name: dest_device_id - role: - - Victim - type: Hostname - - name: parent_process_name - role: - - Parent Process - type: Parent Process - - name: process_name - role: - - Child Process - type: Process - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics required_fields: - _time - dest_device_id @@ -100,18 +62,15 @@ tags: - dest_user_id - process - cmd_line - risk_score: 80 - risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint + risk_severity: high test: name: Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination Unit Test tests: - - attack_data: - - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log - file_name: windows-security.log - source: WinEventLog:Security + - name: Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination file: endpoint/ssa___windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination.yml - name: Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' -type: TTP -version: 1 + attack_data: + - file_name: windows-security.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution.yml b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution.yml index fd1496d2c7..bf3e0e467f 100644 --- a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution.yml +++ b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution.yml @@ -1,26 +1,12 @@ -author: Lou Stella, Splunk -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -date: '2022-02-17' +name: Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution +id: aa502688-9037-11ec-842d-acde48001122 +version: 1 description: DiskShadow.exe is a Microsoft Signed binary present on Windows Server. It has a scripting mode intended for complex scripted backup operations. This feature also allows for execution of arbitrary unsigned code. This analytic looks for the usage of the scripting mode flags in executions of DiskShadow. During triage, compare to known backup behavior in your environment and then review the scripts called by diskshadow. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information - on processes that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from - your endpoints into the `Endpoint_Processess` datamodel. -id: aa502688-9037-11ec-842d-acde48001122 -known_false_positives: Administrators using the DiskShadow tool in their infrastructure - as a main backup tool with scripts will cause false positives -name: Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution -product: -- Splunk Behavioral Analytics -references: -- https://bohops.com/2018/03/26/diskshadow-the-return-of-vss-evasion-persistence-and-active-directory-database-extraction/ -risk_message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified - on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to run a script. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where "Endpoint_Processes" IN(_datamodels) | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, @@ -34,45 +20,24 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where "Endpoint_Processes" IN(_data | eval body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name", process_name, "parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "process_path", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information + on processes that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from + your endpoints into the `Endpoint_Processess` datamodel. +known_false_positives: Administrators using the DiskShadow tool in their infrastructure + as a main backup tool with scripts will cause false positives +references: +- https://bohops.com/2018/03/26/diskshadow-the-return-of-vss-evasion-persistence-and-active-directory-database-extraction/ tags: analytic_story: - Living Off The Land cis20: - CIS 8 - confidence: 70 - context: - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Execution - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218/diskshadow/windows-security.log - impact: 70 kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation - message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified - on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to run a script. mitre_attack_id: - T1218 nist: - DE.CM - observable: - - name: dest_device_id - role: - - Victim - type: Hostname - - name: dest_user_id - role: - - Victim - type: User - - name: parent_process_name - role: - - Parent Process - type: Parent Process - - name: process_name - role: - - Child Process - type: Process - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics required_fields: - _time - dest_device_id @@ -82,18 +47,15 @@ tags: - dest_user_id - process - cmd_line - risk_score: 49 - risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint + risk_severity: low test: name: BA Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution Unit Test tests: - - attack_data: - - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218/diskshadow/windows-security.log - file_name: windows-security.log - source: WinEventLog:Security + - name: Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution file: endpoint/ssa___windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution.yml - name: BA Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' -type: Anomaly -version: 1 + attack_data: + - file_name: windows-security.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218/diskshadow/windows-security.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_eventvwr_uac_bypass.yml b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_eventvwr_uac_bypass.yml index 9956dd4fa7..f85e8c20f6 100644 --- a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_eventvwr_uac_bypass.yml +++ b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_eventvwr_uac_bypass.yml @@ -1,27 +1,12 @@ -author: Lou Stella, Splunk -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Registry -date: '2022-02-18' +name: Windows Eventvwr UAC Bypass +id: 66adff66-90d9-11ec-aba7-acde48001122 +version: 1 description: The following search identifies Eventvwr bypass by identifying the registry modification into a specific path that eventvwr.msc looks to (but is not valid) upon execution. A successful attack will include a suspicious command to be executed upon eventvwr.msc loading. Upon triage, review the parallel processes that have executed. Identify any additional registry modifications on the endpoint that may look suspicious. Remediate as necessary. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information - on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from - your endpoints into the `Endpoint_Registry` datamodel. -id: 66adff66-90d9-11ec-aba7-acde48001122 -known_false_positives: None known at this time. -name: Windows Eventvwr UAC Bypass -product: -- Splunk Behavioral Analytics -references: -- https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/ -- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.md -- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002 -- https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/ -risk_message: Registry values were modified to bypass UAC using Event Viewer on $dest_device_id$ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where "Endpoint_Registry" IN (_datamodels) | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), registry_path=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "registry_path"), "string", null)), @@ -38,6 +23,15 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where "Endpoint_Registry" IN (_data registry_hive, "registry_value_name", registry_value_name, "registry_key_name", registry_key_name, "registry_value_type", registry_value_type, "registry_value_data", registry_value_data, "process_guid", process_guid]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information + on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from + your endpoints into the `Endpoint_Registry` datamodel. +known_false_positives: None known at this time. +references: +- https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/ +- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.md +- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002 +- https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/ tags: analytic_story: - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics @@ -45,32 +39,13 @@ tags: - Living Off The Land cis20: - CIS 14 - confidence: 100 - context: - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Privilege Escalation - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/ssa_eventvwr/windows-sysmon-registry.log - impact: 80 kill_chain_phases: - - Privilege Escalation - message: Registry values were modified to bypass UAC using Event Viewer on $dest_device_id$ + - Exploitation mitre_attack_id: - T1548.002 - T1548 nist: - DE.AE - observable: - - name: dest_device_id - role: - - Victim - type: Hostname - - name: dest_user_id - role: - - Victim - type: User - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics required_fields: - _time - event_id @@ -81,19 +56,15 @@ tags: - registry_value_type - registry_value_data - process_guid - risk_score: 80 - risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint + risk_severity: high test: name: Windows Eventvwr UAC Bypass Unit Test tests: - - attack_data: - - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/ssa_eventvwr/windows-sysmon-registry.log - file_name: windows-sysmon-registry.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog + - name: Windows Eventvwr UAC Bypass file: endpoint/ssa___windows_eventvwr_uac_bypass.yml - name: Windows Eventvwr UAC Bypass pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' -type: Anomaly -version: 1 + attack_data: + - file_name: windows-sysmon-registry.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/ssa_eventvwr/windows-sysmon-registry.log + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational diff --git a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_mshta_child_process.yml b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_mshta_child_process.yml index bc8fc0c0d9..b19a18915a 100644 --- a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_mshta_child_process.yml +++ b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_mshta_child_process.yml @@ -1,27 +1,10 @@ -author: Michael Haag, Splunk -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -date: '2022-02-23' +name: Windows MSHTA Child Process +id: f63f7e9c-9526-11ec-9fc7-acde48001122 +version: 1 description: The following analytic identifies child processes spawning from "mshta.exe". The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, parent process "mshta.exe" and its child process. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting - logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your - endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the - Sysmon TA. -id: f63f7e9c-9526-11ec-9fc7-acde48001122 -known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit - this behavior, triggering a false positive. -name: Windows MSHTA Child Process -product: -- Splunk Behavioral Analytics -references: -- https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses -- https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/ -risk_message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified - on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to access a remote - destination to download an additional payload. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), @@ -38,49 +21,29 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name", process_name, "parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "process_path", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting + logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your + endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the + Sysmon TA. +known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit + this behavior, triggering a false positive. +references: +- https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses +- https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/ tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious MSHTA Activity - Living Off The Land cis20: - CIS 8 - confidence: 100 - context: - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Defense Evasion - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log - impact: 80 kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation - message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified - on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to access a remote - destination to download an additional payload. mitre_attack_id: - T1218.005 - T1218 nist: - PR.PT - DE.CM - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - role: - - Victim - type: User - - name: dest_device_id - role: - - Victim - type: Hostname - - name: parent_process_name - role: - - Parent Process - type: Parent Process - - name: process_name - role: - - Child Process - type: Process - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics required_fields: - _time - dest_device_id @@ -90,18 +53,15 @@ tags: - dest_user_id - process - cmd_line - risk_score: 80 - risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint + risk_severity: high test: name: Windows MSHTA Child Process Unit Test tests: - - attack_data: - - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log - file_name: windows-security.log - source: WinEventLog:Security + - name: Windows MSHTA Child Process file: endpoint/ssa___windows_mshta_child_process.yml - name: Windows MSHTA Child Process pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' -type: TTP -version: 1 + attack_data: + - file_name: windows-security.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_mshta_command-line_url.yml b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_mshta_command_line_url.yml similarity index 70% rename from dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_mshta_command-line_url.yml rename to dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_mshta_command_line_url.yml index 60ef667e7a..17655034aa 100644 --- a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_mshta_command-line_url.yml +++ b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_mshta_command_line_url.yml @@ -1,7 +1,6 @@ -author: Michael Haag, Splunk -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -date: '2022-02-23' +name: Windows MSHTA Command-Line URL +id: 9b35c538-94ef-11ec-9439-acde48001122 +version: 1 description: This analytic identifies when Microsoft HTML Application Host (mshta.exe) utility is used to make remote http connections. Adversaries may use mshta.exe to proxy the download and execution of remote .hta files. The analytic identifies command @@ -9,24 +8,6 @@ description: This analytic identifies when Microsoft HTML Application Host (msht malicious software to bypass preventative controls. The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process "rundll32.exe" and its parent process. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information - on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from - your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, - confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the - endpoint product. -id: 9b35c538-94ef-11ec-9439-acde48001122 -known_false_positives: It is possible legitimate applications may perform this behavior - and will need to be filtered. -name: Windows MSHTA Command-Line URL -product: -- Splunk Behavioral Analytics -references: -- https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses -- https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/ -- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/search/-search-3x-wds-extidx-prot-implementing -risk_message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified - on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to access a remote - destination to download an additional payload. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), @@ -40,49 +21,31 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name", process_name, "parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "process_path", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information + on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from + your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, + confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the + endpoint product. +known_false_positives: It is possible legitimate applications may perform this behavior + and will need to be filtered. +references: +- https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses +- https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/ +- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/search/-search-3x-wds-extidx-prot-implementing tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious MSHTA Activity - Living Off The Land cis20: - CIS 8 - confidence: 100 - context: - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Defense Evasion - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log - impact: 80 kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation - message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified - on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to access a remote - destination to download an additional payload. mitre_attack_id: - T1218.005 - T1218 nist: - PR.PT - DE.CM - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - role: - - Victim - type: User - - name: dest_device_id - role: - - Victim - type: Hostname - - name: parent_process_name - role: - - Parent Process - type: Parent Process - - name: process_name - role: - - Child Process - type: Process - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics required_fields: - _time - dest_device_id @@ -92,18 +55,15 @@ tags: - dest_user_id - process - cmd_line - risk_score: 80 - risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint + risk_severity: high test: name: Windows MSHTA Command-Line URL Unit Test tests: - - attack_data: - - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log - file_name: windows-security.log - source: WinEventLog:Security + - name: Windows MSHTA Command-Line URL file: endpoint/ssa___windows_mshta_command_line_url.yml - name: Windows MSHTA Command-Line URL pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' -type: TTP -version: 1 + attack_data: + - file_name: windows-security.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml index d3c940e30f..36cad740cd 100644 --- a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml +++ b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml @@ -1,30 +1,11 @@ -author: Michael Haag, Splunk -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -date: '2022-02-23' +name: Windows MSHTA Inline HTA Execution +id: 24962154-9524-11ec-9333-acde48001122 +version: 1 description: The following analytic identifies "mshta.exe" execution with inline protocol handlers. "JavaScript", "VBScript", and "About" are the only supported options when invoking HTA content directly on the command-line. The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process "mshta.exe" and its parent process. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information - on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from - your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, - confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the - endpoint product. -id: 24962154-9524-11ec-9333-acde48001122 -known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit - this behavior, triggering a false positive. -name: Windows MSHTA Inline HTA Execution -product: -- Splunk Behavioral Analytics -references: -- https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses -- https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/ -- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/search/-search-3x-wds-extidx-prot-implementing -risk_message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified - on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ executing with inline HTA, indicative - of defense evasion. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), @@ -38,49 +19,31 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name", process_name, "parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "process_path", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information + on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from + your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, + confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the + endpoint product. +known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit + this behavior, triggering a false positive. +references: +- https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses +- https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/ +- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/search/-search-3x-wds-extidx-prot-implementing tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious MSHTA Activity - Living Off The Land cis20: - CIS 8 - confidence: 100 - context: - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Defense Evasion - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log - impact: 80 kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation - message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified - on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ executing with inline HTA, - indicative of defense evasion. mitre_attack_id: - T1218.005 - T1218 nist: - PR.PT - DE.CM - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - role: - - Victim - type: User - - name: dest_device_id - role: - - Victim - type: Hostname - - name: parent_process_name - role: - - Parent Process - type: Parent Process - - name: process_name - role: - - Child Process - type: Process - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics required_fields: - _time - dest_device_id @@ -90,18 +53,15 @@ tags: - dest_user_id - process - cmd_line - risk_score: 80 - risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint + risk_severity: high test: name: Windows MSHTA Inline HTA Execution Unit Test tests: - - attack_data: - - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log - file_name: windows-security.log - source: WinEventLog:Security + - name: Windows MSHTA Inline HTA Execution file: endpoint/ssa___windows_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml - name: Windows MSHTA Inline HTA Execution pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' -type: TTP -version: 1 + attack_data: + - file_name: windows-security.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_powershell_connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_powershell_connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml index 2ad587f434..d5ef0ec62c 100644 --- a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_powershell_connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml +++ b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_powershell_connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml @@ -1,7 +1,6 @@ -author: Jose Hernandez, David Dorsey, Michael Haag Splunk -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -date: '2022-02-11' +name: Windows Powershell Connect to Internet With Hidden Window +id: 477e068e-8b6d-11ec-b6c1-81af21670352 +version: 1 description: The following hunting analytic identifies PowerShell commands utilizing the WindowStyle parameter to hide the window on the compromised endpoint. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it is overriding the default PowerShell @@ -11,26 +10,6 @@ description: The following hunting analytic identifies PowerShell commands utili For example w, win, windowsty and so forth. In addition, through our research it was identified that PowerShell will interpret different command switch types beyond the hyphen. We have added endash, emdash, horizontal bar, and forward slash. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your - hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be - ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. - The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data - model. -id: 477e068e-8b6d-11ec-b6c1-81af21670352 -known_false_positives: Legitimate process can have this combination of command-line - options, but it's not common. -name: Windows Powershell Connect to Internet With Hidden Window -product: -- Splunk Behavioral Analytics -references: -- https://regexr.com/663rr -- https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses/blob/master/TestHarnesses/T1059.001_PowerShell/OutPowerShellCommandLineParameter.ps1 -- https://ss64.com/ps/powershell.html -- https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/1440758396534214658?s=20 -- https://blog.netlab.360.com/ten-families-of-malicious-samples-are-spreading-using-the-log4j2-vulnerability-now/ -risk_message: PowerShell processes $process$ started with parameters to modify the - execution policy of the run, run in a hidden window, and connect to the Internet - on host $dest$ executed by user $user$. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), @@ -46,51 +25,34 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name", process_name, "parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "process_path", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your + hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be + ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. + The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data + model. +known_false_positives: Legitimate process can have this combination of command-line + options, but it's not common. +references: +- https://regexr.com/663rr +- https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses/blob/master/TestHarnesses/T1059.001_PowerShell/OutPowerShellCommandLineParameter.ps1 +- https://ss64.com/ps/powershell.html +- https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/1440758396534214658?s=20 +- https://blog.netlab.360.com/ten-families-of-malicious-samples-are-spreading-using-the-log4j2-vulnerability-now/ tags: analytic_story: - Malicious PowerShell - Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns - HAFNIUM Group - Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 - confidence: 70 - context: - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Exfiltration - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/hidden_powershell/hidden_windows-security.log - impact: 50 kill_chain_phases: - - Exfiltration - message: PowerShell processes $process$ started with parameters to modify the execution - policy of the run, run in a hidden window, and connect to the Internet on host - $dest$ executed by user $user$. + - Exploitation mitre_attack_id: - T1020 nist: - PR.PT - DE.CM - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - role: - - Victim - type: User - - name: dest_device_id - role: - - Victim - type: Hostname - - name: parent_process_name - role: - - Parent Process - type: Parent Process - - name: process_name - role: - - Child Process - type: Process - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics required_fields: - _time - dest_device_id @@ -100,19 +62,15 @@ tags: - dest_user_id - process - cmd_line - risk_score: 35 - risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint + risk_severity: low test: name: Windows Powershell Connect to Internet With Hidden Window Unit Test tests: - - attack_data: - - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/hidden_powershell/hidden_windows-security.log - file_name: hidden_windows-security.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - description: Test Windows Powershell Connect to Internet With Hidden Window detections + - name: Windows Powershell Connect to Internet With Hidden Window file: endpoint/ssa___windows_powershell_connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml - name: Windows Powershell Connect to Internet With Hidden Window pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' -type: Anomaly -version: 1 + attack_data: + - file_name: hidden_windows-security.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/hidden_powershell/hidden_windows-security.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_powershell_downloadfile.yml b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_powershell_downloadfile.yml index 88e821cb25..3c21f70eeb 100644 --- a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_powershell_downloadfile.yml +++ b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_powershell_downloadfile.yml @@ -1,31 +1,11 @@ -author: Jose Hernandez, Michael Haag, Splunk -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -date: '2022-02-11' +name: Windows Powershell DownloadFile +id: 46440222-81d5-44b1-a376-19dcd70d1b08 +version: 1 description: The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a file using `DownloadFile` method. This particular method is utilized in many different PowerShell frameworks to download files and output to disk. Identify the source (IP/domain) and destination file and triage appropriately. If AMSI logging or PowerShell transaction logs are available, review for further details of the implant. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information - on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from - your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, - confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the - endpoint product. -id: 46440222-81d5-44b1-a376-19dcd70d1b08 -known_false_positives: False positives may be present and filtering will need to occur - by parent process or command line argument. It may be required to modify this query - to an EDR product for more granular coverage. -name: Windows Powershell DownloadFile -product: -- Splunk Behavioral Analytics -references: -- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.net.webclient.downloadfile?view=net-5.0 -- https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/ -- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md -risk_message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified - on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior identifies the use of DownloadFile - within PowerShell. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), @@ -40,6 +20,18 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name", process_name, "parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "process_path", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information + on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from + your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, + confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the + endpoint product. +known_false_positives: False positives may be present and filtering will need to occur + by parent process or command line argument. It may be required to modify this query + to an EDR product for more granular coverage. +references: +- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.net.webclient.downloadfile?view=net-5.0 +- https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/ +- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md tags: analytic_story: - Malicious PowerShell @@ -47,42 +39,13 @@ tags: - Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 cis20: - CIS 8 - confidence: 70 - context: - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:LateralMovement - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/downloadfile_windows-security.log - impact: 50 kill_chain_phases: - - Lateral Movement - message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified - on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior identifies the use of DownloadFile - within PowerShell. + - Exploitation mitre_attack_id: - T1020 nist: - PR.PT - DE.CM - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - role: - - Victim - type: User - - name: dest_device_id - role: - - Victim - type: Hostname - - name: parent_process_name - role: - - Parent Process - type: Parent Process - - name: process_name - role: - - Child Process - type: Process - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics required_fields: - _time - dest_device_id @@ -92,19 +55,15 @@ tags: - dest_user_id - process - cmd_line - risk_score: 35 - risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint + risk_severity: low test: name: Windows Powershell DownloadFile Unit Test tests: - - attack_data: - - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/downloadfile_windows-security.log - file_name: downloadfile_windows-security.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - description: Test Windows Powershell DownloadFile detections + - name: Windows Powershell DownloadFile file: endpoint/ssa___windows_powershell_downloadfile.yml - name: Windows Powershell DownloadFile pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' -type: Anomaly -version: 1 + attack_data: + - file_name: downloadfile_windows-security.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/downloadfile_windows-security.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_powershell_start-bitstransfer.yml b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_powershell_start_bitstransfer.yml similarity index 71% rename from dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_powershell_start-bitstransfer.yml rename to dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_powershell_start_bitstransfer.yml index b15826348a..26f88372cf 100644 --- a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_powershell_start-bitstransfer.yml +++ b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_powershell_start_bitstransfer.yml @@ -1,7 +1,6 @@ -author: Michael Haag, Splunk -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -date: '2022-02-16' +name: Windows PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer +id: 0bafd086-8f61-11ec-996e-acde48001122 +version: 1 description: Start-BitsTransfer is the PowerShell "version" of BitsAdmin.exe. Similar functionality is present. This technique variation is not as commonly used by adversaries, but has been abused in the past. Lesser known uses include the ability to set the @@ -9,21 +8,6 @@ description: Start-BitsTransfer is the PowerShell "version" of BitsAdmin.exe. Si is used, it is highly possible files will be archived. During triage, review parallel processes and process lineage. Capture any files on disk and review. For the remote domain or IP, what is the reputation? -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information - on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from - your endpoints into the `Endpoint_Processess` datamodel. -id: 0bafd086-8f61-11ec-996e-acde48001122 -known_false_positives: Limited false positives. It is possible administrators will - utilize Start-BitsTransfer for administrative tasks, otherwise filter based parent - process or command-line arguments. -name: Windows PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer -product: -- Splunk Behavioral Analytics -references: -- https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Investigating+Microsoft+BITS+Activity/23281 -- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/bits/using-windows-powershell-to-create-bits-transfer-jobs -risk_message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified - on endpoint $dest$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to download a file. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), @@ -38,45 +22,26 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map "dest_device_id"), "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name", process_name, "parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "process_path", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information + on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from + your endpoints into the `Endpoint_Processess` datamodel. +known_false_positives: Limited false positives. It is possible administrators will + utilize Start-BitsTransfer for administrative tasks, otherwise filter based parent + process or command-line arguments. +references: +- https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Investigating+Microsoft+BITS+Activity/23281 +- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/bits/using-windows-powershell-to-create-bits-transfer-jobs tags: analytic_story: - BITS Jobs - Living Off The Land - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: [] - confidence: 70 - context: - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Exfiltration - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1197/atomic_red_team/T1197_windows-security.log - impact: 70 kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation - message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified - on endpoint $dest$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to download a file. mitre_attack_id: - T1197 - T1105 - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - role: - - Victim - type: User - - name: dest_device_id - role: - - Victim - type: Hostname - - name: parent_process_name - role: - - Parent Process - type: Parent Process - - name: process_name - role: - - Child Process - type: Process - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics + nist: null required_fields: - _time - dest_device_id @@ -86,18 +51,15 @@ tags: - dest_user_id - process - cmd_line - risk_score: 49 - risk_severity: low security_domain: endpoint + risk_severity: low test: name: Windows PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer Unit Test tests: - - attack_data: - - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1197/atomic_red_team/T1197_windows-security.log - file_name: T1197_windows-security.log - source: WinEventLog:Security + - name: Windows PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer file: endpoint/ssa___windows_powershell_start_bitstransfer.yml - name: Windows PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' -type: TTP -version: 1 + attack_data: + - file_name: T1197_windows-security.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1197/atomic_red_team/T1197_windows-security.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_rasautou_dll_execution.yml b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_rasautou_dll_execution.yml index 54080ee24b..4fd68ed7b6 100644 --- a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_rasautou_dll_execution.yml +++ b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_rasautou_dll_execution.yml @@ -1,29 +1,10 @@ -author: Michael Haag, Splunk -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -date: '2022-02-15' +name: Windows Rasautou DLL Execution +id: 6f42b8ce-1e15-11ec-ad5a-acde48001122 +version: 1 description: The following analytic identifies the Windows Windows Remote Auto Dialer, rasautou.exe executing an arbitrary DLL. This technique is used to execute arbitrary shellcode or DLLs via the rasautou.exe LOLBin capability. During triage, review parent and child process behavior including file and image loads. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information - on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from - your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, - confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the - endpoint product. -id: 6f42b8ce-1e15-11ec-ad5a-acde48001122 -known_false_positives: False positives will be limited to applications that require - Rasautou.exe to load a DLL from disk. Filter as needed. -name: Windows Rasautou DLL Execution -product: -- Splunk Behavioral Analytics -references: -- https://github.com/mandiant/DueDLLigence -- https://github.com/MHaggis/notes/blob/master/utilities/Invoke-SPLDLLigence.ps1 -- https://gist.github.com/NickTyrer/c6043e4b302d5424f701f15baf136513 -- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/10/staying-hidden-on-the-endpoint-evading-detection-with-shellcode.html -risk_message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified - on endpoint $dest$ attempting to load a DLL in a suspicious manner. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where "Endpoint_Processes" IN(_datamodels) | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, @@ -37,44 +18,30 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where "Endpoint_Processes" IN(_data | eval body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name", process_name, "parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "process_path", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information + on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from + your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, + confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the + endpoint product. +known_false_positives: False positives will be limited to applications that require + Rasautou.exe to load a DLL from disk. Filter as needed. +references: +- https://github.com/mandiant/DueDLLigence +- https://github.com/MHaggis/notes/blob/master/utilities/Invoke-SPLDLLigence.ps1 +- https://gist.github.com/NickTyrer/c6043e4b302d5424f701f15baf136513 +- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/10/staying-hidden-on-the-endpoint-evading-detection-with-shellcode.html tags: analytic_story: - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics - Living Off The Land - confidence: 100 - context: - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Defense Evasion - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055.001/rasautou/windows-security.log - impact: 80 + cis20: null kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation - message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified - on endpoint $dest$ attempting to load a DLL in a suspicious manner. mitre_attack_id: - T1055.001 - T1218 - T1055 - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - role: - - Victim - type: User - - name: dest_device_id - role: - - Victim - type: Hostname - - name: parent_process_name - role: - - Parent Process - type: Parent Process - - name: process_name - role: - - Child Process - type: Process - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics + nist: null required_fields: - _time - dest_device_id @@ -84,18 +51,15 @@ tags: - dest_user_id - process - cmd_line - risk_score: 80 - risk_severity: high security_domain: endpoint + risk_severity: high test: name: Windows Rasautou DLL Execution Unit Test tests: - - attack_data: - - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055.001/rasautou/windows-security.log - file_name: windows-security.log - source: WinEventLog:Security + - name: Windows Rasautou DLL Execution file: endpoint/ssa___windows_rasautou_dll_execution.yml - name: Windows Rasautou DLL Execution pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' -type: TTP -version: 1 + attack_data: + - file_name: windows-security.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055.001/rasautou/windows-security.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml index 01067f33bc..5051572b45 100644 --- a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml +++ b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml @@ -1,7 +1,6 @@ -author: Michael Haag, Splunk -datamodel: -- Endpoint_Processes -date: '2022-02-23' +name: Windows Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution +id: 0caa1dd6-94f5-11ec-9786-acde48001122 +version: 1 description: The following analytic identifies "rundll32.exe" execution with inline protocol handlers. "JavaScript", "VBScript", and "About" are the only supported options when invoking HTA content directly on the command-line. This type of behavior @@ -9,22 +8,6 @@ description: The following analytic identifies "rundll32.exe" execution with inl The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process "rundll32.exe" and its parent process. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information - on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from - your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, - confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the - endpoint product. -id: 0caa1dd6-94f5-11ec-9786-acde48001122 -known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit - this behavior, triggering a false positive. -name: Windows Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution -product: -- Splunk Behavioral Analytics -references: -- https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses -- https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/ -- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/search/-search-3x-wds-extidx-prot-implementing -risk_message: Suspicious $process_name$ inline HTA execution on $dest_device_id$. search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), @@ -38,52 +21,32 @@ search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name", process_name, "parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "process_path", process_path]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information + on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from + your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, + confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the + endpoint product. +known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit + this behavior, triggering a false positive. +references: +- https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses +- https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/ +- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/search/-search-3x-wds-extidx-prot-implementing tags: analytic_story: - Suspicious MSHTA Activity - NOBELIUM Group - Living Off The Land - asset_type: Endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 8 - confidence: 80 - context: - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Initial Access - - Stage:Execution - - Stage:Defense Evasion - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log - impact: 70 kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation - message: Suspicious $process_name$ inline HTA execution on $dest_device_id$. mitre_attack_id: - T1218 - T1218.005 nist: - PR.PT - DE.CM - observable: - - name: dest_user_id - role: - - Victim - type: User - - name: dest_device_id - role: - - Victim - type: Hostname - - name: parent_process_name - role: - - Parent Process - type: Parent Process - - name: process_name - role: - - Child Process - type: Process - product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics required_fields: - _time - dest_device_id @@ -93,20 +56,15 @@ tags: - dest_user_id - process - cmd_line - risk_score: 56 - risk_severity: medium security_domain: endpoint - supported_tas: - - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon + risk_severity: medium test: name: Windows Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution Unit Test tests: - - attack_data: - - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log - file_name: windows-security.log - source: WinEventLog:Security + - name: Windows Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution file: endpoint/ssa___windows_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml - name: Windows Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' -type: TTP -version: 1 + attack_data: + - file_name: windows-security.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/docs/_data/navigation.yml b/docs/_data/navigation.yml index a383062d30..824899c46f 100644 --- a/docs/_data/navigation.yml +++ b/docs/_data/navigation.yml @@ -44,20 +44,14 @@ detections: children: - title: Authentication url: /detections/authentication/ - - title: Certificates - url: /detections/certificates/ - title: Change url: /detections/change/ + - title: Change_Analysis + url: /detections/change_analysis/ - title: Email url: /detections/email/ - title: Endpoint url: /detections/endpoint/ - - title: Endpoint_Filesystem - url: /detections/endpoint_filesystem/ - - title: Endpoint_Processes - url: /detections/endpoint_processes/ - - title: Endpoint_Registry - url: /detections/endpoint_registry/ - title: Network_Resolution url: /detections/network_resolution/ - title: Network_Sessions @@ -66,8 +60,12 @@ detections: url: /detections/network_traffic/ - title: Risk url: /detections/risk/ + - title: UEBA + url: /detections/ueba/ - title: Updates url: /detections/updates/ + - title: Vulnerabilities + url: /detections/vulnerabilities/ - title: Web url: /detections/web/ - title: "Product" @@ -83,16 +81,24 @@ stories: children: - title: Abuse url: /stories/abuse/ + - title: Account Compromise + url: /stories/account_compromise/ - title: Adversary Tactics url: /stories/adversary_tactics/ - title: Best Practices url: /stories/best_practices/ - title: Cloud Security url: /stories/cloud_security/ + - title: Lateral Movement + url: /stories/lateral_movement/ - title: Malware url: /stories/malware/ - title: Privilege Escalation url: /stories/privilege_escalation/ + - title: Ransomware + url: /stories/ransomware/ + - title: Unauthorized Software + url: /stories/unauthorized_software/ - title: Vulnerability url: /stories/vulnerability/ playbooks: diff --git a/docs/_pages/abuse.md b/docs/_pages/abuse.md index a2fa9aea9e..ecf00dcac7 100644 --- a/docs/_pages/abuse.md +++ b/docs/_pages/abuse.md @@ -3,15 +3,7 @@ title: Abuse layout: tag author_profile: false taxonomy: Abuse -permalink: /stories/abuse/ +permalink: /detections/abuse/ sidebar: - nav: "stories" ---- - -| Name | Technique | Tactic | -| ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Brand Monitoring]() | None | None | -| [DNS Amplification Attacks](/stories/dns_amplification_attacks/) | [Network Denial of Service](/tags/#network-denial-of-service), [Reflection Amplification](/tags/#reflection-amplification) | [Impact](/tags/#impact) | -| [Data Protection](/stories/data_protection/) | [Drive-by Compromise](/tags/#drive-by-compromise) | [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) | -| [Information Sabotage](/stories/information_sabotage/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction), [File Deletion](/tags/#file-deletion), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host) | [Impact](/tags/#impact) | -| [Netsh Abuse](/stories/netsh_abuse/) | [Disable or Modify System Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-system-firewall), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | \ No newline at end of file + nav: "detections" +--- \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_pages/account_compromise.md b/docs/_pages/account_compromise.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f713b0823b --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_pages/account_compromise.md @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +--- +title: Account Compromise +layout: tag +author_profile: false +taxonomy: Account Compromise +permalink: /detections/account_compromise/ +sidebar: + nav: "detections" +--- \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_pages/adversary_tactics.md b/docs/_pages/adversary_tactics.md index 3e7b4dafcd..f5a2ac8395 100644 --- a/docs/_pages/adversary_tactics.md +++ b/docs/_pages/adversary_tactics.md @@ -3,66 +3,7 @@ title: Adversary Tactics layout: tag author_profile: false taxonomy: Adversary Tactics -permalink: /stories/adversary_tactics/ +permalink: /detections/adversary_tactics/ sidebar: - nav: "stories" ---- - -| Name | Technique | Tactic | -| ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Active Directory Discovery](/stories/active_directory_discovery/) | [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Local Groups](/tags/#local-groups) | [Discovery](/tags/#discovery) | -| [Active Directory Kerberos Attacks](/stories/active_directory_kerberos_attacks/) | [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets), [Kerberoasting](/tags/#kerberoasting) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access) | -| [Active Directory Lateral Movement](/stories/active_directory_lateral_movement/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [Windows Remote Management](/tags/#windows-remote-management) | [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement) | -| [Active Directory Password Spraying](/stories/active_directory_password_spraying/) | [Password Spraying](/tags/#password-spraying), [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access) | -| [BITS Jobs](/stories/bits_jobs/) | [BITS Jobs](/tags/#bits-jobs), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156](/stories/baron_samedit_cve-2021-3156/) | [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](/tags/#exploitation-for-privilege-escalation) | [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | -| [Cobalt Strike](/stories/cobalt_strike/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [MSBuild](/tags/#msbuild) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [Collection and Staging](/stories/collection_and_staging/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [Command and Control](/stories/command_and_control/) | [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol), [Web Protocols](/tags/#web-protocols) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control) | -| [Credential Dumping](/stories/credential_dumping/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access) | -| [DNS Hijacking](/stories/dns_hijacking/) | [Drive-by Compromise](/tags/#drive-by-compromise) | [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) | -| [Data Exfiltration](/stories/data_exfiltration/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol) | [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration) | -| [Deobfuscate-Decode Files or Information](/stories/deobfuscate-decode_files_or_information/) | [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](/tags/#deobfuscate/decode-files-or-information) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [Detect Zerologon Attack](/stories/detect_zerologon_attack/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access) | -| [Disabling Security Tools](/stories/disabling_security_tools/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [Domain Trust Discovery](/stories/domain_trust_discovery/) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery) | [Discovery](/tags/#discovery) | -| [F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902](/stories/f5_tmui_rce_cve-2020-5902/) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) | -| [HAFNIUM Group](/stories/hafnium_group/) | [Automated Exfiltration](/tags/#automated-exfiltration) | [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration) | -| [Ingress Tool Transfer](/stories/ingress_tool_transfer/) | [Automated Exfiltration](/tags/#automated-exfiltration) | [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration) | -| [Linux Persistence Techniques](/stories/linux_persistence_techniques/) | [Sudo and Sudo Caching](/tags/#sudo-and-sudo-caching), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | -| [Linux Post-Exploitation](/stories/linux_post-exploitation/) | [Unix Shell](/tags/#unix-shell) | [Execution](/tags/#execution) | -| [Linux Privilege Escalation](/stories/linux_privilege_escalation/) | [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](/tags/#exploitation-for-privilege-escalation) | [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | -| [Living Off The Land](/stories/living_off_the_land/) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | -| [Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228](/stories/log4shell_cve-2021-44228/) | [Automated Exfiltration](/tags/#automated-exfiltration) | [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration) | -| [Malicious PowerShell](/stories/malicious_powershell/) | [Automated Exfiltration](/tags/#automated-exfiltration) | [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration) | -| [Masquerading - Rename System Utilities](/stories/masquerading_-_rename_system_utilities/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [Meterpreter](/stories/meterpreter/) | [System Owner/User Discovery](/tags/#system-owner/user-discovery) | [Discovery](/tags/#discovery) | -| [Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444](/stories/microsoft_mshtml_remote_code_execution_cve-2021-40444/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [NOBELIUM Group](/stories/nobelium_group/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services](/stories/petitpotam_ntlm_relay_on_active_directory_certificate_services/) | [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access) | -| [Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns](/stories/possible_backdoor_activity_associated_with_mudcarp_espionage_campaigns/) | [Automated Exfiltration](/tags/#automated-exfiltration) | [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration) | -| [ProxyShell](/stories/proxyshell/) | [Server Software Component](/tags/#server-software-component), [Web Shell](/tags/#web-shell) | [Persistence](/tags/#persistence) | -| [SQL Injection](/stories/sql_injection/) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) | -| [Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil](/stories/signed_binary_proxy_execution_installutil/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [Silver Sparrow](/stories/silver_sparrow/) | [Data Staged](/tags/#data-staged) | [Collection](/tags/#collection) | -| [Spearphishing Attachments](/stories/spearphishing_attachments/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment) | [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) | -| [Suspicious Command-Line Executions](/stories/suspicious_command-line_executions/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity](/stories/suspicious_compiled_html_activity/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Compiled HTML File](/tags/#compiled-html-file) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [Suspicious DNS Traffic](/stories/suspicious_dns_traffic/) | [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol) | [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration) | -| [Suspicious Emails](/stories/suspicious_emails/) | [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing) | [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) | -| [Suspicious MSHTA Activity](/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [Suspicious Okta Activity](/stories/suspicious_okta_activity/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts), [Default Accounts](/tags/#default-accounts) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity](/stories/suspicious_regsvcs_regasm_activity/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvcs/Regasm](/tags/#regsvcs/regasm) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity](/stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [Suspicious Rundll32 Activity](/stories/suspicious_rundll32_activity/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [Suspicious WMI Use](/stories/suspicious_wmi_use/) | [XSL Script Processing](/tags/#xsl-script-processing) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [Suspicious Windows Registry Activities](/stories/suspicious_windows_registry_activities/) | [Services Registry Permissions Weakness](/tags/#services-registry-permissions-weakness) | [Persistence](/tags/#persistence) | -| [Suspicious Zoom Child Processes](/stories/suspicious_zoom_child_processes/) | [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](/tags/#exploitation-for-privilege-escalation) | [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | -| [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution/) | [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild](/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [MSBuild](/tags/#msbuild) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350](/stories/windows_dns_sigred_cve-2020-1350/) | [Exploitation for Client Execution](/tags/#exploitation-for-client-execution) | [Execution](/tags/#execution) | -| [Windows Defense Evasion Tactics](/stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics/) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | -| [Windows Discovery Techniques](/stories/windows_discovery_techniques/) | [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Local Groups](/tags/#local-groups) | [Discovery](/tags/#discovery) | -| [Windows Log Manipulation](/stories/windows_log_manipulation/) | [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Clear Windows Event Logs](/tags/#clear-windows-event-logs) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [Windows Persistence Techniques](/stories/windows_persistence_techniques/) | [Services Registry Permissions Weakness](/tags/#services-registry-permissions-weakness) | [Persistence](/tags/#persistence) | -| [Windows Privilege Escalation](/stories/windows_privilege_escalation/) | [Time Providers](/tags/#time-providers), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution) | [Persistence](/tags/#persistence) | \ No newline at end of file + nav: "detections" +--- \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_pages/best_practices.md b/docs/_pages/best_practices.md index dc03339daa..4a51438a99 100644 --- a/docs/_pages/best_practices.md +++ b/docs/_pages/best_practices.md @@ -3,15 +3,7 @@ title: Best Practices layout: tag author_profile: false taxonomy: Best Practices -permalink: /stories/best_practices/ +permalink: /detections/best_practices/ sidebar: - nav: "stories" ---- - -| Name | Technique | Tactic | -| ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Asset Tracking]() | None | None | -| [Monitor for Updates]() | None | None | -| [Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch](/stories/prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch/) | [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol), [Web Protocols](/tags/#web-protocols) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control) | -| [Router and Infrastructure Security](/stories/router_and_infrastructure_security/) | [Hardware Additions](/tags/#hardware-additions), [Automated Exfiltration](/tags/#automated-exfiltration), [Network Denial of Service](/tags/#network-denial-of-service), [Traffic Duplication](/tags/#traffic-duplication) | [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) | -| [Use of Cleartext Protocols]() | None | None | \ No newline at end of file + nav: "detections" +--- \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_pages/change_analysis.md b/docs/_pages/change_analysis.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8e0aa5ad5f --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_pages/change_analysis.md @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +--- +title: Change_Analysis +layout: tag +author_profile: false +taxonomy: Change_Analysis +permalink: /detections/change_analysis/ +sidebar: + nav: "detections" +--- \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_pages/cloud_security.md b/docs/_pages/cloud_security.md index 1e113284d0..8f5f4767d1 100644 --- a/docs/_pages/cloud_security.md +++ b/docs/_pages/cloud_security.md @@ -3,31 +3,7 @@ title: Cloud Security layout: tag author_profile: false taxonomy: Cloud Security -permalink: /stories/cloud_security/ +permalink: /detections/cloud_security/ sidebar: - nav: "stories" ---- - -| Name | Technique | Tactic | -| ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [AWS Cross Account Activity](/stories/aws_cross_account_activity/) | [Use Alternate Authentication Material](/tags/#use-alternate-authentication-material) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [AWS IAM Privilege Escalation](/stories/aws_iam_privilege_escalation/) | [Cloud Account](/tags/#cloud-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account) | [Persistence](/tags/#persistence) | -| [AWS Network ACL Activity](/stories/aws_network_acl_activity/) | [Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-cloud-firewall), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [AWS Security Hub Alerts]() | None | None | -| [AWS User Monitoring](/stories/aws_user_monitoring/) | [Cloud Service Discovery](/tags/#cloud-service-discovery) | [Discovery](/tags/#discovery) | -| [Cloud Cryptomining](/stories/cloud_cryptomining/) | [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](/tags/#unused/unsupported-cloud-regions) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [Cloud Federated Credential Abuse](/stories/cloud_federated_credential_abuse/) | [Image File Execution Options Injection](/tags/#image-file-execution-options-injection), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution) | [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | -| [Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation](/stories/container_implantation_monitoring_and_investigation/) | [Implant Internal Image](/tags/#implant-internal-image) | [Persistence](/tags/#persistence) | -| [Dev Sec Ops](/stories/dev_sec_ops/) | [Cloud Service Discovery](/tags/#cloud-service-discovery) | [Discovery](/tags/#discovery) | -| [GCP Cross Account Activity](/stories/gcp_cross_account_activity/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [Kubernetes Scanning Activity](/stories/kubernetes_scanning_activity/) | [Cloud Service Discovery](/tags/#cloud-service-discovery) | [Discovery](/tags/#discovery) | -| [Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity]() | None | None | -| [Office 365 Detections](/stories/office_365_detections/) | [Email Forwarding Rule](/tags/#email-forwarding-rule), [Email Collection](/tags/#email-collection) | [Collection](/tags/#collection) | -| [Suspicious AWS Login Activities](/stories/suspicious_aws_login_activities/) | [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](/tags/#unused/unsupported-cloud-regions) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [Suspicious AWS S3 Activities](/stories/suspicious_aws_s3_activities/) | [Data from Cloud Storage Object](/tags/#data-from-cloud-storage-object) | [Collection](/tags/#collection) | -| [Suspicious AWS Traffic]() | None | None | -| [Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities](/stories/suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities/) | [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](/tags/#unused/unsupported-cloud-regions) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities](/stories/suspicious_cloud_instance_activities/) | [Transfer Data to Cloud Account](/tags/#transfer-data-to-cloud-account) | [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration) | -| [Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities](/stories/suspicious_cloud_provisioning_activities/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [Suspicious Cloud User Activities](/stories/suspicious_cloud_user_activities/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [Suspicious GCP Storage Activities](/stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities/) | [Data from Cloud Storage Object](/tags/#data-from-cloud-storage-object) | [Collection](/tags/#collection) | \ No newline at end of file + nav: "detections" +--- \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_pages/detections.md b/docs/_pages/detections.md index 0a993ff4a5..3df33b8ace 100644 --- a/docs/_pages/detections.md +++ b/docs/_pages/detections.md @@ -11,6 +11,10 @@ sidebar: | Name | Technique | Type | | -------------- | --------------- | --------------- | | [7zip CommandLine To SMB Share Path](/endpoint/7zip_commandline_to_smb_share_path/) | [Archive via Utility](/tags/#archive-via-utility), [Archive Collected Data](/tags/#archive-collected-data) | Hunting | +| [AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City](/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city/) | [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](/tags/#unused/unsupported-cloud-regions) | Anomaly | +| [AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country](/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country/) | [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](/tags/#unused/unsupported-cloud-regions) | Anomaly | +| [AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address]() | None | Anomaly | +| [AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region](/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region/) | [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](/tags/#unused/unsupported-cloud-regions) | Anomaly | | [AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources](/cloud/aws_create_policy_version_to_allow_all_resources/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts), [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | TTP | | [AWS CreateAccessKey](/cloud/aws_createaccesskey/) | [Cloud Account](/tags/#cloud-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account) | Hunting | | [AWS CreateLoginProfile](/cloud/aws_createloginprofile/) | [Cloud Account](/tags/#cloud-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account) | TTP | @@ -22,6 +26,7 @@ sidebar: | [AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Medium](/cloud/aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_medium/) | [Malicious Image](/tags/#malicious-image), [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution) | Anomaly | | [AWS ECR Container Upload Outside Business Hours](/cloud/aws_ecr_container_upload_outside_business_hours/) | [Malicious Image](/tags/#malicious-image), [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution) | Anomaly | | [AWS ECR Container Upload Unknown User](/cloud/aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user/) | [Malicious Image](/tags/#malicious-image), [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution) | Anomaly | +| [AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access]() | None | Hunting | | [AWS Excessive Security Scanning](/cloud/aws_excessive_security_scanning/) | [Cloud Service Discovery](/tags/#cloud-service-discovery) | TTP | | [AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events](/cloud/aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events/) | [Cloud Infrastructure Discovery](/tags/#cloud-infrastructure-discovery) | Anomaly | | [AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force](/cloud/aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force/) | [Cloud Infrastructure Discovery](/tags/#cloud-infrastructure-discovery), [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force) | TTP | @@ -35,6 +40,10 @@ sidebar: | [AWS SAML Update identity provider](/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | TTP | | [AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion](/cloud/aws_setdefaultpolicyversion/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts), [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | TTP | | [AWS UpdateLoginProfile](/cloud/aws_updateloginprofile/) | [Cloud Account](/tags/#cloud-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account) | TTP | +| [Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User](/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts) | Anomaly | +| [Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK](/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user_-_mltk/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts) | Anomaly | +| [Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User](/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts) | Anomaly | +| [Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK](/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user_-_mltk/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts) | Anomaly | | [Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls](/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts), [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | Anomaly | | [Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed](/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_destroyed/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts), [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | Anomaly | | [Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched](/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_launched/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts), [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | Anomaly | @@ -52,21 +61,15 @@ sidebar: | [Allow Operation with Consent Admin](/endpoint/allow_operation_with_consent_admin/) | [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | TTP | | [Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection](/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection/) | [Cloud Service Discovery](/tags/#cloud-service-discovery) | Hunting | | [Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection](/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection/) | [Cloud Service Discovery](/tags/#cloud-service-discovery) | Hunting | -| [Anomalous Usage of Account Credentials](/endpoint/anomalous_usage_of_account_credentials/) | [Domain Accounts](/tags/#domain-accounts) | Anomaly | | [Anomalous usage of 7zip](/endpoint/anomalous_usage_of_7zip/) | [Archive via Utility](/tags/#archive-via-utility), [Archive Collected Data](/tags/#archive-collected-data) | Anomaly | -| [Anomalous usage of Archive Tools](/endpoint/anomalous_usage_of_archive_tools/) | [Archive via Utility](/tags/#archive-via-utility), [Archive Collected Data](/tags/#archive-collected-data) | Anomaly | | [Any Powershell DownloadFile](/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadfile/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell) | TTP | | [Any Powershell DownloadString](/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadstring/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell) | TTP | | [Attacker Tools On Endpoint](/endpoint/attacker_tools_on_endpoint/) | [Match Legitimate Name or Location](/tags/#match-legitimate-name-or-location), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [Active Scanning](/tags/#active-scanning) | TTP | | [Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store](/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store/) | [Install Root Certificate](/tags/#install-root-certificate), [Subvert Trust Controls](/tags/#subvert-trust-controls) | TTP | -| [Attempt To Delete Services](/endpoint/attempt_to_delete_services/) | [Service Stop](/tags/#service-stop), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service) | TTP | -| [Attempt To Disable Services](/endpoint/attempt_to_disable_services/) | [Service Stop](/tags/#service-stop) | TTP | | [Attempt To Stop Security Service](/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | | [Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe](/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe/) | [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | TTP | -| [Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe](/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe/) | [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager) | TTP | | [Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry](/endpoint/auto_admin_logon_registry_entry/) | [Credentials in Registry](/tags/#credentials-in-registry), [Unsecured Credentials](/tags/#unsecured-credentials) | TTP | | [BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification](/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification/) | [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery) | TTP | -| [BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification](/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification/) | [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery) | TTP | | [BITS Job Persistence](/endpoint/bits_job_persistence/) | [BITS Jobs](/tags/#bits-jobs) | TTP | | [BITSAdmin Download File](/endpoint/bitsadmin_download_file/) | [BITS Jobs](/tags/#bits-jobs), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer) | TTP | | [Batch File Write to System32](/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32/) | [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution), [Malicious File](/tags/#malicious-file) | TTP | @@ -87,7 +90,7 @@ sidebar: | [Circle CI Disable Security Job](/cloud/circle_ci_disable_security_job/) | [Compromise Client Software Binary](/tags/#compromise-client-software-binary) | Anomaly | | [Circle CI Disable Security Step](/cloud/circle_ci_disable_security_step/) | [Compromise Client Software Binary](/tags/#compromise-client-software-binary) | Anomaly | | [Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App](/endpoint/clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app/) | [File Deletion](/tags/#file-deletion), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host) | TTP | -| [Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App](/endpoint/clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app/) | [File Deletion](/tags/#file-deletion), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host) | TTP | +| [Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers](/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol) | TTP | | [Clop Common Exec Parameter](/endpoint/clop_common_exec_parameter/) | [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution) | TTP | | [Clop Ransomware Known Service Name](/endpoint/clop_ransomware_known_service_name/) | [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process) | TTP | | [Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles](/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | Anomaly | @@ -96,6 +99,7 @@ sidebar: | [Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image]() | None | Anomaly | | [Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type]() | None | Anomaly | | [Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User](/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_by_previously_unseen_user/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts), [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | Anomaly | +| [Cloud Network Access Control List Deleted]() | None | Anomaly | | [Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City](/cloud/cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | Anomaly | | [Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country](/cloud/cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_country/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | Anomaly | | [Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address](/cloud/cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | Anomaly | @@ -120,16 +124,17 @@ sidebar: | [Curl Download and Bash Execution](/endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution/) | [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer) | TTP | | [DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network](/endpoint/dllhost_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection) | TTP | | [DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App](/endpoint/dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app/) | [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol) | TTP | -| [DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App](/endpoint/dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app/) | [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol) | TTP | | [DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK](/network/dns_query_length_outliers_-_mltk/) | [DNS](/tags/#dns), [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol) | Anomaly | | [DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation](/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol) | Anomaly | +| [DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers](/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers/) | [DNS](/tags/#dns) | TTP | +| [DNS record changed](/deprecated/dns_record_changed/) | [DNS](/tags/#dns) | TTP | | [DSQuery Domain Discovery](/endpoint/dsquery_domain_discovery/) | [Domain Trust Discovery](/tags/#domain-trust-discovery) | TTP | -| [Delete A Net User](/endpoint/delete_a_net_user/) | [Account Access Removal](/tags/#account-access-removal) | Anomaly | | [Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell](/endpoint/delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell/) | [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery) | TTP | | [Deleting Of Net Users](/endpoint/deleting_of_net_users/) | [Account Access Removal](/tags/#account-access-removal) | TTP | | [Deleting Shadow Copies](/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies/) | [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery) | TTP | -| [Deny Permission using Cacls Utility](/endpoint/deny_permission_using_cacls_utility/) | [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification) | TTP | +| [Detect API activity from users without MFA]() | None | Hunting | | [Detect ARP Poisoning](/network/detect_arp_poisoning/) | [Hardware Additions](/tags/#hardware-additions), [Network Denial of Service](/tags/#network-denial-of-service), [Adversary-in-the-Middle](/tags/#adversary-in-the-middle), [ARP Cache Poisoning](/tags/#arp-cache-poisoning) | TTP | +| [Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts](/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts) | Hunting | | [Detect AWS Console Login by New User]() | None | Hunting | | [Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City](/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city/) | [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](/tags/#unused/unsupported-cloud-regions) | Hunting | | [Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country](/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country/) | [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](/tags/#unused/unsupported-cloud-regions) | Hunting | @@ -143,7 +148,7 @@ sidebar: | [Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account](/endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account/) | [Exploitation of Remote Services](/tags/#exploitation-of-remote-services) | Hunting | | [Detect Copy of ShadowCopy with Script Block Logging](/endpoint/detect_copy_of_shadowcopy_with_script_block_logging/) | [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | TTP | | [Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access](/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | TTP | -| [Detect Dump LSASS Memory using comsvcs](/endpoint/detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs/) | [NTDS](/tags/#ntds), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | TTP | +| [Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2](/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2/) | [Spearphishing via Service](/tags/#spearphishing-via-service) | TTP | | [Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging](/endpoint/detect_empire_with_powershell_script_block_logging/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell) | TTP | | [Detect Excessive Account Lockouts From Endpoint](/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts), [Domain Accounts](/tags/#domain-accounts) | Anomaly | | [Detect Excessive User Account Lockouts](/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts), [Local Accounts](/tags/#local-accounts) | Anomaly | @@ -155,10 +160,11 @@ sidebar: | [Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line](/endpoint/detect_html_help_url_in_command_line/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Compiled HTML File](/tags/#compiled-html-file) | TTP | | [Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers](/endpoint/detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Compiled HTML File](/tags/#compiled-html-file) | TTP | | [Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats](/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats/) | [Hardware Additions](/tags/#hardware-additions), [Network Denial of Service](/tags/#network-denial-of-service), [Adversary-in-the-Middle](/tags/#adversary-in-the-middle), [ARP Cache Poisoning](/tags/#arp-cache-poisoning) | TTP | -| [Detect Kerberoasting](/endpoint/detect_kerberoasting/) | [Kerberoasting](/tags/#kerberoasting), [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets) | TTP | | [Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets](/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets/) | [Non-Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#non-application-layer-protocol) | TTP | +| [Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response](/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol) | TTP | | [Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line](/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta) | TTP | | [Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images](/endpoint/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | TTP | +| [Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703](/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory) | TTP | | [Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging](/endpoint/detect_mimikatz_with_powershell_script_block_logging/) | [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | TTP | | [Detect New Local Admin account](/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account/) | [Local Account](/tags/#local-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account) | TTP | | [Detect New Login Attempts to Routers]() | None | TTP | @@ -171,10 +177,8 @@ sidebar: | [Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe](/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe/) | [Path Interception by Unquoted Path](/tags/#path-interception-by-unquoted-path), [Hijack Execution Flow](/tags/#hijack-execution-flow) | TTP | | [Detect Port Security Violation](/network/detect_port_security_violation/) | [Hardware Additions](/tags/#hardware-additions), [Network Denial of Service](/tags/#network-denial-of-service), [Adversary-in-the-Middle](/tags/#adversary-in-the-middle), [ARP Cache Poisoning](/tags/#arp-cache-poisoning) | TTP | | [Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe](/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell) | Hunting | -| [Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe](/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter) | Anomaly | | [Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag](/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares) | TTP | | [Detect RClone Command-Line Usage](/endpoint/detect_rclone_command-line_usage/) | [Automated Exfiltration](/tags/#automated-exfiltration) | TTP | -| [Detect RClone Command-Line Usage](/endpoint/detect_rclone_command-line_usage/) | [Automated Exfiltration](/tags/#automated-exfiltration) | TTP | | [Detect Rare Executables]() | None | Anomaly | | [Detect Regasm Spawning a Process](/endpoint/detect_regasm_spawning_a_process/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvcs/Regasm](/tags/#regsvcs/regasm) | TTP | | [Detect Regasm with Network Connection](/endpoint/detect_regasm_with_network_connection/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvcs/Regasm](/tags/#regsvcs/regasm) | TTP | @@ -198,11 +202,15 @@ sidebar: | [Detect SharpHound File Modifications](/endpoint/detect_sharphound_file_modifications/) | [Domain Account](/tags/#domain-account), [Local Groups](/tags/#local-groups), [Domain Trust Discovery](/tags/#domain-trust-discovery), [Local Account](/tags/#local-account), [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery), [Domain Groups](/tags/#domain-groups), [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery) | TTP | | [Detect SharpHound Usage](/endpoint/detect_sharphound_usage/) | [Domain Account](/tags/#domain-account), [Local Groups](/tags/#local-groups), [Domain Trust Discovery](/tags/#domain-trust-discovery), [Local Account](/tags/#local-account), [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery), [Domain Groups](/tags/#domain-groups), [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery) | TTP | | [Detect Software Download To Network Device](/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device/) | [TFTP Boot](/tags/#tftp-boot), [Pre-OS Boot](/tags/#pre-os-boot) | TTP | +| [Detect Spike in AWS API Activity](/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts) | Anomaly | | [Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance]() | None | Anomaly | | [Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User]() | None | Anomaly | +| [Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity](/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity/) | [Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-cloud-firewall) | Anomaly | | [Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion](/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion/) | [Data from Cloud Storage Object](/tags/#data-from-cloud-storage-object) | Anomaly | +| [Detect Spike in Security Group Activity](/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts) | Anomaly | | [Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS]() | None | Anomaly | | [Detect Traffic Mirroring](/network/detect_traffic_mirroring/) | [Hardware Additions](/tags/#hardware-additions), [Automated Exfiltration](/tags/#automated-exfiltration), [Network Denial of Service](/tags/#network-denial-of-service), [Traffic Duplication](/tags/#traffic-duplication) | TTP | +| [Detect USB device insertion]() | None | TTP | | [Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address]() | None | TTP | | [Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters](/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell) | TTP | | [Detect WMI Event Subscription Persistence](/endpoint/detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence/) | [Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation-event-subscription), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution) | TTP | @@ -214,12 +222,15 @@ sidebar: | [Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers]() | None | TTP | | [Detect mshta inline hta execution](/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta) | TTP | | [Detect mshta renamed](/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta) | Hunting | +| [Detect new API calls from user roles](/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts) | Anomaly | +| [Detect new user AWS Console Login](/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts) | Hunting | | [Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery](/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery/) | [System Network Configuration Discovery](/tags/#system-network-configuration-discovery) | TTP | | [Detect shared ec2 snapshot](/cloud/detect_shared_ec2_snapshot/) | [Transfer Data to Cloud Account](/tags/#transfer-data-to-cloud-account) | TTP | +| [Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers](/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers/) | [Web Protocols](/tags/#web-protocols) | TTP | +| [Detection of DNS Tunnels](/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol) | TTP | | [Detection of tools built by NirSoft](/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft/) | [Software Deployment Tools](/tags/#software-deployment-tools) | TTP | | [Disable AMSI Through Registry](/endpoint/disable_amsi_through_registry/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | | [Disable Defender AntiVirus Registry](/endpoint/disable_defender_antivirus_registry/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | -| [Disable Defender AntiVirus Registry](/endpoint/disable_defender_antivirus_registry/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | | [Disable Defender BlockAtFirstSeen Feature](/endpoint/disable_defender_blockatfirstseen_feature/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | | [Disable Defender Enhanced Notification](/endpoint/disable_defender_enhanced_notification/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | | [Disable Defender MpEngine Registry](/endpoint/disable_defender_mpengine_registry/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | @@ -227,7 +238,6 @@ sidebar: | [Disable Defender Submit Samples Consent Feature](/endpoint/disable_defender_submit_samples_consent_feature/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | | [Disable ETW Through Registry](/endpoint/disable_etw_through_registry/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | | [Disable Logs Using WevtUtil](/endpoint/disable_logs_using_wevtutil/) | [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Clear Windows Event Logs](/tags/#clear-windows-event-logs) | TTP | -| [Disable Net User Account](/endpoint/disable_net_user_account/) | [Service Stop](/tags/#service-stop), [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | TTP | | [Disable Registry Tool](/endpoint/disable_registry_tool/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | | [Disable Schedule Task](/endpoint/disable_schedule_task/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | | [Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry](/endpoint/disable_security_logs_using_minint_registry/) | [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry) | TTP | @@ -261,6 +271,12 @@ sidebar: | [Drop IcedID License dat](/endpoint/drop_icedid_license_dat/) | [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution), [Malicious File](/tags/#malicious-file) | Hunting | | [Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL](/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | TTP | | [Dump LSASS via procdump](/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | TTP | +| [Dump LSASS via procdump Rename](/deprecated/dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory) | Hunting | +| [EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User](/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts) | Anomaly | +| [EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region](/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region/) | [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](/tags/#unused/unsupported-cloud-regions) | Anomaly | +| [EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI]() | None | Anomaly | +| [EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type]() | None | Anomaly | +| [EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User](/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts) | Anomaly | | [ETW Registry Disabled](/endpoint/etw_registry_disabled/) | [Indicator Blocking](/tags/#indicator-blocking), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | | [Elevated Group Discovery With Net](/endpoint/elevated_group_discovery_with_net/) | [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Domain Groups](/tags/#domain-groups) | TTP | | [Elevated Group Discovery With Wmic](/endpoint/elevated_group_discovery_with_wmic/) | [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Domain Groups](/tags/#domain-groups) | TTP | @@ -278,7 +294,6 @@ sidebar: | [Excessive Attempt To Disable Services](/endpoint/excessive_attempt_to_disable_services/) | [Service Stop](/tags/#service-stop) | Anomaly | | [Excessive DNS Failures](/network/excessive_dns_failures/) | [DNS](/tags/#dns), [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol) | Anomaly | | [Excessive File Deletion In WinDefender Folder](/endpoint/excessive_file_deletion_in_windefender_folder/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction) | TTP | -| [Excessive Number of Office Files Copied](/endpoint/excessive_number_of_office_files_copied/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol) | Anomaly | | [Excessive Service Stop Attempt](/endpoint/excessive_service_stop_attempt/) | [Service Stop](/tags/#service-stop) | Anomaly | | [Excessive Usage Of Cacls App](/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_cacls_app/) | [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification) | Anomaly | | [Excessive Usage Of Net App](/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_net_app/) | [Account Access Removal](/tags/#account-access-removal) | Anomaly | @@ -293,18 +308,23 @@ sidebar: | [Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share](/endpoint/executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares) | TTP | | [Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path](/endpoint/executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading) | TTP | | [Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID](/endpoint/execute_javascript_with_jscript_com_clsid/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Visual Basic](/tags/#visual-basic) | TTP | +| [Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension](/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension/) | [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities) | TTP | | [Execution of File with Multiple Extensions](/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities) | TTP | +| [Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups]() | None | Hunting | | [Extraction of Registry Hives](/endpoint/extraction_of_registry_hives/) | [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | TTP | | [File with Samsam Extension]() | None | TTP | | [Firewall Allowed Program Enable](/endpoint/firewall_allowed_program_enable/) | [Disable or Modify System Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-system-firewall), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | Anomaly | | [First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom](/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom/) | [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](/tags/#exploitation-for-privilege-escalation) | Anomaly | | [First Time Seen Running Windows Service](/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service/) | [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution) | Anomaly | -| [First time seen command line argument](/endpoint/first_time_seen_command_line_argument/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Indirect Command Execution](/tags/#indirect-command-execution) | Anomaly | +| [First time seen command line argument](/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument/) | [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell) | Hunting | | [FodHelper UAC Bypass](/endpoint/fodhelper_uac_bypass/) | [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry), [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | TTP | | [Fsutil Zeroing File](/endpoint/fsutil_zeroing_file/) | [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host) | TTP | -| [Fsutil Zeroing File](/endpoint/fsutil_zeroing_file/) | [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host) | TTP | +| [GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project](/deprecated/gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | Hunting | | [GCP Detect gcploit framework](/cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | TTP | +| [GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account](/deprecated/gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | Hunting | +| [GCP GCR container uploaded](/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded/) | [Implant Internal Image](/tags/#implant-internal-image) | Hunting | | [GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection](/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection/) | [Cloud Service Discovery](/tags/#cloud-service-discovery) | Hunting | +| [GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection](/deprecated/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection/) | [Cloud Service Discovery](/tags/#cloud-service-discovery) | TTP | | [GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network](/endpoint/gpupdate_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection) | TTP | | [GSuite Email Suspicious Attachment](/cloud/gsuite_email_suspicious_attachment/) | [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing) | Anomaly | | [Gdrive suspicious file sharing](/cloud/gdrive_suspicious_file_sharing/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing) | Hunting | @@ -352,7 +372,6 @@ sidebar: | [GitHub Pull Request from Unknown User](/cloud/github_pull_request_from_unknown_user/) | [Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools](/tags/#compromise-software-dependencies-and-development-tools), [Supply Chain Compromise](/tags/#supply-chain-compromise) | Anomaly | | [Github Commit Changes In Master](/cloud/github_commit_changes_in_master/) | [Trusted Relationship](/tags/#trusted-relationship) | Anomaly | | [Github Commit In Develop](/cloud/github_commit_in_develop/) | [Trusted Relationship](/tags/#trusted-relationship) | Anomaly | -| [Grant Permission Using Cacls Utility](/endpoint/grant_permission_using_cacls_utility/) | [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification) | TTP | | [Gsuite Drive Share In External Email](/cloud/gsuite_drive_share_in_external_email/) | [Exfiltration to Cloud Storage](/tags/#exfiltration-to-cloud-storage), [Exfiltration Over Web Service](/tags/#exfiltration-over-web-service) | Anomaly | | [Gsuite Email Suspicious Subject With Attachment](/cloud/gsuite_email_suspicious_subject_with_attachment/) | [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing) | Anomaly | | [Gsuite Email With Known Abuse Web Service Link](/cloud/gsuite_email_with_known_abuse_web_service_link/) | [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing) | Anomaly | @@ -361,8 +380,6 @@ sidebar: | [Gsuite suspicious calendar invite](/cloud/gsuite_suspicious_calendar_invite/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing) | Hunting | | [Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen](/endpoint/hide_user_account_from_sign-in_screen/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | | [Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe](/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe/) | [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification), [Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#windows-file-and-directory-permissions-modification) | TTP | -| [Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe](/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe/) | [Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#windows-file-and-directory-permissions-modification), [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification) | TTP | -| [High File Deletion Frequency](/endpoint/high_file_deletion_frequency/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction) | Anomaly | | [High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share](/endpoint/high_frequency_copy_of_files_in_network_share/) | [Transfer Data to Cloud Account](/tags/#transfer-data-to-cloud-account) | Anomaly | | [High Number of Login Failures from a single source](/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source/) | [Password Guessing](/tags/#password-guessing), [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force) | Anomaly | | [High Process Termination Frequency](/endpoint/high_process_termination_frequency/) | [Data Encrypted for Impact](/tags/#data-encrypted-for-impact) | Anomaly | @@ -371,6 +388,7 @@ sidebar: | [ICACLS Grant Command](/endpoint/icacls_grant_command/) | [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification) | TTP | | [Icacls Deny Command](/endpoint/icacls_deny_command/) | [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification) | TTP | | [IcedID Exfiltrated Archived File Creation](/endpoint/icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation/) | [Archive via Utility](/tags/#archive-via-utility), [Archive Collected Data](/tags/#archive-collected-data) | Hunting | +| [Identify New User Accounts](/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts/) | [Domain Accounts](/tags/#domain-accounts) | Hunting | | [Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters](/endpoint/impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [Distributed Component Object Model](/tags/#distributed-component-object-model), [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service) | TTP | | [Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell](/endpoint/interactive_session_on_remote_endpoint_with_powershell/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [Windows Remote Management](/tags/#windows-remote-management) | TTP | | [Java Class File download by Java User Agent](/endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent/) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | TTP | @@ -379,7 +397,25 @@ sidebar: | [Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled in UserAccountControl](/endpoint/kerberos_pre-authentication_flag_disabled_in_useraccountcontrol/) | [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets), [AS-REP Roasting](/tags/#as-rep-roasting) | TTP | | [Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled with PowerShell](/endpoint/kerberos_pre-authentication_flag_disabled_with_powershell/) | [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets), [AS-REP Roasting](/tags/#as-rep-roasting) | TTP | | [Known Services Killed by Ransomware](/endpoint/known_services_killed_by_ransomware/) | [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery) | TTP | +| [Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account]() | None | Hunting | +| [Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod]() | None | Hunting | +| [Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access]() | None | Hunting | +| [Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access]() | None | Hunting | | [Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls]() | None | Hunting | +| [Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account]() | None | Hunting | +| [Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace]() | None | Hunting | +| [Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access]() | None | Hunting | +| [Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access]() | None | Hunting | +| [Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access]() | None | Hunting | +| [Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls]() | None | Hunting | +| [Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint]() | None | Hunting | +| [Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint](/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint/) | [Cloud Service Discovery](/tags/#cloud-service-discovery) | Hunting | +| [Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account]() | None | Hunting | +| [Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod]() | None | Hunting | +| [Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access]() | None | Hunting | +| [Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access]() | None | Hunting | +| [Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access]() | None | Hunting | +| [Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls]() | None | Hunting | | [Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI](/cloud/kubernetes_nginx_ingress_lfi/) | [Exploitation for Credential Access](/tags/#exploitation-for-credential-access) | TTP | | [Kubernetes Nginx Ingress RFI](/cloud/kubernetes_nginx_ingress_rfi/) | [Exploitation for Credential Access](/tags/#exploitation-for-credential-access) | TTP | | [Kubernetes Scanner Image Pulling](/cloud/kubernetes_scanner_image_pulling/) | [Cloud Service Discovery](/tags/#cloud-service-discovery) | TTP | @@ -437,6 +473,7 @@ sidebar: | [Malicious InProcServer32 Modification](/endpoint/malicious_inprocserver32_modification/) | [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry) | TTP | | [Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command](/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_-_encoded_command/) | [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information) | Hunting | | [Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass](/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_-_execution_policy_bypass/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell) | TTP | +| [Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments](/deprecated/malicious_powershell_process_-_multiple_suspicious_command-line_arguments/) | [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell) | TTP | | [Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques](/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell) | TTP | | [Malicious Powershell Executed As A Service](/endpoint/malicious_powershell_executed_as_a_service/) | [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution) | TTP | | [Microsoft Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages](/endpoint/microsoft_exchange_mailbox_replication_service_writing_active_server_pages/) | [Server Software Component](/tags/#server-software-component), [Web Shell](/tags/#web-shell), [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | TTP | @@ -444,7 +481,7 @@ sidebar: | [Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn](/endpoint/mmc_lolbas_execution_process_spawn/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [Distributed Component Object Model](/tags/#distributed-component-object-model) | TTP | | [Modification Of Wallpaper](/endpoint/modification_of_wallpaper/) | [Defacement](/tags/#defacement) | TTP | | [Modify ACL permission To Files Or Folder](/endpoint/modify_acl_permission_to_files_or_folder/) | [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification) | TTP | -| [Modify ACLs Permission Of Files Or Folders](/endpoint/modify_acls_permission_of_files_or_folders/) | [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification) | Anomaly | +| [Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse]() | None | TTP | | [Monitor Email For Brand Abuse]() | None | TTP | | [Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors](/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors/) | [Port Monitors](/tags/#port-monitors), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution) | TTP | | [Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse]() | None | TTP | @@ -501,19 +538,18 @@ sidebar: | [Okta Account Lockout Events](/application/okta_account_lockout_events/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts), [Default Accounts](/tags/#default-accounts) | Anomaly | | [Okta Failed SSO Attempts](/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts), [Default Accounts](/tags/#default-accounts) | Anomaly | | [Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities](/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts), [Default Accounts](/tags/#default-accounts) | Anomaly | +| [Open Redirect in Splunk Web]() | None | TTP | +| [Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection]() | None | TTP | | [Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports](/endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports/) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | TTP | | [Overwriting Accessibility Binaries](/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries/) | [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution), [Accessibility Features](/tags/#accessibility-features) | TTP | | [Password Policy Discovery with Net](/endpoint/password_policy_discovery_with_net/) | [Password Policy Discovery](/tags/#password-policy-discovery) | Hunting | | [Permission Modification using Takeown App](/endpoint/permission_modification_using_takeown_app/) | [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification) | TTP | | [PetitPotam Network Share Access Request](/endpoint/petitpotam_network_share_access_request/) | [Forced Authentication](/tags/#forced-authentication) | TTP | | [PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request](/endpoint/petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request/) | [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | TTP | -| [Phishing Email Detection by Machine Learning Method - SSA](/application/phishing_email_detection_by_machine_learning_method_-_ssa/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing) | Anomaly | | [Ping Sleep Batch Command](/endpoint/ping_sleep_batch_command/) | [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](/tags/#virtualization/sandbox-evasion), [Time Based Evasion](/tags/#time-based-evasion) | Anomaly | | [Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data](/network/plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol) | TTP | | [Possible Browser Pass View Parameter](/endpoint/possible_browser_pass_view_parameter/) | [Credentials from Web Browsers](/tags/#credentials-from-web-browsers), [Credentials from Password Stores](/tags/#credentials-from-password-stores) | Hunting | | [Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn](/endpoint/possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [Distributed Component Object Model](/tags/#distributed-component-object-model), [Windows Remote Management](/tags/#windows-remote-management), [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation), [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell) | TTP | -| [Potential Pass the Token or Hash Observed at the Destination Device](/endpoint/potential_pass_the_token_or_hash_observed_at_the_destination_device/) | [Use Alternate Authentication Material](/tags/#use-alternate-authentication-material), [Pass the Hash](/tags/#pass-the-hash) | TTP | -| [Potential Pass the Token or Hash Observed by an Event Collecting Device](/endpoint/potential_pass_the_token_or_hash_observed_by_an_event_collecting_device/) | [Use Alternate Authentication Material](/tags/#use-alternate-authentication-material), [Pass the Hash](/tags/#pass-the-hash) | TTP | | [Potentially malicious code on commandline](/endpoint/potentially_malicious_code_on_commandline/) | [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell) | Anomaly | | [PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window](/endpoint/powershell_-_connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window/) | [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter) | Hunting | | [PowerShell 4104 Hunting](/endpoint/powershell_4104_hunting/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell) | Hunting | @@ -543,18 +579,20 @@ sidebar: | [Process Kill Base On File Path](/endpoint/process_kill_base_on_file_path/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | | [Process Writing DynamicWrapperX](/endpoint/process_writing_dynamicwrapperx/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Component Object Model](/tags/#component-object-model) | Hunting | | [Processes Tapping Keyboard Events]() | None | TTP | +| [Processes created by netsh](/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh/) | [Disable or Modify System Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-system-firewall) | TTP | | [Processes launching netsh](/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh/) | [Disable or Modify System Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-system-firewall), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | | [Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed](/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed/) | [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol) | TTP | +| [Prohibited Software On Endpoint]() | None | Hunting | | [Protocol or Port Mismatch](/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol) | Anomaly | | [Protocols passing authentication in cleartext]() | None | TTP | | [Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name](/endpoint/randomly_generated_scheduled_task_name/) | [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task) | Hunting | | [Randomly Generated Windows Service Name](/endpoint/randomly_generated_windows_service_name/) | [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service) | Hunting | | [Ransomware Notes bulk creation](/endpoint/ransomware_notes_bulk_creation/) | [Data Encrypted for Impact](/tags/#data-encrypted-for-impact) | Anomaly | -| [Rare Parent-Child Process Relationship](/endpoint/rare_parent-child_process_relationship/) | [Exploitation for Client Execution](/tags/#exploitation-for-client-execution), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [Software Deployment Tools](/tags/#software-deployment-tools) | Anomaly | | [Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI](/endpoint/recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi/) | [Gather Victim Host Information](/tags/#gather-victim-host-information) | TTP | | [Recon Using WMI Class](/endpoint/recon_using_wmi_class/) | [Gather Victim Host Information](/tags/#gather-victim-host-information) | TTP | | [Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD](/endpoint/recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd/) | [File Deletion](/tags/#file-deletion), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host) | TTP | | [Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys](/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys/) | [Services Registry Permissions Weakness](/tags/#services-registry-permissions-weakness), [Hijack Execution Flow](/tags/#hijack-execution-flow) | TTP | +| [Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys](/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys/) | [Hidden Files and Directories](/tags/#hidden-files-and-directories) | TTP | | [Registry Keys Used For Persistence](/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence/) | [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](/tags/#registry-run-keys-/-startup-folder), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution) | TTP | | [Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation](/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation/) | [Image File Execution Options Injection](/tags/#image-file-execution-options-injection), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution) | TTP | | [Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases](/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases/) | [Application Shimming](/tags/#application-shimming), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution) | TTP | @@ -573,13 +611,13 @@ sidebar: | [Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell](/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [Windows Remote Management](/tags/#windows-remote-management) | TTP | | [Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell Script Block](/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_script_block/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [Windows Remote Management](/tags/#windows-remote-management) | TTP | | [Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and Winrs](/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_winrs/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [Windows Remote Management](/tags/#windows-remote-management) | TTP | +| [Remote Registry Key modifications]() | None | TTP | | [Remote System Discovery with Adsisearcher](/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_adsisearcher/) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery) | TTP | | [Remote System Discovery with Dsquery](/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_dsquery/) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery) | Hunting | | [Remote System Discovery with Net](/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_net/) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery) | Hunting | | [Remote System Discovery with Wmic](/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_wmic/) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery) | TTP | | [Remote WMI Command Attempt](/endpoint/remote_wmi_command_attempt/) | [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation) | TTP | | [Resize ShadowStorage volume](/endpoint/resize_shadowstorage_volume/) | [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery) | TTP | -| [Resize Shadowstorage Volume](/endpoint/resize_shadowstorage_volume/) | [Service Stop](/tags/#service-stop) | TTP | | [Revil Common Exec Parameter](/endpoint/revil_common_exec_parameter/) | [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution) | TTP | | [Revil Registry Entry](/endpoint/revil_registry_entry/) | [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry) | TTP | | [Rubeus Command Line Parameters](/endpoint/rubeus_command_line_parameters/) | [Use Alternate Authentication Material](/tags/#use-alternate-authentication-material), [Pass the Ticket](/tags/#pass-the-ticket), [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets), [Kerberoasting](/tags/#kerberoasting), [AS-REP Roasting](/tags/#as-rep-roasting) | TTP | @@ -610,6 +648,7 @@ sidebar: | [Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At](/endpoint/scheduled_task_creation_on_remote_endpoint_using_at/) | [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [At (Windows)](/tags/#at-(windows)) | TTP | | [Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD](/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | TTP | | [Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint](/endpoint/scheduled_task_initiation_on_remote_endpoint/) | [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task) | TTP | +| [Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware](/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task) | TTP | | [Schtasks Run Task On Demand](/endpoint/schtasks_run_task_on_demand/) | [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | TTP | | [Schtasks scheduling job on remote system](/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | TTP | | [Schtasks used for forcing a reboot](/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | TTP | @@ -617,7 +656,6 @@ sidebar: | [Script Execution via WMI](/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi/) | [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation) | TTP | | [Sdclt UAC Bypass](/endpoint/sdclt_uac_bypass/) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | TTP | | [Sdelete Application Execution](/endpoint/sdelete_application_execution/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction), [File Deletion](/tags/#file-deletion), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host) | TTP | -| [Sdelete Application Execution](/endpoint/sdelete_application_execution/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction), [File Deletion](/tags/#file-deletion), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host) | Anomaly | | [SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network](/endpoint/searchprotocolhost_with_no_command_line_with_network/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection) | TTP | | [SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool](/endpoint/secretdumps_offline_ntds_dumping_tool/) | [NTDS](/tags/#ntds), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | TTP | | [ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell](/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell/) | [Kerberoasting](/tags/#kerberoasting) | TTP | @@ -631,7 +669,9 @@ sidebar: | [Short Lived Windows Accounts](/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts/) | [Local Account](/tags/#local-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account) | TTP | | [SilentCleanup UAC Bypass](/endpoint/silentcleanup_uac_bypass/) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | TTP | | [Single Letter Process On Endpoint](/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint/) | [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution), [Malicious File](/tags/#malicious-file) | TTP | +| [Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems]() | None | TTP | | [Spike in File Writes]() | None | Anomaly | +| [Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure]() | None | TTP | | [Spoolsv Spawning Rundll32](/endpoint/spoolsv_spawning_rundll32/) | [Print Processors](/tags/#print-processors), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution) | TTP | | [Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules](/endpoint/spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules/) | [Print Processors](/tags/#print-processors), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution) | TTP | | [Spoolsv Suspicious Process Access](/endpoint/spoolsv_suspicious_process_access/) | [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](/tags/#exploitation-for-privilege-escalation) | TTP | @@ -641,13 +681,16 @@ sidebar: | [Start Up During Safe Mode Boot](/endpoint/start_up_during_safe_mode_boot/) | [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](/tags/#registry-run-keys-/-startup-folder), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution) | TTP | | [Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event](/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event/) | [Exploitation for Client Execution](/tags/#exploitation-for-client-execution) | TTP | | [Supernova Webshell](/web/supernova_webshell/) | [Web Shell](/tags/#web-shell) | TTP | +| [Suspicious Changes to File Associations](/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations/) | [Change Default File Association](/tags/#change-default-file-association) | TTP | | [Suspicious Computer Account Name Change](/endpoint/suspicious_computer_account_name_change/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts), [Domain Accounts](/tags/#domain-accounts) | TTP | | [Suspicious Copy on System32](/endpoint/suspicious_copy_on_system32/) | [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading) | TTP | | [Suspicious Curl Network Connection](/endpoint/suspicious_curl_network_connection/) | [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer) | TTP | | [Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments](/endpoint/suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection) | TTP | | [Suspicious Driver Loaded Path](/endpoint/suspicious_driver_loaded_path/) | [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process) | TTP | +| [Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly](/deprecated/suspicious_email_-_uba_anomaly/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing) | Anomaly | | [Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions](/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions/) | [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing) | Anomaly | | [Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior](/endpoint/suspicious_event_log_service_behavior/) | [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Clear Windows Event Logs](/tags/#clear-windows-event-logs) | TTP | +| [Suspicious File Write]() | None | Hunting | | [Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments](/endpoint/suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection) | TTP | | [Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline](/endpoint/suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | TTP | | [Suspicious Image Creation In Appdata Folder](/endpoint/suspicious_image_creation_in_appdata_folder/) | [Screen Capture](/tags/#screen-capture) | TTP | @@ -664,6 +707,7 @@ sidebar: | [Suspicious Reg exe Process](/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process/) | [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry) | TTP | | [Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path](/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32) | TTP | | [Suspicious Rundll32 PluginInit](/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_plugininit/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | TTP | +| [Suspicious Rundll32 Rename](/deprecated/suspicious_rundll32_rename/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities) | Hunting | | [Suspicious Rundll32 StartW](/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | TTP | | [Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver](/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | TTP | | [Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments](/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | TTP | @@ -678,30 +722,30 @@ sidebar: | [Suspicious mshta child process](/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta) | TTP | | [Suspicious mshta spawn](/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta) | TTP | | [Suspicious wevtutil Usage](/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage/) | [Clear Windows Event Logs](/tags/#clear-windows-event-logs), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host) | TTP | +| [Suspicious writes to System Volume Information](/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading) | Hunting | | [Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin](/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading) | TTP | | [Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn](/endpoint/svchost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn/) | [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task) | TTP | | [System Info Gathering Using Dxdiag Application](/endpoint/system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application/) | [Gather Victim Host Information](/tags/#gather-victim-host-information) | Hunting | | [System Information Discovery Detection](/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection/) | [System Information Discovery](/tags/#system-information-discovery) | TTP | -| [System Process Running from Unexpected Location](/endpoint/system_process_running_from_unexpected_location/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading) | Anomaly | | [System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations](/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities) | TTP | | [System User Discovery With Query](/endpoint/system_user_discovery_with_query/) | [System Owner/User Discovery](/tags/#system-owner/user-discovery) | Hunting | | [System User Discovery With Whoami](/endpoint/system_user_discovery_with_whoami/) | [System Owner/User Discovery](/tags/#system-owner/user-discovery) | Hunting | -| [TCP Command and Scripting Interpreter Outbound LDAP Traffic](/network/tcp_command_and_scripting_interpreter_outbound_ldap_traffic/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter) | Anomaly | | [TOR Traffic](/network/tor_traffic/) | [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol), [Web Protocols](/tags/#web-protocols) | TTP | | [Time Provider Persistence Registry](/endpoint/time_provider_persistence_registry/) | [Time Providers](/tags/#time-providers), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution) | TTP | | [Trickbot Named Pipe](/endpoint/trickbot_named_pipe/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection) | TTP | | [UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll](/endpoint/uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll/) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | TTP | | [UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object](/endpoint/uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [CMSTP](/tags/#cmstp) | TTP | | [USN Journal Deletion](/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion/) | [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host) | TTP | +| [Uncommon Processes On Endpoint](/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint/) | [Malicious File](/tags/#malicious-file) | Hunting | | [Unified Messaging Service Spawning a Process](/endpoint/unified_messaging_service_spawning_a_process/) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | TTP | | [Uninstall App Using MsiExec](/endpoint/uninstall_app_using_msiexec/) | [Msiexec](/tags/#msiexec), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution) | TTP | | [Unload Sysmon Filter Driver](/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | | [Unloading AMSI via Reflection](/endpoint/unloading_amsi_via_reflection/) | [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | -| [Unusual LOLBAS in short period of time](/endpoint/unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | Anomaly | +| [Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS](/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory) | TTP | +| [Unsuccessful Netbackup backups]() | None | Hunting | | [Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested](/endpoint/unusual_number_of_computer_service_tickets_requested/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | Hunting | | [Unusual Number of Kerberos Service Tickets Requested](/endpoint/unusual_number_of_kerberos_service_tickets_requested/) | [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets), [Kerberoasting](/tags/#kerberoasting) | Anomaly | | [Unusual Number of Remote Endpoint Authentication Events](/endpoint/unusual_number_of_remote_endpoint_authentication_events/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | Hunting | -| [Unusual Volume of Data Download from Internal Server Per Entity](/network/unusual_volume_of_data_download_from_internal_server_per_entity/) | [Data from Information Repositories](/tags/#data-from-information-repositories), [Data from Network Shared Drive](/tags/#data-from-network-shared-drive) | Anomaly | | [Unusually Long Command Line]() | None | Anomaly | | [Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK]() | None | Anomaly | | [Unusually Long Content-Type Length]() | None | Anomaly | @@ -711,7 +755,6 @@ sidebar: | [Verclsid CLSID Execution](/endpoint/verclsid_clsid_execution/) | [Verclsid](/tags/#verclsid), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution) | Hunting | | [W3WP Spawning Shell](/endpoint/w3wp_spawning_shell/) | [Server Software Component](/tags/#server-software-component), [Web Shell](/tags/#web-shell) | TTP | | [WBAdmin Delete System Backups](/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups/) | [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery) | TTP | -| [WBAdmin Delete System Backups](/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups/) | [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery) | TTP | | [WMI Permanent Event Subscription](/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription/) | [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation) | TTP | | [WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon](/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription_-_sysmon/) | [Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation-event-subscription), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution) | TTP | | [WMI Recon Running Process Or Services](/endpoint/wmi_recon_running_process_or_services/) | [Gather Victim Host Information](/tags/#gather-victim-host-information) | TTP | @@ -719,37 +762,30 @@ sidebar: | [WMIC XSL Execution via URL](/endpoint/wmic_xsl_execution_via_url/) | [XSL Script Processing](/tags/#xsl-script-processing) | TTP | | [WSReset UAC Bypass](/endpoint/wsreset_uac_bypass/) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | TTP | | [Wbemprox COM Object Execution](/endpoint/wbemprox_com_object_execution/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [CMSTP](/tags/#cmstp) | TTP | +| [Web Fraud - Account Harvesting](/deprecated/web_fraud_-_account_harvesting/) | [Create Account](/tags/#create-account) | TTP | +| [Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed](/deprecated/web_fraud_-_anomalous_user_clickspeed/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | Anomaly | +| [Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts]() | None | Anomaly | | [Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes](/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes/) | [System Information Discovery](/tags/#system-information-discovery) | TTP | | [Wermgr Process Connecting To IP Check Web Services](/endpoint/wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services/) | [Gather Victim Network Information](/tags/#gather-victim-network-information), [IP Addresses](/tags/#ip-addresses) | TTP | | [Wermgr Process Create Executable File](/endpoint/wermgr_process_create_executable_file/) | [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information) | TTP | | [Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process](/endpoint/wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter) | TTP | -| [WevtUtil Usage To Clear Logs](/endpoint/wevtutil_usage_to_clear_logs/) | [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Clear Windows Event Logs](/tags/#clear-windows-event-logs) | TTP | -| [Wevtutil Usage To Disable Logs](/endpoint/wevtutil_usage_to_disable_logs/) | [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Clear Windows Event Logs](/tags/#clear-windows-event-logs) | TTP | | [Wget Download and Bash Execution](/endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution/) | [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer) | TTP | | [WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path](/endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | TTP | | [WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell](/endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | TTP | | [WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started](/endpoint/winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task) | Hunting | | [WinRM Spawning a Process](/endpoint/winrm_spawning_a_process/) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | TTP | | [Windows AdFind Exe](/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe/) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery) | TTP | -| [Windows Bits Job Persistence](/endpoint/windows_bits_job_persistence/) | [BITS Jobs](/tags/#bits-jobs) | TTP | -| [Windows Bitsadmin Download File](/endpoint/windows_bitsadmin_download_file/) | [BITS Jobs](/tags/#bits-jobs), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer) | TTP | -| [Windows CertUtil Decode File](/endpoint/windows_certutil_decode_file/) | [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](/tags/#deobfuscate/decode-files-or-information) | TTP | -| [Windows CertUtil URLCache Download](/endpoint/windows_certutil_urlcache_download/) | [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer) | TTP | -| [Windows CertUtil VerifyCtl Download](/endpoint/windows_certutil_verifyctl_download/) | [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer) | TTP | | [Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path](/endpoint/windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path/) | [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer) | TTP | | [Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination](/endpoint/windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination/) | [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer) | TTP | -| [Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination](/endpoint/windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination/) | [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer) | TTP | | [Windows DISM Remove Defender](/endpoint/windows_dism_remove_defender/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | | [Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry](/endpoint/windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | | [Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump](/endpoint/windows_disable_memory_crash_dump/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction) | TTP | | [Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry](/endpoint/windows_disableantispyware_registry/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | | [Windows DiskCryptor Usage](/endpoint/windows_diskcryptor_usage/) | [Data Encrypted for Impact](/tags/#data-encrypted-for-impact) | Hunting | -| [Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution](/endpoint/windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution) | Anomaly | | [Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution](/endpoint/windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution) | TTP | | [Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path](/endpoint/windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil) | TTP | | [Windows Event For Service Disabled](/endpoint/windows_event_for_service_disabled/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | Hunting | | [Windows Event Log Cleared](/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared/) | [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Clear Windows Event Logs](/tags/#clear-windows-event-logs) | TTP | -| [Windows Eventvwr UAC Bypass](/endpoint/windows_eventvwr_uac_bypass/) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | Anomaly | | [Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event](/endpoint/windows_excessive_disabled_services_event/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | | [Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder](/endpoint/windows_file_without_extension_in_critical_folder/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction) | TTP | | [Windows High File Deletion Frequency](/endpoint/windows_high_file_deletion_frequency/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction) | Anomaly | @@ -761,25 +797,17 @@ sidebar: | [Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network](/endpoint/windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network/) | [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution) | TTP | | [Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path](/endpoint/windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil) | TTP | | [Windows Java Spawning Shells](/endpoint/windows_java_spawning_shells/) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | TTP | -| [Windows MSHTA Child Process](/endpoint/windows_mshta_child_process/) | [Mshta](/tags/#mshta), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution) | TTP | -| [Windows MSHTA Command-Line URL](/endpoint/windows_mshta_command-line_url/) | [Mshta](/tags/#mshta), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution) | TTP | -| [Windows MSHTA Inline HTA Execution](/endpoint/windows_mshta_inline_hta_execution/) | [Mshta](/tags/#mshta), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution) | TTP | | [Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry](/endpoint/windows_modify_show_compress_color_and_info_tip_registry/) | [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry) | TTP | | [Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun](/endpoint/windows_nirsoft_advancedrun/) | [Tool](/tags/#tool) | TTP | | [Windows NirSoft Utilities](/endpoint/windows_nirsoft_utilities/) | [Tool](/tags/#tool) | Hunting | | [Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass](/endpoint/windows_non-system_account_targeting_lsass/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | TTP | | [Windows Possible Credential Dumping](/endpoint/windows_possible_credential_dumping/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | TTP | -| [Windows PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer](/endpoint/windows_powershell_start-bitstransfer/) | [BITS Jobs](/tags/#bits-jobs), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer) | TTP | -| [Windows Powershell Connect to Internet With Hidden Window](/endpoint/windows_powershell_connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window/) | [Automated Exfiltration](/tags/#automated-exfiltration) | Anomaly | -| [Windows Powershell DownloadFile](/endpoint/windows_powershell_downloadfile/) | [Automated Exfiltration](/tags/#automated-exfiltration) | Anomaly | | [Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine](/endpoint/windows_process_with_namedpipe_commandline/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection) | Anomaly | | [Windows Raccine Scheduled Task Deletion](/endpoint/windows_raccine_scheduled_task_deletion/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools) | TTP | | [Windows Rasautou DLL Execution](/endpoint/windows_rasautou_dll_execution/) | [Dynamic-link Library Injection](/tags/#dynamic-link-library-injection), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection) | TTP | -| [Windows Rasautou DLL Execution](/endpoint/windows_rasautou_dll_execution/) | [Dynamic-link Library Injection](/tags/#dynamic-link-library-injection), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection) | TTP | | [Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition](/endpoint/windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition/) | [Disk Structure Wipe](/tags/#disk-structure-wipe), [Disk Wipe](/tags/#disk-wipe) | Anomaly | | [Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive](/endpoint/windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive/) | [Disk Structure Wipe](/tags/#disk-structure-wipe), [Disk Wipe](/tags/#disk-wipe) | TTP | | [Windows Remote Assistance Spawning Process](/endpoint/windows_remote_assistance_spawning_process/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection) | TTP | -| [Windows Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution](/endpoint/windows_rundll32_inline_hta_execution/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta) | TTP | | [Windows Schtasks Create Run As System](/endpoint/windows_schtasks_create_run_as_system/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | TTP | | [Windows Security Account Manager Stopped](/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped/) | [Service Stop](/tags/#service-stop) | TTP | | [Windows Service Created With Suspicious Service Path](/endpoint/windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path/) | [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution) | TTP | @@ -788,7 +816,8 @@ sidebar: | [Windows Service Creation on Remote Endpoint](/endpoint/windows_service_creation_on_remote_endpoint/) | [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service) | TTP | | [Windows Service Initiation on Remote Endpoint](/endpoint/windows_service_initiation_on_remote_endpoint/) | [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service) | TTP | | [Windows WMI Process Call Create](/endpoint/windows_wmi_process_call_create/) | [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation) | Hunting | -| [Windows WSReset UAC Bypass](/endpoint/windows_wsreset_uac_bypass/) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | Anomaly | +| [Windows connhost exe started forcefully](/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_started_forcefully/) | [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell) | TTP | +| [Windows hosts file modification]() | None | TTP | | [Winhlp32 Spawning a Process](/endpoint/winhlp32_spawning_a_process/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection) | TTP | | [Winword Spawning Cmd](/endpoint/winword_spawning_cmd/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment) | TTP | | [Winword Spawning PowerShell](/endpoint/winword_spawning_powershell/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment) | TTP | @@ -804,4 +833,5 @@ sidebar: | [aws detect permanent key creation](/cloud/aws_detect_permanent_key_creation/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | Hunting | | [aws detect role creation](/cloud/aws_detect_role_creation/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | Hunting | | [aws detect sts assume role abuse](/cloud/aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | Hunting | -| [aws detect sts get session token abuse](/cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse/) | [Use Alternate Authentication Material](/tags/#use-alternate-authentication-material) | Hunting | \ No newline at end of file +| [aws detect sts get session token abuse](/cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse/) | [Use Alternate Authentication Material](/tags/#use-alternate-authentication-material) | Hunting | +| [gcp detect oauth token abuse](/deprecated/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | Hunting | \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_pages/malware.md b/docs/_pages/malware.md index 167f2f81c2..c4d4949baa 100644 --- a/docs/_pages/malware.md +++ b/docs/_pages/malware.md @@ -3,36 +3,7 @@ title: Malware layout: tag author_profile: false taxonomy: Malware -permalink: /stories/malware/ +permalink: /detections/malware/ sidebar: - nav: "stories" ---- - -| Name | Technique | Tactic | -| ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [BlackMatter Ransomware](/stories/blackmatter_ransomware/) | [Data Encrypted for Impact](/tags/#data-encrypted-for-impact) | [Impact](/tags/#impact) | -| [Clop Ransomware](/stories/clop_ransomware/) | [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution) | [Execution](/tags/#execution) | -| [ColdRoot MacOS RAT]() | None | None | -| [DHS Report TA18-074A](/stories/dhs_report_ta18-074a/) | [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [DarkSide Ransomware](/stories/darkside_ransomware/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access) | -| [Data Destruction](/stories/data_destruction/) | [Disk Structure Wipe](/tags/#disk-structure-wipe), [Disk Wipe](/tags/#disk-wipe) | [Impact](/tags/#impact) | -| [Dynamic DNS](/stories/dynamic_dns/) | [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol) | [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration) | -| [Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ](/stories/emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18-201a_/) | [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing) | [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) | -| [FIN7](/stories/fin7/) | [XSL Script Processing](/tags/#xsl-script-processing) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [Hermetic Wiper](/stories/hermetic_wiper/) | [Disk Structure Wipe](/tags/#disk-structure-wipe), [Disk Wipe](/tags/#disk-wipe) | [Impact](/tags/#impact) | -| [Hidden Cobra Malware](/stories/hidden_cobra_malware/) | [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services) | [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement) | -| [IcedID](/stories/icedid/) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | -| [Network Discovery](/stories/network_discovery/) | [System Network Configuration Discovery](/tags/#system-network-configuration-discovery) | [Discovery](/tags/#discovery) | -| [Orangeworm Attack Group](/stories/orangeworm_attack_group/) | [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process) | [Persistence](/tags/#persistence) | -| [Ransomware](/stories/ransomware/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [Ransomware Cloud](/stories/ransomware_cloud/) | [Data Encrypted for Impact](/tags/#data-encrypted-for-impact) | [Impact](/tags/#impact) | -| [Remcos](/stories/remcos/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Parent PID Spoofing](/tags/#parent-pid-spoofing), [Access Token Manipulation](/tags/#access-token-manipulation) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [Revil Ransomware](/stories/revil_ransomware/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [CMSTP](/tags/#cmstp) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [Ryuk Ransomware](/stories/ryuk_ransomware/) | [Service Stop](/tags/#service-stop) | [Impact](/tags/#impact) | -| [SamSam Ransomware](/stories/samsam_ransomware/) | [Data Encrypted for Impact](/tags/#data-encrypted-for-impact) | [Impact](/tags/#impact) | -| [Trickbot](/stories/trickbot/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter) | [Execution](/tags/#execution) | -| [Unusual Processes](/stories/unusual_processes/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Parent PID Spoofing](/tags/#parent-pid-spoofing), [Access Token Manipulation](/tags/#access-token-manipulation) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [WhisperGate](/stories/whispergate/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Parent PID Spoofing](/tags/#parent-pid-spoofing), [Access Token Manipulation](/tags/#access-token-manipulation) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [Windows File Extension and Association Abuse](/stories/windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [Windows Service Abuse](/stories/windows_service_abuse/) | [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process) | [Persistence](/tags/#persistence) | -| [XMRig](/stories/xmrig/) | [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process) | [Persistence](/tags/#persistence) | \ No newline at end of file + nav: "detections" +--- \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_pages/paybooks.md b/docs/_pages/paybooks.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..37bdd07198 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_pages/paybooks.md @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +--- +title: "Playbooks" +layout: collection +author_profile: false +permalink: /playbooks/ +classes: wide +sidebar: + nav: "playbooks" +--- + +| Name | Detections | Type | +| --------| ---------- | ----------- | +| [AWS Disable User Accounts](/playbooks/aws_disable_user_accounts/)| None | Response | +| [AWS Find Inactive Users](/playbooks/aws_find_inactive_users/)| None | Investigation | +| [Active Directory Reset password](/playbooks/active_directory_reset_password/)| None | Response | +| [Block Indicators](/playbooks/block_indicators/)| None | Response | +| [Crowdstrike Malware Triage](/playbooks/crowdstrike_malware_triage/)| None | Response | +| [Delete Detected Files](/playbooks/delete_detected_files/)|[Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share](/endpoint/executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share/)| Response | +| [Email Notification for Malware](/playbooks/email_notification_for_malware/)| None | Response | +| [Internal Host SSH Investigate](/playbooks/internal_host_ssh_investigate/)| None | Investigation | +| [Internal Host SSH Log4j Investigate](/playbooks/internal_host_ssh_log4j_investigate/)| None | Investigation | +| [Internal Host SSH Log4j Response](/playbooks/internal_host_ssh_log4j_response/)| None | Response | +| [Internal Host WinRM Investigate](/playbooks/internal_host_winrm_investigate/)| None | Investigation | +| [Internal Host WinRM Log4j Investigate](/playbooks/internal_host_winrm_log4j_investigate/)| None | Investigation | +| [Internal Host WinRM Response](/playbooks/internal_host_winrm_response/)| None | Response | +| [Log4j Investigate](/playbooks/log4j_investigate/)|[Curl Download and Bash Execution](/endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution/)[Java Class File download by Java User Agent](/endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent/)[Linux Java Spawning Shell](/endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell/)[Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports](/endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports/)[Wget Download and Bash Execution](/endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution/)[Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic](/network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic/)[Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt](/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt/)[Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection](/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection/)| Investigation | +| [Log4j Respond](/playbooks/log4j_respond/)|[Curl Download and Bash Execution](/endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution/)[Java Class File download by Java User Agent](/endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent/)[Linux Java Spawning Shell](/endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell/)[Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports](/endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports/)[Wget Download and Bash Execution](/endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution/)[Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic](/network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic/)[Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt](/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt/)[Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection](/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection/)| Response | +| [Log4j Splunk Investigation](/playbooks/log4j_splunk_investigation/)| None | Investigation | +| [Malware Hunt and Contain](/playbooks/malware_hunt_and_contain/)| None | Response | +| [Ransomware Investigate and Contain](/playbooks/ransomware_investigate_and_contain/)|[Conti Common Exec parameter](/endpoint/conti_common_exec_parameter/)| Response | +| [Risk Notable Block Indicators](/playbooks/risk_notable_block_indicators/)| None | Response | +| [Risk Notable Enrich](/playbooks/risk_notable_enrich/)| None | Investigation | +| [Risk Notable Import Data](/playbooks/risk_notable_import_data/)| None | Investigation | +| [Risk Notable Investigate](/playbooks/risk_notable_investigate/)| None | Investigation | +| [Risk Notable Merge Events](/playbooks/risk_notable_merge_events/)| None | Investigation | +| [Risk Notable Mitigate](/playbooks/risk_notable_mitigate/)| None | Response | +| [Risk Notable Preprocess](/playbooks/risk_notable_preprocess/)| None | Investigation | +| [Risk Notable Protect Assets and Users](/playbooks/risk_notable_protect_assets_and_users/)| None | Response | +| [Risk Notable Review Indicators](/playbooks/risk_notable_review_indicators/)| None | Response | +| [Risk Notable Verdict](/playbooks/risk_notable_verdict/)| None | Response | +| [Start Investigation](/playbooks/start_investigation/)| None | Investigation | +| [Threat Intel Investigate](/playbooks/threat_intel_investigate/)| None | Investigation | +| [TruSTAR Enrich Indicators](/playbooks/trustar_enrich_indicators/)| None | Investigation | diff --git a/docs/_pages/privilege_escalation.md b/docs/_pages/privilege_escalation.md index 234c9e8c36..60bde4562d 100644 --- a/docs/_pages/privilege_escalation.md +++ b/docs/_pages/privilege_escalation.md @@ -3,11 +3,7 @@ title: Privilege Escalation layout: tag author_profile: false taxonomy: Privilege Escalation -permalink: /stories/privilege_escalation/ +permalink: /detections/privilege_escalation/ sidebar: - nav: "stories" ---- - -| Name | Technique | Tactic | -| ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation](/stories/samaccountname_spoofing_and_domain_controller_impersonation/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts), [Domain Accounts](/tags/#domain-accounts) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | \ No newline at end of file + nav: "detections" +--- \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_pages/ransomware.md b/docs/_pages/ransomware.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2568a01143 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_pages/ransomware.md @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +--- +title: Ransomware +layout: tag +author_profile: false +taxonomy: Ransomware +permalink: /detections/ransomware/ +sidebar: + nav: "detections" +--- \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_pages/stories.md b/docs/_pages/stories.md index 4369677544..a29145b8d2 100644 --- a/docs/_pages/stories.md +++ b/docs/_pages/stories.md @@ -10,120 +10,133 @@ sidebar: | Name | Technique | Tactic | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [AWS Cross Account Activity](aws_cross_account_activity) | [Use Alternate Authentication Material](/tags/#use-alternate-authentication-material) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [AWS IAM Privilege Escalation](aws_iam_privilege_escalation) | [Cloud Account](/tags/#cloud-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account) | [Persistence](/tags/#persistence) | +| [AWS Cross Account Activity](aws_cross_account_activity) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts), [Use Alternate Authentication Material](/tags/#use-alternate-authentication-material) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | +| [AWS Cryptomining](aws_cryptomining) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts), [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](/tags/#unused/unsupported-cloud-regions) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | +| [AWS IAM Privilege Escalation](aws_iam_privilege_escalation) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts), [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts), [Cloud Account](/tags/#cloud-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account), [Cloud Infrastructure Discovery](/tags/#cloud-infrastructure-discovery), [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force), [Account Manipulation](/tags/#account-manipulation), [Cloud Groups](/tags/#cloud-groups), [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Discovery](/tags/#discovery), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | | [AWS Network ACL Activity](aws_network_acl_activity) | [Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-cloud-firewall), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | | [AWS Security Hub Alerts]() | None | None | -| [AWS User Monitoring](aws_user_monitoring) | [Cloud Service Discovery](/tags/#cloud-service-discovery) | [Discovery](/tags/#discovery) | -| [Active Directory Discovery](active_directory_discovery) | [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Local Groups](/tags/#local-groups) | [Discovery](/tags/#discovery) | -| [Active Directory Kerberos Attacks](active_directory_kerberos_attacks) | [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets), [Kerberoasting](/tags/#kerberoasting) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access) | -| [Active Directory Lateral Movement](active_directory_lateral_movement) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [Windows Remote Management](/tags/#windows-remote-management) | [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement) | +| [AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities](aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities) | [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](/tags/#unused/unsupported-cloud-regions) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | +| [AWS User Monitoring](aws_user_monitoring) | [Cloud Service Discovery](/tags/#cloud-service-discovery), [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Discovery](/tags/#discovery), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | +| [Active Directory Discovery](active_directory_discovery) | [Domain Account](/tags/#domain-account), [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery), [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery), [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Domain Groups](/tags/#domain-groups), [Domain Trust Discovery](/tags/#domain-trust-discovery), [Password Policy Discovery](/tags/#password-policy-discovery), [Local Groups](/tags/#local-groups), [System Owner/User Discovery](/tags/#system-owner/user-discovery), [Local Account](/tags/#local-account), [System Network Connections Discovery](/tags/#system-network-connections-discovery), [System Network Configuration Discovery](/tags/#system-network-configuration-discovery), [Internet Connection Discovery](/tags/#internet-connection-discovery), [Kerberoasting](/tags/#kerberoasting) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Discovery](/tags/#discovery) | +| [Active Directory Kerberos Attacks](active_directory_kerberos_attacks) | [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets), [AS-REP Roasting](/tags/#as-rep-roasting), [Kerberoasting](/tags/#kerberoasting), [Use Alternate Authentication Material](/tags/#use-alternate-authentication-material), [Pass the Ticket](/tags/#pass-the-ticket), [Password Spraying](/tags/#password-spraying), [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement) | +| [Active Directory Lateral Movement](active_directory_lateral_movement) | [Use Alternate Authentication Material](/tags/#use-alternate-authentication-material), [Pass the Hash](/tags/#pass-the-hash), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution), [Distributed Component Object Model](/tags/#distributed-component-object-model), [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Windows Remote Management](/tags/#windows-remote-management), [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [At (Windows)](/tags/#at-(windows)), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Services Registry Permissions Weakness](/tags/#services-registry-permissions-weakness), [Remote Desktop Protocol](/tags/#remote-desktop-protocol), [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | | [Active Directory Password Spraying](active_directory_password_spraying) | [Password Spraying](/tags/#password-spraying), [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access) | | [Apache Struts Vulnerability](apache_struts_vulnerability) | [System Information Discovery](/tags/#system-information-discovery) | [Discovery](/tags/#discovery) | | [Asset Tracking]() | None | None | -| [BITS Jobs](bits_jobs) | [BITS Jobs](/tags/#bits-jobs), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | +| [BITS Jobs](bits_jobs) | [BITS Jobs](/tags/#bits-jobs), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence) | | [Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156](baron_samedit_cve-2021-3156) | [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](/tags/#exploitation-for-privilege-escalation) | [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | -| [BlackMatter Ransomware](blackmatter_ransomware) | [Data Encrypted for Impact](/tags/#data-encrypted-for-impact) | [Impact](/tags/#impact) | +| [BlackMatter Ransomware](blackmatter_ransomware) | [Credentials in Registry](/tags/#credentials-in-registry), [Unsecured Credentials](/tags/#unsecured-credentials), [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery), [Defacement](/tags/#defacement), [Data Encrypted for Impact](/tags/#data-encrypted-for-impact) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Impact](/tags/#impact) | | [Brand Monitoring]() | None | None | -| [Clop Ransomware](clop_ransomware) | [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution) | [Execution](/tags/#execution) | -| [Cloud Cryptomining](cloud_cryptomining) | [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](/tags/#unused/unsupported-cloud-regions) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [Cloud Federated Credential Abuse](cloud_federated_credential_abuse) | [Image File Execution Options Injection](/tags/#image-file-execution-options-injection), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution) | [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | -| [Cobalt Strike](cobalt_strike) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [MSBuild](/tags/#msbuild) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | +| [Clop Ransomware](clop_ransomware) | [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction), [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery), [Data Encrypted for Impact](/tags/#data-encrypted-for-impact), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Clear Windows Event Logs](/tags/#clear-windows-event-logs), [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Impact](/tags/#impact), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | +| [Cloud Cryptomining](cloud_cryptomining) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts), [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts), [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](/tags/#unused/unsupported-cloud-regions) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | +| [Cloud Federated Credential Abuse](cloud_federated_credential_abuse) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts), [Cloud Account](/tags/#cloud-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account), [Modify Authentication Process](/tags/#modify-authentication-process), [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [Image File Execution Options Injection](/tags/#image-file-execution-options-injection), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | +| [Cobalt Strike](cobalt_strike) | [Archive via Utility](/tags/#archive-via-utility), [Archive Collected Data](/tags/#archive-collected-data), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [MSBuild](/tags/#msbuild) | [Collection](/tags/#collection), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | | [ColdRoot MacOS RAT]() | None | None | -| [Collection and Staging](collection_and_staging) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [Command and Control](command_and_control) | [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol), [Web Protocols](/tags/#web-protocols) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control) | +| [Collection and Staging](collection_and_staging) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Archive via Utility](/tags/#archive-via-utility), [Archive Collected Data](/tags/#archive-collected-data), [Email Collection](/tags/#email-collection), [Local Email Collection](/tags/#local-email-collection), [Remote Email Collection](/tags/#remote-email-collection) | [Collection](/tags/#collection), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | +| [Command and Control](command_and_control) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol), [DNS](/tags/#dns), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol), [Non-Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#non-application-layer-protocol), [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol), [Web Protocols](/tags/#web-protocols), [Drive-by Compromise](/tags/#drive-by-compromise) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) | +| [Common Phishing Frameworks](common_phishing_frameworks) | [Spearphishing via Service](/tags/#spearphishing-via-service) | [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) | | [Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation](container_implantation_monitoring_and_investigation) | [Implant Internal Image](/tags/#implant-internal-image) | [Persistence](/tags/#persistence) | -| [Credential Dumping](credential_dumping) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access) | -| [DHS Report TA18-074A](dhs_report_ta18-074a) | [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | +| [Credential Dumping](credential_dumping) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager), [NTDS](/tags/#ntds), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution) | +| [DHS Report TA18-074A](dhs_report_ta18-074a) | [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Local Account](/tags/#local-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Disable or Modify System Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-system-firewall), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses), [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](/tags/#registry-run-keys-/-startup-folder), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution), [Malicious File](/tags/#malicious-file), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry), [File Transfer Protocols](/tags/#file-transfer-protocols), [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | | [DNS Amplification Attacks](dns_amplification_attacks) | [Network Denial of Service](/tags/#network-denial-of-service), [Reflection Amplification](/tags/#reflection-amplification) | [Impact](/tags/#impact) | -| [DNS Hijacking](dns_hijacking) | [Drive-by Compromise](/tags/#drive-by-compromise) | [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) | -| [DarkSide Ransomware](darkside_ransomware) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access) | -| [Data Destruction](data_destruction) | [Disk Structure Wipe](/tags/#disk-structure-wipe), [Disk Wipe](/tags/#disk-wipe) | [Impact](/tags/#impact) | -| [Data Exfiltration](data_exfiltration) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol) | [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration) | -| [Data Protection](data_protection) | [Drive-by Compromise](/tags/#drive-by-compromise) | [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) | +| [DNS Hijacking](dns_hijacking) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol), [DNS](/tags/#dns), [Drive-by Compromise](/tags/#drive-by-compromise) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) | +| [DarkSide Ransomware](darkside_ransomware) | [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [BITS Jobs](/tags/#bits-jobs), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [CMSTP](/tags/#cmstp), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery), [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [Automated Exfiltration](/tags/#automated-exfiltration), [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution), [Data Encrypted for Impact](/tags/#data-encrypted-for-impact), [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration), [Impact](/tags/#impact), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | +| [Data Destruction](data_destruction) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction), [Disk Structure Wipe](/tags/#disk-structure-wipe), [Disk Wipe](/tags/#disk-wipe) | [Impact](/tags/#impact) | +| [Data Exfiltration](data_exfiltration) | [Transfer Data to Cloud Account](/tags/#transfer-data-to-cloud-account), [Email Collection](/tags/#email-collection), [Email Forwarding Rule](/tags/#email-forwarding-rule), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol), [Local Email Collection](/tags/#local-email-collection), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Exfiltration Over C2 Channel](/tags/#exfiltration-over-c2-channel), [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol) | [Collection](/tags/#collection), [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) | +| [Data Protection](data_protection) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol), [Drive-by Compromise](/tags/#drive-by-compromise) | [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) | | [Deobfuscate-Decode Files or Information](deobfuscate-decode_files_or_information) | [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](/tags/#deobfuscate/decode-files-or-information) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [Detect Zerologon Attack](detect_zerologon_attack) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access) | -| [Dev Sec Ops](dev_sec_ops) | [Cloud Service Discovery](/tags/#cloud-service-discovery) | [Discovery](/tags/#discovery) | -| [Disabling Security Tools](disabling_security_tools) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [Domain Trust Discovery](domain_trust_discovery) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery) | [Discovery](/tags/#discovery) | -| [Dynamic DNS](dynamic_dns) | [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol) | [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration) | -| [Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ](emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18-201a_) | [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing) | [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) | +| [Detect Zerologon Attack](detect_zerologon_attack) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [Exploitation of Remote Services](/tags/#exploitation-of-remote-services), [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement) | +| [Dev Sec Ops](dev_sec_ops) | [Malicious Image](/tags/#malicious-image), [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution), [Compromise Client Software Binary](/tags/#compromise-client-software-binary), [Trusted Relationship](/tags/#trusted-relationship), [Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools](/tags/#compromise-software-dependencies-and-development-tools), [Supply Chain Compromise](/tags/#supply-chain-compromise), [Exfiltration to Cloud Storage](/tags/#exfiltration-to-cloud-storage), [Exfiltration Over Web Service](/tags/#exfiltration-over-web-service), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol), [Exploitation for Credential Access](/tags/#exploitation-for-credential-access), [Cloud Service Discovery](/tags/#cloud-service-discovery) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Discovery](/tags/#discovery), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence) | +| [Disabling Security Tools](disabling_security_tools) | [Install Root Certificate](/tags/#install-root-certificate), [Subvert Trust Controls](/tags/#subvert-trust-controls), [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses), [Disable or Modify System Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-system-firewall), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | +| [Domain Trust Discovery](domain_trust_discovery) | [Domain Trust Discovery](/tags/#domain-trust-discovery), [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery) | [Discovery](/tags/#discovery) | +| [Dynamic DNS](dynamic_dns) | [Web Protocols](/tags/#web-protocols), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol), [Drive-by Compromise](/tags/#drive-by-compromise) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) | +| [Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ](emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18-201a_) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](/tags/#registry-run-keys-/-startup-folder), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Software Deployment Tools](/tags/#software-deployment-tools), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services) | [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | | [F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902](f5_tmui_rce_cve-2020-5902) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) | -| [FIN7](fin7) | [XSL Script Processing](/tags/#xsl-script-processing) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [GCP Cross Account Activity](gcp_cross_account_activity) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [HAFNIUM Group](hafnium_group) | [Automated Exfiltration](/tags/#automated-exfiltration) | [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration) | -| [Hermetic Wiper](hermetic_wiper) | [Disk Structure Wipe](/tags/#disk-structure-wipe), [Disk Wipe](/tags/#disk-wipe) | [Impact](/tags/#impact) | -| [Hidden Cobra Malware](hidden_cobra_malware) | [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services) | [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement) | -| [IcedID](icedid) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | -| [Information Sabotage](information_sabotage) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction), [File Deletion](/tags/#file-deletion), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host) | [Impact](/tags/#impact) | -| [Ingress Tool Transfer](ingress_tool_transfer) | [Automated Exfiltration](/tags/#automated-exfiltration) | [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration) | +| [FIN7](fin7) | [System Owner/User Discovery](/tags/#system-owner/user-discovery), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [JavaScript](/tags/#javascript), [Credentials from Password Stores](/tags/#credentials-from-password-stores), [Credentials from Web Browsers](/tags/#credentials-from-web-browsers), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment), [Visual Basic](/tags/#visual-basic), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Parent PID Spoofing](/tags/#parent-pid-spoofing), [Access Token Manipulation](/tags/#access-token-manipulation), [XSL Script Processing](/tags/#xsl-script-processing) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Discovery](/tags/#discovery), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | +| [GCP Cross Account Activity](gcp_cross_account_activity) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | +| [HAFNIUM Group](hafnium_group) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Server Software Component](/tags/#server-software-component), [Web Shell](/tags/#web-shell), [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application), [Local Account](/tags/#local-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [NTDS](/tags/#ntds), [Email Collection](/tags/#email-collection), [Remote Email Collection](/tags/#remote-email-collection) | [Collection](/tags/#collection), [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence) | +| [Hermetic Wiper](hermetic_wiper) | [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry), [Disk Structure Wipe](/tags/#disk-structure-wipe), [Disk Wipe](/tags/#disk-wipe) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Impact](/tags/#impact), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | +| [Hidden Cobra Malware](hidden_cobra_malware) | [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Network Share Connection Removal](/tags/#network-share-connection-removal), [Remote Desktop Protocol](/tags/#remote-desktop-protocol), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [File Transfer Protocols](/tags/#file-transfer-protocols), [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol), [DNS](/tags/#dns), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement) | +| [Host Redirection](host_redirection) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol), [DNS](/tags/#dns) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration) | +| [IcedID](icedid) | [Domain Account](/tags/#domain-account), [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses), [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution), [Malicious File](/tags/#malicious-file), [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry), [Archive via Utility](/tags/#archive-via-utility), [Archive Collected Data](/tags/#archive-collected-data), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta), [Domain Trust Discovery](/tags/#domain-trust-discovery), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment), [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](/tags/#registry-run-keys-/-startup-folder), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [Data from Local System](/tags/#data-from-local-system), [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task) | [Collection](/tags/#collection), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Discovery](/tags/#discovery), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | +| [Information Sabotage](information_sabotage) | [Transfer Data to Cloud Account](/tags/#transfer-data-to-cloud-account) | [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration) | +| [Ingress Tool Transfer](ingress_tool_transfer) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [BITS Jobs](/tags/#bits-jobs), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence) | | [JBoss Vulnerability](jboss_vulnerability) | [System Information Discovery](/tags/#system-information-discovery) | [Discovery](/tags/#discovery) | | [Kubernetes Scanning Activity](kubernetes_scanning_activity) | [Cloud Service Discovery](/tags/#cloud-service-discovery) | [Discovery](/tags/#discovery) | | [Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity]() | None | None | -| [Linux Persistence Techniques](linux_persistence_techniques) | [Sudo and Sudo Caching](/tags/#sudo-and-sudo-caching), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | +| [Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity]() | None | None | +| [Linux Persistence Techniques](linux_persistence_techniques) | [Cron](/tags/#cron), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [Local Account](/tags/#local-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account), [At (Linux)](/tags/#at-(linux)), [Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#linux-and-mac-file-and-directory-permissions-modification), [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification), [Setuid and Setgid](/tags/#setuid-and-setgid), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism), [Sudo and Sudo Caching](/tags/#sudo-and-sudo-caching), [Kernel Modules and Extensions](/tags/#kernel-modules-and-extensions), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution), [RC Scripts](/tags/#rc-scripts), [Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts](/tags/#boot-or-logon-initialization-scripts), [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](/tags/#unix-shell-configuration-modification), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution), [SSH Authorized Keys](/tags/#ssh-authorized-keys), [Account Manipulation](/tags/#account-manipulation), [/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow](/tags/#/etc/passwd-and-/etc/shadow), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [Dynamic Linker Hijacking](/tags/#dynamic-linker-hijacking), [Hijack Execution Flow](/tags/#hijack-execution-flow), [Systemd Timers](/tags/#systemd-timers) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | | [Linux Post-Exploitation](linux_post-exploitation) | [Unix Shell](/tags/#unix-shell) | [Execution](/tags/#execution) | -| [Linux Privilege Escalation](linux_privilege_escalation) | [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](/tags/#exploitation-for-privilege-escalation) | [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | -| [Living Off The Land](living_off_the_land) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | -| [Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228](log4shell_cve-2021-44228) | [Automated Exfiltration](/tags/#automated-exfiltration) | [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration) | -| [Malicious PowerShell](malicious_powershell) | [Automated Exfiltration](/tags/#automated-exfiltration) | [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration) | -| [Masquerading - Rename System Utilities](masquerading_-_rename_system_utilities) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [Meterpreter](meterpreter) | [System Owner/User Discovery](/tags/#system-owner/user-discovery) | [Discovery](/tags/#discovery) | -| [Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444](microsoft_mshtml_remote_code_execution_cve-2021-40444) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | +| [Linux Privilege Escalation](linux_privilege_escalation) | [Cron](/tags/#cron), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [Local Account](/tags/#local-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account), [At (Linux)](/tags/#at-(linux)), [Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#linux-and-mac-file-and-directory-permissions-modification), [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification), [Setuid and Setgid](/tags/#setuid-and-setgid), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism), [Sudo and Sudo Caching](/tags/#sudo-and-sudo-caching), [Kernel Modules and Extensions](/tags/#kernel-modules-and-extensions), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution), [RC Scripts](/tags/#rc-scripts), [Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts](/tags/#boot-or-logon-initialization-scripts), [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](/tags/#unix-shell-configuration-modification), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](/tags/#exploitation-for-privilege-escalation), [SSH Authorized Keys](/tags/#ssh-authorized-keys), [Account Manipulation](/tags/#account-manipulation), [/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow](/tags/#/etc/passwd-and-/etc/shadow), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [Dynamic Linker Hijacking](/tags/#dynamic-linker-hijacking), [Hijack Execution Flow](/tags/#hijack-execution-flow), [Systemd Timers](/tags/#systemd-timers) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | +| [Living Off The Land](living_off_the_land) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | +| [Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228](log4shell_cve-2021-44228) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer), [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) | +| [Malicious PowerShell](malicious_powershell) | [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [Distributed Component Object Model](/tags/#distributed-component-object-model), [Windows Remote Management](/tags/#windows-remote-management), [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation), [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Indicator Removal from Tools](/tags/#indicator-removal-from-tools), [Component Object Model Hijacking](/tags/#component-object-model-hijacking), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](/tags/#deobfuscate/decode-files-or-information), [Gather Victim Host Information](/tags/#gather-victim-host-information), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation), [Reconnaissance](/tags/#reconnaissance) | +| [Masquerading - Rename System Utilities](masquerading_-_rename_system_utilities) | [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32), [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction), [File Deletion](/tags/#file-deletion), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [MSBuild](/tags/#msbuild), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Impact](/tags/#impact) | +| [Meterpreter](meterpreter) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [System Owner/User Discovery](/tags/#system-owner/user-discovery) | [Discovery](/tags/#discovery), [Execution](/tags/#execution) | +| [Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444](microsoft_mshtml_remote_code_execution_cve-2021-40444) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Control Panel](/tags/#control-panel), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) | +| [Monitor Backup Solution]() | None | None | +| [Monitor for Unauthorized Software](monitor_for_unauthorized_software) | [Match Legitimate Name or Location](/tags/#match-legitimate-name-or-location), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [Active Scanning](/tags/#active-scanning) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Reconnaissance](/tags/#reconnaissance) | | [Monitor for Updates]() | None | None | -| [NOBELIUM Group](nobelium_group) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | +| [NOBELIUM Group](nobelium_group) | [Archive via Utility](/tags/#archive-via-utility), [Archive Collected Data](/tags/#archive-collected-data), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta), [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery), [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution), [Exploitation for Client Execution](/tags/#exploitation-for-client-execution), [File Transfer Protocols](/tags/#file-transfer-protocols), [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol), [Web Protocols](/tags/#web-protocols), [Web Shell](/tags/#web-shell) | [Collection](/tags/#collection), [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Discovery](/tags/#discovery), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | | [Netsh Abuse](netsh_abuse) | [Disable or Modify System Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-system-firewall), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | | [Network Discovery](network_discovery) | [System Network Configuration Discovery](/tags/#system-network-configuration-discovery) | [Discovery](/tags/#discovery) | -| [Office 365 Detections](office_365_detections) | [Email Forwarding Rule](/tags/#email-forwarding-rule), [Email Collection](/tags/#email-collection) | [Collection](/tags/#collection) | -| [Orangeworm Attack Group](orangeworm_attack_group) | [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process) | [Persistence](/tags/#persistence) | -| [PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services](petitpotam_ntlm_relay_on_active_directory_certificate_services) | [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access) | -| [Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns](possible_backdoor_activity_associated_with_mudcarp_espionage_campaigns) | [Automated Exfiltration](/tags/#automated-exfiltration) | [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration) | -| [PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527](printnightmare_cve-2021-34527) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch](prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch) | [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol), [Web Protocols](/tags/#web-protocols) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control) | -| [ProxyShell](proxyshell) | [Server Software Component](/tags/#server-software-component), [Web Shell](/tags/#web-shell) | [Persistence](/tags/#persistence) | -| [Ransomware](ransomware) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | +| [Office 365 Detections](office_365_detections) | [Cloud Account](/tags/#cloud-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account), [Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-cloud-firewall), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses), [Modify Authentication Process](/tags/#modify-authentication-process), [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force), [Email Collection](/tags/#email-collection), [Email Forwarding Rule](/tags/#email-forwarding-rule), [Remote Email Collection](/tags/#remote-email-collection), [Password Guessing](/tags/#password-guessing) | [Collection](/tags/#collection), [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence) | +| [Orangeworm Attack Group](orangeworm_attack_group) | [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution) | [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | +| [PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services](petitpotam_ntlm_relay_on_active_directory_certificate_services) | [Forced Authentication](/tags/#forced-authentication), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access) | +| [Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns](possible_backdoor_activity_associated_with_mudcarp_espionage_campaigns) | [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](/tags/#registry-run-keys-/-startup-folder), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution) | [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | +| [PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527](printnightmare_cve-2021-34527) | [Print Processors](/tags/#print-processors), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](/tags/#exploitation-for-privilege-escalation) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | +| [Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch](prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch) | [Remote Desktop Protocol](/tags/#remote-desktop-protocol), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol), [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol), [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol), [Web Protocols](/tags/#web-protocols), [Drive-by Compromise](/tags/#drive-by-compromise) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement) | +| [ProxyShell](proxyshell) | [Server Software Component](/tags/#server-software-component), [Web Shell](/tags/#web-shell), [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell) | [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence) | +| [Ransomware](ransomware) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Archive via Utility](/tags/#archive-via-utility), [Archive Collected Data](/tags/#archive-collected-data), [Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-cloud-firewall), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism), [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery), [File Deletion](/tags/#file-deletion), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [CMSTP](/tags/#cmstp), [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction), [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution), [Automated Exfiltration](/tags/#automated-exfiltration), [Domain Account](/tags/#domain-account), [Local Groups](/tags/#local-groups), [Domain Trust Discovery](/tags/#domain-trust-discovery), [Local Account](/tags/#local-account), [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery), [Domain Groups](/tags/#domain-groups), [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Clear Windows Event Logs](/tags/#clear-windows-event-logs), [Service Stop](/tags/#service-stop), [Account Access Removal](/tags/#account-access-removal), [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Visual Basic](/tags/#visual-basic), [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification), [Defacement](/tags/#defacement), [DLL Side-Loading](/tags/#dll-side-loading), [Hijack Execution Flow](/tags/#hijack-execution-flow), [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information), [Indicator Removal from Tools](/tags/#indicator-removal-from-tools), [Component Object Model Hijacking](/tags/#component-object-model-hijacking), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution), [Gather Victim Host Information](/tags/#gather-victim-host-information), [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](/tags/#registry-run-keys-/-startup-folder), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution), [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [Msiexec](/tags/#msiexec), [Data Encrypted for Impact](/tags/#data-encrypted-for-impact), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil), [Tool](/tags/#tool), [Server Software Component](/tags/#server-software-component), [Web Shell](/tags/#web-shell), [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol), [Web Protocols](/tags/#web-protocols) | [Collection](/tags/#collection), [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Discovery](/tags/#discovery), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration), [Impact](/tags/#impact), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation), [Reconnaissance](/tags/#reconnaissance), [Resource Development](/tags/#resource-development) | | [Ransomware Cloud](ransomware_cloud) | [Data Encrypted for Impact](/tags/#data-encrypted-for-impact) | [Impact](/tags/#impact) | -| [Remcos](remcos) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Parent PID Spoofing](/tags/#parent-pid-spoofing), [Access Token Manipulation](/tags/#access-token-manipulation) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [Revil Ransomware](revil_ransomware) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [CMSTP](/tags/#cmstp) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [Router and Infrastructure Security](router_and_infrastructure_security) | [Hardware Additions](/tags/#hardware-additions), [Automated Exfiltration](/tags/#automated-exfiltration), [Network Denial of Service](/tags/#network-denial-of-service), [Traffic Duplication](/tags/#traffic-duplication) | [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) | -| [Ryuk Ransomware](ryuk_ransomware) | [Service Stop](/tags/#service-stop) | [Impact](/tags/#impact) | +| [Remcos](remcos) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses), [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [JavaScript](/tags/#javascript), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Dynamic-link Library Injection](/tags/#dynamic-link-library-injection), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry), [Credentials from Password Stores](/tags/#credentials-from-password-stores), [Credentials from Web Browsers](/tags/#credentials-from-web-browsers), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Component Object Model](/tags/#component-object-model), [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](/tags/#registry-run-keys-/-startup-folder), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Screen Capture](/tags/#screen-capture), [Visual Basic](/tags/#visual-basic), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Gather Victim Host Information](/tags/#gather-victim-host-information), [Parent PID Spoofing](/tags/#parent-pid-spoofing), [Access Token Manipulation](/tags/#access-token-manipulation) | [Collection](/tags/#collection), [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation), [Reconnaissance](/tags/#reconnaissance) | +| [Revil Ransomware](revil_ransomware) | [Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-cloud-firewall), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses), [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery), [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Defacement](/tags/#defacement), [DLL Side-Loading](/tags/#dll-side-loading), [Hijack Execution Flow](/tags/#hijack-execution-flow), [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [CMSTP](/tags/#cmstp) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Impact](/tags/#impact), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | +| [Router and Infrastructure Security](router_and_infrastructure_security) | [Hardware Additions](/tags/#hardware-additions), [Network Denial of Service](/tags/#network-denial-of-service), [Adversary-in-the-Middle](/tags/#adversary-in-the-middle), [ARP Cache Poisoning](/tags/#arp-cache-poisoning), [TFTP Boot](/tags/#tftp-boot), [Pre-OS Boot](/tags/#pre-os-boot), [Automated Exfiltration](/tags/#automated-exfiltration), [Traffic Duplication](/tags/#traffic-duplication) | [Collection](/tags/#collection), [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration), [Impact](/tags/#impact), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence) | +| [Ryuk Ransomware](ryuk_ransomware) | [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery), [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction), [Domain Trust Discovery](/tags/#domain-trust-discovery), [Data Encrypted for Impact](/tags/#data-encrypted-for-impact), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses), [Service Stop](/tags/#service-stop), [Remote Desktop Protocol](/tags/#remote-desktop-protocol), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Discovery](/tags/#discovery), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Impact](/tags/#impact), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | | [SQL Injection](sql_injection) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) | -| [SamSam Ransomware](samsam_ransomware) | [Data Encrypted for Impact](/tags/#data-encrypted-for-impact) | [Impact](/tags/#impact) | +| [SamSam Ransomware](samsam_ransomware) | [Match Legitimate Name or Location](/tags/#match-legitimate-name-or-location), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [Active Scanning](/tags/#active-scanning), [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution), [Malicious File](/tags/#malicious-file), [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction), [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution), [Data Encrypted for Impact](/tags/#data-encrypted-for-impact), [Remote Desktop Protocol](/tags/#remote-desktop-protocol), [System Information Discovery](/tags/#system-information-discovery) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Discovery](/tags/#discovery), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Impact](/tags/#impact), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement), [Reconnaissance](/tags/#reconnaissance) | | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil](signed_binary_proxy_execution_installutil) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [Silver Sparrow](silver_sparrow) | [Data Staged](/tags/#data-staged) | [Collection](/tags/#collection) | -| [Spearphishing Attachments](spearphishing_attachments) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment) | [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) | -| [Suspicious AWS Login Activities](suspicious_aws_login_activities) | [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](/tags/#unused/unsupported-cloud-regions) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | +| [Silver Sparrow](silver_sparrow) | [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer), [Launch Agent](/tags/#launch-agent), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Data Staged](/tags/#data-staged) | [Collection](/tags/#collection), [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | +| [Spearphishing Attachments](spearphishing_attachments) | [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment), [Spearphishing Link](/tags/#spearphishing-link) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) | +| [Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities]() | None | None | +| [Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability]() | None | None | +| [Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409]() | None | None | +| [Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities](suspicious_aws_ec2_activities) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts), [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](/tags/#unused/unsupported-cloud-regions) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | +| [Suspicious AWS Login Activities](suspicious_aws_login_activities) | [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](/tags/#unused/unsupported-cloud-regions), [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | | [Suspicious AWS S3 Activities](suspicious_aws_s3_activities) | [Data from Cloud Storage Object](/tags/#data-from-cloud-storage-object) | [Collection](/tags/#collection) | | [Suspicious AWS Traffic]() | None | None | | [Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities](suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities) | [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](/tags/#unused/unsupported-cloud-regions) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities](suspicious_cloud_instance_activities) | [Transfer Data to Cloud Account](/tags/#transfer-data-to-cloud-account) | [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration) | -| [Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities](suspicious_cloud_provisioning_activities) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [Suspicious Cloud User Activities](suspicious_cloud_user_activities) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [Suspicious Command-Line Executions](suspicious_command-line_executions) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | +| [Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities](suspicious_cloud_instance_activities) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts), [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts), [Transfer Data to Cloud Account](/tags/#transfer-data-to-cloud-account) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | +| [Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities](suspicious_cloud_provisioning_activities) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | +| [Suspicious Cloud User Activities](suspicious_cloud_user_activities) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts), [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts), [Cloud Infrastructure Discovery](/tags/#cloud-infrastructure-discovery), [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Discovery](/tags/#discovery), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | +| [Suspicious Command-Line Executions](suspicious_command-line_executions) | [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution) | | [Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity](suspicious_compiled_html_activity) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Compiled HTML File](/tags/#compiled-html-file) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [Suspicious DNS Traffic](suspicious_dns_traffic) | [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol) | [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration) | -| [Suspicious Emails](suspicious_emails) | [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing) | [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) | +| [Suspicious DNS Traffic](suspicious_dns_traffic) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol), [DNS](/tags/#dns), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol), [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol), [Drive-by Compromise](/tags/#drive-by-compromise) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) | +| [Suspicious Emails](suspicious_emails) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment) | [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) | | [Suspicious GCP Storage Activities](suspicious_gcp_storage_activities) | [Data from Cloud Storage Object](/tags/#data-from-cloud-storage-object) | [Collection](/tags/#collection) | -| [Suspicious MSHTA Activity](suspicious_mshta_activity) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [Suspicious Okta Activity](suspicious_okta_activity) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts), [Default Accounts](/tags/#default-accounts) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | +| [Suspicious MSHTA Activity](suspicious_mshta_activity) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](/tags/#registry-run-keys-/-startup-folder), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | +| [Suspicious Okta Activity](suspicious_okta_activity) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts), [Default Accounts](/tags/#default-accounts) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | | [Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity](suspicious_regsvcs_regasm_activity) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvcs/Regasm](/tags/#regsvcs/regasm) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity](suspicious_regsvr32_activity) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [Suspicious Rundll32 Activity](suspicious_rundll32_activity) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [Suspicious WMI Use](suspicious_wmi_use) | [XSL Script Processing](/tags/#xsl-script-processing) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [Suspicious Windows Registry Activities](suspicious_windows_registry_activities) | [Services Registry Permissions Weakness](/tags/#services-registry-permissions-weakness) | [Persistence](/tags/#persistence) | -| [Suspicious Zoom Child Processes](suspicious_zoom_child_processes) | [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](/tags/#exploitation-for-privilege-escalation) | [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | -| [Trickbot](trickbot) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter) | [Execution](/tags/#execution) | -| [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution) | [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild](trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [MSBuild](/tags/#msbuild) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [Unusual Processes](unusual_processes) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Parent PID Spoofing](/tags/#parent-pid-spoofing), [Access Token Manipulation](/tags/#access-token-manipulation) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | +| [Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity](suspicious_regsvr32_activity) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | +| [Suspicious Rundll32 Activity](suspicious_rundll32_activity) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | +| [Suspicious WMI Use](suspicious_wmi_use) | [Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation-event-subscription), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution), [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation), [XSL Script Processing](/tags/#xsl-script-processing) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | +| [Suspicious Windows Registry Activities](suspicious_windows_registry_activities) | [Hidden Files and Directories](/tags/#hidden-files-and-directories), [Change Default File Association](/tags/#change-default-file-association), [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism), [Port Monitors](/tags/#port-monitors), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution), [Application Shimming](/tags/#application-shimming), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution), [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](/tags/#registry-run-keys-/-startup-folder), [Image File Execution Options Injection](/tags/#image-file-execution-options-injection), [Services Registry Permissions Weakness](/tags/#services-registry-permissions-weakness) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | +| [Suspicious Zoom Child Processes](suspicious_zoom_child_processes) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](/tags/#exploitation-for-privilege-escalation) | [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | +| [Trickbot](trickbot) | [Domain Account](/tags/#domain-account), [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery), [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32), [Gather Victim Network Information](/tags/#gather-victim-network-information), [IP Addresses](/tags/#ip-addresses), [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Discovery](/tags/#discovery), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation), [Reconnaissance](/tags/#reconnaissance) | +| [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | +| [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild](trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild) | [MSBuild](/tags/#msbuild), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | +| [Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications](unusual_aws_ec2_modifications) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | +| [Unusual Processes](unusual_processes) | [Malicious File](/tags/#malicious-file), [Match Legitimate Name or Location](/tags/#match-legitimate-name-or-location), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [Active Scanning](/tags/#active-scanning), [System Network Configuration Discovery](/tags/#system-network-configuration-discovery), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [Verclsid](/tags/#verclsid), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil), [Tool](/tags/#tool), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Parent PID Spoofing](/tags/#parent-pid-spoofing), [Access Token Manipulation](/tags/#access-token-manipulation), [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Discovery](/tags/#discovery), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation), [Reconnaissance](/tags/#reconnaissance), [Resource Development](/tags/#resource-development) | | [Use of Cleartext Protocols]() | None | None | -| [WhisperGate](whispergate) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Parent PID Spoofing](/tags/#parent-pid-spoofing), [Access Token Manipulation](/tags/#access-token-manipulation) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | +| [Web Fraud Detection](web_fraud_detection) | [Create Account](/tags/#create-account), [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | +| [WhisperGate](whispergate) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [Distributed Component Object Model](/tags/#distributed-component-object-model), [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information), [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](/tags/#virtualization/sandbox-evasion), [Time Based Evasion](/tags/#time-based-evasion), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Visual Basic](/tags/#visual-basic), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil), [Tool](/tags/#tool), [Disk Structure Wipe](/tags/#disk-structure-wipe), [Disk Wipe](/tags/#disk-wipe), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Parent PID Spoofing](/tags/#parent-pid-spoofing), [Access Token Manipulation](/tags/#access-token-manipulation) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Discovery](/tags/#discovery), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Impact](/tags/#impact), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation), [Resource Development](/tags/#resource-development) | | [Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350](windows_dns_sigred_cve-2020-1350) | [Exploitation for Client Execution](/tags/#exploitation-for-client-execution) | [Execution](/tags/#execution) | -| [Windows Defense Evasion Tactics](windows_defense_evasion_tactics) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | +| [Windows Defense Evasion Tactics](windows_defense_evasion_tactics) | [Hidden Files and Directories](/tags/#hidden-files-and-directories), [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses), [Compile After Delivery](/tags/#compile-after-delivery), [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry), [Hide Artifacts](/tags/#hide-artifacts), [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism), [Disable or Modify System Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-system-firewall), [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification), [Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#windows-file-and-directory-permissions-modification), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Dynamic-link Library Injection](/tags/#dynamic-link-library-injection), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | | [Windows Discovery Techniques](windows_discovery_techniques) | [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Local Groups](/tags/#local-groups) | [Discovery](/tags/#discovery) | -| [Windows File Extension and Association Abuse](windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [Windows Log Manipulation](windows_log_manipulation) | [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Clear Windows Event Logs](/tags/#clear-windows-event-logs) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | -| [Windows Persistence Techniques](windows_persistence_techniques) | [Services Registry Permissions Weakness](/tags/#services-registry-permissions-weakness) | [Persistence](/tags/#persistence) | -| [Windows Privilege Escalation](windows_privilege_escalation) | [Time Providers](/tags/#time-providers), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution) | [Persistence](/tags/#persistence) | -| [Windows Service Abuse](windows_service_abuse) | [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process) | [Persistence](/tags/#persistence) | -| [XMRig](xmrig) | [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process) | [Persistence](/tags/#persistence) | -| [sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation](samaccountname_spoofing_and_domain_controller_impersonation) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts), [Domain Accounts](/tags/#domain-accounts) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | \ No newline at end of file +| [Windows File Extension and Association Abuse](windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse) | [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [Change Default File Association](/tags/#change-default-file-association), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | +| [Windows Log Manipulation](windows_log_manipulation) | [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Clear Windows Event Logs](/tags/#clear-windows-event-logs) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Impact](/tags/#impact) | +| [Windows Persistence Techniques](windows_persistence_techniques) | [Hidden Files and Directories](/tags/#hidden-files-and-directories), [Active Setup](/tags/#active-setup), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution), [Change Default File Association](/tags/#change-default-file-association), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution), [Path Interception by Unquoted Path](/tags/#path-interception-by-unquoted-path), [Hijack Execution Flow](/tags/#hijack-execution-flow), [Indicator Blocking](/tags/#indicator-blocking), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses), [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification), [Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#windows-file-and-directory-permissions-modification), [Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts](/tags/#boot-or-logon-initialization-scripts), [Logon Script (Windows)](/tags/#logon-script-(windows)), [Port Monitors](/tags/#port-monitors), [Services Registry Permissions Weakness](/tags/#services-registry-permissions-weakness), [Application Shimming](/tags/#application-shimming), [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](/tags/#registry-run-keys-/-startup-folder), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Screensaver](/tags/#screensaver), [Time Providers](/tags/#time-providers), [Print Processors](/tags/#print-processors) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | +| [Windows Privilege Escalation](windows_privilege_escalation) | [Malicious File](/tags/#malicious-file), [Active Setup](/tags/#active-setup), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution), [Change Default File Association](/tags/#change-default-file-association), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution), [Indicator Blocking](/tags/#indicator-blocking), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses), [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets), [Kerberoasting](/tags/#kerberoasting), [Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts](/tags/#boot-or-logon-initialization-scripts), [Logon Script (Windows)](/tags/#logon-script-(windows)), [DLL Side-Loading](/tags/#dll-side-loading), [Hijack Execution Flow](/tags/#hijack-execution-flow), [Accessibility Features](/tags/#accessibility-features), [Image File Execution Options Injection](/tags/#image-file-execution-options-injection), [Access Token Manipulation](/tags/#access-token-manipulation), [Token Impersonation/Theft](/tags/#token-impersonation/theft), [Screensaver](/tags/#screensaver), [Time Providers](/tags/#time-providers), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](/tags/#exploitation-for-privilege-escalation), [Print Processors](/tags/#print-processors) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | +| [Windows Service Abuse](windows_service_abuse) | [Services Registry Permissions Weakness](/tags/#services-registry-permissions-weakness), [Hijack Execution Flow](/tags/#hijack-execution-flow), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | +| [XMRig](xmrig) | [Match Legitimate Name or Location](/tags/#match-legitimate-name-or-location), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [Active Scanning](/tags/#active-scanning), [Account Access Removal](/tags/#account-access-removal), [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer), [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery), [Service Stop](/tags/#service-stop), [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Discovery](/tags/#discovery), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Impact](/tags/#impact), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation), [Reconnaissance](/tags/#reconnaissance) | +| [sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation](samaccountname_spoofing_and_domain_controller_impersonation) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts), [Domain Accounts](/tags/#domain-accounts) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_pages/ueba.md b/docs/_pages/ueba.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7fe40b183e --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_pages/ueba.md @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +--- +title: UEBA +layout: tag +author_profile: false +taxonomy: UEBA +permalink: /detections/ueba/ +sidebar: + nav: "detections" +--- \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_pages/unauthorized_software.md b/docs/_pages/unauthorized_software.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ff4ba9d15a --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_pages/unauthorized_software.md @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +--- +title: Unauthorized Software +layout: tag +author_profile: false +taxonomy: Unauthorized Software +permalink: /detections/unauthorized_software/ +sidebar: + nav: "detections" +--- \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_pages/vulnerabilities.md b/docs/_pages/vulnerabilities.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ddc8ba1f7e --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_pages/vulnerabilities.md @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +--- +title: Vulnerabilities +layout: tag +author_profile: false +taxonomy: Vulnerabilities +permalink: /detections/vulnerabilities/ +sidebar: + nav: "detections" +--- \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_pages/vulnerability.md b/docs/_pages/vulnerability.md index 495243b7ee..39843cd0da 100644 --- a/docs/_pages/vulnerability.md +++ b/docs/_pages/vulnerability.md @@ -3,13 +3,7 @@ title: Vulnerability layout: tag author_profile: false taxonomy: Vulnerability -permalink: /stories/vulnerability/ +permalink: /detections/vulnerability/ sidebar: - nav: "stories" ---- - -| Name | Technique | Tactic | -| ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Apache Struts Vulnerability](/stories/apache_struts_vulnerability/) | [System Information Discovery](/tags/#system-information-discovery) | [Discovery](/tags/#discovery) | -| [JBoss Vulnerability](/stories/jboss_vulnerability/) | [System Information Discovery](/tags/#system-information-discovery) | [Discovery](/tags/#discovery) | -| [PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527](/stories/printnightmare_cve-2021-34527/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | \ No newline at end of file + nav: "detections" +--- \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_playbooks/active_directory_reset_password.md b/docs/_playbooks/active_directory_reset_password.md index 6aa1af6985..f1f4cd70d7 100644 --- a/docs/_playbooks/active_directory_reset_password.md +++ b/docs/_playbooks/active_directory_reset_password.md @@ -26,17 +26,16 @@ This playbook resets the password of a potentially compromised user account. Fir #### How To Implement -This playbook works on artifacts with artifact:*.cef.compromisedUserName which can be created as shown in the playbook "recorded_future_handle_leaked_credentials" - The prompt is hard-coded to use "admin" as the user, so change it to the correct user or role +This playbook works on artifacts with artifact:*.cef.compromisedUserName which can be created as shown in the playbook "recorded_future_handle_leaked_credentials" - The prompt is hard-coded to use "admin" as the user, so change it to the correct user or role #### Playbooks ![](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/security_content/develop/playbooks/activedirectory_reset_password.png) #### Required field -* compromisedUserName #### Reference -[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/playbooks/activedirectory_reset_password.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/playbooks/active_directory_reset_password.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_playbooks/aws_disable_user_accounts.md b/docs/_playbooks/aws_disable_user_accounts.md index 0116fd599d..195f7c5d3f 100644 --- a/docs/_playbooks/aws_disable_user_accounts.md +++ b/docs/_playbooks/aws_disable_user_accounts.md @@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ This playbook works with the community playbook aws_find_inactive_users using th ![](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/security_content/develop/playbooks/aws_disable_user_accounts.png) #### Required field -* aws_username #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_playbooks/aws_find_inactive_users.md b/docs/_playbooks/aws_find_inactive_users.md index 2b87dec545..cceaa0afc4 100644 --- a/docs/_playbooks/aws_find_inactive_users.md +++ b/docs/_playbooks/aws_find_inactive_users.md @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ Find AWS accounts that have not been used for a long time (90 days by default). #### How To Implement -This playbook is meant to run on a Timer, such as once per week. To adjust the lookback period away from the default, change the number of days to a different negative number in the 'calculate_start_time' block. Note that this playbook will ignore accounts where the password has never been used. These could be unused human accounts or they could be API accounts where the access keys are actively used. +This playbook is meant to run on a Timer, such as once per week. To adjust the lookback period away from the default, change the number of days to a different negative number in the 'calculate_start_time' block. Note that this playbook will ignore accounts where the password has never been used. These could be unused human accounts or they could be API accounts where the access keys are actively used. #### Playbooks ![](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/security_content/develop/playbooks/aws_find_inactive_users.png) diff --git a/docs/_playbooks/block_indicators.md b/docs/_playbooks/block_indicators.md index 0e781251b7..5864997166 100644 --- a/docs/_playbooks/block_indicators.md +++ b/docs/_playbooks/block_indicators.md @@ -34,9 +34,6 @@ This playbook uses the following custom lists: ip_address_blocklist, domain_blo ![](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/security_content/develop/playbooks/block_indicators.png) #### Required field -* destinationDnsDomain -* destinationAddress -* fileHash #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_playbooks/crowdstrike_malware_triage.md b/docs/_playbooks/crowdstrike_malware_triage.md index 1efead38b2..00a0c273ca 100644 --- a/docs/_playbooks/crowdstrike_malware_triage.md +++ b/docs/_playbooks/crowdstrike_malware_triage.md @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ tags: #### Description -This playbook is used to enrich and respond to a CrowdStrike Falcon detection involving a potentially malicious executable on an endpoint. Check for previous sightings of the same executable, hunt across other endpoints for the file, gather details about all processes associated with the file, and collect all the gathered information into a prompt for an analyst to review. Based on the analyst's choice, the file can be added to the custom indicators list in CrowdStrike with a detection policy of "detect" or "none", and the endpoint can be optionally quarantined from the network. +This playbook is used to enrich and respond to a CrowdStrike Falcon detection involving a potentially malicious executable on an endpoint. Check for previous sightings of the same executable, hunt across other endpoints for the file, gather details about all processes associated with the file, and collect all the gathered information into a prompt for an analyst to review. Based on the analyst's choice, the file can be added to the custom indicators list in CrowdStrike with a detection policy of "detect" or "none", and the endpoint can be optionally quarantined from the network. - **Type**: Response - **Product**: Splunk SOAR @@ -32,8 +32,6 @@ This playbook uses the Crowdstrike OAuth app. Change the target user of the prom ![](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/security_content/develop/playbooks/crowdstrike_malware_triage.png) #### Required field -* filePath -* destinationAddress #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_playbooks/delete_detected_files.md b/docs/_playbooks/delete_detected_files.md index 0708bfe136..63b2ec3b27 100644 --- a/docs/_playbooks/delete_detected_files.md +++ b/docs/_playbooks/delete_detected_files.md @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ tags: #### Description -This playbook acts upon events where a file has been determined to be malicious (ie webshells being dropped on an end host). Before deleting the file, we run a "more" command on the file in question to extract its contents. We then run a delete on the file in question. +This playbook acts upon events where a file has been determined to be malicious (ie webshells being dropped on an end host). Before deleting the file, we run a "more" command on the file in question to extract its contents. We then run a delete on the file in question. - **Type**: Response - **Product**: Splunk SOAR @@ -24,801 +24,7 @@ This playbook acts upon events where a file has been determined to be malicious #### Associated Detections - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -* [Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share](/endpoint/executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share/) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - +* [Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share](//executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share/) @@ -829,8 +35,6 @@ This playbook reads and then deletes files stored with artifact:*.cef.filePath f ![](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/security_content/develop/playbooks/delete_detected_files.png) #### Required field -* filePath -* destinationAddress #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_playbooks/email_notification_for_malware.md b/docs/_playbooks/email_notification_for_malware.md index ebd1df6037..3d6bf851a5 100644 --- a/docs/_playbooks/email_notification_for_malware.md +++ b/docs/_playbooks/email_notification_for_malware.md @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ tags: #### Description -This playbook tries to determine if a file is malware and whether or not the file is present on any managed machines. VirusTotal "file reputation" and PAN WildFire "detonate file" are used to determine if a file is malware, and CarbonBlack Response "hunt file" is used to search managed machines for the file. The results of these investigations are summarized in an email to the incident response team. +This playbook tries to determine if a file is malware and whether or not the file is present on any managed machines. VirusTotal "file reputation" and PAN WildFire "detonate file" are used to determine if a file is malware, and CarbonBlack Response "hunt file" is used to search managed machines for the file. The results of these investigations are summarized in an email to the incident response team. - **Type**: Response - **Product**: Splunk SOAR @@ -35,8 +35,6 @@ Be sure to update asset naming to reflect the asset names configured in your env ![](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/security_content/develop/playbooks/email_notification_for_malware.png) #### Required field -* fileHash -* vaultId #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_playbooks/internal_host_ssh_log4j_response.md b/docs/_playbooks/internal_host_ssh_log4j_response.md index 98ca813b35..3ad67f75b1 100644 --- a/docs/_playbooks/internal_host_ssh_log4j_response.md +++ b/docs/_playbooks/internal_host_ssh_log4j_response.md @@ -41,4 +41,4 @@ The ssh asset may require ssh access to delete some files depending on their per -[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/playbooks/internal_host_ssh_log4j_respond.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/playbooks/internal_host_ssh_log4j_response.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_playbooks/internal_host_winrm_log4j_investigate.md b/docs/_playbooks/internal_host_winrm_log4j_investigate.md index 7dee6e6125..b9b65e7275 100644 --- a/docs/_playbooks/internal_host_winrm_log4j_investigate.md +++ b/docs/_playbooks/internal_host_winrm_log4j_investigate.md @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ tags: #### Description -Published in response to CVE-2021-44228, this playbook uses WinRM to scan Windows endpoints for the presence of "jndilookup.class" in all .jar files. The presence of that string could indicate a log4j vulnerability. +Published in response to CVE-2021-44228, this playbook uses WinRM to scan Windows endpoints for the presence of "jndilookup.class" in all .jar files. The presence of that string could indicate a log4j vulnerability. - **Type**: Investigation - **Product**: Splunk SOAR diff --git a/docs/_playbooks/internal_host_winrm_response.md b/docs/_playbooks/internal_host_winrm_response.md index cc6f261e37..51bd64f1ab 100644 --- a/docs/_playbooks/internal_host_winrm_response.md +++ b/docs/_playbooks/internal_host_winrm_response.md @@ -38,4 +38,4 @@ The winrm asset requires Administrator access to gather certain files. -[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/playbooks/internal_host_winrm_log4j_respond.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/playbooks/internal_host_winrm_response.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_playbooks/log4j_investigate.md b/docs/_playbooks/log4j_investigate.md index 7b743bc384..b337ceb3eb 100644 --- a/docs/_playbooks/log4j_investigate.md +++ b/docs/_playbooks/log4j_investigate.md @@ -24,7182 +24,19 @@ Published in response to CVE-2021-44228, this playbook and its sub-playbooks can #### Associated Detections - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -* [Curl Download and Bash Execution](/endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution/) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -* [Wget Download and Bash Execution](/endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution/) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -* [Linux Java Spawning Shell](/endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell/) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -* [Java Class File download by Java User Agent](/endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent/) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -* [Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports](/endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports/) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -* [Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt](/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt/) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -* [Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection](/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection/) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -* [Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic](/network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic/) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - +* [Curl Download and Bash Execution](//curl_download_and_bash_execution/) +* [Java Class File download by Java User Agent](//java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent/) +* [Linux Java Spawning Shell](//linux_java_spawning_shell/) +* [Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports](//outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports/) +* [Wget Download and Bash Execution](//wget_download_and_bash_execution/) +* [Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic](//detect_outbound_ldap_traffic/) +* [Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt](//log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt/) +* [Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection](//log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection/) #### How To Implement -To start this playbook, create a custom list called "log4j_hosts" with a format in which the first column should be an IP or hostname of a potentially affected log4j host, the second should be the operating system family (either unix or windows). If the operating system is unknown it can be left blank. In the block called "fetch_hosts_from_custom_list", change the custom list name from "log4j_hosts" if needed. If the operating system family ("windows" or "unix") is not known, both ssh and winrm will be attempted. If ssh and/or winrm are not the preferred endpoint management methods, these playbooks could be ported to use Google's GRR, osquery, CrowdStrike's RTR, Carbon Black's EDR API, or similar tools. The artifact scope "all" is used throughout this playbook because the artifact list can be added to as the playbook progresses. - +To start this playbook, create a custom list called "log4j_hosts" with a format in which the first column should be an IP or hostname of a potentially affected log4j host, the second should be the operating system family (either unix or windows). If the operating system is unknown it can be left blank. In the block called "fetch_hosts_from_custom_list", change the custom list name from "log4j_hosts" if needed. If the operating system family ("windows" or "unix") is not known, both ssh and winrm will be attempted. If ssh and/or winrm are not the preferred endpoint management methods, these playbooks could be ported to use Google's GRR, osquery, CrowdStrike's RTR, Carbon Black's EDR API, or similar tools. The artifact scope "all" is used throughout this playbook because the artifact list can be added to as the playbook progresses. #### Playbooks ![](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/security_content/develop/playbooks/log4j_investigate.png) @@ -7211,7 +48,7 @@ To start this playbook, create a custom list called "log4j_hosts" with a * [https://github.com/Neo23x0/Fenrir/blob/master/fenrir.sh](https://github.com/Neo23x0/Fenrir/blob/master/fenrir.sh) * [https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Log4j++Log4Shell+Followup%3A+What+we+see+and+how+to+defend+%28and+how+to+access+our+data%29/28122](https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Log4j++Log4Shell+Followup%3A+What+we+see+and+how+to+defend+%28and+how+to+access+our+data%29/28122) -* [https://twitter.com/ElektroWolle/status/1469962895849140224?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1469962895849140224%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_c10&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fpublish.twitter.com%2F%3Fquery%3Dhttps3A2F2Ftwitter.com2FElektroWolle2Fstatus2F1469962895849140224widget%3DTweet](https://twitter.com/ElektroWolle/status/1469962895849140224?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1469962895849140224%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_c10&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fpublish.twitter.com%2F%3Fquery%3Dhttps3A2F2Ftwitter.com2FElektroWolle2Fstatus2F1469962895849140224widget%3DTweet) +* [https://twitter.com/ElektroWolle/status/1469962895849140224?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1469962895849140224%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_c10&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fpublish.twitter.com%2F%3Fquery%3Dhttps3A2F2Ftwitter.com2FElektroWolle2Fstatus2F1469962895849140224widget%3DTweet](https://twitter.com/ElektroWolle/status/1469962895849140224?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1469962895849140224%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_c10&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fpublish.twitter.com%2F%3Fquery%3Dhttps3A2F2Ftwitter.com2FElektroWolle2Fstatus2F1469962895849140224widget%3DTweet) * [https://blog.cloudflare.com/cve-2021-44228-log4j-rce-0-day-mitigation/](https://blog.cloudflare.com/cve-2021-44228-log4j-rce-0-day-mitigation/) diff --git a/docs/_playbooks/log4j_respond.md b/docs/_playbooks/log4j_respond.md index b37a5c8ebb..e781a71ad5 100644 --- a/docs/_playbooks/log4j_respond.md +++ b/docs/_playbooks/log4j_respond.md @@ -24,7182 +24,19 @@ Published in response to CVE-2021-44228, this playbook is meant to be launched a #### Associated Detections - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -* [Curl Download and Bash Execution](/endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution/) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -* [Wget Download and Bash Execution](/endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution/) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -* [Linux Java Spawning Shell](/endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell/) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -* [Java Class File download by Java User Agent](/endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent/) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -* [Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports](/endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports/) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -* [Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt](/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt/) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -* [Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection](/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection/) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -* [Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic](/network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic/) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - +* [Curl Download and Bash Execution](//curl_download_and_bash_execution/) +* [Java Class File download by Java User Agent](//java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent/) +* [Linux Java Spawning Shell](//linux_java_spawning_shell/) +* [Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports](//outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports/) +* [Wget Download and Bash Execution](//wget_download_and_bash_execution/) +* [Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic](//detect_outbound_ldap_traffic/) +* [Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt](//log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt/) +* [Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection](//log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection/) #### How To Implement -To use this playbook, create a custom list called "log4j_hosts_and_files" with a format in which the first column should be an IP or hostname of a potentially affected log4j host, the second should be the operating system family (either unix or windows), and the third should be a full path to a file to delete if there are any. The first two are mandatory and the file is optional. In the block called "enumerate_files_to_delete", change the custom list name from "log4j_hosts_and_files" if needed. If ssh and/or winrm are not the preferred endpoint management methods, these playbooks could be ported to use Google's GRR, osquery, CrowdStrike's RTR, Carbon Black's EDR API, or similar tools. The artifact scope "all" is used throughout this playbook because the artifact list can be added to as the playbook progresses. - +To use this playbook, create a custom list called "log4j_hosts_and_files" with a format in which the first column should be an IP or hostname of a potentially affected log4j host, the second should be the operating system family (either unix or windows), and the third should be a full path to a file to delete if there are any. The first two are mandatory and the file is optional. In the block called "enumerate_files_to_delete", change the custom list name from "log4j_hosts_and_files" if needed. If ssh and/or winrm are not the preferred endpoint management methods, these playbooks could be ported to use Google's GRR, osquery, CrowdStrike's RTR, Carbon Black's EDR API, or similar tools. The artifact scope "all" is used throughout this playbook because the artifact list can be added to as the playbook progresses. #### Playbooks ![](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/security_content/develop/playbooks/log4j_respond.png) @@ -7211,7 +48,7 @@ To use this playbook, create a custom list called "log4j_hosts_and_files" * [https://github.com/Neo23x0/Fenrir/blob/master/fenrir.sh](https://github.com/Neo23x0/Fenrir/blob/master/fenrir.sh) * [https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Log4j++Log4Shell+Followup%3A+What+we+see+and+how+to+defend+%28and+how+to+access+our+data%29/28122](https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Log4j++Log4Shell+Followup%3A+What+we+see+and+how+to+defend+%28and+how+to+access+our+data%29/28122) -* [https://twitter.com/ElektroWolle/status/1469962895849140224?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1469962895849140224%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_c10&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fpublish.twitter.com%2F%3Fquery%3Dhttps3A2F2Ftwitter.com2FElektroWolle2Fstatus2F1469962895849140224widget%3DTweet](https://twitter.com/ElektroWolle/status/1469962895849140224?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1469962895849140224%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_c10&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fpublish.twitter.com%2F%3Fquery%3Dhttps3A2F2Ftwitter.com2FElektroWolle2Fstatus2F1469962895849140224widget%3DTweet) +* [https://twitter.com/ElektroWolle/status/1469962895849140224?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1469962895849140224%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_c10&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fpublish.twitter.com%2F%3Fquery%3Dhttps3A2F2Ftwitter.com2FElektroWolle2Fstatus2F1469962895849140224widget%3DTweet](https://twitter.com/ElektroWolle/status/1469962895849140224?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1469962895849140224%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_c10&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fpublish.twitter.com%2F%3Fquery%3Dhttps3A2F2Ftwitter.com2FElektroWolle2Fstatus2F1469962895849140224widget%3DTweet) * [https://blog.cloudflare.com/cve-2021-44228-log4j-rce-0-day-mitigation/](https://blog.cloudflare.com/cve-2021-44228-log4j-rce-0-day-mitigation/) diff --git a/docs/_playbooks/log4j_splunk_investigation.md b/docs/_playbooks/log4j_splunk_investigation.md index 0f1d80e6d8..7f8eb8a39b 100644 --- a/docs/_playbooks/log4j_splunk_investigation.md +++ b/docs/_playbooks/log4j_splunk_investigation.md @@ -26,14 +26,12 @@ Published in response to CVE-2021-44228, this playbook utilizes data already in #### How To Implement -This playbook presumes you have Enterprise Security and have configured Assets & Identities, as well as the Endpoint.Processes datamodel +This playbook presumes you have Enterprise Security and have configured Assets & Identities, as well as the Endpoint.Processes datamodel #### Playbooks ![](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/security_content/develop/playbooks/internal_host_splunk_investigate_log4j.png) #### Required field -* hostName -* destinationAddress #### Reference @@ -43,4 +41,4 @@ This playbook presumes you have Enterprise Security and have configured Assets & -[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/playbooks/internal_host_splunk_investigate_log4j.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/playbooks/log4j_splunk_investigation.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_playbooks/malware_hunt_and_contain.md b/docs/_playbooks/malware_hunt_and_contain.md index affcc75d0e..f09245f174 100644 --- a/docs/_playbooks/malware_hunt_and_contain.md +++ b/docs/_playbooks/malware_hunt_and_contain.md @@ -35,7 +35,6 @@ Be sure to update asset naming to reflect the asset names configured in your env ![](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/security_content/develop/playbooks/malware_hunt_and_contain.png) #### Required field -* fileHash #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_playbooks/ransomware_investigate_and_contain.md b/docs/_playbooks/ransomware_investigate_and_contain.md index 0e851a29d2..f899706d0b 100644 --- a/docs/_playbooks/ransomware_investigate_and_contain.md +++ b/docs/_playbooks/ransomware_investigate_and_contain.md @@ -29,801 +29,7 @@ This playbook investigates and contains ransomware detected on endpoints. #### Associated Detections - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -* [Conti Common Exec parameter](/endpoint/conti_common_exec_parameter/) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - +* [Conti Common Exec parameter](//conti_common_exec_parameter/) @@ -834,8 +40,6 @@ This playbook requires the Splunk SOAR apps for Palo Alto Networks Firewalls, Pa ![](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/security_content/develop/playbooks/ransomware_investigate_and_contain.png) #### Required field -* ComputerName -* Username #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_playbooks/risk_notable_block_indicators.md b/docs/_playbooks/risk_notable_block_indicators.md index 3b75e9b955..e5df6b504d 100644 --- a/docs/_playbooks/risk_notable_block_indicators.md +++ b/docs/_playbooks/risk_notable_block_indicators.md @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ This playbook handles locating indicators marked for blocking and determining if #### How To Implement -None +tbd #### Playbooks ![](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/security_content/develop/playbooks/risk_notable_block_indicators.png) diff --git a/docs/_playbooks/risk_notable_enrich.md b/docs/_playbooks/risk_notable_enrich.md index fba05b8ab2..911ffb3162 100644 --- a/docs/_playbooks/risk_notable_enrich.md +++ b/docs/_playbooks/risk_notable_enrich.md @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ This playbook collects the available Indicator data types within the event as we #### How To Implement -None +tbd #### Playbooks ![](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/security_content/develop/playbooks/risk_notable_enrich.png) diff --git a/docs/_playbooks/risk_notable_import_data.md b/docs/_playbooks/risk_notable_import_data.md index a05f5ef449..b6fc3c0dc7 100644 --- a/docs/_playbooks/risk_notable_import_data.md +++ b/docs/_playbooks/risk_notable_import_data.md @@ -27,20 +27,15 @@ This playbook gathers all of the events associated with the risk notable and imp #### How To Implement -The Splunk search used to locate contributing events requires three fields in the notable artifact\: risk_object, info_min_time, and info_max_time. The query also performs some deduplication on contributing events and may need to be adjusted based on individual Enterprise Security environments. Mitre Tactics and Techniques appear if using the annotation framework in Splunk ES." -```index=risk risk_object=\"{0}\" earliest=\"{1}\" latest="{2}\" | rex field=source \".*-\s(?<source>.*)\s+-\s+\w+\s+-\s+Rule\" | fillnull value=\"unknown\" threat_object | eval risk_message=coalesce(risk_message,source) | stats values(*) as * by _time source threat_object risk_message | rename annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id as mitre_technique_id annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic as mitre_tactic annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique as mitre_technique | fields - annotations* risk_object_* date_* orig_* user_* src_user_* src_* dest_* dest_user_* info_* search_* splunk_* tag* risk_modifier* risk_rule* sourcetype timestamp index next_cron_time timeendpos timestartpos testmode linecount | sort + _time | `uitime(_time)` | dedup source threat_object``` -A custom code block sorts the returned event data and produces a markdown formatted note into the note_content output field. This field is then available for use in downstream playbooks." +The Splunk search used to locate contributing events requires three fields in the notable artifact\: risk_object, info_min_time, and info_max_time. The query also performs some deduplication on contributing events and may need to be adjusted based on individual Enterprise Security environments. Mitre Tactics and Techniques appear if using the annotation framework in Splunk ES." +```index=risk risk_object=\"{0}\" earliest=\"{1}\" latest="{2}\" | rex field=source \".*-\s(?.*)\s+-\s+\w+\s+-\s+Rule\" | fillnull value=\"unknown\" threat_object | eval risk_message=coalesce(risk_message,source) | stats values(*) as * by _time source threat_object risk_message | rename annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id as mitre_technique_id annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic as mitre_tactic annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique as mitre_technique | fields - annotations* risk_object_* date_* orig_* user_* src_user_* src_* dest_* dest_user_* info_* search_* splunk_* tag* risk_modifier* risk_rule* sourcetype timestamp index next_cron_time timeendpos timestartpos testmode linecount | sort + _time | `uitime(_time)` | dedup source threat_object``` +A custom code block sorts the returned event data and produces a markdown formatted note into the note_content output field. This field is then available for use in downstream playbooks." #### Playbooks ![](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/security_content/develop/playbooks/risk_notable_import_data.png) #### Required field -* event_id -* info_min_time -* info_max_time -* risk_object -* risk_object_type #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_playbooks/risk_notable_mitigate.md b/docs/_playbooks/risk_notable_mitigate.md index a502c418d4..75dfad7eb7 100644 --- a/docs/_playbooks/risk_notable_mitigate.md +++ b/docs/_playbooks/risk_notable_mitigate.md @@ -6,10 +6,6 @@ toc_label: "" tags: - Response - Splunk SOAR - - N - - o - - n - - e - Risk Notable --- @@ -21,7 +17,7 @@ This playbook checks for the presence of the Risk Response workbook and updates - **Type**: Response - **Product**: Splunk SOAR -- **Apps**: [N](https://splunkbase.splunk.com/apps/#/search/N/product/soar), [o](https://splunkbase.splunk.com/apps/#/search/o/product/soar), [n](https://splunkbase.splunk.com/apps/#/search/n/product/soar), [e](https://splunkbase.splunk.com/apps/#/search/e/product/soar) +- **Apps**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-10-22 - **Author**: Kelby Shelton, Splunk - **ID**: rn0edc96-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3783fd63 @@ -30,7 +26,7 @@ This playbook checks for the presence of the Risk Response workbook and updates #### How To Implement - +tbd #### Playbooks ![](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/security_content/develop/playbooks/risk_notable_mitigate.png) diff --git a/docs/_playbooks/risk_notable_preprocess.md b/docs/_playbooks/risk_notable_preprocess.md index dee8ffe476..c951db2439 100644 --- a/docs/_playbooks/risk_notable_preprocess.md +++ b/docs/_playbooks/risk_notable_preprocess.md @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ tags: #### Description -"This playbook prepares a risk notable for investigation by performing the following tasks: 1. Ensures that a risk notable links back to the original notable event with a card pinned to the HUD. 2. Posts a link to this container in the comment field of Splunk ES. 3. Updates the container name, description, and severity to reflect the data in the notable artifact." +"This playbook prepares a risk notable for investigation by performing the following tasks: 1. Ensures that a risk notable links back to the original notable event with a card pinned to the HUD. 2. Posts a link to this container in the comment field of Splunk ES. 3. Updates the container name, description, and severity to reflect the data in the notable artifact." - **Type**: Investigation @@ -28,15 +28,12 @@ tags: #### How To Implement -None +tbd #### Playbooks ![](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/security_content/develop/playbooks/risk_notable_preprocess.png) #### Required field -* event_id -* info_min_time -* info_max_time #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_playbooks/risk_notable_protect_assets_and_users.md b/docs/_playbooks/risk_notable_protect_assets_and_users.md index 1cb23f13ed..e809d14113 100644 --- a/docs/_playbooks/risk_notable_protect_assets_and_users.md +++ b/docs/_playbooks/risk_notable_protect_assets_and_users.md @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ This playbook attempts to find assets and users from the notable event and match #### How To Implement - +tbd #### Playbooks ![](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/security_content/develop/playbooks/risk_notable_protect_assets_and_users.png) diff --git a/docs/_playbooks/risk_notable_review_indicators.md b/docs/_playbooks/risk_notable_review_indicators.md index dfae32bd39..e23c0ec468 100644 --- a/docs/_playbooks/risk_notable_review_indicators.md +++ b/docs/_playbooks/risk_notable_review_indicators.md @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ This playbook was designed to be called by a user to process indicators that are #### How To Implement - +tbd #### Playbooks ![](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/security_content/develop/playbooks/risk_notable_review_indicators.png) diff --git a/docs/_playbooks/risk_notable_verdict.md b/docs/_playbooks/risk_notable_verdict.md index 82185a47e2..1acb9d2b77 100644 --- a/docs/_playbooks/risk_notable_verdict.md +++ b/docs/_playbooks/risk_notable_verdict.md @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ This playbook locates available playbooks with the response tag and presents the #### How To Implement - +tbd #### Playbooks ![](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/security_content/develop/playbooks/risk_notable_verdict.png) diff --git a/docs/_playbooks/start_investigation.md b/docs/_playbooks/start_investigation.md index 7be4450648..95e68ad998 100644 --- a/docs/_playbooks/start_investigation.md +++ b/docs/_playbooks/start_investigation.md @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ Handle cases in Splunk SOAR with consistency that only automation can provide. T #### How To Implement -This is a playbook that is designed to be recommended within a workbook. If used in this manner, the playbook will assign the user that launched the playbook as the owner of the event, move the event status to "Open", and complete the workbook task where this playbook appears. If there is a task after the one where the playbook appears (within the same phase), it will set the next task to "In Progress." +This is a playbook that is designed to be recommended within a workbook. If used in this manner, the playbook will assign the user that launched the playbook as the owner of the event, move the event status to "Open", and complete the workbook task where this playbook appears. If there is a task after the one where the playbook appears (within the same phase), it will set the next task to "In Progress." #### Playbooks ![](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/security_content/develop/playbooks/start_investigation.png) diff --git a/docs/_playbooks/threat_intel_investigate.md b/docs/_playbooks/threat_intel_investigate.md index f5b99eb9ec..36c18abbca 100644 --- a/docs/_playbooks/threat_intel_investigate.md +++ b/docs/_playbooks/threat_intel_investigate.md @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ This parent playbook collects data and launches appropriate child playbooks to g #### How To Implement -The prompt is currently sent to the Administrator role, but should be changed to the appropriate user and role. The "list_investigate_playbooks" block fetches playbooks from the local repository with the tags "investigate" and "threat_intel" by default. The playbook "trustar_enrich_indicators" is meant to be used by this playbook, and others can be created to replace it or work alongside it. To add a new input playbook, copy it to the local repository and give it the necessary tags. Define a playbook input with the name "indicators" and the data type matching the types of indicators the playbook can process. To add a new tag to the preconfigured list, add it to the "choices" array in the "threat_intel_indicator_review" prompt block, and add it to the "response_to_tag_map" in "process_indicators". +The prompt is currently sent to the Administrator role, but should be changed to the appropriate user and role. The "list_investigate_playbooks" block fetches playbooks from the local repository with the tags "investigate" and "threat_intel" by default. The playbook "trustar_enrich_indicators" is meant to be used by this playbook, and others can be created to replace it or work alongside it. To add a new input playbook, copy it to the local repository and give it the necessary tags. Define a playbook input with the name "indicators" and the data type matching the types of indicators the playbook can process. To add a new tag to the preconfigured list, add it to the "choices" array in the "threat_intel_indicator_review" prompt block, and add it to the "response_to_tag_map" in "process_indicators". #### Playbooks ![](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/security_content/develop/playbooks/threat_intel_investigate.png) diff --git a/docs/_playbooks/trustar_enrich_indicators.md b/docs/_playbooks/trustar_enrich_indicators.md index 08c9847a7c..524edba7c8 100644 --- a/docs/_playbooks/trustar_enrich_indicators.md +++ b/docs/_playbooks/trustar_enrich_indicators.md @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ tags: #### Description -Use TruSTAR to gather threat information about indicators in a SOAR event. Tag the indicators with the normalized priority score from TruSTAR and summarize the findings in an analyst note. This playbook is meant to be used as a child playbook executed by a parent playbook such as "threat_intel_investigate". +Use TruSTAR to gather threat information about indicators in a SOAR event. Tag the indicators with the normalized priority score from TruSTAR and summarize the findings in an analyst note. This playbook is meant to be used as a child playbook executed by a parent playbook such as "threat_intel_investigate". - **Type**: Investigation - **Product**: Splunk SOAR @@ -28,13 +28,12 @@ Use TruSTAR to gather threat information about indicators in a SOAR event. Tag t #### How To Implement -To use this playbook as a sub-playbook of "threat_intel_investigate", copy it to the local git repository and make sure it has the tags "investigate" and "threat_intel". To use this playbook as a sub-playbook of "risk_notable_enrich", copy it to local and make sure it has the tags "investigate" and "risk_notable" To control the types of indicators processed by this playbook, change the data types of the "indicators" input" +To use this playbook as a sub-playbook of "threat_intel_investigate", copy it to the local git repository and make sure it has the tags "investigate" and "threat_intel". To use this playbook as a sub-playbook of "risk_notable_enrich", copy it to local and make sure it has the tags "investigate" and "risk_notable" To control the types of indicators processed by this playbook, change the data types of the "indicators" input" #### Playbooks ![](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/security_content/develop/playbooks/trustar_enrich_indicators.png) #### Required field -* indicators #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_posts/2017-01-07-spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.md b/docs/_posts/2017-01-07-spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a165ad8caa --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2017-01-07-spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.md @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +--- +title: "Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems" +excerpt: "" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2017-01-07 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Vulnerabilities +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +The search is used to detect systems that are still vulnerable to the Spectre and Meltdown vulnerabilities. + +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: [Vulnerabilities](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Vulnerabilities) +- **Last Updated**: 2017-01-07 +- **Author**: David Dorsey, Splunk +- **ID**: 354be8e0-32cd-4da0-8c47-796de13b60ea + +#### Search + +``` + +| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Vulnerabilities where Vulnerabilities.cve ="CVE-2017-5753" OR Vulnerabilities.cve ="CVE-2017-5715" OR Vulnerabilities.cve ="CVE-2017-5754" by Vulnerabilities.dest +| `drop_dm_object_name(Vulnerabilities)` +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| `spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) + +Note that `spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time + + +#### How To Implement +The search requires that you are ingesting your vulnerability-scanner data and that it reports the CVE of the vulnerability identified. + +#### Known False Positives +It is possible that your vulnerability scanner is not detecting that the patches have been applied. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities](/stories/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerabilities) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Exploitation + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2017-09-12-detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.md b/docs/_posts/2017-09-12-detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.md index 848b89865f..370deff141 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2017-09-12-detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2017-09-12-detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.md @@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ tags: - Authentication --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -23,12 +23,12 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U The search queries the authentication logs for assets that are categorized as routers in the ES Assets and Identity Framework, to identify connections that have not been seen before in the last 30 days. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Authentication](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Authentication) - **Last Updated**: 2017-09-12 - **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk -- **ID**: 104658f4-afdc-499e-9719-17243rr826f1 +- **ID**: bce3ed7c-9b1f-42a0-abdf-d8b123a34836 #### Search @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ Note that `detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers_filter` is a empty macro by defa #### How To Implement -To successfully implement this search, you must ensure the network router devices are categorized as "router" in the Assets and identity table. You must also populate the Authentication data model with logs related to users authenticating to routing infrastructure. +To successfully implement this search, you must ensure the network router devices are categorized as "router" in the Assets and identity table. You must also populate the Authentication data model with logs related to users authenticating to routing infrastructure. #### Known False Positives Legitimate router connections may appear as new connections @@ -72,8 +72,12 @@ Legitimate router connections may appear as new connections +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -86,5 +90,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2017-09-12-extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.md b/docs/_posts/2017-09-12-extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..fed1d7ca78 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2017-09-12-extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.md @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +--- +title: "Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups" +excerpt: "" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2017-09-12 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search returns a list of hosts that have not successfully completed a backup in over a week. Deprecated because it's a infrastructure monitoring. + +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2017-09-12 +- **Author**: David Dorsey, Splunk +- **ID**: a34aae96-ccf8-4aef-952c-3ea214444440 + +#### Search + +``` +`netbackup` MESSAGE="Disk/Partition backup completed successfully." +| stats latest(_time) as latestTime by COMPUTERNAME +| `security_content_ctime(latestTime)` +| rename COMPUTERNAME as dest +| eval isOutlier=if(latestTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) +| search isOutlier=1 +| table latestTime, dest +| `extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [netbackup](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/netbackup.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) + +Note that `extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* MESSAGE +* COMPUTERNAME + + +#### How To Implement +To successfully implement this search you need to first obtain data from your backup solution, either from the backup logs on your hosts, or from a central server responsible for performing the backups. If you do not use Netbackup, you can modify this search for your backup solution. Depending on how often you backup your systems, you may want to modify how far in the past to look for a successful backup, other than the default of seven days. + +#### Known False Positives +None identified + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Monitor Backup Solution](/stories/monitor_backup_solution) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Exploitation + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2017-09-12-identify_new_user_accounts.md b/docs/_posts/2017-09-12-identify_new_user_accounts.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..73b851f297 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2017-09-12-identify_new_user_accounts.md @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +--- +title: "Identify New User Accounts" +excerpt: "Domain Accounts +" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2017-09-12 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Domain Accounts + - Defense Evasion + - Initial Access + - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This detection search will help profile user accounts in your environment by identifying newly created accounts that have been added to your network in the past week. + +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2017-09-12 +- **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +- **ID**: 475b9e27-17e4-46e2-b7e2-648221be3b89 + + +#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1078.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002/) | Domain Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | + +#### Search + +``` + +| from datamodel Identity_Management.All_Identities +| eval empStatus=case((now()-startDate)<604800, "Accounts created in last week") +| search empStatus="Accounts created in last week" +| `security_content_ctime(endDate)` +| `security_content_ctime(startDate)` +| table identity empStatus endDate startDate +| `identify_new_user_accounts_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) + +Note that `identify_new_user_accounts_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time + + +#### How To Implement +To successfully implement this search, you need to be populating the Enterprise Security Identity_Management data model in the assets and identity framework. + +#### Known False Positives +If the Identity_Management data model is not updated regularly, this search could give you false positive alerts. Please consider this and investigate appropriately. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Account Monitoring and Controls](/stories/account_monitoring_and_controls) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Exploitation + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2017-09-12-unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.md b/docs/_posts/2017-09-12-unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3b0590db54 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2017-09-12-unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.md @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +--- +title: "Unsuccessful Netbackup backups" +excerpt: "" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2017-09-12 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search gives you the hosts where a backup was attempted and then failed. + +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2017-09-12 +- **Author**: David Dorsey, Splunk +- **ID**: a34aae96-ccf8-4aaa-952c-3ea21444444f + +#### Search + +``` +`netbackup` +| stats latest(_time) as latestTime by COMPUTERNAME, MESSAGE +| search MESSAGE="An error occurred, failed to backup." +| `security_content_ctime(latestTime)` +| rename COMPUTERNAME as dest, MESSAGE as signature +| table latestTime, dest, signature +| `unsuccessful_netbackup_backups_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [netbackup](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/netbackup.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) + +Note that `unsuccessful_netbackup_backups_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time + + +#### How To Implement +To successfully implement this search you need to obtain data from your backup solution, either from the backup logs on your endpoints or from a central server responsible for performing the backups. If you do not use Netbackup, you can modify this search for your specific backup solution. + +#### Known False Positives +None identified + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Monitor Backup Solution](/stories/monitor_backup_solution) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Exploitation + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2017-09-13-detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.md b/docs/_posts/2017-09-13-detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.md index 91ad0bfa73..1089abeefa 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2017-09-13-detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2017-09-13-detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.md @@ -13,17 +13,17 @@ tags: - Network_Sessions --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} #### Description -By populating the organization's assets within the assets_by_str.csv, we will be able to detect unauthorized devices that are trying to connect with the organization's network by inspecting DHCP request packets, which are issued by devices when they attempt to obtain an IP address from the DHCP server. The MAC address associated with the source of the DHCP request is checked against the list of known devices, and reports on those that are not found. +By populating the organization's assets within the assets_by_str.csv, we will be able to detect unauthorized devices that are trying to connect with the organization's network by inspecting DHCP request packets, which are issued by devices when they attempt to obtain an IP address from the DHCP server. The MAC address associated with the source of the DHCP request is checked against the list of known devices, and reports on those that are not found. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Network_Sessions](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkSessions) - **Last Updated**: 2017-09-13 @@ -75,8 +75,12 @@ This search might be prone to high false positives. Please consider this when co +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -89,5 +93,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2017-09-15-no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.md b/docs/_posts/2017-09-15-no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.md index 02bbc6f802..ece9bdddad 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2017-09-15-no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2017-09-15-no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.md @@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ tags: - Updates --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search looks for Windows endpoints that have not generated an event indicating a successful Windows update in the last 60 days. Windows updates are typically released monthly and applied shortly thereafter. An endpoint that has not successfully applied an update in this time frame indicates the endpoint is not regularly being patched for some reason. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Updates](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Updates) - **Last Updated**: 2017-09-15 @@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ Note that `no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame_filter` is a empty macro by defaul #### How To Implement -To successfully implement this search, it requires that the 'Update' data model is being populated. This can be accomplished by ingesting Windows events or the Windows Update log via a universal forwarder on the Windows endpoints you wish to monitor. The Windows add-on should be also be installed and configured to properly parse Windows events in Splunk. There may be other data sources which can populate this data model, including vulnerability management systems. +To successfully implement this search, it requires that the 'Update' data model is being populated. This can be accomplished by ingesting Windows events or the Windows Update log via a universal forwarder on the Windows endpoints you wish to monitor. The Windows add-on should be also be installed and configured to properly parse Windows events in Splunk. There may be other data sources which can populate this data model, including vulnerability management systems. #### Known False Positives None identified @@ -71,11 +71,16 @@ None identified #### Kill Chain Phase +* Exploitation +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -88,5 +93,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2017-09-19-email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.md b/docs/_posts/2017-09-19-email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.md index c286a458fc..d8708e020a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2017-09-19-email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2017-09-19-email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.md @@ -13,17 +13,17 @@ tags: - Email --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} #### Description -Attackers often use spaces as a means to obfuscate an attachment's file extension. This search looks for messages with email attachments that have many spaces within the file names. +Attackers often use spaces as a means to obfuscate an attachment's file extension. This search looks for messages with email attachments that have many spaces within the file names. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Email](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Email) - **Last Updated**: 2017-09-19 @@ -61,9 +61,9 @@ Note that `email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces_filter` is a empty macro by def #### How To Implement -You need to ingest data from emails. Specifically, the sender's address and the file names of any attachments must be mapped to the Email data model. The threshold ratio is set to 10%, but this value can be configured to suit each environment. \ +You need to ingest data from emails. Specifically, the sender's address and the file names of any attachments must be mapped to the Email data model. The threshold ratio is set to 10%, but this value can be configured to suit each environment. \ **Splunk Phantom Playbook Integration**\ -If Splunk Phantom is also configured in your environment, a playbook called "Suspicious Email Attachment Investigate and Delete" can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/` and add the correct hostname to the "Phantom Instance" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search. The notable event will be sent to Phantom and the playbook will gather further information about the file attachment and its network behaviors. If Phantom finds malicious behavior and an analyst approves of the results, the email will be deleted from the user's inbox. +If Splunk Phantom is also configured in your environment, a playbook called "Suspicious Email Attachment Investigate and Delete" can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/` and add the correct hostname to the "Phantom Instance" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search. The notable event will be sent to Phantom and the playbook will gather further information about the file attachment and its network behaviors. If Phantom finds malicious behavior and an analyst approves of the results, the email will be deleted from the user's inbox. #### Known False Positives None at this time @@ -78,8 +78,12 @@ None at this time +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -92,5 +96,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml) \| *version*: **2** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2017-09-19-open_redirect_in_splunk_web.md b/docs/_posts/2017-09-19-open_redirect_in_splunk_web.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bde38e8a6c --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2017-09-19-open_redirect_in_splunk_web.md @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +--- +title: "Open Redirect in Splunk Web" +excerpt: "" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2017-09-19 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search allows you to look for evidence of exploitation for CVE-2016-4859, the Splunk Open Redirect Vulnerability. + +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2017-09-19 +- **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +- **ID**: d199fb99-2312-451a-9daa-e5efa6ed76a7 + +#### Search + +``` +index=_internal sourcetype=splunk_web_access return_to="/%09/*" +| `open_redirect_in_splunk_web_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: + +Note that `open_redirect_in_splunk_web_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time + + +#### How To Implement +No extra steps needed to implement this search. + +#### Known False Positives +None identified + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability](/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Delivery + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2017-09-20-large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.md b/docs/_posts/2017-09-20-large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.md index 4cd80b693d..a5f3d68ac5 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2017-09-20-large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2017-09-20-large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries" -excerpt: "Network Denial of Service, Reflection Amplification" +excerpt: "Network Denial of Service +, Reflection Amplification +" categories: - Network last_modified_at: 2017-09-20 @@ -8,17 +10,17 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Network Denial of Service - - Impact - Reflection Amplification - Impact + - Impact - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Network_Resolution --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U The search is used to identify attempts to use your DNS Infrastructure for DDoS purposes via a DNS amplification attack leveraging ANY queries. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Network_Resolution](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkResolution) - **Last Updated**: 2017-09-20 @@ -81,8 +83,12 @@ Legitimate ANY requests may trigger this search, however it is unusual to see a +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -95,5 +101,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2017-09-23-detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.md b/docs/_posts/2017-09-23-detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.md index ac6c61880c..43e9f3643a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2017-09-23-detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2017-09-23-detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers" -excerpt: "System Information Discovery" +excerpt: "System Information Discovery +" categories: - Web last_modified_at: 2017-09-23 @@ -15,8 +16,8 @@ tags: - Web --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -25,7 +26,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search looks for specific GET or HEAD requests to web servers that are indicative of reconnaissance attempts to identify vulnerable JBoss servers. JexBoss is described as the exploit tool of choice for this malicious activity. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Web](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Web) - **Last Updated**: 2017-09-23 @@ -69,7 +70,7 @@ Note that `detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers_filter` is a e You must be ingesting data from the web server or network traffic that contains web specific information, and populating the Web data model. #### Known False Positives -It's possible for legitimate HTTP requests to be made to URLs containing the suspicious paths. +It's possible for legitimate HTTP requests to be made to URLs containing the suspicious paths. #### Associated Analytic story * [JBoss Vulnerability](/stories/jboss_vulnerability) @@ -81,8 +82,12 @@ It's possible for legitimate HTTP requests to be made to URLs containing the +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -95,5 +100,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2017-09-23-detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.md b/docs/_posts/2017-09-23-detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.md index e47cff84db..21c36c4502 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2017-09-23-detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2017-09-23-detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.md @@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ tags: - Web --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search is used to detect malicious HTTP requests crafted to exploit jmx-console in JBoss servers. The malicious requests have a long URL length, as the payload is embedded in the URL. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Web](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Web) - **Last Updated**: 2017-09-23 @@ -75,8 +75,12 @@ No known false positives for this detection. +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -89,5 +93,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2017-09-23-monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.md b/docs/_posts/2017-09-23-monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..256d76f5c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2017-09-23-monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.md @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +--- +title: "Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse" +excerpt: "" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2017-09-23 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Network_Resolution +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search looks for DNS requests for faux domains similar to the domains that you want to have monitored for abuse. + +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: [Network_Resolution](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkResolution) +- **Last Updated**: 2017-09-23 +- **Author**: David Dorsey, Splunk +- **ID**: 24dd17b1-e2fb-4c31-878c-d4f746595bfa + +#### Search + +``` + +| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(DNS.answer) as IPs min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.src, DNS.query +| `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `brand_abuse_dns` +| `monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [brand_abuse_dns](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/brand_abuse_dns.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) + +Note that `monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time + + +#### How To Implement +You need to ingest data from your DNS logs. Specifically you must ingest the domain that is being queried and the IP of the host originating the request. Ideally, you should also be ingesting the answer to the query and the query type. This approach allows you to also create your own localized passive DNS capability which can aid you in future investigations. You also need to have run the search "ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names", which creates the permutations of the domain that will be checked for. + +#### Known False Positives +None at this time + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Brand Monitoring](/stories/brand_monitoring) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Delivery +* Actions on Objectives + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2017-09-23-monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.md b/docs/_posts/2017-09-23-monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.md index e3249233cd..659aed7e21 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2017-09-23-monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2017-09-23-monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.md @@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ tags: - Web --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search looks for Web requests to faux domains similar to the one that you want to have monitored for abuse. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Web](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Web) - **Last Updated**: 2017-09-23 @@ -49,11 +49,6 @@ The SPL above uses the following Macros: Note that `monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. -#### Lookups -The SPL above uses the following Lookups: - -* [brandMonitoring_lookup](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/brandMonitoring_lookup.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/brand_monitoring.csv) - #### Required field * _time * Web.url @@ -61,7 +56,7 @@ The SPL above uses the following Lookups: #### How To Implement -You need to ingest data from your web traffic. This can be accomplished by indexing data from a web proxy, or using a network traffic analysis tool, such as Bro or Splunk Stream. You also need to have run the search "ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names", which creates the permutations of the domain that will be checked for. +You need to ingest data from your web traffic. This can be accomplished by indexing data from a web proxy, or using a network traffic analysis tool, such as Bro or Splunk Stream. You also need to have run the search "ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names", which creates the permutations of the domain that will be checked for. #### Known False Positives None at this time @@ -75,8 +70,12 @@ None at this time +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -89,5 +88,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2017-10-13-unusually_long_content-type_length.md b/docs/_posts/2017-10-13-unusually_long_content-type_length.md index 3d88168e32..b01ea49cbb 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2017-10-13-unusually_long_content-type_length.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2017-10-13-unusually_long_content-type_length.md @@ -12,8 +12,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Cloud --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search looks for unusually long strings in the Content-Type http header that the client sends the server. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2017-10-13 @@ -69,8 +69,12 @@ Very few legitimate Content-Type fields will have a length greater than 100 char +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -83,5 +87,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/network/unusually_long_content-type_length.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2017-11-27-detect_usb_device_insertion.md b/docs/_posts/2017-11-27-detect_usb_device_insertion.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..756fa3cb9a --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2017-11-27-detect_usb_device_insertion.md @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +--- +title: "Detect USB device insertion" +excerpt: "" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2017-11-27 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Change_Analysis +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +The search is used to detect hosts that generate Windows Event ID 4663 for successful attempts to write to or read from a removable storage and Event ID 4656 for failures, which occurs when a USB drive is plugged in. In this scenario we are querying the Change_Analysis data model to look for Windows Event ID 4656 or 4663 where the priority of the affected host is marked as high in the ES Assets and Identity Framework. + +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: [Change_Analysis](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/ChangeAnalysis) +- **Last Updated**: 2017-11-27 +- **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +- **ID**: 104658f4-afdc-499f-9719-17a43f9826f5 + +#### Search + +``` + +| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) AS earliest latest(_time) AS latest from datamodel=Change_Analysis where (nodename = All_Changes) All_Changes.result="Removable Storage device" (All_Changes.result_id=4663 OR All_Changes.result_id=4656) (All_Changes.src_priority=high) by All_Changes.dest +| `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` +| `security_content_ctime(earliest)` +| `security_content_ctime(latest)` +| `detect_usb_device_insertion_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) + +Note that `detect_usb_device_insertion_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* All_Changes.result +* All_Changes.result_id +* All_Changes.src_priority +* All_Changes.dest + + +#### How To Implement +To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663 and 4656. Ensure that the field from the event logs is being mapped to the result_id field in the Change_Analysis data model. To minimize the alert volume, this search leverages the Assets and Identity framework to filter out events from those assets not marked high priority in the Enterprise Security Assets and Identity Framework. + +#### Known False Positives +Legitimate USB activity will also be detected. Please verify and investigate as appropriate. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Data Protection](/stories/data_protection) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Installation +* Actions on Objectives + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-01-05-monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.md b/docs/_posts/2018-01-05-monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.md index ebddea9d5a..be9ad9792b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2018-01-05-monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-01-05-monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.md @@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ tags: - Email --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search looks for emails claiming to be sent from a domain similar to one that you want to have monitored for abuse. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Email](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Email) - **Last Updated**: 2018-01-05 @@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ Note that `monitor_email_for_brand_abuse_filter` is a empty macro by default. It #### Lookups The SPL above uses the following Lookups: -* [brandMonitoring_lookup](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/brandMonitoring_lookup.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/brand_monitoring.csv) +* [brandMonitoring_lookup](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/brandMonitoring_lookup.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/lookups/brandMonitoring_lookup.csv) #### Required field * _time @@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ The SPL above uses the following Lookups: #### How To Implement -You need to ingest email header data. Specifically the sender's address (src_user) must be populated. You also need to have run the search "ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names", which creates the permutations of the domain that will be checked for. +You need to ingest email header data. Specifically the sender's address (src_user) must be populated. You also need to have run the search "ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names", which creates the permutations of the domain that will be checked for. #### Known False Positives None at this time @@ -81,8 +81,12 @@ None at this time +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -95,5 +99,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml) \| *version*: **2** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-02-23-ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.md b/docs/_posts/2018-02-23-ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..02713adeb3 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-02-23-ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.md @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +--- +title: "EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region" +excerpt: "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions +" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2018-02-23 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions + - Defense Evasion + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where an instance is started in a particular region in the last one hour and then compares it to a lookup file of previously seen regions where an instance was started + +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2018-02-23 +- **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +- **ID**: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f3-d82362d6fd75 + + +#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1535](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1535/) | Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions | Defense Evasion | + +#### Search + +``` +`cloudtrail` earliest=-1h StartInstances +| stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by awsRegion +| inputlookup append=t previously_seen_aws_regions.csv +| stats min(earliest) as earliest max(latest) as latest by awsRegion +| outputlookup previously_seen_aws_regions.csv +| eval regionStatus=if(earliest >= relative_time(now(),"-1d@d"), "Instance Started in a New Region","Previously Seen Region") +| `security_content_ctime(earliest)` +| `security_content_ctime(latest)` +| where regionStatus="Instance Started in a New Region" +| `ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) + +Note that `ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* awsRegion + + +#### How To Implement +You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. Run the "Previously seen AWS Regions" support search only once to create of baseline of previously seen regions. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. + +#### Known False Positives +It's possible that a user has unknowingly started an instance in a new region. Please verify that this activity is legitimate. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [AWS Cryptomining](/stories/aws_cryptomining) +* [Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities](/stories/suspicious_aws_ec2_activities) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Actions on Objectives + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-03-12-ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.md b/docs/_posts/2018-03-12-ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c3791a5307 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-03-12-ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.md @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +--- +title: "EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI" +excerpt: "" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2018-03-12 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen AMIs. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. + +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2018-03-12 +- **Author**: David Dorsey, Splunk +- **ID**: 347ec301-601b-48b9-81aa-9ddf9c829dd3 + +#### Search + +``` +`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success +| stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId +| rename requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId as amiID +| inputlookup append=t previously_seen_ec2_amis.csv +| stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by amiID +| outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_amis.csv +| eval newAMI=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| where newAMI=1 +| rename amiID as requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId +| table requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId] +| rename requestParameters.instanceType as instanceType, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as dest, userIdentity.arn as arn, requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId as amiID +| table firstTime, lastTime, arn, amiID, dest, instanceType +| `ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) + +Note that `ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* eventName +* errorCode +* requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId + + +#### How To Implement +You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 AMIs" support search once to create a history of previously seen AMIs. + +#### Known False Positives +After a new AMI is created, the first systems created with that AMI will cause this alert to fire. Verify that the AMI being used was created by a legitimate user. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [AWS Cryptomining](/stories/aws_cryptomining) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Exploitation + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-03-16-aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.md b/docs/_posts/2018-03-16-aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..726612e54d --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-03-16-aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.md @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ +--- +title: "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City" +excerpt: "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions +" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2018-03-16 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions + - Defense Evasion + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen cities. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. + +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2018-03-16 +- **Author**: David Dorsey, Splunk +- **ID**: 344a1778-0b25-490c-adb1-de8beddf59cd + + +#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1535](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1535/) | Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions | Defense Evasion | + +#### Search + +``` +`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) +| iplocation sourceIPAddress +| search City=* [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) +| iplocation sourceIPAddress +| search City=* +| stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country +| inputlookup append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv +| stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country +| outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv +| stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by City +| eval newCity=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) +| where newCity=1 +| table City] +| spath output=user userIdentity.arn +| rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip +| table _time, user, src_ip, City, eventName, errorCode +| `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) + +Note that `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* eventName +* sourceIPAddress + + +#### How To Implement +You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources. + +#### Known False Positives +This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ + This search will fire any time a new city is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your city, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities](/stories/aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Exploitation + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-03-16-aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.md b/docs/_posts/2018-03-16-aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..33b81408e5 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-03-16-aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.md @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ +--- +title: "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country" +excerpt: "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions +" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2018-03-16 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions + - Defense Evasion + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen countries. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. + +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2018-03-16 +- **Author**: David Dorsey, Splunk +- **ID**: ceb8d3d8-06cb-49eb-beaf-829526e33ff0 + + +#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1535](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1535/) | Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions | Defense Evasion | + +#### Search + +``` +`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) +| iplocation sourceIPAddress +| search Country=* [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) +| iplocation sourceIPAddress +| search Country=* +| stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country +| inputlookup append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv +| stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country +| outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv +| stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by Country +| eval newCountry=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) +| where newCountry=1 +| table Country] +| spath output=user userIdentity.arn +| rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip +| table _time, user, src_ip, Country, eventName, errorCode +| `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) + +Note that `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* eventName +* sourceIPAddress + + +#### How To Implement +You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources. + +#### Known False Positives +This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching over plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ + This search will fire any time a new country is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities](/stories/aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Exploitation + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-03-16-aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.md b/docs/_posts/2018-03-16-aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..021cc2b1ed --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-03-16-aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.md @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +--- +title: "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address" +excerpt: "" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2018-03-16 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen IP addresses. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. + +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2018-03-16 +- **Author**: David Dorsey, Splunk +- **ID**: 42e15012-ac14-4801-94f4-f1acbe64880b + +#### Search + +``` +`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) +| iplocation sourceIPAddress +| search Country=* +| stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country +| inputlookup append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv +| stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country +| outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv +| stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress +| eval newIP=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) +| where newIP=1 +| table sourceIPAddress] +| spath output=user userIdentity.arn +| rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip +| table _time, user, src_ip, eventName, errorCode +| `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) + +Note that `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* eventName +* sourceIPAddress + + +#### How To Implement +You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources. + +#### Known False Positives +This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ + This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities](/stories/aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Exploitation + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-03-16-aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.md b/docs/_posts/2018-03-16-aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..00eec36d1e --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-03-16-aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.md @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ +--- +title: "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region" +excerpt: "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions +" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2018-03-16 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions + - Defense Evasion + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen regions. Region in this context is similar to a state in the United States. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. + +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2018-03-16 +- **Author**: David Dorsey, Splunk +- **ID**: 7971d3df-da82-4648-a6e5-b5637bea5253 + + +#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1535](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1535/) | Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions | Defense Evasion | + +#### Search + +``` +`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) +| iplocation sourceIPAddress +| search Region=* [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) +| iplocation sourceIPAddress +| search Region=* +| stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country +| inputlookup append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv +| stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country +| outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv +| stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by Region +| eval newRegion=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) +| where newRegion=1 +| table Region] +| spath output=user userIdentity.arn +| rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip +| table _time, user, src_ip, Region, eventName, errorCode +| `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) + +Note that `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* eventName +* sourceIPAddress + + +#### How To Implement +You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources. + +#### Known False Positives +This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ + This search will fire any time a new region is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your region, there should be few false positives. If you are located in regions where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities](/stories/aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Exploitation + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-04-16-detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.md b/docs/_posts/2018-04-16-detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6cbf85a517 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-04-16-detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.md @@ -0,0 +1,117 @@ +--- +title: "Detect new API calls from user roles" +excerpt: "Cloud Accounts +" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2018-04-16 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Cloud Accounts + - Defense Evasion + - Initial Access + - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search detects new API calls that have either never been seen before or that have not been seen in the previous hour, where the identity type is `AssumedRole`. + +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2018-04-16 +- **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +- **ID**: 22773e84-bac0-4595-b086-20d3f335b4f1 + + +#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1078.004](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/) | Cloud Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | + +#### Search + +``` +`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall errorCode=success userIdentity.type=AssumedRole [search `cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall errorCode=success userIdentity.type=AssumedRole +| stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by userName eventName +| inputlookup append=t previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles +| stats min(earliest) as earliest, max(latest) as latest by userName eventName +| outputlookup previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles +| eval newApiCallfromUserRole=if(earliest>=relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) +| where newApiCallfromUserRole=1 +| `security_content_ctime(earliest)` +| `security_content_ctime(latest)` +| table eventName userName] +|rename userName as user +| stats values(eventName) earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by user +| `security_content_ctime(earliest)` +| `security_content_ctime(latest)` +| `detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) + +Note that `detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Lookups +The SPL above uses the following Lookups: + +* [previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/lookups/previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles.csv) + +#### Required field +* _time +* eventType +* errorCode +* userIdentity.type +* userName +* eventName + + +#### How To Implement +You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously seen API call per user roles in AWS CloudTrail" support search once to create a history of previously seen user roles. + +#### Known False Positives +It is possible that there are legitimate user roles making new or infrequently used API calls in your infrastructure, causing the search to trigger. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [AWS User Monitoring](/stories/aws_user_monitoring) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Exploitation + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-04-18-detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.md b/docs/_posts/2018-04-18-detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0a84497ab5 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-04-18-detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.md @@ -0,0 +1,119 @@ +--- +title: "Detect Spike in Security Group Activity" +excerpt: "Cloud Accounts +" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2018-04-18 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Cloud Accounts + - Defense Evasion + - Initial Access + - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to security groups in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. + +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2018-04-18 +- **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +- **ID**: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-e32372d4bd53 + + +#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1078.004](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/) | Cloud Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | + +#### Search + +``` +`cloudtrail` `security_group_api_calls` [search `cloudtrail` `security_group_api_calls` +| spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn +| stats count as apiCalls by arn +| inputlookup security_group_activity_baseline append=t +| fields - latestCount +| stats values(*) as * by arn +| rename apiCalls as latestCount +| eval newAvgApiCalls=avgApiCalls + (latestCount-avgApiCalls)/720 +| eval newStdevApiCalls=sqrt(((pow(stdevApiCalls, 2)*719 + (latestCount-newAvgApiCalls)*(latestCount-avgApiCalls))/720)) +| eval avgApiCalls=coalesce(newAvgApiCalls, avgApiCalls), stdevApiCalls=coalesce(newStdevApiCalls, stdevApiCalls), numDataPoints=if(isnull(latestCount), numDataPoints, numDataPoints+1) +| table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls +| outputlookup security_group_activity_baseline +| eval dataPointThreshold = 15, deviationThreshold = 3 +| eval isSpike=if((latestCount > avgApiCalls+deviationThreshold*stdevApiCalls) AND numDataPoints > dataPointThreshold, 1, 0) +| where isSpike=1 +| rename arn as userIdentity.arn +| table userIdentity.arn] +| spath output=user userIdentity.arn +| stats values(eventName) as eventNames, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName) as uniqueApisCalled by user +| `detect_spike_in_security_group_activity_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) +* [security_group_api_calls](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_group_api_calls.yml) + +Note that `detect_spike_in_security_group_activity_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Lookups +The SPL above uses the following Lookups: + +* [security_group_activity_baseline](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/security_group_activity_baseline.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/lookups/security_group_activity_baseline.csv) +* [security_group_activity_baseline](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/security_group_activity_baseline.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/lookups/security_group_activity_baseline.csv) + +#### Required field +* _time +* serIdentity.arn + + +#### How To Implement +You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike.This search works best when you run the "Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN" support search once to create a history of previously seen Security Group Activity. To add or remove API event names for security groups, edit the macro `security_group_api_calls`. + +#### Known False Positives +Based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`, the false positive rate may vary. Please modify this according the your environment. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [AWS User Monitoring](/stories/aws_user_monitoring) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Actions on Objectives + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-05-07-detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.md b/docs/_posts/2018-05-07-detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.md index 87d7d44189..ef97e5fce1 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2018-05-07-detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-05-07-detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.md @@ -12,8 +12,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Cloud --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -22,12 +22,12 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search will detect spike in blocked outbound network connections originating from within your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2018-05-07 - **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk -- **ID**: ada0f278-84a8-46w1-a3f1-w32372d4bd53 +- **ID**: d3fffa37-492f-487b-a35d-c60fcb2acf01 #### Search @@ -60,7 +60,8 @@ Note that `detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws_filter` is a e #### Lookups The SPL above uses the following Lookups: -* [baseline_blocked_outbound_connections](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/baseline_blocked_outbound_connections.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/baseline_blocked_outbound_connections.csv) +* [baseline_blocked_outbound_connections](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/baseline_blocked_outbound_connections.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/lookups/baseline_blocked_outbound_connections.csv) +* [baseline_blocked_outbound_connections](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/baseline_blocked_outbound_connections.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/lookups/baseline_blocked_outbound_connections.csv) #### Required field * _time @@ -70,7 +71,7 @@ The SPL above uses the following Lookups: #### How To Implement -You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your VPC Flow logs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the number of data points required to meet the definition of "spike." The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best when you run the "Baseline of Blocked Outbound Connection" support search once to create a history of previously seen blocked outbound connections. +You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your VPC Flow logs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the number of data points required to meet the definition of "spike." The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best when you run the "Baseline of Blocked Outbound Connection" support search once to create a history of previously seen blocked outbound connections. #### Known False Positives The false-positive rate may vary based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`. Additionally, false positives may result when AWS administrators roll out policies enforcing network blocks, causing sudden increases in the number of blocked outbound connections. @@ -83,12 +84,16 @@ The false-positive rate may vary based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and #### Kill Chain Phase * Actions on Objectives -* Command and Control +* Command & Control +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -101,5 +106,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-05-17-detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.md b/docs/_posts/2018-05-17-detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6b6b67368b --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-05-17-detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.md @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +--- +title: "Detect API activity from users without MFA" +excerpt: "" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2018-05-17 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user logged into the AWS account, is making API calls and has not enabled Multi Factor authentication. Multi factor authentication adds a layer of security by forcing the users to type a unique authentication code from an approved authentication device when they access AWS websites or services. AWS Best Practices recommend that you enable MFA for privileged IAM users. + +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2018-05-17 +- **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +- **ID**: 4d46e8bd-4072-48e4-92db-0325889ef894 + +#### Search + +``` +`cloudtrail` userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.mfaAuthenticated=false +| search NOT [ +| inputlookup aws_service_accounts +| fields identity +| rename identity as user] +| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(eventName) as eventName by userIdentity.arn userIdentity.type user +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| `detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) + +Note that `detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Lookups +The SPL above uses the following Lookups: + +* [aws_service_accounts](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/aws_service_accounts.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/lookups/aws_service_accounts.csv) + +#### Required field +* _time +* userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.mfaAuthenticated +* eventName +* userIdentity.arn +* userIdentity.type +* user + + +#### How To Implement +You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. Leverage the support search `Create a list of approved AWS service accounts`: run it once every 30 days to create a list of service accounts and validate them.\ +This search produces fields (`eventName`,`userIdentity.type`,`userIdentity.arn`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** AWS Event Name, **Field:** eventName\ +1. \ +1. **Label:** AWS User ARN, **Field:** userIdentity.arn\ +1. \ +1. **Label:** AWS User Type, **Field:** userIdentity.type\ +Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` + +#### Known False Positives +Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure do not have multi factor authentication enabled. Please ignore the service accounts, if triggered and instead add them to the aws_service_accounts.csv file to fine tune the detection. It is also possible that the search detects users in your environment using Single Sign-On systems, since the MFA is not handled by AWS. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [AWS User Monitoring](/stories/aws_user_monitoring) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Exploitation + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-05-21-detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.md b/docs/_posts/2018-05-21-detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c82d8c7ca9 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-05-21-detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.md @@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +--- +title: "Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity" +excerpt: "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall +" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2018-05-21 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall + - Defense Evasion + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to network access-control lists (ACLs)in your AWS environment. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. + +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2018-05-21 +- **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +- **ID**: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a1f1-e32372d4bd53 + + +#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1562.007](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/007/) | Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall | Defense Evasion | + +#### Search + +``` +`cloudtrail` `network_acl_events` [search `cloudtrail` `network_acl_events` +| spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn +| stats count as apiCalls by arn +| inputlookup network_acl_activity_baseline append=t +| fields - latestCount +| stats values(*) as * by arn +| rename apiCalls as latestCount +| eval newAvgApiCalls=avgApiCalls + (latestCount-avgApiCalls)/720 +| eval newStdevApiCalls=sqrt(((pow(stdevApiCalls, 2)*719 + (latestCount-newAvgApiCalls)*(latestCount-avgApiCalls))/720)) +| eval avgApiCalls=coalesce(newAvgApiCalls, avgApiCalls), stdevApiCalls=coalesce(newStdevApiCalls, stdevApiCalls), numDataPoints=if(isnull(latestCount), numDataPoints, numDataPoints+1) +| table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls +| outputlookup network_acl_activity_baseline +| eval dataPointThreshold = 15, deviationThreshold = 3 +| eval isSpike=if((latestCount > avgApiCalls+deviationThreshold*stdevApiCalls) AND numDataPoints > dataPointThreshold, 1, 0) +| where isSpike=1 +| rename arn as userIdentity.arn +| table userIdentity.arn] +| spath output=user userIdentity.arn +| stats values(eventName) as eventNames, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName) as uniqueApisCalled by user +| `detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) +* [network_acl_events](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/network_acl_events.yml) + +Note that `detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Lookups +The SPL above uses the following Lookups: + +* [network_acl_activity_baseline](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/network_acl_activity_baseline.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/lookups/network_acl_activity_baseline.csv) +* [network_acl_activity_baseline](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/network_acl_activity_baseline.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/lookups/network_acl_activity_baseline.csv) + +#### Required field +* _time +* userIdentity.arn + + +#### How To Implement +You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best when you run the "Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN" support search once to create a lookup file of previously seen Network ACL Activity. To add or remove API event names related to network ACLs, edit the macro `network_acl_events`. + +#### Known False Positives +The false-positive rate may vary based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`. Please modify this according the your environment. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [AWS Network ACL Activity](/stories/aws_network_acl_activity) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Actions on Objectives + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-06-01-detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.md b/docs/_posts/2018-06-01-detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.md index 41a8a13207..d9b0aee9a1 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2018-06-01-detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-06-01-detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets" -excerpt: "Non-Application Layer Protocol" +excerpt: "Non-Application Layer Protocol +" categories: - Network last_modified_at: 2018-06-01 @@ -15,8 +16,8 @@ tags: - Network_Traffic --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -25,7 +26,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search looks for outbound ICMP packets with a packet size larger than 1,000 bytes. Various threat actors have been known to use ICMP as a command and control channel for their attack infrastructure. Large ICMP packets from an endpoint to a remote host may be indicative of this activity. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Network_Traffic](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkTraffic) - **Last Updated**: 2018-06-01 @@ -70,7 +71,7 @@ Note that `detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets_filter` is a empty macro by defaul #### How To Implement -In order to run this search effectively, we highly recommend that you leverage the Assets and Identity framework. It is important that you have a good understanding of how your network segments are designed and that you are able to distinguish internal from external address space. Add a category named `internal` to the CIDRs that host the company's assets in the `assets_by_cidr.csv` lookup file, which is located in `$SPLUNK_HOME/etc/apps/SA-IdentityManagement/lookups/`. More information on updating this lookup can be found here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.0.0/Admin/Addassetandidentitydata. This search also requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model +In order to run this search effectively, we highly recommend that you leverage the Assets and Identity framework. It is important that you have a good understanding of how your network segments are designed and that you are able to distinguish internal from external address space. Add a category named `internal` to the CIDRs that host the company's assets in the `assets_by_cidr.csv` lookup file, which is located in `$SPLUNK_HOME/etc/apps/SA-IdentityManagement/lookups/`. More information on updating this lookup can be found here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.0.0/Admin/Addassetandidentitydata. This search also requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model #### Known False Positives ICMP packets are used in a variety of ways to help troubleshoot networking issues and ensure the proper flow of traffic. As such, it is possible that a large ICMP packet could be perfectly legitimate. If large ICMP packets are associated with command and control traffic, there will typically be a large number of these packets observed over time. If the search is providing a large number of false positives, you can modify the macro `detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets_filter` to adjust the byte threshold or add specific IP addresses to an allow list. @@ -80,12 +81,16 @@ ICMP packets are used in a variety of ways to help troubleshoot networking issue #### Kill Chain Phase -* Command and Control +* Command & Control +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -98,5 +103,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml) \| *version*: **2** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-06-14-splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.md b/docs/_posts/2018-06-14-splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2fcbc67271 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-06-14-splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.md @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +--- +title: "Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure" +excerpt: "" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2018-06-14 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search allows you to look for evidence of exploitation for CVE-2018-11409, a Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure Bug. + +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2018-06-14 +- **Author**: David Dorsey, Splunk +- **ID**: f6a26b7b-7e80-4963-a9a8-d836e7534ebd + +#### Search + +``` +index=_internal sourcetype=splunkd_ui_access server-info +| search clientip!=127.0.0.1 uri_path="*raw/services/server/info/server-info" +| rename clientip as src_ip, splunk_server as dest +| stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime, values(uri) as uri, values(useragent) as http_user_agent, values(user) as user by src_ip, dest +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| `splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) + +Note that `splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time + + +#### How To Implement +The REST endpoint that exposes system information is also necessary for the proper operation of Splunk clustering and instrumentation. Whitelisting your Splunk systems will reduce false positives. + +#### Known False Positives +Retrieving server information may be a legitimate API request. Verify that the attempt is a valid request for information. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409](/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability_cve-2018-11409) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Delivery + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-06-28-detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.md b/docs/_posts/2018-06-28-detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.md index cb49e6796c..e9bb8f1390 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2018-06-28-detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-06-28-detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Detect S3 access from a new IP" -excerpt: "Data from Cloud Storage Object" +excerpt: "Data from Cloud Storage Object +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2018-06-28 @@ -14,8 +15,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Cloud --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -24,12 +25,12 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search looks at S3 bucket-access logs and detects new or previously unseen remote IP addresses that have successfully accessed an S3 bucket. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2018-06-28 - **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk -- **ID**: 2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-291bq3d0daq4 +- **ID**: e6f1bb1b-f441-492b-9126-902acda217da #### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) @@ -72,7 +73,7 @@ Note that `detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip_filter` is a empty macro by default. I #### How To Implement -You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your S3 access logs' inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen S3 Bucket Access by Remote IP" support search once to create a history of previously seen remote IPs and bucket names. +You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your S3 access logs' inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen S3 Bucket Access by Remote IP" support search once to create a history of previously seen remote IPs and bucket names. #### Known False Positives S3 buckets can be accessed from any IP, as long as it can make a successful connection. This will be a false postive, since the search is looking for a new IP within the past hour @@ -86,8 +87,12 @@ S3 buckets can be accessed from any IP, as long as it can make a successful conn +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -100,5 +105,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-10-08-web_fraud_-_account_harvesting.md b/docs/_posts/2018-10-08-web_fraud_-_account_harvesting.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f897e5444b --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-10-08-web_fraud_-_account_harvesting.md @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +--- +title: "Web Fraud - Account Harvesting" +excerpt: "Create Account +" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2018-10-08 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Create Account + - Persistence + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search is used to identify the creation of multiple user accounts using the same email domain name. + +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2018-10-08 +- **Author**: Jim Apger, Splunk +- **ID**: bf1d7b5c-df2f-4249-a401-c09fdc221ddf + + +#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1136](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/) | Create Account | Persistence | + +#### Search + +``` +`stream_http` http_content_type=text* uri="/magento2/customer/account/loginPost/" +| rex field=cookie "form_key=(?\w+)" +| rex field=form_data "login\[username\]=(?[^& +|^$]+)" +| search Username=* +| rex field=Username "@(?.*)" +| stats dc(Username) as UniqueUsernames list(Username) as src_user by email_domain +| where UniqueUsernames> 25 +| `web_fraud___account_harvesting_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [stream_http](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/stream_http.yml) + +Note that `web_fraud_-_account_harvesting_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* http_content_type +* uri +* cookie + + +#### How To Implement +We start with a dataset that provides visibility into the email address used for the account creation. In this example, we are narrowing our search down to the single web page that hosts the Magento2 e-commerce platform (via URI) used for account creation, the single http content-type to grab only the user's clicks, and the http field that provides the username (form_data), for performance reasons. After we have the username and email domain, we look for numerous account creations per email domain. Common data sources used for this detection are customized Apache logs or Splunk Stream. + +#### Known False Positives +As is common with many fraud-related searches, we are usually looking to attribute risk or synthesize relevant context with loosely written detections that simply detect anamolous behavior. This search will need to be customized to fit your environment—improving its fidelity by counting based on something much more specific, such as a device ID that may be present in your dataset. Consideration for whether the large number of registrations are occuring from a first-time seen domain may also be important. Extending the search window to look further back in time, or even calculating the average per hour/day for each email domain to look for an anomalous spikes, will improve this search. You can also use Shannon entropy or Levenshtein Distance (both courtesy of URL Toolbox) to consider the randomness or similarity of the email name or email domain, as the names are often machine-generated. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Web Fraud Detection](/stories/web_fraud_detection) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Actions on Objectives + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + +* [https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/2734/](https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/2734/) +* [https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1809/](https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1809/) + + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/web_fraud_-_account_harvesting.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-10-08-web_fraud_-_anomalous_user_clickspeed.md b/docs/_posts/2018-10-08-web_fraud_-_anomalous_user_clickspeed.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..05ea9c88ca --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-10-08-web_fraud_-_anomalous_user_clickspeed.md @@ -0,0 +1,106 @@ +--- +title: "Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed" +excerpt: "Valid Accounts +" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2018-10-08 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Valid Accounts + - Defense Evasion + - Initial Access + - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search is used to examine web sessions to identify those where the clicks are occurring too quickly for a human or are occurring with a near-perfect cadence (high periodicity or low standard deviation), resembling a script driven session. + +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2018-10-08 +- **Author**: Jim Apger, Splunk +- **ID**: 31337bbb-bc22-4752-b599-ef192df2dc7a + + +#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | + +#### Search + +``` +`stream_http` http_content_type=text* +| rex field=cookie "form_key=(?\w+)" +| streamstats window=2 current=1 range(_time) as TimeDelta by session_id +| where TimeDelta>0 +|stats count stdev(TimeDelta) as ClickSpeedStdDev avg(TimeDelta) as ClickSpeedAvg by session_id +| where count>5 AND (ClickSpeedStdDev<.5 OR ClickSpeedAvg<.5) +| `web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [stream_http](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/stream_http.yml) + +Note that `web_fraud_-_anomalous_user_clickspeed_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* http_content_type +* cookie + + +#### How To Implement +Start with a dataset that allows you to see clickstream data for each user click on the website. That data must have a time stamp and must contain a reference to the session identifier being used by the website. This ties the clicks together into clickstreams. This value is usually found in the http cookie. With a bit of tuning, a version of this search could be used in high-volume scenarios, such as scraping, crawling, application DDOS, credit-card testing, account takeover, etc. Common data sources used for this detection are customized Apache logs, customized IIS, and Splunk Stream. + +#### Known False Positives +As is common with many fraud-related searches, we are usually looking to attribute risk or synthesize relevant context with loosly written detections that simply detect anamoluous behavior. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Web Fraud Detection](/stories/web_fraud_detection) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Actions on Objectives + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + +* [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Session_ID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Session_ID) +* [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Session_(computer_science)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Session_(computer_science)) +* [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_cookie](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_cookie) +* [https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1809/](https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1809/) + + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/web_fraud_-_anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-10-08-web_fraud_-_password_sharing_across_accounts.md b/docs/_posts/2018-10-08-web_fraud_-_password_sharing_across_accounts.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d8503c9270 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-10-08-web_fraud_-_password_sharing_across_accounts.md @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +--- +title: "Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts" +excerpt: "" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2018-10-08 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search is used to identify user accounts that share a common password. + +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2018-10-08 +- **Author**: Jim Apger, Splunk +- **ID**: 31337a1a-53b9-4e05-96e9-55c934cb71d3 + +#### Search + +``` +`stream_http` http_content_type=text* uri=/magento2/customer/account/loginPost* +| rex field=form_data "login\[username\]=(?[^& +|^$]+)" +| rex field=form_data "login\[password\]=(?[^& +|^$]+)" +| stats dc(Username) as UniqueUsernames values(Username) as user list(src_ip) as src_ip by Password +|where UniqueUsernames>5 +| `web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [stream_http](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/stream_http.yml) + +Note that `web_fraud_-_password_sharing_across_accounts_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* http_content_type +* uri + + +#### How To Implement +We need to start with a dataset that allows us to see the values of usernames and passwords that users are submitting to the website hosting the Magento2 e-commerce platform (commonly found in the HTTP form_data field). A tokenized or hashed value of a password is acceptable and certainly preferable to a clear-text password. Common data sources used for this detection are customized Apache logs, customized IIS, and Splunk Stream. + +#### Known False Positives +As is common with many fraud-related searches, we are usually looking to attribute risk or synthesize relevant context with loosely written detections that simply detect anamoluous behavior. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Web Fraud Detection](/stories/web_fraud_detection) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Exploitation + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + +* [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Session_ID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Session_ID) +* [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Session_(computer_science)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Session_(computer_science)) +* [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_cookie](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_cookie) +* [https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1809/](https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1809/) + + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/web_fraud_-_password_sharing_across_accounts.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-10-12-cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.md b/docs/_posts/2018-10-12-cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.md index f9970a7d43..180b6b9ee8 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2018-10-12-cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-10-12-cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.md @@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ last_modified_at: 2018-10-12 toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -22,8 +21,8 @@ tags: This search looks for cloud compute instances being created with previously unseen image IDs. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Security Analytics for AWS, Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Change](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Change) - **Last Updated**: 2018-10-12 - **Author**: David Dorsey, Splunk @@ -56,7 +55,7 @@ Note that `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image_filter` i #### Lookups The SPL above uses the following Lookups: -* [previously_seen_cloud_compute_images](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images.yml) with [data]() +* [previously_seen_cloud_compute_images](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/lookups/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images.csv) #### Required field * _time @@ -77,6 +76,7 @@ After a new image is created, the first systems created with that image will cau #### Kill Chain Phase +* Actions on Objectives @@ -87,8 +87,6 @@ After a new image is created, the first systems created with that image will cau | 36.0 | 60 | 60 | User $user$ is creating an instance $dest$ with an image that has not been previously seen. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -98,6 +96,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-10-23-wmi_permanent_event_subscription.md b/docs/_posts/2018-10-23-wmi_permanent_event_subscription.md index ae51645314..5657254d99 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2018-10-23-wmi_permanent_event_subscription.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-10-23-wmi_permanent_event_subscription.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "WMI Permanent Event Subscription" -excerpt: "Windows Management Instrumentation" +excerpt: "Windows Management Instrumentation +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2018-10-23 @@ -14,8 +15,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Cloud --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -24,7 +25,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2018-10-23 @@ -82,8 +83,12 @@ Although unlikely, administrators may use event subscriptions for legitimate pur +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -96,5 +101,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-10-23-wmi_temporary_event_subscription.md b/docs/_posts/2018-10-23-wmi_temporary_event_subscription.md index f05b2a1938..e1ff7f6ae1 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2018-10-23-wmi_temporary_event_subscription.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-10-23-wmi_temporary_event_subscription.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "WMI Temporary Event Subscription" -excerpt: "Windows Management Instrumentation" +excerpt: "Windows Management Instrumentation +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2018-10-23 @@ -14,8 +15,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Cloud --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -24,7 +25,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search looks for the creation of WMI temporary event subscriptions. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2018-10-23 @@ -80,8 +81,12 @@ Some software may create WMI temporary event subscriptions for various purposes. +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -94,5 +99,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-11-02-windows_hosts_file_modification.md b/docs/_posts/2018-11-02-windows_hosts_file_modification.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4d7cb6f5da --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-11-02-windows_hosts_file_modification.md @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +--- +title: "Windows hosts file modification" +excerpt: "" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2018-11-02 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +The search looks for modifications to the hosts file on all Windows endpoints across your environment. + +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2018-11-02 +- **Author**: Rico Valdez, Splunk +- **ID**: 06a6fc63-a72d-41dc-8736-7e3dd9612116 + +#### Search + +``` + +| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| search Filesystem.file_name=hosts AND Filesystem.file_path=*Windows\\System32\\* +| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` +| `windows_hosts_file_modification_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) + +Note that `windows_hosts_file_modification_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time + + +#### How To Implement +To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records the file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint.Filesystem data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or by other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system reads and writes. + +#### Known False Positives +There may be legitimate reasons for system administrators to add entries to this file. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Host Redirection](/stories/host_redirection) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Command & Control + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-11-27-detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.md b/docs/_posts/2018-11-27-detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.md index 9f9d2527e6..4ba9f16d13 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2018-11-27-detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-11-27-detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion" -excerpt: "Data from Cloud Storage Object" +excerpt: "Data from Cloud Storage Object +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2018-11-27 @@ -14,8 +15,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Cloud --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -24,12 +25,12 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search detects users creating spikes in API activity related to deletion of S3 buckets in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2018-11-27 - **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk -- **ID**: ad12w478-84a8-4641-a3w1-e32372q4bd53 +- **ID**: e733a326-59d2-446d-b8db-14a17151aa68 #### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) @@ -73,7 +74,8 @@ Note that `detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion_filter` is a empty macro by defaul #### Lookups The SPL above uses the following Lookups: -* [s3_deletion_baseline](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/s3_deletion_baseline.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/s3_deletion_baseline.csv) +* [s3_deletion_baseline](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/s3_deletion_baseline.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/lookups/s3_deletion_baseline.csv) +* [s3_deletion_baseline](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/s3_deletion_baseline.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/lookups/s3_deletion_baseline.csv) #### Required field * _time @@ -82,7 +84,7 @@ The SPL above uses the following Lookups: #### How To Implement -You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best when you run the "Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN" support search once to create a baseline of previously seen S3 bucket-deletion activity. +You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best when you run the "Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN" support search once to create a baseline of previously seen S3 bucket-deletion activity. #### Known False Positives Based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`, the false positive rate may vary. Please modify this according the your environment. @@ -96,8 +98,12 @@ Based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`, the false p +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -110,5 +116,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-12-03-remote_wmi_command_attempt.md b/docs/_posts/2018-12-03-remote_wmi_command_attempt.md index cf71ad52d2..92b76f915d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2018-12-03-remote_wmi_command_attempt.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-12-03-remote_wmi_command_attempt.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Remote WMI Command Attempt" -excerpt: "Windows Management Instrumentation" +excerpt: "Windows Management Instrumentation +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2018-12-03 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies usage of `wmic.exe` spawning a local or remote process, identified by the `node` switch. During triage, review parallel processes for additional commands executed. Look for any file modifications before and after `wmic.exe` execution. In addition, identify the remote endpoint and confirm execution or file modifications. Contain and isolate the endpoint as needed. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2018-12-03 @@ -50,9 +51,9 @@ The following analytic identifies usage of `wmic.exe` spawning a local or remote #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_wmic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_wmic.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_wmic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_wmic.yml) Note that `remote_wmi_command_attempt_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -89,8 +90,6 @@ Administrators may use this legitimately to gather info from remote systems. Fil | 36.0 | 60 | 60 | A wmic.exe process $process$ contain node commandline $process$ in host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -103,6 +102,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-12-03-usn_journal_deletion.md b/docs/_posts/2018-12-03-usn_journal_deletion.md index a17ff3cde3..96b0c05747 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2018-12-03-usn_journal_deletion.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-12-03-usn_journal_deletion.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "USN Journal Deletion" -excerpt: "Indicator Removal on Host" +excerpt: "Indicator Removal on Host +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2018-12-03 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: The fsutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows utility used to perform tasks related to the file allocation table (FAT) and NTFS file systems. The update sequence number (USN) change journal provides a log of all changes made to the files on the disk. This search looks for fsutil.exe deleting the USN journal. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2018-12-03 @@ -67,7 +68,7 @@ Note that `usn_journal_deletion_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows t #### How To Implement -You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. +You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. #### Known False Positives None identified @@ -89,8 +90,6 @@ None identified | 45.0 | 50 | 90 | Possible USN journal deletion on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -100,6 +99,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-12-06-suspicious_java_classes.md b/docs/_posts/2018-12-06-suspicious_java_classes.md index 2552d5f088..c21f771c79 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2018-12-06-suspicious_java_classes.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-12-06-suspicious_java_classes.md @@ -12,8 +12,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Cloud --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -22,12 +22,12 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search looks for suspicious Java classes that are often used to exploit remote command execution in common Java frameworks, such as Apache Struts. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2018-12-06 - **Author**: Jose Hernandez, Splunk -- **ID**: if1fea6da-3c86-4c1d-b255-fc3b2781a491 +- **ID**: 6ed33786-5e87-4f55-b62c-cb5f1168b831 #### Search @@ -76,8 +76,12 @@ There are no known false positives. +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -90,5 +94,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-12-14-file_with_samsam_extension.md b/docs/_posts/2018-12-14-file_with_samsam_extension.md index 2773fd90af..d83b77f8a1 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2018-12-14-file_with_samsam_extension.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-12-14-file_with_samsam_extension.md @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ tags: The search looks for file writes with extensions consistent with a SamSam ransomware attack. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2018-12-14 @@ -78,8 +78,6 @@ Because these extensions are not typically used in normal operations, you should | 90.0 | 100 | 90 | File writes $file_name$ with extensions consistent with a SamSam ransomware attack seen on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -89,6 +87,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/samsam_extension/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/samsam_extension/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-12-14-samsam_test_file_write.md b/docs/_posts/2018-12-14-samsam_test_file_write.md index 4098507a1d..fa43fbd688 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2018-12-14-samsam_test_file_write.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-12-14-samsam_test_file_write.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Samsam Test File Write" -excerpt: "Data Encrypted for Impact" +excerpt: "Data Encrypted for Impact +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2018-12-14 @@ -21,9 +22,9 @@ tags: #### Description -The search looks for a file named "test.txt" written to the windows system directory tree, which is consistent with Samsam propagation. +The search looks for a file named "test.txt" written to the windows system directory tree, which is consistent with Samsam propagation. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2018-12-14 @@ -85,8 +86,6 @@ No false positives have been identified. | 12.0 | 60 | 20 | A samsam ransomware test file creation in $file_path$ in host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -96,6 +95,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1486/sam_sam_note/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1486/sam_sam_note/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2019-01-25-processes_tapping_keyboard_events.md b/docs/_posts/2019-01-25-processes_tapping_keyboard_events.md index f2542e5ca7..ec85edc9bb 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2019-01-25-processes_tapping_keyboard_events.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2019-01-25-processes_tapping_keyboard_events.md @@ -12,8 +12,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Cloud --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search looks for processes in an MacOS system that is tapping keyboard events in MacOS, and essentially monitoring all keystrokes made by a user. This is a common technique used by RATs to log keystrokes from a victim, although it can also be used by legitimate processes like Siri to react on human input -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2019-01-25 @@ -67,12 +67,16 @@ There might be some false positives as keyboard event taps are used by processes #### Kill Chain Phase -* Command and Control +* Command & Control +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -85,5 +89,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2019-01-29-osquery_pack_-_coldroot_detection.md b/docs/_posts/2019-01-29-osquery_pack_-_coldroot_detection.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..400e12f9f1 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2019-01-29-osquery_pack_-_coldroot_detection.md @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +--- +title: "Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection" +excerpt: "" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2019-01-29 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search looks for ColdRoot events from the osx-attacks osquery pack. + +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2019-01-29 +- **Author**: Rico Valdez, Splunk +- **ID**: a6fffe5e-05c3-4c04-badc-887607fbb8dc + +#### Search + +``` + +| from datamodel Alerts.Alerts +| search app=osquery:results (name=pack_osx-attacks_OSX_ColdRoot_RAT_Launchd OR name=pack_osx-attacks_OSX_ColdRoot_RAT_Files) +| rename columns.path as path +| bucket _time span=30s +| stats count(path) by _time, host, user, path +| `osquery_pack___coldroot_detection_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: + +Note that `osquery_pack_-_coldroot_detection_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time + + +#### How To Implement +In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from your osquery deployed agents with the [osx-attacks.conf](https://github.com/facebook/osquery/blob/experimental/packs/osx-attacks.conf#L599) pack enabled. Also the [TA-OSquery](https://github.com/d1vious/TA-osquery) must be deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the osquery data populate the Alerts data model + +#### Known False Positives +There are no known false positives. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [ColdRoot MacOS RAT](/stories/coldroot_macos_rat) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Installation +* Command & Control + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/osquery_pack_-_coldroot_detection.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2019-02-27-detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.md b/docs/_posts/2019-02-27-detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..52622e997f --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2019-02-27-detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.md @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +--- +title: "Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703" +excerpt: "LSASS Memory +" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2019-02-27 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - LSASS Memory + - Credential Access + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search looks for PowerShell requesting privileges consistent with credential dumping. Deprecated, looks like things changed from a logging perspective. + +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2019-02-27 +- **Author**: Rico Valdez, Splunk +- **ID**: 98917be2-bfc8-475a-8618-a9bb06575188 + + +#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1003.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/) | LSASS Memory | Credential Access | + +#### Search + +``` +`wineventlog_security` signature_id=4703 Process_Name=*powershell.exe +| rex field=Message "Enabled Privileges:\s+(?\w+)\s+Disabled Privileges:" +| where privs="SeDebugPrivilege" +| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Process_Name, privs, Process_ID, Message +| rename privs as "Enabled Privilege" +| rename Process_Name as process +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| `detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) + +Note that `detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* signature_id +* Process_Name +* Message +* dest +* Process_ID + + +#### How To Implement +You must be ingesting Windows Security logs. You must also enable the account change auditing here: http://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/7.0.2/Data/MonitorWindowseventlogdata. Additionally, this search requires you to enable your Group Management Audit Logs in your Local Windows Security Policy and to be ingesting those logs. More information on how to enable them can be found here: http://whatevernetworks.com/auditing-group-membership-changes-in-active-directory/. Finally, please make sure that the local administrator group name is "Administrators" to be able to look for the right group membership changes. + +#### Known False Positives +The activity may be legitimate. PowerShell is often used by administrators to perform various tasks, and it's possible this event could be generated in those cases. In these cases, false positives should be fairly obvious and you may need to tweak the search to eliminate noise. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Cloud Federated Credential Abuse](/stories/cloud_federated_credential_abuse) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Actions on Objectives + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml) \| *version*: **2** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2019-02-27-reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.md b/docs/_posts/2019-02-27-reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a097081252 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2019-02-27-reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.md @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +--- +title: "Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys" +excerpt: "Hidden Files and Directories +" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2019-02-27 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Hidden Files and Directories + - Defense Evasion + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Endpoint +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +The search looks for command-line arguments used to hide a file or directory using the reg add command. + +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) +- **Last Updated**: 2019-02-27 +- **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +- **ID**: 61a7d1e6-f5d4-41d9-a9be-39a1ffe69459 + + +#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1564.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/001/) | Hidden Files and Directories | Defense Evasion | + +#### Search + +``` + +| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = reg.exe Processes.process="*add*" Processes.process="*Hidden*" Processes.process="*REG_DWORD*" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user +| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| regex process = "(/d\s+2)" +| `reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) + +Note that `reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time + + +#### How To Implement +You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. + +#### Known False Positives +None at the moment + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Windows Defense Evasion Tactics](/stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics) +* [Suspicious Windows Registry Activities](/stories/suspicious_windows_registry_activities) +* [Windows Persistence Techniques](/stories/windows_persistence_techniques) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Actions on Objectives + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml) \| *version*: **2** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2019-04-01-web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.md b/docs/_posts/2019-04-01-web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.md index 080ebe2dda..7b887af0b9 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2019-04-01-web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2019-04-01-web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes" -excerpt: "System Information Discovery" +excerpt: "System Information Discovery +" categories: - Application last_modified_at: 2019-04-01 @@ -15,8 +16,8 @@ tags: - Endpoint --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -25,7 +26,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search looks for suspicious processes on all systems labeled as web servers. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2019-04-01 @@ -67,7 +68,7 @@ Note that `web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes_filter` is a empty macro b #### How To Implement -You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. In addition, web servers will need to be identified in the Assets and Identity Framework of Enterprise Security. +You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. In addition, web servers will need to be identified in the Assets and Identity Framework of Enterprise Security. #### Known False Positives Some of these processes may be used legitimately on web servers during maintenance or other administrative tasks. @@ -81,8 +82,12 @@ Some of these processes may be used legitimately on web servers during maintenan +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -95,5 +100,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2019-04-25-suspicious_file_write.md b/docs/_posts/2019-04-25-suspicious_file_write.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..aa95f9b0b1 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2019-04-25-suspicious_file_write.md @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +--- +title: "Suspicious File Write" +excerpt: "" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2019-04-25 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +The search looks for files created with names that have been linked to malicious activity. + +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2019-04-25 +- **Author**: Rico Valdez, Splunk +- **ID**: 57f76b8a-32f0-42ed-b358-d9fa3ca7bac8 + +#### Search + +``` + +| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.action) as action values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` +| `suspicious_writes` +| `suspicious_file_write_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [suspicious_writes](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/suspicious_writes.yml) + +Note that `suspicious_file_write_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time + + +#### How To Implement +You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file system reads and writes. In addition, this search leverages an included lookup file that contains the names of the files to watch for, as well as a note to communicate why that file name is being monitored. This lookup file can be edited to add or remove file the file names you want to monitor. + +#### Known False Positives +It's possible for a legitimate file to be created with the same name as one noted in the lookup file. Filenames listed in the lookup file should be unique enough that collisions are rare. Looking at the location of the file and the process responsible for the activity can help determine whether or not the activity is legitimate. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Hidden Cobra Malware](/stories/hidden_cobra_malware) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Actions on Objectives + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml) \| *version*: **3** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2019-05-08-unusually_long_command_line_-_mltk.md b/docs/_posts/2019-05-08-unusually_long_command_line_-_mltk.md index 754067fe76..f0a08d34c7 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2019-05-08-unusually_long_command_line_-_mltk.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2019-05-08-unusually_long_command_line_-_mltk.md @@ -12,8 +12,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Cloud --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious activity on your hosts. This search leverages the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) to help identify command lines with lengths that are unusual for a given user. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2019-05-08 @@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ Note that `unusually_long_command_line_-_mltk_filter` is a empty macro by defaul #### How To Implement -You must be ingesting endpoint data that monitors command lines and populates the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. In addition, MLTK version >= 4.2 must be installed on your search heads, along with any required dependencies. Finally, the support search "Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK" must be executed before this detection search, as it builds an ML model over the historical data used by this search. It is important that this search is run in the same app context as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild the model with the latest data available in your environment. +You must be ingesting endpoint data that monitors command lines and populates the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. In addition, MLTK version >= 4.2 must be installed on your search heads, along with any required dependencies. Finally, the support search "Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK" must be executed before this detection search, as it builds an ML model over the historical data used by this search. It is important that this search is run in the same app context as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild the model with the latest data available in your environment. #### Known False Positives Some legitimate applications use long command lines for installs or updates. You should review identified command lines for legitimacy. You may modify the first part of the search to omit legitimate command lines from consideration. If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider changing the value of threshold in the search to a smaller value. You should also periodically re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data. You may get unexpected results if the user identified in the results is not present in the data used to build the associated model. @@ -79,8 +79,12 @@ Some legitimate applications use long command lines for installs or updates. You +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -93,5 +97,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line_-_mltk.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2019-10-11-prohibited_software_on_endpoint.md b/docs/_posts/2019-10-11-prohibited_software_on_endpoint.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..84c3565d6f --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2019-10-11-prohibited_software_on_endpoint.md @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +--- +title: "Prohibited Software On Endpoint" +excerpt: "" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2019-10-11 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Endpoint +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search looks for applications on the endpoint that you have marked as prohibited. + +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) +- **Last Updated**: 2019-10-11 +- **Author**: David Dorsey, Splunk +- **ID**: a51bfe1a-94f0-48cc-b4e4-b6ae50145893 + +#### Search + +``` + +| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` +| `prohibited_softwares` +| `prohibited_software_on_endpoint_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [prohibited_softwares](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/prohibited_softwares.yml) + +Note that `prohibited_software_on_endpoint_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _times + + +#### How To Implement +To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is usually generated via logs that report process tracking in your Windows audit settings. In addition, you must also have only the `process_name` (not the entire process path) marked as "prohibited" in the Enterprise Security `interesting processes` table. To include the process names marked as "prohibited", which is included with ES Content Updates, run the included search Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security. + +#### Known False Positives +None identified + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Monitor for Unauthorized Software](/stories/monitor_for_unauthorized_software) +* [Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ](/stories/emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18-201a_) +* [SamSam Ransomware](/stories/samsam_ransomware) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Installation +* Command & Control +* Actions on Objectives + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml) \| *version*: **2** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2019-12-03-detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.md b/docs/_posts/2019-12-03-detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.md index 76c6a4b899..e010fbec9b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2019-12-03-detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2019-12-03-detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access" -excerpt: "LSASS Memory, OS Credential Dumping" +excerpt: "LSASS Memory +, OS Credential Dumping +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2019-12-03 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - LSASS Memory - - Credential Access - OS Credential Dumping - Credential Access + - Credential Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -24,7 +26,7 @@ tags: This search looks for reading lsass memory consistent with credential dumping. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2019-12-03 @@ -53,8 +55,8 @@ This search looks for reading lsass memory consistent with credential dumping. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -74,7 +76,7 @@ Note that `detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access_filter` is a empty mac This search needs Sysmon Logs and a sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 10 with lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. #### Known False Positives -The activity may be legitimate. Other tools can access lsass for legitimate reasons, and it's possible this event could be generated in those cases. In these cases, false positives should be fairly obvious and you may need to tweak the search to eliminate noise. +The activity may be legitimate. Other tools can access lsass for legitimate reasons, and it's possible this event could be generated in those cases. In these cases, false positives should be fairly obvious and you may need to tweak the search to eliminate noise. #### Associated Analytic story * [Credential Dumping](/stories/credential_dumping) @@ -93,8 +95,6 @@ The activity may be legitimate. Other tools can access lsass for legitimate reas | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | The $source_image$ has attempted access to read $TargetImage$ was identified on endpoint $Computer$, this is indicative of credential dumping and should be investigated. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2019-12-03-detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.md b/docs/_posts/2019-12-03-detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.md index a5da0aaa95..b3314c2808 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2019-12-03-detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2019-12-03-detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images" -excerpt: "LSASS Memory, OS Credential Dumping" +excerpt: "LSASS Memory +, OS Credential Dumping +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2019-12-03 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - LSASS Memory - - Credential Access - OS Credential Dumping - Credential Access + - Credential Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -24,7 +26,7 @@ tags: This search looks for reading loaded Images unique to credential dumping with Mimikatz. Deprecated because mimikatz libraries changed and very noisy sysmon Event Code. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2019-12-03 @@ -54,8 +56,8 @@ This search looks for reading loaded Images unique to credential dumping with Mi #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -93,8 +95,6 @@ Other tools can import the same DLLs. These tools should be part of a whitelist. | 64.0 | 80 | 80 | A process, $Image$, has loaded $ImageLoaded$ that are typically related to credential dumping on $Computer$. Review for further details. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2019-12-06-access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.md b/docs/_posts/2019-12-06-access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.md index 9720416e8d..373fd7611e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2019-12-06-access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2019-12-06-access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation" -excerpt: "LSASS Memory, OS Credential Dumping" +excerpt: "LSASS Memory +, OS Credential Dumping +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2019-12-06 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - LSASS Memory - - Credential Access - OS Credential Dumping - Credential Access + - Credential Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -24,7 +26,7 @@ tags: Detect memory dumping of the LSASS process. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2019-12-06 @@ -53,8 +55,8 @@ Detect memory dumping of the LSASS process. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -91,8 +93,6 @@ Administrators can create memory dumps for debugging purposes, but memory dumps | 63.0 | 70 | 90 | process $SourceImage$ injected into $TargetImage$ and was attempted dump LSASS on $dest$. Adversaries tend to do this when trying to accesss credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2019-12-06-create_remote_thread_into_lsass.md b/docs/_posts/2019-12-06-create_remote_thread_into_lsass.md index c81e475186..aff4a57434 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2019-12-06-create_remote_thread_into_lsass.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2019-12-06-create_remote_thread_into_lsass.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Create Remote Thread into LSASS" -excerpt: "LSASS Memory, OS Credential Dumping" +excerpt: "LSASS Memory +, OS Credential Dumping +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2019-12-06 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - LSASS Memory - - Credential Access - OS Credential Dumping - Credential Access + - Credential Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -24,7 +26,7 @@ tags: Detect remote thread creation into LSASS consistent with credential dumping. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2019-12-06 @@ -53,8 +55,8 @@ Detect remote thread creation into LSASS consistent with credential dumping. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `create_remote_thread_into_lsass_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -91,8 +93,6 @@ Other tools can access LSASS for legitimate reasons and generate an event. In th | 81.0 | 90 | 90 | A process has created a remote thread into $TargetImage$ on $dest$. This behavior is indicative of credential dumping and should be investigated. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2019-12-06-unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.md b/docs/_posts/2019-12-06-unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ab92efb603 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2019-12-06-unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.md @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +--- +title: "Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS" +excerpt: "LSASS Memory +" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2019-12-06 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - LSASS Memory + - Credential Access + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search detects loading of unsigned images by LSASS. Deprecated because too noisy. + +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2019-12-06 +- **Author**: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +- **ID**: 56ef054c-76ef-45f9-af4a-a634695dcd65 + + +#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1003.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/) | LSASS Memory | Credential Access | + +#### Search + +``` +`sysmon` EventID=7 Image=*lsass.exe Signed=false +| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, Image, ImageLoaded, Signed, SHA1 +| rename Computer as dest +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| `unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) + +Note that `unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time + + +#### How To Implement +This search needs Sysmon Logs with a sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 7 with lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. + +#### Known False Positives +Other tools could load images into LSASS for legitimate reason. But enterprise tools should always use signed DLLs. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Credential Dumping](/stories/credential_dumping) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Actions on Objectives + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + +* [https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf](https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf) + + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2019-12-10-creation_of_shadow_copy.md b/docs/_posts/2019-12-10-creation_of_shadow_copy.md index cf986ef1a7..5462bc3d62 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2019-12-10-creation_of_shadow_copy.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2019-12-10-creation_of_shadow_copy.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Creation of Shadow Copy" -excerpt: "NTDS, OS Credential Dumping" +excerpt: "NTDS +, OS Credential Dumping +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2019-12-10 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - NTDS - - Credential Access - OS Credential Dumping - Credential Access + - Credential Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: Monitor for signs that Vssadmin or Wmic has been used to create a shadow copy. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2019-12-10 @@ -75,7 +77,7 @@ Note that `creation_of_shadow_copy_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allow #### How To Implement -You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. +You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. #### Known False Positives Legitimate administrator usage of Vssadmin or Wmic will create false positives. @@ -96,8 +98,6 @@ Legitimate administrator usage of Vssadmin or Wmic will create false positives. | 81.0 | 90 | 90 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to create a shadow copy to perform offline password cracking. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-01-22-dns_query_length_outliers_-_mltk.md b/docs/_posts/2020-01-22-dns_query_length_outliers_-_mltk.md index 83bd3fd38d..817808f653 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-01-22-dns_query_length_outliers_-_mltk.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-01-22-dns_query_length_outliers_-_mltk.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK" -excerpt: "DNS, Application Layer Protocol" +excerpt: "DNS +, Application Layer Protocol +" categories: - Network last_modified_at: 2020-01-22 @@ -8,17 +10,17 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - DNS - - Command And Control - Application Layer Protocol - Command And Control + - Command And Control - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Network_Resolution --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search allows you to identify DNS requests that are unusually large for the record type being requested in your environment. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Network_Resolution](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkResolution) - **Last Updated**: 2020-01-22 @@ -77,8 +79,8 @@ Note that `dns_query_length_outliers_-_mltk_filter` is a empty macro by default. #### How To Implement -To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. In addition, the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or greater must be installed on your search heads, along with any required dependencies. Finally, the support search "Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK" must be executed before this detection search, because it builds a machine-learning (ML) model over the historical data used by this search. It is important that this search is run in the same app context as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild the model with the latest data available in your environment.\ -This search produces fields (`query`,`query_length`,`count`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** DNS Query, **Field:** query\ +To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. In addition, the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or greater must be installed on your search heads, along with any required dependencies. Finally, the support search "Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK" must be executed before this detection search, because it builds a machine-learning (ML) model over the historical data used by this search. It is important that this search is run in the same app context as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild the model with the latest data available in your environment.\ +This search produces fields (`query`,`query_length`,`count`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** DNS Query, **Field:** query\ 1. \ 1. **Label:** DNS Query Length, **Field:** query_length\ 1. \ @@ -95,12 +97,16 @@ If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider reducing the value #### Kill Chain Phase -* Command and Control +* Command & Control +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -113,5 +119,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/network/dns_query_length_outliers_-_mltk.yml) \| *version*: **2** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-01-28-auto_admin_logon_registry_entry.md b/docs/_posts/2020-01-28-auto_admin_logon_registry_entry.md index 2f3c482246..dfd60adb67 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-01-28-auto_admin_logon_registry_entry.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-01-28-auto_admin_logon_registry_entry.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry" -excerpt: "Credentials in Registry, Unsecured Credentials" +excerpt: "Credentials in Registry +, Unsecured Credentials +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2020-01-28 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Credentials in Registry - - Credential Access - Unsecured Credentials - Credential Access + - Credential Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: this search is to detect a suspicious registry modification to implement auto admin logon to a host. This technique was seen in BlackMatter ransomware to automatically logon to the compromise host after triggering a safemode boot to continue encrypting the whole network. This behavior is not a common practice and really a suspicious TTP or alert need to be consider if found within then network premise. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2020-01-28 @@ -93,8 +95,6 @@ unknown | 63.0 | 70 | 90 | modified registry key $registry_key_name$ with registry value $registry_value_name$ to prepare autoadminlogon | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1552.002/autoadminlogon/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1552.002/autoadminlogon/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-01-28-monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.md b/docs/_posts/2020-01-28-monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.md index 624903ecfb..4391fa7d1d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-01-28-monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-01-28-monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors" -excerpt: "Port Monitors, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution" +excerpt: "Port Monitors +, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2020-01-28 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Port Monitors + - Boot or Logon Autostart Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Boot or Logon Autostart Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise @@ -26,7 +28,7 @@ tags: This search looks for registry activity associated with modifications to the registry key `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors`. In this scenario, an attacker can load an arbitrary .dll into the print-monitor registry by giving the full path name to the after.dll. The system will execute the .dll with elevated (SYSTEM) permissions and will persist after reboot. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2020-01-28 @@ -97,8 +99,6 @@ You will encounter noise from legitimate print-monitor registry entries. | 64.0 | 80 | 80 | New print monitor added on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.010/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.010/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.010/atomic_red_team/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.010/atomic_red_team/sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-01-28-registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.md b/docs/_posts/2020-01-28-registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.md index cf0d71a0bc..c2aca7461f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-01-28-registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-01-28-registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases" -excerpt: "Application Shimming, Event Triggered Execution" +excerpt: "Application Shimming +, Event Triggered Execution +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2020-01-28 @@ -8,11 +10,11 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Application Shimming - - Privilege Escalation - - Persistence - Event Triggered Execution + - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -26,7 +28,7 @@ tags: This search looks for registry activity associated with application compatibility shims, which can be leveraged by attackers for various nefarious purposes. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2020-01-28 @@ -38,9 +40,9 @@ This search looks for registry activity associated with application compatibilit | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1546.011](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/011/) | Application Shimming | Privilege Escalation, Persistence | +| [T1546.011](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/011/) | Application Shimming | Persistence, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1546](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/) | Event Triggered Execution | Privilege Escalation, Persistence | +| [T1546](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/) | Event Triggered Execution | Persistence, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -95,8 +97,6 @@ There are many legitimate applications that leverage shim databases for compatib | 56.0 | 70 | 80 | A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to shim modication in host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-01-28-sdclt_uac_bypass.md b/docs/_posts/2020-01-28-sdclt_uac_bypass.md index 9402aa992d..da2665baed 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-01-28-sdclt_uac_bypass.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-01-28-sdclt_uac_bypass.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Sdclt UAC Bypass" -excerpt: "Bypass User Account Control, Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism" +excerpt: "Bypass User Account Control +, Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2020-01-28 @@ -8,11 +10,11 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Bypass User Account Control - - Privilege Escalation - - Defense Evasion - Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism + - Defense Evasion - Privilege Escalation - Defense Evasion + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ tags: This search is to detect a suspicious sdclt.exe registry modification. This technique is commonly seen when attacker try to bypassed UAC by using sdclt.exe application by modifying some registry that sdclt.exe tries to open or query with payload file path on it to be executed. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2020-01-28 @@ -39,9 +41,9 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious sdclt.exe registry modification. This tech | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1548.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/) | Bypass User Account Control | Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1548.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/) | Bypass User Account Control | Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1548](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1548](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -95,8 +97,6 @@ Limited to no false positives are expected. | 63.0 | 70 | 90 | Suspicious modification of registry $registry_path$ with possible payload path $registry_value_name$ in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-01-28-silentcleanup_uac_bypass.md b/docs/_posts/2020-01-28-silentcleanup_uac_bypass.md index bee604b8bc..4455a95461 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-01-28-silentcleanup_uac_bypass.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-01-28-silentcleanup_uac_bypass.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "SilentCleanup UAC Bypass" -excerpt: "Bypass User Account Control, Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism" +excerpt: "Bypass User Account Control +, Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2020-01-28 @@ -8,11 +10,11 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Bypass User Account Control - - Privilege Escalation - - Defense Evasion - Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism + - Defense Evasion - Privilege Escalation - Defense Evasion + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ tags: This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry that may related to UAC bypassed. This registry will be trigger once the attacker abuse the silentcleanup task schedule to gain high privilege execution that will bypass User control account. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2020-01-28 @@ -39,9 +41,9 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry that may related | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1548.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/) | Bypass User Account Control | Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1548.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/) | Bypass User Account Control | Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1548](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1548](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -95,8 +97,6 @@ unknown | 63.0 | 70 | 90 | Suspicious modification of registry $registry_path$ with possible payload path $registry_value_name$ in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-01-28-wsreset_uac_bypass.md b/docs/_posts/2020-01-28-wsreset_uac_bypass.md index dfa7273a2a..a72658ee9c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-01-28-wsreset_uac_bypass.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-01-28-wsreset_uac_bypass.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "WSReset UAC Bypass" -excerpt: "Bypass User Account Control, Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism" +excerpt: "Bypass User Account Control +, Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2020-01-28 @@ -8,11 +10,11 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Bypass User Account Control - - Privilege Escalation - - Defense Evasion - Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism + - Defense Evasion - Privilege Escalation - Defense Evasion + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ tags: This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry related to UAC bypass. This technique is to modify the registry in this detection, create a registry value with the path of the payload and run WSreset.exe to bypass User account Control. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2020-01-28 @@ -39,9 +41,9 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry related to UAC by | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1548.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/) | Bypass User Account Control | Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1548.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/) | Bypass User Account Control | Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1548](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1548](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -96,8 +98,6 @@ unknown | 63.0 | 70 | 90 | Suspicious modification of registry $registry_path$ with possible payload path $registry_value_name$ in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-02-03-creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.md b/docs/_posts/2020-02-03-creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.md index bc225fe201..5a538148fc 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-02-03-creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-02-03-creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr" -excerpt: "LSASS Memory, OS Credential Dumping" +excerpt: "LSASS Memory +, OS Credential Dumping +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2020-02-03 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - LSASS Memory - - Credential Access - OS Credential Dumping - Credential Access + - Credential Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -24,7 +26,7 @@ tags: Detect the hands on keyboard behavior of Windows Task Manager creating a process dump of lsass.exe. Upon this behavior occurring, a file write/modification will occur in the users profile under \AppData\Local\Temp. The dump file, lsass.dmp, cannot be renamed, however if the dump occurs more than once, it will be named lsass (2).dmp. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2020-02-03 @@ -53,8 +55,8 @@ Detect the hands on keyboard behavior of Windows Task Manager creating a process #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -89,8 +91,6 @@ Administrators can create memory dumps for debugging purposes, but memory dumps | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $Computer$ writing $TargetFilename$ to disk. This behavior is related to dumping credentials via Task Manager. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-02-07-ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.md b/docs/_posts/2020-02-07-ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c25cc3371f --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-02-07-ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.md @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +--- +title: "EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type" +excerpt: "" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2020-02-07 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen instance types. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. + +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2020-02-07 +- **Author**: David Dorsey, Splunk +- **ID**: 65541c80-03c7-4e05-83c8-1dcd57a2e1ad + +#### Search + +``` +`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success +| fillnull value="m1.small" requestParameters.instanceType +| stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by requestParameters.instanceType +| rename requestParameters.instanceType as instanceType +| inputlookup append=t previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.csv +| stats min(earliest) as earliest max(latest) as latest by instanceType +| outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.csv +| eval newType=if(earliest >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) +| `security_content_ctime(earliest)` +| `security_content_ctime(latest)` +| where newType=1 +| rename instanceType as requestParameters.instanceType +| table requestParameters.instanceType] +| spath output=user userIdentity.arn +| rename requestParameters.instanceType as instanceType, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as dest +| table _time, user, dest, instanceType +| `ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) + +Note that `ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* eventName +* errorCode +* requestParameters.instanceType + + +#### How To Implement +You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types" support search once to create a history of previously seen instance types. + +#### Known False Positives +It is possible that an admin will create a new system using a new instance type never used before. Verify with the creator that they intended to create the system with the new instance type. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [AWS Cryptomining](/stories/aws_cryptomining) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Exploitation + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml) \| *version*: **2** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-02-07-macos_-_re-opened_applications.md b/docs/_posts/2020-02-07-macos_-_re-opened_applications.md index 0cc6f59d08..8d23b3f59c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-02-07-macos_-_re-opened_applications.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-02-07-macos_-_re-opened_applications.md @@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ tags: - Endpoint --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search looks for processes referencing the plist files that determine which applications are re-opened when a user reboots their machine. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2020-02-07 @@ -65,16 +65,21 @@ In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest process data from y At this stage, there are no known false positives. During testing, no process events refering the com.apple.loginwindow.plist files were observed during normal operation of re-opening applications on reboot. Therefore, it can be asumed that any occurences of this in the process events would be worth investigating. In the event that the legitimate modification by the system of these files is in fact logged to the process log, then the process_name of that process can be added to an allow list. #### Associated Analytic story +* [ColdRoot MacOS RAT](/stories/coldroot_macos_rat) #### Kill Chain Phase * Installation -* Command and Control +* Command & Control +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -87,5 +92,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/endpoint/macos_-_re-opened_applications.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-02-20-gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.md b/docs/_posts/2020-02-20-gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4ed1734b1c --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-02-20-gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.md @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +--- +title: "GCP GCR container uploaded" +excerpt: "Implant Internal Image +" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2020-02-20 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Implant Internal Image + - Persistence + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search show information on uploaded containers including source user, account, action, bucket name event name, http user agent, message and destination path. + +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2020-02-20 +- **Author**: Rod Soto, Rico Valdez, Splunk +- **ID**: 4f00ca88-e766-4605-ac65-ae51c9fd185b + + +#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1525](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1525/) | Implant Internal Image | Persistence | + +#### Search + +``` + +|tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Cloud_Infrastructure.Storage where Storage.event_name=storage.objects.create by Storage.src_user Storage.account Storage.action Storage.bucket_name Storage.event_name Storage.http_user_agent Storage.msg Storage.object_path +| `drop_dm_object_name("Storage")` +| `gcp_gcr_container_uploaded_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: + +Note that `gcp_gcr_container_uploaded_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time + + +#### How To Implement +You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later), then configure stackdriver and set a subpub subscription to be imported to Splunk. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model. Please also customize the `container_implant_gcp_detection_filter` macro to filter out the false positives. + +#### Known False Positives +Uploading container is a normal behavior from developers or users with access to container registry. GCP GCR registers container upload as a Storage event, this search must be considered under the context of CONTAINER upload creation which automatically generates a bucket entry for destination path. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation](/stories/container_implantation_monitoring_and_investigation) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Exploitation + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-02-20-new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.md b/docs/_posts/2020-02-20-new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.md index 82801cdac1..039c1aba96 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-02-20-new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-02-20-new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "New container uploaded to AWS ECR" -excerpt: "Implant Internal Image" +excerpt: "Implant Internal Image +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2020-02-20 @@ -14,8 +15,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Cloud --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -24,7 +25,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This searches show information on uploaded containers including source user, image id, source IP user type, http user agent, region, first time, last time of operation (PutImage). These searches are based on Cloud Infrastructure Data Model. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2020-02-20 @@ -67,11 +68,16 @@ Uploading container is a normal behavior from developers or users with access to #### Kill Chain Phase +* Exploitation +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -84,5 +90,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-02-21-dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.md b/docs/_posts/2020-02-21-dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.md index 9a1c8938a9..4b3531c219 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-02-21-dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-02-21-dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL" -excerpt: "LSASS Memory, OS Credential Dumping" +excerpt: "LSASS Memory +, OS Credential Dumping +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2020-02-21 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - LSASS Memory - - Credential Access - OS Credential Dumping - Credential Access + - Credential Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: Detect the usage of comsvcs.dll for dumping the lsass process. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2020-02-21 @@ -99,8 +101,6 @@ None identified. | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified accessing credentials using comsvcs.dll on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-03-02-remote_registry_key_modifications.md b/docs/_posts/2020-03-02-remote_registry_key_modifications.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..13f0442a3f --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-03-02-remote_registry_key_modifications.md @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +--- +title: "Remote Registry Key modifications" +excerpt: "" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2020-03-02 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search monitors for remote modifications to registry keys. + +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2020-03-02 +- **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +- **ID**: c9f4b923-f8af-4155-b697-1354f5dcbc5e + +#### Search + +``` + +| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path="\\\\*" by Registry.dest , Registry.user +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` +| `remote_registry_key_modifications_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) + +Note that `remote_registry_key_modifications_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time + + +#### How To Implement +To successfully implement this search, you must populate the `Endpoint` data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. Deprecated because I don't think the logic is right. + +#### Known False Positives +This technique may be legitimately used by administrators to modify remote registries, so it's important to filter these events out. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Windows Defense Evasion Tactics](/stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics) +* [Suspicious Windows Registry Activities](/stories/suspicious_windows_registry_activities) +* [Windows Persistence Techniques](/stories/windows_persistence_techniques) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Actions on Objectives + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml) \| *version*: **3** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-03-16-child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.md b/docs/_posts/2020-03-16-child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.md index 0b3d076c32..30ea07d213 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-03-16-child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-03-16-child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Child Processes of Spoolsv exe" -excerpt: "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation" +excerpt: "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2020-03-16 @@ -12,12 +13,11 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - CVE-2018-8440 - Endpoint --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search looks for child processes of spoolsv.exe. This activity is associated with a POC privilege-escalation exploit associated with CVE-2018-8440. Spoolsv.exe is the process associated with the Print Spooler service in Windows and typically runs as SYSTEM. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2020-03-16 @@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ Note that `child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe_filter` is a empty macro by default. I #### How To Implement -You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. Update the `children_of_spoolsv_filter` macro to filter out legitimate child processes spawned by spoolsv.exe. +You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. Update the `children_of_spoolsv_filter` macro to filter out legitimate child processes spawned by spoolsv.exe. #### Known False Positives Some legitimate printer-related processes may show up as children of spoolsv.exe. You should confirm that any activity as legitimate and may be added as exclusions in the search. @@ -84,16 +84,13 @@ Some legitimate printer-related processes may show up as children of spoolsv.exe +#### RBA -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -#### CVE - -| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | -| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [CVE-2018-8440](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-8440) | An elevation of privilege vulnerability exists when Windows improperly handles calls to Advanced Local Procedure Call (ALPC), aka "Windows ALPC Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability." This affects Windows 7, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows RT 8.1, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2016, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows 10, Windows 10 Servers. | 7.2 | - #### Reference @@ -105,5 +102,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml) \| *version*: **3** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-03-16-detect_rare_executables.md b/docs/_posts/2020-03-16-detect_rare_executables.md index ef38c3b72f..0dc1bfa7a4 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-03-16-detect_rare_executables.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-03-16-detect_rare_executables.md @@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ tags: - Endpoint --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search will return a table of rare processes, the names of the systems running them, and the users who initiated each process. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2020-03-16 @@ -50,18 +50,12 @@ This search will return a table of rare processes, the names of the systems runn #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [filter_rare_process_allow_list](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/filter_rare_process_allow_list.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [filter_rare_process_allow_list](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/filter_rare_process_allow_list.yml) Note that `detect_rare_executables_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. -#### Lookups -The SPL above uses the following Lookups: - -* [lookup_rare_process_allow_list_default](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/lookup_rare_process_allow_list_default.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/rare_process_allow_list_default.csv) -* [lookup_rare_process_allow_list_local](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/lookup_rare_process_allow_list_local.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/rare_process_allow_list_local.csv) - #### Required field * _time * Processes.dest @@ -83,13 +77,17 @@ Some legitimate processes may be only rarely executed in your environment. As th #### Kill Chain Phase * Installation -* Command and Control +* Command & Control * Actions on Objectives +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -102,5 +100,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml) \| *version*: **5** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-03-16-process_execution_via_wmi.md b/docs/_posts/2020-03-16-process_execution_via_wmi.md index 0c34939b1d..12a8906a26 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-03-16-process_execution_via_wmi.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-03-16-process_execution_via_wmi.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Process Execution via WMI" -excerpt: "Windows Management Instrumentation" +excerpt: "Windows Management Instrumentation +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2020-03-16 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies `WmiPrvSE.exe` spawning a process. This typically occurs when a process is instantiated from a local or remote process using `wmic.exe`. During triage, review parallel processes for suspicious behavior or commands executed. Review the process and command-line spawning from `wmiprvse.exe`. Contain and remediate the endpoint as necessary. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2020-03-16 @@ -65,7 +66,7 @@ Note that `process_execution_via_wmi_filter` is a empty macro by default. It all #### How To Implement -You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. +You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. #### Known False Positives Although unlikely, administrators may use wmi to execute commands for legitimate purposes. @@ -86,8 +87,6 @@ Although unlikely, administrators may use wmi to execute commands for legitimate | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | A remote instance execution of wmic.exe that will spawn $parent_process_name$ in host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -97,6 +96,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-03-16-script_execution_via_wmi.md b/docs/_posts/2020-03-16-script_execution_via_wmi.md index 94fcfce857..9bfaac2979 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-03-16-script_execution_via_wmi.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-03-16-script_execution_via_wmi.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Script Execution via WMI" -excerpt: "Windows Management Instrumentation" +excerpt: "Windows Management Instrumentation +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2020-03-16 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This search looks for scripts launched via WMI. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2020-03-16 @@ -63,7 +64,7 @@ Note that `script_execution_via_wmi_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allo #### How To Implement -You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. +You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. #### Known False Positives Although unlikely, administrators may use wmi to launch scripts for legitimate purposes. Filter as needed. @@ -84,8 +85,6 @@ Although unlikely, administrators may use wmi to launch scripts for legitimate p | 36.0 | 60 | 60 | A wmic.exe process $process_name$ taht execute script in host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -98,6 +97,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/execution_scrcons/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/execution_scrcons/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-03-16-spike_in_file_writes.md b/docs/_posts/2020-03-16-spike_in_file_writes.md index 7d30285671..36755d5977 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-03-16-spike_in_file_writes.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-03-16-spike_in_file_writes.md @@ -12,8 +12,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Cloud --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U The search looks for a sharp increase in the number of files written to a particular host -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2020-03-16 @@ -71,8 +71,12 @@ It is important to understand that if you happen to install any new applications +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -85,5 +89,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml) \| *version*: **3** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-04-15-amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.md b/docs/_posts/2020-04-15-amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.md index c0450ba2ee..9ae84ab788 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-04-15-amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-04-15-amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection" -excerpt: "Cloud Service Discovery" +excerpt: "Cloud Service Discovery +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2020-04-15 @@ -14,8 +15,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Cloud --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -24,7 +25,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster in AWS -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2020-04-15 @@ -85,8 +86,12 @@ Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, UA and source IPs +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -99,5 +104,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-04-15-amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.md b/docs/_posts/2020-04-15-amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.md index 0bfa556de7..64f0605b2e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-04-15-amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-04-15-amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection" -excerpt: "Cloud Service Discovery" +excerpt: "Cloud Service Discovery +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2020-04-15 @@ -14,17 +15,17 @@ tags: - Splunk Cloud --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} #### Description -This search provides detection information on unauthenticated requests against Kubernetes' Pods API +This search provides detection information on unauthenticated requests against Kubernetes' Pods API -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2020-04-15 @@ -86,8 +87,12 @@ Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, UA and source IPs +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -100,5 +105,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-04-15-gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.md b/docs/_posts/2020-04-15-gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5cd2c9d085 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-04-15-gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.md @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +--- +title: "GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection" +excerpt: "Cloud Service Discovery +" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2020-04-15 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Cloud Service Discovery + - Discovery + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster + +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2020-04-15 +- **Author**: Rod Soto, Splunk +- **ID**: db5957ec-0144-4c56-b512-9dccbe7a2d26 + + +#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1526](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1526/) | Cloud Service Discovery | Discovery | + +#### Search + +``` +`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp!=127.0.0.1 data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp!=::1 "data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision"=forbid "data.protoPayload.status.message"=PERMISSION_DENIED data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail="system:anonymous" +| rename data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp as src_ip +| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(data.protoPayload.methodName) as method_name values(data.protoPayload.resourceName) as resource_name values(data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent) as http_user_agent by src_ip data.resource.labels.cluster_name +| rename data.resource.labels.cluster_name as cluster_name +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [google_gcp_pubsub_message](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/google_gcp_pubsub_message.yml) + +Note that `gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time + + +#### How To Implement +You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later), then configure stackdriver and set a Pub/Sub subscription to be imported to Splunk. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model.Customize the macro kubernetes_gcp_scan_fingerprint_attack_detection to filter out FPs. + +#### Known False Positives +Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, User Agent and source IPs will provide context. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Kubernetes Scanning Activity](/stories/kubernetes_scanning_activity) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Reconnaissance + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-05-19-kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.md b/docs/_posts/2020-05-19-kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3f77fd6656 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-05-19-kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.md @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +--- +title: "Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint" +excerpt: "Cloud Service Discovery +" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2020-05-19 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Cloud Service Discovery + - Discovery + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via source IP user agent, request URI and response status data against Kubernetes cluster in Azure + +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2020-05-19 +- **Author**: Rod Soto, Splunk +- **ID**: c5e5bd5c-1013-4841-8b23-e7b3253c840a + + +#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1526](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1526/) | Cloud Service Discovery | Discovery | + +#### Search + +``` +`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit +| spath input=properties.log +| search responseStatus.code=401 +| table sourceIPs{} userAgent verb requestURI responseStatus.reason +|`kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [kubernetes_azure](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/kubernetes_azure.yml) + +Note that `kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time + + +#### How To Implement +You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics + +#### Known False Positives +Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but source IPs, userAgent, verb, request URI and response status will provide context. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Kubernetes Scanning Activity](/stories/kubernetes_scanning_activity) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Reconnaissance + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-05-20-first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.md b/docs/_posts/2020-05-20-first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.md index 8328714ed0..b0fed8e73b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-05-20-first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-05-20-first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom" -excerpt: "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation" +excerpt: "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2020-05-20 @@ -15,8 +16,8 @@ tags: - Endpoint --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -25,7 +26,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search looks for child processes spawned by zoom.exe or zoom.us that has not previously been seen. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2020-05-20 @@ -55,15 +56,15 @@ This search looks for child processes spawned by zoom.exe or zoom.us that has no #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window.yml) -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. #### Lookups The SPL above uses the following Lookups: -* [zoom_first_time_child_process](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/zoom_first_time_child_process.yml) with [data]() +* [zoom_first_time_child_process](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/zoom_first_time_child_process.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/lookups/zoom_first_time_child_process.csv) #### Required field * _time @@ -80,7 +81,7 @@ The SPL above uses the following Lookups: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial` to build the initial table of child processes and hostnames for this search to work. You should also schedule at the same interval as this search the second baseline search `Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old child processes. Please update the `previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window` macro to adjust the time window. #### Known False Positives -A new child process of zoom isn't malicious by that fact alone. Further investigation of the actions of the child process is needed to verify any malicious behavior is taken. +A new child process of zoom isn't malicious by that fact alone. Further investigation of the actions of the child process is needed to verify any malicious behavior is taken. #### Associated Analytic story * [Suspicious Zoom Child Processes](/stories/suspicious_zoom_child_processes) @@ -98,8 +99,6 @@ A new child process of zoom isn't malicious by that fact alone. Further inve | 64.0 | 80 | 80 | Child process $process_name$ with $process_id$ spawned by zoom.exe or zoom.us which has not been previously on host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -109,6 +108,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1068/zoom_child_process/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1068/zoom_child_process/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-05-20-kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.md b/docs/_posts/2020-05-20-kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4df0a67e47 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-05-20-kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.md @@ -0,0 +1,84 @@ +--- +title: "Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access" +excerpt: "" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2020-05-20 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets + +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2020-05-20 +- **Author**: Rod Soto, Splunk +- **ID**: 1bba382b-07fd-4ffa-b390-8002739b76e8 + +#### Search + +``` +`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit +| spath input=properties.log +| search objectRef.resource=secrets OR configmaps user.username=system.anonymous OR annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision=allow +|table user.username user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace objectRef.name annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason +|dedup user.username user.groups{} +|`kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [kubernetes_azure](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/kubernetes_azure.yml) + +Note that `kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time + + +#### How To Implement +You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics + +#### Known False Positives +Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user and object context can provide guidance for detection. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity](/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Exploitation + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-05-20-kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.md b/docs/_posts/2020-05-20-kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..96566f4eeb --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-05-20-kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.md @@ -0,0 +1,84 @@ +--- +title: "Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access" +excerpt: "" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2020-05-20 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets + +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2020-05-20 +- **Author**: Rod Soto, Splunk +- **ID**: f27349e5-1641-4f6a-9e68-30402be0ad4c + +#### Search + +``` +`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit +| spath input=properties.log +| search objectRef.resource=clusterroles OR clusterrolebindings +| table sourceIPs{} user.username user.groups{} objectRef.namespace requestURI annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason +| dedup user.username user.groups{} +|`kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [kubernetes_azure](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/kubernetes_azure.yml) + +Note that `kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time + + +#### How To Implement +You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics + +#### Known False Positives +Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation, however source IP, namespace and user group may indicate possible malicious use. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity](/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Exploitation + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-05-20-kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.md b/docs/_posts/2020-05-20-kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f32e398dc1 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-05-20-kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.md @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +--- +title: "Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access" +excerpt: "" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2020-05-20 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status + +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2020-05-20 +- **Author**: Rod Soto, Splunk +- **ID**: 019690d7-420f-4da0-b320-f27b09961514 + +#### Search + +``` +`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit +| spath input=properties.log +| search user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts* responseStatus.reason=Forbidden +| table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb responseStatus.reason responseStatus.status properties.pod objectRef.namespace +|`kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [kubernetes_azure](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/kubernetes_azure.yml) + +Note that `kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time + + +#### How To Implement +You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics + +#### Known False Positives +This search can give false positives as there might be inherent issues with authentications and permissions at cluster. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity](/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Exploitation + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-05-20-kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.md b/docs/_posts/2020-05-20-kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1add6fc6a0 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-05-20-kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.md @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +--- +title: "Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint" +excerpt: "" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2020-05-20 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via source IP user agent, request URI and response status data against Kubernetes cluster pod in Azure + +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2020-05-20 +- **Author**: Rod Soto, Splunk +- **ID**: 86aad3e0-732f-4f66-bbbc-70df448e461d + +#### Search + +``` +`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit +| spath input=properties.log +| search responseStatus.code=401 +| table sourceIPs{} userAgent verb requestURI responseStatus.reason properties.pod +|`kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [kubernetes_azure](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/kubernetes_azure.yml) + +Note that `kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time + + +#### How To Implement +You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics + +#### Known False Positives +Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but source IPs, userAgent, verb, request URI and response status will provide context. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Kubernetes Scanning Activity](/stories/kubernetes_scanning_activity) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Reconnaissance + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-05-26-kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.md b/docs/_posts/2020-05-26-kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6ebab02f21 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-05-26-kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.md @@ -0,0 +1,84 @@ +--- +title: "Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace" +excerpt: "" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2020-05-26 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods and namespaces by IP address and verb + +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2020-05-26 +- **Author**: Rod Soto, Splunk +- **ID**: 55a2264a-b7f0-45e5-addd-1e5ab3415c72 + +#### Search + +``` +`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit +| spath input=properties.log +| search user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts* OR user.username=system.anonymous OR annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision=allow +| table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb responseStatus.reason responseStatus.status properties.pod objectRef.namespace +| top sourceIPs{} user.username verb responseStatus.status properties.pod objectRef.namespace +|`kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [kubernetes_azure](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/kubernetes_azure.yml) + +Note that `kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time + + +#### How To Implement +You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics + +#### Known False Positives +Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst must consider IP and verb context when trying to detect maliciousness. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity](/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Exploitation + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-05-26-kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.md b/docs/_posts/2020-05-26-kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..17a5aab58b --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-05-26-kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.md @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +--- +title: "Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account" +excerpt: "" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2020-05-26 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding rare or top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences + +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2020-05-26 +- **Author**: Rod Soto, Splunk +- **ID**: 47af7d20-0607-4079-97d7-7a29af58b54e + +#### Search + +``` +`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit +| spath input=properties.log +| search annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason=* +| table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason +|stats count by user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason +| rare user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason +|`kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [kubernetes_azure](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/kubernetes_azure.yml) + +Note that `kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time + + +#### How To Implement +You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics + +#### Known False Positives +Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity](/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Exploitation + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-05-26-kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.md b/docs/_posts/2020-05-26-kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d1dee01231 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-05-26-kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.md @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +--- +title: "Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls" +excerpt: "" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2020-05-26 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search provides information on rare Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context + +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2020-05-26 +- **Author**: Rod Soto, Splunk +- **ID**: 4b6d1ba8-0000-4cec-87e6-6cbbd71651b5 + +#### Search + +``` +`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit +| spath input=properties.log +| spath input=responseObject.metadata.annotations.kubectl.kubernetes.io/last-applied-configuration +| search userAgent=kubectl* sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1 sourceIPs{}!=::1 +| table sourceIPs{} verb userAgent user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace requestURI +| rare sourceIPs{} verb userAgent user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace requestURI +|`kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [kubernetes_azure](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/kubernetes_azure.yml) + +Note that `kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time + + +#### How To Implement +You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics + +#### Known False Positives +Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP, verb and Object can reveal potential malicious activity, specially suspicious IPs and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity](/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Exploitation + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-05-28-aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.md b/docs/_posts/2020-05-28-aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.md index 7bb0458e75..a3596612d2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-05-28-aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-05-28-aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.md @@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ last_modified_at: 2020-05-28 toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -22,8 +21,8 @@ tags: This search looks for AssumeRole events where an IAM role in a different account is requested for the first time. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Security Analytics for AWS, Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Authentication](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Authentication) - **Last Updated**: 2020-05-28 - **Author**: Rico Valdez, Splunk @@ -55,7 +54,7 @@ Note that `aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account_filter` is #### Lookups The SPL above uses the following Lookups: -* [previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.csv) +* [previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/lookups/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.csv) #### Required field * _time @@ -70,7 +69,7 @@ The SPL above uses the following Lookups: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account_filter` macro. #### Known False Positives -Using multiple AWS accounts and roles is perfectly valid behavior. It's suspicious when an account requests privileges of an account it hasn't before. You should validate with the account owner that this is a legitimate request. +Using multiple AWS accounts and roles is perfectly valid behavior. It's suspicious when an account requests privileges of an account it hasn't before. You should validate with the account owner that this is a legitimate request. #### Associated Analytic story * [Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities](/stories/suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities) @@ -88,8 +87,6 @@ Using multiple AWS accounts and roles is perfectly valid behavior. It's susp | 15.0 | 30 | 50 | AWS account $requestingAccountId$ is trying to access resource from some other account $requestedAccountId$, for the first time. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -99,6 +96,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-05-28-detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.md b/docs/_posts/2020-05-28-detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.md index 5fdf216414..6229c626fc 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-05-28-detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-05-28-detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.md @@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ last_modified_at: 2020-05-28 toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -22,8 +21,8 @@ tags: This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Security Analytics for AWS, Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Authentication](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Authentication) - **Last Updated**: 2020-05-28 - **Author**: Rico Valdez, Splunk @@ -53,7 +52,7 @@ Note that `detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user_filter` is a empty macro by defa #### Lookups The SPL above uses the following Lookups: -* [previously_seen_users_console_logins](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/previously_seen_users_console_logins.yml) with [data]() +* [previously_seen_users_console_logins](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/previously_seen_users_console_logins.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/lookups/previously_seen_users_console_logins.csv) #### Required field * _time @@ -83,8 +82,6 @@ When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be dete | 30.0 | 50 | 60 | User $user$ is logging into the AWS console for the first time | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -94,6 +91,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-06-23-aws_eks_kubernetes_cluster_sensitive_object_access.md b/docs/_posts/2020-06-23-aws_eks_kubernetes_cluster_sensitive_object_access.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..19854838f6 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-06-23-aws_eks_kubernetes_cluster_sensitive_object_access.md @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +--- +title: "AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access" +excerpt: "" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2020-06-23 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmaps or secrets + +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2020-06-23 +- **Author**: Rod Soto, Splunk +- **ID**: 7f227943-2196-4d4d-8d6a-ac8cb308e61c + +#### Search + +``` +`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` objectRef.resource=secrets OR configmaps sourceIPs{}!=::1 sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1 +|table sourceIPs{} user.username user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace objectRef.name annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason +|dedup user.username user.groups{} +|`aws_eks_kubernetes_cluster_sensitive_object_access_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks.yml) + +Note that `aws_eks_kubernetes_cluster_sensitive_object_access_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time + + +#### How To Implement +You must install Splunk Add-on for Amazon Web Services and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs. + +#### Known False Positives +Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user and object context can provide guidance for detection. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity](/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Exploitation + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/aws_eks_kubernetes_cluster_sensitive_object_access.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-06-23-kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.md b/docs/_posts/2020-06-23-kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2aebeb7958 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-06-23-kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.md @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +--- +title: "Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod" +excerpt: "" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2020-06-23 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods by IP address, verb and decision + +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2020-06-23 +- **Author**: Rod Soto, Splunk +- **ID**: 5b30b25d-7d32-42d8-95ca-64dfcd9076e6 + +#### Search + +``` +`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts objectRef.resource=pods +| table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision +| top sourceIPs{} user.username verb annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision +|`kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks.yml) + +Note that `kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time + + +#### How To Implement +You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs + +#### Known False Positives +Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst must consider IP, verb and decision context when trying to detect maliciousness. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity](/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Exploitation + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-06-23-kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.md b/docs/_posts/2020-06-23-kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..611c8984de --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-06-23-kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.md @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +--- +title: "Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account" +excerpt: "" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2020-06-23 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences + +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2020-06-23 +- **Author**: Rod Soto, Splunk +- **ID**: de7264ed-3ed9-4fef-bb01-6eefc87cefe8 + +#### Search + +``` +`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason=* +| table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason +| stats count by user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason +| rare user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason +|`kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks.yml) + +Note that `kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time + + +#### How To Implement +You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs + +#### Known False Positives +Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity](/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Exploitation + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-06-23-kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.md b/docs/_posts/2020-06-23-kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d6fa8571e7 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-06-23-kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.md @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +--- +title: "Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access" +excerpt: "" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2020-06-23 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets + +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2020-06-23 +- **Author**: Rod Soto, Splunk +- **ID**: b6013a7b-85e0-4a45-b051-10b252d69569 + +#### Search + +``` +`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` objectRef.resource=clusterroles OR clusterrolebindings sourceIPs{}!=::1 sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1 +| table sourceIPs{} user.username user.groups{} objectRef.namespace requestURI annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason +| dedup user.username user.groups{} +|`kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks.yml) + +Note that `kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time + + +#### How To Implement +You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs. + +#### Known False Positives +Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation, however source IP, namespace and user group may indicate possible malicious use. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity](/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Exploitation + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-06-23-kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.md b/docs/_posts/2020-06-23-kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..558e46e6ff --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-06-23-kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.md @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +--- +title: "Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access" +excerpt: "" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2020-06-23 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status, this search can be extended by using top or rare operators to find trends or rarities in failure status, user agents, source IPs and request URI + +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2020-06-23 +- **Author**: Rod Soto, Splunk +- **ID**: a6959c57-fa8f-4277-bb86-7c32fba579d5 + +#### Search + +``` +`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts responseStatus.status = Failure +| table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb responseStatus.status requestURI +| `kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks.yml) + +Note that `kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time + + +#### How To Implement +You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs. + +#### Known False Positives +This search can give false positives as there might be inherent issues with authentications and permissions at cluster. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity](/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Exploitation + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-06-23-kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.md b/docs/_posts/2020-06-23-kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.md index 42eaf133ce..1fc9ab49c7 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-06-23-kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-06-23-kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.md @@ -12,8 +12,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Cloud --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search provides information on anonymous Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2020-06-23 @@ -65,12 +65,16 @@ Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP, verb and Object ca #### Kill Chain Phase -* Lateral Movement +* Exploitation +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -83,5 +87,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-06-23-kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.md b/docs/_posts/2020-06-23-kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3df177dbe0 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-06-23-kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.md @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +--- +title: "Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access" +excerpt: "" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2020-06-23 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status, this search can be extended by using top or rare operators to find trends or rarities in failure status, user agents, source IPs and request URI + +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2020-06-23 +- **Author**: Rod Soto, Splunk +- **ID**: 7094808d-432a-48e7-bb3c-77e96c894f3b + +#### Search + +``` +`google_gcp_pubsub_message` system:serviceaccounts data.protoPayload.response.status.allowed!=* +| table src_ip src_user http_user_agent data.protoPayload.response.spec.resourceAttributes.namespace data.resource.labels.cluster_name data.protoPayload.response.spec.resourceAttributes.verb data.protoPayload.request.status.allowed data.protoPayload.response.status.reason data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision +| dedup src_ip src_user +| `kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [google_gcp_pubsub_message](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/google_gcp_pubsub_message.yml) + +Note that `kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time + + +#### How To Implement +You must install splunk add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub messaging service logs. + +#### Known False Positives +This search can give false positives as there might be inherent issues with authentications and permissions at cluster. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity](/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Exploitation + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-03-detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-03-detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.md index 05b514b13f..7c01f89571 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-03-detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-03-detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe" -excerpt: "Path Interception by Unquoted Path, Hijack Execution Flow" +excerpt: "Path Interception by Unquoted Path +, Hijack Execution Flow +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2020-07-03 @@ -8,13 +10,13 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Path Interception by Unquoted Path - - Persistence - - Privilege Escalation - - Defense Evasion - Hijack Execution Flow + - Defense Evasion - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - Defense Evasion + - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -29,21 +31,21 @@ tags: The detection Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe is detecting the abuse of unquoted service paths, which is a popular technique for privilege escalation. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2020-07-03 - **Author**: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk -- **ID**: c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6v5264g9f +- **ID**: cbef820c-e1ff-407f-887f-0a9240a2d477 #### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1574.009](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/009/) | Path Interception by Unquoted Path | Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1574.009](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/009/) | Path Interception by Unquoted Path | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1574](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/) | Hijack Execution Flow | Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1574](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/) | Hijack Execution Flow | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -86,7 +88,7 @@ Note that `detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe_filter` is a empt #### How To Implement -You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. +You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. #### Known False Positives unknown @@ -107,8 +109,6 @@ unknown | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to perform privilege escalation by using unquoted service paths. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -121,6 +121,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1574.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1574.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-06-short_lived_windows_accounts.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-06-short_lived_windows_accounts.md index cb7a0c7403..be4324dba7 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-06-short_lived_windows_accounts.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-06-short_lived_windows_accounts.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Short Lived Windows Accounts" -excerpt: "Local Account, Create Account" +excerpt: "Local Account +, Create Account +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2020-07-06 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Local Account - - Persistence - Create Account - Persistence + - Persistence - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This search detects accounts that were created and deleted in a short time period. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Change](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Change) - **Last Updated**: 2020-07-06 @@ -80,6 +82,7 @@ It is possible that an administrator created and deleted an account in a short t #### Kill Chain Phase +* Exploitation @@ -90,8 +93,6 @@ It is possible that an administrator created and deleted an account in a short t | 63.0 | 70 | 90 | A user account created or delete shortly in host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -101,6 +102,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log) * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log) * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-06-windows_event_log_cleared.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-06-windows_event_log_cleared.md index 2ad60b568b..08c44c9f62 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-06-windows_event_log_cleared.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-06-windows_event_log_cleared.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Windows Event Log Cleared" -excerpt: "Indicator Removal on Host, Clear Windows Event Logs" +excerpt: "Indicator Removal on Host +, Clear Windows Event Logs +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2020-07-06 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Indicator Removal on Host - - Defense Evasion - Clear Windows Event Logs - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -24,7 +26,7 @@ tags: The following analytic utilizes Windows Security Event ID 1102 or System log event 104 to identify when a Windows event log is cleared. Note that this analytic will require tuning or restricted to specific endpoints based on criticality. During triage, based on time of day and user, determine if this was planned. If not planned, follow through with reviewing parallel alerts and other data sources to determine what else may have occurred. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2020-07-06 @@ -52,8 +54,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes Windows Security Event ID 1102 or System log eve #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [wineventlog_system](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_system.yml) Note that `windows_event_log_cleared_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -88,8 +90,6 @@ It is possible that these logs may be legitimately cleared by Administrators. Fi | 70.0 | 70 | 100 | Windows event logs cleared on $dest$ via EventCode $EventCode$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log) * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-07-remote_desktop_network_traffic.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-07-remote_desktop_network_traffic.md index f46820f9d4..83ca12cc39 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-07-remote_desktop_network_traffic.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-07-remote_desktop_network_traffic.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Remote Desktop Network Traffic" -excerpt: "Remote Desktop Protocol, Remote Services" +excerpt: "Remote Desktop Protocol +, Remote Services +" categories: - Network last_modified_at: 2020-07-07 @@ -8,17 +10,17 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Remote Desktop Protocol - - Lateral Movement - Remote Services - Lateral Movement + - Lateral Movement - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Network_Traffic --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search looks for network traffic on TCP/3389, the default port used by remote desktop. While remote desktop traffic is not uncommon on a network, it is usually associated with known hosts. This search will ignore common RDP sources and common RDP destinations so you can focus on the uncommon uses of remote desktop on your network. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Network_Traffic](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkTraffic) - **Last Updated**: 2020-07-07 @@ -72,7 +74,7 @@ Note that `remote_desktop_network_traffic_filter` is a empty macro by default. I #### How To Implement -To successfully implement this search you need to identify systems that commonly originate remote desktop traffic and that commonly receive remote desktop traffic. You can use the included support search "Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic" to identify systems that originate the traffic and the search "Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic" to identify systems that receive a lot of remote desktop traffic. After identifying these systems, you will need to add the "common_rdp_source" or "common_rdp_destination" category to that system depending on the usage, using the Enterprise Security Assets and Identities framework. This can be done by adding an entry in the assets.csv file located in SA-IdentityManagement/lookups. +To successfully implement this search you need to identify systems that commonly originate remote desktop traffic and that commonly receive remote desktop traffic. You can use the included support search "Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic" to identify systems that originate the traffic and the search "Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic" to identify systems that receive a lot of remote desktop traffic. After identifying these systems, you will need to add the "common_rdp_source" or "common_rdp_destination" category to that system depending on the usage, using the Enterprise Security Assets and Identities framework. This can be done by adding an entry in the assets.csv file located in SA-IdentityManagement/lookups. #### Known False Positives Remote Desktop may be used legitimately by users on the network. @@ -89,8 +91,12 @@ Remote Desktop may be used legitimately by users on the network. +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -103,5 +109,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml) \| *version*: **3** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-08-detect_new_local_admin_account.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-08-detect_new_local_admin_account.md index d3698f594c..01e179d7ae 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-08-detect_new_local_admin_account.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-08-detect_new_local_admin_account.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Detect New Local Admin account" -excerpt: "Local Account, Create Account" +excerpt: "Local Account +, Create Account +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2020-07-08 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Local Account - - Persistence - Create Account - Persistence + - Persistence - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -24,7 +26,7 @@ tags: This search looks for newly created accounts that have been elevated to local administrators. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2020-07-08 @@ -54,8 +56,8 @@ This search looks for newly created accounts that have been elevated to local ad #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `detect_new_local_admin_account_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -72,7 +74,7 @@ Note that `detect_new_local_admin_account_filter` is a empty macro by default. I You must be ingesting Windows event logs using the Splunk Windows TA and collecting event code 4720 and 4732 #### Known False Positives -The activity may be legitimate. For this reason, it's best to verify the account with an administrator and ask whether there was a valid service request for the account creation. If your local administrator group name is not "Administrators", this search may generate an excessive number of false positives +The activity may be legitimate. For this reason, it's best to verify the account with an administrator and ask whether there was a valid service request for the account creation. If your local administrator group name is not "Administrators", this search may generate an excessive number of false positives #### Associated Analytic story * [DHS Report TA18-074A](/stories/dhs_report_ta18-074a) @@ -81,7 +83,7 @@ The activity may be legitimate. For this reason, it's best to verify the acc #### Kill Chain Phase * Actions on Objectives -* Command and Control +* Command & Control @@ -92,8 +94,6 @@ The activity may be legitimate. For this reason, it's best to verify the acc | 42.0 | 60 | 70 | A $user$ on $dest$ was added recently. Identify if this was legitimate behavior or not. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log) * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log) * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-10-kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-10-kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..17d9261e2e --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-10-kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.md @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +--- +title: "Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod" +excerpt: "" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2020-07-10 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods by IP address, verb and decision + +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2020-07-10 +- **Author**: Rod Soto, Splunk +- **ID**: 7f5c2779-88a0-4824-9caa-0f606c8f260f + +#### Search + +``` +`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.request.spec.group{}=system:serviceaccounts +| table src_ip src_user http_user_agent data.protoPayload.request.spec.nonResourceAttributes.verb data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision data.protoPayload.response.spec.resourceAttributes.resource +| top src_ip src_user http_user_agent data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision data.protoPayload.response.spec.resourceAttributes.resource +|`kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [google_gcp_pubsub_message](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/google_gcp_pubsub_message.yml) + +Note that `kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time + + +#### How To Implement +You must install splunk GCP add on. This search works with pubsub messaging service logs + +#### Known False Positives +Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst must consider IP, verb and decision context when trying to detect maliciousness. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity](/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Exploitation + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-11-kubernetes_gcp_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-11-kubernetes_gcp_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f91179a107 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-11-kubernetes_gcp_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.md @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +--- +title: "Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account" +excerpt: "" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2020-07-11 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences + +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2020-07-11 +- **Author**: Rod Soto, Splunk +- **ID**: 99487de3-7192-4b41-939d-fbe9acfb1340 + +#### Search + +``` +`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason=ClusterRoleBinding OR Clusterrole +| table src_ip src_user data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason +| rare src_user data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason +|`kubernetes_gcp_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [google_gcp_pubsub_message](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/google_gcp_pubsub_message.yml) + +Note that `kubernetes_gcp_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time + + +#### How To Implement +You must install splunk AWS add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub messaging service logs + +#### Known False Positives +Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity](/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Exploitation + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-11-kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-11-kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1b3c15d5d1 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-11-kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.md @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +--- +title: "Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access" +excerpt: "" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2020-07-11 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmaps or secrets + +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2020-07-11 +- **Author**: Rod Soto, Splunk +- **ID**: bdb6d596-86a0-4aba-8369-418ae8b9963a + +#### Search + +``` +`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.resource=configmaps OR secrets +| table data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp src_user data.resource.labels.cluster_name data.protoPayload.request.metadata.namespace data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision +| dedup data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp src_user data.resource.labels.cluster_name +|`kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [google_gcp_pubsub_message](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/google_gcp_pubsub_message.yml) + +Note that `kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time + + +#### How To Implement +You must install splunk add on for GCP . This search works with pubsub messaging service logs. + +#### Known False Positives +Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user and object context can provide guidance for detection. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity](/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Exploitation + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-11-kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-11-kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0e6c337cae --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-11-kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.md @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +--- +title: "Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access" +excerpt: "" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2020-07-11 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets + +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2020-07-11 +- **Author**: Rod Soto, Splunk +- **ID**: a46923f6-36b9-4806-a681-31f314907c30 + +#### Search + +``` +`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason=ClusterRoleBinding OR Clusterrole dest=apis/rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1 src_ip!=::1 +| table src_ip src_user http_user_agent data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason +| dedup src_ip src_user +|`kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [google_gcp_pubsub_message](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/google_gcp_pubsub_message.yml) + +Note that `kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time + + +#### How To Implement +You must install splunk add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub messaging servicelogs. + +#### Known False Positives +Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation, however source IP, user agent, decision and reason may indicate possible malicious use. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity](/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Exploitation + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-11-kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-11-kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f287d94fc8 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-11-kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.md @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +--- +title: "Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls" +excerpt: "" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2020-07-11 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search provides information on anonymous Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context + +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2020-07-11 +- **Author**: Rod Soto, Splunk +- **ID**: a5bed417-070a-41f2-a1e4-82b6aa281557 + +#### Search + +``` +`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent=kubectl* src_user=system:unsecured OR src_user=system:anonymous +| table src_ip src_user data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.granted object_path +|dedup src_ip src_user +|`kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [google_gcp_pubsub_message](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/google_gcp_pubsub_message.yml) + +Note that `kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time + + +#### How To Implement +You must install splunk add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub messaging logs. + +#### Known False Positives +Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP, source user, user agent, object path, and authorization context can reveal potential malicious activity, specially anonymous suspicious IPs and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity](/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Exploitation + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-17-gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-17-gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.md index 6602bbd27d..7049254eee 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-17-gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-17-gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection" -excerpt: "Cloud Service Discovery" +excerpt: "Cloud Service Discovery +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2020-07-17 @@ -14,17 +15,17 @@ tags: - Splunk Cloud --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} #### Description -This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster's pods +This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster's pods -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2020-07-17 @@ -81,8 +82,12 @@ Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, User Agent, sourc +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -95,5 +100,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0a37371fe3 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.md @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ +--- +title: "Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User" +excerpt: "Cloud Accounts +" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2020-07-21 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Cloud Accounts + - Defense Evasion + - Initial Access + - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel + +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2020-07-21 +- **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +- **ID**: 2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-290bf5d0dac4 + + +#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1078.004](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/) | Cloud Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | + +#### Search + +``` +`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success +| bucket span=10m _time +| stats count AS instances_launched by _time userName +| eventstats avg(instances_launched) as total_launched_avg, stdev(instances_launched) as total_launched_stdev +| eval threshold_value = 4 +| eval isOutlier=if(instances_launched > total_launched_avg+(total_launched_stdev * threshold_value), 1, 0) +| search isOutlier=1 AND _time >= relative_time(now(), "-10m@m") +| eval num_standard_deviations_away = round(abs(instances_launched - total_launched_avg) / total_launched_stdev, 2) +| table _time, userName, instances_launched, num_standard_deviations_away, total_launched_avg, total_launched_stdev +| `abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) + +Note that `abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* eventName +* errorCode +* userName + + +#### How To Implement +You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment. + +#### Known False Positives +Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [AWS Cryptomining](/stories/aws_cryptomining) +* [Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities](/stories/suspicious_aws_ec2_activities) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Actions on Objectives + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml) \| *version*: **2** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user_-_mltk.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user_-_mltk.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..608449594f --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user_-_mltk.md @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +--- +title: "Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK" +excerpt: "Cloud Accounts +" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2020-07-21 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Cloud Accounts + - Defense Evasion + - Initial Access + - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. + +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2020-07-21 +- **Author**: Jason Brewer, Splunk +- **ID**: dec41ad5-d579-42cb-b4c6-f5dbb778bbe5 + + +#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1078.004](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/) | Cloud Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | + +#### Search + +``` +`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success `abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk_filter` +| bucket span=10m _time +| stats count as instances_launched by _time src_user +| apply ec2_excessive_runinstances_v1 +| rename "IsOutlier(instances_launched)" as isOutlier +| where isOutlier=1 +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) + +Note that `abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user_-_mltk_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* eventName +* errorCode +* src_user + + +#### How To Implement +You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment. + +#### Known False Positives +Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [AWS Cryptomining](/stories/aws_cryptomining) +* [Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities](/stories/suspicious_aws_ec2_activities) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Actions on Objectives + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user_-_mltk.yml) \| *version*: **2** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..22924a0c0b --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.md @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +--- +title: "Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User" +excerpt: "Cloud Accounts +" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2020-07-21 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Cloud Accounts + - Defense Evasion + - Initial Access + - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where an abnormally high number of instances were successfully terminated by a user in a 10-minute window. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. + +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2020-07-21 +- **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +- **ID**: 8d301246-fccf-45e2-a8e7-3655fd14379c + + +#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1078.004](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/) | Cloud Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | + +#### Search + +``` +`cloudtrail` eventName=TerminateInstances errorCode=success +| bucket span=10m _time +| stats count AS instances_terminated by _time userName +| eventstats avg(instances_terminated) as total_terminations_avg, stdev(instances_terminated) as total_terminations_stdev +| eval threshold_value = 4 +| eval isOutlier=if(instances_terminated > total_terminations_avg+(total_terminations_stdev * threshold_value), 1, 0) +| search isOutlier=1 AND _time >= relative_time(now(), "-10m@m") +| eval num_standard_deviations_away = round(abs(instances_terminated - total_terminations_avg) / total_terminations_stdev, 2) +|table _time, userName, instances_terminated, num_standard_deviations_away, total_terminations_avg, total_terminations_stdev +| `abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) + +Note that `abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* eventName +* errorCode +* userName + + +#### How To Implement +You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. + +#### Known False Positives +Many service accounts configured with your AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify whether this search alerted on a human user. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities](/stories/suspicious_aws_ec2_activities) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Actions on Objectives + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml) \| *version*: **2** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user_-_mltk.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user_-_mltk.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d6eda64f20 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user_-_mltk.md @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +--- +title: "Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK" +excerpt: "Cloud Accounts +" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2020-07-21 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Cloud Accounts + - Defense Evasion + - Initial Access + - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user successfully terminates an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. + +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2020-07-21 +- **Author**: Jason Brewer, Splunk +- **ID**: 1c02b86a-cd85-473e-a50b-014a9ac8fe3e + + +#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1078.004](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/) | Cloud Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | + +#### Search + +``` +`cloudtrail` eventName=TerminateInstances errorCode=success `abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk_filter` +| bucket span=10m _time +| stats count as instances_terminated by _time src_user +| apply ec2_excessive_terminateinstances_v1 +| rename "IsOutlier(instances_terminated)" as isOutlier +| where isOutlier=1 +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) + +Note that `abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user_-_mltk_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* eventName +* errorCode +* src_user + + +#### How To Implement +You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment. + +#### Known False Positives +Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities](/stories/suspicious_aws_ec2_activities) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Actions on Objectives + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user_-_mltk.yml) \| *version*: **2** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-attempt_to_stop_security_service.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-attempt_to_stop_security_service.md index 640772987e..b8ec641a97 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-attempt_to_stop_security_service.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-attempt_to_stop_security_service.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Attempt To Stop Security Service" -excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools, Impair Defenses" +excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools +, Impair Defenses +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2020-07-21 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Disable or Modify Tools - - Defense Evasion - Impair Defenses - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This search looks for attempts to stop security-related services on the endpoint. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2020-07-21 @@ -56,16 +58,16 @@ This search looks for attempts to stop security-related services on the endpoint #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) Note that `attempt_to_stop_security_service_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. #### Lookups The SPL above uses the following Lookups: -* [security_services_lookup](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/security_services_lookup.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/security_services.csv) +* [security_services_lookup](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/security_services_lookup.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/lookups/security_services_lookup.csv) #### Required field * _time @@ -107,8 +109,6 @@ None identified. Attempts to disable security-related services should be identif | 20.0 | 40 | 50 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified attempting to disable security services on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_defend_service_stop/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_defend_service_stop/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..08667d0f3a --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.md @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +--- +title: "Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers" +excerpt: "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol +" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2020-07-21 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol + - Exfiltration + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Network_Resolution +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search allows you to identify the endpoints that have connected to more than five DNS servers and made DNS Queries over the time frame of the search. + +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: [Network_Resolution](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkResolution) +- **Last Updated**: 2020-07-21 +- **Author**: David Dorsey, Splunk +- **ID**: 74ec6f18-604b-4202-a567-86b2066be3ce + + +#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1048.003](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048/003/) | Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol | Exfiltration | + +#### Search + +``` + +| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count, values(DNS.dest) AS dest dc(DNS.dest) as dest_count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.message_type=QUERY by DNS.src +| `drop_dm_object_name("Network_Resolution")` +|where dest_count > 5 +| `clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) + +Note that `clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* DNS.dest +* DNS.message_type +* DNS.src + + +#### How To Implement +This search requires that DNS data is being ingested and populating the `Network_Resolution` data model. This data can come from DNS logs or from solutions that parse network traffic for this data, such as Splunk Stream or Bro.\ +This search produces fields (`dest_count`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** Distinct DNS Connections, **Field:** dest_count\ +Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` + +#### Known False Positives +It's possible that an enterprise has more than five DNS servers that are configured in a round-robin rotation. Please customize the search, as appropriate. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [DNS Hijacking](/stories/dns_hijacking) +* [Suspicious DNS Traffic](/stories/suspicious_dns_traffic) +* [Host Redirection](/stories/host_redirection) +* [Command and Control](/stories/command_and_control) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Command & Control + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml) \| *version*: **3** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0c5a5447b8 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.md @@ -0,0 +1,120 @@ +--- +title: "Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts" +excerpt: "Cloud Accounts +" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2020-07-21 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Cloud Accounts + - Defense Evasion + - Initial Access + - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search looks for successful AWS CloudTrail activity by user accounts that are not listed in the identity table or `aws_service_accounts.csv`. It returns event names and count, as well as the first and last time a specific user or service is detected, grouped by users. Deprecated because managing this list can be quite hard. + +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2020-07-21 +- **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +- **ID**: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d4bd55 + + +#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1078.004](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/) | Cloud Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | + +#### Search + +``` +`cloudtrail` errorCode=success +| rename userName as identity +| search NOT [ +| inputlookup identity_lookup_expanded +| fields identity] +| search NOT [ +| inputlookup aws_service_accounts +| fields identity] +| rename identity as user +| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(eventName) as eventName by user +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| `detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) + +Note that `detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Lookups +The SPL above uses the following Lookups: + +* [aws_service_accounts](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/aws_service_accounts.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/lookups/aws_service_accounts.csv) + +#### Required field +* _time +* errorCode +* userName +* eventName +* user + + +#### How To Implement +You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You must also populate the `identity_lookup_expanded` lookup shipped with the Asset and Identity framework to be able to look up users in your identity table in Enterprise Security (ES). Leverage the support search called "Create a list of approved AWS service accounts": run it once every 30 days to create and validate a list of service accounts.\ +This search produces fields (`eventName`,`firstTime`,`lastTime`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** AWS Event Name, **Field:** eventName\ +1. \ +1. **Label:** First Time, **Field:** firstTime\ +1. \ +1. **Label:** Last Time, **Field:** lastTime\ +Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` + +#### Known False Positives +It's likely that you'll find activity detected by users/service accounts that are not listed in the `identity_lookup_expanded` or ` aws_service_accounts.csv` file. If the user is a legitimate service account, update the `aws_service_accounts.csv` table with that entry. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [AWS User Monitoring](/stories/aws_user_monitoring) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Actions on Objectives + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml) \| *version*: **2** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8041f1f514 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.md @@ -0,0 +1,123 @@ +--- +title: "Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2" +excerpt: "Spearphishing via Service +" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2020-07-21 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Spearphishing via Service + - Initial Access + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Network_Resolution +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search looks for DNS requests for phishing domains that are leveraging EvilGinx tools to mimic websites. + +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: [Network_Resolution](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkResolution) +- **Last Updated**: 2020-07-21 +- **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +- **ID**: 24dd17b1-e2fb-4c31-878c-d4f226595bfa + + +#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1566.003](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003/) | Spearphishing via Service | Initial Access | + +#### Search + +``` + +| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(DNS.answer) as answer from datamodel=Network_Resolution.DNS by DNS.dest DNS.src DNS.query host +| `drop_dm_object_name(DNS)` +| rex field=query ".*?(?[^./:]+\.(\S{2,3} +|\S{2,3}.\S{2,3}))$" +| stats count values(query) as query by domain dest src answer +| search `evilginx_phishlets_amazon` OR `evilginx_phishlets_facebook` OR `evilginx_phishlets_github` OR `evilginx_phishlets_0365` OR `evilginx_phishlets_outlook` OR `evilginx_phishlets_aws` OR `evilginx_phishlets_google` +| search NOT [ inputlookup legit_domains.csv +| fields domain] +| join domain type=outer [ +| tstats count `security_content_summariesonly` values(Web.url) as url from datamodel=Web.Web by Web.dest Web.site +| rename "Web.*" as * +| rex field=site ".*?(?[^./:]+\.(\S{2,3} +|\S{2,3}.\S{2,3}))$" +| table dest domain url] +| table count src dest query answer domain url +| `detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [evilginx_phishlets_facebook](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_facebook.yml) +* [evilginx_phishlets_outlook](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_outlook.yml) +* [evilginx_phishlets_aws](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_aws.yml) +* [evilginx_phishlets_github](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_github.yml) +* [evilginx_phishlets_0365](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_0365.yml) +* [evilginx_phishlets_google](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_google.yml) +* [evilginx_phishlets_amazon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_amazon.yml) + +Note that `detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* DNS.answer +* DNS.dest +* DNS.src +* DNS.query +* host + + +#### How To Implement +You need to ingest data from your DNS logs in the Network_Resolution datamodel. Specifically you must ingest the domain that is being queried and the IP of the host originating the request. Ideally, you should also be ingesting the answer to the query and the query type. This approach allows you to also create your own localized passive DNS capability which can aid you in future investigations. You will have to add legitimate domain names to the `legit_domains.csv` file shipped with the app. \ + **Splunk>Phantom Playbook Integration**\ +If Splunk>Phantom is also configured in your environment, a Playbook called `Lets Encrypt Domain Investigate` can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/`, add the correct hostname to the "Phantom Instance" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search, and set the corresponding Playbook to active. \ +(Playbook link:`https://my.phantom.us/4.2/playbook/lets-encrypt-domain-investigate/`).\ + + +#### Known False Positives +If a known good domain is not listed in the legit_domains.csv file, then the search could give you false postives. Please update that lookup file to filter out DNS requests to legitimate domains. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Common Phishing Frameworks](/stories/common_phishing_frameworks) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Delivery +* Command & Control + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml) \| *version*: **2** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.md index 339506e5a8..d0fc3a03da 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Detect Excessive User Account Lockouts" -excerpt: "Valid Accounts, Local Accounts" +excerpt: "Valid Accounts +, Local Accounts +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2020-07-21 @@ -8,15 +10,15 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Valid Accounts - - Defense Evasion - - Persistence - - Privilege Escalation - - Initial Access - Local Accounts - Defense Evasion + - Initial Access - Persistence - Privilege Escalation + - Defense Evasion - Initial Access + - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -31,7 +33,7 @@ tags: This search detects user accounts that have been locked out a relatively high number of times in a short period. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Change](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Change) - **Last Updated**: 2020-07-21 @@ -43,9 +45,9 @@ This search detects user accounts that have been locked out a relatively high nu | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access | +| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1078.003](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/003/) | Local Accounts | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access | +| [T1078.003](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/003/) | Local Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -85,6 +87,7 @@ It is possible that a legitimate user is experiencing an issue causing multiple #### Kill Chain Phase +* Exploitation @@ -95,8 +98,6 @@ It is possible that a legitimate user is experiencing an issue causing multiple | 36.0 | 60 | 60 | Multiple accounts have been locked out. Review $nodename$ and $result$ related to $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -106,6 +107,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/account_lockout/windows-security.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/account_lockout/windows-security.log) * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/account_lockout/windows-system.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/account_lockout/windows-system.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e73b910ff9 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.md @@ -0,0 +1,106 @@ +--- +title: "Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response" +excerpt: "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol +" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2020-07-21 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol + - Exfiltration + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Network_Resolution +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search is used to detect attempts to use DNS tunneling, by calculating the length of responses to DNS TXT queries. Endpoints using DNS as a method of transmission for data exfiltration, command and control, or evasion of security controls can often be detected by noting unusually large volumes of DNS traffic. Deprecated because this detection should focus on DNS queries instead of DNS responses. + +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: [Network_Resolution](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkResolution) +- **Last Updated**: 2020-07-21 +- **Author**: Rico Valdez, Splunk +- **ID**: 05437c07-62f5-452e-afdc-04dd44815bb9 + + +#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1048.003](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048/003/) | Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol | Exfiltration | + +#### Search + +``` + +| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.message_type=response AND DNS.record_type=TXT by DNS.src DNS.dest DNS.answer DNS.record_type +| `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` +| eval anslen=len(answer) +| search anslen>100 +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| rename src as "Source IP", dest as "Destination IP", answer as "DNS Answer" anslen as "Answer Length" record_type as "DNS Record Type" firstTime as "First Time" lastTime as "Last Time" count as Count +| table "Source IP" "Destination IP" "DNS Answer" "DNS Record Type" "Answer Length" Count "First Time" "Last Time" +| `detect_long_dns_txt_record_response_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) + +Note that `detect_long_dns_txt_record_response_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* DNS.message_type +* DNS.record_type +* DNS.src +* DNS.dest +* DNS.answer + + +#### How To Implement +To successfully implement this search you need to ingest data from your DNS logs, or monitor DNS traffic using Stream, Bro or something similar. Specifically, this query requires that the DNS data model is populated with information regarding the DNS record type that is being returned as well as the data in the answer section of the protocol. + +#### Known False Positives +It's possible that legitimate TXT record responses can be long enough to trigger this search. You can modify the packet threshold for this search to help mitigate false positives. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Suspicious DNS Traffic](/stories/suspicious_dns_traffic) +* [Command and Control](/stories/command_and_control) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Command & Control + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml) \| *version*: **2** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_new_user_aws_console_login.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_new_user_aws_console_login.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..062ce82f01 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_new_user_aws_console_login.md @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +--- +title: "Detect new user AWS Console Login" +excerpt: "Cloud Accounts +" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2020-07-21 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Cloud Accounts + - Defense Evasion + - Initial Access + - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour. Deprecated now this search is updated to use the Authentication datamodel. + +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2020-07-21 +- **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +- **ID**: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f3-d82362dffd75 + + +#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1078.004](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/) | Cloud Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | + +#### Search + +``` +`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin +| rename userIdentity.arn as user +| stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user +| inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail +| stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user +| eval userStatus=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), "First Time Logging into AWS Console","Previously Seen User") +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| where userStatus ="First Time Logging into AWS Console" +| `detect_new_user_aws_console_login_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) + +Note that `detect_new_user_aws_console_login_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* eventName +* userIdentity.arn + + +#### How To Implement +You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. Run the "Previously seen users in AWS CloudTrail" support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run "Update previously seen users in AWS CloudTrail" hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. + +#### Known False Positives +When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Suspicious AWS Login Activities](/stories/suspicious_aws_login_activities) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Actions on Objectives + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml) \| *version*: **2** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_outbound_smb_traffic.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_outbound_smb_traffic.md index 05665d5f90..3a2daf297f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_outbound_smb_traffic.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_outbound_smb_traffic.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Detect Outbound SMB Traffic" -excerpt: "File Transfer Protocols, Application Layer Protocol" +excerpt: "File Transfer Protocols +, Application Layer Protocol +" categories: - Network last_modified_at: 2020-07-21 @@ -8,17 +10,17 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - File Transfer Protocols - - Command And Control - Application Layer Protocol - Command And Control + - Command And Control - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Network_Traffic --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -27,12 +29,12 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search looks for outbound SMB connections made by hosts within your network to the Internet. SMB traffic is used for Windows file-sharing activity. One of the techniques often used by attackers involves retrieving the credential hash using an SMB request made to a compromised server controlled by the threat actor. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Network_Traffic](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkTraffic) - **Last Updated**: 2020-07-21 - **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Stuart Hopkins from Splunk -- **ID**: 7f5fb3e1-4209-414-90db-0ec21b936378 +- **ID**: 1bed7774-304a-4e8f-9d72-d80e45ff492b #### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) @@ -76,7 +78,7 @@ Note that `detect_outbound_smb_traffic_filter` is a empty macro by default. It a In order to run this search effectively, we highly recommend that you leverage the Assets and Identity framework. It is important that you have good understanding of how your network segments are designed, and be able to distinguish internal from external address space. Add a category named `internal` to the CIDRs that host the companys assets in `assets_by_cidr.csv` lookup file, which is located in `$SPLUNK_HOME/etc/apps/SA-IdentityManagement/lookups/`. More information on updating this lookup can be found here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.0.0/Admin/Addassetandidentitydata. This search also requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model #### Known False Positives -It is likely that the outbound Server Message Block (SMB) traffic is legitimate, if the company's internal networks are not well-defined in the Assets and Identity Framework. Categorize the internal CIDR blocks as `internal` in the lookup file to avoid creating notable events for traffic destined to those CIDR blocks. Any other network connection that is going out to the Internet should be investigated and blocked. Best practices suggest preventing external communications of all SMB versions and related protocols at the network boundary. +It is likely that the outbound Server Message Block (SMB) traffic is legitimate, if the company's internal networks are not well-defined in the Assets and Identity Framework. Categorize the internal CIDR blocks as `internal` in the lookup file to avoid creating notable events for traffic destined to those CIDR blocks. Any other network connection that is going out to the Internet should be investigated and blocked. Best practices suggest preventing external communications of all SMB versions and related protocols at the network boundary. #### Associated Analytic story * [Hidden Cobra Malware](/stories/hidden_cobra_malware) @@ -86,12 +88,16 @@ It is likely that the outbound Server Message Block (SMB) traffic is legitimate, #### Kill Chain Phase * Actions on Objectives -* Command and Control +* Command & Control +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -104,5 +110,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml) \| *version*: **3** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_outlook_exe_writing_a_zip_file.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_outlook_exe_writing_a_zip_file.md index 5875eb63cb..61ab09c214 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_outlook_exe_writing_a_zip_file.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_outlook_exe_writing_a_zip_file.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file" -excerpt: "Phishing, Spearphishing Attachment" +excerpt: "Phishing +, Spearphishing Attachment +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2020-07-21 @@ -8,16 +10,16 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Phishing - - Initial Access - Spearphishing Attachment - Initial Access + - Initial Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -26,7 +28,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search looks for execution of process `outlook.exe` where the process is writing a `.zip` file to the disk. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2020-07-21 @@ -97,8 +99,12 @@ It is not uncommon for outlook to write legitimate zip files to the disk. +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -111,5 +117,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_outlook_exe_writing_a_zip_file.yml) \| *version*: **3** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..654dd9105c --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.md @@ -0,0 +1,125 @@ +--- +title: "Detect Spike in AWS API Activity" +excerpt: "Cloud Accounts +" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2020-07-21 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Cloud Accounts + - Defense Evasion + - Initial Access + - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search will detect users creating spikes of API activity in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. + +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2020-07-21 +- **Author**: David Dorsey, Splunk +- **ID**: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d32362d4bd55 + + +#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1078.004](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/) | Cloud Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | + +#### Search + +``` +`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall [search `cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall +| spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn +| stats count as apiCalls by arn +| inputlookup api_call_by_user_baseline append=t +| fields - latestCount +| stats values(*) as * by arn +| rename apiCalls as latestCount +| eval newAvgApiCalls=avgApiCalls + (latestCount-avgApiCalls)/720 +| eval newStdevApiCalls=sqrt(((pow(stdevApiCalls, 2)*719 + (latestCount-newAvgApiCalls)*(latestCount-avgApiCalls))/720)) +| eval avgApiCalls=coalesce(newAvgApiCalls, avgApiCalls), stdevApiCalls=coalesce(newStdevApiCalls, stdevApiCalls), numDataPoints=if(isnull(latestCount), numDataPoints, numDataPoints+1) +| table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls +| outputlookup api_call_by_user_baseline +| eval dataPointThreshold = 15, deviationThreshold = 3 +| eval isSpike=if((latestCount > avgApiCalls+deviationThreshold*stdevApiCalls) AND numDataPoints > dataPointThreshold, 1, 0) +| where isSpike=1 +| rename arn as userIdentity.arn +| table userIdentity.arn] +| spath output=user userIdentity.arn +| stats values(eventName) as eventName, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName) as uniqueApisCalled by user +| `detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) + +Note that `detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Lookups +The SPL above uses the following Lookups: + +* [api_call_by_user_baseline](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/api_call_by_user_baseline.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/lookups/api_call_by_user_baseline.csv) +* [api_call_by_user_baseline](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/api_call_by_user_baseline.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/lookups/api_call_by_user_baseline.csv) + +#### Required field +* _time +* eventType +* userIdentity.arn + + +#### How To Implement +You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike.\ +This search produces fields (`eventName`,`numberOfApiCalls`,`uniqueApisCalled`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** AWS Event Name, **Field:** eventName\ +1. \ +1. **Label:** Number of API Calls, **Field:** numberOfApiCalls\ +1. \ +1. **Label:** Unique API Calls, **Field:** uniqueApisCalled\ +Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` + +#### Known False Positives + + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [AWS User Monitoring](/stories/aws_user_monitoring) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Actions on Objectives + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml) \| *version*: **2** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.md index 25b405aee7..6542afe296 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters" -excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter, Windows Command Shell" +excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter +, Windows Command Shell +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2020-07-21 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Command and Scripting Interpreter - - Execution - Windows Command Shell - Execution + - Execution - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This search looks for the execution of the cscript.exe or wscript.exe processes, with a parent of cmd.exe. The search will return the count, the first and last time this execution was seen on a machine, the user, and the destination of the machine -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2020-07-21 @@ -92,8 +94,6 @@ Some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior. | 35.0 | 70 | 50 | cmd.exe launching script interpreters on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/cmd_spawns_cscript/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/cmd_spawns_cscript/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e304bac90b --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.md @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +--- +title: "Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers" +excerpt: "Web Protocols +" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2020-07-21 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Web Protocols + - Command And Control + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Web +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search looks for web connections to dynamic DNS providers. + +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: [Web](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Web) +- **Last Updated**: 2020-07-21 +- **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +- **ID**: 134da869-e264-4a8f-8d7e-fcd01c18f301 + + +#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1071.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001/) | Web Protocols | Command And Control | + +#### Search + +``` + +| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Web.url) as url min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Web where Web.status=200 by Web.src Web.dest Web.status +| `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `dynamic_dns_web_traffic` +| `detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [dynamic_dns_web_traffic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/dynamic_dns_web_traffic.yml) + +Note that `detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* Web.url +* Web.status +* Web.src +* Web.dest + + +#### How To Implement +This search requires you to be ingesting web-traffic logs. You can obtain these logs from indexing data from a web proxy or by using a network-traffic-analysis tool, such as Bro or Splunk Stream. The web data model must contain the URL being requested, the IP address of the host initiating the request, and the destination IP. This search also leverages a lookup file, `dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv`, which contains a non-exhaustive list of dynamic DNS providers. Consider periodically updating this local lookup file with new domains.\ +This search produces fields (`isDynDNS`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** IsDynamicDNS, **Field:** isDynDNS\ +Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` Deprecated because duplicate. + +#### Known False Positives +It is possible that list of dynamic DNS providers is outdated and/or that the URL being requested is legitimate. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Dynamic DNS](/stories/dynamic_dns) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Command & Control +* Actions on Objectives + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml) \| *version*: **2** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.md index 2ef9392175..484dde7b7c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Detection of tools built by NirSoft" -excerpt: "Software Deployment Tools" +excerpt: "Software Deployment Tools +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2020-07-21 @@ -16,8 +17,8 @@ tags: - Endpoint --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -26,12 +27,12 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search looks for specific command-line arguments that may indicate the execution of tools made by Nirsoft, which are legitimate, but may be abused by attackers. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2020-07-21 - **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk -- **ID**: 1297fb80-f42a-4q4a-9c8b-78c061417cf6 +- **ID**: 3d8d201c-aa03-422d-b0ee-2e5ecf9718c0 #### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) @@ -67,7 +68,7 @@ Note that `detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft_filter` is a empty macro by defau #### How To Implement -You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. +You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. #### Known False Positives While legitimate, these NirSoft tools are prone to abuse. You should verfiy that the tool was used for a legitimate purpose. @@ -82,8 +83,12 @@ While legitimate, these NirSoft tools are prone to abuse. You should verfiy that +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -96,5 +101,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml) \| *version*: **3** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d29933ab1c --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.md @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +--- +title: "DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers" +excerpt: "DNS +" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2020-07-21 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - DNS + - Command And Control + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Network_Resolution +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search will detect DNS requests resolved by unauthorized DNS servers. Legitimate DNS servers should be identified in the Enterprise Security Assets and Identity Framework. + +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: [Network_Resolution](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkResolution) +- **Last Updated**: 2020-07-21 +- **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +- **ID**: 1a67f15a-f4ff-4170-84e9-08cf6f75d6f6 + + +#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1071.004](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/004/) | DNS | Command And Control | + +#### Search + +``` + +| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.dest_category != dns_server AND DNS.src_category != dns_server by DNS.src DNS.dest +| `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` +| `dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) + +Note that `dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* DNS.dest_category +* DNS.src_category +* DNS.src +* DNS.dest + + +#### How To Implement +To successfully implement this search you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. It also requires that your DNS servers are identified correctly in the Assets and Identity table of Enterprise Security. + +#### Known False Positives +Legitimate DNS activity can be detected in this search. Investigate, verify and update the list of authorized DNS servers as appropriate. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [DNS Hijacking](/stories/dns_hijacking) +* [Suspicious DNS Traffic](/stories/suspicious_dns_traffic) +* [Host Redirection](/stories/host_redirection) +* [Command and Control](/stories/command_and_control) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Command & Control + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml) \| *version*: **3** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-dns_record_changed.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-dns_record_changed.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..56215b21d4 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-dns_record_changed.md @@ -0,0 +1,122 @@ +--- +title: "DNS record changed" +excerpt: "DNS +" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2020-07-21 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - DNS + - Command And Control + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Network_Resolution +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +The search takes the DNS records and their answers results of the discovered_dns_records lookup and finds if any records have changed by searching DNS response from the Network_Resolution datamodel across the last day. + +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: [Network_Resolution](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkResolution) +- **Last Updated**: 2020-07-21 +- **Author**: Jose Hernandez, Splunk +- **ID**: 44d3a43e-dcd5-49f7-8356-5209bb369065 + + +#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1071.004](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/004/) | DNS | Command And Control | + +#### Search + +``` + +| inputlookup discovered_dns_records +| rename answer as discovered_answer +| join domain[ +|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.record_type) as type, values(DNS.answer) as current_answer values(DNS.src) as src from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.message_type=RESPONSE DNS.answer!="unknown" DNS.answer!="" by DNS.query +| rename DNS.query as query +| where query!="unknown" +| rex field=query "(?\w+\.\w+?)(?:$ +|/)"] +| makemv delim=" " answer +| makemv delim=" " type +| sort -count +| table count,src,domain,type,query,current_answer,discovered_answer +| makemv current_answer +| mvexpand current_answer +| makemv discovered_answer +| eval n=mvfind(discovered_answer, current_answer) +| where isnull(n) +| `dns_record_changed_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) + +Note that `dns_record_changed_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Lookups +The SPL above uses the following Lookups: + +* [discovered_dns_records](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/discovered_dns_records.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/lookups/discovered_dns_records.csv) + +#### Required field +* _time +* DNS.record_type +* DNS.answer +* DNS.src +* DNS.message_type +* DNS.query + + +#### How To Implement +To successfully implement this search you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the `Network_Resolution` data model. It also requires that the `discover_dns_record` lookup table be populated by the included support search "Discover DNS record". \ + **Splunk>Phantom Playbook Integration**\ +If Splunk>Phantom is also configured in your environment, a Playbook called "DNS Hijack Enrichment" can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. The playbook takes in the DNS record changed and uses Geoip, whois, Censys and PassiveTotal to detect if DNS issuers changed. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/`, add the correct hostname to the "Phantom Instance" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search, and set the corresponding Playbook to active. \ +(Playbook Link:`https://my.phantom.us/4.2/playbook/dns-hijack-enrichment/`).\ + + +#### Known False Positives +Legitimate DNS changes can be detected in this search. Investigate, verify and update the list of provided current answers for the domains in question as appropriate. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [DNS Hijacking](/stories/dns_hijacking) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Command & Control + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/dns_record_changed.yml) \| *version*: **3** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9184e4c901 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.md @@ -0,0 +1,117 @@ +--- +title: "EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User" +excerpt: "Cloud Accounts +" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2020-07-21 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Cloud Accounts + - Defense Evasion + - Initial Access + - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search looks for EC2 instances being modified by users who have not previously modified them. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. + +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2020-07-21 +- **Author**: David Dorsey, Splunk +- **ID**: 56f91724-cf3f-4666-84e1-e3712fb41e76 + + +#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1078.004](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/) | Cloud Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | + +#### Search + +``` +`cloudtrail` `ec2_modification_api_calls` [search `cloudtrail` `ec2_modification_api_calls` errorCode=success +| stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by userIdentity.arn +| rename userIdentity.arn as arn +| inputlookup append=t previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user +| stats min(firstTime) as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by arn +| outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user +| eval newUser=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) +| where newUser=1 +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| rename arn as userIdentity.arn +| table userIdentity.arn] +| spath output=dest responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId +| spath output=user userIdentity.arn +| table _time, user, dest +| `ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [ec2_modification_api_calls](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/ec2_modification_api_calls.yml) + +Note that `ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Lookups +The SPL above uses the following Lookups: + +* [previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/lookups/previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user.csv) +* [previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/lookups/previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user.csv) + +#### Required field +* _time +* errorCode +* userIdentity.arn + + +#### How To Implement +You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User" support search once to create a history of previously seen ARNs. To add or remove APIs that modify an EC2 instance, edit the macro `ec2_modification_api_calls`. + +#### Known False Positives +It's possible that a new user will start to modify EC2 instances when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is modifying instances that this is the intended behavior. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications](/stories/unusual_aws_ec2_modifications) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Exploitation + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml) \| *version*: **3** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f1ad155cf0 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.md @@ -0,0 +1,111 @@ +--- +title: "EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User" +excerpt: "Cloud Accounts +" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2020-07-21 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Cloud Accounts + - Defense Evasion + - Initial Access + - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search looks for EC2 instances being created by users who have not created them before. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. + +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2020-07-21 +- **Author**: David Dorsey, Splunk +- **ID**: 22773e84-bac0-4595-b086-20d3f735b4f1 + + +#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1078.004](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/) | Cloud Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | + +#### Search + +``` +`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success +| stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by userIdentity.arn +| rename userIdentity.arn as arn +| inputlookup append=t previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.csv +| stats min(firstTime) as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by arn +| outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.csv +| eval newUser=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) +| where newUser=1 +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| rename arn as userIdentity.arn +| table userIdentity.arn] +| rename requestParameters.instanceType as instanceType, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as dest, userIdentity.arn as user +| table _time, user, dest, instanceType +| `ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) + +Note that `ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* eventName +* errorCode +* userIdentity.arn + + +#### How To Implement +You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User" support search once to create a history of previously seen ARNs. + +#### Known False Positives +It's possible that a user will start to create EC2 instances when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is launching instances that this is the intended behavior. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [AWS Cryptomining](/stories/aws_cryptomining) +* [Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities](/stories/suspicious_aws_ec2_activities) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Exploitation + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml) \| *version*: **2** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.md index 7a644734ff..07d0999369 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Email files written outside of the Outlook directory" -excerpt: "Email Collection, Local Email Collection" +excerpt: "Email Collection +, Local Email Collection +" categories: - Application last_modified_at: 2020-07-21 @@ -8,17 +10,17 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Email Collection - - Collection - Local Email Collection - Collection + - Collection - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -27,12 +29,12 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U The search looks at the change-analysis data model and detects email files created outside the normal Outlook directory. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2020-07-21 - **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk -- **ID**: ee18ed37-0802-4268-9435-b3b91aaa18xx +- **ID**: 8d52cf03-ba25-4101-aa78-07994aed4f74 #### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) @@ -85,8 +87,12 @@ Administrators and users sometimes prefer backing up their email data by moving +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -99,5 +105,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml) \| *version*: **3** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.md index 26adafdea7..b47589a33d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts" -excerpt: "Email Collection, Remote Email Collection" +excerpt: "Email Collection +, Remote Email Collection +" categories: - Application last_modified_at: 2020-07-21 @@ -8,17 +10,17 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Email Collection - - Collection - Remote Email Collection - Collection + - Collection - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Network_Traffic --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search looks for an increase of data transfers from your email server to your clients. This could be indicative of a malicious actor collecting data using your email server. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Network_Traffic](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkTraffic) - **Last Updated**: 2020-07-21 @@ -72,7 +74,7 @@ Note that `email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts_filter` is a empty #### How To Implement -This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model. Your email servers must be categorized as "email_server" for the search to work, as well. You may need to adjust the deviation_threshold and minimum_data_samples values based on the network traffic in your environment. The "deviation_threshold" field is a multiplying factor to control how much variation you're willing to tolerate. The "minimum_data_samples" field is the minimum number of connections of data samples required for the statistic to be valid. +This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model. Your email servers must be categorized as "email_server" for the search to work, as well. You may need to adjust the deviation_threshold and minimum_data_samples values based on the network traffic in your environment. The "deviation_threshold" field is a multiplying factor to control how much variation you're willing to tolerate. The "minimum_data_samples" field is the minimum number of connections of data samples required for the statistic to be valid. #### Known False Positives The false-positive rate will vary based on how you set the deviation_threshold and data_samples values. Our recommendation is to adjust these values based on your network traffic to and from your email servers. @@ -87,8 +89,12 @@ The false-positive rate will vary based on how you set the deviation_threshold a +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -101,5 +107,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml) \| *version*: **2** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-excessive_dns_failures.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-excessive_dns_failures.md index f6b6c27dd8..6e68ccb035 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-excessive_dns_failures.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-excessive_dns_failures.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Excessive DNS Failures" -excerpt: "DNS, Application Layer Protocol" +excerpt: "DNS +, Application Layer Protocol +" categories: - Network last_modified_at: 2020-07-21 @@ -8,17 +10,17 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - DNS - - Command And Control - Application Layer Protocol - Command And Control + - Command And Control - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Network_Resolution --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search identifies DNS query failures by counting the number of DNS responses that do not indicate success, and trigger on more than 50 occurrences. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Network_Resolution](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkResolution) - **Last Updated**: 2020-07-21 @@ -84,12 +86,16 @@ It is possible legitimate traffic can trigger this rule. Please investigate as a #### Kill Chain Phase -* Command and Control +* Command & Control +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -102,5 +108,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml) \| *version*: **2** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-first_time_seen_command_line_argument.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-first_time_seen_command_line_argument.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..77646a863d --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-first_time_seen_command_line_argument.md @@ -0,0 +1,127 @@ +--- +title: "First time seen command line argument" +excerpt: "PowerShell +, Windows Command Shell +" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2020-07-21 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - PowerShell + - Windows Command Shell + - Execution + - Execution + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Endpoint +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search looks for command-line arguments that use a `/c` parameter to execute a command that has not previously been seen. + +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) +- **Last Updated**: 2020-07-21 +- **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +- **ID**: a1b6e73f-98d5-470f-99ac-77aacd578473 + + +#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1059.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/) | PowerShell | Execution | + +| [T1059.003](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003/) | Windows Command Shell | Execution | + +#### Search + +``` + +| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = cmd.exe Processes.process = "* /c *" by Processes.process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest +| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| search [ +| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = cmd.exe Processes.process = "* /c *" by Processes.process +| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` +| inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments +| stats min(firstTime) as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by process +| outputlookup previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments +| eval newCmdLineArgument=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) +| where newCmdLineArgument=1 +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| table process] +| `first_time_seen_command_line_argument_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) + +Note that `first_time_seen_command_line_argument_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Lookups +The SPL above uses the following Lookups: + +* [previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/lookups/previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments.csv) +* [previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/lookups/previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments.csv) + +#### Required field +* _time +* Processes.process_name +* Processes.process +* Processes.parent_process_name +* Processes.dest + + +#### How To Implement +You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The complete process name with command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. Please make sure you run the support search "Previously seen command line arguments,"—which creates a lookup file called `previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments.csv`—a historical baseline of all command-line arguments. You must also validate this list. For the search to do accurate calculation, ensure the search scheduling is the same value as the `relative_time` evaluation function. + +#### Known False Positives +Legitimate programs can also use command-line arguments to execute. Please verify the command-line arguments to check what command/program is being executed. We recommend customizing the `first_time_seen_cmd_line_filter` macro to exclude legitimate parent_process_name + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [DHS Report TA18-074A](/stories/dhs_report_ta18-074a) +* [Suspicious Command-Line Executions](/stories/suspicious_command-line_executions) +* [Orangeworm Attack Group](/stories/orangeworm_attack_group) +* [Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns](/stories/possible_backdoor_activity_associated_with_mudcarp_espionage_campaigns) +* [Hidden Cobra Malware](/stories/hidden_cobra_malware) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Command & Control +* Actions on Objectives + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml) \| *version*: **5** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-first_time_seen_running_windows_service.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-first_time_seen_running_windows_service.md index 2e9cc0e635..39810dbef6 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-first_time_seen_running_windows_service.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-first_time_seen_running_windows_service.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "First Time Seen Running Windows Service" -excerpt: "System Services, Service Execution" +excerpt: "System Services +, Service Execution +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2020-07-21 @@ -8,16 +10,16 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - System Services - - Execution - Service Execution - Execution + - Execution - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -26,7 +28,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search looks for the first and last time a Windows service is seen running in your environment. This table is then cached. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2020-07-21 @@ -56,15 +58,15 @@ This search looks for the first and last time a Windows service is seen running #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [previously_seen_windows_services_window](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/previously_seen_windows_services_window.yml) * [wineventlog_system](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_system.yml) +* [previously_seen_windows_services_window](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/previously_seen_windows_services_window.yml) Note that `first_time_seen_running_windows_service_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. #### Lookups The SPL above uses the following Lookups: -* [previously_seen_running_windows_services](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/previously_seen_running_windows_services.yml) with [data]() +* [previously_seen_running_windows_services](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/previously_seen_running_windows_services.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/lookups/previously_seen_running_windows_services.csv) #### Required field * _time @@ -91,8 +93,12 @@ A previously unseen service is not necessarily malicious. Verify that the servic +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -105,5 +111,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml) \| *version*: **4** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.md index bc8abe10ed..b71164fea8 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe" -excerpt: "File and Directory Permissions Modification, Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification" +excerpt: "File and Directory Permissions Modification +, Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2020-07-21 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - File and Directory Permissions Modification - - Defense Evasion - Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,12 +27,12 @@ tags: Attackers leverage an existing Windows binary, attrib.exe, to mark specific as hidden by using specific flags so that the victim does not see the file. The search looks for specific command-line arguments to detect the use of attrib.exe to hide files. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2020-07-21 - **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk -- **ID**: c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6b5264g9f +- **ID**: 6e5a3ae4-90a3-462d-9aa6-0119f638c0f1 #### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) @@ -69,7 +71,7 @@ Note that `hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe_filter` is a empty macro #### How To Implement -You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. +You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. #### Known False Positives Some applications and users may legitimately use attrib.exe to interact with the files. @@ -91,8 +93,6 @@ Some applications and users may legitimately use attrib.exe to interact with the | 72.0 | 90 | 80 | Attrib.exe with +h flag to hide files on $dest$ executed by $user$ is detected. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1222.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1222.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.md index 65412214de..3a7d85966b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server" -excerpt: "Remote Email Collection, Email Collection" +excerpt: "Remote Email Collection +, Email Collection +" categories: - Network last_modified_at: 2020-07-21 @@ -8,17 +10,17 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Remote Email Collection - - Collection - Email Collection - Collection + - Collection - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Network_Traffic --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search looks for an increase of data transfers from your email server to your clients. This could be indicative of a malicious actor collecting data using your email server. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Network_Traffic](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkTraffic) - **Last Updated**: 2020-07-21 @@ -72,7 +74,7 @@ Note that `hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server_filt #### How To Implement -This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model. Your email servers must be categorized as "email_server" for the search to work, as well. You may need to adjust the deviation_threshold and minimum_data_samples values based on the network traffic in your environment. The "deviation_threshold" field is a multiplying factor to control how much variation you're willing to tolerate. The "minimum_data_samples" field is the minimum number of connections of data samples required for the statistic to be valid. +This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model. Your email servers must be categorized as "email_server" for the search to work, as well. You may need to adjust the deviation_threshold and minimum_data_samples values based on the network traffic in your environment. The "deviation_threshold" field is a multiplying factor to control how much variation you're willing to tolerate. The "minimum_data_samples" field is the minimum number of connections of data samples required for the statistic to be valid. #### Known False Positives The false-positive rate will vary based on how you set the deviation_threshold and data_samples values. Our recommendation is to adjust these values based on your network traffic to and from your email servers. @@ -86,8 +88,12 @@ The false-positive rate will vary based on how you set the deviation_threshold a +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -100,5 +106,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml) \| *version*: **2** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-malicious_powershell_process_-_execution_policy_bypass.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-malicious_powershell_process_-_execution_policy_bypass.md index 8807d6c973..ed415b7baf 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-malicious_powershell_process_-_execution_policy_bypass.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-malicious_powershell_process_-_execution_policy_bypass.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass" -excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter, PowerShell" +excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter +, PowerShell +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2020-07-21 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Command and Scripting Interpreter - - Execution - PowerShell - Execution + - Execution - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This search looks for PowerShell processes started with parameters used to bypass the local execution policy for scripts. These parameters are often observed in attacks leveraging PowerShell scripts as they override the default PowerShell execution policy. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2020-07-21 @@ -54,9 +56,9 @@ This search looks for PowerShell processes started with parameters used to bypas #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) Note that `malicious_powershell_process_-_execution_policy_bypass_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -87,7 +89,7 @@ There may be legitimate reasons to bypass the PowerShell execution policy. The P #### Kill Chain Phase -* Command and Control +* Command & Control * Actions on Objectives @@ -99,8 +101,6 @@ There may be legitimate reasons to bypass the PowerShell execution policy. The P | 42.0 | 70 | 60 | PowerShell local execution policy bypass attempt on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/encoded_powershell/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/encoded_powershell/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip.md index 6fe60a80fb..5886f146f2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP" -excerpt: "Valid Accounts, Default Accounts" +excerpt: "Valid Accounts +, Default Accounts +" categories: - Application last_modified_at: 2020-07-21 @@ -8,22 +10,22 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Valid Accounts - - Defense Evasion - - Persistence - - Privilege Escalation - - Initial Access - Default Accounts - Defense Evasion + - Initial Access - Persistence - Privilege Escalation + - Defense Evasion - Initial Access + - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -32,7 +34,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search detects Okta login failures due to bad credentials for multiple users originating from the same ip address. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2020-07-21 @@ -44,9 +46,9 @@ This search detects Okta login failures due to bad credentials for multiple user | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access | +| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1078.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/001/) | Default Accounts | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access | +| [T1078.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/001/) | Default Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -89,11 +91,16 @@ A single public IP address servicing multiple legitmate users may trigger this s #### Kill Chain Phase +* Exploitation +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -106,5 +113,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip.yml) \| *version*: **2** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-okta_account_lockout_events.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-okta_account_lockout_events.md index db2367dad0..4e95568f29 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-okta_account_lockout_events.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-okta_account_lockout_events.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Okta Account Lockout Events" -excerpt: "Valid Accounts, Default Accounts" +excerpt: "Valid Accounts +, Default Accounts +" categories: - Application last_modified_at: 2020-07-21 @@ -8,22 +10,22 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Valid Accounts - - Defense Evasion - - Persistence - - Privilege Escalation - - Initial Access - Default Accounts - Defense Evasion + - Initial Access - Persistence - Privilege Escalation + - Defense Evasion - Initial Access + - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -32,7 +34,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U Detect Okta user lockout events -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2020-07-21 @@ -44,9 +46,9 @@ Detect Okta user lockout events | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access | +| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1078.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/001/) | Default Accounts | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access | +| [T1078.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/001/) | Default Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -82,11 +84,16 @@ None. Account lockouts should be followed up on to determine if the actual user #### Kill Chain Phase +* Exploitation +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -99,5 +106,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml) \| *version*: **2** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-okta_failed_sso_attempts.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-okta_failed_sso_attempts.md index d80fb2a790..b487466610 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-okta_failed_sso_attempts.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-okta_failed_sso_attempts.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Okta Failed SSO Attempts" -excerpt: "Valid Accounts, Default Accounts" +excerpt: "Valid Accounts +, Default Accounts +" categories: - Application last_modified_at: 2020-07-21 @@ -8,22 +10,22 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Valid Accounts - - Defense Evasion - - Persistence - - Privilege Escalation - - Initial Access - Default Accounts - Defense Evasion + - Initial Access - Persistence - Privilege Escalation + - Defense Evasion - Initial Access + - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -32,7 +34,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U Detect failed Okta SSO events -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2020-07-21 @@ -44,9 +46,9 @@ Detect failed Okta SSO events | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access | +| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1078.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/001/) | Default Accounts | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access | +| [T1078.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/001/) | Default Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -85,11 +87,16 @@ There may be a faulty config preventing legitmate users from accessing apps they #### Kill Chain Phase +* Exploitation +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -102,5 +109,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml) \| *version*: **2** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.md index e017844871..ea7be9dd76 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities" -excerpt: "Valid Accounts, Default Accounts" +excerpt: "Valid Accounts +, Default Accounts +" categories: - Application last_modified_at: 2020-07-21 @@ -8,22 +10,22 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Valid Accounts - - Defense Evasion - - Persistence - - Privilege Escalation - - Initial Access - Default Accounts - Defense Evasion + - Initial Access - Persistence - Privilege Escalation + - Defense Evasion - Initial Access + - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -32,7 +34,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search detects logins from the same user from different cities in a 24 hour period. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2020-07-21 @@ -44,9 +46,9 @@ This search detects logins from the same user from different cities in a 24 hour | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access | +| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1078.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/001/) | Default Accounts | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access | +| [T1078.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/001/) | Default Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -85,11 +87,16 @@ Users in your enviornment may legitmately be travelling and loggin in from diffe #### Kill Chain Phase +* Exploitation +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -102,5 +109,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml) \| *version*: **2** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-overwriting_accessibility_binaries.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-overwriting_accessibility_binaries.md index 06c68fd3bd..c16aede44c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-overwriting_accessibility_binaries.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-overwriting_accessibility_binaries.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Overwriting Accessibility Binaries" -excerpt: "Event Triggered Execution, Accessibility Features" +excerpt: "Event Triggered Execution +, Accessibility Features +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2020-07-21 @@ -8,11 +10,11 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Event Triggered Execution - - Privilege Escalation - - Persistence - Accessibility Features + - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ tags: Microsoft Windows contains accessibility features that can be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in. An adversary can modify or replace these programs so they can get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system. This search looks for modifications to these binaries. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2020-07-21 @@ -39,9 +41,9 @@ Microsoft Windows contains accessibility features that can be launched with a ke | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1546](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/) | Event Triggered Execution | Privilege Escalation, Persistence | +| [T1546](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/) | Event Triggered Execution | Persistence, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1546.008](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008/) | Accessibility Features | Privilege Escalation, Persistence | +| [T1546.008](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008/) | Accessibility Features | Persistence, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -91,8 +93,6 @@ Microsoft may provide updates to these binaries. Verify that these changes do no | 72.0 | 80 | 90 | A suspicious file modification or replace in $file_path$ in host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.008/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.008/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.md index 1a8d02af91..56962e879a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed" -excerpt: "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol" +excerpt: "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol +" categories: - Network last_modified_at: 2020-07-21 @@ -15,17 +16,17 @@ tags: - Network_Traffic --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} #### Description -This search looks for network traffic defined by port and transport layer protocol in the Enterprise Security lookup table "lookup_interesting_ports", that is marked as prohibited, and has an associated 'allow' action in the Network_Traffic data model. This could be indicative of a misconfigured network device. +This search looks for network traffic defined by port and transport layer protocol in the Enterprise Security lookup table "lookup_interesting_ports", that is marked as prohibited, and has an associated 'allow' action in the Network_Traffic data model. This could be indicative of a misconfigured network device. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Network_Traffic](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkTraffic) - **Last Updated**: 2020-07-21 @@ -68,7 +69,7 @@ Note that `prohibited_network_traffic_allowed_filter` is a empty macro by defaul #### How To Implement -In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from firewalls or other network control devices that mediate the traffic allowed into an environment. This is necessary so that the search can identify an 'action' taken on the traffic of interest. The search requires the Network_Traffic data model be populated. +In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from firewalls or other network control devices that mediate the traffic allowed into an environment. This is necessary so that the search can identify an 'action' taken on the traffic of interest. The search requires the Network_Traffic data model be populated. #### Known False Positives None identified @@ -81,12 +82,16 @@ None identified #### Kill Chain Phase * Delivery -* Command and Control +* Command & Control +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -99,5 +104,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml) \| *version*: **2** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-protocol_or_port_mismatch.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-protocol_or_port_mismatch.md index ff7a201b66..20d6c37afb 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-protocol_or_port_mismatch.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-protocol_or_port_mismatch.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Protocol or Port Mismatch" -excerpt: "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol, Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol" +excerpt: "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol +, Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol +" categories: - Network last_modified_at: 2020-07-21 @@ -8,17 +10,17 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol - - Exfiltration - Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol - Exfiltration + - Exfiltration - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Network_Traffic --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search looks for network traffic on common ports where a higher layer protocol does not match the port that is being used. For example, this search should identify cases where protocols other than HTTP are running on TCP port 80. This can be used by attackers to circumvent firewall restrictions, or as an attempt to hide malicious communications over ports and protocols that are typically allowed and not well inspected. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Network_Traffic](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkTraffic) - **Last Updated**: 2020-07-21 @@ -81,12 +83,16 @@ None identified #### Kill Chain Phase -* Command and Control +* Command & Control +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -99,5 +105,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml) \| *version*: **2** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.md index b973bd6e19..bb37fb25ae 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce" -excerpt: "Remote Desktop Protocol, Remote Services" +excerpt: "Remote Desktop Protocol +, Remote Services +" categories: - Network last_modified_at: 2020-07-21 @@ -8,17 +10,17 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Remote Desktop Protocol - - Lateral Movement - Remote Services - Lateral Movement + - Lateral Movement - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Network_Traffic --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search looks for RDP application network traffic and filters any source/destination pair generating more than twice the standard deviation of the average traffic. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Network_Traffic](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkTraffic) - **Last Updated**: 2020-07-21 @@ -73,7 +75,7 @@ Note that `remote_desktop_network_bruteforce_filter` is a empty macro by default You must ensure that your network traffic data is populating the Network_Traffic data model. #### Known False Positives -RDP gateways may have unusually high amounts of traffic from all other hosts' RDP applications in the network. +RDP gateways may have unusually high amounts of traffic from all other hosts' RDP applications in the network. #### Associated Analytic story * [SamSam Ransomware](/stories/samsam_ransomware) @@ -86,8 +88,12 @@ RDP gateways may have unusually high amounts of traffic from all other hosts' +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -100,5 +106,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml) \| *version*: **2** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.md index 2f38a78798..0bc4cdda0e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Remote Desktop Process Running On System" -excerpt: "Remote Desktop Protocol, Remote Services" +excerpt: "Remote Desktop Protocol +, Remote Services +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2020-07-21 @@ -8,26 +10,26 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Remote Desktop Protocol - - Lateral Movement - Remote Services - Lateral Movement + - Lateral Movement - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} #### Description -This search looks for the remote desktop process mstsc.exe running on systems upon which it doesn't typically run. This is accomplished by filtering out all systems that are noted in the `common_rdp_source category` in the Assets and Identity framework. +This search looks for the remote desktop process mstsc.exe running on systems upon which it doesn't typically run. This is accomplished by filtering out all systems that are noted in the `common_rdp_source category` in the Assets and Identity framework. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2020-07-21 @@ -70,7 +72,7 @@ Note that `remote_desktop_process_running_on_system_filter` is a empty macro by #### How To Implement -To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. The search requires you to identify systems that do not commonly use remote desktop. You can use the included support search "Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop" to identify these systems. After identifying them, you will need to add the "common_rdp_source" category to that system using the Enterprise Security Assets and Identities framework. This can be done by adding an entry in the assets.csv file located in `SA-IdentityManagement/lookups`. +To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. The search requires you to identify systems that do not commonly use remote desktop. You can use the included support search "Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop" to identify these systems. After identifying them, you will need to add the "common_rdp_source" category to that system using the Enterprise Security Assets and Identities framework. This can be done by adding an entry in the assets.csv file located in `SA-IdentityManagement/lookups`. #### Known False Positives Remote Desktop may be used legitimately by users on the network. @@ -85,8 +87,12 @@ Remote Desktop may be used legitimately by users on the network. +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -99,5 +105,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml) \| *version*: **5** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.md index a763a52d23..f5369ab881 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services" -excerpt: "Windows Service, Create or Modify System Process" +excerpt: "Windows Service +, Create or Modify System Process +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2020-07-21 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Windows Service + - Create or Modify System Process - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Create or Modify System Process - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ tags: This search looks for arguments to sc.exe indicating the creation or modification of a Windows service. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2020-07-21 @@ -97,8 +99,6 @@ Using sc.exe to manipulate Windows services is uncommon. However, there may be l | 56.0 | 70 | 80 | A sc process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ to create of configure services in host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..944bfd8130 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.md @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +--- +title: "Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware" +excerpt: "Scheduled Task +" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2020-07-21 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Scheduled Task + - Execution + - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Endpoint +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line that indicate that task names related to the execution of Bad Rabbit ransomware were created or deleted. Deprecated because we already have a similar detection + +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) +- **Last Updated**: 2020-07-21 +- **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +- **ID**: 1297fb80-f42a-4b4a-9c8b-78c066437cf6 + + +#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1053.005](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/) | Scheduled Task | Execution, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | + +#### Search + +``` + +| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process) as process from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe (Processes.process= "*create*" OR Processes.process= "*delete*") by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user +| `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| search (process=*rhaegal* OR process=*drogon* OR *viserion_*) +| `scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) + +Note that `scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time + + +#### How To Implement +You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. + +#### Known False Positives +No known false positives + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Ransomware](/stories/ransomware) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Actions on Objectives + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml) \| *version*: **3** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-sql_injection_with_long_urls.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-sql_injection_with_long_urls.md index 138a0ff6ee..c23663e857 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-sql_injection_with_long_urls.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-sql_injection_with_long_urls.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "SQL Injection with Long URLs" -excerpt: "Exploit Public-Facing Application" +excerpt: "Exploit Public-Facing Application +" categories: - Web last_modified_at: 2020-07-21 @@ -15,8 +16,8 @@ tags: - Web --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -25,7 +26,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search looks for long URLs that have several SQL commands visible within them. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Web](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Web) - **Last Updated**: 2020-07-21 @@ -71,7 +72,7 @@ Note that `sql_injection_with_long_urls_filter` is a empty macro by default. It To successfully implement this search, you need to be monitoring network communications to your web servers or ingesting your HTTP logs and populating the Web data model. You must also identify your web servers in the Enterprise Security assets table. #### Known False Positives -It's possible that legitimate traffic will have long URLs or long user agent strings and that common SQL commands may be found within the URL. Please investigate as appropriate. +It's possible that legitimate traffic will have long URLs or long user agent strings and that common SQL commands may be found within the URL. Please investigate as appropriate. #### Associated Analytic story * [SQL Injection](/stories/sql_injection) @@ -82,8 +83,12 @@ It's possible that legitimate traffic will have long URLs or long user agent +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -96,5 +101,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml) \| *version*: **2** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-smb_traffic_spike.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-smb_traffic_spike.md index ce817934d8..5604752050 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-smb_traffic_spike.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-smb_traffic_spike.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "SMB Traffic Spike" -excerpt: "SMB/Windows Admin Shares, Remote Services" +excerpt: "SMB/Windows Admin Shares +, Remote Services +" categories: - Network last_modified_at: 2020-07-22 @@ -8,17 +10,17 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - SMB/Windows Admin Shares - - Lateral Movement - Remote Services - Lateral Movement + - Lateral Movement - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Network_Traffic --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search looks for spikes in the number of Server Message Block (SMB) traffic connections. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Network_Traffic](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkTraffic) - **Last Updated**: 2020-07-22 @@ -88,8 +90,12 @@ A file server may experience high-demand loads that could cause this analytic to +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -102,5 +108,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml) \| *version*: **3** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-smb_traffic_spike_-_mltk.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-smb_traffic_spike_-_mltk.md index 866e70a22a..70313f634a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-smb_traffic_spike_-_mltk.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-smb_traffic_spike_-_mltk.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK" -excerpt: "SMB/Windows Admin Shares, Remote Services" +excerpt: "SMB/Windows Admin Shares +, Remote Services +" categories: - Network last_modified_at: 2020-07-22 @@ -8,17 +10,17 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - SMB/Windows Admin Shares - - Lateral Movement - Remote Services - Lateral Movement + - Lateral Movement - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Network_Traffic --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search uses the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) to identify spikes in the number of Server Message Block (SMB) connections. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Network_Traffic](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkTraffic) - **Last Updated**: 2020-07-22 @@ -74,8 +76,8 @@ Note that `smb_traffic_spike_-_mltk_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allo #### How To Implement -To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. In addition, the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or greater must be installed on your search heads, along with any required dependencies. Finally, the support search "Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK" must be executed before this detection search, because it builds a machine-learning (ML) model over the historical data used by this search. It is important that this search is run in the same app context as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild the model with the latest data available in your environment.\ -This search produces a field (Number of events,count) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. This field contributes additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following field, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry): \ +To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. In addition, the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or greater must be installed on your search heads, along with any required dependencies. Finally, the support search "Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK" must be executed before this detection search, because it builds a machine-learning (ML) model over the historical data used by this search. It is important that this search is run in the same app context as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild the model with the latest data available in your environment.\ +This search produces a field (Number of events,count) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. This field contributes additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following field, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry): \ 1. **Label:** Number of events, **Field:** count\ Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review is found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` @@ -94,8 +96,12 @@ If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider reducing the value +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -108,5 +114,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/network/smb_traffic_spike_-_mltk.yml) \| *version*: **3** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..963b85013d --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.md @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +--- +title: "Suspicious Changes to File Associations" +excerpt: "Change Default File Association +" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2020-07-22 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Change Default File Association + - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search looks for changes to registry values that control Windows file associations, executed by a process that is not typical for legitimate, routine changes to this area. + +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2020-07-22 +- **Author**: Rico Valdez, Splunk +- **ID**: 1b989a0e-0129-4446-a695-f193a5b746fc + + +#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1546.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/001/) | Change Default File Association | Persistence, Privilege Escalation | + +#### Search + +``` + +| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name!=Explorer.exe AND Processes.process_name!=OpenWith.exe by Processes.process_id Processes.dest +| `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| join [ +| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*\\Explorer\\FileExts* by Registry.process_id Registry.dest +| `drop_dm_object_name("Registry")` +| table process_id dest registry_path] +| `suspicious_changes_to_file_associations_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) + +Note that `suspicious_changes_to_file_associations_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time + + +#### How To Implement +To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on registry changes that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Registry` nodes. + +#### Known False Positives +There may be other processes in your environment that users may legitimately use to modify file associations. If this is the case and you are finding false positives, you can modify the search to add those processes as exceptions. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Suspicious Windows Registry Activities](/stories/suspicious_windows_registry_activities) +* [Windows File Extension and Association Abuse](/stories/windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Actions on Objectives + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml) \| *version*: **4** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_email_-_uba_anomaly.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_email_-_uba_anomaly.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e0c6533177 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_email_-_uba_anomaly.md @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +--- +title: "Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly" +excerpt: "Phishing +" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2020-07-22 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Phishing + - Initial Access + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - UEBA +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This detection looks for emails that are suspicious because of their sender, domain rareness, or behavior differences. This is an anomaly generated by Splunk User Behavior Analytics (UBA). + +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: [UEBA](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/UEBA) +- **Last Updated**: 2020-07-22 +- **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +- **ID**: 56e877a6-1455-4479-ad16-0550dc1e33f8 + + +#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1566](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/) | Phishing | Initial Access | + +#### Search + +``` + +|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(All_UEBA_Events.category) as category from datamodel=UEBA where nodename=All_UEBA_Events.UEBA_Anomalies All_UEBA_Events.UEBA_Anomalies.uba_model = "SuspiciousEmailDetectionModel" by All_UEBA_Events.description All_UEBA_Events.severity All_UEBA_Events.user All_UEBA_Events.uba_event_type All_UEBA_Events.link All_UEBA_Events.signature All_UEBA_Events.url All_UEBA_Events.UEBA_Anomalies.uba_model +| `drop_dm_object_name(All_UEBA_Events)` +| `drop_dm_object_name(UEBA_Anomalies)` +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| `suspicious_email___uba_anomaly_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) + +Note that `suspicious_email_-_uba_anomaly_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time + + +#### How To Implement +You must be ingesting data from email logs and have Splunk integrated with UBA. This anomaly is raised by a UBA detection model called "SuspiciousEmailDetectionModel." Ensure that this model is enabled on your UBA instance. + +#### Known False Positives +This detection model will alert on any sender domain that is seen for the first time. This could be a potential false positive. The next step is to investigate and add the URL to an allow list if you determine that it is a legitimate sender. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Suspicious Emails](/stories/suspicious_emails) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Delivery + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/suspicious_email_-_uba_anomaly.yml) \| *version*: **3** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.md index ead71021d1..8c95fbf7b0 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions" -excerpt: "Spearphishing Attachment, Phishing" +excerpt: "Spearphishing Attachment +, Phishing +" categories: - Application last_modified_at: 2020-07-22 @@ -8,17 +10,17 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Spearphishing Attachment - - Initial Access - Phishing - Initial Access + - Initial Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Email --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search looks for emails that have attachments with suspicious file extensions. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Email](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Email) - **Last Updated**: 2020-07-22 @@ -57,17 +59,12 @@ This search looks for emails that have attachments with suspicious file extensio #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [suspicious_email_attachments](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/suspicious_email_attachments.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [suspicious_email_attachments](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/suspicious_email_attachments.yml) Note that `suspicious_email_attachment_extensions_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. -#### Lookups -The SPL above uses the following Lookups: - -* [is_suspicious_file_extension_lookup](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/is_suspicious_file_extension_lookup.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/is_suspicious_file_extension_lookup.csv) - #### Required field * _time * All_Email.file_name @@ -76,9 +73,9 @@ The SPL above uses the following Lookups: #### How To Implement -You need to ingest data from emails. Specifically, the sender's address and the file names of any attachments must be mapped to the Email data model. \ +You need to ingest data from emails. Specifically, the sender's address and the file names of any attachments must be mapped to the Email data model. \ **Splunk Phantom Playbook Integration**\ -If Splunk Phantom is also configured in your environment, a Playbook called "Suspicious Email Attachment Investigate and Delete" can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/`, and add the correct hostname to the "Phantom Instance" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search. The notable event will be sent to Phantom and the playbook will gather further information about the file attachment and its network behaviors. If Phantom finds malicious behavior and an analyst approves of the results, the email will be deleted from the user's inbox. +If Splunk Phantom is also configured in your environment, a Playbook called "Suspicious Email Attachment Investigate and Delete" can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/`, and add the correct hostname to the "Phantom Instance" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search. The notable event will be sent to Phantom and the playbook will gather further information about the file attachment and its network behaviors. If Phantom finds malicious behavior and an analyst approves of the results, the email will be deleted from the user's inbox. #### Known False Positives None identified @@ -93,8 +90,12 @@ None identified +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -107,5 +108,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml) \| *version*: **3** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_reg_exe_process.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_reg_exe_process.md index 443fe3d7b7..fb216e2876 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_reg_exe_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_reg_exe_process.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Suspicious Reg exe Process" -excerpt: "Modify Registry" +excerpt: "Modify Registry +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2020-07-22 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This search looks for reg.exe being launched from a command prompt not started by the user. When a user launches cmd.exe, the parent process is usually explorer.exe. This search filters out those instances. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2020-07-22 @@ -75,10 +76,10 @@ Note that `suspicious_reg_exe_process_filter` is a empty macro by default. It al #### How To Implement -You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. +You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. #### Known False Positives -It's possible for system administrators to write scripts that exhibit this behavior. If this is the case, the search will need to be modified to filter them out. +It's possible for system administrators to write scripts that exhibit this behavior. If this is the case, the search will need to be modified to filter them out. #### Associated Analytic story * [Windows Defense Evasion Tactics](/stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics) @@ -98,8 +99,6 @@ It's possible for system administrators to write scripts that exhibit this b | 35.0 | 70 | 50 | Suspicious $Processes.process_path.file_path$ process running with an uncommon parent process $Processes.parent_process_name$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -112,6 +111,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c343694113 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.md @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +--- +title: "Suspicious writes to System Volume Information" +excerpt: "Masquerading +" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2020-07-22 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Masquerading + - Defense Evasion + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search detects writes to the 'System Volume Information' folder by something other than the System process. + +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2020-07-22 +- **Author**: Rico Valdez, Splunk +- **ID**: cd6297cd-2bdd-4aa1-84aa-5d2f84228fac + + +#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1036](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/) | Masquerading | Defense Evasion | + +#### Search + +``` +(`sysmon` OR tag=process) EventCode=11 process_id!=4 file_path=*System\ Volume\ Information* +| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Image, file_path +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| `suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) + +Note that `suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time + + +#### How To Implement +You need to be ingesting logs with both the process name and command-line from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. + +#### Known False Positives +It is possible that other utilities or system processes may legitimately write to this folder. Investigate and modify the search to include exceptions as appropriate. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Collection and Staging](/stories/collection_and_staging) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Exploitation + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml) \| *version*: **2** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.md index 61c497c2e7..4c27c493e5 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin" -excerpt: "Masquerading" +excerpt: "Masquerading +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2020-07-22 @@ -22,7 +23,7 @@ tags: This search detects writes to the recycle bin by a process other than explorer.exe. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2020-07-22 @@ -79,6 +80,7 @@ Because the Recycle Bin is a hidden folder in modern versions of Windows, it wou #### Kill Chain Phase +* Exploitation @@ -89,8 +91,6 @@ Because the Recycle Bin is a hidden folder in modern versions of Windows, it wou | 28.0 | 40 | 70 | Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin process $Processes.process_name$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036/write_to_recycle_bin/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036/write_to_recycle_bin/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-tor_traffic.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-tor_traffic.md index 46b8a629d9..c939c86ea3 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-tor_traffic.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-tor_traffic.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "TOR Traffic" -excerpt: "Application Layer Protocol, Web Protocols" +excerpt: "Application Layer Protocol +, Web Protocols +" categories: - Network last_modified_at: 2020-07-22 @@ -8,17 +10,17 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Application Layer Protocol - - Command And Control - Web Protocols - Command And Control + - Command And Control - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Network_Traffic --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search looks for network traffic identified as The Onion Router (TOR), a benign anonymity network which can be abused for a variety of nefarious purposes. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Network_Traffic](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkTraffic) - **Last Updated**: 2020-07-22 @@ -71,7 +73,7 @@ Note that `tor_traffic_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user t #### How To Implement -In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from firewalls or other network control devices that mediate the traffic allowed into an environment. This is necessary so that the search can identify an 'action' taken on the traffic of interest. The search requires the Network_Traffic data model be populated. +In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from firewalls or other network control devices that mediate the traffic allowed into an environment. This is necessary so that the search can identify an 'action' taken on the traffic of interest. The search requires the Network_Traffic data model be populated. #### Known False Positives None at this time @@ -79,17 +81,21 @@ None at this time #### Associated Analytic story * [Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch](/stories/prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch) * [Ransomware](/stories/ransomware) -* [Command and Control](/stories/command_and_control) * [NOBELIUM Group](/stories/nobelium_group) +* [Command and Control](/stories/command_and_control) #### Kill Chain Phase -* Command and Control +* Command & Control +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -102,5 +108,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/network/tor_traffic.yml) \| *version*: **2** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8ce986980f --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.md @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +--- +title: "Uncommon Processes On Endpoint" +excerpt: "Malicious File +" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2020-07-22 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Malicious File + - Execution + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Endpoint +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search looks for applications on the endpoint that you have marked as uncommon. + +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) +- **Last Updated**: 2020-07-22 +- **Author**: David Dorsey, Splunk +- **ID**: 29ccce64-a10c-4389-a45f-337cb29ba1f7 + + +#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1204.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002/) | Malicious File | Execution | + +#### Search + +``` + +| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process Processes.process_name +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` +| `uncommon_processes` +|`uncommon_processes_on_endpoint_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [uncommon_processes](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/uncommon_processes.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) + +Note that `uncommon_processes_on_endpoint_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time + + +#### How To Implement +You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. This search uses a lookup file `uncommon_processes_default.csv` to track various features of process names that are usually uncommon in most environments. Please consider updating `uncommon_processes_local.csv` to hunt for processes that are uncommon in your environment. + +#### Known False Positives +None identified + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Windows Privilege Escalation](/stories/windows_privilege_escalation) +* [Unusual Processes](/stories/unusual_processes) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Actions on Objectives + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml) \| *version*: **4** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-unload_sysmon_filter_driver.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-unload_sysmon_filter_driver.md index f81ae6c0d0..361e494373 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-unload_sysmon_filter_driver.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-unload_sysmon_filter_driver.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Unload Sysmon Filter Driver" -excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools, Impair Defenses" +excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools +, Impair Defenses +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2020-07-22 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Disable or Modify Tools - - Defense Evasion - Impair Defenses - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,12 +27,12 @@ tags: Attackers often disable security tools to avoid detection. This search looks for the usage of process `fltMC.exe` to unload a Sysmon Driver that will stop sysmon from collecting the data. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2020-07-22 - **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk -- **ID**: c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f665664g9f +- **ID**: e5928ff3-23eb-4d8b-b8a4-dcbc844fdfbe #### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) @@ -71,7 +73,7 @@ Note that `unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter` is a empty macro by default. It a #### How To Implement -You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. This search is also shipped with `unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter` macro, update this macro to filter out false positives. +You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. This search is also shipped with `unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter` macro, update this macro to filter out false positives. #### Known False Positives @@ -92,8 +94,6 @@ You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to popu | 45.0 | 50 | 90 | Possible Sysmon filter driver unloading on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-27-aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-27-aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.md index f7408a07a5..2e662c6b9a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-27-aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-27-aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "aws detect attach to role policy" -excerpt: "Valid Accounts" +excerpt: "Valid Accounts +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2020-07-27 @@ -9,16 +10,16 @@ toc_label: "" tags: - Valid Accounts - Defense Evasion + - Initial Access - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Initial Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -27,7 +28,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search provides detection of an user attaching itself to a different role trust policy. This can be used for lateral movement and escalation of privileges. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2020-07-27 @@ -39,7 +40,7 @@ This search provides detection of an user attaching itself to a different role t | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access | +| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -72,12 +73,16 @@ Attach to policy can create a lot of noise. This search can be adjusted to provi #### Kill Chain Phase -* Lateral Movement +* Exploitation +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -90,5 +95,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-27-aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-27-aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.md index a0af3f9bd7..e3881400ee 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-27-aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-27-aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "aws detect permanent key creation" -excerpt: "Valid Accounts" +excerpt: "Valid Accounts +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2020-07-27 @@ -9,16 +10,16 @@ toc_label: "" tags: - Valid Accounts - Defense Evasion + - Initial Access - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Initial Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -27,7 +28,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search provides detection of accounts creating permanent keys. Permanent keys are not created by default and they are only needed for programmatic calls. Creation of Permanent key is an important event to monitor. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2020-07-27 @@ -39,7 +40,7 @@ This search provides detection of accounts creating permanent keys. Permanent ke | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access | +| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -82,12 +83,16 @@ Not all permanent key creations are malicious. If there is a policy of rotating #### Kill Chain Phase -* Lateral Movement +* Exploitation +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -100,5 +105,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-27-aws_detect_role_creation.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-27-aws_detect_role_creation.md index 1b2a99dfb9..fca67a4222 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-27-aws_detect_role_creation.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-27-aws_detect_role_creation.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "aws detect role creation" -excerpt: "Valid Accounts" +excerpt: "Valid Accounts +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2020-07-27 @@ -9,16 +10,16 @@ toc_label: "" tags: - Valid Accounts - Defense Evasion + - Initial Access - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Initial Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -27,7 +28,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search provides detection of role creation by IAM users. Role creation is an event by itself if user is creating a new role with trust policies different than the available in AWS and it can be used for lateral movement and escalation of privileges. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2020-07-27 @@ -39,7 +40,7 @@ This search provides detection of role creation by IAM users. Role creation is a | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access | +| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -87,12 +88,16 @@ CreateRole is not very common in common users. This search can be adjusted to pr #### Kill Chain Phase -* Lateral Movement +* Exploitation +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -105,5 +110,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_role_creation.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-27-aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-27-aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.md index 1613443534..cad78c02bd 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-27-aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-27-aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "aws detect sts assume role abuse" -excerpt: "Valid Accounts" +excerpt: "Valid Accounts +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2020-07-27 @@ -9,16 +10,16 @@ toc_label: "" tags: - Valid Accounts - Defense Evasion + - Initial Access - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Initial Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -27,7 +28,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search provides detection of suspicious use of sts:AssumeRole. These tokens can be created on the go and used by attackers to move laterally and escalate privileges. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2020-07-27 @@ -39,7 +40,7 @@ This search provides detection of suspicious use of sts:AssumeRole. These tokens | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access | +| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -81,12 +82,16 @@ Sts:AssumeRole can be very noisy as it is a standard mechanism to provide cross #### Kill Chain Phase -* Lateral Movement +* Exploitation +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -99,5 +104,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-27-aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-27-aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.md index 96891cb8e8..623fc7ec78 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-27-aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-27-aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "aws detect sts get session token abuse" -excerpt: "Use Alternate Authentication Material" +excerpt: "Use Alternate Authentication Material +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2020-07-27 @@ -15,8 +16,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Cloud --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -25,7 +26,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search provides detection of suspicious use of sts:GetSessionToken. These tokens can be created on the go and used by attackers to move laterally and escalate privileges. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2020-07-27 @@ -80,12 +81,16 @@ Sts:GetSessionToken can be very noisy as in certain environments numerous calls #### Kill Chain Phase -* Lateral Movement +* Exploitation +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -98,5 +103,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-28-detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-28-detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.md index a1cd428847..e9ebb38342 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-28-detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-28-detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream" -excerpt: "Exploitation for Client Execution" +excerpt: "Exploitation for Client Execution +" categories: - Network last_modified_at: 2020-07-28 @@ -12,11 +13,10 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - CVE-2020-1350 --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search detects SIGRed via Splunk Stream. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2020-07-28 @@ -56,8 +56,8 @@ This search detects SIGRed via Splunk Stream. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [stream_dns](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/stream_dns.yml) * [stream_tcp](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/stream_tcp.yml) +* [stream_dns](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/stream_dns.yml) Note that `detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ Note that `detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream_filter` is a empty macro #### How To Implement -You must be ingesting Splunk Stream DNS and Splunk Stream TCP. We are detecting SIG and KEY records via stream:dns and TCP payload over 65KB in size via stream:tcp. Replace the macro definitions ('stream:dns' and 'stream:tcp') with configurations for your Splunk environment. +You must be ingesting Splunk Stream DNS and Splunk Stream TCP. We are detecting SIG and KEY records via stream:dns and TCP payload over 65KB in size via stream:tcp. Replace the macro definitions ('stream:dns' and 'stream:tcp') with configurations for your Splunk environment. #### Known False Positives unknown @@ -80,23 +80,17 @@ unknown +#### RBA -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -#### CVE - -| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | -| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [CVE-2020-1350](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1350) | A remote code execution vulnerability exists in Windows Domain Name System servers when they fail to properly handle requests, aka 'Windows DNS Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability'. | 10.0 | - #### Reference -* [https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/](https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/) - - #### Test Dataset Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). @@ -104,5 +98,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-28-detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-28-detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.md index 5b76d34377..fe85f17092 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-28-detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-28-detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek" -excerpt: "Exploitation for Client Execution" +excerpt: "Exploitation for Client Execution +" categories: - Network last_modified_at: 2020-07-28 @@ -12,12 +13,11 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - CVE-2020-1350 - Network_Resolution --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search detects SIGRed via Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Network_Resolution](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkResolution) - **Last Updated**: 2020-07-28 @@ -84,23 +84,17 @@ unknown +#### RBA -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -#### CVE - -| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | -| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [CVE-2020-1350](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1350) | A remote code execution vulnerability exists in Windows Domain Name System servers when they fail to properly handle requests, aka 'Windows DNS Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability'. | 10.0 | - #### Reference -* [https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/](https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/) - - #### Test Dataset Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). @@ -108,5 +102,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-29-cloud_instance_modified_by_previously_unseen_user.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-29-cloud_instance_modified_by_previously_unseen_user.md index be533680fe..97102544f8 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-29-cloud_instance_modified_by_previously_unseen_user.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-29-cloud_instance_modified_by_previously_unseen_user.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User" -excerpt: "Cloud Accounts, Valid Accounts" +excerpt: "Cloud Accounts +, Valid Accounts +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2020-07-29 @@ -8,16 +10,15 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Cloud Accounts - - Defense Evasion - - Persistence - - Privilege Escalation - - Initial Access - Valid Accounts - Defense Evasion + - Initial Access - Persistence - Privilege Escalation + - Defense Evasion - Initial Access - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS + - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -32,8 +33,8 @@ tags: This search looks for cloud instances being modified by users who have not previously modified them. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Security Analytics for AWS, Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Change](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Change) - **Last Updated**: 2020-07-29 - **Author**: Rico Valdez, Splunk @@ -44,9 +45,9 @@ This search looks for cloud instances being modified by users who have not previ | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1078.004](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/) | Cloud Accounts | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access | +| [T1078.004](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/) | Cloud Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access | +| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -74,7 +75,7 @@ Note that `cloud_instance_modified_by_previously_unseen_user_filter` is a empty #### Lookups The SPL above uses the following Lookups: -* [previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user.yml) with [data]() +* [previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/lookups/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user.csv) #### Required field * _time @@ -87,16 +88,17 @@ The SPL above uses the following Lookups: #### How To Implement -This search has a dependency on other searches to create and update a baseline of users observed to be associated with this activity. The search "Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update" should be enabled for this detection to properly work. +This search has a dependency on other searches to create and update a baseline of users observed to be associated with this activity. The search "Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update" should be enabled for this detection to properly work. #### Known False Positives -It's possible that a new user will start to modify EC2 instances when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is modifying instances that this is the intended behavior. +It's possible that a new user will start to modify EC2 instances when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is modifying instances that this is the intended behavior. #### Associated Analytic story * [Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities](/stories/suspicious_cloud_instance_activities) #### Kill Chain Phase +* Actions on Objectives @@ -107,8 +109,6 @@ It's possible that a new user will start to modify EC2 instances when they h | 42.0 | 70 | 60 | User $user$ is modifying an instance $dest$ for the first time. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-08-02-detect_f5_tmui_rce_cve-2020-5902.md b/docs/_posts/2020-08-02-detect_f5_tmui_rce_cve-2020-5902.md index 16079da667..dd28a8ead7 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-08-02-detect_f5_tmui_rce_cve-2020-5902.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-08-02-detect_f5_tmui_rce_cve-2020-5902.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902" -excerpt: "Exploit Public-Facing Application" +excerpt: "Exploit Public-Facing Application +" categories: - Web last_modified_at: 2020-08-02 @@ -12,11 +13,10 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - CVE-2020-5902 --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search detects remote code exploit attempts on F5 BIG-IP, BIG-IQ, and Traffix SDC devices -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2020-08-02 @@ -73,23 +73,19 @@ unknown +#### RBA -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -#### CVE - -| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | -| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [CVE-2020-5902](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-5902) | In BIG-IP versions 15.0.0-15.1.0.3, 14.1.0-14.1.2.5, 13.1.0-13.1.3.3, 12.1.0-12.1.5.1, and 11.6.1-11.6.5.1, the Traffic Management User Interface (TMUI), also referred to as the Configuration utility, has a Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability in undisclosed pages. | 10.0 | - #### Reference * [https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/about/news/f5-fixes-critical-vulnerability-discovered-by-positive-technologies-in-big-ip-application-delivery-controller/](https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/about/news/f5-fixes-critical-vulnerability-discovered-by-positive-technologies-in-big-ip-application-delivery-controller/) * [https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K52145254](https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K52145254) -* [https://blog.cloudflare.com/cve-2020-5902-helping-to-protect-against-the-f5-tmui-rce-vulnerability/](https://blog.cloudflare.com/cve-2020-5902-helping-to-protect-against-the-f5-tmui-rce-vulnerability/) @@ -99,5 +95,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rce_cve-2020-5902.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-08-05-detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.md b/docs/_posts/2020-08-05-detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.md index 408775f3bd..5d4b9a5823 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-08-05-detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-08-05-detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets" -excerpt: "Data from Cloud Storage Object" +excerpt: "Data from Cloud Storage Object +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2020-08-05 @@ -14,8 +15,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Cloud --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -24,7 +25,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search looks for GCP PubSub events where a user has created an open/public GCP Storage bucket. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2020-08-05 @@ -77,7 +78,7 @@ Note that `detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets_filter` is a empty macro by defau This search relies on the Splunk Add-on for Google Cloud Platform, setting up a Cloud Pub/Sub input, along with the relevant GCP PubSub topics and logging sink to capture GCP Storage Bucket events (https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/routing/overview). #### Known False Positives -While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that a GCP admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. That said, GCP strongly advises against granting full control to the "allUsers" group. +While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that a GCP admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. That said, GCP strongly advises against granting full control to the "allUsers" group. #### Associated Analytic story * [Suspicious GCP Storage Activities](/stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities) @@ -88,8 +89,12 @@ While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that a GCP admin +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -102,5 +107,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-08-10-detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.md b/docs/_posts/2020-08-10-detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.md index 931f8d21a0..ad5c098667 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-08-10-detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-08-10-detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP" -excerpt: "Data from Cloud Storage Object" +excerpt: "Data from Cloud Storage Object +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2020-08-10 @@ -14,8 +15,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Cloud --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -24,7 +25,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search looks at GCP Storage bucket-access logs and detects new or previously unseen remote IP addresses that have successfully accessed a GCP Storage bucket. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2020-08-10 @@ -71,7 +72,8 @@ Note that `detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip_filter` is a empty macro by d #### Lookups The SPL above uses the following Lookups: -* [previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip.csv) +* [previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/lookups/previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip.csv) +* [previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/lookups/previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip.csv) #### Required field * _time @@ -97,8 +99,12 @@ GCP Storage buckets can be accessed from any IP (if the ACLs are open to allow i +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -111,5 +117,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-08-11-detect_arp_poisoning.md b/docs/_posts/2020-08-11-detect_arp_poisoning.md index 0c0affcd73..1c531ad91d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-08-11-detect_arp_poisoning.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-08-11-detect_arp_poisoning.md @@ -1,6 +1,10 @@ --- title: "Detect ARP Poisoning" -excerpt: "Hardware Additions, Network Denial of Service, Adversary-in-the-Middle, ARP Cache Poisoning" +excerpt: "Hardware Additions +, Network Denial of Service +, Adversary-in-the-Middle +, ARP Cache Poisoning +" categories: - Network last_modified_at: 2020-08-11 @@ -8,31 +12,31 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Hardware Additions - - Initial Access - Network Denial of Service - - Impact - Adversary-in-the-Middle - - Credential Access - - Collection - ARP Cache Poisoning + - Initial Access + - Impact + - Collection - Credential Access - Collection + - Credential Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} #### Description -By enabling Dynamic ARP Inspection as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect ARP Poisoning attacks in the Infrastructure. +By enabling Dynamic ARP Inspection as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect ARP Poisoning attacks in the Infrastructure. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2020-08-11 @@ -48,9 +52,9 @@ By enabling Dynamic ARP Inspection as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organiza | [T1498](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/) | Network Denial of Service | Impact | -| [T1557](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/) | Adversary-in-the-Middle | Credential Access, Collection | +| [T1557](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/) | Adversary-in-the-Middle | Collection, Credential Access | -| [T1557.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/002/) | ARP Cache Poisoning | Credential Access, Collection | +| [T1557.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/002/) | ARP Cache Poisoning | Collection, Credential Access | #### Search @@ -65,8 +69,8 @@ By enabling Dynamic ARP Inspection as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organiza #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [cisco_networks](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cisco_networks.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [cisco_networks](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cisco_networks.yml) Note that `detect_arp_poisoning_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -82,7 +86,7 @@ Note that `detect_arp_poisoning_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows t #### How To Implement -This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with DHCP Snooping (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960x/software/15-0_2_EX/security/configuration_guide/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg_chapter_01101.html) and Dynamic ARP Inspection (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960x/software/15-2_2_e/security/configuration_guide/b_sec_1522e_2960x_cg/b_sec_1522e_2960x_cg_chapter_01111.html) and log with a severity level of minimum "5 - notification". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices. +This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with DHCP Snooping (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960x/software/15-0_2_EX/security/configuration_guide/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg_chapter_01101.html) and Dynamic ARP Inspection (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960x/software/15-2_2_e/security/configuration_guide/b_sec_1522e_2960x_cg/b_sec_1522e_2960x_cg_chapter_01111.html) and log with a severity level of minimum "5 - notification". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices. #### Known False Positives This search might be prone to high false positives if DHCP Snooping or ARP inspection has been incorrectly configured, or if a device normally sends many ARP packets (unlikely). @@ -98,8 +102,12 @@ This search might be prone to high false positives if DHCP Snooping or ARP inspe +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -112,5 +120,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-08-11-detect_rogue_dhcp_server.md b/docs/_posts/2020-08-11-detect_rogue_dhcp_server.md index ad46b2f7b8..11d63f38a3 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-08-11-detect_rogue_dhcp_server.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-08-11-detect_rogue_dhcp_server.md @@ -1,6 +1,9 @@ --- title: "Detect Rogue DHCP Server" -excerpt: "Hardware Additions, Network Denial of Service, Adversary-in-the-Middle" +excerpt: "Hardware Additions +, Network Denial of Service +, Adversary-in-the-Middle +" categories: - Network last_modified_at: 2020-08-11 @@ -8,28 +11,28 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Hardware Additions - - Initial Access - Network Denial of Service - - Impact - Adversary-in-the-Middle - - Credential Access + - Initial Access + - Impact - Collection + - Credential Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} #### Description -By enabling DHCP Snooping as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect unauthorized DHCP servers handing out DHCP leases to devices on the network (Man in the Middle attack). +By enabling DHCP Snooping as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect unauthorized DHCP servers handing out DHCP leases to devices on the network (Man in the Middle attack). -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2020-08-11 @@ -45,7 +48,7 @@ By enabling DHCP Snooping as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization' | [T1498](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/) | Network Denial of Service | Impact | -| [T1557](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/) | Adversary-in-the-Middle | Credential Access, Collection | +| [T1557](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/) | Adversary-in-the-Middle | Collection, Credential Access | #### Search @@ -59,8 +62,8 @@ By enabling DHCP Snooping as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization' #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [cisco_networks](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cisco_networks.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [cisco_networks](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cisco_networks.yml) Note that `detect_rogue_dhcp_server_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -74,7 +77,7 @@ Note that `detect_rogue_dhcp_server_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allo #### How To Implement -This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with DHCP Snooping enabled (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960x/software/15-0_2_EX/security/configuration_guide/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg_chapter_01101.html) and log with a severity level of minimum "5 - notification". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices. +This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with DHCP Snooping enabled (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960x/software/15-0_2_EX/security/configuration_guide/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg_chapter_01101.html) and log with a severity level of minimum "5 - notification". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices. #### Known False Positives This search might be prone to high false positives if DHCP Snooping has been incorrectly configured or in the unlikely event that the DHCP server has been moved to another network interface. @@ -90,8 +93,12 @@ This search might be prone to high false positives if DHCP Snooping has been inc +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -104,5 +111,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-08-16-cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.md b/docs/_posts/2020-08-16-cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.md index d608b315f6..7d0f2242c2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-08-16-cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-08-16-cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address" -excerpt: "Valid Accounts" +excerpt: "Valid Accounts +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2020-08-16 @@ -9,10 +10,9 @@ toc_label: "" tags: - Valid Accounts - Defense Evasion + - Initial Access - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Initial Access - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -27,8 +27,8 @@ tags: This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen IP addresses. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Security Analytics for AWS, Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Change](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Change) - **Last Updated**: 2020-08-16 - **Author**: Rico Valdez, Splunk @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen IP ad | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access | +| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -59,15 +59,15 @@ This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen IP ad #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window.yml) Note that `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. #### Lookups The SPL above uses the following Lookups: -* [previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources.yml) with [data]() +* [previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/lookups/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources.csv) #### Required field * _time @@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ The SPL above uses the following Lookups: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter` macro. #### Known False Positives -This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ +This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. #### Associated Analytic story @@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slig #### Kill Chain Phase +* Actions on Objectives @@ -101,8 +102,6 @@ This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slig | 42.0 | 70 | 60 | User $user$ is starting or creating an instance $object_id$ for the first time from IP address $src$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -112,6 +111,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-08-16-cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region.md b/docs/_posts/2020-08-16-cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region.md index a6d25cadc8..d7d805a76a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-08-16-cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-08-16-cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region" -excerpt: "Valid Accounts" +excerpt: "Valid Accounts +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2020-08-16 @@ -9,10 +10,9 @@ toc_label: "" tags: - Valid Accounts - Defense Evasion + - Initial Access - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Initial Access - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -27,8 +27,8 @@ tags: This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen regions. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Security Analytics for AWS, Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Change](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Change) - **Last Updated**: 2020-08-16 - **Author**: Rico Valdez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen regio | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access | +| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -61,15 +61,15 @@ This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen regio #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window.yml) Note that `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. #### Lookups The SPL above uses the following Lookups: -* [previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources.yml) with [data]() +* [previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/lookups/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources.csv) #### Required field * _time @@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ The SPL above uses the following Lookups: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region_filter` macro. #### Known False Positives -This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ +This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. #### Associated Analytic story @@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slig #### Kill Chain Phase +* Actions on Objectives @@ -103,8 +104,6 @@ This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slig | 42.0 | 70 | 60 | User $user$ is starting or creating an instance $object$ for the first time in region $Region$ from IP address $src$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -114,6 +113,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-08-21-abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_destroyed.md b/docs/_posts/2020-08-21-abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_destroyed.md index cc144f830a..9db1adb898 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-08-21-abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_destroyed.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-08-21-abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_destroyed.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed" -excerpt: "Cloud Accounts, Valid Accounts" +excerpt: "Cloud Accounts +, Valid Accounts +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2020-08-21 @@ -8,24 +10,23 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Cloud Accounts - - Defense Evasion - - Persistence - - Privilege Escalation - - Initial Access - Valid Accounts - Defense Evasion + - Initial Access - Persistence - Privilege Escalation + - Defense Evasion - Initial Access - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS + - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Change --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -34,8 +35,8 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search finds for the number successfully destroyed cloud instances for every 4 hour block. This is split up between weekdays and the weekend. It then applies the probability densitiy model previously created and alerts on any outliers. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Security Analytics for AWS, Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Change](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Change) - **Last Updated**: 2020-08-21 - **Author**: David Dorsey, Splunk @@ -46,9 +47,9 @@ This search finds for the number successfully destroyed cloud instances for ever | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1078.004](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/) | Cloud Accounts | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access | +| [T1078.004](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/) | Cloud Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access | +| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -100,8 +101,12 @@ Many service accounts configured within a cloud infrastructure are known to exhi +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -114,5 +119,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-08-21-abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_launched.md b/docs/_posts/2020-08-21-abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_launched.md index 07a2a6ecc6..94d2e104c8 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-08-21-abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_launched.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-08-21-abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_launched.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched" -excerpt: "Cloud Accounts, Valid Accounts" +excerpt: "Cloud Accounts +, Valid Accounts +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2020-08-21 @@ -8,24 +10,23 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Cloud Accounts - - Defense Evasion - - Persistence - - Privilege Escalation - - Initial Access - Valid Accounts - Defense Evasion + - Initial Access - Persistence - Privilege Escalation + - Defense Evasion - Initial Access - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS + - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Change --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -34,8 +35,8 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search finds for the number successfully created cloud instances for every 4 hour block. This is split up between weekdays and the weekend. It then applies the probability densitiy model previously created and alerts on any outliers. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Security Analytics for AWS, Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Change](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Change) - **Last Updated**: 2020-08-21 - **Author**: David Dorsey, Splunk @@ -46,9 +47,9 @@ This search finds for the number successfully created cloud instances for every | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1078.004](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/) | Cloud Accounts | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access | +| [T1078.004](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/) | Cloud Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access | +| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -101,8 +102,12 @@ Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhib +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -115,5 +120,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_launched.yml) \| *version*: **2** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-09-01-gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.md b/docs/_posts/2020-09-01-gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ddd119d9e7 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-09-01-gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.md @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +--- +title: "gcp detect oauth token abuse" +excerpt: "Valid Accounts +" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2020-09-01 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Valid Accounts + - Defense Evasion + - Initial Access + - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search provides detection of possible GCP Oauth token abuse. GCP Oauth token without time limit can be exfiltrated and reused for keeping access sessions alive without further control of authentication, allowing attackers to access and move laterally. + +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2020-09-01 +- **Author**: Rod Soto, Splunk +- **ID**: a7e9f7bb-8901-4ad0-8d88-0a4ab07b1972 + + +#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | + +#### Search + +``` +`google_gcp_pubsub_message` type.googleapis.com/google.cloud.audit.AuditLog +|table protoPayload.@type protoPayload.status.details{}.@type protoPayload.status.details{}.violations{}.callerIp protoPayload.status.details{}.violations{}.type protoPayload.status.message +| `gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [google_gcp_pubsub_message](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/google_gcp_pubsub_message.yml) + +Note that `gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time + + +#### How To Implement +You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message logs + +#### Known False Positives +GCP Oauth token abuse detection will only work if there are access policies in place along with audit logs. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [GCP Cross Account Activity](/stories/gcp_cross_account_activity) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Exploitation + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + +* [https://www.netskope.com/blog/gcp-oauth-token-hijacking-in-google-cloud-part-1](https://www.netskope.com/blog/gcp-oauth-token-hijacking-in-google-cloud-part-1) +* [https://www.netskope.com/blog/gcp-oauth-token-hijacking-in-google-cloud-part-2](https://www.netskope.com/blog/gcp-oauth-token-hijacking-in-google-cloud-part-2) + + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-09-02-cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.md b/docs/_posts/2020-09-02-cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.md index 25c8be3565..8d89a2d964 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-09-02-cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-09-02-cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region" -excerpt: "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions" +excerpt: "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2020-09-02 @@ -9,7 +10,6 @@ toc_label: "" tags: - Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions - Defense Evasion - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -24,8 +24,8 @@ tags: This search looks at cloud-infrastructure events where an instance is created in any region within the last hour and then compares it to a lookup file of previously seen regions where instances have been created. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Security Analytics for AWS, Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Change](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Change) - **Last Updated**: 2020-09-02 - **Author**: David Dorsey, Splunk @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ Note that `cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region_filter` is #### Lookups The SPL above uses the following Lookups: -* [previously_seen_cloud_regions](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/previously_seen_cloud_regions.yml) with [data]() +* [previously_seen_cloud_regions](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/previously_seen_cloud_regions.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/lookups/previously_seen_cloud_regions.csv) #### Required field * _time @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ The SPL above uses the following Lookups: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial` to build the initial table of images observed and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region_filter` macro. #### Known False Positives -It's possible that a user has unknowingly started an instance in a new region. Please verify that this activity is legitimate. +It's possible that a user has unknowingly started an instance in a new region. Please verify that this activity is legitimate. #### Associated Analytic story * [Cloud Cryptomining](/stories/cloud_cryptomining) @@ -95,8 +95,6 @@ It's possible that a user has unknowingly started an instance in a new regio | 42.0 | 70 | 60 | User $user$ is creating an instance $dest$ in a new region for the first time | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -106,6 +104,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-09-04-cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.md b/docs/_posts/2020-09-04-cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.md index a54753a5cb..c7cb6481b5 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-09-04-cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-09-04-cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles" -excerpt: "Valid Accounts" +excerpt: "Valid Accounts +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2020-09-04 @@ -9,10 +10,9 @@ toc_label: "" tags: - Valid Accounts - Defense Evasion + - Initial Access - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Initial Access - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -27,8 +27,8 @@ tags: This search looks for new commands from each user role. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Security Analytics for AWS, Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Change](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Change) - **Last Updated**: 2020-09-04 - **Author**: David Dorsey, Splunk @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ This search looks for new commands from each user role. | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access | +| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ Note that `cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_filter` is a empty #### Lookups The SPL above uses the following Lookups: -* [previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role.yml) with [data]() +* [previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/lookups/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role.csv) #### Required field * _time @@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. #### Kill Chain Phase +* Actions on Objectives @@ -99,8 +100,6 @@ You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. | 36.0 | 60 | 60 | User $user$ of type AssumedRole attempting to execute new API calls $command$ that have not been seen before | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -110,6 +109,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-09-07-abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.md b/docs/_posts/2020-09-07-abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.md index 76971e4519..8ac44cd7bf 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-09-07-abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-09-07-abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls" -excerpt: "Cloud Accounts, Valid Accounts" +excerpt: "Cloud Accounts +, Valid Accounts +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2020-09-07 @@ -8,16 +10,15 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Cloud Accounts - - Defense Evasion - - Persistence - - Privilege Escalation - - Initial Access - Valid Accounts - Defense Evasion + - Initial Access - Persistence - Privilege Escalation + - Defense Evasion - Initial Access - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS + - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -32,8 +33,8 @@ tags: This search will detect a spike in the number of API calls made to your cloud infrastructure environment by a user. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Security Analytics for AWS, Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Change](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Change) - **Last Updated**: 2020-09-07 - **Author**: David Dorsey, Splunk @@ -44,9 +45,9 @@ This search will detect a spike in the number of API calls made to your cloud in | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1078.004](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/) | Cloud Accounts | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access | +| [T1078.004](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/) | Cloud Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access | +| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -104,8 +105,6 @@ You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the base | 15.0 | 30 | 50 | user $user$ has made $api_calls$ api calls, violating the dynamic threshold of $expected_upper_threshold$ with the following command $command$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -115,6 +114,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-09-07-abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.md b/docs/_posts/2020-09-07-abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.md index 6171b9d95b..f4bfd9fd10 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-09-07-abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-09-07-abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls" -excerpt: "Cloud Accounts, Valid Accounts" +excerpt: "Cloud Accounts +, Valid Accounts +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2020-09-07 @@ -8,16 +10,15 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Cloud Accounts - - Defense Evasion - - Persistence - - Privilege Escalation - - Initial Access - Valid Accounts - Defense Evasion + - Initial Access - Persistence - Privilege Escalation + - Defense Evasion - Initial Access - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS + - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -32,8 +33,8 @@ tags: This search will detect a spike in the number of API calls made to your cloud infrastructure environment about security groups by a user. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Security Analytics for AWS, Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Change](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Change) - **Last Updated**: 2020-09-07 - **Author**: David Dorsey, Splunk @@ -44,9 +45,9 @@ This search will detect a spike in the number of API calls made to your cloud in | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1078.004](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/) | Cloud Accounts | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access | +| [T1078.004](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/) | Cloud Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access | +| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -105,8 +106,6 @@ You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the base | 15.0 | 30 | 50 | user $user$ has made $api_calls$ api calls related to security groups, violating the dynamic threshold of $expected_upper_threshold$ with the following command $command$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -116,6 +115,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-09-08-cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.md b/docs/_posts/2020-09-08-cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c007dc6e90 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-09-08-cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.md @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +--- +title: "Cloud Network Access Control List Deleted" +excerpt: "" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2020-09-08 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +Enforcing network-access controls is one of the defensive mechanisms used by cloud administrators to restrict access to a cloud instance. After the attacker has gained control of the console by compromising an admin account, they can delete a network ACL and gain access to the instance from anywhere. This search will query the Change datamodel to detect users deleting network ACLs. Deprecated because it's a duplicate + +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2020-09-08 +- **Author**: Peter Gael, Splunk +- **ID**: 021abc51-1862-41dd-ad43-43c739c0a983 + +#### Search + +``` +`cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteNetworkAcl +|rename userIdentity.arn as arn +| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(errorMessage) values(errorCode) values(userAgent) values(userIdentity.*) by src userName arn eventName +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) + +Note that `cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* eventName +* userIdentity.arn +* errorMessage +* errorCode +* userAgent +* src +* userName +* arn + + +#### How To Implement +You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter` macro. + +#### Known False Positives +It's possible that a user has legitimately deleted a network ACL. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Cloud Network ACL Activity](/stories/cloud_network_acl_activity) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Actions on Objectives + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-09-12-cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.md b/docs/_posts/2020-09-12-cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.md index 572695b587..a842431eeb 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-09-12-cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-09-12-cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.md @@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ last_modified_at: 2020-09-12 toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -22,8 +21,8 @@ tags: Find EC2 instances being created with previously unseen instance types. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Security Analytics for AWS, Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Change](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Change) - **Last Updated**: 2020-09-12 - **Author**: David Dorsey, Splunk @@ -56,7 +55,7 @@ Note that `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_f #### Lookups The SPL above uses the following Lookups: -* [previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types.yml) with [data]() +* [previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/lookups/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types.csv) #### Required field * _time @@ -77,6 +76,7 @@ It is possible that an admin will create a new system using a new instance type #### Kill Chain Phase +* Actions on Objectives @@ -87,8 +87,6 @@ It is possible that an admin will create a new system using a new instance type | 30.0 | 50 | 60 | User $user$ is creating an instance $dest$ with an instance type $instance_type$ that has not been previously seen. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -98,6 +96,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-09-15-detect_zerologon_via_zeek.md b/docs/_posts/2020-09-15-detect_zerologon_via_zeek.md index 58ac2575e2..8059b1526d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-09-15-detect_zerologon_via_zeek.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-09-15-detect_zerologon_via_zeek.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Detect Zerologon via Zeek" -excerpt: "Exploit Public-Facing Application" +excerpt: "Exploit Public-Facing Application +" categories: - Network last_modified_at: 2020-09-15 @@ -12,11 +13,10 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - CVE-2020-1472 --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search detects attempts to run exploits for the Zerologon CVE-2020-1472 vulnerability via Zeek RPC -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2020-09-15 @@ -75,16 +75,13 @@ unknown +#### RBA -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -#### CVE - -| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | -| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [CVE-2020-1472](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472) | An elevation of privilege vulnerability exists when an attacker establishes a vulnerable Netlogon secure channel connection to a domain controller, using the Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC), aka 'Netlogon Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability'. | 9.3 | - #### Reference @@ -101,5 +98,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-09-16-create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.md b/docs/_posts/2020-09-16-create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.md index 50661ff540..4851598bb9 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-09-16-create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-09-16-create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Create or delete windows shares using net exe" -excerpt: "Indicator Removal on Host, Network Share Connection Removal" +excerpt: "Indicator Removal on Host +, Network Share Connection Removal +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2020-09-16 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Indicator Removal on Host - - Defense Evasion - Network Share Connection Removal - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,12 +27,12 @@ tags: This search looks for the creation or deletion of hidden shares using net.exe. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2020-09-16 - **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk -- **ID**: qw9919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-151bb162140e +- **ID**: 743a322c-9a68-4a0f-9c17-85d9cce2a27c #### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) @@ -55,9 +57,9 @@ This search looks for the creation or deletion of hidden shares using net.exe. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) Note that `create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -98,8 +100,6 @@ Administrators often leverage net.exe to create or delete network shares. You sh | 25.0 | 50 | 50 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ enumerating Windows file shares. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-09-18-detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.md b/docs/_posts/2020-09-18-detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.md index 712c18cfda..07cd766820 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-09-18-detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-09-18-detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account" -excerpt: "Exploitation of Remote Services" +excerpt: "Exploitation of Remote Services +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2020-09-18 @@ -12,11 +13,10 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - CVE-2020-1472 --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search looks for Event Code 4742 (Computer Change) or EventCode 4624 (An account was successfully logged on) with an anonymous account. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2020-09-18 @@ -84,15 +84,6 @@ None thus far found | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | The following $EventCode$ occurred on $dest$ by $user$ with Logon Type 3, which may be indicative of the an account or group being changed by an anonymous account. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - - -#### CVE - -| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | -| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [CVE-2020-1472](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472) | An elevation of privilege vulnerability exists when an attacker establishes a vulnerable Netlogon secure channel connection to a domain controller, using the Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC), aka 'Netlogon Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability'. | 9.3 | - #### Reference @@ -107,5 +98,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-10-07-detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.md b/docs/_posts/2020-10-07-detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.md index cd08353b6c..7112716a73 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-10-07-detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-10-07-detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City" -excerpt: "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions" +excerpt: "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2020-10-07 @@ -9,7 +10,6 @@ toc_label: "" tags: - Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions - Defense Evasion - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -24,8 +24,8 @@ tags: This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Security Analytics for AWS, Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Authentication](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Authentication) - **Last Updated**: 2020-10-07 - **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ Note that `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter` is a empty mac #### Lookups The SPL above uses the following Lookups: -* [previously_seen_users_console_logins](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/previously_seen_users_console_logins.yml) with [data]() +* [previously_seen_users_console_logins](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/previously_seen_users_console_logins.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/lookups/previously_seen_users_console_logins.csv) #### Required field * _time @@ -100,8 +100,6 @@ When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be dete | 18.0 | 30 | 60 | User $user$ is logging into the AWS console from City $City$ for the first time | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -111,6 +109,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-10-07-detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.md b/docs/_posts/2020-10-07-detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.md index 47b3f573b2..3576c911c6 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-10-07-detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-10-07-detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country" -excerpt: "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions" +excerpt: "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2020-10-07 @@ -9,7 +10,6 @@ toc_label: "" tags: - Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions - Defense Evasion - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -24,8 +24,8 @@ tags: This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Security Analytics for AWS, Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Authentication](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Authentication) - **Last Updated**: 2020-10-07 - **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ Note that `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter` is a empty #### Lookups The SPL above uses the following Lookups: -* [previously_seen_users_console_logins](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/previously_seen_users_console_logins.yml) with [data]() +* [previously_seen_users_console_logins](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/previously_seen_users_console_logins.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/lookups/previously_seen_users_console_logins.csv) #### Required field * _time @@ -100,8 +100,6 @@ When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be dete | 42.0 | 70 | 60 | User $user$ is logging into the AWS console from Country $Country$ for the first time | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -111,6 +109,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-10-07-detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.md b/docs/_posts/2020-10-07-detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.md index e1cd06a4c3..d6a6c7cab9 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-10-07-detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-10-07-detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region" -excerpt: "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions" +excerpt: "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2020-10-07 @@ -9,7 +10,6 @@ toc_label: "" tags: - Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions - Defense Evasion - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -24,8 +24,8 @@ tags: This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Security Analytics for AWS, Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Authentication](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Authentication) - **Last Updated**: 2020-10-07 - **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ Note that `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter` is a empty m #### Lookups The SPL above uses the following Lookups: -* [previously_seen_users_console_logins](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/previously_seen_users_console_logins.yml) with [data]() +* [previously_seen_users_console_logins](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/previously_seen_users_console_logins.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/lookups/previously_seen_users_console_logins.csv) #### Required field * _time @@ -100,8 +100,6 @@ When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be dete | 36.0 | 60 | 60 | User $user$ is logging into the AWS console from Region $Region$ for the first time | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -111,6 +109,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-10-08-gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.md b/docs/_posts/2020-10-08-gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.md index bff0afad11..3812a53656 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-10-08-gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-10-08-gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "GCP Detect gcploit framework" -excerpt: "Valid Accounts" +excerpt: "Valid Accounts +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2020-10-08 @@ -9,16 +10,16 @@ toc_label: "" tags: - Valid Accounts - Defense Evasion + - Initial Access - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Initial Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -27,7 +28,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search provides detection of GCPloit exploitation framework. This framework can be used to escalate privileges and move laterally from compromised high privilege accounts. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2020-10-08 @@ -39,7 +40,7 @@ This search provides detection of GCPloit exploitation framework. This framework | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access | +| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -78,12 +79,16 @@ Payload.request.function.timeout value can possibly be match with other function #### Kill Chain Phase -* Lateral Movement +* Exploitation +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -100,5 +105,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-10-09-cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city.md b/docs/_posts/2020-10-09-cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city.md index 6acbb8edca..c2cd4a59bf 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-10-09-cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-10-09-cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City" -excerpt: "Valid Accounts" +excerpt: "Valid Accounts +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2020-10-09 @@ -9,10 +10,9 @@ toc_label: "" tags: - Valid Accounts - Defense Evasion + - Initial Access - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Initial Access - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -27,8 +27,8 @@ tags: This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen cities. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Security Analytics for AWS, Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Change](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Change) - **Last Updated**: 2020-10-09 - **Author**: Rico Valdez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen citie | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access | +| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -61,15 +61,15 @@ This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen citie #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window.yml) Note that `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. #### Lookups The SPL above uses the following Lookups: -* [previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources.yml) with [data]() +* [previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/lookups/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources.csv) #### Required field * _time @@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ The SPL above uses the following Lookups: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city_filter` macro. #### Known False Positives -This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ +This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. #### Associated Analytic story @@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slig #### Kill Chain Phase +* Actions on Objectives @@ -103,8 +104,6 @@ This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slig | 18.0 | 30 | 60 | User $user$ is starting or creating an instance $dest$ for the first time in City $City$ from IP address $src$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -114,6 +113,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-10-09-cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_country.md b/docs/_posts/2020-10-09-cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_country.md index 1b3ec960ca..ae76ca25b9 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-10-09-cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_country.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-10-09-cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_country.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country" -excerpt: "Valid Accounts" +excerpt: "Valid Accounts +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2020-10-09 @@ -9,10 +10,9 @@ toc_label: "" tags: - Valid Accounts - Defense Evasion + - Initial Access - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Initial Access - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -27,8 +27,8 @@ tags: This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen countries. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Security Analytics for AWS, Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Change](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Change) - **Last Updated**: 2020-10-09 - **Author**: Rico Valdez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen count | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access | +| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ Note that `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_country_filter` is #### Lookups The SPL above uses the following Lookups: -* [previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources.yml) with [data]() +* [previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/lookups/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources.csv) #### Required field * _time @@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ The SPL above uses the following Lookups: You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_country_filter` macro. #### Known False Positives -This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ +This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. #### Associated Analytic story @@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slig #### Kill Chain Phase +* Actions on Objectives @@ -102,8 +103,6 @@ This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slig | 42.0 | 70 | 60 | User $user$ is starting or creating an instance $object$ for the first time in Country $Country$ from IP address $src$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -113,6 +112,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-10-09-gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.md b/docs/_posts/2020-10-09-gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..44b32f51ab --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-10-09-gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.md @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ +--- +title: "GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project" +excerpt: "Valid Accounts +" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2020-10-09 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Valid Accounts + - Defense Evasion + - Initial Access + - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search provides detection of accounts with high risk roles by projects. Compromised accounts with high risk roles can move laterally or even scalate privileges at different projects depending on organization schema. + +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2020-10-09 +- **Author**: Rod Soto, Splunk +- **ID**: 27af8c15-38b0-4408-b339-920170724adb + + +#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | + +#### Search + +``` +`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.request.policy.bindings{}.role=roles/owner OR roles/editor OR roles/iam.serviceAccountUser OR roles/iam.serviceAccountAdmin OR roles/iam.serviceAccountTokenCreator OR roles/dataflow.developer OR roles/dataflow.admin OR roles/composer.admin OR roles/dataproc.admin OR roles/dataproc.editor +| table data.resource.type data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.resource data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.role data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.members{} +| `gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [google_gcp_pubsub_message](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/google_gcp_pubsub_message.yml) + +Note that `gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* data.protoPayload.request.policy.bindings{}.role +* data.resource.type data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail +* data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission +* data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.resource +* data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.role +* data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.members{} + + +#### How To Implement +You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message logs + +#### Known False Positives +Accounts with high risk roles should be reduced to the minimum number needed, however specific tasks and setups may be simply expected behavior within organization + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [GCP Cross Account Activity](/stories/gcp_cross_account_activity) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Exploitation + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + +* [https://github.com/dxa4481/gcploit](https://github.com/dxa4481/gcploit) +* [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ml09R38jpok](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ml09R38jpok) +* [https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-roles](https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-roles) + + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-10-09-gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.md b/docs/_posts/2020-10-09-gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bd1aa88041 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-10-09-gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.md @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ +--- +title: "GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account" +excerpt: "Valid Accounts +" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2020-10-09 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Valid Accounts + - Defense Evasion + - Initial Access + - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search provides detection of high risk permissions by resource and accounts. These are permissions that can allow attackers with compromised accounts to move laterally and escalate privileges. + +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2020-10-09 +- **Author**: Rod Soto, Splunk +- **ID**: 2e70ef35-2187-431f-aedc-4503dc9b06ba + + +#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | + +#### Search + +``` +`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission=iam.serviceAccounts.getaccesstoken OR iam.serviceAccounts.setIamPolicy OR iam.serviceAccounts.actas OR dataflow.jobs.create OR composer.environments.create OR dataproc.clusters.create +|table data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.members{} data.resource.labels.project_id +| `gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [google_gcp_pubsub_message](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/google_gcp_pubsub_message.yml) + +Note that `gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission +* data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp +* data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail +* data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission +* data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.members{} +* data.resource.labels.project_id + + +#### How To Implement +You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message logs + +#### Known False Positives +High risk permissions are part of any GCP environment, however it is important to track resource and accounts usage, this search may produce false positives. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [GCP Cross Account Activity](/stories/gcp_cross_account_activity) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Exploitation + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + +* [https://github.com/dxa4481/gcploit](https://github.com/dxa4481/gcploit) +* [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ml09R38jpok](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ml09R38jpok) +* [https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/permissions-reference](https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/permissions-reference) + + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-10-15-detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.md b/docs/_posts/2020-10-15-detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.md index e20802e283..642fa221c1 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-10-15-detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-10-15-detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks" -excerpt: "Use Alternate Authentication Material, Pass the Hash" +excerpt: "Use Alternate Authentication Material +, Pass the Hash +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2020-10-15 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Use Alternate Authentication Material + - Pass the Hash - Defense Evasion - Lateral Movement - - Pass the Hash - Defense Evasion - Lateral Movement - Splunk Enterprise @@ -26,7 +28,7 @@ tags: This search looks for specific authentication events from the Windows Security Event logs to detect potential attempts at using the Pass-the-Hash technique. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2020-10-15 @@ -55,8 +57,8 @@ This search looks for specific authentication events from the Windows Security E #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -92,8 +94,6 @@ Legitimate logon activity by authorized NTLM systems may be detected by this sea | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | The following $EventCode$ occurred on $dest$ by $user$ with Logon Type 3, which may be indicative of the pass the hash technique. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1550.002/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1550.002/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-10-21-detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.md b/docs/_posts/2020-10-21-detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.md index 4a5f5a5d5c..3a6395fb52 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-10-21-detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-10-21-detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration" -excerpt: "Exfiltration Over C2 Channel" +excerpt: "Exfiltration Over C2 Channel +" categories: - Network last_modified_at: 2020-10-21 @@ -14,8 +15,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Cloud --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -24,7 +25,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search looks for commands that the SNICat tool uses in the TLS SNI field. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2020-10-21 @@ -87,8 +88,12 @@ Unknown +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -106,5 +111,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-10-28-detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.md b/docs/_posts/2020-10-28-detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.md index f97b961bed..8c054fb27d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-10-28-detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-10-28-detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.md @@ -1,6 +1,10 @@ --- title: "Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats" -excerpt: "Hardware Additions, Network Denial of Service, Adversary-in-the-Middle, ARP Cache Poisoning" +excerpt: "Hardware Additions +, Network Denial of Service +, Adversary-in-the-Middle +, ARP Cache Poisoning +" categories: - Network last_modified_at: 2020-10-28 @@ -8,31 +12,31 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Hardware Additions - - Initial Access - Network Denial of Service - - Impact - Adversary-in-the-Middle - - Credential Access - - Collection - ARP Cache Poisoning + - Initial Access + - Impact + - Collection - Credential Access - Collection + - Credential Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} #### Description -By enabling IPv6 First Hop Security as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect various attacks such as packet forging in the Infrastructure. +By enabling IPv6 First Hop Security as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect various attacks such as packet forging in the Infrastructure. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2020-10-28 @@ -48,9 +52,9 @@ By enabling IPv6 First Hop Security as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organiz | [T1498](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/) | Network Denial of Service | Impact | -| [T1557](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/) | Adversary-in-the-Middle | Credential Access, Collection | +| [T1557](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/) | Adversary-in-the-Middle | Collection, Credential Access | -| [T1557.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/002/) | ARP Cache Poisoning | Credential Access, Collection | +| [T1557.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/002/) | ARP Cache Poisoning | Collection, Credential Access | #### Search @@ -67,8 +71,8 @@ By enabling IPv6 First Hop Security as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organiz #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [cisco_networks](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cisco_networks.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [cisco_networks](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cisco_networks.yml) Note that `detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -103,8 +107,12 @@ None currently known +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -127,5 +135,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-10-28-detect_port_security_violation.md b/docs/_posts/2020-10-28-detect_port_security_violation.md index b6b8fae8a8..7f0955e896 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-10-28-detect_port_security_violation.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-10-28-detect_port_security_violation.md @@ -1,6 +1,10 @@ --- title: "Detect Port Security Violation" -excerpt: "Hardware Additions, Network Denial of Service, Adversary-in-the-Middle, ARP Cache Poisoning" +excerpt: "Hardware Additions +, Network Denial of Service +, Adversary-in-the-Middle +, ARP Cache Poisoning +" categories: - Network last_modified_at: 2020-10-28 @@ -8,22 +12,22 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Hardware Additions - - Initial Access - Network Denial of Service - - Impact - Adversary-in-the-Middle - - Credential Access - - Collection - ARP Cache Poisoning + - Initial Access + - Impact + - Collection - Credential Access - Collection + - Credential Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -32,7 +36,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U By enabling Port Security on a Cisco switch you can restrict input to an interface by limiting and identifying MAC addresses of the workstations that are allowed to access the port. When you assign secure MAC addresses to a secure port, the port does not forward packets with source addresses outside the group of defined addresses. If you limit the number of secure MAC addresses to one and assign a single secure MAC address, the workstation attached to that port is assured the full bandwidth of the port. If a port is configured as a secure port and the maximum number of secure MAC addresses is reached, when the MAC address of a workstation attempting to access the port is different from any of the identified secure MAC addresses, a security violation occurs. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2020-10-28 @@ -48,9 +52,9 @@ By enabling Port Security on a Cisco switch you can restrict input to an interfa | [T1498](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/) | Network Denial of Service | Impact | -| [T1557](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/) | Adversary-in-the-Middle | Credential Access, Collection | +| [T1557](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/) | Adversary-in-the-Middle | Collection, Credential Access | -| [T1557.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/002/) | ARP Cache Poisoning | Credential Access, Collection | +| [T1557.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/002/) | ARP Cache Poisoning | Collection, Credential Access | #### Search @@ -65,8 +69,8 @@ By enabling Port Security on a Cisco switch you can restrict input to an interfa #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [cisco_networks](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cisco_networks.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [cisco_networks](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cisco_networks.yml) Note that `detect_port_security_violation_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -85,7 +89,7 @@ Note that `detect_port_security_violation_filter` is a empty macro by default. I #### How To Implement -This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with Port Security and Error Disable for this to work (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst4500/12-2/25ew/configuration/guide/conf/port_sec.html) and log with a severity level of minimum "5 - notification". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices. +This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with Port Security and Error Disable for this to work (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst4500/12-2/25ew/configuration/guide/conf/port_sec.html) and log with a severity level of minimum "5 - notification". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices. #### Known False Positives This search might be prone to high false positives if you have malfunctioning devices connected to your ethernet ports or if end users periodically connect physical devices to the network. @@ -102,8 +106,12 @@ This search might be prone to high false positives if you have malfunctioning de +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -116,5 +124,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-10-28-detect_software_download_to_network_device.md b/docs/_posts/2020-10-28-detect_software_download_to_network_device.md index ca84b61019..20d08d429d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-10-28-detect_software_download_to_network_device.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-10-28-detect_software_download_to_network_device.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Detect Software Download To Network Device" -excerpt: "TFTP Boot, Pre-OS Boot" +excerpt: "TFTP Boot +, Pre-OS Boot +" categories: - Network last_modified_at: 2020-10-28 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - TFTP Boot + - Pre-OS Boot - Defense Evasion - Persistence - - Pre-OS Boot - Defense Evasion - Persistence - Splunk Enterprise @@ -19,8 +21,8 @@ tags: - Network_Traffic --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -29,7 +31,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U Adversaries may abuse netbooting to load an unauthorized network device operating system from a Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) server. TFTP boot (netbooting) is commonly used by network administrators to load configuration-controlled network device images from a centralized management server. Netbooting is one option in the boot sequence and can be used to centralize, manage, and control device images. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Network_Traffic](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkTraffic) - **Last Updated**: 2020-10-28 @@ -74,7 +76,7 @@ Note that `detect_software_download_to_network_device_filter` is a empty macro b #### How To Implement -This search looks for Network Traffic events to TFTP, FTP or SSH/SCP ports from network devices. Make sure to tag any network devices as network, router or switch in order for this detection to work. If the TFTP traffic doesn't traverse a firewall nor packet inspection, these events will not be logged. This is typically an issue if the TFTP server is on the same subnet as the network device. There is also a chance of the network device loading software using a DHCP assigned IP address (netboot) which is not in the Asset inventory. +This search looks for Network Traffic events to TFTP, FTP or SSH/SCP ports from network devices. Make sure to tag any network devices as network, router or switch in order for this detection to work. If the TFTP traffic doesn't traverse a firewall nor packet inspection, these events will not be logged. This is typically an issue if the TFTP server is on the same subnet as the network device. There is also a chance of the network device loading software using a DHCP assigned IP address (netboot) which is not in the Asset inventory. #### Known False Positives This search will also report any legitimate attempts of software downloads to network devices as well as outbound SSH sessions from network devices. @@ -88,8 +90,12 @@ This search will also report any legitimate attempts of software downloads to ne +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -102,5 +108,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-10-28-detect_traffic_mirroring.md b/docs/_posts/2020-10-28-detect_traffic_mirroring.md index ee0a057eea..33516a9de3 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-10-28-detect_traffic_mirroring.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-10-28-detect_traffic_mirroring.md @@ -1,6 +1,10 @@ --- title: "Detect Traffic Mirroring" -excerpt: "Hardware Additions, Automated Exfiltration, Network Denial of Service, Traffic Duplication" +excerpt: "Hardware Additions +, Automated Exfiltration +, Network Denial of Service +, Traffic Duplication +" categories: - Network last_modified_at: 2020-10-28 @@ -8,20 +12,20 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Hardware Additions - - Initial Access - Automated Exfiltration - - Exfiltration - Network Denial of Service - - Impact - Traffic Duplication + - Initial Access + - Exfiltration + - Impact - Exfiltration - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -30,7 +34,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to automate data exfiltration over compromised network infrastructure. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some network devices and used for network analysis and may be configured to duplicate traffic and forward to one or more destinations for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring device. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2020-10-28 @@ -62,8 +66,8 @@ Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to automate data exfiltratio #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [cisco_networks](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cisco_networks.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [cisco_networks](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cisco_networks.yml) Note that `detect_traffic_mirroring_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -75,7 +79,7 @@ Note that `detect_traffic_mirroring_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allo #### How To Implement -This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must log with a severity level of minimum "5 - notification". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices and that the devices have been configured according to the documentation of the Cisco Networks Add-on. Also note that an attacker may disable logging from the device prior to enabling traffic mirroring. +This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must log with a severity level of minimum "5 - notification". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices and that the devices have been configured according to the documentation of the Cisco Networks Add-on. Also note that an attacker may disable logging from the device prior to enabling traffic mirroring. #### Known False Positives This search will return false positives for any legitimate traffic captures by network administrators. @@ -90,8 +94,12 @@ This search will return false positives for any legitimate traffic captures by n +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -104,5 +112,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-11-06-ryuk_test_files_detected.md b/docs/_posts/2020-11-06-ryuk_test_files_detected.md index 5b0c21a34a..0a97a280b8 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-11-06-ryuk_test_files_detected.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-11-06-ryuk_test_files_detected.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Ryuk Test Files Detected" -excerpt: "Data Encrypted for Impact" +excerpt: "Data Encrypted for Impact +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2020-11-06 @@ -22,7 +23,7 @@ tags: The search looks for files that contain the key word *Ryuk* under any folder in the C drive, which is consistent with Ryuk propagation. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2020-11-06 @@ -83,8 +84,6 @@ If there are files with this keywoord as file names it might trigger false possi | 70.0 | 70 | 100 | A creation of ryuk test file $file_path$ in host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -94,6 +93,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ryuk/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ryuk/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-11-06-windows_connhost_exe_started_forcefully.md b/docs/_posts/2020-11-06-windows_connhost_exe_started_forcefully.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..24f476557b --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-11-06-windows_connhost_exe_started_forcefully.md @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +--- +title: "Windows connhost exe started forcefully" +excerpt: "Windows Command Shell +" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2020-11-06 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Windows Command Shell + - Execution + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +The search looks for the Console Window Host process (connhost.exe) executed using the force flag -ForceV1. This is not regular behavior in the Windows OS and is often seen executed by the Ryuk Ransomware. DEPRECATED This event is actually seen in the windows 10 client of attack_range_local. After further testing we realized this is not specific to Ryuk. + +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2020-11-06 +- **Author**: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk +- **ID**: c114aaca-68ee-41c2-ad8c-32bf21db8769 + + +#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1059.003](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003/) | Windows Command Shell | Execution | + +#### Search + +``` + +| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE Processes.process="*C:\\Windows\\system32\\conhost.exe* 0xffffffff *-ForceV1*" by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest +| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| `windows_connhost_exe_started_forcefully_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) + +Note that `windows_connhost_exe_started_forcefully_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time + + +#### How To Implement +You must be ingesting data that records the process-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Processes data-model object. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data. + +#### Known False Positives +This process should not be ran forcefully, we have not see any false positives for this detection + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Ryuk Ransomware](/stories/ryuk_ransomware) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Delivery + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_started_forcefully.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-11-06-windows_security_account_manager_stopped.md b/docs/_posts/2020-11-06-windows_security_account_manager_stopped.md index a0eae2ff28..300d8a2433 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-11-06-windows_security_account_manager_stopped.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-11-06-windows_security_account_manager_stopped.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Windows Security Account Manager Stopped" -excerpt: "Service Stop" +excerpt: "Service Stop +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2020-11-06 @@ -22,7 +23,7 @@ tags: The search looks for a Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) was stopped via command-line. This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2020-11-06 @@ -84,8 +85,6 @@ SAM is a critical windows service, stopping it would cause major issues on an en | 70.0 | 70 | 100 | The Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) was stopped via cli by $user$ on $dest$ by this command: $processs$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -95,6 +94,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ryuk/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ryuk/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-11-09-common_ransomware_extensions.md b/docs/_posts/2020-11-09-common_ransomware_extensions.md index eaf05768cd..aaf7e3f33f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-11-09-common_ransomware_extensions.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-11-09-common_ransomware_extensions.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Common Ransomware Extensions" -excerpt: "Data Destruction" +excerpt: "Data Destruction +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2020-11-09 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: The search looks for file modifications with extensions commonly used by Ransomware -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2020-11-09 @@ -58,11 +59,6 @@ The SPL above uses the following Macros: Note that `common_ransomware_extensions_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. -#### Lookups -The SPL above uses the following Lookups: - -* [ransomware_extensions_lookup](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/ransomware_extensions_lookup.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/ransomware_extensions.csv) - #### Required field * _time * Filesystem.user @@ -73,7 +69,7 @@ The SPL above uses the following Lookups: #### How To Implement You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.\ -This search produces fields (`query`,`query_length`,`count`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** Name, **Field:** Name\ +This search produces fields (`query`,`query_length`,`count`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** Name, **Field:** Name\ 1. \ 1. **Label:** File Extension, **Field:** file_extension\ Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` @@ -100,8 +96,6 @@ It is possible for a legitimate file with these extensions to be created. If thi | 90.0 | 90 | 100 | A file - $file_name$ was written to disk on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$, this is indicative of a known ransomware file extension and should be reviewed immediately. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -111,6 +105,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/ransomware_extensions/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/ransomware_extensions/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-11-09-common_ransomware_notes.md b/docs/_posts/2020-11-09-common_ransomware_notes.md index 3913ec95f6..f2a462d996 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-11-09-common_ransomware_notes.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-11-09-common_ransomware_notes.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Common Ransomware Notes" -excerpt: "Data Destruction" +excerpt: "Data Destruction +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2020-11-09 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: The search looks for files created with names matching those typically used in ransomware notes that tell the victim how to get their data back. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2020-11-09 @@ -51,17 +52,12 @@ The search looks for files created with names matching those typically used in r #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [ransomware_notes](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/ransomware_notes.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [ransomware_notes](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/ransomware_notes.yml) Note that `common_ransomware_notes_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. -#### Lookups -The SPL above uses the following Lookups: - -* [ransomware_notes_lookup](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/ransomware_notes_lookup.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/ransomware_notes.csv) - #### Required field * _time * Filesystem.user @@ -74,7 +70,7 @@ The SPL above uses the following Lookups: You must be ingesting data that records file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Filesystem data-model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system reads and writes. #### Known False Positives -It's possible that a legitimate file could be created with the same name used by ransomware note files. +It's possible that a legitimate file could be created with the same name used by ransomware note files. #### Associated Analytic story * [SamSam Ransomware](/stories/samsam_ransomware) @@ -95,8 +91,6 @@ It's possible that a legitimate file could be created with the same name use | 90.0 | 90 | 100 | A file - $file_name$ was written to disk on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$, this is indicative of a known ransomware note file and should be reviewed immediately. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -106,6 +100,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/ransomware_notes/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/ransomware_notes/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-11-09-deleting_shadow_copies.md b/docs/_posts/2020-11-09-deleting_shadow_copies.md index c76e1529a4..f3cdaf3e75 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-11-09-deleting_shadow_copies.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-11-09-deleting_shadow_copies.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Deleting Shadow Copies" -excerpt: "Inhibit System Recovery" +excerpt: "Inhibit System Recovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2020-11-09 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: The vssadmin.exe utility is used to interact with the Volume Shadow Copy Service. Wmic is an interface to the Windows Management Instrumentation. This search looks for either of these tools being used to delete shadow copies. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2020-11-09 @@ -71,7 +72,7 @@ Note that `deleting_shadow_copies_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows #### How To Implement -You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. +You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. #### Known False Positives vssadmin.exe and wmic.exe are standard applications shipped with modern versions of windows. They may be used by administrators to legitimately delete old backup copies, although this is typically rare. @@ -95,8 +96,6 @@ vssadmin.exe and wmic.exe are standard applications shipped with modern versions | 81.0 | 90 | 90 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to delete shadow copies. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -106,6 +105,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-11-09-detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.md b/docs/_posts/2020-11-09-detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.md index 632344edcb..9bc5498855 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-11-09-detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-11-09-detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Detect Excessive Account Lockouts From Endpoint" -excerpt: "Valid Accounts, Domain Accounts" +excerpt: "Valid Accounts +, Domain Accounts +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2020-11-09 @@ -8,15 +10,15 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Valid Accounts - - Defense Evasion - - Persistence - - Privilege Escalation - - Initial Access - Domain Accounts - Defense Evasion + - Initial Access - Persistence - Privilege Escalation + - Defense Evasion - Initial Access + - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -31,7 +33,7 @@ tags: This search identifies endpoints that have caused a relatively high number of account lockouts in a short period. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Change](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Change) - **Last Updated**: 2020-11-09 @@ -43,9 +45,9 @@ This search identifies endpoints that have caused a relatively high number of ac | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access | +| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1078.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002/) | Domain Accounts | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access | +| [T1078.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002/) | Domain Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -77,19 +79,20 @@ Note that `detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint_filter` is a empty ma #### How To Implement You must ingest your Windows security event logs in the `Change` datamodel under the nodename is `Account_Management`, for this search to execute successfully. Please consider updating the cron schedule and the count of lockouts you want to monitor, according to your environment. \ - **Splunk>Phantom Playbook Integration**\ -If Splunk>Phantom is also configured in your environment, a Playbook called "Excessive Account Lockouts Enrichment and Response" can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. The Playbook executes the Contextual and Investigative searches in this Story, conducts additional information gathering on Windows endpoints, and takes a response action to shut down the affected endpoint. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/`, add the correct hostname to the "Phantom Instance" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search, and set the corresponding Playbook to active. \ + **Splunk>Phantom Playbook Integration**\ +If Splunk>Phantom is also configured in your environment, a Playbook called "Excessive Account Lockouts Enrichment and Response" can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. The Playbook executes the Contextual and Investigative searches in this Story, conducts additional information gathering on Windows endpoints, and takes a response action to shut down the affected endpoint. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/`, add the correct hostname to the "Phantom Instance" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search, and set the corresponding Playbook to active. \ (Playbook Link:`https://my.phantom.us/4.1/playbook/excessive-account-lockouts-enrichment-and-response/`).\ #### Known False Positives -It's possible that a widely used system, such as a kiosk, could cause a large number of account lockouts. +It's possible that a widely used system, such as a kiosk, could cause a large number of account lockouts. #### Associated Analytic story * [Account Monitoring and Controls](/stories/account_monitoring_and_controls) #### Kill Chain Phase +* Exploitation @@ -100,8 +103,6 @@ It's possible that a widely used system, such as a kiosk, could cause a larg | 36.0 | 60 | 60 | Multiple accounts have been locked out. Review $dest$ and results related to $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -111,6 +112,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/account_lockout/windows-security.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/account_lockout/windows-security.log) * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/account_lockout/windows-system.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/account_lockout/windows-system.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-11-10-detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.md b/docs/_posts/2020-11-10-detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.md index e98e783b6b..e9fb6edae0 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-11-10-detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-11-10-detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery" -excerpt: "System Network Configuration Discovery" +excerpt: "System Network Configuration Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2020-11-10 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This search looks for fast execution of processes used for system network configuration discovery on the endpoint. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2020-11-10 @@ -87,7 +88,7 @@ It is uncommon for normal users to execute a series of commands used for network #### Kill Chain Phase * Installation -* Command and Control +* Command & Control * Actions on Objectives @@ -99,8 +100,6 @@ It is uncommon for normal users to execute a series of commands used for network | 32.0 | 40 | 80 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning multiple $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ typically not a normal behavior of the process. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -110,6 +109,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1016/discovery_commands/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1016/discovery_commands/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-11-10-detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.md b/docs/_posts/2020-11-10-detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.md index a35d8f756e..69ec634a7b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-11-10-detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-11-10-detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe" -excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter" +excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter +, Windows Command Shell +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2020-11-10 @@ -8,9 +10,13 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Command and Scripting Interpreter + - Windows Command Shell - Execution - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics - - Endpoint_Processes + - Execution + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Endpoint --- @@ -19,14 +25,14 @@ tags: #### Description -The following analytic identifies parent processes, browsers, Windows terminal applications, Office Products and Java spawning cmd.exe. By its very nature, many applications spawn cmd.exe natively or built into macros. Much of this will need to be tuned to further enhance the risk. +This search looks for executions of cmd.exe spawned by a process that is often abused by attackers and that does not typically launch cmd.exe. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Behavioral Analytics -- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint_Processes](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/EndpointProcesses) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2020-11-10 -- **Author**: Ignacio Bermudez Corrales, Splunk -- **ID**: c10a18cb-fd80-4ffa-a844-25026e0a0c94 +- **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +- **ID**: dcfd6b40-42f9-469d-a433-2e53f7486664 #### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) @@ -35,42 +41,55 @@ The following analytic identifies parent processes, browsers, Windows terminal a | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | | [T1059](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/) | Command and Scripting Interpreter | Execution | +| [T1059.003](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003/) | Windows Command Shell | Execution | + #### Search ``` -| from read_ssa_enriched_events() -| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)) -| eval process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string", null), parent_process=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "parent_process_name"), "string", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"),"string", null)), dest_user_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), dest_device_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event,"event_id"), "string", null) -| where process_name="cmd.exe" -| rex field=parent_process "(?[^\\\\]+)$" -| where ParentBaseFileName="winword.exe" OR ParentBaseFileName="excel.exe" OR ParentBaseFileName="outlook.exe" OR ParentBaseFileName="powerpnt.exe" OR ParentBaseFileName="visio.exe" OR ParentBaseFileName="mspub.exe" OR ParentBaseFileName="acrobat.exe" OR ParentBaseFileName="acrord32.exe" OR ParentBaseFileName="iexplore.exe" OR ParentBaseFileName="opera.exe" OR ParentBaseFileName="firefox.exe" OR (ParentBaseFileName="java.exe" AND (cmd_line IS NULL OR (cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND match_regex(cmd_line, /(?i)patch1-Hotfix1a/)=false))) OR ParentBaseFileName="powershell.exe" OR (ParentBaseFileName="chrome.exe" AND (cmd_line IS NULL OR (cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND NOT like(cmd_line, "%chrome-extension%")))) -| eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(dest_device_id, dest_user_id), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "process_name", process_name, "parent_process_name", parent_process, "cmd_line", cmd_line]) -| into write_ssa_detected_events(); +| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user +| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +|search [`prohibited_apps_launching_cmd`] +| `detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe_filter` ``` #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) +* [prohibited_apps_launching_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.yml) Note that `detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. #### Required field -* process_name -* parent_process_name * _time -* dest_device_id -* dest_user_id -* cmd_line +* Processes.dest +* Processes.user +* Processes.parent_process_name +* Processes.parent_process +* Processes.original_file_name +* Processes.process_name +* Processes.process +* Processes.process_id +* Processes.parent_process_path +* Processes.process_path +* Processes.parent_process_id #### How To Implement -In order to successfully implement this analytic, you will need endpoint process data from a EDR product or Sysmon. This search has been modified to process raw sysmon data from attack_range's nxlogs on DSP. +You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts and populates the Endpoint data model with the resultant dataset. This search includes a lookup file, `prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.csv`, that contains a list of processes that should not be spawning cmd.exe. You can modify this lookup to better suit your environment. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. #### Known False Positives -There are circumstances where an application may legitimately execute and interact with the Windows command-line interface. +There are circumstances where an application may legitimately execute and interact with the Windows command-line interface. Investigate and modify the lookup file, as appropriate. #### Associated Analytic story * [Suspicious Command-Line Executions](/stories/suspicious_command-line_executions) +* [Suspicious MSHTA Activity](/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity) +* [Suspicious Zoom Child Processes](/stories/suspicious_zoom_child_processes) +* [NOBELIUM Group](/stories/nobelium_group) #### Kill Chain Phase @@ -82,24 +101,21 @@ There are circumstances where an application may legitimately execute and intera | Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| -| 35.0 | 70 | 50 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$, producing a suspicious event that warrants investigating. | +| 80.0 | 80 | 100 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ running prohibited applications. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference -* [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/) - - #### Test Dataset Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) +* [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/powershell_spawn_cmd/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/powershell_spawn_cmd/windows-sysmon.log) -[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml) \| *version*: **2** \ No newline at end of file + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml) \| *version*: **6** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-11-18-disabling_remote_user_account_control.md b/docs/_posts/2020-11-18-disabling_remote_user_account_control.md index b668f55369..4d45e66f26 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-11-18-disabling_remote_user_account_control.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-11-18-disabling_remote_user_account_control.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Disabling Remote User Account Control" -excerpt: "Bypass User Account Control, Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism" +excerpt: "Bypass User Account Control +, Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2020-11-18 @@ -8,11 +10,11 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Bypass User Account Control - - Privilege Escalation - - Defense Evasion - Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism + - Defense Evasion - Privilege Escalation - Defense Evasion + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -26,7 +28,7 @@ tags: The search looks for modifications to registry keys that control the enforcement of Windows User Account Control (UAC). -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2020-11-18 @@ -38,9 +40,9 @@ The search looks for modifications to registry keys that control the enforcement | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1548.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/) | Bypass User Account Control | Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1548.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/) | Bypass User Account Control | Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1548](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1548](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -91,8 +93,6 @@ This registry key may be modified via administrators to implement a change in sy | 42.0 | 70 | 60 | The Windows registry keys that control the enforcement of Windows User Account Control (UAC) were modified on $dest$ by $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-11-18-execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.md b/docs/_posts/2020-11-18-execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.md index 353903eebc..a8134fa886 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-11-18-execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-11-18-execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Execution of File with Multiple Extensions" -excerpt: "Masquerading, Rename System Utilities" +excerpt: "Masquerading +, Rename System Utilities +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2020-11-18 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Masquerading - - Defense Evasion - Rename System Utilities - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -23,9 +25,9 @@ tags: #### Description -This search looks for processes launched from files that have double extensions in the file name. This is typically done to obscure the "real" file extension and make it appear as though the file being accessed is a data file, as opposed to executable content. +This search looks for processes launched from files that have double extensions in the file name. This is typically done to obscure the "real" file extension and make it appear as though the file being accessed is a data file, as opposed to executable content. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2020-11-18 @@ -90,8 +92,6 @@ None identified. | 56.0 | 80 | 70 | process $process$ have double extensions in the file name is executed on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-11-19-execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.md b/docs/_posts/2020-11-19-execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4e5dcb4cb6 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-11-19-execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.md @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +--- +title: "Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension" +excerpt: "Rename System Utilities +" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2020-11-19 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Rename System Utilities + - Defense Evasion + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Endpoint +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search looks for processes launched from files with at least five spaces in the name before the extension. This is typically done to obfuscate the file extension by pushing it outside of the default view. + +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) +- **Last Updated**: 2020-11-19 +- **Author**: Rico Valdez, Splunk +- **ID**: ab0353e6-a956-420b-b724-a8b4846d5d5a + + +#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1036.003](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/) | Rename System Utilities | Defense Evasion | + +#### Search + +``` + +| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_path) as process_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = "* .*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process Processes.process_name +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` +| `execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) + +Note that `execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* Processes.process_path +* Processes.process +* Processes.dest +* Processes.user +* Processes.process_name + + +#### How To Implement +To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. + +#### Known False Positives +None identified. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Windows File Extension and Association Abuse](/stories/windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse) +* [Masquerading - Rename System Utilities](/stories/masquerading_-_rename_system_utilities) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Actions on Objectives + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml) \| *version*: **3** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-11-23-processes_created_by_netsh.md b/docs/_posts/2020-11-23-processes_created_by_netsh.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..aa09c399ae --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-11-23-processes_created_by_netsh.md @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +--- +title: "Processes created by netsh" +excerpt: "Disable or Modify System Firewall +" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2020-11-23 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Disable or Modify System Firewall + - Defense Evasion + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Endpoint +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe to execute various commands via the netsh command-line utility. Netsh.exe is a command-line scripting utility that allows you to, either locally or remotely, display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. Netsh can be used as a persistence proxy technique to execute a helper .dll when netsh.exe is executed. In this search, we are looking for processes spawned by netsh.exe that are executing commands via the command line. Deprecated because we have another detection of the same type. + +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) +- **Last Updated**: 2020-11-23 +- **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +- **ID**: b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-95dbb162041e + + +#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1562.004](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/004/) | Disable or Modify System Firewall | Defense Evasion | + +#### Search + +``` + +| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=netsh.exe by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name +| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| `processes_created_by_netsh_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) + +Note that `processes_created_by_netsh_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time + + +#### How To Implement +To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting logs with the process name, command-line arguments, and parent processes from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. + +#### Known False Positives +It is unusual for netsh.exe to have any child processes in most environments. It makes sense to investigate the child process and verify whether the process spawned is legitimate. We explicitely exclude "C:\Program Files\rempl\sedlauncher.exe" process path since it is a legitimate process by Mircosoft. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Netsh Abuse](/stories/netsh_abuse) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Actions on Objectives + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml) \| *version*: **5** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-11-23-shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.md b/docs/_posts/2020-11-23-shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.md index 544e81dc76..5a873211ea 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-11-23-shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-11-23-shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters" -excerpt: "Application Shimming, Event Triggered Execution" +excerpt: "Application Shimming +, Event Triggered Execution +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2020-11-23 @@ -8,11 +10,11 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Application Shimming - - Privilege Escalation - - Persistence - Event Triggered Execution + - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ tags: This search detects the process execution and arguments required to silently create a shim database. The sdbinst.exe application is used to install shim database files (.sdb). A shim is a small library which transparently intercepts an API, changes the parameters passed, handles the operation itself, or redirects the operation elsewhere. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2020-11-23 @@ -39,9 +41,9 @@ This search detects the process execution and arguments required to silently cre | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1546.011](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/011/) | Application Shimming | Privilege Escalation, Persistence | +| [T1546.011](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/011/) | Application Shimming | Persistence, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1546](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/) | Event Triggered Execution | Privilege Escalation, Persistence | +| [T1546](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/) | Event Triggered Execution | Persistence, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -70,7 +72,7 @@ Note that `shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters_filter` is a em #### How To Implement -You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. +You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. #### Known False Positives None identified @@ -91,8 +93,6 @@ None identified | 63.0 | 70 | 90 | A process $process_name$ that possible create a shim db silently in host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-11-26-reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.md b/docs/_posts/2020-11-26-reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.md index c8c9643e14..9c15de4439 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-11-26-reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-11-26-reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys" -excerpt: "Services Registry Permissions Weakness, Hijack Execution Flow" +excerpt: "Services Registry Permissions Weakness +, Hijack Execution Flow +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2020-11-26 @@ -8,13 +10,13 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Services Registry Permissions Weakness - - Persistence - - Privilege Escalation - - Defense Evasion - Hijack Execution Flow + - Defense Evasion - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - Defense Evasion + - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -29,7 +31,7 @@ tags: The search looks for reg.exe modifying registry keys that define Windows services and their configurations. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2020-11-26 @@ -41,9 +43,9 @@ The search looks for reg.exe modifying registry keys that define Windows service | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1574.011](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/011/) | Services Registry Permissions Weakness | Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1574.011](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/011/) | Services Registry Permissions Weakness | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1574](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/) | Hijack Execution Flow | Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1574](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/) | Hijack Execution Flow | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -96,8 +98,6 @@ It is unusual for a service to be created or modified by directly manipulating t | 45.0 | 75 | 60 | A reg.exe process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1574.011/change_registry_path_service/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1574.011/change_registry_path_service/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-12-07-schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.md b/docs/_posts/2020-12-07-schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.md index 520d87b135..b16b92240f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-12-07-schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-12-07-schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Schtasks used for forcing a reboot" -excerpt: "Scheduled Task, Scheduled Task/Job" +excerpt: "Scheduled Task +, Scheduled Task/Job +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2020-12-07 @@ -8,10 +10,10 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Scheduled Task + - Scheduled Task/Job - Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Scheduled Task/Job - Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation @@ -29,7 +31,7 @@ tags: This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line that indicate that a forced reboot of system is scheduled. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2020-12-07 @@ -95,8 +97,6 @@ Administrators may create jobs on systems forcing reboots to perform updates, ma | 56.0 | 70 | 80 | A schedule task process $process_name$ with force reboot commandline $process$ in host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/schtask_shutdown/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/schtask_shutdown/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-12-08-shim_database_file_creation.md b/docs/_posts/2020-12-08-shim_database_file_creation.md index 5fff61547d..7429c95078 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-12-08-shim_database_file_creation.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-12-08-shim_database_file_creation.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Shim Database File Creation" -excerpt: "Application Shimming, Event Triggered Execution" +excerpt: "Application Shimming +, Event Triggered Execution +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2020-12-08 @@ -8,11 +10,11 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Application Shimming - - Privilege Escalation - - Persistence - Event Triggered Execution + - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -26,7 +28,7 @@ tags: This search looks for shim database files being written to default directories. The sdbinst.exe application is used to install shim database files (.sdb). According to Microsoft, a shim is a small library that transparently intercepts an API, changes the parameters passed, handles the operation itself, or redirects the operation elsewhere. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2020-12-08 @@ -38,9 +40,9 @@ This search looks for shim database files being written to default directories. | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1546.011](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/011/) | Application Shimming | Privilege Escalation, Persistence | +| [T1546.011](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/011/) | Application Shimming | Persistence, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1546](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/) | Event Triggered Execution | Privilege Escalation, Persistence | +| [T1546](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/) | Event Triggered Execution | Persistence, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -90,8 +92,6 @@ Because legitimate shim files are created and used all the time, this event, in | 56.0 | 70 | 80 | A process that possibly write shim database in $file_path$ in host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-12-08-single_letter_process_on_endpoint.md b/docs/_posts/2020-12-08-single_letter_process_on_endpoint.md index 6e8b75dc0f..ae59045b1f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-12-08-single_letter_process_on_endpoint.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-12-08-single_letter_process_on_endpoint.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Single Letter Process On Endpoint" -excerpt: "User Execution, Malicious File" +excerpt: "User Execution +, Malicious File +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2020-12-08 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - User Execution - - Execution - Malicious File - Execution + - Execution - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This search looks for process names that consist only of a single letter. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2020-12-08 @@ -71,7 +73,7 @@ Note that `single_letter_process_on_endpoint_filter` is a empty macro by default #### How To Implement -You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. +You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. #### Known False Positives Single-letter executables are not always malicious. Investigate this activity with your normal incident-response process. @@ -92,8 +94,6 @@ Single-letter executables are not always malicious. Investigate this activity wi | 63.0 | 70 | 90 | A suspicious process $process_name$ with single letter in host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1204.002/single_letter_exe/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1204.002/single_letter_exe/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-12-08-system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.md b/docs/_posts/2020-12-08-system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.md index 8b8b3a208b..9f68e67ece 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-12-08-system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-12-08-system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations" -excerpt: "Masquerading, Rename System Utilities" +excerpt: "Masquerading +, Rename System Utilities +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2020-12-08 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Masquerading - - Defense Evasion - Rename System Utilities - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ This search looks for system processes that typically execute from `C:\Windows\S This detection utilizes a lookup that is deduped `system32` and `syswow64` directories from Server 2016 and Windows 10.\ During triage, review the parallel processes - what process moved the native Windows binary? identify any artifacts on disk and review. If a remote destination is contacted, what is the reputation? -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2020-12-08 @@ -63,11 +65,6 @@ The SPL above uses the following Macros: Note that `system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. -#### Lookups -The SPL above uses the following Lookups: - -* [is_windows_system_file](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/is_windows_system_file.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/is_windows_system_file.csv) - #### Required field * _time * Processes.process_path @@ -104,8 +101,6 @@ This detection may require tuning based on third party applications utilizing na | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | System process running from unexpected location on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -119,6 +114,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-12-08-unusually_long_command_line.md b/docs/_posts/2020-12-08-unusually_long_command_line.md index ad68228635..5324024d08 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-12-08-unusually_long_command_line.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-12-08-unusually_long_command_line.md @@ -12,8 +12,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Cloud --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious activity on your hosts. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2020-12-08 @@ -85,8 +85,6 @@ Some legitimate applications start with long command lines. | 42.0 | 70 | 60 | Unusually long command line $Processes.process_name$ on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -96,6 +94,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-12-08-wmi_permanent_event_subscription_-_sysmon.md b/docs/_posts/2020-12-08-wmi_permanent_event_subscription_-_sysmon.md index ec4742bfe7..7ff2e99eca 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-12-08-wmi_permanent_event_subscription_-_sysmon.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-12-08-wmi_permanent_event_subscription_-_sysmon.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon" -excerpt: "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription, Event Triggered Execution" +excerpt: "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription +, Event Triggered Execution +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2020-12-08 @@ -8,11 +10,11 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription - - Privilege Escalation - - Persistence - Event Triggered Execution + - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -31,7 +33,7 @@ All event subscriptions have three components \ 1. Binding - Registers a filter to a consumer. EventID = 21 \ Monitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding. It may be pertinent to review all 3 to identify the flow of execution. In addition, EventCode 4104 may assist with any other PowerShell script usage that registered the subscription. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2020-12-08 @@ -43,9 +45,9 @@ Monitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToCons | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1546.003](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/003/) | Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription | Privilege Escalation, Persistence | +| [T1546.003](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/003/) | Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription | Persistence, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1546](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/) | Event Triggered Execution | Privilege Escalation, Persistence | +| [T1546](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/) | Event Triggered Execution | Persistence, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -96,8 +98,6 @@ Although unlikely, administrators may use event subscriptions for legitimate pur | 30.0 | 30 | 100 | User $user$ on $host$ executed the following suspicious WMI query: $Query$. Filter: $filter$. Consumer: $Consumer$. EventCode: $EventCode$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-12-14-sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.md b/docs/_posts/2020-12-14-sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.md index 060292b09e..5acc341624 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-12-14-sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-12-14-sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event" -excerpt: "Exploitation for Client Execution" +excerpt: "Exploitation for Client Execution +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2020-12-14 @@ -14,8 +15,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Cloud --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -24,7 +25,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U The malware sunburst will load the malicious dll by SolarWinds.BusinessLayerHost.exe. After a period of 12-14 days, the malware will attempt to resolve a subdomain of avsvmcloud.com. This detections will correlate both events. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2020-12-14 @@ -53,8 +54,8 @@ The malware sunburst will load the malicious dll by SolarWinds.BusinessLayerHost #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -80,8 +81,12 @@ unknown +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -97,5 +102,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-12-15-o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.md b/docs/_posts/2020-12-15-o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.md index 04bde8ed49..dfdef50692 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-12-15-o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-12-15-o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation" -excerpt: "Remote Email Collection, Email Collection" +excerpt: "Remote Email Collection +, Email Collection +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2020-12-15 @@ -8,10 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Remote Email Collection - - Collection - Email Collection - Collection - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS + - Collection - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,8 +26,8 @@ tags: This search detects the assignment of rights to accesss content from another mailbox. This is usually only assigned to a service account. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Security Analytics for AWS, Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2020-12-15 - **Author**: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk @@ -89,8 +90,6 @@ Service Accounts | 48.0 | 80 | 60 | User $user$ has delegated suspicious rights $AccessRights$ to user $dest_user$ that allow access to sensitive | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -100,6 +99,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114.002/suspicious_rights_delegation/suspicious_rights_delegation.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114.002/suspicious_rights_delegation/suspicious_rights_delegation.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-12-16-high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.md b/docs/_posts/2020-12-16-high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.md index 62ffbded74..87734840a8 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-12-16-high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-12-16-high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "High Number of Login Failures from a single source" -excerpt: "Password Guessing, Brute Force" +excerpt: "Password Guessing +, Brute Force +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2020-12-16 @@ -8,16 +10,16 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Password Guessing - - Credential Access - Brute Force - Credential Access + - Credential Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -26,7 +28,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search will detect more than 5 login failures in Office365 Azure Active Directory from a single source IP address. Please adjust the threshold value of 5 as suited for your environment. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2020-12-16 @@ -86,8 +88,12 @@ unknown +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -100,5 +106,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-12-16-o365_pst_export_alert.md b/docs/_posts/2020-12-16-o365_pst_export_alert.md index 5c3b66c80a..e6ef6014ed 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-12-16-o365_pst_export_alert.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-12-16-o365_pst_export_alert.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "O365 PST export alert" -excerpt: "Email Collection" +excerpt: "Email Collection +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2020-12-16 @@ -9,7 +10,6 @@ toc_label: "" tags: - Email Collection - Collection - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -23,8 +23,8 @@ tags: This search detects when a user has performed an Ediscovery search or exported a PST file from the search. This PST file usually has sensitive information including email body content -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Security Analytics for AWS, Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2020-12-16 - **Author**: Rod Soto, Splunk @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ PST export can be done for legitimate purposes but due to the sensitive nature o #### Kill Chain Phase -* Actions on Objective +* Exploitation @@ -87,8 +87,6 @@ PST export can be done for legitimate purposes but due to the sensitive nature o | 48.0 | 80 | 60 | User $Source$ has exported a PST file from the search using this operation- $Operation$ with a severity of $Severity$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -101,6 +99,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114/o365_export_pst_file/o365_export_pst_file.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114/o365_export_pst_file/o365_export_pst_file.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-12-16-o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.md b/docs/_posts/2020-12-16-o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.md index 7de46cf473..df22584920 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-12-16-o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-12-16-o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding" -excerpt: "Email Forwarding Rule, Email Collection" +excerpt: "Email Forwarding Rule +, Email Collection +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2020-12-16 @@ -8,10 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Email Forwarding Rule - - Collection - Email Collection - Collection - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS + - Collection - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,8 +26,8 @@ tags: This search detects when an admin configured a forwarding rule for multiple mailboxes to the same destination. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Security Analytics for AWS, Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2020-12-16 - **Author**: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk @@ -91,8 +92,6 @@ unknown | 48.0 | 80 | 60 | User $user$ has configured a forwarding rule for multiple mailboxes to the same destination $ForwardingAddress$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -102,6 +101,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114.003/o365_email_forwarding_rule/o365_email_forwarding_rule.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114.003/o365_email_forwarding_rule/o365_email_forwarding_rule.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-12-16-o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.md b/docs/_posts/2020-12-16-o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.md index fa5b6c1462..6b2aad9d18 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-12-16-o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-12-16-o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding" -excerpt: "Email Forwarding Rule, Email Collection" +excerpt: "Email Forwarding Rule +, Email Collection +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2020-12-16 @@ -8,10 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Email Forwarding Rule - - Collection - Email Collection - Collection - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS + - Collection - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,8 +26,8 @@ tags: This search detects when multiple user configured a forwarding rule to the same destination. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Security Analytics for AWS, Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2020-12-16 - **Author**: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk @@ -91,8 +92,6 @@ unknown | 48.0 | 80 | 60 | User $user$ configured multiple users $src_user$ with a count of $count_src_user$, a forwarding rule to same destination $ForwardingSmtpAddress$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -102,6 +101,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114.003/o365_email_forwarding_rule/o365_email_forwarding_rule.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114.003/o365_email_forwarding_rule/o365_email_forwarding_rule.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-12-21-bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.md b/docs/_posts/2020-12-21-bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.md index 52c6edf2ab..c9332e5abe 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-12-21-bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-12-21-bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification" -excerpt: "Inhibit System Recovery" +excerpt: "Inhibit System Recovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2020-12-21 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This search looks for flags passed to bcdedit.exe modifications to the built-in Windows error recovery boot configurations. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent recovery. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2020-12-21 @@ -87,8 +88,6 @@ Administrators may modify the boot configuration. | 80.0 | 100 | 80 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting disable the ability to recover the endpoint. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -101,6 +100,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-06-supernova_webshell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-06-supernova_webshell.md index 8878cae96c..00a5031036 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-06-supernova_webshell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-06-supernova_webshell.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Supernova Webshell" -excerpt: "Web Shell" +excerpt: "Web Shell +" categories: - Web last_modified_at: 2021-01-06 @@ -15,8 +16,8 @@ tags: - Web --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -25,7 +26,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search aims to detect the Supernova webshell used in the SUNBURST attack. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Web](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Web) - **Last Updated**: 2021-01-06 @@ -74,12 +75,16 @@ There might be false positives associted with this detection since items like ar #### Kill Chain Phase -* Exfiltration +* Exploitation +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -96,5 +101,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-11-aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-11-aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.md index 7c363796e9..bc8c244d36 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-11-aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-11-aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA" -excerpt: "Data Encrypted for Impact" +excerpt: "Data Encrypted for Impact +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2021-01-11 @@ -9,7 +10,6 @@ toc_label: "" tags: - Data Encrypted for Impact - Impact - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -23,8 +23,8 @@ tags: This search provides detection of KMS keys where action kms:Encrypt is accessible for everyone (also outside of your organization). This is an indicator that your account is compromised and the attacker uses the encryption key to compromise another company. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Security Analytics for AWS, Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-01-11 - **Author**: Rod Soto, Patrick Bareiss Splunk @@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ unknown #### Kill Chain Phase +* Exploitation @@ -92,8 +93,6 @@ unknown | 25.0 | 50 | 50 | AWS account is potentially compromised and user $userIdentity.principalId$ is trying to compromise other accounts. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -108,6 +107,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1486/aws_kms_key/aws_cloudtrail_events.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1486/aws_kms_key/aws_cloudtrail_events.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-11-aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-11-aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.md index b2f5010846..571ae9d899 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-11-aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-11-aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3" -excerpt: "Data Encrypted for Impact" +excerpt: "Data Encrypted for Impact +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2021-01-11 @@ -9,7 +10,6 @@ toc_label: "" tags: - Data Encrypted for Impact - Impact - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -23,8 +23,8 @@ tags: This search provides detection of users with KMS keys performing encryption specifically against S3 buckets. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Security Analytics for AWS, Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-01-11 - **Author**: Rod Soto, Patrick Bareiss Splunk @@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ bucket with S3 encryption #### Kill Chain Phase +* Exploitation @@ -87,8 +88,6 @@ bucket with S3 encryption | 15.0 | 30 | 50 | User $user$ with KMS keys is performing encryption, against S3 buckets on these files $dest_file$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -103,6 +102,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1486/s3_file_encryption/aws_cloudtrail_events.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1486/s3_file_encryption/aws_cloudtrail_events.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-11-aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-11-aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.md index 1e0c3ceca3..801c6ba26b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-11-aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-11-aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports" -excerpt: "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall, Impair Defenses" +excerpt: "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall +, Impair Defenses +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2021-01-11 @@ -8,10 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall - - Defense Evasion - Impair Defenses - Defense Evasion - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,8 +26,8 @@ tags: The search looks for AWS CloudTrail events to detect if any network ACLs were created with all the ports open to a specified CIDR. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Security Analytics for AWS, Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-01-11 - **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk @@ -80,7 +81,7 @@ Note that `aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports_filter` i You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS, version 4.4.0 or later, and configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. #### Known False Positives -It's possible that an admin has created this ACL with all ports open for some legitimate purpose however, this should be scoped and not allowed in production environment. +It's possible that an admin has created this ACL with all ports open for some legitimate purpose however, this should be scoped and not allowed in production environment. #### Associated Analytic story * [AWS Network ACL Activity](/stories/aws_network_acl_activity) @@ -98,8 +99,6 @@ It's possible that an admin has created this ACL with all ports open for som | 48.0 | 60 | 80 | User $user_arn$ has created network ACLs with all the ports open to a specified CIDR $requestParameters.cidrBlock$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -109,6 +108,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.007/aws_create_acl/aws_cloudtrail_events.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.007/aws_create_acl/aws_cloudtrail_events.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-12-aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-12-aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.md index 778517ceb6..4ceb152383 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-12-aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-12-aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "AWS Network Access Control List Deleted" -excerpt: "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall, Impair Defenses" +excerpt: "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall +, Impair Defenses +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2021-01-12 @@ -8,10 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall - - Defense Evasion - Impair Defenses - Defense Evasion - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,8 +26,8 @@ tags: Enforcing network-access controls is one of the defensive mechanisms used by cloud administrators to restrict access to a cloud instance. After the attacker has gained control of the AWS console by compromising an admin account, they can delete a network ACL and gain access to the instance from anywhere. This search will query the AWS CloudTrail logs to detect users deleting network ACLs. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Security Analytics for AWS, Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-01-12 - **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk @@ -73,7 +74,7 @@ Note that `aws_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter` is a empty macro by d You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. #### Known False Positives -It's possible that a user has legitimately deleted a network ACL. +It's possible that a user has legitimately deleted a network ACL. #### Associated Analytic story * [AWS Network ACL Activity](/stories/aws_network_acl_activity) @@ -91,8 +92,6 @@ It's possible that a user has legitimately deleted a network ACL. | 5.0 | 10 | 50 | User $user_arn$ from $src$ has sucessfully deleted network ACLs entry (eventName= $eventName$), such that the instance is accessible from anywhere | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -102,6 +101,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.007/aws_delete_acl/aws_cloudtrail_events.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.007/aws_delete_acl/aws_cloudtrail_events.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-12-suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-12-suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.md index 6b01746d49..4c84233c73 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-12-suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-12-suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage" -excerpt: "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution" +excerpt: "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-01-12 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe usage. microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319 and is rarely utilized. When investigating, identify the executed code on disk and review. It is not a commonly used process by many applications. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-01-12 @@ -93,8 +94,6 @@ Although unlikely, limited instances have been identified coming from native Mic | 35.0 | 70 | 50 | Suspicious microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe process ran on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -108,6 +107,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-12-suspicious_msbuild_path.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-12-suspicious_msbuild_path.md index dfaa95b20b..87583afddd 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-12-suspicious_msbuild_path.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-12-suspicious_msbuild_path.md @@ -1,6 +1,10 @@ --- title: "Suspicious msbuild path" -excerpt: "Masquerading, Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution, Rename System Utilities, MSBuild" +excerpt: "Masquerading +, Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution +, Rename System Utilities +, MSBuild +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-01-12 @@ -8,13 +12,13 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Masquerading - - Defense Evasion - Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution - - Defense Evasion - Rename System Utilities - - Defense Evasion - MSBuild - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -29,7 +33,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies msbuild.exe executing from a non-standard path. Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319 and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319. Instances of Visual Studio will run a copy of msbuild.exe. A moved instance of MSBuild is suspicious, however there are instances of build applications that will move or use a copy of MSBuild. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-01-12 @@ -87,7 +91,7 @@ Note that `suspicious_msbuild_path_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allow To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. #### Known False Positives -Some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of msbuild.exe, triggering a false positive. Baselining of MSBuild.exe usage is recommended to better understand it's path usage. Visual Studio runs an instance out of a path that will need to be filtered on. +Some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of msbuild.exe, triggering a false positive. Baselining of MSBuild.exe usage is recommended to better understand it's path usage. Visual Studio runs an instance out of a path that will need to be filtered on. #### Associated Analytic story * [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild](/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild) @@ -107,8 +111,6 @@ Some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of msbuild.exe, triggering a f | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | Msbuild.exe ran from an uncommon path on $dest$ execyted by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -122,6 +124,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-12-suspicious_msbuild_rename.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-12-suspicious_msbuild_rename.md index 9413aedc4e..ccbe304a9d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-12-suspicious_msbuild_rename.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-12-suspicious_msbuild_rename.md @@ -1,6 +1,10 @@ --- title: "Suspicious MSBuild Rename" -excerpt: "Masquerading, Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution, Rename System Utilities, MSBuild" +excerpt: "Masquerading +, Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution +, Rename System Utilities +, MSBuild +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-01-12 @@ -8,13 +12,13 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Masquerading - - Defense Evasion - Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution - - Defense Evasion - Rename System Utilities - - Defense Evasion - MSBuild - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -29,7 +33,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies renamed instances of msbuild.exe executing. Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319 and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319. During investigation, identify the code executed and what is executing a renamed instance of MSBuild. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-01-12 @@ -107,8 +111,6 @@ Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of msbuild, | 63.0 | 70 | 90 | Suspicious renamed msbuild.exe binary ran on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -123,6 +125,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-12-suspicious_msbuild_spawn.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-12-suspicious_msbuild_spawn.md index b4ac3fdf44..7140b48cc6 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-12-suspicious_msbuild_spawn.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-12-suspicious_msbuild_spawn.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Suspicious MSBuild Spawn" -excerpt: "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution, MSBuild" +excerpt: "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution +, MSBuild +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-01-12 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution - - Defense Evasion - MSBuild - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning msbuild.exe. This behavior is indicative of a COM object being utilized to spawn msbuild from wmiprvse.exe. It is common for MSBuild.exe to be spawned from devenv.exe while using Visual Studio. In this instance, there will be command line arguments and file paths. In a malicious instance, MSBuild.exe will spawn from non-standard processes and have no command line arguments. For example, MSBuild.exe spawning from explorer.exe, powershell.exe is far less common and should be investigated. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-01-12 @@ -97,8 +99,6 @@ Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, trigg | 42.0 | 70 | 60 | Suspicious msbuild.exe process executed on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-12-suspicious_mshta_child_process.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-12-suspicious_mshta_child_process.md index aec552e8c6..d152bc5870 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-12-suspicious_mshta_child_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-12-suspicious_mshta_child_process.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Suspicious mshta child process" -excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution, Mshta" +excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution +, Mshta +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-01-12 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Signed Binary Proxy Execution - - Defense Evasion - Mshta - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -23,9 +25,9 @@ tags: #### Description -The following analytic identifies child processes spawning from "mshta.exe". The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, parent process "mshta.exe" and its child process. +The following analytic identifies child processes spawning from "mshta.exe". The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, parent process "mshta.exe" and its child process. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-01-12 @@ -91,8 +93,6 @@ Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, trigg | 40.0 | 50 | 80 | suspicious mshta child process detected on host $dest$ by user $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-14-detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-14-detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.md index ca70bfc371..8cd378877a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-14-detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-14-detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers" -excerpt: "Drive-by Compromise" +excerpt: "Drive-by Compromise +" categories: - Network last_modified_at: 2021-01-14 @@ -23,12 +24,12 @@ tags: Malicious actors often abuse legitimate Dynamic DNS services to host malicious payloads or interactive command and control nodes. Attackers will automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to countless IP addresses to circumvent firewall blocks, block lists as well as frustrate a network defenders analytic and investigative processes. This search will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Network_Resolution](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkResolution) - **Last Updated**: 2021-01-14 - **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk -- **ID**: c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6v5464g9f +- **ID**: a1e761ac-1344-4dbd-88b2-3f34c912d359 #### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) @@ -50,18 +51,12 @@ Malicious actors often abuse legitimate Dynamic DNS services to host malicious p #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [dynamic_dns_providers](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/dynamic_dns_providers.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [dynamic_dns_providers](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/dynamic_dns_providers.yml) Note that `detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. -#### Lookups -The SPL above uses the following Lookups: - -* [dynamic_dns_providers_default](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/dynamic_dns_providers_default.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv) -* [dynamic_dns_providers_local](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/dynamic_dns_providers_local.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/dynamic_dns_providers_local.csv) - #### Required field * _time * DNS.answer @@ -70,8 +65,8 @@ The SPL above uses the following Lookups: #### How To Implement -First, you'll need to ingest data from your DNS operations. This can be done by ingesting logs from your server or data, collected passively by Splunk Stream or a similar solution. Specifically, data that contains the domain that is being queried and the IP of the host originating the request must be populating the `Network_Resolution` data model. This search also leverages a lookup file, `dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv`, which contains a non-exhaustive list of Dynamic DNS providers. Please consider updating the local lookup periodically by adding new domains to the list of `dynamic_dns_providers_local.csv`.\ -This search produces fields (query, answer, isDynDNS) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable event. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review. Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** DNS Query, **Field:** query\ +First, you'll need to ingest data from your DNS operations. This can be done by ingesting logs from your server or data, collected passively by Splunk Stream or a similar solution. Specifically, data that contains the domain that is being queried and the IP of the host originating the request must be populating the `Network_Resolution` data model. This search also leverages a lookup file, `dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv`, which contains a non-exhaustive list of Dynamic DNS providers. Please consider updating the local lookup periodically by adding new domains to the list of `dynamic_dns_providers_local.csv`.\ +This search produces fields (query, answer, isDynDNS) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable event. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review. Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** DNS Query, **Field:** query\ 1. \ 1. **Label:** DNS Answer, **Field:** answer\ 1. \ @@ -91,7 +86,7 @@ Some users and applications may leverage Dynamic DNS to reach out to some domain #### Kill Chain Phase -* Command and Control +* Command & Control * Actions on Objectives @@ -103,8 +98,6 @@ Some users and applications may leverage Dynamic DNS to reach out to some domain | 56.0 | 70 | 80 | A dns query $query$ from your infra connecting to suspicious domain in host $host$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -114,6 +107,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1189/dyn_dns_site/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1189/dyn_dns_site/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-19-malicious_powershell_process_-_multiple_suspicious_command-line_arguments.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-19-malicious_powershell_process_-_multiple_suspicious_command-line_arguments.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6935cf6776 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-19-malicious_powershell_process_-_multiple_suspicious_command-line_arguments.md @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +--- +title: "Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments" +excerpt: "PowerShell +" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2021-01-19 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - PowerShell + - Execution + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Endpoint +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search looks for PowerShell processes started with a base64 encoded command-line passed to it, with parameters to modify the execution policy for the process, and those that prevent the display of an interactive prompt to the user. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it overrides the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide itself from the user, and passes an encoded script to be run on the command-line. Deprecated because almost the same as Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command + +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) +- **Last Updated**: 2021-01-19 +- **Author**: David Dorsey, Splunk +- **ID**: 2cdb91d2-542c-497f-b252-be495e71f38c + + +#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1059.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/) | PowerShell | Execution | + +#### Search + +``` + +| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=powershell.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest +| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| search (process=*-EncodedCommand* OR process=*-enc*) process=*-Exec* +| `malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) + +Note that `malicious_powershell_process_-_multiple_suspicious_command-line_arguments_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time + + +#### How To Implement +You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. + +#### Known False Positives +Legitimate process can have this combination of command-line options, but it's not common. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Malicious PowerShell](/stories/malicious_powershell) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Command & Control +* Actions on Objectives + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/malicious_powershell_process_-_multiple_suspicious_command-line_arguments.yml) \| *version*: **6** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-19-malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-19-malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.md index 9723b2760d..bdd2623dc0 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-19-malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-19-malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques" -excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter, PowerShell" +excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter +, PowerShell +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-01-19 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Command and Scripting Interpreter - - Execution - PowerShell - Execution + - Execution - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This search looks for PowerShell processes launched with arguments that have characters indicative of obfuscation on the command-line. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-01-19 @@ -56,9 +58,9 @@ This search looks for PowerShell processes launched with arguments that have cha #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) Note that `malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -88,7 +90,7 @@ These characters might be legitimately on the command-line, but it is not common #### Kill Chain Phase -* Command and Control +* Command & Control * Actions on Objectives @@ -100,8 +102,6 @@ These characters might be legitimately on the command-line, but it is not common | 42.0 | 70 | 60 | Powershell.exe running with potential obfuscated arguments on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/obfuscated_powershell/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/obfuscated_powershell/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-20-detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-20-detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.md index d6c26640ad..7147e2b9ac 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-20-detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-20-detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution" -excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution, Mshta" +excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution +, Mshta +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-01-20 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Signed Binary Proxy Execution - - Defense Evasion - Mshta - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -23,9 +25,9 @@ tags: #### Description -The following analytic identifies "rundll32.exe" execution with inline protocol handlers. "JavaScript", "VBScript", and "About" are the only supported options when invoking HTA content directly on the command-line. This type of behavior is commonly observed with fileless malware or application whitelisting bypass techniques. The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process "rundll32.exe" and its parent process. +The following analytic identifies "rundll32.exe" execution with inline protocol handlers. "JavaScript", "VBScript", and "About" are the only supported options when invoking HTA content directly on the command-line. This type of behavior is commonly observed with fileless malware or application whitelisting bypass techniques. The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process "rundll32.exe" and its parent process. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-01-20 @@ -98,8 +100,6 @@ Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, trigg | 56.0 | 70 | 80 | Suspicious rundll32.exe inline HTA execution on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-20-suspicious_mshta_spawn.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-20-suspicious_mshta_spawn.md index f85a5cae16..54d79e044f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-20-suspicious_mshta_spawn.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-20-suspicious_mshta_spawn.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Suspicious mshta spawn" -excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution, Mshta" +excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution +, Mshta +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-01-20 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Signed Binary Proxy Execution - - Defense Evasion - Mshta - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning mshta.exe. This behavior is indicative of a DCOM object being utilized to spawn mshta from wmiprvse.exe or svchost.exe. In this instance, adversaries may use LethalHTA that will spawn mshta.exe from svchost.exe. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-01-20 @@ -55,8 +57,8 @@ The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning mshta.exe. This behavior #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [process_mshta](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_mshta.yml) -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `suspicious_mshta_spawn_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -97,8 +99,6 @@ Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, trigg | 42.0 | 70 | 60 | mshta.exe spawned by wmiprvse.exe on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-22-wbadmin_delete_system_backups.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-22-wbadmin_delete_system_backups.md index 890889c8e9..fb0429d8c6 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-22-wbadmin_delete_system_backups.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-22-wbadmin_delete_system_backups.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "WBAdmin Delete System Backups" -excerpt: "Inhibit System Recovery" +excerpt: "Inhibit System Recovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-01-22 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This search looks for flags passed to wbadmin.exe (Windows Backup Administrator Tool) that delete backup files. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent recovery. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-01-22 @@ -87,8 +88,6 @@ Administrators may modify the boot configuration. | 15.0 | 30 | 50 | System backups deletion on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -104,6 +103,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-25-nltest_domain_trust_discovery.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-25-nltest_domain_trust_discovery.md index 1d78896c91..188bdf5b87 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-25-nltest_domain_trust_discovery.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-25-nltest_domain_trust_discovery.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "NLTest Domain Trust Discovery" -excerpt: "Domain Trust Discovery" +excerpt: "Domain Trust Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-01-25 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This search looks for the execution of `nltest.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for Domain Trust information. Two arguments `/domain trusts`, returns a list of trusted domains, and `/all_trusts`, returns all trusted domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike use NLTest.exe to enumerate the current domain to assist with further understanding where to pivot next. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-01-25 @@ -91,8 +92,6 @@ Administrators may use nltest for troubleshooting purposes, otherwise, rarely us | 15.0 | 30 | 50 | Domain trust discovery execution on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -111,6 +110,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.md index c6f9e89788..bed2dc42a6 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal" -excerpt: "Valid Accounts" +excerpt: "Valid Accounts +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2021-01-26 @@ -9,10 +10,9 @@ toc_label: "" tags: - Valid Accounts - Defense Evasion + - Initial Access - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Initial Access - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -26,8 +26,8 @@ tags: This search provides specific SAML access from specific Service Provider, user and targeted principal at AWS. This search provides specific information to detect abnormal access or potential credential hijack or forgery, specially in federated environments using SAML protocol inside the perimeter or cloud provider. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Security Analytics for AWS, Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-01-26 - **Author**: Rod Soto, Splunk @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ This search provides specific SAML access from specific Service Provider, user a | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access | +| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ Attacks using a Golden SAML or SAML assertion hijacks or forgeries are very diff #### Kill Chain Phase +* Exploitation @@ -90,8 +91,6 @@ Attacks using a Golden SAML or SAML assertion hijacks or forgeries are very diff | 64.0 | 80 | 80 | From IP address $sourceIPAddress$, user agent $userAgent$ has trigged an event $eventName$ for account ID $recipientAccountId$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -107,6 +106,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/assume_role_with_saml/assume_role_with_saml.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/assume_role_with_saml/assume_role_with_saml.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-aws_saml_update_identity_provider.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-aws_saml_update_identity_provider.md index d1ba287ca0..9e8c6e51ce 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-aws_saml_update_identity_provider.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-aws_saml_update_identity_provider.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "AWS SAML Update identity provider" -excerpt: "Valid Accounts" +excerpt: "Valid Accounts +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2021-01-26 @@ -9,10 +10,9 @@ toc_label: "" tags: - Valid Accounts - Defense Evasion + - Initial Access - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Initial Access - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -26,8 +26,8 @@ tags: This search provides detection of updates to SAML provider in AWS. Updates to SAML provider need to be monitored closely as they may indicate possible perimeter compromise of federated credentials, or backdoor access from another cloud provider set by attacker. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Security Analytics for AWS, Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-01-26 - **Author**: Rod Soto, Splunk @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ This search provides detection of updates to SAML provider in AWS. Updates to SA | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access | +| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ Updating a SAML provider or creating a new one may not necessarily be malicious #### Kill Chain Phase +* Exploitation @@ -89,8 +90,6 @@ Updating a SAML provider or creating a new one may not necessarily be malicious | 64.0 | 80 | 80 | User $userIdentity.principalId$ from IP address $sourceIPAddress$ has trigged an event $eventName$ to update the SAML provider to $requestParameters.sAMLProviderArn$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -106,6 +105,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/update_saml_provider/update_saml_provider.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/update_saml_provider/update_saml_provider.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.md index 5ec24f4b34..a090f00c07 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.md @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ tags: This search looks for arguments to certutil.exe indicating the manipulation or extraction of Certificate. This certificate can then be used to sign new authentication tokens specially inside Federated environments such as Windows ADFS. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-01-26 @@ -83,8 +83,6 @@ Unless there are specific use cases, manipulating or exporting certificates usin | 63.0 | 90 | 70 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting export a certificate. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -94,6 +92,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.md index 6200a45168..77afd2f759 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.md @@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ last_modified_at: 2021-01-26 toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -21,8 +20,8 @@ tags: This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub alerts for an EC2 instance in 4 hours intervals -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Security Analytics for AWS, Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-01-26 - **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk @@ -70,6 +69,7 @@ None #### Kill Chain Phase +* Exploitation @@ -80,8 +80,6 @@ None | 15.0 | 30 | 50 | Spike in AWS security Hub alerts with title $Title$ for EC2 instance $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -91,6 +89,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/security_hub_ec2_spike/security_hub_ec2_spike.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/security_hub_ec2_spike/security_hub_ec2_spike.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.md index 635f171522..2cd8276dbb 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.md @@ -12,8 +12,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Cloud --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub alerts for an AWS IAM User in 4 hours intervals. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-01-26 @@ -68,11 +68,16 @@ None #### Kill Chain Phase +* Exploitation +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -85,5 +90,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml) \| *version*: **3** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.md index 4b2ec9be2f..bf97c74462 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User" -excerpt: "Cloud Account, Create Account" +excerpt: "Cloud Account +, Create Account +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2021-01-26 @@ -8,10 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Cloud Account - - Persistence - Create Account - Persistence - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS + - Persistence - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,8 +26,8 @@ tags: This search detects the creation of a new Federation setting by alerting about an specific event related to its creation. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Security Analytics for AWS, Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-01-26 - **Author**: Rod Soto, Splunk @@ -81,7 +82,7 @@ The creation of a new Federation is not necessarily malicious, however this even #### Kill Chain Phase -* Actions on Objective +* Exploitation @@ -92,8 +93,6 @@ The creation of a new Federation is not necessarily malicious, however this even | 18.0 | 30 | 60 | User $Actor.ID$ has created a new federation setting on $dest$ from IP Address $ActorIpAddress$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -107,6 +106,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_new_federation/o365_new_federation.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_new_federation/o365_new_federation.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.md index aede587463..3605f73e11 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "O365 Excessive SSO logon errors" -excerpt: "Modify Authentication Process" +excerpt: "Modify Authentication Process +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2021-01-26 @@ -11,7 +12,6 @@ tags: - Credential Access - Defense Evasion - Persistence - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,8 +25,8 @@ tags: This search detects accounts with high number of Single Sign ON (SSO) logon errors. Excessive logon errors may indicate attempts to bruteforce of password or single sign on token hijack or reuse. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Security Analytics for AWS, Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-01-26 - **Author**: Rod Soto, Splunk @@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ Logon errors may not be malicious in nature however it may indicate attempts to #### Kill Chain Phase -* Actions on Objective +* Exploitation @@ -89,8 +89,6 @@ Logon errors may not be malicious in nature however it may indicate attempts to | 64.0 | 80 | 80 | User $UserId$ has caused excessive number of SSO logon errors from $ActorIpAddress$ using UserAgent $UserAgent$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -103,6 +101,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/o365_sso_logon_errors/o365_sso_logon_errors.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/o365_sso_logon_errors/o365_sso_logon_errors.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-o365_new_federated_domain_added.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-o365_new_federated_domain_added.md index 5a863cdab9..f84bea7a7e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-o365_new_federated_domain_added.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-o365_new_federated_domain_added.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "O365 New Federated Domain Added" -excerpt: "Cloud Account, Create Account" +excerpt: "Cloud Account +, Create Account +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2021-01-26 @@ -8,10 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Cloud Account - - Persistence - Create Account - Persistence - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS + - Persistence - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,8 +26,8 @@ tags: This search detects the addition of a new Federated domain. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Security Analytics for AWS, Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-01-26 - **Author**: Rod Soto, Splunk @@ -82,7 +83,7 @@ The creation of a new Federated domain is not necessarily malicious, however the #### Kill Chain Phase -* Actions on Objective +* Exploitation @@ -93,8 +94,6 @@ The creation of a new Federated domain is not necessarily malicious, however the | 64.0 | 80 | 80 | User $UserId$ has added a new federated domaain $Parameters.Value$ for $OrganizationName$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -111,6 +110,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_new_federated_domain/o365_new_federated_domain.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_new_federated_domain/o365_new_federated_domain.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-revil_registry_entry.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-revil_registry_entry.md index 412b745317..bf023b9640 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-revil_registry_entry.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-revil_registry_entry.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Revil Registry Entry" -excerpt: "Modify Registry" +excerpt: "Modify Registry +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-01-26 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This analytic identifies suspicious modification in registry entry to keep some malware data during its infection. This technique seen in several apt implant, malware and ransomware like REVIL where it keep some information like the random generated file extension it uses for all the encrypted files and ransomware notes file name in the compromised host. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-01-26 @@ -91,8 +92,6 @@ unknown | 60.0 | 60 | 100 | A registry entry $registry_path$ with registry value $registry_value_name$ and $registry_value_name$ related to revil ransomware in host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -106,6 +105,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-27-detect_baron_samedit_cve-2021-3156.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-27-detect_baron_samedit_cve-2021-3156.md index 0a2527ecde..b9f2680e88 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-27-detect_baron_samedit_cve-2021-3156.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-27-detect_baron_samedit_cve-2021-3156.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156" -excerpt: "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation" +excerpt: "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-01-27 @@ -12,11 +13,10 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - CVE-2021-3156 --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-01-27 @@ -72,23 +72,17 @@ unknown +#### RBA -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -#### CVE - -| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | -| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [CVE-2021-3156](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-3156) | Sudo before 1.9.5p2 contains an off-by-one error that can result in a heap-based buffer overflow, which allows privilege escalation to root via "sudoedit -s" and a command-line argument that ends with a single backslash character. | 7.2 | - #### Reference -* [https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit](https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit) - - #### Test Dataset Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). @@ -96,5 +90,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve-2021-3156.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-28-detect_baron_samedit_cve-2021-3156_via_osquery.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-28-detect_baron_samedit_cve-2021-3156_via_osquery.md index 6f479f7245..fb804b5b33 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-28-detect_baron_samedit_cve-2021-3156_via_osquery.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-28-detect_baron_samedit_cve-2021-3156_via_osquery.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery" -excerpt: "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation" +excerpt: "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-01-28 @@ -12,11 +13,10 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - CVE-2021-3156 --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-01-28 @@ -73,23 +73,17 @@ unknown +#### RBA -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -#### CVE - -| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | -| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [CVE-2021-3156](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-3156) | Sudo before 1.9.5p2 contains an off-by-one error that can result in a heap-based buffer overflow, which allows privilege escalation to root via "sudoedit -s" and a command-line argument that ends with a single backslash character. | 7.2 | - #### Reference -* [https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit](https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit) - - #### Test Dataset Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). @@ -97,5 +91,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve-2021-3156_via_osquery.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-28-detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-28-detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.md index da01973045..55d55acd76 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-28-detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-28-detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass" -excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution, Regsvr32" +excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution +, Regsvr32 +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-01-28 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Signed Binary Proxy Execution - - Defense Evasion - Regsvr32 - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -23,10 +25,10 @@ tags: #### Description -Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. Regsvr32.exe is also a Microsoft signed binary.This variation of the technique is often referred to as a "Squiblydoo" attack. \ -Upon investigating, look for network connections to remote destinations (internal or external). Be cautious to modify the query to look for "scrobj.dll", the ".dll" is not required to load scrobj. "scrobj.dll" will be loaded by "regsvr32.exe" upon execution. +Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. Regsvr32.exe is also a Microsoft signed binary.This variation of the technique is often referred to as a "Squiblydoo" attack. \ +Upon investigating, look for network connections to remote destinations (internal or external). Be cautious to modify the query to look for "scrobj.dll", the ".dll" is not required to load scrobj. "scrobj.dll" will be loaded by "regsvr32.exe" upon execution. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-01-28 @@ -80,7 +82,7 @@ Note that `detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass_filter` is a empty macro b To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. #### Known False Positives -Limited false positives related to third party software registering .DLL's. +Limited false positives related to third party software registering .DLL's. #### Associated Analytic story * [Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity](/stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity) @@ -99,8 +101,6 @@ Limited false positives related to third party software registering .DLL's. | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ in an attempt to bypass detection and preventative controls was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.010/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.010/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-28-ntdsutil_export_ntds.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-28-ntdsutil_export_ntds.md index 5eaf8e0f7b..cd2ff2689e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-28-ntdsutil_export_ntds.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-28-ntdsutil_export_ntds.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Ntdsutil Export NTDS" -excerpt: "NTDS, OS Credential Dumping" +excerpt: "NTDS +, OS Credential Dumping +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-01-28 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - NTDS - - Credential Access - OS Credential Dumping - Credential Access + - Credential Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -24,10 +26,10 @@ tags: #### Description Monitor for signs that Ntdsutil is being used to Extract Active Directory database - NTDS.dit, typically used for offline password cracking. It may be used in normal circumstances with no command line arguments or shorthand variations of more common arguments. Ntdsutil.exe is typically seen run on a Windows Server. Typical command used to dump ntds.dit \ -ntdsutil "ac i ntds" "ifm" "create full C:\Temp" q q \ -This technique uses "Install from Media" (IFM), which will extract a copy of the Active Directory database. A successful export of the Active Directory database will yield a file modification named ntds.dit to the destination. +ntdsutil "ac i ntds" "ifm" "create full C:\Temp" q q \ +This technique uses "Install from Media" (IFM), which will extract a copy of the Active Directory database. A successful export of the Active Directory database will yield a file modification named ntds.dit to the destination. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-01-28 @@ -73,7 +75,7 @@ Note that `ntdsutil_export_ntds_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows t #### How To Implement -You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. +You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. #### Known False Positives Highly possible Server Administrators will troubleshoot with ntdsutil.exe, generating false positives. @@ -95,8 +97,6 @@ Highly possible Server Administrators will troubleshoot with ntdsutil.exe, gener | 50.0 | 100 | 50 | Active Directory NTDS export on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-28-suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-28-suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.md index 8cd015315d..93ca00da4a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-28-suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-28-suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path" -excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution, Regsvr32" +excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution +, Regsvr32 +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-01-28 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Signed Binary Proxy Execution - - Defense Evasion - Regsvr32 - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code by using non-standard file extensions to load malciious DLLs. Upon investigating, look for network connections to remote destinations (internal or external). Review additional parrallel processes and child processes for additional activity. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-01-28 @@ -76,7 +78,7 @@ Note that `suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path_filter` is a empty macro #### How To Implement -You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. Tune the query by filtering additional extensions found to be used by legitimate processes. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. Tune the query by filtering additional extensions found to be used by legitimate processes. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. #### Known False Positives Limited false positives with the query restricted to specified paths. Add more world writeable paths as tuning continues. @@ -98,8 +100,6 @@ Limited false positives with the query restricted to specified paths. Add more w | 35.0 | 70 | 50 | Suspicious $Processes.process_path.file_path$ process potentially loading malicious code | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.010/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.010/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-29-detect_baron_samedit_cve-2021-3156_segfault.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-29-detect_baron_samedit_cve-2021-3156_segfault.md index ea4fb3c5bd..456c6787ad 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-29-detect_baron_samedit_cve-2021-3156_segfault.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-29-detect_baron_samedit_cve-2021-3156_segfault.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault" -excerpt: "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation" +excerpt: "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-01-29 @@ -12,11 +13,10 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - CVE-2021-3156 --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-01-29 @@ -75,23 +75,17 @@ If sudoedit is throwing segfaults for other reasons this will pick those up too. +#### RBA -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -#### CVE - -| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | -| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [CVE-2021-3156](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-3156) | Sudo before 1.9.5p2 contains an off-by-one error that can result in a heap-based buffer overflow, which allows privilege escalation to root via "sudoedit -s" and a command-line argument that ends with a single backslash character. | 7.2 | - #### Reference -* [https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit](https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit) - - #### Test Dataset Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). @@ -99,5 +93,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve-2021-3156_segfault.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-02-01-dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.md b/docs/_posts/2021-02-01-dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..22f5a13c3b --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-02-01-dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.md @@ -0,0 +1,111 @@ +--- +title: "Dump LSASS via procdump Rename" +excerpt: "LSASS Memory +" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2021-02-01 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - LSASS Memory + - Credential Access + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +Detect a renamed instance of procdump.exe dumping the lsass process. This query looks for both -mm and -ma usage. -mm will produce a mini dump file and -ma will write a dump file with all process memory. Both are highly suspect and should be reviewed. Modify the query as needed.\ +During triage, confirm this is procdump.exe executing. If it is the first time a Sysinternals utility has been ran, it is possible there will be a -accepteula on the command line. Review other endpoint data sources for cross process (injection) into lsass.exe. + +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2021-02-01 +- **Author**: Michael Haag, Splunk +- **ID**: 21276daa-663d-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 + + +#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1003.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/) | LSASS Memory | Credential Access | + +#### Search + +``` +`sysmon` OriginalFileName=procdump process_name!=procdump*.exe EventID=1 (CommandLine=*-ma* OR CommandLine=*-mm*) CommandLine=*lsass* +| rename Computer as dest +| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, parent_process_name, process_name, OriginalFileName, CommandLine +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| `dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) + +Note that `dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* OriginalFileName +* process_name +* EventID +* CommandLine +* Computer +* parent_process_name + + +#### How To Implement +To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. + +#### Known False Positives +None identified. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Credential Dumping](/stories/credential_dumping) +* [HAFNIUM Group](/stories/hafnium_group) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Actions on Objectives + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 80.0 | 80 | 100 | The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$, attempting to dump lsass.exe. | + + + + +#### Reference + +* [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/) +* [https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procdump](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procdump) +* [https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md#atomic-test-2---dump-lsassexe-memory-using-procdump](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md#atomic-test-2---dump-lsassexe-memory-using-procdump) + + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + +* [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_advpack.md b/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_advpack.md index 6fca2af169..737967c37a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_advpack.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_advpack.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack" -excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution, Rundll32" +excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution +, Rundll32 +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-02-04 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Signed Binary Proxy Execution - - Defense Evasion - Rundll32 - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -23,9 +25,9 @@ tags: #### Description -The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading advpack.dll and ieadvpack.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line. This particular technique will load script code from a file. Upon a successful execution, the following module loads may occur - clr.dll, jscript.dll and scrobj.dll. During investigation, identify script content origination. Generally, a child process will spawn from rundll32.exe, but that may be bypassed based on script code contents. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. During investigation, review any network connections and obtain the script content executed. It's possible other files are on disk. +The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading advpack.dll and ieadvpack.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line. This particular technique will load script code from a file. Upon a successful execution, the following module loads may occur - clr.dll, jscript.dll and scrobj.dll. During investigation, identify script content origination. Generally, a child process will spawn from rundll32.exe, but that may be bypassed based on script code contents. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. During investigation, review any network connections and obtain the script content executed. It's possible other files are on disk. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-02-04 @@ -97,8 +99,6 @@ Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use advpack.dll or ieadvpack | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ loading advpack.dll and ieadvpack.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_setupapi.md b/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_setupapi.md index 53f3b473ed..0c41b49730 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_setupapi.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_setupapi.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi" -excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution, Rundll32" +excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution +, Rundll32 +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-02-04 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Signed Binary Proxy Execution - - Defense Evasion - Rundll32 - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -23,9 +25,9 @@ tags: #### Description -The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading setupapi.dll and iesetupapi.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line. This particular technique will load script code from a file. Upon a successful execution, the following module loads may occur - clr.dll, jscript.dll and scrobj.dll. During investigation, identify script content origination. Generally, a child process will spawn from rundll32.exe, but that may be bypassed based on script code contents. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. During investigation, review any network connections and obtain the script content executed. It's possible other files are on disk. +The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading setupapi.dll and iesetupapi.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line. This particular technique will load script code from a file. Upon a successful execution, the following module loads may occur - clr.dll, jscript.dll and scrobj.dll. During investigation, identify script content origination. Generally, a child process will spawn from rundll32.exe, but that may be bypassed based on script code contents. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. During investigation, review any network connections and obtain the script content executed. It's possible other files are on disk. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-02-04 @@ -97,8 +99,6 @@ Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use setupapi triggering a fa | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ loading setupapi.dll and iesetupapi.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_syssetup.md b/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_syssetup.md index 7de42141b4..163cebba14 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_syssetup.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_syssetup.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup" -excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution, Rundll32" +excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution +, Rundll32 +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-02-04 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Signed Binary Proxy Execution - - Defense Evasion - Rundll32 - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -23,9 +25,9 @@ tags: #### Description -The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading syssetup.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line. This particular technique will load script code from a file. Upon a successful execution, the following module loads may occur - clr.dll, jscript.dll and scrobj.dll. During investigation, identify script content origination. Generally, a child process will spawn from rundll32.exe, but that may be bypassed based on script code contents. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. During investigation, review any network connections and obtain the script content executed. It's possible other files are on disk. +The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading syssetup.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line. This particular technique will load script code from a file. Upon a successful execution, the following module loads may occur - clr.dll, jscript.dll and scrobj.dll. During investigation, identify script content origination. Generally, a child process will spawn from rundll32.exe, but that may be bypassed based on script code contents. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. During investigation, review any network connections and obtain the script content executed. It's possible other files are on disk. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-02-04 @@ -97,8 +99,6 @@ Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use syssetup.dll, triggering | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ loading syssetup.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-suspicious_rundll32_startw.md b/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-suspicious_rundll32_startw.md index 84b7edf779..f9603f7fef 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-suspicious_rundll32_startw.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-suspicious_rundll32_startw.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Suspicious Rundll32 StartW" -excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution, Rundll32" +excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution +, Rundll32 +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-02-04 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Signed Binary Proxy Execution - - Defense Evasion - Rundll32 - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe executing a DLL function name, Start and StartW, on the command line that is commonly observed with Cobalt Strike x86 and x64 DLL payloads. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. Typically, the DLL will be written and loaded from a world writeable path or user location. In most instances it will not have a valid certificate (Unsigned). During investigation, review the parent process and other parallel application execution. Capture and triage the DLL in question. In the instance of Cobalt Strike, rundll32.exe is the default process it opens and injects shellcode into. This default process can be changed, but typically is not. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-02-04 @@ -99,8 +101,6 @@ Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use Start as a function and | 35.0 | 70 | 50 | rundll32.exe running with suspicious parameters on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-02-09-suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.md b/docs/_posts/2021-02-09-suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.md index f2238e4931..d96b0869b6 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-02-09-suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-02-09-suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver" -excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution, Rundll32" +excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution +, Rundll32 +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-02-09 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Signed Binary Proxy Execution - - Defense Evasion - Rundll32 - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe using dllregisterserver on the command line to load a DLL. When a DLL is registered, the DllRegisterServer method entry point in the DLL is invoked. This is typically seen when a DLL is being registered on the system. Not every instance is considered malicious, but it will capture malicious use of it. During investigation, review the parent process and parrellel processes executing. Capture the DLL being loaded and inspect further. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-02-09 @@ -97,8 +99,6 @@ This is likely to produce false positives and will require some filtering. Tune | 35.0 | 70 | 50 | $Processes.process_path.file_path$ process potentially loading malicious code | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-02-11-detect_html_help_spawn_child_process.md b/docs/_posts/2021-02-11-detect_html_help_spawn_child_process.md index 109b8fc446..882959010d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-02-11-detect_html_help_spawn_child_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-02-11-detect_html_help_spawn_child_process.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process" -excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution, Compiled HTML File" +excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution +, Compiled HTML File +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-02-11 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Signed Binary Proxy Execution - - Defense Evasion - Compiled HTML File - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -23,9 +25,9 @@ tags: #### Description -The following analytic identifies hh.exe (HTML Help) execution of a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) that spawns a child process. This particular technique will load Windows script code from a compiled help file. CHM files may contain nearly any file type embedded, but only execute html/htm. Upon a successful execution, the following script engines may be used for execution - JScript, VBScript, VBScript.Encode, JScript.Encode, JScript.Compact. Analyst may identify vbscript.dll or jscript.dll loading into hh.exe upon execution. The "htm" and "html" file extensions were the only extensions observed to be supported for the execution of Shortcut commands or WSH script code. During investigation, identify script content origination. Review child process events and investigate further. hh.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. +The following analytic identifies hh.exe (HTML Help) execution of a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) that spawns a child process. This particular technique will load Windows script code from a compiled help file. CHM files may contain nearly any file type embedded, but only execute html/htm. Upon a successful execution, the following script engines may be used for execution - JScript, VBScript, VBScript.Encode, JScript.Encode, JScript.Compact. Analyst may identify vbscript.dll or jscript.dll loading into hh.exe upon execution. The "htm" and "html" file extensions were the only extensions observed to be supported for the execution of Shortcut commands or WSH script code. During investigation, identify script content origination. Review child process events and investigate further. hh.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-02-11 @@ -96,8 +98,6 @@ Although unlikely, some legitimate applications (ex. web browsers) may spawn a c | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ spawning a child process, typically not normal behavior. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-02-12-detect_regasm_spawning_a_process.md b/docs/_posts/2021-02-12-detect_regasm_spawning_a_process.md index cfdc8e0ab1..c28205cdfb 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-02-12-detect_regasm_spawning_a_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-02-12-detect_regasm_spawning_a_process.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Detect Regasm Spawning a Process" -excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution, Regsvcs/Regasm" +excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution +, Regsvcs/Regasm +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-02-12 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Signed Binary Proxy Execution - - Defense Evasion - Regsvcs/Regasm - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies regasm.exe spawning a process. This particular technique has been used in the wild to bypass application control products. Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe are signed by Microsoft. Spawning of a child process is rare from either process and should be investigated further. During investigation, identify and retrieve the content being loaded. Review parallel processes for additional suspicious behavior. Gather any other file modifications and review accordingly. regsvcs.exe and regasm.exe are natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-02-12 @@ -92,8 +94,6 @@ Although unlikely, limited instances of regasm.exe or regsvcs.exe may cause a fa | 64.0 | 80 | 80 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ spawning a child process, typically not normal behavior for $parent_process_name$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-02-12-detect_regsvcs_spawning_a_process.md b/docs/_posts/2021-02-12-detect_regsvcs_spawning_a_process.md index 6b3995b061..58a1440fbd 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-02-12-detect_regsvcs_spawning_a_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-02-12-detect_regsvcs_spawning_a_process.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process" -excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution, Regsvcs/Regasm" +excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution +, Regsvcs/Regasm +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-02-12 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Signed Binary Proxy Execution - - Defense Evasion - Regsvcs/Regasm - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies regsvcs.exe spawning a process. This particular technique has been used in the wild to bypass application control products. Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe are signed by Microsoft. Spawning of a child process is rare from either process and should be investigated further. During investigation, identify and retrieve the content being loaded. Review parallel processes for additional suspicious behavior. Gather any other file modifications and review accordingly. regsvcs.exe and regasm.exe are natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-02-12 @@ -93,8 +95,6 @@ Although unlikely, limited instances of regasm.exe or regsvcs.exe may cause a fa | 64.0 | 80 | 80 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ typically not normal for this process. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-02-22-aws_create_policy_version_to_allow_all_resources.md b/docs/_posts/2021-02-22-aws_create_policy_version_to_allow_all_resources.md index da31deb082..e73b393424 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-02-22-aws_create_policy_version_to_allow_all_resources.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-02-22-aws_create_policy_version_to_allow_all_resources.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources" -excerpt: "Cloud Accounts, Valid Accounts" +excerpt: "Cloud Accounts +, Valid Accounts +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2021-02-22 @@ -8,16 +10,15 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Cloud Accounts - - Defense Evasion - - Persistence - - Privilege Escalation - - Initial Access - Valid Accounts - Defense Evasion + - Initial Access - Persistence - Privilege Escalation + - Defense Evasion - Initial Access - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS + - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -31,8 +32,8 @@ tags: This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user created a policy version that allows them to access any resource in their account -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Security Analytics for AWS, Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-02-22 - **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk @@ -43,9 +44,9 @@ This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user created a policy versio | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1078.004](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/) | Cloud Accounts | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access | +| [T1078.004](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/) | Cloud Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access | +| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -98,8 +99,6 @@ While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | User $user$ created a policy version that allows them to access any resource in their account | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -113,6 +112,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_create_policy_version/aws_cloudtrail_events.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_create_policy_version/aws_cloudtrail_events.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-02-22-cobalt_strike_named_pipes.md b/docs/_posts/2021-02-22-cobalt_strike_named_pipes.md index 686b3f5207..cf0532a673 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-02-22-cobalt_strike_named_pipes.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-02-22-cobalt_strike_named_pipes.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Cobalt Strike Named Pipes" -excerpt: "Process Injection" +excerpt: "Process Injection +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-02-22 @@ -24,7 +25,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies the use of default or publicly known named pipes used with Cobalt Strike. A named pipe is a named, one-way or duplex pipe for communication between the pipe server and one or more pipe clients. Cobalt Strike uses named pipes in many ways and has default values used with the Artifact Kit and Malleable C2 Profiles. The following query assists with identifying these default named pipes. Each EDR product presents named pipes a little different. Consider taking the values and generating a query based on the product of choice. \ Upon triage, review the process performing the named pipe. If it is explorer.exe, It is possible it was injected into by another process. Review recent parallel processes to identify suspicious patterns or behaviors. A parallel process may have a network connection, review and follow the connection back to identify any file modifications. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-02-22 @@ -51,8 +52,8 @@ Upon triage, review the process performing the named pipe. If it is explorer.exe #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `cobalt_strike_named_pipes_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -90,8 +91,6 @@ The idea of using named pipes with Cobalt Strike is to blend in. Therefore, some | 72.0 | 80 | 90 | An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $Computer$ by user $user$ accessing known suspicious named pipes related to Cobalt Strike. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -109,6 +108,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-02-22-suspicious_curl_network_connection.md b/docs/_posts/2021-02-22-suspicious_curl_network_connection.md index 050828d0cf..ed01cf30cf 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-02-22-suspicious_curl_network_connection.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-02-22-suspicious_curl_network_connection.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Suspicious Curl Network Connection" -excerpt: "Ingress Tool Transfer" +excerpt: "Ingress Tool Transfer +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-02-22 @@ -15,8 +16,8 @@ tags: - Endpoint --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -25,7 +26,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U The following analytic identifies the use of a curl contacting suspicious remote domains to checkin to command and control servers or download further implants. In the context of Silver Sparrow, curl is identified contacting s3.amazonaws.com. This particular behavior is common with MacOS adware-malicious software. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-02-22 @@ -84,8 +85,12 @@ Unknown. Filter as needed. +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -102,5 +107,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/endpoint/suspicious_curl_network_connection.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-02-22-suspicious_plistbuddy_usage.md b/docs/_posts/2021-02-22-suspicious_plistbuddy_usage.md index fce8fd9384..ecfd5764db 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-02-22-suspicious_plistbuddy_usage.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-02-22-suspicious_plistbuddy_usage.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage" -excerpt: "Launch Agent, Create or Modify System Process" +excerpt: "Launch Agent +, Create or Modify System Process +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-02-22 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Launch Agent + - Create or Modify System Process - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Create or Modify System Process - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise @@ -19,8 +21,8 @@ tags: - Endpoint --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -28,15 +30,15 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U #### Description The following analytic identifies the use of a native MacOS utility, PlistBuddy, creating or modifying a properly list (.plist) file. In the instance of Silver Sparrow, the following commands were executed:\ -- PlistBuddy -c "Add :Label string init_verx" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \ -- PlistBuddy -c "Add :RunAtLoad bool true" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \ -- PlistBuddy -c "Add :StartInterval integer 3600" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \ -- PlistBuddy -c "Add :ProgramArguments array" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \ -- PlistBuddy -c "Add :ProgramArguments:0 string /bin/sh" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \ -- PlistBuddy -c "Add :ProgramArguments:1 string -c" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \ +- PlistBuddy -c "Add :Label string init_verx" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \ +- PlistBuddy -c "Add :RunAtLoad bool true" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \ +- PlistBuddy -c "Add :StartInterval integer 3600" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \ +- PlistBuddy -c "Add :ProgramArguments array" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \ +- PlistBuddy -c "Add :ProgramArguments:0 string /bin/sh" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \ +- PlistBuddy -c "Add :ProgramArguments:1 string -c" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \ Upon triage, capture the property list file being written to disk and review for further indicators. Contain the endpoint and triage further. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-02-22 @@ -96,14 +98,17 @@ Some legitimate applications may use PlistBuddy to create or modify property lis +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` #### Reference -* [https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/](https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/) * [https://marcosantadev.com/manage-plist-files-plistbuddy/](https://marcosantadev.com/manage-plist-files-plistbuddy/) @@ -114,5 +119,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/endpoint/suspicious_plistbuddy_usage.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-02-22-suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_via_osquery.md b/docs/_posts/2021-02-22-suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_via_osquery.md index 889c287c58..66e8268f0a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-02-22-suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_via_osquery.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-02-22-suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_via_osquery.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage via OSquery" -excerpt: "Launch Agent, Create or Modify System Process" +excerpt: "Launch Agent +, Create or Modify System Process +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-02-22 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Launch Agent + - Create or Modify System Process - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Create or Modify System Process - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise @@ -18,8 +20,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Cloud --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -27,15 +29,15 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U #### Description The following analytic identifies the use of a native MacOS utility, PlistBuddy, creating or modifying a properly list (.plist) file. In the instance of Silver Sparrow, the following commands were executed:\ -- PlistBuddy -c "Add :Label string init_verx" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \ -- PlistBuddy -c "Add :RunAtLoad bool true" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \ -- PlistBuddy -c "Add :StartInterval integer 3600" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \ -- PlistBuddy -c "Add :ProgramArguments array" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \ -- PlistBuddy -c "Add :ProgramArguments:0 string /bin/sh" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \ -- PlistBuddy -c "Add :ProgramArguments:1 string -c" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \ +- PlistBuddy -c "Add :Label string init_verx" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \ +- PlistBuddy -c "Add :RunAtLoad bool true" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \ +- PlistBuddy -c "Add :StartInterval integer 3600" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \ +- PlistBuddy -c "Add :ProgramArguments array" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \ +- PlistBuddy -c "Add :ProgramArguments:0 string /bin/sh" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \ +- PlistBuddy -c "Add :ProgramArguments:1 string -c" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \ Upon triage, capture the property list file being written to disk and review for further indicators. Contain the endpoint and triage further. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-02-22 @@ -84,14 +86,17 @@ Some legitimate applications may use PlistBuddy to create or modify property lis +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` #### Reference -* [https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/](https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/) * [https://marcosantadev.com/manage-plist-files-plistbuddy/](https://marcosantadev.com/manage-plist-files-plistbuddy/) @@ -102,5 +107,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/endpoint/suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_via_osquery.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-02-22-suspicious_sqlite3_lsquarantine_behavior.md b/docs/_posts/2021-02-22-suspicious_sqlite3_lsquarantine_behavior.md index 2df145bac5..31d7f4297e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-02-22-suspicious_sqlite3_lsquarantine_behavior.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-02-22-suspicious_sqlite3_lsquarantine_behavior.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior" -excerpt: "Data Staged" +excerpt: "Data Staged +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-02-22 @@ -15,8 +16,8 @@ tags: - Endpoint --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -25,7 +26,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U The following analytic identifies the use of a SQLite3 querying the MacOS preferences to identify the original URL the pkg was downloaded from. This particular behavior is common with MacOS adware-malicious software. Upon triage, review other processes in parallel for suspicious activity. Identify any recent package installations. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-02-22 @@ -83,8 +84,12 @@ Unknown. +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -101,5 +106,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/endpoint/suspicious_sqlite3_lsquarantine_behavior.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-01-any_powershell_downloadfile.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-01-any_powershell_downloadfile.md index 945783002e..71c2fa05ef 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-01-any_powershell_downloadfile.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-01-any_powershell_downloadfile.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Any Powershell DownloadFile" -excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter, PowerShell" +excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter +, PowerShell +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-03-01 @@ -8,13 +10,12 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Command and Scripting Interpreter - - Execution - PowerShell - Execution + - Execution - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - CVE-2021-44228 - Endpoint --- @@ -26,7 +27,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a file using `DownloadFile` method. This particular method is utilized in many different PowerShell frameworks to download files and output to disk. Identify the source (IP/domain) and destination file and triage appropriately. If AMSI logging or PowerShell transaction logs are available, review for further details of the implant. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-03-01 @@ -55,9 +56,9 @@ The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a file using #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) Note that `any_powershell_downloadfile_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -100,15 +101,6 @@ False positives may be present and filtering will need to occur by parent proces | 56.0 | 80 | 70 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior identifies the use of DownloadFile within PowerShell. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - - -#### CVE - -| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | -| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [CVE-2021-44228](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44228) | Apache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 (excluding security releases 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1) JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against attacker controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. An attacker who can control log messages or log message parameters can execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has been disabled by default. From version 2.16.0 (along with 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1), this functionality has been completely removed. Note that this vulnerability is specific to log4j-core and does not affect log4net, log4cxx, or other Apache Logging Services projects. | 9.3 | - #### Reference @@ -123,6 +115,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-01-any_powershell_downloadstring.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-01-any_powershell_downloadstring.md index 5f1068053b..03bab4f052 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-01-any_powershell_downloadstring.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-01-any_powershell_downloadstring.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Any Powershell DownloadString" -excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter, PowerShell" +excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter +, PowerShell +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-03-01 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Command and Scripting Interpreter - - Execution - PowerShell - Execution + - Execution - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a file using `DownloadString` method. This particular method is utilized in many different PowerShell frameworks to download files and output to disk. Identify the source (IP/domain) and destination file and triage appropriately. If AMSI logging or PowerShell transaction logs are available, review for further details of the implant. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-03-01 @@ -54,9 +56,9 @@ The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a file using #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) Note that `any_powershell_downloadstring_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -99,8 +101,6 @@ False positives may be present and filtering will need to occur by parent proces | 56.0 | 80 | 70 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior identifies the use of DownloadString within PowerShell. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-01-fodhelper_uac_bypass.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-01-fodhelper_uac_bypass.md index 912861ba77..7dbac3ebb2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-01-fodhelper_uac_bypass.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-01-fodhelper_uac_bypass.md @@ -1,6 +1,9 @@ --- title: "FodHelper UAC Bypass" -excerpt: "Modify Registry, Bypass User Account Control, Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism" +excerpt: "Modify Registry +, Bypass User Account Control +, Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-03-01 @@ -8,13 +11,13 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Modify Registry - - Defense Evasion - Bypass User Account Control - - Privilege Escalation - - Defense Evasion - Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism + - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Privilege Escalation - Defense Evasion + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -33,7 +36,7 @@ Fodhelper.exe has a known UAC bypass as it attempts to look for specific registr 1. `HKCU:\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command\(default)`\ Upon triage, fodhelper.exe will have a child process and read access will occur on the registry keys. Isolate the endpoint and review parallel processes for additional behavior. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-03-01 @@ -47,9 +50,9 @@ Upon triage, fodhelper.exe will have a child process and read access will occur | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | | [T1112](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/) | Modify Registry | Defense Evasion | -| [T1548.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/) | Bypass User Account Control | Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1548.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/) | Bypass User Account Control | Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1548](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1548](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -94,7 +97,6 @@ Limited to no false positives are expected. #### Kill Chain Phase * Exploitation -* Privilege Escalation @@ -105,8 +107,6 @@ Limited to no false positives are expected. | 81.0 | 90 | 90 | Suspcious registy keys added by process fodhelper.exe (process_id- $process_id), with a parent_process of $parent_process_name$ that has been executed on $dest$ by $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-01-ryuk_wake_on_lan_command.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-01-ryuk_wake_on_lan_command.md index d0c3276678..62778382d4 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-01-ryuk_wake_on_lan_command.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-01-ryuk_wake_on_lan_command.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Ryuk Wake on LAN Command" -excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter, Windows Command Shell" +excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter +, Windows Command Shell +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-03-01 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Command and Scripting Interpreter - - Execution - Windows Command Shell - Execution + - Execution - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This Splunk query identifies the use of Wake-on-LAN utilized by Ryuk ransomware. The Ryuk Ransomware uses the Wake-on-Lan feature to turn on powered off devices on a compromised network to have greater success encrypting them. This is a high fidelity indicator of Ryuk ransomware executing on an endpoint. Upon triage, isolate the endpoint. Additional file modification events will be within the users profile (\appdata\roaming) and in public directories (users\public\). Review all Scheduled Tasks on the isolated endpoint and across the fleet. Suspicious Scheduled Tasks will include a path to a unknown binary and those endpoints should be isolated until triaged. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-03-01 @@ -83,7 +85,6 @@ Limited to no known false positives. #### Kill Chain Phase * Exploitation -* Lateral Movement @@ -94,8 +95,6 @@ Limited to no known false positives. | 63.0 | 70 | 90 | A process $process_name$ with wake on LAN commandline $process$ in host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -110,6 +109,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/ryuk/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/ryuk/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-01-suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-01-suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory.md index 925d2ccbaf..83e8329825 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-01-suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-01-suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory" -excerpt: "Scheduled Task, Scheduled Task/Job" +excerpt: "Scheduled Task +, Scheduled Task/Job +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-03-01 @@ -8,10 +10,10 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Scheduled Task + - Scheduled Task/Job - Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Scheduled Task/Job - Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation @@ -29,7 +31,7 @@ tags: The following detection identifies Scheduled Tasks registering (creating a new task) a binary or script to run from a public directory which includes users\public, \programdata\ and \windows\temp. Upon triage, review the binary or script in the command line for legitimacy, whether an approved binary/script or not. In addition, capture the binary or script in question and analyze for further behaviors. Identify the source and contain the endpoint. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-03-01 @@ -89,7 +91,6 @@ Limited false positives may be present. Filter as needed by parent process or co #### Kill Chain Phase * Exploitation -* Privilege Escalation @@ -100,8 +101,6 @@ Limited false positives may be present. Filter as needed by parent process or co | 35.0 | 70 | 50 | Suspicious scheduled task registered on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -114,6 +113,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/schtasks/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/schtasks/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-02-aws_setdefaultpolicyversion.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-02-aws_setdefaultpolicyversion.md index 434f012346..025f113b91 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-02-aws_setdefaultpolicyversion.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-02-aws_setdefaultpolicyversion.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion" -excerpt: "Cloud Accounts, Valid Accounts" +excerpt: "Cloud Accounts +, Valid Accounts +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2021-03-02 @@ -8,16 +10,15 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Cloud Accounts - - Defense Evasion - - Persistence - - Privilege Escalation - - Initial Access - Valid Accounts - Defense Evasion + - Initial Access - Persistence - Privilege Escalation + - Defense Evasion - Initial Access - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS + - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -31,8 +32,8 @@ tags: This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user has set a default policy versions. Attackers have been know to use this technique for Privilege Escalation in case the previous versions of the policy had permissions to access more resources than the current version of the policy -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Security Analytics for AWS, Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-03-02 - **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk @@ -43,9 +44,9 @@ This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user has set a default polic | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1078.004](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/) | Cloud Accounts | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access | +| [T1078.004](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/) | Cloud Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access | +| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -95,8 +96,6 @@ While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin | 30.0 | 50 | 60 | From IP address $sourceIPAddress$, user agent $userAgent$ has trigged an event $eventName$ for updating the the default policy version | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -110,6 +109,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_setdefaultpolicyversion/aws_cloudtrail_events.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_setdefaultpolicyversion/aws_cloudtrail_events.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-02-unified_messaging_service_spawning_a_process.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-02-unified_messaging_service_spawning_a_process.md index a48b3a267c..1c93f0e4dd 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-02-unified_messaging_service_spawning_a_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-02-unified_messaging_service_spawning_a_process.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Unified Messaging Service Spawning a Process" -excerpt: "Exploit Public-Facing Application" +excerpt: "Exploit Public-Facing Application +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-03-02 @@ -12,7 +13,6 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - CVE-2021-26857 - Endpoint --- @@ -22,9 +22,9 @@ tags: #### Description -This detection identifies Microsoft Exchange Server's Unified Messaging services, umworkerprocess.exe and umservice.exe, spawning a child process, indicating possible exploitation of CVE-2021-26857 vulnerability. The query filters out werfault.exe and wermgr.exe mostly due to potential false positives, however, if there is an excessive amount of "wermgr.exe" or "WerFault.exe" failures, it may be due to the active exploitation. During triage, identify any additional suspicious parallel processes. Identify any recent out of place file modifications. Review Exchange logs following Microsofts guide. To contain, perform egress filtering or restrict public access to Exchange. In final, patch the vulnerablity and monitor. +This detection identifies Microsoft Exchange Server's Unified Messaging services, umworkerprocess.exe and umservice.exe, spawning a child process, indicating possible exploitation of CVE-2021-26857 vulnerability. The query filters out werfault.exe and wermgr.exe mostly due to potential false positives, however, if there is an excessive amount of "wermgr.exe" or "WerFault.exe" failures, it may be due to the active exploitation. During triage, identify any additional suspicious parallel processes. Identify any recent out of place file modifications. Review Exchange logs following Microsofts guide. To contain, perform egress filtering or restrict public access to Exchange. In final, patch the vulnerablity and monitor. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-03-02 @@ -89,15 +89,6 @@ Unknown. Tune out child processes as needed to limit volume of false positives. | 56.0 | 70 | 80 | Possible CVE-2021-26857 exploitation on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - - -#### CVE - -| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | -| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [CVE-2021-26857](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26857) | Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2021-26412, CVE-2021-26854, CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-27065, CVE-2021-27078. | 6.8 | - #### Reference @@ -112,6 +103,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/windows-sysmon_umservices.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/windows-sysmon_umservices.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-02-windows_disableantispyware_registry.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-02-windows_disableantispyware_registry.md index 1c031c56dc..604cb89ea3 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-02-windows_disableantispyware_registry.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-02-windows_disableantispyware_registry.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry" -excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools, Impair Defenses" +excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools +, Impair Defenses +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-03-02 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Disable or Modify Tools - - Defense Evasion - Impair Defenses - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: The search looks for the Registry Key DisableAntiSpyware set to disable. This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints. This particular behavior is typically executed when an ransomware actor gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. Endpoint should be isolated. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-03-02 @@ -88,11 +90,9 @@ It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since it is a default se | Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| -| 24.0 | 30 | 80 | Windows DisableAntiSpyware registry key set to 'disabled' on $dest$ | +| 24.0 | 30 | 80 | Windows DisableAntiSpyware registry key set to 'disabled' on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-03-nishang_powershelltcponeline.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-03-nishang_powershelltcponeline.md index 1bebbdd826..0e3d85c609 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-03-nishang_powershelltcponeline.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-03-nishang_powershelltcponeline.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine" -excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter, PowerShell" +excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter +, PowerShell +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-03-03 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Command and Scripting Interpreter - - Execution - PowerShell - Execution + - Execution - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This query detects the Nishang Invoke-PowerShellTCPOneLine utility that spawns a call back to a remote command and control server. This is a powershell oneliner. In addition, this will capture on the command-line additional utilities used by Nishang. Triage the endpoint and identify any parallel processes that look suspicious. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain contacted by the powershell process. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-03-03 @@ -54,9 +56,9 @@ This query detects the Nishang Invoke-PowerShellTCPOneLine utility that spawns a #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) Note that `nishang_powershelltcponeline_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -97,8 +99,6 @@ Limited false positives may be present. Filter as needed based on initial analys | 42.0 | 70 | 60 | Possible Nishang Invoke-PowerShellTCPOneLine behavior on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-03-w3wp_spawning_shell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-03-w3wp_spawning_shell.md index e32c4a77f3..0f24bdbd92 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-03-w3wp_spawning_shell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-03-w3wp_spawning_shell.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "W3WP Spawning Shell" -excerpt: "Server Software Component, Web Shell" +excerpt: "Server Software Component +, Web Shell +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-03-03 @@ -8,15 +10,12 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Server Software Component - - Persistence - Web Shell - Persistence + - Persistence - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - CVE-2021-34473 - - CVE-2021-34523 - - CVE-2021-31207 - Endpoint --- @@ -28,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This query identifies a shell, PowerShell.exe or Cmd.exe, spawning from W3WP.exe, or IIS. In addition to IIS logs, this behavior with an EDR product will capture potential webshell activity, similar to the HAFNIUM Group abusing CVEs, on publicly available Exchange mail servers. During triage, review the parent process and child process of the shell being spawned. Review the command-line arguments and any file modifications that may occur. Identify additional parallel process, child processes, that may highlight further commands executed. After triaging, work to contain the threat and patch the system that is vulnerable. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-03-03 @@ -57,10 +56,10 @@ This query identifies a shell, PowerShell.exe or Cmd.exe, spawning from W3WP.exe #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) -* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) +* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) Note that `w3wp_spawning_shell_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -102,17 +101,6 @@ Baseline your environment before production. It is possible build systems using | 56.0 | 70 | 80 | Possible Web Shell execution on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - - -#### CVE - -| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | -| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [CVE-2021-34473](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34473) | Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2021-31196, CVE-2021-31206. | 10.0 | -| [CVE-2021-34523](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34523) | Microsoft Exchange Server Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2021-33768, CVE-2021-34470. | 7.5 | -| [CVE-2021-31207](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-31207) | Microsoft Exchange Server Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability | 6.5 | - #### Reference @@ -128,6 +116,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-12-ransomware_notes_bulk_creation.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-12-ransomware_notes_bulk_creation.md index d307de8981..90d5fece89 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-12-ransomware_notes_bulk_creation.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-12-ransomware_notes_bulk_creation.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Ransomware Notes bulk creation" -excerpt: "Data Encrypted for Impact" +excerpt: "Data Encrypted for Impact +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-03-12 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: The following analytics identifies a big number of instance of ransomware notes (filetype e.g .txt, .html, .hta) file creation to the infected machine. This behavior is a good sensor if the ransomware note filename is quite new for security industry or the ransomware note filename is not in your ransomware lookup table list for monitoring. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-03-12 @@ -51,8 +52,8 @@ The following analytics identifies a big number of instance of ransomware notes #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `ransomware_notes_bulk_creation_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -79,7 +80,7 @@ unknown #### Kill Chain Phase -* Obfuscation +* Exploitation @@ -90,8 +91,6 @@ unknown | 81.0 | 90 | 90 | A high frequency file creation of $file_name$ in different file path in host $Computer$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -105,6 +104,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-12-resize_shadowstorage_volume.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-12-resize_shadowstorage_volume.md index e415efba99..a2a5001331 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-12-resize_shadowstorage_volume.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-12-resize_shadowstorage_volume.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Resize ShadowStorage volume" -excerpt: "Inhibit System Recovery" +excerpt: "Inhibit System Recovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-03-12 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: The following analytics identifies the resizing of shadowstorage by ransomware malware to avoid the shadow volumes being made again. this technique is an alternative by ransomware attacker than deleting the shadowstorage which is known alert in defensive team. one example of ransomware that use this technique is CLOP ransomware where it drops a .bat file that will resize the shadowstorage to minimum size as much as possible -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-03-12 @@ -87,8 +88,6 @@ network admin can resize the shadowstorage for valid purposes. | 72.0 | 80 | 90 | A process $parent_process_name$ attempt to resize shadow copy with commandline $process$ in host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -105,6 +104,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-16-high_process_termination_frequency.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-16-high_process_termination_frequency.md index dd0e389b58..389b544826 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-16-high_process_termination_frequency.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-16-high_process_termination_frequency.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "High Process Termination Frequency" -excerpt: "Data Encrypted for Impact" +excerpt: "Data Encrypted for Impact +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-03-16 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This analytics are designed to indentify a high frequency of process termination on a machine which is a common behavior of ransomware malware before encrypting files. This technique is designed to avoid an exception error while accessing (docs, images, database and etc..) in the infected machine for encryption. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-03-16 @@ -51,8 +52,8 @@ This analytics are designed to indentify a high frequency of process termination #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `high_process_termination_frequency_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -86,8 +87,6 @@ admin or user tool that can terminate multiple process. | 72.0 | 90 | 80 | High frequency process termination (more than 15 processes within 3s) detected on host $Computer$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -101,6 +100,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-16-windows_high_file_deletion_frequency.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-16-windows_high_file_deletion_frequency.md index 918ddb55b4..a115ef4e4e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-16-windows_high_file_deletion_frequency.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-16-windows_high_file_deletion_frequency.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Windows High File Deletion Frequency" -excerpt: "Data Destruction" +excerpt: "Data Destruction +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-03-16 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This search looks for high frequency of file deletion relative to process name and process id. These events usually happen when the ransomware tries to encrypt the files with the ransomware file extensions and sysmon treat the original files to be deleted as soon it was replace as encrypted data. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-03-16 @@ -50,8 +51,8 @@ This search looks for high frequency of file deletion relative to process name a #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `windows_high_file_deletion_frequency_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -88,8 +89,6 @@ user may delete bunch of pictures or files in a folder. | 72.0 | 90 | 80 | High frequency file deletion activity detected on host $Computer$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -104,6 +103,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-17-clop_common_exec_parameter.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-17-clop_common_exec_parameter.md index 8ffcc0ab77..6edab193be 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-17-clop_common_exec_parameter.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-17-clop_common_exec_parameter.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Clop Common Exec Parameter" -excerpt: "User Execution" +excerpt: "User Execution +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-03-17 @@ -21,9 +22,9 @@ tags: #### Description -The following analytics are designed to identifies some CLOP ransomware variant that using arguments to execute its main code or feature of its code. In this variant if the parameter is "runrun", CLOP ransomware will try to encrypt files in network shares and if it is "temp.dat", it will try to read from some stream pipe or file start encrypting files within the infected local machines. This technique can be also identified as an anti-sandbox technique to make its code non-responsive since it is waiting for some parameter to execute properly. +The following analytics are designed to identifies some CLOP ransomware variant that using arguments to execute its main code or feature of its code. In this variant if the parameter is "runrun", CLOP ransomware will try to encrypt files in network shares and if it is "temp.dat", it will try to read from some stream pipe or file start encrypting files within the infected local machines. This technique can be also identified as an anti-sandbox technique to make its code non-responsive since it is waiting for some parameter to execute properly. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-03-17 @@ -81,7 +82,7 @@ Operators can execute third party tools using these parameters. #### Kill Chain Phase -* Obfuscation +* Exploitation @@ -92,8 +93,6 @@ Operators can execute third party tools using these parameters. | 100.0 | 100 | 100 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting using arguments to execute its main code or feature of its code related to Clop ransomware. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -107,6 +106,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_b/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_b/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-17-clop_ransomware_known_service_name.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-17-clop_ransomware_known_service_name.md index 1663c0ce0f..b429eddf49 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-17-clop_ransomware_known_service_name.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-17-clop_ransomware_known_service_name.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Clop Ransomware Known Service Name" -excerpt: "Create or Modify System Process" +excerpt: "Create or Modify System Process +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-03-17 @@ -24,7 +25,7 @@ tags: This detection is to identify the common service name created by the CLOP ransomware as part of its persistence and high privilege code execution in the infected machine. Ussually CLOP ransomware use StartServiceCtrlDispatcherW API in creating this service entry. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-03-17 @@ -76,7 +77,7 @@ unknown #### Kill Chain Phase -* Privilege Escalation +* Exploitation @@ -87,8 +88,6 @@ unknown | 100.0 | 100 | 100 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ executing known Clop Ransomware service names. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -102,6 +101,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-system.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-system.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-23-certutil_with_decode_argument.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-23-certutil_with_decode_argument.md index 2c9fe448d5..9a758ce676 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-23-certutil_with_decode_argument.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-23-certutil_with_decode_argument.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "CertUtil With Decode Argument" -excerpt: "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information" +excerpt: "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-03-23 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: CertUtil.exe may be used to `encode` and `decode` a file, including PE and script code. Encoding will convert a file to base64 with `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----` and `-----END CERTIFICATE-----` tags. Malicious usage will include decoding a encoded file that was downloaded. Once decoded, it will be loaded by a parallel process. Note that there are two additional command switches that may be used - `encodehex` and `decodehex`. Similarly, the file will be encoded in HEX and later decoded for further execution. During triage, identify the source of the file being decoded. Review its contents or execution behavior for further analysis. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-03-23 @@ -93,8 +94,6 @@ Typically seen used to `encode` files, but it is possible to see legitimate use | 40.0 | 50 | 80 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to decode a file. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -110,6 +109,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1140/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1140/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-29-powershell_start-bitstransfer.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-29-powershell_start-bitstransfer.md index 074ac10e61..e820358933 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-29-powershell_start-bitstransfer.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-29-powershell_start-bitstransfer.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer" -excerpt: "BITS Jobs" +excerpt: "BITS Jobs +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-03-29 @@ -22,9 +23,9 @@ tags: #### Description -Start-BitsTransfer is the PowerShell "version" of BitsAdmin.exe. Similar functionality is present. This technique variation is not as commonly used by adversaries, but has been abused in the past. Lesser known uses include the ability to set the `-TransferType` to `Upload` for exfiltration of files. In an instance where `Upload` is used, it is highly possible files will be archived. During triage, review parallel processes and process lineage. Capture any files on disk and review. For the remote domain or IP, what is the reputation? +Start-BitsTransfer is the PowerShell "version" of BitsAdmin.exe. Similar functionality is present. This technique variation is not as commonly used by adversaries, but has been abused in the past. Lesser known uses include the ability to set the `-TransferType` to `Upload` for exfiltration of files. In an instance where `Upload` is used, it is highly possible files will be archived. During triage, review parallel processes and process lineage. Capture any files on disk and review. For the remote domain or IP, what is the reputation? -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-03-29 @@ -51,9 +52,9 @@ Start-BitsTransfer is the PowerShell "version" of BitsAdmin.exe. Similar #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) Note that `powershell_start-bitstransfer_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -94,8 +95,6 @@ Limited false positives. It is possible administrators will utilize Start-BitsTr | 56.0 | 70 | 80 | A suspicious process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ that are related to bittransfer functionality in host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -109,6 +108,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1197/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1197/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-31-aws_iam_successful_group_deletion.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-31-aws_iam_successful_group_deletion.md index 0a87046c68..5ab3df0d89 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-31-aws_iam_successful_group_deletion.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-31-aws_iam_successful_group_deletion.md @@ -1,6 +1,9 @@ --- title: "AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion" -excerpt: "Cloud Groups, Account Manipulation, Permission Groups Discovery" +excerpt: "Cloud Groups +, Account Manipulation +, Permission Groups Discovery +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2021-03-31 @@ -8,15 +11,14 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Cloud Groups - - Discovery - Account Manipulation - - Persistence - Permission Groups Discovery - Discovery + - Persistence + - Discovery - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS --- @@ -27,8 +29,8 @@ tags: The following query uses IAM events to track the success of a group being deleted on AWS. This is typically not indicative of malicious behavior, but a precurser to additional events thay may unfold. Review parallel IAM events - recently added users, new groups and so forth. Inversely, review failed attempts in a similar manner. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud, Splunk Security Analytics for AWS +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-03-31 - **Author**: Michael Haag, Splunk @@ -92,8 +94,6 @@ This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabiltie | 5.0 | 10 | 50 | User $user_arn$ has sucessfully deleted mulitple groups $group_deleted$ from $src$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098/aws_iam_successful_group_deletion/aws_iam_successful_group_deletion.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098/aws_iam_successful_group_deletion/aws_iam_successful_group_deletion.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-31-disabling_firewall_with_netsh.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-31-disabling_firewall_with_netsh.md index 63aee91568..a6f09b2e9e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-31-disabling_firewall_with_netsh.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-31-disabling_firewall_with_netsh.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Disabling Firewall with Netsh" -excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools, Impair Defenses" +excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools +, Impair Defenses +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-03-31 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Disable or Modify Tools - - Defense Evasion - Impair Defenses - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This search is to identifies suspicious firewall disabling using netsh application. this technique is commonly seen in malware that tries to communicate or download its component or other payload to its C2 server. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-03-31 @@ -55,8 +57,8 @@ This search is to identifies suspicious firewall disabling using netsh applicati #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [process_netsh](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_netsh.yml) -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `disabling_firewall_with_netsh_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -97,8 +99,6 @@ admin may disable firewall during testing or fixing network problem. | 25.0 | 50 | 50 | The Windows Firewall was disabled on $dest$ by $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log) * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log) * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-31-dsquery_domain_discovery.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-31-dsquery_domain_discovery.md index 0a07116959..51db9691bc 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-31-dsquery_domain_discovery.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-31-dsquery_domain_discovery.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "DSQuery Domain Discovery" -excerpt: "Domain Trust Discovery" +excerpt: "Domain Trust Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-03-31 @@ -21,14 +22,14 @@ tags: #### Description -The following analytic identifies "dsquery.exe" execution with arguments looking for `TrustedDomain` query directly on the command-line. This is typically indicative of an Administrator or adversary perform domain trust discovery. Note that this query does not identify any other variations of "Dsquery.exe" usage.\ +The following analytic identifies "dsquery.exe" execution with arguments looking for `TrustedDomain` query directly on the command-line. This is typically indicative of an Administrator or adversary perform domain trust discovery. Note that this query does not identify any other variations of "Dsquery.exe" usage.\ Within this detection, it is assumed `dsquery.exe` is not moved or renamed.\ -The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process "dsquery.exe" and its parent process.\ +The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process "dsquery.exe" and its parent process.\ DSQuery.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64` and only on Server operating system.\ The following DLL(s) are loaded when DSQuery.exe is launched `dsquery.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible dsquery is running within that process context in memory.\ In addition to trust discovery, review parallel processes for additional behaviors performed. Identify the parent process and capture any files (batch files, for example) being used. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-03-31 @@ -94,8 +95,6 @@ Limited false positives. If there is a true false positive, filter based on comm | 72.0 | 80 | 90 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified performing domain discovery on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -111,6 +110,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-01-aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-01-aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force.md index 94e244fc3b..376225f012 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-01-aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-01-aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force" -excerpt: "Cloud Infrastructure Discovery, Brute Force" +excerpt: "Cloud Infrastructure Discovery +, Brute Force +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2021-04-01 @@ -8,13 +10,12 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Cloud Infrastructure Discovery - - Discovery - Brute Force + - Discovery - Credential Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS --- @@ -25,8 +26,8 @@ tags: The following detection identifies any malformed policy document exceptions with a status of `failure`. A malformed policy document exception occurs in instances where roles are attempted to be assumed, or brute forced. In a brute force attempt, using a tool like CloudSploit or Pacu, an attempt will look like `arn:aws:iam::111111111111:role/aws-service-role/rds.amazonaws.com/AWSServiceRoleForRDS`. Meaning, when an adversary is attempting to identify a role name, multiple failures will occur. This detection focuses on the errors of a remote attempt that is failing. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud, Splunk Security Analytics for AWS +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-04-01 - **Author**: Michael Haag, Splunk @@ -89,8 +90,6 @@ This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabiltie | 28.0 | 40 | 70 | User $user_arn$ has caused multiple failures with errorCode $errorCode$, which potentially means adversary is attempting to identify a role name. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -105,6 +104,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1580/aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force/aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1580/aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force/aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-01-aws_iam_delete_policy.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-01-aws_iam_delete_policy.md index 86ff2df95a..b067ac678a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-01-aws_iam_delete_policy.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-01-aws_iam_delete_policy.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "AWS IAM Delete Policy" -excerpt: "Account Manipulation" +excerpt: "Account Manipulation +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2021-04-01 @@ -12,7 +13,6 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS --- @@ -23,8 +23,8 @@ tags: The following detection identifes when a policy is deleted on AWS. This does not identify whether successful or failed, but the error messages tell a story of suspicious attempts. There is a specific process to follow when deleting a policy. First, detach the policy from all users, groups, and roles that the policy is attached to, using DetachUserPolicy , DetachGroupPolicy , or DetachRolePolicy. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud, Splunk Security Analytics for AWS +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-04-01 - **Author**: Michael Haag, Splunk @@ -84,8 +84,6 @@ This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabiltie | 10.0 | 20 | 50 | User $user_arn$ has deleted AWS Policies from IP address $src$ by executing the following command $eventName$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -99,6 +97,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098/aws_iam_delete_policy/aws_iam_delete_policy.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098/aws_iam_delete_policy/aws_iam_delete_policy.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-01-aws_iam_failure_group_deletion.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-01-aws_iam_failure_group_deletion.md index e6353a741a..5447d4e61e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-01-aws_iam_failure_group_deletion.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-01-aws_iam_failure_group_deletion.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "AWS IAM Failure Group Deletion" -excerpt: "Account Manipulation" +excerpt: "Account Manipulation +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2021-04-01 @@ -12,7 +13,6 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS --- @@ -23,8 +23,8 @@ tags: This detection identifies failure attempts to delete groups. We want to identify when a group is attempting to be deleted, but either access is denied, there is a conflict or there is no group. This is indicative of administrators performing an action, but also could be suspicious behavior occurring. Review parallel IAM events - recently added users, new groups and so forth. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud, Splunk Security Analytics for AWS +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-04-01 - **Author**: Michael Haag, Splunk @@ -84,8 +84,6 @@ This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabiltie | 5.0 | 10 | 50 | User $user_arn$ has had mulitple failures while attempting to delete groups from $src$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -99,6 +97,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098/aws_iam_failure_group_deletion/aws_iam_failure_group_deletion.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098/aws_iam_failure_group_deletion/aws_iam_failure_group_deletion.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-07-malicious_powershell_executed_as_a_service.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-07-malicious_powershell_executed_as_a_service.md index d0fbf67a01..098c549343 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-07-malicious_powershell_executed_as_a_service.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-07-malicious_powershell_executed_as_a_service.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Malicious Powershell Executed As A Service" -excerpt: "System Services, Service Execution" +excerpt: "System Services +, Service Execution +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-04-07 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - System Services - - Execution - Service Execution - Execution + - Execution - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This detection is to identify the abuse the Windows SC.exe to execute malicious commands or payloads via PowerShell. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-04-07 @@ -89,7 +91,7 @@ Creating a hidden powershell service is rare and could key off of those instance #### Kill Chain Phase -* Privilege Escalation +* Exploitation @@ -100,8 +102,6 @@ Creating a hidden powershell service is rare and could key off of those instance | 72.0 | 90 | 80 | Identifies the abuse the Windows SC.exe to execute malicious powerShell as a service $Service_File_Name$ by $user$ on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1569.002/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1569.002/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-08-multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-08-multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.md index 730fe9a219..d111fa989c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-08-multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-08-multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos" -excerpt: "Password Spraying, Brute Force" +excerpt: "Password Spraying +, Brute Force +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-04-08 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Password Spraying - - Credential Access - Brute Force - Credential Access + - Credential Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the This detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\ The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source ip and attempted user accounts. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-04-08 @@ -93,8 +95,6 @@ A host failing to authenticate with multiple valid domain users is not a common | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | Potential Kerberos based password spraying attack from $Client_Address$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_valid_users_kerberos/windows-security.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_valid_users_kerberos/windows-security.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-08-winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-08-winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path.md index aa21571d8a..3411dbf72d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-08-winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-08-winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path" -excerpt: "Scheduled Task, Scheduled Task/Job" +excerpt: "Scheduled Task +, Scheduled Task/Job +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-04-08 @@ -8,10 +10,10 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Scheduled Task + - Scheduled Task/Job - Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Scheduled Task/Job - Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation @@ -32,7 +34,7 @@ schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64 The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory.\ Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or was it via TaskService. Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-04-08 @@ -62,8 +64,8 @@ Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or was it v #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -90,7 +92,7 @@ False positives are possible if legitimate applications are allowed to register #### Kill Chain Phase -* Privilege Escalation +* Exploitation @@ -101,8 +103,6 @@ False positives are possible if legitimate applications are allowed to register | 70.0 | 70 | 100 | A windows scheduled task was created (task name=$Task_Name$) on $dest$ by the following command: $Command$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -119,6 +119,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/taskschedule/windows-security.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/taskschedule/windows-security.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-excel_spawning_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-excel_spawning_powershell.md index 0f6a43a4e0..1b497cf82f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-excel_spawning_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-excel_spawning_powershell.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Excel Spawning PowerShell" -excerpt: "Security Account Manager, OS Credential Dumping" +excerpt: "Security Account Manager +, OS Credential Dumping +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-04-12 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Security Account Manager - - Credential Access - OS Credential Dumping - Credential Access + - Credential Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: The following detection identifies Microsoft Excel spawning PowerShell. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with Excel.exe. Excel.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16` (version will vary). PowerShell spawning from Excel.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command executed will most likely be encoded and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-04-12 @@ -54,9 +56,9 @@ The following detection identifies Microsoft Excel spawning PowerShell. Typicall #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) Note that `excel_spawning_powershell_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -96,8 +98,6 @@ False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed. | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$, indicating potential suspicious macro execution. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-excel_spawning_windows_script_host.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-excel_spawning_windows_script_host.md index 46f2cd1029..a9c0564213 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-excel_spawning_windows_script_host.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-excel_spawning_windows_script_host.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Excel Spawning Windows Script Host" -excerpt: "Security Account Manager, OS Credential Dumping" +excerpt: "Security Account Manager +, OS Credential Dumping +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-04-12 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Security Account Manager - - Credential Access - OS Credential Dumping - Credential Access + - Credential Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: The following detection identifies Microsoft Excel spawning Windows Script Host - `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe`. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with Excel.exe. Excel.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16` (version will vary). `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` default location is `c:\windows\system32\` or c:windows\syswow64`. `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` spawning from Excel.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command-line executed will most likely be obfuscated and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. Review the reputation of the remote destination and block accordingly. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-04-12 @@ -91,8 +93,6 @@ False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed. In | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$, indicating potential suspicious macro execution. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell.md index 269dec3e49..e9712636c5 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell" -excerpt: "Scheduled Task, Scheduled Task/Job" +excerpt: "Scheduled Task +, Scheduled Task/Job +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-04-12 @@ -8,10 +10,10 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Scheduled Task + - Scheduled Task/Job - Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Scheduled Task/Job - Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation @@ -32,7 +34,7 @@ schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64 The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory.\ Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-04-12 @@ -62,8 +64,8 @@ Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via Task #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -88,7 +90,7 @@ False positives are possible if legitimate applications are allowed to register #### Kill Chain Phase -* Privilege Escalation +* Exploitation @@ -99,8 +101,6 @@ False positives are possible if legitimate applications are allowed to register | 70.0 | 70 | 100 | A windows scheduled task was created (task name=$Task_Name$) on $dest$ by the following command: $Command$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-winword_spawning_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-winword_spawning_powershell.md index c65d1d32a2..f96071d58f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-winword_spawning_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-winword_spawning_powershell.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Winword Spawning PowerShell" -excerpt: "Phishing, Spearphishing Attachment" +excerpt: "Phishing +, Spearphishing Attachment +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-04-12 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Phishing - - Initial Access - Spearphishing Attachment - Initial Access + - Initial Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: The following detection identifies Microsoft Word spawning PowerShell. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with winword.exe. Winword.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16` (version will vary). PowerShell spawning from winword.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command executed will most likely be encoded and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-04-12 @@ -54,9 +56,9 @@ The following detection identifies Microsoft Word spawning PowerShell. Typically #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) Note that `winword_spawning_powershell_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -97,8 +99,6 @@ False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed. | 70.0 | 70 | 100 | $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$ launched the following powershell process: $process_name$ which is very common in spearphishing attacks | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-winword_spawning_windows_script_host.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-winword_spawning_windows_script_host.md index b526cd1f1e..fd81f3e867 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-winword_spawning_windows_script_host.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-winword_spawning_windows_script_host.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Winword Spawning Windows Script Host" -excerpt: "Phishing, Spearphishing Attachment" +excerpt: "Phishing +, Spearphishing Attachment +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-04-12 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Phishing - - Initial Access - Spearphishing Attachment - Initial Access + - Initial Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: The following detection identifies Microsoft Winword.exe spawning Windows Script Host - `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe`. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with Winword.exe. Winword.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16` (version will vary). `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` default location is `c:\windows\system32\` or c:windows\syswow64\`. `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` spawning from Winword.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command-line executed will most likely be obfuscated and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. Review the reputation of the remote destination and block accordingly. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-04-12 @@ -91,8 +93,6 @@ There will be limited false positives and it will be different for every environ | 70.0 | 70 | 100 | User $user$ on $dest$ spawned Windows Script Host from Winword.exe | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_wsh.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_wsh.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-13-aws_excessive_security_scanning.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-13-aws_excessive_security_scanning.md index e98981b401..637d6f2de0 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-13-aws_excessive_security_scanning.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-13-aws_excessive_security_scanning.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "AWS Excessive Security Scanning" -excerpt: "Cloud Service Discovery" +excerpt: "Cloud Service Discovery +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2021-04-13 @@ -9,7 +10,6 @@ toc_label: "" tags: - Cloud Service Discovery - Discovery - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -23,8 +23,8 @@ tags: This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events and analyse the amount of eventNames which starts with Describe by a single user. This indicates that this user scans the configuration of your AWS cloud environment. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Security Analytics for AWS, Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-04-13 - **Author**: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk @@ -86,8 +86,6 @@ While this search has no known false positives. | 18.0 | 30 | 60 | user $user$ has excessive number of api calls $dc_events$ from these IP addresses $src$, violating the threshold of 50, using the following commands $command$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -100,6 +98,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1526/aws_security_scanner/aws_security_scanner.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1526/aws_security_scanner/aws_security_scanner.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-13-multiple_users_attempting_to_authenticate_using_explicit_credentials.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-13-multiple_users_attempting_to_authenticate_using_explicit_credentials.md index a10acfa092..9df5b65a14 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-13-multiple_users_attempting_to_authenticate_using_explicit_credentials.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-13-multiple_users_attempting_to_authenticate_using_explicit_credentials.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Multiple Users Attempting To Authenticate Using Explicit Credentials" -excerpt: "Password Spraying, Brute Force" +excerpt: "Password Spraying +, Brute Force +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-04-13 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Password Spraying - - Credential Access - Brute Force - Credential Access + - Credential Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the This detection will trigger on the potenfially malicious host, perhaps controlled via a trojan or operated by an insider threat, from where a password spraying attack is being executed.\ The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source account, attempted user accounts and the endpoint were the behavior was identified. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-04-13 @@ -95,8 +97,6 @@ A source user failing attempting to authenticate multiple users on a host is not | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | Potential password spraying attack from $ComputerName$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_explicit_credential_spray/windows-security.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_explicit_credential_spray/windows-security.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-13-multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-13-multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm.md index 3606f1b8de..164a299c38 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-13-multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-13-multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM" -excerpt: "Password Spraying, Brute Force" +excerpt: "Password Spraying +, Brute Force +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-04-13 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Password Spraying - - Credential Access - Brute Force - Credential Access + - Credential Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the This detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\ The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source workstation name and attempted user accounts. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-04-13 @@ -74,7 +76,7 @@ Note that `multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm_filter` i To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Credential Validation` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled. #### Known False Positives -A host failing to authenticate with multiple valid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners and missconfigured systems. If this detection triggers on a host other than a Domain Controller, the behavior could represent a password spraying attack against the host's local accounts. +A host failing to authenticate with multiple valid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners and missconfigured systems. If this detection triggers on a host other than a Domain Controller, the behavior could represent a password spraying attack against the host's local accounts. #### Associated Analytic story * [Active Directory Password Spraying](/stories/active_directory_password_spraying) @@ -92,8 +94,6 @@ A host failing to authenticate with multiple valid domain users is not a common | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | Potential NTLM based password spraying attack from $Source_Workstation$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_valid_users_ntlm/windows-security.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_valid_users_ntlm/windows-security.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-13-multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_process.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-13-multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_process.md index cc1f8cd7fa..3e547a43c6 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-13-multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-13-multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_process.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Process" -excerpt: "Password Spraying, Brute Force" +excerpt: "Password Spraying +, Brute Force +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-04-13 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Password Spraying - - Credential Access - Brute Force - Credential Access + - Credential Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the This detection will trigger on the potenfially malicious host, perhaps controlled via a trojan or operated by an insider threat, from where a password spraying attack is being executed. This could be a domain controller as well as a member server or workstation.\ The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source process name, source account and attempted user accounts. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-04-13 @@ -96,8 +98,6 @@ A process failing to authenticate with multiple users is not a common behavior f | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | Potential password spraying attack from $ComputerName$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_multiple_users_from_process/windows-security.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_multiple_users_from_process/windows-security.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-13-multiple_users_remotely_failing_to_authenticate_from_host.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-13-multiple_users_remotely_failing_to_authenticate_from_host.md index ca81a6baee..589b871d21 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-13-multiple_users_remotely_failing_to_authenticate_from_host.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-13-multiple_users_remotely_failing_to_authenticate_from_host.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Multiple Users Remotely Failing To Authenticate From Host" -excerpt: "Password Spraying, Brute Force" +excerpt: "Password Spraying +, Brute Force +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-04-13 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Password Spraying - - Credential Access - Brute Force - Credential Access + - Credential Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the This detection will trigger on the host that is the target of the password spraying attack. This could be a domain controller as well as a member server or workstation.\ The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source process name, source account and attempted user accounts. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-04-13 @@ -95,8 +97,6 @@ A host failing to authenticate with multiple valid users against a remote host i | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | Potential password spraying attack on $ComputerName$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_remote_spray/windows-security.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_remote_spray/windows-security.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-13-office_application_spawn_rundll32_process.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-13-office_application_spawn_rundll32_process.md index 03cc231ecf..b06a5409c6 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-13-office_application_spawn_rundll32_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-13-office_application_spawn_rundll32_process.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Office Application Spawn rundll32 process" -excerpt: "Phishing, Spearphishing Attachment" +excerpt: "Phishing +, Spearphishing Attachment +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-04-13 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Phishing - - Initial Access - Spearphishing Attachment - Initial Access + - Initial Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: this detection was designed to identifies suspicious spawned process of known MS office application due to macro or malicious code. this technique can be seen in so many malware like trickbot that used MS office as its weapon or attack vector to initially infect the machines. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-04-13 @@ -98,8 +100,6 @@ unknown | 63.0 | 70 | 90 | Office application spawning rundll32.exe on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-14-multiple_disabled_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-14-multiple_disabled_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.md index 665d3d3a9d..0b3334caad 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-14-multiple_disabled_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-14-multiple_disabled_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Multiple Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos" -excerpt: "Password Spraying, Brute Force" +excerpt: "Password Spraying +, Brute Force +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-04-14 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Password Spraying - - Credential Access - Brute Force - Credential Access + - Credential Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the This detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\ The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source ip and attempted user accounts. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-04-14 @@ -93,8 +95,6 @@ A host failing to authenticate with multiple disabled domain users is not a comm | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | Potential Kerberos based password spraying attack from $Client_Address$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_disabled_users_kerberos/windows-security.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_disabled_users_kerberos/windows-security.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-14-multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-14-multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.md index ab9221be25..9fa8e3e7f8 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-14-multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-14-multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos" -excerpt: "Password Spraying, Brute Force" +excerpt: "Password Spraying +, Brute Force +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-04-14 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Password Spraying - - Credential Access - Brute Force - Credential Access + - Credential Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the This detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\ The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source ip and attempted user accounts. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-04-14 @@ -93,8 +95,6 @@ A host failing to authenticate with multiple invalid domain users is not a commo | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | Potential Kerberos based password spraying attack from $Client_Address$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_invalid_users_kerberos/windows-security.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_invalid_users_kerberos/windows-security.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-14-office_document_creating_schedule_task.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-14-office_document_creating_schedule_task.md index d13530444c..7fca8972a0 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-14-office_document_creating_schedule_task.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-14-office_document_creating_schedule_task.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Office Document Creating Schedule Task" -excerpt: "Phishing, Spearphishing Attachment" +excerpt: "Phishing +, Spearphishing Attachment +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-04-14 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Phishing - - Initial Access - Spearphishing Attachment - Initial Access + - Initial Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -23,9 +25,9 @@ tags: #### Description -this search detects a potential malicious office document that create schedule task entry through macro VBA api or through loading taskschd.dll. This technique was seen in so many malicious macro malware that create persistence , beaconing using task schedule malware entry The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it's possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.' +this search detects a potential malicious office document that create schedule task entry through macro VBA api or through loading taskschd.dll. This technique was seen in so many malicious macro malware that create persistence , beaconing using task schedule malware entry The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it's possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.' -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-04-14 @@ -53,8 +55,8 @@ this search detects a potential malicious office document that create schedule t #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `office_document_creating_schedule_task_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -92,8 +94,6 @@ unknown | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | Office document creating a schedule task on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-14-office_document_executing_macro_code.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-14-office_document_executing_macro_code.md index 1e321bbc7f..9dfad908bf 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-14-office_document_executing_macro_code.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-14-office_document_executing_macro_code.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Office Document Executing Macro Code" -excerpt: "Phishing, Spearphishing Attachment" +excerpt: "Phishing +, Spearphishing Attachment +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-04-14 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Phishing - - Initial Access - Spearphishing Attachment - Initial Access + - Initial Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: this detection was designed to identifies suspicious office documents that using macro code. Macro code is known to be one of the prevalent weaponization or attack vector of threat actor. This malicious macro code is embed to a office document as an attachment that may execute malicious payload, download malware payload or other malware component. It is really good practice to disable macro by default to avoid automatically execute macro code while opening or closing a office document files. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-04-14 @@ -53,8 +55,8 @@ this detection was designed to identifies suspicious office documents that using #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `office_document_executing_macro_code_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -94,8 +96,6 @@ Normal Office Document macro use for automation | 35.0 | 70 | 50 | Office document executing a macro on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-15-dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-15-dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app.md index f945f2015f..1c8d69c92d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-15-dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-15-dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App" -excerpt: "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol" +excerpt: "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-04-15 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: this search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. This technique are seen in couple of malware and APT group to exfiltrated collected data in a infected machine or infected network. This detection is looking for unique use of nslookup where it tries to use specific record type, TXT, A, AAAA, that are commonly used by attacker and also the retry parameter which is designed to query C2 DNS multiple tries. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-04-15 @@ -79,8 +80,8 @@ admin nslookup usage #### Associated Analytic story * [Suspicious DNS Traffic](/stories/suspicious_dns_traffic) * [Dynamic DNS](/stories/dynamic_dns) -* [Command and Control](/stories/command_and_control) * [Data Exfiltration](/stories/data_exfiltration) +* [Command and Control](/stories/command_and_control) #### Kill Chain Phase @@ -95,8 +96,6 @@ admin nslookup usage | 72.0 | 90 | 80 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ performing activity related to DNS exfiltration. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -111,6 +110,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/nslookup_exfil/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/nslookup_exfil/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-15-multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-15-multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm.md index 4a964a2089..6c0f66cea4 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-15-multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-15-multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM" -excerpt: "Password Spraying, Brute Force" +excerpt: "Password Spraying +, Brute Force +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-04-15 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Password Spraying - - Credential Access - Brute Force - Credential Access + - Credential Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the This detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\ The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source workstation name and attempted user accounts. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-04-15 @@ -71,10 +73,10 @@ Note that `multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm_f #### How To Implement -To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Credential Validation' within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled. +To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Credential Validation' within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled. #### Known False Positives -A host failing to authenticate with multiple invalid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners and missconfigured systems. If this detection triggers on a host other than a Domain Controller, the behavior could represent a password spraying attack against the host's local accounts. +A host failing to authenticate with multiple invalid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners and missconfigured systems. If this detection triggers on a host other than a Domain Controller, the behavior could represent a password spraying attack against the host's local accounts. #### Associated Analytic story * [Active Directory Password Spraying](/stories/active_directory_password_spraying) @@ -92,8 +94,6 @@ A host failing to authenticate with multiple invalid domain users is not a commo | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | Potential NTLM based password spraying attack from $Source_Workstation$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_invalid_users_ntlm/windows-security.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_invalid_users_ntlm/windows-security.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-gpupdate_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-gpupdate_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.md index 81a406d4af..379e0c481a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-gpupdate_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-gpupdate_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network" -excerpt: "Process Injection" +excerpt: "Process Injection +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-04-19 @@ -24,7 +25,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies gpupdate.exe with no command line arguments and with a network connection. It is unusual for gpupdate.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. gpupdate.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-04-19 @@ -94,8 +95,6 @@ Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be requ | 81.0 | 90 | 90 | Process gpupdate.exe with parent_process $parent_process_name$ is executed on $dest$ by user $user$, followed by an outbound network connection to $connection_to_CNC$ on port $dest_port$. This behaviour is seen with cobaltstrike. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -109,6 +108,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process.md index 4db68846fe..88b76e2090 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Powershell Remote Thread To Known Windows Process" -excerpt: "Process Injection" +excerpt: "Process Injection +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-04-19 @@ -24,7 +25,7 @@ tags: this search is designed to detect suspicious powershell process that tries to inject code and to known/critical windows process and execute it using CreateRemoteThread. This technique is seen in several malware like trickbot and offensive tooling like cobaltstrike where it load a shellcode to svchost.exe to execute reverse shell to c2 and download another payload -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-04-19 @@ -50,8 +51,8 @@ this search is designed to detect suspicious powershell process that tries to in #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -91,8 +92,6 @@ unknown | 63.0 | 70 | 90 | A suspicious powershell process $process_name$ that tries to create a remote thread on target process $TargetImage$ with eventcode $EventCode$ in host $Computer$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -105,6 +104,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/infection/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/infection/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-schedule_task_with_http_command_arguments.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-schedule_task_with_http_command_arguments.md index ffa2466e24..c03c04f25b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-schedule_task_with_http_command_arguments.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-schedule_task_with_http_command_arguments.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments" -excerpt: "Scheduled Task/Job" +excerpt: "Scheduled Task/Job +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-04-19 @@ -23,9 +24,9 @@ tags: #### Description -The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with an arguments "HTTP" string that are unique entry of malware or attack that uses lolbin to download other file or payload to the infected machine. The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.' +The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with an arguments "HTTP" string that are unique entry of malware or attack that uses lolbin to download other file or payload to the infected machine. The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.' -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-04-19 @@ -53,8 +54,8 @@ The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `schedule_task_with_http_command_arguments_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -91,8 +92,6 @@ unknown | 63.0 | 70 | 90 | A schedule task process commandline arguments $Arguments$ with http string on it in host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -105,6 +104,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/tasksched/windows-security.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/tasksched/windows-security.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger.md index 71eb8d206a..b6af8853c1 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger" -excerpt: "Scheduled Task/Job" +excerpt: "Scheduled Task/Job +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-04-19 @@ -23,9 +24,9 @@ tags: #### Description -The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed with a Rundll32. This technique is common in new trickbot that uses rundll32 to load is trickbot downloader. The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.' +The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed with a Rundll32. This technique is common in new trickbot that uses rundll32 to load is trickbot downloader. The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.' -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-04-19 @@ -53,8 +54,8 @@ The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -93,8 +94,6 @@ unknown | 70.0 | 70 | 100 | A schedule task process commandline rundll32 arguments $Arguments$ in host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -108,6 +107,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/tasksched/windows-security.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/tasksched/windows-security.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services.md index cc86935ad6..12aae20505 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Wermgr Process Connecting To IP Check Web Services" -excerpt: "Gather Victim Network Information, IP Addresses" +excerpt: "Gather Victim Network Information +, IP Addresses +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-04-19 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Gather Victim Network Information - - Reconnaissance - IP Addresses - Reconnaissance + - Reconnaissance - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: this search is designed to detect suspicious wermgr.exe process that tries to connect to known IP web services. This technique is know for trickbot and other trojan spy malware to recon the infected machine and look for its ip address without so much finger print on the commandline process. Since wermgr.exe is designed for error handling process of windows it is really suspicious that this process is trying to connect to this IP web services cause that maybe cause of some malicious code injection. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-04-19 @@ -53,8 +55,8 @@ this search is designed to detect suspicious wermgr.exe process that tries to co #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -92,8 +94,6 @@ unknown | 56.0 | 70 | 80 | Wermgr.exe process connecting IP location web services on $ComputerName$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/infection/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/infection/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-wermgr_process_create_executable_file.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-wermgr_process_create_executable_file.md index e3d3c14052..60de5e6a98 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-wermgr_process_create_executable_file.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-wermgr_process_create_executable_file.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Wermgr Process Create Executable File" -excerpt: "Obfuscated Files or Information" +excerpt: "Obfuscated Files or Information +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-04-19 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: this search is designed to detect potential malicious wermgr.exe process that drops or create executable file. Since wermgr.exe is an application trigger when error encountered in a process, it is really un ussual to this process to drop executable file. This technique is commonly seen in trickbot malware where it injects it code to this process to execute it malicious behavior like downloading other payload -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-04-19 @@ -49,8 +50,8 @@ this search is designed to detect potential malicious wermgr.exe process that dr #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `wermgr_process_create_executable_file_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -86,8 +87,6 @@ unknown | 56.0 | 70 | 80 | Wermgr.exe writing executable files on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -101,6 +100,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/infection/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/infection/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process.md index e15ff1883b..354b64f258 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process" -excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter" +excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-04-19 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This search is designed to detect suspicious cmd and powershell process spawned by wermgr.exe process. This suspicious behavior are commonly seen in code injection technique technique like trickbot to execute a shellcode, dll modules to run malicious behavior. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-04-19 @@ -50,10 +51,10 @@ This search is designed to detect suspicious cmd and powershell process spawned #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) -* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) +* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) Note that `wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -94,8 +95,6 @@ unknown | 56.0 | 70 | 80 | Wermgr.exe spawning suspicious processes on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -109,6 +108,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/infection/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/infection/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-21-excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-21-excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app.md index 39d91a7e1a..597038f89b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-21-excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-21-excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App" -excerpt: "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol" +excerpt: "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-04-21 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. This technique are seen in couple of malware and APT group to exfiltrated collected data in a infected machine or infected network. This detection is looking for unique use of nslookup where it tries to use specific record type (TXT, A, AAAA) that are commonly used by attacker and also the retry parameter which is designed to query C2 DNS multiple tries. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-04-21 @@ -54,8 +55,8 @@ This search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -75,8 +76,8 @@ unknown #### Associated Analytic story * [Suspicious DNS Traffic](/stories/suspicious_dns_traffic) * [Dynamic DNS](/stories/dynamic_dns) -* [Command and Control](/stories/command_and_control) * [Data Exfiltration](/stories/data_exfiltration) +* [Command and Control](/stories/command_and_control) #### Kill Chain Phase @@ -91,8 +92,6 @@ unknown | 28.0 | 40 | 70 | Excessive usage of nslookup.exe has been detected on $Computer$. This detection is triggered as as it violates the dynamic threshold | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -107,6 +106,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/nslookup_exfil/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/nslookup_exfil/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-21-multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-21-multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic.md index 8b103739e9..54f2dd6ee4 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-21-multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-21-multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic" -excerpt: "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol, Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol" +excerpt: "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol +, Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol +" categories: - Network last_modified_at: 2021-04-21 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol - - Exfiltration - Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol - Exfiltration + - Exfiltration - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This search is designed to detect high frequency of archive files data exfiltration through HTTP POST method protocol. This are one of the common techniques used by APT or trojan spy after doing the data collection like screenshot, recording, sensitive data to the infected machines. The attacker may execute archiving command to the collected data, save it a temp folder with a hidden attribute then send it to its C2 through HTTP POST. Sometimes adversaries will rename the archive files or encode/encrypt to cover their tracks. This detection can detect a renamed archive files transfer to HTTP POST since it checks the request body header. Unfortunately this detection cannot support archive that was encrypted or encoded before doing the exfiltration. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Network_Traffic](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkTraffic) - **Last Updated**: 2021-04-21 @@ -81,12 +83,12 @@ To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the st Normal archive transfer via HTTP protocol may trip this detection. #### Associated Analytic story -* [Command and Control](/stories/command_and_control) * [Data Exfiltration](/stories/data_exfiltration) +* [Command and Control](/stories/command_and_control) #### Kill Chain Phase -* Exfiltration +* Exploitation @@ -97,8 +99,6 @@ Normal archive transfer via HTTP protocol may trip this detection. | 25.0 | 50 | 50 | A http post $http_method$ sending packet with possible archive bytes header 4form_data$ in uri path $uri_path$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/archive_http_post/stream_http_events.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/archive_http_post/stream_http_events.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-22-anomalous_usage_of_7zip.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-22-anomalous_usage_of_7zip.md index f0dee5531a..bf5cbcc99e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-22-anomalous_usage_of_7zip.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-22-anomalous_usage_of_7zip.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Anomalous usage of 7zip" -excerpt: "Archive via Utility, Archive Collected Data" +excerpt: "Archive via Utility +, Archive Collected Data +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-04-22 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Archive via Utility - - Collection - Archive Collected Data - Collection + - Collection - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: The following detection identifies a 7z.exe spawned from `Rundll32.exe` or `Dllhost.exe`. It is assumed that the adversary has brought in `7z.exe` and `7z.dll`. It has been observed where an adversary will rename `7z.exe`. Additional coverage may be required to identify the behavior of renamed instances of `7z.exe`. During triage, identify the source of injection into `Rundll32.exe` or `Dllhost.exe`. Capture any files written to disk and analyze as needed. Review parallel processes for additional behaviors. Typically, archiving files will result in exfiltration. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-04-22 @@ -84,7 +86,7 @@ False positives should be limited as this behavior is not normal for `rundll32.e #### Kill Chain Phase -* Actions on Objective +* Exploitation @@ -95,8 +97,6 @@ False positives should be limited as this behavior is not normal for `rundll32.e | 64.0 | 80 | 80 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior is indicative of suspicious loading of 7zip. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1560.001/archive_utility/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1560.001/archive_utility/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-22-office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-22-office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll.md index 5b2f4e0742..9c4a4049df 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-22-office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-22-office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL" -excerpt: "Phishing, Spearphishing Attachment" +excerpt: "Phishing +, Spearphishing Attachment +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-04-22 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Phishing - - Initial Access - Spearphishing Attachment - Initial Access + - Initial Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by IcedID malware family. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `rundll32.exe` without a `.dll` file extension. In malicious instances, the command-line of `rundll32.exe` will look like `rundll32 ..\oepddl.igk2,DllRegisterServer`. In addition, Threat Research has released a detection identifying the use of `DllRegisterServer` on the command-line of `rundll32.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze the `DLL` that was dropped to disk. The Office Product will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-04-22 @@ -97,8 +99,6 @@ False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed. | 63.0 | 70 | 90 | office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ and no dll commandline $process$ in host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_icedid.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_icedid.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-22-plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-22-plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data.md index ab515ef8ad..5362ec99a5 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-22-plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-22-plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data" -excerpt: "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol, Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol" +excerpt: "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol +, Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol +" categories: - Network last_modified_at: 2021-04-22 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol - - Exfiltration - Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol - Exfiltration + - Exfiltration - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This search is to detect potential plain HTTP POST method data exfiltration. This network traffic is commonly used by trickbot, trojanspy, keylogger or APT adversary where arguments or commands are sent in plain text to the remote C2 server using HTTP POST method as part of data exfiltration. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Network_Traffic](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkTraffic) - **Last Updated**: 2021-04-22 @@ -75,12 +77,12 @@ To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the st unknown #### Associated Analytic story -* [Command and Control](/stories/command_and_control) * [Data Exfiltration](/stories/data_exfiltration) +* [Command and Control](/stories/command_and_control) #### Kill Chain Phase -* Exfiltration +* Exploitation @@ -91,8 +93,6 @@ unknown | 63.0 | 70 | 90 | A http post $http_method$ sending packet with plain text of information $form_data$ in uri path $uri_path$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/plain_exfil_data/stream_http_events.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/plain_exfil_data/stream_http_events.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-22-winword_spawning_cmd.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-22-winword_spawning_cmd.md index 8d92460f97..b483daf5d8 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-22-winword_spawning_cmd.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-22-winword_spawning_cmd.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Winword Spawning Cmd" -excerpt: "Phishing, Spearphishing Attachment" +excerpt: "Phishing +, Spearphishing Attachment +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-04-22 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Phishing - - Initial Access - Spearphishing Attachment - Initial Access + - Initial Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: The following detection identifies Microsoft Word spawning `cmd.exe`. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with winword.exe. Winword.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16` (version will vary). Cmd.exe spawning from winword.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command-line will indicate what is being executed. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. It is possible that COM is utilized to trampoline the child process to `explorer.exe` or `wmiprvse.exe`. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-04-22 @@ -54,9 +56,9 @@ The following detection identifies Microsoft Word spawning `cmd.exe`. Typically, #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) Note that `winword_spawning_cmd_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -97,8 +99,6 @@ False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed. | 70.0 | 70 | 100 | $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$ launched command: $process_name$ which is very common in spearphishing attacks. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-office_product_spawning_bitsadmin.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-office_product_spawning_bitsadmin.md index b31d96d2ec..3880010307 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-office_product_spawning_bitsadmin.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-office_product_spawning_bitsadmin.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin" -excerpt: "Phishing, Spearphishing Attachment" +excerpt: "Phishing +, Spearphishing Attachment +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-04-26 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Phishing - - Initial Access - Spearphishing Attachment - Initial Access + - Initial Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `bitsadmin.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `bitsadmin.exe` will contain a URL to a remote destination or similar command-line arguments as transfer, Download, priority, Foreground. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `bitsadmin.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `bitsadmin.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-04-26 @@ -97,8 +99,6 @@ No false positives known. Filter as needed. | 63.0 | 70 | 90 | office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ in host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_macros.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_macros.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-office_product_spawning_certutil.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-office_product_spawning_certutil.md index 6cfc38751a..ddcec53a6f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-office_product_spawning_certutil.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-office_product_spawning_certutil.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Office Product Spawning CertUtil" -excerpt: "Phishing, Spearphishing Attachment" +excerpt: "Phishing +, Spearphishing Attachment +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-04-26 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Phishing - - Initial Access - Spearphishing Attachment - Initial Access + - Initial Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `certutil.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `certutil.exe` will contain a URL to a remote destination. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `certutil.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `certutil.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-04-26 @@ -97,8 +99,6 @@ No false positives known. Filter as needed. | 63.0 | 70 | 90 | office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ in host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_macros.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_macros.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-office_product_spawning_mshta.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-office_product_spawning_mshta.md index 924affc261..7beb64c7e0 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-office_product_spawning_mshta.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-office_product_spawning_mshta.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Office Product Spawning MSHTA" -excerpt: "Phishing, Spearphishing Attachment" +excerpt: "Phishing +, Spearphishing Attachment +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-04-26 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Phishing - - Initial Access - Spearphishing Attachment - Initial Access + - Initial Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `mshta.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `mshta.exe` will contain the `hta` file locally, or a URL to the remote destination. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `mshta.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `mshta.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-04-26 @@ -55,8 +57,8 @@ The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different mal #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [process_mshta](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_mshta.yml) -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `office_product_spawning_mshta_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -98,8 +100,6 @@ No false positives known. Filter as needed. | 63.0 | 70 | 90 | office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ in host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_macros.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_macros.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-trickbot_named_pipe.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-trickbot_named_pipe.md index 3141c7a4bb..c8fa0fe2bf 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-trickbot_named_pipe.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-trickbot_named_pipe.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Trickbot Named Pipe" -excerpt: "Process Injection" +excerpt: "Process Injection +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-04-26 @@ -24,7 +25,7 @@ tags: this search is to detect potential trickbot infection through the create/connected named pipe to the system. This technique is used by trickbot to communicate to its c2 to post or get command during infection. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-04-26 @@ -50,8 +51,8 @@ this search is to detect potential trickbot infection through the create/connect #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `trickbot_named_pipe_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -88,8 +89,6 @@ unknown | 42.0 | 70 | 60 | Possible Trickbot namedpipe created on $Computer$ by $Image$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -103,6 +102,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/namedpipe/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/namedpipe/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-29-icacls_deny_command.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-29-icacls_deny_command.md index 134253e594..f010b34788 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-29-icacls_deny_command.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-29-icacls_deny_command.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Icacls Deny Command" -excerpt: "File and Directory Permissions Modification" +excerpt: "File and Directory Permissions Modification +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-04-29 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This analytic identifies a potential adversary that changes the security permission of a specific file or directory. This technique is commonly seen in APT tradecraft or coinminer scripts. This behavior is meant to evade detection and prevent access to their component files. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-04-29 @@ -87,8 +88,6 @@ Unknown. It is possible some administrative scripts use ICacls. Filter as needed | 72.0 | 90 | 80 | Process name $process_name$ with deny argument executed by $user$ to change security permission of a specific file or directory on host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -101,6 +100,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-29-suspicious_driver_loaded_path.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-29-suspicious_driver_loaded_path.md index fc3daf6186..d096efdb9b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-29-suspicious_driver_loaded_path.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-29-suspicious_driver_loaded_path.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Suspicious Driver Loaded Path" -excerpt: "Windows Service, Create or Modify System Process" +excerpt: "Windows Service +, Create or Modify System Process +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-04-29 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Windows Service + - Create or Modify System Process - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Create or Modify System Process - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ tags: This analytic will detect suspicious driver loaded paths. This technique is commonly used by malicious software like coin miners (xmrig) to register its malicious driver from notable directories where executable or drivers do not commonly exist. During triage, validate this driver is for legitimate business use. Review the metadata and certificate information. Unsigned drivers from non-standard paths is not normal, but occurs. In addition, review driver loads into `ntoskrnl.exe` for possible other drivers of interest. Long tail analyze drivers by path (outside of default, and in default) for further review. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-04-29 @@ -55,8 +57,8 @@ This analytic will detect suspicious driver loaded paths. This technique is comm #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `suspicious_driver_loaded_path_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -92,8 +94,6 @@ Limited false positives will be present. Some applications do load drivers | 63.0 | 70 | 90 | Suspicious driver $ImageLoaded$ on $Computer$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-29-xmrig_driver_loaded.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-29-xmrig_driver_loaded.md index b0c6e51b57..af9804ccda 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-29-xmrig_driver_loaded.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-29-xmrig_driver_loaded.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "XMRIG Driver Loaded" -excerpt: "Windows Service, Create or Modify System Process" +excerpt: "Windows Service +, Create or Modify System Process +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-04-29 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Windows Service + - Create or Modify System Process - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Create or Modify System Process - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ tags: This analytic identifies XMRIG coinminer driver installation on the system. The XMRIG driver name by default is `WinRing0x64.sys`. This cpu miner is an open source project that is commonly abused by adversaries to infect and mine bitcoin. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-04-29 @@ -55,8 +57,8 @@ This analytic identifies XMRIG coinminer driver installation on the system. The #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `xmrig_driver_loaded_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -92,8 +94,6 @@ False positives should be limited. | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | A driver $ImageLoaded$ related to xmrig crytominer loaded in host $Computer$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-deleting_of_net_users.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-deleting_of_net_users.md index f297fee0fe..5ee4d5bacc 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-deleting_of_net_users.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-deleting_of_net_users.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Deleting Of Net Users" -excerpt: "Account Access Removal" +excerpt: "Account Access Removal +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-05-04 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This analytic will detect a suspicious net.exe/net1.exe command-line to delete a user on a system. This technique may be use by an administrator for legitimate purposes, however this behavior has been used in the wild to impair some user or deleting adversaries tracks created during its lateral movement additional systems. During triage, review parallel processes for additional behavior. Identify any other user accounts created before or after. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-05-04 @@ -50,9 +51,9 @@ This analytic will detect a suspicious net.exe/net1.exe command-line to delete a #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) Note that `deleting_of_net_users_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -93,8 +94,6 @@ System administrators or scripts may delete user accounts via this technique. Fi | 25.0 | 50 | 50 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to delete accounts. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -107,6 +106,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-disabling_net_user_account.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-disabling_net_user_account.md index cfccd28f1a..c13fd2c586 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-disabling_net_user_account.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-disabling_net_user_account.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Disabling Net User Account" -excerpt: "Account Access Removal" +excerpt: "Account Access Removal +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-05-04 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This analytic will identify a suspicious command-line that disables a user account using the `net.exe` utility native to Windows. This technique may used by the adversaries to interrupt availability of such users to do their malicious act. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-05-04 @@ -50,9 +51,9 @@ This analytic will identify a suspicious command-line that disables a user accou #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) Note that `disabling_net_user_account_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -93,8 +94,6 @@ unknown | 42.0 | 70 | 60 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified disabling a user account on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -107,6 +106,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-excessive_attempt_to_disable_services.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-excessive_attempt_to_disable_services.md index 8a10b3294e..0787e3de31 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-excessive_attempt_to_disable_services.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-excessive_attempt_to_disable_services.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Excessive Attempt To Disable Services" -excerpt: "Service Stop" +excerpt: "Service Stop +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-05-04 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This analytic will identify suspicious series of command-line to disable several services. This technique is seen where the adversary attempts to disable security app services or other malware services to complete the objective on the compromised system. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-05-04 @@ -88,8 +89,6 @@ unknown | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | An excessive amount of $process_name$ was executed on $dest$ attempting to disable services. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -102,6 +101,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-excessive_service_stop_attempt.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-excessive_service_stop_attempt.md index e7d34373ff..2701155c8b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-excessive_service_stop_attempt.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-excessive_service_stop_attempt.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Excessive Service Stop Attempt" -excerpt: "Service Stop" +excerpt: "Service Stop +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-05-04 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This analytic identifies suspicious series of attempt to kill multiple services on a system using either `net.exe` or `sc.exe`. This technique is use by adversaries to terminate security services or other related services to continue there objective and evade detections. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-05-04 @@ -51,9 +52,9 @@ This analytic identifies suspicious series of attempt to kill multiple services #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) Note that `excessive_service_stop_attempt_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -95,8 +96,6 @@ unknown | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | An excessive amount of $process_name$ was executed on $dest$ attempting to disable services. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -109,6 +108,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-excessive_usage_of_taskkill.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-excessive_usage_of_taskkill.md index e2828848da..0d23a51ed9 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-excessive_usage_of_taskkill.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-excessive_usage_of_taskkill.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Excessive Usage Of Taskkill" -excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools, Impair Defenses" +excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools +, Impair Defenses +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-05-04 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Disable or Modify Tools - - Defense Evasion - Impair Defenses - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This analytic identifies excessive usage of `taskkill.exe` application. This application is commonly used by adversaries to evade detections by killing security product processes or even other processes to evade detection. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-05-04 @@ -92,8 +94,6 @@ Unknown. Filter as needed. | 28.0 | 40 | 70 | Excessive usage of taskkill.exe with process id $process_id$ (more than 10 within 1m) has been detected on $dest$ with a parent process of $parent_process_name$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-icacls_grant_command.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-icacls_grant_command.md index bf9491acc9..ac47559f62 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-icacls_grant_command.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-icacls_grant_command.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "ICACLS Grant Command" -excerpt: "File and Directory Permissions Modification" +excerpt: "File and Directory Permissions Modification +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-05-04 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This analytic identifies potential adversaries that modify the security permission of a specific file or directory. This technique is commonly seen in APT tradecraft and coinminer scripts to evade detections and restrict access to their component files. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-05-04 @@ -88,8 +89,6 @@ Unknown. Filter as needed. | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | Process name $process_name$ with grant argument executed by $user$ to change security permission of a specific file or directory on host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -102,6 +101,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-modify_acl_permission_to_files_or_folder.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-modify_acl_permission_to_files_or_folder.md index de7f112f59..c196bb8dea 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-modify_acl_permission_to_files_or_folder.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-modify_acl_permission_to_files_or_folder.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Modify ACL permission To Files Or Folder" -excerpt: "File and Directory Permissions Modification" +excerpt: "File and Directory Permissions Modification +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-05-04 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This analytic identifies suspicious modification of ACL permission to a files or folder to make it available to everyone. This technique may be used by the adversary to evade ACLs or protected files access. This changes is commonly configured by the file or directory owner with appropriate permission. This behavior is a good indicator if this command seen on a machine utilized by an account with no permission to do so. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-05-04 @@ -87,8 +88,6 @@ administrators may use this command. Filter as needed. | 32.0 | 40 | 80 | Suspicious ACL permission modification on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -101,6 +100,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-process_kill_base_on_file_path.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-process_kill_base_on_file_path.md index 09c1fb0bc7..1619f58636 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-process_kill_base_on_file_path.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-process_kill_base_on_file_path.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Process Kill Base On File Path" -excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools, Impair Defenses" +excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools +, Impair Defenses +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-05-04 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Disable or Modify Tools - - Defense Evasion - Impair Defenses - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies the use of `wmic.exe` using `delete` to remove a executable path. This is typically ran via a batch file during beginning stages of an adversary setting up for mining on an endpoint. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-05-04 @@ -54,9 +56,9 @@ The following analytic identifies the use of `wmic.exe` using `delete` to remove #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_wmic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_wmic.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_wmic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_wmic.yml) Note that `process_kill_base_on_file_path_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -97,8 +99,6 @@ Unknown. | 56.0 | 70 | 80 | A process $process_name$ attempt to kill process by its file path using commandline $process$ in host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-05-suspicious_process_file_path.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-05-suspicious_process_file_path.md index cb3627f71b..05b58eb45d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-05-suspicious_process_file_path.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-05-suspicious_process_file_path.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Suspicious Process File Path" -excerpt: "Create or Modify System Process" +excerpt: "Create or Modify System Process +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-05-05 @@ -24,7 +25,7 @@ tags: The following analytic will detect a suspicious process running in a file path where a process is not commonly seen and is most commonly used by malicious software. This behavior has been used by adversaries where they drop and run an exe in a path that is accessible without admin privileges. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-05-05 @@ -92,8 +93,6 @@ Administrators may allow execution of specific binaries in non-standard paths. F | 35.0 | 70 | 50 | Suspicioues process $Processes.process_path.file_path$ running from suspicious location | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -107,6 +106,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-06-download_files_using_telegram.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-06-download_files_using_telegram.md index 9e9cc3d5d9..ffc082afd2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-06-download_files_using_telegram.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-06-download_files_using_telegram.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Download Files Using Telegram" -excerpt: "Ingress Tool Transfer" +excerpt: "Ingress Tool Transfer +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-05-06 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: The following analytic will identify a suspicious download by the Telegram application on a Windows system. This behavior was identified on a honeypot where the adversary gained access, installed Telegram and followed through with downloading different network scanners (port, bruteforcer, masscan) to the system and later used to mapped the whole network and further move laterally. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-05-06 @@ -49,8 +50,8 @@ The following analytic will identify a suspicious download by the Telegram appli #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `download_files_using_telegram_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -86,8 +87,6 @@ normal download of file in telegram app. (if it was a common app in network) | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | Suspicious files were downloaded with the Telegram application on $dest$ by $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -100,6 +99,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/minergate/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/minergate/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-06-enumerate_users_local_group_using_telegram.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-06-enumerate_users_local_group_using_telegram.md index 18250b4522..bc6259d5fc 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-06-enumerate_users_local_group_using_telegram.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-06-enumerate_users_local_group_using_telegram.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Enumerate Users Local Group Using Telegram" -excerpt: "Account Discovery" +excerpt: "Account Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-05-06 @@ -21,9 +22,9 @@ tags: #### Description -This analytic will detect a suspicious Telegram process enumerating all network users in a local group. This technique was seen in a Monero infected honeypot to mapped all the users on the compromised system. EventCode 4798 is generated when a process enumerates a user's security-enabled local groups on a computer or device. +This analytic will detect a suspicious Telegram process enumerating all network users in a local group. This technique was seen in a Monero infected honeypot to mapped all the users on the compromised system. EventCode 4798 is generated when a process enumerates a user's security-enabled local groups on a computer or device. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-05-06 @@ -49,8 +50,8 @@ This analytic will detect a suspicious Telegram process enumerating all network #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `enumerate_users_local_group_using_telegram_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -89,8 +90,6 @@ unknown | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | The Telegram application has been identified enumerating local groups on $ComputerName$ by $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -104,6 +103,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/minergate/windows-security.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/minergate/windows-security.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-06-excessive_usage_of_net_app.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-06-excessive_usage_of_net_app.md index 229ba6c348..844aab8478 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-06-excessive_usage_of_net_app.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-06-excessive_usage_of_net_app.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Excessive Usage Of Net App" -excerpt: "Account Access Removal" +excerpt: "Account Access Removal +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-05-06 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This analytic identifies excessive usage of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` within a bucket of time (1 minute). This behavior was seen in a Monero incident where the adversary attempts to create many users, delete and disable users as part of its malicious behavior. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-05-06 @@ -51,9 +52,9 @@ This analytic identifies excessive usage of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` within a buc #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) Note that `excessive_usage_of_net_app_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -95,8 +96,6 @@ unknown. Filter as needed. Modify the time span as needed. | 28.0 | 40 | 70 | Excessive usage of net1.exe or net.exe within 1m, with command line $process$ has been detected on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -109,6 +108,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-06-executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-06-executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path.md index 6d351dc195..fe0f2a8567 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-06-executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-06-executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path" -excerpt: "Masquerading" +excerpt: "Masquerading +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-05-06 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This analytic will identify suspicious executable or scripts (known file extensions) in list of suspicious file path in Windows. This technique is used by adversaries to evade detection. The suspicious file path are known paths used in the wild and are not common to have executable or scripts. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-05-06 @@ -89,8 +90,6 @@ Administrators may allow creation of script or exe in the paths specified. Filte | 56.0 | 80 | 70 | Suspicious executable or scripts with file name $file_name$, $file_path$ and process_id $process_id$ executed in suspicious file path in Windows by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -104,6 +103,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-07-excessive_usage_of_cacls_app.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-07-excessive_usage_of_cacls_app.md index 054c65a0ee..7eac03a9eb 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-07-excessive_usage_of_cacls_app.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-07-excessive_usage_of_cacls_app.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Excessive Usage Of Cacls App" -excerpt: "File and Directory Permissions Modification" +excerpt: "File and Directory Permissions Modification +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-05-07 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies excessive usage of `cacls.exe`, `xcacls.exe` or `icacls.exe` application to change file or folder permission. This behavior is commonly seen where the adversary attempts to impair some users from deleting or accessing its malware components or artifact from the compromised system. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-05-07 @@ -88,8 +89,6 @@ Administrators or administrative scripts may use this application. Filter as nee | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | An excessive amount of $process_name$ was executed on $dest$ attempting to modify permissions. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -102,6 +101,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-07-schtasks_run_task_on_demand.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-07-schtasks_run_task_on_demand.md index 1ec915bc52..cff46416f3 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-07-schtasks_run_task_on_demand.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-07-schtasks_run_task_on_demand.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Schtasks Run Task On Demand" -excerpt: "Scheduled Task/Job" +excerpt: "Scheduled Task/Job +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-05-07 @@ -25,7 +26,7 @@ tags: This analytic identifies an on demand run of a Windows Schedule Task through shell or command-line. This technique has been used by adversaries that force to run their created Schedule Task as their persistence mechanism or for lateral movement as part of their malicious attack to the compromised machine. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-05-07 @@ -86,11 +87,9 @@ Administrators may use to debug Schedule Task entries. Filter as needed. | Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| -| 48.0 | 60 | 80 | A "on demand" execution of schedule task process $process_name$ using commandline $process$ in host $dest$ | +| 48.0 | 60 | 80 | A "on demand" execution of schedule task process $process_name$ using commandline $process$ in host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -103,6 +102,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-12-delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-12-delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell.md index 158a6dec91..f44f515f24 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-12-delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-12-delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell" -excerpt: "Inhibit System Recovery" +excerpt: "Inhibit System Recovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-05-12 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This following analytic detects PowerShell command to delete shadow copy using the WMIC PowerShell module. This technique was seen used by a recent adversary to deploy DarkSide Ransomware where it executed a child process of PowerShell to execute a hex encoded command to delete shadow copy. This hex encoded command was able to be decrypted by PowerShell log. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-05-12 @@ -86,8 +87,6 @@ unknown | 81.0 | 90 | 90 | An attempt to delete ShadowCopy was performed using PowerShell on $ComputerName$ by $User$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -101,6 +100,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-powershell.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-13-cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-13-cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass.md index c91234d397..857d23e869 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-13-cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-13-cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass" -excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution, CMSTP" +excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution +, CMSTP +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-05-13 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Signed Binary Proxy Execution - - Defense Evasion - CMSTP - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This analytic detects a potential process using COM Object like CMLUA or CMSTPLUA to bypass UAC. This technique has been used by ransomware adversaries to gain administrative privileges to its running process. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-05-13 @@ -53,8 +55,8 @@ This analytic detects a potential process using COM Object like CMLUA or CMSTPLU #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -92,8 +94,6 @@ Legitimate windows application that are not on the list loading this dll. Filter | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | The following module $ImageLoaded$ was loaded by a non-standard application on endpoint $Computer$ by user $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/darkside_cmstp_com/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/darkside_cmstp_com/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-13-slui_runas_elevated.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-13-slui_runas_elevated.md index 09404d7ea2..333f2d1fe4 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-13-slui_runas_elevated.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-13-slui_runas_elevated.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "SLUI RunAs Elevated" -excerpt: "Bypass User Account Control, Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism" +excerpt: "Bypass User Account Control +, Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-05-13 @@ -8,11 +10,11 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Bypass User Account Control - - Privilege Escalation - - Defense Evasion - Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism + - Defense Evasion - Privilege Escalation - Defense Evasion + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies the Microsoft Software Licensing User Interface Tool, `slui.exe`, elevating access using the `-verb runas` function. This particular bypass utilizes a registry key/value. Identified by two sources, the registry keys are `HKCU\Software\Classes\exefile\shell` and `HKCU\Software\Classes\launcher.Systemsettings\Shell\open\command`. To simulate this behavior, multiple POC are available. The analytic identifies the use of `runas` by `slui.exe`. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-05-13 @@ -39,9 +41,9 @@ The following analytic identifies the Microsoft Software Licensing User Interfac | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1548.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/) | Bypass User Account Control | Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1548.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/) | Bypass User Account Control | Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1548](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1548](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -95,8 +97,6 @@ Limited false positives should be present as this is not commonly used by legiti | 63.0 | 70 | 90 | A slui process $process_name$ with elevated commandline $process$ in host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/slui/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/slui/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-13-slui_spawning_a_process.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-13-slui_spawning_a_process.md index e5fd436a04..0cd4be8024 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-13-slui_spawning_a_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-13-slui_spawning_a_process.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "SLUI Spawning a Process" -excerpt: "Bypass User Account Control, Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism" +excerpt: "Bypass User Account Control +, Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-05-13 @@ -8,11 +10,11 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Bypass User Account Control - - Privilege Escalation - - Defense Evasion - Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism + - Defense Evasion - Privilege Escalation - Defense Evasion + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies the Microsoft Software Licensing User Interface Tool, `slui.exe`, spawning a child process. This behavior is associated with publicly known UAC bypass. `slui.exe` is commonly associated with software updates and is most often spawned by `svchost.exe`. The `slui.exe` process should not have child processes, and any processes spawning from it will be running with elevated privileges. During triage, review the child process and additional parallel processes. Identify any file modifications that may have lead to the bypass. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-05-13 @@ -39,9 +41,9 @@ The following analytic identifies the Microsoft Software Licensing User Interfac | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1548.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/) | Bypass User Account Control | Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1548.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/) | Bypass User Account Control | Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1548](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1548](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -95,8 +97,6 @@ Certain applications may spawn from `slui.exe` that are legitimate. Filtering wi | 63.0 | 70 | 90 | A slui process $parent_process_name$ spawning child process $process_name$ in host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/slui/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/slui/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-18-services_escalate_exe.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-18-services_escalate_exe.md index 34e3a3d9d2..30cdeafa19 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-18-services_escalate_exe.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-18-services_escalate_exe.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Services Escalate Exe" -excerpt: "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism" +excerpt: "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-05-18 @@ -8,8 +9,8 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism - - Privilege Escalation - Defense Evasion + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -24,7 +25,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies the use of `svc-exe` with Cobalt Strike. The behavior typically follows after an adversary has already gained initial access and is escalating privileges. Using `svc-exe`, a randomly named binary will be downloaded from the remote Teamserver and placed on disk within `C:\Windows\400619a.exe`. Following, the binary will be added to the registry under key `HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\400619a\` with multiple keys and values added to look like a legitimate service. Upon loading, `services.exe` will spawn the randomly named binary from `\\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\400619a.exe`. The process lineage is completed with `400619a.exe` spawning rundll32.exe, which is the default `spawnto_` value for Cobalt Strike. The `spawnto_` value is arbitrary and may be any process on disk (typically system32/syswow64 binary). The `spawnto_` process will also contain a network connection. During triage, review parallel procesess and identify any additional file modifications. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-05-18 @@ -36,7 +37,7 @@ The following analytic identifies the use of `svc-exe` with Cobalt Strike. The b | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1548](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1548](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -79,7 +80,6 @@ False positives should be limited as `services.exe` should never spawn a process #### Kill Chain Phase * Exploitation -* Privilege Escalation @@ -90,8 +90,6 @@ False positives should be limited as `services.exe` should never spawn a process | 76.0 | 80 | 95 | A service process $parent_process_name$ with process path $process_path$ in host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -106,6 +104,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-19-allow_inbound_traffic_in_firewall_rule.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-19-allow_inbound_traffic_in_firewall_rule.md index 04491499df..4730f0a011 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-19-allow_inbound_traffic_in_firewall_rule.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-19-allow_inbound_traffic_in_firewall_rule.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Allow Inbound Traffic In Firewall Rule" -excerpt: "Remote Desktop Protocol, Remote Services" +excerpt: "Remote Desktop Protocol +, Remote Services +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-05-19 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Remote Desktop Protocol - - Lateral Movement - Remote Services - Lateral Movement + - Lateral Movement - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell command to allow inbound traffic inbound to a specific local port within the public profile. This technique was seen in some attacker want to have a remote access to a machine by allowing the traffic in firewall rule. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-05-19 @@ -88,8 +90,6 @@ administrator may allow inbound traffic in certain network or machine. | 3.0 | 10 | 30 | Suspicious firewall modification detected on endpoint $ComputerName$ by user $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/casper/datasets1/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/casper/datasets1/windows-powershell.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-19-mailsniper_invoke_functions.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-19-mailsniper_invoke_functions.md index 5f103be115..f51478ac44 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-19-mailsniper_invoke_functions.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-19-mailsniper_invoke_functions.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Mailsniper Invoke functions" -excerpt: "Email Collection, Local Email Collection" +excerpt: "Email Collection +, Local Email Collection +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-05-19 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Email Collection - - Collection - Local Email Collection - Collection + - Collection - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This search is to detect known mailsniper.ps1 functions executed in a machine. This technique was seen in some attacker to harvest some sensitive e-mail in a compromised exchange server. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-05-19 @@ -88,8 +90,6 @@ unknown | 72.0 | 90 | 80 | mailsniper.ps1 functions $Message$ executed on a $ComputerName$ by user $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/casper/datasets1/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/casper/datasets1/windows-powershell.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-20-cmd_echo_pipe_-_escalation.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-20-cmd_echo_pipe_-_escalation.md index b677ad5ad5..da470ec788 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-20-cmd_echo_pipe_-_escalation.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-20-cmd_echo_pipe_-_escalation.md @@ -1,6 +1,10 @@ --- title: "CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation" -excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter, Windows Command Shell, Windows Service, Create or Modify System Process" +excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter +, Windows Command Shell +, Windows Service +, Create or Modify System Process +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-05-20 @@ -8,13 +12,13 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Command and Scripting Interpreter - - Execution - Windows Command Shell - - Execution - Windows Service + - Create or Modify System Process + - Execution + - Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Create or Modify System Process - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise @@ -29,9 +33,9 @@ tags: #### Description -This analytic identifies a common behavior by Cobalt Strike and other frameworks where the adversary will escalate privileges, either via `jump` (Cobalt Strike PTH) or `getsystem`, using named-pipe impersonation. A suspicious event will look like `cmd.exe /c echo 4sgryt3436 > \\.\Pipe\5erg53`. +This analytic identifies a common behavior by Cobalt Strike and other frameworks where the adversary will escalate privileges, either via `jump` (Cobalt Strike PTH) or `getsystem`, using named-pipe impersonation. A suspicious event will look like `cmd.exe /c echo 4sgryt3436 > \\.\Pipe\5erg53`. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-05-20 @@ -64,9 +68,9 @@ This analytic identifies a common behavior by Cobalt Strike and other frameworks #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) Note that `cmd_echo_pipe_-_escalation_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -97,7 +101,6 @@ Unknown. It is possible filtering may be required to ensure fidelity. #### Kill Chain Phase * Exploitation -* Privilege Escalation @@ -108,8 +111,6 @@ Unknown. It is possible filtering may be required to ensure fidelity. | 64.0 | 80 | 80 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ potentially performing privilege escalation using named pipes related to Cobalt Strike and other frameworks. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -123,6 +124,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-21-winrm_spawning_a_process.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-21-winrm_spawning_a_process.md index 363830d202..74d71dc3ce 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-21-winrm_spawning_a_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-21-winrm_spawning_a_process.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "WinRM Spawning a Process" -excerpt: "Exploit Public-Facing Application" +excerpt: "Exploit Public-Facing Application +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-05-21 @@ -12,12 +13,11 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - CVE-2021-31166 - Endpoint --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U The following analytic identifies suspicious processes spawning from WinRM (wsmprovhost.exe). This analytic is related to potential exploitation of CVE-2021-31166. which is a kernel-mode device driver http.sys vulnerability. Current proof of concept code will blue-screen the operating system. However, http.sys used by many different Windows processes, including WinRM. In this case, identifying suspicious process create (child processes) from `wsmprovhost.exe` is what this analytic is identifying. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-05-21 @@ -81,21 +81,17 @@ Unknown. Add new processes or filter as needed. It is possible system management #### Kill Chain Phase * Exploitation -* Privilege Escalation -* Denial of Service +* Actions on Objectives +#### RBA -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -#### CVE - -| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | -| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [CVE-2021-31166](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-31166) | HTTP Protocol Stack Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | 7.5 | - #### Reference @@ -112,5 +108,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/endpoint/winrm_spawning_a_process.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-26-secretdumps_offline_ntds_dumping_tool.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-26-secretdumps_offline_ntds_dumping_tool.md index 6b1cc44564..a8f4204573 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-26-secretdumps_offline_ntds_dumping_tool.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-26-secretdumps_offline_ntds_dumping_tool.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool" -excerpt: "NTDS, OS Credential Dumping" +excerpt: "NTDS +, OS Credential Dumping +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-05-26 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - NTDS - - Credential Access - OS Credential Dumping - Credential Access + - Credential Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This analytic detects a potential usage of secretsdump.py tool for dumping credentials (ntlm hash) from a copy of ntds.dit and SAM.Security,SYSTEM registrry hive. This technique was seen in some attacker that dump ntlm hashes offline after having a copy of ntds.dit and SAM/SYSTEM/SECURITY registry hive. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-05-26 @@ -93,8 +95,6 @@ unknown | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | A secretdump process $process_name$ with secretdump commandline $process$ to dump credentials in host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/casper/datasets1/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/casper/datasets1/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-27-detect_sharphound_file_modifications.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-27-detect_sharphound_file_modifications.md index f534f940a2..2a67507e1f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-27-detect_sharphound_file_modifications.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-27-detect_sharphound_file_modifications.md @@ -1,6 +1,13 @@ --- title: "Detect SharpHound File Modifications" -excerpt: "Domain Account, Local Groups, Domain Trust Discovery, Local Account, Account Discovery, Domain Groups, Permission Groups Discovery" +excerpt: "Domain Account +, Local Groups +, Domain Trust Discovery +, Local Account +, Account Discovery +, Domain Groups +, Permission Groups Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-05-27 @@ -8,19 +15,19 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Domain Account - - Discovery - Local Groups - - Discovery - Domain Trust Discovery - - Discovery - Local Account - - Discovery - Account Discovery - - Discovery - Domain Groups - - Discovery - Permission Groups Discovery - Discovery + - Discovery + - Discovery + - Discovery + - Discovery + - Discovery + - Discovery - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -33,9 +40,9 @@ tags: #### Description -SharpHound is used as a reconnaissance collector, ingestor, for BloodHound. SharpHound will query the domain controller and begin gathering all the data related to the domain and trusts. For output, it will drop a .zip file upon completion following a typical pattern that is often not changed. This analytic focuses on the default file name scheme. Note that this may be evaded with different parameters within SharpHound, but that depends on the operator. `-randomizefilenames` and `-encryptzip` are two examples. In addition, executing SharpHound via .exe or .ps1 without any command-line arguments will still perform activity and dump output to the default filename. Example default filename `20210601181553_BloodHound.zip`. SharpHound creates multiple temp files following the same pattern `20210601182121_computers.json`, `domains.json`, `gpos.json`, `ous.json` and `users.json`. Tuning may be required, or remove these json's entirely if it is too noisy. During traige, review parallel processes for further suspicious behavior. Typically, the process executing the `.ps1` ingestor will be PowerShell. +SharpHound is used as a reconnaissance collector, ingestor, for BloodHound. SharpHound will query the domain controller and begin gathering all the data related to the domain and trusts. For output, it will drop a .zip file upon completion following a typical pattern that is often not changed. This analytic focuses on the default file name scheme. Note that this may be evaded with different parameters within SharpHound, but that depends on the operator. `-randomizefilenames` and `-encryptzip` are two examples. In addition, executing SharpHound via .exe or .ps1 without any command-line arguments will still perform activity and dump output to the default filename. Example default filename `20210601181553_BloodHound.zip`. SharpHound creates multiple temp files following the same pattern `20210601182121_computers.json`, `domains.json`, `gpos.json`, `ous.json` and `users.json`. Tuning may be required, or remove these json's entirely if it is too noisy. During traige, review parallel processes for further suspicious behavior. Typically, the process executing the `.ps1` ingestor will be PowerShell. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-05-27 @@ -111,8 +118,6 @@ False positives should be limited as the analytic is specific to a filename with | 24.0 | 30 | 80 | Potential SharpHound file modifications identified on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -129,6 +134,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/sharphound/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/sharphound/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-27-detect_sharphound_usage.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-27-detect_sharphound_usage.md index 18cca8829c..5089235d36 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-27-detect_sharphound_usage.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-27-detect_sharphound_usage.md @@ -1,6 +1,13 @@ --- title: "Detect SharpHound Usage" -excerpt: "Domain Account, Local Groups, Domain Trust Discovery, Local Account, Account Discovery, Domain Groups, Permission Groups Discovery" +excerpt: "Domain Account +, Local Groups +, Domain Trust Discovery +, Local Account +, Account Discovery +, Domain Groups +, Permission Groups Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-05-27 @@ -8,19 +15,19 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Domain Account - - Discovery - Local Groups - - Discovery - Domain Trust Discovery - - Discovery - Local Account - - Discovery - Account Discovery - - Discovery - Domain Groups - - Discovery - Permission Groups Discovery - Discovery + - Discovery + - Discovery + - Discovery + - Discovery + - Discovery + - Discovery - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -35,7 +42,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies SharpHound binary usage by using the original filena,e. In addition to renaming the PE, other coverage is available to detect command-line arguments. This particular analytic looks for the original_file_name of `SharpHound.exe` and the process name. It is possible older instances of SharpHound.exe have different original filenames. Dependent upon the operator, the code may be re-compiled and the attributes removed or changed to anything else. During triage, review the metadata of the binary in question. Review parallel processes for suspicious behavior. Identify the source of this binary. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-05-27 @@ -117,8 +124,6 @@ False positives should be limited as this is specific to a file attribute not us | 24.0 | 30 | 80 | Potential SharpHound binary identified on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -135,6 +140,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/sharphound/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/sharphound/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-01-detect_azurehound_command-line_arguments.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-01-detect_azurehound_command-line_arguments.md index 1260b73b4a..4b7d5a4f24 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-01-detect_azurehound_command-line_arguments.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-01-detect_azurehound_command-line_arguments.md @@ -1,6 +1,13 @@ --- title: "Detect AzureHound Command-Line Arguments" -excerpt: "Domain Account, Local Groups, Domain Trust Discovery, Local Account, Account Discovery, Domain Groups, Permission Groups Discovery" +excerpt: "Domain Account +, Local Groups +, Domain Trust Discovery +, Local Account +, Account Discovery +, Domain Groups +, Permission Groups Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-06-01 @@ -8,19 +15,19 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Domain Account - - Discovery - Local Groups - - Discovery - Domain Trust Discovery - - Discovery - Local Account - - Discovery - Account Discovery - - Discovery - Domain Groups - - Discovery - Permission Groups Discovery - Discovery + - Discovery + - Discovery + - Discovery + - Discovery + - Discovery + - Discovery - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -35,7 +42,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies the common command-line argument used by AzureHound `Invoke-AzureHound`. Being the script is FOSS, function names may be modified, but these changes are dependent upon the operator. In most instances the defaults are used. This analytic works to identify the common command-line attributes used. It does not cover the entirety of every argument in order to avoid false positives. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-06-01 @@ -116,8 +123,6 @@ Unknown. | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ using AzureHound to enumerate AzureAD. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -133,6 +138,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/sharphound/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/sharphound/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-01-detect_azurehound_file_modifications.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-01-detect_azurehound_file_modifications.md index f10997fc7d..fd99ce7d96 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-01-detect_azurehound_file_modifications.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-01-detect_azurehound_file_modifications.md @@ -1,6 +1,13 @@ --- title: "Detect AzureHound File Modifications" -excerpt: "Domain Account, Local Groups, Domain Trust Discovery, Local Account, Account Discovery, Domain Groups, Permission Groups Discovery" +excerpt: "Domain Account +, Local Groups +, Domain Trust Discovery +, Local Account +, Account Discovery +, Domain Groups +, Permission Groups Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-06-01 @@ -8,19 +15,19 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Domain Account - - Discovery - Local Groups - - Discovery - Domain Trust Discovery - - Discovery - Local Account - - Discovery - Account Discovery - - Discovery - Domain Groups - - Discovery - Permission Groups Discovery - Discovery + - Discovery + - Discovery + - Discovery + - Discovery + - Discovery + - Discovery - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -33,9 +40,9 @@ tags: #### Description -The following analytic is similar to SharpHound file modifications, but this instance covers the use of Invoke-AzureHound. AzureHound is the SharpHound equivilent but for Azure. It's possible this may never be seen in an environment as most attackers may execute this tool remotely. Once execution is complete, a zip file with a similar name will drop `20210601090751-azurecollection.zip`. In addition to the zip, multiple .json files will be written to disk, which are in the zip. +The following analytic is similar to SharpHound file modifications, but this instance covers the use of Invoke-AzureHound. AzureHound is the SharpHound equivilent but for Azure. It's possible this may never be seen in an environment as most attackers may execute this tool remotely. Once execution is complete, a zip file with a similar name will drop `20210601090751-azurecollection.zip`. In addition to the zip, multiple .json files will be written to disk, which are in the zip. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-06-01 @@ -110,8 +117,6 @@ False positives should be limited as the analytic is specific to a filename with | 63.0 | 70 | 90 | A file - $file_name$ was written to disk that is related to AzureHound, a AzureAD enumeration utility, has occurred on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -125,6 +130,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/sharphound/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/sharphound/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-01-detect_sharphound_command-line_arguments.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-01-detect_sharphound_command-line_arguments.md index 6bd725e733..4ba79877dc 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-01-detect_sharphound_command-line_arguments.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-01-detect_sharphound_command-line_arguments.md @@ -1,6 +1,13 @@ --- title: "Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments" -excerpt: "Domain Account, Local Groups, Domain Trust Discovery, Local Account, Account Discovery, Domain Groups, Permission Groups Discovery" +excerpt: "Domain Account +, Local Groups +, Domain Trust Discovery +, Local Account +, Account Discovery +, Domain Groups +, Permission Groups Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-06-01 @@ -8,19 +15,19 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Domain Account - - Discovery - Local Groups - - Discovery - Domain Trust Discovery - - Discovery - Local Account - - Discovery - Account Discovery - - Discovery - Domain Groups - - Discovery - Permission Groups Discovery - Discovery + - Discovery + - Discovery + - Discovery + - Discovery + - Discovery + - Discovery - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -35,7 +42,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies common command-line arguments used by SharpHound `-collectionMethod` and `invoke-bloodhound`. Being the script is FOSS, function names may be modified, but these changes are dependent upon the operator. In most instances the defaults are used. This analytic works to identify the common command-line attributes used. It does not cover the entirety of every argument in order to avoid false positives. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-06-01 @@ -113,8 +120,6 @@ False positives should be limited as the arguments used are specific to SharpHou | 24.0 | 30 | 80 | Possible SharpHound command-Line arguments identified on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -131,6 +136,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/sharphound/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/sharphound/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-02-conti_common_exec_parameter.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-02-conti_common_exec_parameter.md index 0b361de6c5..7c02634c40 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-02-conti_common_exec_parameter.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-02-conti_common_exec_parameter.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Conti Common Exec parameter" -excerpt: "User Execution" +excerpt: "User Execution +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-06-02 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This search detects the suspicious commandline argument of revil ransomware to encrypt specific or all local drive and network shares of the compromised machine or host. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-06-02 @@ -92,8 +93,6 @@ To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the pr | 64.0 | 80 | 80 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ executing specific Conti Ransomware related parameters. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -106,6 +105,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/conti/inf1/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/conti/inf1/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-02-modification_of_wallpaper.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-02-modification_of_wallpaper.md index 40d1dac917..fdcd2118c2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-02-modification_of_wallpaper.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-02-modification_of_wallpaper.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Modification Of Wallpaper" -excerpt: "Defacement" +excerpt: "Defacement +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-06-02 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This analytic identifies suspicious modification of registry to deface or change the wallpaper of a compromised machines as part of its payload. This technique was commonly seen in ransomware like REVIL where it create a bitmap file contain a note that the machine was compromised and make it as a wallpaper. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-06-02 @@ -49,8 +50,8 @@ This analytic identifies suspicious modification of registry to deface or change #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `modification_of_wallpaper_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -90,8 +91,6 @@ To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Im | 54.0 | 60 | 90 | Wallpaper modification on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -105,6 +104,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-02-revil_common_exec_parameter.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-02-revil_common_exec_parameter.md index 0c44b850b3..a62b24aa5e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-02-revil_common_exec_parameter.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-02-revil_common_exec_parameter.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Revil Common Exec Parameter" -excerpt: "User Execution" +excerpt: "User Execution +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-06-02 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This analytic identifies suspicious commandline parameter that are commonly used by REVIL ransomware to encrypts the compromise machine. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-06-02 @@ -90,8 +91,6 @@ third party tool may have same command line parameters as revil ransomware. | 54.0 | 60 | 90 | A process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ related to revil ransomware in host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -105,6 +104,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-02-wbemprox_com_object_execution.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-02-wbemprox_com_object_execution.md index 61c4e7f489..b392df5538 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-02-wbemprox_com_object_execution.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-02-wbemprox_com_object_execution.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Wbemprox COM Object Execution" -excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution, CMSTP" +excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution +, CMSTP +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-06-02 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Signed Binary Proxy Execution - - Defense Evasion - CMSTP - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: this search is designed to detect potential malicious process loading COM object to wbemprox.dll, -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-06-02 @@ -53,8 +55,8 @@ this search is designed to detect potential malicious process loading COM object #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `wbemprox_com_object_execution_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -94,8 +96,6 @@ legitimate process that are not in the exception list may trigger this event. | 35.0 | 70 | 50 | Suspicious COM Object Execution on $Computer$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf2/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf2/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-04-known_services_killed_by_ransomware.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-04-known_services_killed_by_ransomware.md index e10fee8891..91328a603b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-04-known_services_killed_by_ransomware.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-04-known_services_killed_by_ransomware.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Known Services Killed by Ransomware" -excerpt: "Inhibit System Recovery" +excerpt: "Inhibit System Recovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-06-04 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This search detects a suspicioous termination of known services killed by ransomware before encrypting files in a compromised machine. This technique is commonly seen in most of ransomware now a days to avoid exception error while accessing the targetted files it wants to encrypts because of the open handle of those services to the targetted file. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-06-04 @@ -85,8 +86,6 @@ Admin activities or installing related updates may do a sudden stop to list of s | 72.0 | 90 | 80 | Known services $Message$ terminated by a potential ransomware on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -100,6 +99,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf3/windows-system.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf3/windows-system.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-07-excessive_number_of_taskhost_processes.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-07-excessive_number_of_taskhost_processes.md index b3fed5907a..56d5b72cd7 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-07-excessive_number_of_taskhost_processes.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-07-excessive_number_of_taskhost_processes.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Excessive number of taskhost processes" -excerpt: "System Owner/User Discovery" +excerpt: "System Owner/User Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-06-07 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This detection targets behaviors observed in post exploit kits like Meterpreter and Koadic that are run in memory. We have observed that these tools must invoke an excessive number of taskhost.exe and taskhostex.exe processes to complete various actions (discovery, lateral movement, etc.). It is extremely uncommon in the course of normal operations to see so many distinct taskhost and taskhostex processes running concurrently in a short time frame. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-06-07 @@ -90,8 +91,6 @@ Administrators, administrative actions or certain applications may run many inst | 56.0 | 80 | 70 | An excessive amount of $process_name$ was executed on $dest$ indicative of suspicious behavior. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -104,6 +103,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059/meterpreter/taskhost_processes/logExcessiveTaskHost.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059/meterpreter/taskhost_processes/logExcessiveTaskHost.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-08-powershell_fileless_process_injection_via_getprocaddress.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-08-powershell_fileless_process_injection_via_getprocaddress.md index 2c53d899b3..28e191a692 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-08-powershell_fileless_process_injection_via_getprocaddress.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-08-powershell_fileless_process_injection_via_getprocaddress.md @@ -1,6 +1,9 @@ --- title: "Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress" -excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter, Process Injection, PowerShell" +excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter +, Process Injection +, PowerShell +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-06-08 @@ -8,11 +11,11 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Command and Scripting Interpreter - - Execution - Process Injection + - PowerShell + - Execution - Defense Evasion - Privilege Escalation - - PowerShell - Execution - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security @@ -30,7 +33,7 @@ This analytic identifies `GetProcAddress` in the script block. This is not norma In use, `$var_gpa = $var_unsafe_native_methods.GetMethod(GetProcAddress` and later referenced/executed elsewhere. \ During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-06-08 @@ -96,8 +99,6 @@ Limited false positives. Filter as needed. | 48.0 | 60 | 80 | A suspicious powershell script contains GetProcAddress API in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -113,6 +114,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-08-powershell_fileless_script_contains_base64_encoded_content.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-08-powershell_fileless_script_contains_base64_encoded_content.md index 695de3dba9..9c389ce3ee 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-08-powershell_fileless_script_contains_base64_encoded_content.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-08-powershell_fileless_script_contains_base64_encoded_content.md @@ -1,6 +1,9 @@ --- title: "Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content" -excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter, Obfuscated Files or Information, PowerShell" +excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter +, Obfuscated Files or Information +, PowerShell +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-06-08 @@ -8,11 +11,11 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Command and Scripting Interpreter - - Execution - Obfuscated Files or Information - - Defense Evasion - PowerShell - Execution + - Defense Evasion + - Execution - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -29,7 +32,7 @@ This analytic identifies `FromBase64String` within the script block. A typical m Command example - `[Byte[]]$var_code = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String(38uqIyMjQ6rG....` \ During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-06-08 @@ -85,7 +88,6 @@ False positives should be limited. Filter as needed. #### Kill Chain Phase * Exploitation -* Privilege Escalation @@ -96,8 +98,6 @@ False positives should be limited. Filter as needed. | 56.0 | 70 | 80 | A suspicious powershell script contains base64 command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-09-detect_empire_with_powershell_script_block_logging.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-09-detect_empire_with_powershell_script_block_logging.md index 0a0fd13466..4a3385b38d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-09-detect_empire_with_powershell_script_block_logging.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-09-detect_empire_with_powershell_script_block_logging.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging" -excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter, PowerShell" +excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter +, PowerShell +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-06-09 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Command and Scripting Interpreter - - Execution - PowerShell - Execution + - Execution - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -26,7 +28,7 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) This analytic identifies the common PowerShell stager used by PowerShell-Empire. Each stager that may use PowerShell all uses the same pattern. The initial HTTP will be base64 encoded and use `system.net.webclient`. Note that some obfuscation may evade the analytic. \ During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-06-09 @@ -90,8 +92,6 @@ False positives may only pertain to it not being related to Empire, but another | 81.0 | 90 | 90 | The following behavior was identified and typically related to PowerShell-Empire on $ComputerName$ by $User$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-09-detect_mimikatz_with_powershell_script_block_logging.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-09-detect_mimikatz_with_powershell_script_block_logging.md index 8cc908c6cc..cc3c6e70c3 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-09-detect_mimikatz_with_powershell_script_block_logging.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-09-detect_mimikatz_with_powershell_script_block_logging.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging" -excerpt: "OS Credential Dumping" +excerpt: "OS Credential Dumping +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-06-09 @@ -24,7 +25,7 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) This analytic identifies common Mimikatz functions that may be identified in the script block, including `mimikatz`. This will catch the most basic use cases for Pass the Ticket, Pass the Hash and `-DumprCreds`. \ During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-06-09 @@ -86,8 +87,6 @@ False positives should be limited as the commands being identifies are quite spe | 90.0 | 90 | 100 | The following behavior was identified and typically related to MimiKatz being loaded within the context of PowerShell on $ComputerName$ by $User$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -103,6 +102,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-09-unloading_amsi_via_reflection.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-09-unloading_amsi_via_reflection.md index bafcdd5b5a..14de459a88 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-09-unloading_amsi_via_reflection.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-09-unloading_amsi_via_reflection.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Unloading AMSI via Reflection" -excerpt: "Impair Defenses" +excerpt: "Impair Defenses +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-06-09 @@ -21,10 +22,10 @@ tags: #### Description The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ -This analytic identifies the behavior of AMSI being tampered with. Implemented natively in many frameworks, the command will look similar to `SEtValuE($Null,(New-OBJEct COLlECtionS.GenerIC.HAshSEt{[StrINg]))}$ReF=[ReF].AsSeMbLY.GeTTyPe("System.Management.Automation.Amsi"+"Utils")` taken from Powershell-Empire. \ +This analytic identifies the behavior of AMSI being tampered with. Implemented natively in many frameworks, the command will look similar to `SEtValuE($Null,(New-OBJEct COLlECtionS.GenerIC.HAshSEt{[StrINg]))}$ReF=[ReF].AsSeMbLY.GeTTyPe("System.Management.Automation.Amsi"+"Utils")` taken from Powershell-Empire. \ During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-06-09 @@ -86,8 +87,6 @@ Potential for some third party applications to disable AMSI upon invocation. Fil | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | Possible AMSI Unloading via Reflection using PowerShell on $ComputerName$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -103,6 +102,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app.md index f7c233a19d..813d623191 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App" -excerpt: "File Deletion, Indicator Removal on Host" +excerpt: "File Deletion +, Indicator Removal on Host +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-06-10 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - File Deletion - - Defense Evasion - Indicator Removal on Host - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: this search is to detect execution of `cipher.exe` to clear the unallocated sectors of a specific disk. This technique was seen in some ransomware to make it impossible to forensically recover deleted files. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-06-10 @@ -96,8 +98,6 @@ administrator may execute this app to manage disk | 90.0 | 100 | 90 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to clear the unallocated sectors of a specific disk. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-disable_logs_using_wevtutil.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-disable_logs_using_wevtutil.md index 9ba31ccdc3..a25a37df58 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-disable_logs_using_wevtutil.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-disable_logs_using_wevtutil.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Disable Logs Using WevtUtil" -excerpt: "Indicator Removal on Host, Clear Windows Event Logs" +excerpt: "Indicator Removal on Host +, Clear Windows Event Logs +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-06-10 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Indicator Removal on Host - - Defense Evasion - Clear Windows Event Logs - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This search is to detect execution of wevtutil.exe to disable logs. This technique was seen in several ransomware to disable the event logs to evade alerts and detections. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-06-10 @@ -93,8 +95,6 @@ network operator may disable audit event logs for debugging purposes. | 24.0 | 30 | 80 | WevtUtil.exe used to disable Event Logging on $dest | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-permission_modification_using_takeown_app.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-permission_modification_using_takeown_app.md index 23c0b948e7..23c0cfdc37 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-permission_modification_using_takeown_app.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-permission_modification_using_takeown_app.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Permission Modification using Takeown App" -excerpt: "File and Directory Permissions Modification" +excerpt: "File and Directory Permissions Modification +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-06-10 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This search is to detect a modification of file or directory permission using takeown.exe windows app. This technique was seen in some ransomware that take the ownership of a folder or files to encrypt or delete it. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-06-10 @@ -89,8 +90,6 @@ takeown.exe is a normal windows application that may used by network operator. | 56.0 | 70 | 80 | A suspicious of execution of $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ and commandline $process$ to modify permission of directory or files in host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -103,6 +102,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_creating_thread_mutex.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_creating_thread_mutex.md index 54b524c81c..38a1d49cc8 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_creating_thread_mutex.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_creating_thread_mutex.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Powershell Creating Thread Mutex" -excerpt: "Obfuscated Files or Information, Indicator Removal from Tools" +excerpt: "Obfuscated Files or Information +, Indicator Removal from Tools +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-06-10 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Obfuscated Files or Information - - Defense Evasion - Indicator Removal from Tools - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -24,7 +26,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is using the `mutex` function. This function is commonly seen in some obfuscated PowerShell scripts to make sure that only one instance of there process is running on a compromise machine. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-06-10 @@ -87,8 +89,6 @@ powershell developer may used this function in their script for instance checkin | 40.0 | 50 | 80 | A suspicious powershell script contains Thread Mutex in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_domain_enumeration.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_domain_enumeration.md index 549c86e31d..f203e027bc 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_domain_enumeration.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_domain_enumeration.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "PowerShell Domain Enumeration" -excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter, PowerShell" +excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter +, PowerShell +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-06-10 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Command and Scripting Interpreter - - Execution - PowerShell - Execution + - Execution - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -26,7 +28,7 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) This analytic identifies specific PowerShell modules typically used to enumerate an organizations domain or users. \ During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-06-10 @@ -88,8 +90,6 @@ It is possible there will be false positives, filter as needed. | 42.0 | 60 | 70 | A suspicious powershell script contains domain enumeration command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_system_reflection_assembly.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_system_reflection_assembly.md index 6e6496fc80..87fa5fb44b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_system_reflection_assembly.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_system_reflection_assembly.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via System Reflection Assembly" -excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter, PowerShell" +excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter +, PowerShell +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-06-10 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Command and Scripting Interpreter - - Execution - PowerShell - Execution + - Execution - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -26,7 +28,7 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) This analytic identifies the use of PowerShell loading .net assembly via reflection. This is commonly found in malicious PowerShell usage, including Empire and Cobalt Strike. In addition, the `load(` value may be modifed by removing `(` and it will identify more events to review. \ During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-06-10 @@ -90,8 +92,6 @@ False positives should be limited as day to day scripts do not use this method. | 56.0 | 70 | 80 | A suspicious powershell script contains reflective class assembly command in $Message$ to load .net code in memory with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_processing_stream_of_data.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_processing_stream_of_data.md index 3ddd554733..5ea3a87f7b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_processing_stream_of_data.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_processing_stream_of_data.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Powershell Processing Stream Of Data" -excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter, PowerShell" +excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter +, PowerShell +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-06-10 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Command and Scripting Interpreter - - Execution - PowerShell - Execution + - Execution - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -24,7 +26,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is processing compressed stream data. This is typically found in obfuscated PowerShell or PowerShell executing embedded .NET or binary files that are stream flattened and will be deflated durnig execution. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-06-10 @@ -88,8 +90,6 @@ powershell may used this function to process compressed data. | 40.0 | 50 | 80 | A suspicious powershell script contains stream command in $Message$ commonly for processing compressed or to decompressed binary file with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store.md index 8f83bb0ddd..d822dbe01e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Powershell Using memory As Backing Store" -excerpt: "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information" +excerpt: "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-06-10 @@ -22,7 +23,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is using memory stream as new object backstore. The malicious PowerShell script will contain stream flate data and will be decompressed in memory to run or drop the actual payload. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-06-10 @@ -83,8 +84,6 @@ powershell may used this function to store out object into memory. | 40.0 | 50 | 80 | A suspicious powershell script contains memorystream command in $Message$ as new object backstore with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -101,6 +100,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-prevent_automatic_repair_mode_using_bcdedit.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-prevent_automatic_repair_mode_using_bcdedit.md index 255a8f6b35..1efc423d08 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-prevent_automatic_repair_mode_using_bcdedit.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-prevent_automatic_repair_mode_using_bcdedit.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit" -excerpt: "Inhibit System Recovery" +excerpt: "Inhibit System Recovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-06-10 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This search is to detect a suspicious bcdedit.exe execution to ignore all failures. This technique was used by ransomware to prevent the compromise machine automatically boot in repair mode. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-06-10 @@ -89,8 +90,6 @@ Administrators may modify the boot configuration ignore failure during testing a | 56.0 | 70 | 80 | A suspicious process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ contains commandline $process$ to ignore all bcdedit execution failure in host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -103,6 +102,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi.md index 81a0d8d5bc..a2b12540fe 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI" -excerpt: "Gather Victim Host Information" +excerpt: "Gather Victim Host Information +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-06-10 @@ -22,7 +23,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 performing checks to identify anti-virus products installed on the endpoint. This technique is commonly found in malware and APT events where the adversary will map all running security applications or services. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-06-10 @@ -84,8 +85,6 @@ network administrator may used this command for checking purposes | 56.0 | 70 | 80 | A suspicious powershell script contains AV recon command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -102,6 +101,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-recon_using_wmi_class.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-recon_using_wmi_class.md index 5690b9ad1f..26228e4342 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-recon_using_wmi_class.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-recon_using_wmi_class.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Recon Using WMI Class" -excerpt: "Gather Victim Host Information" +excerpt: "Gather Victim Host Information +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-06-10 @@ -22,7 +23,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell via EventCode 4104, where WMI is performing an event query looking for running processes or running services. This technique is commonly found where the adversary will identify services and system information on the compromised machine. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-06-10 @@ -83,8 +84,6 @@ network administrator may used this command for checking purposes | 60.0 | 75 | 80 | A suspicious powershell script contains host recon command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -101,6 +100,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-14-wmi_recon_running_process_or_services.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-14-wmi_recon_running_process_or_services.md index 7c5d2b675f..9222021cce 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-14-wmi_recon_running_process_or_services.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-14-wmi_recon_running_process_or_services.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "WMI Recon Running Process Or Services" -excerpt: "Gather Victim Host Information" +excerpt: "Gather Victim Host Information +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-06-14 @@ -22,7 +23,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104, where WMI is performing an event query looking for running processes or running services. This technique is commonly found in malware and APT events where the adversary will map all running security applications or services on the compromised machine. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-06-14 @@ -83,8 +84,6 @@ network administrator may used this command for checking purposes | 30.0 | 30 | 100 | Suspicious powerShell script execution by $user$ on $ComputerName$ via EventCode 4104, where WMI is performing an event query looking for running processes or running services | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -100,6 +99,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-16-detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-16-detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence.md index f9da351d22..6907f4972a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-16-detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-16-detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Detect WMI Event Subscription Persistence" -excerpt: "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription, Event Triggered Execution" +excerpt: "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription +, Event Triggered Execution +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-06-16 @@ -8,11 +10,11 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription - - Privilege Escalation - - Persistence - Event Triggered Execution + - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -31,7 +33,7 @@ All event subscriptions have three components \ 1. Binding - Registers a filter to a consumer. EventID equals 21 \ Monitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding. It may be pertinent to review all 3 to identify the flow of execution. In addition, EventCode 4104 may assist with any other PowerShell script usage that registered the subscription. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-06-16 @@ -43,9 +45,9 @@ Monitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToCons | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1546.003](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/003/) | Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription | Privilege Escalation, Persistence | +| [T1546.003](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/003/) | Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription | Persistence, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1546](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/) | Event Triggered Execution | Privilege Escalation, Persistence | +| [T1546](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/) | Event Triggered Execution | Persistence, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -59,8 +61,8 @@ Monitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToCons #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -75,7 +77,7 @@ Note that `detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence_filter` is a empty macro by To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with that provide WMI Event Subscription from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA and have enabled EventID 19, 20 and 21. Tune and filter known good to limit the volume. #### Known False Positives -It is possible some applications will create a consumer and may be required to be filtered. For tuning, add any additional LOLBin's for further depth of coverage. +It is possible some applications will create a consumer and may be required to be filtered. For tuning, add any additional LOLBin's for further depth of coverage. #### Associated Analytic story * [Suspicious WMI Use](/stories/suspicious_wmi_use) @@ -93,8 +95,6 @@ It is possible some applications will create a consumer and may be required to b | 63.0 | 70 | 90 | Possible malicious WMI Subscription created on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-17-suspicious_event_log_service_behavior.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-17-suspicious_event_log_service_behavior.md index 805acf7082..06461666e1 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-17-suspicious_event_log_service_behavior.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-17-suspicious_event_log_service_behavior.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior" -excerpt: "Indicator Removal on Host, Clear Windows Event Logs" +excerpt: "Indicator Removal on Host +, Clear Windows Event Logs +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-06-17 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Indicator Removal on Host - - Defense Evasion - Clear Windows Event Logs - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -24,7 +26,7 @@ tags: The following analytic utilizes Windows Event ID 1100 to identify when Windows event log service is shutdown. Note that this is a voluminous analytic that will require tuning or restricted to specific endpoints based on criticality. This event generates every time Windows Event Log service has shut down. It also generates during normal system shutdown. During triage, based on time of day and user, determine if this was planned. If not planned, follow through with reviewing parallel alerts and other data sources to determine what else may have occurred. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-06-17 @@ -52,8 +54,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes Windows Event ID 1100 to identify when Windows e #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `suspicious_event_log_service_behavior_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -87,8 +89,6 @@ It is possible the Event Logging service gets shut down due to system errors or | 9.0 | 30 | 30 | The Windows Event Log Service shutdown on $ComputerName$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-22-execute_javascript_with_jscript_com_clsid.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-22-execute_javascript_with_jscript_com_clsid.md index d236afcf2f..295654979b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-22-execute_javascript_with_jscript_com_clsid.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-22-execute_javascript_with_jscript_com_clsid.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID" -excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter, Visual Basic" +excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter +, Visual Basic +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-06-22 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Command and Scripting Interpreter - - Execution - Visual Basic - Execution + - Execution - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This analytic will identify suspicious process of cscript.exe where it tries to execute javascript using jscript.encode CLSID (COM OBJ). This technique was seen in ransomware (reddot ransomware) where it execute javascript with this com object with combination of amsi disabling technique. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-06-22 @@ -92,8 +94,6 @@ unknown | 56.0 | 80 | 70 | Suspicious process of cscript.exe with a parent process $parent_process_name$ where it tries to execute javascript using jscript.encode CLSID (COM OBJ), detected on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-22-powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-22-powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature.md index 119e29a6f6..63f6f6cbd0 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-22-powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-22-powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature" -excerpt: "Obfuscated Files or Information, Indicator Removal from Tools" +excerpt: "Obfuscated Files or Information +, Indicator Removal from Tools +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-06-22 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Obfuscated Files or Information - - Defense Evasion - Indicator Removal from Tools - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -23,9 +25,9 @@ tags: #### Description -This search is to detect a suspicious enabling of smb1protocol through "powershell.exe". This technique was seen in some ransomware (like reddot) where it enable smb share to do the lateral movement and encrypt other files within the compromise network system. +This search is to detect a suspicious enabling of smb1protocol through "powershell.exe". This technique was seen in some ransomware (like reddot) where it enable smb share to do the lateral movement and encrypt other files within the compromise network system. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-06-22 @@ -82,8 +84,12 @@ network operator may enable or disable this windows feature. +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -97,6 +103,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-powershell.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-22-recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-22-recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd.md index 6d68aa0244..8bd6cc0bc8 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-22-recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-22-recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD" -excerpt: "File Deletion, Indicator Removal on Host" +excerpt: "File Deletion +, Indicator Removal on Host +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-06-22 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - File Deletion - - Defense Evasion - Indicator Removal on Host - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This search is to detect a suspicious commandline designed to delete files or directory recursive using batch command. This technique was seen in ransomware (reddot) where it it tries to delete the files in recycle bin to impaire user from recovering deleted files. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-06-22 @@ -54,9 +56,9 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious commandline designed to delete files or di #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) Note that `recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -90,8 +92,12 @@ network operator may use this batch command to delete recursively a directory or +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -105,6 +111,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-23-allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-23-allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall.md index fbac458768..3d8a215a8b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-23-allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-23-allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall" -excerpt: "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall, Impair Defenses" +excerpt: "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall +, Impair Defenses +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-06-23 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall - - Defense Evasion - Impair Defenses - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This search is to detect a suspicious modification of firewall to allow file and printer sharing. This technique was seen in ransomware to be able to discover more machine connected to the compromised host to encrypt more files -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-06-23 @@ -55,8 +57,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious modification of firewall to allow file and #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [process_netsh](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_netsh.yml) -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -90,8 +92,12 @@ network admin may modify this firewall feature that may cause this rule to be tr +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -106,6 +112,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-23-allow_network_discovery_in_firewall.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-23-allow_network_discovery_in_firewall.md index 01fd7fa0f4..79a8078d12 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-23-allow_network_discovery_in_firewall.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-23-allow_network_discovery_in_firewall.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Allow Network Discovery In Firewall" -excerpt: "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall, Impair Defenses" +excerpt: "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall +, Impair Defenses +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-06-23 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall - - Defense Evasion - Impair Defenses - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This search is to detect a suspicious modification to the firewall to allow network discovery on a machine. This technique was seen in couple of ransomware (revil, reddot) to discover other machine connected to the compromised host to encrypt more files. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-06-23 @@ -55,8 +57,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious modification to the firewall to allow netw #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [process_netsh](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_netsh.yml) -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `allow_network_discovery_in_firewall_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -91,8 +93,12 @@ network admin may modify this firewall feature that may cause this rule to be tr +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -107,6 +113,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-24-excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-24-excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility.md index fdc2f0ded4..36df18d28d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-24-excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-24-excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility" -excerpt: "System Services, Service Execution" +excerpt: "System Services +, Service Execution +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-06-24 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - System Services - - Execution - Service Execution - Execution + - Execution - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This search is to detect a suspicious excessive usage of sc.exe in a host machine. This technique was seen in several ransomware , xmrig and other malware to create, modify, delete or disable a service may related to security application or to gain privilege escalation. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-06-24 @@ -58,8 +60,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious excessive usage of sc.exe in a host machin #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -85,8 +87,12 @@ excessive execution of sc.exe is quite suspicious since it can modify or execute +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -100,6 +106,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-25-excessive_number_of_service_control_start_as_disabled.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-25-excessive_number_of_service_control_start_as_disabled.md index 94cf2a5f87..bd453e4f23 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-25-excessive_number_of_service_control_start_as_disabled.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-25-excessive_number_of_service_control_start_as_disabled.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Excessive number of service control start as disabled" -excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools, Impair Defenses" +excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools +, Impair Defenses +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-06-25 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Disable or Modify Tools - - Defense Evasion - Impair Defenses - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This detection targets behaviors observed when threat actors have used sc.exe to modify services. We observed malware in a honey pot spawning numerous sc.exe processes in a short period of time, presumably to impair defenses, possibly to block others from compromising the same machine. This detection will alert when we see both an excessive number of sc.exe processes launched with specific commandline arguments to disable the start of certain services. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-06-25 @@ -72,7 +74,7 @@ Note that `excessive_number_of_service_control_start_as_disabled_filter` is a em #### How To Implement -You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The complete process name with command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. +You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The complete process name with command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. #### Known False Positives Legitimate programs and administrators will execute sc.exe with the start disabled flag. It is possible, but unlikely from the telemetry of normal Windows operation we observed, that sc.exe will be called more than seven times in a short period of time. @@ -93,8 +95,6 @@ Legitimate programs and administrators will execute sc.exe with the start disabl | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | An excessive amount of $process_name$ was executed on $dest$ attempting to disable services. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/sc_service_start_disabled/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/sc_service_start_disabled/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-print_spooler_adding_a_printer_driver.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-print_spooler_adding_a_printer_driver.md index 2315e1b8c7..c7fe727983 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-print_spooler_adding_a_printer_driver.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-print_spooler_adding_a_printer_driver.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Print Spooler Adding A Printer Driver" -excerpt: "Print Processors, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution" +excerpt: "Print Processors +, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-07-01 @@ -8,16 +10,14 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Print Processors + - Boot or Logon Autostart Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Boot or Logon Autostart Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - CVE-2021-34527 - - CVE-2021-1675 - Endpoint --- @@ -28,10 +28,10 @@ tags: #### Description The following analytic identifies new printer drivers being load by utilizing the Windows PrintService operational logs, EventCode 316. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. \ -Within the proof of concept code, the following event will occur - "Printer driver 1234 for Windows x64 Version-3 was added or updated. Files:- UNIDRV.DLL, kernelbase.dll, evil.dll. No user action is required." \ +Within the proof of concept code, the following event will occur - "Printer driver 1234 for Windows x64 Version-3 was added or updated. Files:- UNIDRV.DLL, kernelbase.dll, evil.dll. No user action is required." \ During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events and review the source of where the exploitation began. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-07-01 @@ -94,16 +94,6 @@ Unknown. This may require filtering. | 72.0 | 80 | 90 | Suspicious print driver was loaded on endpoint $ComputerName$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - - -#### CVE - -| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | -| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [CVE-2021-34527](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34527) | Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | 9.0 | -| [CVE-2021-1675](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-1675) | Windows Print Spooler Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | 9.3 | - #### Reference @@ -119,6 +109,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-printservice_operational.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-printservice_operational.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-print_spooler_failed_to_load_a_plug-in.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-print_spooler_failed_to_load_a_plug-in.md index 23f91b514b..387d32cc46 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-print_spooler_failed_to_load_a_plug-in.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-print_spooler_failed_to_load_a_plug-in.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Print Spooler Failed to Load a Plug-in" -excerpt: "Print Processors, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution" +excerpt: "Print Processors +, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-07-01 @@ -8,16 +10,14 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Print Processors + - Boot or Logon Autostart Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Boot or Logon Autostart Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - CVE-2021-34527 - - CVE-2021-1675 - Endpoint --- @@ -28,11 +28,11 @@ tags: #### Description The following analytic identifies driver load errors utilizing the Windows PrintService Admin logs. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. \ -Within the proof of concept code, the following error will occur - "The print spooler failed to load a plug-in module C:\Windows\system32\spool\DRIVERS\x64\3\meterpreter.dll, error code 0x45A. See the event user data for context information." \ +Within the proof of concept code, the following error will occur - "The print spooler failed to load a plug-in module C:\Windows\system32\spool\DRIVERS\x64\3\meterpreter.dll, error code 0x45A. See the event user data for context information." \ The analytic is based on file path and failure to load the plug-in. \ During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-07-01 @@ -95,16 +95,6 @@ False positives are unknown and filtering may be required. | 72.0 | 80 | 90 | Suspicious printer spooler errors have occured on endpoint $ComputerName$ with EventCode $EventCode$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - - -#### CVE - -| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | -| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [CVE-2021-34527](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34527) | Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | 9.0 | -| [CVE-2021-1675](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-1675) | Windows Print Spooler Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | 9.3 | - #### Reference @@ -121,5 +111,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/endpoint/print_spooler_failed_to_load_a_plug-in.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_spawning_rundll32.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_spawning_rundll32.md index bbe31b19cd..ef946d2825 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_spawning_rundll32.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_spawning_rundll32.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Spoolsv Spawning Rundll32" -excerpt: "Print Processors, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution" +excerpt: "Print Processors +, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-07-01 @@ -8,15 +10,14 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Print Processors + - Boot or Logon Autostart Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Boot or Logon Autostart Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - CVE-2021-34527 - Endpoint --- @@ -28,7 +29,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies a suspicious child process, `rundll32.exe`, with no command-line arguments being spawned from `spoolsv.exe`. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. Typically, this is not normal behavior for `spoolsv.exe` to spawn a process. During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-07-01 @@ -100,15 +101,6 @@ Limited false positives have been identified. There are limited instances where | 72.0 | 80 | 90 | $parent_process$ has spawned $process_name$ on endpoint $ComputerName$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - - -#### CVE - -| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | -| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [CVE-2021-34527](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34527) | Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | 9.0 | - #### Reference @@ -123,6 +115,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules.md index 15d5421041..fe2e269b19 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules" -excerpt: "Print Processors, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution" +excerpt: "Print Processors +, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-07-01 @@ -8,15 +10,14 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Print Processors + - Boot or Logon Autostart Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Boot or Logon Autostart Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - CVE-2021-34527 - Endpoint --- @@ -28,7 +29,7 @@ tags: This search is to detect suspicious loading of dll in specific path relative to printnightmare exploitation. In this search we try to detect the loaded modules made by spoolsv.exe after the exploitation. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-07-01 @@ -57,8 +58,8 @@ This search is to detect suspicious loading of dll in specific path relative to #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -92,15 +93,6 @@ unknown | 72.0 | 80 | 90 | $Image$ with process id $process_id$ has loaded a driver from $ImageLoaded$ on endpoint $Computer$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - - -#### CVE - -| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | -| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [CVE-2021-34527](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34527) | Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | 9.0 | - #### Reference @@ -113,6 +105,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_suspicious_process_access.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_suspicious_process_access.md index 4b4395f9ca..494b02a59a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_suspicious_process_access.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_suspicious_process_access.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Spoolsv Suspicious Process Access" -excerpt: "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation" +excerpt: "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-07-01 @@ -12,7 +13,6 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - CVE-2021-34527 - Endpoint --- @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This analytic identifies a suspicious behavior related to PrintNightmare, or CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675), to gain privilege escalation on the vulnerable machine. This exploit attacks a critical Windows Print Spooler Vulnerability to elevate privilege. This detection is to look for suspicious process access made by the spoolsv.exe that may related to the attack. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-07-01 @@ -50,8 +50,8 @@ This analytic identifies a suspicious behavior related to PrintNightmare, or CVE #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `spoolsv_suspicious_process_access_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -86,15 +86,6 @@ Unknown. Filter as needed. | 72.0 | 80 | 90 | $SourceImage$ was GrantedAccess open access to $TargetImage$ on endpoint $Computer$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - - -#### CVE - -| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | -| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [CVE-2021-34527](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34527) | Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | 9.0 | - #### Reference @@ -110,6 +101,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_writing_a_dll.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_writing_a_dll.md index 67347664e8..e7672e216f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_writing_a_dll.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_writing_a_dll.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Spoolsv Writing a DLL" -excerpt: "Print Processors, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution" +excerpt: "Print Processors +, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-07-01 @@ -8,15 +10,14 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Print Processors + - Boot or Logon Autostart Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Boot or Logon Autostart Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - CVE-2021-34527 - Endpoint --- @@ -28,7 +29,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies a `.dll` being written by `spoolsv.exe`. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. Typically, this is not normal behavior for `spoolsv.exe` to write a `.dll`. Current POC code used will write the suspicious DLL to disk within a path of `\spool\drivers\x64\`. During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-07-01 @@ -96,18 +97,9 @@ Unknown. | Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| -| 72.0 | 80 | 90 | $process_name$ has been identified writing dll's to $file_path$ on endpoint $dest$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare. | +| 72.0 | 80 | 90 | $process_name$ has been identified writing dll's to $file_path$ on endpoint $dest$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - - -#### CVE - -| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | -| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [CVE-2021-34527](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34527) | Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | 9.0 | - #### Reference @@ -122,6 +114,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_writing_a_dll_-_sysmon.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_writing_a_dll_-_sysmon.md index 9f5195caee..5aa5d77a7e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_writing_a_dll_-_sysmon.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_writing_a_dll_-_sysmon.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Sysmon" -excerpt: "Print Processors, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution" +excerpt: "Print Processors +, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-07-01 @@ -8,15 +10,14 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Print Processors + - Boot or Logon Autostart Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Boot or Logon Autostart Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - CVE-2021-34527 - Endpoint --- @@ -28,7 +29,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies a `.dll` being written by `spoolsv.exe`. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously(CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. Typically, this is not normal behavior for `spoolsv.exe` to write a `.dll`. Current POC code used will write the suspicious DLL to disk within a path of `\spool\drivers\x64\`. During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-07-01 @@ -56,8 +57,8 @@ The following analytic identifies a `.dll` being written by `spoolsv.exe`. This #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `spoolsv_writing_a_dll_-_sysmon_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -90,18 +91,9 @@ Limited false positives. Filter as needed. | Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| -| 72.0 | 80 | 90 | $process_name$ has been identified writing dll's to $file_path$ on endpoint $dest$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare. | +| 72.0 | 80 | 90 | $process_name$ has been identified writing dll's to $file_path$ on endpoint $dest$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - - -#### CVE - -| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | -| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [CVE-2021-34527](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34527) | Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | 9.0 | - #### Reference @@ -117,6 +109,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-05-msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-05-msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading.md index 78f276378c..5b94d55a6b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-05-msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-05-msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading" -excerpt: "DLL Side-Loading, Hijack Execution Flow" +excerpt: "DLL Side-Loading +, Hijack Execution Flow +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-07-05 @@ -8,13 +10,13 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - DLL Side-Loading - - Persistence - - Privilege Escalation - - Defense Evasion - Hijack Execution Flow + - Defense Evasion - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - Defense Evasion + - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -29,7 +31,7 @@ tags: This search is to detect a suspicious creation of msmpeng.exe or mpsvc.dll in non default windows defender folder. This technique was seen couple days ago with revil ransomware in Kaseya Supply chain. The approach is to drop an old version of msmpeng.exe to load the actual payload name as mspvc.dll which will load the revil ransomware to the compromise machine -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-07-05 @@ -41,9 +43,9 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious creation of msmpeng.exe or mpsvc.dll in no | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1574.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/002/) | DLL Side-Loading | Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1574.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/002/) | DLL Side-Loading | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1574](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/) | Hijack Execution Flow | Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1574](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/) | Hijack Execution Flow | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -88,8 +90,12 @@ quite minimal false positive expected. +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -103,6 +109,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets//malware/revil/msmpeng_side/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets//malware/revil/msmpeng_side/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-05-powershell_disable_security_monitoring.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-05-powershell_disable_security_monitoring.md index e9706d7112..f413599d67 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-05-powershell_disable_security_monitoring.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-05-powershell_disable_security_monitoring.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Powershell Disable Security Monitoring" -excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools, Impair Defenses" +excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools +, Impair Defenses +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-07-05 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Disable or Modify Tools - - Defense Evasion - Impair Defenses - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This search is to identifies a modification in registry to disable the windows denfender real time behavior monitoring. This event or technique is commonly seen in RAT, bot, or Trojan to disable AV to evade detections. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-07-05 @@ -54,9 +56,9 @@ This search is to identifies a modification in registry to disable the windows d #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) Note that `powershell_disable_security_monitoring_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -91,8 +93,12 @@ Limited false positives. However, tune based on scripts that may perform this ac +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -106,6 +112,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/pwh_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/pwh_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-12-uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-12-uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll.md index e9d1f804a4..0beebfd7fd 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-12-uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-12-uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll" -excerpt: "Bypass User Account Control, Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism" +excerpt: "Bypass User Account Control +, Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-07-12 @@ -8,11 +10,11 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Bypass User Account Control - - Privilege Escalation - - Defense Evasion - Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism + - Defense Evasion - Privilege Escalation - Defense Evasion + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ tags: This search is to detect a suspicious loaded unsigned dll by MMC.exe application. This technique is commonly seen in attacker that tries to bypassed UAC feature or gain privilege escalation. This is done by modifying some CLSID registry that will trigger the mmc.exe to load the dll path -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-07-12 @@ -39,9 +41,9 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious loaded unsigned dll by MMC.exe application | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1548.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/) | Bypass User Account Control | Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1548.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/) | Bypass User Account Control | Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1548](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1548](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -55,8 +57,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious loaded unsigned dll by MMC.exe application #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -94,8 +96,6 @@ unknown. all of the dll loaded by mmc.exe is microsoft signed dll. | 63.0 | 70 | 90 | Suspicious unsigned $ImageLoaded$ loaded by $Image$ on endpoint $Computer$ with EventCode $EventCode$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon2.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon2.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-13-cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-13-cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.md index 194840ecde..b5f0ef8b90 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-13-cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-13-cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User" -excerpt: "Cloud Accounts, Valid Accounts" +excerpt: "Cloud Accounts +, Valid Accounts +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2021-07-13 @@ -8,16 +10,15 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Cloud Accounts - - Defense Evasion - - Persistence - - Privilege Escalation - - Initial Access - Valid Accounts - Defense Evasion + - Initial Access - Persistence - Privilege Escalation + - Defense Evasion - Initial Access - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS + - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -32,8 +33,8 @@ tags: This search looks for cloud compute instances created by users who have not created them before. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Security Analytics for AWS, Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Change](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Change) - **Last Updated**: 2021-07-13 - **Author**: Rico Valdez, Splunk @@ -44,9 +45,9 @@ This search looks for cloud compute instances created by users who have not crea | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1078.004](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/) | Cloud Accounts | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access | +| [T1078.004](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/) | Cloud Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access | +| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -74,7 +75,7 @@ Note that `cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user_filter` is a #### Lookups The SPL above uses the following Lookups: -* [previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user.yml) with [data]() +* [previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/lookups/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user.csv) #### Required field * _time @@ -85,16 +86,17 @@ The SPL above uses the following Lookups: #### How To Implement -You must be ingesting the appropriate cloud-infrastructure logs Run the "Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User" support search to create of baseline of previously seen users. +You must be ingesting the appropriate cloud-infrastructure logs Run the "Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User" support search to create of baseline of previously seen users. #### Known False Positives -It's possible that a user will start to create compute instances for the first time, for any number of reasons. Verify with the user launching instances that this is the intended behavior. +It's possible that a user will start to create compute instances for the first time, for any number of reasons. Verify with the user launching instances that this is the intended behavior. #### Associated Analytic story * [Cloud Cryptomining](/stories/cloud_cryptomining) #### Kill Chain Phase +* Actions on Objectives @@ -105,8 +107,6 @@ It's possible that a user will start to create compute instances for the fir | 18.0 | 30 | 60 | User $user$ is creating a new instance $dest$ for the first time | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-aws_createaccesskey.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-aws_createaccesskey.md index 44f1ca20d7..b423035ff6 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-aws_createaccesskey.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-aws_createaccesskey.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "AWS CreateAccessKey" -excerpt: "Cloud Account, Create Account" +excerpt: "Cloud Account +, Create Account +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2021-07-19 @@ -8,10 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Cloud Account - - Persistence - Create Account - Persistence - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS + - Persistence - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,8 +26,8 @@ tags: This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user A who has already permission to create access keys, makes an API call to create access keys for another user B. Attackers have been know to use this technique for Privilege Escalation in case new victim(user B) has more permissions than old victim(user B) -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Security Analytics for AWS, Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-07-19 - **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk @@ -89,8 +90,6 @@ While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin | 63.0 | 70 | 90 | User $user_arn$ is attempting to create access keys for $requestParameters.userName$ from this IP $src$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -104,6 +103,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_createaccesskey/aws_cloudtrail_events.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_createaccesskey/aws_cloudtrail_events.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-aws_createloginprofile.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-aws_createloginprofile.md index 40e193bd7d..ecfba44a84 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-aws_createloginprofile.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-aws_createloginprofile.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "AWS CreateLoginProfile" -excerpt: "Cloud Account, Create Account" +excerpt: "Cloud Account +, Create Account +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2021-07-19 @@ -8,10 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Cloud Account - - Persistence - Create Account - Persistence - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS + - Persistence - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,8 +26,8 @@ tags: This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user A(victim A) creates a login profile for user B, followed by a AWS Console login event from user B from the same src_ip as user B. This correlated event can be indicative of privilege escalation since both events happened from the same src_ip -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Security Analytics for AWS, Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-07-19 - **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk @@ -93,8 +94,6 @@ While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin | 72.0 | 90 | 80 | User $user_arn$ is attempting to create a login profile for $requestParameters.userName$ and did a console login from this IP $src_ip$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -108,6 +107,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_createloginprofile/aws_cloudtrail_events.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_createloginprofile/aws_cloudtrail_events.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-aws_updateloginprofile.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-aws_updateloginprofile.md index 979d3810dc..724ad761bf 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-aws_updateloginprofile.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-aws_updateloginprofile.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "AWS UpdateLoginProfile" -excerpt: "Cloud Account, Create Account" +excerpt: "Cloud Account +, Create Account +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2021-07-19 @@ -8,10 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Cloud Account - - Persistence - Create Account - Persistence - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS + - Persistence - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,8 +26,8 @@ tags: This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user A who has already permission to update login profile, makes an API call to update login profile for another user B . Attackers have been know to use this technique for Privilege Escalation in case new victim(user B) has more permissions than old victim(user B) -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Security Analytics for AWS, Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-07-19 - **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk @@ -89,8 +90,6 @@ While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin | 30.0 | 50 | 60 | From IP address $sourceIPAddress$, user agent $userAgent$ has trigged an event $eventName$ for updating the existing login profile, potentially giving user $user_arn$ more access privilleges | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -104,6 +103,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_updateloginprofile/aws_cloudtrail_events.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_updateloginprofile/aws_cloudtrail_events.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-detect_new_open_s3_buckets.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-detect_new_open_s3_buckets.md index 2fe745f183..3ac20d434f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-detect_new_open_s3_buckets.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-detect_new_open_s3_buckets.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Detect New Open S3 buckets" -excerpt: "Data from Cloud Storage Object" +excerpt: "Data from Cloud Storage Object +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2021-07-19 @@ -9,7 +10,6 @@ toc_label: "" tags: - Data from Cloud Storage Object - Collection - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -23,8 +23,8 @@ tags: This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public S3 bucket. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Security Analytics for AWS, Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-07-19 - **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk @@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ Note that `detect_new_open_s3_buckets_filter` is a empty macro by default. It al You must install the AWS App for Splunk. #### Known False Positives -While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to the "All Users" group. +While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to the "All Users" group. #### Associated Analytic story * [Suspicious AWS S3 Activities](/stories/suspicious_aws_s3_activities) @@ -97,8 +97,6 @@ While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin | 48.0 | 60 | 80 | User $user_arn$ has created an open/public bucket $bucketName$ with the following permissions $permission$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -108,6 +106,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1530/aws_s3_public_bucket/aws_cloudtrail_events.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1530/aws_s3_public_bucket/aws_cloudtrail_events.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.md index 7a9afa0ef8..9e9c2b56d2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI" -excerpt: "Data from Cloud Storage Object" +excerpt: "Data from Cloud Storage Object +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2021-07-19 @@ -9,7 +10,6 @@ toc_label: "" tags: - Data from Cloud Storage Object - Collection - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -23,8 +23,8 @@ tags: This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public S3 bucket over the aws cli. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Security Analytics for AWS, Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-07-19 - **Author**: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk @@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ Note that `detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli_filter` is a empty macro by d #### Known False Positives -While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to the "All Users" group. +While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to the "All Users" group. #### Associated Analytic story * [Suspicious AWS S3 Activities](/stories/suspicious_aws_s3_activities) @@ -93,8 +93,6 @@ While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin | 48.0 | 60 | 80 | User $userIdentity.userName$ has created an open/public bucket $bucketName$ using AWS CLI with the following permissions - $requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read$ $requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read-acp$ $requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write$ $requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write-acp$ $requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-full-control$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -104,6 +102,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1530/aws_s3_public_bucket/aws_cloudtrail_events.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1530/aws_s3_public_bucket/aws_cloudtrail_events.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process.md index 95bfaaa617..992258d4b8 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process" -excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution, Mshta" +excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution +, Mshta +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-07-19 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Signed Binary Proxy Execution - - Defense Evasion - Mshta - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This search is to detect a suspicious mshta.exe process that spawn rundll32 or regsvr32 child process. This technique was seen in several malware nowadays like trickbot to load its initial .dll stage loader to execute and download the the actual trickbot payload. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-07-19 @@ -54,10 +56,10 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious mshta.exe process that spawn rundll32 or r #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_regsvr32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_regsvr32.yml) * [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [process_regsvr32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_regsvr32.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -99,8 +101,6 @@ limitted. this anomaly behavior is not commonly seen in clean host. | 56.0 | 70 | 80 | a mshta parent process $parent_process_name$ spawn child process $process_name$ in host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/spear_phish/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/spear_phish/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-office_product_spawn_cmd_process.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-office_product_spawn_cmd_process.md index 795478bfdb..a5deef5639 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-office_product_spawn_cmd_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-office_product_spawn_cmd_process.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Office Product Spawn CMD Process" -excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution, Mshta" +excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution +, Mshta +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-07-19 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Signed Binary Proxy Execution - - Defense Evasion - Mshta - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: this search is to detect a suspicious office product process that spawn cmd child process. This is commonly seen in a ms office product having macro to execute shell command to download or execute malicious lolbin relative to its malicious code. This is seen in trickbot spear phishing doc where it execute shell cmd to run mshta payload. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-07-19 @@ -54,9 +56,9 @@ this search is to detect a suspicious office product process that spawn cmd chil #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) Note that `office_product_spawn_cmd_process_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -97,8 +99,6 @@ IT or network admin may create an document automation that will run shell script | 56.0 | 70 | 80 | an office product parent process $parent_process_name$ spawn child process $process_name$ in host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/spear_phish/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/spear_phish/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-20-detect_shared_ec2_snapshot.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-20-detect_shared_ec2_snapshot.md index 5b7a56a807..97258bfee8 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-20-detect_shared_ec2_snapshot.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-20-detect_shared_ec2_snapshot.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Detect shared ec2 snapshot" -excerpt: "Transfer Data to Cloud Account" +excerpt: "Transfer Data to Cloud Account +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2021-07-20 @@ -9,7 +10,6 @@ toc_label: "" tags: - Transfer Data to Cloud Account - Exfiltration - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -23,8 +23,8 @@ tags: The following analytic utilizes AWS CloudTrail events to identify when an EC2 snapshot permissions are modified to be shared with a different AWS account. This method is used by adversaries to exfiltrate the EC2 snapshot. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Security Analytics for AWS, Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-07-20 - **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk @@ -89,8 +89,6 @@ It is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately shared a snapshot with others | 48.0 | 60 | 80 | AWS EC2 snapshot from account $aws_account_id$ is shared with $requested_account_id$ by user $user_arn$ from $src_ip$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -103,6 +101,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1537/aws_snapshot_exfil/aws_cloudtrail_events.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1537/aws_snapshot_exfil/aws_cloudtrail_events.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-21-detect_copy_of_shadowcopy_with_script_block_logging.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-21-detect_copy_of_shadowcopy_with_script_block_logging.md index 081a8e2250..c5e37a49a7 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-21-detect_copy_of_shadowcopy_with_script_block_logging.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-21-detect_copy_of_shadowcopy_with_script_block_logging.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Detect Copy of ShadowCopy with Script Block Logging" -excerpt: "Security Account Manager, OS Credential Dumping" +excerpt: "Security Account Manager +, OS Credential Dumping +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-07-21 @@ -8,13 +10,12 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Security Account Manager - - Credential Access - OS Credential Dumping - Credential Access + - Credential Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - CVE-2021-36934 --- @@ -27,7 +28,7 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) This analytic identifies `copy` or `[System.IO.File]::Copy` being used to capture the SAM, SYSTEM or SECURITY hives identified in script block. This will catch the most basic use cases for credentials being taken for offline cracking. \ During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-07-21 @@ -91,15 +92,6 @@ Limited false positives as the scope is limited to SAM, SYSTEM and SECURITY hive | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | PowerShell was identified running a script to capture the SAM hive on endpoint $ComputerName$ by user $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - - -#### CVE - -| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | -| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [CVE-2021-36934](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-36934) | Windows Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | 4.6 | - #### Reference @@ -114,6 +106,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/serioussam/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/serioussam/windows-powershell.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-23-sam_database_file_access_attempt.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-23-sam_database_file_access_attempt.md index e5217eb727..a251f39794 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-23-sam_database_file_access_attempt.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-23-sam_database_file_access_attempt.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "SAM Database File Access Attempt" -excerpt: "Security Account Manager, OS Credential Dumping" +excerpt: "Security Account Manager +, OS Credential Dumping +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-07-23 @@ -8,13 +10,12 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Security Account Manager - - Credential Access - OS Credential Dumping - Credential Access + - Credential Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - CVE-2021-36934 - Endpoint --- @@ -24,9 +25,9 @@ tags: #### Description -The following analytic identifies access to SAM, SYSTEM or SECURITY databases' within the file path of `windows\system32\config` using Windows Security EventCode 4663. This particular behavior is related to credential access, an attempt to either use a Shadow Copy or recent CVE-2021-36934 to access the SAM database. The Security Account Manager (SAM) is a database file in Windows XP, Windows Vista, Windows 7, 8.1 and 10 that stores users' passwords. +The following analytic identifies access to SAM, SYSTEM or SECURITY databases' within the file path of `windows\system32\config` using Windows Security EventCode 4663. This particular behavior is related to credential access, an attempt to either use a Shadow Copy or recent CVE-2021-36934 to access the SAM database. The Security Account Manager (SAM) is a database file in Windows XP, Windows Vista, Windows 7, 8.1 and 10 that stores users' passwords. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-07-23 @@ -65,7 +66,7 @@ Note that `sam_database_file_access_attempt_filter` is a empty macro by default. #### How To Implement -To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663. For 4663, enable "Audit Object Access" in Group Policy. Then check the two boxes listed for both "Success" and "Failure." +To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663. For 4663, enable "Audit Object Access" in Group Policy. Then check the two boxes listed for both "Success" and "Failure." #### Known False Positives Natively, `dllhost.exe` will access the files. Every environment will have additional native processes that do as well. Filter by process_name. As an aside, one can remove process_name entirely and add `Object_Name=*ShadowCopy*`. @@ -86,15 +87,6 @@ Natively, `dllhost.exe` will access the files. Every environment will have addit | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | The following process $process_name$ accessed the object $Object_Name$ attempting to gain access to credentials on $dest$ by user $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - - -#### CVE - -| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | -| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [CVE-2021-36934](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-36934) | Windows Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | 4.6 | - #### Reference @@ -114,5 +106,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/endpoint/sam_database_file_access_attempt.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser.md index ed1b4cc266..03f8966a41 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser" -excerpt: "Process Injection" +excerpt: "Process Injection +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-07-26 @@ -22,9 +23,9 @@ tags: #### Description -This analytic identifies the suspicious Remote Thread execution of rundll32.exe process to "firefox.exe" and "chrome.exe" browser. This technique was seen in IcedID malware where it hooks the browser to parse banking information as user used the targetted browser process. +This analytic identifies the suspicious Remote Thread execution of rundll32.exe process to "firefox.exe" and "chrome.exe" browser. This technique was seen in IcedID malware where it hooks the browser to parse banking information as user used the targetted browser process. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-07-26 @@ -50,8 +51,8 @@ This analytic identifies the suspicious Remote Thread execution of rundll32.exe #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -88,8 +89,6 @@ unknown | 70.0 | 70 | 100 | rundl32 process $SourceImage$ create a remote thread to browser process $TargetImage$ in host $Computer$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -102,6 +101,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files.md index da6073a45d..3ac8d95609 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files" -excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution, Rundll32" +excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution +, Rundll32 +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-07-26 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Signed Binary Proxy Execution - - Defense Evasion - Rundll32 - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32 process that drops executable (.exe or .dll) files. this behavior seen in rundll32 process of IcedID that tries to drop copy of itself in temp folder or download executable drop it either appdata or programdata as part of its execution. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-07-26 @@ -53,8 +55,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32 process that drops executable (.e #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -89,8 +91,6 @@ unknown | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | rundll32 process $process_name$ drops a file $TargetFilename$ in host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline.md index a4fe383fc7..ce617dbdf9 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline" -excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution, Rundll32" +excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution +, Rundll32 +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-07-26 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Signed Binary Proxy Execution - - Defense Evasion - Rundll32 - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe commandline to execute dll file. This technique was seen in IcedID malware to load its payload dll with the following parameter to load encrypted dll payload which is the license.dat. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-07-26 @@ -97,8 +99,6 @@ limitted. this parameter is not commonly used by windows application but can be | 56.0 | 70 | 80 | rundll32 process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-suspicious_rundll32_plugininit.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-suspicious_rundll32_plugininit.md index c48c73668b..5769a86769 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-suspicious_rundll32_plugininit.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-suspicious_rundll32_plugininit.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Suspicious Rundll32 PluginInit" -excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution, Rundll32" +excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution +, Rundll32 +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-07-26 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Signed Binary Proxy Execution - - Defense Evasion - Rundll32 - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe process with plugininit parameter. This technique is commonly seen in IceID malware to execute its initial dll stager to download another payload to the compromised machine. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-07-26 @@ -97,8 +99,6 @@ third party application may used this dll export name to execute function. | 42.0 | 60 | 70 | rundll32 process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-27-chcp_command_execution.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-27-chcp_command_execution.md index adf0957603..9911265f85 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-27-chcp_command_execution.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-27-chcp_command_execution.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "CHCP Command Execution" -excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter" +excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-07-27 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This search is to detect execution of chcp.exe application. this utility is used to change the active code page of the console. This technique was seen in icedid malware to know the locale region/language/country of the compromise host. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-07-27 @@ -89,8 +90,6 @@ other tools or script may used this to change code page to UTF-* or others | 9.0 | 30 | 30 | parent process $parent_process_name$ spawning chcp process $process_name$ with parent command line $parent_process$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -104,6 +103,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/simulated_icedid/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/simulated_icedid/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-27-regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-27-regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline.md index e0f2084b47..77baad4c17 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-27-regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-27-regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline" -excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution, Regsvr32" +excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution +, Regsvr32 +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-07-27 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Signed Binary Proxy Execution - - Defense Evasion - Regsvr32 - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies Regsvr32.exe utilizing the silent switch to load DLLs. This technique has most recently been seen in IcedID campaigns to load its initial dll that will download the 2nd stage loader that will download and decrypt the config payload. The switch type may be either a hyphen `-` or forward slash `/`. This behavior is typically found with `-s`, and it is possible there are more switch types that may be used. \ During triage, review parallel processes and capture any artifacts that may have landed on disk. Isolate and contain the endpoint as necessary. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-07-27 @@ -101,8 +103,6 @@ minimal. but network operator can use this application to load dll. | 56.0 | 70 | 80 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a DLL using the silent parameter. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-29-rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-29-rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process.md index a45dc70dea..cb300c1134 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-29-rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-29-rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process" -excerpt: "Process Injection" +excerpt: "Process Injection +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-07-29 @@ -24,7 +25,7 @@ tags: This analytic identifies the suspicious Remote Thread execution of rundll32.exe process to cmd.exe process. This technique was seen in IcedID malware to execute its malicious code in normal process for defense evasion and to steal sensitive information the the compromised host. browser process. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-07-29 @@ -50,8 +51,8 @@ This analytic identifies the suspicious Remote Thread execution of rundll32.exe #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -88,8 +89,6 @@ unknown | 56.0 | 70 | 80 | rundl32 process $SourceImage$ create a remote thread to process $TargetImage$ in host $Computer$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -102,6 +101,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-30-drop_icedid_license_dat.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-30-drop_icedid_license_dat.md index 4179feddc6..80e3a461a3 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-30-drop_icedid_license_dat.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-30-drop_icedid_license_dat.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Drop IcedID License dat" -excerpt: "User Execution, Malicious File" +excerpt: "User Execution +, Malicious File +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-07-30 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - User Execution - - Execution - Malicious File - Execution + - Execution - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -23,9 +25,9 @@ tags: #### Description -This search is to detect dropping a suspicious file named as "license.dat" in %appdata%. This behavior seen in latest IcedID malware that contain the actual core bot that will be injected in other process to do banking stealing. +This search is to detect dropping a suspicious file named as "license.dat" in %appdata%. This behavior seen in latest IcedID malware that contain the actual core bot that will be injected in other process to do banking stealing. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-07-30 @@ -53,8 +55,8 @@ This search is to detect dropping a suspicious file named as "license.dat #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `drop_icedid_license_dat_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -84,8 +86,6 @@ unknown | 63.0 | 70 | 90 | process $SourceImage$ create a file $TargetImage$ in host $Computer$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/simulated_icedid/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/simulated_icedid/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-30-icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-30-icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation.md index 1d73297a56..b5bb7f7b32 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-30-icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-30-icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "IcedID Exfiltrated Archived File Creation" -excerpt: "Archive via Utility, Archive Collected Data" +excerpt: "Archive via Utility +, Archive Collected Data +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-07-30 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Archive via Utility - - Collection - Archive Collected Data - Collection + - Collection - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This search is to detect a suspicious file creation namely passff.tar and cookie.tar. This files are possible archived of stolen browser information like history and cookies in a compromised machine with IcedID. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-07-30 @@ -53,8 +55,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious file creation namely passff.tar and cookie #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -89,8 +91,6 @@ unknown | 72.0 | 80 | 90 | process $SourceImage$ create a file $TargetImage$ in host $Computer$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/simulated_icedid/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/simulated_icedid/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-30-office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-30-office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process.md index 953cb6e2eb..8606198ab5 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-30-office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-30-office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process" -excerpt: "Phishing, Spearphishing Attachment" +excerpt: "Phishing +, Spearphishing Attachment +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-07-30 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Phishing - - Initial Access - Spearphishing Attachment - Initial Access + - Initial Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: this detection was designed to identifies suspicious spawned process of known MS office application due to macro or malicious code. this technique can be seen in so many malware like IcedID that used MS office as its weapon or attack vector to initially infect the machines. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-07-30 @@ -97,8 +99,6 @@ unknown | 63.0 | 70 | 90 | Office application spawning regsvr32.exe on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/phish_icedid/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/phish_icedid/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-03-sqlite_module_in_temp_folder.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-03-sqlite_module_in_temp_folder.md index 8a738ccbc3..9f7fd75ac8 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-03-sqlite_module_in_temp_folder.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-03-sqlite_module_in_temp_folder.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Sqlite Module In Temp Folder" -excerpt: "Data from Local System" +excerpt: "Data from Local System +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-08-03 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This search is to detect a suspicious file creation of sqlite3.dll in %temp% folder. This behavior was seen in IcedID malware where it download sqlite module to parse browser database like for chrome or firefox to stole browser information related to bank, credit card or credentials. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-03 @@ -49,8 +50,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious file creation of sqlite3.dll in %temp% fol #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `sqlite_module_in_temp_folder_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -85,8 +86,6 @@ unknown | 9.0 | 30 | 30 | process $SourceImage$ create a file $TargetImage$ in host $Computer$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -99,6 +98,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/simulated_icedid/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/simulated_icedid/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-04-create_remote_thread_in_shell_application.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-04-create_remote_thread_in_shell_application.md index b287fffbf3..26e37fc2ba 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-04-create_remote_thread_in_shell_application.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-04-create_remote_thread_in_shell_application.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Create Remote Thread In Shell Application" -excerpt: "Process Injection" +excerpt: "Process Injection +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-08-04 @@ -24,7 +25,7 @@ tags: This search is to detect suspicious process injection in command shell. This technique was seen in IcedID where it execute cmd.exe process to inject its shellcode as part of its execution as banking trojan. It is really uncommon to have a create remote thread execution in the following application. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-04 @@ -50,8 +51,8 @@ This search is to detect suspicious process injection in command shell. This tec #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `create_remote_thread_in_shell_application_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -88,8 +89,6 @@ unknown | 70.0 | 70 | 100 | process $SourceImage$ create a remote thread to shell app process $TargetImage$ in host $Computer$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -102,6 +101,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/simulated_icedid/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/simulated_icedid/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-09-uninstall_app_using_msiexec.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-09-uninstall_app_using_msiexec.md index 71c4261315..4789041953 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-09-uninstall_app_using_msiexec.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-09-uninstall_app_using_msiexec.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Uninstall App Using MsiExec" -excerpt: "Msiexec, Signed Binary Proxy Execution" +excerpt: "Msiexec +, Signed Binary Proxy Execution +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-08-09 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Msiexec - - Defense Evasion - Signed Binary Proxy Execution - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This search is to detect a suspicious un-installation of application using msiexec. This technique was seen in conti leak tool and script where it tries to uninstall AV product using this commandline. This commandline to uninstall product is not a common practice in enterprise network. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-09 @@ -93,8 +95,6 @@ unknown. | 30.0 | 50 | 60 | process $process_name$ with a cmdline $process$ in host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/conti/conti_leak/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/conti/conti_leak/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-10-powershell_execute_com_object.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-10-powershell_execute_com_object.md index c99d3d9e87..e35e307544 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-10-powershell_execute_com_object.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-10-powershell_execute_com_object.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Powershell Execute COM Object" -excerpt: "Component Object Model Hijacking, Event Triggered Execution" +excerpt: "Component Object Model Hijacking +, Event Triggered Execution +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-08-10 @@ -8,11 +10,11 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Component Object Model Hijacking - - Privilege Escalation - - Persistence - Event Triggered Execution + - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ tags: This search is to detect a COM CLSID execution through powershell. This technique was seen in several adversaries and malware like ransomware conti where it has a feature to execute command using COM Object. This technique may use by network operator at some cases but a good indicator if some application want to gain privilege escalation or bypass uac. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-10 @@ -39,9 +41,9 @@ This search is to detect a COM CLSID execution through powershell. This techniqu | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1546.015](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/015/) | Component Object Model Hijacking | Privilege Escalation, Persistence | +| [T1546.015](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/015/) | Component Object Model Hijacking | Persistence, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1546](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/) | Event Triggered Execution | Privilege Escalation, Persistence | +| [T1546](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/) | Event Triggered Execution | Persistence, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -87,8 +89,6 @@ network operrator may use this command. | 5.0 | 10 | 50 | A suspicious powershell script contains COM CLSID command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/conti/conti_leak/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/conti/conti_leak/windows-powershell.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-11-fsutil_zeroing_file.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-11-fsutil_zeroing_file.md index 7f5af18908..68609f221e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-11-fsutil_zeroing_file.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-11-fsutil_zeroing_file.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Fsutil Zeroing File" -excerpt: "Indicator Removal on Host" +excerpt: "Indicator Removal on Host +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-08-11 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This search is to detect a suspicious fsutil process to zeroing a target file. This technique was seen in lockbit ransomware where it tries to zero out its malware path as part of its defense evasion after encrypting the compromised host. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-11 @@ -87,8 +88,6 @@ unknown | 54.0 | 60 | 90 | Possible file data deletion on $dest$ using $process$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -101,6 +100,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070/fsutil_file_zero/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070/fsutil_file_zero/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-13-uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-13-uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object.md index 0d83ccf517..69d44c51c2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-13-uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-13-uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object" -excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution, CMSTP" +excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution +, CMSTP +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-08-13 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Signed Binary Proxy Execution - - Defense Evasion - CMSTP - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This search is to detect a possible uac bypass using the colorui.dll COM Object. this technique was seen in so many malware and ransomware like lockbit where it make use of the colorui.dll COM CLSID to bypass UAC. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-13 @@ -53,8 +55,8 @@ This search is to detect a possible uac bypass using the colorui.dll COM Object. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -91,8 +93,6 @@ not so common. but 3rd part app may load this dll. | 48.0 | 60 | 80 | The following module $ImageLoaded$ was loaded by a non-standard application on endpoint $Computer$ by user $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.015/uac_colorui/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.015/uac_colorui/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-16-gsuite_drive_share_in_external_email.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-16-gsuite_drive_share_in_external_email.md index d0c3dda7c1..db9287becc 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-16-gsuite_drive_share_in_external_email.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-16-gsuite_drive_share_in_external_email.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Gsuite Drive Share In External Email" -excerpt: "Exfiltration to Cloud Storage, Exfiltration Over Web Service" +excerpt: "Exfiltration to Cloud Storage +, Exfiltration Over Web Service +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2021-08-16 @@ -8,13 +10,12 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Exfiltration to Cloud Storage - - Exfiltration - Exfiltration Over Web Service - Exfiltration + - Exfiltration - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Dev Sec Ops Analytics --- @@ -25,8 +26,8 @@ tags: This search is to detect suspicious google drive or google docs files shared outside or externally. This behavior might be a good hunting query to monitor exfitration of data made by an attacker or insider to a targetted machine. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud, Dev Sec Ops Analytics +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-16 - **Author**: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk @@ -86,7 +87,7 @@ network admin or normal user may share files to customer and external team. #### Kill Chain Phase -* Exfiltration +* Exploitation @@ -97,8 +98,6 @@ network admin or normal user may share files to customer and external team. | 72.0 | 80 | 90 | suspicious share gdrive from $parameters.owner$ to $email$ namely as $parameters.doc_title$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -111,6 +110,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1567.002/gsuite_share_drive/gdrive_share_external.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1567.002/gsuite_share_drive/gdrive_share_external.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-16-gsuite_email_suspicious_attachment.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-16-gsuite_email_suspicious_attachment.md index 46e118a824..b60976a10f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-16-gsuite_email_suspicious_attachment.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-16-gsuite_email_suspicious_attachment.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "GSuite Email Suspicious Attachment" -excerpt: "Spearphishing Attachment, Phishing" +excerpt: "Spearphishing Attachment +, Phishing +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2021-08-16 @@ -8,13 +10,12 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Spearphishing Attachment - - Initial Access - Phishing - Initial Access + - Initial Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Dev Sec Ops Analytics --- @@ -25,8 +26,8 @@ tags: This search is to detect a suspicious attachment file extension in Gsuite email that may related to spear phishing attack. This file type is commonly used by malware to lure user to click on it to execute malicious code to compromised targetted machine. But this search can also catch some normal files related to this file type that maybe send by employee or network admin. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud, Dev Sec Ops Analytics +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-16 - **Author**: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk @@ -94,8 +95,6 @@ network admin and normal user may send this file attachment as part of their day | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | suspicious email from $source.address$ to $destination{}.address$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -108,6 +107,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gsuite_susp_attachment_ext/gsuite_gmail_file_ext.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gsuite_susp_attachment_ext/gsuite_gmail_file_ext.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-17-7zip_commandline_to_smb_share_path.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-17-7zip_commandline_to_smb_share_path.md index 08ccd93946..83d673673e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-17-7zip_commandline_to_smb_share_path.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-17-7zip_commandline_to_smb_share_path.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "7zip CommandLine To SMB Share Path" -excerpt: "Archive via Utility, Archive Collected Data" +excerpt: "Archive via Utility +, Archive Collected Data +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-08-17 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Archive via Utility - - Collection - Archive Collected Data - Collection + - Collection - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This search is to detect a suspicious 7z process with commandline pointing to SMB network share. This technique was seen in CONTI LEAK tools where it use 7z to archive a sensitive files and place it in network share tmp folder. This search is a good hunting query that may give analyst a hint why specific user try to archive a file pointing to SMB user which is un usual. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-17 @@ -93,8 +95,6 @@ unknown | 25.0 | 50 | 50 | archive process $process_name$ with suspicious cmdline $process$ in host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/conti/conti_leak/windows-sysmon_7z.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/conti/conti_leak/windows-sysmon_7z.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-17-aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_high.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-17-aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_high.md index c71264bb1f..34948c73cd 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-17-aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_high.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-17-aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_high.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings High" -excerpt: "Malicious Image, User Execution" +excerpt: "Malicious Image +, User Execution +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2021-08-17 @@ -8,13 +10,12 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Malicious Image - - Execution - User Execution - Execution + - Execution - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Dev Sec Ops Analytics --- @@ -25,8 +26,8 @@ tags: This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). You need to activate image scanning in order to get the event DescribeImageScanFindings with the results. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud, Dev Sec Ops Analytics +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-17 - **Author**: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk @@ -100,8 +101,6 @@ unknown | 70.0 | 70 | 100 | Vulnerabilities with severity high found in image $image$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -116,5 +115,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/cloud/aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_high.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-17-aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_low_informational_unknown.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-17-aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_low_informational_unknown.md index 90e965f033..09c822ac28 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-17-aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_low_informational_unknown.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-17-aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_low_informational_unknown.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Low Informational Unknown" -excerpt: "Malicious Image, User Execution" +excerpt: "Malicious Image +, User Execution +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2021-08-17 @@ -8,13 +10,12 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Malicious Image - - Execution - User Execution - Execution + - Execution - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Dev Sec Ops Analytics --- @@ -25,8 +26,8 @@ tags: This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). You need to activate image scanning in order to get the event DescribeImageScanFindings with the results. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud, Dev Sec Ops Analytics +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-17 - **Author**: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk @@ -100,8 +101,6 @@ unknown | 7.0 | 10 | 70 | Vulnerabilities with severity high found in repository $repositoryName$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -116,5 +115,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/cloud/aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_low_informational_unknown.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-17-aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_medium.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-17-aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_medium.md index 3734e2b974..3fb2d3d1d0 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-17-aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_medium.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-17-aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_medium.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Medium" -excerpt: "Malicious Image, User Execution" +excerpt: "Malicious Image +, User Execution +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2021-08-17 @@ -8,13 +10,12 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Malicious Image - - Execution - User Execution - Execution + - Execution - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Dev Sec Ops Analytics --- @@ -25,8 +26,8 @@ tags: This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). You need to activate image scanning in order to get the event DescribeImageScanFindings with the results. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud, Dev Sec Ops Analytics +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-17 - **Author**: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk @@ -100,8 +101,6 @@ unknown | 21.0 | 30 | 70 | Vulnerabilities with severity high found in image $image$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -116,5 +115,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/cloud/aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_medium.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-17-gsuite_outbound_email_with_attachment_to_external_domain.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-17-gsuite_outbound_email_with_attachment_to_external_domain.md index 5d68ed25cb..793154c13f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-17-gsuite_outbound_email_with_attachment_to_external_domain.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-17-gsuite_outbound_email_with_attachment_to_external_domain.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain" -excerpt: "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol, Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol" +excerpt: "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol +, Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2021-08-17 @@ -8,13 +10,12 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol - - Exfiltration - Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol - Exfiltration + - Exfiltration - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Dev Sec Ops Analytics --- @@ -23,10 +24,10 @@ tags: #### Description -This search is to detect a suspicious outbound e-mail from internal email to external email domain. This can be a good hunting query to monitor insider or outbound email traffic for not common domain e-mail. The idea is to parse the domain of destination email check if there is a minimum outbound traffic < 20 with attachment. +This search is to detect a suspicious outbound e-mail from internal email to external email domain. This can be a good hunting query to monitor insider or outbound email traffic for not common domain e-mail. The idea is to parse the domain of destination email check if there is a minimum outbound traffic < 20 with attachment. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud, Dev Sec Ops Analytics +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-17 - **Author**: Teoderick Contreras, Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk @@ -91,8 +92,6 @@ network admin and normal user may send this file attachment as part of their day | 9.0 | 30 | 30 | suspicious email from $source.address$ to $destination{}.address$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -105,6 +104,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gsuite_outbound_email_to_external/gsuite_external_domain.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gsuite_outbound_email_to_external/gsuite_external_domain.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-18-esentutl_sam_copy.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-18-esentutl_sam_copy.md index a51616375c..2c305257ad 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-18-esentutl_sam_copy.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-18-esentutl_sam_copy.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Esentutl SAM Copy" -excerpt: "Security Account Manager, OS Credential Dumping" +excerpt: "Security Account Manager +, OS Credential Dumping +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-08-18 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Security Account Manager - - Credential Access - OS Credential Dumping - Credential Access + - Credential Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies the process - `esentutl.exe` - being used to capture credentials stored in ntds.dit or the SAM file on disk. During triage, review parallel processes and determine if legitimate activity. Upon determination of illegitimate activity, take further action to isolate and contain the threat. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-18 @@ -86,8 +88,7 @@ False positives should be limited. Filter as needed. #### Kill Chain Phase -* Privilege Escalation -* Lateral Movement +* Exploitation @@ -98,8 +99,6 @@ False positives should be limited. Filter as needed. | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user user$ attempting to capture credentials for offline cracking or observability. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -115,5 +114,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/endpoint/esentutl_sam_copy.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-18-powershell_4104_hunting.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-18-powershell_4104_hunting.md index a2090ba416..d5f1d74cee 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-18-powershell_4104_hunting.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-18-powershell_4104_hunting.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "PowerShell 4104 Hunting" -excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter, PowerShell" +excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter +, PowerShell +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-08-18 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Command and Scripting Interpreter - - Execution - PowerShell - Execution + - Execution - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -24,7 +26,7 @@ tags: The following Hunting analytic assists with identifying suspicious PowerShell execution using Script Block Logging, or EventCode 4104. This analytic is not meant to be ran hourly, but occasionally to identify malicious or suspicious PowerShell. This analytic is a combination of work completed by Alex Teixeira and Splunk Threat Research Team. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-18 @@ -257,8 +259,6 @@ Limited false positives. May filter as needed. | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ executing suspicious commands. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -279,5 +279,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/endpoint/powershell_4104_hunting.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-19-aws_ecr_container_upload_outside_business_hours.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-19-aws_ecr_container_upload_outside_business_hours.md index 311931c0c7..e8e673f172 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-19-aws_ecr_container_upload_outside_business_hours.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-19-aws_ecr_container_upload_outside_business_hours.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "AWS ECR Container Upload Outside Business Hours" -excerpt: "Malicious Image, User Execution" +excerpt: "Malicious Image +, User Execution +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2021-08-19 @@ -8,13 +10,12 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Malicious Image - - Execution - User Execution - Execution + - Execution - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Dev Sec Ops Analytics --- @@ -25,8 +26,8 @@ tags: This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). A upload of a new container is normally done during business hours. When done outside business hours, we want to take a look into it. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud, Dev Sec Ops Analytics +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-19 - **Author**: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk @@ -96,8 +97,6 @@ When your development is spreaded in different time zones, applying this rule ca | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | Container uploaded outside business hours from $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -112,5 +111,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/cloud/aws_ecr_container_upload_outside_business_hours.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-19-aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-19-aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user.md index 80759e0adc..c163ccfd46 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-19-aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-19-aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "AWS ECR Container Upload Unknown User" -excerpt: "Malicious Image, User Execution" +excerpt: "Malicious Image +, User Execution +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2021-08-19 @@ -8,13 +10,12 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Malicious Image - - Execution - User Execution - Execution + - Execution - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Dev Sec Ops Analytics --- @@ -25,8 +26,8 @@ tags: This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). A upload of a new container is normally done from only a few known users. When the user was never seen before, we should have a closer look into the event. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud, Dev Sec Ops Analytics +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-19 - **Author**: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk @@ -57,8 +58,8 @@ This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service ( #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [aws_ecr_users](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/aws_ecr_users.yml) * [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) +* [aws_ecr_users](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/aws_ecr_users.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -97,8 +98,6 @@ unknown | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | Container uploaded from unknown user $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -113,5 +112,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/cloud/aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-19-gsuite_email_suspicious_subject_with_attachment.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-19-gsuite_email_suspicious_subject_with_attachment.md index 4d05aae845..f4222d2a64 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-19-gsuite_email_suspicious_subject_with_attachment.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-19-gsuite_email_suspicious_subject_with_attachment.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Gsuite Email Suspicious Subject With Attachment" -excerpt: "Spearphishing Attachment, Phishing" +excerpt: "Spearphishing Attachment +, Phishing +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2021-08-19 @@ -8,13 +10,12 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Spearphishing Attachment - - Initial Access - Phishing - Initial Access + - Initial Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Dev Sec Ops Analytics --- @@ -25,8 +26,8 @@ tags: This search is to detect a gsuite email contains suspicious subject having known file type used in spear phishing. This technique is a common and effective entry vector of attacker to compromise a network by luring the user to click or execute the suspicious attachment send from external email account because of the effective social engineering of subject related to delivery, bank and so on. On the other hand this detection may catch a normal email traffic related to legitimate transaction so better to check the email sender, spelling and etc. avoid click link or opening the attachment if you are not expecting this type of e-mail. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud, Dev Sec Ops Analytics +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-19 - **Author**: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk @@ -82,8 +83,12 @@ normal user or normal transaction may contain the subject and file type attachme +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | suspicious email from $source.address$ to $destination{}.address$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -98,6 +103,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gsuite_susp_subj/gsuite_susp_subj_attach.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gsuite_susp_subj/gsuite_susp_subj_attach.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-19-protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-19-protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.md index f624197c95..122839827c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-19-protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-19-protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.md @@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ tags: - Network_Traffic --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U The following analytic identifies cleartext protocols at risk of leaking sensitive information. Currently, this consists of legacy protocols such as telnet (port 23), POP3 (port 110), IMAP (port 143), and non-anonymous FTP (port 21) sessions. While some of these protocols may be used over SSL, they typically are found on different assigned ports in those instances. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Network_Traffic](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkTraffic) - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-19 @@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ Note that `protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext_filter` is a empty macr #### How To Implement -This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic, and populating the Network_Traffic data model. For more accurate result it's better to limit destination to organization private and public IP range, like All_Traffic.dest IN(192.168.0.0/16,172.16.0.0/12,10.0.0.0/8, x.x.x.x/22) +This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic, and populating the Network_Traffic data model. For more accurate result it's better to limit destination to organization private and public IP range, like All_Traffic.dest IN(192.168.0.0/16,172.16.0.0/12,10.0.0.0/8, x.x.x.x/22) #### Known False Positives Some networks may use kerberized FTP or telnet servers, however, this is rare. @@ -74,8 +74,12 @@ Some networks may use kerberized FTP or telnet servers, however, this is rare. +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -92,5 +96,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml) \| *version*: **3** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-20-github_commit_changes_in_master.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-20-github_commit_changes_in_master.md index 5939a739d2..69cf151c0b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-20-github_commit_changes_in_master.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-20-github_commit_changes_in_master.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Github Commit Changes In Master" -excerpt: "Trusted Relationship" +excerpt: "Trusted Relationship +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2021-08-20 @@ -12,7 +13,6 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Dev Sec Ops Analytics --- @@ -23,8 +23,8 @@ tags: This search is to detect a pushed or commit to master or main branch. This is to avoid unwanted modification to master without a review to the changes. Ideally in terms of devsecops the changes made in a branch and do a PR for review. of course in some cases admin of the project may did a changes directly to master branch -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud, Dev Sec Ops Analytics +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-20 - **Author**: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk @@ -52,8 +52,8 @@ This search is to detect a pushed or commit to master or main branch. This is to #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [github](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/github.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [github](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/github.yml) Note that `github_commit_changes_in_master_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -83,8 +83,6 @@ admin can do changes directly to master branch | 9.0 | 30 | 30 | suspicious commit by $commit.commit.author.email$ to main branch | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -97,6 +95,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1199/github_push_master/github_push_master.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1199/github_push_master/github_push_master.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-20-kubernetes_nginx_ingress_lfi.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-20-kubernetes_nginx_ingress_lfi.md index 3d6a15c034..b49558dc00 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-20-kubernetes_nginx_ingress_lfi.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-20-kubernetes_nginx_ingress_lfi.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI" -excerpt: "Exploitation for Credential Access" +excerpt: "Exploitation for Credential Access +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2021-08-20 @@ -12,7 +13,6 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Dev Sec Ops Analytics --- @@ -23,8 +23,8 @@ tags: This search uses the Kubernetes logs from a nginx ingress controller to detect local file inclusion attacks. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud, Dev Sec Ops Analytics +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-20 - **Author**: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk @@ -56,15 +56,15 @@ This search uses the Kubernetes logs from a nginx ingress controller to detect l #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [kubernetes_container_controller](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/kubernetes_container_controller.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [kubernetes_container_controller](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/kubernetes_container_controller.yml) Note that `kubernetes_nginx_ingress_lfi_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. #### Lookups The SPL above uses the following Lookups: -* [local_file_inclusion_paths](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/local_file_inclusion_paths.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/local_file_inclusion_paths.csv) +* [local_file_inclusion_paths](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/local_file_inclusion_paths.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/lookups/local_file_inclusion_paths.csv) #### Required field * raw @@ -92,8 +92,6 @@ unknown | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | Local File Inclusion Attack detected on $host$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -107,6 +105,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1212/kubernetes_nginx_lfi_attack/kubernetes_nginx_lfi_attack.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1212/kubernetes_nginx_lfi_attack/kubernetes_nginx_lfi_attack.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-getlocaluser_with_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-getlocaluser_with_powershell.md index 5a709ec9cb..55a1e42445 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-getlocaluser_with_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-getlocaluser_with_powershell.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "GetLocalUser with PowerShell" -excerpt: "Account Discovery, Local Account" +excerpt: "Account Discovery +, Local Account +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-08-23 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Account Discovery - - Discovery - Local Account - Discovery + - Discovery - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for local users. The `Get-LocalUser` commandlet is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-23 @@ -85,8 +87,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshoo | 15.0 | 30 | 50 | Local user discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -99,6 +99,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-getlocaluser_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-getlocaluser_with_powershell_script_block.md index 8bf13b7bf4..4545bb3145 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-getlocaluser_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-getlocaluser_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block" -excerpt: "Account Discovery, Local Account" +excerpt: "Account Discovery +, Local Account +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-08-23 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Account Discovery - - Discovery - Local Account - Discovery + - Discovery - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -24,7 +26,7 @@ tags: The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-LocalUser` commandlet. The `Get-LocalUser` commandlet is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-23 @@ -82,8 +84,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshoo | 15.0 | 30 | 50 | Local user discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell.md index 3ee50b9d02..40ea9b1939 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell" -excerpt: "Account Discovery, Local Account" +excerpt: "Account Discovery +, Local Account +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-08-23 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Account Discovery - - Discovery - Local Account - Discovery + - Discovery - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query local users. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `Win32_UserAccount` parameter is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-23 @@ -85,8 +87,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshoo | 15.0 | 30 | 50 | Local user discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -99,6 +99,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_script_block.md index c9a6f0ad85..1edf9e5e98 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block" -excerpt: "Account Discovery, Local Account" +excerpt: "Account Discovery +, Local Account +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-08-23 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Account Discovery - - Discovery - Local Account - Discovery + - Discovery - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -24,7 +26,7 @@ tags: The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet used with specific parameters. The `Win32_UserAccount` parameter is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-23 @@ -82,8 +84,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshoo | 15.0 | 30 | 50 | Local user discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-gsuite_email_with_known_abuse_web_service_link.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-gsuite_email_with_known_abuse_web_service_link.md index 234e51385f..6fb9af31c9 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-gsuite_email_with_known_abuse_web_service_link.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-gsuite_email_with_known_abuse_web_service_link.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Gsuite Email With Known Abuse Web Service Link" -excerpt: "Spearphishing Attachment, Phishing" +excerpt: "Spearphishing Attachment +, Phishing +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2021-08-23 @@ -8,13 +10,12 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Spearphishing Attachment - - Initial Access - Phishing - Initial Access + - Initial Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Dev Sec Ops Analytics --- @@ -25,8 +26,8 @@ tags: This analytics is to detect a gmail containing a link that are known to be abused by malware or attacker like pastebin, telegram and discord to deliver malicious payload. This event can encounter some normal email traffic within organization and external email that normally using this application and services. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud, Dev Sec Ops Analytics +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-23 - **Author**: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk @@ -82,8 +83,12 @@ normal email contains this link that are known application within the organizati +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | suspicious email from $source.address$ to $destination{}.address$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -97,6 +102,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gsuite_susp_url/gsuite_susp_url.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gsuite_susp_url/gsuite_susp_url.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-gsuite_suspicious_shared_file_name.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-gsuite_suspicious_shared_file_name.md index 2ea358d35c..d3b870e462 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-gsuite_suspicious_shared_file_name.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-gsuite_suspicious_shared_file_name.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Gsuite Suspicious Shared File Name" -excerpt: "Spearphishing Attachment, Phishing" +excerpt: "Spearphishing Attachment +, Phishing +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2021-08-23 @@ -8,13 +10,12 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Spearphishing Attachment - - Initial Access - Phishing - Initial Access + - Initial Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Dev Sec Ops Analytics --- @@ -25,8 +26,8 @@ tags: This search is to detect a shared file in google drive with suspicious file name that are commonly used by spear phishing campaign. This technique is very popular to lure the user by running a malicious document or click a malicious link within the shared file that will redirected to malicious website. This detection can also catch some normal email communication between organization and its external customer. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud, Dev Sec Ops Analytics +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-23 - **Author**: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk @@ -97,8 +98,6 @@ normal user or normal transaction may contain the subject and file type attachme | 21.0 | 30 | 70 | suspicious share gdrive from $parameters.owner$ to $email$ namely as $parameters.doc_title$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -112,6 +111,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gdrive_susp_file_share/gdrive_susp_attach.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gdrive_susp_file_share/gdrive_susp_attach.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-kubernetes_nginx_ingress_rfi.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-kubernetes_nginx_ingress_rfi.md index d867ce7fdf..3598463a27 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-kubernetes_nginx_ingress_rfi.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-kubernetes_nginx_ingress_rfi.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Kubernetes Nginx Ingress RFI" -excerpt: "Exploitation for Credential Access" +excerpt: "Exploitation for Credential Access +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2021-08-23 @@ -12,7 +13,6 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Dev Sec Ops Analytics --- @@ -23,8 +23,8 @@ tags: This search uses the Kubernetes logs from a nginx ingress controller to detect remote file inclusion attacks. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud, Dev Sec Ops Analytics +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-23 - **Author**: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk @@ -56,8 +56,8 @@ This search uses the Kubernetes logs from a nginx ingress controller to detect r #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [kubernetes_container_controller](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/kubernetes_container_controller.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [kubernetes_container_controller](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/kubernetes_container_controller.yml) Note that `kubernetes_nginx_ingress_rfi_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -87,8 +87,6 @@ unknown | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | Remote File Inclusion Attack detected on $host$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -102,6 +100,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1212/kuberntest_nginx_rfi_attack/kubernetes_nginx_rfi_attack.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1212/kuberntest_nginx_rfi_attack/kubernetes_nginx_rfi_attack.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-adsisearcher_account_discovery.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-adsisearcher_account_discovery.md index c647310767..2a97a0e6ba 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-adsisearcher_account_discovery.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-adsisearcher_account_discovery.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "AdsiSearcher Account Discovery" -excerpt: "Domain Account, Account Discovery" +excerpt: "Domain Account +, Account Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-08-24 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Domain Account - - Discovery - Account Discovery - Discovery + - Discovery - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -24,7 +26,7 @@ tags: The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator being used to query Active Directory for domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `[Adsisearcher]` to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-24 @@ -87,8 +89,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. | 25.0 | 50 | 50 | powershell process having commandline $Message$ for user enumeration | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-domain_account_discovery_with_dsquery.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-domain_account_discovery_with_dsquery.md index 64b17ddb4e..c0cb3747fe 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-domain_account_discovery_with_dsquery.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-domain_account_discovery_with_dsquery.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Domain Account Discovery with Dsquery" -excerpt: "Domain Account, Account Discovery" +excerpt: "Domain Account +, Account Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-08-24 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Domain Account - - Discovery - Account Discovery - Discovery + - Discovery - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for the execution of `dsquery.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover domain users. The `user` argument returns a list of all users registered in the domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike engage in remote system discovery for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-24 @@ -93,8 +95,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. | 25.0 | 50 | 50 | an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-domain_account_discovery_with_net_app.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-domain_account_discovery_with_net_app.md index 670eea9bd8..70f478676c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-domain_account_discovery_with_net_app.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-domain_account_discovery_with_net_app.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Domain Account Discovery With Net App" -excerpt: "Domain Account, Account Discovery" +excerpt: "Domain Account +, Account Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-08-24 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Domain Account - - Discovery - Account Discovery - Discovery + - Discovery - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain users. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use net.exe to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-24 @@ -54,9 +56,9 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-li #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) Note that `domain_account_discovery_with_net_app_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -94,8 +96,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. | 25.0 | 50 | 50 | an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-domain_account_discovery_with_wmic.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-domain_account_discovery_with_wmic.md index d88b40119a..9b5d335fdf 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-domain_account_discovery_with_wmic.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-domain_account_discovery_with_wmic.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Domain Account Discovery with Wmic" -excerpt: "Domain Account, Account Discovery" +excerpt: "Domain Account +, Account Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-08-24 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Domain Account - - Discovery - Account Discovery - Discovery + - Discovery - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain users. Red Teams and adversaries alike use wmic.exe to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-24 @@ -93,8 +95,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. | 25.0 | 50 | 50 | an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get-domaintrust_with_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get-domaintrust_with_powershell.md index 6fd459041b..b21be35369 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get-domaintrust_with_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get-domaintrust_with_powershell.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell" -excerpt: "Domain Trust Discovery" +excerpt: "Domain Trust Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-08-24 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This analytic identifies Get-DomainTrust from PowerView in order to gather domain trust information. Typically, this is utilized within a script being executed and used to enumerate the domain trust information. This grants the adversary an understanding of how large or small the domain is. During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-24 @@ -92,8 +93,6 @@ Limited false positives as this requires an active Administrator or adversary to | 12.0 | 30 | 40 | Suspicious PowerShell Get-DomainTrust was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -106,6 +105,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/discovery/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/discovery/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get-domaintrust_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get-domaintrust_with_powershell_script_block.md index b678040a32..365d52b43d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get-domaintrust_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get-domaintrust_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell Script Block" -excerpt: "Domain Trust Discovery" +excerpt: "Domain Trust Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-08-24 @@ -24,7 +25,7 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) This analytic identifies Get-DomainTrust from PowerView in order to gather domain trust information. \ During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-24 @@ -87,8 +88,6 @@ It is possible certain system management frameworks utilize this command to gath | 12.0 | 30 | 40 | Suspicious PowerShell Get-DomainTrust was identified on endpoint $ComputerName$ by user $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -105,6 +104,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/discovery/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/discovery/windows-powershell.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get_aduser_with_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get_aduser_with_powershell.md index 38c81abc56..9354220af4 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get_aduser_with_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get_aduser_with_powershell.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Get ADUser with PowerShell" -excerpt: "Domain Account, Account Discovery" +excerpt: "Domain Account +, Account Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-08-24 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Domain Account - - Discovery - Account Discovery - Discovery + - Discovery - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -23,9 +25,9 @@ tags: #### Description -This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to enumerate domain users. The `Get-AdUser' commandlet returns a list of all domain users. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to enumerate domain users. The `Get-AdUser' commandlet returns a list of all domain users. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-24 @@ -93,8 +95,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. | 25.0 | 50 | 50 | an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get_aduser_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get_aduser_with_powershell_script_block.md index 3863094d15..3beec9f46b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get_aduser_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get_aduser_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block" -excerpt: "Domain Account, Account Discovery" +excerpt: "Domain Account +, Account Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-08-24 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Domain Account - - Discovery - Account Discovery - Discovery + - Discovery - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -24,7 +26,7 @@ tags: The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-AdGUser` commandlet. The `Get-AdUser` commandlet is used to return a list of all domain users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-24 @@ -87,8 +89,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. | 25.0 | 50 | 50 | powershell process having commandline $Message$ for user enumeration | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get_domainuser_with_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get_domainuser_with_powershell.md index 0fce4f455b..73f91a9f6c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get_domainuser_with_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get_domainuser_with_powershell.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Get DomainUser with PowerShell" -excerpt: "Domain Account, Account Discovery" +excerpt: "Domain Account +, Account Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-08-24 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Domain Account - - Discovery - Account Discovery - Discovery + - Discovery - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to enumerate domain users. `Get-DomainUser` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-24 @@ -93,8 +95,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. | 25.0 | 50 | 50 | an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get_domainuser_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get_domainuser_with_powershell_script_block.md index 018bbcca06..0bcd8a7158 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get_domainuser_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get_domainuser_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block" -excerpt: "Domain Account, Account Discovery" +excerpt: "Domain Account +, Account Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-08-24 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Domain Account - - Discovery - Account Discovery - Discovery + - Discovery - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -24,7 +26,7 @@ tags: The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainUser` commandlet. `GetDomainUser` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerView to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-24 @@ -87,8 +89,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. | 25.0 | 50 | 50 | powershell process having commandline $Message$ for user enumeration | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell.md index 5d8cbfffd1..19321d6037 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell" -excerpt: "Domain Account, Account Discovery" +excerpt: "Domain Account +, Account Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-08-24 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Domain Account - - Discovery - Account Discovery - Discovery + - Discovery - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain users. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `-class ds_user` parameter can be used to return the full list of users in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI in this case, using PowerShell, to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-24 @@ -93,8 +95,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. | 25.0 | 50 | 50 | an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_script_block.md index 1a7ad97d66..ff1ab780ec 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell Script Block" -excerpt: "Domain Account, Account Discovery" +excerpt: "Domain Account +, Account Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-08-24 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Domain Account - - Discovery - Account Discovery - Discovery + - Discovery - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -24,7 +26,7 @@ tags: The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet. The `DS_User` class parameter leverages WMI to query for all domain users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-24 @@ -87,8 +89,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. | 25.0 | 50 | 50 | powershell process having commandline $Message$ for user enumeration | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-kubernetes_scanner_image_pulling.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-kubernetes_scanner_image_pulling.md index 7030f6f31a..a4968d108b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-kubernetes_scanner_image_pulling.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-kubernetes_scanner_image_pulling.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Kubernetes Scanner Image Pulling" -excerpt: "Cloud Service Discovery" +excerpt: "Cloud Service Discovery +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2021-08-24 @@ -12,7 +13,6 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Dev Sec Ops Analytics --- @@ -23,8 +23,8 @@ tags: This search uses the Kubernetes logs from Splunk Connect from Kubernetes to detect Kubernetes Security Scanner. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud, Dev Sec Ops Analytics +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-24 - **Author**: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk @@ -91,8 +91,6 @@ unknown | 81.0 | 90 | 90 | Kubernetes Scanner image pulled on host $host$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -105,6 +103,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1526/kubernetes_kube_hunter/kubernetes_kube_hunter.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1526/kubernetes_kube_hunter/kubernetes_kube_hunter.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-domain_group_discovery_with_adsisearcher.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-domain_group_discovery_with_adsisearcher.md index 127f2d4a26..719d4894c3 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-domain_group_discovery_with_adsisearcher.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-domain_group_discovery_with_adsisearcher.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Domain Group Discovery with Adsisearcher" -excerpt: "Permission Groups Discovery, Domain Groups" +excerpt: "Permission Groups Discovery +, Domain Groups +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-08-25 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Permission Groups Discovery - - Discovery - Domain Groups - Discovery + - Discovery - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -24,7 +26,7 @@ tags: The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator being used to query Active Directory for domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `[Adsisearcher]` to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-25 @@ -86,8 +88,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use Adsisearcher for troubleshooting. | 18.0 | 30 | 60 | Domain group discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-domain_group_discovery_with_net.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-domain_group_discovery_with_net.md index e0521d1c60..ca1d24a24b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-domain_group_discovery_with_net.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-domain_group_discovery_with_net.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Domain Group Discovery With Net" -excerpt: "Permission Groups Discovery, Domain Groups" +excerpt: "Permission Groups Discovery +, Domain Groups +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-08-25 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Permission Groups Discovery - - Discovery - Domain Groups - Discovery + - Discovery - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The argument `group /domain`, returns a list of all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-25 @@ -95,8 +97,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. | 15.0 | 30 | 50 | Domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-domain_group_discovery_with_wmic.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-domain_group_discovery_with_wmic.md index e8a4231b57..d90bdc7d39 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-domain_group_discovery_with_wmic.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-domain_group_discovery_with_wmic.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Domain Group Discovery With Wmic" -excerpt: "Permission Groups Discovery, Domain Groups" +excerpt: "Permission Groups Discovery +, Domain Groups +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-08-25 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Permission Groups Discovery - - Discovery - Domain Groups - Discovery + - Discovery - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The arguments utilized in this command return a list of all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use wmic.exe to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-25 @@ -95,8 +97,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. | 15.0 | 30 | 50 | Domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-elevated_group_discovery_with_net.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-elevated_group_discovery_with_net.md index a33aabc871..0bb67a96eb 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-elevated_group_discovery_with_net.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-elevated_group_discovery_with_net.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Elevated Group Discovery With Net" -excerpt: "Permission Groups Discovery, Domain Groups" +excerpt: "Permission Groups Discovery +, Domain Groups +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-08-25 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Permission Groups Discovery - - Discovery - Domain Groups - Discovery + - Discovery - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for specific elevated domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate elevated domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery to identify high privileged users. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-25 @@ -95,8 +97,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. | 21.0 | 30 | 70 | Elevated domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-elevated_group_discovery_with_powerview.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-elevated_group_discovery_with_powerview.md index 27316125e0..9162718642 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-elevated_group_discovery_with_powerview.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-elevated_group_discovery_with_powerview.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Elevated Group Discovery with PowerView" -excerpt: "Permission Groups Discovery, Domain Groups" +excerpt: "Permission Groups Discovery +, Domain Groups +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-08-25 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Permission Groups Discovery - - Discovery - Domain Groups - Discovery + - Discovery - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -24,7 +26,7 @@ tags: The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainGroupMember` commandlet. `Get-DomainGroupMember` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. As the name suggests, `Get-DomainGroupMember` is used to list the members of an specific domain group. Red Teams and adversaries alike use PowerView to enumerate elevated domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery to identify high privileged users. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-25 @@ -86,8 +88,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this PowerView for troubleshooting. | 21.0 | 30 | 70 | Elevated group discovery using PowerView on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-elevated_group_discovery_with_wmic.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-elevated_group_discovery_with_wmic.md index b02f6a2edc..c075198c2e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-elevated_group_discovery_with_wmic.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-elevated_group_discovery_with_wmic.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Elevated Group Discovery With Wmic" -excerpt: "Permission Groups Discovery, Domain Groups" +excerpt: "Permission Groups Discovery +, Domain Groups +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-08-25 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Permission Groups Discovery - - Discovery - Domain Groups - Discovery + - Discovery - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for specific domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate elevated domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery to identify high privileged users. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-25 @@ -95,8 +97,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. | 21.0 | 30 | 70 | Elevated domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getadgroup_with_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getadgroup_with_powershell.md index 04189e415d..df3f5fff13 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getadgroup_with_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getadgroup_with_powershell.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "GetAdGroup with PowerShell" -excerpt: "Permission Groups Discovery, Domain Groups" +excerpt: "Permission Groups Discovery +, Domain Groups +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-08-25 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Permission Groups Discovery - - Discovery - Domain Groups - Discovery + - Discovery - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The `Get-AdGroup` commandlnet is used to return a list of all groups available in a Windows Domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-25 @@ -95,8 +97,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. | 15.0 | 30 | 50 | Domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getadgroup_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getadgroup_with_powershell_script_block.md index d5fb9e7081..a3e3f274f4 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getadgroup_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getadgroup_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "GetAdGroup with PowerShell Script Block" -excerpt: "Permission Groups Discovery, Domain Groups" +excerpt: "Permission Groups Discovery +, Domain Groups +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-08-25 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Permission Groups Discovery - - Discovery - Domain Groups - Discovery + - Discovery - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -24,7 +26,7 @@ tags: The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-AdGroup` commandlet. The `Get-AdGroup` commandlet is used to return a list of all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-25 @@ -86,8 +88,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshoo | 15.0 | 30 | 50 | Domain group discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getdomaingroup_with_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getdomaingroup_with_powershell.md index a6b52bd6ef..6b2c097070 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getdomaingroup_with_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getdomaingroup_with_powershell.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "GetDomainGroup with PowerShell" -excerpt: "Permission Groups Discovery, Domain Groups" +excerpt: "Permission Groups Discovery +, Domain Groups +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-08-25 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Permission Groups Discovery - - Discovery - Domain Groups - Discovery + - Discovery - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. `Get-DomainGroup` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-25 @@ -95,8 +97,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. | 15.0 | 30 | 50 | Domain group discovery with PowerView on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getnettcpconnection_with_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getnettcpconnection_with_powershell.md index deb4ecd7b7..32c59b7d12 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getnettcpconnection_with_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getnettcpconnection_with_powershell.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell" -excerpt: "System Network Connections Discovery" +excerpt: "System Network Connections Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-08-25 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. The `Get-NetTcpConnection` commandlet lists the current TCP connections. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-25 @@ -91,8 +92,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. | 15.0 | 30 | 50 | Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -106,6 +105,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1049/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1049/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell.md index b392b27e54..150d0f8f9c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell" -excerpt: "Permission Groups Discovery, Domain Groups" +excerpt: "Permission Groups Discovery +, Domain Groups +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-08-25 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Permission Groups Discovery - - Discovery - Domain Groups - Discovery + - Discovery - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `-class ds_group` parameter can be used to return the full list of groups in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI in this case, using PowerShell, to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-25 @@ -95,8 +97,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. | 15.0 | 30 | 50 | Domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_script_block.md index 2f63b5c62b..bd25120722 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell Script Block" -excerpt: "Permission Groups Discovery, Domain Groups" +excerpt: "Permission Groups Discovery +, Domain Groups +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-08-25 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Permission Groups Discovery - - Discovery - Domain Groups - Discovery + - Discovery - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -24,7 +26,7 @@ tags: The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet used with specific parameters . The `DS_Group` parameter leverages WMI to query for all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-25 @@ -86,8 +88,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshoo | 15.0 | 30 | 50 | Domain group discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell.md index 7f778d80e7..0970c0f1e4 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell" -excerpt: "Password Policy Discovery" +excerpt: "Password Policy Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-08-26 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` executing the Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-26 @@ -89,8 +90,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. | 9.0 | 30 | 30 | an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -105,6 +104,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.md index 2bdb60818a..5264035e0d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block" -excerpt: "Password Policy Discovery" +excerpt: "Password Policy Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-08-26 @@ -22,7 +23,7 @@ tags: The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-26 @@ -83,8 +84,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. | 9.0 | 30 | 30 | powershell process having commandline $Message$ to query domain password policy | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -99,6 +98,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-powershell.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell.md index 09f7a7626b..429a4442e5 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell" -excerpt: "Password Policy Discovery" +excerpt: "Password Policy Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-08-26 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` executing the Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-26 @@ -89,8 +90,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. | 25.0 | 50 | 50 | an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -105,6 +104,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.md index b645bc2992..cd743bb56f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block" -excerpt: "Password Policy Discovery" +excerpt: "Password Policy Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-08-26 @@ -22,7 +23,7 @@ tags: The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-26 @@ -83,8 +84,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. | 9.0 | 30 | 30 | powershell process having commandline $Message$ to query domain user password policy. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -99,6 +98,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-powershell.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_domainpolicy_with_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_domainpolicy_with_powershell.md index dd15fd6ac7..17ea6bf22e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_domainpolicy_with_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_domainpolicy_with_powershell.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Get DomainPolicy with Powershell" -excerpt: "Password Policy Discovery" +excerpt: "Password Policy Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-08-26 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` executing the `Get-DomainPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-26 @@ -89,8 +90,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. | 30.0 | 50 | 60 | an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -105,6 +104,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.md index 5481d2ab36..6a540f33ec 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Get DomainPolicy with Powershell Script Block" -excerpt: "Password Policy Discovery" +excerpt: "Password Policy Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-08-26 @@ -22,7 +23,7 @@ tags: The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get DomainPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-26 @@ -83,8 +84,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. | 30.0 | 50 | 60 | powershell process having commandline $Message$ to query domain policy. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -99,6 +98,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-powershell.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-getdomaingroup_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-getdomaingroup_with_powershell_script_block.md index 6b9495e9fd..ff948ca1a8 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-getdomaingroup_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-getdomaingroup_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "GetDomainGroup with PowerShell Script Block" -excerpt: "Permission Groups Discovery, Domain Groups" +excerpt: "Permission Groups Discovery +, Domain Groups +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-08-26 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Permission Groups Discovery - - Discovery - Domain Groups - Discovery + - Discovery - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -24,7 +26,7 @@ tags: The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainGroup` commandlet. `Get-DomainGroup` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. As the name suggests, `Get-DomainGroup` is used to query domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this function to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-26 @@ -86,8 +88,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this PowerView functions for troubleshooti | 15.0 | 30 | 50 | Domain group discovery enumeration using PowerView on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-password_policy_discovery_with_net.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-password_policy_discovery_with_net.md index e437824df6..a362e74ed8 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-password_policy_discovery_with_net.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-password_policy_discovery_with_net.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Password Policy Discovery with Net" -excerpt: "Password Policy Discovery" +excerpt: "Password Policy Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-08-26 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command line arguments used to obtain the domain password policy. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `net.exe` for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-26 @@ -89,8 +90,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. | 9.0 | 30 | 30 | an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -103,6 +102,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.md index c0839aab80..006a9f31a4 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location" -excerpt: "Phishing, Spearphishing Link" +excerpt: "Phishing +, Spearphishing Link +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-08-26 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Phishing - - Initial Access - Spearphishing Link - Initial Access + - Initial Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This search looks for a process launching an `*.lnk` file under `C:\User*` or `*\Local\Temp\*`. This is common behavior used by various spear phishing tools. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-26 @@ -100,8 +102,6 @@ This detection should yield little or no false positive results. It is uncommon | 63.0 | 70 | 90 | A process $process_name$ that launching .lnk file in $file_path$ in host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.002/lnk_file_temp_folder/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.002/lnk_file_temp_folder/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-27-exchange_powershell_abuse_via_ssrf.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-27-exchange_powershell_abuse_via_ssrf.md index 943785b6be..76b972d503 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-27-exchange_powershell_abuse_via_ssrf.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-27-exchange_powershell_abuse_via_ssrf.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF" -excerpt: "Exploit Public-Facing Application" +excerpt: "Exploit Public-Facing Application +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-08-27 @@ -14,8 +15,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Cloud --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -28,7 +29,7 @@ A suspicious event will have `PowerShell`, the method `POST` and `autodiscover.j An event will look similar to `POST /autodiscover/autodiscover.json a=dsxvu@fnsso.flq/powershell/?X-Rps-CAT=VgEAVAdXaW5kb3d...` (abbreviated) \ Review the source attempting to perform this activity against your environment. In addition, review PowerShell logs and access recently granted to Exchange roles. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-27 @@ -90,8 +91,6 @@ Limited false positives, however, tune as needed. | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | Activity related to ProxyShell has been identified on $dest$. Review events and take action accordingly. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -106,6 +105,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/exchange-events.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/exchange-events.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-27-exchange_powershell_module_usage.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-27-exchange_powershell_module_usage.md index 3cd1f2c919..648aa6280e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-27-exchange_powershell_module_usage.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-27-exchange_powershell_module_usage.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Exchange PowerShell Module Usage" -excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter, PowerShell" +excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter +, PowerShell +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-08-27 @@ -8,16 +10,16 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Command and Scripting Interpreter - - Execution - PowerShell - Execution + - Execution - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -29,7 +31,7 @@ Inherently, the usage of the modules is not malicious, but reviewing parallel pr Module - New-MailboxExportRequest will begin the process of exporting contents of a primary mailbox or archive to a .pst file. \ Module - New-managementroleassignment can assign a management role to a management role group, management role assignment policy, user, or universal security group (USG). -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-27 @@ -95,8 +97,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshoo | 15.0 | 30 | 50 | Local user discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -115,5 +115,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/endpoint/exchange_powershell_module_usage.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-30-domain_controller_discovery_with_nltest.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-30-domain_controller_discovery_with_nltest.md index 847eff86d3..4f758221b3 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-30-domain_controller_discovery_with_nltest.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-30-domain_controller_discovery_with_nltest.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest" -excerpt: "Remote System Discovery" +excerpt: "Remote System Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-08-30 @@ -21,9 +22,9 @@ tags: #### Description -This analytic looks for the execution of `nltest.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The arguments `/dclist:` and '/dsgetdc:', can be used to return a list of all domain controllers. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use nltest.exe to identify domain controllers in a Windows Domain for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +This analytic looks for the execution of `nltest.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The arguments `/dclist:` and '/dsgetdc:', can be used to return a list of all domain controllers. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use nltest.exe to identify domain controllers in a Windows Domain for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-30 @@ -91,8 +92,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. | 21.0 | 30 | 70 | Domain controller discovery on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -105,6 +104,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-30-remote_system_discovery_with_net.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-30-remote_system_discovery_with_net.md index 8848308f9b..f10bf71b0d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-30-remote_system_discovery_with_net.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-30-remote_system_discovery_with_net.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Remote System Discovery with Net" -excerpt: "Remote System Discovery" +excerpt: "Remote System Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-08-30 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The argument `domain computers /domain` returns a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-30 @@ -91,8 +92,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. | 15.0 | 30 | 50 | Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -105,6 +104,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-31-petitpotam_network_share_access_request.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-31-petitpotam_network_share_access_request.md index 799420ec7f..3c3d6a884b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-31-petitpotam_network_share_access_request.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-31-petitpotam_network_share_access_request.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "PetitPotam Network Share Access Request" -excerpt: "Forced Authentication" +excerpt: "Forced Authentication +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-08-31 @@ -12,7 +13,6 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - CVE-2021-36942 --- @@ -21,12 +21,12 @@ tags: #### Description -The following analytic utilizes Windows Event Code 5145, "A network share object was checked to see whether client can be granted desired access". During our research into PetitPotam, CVE-2021-36942, we identified the ocurrence of this event on the target host with specific values. \ -To enable 5145 events via Group Policy - Computer Configuration->Polices->Windows Settings->Security Settings->Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Expand this node, go to Object Access (Audit Polices->Object Access), then select the Setting Audit Detailed File Share Audit \ +The following analytic utilizes Windows Event Code 5145, "A network share object was checked to see whether client can be granted desired access". During our research into PetitPotam, CVE-2021-36942, we identified the ocurrence of this event on the target host with specific values. \ +To enable 5145 events via Group Policy - Computer Configuration->Polices->Windows Settings->Security Settings->Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Expand this node, go to Object Access (Audit Polices->Object Access), then select the Setting Audit Detailed File Share Audit \ It is possible this is not enabled by default and may need to be reviewed and enabled. \ During triage, review parallel security events to identify further suspicious activity. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-31 @@ -52,8 +52,8 @@ During triage, review parallel security events to identify further suspicious ac #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `petitpotam_network_share_access_request_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -79,7 +79,6 @@ False positives have been limited when the Anonymous Logon is used for Account N #### Kill Chain Phase * Exploitation -* Lateral Movement @@ -90,15 +89,6 @@ False positives have been limited when the Anonymous Logon is used for Account N | 56.0 | 80 | 70 | A remote host is enumerating a $dest$ to identify permissions. This is a precursor event to CVE-2021-36942, PetitPotam. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - - -#### CVE - -| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | -| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [CVE-2021-36942](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-36942) | Windows LSA Spoofing Vulnerability | 5.0 | - #### Reference @@ -113,6 +103,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1187/petitpotam/windows-security.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1187/petitpotam/windows-security.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-31-petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-31-petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request.md index 3f078d4371..e3ebb01acd 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-31-petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-31-petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request" -excerpt: "OS Credential Dumping" +excerpt: "OS Credential Dumping +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-08-31 @@ -12,7 +13,6 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - CVE-2021-36942 --- @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifes Event Code 4768, A `Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested`, successfull occurs. This behavior has been identified to assist with detecting PetitPotam, CVE-2021-36942. Once an attacer obtains a computer certificate by abusing Active Directory Certificate Services in combination with PetitPotam, the next step would be to leverage the certificate for malicious purposes. One way of doing this is to request a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket using a tool like Rubeus. This request will generate a 4768 event with some unusual fields depending on the environment. This analytic will require tuning, we recommend filtering Account_Name to Domain Controllers for your environment. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-31 @@ -49,8 +49,8 @@ The following analytic identifes Event Code 4768, A `Kerberos authentication tic #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -75,7 +75,6 @@ False positives are possible if the environment is using certificates for authen #### Kill Chain Phase * Exploitation -* Lateral Movement @@ -86,15 +85,6 @@ False positives are possible if the environment is using certificates for authen | 56.0 | 80 | 70 | A Kerberos TGT was requested in a non-standard manner against $dest$, potentially related to CVE-2021-36942, PetitPotam. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - - -#### CVE - -| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | -| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [CVE-2021-36942](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-36942) | Windows LSA Spoofing Vulnerability | 5.0 | - #### Reference @@ -108,6 +98,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1187/petitpotam/windows-security.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1187/petitpotam/windows-security.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-31-remote_system_discovery_with_dsquery.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-31-remote_system_discovery_with_dsquery.md index 096780eb42..ad08b8e27a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-31-remote_system_discovery_with_dsquery.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-31-remote_system_discovery_with_dsquery.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Remote System Discovery with Dsquery" -excerpt: "Remote System Discovery" +excerpt: "Remote System Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-08-31 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for the execution of `dsquery.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The `computer` argument returns a list of all computers registered in the domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike engage in remote system discovery for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-31 @@ -91,8 +92,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. | 15.0 | 30 | 50 | Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -106,6 +105,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-circle_ci_disable_security_step.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-circle_ci_disable_security_step.md index 30fe4ad121..3027360a77 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-circle_ci_disable_security_step.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-circle_ci_disable_security_step.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Circle CI Disable Security Step" -excerpt: "Compromise Client Software Binary" +excerpt: "Compromise Client Software Binary +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2021-09-01 @@ -12,7 +13,6 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Dev Sec Ops Analytics --- @@ -23,8 +23,8 @@ tags: This search looks for disable security step in CircleCI pipeline. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud, Dev Sec Ops Analytics +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-01 - **Author**: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ Note that `circle_ci_disable_security_step_filter` is a empty macro by default. #### Lookups The SPL above uses the following Lookups: -* [mandatory_step_for_job](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/mandatory_step_for_job.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/mandatory_step_for_job.csv) +* [mandatory_step_for_job](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/mandatory_step_for_job.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/lookups/mandatory_step_for_job.csv) #### Required field * _times @@ -96,8 +96,6 @@ unknown | 72.0 | 80 | 90 | disable security step $mandatory_step$ in job $job_name$ from user $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -107,6 +105,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1554/circle_ci_disable_security_step/circle_ci_disable_security_step.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1554/circle_ci_disable_security_step/circle_ci_disable_security_step.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-domain_controller_discovery_with_wmic.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-domain_controller_discovery_with_wmic.md index 43a2a3fbdd..815503a673 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-domain_controller_discovery_with_wmic.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-domain_controller_discovery_with_wmic.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Domain Controller Discovery with Wmic" -excerpt: "Remote System Discovery" +excerpt: "Remote System Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-01 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The arguments utilized in this command line return a list of all domain controllers in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike use *.exe to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-01 @@ -91,8 +92,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. | 21.0 | 30 | 70 | Domain controller discovery on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -105,6 +104,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-domain_group_discovery_with_dsquery.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-domain_group_discovery_with_dsquery.md index 0e2e1c35a5..b543564cd4 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-domain_group_discovery_with_dsquery.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-domain_group_discovery_with_dsquery.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Domain Group Discovery With Dsquery" -excerpt: "Permission Groups Discovery, Domain Groups" +excerpt: "Permission Groups Discovery +, Domain Groups +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-01 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Permission Groups Discovery - - Discovery - Domain Groups - Discovery + - Discovery - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for the execution of `dsquery.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The argument `group`, returns a list of all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use may leverage dsquery.exe to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-01 @@ -95,8 +97,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. | 15.0 | 30 | 50 | Domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-getadcomputer_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-getadcomputer_with_powershell_script_block.md index 09dd3c424b..c807746f4c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-getadcomputer_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-getadcomputer_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "GetAdComputer with PowerShell Script Block" -excerpt: "Remote System Discovery" +excerpt: "Remote System Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-01 @@ -22,7 +23,7 @@ tags: The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-AdGroup` commandlet. The `Get-AdGroup` commandlet is used to return a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-01 @@ -82,8 +83,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshoo | 15.0 | 30 | 50 | Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -97,6 +96,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_script_block.md index fe86ffa34a..2f6f4ef12a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell Script Block" -excerpt: "Remote System Discovery" +excerpt: "Remote System Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-01 @@ -22,7 +23,7 @@ tags: The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet. The `DS_Computer` class parameter leverages WMI to query for all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-01 @@ -82,8 +83,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshoo | 15.0 | 30 | 50 | Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -97,6 +96,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-github_commit_in_develop.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-github_commit_in_develop.md index 7351856da8..fbf6397c10 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-github_commit_in_develop.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-github_commit_in_develop.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Github Commit In Develop" -excerpt: "Trusted Relationship" +excerpt: "Trusted Relationship +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2021-09-01 @@ -12,7 +13,6 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Dev Sec Ops Analytics --- @@ -23,8 +23,8 @@ tags: This search is to detect a pushed or commit to develop branch. This is to avoid unwanted modification to develop without a review to the changes. Ideally in terms of devsecops the changes made in a branch and do a PR for review. of course in some cases admin of the project may did a changes directly to master branch -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud, Dev Sec Ops Analytics +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-01 - **Author**: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk @@ -50,8 +50,8 @@ This search is to detect a pushed or commit to develop branch. This is to avoid #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [github](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/github.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [github](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/github.yml) Note that `github_commit_in_develop_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -81,8 +81,6 @@ admin can do changes directly to develop branch | 9.0 | 30 | 30 | suspicious commit by $commit.commit.author.email$ to develop branch | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -95,6 +93,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1199/github_push_master/github_push_develop.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1199/github_push_master/github_push_develop.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-github_dependabot_alert.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-github_dependabot_alert.md index f4873d8edd..f47f9bf6a9 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-github_dependabot_alert.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-github_dependabot_alert.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "GitHub Dependabot Alert" -excerpt: "Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools, Supply Chain Compromise" +excerpt: "Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools +, Supply Chain Compromise +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2021-09-01 @@ -8,13 +10,12 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools - - Initial Access - Supply Chain Compromise - Initial Access + - Initial Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Dev Sec Ops Analytics --- @@ -25,8 +26,8 @@ tags: This search looks for Dependabot Alerts in Github logs. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud, Dev Sec Ops Analytics +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-01 - **Author**: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk @@ -55,8 +56,8 @@ This search looks for Dependabot Alerts in Github logs. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [github](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/github.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [github](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/github.yml) Note that `github_dependabot_alert_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -97,8 +98,6 @@ unknown | 27.0 | 30 | 90 | Vulnerabilities found in packages used by GitHub repository $repository$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -111,6 +110,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1195.001/github_security_advisor_alert/github_security_advisor_alert.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1195.001/github_security_advisor_alert/github_security_advisor_alert.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-github_pull_request_from_unknown_user.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-github_pull_request_from_unknown_user.md index 5e4f9ed1fb..c3accd20ac 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-github_pull_request_from_unknown_user.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-github_pull_request_from_unknown_user.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "GitHub Pull Request from Unknown User" -excerpt: "Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools, Supply Chain Compromise" +excerpt: "Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools +, Supply Chain Compromise +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2021-09-01 @@ -8,13 +10,12 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools - - Initial Access - Supply Chain Compromise - Initial Access + - Initial Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Dev Sec Ops Analytics --- @@ -25,8 +26,8 @@ tags: This search looks for Pull Request from unknown user. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud, Dev Sec Ops Analytics +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-01 - **Author**: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk @@ -56,9 +57,9 @@ This search looks for Pull Request from unknown user. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [github](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/github.yml) * [github_known_users](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/github_known_users.yml) -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `github_pull_request_from_unknown_user_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -99,8 +100,6 @@ unknown | 27.0 | 30 | 90 | Vulnerabilities found in packages used by GitHub repository $repository$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -113,6 +112,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1195.001/github_pull_request/github_pull_request.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1195.001/github_pull_request/github_pull_request.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-remote_system_discovery_with_adsisearcher.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-remote_system_discovery_with_adsisearcher.md index 5a2653dfe6..f68b6d1174 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-remote_system_discovery_with_adsisearcher.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-remote_system_discovery_with_adsisearcher.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Remote System Discovery with Adsisearcher" -excerpt: "Remote System Discovery" +excerpt: "Remote System Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-01 @@ -22,7 +23,7 @@ tags: The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator being used to query Active Directory for domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `[Adsisearcher]` to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-01 @@ -82,8 +83,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use Adsisearcher for troubleshooting. | 15.0 | 30 | 50 | Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -97,6 +96,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-remote_system_discovery_with_wmic.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-remote_system_discovery_with_wmic.md index 1c7ce46ed1..f74622a1dd 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-remote_system_discovery_with_wmic.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-remote_system_discovery_with_wmic.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Remote System Discovery with Wmic" -excerpt: "Remote System Discovery" +excerpt: "Remote System Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-01 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The arguments utilized in this command return a list of all the systems registered in the domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI and wmic.exe to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-01 @@ -91,8 +92,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. | 15.0 | 30 | 50 | Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -106,6 +105,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-02-circle_ci_disable_security_job.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-02-circle_ci_disable_security_job.md index 8917082d82..dad3c9a21e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-02-circle_ci_disable_security_job.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-02-circle_ci_disable_security_job.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Circle CI Disable Security Job" -excerpt: "Compromise Client Software Binary" +excerpt: "Compromise Client Software Binary +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2021-09-02 @@ -12,7 +13,6 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Dev Sec Ops Analytics --- @@ -23,8 +23,8 @@ tags: This search looks for disable security job in CircleCI pipeline. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud, Dev Sec Ops Analytics +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-02 - **Author**: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ Note that `circle_ci_disable_security_job_filter` is a empty macro by default. I #### Lookups The SPL above uses the following Lookups: -* [mandatory_job_for_workflow](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/mandatory_job_for_workflow.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/mandatory_job_for_workflow.csv) +* [mandatory_job_for_workflow](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/mandatory_job_for_workflow.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/lookups/mandatory_job_for_workflow.csv) #### Required field * _times @@ -92,8 +92,6 @@ unknown | 72.0 | 80 | 90 | disable security job $mandatory_job$ in workflow $workflow_name$ from user $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -103,6 +101,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1554/circle_ci_disable_security_job/circle_ci_disable_security_job.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1554/circle_ci_disable_security_job/circle_ci_disable_security_job.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-02-get-foresttrust_with_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-02-get-foresttrust_with_powershell.md index 52fe1267b0..d1c440121d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-02-get-foresttrust_with_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-02-get-foresttrust_with_powershell.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell" -excerpt: "Domain Trust Discovery" +excerpt: "Domain Trust Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-02 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This analytic identifies Get-ForestTrust from PowerSploit in order to gather domain trust information. Typically, this is utilized within a script being executed and used to enumerate the domain trust information. This grants the adversary an understanding of how large or small the domain is. During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-02 @@ -92,8 +93,6 @@ Limited false positives as this requires an active Administrator or adversary to | 12.0 | 30 | 40 | Suspicious PowerShell Get-ForestTrust was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -106,6 +105,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/discovery/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/discovery/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-02-get-foresttrust_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-02-get-foresttrust_with_powershell_script_block.md index 84729f94c0..fefc1fd539 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-02-get-foresttrust_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-02-get-foresttrust_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell Script Block" -excerpt: "Domain Trust Discovery" +excerpt: "Domain Trust Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-02 @@ -24,7 +25,7 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) This analytic identifies Get-ForestTrust from PowerSploit in order to gather domain trust information. \ During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-02 @@ -87,8 +88,6 @@ UPDATE_KNOWN_FALSE_POSITIVES | 12.0 | 30 | 40 | Suspicious PowerShell Get-ForestTrust was identified on endpoint $ComputerName$ by user $User$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -101,6 +100,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/discovery/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/discovery/windows-powershell.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-02-getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-02-getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_script_block.md index 7ab2ec6a6d..2f54b23a53 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-02-getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-02-getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "GetDomainComputer with PowerShell Script Block" -excerpt: "Remote System Discovery" +excerpt: "Remote System Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-02 @@ -22,7 +23,7 @@ tags: The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainComputer` commandlet. `GetDomainComputer` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerView to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-02 @@ -82,8 +83,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use PowerView for troubleshooting. | 24.0 | 30 | 80 | Remote system discovery with PowerView on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -97,6 +96,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-02-getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-02-getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_script_block.md index 12b721e8bb..52842a99c0 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-02-getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-02-getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "GetDomainController with PowerShell Script Block" -excerpt: "Remote System Discovery" +excerpt: "Remote System Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-02 @@ -22,7 +23,7 @@ tags: The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainController` commandlet. `Get-DomainController` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerView to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-02 @@ -82,8 +83,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshoo | 24.0 | 30 | 80 | Remote system discovery with PowerView on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -97,6 +96,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-06-bcdedit_command_back_to_normal_mode_boot.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-06-bcdedit_command_back_to_normal_mode_boot.md index ad7530a633..0ec8979f92 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-06-bcdedit_command_back_to_normal_mode_boot.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-06-bcdedit_command_back_to_normal_mode_boot.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Bcdedit Command Back To Normal Mode Boot" -excerpt: "Inhibit System Recovery" +excerpt: "Inhibit System Recovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-06 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This search is to detect a suspicious bcdedit commandline to configure the host from safe mode back to normal boot configuration. This technique was seen in blackMatter ransomware where it force the compromised host to boot in safe mode to continue its encryption and bring back to normal boot using bcdedit deletevalue command. This TTP can be a good alert for host that booted from safe mode forcefully since it need to modify the boot configuration to bring it back to normal. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-06 @@ -87,8 +88,6 @@ unknown | 35.0 | 50 | 70 | bcdedit process with commandline $process$ to bring back to normal boot configuration the $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -101,6 +100,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1552.002/autoadminlogon/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1552.002/autoadminlogon/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-06-change_to_safe_mode_with_network_config.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-06-change_to_safe_mode_with_network_config.md index 1764a1ae59..0e3578521e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-06-change_to_safe_mode_with_network_config.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-06-change_to_safe_mode_with_network_config.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Change To Safe Mode With Network Config" -excerpt: "Inhibit System Recovery" +excerpt: "Inhibit System Recovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-06 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This search is to detect a suspicious bcdedit commandline to configure the host to boot in safe mode with network config. This technique was seen in blackMatter ransomware where it force the compromised host to boot in safe mode to continue its encryption and bring back to normal boot using bcdedit deletevalue command. This TTP can be a good alert for host that booted from safe mode forcefully since it need to modify the boot configuration to bring it back to normal. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-06 @@ -87,8 +88,6 @@ unknown | 25.0 | 50 | 50 | bcdedit process with commandline $process$ to force safemode boot the $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -101,6 +100,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1552.002/autoadminlogon/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1552.002/autoadminlogon/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-06-correlation_by_repository_and_risk.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-06-correlation_by_repository_and_risk.md index 6838aea9e7..1abc2e8848 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-06-correlation_by_repository_and_risk.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-06-correlation_by_repository_and_risk.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Correlation by Repository and Risk" -excerpt: "Malicious Image, User Execution" +excerpt: "Malicious Image +, User Execution +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2021-09-06 @@ -8,13 +10,12 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Malicious Image - - Execution - User Execution - Execution + - Execution - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Dev Sec Ops Analytics --- @@ -25,8 +26,8 @@ tags: This search correlations detections by repository and risk_score -- **Type**: [Correlation](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud, Dev Sec Ops Analytics +- **Type**: [Correlation](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-06 - **Author**: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk @@ -84,8 +85,6 @@ unknown | 70.0 | 70 | 100 | Correlation triggered for user $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -97,5 +96,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/cloud/correlation_by_repository_and_risk.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-06-correlation_by_user_and_risk.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-06-correlation_by_user_and_risk.md index aabf2dbbf9..6e8c54b63d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-06-correlation_by_user_and_risk.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-06-correlation_by_user_and_risk.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Correlation by User and Risk" -excerpt: "Malicious Image, User Execution" +excerpt: "Malicious Image +, User Execution +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2021-09-06 @@ -8,13 +10,12 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Malicious Image - - Execution - User Execution - Execution + - Execution - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Dev Sec Ops Analytics --- @@ -25,8 +26,8 @@ tags: This search correlations detections by user and risk_score -- **Type**: [Correlation](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud, Dev Sec Ops Analytics +- **Type**: [Correlation](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-06 - **Author**: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk @@ -84,8 +85,6 @@ unknown | 70.0 | 70 | 100 | Correlation triggered for user $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -97,5 +96,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/cloud/correlation_by_user_and_risk.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-getadcomputer_with_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-getadcomputer_with_powershell.md index b33a1501d3..b0051ced4d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-getadcomputer_with_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-getadcomputer_with_powershell.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "GetAdComputer with PowerShell" -excerpt: "Remote System Discovery" +excerpt: "Remote System Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-07 @@ -21,9 +22,9 @@ tags: #### Description -This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The `Get-AdComputer' commandlet returns a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The `Get-AdComputer' commandlet returns a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-07 @@ -91,8 +92,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. | 15.0 | 30 | 50 | Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -105,6 +104,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-getdomaincomputer_with_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-getdomaincomputer_with_powershell.md index 49ba2384b0..2ea7a8f834 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-getdomaincomputer_with_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-getdomaincomputer_with_powershell.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "GetDomainComputer with PowerShell" -excerpt: "Remote System Discovery" +excerpt: "Remote System Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-07 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. `Get-DomainComputer` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-07 @@ -91,8 +92,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use PowerView for troubleshooting. | 24.0 | 30 | 80 | Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -105,6 +104,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-getdomaincontroller_with_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-getdomaincontroller_with_powershell.md index 42d6fc980d..dc2a880d09 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-getdomaincontroller_with_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-getdomaincontroller_with_powershell.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "GetDomainController with PowerShell" -excerpt: "Remote System Discovery" +excerpt: "Remote System Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-07 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. `Get-DomainController` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-07 @@ -91,8 +92,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use PowerView for troubleshooting. | 24.0 | 30 | 80 | Remote system discovery using PowerView on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -106,6 +105,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell.md index 67e00af893..c110695866 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell" -excerpt: "Remote System Discovery" +excerpt: "Remote System Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-07 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `DS_Computer` parameter can be used to return a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI in this case, using PowerShell, to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-07 @@ -91,8 +92,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. | 21.0 | 30 | 70 | Remote system discovery enumeration using WMI on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -105,6 +104,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-schcache_change_by_app_connect_and_create_adsi_object.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-schcache_change_by_app_connect_and_create_adsi_object.md index 1772cb517c..f0a356d06e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-schcache_change_by_app_connect_and_create_adsi_object.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-schcache_change_by_app_connect_and_create_adsi_object.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "SchCache Change By App Connect And Create ADSI Object" -excerpt: "Domain Account, Account Discovery" +excerpt: "Domain Account +, Account Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-07 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Domain Account - - Discovery - Account Discovery - Discovery + - Discovery - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This analytic is to detect an application try to connect and create ADSI Object to do LDAP query. Every time an application connects to the directory and attempts to create an ADSI object, the Active Directory Schema is checked for changes. If it has changed since the last connection, the schema is downloaded and stored in a cache on the local computer either in %LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\SchCache or %systemroot%\SchCache. We found this a good anomaly use case to detect suspicious application like blackmatter ransomware that use ADS object api to execute ldap query. having a good list of ldap or normal AD query tool used within the network is a good start to reduce the noise. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-07 @@ -53,8 +55,8 @@ This analytic is to detect an application try to connect and create ADSI Object #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `schcache_change_by_app_connect_and_create_adsi_object_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -90,8 +92,6 @@ normal application like mmc.exe and other ldap query tool may trigger this detec | 25.0 | 50 | 50 | process $Image$ create a file $TargetFilename$ in host $Computer$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/blackmatter_schcache/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/blackmatter_schcache/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-system_information_discovery_detection.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-system_information_discovery_detection.md index 0ef9d4f3d7..4013524077 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-system_information_discovery_detection.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-system_information_discovery_detection.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "System Information Discovery Detection" -excerpt: "System Information Discovery" +excerpt: "System Information Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-07 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: Detect system information discovery techniques used by attackers to understand configurations of the system to further exploit it. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-07 @@ -88,8 +89,6 @@ Administrators debugging servers | 15.0 | 30 | 50 | Potential system information discovery behavior on $dest$ by $User$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -102,6 +101,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1082/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1082/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-control_loading_from_world_writable_directory.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-control_loading_from_world_writable_directory.md index 2ddd90b4d4..345daf5554 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-control_loading_from_world_writable_directory.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-control_loading_from_world_writable_directory.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Control Loading from World Writable Directory" -excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution, Control Panel" +excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution +, Control Panel +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-08 @@ -8,13 +10,12 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Signed Binary Proxy Execution - - Defense Evasion - Control Panel - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - CVE-2021-40444 - Endpoint --- @@ -26,7 +27,7 @@ tags: The following detection identifies control.exe loading either a .cpl or .inf from a writable directory. This is related to CVE-2021-40444. During triage, review parallel processes, parent and child, for further suspicious behaviors. In addition, capture file modifications and analyze. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-08 @@ -96,15 +97,6 @@ Limited false positives will be present as control.exe does not natively load fr | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a suspicious file from disk. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - - -#### CVE - -| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | -| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [CVE-2021-40444](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-40444) | Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | 6.8 | - #### Reference @@ -121,6 +113,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.md index 8fd0c88530..26f1885005 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Create local admin accounts using net exe" -excerpt: "Local Account, Create Account" +excerpt: "Local Account +, Create Account +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-08 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Local Account - - Persistence - Create Account - Persistence + - Persistence - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This search looks for the creation of local administrator accounts using net.exe . -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-08 @@ -75,7 +77,7 @@ Note that `create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe_filter` is a empty macro by #### How To Implement -You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. +You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. #### Known False Positives Administrators often leverage net.exe to create admin accounts. @@ -96,8 +98,6 @@ Administrators often leverage net.exe to create admin accounts. | 30.0 | 50 | 60 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to add a user to the local Administrators group. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log) * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log) * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-office_spawning_control.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-office_spawning_control.md index ce86e6cfd2..40f47a68a8 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-office_spawning_control.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-office_spawning_control.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Office Spawning Control" -excerpt: "Phishing, Spearphishing Attachment" +excerpt: "Phishing +, Spearphishing Attachment +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-08 @@ -8,13 +10,12 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Phishing - - Initial Access - Spearphishing Attachment - Initial Access + - Initial Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - CVE-2021-40444 - Endpoint --- @@ -26,7 +27,7 @@ tags: The following detection identifies control.exe spawning from an office product. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `control.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `control.exe` will contain a file path to a .cpl or .inf, related to CVE-2021-40444. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. review parallel and child processes to identify further suspicious behavior -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-08 @@ -97,15 +98,6 @@ Limited false positives should be present. | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ clicking a suspicious attachment. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - - -#### CVE - -| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | -| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [CVE-2021-40444](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-40444) | Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | 6.8 | - #### Reference @@ -123,6 +115,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_control.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_control.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-rundll32_control_rundll_hunt.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-rundll32_control_rundll_hunt.md index 936ae7674c..df014516b7 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-rundll32_control_rundll_hunt.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-rundll32_control_rundll_hunt.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt" -excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution, Rundll32" +excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution +, Rundll32 +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-08 @@ -8,13 +10,12 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Signed Binary Proxy Execution - - Defense Evasion - Rundll32 - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - CVE-2021-40444 - Endpoint --- @@ -26,7 +27,7 @@ tags: The following hunting detection identifies rundll32.exe with `control_rundll` within the command-line, loading a .cpl or another file type. Developed in relation to CVE-2021-40444. Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. \ This is written to be a bit more broad by not including .cpl. \ During triage, review parallel processes to identify any further suspicious behavior. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-08 @@ -98,15 +99,6 @@ This is a hunting detection, meant to provide a understanding of how voluminous | 15.0 | 30 | 50 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a suspicious file from disk. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - - -#### CVE - -| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | -| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [CVE-2021-40444](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-40444) | Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | 6.8 | - #### Reference @@ -124,6 +116,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory.md index aa6861016c..143850b9b1 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory" -excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution, Rundll32" +excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution +, Rundll32 +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-08 @@ -8,13 +10,12 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Signed Binary Proxy Execution - - Defense Evasion - Rundll32 - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - CVE-2021-40444 - Endpoint --- @@ -26,7 +27,7 @@ tags: The following detection identifies rundll32.exe with `control_rundll` within the command-line, loading a .cpl or another file type from windows\temp, programdata, or appdata. Developed in relation to CVE-2021-40444. Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. This is written to be a bit more broad by not including .cpl. The paths are specified, add more as needed. During triage, review parallel processes to identify any further suspicious behavior. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-08 @@ -79,7 +80,7 @@ Note that `rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory_filter` is a empty m To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. #### Known False Positives -This may be tuned, or a new one related, by adding .cpl to command-line. However, it's important to look for both. Tune/filter as needed. +This may be tuned, or a new one related, by adding .cpl to command-line. However, it's important to look for both. Tune/filter as needed. #### Associated Analytic story * [Suspicious Rundll32 Activity](/stories/suspicious_rundll32_activity) @@ -98,15 +99,6 @@ This may be tuned, or a new one related, by adding .cpl to command-line. However | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a suspicious file from disk. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - - -#### CVE - -| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | -| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [CVE-2021-40444](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-40444) | Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | 6.8 | - #### Reference @@ -124,6 +116,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-09-extraction_of_registry_hives.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-09-extraction_of_registry_hives.md index 5a973f0015..d57354b984 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-09-extraction_of_registry_hives.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-09-extraction_of_registry_hives.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Extraction of Registry Hives" -excerpt: "Security Account Manager, OS Credential Dumping" +excerpt: "Security Account Manager +, OS Credential Dumping +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-09 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Security Account Manager - - Credential Access - OS Credential Dumping - Credential Access + - Credential Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies the use of `reg.exe` exporting Windows Registry hives containing credentials. Adversaries may use this technique to export registry hives for offline credential access attacks. Typically found executed from a untrusted process or script. Upon execution, a file will be written to disk. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-09 @@ -54,9 +56,9 @@ The following analytic identifies the use of `reg.exe` exporting Windows Registr #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_reg](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_reg.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_reg](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_reg.yml) Note that `extraction_of_registry_hives_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -98,8 +100,6 @@ It is possible some agent based products will generate false positives. Filter a | 56.0 | 80 | 70 | Suspicious use of `reg.exe` exporting Windows Registry hives containing credentials executed on $dest$ by user $user$, with a parent process of $parent_process_id$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-09-mshtml_module_load_in_office_product.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-09-mshtml_module_load_in_office_product.md index 8a0c141d71..140d2e20f4 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-09-mshtml_module_load_in_office_product.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-09-mshtml_module_load_in_office_product.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "MSHTML Module Load in Office Product" -excerpt: "Phishing, Spearphishing Attachment" +excerpt: "Phishing +, Spearphishing Attachment +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-09 @@ -8,13 +10,12 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Phishing - - Initial Access - Spearphishing Attachment - Initial Access + - Initial Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - CVE-2021-40444 - Endpoint --- @@ -26,7 +27,7 @@ tags: The following detection identifies the module load of mshtml.dll into an Office product. This behavior has been related to CVE-2021-40444, whereas the malicious document will load ActiveX, which activates the MSHTML component. The vulnerability resides in the MSHTML component. During triage, identify parallel processes and capture any file modifications for analysis. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-09 @@ -55,8 +56,8 @@ The following detection identifies the module load of mshtml.dll into an Office #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `mshtml_module_load_in_office_product_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -92,15 +93,6 @@ Limited false positives will be present, however, tune as necessary. | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ loading mshtml.dll. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - - -#### CVE - -| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | -| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [CVE-2021-40444](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-40444) | Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | 6.8 | - #### Reference @@ -115,6 +107,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_mshtml.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_mshtml.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-10-getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-10-getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_script_block.md index 4a74b6b373..f964e65740 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-10-getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-10-getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell Script Block" -excerpt: "System Network Connections Discovery" +excerpt: "System Network Connections Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-10 @@ -22,7 +23,7 @@ tags: The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-NetTcpconnection ` commandlet. This commandlet is used to return a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-10 @@ -82,8 +83,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshoo | 15.0 | 30 | 50 | Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -97,6 +96,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1049/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1049/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-10-network_connection_discovery_with_arp.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-10-network_connection_discovery_with_arp.md index e39985d88d..c244645f49 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-10-network_connection_discovery_with_arp.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-10-network_connection_discovery_with_arp.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Network Connection Discovery With Arp" -excerpt: "System Network Connections Discovery" +excerpt: "System Network Connections Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-10 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for the execution of `arp.exe` utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use arp.exe for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-10 @@ -91,8 +92,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. | 15.0 | 30 | 50 | Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -105,6 +104,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1049/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1049/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-10-network_connection_discovery_with_net.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-10-network_connection_discovery_with_net.md index 96dc60f099..a9229c3fce 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-10-network_connection_discovery_with_net.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-10-network_connection_discovery_with_net.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Network Connection Discovery With Net" -excerpt: "System Network Connections Discovery" +excerpt: "System Network Connections Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-10 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use net.exe for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-10 @@ -91,8 +92,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. | 15.0 | 30 | 50 | Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -105,6 +104,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1049/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1049/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-10-network_connection_discovery_with_netstat.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-10-network_connection_discovery_with_netstat.md index e624431581..a2c04a9b91 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-10-network_connection_discovery_with_netstat.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-10-network_connection_discovery_with_netstat.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Network Connection Discovery With Netstat" -excerpt: "System Network Connections Discovery" +excerpt: "System Network Connections Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-10 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for the execution of `netstat.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use netstat.exe for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-10 @@ -91,8 +92,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. | 15.0 | 30 | 50 | Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -105,6 +104,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1049/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1049/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-10-office_product_writing_cab_or_inf.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-10-office_product_writing_cab_or_inf.md index 46c8ff94eb..a00e049f6e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-10-office_product_writing_cab_or_inf.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-10-office_product_writing_cab_or_inf.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Office Product Writing cab or inf" -excerpt: "Phishing, Spearphishing Attachment" +excerpt: "Phishing +, Spearphishing Attachment +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-10 @@ -8,13 +10,12 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Phishing - - Initial Access - Spearphishing Attachment - Initial Access + - Initial Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - CVE-2021-40444 - Endpoint --- @@ -26,7 +27,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies behavior related to CVE-2021-40444. Whereas the malicious document will load ActiveX and download the remote payload (.inf, .cab). During triage, review parallel processes and further activity on endpoint to identify additional patterns. Retrieve the file modifications and analyze further. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-10 @@ -96,15 +97,6 @@ The query is structured in a way that `action` (read, create) is not defined. Re | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | An instance of $process_name$ was identified on $dest$ writing an inf or cab file to this. This is not typical of $process_name$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - - -#### CVE - -| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | -| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [CVE-2021-40444](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-40444) | Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | 6.8 | - #### Reference @@ -120,6 +112,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_cabinf.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_cabinf.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-getcurrent_user_with_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-getcurrent_user_with_powershell.md index 5c823d0e81..b636972c17 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-getcurrent_user_with_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-getcurrent_user_with_powershell.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "GetCurrent User with PowerShell" -excerpt: "System Owner/User Discovery" +excerpt: "System Owner/User Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-13 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for the execution of `powerhsell.exe` with command-line arguments that execute the `GetCurrent` method of the WindowsIdentity .NET class. This method returns an object that represents the current Windows user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-13 @@ -92,8 +93,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. | 15.0 | 30 | 50 | System user discovery on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -106,6 +105,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-getcurrent_user_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-getcurrent_user_with_powershell_script_block.md index 5012ebfff5..12ce6a0f71 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-getcurrent_user_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-getcurrent_user_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "GetCurrent User with PowerShell Script Block" -excerpt: "System Owner/User Discovery" +excerpt: "System Owner/User Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-13 @@ -22,7 +23,7 @@ tags: The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `GetCurrent` method of the WindowsIdentity .NET class. This method returns an object that represents the current Windows user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-13 @@ -84,8 +85,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshoo | 15.0 | 30 | 50 | System user discovery on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -99,6 +98,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-jscript_execution_using_cscript_app.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-jscript_execution_using_cscript_app.md index 8cb5e199aa..d44db66c59 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-jscript_execution_using_cscript_app.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-jscript_execution_using_cscript_app.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Jscript Execution Using Cscript App" -excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter, JavaScript" +excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter +, JavaScript +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-13 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Command and Scripting Interpreter - - Execution - JavaScript - Execution + - Execution - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This search is to detect a execution of jscript using cscript process. Commonly when a user run jscript file it was executed by wscript.exe application. This technique was seen in FIN7 js implant to execute its malicious script using cscript process. This behavior is uncommon and a good artifacts to check further anomalies within the network -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-13 @@ -93,8 +95,6 @@ unknown | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | Process name $process_name$ with commandline $process$ to execute jscript in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_macro_js_1/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_macro_js_1/sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module.md index be3f442364..49f4ccfc82 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "MS Scripting Process Loading Ldap Module" -excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter, JavaScript" +excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter +, JavaScript +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-13 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Command and Scripting Interpreter - - Execution - JavaScript - Execution + - Execution - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This search is to detect a suspicious MS scripting process such as wscript.exe or cscript.exe that loading ldap module to process ldap query. This behavior was seen in FIN7 implant where it uses javascript to execute ldap query to parse host information that will send to its C2 server. this anomaly detections is a good initial step to hunt further a suspicious ldap query or ldap related events to the host that may give you good information regarding ldap or AD information processing or might be a attacker. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-13 @@ -53,8 +55,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious MS scripting process such as wscript.exe o #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -91,8 +93,6 @@ automation scripting language may used by network operator to do ldap query. | 9.0 | 30 | 30 | $process_name$ loading ldap modules $ImageLoaded$ in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_js_2/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_js_2/sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module.md index 1152dea23c..7a52e89940 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "MS Scripting Process Loading WMI Module" -excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter, JavaScript" +excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter +, JavaScript +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-13 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Command and Scripting Interpreter - - Execution - JavaScript - Execution + - Execution - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This search is to detect a suspicious MS scripting process such as wscript.exe or cscript.exe that loading wmi module to process wmi query. This behavior was seen in FIN7 implant where it uses javascript to execute wmi query to parse host information that will send to its C2 server. this anomaly detections is a good initial step to hunt further a suspicious wmi query or wmi related events to the host that may give you good information regarding process that are commonly using wmi query or modules or might be an attacker using this technique. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-13 @@ -53,8 +55,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious MS scripting process such as wscript.exe o #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -91,8 +93,6 @@ automation scripting language may used by network operator to do ldap query. | 9.0 | 30 | 30 | $process_name$ loading wmi modules $ImageLoaded$ in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_js_2/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_js_2/sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-office_application_drop_executable.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-office_application_drop_executable.md index f24d709974..896cdac9f6 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-office_application_drop_executable.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-office_application_drop_executable.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Office Application Drop Executable" -excerpt: "Phishing, Spearphishing Attachment" +excerpt: "Phishing +, Spearphishing Attachment +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-13 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Phishing - - Initial Access - Spearphishing Attachment - Initial Access + - Initial Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This search is to detect a suspicious MS office application that drop or create executables or script in the host. This behavior is commonly seen in spear phishing office attachment where it drop malicious files or script to compromised the host. It might be some normal macro may drop script or tools as part of automation but still this behavior is reallly suspicious and not commonly seen in normal office application -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-13 @@ -95,8 +97,6 @@ office macro for automation may do this behavior | 64.0 | 80 | 80 | process $process_name$ drops a file $TargetFilename$ in host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_macro_js_1/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_macro_js_1/sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-system_user_discovery_with_query.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-system_user_discovery_with_query.md index 81323a5aae..9eaa2763c0 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-system_user_discovery_with_query.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-system_user_discovery_with_query.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "System User Discovery With Query" -excerpt: "System Owner/User Discovery" +excerpt: "System Owner/User Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-13 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for the execution of `query.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover the logged user. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage `query.exe` to identify system users on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-13 @@ -92,8 +93,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. | 15.0 | 30 | 50 | System user discovery on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -106,6 +105,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-system_user_discovery_with_whoami.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-system_user_discovery_with_whoami.md index 86e4c88f94..628c45ca50 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-system_user_discovery_with_whoami.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-system_user_discovery_with_whoami.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "System User Discovery With Whoami" -excerpt: "System Owner/User Discovery" +excerpt: "System Owner/User Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-13 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for the execution of `whoami.exe` without any arguments. This windows native binary prints out the current logged user. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage `whoami.exe` to identify system users on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-13 @@ -92,8 +93,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. | 15.0 | 30 | 50 | System user discovery on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -106,6 +105,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell.md index 7910d1b0a7..04c6ccf418 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell" -excerpt: "System Owner/User Discovery" +excerpt: "System Owner/User Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-13 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments that leverage PowerShell environment variables to identify the current logged user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-13 @@ -92,8 +93,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. | 15.0 | 30 | 50 | System user discovery on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -106,6 +105,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_script_block.md index bf04a57381..0cdbded1c5 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_script_block.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell Script Block" -excerpt: "System Owner/User Discovery" +excerpt: "System Owner/User Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-13 @@ -22,7 +23,7 @@ tags: The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the use of PowerShell environment variables to identify the current logged user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-13 @@ -84,8 +85,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshoo | 15.0 | 30 | 50 | System user discovery on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -98,6 +97,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-xsl_script_execution_with_wmic.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-xsl_script_execution_with_wmic.md index b789752ec5..737946a6ba 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-xsl_script_execution_with_wmic.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-xsl_script_execution_with_wmic.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "XSL Script Execution With WMIC" -excerpt: "XSL Script Processing" +excerpt: "XSL Script Processing +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-13 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This search is to detect a suspicious wmic.exe process or renamed wmic process to execute malicious xsl file. This technique was seen in FIN7 to execute its malicous jscript using the .xsl as the loader with the help of wmic.exe process. This TTP is really a good indicator for you to hunt further for FIN7 or other attacker that known to used this technique. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-13 @@ -50,9 +51,9 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious wmic.exe process or renamed wmic process t #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_wmic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_wmic.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_wmic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_wmic.yml) Note that `xsl_script_execution_with_wmic_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -90,8 +91,6 @@ unknown | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ utilizing wmic to load a XSL script. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -107,6 +106,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_macro_js_1/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_macro_js_1/sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-cmdline_tool_not_executed_in_cmd_shell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-cmdline_tool_not_executed_in_cmd_shell.md index 156be47415..ea29530852 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-cmdline_tool_not_executed_in_cmd_shell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-cmdline_tool_not_executed_in_cmd_shell.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell" -excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter, JavaScript" +excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter +, JavaScript +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-14 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Command and Scripting Interpreter - - Execution - JavaScript - Execution + - Execution - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -23,9 +25,9 @@ tags: #### Description -The following analytic identifies a non-standard parent process (not matching CMD, PowerShell, or Explorer) spawning `ipconfig.exe` or `systeminfo.exe`. This particular behavior was seen in FIN7's JSSLoader .NET payload. This is also typically seen when an adversary is injected into another process performing different discovery techniques. This event stands out as a TTP since these tools are commonly executed with a shell application or Explorer parent, and not by another application. This TTP is a good indicator for an adversary gathering host information, but one possible false positive might be an automated tool used by a system administator. +The following analytic identifies a non-standard parent process (not matching CMD, PowerShell, or Explorer) spawning `ipconfig.exe` or `systeminfo.exe`. This particular behavior was seen in FIN7's JSSLoader .NET payload. This is also typically seen when an adversary is injected into another process performing different discovery techniques. This event stands out as a TTP since these tools are commonly executed with a shell application or Explorer parent, and not by another application. This TTP is a good indicator for an adversary gathering host information, but one possible false positive might be an automated tool used by a system administator. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-14 @@ -96,8 +98,6 @@ A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated host discov | 56.0 | 70 | 80 | A non-standard parent process $parent_process_name$ spawned child process $process_name$ to execute command-line tool on $dest$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/jssloader/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/jssloader/sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-get_wmiobject_group_discovery.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-get_wmiobject_group_discovery.md index 9fceb935a2..703a994fd8 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-get_wmiobject_group_discovery.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-get_wmiobject_group_discovery.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Get WMIObject Group Discovery" -excerpt: "Permission Groups Discovery, Local Groups" +excerpt: "Permission Groups Discovery +, Local Groups +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-14 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Permission Groups Discovery - - Discovery - Local Groups - Discovery + - Discovery - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: The following hunting analytic identifies the use of `Get-WMIObject Win32_Group` being used with PowerShell to identify local groups on the endpoint. \ Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \ During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-14 @@ -96,8 +98,6 @@ False positives may be present. Tune as needed. | 15.0 | 30 | 50 | System group discovery on $dest$ by $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-get_wmiobject_group_discovery_with_script_block_logging.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-get_wmiobject_group_discovery_with_script_block_logging.md index 7087f2751c..d544ab716e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-get_wmiobject_group_discovery_with_script_block_logging.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-get_wmiobject_group_discovery_with_script_block_logging.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Get WMIObject Group Discovery with Script Block Logging" -excerpt: "Permission Groups Discovery, Local Groups" +excerpt: "Permission Groups Discovery +, Local Groups +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-14 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Permission Groups Discovery - - Discovery - Local Groups - Discovery + - Discovery - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -26,7 +28,7 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) This analytic identifies the usage of `Get-WMIObject Win32_Group`, which is typically used as a way to identify groups on the endpoint. Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \ During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-14 @@ -89,8 +91,6 @@ False positives may be present. Tune as needed. | 15.0 | 30 | 50 | System group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-powershell.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-net_localgroup_discovery.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-net_localgroup_discovery.md index 07f6a05b92..a0f0425034 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-net_localgroup_discovery.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-net_localgroup_discovery.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Net Localgroup Discovery" -excerpt: "Permission Groups Discovery, Local Groups" +excerpt: "Permission Groups Discovery +, Local Groups +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-14 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Permission Groups Discovery - - Discovery - Local Groups - Discovery + - Discovery - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: The following hunting analytic will identify the use of localgroup discovery using `net localgroup`. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-14 @@ -97,8 +99,6 @@ False positives may be present. Tune as needed. | 15.0 | 30 | 50 | Local group discovery on $dest$ by $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-powershell_get_localgroup_discovery.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-powershell_get_localgroup_discovery.md index cdd0f07d15..72c30e8451 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-powershell_get_localgroup_discovery.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-powershell_get_localgroup_discovery.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "PowerShell Get LocalGroup Discovery" -excerpt: "Permission Groups Discovery, Local Groups" +excerpt: "Permission Groups Discovery +, Local Groups +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-14 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Permission Groups Discovery - - Discovery - Local Groups - Discovery + - Discovery - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: The following hunting analytic identifies the use of `get-localgroup` being used with PowerShell to identify local groups on the endpoint. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-14 @@ -96,8 +98,6 @@ False positives may be present. Tune as needed. | 15.0 | 30 | 50 | Local group discovery on $dest$ by $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_with_script_block_logging.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_with_script_block_logging.md index a80fcddcc9..2b4b327871 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_with_script_block_logging.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_with_script_block_logging.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Powershell Get LocalGroup Discovery with Script Block Logging" -excerpt: "Permission Groups Discovery, Local Groups" +excerpt: "Permission Groups Discovery +, Local Groups +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-14 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Permission Groups Discovery - - Discovery - Local Groups - Discovery + - Discovery - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -26,7 +28,7 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) This analytic identifies PowerShell cmdlet - `get-localgroup` being ran. Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \ During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-14 @@ -89,8 +91,6 @@ False positives may be present. Tune as needed. | 15.0 | 30 | 50 | Local group discovery on $dest$ by $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-powershell.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-wmic_group_discovery.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-wmic_group_discovery.md index e2888cceb1..9fa586ad23 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-wmic_group_discovery.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-wmic_group_discovery.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Wmic Group Discovery" -excerpt: "Permission Groups Discovery, Local Groups" +excerpt: "Permission Groups Discovery +, Local Groups +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-14 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Permission Groups Discovery - - Discovery - Local Groups - Discovery + - Discovery - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ The following hunting analytic identifies the use of `wmic.exe` enumerating loca Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \ During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-14 @@ -98,8 +100,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. | 15.0 | 30 | 50 | Local group discovery on $dest$ by $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-15-check_elevated_cmd_using_whoami.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-15-check_elevated_cmd_using_whoami.md index 929db9d421..9a167c811b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-15-check_elevated_cmd_using_whoami.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-15-check_elevated_cmd_using_whoami.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Check Elevated CMD using whoami" -excerpt: "System Owner/User Discovery" +excerpt: "System Owner/User Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-15 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This search is to detect a suspicious whoami execution to check if the cmd or shell instance process is with elevated privileges. This technique was seen in FIN7 js implant where it execute this as part of its data collection to the infected machine to check if the running shell cmd process is elevated or not. This TTP is really a good alert for known attacker that recon on the targetted host. This command is not so commonly executed by a normal user or even an admin to check if a process is elevated. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-15 @@ -88,8 +89,6 @@ unknown | 56.0 | 70 | 80 | Process name $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -99,6 +98,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_js_2/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_js_2/sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-15-non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-15-non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir.md index e6c7b04f01..272b4496e5 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-15-non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-15-non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir" -excerpt: "Credentials from Password Stores, Credentials from Web Browsers" +excerpt: "Credentials from Password Stores +, Credentials from Web Browsers +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-15 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Credentials from Password Stores - - Credential Access - Credentials from Web Browsers - Credential Access + - Credential Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This search is to detect an anomaly event of non-chrome process accessing the files in chrome user default folder. This folder contains all the sqlite database of the chrome browser related to users login, history, cookies and etc. Most of the RAT, trojan spy as well as FIN7 jssloader try to parse the those sqlite database to collect information on the compromised host. This SACL Event (4663) need to be enabled to tthe firefox profile directory to be eable to use this. Since you monitoring this access to the folder a noise coming from firefox need to be filter and also sqlite db browser and explorer .exe to make this detection more stable. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-15 @@ -53,8 +55,8 @@ This search is to detect an anomaly event of non-chrome process accessing the fi #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -72,7 +74,7 @@ Note that `non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir_filter` is a empty ma #### How To Implement -To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663. For 4663, enable "Audit Object Access" in Group Policy. Then check the two boxes listed for both "Success" and "Failure." +To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663. For 4663, enable "Audit Object Access" in Group Policy. Then check the two boxes listed for both "Success" and "Failure." #### Known False Positives other browser not listed related to firefox may catch by this rule. @@ -94,8 +96,6 @@ other browser not listed related to firefox may catch by this rule. | 35.0 | 50 | 70 | a non firefox browser process $process_name$ accessing $Object_Name$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_sacl/security2.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_sacl/security2.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-15-non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-15-non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir.md index 74b0f6d6a9..a92a906214 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-15-non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-15-non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir" -excerpt: "Credentials from Password Stores, Credentials from Web Browsers" +excerpt: "Credentials from Password Stores +, Credentials from Web Browsers +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-15 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Credentials from Password Stores - - Credential Access - Credentials from Web Browsers - Credential Access + - Credential Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This search is to detect an anomaly event of non-firefox process accessing the files in profile folder. This folder contains all the sqlite database of the firefox browser related to users login, history, cookies and etc. Most of the RAT, trojan spy as well as FIN7 jssloader try to parse the those sqlite database to collect information on the compromised host. This SACL Event (4663) need to be enabled to tthe firefox profile directory to be eable to use this. Since you monitoring this access to the folder a noise coming from firefox need to be filter and also sqlite db browser and explorer .exe to make this detection more stable. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-15 @@ -53,8 +55,8 @@ This search is to detect an anomaly event of non-firefox process accessing the f #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -72,7 +74,7 @@ Note that `non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir_filter` is a empty mac #### How To Implement -To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663. For 4663, enable "Audit Object Access" in Group Policy. Then check the two boxes listed for both "Success" and "Failure." +To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663. For 4663, enable "Audit Object Access" in Group Policy. Then check the two boxes listed for both "Success" and "Failure." #### Known False Positives other browser not listed related to firefox may catch by this rule. @@ -94,8 +96,6 @@ other browser not listed related to firefox may catch by this rule. | 35.0 | 50 | 70 | a non firefox browser process $process_name$ accessing $Object_Name$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_sacl/security.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_sacl/security.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-account_discovery_with_net_app.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-account_discovery_with_net_app.md index 46c6cd04fd..8d7bcfa82c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-account_discovery_with_net_app.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-account_discovery_with_net_app.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Account Discovery With Net App" -excerpt: "Domain Account, Account Discovery" +excerpt: "Domain Account +, Account Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-16 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Domain Account - - Discovery - Account Discovery - Discovery + - Discovery - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: this search is to detect a potential account discovery series of command used by several malware or attack to recon the target machine. This technique is also seen in some note worthy malware like trickbot where it runs a cmd process, or even drop its module that will execute the said series of net command. This series of command are good correlation search and indicator of attacker recon if seen in the machines within a none technical user or department (HR, finance, ceo and etc) network. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-16 @@ -55,9 +57,9 @@ this search is to detect a potential account discovery series of command used by #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) Note that `account_discovery_with_net_app_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -99,8 +101,6 @@ admin or power user may used this series of command. | 5.0 | 10 | 50 | Suspicious $process_name$ usage detected on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/infection/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/infection/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.md index cf214b666e..4705eb9168 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store" -excerpt: "Install Root Certificate, Subvert Trust Controls" +excerpt: "Install Root Certificate +, Subvert Trust Controls +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-16 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Install Root Certificate - - Defense Evasion - Subvert Trust Controls - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-16 @@ -73,7 +75,7 @@ Note that `attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store_filter` is a empty macr #### How To Implement -You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. +You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. #### Known False Positives There may be legitimate reasons for administrators to add a certificate to the untrusted certificate store. In such cases, this will typically be done on a large number of systems. @@ -95,8 +97,6 @@ There may be legitimate reasons for administrators to add a certificate to the u | 35.0 | 70 | 50 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified attempting to add a certificate to the store on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1553.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1553.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.md index a0a9c637f9..1a7750aeba 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe" -excerpt: "Security Account Manager, OS Credential Dumping" +excerpt: "Security Account Manager +, OS Credential Dumping +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-16 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Security Account Manager - - Credential Access - OS Credential Dumping - Credential Access + - Credential Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-16 @@ -54,10 +56,10 @@ Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys th #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) -* [process_reg](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_reg.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) +* [process_reg](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_reg.yml) Note that `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -99,8 +101,6 @@ None identified. | 90.0 | 90 | 100 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to export the registry keys. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-batch_file_write_to_system32.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-batch_file_write_to_system32.md index bcb1906175..748e5f25db 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-batch_file_write_to_system32.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-batch_file_write_to_system32.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Batch File Write to System32" -excerpt: "User Execution, Malicious File" +excerpt: "User Execution +, Malicious File +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-16 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - User Execution - - Execution - Malicious File - Execution + - Execution - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: The search looks for a batch file (.bat) written to the Windows system directory tree. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-16 @@ -77,7 +79,7 @@ Note that `batch_file_write_to_system32_filter` is a empty macro by default. It To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. #### Known False Positives -It is possible for this search to generate a notable event for a batch file write to a path that includes the string "system32", but is not the actual Windows system directory. As such, you should confirm the path of the batch file identified by the search. In addition, a false positive may be generated by an administrator copying a legitimate batch file in this directory tree. You should confirm that the activity is legitimate and modify the search to add exclusions, as necessary. +It is possible for this search to generate a notable event for a batch file write to a path that includes the string "system32", but is not the actual Windows system directory. As such, you should confirm the path of the batch file identified by the search. In addition, a false positive may be generated by an administrator copying a legitimate batch file in this directory tree. You should confirm that the activity is legitimate and modify the search to add exclusions, as necessary. #### Associated Analytic story * [SamSam Ransomware](/stories/samsam_ransomware) @@ -95,8 +97,6 @@ It is possible for this search to generate a notable event for a batch file writ | 63.0 | 70 | 90 | A file - $file_name$ was written to system32 has occurred on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1204.002/batch_file_in_system32/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1204.002/batch_file_in_system32/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-bits_job_persistence.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-bits_job_persistence.md index 7135294f6f..4a3734f173 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-bits_job_persistence.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-bits_job_persistence.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "BITS Job Persistence" -excerpt: "BITS Jobs" +excerpt: "BITS Jobs +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-16 @@ -24,7 +25,7 @@ tags: The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service utility `bitsadmin.exe` scheduling a BITS job to persist on an endpoint. The query identifies the parameters used to create, resume or add a file to a BITS job. Typically seen combined in a oneliner or ran in sequence. If identified, review the BITS job created and capture any files written to disk. It is possible for BITS to be used to upload files and this may require further network data analysis to identify. You can use `bitsadmin /list /verbose` to list out the jobs during investigation. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-16 @@ -94,8 +95,6 @@ Limited false positives will be present. Typically, applications will use `BitsA | 56.0 | 70 | 80 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to persist using BITS. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -111,6 +110,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1197/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1197/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-bitsadmin_download_file.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-bitsadmin_download_file.md index 3685064373..78a5f40de4 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-bitsadmin_download_file.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-bitsadmin_download_file.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "BITSAdmin Download File" -excerpt: "BITS Jobs, Ingress Tool Transfer" +excerpt: "BITS Jobs +, Ingress Tool Transfer +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-16 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - BITS Jobs + - Ingress Tool Transfer - Defense Evasion - Persistence - - Ingress Tool Transfer - Command And Control - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security @@ -24,9 +26,9 @@ tags: #### Description -The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service utility `bitsadmin.exe` using the `transfer` parameter to download a remote object. In addition, look for `download` or `upload` on the command-line, the switches are not required to perform a transfer. Capture any files downloaded. Review the reputation of the IP or domain used. Typically once executed, a follow on command will be used to execute the dropped file. Note that the network connection or file modification events related will not spawn or create from `bitsadmin.exe`, but the artifacts will appear in a parallel process of `svchost.exe` with a command-line similar to `svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s BITS`. It's important to review all parallel and child processes to capture any behaviors and artifacts. In some suspicious and malicious instances, BITS jobs will be created. You can use `bitsadmin /list /verbose` to list out the jobs during investigation. +The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service utility `bitsadmin.exe` using the `transfer` parameter to download a remote object. In addition, look for `download` or `upload` on the command-line, the switches are not required to perform a transfer. Capture any files downloaded. Review the reputation of the IP or domain used. Typically once executed, a follow on command will be used to execute the dropped file. Note that the network connection or file modification events related will not spawn or create from `bitsadmin.exe`, but the artifacts will appear in a parallel process of `svchost.exe` with a command-line similar to `svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s BITS`. It's important to review all parallel and child processes to capture any behaviors and artifacts. In some suspicious and malicious instances, BITS jobs will be created. You can use `bitsadmin /list /verbose` to list out the jobs during investigation. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-16 @@ -100,8 +102,6 @@ Limited false positives, however it may be required to filter based on parent pr | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to download a file. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1197/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1197/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.md index 27c066e6a1..8f6d9db471 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell" -excerpt: "NTDS, OS Credential Dumping" +excerpt: "NTDS +, OS Credential Dumping +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-16 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - NTDS - - Credential Access - OS Credential Dumping - Credential Access + - Credential Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This search detects the use of wmic and Powershell to create a shadow copy. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-16 @@ -54,10 +56,10 @@ This search detects the use of wmic and Powershell to create a shadow copy. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) -* [process_wmic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_wmic.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) +* [process_wmic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_wmic.yml) Note that `creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -98,8 +100,6 @@ Legtimate administrator usage of wmic to create a shadow copy. | 81.0 | 90 | 90 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to create a shadow copy to perform offline password cracking. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.md index d4ee075672..d26e1e36a5 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy" -excerpt: "NTDS, OS Credential Dumping" +excerpt: "NTDS +, OS Credential Dumping +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-16 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - NTDS - - Credential Access - OS Credential Dumping - Credential Access + - Credential Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This search detects credential dumping using copy command from a shadow copy. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-16 @@ -54,9 +56,9 @@ This search detects credential dumping using copy command from a shadow copy. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) Note that `credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -97,8 +99,6 @@ unknown | 81.0 | 90 | 90 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to copy SAM and NTDS.dit for offline password cracking. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.md index 1d0943cd3d..1938ab80bb 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy" -excerpt: "NTDS, OS Credential Dumping" +excerpt: "NTDS +, OS Credential Dumping +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-16 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - NTDS - - Credential Access - OS Credential Dumping - Credential Access + - Credential Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This search detects the creation of a symlink to a shadow copy. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-16 @@ -54,9 +56,9 @@ This search detects the creation of a symlink to a shadow copy. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) Note that `credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -97,8 +99,6 @@ unknown | 81.0 | 90 | 90 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to create symlink to a shadow copy to grab credentials. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_html_help_renamed.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_html_help_renamed.md index 6780747255..70a98a00dc 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_html_help_renamed.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_html_help_renamed.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Detect HTML Help Renamed" -excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution, Compiled HTML File" +excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution +, Compiled HTML File +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-16 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Signed Binary Proxy Execution - - Defense Evasion - Compiled HTML File - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -23,9 +25,9 @@ tags: #### Description -The following analytic identifies a renamed instance of hh.exe (HTML Help) executing a Compiled HTML Help (CHM). This particular technique will load Windows script code from a compiled help file. CHM files may contain nearly any file type embedded, but only execute html/htm. Upon a successful execution, the following script engines may be used for execution - JScript, VBScript, VBScript.Encode, JScript.Encode, JScript.Compact. Analyst may identify vbscript.dll or jscript.dll loading into hh.exe upon execution. The "htm" and "html" file extensions were the only extensions observed to be supported for the execution of Shortcut commands or WSH script code. During investigation, identify script content origination. Validate it is the legitimate version of hh.exe by reviewing the PE metadata. hh.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. +The following analytic identifies a renamed instance of hh.exe (HTML Help) executing a Compiled HTML Help (CHM). This particular technique will load Windows script code from a compiled help file. CHM files may contain nearly any file type embedded, but only execute html/htm. Upon a successful execution, the following script engines may be used for execution - JScript, VBScript, VBScript.Encode, JScript.Encode, JScript.Compact. Analyst may identify vbscript.dll or jscript.dll loading into hh.exe upon execution. The "htm" and "html" file extensions were the only extensions observed to be supported for the execution of Shortcut commands or WSH script code. During investigation, identify script content origination. Validate it is the legitimate version of hh.exe by reviewing the PE metadata. hh.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-16 @@ -55,8 +57,8 @@ The following analytic identifies a renamed instance of hh.exe (HTML Help) execu #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [process_hh](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_hh.yml) -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `detect_html_help_renamed_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -97,8 +99,6 @@ Although unlikely a renamed instance of hh.exe will be used legitimately, filter | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_html_help_url_in_command_line.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_html_help_url_in_command_line.md index 032d1a6a5a..f58d8e8ea0 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_html_help_url_in_command_line.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_html_help_url_in_command_line.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line" -excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution, Compiled HTML File" +excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution +, Compiled HTML File +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-16 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Signed Binary Proxy Execution - - Defense Evasion - Compiled HTML File - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -23,9 +25,9 @@ tags: #### Description -The following analytic identifies hh.exe (HTML Help) execution of a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) file from a remote url. This particular technique will load Windows script code from a compiled help file. CHM files may contain nearly any file type embedded, but only execute html/htm. Upon a successful execution, the following script engines may be used for execution - JScript, VBScript, VBScript.Encode, JScript.Encode, JScript.Compact. Analyst may identify vbscript.dll or jscript.dll loading into hh.exe upon execution. The "htm" and "html" file extensions were the only extensions observed to be supported for the execution of Shortcut commands or WSH script code. During investigation, identify script content origination. Review reputation of remote IP and domain. Some instances, it is worth decompiling the .chm file to review its original contents. hh.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. +The following analytic identifies hh.exe (HTML Help) execution of a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) file from a remote url. This particular technique will load Windows script code from a compiled help file. CHM files may contain nearly any file type embedded, but only execute html/htm. Upon a successful execution, the following script engines may be used for execution - JScript, VBScript, VBScript.Encode, JScript.Encode, JScript.Compact. Analyst may identify vbscript.dll or jscript.dll loading into hh.exe upon execution. The "htm" and "html" file extensions were the only extensions observed to be supported for the execution of Shortcut commands or WSH script code. During investigation, identify script content origination. Review reputation of remote IP and domain. Some instances, it is worth decompiling the .chm file to review its original contents. hh.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-16 @@ -55,8 +57,8 @@ The following analytic identifies hh.exe (HTML Help) execution of a Compiled HTM #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [process_hh](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_hh.yml) -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `detect_html_help_url_in_command_line_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -97,8 +99,6 @@ Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may retrieve a CHM remotely, fil | 90.0 | 90 | 100 | An instance of $parent_proces_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ contacting a remote destination to potentally download a malicious payload. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers.md index 91f1717859..61845051a4 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers" -excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution, Compiled HTML File" +excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution +, Compiled HTML File +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-16 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Signed Binary Proxy Execution - - Defense Evasion - Compiled HTML File - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -23,9 +25,9 @@ tags: #### Description -The following analytic identifies hh.exe (HTML Help) execution of a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) file using InfoTech Storage Handlers. This particular technique will load Windows script code from a compiled help file, using InfoTech Storage Handlers. itss.dll will load upon execution. Three InfoTech Storage handlers are supported - ms-its, its, mk:@MSITStore. ITSS may be used to launch a specific html/htm file from within a CHM file. CHM files may contain nearly any file type embedded. Upon a successful execution, the following script engines may be used for execution - JScript, VBScript, VBScript.Encode, JScript.Encode, JScript.Compact. Analyst may identify vbscript.dll or jscript.dll loading into hh.exe upon execution. The "htm" and "html" file extensions were the only extensions observed to be supported for the execution of Shortcut commands or WSH script code. During investigation, identify script content origination. hh.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. +The following analytic identifies hh.exe (HTML Help) execution of a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) file using InfoTech Storage Handlers. This particular technique will load Windows script code from a compiled help file, using InfoTech Storage Handlers. itss.dll will load upon execution. Three InfoTech Storage handlers are supported - ms-its, its, mk:@MSITStore. ITSS may be used to launch a specific html/htm file from within a CHM file. CHM files may contain nearly any file type embedded. Upon a successful execution, the following script engines may be used for execution - JScript, VBScript, VBScript.Encode, JScript.Encode, JScript.Compact. Analyst may identify vbscript.dll or jscript.dll loading into hh.exe upon execution. The "htm" and "html" file extensions were the only extensions observed to be supported for the execution of Shortcut commands or WSH script code. During investigation, identify script content origination. hh.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-16 @@ -55,8 +57,8 @@ The following analytic identifies hh.exe (HTML Help) execution of a Compiled HTM #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [process_hh](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_hh.yml) -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -97,8 +99,6 @@ It is rare to see instances of InfoTech Storage Handlers being used, but it does | 72.0 | 80 | 90 | $process_name$ has been identified using Infotech Storage Handlers to load a specific file within a CHM on $dest$ under user $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.md index 56bc87a09f..56703d3be2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Detect mshta inline hta execution" -excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution, Mshta" +excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution +, Mshta +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-16 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Signed Binary Proxy Execution - - Defense Evasion - Mshta - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -23,9 +25,9 @@ tags: #### Description -The following analytic identifies "mshta.exe" execution with inline protocol handlers. "JavaScript", "VBScript", and "About" are the only supported options when invoking HTA content directly on the command-line. The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process "mshta.exe" and its parent process. +The following analytic identifies "mshta.exe" execution with inline protocol handlers. "JavaScript", "VBScript", and "About" are the only supported options when invoking HTA content directly on the command-line. The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process "mshta.exe" and its parent process. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-16 @@ -55,8 +57,8 @@ The following analytic identifies "mshta.exe" execution with inline prot #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [process_mshta](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_mshta.yml) -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -97,8 +99,6 @@ Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, trigg | 90.0 | 90 | 100 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ executing with inline HTA, indicative of defense evasion. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_mshta_renamed.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_mshta_renamed.md index ca21ca2717..54ce639a65 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_mshta_renamed.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_mshta_renamed.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Detect mshta renamed" -excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution, Mshta" +excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution +, Mshta +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-16 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Signed Binary Proxy Execution - - Defense Evasion - Mshta - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies renamed instances of mshta.exe executing. Mshta.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. This analytic utilizes the internal name of the PE to identify if is the legitimate mshta binary. Further analysis should be performed to review the executed content and validation it is the real mshta. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-16 @@ -55,8 +57,8 @@ The following analytic identifies renamed instances of mshta.exe executing. Msht #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [process_mshta](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_mshta.yml) -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `detect_mshta_renamed_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -97,8 +99,6 @@ Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of mshta.ex | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.md index f5657de256..bc43fdca48 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line" -excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution, Mshta" +excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution +, Mshta +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-16 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Signed Binary Proxy Execution - - Defense Evasion - Mshta - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -23,9 +25,9 @@ tags: #### Description -This analytic identifies when Microsoft HTML Application Host (mshta.exe) utility is used to make remote http connections. Adversaries may use mshta.exe to proxy the download and execution of remote .hta files. The analytic identifies command line arguments of http and https being used. This technique is commonly used by malicious software to bypass preventative controls. The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process "rundll32.exe" and its parent process. +This analytic identifies when Microsoft HTML Application Host (mshta.exe) utility is used to make remote http connections. Adversaries may use mshta.exe to proxy the download and execution of remote .hta files. The analytic identifies command line arguments of http and https being used. This technique is commonly used by malicious software to bypass preventative controls. The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process "rundll32.exe" and its parent process. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-16 @@ -55,8 +57,8 @@ This analytic identifies when Microsoft HTML Application Host (mshta.exe) utilit #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [process_mshta](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_mshta.yml) -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `detect_mshta_url_in_command_line_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -97,8 +99,6 @@ It is possible legitimate applications may perform this behavior and will need t | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $est$ by user $user$ attempting to access a remote destination to download an additional payload. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.md index 5cc45bb15d..449dbfc693 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag" -excerpt: "Remote Services, SMB/Windows Admin Shares" +excerpt: "Remote Services +, SMB/Windows Admin Shares +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-16 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Remote Services - - Lateral Movement - SMB/Windows Admin Shares - Lateral Movement + - Lateral Movement - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,12 +27,12 @@ tags: This search looks for events where `PsExec.exe` is run with the `accepteula` flag in the command line. PsExec is a built-in Windows utility that enables you to execute processes on other systems. It is fully interactive for console applications. This tool is widely used for launching interactive command prompts on remote systems. Threat actors leverage this extensively for executing code on compromised systems. If an attacker is running PsExec for the first time, they will be prompted to accept the end-user license agreement (EULA), which can be passed as the argument `accepteula` within the command line. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-16 - **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk -- **ID**: b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-151xb162040e +- **ID**: 27c3a83d-cada-47c6-9042-67baf19d2574 #### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) @@ -55,8 +57,8 @@ This search looks for events where `PsExec.exe` is run with the `accepteula` fla #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [process_psexec](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_psexec.yml) -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -79,7 +81,7 @@ Note that `detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag_filter` is a empty macro by defaul To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. #### Known False Positives -Administrators can leverage PsExec for accessing remote systems and might pass `accepteula` as an argument if they are running this tool for the first time. However, it is not likely that you'd see multiple occurrences of this event on a machine +Administrators can leverage PsExec for accessing remote systems and might pass `accepteula` as an argument if they are running this tool for the first time. However, it is not likely that you'd see multiple occurrences of this event on a machine #### Associated Analytic story * [SamSam Ransomware](/stories/samsam_ransomware) @@ -101,8 +103,6 @@ Administrators can leverage PsExec for accessing remote systems and might pass ` | 35.0 | 50 | 70 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ running the utility for possibly the first time. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_renamed_7-zip.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_renamed_7-zip.md index a5e08f0284..c859bd9d1e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_renamed_7-zip.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_renamed_7-zip.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Detect Renamed 7-Zip" -excerpt: "Archive via Utility, Archive Collected Data" +excerpt: "Archive via Utility +, Archive Collected Data +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-16 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Archive via Utility - - Collection - Archive Collected Data - Collection + - Collection - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies renamed 7-Zip usage using Sysmon. At this stage of an attack, review parallel processes and file modifications for data that is staged or potentially have been exfiltrated. This analytic utilizes the OriginalFileName to capture the renamed process. During triage, validate this is the legitimate version of `7zip` by reviewing the PE metadata. In addition, review parallel processes for further suspicious behavior. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-16 @@ -85,7 +87,7 @@ Limited false positives, however this analytic will need to be modified for each #### Kill Chain Phase -* Exfiltration +* Exploitation @@ -96,8 +98,6 @@ Limited false positives, however this analytic will need to be modified for each | 27.0 | 30 | 90 | The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1560.001/archive_utility/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1560.001/archive_utility/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_renamed_psexec.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_renamed_psexec.md index 63bad21aa7..0b5d88e372 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_renamed_psexec.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_renamed_psexec.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Detect Renamed PSExec" -excerpt: "System Services, Service Execution" +excerpt: "System Services +, Service Execution +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-16 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - System Services - - Execution - Service Execution - Execution + - Execution - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies renamed instances of `PsExec.exe` being utilized on an endpoint. Most instances, it is highly probable to capture `Psexec.exe` or other SysInternal utility usage with the command-line argument of `-accepteula`. During triage, validate this is the legitimate version of `PsExec` by reviewing the PE metadata. In addition, review parallel processes for further suspicious behavior. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-16 @@ -55,8 +57,8 @@ The following analytic identifies renamed instances of `PsExec.exe` being utiliz #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [process_psexec](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_psexec.yml) -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `detect_renamed_psexec_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -91,8 +93,6 @@ Limited false positives should be present. It is possible some third party appli #### Kill Chain Phase * Exploitation -* Lateral Movement -* Execution @@ -103,8 +103,6 @@ Limited false positives should be present. It is possible some third party appli | 27.0 | 30 | 90 | The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -118,6 +116,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1569.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1569.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_renamed_rclone.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_renamed_rclone.md index f5a43ff807..c8406e1ff7 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_renamed_rclone.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_renamed_rclone.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Detect Renamed RClone" -excerpt: "Automated Exfiltration" +excerpt: "Automated Exfiltration +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-16 @@ -22,7 +23,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies the usage of `rclone.exe`, renamed, being used to exfiltrate data to a remote destination. RClone has been used by multiple ransomware groups to exfiltrate data. In many instances, it will be downloaded from the legitimate site and executed accordingly. During triage, isolate the endpoint and begin to review parallel processes for additional behavior. At this stage, the adversary may have staged data to be exfiltrated. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-16 @@ -81,7 +82,7 @@ False positives should be limited as this analytic identifies renamed instances #### Kill Chain Phase -* Exfiltration +* Exploitation @@ -92,8 +93,6 @@ False positives should be limited as this analytic identifies renamed instances | 27.0 | 30 | 90 | The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -108,6 +107,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1020/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1020/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_renamed_winrar.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_renamed_winrar.md index e68b64db45..67cfb47e7a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_renamed_winrar.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_renamed_winrar.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Detect Renamed WinRAR" -excerpt: "Archive via Utility, Archive Collected Data" +excerpt: "Archive via Utility +, Archive Collected Data +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-16 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Archive via Utility - - Collection - Archive Collected Data - Collection + - Collection - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: The following analtyic identifies renamed instances of `WinRAR.exe`. In most cases, it is not common for WinRAR to be used renamed, however it is common to be installed by a third party application and executed from a non-standard path. During triage, validate additional metadata from the binary that this is `WinRAR`. Review parallel processes and file modifications. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-16 @@ -86,7 +88,6 @@ Unknown. It is possible third party applications use renamed instances of WinRAR #### Kill Chain Phase * Exploitation -* Exfiltration @@ -97,8 +98,6 @@ Unknown. It is possible third party applications use renamed instances of WinRAR | 27.0 | 30 | 90 | The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -111,6 +110,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1560.001/archive_utility/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1560.001/archive_utility/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-dump_lsass_via_procdump.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-dump_lsass_via_procdump.md index 201ef1a9bc..2c2ccf112e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-dump_lsass_via_procdump.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-dump_lsass_via_procdump.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Dump LSASS via procdump" -excerpt: "LSASS Memory, OS Credential Dumping" +excerpt: "LSASS Memory +, OS Credential Dumping +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-16 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - LSASS Memory - - Credential Access - OS Credential Dumping - Credential Access + - Credential Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -26,7 +28,7 @@ tags: Detect procdump.exe dumping the lsass process. This query looks for both -mm and -ma usage. -mm will produce a mini dump file and -ma will write a dump file with all process memory. Both are highly suspect and should be reviewed. This query does not monitor for the internal name (original_file_name=procdump) of the PE or look for procdump64.exe. Modify the query as needed.\ During triage, confirm this is procdump.exe executing. If it is the first time a Sysinternals utility has been ran, it is possible there will be a -accepteula on the command line. Review other endpoint data sources for cross process (injection) into lsass.exe. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-16 @@ -55,9 +57,9 @@ During triage, confirm this is procdump.exe executing. If it is the first time a #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_procdump](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_procdump.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_procdump](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_procdump.yml) Note that `dump_lsass_via_procdump_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -95,8 +97,6 @@ None identified. | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified attempting to dump lsass.exe on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-local_account_discovery_with_net.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-local_account_discovery_with_net.md index b89fd78d8d..ad6701176d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-local_account_discovery_with_net.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-local_account_discovery_with_net.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Local Account Discovery with Net" -excerpt: "Account Discovery, Local Account" +excerpt: "Account Discovery +, Local Account +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-16 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Account Discovery - - Discovery - Local Account - Discovery + - Discovery - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -23,9 +25,9 @@ tags: #### Description -This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for local users. The two arguments `user` and 'users', return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for local users. The two arguments `user` and 'users', return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-16 @@ -54,9 +56,9 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-li #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) Note that `local_account_discovery_with_net_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -86,8 +88,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. | 15.0 | 30 | 50 | Local user discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-local_account_discovery_with_wmic.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-local_account_discovery_with_wmic.md index 1d3ecad1dc..24136fba0a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-local_account_discovery_with_wmic.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-local_account_discovery_with_wmic.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Local Account Discovery With Wmic" -excerpt: "Account Discovery, Local Account" +excerpt: "Account Discovery +, Local Account +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-16 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Account Discovery - - Discovery - Local Account - Discovery + - Discovery - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for local users. The argument `useraccount` is used to leverage WMI to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-16 @@ -54,9 +56,9 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_wmic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_wmic.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_wmic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_wmic.yml) Note that `local_account_discovery_with_wmic_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -86,8 +88,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. | 15.0 | 30 | 50 | Local user discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-office_product_spawning_wmic.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-office_product_spawning_wmic.md index 39a7aa31a7..faaa281b3e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-office_product_spawning_wmic.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-office_product_spawning_wmic.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Office Product Spawning Wmic" -excerpt: "Phishing, Spearphishing Attachment" +excerpt: "Phishing +, Spearphishing Attachment +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-16 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Phishing - - Initial Access - Spearphishing Attachment - Initial Access + - Initial Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by Ursnif malware family. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `wmic.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `wmic.exe` will contain `wmic process call create`. In addition, Threat Research has released a detection identifying the use of `wmic process call create` on the command-line of `wmic.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `wmic.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-16 @@ -54,9 +56,9 @@ The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by Ursnif malwar #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_wmic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_wmic.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_wmic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_wmic.yml) Note that `office_product_spawning_wmic_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -98,8 +100,6 @@ No false positives known. Filter as needed. | 63.0 | 70 | 90 | office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ in host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_macros.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_macros.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-processes_launching_netsh.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-processes_launching_netsh.md index 3c2739d0fa..9a8c82e520 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-processes_launching_netsh.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-processes_launching_netsh.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Processes launching netsh" -excerpt: "Disable or Modify System Firewall, Impair Defenses" +excerpt: "Disable or Modify System Firewall +, Impair Defenses +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-16 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Disable or Modify System Firewall - - Defense Evasion - Impair Defenses - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe. Netsh is a command-line scripting utility that allows you to, either locally or remotely, display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. Netsh can be used as a persistence proxy technique to execute a helper DLL when netsh.exe is executed. In this search, we are looking for processes spawned by netsh.exe and executing commands via the command line. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-16 @@ -55,8 +57,8 @@ This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe. Netsh is a command-line scr #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [process_netsh](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_netsh.yml) -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `processes_launching_netsh_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -94,8 +96,6 @@ Some VPN applications are known to launch netsh.exe. Outside of these instances, | 42.0 | 60 | 70 | A process $process_name$ that tries to execute netsh commandline $process$ in host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-20-detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-20-detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments.md index bff121d182..b1070ff4b5 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-20-detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-20-detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments" -excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution, Regsvcs/Regasm" +excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution +, Regsvcs/Regasm +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-20 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Signed Binary Proxy Execution - - Defense Evasion - Regsvcs/Regasm - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies regasm.exe with no command line arguments. This particular behavior occurs when another process injects into regasm.exe, no command line arguments will be present. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Regasm.exe are natively found in `C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe` and `C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe`. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-20 @@ -98,8 +100,6 @@ Although unlikely, limited instances of regasm.exe or may cause a false positive | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | The process $process_name$ was spawned by $parent_process_name$ without any command-line arguments on $dest$ by $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-20-detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-20-detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments.md index 4b784ba308..7655afcb9d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-20-detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-20-detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments" -excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution, Regsvcs/Regasm" +excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution +, Regsvcs/Regasm +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-20 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Signed Binary Proxy Execution - - Defense Evasion - Regsvcs/Regasm - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies regsvcs.exe with no command line arguments. This particular behavior occurs when another process injects into regsvcs.exe, no command line arguments will be present. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Regasm.exe are natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-20 @@ -56,8 +58,8 @@ The following analytic identifies regsvcs.exe with no command line arguments. Th #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [process_regsvcs](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_regsvcs.yml) -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -98,8 +100,6 @@ Although unlikely, limited instances of regsvcs.exe may cause a false positive. | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | The process $process_name$ was spawned by $parent_process_name$ without any command-line arguments on $dest$ by $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-20-office_document_spawned_child_process_to_download.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-20-office_document_spawned_child_process_to_download.md index 4b3403845e..184a3fa66f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-20-office_document_spawned_child_process_to_download.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-20-office_document_spawned_child_process_to_download.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download" -excerpt: "Phishing, Spearphishing Attachment" +excerpt: "Phishing +, Spearphishing Attachment +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-20 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Phishing - - Initial Access - Spearphishing Attachment - Initial Access + - Initial Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This search is to detect potential malicious office document executing lolbin child process to download payload or other malware. Since most of the attacker abused the capability of office document to execute living on land application to blend it to the normal noise in the infected machine to cover its track. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-20 @@ -96,8 +98,6 @@ Default browser not in the filter list. | 35.0 | 70 | 50 | Office document spawning suspicious child process on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets2/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets2/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-20-suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-20-suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments.md index 252aad0b97..7b91165636 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-20-suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-20-suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments" -excerpt: "Process Injection" +excerpt: "Process Injection +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-20 @@ -24,7 +25,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies DLLHost.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for DLLHost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. DLLHost.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-20 @@ -95,8 +96,6 @@ Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be requ | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | Suspicious dllhost.exe process with no command line arguments executed on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -110,6 +109,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-20-suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-20-suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments.md index 60a84f8763..dcc2801429 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-20-suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-20-suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments" -excerpt: "Process Injection" +excerpt: "Process Injection +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-20 @@ -24,7 +25,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies gpupdate.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for gpupdate.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. gpupdate.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-20 @@ -53,8 +54,8 @@ The following analytic identifies gpupdate.exe with no command line arguments. I #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [process_gpupdate](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_gpupdate.yml) -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -95,8 +96,6 @@ Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be requ | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | Suspicious gpupdate.exe process with no command line arguments executed on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -110,6 +109,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-20-suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-20-suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.md index 049ac746c1..100b4e9d37 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-20-suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-20-suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.md @@ -1,6 +1,9 @@ --- title: "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename" -excerpt: "Masquerading, Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution, Rename System Utilities" +excerpt: "Masquerading +, Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution +, Rename System Utilities +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-20 @@ -8,11 +11,11 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Masquerading - - Defense Evasion - Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution - - Defense Evasion - Rename System Utilities - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -27,7 +30,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies a renamed instance of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe. Microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319 and is rarely utilized. When investigating, identify the executed code on disk and review. A spawned child process from microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is uncommon. In any instance, microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe spawning from an Office product or any living off the land binary is highly suspect. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-20 @@ -103,8 +106,6 @@ Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of microsof | 63.0 | 70 | 90 | Suspicious renamed microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe binary ran on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -118,6 +119,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-20-suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-20-suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments.md index e461aa4f88..bf24b5f381 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-20-suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-20-suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments" -excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution, Rundll32" +excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution +, Rundll32 +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-20 @@ -8,13 +10,12 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Signed Binary Proxy Execution - - Defense Evasion - Rundll32 - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - CVE-2021-34527 - Endpoint --- @@ -26,7 +27,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for rundll32.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-20 @@ -101,15 +102,6 @@ Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32 | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | Suspicious rundll32.exe process with no command line arguments executed on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - - -#### CVE - -| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | -| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [CVE-2021-34527](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34527) | Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | 9.0 | - #### Reference @@ -125,6 +117,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-20-suspicious_searchprotocolhost_no_command_line_arguments.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-20-suspicious_searchprotocolhost_no_command_line_arguments.md index f377cfe138..03b8c7fe7b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-20-suspicious_searchprotocolhost_no_command_line_arguments.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-20-suspicious_searchprotocolhost_no_command_line_arguments.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments" -excerpt: "Process Injection" +excerpt: "Process Injection +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-20 @@ -24,7 +25,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies searchprotocolhost.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for searchprotocolhost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. searchprotocolhost.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-20 @@ -94,8 +95,6 @@ Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be requ | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | Suspicious searchprotocolhost.exe process with no command line arguments executed on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -108,6 +107,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-21-remcos_rat_file_creation_in_remcos_folder.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-21-remcos_rat_file_creation_in_remcos_folder.md index d1614dd2d9..b2522ba26a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-21-remcos_rat_file_creation_in_remcos_folder.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-21-remcos_rat_file_creation_in_remcos_folder.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Remcos RAT File Creation in Remcos Folder" -excerpt: "Screen Capture" +excerpt: "Screen Capture +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-21 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This search is to detect file creation in remcos folder in appdata which is the keylog and clipboard logs that will be send to its c2 server. This is really a good TTP indicator that there is a remcos rat in the system that do keylogging, clipboard grabbing and audio recording. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-21 @@ -85,8 +86,6 @@ unknown | 100.0 | 100 | 100 | file $file_name$ created in $file_path$ of $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -100,6 +99,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_agent/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_agent/sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-21-suspicious_image_creation_in_appdata_folder.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-21-suspicious_image_creation_in_appdata_folder.md index 4983339cc4..22714bc6b8 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-21-suspicious_image_creation_in_appdata_folder.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-21-suspicious_image_creation_in_appdata_folder.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Suspicious Image Creation In Appdata Folder" -excerpt: "Screen Capture" +excerpt: "Screen Capture +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-21 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This search is to detect a suspicious creation of image in appdata folder made by process that also has a file reference in appdata folder. This technique was seen in remcos rat that capture screenshot of the compromised machine and place it in the appdata and will be send to its C2 server. This TTP is really a good indicator to check that process because it is in suspicious folder path and image files are not commonly created by user in this folder path. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-21 @@ -89,8 +90,6 @@ unknown | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | process $process_name$ creating image file $file_path$ in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -104,6 +103,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_agent/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_agent/sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-21-suspicious_wav_file_in_appdata_folder.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-21-suspicious_wav_file_in_appdata_folder.md index fffb354cff..c4f27b48d1 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-21-suspicious_wav_file_in_appdata_folder.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-21-suspicious_wav_file_in_appdata_folder.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Suspicious WAV file in Appdata Folder" -excerpt: "Screen Capture" +excerpt: "Screen Capture +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-21 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This analytic is to detect a suspicious creation of .wav file in appdata folder. This behavior was seen in Remcos RAT malware where it put the audio recording in the appdata\audio folde as part of data collection. this recording can be send to its C2 server as part of its exfiltration to the compromised machine. creation of wav files in this folder path is not a ussual disk place used by user to save audio format file. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-21 @@ -89,8 +90,6 @@ unknown | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | process $process_name$ creating image file $file_path$ in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -104,6 +103,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_agent/sysmon_wav.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_agent/sysmon_wav.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-27-change_default_file_association.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-27-change_default_file_association.md index 2d79910ed4..7eaca931dd 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-27-change_default_file_association.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-27-change_default_file_association.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Change Default File Association" -excerpt: "Change Default File Association, Event Triggered Execution" +excerpt: "Change Default File Association +, Event Triggered Execution +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-27 @@ -8,11 +10,11 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Change Default File Association - - Privilege Escalation - - Persistence - Event Triggered Execution + - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ tags: This analytic is developed to detect suspicious registry modification to change the default file association of windows to malicious payload. This techninique was seen in some APT where it modify the default process to run file association, like .txt to notepad.exe. Instead notepad.exe it will point to a Script or other payload that will load malicious command to the compromised host. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-27 @@ -39,9 +41,9 @@ This analytic is developed to detect suspicious registry modification to change | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1546.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/001/) | Change Default File Association | Privilege Escalation, Persistence | +| [T1546.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/001/) | Change Default File Association | Persistence, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1546](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/) | Event Triggered Execution | Privilege Escalation, Persistence | +| [T1546](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/) | Event Triggered Execution | Persistence, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -93,8 +95,6 @@ unknown | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.001/txtfile_reg/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.001/txtfile_reg/sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-27-logon_script_event_trigger_execution.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-27-logon_script_event_trigger_execution.md index e36a0295a0..cc7cc3e986 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-27-logon_script_event_trigger_execution.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-27-logon_script_event_trigger_execution.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Logon Script Event Trigger Execution" -excerpt: "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts, Logon Script (Windows)" +excerpt: "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts +, Logon Script (Windows) +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-27 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts + - Logon Script (Windows) - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Logon Script (Windows) - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ tags: This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry entry to persist and gain privilege escalation upon booting up of compromised host. This technique was seen in several APT and malware where it modify UserInitMprLogonScript registry entry to its malicious payload to be executed upon boot up of the machine. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-27 @@ -93,8 +95,6 @@ unknown | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1037.001/logonscript_reg/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1037.001/logonscript_reg/sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-27-screensaver_event_trigger_execution.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-27-screensaver_event_trigger_execution.md index 85153ef7c7..43ec6ebfa3 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-27-screensaver_event_trigger_execution.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-27-screensaver_event_trigger_execution.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Screensaver Event Trigger Execution" -excerpt: "Event Triggered Execution, Screensaver" +excerpt: "Event Triggered Execution +, Screensaver +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-27 @@ -8,11 +10,11 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Event Triggered Execution - - Privilege Escalation - - Persistence - Screensaver + - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ tags: This analytic is developed to detect possible event trigger execution through screensaver registry entry modification for persistence or privilege escalation. This technique was seen in several APT and malware where they put the malicious payload path to the SCRNSAVE.EXE registry key to redirect the execution to their malicious payload path. This TTP is a good indicator that some attacker may modify this entry for their persistence and privilege escalation. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-27 @@ -39,9 +41,9 @@ This analytic is developed to detect possible event trigger execution through sc | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1546](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/) | Event Triggered Execution | Privilege Escalation, Persistence | +| [T1546](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/) | Event Triggered Execution | Persistence, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1546.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/002/) | Screensaver | Privilege Escalation, Persistence | +| [T1546.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/002/) | Screensaver | Persistence, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -93,8 +95,6 @@ unknown | 72.0 | 80 | 90 | modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.002/scrnsave_reg/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.002/scrnsave_reg/sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-28-print_processor_registry_autostart.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-28-print_processor_registry_autostart.md index 113f41dc00..2028b23b99 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-28-print_processor_registry_autostart.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-28-print_processor_registry_autostart.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Print Processor Registry Autostart" -excerpt: "Print Processors, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution" +excerpt: "Print Processors +, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-28 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Print Processors + - Boot or Logon Autostart Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Boot or Logon Autostart Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise @@ -19,8 +21,8 @@ tags: - Endpoint --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -29,7 +31,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification or new registry entry regarding print processor. This registry is known to be abuse by turla or other APT to gain persistence and privilege escalation to the compromised machine. This is done by adding the malicious dll payload on the new created key in this registry that will be executed as it restarted the spoolsv.exe process and services. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-28 @@ -95,8 +97,6 @@ possible new printer installation may add driver component on this registry. | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/print_reg/sysmon_print.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/print_reg/sysmon_print.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-29-verclsid_clsid_execution.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-29-verclsid_clsid_execution.md index 5189626b50..f78dde196e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-29-verclsid_clsid_execution.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-29-verclsid_clsid_execution.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Verclsid CLSID Execution" -excerpt: "Verclsid, Signed Binary Proxy Execution" +excerpt: "Verclsid +, Signed Binary Proxy Execution +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-09-29 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Verclsid - - Defense Evasion - Signed Binary Proxy Execution - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This analytic is to detect a possible abuse of verclsid to execute malicious file through generate CLSID. This process is a normal application of windows to verify the CLSID COM object before it is instantiated by Windows Explorer. This hunting query can be a good pivot point to analyze what is he CLSID or COM object pointing too to check if it is a valid application or not. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-09-29 @@ -55,8 +57,8 @@ This analytic is to detect a possible abuse of verclsid to execute malicious fil #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [process_verclsid](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_verclsid.yml) -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `verclsid_clsid_execution_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -97,8 +99,6 @@ windows can used this application for its normal COM object validation. | 25.0 | 50 | 50 | process $process_name$ to execute possible clsid commandline $process$ in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.012/verclsid_exec/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.012/verclsid_exec/sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-10-01-vbscript_execution_using_wscript_app.md b/docs/_posts/2021-10-01-vbscript_execution_using_wscript_app.md index aab7338b44..263607a67d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-10-01-vbscript_execution_using_wscript_app.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-10-01-vbscript_execution_using_wscript_app.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App" -excerpt: "Visual Basic, Command and Scripting Interpreter" +excerpt: "Visual Basic +, Command and Scripting Interpreter +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-10-01 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Visual Basic - - Execution - Command and Scripting Interpreter - Execution + - Execution - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This analytic is to detect a suspicious wscript commandline to execute vbscript. This technique was seen in several malware to execute malicious vbs file using wscript application. commonly vbs script is associated to cscript process and this can be a technique to evade process parent child detections or even some av script emulation system. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-10-01 @@ -97,8 +99,6 @@ unknown | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | Process name $process_name$ with commandline $process$ to execute vbsscript | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/vbs_wscript/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/vbs_wscript/sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-10-04-msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process.md b/docs/_posts/2021-10-04-msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process.md index 49f30f28c2..863bcfcd90 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-10-04-msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-10-04-msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "MSBuild Suspicious Spawned By Script Process" -excerpt: "MSBuild, Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution" +excerpt: "MSBuild +, Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-10-04 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - MSBuild - - Defense Evasion - Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This analytic is to detect a suspicious child process of MSBuild spawned by Windows Script Host - cscript or wscript. This behavior or event are commonly seen and used by malware or adversaries to execute malicious msbuild process using malicious script in the compromised host. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any file modifications. MSBuild may load a script from the same path without having command-line arguments. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-10-04 @@ -92,8 +94,6 @@ False positives should be limited as developers do not spawn MSBuild via a WSH. | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | Msbuild.exe process spawned by $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ executed by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/regsvr32_silent/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/regsvr32_silent/sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-10-04-regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading.md b/docs/_posts/2021-10-04-regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading.md index 0ce957fe09..eff038a6e7 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-10-04-regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-10-04-regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading" -excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution, Regsvr32" +excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution +, Regsvr32 +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-10-04 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Signed Binary Proxy Execution - - Defense Evasion - Regsvr32 - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This analytic is to detect a loading of dll using regsvr32 application with silent parameter and dllinstall execution. This technique was seen in several RAT malware similar to remcos, njrat and adversaries to load their malicious DLL on the compromised machine. This TTP may executed by normal 3rd party application so it is better to pivot by the parent process, parent command-line and command-line of the file that execute this regsvr32. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-10-04 @@ -101,8 +103,6 @@ Other third part application may used this parameter but not so common in base w | 36.0 | 60 | 60 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a DLL using the silent and dllinstall parameter. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/vbs_wscript/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/vbs_wscript/sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-detect_exchange_web_shell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-detect_exchange_web_shell.md index 1f100eed7b..c7a1a636df 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-detect_exchange_web_shell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-detect_exchange_web_shell.md @@ -1,6 +1,9 @@ --- title: "Detect Exchange Web Shell" -excerpt: "Server Software Component, Web Shell, Exploit Public-Facing Application" +excerpt: "Server Software Component +, Web Shell +, Exploit Public-Facing Application +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-10-05 @@ -8,10 +11,10 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Server Software Component - - Persistence - Web Shell - - Persistence - Exploit Public-Facing Application + - Persistence + - Persistence - Initial Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security @@ -27,7 +30,7 @@ tags: The following query identifies suspicious .aspx created in 3 paths identified by Microsoft as known drop locations for Exchange exploitation related to HAFNIUM group and recently disclosed vulnerablity named ProxyShell. Paths include: `\HttpProxy\owa\auth\`, `\inetpub\wwwroot\aspnet_client\`, and `\HttpProxy\OAB\`. Upon triage, the suspicious .aspx file will likely look obvious on the surface. inspect the contents for script code inside. Identify additional log sources, IIS included, to review source and other potential exploitation. It is often the case that a particular threat is only applicable to a specific subset of systems in your environment. Typically analytics to detect those threats are written without the benefit of being able to only target those systems as well. Writing analytics against all systems when those behaviors are limited to identifiable subsets of those systems is suboptimal. Consider the case ProxyShell vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Servers. With asset information, a hunter can limit their analytics to systems that have been identified as Exchange servers. A hunter may start with the theory that the exchange server is communicating with new systems that it has not previously. If this theory is run against all publicly facing systems, the amount of noise it will generate will likely render this theory untenable. However, using the asset information to limit this analytic to just the Exchange servers will reduce the noise allowing the hunter to focus only on the systems where this behavioral change is relevant. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-10-05 @@ -98,8 +101,6 @@ The query is structured in a way that `action` (read, create) is not defined. Re | 81.0 | 90 | 90 | A file - $file_name$ was written to disk that is related to IIS exploitation previously performed by HAFNIUM. Review further file modifications on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -115,6 +116,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/windows-sysmon_proxylogon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/windows-sysmon_proxylogon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-malicious_inprocserver32_modification.md b/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-malicious_inprocserver32_modification.md index 1c63814662..651a912f66 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-malicious_inprocserver32_modification.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-malicious_inprocserver32_modification.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Malicious InProcServer32 Modification" -excerpt: "Regsvr32, Modify Registry" +excerpt: "Regsvr32 +, Modify Registry +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-10-05 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Regsvr32 - - Defense Evasion - Modify Registry - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies a process modifying the registry with a known malicious CLSID under InProcServer32. Most COM classes are registered with the operating system and are identified by a GUID that represents the Class Identifier (CLSID) within the registry (usually under HKLM\\Software\\Classes\\CLSID or HKCU\\Software\\Classes\\CLSID). Behind the implementation of a COM class is the server (some binary) that is referenced within registry keys under the CLSID. The LocalServer32 key represents a path to an executable (exe) implementation, and the InprocServer32 key represents a path to a dynamic link library (DLL) implementation (Bohops). During triage, review parallel processes for suspicious activity. Pivot on the process GUID to see the full timeline of events. Analyze the value and look for file modifications. Being this is looking for inprocserver32, a DLL found in the value will most likely be loaded by a parallel process. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-10-05 @@ -97,8 +99,6 @@ False positives should be limited, filter as needed. In our test case, Remcos us | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | The $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ modifying the registry with a known malicious clsid under InProcServer32. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-process_writing_dynamicwrapperx.md b/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-process_writing_dynamicwrapperx.md index 5527bafa73..8e27a34dbf 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-process_writing_dynamicwrapperx.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-process_writing_dynamicwrapperx.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Process Writing DynamicWrapperX" -excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter, Component Object Model" +excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter +, Component Object Model +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-10-05 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Command and Scripting Interpreter - - Execution - Component Object Model - Execution + - Execution - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: DynamicWrapperX is an ActiveX component that can be used in a script to call Windows API functions, but it requires the dynwrapx.dll to be installed and registered. With that, a binary writing dynwrapx.dll to disk and registering it into the registry is highly suspect. Why is it needed? In most malicious instances, it will be written to disk at a non-standard location. During triage, review parallel processes and pivot on the process_guid. Review the registry for any suspicious modifications meant to load dynwrapx.dll. Identify any suspicious module loads of dynwrapx.dll. This will identify the process that will invoke vbs/wscript/cscript. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-10-05 @@ -96,8 +98,6 @@ False positives should be limited, however it is possible to filter by Processes | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ downloading the DynamicWrapperX dll. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-rundll32_shimcache_flush.md b/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-rundll32_shimcache_flush.md index abd2b246b9..5a6b1a0772 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-rundll32_shimcache_flush.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-rundll32_shimcache_flush.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Rundll32 Shimcache Flush" -excerpt: "Modify Registry" +excerpt: "Modify Registry +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-10-05 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This analytic is to detect a suspicious rundll32 commandline to clear shim cache. This technique is a anti-forensic technique to clear the cache taht are one important artifacts in terms of digital forensic during attacks or incident. This TTP is a good indicator that someone tries to evade some tools and clear foothold on the machine. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-10-05 @@ -93,8 +94,6 @@ unknown | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | rundll32 process execute $process$ to clear shim cache in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -107,6 +106,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/shimcache_flush/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/shimcache_flush/sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-suspicious_copy_on_system32.md b/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-suspicious_copy_on_system32.md index b31f4a0d39..92888e7faa 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-suspicious_copy_on_system32.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-suspicious_copy_on_system32.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Suspicious Copy on System32" -excerpt: "Rename System Utilities, Masquerading" +excerpt: "Rename System Utilities +, Masquerading +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-10-05 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Rename System Utilities - - Defense Evasion - Masquerading - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This analytic is to detect a suspicious copy of file from systemroot folder of the windows OS. This technique is commonly used by APT or other malware as part of execution (LOLBIN) to run its malicious code using the available legitimate tool in OS. this type of event may seen or may execute of normal user in some instance but this is really a anomaly that needs to be check within the network. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-10-05 @@ -97,8 +99,6 @@ every user may do this event but very un-ussual. | 63.0 | 70 | 90 | execution of copy exe to copy file from $process$ in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/copy_sysmon/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/copy_sysmon/sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-winhlp32_spawning_a_process.md b/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-winhlp32_spawning_a_process.md index 60bd4906c3..3543a70b29 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-winhlp32_spawning_a_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-winhlp32_spawning_a_process.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Winhlp32 Spawning a Process" -excerpt: "Process Injection" +excerpt: "Process Injection +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-10-05 @@ -22,9 +23,9 @@ tags: #### Description -The following analytic identifies winhlp32.exe, found natively in `c:\windows\`, spawning a child process that loads a file out of appdata, programdata, or temp. Winhlp32.exe has a rocky past in that multiple vulnerabilities were found and added to MetaSploit. WinHlp32.exe is required to display 32-bit Help files that have the ".hlp" file name extension. This particular instance is related to a Remcos sample where dynwrapx.dll is added to the registry under inprocserver32, and later module loaded by winhlp32.exe to spawn wscript.exe and load a vbs or file from disk. During triage, review parallel processes to identify further suspicious behavior. Review module loads for unsuspecting unsigned modules. Capture any file modifications and analyze. +The following analytic identifies winhlp32.exe, found natively in `c:\windows\`, spawning a child process that loads a file out of appdata, programdata, or temp. Winhlp32.exe has a rocky past in that multiple vulnerabilities were found and added to MetaSploit. WinHlp32.exe is required to display 32-bit Help files that have the ".hlp" file name extension. This particular instance is related to a Remcos sample where dynwrapx.dll is added to the registry under inprocserver32, and later module loaded by winhlp32.exe to spawn wscript.exe and load a vbs or file from disk. During triage, review parallel processes to identify further suspicious behavior. Review module loads for unsuspecting unsigned modules. Capture any file modifications and analyze. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-10-05 @@ -93,8 +94,6 @@ False positives should be limited as winhlp32.exe is typically not used with the | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$, and is not typical activity for this process. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -109,6 +108,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-10-06-dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.md b/docs/_posts/2021-10-06-dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.md index 351b227f6e..482634ce29 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-10-06-dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-10-06-dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation" -excerpt: "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol, Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol" +excerpt: "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol +, Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol +" categories: - Network last_modified_at: 2021-10-06 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol - - Exfiltration - Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol - Exfiltration + - Exfiltration - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This search allows you to identify DNS requests and compute the standard deviation on the length of the names being resolved, then filter on two times the standard deviation to show you those queries that are unusually large for your environment. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Network_Resolution](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkResolution) - **Last Updated**: 2021-10-06 @@ -74,7 +76,7 @@ Note that `dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation_filter` is a empty macr To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. #### Known False Positives -It's possible there can be long domain names that are legitimate. +It's possible there can be long domain names that are legitimate. #### Associated Analytic story * [Hidden Cobra Malware](/stories/hidden_cobra_malware) @@ -83,7 +85,7 @@ It's possible there can be long domain names that are legitimate. #### Kill Chain Phase -* Command and Control +* Command & Control @@ -94,8 +96,6 @@ It's possible there can be long domain names that are legitimate. | 56.0 | 70 | 80 | A dns query $query$ with 2 time standard deviation of name len of the dns query in host $host$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/long_dns_queries/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/long_dns_queries/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-10-06-sdelete_application_execution.md b/docs/_posts/2021-10-06-sdelete_application_execution.md index e678dfbd8e..5634615cb9 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-10-06-sdelete_application_execution.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-10-06-sdelete_application_execution.md @@ -1,6 +1,9 @@ --- title: "Sdelete Application Execution" -excerpt: "Data Destruction, File Deletion, Indicator Removal on Host" +excerpt: "Data Destruction +, File Deletion +, Indicator Removal on Host +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-10-06 @@ -8,10 +11,10 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Data Destruction - - Impact - File Deletion - - Defense Evasion - Indicator Removal on Host + - Impact + - Defense Evasion - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security @@ -27,7 +30,7 @@ tags: This analytic is to detect the execution of sdelete.exe application sysinternal tools. This tool is one of the most use tool of malware and adversaries to remove or clear their tracks and artifact in the targetted host. This tool is designed to delete securely a file in file system that remove the forensic evidence on the machine. A good TTP query to check why user execute this application which is not a common practice. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-10-06 @@ -58,9 +61,9 @@ This analytic is to detect the execution of sdelete.exe application sysinternal #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_sdelete](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_sdelete.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_sdelete](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_sdelete.yml) Note that `sdelete_application_execution_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -101,8 +104,6 @@ user may execute and use this application | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | sdelete process $process_name$ executed in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -115,6 +116,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/sdelete/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/sdelete/sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-10-06-wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process.md b/docs/_posts/2021-10-06-wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process.md index bce5c13dd7..ad21ebcd27 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-10-06-wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-10-06-wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process.md @@ -1,6 +1,10 @@ --- title: "Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process" -excerpt: "Process Injection, Create or Modify System Process, Parent PID Spoofing, Access Token Manipulation" +excerpt: "Process Injection +, Create or Modify System Process +, Parent PID Spoofing +, Access Token Manipulation +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-10-06 @@ -8,15 +12,15 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Process Injection + - Create or Modify System Process + - Parent PID Spoofing + - Access Token Manipulation - Defense Evasion - Privilege Escalation - - Create or Modify System Process - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Parent PID Spoofing - Defense Evasion - Privilege Escalation - - Access Token Manipulation - Defense Evasion - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise @@ -33,7 +37,7 @@ tags: This analytic identifies a suspicious spawned process by WScript or CScript process. This technique was a common technique used by adversaries and malware to execute different LOLBIN, other scripts like PowerShell or spawn a suspended process to inject its code as a defense evasion. This TTP may detect some normal script that using several application tool that are in the list of the child process it detects but a good pivot and indicator that a script is may execute suspicious code. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-10-06 @@ -111,8 +115,6 @@ Administrators may create vbs or js script that use several tool as part of its | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | wscript or cscript parent process spawned $process_name$ in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -126,6 +128,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/vbs_wscript/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/vbs_wscript/sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-10-11-suspicious_wevtutil_usage.md b/docs/_posts/2021-10-11-suspicious_wevtutil_usage.md index 1e90eb39bc..c9e3f22772 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-10-11-suspicious_wevtutil_usage.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-10-11-suspicious_wevtutil_usage.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Suspicious wevtutil Usage" -excerpt: "Clear Windows Event Logs, Indicator Removal on Host" +excerpt: "Clear Windows Event Logs +, Indicator Removal on Host +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-10-11 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Clear Windows Event Logs - - Defense Evasion - Indicator Removal on Host - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: The wevtutil.exe application is the windows event log utility. This searches for wevtutil.exe with parameters for clearing the application, security, setup, trace or system event logs. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-10-11 @@ -69,7 +71,7 @@ Note that `suspicious_wevtutil_usage_filter` is a empty macro by default. It all #### How To Implement -You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. +You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. #### Known False Positives The wevtutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows event log utility. Administrators may use it to manage Windows event logs. @@ -92,8 +94,6 @@ The wevtutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows event log utility. Administ | 28.0 | 40 | 70 | Wevtutil.exe being used to clear Event Logs on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-10-13-dllhost_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.md b/docs/_posts/2021-10-13-dllhost_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.md index 151e446b54..3d680dce61 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-10-13-dllhost_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-10-13-dllhost_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network" -excerpt: "Process Injection" +excerpt: "Process Injection +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-10-13 @@ -24,7 +25,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies DLLHost.exe with no command line arguments with a network connection. It is unusual for DLLHost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. DLLHost.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-10-13 @@ -94,8 +95,6 @@ Although unlikely, some legitimate third party applications may use a moved copy | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | The process $process_name$ was spawned by $parent_image$ without any command-line arguments on $dest$ by $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -109,6 +108,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon_dllhost.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon_dllhost.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-10-13-rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.md b/docs/_posts/2021-10-13-rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.md index bd535dd110..4984e91774 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-10-13-rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-10-13-rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network" -excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution, Rundll32" +excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution +, Rundll32 +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-10-13 @@ -8,13 +10,12 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Signed Binary Proxy Execution - - Defense Evasion - Rundll32 - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - CVE-2021-34527 - Endpoint --- @@ -26,7 +27,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments and performing a network connection. It is unusual for rundll32.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-10-13 @@ -106,15 +107,6 @@ Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32 | 70.0 | 70 | 100 | A rundll32 process $process_name$ with no commandline argument like this process commandline $process$ in host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - - -#### CVE - -| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | -| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [CVE-2021-34527](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34527) | Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | 9.0 | - #### Reference @@ -130,6 +122,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-10-13-searchprotocolhost_with_no_command_line_with_network.md b/docs/_posts/2021-10-13-searchprotocolhost_with_no_command_line_with_network.md index 6f58db7fae..d458de8592 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-10-13-searchprotocolhost_with_no_command_line_with_network.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-10-13-searchprotocolhost_with_no_command_line_with_network.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network" -excerpt: "Process Injection" +excerpt: "Process Injection +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-10-13 @@ -24,7 +25,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies searchprotocolhost.exe with no command line arguments and with a network connection. It is unusual for searchprotocolhost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. searchprotocolhost.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-10-13 @@ -93,8 +94,6 @@ Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be requ | 70.0 | 70 | 100 | A searchprotocolhost.exe process $process_name$ with no commandline in host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -107,6 +106,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon_searchprotocolhost.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon_searchprotocolhost.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-10-14-serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-10-14-serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell.md index 437bafaf70..0f9370764c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-10-14-serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-10-14-serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell" -excerpt: "Kerberoasting" +excerpt: "Kerberoasting +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-10-14 @@ -26,7 +27,7 @@ A service principal name (SPN) is a unique identifier of a service instance. SPN The following analytic identifies the use of KerberosRequestorSecurityToken class within the script block. Using .NET System.IdentityModel.Tokens.KerberosRequestorSecurityToken class in PowerShell is the equivelant of using setspn.exe. \ During triage, review parallel processes for further suspicious activity. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-10-14 @@ -84,7 +85,7 @@ False positives should be limited, however filter as needed. #### Kill Chain Phase -* Privilege Escalation +* Exploitation @@ -95,8 +96,6 @@ False positives should be limited, however filter as needed. | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to identify service principle names. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -122,6 +121,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/atomic_red_team/windows-powershell_kerberos.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/atomic_red_team/windows-powershell_kerberos.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-10-14-serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn.md b/docs/_posts/2021-10-14-serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn.md index 08a827a7e1..0a20486b3b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-10-14-serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-10-14-serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN" -excerpt: "Kerberoasting" +excerpt: "Kerberoasting +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-10-14 @@ -25,12 +26,12 @@ The following analytic identifies `setspn.exe` usage related to querying the dom What is a ServicePrincipleName? \ A service principal name (SPN) is a unique identifier of a service instance. SPNs are used by Kerberos authentication to associate a service instance with a service logon account. This allows a client application to request that the service authenticate an account even if the client does not have the account name.\ Example usage includes the following \ -1. setspn -T offense -Q */* 1. setspn -T attackrange.local -F -Q MSSQLSvc/* 1. setspn -Q */* > allspns.txt 1. setspn -q \ +1. setspn -T offense -Q */* 1. setspn -T attackrange.local -F -Q MSSQLSvc/* 1. setspn -Q */* > allspns.txt 1. setspn -q \ Values \ 1. -F = perform queries at the forest, rather than domain level 1. -T = perform query on the specified domain or forest (when -F is also used) 1. -Q = query for existence of SPN \ During triage, review parallel processes for further suspicious activity. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-10-14 @@ -90,8 +91,7 @@ False positives may be caused by Administrators resetting SPNs or querying for S #### Kill Chain Phase -* Privilege Escalation -* Active Directory Kerberos Attacks +* Exploitation @@ -102,8 +102,6 @@ False positives may be caused by Administrators resetting SPNs or querying for S | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to identify service principle names. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -124,6 +122,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_setspn.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_setspn.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-10-18-disable_schedule_task.md b/docs/_posts/2021-10-18-disable_schedule_task.md index c8d10ab8f4..1371e8a55a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-10-18-disable_schedule_task.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-10-18-disable_schedule_task.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Disable Schedule Task" -excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools, Impair Defenses" +excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools +, Impair Defenses +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-10-18 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Disable or Modify Tools - - Defense Evasion - Impair Defenses - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This analytic is to detect a suspicious commandline to disable existing schedule task. This technique is used by adversaries or commodity malware like IceID to disable security application (AV products) in the targetted host to evade detections. This TTP is a good pivot to check further why and what other process run before and after this detection. check which process execute the commandline and what task is disabled. parent child process is quite valuable in this scenario too. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-10-18 @@ -89,8 +91,6 @@ admin may disable problematic schedule task | 56.0 | 70 | 80 | schtask process with commandline $process$ to disable schedule task in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_schtask/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_schtask/sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-10-19-windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path.md b/docs/_posts/2021-10-19-windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path.md index e9f38bd9df..f9b1ae67f3 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-10-19-windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-10-19-windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path" -excerpt: "Ingress Tool Transfer" +excerpt: "Ingress Tool Transfer +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-10-19 @@ -25,7 +26,7 @@ The following analytic identifies the use of Windows Curl.exe downloading a file -O or --output is used when a file is to be downloaded and placed in a specified location. \ During triage, review parallel processes for further behavior. In addition, identify if the download was successful. If a file was downloaded, capture and analyze. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-10-19 @@ -52,9 +53,9 @@ During triage, review parallel processes for further behavior. In addition, iden #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_curl](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_curl.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_curl](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_curl.yml) Note that `windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -96,8 +97,6 @@ It is possible Administrators or super users will use Curl for legitimate purpos | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ to download a file to a suspicious directory. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -112,6 +111,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_curl.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_curl.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-10-19-winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started.md b/docs/_posts/2021-10-19-winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started.md index ecab753146..4f8a59edfb 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-10-19-winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-10-19-winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started" -excerpt: "Scheduled Task" +excerpt: "Scheduled Task +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-10-19 @@ -25,7 +26,7 @@ tags: The following hunting analytic assists with identifying suspicious tasks that have been registered and ran in Windows using EventID 200 (action run) and 201 (action completed). It is recommended to filter based on ActionName by specifying specific paths not used in your environment. After some basic tuning, this may be effective in capturing evasive ways to register tasks on Windows. Review parallel events related to tasks being scheduled. EventID 106 will generate when a new task is generated, however, that does not mean it ran. Capture any files on disk and analyze. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-10-19 @@ -52,8 +53,8 @@ The following hunting analytic assists with identifying suspicious tasks that ha #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [wineventlog_task_scheduler](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_task_scheduler.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -89,8 +90,6 @@ False positives will be present. Filter based on ActionName paths or specify key | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | A Scheduled Task was scheduled and ran on $dest$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -104,6 +103,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/windows_taskschedule/windows-taskschedule.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/windows_taskschedule/windows-taskschedule.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-10-20-wmic_noninteractive_app_uninstallation.md b/docs/_posts/2021-10-20-wmic_noninteractive_app_uninstallation.md index 7f855e15a7..ca763e176a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-10-20-wmic_noninteractive_app_uninstallation.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-10-20-wmic_noninteractive_app_uninstallation.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Wmic NonInteractive App Uninstallation" -excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools, Impair Defenses" +excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools +, Impair Defenses +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-10-20 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Disable or Modify Tools - - Defense Evasion - Impair Defenses - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This analytic is to detect a suspicious wmic commandlined that uninstall application non interactively. This technique was seen in IceID to uninstall av products to the compromised host to bypassed and evade detections. This Hunting query maybe a good indicator that some process tries to uninstall application using wmic which is not a common behavior. This approach may seen in some script or third part appication to uninstall their application but it is a good thing to check what it uninstall and why. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-10-20 @@ -96,8 +98,6 @@ third party application may use this approach to uninstall there application | 25.0 | 50 | 50 | wmic $process$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon2.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon2.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-10-24-gdrive_suspicious_file_sharing.md b/docs/_posts/2021-10-24-gdrive_suspicious_file_sharing.md index 4ee95eed34..a16619aec7 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-10-24-gdrive_suspicious_file_sharing.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-10-24-gdrive_suspicious_file_sharing.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Gdrive suspicious file sharing" -excerpt: "Phishing" +excerpt: "Phishing +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2021-10-24 @@ -14,8 +15,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Cloud --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -24,7 +25,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search can help the detection of compromised accounts or internal users sharing potentially malicious/classified documents with users outside your organization via GSuite file sharing . -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-10-24 @@ -80,8 +81,12 @@ This is an anomaly search, you must specify your domain in the parameters so it +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -95,6 +100,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [[]]([]) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-10-24-gsuite_suspicious_calendar_invite.md b/docs/_posts/2021-10-24-gsuite_suspicious_calendar_invite.md index ca23020502..8bcf42bcf7 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-10-24-gsuite_suspicious_calendar_invite.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-10-24-gsuite_suspicious_calendar_invite.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Gsuite suspicious calendar invite" -excerpt: "Phishing" +excerpt: "Phishing +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2021-10-24 @@ -14,8 +15,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Cloud --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -24,7 +25,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U This search can help the detection of compromised accounts or internal users sending suspcious calendar invites via GSuite calendar. These invites may contain malicious links or attachments. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-10-24 @@ -79,8 +80,12 @@ This search will also produce normal activity statistics. Fields such as email, +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -95,6 +100,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [[]]([]) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-03-windows_adfind_exe.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-03-windows_adfind_exe.md index eb973df8e2..d883a6f84f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-03-windows_adfind_exe.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-03-windows_adfind_exe.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Windows AdFind Exe" -excerpt: "Remote System Discovery" +excerpt: "Remote System Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-11-03 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This search looks for the execution of `adfind.exe` with command-line arguments that it uses by default. Specifically the filter or search functions. It also considers the arguments necessary like objectcategory, see readme for more details: https://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/usage.htm. This has been seen used before by Wizard Spider, FIN6 and actors whom also launched SUNBURST. AdFind.exe is usually used a recon tool to enumare a domain controller. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-11-03 @@ -82,8 +83,12 @@ administrators rarely use adfind, usually not used for legitimate reasons +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | Windows AdFind Exe | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -98,6 +103,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-04-attacker_tools_on_endpoint.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-04-attacker_tools_on_endpoint.md index d2701ad3d8..6c10823c9b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-04-attacker_tools_on_endpoint.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-04-attacker_tools_on_endpoint.md @@ -1,6 +1,10 @@ --- title: "Attacker Tools On Endpoint" -excerpt: "Match Legitimate Name or Location, Masquerading, OS Credential Dumping, Active Scanning" +excerpt: "Match Legitimate Name or Location +, Masquerading +, OS Credential Dumping +, Active Scanning +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-11-04 @@ -8,12 +12,12 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Match Legitimate Name or Location - - Defense Evasion - Masquerading - - Defense Evasion - OS Credential Dumping - - Credential Access - Active Scanning + - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion + - Credential Access - Reconnaissance - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security @@ -29,7 +33,7 @@ tags: This search looks for execution of commonly used attacker tools on an endpoint. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-11-04 @@ -72,7 +76,7 @@ Note that `attacker_tools_on_endpoint_filter` is a empty macro by default. It al #### Lookups The SPL above uses the following Lookups: -* [attacker_tools](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/attacker_tools.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/attacker_tools.csv) +* [attacker_tools](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/attacker_tools.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/lookups/attacker_tools.csv) #### Required field * Processes.dest @@ -96,7 +100,7 @@ Some administrator activity can be potentially triggered, please add those users #### Kill Chain Phase * Installation -* Command and Control +* Command & Control * Actions on Objectives @@ -108,8 +112,6 @@ Some administrator activity can be potentially triggered, please add those users | 64.0 | 80 | 80 | An attacker tool $process_name$,listed in attacker_tools.csv is executed on host $dest$ by User $user$. This process $process_name$ is known to do- $description$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -119,6 +121,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1595/attacker_scan_tools/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1595/attacker_scan_tools/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-10-windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-10-windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination.md index a8c7241b23..70c8a671a8 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-10-windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-10-windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination" -excerpt: "Ingress Tool Transfer" +excerpt: "Ingress Tool Transfer +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-11-10 @@ -27,7 +28,7 @@ The following analytic identifies the use of Windows Curl.exe uploading a file t HTTP multipart formposts are done with `-F`, but this appears to not be compatible with the Windows version of Curl. Will update if identified adversary tradecraft. \ Adversaries may use one of the three methods based on the remote destination and what they are attempting to upload (zip vs txt). During triage, review parallel processes for further behavior. In addition, identify if the upload was successful in network logs. If a file was uploaded, isolate the endpoint and review. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-11-10 @@ -54,9 +55,9 @@ Adversaries may use one of the three methods based on the remote destination and #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_curl](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_curl.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_curl](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_curl.yml) Note that `windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -86,7 +87,7 @@ False positives may be limited to source control applications and may be require #### Kill Chain Phase -* Exfiltration +* Exploitation @@ -97,8 +98,6 @@ False positives may be limited to source control applications and may be require | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ uploading a file to a remote destination. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -113,6 +112,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_curl_upload.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_curl_upload.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-10-windows_service_creation_on_remote_endpoint.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-10-windows_service_creation_on_remote_endpoint.md index 49a3198ad0..4fa58c0131 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-10-windows_service_creation_on_remote_endpoint.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-10-windows_service_creation_on_remote_endpoint.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Windows Service Creation on Remote Endpoint" -excerpt: "Create or Modify System Process, Windows Service" +excerpt: "Create or Modify System Process +, Windows Service +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-11-10 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Create or Modify System Process + - Windows Service - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Windows Service - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for the execution of `sc.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to create a Windows Service on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Service Control Manager for lateral movement and remote code execution. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-11-10 @@ -87,7 +89,7 @@ Administrators may create Windows Services on remote systems, but this activity #### Kill Chain Phase -* Lateral Movement +* Exploitation @@ -98,8 +100,6 @@ Administrators may create Windows Services on remote systems, but this activity | 54.0 | 90 | 60 | A Windows Service was created on a remote endpoint from $dest | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-10-windows_service_initiation_on_remote_endpoint.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-10-windows_service_initiation_on_remote_endpoint.md index d08314ddc3..3d7b3fdf54 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-10-windows_service_initiation_on_remote_endpoint.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-10-windows_service_initiation_on_remote_endpoint.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Windows Service Initiation on Remote Endpoint" -excerpt: "Create or Modify System Process, Windows Service" +excerpt: "Create or Modify System Process +, Windows Service +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-11-10 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Create or Modify System Process + - Windows Service - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Windows Service - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for the execution of `sc.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to start a Windows Service on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Service Control Manager for lateral movement and remote code execution. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-11-10 @@ -87,7 +89,7 @@ Administrators may start Windows Services on remote systems, but this activity i #### Kill Chain Phase -* Lateral Movement +* Exploitation @@ -98,8 +100,6 @@ Administrators may start Windows Services on remote systems, but this activity i | 54.0 | 90 | 60 | A Windows Service was started on a remote endpoint from $dest | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-11-remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_winrs.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-11-remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_winrs.md index 866953c7a2..8ca18fc560 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-11-remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_winrs.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-11-remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_winrs.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and Winrs" -excerpt: "Remote Services, Windows Remote Management" +excerpt: "Remote Services +, Windows Remote Management +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-11-11 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Remote Services - - Lateral Movement - Windows Remote Management - Lateral Movement + - Lateral Movement - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for the execution of `winrs.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the WinRM protocol and this binary for lateral movement and remote code execution. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-11-11 @@ -85,7 +87,7 @@ Administrators may leverage WinRM and WinRs to start a process on remote systems #### Kill Chain Phase -* Lateral Movement +* Exploitation @@ -96,8 +98,6 @@ Administrators may leverage WinRM and WinRs to start a process on remote systems | 54.0 | 90 | 60 | A process was started on a remote endpoint from $dest | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-11-scheduled_task_creation_on_remote_endpoint_using_at.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-11-scheduled_task_creation_on_remote_endpoint_using_at.md index 2545c8637e..d7bef8fbae 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-11-scheduled_task_creation_on_remote_endpoint_using_at.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-11-scheduled_task_creation_on_remote_endpoint_using_at.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At" -excerpt: "Scheduled Task/Job, At (Windows)" +excerpt: "Scheduled Task/Job +, At (Windows) +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-11-11 @@ -8,10 +10,10 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Scheduled Task/Job + - At (Windows) - Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - At (Windows) - Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation @@ -29,7 +31,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for the execution of `at.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to create a Scheduled Task on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution. The `at.exe` binary internally leverages the AT protocol which was deprecated starting with Windows 8 and Windows Server 2012 but may still work on previous versions of Windows. Furthermore, attackers may enable this protocol on demand by changing a sytem registry key. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-11-11 @@ -89,7 +91,7 @@ Administrators may create scheduled tasks on remote systems, but this activity i #### Kill Chain Phase -* Lateral Movement +* Exploitation @@ -100,8 +102,6 @@ Administrators may create scheduled tasks on remote systems, but this activity i | 54.0 | 90 | 60 | A Windows Scheduled Task was created on a remote endpoint from $dest | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.002/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.002/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-11-scheduled_task_initiation_on_remote_endpoint.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-11-scheduled_task_initiation_on_remote_endpoint.md index 76ab38b644..4ac12cc318 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-11-scheduled_task_initiation_on_remote_endpoint.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-11-scheduled_task_initiation_on_remote_endpoint.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint" -excerpt: "Scheduled Task/Job, Scheduled Task" +excerpt: "Scheduled Task/Job +, Scheduled Task +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-11-11 @@ -8,10 +10,10 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Scheduled Task/Job + - Scheduled Task - Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Scheduled Task - Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation @@ -29,7 +31,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for the execution of `schtasks.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to start a Scheduled Task on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-11-11 @@ -89,7 +91,7 @@ Administrators may start scheduled tasks on remote systems, but this activity is #### Kill Chain Phase -* Lateral Movement +* Exploitation @@ -100,8 +102,6 @@ Administrators may start scheduled tasks on remote systems, but this activity is | 54.0 | 90 | 60 | A Windows Scheduled Task was ran on a remote endpoint from $dest | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-11-schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-11-schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.md index 90d87dfbf8..6dd3131eb9 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-11-schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-11-schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Schtasks scheduling job on remote system" -excerpt: "Scheduled Task, Scheduled Task/Job" +excerpt: "Scheduled Task +, Scheduled Task/Job +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-11-11 @@ -8,10 +10,10 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Scheduled Task + - Scheduled Task/Job - Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Scheduled Task/Job - Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation @@ -29,7 +31,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for the execution of `schtasks.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to create a Scheduled Task on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-11-11 @@ -73,7 +75,7 @@ Note that `schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system_filter` is a empty macro by #### How To Implement -You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. +You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. #### Known False Positives Administrators may create scheduled tasks on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. It is important to validate and investigate as appropriate. @@ -95,8 +97,6 @@ Administrators may create scheduled tasks on remote systems, but this activity i | 63.0 | 70 | 90 | A schedule task process $process_name$ with remote job commandline $process$ in host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-11-wmic_xsl_execution_via_url.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-11-wmic_xsl_execution_via_url.md index 6da0616322..46b83eb4f0 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-11-wmic_xsl_execution_via_url.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-11-wmic_xsl_execution_via_url.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "WMIC XSL Execution via URL" -excerpt: "XSL Script Processing" +excerpt: "XSL Script Processing +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-11-11 @@ -21,9 +22,9 @@ tags: #### Description -The following analytic identifies `wmic.exe` loading a remote XSL (eXtensible Stylesheet Language) script. This originally was identified by Casey Smith, dubbed Squiblytwo, as an application control bypass. Many adversaries will utilize this technique to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file. This technique can also execute local/remote scripts and, similar to its Regsvr32 "Squiblydoo" counterpart, leverages a trusted, built-in Windows tool. Adversaries may abuse any alias in Windows Management Instrumentation provided they utilize the /FORMAT switch. Upon identifying a suspicious execution, review for confirmed network connnection and script download. +The following analytic identifies `wmic.exe` loading a remote XSL (eXtensible Stylesheet Language) script. This originally was identified by Casey Smith, dubbed Squiblytwo, as an application control bypass. Many adversaries will utilize this technique to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file. This technique can also execute local/remote scripts and, similar to its Regsvr32 "Squiblydoo" counterpart, leverages a trusted, built-in Windows tool. Adversaries may abuse any alias in Windows Management Instrumentation provided they utilize the /FORMAT switch. Upon identifying a suspicious execution, review for confirmed network connnection and script download. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-11-11 @@ -50,9 +51,9 @@ The following analytic identifies `wmic.exe` loading a remote XSL (eXtensible St #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_wmic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_wmic.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_wmic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_wmic.yml) Note that `wmic_xsl_execution_via_url_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -93,8 +94,6 @@ False positives are limited as legitimate applications typically do not download | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ utilizing wmic to download a remote XSL script. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -109,6 +108,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1220/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1220/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events.md index b476e21d55..eb307f9322 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events" -excerpt: "Cloud Infrastructure Discovery" +excerpt: "Cloud Infrastructure Discovery +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2021-11-12 @@ -12,7 +13,6 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS --- @@ -23,8 +23,8 @@ tags: The following detection identifies excessive AccessDenied events within an hour timeframe. It is possible that an access key to AWS may have been stolen and is being misused to perform discovery events. In these instances, the access is not available with the key stolen therefore these events will be generated. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud, Splunk Security Analytics for AWS +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-11-12 - **Author**: Michael Haag, Splunk @@ -87,8 +87,6 @@ It is possible to start this detection will need to be tuned by source IP or use | 10.0 | 20 | 50 | User $userIdentity.arn$ is seen to perform excessive number of discovery related api calls- $failures$, within an hour where the access was denied. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -101,6 +99,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1580/aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events/aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1580/aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events/aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-csc_net_on_the_fly_compilation.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-csc_net_on_the_fly_compilation.md index 5b91cf651a..b33f8dd434 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-csc_net_on_the_fly_compilation.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-csc_net_on_the_fly_compilation.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "CSC Net On The Fly Compilation" -excerpt: "Compile After Delivery, Obfuscated Files or Information" +excerpt: "Compile After Delivery +, Obfuscated Files or Information +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-11-12 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Compile After Delivery - - Defense Evasion - Obfuscated Files or Information - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: this analytic is to detect a suspicious compile before delivery approach of .net compiler csc.exe. This technique was seen in several adversaries, malware and even in red teams to take advantage the csc.exe .net compiler tool to compile on the fly a malicious .net code to evade detection from security product. This is a good hunting query to check further the file or process created after this event and check the file path that passed to csc.exe which is the .net code. Aside from that, powershell is capable of using this compiler in executing .net code in a powershell script so filter on that case is needed. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-11-12 @@ -54,9 +56,9 @@ this analytic is to detect a suspicious compile before delivery approach of .net #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_csc](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_csc.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_csc](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_csc.yml) Note that `csc_net_on_the_fly_compilation_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -94,8 +96,6 @@ A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated powershell | 25.0 | 50 | 50 | csc.exe with commandline $process$ to compile .net code on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/vilsel/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/vilsel/sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-firewall_allowed_program_enable.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-firewall_allowed_program_enable.md index f667a632f5..b51fa19611 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-firewall_allowed_program_enable.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-firewall_allowed_program_enable.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Firewall Allowed Program Enable" -excerpt: "Disable or Modify System Firewall, Impair Defenses" +excerpt: "Disable or Modify System Firewall +, Impair Defenses +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-11-12 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Disable or Modify System Firewall - - Defense Evasion - Impair Defenses - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This analytic detects a potential suspicious modification of firewall rule allowing to execute specific application. This technique was identified when an adversary and red teams to bypassed firewall file execution restriction in a targetted host. Take note that this event or command can run by administrator during testing or allowing legitimate tool or application. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-11-12 @@ -93,8 +95,6 @@ A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated or manual e | 25.0 | 50 | 50 | firewall allowed program commandline $process$ of $process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/vilsel/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/vilsel/sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-network_discovery_using_route_windows_app.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-network_discovery_using_route_windows_app.md index a08514361f..d5da39a5d0 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-network_discovery_using_route_windows_app.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-network_discovery_using_route_windows_app.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Network Discovery Using Route Windows App" -excerpt: "System Network Configuration Discovery, Internet Connection Discovery" +excerpt: "System Network Configuration Discovery +, Internet Connection Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-11-12 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - System Network Configuration Discovery - - Discovery - Internet Connection Discovery - Discovery + - Discovery - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This analytic look for a spawned process of route.exe windows application. Adversaries and red teams alike abuse this application the recon or do a network discovery on a target host. but one possible false positive might be an automated tool used by a system administator or a powershell script in amazon ec2 config services. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-11-12 @@ -94,8 +96,6 @@ A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated host discov | 9.0 | 30 | 30 | Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/vilsel/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/vilsel/sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.md index ea338a9ceb..76a31d818a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI" -excerpt: "Windows Management Instrumentation" +excerpt: "Windows Management Instrumentation +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-11-12 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This analytic identifies wmic.exe being launched with parameters to spawn a process on a remote system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WMI and this binary for lateral movement and remote code execution. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-11-12 @@ -50,9 +51,9 @@ This analytic identifies wmic.exe being launched with parameters to spawn a proc #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_wmic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_wmic.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_wmic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_wmic.yml) Note that `remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -75,7 +76,7 @@ Note that `remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_filter` is a empty macro by defa To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. #### Known False Positives -The wmic.exe utility is a benign Windows application. It may be used legitimately by Administrators with these parameters for remote system administration, but it's relatively uncommon. +The wmic.exe utility is a benign Windows application. It may be used legitimately by Administrators with these parameters for remote system administration, but it's relatively uncommon. #### Associated Analytic story * [Ransomware](/stories/ransomware) @@ -95,8 +96,6 @@ The wmic.exe utility is a benign Windows application. It may be used legitimatel | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | A wmic.exe process $process$ contain process spawn commandline $process$ in host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -110,6 +109,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-runas_execution_in_commandline.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-runas_execution_in_commandline.md index 81a5081983..87e719ed96 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-runas_execution_in_commandline.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-runas_execution_in_commandline.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Runas Execution in CommandLine" -excerpt: "Access Token Manipulation, Token Impersonation/Theft" +excerpt: "Access Token Manipulation +, Token Impersonation/Theft +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-11-12 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Access Token Manipulation + - Token Impersonation/Theft - Defense Evasion - Privilege Escalation - - Token Impersonation/Theft - Defense Evasion - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ tags: This analytic look for a spawned runas.exe process with a administrator user option parameter. This parameter was abused by adversaries, malware author or even red teams to gain elevated privileges in target host. This is a good hunting query to figure out privilege escalation tactics that may used for different stages like lateral movement but take note that administrator may use this command in purpose so its better to see other event context before and after this analytic. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-11-12 @@ -56,9 +58,9 @@ This analytic look for a spawned runas.exe process with a administrator user opt #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_runas](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_runas.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_runas](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_runas.yml) Note that `runas_execution_in_commandline_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -85,7 +87,7 @@ A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated or manual e #### Kill Chain Phase -* Privilege Escalation +* Exploitation @@ -96,8 +98,6 @@ A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated or manual e | 25.0 | 50 | 50 | elevated process using runas on $dest$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/vilsel/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/vilsel/sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-windows_installutil_credential_theft.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-windows_installutil_credential_theft.md index 3d3f8e7732..40ce2b5083 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-windows_installutil_credential_theft.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-windows_installutil_credential_theft.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft" -excerpt: "InstallUtil, Signed Binary Proxy Execution" +excerpt: "InstallUtil +, Signed Binary Proxy Execution +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-11-12 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - InstallUtil - - Defense Evasion - Signed Binary Proxy Execution - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -28,7 +30,7 @@ When `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable o If used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \ During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-11-12 @@ -57,8 +59,8 @@ During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and para #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `windows_installutil_credential_theft_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -81,7 +83,7 @@ Note that `windows_installutil_credential_theft_filter` is a empty macro by defa To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and module loads from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. #### Known False Positives -Typically this will not trigger as by it's very nature InstallUtil does not need credentials. Filter as needed. +Typically this will not trigger as by it's very nature InstallUtil does not need credentials. Filter as needed. #### Associated Analytic story * [Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil](/stories/signed_binary_proxy_execution_installutil) @@ -89,7 +91,6 @@ Typically this will not trigger as by it's very nature InstallUtil does not #### Kill Chain Phase * Exploitation -* Privilege Escalation @@ -100,8 +101,6 @@ Typically this will not trigger as by it's very nature InstallUtil does not | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ loading samlib.dll and vaultcli.dll to potentially capture credentials in memory. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -114,6 +113,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-windows_installutil_remote_network_connection.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-windows_installutil_remote_network_connection.md index 37e1e7a87b..1d8470f90d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-windows_installutil_remote_network_connection.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-windows_installutil_remote_network_connection.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection" -excerpt: "InstallUtil, Signed Binary Proxy Execution" +excerpt: "InstallUtil +, Signed Binary Proxy Execution +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-11-12 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - InstallUtil - - Defense Evasion - Signed Binary Proxy Execution - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -28,7 +30,7 @@ When `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable o If used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \ During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-11-12 @@ -63,8 +65,8 @@ During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and para #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [process_installutil](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_installutil.yml) -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `windows_installutil_remote_network_connection_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -98,7 +100,6 @@ Limited false positives should be present as InstallUtil is not typically used t #### Kill Chain Phase * Exploitation -* Privilege Escalation @@ -109,8 +110,6 @@ Limited false positives should be present as InstallUtil is not typically used t | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ generating a remote download. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -123,6 +122,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-windows_installutil_uninstall_option.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-windows_installutil_uninstall_option.md index 83b51bc752..1e412af3a7 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-windows_installutil_uninstall_option.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-windows_installutil_uninstall_option.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option" -excerpt: "InstallUtil, Signed Binary Proxy Execution" +excerpt: "InstallUtil +, Signed Binary Proxy Execution +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-11-12 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - InstallUtil - - Defense Evasion - Signed Binary Proxy Execution - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -29,7 +31,7 @@ When `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable o If used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \ During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-11-12 @@ -59,8 +61,8 @@ During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and para #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [process_installutil](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_installutil.yml) -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `windows_installutil_uninstall_option_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -91,7 +93,6 @@ Limited false positives should be present. Filter as needed by parent process or #### Kill Chain Phase * Exploitation -* Privilege Escalation @@ -102,8 +103,6 @@ Limited false positives should be present. Filter as needed by parent process or | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ performing an uninstall. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -118,6 +117,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network.md index 8ea6579420..4ca6d44b00 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network" -excerpt: "InstallUtil, Signed Binary Proxy Execution" +excerpt: "InstallUtil +, Signed Binary Proxy Execution +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-11-12 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - InstallUtil - - Defense Evasion - Signed Binary Proxy Execution - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -29,7 +31,7 @@ When `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable o If used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \ During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-11-12 @@ -64,8 +66,8 @@ During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and para #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [process_installutil](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_installutil.yml) -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -99,7 +101,6 @@ Limited false positives should be present as InstallUtil is not typically used t #### Kill Chain Phase * Exploitation -* Privilege Escalation @@ -110,8 +111,6 @@ Limited false positives should be present as InstallUtil is not typically used t | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ performing an uninstall. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -126,6 +125,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-windows_installutil_url_in_command_line.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-windows_installutil_url_in_command_line.md index b9ee2a0617..60e5fb5674 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-windows_installutil_url_in_command_line.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-windows_installutil_url_in_command_line.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line" -excerpt: "InstallUtil, Signed Binary Proxy Execution" +excerpt: "InstallUtil +, Signed Binary Proxy Execution +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-11-12 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - InstallUtil - - Defense Evasion - Signed Binary Proxy Execution - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -28,7 +30,7 @@ When `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable o If used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \ During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-11-12 @@ -58,8 +60,8 @@ During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and para #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [process_installutil](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_installutil.yml) -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `windows_installutil_url_in_command_line_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -90,7 +92,6 @@ Limited false positives should be present as InstallUtil is not typically used t #### Kill Chain Phase * Exploitation -* Privilege Escalation @@ -101,8 +102,6 @@ Limited false positives should be present as InstallUtil is not typically used t | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ passing a URL on the command-line. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -116,6 +115,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell.md index da83592d5c..15dd602b4b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell" -excerpt: "Remote Services, Distributed Component Object Model" +excerpt: "Remote Services +, Distributed Component Object Model +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-11-15 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Remote Services - - Lateral Movement - Distributed Component Object Model - Lateral Movement + - Lateral Movement - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the DCOM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of ShellExecute and ExecuteShellCommand. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse DCOM and `powershell.exe` for lateral movement and remote code execution. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-11-15 @@ -54,9 +56,9 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with arguments utilize #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) Note that `remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -86,7 +88,7 @@ Administrators may leverage DCOM to start a process on remote systems, but this #### Kill Chain Phase -* Lateral Movement +* Exploitation @@ -97,8 +99,6 @@ Administrators may leverage DCOM to start a process on remote systems, but this | 63.0 | 90 | 70 | A process was started on a remote endpoint from $dest by abusing DCOM using PowerShell.exe | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.003/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.003/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_script_block.md index 2f8b64f447..fe7b20a4b4 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_script_block.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell Script Block" -excerpt: "Remote Services, Distributed Component Object Model" +excerpt: "Remote Services +, Distributed Component Object Model +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-11-15 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Remote Services - - Lateral Movement - Distributed Component Object Model - Lateral Movement + - Lateral Movement - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -24,7 +26,7 @@ tags: The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of PowerShell with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the DCOM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of ShellExecute and ExecuteShellCommand. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse DCOM for lateral movement and remote code execution. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-11-15 @@ -75,7 +77,7 @@ Administrators may leverage DCOM to start a process on remote systems, but this #### Kill Chain Phase -* Lateral Movement +* Exploitation @@ -86,8 +88,6 @@ Administrators may leverage DCOM to start a process on remote systems, but this | 63.0 | 90 | 70 | A process was started on a remote endpoint from $ComputerName by abusing WMI using PowerShell.exe | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.003/lateral_movement/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.003/lateral_movement/windows-powershell.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell.md index bdae3d1008..ed55b971a6 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell" -excerpt: "Windows Management Instrumentation" +excerpt: "Windows Management Instrumentation +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-11-15 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` leveraging the `Invoke-WmiMethod` commandlet complemented with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing WMI. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WMI and `powershell.exe` for lateral movement and remote code execution. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-11-15 @@ -50,9 +51,9 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` leveraging the `Invoke #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) Note that `remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -82,7 +83,7 @@ Administrators may leverage WWMI and powershell.exe to start a process on remote #### Kill Chain Phase -* Lateral Movement +* Exploitation @@ -93,8 +94,6 @@ Administrators may leverage WWMI and powershell.exe to start a process on remote | 63.0 | 90 | 70 | A process was started on a remote endpoint from $dest by abusing WMI using PowerShell.exe | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -108,6 +107,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_script_block.md index 6ccf682a67..21bd6749aa 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_script_block.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell Script Block" -excerpt: "Windows Management Instrumentation" +excerpt: "Windows Management Instrumentation +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-11-15 @@ -22,7 +23,7 @@ tags: The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Invoke-WmiMethod` commandlet with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing WMI. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WMI and this commandlet for lateral movement and remote code execution. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-11-15 @@ -71,7 +72,7 @@ Administrators may leverage WWMI and powershell.exe to start a process on remote #### Kill Chain Phase -* Lateral Movement +* Exploitation @@ -82,8 +83,6 @@ Administrators may leverage WWMI and powershell.exe to start a process on remote | 63.0 | 90 | 70 | A process was started on a remote endpoint from $ComputerName by abusing WMI using PowerShell.exe | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -97,6 +96,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/lateral_movement/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/lateral_movement/windows-powershell.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-windows_diskcryptor_usage.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-windows_diskcryptor_usage.md index f0af880755..1703734b77 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-windows_diskcryptor_usage.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-windows_diskcryptor_usage.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Windows DiskCryptor Usage" -excerpt: "Data Encrypted for Impact" +excerpt: "Data Encrypted for Impact +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-11-15 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies DiskCryptor process name of dcrypt.exe or internal name dcinst.exe. This utility has been utilized by adversaries to encrypt disks manually during an operation. In addition, during install, a dcrypt.sys driver is installed and requires a reboot in order to take effect. There are no command-line arguments used. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-11-15 @@ -92,8 +93,6 @@ It is possible false positives may be present based on the internal name dcinst. | 35.0 | 70 | 50 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to encrypt disks. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -107,6 +106,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1486/dcrypt/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1486/dcrypt/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-16-high_frequency_copy_of_files_in_network_share.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-16-high_frequency_copy_of_files_in_network_share.md index 2ea20b8fdd..502e9da7c9 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-16-high_frequency_copy_of_files_in_network_share.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-16-high_frequency_copy_of_files_in_network_share.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share" -excerpt: "Transfer Data to Cloud Account" +excerpt: "Transfer Data to Cloud Account +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-11-16 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This analytic is to detect a suspicious high frequency copying/moving of files in network share as part of information sabotage. This anomaly event can be a good indicator of insider trying to sabotage data by transfering classified or internal files within network share to exfitrate it after or to lure evidence of insider attack to other user. This behavior may catch several noise if network share is a common place for classified or internal document processing. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-11-16 @@ -79,7 +80,7 @@ this behavior may seen in normal transfer of file within network if network shar #### Kill Chain Phase -* Exfiltration +* Exploitation @@ -90,8 +91,6 @@ this behavior may seen in normal transfer of file within network if network shar | 9.0 | 30 | 30 | high frequency copy of document in network share $Share_Name$ from $Source_Address$ by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -104,6 +103,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1537/high_copy_files_in_net_share/security.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1537/high_copy_files_in_net_share/security.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-16-remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-16-remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell.md index 49d8188e00..a7dc3adbcd 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-16-remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-16-remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell" -excerpt: "Remote Services, Windows Remote Management" +excerpt: "Remote Services +, Windows Remote Management +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-11-16 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Remote Services - - Lateral Movement - Windows Remote Management - Lateral Movement + - Lateral Movement - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the WinRM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of the `Invoke-Command` commandlet. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WinRM and `powershell.exe` for lateral movement and remote code execution. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-11-16 @@ -54,9 +56,9 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with arguments utilize #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) Note that `remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -86,7 +88,7 @@ Administrators may leverage WinRM and `Invoke-Command` to start a process on rem #### Kill Chain Phase -* Lateral Movement +* Exploitation @@ -97,8 +99,6 @@ Administrators may leverage WinRM and `Invoke-Command` to start a process on rem | 45.0 | 90 | 50 | A process was started on a remote endpoint from $dest by abusing WinRM using PowerShell.exe | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement_psh/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement_psh/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-16-remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-16-remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_script_block.md index 152434d386..0d0530d516 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-16-remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-16-remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_script_block.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell Script Block" -excerpt: "Remote Services, Windows Remote Management" +excerpt: "Remote Services +, Windows Remote Management +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-11-16 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Remote Services - - Lateral Movement - Windows Remote Management - Lateral Movement + - Lateral Movement - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -24,7 +26,7 @@ tags: The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of PowerShell with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the WinRM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of the `Invoke-Command` commandlet. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WinRM for lateral movement and remote code execution. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-11-16 @@ -75,7 +77,7 @@ Administrators may leverage WinRM and `Invoke-Command` to start a process on rem #### Kill Chain Phase -* Lateral Movement +* Exploitation @@ -86,8 +88,6 @@ Administrators may leverage WinRM and `Invoke-Command` to start a process on rem | 45.0 | 90 | 50 | A process was started on a remote endpoint from $ComputerName by abusing WinRM using PowerShell.exe | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement_psh/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement_psh/windows-powershell.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-17-windows_dism_remove_defender.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-17-windows_dism_remove_defender.md index 122bab8808..89cd8252fe 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-17-windows_dism_remove_defender.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-17-windows_dism_remove_defender.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Windows DISM Remove Defender" -excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools, Impair Defenses" +excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools +, Impair Defenses +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-11-17 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Disable or Modify Tools - - Defense Evasion - Impair Defenses - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies the use of the Windows Disk Image Utility, `dism.exe`, to remove Windows Defender. Adversaries may use `dism.exe` to disable Defender before completing their objective. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-11-17 @@ -96,8 +98,6 @@ Some legitimate administrative tools leverage `dism.exe` to manipulate packages | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to disable Windows Defender. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_dism.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_dism.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-18-executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-18-executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share.md index 58f655ecb1..50237f8b01 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-18-executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-18-executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share" -excerpt: "Remote Services, SMB/Windows Admin Shares" +excerpt: "Remote Services +, SMB/Windows Admin Shares +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-11-18 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Remote Services - - Lateral Movement - SMB/Windows Admin Shares - Lateral Movement + - Lateral Movement - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -24,7 +26,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies executable files (.exe or .dll) being written to Windows administrative SMB shares (Admin$, IPC$, C$). This represents suspicious behavior as its commonly used by tools like like PsExec/PaExec and others to stage service binaries before creating and starting a Windows service on remote endpoints. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse administrative shares for lateral movement and remote code execution. The Trickbot malware family also implements this behavior to try to infect other machines in the infected network. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-11-18 @@ -52,8 +54,8 @@ The following analytic identifies executable files (.exe or .dll) being written #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -82,7 +84,7 @@ System Administrators may use looks like PsExec for troubleshooting or administr #### Kill Chain Phase -* Lateral Movement +* Exploitation @@ -93,8 +95,6 @@ System Administrators may use looks like PsExec for troubleshooting or administr | 70.0 | 70 | 100 | $user$ dropped or created an executable file in known sensitive SMB share. Share name=$Share_Name$, Target name=$Relative_Target_Name$, and Access mask=$Access_Mask$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/exe_smbshare/windows-security.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/exe_smbshare/windows-security.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-18-loading_of_dynwrapx_module.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-18-loading_of_dynwrapx_module.md index 5950c87e09..a76d283740 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-18-loading_of_dynwrapx_module.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-18-loading_of_dynwrapx_module.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Loading Of Dynwrapx Module" -excerpt: "Process Injection, Dynamic-link Library Injection" +excerpt: "Process Injection +, Dynamic-link Library Injection +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-11-18 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Process Injection + - Dynamic-link Library Injection - Defense Evasion - Privilege Escalation - - Dynamic-link Library Injection - Defense Evasion - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ tags: DynamicWrapperX is an ActiveX component that can be used in a script to call Windows API functions, but it requires the dynwrapx.dll to be installed and registered. With that, registering or loading dynwrapx.dll to a host is highly suspicious. In most instances when it is used maliciously, the best way to triage is to review parallel processes and pivot on the process_guid. Review the registry for any suspicious modifications meant to load dynwrapx.dll. Identify any suspicious module loads of dynwrapx.dll. This detection will return and identify the processes that invoke vbs/wscript/cscript. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-11-18 @@ -55,8 +57,8 @@ DynamicWrapperX is an ActiveX component that can be used in a script to call Win #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `loading_of_dynwrapx_module_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -95,8 +97,6 @@ False positives should be limited, however it is possible to filter by Processes | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | dynwrapx.dll loaded by process $process_name$ on $Computer$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_dynwrapx/sysmon_dynwraper.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_dynwrapx/sysmon_dynwraper.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-19-system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-19-system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application.md index a7bf39af25..33eafdcf79 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-19-system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-19-system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "System Info Gathering Using Dxdiag Application" -excerpt: "Gather Victim Host Information" +excerpt: "Gather Victim Host Information +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-11-19 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This analytic is to detect a suspicious dxdiag.exe process command-line execution. Dxdiag is used to collect the system info of the target host. This technique has been used by Remcos RATS, various actors, and other malware to collect information as part of the recon or collection phase of an attack. This behavior should rarely be seen in a corporate network, but this command line can be used by a network administrator to audit host machine specifications. Thus in some rare cases, this detection will contain false positives in its results. To triage further, analyze what commands were passed after it pipes out the result to a file for further processing. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-11-19 @@ -93,8 +94,6 @@ This commandline can be used by a network administrator to audit host machine sp | 25.0 | 50 | 50 | dxdiag.exe process with commandline $process$ on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -107,6 +106,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/t1592/host_info_dxdiag/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/t1592/host_info_dxdiag/sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-possible_browser_pass_view_parameter.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-possible_browser_pass_view_parameter.md index 2deb1507be..14b88a2ec2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-possible_browser_pass_view_parameter.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-possible_browser_pass_view_parameter.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Possible Browser Pass View Parameter" -excerpt: "Credentials from Web Browsers, Credentials from Password Stores" +excerpt: "Credentials from Web Browsers +, Credentials from Password Stores +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-11-22 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Credentials from Web Browsers - - Credential Access - Credentials from Password Stores - Credential Access + - Credential Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -23,9 +25,9 @@ tags: #### Description -This analytic will detect if a suspicious process contains a commandline parameter related to a web browser credential dumper. This technique is used by Remcos RAT malware which uses the Nirsoft webbrowserpassview.exe application to dump web browser credentials. Remcos uses the "/stext" command line to dump the credentials in text format. This Hunting query is a good indicator of hosts suffering from possible Remcos RAT infection. Since the hunting query is based on the parameter command and the possible path where it will save the text credential information, it may catch normal tools that are using the same command and behavior. +This analytic will detect if a suspicious process contains a commandline parameter related to a web browser credential dumper. This technique is used by Remcos RAT malware which uses the Nirsoft webbrowserpassview.exe application to dump web browser credentials. Remcos uses the "/stext" command line to dump the credentials in text format. This Hunting query is a good indicator of hosts suffering from possible Remcos RAT infection. Since the hunting query is based on the parameter command and the possible path where it will save the text credential information, it may catch normal tools that are using the same command and behavior. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-11-22 @@ -96,8 +98,6 @@ False positive is quite limited. Filter is needed | 16.0 | 40 | 40 | suspicious process $process_name$ contains commandline $process$ on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1555/web_browser_pass_view/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1555/web_browser_pass_view/sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-services_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-services_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.md index 0a307098e4..85ccb07cbd 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-services_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-services_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn" -excerpt: "Create or Modify System Process, Windows Service" +excerpt: "Create or Modify System Process +, Windows Service +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-11-22 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Create or Modify System Process + - Windows Service - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Windows Service - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies `services.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the Service Control Manager and creating a remote malicious service, the executed command is spawned as a child process of `services.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of services.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-11-22 @@ -87,7 +89,7 @@ Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed. #### Kill Chain Phase -* Lateral Movement +* Exploitation @@ -98,8 +100,6 @@ Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed. | 54.0 | 90 | 60 | Services.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-svchost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-svchost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.md index cee8423a0b..8ed1ae7ab9 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-svchost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-svchost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn" -excerpt: "Scheduled Task/Job, Scheduled Task" +excerpt: "Scheduled Task/Job +, Scheduled Task +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-11-22 @@ -8,10 +10,10 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Scheduled Task/Job + - Scheduled Task - Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Scheduled Task - Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation @@ -29,7 +31,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies `svchost.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the Task Scheduler and creating a malicious remote scheduled task, the executed command is spawned as a child process of `svchost.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of svchost.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-11-22 @@ -89,7 +91,7 @@ Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed. #### Kill Chain Phase -* Lateral Movement +* Exploitation @@ -100,8 +102,6 @@ Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed. | 54.0 | 90 | 60 | Svchost.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-security.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-security.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path.md index 6b37ce8b37..a62d6f41e7 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Windows Service Created With Suspicious Service Path" -excerpt: "System Services, Service Execution" +excerpt: "System Services +, Service Execution +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-11-22 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - System Services - - Execution - Service Execution - Execution + - Execution - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -24,7 +26,7 @@ tags: The following analytc uses Windows Event Id 7045, `New Service Was Installed`, to identify the creation of a Windows Service where the service binary path path is located in a non-common Service folder in Windows. Red Teams and adversaries alike may create malicious Services for lateral movement or remote code execution as well as persistence and execution. The Clop ransomware has also been seen in the wild abusing Windows services. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-11-22 @@ -78,8 +80,7 @@ Legitimate applications may install services with uncommon services paths. #### Kill Chain Phase -* Privilege Escalation -* Lateral Movement +* Exploitation @@ -90,8 +91,6 @@ Legitimate applications may install services with uncommon services paths. | 56.0 | 70 | 80 | A service $Service_File_Name$ was created from a non-standard path using $Service_Name$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -105,6 +104,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-system.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-system.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-windows_service_created_within_public_path.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-windows_service_created_within_public_path.md index 33ee0b285d..7361eb6b49 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-windows_service_created_within_public_path.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-windows_service_created_within_public_path.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Windows Service Created Within Public Path" -excerpt: "Create or Modify System Process, Windows Service" +excerpt: "Create or Modify System Process +, Windows Service +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-11-22 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Create or Modify System Process + - Windows Service - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Windows Service - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise @@ -26,7 +28,7 @@ tags: The following analytc uses Windows Event Id 7045, `New Service Was Installed`, to identify the creation of a Windows Service where the service binary path is located in public paths. This behavior could represent the installation of a malicious service. Red Teams and adversaries alike may create malicious Services for lateral movement or remote code execution -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-11-22 @@ -79,7 +81,7 @@ Legitimate applications may install services with uncommon services paths. #### Kill Chain Phase -* Lateral Movement +* Exploitation @@ -90,8 +92,6 @@ Legitimate applications may install services with uncommon services paths. | 54.0 | 90 | 60 | A Windows Service $Service_File_Name$ with a public path was created on $ComputerName | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement_suspicious_path/windows-system.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement_suspicious_path/windows-system.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-wmiprsve_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-wmiprsve_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.md index ea6a345e33..79cbb2a83d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-wmiprsve_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-wmiprsve_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Wmiprsve LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn" -excerpt: "Windows Management Instrumentation" +excerpt: "Windows Management Instrumentation +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-11-22 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies `wmiprsve.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), the executed command is spawned as a child process of `wmiprvse.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of wmiprvse.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-11-22 @@ -81,7 +82,7 @@ Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed. #### Kill Chain Phase -* Lateral Movement +* Exploitation @@ -92,8 +93,6 @@ Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed. | 54.0 | 90 | 60 | Wmiprsve.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -108,6 +107,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-wsmprovhost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-wsmprovhost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.md index e3ccecabdc..0296d98e72 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-wsmprovhost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-wsmprovhost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Wsmprovhost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn" -excerpt: "Remote Services, Windows Remote Management" +excerpt: "Remote Services +, Windows Remote Management +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-11-22 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Remote Services - - Lateral Movement - Windows Remote Management - Lateral Movement + - Lateral Movement - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies `Wsmprovhost.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the Windows Remote Management (WinRm) protocol, the executed command is spawned as a child processs of `Wsmprovhost.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of Wsmprovhost.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-11-22 @@ -85,7 +87,7 @@ Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed. #### Kill Chain Phase -* Lateral Movement +* Exploitation @@ -96,8 +98,6 @@ Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed. | 54.0 | 90 | 60 | Wsmprovhost.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-23-mmc_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-23-mmc_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.md index 96f8975616..99e1b3239e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-23-mmc_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-23-mmc_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn" -excerpt: "Remote Services, Distributed Component Object Model" +excerpt: "Remote Services +, Distributed Component Object Model +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-11-23 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Remote Services - - Lateral Movement - Distributed Component Object Model - Lateral Movement + - Lateral Movement - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies `mmc.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the DCOM protocol and the MMC20 COM object, the executed command is spawned as a child processs of `mmc.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of mmc.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-11-23 @@ -85,7 +87,7 @@ Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed. #### Kill Chain Phase -* Privilege Escalation +* Exploitation @@ -96,8 +98,6 @@ Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed. | 54.0 | 90 | 60 | Mmc.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.003/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.003/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-25-add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-25-add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion.md index e7e3cedb19..420e7a1a5a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-25-add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-25-add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion" -excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools, Impair Defenses" +excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools +, Impair Defenses +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-11-25 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Disable or Modify Tools - - Defense Evasion - Impair Defenses - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This analytic will identify a suspicious process command-line related to Windows Defender exclusion feature. This command is abused by adversaries, malware authors and red teams to bypass Windows Defender Antivirus products by excluding folder path, file path, process and extensions. From its real time or schedule scan to execute their malicious code. This is a good indicator for defense evasion and to look further for events after this behavior. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-11-25 @@ -98,8 +100,6 @@ Admin or user may choose to use this windows features. Filter as needed. | 64.0 | 80 | 80 | exclusion command $process$ executed on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/defender_exclusion_sysmon/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/defender_exclusion_sysmon/sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-25-powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-25-powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands.md index dd39a2490b..180cb980c0 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-25-powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-25-powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands" -excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools, Impair Defenses" +excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools +, Impair Defenses +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-11-25 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Disable or Modify Tools - - Defense Evasion - Impair Defenses - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This analytic will detect a suspicious process commandline related to windows defender exclusion feature. This command is abused by adversaries, malware author and red teams to bypassed Windows Defender Anti-Virus product by excluding folder path, file path, process, extensions and etc. from its real time or schedule scan to execute their malicious code. This is a good indicator for defense evasion and to look further for events after this behavior. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-11-25 @@ -90,8 +92,6 @@ admin or user may choose to use this windows features. | 64.0 | 80 | 80 | exclusion command $Message$ executed on $ComputerName$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/defender_exclusion_powershell/powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/defender_exclusion_powershell/powershell.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-25-windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-25-windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry.md index 0ff7add633..41825f68ce 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-25-windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-25-windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry" -excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools, Impair Defenses" +excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools +, Impair Defenses +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-11-25 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Disable or Modify Tools - - Defense Evasion - Impair Defenses - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This analytic will detect a suspicious process that modify a registry related to windows defender exclusion feature. This registry is abused by adversaries, malware author and red teams to bypassed Windows Defender Anti-Virus product by excluding folder path, file path, process, extensions and etc. from its real time or schedule scan to execute their malicious code. This is a good indicator for a defense evasion and to look further for events after this behavior. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-11-25 @@ -96,8 +98,6 @@ admin or user may choose to use this windows features. | 64.0 | 80 | 80 | exclusion registry $registry_path$ modified or added on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/defender_exclusion_sysmon/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/defender_exclusion_sysmon/sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-29-detect_rclone_command-line_usage.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-29-detect_rclone_command-line_usage.md index 20462fc6f6..cd15d09ca3 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-29-detect_rclone_command-line_usage.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-29-detect_rclone_command-line_usage.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Detect RClone Command-Line Usage" -excerpt: "Automated Exfiltration" +excerpt: "Automated Exfiltration +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-11-29 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This analytic identifies commonly used command-line arguments used by `rclone.exe` to initiate a file transfer. Some arguments were negated as they are specific to the configuration used by adversaries. In particular, an adversary may list the files or directories of the remote file share using `ls` or `lsd`, which is not indicative of malicious behavior. During triage, at this stage of a ransomware event, exfiltration is about to occur or has already. Isolate the endpoint and continue investigating by review file modifications and parallel processes. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-11-29 @@ -50,9 +51,9 @@ This analytic identifies commonly used command-line arguments used by `rclone.ex #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_rclone](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rclone.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_rclone](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rclone.yml) Note that `detect_rclone_command-line_usage_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -80,7 +81,7 @@ False positives should be limited as this is restricted to the Rclone process na #### Kill Chain Phase -* Exfiltration +* Exploitation @@ -91,8 +92,6 @@ False positives should be limited as this is restricted to the Rclone process na | 35.0 | 50 | 70 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to connect to a remote cloud service to move files or folders. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -108,6 +107,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1020/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1020/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-29-possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-29-possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn.md index f604258041..42ad2c1b79 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-29-possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-29-possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn.md @@ -1,6 +1,13 @@ --- title: "Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn" -excerpt: "Remote Services, Distributed Component Object Model, Windows Remote Management, Windows Management Instrumentation, Scheduled Task, Windows Service, PowerShell" +excerpt: "Remote Services +, Distributed Component Object Model +, Windows Remote Management +, Windows Management Instrumentation +, Scheduled Task +, Windows Service +, PowerShell +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-11-29 @@ -8,21 +15,21 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Remote Services - - Lateral Movement - Distributed Component Object Model - - Lateral Movement - Windows Remote Management - - Lateral Movement - Windows Management Instrumentation - - Execution - Scheduled Task + - Windows Service + - PowerShell + - Lateral Movement + - Lateral Movement + - Lateral Movement + - Execution - Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Windows Service - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - PowerShell - Execution - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security @@ -38,7 +45,7 @@ tags: The following analytic assists with identifying a PowerShell process spawned as a child or grand child process of commonly abused processes during lateral movement techniques including `services.exe`, `wmiprsve.exe`, `svchost.exe`, `wsmprovhost.exe` and `mmc.exe`. Legitimate Windows features such as the Service Control Manager, Windows Management Instrumentation, Task Scheduler, Windows Remote Management and the DCOM protocol can be abused to start a process on a remote endpoint. Looking for PowerShell spawned out of this processes may reveal a lateral movement attack. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse these services during a breach for lateral movement and remote code execution. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-11-29 @@ -109,8 +116,7 @@ Legitimate applications may spawn PowerShell as a child process of the the ident #### Kill Chain Phase -* Lateral Movement -* Malicious PowerShell +* Exploitation @@ -121,8 +127,6 @@ Legitimate applications may spawn PowerShell as a child process of the the ident | 45.0 | 90 | 50 | A PowerShell process was spawned as a child process of typically abused processes on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -139,6 +143,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement_powershell/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement_powershell/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-29-randomly_generated_scheduled_task_name.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-29-randomly_generated_scheduled_task_name.md index b8e71a5ef6..194fefef72 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-29-randomly_generated_scheduled_task_name.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-29-randomly_generated_scheduled_task_name.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name" -excerpt: "Scheduled Task/Job, Scheduled Task" +excerpt: "Scheduled Task/Job +, Scheduled Task +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-11-29 @@ -8,10 +10,10 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Scheduled Task/Job + - Scheduled Task - Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Scheduled Task - Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation @@ -20,17 +22,17 @@ tags: - Splunk Cloud --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} #### Description -The following hunting analytic leverages Event ID 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify the creation of a Scheduled Task with a suspicious, high entropy, Task Name. To achieve this, this analytic also leverages the `ut_shannon` function from the URL ToolBox Splunk application. Red teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler to create and start a remote Scheduled Task and obtain remote code execution. To achieve this goal, tools like Impacket or Crapmapexec, typically create a Scheduled Task with a random task name on the victim host. This hunting analytic may help defenders identify Scheduled Tasks created as part of a lateral movement attack. The entropy threshold `ut_shannon > 3` should be customized by users. The Command field can be used to determine if the task has malicious intent or not. +The following hunting analytic leverages Event ID 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify the creation of a Scheduled Task with a suspicious, high entropy, Task Name. To achieve this, this analytic also leverages the `ut_shannon` function from the URL ToolBox Splunk application. Red teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler to create and start a remote Scheduled Task and obtain remote code execution. To achieve this goal, tools like Impacket or Crapmapexec, typically create a Scheduled Task with a random task name on the victim host. This hunting analytic may help defenders identify Scheduled Tasks created as part of a lateral movement attack. The entropy threshold `ut_shannon > 3` should be customized by users. The Command field can be used to determine if the task has malicious intent or not. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-11-29 @@ -82,9 +84,7 @@ Legitimate applications may use random Scheduled Task names. #### Kill Chain Phase -* Privilege Escalation -* Lateral Movement -* Persistence +* Exploitation @@ -95,8 +95,6 @@ Legitimate applications may use random Scheduled Task names. | 45.0 | 90 | 50 | A windows scheduled task with a suspicious task name was created on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -113,5 +111,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/endpoint/randomly_generated_scheduled_task_name.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-29-randomly_generated_windows_service_name.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-29-randomly_generated_windows_service_name.md index 3bc89d7f1b..9288f67aab 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-29-randomly_generated_windows_service_name.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-29-randomly_generated_windows_service_name.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Randomly Generated Windows Service Name" -excerpt: "Create or Modify System Process, Windows Service" +excerpt: "Create or Modify System Process +, Windows Service +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-11-29 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Create or Modify System Process + - Windows Service - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Windows Service - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise @@ -18,17 +20,17 @@ tags: - Splunk Cloud --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} #### Description -The following hunting analytic leverages Event ID 7045, `A new service was installed in the system`, to identify the installation of a Windows Service with a suspicious, high entropy, Service Name. To achieve this, this analytic also leverages the `ut_shannon` function from the URL ToolBox Splunk application. Red teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Service Control Manager to create and start a remote Windows Service and obtain remote code execution. To achieve this goal, some tools like Metasploit, Cobalt Strike and Impacket, typically create a Windows Service with a random service name on the victim host. This hunting analytic may help defenders identify Windows Services installed as part of a lateral movement attack. The entropy threshold `ut_shannon > 3` should be customized by users. The Service_File_Name field can be used to determine if the Windows Service has malicious intent or not. +The following hunting analytic leverages Event ID 7045, `A new service was installed in the system`, to identify the installation of a Windows Service with a suspicious, high entropy, Service Name. To achieve this, this analytic also leverages the `ut_shannon` function from the URL ToolBox Splunk application. Red teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Service Control Manager to create and start a remote Windows Service and obtain remote code execution. To achieve this goal, some tools like Metasploit, Cobalt Strike and Impacket, typically create a Windows Service with a random service name on the victim host. This hunting analytic may help defenders identify Windows Services installed as part of a lateral movement attack. The entropy threshold `ut_shannon > 3` should be customized by users. The Service_File_Name field can be used to determine if the Windows Service has malicious intent or not. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-11-29 @@ -81,8 +83,7 @@ Legitimate applications may use random Windows Service names. #### Kill Chain Phase -* Privilege Escalation -* Lateral Movement +* Exploitation @@ -93,8 +94,6 @@ Legitimate applications may use random Windows Service names. | 45.0 | 90 | 50 | A Windows Service with a suspicious service name was installed on $ComputerName$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -109,5 +108,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/endpoint/randomly_generated_windows_service_name.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-01-unusual_number_of_computer_service_tickets_requested.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-01-unusual_number_of_computer_service_tickets_requested.md index 14e7d69e3d..5d738c176b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-01-unusual_number_of_computer_service_tickets_requested.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-01-unusual_number_of_computer_service_tickets_requested.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested" -excerpt: "Valid Accounts" +excerpt: "Valid Accounts +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-12-01 @@ -9,16 +10,16 @@ toc_label: "" tags: - Valid Accounts - Defense Evasion + - Initial Access - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Initial Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -28,7 +29,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U The following hunting analytic leverages Event ID 4769, `A Kerberos service ticket was requested`, to identify an unusual number of computer service ticket requests from one source. When a domain joined endpoint connects to a remote endpoint, it first will request a Kerberos Ticket with the computer name as the Service Name. An endpoint requesting a large number of computer service tickets for different endpoints could represent malicious behavior like lateral movement, malware staging, reconnaissance, etc.\ The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of service requests. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time, the calculation of the `upperBound` field as well as the Outlier calculation. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-12-01 @@ -40,7 +41,7 @@ The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access | +| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -81,9 +82,7 @@ An single endpoint requesting a large number of computer service tickets is not #### Kill Chain Phase -* Reconnaissance * Exploitation -* Lateral Movement @@ -91,11 +90,9 @@ An single endpoint requesting a large number of computer service tickets is not | Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| -| 42.0 | 70 | 60 | None | +| 42.0 | 70 | 60 | | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -110,5 +107,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/endpoint/unusual_number_of_computer_service_tickets_requested.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-01-unusual_number_of_remote_endpoint_authentication_events.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-01-unusual_number_of_remote_endpoint_authentication_events.md index 869e1014d4..5406d67164 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-01-unusual_number_of_remote_endpoint_authentication_events.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-01-unusual_number_of_remote_endpoint_authentication_events.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Unusual Number of Remote Endpoint Authentication Events" -excerpt: "Valid Accounts" +excerpt: "Valid Accounts +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-12-01 @@ -9,16 +10,16 @@ toc_label: "" tags: - Valid Accounts - Defense Evasion + - Initial Access - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Initial Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -28,7 +29,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U The following hunting analytic leverages Event ID 4624, `An account was successfully logged on`, to identify an unusual number of remote authentication attempts coming from one source. An endpoint authenticating to a large number of remote endpoints could represent malicious behavior like lateral movement, malware staging, reconnaissance, etc.\ The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual high number of authentication events. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time, the calculation of the `upperBound` field as well as the Outlier calculation. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-12-01 @@ -40,7 +41,7 @@ The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access | +| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -83,7 +84,6 @@ An single endpoint authenticating to a large number of hosts is not common behav #### Kill Chain Phase * Reconnaissance -* Lateral Movement @@ -91,11 +91,9 @@ An single endpoint authenticating to a large number of hosts is not common behav | Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| -| 42.0 | 70 | 60 | None | +| 42.0 | 70 | 60 | | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -110,5 +108,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/endpoint/unusual_number_of_remote_endpoint_authentication_events.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-03-short_lived_scheduled_task.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-03-short_lived_scheduled_task.md index 21047f2129..bbdd17df09 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-03-short_lived_scheduled_task.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-03-short_lived_scheduled_task.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Short Lived Scheduled Task" -excerpt: "Scheduled Task" +excerpt: "Scheduled Task +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-12-03 @@ -24,7 +25,7 @@ tags: The following analytic leverages Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created` and Windows Security EventCode 4699, `A scheduled task was deleted` to identify scheduled tasks created and deleted in less than 30 seconds. This behavior may represent a lateral movement attack abusing the Task Scheduler to obtain code execution. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-12-03 @@ -77,7 +78,7 @@ Although uncommon, legitimate applications may create and delete a Scheduled Tas #### Kill Chain Phase -* Lateral Movement +* Exploitation @@ -88,8 +89,6 @@ Although uncommon, legitimate applications may create and delete a Scheduled Tas | 81.0 | 90 | 90 | A windows scheduled task was created and deleted in 30 seconds on $ComputerName$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -103,6 +102,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/lateral_movement/windows-security.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/lateral_movement/windows-security.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-03-windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-03-windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination.md index 34494a69ee..da10ee9932 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-03-windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-03-windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination.md @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Ingress Tool Transfer - - Command And Control + - Command & Control - Splunk Behavioral Analytics - Endpoint_Processes --- diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-06-suspicious_linux_discovery_commands.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-06-suspicious_linux_discovery_commands.md index 039395f950..af5de4202a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-06-suspicious_linux_discovery_commands.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-06-suspicious_linux_discovery_commands.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Suspicious Linux Discovery Commands" -excerpt: "Unix Shell" +excerpt: "Unix Shell +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-12-06 @@ -24,7 +25,7 @@ tags: This search, detects execution of suspicious bash commands from various commonly leveraged bash scripts like (AutoSUID, LinEnum, LinPeas) to perform discovery of possible paths of privilege execution, password files, vulnerable directories, executables and file permissions on a Linux host.\ The search logic specifically looks for high number of distinct commands run in a short period of time. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-12-06 @@ -90,8 +91,6 @@ Unless an administrator is using these commands to troubleshoot or audit a syste | 81.0 | 90 | 90 | Suspicious Linux Discovery Commands detected on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -108,6 +107,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.004/linux_discovery_tools/sysmon_linux.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.004/linux_discovery_tools/sysmon_linux.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-07-microsoft_exchange_mailbox_replication_service_writing_active_server_pages.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-07-microsoft_exchange_mailbox_replication_service_writing_active_server_pages.md index a7dcb6e348..2d79e1da67 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-07-microsoft_exchange_mailbox_replication_service_writing_active_server_pages.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-07-microsoft_exchange_mailbox_replication_service_writing_active_server_pages.md @@ -1,6 +1,9 @@ --- title: "Microsoft Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages" -excerpt: "Server Software Component, Web Shell, Exploit Public-Facing Application" +excerpt: "Server Software Component +, Web Shell +, Exploit Public-Facing Application +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-12-07 @@ -8,10 +11,10 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Server Software Component - - Persistence - Web Shell - - Persistence - Exploit Public-Facing Application + - Persistence + - Persistence - Initial Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security @@ -19,8 +22,8 @@ tags: - Endpoint --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -29,7 +32,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. U The following query identifies suspicious .aspx created in 3 paths identified by Microsoft as known drop locations for Exchange exploitation related to HAFNIUM group and recently disclosed vulnerablity named ProxyShell. Paths include: `\HttpProxy\owa\auth\`, `\inetpub\wwwroot\aspnet_client\`, and `\HttpProxy\OAB\`. The analytic is limited to process name MSExchangeMailboxReplication.exe, which typically does not write .aspx files to disk. Upon triage, the suspicious .aspx file will likely look obvious on the surface. inspect the contents for script code inside. Identify additional log sources, IIS included, to review source and other potential exploitation. It is often the case that a particular threat is only applicable to a specific subset of systems in your environment. Typically analytics to detect those threats are written without the benefit of being able to only target those systems as well. Writing analytics against all systems when those behaviors are limited to identifiable subsets of those systems is suboptimal. Consider the case ProxyShell vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Servers. With asset information, a hunter can limit their analytics to systems that have been identified as Exchange servers. A hunter may start with the theory that the exchange server is communicating with new systems that it has not previously. If this theory is run against all publicly facing systems, the amount of noise it will generate will likely render this theory untenable. However, using the asset information to limit this analytic to just the Exchange servers will reduce the noise allowing the hunter to focus only on the systems where this behavioral change is relevant. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-12-07 @@ -105,8 +108,6 @@ The query is structured in a way that `action` (read, create) is not defined. Re | 81.0 | 90 | 90 | A file - $file_name$ was written to disk that is related to IIS exploitation related to ProxyShell. Review further file modifications on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -119,6 +120,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/windows-sysmon_proxylogon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/windows-sysmon_proxylogon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-07-windows_raccine_scheduled_task_deletion.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-07-windows_raccine_scheduled_task_deletion.md index 392f00aab3..f07825d9f7 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-07-windows_raccine_scheduled_task_deletion.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-07-windows_raccine_scheduled_task_deletion.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Windows Raccine Scheduled Task Deletion" -excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools" +excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-12-07 @@ -21,9 +22,9 @@ tags: #### Description -The following analytic identifies the Raccine Rules Updater scheduled task being deleted. Adversaries may attempt to remove this task in order to prevent the update of Raccine. Raccine is a "ransomware vaccine" created by security researcher Florian Roth, designed to intercept and prevent precursors and active ransomware behavior. +The following analytic identifies the Raccine Rules Updater scheduled task being deleted. Adversaries may attempt to remove this task in order to prevent the update of Raccine. Raccine is a "ransomware vaccine" created by security researcher Florian Roth, designed to intercept and prevent precursors and active ransomware behavior. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-12-07 @@ -92,8 +93,6 @@ False positives should be limited, however filter as needed. | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user user$ attempting to disable Raccines scheduled task. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -107,6 +106,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_raccine.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_raccine.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-08-msi_module_loaded_by_non-system_binary.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-08-msi_module_loaded_by_non-system_binary.md index 9f1afde51e..6432b563e7 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-08-msi_module_loaded_by_non-system_binary.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-08-msi_module_loaded_by_non-system_binary.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary" -excerpt: "DLL Side-Loading, Hijack Execution Flow" +excerpt: "DLL Side-Loading +, Hijack Execution Flow +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-12-08 @@ -8,13 +10,13 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - DLL Side-Loading - - Persistence - - Privilege Escalation - - Defense Evasion - Hijack Execution Flow + - Defense Evasion - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - Defense Evasion + - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -33,7 +35,7 @@ The following hunting analytic identifies `msi.dll` being loaded by a binary not 1. Racing to introduce a junction and a symlink to trick msiexec.exe to modify the attacker specified file. \ In addition, `msi.dll` has been abused in DLL side-loading attacks by being loaded by non-system binaries. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-12-08 @@ -45,9 +47,9 @@ In addition, `msi.dll` has been abused in DLL side-loading attacks by being load | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1574.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/002/) | DLL Side-Loading | Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1574.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/002/) | DLL Side-Loading | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1574](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/) | Hijack Execution Flow | Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1574](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/) | Hijack Execution Flow | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -61,8 +63,8 @@ In addition, `msi.dll` has been abused in DLL side-loading attacks by being load #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `msi_module_loaded_by_non-system_binary_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -98,8 +100,6 @@ It is possible some Administrative utilities will load msi.dll outside of normal | 56.0 | 80 | 70 | The following module $ImageLoaded$ was loaded by $Image$ outside of the normal system paths on endpoint $Computer$, potentally related to DLL side-loading. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -116,5 +116,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/endpoint/msi_module_loaded_by_non-system_binary.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-10-curl_download_and_bash_execution.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-10-curl_download_and_bash_execution.md index 09180df532..cea6068e27 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-10-curl_download_and_bash_execution.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-10-curl_download_and_bash_execution.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Curl Download and Bash Execution" -excerpt: "Ingress Tool Transfer" +excerpt: "Ingress Tool Transfer +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-12-10 @@ -12,7 +13,6 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - CVE-2021-44228 - Endpoint --- @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies the use of curl on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-12-10 @@ -94,15 +94,6 @@ False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required. | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - - -#### CVE - -| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | -| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [CVE-2021-44228](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44228) | Apache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 (excluding security releases 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1) JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against attacker controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. An attacker who can control log messages or log message parameters can execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has been disabled by default. From version 2.16.0 (along with 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1), this functionality has been completely removed. Note that this vulnerability is specific to log4j-core and does not affect log4net, log4cxx, or other Apache Logging Services projects. | 9.3 | - #### Reference @@ -117,6 +108,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-11-wget_download_and_bash_execution.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-11-wget_download_and_bash_execution.md index 7b1f213d61..53455f0b43 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-11-wget_download_and_bash_execution.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-11-wget_download_and_bash_execution.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Wget Download and Bash Execution" -excerpt: "Ingress Tool Transfer" +excerpt: "Ingress Tool Transfer +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-12-11 @@ -12,7 +13,6 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - CVE-2021-44228 - Endpoint --- @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies the use of wget on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-12-11 @@ -94,15 +94,6 @@ False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required. | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - - -#### CVE - -| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | -| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [CVE-2021-44228](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44228) | Apache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 (excluding security releases 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1) JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against attacker controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. An attacker who can control log messages or log message parameters can execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has been disabled by default. From version 2.16.0 (along with 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1), this functionality has been completely removed. Note that this vulnerability is specific to log4j-core and does not affect log4net, log4cxx, or other Apache Logging Services projects. | 9.3 | - #### Reference @@ -117,6 +108,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.md index f4fc63f232..2b91aa74cd 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic" -excerpt: "Exploit Public-Facing Application, Command and Scripting Interpreter" +excerpt: "Exploit Public-Facing Application +, Command and Scripting Interpreter +" categories: - Network last_modified_at: 2021-12-13 @@ -8,13 +10,12 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Exploit Public-Facing Application - - Initial Access - Command and Scripting Interpreter + - Initial Access - Execution - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - CVE-2021-44228 - Network_Traffic --- @@ -26,12 +27,12 @@ tags: Malicious actors often abuse misconfigured LDAP servers or applications that use the LDAP servers in organizations. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. This search will help determine if you have any LDAP connections to IP addresses outside of private (RFC1918) address space. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Network_Traffic](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkTraffic) - **Last Updated**: 2021-12-13 - **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Johan Bjerke, Splunk -- **ID**: c77162d3-f91c-45cc-80c8-22f6v546119f +- **ID**: 5e06e262-d7cd-4216-b2f8-27b437e18458 #### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) @@ -78,7 +79,7 @@ Unknown at this moment. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound thr #### Kill Chain Phase -* Command and Control +* Command & Control * Actions on Objectives @@ -90,15 +91,6 @@ Unknown at this moment. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound thr | 56.0 | 70 | 80 | An outbound LDAP connection from $src_ip$ in your infrastructure connecting to dest ip $dest_ip$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - - -#### CVE - -| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | -| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [CVE-2021-44228](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44228) | Apache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 (excluding security releases 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1) JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against attacker controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. An attacker who can control log messages or log message parameters can execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has been disabled by default. From version 2.16.0 (along with 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1), this functionality has been completely removed. Note that this vulnerability is specific to log4j-core and does not affect log4net, log4cxx, or other Apache Logging Services projects. | 9.3 | - #### Reference @@ -111,6 +103,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_ldap/bro_conn.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_ldap/bro_conn.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.md index 91d5c3769f..92b5eddb86 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Java Class File download by Java User Agent" -excerpt: "Exploit Public-Facing Application" +excerpt: "Exploit Public-Facing Application +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-12-13 @@ -12,7 +13,6 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - CVE-2021-44228 - Web --- @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies a Java user agent performing a GET request for a .class file from the remote site. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Web](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Web) - **Last Updated**: 2021-12-13 @@ -87,15 +87,6 @@ Filtering may be required in some instances, filter as needed. | 40.0 | 80 | 50 | A Java user agent $http_user_agent$ was performing a $http_method$ to retrieve a remote class file. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - - -#### CVE - -| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | -| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [CVE-2021-44228](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44228) | Apache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 (excluding security releases 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1) JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against attacker controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. An attacker who can control log messages or log message parameters can execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has been disabled by default. From version 2.16.0 (along with 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1), this functionality has been completely removed. Note that this vulnerability is specific to log4j-core and does not affect log4net, log4cxx, or other Apache Logging Services projects. | 9.3 | - #### Reference @@ -108,6 +99,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-linux_java_spawning_shell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-linux_java_spawning_shell.md index 8626fec415..94f7a154f0 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-linux_java_spawning_shell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-linux_java_spawning_shell.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Linux Java Spawning Shell" -excerpt: "Exploit Public-Facing Application" +excerpt: "Exploit Public-Facing Application +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-12-13 @@ -12,7 +13,6 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - CVE-2021-44228 - Endpoint --- @@ -22,9 +22,9 @@ tags: #### Description -The following analytic identifies the process name of Java, Apache, or Tomcat spawning a Linux shell. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). The shells included in the macro are "sh", "ksh", "zsh", "bash", "dash", "rbash", "fish", "csh', "tcsh', "ion", "eshell". Upon triage, review parallel processes and command-line arguments to determine legitimacy. +The following analytic identifies the process name of Java, Apache, or Tomcat spawning a Linux shell. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). The shells included in the macro are "sh", "ksh", "zsh", "bash", "dash", "rbash", "fish", "csh', "tcsh', "ion", "eshell". Upon triage, review parallel processes and command-line arguments to determine legitimacy. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-12-13 @@ -94,15 +94,6 @@ Filtering may be required on internal developer build systems or classify assets | 40.0 | 80 | 50 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ spawning a Linux shell, potentially indicative of exploitation. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - - -#### CVE - -| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | -| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [CVE-2021-44228](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44228) | Apache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 (excluding security releases 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1) JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against attacker controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. An attacker who can control log messages or log message parameters can execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has been disabled by default. From version 2.16.0 (along with 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1), this functionality has been completely removed. Note that this vulnerability is specific to log4j-core and does not affect log4net, log4cxx, or other Apache Logging Services projects. | 9.3 | - #### Reference @@ -118,5 +109,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.md index 1abf4a9a91..b32fd973cc 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt" -excerpt: "Exploit Public-Facing Application" +excerpt: "Exploit Public-Facing Application +" categories: - Web last_modified_at: 2021-12-13 @@ -12,7 +13,6 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - CVE-2021-44228 - Web --- @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ tags: CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we first limit the scope of our search to the Web Datamodel and use the `| from datamodel` function to benefit from schema accelerated searching capabilities, mainly because the second part of the detection is pretty heavy, it runs a regex across all _raw events that looks for `${jndi:ldap://` pattern across all potential web fields available to the raw data, like http headers for example. If you see results for this detection, it means that there was a attempt at a injection, which could be a reconnaissance activity or a valid expliotation attempt, but this does not exactly mean that the host was indeed successfully exploited. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Web](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Web) - **Last Updated**: 2021-12-13 @@ -97,15 +97,6 @@ If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, | 15.0 | 50 | 30 | CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - - -#### CVE - -| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | -| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [CVE-2021-44228](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44228) | Apache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 (excluding security releases 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1) JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against attacker controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. An attacker who can control log messages or log message parameters can execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has been disabled by default. From version 2.16.0 (along with 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1), this functionality has been completely removed. Note that this vulnerability is specific to log4j-core and does not affect log4net, log4cxx, or other Apache Logging Services projects. | 9.3 | - #### Reference @@ -118,6 +109,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.md index 1117da60dd..2a08961c47 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection" -excerpt: "Exploit Public-Facing Application" +excerpt: "Exploit Public-Facing Application +" categories: - Web last_modified_at: 2021-12-13 @@ -12,7 +13,6 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - CVE-2021-44228 - Network_Traffic - Web --- @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ tags: CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we match the invocation function with a network connection to a malicious ip address. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Network_Traffic](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkTraffic), [Web](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Web) - **Last Updated**: 2021-12-13 @@ -105,15 +105,6 @@ If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, | 15.0 | 50 | 30 | CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - - -#### CVE - -| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | -| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [CVE-2021-44228](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44228) | Apache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 (excluding security releases 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1) JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against attacker controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. An attacker who can control log messages or log message parameters can execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has been disabled by default. From version 2.16.0 (along with 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1), this functionality has been completely removed. Note that this vulnerability is specific to log4j-core and does not affect log4net, log4cxx, or other Apache Logging Services projects. | 9.3 | - #### Reference @@ -126,6 +117,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log) * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_network_logs/log4j_network_logs.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_network_logs/log4j_network_logs.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.md index f67564e419..d568a4df62 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports" -excerpt: "Exploit Public-Facing Application" +excerpt: "Exploit Public-Facing Application +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-12-13 @@ -12,7 +13,6 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - CVE-2021-44228 --- @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ tags: A required step while exploiting the CVE-2021-44228-Log4j vulnerability is that the victim server will perform outbound connections to attacker-controlled infrastructure. This is required as part of the JNDI lookup as well as for retrieving the second stage .class payload. The following analytic identifies the Java process reaching out to default ports used by the LDAP and RMI protocols. This behavior could represent successfull exploitation. Note that adversaries can easily decide to use arbitrary ports for these protocols and potentially bypass this detection. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-12-13 @@ -95,15 +95,6 @@ Legitimate Java applications may use perform outbound connections to these ports | 54.0 | 90 | 60 | Java performed outbound connections to default ports of LDAP or RMI on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - - -#### CVE - -| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | -| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [CVE-2021-44228](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44228) | Apache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 (excluding security releases 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1) JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against attacker controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. An attacker who can control log messages or log message parameters can execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has been disabled by default. From version 2.16.0 (along with 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1), this functionality has been completely removed. Note that this vulnerability is specific to log4j-core and does not affect log4net, log4cxx, or other Apache Logging Services projects. | 9.3 | - #### Reference @@ -117,6 +108,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_java/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_java/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-windows_java_spawning_shells.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-windows_java_spawning_shells.md index 109504d529..0195f93076 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-windows_java_spawning_shells.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-windows_java_spawning_shells.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Windows Java Spawning Shells" -excerpt: "Exploit Public-Facing Application" +excerpt: "Exploit Public-Facing Application +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-12-13 @@ -12,21 +13,20 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - CVE-2021-44228 - Endpoint --- -### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION -We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this detection. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. +### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object +We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported. [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} #### Description -The following analytic identifies the process name of java.exe and w3wp.exe spawning a Windows shell. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). The shells included in the macro are "cmd.exe", "powershell.exe". Upon triage, review parallel processes and command-line arguments to determine legitimacy. +The following analytic identifies the process name of java.exe and w3wp.exe spawning a Windows shell. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). The shells included in the macro are "cmd.exe", "powershell.exe". Upon triage, review parallel processes and command-line arguments to determine legitimacy. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-12-13 @@ -53,9 +53,9 @@ The following analytic identifies the process name of java.exe and w3wp.exe spaw #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [windows_shells](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/windows_shells.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `windows_java_spawning_shells_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -96,15 +96,6 @@ Filtering may be required on internal developer build systems or classify assets | 40.0 | 80 | 50 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ spawning a Windows shell, potentially indicative of exploitation. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - - -#### CVE - -| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | -| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [CVE-2021-44228](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44228) | Apache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 (excluding security releases 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1) JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against attacker controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. An attacker who can control log messages or log message parameters can execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has been disabled by default. From version 2.16.0 (along with 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1), this functionality has been completely removed. Note that this vulnerability is specific to log4j-core and does not affect log4net, log4cxx, or other Apache Logging Services projects. | 9.3 | - #### Reference @@ -120,5 +111,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith - [*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/endpoint/windows_java_spawning_shells.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-14-hunting_for_log4shell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-14-hunting_for_log4shell.md index a410fa6e1e..88715d3edb 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-14-hunting_for_log4shell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-14-hunting_for_log4shell.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Hunting for Log4Shell" -excerpt: "Exploit Public-Facing Application" +excerpt: "Exploit Public-Facing Application +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-12-14 @@ -12,7 +13,6 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - CVE-2021-44228 - Web --- @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ tags: The following hunting query assists with quickly assessing CVE-2021-44228, or Log4Shell, activity mapped to the Web Datamodel. This is a combination query attempting to identify, score and dashboard. Because the Log4Shell vulnerability requires the string to be in the logs, this will work to identify the activity anywhere in the HTTP headers using _raw. Modify the first line to use the same pattern matching against other log sources. Scoring is based on a simple rubric of 0-5. 5 being the best match, and less than 5 meant to identify additional patterns that will equate to a higher total score. \ The first jndi match identifies the standard pattern of `{jndi:` \ -jndi_fastmatch is meant to identify any jndi in the logs. The score is set low and is meant to be the "base" score used later. \ +jndi_fastmatch is meant to identify any jndi in the logs. The score is set low and is meant to be the "base" score used later. \ jndi_proto is a protocol match that identifies `jndi` and one of `ldap, ldaps, rmi, dns, nis, iiop, corba, nds, http, https.` \ all_match is a very well written regex by https://gist.github.com/Schvenn that identifies nearly all patterns of this attack behavior. \ env works to identify environment variables in the header, meant to capture `AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID`, `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY` and `env`. \ @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ lookup matching is meant to catch some basic obfuscation that has been identifie Scoring will then occur based on any findings. The base score is meant to be 2 , created by jndi_fastmatch. Everything else is meant to increase that score. \ Finally, a simple table is created to show the scoring and the _raw field. Sort based on score or columns of interest. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Web](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Web) - **Last Updated**: 2021-12-14 @@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ Note that `hunting_for_log4shell_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows #### How To Implement -Out of the box, the Web datamodel is required to be pre-filled. However, tested was performed against raw httpd access logs. Change the first line to any dataset to pass the regex's against. +Out of the box, the Web datamodel is required to be pre-filled. However, tested was performed against raw httpd access logs. Change the first line to any dataset to pass the regex's against. #### Known False Positives It is highly possible you will find false positives, however, the base score is set to 2 for _any_ jndi found in raw logs. tune and change as needed, include any filtering. @@ -210,15 +210,6 @@ It is highly possible you will find false positives, however, the base score is | 40.0 | 80 | 50 | Hunting for Log4Shell exploitation has occurred. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - - -#### CVE - -| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | -| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [CVE-2021-44228](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44228) | Apache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 (excluding security releases 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1) JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against attacker controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. An attacker who can control log messages or log message parameters can execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has been disabled by default. From version 2.16.0 (along with 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1), this functionality has been completely removed. Note that this vulnerability is specific to log4j-core and does not affect log4net, log4cxx, or other Apache Logging Services projects. | 9.3 | - #### Reference @@ -237,6 +228,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/log4shell-nginx.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/log4shell-nginx.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_add_files_in_known_crontab_directories.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_add_files_in_known_crontab_directories.md index c9ca7fa5a3..ad8f211aea 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_add_files_in_known_crontab_directories.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_add_files_in_known_crontab_directories.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories" -excerpt: "Cron, Scheduled Task/Job" +excerpt: "Cron +, Scheduled Task/Job +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-12-17 @@ -8,10 +10,10 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Cron + - Scheduled Task/Job - Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Scheduled Task/Job - Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation @@ -29,7 +31,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies a suspicious file creation in known cron table directories. This event is commonly abuse by malware, adversaries and red teamers to persist on the target or compromised host. crontab or cronjob is like a schedule task in windows environment where you can create an executable or script on the known crontab directories to run it base on its schedule. This Anomaly query is a good indicator to look further what file is added and who added the file if to consider it legitimate file. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-12-17 @@ -84,7 +86,7 @@ Administrator or network operator can create file in crontab folders for automat #### Kill Chain Phase -* Privilege Escalation +* Exploitation @@ -95,8 +97,6 @@ Administrator or network operator can create file in crontab folders for automat | 25.0 | 50 | 50 | a file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/cronjobs_entry/sysmon_linux.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/cronjobs_entry/sysmon_linux.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_at_allow_config_file_creation.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_at_allow_config_file_creation.md index 4764bc6d90..ebd2ca92ac 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_at_allow_config_file_creation.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_at_allow_config_file_creation.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Linux At Allow Config File Creation" -excerpt: "Cron, Scheduled Task/Job" +excerpt: "Cron +, Scheduled Task/Job +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-12-17 @@ -8,10 +10,10 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Cron + - Scheduled Task/Job - Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Scheduled Task/Job - Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation @@ -27,9 +29,9 @@ tags: #### Description -The following analytic identifies a suspicious file creation of /etc/at.allow or /etc/at.deny. These 2 files are commonly abused by malware, adversaries or red teamers to persist on the targeted or compromised host. These config files can restrict or allow user to execute "at" application (another schedule task application in linux). attacker can create a user or add the compromised username to that config file to execute "at" to schedule it malicious code. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator to investigate further the entry in created config file and who created it to verify if it is a false positive. +The following analytic identifies a suspicious file creation of /etc/at.allow or /etc/at.deny. These 2 files are commonly abused by malware, adversaries or red teamers to persist on the targeted or compromised host. These config files can restrict or allow user to execute "at" application (another schedule task application in linux). attacker can create a user or add the compromised username to that config file to execute "at" to schedule it malicious code. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator to investigate further the entry in created config file and who created it to verify if it is a false positive. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-12-17 @@ -84,7 +86,7 @@ Administrator or network operator can create this file for automation purposes. #### Kill Chain Phase -* Privilege Escalation +* Exploitation @@ -95,8 +97,6 @@ Administrator or network operator can create this file for automation purposes. | 25.0 | 50 | 50 | A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.001/at_execution/sysmon_linux.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.001/at_execution/sysmon_linux.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_at_application_execution.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_at_application_execution.md index 5c11c0ad37..d9e36be43f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_at_application_execution.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_at_application_execution.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Linux At Application Execution" -excerpt: "At (Linux), Scheduled Task/Job" +excerpt: "At (Linux) +, Scheduled Task/Job +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-12-17 @@ -8,10 +10,10 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - At (Linux) + - Scheduled Task/Job - Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Scheduled Task/Job - Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation @@ -29,7 +31,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies a suspicious process creation of At application. This process can be used by malware, adversaries and red teamers to create persistence entry to the targeted or compromised host with their malicious code. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator to investigate the event before and after this process execution, when it was executed and what schedule task it will execute. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-12-17 @@ -86,7 +88,7 @@ Administrator or network operator can use this application for automation purpos #### Kill Chain Phase -* Privilege Escalation +* Exploitation @@ -97,8 +99,6 @@ Administrator or network operator can use this application for automation purpos | 9.0 | 30 | 30 | At application was executed in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.001/at_execution/sysmon_linux.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.001/at_execution/sysmon_linux.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_edit_cron_table_parameter.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_edit_cron_table_parameter.md index 418ec1462c..2bad80676d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_edit_cron_table_parameter.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_edit_cron_table_parameter.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter" -excerpt: "Cron, Scheduled Task/Job" +excerpt: "Cron +, Scheduled Task/Job +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-12-17 @@ -8,10 +10,10 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Cron + - Scheduled Task/Job - Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Scheduled Task/Job - Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation @@ -29,7 +31,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies a suspicious cronjobs modification using crontab edit parameter. This commandline parameter can be abuse by malware author, adversaries, and red red teamers to add cronjob entry to their malicious code to execute to the schedule they want. This event can also be executed by administrator or normal user for automation purposes so filter is needed. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-12-17 @@ -86,7 +88,7 @@ Administrator or network operator can use this application for automation purpos #### Kill Chain Phase -* Privilege Escalation +* Exploitation @@ -97,8 +99,6 @@ Administrator or network operator can use this application for automation purpos | 9.0 | 30 | 30 | A possible crontab edit command $process$ executed on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/crontab_edit_parameter/sysmon_linux.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/crontab_edit_parameter/sysmon_linux.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file.md index 4081d3f813..0d2e419e74 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File" -excerpt: "At (Linux), Scheduled Task/Job" +excerpt: "At (Linux) +, Scheduled Task/Job +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-12-17 @@ -8,10 +10,10 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - At (Linux) + - Scheduled Task/Job - Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Scheduled Task/Job - Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation @@ -29,7 +31,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for suspicious commandline that may use to append user entry to /etc/at.allow or /etc/at.deny. These 2 files are commonly abused by malware, adversaries or red teamers to persist on the targeted or compromised host. These config file can restrict user that can only execute at application (another schedule task application in linux). attacker can create a user or add the compromised username to that config file to execute at to schedule it malicious code. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator to investigate further the entry in created config file and who created it to verify if it is a false positive. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-12-17 @@ -86,7 +88,7 @@ Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purpos #### Kill Chain Phase -* Privilege Escalation +* Exploitation @@ -97,8 +99,6 @@ Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purpos | 9.0 | 30 | 30 | A commandline $process$ that may modify at allow config file in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.001/at_execution/sysmon_linux.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.001/at_execution/sysmon_linux.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file.md index 65d163f593..f900bb72e8 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File" -excerpt: "Cron, Scheduled Task/Job" +excerpt: "Cron +, Scheduled Task/Job +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-12-17 @@ -8,10 +10,10 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Cron + - Scheduled Task/Job - Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Scheduled Task/Job - Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation @@ -29,7 +31,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for possible suspicious commandline that may use to append a code to any existing cronjob files for persistence or privilege escalation. This technique is commonly abused by malware, adversaries and red teamers to automatically execute their code within a existing or sometimes in normal cronjob script file. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-12-17 @@ -86,7 +88,7 @@ Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purpos #### Kill Chain Phase -* Privilege Escalation +* Exploitation @@ -97,8 +99,6 @@ Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purpos | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | A commandline $process$ that may modify cronjob file in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/cronjobs_entry/sysmon_linux.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/cronjobs_entry/sysmon_linux.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor.md index 623009b971..cfd1575273 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor" -excerpt: "Cron, Scheduled Task/Job" +excerpt: "Cron +, Scheduled Task/Job +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-12-17 @@ -8,10 +10,10 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Cron + - Scheduled Task/Job - Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Scheduled Task/Job - Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation @@ -29,7 +31,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for possible modification of cronjobs file using editor. This event is can be seen in normal user but can also be a good hunting indicator for unwanted user modifying cronjobs for possible persistence or privilege escalation. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-12-17 @@ -86,7 +88,7 @@ Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purpos #### Kill Chain Phase -* Privilege Escalation +* Exploitation @@ -97,8 +99,6 @@ Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purpos | 6.0 | 20 | 30 | A commandline $process$ that may modify cronjob file using editor in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/cronjobs_entry/sysmon_linux.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/cronjobs_entry/sysmon_linux.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-linux_file_creation_in_init_boot_directory.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-linux_file_creation_in_init_boot_directory.md index 08718fdfe8..6c8af424a4 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-linux_file_creation_in_init_boot_directory.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-linux_file_creation_in_init_boot_directory.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory" -excerpt: "RC Scripts, Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts" +excerpt: "RC Scripts +, Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-12-20 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - RC Scripts + - Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for suspicious file creation on init system directories for automatic execution of script or file upon boot up. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamer to persist on the targeted or compromised host. This behavior can be executed or use by an administrator or network operator to add script files or binary files as part of a task or automation. filter is needed. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-12-20 @@ -82,7 +84,7 @@ Administrator or network operator can create file in this folders for automation #### Kill Chain Phase -* Privilege Escalation +* Exploitation @@ -93,8 +95,6 @@ Administrator or network operator can create file in this folders for automation | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.004/linux_init_profile/sysmon_linux.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.004/linux_init_profile/sysmon_linux.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-linux_file_creation_in_profile_directory.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-linux_file_creation_in_profile_directory.md index 35c1b258cc..b3d9bb2062 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-linux_file_creation_in_profile_directory.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-linux_file_creation_in_profile_directory.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Linux File Creation In Profile Directory" -excerpt: "Unix Shell Configuration Modification, Event Triggered Execution" +excerpt: "Unix Shell Configuration Modification +, Event Triggered Execution +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-12-20 @@ -8,11 +10,11 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Unix Shell Configuration Modification - - Privilege Escalation - - Persistence - Event Triggered Execution + - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for suspicious file creation in /etc/profile.d directory to automatically execute scripts by shell upon boot up of a linux machine. This technique is commonly abused by adversaries, malware and red teamers as a persistence mechanism to the targeted or compromised host. This Anomaly detection is a good indicator that someone wants to run a code after boot up which can be done also by the administrator or network operator for automation purposes. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-12-20 @@ -39,9 +41,9 @@ This analytic looks for suspicious file creation in /etc/profile.d directory to | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1546.004](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004/) | Unix Shell Configuration Modification | Privilege Escalation, Persistence | +| [T1546.004](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004/) | Unix Shell Configuration Modification | Persistence, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1546](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/) | Event Triggered Execution | Privilege Escalation, Persistence | +| [T1546](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/) | Event Triggered Execution | Persistence, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -82,7 +84,7 @@ Administrator or network operator can create file in profile.d folders for autom #### Kill Chain Phase -* Privilege Escalation +* Exploitation @@ -93,8 +95,6 @@ Administrator or network operator can create file in profile.d folders for autom | 56.0 | 70 | 80 | A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.004/linux_init_profile/sysmon_linux.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.004/linux_init_profile/sysmon_linux.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-linux_possible_append_command_to_profile_config_file.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-linux_possible_append_command_to_profile_config_file.md index 5ea02084c6..7c14cd1ed7 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-linux_possible_append_command_to_profile_config_file.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-linux_possible_append_command_to_profile_config_file.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File" -excerpt: "Unix Shell Configuration Modification, Event Triggered Execution" +excerpt: "Unix Shell Configuration Modification +, Event Triggered Execution +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-12-20 @@ -8,11 +10,11 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Unix Shell Configuration Modification - - Privilege Escalation - - Persistence - Event Triggered Execution + - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for suspicious command-lines that can be possibly used to modify user profile files to automatically execute scripts/executables by shell upon reboot of the machine. This technique is commonly abused by adversaries, malware and red teamers as persistence mechanism to the targeted or compromised host. This Anomaly detection is a good indicator that someone wants to run code after reboot which can be done also by the administrator or network operator for automation purposes. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-12-20 @@ -39,9 +41,9 @@ This analytic looks for suspicious command-lines that can be possibly used to mo | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1546.004](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004/) | Unix Shell Configuration Modification | Privilege Escalation, Persistence | +| [T1546.004](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004/) | Unix Shell Configuration Modification | Persistence, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1546](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/) | Event Triggered Execution | Privilege Escalation, Persistence | +| [T1546](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/) | Event Triggered Execution | Persistence, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -84,7 +86,7 @@ Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purpos #### Kill Chain Phase -* Privilege Escalation +* Exploitation @@ -95,8 +97,6 @@ Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purpos | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | a commandline $process$ that may modify profile files in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.004/linux_init_profile/sysmon_linux.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.004/linux_init_profile/sysmon_linux.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-linux_service_file_created_in_systemd_directory.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-linux_service_file_created_in_systemd_directory.md index ccc9a36100..c87840d06c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-linux_service_file_created_in_systemd_directory.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-linux_service_file_created_in_systemd_directory.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory" -excerpt: "Systemd Timers, Scheduled Task/Job" +excerpt: "Systemd Timers +, Scheduled Task/Job +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-12-20 @@ -8,10 +10,10 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Systemd Timers + - Scheduled Task/Job - Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Scheduled Task/Job - Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation @@ -29,7 +31,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for suspicious file creation in systemd timer directory in linux platform. systemd is a system and service manager for Linux distributions. From the Windows perspective, this process fulfills the duties of wininit.exe and services.exe combined. At the risk of simplifying the functionality of systemd, it initializes a Linux system and starts relevant services that are defined in service unit files. Adversaries, malware and red teamers may abuse this this feature by stashing systemd service file to persist on the targetted or compromised host. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-12-20 @@ -84,7 +86,7 @@ Administrator or network operator can create file in systemd folders for automat #### Kill Chain Phase -* Privilege Escalation +* Exploitation @@ -95,8 +97,6 @@ Administrator or network operator can create file in systemd folders for automat | 64.0 | 80 | 80 | A service file named as $file_path$ is created in systemd folder on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.006/service_systemd/sysmon_linux.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.006/service_systemd/sysmon_linux.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-linux_service_restarted.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-linux_service_restarted.md index 85e0c4bdb7..1fde9706e5 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-linux_service_restarted.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-linux_service_restarted.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Linux Service Restarted" -excerpt: "Systemd Timers, Scheduled Task/Job" +excerpt: "Systemd Timers +, Scheduled Task/Job +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-12-20 @@ -8,10 +10,10 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Systemd Timers + - Scheduled Task/Job - Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Scheduled Task/Job - Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation @@ -29,7 +31,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for restarted or re-enable services in linux platform. This technique can be executed or performed using systemctl or service tool application. Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Administrator may also create a legitimated service for a specific tool or normal application as part of task or automation, in this scenario it is suggested to look for the service path of the actual script or executable that register as service and who created the service for further verification. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-12-20 @@ -86,7 +88,7 @@ Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purpos #### Kill Chain Phase -* Privilege Escalation +* Exploitation @@ -97,8 +99,6 @@ Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purpos | 25.0 | 50 | 50 | A commandline $process$ that may create or start a service on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.006/service_systemd/sysmon_linux.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.006/service_systemd/sysmon_linux.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-linux_service_started_or_enabled.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-linux_service_started_or_enabled.md index 3c0e0e66d9..bf4b45d39b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-linux_service_started_or_enabled.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-linux_service_started_or_enabled.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Linux Service Started Or Enabled" -excerpt: "Systemd Timers, Scheduled Task/Job" +excerpt: "Systemd Timers +, Scheduled Task/Job +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-12-20 @@ -8,10 +10,10 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Systemd Timers + - Scheduled Task/Job - Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Scheduled Task/Job - Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation @@ -29,7 +31,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for created or enable services in linux platform. This technique can be executed or performed using systemctl or service tool application. Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Administrator may also create a legitimated service for a specific tool or normal application as part of task or automation, in this scenario it is suggested to look for the service path of the actual script or executable that register as service and who created the service for further verification. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-12-20 @@ -86,7 +88,7 @@ Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purpos #### Kill Chain Phase -* Privilege Escalation +* Exploitation @@ -97,8 +99,6 @@ Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purpos | 42.0 | 60 | 70 | a commandline $process$ that may create or start a service on $dest | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.006/service_systemd/sysmon_linux.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.006/service_systemd/sysmon_linux.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-suspicious_computer_account_name_change.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-suspicious_computer_account_name_change.md index 44799e7a11..976cbdbfc9 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-suspicious_computer_account_name_change.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-suspicious_computer_account_name_change.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Suspicious Computer Account Name Change" -excerpt: "Valid Accounts, Domain Accounts" +excerpt: "Valid Accounts +, Domain Accounts +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-12-20 @@ -8,20 +10,18 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Valid Accounts - - Defense Evasion - - Persistence - - Privilege Escalation - - Initial Access - Domain Accounts - Defense Evasion + - Initial Access - Persistence - Privilege Escalation + - Defense Evasion - Initial Access + - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - CVE-2021-42287 - - CVE-2021-42278 - Endpoint --- @@ -31,9 +31,9 @@ tags: #### Description -As part of the sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287) exploitation chain, adversaries need to create a new computer account name and rename it to match the name of a domain controller account without the ending '$'. In Windows Active Directory environments, computer account names always end with `$`. This analytic leverages Event Id 4781, `The name of an account was changed`, to identify a computer account rename event with a suspicious name that does not terminate with `$`. This behavior could represent an exploitation attempt of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287 for privilege escalation. +As part of the sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287) exploitation chain, adversaries need to create a new computer account name and rename it to match the name of a domain controller account without the ending '$'. In Windows Active Directory environments, computer account names always end with `$`. This analytic leverages Event Id 4781, `The name of an account was changed`, to identify a computer account rename event with a suspicious name that does not terminate with `$`. This behavior could represent an exploitation attempt of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287 for privilege escalation. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-12-20 @@ -45,9 +45,9 @@ As part of the sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Im | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access | +| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1078.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002/) | Domain Accounts | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access | +| [T1078.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002/) | Domain Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -76,14 +76,14 @@ Note that `suspicious_computer_account_name_change_filter` is a empty macro by d To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows event logs from your hosts. In addition, the Splunk Windows TA is needed. #### Known False Positives -Renaming a computer account name to a name that not end with '$' is highly unsual and may not have any legitimate scenarios. +Renaming a computer account name to a name that not end with '$' is highly unsual and may not have any legitimate scenarios. #### Associated Analytic story * [sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation](/stories/samaccountname_spoofing_and_domain_controller_impersonation) #### Kill Chain Phase -* Privilege Escalation +* Exploitation @@ -94,16 +94,6 @@ Renaming a computer account name to a name that not end with '$' is high | 70.0 | 100 | 70 | A computer account $Old_Account_Name$ was renamed with a suspicious computer name | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - - -#### CVE - -| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | -| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [CVE-2021-42287](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-42287) | Active Directory Domain Services Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2021-42278, CVE-2021-42282, CVE-2021-42291. | 6.5 | -| [CVE-2021-42278](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-42278) | Active Directory Domain Services Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2021-42282, CVE-2021-42287, CVE-2021-42291. | 6.5 | - #### Reference @@ -118,6 +108,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/samaccountname_spoofing/windows-security.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/samaccountname_spoofing/windows-security.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-suspicious_kerberos_service_ticket_request.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-suspicious_kerberos_service_ticket_request.md index 904e4e32cd..d472d2ba62 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-suspicious_kerberos_service_ticket_request.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-suspicious_kerberos_service_ticket_request.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request" -excerpt: "Valid Accounts, Domain Accounts" +excerpt: "Valid Accounts +, Domain Accounts +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-12-20 @@ -8,20 +10,18 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Valid Accounts - - Defense Evasion - - Persistence - - Privilege Escalation - - Initial Access - Domain Accounts - Defense Evasion + - Initial Access - Persistence - Privilege Escalation + - Defense Evasion - Initial Access + - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - CVE-2021-42287 - - CVE-2021-42278 - Endpoint --- @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ tags: As part of the sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287) exploitation chain, adversaries will request and obtain a Kerberos Service Ticket (TGS) with a domain controller computer account as the Service Name. This Service Ticket can be then used to take control of the domain controller on the final part of the attack. This analytic leverages Event Id 4769, `A Kerberos service ticket was requested`, to identify an unusual TGS request where the Account_Name requesting the ticket matches the Service_Name field. This behavior could represent an exploitation attempt of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287 for privilege escalation. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-12-20 @@ -45,9 +45,9 @@ As part of the sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Im | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access | +| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1078.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002/) | Domain Accounts | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access | +| [T1078.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002/) | Domain Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ We have tested this detection logic with ~2 million 4769 events and did not iden #### Kill Chain Phase -* Privilege Escalation +* Exploitation @@ -96,16 +96,6 @@ We have tested this detection logic with ~2 million 4769 events and did not iden | 60.0 | 100 | 60 | A suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket was requested by $Account_Name$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - - -#### CVE - -| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | -| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [CVE-2021-42287](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-42287) | Active Directory Domain Services Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2021-42278, CVE-2021-42282, CVE-2021-42291. | 6.5 | -| [CVE-2021-42278](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-42278) | Active Directory Domain Services Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2021-42282, CVE-2021-42287, CVE-2021-42291. | 6.5 | - #### Reference @@ -121,6 +111,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/samaccountname_spoofing/windows-security.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/samaccountname_spoofing/windows-security.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-linux_add_user_account.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-linux_add_user_account.md index d3a0bfe619..81c4740217 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-linux_add_user_account.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-linux_add_user_account.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Linux Add User Account" -excerpt: "Local Account, Create Account" +excerpt: "Local Account +, Create Account +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-12-21 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Local Account - - Persistence - Create Account - Persistence + - Persistence - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for commands to create user accounts on the linux platform. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to persist on the targeted or compromised host by creating new user with an elevated privilege. This Hunting query may catch normal creation of user by administrator so filter is needed. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-12-21 @@ -82,7 +84,7 @@ Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the fi #### Kill Chain Phase -* Privilege Escalation +* Exploitation @@ -93,8 +95,6 @@ Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the fi | 25.0 | 50 | 50 | A commandline $process$ that may create user account on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/linux_adduser/sysmon_linux.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/linux_adduser/sysmon_linux.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-linux_change_file_owner_to_root.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-linux_change_file_owner_to_root.md index e9bb5b99fa..28a5bbb742 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-linux_change_file_owner_to_root.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-linux_change_file_owner_to_root.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Linux Change File Owner To Root" -excerpt: "Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification, File and Directory Permissions Modification" +excerpt: "Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification +, File and Directory Permissions Modification +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-12-21 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification - - Defense Evasion - File and Directory Permissions Modification - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for a commandline that change the file owner to root using chown utility tool. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to escalate privilege to the targeted or compromised host by changing the owner of their malicious file to root. This event is not so common in corporate network except from the administrator doing normal task that needs high privilege. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-12-21 @@ -82,7 +84,7 @@ Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the fi #### Kill Chain Phase -* Privilege Escalation +* Exploitation @@ -93,8 +95,6 @@ Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the fi | 64.0 | 80 | 80 | A commandline $process$ that may change ownership to root on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.001/chmod_uid/sysmon_linux.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.001/chmod_uid/sysmon_linux.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-linux_nopasswd_entry_in_sudoers_file.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-linux_nopasswd_entry_in_sudoers_file.md index 69d1b236c2..91c27c527b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-linux_nopasswd_entry_in_sudoers_file.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-linux_nopasswd_entry_in_sudoers_file.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File" -excerpt: "Sudo and Sudo Caching, Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism" +excerpt: "Sudo and Sudo Caching +, Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-12-21 @@ -8,11 +10,11 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Sudo and Sudo Caching - - Privilege Escalation - - Defense Evasion - Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism + - Defense Evasion - Privilege Escalation - Defense Evasion + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ tags: This analytic is to look for suspicious command lines that may add entry to /etc/sudoers with NOPASSWD attribute in linux platform. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain elevated privilege to the targeted or compromised host. /etc/sudoers file controls who can run what commands users can execute on the machines and can also control whether user need a password to execute particular commands. This file is composed of aliases (basically variables) and user specifications. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-12-21 @@ -39,9 +41,9 @@ This analytic is to look for suspicious command lines that may add entry to /etc | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1548.003](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003/) | Sudo and Sudo Caching | Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1548.003](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003/) | Sudo and Sudo Caching | Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1548](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1548](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -84,7 +86,7 @@ Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the fi #### Kill Chain Phase -* Privilege Escalation +* Exploitation @@ -95,8 +97,6 @@ Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the fi | 64.0 | 80 | 80 | a commandline $process$ executed on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/nopasswd_sudoers/sysmon_linux.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/nopasswd_sudoers/sysmon_linux.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-linux_setuid_using_chmod_utility.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-linux_setuid_using_chmod_utility.md index 87d9ca9071..95eef95944 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-linux_setuid_using_chmod_utility.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-linux_setuid_using_chmod_utility.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility" -excerpt: "Setuid and Setgid, Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism" +excerpt: "Setuid and Setgid +, Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-12-21 @@ -8,11 +10,11 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Setuid and Setgid - - Privilege Escalation - - Defense Evasion - Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism + - Defense Evasion - Privilege Escalation - Defense Evasion + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,9 +27,9 @@ tags: #### Description -This analytic looks for suspicious chmod utility execution to enable SUID bit. This allows a user to temporarily gain root access, usually in order to run a program. For example, only the root account is allowed to change the password information contained in the password database; If the SUID bit appears as an s, the file's owner also has execute permission to the file; if it appears as an S, the file's owner does not have execute permission. The second specialty permission is the SGID, or set group id bit. It is similar to the SUID bit, except it can temporarily change group membership, usually to execute a program. The SGID bit is set if an s or an S appears in the group section of permissions. +This analytic looks for suspicious chmod utility execution to enable SUID bit. This allows a user to temporarily gain root access, usually in order to run a program. For example, only the root account is allowed to change the password information contained in the password database; If the SUID bit appears as an s, the file's owner also has execute permission to the file; if it appears as an S, the file's owner does not have execute permission. The second specialty permission is the SGID, or set group id bit. It is similar to the SUID bit, except it can temporarily change group membership, usually to execute a program. The SGID bit is set if an s or an S appears in the group section of permissions. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-12-21 @@ -39,9 +41,9 @@ This analytic looks for suspicious chmod utility execution to enable SUID bit. T | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1548.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/001/) | Setuid and Setgid | Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1548.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/001/) | Setuid and Setgid | Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1548](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1548](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -84,7 +86,7 @@ Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the fi #### Kill Chain Phase -* Privilege Escalation +* Exploitation @@ -95,8 +97,6 @@ Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the fi | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | a commandline $process$ that may set suid or sgid on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.001/chmod_uid/sysmon_linux.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.001/chmod_uid/sysmon_linux.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-linux_setuid_using_setcap_utility.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-linux_setuid_using_setcap_utility.md index cdddbcfb93..3ce6d36067 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-linux_setuid_using_setcap_utility.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-linux_setuid_using_setcap_utility.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility" -excerpt: "Setuid and Setgid, Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism" +excerpt: "Setuid and Setgid +, Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-12-21 @@ -8,11 +10,11 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Setuid and Setgid - - Privilege Escalation - - Defense Evasion - Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism + - Defense Evasion - Privilege Escalation - Defense Evasion + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,9 +27,9 @@ tags: #### Description -This analytic looks for suspicious setcap utility execution to enable SUID bit. This allows a user to temporarily gain root access, usually in order to run a program. For example, only the root account is allowed to change the password information contained in the password database; If the SUID bit appears as an s, the file's owner also has execute permission to the file; if it appears as an S, the file's owner does not have execute permission. The second specialty permission is the SGID, or set group id bit. It is similar to the SUID bit, except it can temporarily change group membership, usually to execute a program. The SGID bit is set if an s or an S appears in the group section of permissions. +This analytic looks for suspicious setcap utility execution to enable SUID bit. This allows a user to temporarily gain root access, usually in order to run a program. For example, only the root account is allowed to change the password information contained in the password database; If the SUID bit appears as an s, the file's owner also has execute permission to the file; if it appears as an S, the file's owner does not have execute permission. The second specialty permission is the SGID, or set group id bit. It is similar to the SUID bit, except it can temporarily change group membership, usually to execute a program. The SGID bit is set if an s or an S appears in the group section of permissions. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-12-21 @@ -39,9 +41,9 @@ This analytic looks for suspicious setcap utility execution to enable SUID bit. | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1548.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/001/) | Setuid and Setgid | Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1548.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/001/) | Setuid and Setgid | Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1548](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1548](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -84,7 +86,7 @@ Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the fi #### Kill Chain Phase -* Privilege Escalation +* Exploitation @@ -95,8 +97,6 @@ Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the fi | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | A commandline $process$ that may set suid or sgid on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.001/linux_setcap/sysmon_linux.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.001/linux_setcap/sysmon_linux.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-linux_visudo_utility_execution.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-linux_visudo_utility_execution.md index 4800fadf07..59569a2f1e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-linux_visudo_utility_execution.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-linux_visudo_utility_execution.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Linux Visudo Utility Execution" -excerpt: "Sudo and Sudo Caching, Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism" +excerpt: "Sudo and Sudo Caching +, Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-12-21 @@ -8,11 +10,11 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Sudo and Sudo Caching - - Privilege Escalation - - Defense Evasion - Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism + - Defense Evasion - Privilege Escalation - Defense Evasion + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ tags: This analytic is to looks for suspicious commandline that add entry to /etc/sudoers by using visudo utility tool in linux platform. This technique may abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain elevated privilege to targeted or compromised host. /etc/sudoers file controls who can run what commands as what users on what machines and can also control special things such as whether you need a password for particular commands. The file is composed of aliases (basically variables) and user specifications (which control who can run what). -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-12-21 @@ -39,9 +41,9 @@ This analytic is to looks for suspicious commandline that add entry to /etc/sudo | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1548.003](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003/) | Sudo and Sudo Caching | Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1548.003](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003/) | Sudo and Sudo Caching | Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1548](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1548](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -84,7 +86,7 @@ Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the fi #### Kill Chain Phase -* Privilege Escalation +* Exploitation @@ -95,8 +97,6 @@ Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the fi | 16.0 | 40 | 40 | A commandline $process$ executed on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/visudo/sysmon_linux.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/visudo/sysmon_linux.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-suspicious_ticket_granting_ticket_request.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-suspicious_ticket_granting_ticket_request.md index 90bc4ad1e6..1d72427c29 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-suspicious_ticket_granting_ticket_request.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-suspicious_ticket_granting_ticket_request.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request" -excerpt: "Valid Accounts, Domain Accounts" +excerpt: "Valid Accounts +, Domain Accounts +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-12-21 @@ -8,15 +10,15 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Valid Accounts - - Defense Evasion - - Persistence - - Privilege Escalation - - Initial Access - Domain Accounts - Defense Evasion + - Initial Access - Persistence - Privilege Escalation + - Defense Evasion - Initial Access + - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -31,7 +33,7 @@ tags: As part of the sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287) exploitation chain, adversaries will need to request a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) on behalf of the newly created and renamed computer account. The TGT request will be preceded by a computer account name event. This analytic leverages Event Id 4781, `The name of an account was changed` and event Id 4768 `A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested` to correlate a sequence of events where the new computer account on event id 4781 matches the request account on event id 4768. This behavior could represent an exploitation attempt of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287 for privilege escalation. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-12-21 @@ -43,9 +45,9 @@ As part of the sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Im | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access | +| [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1078.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002/) | Domain Accounts | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access | +| [T1078.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002/) | Domain Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -85,7 +87,7 @@ A computer account name change event inmediately followed by a kerberos TGT requ #### Kill Chain Phase -* Privilege Escalation +* Exploitation @@ -96,8 +98,6 @@ A computer account name change event inmediately followed by a kerberos TGT requ | 60.0 | 100 | 60 | A suspicious TGT was requested was requested | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/samaccountname_spoofing/windows-security.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/samaccountname_spoofing/windows-security.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-22-linux_file_created_in_kernel_driver_directory.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-22-linux_file_created_in_kernel_driver_directory.md index 2aa016963a..a10ad6ee62 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-22-linux_file_created_in_kernel_driver_directory.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-22-linux_file_created_in_kernel_driver_directory.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory" -excerpt: "Kernel Modules and Extensions, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution" +excerpt: "Kernel Modules and Extensions +, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-12-22 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Kernel Modules and Extensions + - Boot or Logon Autostart Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Boot or Logon Autostart Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for suspicious file creation in kernel/driver directory in linux platform. This directory is known folder for all linux kernel module available within the system. so creation of file in this directory is a good indicator that there is a possible rootkit installation in the host machine. This technique was abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain high privileges to their malicious code such us in kernel level. Even this event is not so common administrator or legitimate 3rd party tool may install driver or linux kernel module as part of its installation. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-12-22 @@ -82,7 +84,7 @@ Administrator or network operator can create file in this folders for automation #### Kill Chain Phase -* Privilege Escalation +* Exploitation @@ -93,8 +95,6 @@ Administrator or network operator can create file in this folders for automation | 72.0 | 80 | 90 | A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.006/loading_linux_kernel_module/sysmon_linux.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.006/loading_linux_kernel_module/sysmon_linux.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-22-linux_insert_kernel_module_using_insmod_utility.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-22-linux_insert_kernel_module_using_insmod_utility.md index dcc364812c..578fedb286 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-22-linux_insert_kernel_module_using_insmod_utility.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-22-linux_insert_kernel_module_using_insmod_utility.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility" -excerpt: "Kernel Modules and Extensions, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution" +excerpt: "Kernel Modules and Extensions +, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-12-22 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Kernel Modules and Extensions + - Boot or Logon Autostart Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Boot or Logon Autostart Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for inserting of linux kernel module using insmod utility function. This event can detect a installation of rootkit or malicious kernel module to gain elevated privileges to their malicious code and bypassed detections. This Anomaly detection is a good indicator that someone installing kernel module in a linux host either admin or adversaries. filter is needed in this scenario -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-12-22 @@ -84,7 +86,7 @@ Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the fi #### Kill Chain Phase -* Privilege Escalation +* Exploitation @@ -95,8 +97,6 @@ Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the fi | 64.0 | 80 | 80 | A commandline $process$ that may install kernel module on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.006/loading_linux_kernel_module/sysmon_linux.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.006/loading_linux_kernel_module/sysmon_linux.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-22-linux_install_kernel_module_using_modprobe_utility.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-22-linux_install_kernel_module_using_modprobe_utility.md index 6512abe6fd..26f82a442e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-22-linux_install_kernel_module_using_modprobe_utility.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-22-linux_install_kernel_module_using_modprobe_utility.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility" -excerpt: "Kernel Modules and Extensions, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution" +excerpt: "Kernel Modules and Extensions +, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-12-22 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Kernel Modules and Extensions + - Boot or Logon Autostart Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Boot or Logon Autostart Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for possible installing a linux kernel module using modprobe utility function. This event can detect a installation of rootkit or malicious kernel module to gain elevated privileges to their malicious code and bypassed detections. This Anomaly detection is a good indicator that someone installing kernel module in a linux host either admin or adversaries. filter is needed in this scenario -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-12-22 @@ -84,7 +86,7 @@ Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the fi #### Kill Chain Phase -* Privilege Escalation +* Exploitation @@ -95,8 +97,6 @@ Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the fi | 64.0 | 80 | 80 | A commandline $process$ that may install kernel module on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.006/loading_linux_kernel_module/sysmon_linux.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.006/loading_linux_kernel_module/sysmon_linux.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-22-linux_preload_hijack_library_calls.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-22-linux_preload_hijack_library_calls.md index 81d48ae8ad..c76976f60e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-22-linux_preload_hijack_library_calls.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-22-linux_preload_hijack_library_calls.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls" -excerpt: "Dynamic Linker Hijacking, Hijack Execution Flow" +excerpt: "Dynamic Linker Hijacking +, Hijack Execution Flow +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-12-22 @@ -8,13 +10,13 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Dynamic Linker Hijacking - - Persistence - - Privilege Escalation - - Defense Evasion - Hijack Execution Flow + - Defense Evasion - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - Defense Evasion + - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -29,7 +31,7 @@ tags: This analytic is to detect a suspicious command that may hijack a library function in linux platform. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain privileges and persist on the machine. This detection pertains to loading a dll to hijack or hook a library function of specific program using LD_PRELOAD command. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-12-22 @@ -41,9 +43,9 @@ This analytic is to detect a suspicious command that may hijack a library functi | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1574.006](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006/) | Dynamic Linker Hijacking | Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1574.006](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006/) | Dynamic Linker Hijacking | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1574](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/) | Hijack Execution Flow | Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1574](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/) | Hijack Execution Flow | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -86,7 +88,7 @@ Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the fi #### Kill Chain Phase -* Privilege Escalation +* Exploitation @@ -97,8 +99,6 @@ Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the fi | 64.0 | 80 | 80 | A commandline $process$ that may hijack library function on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1574.006/lib_hijack/sysmon_linux.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1574.006/lib_hijack/sysmon_linux.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-23-linux_common_process_for_elevation_control.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-23-linux_common_process_for_elevation_control.md index 74ae1ddc77..6e6d0368a9 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-23-linux_common_process_for_elevation_control.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-23-linux_common_process_for_elevation_control.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Linux Common Process For Elevation Control" -excerpt: "Setuid and Setgid, Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism" +excerpt: "Setuid and Setgid +, Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-12-23 @@ -8,11 +10,11 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Setuid and Setgid - - Privilege Escalation - - Defense Evasion - Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism + - Defense Evasion - Privilege Escalation - Defense Evasion + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ tags: This analytic is to look for possible elevation control access using a common known process in linux platform to change the attribute and file ownership. This technique is commonly abused by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain persistence or privilege escalation on the target or compromised host. Tis common process is used to modify file attribute, file ownership or SUID. This tools can be used in legitimate purposes so filter is needed. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-12-23 @@ -39,9 +41,9 @@ This analytic is to look for possible elevation control access using a common kn | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1548.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/001/) | Setuid and Setgid | Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1548.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/001/) | Setuid and Setgid | Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1548](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1548](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -84,7 +86,7 @@ Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the fi #### Kill Chain Phase -* Privilege Escalation +* Exploitation @@ -95,8 +97,6 @@ Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the fi | 9.0 | 30 | 30 | A commandline $process$ with process $process_name$ on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.001/chmod_uid/sysmon_linux.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.001/chmod_uid/sysmon_linux.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-23-linux_sudoers_tmp_file_creation.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-23-linux_sudoers_tmp_file_creation.md index cb9ef23d9b..1e358db4dd 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-23-linux_sudoers_tmp_file_creation.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-23-linux_sudoers_tmp_file_creation.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation" -excerpt: "Sudo and Sudo Caching, Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism" +excerpt: "Sudo and Sudo Caching +, Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2021-12-23 @@ -8,11 +10,11 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Sudo and Sudo Caching - - Privilege Escalation - - Defense Evasion - Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism + - Defense Evasion - Privilege Escalation - Defense Evasion + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ tags: This analytic is to looks for file creation of sudoers.tmp file cause by editing /etc/sudoers using visudo or editor in linux platform. This technique may abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain elevated privilege to targeted or compromised host. /etc/sudoers file controls who can run what commands as what users on what machines and can also control special things such as whether you need a password for particular commands. The file is composed of aliases (basically variables) and user specifications (which control who can run what). -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-12-23 @@ -39,9 +41,9 @@ This analytic is to looks for file creation of sudoers.tmp file cause by editing | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1548.003](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003/) | Sudo and Sudo Caching | Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1548.003](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003/) | Sudo and Sudo Caching | Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1548](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1548](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -82,7 +84,7 @@ administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the fi #### Kill Chain Phase -* Privilege Escalation +* Exploitation @@ -93,8 +95,6 @@ administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the fi | 72.0 | 80 | 90 | A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/sudoers_temp/sysmon_linux.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/sudoers_temp/sysmon_linux.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-04-linux_sudo_or_su_execution.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-04-linux_sudo_or_su_execution.md index 89ffa17595..f62328b01d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-04-linux_sudo_or_su_execution.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-04-linux_sudo_or_su_execution.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Linux Sudo OR Su Execution" -excerpt: "Sudo and Sudo Caching, Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism" +excerpt: "Sudo and Sudo Caching +, Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-04 @@ -8,11 +10,11 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Sudo and Sudo Caching - - Privilege Escalation - - Defense Evasion - Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism + - Defense Evasion - Privilege Escalation - Defense Evasion + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,9 +27,9 @@ tags: #### Description -This analytic is to detect the execution of sudo or su command in linux operating system. The "sudo" command allows a system administrator to delegate authority to give certain users (or groups of users) the ability to run some (or all) commands as root or another user while providing an audit trail of the commands and their arguments. This command is commonly abused by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to elevate privileges to the targeted host. This command can be executed by administrator for legitimate purposes or to execute process that need admin privileges, In this scenario filter is needed. +This analytic is to detect the execution of sudo or su command in linux operating system. The "sudo" command allows a system administrator to delegate authority to give certain users (or groups of users) the ability to run some (or all) commands as root or another user while providing an audit trail of the commands and their arguments. This command is commonly abused by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to elevate privileges to the targeted host. This command can be executed by administrator for legitimate purposes or to execute process that need admin privileges, In this scenario filter is needed. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-04 @@ -39,9 +41,9 @@ This analytic is to detect the execution of sudo or su command in linux operatin | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1548.003](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003/) | Sudo and Sudo Caching | Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1548.003](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003/) | Sudo and Sudo Caching | Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1548](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1548](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -84,7 +86,7 @@ Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the fi #### Kill Chain Phase -* Privilege Escalation +* Exploitation @@ -95,8 +97,6 @@ Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the fi | 9.0 | 30 | 30 | A commandline $process$ that execute sudo or su in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/sudo_su/sysmon_linux.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/sudo_su/sysmon_linux.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-05-linux_doas_conf_file_creation.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-05-linux_doas_conf_file_creation.md index 5318b75d2d..c507789e55 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-05-linux_doas_conf_file_creation.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-05-linux_doas_conf_file_creation.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Linux Doas Conf File Creation" -excerpt: "Sudo and Sudo Caching, Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism" +excerpt: "Sudo and Sudo Caching +, Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-05 @@ -8,11 +10,11 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Sudo and Sudo Caching - - Privilege Escalation - - Defense Evasion - Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism + - Defense Evasion - Privilege Escalation - Defense Evasion + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ tags: This analytic is to detect the creation of doas.conf file in linux host platform. This configuration file can be use by doas utility tool to allow or permit standard users to perform tasks as root, the same way sudo does. This tool is developed as a minimalistic alternative to sudo application. This tool can be abused advesaries, attacker or malware to gain elevated privileges to the targeted or compromised host. On the other hand this can also be executed by administrator for a certain task that needs admin rights. In this case filter is needed. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-05 @@ -39,9 +41,9 @@ This analytic is to detect the creation of doas.conf file in linux host platform | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1548.003](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003/) | Sudo and Sudo Caching | Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1548.003](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003/) | Sudo and Sudo Caching | Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1548](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1548](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -82,7 +84,7 @@ Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the fi #### Kill Chain Phase -* Privilege Escalation +* Exploitation @@ -93,8 +95,6 @@ Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the fi | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/doas/sysmon_linux.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/doas/sysmon_linux.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-05-linux_doas_tool_execution.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-05-linux_doas_tool_execution.md index 1f0f1d2c32..0e4ef149da 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-05-linux_doas_tool_execution.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-05-linux_doas_tool_execution.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Linux Doas Tool Execution" -excerpt: "Sudo and Sudo Caching, Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism" +excerpt: "Sudo and Sudo Caching +, Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-05 @@ -8,11 +10,11 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Sudo and Sudo Caching - - Privilege Escalation - - Defense Evasion - Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism + - Defense Evasion - Privilege Escalation - Defense Evasion + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ tags: This analytic is to detect the doas tool execution in linux host platform. This utility tool allow standard users to perform tasks as root, the same way sudo does. This tool is developed as a minimalistic alternative to sudo application. This tool can be abused advesaries, attacker or malware to gain elevated privileges to the targeted or compromised host. On the other hand this can also be executed by administrator for a certain task that needs admin rights. In this case filter is needed. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-05 @@ -39,9 +41,9 @@ This analytic is to detect the doas tool execution in linux host platform. This | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1548.003](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003/) | Sudo and Sudo Caching | Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1548.003](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003/) | Sudo and Sudo Caching | Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1548](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1548](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -84,7 +86,7 @@ Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the fi #### Kill Chain Phase -* Privilege Escalation +* Exploitation @@ -95,8 +97,6 @@ Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the fi | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | A doas $process_name$ with commandline $process$ was executed on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/doas_exec/sysmon_linux.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/doas_exec/sysmon_linux.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-10-linux_possible_access_to_credential_files.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-10-linux_possible_access_to_credential_files.md index 5c6249f0ed..ea1836cb40 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-10-linux_possible_access_to_credential_files.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-10-linux_possible_access_to_credential_files.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Linux Possible Access To Credential Files" -excerpt: "/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow, OS Credential Dumping" +excerpt: "/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow +, OS Credential Dumping +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-10 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow - - Credential Access - OS Credential Dumping - Credential Access + - Credential Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -23,9 +25,9 @@ tags: #### Description -This analytic is to detect a possible attempt to dump or access the content of /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow to enable offline credential cracking. "etc/passwd" store user information within linux OS while "etc/shadow" contain the user passwords hash. Adversaries and threat actors may attempt to access this to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator of possible credential dumping technique but it might catch some normal administrator automation scripts or during credential auditing. In this scenario filter is needed. +This analytic is to detect a possible attempt to dump or access the content of /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow to enable offline credential cracking. "etc/passwd" store user information within linux OS while "etc/shadow" contain the user passwords hash. Adversaries and threat actors may attempt to access this to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator of possible credential dumping technique but it might catch some normal administrator automation scripts or during credential auditing. In this scenario filter is needed. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-10 @@ -82,7 +84,7 @@ Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the fi #### Kill Chain Phase -* Privilege Escalation +* Exploitation @@ -93,8 +95,6 @@ Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the fi | 25.0 | 50 | 50 | A commandline $process$ executed on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.008/copy_file_stdoutpipe/sysmon_linux.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.008/copy_file_stdoutpipe/sysmon_linux.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-10-linux_possible_access_to_sudoers_file.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-10-linux_possible_access_to_sudoers_file.md index 0df3228295..ceb6e000f5 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-10-linux_possible_access_to_sudoers_file.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-10-linux_possible_access_to_sudoers_file.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File" -excerpt: "Sudo and Sudo Caching, Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism" +excerpt: "Sudo and Sudo Caching +, Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-10 @@ -8,11 +10,11 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Sudo and Sudo Caching - - Privilege Escalation - - Defense Evasion - Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism + - Defense Evasion - Privilege Escalation - Defense Evasion + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,9 +27,9 @@ tags: #### Description -This analytic is to detect a possible access or modification of /etc/sudoers file. "/etc/sudoers" file controls who can run what command as what users on what machine and can also control whether a specific user need a password for particular commands. adversaries and threat actors abuse this file to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation during attack on targeted host. +This analytic is to detect a possible access or modification of /etc/sudoers file. "/etc/sudoers" file controls who can run what command as what users on what machine and can also control whether a specific user need a password for particular commands. adversaries and threat actors abuse this file to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation during attack on targeted host. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-10 @@ -39,9 +41,9 @@ This analytic is to detect a possible access or modification of /etc/sudoers fil | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1548.003](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003/) | Sudo and Sudo Caching | Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1548.003](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003/) | Sudo and Sudo Caching | Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1548](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1548](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -84,7 +86,7 @@ administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the fi #### Kill Chain Phase -* Privilege Escalation +* Exploitation @@ -95,8 +97,6 @@ administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the fi | 25.0 | 50 | 50 | A commandline $process$ executed on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.008/copy_file_stdoutpipe/sysmon_linux.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.008/copy_file_stdoutpipe/sysmon_linux.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-11-linux_possible_access_or_modification_of_sshd_config_file.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-11-linux_possible_access_or_modification_of_sshd_config_file.md index 6c5e71d0a5..2b2f847db4 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-11-linux_possible_access_or_modification_of_sshd_config_file.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-11-linux_possible_access_or_modification_of_sshd_config_file.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File" -excerpt: "SSH Authorized Keys, Account Manipulation" +excerpt: "SSH Authorized Keys +, Account Manipulation +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-11 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - SSH Authorized Keys - - Persistence - Account Manipulation - Persistence + - Persistence - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This analytic is to look for suspicious process command-line that might be accessing or modifying sshd_config. This file is the ssh configuration file that might be modify by threat actors or adversaries to redirect port connection, allow user using authorized key generated during attack. This anomaly detection might catch noise from administrator auditing or modifying ssh configuration file. In this scenario filter is needed -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-11 @@ -82,7 +84,7 @@ Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purpos #### Kill Chain Phase -* Privilege Escalation +* Exploitation @@ -93,8 +95,6 @@ Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purpos | 25.0 | 50 | 50 | a commandline $process$ executed on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098.004/ssh_authorized_keys/sysmon_linux.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098.004/ssh_authorized_keys/sysmon_linux.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-11-linux_possible_ssh_key_file_creation.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-11-linux_possible_ssh_key_file_creation.md index 6bcf9ae8f2..cf6db26ecc 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-11-linux_possible_ssh_key_file_creation.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-11-linux_possible_ssh_key_file_creation.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation" -excerpt: "SSH Authorized Keys, Account Manipulation" +excerpt: "SSH Authorized Keys +, Account Manipulation +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-11 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - SSH Authorized Keys - - Persistence - Account Manipulation - Persistence + - Persistence - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This analytic is to look for possible ssh key file creation on ~/.ssh/ folder. This technique is commonly abused by threat actors and adversaries to gain persistence and privilege escalation to the targeted host. by creating ssh private and public key and passing the public key to the attacker server. threat actor can access remotely the machine using openssh daemon service. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-11 @@ -80,7 +82,7 @@ Administrator or network operator can create file in ~/.ssh folders for automati #### Kill Chain Phase -* Privilege Escalation +* Exploitation @@ -91,8 +93,6 @@ Administrator or network operator can create file in ~/.ssh folders for automati | 36.0 | 60 | 60 | A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098.004/ssh_authorized_keys/sysmon_linux.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098.004/ssh_authorized_keys/sysmon_linux.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-12-powershell_-_connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-12-powershell_-_connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.md index 24d8c4ed20..721e534fff 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-12-powershell_-_connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-12-powershell_-_connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window" -excerpt: "PowerShell, Command and Scripting Interpreter" +excerpt: "PowerShell +, Command and Scripting Interpreter +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-12 @@ -8,13 +10,12 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - PowerShell - - Execution - Command and Scripting Interpreter - Execution + - Execution - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - CVE-2021-44228 - Endpoint --- @@ -26,7 +27,7 @@ tags: The following hunting analytic identifies PowerShell commands utilizing the WindowStyle parameter to hide the window on the compromised endpoint. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it is overriding the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide its activity from the user, and connects to the Internet. Removed in this version of the query is New-Object. The analytic identifies all variations of WindowStyle, as PowerShell allows the ability to shorten the parameter. For example w, win, windowsty and so forth. In addition, through our research it was identified that PowerShell will interpret different command switch types beyond the hyphen. We have added endash, emdash, horizontal bar, and forward slash. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-12 @@ -52,17 +53,17 @@ The following hunting analytic identifies PowerShell commands utilizing the Wind | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,"(?i)[\- |\/ -|– -|— -|―]w(in*d*o*w*s*t*y*l*e*)*\s+[^-]") +| +| +|]w(in*d*o*w*s*t*y*l*e*)*\s+[^-]") | `powershell___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window_filter` ``` #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) Note that `powershell_-_connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -76,10 +77,10 @@ Note that `powershell_-_connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window_filter` is a empt #### How To Implement -You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. +You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. #### Known False Positives -Legitimate process can have this combination of command-line options, but it's not common. +Legitimate process can have this combination of command-line options, but it's not common. #### Associated Analytic story * [Malicious PowerShell](/stories/malicious_powershell) @@ -89,7 +90,7 @@ Legitimate process can have this combination of command-line options, but it' #### Kill Chain Phase -* Command and Control +* Command & Control * Actions on Objectives @@ -101,15 +102,6 @@ Legitimate process can have this combination of command-line options, but it' | 81.0 | 90 | 90 | PowerShell processes $process$ started with parameters to modify the execution policy of the run, run in a hidden window, and connect to the Internet on host $dest$ executed by user $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - - -#### CVE - -| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | -| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [CVE-2021-44228](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44228) | Apache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 (excluding security releases 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1) JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against attacker controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. An attacker who can control log messages or log message parameters can execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has been disabled by default. From version 2.16.0 (along with 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1), this functionality has been completely removed. Note that this vulnerability is specific to log4j-core and does not affect log4net, log4cxx, or other Apache Logging Services projects. | 9.3 | - #### Reference @@ -126,6 +118,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/hidden_powershell/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/hidden_powershell/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-12-windows_hunting_system_account_targeting_lsass.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-12-windows_hunting_system_account_targeting_lsass.md index 13cddd2ebb..395482d415 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-12-windows_hunting_system_account_targeting_lsass.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-12-windows_hunting_system_account_targeting_lsass.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass" -excerpt: "LSASS Memory, OS Credential Dumping" +excerpt: "LSASS Memory +, OS Credential Dumping +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-12 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - LSASS Memory - - Credential Access - OS Credential Dumping - Credential Access + - Credential Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -24,7 +26,7 @@ tags: The following hunting analytic identifies all processes requesting access into Lsass.exe. his behavior may be related to credential dumping or applications requiring access to credentials. Triaging this event will require understanding the GrantedAccess from the SourceImage. In addition, whether the account is privileged or not. Review the process requesting permissions and review parallel processes. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-12 @@ -53,8 +55,8 @@ The following hunting analytic identifies all processes requesting access into L #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `windows_hunting_system_account_targeting_lsass_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -91,8 +93,6 @@ False positives will occur based on GrantedAccess and SourceUser, filter based o | 64.0 | 80 | 80 | A process, $SourceImage$, has loaded $ImageLoaded$ that are typically related to credential dumping on $dest$. Review for further details. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_creddump.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_creddump.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-12-windows_non-system_account_targeting_lsass.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-12-windows_non-system_account_targeting_lsass.md index a559fea6bd..71d0caa538 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-12-windows_non-system_account_targeting_lsass.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-12-windows_non-system_account_targeting_lsass.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass" -excerpt: "LSASS Memory, OS Credential Dumping" +excerpt: "LSASS Memory +, OS Credential Dumping +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-12 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - LSASS Memory - - Credential Access - OS Credential Dumping - Credential Access + - Credential Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -24,7 +26,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies non SYSTEM accounts requesting access to lsass.exe. This behavior may be related to credential dumping or applications requiring access to credentials. Triaging this event will require understanding the GrantedAccess from the SourceImage. In addition, whether the account is privileged or not. Review the process requesting permissions and review parallel processes. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-12 @@ -53,8 +55,8 @@ The following analytic identifies non SYSTEM accounts requesting access to lsass #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `windows_non-system_account_targeting_lsass_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -91,8 +93,6 @@ False positives will occur based on legitimate application requests, filter base | 64.0 | 80 | 80 | A process, $SourceImage$, has loaded $ImageLoaded$ that are typically related to credential dumping on $dest$. Review for further details. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_creddump.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_creddump.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-14-potentially_malicious_code_on_commandline.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-14-potentially_malicious_code_on_commandline.md index 0bc4821944..e9c0e77980 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-14-potentially_malicious_code_on_commandline.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-14-potentially_malicious_code_on_commandline.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Potentially malicious code on commandline" -excerpt: "Windows Command Shell" +excerpt: "Windows Command Shell +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-14 @@ -21,9 +22,9 @@ tags: #### Description -The following analytic uses a pretrained machine learning text classifier to detect potentially malicious commandlines. The model identifies unusual combinations of keywords found in samples of commandlines where adversaries executed powershell code, primarily for C2 communication. For example, adversaries will leverage IO capabilities such as "streamreader" and "webclient", threading capabilties such as "mutex" locks, programmatic constructs like "function" and "catch", and cryptographic operations like "computehash". Although observing one of these keywords in a commandline script is possible, combinations of keywords observed in attack data are not typically found in normal usage of the commandline. The model will output a score where all values above zero are suspicious, anything greater than one particularly so. +The following analytic uses a pretrained machine learning text classifier to detect potentially malicious commandlines. The model identifies unusual combinations of keywords found in samples of commandlines where adversaries executed powershell code, primarily for C2 communication. For example, adversaries will leverage IO capabilities such as "streamreader" and "webclient", threading capabilties such as "mutex" locks, programmatic constructs like "function" and "catch", and cryptographic operations like "computehash". Although observing one of these keywords in a commandline script is possible, combinations of keywords observed in attack data are not typically found in normal usage of the commandline. The model will output a score where all values above zero are suspicious, anything greater than one particularly so. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-14 @@ -94,8 +95,6 @@ This model is an anomaly detector that identifies usage of APIs and scripting co | 12.0 | 60 | 20 | Unusual command-line execution with hallmarks of malicious activity run by $user$ found on $dest$ with commandline $process$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -109,6 +108,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/malicious_cmd_line_samples/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/malicious_cmd_line_samples/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter.md index ac2493263c..580dc06d81 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter" -excerpt: "Windows Command Shell, Command and Scripting Interpreter" +excerpt: "Windows Command Shell +, Command and Scripting Interpreter +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-18 @@ -8,13 +10,12 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Windows Command Shell - - Execution - Command and Scripting Interpreter - Execution + - Execution - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - CVE-2021-44228 - Endpoint --- @@ -26,7 +27,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies command-line arguments where `cmd.exe /c` is used to execute a program. `cmd /c` is used to run commands in MS-DOS and terminate after command or process completion. This technique is commonly seen in adversaries and malware to execute batch command using different shell like PowerShell or different process other than `cmd.exe`. This is a good hunting query for suspicious command-line made by a script or relative process execute it. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-18 @@ -55,9 +56,9 @@ The following analytic identifies command-line arguments where `cmd.exe /c` is u #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) Note that `cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -99,15 +100,6 @@ False positives may be high based on legitimate scripted code in any environment | 30.0 | 60 | 50 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting spawn a new process. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - - -#### CVE - -| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | -| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [CVE-2021-44228](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44228) | Apache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 (excluding security releases 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1) JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against attacker controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. An attacker who can control log messages or log message parameters can execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has been disabled by default. From version 2.16.0 (along with 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1), this functionality has been completely removed. Note that this vulnerability is specific to log4j-core and does not affect log4net, log4cxx, or other Apache Logging Services projects. | 9.3 | - #### Reference @@ -121,6 +113,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/cmd_carry_str_param/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/cmd_carry_str_param/sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters.md index 50250df870..aec9a1a50e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters.md @@ -1,6 +1,11 @@ --- title: "Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters" -excerpt: "Remote Services, SMB/Windows Admin Shares, Distributed Component Object Model, Windows Management Instrumentation, Windows Service" +excerpt: "Remote Services +, SMB/Windows Admin Shares +, Distributed Component Object Model +, Windows Management Instrumentation +, Windows Service +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-18 @@ -8,14 +13,14 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Remote Services - - Lateral Movement - SMB/Windows Admin Shares - - Lateral Movement - Distributed Component Object Model - - Lateral Movement - Windows Management Instrumentation - - Execution - Windows Service + - Lateral Movement + - Lateral Movement + - Lateral Movement + - Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise @@ -32,7 +37,7 @@ tags: This analytic looks for the presence of suspicious commandline parameters typically present when using Impacket tools. Impacket is a collection of python classes meant to be used with Microsoft network protocols. There are multiple scripts that leverage impacket libraries like `wmiexec.py`, `smbexec.py`, `dcomexec.py` and `atexec.py` used to execute commands on remote endpoints. By default, these scripts leverage administrative shares and hardcoded parameters that can be used as a signature to detect its use. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage Impackets tools for lateral movement and remote code execution. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-18 @@ -99,7 +104,7 @@ Although uncommon, Administrators may leverage Impackets tools to start a proces #### Kill Chain Phase -* Lateral Movement +* Exploitation @@ -110,8 +115,6 @@ Although uncommon, Administrators may leverage Impackets tools to start a proces | 63.0 | 90 | 70 | Suspicious command line parameters on $dest may represent a lateral movement attack with Impackets tools | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -131,6 +134,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.003/impacket/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.003/impacket/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-malicious_powershell_process_-_encoded_command.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-malicious_powershell_process_-_encoded_command.md index 77aa316328..8db19fbff4 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-malicious_powershell_process_-_encoded_command.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-malicious_powershell_process_-_encoded_command.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command" -excerpt: "Obfuscated Files or Information" +excerpt: "Obfuscated Files or Information +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-18 @@ -26,7 +27,7 @@ The analytic identifies all variations of EncodedCommand, as PowerShell allows t During triage, review parallel events to determine legitimacy. Tune as needed based on admin scripts in use. \ Alternatively, may use regex per matching here https://regexr.com/662ov. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-18 @@ -50,17 +51,17 @@ Alternatively, may use regex per matching here https://regexr.com/662ov. | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,"(?i)[\- |\/ -|– -|— -|―]e(nc*o*d*e*d*c*o*m*m*a*n*d*)*\s+[^-]") +| +| +|]e(nc*o*d*e*d*c*o*m*m*a*n*d*)*\s+[^-]") | `malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command_filter` ``` #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) Note that `malicious_powershell_process_-_encoded_command_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -78,7 +79,7 @@ Note that `malicious_powershell_process_-_encoded_command_filter` is a empty mac To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. #### Known False Positives -System administrators may use this option, but it's not common. +System administrators may use this option, but it's not common. #### Associated Analytic story * [Malicious PowerShell](/stories/malicious_powershell) @@ -87,7 +88,7 @@ System administrators may use this option, but it's not common. #### Kill Chain Phase -* Command and Control +* Command & Control * Actions on Objectives @@ -99,8 +100,6 @@ System administrators may use this option, but it's not common. | 35.0 | 70 | 50 | Powershell.exe running potentially malicious encodede commands on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -117,6 +116,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1027/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1027/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-powershell_remove_windows_defender_directory.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-powershell_remove_windows_defender_directory.md index c1249945ff..ea6575e34e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-powershell_remove_windows_defender_directory.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-powershell_remove_windows_defender_directory.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Powershell Remove Windows Defender Directory" -excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools, Impair Defenses" +excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools +, Impair Defenses +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-18 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Disable or Modify Tools - - Defense Evasion - Impair Defenses - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This analytic will identify a suspicious PowerShell command used to delete the Windows Defender folder. This technique was seen used by the WhisperGate malware campaign where it used Nirsofts advancedrun.exe to gain administrative privileges to then execute a PowerShell command to delete the Windows Defender folder. This is a good indicator the offending process is trying corrupt a Windows Defender installation. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-18 @@ -88,8 +90,6 @@ unknown | 90.0 | 100 | 90 | suspicious powershell script $Message$ was executed on the $ComputerName$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/rmdir_defender_pwsh/powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/rmdir_defender_pwsh/powershell.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services.md index 69982e4121..a1c84efffe 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services" -excerpt: "Visual Basic, Command and Scripting Interpreter" +excerpt: "Visual Basic +, Command and Scripting Interpreter +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-18 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Visual Basic - - Execution - Command and Scripting Interpreter - Execution + - Execution - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This analytic detects a suspicious process making a DNS query via known, abused text-paste web services, VoIP, instant messaging, and digital distribution platforms used to download external files. This technique is abused by adversaries, malware actors, and red teams to download a malicious file on the target host. This is a good TTP indicator for possible initial access techniques. A user will experience false positives if the following instant messaging is allowed or common applications like telegram or discord are allowed in the corporate network. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-18 @@ -53,8 +55,8 @@ This analytic detects a suspicious process making a DNS query via known, abused #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -91,8 +93,6 @@ Noise and false positive can be seen if the following instant messaging is allow | 64.0 | 80 | 80 | suspicious process $process_name$ has a dns query in $QueryName$ on $Computer$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_pastebin_download/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_pastebin_download/sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-19-suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-19-suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query.md index 2f3c7b3e7a..54ae0b2a89 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-19-suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-19-suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query" -excerpt: "Visual Basic, Command and Scripting Interpreter" +excerpt: "Visual Basic +, Command and Scripting Interpreter +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-19 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Visual Basic - - Execution - Command and Scripting Interpreter - Execution + - Execution - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This analytic identifies a process making a DNS query to Discord, a well known instant messaging and digital distribution platform. Discord can be abused by adversaries, as seen in the WhisperGate campaign, to host and download malicious. external files. A process resolving a Discord DNS name could be an indicator of malware trying to download files from Discord for further execution. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-19 @@ -53,8 +55,8 @@ This analytic identifies a process making a DNS query to Discord, a well known i #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -91,8 +93,6 @@ Noise and false positive can be seen if the following instant messaging is allow | 64.0 | 80 | 80 | suspicious process $process_name$ has a dns query in $QueryName$ on $Computer$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/discord_dnsquery/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/discord_dnsquery/sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-19-windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-19-windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path.md index c6d6de98c3..c508733ada 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-19-windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-19-windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path.md @@ -1,6 +1,10 @@ --- title: "Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path" -excerpt: "Masquerading, Rename System Utilities, Signed Binary Proxy Execution, InstallUtil" +excerpt: "Masquerading +, Rename System Utilities +, Signed Binary Proxy Execution +, InstallUtil +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-19 @@ -8,13 +12,13 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Masquerading - - Defense Evasion - Rename System Utilities - - Defense Evasion - Signed Binary Proxy Execution - - Defense Evasion - InstallUtil - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -29,7 +33,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies native .net binaries within the Windows operating system that may be abused by adversaries by moving it to a new directory. The analytic identifies the .net binary by using a lookup and compares the process name and original file name (internal name). The analytic utilizes a lookup with the is_net_windows_file macro to identify the binary process name and original file name. if one or the other matches an alert will be generated. Adversaries abuse these binaries as they are native to windows and native DotNet. Note that not all SDK (post install of Windows) are captured in the lookup. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-19 @@ -63,18 +67,12 @@ The following analytic identifies native .net binaries within the Windows operat #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [is_net_windows_file](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/is_net_windows_file.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [is_net_windows_file](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/is_net_windows_file.yml) Note that `windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. -#### Lookups -The SPL above uses the following Lookups: - -* [is_net_windows_file](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/is_net_windows_file.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/is_net_windows_file.csv) -* [is_net_windows_file](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/is_net_windows_file.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/is_net_windows_file.csv) - #### Required field * _time * Processes.dest @@ -116,8 +114,6 @@ False positives may be present and filtering may be required. Certain utilities | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ from a non-standard path was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -133,6 +129,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_installutil_path.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_installutil_path.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-19-windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-19-windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path.md index d087f2627b..9f8b7fb9c5 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-19-windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-19-windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path.md @@ -1,6 +1,10 @@ --- title: "Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path" -excerpt: "Masquerading, Rename System Utilities, Signed Binary Proxy Execution, InstallUtil" +excerpt: "Masquerading +, Rename System Utilities +, Signed Binary Proxy Execution +, InstallUtil +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-19 @@ -8,13 +12,13 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Masquerading - - Defense Evasion - Rename System Utilities - - Defense Evasion - Signed Binary Proxy Execution - - Defense Evasion - InstallUtil - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -29,7 +33,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies the Windows binary InstallUtil.exe running from a non-standard location. The analytic utilizes a macro for InstallUtil and identifies both the process_name and original_file_name. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-19 @@ -63,8 +67,8 @@ The following analytic identifies the Windows binary InstallUtil.exe running fro #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [process_installutil](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_installutil.yml) -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -109,8 +113,6 @@ False positives may be present and filtering may be required. Certain utilities | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ from a non-standard path was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -126,6 +128,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_installutil_path.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_installutil_path.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-20-excessive_file_deletion_in_windefender_folder.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-20-excessive_file_deletion_in_windefender_folder.md index 3b440cbe14..391689f935 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-20-excessive_file_deletion_in_windefender_folder.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-20-excessive_file_deletion_in_windefender_folder.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Excessive File Deletion In WinDefender Folder" -excerpt: "Data Destruction" +excerpt: "Data Destruction +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-20 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This analytic will identify excessive file deletion events in the Windows Defender folder. This technique was seen in the WhisperGate malware campaign in which adversaries abused Nirsofts advancedrun.exe to gain administrative privilege to then execute PowerShell commands to delete files within the Windows Defender application folder. This behavior is a good indicator the offending process is trying to corrupt a Windows Defender installation. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-20 @@ -50,8 +51,8 @@ This analytic will identify excessive file deletion events in the Windows Defend #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `excessive_file_deletion_in_windefender_folder_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -87,8 +88,6 @@ Windows Defender AV updates may cause this alert. Please update the filter macro | 25.0 | 50 | 50 | High frequency file deletion activity detected on host $Computer$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -101,6 +100,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/excessive_file_del_in_windefender_dir/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/excessive_file_del_in_windefender_dir/sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-20-ping_sleep_batch_command.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-20-ping_sleep_batch_command.md index 0f1c56ccbc..f410494080 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-20-ping_sleep_batch_command.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-20-ping_sleep_batch_command.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Ping Sleep Batch Command" -excerpt: "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion, Time Based Evasion" +excerpt: "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion +, Time Based Evasion +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-20 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion + - Time Based Evasion - Defense Evasion - Discovery - - Time Based Evasion - Defense Evasion - Discovery - Splunk Enterprise @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ tags: This analytic will identify the possible execution of ping sleep batch commands. This technique was seen in several malware samples and is used to trigger sleep times without explicitly calling sleep functions or commandlets. The goal is to delay the execution of malicious code and bypass detection or sandbox analysis. This detection can be a good indicator of a process delaying its execution for malicious purposes. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-20 @@ -56,9 +58,9 @@ This analytic will identify the possible execution of ping sleep batch commands. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_ping](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_ping.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_ping](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_ping.yml) Note that `ping_sleep_batch_command_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -99,8 +101,6 @@ Administrator or network operator may execute this command. Please update the fi | 36.0 | 60 | 60 | suspicious $process$ commandline run in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1497.003/ping_sleep/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1497.003/ping_sleep/sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-21-windows_nirsoft_advancedrun.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-21-windows_nirsoft_advancedrun.md index 54cc011861..7578830a45 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-21-windows_nirsoft_advancedrun.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-21-windows_nirsoft_advancedrun.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun" -excerpt: "Tool" +excerpt: "Tool +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-21 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies the use of AdvancedRun.exe. AdvancedRun.exe has similar capabilities as other remote programs like psexec. AdvancedRun may also ingest a configuration file with all settings defined and perform its activity. The analytic is written in a way to identify a renamed binary and also the common command-line arguments. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-21 @@ -94,8 +95,6 @@ False positives should be limited as it is specific to AdvancedRun. Filter as ne | 60.0 | 60 | 100 | An instance of advancedrun.exe, $process_name$, was spawned by $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -109,6 +108,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1588.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1588.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-24-windows_nirsoft_utilities.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-24-windows_nirsoft_utilities.md index f2892c1250..7e59e7ef04 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-24-windows_nirsoft_utilities.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-24-windows_nirsoft_utilities.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Windows NirSoft Utilities" -excerpt: "Tool" +excerpt: "Tool +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-24 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: The following hunting analytic assists with identifying the proces execution of commonly used utilities from NirSoft. Potentially not adversary behavior, but worth identifying to know if the software is present and being used. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-24 @@ -51,17 +52,12 @@ The following hunting analytic assists with identifying the proces execution of #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [is_nirsoft_software](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/is_nirsoft_software.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [is_nirsoft_software](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/is_nirsoft_software.yml) Note that `windows_nirsoft_utilities_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. -#### Lookups -The SPL above uses the following Lookups: - -* [is_nirsoft_software](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/is_nirsoft_software.yml) with [data](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/lookups/is_nirsoft_software.csv) - #### Required field * _time * Processes.dest @@ -99,8 +95,6 @@ False positives may be present. Filtering may be required before setting to aler | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ related to NiRSoft software usage. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -115,6 +109,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1588.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1588.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-active_setup_registry_autostart.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-active_setup_registry_autostart.md index bf1875433b..29bc51b67a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-active_setup_registry_autostart.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-active_setup_registry_autostart.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Active Setup Registry Autostart" -excerpt: "Active Setup, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution" +excerpt: "Active Setup +, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-26 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Active Setup + - Boot or Logon Autostart Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Boot or Logon Autostart Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ tags: This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of the active setup registry for persistence and privilege escalation. This technique was seen in several malware (poisonIvy), adware and APT to gain persistence to the compromised machine upon boot up. This TTP is a good indicator to further check the process id that do the modification since modification of this registry is not commonly done. check the legitimacy of the file and process involve in this rules to check if it is a valid setup installer that creating or modifying this registry. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-26 @@ -97,8 +99,6 @@ Active setup installer may add or modify this registry. | 64.0 | 80 | 80 | modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/t1547.014/active_setup_stubpath/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/t1547.014/active_setup_stubpath/sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-add_defaultuser_and_password_in_registry.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-add_defaultuser_and_password_in_registry.md index a636171be5..bdd3dd1a71 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-add_defaultuser_and_password_in_registry.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-add_defaultuser_and_password_in_registry.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Add DefaultUser And Password In Registry" -excerpt: "Credentials in Registry, Unsecured Credentials" +excerpt: "Credentials in Registry +, Unsecured Credentials +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-26 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Credentials in Registry - - Credential Access - Unsecured Credentials - Credential Access + - Credential Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: this search is to detect a suspicious registry modification to implement auto admin logon to a host. This technique was seen in BlackMatter ransomware to automatically logon to the compromise host after triggering a safemode boot to continue encrypting the whole network. This behavior is not a common practice and really a suspicious TTP or alert need to be consider if found within then network premise. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-26 @@ -93,8 +95,6 @@ unknown | 25.0 | 50 | 50 | modified registry key $registry_key_name$ with registry value $registry_value_name$ to prepare autoadminlogon | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1552.002/autoadminlogon/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1552.002/autoadminlogon/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-allow_inbound_traffic_by_firewall_rule_registry.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-allow_inbound_traffic_by_firewall_rule_registry.md index da2dc82e98..f0880828e2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-allow_inbound_traffic_by_firewall_rule_registry.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-allow_inbound_traffic_by_firewall_rule_registry.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry" -excerpt: "Remote Desktop Protocol, Remote Services" +excerpt: "Remote Desktop Protocol +, Remote Services +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-26 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Remote Desktop Protocol - - Lateral Movement - Remote Services - Lateral Movement + - Lateral Movement - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This analytic detects a potential suspicious modification of firewall rule registry allowing inbound traffic in specific port with public profile. This technique was identified when an adversary wants to grant remote access to a machine by allowing the traffic in a firewall rule. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-26 @@ -101,8 +103,6 @@ network admin may add/remove/modify public inbound firewall rule that may cause | 3.0 | 10 | 30 | Suspicious firewall modifications were detected via the registry on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/casper/datasets1/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/casper/datasets1/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-allow_operation_with_consent_admin.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-allow_operation_with_consent_admin.md index f0d97fc718..323fe8608c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-allow_operation_with_consent_admin.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-allow_operation_with_consent_admin.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Allow Operation with Consent Admin" -excerpt: "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism" +excerpt: "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-26 @@ -8,8 +9,8 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism - - Privilege Escalation - Defense Evasion + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -24,7 +25,7 @@ tags: This analytic identifies a potential privilege escalation attempt to perform malicious task. This registry modification is designed to allow the `Consent Admin` to perform an operation that requires elevation without consent or credentials. We also found this in some attacker to gain privilege escalation to the compromise machine. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-26 @@ -36,7 +37,7 @@ This analytic identifies a potential privilege escalation attempt to perform mal | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1548](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1548](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -90,8 +91,6 @@ unknown | 25.0 | 50 | 50 | Suspicious registry modification was performed on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior is indicative of privilege escalation. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -105,6 +104,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-disable_amsi_through_registry.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-disable_amsi_through_registry.md index cdcbed47d0..3803838b99 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-disable_amsi_through_registry.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-disable_amsi_through_registry.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Disable AMSI Through Registry" -excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools, Impair Defenses" +excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools +, Impair Defenses +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-26 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Disable or Modify Tools - - Defense Evasion - Impair Defenses - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: this search is to identify modification in registry to disable AMSI windows feature to evade detections. This technique was seen in several ransomware, RAT and even APT to impaire defenses of the compromise machine and to be able to execute payload with minimal alert as much as possible. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-26 @@ -87,8 +89,12 @@ network operator may disable this feature of windows but not so common. +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | Disable AMSI Through Registry | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -103,6 +109,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-disable_defender_antivirus_registry.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-disable_defender_antivirus_registry.md index 9b8e7ed29a..b72fb0df6d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-disable_defender_antivirus_registry.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-disable_defender_antivirus_registry.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Disable Defender AntiVirus Registry" -excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools, Impair Defenses" +excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools +, Impair Defenses +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-26 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Disable or Modify Tools - - Defense Evasion - Impair Defenses - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This particular behavior is typically executed when an adversaries or malware gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution and to evade detections. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. Endpoint should be isolated. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-26 @@ -95,8 +97,6 @@ admin or user may choose to disable windows defender product | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-disable_defender_blockatfirstseen_feature.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-disable_defender_blockatfirstseen_feature.md index e8d4c467b3..bf97ccdc3d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-disable_defender_blockatfirstseen_feature.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-disable_defender_blockatfirstseen_feature.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Disable Defender BlockAtFirstSeen Feature" -excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools, Impair Defenses" +excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools +, Impair Defenses +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-26 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Disable or Modify Tools - - Defense Evasion - Impair Defenses - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable windows defender feature. This technique is to bypassed or evade detection from Windows Defender AV product specially the BlockAtFirstSeen feature where it block suspicious file first seen in the host. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-26 @@ -95,8 +97,6 @@ admin or user may choose to disable windows defender product | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-disable_defender_enhanced_notification.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-disable_defender_enhanced_notification.md index e0b4a40c50..bdcd4f074c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-disable_defender_enhanced_notification.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-disable_defender_enhanced_notification.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Disable Defender Enhanced Notification" -excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools, Impair Defenses" +excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools +, Impair Defenses +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-26 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Disable or Modify Tools - - Defense Evasion - Impair Defenses - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable windows defender feature. This technique is to bypassed or evade detection from Windows Defender AV product specially the Enhanced Notification feature wher user or admin set to show or display alerts. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-26 @@ -95,8 +97,6 @@ user may choose to disable windows defender AV | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-disable_defender_mpengine_registry.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-disable_defender_mpengine_registry.md index 80e4228df7..13e153f6dc 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-disable_defender_mpengine_registry.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-disable_defender_mpengine_registry.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Disable Defender MpEngine Registry" -excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools, Impair Defenses" +excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools +, Impair Defenses +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-26 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Disable or Modify Tools - - Defense Evasion - Impair Defenses - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This particular behavior is typically executed when an adversaries or malware gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution and to evade detections. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. Endpoint should be isolated. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-26 @@ -95,8 +97,6 @@ admin or user may choose to disable windows defender product | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-disable_defender_spynet_reporting.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-disable_defender_spynet_reporting.md index 9cf104cbad..c3fd06f580 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-disable_defender_spynet_reporting.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-disable_defender_spynet_reporting.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Disable Defender Spynet Reporting" -excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools, Impair Defenses" +excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools +, Impair Defenses +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-26 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Disable or Modify Tools - - Defense Evasion - Impair Defenses - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable windows defender feature. This technique is to bypassed or evade detection from Windows Defender AV product specially the spynet reporting for its telemetry. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-26 @@ -95,8 +97,6 @@ admin or user may choose to disable windows defender product | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-disable_defender_submit_samples_consent_feature.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-disable_defender_submit_samples_consent_feature.md index be48656b1f..fc01e39849 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-disable_defender_submit_samples_consent_feature.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-disable_defender_submit_samples_consent_feature.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Disable Defender Submit Samples Consent Feature" -excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools, Impair Defenses" +excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools +, Impair Defenses +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-26 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Disable or Modify Tools - - Defense Evasion - Impair Defenses - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: his analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable windows defender feature. This technique is to bypassed or evade detection from Windows Defender AV product specially the submit samples feature for further analysis.. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-26 @@ -95,8 +97,6 @@ admin or user may choose to disable windows defender product | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-log4shell_cve-2021-44228_exploitation.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-log4shell_cve-2021-44228_exploitation.md index 3aed3f053a..e75581d04b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-log4shell_cve-2021-44228_exploitation.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-log4shell_cve-2021-44228_exploitation.md @@ -1,6 +1,9 @@ --- title: "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 Exploitation" -excerpt: "Ingress Tool Transfer, Exploit Public-Facing Application, Command and Scripting Interpreter" +excerpt: "Ingress Tool Transfer +, Exploit Public-Facing Application +, Command and Scripting Interpreter +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-26 @@ -8,10 +11,10 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Ingress Tool Transfer - - Command And Control - Exploit Public-Facing Application - - Initial Access - Command and Scripting Interpreter + - Command And Control + - Initial Access - Execution - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security @@ -25,9 +28,9 @@ tags: #### Description -This correlation find exploitation of Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 against systems using detections from Splunk Security Content Analytic Story. It does this by calculating the distinct count of MITRE ATT&CK tactics from Log4Shell detections fired. If the count is larger than 2 or more distinct MITRE ATT&CK tactics we assume high problability of exploitation. The Analytic story breaks down into 3 major phases of a Log4Shell exploitation, specifically 1. Initial Payload delivery eg. `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}` 2. Call back to malicious LDAP server eg. Exploit.class 3. Post Exploitation Activity/Lateral Movement using Powershell or similar T1562.001 Each of these phases fall into different MITRE ATT&CK Tactics (Initial Access, Execution, Command and Control), by looking into 2 or more phases showing up in detections triggerd is how this correlation search finds exploitation. If we get a notable from this correlation search the best way to triage it is by investigating the affected systems against Log4Shell exploitation using Splunk SOAR playbooks. +This correlation find exploitation of Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 against systems using detections from Splunk Security Content Analytic Story. It does this by calculating the distinct count of MITRE ATT&CK tactics from Log4Shell detections fired. If the count is larger than 2 or more distinct MITRE ATT&CK tactics we assume high problability of exploitation. The Analytic story breaks down into 3 major phases of a Log4Shell exploitation, specifically 1. Initial Payload delivery eg. `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}` 2. Call back to malicious LDAP server eg. Exploit.class 3. Post Exploitation Activity/Lateral Movement using Powershell or similar T1562.001 Each of these phases fall into different MITRE ATT&CK Tactics (Initial Access, Execution, Command and Control), by looking into 2 or more phases showing up in detections triggerd is how this correlation search finds exploitation. If we get a notable from this correlation search the best way to triage it is by investigating the affected systems against Log4Shell exploitation using Splunk SOAR playbooks. -- **Type**: [Correlation](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Correlation](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Risk](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Risk) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-26 @@ -75,7 +78,7 @@ Note that `log4shell_cve-2021-44228_exploitation_filter` is a empty macro by def #### How To Implement -To implement this correlation search a user needs to enable all detections in the Log4Shell Analytic Story and confirm it is generation risk events. A simple search `index=risk analyticstories="Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"` should contain events. +To implement this correlation search a user needs to enable all detections in the Log4Shell Analytic Story and confirm it is generation risk events. A simple search `index=risk analyticstories="Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"` should contain events. #### Known False Positives There are no known false positive for this search, but it could contain false positives as multiple detections can trigger and not have successful exploitation. @@ -87,7 +90,6 @@ There are no known false positive for this search, but it could contain false po #### Kill Chain Phase * Reconnaissance * Exploitation -* Lateral Movement @@ -98,8 +100,6 @@ There are no known false positive for this search, but it could contain false po | 63.0 | 90 | 70 | Log4Shell Exploitation detected against $affected_systems$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/log4shell_exploitation/log4shell_correlation.txt](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/log4shell_exploitation/log4shell_correlation.txt) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-registry_keys_used_for_persistence.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-registry_keys_used_for_persistence.md index b6108205f5..f26e69d23f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-registry_keys_used_for_persistence.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-registry_keys_used_for_persistence.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Registry Keys Used For Persistence" -excerpt: "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution" +excerpt: "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder +, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-26 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder + - Boot or Logon Autostart Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Boot or Logon Autostart Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ tags: The search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to launch an application or service at system startup. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-26 @@ -103,8 +105,6 @@ There are many legitimate applications that must execute on system startup and w | 76.0 | 80 | 95 | A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to persistence in host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) * [https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/atomic_red_team/t1547001-runonce.log](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/atomic_red_team/t1547001-runonce.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.md index 390580e235..982ffd0dab 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation" -excerpt: "Image File Execution Options Injection, Event Triggered Execution" +excerpt: "Image File Execution Options Injection +, Event Triggered Execution +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-26 @@ -8,11 +10,11 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Image File Execution Options Injection - - Privilege Escalation - - Persistence - Event Triggered Execution + - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -24,9 +26,9 @@ tags: #### Description -This search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to elevate privileges. The registry keys under "Image File Execution Options" are used to intercept calls to an executable and can be used to attach malicious binaries to benign system binaries. +This search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to elevate privileges. The registry keys under "Image File Execution Options" are used to intercept calls to an executable and can be used to attach malicious binaries to benign system binaries. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-26 @@ -38,9 +40,9 @@ This search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to elevate | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1546.012](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/012/) | Image File Execution Options Injection | Privilege Escalation, Persistence | +| [T1546.012](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/012/) | Image File Execution Options Injection | Persistence, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1546](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/) | Event Triggered Execution | Privilege Escalation, Persistence | +| [T1546](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/) | Event Triggered Execution | Persistence, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -96,8 +98,6 @@ There are many legitimate applications that must execute upon system startup and | 76.0 | 80 | 95 | A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to privilege escalation in host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.012/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.012/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-remcos_client_registry_install_entry.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-remcos_client_registry_install_entry.md index ebba1879a8..9b48ba6478 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-remcos_client_registry_install_entry.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-remcos_client_registry_install_entry.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Remcos client registry install entry" -excerpt: "Modify Registry" +excerpt: "Modify Registry +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-26 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This search detects registry key license at host where Remcos RAT agent is installed. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-26 @@ -90,8 +91,6 @@ unknown | 90.0 | 90 | 100 | A registry entry $registry_path$ with registry keyname $registry_key_name$ related to Remcos RAT in host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -104,6 +103,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_panel_client/remcos_registry_entry.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_panel_client/remcos_registry_entry.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-start_up_during_safe_mode_boot.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-start_up_during_safe_mode_boot.md index 9398b4fa95..dcd990ae24 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-start_up_during_safe_mode_boot.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-start_up_during_safe_mode_boot.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Start Up During Safe Mode Boot" -excerpt: "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution" +excerpt: "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder +, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-26 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder + - Boot or Logon Autostart Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Boot or Logon Autostart Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ tags: This search is to detect a modification or registry add to the safeboot registry as an autostart mechanism. This technique was seen in some ransomware to automatically execute its code upon a safe mode boot. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-26 @@ -95,8 +97,6 @@ updated windows application needed in safe boot may used this registry | 42.0 | 60 | 70 | Safeboot registry $registry_path$ was added or modified with a new value $registry_value_name$ on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-time_provider_persistence_registry.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-time_provider_persistence_registry.md index 5058d02a31..ab6e8d3665 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-time_provider_persistence_registry.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-time_provider_persistence_registry.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Time Provider Persistence Registry" -excerpt: "Time Providers, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution" +excerpt: "Time Providers +, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-26 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Time Providers + - Boot or Logon Autostart Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Boot or Logon Autostart Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ tags: This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of time provider registry for persistence and autostart. This technique can allow the attacker to persist on the compromised host and autostart as soon as the machine boot up. This TTP can be a good indicator of suspicious behavior since this registry is not commonly modified by normal user or even an admin. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-26 @@ -97,8 +99,6 @@ unknown | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.003/timeprovider_reg/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.003/timeprovider_reg/sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-disable_etw_through_registry.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-disable_etw_through_registry.md index d6c9352ab5..a5aba1de55 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-disable_etw_through_registry.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-disable_etw_through_registry.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Disable ETW Through Registry" -excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools, Impair Defenses" +excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools +, Impair Defenses +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-27 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Disable or Modify Tools - - Defense Evasion - Impair Defenses - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: this search is to identify modification in registry to disable ETW windows feature to evade detections. This technique was seen in several ransomware, RAT and even APT to impaire defenses of the compromise machine and to be able to execute payload with minimal alert as much as possible. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-27 @@ -87,8 +89,12 @@ network operator may disable this feature of windows but not so common. +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | Disable ETW Through Registry | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` @@ -102,6 +108,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-disable_registry_tool.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-disable_registry_tool.md index a6e93d7800..925be726b2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-disable_registry_tool.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-disable_registry_tool.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Disable Registry Tool" -excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools, Impair Defenses" +excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools +, Impair Defenses +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-27 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Disable or Modify Tools - - Defense Evasion - Impair Defenses - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This search identifies modification of registry to disable the regedit or registry tools of the windows operating system. Since registry tool is a swiss knife in analyzing registry, malware such as RAT or trojan Spy disable this application to prevent the removal of their registry entry such as persistence, file less components and defense evasion. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-27 @@ -94,8 +96,6 @@ admin may disable this application for non technical user. | 40.0 | 40 | 100 | Disabled Registry Tools on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log) * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log) * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-disable_security_logs_using_minint_registry.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-disable_security_logs_using_minint_registry.md index 167db9fe4f..2b81c93906 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-disable_security_logs_using_minint_registry.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-disable_security_logs_using_minint_registry.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry" -excerpt: "Modify Registry" +excerpt: "Modify Registry +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-27 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This analytic is to detect a suspicious registry modification to disable security audit logs. This technique was shared by a researcher to disable Security logs of windows by adding this registry. The Windows will think it is WinPE and will not log any event to the Security Log -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-27 @@ -91,8 +92,6 @@ Unknown. | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -105,6 +104,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/minint_reg/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/minint_reg/sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-disable_show_hidden_files.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-disable_show_hidden_files.md index 5cf447c922..56644d2b93 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-disable_show_hidden_files.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-disable_show_hidden_files.md @@ -1,6 +1,10 @@ --- title: "Disable Show Hidden Files" -excerpt: "Hidden Files and Directories, Disable or Modify Tools, Hide Artifacts, Impair Defenses" +excerpt: "Hidden Files and Directories +, Disable or Modify Tools +, Hide Artifacts +, Impair Defenses +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-27 @@ -8,13 +12,13 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Hidden Files and Directories - - Defense Evasion - Disable or Modify Tools - - Defense Evasion - Hide Artifacts - - Defense Evasion - Impair Defenses - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -29,7 +33,7 @@ tags: The following analytic is to identify a modification in the Windows registry to prevent users from seeing all the files with hidden attributes. This event or techniques are known on some worm and trojan spy malware that will drop hidden files on the infected machine. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-27 @@ -99,11 +103,9 @@ unknown | Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| -| 40.0 | 40 | 100 | Disabled 'Show Hidden Files' on $dest$ | +| 40.0 | 40 | 100 | Disabled 'Show Hidden Files' on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -116,6 +118,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log) * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log) * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-disable_uac_remote_restriction.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-disable_uac_remote_restriction.md index 6c90d86a71..628dd18962 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-disable_uac_remote_restriction.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-disable_uac_remote_restriction.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Disable UAC Remote Restriction" -excerpt: "Bypass User Account Control, Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism" +excerpt: "Bypass User Account Control +, Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-27 @@ -8,11 +10,11 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Bypass User Account Control - - Privilege Escalation - - Defense Evasion - Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism + - Defense Evasion - Privilege Escalation - Defense Evasion + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ tags: This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable UAC remote restriction. This technique was well documented in Microsoft page where attacker may modify this registry value to bypassed UAC feature of windows host. This is a good indicator that some tries to bypassed UAC to suspicious process or gain privilege escalation. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-27 @@ -39,9 +41,9 @@ This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable UAC | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1548.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/) | Bypass User Account Control | Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1548.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/) | Bypass User Account Control | Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1548](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1548](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -98,8 +100,6 @@ admin may set this policy for non-critical machine. | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy/sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-disable_windows_app_hotkeys.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-disable_windows_app_hotkeys.md index 3f01672b0b..28965ebf82 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-disable_windows_app_hotkeys.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-disable_windows_app_hotkeys.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Disable Windows App Hotkeys" -excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools, Impair Defenses" +excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools +, Impair Defenses +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-27 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Disable or Modify Tools - - Defense Evasion - Impair Defenses - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This analytic detects a suspicious registry modification to disable Windows hotkey (shortcut keys) for native Windows applications. This technique is commonly used to disable certain or several Windows applications like `taskmgr.exe` and `cmd.exe`. This technique is used to impair the analyst in analyzing and removing the attacker implant in compromised systems. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-27 @@ -90,11 +92,9 @@ unknown | Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| -| 40.0 | 40 | 100 | Disabled 'Windows App Hotkeys' on $dest$ | +| 40.0 | 40 | 100 | Disabled 'Windows App Hotkeys' on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/hotkey_disabled_hidden_user/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/hotkey_disabled_hidden_user/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-disable_windows_behavior_monitoring.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-disable_windows_behavior_monitoring.md index f43a20aa48..42e42de255 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-disable_windows_behavior_monitoring.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-disable_windows_behavior_monitoring.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring" -excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools, Impair Defenses" +excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools +, Impair Defenses +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-27 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Disable or Modify Tools - - Defense Evasion - Impair Defenses - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This search is to identifies a modification in registry to disable the windows denfender real time behavior monitoring. This event or technique is commonly seen in RAT, bot, or Trojan to disable AV to evade detections. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-27 @@ -96,8 +98,6 @@ admin or user may choose to disable this windows features. | 40.0 | 40 | 100 | Windows Defender real time behavior monitoring disabled on $dest | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log) * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log) * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-disable_windows_smartscreen_protection.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-disable_windows_smartscreen_protection.md index ec9382e96e..c5dc5b04b5 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-disable_windows_smartscreen_protection.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-disable_windows_smartscreen_protection.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection" -excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools, Impair Defenses" +excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools +, Impair Defenses +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-27 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Disable or Modify Tools - - Defense Evasion - Impair Defenses - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: The following search identifies a modification of registry to disable the smartscreen protection of windows machine. This is windows feature provide an early warning system against website that might engage in phishing attack or malware distribution. This modification are seen in RAT malware to cover their tracks upon downloading other of its component or other payload. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-27 @@ -94,8 +96,6 @@ admin or user may choose to disable this windows features. | 25.0 | 50 | 50 | The Windows Smartscreen was disabled on $dest$ by $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log) * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log) * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-disabling_cmd_application.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-disabling_cmd_application.md index f9c5fb91cd..ba4034c9d3 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-disabling_cmd_application.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-disabling_cmd_application.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Disabling CMD Application" -excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools, Impair Defenses" +excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools +, Impair Defenses +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-27 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Disable or Modify Tools - - Defense Evasion - Impair Defenses - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: this search is to identify modification in registry to disable cmd prompt application. This technique is commonly seen in RAT, Trojan or WORM to prevent triaging or deleting there samples through cmd application which is one of the tool of analyst to traverse on directory and files. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-27 @@ -94,8 +96,6 @@ admin may disable this application for non technical user. | 25.0 | 50 | 50 | The Windows command prompt was disabled on $dest$ by $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log) * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log) * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-disabling_controlpanel.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-disabling_controlpanel.md index 09083edf53..8c03bb3591 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-disabling_controlpanel.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-disabling_controlpanel.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Disabling ControlPanel" -excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools, Impair Defenses" +excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools +, Impair Defenses +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-27 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Disable or Modify Tools - - Defense Evasion - Impair Defenses - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: this search is to identify registry modification to disable control panel window. This technique is commonly seen in malware to prevent their artifacts , persistence removed on the infected machine. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-27 @@ -94,8 +96,6 @@ admin may disable this application for non technical user. | 25.0 | 50 | 50 | The Windows Control Panel was disabled on $dest$ by $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log) * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log) * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-windows_possible_credential_dumping.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-windows_possible_credential_dumping.md index 99535d0a00..fe2aee7aeb 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-windows_possible_credential_dumping.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-windows_possible_credential_dumping.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Windows Possible Credential Dumping" -excerpt: "LSASS Memory, OS Credential Dumping" +excerpt: "LSASS Memory +, OS Credential Dumping +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-27 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - LSASS Memory - - Credential Access - OS Credential Dumping - Credential Access + - Credential Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -28,7 +30,7 @@ CallTrace Stack trace of where open process is called. Included is the DLL and t dbgcore.dll or dbghelp.dll are two core Windows debug DLLs that have minidump functions which provide a way for applications to produce crashdump files that contain a useful subset of the entire process context. \ The idea behind using ntdll.dll is to blend in by using native api of ntdll.dll. For example in sekurlsa module there are many ntdll exported api, like RtlCopyMemory, used to execute this module which is related to lsass dumping. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-27 @@ -57,8 +59,8 @@ The idea behind using ntdll.dll is to blend in by using native api of ntdll.dll. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `windows_possible_credential_dumping_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -97,8 +99,6 @@ False positives will occur based on GrantedAccess 0x1010 and 0x1400, filter base | 64.0 | 80 | 80 | A process, $SourceImage$, has loaded $ImageLoaded$ that are typically related to credential dumping on $dest$. Review for further details. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_creddump.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_creddump.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-28-disabling_defender_services.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-28-disabling_defender_services.md index 734a7fedfc..487cf9a2de 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-28-disabling_defender_services.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-28-disabling_defender_services.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Disabling Defender Services" -excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools, Impair Defenses" +excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools +, Impair Defenses +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-28 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Disable or Modify Tools - - Defense Evasion - Impair Defenses - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This particular behavior is typically executed when an adversaries or malware gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution and to evade detections. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. Endpoint should be isolated. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-28 @@ -95,8 +97,6 @@ admin or user may choose to disable windows defender product | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon2.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon2.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-28-disabling_folderoptions_windows_feature.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-28-disabling_folderoptions_windows_feature.md index 5728ad355a..2319a7f7c0 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-28-disabling_folderoptions_windows_feature.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-28-disabling_folderoptions_windows_feature.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature" -excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools, Impair Defenses" +excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools +, Impair Defenses +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-28 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Disable or Modify Tools - - Defense Evasion - Impair Defenses - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This search is to identify registry modification to disable folder options feature of windows to show hidden files, file extension and etc. This technique used by malware in combination if disabling show hidden files feature to hide their files and also to hide the file extension to lure the user base on file icons or fake file extensions. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-28 @@ -94,8 +96,6 @@ admin may disable this application for non technical user. | 25.0 | 50 | 50 | The Windows Folder Options, to hide files, was disabled on $dest$ by $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log) * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log) * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-28-disabling_norun_windows_app.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-28-disabling_norun_windows_app.md index b280e211fd..d4ffb2a3c2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-28-disabling_norun_windows_app.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-28-disabling_norun_windows_app.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Disabling NoRun Windows App" -excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools, Impair Defenses" +excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools +, Impair Defenses +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-28 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Disable or Modify Tools - - Defense Evasion - Impair Defenses - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This search is to identify modification of registry to disable run application in window start menu. this application is known to be a helpful shortcut to windows OS user to run known application and also to execute some reg or batch script. This technique is used malware to make cleaning of its infection more harder by preventing known application run easily through run shortcut. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-28 @@ -94,8 +96,6 @@ admin may disable this application for non technical user. | 25.0 | 50 | 50 | The Windows registry was modified to disable run application in window start menu on $dest$ by $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log) * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log) * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-28-disabling_systemrestore_in_registry.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-28-disabling_systemrestore_in_registry.md index 2a79f3d72c..1023e38689 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-28-disabling_systemrestore_in_registry.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-28-disabling_systemrestore_in_registry.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Disabling SystemRestore In Registry" -excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools, Impair Defenses" +excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools +, Impair Defenses +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-28 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Disable or Modify Tools - - Defense Evasion - Impair Defenses - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: The following search identifies the modification of registry related in disabling the system restore of a machine. This event or behavior are seen in some RAT malware to make the restore of the infected machine difficult and keep their infection on the box. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-28 @@ -94,8 +96,6 @@ in some cases admin can disable systemrestore on a machine. | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | The Windows registry was modified to disable system restore on $dest$ by $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log) * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log) * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-28-disabling_task_manager.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-28-disabling_task_manager.md index 7fb480fba5..82d69bcd43 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-28-disabling_task_manager.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-28-disabling_task_manager.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Disabling Task Manager" -excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools, Impair Defenses" +excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools +, Impair Defenses +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-28 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Disable or Modify Tools - - Defense Evasion - Impair Defenses - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This search is to identifies modification of registry to disable the task manager of windows operating system. this event or technique are commonly seen in malware such as RAT, Trojan, TrojanSpy or worm to prevent the user to terminate their process. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-28 @@ -94,8 +96,6 @@ admin may disable this application for non technical user. | 42.0 | 70 | 60 | The Windows Task Manager was disabled on $dest$ by $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log) * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log) * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-28-enable_rdp_in_other_port_number.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-28-enable_rdp_in_other_port_number.md index f628fad846..fe99b14c4c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-28-enable_rdp_in_other_port_number.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-28-enable_rdp_in_other_port_number.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Enable RDP In Other Port Number" -excerpt: "Remote Services" +excerpt: "Remote Services +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-28 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This search is to detect a modification to registry to enable rdp to a machine with different port number. This technique was seen in some atttacker tries to do lateral movement and remote access to a compromised machine to gain control of it. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-28 @@ -89,8 +90,6 @@ unknown | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | RDP was moved to a non-standard port on $dest$ by $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -103,6 +102,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/casper/datasets1/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/casper/datasets1/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-28-enable_wdigest_uselogoncredential_registry.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-28-enable_wdigest_uselogoncredential_registry.md index 151a0fbeb0..120c9c7bdf 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-28-enable_wdigest_uselogoncredential_registry.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-28-enable_wdigest_uselogoncredential_registry.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry" -excerpt: "Modify Registry, OS Credential Dumping" +excerpt: "Modify Registry +, OS Credential Dumping +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-28 @@ -8,8 +10,8 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Modify Registry - - Defense Evasion - OS Credential Dumping + - Defense Evasion - Credential Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This analytic is to detect a suspicious registry modification to enable plain text credential feature of windows. This technique was used by several malware and also by mimikatz to be able to dumpe the a plain text credential to the compromised or target host. This TTP is really a good indicator that someone wants to dump the crendential of the host so it must be a good pivot for credential dumping techniques. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-28 @@ -95,8 +97,6 @@ unknown | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | wdigest registry $registry_path$ was modified in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/wdigest_enable/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/wdigest_enable/sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-28-etw_registry_disabled.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-28-etw_registry_disabled.md index 45e15fbea7..28a760795f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-28-etw_registry_disabled.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-28-etw_registry_disabled.md @@ -1,6 +1,9 @@ --- title: "ETW Registry Disabled" -excerpt: "Indicator Blocking, Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution, Impair Defenses" +excerpt: "Indicator Blocking +, Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution +, Impair Defenses +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-28 @@ -8,11 +11,11 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Indicator Blocking - - Defense Evasion - Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution - - Defense Evasion - Impair Defenses - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -27,7 +30,7 @@ tags: This analytic is to detect a registry modification to disable ETW feature of windows. This technique is to evade EDR appliance to evade detections and hide its execution from audit logs. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-28 @@ -100,8 +103,6 @@ unknown | 90.0 | 90 | 100 | modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -114,6 +115,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127/etw_disable/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127/etw_disable/sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-28-eventvwr_uac_bypass.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-28-eventvwr_uac_bypass.md index 56bdea4396..f3024aa07f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-28-eventvwr_uac_bypass.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-28-eventvwr_uac_bypass.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Eventvwr UAC Bypass" -excerpt: "Bypass User Account Control, Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism" +excerpt: "Bypass User Account Control +, Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-28 @@ -8,11 +10,11 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Bypass User Account Control - - Privilege Escalation - - Defense Evasion - Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism + - Defense Evasion - Privilege Escalation - Defense Evasion + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ tags: The following search identifies Eventvwr bypass by identifying the registry modification into a specific path that eventvwr.msc looks to (but is not valid) upon execution. A successful attack will include a suspicious command to be executed upon eventvwr.msc loading. Upon triage, review the parallel processes that have executed. Identify any additional registry modifications on the endpoint that may look suspicious. Remediate as necessary. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-28 @@ -39,9 +41,9 @@ The following search identifies Eventvwr bypass by identifying the registry modi | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1548.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/) | Bypass User Account Control | Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1548.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/) | Bypass User Account Control | Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1548](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1548](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -88,7 +90,6 @@ Some false positives may be present and will need to be filtered. #### Kill Chain Phase * Exploitation -* Privilege Escalation @@ -99,8 +100,6 @@ Some false positives may be present and will need to be filtered. | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | Registry values were modified to bypass UAC using Event Viewer on $dest$ by $user$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -116,6 +115,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-28-hide_user_account_from_sign-in_screen.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-28-hide_user_account_from_sign-in_screen.md index 1b269f9c8a..62f068ac10 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-28-hide_user_account_from_sign-in_screen.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-28-hide_user_account_from_sign-in_screen.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen" -excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools, Impair Defenses" +excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools +, Impair Defenses +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-28 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Disable or Modify Tools - - Defense Evasion - Impair Defenses - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This analytic identifies a suspicious registry modification to hide a user account on the Windows Login screen. This technique was seen in some tradecraft where the adversary will create a hidden user account with Admin privileges in login screen to avoid noticing by the user that they already compromise and to persist on that said machine. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-28 @@ -93,8 +95,6 @@ Unknown. Filter as needed. | 72.0 | 90 | 80 | Suspicious registry modification ($registry_value_name$) which is used go hide a user account on the Windows Login screen detected on $dest$ executed by $user$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/hotkey_disabled_hidden_user/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/hotkey_disabled_hidden_user/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-28-linux_pkexec_privilege_escalation.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-28-linux_pkexec_privilege_escalation.md index bf36b695d2..a66960863c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-28-linux_pkexec_privilege_escalation.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-28-linux_pkexec_privilege_escalation.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Linux pkexec Privilege Escalation" -excerpt: "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation" +excerpt: "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-01-28 @@ -12,7 +13,6 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - CVE-2021-4034 - Endpoint --- @@ -22,9 +22,9 @@ tags: #### Description -The following analytic identifies `pkexec` spawning with no command-line arguments. A vulnerability in Polkit's pkexec component identified as CVE-2021-4034 (PwnKit) which is present in the default configuration of all major Linux distributions and can be exploited to gain full root privileges on the system. +The following analytic identifies `pkexec` spawning with no command-line arguments. A vulnerability in Polkit's pkexec component identified as CVE-2021-4034 (PwnKit) which is present in the default configuration of all major Linux distributions and can be exploited to gain full root privileges on the system. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-01-28 @@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ Note that `linux_pkexec_privilege_escalation_filter` is a empty macro by default #### How To Implement -Depending on the EDR product in use, there are multiple ways to "null" the command-line field, Processes.process. Two that may be useful `process="(^.{0}$)"` or `| where isnull(process)`. To generate data for this behavior, Sysmon for Linux was utilized. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +Depending on the EDR product in use, there are multiple ways to "null" the command-line field, Processes.process. Two that may be useful `process="(^.{0}$)"` or `| where isnull(process)`. To generate data for this behavior, Sysmon for Linux was utilized. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. #### Known False Positives False positives may be present, filter as needed. @@ -94,15 +94,6 @@ False positives may be present, filter as needed. | 56.0 | 80 | 70 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ related to a local privilege escalation in polkit pkexec. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - - -#### CVE - -| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | -| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [CVE-2021-4034](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-4034) | A local privilege escalation vulnerability was found on polkit's pkexec utility. The pkexec application is a setuid tool designed to allow unprivileged users to run commands as privileged users according predefined policies. The current version of pkexec doesn't handle the calling parameters count correctly and ends trying to execute environment variables as commands. An attacker can leverage this by crafting environment variables in such a way it'll induce pkexec to execute arbitrary code. When successfully executed the attack can cause a local privilege escalation given unprivileged users administrative rights on the target machine. | 7.2 | - #### Reference @@ -110,7 +101,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con * [https://www.reddit.com/r/crowdstrike/comments/sdfeig/20220126_cool_query_friday_hunting_pwnkit_local/](https://www.reddit.com/r/crowdstrike/comments/sdfeig/20220126_cool_query_friday_hunting_pwnkit_local/) * [https://linux.die.net/man/1/pkexec](https://linux.die.net/man/1/pkexec) * [https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/linux-system-service-bug-gives-root-on-all-major-distros-exploit-released/](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/linux-system-service-bug-gives-root-on-all-major-distros-exploit-released/) -* [https://access.redhat.com/security/security-updates/#/?q=polkit&p=1&sort=portal_publication_date%20desc&rows=10&portal_advisory_type=Security%20Advisory&documentKind=PortalProduct](https://access.redhat.com/security/security-updates/#/?q=polkit&p=1&sort=portal_publication_date%20desc&rows=10&portal_advisory_type=Security%20Advisory&documentKind=PortalProduct) +* [https://access.redhat.com/security/security-updates/#/?q=polkit&p=1&sort=portal_publication_date%20desc&rows=10&portal_advisory_type=Security%20Advisory&documentKind=PortalProduct](https://access.redhat.com/security/security-updates/#/?q=polkit&p=1&sort=portal_publication_date%20desc&rows=10&portal_advisory_type=Security%20Advisory&documentKind=PortalProduct) @@ -118,6 +109,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1068/zoom_child_process/linux-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1068/zoom_child_process/linux-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-01-mimikatz_passtheticket_commandline_parameters.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-01-mimikatz_passtheticket_commandline_parameters.md index 4ef58ffac2..2d0ac76231 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-01-mimikatz_passtheticket_commandline_parameters.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-01-mimikatz_passtheticket_commandline_parameters.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters" -excerpt: "Use Alternate Authentication Material, Pass the Ticket" +excerpt: "Use Alternate Authentication Material +, Pass the Ticket +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-02-01 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Use Alternate Authentication Material + - Pass the Ticket - Defense Evasion - Lateral Movement - - Pass the Ticket - Defense Evasion - Lateral Movement - Splunk Enterprise @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ tags: The following analytic looks for the use of Mimikatz command line parameters leveraged to execute pass the ticket attacks. Red teams and adversaries alike may use the pass the ticket technique using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Defenders should be aware that adversaries may customize the source code of Mimikatz and modify the command line parameters. This would effectively bypass this analytic. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-02-01 @@ -84,7 +86,7 @@ Although highly unlikely, legitimate applications may use the same command line #### Kill Chain Phase -* Privilege Escalation +* Exploitation @@ -95,8 +97,6 @@ Although highly unlikely, legitimate applications may use the same command line | 36.0 | 60 | 60 | Mimikatz command line parameters for pass the ticket attacks were used on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1550.003/mimikatz/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1550.003/mimikatz/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-01-rubeus_command_line_parameters.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-01-rubeus_command_line_parameters.md index d733ac6b28..88bd9a4455 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-01-rubeus_command_line_parameters.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-01-rubeus_command_line_parameters.md @@ -1,6 +1,11 @@ --- title: "Rubeus Command Line Parameters" -excerpt: "Use Alternate Authentication Material, Pass the Ticket, Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets, Kerberoasting, AS-REP Roasting" +excerpt: "Use Alternate Authentication Material +, Pass the Ticket +, Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets +, Kerberoasting +, AS-REP Roasting +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-02-01 @@ -8,16 +13,16 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Use Alternate Authentication Material - - Defense Evasion - - Lateral Movement - Pass the Ticket + - Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets + - Kerberoasting + - AS-REP Roasting + - Defense Evasion + - Lateral Movement - Defense Evasion - Lateral Movement - - Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets - Credential Access - - Kerberoasting - Credential Access - - AS-REP Roasting - Credential Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security @@ -33,7 +38,7 @@ tags: Rubeus is a C# toolset for raw Kerberos interaction and abuses. It is heavily adapted from Benjamin Delpys Kekeo project and Vincent LE TOUXs MakeMeEnterpriseAdmin project. This analytic looks for the use of Rubeus command line arguments utilized in common Kerberos attacks like exporting and importing tickets, forging silver and golden tickets, requesting a TGT or TGS, kerberoasting, password spraying, etc. Red teams and adversaries alike use Rubeus for Kerberos attacks within Active Directory networks. Defenders should be aware that adversaries may customize the source code of Rubeus and modify the command line parameters. This would effectively bypass this analytic. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-02-01 @@ -96,7 +101,7 @@ Although unlikely, legitimate applications may use the same command line paramet #### Kill Chain Phase -* Privilege Escalation +* Exploitation @@ -107,8 +112,6 @@ Although unlikely, legitimate applications may use the same command line paramet | 36.0 | 60 | 60 | Rubeus command line parameters were used on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -123,6 +126,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1550.003/rubeus/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1550.003/rubeus/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-01-suspicious_rundll32_rename.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-01-suspicious_rundll32_rename.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..13d0ebbc1d --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-01-suspicious_rundll32_rename.md @@ -0,0 +1,132 @@ +--- +title: "Suspicious Rundll32 Rename" +excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution +, Masquerading +, Rundll32 +, Rename System Utilities +" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2022-02-01 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Signed Binary Proxy Execution + - Masquerading + - Rundll32 + - Rename System Utilities + - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Endpoint +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +The following hunting analytic identifies renamed instances of rundll32.exe executing. rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. During investigation, validate it is the legitimate rundll32.exe executing and what script content it is loading. This query relies on the original filename or internal name from the PE meta data. Expand the query as needed by looking for specific command line arguments outlined in other analytics. + +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) +- **Last Updated**: 2022-02-01 +- **Author**: Michael Haag, Splunk +- **ID**: 7360137f-abad-473e-8189-acbdaa34d114 + + +#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1218](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/) | Signed Binary Proxy Execution | Defense Evasion | + +| [T1036](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/) | Masquerading | Defense Evasion | + +| [T1218.011](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/) | Rundll32 | Defense Evasion | + +| [T1036.003](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/) | Rename System Utilities | Defense Evasion | + +#### Search + +``` + +| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name +| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| `suspicious_rundll32_rename_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) + +Note that `suspicious_rundll32_rename_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* Processes.dest +* Processes.user +* Processes.parent_process_name +* Processes.parent_process +* Processes.original_file_name +* Processes.process_name +* Processes.process +* Processes.process_id +* Processes.parent_process_path +* Processes.process_path +* Processes.parent_process_id + + +#### How To Implement +To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. + +#### Known False Positives +Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Suspicious Rundll32 Activity](/stories/suspicious_rundll32_activity) +* [Masquerading - Rename System Utilities](/stories/masquerading_-_rename_system_utilities) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Actions on Objectives + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 63.0 | 70 | 90 | Suspicious renamed rundll32.exe binary ran on $dest$ by $user$ | + + + + +#### Reference + +* [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/) +* [https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md) +* [https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32](https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32) + + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + +* [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/suspicious_rundll32_rename.yml) \| *version*: **4** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments.md index 0bf192b760..16a209ae25 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments" -excerpt: "Ingress Tool Transfer" +excerpt: "Ingress Tool Transfer +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-02-03 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: Certutil.exe may download a file from a remote destination using `-urlcache`. This behavior does require a URL to be passed on the command-line. In addition, `-f` (force) and `-split` (Split embedded ASN.1 elements, and save to files) will be used. It is not entirely common for `certutil.exe` to contact public IP space. However, it is uncommon for `certutil.exe` to write files to world writeable paths.\ During triage, capture any files on disk and review. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain in question. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-02-03 @@ -94,8 +95,6 @@ Limited false positives in most environments, however tune as needed based on pa | 90.0 | 90 | 100 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to download a file. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -110,6 +109,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments.md index b28f780ff3..502cd2875a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments" -excerpt: "Ingress Tool Transfer" +excerpt: "Ingress Tool Transfer +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-02-03 @@ -21,9 +22,9 @@ tags: #### Description -Certutil.exe may download a file from a remote destination using `-VerifyCtl`. This behavior does require a URL to be passed on the command-line. In addition, `-f` (force) and `-split` (Split embedded ASN.1 elements, and save to files) will be used. It is not entirely common for `certutil.exe` to contact public IP space. \ During triage, capture any files on disk and review. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain in question. Using `-VerifyCtl`, the file will either be written to the current working directory or `%APPDATA%\..\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\<hash>`. +Certutil.exe may download a file from a remote destination using `-VerifyCtl`. This behavior does require a URL to be passed on the command-line. In addition, `-f` (force) and `-split` (Split embedded ASN.1 elements, and save to files) will be used. It is not entirely common for `certutil.exe` to contact public IP space. \ During triage, capture any files on disk and review. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain in question. Using `-VerifyCtl`, the file will either be written to the current working directory or `%APPDATA%\..\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\`. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-02-03 @@ -94,8 +95,6 @@ Limited false positives in most environments, however tune as needed based on pa | 90.0 | 90 | 100 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to download a file. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -111,6 +110,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-o365_added_service_principal.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-o365_added_service_principal.md index 0636183fc1..9bc0dcc67b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-o365_added_service_principal.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-o365_added_service_principal.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "O365 Added Service Principal" -excerpt: "Cloud Account, Create Account" +excerpt: "Cloud Account +, Create Account +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2022-02-03 @@ -8,10 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Cloud Account - - Persistence - Create Account - Persistence - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS + - Persistence - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,8 +26,8 @@ tags: This search detects the creation of a new Federation setting by alerting about an specific event related to its creation. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Security Analytics for AWS, Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2022-02-03 - **Author**: Rod Soto, Splunk @@ -81,7 +82,7 @@ The creation of a new Federation is not necessarily malicious, however these eve #### Kill Chain Phase -* Actions on Objective +* Exploitation @@ -92,8 +93,6 @@ The creation of a new Federation is not necessarily malicious, however these eve | 42.0 | 70 | 60 | User $Actor.ID$ created a new federation setting on $Target.ID$ and added service principal credentials from IP Address $ActorIpAddress$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -109,6 +108,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_add_service_principal/o365_add_service_principal.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_add_service_principal/o365_add_service_principal.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.md index b3daa88f8a..fc25eadc8a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP" -excerpt: "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall, Impair Defenses" +excerpt: "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall +, Impair Defenses +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2022-02-03 @@ -8,10 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall - - Defense Evasion - Impair Defenses - Defense Evasion - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,8 +26,8 @@ tags: This search detects newly added IP addresses/CIDR blocks to the list of MFA Trusted IPs to bypass multi factor authentication. Attackers are often known to use this technique so that they can bypass the MFA system. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Security Analytics for AWS, Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2022-02-03 - **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk @@ -87,7 +88,7 @@ Unless it is a special case, it is uncommon to continually update Trusted IPs to #### Kill Chain Phase -* Actions on Objective +* Exploitation @@ -98,8 +99,6 @@ Unless it is a special case, it is uncommon to continually update Trusted IPs to | 42.0 | 70 | 60 | User $user_id$ has added new IP addresses $ip_addresses_new_added$ to a list of trusted IPs to bypass MFA | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -113,6 +112,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.007/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.007/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-o365_disable_mfa.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-o365_disable_mfa.md index 1f26ebba0a..1a721e4d8c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-o365_disable_mfa.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-o365_disable_mfa.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "O365 Disable MFA" -excerpt: "Modify Authentication Process" +excerpt: "Modify Authentication Process +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2022-02-03 @@ -11,7 +12,6 @@ tags: - Credential Access - Defense Evasion - Persistence - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,8 +25,8 @@ tags: This search detects when multi factor authentication has been disabled, what entitiy performed the action and against what user -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Security Analytics for AWS, Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2022-02-03 - **Author**: Rod Soto, Splunk @@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ Unless it is a special case, it is uncommon to disable MFA or Strong Authenticat #### Kill Chain Phase -* Actions on Objective +* Exploitation @@ -89,8 +89,6 @@ Unless it is a special case, it is uncommon to disable MFA or Strong Authenticat | 64.0 | 80 | 80 | User $user$ has executed an operation $Operation$ for this destination $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -103,6 +101,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/o365_disable_mfa/o365_disable_mfa.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/o365_disable_mfa/o365_disable_mfa.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-07-rubeus_kerberos_ticket_exports_through_winlogon_access.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-07-rubeus_kerberos_ticket_exports_through_winlogon_access.md index 85cb869eda..6514f1f549 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-07-rubeus_kerberos_ticket_exports_through_winlogon_access.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-07-rubeus_kerberos_ticket_exports_through_winlogon_access.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access" -excerpt: "Use Alternate Authentication Material, Pass the Ticket" +excerpt: "Use Alternate Authentication Material +, Pass the Ticket +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-02-07 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Use Alternate Authentication Material + - Pass the Ticket - Defense Evasion - Lateral Movement - - Pass the Ticket - Defense Evasion - Lateral Movement - Splunk Enterprise @@ -26,7 +28,7 @@ tags: The following analytic looks for a process accessing the winlogon.exe system process. The Splunk Threat Research team identified this behavior when using the Rubeus tool to monitor for and export kerberos tickets from memory. Before being able to export tickets. Rubeus will try to escalate privileges to SYSTEM by obtaining a handle to winlogon.exe before trying to monitor for kerberos tickets. Exporting tickets from memory is typically the first step for pass the ticket attacks. Red teams and adversaries alike may use the pass the ticket technique using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Defenders should be aware that adversaries may customize the source code of Rubeus to potentially bypass this analytic. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2022-02-07 @@ -55,8 +57,8 @@ The following analytic looks for a process accessing the winlogon.exe system pro #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `rubeus_kerberos_ticket_exports_through_winlogon_access_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -82,8 +84,7 @@ Legitimate applications may obtain a handle for winlogon.exe. Filter as needed #### Kill Chain Phase -* Privilege Escalation -* Lateral Movement +* Exploitation @@ -94,8 +95,6 @@ Legitimate applications may obtain a handle for winlogon.exe. Filter as needed | 36.0 | 60 | 60 | Winlogon.exe was accessed by $SourceImage$ on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -110,6 +109,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1550.003/rubeus/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1550.003/rubeus/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-07-windows_remote_assistance_spawning_process.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-07-windows_remote_assistance_spawning_process.md index c822b0c567..a3cd3a62ae 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-07-windows_remote_assistance_spawning_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-07-windows_remote_assistance_spawning_process.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Windows Remote Assistance Spawning Process" -excerpt: "Process Injection" +excerpt: "Process Injection +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-02-07 @@ -24,7 +25,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies the use of Microsoft Remote Assistance, msra.exe, spawning PowerShell.exe or cmd.exe as a child process. Msra.exe by default has no command-line arguments and typically spawns itself. It will generate a network connection to the remote system that is connected. This behavior is indicative of another process injected into msra.exe. Review the parent process or cross process events to identify source. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-02-07 @@ -51,9 +52,9 @@ The following analytic identifies the use of Microsoft Remote Assistance, msra.e #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [windows_shells](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/windows_shells.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `windows_remote_assistance_spawning_process_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -94,8 +95,6 @@ False positives should be limited, filter as needed. Add additional shells as ne | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$, generating behavior not common with msra.exe. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -108,6 +107,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/msra/msra-windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/msra/msra-windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-07-windows_schtasks_create_run_as_system.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-07-windows_schtasks_create_run_as_system.md index 9cbc4303c2..80204647e8 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-07-windows_schtasks_create_run_as_system.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-07-windows_schtasks_create_run_as_system.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Windows Schtasks Create Run As System" -excerpt: "Scheduled Task, Scheduled Task/Job" +excerpt: "Scheduled Task +, Scheduled Task/Job +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-02-07 @@ -8,10 +10,10 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Scheduled Task + - Scheduled Task/Job - Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Scheduled Task/Job - Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation @@ -29,7 +31,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies Schtasks.exe creating a new task to start and run as an elevated user - SYSTEM. This is commonly used by adversaries to spawn a process in an elevated state. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-02-07 @@ -101,8 +103,6 @@ False positives will be limited to legitimate applications creating a task to ru | 48.0 | 80 | 60 | An $process_name$ was created on endpoint $dest$ attempting to spawn as SYSTEM. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/schtask_system/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/schtask_system/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-08-rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-08-rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.md index 4bbca30820..6db8bf0182 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-08-rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-08-rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal" -excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution, Rundll32" +excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution +, Rundll32 +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-02-08 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Signed Binary Proxy Execution - - Defense Evasion - Rundll32 - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading an export function by ordinal value. Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly, may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Utilizing ordinal values makes it a bit more complicated for analysts to understand the behavior until the DLL is reviewed. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-02-08 @@ -99,8 +101,6 @@ False positives are possible with native utilities and third party applications. | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | A rundll32 process $process_name$ with ordinal parameter like this process commandline $process$ on host $dest$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/ordinal_windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/ordinal_windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-08-unusual_number_of_kerberos_service_tickets_requested.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-08-unusual_number_of_kerberos_service_tickets_requested.md index fc0d9f458e..b312237ea3 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-08-unusual_number_of_kerberos_service_tickets_requested.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-08-unusual_number_of_kerberos_service_tickets_requested.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Unusual Number of Kerberos Service Tickets Requested" -excerpt: "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets, Kerberoasting" +excerpt: "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets +, Kerberoasting +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-02-08 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets - - Credential Access - Kerberoasting - Credential Access + - Credential Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: The following hunting analytic leverages Kerberos Event 4769, A Kerberos service ticket was requested, to identify a potential kerberoasting attack against Active Directory networks. Kerberoasting allows an adversary to request kerberos tickets for domain accounts typically used as service accounts and attempt to crack them offline allowing them to obtain privileged access to the domain.\ The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number service ticket requests. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2022-02-08 @@ -82,7 +84,7 @@ An single endpoint requesting a large number of kerberos service tickets is not #### Kill Chain Phase -* Privilege Escalation +* Exploitation @@ -90,11 +92,9 @@ An single endpoint requesting a large number of kerberos service tickets is not | Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| -| 36.0 | 60 | 60 | None | +| 36.0 | 60 | 60 | tbd | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/rubeus/windows-security.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/rubeus/windows-security.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-09-kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-09-kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.md index a9e1881bfe..300228efab 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-09-kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-09-kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption" -excerpt: "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets, Kerberoasting" +excerpt: "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets +, Kerberoasting +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-02-09 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets - - Credential Access - Kerberoasting - Credential Access + - Credential Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -24,7 +26,7 @@ tags: The following analytic leverages Kerberos Event 4769, A Kerberos service ticket was requested, to identify a potential kerberoasting attack against Active Directory networks. Kerberoasting allows an adversary to request kerberos tickets for domain accounts typically used as service accounts and attempt to crack them offline allowing them to obtain privileged access to the domain. This analytic looks for a specific combination of the Ticket_Options field based on common kerberoasting tools. Defenders should be aware that it may be possible for a Kerberoast attack to use different Ticket_Options. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2022-02-09 @@ -52,8 +54,8 @@ The following analytic leverages Kerberos Event 4769, A Kerberos service ticket #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -79,7 +81,7 @@ Older systems that support kerberos RC4 by default like NetApp may generate fals #### Kill Chain Phase -* Privilege Escalation +* Exploitation @@ -90,8 +92,6 @@ Older systems that support kerberos RC4 by default like NetApp may generate fals | 72.0 | 90 | 80 | Potential kerberoasting attack via service principal name requests detected on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/rubeus/windows-security.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/rubeus/windows-security.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-11-linux_system_network_discovery.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-11-linux_system_network_discovery.md index eb6f235c12..58c7054c15 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-11-linux_system_network_discovery.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-11-linux_system_network_discovery.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Linux System Network Discovery" -excerpt: "System Network Configuration Discovery" +excerpt: "System Network Configuration Discovery +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-02-11 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This analytic is to look for possible enumeration of local network configuration. This technique is commonly used as part of recon of adversaries or threat actor to know some network information for its next or further attack. This anomaly detections may capture normal event made by administrator during auditing or testing network connection of specific host or network to network. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-02-11 @@ -86,8 +87,6 @@ Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the fi | 9.0 | 30 | 30 | A commandline $process$ executed on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -100,6 +99,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1016/atomic_red_team/linux_net_discovery/sysmon_linux.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1016/atomic_red_team/linux_net_discovery/sysmon_linux.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-14-linux_dd_file_overwrite.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-14-linux_dd_file_overwrite.md index 83434fe25e..cc16472d78 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-14-linux_dd_file_overwrite.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-14-linux_dd_file_overwrite.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Linux DD File Overwrite" -excerpt: "Data Destruction" +excerpt: "Data Destruction +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-02-14 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This analytic is to look for dd command to overwrite file. This technique was abused by adversaries or threat actor to destroy files or data on specific system or in a large number of host within network to interrupt host avilability, services and many more. This is also used to destroy data where it make the file irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files, data or local and remote drives. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-02-14 @@ -88,8 +89,6 @@ Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the fi | 64.0 | 80 | 80 | A commandline $process$ executed on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -103,6 +102,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/linux_dd_file_overwrite/sysmon_linux.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/linux_dd_file_overwrite/sysmon_linux.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-15-detection_of_dns_tunnels.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-15-detection_of_dns_tunnels.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c915a8d3bc --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-15-detection_of_dns_tunnels.md @@ -0,0 +1,110 @@ +--- +title: "Detection of DNS Tunnels" +excerpt: "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol +" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2022-02-15 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol + - Exfiltration + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Network_Resolution +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search is used to detect DNS tunneling, by calculating the sum of the length of DNS queries and DNS answers. The search also filters out potential false positives by filtering out queries made to internal systems and the queries originating from internal DNS, Web, and Email servers. Endpoints using DNS as a method of transmission for data exfiltration, command and control, or evasion of security controls can often be detected by noting an unusually large volume of DNS traffic. \ +NOTE:Deprecated because existing detection is doing the same. This detection is replaced with two other variations, if you are using MLTK then you can use this search `ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule` or use the standard deviation version `ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule`, as an alternantive. + +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: [Network_Resolution](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkResolution) +- **Last Updated**: 2022-02-15 +- **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +- **ID**: 104658f4-afdc-499f-9719-17a43f9826f4 + + +#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1048.003](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048/003/) | Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol | Exfiltration | + +#### Search + +``` + +| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc("DNS.query") as count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where nodename=DNS "DNS.message_type"="QUERY" NOT (`cim_corporate_web_domain_search("DNS.query")`) NOT "DNS.query"="*.in-addr.arpa" NOT ("DNS.src_category"="svc_infra_dns" OR "DNS.src_category"="svc_infra_webproxy" OR "DNS.src_category"="svc_infra_email*" ) by "DNS.src","DNS.query" +| rename "DNS.src" as src "DNS.query" as message +| eval length=len(message) +| stats sum(length) as length by src +| append [ tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc("DNS.answer") as count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where nodename=DNS "DNS.message_type"="QUERY" NOT (`cim_corporate_web_domain_search("DNS.query")`) NOT "DNS.query"="*.in-addr.arpa" NOT ("DNS.src_category"="svc_infra_dns" OR "DNS.src_category"="svc_infra_webproxy" OR "DNS.src_category"="svc_infra_email*" ) by "DNS.src","DNS.answer" +| rename "DNS.src" as src "DNS.answer" as message +| eval message=if(message=="unknown","", message) +| eval length=len(message) +| stats sum(length) as length by src ] +| stats sum(length) as length by src +| where length > 10000 +| `detection_of_dns_tunnels_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) + +Note that `detection_of_dns_tunnels_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* DNS.query +* DNS.message_type +* DNS.src_category +* DNS.src + + +#### How To Implement +To successfully implement this search, we must ensure that DNS data is being ingested and mapped to the appropriate fields in the Network_Resolution data model. Fields like src_category are automatically provided by the Assets and Identity Framework shipped with Splunk Enterprise Security. You will need to ensure you are using the Assets and Identity Framework and populating the src_category field. You will also need to enable the `cim_corporate_web_domain_search()` macro which will essentially filter out the DNS queries made to the corporate web domains to reduce alert fatigue. + +#### Known False Positives +It's possible that normal DNS traffic will exhibit this behavior. If an alert is generated, please investigate and validate as appropriate. The threshold can also be modified to better suit your environment. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Data Protection](/stories/data_protection) +* [Suspicious DNS Traffic](/stories/suspicious_dns_traffic) +* [Command and Control](/stories/command_and_control) + + +#### Kill Chain Phase +* Command & Control +* Actions on Objectives + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd | + + + + +#### Reference + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml) \| *version*: **2** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-15-windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-15-windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution.md index f85707d025..f509e24075 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-15-windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-15-windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution" -excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution" +excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-02-15 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: DiskShadow.exe is a Microsoft Signed binary present on Windows Server. It has a scripting mode intended for complex scripted backup operations. This feature also allows for execution of arbitrary unsigned code. This analytic looks for the usage of the scripting mode flags in executions of DiskShadow. During triage, compare to known backup behavior in your environment and then review the scripts called by diskshadow. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-02-15 @@ -50,9 +51,9 @@ DiskShadow.exe is a Microsoft Signed binary present on Windows Server. It has a #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_diskshadow](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_diskshadow.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_diskshadow](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_diskshadow.yml) Note that `windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -90,8 +91,6 @@ Administrators using the DiskShadow tool in their infrastructure as a main backu | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | Possible Signed Binary Proxy Execution on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -104,6 +103,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218/diskshadow/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218/diskshadow/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-15-windows_rasautou_dll_execution.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-15-windows_rasautou_dll_execution.md index 34ccc45b95..705a912265 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-15-windows_rasautou_dll_execution.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-15-windows_rasautou_dll_execution.md @@ -1,6 +1,9 @@ --- title: "Windows Rasautou DLL Execution" -excerpt: "Dynamic-link Library Injection, Signed Binary Proxy Execution, Process Injection" +excerpt: "Dynamic-link Library Injection +, Signed Binary Proxy Execution +, Process Injection +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-02-15 @@ -8,15 +11,17 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Dynamic-link Library Injection - - Defense Evasion - - Privilege Escalation - Signed Binary Proxy Execution - - Defense Evasion - Process Injection - Defense Evasion - Privilege Escalation - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics - - Endpoint_Processes + - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion + - Privilege Escalation + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Endpoint --- @@ -27,12 +32,12 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies the Windows Windows Remote Auto Dialer, rasautou.exe executing an arbitrary DLL. This technique is used to execute arbitrary shellcode or DLLs via the rasautou.exe LOLBin capability. During triage, review parent and child process behavior including file and image loads. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Behavioral Analytics -- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint_Processes](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/EndpointProcesses) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-02-15 - **Author**: Michael Haag, Splunk -- **ID**: 6f42b8ce-1e15-11ec-ad5a-acde48001122 +- **ID**: 6f42b8be-8e96-11ec-ad5a-acde48001122 #### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) @@ -49,29 +54,33 @@ The following analytic identifies the Windows Windows Remote Auto Dialer, rasaut ``` -| from read_ssa_enriched_events() -| where "Endpoint_Processes" IN(_datamodels) -| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null), process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string", null), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_path"), "string", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "parent_process_name"), "string", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "event_id"), "string", null) -| where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND process_name IS NOT NULL AND process_name="rasautou.exe" AND (like (cmd_line, "%-d %") AND like (cmd_line, "%-p %")) -| eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)) -| eval body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name", process_name, "parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "process_path", process_path]) -| into write_ssa_detected_events(); +| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rasautou.exe Processes.process="* -d *"AND Processes.process="* -p *" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name +| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| `windows_rasautou_dll_execution_filter` ``` #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that `windows_rasautou_dll_execution_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. #### Required field * _time -* dest_device_id -* process_name -* parent_process_name -* process_path -* dest_user_id -* process -* cmd_line +* Processes.dest +* Processes.user +* Processes.parent_process_name +* Processes.parent_process +* Processes.original_file_name +* Processes.process_name +* Processes.process +* Processes.process_id +* Processes.parent_process_path +* Processes.process_path +* Processes.parent_process_id #### How To Implement @@ -82,7 +91,6 @@ False positives will be limited to applications that require Rasautou.exe to loa #### Associated Analytic story * [Windows Defense Evasion Tactics](/stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics) -* [Living Off The Land](/stories/living_off_the_land) #### Kill Chain Phase @@ -97,8 +105,6 @@ False positives will be limited to applications that require Rasautou.exe to loa | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to load a DLL in a suspicious manner. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -114,7 +120,8 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) -* [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055.001/rasautou/windows-security.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055.001/rasautou/windows-security.log) + +* [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055.001/rasautou/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055.001/rasautou/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-16-windows_bitsadmin_download_file.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-16-windows_bitsadmin_download_file.md index ab35497b66..6c8c02145b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-16-windows_bitsadmin_download_file.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-16-windows_bitsadmin_download_file.md @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ tags: - Defense Evasion - Persistence - Ingress Tool Transfer - - Command And Control + - Command & Control - Splunk Behavioral Analytics - Endpoint_Processes --- diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-16-windows_certutil_urlcache_download.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-16-windows_certutil_urlcache_download.md index a8bb66239a..686ea244a2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-16-windows_certutil_urlcache_download.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-16-windows_certutil_urlcache_download.md @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Ingress Tool Transfer - - Command And Control + - Command & Control - Splunk Behavioral Analytics - Endpoint_Processes --- diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-16-windows_certutil_verifyctl_download.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-16-windows_certutil_verifyctl_download.md index 1c41903fde..9d4948a7a1 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-16-windows_certutil_verifyctl_download.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-16-windows_certutil_verifyctl_download.md @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Ingress Tool Transfer - - Command And Control + - Command & Control - Splunk Behavioral Analytics - Endpoint_Processes --- diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-16-windows_powershell_start-bitstransfer.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-16-windows_powershell_start-bitstransfer.md index c4d728c92f..2e9ec6d465 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-16-windows_powershell_start-bitstransfer.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-16-windows_powershell_start-bitstransfer.md @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ tags: - Defense Evasion - Persistence - Ingress Tool Transfer - - Command And Control + - Command & Control - Splunk Behavioral Analytics - Endpoint_Processes --- diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-17-windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-17-windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive.md index a1e02af3e7..d330b80d6b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-17-windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-17-windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive" -excerpt: "Disk Structure Wipe, Disk Wipe" +excerpt: "Disk Structure Wipe +, Disk Wipe +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-02-17 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Disk Structure Wipe - - Impact - Disk Wipe - Impact + - Impact - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This analytic is to look for suspicious raw access read to drive where the master boot record is placed. This technique was seen in several attacks by adversaries or threat actor to wipe, encrypt or overwrite the master boot record code as part of their impact payload. This detection is a good indicator that there is a process try to read or write on MBR sector. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-02-17 @@ -53,8 +55,8 @@ This analytic is to look for suspicious raw access read to drive where the maste #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -73,7 +75,7 @@ Note that `windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive_filter` is a empty mac To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the raw access read event (like sysmon eventcode 9), process name and process guid from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. #### Known False Positives -This event is really notable but we found minimal number of normal application from system32 folder like svchost.exe accessing it too. In this case we used 'system32' and 'syswow64' path as a filter for this detection. +This event is really notable but we found minimal number of normal application from system32 folder like svchost.exe accessing it too. In this case we used 'system32' and 'syswow64' path as a filter for this detection. #### Associated Analytic story * [WhisperGate](/stories/whispergate) @@ -92,8 +94,6 @@ This event is really notable but we found minimal number of normal application f | 90.0 | 90 | 100 | process accessing MBR $device$ in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1561.002/mbr_raw_access/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1561.002/mbr_raw_access/sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-detect_regasm_with_network_connection.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-detect_regasm_with_network_connection.md index 2a9fd006c0..1c6a4ce576 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-detect_regasm_with_network_connection.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-detect_regasm_with_network_connection.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Detect Regasm with Network Connection" -excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution, Regsvcs/Regasm" +excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution +, Regsvcs/Regasm +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-02-18 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Signed Binary Proxy Execution - - Defense Evasion - Regsvcs/Regasm - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -24,7 +26,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies regasm.exe with a network connection to a public IP address, exluding private IP space. This particular technique has been used in the wild to bypass application control products. Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe are signed by Microsoft. By contacting a remote command and control server, the adversary will have the ability to escalate privileges and complete the objectives. During investigation, identify and retrieve the content being loaded. Review parallel processes for additional suspicious behavior. Gather any other file modifications and review accordingly. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain and block as needed. regsvcs.exe and regasm.exe are natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2022-02-18 @@ -53,8 +55,8 @@ The following analytic identifies regasm.exe with a network connection to a publ #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `detect_regasm_with_network_connection_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -92,8 +94,6 @@ Although unlikely, limited instances of regasm.exe with a network connection may | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | An instance of $process_name$ contacting a remote destination was identified on endpoint $Computer$ by user $user$. This behavior is not normal for $process_name$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection.md index d706ad0fa8..3a9d06fa65 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection" -excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution, Regsvcs/Regasm" +excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution +, Regsvcs/Regasm +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-02-18 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Signed Binary Proxy Execution - - Defense Evasion - Regsvcs/Regasm - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -24,7 +26,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies Regsvcs.exe with a network connection to a public IP address, exluding private IP space. This particular technique has been used in the wild to bypass application control products. Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe are signed by Microsoft. By contacting a remote command and control server, the adversary will have the ability to escalate privileges and complete the objectives. During investigation, identify and retrieve the content being loaded. Review parallel processes for additional suspicious behavior. Gather any other file modifications and review accordingly. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain and block as needed. regsvcs.exe and regasm.exe are natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2022-02-18 @@ -53,8 +55,8 @@ The following analytic identifies Regsvcs.exe with a network connection to a pub #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -91,8 +93,6 @@ Although unlikely, limited instances of regsvcs.exe may cause a false positive. | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | An instance of $process_name$ contacting a remote destination was identified on endpoint $Computer$ by user $user$. This behavior is not normal for $process_name$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-disabled_kerberos_pre-authentication_discovery_with_powerview.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-disabled_kerberos_pre-authentication_discovery_with_powerview.md index 261b695620..03a5e04189 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-disabled_kerberos_pre-authentication_discovery_with_powerview.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-disabled_kerberos_pre-authentication_discovery_with_powerview.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With PowerView" -excerpt: "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets, AS-REP Roasting" +excerpt: "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets +, AS-REP Roasting +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-02-18 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets - - Credential Access - AS-REP Roasting - Credential Access + - Credential Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -24,7 +26,7 @@ tags: The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainUser` commandlet with specific parameters. `Get-DomainUser` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows Active Directory networks. As the name suggests, `Get-DomainUser` is used to identify domain users and combining it with `-PreauthNotRequired` allows adversaries to discover domain accounts with Kerberos Pre Authentication disabled.\ Red Teams and adversaries alike use may leverage PowerView to enumerate these accounts and attempt to crack their passwords offline. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2022-02-18 @@ -75,7 +77,7 @@ Administrators or power users may use PowerView for troubleshooting #### Kill Chain Phase -* Privilege Escalation +* Exploitation @@ -86,8 +88,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use PowerView for troubleshooting | 54.0 | 60 | 90 | Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With PowerView from $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.004/powerview/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.004/powerview/windows-powershell.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-interactive_session_on_remote_endpoint_with_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-interactive_session_on_remote_endpoint_with_powershell.md index fcf1d1eaac..2c750da720 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-interactive_session_on_remote_endpoint_with_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-interactive_session_on_remote_endpoint_with_powershell.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell" -excerpt: "Remote Services, Windows Remote Management" +excerpt: "Remote Services +, Windows Remote Management +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-02-18 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Remote Services - - Lateral Movement - Windows Remote Management - Lateral Movement + - Lateral Movement - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -24,7 +26,7 @@ tags: The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the usage of the `Enter-PSSession`. This commandlet can be used to open an interactive session on a remote endpoint leveraging the WinRM protocol. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WinRM and `Enter-PSSession` for lateral movement and remote code execution. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2022-02-18 @@ -75,7 +77,7 @@ Administrators may leverage WinRM and `Enter-PSSession` for administrative and t #### Kill Chain Phase -* Lateral Movement +* Exploitation @@ -86,8 +88,6 @@ Administrators may leverage WinRM and `Enter-PSSession` for administrative and t | 45.0 | 90 | 50 | An interactive session was opened on a remote endpoint from $ComputerName | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement_pssession/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement_pssession/windows-powershell.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-net_profiler_uac_bypass.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-net_profiler_uac_bypass.md index 2f6e9310eb..685bfda508 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-net_profiler_uac_bypass.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-net_profiler_uac_bypass.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "NET Profiler UAC bypass" -excerpt: "Bypass User Account Control, Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism" +excerpt: "Bypass User Account Control +, Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-02-18 @@ -8,11 +10,11 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Bypass User Account Control - - Privilege Escalation - - Defense Evasion - Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism + - Defense Evasion - Privilege Escalation - Defense Evasion + - Privilege Escalation - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ tags: This search is to detect modification of registry to bypass UAC windows feature. This technique is to add a payload dll path on .NET COR file path that will be loaded by mmc.exe as soon it was executed. This detection rely on monitoring the registry key and values in the detection area. It may happened that windows update some dll related to mmc.exe and add dll path in this registry. In this case filtering is needed. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-02-18 @@ -39,9 +41,9 @@ This search is to detect modification of registry to bypass UAC windows feature. | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1548.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/) | Bypass User Account Control | Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1548.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/) | Bypass User Account Control | Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation | -| [T1548](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1548](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -91,8 +93,6 @@ limited false positive. It may trigger by some windows update that will modify t | 63.0 | 70 | 90 | Suspicious modification of registry $registry_path$ with possible payload path $registry_value_name$ in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon2.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon2.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.md index 3625bdae1a..6bfbf1dae0 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert" -excerpt: "Brute Force" +excerpt: "Brute Force +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2022-02-18 @@ -9,7 +10,6 @@ toc_label: "" tags: - Brute Force - Credential Access - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -23,8 +23,8 @@ tags: This search detects when an excessive number of authentication failures occur this search also includes attempts against MFA prompt codes -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) -- **Product**: Splunk Security Analytics for AWS, Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2022-02-18 - **Author**: Rod Soto, Splunk @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ The threshold for alert is above 10 attempts and this should reduce the number o #### Kill Chain Phase -* Not Applicable +* Exploitation @@ -87,8 +87,6 @@ The threshold for alert is above 10 attempts and this should reduce the number o | 64.0 | 80 | 80 | User $user$ has caused excessive number of authentication failures from $src_ip$ using UserAgent $UserAgent$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -101,6 +99,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110/o365_brute_force_login/o365_brute_force_login.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110/o365_brute_force_login/o365_brute_force_login.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-process_deleting_its_process_file_path.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-process_deleting_its_process_file_path.md index ee42d3f781..f8ce522bfb 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-process_deleting_its_process_file_path.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-process_deleting_its_process_file_path.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Process Deleting Its Process File Path" -excerpt: "Indicator Removal on Host" +excerpt: "Indicator Removal on Host +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-02-18 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This detection is to identify a suspicious process that tries to delete the process file path related to its process. This technique is known to be defense evasion once a certain condition of malware is satisfied or not. Clop ransomware use this technique where it will try to delete its process file path using a .bat command if the keyboard layout is not the layout it tries to infect. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-02-18 @@ -51,8 +52,8 @@ This detection is to identify a suspicious process that tries to delete the proc #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `process_deleting_its_process_file_path_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -70,7 +71,7 @@ Note that `process_deleting_its_process_file_path_filter` is a empty macro by de #### How To Implement -You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. +You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. #### Known False Positives unknown @@ -93,8 +94,6 @@ unknown | 60.0 | 60 | 100 | A process $Image$ tries to delete its process path in commandline $cmdline$ as part of defense evasion in host $Computer$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -109,6 +108,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-rundll32_dnsquery.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-rundll32_dnsquery.md index a4f8f0c9bb..c877ad4a1f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-rundll32_dnsquery.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-rundll32_dnsquery.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Rundll32 DNSQuery" -excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution, Rundll32" +excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution +, Rundll32 +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-02-18 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Signed Binary Proxy Execution - - Defense Evasion - Rundll32 - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -23,9 +25,9 @@ tags: #### Description -This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe process having a http connection and do a dns query in some web domain. This technique was seen in IcedID malware where the rundll32 that execute its payload will contact amazon.com to check internet connect and to communicate to its C&C server to download config and other file component. +This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe process having a http connection and do a dns query in some web domain. This technique was seen in IcedID malware where the rundll32 that execute its payload will contact amazon.com to check internet connect and to communicate to its C&C server to download config and other file component. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-02-18 @@ -53,8 +55,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe process having a http connect #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `rundll32_dnsquery_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -89,8 +91,6 @@ unknown | 56.0 | 70 | 80 | rundll32 process $process_name$ having a dns query to $QueryName$ in host $Computer$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.md index 7e75ac0e38..fb5f07ab4d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass" -excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter, PowerShell" +excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter +, PowerShell +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-02-18 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Command and Scripting Interpreter - - Execution - PowerShell - Execution + - Execution - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -23,9 +25,9 @@ tags: #### Description -Monitor for changes of the ExecutionPolicy in the registry to the values "unrestricted" or "bypass," which allows the execution of malicious scripts. +Monitor for changes of the ExecutionPolicy in the registry to the values "unrestricted" or "bypass," which allows the execution of malicious scripts. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-02-18 @@ -71,7 +73,7 @@ Note that `set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass_fil You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Registry node. You must also be ingesting logs with the fields registry_path, registry_key_name, and registry_value_name from your endpoints. #### Known False Positives -Administrators may attempt to change the default execution policy on a system for a variety of reasons. However, setting the policy to "unrestricted" or "bypass" as this search is designed to identify, would be unusual. Hits should be reviewed and investigated as appropriate. +Administrators may attempt to change the default execution policy on a system for a variety of reasons. However, setting the policy to "unrestricted" or "bypass" as this search is designed to identify, would be unusual. Hits should be reviewed and investigated as appropriate. #### Associated Analytic story * [Malicious PowerShell](/stories/malicious_powershell) @@ -92,8 +94,6 @@ Administrators may attempt to change the default execution policy on a system fo | 48.0 | 60 | 80 | A registry modification in $registry_path$ with reg key $registry_key_name$ and reg value $registry_value_name$ in host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_execution_policy/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_execution_policy/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-22-disabled_kerberos_pre-authentication_discovery_with_get-aduser.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-22-disabled_kerberos_pre-authentication_discovery_with_get-aduser.md index ba53858b09..4ee09d3791 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-22-disabled_kerberos_pre-authentication_discovery_with_get-aduser.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-22-disabled_kerberos_pre-authentication_discovery_with_get-aduser.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser" -excerpt: "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets, AS-REP Roasting" +excerpt: "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets +, AS-REP Roasting +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-02-22 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets - - Credential Access - AS-REP Roasting - Credential Access + - Credential Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -24,7 +26,7 @@ tags: The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-ADUser` commandlet with specific parameters. `Get-ADUser` is part of the Active Directory PowerShell module used to manage Windows Active Directory networks. As the name suggests, `Get-ADUser` is used to query for domain users. With the appropiate parameters, Get-ADUser allows adversaries to discover domain accounts with Kerberos Pre Authentication disabled.\ Red Teams and adversaries alike use may abuse Get-ADUSer to enumerate these accounts and attempt to crack their passwords offline. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2022-02-22 @@ -75,7 +77,7 @@ Administrators or power users may use search for accounts with Kerberos Pre Auth #### Kill Chain Phase -* Privilege Escalation +* Exploitation @@ -86,8 +88,6 @@ Administrators or power users may use search for accounts with Kerberos Pre Auth | 54.0 | 60 | 90 | Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser from $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.004/getaduser/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.004/getaduser/windows-powershell.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-22-kerberos_pre-authentication_flag_disabled_in_useraccountcontrol.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-22-kerberos_pre-authentication_flag_disabled_in_useraccountcontrol.md index fb11f19e11..bacb5577a7 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-22-kerberos_pre-authentication_flag_disabled_in_useraccountcontrol.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-22-kerberos_pre-authentication_flag_disabled_in_useraccountcontrol.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled in UserAccountControl" -excerpt: "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets, AS-REP Roasting" +excerpt: "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets +, AS-REP Roasting +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-02-22 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets - - Credential Access - AS-REP Roasting - Credential Access + - Credential Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -22,9 +24,9 @@ tags: #### Description -The following analytic leverages Windows Security Event 4738, `A user account was changed`, to identify a change performed on a domain user object that disables Kerberos Pre-Authentication. Disabling the Pre Authentication flag in the UserAccountControl property allows an adversary to easily perform a brute force attack against the user's password offline leveraging the ASP REP Roasting technique. Red Teams and adversaries alike who have obtained privileges in an Active Directory network may use this technique as a backdoor or a way to escalate privileges. +The following analytic leverages Windows Security Event 4738, `A user account was changed`, to identify a change performed on a domain user object that disables Kerberos Pre-Authentication. Disabling the Pre Authentication flag in the UserAccountControl property allows an adversary to easily perform a brute force attack against the user's password offline leveraging the ASP REP Roasting technique. Red Teams and adversaries alike who have obtained privileges in an Active Directory network may use this technique as a backdoor or a way to escalate privileges. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2022-02-22 @@ -73,8 +75,7 @@ Unknown. #### Kill Chain Phase -* Intrusion -* Privilege Escalation +* Exploitation @@ -85,8 +86,6 @@ Unknown. | 45.0 | 50 | 90 | Kerberos Pre Authentication was Disabled for $Account_Name$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -101,6 +100,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.004/powershell/windows-security.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.004/powershell/windows-security.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-22-scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-22-scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.md index f8f903dda2..f32a530638 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-22-scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-22-scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD" -excerpt: "Scheduled Task, Scheduled Task/Job" +excerpt: "Scheduled Task +, Scheduled Task/Job +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-02-22 @@ -8,10 +10,10 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Scheduled Task + - Scheduled Task/Job - Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Scheduled Task/Job - Execution - Persistence - Privilege Escalation @@ -27,9 +29,9 @@ tags: #### Description -The following analytic identifies the creation or deletion of a scheduled task using schtasks.exe with flags - create or delete being passed on the command-line. This has been associated with the Dragonfly threat actor, and the SUNBURST attack against Solarwinds. This analytic replaces "Scheduled Task used in BadRabbit Ransomware". +The following analytic identifies the creation or deletion of a scheduled task using schtasks.exe with flags - create or delete being passed on the command-line. This has been associated with the Dragonfly threat actor, and the SUNBURST attack against Solarwinds. This analytic replaces "Scheduled Task used in BadRabbit Ransomware". -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-02-22 @@ -97,8 +99,6 @@ It is possible scripts or administrators may trigger this analytic. Filter as ne | 56.0 | 70 | 80 | A schedule task process $process_name$ with create or delete commandline $process$ in host $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-22-windows_wmi_process_call_create.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-22-windows_wmi_process_call_create.md index a4d880a85f..ac6238ba6d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-22-windows_wmi_process_call_create.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-22-windows_wmi_process_call_create.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Windows WMI Process Call Create" -excerpt: "Windows Management Instrumentation" +excerpt: "Windows Management Instrumentation +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-02-22 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This analytic is to look for wmi commandlines to execute or create process. This technique was used by adversaries or threat actor to execute their malicious payload in local or remote host. This hunting query is a good pivot to start to look further which process trigger the wmi or what process it execute locally or remotely. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-02-22 @@ -50,9 +51,9 @@ This analytic is to look for wmi commandlines to execute or create process. This #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_wmic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_wmic.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_wmic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_wmic.yml) Note that `windows_wmi_process_call_create_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -94,8 +95,6 @@ Administrators may execute this command for testing or auditing. | 25.0 | 50 | 50 | process with $process$ commandline executed in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -109,6 +108,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-23-kerberos_pre-authentication_flag_disabled_with_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-23-kerberos_pre-authentication_flag_disabled_with_powershell.md index 5fe605a05e..642acf64cd 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-23-kerberos_pre-authentication_flag_disabled_with_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-23-kerberos_pre-authentication_flag_disabled_with_powershell.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled with PowerShell" -excerpt: "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets, AS-REP Roasting" +excerpt: "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets +, AS-REP Roasting +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-02-23 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets - - Credential Access - AS-REP Roasting - Credential Access + - Credential Access - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -22,9 +24,9 @@ tags: #### Description -The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Set-ADAccountControl` commandlet with specific parameters. `Set-ADAccountControl` is part of the Active Directory PowerShell module used to manage Windows Active Directory networks. As the name suggests, `Set-ADAccountControl` is used to modify User Account Control values for an Active Directory domain account. With the appropiate parameters, Set-ADAccountControl allows adversaries to disable Kerberos Pre-Authentication for an account to to easily perform a brute force attack against the user's password offline leveraging the ASP REP Roasting technique. Red Teams and adversaries alike who have obtained privileges in an Active Directory network may use this technique as a backdoor or a way to escalate privileges. +The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Set-ADAccountControl` commandlet with specific parameters. `Set-ADAccountControl` is part of the Active Directory PowerShell module used to manage Windows Active Directory networks. As the name suggests, `Set-ADAccountControl` is used to modify User Account Control values for an Active Directory domain account. With the appropiate parameters, Set-ADAccountControl allows adversaries to disable Kerberos Pre-Authentication for an account to to easily perform a brute force attack against the user's password offline leveraging the ASP REP Roasting technique. Red Teams and adversaries alike who have obtained privileges in an Active Directory network may use this technique as a backdoor or a way to escalate privileges. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2022-02-23 @@ -71,8 +73,7 @@ Although unlikely, Administrators may need to set this flag for legitimate purpo #### Kill Chain Phase -* Intrusion -* Privilege Escalation +* Exploitation @@ -83,8 +84,6 @@ Although unlikely, Administrators may need to set this flag for legitimate purpo | 45.0 | 50 | 90 | Kerberos Pre Authentication was Disabled using PowerShell on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -99,6 +98,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.004/powershell/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.004/powershell/windows-powershell.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-23-windows_event_for_service_disabled.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-23-windows_event_for_service_disabled.md index 7d7f1b4cd0..1ec08a0014 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-23-windows_event_for_service_disabled.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-23-windows_event_for_service_disabled.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Windows Event For Service Disabled" -excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools, Impair Defenses" +excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools +, Impair Defenses +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-02-23 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Disable or Modify Tools - - Defense Evasion - Impair Defenses - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This analytic will identify suspicious system event of services that was modified from start to disabled. This technique is seen where the adversary attempts to disable security app services, other malware services to evade the defense systems on the compromised host -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-02-23 @@ -89,8 +91,6 @@ Windows service update may cause this event. In that scenario, filtering is need | 36.0 | 60 | 60 | Service was disabled on $Computer$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/olympic_destroyer/system.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/olympic_destroyer/system.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-23-windows_excessive_disabled_services_event.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-23-windows_excessive_disabled_services_event.md index 85bc131df1..10c450fc63 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-23-windows_excessive_disabled_services_event.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-23-windows_excessive_disabled_services_event.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event" -excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools, Impair Defenses" +excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools +, Impair Defenses +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-02-23 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Disable or Modify Tools - - Defense Evasion - Impair Defenses - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ tags: This analytic will identify suspicious excessive number of system events of services that was modified from start to disabled. This technique is seen where the adversary attempts to disable security app services, other malware services oer serve as an destructive impact to complete the objective on the compromised system. One good example for this scenario is Olympic destroyer where it disable all active services in the compromised host as part of its destructive impact and defense evasion. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-02-23 @@ -90,8 +92,6 @@ Unknown | 81.0 | 90 | 90 | Service was disabled in $Computer$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/olympic_destroyer/system.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/olympic_destroyer/system.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-23-windows_process_with_namedpipe_commandline.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-23-windows_process_with_namedpipe_commandline.md index 2ee894a451..d71ab4aad1 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-23-windows_process_with_namedpipe_commandline.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-23-windows_process_with_namedpipe_commandline.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine" -excerpt: "Process Injection" +excerpt: "Process Injection +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-02-23 @@ -22,9 +23,9 @@ tags: #### Description -This analytic is to look for process commandline that contains named pipe. This technique was seen in some adversaries, threat actor and malware like olympic destroyer to communicate to its other child processes after process injection that serve as defense evasion and privilege escalation. On the other hand this analytic may catch some normal process that using this technique for example browser application. In that scenario we include common process path we've seen during testing that cause false positive which is the program files. False positive may still be arise if the normal application is in other folder path. +This analytic is to look for process commandline that contains named pipe. This technique was seen in some adversaries, threat actor and malware like olympic destroyer to communicate to its other child processes after process injection that serve as defense evasion and privilege escalation. On the other hand this analytic may catch some normal process that using this technique for example browser application. In that scenario we include common process path we've seen during testing that cause false positive which is the program files. False positive may still be arise if the normal application is in other folder path. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-02-23 @@ -94,8 +95,6 @@ Normal browser application may use this technique. Please update the filter macr | 49.0 | 70 | 70 | Process with named pipe in $process$ on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -108,6 +107,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/olympic_destroyer/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/olympic_destroyer/sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-23-windows_service_creation_using_registry_entry.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-23-windows_service_creation_using_registry_entry.md index 668438685f..883878904f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-23-windows_service_creation_using_registry_entry.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-23-windows_service_creation_using_registry_entry.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry" -excerpt: "Services Registry Permissions Weakness" +excerpt: "Services Registry Permissions Weakness +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-02-23 @@ -8,9 +9,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Services Registry Permissions Weakness + - Defense Evasion - Persistence - Privilege Escalation - - Defense Evasion - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -25,7 +26,7 @@ tags: This analytic is to look for suspicious modification or creation of registry to have service entry. This technique is abused by adversaries or threat actor to persist, gain privileges in the machine or even lateral movement. This technique can be executed using reg.exe application or using windows API like for example the CrashOveride malware. This detection is a good indicator that a process is trying to create a service entry using registry ImagePath. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-02-23 @@ -37,7 +38,7 @@ This analytic is to look for suspicious modification or creation of registry to | ID | Technique | Tactic | | -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | -| [T1574.011](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/011/) | Services Registry Permissions Weakness | Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion | +| [T1574.011](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/011/) | Services Registry Permissions Weakness | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | #### Search @@ -101,8 +102,6 @@ Third party tools may used this technique to create services but not so common. | 64.0 | 80 | 80 | A Windows Service was created on a endpoint from $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -115,6 +114,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1574.011/change_registry_path_service/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1574.011/change_registry_path_service/windows-sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-24-aws_lambda_updatefunctioncode.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-24-aws_lambda_updatefunctioncode.md index 42835ab139..400633f3d6 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-24-aws_lambda_updatefunctioncode.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-24-aws_lambda_updatefunctioncode.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "AWS Lambda UpdateFunctionCode" -excerpt: "User Execution" +excerpt: "User Execution +" categories: - Cloud last_modified_at: 2022-02-24 @@ -22,7 +23,7 @@ tags: This analytic is designed to detect IAM users attempting to update/modify AWS lambda code via the AWS CLI to gain persistence, futher access into your AWS environment and to facilitate planting backdoors. In this instance, an attacker may upload malicious code/binary to a lambda function which will be executed automatically when the funnction is triggered. -- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2022-02-24 @@ -79,8 +80,6 @@ While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin | 63.0 | 70 | 90 | User $user_arn$ is attempting to update the lambda function code of $function_updated$ from this IP $src_ip$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -94,6 +93,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1204/aws_updatelambdafunctioncode/aws_cloudtrail_events.json](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1204/aws_updatelambdafunctioncode/aws_cloudtrail_events.json) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-25-windows_disable_memory_crash_dump.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-25-windows_disable_memory_crash_dump.md index 88d1c257fb..8c4ad7dfb7 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-25-windows_disable_memory_crash_dump.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-25-windows_disable_memory_crash_dump.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump" -excerpt: "Data Destruction" +excerpt: "Data Destruction +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-02-25 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: The following analytic identifies a process that is attempting to disable the ability on Windows to generate a memory crash dump. This was recently identified being utilized by HermeticWiper. To disable crash dumps, the value must be set to 0. This feature is typically modified to perform a memory crash dump when a computer stops unexpectedly because of a Stop error (also known as a blue screen, system crash, or bug check). -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-02-25 @@ -98,8 +99,6 @@ unknown | 90.0 | 90 | 100 | A process $process_name$ was identified attempting to disable memory crash dumps on $dest$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -113,6 +112,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/hermetic_wiper/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/hermetic_wiper/sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-25-windows_file_without_extension_in_critical_folder.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-25-windows_file_without_extension_in_critical_folder.md index 31ab738021..ce871752af 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-25-windows_file_without_extension_in_critical_folder.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-25-windows_file_without_extension_in_critical_folder.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder" -excerpt: "Data Destruction" +excerpt: "Data Destruction +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-02-25 @@ -21,9 +22,9 @@ tags: #### Description -This analytic is to look for suspicious file creation in the critical folder like "System32\Drivers" folder without file extension. This artifacts was seen in latest hermeticwiper where it drops its driver component in Driver Directory both the compressed(without file extension) and the actual driver component (with .sys file extension). This TTP is really a good indication that a host might be compromised by this destructive malware that wipes the boot sector of the system. +This analytic is to look for suspicious file creation in the critical folder like "System32\Drivers" folder without file extension. This artifacts was seen in latest hermeticwiper where it drops its driver component in Driver Directory both the compressed(without file extension) and the actual driver component (with .sys file extension). This TTP is really a good indication that a host might be compromised by this destructive malware that wipes the boot sector of the system. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-02-25 @@ -98,8 +99,6 @@ Unknown at this point | 90.0 | 90 | 100 | Driver file with out file extension drop in $file_path$ in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -112,6 +111,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/hermetic_wiper/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/hermetic_wiper/sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-25-windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-25-windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition.md index 3d005f2928..17a3eb08ae 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-25-windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-25-windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ --- title: "Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition" -excerpt: "Disk Structure Wipe, Disk Wipe" +excerpt: "Disk Structure Wipe +, Disk Wipe +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-02-25 @@ -8,9 +10,9 @@ toc: true toc_label: "" tags: - Disk Structure Wipe - - Impact - Disk Wipe - Impact + - Impact - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud @@ -23,9 +25,9 @@ tags: #### Description -This analytic is to look for suspicious raw access read to device disk partition of the host machine. This technique was seen in several attacks by adversaries or threat actor to wipe, encrypt or overwrite the boot sector of each partition as part of their impact payload for example the "hermeticwiper" malware. This detection is a good indicator that there is a process try to read or write on boot sector. +This analytic is to look for suspicious raw access read to device disk partition of the host machine. This technique was seen in several attacks by adversaries or threat actor to wipe, encrypt or overwrite the boot sector of each partition as part of their impact payload for example the "hermeticwiper" malware. This detection is a good indicator that there is a process try to read or write on boot sector. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-02-25 @@ -53,8 +55,8 @@ This analytic is to look for suspicious raw access read to device disk partition #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that `windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -73,7 +75,7 @@ Note that `windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition_filter` is a empty macro To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the raw access read event (like sysmon eventcode 9), process name and process guid from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. #### Known False Positives -This event is really notable but we found minimal number of normal application from system32 folder like svchost.exe accessing it too. In this case we used 'system32' and 'syswow64' path as a filter for this detection. +This event is really notable but we found minimal number of normal application from system32 folder like svchost.exe accessing it too. In this case we used 'system32' and 'syswow64' path as a filter for this detection. #### Associated Analytic story * [Data Destruction](/stories/data_destruction) @@ -92,8 +94,6 @@ This event is really notable but we found minimal number of normal application f | 90.0 | 90 | 100 | Process accessing disk partition $device$ in $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/hermetic_wiper/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/hermetic_wiper/sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-28-excessive_number_of_distinct_processes_created_in_windows_temp_folder.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-28-excessive_number_of_distinct_processes_created_in_windows_temp_folder.md index 05453d598a..845a2cec54 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-28-excessive_number_of_distinct_processes_created_in_windows_temp_folder.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-28-excessive_number_of_distinct_processes_created_in_windows_temp_folder.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Excessive number of distinct processes created in Windows Temp folder" -excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter" +excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-02-28 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This analytic will identify suspicious series of process executions. We have observed that post exploit framework tools like Koadic and Meterpreter will launch an excessive number of processes with distinct file paths from Windows\Temp to execute actions on objective. This behavior is extremely anomalous compared to typical application behaviors that use Windows\Temp. -- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-02-28 @@ -64,7 +65,7 @@ Note that `excessive_number_of_distinct_processes_created_in_windows_temp_folder #### How To Implement -To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the full process path in the process field of CIM's Process data model. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed sc.exe may be used. +To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the full process path in the process field of CIM's Process data model. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed sc.exe may be used. #### Known False Positives Many benign applications will create processes from executables in Windows\Temp, although unlikely to exceed the given threshold. Filter as needed. @@ -85,8 +86,6 @@ Many benign applications will create processes from executables in Windows\Temp, | 80.0 | 80 | 100 | Multiple processes were executed out of windows\temp within a short amount of time on $dest$. | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -99,6 +98,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059/meterpreter/windows_temp_processes/logExcessiveWindowsTemp.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059/meterpreter/windows_temp_processes/logExcessiveWindowsTemp.log) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-03-02-windows_modify_show_compress_color_and_info_tip_registry.md b/docs/_posts/2022-03-02-windows_modify_show_compress_color_and_info_tip_registry.md index 14515e4e40..3b43905f67 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-03-02-windows_modify_show_compress_color_and_info_tip_registry.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-03-02-windows_modify_show_compress_color_and_info_tip_registry.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry" -excerpt: "Modify Registry" +excerpt: "Modify Registry +" categories: - Endpoint last_modified_at: 2022-03-02 @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This analytic is to look for suspicious registry modification related to file compression color and information tips. This IOC was seen in hermetic wiper where it has a thread that will create this registry entry to change the color of compressed or encrypted files in NTFS file system as well as the pop up information tips. This is a good indicator that a process tries to modified one of the registry GlobalFolderOptions related to file compression attribution in terms of color in NTFS file system. -- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types) - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-03-02 @@ -87,11 +88,9 @@ unknown | Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| -| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | Registry modification in "ShowCompColor" and "ShowInfoTips" on $dest$ | +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | Registry modification in "ShowCompColor" and "ShowInfoTips" on $dest$ | -Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Confidence)/100` - #### Reference @@ -104,6 +103,7 @@ Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: `(Impact * Con Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + * [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/hermetic_wiper/globalfolderoptions_reg/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/hermetic_wiper/globalfolderoptions_reg/sysmon.log) diff --git a/docs/_stories/active_directory_discovery.md b/docs/_stories/active_directory_discovery.md index 0e4df226e5..b3066d9ac6 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/active_directory_discovery.md +++ b/docs/_stories/active_directory_discovery.md @@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint + - Exploitation + - Reconnaissance --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -31,82 +33,82 @@ Once an attacker obtains an initial foothold in an Active Directory environment, | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [AdsiSearcher Account Discovery](/endpoint/adsisearcher_account_discovery/) | [Domain Account](/tags/#domain-account), [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery) | TTP | -| [DSQuery Domain Discovery](/endpoint/dsquery_domain_discovery/) | [Domain Trust Discovery](/tags/#domain-trust-discovery) | TTP | -| [Domain Account Discovery With Net App](/endpoint/domain_account_discovery_with_net_app/) | [Domain Account](/tags/#domain-account), [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery) | TTP | -| [Domain Account Discovery with Dsquery](/endpoint/domain_account_discovery_with_dsquery/) | [Domain Account](/tags/#domain-account), [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery) | Hunting | -| [Domain Account Discovery with Wmic](/endpoint/domain_account_discovery_with_wmic/) | [Domain Account](/tags/#domain-account), [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery) | TTP | -| [Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest](/endpoint/domain_controller_discovery_with_nltest/) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery) | TTP | -| [Domain Controller Discovery with Wmic](/endpoint/domain_controller_discovery_with_wmic/) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery) | Hunting | -| [Domain Group Discovery With Dsquery](/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_dsquery/) | [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Domain Groups](/tags/#domain-groups) | Hunting | -| [Domain Group Discovery With Net](/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_net/) | [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Domain Groups](/tags/#domain-groups) | Hunting | -| [Domain Group Discovery With Wmic](/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_wmic/) | [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Domain Groups](/tags/#domain-groups) | Hunting | -| [Domain Group Discovery with Adsisearcher](/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_adsisearcher/) | [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Domain Groups](/tags/#domain-groups) | TTP | -| [Elevated Group Discovery With Net](/endpoint/elevated_group_discovery_with_net/) | [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Domain Groups](/tags/#domain-groups) | TTP | -| [Elevated Group Discovery With Wmic](/endpoint/elevated_group_discovery_with_wmic/) | [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Domain Groups](/tags/#domain-groups) | TTP | -| [Elevated Group Discovery with PowerView](/endpoint/elevated_group_discovery_with_powerview/) | [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Domain Groups](/tags/#domain-groups) | Hunting | -| [Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell](/endpoint/get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell/) | [Password Policy Discovery](/tags/#password-policy-discovery) | Hunting | -| [Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block](/endpoint/get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block/) | [Password Policy Discovery](/tags/#password-policy-discovery) | Hunting | -| [Get ADUser with PowerShell](/endpoint/get_aduser_with_powershell/) | [Domain Account](/tags/#domain-account), [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery) | Hunting | -| [Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block](/endpoint/get_aduser_with_powershell_script_block/) | [Domain Account](/tags/#domain-account), [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery) | Hunting | -| [Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell](/endpoint/get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell/) | [Password Policy Discovery](/tags/#password-policy-discovery) | TTP | -| [Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block](/endpoint/get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block/) | [Password Policy Discovery](/tags/#password-policy-discovery) | TTP | -| [Get DomainPolicy with Powershell](/endpoint/get_domainpolicy_with_powershell/) | [Password Policy Discovery](/tags/#password-policy-discovery) | TTP | -| [Get DomainPolicy with Powershell Script Block](/endpoint/get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_script_block/) | [Password Policy Discovery](/tags/#password-policy-discovery) | TTP | -| [Get DomainUser with PowerShell](/endpoint/get_domainuser_with_powershell/) | [Domain Account](/tags/#domain-account), [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery) | TTP | -| [Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block](/endpoint/get_domainuser_with_powershell_script_block/) | [Domain Account](/tags/#domain-account), [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery) | TTP | -| [Get WMIObject Group Discovery](/endpoint/get_wmiobject_group_discovery/) | [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Local Groups](/tags/#local-groups) | Hunting | -| [Get WMIObject Group Discovery with Script Block Logging](/endpoint/get_wmiobject_group_discovery_with_script_block_logging/) | [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Local Groups](/tags/#local-groups) | Hunting | -| [Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell](/endpoint/get-domaintrust_with_powershell/) | [Domain Trust Discovery](/tags/#domain-trust-discovery) | TTP | -| [Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell Script Block](/endpoint/get-domaintrust_with_powershell_script_block/) | [Domain Trust Discovery](/tags/#domain-trust-discovery) | TTP | -| [Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell](/endpoint/get-foresttrust_with_powershell/) | [Domain Trust Discovery](/tags/#domain-trust-discovery) | TTP | -| [Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell Script Block](/endpoint/get-foresttrust_with_powershell_script_block/) | [Domain Trust Discovery](/tags/#domain-trust-discovery) | TTP | -| [GetAdComputer with PowerShell](/endpoint/getadcomputer_with_powershell/) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery) | Hunting | -| [GetAdComputer with PowerShell Script Block](/endpoint/getadcomputer_with_powershell_script_block/) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery) | Hunting | -| [GetAdGroup with PowerShell](/endpoint/getadgroup_with_powershell/) | [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Domain Groups](/tags/#domain-groups) | Hunting | -| [GetAdGroup with PowerShell Script Block](/endpoint/getadgroup_with_powershell_script_block/) | [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Domain Groups](/tags/#domain-groups) | Hunting | -| [GetCurrent User with PowerShell](/endpoint/getcurrent_user_with_powershell/) | [System Owner/User Discovery](/tags/#system-owner/user-discovery) | Hunting | -| [GetCurrent User with PowerShell Script Block](/endpoint/getcurrent_user_with_powershell_script_block/) | [System Owner/User Discovery](/tags/#system-owner/user-discovery) | Hunting | -| [GetDomainComputer with PowerShell](/endpoint/getdomaincomputer_with_powershell/) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery) | TTP | -| [GetDomainComputer with PowerShell Script Block](/endpoint/getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_script_block/) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery) | TTP | -| [GetDomainController with PowerShell](/endpoint/getdomaincontroller_with_powershell/) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery) | Hunting | -| [GetDomainController with PowerShell Script Block](/endpoint/getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_script_block/) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery) | TTP | -| [GetDomainGroup with PowerShell](/endpoint/getdomaingroup_with_powershell/) | [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Domain Groups](/tags/#domain-groups) | TTP | -| [GetDomainGroup with PowerShell Script Block](/endpoint/getdomaingroup_with_powershell_script_block/) | [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Domain Groups](/tags/#domain-groups) | TTP | -| [GetLocalUser with PowerShell](/endpoint/getlocaluser_with_powershell/) | [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery), [Local Account](/tags/#local-account) | Hunting | -| [GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block](/endpoint/getlocaluser_with_powershell_script_block/) | [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery), [Local Account](/tags/#local-account) | Hunting | -| [GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell](/endpoint/getnettcpconnection_with_powershell/) | [System Network Connections Discovery](/tags/#system-network-connections-discovery) | Hunting | -| [GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell Script Block](/endpoint/getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_script_block/) | [System Network Connections Discovery](/tags/#system-network-connections-discovery) | Hunting | -| [GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell](/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell/) | [Domain Account](/tags/#domain-account), [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery) | TTP | -| [GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell Script Block](/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_script_block/) | [Domain Account](/tags/#domain-account), [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery) | TTP | -| [GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell](/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell/) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery) | TTP | -| [GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell Script Block](/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_script_block/) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery) | TTP | -| [GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell](/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell/) | [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Domain Groups](/tags/#domain-groups) | TTP | -| [GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell Script Block](/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_script_block/) | [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Domain Groups](/tags/#domain-groups) | TTP | -| [GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell](/endpoint/getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell/) | [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery), [Local Account](/tags/#local-account) | Hunting | -| [GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block](/endpoint/getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_script_block/) | [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery), [Local Account](/tags/#local-account) | Hunting | -| [Local Account Discovery With Wmic](/endpoint/local_account_discovery_with_wmic/) | [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery), [Local Account](/tags/#local-account) | Hunting | -| [Local Account Discovery with Net](/endpoint/local_account_discovery_with_net/) | [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery), [Local Account](/tags/#local-account) | Hunting | -| [NLTest Domain Trust Discovery](/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery/) | [Domain Trust Discovery](/tags/#domain-trust-discovery) | TTP | -| [Net Localgroup Discovery](/endpoint/net_localgroup_discovery/) | [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Local Groups](/tags/#local-groups) | Hunting | -| [Network Connection Discovery With Arp](/endpoint/network_connection_discovery_with_arp/) | [System Network Connections Discovery](/tags/#system-network-connections-discovery) | Hunting | -| [Network Connection Discovery With Net](/endpoint/network_connection_discovery_with_net/) | [System Network Connections Discovery](/tags/#system-network-connections-discovery) | Hunting | -| [Network Connection Discovery With Netstat](/endpoint/network_connection_discovery_with_netstat/) | [System Network Connections Discovery](/tags/#system-network-connections-discovery) | Hunting | -| [Network Discovery Using Route Windows App](/endpoint/network_discovery_using_route_windows_app/) | [System Network Configuration Discovery](/tags/#system-network-configuration-discovery), [Internet Connection Discovery](/tags/#internet-connection-discovery) | Hunting | -| [Password Policy Discovery with Net](/endpoint/password_policy_discovery_with_net/) | [Password Policy Discovery](/tags/#password-policy-discovery) | Hunting | -| [PowerShell Get LocalGroup Discovery](/endpoint/powershell_get_localgroup_discovery/) | [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Local Groups](/tags/#local-groups) | Hunting | -| [Powershell Get LocalGroup Discovery with Script Block Logging](/endpoint/powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_with_script_block_logging/) | [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Local Groups](/tags/#local-groups) | Hunting | -| [Remote System Discovery with Adsisearcher](/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_adsisearcher/) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery) | TTP | -| [Remote System Discovery with Dsquery](/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_dsquery/) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery) | Hunting | -| [Remote System Discovery with Net](/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_net/) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery) | Hunting | -| [Remote System Discovery with Wmic](/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_wmic/) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery) | TTP | -| [ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell](/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell/) | [Kerberoasting](/tags/#kerberoasting) | TTP | -| [ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN](/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn/) | [Kerberoasting](/tags/#kerberoasting) | TTP | -| [System User Discovery With Query](/endpoint/system_user_discovery_with_query/) | [System Owner/User Discovery](/tags/#system-owner/user-discovery) | Hunting | -| [System User Discovery With Whoami](/endpoint/system_user_discovery_with_whoami/) | [System Owner/User Discovery](/tags/#system-owner/user-discovery) | Hunting | -| [User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell](/endpoint/user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell/) | [System Owner/User Discovery](/tags/#system-owner/user-discovery) | Hunting | -| [User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell Script Block](/endpoint/user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_script_block/) | [System Owner/User Discovery](/tags/#system-owner/user-discovery) | Hunting | -| [Wmic Group Discovery](/endpoint/wmic_group_discovery/) | [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Local Groups](/tags/#local-groups) | Hunting | +| [AdsiSearcher Account Discovery](/endpoint/adsisearcher_account_discovery/) | [Domain Account](/tags/#domain-account), [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery)| TTP | +| [Domain Account Discovery with Dsquery](/endpoint/domain_account_discovery_with_dsquery/) | [Domain Account](/tags/#domain-account), [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery)| Hunting | +| [Domain Account Discovery With Net App](/endpoint/domain_account_discovery_with_net_app/) | [Domain Account](/tags/#domain-account), [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery)| TTP | +| [Domain Account Discovery with Wmic](/endpoint/domain_account_discovery_with_wmic/) | [Domain Account](/tags/#domain-account), [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery)| TTP | +| [Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest](/endpoint/domain_controller_discovery_with_nltest/) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery)| TTP | +| [Domain Controller Discovery with Wmic](/endpoint/domain_controller_discovery_with_wmic/) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery)| Hunting | +| [Domain Group Discovery with Adsisearcher](/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_adsisearcher/) | [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Domain Groups](/tags/#domain-groups)| TTP | +| [Domain Group Discovery With Dsquery](/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_dsquery/) | [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Domain Groups](/tags/#domain-groups)| Hunting | +| [Domain Group Discovery With Net](/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_net/) | [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Domain Groups](/tags/#domain-groups)| Hunting | +| [Domain Group Discovery With Wmic](/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_wmic/) | [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Domain Groups](/tags/#domain-groups)| Hunting | +| [DSQuery Domain Discovery](/endpoint/dsquery_domain_discovery/) | [Domain Trust Discovery](/tags/#domain-trust-discovery)| TTP | +| [Elevated Group Discovery With Net](/endpoint/elevated_group_discovery_with_net/) | [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Domain Groups](/tags/#domain-groups)| TTP | +| [Elevated Group Discovery with PowerView](/endpoint/elevated_group_discovery_with_powerview/) | [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Domain Groups](/tags/#domain-groups)| Hunting | +| [Elevated Group Discovery With Wmic](/endpoint/elevated_group_discovery_with_wmic/) | [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Domain Groups](/tags/#domain-groups)| TTP | +| [Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell](/endpoint/get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell/) | [Password Policy Discovery](/tags/#password-policy-discovery)| Hunting | +| [Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block](/endpoint/get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block/) | [Password Policy Discovery](/tags/#password-policy-discovery)| Hunting | +| [Get ADUser with PowerShell](/endpoint/get_aduser_with_powershell/) | [Domain Account](/tags/#domain-account), [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery)| Hunting | +| [Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block](/endpoint/get_aduser_with_powershell_script_block/) | [Domain Account](/tags/#domain-account), [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery)| Hunting | +| [Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell](/endpoint/get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell/) | [Password Policy Discovery](/tags/#password-policy-discovery)| TTP | +| [Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block](/endpoint/get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block/) | [Password Policy Discovery](/tags/#password-policy-discovery)| TTP | +| [Get DomainPolicy with Powershell](/endpoint/get_domainpolicy_with_powershell/) | [Password Policy Discovery](/tags/#password-policy-discovery)| TTP | +| [Get DomainPolicy with Powershell Script Block](/endpoint/get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_script_block/) | [Password Policy Discovery](/tags/#password-policy-discovery)| TTP | +| [Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell](/endpoint/get-domaintrust_with_powershell/) | [Domain Trust Discovery](/tags/#domain-trust-discovery)| TTP | +| [Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell Script Block](/endpoint/get-domaintrust_with_powershell_script_block/) | [Domain Trust Discovery](/tags/#domain-trust-discovery)| TTP | +| [Get DomainUser with PowerShell](/endpoint/get_domainuser_with_powershell/) | [Domain Account](/tags/#domain-account), [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery)| TTP | +| [Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block](/endpoint/get_domainuser_with_powershell_script_block/) | [Domain Account](/tags/#domain-account), [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery)| TTP | +| [Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell](/endpoint/get-foresttrust_with_powershell/) | [Domain Trust Discovery](/tags/#domain-trust-discovery)| TTP | +| [Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell Script Block](/endpoint/get-foresttrust_with_powershell_script_block/) | [Domain Trust Discovery](/tags/#domain-trust-discovery)| TTP | +| [Get WMIObject Group Discovery](/endpoint/get_wmiobject_group_discovery/) | [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Local Groups](/tags/#local-groups)| Hunting | +| [Get WMIObject Group Discovery with Script Block Logging](/endpoint/get_wmiobject_group_discovery_with_script_block_logging/) | [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Local Groups](/tags/#local-groups)| Hunting | +| [GetAdComputer with PowerShell](/endpoint/getadcomputer_with_powershell/) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery)| Hunting | +| [GetAdComputer with PowerShell Script Block](/endpoint/getadcomputer_with_powershell_script_block/) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery)| Hunting | +| [GetAdGroup with PowerShell](/endpoint/getadgroup_with_powershell/) | [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Domain Groups](/tags/#domain-groups)| Hunting | +| [GetAdGroup with PowerShell Script Block](/endpoint/getadgroup_with_powershell_script_block/) | [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Domain Groups](/tags/#domain-groups)| Hunting | +| [GetCurrent User with PowerShell](/endpoint/getcurrent_user_with_powershell/) | [System Owner/User Discovery](/tags/#system-owner/user-discovery)| Hunting | +| [GetCurrent User with PowerShell Script Block](/endpoint/getcurrent_user_with_powershell_script_block/) | [System Owner/User Discovery](/tags/#system-owner/user-discovery)| Hunting | +| [GetDomainComputer with PowerShell](/endpoint/getdomaincomputer_with_powershell/) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery)| TTP | +| [GetDomainComputer with PowerShell Script Block](/endpoint/getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_script_block/) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery)| TTP | +| [GetDomainController with PowerShell](/endpoint/getdomaincontroller_with_powershell/) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery)| Hunting | +| [GetDomainController with PowerShell Script Block](/endpoint/getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_script_block/) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery)| TTP | +| [GetDomainGroup with PowerShell](/endpoint/getdomaingroup_with_powershell/) | [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Domain Groups](/tags/#domain-groups)| TTP | +| [GetDomainGroup with PowerShell Script Block](/endpoint/getdomaingroup_with_powershell_script_block/) | [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Domain Groups](/tags/#domain-groups)| TTP | +| [GetLocalUser with PowerShell](/endpoint/getlocaluser_with_powershell/) | [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery), [Local Account](/tags/#local-account)| Hunting | +| [GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block](/endpoint/getlocaluser_with_powershell_script_block/) | [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery), [Local Account](/tags/#local-account)| Hunting | +| [GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell](/endpoint/getnettcpconnection_with_powershell/) | [System Network Connections Discovery](/tags/#system-network-connections-discovery)| Hunting | +| [GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell Script Block](/endpoint/getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_script_block/) | [System Network Connections Discovery](/tags/#system-network-connections-discovery)| Hunting | +| [GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell](/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell/) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery)| TTP | +| [GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell Script Block](/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_script_block/) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery)| TTP | +| [GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell](/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell/) | [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Domain Groups](/tags/#domain-groups)| TTP | +| [GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell Script Block](/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_script_block/) | [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Domain Groups](/tags/#domain-groups)| TTP | +| [GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell](/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell/) | [Domain Account](/tags/#domain-account), [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery)| TTP | +| [GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell Script Block](/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_script_block/) | [Domain Account](/tags/#domain-account), [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery)| TTP | +| [GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell](/endpoint/getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell/) | [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery), [Local Account](/tags/#local-account)| Hunting | +| [GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block](/endpoint/getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_script_block/) | [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery), [Local Account](/tags/#local-account)| Hunting | +| [Local Account Discovery with Net](/endpoint/local_account_discovery_with_net/) | [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery), [Local Account](/tags/#local-account)| Hunting | +| [Local Account Discovery With Wmic](/endpoint/local_account_discovery_with_wmic/) | [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery), [Local Account](/tags/#local-account)| Hunting | +| [Net Localgroup Discovery](/endpoint/net_localgroup_discovery/) | [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Local Groups](/tags/#local-groups)| Hunting | +| [Network Connection Discovery With Arp](/endpoint/network_connection_discovery_with_arp/) | [System Network Connections Discovery](/tags/#system-network-connections-discovery)| Hunting | +| [Network Connection Discovery With Net](/endpoint/network_connection_discovery_with_net/) | [System Network Connections Discovery](/tags/#system-network-connections-discovery)| Hunting | +| [Network Connection Discovery With Netstat](/endpoint/network_connection_discovery_with_netstat/) | [System Network Connections Discovery](/tags/#system-network-connections-discovery)| Hunting | +| [Network Discovery Using Route Windows App](/endpoint/network_discovery_using_route_windows_app/) | [System Network Configuration Discovery](/tags/#system-network-configuration-discovery), [Internet Connection Discovery](/tags/#internet-connection-discovery)| Hunting | +| [NLTest Domain Trust Discovery](/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery/) | [Domain Trust Discovery](/tags/#domain-trust-discovery)| TTP | +| [Password Policy Discovery with Net](/endpoint/password_policy_discovery_with_net/) | [Password Policy Discovery](/tags/#password-policy-discovery)| Hunting | +| [PowerShell Get LocalGroup Discovery](/endpoint/powershell_get_localgroup_discovery/) | [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Local Groups](/tags/#local-groups)| Hunting | +| [Powershell Get LocalGroup Discovery with Script Block Logging](/endpoint/powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_with_script_block_logging/) | [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Local Groups](/tags/#local-groups)| Hunting | +| [Remote System Discovery with Adsisearcher](/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_adsisearcher/) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery)| TTP | +| [Remote System Discovery with Dsquery](/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_dsquery/) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery)| Hunting | +| [Remote System Discovery with Net](/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_net/) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery)| Hunting | +| [Remote System Discovery with Wmic](/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_wmic/) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery)| TTP | +| [ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell](/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell/) | [Kerberoasting](/tags/#kerberoasting)| TTP | +| [ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN](/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn/) | [Kerberoasting](/tags/#kerberoasting)| TTP | +| [System User Discovery With Query](/endpoint/system_user_discovery_with_query/) | [System Owner/User Discovery](/tags/#system-owner/user-discovery)| Hunting | +| [System User Discovery With Whoami](/endpoint/system_user_discovery_with_whoami/) | [System Owner/User Discovery](/tags/#system-owner/user-discovery)| Hunting | +| [User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell](/endpoint/user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell/) | [System Owner/User Discovery](/tags/#system-owner/user-discovery)| Hunting | +| [User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell Script Block](/endpoint/user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_script_block/) | [System Owner/User Discovery](/tags/#system-owner/user-discovery)| Hunting | +| [Wmic Group Discovery](/endpoint/wmic_group_discovery/) | [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Local Groups](/tags/#local-groups)| Hunting | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/active_directory_kerberos_attacks.md b/docs/_stories/active_directory_kerberos_attacks.md index c9c1bef927..cfe54ca30c 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/active_directory_kerberos_attacks.md +++ b/docs/_stories/active_directory_kerberos_attacks.md @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -30,20 +31,20 @@ Kerberos, initially named after Cerberus, the three-headed dog in Greek mytholog | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser](/endpoint/disabled_kerberos_pre-authentication_discovery_with_get-aduser/) | [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets), [AS-REP Roasting](/tags/#as-rep-roasting) | TTP | -| [Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With PowerView](/endpoint/disabled_kerberos_pre-authentication_discovery_with_powerview/) | [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets), [AS-REP Roasting](/tags/#as-rep-roasting) | TTP | -| [Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption](/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption/) | [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets), [Kerberoasting](/tags/#kerberoasting) | TTP | -| [Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled in UserAccountControl](/endpoint/kerberos_pre-authentication_flag_disabled_in_useraccountcontrol/) | [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets), [AS-REP Roasting](/tags/#as-rep-roasting) | TTP | -| [Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled with PowerShell](/endpoint/kerberos_pre-authentication_flag_disabled_with_powershell/) | [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets), [AS-REP Roasting](/tags/#as-rep-roasting) | TTP | -| [Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters](/endpoint/mimikatz_passtheticket_commandline_parameters/) | [Use Alternate Authentication Material](/tags/#use-alternate-authentication-material), [Pass the Ticket](/tags/#pass-the-ticket) | TTP | -| [Multiple Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos](/endpoint/multiple_disabled_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos/) | [Password Spraying](/tags/#password-spraying), [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force) | Anomaly | -| [Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos](/endpoint/multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos/) | [Password Spraying](/tags/#password-spraying), [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force) | Anomaly | -| [Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos](/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos/) | [Password Spraying](/tags/#password-spraying), [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force) | Anomaly | -| [Rubeus Command Line Parameters](/endpoint/rubeus_command_line_parameters/) | [Use Alternate Authentication Material](/tags/#use-alternate-authentication-material), [Pass the Ticket](/tags/#pass-the-ticket), [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets), [Kerberoasting](/tags/#kerberoasting), [AS-REP Roasting](/tags/#as-rep-roasting) | TTP | -| [Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access](/endpoint/rubeus_kerberos_ticket_exports_through_winlogon_access/) | [Use Alternate Authentication Material](/tags/#use-alternate-authentication-material), [Pass the Ticket](/tags/#pass-the-ticket) | TTP | -| [ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell](/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell/) | [Kerberoasting](/tags/#kerberoasting) | TTP | -| [ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN](/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn/) | [Kerberoasting](/tags/#kerberoasting) | TTP | -| [Unusual Number of Kerberos Service Tickets Requested](/endpoint/unusual_number_of_kerberos_service_tickets_requested/) | [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets), [Kerberoasting](/tags/#kerberoasting) | Anomaly | +| [Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser](/endpoint/disabled_kerberos_pre-authentication_discovery_with_get-aduser/) | [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets), [AS-REP Roasting](/tags/#as-rep-roasting)| TTP | +| [Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With PowerView](/endpoint/disabled_kerberos_pre-authentication_discovery_with_powerview/) | [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets), [AS-REP Roasting](/tags/#as-rep-roasting)| TTP | +| [Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption](/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption/) | [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets), [Kerberoasting](/tags/#kerberoasting)| TTP | +| [Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled in UserAccountControl](/endpoint/kerberos_pre-authentication_flag_disabled_in_useraccountcontrol/) | [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets), [AS-REP Roasting](/tags/#as-rep-roasting)| TTP | +| [Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled with PowerShell](/endpoint/kerberos_pre-authentication_flag_disabled_with_powershell/) | [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets), [AS-REP Roasting](/tags/#as-rep-roasting)| TTP | +| [Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters](/endpoint/mimikatz_passtheticket_commandline_parameters/) | [Use Alternate Authentication Material](/tags/#use-alternate-authentication-material), [Pass the Ticket](/tags/#pass-the-ticket)| TTP | +| [Multiple Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos](/endpoint/multiple_disabled_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos/) | [Password Spraying](/tags/#password-spraying), [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force)| Anomaly | +| [Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos](/endpoint/multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos/) | [Password Spraying](/tags/#password-spraying), [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force)| Anomaly | +| [Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos](/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos/) | [Password Spraying](/tags/#password-spraying), [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force)| Anomaly | +| [Rubeus Command Line Parameters](/endpoint/rubeus_command_line_parameters/) | [Use Alternate Authentication Material](/tags/#use-alternate-authentication-material), [Pass the Ticket](/tags/#pass-the-ticket), [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets), [Kerberoasting](/tags/#kerberoasting), [AS-REP Roasting](/tags/#as-rep-roasting)| TTP | +| [Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access](/endpoint/rubeus_kerberos_ticket_exports_through_winlogon_access/) | [Use Alternate Authentication Material](/tags/#use-alternate-authentication-material), [Pass the Ticket](/tags/#pass-the-ticket)| TTP | +| [ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell](/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell/) | [Kerberoasting](/tags/#kerberoasting)| TTP | +| [ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN](/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn/) | [Kerberoasting](/tags/#kerberoasting)| TTP | +| [Unusual Number of Kerberos Service Tickets Requested](/endpoint/unusual_number_of_kerberos_service_tickets_requested/) | [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets), [Kerberoasting](/tags/#kerberoasting)| Anomaly | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/active_directory_lateral_movement.md b/docs/_stories/active_directory_lateral_movement.md index ca215275b6..00a97941dd 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/active_directory_lateral_movement.md +++ b/docs/_stories/active_directory_lateral_movement.md @@ -7,9 +7,11 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Authentication - Endpoint - Network_Traffic + - Actions on Objectives + - Exploitation + - Reconnaissance --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -19,7 +21,7 @@ tags: Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how attackers move laterally within an Active Directory environment. Since lateral movement is often a necessary step in a breach, it is important for cyber defenders to deploy detection coverage. - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud -- **Datamodel**: [Authentication](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Authentication), [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint), [Network_Traffic](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkTraffic) +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint), [Network_Traffic](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkTraffic) - **Last Updated**: 2021-12-09 - **Author**: David Dorsey, Mauricio Velazco Splunk - **ID**: 399d65dc-1f08-499b-a259-aad9051f38ad @@ -36,44 +38,42 @@ If there is evidence of lateral movement, it is imperative for analysts to colle | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks](/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks/) | [Use Alternate Authentication Material](/tags/#use-alternate-authentication-material), [Pass the Hash](/tags/#pass-the-hash) | TTP | -| [Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag](/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares) | TTP | -| [Detect Renamed PSExec](/endpoint/detect_renamed_psexec/) | [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution) | Hunting | -| [Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share](/endpoint/executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares) | TTP | -| [Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters](/endpoint/impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [Distributed Component Object Model](/tags/#distributed-component-object-model), [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service) | TTP | -| [Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell](/endpoint/interactive_session_on_remote_endpoint_with_powershell/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [Windows Remote Management](/tags/#windows-remote-management) | TTP | -| [Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn](/endpoint/mmc_lolbas_execution_process_spawn/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [Distributed Component Object Model](/tags/#distributed-component-object-model) | TTP | -| [Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn](/endpoint/possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [Distributed Component Object Model](/tags/#distributed-component-object-model), [Windows Remote Management](/tags/#windows-remote-management), [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation), [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell) | TTP | -| [Potential Pass the Token or Hash Observed at the Destination Device](/endpoint/potential_pass_the_token_or_hash_observed_at_the_destination_device/) | [Use Alternate Authentication Material](/tags/#use-alternate-authentication-material), [Pass the Hash](/tags/#pass-the-hash) | TTP | -| [Potential Pass the Token or Hash Observed by an Event Collecting Device](/endpoint/potential_pass_the_token_or_hash_observed_by_an_event_collecting_device/) | [Use Alternate Authentication Material](/tags/#use-alternate-authentication-material), [Pass the Hash](/tags/#pass-the-hash) | TTP | -| [Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name](/endpoint/randomly_generated_scheduled_task_name/) | [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task) | Hunting | -| [Randomly Generated Windows Service Name](/endpoint/randomly_generated_windows_service_name/) | [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service) | Hunting | -| [Remote Desktop Network Traffic](/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic/) | [Remote Desktop Protocol](/tags/#remote-desktop-protocol), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services) | Anomaly | -| [Remote Desktop Process Running On System](/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system/) | [Remote Desktop Protocol](/tags/#remote-desktop-protocol), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services) | Hunting | -| [Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell](/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [Distributed Component Object Model](/tags/#distributed-component-object-model) | TTP | -| [Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell Script Block](/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_script_block/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [Distributed Component Object Model](/tags/#distributed-component-object-model) | TTP | -| [Remote Process Instantiation via WMI](/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi/) | [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation) | TTP | -| [Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell](/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell/) | [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation) | TTP | -| [Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell Script Block](/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_script_block/) | [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation) | TTP | -| [Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell](/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [Windows Remote Management](/tags/#windows-remote-management) | TTP | -| [Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell Script Block](/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_script_block/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [Windows Remote Management](/tags/#windows-remote-management) | TTP | -| [Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and Winrs](/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_winrs/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [Windows Remote Management](/tags/#windows-remote-management) | TTP | -| [Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At](/endpoint/scheduled_task_creation_on_remote_endpoint_using_at/) | [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [At (Windows)](/tags/#at-(windows)) | TTP | -| [Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint](/endpoint/scheduled_task_initiation_on_remote_endpoint/) | [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task) | TTP | -| [Schtasks scheduling job on remote system](/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | TTP | -| [Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn](/endpoint/services_lolbas_execution_process_spawn/) | [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service) | TTP | -| [Short Lived Scheduled Task](/endpoint/short_lived_scheduled_task/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task) | TTP | -| [Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn](/endpoint/svchost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn/) | [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task) | TTP | -| [Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested](/endpoint/unusual_number_of_computer_service_tickets_requested/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | Hunting | -| [Unusual Number of Remote Endpoint Authentication Events](/endpoint/unusual_number_of_remote_endpoint_authentication_events/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | Hunting | -| [WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path](/endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | TTP | -| [Windows Service Created With Suspicious Service Path](/endpoint/windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path/) | [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution) | TTP | -| [Windows Service Created Within Public Path](/endpoint/windows_service_created_within_public_path/) | [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service) | TTP | -| [Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry](/endpoint/windows_service_creation_using_registry_entry/) | [Services Registry Permissions Weakness](/tags/#services-registry-permissions-weakness) | TTP | -| [Windows Service Creation on Remote Endpoint](/endpoint/windows_service_creation_on_remote_endpoint/) | [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service) | TTP | -| [Windows Service Initiation on Remote Endpoint](/endpoint/windows_service_initiation_on_remote_endpoint/) | [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service) | TTP | -| [Wmiprsve LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn](/endpoint/wmiprsve_lolbas_execution_process_spawn/) | [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation) | TTP | -| [Wsmprovhost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn](/endpoint/wsmprovhost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [Windows Remote Management](/tags/#windows-remote-management) | TTP | +| [Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks](/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks/) | [Use Alternate Authentication Material](/tags/#use-alternate-authentication-material), [Pass the Hash](/tags/#pass-the-hash)| TTP | +| [Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag](/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares)| TTP | +| [Detect Renamed PSExec](/endpoint/detect_renamed_psexec/) | [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution)| Hunting | +| [Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share](/endpoint/executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares)| TTP | +| [Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters](/endpoint/impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [Distributed Component Object Model](/tags/#distributed-component-object-model), [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service)| TTP | +| [Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell](/endpoint/interactive_session_on_remote_endpoint_with_powershell/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [Windows Remote Management](/tags/#windows-remote-management)| TTP | +| [Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn](/endpoint/mmc_lolbas_execution_process_spawn/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [Distributed Component Object Model](/tags/#distributed-component-object-model)| TTP | +| [Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn](/endpoint/possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [Distributed Component Object Model](/tags/#distributed-component-object-model), [Windows Remote Management](/tags/#windows-remote-management), [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation), [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell)| TTP | +| [Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell](/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [Distributed Component Object Model](/tags/#distributed-component-object-model)| TTP | +| [Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell Script Block](/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_script_block/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [Distributed Component Object Model](/tags/#distributed-component-object-model)| TTP | +| [Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell](/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [Windows Remote Management](/tags/#windows-remote-management)| TTP | +| [Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell Script Block](/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_script_block/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [Windows Remote Management](/tags/#windows-remote-management)| TTP | +| [Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and Winrs](/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_winrs/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [Windows Remote Management](/tags/#windows-remote-management)| TTP | +| [Remote Process Instantiation via WMI](/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi/) | [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation)| TTP | +| [Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell](/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell/) | [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation)| TTP | +| [Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell Script Block](/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_script_block/) | [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation)| TTP | +| [Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At](/endpoint/scheduled_task_creation_on_remote_endpoint_using_at/) | [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [At (Windows)](/tags/#at-(windows))| TTP | +| [Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint](/endpoint/scheduled_task_initiation_on_remote_endpoint/) | [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task)| TTP | +| [Schtasks scheduling job on remote system](/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job)| TTP | +| [Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn](/endpoint/services_lolbas_execution_process_spawn/) | [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service)| TTP | +| [Short Lived Scheduled Task](/endpoint/short_lived_scheduled_task/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task)| TTP | +| [Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn](/endpoint/svchost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn/) | [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task)| TTP | +| [Windows Service Created With Suspicious Service Path](/endpoint/windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path/) | [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution)| TTP | +| [Windows Service Created Within Public Path](/endpoint/windows_service_created_within_public_path/) | [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service)| TTP | +| [Windows Service Creation on Remote Endpoint](/endpoint/windows_service_creation_on_remote_endpoint/) | [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service)| TTP | +| [Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry](/endpoint/windows_service_creation_using_registry_entry/) | [Services Registry Permissions Weakness](/tags/#services-registry-permissions-weakness)| TTP | +| [Windows Service Initiation on Remote Endpoint](/endpoint/windows_service_initiation_on_remote_endpoint/) | [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service)| TTP | +| [WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path](/endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job)| TTP | +| [Wmiprsve LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn](/endpoint/wmiprsve_lolbas_execution_process_spawn/) | [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation)| TTP | +| [Wsmprovhost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn](/endpoint/wsmprovhost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [Windows Remote Management](/tags/#windows-remote-management)| TTP | +| [Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name](/endpoint/randomly_generated_scheduled_task_name/) | [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task)| Hunting | +| [Randomly Generated Windows Service Name](/endpoint/randomly_generated_windows_service_name/) | [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service)| Hunting | +| [Remote Desktop Process Running On System](/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system/) | [Remote Desktop Protocol](/tags/#remote-desktop-protocol), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services)| Hunting | +| [Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested](/endpoint/unusual_number_of_computer_service_tickets_requested/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts)| Hunting | +| [Unusual Number of Remote Endpoint Authentication Events](/endpoint/unusual_number_of_remote_endpoint_authentication_events/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts)| Hunting | +| [Remote Desktop Network Traffic](/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic/) | [Remote Desktop Protocol](/tags/#remote-desktop-protocol), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services)| Anomaly | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/active_directory_password_spraying.md b/docs/_stories/active_directory_password_spraying.md index 966c6a09b6..0e0242d6df 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/active_directory_password_spraying.md +++ b/docs/_stories/active_directory_password_spraying.md @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -31,14 +32,14 @@ Specifically, this Analytic Story is focused on detecting possible Password Spra | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Multiple Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos](/endpoint/multiple_disabled_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos/) | [Password Spraying](/tags/#password-spraying), [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force) | Anomaly | -| [Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos](/endpoint/multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos/) | [Password Spraying](/tags/#password-spraying), [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force) | Anomaly | -| [Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM](/endpoint/multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm/) | [Password Spraying](/tags/#password-spraying), [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force) | Anomaly | -| [Multiple Users Attempting To Authenticate Using Explicit Credentials](/endpoint/multiple_users_attempting_to_authenticate_using_explicit_credentials/) | [Password Spraying](/tags/#password-spraying), [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force) | Anomaly | -| [Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos](/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos/) | [Password Spraying](/tags/#password-spraying), [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force) | Anomaly | -| [Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM](/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm/) | [Password Spraying](/tags/#password-spraying), [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force) | Anomaly | -| [Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Process](/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_process/) | [Password Spraying](/tags/#password-spraying), [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force) | Anomaly | -| [Multiple Users Remotely Failing To Authenticate From Host](/endpoint/multiple_users_remotely_failing_to_authenticate_from_host/) | [Password Spraying](/tags/#password-spraying), [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force) | Anomaly | +| [Multiple Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos](/endpoint/multiple_disabled_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos/) | [Password Spraying](/tags/#password-spraying), [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force)| Anomaly | +| [Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos](/endpoint/multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos/) | [Password Spraying](/tags/#password-spraying), [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force)| Anomaly | +| [Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM](/endpoint/multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm/) | [Password Spraying](/tags/#password-spraying), [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force)| Anomaly | +| [Multiple Users Attempting To Authenticate Using Explicit Credentials](/endpoint/multiple_users_attempting_to_authenticate_using_explicit_credentials/) | [Password Spraying](/tags/#password-spraying), [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force)| Anomaly | +| [Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos](/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos/) | [Password Spraying](/tags/#password-spraying), [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force)| Anomaly | +| [Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM](/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm/) | [Password Spraying](/tags/#password-spraying), [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force)| Anomaly | +| [Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Process](/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_process/) | [Password Spraying](/tags/#password-spraying), [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force)| Anomaly | +| [Multiple Users Remotely Failing To Authenticate From Host](/endpoint/multiple_users_remotely_failing_to_authenticate_from_host/) | [Password Spraying](/tags/#password-spraying), [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force)| Anomaly | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/apache_struts_vulnerability.md b/docs/_stories/apache_struts_vulnerability.md index ca8f307c8b..804db44d9c 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/apache_struts_vulnerability.md +++ b/docs/_stories/apache_struts_vulnerability.md @@ -8,6 +8,9 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint + - Actions on Objectives + - Delivery + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -43,9 +46,9 @@ It can also be very helpful to examine various behaviors of the process of inter | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Suspicious Java Classes](/application/suspicious_java_classes/) | | Anomaly | -| [Unusually Long Content-Type Length](/network/unusually_long_content-type_length/) | | Anomaly | -| [Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes](/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes/) | [System Information Discovery](/tags/#system-information-discovery) | TTP | +| [Suspicious Java Classes](/application/suspicious_java_classes/) | None| Anomaly | +| [Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes](/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes/) | [System Information Discovery](/tags/#system-information-discovery)| TTP | +| [Unusually Long Content-Type Length](/network/unusually_long_content-type_length/) | None| Anomaly | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/asset_tracking.md b/docs/_stories/asset_tracking.md index e8b909c3f8..476cc87fa7 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/asset_tracking.md +++ b/docs/_stories/asset_tracking.md @@ -8,6 +8,9 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Network_Sessions + - Actions on Objectives + - Delivery + - Reconnaissance --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -30,7 +33,7 @@ This Analytic Story is designed to help you develop a better understanding of wh | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address](/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address/) | | TTP | +| [Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address](/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address/) | None| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/aws_cross_account_activity.md b/docs/_stories/aws_cross_account_activity.md index 6fffcee516..7d54b5e8b9 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/aws_cross_account_activity.md +++ b/docs/_stories/aws_cross_account_activity.md @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -31,11 +32,11 @@ This Analytic Story includes searches that will help you monitor your AWS CloudT | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [aws detect attach to role policy](/cloud/aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | Hunting | -| [aws detect permanent key creation](/cloud/aws_detect_permanent_key_creation/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | Hunting | -| [aws detect role creation](/cloud/aws_detect_role_creation/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | Hunting | -| [aws detect sts assume role abuse](/cloud/aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | Hunting | -| [aws detect sts get session token abuse](/cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse/) | [Use Alternate Authentication Material](/tags/#use-alternate-authentication-material) | Hunting | +| [aws detect attach to role policy](/cloud/aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts)| Hunting | +| [aws detect permanent key creation](/cloud/aws_detect_permanent_key_creation/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts)| Hunting | +| [aws detect role creation](/cloud/aws_detect_role_creation/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts)| Hunting | +| [aws detect sts assume role abuse](/cloud/aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts)| Hunting | +| [aws detect sts get session token abuse](/cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse/) | [Use Alternate Authentication Material](/tags/#use-alternate-authentication-material)| Hunting | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/aws_cryptomining.md b/docs/_stories/aws_cryptomining.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d2db97af0e --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_stories/aws_cryptomining.md @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +--- +title: "AWS Cryptomining" +last_modified_at: 2018-03-08 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Actions on Objectives + - Exploitation +--- + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior. + +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2018-03-08 +- **Author**: David Dorsey, Splunk +- **ID**: ced74200-8465-4bc3-bd2c-9a782eec6750 + +#### Narrative + +Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority. \ +Cryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS). It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN. \ +When malicious miners appropriate a cloud instance, often spinning up hundreds of new instances, the costs can become astronomical for the account holder. So, it is critically important to monitor your systems for suspicious activities that could indicate that your network has been infiltrated. \ +This Analytic Story is focused on detecting suspicious new instances in your EC2 environment to help prevent such a disaster. It contains detection searches that will detect when a previously unused instance type or AMI is used. It also contains support searches to build lookup files to ensure proper execution of the detection searches. + +#### Detections + +| Name | Technique | Type | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------| +| [Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User](/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts)| Anomaly | +| [Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK](/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user_-_mltk/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts)| Anomaly | +| [EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region](/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region/) | [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](/tags/#unused/unsupported-cloud-regions)| Anomaly | +| [EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI](/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami/) | None| Anomaly | +| [EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type](/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type/) | None| Anomaly | +| [EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User](/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts)| Anomaly | + +#### Reference + +* [https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf](https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/stories/aws_cryptomining.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_stories/aws_iam_privilege_escalation.md b/docs/_stories/aws_iam_privilege_escalation.md index 941fa18846..bb4c51519c 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/aws_iam_privilege_escalation.md +++ b/docs/_stories/aws_iam_privilege_escalation.md @@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud + - Actions on Objectives + - Reconnaissance --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -25,21 +27,21 @@ This analytic story contains detections that query your AWS Cloudtrail for activ #### Narrative Amazon Web Services provides a neat feature called Identity and Access Management (IAM) that enables organizations to manage various AWS services and resources in a secure way. All IAM users have roles, groups and policies associated with them which governs and sets permissions to allow a user to access specific restrictions.\ -However, if these IAM policies are misconfigured and have specific combinations of weak permissions; it can allow attackers to escalate their privileges and further compromise the organization. Rhino Security Labs have published comprehensive blogs detailing various AWS Escalation methods. By using this as an inspiration, Splunk’s research team wants to highlight how these attack vectors look in AWS Cloudtrail logs and provide you with detection queries to uncover these potentially malicious events via this Analytic Story. \ +However, if these IAM policies are misconfigured and have specific combinations of weak permissions; it can allow attackers to escalate their privileges and further compromise the organization. Rhino Security Labs have published comprehensive blogs detailing various AWS Escalation methods. By using this as an inspiration, Splunks research team wants to highlight how these attack vectors look in AWS Cloudtrail logs and provide you with detection queries to uncover these potentially malicious events via this Analytic Story. #### Detections | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources](/cloud/aws_create_policy_version_to_allow_all_resources/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts), [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | TTP | -| [AWS CreateAccessKey](/cloud/aws_createaccesskey/) | [Cloud Account](/tags/#cloud-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account) | Hunting | -| [AWS CreateLoginProfile](/cloud/aws_createloginprofile/) | [Cloud Account](/tags/#cloud-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account) | TTP | -| [AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force](/cloud/aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force/) | [Cloud Infrastructure Discovery](/tags/#cloud-infrastructure-discovery), [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force) | TTP | -| [AWS IAM Delete Policy](/cloud/aws_iam_delete_policy/) | [Account Manipulation](/tags/#account-manipulation) | Hunting | -| [AWS IAM Failure Group Deletion](/cloud/aws_iam_failure_group_deletion/) | [Account Manipulation](/tags/#account-manipulation) | Anomaly | -| [AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion](/cloud/aws_iam_successful_group_deletion/) | [Cloud Groups](/tags/#cloud-groups), [Account Manipulation](/tags/#account-manipulation), [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery) | Hunting | -| [AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion](/cloud/aws_setdefaultpolicyversion/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts), [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | TTP | -| [AWS UpdateLoginProfile](/cloud/aws_updateloginprofile/) | [Cloud Account](/tags/#cloud-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account) | TTP | +| [AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources](/cloud/aws_create_policy_version_to_allow_all_resources/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts), [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts)| TTP | +| [AWS CreateAccessKey](/cloud/aws_createaccesskey/) | [Cloud Account](/tags/#cloud-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account)| Hunting | +| [AWS CreateLoginProfile](/cloud/aws_createloginprofile/) | [Cloud Account](/tags/#cloud-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account)| TTP | +| [AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force](/cloud/aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force/) | [Cloud Infrastructure Discovery](/tags/#cloud-infrastructure-discovery), [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force)| TTP | +| [AWS IAM Delete Policy](/cloud/aws_iam_delete_policy/) | [Account Manipulation](/tags/#account-manipulation)| Hunting | +| [AWS IAM Failure Group Deletion](/cloud/aws_iam_failure_group_deletion/) | [Account Manipulation](/tags/#account-manipulation)| Anomaly | +| [AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion](/cloud/aws_iam_successful_group_deletion/) | [Cloud Groups](/tags/#cloud-groups), [Account Manipulation](/tags/#account-manipulation), [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery)| Hunting | +| [AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion](/cloud/aws_setdefaultpolicyversion/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts), [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts)| TTP | +| [AWS UpdateLoginProfile](/cloud/aws_updateloginprofile/) | [Cloud Account](/tags/#cloud-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/aws_network_acl_activity.md b/docs/_stories/aws_network_acl_activity.md index 359fbc3f4e..5e385cd391 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/aws_network_acl_activity.md +++ b/docs/_stories/aws_network_acl_activity.md @@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud + - Actions on Objectives + - Command & Control --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -30,9 +32,10 @@ AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, a | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports](/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports/) | [Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-cloud-firewall), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | -| [AWS Network Access Control List Deleted](/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted/) | [Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-cloud-firewall), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | Anomaly | -| [Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS](/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws/) | | Anomaly | +| [AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports](/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports/) | [Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-cloud-firewall), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| TTP | +| [AWS Network Access Control List Deleted](/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted/) | [Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-cloud-firewall), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| Anomaly | +| [Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity](/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity/) | [Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-cloud-firewall)| Anomaly | +| [Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS](/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws/) | None| Anomaly | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/aws_security_hub_alerts.md b/docs/_stories/aws_security_hub_alerts.md index 5ca7a8fa58..dcb7accb37 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/aws_security_hub_alerts.md +++ b/docs/_stories/aws_security_hub_alerts.md @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -30,8 +31,8 @@ AWS Security Hub collects and consolidates findings from AWS security services e | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance](/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance/) | | Anomaly | -| [Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User](/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user/) | | Anomaly | +| [Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance](/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance/) | None| Anomaly | +| [Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User](/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user/) | None| Anomaly | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities.md b/docs/_stories/aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..59f3817c1f --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_stories/aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities.md @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +--- +title: "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities" +last_modified_at: 2018-03-16 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Exploitation +--- + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +Monitor your AWS provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your network. + +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2018-03-16 +- **Author**: David Dorsey, Splunk +- **ID**: 3338b567-3804-4261-9889-cf0ca4753c7f + +#### Narrative + +Because most enterprise AWS activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to add specific IPs to an allow list because they vary. \ +This Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further. + +#### Detections + +| Name | Technique | Type | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------| +| [AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City](/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city/) | [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](/tags/#unused/unsupported-cloud-regions)| Anomaly | +| [AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country](/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country/) | [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](/tags/#unused/unsupported-cloud-regions)| Anomaly | +| [AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address](/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address/) | None| Anomaly | +| [AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region](/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region/) | [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](/tags/#unused/unsupported-cloud-regions)| Anomaly | + +#### Reference + +* [https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf](https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/stories/aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_stories/aws_user_monitoring.md b/docs/_stories/aws_user_monitoring.md index 37ff25e044..f5c2c1deab 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/aws_user_monitoring.md +++ b/docs/_stories/aws_user_monitoring.md @@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud + - Actions on Objectives + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -32,7 +34,12 @@ The detection searches in this Analytic Story are designed to help you uncover A | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [AWS Excessive Security Scanning](/cloud/aws_excessive_security_scanning/) | [Cloud Service Discovery](/tags/#cloud-service-discovery) | TTP | +| [AWS Excessive Security Scanning](/cloud/aws_excessive_security_scanning/) | [Cloud Service Discovery](/tags/#cloud-service-discovery)| TTP | +| [Detect API activity from users without MFA](/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa/) | None| Hunting | +| [Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts](/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts)| Hunting | +| [Detect new API calls from user roles](/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts)| Anomaly | +| [Detect Spike in AWS API Activity](/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts)| Anomaly | +| [Detect Spike in Security Group Activity](/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts)| Anomaly | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/baron_samedit_cve-2021-3156.md b/docs/_stories/baron_samedit_cve-2021-3156.md index e4d963063c..9b82076f7e 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/baron_samedit_cve-2021-3156.md +++ b/docs/_stories/baron_samedit_cve-2021-3156.md @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -29,9 +30,9 @@ A non-privledged user is able to execute the sudoedit command to trigger a buffe | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156](/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve-2021-3156/) | [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](/tags/#exploitation-for-privilege-escalation) | TTP | -| [Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault](/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve-2021-3156_segfault/) | [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](/tags/#exploitation-for-privilege-escalation) | TTP | -| [Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery](/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve-2021-3156_via_osquery/) | [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](/tags/#exploitation-for-privilege-escalation) | TTP | +| [Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156](/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve-2021-3156/) | [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](/tags/#exploitation-for-privilege-escalation)| TTP | +| [Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault](/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve-2021-3156_segfault/) | [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](/tags/#exploitation-for-privilege-escalation)| TTP | +| [Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery](/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve-2021-3156_via_osquery/) | [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](/tags/#exploitation-for-privilege-escalation)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/bits_jobs.md b/docs/_stories/bits_jobs.md index fd680b0a71..8f941660f3 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/bits_jobs.md +++ b/docs/_stories/bits_jobs.md @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint - - Endpoint_Processes + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ tags: Adversaries may abuse BITS jobs to persistently execute or clean up after malicious payloads. - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud -- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint), [Endpoint_Processes](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/EndpointProcesses) +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-03-26 - **Author**: Michael Haag, Splunk - **ID**: dbc7edce-8e4c-11eb-9f31-acde48001122 @@ -31,12 +31,9 @@ Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, async | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [BITS Job Persistence](/endpoint/bits_job_persistence/) | [BITS Jobs](/tags/#bits-jobs) | TTP | -| [BITSAdmin Download File](/endpoint/bitsadmin_download_file/) | [BITS Jobs](/tags/#bits-jobs), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer) | TTP | -| [PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer](/endpoint/powershell_start-bitstransfer/) | [BITS Jobs](/tags/#bits-jobs) | TTP | -| [Windows Bits Job Persistence](/endpoint/windows_bits_job_persistence/) | [BITS Jobs](/tags/#bits-jobs) | TTP | -| [Windows Bitsadmin Download File](/endpoint/windows_bitsadmin_download_file/) | [BITS Jobs](/tags/#bits-jobs), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer) | TTP | -| [Windows PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer](/endpoint/windows_powershell_start-bitstransfer/) | [BITS Jobs](/tags/#bits-jobs), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer) | TTP | +| [BITS Job Persistence](/endpoint/bits_job_persistence/) | [BITS Jobs](/tags/#bits-jobs)| TTP | +| [BITSAdmin Download File](/endpoint/bitsadmin_download_file/) | [BITS Jobs](/tags/#bits-jobs), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer)| TTP | +| [PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer](/endpoint/powershell_start-bitstransfer/) | [BITS Jobs](/tags/#bits-jobs)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/blackmatter_ransomware.md b/docs/_stories/blackmatter_ransomware.md index c6dc072cdb..4b8d85e38d 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/blackmatter_ransomware.md +++ b/docs/_stories/blackmatter_ransomware.md @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -30,13 +31,13 @@ BlackMatter ransomware campaigns targeting healthcare and other vertical sectors | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Add DefaultUser And Password In Registry](/endpoint/add_defaultuser_and_password_in_registry/) | [Credentials in Registry](/tags/#credentials-in-registry), [Unsecured Credentials](/tags/#unsecured-credentials) | Anomaly | -| [Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry](/endpoint/auto_admin_logon_registry_entry/) | [Credentials in Registry](/tags/#credentials-in-registry), [Unsecured Credentials](/tags/#unsecured-credentials) | TTP | -| [Bcdedit Command Back To Normal Mode Boot](/endpoint/bcdedit_command_back_to_normal_mode_boot/) | [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery) | TTP | -| [Change To Safe Mode With Network Config](/endpoint/change_to_safe_mode_with_network_config/) | [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery) | TTP | -| [Known Services Killed by Ransomware](/endpoint/known_services_killed_by_ransomware/) | [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery) | TTP | -| [Modification Of Wallpaper](/endpoint/modification_of_wallpaper/) | [Defacement](/tags/#defacement) | TTP | -| [Ransomware Notes bulk creation](/endpoint/ransomware_notes_bulk_creation/) | [Data Encrypted for Impact](/tags/#data-encrypted-for-impact) | Anomaly | +| [Add DefaultUser And Password In Registry](/endpoint/add_defaultuser_and_password_in_registry/) | [Credentials in Registry](/tags/#credentials-in-registry), [Unsecured Credentials](/tags/#unsecured-credentials)| Anomaly | +| [Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry](/endpoint/auto_admin_logon_registry_entry/) | [Credentials in Registry](/tags/#credentials-in-registry), [Unsecured Credentials](/tags/#unsecured-credentials)| TTP | +| [Bcdedit Command Back To Normal Mode Boot](/endpoint/bcdedit_command_back_to_normal_mode_boot/) | [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery)| TTP | +| [Change To Safe Mode With Network Config](/endpoint/change_to_safe_mode_with_network_config/) | [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery)| TTP | +| [Known Services Killed by Ransomware](/endpoint/known_services_killed_by_ransomware/) | [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery)| TTP | +| [Modification Of Wallpaper](/endpoint/modification_of_wallpaper/) | [Defacement](/tags/#defacement)| TTP | +| [Ransomware Notes bulk creation](/endpoint/ransomware_notes_bulk_creation/) | [Data Encrypted for Impact](/tags/#data-encrypted-for-impact)| Anomaly | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/brand_monitoring.md b/docs/_stories/brand_monitoring.md index 44e1cbd2ff..ef53170244 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/brand_monitoring.md +++ b/docs/_stories/brand_monitoring.md @@ -8,7 +8,10 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Email + - Network_Resolution - Web + - Actions on Objectives + - Delivery --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -18,7 +21,7 @@ tags: Detect and investigate activity that may indicate that an adversary is using faux domains to mislead users into interacting with malicious infrastructure. Monitor DNS, email, and web traffic for permutations of your brand name. - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud -- **Datamodel**: [Email](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Email), [Web](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Web) +- **Datamodel**: [Email](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Email), [Network_Resolution](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkResolution), [Web](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Web) - **Last Updated**: 2017-12-19 - **Author**: David Dorsey, Splunk - **ID**: 91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e1fce78 @@ -33,8 +36,9 @@ Notable events will include IP addresses, URLs, and user data. Drilling down can | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Monitor Email For Brand Abuse](/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse/) | | TTP | -| [Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse](/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse/) | | TTP | +| [Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse](/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse/) | None| TTP | +| [Monitor Email For Brand Abuse](/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse/) | None| TTP | +| [Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse](/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse/) | None| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/clop_ransomware.md b/docs/_stories/clop_ransomware.md index cc71f6534d..69d1b00ab0 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/clop_ransomware.md +++ b/docs/_stories/clop_ransomware.md @@ -8,8 +8,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint - - Endpoint_Filesystem - - Endpoint_Processes + - Actions on Objectives + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ tags: Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Clop ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Clope, encrypting network shares, deleting and resizing shadow volume storage, registry key modification, deleting of security logs, and more. - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud -- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint), [Endpoint_Filesystem](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/EndpointFilesystem), [Endpoint_Processes](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/EndpointProcesses) +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-03-17 - **Author**: Rod Soto, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk - **ID**: 5a6f6849-1a26-4fae-aa05-fa730556eeb6 @@ -32,23 +32,20 @@ Clop ransomware campaigns targeting healthcare and other vertical sectors, invol | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Clop Common Exec Parameter](/endpoint/clop_common_exec_parameter/) | [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution) | TTP | -| [Clop Ransomware Known Service Name](/endpoint/clop_ransomware_known_service_name/) | [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process) | TTP | -| [Common Ransomware Extensions](/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction) | Hunting | -| [Common Ransomware Notes](/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction) | Hunting | -| [Deleting Shadow Copies](/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies/) | [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery) | TTP | -| [High File Deletion Frequency](/endpoint/high_file_deletion_frequency/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction) | Anomaly | -| [High Process Termination Frequency](/endpoint/high_process_termination_frequency/) | [Data Encrypted for Impact](/tags/#data-encrypted-for-impact) | Anomaly | -| [Process Deleting Its Process File Path](/endpoint/process_deleting_its_process_file_path/) | [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host) | TTP | -| [Ransomware Notes bulk creation](/endpoint/ransomware_notes_bulk_creation/) | [Data Encrypted for Impact](/tags/#data-encrypted-for-impact) | Anomaly | -| [Resize ShadowStorage volume](/endpoint/resize_shadowstorage_volume/) | [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery) | TTP | -| [Resize Shadowstorage Volume](/endpoint/resize_shadowstorage_volume/) | [Service Stop](/tags/#service-stop) | TTP | -| [Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior](/endpoint/suspicious_event_log_service_behavior/) | [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Clear Windows Event Logs](/tags/#clear-windows-event-logs) | TTP | -| [Suspicious wevtutil Usage](/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage/) | [Clear Windows Event Logs](/tags/#clear-windows-event-logs), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host) | TTP | -| [WevtUtil Usage To Clear Logs](/endpoint/wevtutil_usage_to_clear_logs/) | [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Clear Windows Event Logs](/tags/#clear-windows-event-logs) | TTP | -| [Windows Event Log Cleared](/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared/) | [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Clear Windows Event Logs](/tags/#clear-windows-event-logs) | TTP | -| [Windows High File Deletion Frequency](/endpoint/windows_high_file_deletion_frequency/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction) | Anomaly | -| [Windows Service Created With Suspicious Service Path](/endpoint/windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path/) | [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution) | TTP | +| [Clop Common Exec Parameter](/endpoint/clop_common_exec_parameter/) | [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution)| TTP | +| [Clop Ransomware Known Service Name](/endpoint/clop_ransomware_known_service_name/) | [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process)| TTP | +| [Common Ransomware Extensions](/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction)| Hunting | +| [Common Ransomware Notes](/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction)| Hunting | +| [Deleting Shadow Copies](/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies/) | [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery)| TTP | +| [High Process Termination Frequency](/endpoint/high_process_termination_frequency/) | [Data Encrypted for Impact](/tags/#data-encrypted-for-impact)| Anomaly | +| [Process Deleting Its Process File Path](/endpoint/process_deleting_its_process_file_path/) | [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host)| TTP | +| [Ransomware Notes bulk creation](/endpoint/ransomware_notes_bulk_creation/) | [Data Encrypted for Impact](/tags/#data-encrypted-for-impact)| Anomaly | +| [Resize ShadowStorage volume](/endpoint/resize_shadowstorage_volume/) | [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery)| TTP | +| [Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior](/endpoint/suspicious_event_log_service_behavior/) | [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Clear Windows Event Logs](/tags/#clear-windows-event-logs)| TTP | +| [Suspicious wevtutil Usage](/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage/) | [Clear Windows Event Logs](/tags/#clear-windows-event-logs), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host)| TTP | +| [Windows Event Log Cleared](/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared/) | [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Clear Windows Event Logs](/tags/#clear-windows-event-logs)| TTP | +| [Windows High File Deletion Frequency](/endpoint/windows_high_file_deletion_frequency/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction)| Anomaly | +| [Windows Service Created With Suspicious Service Path](/endpoint/windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path/) | [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/cloud_cryptomining.md b/docs/_stories/cloud_cryptomining.md index 5b3567ce17..3ea75f75ac 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/cloud_cryptomining.md +++ b/docs/_stories/cloud_cryptomining.md @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Change + - Actions on Objectives --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -34,11 +35,11 @@ This Analytic Story is focused on detecting suspicious new instances in your clo | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched](/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_launched/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts), [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | Anomaly | -| [Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User](/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts), [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | Anomaly | -| [Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region](/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region/) | [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](/tags/#unused/unsupported-cloud-regions) | Anomaly | -| [Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image](/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image/) | | Anomaly | -| [Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type](/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type/) | | Anomaly | +| [Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User](/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts), [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts)| Anomaly | +| [Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region](/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region/) | [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](/tags/#unused/unsupported-cloud-regions)| Anomaly | +| [Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image](/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image/) | None| Anomaly | +| [Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type](/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type/) | None| Anomaly | +| [Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched](/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_launched/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts), [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts)| Anomaly | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/cloud_federated_credential_abuse.md b/docs/_stories/cloud_federated_credential_abuse.md index f9f7b133cd..6cda73f89c 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/cloud_federated_credential_abuse.md +++ b/docs/_stories/cloud_federated_credential_abuse.md @@ -9,6 +9,10 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint + - Actions on Objectives + - Command & Control + - Exploitation + - Installation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -31,16 +35,17 @@ This story is composed of detection searches based on endpoint that addresses th | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal](/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | Anomaly | -| [AWS SAML Update identity provider](/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | TTP | -| [Certutil exe certificate extraction](/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction/) | | TTP | -| [Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images](/endpoint/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | TTP | -| [Detect Rare Executables](/endpoint/detect_rare_executables/) | | Anomaly | -| [O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User](/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user/) | [Cloud Account](/tags/#cloud-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account) | TTP | -| [O365 Added Service Principal](/cloud/o365_added_service_principal/) | [Cloud Account](/tags/#cloud-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account) | TTP | -| [O365 Excessive SSO logon errors](/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors/) | [Modify Authentication Process](/tags/#modify-authentication-process) | Anomaly | -| [O365 New Federated Domain Added](/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added/) | [Cloud Account](/tags/#cloud-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account) | TTP | -| [Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation](/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation/) | [Image File Execution Options Injection](/tags/#image-file-execution-options-injection), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution) | TTP | +| [AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal](/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts)| Anomaly | +| [AWS SAML Update identity provider](/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts)| TTP | +| [O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User](/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user/) | [Cloud Account](/tags/#cloud-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account)| TTP | +| [O365 Added Service Principal](/cloud/o365_added_service_principal/) | [Cloud Account](/tags/#cloud-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account)| TTP | +| [O365 Excessive SSO logon errors](/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors/) | [Modify Authentication Process](/tags/#modify-authentication-process)| Anomaly | +| [O365 New Federated Domain Added](/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added/) | [Cloud Account](/tags/#cloud-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account)| TTP | +| [Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703](/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory)| TTP | +| [Certutil exe certificate extraction](/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction/) | None| TTP | +| [Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images](/endpoint/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping)| TTP | +| [Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation](/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation/) | [Image File Execution Options Injection](/tags/#image-file-execution-options-injection), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution)| TTP | +| [Detect Rare Executables](/endpoint/detect_rare_executables/) | None| Anomaly | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/cobalt_strike.md b/docs/_stories/cobalt_strike.md index fd43af76df..fc7c2e5637 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/cobalt_strike.md +++ b/docs/_stories/cobalt_strike.md @@ -8,7 +8,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint - - Endpoint_Processes + - Actions on Objectives + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -18,7 +19,7 @@ tags: Cobalt Strike is threat emulation software. Red teams and penetration testers use Cobalt Strike to demonstrate the risk of a breach and evaluate mature security programs. Most recently, Cobalt Strike has become the choice tool by threat groups due to its ease of use and extensibility. - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud -- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint), [Endpoint_Processes](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/EndpointProcesses) +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-02-16 - **Author**: Michael Haag, Splunk - **ID**: bcfd17e8-5461-400a-80a2-3b7d1459220c @@ -40,24 +41,23 @@ While investigating a detection related to this Analytic Story, keep in mind the | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Anomalous usage of 7zip](/endpoint/anomalous_usage_of_7zip/) | [Archive via Utility](/tags/#archive-via-utility), [Archive Collected Data](/tags/#archive-collected-data) | Anomaly | -| [Anomalous usage of Archive Tools](/endpoint/anomalous_usage_of_archive_tools/) | [Archive via Utility](/tags/#archive-via-utility), [Archive Collected Data](/tags/#archive-collected-data) | Anomaly | -| [CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation](/endpoint/cmd_echo_pipe_-_escalation/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process) | TTP | -| [Cobalt Strike Named Pipes](/endpoint/cobalt_strike_named_pipes/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection) | TTP | -| [DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network](/endpoint/dllhost_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection) | TTP | -| [Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass](/endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32) | TTP | -| [GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network](/endpoint/gpupdate_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection) | TTP | -| [Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network](/endpoint/rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | TTP | -| [SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network](/endpoint/searchprotocolhost_with_no_command_line_with_network/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection) | TTP | -| [Services Escalate Exe](/endpoint/services_escalate_exe/) | [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | TTP | -| [Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments](/endpoint/suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection) | TTP | -| [Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments](/endpoint/suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection) | TTP | -| [Suspicious MSBuild Rename](/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [MSBuild](/tags/#msbuild) | TTP | -| [Suspicious Rundll32 StartW](/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | TTP | -| [Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments](/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | TTP | -| [Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments](/endpoint/suspicious_searchprotocolhost_no_command_line_arguments/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection) | TTP | -| [Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename](/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities) | Hunting | -| [Suspicious msbuild path](/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [MSBuild](/tags/#msbuild) | TTP | +| [Anomalous usage of 7zip](/endpoint/anomalous_usage_of_7zip/) | [Archive via Utility](/tags/#archive-via-utility), [Archive Collected Data](/tags/#archive-collected-data)| Anomaly | +| [CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation](/endpoint/cmd_echo_pipe_-_escalation/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process)| TTP | +| [Cobalt Strike Named Pipes](/endpoint/cobalt_strike_named_pipes/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection)| TTP | +| [Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass](/endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32)| TTP | +| [DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network](/endpoint/dllhost_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection)| TTP | +| [GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network](/endpoint/gpupdate_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection)| TTP | +| [Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network](/endpoint/rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32)| TTP | +| [SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network](/endpoint/searchprotocolhost_with_no_command_line_with_network/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection)| TTP | +| [Services Escalate Exe](/endpoint/services_escalate_exe/) | [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism)| TTP | +| [Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments](/endpoint/suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection)| TTP | +| [Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments](/endpoint/suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection)| TTP | +| [Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename](/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities)| Hunting | +| [Suspicious msbuild path](/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [MSBuild](/tags/#msbuild)| TTP | +| [Suspicious MSBuild Rename](/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [MSBuild](/tags/#msbuild)| TTP | +| [Suspicious Rundll32 StartW](/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32)| TTP | +| [Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments](/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32)| TTP | +| [Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments](/endpoint/suspicious_searchprotocolhost_no_command_line_arguments/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/coldroot_macos_rat.md b/docs/_stories/coldroot_macos_rat.md index f426bd03d7..bc50283cb3 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/coldroot_macos_rat.md +++ b/docs/_stories/coldroot_macos_rat.md @@ -7,6 +7,9 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud + - Endpoint + - Command & Control + - Installation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -16,7 +19,7 @@ tags: Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that relate to the ColdRoot Remote Access Trojan that affects MacOS. An example of some of these activities are changing sensative binaries in the MacOS sub-system, detecting process names and executables associated with the RAT, detecting when a keyboard tab is installed on a MacOS machine and more. - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud -- **Datamodel**: +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2019-01-09 - **Author**: Jose Hernandez, Splunk - **ID**: bd91a2bc-d20b-4f44-a982-1bea98e86390 @@ -31,7 +34,9 @@ Searches in this Analytic Story leverage the capabilities of OSquery to address | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Processes Tapping Keyboard Events](/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events/) | | TTP | +| [Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection](/deprecated/osquery_pack_-_coldroot_detection/) | None| TTP | +| [MacOS - Re-opened Applications](/endpoint/macos_-_re-opened_applications/) | None| TTP | +| [Processes Tapping Keyboard Events](/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events/) | None| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/collection_and_staging.md b/docs/_stories/collection_and_staging.md index 21dfeff9ce..80ed684105 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/collection_and_staging.md +++ b/docs/_stories/collection_and_staging.md @@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint - Network_Traffic + - Actions on Objectives + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -33,12 +35,13 @@ Use the searches to detect and monitor suspicious behavior related to these acti | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Detect Renamed 7-Zip](/endpoint/detect_renamed_7-zip/) | [Archive via Utility](/tags/#archive-via-utility), [Archive Collected Data](/tags/#archive-collected-data) | Hunting | -| [Detect Renamed WinRAR](/endpoint/detect_renamed_winrar/) | [Archive via Utility](/tags/#archive-via-utility), [Archive Collected Data](/tags/#archive-collected-data) | Hunting | -| [Email files written outside of the Outlook directory](/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory/) | [Email Collection](/tags/#email-collection), [Local Email Collection](/tags/#local-email-collection) | TTP | -| [Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts](/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts/) | [Email Collection](/tags/#email-collection), [Remote Email Collection](/tags/#remote-email-collection) | Anomaly | -| [Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server](/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server/) | [Remote Email Collection](/tags/#remote-email-collection), [Email Collection](/tags/#email-collection) | Anomaly | -| [Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin](/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading) | TTP | +| [Suspicious writes to System Volume Information](/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading)| Hunting | +| [Detect Renamed 7-Zip](/endpoint/detect_renamed_7-zip/) | [Archive via Utility](/tags/#archive-via-utility), [Archive Collected Data](/tags/#archive-collected-data)| Hunting | +| [Detect Renamed WinRAR](/endpoint/detect_renamed_winrar/) | [Archive via Utility](/tags/#archive-via-utility), [Archive Collected Data](/tags/#archive-collected-data)| Hunting | +| [Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin](/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading)| TTP | +| [Email files written outside of the Outlook directory](/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory/) | [Email Collection](/tags/#email-collection), [Local Email Collection](/tags/#local-email-collection)| TTP | +| [Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts](/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts/) | [Email Collection](/tags/#email-collection), [Remote Email Collection](/tags/#remote-email-collection)| Anomaly | +| [Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server](/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server/) | [Remote Email Collection](/tags/#remote-email-collection), [Email Collection](/tags/#email-collection)| Anomaly | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/command_and_control.md b/docs/_stories/command_and_control.md index 69411e5d8c..4774021ae1 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/command_and_control.md +++ b/docs/_stories/command_and_control.md @@ -8,9 +8,12 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint - - Endpoint_Processes - Network_Resolution - Network_Traffic + - Actions on Objectives + - Command & Control + - Delivery + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -20,7 +23,7 @@ tags: Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged by attackers to establish and operate command and control channels. Implants installed by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions and send data back to the malicious operators. - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud -- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint), [Endpoint_Processes](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/EndpointProcesses), [Network_Resolution](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkResolution), [Network_Traffic](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkTraffic) +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint), [Network_Resolution](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkResolution), [Network_Traffic](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkTraffic) - **Last Updated**: 2018-06-01 - **Author**: Rico Valdez, Splunk - **ID**: 943773c6-c4de-4f38-89a8-0b92f98804d8 @@ -34,20 +37,23 @@ Because this communication is so critical for an adversary, they often use techn | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App](/endpoint/dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app/) | [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol) | TTP | -| [DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App](/endpoint/dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app/) | [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol) | TTP | -| [DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK](/network/dns_query_length_outliers_-_mltk/) | [DNS](/tags/#dns), [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol) | Anomaly | -| [DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation](/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol) | Anomaly | -| [Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets](/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets/) | [Non-Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#non-application-layer-protocol) | TTP | -| [Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS](/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws/) | | Anomaly | -| [Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers](/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers/) | [Drive-by Compromise](/tags/#drive-by-compromise) | TTP | -| [Excessive DNS Failures](/network/excessive_dns_failures/) | [DNS](/tags/#dns), [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol) | Anomaly | -| [Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App](/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app/) | [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol) | Anomaly | -| [Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic](/network/multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol) | TTP | -| [Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data](/network/plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol) | TTP | -| [Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed](/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed/) | [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol) | TTP | -| [Protocol or Port Mismatch](/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol) | Anomaly | -| [TOR Traffic](/network/tor_traffic/) | [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol), [Web Protocols](/tags/#web-protocols) | TTP | +| [Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers](/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol)| TTP | +| [Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response](/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol)| TTP | +| [Detection of DNS Tunnels](/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol)| TTP | +| [DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers](/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers/) | [DNS](/tags/#dns)| TTP | +| [DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App](/endpoint/dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app/) | [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol)| TTP | +| [Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App](/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app/) | [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol)| Anomaly | +| [Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS](/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws/) | None| Anomaly | +| [Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets](/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets/) | [Non-Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#non-application-layer-protocol)| TTP | +| [DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK](/network/dns_query_length_outliers_-_mltk/) | [DNS](/tags/#dns), [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol)| Anomaly | +| [Excessive DNS Failures](/network/excessive_dns_failures/) | [DNS](/tags/#dns), [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol)| Anomaly | +| [Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed](/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed/) | [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol)| TTP | +| [Protocol or Port Mismatch](/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol)| Anomaly | +| [TOR Traffic](/network/tor_traffic/) | [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol), [Web Protocols](/tags/#web-protocols)| TTP | +| [Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers](/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers/) | [Drive-by Compromise](/tags/#drive-by-compromise)| TTP | +| [DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation](/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol)| Anomaly | +| [Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic](/network/multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol)| TTP | +| [Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data](/network/plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/common_phishing_frameworks.md b/docs/_stories/common_phishing_frameworks.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..827f39c280 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_stories/common_phishing_frameworks.md @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +--- +title: "Common Phishing Frameworks" +last_modified_at: 2019-04-29 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Network_Resolution + - Command & Control + - Delivery +--- + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +Detect DNS and web requests to fake websites generated by the EvilGinx2 toolkit. These websites are designed to fool unwitting users who have clicked on a malicious link in a phishing email. + +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: [Network_Resolution](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkResolution) +- **Last Updated**: 2019-04-29 +- **Author**: Splunk Research Team, Splunk +- **ID**: 9a64ab44-9214-4639-8163-7eaa2621bd61 + +#### Narrative + +As most people know, these emails use fraudulent domains, [email scraping](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), familiar contact names inserted as senders, and other tactics to lure targets into clicking a malicious link, opening an attachment with a [nefarious payload](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), or entering sensitive personal information that perpetrators may intercept. This attack technique requires a relatively low level of skill and allows adversaries to easily cast a wide net. Because phishing is a technique that relies on human psychology, you will never be able to eliminate this vulnerability 100%. But you can use automated detection to significantly reduce the risks.\ +This Analytic Story focuses on detecting signs of MiTM attacks enabled by [EvilGinx2](https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2), a toolkit that sets up a transparent proxy between the targeted site and the user. In this way, the attacker is able to intercept credentials and two-factor identification tokens. It employs a proxy template to allow a registered domain to impersonate targeted sites, such as Linkedin, Amazon, Okta, Github, Twitter, Instagram, Reddit, Office 365, and others. It can even register SSL certificates and camouflage them via a URL shortener, making them difficult to detect. Searches in this story look for signs of MiTM attacks enabled by EvilGinx2. + +#### Detections + +| Name | Technique | Type | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------| +| [Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2](/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2/) | [Spearphishing via Service](/tags/#spearphishing-via-service)| TTP | + +#### Reference + +* [https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2](https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2) +* [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1192/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1192/) +* [https://breakdev.org/evilginx-advanced-phishing-with-two-factor-authentication-bypass/](https://breakdev.org/evilginx-advanced-phishing-with-two-factor-authentication-bypass/) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/stories/common_phishing_frameworks.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_stories/container_implantation_monitoring_and_investigation.md b/docs/_stories/container_implantation_monitoring_and_investigation.md index 16eaac650e..d39b89f55d 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/container_implantation_monitoring_and_investigation.md +++ b/docs/_stories/container_implantation_monitoring_and_investigation.md @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -29,7 +30,8 @@ Container Registrys provide a way for organizations to keep customized images of | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [New container uploaded to AWS ECR](/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr/) | [Implant Internal Image](/tags/#implant-internal-image) | Hunting | +| [GCP GCR container uploaded](/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded/) | [Implant Internal Image](/tags/#implant-internal-image)| Hunting | +| [New container uploaded to AWS ECR](/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr/) | [Implant Internal Image](/tags/#implant-internal-image)| Hunting | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/credential_dumping.md b/docs/_stories/credential_dumping.md index 99b0828fa0..6c33f6adf1 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/credential_dumping.md +++ b/docs/_stories/credential_dumping.md @@ -7,9 +7,10 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Certificates - Endpoint - - Endpoint_Processes + - Actions on Objectives + - Exploitation + - Installation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -19,7 +20,7 @@ tags: Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords. The threat actors use these pilfered credentials to further escalate privileges and spread throughout a target environment. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to credential dumping. - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud -- **Datamodel**: [Certificates](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Certificates), [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint), [Endpoint_Processes](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/EndpointProcesses) +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2020-02-04 - **Author**: Rico Valdez, Splunk - **ID**: 854d78bf-d0e2-4f4e-b05c-640905f86d7a @@ -34,32 +35,31 @@ The detection searches in this Analytic Story monitor access to the Local Securi | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation](/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | TTP | -| [Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe](/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe/) | [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | TTP | -| [Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe](/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe/) | [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager) | TTP | -| [Create Remote Thread into LSASS](/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | TTP | -| [Creation of Shadow Copy](/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy/) | [NTDS](/tags/#ntds), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | TTP | -| [Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell](/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell/) | [NTDS](/tags/#ntds), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | TTP | -| [Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr](/endpoint/creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | TTP | -| [Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy](/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy/) | [NTDS](/tags/#ntds), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | TTP | -| [Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy](/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy/) | [NTDS](/tags/#ntds), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | TTP | -| [Detect Copy of ShadowCopy with Script Block Logging](/endpoint/detect_copy_of_shadowcopy_with_script_block_logging/) | [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | TTP | -| [Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access](/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | TTP | -| [Detect Dump LSASS Memory using comsvcs](/endpoint/detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs/) | [NTDS](/tags/#ntds), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | TTP | -| [Detect Kerberoasting](/endpoint/detect_kerberoasting/) | [Kerberoasting](/tags/#kerberoasting), [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets) | TTP | -| [Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images](/endpoint/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | TTP | -| [Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL](/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | TTP | -| [Dump LSASS via procdump](/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | TTP | -| [Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry](/endpoint/enable_wdigest_uselogoncredential_registry/) | [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | TTP | -| [Esentutl SAM Copy](/endpoint/esentutl_sam_copy/) | [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | Hunting | -| [Extraction of Registry Hives](/endpoint/extraction_of_registry_hives/) | [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | TTP | -| [Ntdsutil Export NTDS](/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds/) | [NTDS](/tags/#ntds), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | TTP | -| [SAM Database File Access Attempt](/endpoint/sam_database_file_access_attempt/) | [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | Hunting | -| [SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool](/endpoint/secretdumps_offline_ntds_dumping_tool/) | [NTDS](/tags/#ntds), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | TTP | -| [Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass](/endpoint/set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell) | TTP | -| [Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass](/endpoint/windows_hunting_system_account_targeting_lsass/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | Hunting | -| [Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass](/endpoint/windows_non-system_account_targeting_lsass/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | TTP | -| [Windows Possible Credential Dumping](/endpoint/windows_possible_credential_dumping/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | TTP | +| [Dump LSASS via procdump Rename](/deprecated/dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory)| Hunting | +| [Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS](/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory)| TTP | +| [Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation](/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping)| TTP | +| [Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe](/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe/) | [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping)| TTP | +| [Create Remote Thread into LSASS](/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping)| TTP | +| [Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr](/endpoint/creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping)| TTP | +| [Creation of Shadow Copy](/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy/) | [NTDS](/tags/#ntds), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping)| TTP | +| [Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell](/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell/) | [NTDS](/tags/#ntds), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping)| TTP | +| [Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy](/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy/) | [NTDS](/tags/#ntds), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping)| TTP | +| [Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy](/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy/) | [NTDS](/tags/#ntds), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping)| TTP | +| [Detect Copy of ShadowCopy with Script Block Logging](/endpoint/detect_copy_of_shadowcopy_with_script_block_logging/) | [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping)| TTP | +| [Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access](/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping)| TTP | +| [Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images](/endpoint/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping)| TTP | +| [Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL](/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping)| TTP | +| [Dump LSASS via procdump](/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping)| TTP | +| [Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry](/endpoint/enable_wdigest_uselogoncredential_registry/) | [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping)| TTP | +| [Esentutl SAM Copy](/endpoint/esentutl_sam_copy/) | [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping)| Hunting | +| [Extraction of Registry Hives](/endpoint/extraction_of_registry_hives/) | [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping)| TTP | +| [Ntdsutil Export NTDS](/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds/) | [NTDS](/tags/#ntds), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping)| TTP | +| [SAM Database File Access Attempt](/endpoint/sam_database_file_access_attempt/) | [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping)| Hunting | +| [SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool](/endpoint/secretdumps_offline_ntds_dumping_tool/) | [NTDS](/tags/#ntds), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping)| TTP | +| [Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass](/endpoint/set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell)| TTP | +| [Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass](/endpoint/windows_hunting_system_account_targeting_lsass/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping)| Hunting | +| [Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass](/endpoint/windows_non-system_account_targeting_lsass/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping)| TTP | +| [Windows Possible Credential Dumping](/endpoint/windows_possible_credential_dumping/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/darkside_ransomware.md b/docs/_stories/darkside_ransomware.md index 8149cbe22b..add9b10ea8 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/darkside_ransomware.md +++ b/docs/_stories/darkside_ransomware.md @@ -8,7 +8,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint - - Endpoint_Processes + - Actions on Objectives + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -18,7 +19,7 @@ tags: Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the DarkSide Ransomware - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud -- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint), [Endpoint_Processes](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/EndpointProcesses) +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-05-12 - **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk - **ID**: 507edc74-13d5-4339-878e-b9114ded1f35 @@ -31,27 +32,23 @@ This story addresses Darkside ransomware. This ransomware payload has many simil | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe](/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe/) | [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | TTP | -| [BITSAdmin Download File](/endpoint/bitsadmin_download_file/) | [BITS Jobs](/tags/#bits-jobs), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer) | TTP | -| [CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass](/endpoint/cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [CMSTP](/tags/#cmstp) | TTP | -| [CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments](/endpoint/certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments/) | [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer) | TTP | -| [CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments](/endpoint/certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments/) | [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer) | TTP | -| [Cobalt Strike Named Pipes](/endpoint/cobalt_strike_named_pipes/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection) | TTP | -| [Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell](/endpoint/delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell/) | [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery) | TTP | -| [Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images](/endpoint/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | TTP | -| [Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag](/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares) | TTP | -| [Detect RClone Command-Line Usage](/endpoint/detect_rclone_command-line_usage/) | [Automated Exfiltration](/tags/#automated-exfiltration) | TTP | -| [Detect RClone Command-Line Usage](/endpoint/detect_rclone_command-line_usage/) | [Automated Exfiltration](/tags/#automated-exfiltration) | TTP | -| [Detect Renamed PSExec](/endpoint/detect_renamed_psexec/) | [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution) | Hunting | -| [Detect Renamed RClone](/endpoint/detect_renamed_rclone/) | [Automated Exfiltration](/tags/#automated-exfiltration) | Hunting | -| [Extraction of Registry Hives](/endpoint/extraction_of_registry_hives/) | [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | TTP | -| [Ransomware Notes bulk creation](/endpoint/ransomware_notes_bulk_creation/) | [Data Encrypted for Impact](/tags/#data-encrypted-for-impact) | Anomaly | -| [SLUI RunAs Elevated](/endpoint/slui_runas_elevated/) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | TTP | -| [SLUI Spawning a Process](/endpoint/slui_spawning_a_process/) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | TTP | -| [Windows Bitsadmin Download File](/endpoint/windows_bitsadmin_download_file/) | [BITS Jobs](/tags/#bits-jobs), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer) | TTP | -| [Windows CertUtil URLCache Download](/endpoint/windows_certutil_urlcache_download/) | [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer) | TTP | -| [Windows CertUtil VerifyCtl Download](/endpoint/windows_certutil_verifyctl_download/) | [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer) | TTP | -| [Windows Possible Credential Dumping](/endpoint/windows_possible_credential_dumping/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | TTP | +| [Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe](/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe/) | [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping)| TTP | +| [BITSAdmin Download File](/endpoint/bitsadmin_download_file/) | [BITS Jobs](/tags/#bits-jobs), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer)| TTP | +| [CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments](/endpoint/certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments/) | [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer)| TTP | +| [CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments](/endpoint/certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments/) | [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer)| TTP | +| [CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass](/endpoint/cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [CMSTP](/tags/#cmstp)| TTP | +| [Cobalt Strike Named Pipes](/endpoint/cobalt_strike_named_pipes/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection)| TTP | +| [Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell](/endpoint/delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell/) | [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery)| TTP | +| [Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images](/endpoint/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping)| TTP | +| [Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag](/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares)| TTP | +| [Detect RClone Command-Line Usage](/endpoint/detect_rclone_command-line_usage/) | [Automated Exfiltration](/tags/#automated-exfiltration)| TTP | +| [Detect Renamed PSExec](/endpoint/detect_renamed_psexec/) | [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution)| Hunting | +| [Detect Renamed RClone](/endpoint/detect_renamed_rclone/) | [Automated Exfiltration](/tags/#automated-exfiltration)| Hunting | +| [Extraction of Registry Hives](/endpoint/extraction_of_registry_hives/) | [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping)| TTP | +| [Ransomware Notes bulk creation](/endpoint/ransomware_notes_bulk_creation/) | [Data Encrypted for Impact](/tags/#data-encrypted-for-impact)| Anomaly | +| [SLUI RunAs Elevated](/endpoint/slui_runas_elevated/) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism)| TTP | +| [SLUI Spawning a Process](/endpoint/slui_spawning_a_process/) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism)| TTP | +| [Windows Possible Credential Dumping](/endpoint/windows_possible_credential_dumping/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/data_destruction.md b/docs/_stories/data_destruction.md index 399add7360..96f86f3a0e 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/data_destruction.md +++ b/docs/_stories/data_destruction.md @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -30,10 +31,10 @@ Adversaries may use this technique to maximize the impact on the target organiza | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Linux DD File Overwrite](/endpoint/linux_dd_file_overwrite/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction) | TTP | -| [Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump](/endpoint/windows_disable_memory_crash_dump/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction) | TTP | -| [Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder](/endpoint/windows_file_without_extension_in_critical_folder/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction) | TTP | -| [Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition](/endpoint/windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition/) | [Disk Structure Wipe](/tags/#disk-structure-wipe), [Disk Wipe](/tags/#disk-wipe) | Anomaly | +| [Linux DD File Overwrite](/endpoint/linux_dd_file_overwrite/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction)| TTP | +| [Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump](/endpoint/windows_disable_memory_crash_dump/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction)| TTP | +| [Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder](/endpoint/windows_file_without_extension_in_critical_folder/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction)| TTP | +| [Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition](/endpoint/windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition/) | [Disk Structure Wipe](/tags/#disk-structure-wipe), [Disk Wipe](/tags/#disk-wipe)| Anomaly | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/data_exfiltration.md b/docs/_stories/data_exfiltration.md index ec71ecb49a..57d7307ca6 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/data_exfiltration.md +++ b/docs/_stories/data_exfiltration.md @@ -8,8 +8,9 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint - - Endpoint_Processes - Network_Traffic + - Actions on Objectives + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -19,7 +20,7 @@ tags: The stealing of data by an adversary. - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud -- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint), [Endpoint_Processes](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/EndpointProcesses), [Network_Traffic](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkTraffic) +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint), [Network_Traffic](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkTraffic) - **Last Updated**: 2020-10-21 - **Author**: Shannon Davis, Splunk - **ID**: 66b0fe0c-1351-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002 @@ -32,18 +33,17 @@ Exfiltration comes in many flavors. Adversaries can collect data over encrypted | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App](/endpoint/dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app/) | [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol) | TTP | -| [DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App](/endpoint/dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app/) | [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol) | TTP | -| [Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration](/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration/) | [Exfiltration Over C2 Channel](/tags/#exfiltration-over-c2-channel) | TTP | -| [Detect shared ec2 snapshot](/cloud/detect_shared_ec2_snapshot/) | [Transfer Data to Cloud Account](/tags/#transfer-data-to-cloud-account) | TTP | -| [Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App](/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app/) | [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol) | Anomaly | -| [Gdrive suspicious file sharing](/cloud/gdrive_suspicious_file_sharing/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing) | Hunting | -| [Mailsniper Invoke functions](/endpoint/mailsniper_invoke_functions/) | [Email Collection](/tags/#email-collection), [Local Email Collection](/tags/#local-email-collection) | TTP | -| [Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic](/network/multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol) | TTP | -| [O365 PST export alert](/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert/) | [Email Collection](/tags/#email-collection) | TTP | -| [O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding](/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding/) | [Email Forwarding Rule](/tags/#email-forwarding-rule), [Email Collection](/tags/#email-collection) | Anomaly | -| [O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding](/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding/) | [Email Forwarding Rule](/tags/#email-forwarding-rule), [Email Collection](/tags/#email-collection) | Anomaly | -| [Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data](/network/plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol) | TTP | +| [Detect shared ec2 snapshot](/cloud/detect_shared_ec2_snapshot/) | [Transfer Data to Cloud Account](/tags/#transfer-data-to-cloud-account)| TTP | +| [O365 PST export alert](/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert/) | [Email Collection](/tags/#email-collection)| TTP | +| [O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding](/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding/) | [Email Forwarding Rule](/tags/#email-forwarding-rule), [Email Collection](/tags/#email-collection)| Anomaly | +| [O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding](/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding/) | [Email Forwarding Rule](/tags/#email-forwarding-rule), [Email Collection](/tags/#email-collection)| Anomaly | +| [DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App](/endpoint/dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app/) | [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol)| TTP | +| [Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App](/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app/) | [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol)| Anomaly | +| [Mailsniper Invoke functions](/endpoint/mailsniper_invoke_functions/) | [Email Collection](/tags/#email-collection), [Local Email Collection](/tags/#local-email-collection)| TTP | +| [Gdrive suspicious file sharing](/cloud/gdrive_suspicious_file_sharing/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing)| Hunting | +| [Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration](/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration/) | [Exfiltration Over C2 Channel](/tags/#exfiltration-over-c2-channel)| TTP | +| [Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic](/network/multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol)| TTP | +| [Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data](/network/plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/data_protection.md b/docs/_stories/data_protection.md index 8287938a09..5c100eeede 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/data_protection.md +++ b/docs/_stories/data_protection.md @@ -7,7 +7,11 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud + - Change_Analysis - Network_Resolution + - Actions on Objectives + - Command & Control + - Installation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -17,7 +21,7 @@ tags: Fortify your data-protection arsenal--while continuing to ensure data confidentiality and integrity--with searches that monitor for and help you investigate possible signs of data exfiltration. - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud -- **Datamodel**: [Network_Resolution](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkResolution) +- **Datamodel**: [Change_Analysis](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/ChangeAnalysis), [Network_Resolution](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkResolution) - **Last Updated**: 2017-09-14 - **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk - **ID**: 91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e1fce33 @@ -30,7 +34,9 @@ Attackers can leverage a variety of resources to compromise or exfiltrate enterp | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers](/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers/) | [Drive-by Compromise](/tags/#drive-by-compromise) | TTP | +| [Detect USB device insertion](/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion/) | None| TTP | +| [Detection of DNS Tunnels](/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol)| TTP | +| [Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers](/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers/) | [Drive-by Compromise](/tags/#drive-by-compromise)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/deobfuscate-decode_files_or_information.md b/docs/_stories/deobfuscate-decode_files_or_information.md index 315c8c786c..56c9e6c1e3 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/deobfuscate-decode_files_or_information.md +++ b/docs/_stories/deobfuscate-decode_files_or_information.md @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint - - Endpoint_Processes + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ tags: Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud -- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint), [Endpoint_Processes](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/EndpointProcesses) +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-03-24 - **Author**: Michael Haag, Splunk - **ID**: 0bd01a54-8cbe-11eb-abcd-acde48001122 @@ -31,8 +31,7 @@ An example of obfuscated files is `Certutil.exe` usage to encode a portable exec | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [CertUtil With Decode Argument](/endpoint/certutil_with_decode_argument/) | [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](/tags/#deobfuscate/decode-files-or-information) | TTP | -| [Windows CertUtil Decode File](/endpoint/windows_certutil_decode_file/) | [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](/tags/#deobfuscate/decode-files-or-information) | TTP | +| [CertUtil With Decode Argument](/endpoint/certutil_with_decode_argument/) | [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](/tags/#deobfuscate/decode-files-or-information)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/detect_zerologon_attack.md b/docs/_stories/detect_zerologon_attack.md index 3340d3e498..15537b5e43 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/detect_zerologon_attack.md +++ b/docs/_stories/detect_zerologon_attack.md @@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud + - Actions on Objectives + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -29,11 +31,11 @@ This attack is a privilege escalation technique, where attacker targets a Netlog | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account](/endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account/) | [Exploitation of Remote Services](/tags/#exploitation-of-remote-services) | Hunting | -| [Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access](/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | TTP | -| [Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images](/endpoint/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | TTP | -| [Detect Zerologon via Zeek](/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek/) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | TTP | -| [Windows Possible Credential Dumping](/endpoint/windows_possible_credential_dumping/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | TTP | +| [Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access](/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping)| TTP | +| [Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images](/endpoint/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping)| TTP | +| [Windows Possible Credential Dumping](/endpoint/windows_possible_credential_dumping/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping)| TTP | +| [Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account](/endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account/) | [Exploitation of Remote Services](/tags/#exploitation-of-remote-services)| Hunting | +| [Detect Zerologon via Zeek](/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek/) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/dev_sec_ops.md b/docs/_stories/dev_sec_ops.md index 591480ea30..83abc82d01 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/dev_sec_ops.md +++ b/docs/_stories/dev_sec_ops.md @@ -7,7 +7,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Dev Sec Ops Analytics + - Actions on Objectives + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -16,7 +17,7 @@ tags: This story is focused around detecting attacks on a DevSecOps lifeccycle which consists of the phases plan, code, build, test, release, deploy, operate and monitor. -- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud, Dev Sec Ops Analytics +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2021-08-18 - **Author**: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk @@ -30,28 +31,28 @@ DevSecOps is a collaborative framework, which thinks about application and infra | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings High](/cloud/aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_high/) | [Malicious Image](/tags/#malicious-image), [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution) | TTP | -| [AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Low Informational Unknown](/cloud/aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_low_informational_unknown/) | [Malicious Image](/tags/#malicious-image), [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution) | Hunting | -| [AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Medium](/cloud/aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_medium/) | [Malicious Image](/tags/#malicious-image), [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution) | Anomaly | -| [AWS ECR Container Upload Outside Business Hours](/cloud/aws_ecr_container_upload_outside_business_hours/) | [Malicious Image](/tags/#malicious-image), [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution) | Anomaly | -| [AWS ECR Container Upload Unknown User](/cloud/aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user/) | [Malicious Image](/tags/#malicious-image), [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution) | Anomaly | -| [Circle CI Disable Security Job](/cloud/circle_ci_disable_security_job/) | [Compromise Client Software Binary](/tags/#compromise-client-software-binary) | Anomaly | -| [Circle CI Disable Security Step](/cloud/circle_ci_disable_security_step/) | [Compromise Client Software Binary](/tags/#compromise-client-software-binary) | Anomaly | -| [Correlation by Repository and Risk](/cloud/correlation_by_repository_and_risk/) | [Malicious Image](/tags/#malicious-image), [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution) | Correlation | -| [Correlation by User and Risk](/cloud/correlation_by_user_and_risk/) | [Malicious Image](/tags/#malicious-image), [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution) | Correlation | -| [GSuite Email Suspicious Attachment](/cloud/gsuite_email_suspicious_attachment/) | [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing) | Anomaly | -| [GitHub Dependabot Alert](/cloud/github_dependabot_alert/) | [Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools](/tags/#compromise-software-dependencies-and-development-tools), [Supply Chain Compromise](/tags/#supply-chain-compromise) | Anomaly | -| [GitHub Pull Request from Unknown User](/cloud/github_pull_request_from_unknown_user/) | [Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools](/tags/#compromise-software-dependencies-and-development-tools), [Supply Chain Compromise](/tags/#supply-chain-compromise) | Anomaly | -| [Github Commit Changes In Master](/cloud/github_commit_changes_in_master/) | [Trusted Relationship](/tags/#trusted-relationship) | Anomaly | -| [Github Commit In Develop](/cloud/github_commit_in_develop/) | [Trusted Relationship](/tags/#trusted-relationship) | Anomaly | -| [Gsuite Drive Share In External Email](/cloud/gsuite_drive_share_in_external_email/) | [Exfiltration to Cloud Storage](/tags/#exfiltration-to-cloud-storage), [Exfiltration Over Web Service](/tags/#exfiltration-over-web-service) | Anomaly | -| [Gsuite Email Suspicious Subject With Attachment](/cloud/gsuite_email_suspicious_subject_with_attachment/) | [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing) | Anomaly | -| [Gsuite Email With Known Abuse Web Service Link](/cloud/gsuite_email_with_known_abuse_web_service_link/) | [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing) | Anomaly | -| [Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain](/cloud/gsuite_outbound_email_with_attachment_to_external_domain/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol) | Anomaly | -| [Gsuite Suspicious Shared File Name](/cloud/gsuite_suspicious_shared_file_name/) | [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing) | Anomaly | -| [Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI](/cloud/kubernetes_nginx_ingress_lfi/) | [Exploitation for Credential Access](/tags/#exploitation-for-credential-access) | TTP | -| [Kubernetes Nginx Ingress RFI](/cloud/kubernetes_nginx_ingress_rfi/) | [Exploitation for Credential Access](/tags/#exploitation-for-credential-access) | TTP | -| [Kubernetes Scanner Image Pulling](/cloud/kubernetes_scanner_image_pulling/) | [Cloud Service Discovery](/tags/#cloud-service-discovery) | TTP | +| [AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings High](/cloud/aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_high/) | [Malicious Image](/tags/#malicious-image), [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution)| TTP | +| [AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Low Informational Unknown](/cloud/aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_low_informational_unknown/) | [Malicious Image](/tags/#malicious-image), [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution)| Hunting | +| [AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Medium](/cloud/aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_medium/) | [Malicious Image](/tags/#malicious-image), [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution)| Anomaly | +| [AWS ECR Container Upload Outside Business Hours](/cloud/aws_ecr_container_upload_outside_business_hours/) | [Malicious Image](/tags/#malicious-image), [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution)| Anomaly | +| [AWS ECR Container Upload Unknown User](/cloud/aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user/) | [Malicious Image](/tags/#malicious-image), [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution)| Anomaly | +| [Circle CI Disable Security Job](/cloud/circle_ci_disable_security_job/) | [Compromise Client Software Binary](/tags/#compromise-client-software-binary)| Anomaly | +| [Circle CI Disable Security Step](/cloud/circle_ci_disable_security_step/) | [Compromise Client Software Binary](/tags/#compromise-client-software-binary)| Anomaly | +| [Correlation by Repository and Risk](/cloud/correlation_by_repository_and_risk/) | [Malicious Image](/tags/#malicious-image), [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution)| Correlation | +| [Correlation by User and Risk](/cloud/correlation_by_user_and_risk/) | [Malicious Image](/tags/#malicious-image), [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution)| Correlation | +| [Github Commit Changes In Master](/cloud/github_commit_changes_in_master/) | [Trusted Relationship](/tags/#trusted-relationship)| Anomaly | +| [Github Commit In Develop](/cloud/github_commit_in_develop/) | [Trusted Relationship](/tags/#trusted-relationship)| Anomaly | +| [GitHub Dependabot Alert](/cloud/github_dependabot_alert/) | [Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools](/tags/#compromise-software-dependencies-and-development-tools), [Supply Chain Compromise](/tags/#supply-chain-compromise)| Anomaly | +| [GitHub Pull Request from Unknown User](/cloud/github_pull_request_from_unknown_user/) | [Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools](/tags/#compromise-software-dependencies-and-development-tools), [Supply Chain Compromise](/tags/#supply-chain-compromise)| Anomaly | +| [Gsuite Drive Share In External Email](/cloud/gsuite_drive_share_in_external_email/) | [Exfiltration to Cloud Storage](/tags/#exfiltration-to-cloud-storage), [Exfiltration Over Web Service](/tags/#exfiltration-over-web-service)| Anomaly | +| [GSuite Email Suspicious Attachment](/cloud/gsuite_email_suspicious_attachment/) | [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing)| Anomaly | +| [Gsuite Email Suspicious Subject With Attachment](/cloud/gsuite_email_suspicious_subject_with_attachment/) | [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing)| Anomaly | +| [Gsuite Email With Known Abuse Web Service Link](/cloud/gsuite_email_with_known_abuse_web_service_link/) | [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing)| Anomaly | +| [Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain](/cloud/gsuite_outbound_email_with_attachment_to_external_domain/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol)| Anomaly | +| [Gsuite Suspicious Shared File Name](/cloud/gsuite_suspicious_shared_file_name/) | [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing)| Anomaly | +| [Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI](/cloud/kubernetes_nginx_ingress_lfi/) | [Exploitation for Credential Access](/tags/#exploitation-for-credential-access)| TTP | +| [Kubernetes Nginx Ingress RFI](/cloud/kubernetes_nginx_ingress_rfi/) | [Exploitation for Credential Access](/tags/#exploitation-for-credential-access)| TTP | +| [Kubernetes Scanner Image Pulling](/cloud/kubernetes_scanner_image_pulling/) | [Cloud Service Discovery](/tags/#cloud-service-discovery)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/dhs_report_ta18-074a.md b/docs/_stories/dhs_report_ta18-074a.md index 44c93c2e37..b92b143b1e 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/dhs_report_ta18-074a.md +++ b/docs/_stories/dhs_report_ta18-074a.md @@ -9,6 +9,10 @@ tags: - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint - Network_Traffic + - Actions on Objectives + - Command & Control + - Exploitation + - Installation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -34,20 +38,21 @@ Suspicious activities--spikes in SMB traffic, processes that launch netsh (to mo | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Create local admin accounts using net exe](/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe/) | [Local Account](/tags/#local-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account) | TTP | -| [Detect New Local Admin account](/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account/) | [Local Account](/tags/#local-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account) | TTP | -| [Detect Outbound SMB Traffic](/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic/) | [File Transfer Protocols](/tags/#file-transfer-protocols), [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol) | TTP | -| [Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag](/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares) | TTP | -| [Detect Renamed PSExec](/endpoint/detect_renamed_psexec/) | [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution) | Hunting | -| [Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass](/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_-_execution_policy_bypass/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell) | TTP | -| [Processes launching netsh](/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh/) | [Disable or Modify System Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-system-firewall), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | -| [Registry Keys Used For Persistence](/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence/) | [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](/tags/#registry-run-keys-/-startup-folder), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution) | TTP | -| [SMB Traffic Spike](/network/smb_traffic_spike/) | [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services) | Anomaly | -| [SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK](/network/smb_traffic_spike_-_mltk/) | [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services) | Anomaly | -| [Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services](/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services/) | [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process) | TTP | -| [Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD](/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | TTP | -| [Single Letter Process On Endpoint](/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint/) | [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution), [Malicious File](/tags/#malicious-file) | TTP | -| [Suspicious Reg exe Process](/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process/) | [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry) | TTP | +| [First time seen command line argument](/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument/) | [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell)| Hunting | +| [Create local admin accounts using net exe](/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe/) | [Local Account](/tags/#local-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account)| TTP | +| [Detect New Local Admin account](/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account/) | [Local Account](/tags/#local-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account)| TTP | +| [Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag](/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares)| TTP | +| [Detect Renamed PSExec](/endpoint/detect_renamed_psexec/) | [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution)| Hunting | +| [Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass](/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_-_execution_policy_bypass/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell)| TTP | +| [Processes launching netsh](/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh/) | [Disable or Modify System Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-system-firewall), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| TTP | +| [Registry Keys Used For Persistence](/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence/) | [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](/tags/#registry-run-keys-/-startup-folder), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution)| TTP | +| [Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services](/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services/) | [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process)| TTP | +| [Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD](/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job)| TTP | +| [Single Letter Process On Endpoint](/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint/) | [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution), [Malicious File](/tags/#malicious-file)| TTP | +| [Suspicious Reg exe Process](/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process/) | [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry)| TTP | +| [Detect Outbound SMB Traffic](/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic/) | [File Transfer Protocols](/tags/#file-transfer-protocols), [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol)| TTP | +| [SMB Traffic Spike](/network/smb_traffic_spike/) | [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services)| Anomaly | +| [SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK](/network/smb_traffic_spike_-_mltk/) | [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services)| Anomaly | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/disabling_security_tools.md b/docs/_stories/disabling_security_tools.md index f0069a852f..1316ad27c7 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/disabling_security_tools.md +++ b/docs/_stories/disabling_security_tools.md @@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint + - Actions on Objectives + - Installation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -30,12 +32,12 @@ Attackers employ a variety of tactics in order to avoid detection and operate wi | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store](/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store/) | [Install Root Certificate](/tags/#install-root-certificate), [Subvert Trust Controls](/tags/#subvert-trust-controls) | TTP | -| [Attempt To Stop Security Service](/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | -| [Processes launching netsh](/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh/) | [Disable or Modify System Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-system-firewall), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | -| [Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services](/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services/) | [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process) | TTP | -| [Suspicious Reg exe Process](/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process/) | [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry) | TTP | -| [Unload Sysmon Filter Driver](/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | +| [Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store](/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store/) | [Install Root Certificate](/tags/#install-root-certificate), [Subvert Trust Controls](/tags/#subvert-trust-controls)| TTP | +| [Attempt To Stop Security Service](/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| TTP | +| [Processes launching netsh](/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh/) | [Disable or Modify System Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-system-firewall), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| TTP | +| [Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services](/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services/) | [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process)| TTP | +| [Suspicious Reg exe Process](/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process/) | [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry)| TTP | +| [Unload Sysmon Filter Driver](/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/dns_amplification_attacks.md b/docs/_stories/dns_amplification_attacks.md index 20cbc0f0fa..9a27370600 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/dns_amplification_attacks.md +++ b/docs/_stories/dns_amplification_attacks.md @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Network_Resolution + - Actions on Objectives --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -20,7 +21,7 @@ DNS poses a serious threat as a Denial of Service (DOS) amplifier, if it respond - **Datamodel**: [Network_Resolution](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkResolution) - **Last Updated**: 2016-09-13 - **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk -- **ID**: e8afd39e-3294-11e6-b39d-a45e60c6700 +- **ID**: a563972b-d2e2-4978-b6ca-6e83e24af4d3 #### Narrative @@ -31,7 +32,7 @@ The search in this story can help you to detect if attackers are abusing your co | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries](/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries/) | [Network Denial of Service](/tags/#network-denial-of-service), [Reflection Amplification](/tags/#reflection-amplification) | Anomaly | +| [Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries](/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries/) | [Network Denial of Service](/tags/#network-denial-of-service), [Reflection Amplification](/tags/#reflection-amplification)| Anomaly | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/dns_hijacking.md b/docs/_stories/dns_hijacking.md index 3c1d540cdb..6af5c024e2 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/dns_hijacking.md +++ b/docs/_stories/dns_hijacking.md @@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Network_Resolution + - Actions on Objectives + - Command & Control --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -38,7 +40,10 @@ The searches in this Analytic Story help you detect and investigate activities t | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers](/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers/) | [Drive-by Compromise](/tags/#drive-by-compromise) | TTP | +| [Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers](/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol)| TTP | +| [DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers](/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers/) | [DNS](/tags/#dns)| TTP | +| [DNS record changed](/deprecated/dns_record_changed/) | [DNS](/tags/#dns)| TTP | +| [Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers](/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers/) | [Drive-by Compromise](/tags/#drive-by-compromise)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/domain_trust_discovery.md b/docs/_stories/domain_trust_discovery.md index 7228ec499b..34b748a7a5 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/domain_trust_discovery.md +++ b/docs/_stories/domain_trust_discovery.md @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -30,9 +31,9 @@ Domain trusts provide a mechanism for a domain to allow access to resources base | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [DSQuery Domain Discovery](/endpoint/dsquery_domain_discovery/) | [Domain Trust Discovery](/tags/#domain-trust-discovery) | TTP | -| [NLTest Domain Trust Discovery](/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery/) | [Domain Trust Discovery](/tags/#domain-trust-discovery) | TTP | -| [Windows AdFind Exe](/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe/) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery) | TTP | +| [DSQuery Domain Discovery](/endpoint/dsquery_domain_discovery/) | [Domain Trust Discovery](/tags/#domain-trust-discovery)| TTP | +| [NLTest Domain Trust Discovery](/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery/) | [Domain Trust Discovery](/tags/#domain-trust-discovery)| TTP | +| [Windows AdFind Exe](/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe/) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/dynamic_dns.md b/docs/_stories/dynamic_dns.md index fcd1b96af5..68515c0119 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/dynamic_dns.md +++ b/docs/_stories/dynamic_dns.md @@ -8,8 +8,11 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint - - Endpoint_Processes - Network_Resolution + - Web + - Actions on Objectives + - Command & Control + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -19,7 +22,7 @@ tags: Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them avoid firewall blocks and deny lists. - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud -- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint), [Endpoint_Processes](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/EndpointProcesses), [Network_Resolution](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkResolution) +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint), [Network_Resolution](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkResolution), [Web](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Web) - **Last Updated**: 2018-09-06 - **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk - **ID**: 8169f17b-ef68-4b59-aae8-586907301221 @@ -32,10 +35,10 @@ Dynamic DNS services (DDNS) are legitimate low-cost or free services that allow | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App](/endpoint/dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app/) | [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol) | TTP | -| [DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App](/endpoint/dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app/) | [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol) | TTP | -| [Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers](/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers/) | [Drive-by Compromise](/tags/#drive-by-compromise) | TTP | -| [Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App](/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app/) | [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol) | Anomaly | +| [Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers](/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers/) | [Web Protocols](/tags/#web-protocols)| TTP | +| [DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App](/endpoint/dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app/) | [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol)| TTP | +| [Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App](/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app/) | [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol)| Anomaly | +| [Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers](/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers/) | [Drive-by Compromise](/tags/#drive-by-compromise)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18-201a_.md b/docs/_stories/emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18-201a_.md index 6558b3ffe4..4d43e55985 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18-201a_.md +++ b/docs/_stories/emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18-201a_.md @@ -10,6 +10,11 @@ tags: - Email - Endpoint - Network_Traffic + - Actions on Objectives + - Command & Control + - Delivery + - Exploitation + - Installation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -34,14 +39,15 @@ The searches in this Analytic Story will help you find executables that are rare | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Detect Rare Executables](/endpoint/detect_rare_executables/) | | Anomaly | -| [Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters](/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell) | TTP | -| [Detection of tools built by NirSoft](/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft/) | [Software Deployment Tools](/tags/#software-deployment-tools) | TTP | -| [Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces](/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces/) | | Anomaly | -| [Registry Keys Used For Persistence](/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence/) | [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](/tags/#registry-run-keys-/-startup-folder), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution) | TTP | -| [SMB Traffic Spike](/network/smb_traffic_spike/) | [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services) | Anomaly | -| [SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK](/network/smb_traffic_spike_-_mltk/) | [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services) | Anomaly | -| [Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions](/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions/) | [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing) | Anomaly | +| [Prohibited Software On Endpoint](/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint/) | None| Hunting | +| [Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters](/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell)| TTP | +| [Registry Keys Used For Persistence](/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence/) | [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](/tags/#registry-run-keys-/-startup-folder), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution)| TTP | +| [Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces](/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces/) | None| Anomaly | +| [Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions](/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions/) | [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing)| Anomaly | +| [Detect Rare Executables](/endpoint/detect_rare_executables/) | None| Anomaly | +| [Detection of tools built by NirSoft](/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft/) | [Software Deployment Tools](/tags/#software-deployment-tools)| TTP | +| [SMB Traffic Spike](/network/smb_traffic_spike/) | [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services)| Anomaly | +| [SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK](/network/smb_traffic_spike_-_mltk/) | [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services)| Anomaly | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/f5_tmui_rce_cve-2020-5902.md b/docs/_stories/f5_tmui_rce_cve-2020-5902.md index 0ca1d44537..ca3302ea1e 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/f5_tmui_rce_cve-2020-5902.md +++ b/docs/_stories/f5_tmui_rce_cve-2020-5902.md @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -29,7 +30,7 @@ A client is able to perform a remote code execution on an exposed and vulnerable | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902](/web/detect_f5_tmui_rce_cve-2020-5902/) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | TTP | +| [Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902](/web/detect_f5_tmui_rce_cve-2020-5902/) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/fin7.md b/docs/_stories/fin7.md index 8169adafd2..6ebc12420f 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/fin7.md +++ b/docs/_stories/fin7.md @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -30,18 +31,18 @@ FIN7 is a Russian criminal advanced persistent threat group that has primarily t | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Check Elevated CMD using whoami](/endpoint/check_elevated_cmd_using_whoami/) | [System Owner/User Discovery](/tags/#system-owner/user-discovery) | TTP | -| [Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell](/endpoint/cmdline_tool_not_executed_in_cmd_shell/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [JavaScript](/tags/#javascript) | TTP | -| [Jscript Execution Using Cscript App](/endpoint/jscript_execution_using_cscript_app/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [JavaScript](/tags/#javascript) | TTP | -| [MS Scripting Process Loading Ldap Module](/endpoint/ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [JavaScript](/tags/#javascript) | Anomaly | -| [MS Scripting Process Loading WMI Module](/endpoint/ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [JavaScript](/tags/#javascript) | Anomaly | -| [Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir](/endpoint/non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir/) | [Credentials from Password Stores](/tags/#credentials-from-password-stores), [Credentials from Web Browsers](/tags/#credentials-from-web-browsers) | Anomaly | -| [Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir](/endpoint/non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir/) | [Credentials from Password Stores](/tags/#credentials-from-password-stores), [Credentials from Web Browsers](/tags/#credentials-from-web-browsers) | Anomaly | -| [Office Application Drop Executable](/endpoint/office_application_drop_executable/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment) | TTP | -| [Office Product Spawning Wmic](/endpoint/office_product_spawning_wmic/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment) | TTP | -| [Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App](/endpoint/vbscript_execution_using_wscript_app/) | [Visual Basic](/tags/#visual-basic), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter) | TTP | -| [Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process](/endpoint/wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Parent PID Spoofing](/tags/#parent-pid-spoofing), [Access Token Manipulation](/tags/#access-token-manipulation) | TTP | -| [XSL Script Execution With WMIC](/endpoint/xsl_script_execution_with_wmic/) | [XSL Script Processing](/tags/#xsl-script-processing) | TTP | +| [Check Elevated CMD using whoami](/endpoint/check_elevated_cmd_using_whoami/) | [System Owner/User Discovery](/tags/#system-owner/user-discovery)| TTP | +| [Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell](/endpoint/cmdline_tool_not_executed_in_cmd_shell/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [JavaScript](/tags/#javascript)| TTP | +| [Jscript Execution Using Cscript App](/endpoint/jscript_execution_using_cscript_app/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [JavaScript](/tags/#javascript)| TTP | +| [MS Scripting Process Loading Ldap Module](/endpoint/ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [JavaScript](/tags/#javascript)| Anomaly | +| [MS Scripting Process Loading WMI Module](/endpoint/ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [JavaScript](/tags/#javascript)| Anomaly | +| [Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir](/endpoint/non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir/) | [Credentials from Password Stores](/tags/#credentials-from-password-stores), [Credentials from Web Browsers](/tags/#credentials-from-web-browsers)| Anomaly | +| [Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir](/endpoint/non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir/) | [Credentials from Password Stores](/tags/#credentials-from-password-stores), [Credentials from Web Browsers](/tags/#credentials-from-web-browsers)| Anomaly | +| [Office Application Drop Executable](/endpoint/office_application_drop_executable/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment)| TTP | +| [Office Product Spawning Wmic](/endpoint/office_product_spawning_wmic/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment)| TTP | +| [Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App](/endpoint/vbscript_execution_using_wscript_app/) | [Visual Basic](/tags/#visual-basic), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter)| TTP | +| [Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process](/endpoint/wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Parent PID Spoofing](/tags/#parent-pid-spoofing), [Access Token Manipulation](/tags/#access-token-manipulation)| TTP | +| [XSL Script Execution With WMIC](/endpoint/xsl_script_execution_with_wmic/) | [XSL Script Processing](/tags/#xsl-script-processing)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/gcp_cross_account_activity.md b/docs/_stories/gcp_cross_account_activity.md index bde070db0b..8d762bdbc1 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/gcp_cross_account_activity.md +++ b/docs/_stories/gcp_cross_account_activity.md @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -31,7 +32,10 @@ This Analytic Story includes searches that will help you monitor your GCP Audit | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [GCP Detect gcploit framework](/cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | TTP | +| [GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project](/deprecated/gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts)| Hunting | +| [GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account](/deprecated/gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts)| Hunting | +| [gcp detect oauth token abuse](/deprecated/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts)| Hunting | +| [GCP Detect gcploit framework](/cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/hafnium_group.md b/docs/_stories/hafnium_group.md index 1e6493d72b..2cea75a9bd 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/hafnium_group.md +++ b/docs/_stories/hafnium_group.md @@ -8,8 +8,11 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint - - Endpoint_Processes - Network_Traffic + - Actions on Objectives + - Command & Control + - Exploitation + - Installation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -19,7 +22,7 @@ tags: HAFNIUM group was identified by Microsoft as exploiting 4 Microsoft Exchange CVEs in the wild - CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858 and CVE-2021-27065. - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud -- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint), [Endpoint_Processes](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/EndpointProcesses), [Network_Traffic](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkTraffic) +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint), [Network_Traffic](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkTraffic) - **Last Updated**: 2021-03-03 - **Author**: Michael Haag, Splunk - **ID**: beae2ab0-7c3f-11eb-8b63-acde48001122 @@ -34,22 +37,22 @@ The following Splunk detections assist with identifying the HAFNIUM groups trade | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Any Powershell DownloadString](/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadstring/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell) | TTP | -| [Detect Exchange Web Shell](/endpoint/detect_exchange_web_shell/) | [Server Software Component](/tags/#server-software-component), [Web Shell](/tags/#web-shell), [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | TTP | -| [Detect New Local Admin account](/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account/) | [Local Account](/tags/#local-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account) | TTP | -| [Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag](/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares) | TTP | -| [Detect Renamed PSExec](/endpoint/detect_renamed_psexec/) | [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution) | Hunting | -| [Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL](/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | TTP | -| [Dump LSASS via procdump](/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | TTP | -| [Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts](/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts/) | [Email Collection](/tags/#email-collection), [Remote Email Collection](/tags/#remote-email-collection) | Anomaly | -| [Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass](/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_-_execution_policy_bypass/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell) | TTP | -| [Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine](/endpoint/nishang_powershelltcponeline/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell) | TTP | -| [Ntdsutil Export NTDS](/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds/) | [NTDS](/tags/#ntds), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | TTP | -| [PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window](/endpoint/powershell_-_connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window/) | [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter) | Hunting | -| [Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass](/endpoint/set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell) | TTP | -| [Unified Messaging Service Spawning a Process](/endpoint/unified_messaging_service_spawning_a_process/) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | TTP | -| [W3WP Spawning Shell](/endpoint/w3wp_spawning_shell/) | [Server Software Component](/tags/#server-software-component), [Web Shell](/tags/#web-shell) | TTP | -| [Windows Powershell Connect to Internet With Hidden Window](/endpoint/windows_powershell_connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window/) | [Automated Exfiltration](/tags/#automated-exfiltration) | Anomaly | +| [Dump LSASS via procdump Rename](/deprecated/dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory)| Hunting | +| [Any Powershell DownloadString](/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadstring/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell)| TTP | +| [Detect Exchange Web Shell](/endpoint/detect_exchange_web_shell/) | [Server Software Component](/tags/#server-software-component), [Web Shell](/tags/#web-shell), [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application)| TTP | +| [Detect New Local Admin account](/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account/) | [Local Account](/tags/#local-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account)| TTP | +| [Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag](/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares)| TTP | +| [Detect Renamed PSExec](/endpoint/detect_renamed_psexec/) | [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution)| Hunting | +| [Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL](/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping)| TTP | +| [Dump LSASS via procdump](/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping)| TTP | +| [Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass](/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_-_execution_policy_bypass/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell)| TTP | +| [Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine](/endpoint/nishang_powershelltcponeline/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell)| TTP | +| [Ntdsutil Export NTDS](/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds/) | [NTDS](/tags/#ntds), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping)| TTP | +| [PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window](/endpoint/powershell_-_connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window/) | [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter)| Hunting | +| [Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass](/endpoint/set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell)| TTP | +| [Unified Messaging Service Spawning a Process](/endpoint/unified_messaging_service_spawning_a_process/) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application)| TTP | +| [W3WP Spawning Shell](/endpoint/w3wp_spawning_shell/) | [Server Software Component](/tags/#server-software-component), [Web Shell](/tags/#web-shell)| TTP | +| [Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts](/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts/) | [Email Collection](/tags/#email-collection), [Remote Email Collection](/tags/#remote-email-collection)| Anomaly | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/hermetic_wiper.md b/docs/_stories/hermetic_wiper.md index b800e423a6..5a3b61ef6b 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/hermetic_wiper.md +++ b/docs/_stories/hermetic_wiper.md @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -30,16 +31,16 @@ Hermetic Wiper is destructive malware operation found by Sentinel One targeting | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter](/endpoint/cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter/) | [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter) | Hunting | -| [Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share](/endpoint/executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares) | TTP | -| [Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path](/endpoint/executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading) | TTP | -| [Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading](/endpoint/regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32) | Anomaly | -| [Suspicious Process File Path](/endpoint/suspicious_process_file_path/) | [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process) | TTP | -| [Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump](/endpoint/windows_disable_memory_crash_dump/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction) | TTP | -| [Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder](/endpoint/windows_file_without_extension_in_critical_folder/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction) | TTP | -| [Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry](/endpoint/windows_modify_show_compress_color_and_info_tip_registry/) | [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry) | TTP | -| [Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition](/endpoint/windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition/) | [Disk Structure Wipe](/tags/#disk-structure-wipe), [Disk Wipe](/tags/#disk-wipe) | Anomaly | -| [Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive](/endpoint/windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive/) | [Disk Structure Wipe](/tags/#disk-structure-wipe), [Disk Wipe](/tags/#disk-wipe) | TTP | +| [CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter](/endpoint/cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter/) | [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter)| Hunting | +| [Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share](/endpoint/executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares)| TTP | +| [Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path](/endpoint/executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading)| TTP | +| [Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading](/endpoint/regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32)| Anomaly | +| [Suspicious Process File Path](/endpoint/suspicious_process_file_path/) | [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process)| TTP | +| [Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump](/endpoint/windows_disable_memory_crash_dump/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction)| TTP | +| [Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder](/endpoint/windows_file_without_extension_in_critical_folder/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction)| TTP | +| [Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry](/endpoint/windows_modify_show_compress_color_and_info_tip_registry/) | [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry)| TTP | +| [Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition](/endpoint/windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition/) | [Disk Structure Wipe](/tags/#disk-structure-wipe), [Disk Wipe](/tags/#disk-wipe)| Anomaly | +| [Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive](/endpoint/windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive/) | [Disk Structure Wipe](/tags/#disk-structure-wipe), [Disk Wipe](/tags/#disk-wipe)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/hidden_cobra_malware.md b/docs/_stories/hidden_cobra_malware.md index 309ad02f0c..f3c2694817 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/hidden_cobra_malware.md +++ b/docs/_stories/hidden_cobra_malware.md @@ -10,6 +10,8 @@ tags: - Endpoint - Network_Resolution - Network_Traffic + - Actions on Objectives + - Command & Control --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -35,14 +37,16 @@ Among other searches in this Analytic Story is a detection search that looks for | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Create or delete windows shares using net exe](/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe/) | [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Network Share Connection Removal](/tags/#network-share-connection-removal) | TTP | -| [DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK](/network/dns_query_length_outliers_-_mltk/) | [DNS](/tags/#dns), [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol) | Anomaly | -| [DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation](/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol) | Anomaly | -| [Detect Outbound SMB Traffic](/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic/) | [File Transfer Protocols](/tags/#file-transfer-protocols), [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol) | TTP | -| [Remote Desktop Network Traffic](/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic/) | [Remote Desktop Protocol](/tags/#remote-desktop-protocol), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services) | Anomaly | -| [Remote Desktop Process Running On System](/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system/) | [Remote Desktop Protocol](/tags/#remote-desktop-protocol), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services) | Hunting | -| [SMB Traffic Spike](/network/smb_traffic_spike/) | [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services) | Anomaly | -| [SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK](/network/smb_traffic_spike_-_mltk/) | [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services) | Anomaly | +| [First time seen command line argument](/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument/) | [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell)| Hunting | +| [Suspicious File Write](/deprecated/suspicious_file_write/) | None| Hunting | +| [Create or delete windows shares using net exe](/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe/) | [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Network Share Connection Removal](/tags/#network-share-connection-removal)| TTP | +| [Remote Desktop Process Running On System](/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system/) | [Remote Desktop Protocol](/tags/#remote-desktop-protocol), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services)| Hunting | +| [Detect Outbound SMB Traffic](/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic/) | [File Transfer Protocols](/tags/#file-transfer-protocols), [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol)| TTP | +| [DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK](/network/dns_query_length_outliers_-_mltk/) | [DNS](/tags/#dns), [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol)| Anomaly | +| [Remote Desktop Network Traffic](/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic/) | [Remote Desktop Protocol](/tags/#remote-desktop-protocol), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services)| Anomaly | +| [SMB Traffic Spike](/network/smb_traffic_spike/) | [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services)| Anomaly | +| [SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK](/network/smb_traffic_spike_-_mltk/) | [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services)| Anomaly | +| [DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation](/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol)| Anomaly | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/host_redirection.md b/docs/_stories/host_redirection.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b977a8ef71 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_stories/host_redirection.md @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +--- +title: "Host Redirection" +last_modified_at: 2017-09-14 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Network_Resolution + - Command & Control +--- + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +Detect evidence of tactics used to redirect traffic from a host to a destination other than the one intended--potentially one that is part of an adversary's attack infrastructure. An example is redirecting communications regarding patches and updates or misleading users into visiting a malicious website. + +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: [Network_Resolution](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkResolution) +- **Last Updated**: 2017-09-14 +- **Author**: Rico Valdez, Splunk +- **ID**: 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50fe268af4 + +#### Narrative + +Attackers will often attempt to manipulate client communications for nefarious purposes. In some cases, an attacker may endeavor to modify a local host file to redirect communications with resources (such as antivirus or system-update services) to prevent clients from receiving patches or updates. In other cases, an attacker might use this tactic to have the client connect to a site that looks like the intended site, but instead installs malware or collects information from the victim. Additionally, an attacker may redirect a victim in order to execute a MITM attack and observe communications. + +#### Detections + +| Name | Technique | Type | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------| +| [Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers](/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol)| TTP | +| [DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers](/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers/) | [DNS](/tags/#dns)| TTP | +| [Windows hosts file modification](/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification/) | None| TTP | + +#### Reference + +* [https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/09/hosts-file-hijacks/](https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/09/hosts-file-hijacks/) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/stories/host_redirection.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_stories/icedid.md b/docs/_stories/icedid.md index 6a761b281c..f0ce4fd07b 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/icedid.md +++ b/docs/_stories/icedid.md @@ -8,7 +8,9 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint - - Endpoint_Registry + - Actions on Objectives + - Exploitation + - Reconnaissance --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -18,7 +20,7 @@ tags: Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the IcedID banking trojan, including looking for file writes associated with its payload, process injection, shellcode execution and data collection. - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud -- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint), [Endpoint_Registry](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/EndpointRegistry) +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-07-29 - **Author**: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk - **ID**: 1d2cc747-63d7-49a9-abb8-93aa36305603 @@ -31,34 +33,33 @@ IcedId banking trojan campaigns targeting banks and other vertical sectors.This | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Account Discovery With Net App](/endpoint/account_discovery_with_net_app/) | [Domain Account](/tags/#domain-account), [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery) | TTP | -| [CHCP Command Execution](/endpoint/chcp_command_execution/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter) | TTP | -| [CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter](/endpoint/cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter/) | [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter) | Hunting | -| [Create Remote Thread In Shell Application](/endpoint/create_remote_thread_in_shell_application/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection) | TTP | -| [Disable Schedule Task](/endpoint/disable_schedule_task/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | -| [Drop IcedID License dat](/endpoint/drop_icedid_license_dat/) | [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution), [Malicious File](/tags/#malicious-file) | Hunting | -| [Eventvwr UAC Bypass](/endpoint/eventvwr_uac_bypass/) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | TTP | -| [FodHelper UAC Bypass](/endpoint/fodhelper_uac_bypass/) | [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry), [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | TTP | -| [IcedID Exfiltrated Archived File Creation](/endpoint/icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation/) | [Archive via Utility](/tags/#archive-via-utility), [Archive Collected Data](/tags/#archive-collected-data) | Hunting | -| [Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process](/endpoint/mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta) | TTP | -| [NLTest Domain Trust Discovery](/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery/) | [Domain Trust Discovery](/tags/#domain-trust-discovery) | TTP | -| [Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process](/endpoint/office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment) | TTP | -| [Office Application Spawn rundll32 process](/endpoint/office_application_spawn_rundll32_process/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment) | TTP | -| [Office Document Executing Macro Code](/endpoint/office_document_executing_macro_code/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment) | TTP | -| [Office Product Spawning MSHTA](/endpoint/office_product_spawning_mshta/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment) | TTP | -| [Registry Keys Used For Persistence](/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence/) | [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](/tags/#registry-run-keys-/-startup-folder), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution) | TTP | -| [Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline](/endpoint/regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32) | Anomaly | -| [Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process](/endpoint/rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection) | TTP | -| [Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser](/endpoint/rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection) | TTP | -| [Rundll32 DNSQuery](/endpoint/rundll32_dnsquery/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | TTP | -| [Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files](/endpoint/rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | TTP | -| [Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger](/endpoint/schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger/) | [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | TTP | -| [Sqlite Module In Temp Folder](/endpoint/sqlite_module_in_temp_folder/) | [Data from Local System](/tags/#data-from-local-system) | TTP | -| [Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline](/endpoint/suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | TTP | -| [Suspicious Rundll32 PluginInit](/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_plugininit/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | TTP | -| [WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path](/endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | TTP | -| [WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started](/endpoint/winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task) | Hunting | -| [Windows Eventvwr UAC Bypass](/endpoint/windows_eventvwr_uac_bypass/) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | Anomaly | +| [Account Discovery With Net App](/endpoint/account_discovery_with_net_app/) | [Domain Account](/tags/#domain-account), [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery)| TTP | +| [CHCP Command Execution](/endpoint/chcp_command_execution/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter)| TTP | +| [CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter](/endpoint/cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter/) | [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter)| Hunting | +| [Create Remote Thread In Shell Application](/endpoint/create_remote_thread_in_shell_application/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection)| TTP | +| [Disable Schedule Task](/endpoint/disable_schedule_task/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| TTP | +| [Drop IcedID License dat](/endpoint/drop_icedid_license_dat/) | [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution), [Malicious File](/tags/#malicious-file)| Hunting | +| [Eventvwr UAC Bypass](/endpoint/eventvwr_uac_bypass/) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism)| TTP | +| [FodHelper UAC Bypass](/endpoint/fodhelper_uac_bypass/) | [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry), [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism)| TTP | +| [IcedID Exfiltrated Archived File Creation](/endpoint/icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation/) | [Archive via Utility](/tags/#archive-via-utility), [Archive Collected Data](/tags/#archive-collected-data)| Hunting | +| [Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process](/endpoint/mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta)| TTP | +| [NLTest Domain Trust Discovery](/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery/) | [Domain Trust Discovery](/tags/#domain-trust-discovery)| TTP | +| [Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process](/endpoint/office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment)| TTP | +| [Office Application Spawn rundll32 process](/endpoint/office_application_spawn_rundll32_process/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment)| TTP | +| [Office Document Executing Macro Code](/endpoint/office_document_executing_macro_code/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment)| TTP | +| [Office Product Spawning MSHTA](/endpoint/office_product_spawning_mshta/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment)| TTP | +| [Registry Keys Used For Persistence](/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence/) | [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](/tags/#registry-run-keys-/-startup-folder), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution)| TTP | +| [Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline](/endpoint/regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32)| Anomaly | +| [Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process](/endpoint/rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection)| TTP | +| [Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser](/endpoint/rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection)| TTP | +| [Rundll32 DNSQuery](/endpoint/rundll32_dnsquery/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32)| TTP | +| [Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files](/endpoint/rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32)| TTP | +| [Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger](/endpoint/schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger/) | [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job)| TTP | +| [Sqlite Module In Temp Folder](/endpoint/sqlite_module_in_temp_folder/) | [Data from Local System](/tags/#data-from-local-system)| TTP | +| [Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline](/endpoint/suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32)| TTP | +| [Suspicious Rundll32 PluginInit](/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_plugininit/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32)| TTP | +| [WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path](/endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job)| TTP | +| [WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started](/endpoint/winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task)| Hunting | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/information_sabotage.md b/docs/_stories/information_sabotage.md index fb16a287a3..9acee4b867 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/information_sabotage.md +++ b/docs/_stories/information_sabotage.md @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Cloud - Splunk Behavioral Analytics - Endpoint - - Endpoint_Processes + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ tags: Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might correlate to insider threat specially in terms of information sabotage. - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud, Splunk Behavioral Analytics -- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint), [Endpoint_Processes](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/EndpointProcesses) +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-11-17 - **Author**: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk - **ID**: b71ba595-ef80-4e39-8b66-887578a7a71b @@ -32,10 +32,7 @@ Information sabotage is the type of crime many people associate with insider thr | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App](/endpoint/clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app/) | [File Deletion](/tags/#file-deletion), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host) | TTP | -| [Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe](/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe/) | [Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#windows-file-and-directory-permissions-modification), [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification) | TTP | -| [High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share](/endpoint/high_frequency_copy_of_files_in_network_share/) | [Transfer Data to Cloud Account](/tags/#transfer-data-to-cloud-account) | Anomaly | -| [Sdelete Application Execution](/endpoint/sdelete_application_execution/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction), [File Deletion](/tags/#file-deletion), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host) | Anomaly | +| [High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share](/endpoint/high_frequency_copy_of_files_in_network_share/) | [Transfer Data to Cloud Account](/tags/#transfer-data-to-cloud-account)| Anomaly | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/ingress_tool_transfer.md b/docs/_stories/ingress_tool_transfer.md index f3c3ae62d7..df55e037e3 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/ingress_tool_transfer.md +++ b/docs/_stories/ingress_tool_transfer.md @@ -8,7 +8,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint - - Endpoint_Processes + - Actions on Objectives + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -18,7 +19,7 @@ tags: Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Files may be copied from an external adversary controlled system through the command and control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP. - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud -- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint), [Endpoint_Processes](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/EndpointProcesses) +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-03-24 - **Author**: Michael Haag, Splunk - **ID**: b3782036-8cbd-11eb-9d8e-acde48001122 @@ -31,21 +32,16 @@ Ingress tool transfer is a Technique under tactic Command and Control. Behaviors | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Any Powershell DownloadFile](/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadfile/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell) | TTP | -| [Any Powershell DownloadString](/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadstring/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell) | TTP | -| [BITSAdmin Download File](/endpoint/bitsadmin_download_file/) | [BITS Jobs](/tags/#bits-jobs), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer) | TTP | -| [CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments](/endpoint/certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments/) | [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer) | TTP | -| [CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments](/endpoint/certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments/) | [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer) | TTP | -| [Curl Download and Bash Execution](/endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution/) | [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer) | TTP | -| [Suspicious Curl Network Connection](/endpoint/suspicious_curl_network_connection/) | [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer) | TTP | -| [Wget Download and Bash Execution](/endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution/) | [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer) | TTP | -| [Windows Bitsadmin Download File](/endpoint/windows_bitsadmin_download_file/) | [BITS Jobs](/tags/#bits-jobs), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer) | TTP | -| [Windows CertUtil URLCache Download](/endpoint/windows_certutil_urlcache_download/) | [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer) | TTP | -| [Windows CertUtil VerifyCtl Download](/endpoint/windows_certutil_verifyctl_download/) | [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer) | TTP | -| [Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path](/endpoint/windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path/) | [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer) | TTP | -| [Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination](/endpoint/windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination/) | [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer) | TTP | -| [Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination](/endpoint/windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination/) | [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer) | TTP | -| [Windows Powershell DownloadFile](/endpoint/windows_powershell_downloadfile/) | [Automated Exfiltration](/tags/#automated-exfiltration) | Anomaly | +| [Any Powershell DownloadFile](/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadfile/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell)| TTP | +| [Any Powershell DownloadString](/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadstring/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell)| TTP | +| [BITSAdmin Download File](/endpoint/bitsadmin_download_file/) | [BITS Jobs](/tags/#bits-jobs), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer)| TTP | +| [CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments](/endpoint/certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments/) | [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer)| TTP | +| [CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments](/endpoint/certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments/) | [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer)| TTP | +| [Curl Download and Bash Execution](/endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution/) | [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer)| TTP | +| [Wget Download and Bash Execution](/endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution/) | [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer)| TTP | +| [Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path](/endpoint/windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path/) | [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer)| TTP | +| [Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination](/endpoint/windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination/) | [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer)| TTP | +| [Suspicious Curl Network Connection](/endpoint/suspicious_curl_network_connection/) | [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/jboss_vulnerability.md b/docs/_stories/jboss_vulnerability.md index c415bc07b9..5236cd6e6d 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/jboss_vulnerability.md +++ b/docs/_stories/jboss_vulnerability.md @@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Web + - Delivery + - Reconnaissance --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -44,8 +46,8 @@ It can also be helpful to examine various behaviors of and the parent of the pro | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers](/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers/) | [System Information Discovery](/tags/#system-information-discovery) | TTP | -| [Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers](/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers/) | | TTP | +| [Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers](/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers/) | [System Information Discovery](/tags/#system-information-discovery)| TTP | +| [Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers](/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers/) | None| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/kubernetes_scanning_activity.md b/docs/_stories/kubernetes_scanning_activity.md index cf30698209..b97382498d 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/kubernetes_scanning_activity.md +++ b/docs/_stories/kubernetes_scanning_activity.md @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud + - Reconnaissance --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -29,9 +30,12 @@ Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection](/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection/) | [Cloud Service Discovery](/tags/#cloud-service-discovery) | Hunting | -| [Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection](/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection/) | [Cloud Service Discovery](/tags/#cloud-service-discovery) | Hunting | -| [GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection](/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection/) | [Cloud Service Discovery](/tags/#cloud-service-discovery) | Hunting | +| [GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection](/deprecated/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection/) | [Cloud Service Discovery](/tags/#cloud-service-discovery)| TTP | +| [Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint](/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint/) | None| Hunting | +| [Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint](/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint/) | [Cloud Service Discovery](/tags/#cloud-service-discovery)| Hunting | +| [Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection](/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection/) | [Cloud Service Discovery](/tags/#cloud-service-discovery)| Hunting | +| [Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection](/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection/) | [Cloud Service Discovery](/tags/#cloud-service-discovery)| Hunting | +| [GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection](/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection/) | [Cloud Service Discovery](/tags/#cloud-service-discovery)| Hunting | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity.md b/docs/_stories/kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity.md index 035be27de1..6db4713f72 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity.md +++ b/docs/_stories/kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity.md @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -19,7 +20,7 @@ This story addresses detection and response of accounts acccesing Kubernetes clu - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2020-05-20 - **Author**: Rod Soto, Splunk -- **ID**: 2574e6d9-7254-4751-8925-0447deeec8ea +- **ID**: c7d4dbf0-a171-4eaf-8444-4f40392e4f92 #### Narrative @@ -29,7 +30,15 @@ Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls](/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls/) | | Hunting | +| [AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access](/deprecated/aws_eks_kubernetes_cluster_sensitive_object_access/) | None| Hunting | +| [Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access](/deprecated/kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access/) | None| Hunting | +| [Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access](/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access/) | None| Hunting | +| [Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access](/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access/) | None| Hunting | +| [Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls](/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls/) | None| Hunting | +| [Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access](/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access/) | None| Hunting | +| [Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access](/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access/) | None| Hunting | +| [Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls](/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls/) | None| Hunting | +| [Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls](/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls/) | None| Hunting | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity.md b/docs/_stories/kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6afd71dcc7 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_stories/kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity.md @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +--- +title: "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity" +last_modified_at: 2020-05-20 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Exploitation +--- + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This story addresses detection and response around Sensitive Role usage within a Kubernetes clusters against cluster resources and namespaces. + +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2020-05-20 +- **Author**: Rod Soto, Splunk +- **ID**: 8b3984d2-17b6-47e9-ba43-a3376e70fdcc + +#### Narrative + +Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive roles within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes role activities + +#### Detections + +| Name | Technique | Type | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------| +| [Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod](/deprecated/kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod/) | None| Hunting | +| [Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account](/deprecated/kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account/) | None| Hunting | +| [Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access](/deprecated/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access/) | None| Hunting | +| [Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace](/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace/) | None| Hunting | +| [Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account](/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account/) | None| Hunting | +| [Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access](/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access/) | None| Hunting | +| [Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account](/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account/) | None| Hunting | +| [Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod](/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod/) | None| Hunting | +| [Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access](/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access/) | None| Hunting | + +#### Reference + +* [https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_stories/linux_persistence_techniques.md b/docs/_stories/linux_persistence_techniques.md index c2c30d8f98..4f18340b94 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/linux_persistence_techniques.md +++ b/docs/_stories/linux_persistence_techniques.md @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -30,38 +31,38 @@ Maintaining persistence is one of the first steps taken by attackers after the i | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories](/endpoint/linux_add_files_in_known_crontab_directories/) | [Cron](/tags/#cron), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | Anomaly | -| [Linux Add User Account](/endpoint/linux_add_user_account/) | [Local Account](/tags/#local-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account) | Hunting | -| [Linux At Allow Config File Creation](/endpoint/linux_at_allow_config_file_creation/) | [Cron](/tags/#cron), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | Anomaly | -| [Linux At Application Execution](/endpoint/linux_at_application_execution/) | [At (Linux)](/tags/#at-(linux)), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | Anomaly | -| [Linux Change File Owner To Root](/endpoint/linux_change_file_owner_to_root/) | [Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#linux-and-mac-file-and-directory-permissions-modification), [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification) | Anomaly | -| [Linux Common Process For Elevation Control](/endpoint/linux_common_process_for_elevation_control/) | [Setuid and Setgid](/tags/#setuid-and-setgid), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | Hunting | -| [Linux Doas Conf File Creation](/endpoint/linux_doas_conf_file_creation/) | [Sudo and Sudo Caching](/tags/#sudo-and-sudo-caching), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | Anomaly | -| [Linux Doas Tool Execution](/endpoint/linux_doas_tool_execution/) | [Sudo and Sudo Caching](/tags/#sudo-and-sudo-caching), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | Anomaly | -| [Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter](/endpoint/linux_edit_cron_table_parameter/) | [Cron](/tags/#cron), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | Hunting | -| [Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory](/endpoint/linux_file_created_in_kernel_driver_directory/) | [Kernel Modules and Extensions](/tags/#kernel-modules-and-extensions), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution) | Anomaly | -| [Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory](/endpoint/linux_file_creation_in_init_boot_directory/) | [RC Scripts](/tags/#rc-scripts), [Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts](/tags/#boot-or-logon-initialization-scripts) | Anomaly | -| [Linux File Creation In Profile Directory](/endpoint/linux_file_creation_in_profile_directory/) | [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](/tags/#unix-shell-configuration-modification), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution) | Anomaly | -| [Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility](/endpoint/linux_insert_kernel_module_using_insmod_utility/) | [Kernel Modules and Extensions](/tags/#kernel-modules-and-extensions), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution) | Anomaly | -| [Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility](/endpoint/linux_install_kernel_module_using_modprobe_utility/) | [Kernel Modules and Extensions](/tags/#kernel-modules-and-extensions), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution) | Anomaly | -| [Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File](/endpoint/linux_nopasswd_entry_in_sudoers_file/) | [Sudo and Sudo Caching](/tags/#sudo-and-sudo-caching), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | Anomaly | -| [Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File](/endpoint/linux_possible_access_or_modification_of_sshd_config_file/) | [SSH Authorized Keys](/tags/#ssh-authorized-keys), [Account Manipulation](/tags/#account-manipulation) | Anomaly | -| [Linux Possible Access To Credential Files](/endpoint/linux_possible_access_to_credential_files/) | [/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow](/tags/#/etc/passwd-and-/etc/shadow), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | Anomaly | -| [Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File](/endpoint/linux_possible_access_to_sudoers_file/) | [Sudo and Sudo Caching](/tags/#sudo-and-sudo-caching), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | Anomaly | -| [Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File](/endpoint/linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file/) | [At (Linux)](/tags/#at-(linux)), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | Anomaly | -| [Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File](/endpoint/linux_possible_append_command_to_profile_config_file/) | [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](/tags/#unix-shell-configuration-modification), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution) | Anomaly | -| [Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File](/endpoint/linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file/) | [Cron](/tags/#cron), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | Hunting | -| [Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor](/endpoint/linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor/) | [Cron](/tags/#cron), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | Hunting | -| [Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation](/endpoint/linux_possible_ssh_key_file_creation/) | [SSH Authorized Keys](/tags/#ssh-authorized-keys), [Account Manipulation](/tags/#account-manipulation) | Anomaly | -| [Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls](/endpoint/linux_preload_hijack_library_calls/) | [Dynamic Linker Hijacking](/tags/#dynamic-linker-hijacking), [Hijack Execution Flow](/tags/#hijack-execution-flow) | TTP | -| [Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory](/endpoint/linux_service_file_created_in_systemd_directory/) | [Systemd Timers](/tags/#systemd-timers), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | Anomaly | -| [Linux Service Restarted](/endpoint/linux_service_restarted/) | [Systemd Timers](/tags/#systemd-timers), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | Anomaly | -| [Linux Service Started Or Enabled](/endpoint/linux_service_started_or_enabled/) | [Systemd Timers](/tags/#systemd-timers), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | Anomaly | -| [Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility](/endpoint/linux_setuid_using_chmod_utility/) | [Setuid and Setgid](/tags/#setuid-and-setgid), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | Anomaly | -| [Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility](/endpoint/linux_setuid_using_setcap_utility/) | [Setuid and Setgid](/tags/#setuid-and-setgid), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | Anomaly | -| [Linux Sudo OR Su Execution](/endpoint/linux_sudo_or_su_execution/) | [Sudo and Sudo Caching](/tags/#sudo-and-sudo-caching), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | Hunting | -| [Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation](/endpoint/linux_sudoers_tmp_file_creation/) | [Sudo and Sudo Caching](/tags/#sudo-and-sudo-caching), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | Anomaly | -| [Linux Visudo Utility Execution](/endpoint/linux_visudo_utility_execution/) | [Sudo and Sudo Caching](/tags/#sudo-and-sudo-caching), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | Anomaly | +| [Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories](/endpoint/linux_add_files_in_known_crontab_directories/) | [Cron](/tags/#cron), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job)| Anomaly | +| [Linux Add User Account](/endpoint/linux_add_user_account/) | [Local Account](/tags/#local-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account)| Hunting | +| [Linux At Allow Config File Creation](/endpoint/linux_at_allow_config_file_creation/) | [Cron](/tags/#cron), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job)| Anomaly | +| [Linux At Application Execution](/endpoint/linux_at_application_execution/) | [At (Linux)](/tags/#at-(linux)), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job)| Anomaly | +| [Linux Change File Owner To Root](/endpoint/linux_change_file_owner_to_root/) | [Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#linux-and-mac-file-and-directory-permissions-modification), [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification)| Anomaly | +| [Linux Common Process For Elevation Control](/endpoint/linux_common_process_for_elevation_control/) | [Setuid and Setgid](/tags/#setuid-and-setgid), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism)| Hunting | +| [Linux Doas Conf File Creation](/endpoint/linux_doas_conf_file_creation/) | [Sudo and Sudo Caching](/tags/#sudo-and-sudo-caching), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism)| Anomaly | +| [Linux Doas Tool Execution](/endpoint/linux_doas_tool_execution/) | [Sudo and Sudo Caching](/tags/#sudo-and-sudo-caching), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism)| Anomaly | +| [Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter](/endpoint/linux_edit_cron_table_parameter/) | [Cron](/tags/#cron), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job)| Hunting | +| [Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory](/endpoint/linux_file_created_in_kernel_driver_directory/) | [Kernel Modules and Extensions](/tags/#kernel-modules-and-extensions), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution)| Anomaly | +| [Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory](/endpoint/linux_file_creation_in_init_boot_directory/) | [RC Scripts](/tags/#rc-scripts), [Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts](/tags/#boot-or-logon-initialization-scripts)| Anomaly | +| [Linux File Creation In Profile Directory](/endpoint/linux_file_creation_in_profile_directory/) | [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](/tags/#unix-shell-configuration-modification), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution)| Anomaly | +| [Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility](/endpoint/linux_insert_kernel_module_using_insmod_utility/) | [Kernel Modules and Extensions](/tags/#kernel-modules-and-extensions), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution)| Anomaly | +| [Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility](/endpoint/linux_install_kernel_module_using_modprobe_utility/) | [Kernel Modules and Extensions](/tags/#kernel-modules-and-extensions), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution)| Anomaly | +| [Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File](/endpoint/linux_nopasswd_entry_in_sudoers_file/) | [Sudo and Sudo Caching](/tags/#sudo-and-sudo-caching), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism)| Anomaly | +| [Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File](/endpoint/linux_possible_access_or_modification_of_sshd_config_file/) | [SSH Authorized Keys](/tags/#ssh-authorized-keys), [Account Manipulation](/tags/#account-manipulation)| Anomaly | +| [Linux Possible Access To Credential Files](/endpoint/linux_possible_access_to_credential_files/) | [/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow](/tags/#/etc/passwd-and-/etc/shadow), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping)| Anomaly | +| [Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File](/endpoint/linux_possible_access_to_sudoers_file/) | [Sudo and Sudo Caching](/tags/#sudo-and-sudo-caching), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism)| Anomaly | +| [Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File](/endpoint/linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file/) | [At (Linux)](/tags/#at-(linux)), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job)| Anomaly | +| [Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File](/endpoint/linux_possible_append_command_to_profile_config_file/) | [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](/tags/#unix-shell-configuration-modification), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution)| Anomaly | +| [Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File](/endpoint/linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file/) | [Cron](/tags/#cron), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job)| Hunting | +| [Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor](/endpoint/linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor/) | [Cron](/tags/#cron), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job)| Hunting | +| [Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation](/endpoint/linux_possible_ssh_key_file_creation/) | [SSH Authorized Keys](/tags/#ssh-authorized-keys), [Account Manipulation](/tags/#account-manipulation)| Anomaly | +| [Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls](/endpoint/linux_preload_hijack_library_calls/) | [Dynamic Linker Hijacking](/tags/#dynamic-linker-hijacking), [Hijack Execution Flow](/tags/#hijack-execution-flow)| TTP | +| [Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory](/endpoint/linux_service_file_created_in_systemd_directory/) | [Systemd Timers](/tags/#systemd-timers), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job)| Anomaly | +| [Linux Service Restarted](/endpoint/linux_service_restarted/) | [Systemd Timers](/tags/#systemd-timers), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job)| Anomaly | +| [Linux Service Started Or Enabled](/endpoint/linux_service_started_or_enabled/) | [Systemd Timers](/tags/#systemd-timers), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job)| Anomaly | +| [Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility](/endpoint/linux_setuid_using_chmod_utility/) | [Setuid and Setgid](/tags/#setuid-and-setgid), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism)| Anomaly | +| [Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility](/endpoint/linux_setuid_using_setcap_utility/) | [Setuid and Setgid](/tags/#setuid-and-setgid), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism)| Anomaly | +| [Linux Sudo OR Su Execution](/endpoint/linux_sudo_or_su_execution/) | [Sudo and Sudo Caching](/tags/#sudo-and-sudo-caching), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism)| Hunting | +| [Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation](/endpoint/linux_sudoers_tmp_file_creation/) | [Sudo and Sudo Caching](/tags/#sudo-and-sudo-caching), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism)| Anomaly | +| [Linux Visudo Utility Execution](/endpoint/linux_visudo_utility_execution/) | [Sudo and Sudo Caching](/tags/#sudo-and-sudo-caching), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism)| Anomaly | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/linux_post-exploitation.md b/docs/_stories/linux_post-exploitation.md index 821c27ffb4..1f67698e00 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/linux_post-exploitation.md +++ b/docs/_stories/linux_post-exploitation.md @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -30,7 +31,7 @@ These tools allow operators find possible exploits or paths for privilege escala | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Suspicious Linux Discovery Commands](/endpoint/suspicious_linux_discovery_commands/) | [Unix Shell](/tags/#unix-shell) | TTP | +| [Suspicious Linux Discovery Commands](/endpoint/suspicious_linux_discovery_commands/) | [Unix Shell](/tags/#unix-shell)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/linux_privilege_escalation.md b/docs/_stories/linux_privilege_escalation.md index 6854233057..a81a4e5399 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/linux_privilege_escalation.md +++ b/docs/_stories/linux_privilege_escalation.md @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -30,39 +31,39 @@ Privilege escalation is a "land-and-expand" technique, wherein an adversary gain | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories](/endpoint/linux_add_files_in_known_crontab_directories/) | [Cron](/tags/#cron), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | Anomaly | -| [Linux Add User Account](/endpoint/linux_add_user_account/) | [Local Account](/tags/#local-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account) | Hunting | -| [Linux At Allow Config File Creation](/endpoint/linux_at_allow_config_file_creation/) | [Cron](/tags/#cron), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | Anomaly | -| [Linux At Application Execution](/endpoint/linux_at_application_execution/) | [At (Linux)](/tags/#at-(linux)), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | Anomaly | -| [Linux Change File Owner To Root](/endpoint/linux_change_file_owner_to_root/) | [Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#linux-and-mac-file-and-directory-permissions-modification), [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification) | Anomaly | -| [Linux Common Process For Elevation Control](/endpoint/linux_common_process_for_elevation_control/) | [Setuid and Setgid](/tags/#setuid-and-setgid), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | Hunting | -| [Linux Doas Conf File Creation](/endpoint/linux_doas_conf_file_creation/) | [Sudo and Sudo Caching](/tags/#sudo-and-sudo-caching), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | Anomaly | -| [Linux Doas Tool Execution](/endpoint/linux_doas_tool_execution/) | [Sudo and Sudo Caching](/tags/#sudo-and-sudo-caching), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | Anomaly | -| [Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter](/endpoint/linux_edit_cron_table_parameter/) | [Cron](/tags/#cron), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | Hunting | -| [Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory](/endpoint/linux_file_created_in_kernel_driver_directory/) | [Kernel Modules and Extensions](/tags/#kernel-modules-and-extensions), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution) | Anomaly | -| [Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory](/endpoint/linux_file_creation_in_init_boot_directory/) | [RC Scripts](/tags/#rc-scripts), [Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts](/tags/#boot-or-logon-initialization-scripts) | Anomaly | -| [Linux File Creation In Profile Directory](/endpoint/linux_file_creation_in_profile_directory/) | [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](/tags/#unix-shell-configuration-modification), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution) | Anomaly | -| [Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility](/endpoint/linux_insert_kernel_module_using_insmod_utility/) | [Kernel Modules and Extensions](/tags/#kernel-modules-and-extensions), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution) | Anomaly | -| [Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility](/endpoint/linux_install_kernel_module_using_modprobe_utility/) | [Kernel Modules and Extensions](/tags/#kernel-modules-and-extensions), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution) | Anomaly | -| [Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File](/endpoint/linux_nopasswd_entry_in_sudoers_file/) | [Sudo and Sudo Caching](/tags/#sudo-and-sudo-caching), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | Anomaly | -| [Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File](/endpoint/linux_possible_access_or_modification_of_sshd_config_file/) | [SSH Authorized Keys](/tags/#ssh-authorized-keys), [Account Manipulation](/tags/#account-manipulation) | Anomaly | -| [Linux Possible Access To Credential Files](/endpoint/linux_possible_access_to_credential_files/) | [/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow](/tags/#/etc/passwd-and-/etc/shadow), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | Anomaly | -| [Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File](/endpoint/linux_possible_access_to_sudoers_file/) | [Sudo and Sudo Caching](/tags/#sudo-and-sudo-caching), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | Anomaly | -| [Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File](/endpoint/linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file/) | [At (Linux)](/tags/#at-(linux)), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | Anomaly | -| [Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File](/endpoint/linux_possible_append_command_to_profile_config_file/) | [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](/tags/#unix-shell-configuration-modification), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution) | Anomaly | -| [Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File](/endpoint/linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file/) | [Cron](/tags/#cron), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | Hunting | -| [Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor](/endpoint/linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor/) | [Cron](/tags/#cron), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | Hunting | -| [Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation](/endpoint/linux_possible_ssh_key_file_creation/) | [SSH Authorized Keys](/tags/#ssh-authorized-keys), [Account Manipulation](/tags/#account-manipulation) | Anomaly | -| [Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls](/endpoint/linux_preload_hijack_library_calls/) | [Dynamic Linker Hijacking](/tags/#dynamic-linker-hijacking), [Hijack Execution Flow](/tags/#hijack-execution-flow) | TTP | -| [Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory](/endpoint/linux_service_file_created_in_systemd_directory/) | [Systemd Timers](/tags/#systemd-timers), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | Anomaly | -| [Linux Service Restarted](/endpoint/linux_service_restarted/) | [Systemd Timers](/tags/#systemd-timers), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | Anomaly | -| [Linux Service Started Or Enabled](/endpoint/linux_service_started_or_enabled/) | [Systemd Timers](/tags/#systemd-timers), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | Anomaly | -| [Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility](/endpoint/linux_setuid_using_chmod_utility/) | [Setuid and Setgid](/tags/#setuid-and-setgid), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | Anomaly | -| [Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility](/endpoint/linux_setuid_using_setcap_utility/) | [Setuid and Setgid](/tags/#setuid-and-setgid), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | Anomaly | -| [Linux Sudo OR Su Execution](/endpoint/linux_sudo_or_su_execution/) | [Sudo and Sudo Caching](/tags/#sudo-and-sudo-caching), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | Hunting | -| [Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation](/endpoint/linux_sudoers_tmp_file_creation/) | [Sudo and Sudo Caching](/tags/#sudo-and-sudo-caching), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | Anomaly | -| [Linux Visudo Utility Execution](/endpoint/linux_visudo_utility_execution/) | [Sudo and Sudo Caching](/tags/#sudo-and-sudo-caching), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | Anomaly | -| [Linux pkexec Privilege Escalation](/endpoint/linux_pkexec_privilege_escalation/) | [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](/tags/#exploitation-for-privilege-escalation) | TTP | +| [Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories](/endpoint/linux_add_files_in_known_crontab_directories/) | [Cron](/tags/#cron), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job)| Anomaly | +| [Linux Add User Account](/endpoint/linux_add_user_account/) | [Local Account](/tags/#local-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account)| Hunting | +| [Linux At Allow Config File Creation](/endpoint/linux_at_allow_config_file_creation/) | [Cron](/tags/#cron), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job)| Anomaly | +| [Linux At Application Execution](/endpoint/linux_at_application_execution/) | [At (Linux)](/tags/#at-(linux)), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job)| Anomaly | +| [Linux Change File Owner To Root](/endpoint/linux_change_file_owner_to_root/) | [Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#linux-and-mac-file-and-directory-permissions-modification), [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification)| Anomaly | +| [Linux Common Process For Elevation Control](/endpoint/linux_common_process_for_elevation_control/) | [Setuid and Setgid](/tags/#setuid-and-setgid), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism)| Hunting | +| [Linux Doas Conf File Creation](/endpoint/linux_doas_conf_file_creation/) | [Sudo and Sudo Caching](/tags/#sudo-and-sudo-caching), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism)| Anomaly | +| [Linux Doas Tool Execution](/endpoint/linux_doas_tool_execution/) | [Sudo and Sudo Caching](/tags/#sudo-and-sudo-caching), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism)| Anomaly | +| [Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter](/endpoint/linux_edit_cron_table_parameter/) | [Cron](/tags/#cron), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job)| Hunting | +| [Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory](/endpoint/linux_file_created_in_kernel_driver_directory/) | [Kernel Modules and Extensions](/tags/#kernel-modules-and-extensions), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution)| Anomaly | +| [Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory](/endpoint/linux_file_creation_in_init_boot_directory/) | [RC Scripts](/tags/#rc-scripts), [Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts](/tags/#boot-or-logon-initialization-scripts)| Anomaly | +| [Linux File Creation In Profile Directory](/endpoint/linux_file_creation_in_profile_directory/) | [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](/tags/#unix-shell-configuration-modification), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution)| Anomaly | +| [Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility](/endpoint/linux_insert_kernel_module_using_insmod_utility/) | [Kernel Modules and Extensions](/tags/#kernel-modules-and-extensions), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution)| Anomaly | +| [Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility](/endpoint/linux_install_kernel_module_using_modprobe_utility/) | [Kernel Modules and Extensions](/tags/#kernel-modules-and-extensions), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution)| Anomaly | +| [Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File](/endpoint/linux_nopasswd_entry_in_sudoers_file/) | [Sudo and Sudo Caching](/tags/#sudo-and-sudo-caching), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism)| Anomaly | +| [Linux pkexec Privilege Escalation](/endpoint/linux_pkexec_privilege_escalation/) | [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](/tags/#exploitation-for-privilege-escalation)| TTP | +| [Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File](/endpoint/linux_possible_access_or_modification_of_sshd_config_file/) | [SSH Authorized Keys](/tags/#ssh-authorized-keys), [Account Manipulation](/tags/#account-manipulation)| Anomaly | +| [Linux Possible Access To Credential Files](/endpoint/linux_possible_access_to_credential_files/) | [/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow](/tags/#/etc/passwd-and-/etc/shadow), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping)| Anomaly | +| [Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File](/endpoint/linux_possible_access_to_sudoers_file/) | [Sudo and Sudo Caching](/tags/#sudo-and-sudo-caching), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism)| Anomaly | +| [Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File](/endpoint/linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file/) | [At (Linux)](/tags/#at-(linux)), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job)| Anomaly | +| [Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File](/endpoint/linux_possible_append_command_to_profile_config_file/) | [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](/tags/#unix-shell-configuration-modification), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution)| Anomaly | +| [Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File](/endpoint/linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file/) | [Cron](/tags/#cron), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job)| Hunting | +| [Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor](/endpoint/linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor/) | [Cron](/tags/#cron), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job)| Hunting | +| [Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation](/endpoint/linux_possible_ssh_key_file_creation/) | [SSH Authorized Keys](/tags/#ssh-authorized-keys), [Account Manipulation](/tags/#account-manipulation)| Anomaly | +| [Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls](/endpoint/linux_preload_hijack_library_calls/) | [Dynamic Linker Hijacking](/tags/#dynamic-linker-hijacking), [Hijack Execution Flow](/tags/#hijack-execution-flow)| TTP | +| [Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory](/endpoint/linux_service_file_created_in_systemd_directory/) | [Systemd Timers](/tags/#systemd-timers), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job)| Anomaly | +| [Linux Service Restarted](/endpoint/linux_service_restarted/) | [Systemd Timers](/tags/#systemd-timers), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job)| Anomaly | +| [Linux Service Started Or Enabled](/endpoint/linux_service_started_or_enabled/) | [Systemd Timers](/tags/#systemd-timers), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job)| Anomaly | +| [Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility](/endpoint/linux_setuid_using_chmod_utility/) | [Setuid and Setgid](/tags/#setuid-and-setgid), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism)| Anomaly | +| [Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility](/endpoint/linux_setuid_using_setcap_utility/) | [Setuid and Setgid](/tags/#setuid-and-setgid), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism)| Anomaly | +| [Linux Sudo OR Su Execution](/endpoint/linux_sudo_or_su_execution/) | [Sudo and Sudo Caching](/tags/#sudo-and-sudo-caching), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism)| Hunting | +| [Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation](/endpoint/linux_sudoers_tmp_file_creation/) | [Sudo and Sudo Caching](/tags/#sudo-and-sudo-caching), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism)| Anomaly | +| [Linux Visudo Utility Execution](/endpoint/linux_visudo_utility_execution/) | [Sudo and Sudo Caching](/tags/#sudo-and-sudo-caching), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism)| Anomaly | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/living_off_the_land.md b/docs/_stories/living_off_the_land.md index 8c899b89c4..5eaef9e662 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/living_off_the_land.md +++ b/docs/_stories/living_off_the_land.md @@ -8,8 +8,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint - - Endpoint_Processes - - Endpoint_Registry + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -19,7 +18,7 @@ tags: Leverage searches that allow you to search for the presence of an attacker leveraging existing tooling within your environment. - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud -- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint), [Endpoint_Processes](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/EndpointProcesses), [Endpoint_Registry](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/EndpointRegistry) +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-02-17 - **Author**: Lou Stella, Splunk - **ID**: 6f7982e2-900b-11ec-a54a-acde48001122 @@ -32,23 +31,9 @@ Living Off The Land refers to an attacker methodology of using software already | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Eventvwr UAC Bypass](/endpoint/eventvwr_uac_bypass/) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | TTP | -| [WSReset UAC Bypass](/endpoint/wsreset_uac_bypass/) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | TTP | -| [Windows Bits Job Persistence](/endpoint/windows_bits_job_persistence/) | [BITS Jobs](/tags/#bits-jobs) | TTP | -| [Windows Bitsadmin Download File](/endpoint/windows_bitsadmin_download_file/) | [BITS Jobs](/tags/#bits-jobs), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer) | TTP | -| [Windows CertUtil Decode File](/endpoint/windows_certutil_decode_file/) | [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](/tags/#deobfuscate/decode-files-or-information) | TTP | -| [Windows CertUtil URLCache Download](/endpoint/windows_certutil_urlcache_download/) | [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer) | TTP | -| [Windows CertUtil VerifyCtl Download](/endpoint/windows_certutil_verifyctl_download/) | [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer) | TTP | -| [Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution](/endpoint/windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution) | Anomaly | -| [Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution](/endpoint/windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution) | TTP | -| [Windows Eventvwr UAC Bypass](/endpoint/windows_eventvwr_uac_bypass/) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | Anomaly | -| [Windows MSHTA Child Process](/endpoint/windows_mshta_child_process/) | [Mshta](/tags/#mshta), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution) | TTP | -| [Windows MSHTA Command-Line URL](/endpoint/windows_mshta_command-line_url/) | [Mshta](/tags/#mshta), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution) | TTP | -| [Windows MSHTA Inline HTA Execution](/endpoint/windows_mshta_inline_hta_execution/) | [Mshta](/tags/#mshta), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution) | TTP | -| [Windows PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer](/endpoint/windows_powershell_start-bitstransfer/) | [BITS Jobs](/tags/#bits-jobs), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer) | TTP | -| [Windows Rasautou DLL Execution](/endpoint/windows_rasautou_dll_execution/) | [Dynamic-link Library Injection](/tags/#dynamic-link-library-injection), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection) | TTP | -| [Windows Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution](/endpoint/windows_rundll32_inline_hta_execution/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta) | TTP | -| [Windows WSReset UAC Bypass](/endpoint/windows_wsreset_uac_bypass/) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | Anomaly | +| [Eventvwr UAC Bypass](/endpoint/eventvwr_uac_bypass/) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism)| TTP | +| [Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution](/endpoint/windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution)| TTP | +| [WSReset UAC Bypass](/endpoint/wsreset_uac_bypass/) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/log4shell_cve-2021-44228.md b/docs/_stories/log4shell_cve-2021-44228.md index 30130c6bf1..725845d49e 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/log4shell_cve-2021-44228.md +++ b/docs/_stories/log4shell_cve-2021-44228.md @@ -8,10 +8,13 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint - - Endpoint_Processes - Network_Traffic - Risk - Web + - Actions on Objectives + - Command & Control + - Exploitation + - Reconnaissance --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -21,7 +24,7 @@ tags: Log4Shell or CVE-2021-44228 is a Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability in the Apache Log4j library, a widely used and ubiquitous logging framework for Java. The vulnerability allows an attacker who can control log messages to execute arbitrary code loaded from attacker-controlled servers and we anticipate that most apps using the Log4j library will meet this condition. - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud -- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint), [Endpoint_Processes](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/EndpointProcesses), [Network_Traffic](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkTraffic), [Risk](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Risk), [Web](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Web) +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint), [Network_Traffic](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkTraffic), [Risk](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Risk), [Web](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Web) - **Last Updated**: 2021-12-11 - **Author**: Jose Hernandez - **ID**: b4453928-5a98-11ec-afcd-8de10b48fc52 @@ -34,23 +37,20 @@ In late November 2021, Chen Zhaojun of Alibaba identified a remote code executio | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Any Powershell DownloadFile](/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadfile/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell) | TTP | -| [CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter](/endpoint/cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter/) | [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter) | Hunting | -| [Curl Download and Bash Execution](/endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution/) | [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer) | TTP | -| [Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic](/network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic/) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter) | Hunting | -| [Hunting for Log4Shell](/endpoint/hunting_for_log4shell/) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | Hunting | -| [Java Class File download by Java User Agent](/endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent/) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | TTP | -| [Linux Java Spawning Shell](/endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell/) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | TTP | -| [Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 Exploitation](/endpoint/log4shell_cve-2021-44228_exploitation/) | [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer), [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter) | Correlation | -| [Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt](/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt/) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | Anomaly | -| [Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection](/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection/) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | Anomaly | -| [Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports](/endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports/) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | TTP | -| [PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window](/endpoint/powershell_-_connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window/) | [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter) | Hunting | -| [TCP Command and Scripting Interpreter Outbound LDAP Traffic](/network/tcp_command_and_scripting_interpreter_outbound_ldap_traffic/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter) | Anomaly | -| [Wget Download and Bash Execution](/endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution/) | [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer) | TTP | -| [Windows Java Spawning Shells](/endpoint/windows_java_spawning_shells/) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | TTP | -| [Windows Powershell Connect to Internet With Hidden Window](/endpoint/windows_powershell_connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window/) | [Automated Exfiltration](/tags/#automated-exfiltration) | Anomaly | -| [Windows Powershell DownloadFile](/endpoint/windows_powershell_downloadfile/) | [Automated Exfiltration](/tags/#automated-exfiltration) | Anomaly | +| [Any Powershell DownloadFile](/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadfile/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell)| TTP | +| [CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter](/endpoint/cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter/) | [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter)| Hunting | +| [Curl Download and Bash Execution](/endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution/) | [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer)| TTP | +| [Hunting for Log4Shell](/endpoint/hunting_for_log4shell/) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application)| Hunting | +| [Java Class File download by Java User Agent](/endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent/) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application)| TTP | +| [Linux Java Spawning Shell](/endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell/) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application)| TTP | +| [Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 Exploitation](/endpoint/log4shell_cve-2021-44228_exploitation/) | [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer), [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter)| Correlation | +| [Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports](/endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports/) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application)| TTP | +| [PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window](/endpoint/powershell_-_connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window/) | [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter)| Hunting | +| [Wget Download and Bash Execution](/endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution/) | [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer)| TTP | +| [Windows Java Spawning Shells](/endpoint/windows_java_spawning_shells/) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application)| TTP | +| [Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic](/network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic/) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter)| Hunting | +| [Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt](/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt/) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application)| Anomaly | +| [Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection](/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection/) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application)| Anomaly | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/malicious_powershell.md b/docs/_stories/malicious_powershell.md index 45f7ce457d..8f85b17083 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/malicious_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_stories/malicious_powershell.md @@ -8,7 +8,11 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint - - Endpoint_Processes + - Actions on Objectives + - Command & Control + - Exploitation + - Installation + - Reconnaissance --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -18,7 +22,7 @@ tags: Attackers are finding stealthy ways "live off the land," leveraging utilities and tools that come standard on the endpoint--such as PowerShell--to achieve their goals without downloading binary files. These searches can help you detect and investigate PowerShell command-line options that may be indicative of malicious intent. - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud -- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint), [Endpoint_Processes](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/EndpointProcesses) +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2017-08-23 - **Author**: David Dorsey, Splunk - **ID**: 2c8ff66e-0b57-42af-8ad7-912438a403fc @@ -42,31 +46,30 @@ Most recently we have added new content related to PowerShell Script Block loggi | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Any Powershell DownloadFile](/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadfile/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell) | TTP | -| [Any Powershell DownloadString](/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadstring/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell) | TTP | -| [Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging](/endpoint/detect_empire_with_powershell_script_block_logging/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell) | TTP | -| [Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging](/endpoint/detect_mimikatz_with_powershell_script_block_logging/) | [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | TTP | -| [Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command](/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_-_encoded_command/) | [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information) | Hunting | -| [Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques](/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell) | TTP | -| [Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn](/endpoint/possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [Distributed Component Object Model](/tags/#distributed-component-object-model), [Windows Remote Management](/tags/#windows-remote-management), [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation), [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell) | TTP | -| [PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window](/endpoint/powershell_-_connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window/) | [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter) | Hunting | -| [PowerShell 4104 Hunting](/endpoint/powershell_4104_hunting/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell) | Hunting | -| [PowerShell Domain Enumeration](/endpoint/powershell_domain_enumeration/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell) | TTP | -| [PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via System Reflection Assembly](/endpoint/powershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_system_reflection_assembly/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell) | TTP | -| [Powershell Creating Thread Mutex](/endpoint/powershell_creating_thread_mutex/) | [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information), [Indicator Removal from Tools](/tags/#indicator-removal-from-tools) | TTP | -| [Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature](/endpoint/powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature/) | [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information), [Indicator Removal from Tools](/tags/#indicator-removal-from-tools) | TTP | -| [Powershell Execute COM Object](/endpoint/powershell_execute_com_object/) | [Component Object Model Hijacking](/tags/#component-object-model-hijacking), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution) | TTP | -| [Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress](/endpoint/powershell_fileless_process_injection_via_getprocaddress/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell) | TTP | -| [Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content](/endpoint/powershell_fileless_script_contains_base64_encoded_content/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell) | TTP | -| [Powershell Processing Stream Of Data](/endpoint/powershell_processing_stream_of_data/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell) | TTP | -| [Powershell Using memory As Backing Store](/endpoint/powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store/) | [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](/tags/#deobfuscate/decode-files-or-information) | TTP | -| [Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI](/endpoint/recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi/) | [Gather Victim Host Information](/tags/#gather-victim-host-information) | TTP | -| [Recon Using WMI Class](/endpoint/recon_using_wmi_class/) | [Gather Victim Host Information](/tags/#gather-victim-host-information) | TTP | -| [Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass](/endpoint/set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell) | TTP | -| [Unloading AMSI via Reflection](/endpoint/unloading_amsi_via_reflection/) | [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | -| [WMI Recon Running Process Or Services](/endpoint/wmi_recon_running_process_or_services/) | [Gather Victim Host Information](/tags/#gather-victim-host-information) | TTP | -| [Windows Powershell Connect to Internet With Hidden Window](/endpoint/windows_powershell_connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window/) | [Automated Exfiltration](/tags/#automated-exfiltration) | Anomaly | -| [Windows Powershell DownloadFile](/endpoint/windows_powershell_downloadfile/) | [Automated Exfiltration](/tags/#automated-exfiltration) | Anomaly | +| [Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments](/deprecated/malicious_powershell_process_-_multiple_suspicious_command-line_arguments/) | [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell)| TTP | +| [Any Powershell DownloadFile](/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadfile/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell)| TTP | +| [Any Powershell DownloadString](/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadstring/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell)| TTP | +| [Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging](/endpoint/detect_empire_with_powershell_script_block_logging/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell)| TTP | +| [Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging](/endpoint/detect_mimikatz_with_powershell_script_block_logging/) | [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping)| TTP | +| [Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command](/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_-_encoded_command/) | [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information)| Hunting | +| [Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques](/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell)| TTP | +| [Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn](/endpoint/possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [Distributed Component Object Model](/tags/#distributed-component-object-model), [Windows Remote Management](/tags/#windows-remote-management), [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation), [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell)| TTP | +| [PowerShell 4104 Hunting](/endpoint/powershell_4104_hunting/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell)| Hunting | +| [PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window](/endpoint/powershell_-_connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window/) | [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter)| Hunting | +| [Powershell Creating Thread Mutex](/endpoint/powershell_creating_thread_mutex/) | [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information), [Indicator Removal from Tools](/tags/#indicator-removal-from-tools)| TTP | +| [PowerShell Domain Enumeration](/endpoint/powershell_domain_enumeration/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell)| TTP | +| [Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature](/endpoint/powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature/) | [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information), [Indicator Removal from Tools](/tags/#indicator-removal-from-tools)| TTP | +| [Powershell Execute COM Object](/endpoint/powershell_execute_com_object/) | [Component Object Model Hijacking](/tags/#component-object-model-hijacking), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution)| TTP | +| [Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress](/endpoint/powershell_fileless_process_injection_via_getprocaddress/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell)| TTP | +| [Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content](/endpoint/powershell_fileless_script_contains_base64_encoded_content/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell)| TTP | +| [PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via System Reflection Assembly](/endpoint/powershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_system_reflection_assembly/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell)| TTP | +| [Powershell Processing Stream Of Data](/endpoint/powershell_processing_stream_of_data/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell)| TTP | +| [Powershell Using memory As Backing Store](/endpoint/powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store/) | [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](/tags/#deobfuscate/decode-files-or-information)| TTP | +| [Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI](/endpoint/recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi/) | [Gather Victim Host Information](/tags/#gather-victim-host-information)| TTP | +| [Recon Using WMI Class](/endpoint/recon_using_wmi_class/) | [Gather Victim Host Information](/tags/#gather-victim-host-information)| TTP | +| [Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass](/endpoint/set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell)| TTP | +| [Unloading AMSI via Reflection](/endpoint/unloading_amsi_via_reflection/) | [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| TTP | +| [WMI Recon Running Process Or Services](/endpoint/wmi_recon_running_process_or_services/) | [Gather Victim Host Information](/tags/#gather-victim-host-information)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/masquerading_-_rename_system_utilities.md b/docs/_stories/masquerading_-_rename_system_utilities.md index 83798bb57e..26cff5c908 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/masquerading_-_rename_system_utilities.md +++ b/docs/_stories/masquerading_-_rename_system_utilities.md @@ -8,7 +8,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint - - Endpoint_Processes + - Actions on Objectives + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -18,7 +19,7 @@ tags: Adversaries may rename legitimate system utilities to try to evade security mechanisms concerning the usage of those utilities. - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud -- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint), [Endpoint_Processes](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/EndpointProcesses) +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-04-26 - **Author**: Michael Haag, Splunk - **ID**: f0258af4-a6ae-11eb-b3c2-acde48001122 @@ -33,15 +34,16 @@ There will be false positives as some native Windows processes are moved or ran | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Execution of File with Multiple Extensions](/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities) | TTP | -| [Sdelete Application Execution](/endpoint/sdelete_application_execution/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction), [File Deletion](/tags/#file-deletion), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host) | TTP | -| [Suspicious MSBuild Rename](/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [MSBuild](/tags/#msbuild) | TTP | -| [Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename](/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities) | Hunting | -| [Suspicious msbuild path](/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [MSBuild](/tags/#msbuild) | TTP | -| [System Process Running from Unexpected Location](/endpoint/system_process_running_from_unexpected_location/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading) | Anomaly | -| [System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations](/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities) | TTP | -| [Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path](/endpoint/windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil) | TTP | -| [Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path](/endpoint/windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil) | TTP | +| [Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension](/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension/) | [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities)| TTP | +| [Suspicious Rundll32 Rename](/deprecated/suspicious_rundll32_rename/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities)| Hunting | +| [Execution of File with Multiple Extensions](/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities)| TTP | +| [Sdelete Application Execution](/endpoint/sdelete_application_execution/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction), [File Deletion](/tags/#file-deletion), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host)| TTP | +| [Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename](/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities)| Hunting | +| [Suspicious msbuild path](/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [MSBuild](/tags/#msbuild)| TTP | +| [Suspicious MSBuild Rename](/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [MSBuild](/tags/#msbuild)| TTP | +| [System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations](/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities)| TTP | +| [Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path](/endpoint/windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil)| TTP | +| [Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path](/endpoint/windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/meterpreter.md b/docs/_stories/meterpreter.md index 9b6a871cee..8520bdc4f2 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/meterpreter.md +++ b/docs/_stories/meterpreter.md @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -32,8 +33,8 @@ While investigating a detection related to this analytic story, please bear in m | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Excessive number of distinct processes created in Windows Temp folder](/endpoint/excessive_number_of_distinct_processes_created_in_windows_temp_folder/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter) | Anomaly | -| [Excessive number of taskhost processes](/endpoint/excessive_number_of_taskhost_processes/) | [System Owner/User Discovery](/tags/#system-owner/user-discovery) | Anomaly | +| [Excessive number of distinct processes created in Windows Temp folder](/endpoint/excessive_number_of_distinct_processes_created_in_windows_temp_folder/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter)| Anomaly | +| [Excessive number of taskhost processes](/endpoint/excessive_number_of_taskhost_processes/) | [System Owner/User Discovery](/tags/#system-owner/user-discovery)| Anomaly | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/microsoft_mshtml_remote_code_execution_cve-2021-40444.md b/docs/_stories/microsoft_mshtml_remote_code_execution_cve-2021-40444.md index 3ef88c84bf..08bab42fcb 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/microsoft_mshtml_remote_code_execution_cve-2021-40444.md +++ b/docs/_stories/microsoft_mshtml_remote_code_execution_cve-2021-40444.md @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -24,20 +25,19 @@ CVE-2021-40444 is a remote code execution vulnerability in MSHTML, recently used #### Narrative -Microsoft is aware of targeted attacks that attempt to exploit this vulnerability, CVE-2021-40444 by using specially-crafted Microsoft Office documents. MSHTML is a software component used to render web pages on Windows. Although it’s most commonly associated with Internet Explorer, it is also used in other software. CVE-2021-40444 received a CVSS score of 8.8 out of 10. MSHTML is the beating heart of Internet Explorer, the vulnerability also exists in that browser. Although given its limited use, there is little risk of infection by that vector. Microsoft Office applications use the MSHTML component to display web content in Office documents. The attack depends on MSHTML loading a specially crafted ActiveX control when the target opens a malicious Office document. The loaded ActiveX control can then run arbitrary code to infect the system with more malware. \ At the moment all supported Windows versions are vulnerable. Since there is no patch available yet, Microsoft proposes a few methods to block these attacks. \ -1. Disable the installation of all ActiveX controls in Internet Explorer via the registry. Previously-installed ActiveX controls will still run, but no new ones will be added, including malicious ones. \ -1. Open documents from the Internet in Protected View or Application Guard for Office, both of which prevent the current attack. This is a default setting but it may have been changed. +Microsoft is aware of targeted attacks that attempt to exploit this vulnerability, CVE-2021-40444 by using specially-crafted Microsoft Office documents. MSHTML is a software component used to render web pages on Windows. Although it is 2019s most commonly associated with Internet Explorer, it is also used in other software. CVE-2021-40444 received a CVSS score of 8.8 out of 10. MSHTML is the beating heart of Internet Explorer, the vulnerability also exists in that browser. Although given its limited use, there is little risk of infection by that vector. Microsoft Office applications use the MSHTML component to display web content in Office documents. The attack depends on MSHTML loading a specially crafted ActiveX control when the target opens a malicious Office document. The loaded ActiveX control can then run arbitrary code to infect the system with more malware. At the moment all supported Windows versions are vulnerable. Since there is no patch available yet, Microsoft proposes a few methods to block these attacks. \ +1. Disable the installation of all ActiveX controls in Internet Explorer via the registry. Previously-installed ActiveX controls will still run, but no new ones will be added, including malicious ones. Open documents from the Internet in Protected View or Application Guard for Office, both of which prevent the current attack. This is a default setting but it may have been changed. #### Detections | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Control Loading from World Writable Directory](/endpoint/control_loading_from_world_writable_directory/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Control Panel](/tags/#control-panel) | TTP | -| [MSHTML Module Load in Office Product](/endpoint/mshtml_module_load_in_office_product/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment) | TTP | -| [Office Product Writing cab or inf](/endpoint/office_product_writing_cab_or_inf/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment) | TTP | -| [Office Spawning Control](/endpoint/office_spawning_control/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment) | TTP | -| [Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt](/endpoint/rundll32_control_rundll_hunt/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | Hunting | -| [Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory](/endpoint/rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | TTP | +| [Control Loading from World Writable Directory](/endpoint/control_loading_from_world_writable_directory/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Control Panel](/tags/#control-panel)| TTP | +| [MSHTML Module Load in Office Product](/endpoint/mshtml_module_load_in_office_product/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment)| TTP | +| [Office Product Writing cab or inf](/endpoint/office_product_writing_cab_or_inf/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment)| TTP | +| [Office Spawning Control](/endpoint/office_spawning_control/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment)| TTP | +| [Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt](/endpoint/rundll32_control_rundll_hunt/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32)| Hunting | +| [Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory](/endpoint/rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/monitor_backup_solution.md b/docs/_stories/monitor_backup_solution.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8588b00b8a --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_stories/monitor_backup_solution.md @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +--- +title: "Monitor Backup Solution" +last_modified_at: 2017-09-12 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Exploitation +--- + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +Address common concerns when monitoring your backup processes. These searches can help you reduce risks from ransomware, device theft, or denial of physical access to a host by backing up data on endpoints. + +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2017-09-12 +- **Author**: David Dorsey, Splunk +- **ID**: abe807c7-1eb6-4304-ac32-6e7aacdb891d + +#### Narrative + +Having backups is a standard best practice that helps ensure continuity of business operations. Having mature backup processes can also help you reduce the risks of many security-related incidents and streamline your response processes. The detection searches in this Analytic Story will help you identify systems that have backup failures, as well as systems that have not been backed up for an extended period of time. The story will also return the notable event history and all of the backup logs for an endpoint. + +#### Detections + +| Name | Technique | Type | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------| +| [Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups](/deprecated/extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups/) | None| Hunting | +| [Unsuccessful Netbackup backups](/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups/) | None| Hunting | + +#### Reference + +* [https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/03/04/tracking-locky-ransomware-using-carbon-black/](https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/03/04/tracking-locky-ransomware-using-carbon-black/) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/stories/monitor_backup_solution.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_stories/monitor_for_unauthorized_software.md b/docs/_stories/monitor_for_unauthorized_software.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ce9d496ded --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_stories/monitor_for_unauthorized_software.md @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +--- +title: "Monitor for Unauthorized Software" +last_modified_at: 2017-09-15 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Endpoint + - Actions on Objectives + - Command & Control + - Installation +--- + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +Identify and investigate prohibited/unauthorized software or processes that may be concealing malicious behavior within your environment. + +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) +- **Last Updated**: 2017-09-15 +- **Author**: David Dorsey, Splunk +- **ID**: 8892a655-6205-43f7-abba-06460e38c8ae + +#### Narrative + +It is critical to identify unauthorized software and processes running on enterprise endpoints and determine whether they are likely to be malicious. This Analytic Story requires the user to populate the Interesting Processes table within Enterprise Security with prohibited processes. An included support search will augment this data, adding information on processes thought to be malicious. This search requires data from endpoint detection-and-response solutions, endpoint data sources (such as Sysmon), or Windows Event Logs--assuming that the Active Directory administrator has enabled process tracking within the System Event Audit Logs.\ +It is important to investigate any software identified as suspicious, in order to understand how it was installed or executed. Analyzing authentication logs or any historic notable events might elicit additional investigative leads of interest. For best results, schedule the search to run every two weeks. + +#### Detections + +| Name | Technique | Type | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------| +| [Prohibited Software On Endpoint](/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint/) | None| Hunting | +| [Attacker Tools On Endpoint](/endpoint/attacker_tools_on_endpoint/) | [Match Legitimate Name or Location](/tags/#match-legitimate-name-or-location), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [Active Scanning](/tags/#active-scanning)| TTP | + +#### Reference + +* [https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/](https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/stories/monitor_for_unauthorized_software.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_stories/monitor_for_updates.md b/docs/_stories/monitor_for_updates.md index 19dd3c6a63..e78a38741e 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/monitor_for_updates.md +++ b/docs/_stories/monitor_for_updates.md @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Updates + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -32,7 +33,7 @@ Microsoft releases updates for Windows systems on a monthly cadence. They should | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [No Windows Updates in a time frame](/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame/) | | Hunting | +| [No Windows Updates in a time frame](/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame/) | None| Hunting | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/netsh_abuse.md b/docs/_stories/netsh_abuse.md index 761f9dbde9..1373f2ac68 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/netsh_abuse.md +++ b/docs/_stories/netsh_abuse.md @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint + - Actions on Objectives --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -31,7 +32,8 @@ To get started, run the detection search to identify parent processes of `netsh. | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Processes launching netsh](/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh/) | [Disable or Modify System Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-system-firewall), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | +| [Processes created by netsh](/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh/) | [Disable or Modify System Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-system-firewall)| TTP | +| [Processes launching netsh](/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh/) | [Disable or Modify System Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-system-firewall), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/network_discovery.md b/docs/_stories/network_discovery.md index c8b18b26f0..dd9cf0ebab 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/network_discovery.md +++ b/docs/_stories/network_discovery.md @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint + - Reconnaissance --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -30,7 +31,7 @@ Adversaries may use the information from System Network Configuration Discovery | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Linux System Network Discovery](/endpoint/linux_system_network_discovery/) | [System Network Configuration Discovery](/tags/#system-network-configuration-discovery) | Anomaly | +| [Linux System Network Discovery](/endpoint/linux_system_network_discovery/) | [System Network Configuration Discovery](/tags/#system-network-configuration-discovery)| Anomaly | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/nobelium_group.md b/docs/_stories/nobelium_group.md index 10459dc2f8..70bb404dcf 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/nobelium_group.md +++ b/docs/_stories/nobelium_group.md @@ -8,9 +8,12 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint - - Endpoint_Processes - Network_Traffic - Web + - Actions on Objectives + - Command & Control + - Exploitation + - Installation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -20,7 +23,7 @@ tags: Sunburst is a trojanized updates to SolarWinds Orion IT monitoring and management software. It was discovered by FireEye in December 2020. The actors behind this campaign gained access to numerous public and private organizations around the world. - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud -- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint), [Endpoint_Processes](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/EndpointProcesses), [Network_Traffic](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkTraffic), [Web](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Web) +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint), [Network_Traffic](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkTraffic), [Web](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Web) - **Last Updated**: 2020-12-14 - **Author**: Patrick Bareiss, Michael Haag, Splunk - **ID**: 758196b5-2e21-424f-a50c-6e421ce926c2 @@ -33,21 +36,19 @@ This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (T | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Anomalous usage of 7zip](/endpoint/anomalous_usage_of_7zip/) | [Archive via Utility](/tags/#archive-via-utility), [Archive Collected Data](/tags/#archive-collected-data) | Anomaly | -| [Anomalous usage of Archive Tools](/endpoint/anomalous_usage_of_archive_tools/) | [Archive via Utility](/tags/#archive-via-utility), [Archive Collected Data](/tags/#archive-collected-data) | Anomaly | -| [Detect Outbound SMB Traffic](/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic/) | [File Transfer Protocols](/tags/#file-transfer-protocols), [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol) | TTP | -| [Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe](/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell) | Hunting | -| [Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution](/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta) | TTP | -| [First Time Seen Running Windows Service](/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service/) | [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution) | Anomaly | -| [Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command](/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_-_encoded_command/) | [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information) | Hunting | -| [Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services](/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services/) | [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process) | TTP | -| [Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD](/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | TTP | -| [Schtasks scheduling job on remote system](/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | TTP | -| [Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event](/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event/) | [Exploitation for Client Execution](/tags/#exploitation-for-client-execution) | TTP | -| [Supernova Webshell](/web/supernova_webshell/) | [Web Shell](/tags/#web-shell) | TTP | -| [TOR Traffic](/network/tor_traffic/) | [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol), [Web Protocols](/tags/#web-protocols) | TTP | -| [Windows AdFind Exe](/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe/) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery) | TTP | -| [Windows Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution](/endpoint/windows_rundll32_inline_hta_execution/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta) | TTP | +| [Anomalous usage of 7zip](/endpoint/anomalous_usage_of_7zip/) | [Archive via Utility](/tags/#archive-via-utility), [Archive Collected Data](/tags/#archive-collected-data)| Anomaly | +| [Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe](/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell)| Hunting | +| [Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution](/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta)| TTP | +| [Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command](/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_-_encoded_command/) | [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information)| Hunting | +| [Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services](/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services/) | [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process)| TTP | +| [Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD](/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job)| TTP | +| [Schtasks scheduling job on remote system](/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job)| TTP | +| [Windows AdFind Exe](/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe/) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery)| TTP | +| [First Time Seen Running Windows Service](/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service/) | [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution)| Anomaly | +| [Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event](/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event/) | [Exploitation for Client Execution](/tags/#exploitation-for-client-execution)| TTP | +| [Detect Outbound SMB Traffic](/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic/) | [File Transfer Protocols](/tags/#file-transfer-protocols), [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol)| TTP | +| [TOR Traffic](/network/tor_traffic/) | [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol), [Web Protocols](/tags/#web-protocols)| TTP | +| [Supernova Webshell](/web/supernova_webshell/) | [Web Shell](/tags/#web-shell)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/office_365_detections.md b/docs/_stories/office_365_detections.md index 759d539258..fdaf45ba3f 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/office_365_detections.md +++ b/docs/_stories/office_365_detections.md @@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud + - Actions on Objectives + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -30,18 +32,18 @@ More and more companies are using Microsofts Office 365 cloud offering. Therefor | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [High Number of Login Failures from a single source](/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source/) | [Password Guessing](/tags/#password-guessing), [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force) | Anomaly | -| [O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User](/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user/) | [Cloud Account](/tags/#cloud-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account) | TTP | -| [O365 Added Service Principal](/cloud/o365_added_service_principal/) | [Cloud Account](/tags/#cloud-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account) | TTP | -| [O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP](/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip/) | [Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-cloud-firewall), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | -| [O365 Disable MFA](/cloud/o365_disable_mfa/) | [Modify Authentication Process](/tags/#modify-authentication-process) | TTP | -| [O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert](/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert/) | [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force) | Anomaly | -| [O365 Excessive SSO logon errors](/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors/) | [Modify Authentication Process](/tags/#modify-authentication-process) | Anomaly | -| [O365 New Federated Domain Added](/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added/) | [Cloud Account](/tags/#cloud-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account) | TTP | -| [O365 PST export alert](/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert/) | [Email Collection](/tags/#email-collection) | TTP | -| [O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding](/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding/) | [Email Forwarding Rule](/tags/#email-forwarding-rule), [Email Collection](/tags/#email-collection) | Anomaly | -| [O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation](/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation/) | [Remote Email Collection](/tags/#remote-email-collection), [Email Collection](/tags/#email-collection) | TTP | -| [O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding](/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding/) | [Email Forwarding Rule](/tags/#email-forwarding-rule), [Email Collection](/tags/#email-collection) | Anomaly | +| [O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User](/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user/) | [Cloud Account](/tags/#cloud-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account)| TTP | +| [O365 Added Service Principal](/cloud/o365_added_service_principal/) | [Cloud Account](/tags/#cloud-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account)| TTP | +| [O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP](/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip/) | [Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-cloud-firewall), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| TTP | +| [O365 Disable MFA](/cloud/o365_disable_mfa/) | [Modify Authentication Process](/tags/#modify-authentication-process)| TTP | +| [O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert](/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert/) | [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force)| Anomaly | +| [O365 Excessive SSO logon errors](/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors/) | [Modify Authentication Process](/tags/#modify-authentication-process)| Anomaly | +| [O365 New Federated Domain Added](/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added/) | [Cloud Account](/tags/#cloud-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account)| TTP | +| [O365 PST export alert](/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert/) | [Email Collection](/tags/#email-collection)| TTP | +| [O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding](/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding/) | [Email Forwarding Rule](/tags/#email-forwarding-rule), [Email Collection](/tags/#email-collection)| Anomaly | +| [O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation](/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation/) | [Remote Email Collection](/tags/#remote-email-collection), [Email Collection](/tags/#email-collection)| TTP | +| [O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding](/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding/) | [Email Forwarding Rule](/tags/#email-forwarding-rule), [Email Collection](/tags/#email-collection)| Anomaly | +| [High Number of Login Failures from a single source](/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source/) | [Password Guessing](/tags/#password-guessing), [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force)| Anomaly | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/orangeworm_attack_group.md b/docs/_stories/orangeworm_attack_group.md index 9d73c2bd2d..d0bbd976c1 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/orangeworm_attack_group.md +++ b/docs/_stories/orangeworm_attack_group.md @@ -8,6 +8,9 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint + - Actions on Objectives + - Command & Control + - Installation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -33,8 +36,9 @@ This Analytic Story is designed to help you detect and investigate suspicious ac | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [First Time Seen Running Windows Service](/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service/) | [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution) | Anomaly | -| [Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services](/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services/) | [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process) | TTP | +| [First time seen command line argument](/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument/) | [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell)| Hunting | +| [Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services](/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services/) | [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process)| TTP | +| [First Time Seen Running Windows Service](/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service/) | [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution)| Anomaly | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/petitpotam_ntlm_relay_on_active_directory_certificate_services.md b/docs/_stories/petitpotam_ntlm_relay_on_active_directory_certificate_services.md index a7117627d6..16d2ac36ce 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/petitpotam_ntlm_relay_on_active_directory_certificate_services.md +++ b/docs/_stories/petitpotam_ntlm_relay_on_active_directory_certificate_services.md @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -29,8 +30,8 @@ In June 2021, security researchers at SpecterOps released a blog post and white | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [PetitPotam Network Share Access Request](/endpoint/petitpotam_network_share_access_request/) | [Forced Authentication](/tags/#forced-authentication) | TTP | -| [PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request](/endpoint/petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request/) | [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | TTP | +| [PetitPotam Network Share Access Request](/endpoint/petitpotam_network_share_access_request/) | [Forced Authentication](/tags/#forced-authentication)| TTP | +| [PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request](/endpoint/petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request/) | [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/possible_backdoor_activity_associated_with_mudcarp_espionage_campaigns.md b/docs/_stories/possible_backdoor_activity_associated_with_mudcarp_espionage_campaigns.md index b8ad6c1ccd..035b4d45f7 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/possible_backdoor_activity_associated_with_mudcarp_espionage_campaigns.md +++ b/docs/_stories/possible_backdoor_activity_associated_with_mudcarp_espionage_campaigns.md @@ -8,7 +8,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint - - Endpoint_Processes + - Actions on Objectives + - Command & Control --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -18,7 +19,7 @@ tags: Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques employed by the MUDCARP threat group. - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud -- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint), [Endpoint_Processes](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/EndpointProcesses) +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2020-01-22 - **Author**: iDefense Cyber Espionage Team, iDefense - **ID**: 988C59C5-0A1C-45B6-A555-0C62276E327E @@ -58,11 +59,11 @@ If behavioral searches included in this story yield positive hits, iDefense reco | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window](/endpoint/powershell_-_connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window/) | [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter) | Hunting | -| [Registry Keys Used For Persistence](/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence/) | [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](/tags/#registry-run-keys-/-startup-folder), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution) | TTP | -| [Unusually Long Command Line](/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line/) | | Anomaly | -| [Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK](/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line_-_mltk/) | | Anomaly | -| [Windows Powershell Connect to Internet With Hidden Window](/endpoint/windows_powershell_connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window/) | [Automated Exfiltration](/tags/#automated-exfiltration) | Anomaly | +| [First time seen command line argument](/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument/) | [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell)| Hunting | +| [PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window](/endpoint/powershell_-_connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window/) | [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter)| Hunting | +| [Registry Keys Used For Persistence](/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence/) | [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](/tags/#registry-run-keys-/-startup-folder), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution)| TTP | +| [Unusually Long Command Line](/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line/) | None| Anomaly | +| [Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK](/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line_-_mltk/) | None| Anomaly | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/printnightmare_cve-2021-34527.md b/docs/_stories/printnightmare_cve-2021-34527.md index 84139f4aed..9e65e61144 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/printnightmare_cve-2021-34527.md +++ b/docs/_stories/printnightmare_cve-2021-34527.md @@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint + - Actions on Objectives + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -35,15 +37,15 @@ In the most impactful scenario, an attacker would be able to leverage this vulne | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Print Spooler Adding A Printer Driver](/endpoint/print_spooler_adding_a_printer_driver/) | [Print Processors](/tags/#print-processors), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution) | TTP | -| [Print Spooler Failed to Load a Plug-in](/endpoint/print_spooler_failed_to_load_a_plug-in/) | [Print Processors](/tags/#print-processors), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution) | TTP | -| [Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network](/endpoint/rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | TTP | -| [Spoolsv Spawning Rundll32](/endpoint/spoolsv_spawning_rundll32/) | [Print Processors](/tags/#print-processors), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution) | TTP | -| [Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules](/endpoint/spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules/) | [Print Processors](/tags/#print-processors), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution) | TTP | -| [Spoolsv Suspicious Process Access](/endpoint/spoolsv_suspicious_process_access/) | [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](/tags/#exploitation-for-privilege-escalation) | TTP | -| [Spoolsv Writing a DLL](/endpoint/spoolsv_writing_a_dll/) | [Print Processors](/tags/#print-processors), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution) | TTP | -| [Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Sysmon](/endpoint/spoolsv_writing_a_dll_-_sysmon/) | [Print Processors](/tags/#print-processors), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution) | TTP | -| [Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments](/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | TTP | +| [Print Spooler Adding A Printer Driver](/endpoint/print_spooler_adding_a_printer_driver/) | [Print Processors](/tags/#print-processors), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution)| TTP | +| [Print Spooler Failed to Load a Plug-in](/endpoint/print_spooler_failed_to_load_a_plug-in/) | [Print Processors](/tags/#print-processors), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution)| TTP | +| [Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network](/endpoint/rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32)| TTP | +| [Spoolsv Spawning Rundll32](/endpoint/spoolsv_spawning_rundll32/) | [Print Processors](/tags/#print-processors), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution)| TTP | +| [Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules](/endpoint/spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules/) | [Print Processors](/tags/#print-processors), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution)| TTP | +| [Spoolsv Suspicious Process Access](/endpoint/spoolsv_suspicious_process_access/) | [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](/tags/#exploitation-for-privilege-escalation)| TTP | +| [Spoolsv Writing a DLL](/endpoint/spoolsv_writing_a_dll/) | [Print Processors](/tags/#print-processors), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution)| TTP | +| [Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Sysmon](/endpoint/spoolsv_writing_a_dll_-_sysmon/) | [Print Processors](/tags/#print-processors), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution)| TTP | +| [Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments](/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch.md b/docs/_stories/prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch.md index 9e7df70211..8ddb30c408 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch.md +++ b/docs/_stories/prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch.md @@ -10,6 +10,10 @@ tags: - Endpoint - Network_Resolution - Network_Traffic + - Actions on Objectives + - Command & Control + - Delivery + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -32,13 +36,13 @@ A traditional security best practice is to control the ports, protocols, and ser | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry](/endpoint/allow_inbound_traffic_by_firewall_rule_registry/) | [Remote Desktop Protocol](/tags/#remote-desktop-protocol), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services) | TTP | -| [Allow Inbound Traffic In Firewall Rule](/endpoint/allow_inbound_traffic_in_firewall_rule/) | [Remote Desktop Protocol](/tags/#remote-desktop-protocol), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services) | TTP | -| [Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers](/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers/) | [Drive-by Compromise](/tags/#drive-by-compromise) | TTP | -| [Enable RDP In Other Port Number](/endpoint/enable_rdp_in_other_port_number/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services) | TTP | -| [Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed](/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed/) | [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol) | TTP | -| [Protocol or Port Mismatch](/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol) | Anomaly | -| [TOR Traffic](/network/tor_traffic/) | [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol), [Web Protocols](/tags/#web-protocols) | TTP | +| [Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry](/endpoint/allow_inbound_traffic_by_firewall_rule_registry/) | [Remote Desktop Protocol](/tags/#remote-desktop-protocol), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services)| TTP | +| [Allow Inbound Traffic In Firewall Rule](/endpoint/allow_inbound_traffic_in_firewall_rule/) | [Remote Desktop Protocol](/tags/#remote-desktop-protocol), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services)| TTP | +| [Enable RDP In Other Port Number](/endpoint/enable_rdp_in_other_port_number/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services)| TTP | +| [Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed](/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed/) | [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol)| TTP | +| [Protocol or Port Mismatch](/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol)| Anomaly | +| [TOR Traffic](/network/tor_traffic/) | [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol), [Web Protocols](/tags/#web-protocols)| TTP | +| [Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers](/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers/) | [Drive-by Compromise](/tags/#drive-by-compromise)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/proxyshell.md b/docs/_stories/proxyshell.md index 99fe8ec52b..54880e593f 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/proxyshell.md +++ b/docs/_stories/proxyshell.md @@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint + - Exploitation + - Reconnaissance --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -24,21 +26,17 @@ ProxyShell is a chain of exploits targeting on-premise Microsoft Exchange Server #### Narrative -During Pwn2Own April 2021, a security researcher demonstrated an attack chain targeting on-premise Microsoft Exchange Server. August 5th, the same researcher publicly released further details and demonstrated the attack chain. \ -1. CVE-2021-34473 - Pre-auth path confusion leads to ACL Bypass (Patched in April by KB5001779) \ -1. CVE-2021-34523 - Elevation of privilege on Exchange PowerShell backend (Patched in April by KB5001779) \ -1. CVE-2021-31207 - Post-auth Arbitrary-File-Write leads to RCE (Patched in May by KB5003435) \ -Upon successful exploitation, the remote attacker will have `SYSTEM` privileges on the Exchange Server. In addition to remote access/execution, the adversary may be able to run Exchange PowerShell Cmdlets to perform further actions. +During Pwn2Own April 2021, a security researcher demonstrated an attack chain targeting on-premise Microsoft Exchange Server. August 5th, the same researcher publicly released further details and demonstrated the attack chain. CVE-2021-34473 Pre-auth path confusion leads to ACL Bypass (Patched in April by KB5001779) CVE-2021-34523 - Elevation of privilege on Exchange PowerShell backend (Patched in April by KB5001779) . CVE-2021-31207 - Post-auth Arbitrary-File-Write leads to RCE (Patched in May by KB5003435) Upon successful exploitation, the remote attacker will have SYSTEM privileges on the Exchange Server. In addition to remote access/execution, the adversary may be able to run Exchange PowerShell Cmdlets to perform further actions. #### Detections | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Detect Exchange Web Shell](/endpoint/detect_exchange_web_shell/) | [Server Software Component](/tags/#server-software-component), [Web Shell](/tags/#web-shell), [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | TTP | -| [Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF](/endpoint/exchange_powershell_abuse_via_ssrf/) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | TTP | -| [Exchange PowerShell Module Usage](/endpoint/exchange_powershell_module_usage/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell) | TTP | -| [Microsoft Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages](/endpoint/microsoft_exchange_mailbox_replication_service_writing_active_server_pages/) | [Server Software Component](/tags/#server-software-component), [Web Shell](/tags/#web-shell), [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | TTP | -| [W3WP Spawning Shell](/endpoint/w3wp_spawning_shell/) | [Server Software Component](/tags/#server-software-component), [Web Shell](/tags/#web-shell) | TTP | +| [Detect Exchange Web Shell](/endpoint/detect_exchange_web_shell/) | [Server Software Component](/tags/#server-software-component), [Web Shell](/tags/#web-shell), [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application)| TTP | +| [W3WP Spawning Shell](/endpoint/w3wp_spawning_shell/) | [Server Software Component](/tags/#server-software-component), [Web Shell](/tags/#web-shell)| TTP | +| [Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF](/endpoint/exchange_powershell_abuse_via_ssrf/) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application)| TTP | +| [Exchange PowerShell Module Usage](/endpoint/exchange_powershell_module_usage/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell)| TTP | +| [Microsoft Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages](/endpoint/microsoft_exchange_mailbox_replication_service_writing_active_server_pages/) | [Server Software Component](/tags/#server-software-component), [Web Shell](/tags/#web-shell), [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/ransomware.md b/docs/_stories/ransomware.md index 04dbd59ddf..c72f4495ad 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/ransomware.md +++ b/docs/_stories/ransomware.md @@ -8,8 +8,12 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint - - Endpoint_Processes - Network_Traffic + - Actions on Objectives + - Command & Control + - Delivery + - Exploitation + - Reconnaissance --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -19,7 +23,7 @@ tags: Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage, the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected locations, and many others. - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud -- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint), [Endpoint_Processes](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/EndpointProcesses), [Network_Traffic](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkTraffic) +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint), [Network_Traffic](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkTraffic) - **Last Updated**: 2020-02-04 - **Author**: David Dorsey, Splunk - **ID**: cf309d0d-d4aa-4fbb-963d-1e79febd3756 @@ -32,87 +36,76 @@ Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host e | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [7zip CommandLine To SMB Share Path](/endpoint/7zip_commandline_to_smb_share_path/) | [Archive via Utility](/tags/#archive-via-utility), [Archive Collected Data](/tags/#archive-collected-data) | Hunting | -| [Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall](/endpoint/allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall/) | [Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-cloud-firewall), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | -| [Allow Network Discovery In Firewall](/endpoint/allow_network_discovery_in_firewall/) | [Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-cloud-firewall), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | -| [Allow Operation with Consent Admin](/endpoint/allow_operation_with_consent_admin/) | [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | TTP | -| [Attempt To Delete Services](/endpoint/attempt_to_delete_services/) | [Service Stop](/tags/#service-stop), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service) | TTP | -| [Attempt To Disable Services](/endpoint/attempt_to_disable_services/) | [Service Stop](/tags/#service-stop) | TTP | -| [BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification](/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification/) | [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery) | TTP | -| [BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification](/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification/) | [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery) | TTP | -| [CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass](/endpoint/cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [CMSTP](/tags/#cmstp) | TTP | -| [Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App](/endpoint/clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app/) | [File Deletion](/tags/#file-deletion), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host) | TTP | -| [Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App](/endpoint/clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app/) | [File Deletion](/tags/#file-deletion), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host) | TTP | -| [Common Ransomware Extensions](/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction) | Hunting | -| [Common Ransomware Notes](/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction) | Hunting | -| [Conti Common Exec parameter](/endpoint/conti_common_exec_parameter/) | [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution) | TTP | -| [Delete A Net User](/endpoint/delete_a_net_user/) | [Account Access Removal](/tags/#account-access-removal) | Anomaly | -| [Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell](/endpoint/delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell/) | [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery) | TTP | -| [Deleting Shadow Copies](/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies/) | [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery) | TTP | -| [Detect RClone Command-Line Usage](/endpoint/detect_rclone_command-line_usage/) | [Automated Exfiltration](/tags/#automated-exfiltration) | TTP | -| [Detect RClone Command-Line Usage](/endpoint/detect_rclone_command-line_usage/) | [Automated Exfiltration](/tags/#automated-exfiltration) | TTP | -| [Detect Renamed RClone](/endpoint/detect_renamed_rclone/) | [Automated Exfiltration](/tags/#automated-exfiltration) | Hunting | -| [Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments](/endpoint/detect_sharphound_command-line_arguments/) | [Domain Account](/tags/#domain-account), [Local Groups](/tags/#local-groups), [Domain Trust Discovery](/tags/#domain-trust-discovery), [Local Account](/tags/#local-account), [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery), [Domain Groups](/tags/#domain-groups), [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery) | TTP | -| [Detect SharpHound File Modifications](/endpoint/detect_sharphound_file_modifications/) | [Domain Account](/tags/#domain-account), [Local Groups](/tags/#local-groups), [Domain Trust Discovery](/tags/#domain-trust-discovery), [Local Account](/tags/#local-account), [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery), [Domain Groups](/tags/#domain-groups), [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery) | TTP | -| [Detect SharpHound Usage](/endpoint/detect_sharphound_usage/) | [Domain Account](/tags/#domain-account), [Local Groups](/tags/#local-groups), [Domain Trust Discovery](/tags/#domain-trust-discovery), [Local Account](/tags/#local-account), [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery), [Domain Groups](/tags/#domain-groups), [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery) | TTP | -| [Disable AMSI Through Registry](/endpoint/disable_amsi_through_registry/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | -| [Disable ETW Through Registry](/endpoint/disable_etw_through_registry/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | -| [Disable Logs Using WevtUtil](/endpoint/disable_logs_using_wevtutil/) | [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Clear Windows Event Logs](/tags/#clear-windows-event-logs) | TTP | -| [Disable Net User Account](/endpoint/disable_net_user_account/) | [Service Stop](/tags/#service-stop), [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | TTP | -| [Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring](/endpoint/disable_windows_behavior_monitoring/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | -| [Excessive Service Stop Attempt](/endpoint/excessive_service_stop_attempt/) | [Service Stop](/tags/#service-stop) | Anomaly | -| [Excessive Usage Of Net App](/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_net_app/) | [Account Access Removal](/tags/#account-access-removal) | Anomaly | -| [Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility](/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility/) | [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution) | Anomaly | -| [Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID](/endpoint/execute_javascript_with_jscript_com_clsid/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Visual Basic](/tags/#visual-basic) | TTP | -| [Fsutil Zeroing File](/endpoint/fsutil_zeroing_file/) | [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host) | TTP | -| [Fsutil Zeroing File](/endpoint/fsutil_zeroing_file/) | [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host) | TTP | -| [ICACLS Grant Command](/endpoint/icacls_grant_command/) | [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification) | TTP | -| [Known Services Killed by Ransomware](/endpoint/known_services_killed_by_ransomware/) | [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery) | TTP | -| [Microsoft Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages](/endpoint/microsoft_exchange_mailbox_replication_service_writing_active_server_pages/) | [Server Software Component](/tags/#server-software-component), [Web Shell](/tags/#web-shell), [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | TTP | -| [Modification Of Wallpaper](/endpoint/modification_of_wallpaper/) | [Defacement](/tags/#defacement) | TTP | -| [Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading](/endpoint/msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading/) | [DLL Side-Loading](/tags/#dll-side-loading), [Hijack Execution Flow](/tags/#hijack-execution-flow) | TTP | -| [Permission Modification using Takeown App](/endpoint/permission_modification_using_takeown_app/) | [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification) | TTP | -| [Powershell Disable Security Monitoring](/endpoint/powershell_disable_security_monitoring/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | -| [Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature](/endpoint/powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature/) | [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information), [Indicator Removal from Tools](/tags/#indicator-removal-from-tools) | TTP | -| [Powershell Execute COM Object](/endpoint/powershell_execute_com_object/) | [Component Object Model Hijacking](/tags/#component-object-model-hijacking), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution) | TTP | -| [Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit](/endpoint/prevent_automatic_repair_mode_using_bcdedit/) | [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery) | TTP | -| [Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed](/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed/) | [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol) | TTP | -| [Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI](/endpoint/recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi/) | [Gather Victim Host Information](/tags/#gather-victim-host-information) | TTP | -| [Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD](/endpoint/recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd/) | [File Deletion](/tags/#file-deletion), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host) | TTP | -| [Registry Keys Used For Persistence](/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence/) | [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](/tags/#registry-run-keys-/-startup-folder), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution) | TTP | -| [Remote Process Instantiation via WMI](/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi/) | [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation) | TTP | -| [Resize Shadowstorage Volume](/endpoint/resize_shadowstorage_volume/) | [Service Stop](/tags/#service-stop) | TTP | -| [Revil Common Exec Parameter](/endpoint/revil_common_exec_parameter/) | [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution) | TTP | -| [Revil Registry Entry](/endpoint/revil_registry_entry/) | [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry) | TTP | -| [SMB Traffic Spike](/network/smb_traffic_spike/) | [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services) | Anomaly | -| [SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK](/network/smb_traffic_spike_-_mltk/) | [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services) | Anomaly | -| [Schtasks used for forcing a reboot](/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | TTP | -| [Spike in File Writes](/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes/) | | Anomaly | -| [Start Up During Safe Mode Boot](/endpoint/start_up_during_safe_mode_boot/) | [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](/tags/#registry-run-keys-/-startup-folder), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution) | TTP | -| [Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior](/endpoint/suspicious_event_log_service_behavior/) | [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Clear Windows Event Logs](/tags/#clear-windows-event-logs) | TTP | -| [Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory](/endpoint/suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | Anomaly | -| [Suspicious wevtutil Usage](/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage/) | [Clear Windows Event Logs](/tags/#clear-windows-event-logs), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host) | TTP | -| [System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations](/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities) | TTP | -| [TOR Traffic](/network/tor_traffic/) | [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol), [Web Protocols](/tags/#web-protocols) | TTP | -| [UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object](/endpoint/uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [CMSTP](/tags/#cmstp) | TTP | -| [USN Journal Deletion](/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion/) | [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host) | TTP | -| [Uninstall App Using MsiExec](/endpoint/uninstall_app_using_msiexec/) | [Msiexec](/tags/#msiexec), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution) | TTP | -| [Unusually Long Command Line](/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line/) | | Anomaly | -| [Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK](/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line_-_mltk/) | | Anomaly | -| [WBAdmin Delete System Backups](/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups/) | [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery) | TTP | -| [WBAdmin Delete System Backups](/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups/) | [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery) | TTP | -| [Wbemprox COM Object Execution](/endpoint/wbemprox_com_object_execution/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [CMSTP](/tags/#cmstp) | TTP | -| [WevtUtil Usage To Clear Logs](/endpoint/wevtutil_usage_to_clear_logs/) | [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Clear Windows Event Logs](/tags/#clear-windows-event-logs) | TTP | -| [Wevtutil Usage To Disable Logs](/endpoint/wevtutil_usage_to_disable_logs/) | [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Clear Windows Event Logs](/tags/#clear-windows-event-logs) | TTP | -| [WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path](/endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | TTP | -| [WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell](/endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | TTP | -| [Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump](/endpoint/windows_disable_memory_crash_dump/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction) | TTP | -| [Windows DiskCryptor Usage](/endpoint/windows_diskcryptor_usage/) | [Data Encrypted for Impact](/tags/#data-encrypted-for-impact) | Hunting | -| [Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path](/endpoint/windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil) | TTP | -| [Windows Event Log Cleared](/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared/) | [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Clear Windows Event Logs](/tags/#clear-windows-event-logs) | TTP | -| [Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path](/endpoint/windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil) | TTP | -| [Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun](/endpoint/windows_nirsoft_advancedrun/) | [Tool](/tags/#tool) | TTP | -| [Windows Raccine Scheduled Task Deletion](/endpoint/windows_raccine_scheduled_task_deletion/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools) | TTP | +| [Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware](/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task)| TTP | +| [7zip CommandLine To SMB Share Path](/endpoint/7zip_commandline_to_smb_share_path/) | [Archive via Utility](/tags/#archive-via-utility), [Archive Collected Data](/tags/#archive-collected-data)| Hunting | +| [Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall](/endpoint/allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall/) | [Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-cloud-firewall), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| TTP | +| [Allow Network Discovery In Firewall](/endpoint/allow_network_discovery_in_firewall/) | [Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-cloud-firewall), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| TTP | +| [Allow Operation with Consent Admin](/endpoint/allow_operation_with_consent_admin/) | [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism)| TTP | +| [BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification](/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification/) | [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery)| TTP | +| [Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App](/endpoint/clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app/) | [File Deletion](/tags/#file-deletion), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host)| TTP | +| [CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass](/endpoint/cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [CMSTP](/tags/#cmstp)| TTP | +| [Common Ransomware Extensions](/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction)| Hunting | +| [Common Ransomware Notes](/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction)| Hunting | +| [Conti Common Exec parameter](/endpoint/conti_common_exec_parameter/) | [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution)| TTP | +| [Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell](/endpoint/delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell/) | [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery)| TTP | +| [Deleting Shadow Copies](/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies/) | [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery)| TTP | +| [Detect RClone Command-Line Usage](/endpoint/detect_rclone_command-line_usage/) | [Automated Exfiltration](/tags/#automated-exfiltration)| TTP | +| [Detect Renamed RClone](/endpoint/detect_renamed_rclone/) | [Automated Exfiltration](/tags/#automated-exfiltration)| Hunting | +| [Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments](/endpoint/detect_sharphound_command-line_arguments/) | [Domain Account](/tags/#domain-account), [Local Groups](/tags/#local-groups), [Domain Trust Discovery](/tags/#domain-trust-discovery), [Local Account](/tags/#local-account), [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery), [Domain Groups](/tags/#domain-groups), [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery)| TTP | +| [Detect SharpHound File Modifications](/endpoint/detect_sharphound_file_modifications/) | [Domain Account](/tags/#domain-account), [Local Groups](/tags/#local-groups), [Domain Trust Discovery](/tags/#domain-trust-discovery), [Local Account](/tags/#local-account), [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery), [Domain Groups](/tags/#domain-groups), [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery)| TTP | +| [Detect SharpHound Usage](/endpoint/detect_sharphound_usage/) | [Domain Account](/tags/#domain-account), [Local Groups](/tags/#local-groups), [Domain Trust Discovery](/tags/#domain-trust-discovery), [Local Account](/tags/#local-account), [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery), [Domain Groups](/tags/#domain-groups), [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery)| TTP | +| [Disable AMSI Through Registry](/endpoint/disable_amsi_through_registry/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| TTP | +| [Disable ETW Through Registry](/endpoint/disable_etw_through_registry/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| TTP | +| [Disable Logs Using WevtUtil](/endpoint/disable_logs_using_wevtutil/) | [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Clear Windows Event Logs](/tags/#clear-windows-event-logs)| TTP | +| [Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring](/endpoint/disable_windows_behavior_monitoring/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| TTP | +| [Excessive Service Stop Attempt](/endpoint/excessive_service_stop_attempt/) | [Service Stop](/tags/#service-stop)| Anomaly | +| [Excessive Usage Of Net App](/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_net_app/) | [Account Access Removal](/tags/#account-access-removal)| Anomaly | +| [Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility](/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility/) | [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution)| Anomaly | +| [Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID](/endpoint/execute_javascript_with_jscript_com_clsid/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Visual Basic](/tags/#visual-basic)| TTP | +| [Fsutil Zeroing File](/endpoint/fsutil_zeroing_file/) | [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host)| TTP | +| [ICACLS Grant Command](/endpoint/icacls_grant_command/) | [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification)| TTP | +| [Known Services Killed by Ransomware](/endpoint/known_services_killed_by_ransomware/) | [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery)| TTP | +| [Modification Of Wallpaper](/endpoint/modification_of_wallpaper/) | [Defacement](/tags/#defacement)| TTP | +| [Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading](/endpoint/msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading/) | [DLL Side-Loading](/tags/#dll-side-loading), [Hijack Execution Flow](/tags/#hijack-execution-flow)| TTP | +| [Permission Modification using Takeown App](/endpoint/permission_modification_using_takeown_app/) | [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification)| TTP | +| [Powershell Disable Security Monitoring](/endpoint/powershell_disable_security_monitoring/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| TTP | +| [Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature](/endpoint/powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature/) | [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information), [Indicator Removal from Tools](/tags/#indicator-removal-from-tools)| TTP | +| [Powershell Execute COM Object](/endpoint/powershell_execute_com_object/) | [Component Object Model Hijacking](/tags/#component-object-model-hijacking), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution)| TTP | +| [Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit](/endpoint/prevent_automatic_repair_mode_using_bcdedit/) | [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery)| TTP | +| [Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI](/endpoint/recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi/) | [Gather Victim Host Information](/tags/#gather-victim-host-information)| TTP | +| [Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD](/endpoint/recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd/) | [File Deletion](/tags/#file-deletion), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host)| TTP | +| [Registry Keys Used For Persistence](/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence/) | [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](/tags/#registry-run-keys-/-startup-folder), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution)| TTP | +| [Remote Process Instantiation via WMI](/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi/) | [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation)| TTP | +| [Revil Common Exec Parameter](/endpoint/revil_common_exec_parameter/) | [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution)| TTP | +| [Revil Registry Entry](/endpoint/revil_registry_entry/) | [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry)| TTP | +| [Schtasks used for forcing a reboot](/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job)| TTP | +| [Start Up During Safe Mode Boot](/endpoint/start_up_during_safe_mode_boot/) | [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](/tags/#registry-run-keys-/-startup-folder), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution)| TTP | +| [Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior](/endpoint/suspicious_event_log_service_behavior/) | [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Clear Windows Event Logs](/tags/#clear-windows-event-logs)| TTP | +| [Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory](/endpoint/suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job)| Anomaly | +| [Suspicious wevtutil Usage](/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage/) | [Clear Windows Event Logs](/tags/#clear-windows-event-logs), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host)| TTP | +| [System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations](/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities)| TTP | +| [UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object](/endpoint/uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [CMSTP](/tags/#cmstp)| TTP | +| [Uninstall App Using MsiExec](/endpoint/uninstall_app_using_msiexec/) | [Msiexec](/tags/#msiexec), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution)| TTP | +| [USN Journal Deletion](/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion/) | [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host)| TTP | +| [WBAdmin Delete System Backups](/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups/) | [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery)| TTP | +| [Wbemprox COM Object Execution](/endpoint/wbemprox_com_object_execution/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [CMSTP](/tags/#cmstp)| TTP | +| [Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump](/endpoint/windows_disable_memory_crash_dump/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction)| TTP | +| [Windows DiskCryptor Usage](/endpoint/windows_diskcryptor_usage/) | [Data Encrypted for Impact](/tags/#data-encrypted-for-impact)| Hunting | +| [Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path](/endpoint/windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil)| TTP | +| [Windows Event Log Cleared](/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared/) | [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Clear Windows Event Logs](/tags/#clear-windows-event-logs)| TTP | +| [Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path](/endpoint/windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil)| TTP | +| [Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun](/endpoint/windows_nirsoft_advancedrun/) | [Tool](/tags/#tool)| TTP | +| [Windows Raccine Scheduled Task Deletion](/endpoint/windows_raccine_scheduled_task_deletion/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools)| TTP | +| [WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell](/endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job)| TTP | +| [WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path](/endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job)| TTP | +| [Microsoft Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages](/endpoint/microsoft_exchange_mailbox_replication_service_writing_active_server_pages/) | [Server Software Component](/tags/#server-software-component), [Web Shell](/tags/#web-shell), [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application)| TTP | +| [Spike in File Writes](/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes/) | None| Anomaly | +| [Unusually Long Command Line](/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line/) | None| Anomaly | +| [Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK](/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line_-_mltk/) | None| Anomaly | +| [Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed](/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed/) | [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol)| TTP | +| [SMB Traffic Spike](/network/smb_traffic_spike/) | [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services)| Anomaly | +| [SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK](/network/smb_traffic_spike_-_mltk/) | [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services)| Anomaly | +| [TOR Traffic](/network/tor_traffic/) | [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol), [Web Protocols](/tags/#web-protocols)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/ransomware_cloud.md b/docs/_stories/ransomware_cloud.md index 77b557ccd2..62f4b76f05 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/ransomware_cloud.md +++ b/docs/_stories/ransomware_cloud.md @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -30,8 +31,8 @@ Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host e | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA](/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa/) | [Data Encrypted for Impact](/tags/#data-encrypted-for-impact) | TTP | -| [AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3](/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3/) | [Data Encrypted for Impact](/tags/#data-encrypted-for-impact) | Anomaly | +| [AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA](/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa/) | [Data Encrypted for Impact](/tags/#data-encrypted-for-impact)| TTP | +| [AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3](/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3/) | [Data Encrypted for Impact](/tags/#data-encrypted-for-impact)| Anomaly | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/remcos.md b/docs/_stories/remcos.md index f78543883a..aad8b0f1e3 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/remcos.md +++ b/docs/_stories/remcos.md @@ -8,6 +8,9 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint + - Actions on Objectives + - Exploitation + - Reconnaissance --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -30,32 +33,32 @@ Remcos or Remote Control and Surveillance, marketed as a legitimate software for | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion](/endpoint/add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | -| [Disabling Remote User Account Control](/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control/) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | TTP | -| [Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path](/endpoint/executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading) | TTP | -| [Jscript Execution Using Cscript App](/endpoint/jscript_execution_using_cscript_app/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [JavaScript](/tags/#javascript) | TTP | -| [Loading Of Dynwrapx Module](/endpoint/loading_of_dynwrapx_module/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Dynamic-link Library Injection](/tags/#dynamic-link-library-injection) | TTP | -| [Malicious InProcServer32 Modification](/endpoint/malicious_inprocserver32_modification/) | [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry) | TTP | -| [Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir](/endpoint/non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir/) | [Credentials from Password Stores](/tags/#credentials-from-password-stores), [Credentials from Web Browsers](/tags/#credentials-from-web-browsers) | Anomaly | -| [Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir](/endpoint/non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir/) | [Credentials from Password Stores](/tags/#credentials-from-password-stores), [Credentials from Web Browsers](/tags/#credentials-from-web-browsers) | Anomaly | -| [Possible Browser Pass View Parameter](/endpoint/possible_browser_pass_view_parameter/) | [Credentials from Web Browsers](/tags/#credentials-from-web-browsers), [Credentials from Password Stores](/tags/#credentials-from-password-stores) | Hunting | -| [Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands](/endpoint/powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | -| [Process Deleting Its Process File Path](/endpoint/process_deleting_its_process_file_path/) | [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host) | TTP | -| [Process Writing DynamicWrapperX](/endpoint/process_writing_dynamicwrapperx/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Component Object Model](/tags/#component-object-model) | Hunting | -| [Registry Keys Used For Persistence](/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence/) | [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](/tags/#registry-run-keys-/-startup-folder), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution) | TTP | -| [Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading](/endpoint/regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32) | Anomaly | -| [Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline](/endpoint/regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32) | Anomaly | -| [Remcos RAT File Creation in Remcos Folder](/endpoint/remcos_rat_file_creation_in_remcos_folder/) | [Screen Capture](/tags/#screen-capture) | TTP | -| [Remcos client registry install entry](/endpoint/remcos_client_registry_install_entry/) | [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry) | TTP | -| [Suspicious Image Creation In Appdata Folder](/endpoint/suspicious_image_creation_in_appdata_folder/) | [Screen Capture](/tags/#screen-capture) | TTP | -| [Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services](/endpoint/suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services/) | [Visual Basic](/tags/#visual-basic), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter) | TTP | -| [Suspicious Process File Path](/endpoint/suspicious_process_file_path/) | [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process) | TTP | -| [Suspicious WAV file in Appdata Folder](/endpoint/suspicious_wav_file_in_appdata_folder/) | [Screen Capture](/tags/#screen-capture) | TTP | -| [System Info Gathering Using Dxdiag Application](/endpoint/system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application/) | [Gather Victim Host Information](/tags/#gather-victim-host-information) | Hunting | -| [Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App](/endpoint/vbscript_execution_using_wscript_app/) | [Visual Basic](/tags/#visual-basic), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter) | TTP | -| [Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry](/endpoint/windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | -| [Winhlp32 Spawning a Process](/endpoint/winhlp32_spawning_a_process/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection) | TTP | -| [Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process](/endpoint/wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Parent PID Spoofing](/tags/#parent-pid-spoofing), [Access Token Manipulation](/tags/#access-token-manipulation) | TTP | +| [Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion](/endpoint/add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| TTP | +| [Disabling Remote User Account Control](/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control/) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism)| TTP | +| [Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path](/endpoint/executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading)| TTP | +| [Jscript Execution Using Cscript App](/endpoint/jscript_execution_using_cscript_app/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [JavaScript](/tags/#javascript)| TTP | +| [Loading Of Dynwrapx Module](/endpoint/loading_of_dynwrapx_module/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Dynamic-link Library Injection](/tags/#dynamic-link-library-injection)| TTP | +| [Malicious InProcServer32 Modification](/endpoint/malicious_inprocserver32_modification/) | [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry)| TTP | +| [Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir](/endpoint/non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir/) | [Credentials from Password Stores](/tags/#credentials-from-password-stores), [Credentials from Web Browsers](/tags/#credentials-from-web-browsers)| Anomaly | +| [Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir](/endpoint/non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir/) | [Credentials from Password Stores](/tags/#credentials-from-password-stores), [Credentials from Web Browsers](/tags/#credentials-from-web-browsers)| Anomaly | +| [Possible Browser Pass View Parameter](/endpoint/possible_browser_pass_view_parameter/) | [Credentials from Web Browsers](/tags/#credentials-from-web-browsers), [Credentials from Password Stores](/tags/#credentials-from-password-stores)| Hunting | +| [Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands](/endpoint/powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| TTP | +| [Process Deleting Its Process File Path](/endpoint/process_deleting_its_process_file_path/) | [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host)| TTP | +| [Process Writing DynamicWrapperX](/endpoint/process_writing_dynamicwrapperx/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Component Object Model](/tags/#component-object-model)| Hunting | +| [Registry Keys Used For Persistence](/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence/) | [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](/tags/#registry-run-keys-/-startup-folder), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution)| TTP | +| [Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading](/endpoint/regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32)| Anomaly | +| [Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline](/endpoint/regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32)| Anomaly | +| [Remcos client registry install entry](/endpoint/remcos_client_registry_install_entry/) | [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry)| TTP | +| [Remcos RAT File Creation in Remcos Folder](/endpoint/remcos_rat_file_creation_in_remcos_folder/) | [Screen Capture](/tags/#screen-capture)| TTP | +| [Suspicious Image Creation In Appdata Folder](/endpoint/suspicious_image_creation_in_appdata_folder/) | [Screen Capture](/tags/#screen-capture)| TTP | +| [Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services](/endpoint/suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services/) | [Visual Basic](/tags/#visual-basic), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter)| TTP | +| [Suspicious Process File Path](/endpoint/suspicious_process_file_path/) | [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process)| TTP | +| [Suspicious WAV file in Appdata Folder](/endpoint/suspicious_wav_file_in_appdata_folder/) | [Screen Capture](/tags/#screen-capture)| TTP | +| [System Info Gathering Using Dxdiag Application](/endpoint/system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application/) | [Gather Victim Host Information](/tags/#gather-victim-host-information)| Hunting | +| [Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App](/endpoint/vbscript_execution_using_wscript_app/) | [Visual Basic](/tags/#visual-basic), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter)| TTP | +| [Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry](/endpoint/windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| TTP | +| [Winhlp32 Spawning a Process](/endpoint/winhlp32_spawning_a_process/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection)| TTP | +| [Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process](/endpoint/wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Parent PID Spoofing](/tags/#parent-pid-spoofing), [Access Token Manipulation](/tags/#access-token-manipulation)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/revil_ransomware.md b/docs/_stories/revil_ransomware.md index 1d8a5867fe..5b7f44a7ac 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/revil_ransomware.md +++ b/docs/_stories/revil_ransomware.md @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -30,15 +31,15 @@ Revil ransomware is a RaaS,that a single group may operates and manges the devel | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Allow Network Discovery In Firewall](/endpoint/allow_network_discovery_in_firewall/) | [Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-cloud-firewall), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | -| [Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell](/endpoint/delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell/) | [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery) | TTP | -| [Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring](/endpoint/disable_windows_behavior_monitoring/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | -| [Modification Of Wallpaper](/endpoint/modification_of_wallpaper/) | [Defacement](/tags/#defacement) | TTP | -| [Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading](/endpoint/msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading/) | [DLL Side-Loading](/tags/#dll-side-loading), [Hijack Execution Flow](/tags/#hijack-execution-flow) | TTP | -| [Powershell Disable Security Monitoring](/endpoint/powershell_disable_security_monitoring/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | -| [Revil Common Exec Parameter](/endpoint/revil_common_exec_parameter/) | [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution) | TTP | -| [Revil Registry Entry](/endpoint/revil_registry_entry/) | [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry) | TTP | -| [Wbemprox COM Object Execution](/endpoint/wbemprox_com_object_execution/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [CMSTP](/tags/#cmstp) | TTP | +| [Allow Network Discovery In Firewall](/endpoint/allow_network_discovery_in_firewall/) | [Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-cloud-firewall), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| TTP | +| [Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell](/endpoint/delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell/) | [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery)| TTP | +| [Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring](/endpoint/disable_windows_behavior_monitoring/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| TTP | +| [Modification Of Wallpaper](/endpoint/modification_of_wallpaper/) | [Defacement](/tags/#defacement)| TTP | +| [Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading](/endpoint/msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading/) | [DLL Side-Loading](/tags/#dll-side-loading), [Hijack Execution Flow](/tags/#hijack-execution-flow)| TTP | +| [Powershell Disable Security Monitoring](/endpoint/powershell_disable_security_monitoring/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| TTP | +| [Revil Common Exec Parameter](/endpoint/revil_common_exec_parameter/) | [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution)| TTP | +| [Revil Registry Entry](/endpoint/revil_registry_entry/) | [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry)| TTP | +| [Wbemprox COM Object Execution](/endpoint/wbemprox_com_object_execution/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [CMSTP](/tags/#cmstp)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/router_and_infrastructure_security.md b/docs/_stories/router_and_infrastructure_security.md index c6da350fb6..5779c4fc5d 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/router_and_infrastructure_security.md +++ b/docs/_stories/router_and_infrastructure_security.md @@ -9,6 +9,10 @@ tags: - Splunk Cloud - Authentication - Network_Traffic + - Actions on Objectives + - Delivery + - Exploitation + - Reconnaissance --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -32,13 +36,13 @@ This Analytic Story helps you gain a better understanding of how your network de | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Detect ARP Poisoning](/network/detect_arp_poisoning/) | [Hardware Additions](/tags/#hardware-additions), [Network Denial of Service](/tags/#network-denial-of-service), [Adversary-in-the-Middle](/tags/#adversary-in-the-middle), [ARP Cache Poisoning](/tags/#arp-cache-poisoning) | TTP | -| [Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats](/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats/) | [Hardware Additions](/tags/#hardware-additions), [Network Denial of Service](/tags/#network-denial-of-service), [Adversary-in-the-Middle](/tags/#adversary-in-the-middle), [ARP Cache Poisoning](/tags/#arp-cache-poisoning) | TTP | -| [Detect New Login Attempts to Routers](/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers/) | | TTP | -| [Detect Port Security Violation](/network/detect_port_security_violation/) | [Hardware Additions](/tags/#hardware-additions), [Network Denial of Service](/tags/#network-denial-of-service), [Adversary-in-the-Middle](/tags/#adversary-in-the-middle), [ARP Cache Poisoning](/tags/#arp-cache-poisoning) | TTP | -| [Detect Rogue DHCP Server](/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server/) | [Hardware Additions](/tags/#hardware-additions), [Network Denial of Service](/tags/#network-denial-of-service), [Adversary-in-the-Middle](/tags/#adversary-in-the-middle) | TTP | -| [Detect Software Download To Network Device](/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device/) | [TFTP Boot](/tags/#tftp-boot), [Pre-OS Boot](/tags/#pre-os-boot) | TTP | -| [Detect Traffic Mirroring](/network/detect_traffic_mirroring/) | [Hardware Additions](/tags/#hardware-additions), [Automated Exfiltration](/tags/#automated-exfiltration), [Network Denial of Service](/tags/#network-denial-of-service), [Traffic Duplication](/tags/#traffic-duplication) | TTP | +| [Detect New Login Attempts to Routers](/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers/) | None| TTP | +| [Detect ARP Poisoning](/network/detect_arp_poisoning/) | [Hardware Additions](/tags/#hardware-additions), [Network Denial of Service](/tags/#network-denial-of-service), [Adversary-in-the-Middle](/tags/#adversary-in-the-middle), [ARP Cache Poisoning](/tags/#arp-cache-poisoning)| TTP | +| [Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats](/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats/) | [Hardware Additions](/tags/#hardware-additions), [Network Denial of Service](/tags/#network-denial-of-service), [Adversary-in-the-Middle](/tags/#adversary-in-the-middle), [ARP Cache Poisoning](/tags/#arp-cache-poisoning)| TTP | +| [Detect Port Security Violation](/network/detect_port_security_violation/) | [Hardware Additions](/tags/#hardware-additions), [Network Denial of Service](/tags/#network-denial-of-service), [Adversary-in-the-Middle](/tags/#adversary-in-the-middle), [ARP Cache Poisoning](/tags/#arp-cache-poisoning)| TTP | +| [Detect Rogue DHCP Server](/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server/) | [Hardware Additions](/tags/#hardware-additions), [Network Denial of Service](/tags/#network-denial-of-service), [Adversary-in-the-Middle](/tags/#adversary-in-the-middle)| TTP | +| [Detect Software Download To Network Device](/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device/) | [TFTP Boot](/tags/#tftp-boot), [Pre-OS Boot](/tags/#pre-os-boot)| TTP | +| [Detect Traffic Mirroring](/network/detect_traffic_mirroring/) | [Hardware Additions](/tags/#hardware-additions), [Automated Exfiltration](/tags/#automated-exfiltration), [Network Denial of Service](/tags/#network-denial-of-service), [Traffic Duplication](/tags/#traffic-duplication)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/ryuk_ransomware.md b/docs/_stories/ryuk_ransomware.md index ac8145245f..38a1ec8a21 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/ryuk_ransomware.md +++ b/docs/_stories/ryuk_ransomware.md @@ -8,8 +8,11 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint - - Endpoint_Processes - Network_Traffic + - Actions on Objectives + - Delivery + - Exploitation + - Reconnaissance --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -19,36 +22,35 @@ tags: Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Ryuk ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Ryuk, Stopping Security Access Manager, DisableAntiSpyware registry key modification, suspicious psexec use, and more. - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud -- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint), [Endpoint_Processes](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/EndpointProcesses), [Network_Traffic](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkTraffic) +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint), [Network_Traffic](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkTraffic) - **Last Updated**: 2020-11-06 - **Author**: Jose Hernandez, Splunk - **ID**: 507edc74-13d5-4339-878e-b9744ded1f35 #### Narrative -Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released Alert (AA20-302A) on October 28th called “Ransomware Activity Targeting the Healthcare and Public Health Sector.” This alert details TTPs associated with ongoing and possible imminent attacks against the Healthcare sector, and is a joint advisory in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies. The objective of these malicious campaigns is to infiltrate targets in named sectors and to drop ransomware payloads, which will likely cause disruption of service and increase risk of actual harm to the health and safety of patients at hospitals, even with the aggravant of an ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. This document specifically refers to several crimeware exploitation frameworks, emphasizing the use of Ryuk ransomware as payload. The Ryuk ransomware payload is not new. It has been well documented and identified in multiple variants. Payloads need a carrier, and for Ryuk it has often been exploitation frameworks such as Cobalt Strike, or popular crimeware frameworks such as Emotet or Trickbot. +Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released Alert (AA20-302A) on October 28th called Ransomware Activity Targeting the Healthcare and Public Health Sector. This alert details TTPs associated with ongoing and possible imminent attacks against the Healthcare sector, and is a joint advisory in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies. The objective of these malicious campaigns is to infiltrate targets in named sectors and to drop ransomware payloads, which will likely cause disruption of service and increase risk of actual harm to the health and safety of patients at hospitals, even with the aggravant of an ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. This document specifically refers to several crimeware exploitation frameworks, emphasizing the use of Ryuk ransomware as payload. The Ryuk ransomware payload is not new. It has been well documented and identified in multiple variants. Payloads need a carrier, and for Ryuk it has often been exploitation frameworks such as Cobalt Strike, or popular crimeware frameworks such as Emotet or Trickbot. #### Detections | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification](/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification/) | [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery) | TTP | -| [BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification](/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification/) | [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery) | TTP | -| [Common Ransomware Extensions](/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction) | Hunting | -| [Common Ransomware Notes](/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction) | Hunting | -| [NLTest Domain Trust Discovery](/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery/) | [Domain Trust Discovery](/tags/#domain-trust-discovery) | TTP | -| [Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce](/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce/) | [Remote Desktop Protocol](/tags/#remote-desktop-protocol), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services) | TTP | -| [Remote Desktop Network Traffic](/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic/) | [Remote Desktop Protocol](/tags/#remote-desktop-protocol), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services) | Anomaly | -| [Ryuk Test Files Detected](/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected/) | [Data Encrypted for Impact](/tags/#data-encrypted-for-impact) | TTP | -| [Ryuk Wake on LAN Command](/endpoint/ryuk_wake_on_lan_command/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell) | TTP | -| [Spike in File Writes](/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes/) | | Anomaly | -| [Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory](/endpoint/suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | Anomaly | -| [WBAdmin Delete System Backups](/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups/) | [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery) | TTP | -| [WBAdmin Delete System Backups](/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups/) | [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery) | TTP | -| [WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path](/endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | TTP | -| [WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell](/endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | TTP | -| [Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry](/endpoint/windows_disableantispyware_registry/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | -| [Windows Security Account Manager Stopped](/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped/) | [Service Stop](/tags/#service-stop) | TTP | +| [Windows connhost exe started forcefully](/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_started_forcefully/) | [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell)| TTP | +| [BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification](/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification/) | [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery)| TTP | +| [Common Ransomware Extensions](/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction)| Hunting | +| [Common Ransomware Notes](/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction)| Hunting | +| [NLTest Domain Trust Discovery](/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery/) | [Domain Trust Discovery](/tags/#domain-trust-discovery)| TTP | +| [Ryuk Test Files Detected](/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected/) | [Data Encrypted for Impact](/tags/#data-encrypted-for-impact)| TTP | +| [Ryuk Wake on LAN Command](/endpoint/ryuk_wake_on_lan_command/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell)| TTP | +| [Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory](/endpoint/suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job)| Anomaly | +| [WBAdmin Delete System Backups](/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups/) | [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery)| TTP | +| [Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry](/endpoint/windows_disableantispyware_registry/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| TTP | +| [Windows Security Account Manager Stopped](/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped/) | [Service Stop](/tags/#service-stop)| TTP | +| [WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell](/endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job)| TTP | +| [WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path](/endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job)| TTP | +| [Spike in File Writes](/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes/) | None| Anomaly | +| [Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce](/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce/) | [Remote Desktop Protocol](/tags/#remote-desktop-protocol), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services)| TTP | +| [Remote Desktop Network Traffic](/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic/) | [Remote Desktop Protocol](/tags/#remote-desktop-protocol), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services)| Anomaly | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/samaccountname_spoofing_and_domain_controller_impersonation.md b/docs/_stories/samaccountname_spoofing_and_domain_controller_impersonation.md index f0f76e3896..353bd445ab 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/samaccountname_spoofing_and_domain_controller_impersonation.md +++ b/docs/_stories/samaccountname_spoofing_and_domain_controller_impersonation.md @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -30,9 +31,9 @@ On November 9, 2021, Microsoft released patches to address two vulnerabilities t | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Suspicious Computer Account Name Change](/endpoint/suspicious_computer_account_name_change/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts), [Domain Accounts](/tags/#domain-accounts) | TTP | -| [Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request](/endpoint/suspicious_kerberos_service_ticket_request/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts), [Domain Accounts](/tags/#domain-accounts) | TTP | -| [Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request](/endpoint/suspicious_ticket_granting_ticket_request/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts), [Domain Accounts](/tags/#domain-accounts) | Hunting | +| [Suspicious Computer Account Name Change](/endpoint/suspicious_computer_account_name_change/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts), [Domain Accounts](/tags/#domain-accounts)| TTP | +| [Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request](/endpoint/suspicious_kerberos_service_ticket_request/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts), [Domain Accounts](/tags/#domain-accounts)| TTP | +| [Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request](/endpoint/suspicious_ticket_granting_ticket_request/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts), [Domain Accounts](/tags/#domain-accounts)| Hunting | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/samsam_ransomware.md b/docs/_stories/samsam_ransomware.md index df30a5bf30..4d90161e95 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/samsam_ransomware.md +++ b/docs/_stories/samsam_ransomware.md @@ -10,6 +10,12 @@ tags: - Endpoint - Network_Traffic - Web + - Actions on Objectives + - Command & Control + - Delivery + - Exploitation + - Installation + - Reconnaissance --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -37,20 +43,21 @@ This Analytic Story includes searches designed to help detect and investigate si | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Attacker Tools On Endpoint](/endpoint/attacker_tools_on_endpoint/) | [Match Legitimate Name or Location](/tags/#match-legitimate-name-or-location), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [Active Scanning](/tags/#active-scanning) | TTP | -| [Batch File Write to System32](/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32/) | [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution), [Malicious File](/tags/#malicious-file) | TTP | -| [Common Ransomware Extensions](/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction) | Hunting | -| [Common Ransomware Notes](/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction) | Hunting | -| [Deleting Shadow Copies](/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies/) | [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery) | TTP | -| [Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag](/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares) | TTP | -| [Detect Renamed PSExec](/endpoint/detect_renamed_psexec/) | [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution) | Hunting | -| [Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers](/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers/) | [System Information Discovery](/tags/#system-information-discovery) | TTP | -| [Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers](/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers/) | | TTP | -| [File with Samsam Extension](/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension/) | | TTP | -| [Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce](/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce/) | [Remote Desktop Protocol](/tags/#remote-desktop-protocol), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services) | TTP | -| [Remote Desktop Network Traffic](/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic/) | [Remote Desktop Protocol](/tags/#remote-desktop-protocol), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services) | Anomaly | -| [Samsam Test File Write](/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write/) | [Data Encrypted for Impact](/tags/#data-encrypted-for-impact) | TTP | -| [Spike in File Writes](/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes/) | | Anomaly | +| [Prohibited Software On Endpoint](/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint/) | None| Hunting | +| [Attacker Tools On Endpoint](/endpoint/attacker_tools_on_endpoint/) | [Match Legitimate Name or Location](/tags/#match-legitimate-name-or-location), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [Active Scanning](/tags/#active-scanning)| TTP | +| [Batch File Write to System32](/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32/) | [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution), [Malicious File](/tags/#malicious-file)| TTP | +| [Common Ransomware Extensions](/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction)| Hunting | +| [Common Ransomware Notes](/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction)| Hunting | +| [Deleting Shadow Copies](/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies/) | [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery)| TTP | +| [Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag](/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares)| TTP | +| [Detect Renamed PSExec](/endpoint/detect_renamed_psexec/) | [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution)| Hunting | +| [File with Samsam Extension](/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension/) | None| TTP | +| [Samsam Test File Write](/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write/) | [Data Encrypted for Impact](/tags/#data-encrypted-for-impact)| TTP | +| [Spike in File Writes](/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes/) | None| Anomaly | +| [Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce](/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce/) | [Remote Desktop Protocol](/tags/#remote-desktop-protocol), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services)| TTP | +| [Remote Desktop Network Traffic](/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic/) | [Remote Desktop Protocol](/tags/#remote-desktop-protocol), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services)| Anomaly | +| [Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers](/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers/) | [System Information Discovery](/tags/#system-information-discovery)| TTP | +| [Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers](/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers/) | None| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/signed_binary_proxy_execution_installutil.md b/docs/_stories/signed_binary_proxy_execution_installutil.md index 9fe61cbc77..defda50183 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/signed_binary_proxy_execution_installutil.md +++ b/docs/_stories/signed_binary_proxy_execution_installutil.md @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -34,13 +35,13 @@ Parallel processes may also include csc.exe being used to compile a local `.cs` | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path](/endpoint/windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil) | TTP | -| [Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft](/endpoint/windows_installutil_credential_theft/) | [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution) | TTP | -| [Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection](/endpoint/windows_installutil_remote_network_connection/) | [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution) | TTP | -| [Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line](/endpoint/windows_installutil_url_in_command_line/) | [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution) | TTP | -| [Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option](/endpoint/windows_installutil_uninstall_option/) | [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution) | TTP | -| [Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network](/endpoint/windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network/) | [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution) | TTP | -| [Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path](/endpoint/windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil) | TTP | +| [Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path](/endpoint/windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil)| TTP | +| [Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft](/endpoint/windows_installutil_credential_theft/) | [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution)| TTP | +| [Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path](/endpoint/windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil)| TTP | +| [Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection](/endpoint/windows_installutil_remote_network_connection/) | [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution)| TTP | +| [Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option](/endpoint/windows_installutil_uninstall_option/) | [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution)| TTP | +| [Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network](/endpoint/windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network/) | [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution)| TTP | +| [Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line](/endpoint/windows_installutil_url_in_command_line/) | [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/silver_sparrow.md b/docs/_stories/silver_sparrow.md index f5a1f8dc55..66387c4eef 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/silver_sparrow.md +++ b/docs/_stories/silver_sparrow.md @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint + - Actions on Objectives --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -24,16 +25,16 @@ Silver Sparrow, identified by Red Canary Intelligence, is a new forward looking #### Narrative -Silver Sparrow works is a dropper and uses typical persistence mechanisms on a Mac. It is cross platform, covering both Intel and Apple M1 architecture. To this date, no implant has been downloaded for malicious purposes. During installation of the update.pkg or updater.pkg file, the malicious software utilizes JavaScript to generate files and scripts on disk for persistence.These files later download a implant from an S3 bucket every hour. This analytic assists with identifying different types of macOS malware families establishing LaunchAgent persistence. Per SentinelOne source, it is predicted that Silver Sparrow is likely selling itself as a mechanism to 3rd party “affiliates” or pay-per-install (PPI) partners, typically seen as commodity adware/malware. Additional indicators and behaviors may be found within the references. +Silver Sparrow works is a dropper and uses typical persistence mechanisms on a Mac. It is cross platform, covering both Intel and Apple M1 architecture. To this date, no implant has been downloaded for malicious purposes. During installation of the update.pkg or updater.pkg file, the malicious software utilizes JavaScript to generate files and scripts on disk for persistence.These files later download a implant from an S3 bucket every hour. This analytic assists with identifying different types of macOS malware families establishing LaunchAgent persistence. Per SentinelOne source, it is predicted that Silver Sparrow is likely selling itself as a mechanism to 3rd party Caffiliates or pay-per-install (PPI) partners, typically seen as commodity adware/malware. Additional indicators and behaviors may be found within the references. #### Detections | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Suspicious Curl Network Connection](/endpoint/suspicious_curl_network_connection/) | [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer) | TTP | -| [Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage](/endpoint/suspicious_plistbuddy_usage/) | [Launch Agent](/tags/#launch-agent), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process) | TTP | -| [Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage via OSquery](/endpoint/suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_via_osquery/) | [Launch Agent](/tags/#launch-agent), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process) | TTP | -| [Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior](/endpoint/suspicious_sqlite3_lsquarantine_behavior/) | [Data Staged](/tags/#data-staged) | TTP | +| [Suspicious Curl Network Connection](/endpoint/suspicious_curl_network_connection/) | [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer)| TTP | +| [Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage](/endpoint/suspicious_plistbuddy_usage/) | [Launch Agent](/tags/#launch-agent), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process)| TTP | +| [Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage via OSquery](/endpoint/suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_via_osquery/) | [Launch Agent](/tags/#launch-agent), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process)| TTP | +| [Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior](/endpoint/suspicious_sqlite3_lsquarantine_behavior/) | [Data Staged](/tags/#data-staged)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/spearphishing_attachments.md b/docs/_stories/spearphishing_attachments.md index 2bd2e877ad..e41084b62b 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/spearphishing_attachments.md +++ b/docs/_stories/spearphishing_attachments.md @@ -8,6 +8,9 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint + - Actions on Objectives + - Exploitation + - Installation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -37,26 +40,26 @@ This Analytic Story focuses on detecting signs that a malicious payload has been | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file](/endpoint/detect_outlook_exe_writing_a_zip_file/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment) | TTP | -| [Excel Spawning PowerShell](/endpoint/excel_spawning_powershell/) | [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | TTP | -| [Excel Spawning Windows Script Host](/endpoint/excel_spawning_windows_script_host/) | [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | TTP | -| [Gdrive suspicious file sharing](/cloud/gdrive_suspicious_file_sharing/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing) | Hunting | -| [Gsuite suspicious calendar invite](/cloud/gsuite_suspicious_calendar_invite/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing) | Hunting | -| [MSHTML Module Load in Office Product](/endpoint/mshtml_module_load_in_office_product/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment) | TTP | -| [Office Application Spawn rundll32 process](/endpoint/office_application_spawn_rundll32_process/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment) | TTP | -| [Office Document Creating Schedule Task](/endpoint/office_document_creating_schedule_task/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment) | TTP | -| [Office Document Executing Macro Code](/endpoint/office_document_executing_macro_code/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment) | TTP | -| [Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download](/endpoint/office_document_spawned_child_process_to_download/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment) | TTP | -| [Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin](/endpoint/office_product_spawning_bitsadmin/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment) | TTP | -| [Office Product Spawning CertUtil](/endpoint/office_product_spawning_certutil/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment) | TTP | -| [Office Product Spawning MSHTA](/endpoint/office_product_spawning_mshta/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment) | TTP | -| [Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL](/endpoint/office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment) | TTP | -| [Office Product Spawning Wmic](/endpoint/office_product_spawning_wmic/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment) | TTP | -| [Office Product Writing cab or inf](/endpoint/office_product_writing_cab_or_inf/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment) | TTP | -| [Office Spawning Control](/endpoint/office_spawning_control/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment) | TTP | -| [Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location](/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Link](/tags/#spearphishing-link) | TTP | -| [Winword Spawning Cmd](/endpoint/winword_spawning_cmd/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment) | TTP | -| [Winword Spawning PowerShell](/endpoint/winword_spawning_powershell/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment) | TTP | +| [Excel Spawning PowerShell](/endpoint/excel_spawning_powershell/) | [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping)| TTP | +| [Excel Spawning Windows Script Host](/endpoint/excel_spawning_windows_script_host/) | [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping)| TTP | +| [MSHTML Module Load in Office Product](/endpoint/mshtml_module_load_in_office_product/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment)| TTP | +| [Office Application Spawn rundll32 process](/endpoint/office_application_spawn_rundll32_process/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment)| TTP | +| [Office Document Creating Schedule Task](/endpoint/office_document_creating_schedule_task/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment)| TTP | +| [Office Document Executing Macro Code](/endpoint/office_document_executing_macro_code/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment)| TTP | +| [Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download](/endpoint/office_document_spawned_child_process_to_download/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment)| TTP | +| [Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin](/endpoint/office_product_spawning_bitsadmin/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment)| TTP | +| [Office Product Spawning CertUtil](/endpoint/office_product_spawning_certutil/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment)| TTP | +| [Office Product Spawning MSHTA](/endpoint/office_product_spawning_mshta/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment)| TTP | +| [Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL](/endpoint/office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment)| TTP | +| [Office Product Spawning Wmic](/endpoint/office_product_spawning_wmic/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment)| TTP | +| [Office Product Writing cab or inf](/endpoint/office_product_writing_cab_or_inf/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment)| TTP | +| [Office Spawning Control](/endpoint/office_spawning_control/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment)| TTP | +| [Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location](/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Link](/tags/#spearphishing-link)| TTP | +| [Winword Spawning Cmd](/endpoint/winword_spawning_cmd/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment)| TTP | +| [Winword Spawning PowerShell](/endpoint/winword_spawning_powershell/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment)| TTP | +| [Gdrive suspicious file sharing](/cloud/gdrive_suspicious_file_sharing/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing)| Hunting | +| [Gsuite suspicious calendar invite](/cloud/gsuite_suspicious_calendar_invite/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing)| Hunting | +| [Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file](/endpoint/detect_outlook_exe_writing_a_zip_file/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerabilities.md b/docs/_stories/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerabilities.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1b6155290d --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_stories/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerabilities.md @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +--- +title: "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities" +last_modified_at: 2018-01-08 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Vulnerabilities + - Exploitation +--- + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +Assess and mitigate your systems' vulnerability to Spectre and Meltdown exploitation with the searches in this Analytic Story. + +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: [Vulnerabilities](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Vulnerabilities) +- **Last Updated**: 2018-01-08 +- **Author**: David Dorsey, Splunk +- **ID**: 6d3306f6-bb2b-4219-8609-8efad64032f2 + +#### Narrative + +Meltdown and Spectre exploit critical vulnerabilities in modern CPUs that allow unintended access to data in memory. This Analytic Story will help you identify the systems can be patched for these vulnerabilities, as well as those that still need to be patched. + +#### Detections + +| Name | Technique | Type | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------| +| [Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems](/deprecated/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems/) | None| TTP | + +#### Reference + +* [https://meltdownattack.com/](https://meltdownattack.com/) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/stories/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerabilities.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability.md b/docs/_stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..eafa15d1c4 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability.md @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +--- +title: "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability" +last_modified_at: 2017-09-19 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Delivery +--- + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +Keeping your Splunk deployment up to date is critical and may help you reduce the risk of CVE-2016-4859, an open-redirection vulnerability within some older versions of Splunk Enterprise. The detection search will help ensure that users are being properly authenticated and not being redirected to malicious domains. + +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2017-09-19 +- **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +- **ID**: 4e692b96-de2d-4bd1-9105-37e2368a8db1 + +#### Narrative + +This Analytic Story is associated with CVE-2016-4859, an open-redirect vulnerability in the following versions of Splunk Enterprise:\ +\ +1. Splunk Enterprise 6.4.x, prior to 6.4.3\ +1. Splunk Enterprise 6.3.x, prior to 6.3.6\ +1. Splunk Enterprise 6.2.x, prior to 6.2.10\ +1. Splunk Enterprise 6.1.x, prior to 6.1.11\ +1. Splunk Enterprise 6.0.x, prior to 6.0.12\ +1. Splunk Enterprise 5.0.x, prior to 5.0.16\ +1. Splunk Light, prior to 6.4.3CVE-2016-4859 allows attackers to redirect users to arbitrary web sites and conduct phishing attacks via unspecified vectors. (Credit: Noriaki Iwasaki, Cyber Defense Institute, Inc.).\ +It is important to ensure that your Splunk deployment is being kept up to date and is properly configured. This detection search allows analysts to monitor internal logs to ensure users are properly authenticated and cannot be redirected to any malicious third-party websites. + +#### Detections + +| Name | Technique | Type | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------| +| [Open Redirect in Splunk Web](/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web/) | None| TTP | + +#### Reference + +* [http://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAPQ6#announce](http://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAPQ6#announce) +* [https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-4859](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-4859) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability_cve-2018-11409.md b/docs/_stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability_cve-2018-11409.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..481129cb91 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability_cve-2018-11409.md @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +--- +title: "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409" +last_modified_at: 2018-06-14 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Delivery +--- + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +Reduce the risk of CVE-2018-11409, an information disclosure vulnerability within some older versions of Splunk Enterprise, with searches designed to help ensure that your Splunk system does not leak information to authenticated users. + +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2018-06-14 +- **Author**: David Dorsey, Splunk +- **ID**: 1fc34cbc-34e9-43ba-87ab-6811c9e95400 + +#### Narrative + +Although there have been no reports of it being exploited, Splunk Enterprise versions through 7.0.1 reportedly have a vulnerability that may expose information through a REST endpoint (read more here: https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings). NIST has included it in its vulnerability database (read more here: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409). The REST endpoint that exposes system information is also necessary for the proper operation of Splunk clustering and instrumentation. Customers should upgrade to the latest version to reduce the risk of this vulnerability.\ +Splunk Enterprise exposes partial information about the host operating system, hardware, and Splunk license. Splunk Enterprise before 6.6.0 exposes this information without authentication. Splunk Enterprise 6.6.0 and later exposes this information only to authenticated Splunk users. Based on the information exposure, Splunk characterizes this issue as a low severity impact.\ +Read more in Splunk's official response: https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings.\ +A detection search within this Analytic Story looks for vulnerabilities described in CVE-2018-11409: Information Exposure (https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409). If it turns up activities that may be specific, you can use the included investigative searches to return information regarding web activity and network traffic by src_ip. + +#### Detections + +| Name | Technique | Type | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------| +| [Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure](/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure/) | None| TTP | + +#### Reference + +* [https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409) +* [https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings](https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings) +* [https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44865/](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44865/) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/stories/splunk_enterprise_vulnerability_cve-2018-11409.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_stories/sql_injection.md b/docs/_stories/sql_injection.md index 982468d504..c17a536bd7 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/sql_injection.md +++ b/docs/_stories/sql_injection.md @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Web + - Delivery --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -31,7 +32,7 @@ This Analytic Story contains a search designed to identify attempts by attackers | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [SQL Injection with Long URLs](/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls/) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | TTP | +| [SQL Injection with Long URLs](/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls/) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/suspicious_aws_ec2_activities.md b/docs/_stories/suspicious_aws_ec2_activities.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6e42bf9a18 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_stories/suspicious_aws_ec2_activities.md @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +--- +title: "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities" +last_modified_at: 2018-02-09 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Actions on Objectives + - Exploitation +--- + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply, when the information warrants it. + +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2018-02-09 +- **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +- **ID**: 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50f1268af3 + +#### Narrative + +AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing within your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Console, AWS command-line interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your EC2 instances are not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your AWS EC2 instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities. + +#### Detections + +| Name | Technique | Type | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------| +| [Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User](/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts)| Anomaly | +| [Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK](/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user_-_mltk/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts)| Anomaly | +| [Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User](/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts)| Anomaly | +| [Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK](/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user_-_mltk/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts)| Anomaly | +| [EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region](/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region/) | [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](/tags/#unused/unsupported-cloud-regions)| Anomaly | +| [EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User](/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts)| Anomaly | + +#### Reference + +* [https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf](https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/stories/suspicious_aws_ec2_activities.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_stories/suspicious_aws_login_activities.md b/docs/_stories/suspicious_aws_login_activities.md index 291786683c..ba94fdb33a 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/suspicious_aws_login_activities.md +++ b/docs/_stories/suspicious_aws_login_activities.md @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Authentication + - Actions on Objectives --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -31,9 +32,10 @@ It is important to monitor and control who has access to your AWS infrastructure | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City](/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city/) | [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](/tags/#unused/unsupported-cloud-regions) | Hunting | -| [Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country](/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country/) | [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](/tags/#unused/unsupported-cloud-regions) | Hunting | -| [Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region](/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region/) | [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](/tags/#unused/unsupported-cloud-regions) | Hunting | +| [Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City](/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city/) | [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](/tags/#unused/unsupported-cloud-regions)| Hunting | +| [Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country](/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country/) | [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](/tags/#unused/unsupported-cloud-regions)| Hunting | +| [Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region](/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region/) | [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](/tags/#unused/unsupported-cloud-regions)| Hunting | +| [Detect new user AWS Console Login](/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts)| Hunting | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/suspicious_aws_s3_activities.md b/docs/_stories/suspicious_aws_s3_activities.md index 76df396542..61e15e43ff 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/suspicious_aws_s3_activities.md +++ b/docs/_stories/suspicious_aws_s3_activities.md @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud + - Actions on Objectives --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -20,7 +21,7 @@ Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evide - **Datamodel**: - **Last Updated**: 2018-07-24 - **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk -- **ID**: 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50w3168af3 +- **ID**: 66732346-8fb0-407b-9633-da16756567d6 #### Narrative @@ -32,10 +33,10 @@ Among things to look out for are S3 access from unfamiliar locations and by unfa | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI](/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli/) | [Data from Cloud Storage Object](/tags/#data-from-cloud-storage-object) | TTP | -| [Detect New Open S3 buckets](/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets/) | [Data from Cloud Storage Object](/tags/#data-from-cloud-storage-object) | TTP | -| [Detect S3 access from a new IP](/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip/) | [Data from Cloud Storage Object](/tags/#data-from-cloud-storage-object) | Anomaly | -| [Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion](/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion/) | [Data from Cloud Storage Object](/tags/#data-from-cloud-storage-object) | Anomaly | +| [Detect New Open S3 buckets](/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets/) | [Data from Cloud Storage Object](/tags/#data-from-cloud-storage-object)| TTP | +| [Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI](/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli/) | [Data from Cloud Storage Object](/tags/#data-from-cloud-storage-object)| TTP | +| [Detect S3 access from a new IP](/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip/) | [Data from Cloud Storage Object](/tags/#data-from-cloud-storage-object)| Anomaly | +| [Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion](/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion/) | [Data from Cloud Storage Object](/tags/#data-from-cloud-storage-object)| Anomaly | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/suspicious_aws_traffic.md b/docs/_stories/suspicious_aws_traffic.md index f537c45ed3..158f5f7938 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/suspicious_aws_traffic.md +++ b/docs/_stories/suspicious_aws_traffic.md @@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud + - Actions on Objectives + - Command & Control --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -32,7 +34,7 @@ The searches in this Analytic Story will monitor your AWS network traffic for ev | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS](/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws/) | | Anomaly | +| [Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS](/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws/) | None| Anomaly | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities.md b/docs/_stories/suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities.md index 69458c9bfe..d133c233fd 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities.md +++ b/docs/_stories/suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities.md @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Authentication + - Actions on Objectives --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -32,11 +33,11 @@ This Analytic Story has data model versions of cloud searches leveraging Authent | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account](/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account/) | | Anomaly | -| [Detect AWS Console Login by New User](/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user/) | | Hunting | -| [Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City](/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city/) | [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](/tags/#unused/unsupported-cloud-regions) | Hunting | -| [Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country](/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country/) | [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](/tags/#unused/unsupported-cloud-regions) | Hunting | -| [Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region](/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region/) | [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](/tags/#unused/unsupported-cloud-regions) | Hunting | +| [AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account](/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account/) | None| Anomaly | +| [Detect AWS Console Login by New User](/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user/) | None| Hunting | +| [Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City](/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city/) | [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](/tags/#unused/unsupported-cloud-regions)| Hunting | +| [Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country](/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country/) | [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](/tags/#unused/unsupported-cloud-regions)| Hunting | +| [Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region](/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region/) | [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](/tags/#unused/unsupported-cloud-regions)| Hunting | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/suspicious_cloud_instance_activities.md b/docs/_stories/suspicious_cloud_instance_activities.md index 4d3f40bfb5..28543be7be 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/suspicious_cloud_instance_activities.md +++ b/docs/_stories/suspicious_cloud_instance_activities.md @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Change + - Actions on Objectives --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -31,10 +32,10 @@ Monitoring your cloud infrastructure logs allows you enable governance, complian | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed](/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_destroyed/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts), [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | Anomaly | -| [Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched](/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_launched/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts), [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | Anomaly | -| [Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User](/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_by_previously_unseen_user/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts), [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | Anomaly | -| [Detect shared ec2 snapshot](/cloud/detect_shared_ec2_snapshot/) | [Transfer Data to Cloud Account](/tags/#transfer-data-to-cloud-account) | TTP | +| [Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User](/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_by_previously_unseen_user/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts), [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts)| Anomaly | +| [Detect shared ec2 snapshot](/cloud/detect_shared_ec2_snapshot/) | [Transfer Data to Cloud Account](/tags/#transfer-data-to-cloud-account)| TTP | +| [Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed](/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_destroyed/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts), [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts)| Anomaly | +| [Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched](/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_launched/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts), [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts)| Anomaly | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/suspicious_cloud_provisioning_activities.md b/docs/_stories/suspicious_cloud_provisioning_activities.md index 044d70cd9f..450fe8e90f 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/suspicious_cloud_provisioning_activities.md +++ b/docs/_stories/suspicious_cloud_provisioning_activities.md @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Change + - Actions on Objectives --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -32,10 +33,10 @@ This Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precisio | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City](/cloud/cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | Anomaly | -| [Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country](/cloud/cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_country/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | Anomaly | -| [Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address](/cloud/cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | Anomaly | -| [Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region](/cloud/cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | Anomaly | +| [Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City](/cloud/cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts)| Anomaly | +| [Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country](/cloud/cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_country/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts)| Anomaly | +| [Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address](/cloud/cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts)| Anomaly | +| [Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region](/cloud/cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts)| Anomaly | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/suspicious_cloud_user_activities.md b/docs/_stories/suspicious_cloud_user_activities.md index 58868a9d88..97550ddb7e 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/suspicious_cloud_user_activities.md +++ b/docs/_stories/suspicious_cloud_user_activities.md @@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Change + - Actions on Objectives + - Reconnaissance --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -32,11 +34,11 @@ In addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events](/cloud/aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events/) | [Cloud Infrastructure Discovery](/tags/#cloud-infrastructure-discovery) | Anomaly | -| [AWS Lambda UpdateFunctionCode](/cloud/aws_lambda_updatefunctioncode/) | [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution) | Hunting | -| [Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls](/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts), [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | Anomaly | -| [Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls](/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts), [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | Anomaly | -| [Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles](/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | Anomaly | +| [Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls](/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts), [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts)| Anomaly | +| [Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls](/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts), [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts)| Anomaly | +| [AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events](/cloud/aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events/) | [Cloud Infrastructure Discovery](/tags/#cloud-infrastructure-discovery)| Anomaly | +| [AWS Lambda UpdateFunctionCode](/cloud/aws_lambda_updatefunctioncode/) | [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution)| Hunting | +| [Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles](/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts)| Anomaly | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/suspicious_command-line_executions.md b/docs/_stories/suspicious_command-line_executions.md index 45fab7943b..8110604e98 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/suspicious_command-line_executions.md +++ b/docs/_stories/suspicious_command-line_executions.md @@ -8,7 +8,9 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint - - Endpoint_Processes + - Actions on Objectives + - Command & Control + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -18,7 +20,7 @@ tags: Leveraging the Windows command-line interface (CLI) is one of the most common attack techniques--one that is also detailed in the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Use this Analytic Story to help you identify unusual or suspicious use of the CLI on Windows systems. - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud -- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint), [Endpoint_Processes](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/EndpointProcesses) +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2020-02-03 - **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk - **ID**: f4368ddf-d59f-4192-84f6-778ac5a3ffc7 @@ -31,13 +33,13 @@ The ability to execute arbitrary commands via the Windows CLI is a primary goal | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe](/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell) | Hunting | -| [Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe](/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter) | Anomaly | -| [Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters](/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell) | TTP | -| [Potentially malicious code on commandline](/endpoint/potentially_malicious_code_on_commandline/) | [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell) | Anomaly | -| [System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations](/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities) | TTP | -| [Unusually Long Command Line](/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line/) | | Anomaly | -| [Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK](/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line_-_mltk/) | | Anomaly | +| [First time seen command line argument](/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument/) | [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell)| Hunting | +| [Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe](/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell)| Hunting | +| [Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters](/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell)| TTP | +| [Potentially malicious code on commandline](/endpoint/potentially_malicious_code_on_commandline/) | [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell)| Anomaly | +| [System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations](/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities)| TTP | +| [Unusually Long Command Line](/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line/) | None| Anomaly | +| [Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK](/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line_-_mltk/) | None| Anomaly | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/suspicious_compiled_html_activity.md b/docs/_stories/suspicious_compiled_html_activity.md index acca03dd17..20545d8fef 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/suspicious_compiled_html_activity.md +++ b/docs/_stories/suspicious_compiled_html_activity.md @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint + - Actions on Objectives --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -33,10 +34,10 @@ Upon usage of InfoTech Storage Handlers, ms-its, its, mk, itss.dll will load. | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Detect HTML Help Renamed](/endpoint/detect_html_help_renamed/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Compiled HTML File](/tags/#compiled-html-file) | Hunting | -| [Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process](/endpoint/detect_html_help_spawn_child_process/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Compiled HTML File](/tags/#compiled-html-file) | TTP | -| [Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line](/endpoint/detect_html_help_url_in_command_line/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Compiled HTML File](/tags/#compiled-html-file) | TTP | -| [Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers](/endpoint/detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Compiled HTML File](/tags/#compiled-html-file) | TTP | +| [Detect HTML Help Renamed](/endpoint/detect_html_help_renamed/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Compiled HTML File](/tags/#compiled-html-file)| Hunting | +| [Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process](/endpoint/detect_html_help_spawn_child_process/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Compiled HTML File](/tags/#compiled-html-file)| TTP | +| [Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line](/endpoint/detect_html_help_url_in_command_line/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Compiled HTML File](/tags/#compiled-html-file)| TTP | +| [Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers](/endpoint/detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Compiled HTML File](/tags/#compiled-html-file)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/suspicious_dns_traffic.md b/docs/_stories/suspicious_dns_traffic.md index 225237c3c9..6fd280cede 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/suspicious_dns_traffic.md +++ b/docs/_stories/suspicious_dns_traffic.md @@ -8,8 +8,10 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint - - Endpoint_Processes - Network_Resolution + - Actions on Objectives + - Command & Control + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -19,7 +21,7 @@ tags: Attackers often attempt to hide within or otherwise abuse the domain name system (DNS). You can thwart attempts to manipulate this omnipresent protocol by monitoring for these types of abuses. - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud -- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint), [Endpoint_Processes](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/EndpointProcesses), [Network_Resolution](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkResolution) +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint), [Network_Resolution](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkResolution) - **Last Updated**: 2017-09-18 - **Author**: Rico Valdez, Splunk - **ID**: 3c3835c0-255d-4f9e-ab84-e29ec9ec9b56 @@ -32,13 +34,16 @@ Although DNS is one of the fundamental underlying protocols that make the Intern | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App](/endpoint/dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app/) | [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol) | TTP | -| [DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App](/endpoint/dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app/) | [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol) | TTP | -| [DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK](/network/dns_query_length_outliers_-_mltk/) | [DNS](/tags/#dns), [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol) | Anomaly | -| [DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation](/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol) | Anomaly | -| [Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers](/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers/) | [Drive-by Compromise](/tags/#drive-by-compromise) | TTP | -| [Excessive DNS Failures](/network/excessive_dns_failures/) | [DNS](/tags/#dns), [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol) | Anomaly | -| [Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App](/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app/) | [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol) | Anomaly | +| [Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers](/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol)| TTP | +| [Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response](/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol)| TTP | +| [Detection of DNS Tunnels](/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol)| TTP | +| [DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers](/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers/) | [DNS](/tags/#dns)| TTP | +| [DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App](/endpoint/dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app/) | [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol)| TTP | +| [Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App](/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app/) | [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol)| Anomaly | +| [DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK](/network/dns_query_length_outliers_-_mltk/) | [DNS](/tags/#dns), [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol)| Anomaly | +| [Excessive DNS Failures](/network/excessive_dns_failures/) | [DNS](/tags/#dns), [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol)| Anomaly | +| [Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers](/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers/) | [Drive-by Compromise](/tags/#drive-by-compromise)| TTP | +| [DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation](/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol)| Anomaly | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/suspicious_emails.md b/docs/_stories/suspicious_emails.md index 6f25f48afe..e5b935dac8 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/suspicious_emails.md +++ b/docs/_stories/suspicious_emails.md @@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Email + - UEBA + - Delivery --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -17,7 +19,7 @@ tags: Email remains one of the primary means for attackers to gain an initial foothold within the modern enterprise. Detect and investigate suspicious emails in your environment with the help of the searches in this Analytic Story. - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud -- **Datamodel**: [Email](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Email) +- **Datamodel**: [Email](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Email), [UEBA](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/UEBA) - **Last Updated**: 2020-01-27 - **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk - **ID**: 2b1800dd-92f9-47ec-a981-fdf1351e5d55 @@ -34,9 +36,10 @@ Once a phishing message has been detected, the next steps are to answer the foll | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces](/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces/) | | Anomaly | -| [Monitor Email For Brand Abuse](/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse/) | | TTP | -| [Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions](/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions/) | [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing) | Anomaly | +| [Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly](/deprecated/suspicious_email_-_uba_anomaly/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing)| Anomaly | +| [Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces](/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces/) | None| Anomaly | +| [Monitor Email For Brand Abuse](/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse/) | None| TTP | +| [Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions](/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions/) | [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing)| Anomaly | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities.md b/docs/_stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities.md index 812d32fc9c..b905c7aaa9 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities.md +++ b/docs/_stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities.md @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud + - Actions on Objectives --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -29,8 +30,8 @@ Similar to other cloud providers, GCP operates on a shared responsibility model. | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP](/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip/) | [Data from Cloud Storage Object](/tags/#data-from-cloud-storage-object) | Anomaly | -| [Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets](/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets/) | [Data from Cloud Storage Object](/tags/#data-from-cloud-storage-object) | TTP | +| [Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP](/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip/) | [Data from Cloud Storage Object](/tags/#data-from-cloud-storage-object)| Anomaly | +| [Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets](/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets/) | [Data from Cloud Storage Object](/tags/#data-from-cloud-storage-object)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.md b/docs/_stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.md index 07ab672bdf..af0f492673 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.md +++ b/docs/_stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.md @@ -8,7 +8,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint - - Endpoint_Processes + - Actions on Objectives + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -18,10 +19,10 @@ tags: Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code. - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud -- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint), [Endpoint_Processes](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/EndpointProcesses) +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-01-20 - **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Michael Haag, Splunk -- **ID**: 2b1800dd-92f9-47dd-a981-fdf13w1q5d55 +- **ID**: 1e5a5a53-540b-462a-8fb7-f44a4292f5dc #### Narrative @@ -43,18 +44,14 @@ The objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or m | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line](/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta) | TTP | -| [Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe](/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell) | Hunting | -| [Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution](/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta) | TTP | -| [Detect mshta inline hta execution](/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta) | TTP | -| [Detect mshta renamed](/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta) | Hunting | -| [Registry Keys Used For Persistence](/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence/) | [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](/tags/#registry-run-keys-/-startup-folder), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution) | TTP | -| [Suspicious mshta child process](/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta) | TTP | -| [Suspicious mshta spawn](/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta) | TTP | -| [Windows MSHTA Child Process](/endpoint/windows_mshta_child_process/) | [Mshta](/tags/#mshta), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution) | TTP | -| [Windows MSHTA Command-Line URL](/endpoint/windows_mshta_command-line_url/) | [Mshta](/tags/#mshta), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution) | TTP | -| [Windows MSHTA Inline HTA Execution](/endpoint/windows_mshta_inline_hta_execution/) | [Mshta](/tags/#mshta), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution) | TTP | -| [Windows Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution](/endpoint/windows_rundll32_inline_hta_execution/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta) | TTP | +| [Detect mshta inline hta execution](/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta)| TTP | +| [Detect mshta renamed](/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta)| Hunting | +| [Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line](/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta)| TTP | +| [Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe](/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell)| Hunting | +| [Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution](/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta)| TTP | +| [Registry Keys Used For Persistence](/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence/) | [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](/tags/#registry-run-keys-/-startup-folder), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution)| TTP | +| [Suspicious mshta child process](/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta)| TTP | +| [Suspicious mshta spawn](/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/suspicious_okta_activity.md b/docs/_stories/suspicious_okta_activity.md index 3d769d6b1b..ecb34b2f7a 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/suspicious_okta_activity.md +++ b/docs/_stories/suspicious_okta_activity.md @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -31,10 +32,10 @@ With people moving quickly to adopt web-based applications and ways to manage th | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP](/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts), [Default Accounts](/tags/#default-accounts) | TTP | -| [Okta Account Lockout Events](/application/okta_account_lockout_events/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts), [Default Accounts](/tags/#default-accounts) | Anomaly | -| [Okta Failed SSO Attempts](/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts), [Default Accounts](/tags/#default-accounts) | Anomaly | -| [Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities](/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts), [Default Accounts](/tags/#default-accounts) | Anomaly | +| [Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP](/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts), [Default Accounts](/tags/#default-accounts)| TTP | +| [Okta Account Lockout Events](/application/okta_account_lockout_events/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts), [Default Accounts](/tags/#default-accounts)| Anomaly | +| [Okta Failed SSO Attempts](/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts), [Default Accounts](/tags/#default-accounts)| Anomaly | +| [Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities](/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts), [Default Accounts](/tags/#default-accounts)| Anomaly | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/suspicious_regsvcs_regasm_activity.md b/docs/_stories/suspicious_regsvcs_regasm_activity.md index dfbcbf1afb..1e4e9a29e9 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/suspicious_regsvcs_regasm_activity.md +++ b/docs/_stories/suspicious_regsvcs_regasm_activity.md @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint + - Actions on Objectives --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -30,12 +31,12 @@ Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe proce | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Detect Regasm Spawning a Process](/endpoint/detect_regasm_spawning_a_process/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvcs/Regasm](/tags/#regsvcs/regasm) | TTP | -| [Detect Regasm with Network Connection](/endpoint/detect_regasm_with_network_connection/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvcs/Regasm](/tags/#regsvcs/regasm) | TTP | -| [Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments](/endpoint/detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvcs/Regasm](/tags/#regsvcs/regasm) | TTP | -| [Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process](/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_spawning_a_process/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvcs/Regasm](/tags/#regsvcs/regasm) | TTP | -| [Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection](/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvcs/Regasm](/tags/#regsvcs/regasm) | TTP | -| [Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments](/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvcs/Regasm](/tags/#regsvcs/regasm) | TTP | +| [Detect Regasm Spawning a Process](/endpoint/detect_regasm_spawning_a_process/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvcs/Regasm](/tags/#regsvcs/regasm)| TTP | +| [Detect Regasm with Network Connection](/endpoint/detect_regasm_with_network_connection/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvcs/Regasm](/tags/#regsvcs/regasm)| TTP | +| [Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments](/endpoint/detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvcs/Regasm](/tags/#regsvcs/regasm)| TTP | +| [Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process](/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_spawning_a_process/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvcs/Regasm](/tags/#regsvcs/regasm)| TTP | +| [Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection](/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvcs/Regasm](/tags/#regsvcs/regasm)| TTP | +| [Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments](/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvcs/Regasm](/tags/#regsvcs/regasm)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.md b/docs/_stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.md index 85868c9e39..899fb9bb26 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.md +++ b/docs/_stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.md @@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint + - Actions on Objectives + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -30,11 +32,11 @@ One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the r | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass](/endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32) | TTP | -| [Malicious InProcServer32 Modification](/endpoint/malicious_inprocserver32_modification/) | [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry) | TTP | -| [Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading](/endpoint/regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32) | Anomaly | -| [Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline](/endpoint/regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32) | Anomaly | -| [Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path](/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32) | TTP | +| [Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass](/endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32)| TTP | +| [Malicious InProcServer32 Modification](/endpoint/malicious_inprocserver32_modification/) | [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry)| TTP | +| [Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading](/endpoint/regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32)| Anomaly | +| [Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline](/endpoint/regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32)| Anomaly | +| [Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path](/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/suspicious_rundll32_activity.md b/docs/_stories/suspicious_rundll32_activity.md index 4e756c283c..1268213d20 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/suspicious_rundll32_activity.md +++ b/docs/_stories/suspicious_rundll32_activity.md @@ -8,6 +8,9 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint + - Actions on Objectives + - Exploitation + - Installation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -30,17 +33,18 @@ One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the r | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack](/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_advpack/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | TTP | -| [Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi](/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_setupapi/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | TTP | -| [Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup](/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_syssetup/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | TTP | -| [Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL](/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | TTP | -| [RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal](/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | TTP | -| [Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt](/endpoint/rundll32_control_rundll_hunt/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | Hunting | -| [Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory](/endpoint/rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | TTP | -| [Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network](/endpoint/rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | TTP | -| [Suspicious Rundll32 StartW](/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | TTP | -| [Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver](/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | TTP | -| [Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments](/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | TTP | +| [Suspicious Rundll32 Rename](/deprecated/suspicious_rundll32_rename/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities)| Hunting | +| [Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack](/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_advpack/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32)| TTP | +| [Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi](/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_setupapi/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32)| TTP | +| [Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup](/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_syssetup/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32)| TTP | +| [Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL](/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping)| TTP | +| [Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt](/endpoint/rundll32_control_rundll_hunt/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32)| Hunting | +| [Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory](/endpoint/rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32)| TTP | +| [Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network](/endpoint/rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32)| TTP | +| [RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal](/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32)| TTP | +| [Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver](/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32)| TTP | +| [Suspicious Rundll32 StartW](/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32)| TTP | +| [Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments](/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/suspicious_windows_registry_activities.md b/docs/_stories/suspicious_windows_registry_activities.md index 8ba863c01c..e7dbed4ac2 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/suspicious_windows_registry_activities.md +++ b/docs/_stories/suspicious_windows_registry_activities.md @@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint + - Actions on Objectives + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -32,13 +34,16 @@ Attackers are developing increasingly sophisticated techniques for hijacking tar | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Disable UAC Remote Restriction](/endpoint/disable_uac_remote_restriction/) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | TTP | -| [Disabling Remote User Account Control](/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control/) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | TTP | -| [Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors](/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors/) | [Port Monitors](/tags/#port-monitors), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution) | TTP | -| [Registry Keys Used For Persistence](/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence/) | [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](/tags/#registry-run-keys-/-startup-folder), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution) | TTP | -| [Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation](/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation/) | [Image File Execution Options Injection](/tags/#image-file-execution-options-injection), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution) | TTP | -| [Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases](/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases/) | [Application Shimming](/tags/#application-shimming), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution) | TTP | -| [Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry](/endpoint/windows_service_creation_using_registry_entry/) | [Services Registry Permissions Weakness](/tags/#services-registry-permissions-weakness) | TTP | +| [Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys](/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys/) | [Hidden Files and Directories](/tags/#hidden-files-and-directories)| TTP | +| [Remote Registry Key modifications](/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications/) | None| TTP | +| [Suspicious Changes to File Associations](/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations/) | [Change Default File Association](/tags/#change-default-file-association)| TTP | +| [Disable UAC Remote Restriction](/endpoint/disable_uac_remote_restriction/) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism)| TTP | +| [Disabling Remote User Account Control](/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control/) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism)| TTP | +| [Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors](/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors/) | [Port Monitors](/tags/#port-monitors), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution)| TTP | +| [Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases](/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases/) | [Application Shimming](/tags/#application-shimming), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution)| TTP | +| [Registry Keys Used For Persistence](/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence/) | [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](/tags/#registry-run-keys-/-startup-folder), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution)| TTP | +| [Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation](/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation/) | [Image File Execution Options Injection](/tags/#image-file-execution-options-injection), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution)| TTP | +| [Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry](/endpoint/windows_service_creation_using_registry_entry/) | [Services Registry Permissions Weakness](/tags/#services-registry-permissions-weakness)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/suspicious_wmi_use.md b/docs/_stories/suspicious_wmi_use.md index 043e1d632e..ba2f114767 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/suspicious_wmi_use.md +++ b/docs/_stories/suspicious_wmi_use.md @@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint + - Actions on Objectives + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -30,17 +32,17 @@ WMI is a Microsoft infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Detect WMI Event Subscription Persistence](/endpoint/detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence/) | [Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation-event-subscription), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution) | TTP | -| [Process Execution via WMI](/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi/) | [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation) | TTP | -| [Remote Process Instantiation via WMI](/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi/) | [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation) | TTP | -| [Remote WMI Command Attempt](/endpoint/remote_wmi_command_attempt/) | [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation) | TTP | -| [Script Execution via WMI](/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi/) | [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation) | TTP | -| [WMI Permanent Event Subscription](/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription/) | [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation) | TTP | -| [WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon](/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription_-_sysmon/) | [Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation-event-subscription), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution) | TTP | -| [WMI Temporary Event Subscription](/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription/) | [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation) | TTP | -| [WMIC XSL Execution via URL](/endpoint/wmic_xsl_execution_via_url/) | [XSL Script Processing](/tags/#xsl-script-processing) | TTP | -| [Windows WMI Process Call Create](/endpoint/windows_wmi_process_call_create/) | [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation) | Hunting | -| [XSL Script Execution With WMIC](/endpoint/xsl_script_execution_with_wmic/) | [XSL Script Processing](/tags/#xsl-script-processing) | TTP | +| [Detect WMI Event Subscription Persistence](/endpoint/detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence/) | [Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation-event-subscription), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution)| TTP | +| [Process Execution via WMI](/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi/) | [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation)| TTP | +| [Remote Process Instantiation via WMI](/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi/) | [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation)| TTP | +| [Remote WMI Command Attempt](/endpoint/remote_wmi_command_attempt/) | [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation)| TTP | +| [Script Execution via WMI](/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi/) | [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation)| TTP | +| [Windows WMI Process Call Create](/endpoint/windows_wmi_process_call_create/) | [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation)| Hunting | +| [WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon](/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription_-_sysmon/) | [Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation-event-subscription), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution)| TTP | +| [WMIC XSL Execution via URL](/endpoint/wmic_xsl_execution_via_url/) | [XSL Script Processing](/tags/#xsl-script-processing)| TTP | +| [XSL Script Execution With WMIC](/endpoint/xsl_script_execution_with_wmic/) | [XSL Script Processing](/tags/#xsl-script-processing)| TTP | +| [WMI Permanent Event Subscription](/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription/) | [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation)| TTP | +| [WMI Temporary Event Subscription](/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription/) | [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/suspicious_zoom_child_processes.md b/docs/_stories/suspicious_zoom_child_processes.md index e9319ba3eb..759265b3e1 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/suspicious_zoom_child_processes.md +++ b/docs/_stories/suspicious_zoom_child_processes.md @@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint + - Actions on Objectives + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -31,8 +33,8 @@ Current detections focus on finding new child processes of this application on a | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe](/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell) | Hunting | -| [First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom](/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom/) | [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](/tags/#exploitation-for-privilege-escalation) | Anomaly | +| [Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe](/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell)| Hunting | +| [First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom](/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom/) | [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](/tags/#exploitation-for-privilege-escalation)| Anomaly | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/trickbot.md b/docs/_stories/trickbot.md index 09d9f1123d..2c54260829 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/trickbot.md +++ b/docs/_stories/trickbot.md @@ -8,6 +8,10 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint + - Actions on Objectives + - Exploitation + - Installation + - Reconnaissance --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -30,21 +34,21 @@ trickbot banking trojan campaigns targeting banks and other vertical sectors.Thi | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Account Discovery With Net App](/endpoint/account_discovery_with_net_app/) | [Domain Account](/tags/#domain-account), [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery) | TTP | -| [Attempt To Stop Security Service](/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | -| [Cobalt Strike Named Pipes](/endpoint/cobalt_strike_named_pipes/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection) | TTP | -| [Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share](/endpoint/executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares) | TTP | -| [Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process](/endpoint/mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta) | TTP | -| [Office Application Spawn rundll32 process](/endpoint/office_application_spawn_rundll32_process/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment) | TTP | -| [Office Document Executing Macro Code](/endpoint/office_document_executing_macro_code/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment) | TTP | -| [Office Product Spawn CMD Process](/endpoint/office_product_spawn_cmd_process/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta) | TTP | -| [Powershell Remote Thread To Known Windows Process](/endpoint/powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection) | TTP | -| [Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger](/endpoint/schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger/) | [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | TTP | -| [Suspicious Rundll32 StartW](/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | TTP | -| [Trickbot Named Pipe](/endpoint/trickbot_named_pipe/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection) | TTP | -| [Wermgr Process Connecting To IP Check Web Services](/endpoint/wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services/) | [Gather Victim Network Information](/tags/#gather-victim-network-information), [IP Addresses](/tags/#ip-addresses) | TTP | -| [Wermgr Process Create Executable File](/endpoint/wermgr_process_create_executable_file/) | [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information) | TTP | -| [Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process](/endpoint/wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter) | TTP | +| [Account Discovery With Net App](/endpoint/account_discovery_with_net_app/) | [Domain Account](/tags/#domain-account), [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery)| TTP | +| [Attempt To Stop Security Service](/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| TTP | +| [Cobalt Strike Named Pipes](/endpoint/cobalt_strike_named_pipes/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection)| TTP | +| [Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share](/endpoint/executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares)| TTP | +| [Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process](/endpoint/mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta)| TTP | +| [Office Application Spawn rundll32 process](/endpoint/office_application_spawn_rundll32_process/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment)| TTP | +| [Office Document Executing Macro Code](/endpoint/office_document_executing_macro_code/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment)| TTP | +| [Office Product Spawn CMD Process](/endpoint/office_product_spawn_cmd_process/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta)| TTP | +| [Powershell Remote Thread To Known Windows Process](/endpoint/powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection)| TTP | +| [Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger](/endpoint/schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger/) | [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job)| TTP | +| [Suspicious Rundll32 StartW](/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32)| TTP | +| [Trickbot Named Pipe](/endpoint/trickbot_named_pipe/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection)| TTP | +| [Wermgr Process Connecting To IP Check Web Services](/endpoint/wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services/) | [Gather Victim Network Information](/tags/#gather-victim-network-information), [IP Addresses](/tags/#ip-addresses)| TTP | +| [Wermgr Process Create Executable File](/endpoint/wermgr_process_create_executable_file/) | [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information)| TTP | +| [Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process](/endpoint/wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution.md b/docs/_stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution.md index f10fddc439..fce1de6bf3 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution.md +++ b/docs/_stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution.md @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -31,8 +32,8 @@ The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity t | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename](/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities) | Hunting | -| [Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage](/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage/) | [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution) | TTP | +| [Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename](/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities)| Hunting | +| [Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage](/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage/) | [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.md b/docs/_stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.md index 1494782a0f..59c7199927 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.md +++ b/docs/_stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.md @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -43,10 +44,10 @@ The objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or m | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [MSBuild Suspicious Spawned By Script Process](/endpoint/msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process/) | [MSBuild](/tags/#msbuild), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution) | TTP | -| [Suspicious MSBuild Rename](/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [MSBuild](/tags/#msbuild) | TTP | -| [Suspicious MSBuild Spawn](/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn/) | [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [MSBuild](/tags/#msbuild) | TTP | -| [Suspicious msbuild path](/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [MSBuild](/tags/#msbuild) | TTP | +| [MSBuild Suspicious Spawned By Script Process](/endpoint/msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process/) | [MSBuild](/tags/#msbuild), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution)| TTP | +| [Suspicious msbuild path](/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [MSBuild](/tags/#msbuild)| TTP | +| [Suspicious MSBuild Rename](/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [MSBuild](/tags/#msbuild)| TTP | +| [Suspicious MSBuild Spawn](/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn/) | [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [MSBuild](/tags/#msbuild)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/unusual_aws_ec2_modifications.md b/docs/_stories/unusual_aws_ec2_modifications.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..04cb3f0acd --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_stories/unusual_aws_ec2_modifications.md @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +--- +title: "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications" +last_modified_at: 2018-04-09 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Exploitation +--- + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +Identify unusual changes to your AWS EC2 instances that may indicate malicious activity. Modifications to your EC2 instances by previously unseen users is an example of an activity that may warrant further investigation. + +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2018-04-09 +- **Author**: David Dorsey, Splunk +- **ID**: 73de57ef-0dfc-411f-b1e7-fa24428aeae0 + +#### Narrative + +A common attack technique is to infiltrate a cloud instance and make modifications. The adversary can then secure access to your infrastructure or hide their activities. So it's important to stay alert to changes that may indicate that your environment has been compromised. \ + Searches within this Analytic Story can help you detect the presence of a threat by monitoring for EC2 instances that have been created or changed--either by users that have never previously performed these activities or by known users who modify or create instances in a way that have not been done before. This story also provides investigative searches that help you go deeper once you detect suspicious behavior. + +#### Detections + +| Name | Technique | Type | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------| +| [EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User](/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts)| Anomaly | + +#### Reference + +* [https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf](https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/stories/unusual_aws_ec2_modifications.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_stories/unusual_processes.md b/docs/_stories/unusual_processes.md index 0628ca5535..94180289be 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/unusual_processes.md +++ b/docs/_stories/unusual_processes.md @@ -8,7 +8,10 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint - - Endpoint_Processes + - Actions on Objectives + - Command & Control + - Exploitation + - Installation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -18,7 +21,7 @@ tags: Quickly identify systems running new or unusual processes in your environment that could be indicators of suspicious activity. Processes run from unusual locations, those with conspicuously long command lines, and rare executables are all examples of activities that may warrant deeper investigation. - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud -- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint), [Endpoint_Processes](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/EndpointProcesses) +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2020-02-04 - **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk - **ID**: f4368e3f-d59f-4192-84f6-748ac5a3ddb6 @@ -33,25 +36,23 @@ In the event an unusual process is identified, it is imperative to better unders | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Attacker Tools On Endpoint](/endpoint/attacker_tools_on_endpoint/) | [Match Legitimate Name or Location](/tags/#match-legitimate-name-or-location), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [Active Scanning](/tags/#active-scanning) | TTP | -| [Detect Rare Executables](/endpoint/detect_rare_executables/) | | Anomaly | -| [Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery](/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery/) | [System Network Configuration Discovery](/tags/#system-network-configuration-discovery) | TTP | -| [First time seen command line argument](/endpoint/first_time_seen_command_line_argument/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Indirect Command Execution](/tags/#indirect-command-execution) | Anomaly | -| [Rare Parent-Child Process Relationship](/endpoint/rare_parent-child_process_relationship/) | [Exploitation for Client Execution](/tags/#exploitation-for-client-execution), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [Software Deployment Tools](/tags/#software-deployment-tools) | Anomaly | -| [RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal](/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | TTP | -| [Rundll32 Shimcache Flush](/endpoint/rundll32_shimcache_flush/) | [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry) | TTP | -| [Suspicious Copy on System32](/endpoint/suspicious_copy_on_system32/) | [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading) | TTP | -| [System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations](/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities) | TTP | -| [Unusual LOLBAS in short period of time](/endpoint/unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | Anomaly | -| [Unusually Long Command Line](/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line/) | | Anomaly | -| [Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK](/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line_-_mltk/) | | Anomaly | -| [Verclsid CLSID Execution](/endpoint/verclsid_clsid_execution/) | [Verclsid](/tags/#verclsid), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution) | Hunting | -| [WinRM Spawning a Process](/endpoint/winrm_spawning_a_process/) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | TTP | -| [Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path](/endpoint/windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil) | TTP | -| [Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path](/endpoint/windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil) | TTP | -| [Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun](/endpoint/windows_nirsoft_advancedrun/) | [Tool](/tags/#tool) | TTP | -| [Windows Remote Assistance Spawning Process](/endpoint/windows_remote_assistance_spawning_process/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection) | TTP | -| [Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process](/endpoint/wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Parent PID Spoofing](/tags/#parent-pid-spoofing), [Access Token Manipulation](/tags/#access-token-manipulation) | TTP | +| [Uncommon Processes On Endpoint](/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint/) | [Malicious File](/tags/#malicious-file)| Hunting | +| [Attacker Tools On Endpoint](/endpoint/attacker_tools_on_endpoint/) | [Match Legitimate Name or Location](/tags/#match-legitimate-name-or-location), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [Active Scanning](/tags/#active-scanning)| TTP | +| [Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery](/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery/) | [System Network Configuration Discovery](/tags/#system-network-configuration-discovery)| TTP | +| [Rundll32 Shimcache Flush](/endpoint/rundll32_shimcache_flush/) | [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry)| TTP | +| [RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal](/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32)| TTP | +| [Suspicious Copy on System32](/endpoint/suspicious_copy_on_system32/) | [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading)| TTP | +| [System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations](/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities)| TTP | +| [Verclsid CLSID Execution](/endpoint/verclsid_clsid_execution/) | [Verclsid](/tags/#verclsid), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution)| Hunting | +| [Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path](/endpoint/windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil)| TTP | +| [Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path](/endpoint/windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil)| TTP | +| [Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun](/endpoint/windows_nirsoft_advancedrun/) | [Tool](/tags/#tool)| TTP | +| [Windows Remote Assistance Spawning Process](/endpoint/windows_remote_assistance_spawning_process/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection)| TTP | +| [Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process](/endpoint/wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Parent PID Spoofing](/tags/#parent-pid-spoofing), [Access Token Manipulation](/tags/#access-token-manipulation)| TTP | +| [Detect Rare Executables](/endpoint/detect_rare_executables/) | None| Anomaly | +| [Unusually Long Command Line](/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line/) | None| Anomaly | +| [Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK](/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line_-_mltk/) | None| Anomaly | +| [WinRM Spawning a Process](/endpoint/winrm_spawning_a_process/) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/use_of_cleartext_protocols.md b/docs/_stories/use_of_cleartext_protocols.md index 91b23da4d7..dfa68e74f6 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/use_of_cleartext_protocols.md +++ b/docs/_stories/use_of_cleartext_protocols.md @@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Network_Traffic + - Actions on Objectives + - Reconnaissance --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -30,7 +32,7 @@ Various legacy protocols operate by default in the clear, without the protection | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Protocols passing authentication in cleartext](/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext/) | | TTP | +| [Protocols passing authentication in cleartext](/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext/) | None| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/web_fraud_detection.md b/docs/_stories/web_fraud_detection.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e48c7c2603 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_stories/web_fraud_detection.md @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +--- +title: "Web Fraud Detection" +last_modified_at: 2018-10-08 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Actions on Objectives + - Exploitation +--- + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +Monitor your environment for activity consistent with common attack techniques bad actors use when attempting to compromise web servers or other web-related assets. + +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: +- **Last Updated**: 2018-10-08 +- **Author**: Jim Apger, Splunk +- **ID**: 18bb45b9-7684-45c6-9e97-1fdd0d98c0a7 + +#### Narrative + +The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) defines Internet fraud as the use of Internet services or software with Internet access to defraud victims or to otherwise take advantage of them. According to the Bureau, Internet crime schemes are used to steal millions of dollars each year from victims and continue to plague the Internet through various methods. The agency includes phishing scams, data breaches, Denial of Service (DOS) attacks, email account compromise, malware, spoofing, and ransomware in this category.\ +These crimes are not the fraud itself, but rather the attack techniques commonly employed by fraudsters in their pursuit of data that enables them to commit malicious actssuch as obtaining and using stolen credit cards. They represent a serious problem that is steadily increasing and not likely to go away anytime soon.\ +When developing a strategy for preventing fraud in your environment, its important to look across all of your web services for evidence that attackers are abusing enterprise resources to enumerate systems, harvest data for secondary fraudulent activity, or abuse terms of service.This Analytic Story looks for evidence of common Internet attack techniques that could be indicative of web fraud in your environmentincluding account harvesting, anomalous user clickspeed, and password sharing across accounts, to name just a few.\ +The account-harvesting search focuses on web pages used for user-account registration. It detects the creation of a large number of user accounts using the same email domain name, a type of activity frequently seen in advance of a fraud campaign.\ +The anomalous clickspeed search looks for users who are moving through your website at a faster-than-normal speed or with a perfect click cadence (high periodicity or low standard deviation), which could indicate that the user is a script, not an actual human.\ +Another search detects incidents wherein a single password is used across multiple accounts, which may indicate that a fraudster has infiltrated your environment and embedded a common password within a script. + +#### Detections + +| Name | Technique | Type | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------| +| [Web Fraud - Account Harvesting](/deprecated/web_fraud_-_account_harvesting/) | [Create Account](/tags/#create-account)| TTP | +| [Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed](/deprecated/web_fraud_-_anomalous_user_clickspeed/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts)| Anomaly | +| [Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts](/deprecated/web_fraud_-_password_sharing_across_accounts/) | None| Anomaly | + +#### Reference + +* [https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-fraud-schemes/internet-fraud](https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-fraud-schemes/internet-fraud) +* [https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2017-internet-crime-report-released-050718](https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2017-internet-crime-report-released-050718) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/stories/web_fraud_detection.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_stories/whispergate.md b/docs/_stories/whispergate.md index 9d999fb393..78a330f48c 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/whispergate.md +++ b/docs/_stories/whispergate.md @@ -8,6 +8,10 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint + - Actions on Objectives + - Command & Control + - Exploitation + - Installation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -30,27 +34,27 @@ WhisperGate/DEV-0586 is destructive malware operation found by MSTIC (Microsoft | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion](/endpoint/add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | -| [Attempt To Stop Security Service](/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | -| [CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter](/endpoint/cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter/) | [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter) | Hunting | -| [Excessive File Deletion In WinDefender Folder](/endpoint/excessive_file_deletion_in_windefender_folder/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction) | TTP | -| [Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path](/endpoint/executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading) | TTP | -| [Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters](/endpoint/impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [Distributed Component Object Model](/tags/#distributed-component-object-model), [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service) | TTP | -| [Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command](/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_-_encoded_command/) | [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information) | Hunting | -| [Ping Sleep Batch Command](/endpoint/ping_sleep_batch_command/) | [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](/tags/#virtualization/sandbox-evasion), [Time Based Evasion](/tags/#time-based-evasion) | Anomaly | -| [Powershell Remove Windows Defender Directory](/endpoint/powershell_remove_windows_defender_directory/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | -| [Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands](/endpoint/powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | -| [Process Deleting Its Process File Path](/endpoint/process_deleting_its_process_file_path/) | [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host) | TTP | -| [Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services](/endpoint/suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services/) | [Visual Basic](/tags/#visual-basic), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter) | TTP | -| [Suspicious Process File Path](/endpoint/suspicious_process_file_path/) | [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process) | TTP | -| [Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query](/endpoint/suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query/) | [Visual Basic](/tags/#visual-basic), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter) | Anomaly | -| [Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path](/endpoint/windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil) | TTP | -| [Windows High File Deletion Frequency](/endpoint/windows_high_file_deletion_frequency/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction) | Anomaly | -| [Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path](/endpoint/windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil) | TTP | -| [Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun](/endpoint/windows_nirsoft_advancedrun/) | [Tool](/tags/#tool) | TTP | -| [Windows NirSoft Utilities](/endpoint/windows_nirsoft_utilities/) | [Tool](/tags/#tool) | Hunting | -| [Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive](/endpoint/windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive/) | [Disk Structure Wipe](/tags/#disk-structure-wipe), [Disk Wipe](/tags/#disk-wipe) | TTP | -| [Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process](/endpoint/wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Parent PID Spoofing](/tags/#parent-pid-spoofing), [Access Token Manipulation](/tags/#access-token-manipulation) | TTP | +| [Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion](/endpoint/add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| TTP | +| [Attempt To Stop Security Service](/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| TTP | +| [CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter](/endpoint/cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter/) | [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter)| Hunting | +| [Excessive File Deletion In WinDefender Folder](/endpoint/excessive_file_deletion_in_windefender_folder/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction)| TTP | +| [Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path](/endpoint/executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading)| TTP | +| [Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters](/endpoint/impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [Distributed Component Object Model](/tags/#distributed-component-object-model), [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service)| TTP | +| [Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command](/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_-_encoded_command/) | [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information)| Hunting | +| [Ping Sleep Batch Command](/endpoint/ping_sleep_batch_command/) | [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](/tags/#virtualization/sandbox-evasion), [Time Based Evasion](/tags/#time-based-evasion)| Anomaly | +| [Powershell Remove Windows Defender Directory](/endpoint/powershell_remove_windows_defender_directory/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| TTP | +| [Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands](/endpoint/powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| TTP | +| [Process Deleting Its Process File Path](/endpoint/process_deleting_its_process_file_path/) | [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host)| TTP | +| [Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services](/endpoint/suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services/) | [Visual Basic](/tags/#visual-basic), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter)| TTP | +| [Suspicious Process File Path](/endpoint/suspicious_process_file_path/) | [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process)| TTP | +| [Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query](/endpoint/suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query/) | [Visual Basic](/tags/#visual-basic), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter)| Anomaly | +| [Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path](/endpoint/windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil)| TTP | +| [Windows High File Deletion Frequency](/endpoint/windows_high_file_deletion_frequency/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction)| Anomaly | +| [Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path](/endpoint/windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil)| TTP | +| [Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun](/endpoint/windows_nirsoft_advancedrun/) | [Tool](/tags/#tool)| TTP | +| [Windows NirSoft Utilities](/endpoint/windows_nirsoft_utilities/) | [Tool](/tags/#tool)| Hunting | +| [Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive](/endpoint/windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive/) | [Disk Structure Wipe](/tags/#disk-structure-wipe), [Disk Wipe](/tags/#disk-wipe)| TTP | +| [Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process](/endpoint/wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Parent PID Spoofing](/tags/#parent-pid-spoofing), [Access Token Manipulation](/tags/#access-token-manipulation)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics.md b/docs/_stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics.md index 738f99a90a..e219db7794 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics.md +++ b/docs/_stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics.md @@ -8,8 +8,10 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint - - Endpoint_Processes - - Endpoint_Registry + - Actions on Objectives + - Delivery + - Exploitation + - Reconnaissance --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -19,7 +21,7 @@ tags: Detect tactics used by malware to evade defenses on Windows endpoints. A few of these include suspicious `reg.exe` processes, files hidden with `attrib.exe` and disabling user-account control, among many others - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud -- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint), [Endpoint_Processes](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/EndpointProcesses), [Endpoint_Registry](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/EndpointRegistry) +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2018-05-31 - **Author**: David Dorsey, Splunk - **ID**: 56e24a28-5003-4047-b2db-e8f3c4618064 @@ -32,49 +34,46 @@ Defense evasion is a tactic--identified in the MITRE ATT&CK framework--that adve | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion](/endpoint/add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | -| [CSC Net On The Fly Compilation](/endpoint/csc_net_on_the_fly_compilation/) | [Compile After Delivery](/tags/#compile-after-delivery), [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information) | Hunting | -| [Disable Registry Tool](/endpoint/disable_registry_tool/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | -| [Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry](/endpoint/disable_security_logs_using_minint_registry/) | [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry) | TTP | -| [Disable Show Hidden Files](/endpoint/disable_show_hidden_files/) | [Hidden Files and Directories](/tags/#hidden-files-and-directories), [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Hide Artifacts](/tags/#hide-artifacts), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | -| [Disable UAC Remote Restriction](/endpoint/disable_uac_remote_restriction/) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | TTP | -| [Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring](/endpoint/disable_windows_behavior_monitoring/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | -| [Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection](/endpoint/disable_windows_smartscreen_protection/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | -| [Disabling CMD Application](/endpoint/disabling_cmd_application/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | -| [Disabling ControlPanel](/endpoint/disabling_controlpanel/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | -| [Disabling Firewall with Netsh](/endpoint/disabling_firewall_with_netsh/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | -| [Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature](/endpoint/disabling_folderoptions_windows_feature/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | -| [Disabling NoRun Windows App](/endpoint/disabling_norun_windows_app/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | -| [Disabling Remote User Account Control](/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control/) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | TTP | -| [Disabling SystemRestore In Registry](/endpoint/disabling_systemrestore_in_registry/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | -| [Disabling Task Manager](/endpoint/disabling_task_manager/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | -| [Eventvwr UAC Bypass](/endpoint/eventvwr_uac_bypass/) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | TTP | -| [Excessive number of service control start as disabled](/endpoint/excessive_number_of_service_control_start_as_disabled/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | Anomaly | -| [Firewall Allowed Program Enable](/endpoint/firewall_allowed_program_enable/) | [Disable or Modify System Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-system-firewall), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | Anomaly | -| [FodHelper UAC Bypass](/endpoint/fodhelper_uac_bypass/) | [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry), [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | TTP | -| [Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe](/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe/) | [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification), [Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#windows-file-and-directory-permissions-modification) | TTP | -| [Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe](/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe/) | [Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#windows-file-and-directory-permissions-modification), [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification) | TTP | -| [NET Profiler UAC bypass](/endpoint/net_profiler_uac_bypass/) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | TTP | -| [Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands](/endpoint/powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | -| [SLUI RunAs Elevated](/endpoint/slui_runas_elevated/) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | TTP | -| [SLUI Spawning a Process](/endpoint/slui_spawning_a_process/) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | TTP | -| [Sdclt UAC Bypass](/endpoint/sdclt_uac_bypass/) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | TTP | -| [SilentCleanup UAC Bypass](/endpoint/silentcleanup_uac_bypass/) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | TTP | -| [Suspicious Reg exe Process](/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process/) | [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry) | TTP | -| [System Process Running from Unexpected Location](/endpoint/system_process_running_from_unexpected_location/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading) | Anomaly | -| [UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll](/endpoint/uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll/) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | TTP | -| [WSReset UAC Bypass](/endpoint/wsreset_uac_bypass/) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | TTP | -| [Windows DISM Remove Defender](/endpoint/windows_dism_remove_defender/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | -| [Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry](/endpoint/windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | -| [Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry](/endpoint/windows_disableantispyware_registry/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | -| [Windows Event For Service Disabled](/endpoint/windows_event_for_service_disabled/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | Hunting | -| [Windows Eventvwr UAC Bypass](/endpoint/windows_eventvwr_uac_bypass/) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | Anomaly | -| [Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event](/endpoint/windows_excessive_disabled_services_event/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | -| [Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry](/endpoint/windows_modify_show_compress_color_and_info_tip_registry/) | [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry) | TTP | -| [Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine](/endpoint/windows_process_with_namedpipe_commandline/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection) | Anomaly | -| [Windows Rasautou DLL Execution](/endpoint/windows_rasautou_dll_execution/) | [Dynamic-link Library Injection](/tags/#dynamic-link-library-injection), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection) | TTP | -| [Windows Rasautou DLL Execution](/endpoint/windows_rasautou_dll_execution/) | [Dynamic-link Library Injection](/tags/#dynamic-link-library-injection), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection) | TTP | -| [Windows WSReset UAC Bypass](/endpoint/windows_wsreset_uac_bypass/) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | Anomaly | +| [Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys](/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys/) | [Hidden Files and Directories](/tags/#hidden-files-and-directories)| TTP | +| [Remote Registry Key modifications](/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications/) | None| TTP | +| [Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion](/endpoint/add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| TTP | +| [CSC Net On The Fly Compilation](/endpoint/csc_net_on_the_fly_compilation/) | [Compile After Delivery](/tags/#compile-after-delivery), [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information)| Hunting | +| [Disable Registry Tool](/endpoint/disable_registry_tool/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| TTP | +| [Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry](/endpoint/disable_security_logs_using_minint_registry/) | [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry)| TTP | +| [Disable Show Hidden Files](/endpoint/disable_show_hidden_files/) | [Hidden Files and Directories](/tags/#hidden-files-and-directories), [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Hide Artifacts](/tags/#hide-artifacts), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| TTP | +| [Disable UAC Remote Restriction](/endpoint/disable_uac_remote_restriction/) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism)| TTP | +| [Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring](/endpoint/disable_windows_behavior_monitoring/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| TTP | +| [Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection](/endpoint/disable_windows_smartscreen_protection/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| TTP | +| [Disabling CMD Application](/endpoint/disabling_cmd_application/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| TTP | +| [Disabling ControlPanel](/endpoint/disabling_controlpanel/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| TTP | +| [Disabling Firewall with Netsh](/endpoint/disabling_firewall_with_netsh/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| TTP | +| [Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature](/endpoint/disabling_folderoptions_windows_feature/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| TTP | +| [Disabling NoRun Windows App](/endpoint/disabling_norun_windows_app/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| TTP | +| [Disabling Remote User Account Control](/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control/) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism)| TTP | +| [Disabling SystemRestore In Registry](/endpoint/disabling_systemrestore_in_registry/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| TTP | +| [Disabling Task Manager](/endpoint/disabling_task_manager/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| TTP | +| [Eventvwr UAC Bypass](/endpoint/eventvwr_uac_bypass/) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism)| TTP | +| [Excessive number of service control start as disabled](/endpoint/excessive_number_of_service_control_start_as_disabled/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| Anomaly | +| [Firewall Allowed Program Enable](/endpoint/firewall_allowed_program_enable/) | [Disable or Modify System Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-system-firewall), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| Anomaly | +| [FodHelper UAC Bypass](/endpoint/fodhelper_uac_bypass/) | [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry), [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism)| TTP | +| [Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe](/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe/) | [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification), [Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#windows-file-and-directory-permissions-modification)| TTP | +| [NET Profiler UAC bypass](/endpoint/net_profiler_uac_bypass/) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism)| TTP | +| [Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands](/endpoint/powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| TTP | +| [Sdclt UAC Bypass](/endpoint/sdclt_uac_bypass/) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism)| TTP | +| [SilentCleanup UAC Bypass](/endpoint/silentcleanup_uac_bypass/) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism)| TTP | +| [SLUI RunAs Elevated](/endpoint/slui_runas_elevated/) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism)| TTP | +| [SLUI Spawning a Process](/endpoint/slui_spawning_a_process/) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism)| TTP | +| [Suspicious Reg exe Process](/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process/) | [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry)| TTP | +| [UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll](/endpoint/uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll/) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism)| TTP | +| [Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry](/endpoint/windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| TTP | +| [Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry](/endpoint/windows_disableantispyware_registry/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| TTP | +| [Windows DISM Remove Defender](/endpoint/windows_dism_remove_defender/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| TTP | +| [Windows Event For Service Disabled](/endpoint/windows_event_for_service_disabled/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| Hunting | +| [Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event](/endpoint/windows_excessive_disabled_services_event/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| TTP | +| [Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry](/endpoint/windows_modify_show_compress_color_and_info_tip_registry/) | [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry)| TTP | +| [Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine](/endpoint/windows_process_with_namedpipe_commandline/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection)| Anomaly | +| [Windows Rasautou DLL Execution](/endpoint/windows_rasautou_dll_execution/) | [Dynamic-link Library Injection](/tags/#dynamic-link-library-injection), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection)| TTP | +| [WSReset UAC Bypass](/endpoint/wsreset_uac_bypass/) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/windows_discovery_techniques.md b/docs/_stories/windows_discovery_techniques.md index bad982e627..70faba41ad 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/windows_discovery_techniques.md +++ b/docs/_stories/windows_discovery_techniques.md @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint + - Reconnaissance --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -31,7 +32,7 @@ Attackers may not have much if any insight into their target's environment befor | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Net Localgroup Discovery](/endpoint/net_localgroup_discovery/) | [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Local Groups](/tags/#local-groups) | Hunting | +| [Net Localgroup Discovery](/endpoint/net_localgroup_discovery/) | [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Local Groups](/tags/#local-groups)| Hunting | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/windows_dns_sigred_cve-2020-1350.md b/docs/_stories/windows_dns_sigred_cve-2020-1350.md index 93ab8b3240..c41fd1f7f0 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/windows_dns_sigred_cve-2020-1350.md +++ b/docs/_stories/windows_dns_sigred_cve-2020-1350.md @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Network_Resolution + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -30,8 +31,8 @@ When a client requests a DNS record for a particular domain, that request gets r | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream](/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream/) | [Exploitation for Client Execution](/tags/#exploitation-for-client-execution) | TTP | -| [Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek](/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek/) | [Exploitation for Client Execution](/tags/#exploitation-for-client-execution) | TTP | +| [Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream](/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream/) | [Exploitation for Client Execution](/tags/#exploitation-for-client-execution)| TTP | +| [Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek](/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek/) | [Exploitation for Client Execution](/tags/#exploitation-for-client-execution)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse.md b/docs/_stories/windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse.md index 5120875c71..2524e94673 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse.md +++ b/docs/_stories/windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse.md @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint + - Actions on Objectives --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -34,7 +35,9 @@ Run the searches in this story to detect and investigate suspicious behavior tha | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Execution of File with Multiple Extensions](/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities) | TTP | +| [Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension](/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension/) | [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities)| TTP | +| [Suspicious Changes to File Associations](/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations/) | [Change Default File Association](/tags/#change-default-file-association)| TTP | +| [Execution of File with Multiple Extensions](/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/windows_log_manipulation.md b/docs/_stories/windows_log_manipulation.md index 07b1bc8d8b..bda0412d1e 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/windows_log_manipulation.md +++ b/docs/_stories/windows_log_manipulation.md @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint - - Endpoint_Processes + - Actions on Objectives --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ tags: Adversaries often try to cover their tracks by manipulating Windows logs. Use these searches to help you monitor for suspicious activity surrounding log files--an essential component of an effective defense. - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud -- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint), [Endpoint_Processes](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/EndpointProcesses) +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2017-09-12 - **Author**: Rico Valdez, Splunk - **ID**: b6db2c60-a281-48b4-95f1-2cd99ed56835 @@ -32,13 +32,11 @@ The Analytic Story gives users two different ways to detect manipulation of Wind | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Deleting Shadow Copies](/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies/) | [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery) | TTP | -| [Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior](/endpoint/suspicious_event_log_service_behavior/) | [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Clear Windows Event Logs](/tags/#clear-windows-event-logs) | TTP | -| [Suspicious wevtutil Usage](/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage/) | [Clear Windows Event Logs](/tags/#clear-windows-event-logs), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host) | TTP | -| [USN Journal Deletion](/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion/) | [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host) | TTP | -| [WevtUtil Usage To Clear Logs](/endpoint/wevtutil_usage_to_clear_logs/) | [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Clear Windows Event Logs](/tags/#clear-windows-event-logs) | TTP | -| [Wevtutil Usage To Disable Logs](/endpoint/wevtutil_usage_to_disable_logs/) | [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Clear Windows Event Logs](/tags/#clear-windows-event-logs) | TTP | -| [Windows Event Log Cleared](/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared/) | [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Clear Windows Event Logs](/tags/#clear-windows-event-logs) | TTP | +| [Deleting Shadow Copies](/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies/) | [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery)| TTP | +| [Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior](/endpoint/suspicious_event_log_service_behavior/) | [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Clear Windows Event Logs](/tags/#clear-windows-event-logs)| TTP | +| [Suspicious wevtutil Usage](/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage/) | [Clear Windows Event Logs](/tags/#clear-windows-event-logs), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host)| TTP | +| [USN Journal Deletion](/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion/) | [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host)| TTP | +| [Windows Event Log Cleared](/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared/) | [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Clear Windows Event Logs](/tags/#clear-windows-event-logs)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/windows_persistence_techniques.md b/docs/_stories/windows_persistence_techniques.md index cf1f845616..926cd4311f 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/windows_persistence_techniques.md +++ b/docs/_stories/windows_persistence_techniques.md @@ -8,7 +8,9 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint - - Endpoint_Processes + - Actions on Objectives + - Exploitation + - Installation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -18,7 +20,7 @@ tags: Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on a Windows system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment. - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud -- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint), [Endpoint_Processes](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/EndpointProcesses) +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2018-05-31 - **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk - **ID**: 30874d4f-20a1-488f-85ec-5d52ef74e3f9 @@ -31,34 +33,35 @@ Maintaining persistence is one of the first steps taken by attackers after the i | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Active Setup Registry Autostart](/endpoint/active_setup_registry_autostart/) | [Active Setup](/tags/#active-setup), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution) | TTP | -| [Certutil exe certificate extraction](/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction/) | | TTP | -| [Change Default File Association](/endpoint/change_default_file_association/) | [Change Default File Association](/tags/#change-default-file-association), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution) | TTP | -| [Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe](/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe/) | [Path Interception by Unquoted Path](/tags/#path-interception-by-unquoted-path), [Hijack Execution Flow](/tags/#hijack-execution-flow) | TTP | -| [ETW Registry Disabled](/endpoint/etw_registry_disabled/) | [Indicator Blocking](/tags/#indicator-blocking), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | -| [Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe](/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe/) | [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification), [Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#windows-file-and-directory-permissions-modification) | TTP | -| [Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe](/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe/) | [Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#windows-file-and-directory-permissions-modification), [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification) | TTP | -| [Logon Script Event Trigger Execution](/endpoint/logon_script_event_trigger_execution/) | [Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts](/tags/#boot-or-logon-initialization-scripts), [Logon Script (Windows)](/tags/#logon-script-(windows)) | TTP | -| [Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors](/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors/) | [Port Monitors](/tags/#port-monitors), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution) | TTP | -| [Print Processor Registry Autostart](/endpoint/print_processor_registry_autostart/) | [Print Processors](/tags/#print-processors), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution) | TTP | -| [Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys](/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys/) | [Services Registry Permissions Weakness](/tags/#services-registry-permissions-weakness), [Hijack Execution Flow](/tags/#hijack-execution-flow) | TTP | -| [Registry Keys Used For Persistence](/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence/) | [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](/tags/#registry-run-keys-/-startup-folder), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution) | TTP | -| [Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases](/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases/) | [Application Shimming](/tags/#application-shimming), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution) | TTP | -| [Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services](/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services/) | [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process) | TTP | -| [Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments](/endpoint/schedule_task_with_http_command_arguments/) | [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | TTP | -| [Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger](/endpoint/schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger/) | [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | TTP | -| [Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD](/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | TTP | -| [Schtasks used for forcing a reboot](/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | TTP | -| [Screensaver Event Trigger Execution](/endpoint/screensaver_event_trigger_execution/) | [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution), [Screensaver](/tags/#screensaver) | TTP | -| [Shim Database File Creation](/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation/) | [Application Shimming](/tags/#application-shimming), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution) | TTP | -| [Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters](/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters/) | [Application Shimming](/tags/#application-shimming), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution) | TTP | -| [Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory](/endpoint/suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | Anomaly | -| [Time Provider Persistence Registry](/endpoint/time_provider_persistence_registry/) | [Time Providers](/tags/#time-providers), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution) | TTP | -| [WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path](/endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | TTP | -| [WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell](/endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | TTP | -| [WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started](/endpoint/winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task) | Hunting | -| [Windows Schtasks Create Run As System](/endpoint/windows_schtasks_create_run_as_system/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | TTP | -| [Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry](/endpoint/windows_service_creation_using_registry_entry/) | [Services Registry Permissions Weakness](/tags/#services-registry-permissions-weakness) | TTP | +| [Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys](/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys/) | [Hidden Files and Directories](/tags/#hidden-files-and-directories)| TTP | +| [Remote Registry Key modifications](/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications/) | None| TTP | +| [Active Setup Registry Autostart](/endpoint/active_setup_registry_autostart/) | [Active Setup](/tags/#active-setup), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution)| TTP | +| [Certutil exe certificate extraction](/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction/) | None| TTP | +| [Change Default File Association](/endpoint/change_default_file_association/) | [Change Default File Association](/tags/#change-default-file-association), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution)| TTP | +| [Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe](/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe/) | [Path Interception by Unquoted Path](/tags/#path-interception-by-unquoted-path), [Hijack Execution Flow](/tags/#hijack-execution-flow)| TTP | +| [ETW Registry Disabled](/endpoint/etw_registry_disabled/) | [Indicator Blocking](/tags/#indicator-blocking), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| TTP | +| [Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe](/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe/) | [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification), [Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#windows-file-and-directory-permissions-modification)| TTP | +| [Logon Script Event Trigger Execution](/endpoint/logon_script_event_trigger_execution/) | [Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts](/tags/#boot-or-logon-initialization-scripts), [Logon Script (Windows)](/tags/#logon-script-(windows))| TTP | +| [Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors](/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors/) | [Port Monitors](/tags/#port-monitors), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution)| TTP | +| [Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys](/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys/) | [Services Registry Permissions Weakness](/tags/#services-registry-permissions-weakness), [Hijack Execution Flow](/tags/#hijack-execution-flow)| TTP | +| [Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases](/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases/) | [Application Shimming](/tags/#application-shimming), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution)| TTP | +| [Registry Keys Used For Persistence](/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence/) | [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](/tags/#registry-run-keys-/-startup-folder), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution)| TTP | +| [Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services](/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services/) | [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process)| TTP | +| [Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments](/endpoint/schedule_task_with_http_command_arguments/) | [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job)| TTP | +| [Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger](/endpoint/schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger/) | [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job)| TTP | +| [Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD](/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job)| TTP | +| [Schtasks used for forcing a reboot](/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job)| TTP | +| [Screensaver Event Trigger Execution](/endpoint/screensaver_event_trigger_execution/) | [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution), [Screensaver](/tags/#screensaver)| TTP | +| [Shim Database File Creation](/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation/) | [Application Shimming](/tags/#application-shimming), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution)| TTP | +| [Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters](/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters/) | [Application Shimming](/tags/#application-shimming), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution)| TTP | +| [Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory](/endpoint/suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job)| Anomaly | +| [Time Provider Persistence Registry](/endpoint/time_provider_persistence_registry/) | [Time Providers](/tags/#time-providers), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution)| TTP | +| [Windows Schtasks Create Run As System](/endpoint/windows_schtasks_create_run_as_system/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job)| TTP | +| [Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry](/endpoint/windows_service_creation_using_registry_entry/) | [Services Registry Permissions Weakness](/tags/#services-registry-permissions-weakness)| TTP | +| [WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell](/endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job)| TTP | +| [WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path](/endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job)| TTP | +| [WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started](/endpoint/winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task)| Hunting | +| [Print Processor Registry Autostart](/endpoint/print_processor_registry_autostart/) | [Print Processors](/tags/#print-processors), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/windows_privilege_escalation.md b/docs/_stories/windows_privilege_escalation.md index ecca30216b..a533847a87 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/windows_privilege_escalation.md +++ b/docs/_stories/windows_privilege_escalation.md @@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint + - Actions on Objectives + - Exploitation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -30,19 +32,20 @@ Privilege escalation is a "land-and-expand" technique, wherein an adversary gain | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Active Setup Registry Autostart](/endpoint/active_setup_registry_autostart/) | [Active Setup](/tags/#active-setup), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution) | TTP | -| [Change Default File Association](/endpoint/change_default_file_association/) | [Change Default File Association](/tags/#change-default-file-association), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution) | TTP | -| [Child Processes of Spoolsv exe](/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe/) | [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](/tags/#exploitation-for-privilege-escalation) | TTP | -| [ETW Registry Disabled](/endpoint/etw_registry_disabled/) | [Indicator Blocking](/tags/#indicator-blocking), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | -| [Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption](/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption/) | [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets), [Kerberoasting](/tags/#kerberoasting) | TTP | -| [Logon Script Event Trigger Execution](/endpoint/logon_script_event_trigger_execution/) | [Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts](/tags/#boot-or-logon-initialization-scripts), [Logon Script (Windows)](/tags/#logon-script-(windows)) | TTP | -| [MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary](/endpoint/msi_module_loaded_by_non-system_binary/) | [DLL Side-Loading](/tags/#dll-side-loading), [Hijack Execution Flow](/tags/#hijack-execution-flow) | Hunting | -| [Overwriting Accessibility Binaries](/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries/) | [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution), [Accessibility Features](/tags/#accessibility-features) | TTP | -| [Print Processor Registry Autostart](/endpoint/print_processor_registry_autostart/) | [Print Processors](/tags/#print-processors), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution) | TTP | -| [Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation](/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation/) | [Image File Execution Options Injection](/tags/#image-file-execution-options-injection), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution) | TTP | -| [Runas Execution in CommandLine](/endpoint/runas_execution_in_commandline/) | [Access Token Manipulation](/tags/#access-token-manipulation), [Token Impersonation/Theft](/tags/#token-impersonation/theft) | Hunting | -| [Screensaver Event Trigger Execution](/endpoint/screensaver_event_trigger_execution/) | [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution), [Screensaver](/tags/#screensaver) | TTP | -| [Time Provider Persistence Registry](/endpoint/time_provider_persistence_registry/) | [Time Providers](/tags/#time-providers), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution) | TTP | +| [Uncommon Processes On Endpoint](/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint/) | [Malicious File](/tags/#malicious-file)| Hunting | +| [Active Setup Registry Autostart](/endpoint/active_setup_registry_autostart/) | [Active Setup](/tags/#active-setup), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution)| TTP | +| [Change Default File Association](/endpoint/change_default_file_association/) | [Change Default File Association](/tags/#change-default-file-association), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution)| TTP | +| [ETW Registry Disabled](/endpoint/etw_registry_disabled/) | [Indicator Blocking](/tags/#indicator-blocking), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| TTP | +| [Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption](/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption/) | [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets), [Kerberoasting](/tags/#kerberoasting)| TTP | +| [Logon Script Event Trigger Execution](/endpoint/logon_script_event_trigger_execution/) | [Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts](/tags/#boot-or-logon-initialization-scripts), [Logon Script (Windows)](/tags/#logon-script-(windows))| TTP | +| [MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary](/endpoint/msi_module_loaded_by_non-system_binary/) | [DLL Side-Loading](/tags/#dll-side-loading), [Hijack Execution Flow](/tags/#hijack-execution-flow)| Hunting | +| [Overwriting Accessibility Binaries](/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries/) | [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution), [Accessibility Features](/tags/#accessibility-features)| TTP | +| [Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation](/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation/) | [Image File Execution Options Injection](/tags/#image-file-execution-options-injection), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution)| TTP | +| [Runas Execution in CommandLine](/endpoint/runas_execution_in_commandline/) | [Access Token Manipulation](/tags/#access-token-manipulation), [Token Impersonation/Theft](/tags/#token-impersonation/theft)| Hunting | +| [Screensaver Event Trigger Execution](/endpoint/screensaver_event_trigger_execution/) | [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution), [Screensaver](/tags/#screensaver)| TTP | +| [Time Provider Persistence Registry](/endpoint/time_provider_persistence_registry/) | [Time Providers](/tags/#time-providers), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution)| TTP | +| [Child Processes of Spoolsv exe](/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe/) | [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](/tags/#exploitation-for-privilege-escalation)| TTP | +| [Print Processor Registry Autostart](/endpoint/print_processor_registry_autostart/) | [Print Processors](/tags/#print-processors), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/windows_service_abuse.md b/docs/_stories/windows_service_abuse.md index 74d1a37807..90161fbde7 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/windows_service_abuse.md +++ b/docs/_stories/windows_service_abuse.md @@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint + - Actions on Objectives + - Installation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -30,9 +32,9 @@ The Windows operating system uses a services architecture to allow for running c | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [First Time Seen Running Windows Service](/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service/) | [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution) | Anomaly | -| [Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys](/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys/) | [Services Registry Permissions Weakness](/tags/#services-registry-permissions-weakness), [Hijack Execution Flow](/tags/#hijack-execution-flow) | TTP | -| [Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services](/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services/) | [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process) | TTP | +| [Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys](/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys/) | [Services Registry Permissions Weakness](/tags/#services-registry-permissions-weakness), [Hijack Execution Flow](/tags/#hijack-execution-flow)| TTP | +| [Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services](/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services/) | [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process)| TTP | +| [First Time Seen Running Windows Service](/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service/) | [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution)| Anomaly | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/xmrig.md b/docs/_stories/xmrig.md index 731b48a0d3..d3d5244acb 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/xmrig.md +++ b/docs/_stories/xmrig.md @@ -8,7 +8,10 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint - - Endpoint_Processes + - Actions on Objectives + - Command & Control + - Exploitation + - Installation --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -18,7 +21,7 @@ tags: Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the xmrig monero, including looking for file writes associated with its payload, process command-line, defense evasion (killing services, deleting users, modifying files or folder permission, killing other malware or other coin miner) and hacking tools including Telegram as mean of command and control (C2) to download other files. Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems in order to solve resource intensive problems which may impact system and/or hosted service availability. One common purpose for Resource Hijacking is to validate transactions of cryptocurrency networks and earn virtual currency. Adversaries may consume enough system resources to negatively impact and/or cause affected machines to become unresponsive. (1) Servers and cloud-based (2) systems are common targets because of the high potential for available resources, but user endpoint systems may also be compromised and used for Resource Hijacking and cryptocurrency mining. - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud -- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint), [Endpoint_Processes](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/EndpointProcesses) +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2021-05-07 - **Author**: Teoderick Contreras, Rod Soto Splunk - **ID**: 06723e6a-6bd8-4817-ace2-5fb8a7b06628 @@ -31,34 +34,27 @@ XMRig is a high performance, open source, cross platform RandomX, KawPow, Crypto | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Attacker Tools On Endpoint](/endpoint/attacker_tools_on_endpoint/) | [Match Legitimate Name or Location](/tags/#match-legitimate-name-or-location), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [Active Scanning](/tags/#active-scanning) | TTP | -| [Attempt To Delete Services](/endpoint/attempt_to_delete_services/) | [Service Stop](/tags/#service-stop), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service) | TTP | -| [Attempt To Disable Services](/endpoint/attempt_to_disable_services/) | [Service Stop](/tags/#service-stop) | TTP | -| [Delete A Net User](/endpoint/delete_a_net_user/) | [Account Access Removal](/tags/#account-access-removal) | Anomaly | -| [Deleting Of Net Users](/endpoint/deleting_of_net_users/) | [Account Access Removal](/tags/#account-access-removal) | TTP | -| [Deny Permission using Cacls Utility](/endpoint/deny_permission_using_cacls_utility/) | [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification) | TTP | -| [Disable Net User Account](/endpoint/disable_net_user_account/) | [Service Stop](/tags/#service-stop), [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | TTP | -| [Disable Windows App Hotkeys](/endpoint/disable_windows_app_hotkeys/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | -| [Disabling Net User Account](/endpoint/disabling_net_user_account/) | [Account Access Removal](/tags/#account-access-removal) | TTP | -| [Download Files Using Telegram](/endpoint/download_files_using_telegram/) | [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer) | TTP | -| [Enumerate Users Local Group Using Telegram](/endpoint/enumerate_users_local_group_using_telegram/) | [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery) | TTP | -| [Excessive Attempt To Disable Services](/endpoint/excessive_attempt_to_disable_services/) | [Service Stop](/tags/#service-stop) | Anomaly | -| [Excessive Service Stop Attempt](/endpoint/excessive_service_stop_attempt/) | [Service Stop](/tags/#service-stop) | Anomaly | -| [Excessive Usage Of Cacls App](/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_cacls_app/) | [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification) | Anomaly | -| [Excessive Usage Of Net App](/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_net_app/) | [Account Access Removal](/tags/#account-access-removal) | Anomaly | -| [Excessive Usage Of Taskkill](/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_taskkill/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | Anomaly | -| [Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path](/endpoint/executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading) | TTP | -| [Grant Permission Using Cacls Utility](/endpoint/grant_permission_using_cacls_utility/) | [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification) | TTP | -| [Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen](/endpoint/hide_user_account_from_sign-in_screen/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | -| [ICACLS Grant Command](/endpoint/icacls_grant_command/) | [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification) | TTP | -| [Icacls Deny Command](/endpoint/icacls_deny_command/) | [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification) | TTP | -| [Modify ACL permission To Files Or Folder](/endpoint/modify_acl_permission_to_files_or_folder/) | [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification) | TTP | -| [Modify ACLs Permission Of Files Or Folders](/endpoint/modify_acls_permission_of_files_or_folders/) | [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification) | Anomaly | -| [Process Kill Base On File Path](/endpoint/process_kill_base_on_file_path/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | TTP | -| [Schtasks Run Task On Demand](/endpoint/schtasks_run_task_on_demand/) | [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | TTP | -| [Suspicious Driver Loaded Path](/endpoint/suspicious_driver_loaded_path/) | [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process) | TTP | -| [Suspicious Process File Path](/endpoint/suspicious_process_file_path/) | [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process) | TTP | -| [XMRIG Driver Loaded](/endpoint/xmrig_driver_loaded/) | [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process) | TTP | +| [Attacker Tools On Endpoint](/endpoint/attacker_tools_on_endpoint/) | [Match Legitimate Name or Location](/tags/#match-legitimate-name-or-location), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [Active Scanning](/tags/#active-scanning)| TTP | +| [Deleting Of Net Users](/endpoint/deleting_of_net_users/) | [Account Access Removal](/tags/#account-access-removal)| TTP | +| [Disable Windows App Hotkeys](/endpoint/disable_windows_app_hotkeys/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| TTP | +| [Disabling Net User Account](/endpoint/disabling_net_user_account/) | [Account Access Removal](/tags/#account-access-removal)| TTP | +| [Download Files Using Telegram](/endpoint/download_files_using_telegram/) | [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer)| TTP | +| [Enumerate Users Local Group Using Telegram](/endpoint/enumerate_users_local_group_using_telegram/) | [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery)| TTP | +| [Excessive Attempt To Disable Services](/endpoint/excessive_attempt_to_disable_services/) | [Service Stop](/tags/#service-stop)| Anomaly | +| [Excessive Service Stop Attempt](/endpoint/excessive_service_stop_attempt/) | [Service Stop](/tags/#service-stop)| Anomaly | +| [Excessive Usage Of Cacls App](/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_cacls_app/) | [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification)| Anomaly | +| [Excessive Usage Of Net App](/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_net_app/) | [Account Access Removal](/tags/#account-access-removal)| Anomaly | +| [Excessive Usage Of Taskkill](/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_taskkill/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| Anomaly | +| [Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path](/endpoint/executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading)| TTP | +| [Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen](/endpoint/hide_user_account_from_sign-in_screen/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| TTP | +| [Icacls Deny Command](/endpoint/icacls_deny_command/) | [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification)| TTP | +| [ICACLS Grant Command](/endpoint/icacls_grant_command/) | [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification)| TTP | +| [Modify ACL permission To Files Or Folder](/endpoint/modify_acl_permission_to_files_or_folder/) | [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification)| TTP | +| [Process Kill Base On File Path](/endpoint/process_kill_base_on_file_path/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| TTP | +| [Schtasks Run Task On Demand](/endpoint/schtasks_run_task_on_demand/) | [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job)| TTP | +| [Suspicious Driver Loaded Path](/endpoint/suspicious_driver_loaded_path/) | [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process)| TTP | +| [Suspicious Process File Path](/endpoint/suspicious_process_file_path/) | [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process)| TTP | +| [XMRIG Driver Loaded](/endpoint/xmrig_driver_loaded/) | [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/detections/endpoint/all_backup_logs_for_host.yml b/investigations/all_backup_logs_for_host.yml similarity index 100% rename from detections/endpoint/all_backup_logs_for_host.yml rename to investigations/all_backup_logs_for_host.yml diff --git a/detections/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.yml b/investigations/amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.yml similarity index 96% rename from detections/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.yml rename to investigations/amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.yml index d148108aaa..954ae79109 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.yml +++ b/investigations/amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.yml @@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ tags: - Kubernetes Scanning Activity product: - Splunk Phantom - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS required_fields: - _time - sourceIPs{} diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest.yml b/investigations/aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest.yml similarity index 97% rename from detections/cloud/aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest.yml rename to investigations/aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest.yml index 59ecdeb755..131f98115d 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest.yml +++ b/investigations/aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest.yml @@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ tags: - AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities product: - Splunk Phantom - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS required_fields: - _time - findings{}.Resources{}.Type diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid.yml b/investigations/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid.yml similarity index 96% rename from detections/cloud/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid.yml rename to investigations/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid.yml index a7e6ba8525..f9a45e8f8e 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid.yml +++ b/investigations/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid.yml @@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ tags: product: - Splunk Phantom - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS required_fields: - _time - userIdentity.accessKeyId diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn.yml b/investigations/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn.yml similarity index 97% rename from detections/cloud/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn.yml rename to investigations/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn.yml index 55526b3370..351edb5b3a 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn.yml +++ b/investigations/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn.yml @@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ tags: - AWS Cryptomining - AWS Network ACL Activity - Cloud Cryptomining - - Command and Control - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities - Suspicious AWS Login Activities - Suspicious AWS S3 Activities @@ -31,9 +30,9 @@ tags: - AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities - Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities - AWS Security Hub Alerts + - Command and Control product: - Splunk Phantom - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS required_fields: - _time - user diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_network_acl_details_from_id.yml b/investigations/aws_network_acl_details_from_id.yml similarity index 92% rename from detections/cloud/aws_network_acl_details_from_id.yml rename to investigations/aws_network_acl_details_from_id.yml index 83d1b16932..097b63beb2 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_network_acl_details_from_id.yml +++ b/investigations/aws_network_acl_details_from_id.yml @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ name: AWS Network ACL Details from ID -id: f3fb4d1b-5f33-4b01-b541-c7ah9534c242 +id: 2e11293f-c795-41bd-b470-fc87adc4e196 version: 1 date: '2017-01-22' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk @@ -17,11 +17,10 @@ references: [] tags: analytic_story: - AWS Network ACL Activity - - Command and Control - Suspicious AWS Traffic + - Command and Control product: - Splunk Phantom - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS required_fields: - _time - id diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid.yml b/investigations/aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid.yml similarity index 94% rename from detections/cloud/aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid.yml rename to investigations/aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid.yml index 326e16c666..a54f6467ff 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid.yml +++ b/investigations/aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid.yml @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ name: AWS Network Interface details via resourceId -id: f3fb4d1c-5f33-4b01-b541-c3ah9534c241 +id: c55b0a17-8fca-4315-81e3-65ceaa176441 version: 1 date: '2018-05-07' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk @@ -20,11 +20,10 @@ references: [] tags: analytic_story: - AWS Network ACL Activity - - Command and Control - Suspicious AWS Traffic + - Command and Control product: - Splunk Phantom - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS required_fields: - _time - resourceId diff --git a/detections/cloud/aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname.yml b/investigations/aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname.yml similarity index 94% rename from detections/cloud/aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname.yml rename to investigations/aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname.yml index 2261158a04..c292a77254 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname.yml +++ b/investigations/aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname.yml @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ name: AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName -id: f3fb2q1c-5f33-4b01-b541-c2ah9534c242 +id: 2762d4ed-9266-465e-b966-1c10dc8d91f3 version: 1 date: '2018-06-26' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk @@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ tags: - Suspicious AWS S3 Activities product: - Splunk Phantom - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS required_fields: - _time - resourceId diff --git a/detections/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.yml b/investigations/gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.yml similarity index 100% rename from detections/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.yml rename to investigations/gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.yml diff --git a/detections/cloud/get_all_aws_activity_from_city.yml b/investigations/get_all_aws_activity_from_city.yml similarity index 97% rename from detections/cloud/get_all_aws_activity_from_city.yml rename to investigations/get_all_aws_activity_from_city.yml index cd527b1690..d37d913fd1 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/get_all_aws_activity_from_city.yml +++ b/investigations/get_all_aws_activity_from_city.yml @@ -23,7 +23,6 @@ tags: - AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities product: - Splunk Phantom - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS required_fields: - _time - sourceIPAddress diff --git a/detections/cloud/get_all_aws_activity_from_country.yml b/investigations/get_all_aws_activity_from_country.yml similarity index 97% rename from detections/cloud/get_all_aws_activity_from_country.yml rename to investigations/get_all_aws_activity_from_country.yml index c284e742ba..588de58c1a 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/get_all_aws_activity_from_country.yml +++ b/investigations/get_all_aws_activity_from_country.yml @@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ tags: - AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities product: - Splunk Phantom - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS required_fields: - _time - sourceIPAddress diff --git a/detections/cloud/get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address.yml b/investigations/get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address.yml similarity index 97% rename from detections/cloud/get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address.yml rename to investigations/get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address.yml index d043582d11..96bbe9347e 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address.yml +++ b/investigations/get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address.yml @@ -22,13 +22,12 @@ tags: analytic_story: - AWS Network ACL Activity - AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities - - Command and Control - Suspicious AWS S3 Activities - Suspicious AWS Traffic - Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities + - Command and Control product: - Splunk Phantom - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS required_fields: - _time - sourceIPAddress diff --git a/detections/cloud/get_all_aws_activity_from_region.yml b/investigations/get_all_aws_activity_from_region.yml similarity index 97% rename from detections/cloud/get_all_aws_activity_from_region.yml rename to investigations/get_all_aws_activity_from_region.yml index 2511608271..476f3008db 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/get_all_aws_activity_from_region.yml +++ b/investigations/get_all_aws_activity_from_region.yml @@ -23,7 +23,6 @@ tags: - AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities product: - Splunk Phantom - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS required_fields: - _time - sourceIPAddress diff --git a/detections/endpoint/get_backup_logs_for_endpoint.yml b/investigations/get_backup_logs_for_endpoint.yml similarity index 100% rename from detections/endpoint/get_backup_logs_for_endpoint.yml rename to investigations/get_backup_logs_for_endpoint.yml diff --git a/detections/network/get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain.yml b/investigations/get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain.yml similarity index 100% rename from detections/network/get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain.yml rename to investigations/get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain.yml diff --git a/detections/network/get_dns_server_history_for_a_host.yml b/investigations/get_dns_server_history_for_a_host.yml similarity index 100% rename from detections/network/get_dns_server_history_for_a_host.yml rename to investigations/get_dns_server_history_for_a_host.yml index 68021e5d29..045e1c4146 100644 --- a/detections/network/get_dns_server_history_for_a_host.yml +++ b/investigations/get_dns_server_history_for_a_host.yml @@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ references: [] tags: analytic_story: - AWS Network ACL Activity - - Command and Control - DNS Hijacking - Data Protection - Dynamic DNS @@ -28,6 +27,7 @@ tags: - Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch - Suspicious AWS Traffic - Suspicious DNS Traffic + - Command and Control product: - Splunk Phantom required_fields: diff --git a/detections/network/get_dns_traffic_ratio.yml b/investigations/get_dns_traffic_ratio.yml similarity index 100% rename from detections/network/get_dns_traffic_ratio.yml rename to investigations/get_dns_traffic_ratio.yml index 54eaaaa7bf..a3b1f259a5 100644 --- a/detections/network/get_dns_traffic_ratio.yml +++ b/investigations/get_dns_traffic_ratio.yml @@ -22,12 +22,12 @@ references: [] tags: analytic_story: - AWS Network ACL Activity - - Command and Control - Data Protection - Dynamic DNS - Hidden Cobra Malware - Suspicious AWS Traffic - Suspicious DNS Traffic + - Command and Control product: - Splunk Phantom required_fields: diff --git a/detections/cloud/get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid.yml b/investigations/get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid.yml similarity index 95% rename from detections/cloud/get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid.yml rename to investigations/get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid.yml index 19a65c0724..60aa981fa8 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid.yml +++ b/investigations/get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid.yml @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ name: Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId -id: f3db4d1b-5f33-4b01-c541-c7ah9514c242 +id: de4aed1d-f13a-4d2f-a97a-73c60e2e6b56 version: 1 date: '2018-02-12' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk @@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ tags: - AWS Security Hub Alerts product: - Splunk Phantom - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS required_fields: - _time - id diff --git a/detections/cloud/get_ec2_launch_details.yml b/investigations/get_ec2_launch_details.yml similarity index 97% rename from detections/cloud/get_ec2_launch_details.yml rename to investigations/get_ec2_launch_details.yml index 1c605c51a4..b5092ffd05 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/get_ec2_launch_details.yml +++ b/investigations/get_ec2_launch_details.yml @@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ tags: - AWS Security Hub Alerts product: - Splunk Phantom - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS required_fields: - _time - dest diff --git a/detections/network/get_email_info.yml b/investigations/get_email_info.yml similarity index 100% rename from detections/network/get_email_info.yml rename to investigations/get_email_info.yml diff --git a/detections/network/get_emails_from_specific_sender.yml b/investigations/get_emails_from_specific_sender.yml similarity index 100% rename from detections/network/get_emails_from_specific_sender.yml rename to investigations/get_emails_from_specific_sender.yml diff --git a/detections/network/get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address.yml b/investigations/get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address.yml similarity index 100% rename from detections/network/get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address.yml rename to investigations/get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address.yml diff --git a/detections/network/get_history_of_email_sources.yml b/investigations/get_history_of_email_sources.yml similarity index 100% rename from detections/network/get_history_of_email_sources.yml rename to investigations/get_history_of_email_sources.yml diff --git a/detections/endpoint/get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint.yml b/investigations/get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint.yml similarity index 100% rename from detections/endpoint/get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint.yml rename to investigations/get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint.yml diff --git a/detections/endpoint/get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user.yml b/investigations/get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user.yml similarity index 100% rename from detections/endpoint/get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user.yml rename to investigations/get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user.yml diff --git a/detections/endpoint/get_notable_history.yml b/investigations/get_notable_history.yml similarity index 100% rename from detections/endpoint/get_notable_history.yml rename to investigations/get_notable_history.yml index 0972806b8a..9d3f170fef 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/get_notable_history.yml +++ b/investigations/get_notable_history.yml @@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ tags: - Cloud Cryptomining - ColdRoot MacOS RAT - Collection and Staging - - Command and Control - DHS Report TA18-074A - DNS Amplification Attacks - Data Protection @@ -85,6 +84,7 @@ tags: - Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities - Suspicious GCP Storage Activities - Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350 + - Command and Control product: - Splunk Phantom required_fields: diff --git a/detections/network/get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors.yml b/investigations/get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors.yml similarity index 96% rename from detections/network/get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors.yml rename to investigations/get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors.yml index 117faa44ba..ee1a69683d 100644 --- a/detections/network/get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors.yml +++ b/investigations/get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors.yml @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ name: Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors -id: 5df39b3f-347d-4869-b673-8r45ad4616fe +id: 80bac352-e089-46b9-a6a4-8a8467d4d8cf version: 1 date: '2018-06-14' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk diff --git a/detections/endpoint/get_parent_process_info.yml b/investigations/get_parent_process_info.yml similarity index 100% rename from detections/endpoint/get_parent_process_info.yml rename to investigations/get_parent_process_info.yml index f8226abb02..e57ecd9741 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/get_parent_process_info.yml +++ b/investigations/get_parent_process_info.yml @@ -23,7 +23,6 @@ references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Collection and Staging - - Command and Control - DHS Report TA18-074A - Disabling Security Tools - 'Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ' @@ -50,6 +49,7 @@ tags: - Windows Persistence Techniques - Windows Privilege Escalation - Windows Service Abuse + - Command and Control product: - Splunk Phantom required_fields: diff --git a/detections/endpoint/get_process_file_activity.yml b/investigations/get_process_file_activity.yml similarity index 100% rename from detections/endpoint/get_process_file_activity.yml rename to investigations/get_process_file_activity.yml diff --git a/detections/endpoint/get_process_info.yml b/investigations/get_process_info.yml similarity index 100% rename from detections/endpoint/get_process_info.yml rename to investigations/get_process_info.yml index 42769a54f2..8472891334 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/get_process_info.yml +++ b/investigations/get_process_info.yml @@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - AWS Network ACL Activity - Collection and Staging - - Command and Control - DHS Report TA18-074A - Data Protection - Disabling Security Tools @@ -50,6 +49,7 @@ tags: - Windows Persistence Techniques - Windows Privilege Escalation - Windows Service Abuse + - Command and Control product: - Splunk Phantom required_fields: diff --git a/detections/endpoint/get_process_information_for_port_activity.yml b/investigations/get_process_information_for_port_activity.yml similarity index 100% rename from detections/endpoint/get_process_information_for_port_activity.yml rename to investigations/get_process_information_for_port_activity.yml index c76eb864ad..78b17f3094 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/get_process_information_for_port_activity.yml +++ b/investigations/get_process_information_for_port_activity.yml @@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ references: [] tags: analytic_story: - AWS Network ACL Activity - - Command and Control - DHS Report TA18-074A - 'Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ' - Hidden Cobra Malware @@ -32,6 +31,7 @@ tags: - SamSam Ransomware - Suspicious AWS Traffic - Use of Cleartext Protocols + - Command and Control product: - Splunk Phantom required_fields: diff --git a/detections/endpoint/get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic.yml b/investigations/get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic.yml similarity index 100% rename from detections/endpoint/get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic.yml rename to investigations/get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic.yml index 9521720e06..8db6210786 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic.yml +++ b/investigations/get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic.yml @@ -26,12 +26,12 @@ tags: analytic_story: - AWS Network ACL Activity - Brand Monitoring - - Command and Control - Data Protection - Dynamic DNS - Hidden Cobra Malware - Suspicious AWS Traffic - Suspicious DNS Traffic + - Command and Control product: - Splunk Phantom required_fields: diff --git a/detections/endpoint/get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host.yml b/investigations/get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host.yml similarity index 100% rename from detections/endpoint/get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host.yml rename to investigations/get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host.yml diff --git a/detections/network/get_web_session_information_via_session_id.yml b/investigations/get_web_session_information_via_session_id.yml similarity index 100% rename from detections/network/get_web_session_information_via_session_id.yml rename to investigations/get_web_session_information_via_session_id.yml diff --git a/detections/cloud/investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name.yml b/investigations/investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name.yml similarity index 96% rename from detections/cloud/investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name.yml rename to investigations/investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name.yml index 97dadf738f..5a29ff6bae 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name.yml +++ b/investigations/investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name.yml @@ -23,7 +23,6 @@ tags: - Suspicious AWS S3 Activities product: - Splunk Phantom - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS required_fields: - _time - vendor_region diff --git a/detections/cloud/investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field.yml b/investigations/investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field.yml similarity index 96% rename from detections/cloud/investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field.yml rename to investigations/investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field.yml index bcfd431d38..8b8f3a6091 100644 --- a/detections/cloud/investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field.yml +++ b/investigations/investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field.yml @@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ tags: - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities product: - Splunk Phantom - - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS required_fields: - _time - user diff --git a/detections/endpoint/investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations.yml b/investigations/investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations.yml similarity index 100% rename from detections/endpoint/investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations.yml rename to investigations/investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations.yml diff --git a/detections/network/investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip.yml b/investigations/investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip.yml similarity index 100% rename from detections/network/investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip.yml rename to investigations/investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip.yml diff --git a/detections/cloud/investigate_okta_activity_by_app.yml b/investigations/investigate_okta_activity_by_app.yml similarity index 100% rename from detections/cloud/investigate_okta_activity_by_app.yml rename to investigations/investigate_okta_activity_by_app.yml diff --git a/detections/cloud/investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address.yml b/investigations/investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address.yml similarity index 100% rename from detections/cloud/investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address.yml rename to investigations/investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address.yml diff --git a/detections/endpoint/investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts.yml b/investigations/investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts.yml similarity index 100% rename from detections/endpoint/investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts.yml rename to investigations/investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts.yml diff --git a/detections/endpoint/investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts.yml b/investigations/investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts.yml similarity index 100% rename from detections/endpoint/investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts.yml rename to investigations/investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts.yml diff --git a/detections/endpoint/investigate_previous_unseen_user.yml b/investigations/investigate_previous_unseen_user.yml similarity index 97% rename from detections/endpoint/investigate_previous_unseen_user.yml rename to investigations/investigate_previous_unseen_user.yml index cc6582b2e1..1553a8c28f 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/investigate_previous_unseen_user.yml +++ b/investigations/investigate_previous_unseen_user.yml @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ name: Investigate Previous Unseen User -id: 5de385bf-4f1e-404e-9b67-92d162ff8938ad +id: ad114d5c-8079-4a84-a646-2fd00dfc07cc version: 1 date: '2019-12-10' author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk diff --git a/detections/endpoint/investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications.yml b/investigations/investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications.yml similarity index 100% rename from detections/endpoint/investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications.yml rename to investigations/investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications.yml diff --git a/detections/network/investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header.yml b/investigations/investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header.yml similarity index 100% rename from detections/network/investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header.yml rename to investigations/investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header.yml diff --git a/detections/cloud/investigate_user_activities_in_okta.yml b/investigations/investigate_user_activities_in_okta.yml similarity index 100% rename from detections/cloud/investigate_user_activities_in_okta.yml rename to investigations/investigate_user_activities_in_okta.yml diff --git a/detections/network/investigate_web_posts_from_src.yml b/investigations/investigate_web_posts_from_src.yml similarity index 100% rename from detections/network/investigate_web_posts_from_src.yml rename to investigations/investigate_web_posts_from_src.yml diff --git a/detections/endpoint/rundll32_lockworkstation.yml b/investigations/rundll32_lockworkstation.yml similarity index 100% rename from detections/endpoint/rundll32_lockworkstation.yml rename to investigations/rundll32_lockworkstation.yml diff --git a/playbooks/log4j_investigate.yml b/playbooks/log4j_investigate.yml index 25e7e6c816..940432756e 100644 --- a/playbooks/log4j_investigate.yml +++ b/playbooks/log4j_investigate.yml @@ -6,8 +6,7 @@ author: Philip Royer, Splunk type: Investigation description: Published in response to CVE-2021-44228, this playbook and its sub-playbooks can be used to investigate and respond to attacks against hosts running vulnerable Java applications which use log4j. Between the parent playbook and seven sub-playbooks, each potentially compromised host found in Splunk Enteprise can be investigated and the risk can be mitigated using SSH for unix systems and WinRM for Windows systems. playbook: log4j_investigate -how_to_implement: > - To start this playbook, create a custom list called "log4j_hosts" with a format in which the first column should be an IP or hostname of a potentially affected log4j host, the second should be the operating system family (either unix or windows). If the operating system is unknown it can be left blank. In the block called "fetch_hosts_from_custom_list", change the custom list name from "log4j_hosts" if needed. If the operating system family ("windows" or "unix") is not known, both ssh and winrm will be attempted. If ssh and/or winrm are not the preferred endpoint management methods, these playbooks could be ported to use Google's GRR, osquery, CrowdStrike's RTR, Carbon Black's EDR API, or similar tools. The artifact scope "all" is used throughout this playbook because the artifact list can be added to as the playbook progresses. +how_to_implement: To start this playbook, create a custom list called "log4j_hosts" with a format in which the first column should be an IP or hostname of a potentially affected log4j host, the second should be the operating system family (either unix or windows). If the operating system is unknown it can be left blank. In the block called "fetch_hosts_from_custom_list", change the custom list name from "log4j_hosts" if needed. If the operating system family ("windows" or "unix") is not known, both ssh and winrm will be attempted. If ssh and/or winrm are not the preferred endpoint management methods, these playbooks could be ported to use Google's GRR, osquery, CrowdStrike's RTR, Carbon Black's EDR API, or similar tools. The artifact scope "all" is used throughout this playbook because the artifact list can be added to as the playbook progresses. references: - "https://github.com/Neo23x0/Fenrir/blob/master/fenrir.sh" - "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Log4j++Log4Shell+Followup%3A+What+we+see+and+how+to+defend+%28and+how+to+access+our+data%29/28122" diff --git a/playbooks/log4j_respond.yml b/playbooks/log4j_respond.yml index 15bd0a34d2..36bb6d4bf6 100644 --- a/playbooks/log4j_respond.yml +++ b/playbooks/log4j_respond.yml @@ -6,8 +6,7 @@ author: Philip Royer, Splunk type: Response description: Published in response to CVE-2021-44228, this playbook is meant to be launched after log4j_investigate. In this playbook, the risk from exploited hosts can be mitigated by optionally deleting malicious files from the hosts, blocking outbound network connections from the hosts, and/or shutting down the hosts playbook: log4j_respond -how_to_implement: > - To use this playbook, create a custom list called "log4j_hosts_and_files" with a format in which the first column should be an IP or hostname of a potentially affected log4j host, the second should be the operating system family (either unix or windows), and the third should be a full path to a file to delete if there are any. The first two are mandatory and the file is optional. In the block called "enumerate_files_to_delete", change the custom list name from "log4j_hosts_and_files" if needed. If ssh and/or winrm are not the preferred endpoint management methods, these playbooks could be ported to use Google's GRR, osquery, CrowdStrike's RTR, Carbon Black's EDR API, or similar tools. The artifact scope "all" is used throughout this playbook because the artifact list can be added to as the playbook progresses. +how_to_implement: To use this playbook, create a custom list called "log4j_hosts_and_files" with a format in which the first column should be an IP or hostname of a potentially affected log4j host, the second should be the operating system family (either unix or windows), and the third should be a full path to a file to delete if there are any. The first two are mandatory and the file is optional. In the block called "enumerate_files_to_delete", change the custom list name from "log4j_hosts_and_files" if needed. If ssh and/or winrm are not the preferred endpoint management methods, these playbooks could be ported to use Google's GRR, osquery, CrowdStrike's RTR, Carbon Black's EDR API, or similar tools. The artifact scope "all" is used throughout this playbook because the artifact list can be added to as the playbook progresses. references: - "https://github.com/Neo23x0/Fenrir/blob/master/fenrir.sh" - "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Log4j++Log4Shell+Followup%3A+What+we+see+and+how+to+defend+%28and+how+to+access+our+data%29/28122" diff --git a/playbooks/risk_notable_block_indicators.yml b/playbooks/risk_notable_block_indicators.yml index 836ae15d21..2738ba26c5 100644 --- a/playbooks/risk_notable_block_indicators.yml +++ b/playbooks/risk_notable_block_indicators.yml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ author: Kelby Shelton, Splunk type: Response description: This playbook handles locating indicators marked for blocking and determining if any blocking playbooks exist. If there is a match to the appropriate tags in the playbook, a filter block routes the name of the playbook to launch to a code block. playbook: risk_notable_block_indicators -how_to_implement: +how_to_implement: tbd references: - https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ESSOC/latest/user/Useplaybookpack#Call_child_playbooks_with_the_dynamic_playbook_system - https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ESSOC/latest/user/Useplaybookpack#Indicator_tagging_system diff --git a/playbooks/risk_notable_enrich.yml b/playbooks/risk_notable_enrich.yml index cc9e59cf7b..5d0b3aa94f 100644 --- a/playbooks/risk_notable_enrich.yml +++ b/playbooks/risk_notable_enrich.yml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ author: Kelby Shelton, Splunk type: Investigation description: This playbook collects the available Indicator data types within the event as well as available investigative playbooks. It will launch any playbooks that meet the filtered criteria. playbook: risk_notable_enrich -how_to_implement: +how_to_implement: tbd references: - https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ESSOC/latest/user/Useplaybookpack#Call_child_playbooks_with_the_dynamic_playbook_system app_list: diff --git a/playbooks/risk_notable_mitigate.yml b/playbooks/risk_notable_mitigate.yml index fd40aaa74f..ae4e5a708c 100644 --- a/playbooks/risk_notable_mitigate.yml +++ b/playbooks/risk_notable_mitigate.yml @@ -6,10 +6,10 @@ author: Kelby Shelton, Splunk type: Response description: This playbook checks for the presence of the Risk Response workbook and updates tasks or leaves generic notes. The risk_notable_verdict playbooks recommends this playbook as a second phase of the investigation. Additionally, this playbook can be used in ad-hoc investigations or incorporated into custom workbooks. playbook: risk_notable_mitigate +how_to_implement: tbd references: - https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ESSOC/latest/user/Useplaybookpack -app_list: - "None" +app_list: [] tags: labels: - risk_notable diff --git a/playbooks/risk_notable_preprocess.yml b/playbooks/risk_notable_preprocess.yml index f202663f30..9e86b9e3a2 100644 --- a/playbooks/risk_notable_preprocess.yml +++ b/playbooks/risk_notable_preprocess.yml @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ description: > 2. Posts a link to this container in the comment field of Splunk ES. 3. Updates the container name, description, and severity to reflect the data in the notable artifact." playbook: risk_notable_preprocess -how_to_implement: +how_to_implement: tbd references: - https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ESSOC/latest/user/Useplaybookpack app_list: diff --git a/playbooks/risk_notable_protect_assets_and_users.yml b/playbooks/risk_notable_protect_assets_and_users.yml index 3bd2ecdb38..135c144ff1 100644 --- a/playbooks/risk_notable_protect_assets_and_users.yml +++ b/playbooks/risk_notable_protect_assets_and_users.yml @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ author: Kelby Shelton, Splunk type: Response description: This playbook attempts to find assets and users from the notable event and match those with assets and identities from Splunk ES. If a match was found and the user has playbooks available to contain entities, the analyst decides which entities to disable or quarantine. playbook: risk_notable_protect_assets_and_users +how_to_implement: tbd references: - https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ESSOC/latest/user/Useplaybookpack#Call_child_playbooks_with_the_dynamic_playbook_system app_list: diff --git a/playbooks/risk_notable_review_indicators.yml b/playbooks/risk_notable_review_indicators.yml index 129d8413d7..0e20b770aa 100644 --- a/playbooks/risk_notable_review_indicators.yml +++ b/playbooks/risk_notable_review_indicators.yml @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ author: Kelby Shelton, Splunk type: Response description: This playbook was designed to be called by a user to process indicators that are marked as suspicious within the SOAR platform. Analysts will review indicators in a prompt and mark them as blocked or safe. playbook: risk_notable_review_indicators +how_to_implement: tbd references: - https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ESSOC/latest/user/Useplaybookpack#Indicator_tagging_system app_list: diff --git a/playbooks/risk_notable_verdict.yml b/playbooks/risk_notable_verdict.yml index 2d90aa3a8d..a25d6e613f 100644 --- a/playbooks/risk_notable_verdict.yml +++ b/playbooks/risk_notable_verdict.yml @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ author: Kelby Shelton, Splunk type: Response description: This playbook locates available playbooks with the response tag and presents them to the analyst. Based on the analyst selection, it will launch its chosen playbook. playbook: risk_notable_verdict +how_to_implement: tbd references: - https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ESSOC/latest/user/Useplaybookpack#Call_child_playbooks_with_the_dynamic_playbook_system app_list: diff --git a/requirements.txt b/requirements.txt index 99fce38667..a8a53d6162 100644 --- a/requirements.txt +++ b/requirements.txt @@ -1,76 +1,9 @@ -antlr4-python3-runtime==4.8 -appdirs==1.4.4 -aspy.yaml==1.3.0 -attackcti==0.3.4.4 -attrs==21.4.0 -backports.entry-points-selectable==1.1.1 -CacheControl==0.12.10 -certifi==2021.10.8 -cfgv==3.3.1 -chardet==4.0.0 -charset-normalizer==2.0.11 -colorama==0.4.4 -coloredlogs==15.0.1 -configparser==5.2.0 -contextlib2==21.6.0 -distlib==0.3.4 -distro==1.6.0 -filelock==3.4.2 -fire==0.4.0 -gitdb==4.0.9 -html5lib==1.1 -humanfriendly==10.0 -identify==2.4.0 -idna==3.3 -importlib-metadata==4.8.2 -importlib-resources==5.4.0 -ipaddr==2.2.0 -Jinja2==3.0.3 -jsonschema==4.2.1 -lockfile==0.12.2 -MarkupSafe==2.0.1 -more-itertools==8.12.0 -msgpack==1.0.3 -nodeenv==1.6.0 -packaging==21.3 -pathlib2==2.3.6 -pendulum==2.1.2 -pep517==0.12.0 -Pillow==9.0.0 -platformdirs==2.4.1 -pre-commit==2.17.0 -progress==1.6 -prompt-toolkit==1.0.14 -pycvesearch==1.0.1 -pyfiglet==0.8.post1 -Pygments==2.10.0 -PyInquirer==1.0.3 -pyparsing==2.4.7 -pyrsistent==0.18.1 -python-dateutil==2.8.2 -pytoml==0.1.21 -pytz==2021.3 -pytzdata==2020.1 -PyYAML==6.0 -regex==2021.11.10 -requests==2.26.0 -retrying==1.3.3 -scandir==1.10.0 -semantic-version==2.9.0 -simplejson==3.17.6 -six==1.16.0 -sly==0.4 -smmap==5.0.0 -stix2==3.0.1 -stix2-patterns==1.3.2 -taxii2-client==2.3.0 -termcolor==1.1.0 -toml==0.10.2 -tomli==2.0.0 -typing==3.7.4.3 -tzlocal==4.1 -urllib3==1.26.8 -virtualenv==20.12.1 -wcwidth==0.2.5 -webencodings==0.5.1 -zipp==3.6.0 +attackcti +jinja2 +mock +pycvesearch +pydantic +PyInquirer +pytest +PyYAML +requests \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/stories/Icedid.yml b/stories/Icedid.yml index ca1e6194b3..9a4faa7d75 100644 --- a/stories/Icedid.yml +++ b/stories/Icedid.yml @@ -5,12 +5,14 @@ date: '2021-07-29' author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk type: batch description: Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities - that might relate to the IcedID banking trojan, including looking for file writes associated - with its payload, process injection, shellcode execution and data collection. -narrative: IcedId banking trojan campaigns targeting banks and other vertical sectors.This malware is known - in Microsoft Windows OS targetting browser such as firefox and chrom to steal banking information. It is also known - to its unique payload downloaded in C2 where it can be a .png file that hides the core shellcode bot using steganography technique or - gzip dat file that contains "license.dat" which is the actual core icedid bot. + that might relate to the IcedID banking trojan, including looking for file writes + associated with its payload, process injection, shellcode execution and data collection. +narrative: IcedId banking trojan campaigns targeting banks and other vertical sectors.This + malware is known in Microsoft Windows OS targetting browser such as firefox and + chrom to steal banking information. It is also known to its unique payload downloaded + in C2 where it can be a .png file that hides the core shellcode bot using steganography + technique or gzip dat file that contains "license.dat" which is the actual core + icedid bot. references: - https://threatpost.com/icedid-banking-trojan-surges-emotet/165314/ - https://app.any.run/tasks/48414a33-3d66-4a46-afe5-c2003bb55ccf/ @@ -22,4 +24,4 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - usecase: Advanced Threat Detection \ No newline at end of file + usecase: Advanced Threat Detection diff --git a/stories/active_directory_discovery.yml b/stories/active_directory_discovery.yml index 79db2e1060..9d087b88ec 100644 --- a/stories/active_directory_discovery.yml +++ b/stories/active_directory_discovery.yml @@ -4,13 +4,18 @@ version: 1 date: '2021-08-20' author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk type: batch -description: Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Discovery and Reconnaissance within with Active Directory environments. -narrative: 'Discovery consists of techniques an adversay uses to gain knowledge about an internal environment or network. These techniques provide adversaries -with situational awareness and allows them to have the necessary information before deciding how to act or who/what to target next.\ +description: Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Discovery and Reconnaissance + within with Active Directory environments. +narrative: 'Discovery consists of techniques an adversay uses to gain knowledge about + an internal environment or network. These techniques provide adversaries with situational + awareness and allows them to have the necessary information before deciding how + to act or who/what to target next.\ -Once an attacker obtains an initial foothold in an Active Directory environment, she is forced to engage in Discovery techniques in the initial phases of a breach to better -understand and navigate the target network. Some examples include but are not limited to enumerating domain users, domain admins, computers, -domain controllers, network shares, group policy objects, domain trusts, etc.' + Once an attacker obtains an initial foothold in an Active Directory environment, + she is forced to engage in Discovery techniques in the initial phases of a breach + to better understand and navigate the target network. Some examples include but + are not limited to enumerating domain users, domain admins, computers, domain controllers, + network shares, group policy objects, domain trusts, etc.' references: - https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/ - https://adsecurity.org/?p=2535 @@ -25,12 +30,11 @@ references: - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049/ - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/ tags: - analytic_story: - - Active Directory Discovery + analytic_story: Active Directory Discovery category: - Adversary Tactics product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - usecase: Advanced Threat Detection \ No newline at end of file + usecase: Advanced Threat Detection diff --git a/stories/active_directory_kerberos_attacks.yml b/stories/active_directory_kerberos_attacks.yml index fe3ad3cd62..5165844af1 100644 --- a/stories/active_directory_kerberos_attacks.yml +++ b/stories/active_directory_kerberos_attacks.yml @@ -20,8 +20,7 @@ references: - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003/ - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/004/ tags: - analytic_story: - - Active Directory Kerberos Attacks + analytic_story: Active Directory Kerberos Attacks category: - Adversary Tactics - Account Compromise diff --git a/stories/active_directory_lateral_movement.yml b/stories/active_directory_lateral_movement.yml index c54c881974..2176ca4d3d 100644 --- a/stories/active_directory_lateral_movement.yml +++ b/stories/active_directory_lateral_movement.yml @@ -4,18 +4,19 @@ version: 3 date: '2021-12-09' author: David Dorsey, Mauricio Velazco Splunk description: Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how - attackers move laterally within an Active Directory environment. Since lateral movement - is often a necessary step in a breach, it is important for cyber defenders to deploy + attackers move laterally within an Active Directory environment. Since lateral movement + is often a necessary step in a breach, it is important for cyber defenders to deploy detection coverage. narrative: "Once attackers gain a foothold within an enterprise, they will seek to\ \ expand their accesses and leverage techniques that facilitate lateral movement.\ \ Attackers will often spend quite a bit of time and effort moving laterally. Because\ \ lateral movement renders an attacker the most vulnerable to detection, it's an\ \ excellent focus for detection and investigation.\\\nIndications of lateral movement\ - \ in an Active Directory network can include the abuse of system utilities (such as `psexec.exe`), unauthorized\ - \ use of remote desktop services, `file/admin$` shares, WMI, PowerShell, Service Control Manager,\ - \ the DCOM protocol, WinRM or the abuse of scheduled tasks. Organizations must be extra vigilant in detecting\ - \ lateral movement techniques and look for suspicious activity in and around high-value\ + \ in an Active Directory network can include the abuse of system utilities (such\ + \ as `psexec.exe`), unauthorized use of remote desktop services, `file/admin$` shares,\ + \ WMI, PowerShell, Service Control Manager, the DCOM protocol, WinRM or the abuse\ + \ of scheduled tasks. Organizations must be extra vigilant in detecting lateral\ + \ movement techniques and look for suspicious activity in and around high-value\ \ strategic network assets, such as Active Directory, which are often considered\ \ the primary target or \"crown jewels\" to a persistent threat actor.\\\nAn adversary\ \ can use lateral movement for multiple purposes, including remote execution of\ diff --git a/stories/active_directory_password_spraying.yml b/stories/active_directory_password_spraying.yml index 43d0084537..296f5127f6 100644 --- a/stories/active_directory_password_spraying.yml +++ b/stories/active_directory_password_spraying.yml @@ -3,32 +3,45 @@ id: 3de109da-97d2-11eb-8b6a-acde48001122 version: 1 date: '2021-04-07' author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk -description: Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Password Spraying attacks within Active Directory environments. -narrative: In a password spraying attack, adversaries leverage one or a small list of commonly used / popular passwords against a large volume of usernames to acquire valid account credentials. - Unlike a Brute Force attack that targets a specific user or small group of users with a large number of passwords, password spraying follows the opposite aproach and increases the chances of obtaining valid credentials while avoiding account lockouts. - This allows adversaries to remain undetected if the target organization does not have the proper monitoring and detection controls in place.\ +description: Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Password Spraying + attacks within Active Directory environments. +narrative: 'In a password spraying attack, adversaries leverage one or a small list + of commonly used / popular passwords against a large volume of usernames to acquire + valid account credentials. Unlike a Brute Force attack that targets a specific user + or small group of users with a large number of passwords, password spraying follows + the opposite aproach and increases the chances of obtaining valid credentials while + avoiding account lockouts. This allows adversaries to remain undetected if the target + organization does not have the proper monitoring and detection controls in place.\ - Password Spraying can be leveraged by adversaries across different stages in an attack. It can be used to obtain an iniial access to an environment but can also be used - to escalate privileges when access has been already achieved. In some scenarios, this technique capitalizes on a security policy most organizations implement, password rotation. - As enterprise users change their passwords, it is possible some pick predictable, seasonal passwords such as `$CompanyNameWinter`, `Summer2021`, etc.\ + Password Spraying can be leveraged by adversaries across different stages in an + attack. It can be used to obtain an iniial access to an environment but can also + be used to escalate privileges when access has been already achieved. In some scenarios, + this technique capitalizes on a security policy most organizations implement, password + rotation. As enterprise users change their passwords, it is possible some pick predictable, + seasonal passwords such as `$CompanyNameWinter`, `Summer2021`, etc.\ - Specifically, this Analytic Story is focused on detecting possible Password Spraying attacks against Active Directory environments leveraging Windows Event Logs in the - `Account Logon` and `Logon/Logoff` Advanced Audit Policy categories. It presents 9 detection analytics which can aid defenders in identifyng instances where one source - user, source host or source process attempts to authenticate against a target or targets using a high, unsual, number of unique users. A user, host or process attempting to authenticate with multiple - users is not common behavior for legitimate systems and should be monitored by security teams. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to - vulnerability scanners, remote administration tools, multi-user systems and missconfigured systems. These should be easily spotted when first implementing the detection and addded to an allow list or lookup table. - The presented detections can also be used in Threat Hunting exercises. + Specifically, this Analytic Story is focused on detecting possible Password Spraying + attacks against Active Directory environments leveraging Windows Event Logs in the + `Account Logon` and `Logon/Logoff` Advanced Audit Policy categories. It presents + 9 detection analytics which can aid defenders in identifyng instances where one + source user, source host or source process attempts to authenticate against a target + or targets using a high, unsual, number of unique users. A user, host or process + attempting to authenticate with multiple users is not common behavior for legitimate + systems and should be monitored by security teams. Possible false positive scenarios + include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, remote administration tools, + multi-user systems and missconfigured systems. These should be easily spotted when + first implementing the detection and addded to an allow list or lookup table. The + presented detections can also be used in Threat Hunting exercises.' references: - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/ - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/23/protecting-organization-password-spray-attacks/ - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/dn452415(v=ws.11) tags: - analytic_story: - - Active Directory Password Spraying + analytic_story: Active Directory Password Spraying category: - Adversary Tactics product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - usecase: Advanced Threat Detection \ No newline at end of file + usecase: Advanced Threat Detection diff --git a/stories/aws_iam_privilege_escalation.yml b/stories/aws_iam_privilege_escalation.yml index 0be124c6d0..2209eba702 100644 --- a/stories/aws_iam_privilege_escalation.yml +++ b/stories/aws_iam_privilege_escalation.yml @@ -3,10 +3,20 @@ id: ced74200-8465-4bc3-bd2c-22782eec6750 version: 1 date: '2021-03-08' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk -description: This analytic story contains detections that query your AWS Cloudtrail for activities related to privilege escalation. -narrative: 'Amazon Web Services provides a neat feature called Identity and Access Management (IAM) that enables organizations to manage various AWS services and resources in a secure way. All IAM users have roles, groups and policies associated with them which governs and sets permissions to allow a user to access specific restrictions.\ +description: This analytic story contains detections that query your AWS Cloudtrail + for activities related to privilege escalation. +narrative: 'Amazon Web Services provides a neat feature called Identity and Access + Management (IAM) that enables organizations to manage various AWS services and resources + in a secure way. All IAM users have roles, groups and policies associated with them + which governs and sets permissions to allow a user to access specific restrictions.\ - However, if these IAM policies are misconfigured and have specific combinations of weak permissions; it can allow attackers to escalate their privileges and further compromise the organization. Rhino Security Labs have published comprehensive blogs detailing various AWS Escalation methods. By using this as an inspiration, Splunk’s research team wants to highlight how these attack vectors look in AWS Cloudtrail logs and provide you with detection queries to uncover these potentially malicious events via this Analytic Story. \' + However, if these IAM policies are misconfigured and have specific combinations + of weak permissions; it can allow attackers to escalate their privileges and further + compromise the organization. Rhino Security Labs have published comprehensive blogs + detailing various AWS Escalation methods. By using this as an inspiration, Splunks + research team wants to highlight how these attack vectors look in AWS Cloudtrail + logs and provide you with detection queries to uncover these potentially malicious + events via this Analytic Story. ' references: - https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/ - https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/the-cloud-shadow-admin-threat-10-permissions-to-protect diff --git a/stories/bits_jobs.yml b/stories/bits_jobs.yml index fc9465367c..7eb790c369 100644 --- a/stories/bits_jobs.yml +++ b/stories/bits_jobs.yml @@ -3,19 +3,30 @@ id: dbc7edce-8e4c-11eb-9f31-acde48001122 version: 1 date: '2021-03-26' author: Michael Haag, Splunk -description: Adversaries may abuse BITS jobs to persistently execute or clean up after malicious payloads. -narrative: Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, asynchronous file transfer mechanism exposed through Component Object Model (COM). BITS is commonly used by updaters, messengers, and other applications preferred to operate in the background (using available idle bandwidth) without interrupting other networked applications. File transfer tasks are implemented as BITS jobs, which contain a queue of one or more file operations. The interface to create and manage BITS jobs is accessible through PowerShell and the BITSAdmin tool. - Adversaries may abuse BITS to download, execute, and even clean up after running malicious code. BITS tasks are self-contained in the BITS job database, without new files or registry modifications, and often permitted by host firewalls. BITS enabled execution may also enable persistence by creating long-standing jobs (the default maximum lifetime is 90 days and extendable) or invoking an arbitrary program when a job completes or errors (including after system reboots). +description: Adversaries may abuse BITS jobs to persistently execute or clean up after + malicious payloads. +narrative: Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, + asynchronous file transfer mechanism exposed through Component Object Model (COM). + BITS is commonly used by updaters, messengers, and other applications preferred + to operate in the background (using available idle bandwidth) without interrupting + other networked applications. File transfer tasks are implemented as BITS jobs, + which contain a queue of one or more file operations. The interface to create and + manage BITS jobs is accessible through PowerShell and the BITSAdmin tool. Adversaries + may abuse BITS to download, execute, and even clean up after running malicious code. + BITS tasks are self-contained in the BITS job database, without new files or registry + modifications, and often permitted by host firewalls. BITS enabled execution may + also enable persistence by creating long-standing jobs (the default maximum lifetime + is 90 days and extendable) or invoking an arbitrary program when a job completes + or errors (including after system reboots). references: - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1197/ - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/bits/bitsadmin-tool tags: - analytic_story: - - BITS Jobs + analytic_story: BITS Jobs category: - Adversary Tactics product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - usecase: Advanced Threat Detection \ No newline at end of file + usecase: Advanced Threat Detection diff --git a/stories/cloud_federated_credential_abuse.yml b/stories/cloud_federated_credential_abuse.yml index 2ad5467a3d..dc17dbfc7c 100644 --- a/stories/cloud_federated_credential_abuse.yml +++ b/stories/cloud_federated_credential_abuse.yml @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ references: - https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf - https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a tags: - analytics_story: Cloud Federated Credential Abuse + analytic_story: Cloud Federated Credential Abuse category: - Cloud Security usecase: Security Monitoring diff --git a/stories/cobalt_strike.yml b/stories/cobalt_strike.yml index ef1fd824fe..cfb9ffde8e 100644 --- a/stories/cobalt_strike.yml +++ b/stories/cobalt_strike.yml @@ -3,32 +3,45 @@ id: bcfd17e8-5461-400a-80a2-3b7d1459220c version: 1 date: '2021-02-16' author: Michael Haag, Splunk -description: Cobalt Strike is threat emulation software. Red teams and penetration testers use Cobalt Strike to demonstrate the risk of a breach and evaluate mature security programs. Most recently, Cobalt Strike has become the choice tool by threat groups due to its ease of use and extensibility. +description: Cobalt Strike is threat emulation software. Red teams and penetration + testers use Cobalt Strike to demonstrate the risk of a breach and evaluate mature + security programs. Most recently, Cobalt Strike has become the choice tool by threat + groups due to its ease of use and extensibility. narrative: 'This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures - (TTPs) from Cobalt Strike. Cobalt Strike has many ways to be enhanced by using aggressor scripts, malleable C2 profiles, default attack packages, and much more. - For endpoint behavior, Cobalt Strike is most commonly identified via named pipes, spawn to processes, and DLL function names. Many additional variables are provided for in memory operation of the beacon implant. - On the network, depending on the malleable C2 profile used, it is near infinite in the amount of ways to conceal the C2 traffic with Cobalt Strike. - Not every query may be specific to Cobalt Strike the tool, but the methodologies and techniques used by it.\ + (TTPs) from Cobalt Strike. Cobalt Strike has many ways to be enhanced by using aggressor + scripts, malleable C2 profiles, default attack packages, and much more. For endpoint + behavior, Cobalt Strike is most commonly identified via named pipes, spawn to processes, + and DLL function names. Many additional variables are provided for in memory operation + of the beacon implant. On the network, depending on the malleable C2 profile used, + it is near infinite in the amount of ways to conceal the C2 traffic with Cobalt + Strike. Not every query may be specific to Cobalt Strike the tool, but the methodologies + and techniques used by it.\ + + Splunk Threat Research reviewed all publicly available instances of Malleabe C2 + Profiles and generated a list of the most commonly used spawnto and pipenames.\ + + `Spawnto_x86` and `spawnto_x64` is the process that Cobalt Strike will spawn and + injects shellcode into.\ - Splunk Threat Research reviewed all publicly available instances of Malleabe C2 Profiles and generated a list of the most commonly used spawnto and pipenames.\ - - `Spawnto_x86` and `spawnto_x64` is the process that Cobalt Strike will spawn and injects shellcode into.\ - Pipename sets the named pipe name used in Cobalt Strikes Beacon SMB C2 traffic.\ - With that, new detections were generated focused on these spawnto processes spawning without command line arguments. Similar, the named pipes most commonly used by Cobalt Strike added as a detection. - In generating content for Cobalt Strike, the following is considered:\ + With that, new detections were generated focused on these spawnto processes spawning + without command line arguments. Similar, the named pipes most commonly used by Cobalt + Strike added as a detection. In generating content for Cobalt Strike, the following + is considered:\ - - Is it normal for spawnto_ value to have no command line arguments? No command line arguments and a network connection?\ + - Is it normal for spawnto_ value to have no command line arguments? No command + line arguments and a network connection?\ - What is the default, or normal, process lineage for spawnto_ value?\ - Does the spawnto_ value make network connections?\ - Is it normal for spawnto_ value to load jscript, vbscript, Amsi.dll, and clr.dll?\ - - While investigating a detection related to this Analytic Story, keep in mind the parent process, process path, and any file modifications that may occur. Tuning may need to occur to remove any false positives.' + While investigating a detection related to this Analytic Story, keep in mind the + parent process, process path, and any file modifications that may occur. Tuning + may need to occur to remove any false positives.' references: - https://www.cobaltstrike.com/ - https://www.infocyte.com/blog/2020/09/02/cobalt-strike-the-new-favorite-among-thieves/ diff --git a/stories/deobfuscate_decode_files_or_information.yml b/stories/deobfuscate_decode_files_or_information.yml index 983760790f..87c08c06a2 100644 --- a/stories/deobfuscate_decode_files_or_information.yml +++ b/stories/deobfuscate_decode_files_or_information.yml @@ -3,18 +3,24 @@ id: 0bd01a54-8cbe-11eb-abcd-acde48001122 version: 1 date: '2021-03-24' author: Michael Haag, Splunk -description: Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. -narrative: An example of obfuscated files is `Certutil.exe` usage to encode a portable executable to a certificate file, which is base64 encoded, to hide the originating file. There are many utilities cross-platform to encode using XOR, using compressed .cab files to hide contents and scripting languages that may perform similar native Windows tasks. - Triaging an event related will require the capability to review related process events and file modifications. Using a tool such as CyberChef will assist with identifying the encoding that was used, and potentially assist with decoding the contents. +description: Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts + of an intrusion from analysis. +narrative: An example of obfuscated files is `Certutil.exe` usage to encode a portable + executable to a certificate file, which is base64 encoded, to hide the originating + file. There are many utilities cross-platform to encode using XOR, using compressed + .cab files to hide contents and scripting languages that may perform similar native + Windows tasks. Triaging an event related will require the capability to review related + process events and file modifications. Using a tool such as CyberChef will assist + with identifying the encoding that was used, and potentially assist with decoding + the contents. references: - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140/ tags: - analytic_story: - - Deobfuscate-Decode Files or Information + analytic_story: Deobfuscate-Decode Files or Information category: - Adversary Tactics product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - usecase: Advanced Threat Detection \ No newline at end of file + usecase: Advanced Threat Detection diff --git a/stories/deprecated/kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity.yml b/stories/deprecated/kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity.yml index 57ccb792f3..41fdc010f9 100644 --- a/stories/deprecated/kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity.yml +++ b/stories/deprecated/kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity.yml @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ name: Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity -id: 2574e6d9-7254-4751-8925-0447deeec8ew +id: 8b3984d2-17b6-47e9-ba43-a3376e70fdcc version: 1 date: '2020-05-20' author: Rod Soto, Splunk diff --git a/stories/deprecated/web_fraud_detection.yml b/stories/deprecated/web_fraud_detection.yml index a0bdff5e92..f274334116 100644 --- a/stories/deprecated/web_fraud_detection.yml +++ b/stories/deprecated/web_fraud_detection.yml @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ name: Web Fraud Detection -id: 31337aaa-bc22-4752-b599-ef112dq1dq7a +id: 18bb45b9-7684-45c6-9e97-1fdd0d98c0a7 version: 1 date: '2018-10-08' author: Jim Apger, Splunk diff --git a/stories/dev_sec_ops.yml b/stories/dev_sec_ops.yml index b7008f38b2..babb2ffcbf 100644 --- a/stories/dev_sec_ops.yml +++ b/stories/dev_sec_ops.yml @@ -3,14 +3,16 @@ id: 0ca8c38e-631e-4b81-940c-f9c5450ce41e version: 1 date: '2021-08-18' author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk -description: This story is focused around detecting attacks on a DevSecOps lifeccycle which - consists of the phases plan, code, build, test, release, deploy, operate and monitor. -narrative: DevSecOps is a collaborative framework, which thinks about application and infrastructure - security from the start. This means that security tools are part of the continuous integration and - continuous deployment pipeline. In this analytics story, we focused on detections around the tools - used in this framework such as GitHub as a version control system, GDrive for the documentation, CircleCI - as the CI/CD pipeline, Kubernetes as the container execution engine and multiple security tools such as - Semgrep and Kube-Hunter. +description: This story is focused around detecting attacks on a DevSecOps lifeccycle + which consists of the phases plan, code, build, test, release, deploy, operate and + monitor. +narrative: DevSecOps is a collaborative framework, which thinks about application + and infrastructure security from the start. This means that security tools are part + of the continuous integration and continuous deployment pipeline. In this analytics + story, we focused on detections around the tools used in this framework such as + GitHub as a version control system, GDrive for the documentation, CircleCI as the + CI/CD pipeline, Kubernetes as the container execution engine and multiple security + tools such as Semgrep and Kube-Hunter. references: - https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops tags: @@ -21,5 +23,4 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - Dev Sec Ops Analytics usecase: Security Monitoring diff --git a/stories/dns_amplification_attacks.yml b/stories/dns_amplification_attacks.yml index 9426f1b102..d286613ac2 100644 --- a/stories/dns_amplification_attacks.yml +++ b/stories/dns_amplification_attacks.yml @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ name: DNS Amplification Attacks -id: e8afd39e-3294-11e6-b39d-a45e60c6700 +id: a563972b-d2e2-4978-b6ca-6e83e24af4d3 version: 1 date: '2016-09-13' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk diff --git a/stories/domain_controller_impersonation_&_samaccountname_spoofing.yml b/stories/domain_controller_impersonation_&_samaccountname_spoofing.yml index 9d385372ba..11ccc1b1a7 100644 --- a/stories/domain_controller_impersonation_&_samaccountname_spoofing.yml +++ b/stories/domain_controller_impersonation_&_samaccountname_spoofing.yml @@ -3,27 +3,32 @@ id: 0244fdee-61be-11ec-900e-acde48001122 version: 1 date: '2021-12-20' author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk -description: Monitor for activities and techniques associated with the exploitation of the sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) - and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287) vulnerabilities. -narrative: On November 9, 2021, Microsoft released patches to address two vulnerabilities that affect Windows Active Directory networks, - sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287). On December 10, 2021, security researchers Charlie Clark and - Andrew Schwartz released a blog post where they shared how to weaponise these vulnerabilities in a target network an the initial detection opportunities. When successfully exploited, - CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287 allow an adversary, who has stolen the credentials of a low priviled domain user, to obtain a Kerberos Service ticket for a - Domain Controller computer account. The only requirement is to have network connectivity to a domain controller. - This attack vector effectivelly allows attackers to escalate their privileges in an Active Directory from a regular domain user account - and take control of a domain controller. While patches have been released to address these vulnerabilities, deploying detection controls for this attack may help - help defenders identify attackers attempting exploitation. +description: Monitor for activities and techniques associated with the exploitation + of the sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation + (CVE-2021-42287) vulnerabilities. +narrative: On November 9, 2021, Microsoft released patches to address two vulnerabilities + that affect Windows Active Directory networks, sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) + and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287). On December 10, 2021, security + researchers Charlie Clark and Andrew Schwartz released a blog post where they shared + how to weaponise these vulnerabilities in a target network an the initial detection + opportunities. When successfully exploited, CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287 allow + an adversary, who has stolen the credentials of a low priviled domain user, to obtain + a Kerberos Service ticket for a Domain Controller computer account. The only requirement + is to have network connectivity to a domain controller. This attack vector effectivelly + allows attackers to escalate their privileges in an Active Directory from a regular + domain user account and take control of a domain controller. While patches have + been released to address these vulnerabilities, deploying detection controls for + this attack may help help defenders identify attackers attempting exploitation. references: -- https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42278 +- https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42278 - https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42287 - https://exploit.ph/cve-2021-42287-cve-2021-42278-weaponisation.html tags: - analytic_story: - - sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation + analytic_story: sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation category: - Privilege Escalation product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - usecase: Advanced Threat Detection \ No newline at end of file + usecase: Advanced Threat Detection diff --git a/stories/domain_trust_discovery.yml b/stories/domain_trust_discovery.yml index 6831e4a759..1556f2a787 100644 --- a/stories/domain_trust_discovery.yml +++ b/stories/domain_trust_discovery.yml @@ -3,17 +3,24 @@ id: e6f30f14-8daf-11eb-a017-acde48001122 version: 1 date: '2021-03-25' author: Michael Haag, Splunk -description: Adversaries may attempt to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities in Windows multi-domain/forest environments. -narrative: Domain trusts provide a mechanism for a domain to allow access to resources based on the authentication procedures of another domain. Domain trusts allow the users of the trusted domain to access resources in the trusting domain. The information discovered may help the adversary conduct SID-History Injection, Pass the Ticket, and Kerberoasting. Domain trusts can be enumerated using the DSEnumerateDomainTrusts() Win32 API call, .NET methods, and LDAP. The Windows utility Nltest is known to be used by adversaries to enumerate domain trusts. +description: Adversaries may attempt to gather information on domain trust relationships + that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities in Windows multi-domain/forest + environments. +narrative: Domain trusts provide a mechanism for a domain to allow access to resources + based on the authentication procedures of another domain. Domain trusts allow the + users of the trusted domain to access resources in the trusting domain. The information + discovered may help the adversary conduct SID-History Injection, Pass the Ticket, + and Kerberoasting. Domain trusts can be enumerated using the DSEnumerateDomainTrusts() + Win32 API call, .NET methods, and LDAP. The Windows utility Nltest is known to be + used by adversaries to enumerate domain trusts. references: - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482/ tags: - analytic_story: - - Domain Trust Discovery + analytic_story: Domain Trust Discovery category: - Adversary Tactics product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - usecase: Advanced Threat Detection \ No newline at end of file + usecase: Advanced Threat Detection diff --git a/stories/fin7.yml b/stories/fin7.yml index fe38a63258..d6ae2ca93b 100644 --- a/stories/fin7.yml +++ b/stories/fin7.yml @@ -5,19 +5,22 @@ date: '2021-09-14' author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk type: batch description: Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities - that might relate to the FIN7 JS Implant and JSSLoader, including looking for Image Loading of ldap and wmi modules, associated - with its payload, data collection and script execution. -narrative: FIN7 is a Russian criminal advanced persistent threat group that has primarily - targeted the U.S. retail, restaurant, and hospitality sectors since mid-2015. - A portion of FIN7 is run out of the front company Combi Security. - It has been called one of the most successful criminal hacking groups in the world. this passed few day FIN7 tools and implant are seen in the wild - where its code is updated. the FIN& is known to use the spear phishing attack as a entry to targetted network or host that will drop its staging payload like the JS and JSSloader. - Now this artifacts and implants seen downloading other malware like cobaltstrike and event ransomware to encrypt host. + that might relate to the FIN7 JS Implant and JSSLoader, including looking for Image + Loading of ldap and wmi modules, associated with its payload, data collection and + script execution. +narrative: FIN7 is a Russian criminal advanced persistent threat group that has primarily + targeted the U.S. retail, restaurant, and hospitality sectors since mid-2015. A + portion of FIN7 is run out of the front company Combi Security. It has been called + one of the most successful criminal hacking groups in the world. this passed few + day FIN7 tools and implant are seen in the wild where its code is updated. the FIN& + is known to use the spear phishing attack as a entry to targetted network or host + that will drop its staging payload like the JS and JSSloader. Now this artifacts + and implants seen downloading other malware like cobaltstrike and event ransomware + to encrypt host. references: - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIN7 - https://threatpost.com/fin7-windows-11-release/169206/ - https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/jssloader-recoded-and-reloaded - tags: analytic_story: FIN7 category: @@ -26,4 +29,4 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - usecase: Advanced Threat Detection \ No newline at end of file + usecase: Advanced Threat Detection diff --git a/stories/hafnium_group.yml b/stories/hafnium_group.yml index dcd0e241d0..358265d004 100644 --- a/stories/hafnium_group.yml +++ b/stories/hafnium_group.yml @@ -3,24 +3,36 @@ id: beae2ab0-7c3f-11eb-8b63-acde48001122 version: 1 date: '2021-03-03' author: Michael Haag, Splunk -description: HAFNIUM group was identified by Microsoft as exploiting 4 Microsoft Exchange CVEs in the wild - CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858 and CVE-2021-27065. -narrative: 'On Tuesday, March 2, 2021, Microsoft released a set of security patches for its mail server, Microsoft Exchange. These patches respond to a group of vulnerabilities known to impact Exchange 2013, 2016, and 2019. It is important to note that an Exchange 2010 security update has also been issued, though the CVEs do not reference that version as being vulnerable.\ +description: HAFNIUM group was identified by Microsoft as exploiting 4 Microsoft Exchange + CVEs in the wild - CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858 and CVE-2021-27065. +narrative: 'On Tuesday, March 2, 2021, Microsoft released a set of security patches + for its mail server, Microsoft Exchange. These patches respond to a group of vulnerabilities + known to impact Exchange 2013, 2016, and 2019. It is important to note that an Exchange + 2010 security update has also been issued, though the CVEs do not reference that + version as being vulnerable.\ - While the CVEs do not shed much light on the specifics of the vulnerabilities or exploits, the first vulnerability (CVE-2021-26855) has a remote network attack vector that allows the attacker, a group Microsoft named HAFNIUM, to authenticate as the Exchange server. Three additional vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065) were also identified as part of this activity. When chained together along with CVE-2021-26855 for initial access, the attacker would have complete control over the Exchange server. This includes the ability to run code as SYSTEM and write to any path on the server.\ + While the CVEs do not shed much light on the specifics of the vulnerabilities or + exploits, the first vulnerability (CVE-2021-26855) has a remote network attack vector + that allows the attacker, a group Microsoft named HAFNIUM, to authenticate as the + Exchange server. Three additional vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, + and CVE-2021-27065) were also identified as part of this activity. When chained + together along with CVE-2021-26855 for initial access, the attacker would have complete + control over the Exchange server. This includes the ability to run code as SYSTEM + and write to any path on the server.\ - The following Splunk detections assist with identifying the HAFNIUM groups tradecraft and methodology.' + The following Splunk detections assist with identifying the HAFNIUM groups tradecraft + and methodology.' references: - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-hafnium-exchange-server-zero-day-activity-in-splunk.html - https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/ - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/ - https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/03/03/rapid7s-insightidr-enables-detection-and-response-to-microsoft-exchange-0-day/ tags: - analytic_story: - - HAFNIUM Group + analytic_story: HAFNIUM Group category: - Adversary Tactics product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - usecase: Advanced Threat Detection \ No newline at end of file + usecase: Advanced Threat Detection diff --git a/stories/information_sabotage.yml b/stories/information_sabotage.yml index 1011076b09..044af525d0 100644 --- a/stories/information_sabotage.yml +++ b/stories/information_sabotage.yml @@ -6,20 +6,20 @@ author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk type: Anomaly description: Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might correlate to insider threat specially in terms of information sabotage. -narrative: Information sabotage is the type of crime many people associate with insider threat. - Where the current or former employees, contractors, or business partners intentionally exceeded - or misused an authorized level of access to networks, systems, or data with the intention of harming a specific individual, - the organization, or the organization's data, systems, and/or daily business operations. +narrative: Information sabotage is the type of crime many people associate with insider + threat. Where the current or former employees, contractors, or business partners + intentionally exceeded or misused an authorized level of access to networks, systems, + or data with the intention of harming a specific individual, the organization, or + the organization's data, systems, and/or daily business operations. references: - https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/blog/insider-threat-deep-dive-it-sabotage/ tags: analytic_story: Information Sabotage category: - - Abuse + - Abuse product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Splunk Behavioral Analytics usecase: Security Monitoring - diff --git a/stories/ingress_tool_transfer.yml b/stories/ingress_tool_transfer.yml index e9aa1d1dfa..f8ac6ba23f 100644 --- a/stories/ingress_tool_transfer.yml +++ b/stories/ingress_tool_transfer.yml @@ -3,18 +3,26 @@ id: b3782036-8cbd-11eb-9d8e-acde48001122 version: 1 date: '2021-03-24' author: Michael Haag, Splunk -description: Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Files may be copied from an external adversary controlled system through the command and control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP. -narrative: Ingress tool transfer is a Technique under tactic Command and Control. Behaviors will include the use of living off the land binaries to download implants or binaries over alternate communication ports. It is imperative to baseline applications on endpoints to understand what generates network activity, to where, and what is its native behavior. These utilities, when abused, will write files to disk in world writeable paths.\ - During triage, review the reputation of the remote public destination IP or domain. Capture any files written to disk and perform analysis. Review other parrallel processes for additional behaviors. +description: Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system + into a compromised environment. Files may be copied from an external adversary controlled + system through the command and control channel to bring tools into the victim network + or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP. +narrative: Ingress tool transfer is a Technique under tactic Command and Control. + Behaviors will include the use of living off the land binaries to download implants + or binaries over alternate communication ports. It is imperative to baseline applications + on endpoints to understand what generates network activity, to where, and what is + its native behavior. These utilities, when abused, will write files to disk in world + writeable paths.\ During triage, review the reputation of the remote public destination + IP or domain. Capture any files written to disk and perform analysis. Review other + parrallel processes for additional behaviors. references: - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/ tags: - analytic_story: - - Ingress Tool Transfer + analytic_story: Ingress Tool Transfer category: - Adversary Tactics product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - usecase: Advanced Threat Detection \ No newline at end of file + usecase: Advanced Threat Detection diff --git a/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity.yml b/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity.yml index c44e439e03..9a244f0421 100644 --- a/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity.yml +++ b/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity.yml @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ name: Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity -id: 2574e6d9-7254-4751-8925-0447deeec8ea +id: c7d4dbf0-a171-4eaf-8444-4f40392e4f92 version: 1 date: '2020-05-20' author: Rod Soto, Splunk diff --git a/stories/linux_persistence_techniques.yml b/stories/linux_persistence_techniques.yml index a1cbdfea75..5dcd83c80c 100644 --- a/stories/linux_persistence_techniques.yml +++ b/stories/linux_persistence_techniques.yml @@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ references: - https://kifarunix.com/scheduling-tasks-using-at-command-in-linux/ - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/at/ - https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/uploads/CERTFR-2021-CTI-005.pdf - tags: analytic_story: Linux Persistence Techniques category: @@ -24,4 +23,4 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - usecase: Advanced Threat Detection \ No newline at end of file + usecase: Advanced Threat Detection diff --git a/stories/linux_post_exploitation.yml b/stories/linux_post_exploitation.yml index f6214e87de..f8854cffb7 100644 --- a/stories/linux_post_exploitation.yml +++ b/stories/linux_post_exploitation.yml @@ -8,8 +8,7 @@ narrative: These tools allow operators find possible exploits or paths for privi references: - https://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/linux/ tags: - analytic_story: - - Linux Post-Exploitation + analytic_story: Linux Post-Exploitation category: - Adversary Tactics product: diff --git a/stories/linux_privilege_escalation.yml b/stories/linux_privilege_escalation.yml index 006f5c2ca6..83197aacc8 100644 --- a/stories/linux_privilege_escalation.yml +++ b/stories/linux_privilege_escalation.yml @@ -24,4 +24,4 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - usecase: Advanced Threat Detection \ No newline at end of file + usecase: Advanced Threat Detection diff --git a/stories/living_off_the_land.yml b/stories/living_off_the_land.yml index 5051fc4c45..5697926a34 100644 --- a/stories/living_off_the_land.yml +++ b/stories/living_off_the_land.yml @@ -8,8 +8,7 @@ narrative: Living Off The Land refers to an attacker methodology of using softwa references: - https://lolbas-project.github.io/ tags: - analytic_story: - - Living Off The Land + analytic_story: Living Off The Land category: - Adversary Tactics - Unauthorized Software diff --git a/stories/log4shell_cve_2021_44228.yml b/stories/log4shell_cve_2021_44228.yml index 9d07e6bb26..7b520efb0b 100644 --- a/stories/log4shell_cve_2021_44228.yml +++ b/stories/log4shell_cve_2021_44228.yml @@ -3,18 +3,28 @@ id: b4453928-5a98-11ec-afcd-8de10b48fc52 version: 1 date: '2021-12-11' author: Jose Hernandez -description: 'Log4Shell or CVE-2021-44228 is a Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability in the Apache Log4j library, a widely used and ubiquitous logging framework for Java. - The vulnerability allows an attacker who can control log messages to execute arbitrary code loaded from attacker-controlled servers and we anticipate that most apps using the Log4j library will meet this condition.' -narrative: 'In late November 2021, Chen Zhaojun of Alibaba identified a remote code execution vulnerability. Previous work was seen in a 2016 Blackhat talk by Alvaro Munoz and Oleksandr Mirosh called ["A Journey from JNDI/LDAP Manipulation to Remote Code Execution Dream Land"](https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Munoz-A-Journey-From-JNDI-LDAP-Manipulation-To-RCE.pdf). Reported under the CVE ID : CVE-2021-44228, released to the public on December 10, 2021. The vulnerability is exploited through improper deserialization of user input passed into the framework. It permits remote code execution and it can allow an attacker to leak sensitive data, such as environment variables, or execute malicious software on the target system.' +description: Log4Shell or CVE-2021-44228 is a Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability + in the Apache Log4j library, a widely used and ubiquitous logging framework for + Java. The vulnerability allows an attacker who can control log messages to execute + arbitrary code loaded from attacker-controlled servers and we anticipate that most + apps using the Log4j library will meet this condition. +narrative: 'In late November 2021, Chen Zhaojun of Alibaba identified a remote code + execution vulnerability. Previous work was seen in a 2016 Blackhat talk by Alvaro + Munoz and Oleksandr Mirosh called ["A Journey from JNDI/LDAP Manipulation to Remote + Code Execution Dream Land"](https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Munoz-A-Journey-From-JNDI-LDAP-Manipulation-To-RCE.pdf). + Reported under the CVE ID : CVE-2021-44228, released to the public on December 10, + 2021. The vulnerability is exploited through improper deserialization of user input + passed into the framework. It permits remote code execution and it can allow an + attacker to leak sensitive data, such as environment variables, or execute malicious + software on the target system.' references: - - https://mbechler.github.io/2021/12/10/PSA_Log4Shell_JNDI_Injection/ - - https://www.fastly.com/blog/digging-deeper-into-log4shell-0day-rce-exploit-found-in-log4j - - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/log4j2-vulnerability-analysis-and-mitigation-recommendations/ - - https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/ - - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/log-jammin-log4j-2-rce.html +- https://mbechler.github.io/2021/12/10/PSA_Log4Shell_JNDI_Injection/ +- https://www.fastly.com/blog/digging-deeper-into-log4shell-0day-rce-exploit-found-in-log4j +- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/log4j2-vulnerability-analysis-and-mitigation-recommendations/ +- https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/ +- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/log-jammin-log4j-2-rce.html tags: - analytic_story: - - Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 + analytic_story: Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 category: - Adversary Tactics product: diff --git a/stories/malicious_powershell.yml b/stories/malicious_powershell.yml index 21d087f8cd..81435706a2 100644 --- a/stories/malicious_powershell.yml +++ b/stories/malicious_powershell.yml @@ -24,15 +24,17 @@ narrative: 'The searches in this Analytic Story monitor for parameters often use 1. Fully qualified domain names associated with the external IP address \ - 1. Registration of fully qualified domain names associated with external IP address \ - - Determining whether it is a dynamic domain frequently visited by others and/or how third parties - categorize it can also help you answer some questions surrounding the attacker and - details related to the external system. In addition, there are various sources--such - as VirusTotal— that can provide some reputation information on the IP address - or domain name, which can assist in determining whether the event is malicious. - Finally, determining whether there are other events associated with the IP address - may help connect data points or show other events that should be brought into scope. \ + 1. Registration of fully qualified domain names associated with external IP address + \ + + Determining whether it is a dynamic domain frequently visited by others and/or how + third parties categorize it can also help you answer some questions surrounding + the attacker and details related to the external system. In addition, there are + various sources--such as VirusTotal— that can provide some reputation information + on the IP address or domain name, which can assist in determining whether the event + is malicious. Finally, determining whether there are other events associated with + the IP address may help connect data points or show other events that should be + brought into scope. \ Gathering data on the system of interest can sometimes help you quickly determine whether something suspicious is happening. Some of these items include finding out @@ -62,8 +64,19 @@ narrative: 'The searches in this Analytic Story monitor for parameters often use we suggest reviewing the browsing activity from that system around the time of the event. If categories are given for the URLs visited, that can help you zero in on possible malicious sites. \ - - Most recently we have added new content related to PowerShell Script Block logging, Windows EventCode 4104. Script block logging presents the deobfuscated and raw script executed on an endpoint. The analytics produced were tested against commonly used attack frameworks - PowerShell-Empire, Cobalt Strike and Covenant. In addition, we sampled publicly available samples that utilize PowerShell and validated coverage. The analytics are here to identify suspicious usage, cmdlets, or script values. 4104 events are enabled via the Windows registry and may generate a large volume of data if enabled globally. Enabling on critical systems or a limited set may be best. During triage of 4104 events, review parallel processes for other processes and command executed. Identify any file modifications and network communication and review accordingly. Fortunately, we get the full script to determine the level of threat identified.' + + Most recently we have added new content related to PowerShell Script Block logging, + Windows EventCode 4104. Script block logging presents the deobfuscated and raw script + executed on an endpoint. The analytics produced were tested against commonly used + attack frameworks - PowerShell-Empire, Cobalt Strike and Covenant. In addition, + we sampled publicly available samples that utilize PowerShell and validated coverage. + The analytics are here to identify suspicious usage, cmdlets, or script values. + 4104 events are enabled via the Windows registry and may generate a large volume + of data if enabled globally. Enabling on critical systems or a limited set may be + best. During triage of 4104 events, review parallel processes for other processes + and command executed. Identify any file modifications and network communication + and review accordingly. Fortunately, we get the full script to determine the level + of threat identified.' references: - https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malware-employs-powershell-to-infect-systems/ - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/ diff --git a/stories/masquerading___rename_system_utilities.yml b/stories/masquerading___rename_system_utilities.yml index 4826f8b119..68f2022f25 100644 --- a/stories/masquerading___rename_system_utilities.yml +++ b/stories/masquerading___rename_system_utilities.yml @@ -1,25 +1,37 @@ -name: 'Masquerading - Rename System Utilities' +name: Masquerading - Rename System Utilities id: f0258af4-a6ae-11eb-b3c2-acde48001122 version: 1 date: '2021-04-26' author: Michael Haag, Splunk -description: Adversaries may rename legitimate system utilities to try to evade security mechanisms concerning the usage of those utilities. -narrative: 'Security monitoring and control mechanisms may be in place for system utilities adversaries are capable of abusing. - It may be possible to bypass those security mechanisms by renaming the utility prior to utilization (ex: rename rundll32.exe). - An alternative case occurs when a legitimate utility is copied or moved to a different directory and renamed to avoid detections based on system utilities executing from non-standard paths.\ +description: Adversaries may rename legitimate system utilities to try to evade security + mechanisms concerning the usage of those utilities. +narrative: 'Security monitoring and control mechanisms may be in place for system + utilities adversaries are capable of abusing. It may be possible to bypass those + security mechanisms by renaming the utility prior to utilization (ex: rename rundll32.exe). + An alternative case occurs when a legitimate utility is copied or moved to a different + directory and renamed to avoid detections based on system utilities executing from + non-standard paths.\ - The following content is here to assist with binaries within `system32` or `syswow64` being moved to a new location or an adversary bringing a the binary in to execute.\ - - There will be false positives as some native Windows processes are moved or ran by third party applications from different paths. If file names are mismatched between the file name on disk and that of the binarys PE metadata, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries by looking to see if the InternalName, OriginalFilename, and or ProductName match what is expected could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. Do not focus on the possible names a file could have, but instead on the command-line arguments that are known to be used and are distinct because it will have a better rate of detection.' + The following content is here to assist with binaries within `system32` or `syswow64` + being moved to a new location or an adversary bringing a the binary in to execute.\ + + There will be false positives as some native Windows processes are moved or ran + by third party applications from different paths. If file names are mismatched between + the file name on disk and that of the binarys PE metadata, this is a likely indicator + that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and + resource filenames for binaries by looking to see if the InternalName, OriginalFilename, + and or ProductName match what is expected could provide useful leads, but may not + always be indicative of malicious activity. Do not focus on the possible names a + file could have, but instead on the command-line arguments that are known to be + used and are distinct because it will have a better rate of detection.' references: - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/ tags: - analytic_story: - - Masquerading - Rename System Utilities + analytic_story: Masquerading - Rename System Utilities category: - Adversary Tactics product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - usecase: Advanced Threat Detection \ No newline at end of file + usecase: Advanced Threat Detection diff --git a/stories/meterpreter.yml b/stories/meterpreter.yml index 67d0613073..4981477267 100644 --- a/stories/meterpreter.yml +++ b/stories/meterpreter.yml @@ -3,30 +3,37 @@ id: d5f8e298-c85a-11eb-9fea-acde48001122 version: 1 date: '2021-06-08' author: Michael Hart -description: Meterpreter provides red teams, pen testers and threat actors interactive access to a compromised host to run commands, upload payloads, download files, and other actions. -narrative: 'This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from Meterpreter. - Meterpreter is a Metasploit payload for remote execution that leverages DLL injection to make it extremely difficult to detect. Since the software - runs in memory, no new processes are created upon injection. It also leverages encrypted communication channels.\ +description: Meterpreter provides red teams, pen testers and threat actors interactive + access to a compromised host to run commands, upload payloads, download files, and + other actions. +narrative: 'This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures + (TTPs) from Meterpreter. Meterpreter is a Metasploit payload for remote execution + that leverages DLL injection to make it extremely difficult to detect. Since the + software runs in memory, no new processes are created upon injection. It also leverages + encrypted communication channels.\ - Meterpreter enables the operator to remotely run commands on the target machine, upload payloads, download files, dump password hashes, - and much more. It is difficult to determine from the forensic evidence what actions the operator performed. Splunk Research, however, has observed - anomalous behaviors on the compromised hosts that seem to only appear when Meterpreter is executing various commands. With that, we have written new - detections targeted to these detections.\ + Meterpreter enables the operator to remotely run commands on the target machine, + upload payloads, download files, dump password hashes, and much more. It is difficult + to determine from the forensic evidence what actions the operator performed. Splunk + Research, however, has observed anomalous behaviors on the compromised hosts that + seem to only appear when Meterpreter is executing various commands. With that, + we have written new detections targeted to these detections.\ - While investigating a detection related to this analytic story, please bear in mind that the detections look for anomalies in system behavior. It will be - imperative to look for other signs in the endpoint and network logs for lateral movement, discovery and other actions to confirm that the host was compromised - and a remote actor used it to progress on their objectives.' + While investigating a detection related to this analytic story, please bear in mind + that the detections look for anomalies in system behavior. It will be imperative + to look for other signs in the endpoint and network logs for lateral movement, discovery + and other actions to confirm that the host was compromised and a remote actor used + it to progress on their objectives.' references: - https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/about-meterpreter/ - https://doubleoctopus.com/security-wiki/threats-and-tools/meterpreter/ - https://www.rapid7.com/products/metasploit/ tags: - analytic_story: - - Meterpreter + analytic_story: Meterpreter category: - Adversary Tactics product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - usecase: Advanced Threat Detection \ No newline at end of file + usecase: Advanced Threat Detection diff --git a/stories/microsoft_mshtml_remote_code_execution_cve_2021_40444.yml b/stories/microsoft_mshtml_remote_code_execution_cve_2021_40444.yml index af451f7b7b..1664fe623b 100644 --- a/stories/microsoft_mshtml_remote_code_execution_cve_2021_40444.yml +++ b/stories/microsoft_mshtml_remote_code_execution_cve_2021_40444.yml @@ -3,24 +3,36 @@ id: 4ad4253e-10ca-11ec-8235-acde48001122 version: 1 date: '2021-09-08' author: Michael Haag, Splunk -description: CVE-2021-40444 is a remote code execution vulnerability in MSHTML, recently used to delivery targeted spearphishing documents. -narrative: 'Microsoft is aware of targeted attacks that attempt to exploit this vulnerability, CVE-2021-40444 by using specially-crafted Microsoft Office documents. MSHTML is a software component used to render web pages on Windows. Although it’s most commonly associated with Internet Explorer, it is also used in other software. CVE-2021-40444 received a CVSS score of 8.8 out of 10. MSHTML is the beating heart of Internet Explorer, the vulnerability also exists in that browser. Although given its limited use, there is little risk of infection by that vector. Microsoft Office applications use the MSHTML component to display web content in Office documents. The attack depends on MSHTML loading a specially crafted ActiveX control when the target opens a malicious Office document. The loaded ActiveX control can then run arbitrary code to infect the system with more malware. \ - At the moment all supported Windows versions are vulnerable. Since there is no patch available yet, Microsoft proposes a few methods to block these attacks. \ - - 1. Disable the installation of all ActiveX controls in Internet Explorer via the registry. Previously-installed ActiveX controls will still run, but no new ones will be added, including malicious ones. \ - - 1. Open documents from the Internet in Protected View or Application Guard for Office, both of which prevent the current attack. This is a default setting but it may have been changed.' +description: CVE-2021-40444 is a remote code execution vulnerability in MSHTML, recently + used to delivery targeted spearphishing documents. +narrative: "Microsoft is aware of targeted attacks that attempt to exploit this vulnerability,\ + \ CVE-2021-40444 by using specially-crafted Microsoft Office documents. MSHTML is\ + \ a software component used to render web pages on Windows. Although it is 2019s most\ + \ commonly associated with Internet Explorer, it is also used in other software.\ + \ CVE-2021-40444 received a CVSS score of 8.8 out of 10. MSHTML is the beating\ + \ heart of Internet Explorer, the vulnerability also exists in that browser. Although\ + \ given its limited use, there is little risk of infection by that vector. Microsoft\ + \ Office applications use the MSHTML component to display web content in Office\ + \ documents. The attack depends on MSHTML loading a specially crafted ActiveX control\ + \ when the target opens a malicious Office document. The loaded ActiveX control\ + \ can then run arbitrary code to infect the system with more malware. At the\ + \ moment all supported Windows versions are vulnerable. Since there is no patch\ + \ available yet, Microsoft proposes a few methods to block these attacks. \\\n1.\ + \ Disable the installation of all ActiveX controls in Internet Explorer via the\ + \ registry. Previously-installed ActiveX controls will still run, but no new ones\ + \ will be added, including malicious ones. Open documents from the Internet\ + \ in Protected View or Application Guard for Office, both of which prevent the current\ + \ attack. This is a default setting but it may have been changed." references: - - https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/09/windows-mshtml-zero-day-actively-exploited-mitigations-required/ - - https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444 - - https://www.echotrail.io/insights/search/control.exe +- https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/09/windows-mshtml-zero-day-actively-exploited-mitigations-required/ +- https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444 +- https://www.echotrail.io/insights/search/control.exe tags: - analytic_story: - - Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444 + analytic_story: Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444 category: - Adversary Tactics product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - usecase: Advanced Threat Detection \ No newline at end of file + usecase: Advanced Threat Detection diff --git a/stories/nobelium_group.yml b/stories/nobelium_group.yml index 17309b5480..42dac74182 100644 --- a/stories/nobelium_group.yml +++ b/stories/nobelium_group.yml @@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ description: Sunburst is a trojanized updates to SolarWinds Orion IT monitoring this campaign gained access to numerous public and private organizations around the world. narrative: This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures - (TTPs) of the NOBELIUM Group. The threat actor behind sunburst compromised the - SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll, is a SolarWinds digitally-signed component - of the Orion software framework that contains a backdoor that communicates via HTTP - to third party servers. The detections in this Analytic Story are focusing on the - dll loading events, file create events and network events to detect This malware. + (TTPs) of the NOBELIUM Group. The threat actor behind sunburst compromised the SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll, + is a SolarWinds digitally-signed component of the Orion software framework that + contains a backdoor that communicates via HTTP to third party servers. The detections + in this Analytic Story are focusing on the dll loading events, file create events + and network events to detect This malware. references: - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldmax-goldfinder-sibot-analyzing-nobelium-malware/ - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html diff --git a/stories/petitpotam_ntlm_relay_on_active_directory_certificate_services.yml b/stories/petitpotam_ntlm_relay_on_active_directory_certificate_services.yml index 96b5fbf0f6..752a0b5c5d 100644 --- a/stories/petitpotam_ntlm_relay_on_active_directory_certificate_services.yml +++ b/stories/petitpotam_ntlm_relay_on_active_directory_certificate_services.yml @@ -3,24 +3,28 @@ id: 97aecafc-0a68-11ec-962f-acde48001122 version: 1 date: '2021-08-31' author: Michael Haag, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk -description: PetitPotam (CVE-2021-36942,) is a vulnerablity identified in Microsofts EFSRPC Protocol that can allow an unauthenticated account to escalate privileges to domain administrator given the right circumstances. -narrative: In June 2021, security researchers at SpecterOps released a blog post and white paper detailing several potential attack vectors against Active Directory - Certificated Services (ADCS). ADCS is a Microsoft product that implements Public Key Infrastrucutre (PKI) functionality and can be used by organizations to - provide and manage digital certiticates within Active Directory.\ - In July 2021, a security researcher released PetitPotam, a tool that allows attackers to coerce Windows systems into authenticating to arbitrary endpoints.\ - Combining PetitPotam with the identified ADCS attack vectors allows attackers to escalate privileges from an unauthenticated anonymous user to full domain admin privileges. - +description: PetitPotam (CVE-2021-36942,) is a vulnerablity identified in Microsofts + EFSRPC Protocol that can allow an unauthenticated account to escalate privileges + to domain administrator given the right circumstances. +narrative: In June 2021, security researchers at SpecterOps released a blog post and + white paper detailing several potential attack vectors against Active Directory + Certificated Services (ADCS). ADCS is a Microsoft product that implements Public + Key Infrastrucutre (PKI) functionality and can be used by organizations to provide + and manage digital certiticates within Active Directory.\ In July 2021, a security + researcher released PetitPotam, a tool that allows attackers to coerce Windows systems + into authenticating to arbitrary endpoints.\ Combining PetitPotam with the identified + ADCS attack vectors allows attackers to escalate privileges from an unauthenticated + anonymous user to full domain admin privileges. references: - - https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2021/07/27/microsoft-releases-guidance-mitigating-petitpotam-ntlm-relay - - https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5005413-mitigating-ntlm-relay-attacks-on-active-directory-certificate-services-ad-cs-3612b773-4043-4aa9-b23d-b87910cd3429 - - https://www.specterops.io/assets/resources/Certified_Pre-Owned.pdf - - https://github.com/topotam/PetitPotam/ - - https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/releases/tag/2.2.0-20210723 - - https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-36942 - - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187/ +- https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2021/07/27/microsoft-releases-guidance-mitigating-petitpotam-ntlm-relay +- https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5005413-mitigating-ntlm-relay-attacks-on-active-directory-certificate-services-ad-cs-3612b773-4043-4aa9-b23d-b87910cd3429 +- https://www.specterops.io/assets/resources/Certified_Pre-Owned.pdf +- https://github.com/topotam/PetitPotam/ +- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/releases/tag/2.2.0-20210723 +- https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-36942 +- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187/ tags: - analytic_story: - - PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services + analytic_story: PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services category: - Adversary Tactics product: diff --git a/stories/printnightmare_cve_2021_34527.yml b/stories/printnightmare_cve_2021_34527.yml index e436f21bc2..7b4b0dc726 100644 --- a/stories/printnightmare_cve_2021_34527.yml +++ b/stories/printnightmare_cve_2021_34527.yml @@ -3,30 +3,40 @@ id: fd79470a-da88-11eb-b803-acde48001122 version: 1 date: '2021-07-01' author: Splunk Threat Research Team -description: The following analytic story identifies behaviors related PrintNightmare, or CVE-2021-34527 previously known as (CVE-2021-1675), to gain privilege escalation on the vulnerable machine. -narrative: 'This vulnerability affects the Print Spooler service, enabled by default on Windows systems, and allows adversaries to trick this service into installing a remotely hosted print driver using a low privileged user account. Successful exploitation effectively allows adversaries to execute code in the target system (Remote Code Execution) in the context of the Print Spooler service which runs with the highest privileges (Privilege Escalation). \ +description: The following analytic story identifies behaviors related PrintNightmare, + or CVE-2021-34527 previously known as (CVE-2021-1675), to gain privilege escalation + on the vulnerable machine. +narrative: 'This vulnerability affects the Print Spooler service, enabled by default + on Windows systems, and allows adversaries to trick this service into installing + a remotely hosted print driver using a low privileged user account. Successful exploitation + effectively allows adversaries to execute code in the target system (Remote Code + Execution) in the context of the Print Spooler service which runs with the highest + privileges (Privilege Escalation). \ The prerequisites for successful exploitation consist of: \ 1. Print Spooler service enabled on the target system \ - 1. Network connectivity to the target system (initial access has been obtained) \ - + 1. Network connectivity to the target system (initial access has been obtained) + \ + 1. Hash or password for a low privileged user ( or computer ) account. \ - In the most impactful scenario, an attacker would be able to leverage this vulnerability to obtain a SYSTEM shell on a domain controller and so escalate their privileges from a low privileged domain account to full domain access in the target environment as shown below.' + In the most impactful scenario, an attacker would be able to leverage this vulnerability + to obtain a SYSTEM shell on a domain controller and so escalate their privileges + from a low privileged domain account to full domain access in the target environment + as shown below.' references: - - https://github.com/cube0x0/CVE-2021-1675/ - - https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/fix-for-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675-exploit-to-keep-your-print-servers-running-while-a-patch-is-not-available/ - - https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/exploitable-critical-rce-vulnerability-allows-regular-users-to-fully-compromise-active-directory-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675/ - - https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/ob6y02/critical_vulnerability_printnightmare_exposes +- https://github.com/cube0x0/CVE-2021-1675/ +- https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/fix-for-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675-exploit-to-keep-your-print-servers-running-while-a-patch-is-not-available/ +- https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/exploitable-critical-rce-vulnerability-allows-regular-users-to-fully-compromise-active-directory-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675/ +- https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/ob6y02/critical_vulnerability_printnightmare_exposes tags: - analytic_story: - - PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527 + analytic_story: PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527 category: - Vulnerability product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - usecase: Advanced Threat Detection \ No newline at end of file + usecase: Advanced Threat Detection diff --git a/stories/proxyshell.yml b/stories/proxyshell.yml index 02ba5aca57..facd8dc41a 100644 --- a/stories/proxyshell.yml +++ b/stories/proxyshell.yml @@ -4,25 +4,26 @@ version: 1 date: '2021-08-24' author: Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk type: batch -description: ProxyShell is a chain of exploits targeting on-premise Microsoft Exchange Server - CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, and CVE-2021-31207. -narrative: 'During Pwn2Own April 2021, a security researcher demonstrated an attack chain targeting on-premise Microsoft Exchange Server. August 5th, the same researcher publicly released further details and demonstrated the attack chain. \ - - 1. CVE-2021-34473 - Pre-auth path confusion leads to ACL Bypass (Patched in April by KB5001779) \ - - 1. CVE-2021-34523 - Elevation of privilege on Exchange PowerShell backend (Patched in April by KB5001779) \ - - 1. CVE-2021-31207 - Post-auth Arbitrary-File-Write leads to RCE (Patched in May by KB5003435) \ - - Upon successful exploitation, the remote attacker will have `SYSTEM` privileges on the Exchange Server. In addition to remote access/execution, the adversary may be able to run Exchange PowerShell Cmdlets to perform further actions.' +description: ProxyShell is a chain of exploits targeting on-premise Microsoft Exchange + Server - CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, and CVE-2021-31207. +narrative: "During Pwn2Own April 2021, a security researcher demonstrated an attack \ + \ chain targeting on-premise Microsoft Exchange Server. August 5th, the same researcher \ + \ publicly released further details and demonstrated the attack chain. CVE-2021-34473 \ + \ Pre-auth path confusion leads to ACL Bypass (Patched in April by KB5001779) \ + \ CVE-2021-34523 - Elevation of privilege on Exchange PowerShell backend \ + (Patched in April by KB5001779) . CVE-2021-31207 - Post-auth Arbitrary-File-Write \ + \ leads to RCE (Patched in May by KB5003435) Upon successful exploitation, \ + \ the remote attacker will have SYSTEM privileges on the Exchange Server. In addition \ + \ to remote access/execution, the adversary may be able to run Exchange PowerShell \ + \ Cmdlets to perform further actions." references: - - https://y4y.space/2021/08/12/my-steps-of-reproducing-proxyshell/ - - https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/8/17/from-pwn2own-2021-a-new-attack-surface-on-microsoft-exchange-proxyshell - - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FC6iHw258RI - - https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-microsoft-exchange-servers-still-vulnerable-to-proxyshell-exploit#what-should-you-do - - https://i.blackhat.com/USA21/Wednesday-Handouts/us-21-ProxyLogon-Is-Just-The-Tip-Of-The-Iceberg-A-New-Attack-Surface-On-Microsoft-Exchange-Server.pdf +- https://y4y.space/2021/08/12/my-steps-of-reproducing-proxyshell/ +- https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/8/17/from-pwn2own-2021-a-new-attack-surface-on-microsoft-exchange-proxyshell +- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FC6iHw258RI +- https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-microsoft-exchange-servers-still-vulnerable-to-proxyshell-exploit#what-should-you-do +- https://i.blackhat.com/USA21/Wednesday-Handouts/us-21-ProxyLogon-Is-Just-The-Tip-Of-The-Iceberg-A-New-Attack-Surface-On-Microsoft-Exchange-Server.pdf tags: - analytic_story: - - ProxyShell + analytic_story: ProxyShell category: - Adversary Tactics - Ransomware @@ -30,4 +31,4 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - usecase: Advanced Threat Detection \ No newline at end of file + usecase: Advanced Threat Detection diff --git a/stories/ransomware_blackmatter.yml b/stories/ransomware_blackmatter.yml index 78b9e97b6b..ad1ac2e454 100644 --- a/stories/ransomware_blackmatter.yml +++ b/stories/ransomware_blackmatter.yml @@ -4,11 +4,13 @@ version: 1 date: '2021-09-06' author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk description: Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities - that might relate to the BlackMatter ransomware, including looking for file writes associated - with BlackMatter, force safe mode boot, autadminlogon account registry modification and more. -narrative: BlackMatter ransomware campaigns targeting healthcare and other vertical sectors, involve the use of - ransomware payloads along with exfiltration of data per HHS bulletin. Malicious actors demand payment for - ransome of data and threaten deletion and exposure of exfiltrated data. + that might relate to the BlackMatter ransomware, including looking for file writes + associated with BlackMatter, force safe mode boot, autadminlogon account registry + modification and more. +narrative: BlackMatter ransomware campaigns targeting healthcare and other vertical + sectors, involve the use of ransomware payloads along with exfiltration of data + per HHS bulletin. Malicious actors demand payment for ransome of data and threaten + deletion and exposure of exfiltrated data. references: - https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/08/09/blackmatter-ransomware-emerges-from-the-shadow-of-darkside/ - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/blackmatter-ransomware-gang-rises-from-the-ashes-of-darkside-revil/ @@ -21,4 +23,4 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - usecase: Advanced Threat Detection \ No newline at end of file + usecase: Advanced Threat Detection diff --git a/stories/ransomware_clop.yml b/stories/ransomware_clop.yml index 6138f515ab..9c963ee136 100644 --- a/stories/ransomware_clop.yml +++ b/stories/ransomware_clop.yml @@ -5,11 +5,12 @@ date: '2021-03-17' author: Rod Soto, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk description: Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Clop ransomware, including looking for file writes associated - with Clope, encrypting network shares, deleting and resizing shadow volume storage, registry key modification, - deleting of security logs, and more. -narrative: Clop ransomware campaigns targeting healthcare and other vertical sectors, involve the use of - ransomware payloads along with exfiltration of data per HHS bulletin. Malicious actors demand payment for - ransome of data and threaten deletion and exposure of exfiltrated data. + with Clope, encrypting network shares, deleting and resizing shadow volume storage, + registry key modification, deleting of security logs, and more. +narrative: Clop ransomware campaigns targeting healthcare and other vertical sectors, + involve the use of ransomware payloads along with exfiltration of data per HHS bulletin. + Malicious actors demand payment for ransome of data and threaten deletion and exposure + of exfiltrated data. references: - https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/analyst-note-cl0p-tlp-white.pdf - https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/115250/data-breach/qualys-clop-ransomware.html diff --git a/stories/ransomware_darkside.yml b/stories/ransomware_darkside.yml index f2e6d8bfd9..1329c71972 100644 --- a/stories/ransomware_darkside.yml +++ b/stories/ransomware_darkside.yml @@ -5,7 +5,15 @@ date: '2021-05-12' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk description: Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the DarkSide Ransomware -narrative: 'This story addresses Darkside ransomware. This ransomware payload has many similarities to common ransomware however there are certain items particular to it. The creation of a .TXT log that shows every item being encrypted as well as the creation of ransomware notes and files adding a machine ID created based on CRC32 checksum algorithm. This ransomware payload leaves machines in minimal operation level,enough to browse the attackers websites. A customized URI with leaked information is presented to each victim.This is the ransomware payload that shut down the Colonial pipeline. The story is composed of several detection searches covering similar items to other ransomware payloads and those particular to Darkside payload.' +narrative: This story addresses Darkside ransomware. This ransomware payload has many + similarities to common ransomware however there are certain items particular to + it. The creation of a .TXT log that shows every item being encrypted as well as + the creation of ransomware notes and files adding a machine ID created based on + CRC32 checksum algorithm. This ransomware payload leaves machines in minimal operation + level,enough to browse the attackers websites. A customized URI with leaked information + is presented to each victim.This is the ransomware payload that shut down the Colonial + pipeline. The story is composed of several detection searches covering similar items + to other ransomware payloads and those particular to Darkside payload. references: - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/the-darkside-of-the-ransomware-pipeline.htmlbig-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/ - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html diff --git a/stories/ransomware_revil.yml b/stories/ransomware_revil.yml index 33cab06420..f74a4be39c 100644 --- a/stories/ransomware_revil.yml +++ b/stories/ransomware_revil.yml @@ -5,11 +5,12 @@ date: '2021-06-04' author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk description: Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Revil ransomware, including looking for file writes associated - with Revil, encrypting network shares, deleting shadow volume storage, registry key modification, - deleting of security logs, and more. -narrative: Revil ransomware is a RaaS,that a single group may operates and manges the development of this ransomware. - It involve the use of ransomware payloads along with exfiltration of data. Malicious actors demand payment for - ransome of data and threaten deletion and exposure of exfiltrated data. + with Revil, encrypting network shares, deleting shadow volume storage, registry + key modification, deleting of security logs, and more. +narrative: Revil ransomware is a RaaS,that a single group may operates and manges + the development of this ransomware. It involve the use of ransomware payloads along + with exfiltration of data. Malicious actors demand payment for ransome of data and + threaten deletion and exposure of exfiltrated data. references: - https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/ - https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/ diff --git a/stories/ransomware_ryuk.yml b/stories/ransomware_ryuk.yml index bfd0ff7438..ba131c3781 100644 --- a/stories/ransomware_ryuk.yml +++ b/stories/ransomware_ryuk.yml @@ -8,8 +8,8 @@ description: Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual with Ryuk, Stopping Security Access Manager, DisableAntiSpyware registry key modification, suspicious psexec use, and more. narrative: "Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released Alert (AA20-302A)\ - \ on October 28th called \u201CRansomware Activity Targeting the Healthcare and\ - \ Public Health Sector.\u201D This alert details TTPs associated with ongoing and\ + \ on October 28th called Ransomware Activity Targeting the Healthcare and\ + \ Public Health Sector. This alert details TTPs associated with ongoing and\ \ possible imminent attacks against the Healthcare sector, and is a joint advisory\ \ in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies. The objective of these malicious\ \ campaigns is to infiltrate targets in named sectors and to drop ransomware payloads,\ diff --git a/stories/remcos.yml b/stories/remcos.yml index ed4339758c..01a8bb4f6d 100644 --- a/stories/remcos.yml +++ b/stories/remcos.yml @@ -5,9 +5,11 @@ date: '2021-09-23' author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk description: Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Remcos RAT trojan, including looking for file writes associated - with its payload, screencapture, registry modification, UAC bypassed, persistence and data collection.. -narrative: Remcos or Remote Control and Surveillance, marketed as a legitimate software for - remotely managing Windows systems is now widely used in multiple malicious campaigns both APT and commodity malware by threat actors. + with its payload, screencapture, registry modification, UAC bypassed, persistence + and data collection.. +narrative: Remcos or Remote Control and Surveillance, marketed as a legitimate software + for remotely managing Windows systems is now widely used in multiple malicious campaigns + both APT and commodity malware by threat actors. references: - https://success.trendmicro.com/solution/1123281-remcos-malware-information - https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0332/ @@ -20,4 +22,4 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - usecase: Advanced Threat Detection \ No newline at end of file + usecase: Advanced Threat Detection diff --git a/stories/signed_binary_proxy_execution_installutil.yml b/stories/signed_binary_proxy_execution_installutil.yml index c46f2084ad..737c27c2fc 100644 --- a/stories/signed_binary_proxy_execution_installutil.yml +++ b/stories/signed_binary_proxy_execution_installutil.yml @@ -3,26 +3,40 @@ id: 9482a314-43dc-11ec-a3c9-acde48001122 version: 1 date: '2021-11-12' author: Michael Haag, Splunk -description: Adversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. -narrative: 'InstallUtil is a command-line utility that allows for installation and uninstallation of resources by executing specific installer components specified in .NET binaries. InstallUtil is digitally signed by Microsoft and located in the .NET directories on a Windows system: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v\InstallUtil.exe and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v\InstallUtil.exe. \ +description: Adversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a + trusted Windows utility. +narrative: 'InstallUtil is a command-line utility that allows for installation and + uninstallation of resources by executing specific installer components specified + in .NET binaries. InstallUtil is digitally signed by Microsoft and located in the + .NET directories on a Windows system: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v\InstallUtil.exe + and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v\InstallUtil.exe. \ - There are multiple ways to instantiate InstallUtil and they are all outlined within Atomic Red Team - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md. Two specific ways may be used and that includes invoking via installer assembly class constructor through .NET and via InstallUtil.exe. \ + There are multiple ways to instantiate InstallUtil and they are all outlined within + Atomic Red Team - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md. + Two specific ways may be used and that includes invoking via installer assembly + class constructor through .NET and via InstallUtil.exe. \ - Typically, adversaries will utilize the most commonly found way to invoke via InstallUtil Uninstall method. \ + Typically, adversaries will utilize the most commonly found way to invoke via InstallUtil + Uninstall method. \ - Note that parallel processes, and parent process, play a role in how InstallUtil is being used. In particular, a developer using InstallUtil will spawn from VisualStudio. Adversaries, will spawn from non-standard processes like Explorer.exe, cmd.exe or PowerShell.exe. It''s important to review the command-line to identify the DLL being loaded. \ + Note that parallel processes, and parent process, play a role in how InstallUtil + is being used. In particular, a developer using InstallUtil will spawn from VisualStudio. + Adversaries, will spawn from non-standard processes like Explorer.exe, cmd.exe or + PowerShell.exe. It''s important to review the command-line to identify the DLL being + loaded. \ - Parallel processes may also include csc.exe being used to compile a local `.cs` file. This file will be the input to the output. Developers usually do not build direct on the command shell, therefore this should raise suspicion.' + Parallel processes may also include csc.exe being used to compile a local `.cs` + file. This file will be the input to the output. Developers usually do not build + direct on the command shell, therefore this should raise suspicion.' references: - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/004/ - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md tags: - analytic_story: - - Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil + analytic_story: Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil category: - Adversary Tactics product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - usecase: Advanced Threat Detection \ No newline at end of file + usecase: Advanced Threat Detection diff --git a/stories/silver_sparrow.yml b/stories/silver_sparrow.yml index bee529af8c..ee6ca0b445 100644 --- a/stories/silver_sparrow.yml +++ b/stories/silver_sparrow.yml @@ -3,12 +3,20 @@ id: cb4f48fe-7699-11eb-af77-acde48001122 version: 1 date: '2021-02-24' author: Michael Haag, Splunk -description: Silver Sparrow, identified by Red Canary Intelligence, is a new forward looking MacOS (Intel and M1) malicious software downloader utilizing JavaScript for execution and a launchAgent to establish persistence. -narrative: 'Silver Sparrow works is a dropper and uses typical persistence mechanisms on a Mac. It is cross platform, covering both Intel and Apple M1 architecture. - To this date, no implant has been downloaded for malicious purposes. During installation of the update.pkg or updater.pkg file, the malicious software utilizes JavaScript to generate files and scripts on disk for persistence.These files later download a implant from an S3 bucket every hour. - This analytic assists with identifying different types of macOS malware families establishing LaunchAgent persistence. - Per SentinelOne source, it is predicted that Silver Sparrow is likely selling itself as a mechanism to 3rd party “affiliates” or pay-per-install (PPI) partners, typically seen as commodity adware/malware. - Additional indicators and behaviors may be found within the references.' +description: Silver Sparrow, identified by Red Canary Intelligence, is a new forward + looking MacOS (Intel and M1) malicious software downloader utilizing JavaScript + for execution and a launchAgent to establish persistence. +narrative: "Silver Sparrow works is a dropper and uses typical persistence mechanisms\ + \ on a Mac. It is cross platform, covering both Intel and Apple M1 architecture.\ + \ To this date, no implant has been downloaded for malicious purposes. During installation\ + \ of the update.pkg or updater.pkg file, the malicious software utilizes JavaScript\ + \ to generate files and scripts on disk for persistence.These files later download\ + \ a implant from an S3 bucket every hour. This analytic assists with identifying\ + \ different types of macOS malware families establishing LaunchAgent persistence.\ + \ Per SentinelOne source, it is predicted that Silver Sparrow is likely selling\ + \ itself as a mechanism to 3rd party Caffiliates or pay-per-install (PPI)\ + \ partners, typically seen as commodity adware/malware. Additional indicators and\ + \ behaviors may be found within the references." references: - https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/ - https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/5-things-you-need-to-know-about-silver-sparrow/ @@ -20,4 +28,4 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - usecase: Advanced Threat Detection \ No newline at end of file + usecase: Advanced Threat Detection diff --git a/stories/suspicious_aws_s3_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_aws_s3_activities.yml index cff8756af5..e2f1ac3589 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_aws_s3_activities.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_aws_s3_activities.yml @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ name: Suspicious AWS S3 Activities -id: 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50w3168af3 +id: 66732346-8fb0-407b-9633-da16756567d6 version: 2 date: '2018-07-24' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk diff --git a/stories/suspicious_compiled_html_activity.yml b/stories/suspicious_compiled_html_activity.yml index f9a6b1b98c..400afbea8d 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_compiled_html_activity.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_compiled_html_activity.yml @@ -4,16 +4,19 @@ description: Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the ms process to execute malicious code. id: a09db4d1-3827-4833-87b8-3a397e532119 name: Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity -narrative: 'Adversaries may abuse Compiled HTML files (.chm) to conceal malicious code. - CHM files are commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTML Help system. CHM - files are compressed compilations of various content such as HTML documents, images, - and scripting/web related programming languages such VBA, JScript, Java, and ActiveX. - CHM content is displayed using underlying components of the Internet Explorer browser - loaded by the HTML Help executable program (hh.exe). \ +narrative: 'Adversaries may abuse Compiled HTML files (.chm) to conceal malicious + code. CHM files are commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTML Help system. + CHM files are compressed compilations of various content such as HTML documents, + images, and scripting/web related programming languages such VBA, JScript, Java, + and ActiveX. CHM content is displayed using underlying components of the Internet + Explorer browser loaded by the HTML Help executable program (hh.exe). \ - HH.exe relies upon hhctrl.ocx to load CHM topics.This will load upon execution of a chm file. \ + HH.exe relies upon hhctrl.ocx to load CHM topics.This will load upon execution of + a chm file. \ - During investigation, review all parallel processes and child processes. It is possible for file modification events to occur and it is best to capture the CHM file and decompile it for further analysis. \ + During investigation, review all parallel processes and child processes. It is possible + for file modification events to occur and it is best to capture the CHM file and + decompile it for further analysis. \ Upon usage of InfoTech Storage Handlers, ms-its, its, mk, itss.dll will load.' references: diff --git a/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml b/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml index 13fbcab635..0592a10241 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ name: Suspicious MSHTA Activity -id: 2b1800dd-92f9-47dd-a981-fdf13w1q5d55 +id: 1e5a5a53-540b-462a-8fb7-f44a4292f5dc version: 2 date: '2021-01-20' author: Bhavin Patel, Michael Haag, Splunk @@ -14,20 +14,20 @@ narrative: 'One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutio The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an attacker is leveraging mshta.exe to execute malicious code.\ - Triage\ - - Validate execution \ - - 1. Determine if MSHTA.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName - of MSHTA.exe and further PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 - or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect.\ + Triage\ + + Validate execution \ + + 1. Determine if MSHTA.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of MSHTA.exe and + further PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, + it should be highly suspect.\ 1. Determine if script code was executed with MSHTA.\ - Situational Awareness\ - - The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious - behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by MSHTA.exe.\ + Situational Awareness\ + + The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators + related to executed of Script code by MSHTA.exe.\ 1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application?\ @@ -38,17 +38,16 @@ narrative: 'One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutio 1. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain.\ - Retrieval of script code\ - - The objective of this step is to confirm the executed - script code is benign or malicious.' + Retrieval of script code\ + + The objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.' references: - https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/ - https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/ - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005/ - https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5 tags: - analytics_story: Suspicious MSHTA Activity + analytic_story: Suspicious MSHTA Activity category: - Adversary Tactics usecase: Advanced Threat Detection diff --git a/stories/suspicious_regsvcs_regasm_activity.yml b/stories/suspicious_regsvcs_regasm_activity.yml index ba560e9176..cb6dd06db4 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_regsvcs_regasm_activity.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_regsvcs_regasm_activity.yml @@ -4,9 +4,13 @@ description: Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the ms process to execute malicious code. id: 2cdf33a0-4805-4b61-b025-59c20f418fbe name: Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity -narrative: ' Adversaries may abuse Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET Component Object Model (COM) assemblies. Both are digitally signed by Microsoft. - The following queries assist with detecting suspicious and malicious usage of Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe. - Upon reviewing usage of Regasm.exe Regsvcs.exe, review file modification events for possible script code written. Review parallel process events for csc.exe being utilized to compile script code.' +narrative: ' Adversaries may abuse Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through + a trusted Windows utility. Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities + that are used to register .NET Component Object Model (COM) assemblies. Both are + digitally signed by Microsoft. The following queries assist with detecting suspicious + and malicious usage of Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe. Upon reviewing usage of Regasm.exe + Regsvcs.exe, review file modification events for possible script code written. Review + parallel process events for csc.exe being utilized to compile script code.' references: - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/ - https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master/documentation/modules/evasion/windows/applocker_evasion_regasm_regsvcs.md diff --git a/stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml b/stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml index 57e97a3d32..248e61290b 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.md - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/ tags: - analytics_story: Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity + analytic_story: Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity category: - Adversary Tactics usecase: Advanced Threat Detection diff --git a/stories/suspicious_rundll32_activity.yml b/stories/suspicious_rundll32_activity.yml index 7ef59791b7..e7d37fc0e3 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_rundll32_activity.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_rundll32_activity.yml @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32 tags: - analytics_story: Suspicious Rundll32 Activity + analytic_story: Suspicious Rundll32 Activity category: - Adversary Tactics usecase: Advanced Threat Detection diff --git a/stories/suspicious_wmi_use.yml b/stories/suspicious_wmi_use.yml index ba2fdc5918..a54992248c 100644 --- a/stories/suspicious_wmi_use.yml +++ b/stories/suspicious_wmi_use.yml @@ -8,18 +8,17 @@ description: Attackers are increasingly abusing Windows Management Instrumentati systems. Because WMI can be leveraged to manage both local and remote systems, it is important to identify the processes executed and the user context within which the activity occurred. -narrative: 'WMI is a Microsoft infrastructure for management data and operations on +narrative: WMI is a Microsoft infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows operating systems. It includes of a set of utilities that can be leveraged to manage both local and remote Windows systems. Attackers are increasingly turning to WMI abuse in their efforts to conduct nefarious tasks, such as reconnaissance, detection of antivirus and virtual machines, code execution, lateral movement, persistence, - and data exfiltration. - The detection searches included in this Analytic Story are used to look for suspicious - use of WMI commands that attackers may leverage to interact with remote systems. - The searches specifically look for the use of WMI to run processes on remote systems. - In the event that unauthorized WMI execution occurs, it will be important for analysts - and investigators to determine the context of the event. These details may provide - insights related to how WMI was used and to what end.' + and data exfiltration. The detection searches included in this Analytic Story are + used to look for suspicious use of WMI commands that attackers may leverage to interact + with remote systems. The searches specifically look for the use of WMI to run processes + on remote systems. In the event that unauthorized WMI execution occurs, it will + be important for analysts and investigators to determine the context of the event. + These details may provide insights related to how WMI was used and to what end. references: - https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Graeber-Abusing-Windows-Management-Instrumentation-WMI-To-Build-A-Persistent%20Asynchronous-And-Fileless-Backdoor-wp.pdf - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/wmimplant_a_wmi_ba.html diff --git a/stories/trickbot.yml b/stories/trickbot.yml index 00017136e8..512488e5d8 100644 --- a/stories/trickbot.yml +++ b/stories/trickbot.yml @@ -4,11 +4,13 @@ version: 1 date: '2021-04-20' author: Rod Soto, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk description: Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities - that might relate to the trickbot banking trojan, including looking for file writes associated - with its payload, process injection, shellcode execution and data collection even in LDAP environment. -narrative: trickbot banking trojan campaigns targeting banks and other vertical sectors.This malware is known - in Microsoft Windows OS where target security Microsoft Defender to prevent its detection and removal. steal - Verizon credentials and targeting banks using its multi component modules that collect and exfiltrate data. + that might relate to the trickbot banking trojan, including looking for file writes + associated with its payload, process injection, shellcode execution and data collection + even in LDAP environment. +narrative: trickbot banking trojan campaigns targeting banks and other vertical sectors.This + malware is known in Microsoft Windows OS where target security Microsoft Defender + to prevent its detection and removal. steal Verizon credentials and targeting banks + using its multi component modules that collect and exfiltrate data. references: - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trickbot - https://blog.checkpoint.com/2021/03/11/february-2021s-most-wanted-malware-trickbot-takes-over-following-emotet-shutdown/ @@ -20,4 +22,4 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - usecase: Advanced Threat Detection \ No newline at end of file + usecase: Advanced Threat Detection diff --git a/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml b/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml index 6539b84b12..ee74018f30 100644 --- a/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml +++ b/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ references: - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/ - https://github.com/MHaggis/CBR-Queries/blob/master/msbuild.md tags: - analytics_story: Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild + analytic_story: Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild category: - Adversary Tactics usecase: Advanced Threat Detection diff --git a/stories/windows_discovery_techniques.yml b/stories/windows_discovery_techniques.yml index 47dc3978dc..e87622823c 100644 --- a/stories/windows_discovery_techniques.yml +++ b/stories/windows_discovery_techniques.yml @@ -3,26 +3,25 @@ id: f7aba570-7d59-11eb-825e-acde48001122 version: 1 date: '2021-03-04' author: Michael Hart, Splunk -description: Monitors for behaviors associated with adversaries discovering objects in the - environment that can be leveraged in the progression of the attack. +description: Monitors for behaviors associated with adversaries discovering objects + in the environment that can be leveraged in the progression of the attack. narrative: Attackers may not have much if any insight into their target's environment - before the initial compromise. Once a foothold has been established, attackers will - start enumerating objects in the environment (accounts, services, network shares, etc.) - that can be used to achieve their objectives. This Analytic Story provides searches to - help identify activities consistent with adversaries gaining knowledge of compromised - Windows environments. + before the initial compromise. Once a foothold has been established, attackers + will start enumerating objects in the environment (accounts, services, network shares, + etc.) that can be used to achieve their objectives. This Analytic Story provides + searches to help identify activities consistent with adversaries gaining knowledge + of compromised Windows environments. references: - - https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/ - - https://cyberd.us/penetration-testing - - https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0521/ +- https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/ +- https://cyberd.us/penetration-testing +- https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0521/ tags: - analytic_story: - - Windows Discovery Techniques + analytic_story: Windows Discovery Techniques category: - - Adversary Tactics + - Adversary Tactics product: - - Splunk Behavioral Analytics - - Splunk Enterprise - - Splunk Enterprise Security - - Splunk Cloud + - Splunk Behavioral Analytics + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection diff --git a/stories/xmrig.yml b/stories/xmrig.yml index 2ee5eb1781..ae9b909410 100644 --- a/stories/xmrig.yml +++ b/stories/xmrig.yml @@ -5,16 +5,20 @@ date: '2021-05-07' author: Teoderick Contreras, Rod Soto Splunk description: Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the xmrig monero, including looking for file writes associated - with its payload, process command-line, defense evasion (killing services, deleting users, modifying files or folder permission, killing other malware or other coin miner) - and hacking tools including Telegram as mean of command and control (C2) to download other files. - Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems in order to solve resource intensive problems which may impact system and/or hosted service availability. - One common purpose for Resource Hijacking is to validate transactions of cryptocurrency networks and earn virtual currency. - Adversaries may consume enough system resources to negatively impact and/or cause affected machines to become unresponsive. - (1) Servers and cloud-based - (2) systems are common targets because of the high potential for available resources, - but user endpoint systems may also be compromised and used for Resource Hijacking and cryptocurrency mining. -narrative: XMRig is a high performance, open source, cross platform RandomX, KawPow, CryptoNight and AstroBWT unified CPU/GPU miner. - This monero is seen in the wild on May 2017. + with its payload, process command-line, defense evasion (killing services, deleting + users, modifying files or folder permission, killing other malware or other coin + miner) and hacking tools including Telegram as mean of command and control (C2) + to download other files. Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems + in order to solve resource intensive problems which may impact system and/or hosted + service availability. One common purpose for Resource Hijacking is to validate transactions + of cryptocurrency networks and earn virtual currency. Adversaries may consume enough + system resources to negatively impact and/or cause affected machines to become unresponsive. + (1) Servers and cloud-based (2) systems are common targets because of the high potential + for available resources, but user endpoint systems may also be compromised and used + for Resource Hijacking and cryptocurrency mining. +narrative: XMRig is a high performance, open source, cross platform RandomX, KawPow, + CryptoNight and AstroBWT unified CPU/GPU miner. This monero is seen in the wild + on May 2017. references: - https://github.com/xmrig/xmrig - https://www.getmonero.org/resources/user-guides/mine-to-pool.html @@ -29,6 +33,3 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud usecase: Advanced Threat Detection - - - diff --git a/tests/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.test.yml b/tests/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.test.yml index 000c10ed68..fae6763b30 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.test.yml @@ -3,17 +3,17 @@ tests: - name: Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls file: cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now baselines: - name: Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User file: detections/cloud/baseline_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_per_user.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-30d' - latest_time: '-1d' + earliest_time: -30d + latest_time: -1d attack_data: - file_name: cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json sourcetype: aws:cloudtrail source: aws_cloudtrail - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.test.yml b/tests/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.test.yml index f2074430c2..91188972e6 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.test.yml @@ -3,17 +3,17 @@ tests: - name: Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls file: cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now baselines: - name: Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User file: detections/cloud/baseline_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls_per_user.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-30d' - latest_time: '-1d' + earliest_time: -30d + latest_time: -1d attack_data: - file_name: cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json sourcetype: aws:cloudtrail source: aws_cloudtrail - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/cloud/aws_create_policy_version_to_allow_all_resources.test.yml b/tests/cloud/aws_create_policy_version_to_allow_all_resources.test.yml index cc298bfb8f..4a498b1b6b 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/aws_create_policy_version_to_allow_all_resources.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/aws_create_policy_version_to_allow_all_resources.test.yml @@ -3,11 +3,11 @@ tests: - name: AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources file: cloud/aws_create_policy_version_to_allow_all_resources.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-7d' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -7d + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: aws_cloudtrail_events.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_create_policy_version/aws_cloudtrail_events.json sourcetype: aws:cloudtrail source: aws_cloudtrail - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/cloud/aws_createaccesskey.test.yml b/tests/cloud/aws_createaccesskey.test.yml index 71c0654e17..120f78f97f 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/aws_createaccesskey.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/aws_createaccesskey.test.yml @@ -3,11 +3,11 @@ tests: - name: AWS CreateAccessKey file: cloud/aws_createaccesskey.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-7d' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -7d + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: aws_cloudtrail_events.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_createaccesskey/aws_cloudtrail_events.json sourcetype: aws:cloudtrail source: aws_cloudtrail - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/cloud/aws_createloginprofile.test.yml b/tests/cloud/aws_createloginprofile.test.yml index 36c000d883..898e1a208d 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/aws_createloginprofile.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/aws_createloginprofile.test.yml @@ -3,11 +3,11 @@ tests: - name: AWS CreateLoginProfile file: cloud/aws_createloginprofile.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-7d' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -7d + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: aws_cloudtrail_events.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_createloginprofile/aws_cloudtrail_events.json sourcetype: aws:cloudtrail source: aws_cloudtrail - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.test.yml b/tests/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.test.yml index cc782a4a7e..2c03b8db04 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.test.yml @@ -3,22 +3,22 @@ tests: - name: AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account file: cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now baselines: - name: Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial file: detections/cloud/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity_initial.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-30d' - latest_time: '-1d' + earliest_time: -30d + latest_time: -1d - name: Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update file: detections/cloud/previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity_update.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-30d' - latest_time: '-1d' + earliest_time: -30d + latest_time: -1d attack_data: - file_name: cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json sourcetype: aws:cloudtrail source: aws_cloudtrail - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.test.yml b/tests/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.test.yml index 6e504f0a40..f8346d8581 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.test.yml @@ -3,11 +3,11 @@ tests: - name: AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA file: cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: aws_cloudtrail_events.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1486/aws_kms_key/aws_cloudtrail_events.json sourcetype: aws:cloudtrail source: aws_cloudtrail - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.test.yml b/tests/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.test.yml index dbbd719561..3178457c5b 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.test.yml @@ -3,11 +3,11 @@ tests: - name: AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 file: cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: aws_cloudtrail_events.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1486/s3_file_encryption/aws_cloudtrail_events.json sourcetype: aws:cloudtrail source: aws_cloudtrail - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/cloud/aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_high.test.yml b/tests/cloud/aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_high.test.yml index 05ddd52af6..fdf0e3940a 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_high.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_high.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings High file: cloud/aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_high.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-7d' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -7d + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: aws_ecr_scanning_findings_events.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1204.003/aws_ecr_image_scanning/aws_ecr_scanning_findings_events.json diff --git a/tests/cloud/aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_low_informational_unknown.test.yml b/tests/cloud/aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_low_informational_unknown.test.yml index 9b7fd42bcd..e4281030ff 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_low_informational_unknown.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_low_informational_unknown.test.yml @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ name: AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Low Informational Unknwon Unit Test tests: -- name: AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Low Informational Unknwon +- name: AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Low Informational Unknown file: cloud/aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_low_informational_unknown.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-7d' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -7d + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: aws_ecr_scanning_findings_events.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1204.003/aws_ecr_image_scanning/aws_ecr_scanning_findings_events.json diff --git a/tests/cloud/aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_medium.test.yml b/tests/cloud/aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_medium.test.yml index 5ee08601b9..29840f6b90 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_medium.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_medium.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Medium file: cloud/aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_medium.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-7d' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -7d + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: aws_ecr_scanning_findings_events.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1204.003/aws_ecr_image_scanning/aws_ecr_scanning_findings_events.json diff --git a/tests/cloud/aws_ecr_container_upload_outside_business_hours.test.yml b/tests/cloud/aws_ecr_container_upload_outside_business_hours.test.yml index 9315216987..d95e61e2da 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/aws_ecr_container_upload_outside_business_hours.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/aws_ecr_container_upload_outside_business_hours.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: AWS ECR Container Upload Outside Business Hours file: cloud/aws_ecr_container_upload_outside_business_hours.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-7d' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -7d + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: aws_ecr_container_upload.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1204.003/aws_ecr_container_upload/aws_ecr_container_upload.json diff --git a/tests/cloud/aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user.test.yml b/tests/cloud/aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user.test.yml index aed39b18d8..5af5619db0 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: AWS ECR Container Upload Unknown User file: cloud/aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-7d' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -7d + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: aws_ecr_container_upload.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1204.003/aws_ecr_container_upload/aws_ecr_container_upload.json diff --git a/tests/cloud/aws_excessive_security_scanning.test.yml b/tests/cloud/aws_excessive_security_scanning.test.yml index 8a5cfe19e1..f664288e92 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/aws_excessive_security_scanning.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/aws_excessive_security_scanning.test.yml @@ -3,11 +3,11 @@ tests: - name: AWS Excessive Security Scanning file: cloud/aws_excessive_security_scanning.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: aws_cloudtrail_events.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1526/aws_security_scanner/aws_security_scanner.json sourcetype: aws:cloudtrail source: aws_cloudtrail - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/cloud/aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events.test.yml b/tests/cloud/aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events.test.yml index 2425d8e763..9e7a9186a0 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events.test.yml @@ -3,11 +3,11 @@ tests: - name: AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events file: cloud/aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1580/aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events/aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events.json sourcetype: aws:cloudtrail source: aws_cloudtrail - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/cloud/aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force.test.yml b/tests/cloud/aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force.test.yml index 72dfdb5b50..76e662f11c 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force.test.yml @@ -3,11 +3,11 @@ tests: - name: AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force file: cloud/aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1580/aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force/aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force.json sourcetype: aws:cloudtrail source: aws_cloudtrail - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/cloud/aws_iam_delete_policy.test.yml b/tests/cloud/aws_iam_delete_policy.test.yml index a76ae42664..dc9612fc34 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/aws_iam_delete_policy.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/aws_iam_delete_policy.test.yml @@ -3,11 +3,11 @@ tests: - name: AWS IAM Delete Policy file: cloud/aws_iam_delete_policy.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: aws_iam_delete_policy.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098/aws_iam_delete_policy/aws_iam_delete_policy.json sourcetype: aws:cloudtrail source: aws_cloudtrail - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/cloud/aws_iam_failure_group_deletion.test.yml b/tests/cloud/aws_iam_failure_group_deletion.test.yml index 83f02e7dd3..c104d4e620 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/aws_iam_failure_group_deletion.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/aws_iam_failure_group_deletion.test.yml @@ -3,11 +3,11 @@ tests: - name: AWS IAM Failure Group Deletion file: cloud/aws_iam_failure_group_deletion.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: aws_iam_delete_policy.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098/aws_iam_failure_group_deletion/aws_iam_failure_group_deletion.json sourcetype: aws:cloudtrail source: aws_cloudtrail - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/cloud/aws_iam_successful_group_deletion.test.yml b/tests/cloud/aws_iam_successful_group_deletion.test.yml index 76767a7f16..9e41765b31 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/aws_iam_successful_group_deletion.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/aws_iam_successful_group_deletion.test.yml @@ -3,11 +3,11 @@ tests: - name: AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion file: cloud/aws_iam_successful_group_deletion.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: aws_iam_successful_group_deletion.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098/aws_iam_successful_group_deletion/aws_iam_successful_group_deletion.json sourcetype: aws:cloudtrail source: aws_cloudtrail - update_timestamp: True \ No newline at end of file + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.test.yml b/tests/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.test.yml index 9f40599008..2527b35388 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.test.yml @@ -3,11 +3,11 @@ tests: - name: AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports file: cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: aws_cloudtrail_events.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.007/aws_create_acl/aws_cloudtrail_events.json sourcetype: aws:cloudtrail source: aws_cloudtrail - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.test.yml b/tests/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.test.yml index 487aec4323..734d8feaa6 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.test.yml @@ -3,11 +3,11 @@ tests: - name: AWS Network Access Control List Deleted file: cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: aws_cloudtrail_events.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.007/aws_delete_acl/aws_cloudtrail_events.json sourcetype: aws:cloudtrail source: aws_cloudtrail - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.test.yml b/tests/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.test.yml index ab99ac7fed..3232eb0fa2 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.test.yml @@ -3,11 +3,11 @@ tests: - name: AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal file: cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: aws_cloudtrail_events.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/assume_role_with_saml/assume_role_with_saml.json sourcetype: aws:cloudtrail source: aws_cloudtrail - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.test.yml b/tests/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.test.yml index 2e5bc38378..e79d41fb86 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.test.yml @@ -3,11 +3,11 @@ tests: - name: AWS SAML Update identity provider file: cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: aws_cloudtrail_events.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/update_saml_provider/update_saml_provider.json sourcetype: aws:cloudtrail source: aws_cloudtrail - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/cloud/aws_setdefaultpolicyversion.test.yml b/tests/cloud/aws_setdefaultpolicyversion.test.yml index 87938ebce9..805fe8cc65 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/aws_setdefaultpolicyversion.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/aws_setdefaultpolicyversion.test.yml @@ -3,11 +3,11 @@ tests: - name: AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion file: cloud/aws_setdefaultpolicyversion.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-7d' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -7d + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: aws_cloudtrail_events.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_setdefaultpolicyversion/aws_cloudtrail_events.json sourcetype: aws:cloudtrail source: aws_cloudtrail - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/cloud/aws_updateloginprofile.test.yml b/tests/cloud/aws_updateloginprofile.test.yml index 0dbc2fd429..0551991ed5 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/aws_updateloginprofile.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/aws_updateloginprofile.test.yml @@ -3,11 +3,11 @@ tests: - name: AWS UpdateLoginProfile file: cloud/aws_updateloginprofile.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-7d' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -7d + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: aws_cloudtrail_events.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_updateloginprofile/aws_cloudtrail_events.json sourcetype: aws:cloudtrail source: aws_cloudtrail - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/cloud/circle_ci_disable_security_job.test.yml b/tests/cloud/circle_ci_disable_security_job.test.yml index b3de2209cf..056b51abbf 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/circle_ci_disable_security_job.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/circle_ci_disable_security_job.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Circle CI Disable Security Job file: cloud/circle_ci_disable_security_job.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-365d' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -365d + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: circle_ci_disable_security_job.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1554/circle_ci_disable_security_job/circle_ci_disable_security_job.json diff --git a/tests/cloud/circle_ci_disable_security_step.test.yml b/tests/cloud/circle_ci_disable_security_step.test.yml index 0ebfae46b5..a65ccb00b8 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/circle_ci_disable_security_step.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/circle_ci_disable_security_step.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Circle CI Disable Security Step file: cloud/circle_ci_disable_security_step.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-365d' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -365d + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: circle_ci_disable_security_step.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1554/circle_ci_disable_security_step/circle_ci_disable_security_step.json diff --git a/tests/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.test.yml b/tests/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.test.yml index d55a8bb52f..0124df4117 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.test.yml @@ -3,22 +3,22 @@ tests: - name: Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles file: cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now baselines: - name: Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial file: detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_initial.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-30d' - latest_time: '-1d' + earliest_time: -30d + latest_time: -1d - name: Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update file: detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_update.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-30d' - latest_time: '-1d' + earliest_time: -30d + latest_time: -1d attack_data: - file_name: cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json sourcetype: aws:cloudtrail source: aws_cloudtrail - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.test.yml b/tests/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.test.yml index 19fec95d05..65a2e8624f 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.test.yml @@ -3,22 +3,22 @@ tests: - name: Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User file: cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now baselines: - name: Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Initial file: detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_initial.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-30d' - latest_time: '-1d' + earliest_time: -30d + latest_time: -1d - name: Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Update file: detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_update.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-30d' - latest_time: '-1d' + earliest_time: -30d + latest_time: -1d attack_data: - file_name: cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json sourcetype: aws:cloudtrail source: aws_cloudtrail - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.test.yml b/tests/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.test.yml index adce8dbd51..d91095aff0 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.test.yml @@ -3,22 +3,22 @@ tests: - name: Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region file: cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml pass_condition: '| outputlookup test_1.csv | stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now baselines: - name: Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial file: detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_regions_initial.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-30d' - latest_time: '-1d' + earliest_time: -30d + latest_time: -1d - name: Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update file: detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_regions_update.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-30d' - latest_time: '-1d' + earliest_time: -30d + latest_time: -1d attack_data: - file_name: cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json sourcetype: aws:cloudtrail source: aws_cloudtrail - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.test.yml b/tests/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.test.yml index 5f5ca038f3..50115a04bf 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.test.yml @@ -3,22 +3,22 @@ tests: - name: Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image file: cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now baselines: - name: Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial file: detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_initial.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-30d' - latest_time: '-1d' + earliest_time: -30d + latest_time: -1d - name: Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update file: detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_update.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-30d' - latest_time: '-1d' + earliest_time: -30d + latest_time: -1d attack_data: - file_name: cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json sourcetype: aws:cloudtrail source: aws_cloudtrail - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.test.yml b/tests/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.test.yml index f3873c8264..b72e7d26aa 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.test.yml @@ -3,22 +3,22 @@ tests: - name: Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type file: cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now baselines: - name: Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial file: detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types_initial.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-30d' - latest_time: '-1d' + earliest_time: -30d + latest_time: -1d - name: Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update file: detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types_update.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-30d' - latest_time: '-1d' + earliest_time: -30d + latest_time: -1d attack_data: - file_name: cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json sourcetype: aws:cloudtrail source: aws_cloudtrail - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.test.yml b/tests/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.test.yml index f7db1c4a6a..b2f6d85aaf 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.test.yml @@ -3,22 +3,22 @@ tests: - name: Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User file: cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now baselines: - name: Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Initial file: detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user_initial.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-30d' - latest_time: '-1d' + earliest_time: -30d + latest_time: -1d - name: Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update file: detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user_update.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-30d' - latest_time: '-1d' + earliest_time: -30d + latest_time: -1d attack_data: - file_name: cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json sourcetype: aws:cloudtrail source: aws_cloudtrail - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.test.yml b/tests/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.test.yml index 741d779eb2..5e1d145109 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.test.yml @@ -3,22 +3,22 @@ tests: - name: Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City file: cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now baselines: - name: Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial file: detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_initial.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-30d' - latest_time: '-1d' + earliest_time: -30d + latest_time: -1d - name: Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update file: detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_update.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-30d' - latest_time: '-1d' + earliest_time: -30d + latest_time: -1d attack_data: - file_name: cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json sourcetype: aws:cloudtrail source: aws_cloudtrail - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.test.yml b/tests/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.test.yml index 232de687dc..3d3b73b3f7 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.test.yml @@ -3,22 +3,22 @@ tests: - name: Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country file: cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now baselines: - name: Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial file: detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_initial.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-30d' - latest_time: '-1d' + earliest_time: -30d + latest_time: -1d - name: Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update file: detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_update.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-30d' - latest_time: '-1d' + earliest_time: -30d + latest_time: -1d attack_data: - file_name: cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json sourcetype: aws:cloudtrail source: aws_cloudtrail - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.test.yml b/tests/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.test.yml index 720252edac..a8e77d70c8 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.test.yml @@ -3,22 +3,22 @@ tests: - name: Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address file: cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now baselines: - name: Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial file: detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_initial.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-30d' - latest_time: '-1d' + earliest_time: -30d + latest_time: -1d - name: Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update file: detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_update.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-30d' - latest_time: '-1d' + earliest_time: -30d + latest_time: -1d attack_data: - file_name: cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json sourcetype: aws:cloudtrail source: aws_cloudtrail - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.test.yml b/tests/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.test.yml index e821a9025b..c483e82604 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.test.yml @@ -3,22 +3,22 @@ tests: - name: Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region file: cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now baselines: - name: Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial file: detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_initial.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-30d' - latest_time: '-1d' + earliest_time: -30d + latest_time: -1d - name: Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update file: detections/cloud/previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources_update.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-30d' - latest_time: '-1d' + earliest_time: -30d + latest_time: -1d attack_data: - file_name: cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json sourcetype: aws:cloudtrail source: aws_cloudtrail - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.test.yml b/tests/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.test.yml index b84e13d7a6..ad1cb98bea 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.test.yml @@ -3,22 +3,22 @@ tests: - name: Detect AWS Console Login by New User file: cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now baselines: - name: Previously Seen Users In Cloudtrail - Initial file: detections/cloud/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_initial.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-30d' - latest_time: '-1d' + earliest_time: -30d + latest_time: -1d - name: Previously Seen Users In Cloudtrail - Update file: detections/cloud/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_update.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-30d' - latest_time: '-1d' + earliest_time: -30d + latest_time: -1d attack_data: - file_name: cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json sourcetype: aws:cloudtrail source: aws_cloudtrail - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.test.yml b/tests/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.test.yml index 674b1c5f55..bbec97937b 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.test.yml @@ -3,22 +3,22 @@ tests: - name: Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City file: cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now baselines: - name: Previously Seen Users In Cloudtrail - Initial file: detections/cloud/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_initial.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-30d' - latest_time: '-1d' + earliest_time: -30d + latest_time: -1d - name: Previously Seen Users In Cloudtrail - Update file: detections/cloud/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_update.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-30d' - latest_time: '-1d' + earliest_time: -30d + latest_time: -1d attack_data: - file_name: cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json sourcetype: aws:cloudtrail source: aws_cloudtrail - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.test.yml b/tests/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.test.yml index 7195ba7f46..8e4e13e7bc 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.test.yml @@ -3,22 +3,22 @@ tests: - name: Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country file: cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now baselines: - name: Previously Seen Users In Cloudtrail - Initial file: detections/cloud/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_initial.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-30d' - latest_time: '-1d' + earliest_time: -30d + latest_time: -1d - name: Previously Seen Users In Cloudtrail - Update file: detections/cloud/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_update.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-30d' - latest_time: '-1d' + earliest_time: -30d + latest_time: -1d attack_data: - file_name: cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json sourcetype: aws:cloudtrail source: aws_cloudtrail - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.test.yml b/tests/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.test.yml index c09f7ce926..b494592421 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.test.yml @@ -3,22 +3,22 @@ tests: - name: Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region file: cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now baselines: - name: Previously Seen Users In Cloudtrail - Initial file: detections/cloud/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_initial.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-30d' - latest_time: '-1d' + earliest_time: -30d + latest_time: -1d - name: Previously Seen Users In Cloudtrail - Update file: detections/cloud/previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_update.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-30d' - latest_time: '-1d' + earliest_time: -30d + latest_time: -1d attack_data: - file_name: cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json sourcetype: aws:cloudtrail source: aws_cloudtrail - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.test.yml b/tests/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.test.yml index 08567f8224..aaf6277c1e 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.test.yml @@ -3,11 +3,11 @@ tests: - name: Detect New Open S3 buckets file: cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: aws_cloudtrail_events.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1530/aws_s3_public_bucket/aws_cloudtrail_events.json sourcetype: aws:cloudtrail source: aws_cloudtrail - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.test.yml b/tests/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.test.yml index edae6b3d2f..06a32c78fc 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.test.yml @@ -3,11 +3,11 @@ tests: - name: Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI file: cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: aws_cloudtrail_events.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1530/aws_s3_public_bucket/aws_cloudtrail_events.json sourcetype: aws:cloudtrail source: aws_cloudtrail - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/cloud/detect_shared_ec2_snapshot.test.yml b/tests/cloud/detect_shared_ec2_snapshot.test.yml index 30b73d459e..a8c847b576 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/detect_shared_ec2_snapshot.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/detect_shared_ec2_snapshot.test.yml @@ -3,11 +3,11 @@ tests: - name: Detect shared ec2 snapshot file: cloud/detect_shared_ec2_snapshot.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-7d' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -7d + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: aws_cloudtrail_events.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1537/aws_snapshot_exfil/aws_cloudtrail_events.json sourcetype: aws:cloudtrail source: aws_cloudtrail - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.test.yml b/tests/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.test.yml index a9f8379c96..ecb56dc8be 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance file: cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: security_hub_ec2_spike.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/security_hub_ec2_spike/security_hub_ec2_spike.json diff --git a/tests/cloud/github_commit_changes_in_master.test.yml b/tests/cloud/github_commit_changes_in_master.test.yml index 6901948db5..333ca3c3f5 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/github_commit_changes_in_master.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/github_commit_changes_in_master.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Github Commit Changes In Master file: cloud/github_commit_changes_in_master.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-30d' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -30d + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: github_push_master.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1199/github_push_master/github_push_master.log source: github - sourcetype: aws:firehose:json \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: aws:firehose:json diff --git a/tests/cloud/github_commit_in_develop.test.yml b/tests/cloud/github_commit_in_develop.test.yml index 056ff094e3..6111f1a58a 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/github_commit_in_develop.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/github_commit_in_develop.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Github Commit In Develop file: cloud/github_commit_in_develop.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: github_push_develop.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1199/github_push_master/github_push_develop.json source: github - sourcetype: aws:firehose:json \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: aws:firehose:json diff --git a/tests/cloud/github_dependabot_alert.test.yml b/tests/cloud/github_dependabot_alert.test.yml index 7a38c59467..3de367dc2b 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/github_dependabot_alert.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/github_dependabot_alert.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: GitHub Dependabot Alert file: cloud/github_dependabot_alert.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-365d' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -365d + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: github_security_advisor_alert.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1195.001/github_security_advisor_alert/github_security_advisor_alert.json diff --git a/tests/cloud/github_pull_request_from_unknown_user.test.yml b/tests/cloud/github_pull_request_from_unknown_user.test.yml index 32d4f347cf..58bf2a57f5 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/github_pull_request_from_unknown_user.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/github_pull_request_from_unknown_user.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: GitHub Pull Request from Unknown User file: cloud/github_pull_request_from_unknown_user.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-365d' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -365d + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: github_pull_request.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1195.001/github_pull_request/github_pull_request.json diff --git a/tests/cloud/gsuite_drive_share_in_external_email.test.yml b/tests/cloud/gsuite_drive_share_in_external_email.test.yml index 7a4f05ed25..e1f59b4283 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/gsuite_drive_share_in_external_email.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/gsuite_drive_share_in_external_email.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Gsuite Drive Share In External Email file: cloud/gsuite_drive_share_in_external_email.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: gdrive_share_external.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1567.002/gsuite_share_drive/gdrive_share_external.log source: http:gsuite - sourcetype: gsuite:drive:json \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: gsuite:drive:json diff --git a/tests/cloud/gsuite_email_suspicious_attachment.test.yml b/tests/cloud/gsuite_email_suspicious_attachment.test.yml index 3797bd45aa..7e508bd767 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/gsuite_email_suspicious_attachment.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/gsuite_email_suspicious_attachment.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: GSuite Email Suspicious Attachment file: cloud/gsuite_email_suspicious_attachment.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: gsuite_gmail_file_ext.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gsuite_susp_attachment_ext/gsuite_gmail_file_ext.log source: http:gsuite - sourcetype: gsuite:gmail:bigquery \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: gsuite:gmail:bigquery diff --git a/tests/cloud/gsuite_email_suspicious_subject_with_attachment.test.yml b/tests/cloud/gsuite_email_suspicious_subject_with_attachment.test.yml index bd6e1a260c..753ff8c313 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/gsuite_email_suspicious_subject_with_attachment.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/gsuite_email_suspicious_subject_with_attachment.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Gsuite Email Suspicious Subject With Attachment file: cloud/gsuite_email_suspicious_subject_with_attachment.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: gsuite_susp_subj_attach.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gsuite_susp_subj/gsuite_susp_subj_attach.log source: http:gsuite - sourcetype: gsuite:gmail:bigquery \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: gsuite:gmail:bigquery diff --git a/tests/cloud/gsuite_email_with_known_abuse_web_service_link.test.yml b/tests/cloud/gsuite_email_with_known_abuse_web_service_link.test.yml index d8161f3f21..637035bac0 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/gsuite_email_with_known_abuse_web_service_link.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/gsuite_email_with_known_abuse_web_service_link.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Gsuite Email With Known Abuse Web Service Link file: cloud/gsuite_email_with_known_abuse_web_service_link.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: gsuite_susp_url.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gsuite_susp_url/gsuite_susp_url.log source: http:gsuite - sourcetype: gsuite:gmail:bigquery \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: gsuite:gmail:bigquery diff --git a/tests/cloud/gsuite_outbound_email_with_attachment_to_external_domain.test.yml b/tests/cloud/gsuite_outbound_email_with_attachment_to_external_domain.test.yml index dd56c43b8d..f2a6c1af18 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/gsuite_outbound_email_with_attachment_to_external_domain.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/gsuite_outbound_email_with_attachment_to_external_domain.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain file: cloud/gsuite_outbound_email_with_attachment_to_external_domain.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: gsuite_external_domain.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gsuite_outbound_email_to_external/gsuite_external_domain.log source: http:gsuite - sourcetype: gsuite:gmail:bigquery \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: gsuite:gmail:bigquery diff --git a/tests/cloud/gsuite_suspicious_shared_file_name.test.yml b/tests/cloud/gsuite_suspicious_shared_file_name.test.yml index 70297baf7d..13a540de16 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/gsuite_suspicious_shared_file_name.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/gsuite_suspicious_shared_file_name.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Gsuite Suspicious Shared File Name file: cloud/gsuite_suspicious_shared_file_name.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: gdrive_susp_attach.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gdrive_susp_file_share/gdrive_susp_attach.log source: http:gsuite - sourcetype: gsuite:drive:json \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: gsuite:drive:json diff --git a/tests/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.test.yml b/tests/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.test.yml index 561d691b6a..12f7f39400 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: High Number of Login Failures from a single source file: experimental/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.001/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.json - sourcetype: 'o365:management:activity' - source: 'o365' + sourcetype: o365:management:activity + source: o365 diff --git a/tests/cloud/kubernetes_nginx_ingress_lfi.test.yml b/tests/cloud/kubernetes_nginx_ingress_lfi.test.yml index 756ad99e29..fff2019629 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/kubernetes_nginx_ingress_lfi.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/kubernetes_nginx_ingress_lfi.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI file: cloud/kubernetes_nginx_ingress_lfi.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-365d' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -365d + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: kubernetes_nginx_lfi_attack.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1212/kubernetes_nginx_lfi_attack/kubernetes_nginx_lfi_attack.log diff --git a/tests/cloud/kubernetes_nginx_ingress_rfi.test.yml b/tests/cloud/kubernetes_nginx_ingress_rfi.test.yml index 792162624c..8720972b29 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/kubernetes_nginx_ingress_rfi.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/kubernetes_nginx_ingress_rfi.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Kubernetes Nginx Ingress RFI file: cloud/kubernetes_nginx_ingress_rfi.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-365d' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -365d + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: kubernetes_nginx_rfi_attack.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1212/kuberntest_nginx_rfi_attack/kubernetes_nginx_rfi_attack.log diff --git a/tests/cloud/kubernetes_scanner_image_pulling.test.yml b/tests/cloud/kubernetes_scanner_image_pulling.test.yml index 5d8b50443a..136fb7d606 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/kubernetes_scanner_image_pulling.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/kubernetes_scanner_image_pulling.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Kubernetes Scanner Image Pulling file: cloud/kubernetes_scanner_image_pulling.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-7d' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -7d + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: kubernetes_kube_hunter.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1526/kubernetes_kube_hunter/kubernetes_kube_hunter.json diff --git a/tests/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.test.yml b/tests/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.test.yml index 9e1738fb4a..31a69aec48 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User file: cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: o365_management_activity.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_new_federation/o365_new_federation.json - sourcetype: 'o365:management:activity' - source: 'o365' + sourcetype: o365:management:activity + source: o365 diff --git a/tests/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.test.yml b/tests/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.test.yml index b2ee0440f1..2b8fa8ed63 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: O365 Added Service Principal file: cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: o365_management_activity.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_add_service_principal/o365_add_service_principal.json - sourcetype: 'o365:management:activity' - source: 'o365' + sourcetype: o365:management:activity + source: o365 diff --git a/tests/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.test.yml b/tests/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.test.yml index 7f687b3582..dc93adf2cf 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP file: cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-30d' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -30d + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.007/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.json - sourcetype: 'o365:management:activity' - source: 'o365' + sourcetype: o365:management:activity + source: o365 diff --git a/tests/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.test.yml b/tests/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.test.yml index b727901a27..965267cb6c 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: O365 Disable MFA file: cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: o365_disable_mfa.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/o365_disable_mfa/o365_disable_mfa.json - sourcetype: 'o365:management:activity' - source: 'o365' + sourcetype: o365:management:activity + source: o365 diff --git a/tests/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.test.yml b/tests/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.test.yml index 7a121e62d4..2fd78903a9 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert file: cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: o365_brute_force_login.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110/o365_brute_force_login/o365_brute_force_login.json - sourcetype: 'o365:management:activity' - source: 'o365' + sourcetype: o365:management:activity + source: o365 diff --git a/tests/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.test.yml b/tests/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.test.yml index 3546060cfc..a6a39d3eeb 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: O365 Excessive SSO logon errors file: cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: o365_management_activity.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/o365_sso_logon_errors/o365_sso_logon_errors.json - sourcetype: 'o365:management:activity' - source: 'o365' + sourcetype: o365:management:activity + source: o365 diff --git a/tests/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.test.yml b/tests/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.test.yml index 7eb063af41..203ad7d522 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.test.yml @@ -3,11 +3,11 @@ tests: - name: O365 New Federated Domain Added file: cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-7d' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -7d + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: o365_management_activity.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_new_federated_domain/o365_new_federated_domain.json - sourcetype: 'o365:management:activity' - source: 'exchange' - update_timestamp: True + sourcetype: o365:management:activity + source: exchange + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.test.yml b/tests/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.test.yml index 0af9e01dde..3ee7c25a35 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: O365 PST export alert file: cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: o365_export_pst_file.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114/o365_export_pst_file/o365_export_pst_file.json - sourcetype: 'o365:management:activity' - source: 'o365' + sourcetype: o365:management:activity + source: o365 diff --git a/tests/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.test.yml b/tests/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.test.yml index 7a172ae165..f9c3a7245e 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding file: cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: o365_email_forwarding_rule.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114.003/o365_email_forwarding_rule/o365_email_forwarding_rule.json - sourcetype: 'o365:management:activity' - source: 'o365' + sourcetype: o365:management:activity + source: o365 diff --git a/tests/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.test.yml b/tests/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.test.yml index 5a2ca821ee..d545e2246f 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation file: cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: suspicious_rights_delegation.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114.002/suspicious_rights_delegation/suspicious_rights_delegation.json - sourcetype: 'o365:management:activity' - source: 'o365' + sourcetype: o365:management:activity + source: o365 diff --git a/tests/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.test.yml b/tests/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.test.yml index 523580ad04..d1d7b0f3f9 100644 --- a/tests/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.test.yml +++ b/tests/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding file: cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: o365_email_forwarding_rule.json data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114.003/o365_email_forwarding_rule/o365_email_forwarding_rule.json - sourcetype: 'o365:management:activity' - source: 'o365' + sourcetype: o365:management:activity + source: o365 diff --git a/tests/endpoint/7zip_commandline_to_smb_share_path.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/7zip_commandline_to_smb_share_path.test.yml index fffe1c8b08..fe1a1f6a07 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/7zip_commandline_to_smb_share_path.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/7zip_commandline_to_smb_share_path.test.yml @@ -3,13 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: 7zip CommandLine To SMB Share Path file: endpoint/7zip_commandline_to_smb_share_path.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon_7z.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/conti/conti_leak/windows-sysmon_7z.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational sourcetype: xmlwineventlog - - - \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.test.yml index 32e5fb0e48..7081ead8ce 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation file: endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/account_discovery_with_net_app.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/account_discovery_with_net_app.test.yml index 645fa60f74..2da3eeeed0 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/account_discovery_with_net_app.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/account_discovery_with_net_app.test.yml @@ -3,11 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Account Discovery With Net App file: endpoint/account_discovery_with_net_app.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/infection/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational sourcetype: xmlwineventlog - \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/endpoint/active_setup_registry_autostart.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/active_setup_registry_autostart.test.yml index e1fb06c684..bf57da06dd 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/active_setup_registry_autostart.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/active_setup_registry_autostart.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Active Setup Registry Autostart file: endpoint/active_setup_registry_autostart.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/t1547.014/active_setup_stubpath/sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/add_defaultuser_and_password_in_registry.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/add_defaultuser_and_password_in_registry.test.yml index bc31abaa07..26d5fa35a2 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/add_defaultuser_and_password_in_registry.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/add_defaultuser_and_password_in_registry.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Add DefaultUser And Password In Registry file: endpoint/add_defaultuser_and_password_in_registry.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1552.002/autoadminlogon/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion.test.yml index 0d300b72d6..7de82be0cb 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion file: endpoint/add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/defender_exclusion_sysmon/sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/adsisearcher_account_discovery.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/adsisearcher_account_discovery.test.yml index b727b66bb5..17f130c5bf 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/adsisearcher_account_discovery.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/adsisearcher_account_discovery.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: AdsiSearcher Account Discovery file: endpoint/adsisearcher_account_discovery.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-powershell.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational - sourcetype: WinEventLog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: WinEventLog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall.test.yml index 33c74ef7e7..874287745d 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall file: endpoint/allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/allow_inbound_traffic_by_firewall_rule_registry.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/allow_inbound_traffic_by_firewall_rule_registry.test.yml index 39d282bf2b..0c717a56f0 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/allow_inbound_traffic_by_firewall_rule_registry.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/allow_inbound_traffic_by_firewall_rule_registry.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry file: endpoint/allow_inbound_traffic_by_firewall_rule_registry.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/casper/datasets1/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/allow_inbound_traffic_in_firewall_rule.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/allow_inbound_traffic_in_firewall_rule.test.yml index ac2dd09fa0..cb50d53d5f 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/allow_inbound_traffic_in_firewall_rule.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/allow_inbound_traffic_in_firewall_rule.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Allow Inbound Traffic In Firewall Rule file: endpoint/allow_inbound_traffic_in_firewall_rule.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-powershell.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/casper/datasets1/windows-powershell.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational - sourcetype: WinEventLog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: WinEventLog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/allow_network_discovery_in_firewall.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/allow_network_discovery_in_firewall.test.yml index 6eab28d308..3b7eff55d9 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/allow_network_discovery_in_firewall.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/allow_network_discovery_in_firewall.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Allow Network Discovery In Firewall file: endpoint/allow_network_discovery_in_firewall.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/allow_operation_with_consent_admin.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/allow_operation_with_consent_admin.test.yml index d797fdc9d3..e5563d537d 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/allow_operation_with_consent_admin.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/allow_operation_with_consent_admin.test.yml @@ -3,13 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Allow Operation with Consent Admin file: endpoint/allow_operation_with_consent_admin.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational sourcetype: xmlwineventlog - - - \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/endpoint/anomalous_usage_of_7zip.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/anomalous_usage_of_7zip.test.yml index 369aa469e4..a4a5460943 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/anomalous_usage_of_7zip.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/anomalous_usage_of_7zip.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Anomalous usage of 7zip file: endpoint/anomalous_usage_of_7zip.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1560.001/archive_utility/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadfile.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadfile.test.yml index e972ca5e31..16ef2f4ec1 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadfile.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadfile.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Any Powershell DownloadFile file: endpoint/any_powershell_downloadfile.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadstring.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadstring.test.yml index 122ff59583..2106e6212f 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadstring.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadstring.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Any Powershell DownloadString file: endpoint/any_powershell_downloadstring.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/attacker_tools_on_endpoint.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/attacker_tools_on_endpoint.test.yml index 2ce6d32949..408ec40e4a 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/attacker_tools_on_endpoint.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/attacker_tools_on_endpoint.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Attacker Tools On Endpoint file: endpoint/attacker_tools_on_endpoint.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-30d' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -30d + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1595/attacker_scan_tools/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.test.yml index 219a30bb77..7fbc6c5c25 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store file: endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1553.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.test.yml index 52c5b74a41..c343393889 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Attempt To Stop Security Service file: endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_defend_service_stop/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.test.yml index f2bcc7de10..350f093598 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.test.yml @@ -3,11 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe file: endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational sourcetype: xmlwineventlog - diff --git a/tests/endpoint/auto_admin_logon_registry_entry.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/auto_admin_logon_registry_entry.test.yml index 35e38cb16c..353dff7643 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/auto_admin_logon_registry_entry.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/auto_admin_logon_registry_entry.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry file: endpoint/auto_admin_logon_registry_entry.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1552.002/autoadminlogon/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.test.yml index 67c92e718f..9e4d49486c 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Batch File Write to System32 file: endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1204.002/batch_file_in_system32/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/bcdedit_command_back_to_normal_mode_boot.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/bcdedit_command_back_to_normal_mode_boot.test.yml index 4a352d2e57..85f832948f 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/bcdedit_command_back_to_normal_mode_boot.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/bcdedit_command_back_to_normal_mode_boot.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Bcdedit Command Back To Normal Mode Boot file: endpoint/bcdedit_command_back_to_normal_mode_boot.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1552.002/autoadminlogon/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.test.yml index 331aa85f72..57c11afd36 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.test.yml @@ -1,13 +1,13 @@ -name: BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification +name: BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification Unit Test tests: - name: BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification file: endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational sourcetype: xmlwineventlog - update_timestamp: True \ No newline at end of file + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/endpoint/bits_job_persistence.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/bits_job_persistence.test.yml index 3e87301fc5..6ff423451e 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/bits_job_persistence.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/bits_job_persistence.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: BITS Job Persistence file: endpoint/bits_job_persistence.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1197/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/bitsadmin_download_file.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/bitsadmin_download_file.test.yml index 25663f7e79..d7bf6cacfd 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/bitsadmin_download_file.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/bitsadmin_download_file.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: BITSAdmin Download File file: endpoint/bitsadmin_download_file.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1197/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments.test.yml index 2900b76a76..4bc00b2084 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments file: endpoint/certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments.test.yml index 65df1954ea..fe9f7aada7 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments file: endpoint/certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.test.yml index 12d4601c5c..5b44ac6af0 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Certutil exe certificate extraction file: endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-7d' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -7d + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/certutil_with_decode_argument.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/certutil_with_decode_argument.test.yml index d4b5bf611a..7d693a18c2 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/certutil_with_decode_argument.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/certutil_with_decode_argument.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: CertUtil With Decode Argument file: endpoint/certutil_with_decode_argument.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1140/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/change_default_file_association.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/change_default_file_association.test.yml index 42dd4b8324..2045326f8b 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/change_default_file_association.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/change_default_file_association.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Change Default File Association file: endpoint/change_default_file_association.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.001/txtfile_reg/sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/change_to_safe_mode_with_network_config.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/change_to_safe_mode_with_network_config.test.yml index 6c6dd8e13a..61039d41ff 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/change_to_safe_mode_with_network_config.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/change_to_safe_mode_with_network_config.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Change To Safe Mode With Network Config file: endpoint/change_to_safe_mode_with_network_config.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1552.002/autoadminlogon/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/chcp_command_execution.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/chcp_command_execution.test.yml index 0b90e5e8bd..729a2882a7 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/chcp_command_execution.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/chcp_command_execution.test.yml @@ -3,12 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: CHCP Command Execution file: endpoint/chcp_command_execution.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/simulated_icedid/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational sourcetype: xmlwineventlog - - \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/endpoint/check_elevated_cmd_using_whoami.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/check_elevated_cmd_using_whoami.test.yml index c1b40a097d..99d30c0b11 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/check_elevated_cmd_using_whoami.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/check_elevated_cmd_using_whoami.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Check Elevated CMD using whoami file: endpoint/check_elevated_cmd_using_whoami.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_js_2/sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app.test.yml index 6d6992618e..2c9c05a618 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App file: endpoint/clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/clop_common_exec_parameter.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/clop_common_exec_parameter.test.yml index 23bc2d1ec6..39f35814b1 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/clop_common_exec_parameter.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/clop_common_exec_parameter.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Clop Common Exec Parameter file: endpoint/clop_common_exec_parameter.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_b/windows-sysmon.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/clop_ransomware_known_service_name.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/clop_ransomware_known_service_name.test.yml index 31e11ab66b..7e1a49539b 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/clop_ransomware_known_service_name.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/clop_ransomware_known_service_name.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Clop Ransomware Known Service Name file: endpoint/clop_ransomware_known_service_name.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-system.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-system.log source: WinEventLog:System - sourcetype: WinEventLog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: WinEventLog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter.test.yml index c39f5caf49..2116465ea1 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter file: endpoint/cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/cmd_carry_str_param/sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/cmd_echo_pipe___escalation.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/cmd_echo_pipe___escalation.test.yml index 7cb42e8713..5efac7e90a 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/cmd_echo_pipe___escalation.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/cmd_echo_pipe___escalation.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation file: endpoint/cmd_echo_pipe___escalation.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/cmdline_tool_not_executed_in_cmd_shell.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/cmdline_tool_not_executed_in_cmd_shell.test.yml index 2b12437eaa..25f5ccd6b0 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/cmdline_tool_not_executed_in_cmd_shell.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/cmdline_tool_not_executed_in_cmd_shell.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell file: endpoint/cmdline_tool_not_executed_in_cmd_shell.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/jssloader/sysmon.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass.test.yml index 770b92cacb..dd5d45135b 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass file: endpoint/cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/darkside_cmstp_com/windows-sysmon.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/cobalt_strike_named_pipes.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/cobalt_strike_named_pipes.test.yml index 26e57ea485..99840011df 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/cobalt_strike_named_pipes.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/cobalt_strike_named_pipes.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Cobalt Strike Named Pipes file: endpoint/cobalt_strike_named_pipes.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.test.yml index 8b39aa3e04..814a6498fe 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Common Ransomware Extensions file: endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/ransomware_extensions/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.test.yml index e3847c089c..d7ed719cfd 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.test.yml @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ -name: Common Ransomware Extensions Unit Test +name: Common Ransomware Notes Unit Test tests: - name: Common Ransomware Notes file: endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/ransomware_notes/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/conti_common_exec_parameter.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/conti_common_exec_parameter.test.yml index aaa068c8ce..2e93e56089 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/conti_common_exec_parameter.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/conti_common_exec_parameter.test.yml @@ -3,13 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Conti Common Exec parameter file: endpoint/conti_common_exec_parameter.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/conti/inf1/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational sourcetype: xmlwineventlog - - - \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/endpoint/control_loading_from_world_writable_directory.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/control_loading_from_world_writable_directory.test.yml index 0d9e654d60..b1cc6c306e 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/control_loading_from_world_writable_directory.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/control_loading_from_world_writable_directory.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Control Loading from World Writable Directory file: endpoint/control_loading_from_world_writable_directory.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.test.yml index 59960fe704..678150f5e1 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.test.yml @@ -3,19 +3,19 @@ tests: - name: Create local admin accounts using net exe file: endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-security.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log source: WinEventLog:Security sourcetype: WinEventLog - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true - file_name: windows-system.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log source: WinEventLog:System sourcetype: WinEventLog - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational diff --git a/tests/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.test.yml index e83ad61246..8c5de5453d 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Create or delete windows shares using net exe file: endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/create_remote_thread_in_shell_application.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/create_remote_thread_in_shell_application.test.yml index 3d45529127..e8577bcd89 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/create_remote_thread_in_shell_application.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/create_remote_thread_in_shell_application.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Create Remote Thread In Shell Application file: endpoint/create_remote_thread_in_shell_application.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/simulated_icedid/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.test.yml index b2928902c8..5b3342e384 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Create Remote Thread into LSASS file: endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.test.yml index f01f2a6d7e..eaa16e18d4 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.test.yml @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ name: Creation of lsass dump with taskmgr Unit Test tests: -- name: Creation of lsass dump with taskmgr +- name: Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr file: endpoint/creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.test.yml index 6e9ec70756..a12905bc92 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Creation of Shadow Copy file: endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.test.yml index b459c7285d..1c8c6adb71 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell file: endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.test.yml index 70d467b581..b32a86751c 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy file: endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.test.yml index 9652fdc7c7..dfd88112d2 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy file: endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/csc_net_on_the_fly_compilation.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/csc_net_on_the_fly_compilation.test.yml index 983c1f10a8..83ac69fb3d 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/csc_net_on_the_fly_compilation.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/csc_net_on_the_fly_compilation.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: CSC Net On The Fly Compilation file: endpoint/csc_net_on_the_fly_compilation.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-30d' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -30d + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/vilsel/sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.test.yml index 73fd93dabf..86a9ccb4aa 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Curl Download and Bash Execution file: endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: linux-sysmon_curlwget.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log source: Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: sysmon_linux \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: sysmon_linux diff --git a/tests/endpoint/delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell.test.yml index 3f36a62eff..f65c6f0c59 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell.test.yml @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ -name: Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell Test +name: Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell Unit Test tests: - name: Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell file: endpoint/delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-powershell.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-powershell.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational - sourcetype: WinEventLog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: WinEventLog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/deleting_of_net_users.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/deleting_of_net_users.test.yml index c06140938e..4ccef48fd5 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/deleting_of_net_users.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/deleting_of_net_users.test.yml @@ -1,16 +1,12 @@ name: Deleting Of Net Users Unit Test tests: -- name: Excessive Deleting Of Users +- name: Deleting Of Net Users file: endpoint/deleting_of_net_users.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational sourcetype: xmlwineventlog - - - - \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.test.yml index 90a3f3634d..5396f8d8ba 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Deleting Shadow Copies file: endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.test.yml index b25fcd573d..65c11615a4 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.test.yml @@ -3,11 +3,11 @@ tests: - name: Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks file: endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-security.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1550.002/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log source: WinEventLog:Security sourcetype: WinEventLog - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/endpoint/detect_azurehound_command_line_arguments.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/detect_azurehound_command_line_arguments.test.yml index 67a0591dcd..92a1b594f9 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/detect_azurehound_command_line_arguments.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/detect_azurehound_command_line_arguments.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Detect AzureHound Command-Line Arguments file: endpoint/detect_azurehound_command_line_arguments.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/sharphound/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/detect_azurehound_file_modifications.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/detect_azurehound_file_modifications.test.yml index 3db5f91274..3d1577934d 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/detect_azurehound_file_modifications.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/detect_azurehound_file_modifications.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Detect AzureHound File Modifications file: endpoint/detect_azurehound_file_modifications.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/sharphound/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/detect_copy_of_shadowcopy_with_script_block_logging.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/detect_copy_of_shadowcopy_with_script_block_logging.test.yml index b5d5b7a310..20e93d199d 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/detect_copy_of_shadowcopy_with_script_block_logging.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/detect_copy_of_shadowcopy_with_script_block_logging.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Detect Copy of ShadowCopy with Script Block Logging file: endpoint/detect_copy_of_shadowcopy_with_script_block_logging.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-powershell.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/serioussam/windows-powershell.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational - sourcetype: wineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: wineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.test.yml index 5ade33c888..168297c5e4 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access file: endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/detect_empire_with_powershell_script_block_logging.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/detect_empire_with_powershell_script_block_logging.test.yml index 9f6c847c9b..d0feb73f8a 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/detect_empire_with_powershell_script_block_logging.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/detect_empire_with_powershell_script_block_logging.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging file: endpoint/detect_empire_with_powershell_script_block_logging.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-powershell.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational - sourcetype: WinEventLog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: WinEventLog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.test.yml index 73527c9d74..3f147407b0 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.test.yml @@ -3,16 +3,16 @@ tests: - name: Detect Excessive Account Lockouts From Endpoint file: endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-security.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/account_lockout/windows-security.log source: WinEventLog:Security sourcetype: WinEventLog - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true - file_name: windows-system.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/account_lockout/windows-system.log source: WinEventLog:System sourcetype: WinEventLog - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.test.yml index f45e293e67..4abed7735e 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.test.yml @@ -3,16 +3,16 @@ tests: - name: Detect Excessive User Account Lockouts file: endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-security.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/account_lockout/windows-security.log source: WinEventLog:Security sourcetype: WinEventLog - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true - file_name: windows-system.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/account_lockout/windows-system.log source: WinEventLog:System sourcetype: WinEventLog - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/endpoint/detect_exchange_web_shell.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/detect_exchange_web_shell.test.yml index 220a75216b..c5f4f5e917 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/detect_exchange_web_shell.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/detect_exchange_web_shell.test.yml @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ name: Detect Exchange Web Shell Unit Test tests: -- name: Detect Exchange Web Shell, ProxyLogon +- name: Detect Exchange Web Shell file: endpoint/detect_exchange_web_shell.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/windows-sysmon_proxylogon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/detect_html_help_renamed.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/detect_html_help_renamed.test.yml index 40d0ef7935..257d63620c 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/detect_html_help_renamed.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/detect_html_help_renamed.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Detect HTML Help Renamed file: endpoint/detect_html_help_renamed.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/detect_html_help_spawn_child_process.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/detect_html_help_spawn_child_process.test.yml index d35047875e..0711d4a2d5 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/detect_html_help_spawn_child_process.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/detect_html_help_spawn_child_process.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process file: endpoint/detect_html_help_spawn_child_process.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/detect_html_help_url_in_command_line.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/detect_html_help_url_in_command_line.test.yml index 120a1bc318..71746e8270 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/detect_html_help_url_in_command_line.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/detect_html_help_url_in_command_line.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line file: endpoint/detect_html_help_url_in_command_line.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers.test.yml index 060bac2c37..347ddaa819 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers.test.yml @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ -name: Detect HTML Help Using Infotech Storage Handlers Unit Test +name: Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers Unit Test tests: -- name: Detect HTML Help Using Infotech Storage Handlers +- name: Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers file: endpoint/detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.test.yml index 17f93b292c..e1ed2de765 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images file: endpoint/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/detect_mimikatz_with_powershell_script_block_logging.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/detect_mimikatz_with_powershell_script_block_logging.test.yml index f03fd4d85e..68444245ca 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/detect_mimikatz_with_powershell_script_block_logging.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/detect_mimikatz_with_powershell_script_block_logging.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging file: endpoint/detect_mimikatz_with_powershell_script_block_logging.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-powershell.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational - sourcetype: WinEventLog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: WinEventLog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.test.yml index 3f7168eb70..eed78d49e2 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.test.yml @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ name: Detect mshta inline hta execution Unit Test tests: -- name: Detect mshta executing inline protocol handlers +- name: Detect mshta inline hta execution file: endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.test.yml index 6fb5022a26..1eaa1faf03 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.test.yml @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ -name: Detect mshta Rename line test +name: Detect mshta renamed Unit Test tests: -- name: Detect mshta Rename +- name: Detect mshta renamed file: endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.test.yml index 82922a6f94..3285ee3667 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.test.yml @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ -name: Detect mshta url in command line test +name: Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line Unit Test tests: -- name: Detect mshta url in command line +- name: Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line file: endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.test.yml index 077dbc6c73..eaf5e28fcb 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.test.yml @@ -3,19 +3,19 @@ tests: - name: Detect New Local Admin account file: endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-security.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log source: WinEventLog:Security sourcetype: WinEventLog - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true - file_name: windows-system.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log source: WinEventLog:System sourcetype: WinEventLog - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational diff --git a/tests/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.test.yml index 53f7ced227..4ee0bf2596 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe file: endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-7d' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -7d + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1574.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.test.yml index 682689415e..19e215c3fa 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery file: endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1016/discovery_commands/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.test.yml index 08407ec187..f61f53bf16 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.test.yml @@ -1,13 +1,13 @@ name: Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe Unit Test tests: - - name: Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - file: endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml - pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' - description: Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - attack_data: - - file_name: windows-sysmon.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/powershell_spawn_cmd/windows-sysmon.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file +- name: Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe + file: endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml + pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now + description: Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe + attack_data: + - file_name: windows-sysmon.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/powershell_spawn_cmd/windows-sysmon.log + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.test.yml index c922de8c5d..d9b8c3453c 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.test.yml @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ -name: Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag +name: Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag Unit Test tests: - name: Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag file: endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/detect_rclone_command_line_usage.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/detect_rclone_command_line_usage.test.yml index 029bbfe41b..e81d676dca 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/detect_rclone_command_line_usage.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/detect_rclone_command_line_usage.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Detect RClone Command-Line Usage file: endpoint/detect_rclone_command_line_usage.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1020/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/detect_regasm_spawning_a_process.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/detect_regasm_spawning_a_process.test.yml index 3353bf179c..a6914af867 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/detect_regasm_spawning_a_process.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/detect_regasm_spawning_a_process.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Detect Regasm Spawning a Process file: endpoint/detect_regasm_spawning_a_process.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/detect_regasm_with_network_connection.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/detect_regasm_with_network_connection.test.yml index 2748bd5100..1b788a8afa 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/detect_regasm_with_network_connection.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/detect_regasm_with_network_connection.test.yml @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ -name: Detect Regasm With Network Connection Unit Test +name: Detect Regasm with Network Connection Unit Test tests: -- name: Detect Regasm With Network Connection +- name: Detect Regasm with Network Connection file: endpoint/detect_regasm_with_network_connection.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments.test.yml index 3fac881707..7975bad3e9 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments file: endpoint/detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_spawning_a_process.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_spawning_a_process.test.yml index 474d923d4b..321e37b23f 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_spawning_a_process.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_spawning_a_process.test.yml @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ -name: Detect Regsvcs Regasm Spawning a Process Unit Test +name: Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process Unit Test tests: -- name: Detect Regsvcs Regasm Spawning a Process +- name: Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process file: endpoint/detect_regsvcs_spawning_a_process.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection.test.yml index 71788580fd..24b1165321 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection.test.yml @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ -name: Detect Regsvcs With Network Connection Unit Test +name: Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection Unit Test tests: -- name: Detect Regsvcs With Network Connection +- name: Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection file: endpoint/detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments.test.yml index 969d5b5626..0f9eb3fd00 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments.test.yml @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ -name: Detect Regsvcs with no Command Line Arguments Unit Test +name: Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments Unit Test tests: -- name: Detect regsvcs with no Command Line Arguments +- name: Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments file: endpoint/detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.test.yml index c975e940bc..e9a95c8f70 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.test.yml @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ -name: Detect Regsvr32 Appication Control Bypass Unit Test +name: Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass Unit Test tests: -- name: Detect regsvr32 Application Control Bypass +- name: Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass file: endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.010/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/detect_renamed_7_zip.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/detect_renamed_7_zip.test.yml index e0d0b5016b..c176f572e4 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/detect_renamed_7_zip.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/detect_renamed_7_zip.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Detect Renamed 7-Zip file: endpoint/detect_renamed_7_zip.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1560.001/archive_utility/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/detect_renamed_psexec.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/detect_renamed_psexec.test.yml index 4433a31734..5913d634e4 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/detect_renamed_psexec.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/detect_renamed_psexec.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Detect Renamed PSExec file: endpoint/detect_renamed_psexec.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1569.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/detect_renamed_rclone.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/detect_renamed_rclone.test.yml index 592b5da53d..28922f77c6 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/detect_renamed_rclone.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/detect_renamed_rclone.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Detect Renamed RClone file: endpoint/detect_renamed_rclone.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1020/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/detect_renamed_winrar.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/detect_renamed_winrar.test.yml index 62ae0f0c3d..3df172df10 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/detect_renamed_winrar.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/detect_renamed_winrar.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Detect Renamed WinRAR file: endpoint/detect_renamed_winrar.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1560.001/archive_utility/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack.test.yml index b724031987..3c7680e5e7 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack.test.yml @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ -name: Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack +name: Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack Unit Test tests: -- name: Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack and ieadvpack +- name: Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack file: endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi.test.yml index 1b720043a5..810b031a37 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi.test.yml @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ -name: Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi +name: Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi Unit Test tests: - name: Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi file: endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup.test.yml index 9440f42dbe..5454eab759 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup.test.yml @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ -name: Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup +name: Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup Unit Test tests: - name: Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup file: endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.test.yml index 9db91e1c52..0dd38ee367 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.test.yml @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ -name: Detect rundll32 inline hta execution Test +name: Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution Unit Test tests: -- name: Detect rundll32 executing hta with inline protocols +- name: Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution file: endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/detect_sharphound_command_line_arguments.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/detect_sharphound_command_line_arguments.test.yml index 837aca3e30..445d366241 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/detect_sharphound_command_line_arguments.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/detect_sharphound_command_line_arguments.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments file: endpoint/detect_sharphound_command_line_arguments.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/sharphound/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/detect_sharphound_file_modifications.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/detect_sharphound_file_modifications.test.yml index 29fc4d865b..a5cdb545a6 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/detect_sharphound_file_modifications.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/detect_sharphound_file_modifications.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Detect SharpHound File Modifications file: endpoint/detect_sharphound_file_modifications.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/sharphound/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/detect_sharphound_usage.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/detect_sharphound_usage.test.yml index da4408fc50..66d89cb02c 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/detect_sharphound_usage.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/detect_sharphound_usage.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Detect SharpHound Usage file: endpoint/detect_sharphound_usage.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/sharphound/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.test.yml index bd3a0ee8ef..67aea9b4c2 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters file: endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/cmd_spawns_cscript/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence.test.yml index 679df91653..fad4980415 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Detect WMI Event Subscription Persistence file: endpoint/detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/disable_amsi_through_registry.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/disable_amsi_through_registry.test.yml index d76a167e24..ac235a8a93 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/disable_amsi_through_registry.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/disable_amsi_through_registry.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Disable AMSI Through Registry file: endpoint/disable_amsi_through_registry.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/disable_defender_antivirus_registry.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/disable_defender_antivirus_registry.test.yml index 7bc896bf0d..0b8a33b6ac 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/disable_defender_antivirus_registry.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/disable_defender_antivirus_registry.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Disable Defender AntiVirus Registry file: endpoint/disable_defender_antivirus_registry.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/disable_defender_blockatfirstseen_feature.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/disable_defender_blockatfirstseen_feature.test.yml index c59a71686e..63c0ab0324 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/disable_defender_blockatfirstseen_feature.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/disable_defender_blockatfirstseen_feature.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Disable Defender BlockAtFirstSeen Feature file: endpoint/disable_defender_blockatfirstseen_feature.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/disable_defender_enhanced_notification.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/disable_defender_enhanced_notification.test.yml index 04986935f3..69a636e5bf 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/disable_defender_enhanced_notification.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/disable_defender_enhanced_notification.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Disable Defender Enhanced Notification file: endpoint/disable_defender_enhanced_notification.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/disable_defender_mpengine_registry.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/disable_defender_mpengine_registry.test.yml index a54f28cc63..f04deef516 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/disable_defender_mpengine_registry.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/disable_defender_mpengine_registry.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Disable Defender MpEngine Registry file: endpoint/disable_defender_mpengine_registry.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/disable_defender_spynet_reporting.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/disable_defender_spynet_reporting.test.yml index 2c4152f134..ca59530b53 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/disable_defender_spynet_reporting.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/disable_defender_spynet_reporting.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Disable Defender Spynet Reporting file: endpoint/disable_defender_spynet_reporting.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/disable_defender_submit_samples_consent_feature.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/disable_defender_submit_samples_consent_feature.test.yml index f981577b65..0f48552a29 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/disable_defender_submit_samples_consent_feature.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/disable_defender_submit_samples_consent_feature.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Disable Defender Submit Samples Consent Feature file: endpoint/disable_defender_submit_samples_consent_feature.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/disable_etw_through_registry.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/disable_etw_through_registry.test.yml index bd586dade6..e0b1ff6578 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/disable_etw_through_registry.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/disable_etw_through_registry.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Disable ETW Through Registry file: endpoint/disable_etw_through_registry.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/disable_logs_using_wevtutil.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/disable_logs_using_wevtutil.test.yml index 620f570137..98a3a6ad6b 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/disable_logs_using_wevtutil.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/disable_logs_using_wevtutil.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Disable Logs Using WevtUtil file: endpoint/disable_logs_using_wevtutil.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/disable_registry_tool.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/disable_registry_tool.test.yml index f2f6fd210c..b0693dd04e 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/disable_registry_tool.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/disable_registry_tool.test.yml @@ -3,20 +3,20 @@ tests: - name: Disable Registry Tool file: endpoint/disable_registry_tool.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-security.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log source: WinEventLog:Security sourcetype: WinEventLog - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true - file_name: windows-system.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log source: WinEventLog:System sourcetype: WinEventLog - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/disable_schedule_task.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/disable_schedule_task.test.yml index b12f5e2458..a50b149508 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/disable_schedule_task.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/disable_schedule_task.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Disable Schedule Task file: endpoint/disable_schedule_task.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_schtask/sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/disable_security_logs_using_minint_registry.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/disable_security_logs_using_minint_registry.test.yml index b54ddced69..7e9e703938 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/disable_security_logs_using_minint_registry.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/disable_security_logs_using_minint_registry.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry file: endpoint/disable_security_logs_using_minint_registry.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/minint_reg/sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/disable_show_hidden_files.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/disable_show_hidden_files.test.yml index 98db777275..01f66718a6 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/disable_show_hidden_files.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/disable_show_hidden_files.test.yml @@ -3,20 +3,20 @@ tests: - name: Disable Show Hidden Files file: endpoint/disable_show_hidden_files.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-security.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log source: WinEventLog:Security sourcetype: WinEventLog - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true - file_name: windows-system.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log source: WinEventLog:System sourcetype: WinEventLog - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/disable_uac_remote_restriction.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/disable_uac_remote_restriction.test.yml index 4adb6f2d25..3a9b85d112 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/disable_uac_remote_restriction.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/disable_uac_remote_restriction.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Disable UAC Remote Restriction file: endpoint/disable_uac_remote_restriction.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy/sysmon.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/disable_windows_app_hotkeys.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/disable_windows_app_hotkeys.test.yml index addc4307f6..a2668268c5 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/disable_windows_app_hotkeys.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/disable_windows_app_hotkeys.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Disable Windows App Hotkeys file: endpoint/disable_windows_app_hotkeys.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/hotkey_disabled_hidden_user/windows-sysmon.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/disable_windows_behavior_monitoring.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/disable_windows_behavior_monitoring.test.yml index 01c556ef9c..f9198c5b00 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/disable_windows_behavior_monitoring.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/disable_windows_behavior_monitoring.test.yml @@ -3,20 +3,20 @@ tests: - name: Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring file: endpoint/disable_windows_behavior_monitoring.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-security.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log source: WinEventLog:Security sourcetype: WinEventLog - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true - file_name: windows-system.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log source: WinEventLog:System sourcetype: WinEventLog - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/disable_windows_smartscreen_protection.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/disable_windows_smartscreen_protection.test.yml index b1174e469c..f4e70f3667 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/disable_windows_smartscreen_protection.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/disable_windows_smartscreen_protection.test.yml @@ -3,20 +3,20 @@ tests: - name: Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection file: endpoint/disable_windows_smartscreen_protection.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-security.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log source: WinEventLog:Security sourcetype: WinEventLog - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true - file_name: windows-system.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log source: WinEventLog:System sourcetype: WinEventLog - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/disabling_cmd_application.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/disabling_cmd_application.test.yml index 42cb6a6770..24ba75bce5 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/disabling_cmd_application.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/disabling_cmd_application.test.yml @@ -3,20 +3,20 @@ tests: - name: Disabling CMD Application file: endpoint/disabling_cmd_application.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-security.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log source: WinEventLog:Security sourcetype: WinEventLog - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true - file_name: windows-system.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log source: WinEventLog:System sourcetype: WinEventLog - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/disabling_controlpanel.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/disabling_controlpanel.test.yml index b0f8a184d4..e35dd44e69 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/disabling_controlpanel.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/disabling_controlpanel.test.yml @@ -3,20 +3,20 @@ tests: - name: Disabling ControlPanel file: endpoint/disabling_controlpanel.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-security.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log source: WinEventLog:Security sourcetype: WinEventLog - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true - file_name: windows-system.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log source: WinEventLog:System sourcetype: WinEventLog - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/disabling_defender_services.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/disabling_defender_services.test.yml index c22cc73c4f..83e2160cb8 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/disabling_defender_services.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/disabling_defender_services.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Disabling Defender Services file: endpoint/disabling_defender_services.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon2.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon2.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/disabling_firewall_with_netsh.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/disabling_firewall_with_netsh.test.yml index cfad109c1e..9dac643ad4 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/disabling_firewall_with_netsh.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/disabling_firewall_with_netsh.test.yml @@ -3,20 +3,20 @@ tests: - name: Disabling Firewall with Netsh file: endpoint/disabling_firewall_with_netsh.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-security.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log source: WinEventLog:Security sourcetype: WinEventLog - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true - file_name: windows-system.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log source: WinEventLog:System sourcetype: WinEventLog - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/disabling_folderoptions_windows_feature.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/disabling_folderoptions_windows_feature.test.yml index 213be9e4cf..b5252c8271 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/disabling_folderoptions_windows_feature.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/disabling_folderoptions_windows_feature.test.yml @@ -3,20 +3,20 @@ tests: - name: Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature file: endpoint/disabling_folderoptions_windows_feature.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-security.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log source: WinEventLog:Security sourcetype: WinEventLog - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true - file_name: windows-system.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log source: WinEventLog:System sourcetype: WinEventLog - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlogE \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlogE diff --git a/tests/endpoint/disabling_net_user_account.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/disabling_net_user_account.test.yml index 0b0824737f..4250d91c90 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/disabling_net_user_account.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/disabling_net_user_account.test.yml @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ name: Disabling Net User Account Unit Test tests: -- name: Disabling Net User Account +- name: Disabling Net User Account file: endpoint/disabling_net_user_account.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/disabling_norun_windows_app.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/disabling_norun_windows_app.test.yml index 93cb1186b8..ef8ad59d3b 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/disabling_norun_windows_app.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/disabling_norun_windows_app.test.yml @@ -3,20 +3,20 @@ tests: - name: Disabling NoRun Windows App file: endpoint/disabling_norun_windows_app.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-security.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log source: WinEventLog:Security sourcetype: WinEventLog - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true - file_name: windows-system.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log source: WinEventLog:System sourcetype: WinEventLog - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.test.yml index 13c931be83..40fc50add0 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Disabling Remote User Account Control file: endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/disabling_systemrestore_in_registry.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/disabling_systemrestore_in_registry.test.yml index 61d8cfbf10..1ae373a5d2 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/disabling_systemrestore_in_registry.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/disabling_systemrestore_in_registry.test.yml @@ -3,20 +3,20 @@ tests: - name: Disabling SystemRestore In Registry file: endpoint/disabling_systemrestore_in_registry.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-security.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log source: WinEventLog:Security sourcetype: WinEventLog - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true - file_name: windows-system.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log source: WinEventLog:System sourcetype: WinEventLog - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/disabling_task_manager.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/disabling_task_manager.test.yml index b169662e6b..03163501ec 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/disabling_task_manager.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/disabling_task_manager.test.yml @@ -3,20 +3,20 @@ tests: - name: Disabling Task Manager file: endpoint/disabling_task_manager.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-security.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log source: WinEventLog:Security sourcetype: WinEventLog - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true - file_name: windows-system.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log source: WinEventLog:System sourcetype: WinEventLog - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/dllhost_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/dllhost_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.test.yml index bcd7fb2a54..c4c27d8637 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/dllhost_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/dllhost_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network file: endpoint/dllhost_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon_dllhost.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app.test.yml index ff76336158..fd58a4164e 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App file: endpoint/dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/nslookup_exfil/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/domain_account_discovery_with_dsquery.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/domain_account_discovery_with_dsquery.test.yml index 998b007966..6f906d61f8 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/domain_account_discovery_with_dsquery.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/domain_account_discovery_with_dsquery.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Domain Account Discovery with Dsquery file: endpoint/domain_account_discovery_with_dsquery.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/domain_account_discovery_with_net_app.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/domain_account_discovery_with_net_app.test.yml index 4a78b48b43..75d1046a0d 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/domain_account_discovery_with_net_app.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/domain_account_discovery_with_net_app.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Domain Account Discovery With Net App file: endpoint/domain_account_discovery_with_net_app.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/domain_account_discovery_with_wmic.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/domain_account_discovery_with_wmic.test.yml index 0cd381fae0..993106b25d 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/domain_account_discovery_with_wmic.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/domain_account_discovery_with_wmic.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Domain Account Discovery with Wmic file: endpoint/domain_account_discovery_with_wmic.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/domain_controller_discovery_with_nltest.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/domain_controller_discovery_with_nltest.test.yml index 47a1c7a0bb..6b17fc21c4 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/domain_controller_discovery_with_nltest.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/domain_controller_discovery_with_nltest.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest file: endpoint/domain_controller_discovery_with_nltest.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/domain_controller_discovery_with_wmic.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/domain_controller_discovery_with_wmic.test.yml index 27624f60f4..23a05524ab 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/domain_controller_discovery_with_wmic.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/domain_controller_discovery_with_wmic.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Domain Controller Discovery with Wmic file: endpoint/domain_controller_discovery_with_wmic.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_adsisearcher.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_adsisearcher.test.yml index 1a7c735731..68d8803ffa 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_adsisearcher.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_adsisearcher.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Domain Group Discovery with Adsisearcher file: endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_adsisearcher.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-powershell.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational - sourcetype: wineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: wineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_dsquery.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_dsquery.test.yml index befd87f9f1..9b1a37ac1e 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_dsquery.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_dsquery.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Domain Group Discovery With Dsquery file: endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_dsquery.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_net.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_net.test.yml index c74501e388..c16ca757b5 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_net.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_net.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Domain Group Discovery With Net file: endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_net.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_wmic.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_wmic.test.yml index a7f8f7f998..eeeae5a125 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_wmic.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_wmic.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Domain Group Discovery With Wmic file: endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_wmic.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/download_files_using_telegram.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/download_files_using_telegram.test.yml index 74b143e66e..45e187c15c 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/download_files_using_telegram.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/download_files_using_telegram.test.yml @@ -3,12 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Download Files Using Telegram file: endpoint/download_files_using_telegram.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/minergate/windows-sysmon.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational sourcetype: xmlwineventlog - - diff --git a/tests/endpoint/drop_icedid_license_dat.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/drop_icedid_license_dat.test.yml index f1bc61cd4f..6e1ce5fb36 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/drop_icedid_license_dat.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/drop_icedid_license_dat.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Drop IcedID License dat file: endpoint/drop_icedid_license_dat.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/simulated_icedid/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/dsquery_domain_discovery.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/dsquery_domain_discovery.test.yml index b863b03676..a26e47e9c8 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/dsquery_domain_discovery.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/dsquery_domain_discovery.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: DSQuery Domain Discovery file: endpoint/dsquery_domain_discovery.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.test.yml index 595eb54e8b..e06bae36e4 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL file: endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.test.yml index 40d26e48fb..bdaad1cca5 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Dump LSASS via procdump file: endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index b1225d12fd..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,12 +0,0 @@ -name: Dump lsass via procdump rename Unit Test -tests: -- name: Dump lsass via procdump rename - file: deprecated/dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.yml - pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' - attack_data: - - file_name: windows-sysmon.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/endpoint/elevated_group_discovery_with_net.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/elevated_group_discovery_with_net.test.yml index c57ff3e2d5..2ba5091986 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/elevated_group_discovery_with_net.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/elevated_group_discovery_with_net.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Elevated Group Discovery With Net file: endpoint/elevated_group_discovery_with_net.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/elevated_group_discovery_with_powerview.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/elevated_group_discovery_with_powerview.test.yml index afa8c5cfae..232c5af98b 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/elevated_group_discovery_with_powerview.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/elevated_group_discovery_with_powerview.test.yml @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ -name: Elevated Group Discovery with PowerViewUnit Test +name: Elevated Group Discovery with PowerView Unit Test tests: - name: Elevated Group Discovery with PowerView file: endpoint/elevated_group_discovery_with_powerview.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-powershell.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational - sourcetype: wineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: wineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/elevated_group_discovery_with_wmic.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/elevated_group_discovery_with_wmic.test.yml index 77b45b227d..92e0dab45e 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/elevated_group_discovery_with_wmic.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/elevated_group_discovery_with_wmic.test.yml @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ -name: Elevated Group Discovery With WmicUnit Test +name: Elevated Group Discovery With Wmic Unit Test tests: - name: Elevated Group Discovery With Wmic file: endpoint/elevated_group_discovery_with_wmic.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/enable_rdp_in_other_port_number.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/enable_rdp_in_other_port_number.test.yml index 25e3995cc1..dde9f9be07 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/enable_rdp_in_other_port_number.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/enable_rdp_in_other_port_number.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Enable RDP In Other Port Number file: endpoint/enable_rdp_in_other_port_number.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/casper/datasets1/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/enable_wdigest_uselogoncredential_registry.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/enable_wdigest_uselogoncredential_registry.test.yml index 735c79499f..9cd12f2a31 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/enable_wdigest_uselogoncredential_registry.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/enable_wdigest_uselogoncredential_registry.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry file: endpoint/enable_wdigest_uselogoncredential_registry.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/wdigest_enable/sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/enumerate_users_local_group_using_telegram.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/enumerate_users_local_group_using_telegram.test.yml index 59f6e6d3e9..03365de867 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/enumerate_users_local_group_using_telegram.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/enumerate_users_local_group_using_telegram.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Enumerate Users Local Group Using Telegram file: endpoint/enumerate_users_local_group_using_telegram.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-security.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/minergate/windows-security.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/esentutl_sam_copy.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/esentutl_sam_copy.test.yml index 12c872a38e..5886afa708 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/esentutl_sam_copy.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/esentutl_sam_copy.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Esentutl SAM Copy file: endpoint/esentutl_sam_copy.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/etw_registry_disabled.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/etw_registry_disabled.test.yml index 4decd04292..05f664bc6f 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/etw_registry_disabled.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/etw_registry_disabled.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: ETW Registry Disabled file: endpoint/etw_registry_disabled.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127/etw_disable/sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/eventvwr_uac_bypass.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/eventvwr_uac_bypass.test.yml index 27cbf0b7ce..7e7c8a2506 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/eventvwr_uac_bypass.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/eventvwr_uac_bypass.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Eventvwr UAC Bypass file: endpoint/eventvwr_uac_bypass.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/excel_spawning_powershell.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/excel_spawning_powershell.test.yml index c727cd2f58..3d8c4c509e 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/excel_spawning_powershell.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/excel_spawning_powershell.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Excel Spawning PowerShell file: endpoint/excel_spawning_powershell.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/excel_spawning_windows_script_host.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/excel_spawning_windows_script_host.test.yml index 9f3e80bd51..db1b3c78e9 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/excel_spawning_windows_script_host.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/excel_spawning_windows_script_host.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Excel Spawning Windows Script Host file: endpoint/excel_spawning_windows_script_host.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/excessive_attempt_to_disable_services.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/excessive_attempt_to_disable_services.test.yml index d88d68a4bc..e945170464 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/excessive_attempt_to_disable_services.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/excessive_attempt_to_disable_services.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Excessive Attempt To Disable Services file: endpoint/excessive_attempt_to_disable_services.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/excessive_number_of_distinct_processes_created_in_windows_temp_folder.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/excessive_number_of_distinct_processes_created_in_windows_temp_folder.test.yml index 5472eba9ea..693efb4d82 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/excessive_number_of_distinct_processes_created_in_windows_temp_folder.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/excessive_number_of_distinct_processes_created_in_windows_temp_folder.test.yml @@ -3,11 +3,11 @@ tests: - name: Excessive number of distinct processes created in Windows Temp folder file: endpoint/excessive_number_of_distinct_processes_created_in_windows_temp_folder.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - - file_name: windows-security.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059/meterpreter/windows_temp_processes/logExcessiveWindowsTemp.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - sourcetype: WinEventLog - update_timestamp: True \ No newline at end of file + - file_name: windows-security.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059/meterpreter/windows_temp_processes/logExcessiveWindowsTemp.log + source: WinEventLog:Security + sourcetype: WinEventLog + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/endpoint/excessive_number_of_service_control_start_as_disabled.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/excessive_number_of_service_control_start_as_disabled.test.yml index 1010dbbc73..82084f5c7b 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/excessive_number_of_service_control_start_as_disabled.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/excessive_number_of_service_control_start_as_disabled.test.yml @@ -3,11 +3,11 @@ tests: - name: Excessive number of service control start as disabled file: endpoint/excessive_number_of_service_control_start_as_disabled.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/sc_service_start_disabled/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational sourcetype: xmlwineventlog - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/endpoint/excessive_number_of_taskhost_processes.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/excessive_number_of_taskhost_processes.test.yml index 8fc97f291b..b71a857e10 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/excessive_number_of_taskhost_processes.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/excessive_number_of_taskhost_processes.test.yml @@ -3,11 +3,11 @@ tests: - name: Excessive number of taskhost processes file: endpoint/excessive_number_of_taskhost_processes.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - - file_name: windows-security.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059/meterpreter/taskhost_processes/logExcessiveTaskHost.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - sourcetype: WinEventLog - update_timestamp: True \ No newline at end of file + - file_name: windows-security.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059/meterpreter/taskhost_processes/logExcessiveTaskHost.log + source: WinEventLog:Security + sourcetype: WinEventLog + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/endpoint/excessive_service_stop_attempt.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/excessive_service_stop_attempt.test.yml index e678515f18..e0bc1e25aa 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/excessive_service_stop_attempt.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/excessive_service_stop_attempt.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Excessive Service Stop Attempt file: endpoint/excessive_service_stop_attempt.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_cacls_app.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_cacls_app.test.yml index a547af951a..ef6303e221 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_cacls_app.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_cacls_app.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Excessive Usage Of Cacls App file: endpoint/excessive_usage_of_cacls_app.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_net_app.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_net_app.test.yml index 557963736e..def484ccf1 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_net_app.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_net_app.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Excessive Usage Of Net App file: endpoint/excessive_usage_of_net_app.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app.test.yml index 632b5978c7..2822fb969c 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App file: endpoint/excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/nslookup_exfil/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility.test.yml index 7add349bc8..0798bc112c 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility file: endpoint/excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_taskkill.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_taskkill.test.yml index 9ac7b25183..de8d0898d2 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_taskkill.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_taskkill.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Excessive Usage Of Taskkill file: endpoint/excessive_usage_of_taskkill.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share.test.yml index 0f5150c79a..1feec0d803 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share file: endpoint/executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-security.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/exe_smbshare/windows-security.log source: WinEventLog:Security - sourcetype: WinEventLog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: WinEventLog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path.test.yml index 0183b2e7a1..4f64586e3c 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path file: endpoint/executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/execute_javascript_with_jscript_com_clsid.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/execute_javascript_with_jscript_com_clsid.test.yml index 6fe7cadb62..a80f0b1756 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/execute_javascript_with_jscript_com_clsid.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/execute_javascript_with_jscript_com_clsid.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID file: endpoint/execute_javascript_with_jscript_com_clsid.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.test.yml index f32e552456..a42e9b6684 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Execution of File with Multiple Extensions file: endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/extraction_of_registry_hives.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/extraction_of_registry_hives.test.yml index 10e6370649..6dac742645 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/extraction_of_registry_hives.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/extraction_of_registry_hives.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Extraction of Registry Hives file: endpoint/extraction_of_registry_hives.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.test.yml index 5f958265a2..82e5799cb4 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: File with Samsam Extension file: endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/samsam_extension/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/firewall_allowed_program_enable.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/firewall_allowed_program_enable.test.yml index 23ebd31f6d..c6a2e78adc 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/firewall_allowed_program_enable.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/firewall_allowed_program_enable.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Firewall Allowed Program Enable file: endpoint/firewall_allowed_program_enable.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-30d' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -30d + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/vilsel/sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/fodhelper_uac_bypass.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/fodhelper_uac_bypass.test.yml index ad95587bd1..e290052724 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/fodhelper_uac_bypass.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/fodhelper_uac_bypass.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: FodHelper UAC Bypass file: endpoint/fodhelper_uac_bypass.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/fsutil_zeroing_file.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/fsutil_zeroing_file.test.yml index 9f813f611e..f82aa15ef4 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/fsutil_zeroing_file.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/fsutil_zeroing_file.test.yml @@ -3,13 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Fsutil Zeroing File file: endpoint/fsutil_zeroing_file.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070/fsutil_file_zero/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational sourcetype: xmlwineventlog - - - \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/endpoint/get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell.test.yml index 40479d3a9a..6c35e733f8 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell file: endpoint/get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml index 15b4775f0f..b7d0e8d41d 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block file: endpoint/get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-powershell.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-powershell.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational - sourcetype: WinEventLog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: WinEventLog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/get_aduser_with_powershell.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/get_aduser_with_powershell.test.yml index 461b37924d..f25015e7e2 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/get_aduser_with_powershell.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/get_aduser_with_powershell.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Get ADUser with PowerShell file: endpoint/get_aduser_with_powershell.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/get_aduser_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/get_aduser_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml index 31858a93c2..9c45b48d09 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/get_aduser_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/get_aduser_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block file: endpoint/get_aduser_with_powershell_script_block.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-powershell.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational - sourcetype: WinEventLog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: WinEventLog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell.test.yml index ace51f6c21..95e6612d7c 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell.test.yml @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ name: Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Unit Test tests: -- name: Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell +- name: Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell file: endpoint/get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml index 1e9fd7eb85..72007a7295 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block file: endpoint/get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-powershell.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-powershell.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational - sourcetype: WinEventLog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: WinEventLog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/get_domainpolicy_with_powershell.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/get_domainpolicy_with_powershell.test.yml index f484567632..86deca9c56 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/get_domainpolicy_with_powershell.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/get_domainpolicy_with_powershell.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Get DomainPolicy with Powershell file: endpoint/get_domainpolicy_with_powershell.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml index 705eb31b67..d65f4ccf3e 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Get DomainPolicy with Powershell Script Block file: endpoint/get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-powershell.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-powershell.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational - sourcetype: WinEventLog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: WinEventLog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/get_domaintrust_with_powershell.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/get_domaintrust_with_powershell.test.yml index 89b7cd468c..b384732716 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/get_domaintrust_with_powershell.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/get_domaintrust_with_powershell.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell file: endpoint/get_domaintrust_with_powershell.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/discovery/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/get_domaintrust_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/get_domaintrust_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml index b29a8ac0fc..e6d8b8e1df 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/get_domaintrust_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/get_domaintrust_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell Script Block file: endpoint/get_domaintrust_with_powershell_script_block.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-powershell.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/discovery/windows-powershell.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational - sourcetype: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational diff --git a/tests/endpoint/get_domainuser_with_powershell.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/get_domainuser_with_powershell.test.yml index 0abe5e6722..4588064a4b 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/get_domainuser_with_powershell.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/get_domainuser_with_powershell.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Get DomainUser with PowerShell file: endpoint/get_domainuser_with_powershell.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/get_domainuser_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/get_domainuser_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml index bae14d79d5..8dd994abfb 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/get_domainuser_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/get_domainuser_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block file: endpoint/get_domainuser_with_powershell_script_block.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-powershell.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational - sourcetype: WinEventLog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: WinEventLog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/get_foresttrust_with_powershell.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/get_foresttrust_with_powershell.test.yml index fc2186ebf7..7629c04bd7 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/get_foresttrust_with_powershell.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/get_foresttrust_with_powershell.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell file: endpoint/get_foresttrust_with_powershell.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/discovery/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/get_foresttrust_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/get_foresttrust_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml index 46f0c5b07b..dda8e77910 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/get_foresttrust_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/get_foresttrust_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell Script Block file: endpoint/get_foresttrust_with_powershell_script_block.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-powershell.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/discovery/windows-powershell.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational - sourcetype: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational diff --git a/tests/endpoint/get_wmiobject_group_discovery.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/get_wmiobject_group_discovery.test.yml index 0a23af4275..dddbef2cba 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/get_wmiobject_group_discovery.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/get_wmiobject_group_discovery.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Get WMIObject Group Discovery file: endpoint/get_wmiobject_group_discovery.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/get_wmiobject_group_discovery_with_script_block_logging.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/get_wmiobject_group_discovery_with_script_block_logging.test.yml index 036c5e3fa0..6fab339403 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/get_wmiobject_group_discovery_with_script_block_logging.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/get_wmiobject_group_discovery_with_script_block_logging.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Get WMIObject Group Discovery with Script Block Logging file: endpoint/get_wmiobject_group_discovery_with_script_block_logging.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-powershell.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-powershell.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational - sourcetype: wineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: wineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/getadcomputer_with_powershell.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/getadcomputer_with_powershell.test.yml index 115e8dfa1a..0fb9715ec4 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/getadcomputer_with_powershell.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/getadcomputer_with_powershell.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: GetAdComputer with PowerShell file: endpoint/getadcomputer_with_powershell.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/getadcomputer_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/getadcomputer_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml index 0bcc13d836..1c2b617a8b 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/getadcomputer_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/getadcomputer_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: GetAdComputer with PowerShell Script Block file: endpoint/getadcomputer_with_powershell_script_block.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-powershell.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational - sourcetype: wineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: wineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/getadgroup_with_powershell.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/getadgroup_with_powershell.test.yml index 460b02ca32..fa77dfb1e0 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/getadgroup_with_powershell.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/getadgroup_with_powershell.test.yml @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ name: GetAdGroup with PowerShell Unit Test -tests: +tests: - name: GetAdGroup with PowerShell file: endpoint/getadgroup_with_powershell.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/getadgroup_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/getadgroup_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml index 0a44e078a7..f46f12e127 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/getadgroup_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/getadgroup_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: GetAdGroup with PowerShell Script Block file: endpoint/getadgroup_with_powershell_script_block.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-powershell.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational - sourcetype: wineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: wineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/getcurrent_user_with_powershell.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/getcurrent_user_with_powershell.test.yml index 36f254a361..3dd961a731 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/getcurrent_user_with_powershell.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/getcurrent_user_with_powershell.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: GetCurrent User with PowerShell file: endpoint/getcurrent_user_with_powershell.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/getcurrent_user_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/getcurrent_user_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml index 2fdbad5df8..ad6904eb49 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/getcurrent_user_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/getcurrent_user_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: GetCurrent User with PowerShell Script Block file: endpoint/getcurrent_user_with_powershell_script_block.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-powershell.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational - sourcetype: wineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: wineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/getdomaincomputer_with_powershell.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/getdomaincomputer_with_powershell.test.yml index 85f6172fc3..9a8a84b9d6 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/getdomaincomputer_with_powershell.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/getdomaincomputer_with_powershell.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: GetDomainComputer with PowerShell file: endpoint/getdomaincomputer_with_powershell.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml index f8aafbba4b..4502690697 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: GetDomainComputer with PowerShell Script Block file: endpoint/getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_script_block.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-powershell.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational - sourcetype: wineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: wineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/getdomaincontroller_with_powershell.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/getdomaincontroller_with_powershell.test.yml index 7f8e7e40d5..6d3e05cbd5 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/getdomaincontroller_with_powershell.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/getdomaincontroller_with_powershell.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: GetDomainController with PowerShell file: endpoint/getdomaincontroller_with_powershell.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml index 1be5d46f53..183634e851 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: GetDomainController with PowerShell Script Block file: endpoint/getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_script_block.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-powershell.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational - sourcetype: wineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: wineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/getdomaingroup_with_powershell.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/getdomaingroup_with_powershell.test.yml index 303ec60e3d..07b4f43afa 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/getdomaingroup_with_powershell.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/getdomaingroup_with_powershell.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: GetDomainGroup with PowerShell file: endpoint/getdomaingroup_with_powershell.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/getdomaingroup_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/getdomaingroup_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml index 569c34fb55..296c581cd8 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/getdomaingroup_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/getdomaingroup_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: GetDomainGroup with PowerShell Script Block file: endpoint/getdomaingroup_with_powershell_script_block.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-powershell.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational - sourcetype: wineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: wineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/getlocaluser_with_powershell.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/getlocaluser_with_powershell.test.yml index a2b7ae4e89..906ee52e1c 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/getlocaluser_with_powershell.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/getlocaluser_with_powershell.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: GetLocalUser with PowerShell file: endpoint/getlocaluser_with_powershell.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/getlocaluser_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/getlocaluser_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml index 5e96027046..ccb3289680 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/getlocaluser_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/getlocaluser_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block file: endpoint/getlocaluser_with_powershell_script_block.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-powershell.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational - sourcetype: wineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: wineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/getnettcpconnection_with_powershell.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/getnettcpconnection_with_powershell.test.yml index 64d10abed7..a63568edbc 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/getnettcpconnection_with_powershell.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/getnettcpconnection_with_powershell.test.yml @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ name: GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell Unit Test tests: -- name: GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell +- name: GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell file: endpoint/getnettcpconnection_with_powershell.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1049/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml index 6f46d30a7b..088d172453 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell Script Block file: endpoint/getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_script_block.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-powershell.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1049/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational - sourcetype: wineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: wineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell.test.yml index bc3321626e..016d7441ea 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell file: endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml index 2b80757428..ca7ff36731 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell Script Block file: endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_script_block.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-powershell.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational - sourcetype: wineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: wineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell.test.yml index 24225be9c0..513eb2f998 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell file: endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml index 0e862eae33..0fc0f1421e 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell Script Block file: endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_script_block.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-powershell.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational - sourcetype: wineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: wineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell.test.yml index 6637d3263c..b1b71b1348 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell file: endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml index ee1809782e..49113fd821 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell Script Block file: endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_script_block.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-powershell.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational - sourcetype: WinEventLog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: WinEventLog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell.test.yml index c7940893bc..29ddfcdb28 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell file: endpoint/getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml index 8ed5fc6046..7b099a2b03 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_script_block.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block file: endpoint/getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_script_block.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-powershell.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational - sourcetype: wineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: wineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/gpupdate_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/gpupdate_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.test.yml index 71325e2495..5d25a330e0 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/gpupdate_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/gpupdate_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network file: endpoint/gpupdate_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/hide_user_account_from_sign_in_screen.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/hide_user_account_from_sign_in_screen.test.yml index bb0f6358f0..93800901c7 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/hide_user_account_from_sign_in_screen.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/hide_user_account_from_sign_in_screen.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen file: endpoint/hide_user_account_from_sign_in_screen.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/hotkey_disabled_hidden_user/windows-sysmon.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.test.yml index e8b864c8aa..a5b4eb2d17 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe file: endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1222.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/high_frequency_copy_of_files_in_network_share.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/high_frequency_copy_of_files_in_network_share.test.yml index 66b0e63cbe..9764315756 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/high_frequency_copy_of_files_in_network_share.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/high_frequency_copy_of_files_in_network_share.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share file: endpoint/high_frequency_copy_of_files_in_network_share.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-30d' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -30d + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: security.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1537/high_copy_files_in_net_share/security.log source: WinEventLog:Security - sourcetype: WinEventLog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: WinEventLog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/high_process_termination_frequency.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/high_process_termination_frequency.test.yml index 8e9e14a92a..f99b62b892 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/high_process_termination_frequency.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/high_process_termination_frequency.test.yml @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ name: High Process Termination Frequency Unit Test tests: -- name: High Process Termination Frequency +- name: High Process Termination Frequency file: endpoint/high_process_termination_frequency.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/hunting_for_log4shell.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/hunting_for_log4shell.test.yml index 2cc6e1d6d4..b769d04269 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/hunting_for_log4shell.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/hunting_for_log4shell.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Hunting for Log4Shell file: endpoint/hunting_for_log4shell.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: log4shell-nginx.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/log4shell-nginx.log source: /var/log/nginx/access.log - sourcetype: nginx:plus:kv \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: nginx:plus:kv diff --git a/tests/endpoint/icacls_deny_command.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/icacls_deny_command.test.yml index eec60ce008..4c88c9e930 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/icacls_deny_command.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/icacls_deny_command.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Icacls Deny Command file: endpoint/icacls_deny_command.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/icacls_grant_command.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/icacls_grant_command.test.yml index c2c8c66ee4..c292468f53 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/icacls_grant_command.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/icacls_grant_command.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: ICACLS Grant Command file: endpoint/icacls_grant_command.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation.test.yml index 4d11669497..654e3089b1 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: IcedID Exfiltrated Archived File Creation file: endpoint/icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/simulated_icedid/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters.test.yml index f709d110f8..f26067a086 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters file: endpoint/impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.003/impacket/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/interactive_session_on_remote_endpoint_with_powershell.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/interactive_session_on_remote_endpoint_with_powershell.test.yml index a4be81cd7e..c768354c5c 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/interactive_session_on_remote_endpoint_with_powershell.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/interactive_session_on_remote_endpoint_with_powershell.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell file: endpoint/interactive_session_on_remote_endpoint_with_powershell.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-powershell.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement_pssession/windows-powershell.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational - sourcetype: wineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: wineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.test.yml index 6d6ee22ffc..3c8d2fb0a5 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.test.yml @@ -3,11 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Java Class File download by Java User Agent file: endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: java.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java.log source: stream:http sourcetype: stream:http - diff --git a/tests/endpoint/jscript_execution_using_cscript_app.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/jscript_execution_using_cscript_app.test.yml index de8fe9be33..eac73031b5 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/jscript_execution_using_cscript_app.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/jscript_execution_using_cscript_app.test.yml @@ -3,13 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Jscript Execution Using Cscript App file: endpoint/jscript_execution_using_cscript_app.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_macro_js_1/sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational sourcetype: xmlwineventlog - - - \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.test.yml index 0e95642c09..0ccedf2ad7 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.test.yml @@ -3,11 +3,11 @@ tests: - name: Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption file: endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-security.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/rubeus/windows-security.log source: WinEventLog:Security sourcetype: WinEventLog - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/endpoint/known_services_killed_by_ransomware.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/known_services_killed_by_ransomware.test.yml index 86b9a6ac3f..e046071c7b 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/known_services_killed_by_ransomware.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/known_services_killed_by_ransomware.test.yml @@ -3,13 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Known Services Killed by Ransomware file: endpoint/known_services_killed_by_ransomware.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-system.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf3/windows-system.log source: WinEventLog:System sourcetype: WinEventLog - - - \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/endpoint/linux_add_files_in_known_crontab_directories.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/linux_add_files_in_known_crontab_directories.test.yml index e0d0767e9b..bafdc30c52 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/linux_add_files_in_known_crontab_directories.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/linux_add_files_in_known_crontab_directories.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories file: endpoint/linux_add_files_in_known_crontab_directories.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon_linux.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/cronjobs_entry/sysmon_linux.log source: Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: sysmon_linux \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: sysmon_linux diff --git a/tests/endpoint/linux_at_allow_config_file_creation.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/linux_at_allow_config_file_creation.test.yml index d2f3ba2a95..c070af54f3 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/linux_at_allow_config_file_creation.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/linux_at_allow_config_file_creation.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Linux At Allow Config File Creation file: endpoint/linux_at_allow_config_file_creation.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon_linux.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.001/at_execution/sysmon_linux.log source: Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: sysmon_linux \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: sysmon_linux diff --git a/tests/endpoint/linux_at_application_execution.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/linux_at_application_execution.test.yml index ea3b48dbd0..f12ac1f9b6 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/linux_at_application_execution.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/linux_at_application_execution.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Linux At Application Execution file: endpoint/linux_at_application_execution.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon_linux.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.001/at_execution/sysmon_linux.log source: Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: sysmon_linux \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: sysmon_linux diff --git a/tests/endpoint/linux_change_file_owner_to_root.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/linux_change_file_owner_to_root.test.yml index 9549f84393..244a1808cc 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/linux_change_file_owner_to_root.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/linux_change_file_owner_to_root.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Linux Change File Owner To Root file: endpoint/linux_change_file_owner_to_root.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon_linux.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.001/chmod_uid/sysmon_linux.log source: Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: sysmon_linux \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: sysmon_linux diff --git a/tests/endpoint/linux_edit_cron_table_parameter.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/linux_edit_cron_table_parameter.test.yml index 2dd65af9e5..a071902907 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/linux_edit_cron_table_parameter.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/linux_edit_cron_table_parameter.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter file: endpoint/linux_edit_cron_table_parameter.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon_linux.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/crontab_edit_parameter/sysmon_linux.log source: Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: sysmon_linux \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: sysmon_linux diff --git a/tests/endpoint/linux_file_created_in_kernel_driver_directory.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/linux_file_created_in_kernel_driver_directory.test.yml index 8ef34feb59..8cd41b01ff 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/linux_file_created_in_kernel_driver_directory.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/linux_file_created_in_kernel_driver_directory.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory file: endpoint/linux_file_created_in_kernel_driver_directory.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon_linux.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.006/loading_linux_kernel_module/sysmon_linux.log source: Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: sysmon_linux \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: sysmon_linux diff --git a/tests/endpoint/linux_file_creation_in_init_boot_directory.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/linux_file_creation_in_init_boot_directory.test.yml index c974589469..ebe521b893 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/linux_file_creation_in_init_boot_directory.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/linux_file_creation_in_init_boot_directory.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory file: endpoint/linux_file_creation_in_init_boot_directory.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-30d' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -30d + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon_linux.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.004/linux_init_profile/sysmon_linux.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/linux_file_creation_in_profile_directory.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/linux_file_creation_in_profile_directory.test.yml index deb43e7aef..a30fdf490e 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/linux_file_creation_in_profile_directory.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/linux_file_creation_in_profile_directory.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Linux File Creation In Profile Directory file: endpoint/linux_file_creation_in_profile_directory.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon_linux.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.004/linux_init_profile/sysmon_linux.log source: Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: sysmon_linux \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: sysmon_linux diff --git a/tests/endpoint/linux_insert_kernel_module_using_insmod_utility.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/linux_insert_kernel_module_using_insmod_utility.test.yml index bbbfab5235..f94e84eab5 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/linux_insert_kernel_module_using_insmod_utility.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/linux_insert_kernel_module_using_insmod_utility.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility file: endpoint/linux_insert_kernel_module_using_insmod_utility.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon_linux.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.006/loading_linux_kernel_module/sysmon_linux.log source: Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: sysmon_linux \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: sysmon_linux diff --git a/tests/endpoint/linux_install_kernel_module_using_modprobe_utility.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/linux_install_kernel_module_using_modprobe_utility.test.yml index 8b436cebc1..67a15e5ff6 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/linux_install_kernel_module_using_modprobe_utility.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/linux_install_kernel_module_using_modprobe_utility.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility file: endpoint/linux_install_kernel_module_using_modprobe_utility.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon_linux.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.006/loading_linux_kernel_module/sysmon_linux.log source: Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: sysmon_linux \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: sysmon_linux diff --git a/tests/endpoint/linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file.test.yml index a3ff049444..0b979a8588 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File file: endpoint/linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-30d' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -30d + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon_linux.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.001/at_execution/sysmon_linux.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file.test.yml index ef57ab1fea..f6967c206d 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File file: endpoint/linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-30d' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -30d + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon_linux.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/cronjobs_entry/sysmon_linux.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor.test.yml index 83dca42143..1e2f208111 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor file: endpoint/linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon_linux.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/cronjobs_entry/sysmon_linux.log source: Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: sysmon_linux \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: sysmon_linux diff --git a/tests/endpoint/linux_preload_hijack_library_calls.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/linux_preload_hijack_library_calls.test.yml index 526971f77c..e7e1e2f0e8 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/linux_preload_hijack_library_calls.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/linux_preload_hijack_library_calls.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls file: endpoint/linux_preload_hijack_library_calls.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon_linux.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1574.006/lib_hijack/sysmon_linux.log source: Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: sysmon_linux \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: sysmon_linux diff --git a/tests/endpoint/linux_service_file_created_in_systemd_directory.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/linux_service_file_created_in_systemd_directory.test.yml index a0077344c5..cbd3bfe8e6 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/linux_service_file_created_in_systemd_directory.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/linux_service_file_created_in_systemd_directory.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory file: endpoint/linux_service_file_created_in_systemd_directory.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon_linux.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.006/service_systemd/sysmon_linux.log source: Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: sysmon_linux \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: sysmon_linux diff --git a/tests/endpoint/linux_service_restarted.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/linux_service_restarted.test.yml index 4820bcc88a..3e8ec96f5a 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/linux_service_restarted.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/linux_service_restarted.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Linux Service Restarted file: endpoint/linux_service_restarted.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon_linux.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.006/service_systemd/sysmon_linux.log source: Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: sysmon_linux \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: sysmon_linux diff --git a/tests/endpoint/linux_service_started_or_enabled.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/linux_service_started_or_enabled.test.yml index f37ad6c647..e9e1590a5b 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/linux_service_started_or_enabled.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/linux_service_started_or_enabled.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Linux Service Started Or Enabled file: endpoint/linux_service_started_or_enabled.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon_linux.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.006/service_systemd/sysmon_linux.log source: Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: sysmon_linux \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: sysmon_linux diff --git a/tests/endpoint/linux_setuid_using_chmod_utility.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/linux_setuid_using_chmod_utility.test.yml index 31051cbd83..59bd265b0b 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/linux_setuid_using_chmod_utility.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/linux_setuid_using_chmod_utility.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility file: endpoint/linux_setuid_using_chmod_utility.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon_linux.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.001/chmod_uid/sysmon_linux.log source: Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: sysmon_linux \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: sysmon_linux diff --git a/tests/endpoint/linux_setuid_using_setcap_utility.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/linux_setuid_using_setcap_utility.test.yml index 2742ee77cd..0c93930b9c 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/linux_setuid_using_setcap_utility.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/linux_setuid_using_setcap_utility.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility file: endpoint/linux_setuid_using_setcap_utility.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon_linux.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.001/linux_setcap/sysmon_linux.log source: Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: sysmon_linux \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: sysmon_linux diff --git a/tests/endpoint/linux_sudoers_tmp_file_creation.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/linux_sudoers_tmp_file_creation.test.yml index 8629fafa45..a6f68869fb 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/linux_sudoers_tmp_file_creation.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/linux_sudoers_tmp_file_creation.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation file: endpoint/linux_sudoers_tmp_file_creation.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon_linux.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/sudoers_temp/sysmon_linux.log source: Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: sysmon_linux \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: sysmon_linux diff --git a/tests/endpoint/linux_visudo_utility_execution.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/linux_visudo_utility_execution.test.yml index acc41ead03..887f90e753 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/linux_visudo_utility_execution.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/linux_visudo_utility_execution.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Linux Visudo Utility Execution file: endpoint/linux_visudo_utility_execution.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon_linux.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/visudo/sysmon_linux.log source: Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: sysmon_linux \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: sysmon_linux diff --git a/tests/endpoint/loading_of_dynwrapx_module.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/loading_of_dynwrapx_module.test.yml index c8b1472965..67c72c4952 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/loading_of_dynwrapx_module.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/loading_of_dynwrapx_module.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Loading Of Dynwrapx Module file: endpoint/loading_of_dynwrapx_module.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon_dynwraper.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_dynwrapx/sysmon_dynwraper.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/local_account_discovery_with_net.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/local_account_discovery_with_net.test.yml index 4f69526791..c10858de2c 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/local_account_discovery_with_net.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/local_account_discovery_with_net.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Local Account Discovery with Net file: endpoint/local_account_discovery_with_net.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/local_account_discovery_with_wmic.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/local_account_discovery_with_wmic.test.yml index b4c7736c70..43a8cbf1b6 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/local_account_discovery_with_wmic.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/local_account_discovery_with_wmic.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Local Account Discovery With Wmic file: endpoint/local_account_discovery_with_wmic.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/logon_script_event_trigger_execution.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/logon_script_event_trigger_execution.test.yml index dcb74a0a02..3b2ec87cfa 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/logon_script_event_trigger_execution.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/logon_script_event_trigger_execution.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Logon Script Event Trigger Execution file: endpoint/logon_script_event_trigger_execution.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1037.001/logonscript_reg/sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/mailsniper_invoke_functions.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/mailsniper_invoke_functions.test.yml index 067c1bc19f..43be48b636 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/mailsniper_invoke_functions.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/mailsniper_invoke_functions.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Mailsniper Invoke functions file: endpoint/mailsniper_invoke_functions.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-powershell.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/casper/datasets1/windows-powershell.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational - sourcetype: WinEventLog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: WinEventLog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/malicious_inprocserver32_modification.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/malicious_inprocserver32_modification.test.yml index dd97ac887f..362d767425 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/malicious_inprocserver32_modification.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/malicious_inprocserver32_modification.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Malicious InProcServer32 Modification file: endpoint/malicious_inprocserver32_modification.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos/windows-sysmon.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/malicious_powershell_executed_as_a_service.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/malicious_powershell_executed_as_a_service.test.yml index b2d93a1a8f..4bd2162731 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/malicious_powershell_executed_as_a_service.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/malicious_powershell_executed_as_a_service.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Malicious Powershell Executed As A Service file: endpoint/malicious_powershell_executed_as_a_service.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-system.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1569.002/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.test.yml index 3dfa039f34..8b33f7a1c9 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command file: endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1027/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.test.yml index dcebf3ae8d..aa853fde6c 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass file: endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/encoded_powershell/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.test.yml index 9ea73ba45a..04bf8ef9e0 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques file: endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/obfuscated_powershell/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/mmc_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/mmc_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.test.yml index abbe6c30f8..ece44869a7 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/mmc_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/mmc_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.test.yml @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ -name: Mmc EXE LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn Unit Test +name: Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn Unit Test tests: -- name: Mmc.exe LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn +- name: Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn file: endpoint/mmc_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.003/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/modification_of_wallpaper.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/modification_of_wallpaper.test.yml index 391f15e302..47aa54606a 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/modification_of_wallpaper.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/modification_of_wallpaper.test.yml @@ -3,14 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Modification Of Wallpaper file: endpoint/modification_of_wallpaper.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational sourcetype: xmlwineventlog - - - - \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/endpoint/modify_acl_permission_to_files_or_folder.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/modify_acl_permission_to_files_or_folder.test.yml index c0ef962a35..82d45c03fc 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/modify_acl_permission_to_files_or_folder.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/modify_acl_permission_to_files_or_folder.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Modify ACL permission To Files Or Folder file: endpoint/modify_acl_permission_to_files_or_folder.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.test.yml index b2aa5c9c8a..70ae47c462 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors file: endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.010/atomic_red_team/sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module.test.yml index 3e60648541..5cf69ee502 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: MS Scripting Process Loading Ldap Module file: endpoint/ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count >= 2' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_js_2/sysmon.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module.test.yml index df5d0a537c..ea60bebcc1 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module.test.yml @@ -3,13 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: MS Scripting Process Loading WMI Module file: endpoint/ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count >=5' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_js_2/sysmon.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational sourcetype: xmlwineventlog - - - \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/endpoint/msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process.test.yml index 4407f84aa1..4254ea1b17 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: MSBuild Suspicious Spawned By Script Process file: endpoint/msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/regsvr32_silent/sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process.test.yml index d0c1cac793..e63d09499b 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process file: endpoint/mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/spear_phish/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/mshtml_module_load_in_office_product.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/mshtml_module_load_in_office_product.test.yml index e6252f9fe9..cc1f994b96 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/mshtml_module_load_in_office_product.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/mshtml_module_load_in_office_product.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: MSHTML Module Load in Office Product file: endpoint/mshtml_module_load_in_office_product.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon_mshtml.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_mshtml.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/msi_module_loaded_by_non_system_binary.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/msi_module_loaded_by_non_system_binary.test.yml index c06a3b15a4..daa5a50c2b 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/msi_module_loaded_by_non_system_binary.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/msi_module_loaded_by_non_system_binary.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary file: endpoint/msi_module_loaded_by_non_system_binary.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1574.002/msi_module_load/windows-sysmon.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading.test.yml index f9e6e44a8d..a2d12623bb 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading.test.yml @@ -3,12 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading file: endpoint/msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets//malware/revil/msmpeng_side/windows-sysmon.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational sourcetype: xmlwineventlog - - \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/endpoint/multiple_disabled_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/multiple_disabled_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.test.yml index d0f1540cc5..8aa074f0d4 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/multiple_disabled_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/multiple_disabled_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.test.yml @@ -1,12 +1,13 @@ -name: Multiple Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos Unit Test +name: Multiple Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos Unit + Test tests: - name: Multiple Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos file: endpoint/multiple_disabled_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-security.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_disabled_users_kerberos/windows-security.log source: WinEventLog:Security - sourcetype: WinEventLog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: WinEventLog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.test.yml index 21ab5d03d6..579a7a2e9c 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.test.yml @@ -1,15 +1,13 @@ -name: Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos Unit Test +name: Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos Unit + Test tests: -- name: Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos +- name: Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos file: endpoint/multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-security.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_invalid_users_kerberos/windows-security.log source: WinEventLog:Security sourcetype: WinEventLog - - - \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/endpoint/multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm.test.yml index 06f44387f7..3e50ccd72a 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM file: endpoint/multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-security.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_invalid_users_ntlm/windows-security.log source: WinEventLog:Security - sourcetype: WinEventLog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: WinEventLog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/multiple_users_attempting_to_authenticate_using_explicit_credentials.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/multiple_users_attempting_to_authenticate_using_explicit_credentials.test.yml index 1f438d0a3a..d01bbe2e34 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/multiple_users_attempting_to_authenticate_using_explicit_credentials.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/multiple_users_attempting_to_authenticate_using_explicit_credentials.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Multiple Users Attempting To Authenticate Using Explicit Credentials file: endpoint/multiple_users_attempting_to_authenticate_using_explicit_credentials.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-security.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_explicit_credential_spray/windows-security.log source: WinEventLog:Security - sourcetype: WinEventLog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: WinEventLog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.test.yml index 4d91d51ec5..4e6cc25342 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos file: endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' - attack_data: + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now + attack_data: - file_name: windows-security.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_valid_users_kerberos/windows-security.log source: WinEventLog:Security - sourcetype: WinEventLog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: WinEventLog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm.test.yml index 628a04e034..ae8f9e96f3 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM file: endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-security.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_valid_users_ntlm/windows-security.log source: WinEventLog:Security - sourcetype: WinEventLog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: WinEventLog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_process.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_process.test.yml index e3b73b81d6..e026eb0def 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_process.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_process.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Process file: endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_process.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-security.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_multiple_users_from_process/windows-security.log source: WinEventLog:Security - sourcetype: WinEventLog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: WinEventLog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/multiple_users_remotely_failing_to_authenticate_from_host.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/multiple_users_remotely_failing_to_authenticate_from_host.test.yml index 7dc381b88b..dbe9d7cb93 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/multiple_users_remotely_failing_to_authenticate_from_host.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/multiple_users_remotely_failing_to_authenticate_from_host.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Multiple Users Remotely Failing To Authenticate From Host file: endpoint/multiple_users_remotely_failing_to_authenticate_from_host.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-security.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_remote_spray/windows-security.log source: WinEventLog:Security - sourcetype: WinEventLog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: WinEventLog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/net_localgroup_discovery.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/net_localgroup_discovery.test.yml index 158bd374e1..127d6b7291 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/net_localgroup_discovery.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/net_localgroup_discovery.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Net Localgroup Discovery file: endpoint/net_localgroup_discovery.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/net_profiler_uac_bypass.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/net_profiler_uac_bypass.test.yml index 45fe100f27..5fbb537e31 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/net_profiler_uac_bypass.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/net_profiler_uac_bypass.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: NET Profiler UAC bypass file: endpoint/net_profiler_uac_bypass.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon2.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon2.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/network_connection_discovery_arp.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/network_connection_discovery_arp.test.yml index 8c03823f37..d7b659649d 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/network_connection_discovery_arp.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/network_connection_discovery_arp.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Network Connection Discovery With Arp file: endpoint/network_connection_discovery_arp.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1049/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/network_connection_discovery_net.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/network_connection_discovery_net.test.yml index 62a37578ca..88c82db585 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/network_connection_discovery_net.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/network_connection_discovery_net.test.yml @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ -name: Network Connection Discovery With Arp Unit Test +name: Network Connection Discovery With Net Unit Test tests: -- name: Network Connection Discovery With Arp +- name: Network Connection Discovery With Net file: endpoint/network_connection_discovery_net.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1049/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/network_connection_discovery_netstat.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/network_connection_discovery_netstat.test.yml index 15ca89070d..e157c7fb15 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/network_connection_discovery_netstat.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/network_connection_discovery_netstat.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Network Connection Discovery With Netstat file: endpoint/network_connection_discovery_netstat.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1049/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/network_discovery_using_route_windows_app.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/network_discovery_using_route_windows_app.test.yml index 0389608b65..8576da1fe7 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/network_discovery_using_route_windows_app.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/network_discovery_using_route_windows_app.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Network Discovery Using Route Windows App file: endpoint/network_discovery_using_route_windows_app.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-30d' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -30d + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/vilsel/sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: WinEventLog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: WinEventLog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/nishang_powershelltcponeline.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/nishang_powershelltcponeline.test.yml index 13c85185a5..12335ca74a 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/nishang_powershelltcponeline.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/nishang_powershelltcponeline.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine file: endpoint/nishang_powershelltcponeline.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.test.yml index 92fd95983a..629c0d47f2 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.test.yml @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ -name: NLTest Domain Trust Discovery +name: NLTest Domain Trust Discovery Unit Test tests: - name: NLTest Domain Trust Discovery file: endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir.test.yml index 3a582e9cb7..92e361e6ba 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir file: endpoint/non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: security2.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_sacl/security2.log source: WinEventLog:Security - sourcetype: WinEventLog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: WinEventLog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir.test.yml index a073e60157..92c5df138d 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir file: endpoint/non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: security.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_sacl/security.log source: WinEventLog:Security - sourcetype: WinEventLog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: WinEventLog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.test.yml index 0454c467c9..de06bc4dec 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.test.yml @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ -name: NTdsutil export ntds dit Unit Test +name: Ntdsutil Export NTDS Unit Test tests: -- name: NTdsutil to export ntds dit from Directory Services +- name: Ntdsutil Export NTDS file: endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/office_application_drop_executable.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/office_application_drop_executable.test.yml index cd4fc7a718..0af973c71c 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/office_application_drop_executable.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/office_application_drop_executable.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Office Application Drop Executable file: endpoint/office_application_drop_executable.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-120d' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -120d + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_macro_js_1/sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process.test.yml index aa9c3db3e4..e0556922a0 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process file: endpoint/office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/phish_icedid/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/office_application_spawn_rundll32_process.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/office_application_spawn_rundll32_process.test.yml index 528f74d283..869dfa5919 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/office_application_spawn_rundll32_process.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/office_application_spawn_rundll32_process.test.yml @@ -3,11 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Office Application Spawn rundll32 process file: endpoint/office_application_spawn_rundll32_process.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets/windows-sysmon.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational sourcetype: xmlwineventlog - diff --git a/tests/endpoint/office_document_creating_schedule_task.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/office_document_creating_schedule_task.test.yml index d26087261a..dd9a9952a2 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/office_document_creating_schedule_task.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/office_document_creating_schedule_task.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Office Document Creating Schedule Task file: endpoint/office_document_creating_schedule_task.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets/windows-sysmon.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/office_document_executing_macro_code.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/office_document_executing_macro_code.test.yml index 6330750cd6..d6d2aaf208 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/office_document_executing_macro_code.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/office_document_executing_macro_code.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Office Document Executing Macro Code file: endpoint/office_document_executing_macro_code.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets/windows-sysmon.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/office_document_spawned_child_process_to_download.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/office_document_spawned_child_process_to_download.test.yml index 1bd110ade9..c7157363ac 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/office_document_spawned_child_process_to_download.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/office_document_spawned_child_process_to_download.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download file: endpoint/office_document_spawned_child_process_to_download.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets2/windows-sysmon.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/office_product_spawn_cmd_process.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/office_product_spawn_cmd_process.test.yml index 5d3a7506e4..3e0c9bef6d 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/office_product_spawn_cmd_process.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/office_product_spawn_cmd_process.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Office Product Spawn CMD Process file: endpoint/office_product_spawn_cmd_process.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/spear_phish/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/office_product_spawning_bitsadmin.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/office_product_spawning_bitsadmin.test.yml index 11d3631d3e..35acdff3a7 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/office_product_spawning_bitsadmin.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/office_product_spawning_bitsadmin.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin file: endpoint/office_product_spawning_bitsadmin.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon_macros.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_macros.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/office_product_spawning_certutil.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/office_product_spawning_certutil.test.yml index 523acf1f7b..4df26168f2 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/office_product_spawning_certutil.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/office_product_spawning_certutil.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Office Product Spawning CertUtil file: endpoint/office_product_spawning_certutil.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon_macros.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_macros.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/office_product_spawning_mshta.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/office_product_spawning_mshta.test.yml index 5449a0f268..4a49311833 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/office_product_spawning_mshta.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/office_product_spawning_mshta.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Office Product Spawning MSHTA file: endpoint/office_product_spawning_mshta.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon_macros.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_macros.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll.test.yml index bd2950c9c2..902f1b3d94 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL file: endpoint/office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon_icedid.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_icedid.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/office_product_spawning_wmic.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/office_product_spawning_wmic.test.yml index b020768c41..1afc66c3bd 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/office_product_spawning_wmic.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/office_product_spawning_wmic.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Office Product Spawning Wmic file: endpoint/office_product_spawning_wmic.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon_macros.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_macros.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/office_product_writing_cab_or_inf.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/office_product_writing_cab_or_inf.test.yml index 5a3620f4cf..fdab582729 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/office_product_writing_cab_or_inf.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/office_product_writing_cab_or_inf.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Office Product Writing cab or inf file: endpoint/office_product_writing_cab_or_inf.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon_control.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_cabinf.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/office_spawning_control.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/office_spawning_control.test.yml index 963291c0f1..943725dfb8 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/office_spawning_control.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/office_spawning_control.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Office Spawning Control file: endpoint/office_spawning_control.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon_control.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_control.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.test.yml index 2f972aaf90..1086b70ad2 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports file: endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_java/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.test.yml index c6995e656d..ef38177a50 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Overwriting Accessibility Binaries file: endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.008/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/password_policy_discovery_with_net.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/password_policy_discovery_with_net.test.yml index 7513d219d9..99edc2342b 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/password_policy_discovery_with_net.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/password_policy_discovery_with_net.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Password Policy Discovery with Net file: endpoint/password_policy_discovery_with_net.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/permission_modification_using_takeown_app.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/permission_modification_using_takeown_app.test.yml index 083284797e..ae569799f0 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/permission_modification_using_takeown_app.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/permission_modification_using_takeown_app.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Permission Modification using Takeown App file: endpoint/permission_modification_using_takeown_app.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/petitpotam_network_share_access_request.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/petitpotam_network_share_access_request.test.yml index 36e9e43100..10629b0169 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/petitpotam_network_share_access_request.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/petitpotam_network_share_access_request.test.yml @@ -1,13 +1,13 @@ -name: PetitPotam Network Share Access Request Test +name: PetitPotam Network Share Access Request Unit Test tests: -- name: Windows Desired Access Request +- name: PetitPotam Network Share Access Request file: endpoint/petitpotam_network_share_access_request.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-security.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1187/petitpotam/windows-security.log source: WinEventLog:Security sourcetype: WinEventLog - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/endpoint/petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request.test.yml index 9081a76582..8786c00653 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request.test.yml @@ -3,11 +3,11 @@ tests: - name: PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request file: endpoint/petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-security.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1187/petitpotam/windows-security.log source: WinEventLog:Security sourcetype: WinEventLog - update_timestamp: True \ No newline at end of file + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/endpoint/possible_browser_pass_view_parameter.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/possible_browser_pass_view_parameter.test.yml index 462d4d5f3d..5fdd8b66b7 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/possible_browser_pass_view_parameter.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/possible_browser_pass_view_parameter.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Possible Browser Pass View Parameter file: endpoint/possible_browser_pass_view_parameter.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1555/web_browser_pass_view/sysmon.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn.test.yml index 96d82a8249..bea5104705 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn file: endpoint/possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement_powershell/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/powershell_4104_hunting.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/powershell_4104_hunting.test.yml index cccfec9dae..5ee81bda27 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/powershell_4104_hunting.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/powershell_4104_hunting.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: PowerShell 4104 Hunting file: endpoint/powershell_4104_hunting.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-powershell.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_testing/windows-powershell.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational - sourcetype: WinEventLog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: WinEventLog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/powershell___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/powershell___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.test.yml index c9f8db2233..8076c8c0f0 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/powershell___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/powershell___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window file: endpoint/powershell___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/hidden_powershell/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/powershell_creating_thread_mutex.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/powershell_creating_thread_mutex.test.yml index c82a94f942..a32d89cab3 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/powershell_creating_thread_mutex.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/powershell_creating_thread_mutex.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Powershell Creating Thread Mutex file: endpoint/powershell_creating_thread_mutex.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-powershell.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational - sourcetype: WinEventLog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: WinEventLog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/powershell_disable_security_monitoring.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/powershell_disable_security_monitoring.test.yml index 4e58c6d178..fd19d240aa 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/powershell_disable_security_monitoring.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/powershell_disable_security_monitoring.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Powershell Disable Security Monitoring file: endpoint/powershell_disable_security_monitoring.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/pwh_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/powershell_domain_enumeration.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/powershell_domain_enumeration.test.yml index c90a4de8f2..6d025312f2 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/powershell_domain_enumeration.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/powershell_domain_enumeration.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: PowerShell Domain Enumeration file: endpoint/powershell_domain_enumeration.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-powershell.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational - sourcetype: WinEventLog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: WinEventLog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature.test.yml index 1aadf2a95b..13c95788b5 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature.test.yml @@ -3,13 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature file: endpoint/powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-powershell.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-powershell.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational sourcetype: WinEventLog - - - \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/endpoint/powershell_execute_com_object.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/powershell_execute_com_object.test.yml index fb58558ec5..2dd500d007 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/powershell_execute_com_object.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/powershell_execute_com_object.test.yml @@ -3,12 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Powershell Execute COM Object file: endpoint/powershell_execute_com_object.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-powershell.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/conti/conti_leak/windows-powershell.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational sourcetype: WinEventLog - - \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/endpoint/powershell_fileless_process_injection_via_getprocaddress.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/powershell_fileless_process_injection_via_getprocaddress.test.yml index 4622c2090a..2ec67fbc06 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/powershell_fileless_process_injection_via_getprocaddress.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/powershell_fileless_process_injection_via_getprocaddress.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress file: endpoint/powershell_fileless_process_injection_via_getprocaddress.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-powershell.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational - sourcetype: WinEventLog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: WinEventLog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/powershell_fileless_script_contains_base64_encoded_content.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/powershell_fileless_script_contains_base64_encoded_content.test.yml index a407149eda..1a75d8e2c6 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/powershell_fileless_script_contains_base64_encoded_content.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/powershell_fileless_script_contains_base64_encoded_content.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content file: endpoint/powershell_fileless_script_contains_base64_encoded_content.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-powershell.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational - sourcetype: WinEventLog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: WinEventLog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/powershell_get_localgroup_discovery.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/powershell_get_localgroup_discovery.test.yml index ceed69853d..919460fd9f 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/powershell_get_localgroup_discovery.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/powershell_get_localgroup_discovery.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: PowerShell Get LocalGroup Discovery file: endpoint/powershell_get_localgroup_discovery.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_with_script_block_logging.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_with_script_block_logging.test.yml index 15e52bf105..afb412a246 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_with_script_block_logging.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_with_script_block_logging.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Powershell Get LocalGroup Discovery with Script Block Logging file: endpoint/powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_with_script_block_logging.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-powershell.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-powershell.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational - sourcetype: wineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: wineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/powershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_system_reflection_assembly.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/powershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_system_reflection_assembly.test.yml index 9e922a87d7..39e389a1d1 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/powershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_system_reflection_assembly.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/powershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_system_reflection_assembly.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via System Reflection Assembly file: endpoint/powershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_system_reflection_assembly.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-powershell.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational - sourcetype: WinEventLog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: WinEventLog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/powershell_processing_stream_of_data.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/powershell_processing_stream_of_data.test.yml index e2450f20ba..4efed82800 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/powershell_processing_stream_of_data.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/powershell_processing_stream_of_data.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Powershell Processing Stream Of Data file: endpoint/powershell_processing_stream_of_data.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-powershell.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational - sourcetype: WinEventLog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: WinEventLog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process.test.yml index 7434e8c567..ecc46a9467 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Powershell Remote Thread To Known Windows Process file: endpoint/powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/infection/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/powershell_start_bitstransfer.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/powershell_start_bitstransfer.test.yml index ddfaf3ecc8..4499e9f3ab 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/powershell_start_bitstransfer.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/powershell_start_bitstransfer.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer file: endpoint/powershell_start_bitstransfer.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1197/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store.test.yml index ca8be846f5..9187597dd3 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Powershell Using memory As Backing Store file: endpoint/powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-powershell.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational - sourcetype: WinEventLog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: WinEventLog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands.test.yml index d26ea54f80..27992ce996 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands file: endpoint/powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: powershell.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/defender_exclusion_powershell/powershell.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational - sourcetype: WinEventLog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: WinEventLog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/prevent_automatic_repair_mode_using_bcdedit.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/prevent_automatic_repair_mode_using_bcdedit.test.yml index 67a2dbc45e..fd1748f777 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/prevent_automatic_repair_mode_using_bcdedit.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/prevent_automatic_repair_mode_using_bcdedit.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit file: endpoint/prevent_automatic_repair_mode_using_bcdedit.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/print_processor_registry_autostart.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/print_processor_registry_autostart.test.yml index 0a7ef8f35f..86b4e0ef3a 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/print_processor_registry_autostart.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/print_processor_registry_autostart.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Print Processor Registry Autostart file: experimental/endpoint/print_processor_registry_autostart.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-365d' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -365d + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon_print.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/print_reg/sysmon_print.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PrintService/Operational - sourcetype: WinEventLog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: WinEventLog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/print_spooler_adding_a_printer_driver.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/print_spooler_adding_a_printer_driver.test.yml index c25433cc61..f331cffffe 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/print_spooler_adding_a_printer_driver.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/print_spooler_adding_a_printer_driver.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Print Spooler Adding A Printer Driver file: endpoint/print_spooler_adding_a_printer_driver.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-printservice_operational.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-printservice_operational.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PrintService/Operational - sourcetype: WinEventLog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: WinEventLog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/print_spooler_failed_to_load_a_plug_in.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/print_spooler_failed_to_load_a_plug_in.test.yml index 162c929591..f5036b60ce 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/print_spooler_failed_to_load_a_plug_in.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/print_spooler_failed_to_load_a_plug_in.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Print Spooler Failed to Load a Plug-in file: endpoint/print_spooler_failed_to_load_a_plug_in.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-printservice_admin.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-printservice_admin.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PrintService/Admin - sourcetype: WinEventLog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: WinEventLog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.test.yml index f06cade61d..abc497728d 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.test.yml @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ -name: Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious location Unit Test +name: Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location Unit Test tests: -- name: Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location +- name: Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location file: endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.002/lnk_file_temp_folder/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/process_deleting_its_process_file_path.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/process_deleting_its_process_file_path.test.yml index 52c2694147..1933af6f57 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/process_deleting_its_process_file_path.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/process_deleting_its_process_file_path.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Process Deleting Its Process File Path file: endpoint/process_deleting_its_process_file_path.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.test.yml index 23f82aae83..38a9e88512 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.test.yml @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ -name: Process execution via wmi Unit Test +name: Process Execution via WMI Unit Test tests: -- name: Process execution via wmi +- name: Process Execution via WMI file: endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' earliest_time: '-24h' diff --git a/tests/endpoint/process_kill_base_on_file_path.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/process_kill_base_on_file_path.test.yml index 362540508b..73f83d9aed 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/process_kill_base_on_file_path.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/process_kill_base_on_file_path.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Process Kill Base On File Path file: endpoint/process_kill_base_on_file_path.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/process_writing_dynamicwrapperx.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/process_writing_dynamicwrapperx.test.yml index 9b6cdead63..5eb3831952 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/process_writing_dynamicwrapperx.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/process_writing_dynamicwrapperx.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Process Writing DynamicWrapperX file: endpoint/process_writing_dynamicwrapperx.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos/windows-sysmon.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.test.yml index e41eb12b67..198b4d3fac 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.test.yml @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ -name: Processes created by netsh Unit Test +name: Processes launching netsh Unit Test tests: -- name: Processes created by netsh +- name: Processes launching netsh file: endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ransomware_notes_bulk_creation.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ransomware_notes_bulk_creation.test.yml index 6be797d3fd..13a63763e2 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/ransomware_notes_bulk_creation.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/ransomware_notes_bulk_creation.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Ransomware Notes bulk creation file: endpoint/ransomware_notes_bulk_creation.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi.test.yml index 5a8c2518f7..1e0e5f1384 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI file: endpoint/recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-powershell.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational - sourcetype: WinEventLog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: WinEventLog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/recon_using_wmi_class.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/recon_using_wmi_class.test.yml index 336de7244c..83de3af306 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/recon_using_wmi_class.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/recon_using_wmi_class.test.yml @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ -name: Recon Using WMI Class Unit Test +name: Recon Using WMI Class Unit Test tests: - name: Recon Using WMI Class file: endpoint/recon_using_wmi_class.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-powershell.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational - sourcetype: WinEventLog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: WinEventLog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd.test.yml index 6d17d638da..038f8ac5ef 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD file: endpoint/recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.test.yml index 785d4a54d8..022627a9b3 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys file: endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1574.011/change_registry_path_service/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.test.yml index 2998d6ef4e..b33b331ecb 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases file: endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.test.yml index c834ea65e7..bedc6707e3 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Registry Keys Used For Persistence file: endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.test.yml index 3866f1553e..21d0fd9c1e 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation file: endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.012/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading.test.yml index 11f1f4e2ab..65fd6bad4e 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading file: endpoint/regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/vbs_wscript/sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline.test.yml index 3386ddfb46..c16abd525f 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline file: endpoint/regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-150d' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -150d + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/remcos_client_registry_install_entry.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/remcos_client_registry_install_entry.test.yml index 241d221d2e..72235c0da3 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/remcos_client_registry_install_entry.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/remcos_client_registry_install_entry.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Remcos client registry install entry file: endpoint/remcos_client_registry_install_entry.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-15d' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -15d + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: remcos_registry_entry.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_panel_client/remcos_registry_entry.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/remcos_rat_file_creation_in_remcos_folder.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/remcos_rat_file_creation_in_remcos_folder.test.yml index edfa3f3863..267a51abc1 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/remcos_rat_file_creation_in_remcos_folder.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/remcos_rat_file_creation_in_remcos_folder.test.yml @@ -3,12 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Remcos RAT File Creation in Remcos Folder file: endpoint/remcos_rat_file_creation_in_remcos_folder.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_agent/sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational sourcetype: xmlwineventlog - - \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell.test.yml index c10e1ed666..09b2304025 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell file: endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.003/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_script_block.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_script_block.test.yml index 6e140c5b77..949eba3834 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_script_block.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_script_block.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell Script Block file: endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_script_block.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-powershell.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.003/lateral_movement/windows-powershell.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational - sourcetype: wineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: wineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell.test.yml index 192a625346..2abf88cf0f 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell file: endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement_psh/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_script_block.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_script_block.test.yml index f49a35b3b0..8bdcf76bcb 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_script_block.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_script_block.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell Script Block file: endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_script_block.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-powershell.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement_psh/windows-powershell.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational - sourcetype: wineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: wineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_winrs.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_winrs.test.yml index ae91c93058..56e36af42b 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_winrs.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_winrs.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and Winrs file: endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_winrs.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.test.yml index f72b2f0cd2..73e0eae2d8 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Remote Process Instantiation via WMI file: endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell.test.yml index da44fe9229..9aba834c74 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell file: endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_script_block.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_script_block.test.yml index f81f9a9953..63e192f7db 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_script_block.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_script_block.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell Script Block file: endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_script_block.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-powershell.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/lateral_movement/windows-powershell.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational - sourcetype: wineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: wineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_adsisearcher.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_adsisearcher.test.yml index dded02b553..adee413abd 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_adsisearcher.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_adsisearcher.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Remote System Discovery with Adsisearcher file: endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_adsisearcher.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-powershell.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational - sourcetype: wineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: wineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_dsquery.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_dsquery.test.yml index 33a785267b..db04f9fa53 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_dsquery.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_dsquery.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Remote System Discovery with Dsquery file: endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_dsquery.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_net.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_net.test.yml index f5bb736052..1db1cc6990 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_net.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_net.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Remote System Discovery with Net file: endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_net.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_wmic.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_wmic.test.yml index c312fff2ad..81f8d5f6f6 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_wmic.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_wmic.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Remote System Discovery with Wmic file: endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_wmic.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/remote_wmi_command_attempt.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/remote_wmi_command_attempt.test.yml index 8f4134e786..52386db180 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/remote_wmi_command_attempt.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/remote_wmi_command_attempt.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Remote WMI Command Attempt file: endpoint/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/resize_shadowstorage_volume.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/resize_shadowstorage_volume.test.yml index d2460b16a0..195b71a41c 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/resize_shadowstorage_volume.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/resize_shadowstorage_volume.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Resize ShadowStorage volume file: endpoint/resize_shadowstorage_volume.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/revil_common_exec_parameter.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/revil_common_exec_parameter.test.yml index fc986ae8e6..70f2c36b34 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/revil_common_exec_parameter.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/revil_common_exec_parameter.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Revil Common Exec Parameter file: endpoint/revil_common_exec_parameter.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/revil_registry_entry.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/revil_registry_entry.test.yml index 51368e34a8..f3f7f65d7a 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/revil_registry_entry.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/revil_registry_entry.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Revil Registry Entry file: endpoint/revil_registry_entry.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/runas_execution_in_commandline.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/runas_execution_in_commandline.test.yml index df59958ca8..36beeabc4f 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/runas_execution_in_commandline.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/runas_execution_in_commandline.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Runas Execution in CommandLine file: endpoint/runas_execution_in_commandline.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-30d' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -30d + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/vilsel/sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/rundll32_control_rundll_hunt.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/rundll32_control_rundll_hunt.test.yml index 681110e553..ac96e7646b 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/rundll32_control_rundll_hunt.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/rundll32_control_rundll_hunt.test.yml @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ -name: Rundll32 Control_RunDLL Hunt Unit Test +name: Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt Unit Test tests: -- name: Rundll32 Control_RunDLL Hunt +- name: Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt file: endpoint/rundll32_control_rundll_hunt.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory.test.yml index 8a5cd3b25c..cd4619d9eb 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory.test.yml @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ -name: Rundll32 Control_RunDLL World Writable Directory Unit Test +name: Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory Unit Test tests: -- name: Rundll32 Control_RunDLL World Writable Directory +- name: Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory file: endpoint/rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process.test.yml index 3e73848153..83a864d37e 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process file: endpoint/rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser.test.yml index a42be77dff..9a1525f7b5 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser file: endpoint/rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/rundll32_dnsquery.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/rundll32_dnsquery.test.yml index 66f19008ba..a9f197fe15 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/rundll32_dnsquery.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/rundll32_dnsquery.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Rundll32 DNSQuery file: endpoint/rundll32_dnsquery.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/rundll32_lockworkstation.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/rundll32_lockworkstation.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 3b6c52a4d9..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/rundll32_lockworkstation.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,15 +0,0 @@ -name: Rundll32 LockWorkStation Unit Test -tests: -- name: Rundll32 LockWorkStation - file: endpoint/rundll32_lockworkstation.yml - pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' - attack_data: - - file_name: windows-sysmon.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/conti/conti_leak/windows-sysmon.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog - - - \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/endpoint/rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files.test.yml index 594b075486..fb2994b3d2 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files file: endpoint/rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/rundll32_shimcache_flush.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/rundll32_shimcache_flush.test.yml index 2a416381a6..6ec1334dda 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/rundll32_shimcache_flush.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/rundll32_shimcache_flush.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Rundll32 Shimcache Flush file: endpoint/rundll32_shimcache_flush.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/shimcache_flush/sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.test.yml index bc148862c9..3183582672 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network file: endpoint/rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.test.yml index dbf2b6774a..1a85268243 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.test.yml @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ -name: Ryuk Test Files Detected Unit Test +name: Ryuk Test Files Detected Unit Test tests: -- name: Ryuk Test Files Detected +- name: Ryuk Test Files Detected file: endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ryuk/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ryuk_wake_on_lan_command.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ryuk_wake_on_lan_command.test.yml index 1d542adcc2..5c13909a98 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/ryuk_wake_on_lan_command.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/ryuk_wake_on_lan_command.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Ryuk Wake on LAN Command file: endpoint/ryuk_wake_on_lan_command.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/ryuk/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/sam_database_file_access_attempt.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/sam_database_file_access_attempt.test.yml index 39bfe5f8fa..c2fcb5b29f 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/sam_database_file_access_attempt.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/sam_database_file_access_attempt.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: SAM Database File Access Attempt file: endpoint/sam_database_file_access_attempt.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-security.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/serioussam/windows-security.log source: WinEventLog:Security - sourcetype: WinEventLog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: WinEventLog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.test.yml index 90c8081027..73ba98863d 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Samsam Test File Write file: endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1486/sam_sam_note/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.test.yml index 3586ea409a..7ebf1b81ef 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services file: endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/schcache_change_by_app_connect_and_create_adsi_object.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/schcache_change_by_app_connect_and_create_adsi_object.test.yml index b183b4b538..00227d1fc6 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/schcache_change_by_app_connect_and_create_adsi_object.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/schcache_change_by_app_connect_and_create_adsi_object.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: SchCache Change By App Connect And Create ADSI Object file: endpoint/schcache_change_by_app_connect_and_create_adsi_object.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/blackmatter_schcache/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/schedule_task_with_http_command_arguments.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/schedule_task_with_http_command_arguments.test.yml index 7a0dedb3c1..67ebd0379f 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/schedule_task_with_http_command_arguments.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/schedule_task_with_http_command_arguments.test.yml @@ -3,13 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments file: endpoint/schedule_task_with_http_command_arguments.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-security.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/tasksched/windows-security.log source: WinEventLog:Security sourcetype: WinEventLog - - - \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/endpoint/schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger.test.yml index 77411b2298..94f5198a8c 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger file: endpoint/schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-security.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/tasksched/windows-security.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/scheduled_task_creation_on_remote_endpoint_using_at.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/scheduled_task_creation_on_remote_endpoint_using_at.test.yml index 41121f824e..44eb8b24d0 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/scheduled_task_creation_on_remote_endpoint_using_at.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/scheduled_task_creation_on_remote_endpoint_using_at.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At file: endpoint/scheduled_task_creation_on_remote_endpoint_using_at.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.002/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.test.yml index 6ac21cc780..12dddd8836 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.test.yml @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ -name: Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created Via CMD +name: Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD Unit Test tests: -- name: Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created Via CMD +- name: Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD file: endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/scheduled_task_initiation_on_remote_endpoint.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/scheduled_task_initiation_on_remote_endpoint.test.yml index fe3fb1004b..edd7018828 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/scheduled_task_initiation_on_remote_endpoint.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/scheduled_task_initiation_on_remote_endpoint.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint file: endpoint/scheduled_task_initiation_on_remote_endpoint.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/schtasks_run_task_on_demand.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/schtasks_run_task_on_demand.test.yml index 3b9f3d1af9..58edb30ab2 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/schtasks_run_task_on_demand.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/schtasks_run_task_on_demand.test.yml @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ name: Schtasks Run Task On Demand Unit Test tests: -- name: Schtasks Run Task On Demand +- name: Schtasks Run Task On Demand file: endpoint/schtasks_run_task_on_demand.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.test.yml index 9570ac3e86..55a8b16654 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Schtasks scheduling job on remote system file: endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.test.yml index 57f92f5a96..7c549974d0 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Schtasks used for forcing a reboot file: endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/schtask_shutdown/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/screensaver_event_trigger_execution.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/screensaver_event_trigger_execution.test.yml index 1f3ad83e56..1193c7d84f 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/screensaver_event_trigger_execution.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/screensaver_event_trigger_execution.test.yml @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ -name: Screensaver Event Trigger Execution Unit Test +name: Screensaver Event Trigger Execution Unit Test tests: -- name: Manual datasets generation for Screensaver Event Trigger Execution. +- name: Screensaver Event Trigger Execution file: endpoint/screensaver_event_trigger_execution.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.002/scrnsave_reg/sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.test.yml index c0a08ada19..9e805051e7 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Script Execution via WMI file: endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/execution_scrcons/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/sdclt_uac_bypass.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/sdclt_uac_bypass.test.yml index 142f816b2f..ba2c59597d 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/sdclt_uac_bypass.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/sdclt_uac_bypass.test.yml @@ -3,13 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Sdclt UAC Bypass file: endpoint/sdclt_uac_bypass.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational sourcetype: xmlwineventlog - - - \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/endpoint/sdelete_application_execution.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/sdelete_application_execution.test.yml index e86bfc34a9..b1c7338832 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/sdelete_application_execution.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/sdelete_application_execution.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Sdelete Application Execution file: endpoint/sdelete_application_execution.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/sdelete/sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/searchprotocolhost_with_no_command_line_with_network.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/searchprotocolhost_with_no_command_line_with_network.test.yml index f585781bed..948eb29f62 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/searchprotocolhost_with_no_command_line_with_network.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/searchprotocolhost_with_no_command_line_with_network.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network file: endpoint/searchprotocolhost_with_no_command_line_with_network.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon_searchprotocolhost.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/secretdumps_offline_ntds_dumping_tool.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/secretdumps_offline_ntds_dumping_tool.test.yml index 061bd35c35..dcf4758c52 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/secretdumps_offline_ntds_dumping_tool.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/secretdumps_offline_ntds_dumping_tool.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool file: endpoint/secretdumps_offline_ntds_dumping_tool.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/casper/datasets1/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell.test.yml index 305b968da4..e5c9cdd982 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell file: endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-powershell_kerberos.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/atomic_red_team/windows-powershell_kerberos.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational - sourcetype: wineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: wineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn.test.yml index d094d7ebe1..0a8c4bfad5 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN file: endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon_setspn.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_setspn.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/services_escalate_exe.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/services_escalate_exe.test.yml index 4dc5a7986a..7e5a493087 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/services_escalate_exe.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/services_escalate_exe.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Services Escalate Exe file: endpoint/services_escalate_exe.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/services_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/services_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.test.yml index aef94cf037..0742465033 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/services_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/services_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.test.yml @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ name: Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn Unit Test tests: -- name: Services.exe LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn +- name: Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn file: endpoint/services_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.test.yml index d45f44ce25..f9b2541bc4 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass file: endpoint/set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_execution_policy/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.test.yml index 1329b1c242..bde08db01f 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Shim Database File Creation file: endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.test.yml index d3b872c17a..a0b2559aea 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters file: endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/short_lived_scheduled_task.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/short_lived_scheduled_task.test.yml index 5cc0192b87..c34ba7b144 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/short_lived_scheduled_task.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/short_lived_scheduled_task.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Short Lived Scheduled Task file: endpoint/short_lived_scheduled_task.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-security.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/lateral_movement/windows-security.log source: WinEventLog:Security - sourcetype: WinEventLog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: WinEventLog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.test.yml index 2aa1931f9f..23507c66b0 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.test.yml @@ -3,19 +3,19 @@ tests: - name: Short Lived Windows Accounts file: endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-security.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log source: WinEventLog:Security sourcetype: WinEventLog - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true - file_name: windows-system.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log source: WinEventLog:System sourcetype: WinEventLog - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational diff --git a/tests/endpoint/silentcleanup_uac_bypass.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/silentcleanup_uac_bypass.test.yml index 49f7e6dfe2..d1bb5f83c1 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/silentcleanup_uac_bypass.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/silentcleanup_uac_bypass.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: SilentCleanup UAC Bypass file: endpoint/silentcleanup_uac_bypass.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.test.yml index 6b28930c74..f97abc71da 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Single Letter Process On Endpoint file: endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1204.002/single_letter_exe/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/slui_runas_elevated.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/slui_runas_elevated.test.yml index 254825e506..56ec80fdd3 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/slui_runas_elevated.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/slui_runas_elevated.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: SLUI RunAs Elevated file: endpoint/slui_runas_elevated.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/slui/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/slui_spawning_a_process.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/slui_spawning_a_process.test.yml index 0d01ed56c4..14dd1accd2 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/slui_spawning_a_process.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/slui_spawning_a_process.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: SLUI Spawning a Process file: endpoint/slui_spawning_a_process.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/slui/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/spoolsv_spawning_rundll32.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/spoolsv_spawning_rundll32.test.yml index dedc9d32ed..bc38794e91 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/spoolsv_spawning_rundll32.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/spoolsv_spawning_rundll32.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Spoolsv Spawning Rundll32 file: endpoint/spoolsv_spawning_rundll32.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules.test.yml index 5f27b94343..11dcd5cb9a 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules.test.yml @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ -name: Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules +name: Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules Unit Test tests: - name: Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules file: endpoint/spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/spoolsv_suspicious_process_access.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/spoolsv_suspicious_process_access.test.yml index c34d84ef7a..56bb93665d 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/spoolsv_suspicious_process_access.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/spoolsv_suspicious_process_access.test.yml @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ -name: Spoolsv Suspicious Process Access +name: Spoolsv Suspicious Process Access Unit Test tests: - name: Spoolsv Suspicious Process Access file: endpoint/spoolsv_suspicious_process_access.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/spoolsv_writing_a_dll.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/spoolsv_writing_a_dll.test.yml index 1e3b76665c..15a1d450d7 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/spoolsv_writing_a_dll.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/spoolsv_writing_a_dll.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Spoolsv Writing a DLL file: endpoint/spoolsv_writing_a_dll.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/spoolsv_writing_a_dll___sysmon.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/spoolsv_writing_a_dll___sysmon.test.yml index 4dc0ab6b52..996917044a 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/spoolsv_writing_a_dll___sysmon.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/spoolsv_writing_a_dll___sysmon.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Sysmon file: endpoint/spoolsv_writing_a_dll___sysmon.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/sqlite_module_in_temp_folder.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/sqlite_module_in_temp_folder.test.yml index 95206dbdc1..cc35b22d58 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/sqlite_module_in_temp_folder.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/sqlite_module_in_temp_folder.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Sqlite Module In Temp Folder file: endpoint/sqlite_module_in_temp_folder.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/simulated_icedid/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___anomalous_usage_of_account_credentials.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___anomalous_usage_of_account_credentials.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index b1c41573f8..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___anomalous_usage_of_account_credentials.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ -name: Anomalous Usage of Account Credentials Unit Test -tests: - - name: Anomalous Usage of Account Credentials - file: endpoint/ssa___anomalous_usage_of_account_credentials.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test for Anomalous usage of Account Credentials - attack_data: - - file_name: windows-security.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/account_login/windows-security.log - source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___anomalous_usage_of_archive_tools.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___anomalous_usage_of_archive_tools.test.yml index 1dd20eaeea..73bc9097c9 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___anomalous_usage_of_archive_tools.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/ssa___anomalous_usage_of_archive_tools.test.yml @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ name: Anomalous usage of Archive Tools Unit Test tests: - - name: Anomalous usage of Archive Tools - file: endpoint/ssa___anomalous_usage_of_archive_tools.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test for Anomalous usage of Archive Tools - attack_data: - - file_name: security.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1560.001/archive_tools/windows-security.log - source: WinEventLog:Security +- name: Anomalous usage of Archive Tools + file: endpoint/ssa___anomalous_usage_of_archive_tools.yml + pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' + description: Test for Anomalous usage of Archive Tools + attack_data: + - file_name: security.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1560.001/archive_tools/windows-security.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index cf7d52e9f5..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,11 +0,0 @@ -name: Applying Stolen Credentials via Mimikatz modules - SSA Unit test -tests: - - name: Applying Stolen Credentials via Mimikatz modules - file: endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml - description: Test applying stolen credentials detections - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - attack_data: - - file_name: logAllMimikatzModules.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/logAllMimikatzModules.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 610154adeb..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ -name: Applying Stolen Credentials via PowerSploit modules - SSA Unit test -tests: - - name: Applying Stolen Credentials via PowerSploit - file: endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test applying stolen credentials detections - attack_data: - - file_name: logAllPowerSploitModulesWithOldNames.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1555/applying_stolen_credentials/logAllPowerSploitModulesWithOldNames.log - source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___assess_credential_strength_via_dsinternals_modules.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___assess_credential_strength_via_dsinternals_modules.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 9f0798b4af..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___assess_credential_strength_via_dsinternals_modules.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ -name: Assessment of Credential Strength via DSInternals modules - SSA Unit test -tests: - - name: Assessment of Credential Strength via DSInternals modules - file: endpoint/ssa___assess_credential_strength_via_dsinternals_modules.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test assessment of credential strength detections - attack_data: - - file_name: logAllDSInternalsModules.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/logAllDSInternalsModules.log - source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___attempt_to_delete_services.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___attempt_to_delete_services.test.yml index c140ca93c3..4347c634ef 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___attempt_to_delete_services.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/ssa___attempt_to_delete_services.test.yml @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ -name: Attempt To delete Services Unit Test +name: Attempt To Delete Services Unit Test tests: - - name: Attempt To delete Services - file: endpoint/ssa___attempt_to_delete_services.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test for usage of sc.exe to delete a service - attack_data: - - file_name: sc_del.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/ssa_data1/sc_del.log - source: WinEventLog:Security \ No newline at end of file +- name: Attempt To Delete Services + file: endpoint/ssa___attempt_to_delete_services.yml + pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' + description: Test for usage of sc.exe to delete a service + attack_data: + - file_name: sc_del.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/ssa_data1/sc_del.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___attempt_to_disable_services.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___attempt_to_disable_services.test.yml index c1e11cab40..474da0ff1a 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___attempt_to_disable_services.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/ssa___attempt_to_disable_services.test.yml @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ name: Attempt To Disable Services Unit Test tests: - - name: Attempt To Disable Services - file: endpoint/ssa___attempt_to_disable_services.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test for usage of sc.exe to disable a service - attack_data: - - file_name: sc_disable.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/ssa_data1/sc_disable.log - source: WinEventLog:Security \ No newline at end of file +- name: Attempt To Disable Services + file: endpoint/ssa___attempt_to_disable_services.yml + pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' + description: Test for usage of sc.exe to disable a service + attack_data: + - file_name: sc_disable.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/ssa_data1/sc_disable.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.test.yml index daf250b187..6ffe19d094 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.test.yml @@ -1,11 +1,10 @@ -name: Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - SSA Unit test +name: Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe Unit Test tests: - - name: Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - file: endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test credential dumping detections - attack_data: - - file_name: windows-security.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - +- name: Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe + file: endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml + pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' + description: Test credential dumping detections + attack_data: + - file_name: windows-security.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.test.yml index b68e9e1888..8bc422c8a1 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/ssa___bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.test.yml @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -name: BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - SSA Unit Test +name: BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification Unit Test tests: - name: BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification file: endpoint/ssa___bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml @@ -7,4 +7,4 @@ tests: attack_data: - file_name: windows-security_bcdedit_wbadmin.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-security_bcdedit_wbadmin.log - source: WinEventLog:Security \ No newline at end of file + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_conversion_modules.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_conversion_modules.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index c86fd18516..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_conversion_modules.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,11 +0,0 @@ -name: Credential Extraction indicative of use of DSInternals credential conversion modules - SSA Unit test -tests: - - name: Credential Extraction indicative of use of DSInternals credential conversion modules - file: endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_conversion_modules.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test credential extraction detections - attack_data: - - file_name: logAllDSInternalsModules.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/logAllDSInternalsModules.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_modules.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_modules.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 24d3b24915..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_modules.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,11 +0,0 @@ -name: Credential Extraction indicative of use of DSInternals modules - SSA Unit test -tests: - - name: Credential Extraction indicative of use of DSInternals modules - file: endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_modules.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test credential extraction detections - attack_data: - - file_name: logAllDSInternalsModules.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/logAllDSInternalsModules.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_s_option.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_s_option.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 539bf7b484..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_s_option.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,11 +0,0 @@ -name: Credential Extraction indicative of FGDump and CacheDump with s option - SSA Unit test -tests: - - name: Credential Extraction indicative of FGDump and CacheDump with s option - file: endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_s_option.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test credential extraction detections - attack_data: - - file_name: logFgdump.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/logFgdump.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_v_option.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_v_option.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 38119dcef1..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_v_option.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ -name: Credential Extraction indicative of FGDump and CacheDump with v option - SSA Unit test -tests: - - name: Credential Extraction indicative of FGDump and CacheDump with v option - file: endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_v_option.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test credential extraction detections - attack_data: - - file_name: logFgdump.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/logFgdump.log - source: WinEventLog:Security \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_getaddbaccount_from_dump.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_getaddbaccount_from_dump.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 5a81cedcd8..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_getaddbaccount_from_dump.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ -name: Credential Extraction via Get-ADDBAccount module present in PowerSploit and DSInternals - SSA Unit test -tests: - - name: Credential Extraction via Get-ADDBAccount module present in PowerSploit and DSInternals - file: endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_getaddbaccount_from_dump.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test credential extraction detections - attack_data: - - file_name: logPowerShellModule.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/logPowerShellModule.log - source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_lazagne_command_options.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_lazagne_command_options.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index ba5d8c8686..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_lazagne_command_options.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ -name: Credential Extraction indicative of Lazagne command line options - SSA Unit test -tests: - - name: Credential Extraction indicative of Lazagne command line options - file: endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_lazagne_command_options.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test credential extraction detections - attack_data: - - file_name: logLazagneCredDump.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/logLazagneCredDump.log - source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_mimikatz_modules.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_mimikatz_modules.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index c781b05eb3..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_mimikatz_modules.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,11 +0,0 @@ -name: Credential Extraction indicative of use of Mimikatz modules - SSA Unit test -tests: - - name: Credential Extraction indicative of use of Mimikatz modules - file: endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_mimikatz_modules.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test credential extraction detections - attack_data: - - file_name: logAllMimikatzModules.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/logAllMimikatzModules.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_kernel_peek.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_kernel_peek.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 6ad06a52bb..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_kernel_peek.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ -name: Credential Extraction native Microsoft debuggers peek into the kernel - SSA Unit test -tests: - - name: Credential Extraction native Microsoft debuggers peek into the kernel - file: endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_kernel_peek.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test credential extraction detections - attack_data: - - file_name: logLiveKDFullKernelDump.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/logLiveKDFullKernelDump.log - source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_z_option.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_z_option.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index ca7da55118..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_z_option.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ -name: Credential Extraction native Microsoft debuggers via z command line option - SSA Unit test -tests: - - name: Credential Extraction native Microsoft debuggers via z command line option - file: endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_z_option.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test credential extraction detections - attack_data: - - file_name: logLiveKDFullKernelDump.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/logLiveKDFullKernelDump.log - source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_powersploit_modules.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_powersploit_modules.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index b3d2c7933e..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_powersploit_modules.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ -name: Credential Extraction indicative of use of PowerSploit modules - SSA Unit test -tests: - - name: Credential Extraction indicative of use of PowerSploit modules - file: endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_powersploit_modules.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test credential extraction detections - attack_data: - - file_name: logAllPowerSploitModulesWithOldNames.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/logAllPowerSploitModulesWithOldNames.log - source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___delete_a_net_user.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___delete_a_net_user.test.yml index c5fa64cac3..0a30c574dc 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___delete_a_net_user.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/ssa___delete_a_net_user.test.yml @@ -1,15 +1,13 @@ name: Delete A Net User Unit Test tests: - - name: Delete A Net User - file: endpoint/ssa___delete_a_net_user.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test for usage of net.exe or net1.exe to delete net user - attack_data: - - file_name: net_user_del.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/ssa_data1/net_user_del.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - - file_name: security.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1531/atomic_red_team/security.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - - +- name: Delete A Net User + file: endpoint/ssa___delete_a_net_user.yml + pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' + description: Test for usage of net.exe or net1.exe to delete net user + attack_data: + - file_name: net_user_del.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/ssa_data1/net_user_del.log + source: WinEventLog:Security + - file_name: security.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1531/atomic_red_team/security.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___deny_permission_using_cacls_utility.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___deny_permission_using_cacls_utility.test.yml index fec66fbbe8..e5d53dec60 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___deny_permission_using_cacls_utility.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/ssa___deny_permission_using_cacls_utility.test.yml @@ -1,13 +1,10 @@ name: Deny Permission using Cacls Utility Unit Test tests: - - name: Deny Permission using Cacls Utility - file: endpoint/ssa___deny_permission_using_cacls_utility.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test for usage of cacls deny permission to a file(s) or folder(s) - attack_data: - - file_name: all_icalc.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1222.001/ssa_cacls/all_icalc.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - - - \ No newline at end of file +- name: Deny Permission using Cacls Utility + file: endpoint/ssa___deny_permission_using_cacls_utility.yml + pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' + description: Test for usage of cacls deny permission to a file(s) or folder(s) + attack_data: + - file_name: all_icalc.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1222.001/ssa_cacls/all_icalc.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.test.yml index 523f32f702..d71522e2d3 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.test.yml @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ -name: Detect Dump LSASS Memory using comsvcs - SSA Unit Test +name: Detect Dump LSASS Memory using comsvcs Unit Test tests: - - name: Detect Dump LSASS Memory using comsvcs - file: endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test credential dumping detections - attack_data: - - file_name: windows-security.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log - source: WinEventLog:Security \ No newline at end of file +- name: Detect Dump LSASS Memory using comsvcs + file: endpoint/ssa___detect_dump_lsass_memory_using_comsvcs.yml + pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' + description: Test credential dumping detections + attack_data: + - file_name: windows-security.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___detect_kerberoasting.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___detect_kerberoasting.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index ec34425af2..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___detect_kerberoasting.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,11 +0,0 @@ -name: Detect Kerberoasting - SSA Unit test -tests: - - name: Detect kerberoasting - file: endpoint/ssa___detect_kerberoasting.yml - pass_condition: '@count_eq(0)' - description: Test detection of kerberoasting - attack_data: - - file_name: windows-security.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index b974348f97..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ -name: Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe Unit Test -tests: - - name: Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - file: endpoint/ssa___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(1)' - description: Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - attack_data: - - file_name: windows-security.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/prohibited_cmd_spawn/prohibited_apps_spawning_cmd.log - source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___detect_rclone_command_line_usage.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___detect_rclone_command_line_usage.test.yml index 407a7d7975..e0d70f85ad 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___detect_rclone_command_line_usage.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/ssa___detect_rclone_command_line_usage.test.yml @@ -6,4 +6,4 @@ tests: attack_data: - file_name: windows-security.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1020/windows-security.log - source: WinEventLog:Security \ No newline at end of file + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___disable_net_user_account.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___disable_net_user_account.test.yml index cae32acb00..d1202211c7 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___disable_net_user_account.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/ssa___disable_net_user_account.test.yml @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ name: Disable Net User Account Unit Test tests: - - name: Disable Net User Account - file: endpoint/ssa___disable_net_user_account.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test for usage of net.exe or net1.exe to disable net user - attack_data: - - file_name: net_user_dis.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/ssa_data1/net_user_dis.log - source: WinEventLog:Security \ No newline at end of file +- name: Disable Net User Account + file: endpoint/ssa___disable_net_user_account.yml + pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' + description: Test for usage of net.exe or net1.exe to disable net user + attack_data: + - file_name: net_user_dis.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/ssa_data1/net_user_dis.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app.test.yml index 76c940b9cc..91a1552435 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/ssa___dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app.test.yml @@ -6,4 +6,4 @@ tests: attack_data: - file_name: windows-security.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/nslookup_exfil/windows-security.log - source: WinEventLog:Security \ No newline at end of file + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___excessive_number_of_office_files_copied.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___excessive_number_of_office_files_copied.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index b78607f1a9..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___excessive_number_of_office_files_copied.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ -name: Excessive Number of Office Files Copied Unit Test -tests: - - name: Excessive Number of Office Files Copied - file: endpoint/ssa___excessive_number_of_office_files_copied.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test for Excessive Number of Office Files Copied - attack_data: - - file_name: sysmon.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/mass_file_creation/windows-sysmon.log - source: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index e2dfca0320..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ -name: First time seen command line argument - SSA Unit Test -tests: - - name: First time seen command line argument - file: endpoint/ssa___first_time_seen_cmd_line.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test detection of first time seen command - attack_data: - - file_name: windows-security.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/cmd_arguments/windows-security.log - source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___fsutil_zeroing_file.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___fsutil_zeroing_file.test.yml index 4ca51963d1..3f6202f8a0 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___fsutil_zeroing_file.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/ssa___fsutil_zeroing_file.test.yml @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ -name: FSUtil Zeroing File - SSA Unit Test +name: Fsutil Zeroing File Unit Test tests: - - name: FSUtil Zeroing File - file: endpoint/ssa___fsutil_zeroing_file.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test detection of FSUtil Zeroing File - attack_data: - - file_name: windows-security.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070/fsutil_file_zero/windows-security.log - source: WinEventLog:Security \ No newline at end of file +- name: Fsutil Zeroing File + file: endpoint/ssa___fsutil_zeroing_file.yml + pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' + description: Test detection of FSUtil Zeroing File + attack_data: + - file_name: windows-sysmon.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070/fsutil_file_zero/windows-sysmon.log + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___grant_permission_using_cacls_utility.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___grant_permission_using_cacls_utility.test.yml index 12bb3db7cf..0f94a039d2 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___grant_permission_using_cacls_utility.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/ssa___grant_permission_using_cacls_utility.test.yml @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ name: Grant Permission Using Cacls Utility Unit Test tests: - - name: Grant Permission Using Cacls Utility - file: endpoint/ssa___grant_permission_using_cacls_utility.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test for usage of cacls grant permission to a file(s) or folder(s) - attack_data: - - file_name: all_icalc.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1222.001/ssa_cacls/all_icalc.log - source: WinEventLog:Security \ No newline at end of file +- name: Grant Permission Using Cacls Utility + file: endpoint/ssa___grant_permission_using_cacls_utility.yml + pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' + description: Test for usage of cacls grant permission to a file(s) or folder(s) + attack_data: + - file_name: all_icalc.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1222.001/ssa_cacls/all_icalc.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___high_file_deletion_frequency.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___high_file_deletion_frequency.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index d4b1a78b25..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___high_file_deletion_frequency.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ -name: High File Deletion Frequency Unit Test -tests: - - name: High File Deletion Frequency - file: endpoint/ssa___high_file_deletion_frequency.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test for High File Deletion Frequency - attack_data: - - file_name: sysmon.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/excessive_file_deletions/windows-sysmon.log - source: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___illegal_access_user_content_via_powersploit_modules.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___illegal_access_user_content_via_powersploit_modules.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index c8b8e52bc5..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___illegal_access_user_content_via_powersploit_modules.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ -name: Illegal Access To User Content via PowerSploit modules - SSA Unit test -tests: - - name: Illegal Access To User Content via PowerSploit modules - file: endpoint/ssa___illegal_access_user_content_via_powersploit_modules.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test illegal access to user content detections - attack_data: - - file_name: logAllPowerSploitModulesWithOldNames.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021/illegal_access_to_content/logAllPowerSploitModulesWithOldNames.log - source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_creation_via_powersploit_modules.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_creation_via_powersploit_modules.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 0bbf466508..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_creation_via_powersploit_modules.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,11 +0,0 @@ -name: Illegal Account Creation via PowerSploit modules - SSA Unit test -tests: - - name: Illegal Account Creation via PowerSploit modules - file: endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_creation_via_powersploit_modules.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test illegal account creation detections - attack_data: - - file_name: logAllPowerSploitModulesWithOldNames.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021/illegal_access_to_content/logAllPowerSploitModulesWithOldNames.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_enable_disable_via_dsinternals_modules.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_enable_disable_via_dsinternals_modules.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 0c6ee481f0..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_enable_disable_via_dsinternals_modules.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ -name: Illegal Enabling or Disabling of Accounts via DSInternals modules - SSA Unit test -tests: - - name: Illegal Enabling or Disabling of Accounts via DSInternals modules - file: endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_enable_disable_via_dsinternals_modules.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test enabling or disabling of accounts detections - attack_data: - - file_name: logAllDSInternalsModules.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098/account_manipulation/logAllDSInternalsModules.log - source: WinEventLog:Security \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___illegal_log_deletion_via_mimikatz_modules.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___illegal_log_deletion_via_mimikatz_modules.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 29b0397ff2..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___illegal_log_deletion_via_mimikatz_modules.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ -name: Illegal Deletion of Logs via Mimikatz modules - SSA Unit test -tests: - - name: Illegal Deletion of Logs via Mimikatz modules - file: endpoint/ssa___illegal_log_deletion_via_mimikatz_modules.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test illegal log deletion detections - attack_data: - - file_name: logAllMimikatzModules.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070/illegal_log_deletion/logAllMimikatzModules.log - source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_AD_elements_and_policies_via_dsinternals_modules.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_AD_elements_and_policies_via_dsinternals_modules.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 2b0471fe87..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_AD_elements_and_policies_via_dsinternals_modules.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ -name: Illegal Management of Active Directory Elements and Policies via DSInternals modules - SSA Unit test -tests: - - name: Illegal Management of Active Directory Elements and Policies via DSInternals modules - file: endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_AD_elements_and_policies_via_dsinternals_modules.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test illegal management of Active Directory elements and policies detections - attack_data: - - file_name: logAllDSInternalsModules.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1484/logAllDSInternalsModules.log - source: WinEventLog:Security \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_computers_and_AD_elements_via_powersploit_modules.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_computers_and_AD_elements_via_powersploit_modules.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 2ce4a24443..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_computers_and_AD_elements_via_powersploit_modules.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ -name: Illegal Management of Computers and Active Directory Elements via PowerSploit modules - SSA Unit test -tests: - - name: Illegal Management of Computers and Active Directory Elements via PowerSploit modules - file: endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_computers_and_AD_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test illegal management of computers and Active Directory elements detections - attack_data: - - file_name: logAllPowerSploitModulesWithOldNames.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1484/logAllPowerSploitModulesWithOldNames.log - source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_and_persistence_via_powersploit_modules.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_and_persistence_via_powersploit_modules.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 36bcadf573..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_and_persistence_via_powersploit_modules.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ -name: Illegal Privilege Elevation and Persistence via PowerSploit modules - SSA Unit test -tests: - - name: Illegal Privilege Elevation and Persistence via PowerSploit modules - file: endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_and_persistence_via_powersploit_modules.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test privilege elevation and persistence detections - attack_data: - - file_name: logAllPowerSploitModulesWithOldNames.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/logAllPowerSploitModulesWithOldNames.log - source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_via_mimikatz_modules.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_via_mimikatz_modules.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 3f1353c209..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_via_mimikatz_modules.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ -name: Illegal Privilege Elevation via Mimikatz modules - SSA Unit test -tests: - - name: Illegal Privilege Elevation via Mimikatz modules - file: endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_via_mimikatz_modules.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test illegal privilege elevation detections - attack_data: - - file_name: logAllMimikatzModules.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/logAllMimikatzModules.log - source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_mimikatz_modules.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_mimikatz_modules.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 6d817ccd8e..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_mimikatz_modules.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ -name: Illegal Service and Process Control via Mimikatz modules - SSA Unit test -tests: - - name: Illegal Service and Process Control via Mimikatz modules - file: endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_mimikatz_modules.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test illegal service and process control detections - attack_data: - - file_name: logAllMimikatzModules.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/logAllMimikatzModules.log - source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_powersploit_modules.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_powersploit_modules.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 934de2ea9e..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_powersploit_modules.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,11 +0,0 @@ -name: Illegal Service and Process Control via PowerSploit modules - SSA Unit test -tests: - - name: Illegal Service and Process Control via PowerSploit modules - file: endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_powersploit_modules.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test illegal service and process control detections - attack_data: - - file_name: logAllPowerSploitModulesWithOldNames.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/logAllPowerSploitModulesWithOldNames.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___modify_acls_permission_of_files_or_folders.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___modify_acls_permission_of_files_or_folders.test.yml index 01d315285a..091478676c 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___modify_acls_permission_of_files_or_folders.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/ssa___modify_acls_permission_of_files_or_folders.test.yml @@ -1,10 +1,11 @@ name: Modify ACLs Permission Of Files Or Folders Unit Test tests: - - name: Modify ACLs Permission Of Files Or Folders - file: endpoint/ssa___modify_acls_permission_of_files_or_folders.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test for modifying permission of a file(s) or folder(s) using cacls utility. - attack_data: - - file_name: all_icalc.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1222.001/ssa_cacls/all_icalc.log - source: WinEventLog:Security \ No newline at end of file +- name: Modify ACLs Permission Of Files Or Folders + file: endpoint/ssa___modify_acls_permission_of_files_or_folders.yml + pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' + description: Test for modifying permission of a file(s) or folder(s) using cacls + utility. + attack_data: + - file_name: all_icalc.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1222.001/ssa_cacls/all_icalc.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___potential_pass_the_token_or_hash_observed_at_the_destination_device.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___potential_pass_the_token_or_hash_observed_at_the_destination_device.test.yml index c4613dbbcc..b25ca49a47 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___potential_pass_the_token_or_hash_observed_at_the_destination_device.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/ssa___potential_pass_the_token_or_hash_observed_at_the_destination_device.test.yml @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -name: Potential Pass the Token or Hash Observed at the Destination Device - SSA Unit test +name: Potential Pass the Token or Hash Observed at the Destination Device Unit Test tests: - name: Potential Pass the Token or Hash Observed at the Destination Device file: endpoint/ssa___potential_pass_the_token_or_hash_observed_at_the_destination_device.yml @@ -7,5 +7,4 @@ tests: attack_data: - file_name: ptt_pth_kerb_ntlm_anon_dest_dataset.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1550.002/extracts_from_real_data/ptt_pth_kerb_ntlm_anon_dest_dataset.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - + source: WinEventLog:Security \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___potential_pass_the_token_or_hash_observed_by_an_event_collecting_device.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___potential_pass_the_token_or_hash_observed_by_an_event_collecting_device.test.yml index 7d6319bb8b..f988fd89fb 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___potential_pass_the_token_or_hash_observed_by_an_event_collecting_device.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/ssa___potential_pass_the_token_or_hash_observed_by_an_event_collecting_device.test.yml @@ -1,11 +1,10 @@ -name: Potential Pass the Token or Hash Observed by an Event Collecting Device - SSA Unit test +name: Potential Pass the Token or Hash Observed by an Event Collecting Device Unit Test tests: - name: Potential Pass the Token or Hash Observed by an Event Collecting Device - file: endpoint/ssa___potential_pass_the_token_or_hash_observed_by_an_event_collecting_device.yml + file: endpoint/ssa___ptt_pth_kerb_ntlm_origin_device.yml pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' description: Test Pass the Hash or Pass the Token Detection Observed by an Event Collecting Device attack_data: - file_name: ptt_pth_kerb_ntlm_anon_DC_dataset.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1550.002/extracts_from_real_data/ptt_pth_kerb_ntlm_anon_DC_dataset.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - + source: WinEventLog:Security \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___probing_access_with_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___probing_access_with_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 294a265703..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___probing_access_with_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ -name: Probing Access with Stolen Credentials via PowerSploit modules - SSA Unit test -tests: - - name: Probing Access with Stolen Credentials via PowerSploit modules - file: endpoint/ssa___probing_access_with_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test access probing with stolen credentials detections - attack_data: - - file_name: logAllPowerSploitModulesWithOldNames.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/logAllPowerSploitModulesWithOldNames.log - source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.test.yml index e4a7ef5e02..b2ab6ba37f 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/ssa___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.test.yml @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ -name: Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - SSA +name: Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe Unit Test tests: - - name: Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - file: endpoint/ssa___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test prohibited apps spawning cmd.exe - attack_data: - - file_name: windows-security.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/powershell_spawn_cmd/windows-security.log - source: WinEventLog:Security \ No newline at end of file +- name: Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe + file: endpoint/ssa___prohibited_apps_spawning_cmdprompt.yml + pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' + description: Test prohibited apps spawning cmd.exe + attack_data: + - file_name: windows-security.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/powershell_spawn_cmd/windows-security.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___rare_parent_process_relationship_lolbas.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___rare_parent_process_relationship_lolbas.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 057ea4115e..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___rare_parent_process_relationship_lolbas.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,11 +0,0 @@ -name: Rare Parent/Child Process Relationship with LOLBAS - SSA Unit Test -tests: - - name: Rare Parent/Child Process Relationship with LOLBAS - file: endpoint/ssa___rare_parent_process_relationship_lolbas.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test detection looking for LOLBAS processes spawned by other processes that are rarely seen together - attack_data: - - file_name: windows-sec-events.out - data: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sec-events.out - source: WinEventLog:Security - diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___recon_access_and_persistence_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___recon_access_and_persistence_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index a8295db554..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___recon_access_and_persistence_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ -name: Reconnaissance of Access and Persistence Opportunities via PowerSploit modules - SSA Unit test -tests: - - name: Reconnaissance of Access and Persistence Opportunities via PowerSploit modules - file: endpoint/ssa___recon_access_and_persistence_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test reconnaissance of access and persistence detections - attack_data: - - file_name: logAllPowerSploitModulesWithOldNames.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/logAllPowerSploitModulesWithOldNames.log - source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_policies_via_powersploit_modules.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_policies_via_powersploit_modules.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 329486d2cf..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_policies_via_powersploit_modules.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,11 +0,0 @@ -name: Reconnaissance and Access to Accounts Groups and Policies via PowerSploit modules - SSA Unit test -tests: - - name: Reconnaissance and Access to Accounts Groups and Policies via PowerSploit modules - file: endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_policies_via_powersploit_modules.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test reconnaissance and access to accounts groups and policies detections - attack_data: - - file_name: logAllPowerSploitModulesWithOldNames.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/logAllPowerSploitModulesWithOldNames.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_via_mimikatz_modules.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_via_mimikatz_modules.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 6f1a1133c3..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_via_mimikatz_modules.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,11 +0,0 @@ -name: Reconnaissance and Access to Accounts and Groups via Mimikatz modules - SSA Unit test -tests: - - name: Reconnaissance and Access to Accounts and Groups via Mimikatz modules - file: endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_accounts_groups_via_mimikatz_modules.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test reconnaissance and access to accounts and groups detections - attack_data: - - file_name: logAllMimikatzModules.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/logAllMimikatzModules.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_active_directory_infrastructure_via_powersploit_modules.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_active_directory_infrastructure_via_powersploit_modules.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 0831092dd2..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_active_directory_infrastructure_via_powersploit_modules.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,11 +0,0 @@ -name: Reconnaissance and Access to Active Directoty Infrastructure via PowerSploit modules - SSA Unit test -tests: - - name: Reconnaissance and Access to Active Directoty Infrastructure via PowerSploit modules - file: endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_active_directory_infrastructure_via_powersploit_modules.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test reconnaissance and access to active directory infrastrucutre detections - attack_data: - - file_name: logAllPowerSploitModulesWithOldNames.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/logAllPowerSploitModulesWithOldNames.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_domains_via_powersploit_modules.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_domains_via_powersploit_modules.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 9770d934b9..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_domains_via_powersploit_modules.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,11 +0,0 @@ -name: Reconnaissance and Access to Computers and Domains via PowerSploit modules - SSA Unit test -tests: - - name: Reconnaissance and Access to Computers and Domains via PowerSploit modules - file: endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_domains_via_powersploit_modules.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test reconnaissance and access to computers and domains detections - attack_data: - - file_name: logAllPowerSploitModulesWithOldNames.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/logAllPowerSploitModulesWithOldNames.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_via_mimikatz_modules.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_via_mimikatz_modules.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 47067e795d..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_via_mimikatz_modules.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,11 +0,0 @@ -name: Reconnaissance and Access to Computers via Mimikatz modules - SSA Unit test -tests: - - name: Reconnaissance and Access to Computers via Mimikatz modules - file: endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_computers_via_mimikatz_modules.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test reconnaissance and access to computers detections - attack_data: - - file_name: logAllMimikatzModules.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/logAllMimikatzModules.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_operating_system_elements_via_powersploit_modules.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_operating_system_elements_via_powersploit_modules.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 083df9573a..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_operating_system_elements_via_powersploit_modules.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,11 +0,0 @@ -name: Reconnaissance and Access to Operating System Elements via PowerSploit modules - SSA Unit test -tests: - - name: Reconnaissance and Access to Operating System Elements via PowerSploit modules - file: endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_operating_system_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test reconnaissance and access to operating system element detections - attack_data: - - file_name: logAllPowerSploitModulesWithOldNames.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/logAllPowerSploitModulesWithOldNames.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_mimikatz_modules.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_mimikatz_modules.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 56a93c9975..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_mimikatz_modules.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ -name: Reconnaissance and Access to Shared Resources via Mimikatz modules - SSA Unit test -tests: - - name: Reconnaissance and Access to Shared Resources via Mimikatz modules - file: endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_mimikatz_modules.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test reconnaissance and access to network shares detections - attack_data: - - file_name: logAllMimikatzModules.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/logAllMimikatzModules.log - source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_powersploit_modules.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_powersploit_modules.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 9a6587ebde..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_powersploit_modules.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ -name: Reconnaissance and Access to Shared Resources via PowerSploit modules - SSA Unit test -tests: - - name: Reconnaissance and Access to Shared Resources via PowerSploit modules - file: endpoint/ssa___recon_and_use_shares_via_powersploit_modules.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test reconnaissance and access to shares detections - attack_data: - - file_name: logAllPowerSploitModulesWithOldNames.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/logAllPowerSploitModulesWithOldNames.log - source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___recon_connectivity_via_powersploit_modules.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___recon_connectivity_via_powersploit_modules.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 5f49c6706b..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___recon_connectivity_via_powersploit_modules.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,11 +0,0 @@ -name: Reconnaissance of Connectivity via PowerSploit modules - SSA Unit test -tests: - - name: Reconnaissance of Connectivity via PowerSploit modules - file: endpoint/ssa___recon_connectivity_via_powersploit_modules.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test reconnaissance of connectivity detections - attack_data: - - file_name: logAllPowerSploitModulesWithOldNames.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/logAllPowerSploitModulesWithOldNames.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___recon_credential_stores_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___recon_credential_stores_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index b611e5a39b..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___recon_credential_stores_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ -name: Reconnaissance of Credential Stores and Services via Mimikatz modules - SSA Unit test -tests: - - name: Reconnaissance of Credential Stores and Services via Mimikatz modules - file: endpoint/ssa___recon_credential_stores_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test reconnaissance of credential stores and services detections - attack_data: - - file_name: logAllMimikatzModules.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/logAllMimikatzModules.log - source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___recon_defensive_tools_via_powersploit_modules.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___recon_defensive_tools_via_powersploit_modules.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index c715c3b2cb..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___recon_defensive_tools_via_powersploit_modules.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,11 +0,0 @@ -name: Reconnaissance of Defensive Tools via PowerSploit modules - SSA Unit test -tests: - - name: Reconnaissance of Defensive Tools via PowerSploit modules - file: endpoint/ssa___recon_defensive_tools_via_powersploit_modules.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test reconnaissance of presence of defensive tools detections - attack_data: - - file_name: logAllPowerSploitModulesWithOldNames.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/logAllPowerSploitModulesWithOldNames.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___recon_privilege_escalation_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___recon_privilege_escalation_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index d42ca19ca9..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___recon_privilege_escalation_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,11 +0,0 @@ -name: Reconnaissance of Privilege Escalation Opportunities via PowerSploit modules - SSA Unit test -tests: - - name: Reconnaissance of Privilege Escalation Opportunities via PowerSploit modules - file: endpoint/ssa___recon_privilege_escalation_opportunities_via_powersploit_modules.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test reconnaissance of privilege escalations opportunities detections - attack_data: - - file_name: logAllPowerSploitModulesWithOldNames.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/logAllPowerSploitModulesWithOldNames.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___recon_process_service_hijacking_via_mimikatz_modules.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___recon_process_service_hijacking_via_mimikatz_modules.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 3100086761..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___recon_process_service_hijacking_via_mimikatz_modules.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,11 +0,0 @@ -name: Reconnaissance of Process or Service Hijacking Opportunities via Mimikatz modules - SSA Unit test -tests: - - name: Reconnaissance of Process or Service Hijacking Opportunities via Mimikatz modules - file: endpoint/ssa___recon_process_service_hijacking_via_mimikatz_modules.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test reconnaissance of process or service hijacking detections - attack_data: - - file_name: logAllMimikatzModules.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/logAllMimikatzModules.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___recon_processes_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___recon_processes_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 532bc3f60b..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___recon_processes_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,11 +0,0 @@ -name: Reconnaissance and Access to Processes and Services via Mimikatz modules - SSA Unit test -tests: - - name: Reconnaissance and Access to Processes and Services via Mimikatz modules - file: endpoint/ssa___recon_processes_and_services_via_mimikatz_modules.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test reconnaissance of processes and services detections - attack_data: - - file_name: logAllMimikatzModules.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/logAllMimikatzModules.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___resize_shadowstorage_volume.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___resize_shadowstorage_volume.test.yml index e5380d0395..ca7cccfee7 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___resize_shadowstorage_volume.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/ssa___resize_shadowstorage_volume.test.yml @@ -1,13 +1,10 @@ name: Resize Shadowstorage Volume Unit Test tests: - - name: Resize Shadowstorage Volume - file: endpoint/ssa___resize_shadowstorage_volume.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test for resizing the shadow storage of a machine - attack_data: - - file_name: windows-security.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/ssa_data1/windows-security.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - - - \ No newline at end of file +- name: Resize Shadowstorage Volume + file: endpoint/ssa___resize_shadowstorage_volume.yml + pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' + description: Test for resizing the shadow storage of a machine + attack_data: + - file_name: windows-security.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/ssa_data1/windows-security.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___sdelete_application_execution.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___sdelete_application_execution.test.yml index dd067e0575..33a3ddfdbf 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___sdelete_application_execution.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/ssa___sdelete_application_execution.test.yml @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ name: Sdelete Application Execution Unit Test tests: - - name: Sdelete Application Execution - file: endpoint/ssa___sdelete_application_execution.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test for sdelete execution command - attack_data: - - file_name: security.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/sdelete/security.log - source: WinEventLog:Security +- name: Sdelete Application Execution + file: endpoint/ssa___sdelete_application_execution.yml + pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' + description: Test for sdelete execution command + attack_data: + - file_name: security.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/sdelete/security.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_dsinternals_modules.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_dsinternals_modules.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 2f1b684c11..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_dsinternals_modules.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ -name: Setting Credentials via DSInternals modules - SSA Unit test -tests: - - name: Setting Credentials via DSInternals modules - file: endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_dsinternals_modules.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test illegal credential setting detections - attack_data: - - file_name: logAllDSInternalsModules.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/logAllDSInternalsModules.log - source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 185457e21a..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ -name: Setting Credentials via Mimikatz modules - SSA Unit test -tests: - - name: Setting Credentials via Mimikatz modules - file: endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test illegal credential setting detections - attack_data: - - file_name: logAllMimikatzModules.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/logAllMimikatzModules.log - source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index cf50843bf1..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,11 +0,0 @@ -name: Setting Credentials via PowerSploit modules - SSA Unit test -tests: - - name: Setting Credentials via PowerSploit modules - file: endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test illegal credential setting detections - attack_data: - - file_name: logAllPowerSploitModulesWithOldNames.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/logAllPowerSploitModulesWithOldNames.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___system_process_running_from_unexpected_location.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___system_process_running_from_unexpected_location.test.yml index fc10e9eb24..5d2e713eca 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___system_process_running_from_unexpected_location.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/ssa___system_process_running_from_unexpected_location.test.yml @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -name: System Process Running from Unexpected Location - SSA Unit Test +name: System Process Running from Unexpected Location Unit Test tests: - name: System Process Running from Unexpected Location file: endpoint/ssa___system_process_running_from_unexpected_location.yml diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.test.yml index 698c0ad7ee..3851135d93 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.test.yml @@ -1,9 +1,10 @@ -name: Unusual LOLBAS in short period of time - SSA Unit Test +name: Unusual LOLBAS in short period of time Unit Test tests: - - name: Unusual LOLBAS in short period of time - file: endpoint/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test more than usual lolbas being executed in a short period of time - attack_data: - - file_name: T1059.all.labeled.lolbas-test.json - data: https://ssa-test-dataset.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/T1059.all.labeled.lolbas-test.json +- name: Unusual LOLBAS in short period of time + file: endpoint/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml + pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' + description: Test more than usual lolbas being executed in a short period of time + attack_data: + - file_name: T1059.all.labeled.lolbas-test.json + data: https://ssa-test-dataset.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/T1059.all.labeled.lolbas-test.json + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___unusually_long_command_line.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___unusually_long_command_line.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index a72d85358d..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___unusually_long_command_line.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ -name: Unusually Long Command Line - SSA Unit Test -tests: - - name: Unusually Long Command Line - file: endpoint/ssa___unusually_long_command_line.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test unusually long command lines - attack_data: - - file_name: windows-security.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/unusally_cmd_line/windows-security.log - source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___wbadmin_delete_system_backups.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___wbadmin_delete_system_backups.test.yml index 6a7c0c7237..03638ce897 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___wbadmin_delete_system_backups.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/ssa___wbadmin_delete_system_backups.test.yml @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ -name: WBAdmin Delete System Backups - SSA Unit Test +name: WBAdmin Delete System Backups Unit Test tests: - - name: WBAdmin Delete System Backups - file: endpoint/ssa___wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test detection of WBAdmin Delete System Backups - attack_data: - - file_name: windows-security_bcdedit_wbadmin.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-security_bcdedit_wbadmin.log - source: WinEventLog:Security \ No newline at end of file +- name: WBAdmin Delete System Backups + file: endpoint/ssa___wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml + pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' + description: Test detection of WBAdmin Delete System Backups + attack_data: + - file_name: windows-sysmon.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___wevtutil_usage_to_clear_logs.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___wevtutil_usage_to_clear_logs.test.yml index 3d028e17a9..545f6fb69f 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___wevtutil_usage_to_clear_logs.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/ssa___wevtutil_usage_to_clear_logs.test.yml @@ -1,14 +1,10 @@ name: WevtUtil Usage To Clear Logs Unit Test tests: - - name: WevtUtil Usage To Clear Logs - file: endpoint/ssa___wevtutil_usage_to_clear_logs.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test for wevtutil clear logs command - attack_data: - - file_name: clear_evt.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/ssa_wevtutil/clear_evt.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - - - - +- name: WevtUtil Usage To Clear Logs + file: endpoint/ssa___wevtutil_usage_to_clear_logs.yml + pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' + description: Test for wevtutil clear logs command + attack_data: + - file_name: clear_evt.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/ssa_wevtutil/clear_evt.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___wevtutil_usage_to_disable_logs.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___wevtutil_usage_to_disable_logs.test.yml index d417fd8647..ba6d174a71 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___wevtutil_usage_to_disable_logs.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/ssa___wevtutil_usage_to_disable_logs.test.yml @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ name: Wevtutil Usage To Disable Logs Unit Test tests: - - name: Wevtutil Usage To Disable Logs - file: endpoint/ssa___wevtutil_usage_to_disable_logs.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test for wevtutil disable logs command - attack_data: - - file_name: disable_evt.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/ssa_wevtutil/disable_evt.log - source: WinEventLog:Security \ No newline at end of file +- name: Wevtutil Usage To Disable Logs + file: endpoint/ssa___wevtutil_usage_to_disable_logs.yml + pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' + description: Test for wevtutil disable logs command + attack_data: + - file_name: disable_evt.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/ssa_wevtutil/disable_evt.log + source: WinEventLog:Security diff --git a/tests/endpoint/ssa___windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/ssa___windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution.test.yml index 1b8c7d0d1b..3a74d21138 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/ssa___windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/ssa___windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution.test.yml @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ name: BA Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution Unit Test tests: -- name: BA Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution +- name: Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution file: endpoint/ssa___windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution.yml pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' attack_data: diff --git a/tests/endpoint/start_up_during_safe_mode_boot.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/start_up_during_safe_mode_boot.test.yml index 3dfc65e640..aa3c92429d 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/start_up_during_safe_mode_boot.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/start_up_during_safe_mode_boot.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Start Up During Safe Mode Boot file: endpoint/start_up_during_safe_mode_boot.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_computer_account_name_change.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_computer_account_name_change.test.yml index 18f8ebe21b..18b1023943 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_computer_account_name_change.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_computer_account_name_change.test.yml @@ -3,11 +3,11 @@ tests: - name: Suspicious Computer Account Name Change file: endpoint/suspicious_computer_account_name_change.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-security.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/samaccountname_spoofing/windows-security.log source: WinEventLog:Security sourcetype: WinEventLog - update_timestamp: True \ No newline at end of file + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_copy_on_system32.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_copy_on_system32.test.yml index 918c57dd1b..a097869405 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_copy_on_system32.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_copy_on_system32.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Suspicious Copy on System32 file: endpoint/suspicious_copy_on_system32.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/copy_sysmon/sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments.test.yml index 32e85893de..ab5cb11327 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments.test.yml @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ -name: Suspicious DLLHost no command line arguments Unit Test +name: Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments Unit Test tests: - name: Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments file: endpoint/suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_driver_loaded_path.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_driver_loaded_path.test.yml index 2cb83a024d..c5fe445020 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_driver_loaded_path.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_driver_loaded_path.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Suspicious Driver Loaded Path file: endpoint/suspicious_driver_loaded_path.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_event_log_service_behavior.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_event_log_service_behavior.test.yml index 05382d554d..74537d7506 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_event_log_service_behavior.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_event_log_service_behavior.test.yml @@ -1,13 +1,13 @@ -name: Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior +name: Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior Unit Test tests: - name: Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior file: endpoint/suspicious_event_log_service_behavior.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-security.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log source: WinEventLog:Security sourcetype: WinEventLog - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments.test.yml index ddc754c4f6..e5316a527d 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments file: endpoint/suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline.test.yml index 32c62eb72c..48cd79b0c8 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline file: endpoint/suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_image_creation_in_appdata_folder.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_image_creation_in_appdata_folder.test.yml index cdd3f0f988..c9bb612cef 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_image_creation_in_appdata_folder.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_image_creation_in_appdata_folder.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Suspicious Image Creation In Appdata Folder file: endpoint/suspicious_image_creation_in_appdata_folder.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_agent/sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_kerberos_service_ticket_request.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_kerberos_service_ticket_request.test.yml index b101e3b2ce..aaf1852223 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_kerberos_service_ticket_request.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_kerberos_service_ticket_request.test.yml @@ -3,11 +3,11 @@ tests: - name: Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request file: endpoint/suspicious_kerberos_service_ticket_request.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-security.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/samaccountname_spoofing/windows-security.log source: WinEventLog:Security sourcetype: WinEventLog - update_timestamp: True \ No newline at end of file + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.test.yml index c119db0da6..eb22095a66 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.test.yml @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ -name: Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename +name: Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename Unit Test tests: -- name: Detect microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe rename +- name: Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename file: endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.test.yml index b81b1c6d9f..d350621c11 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.test.yml @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ -name: Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage +name: Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage Unit Test tests: -- name: Detect microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe usage +- name: Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage file: endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.test.yml index fa5e080c6b..3a5d86ad5f 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.test.yml @@ -1,13 +1,13 @@ -name: Suspicious msbuild path +name: Suspicious msbuild path Unit Test tests: -- name: Detect moved msbuild execution +- name: Suspicious msbuild path file: endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational sourcetype: xmlwineventlog - update_timestamp: True \ No newline at end of file + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.test.yml index be713ce446..6a47ac212a 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.test.yml @@ -1,13 +1,13 @@ -name: Suspicious msbuild rename +name: Suspicious MSBuild Rename Unit Test tests: -- name: Detect renamed msbuild execution +- name: Suspicious MSBuild Rename file: endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational sourcetype: xmlwineventlog - update_timestamp: True \ No newline at end of file + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.test.yml index 498fd7134d..15545353db 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.test.yml @@ -1,13 +1,13 @@ -name: Suspicious msbuild spawn +name: Suspicious MSBuild Spawn Unit Test tests: -- name: Detect wmiprvse spawn msbuild +- name: Suspicious MSBuild Spawn file: endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational sourcetype: xmlwineventlog - update_timestamp: True \ No newline at end of file + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.test.yml index 531fb31e71..bb6eae1dfb 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.test.yml @@ -1,13 +1,13 @@ name: Suspicious mshta child process Unit Test tests: -- name: Detect mshta spawning a process +- name: Suspicious mshta child process file: endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-7d' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -7d + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational sourcetype: xmlwineventlog - update_timestamp: True \ No newline at end of file + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.test.yml index 0acbd71f95..85f4166181 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.test.yml @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ -name: Detect mshta spawn unit test +name: Suspicious mshta spawn Unit Test tests: -- name: Detect mshta spawn +- name: Suspicious mshta spawn file: endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services.test.yml index 6bb663c2a7..22a5ba6153 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services file: endpoint/suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_pastebin_download/sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_process_file_path.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_process_file_path.test.yml index e04a00597d..08dcacb70e 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_process_file_path.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_process_file_path.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Suspicious Process File Path file: endpoint/suspicious_process_file_path.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.test.yml index f02a0b7dd5..ee4b9a84d4 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Suspicious Reg exe Process file: endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 5' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.test.yml index 0735471a9d..6aa2abbeaf 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.test.yml @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ -name: Detect Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path Unit Test +name: Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path Unit Test tests: -- name: Detect regsvr32 Registering DLLs from non-standard paths +- name: Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path file: endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.010/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.test.yml index f964cf33c7..0e7b9cf28b 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver file: endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_plugininit.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_plugininit.test.yml index 9c3b0018a8..1d7e11ae32 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_plugininit.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_plugininit.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Suspicious Rundll32 PluginInit file: endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_plugininit.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.test.yml index c0f890fc7a..9bc8459a2f 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.test.yml @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ -name: Suspicious Rundll32 startw Unit Test +name: Suspicious Rundll32 StartW Unit Test tests: -- name: Suspicious Rundll32 startw +- name: Suspicious Rundll32 StartW file: endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.test.yml index 145ea7a51f..5e2da978d2 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.test.yml @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ -name: Suspicious rundll32 with no command line arguments Unit Test +name: Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments Unit Test tests: -- name: Suspicious Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments +- name: Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments file: endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory.test.yml index 0d93992299..c1cd88b086 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory file: endpoint/suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/schtasks/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_searchprotocolhost_no_command_line_arguments.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_searchprotocolhost_no_command_line_arguments.test.yml index baa7ec883c..046630bce2 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_searchprotocolhost_no_command_line_arguments.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_searchprotocolhost_no_command_line_arguments.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments file: endpoint/suspicious_searchprotocolhost_no_command_line_arguments.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_ticket_granting_ticket_request.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_ticket_granting_ticket_request.test.yml index b1c22e97be..cc3af5a079 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_ticket_granting_ticket_request.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_ticket_granting_ticket_request.test.yml @@ -3,11 +3,11 @@ tests: - name: Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request file: endpoint/suspicious_ticket_granting_ticket_request.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-security.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/samaccountname_spoofing/windows-security.log source: WinEventLog:Security sourcetype: WinEventLog - update_timestamp: True \ No newline at end of file + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_wav_file_in_appdata_folder.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_wav_file_in_appdata_folder.test.yml index 8b4268b8a0..343d86b802 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_wav_file_in_appdata_folder.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_wav_file_in_appdata_folder.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Suspicious WAV file in Appdata Folder file: endpoint/suspicious_wav_file_in_appdata_folder.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon_wav.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_agent/sysmon_wav.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.test.yml index 4aa2c1da5d..1822097053 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.test.yml @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ -name: Suspicious File Write Unit Test +name: Suspicious wevtutil Usage Unit Test tests: -- name: Suspicious File Write +- name: Suspicious wevtutil Usage file: endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.test.yml index fa60452e42..4edf0dc002 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin file: endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036/write_to_recycle_bin/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/svchost_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/svchost_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.test.yml index ca7f00c14b..bec9243b37 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/svchost_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/svchost_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.test.yml @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ name: Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn Unit Test tests: -- name: Svchost.exe LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn +- name: Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn file: endpoint/svchost_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-security.log source: WinEventLog:Security - sourcetype: WinEventLog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: WinEventLog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application.test.yml index bf5d6247a5..ce3413379e 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: System Info Gathering Using Dxdiag Application file: endpoint/system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/t1592/host_info_dxdiag/sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.test.yml index be9186f74c..5f10733d58 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: System Information Discovery Detection file: endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1082/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.test.yml index 5e93633ca8..bd04ba314a 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations file: endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/system_user_discovery_with_query.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/system_user_discovery_with_query.test.yml index ef1051246d..74cfdef9d9 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/system_user_discovery_with_query.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/system_user_discovery_with_query.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: System User Discovery With Query file: endpoint/system_user_discovery_with_query.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/system_user_discovery_with_whoami.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/system_user_discovery_with_whoami.test.yml index 4e083ae9f4..aab373db63 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/system_user_discovery_with_whoami.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/system_user_discovery_with_whoami.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: System User Discovery With Whoami file: endpoint/system_user_discovery_with_whoami.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/time_provider_persistence_registry.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/time_provider_persistence_registry.test.yml index 4de49c3411..3b2447b2bc 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/time_provider_persistence_registry.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/time_provider_persistence_registry.test.yml @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ name: Time Provider Persistence Registry Unit Test tests: -- name: Time Provider Persistence Registry +- name: Time Provider Persistence Registry file: endpoint/time_provider_persistence_registry.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.003/timeprovider_reg/sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/trickbot_named_pipe.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/trickbot_named_pipe.test.yml index a83bc0136f..ef2e262ea8 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/trickbot_named_pipe.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/trickbot_named_pipe.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Trickbot Named Pipe file: endpoint/trickbot_named_pipe.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/namedpipe/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll.test.yml index d49e167cdb..af935daa0b 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll file: endpoint/uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon2.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon2.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object.test.yml index 74eb196cd1..de2f820f96 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object file: endpoint/uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.015/uac_colorui/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/unified_messaging_service_spawning_a_process.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/unified_messaging_service_spawning_a_process.test.yml index 22d39ba703..f8c23a8d98 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/unified_messaging_service_spawning_a_process.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/unified_messaging_service_spawning_a_process.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Unified Messaging Service Spawning a Process file: endpoint/unified_messaging_service_spawning_a_process.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/windows-sysmon_umservices.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/uninstall_app_using_msiexec.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/uninstall_app_using_msiexec.test.yml index a89525ac77..b35424ce4f 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/uninstall_app_using_msiexec.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/uninstall_app_using_msiexec.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Uninstall App Using MsiExec file: endpoint/uninstall_app_using_msiexec.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/conti/conti_leak/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.test.yml index c86771f240..7a95da22a0 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Unload Sysmon Filter Driver file: endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count = 1' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/unloading_amsi_via_reflection.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/unloading_amsi_via_reflection.test.yml index 60b06d3cd8..910e666767 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/unloading_amsi_via_reflection.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/unloading_amsi_via_reflection.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Unloading AMSI via Reflection file: endpoint/unloading_amsi_via_reflection.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-powershell.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational - sourcetype: WinEventLog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: WinEventLog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/user_discocvery_with_env_vars_powershell.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/user_discocvery_with_env_vars_powershell.test.yml index 7dfdeaa485..0251afd5d2 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/user_discocvery_with_env_vars_powershell.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/user_discocvery_with_env_vars_powershell.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell file: endpoint/user_discocvery_with_env_vars_powershell.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_script_block.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_script_block.test.yml index 4efbc9196d..de1b385e56 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_script_block.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_script_block.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell Script Block file: endpoint/user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_script_block.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-powershell.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational - sourcetype: wineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: wineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.test.yml index 2308cd9cbd..b77b4e62a8 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: USN Journal Deletion file: endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/vbscript_execution_using_wscript_app.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/vbscript_execution_using_wscript_app.test.yml index 2139a83584..c3d91a1c05 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/vbscript_execution_using_wscript_app.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/vbscript_execution_using_wscript_app.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App file: endpoint/vbscript_execution_using_wscript_app.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/vbs_wscript/sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/verclsid_clsid_execution.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/verclsid_clsid_execution.test.yml index cbbc1bfc62..678ee088e3 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/verclsid_clsid_execution.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/verclsid_clsid_execution.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Verclsid CLSID Execution file: endpoint/verclsid_clsid_execution.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.012/verclsid_exec/sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/w3wp_spawning_shell.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/w3wp_spawning_shell.test.yml index 4d09a0e73d..47eec577b5 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/w3wp_spawning_shell.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/w3wp_spawning_shell.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: W3WP Spawning Shell file: endpoint/w3wp_spawning_shell.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.test.yml index 6f9988cd24..3d5355a3cc 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: WBAdmin Delete System Backups file: endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/wbemprox_com_object_execution.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/wbemprox_com_object_execution.test.yml index 941f217106..580fad9316 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/wbemprox_com_object_execution.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/wbemprox_com_object_execution.test.yml @@ -3,13 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Wbemprox COM Object Execution file: endpoint/wbemprox_com_object_execution.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf2/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational sourcetype: xmlwineventlog - - - \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/endpoint/wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services.test.yml index fe866594fe..2021be41fc 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Wermgr Process Connecting To IP Check Web Services file: endpoint/wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/infection/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/wermgr_process_create_executable_file.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/wermgr_process_create_executable_file.test.yml index 0cf6b31dfb..d6227c381e 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/wermgr_process_create_executable_file.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/wermgr_process_create_executable_file.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Wermgr Process Create Executable File file: endpoint/wermgr_process_create_executable_file.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/infection/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process.test.yml index 02fd800a52..43bc02b04c 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process file: endpoint/wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/infection/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.test.yml index d261532861..39f3949793 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Wget Download and Bash Execution file: endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: linux-sysmon_curlwget.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log source: Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: sysmon_linux \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: sysmon_linux diff --git a/tests/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.test.yml index a5b83bfad8..027a4b21bb 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Windows AdFind Exe file: endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path.test.yml index ad7a84bf3f..5cce7ff1ca 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path file: endpoint/windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon_curl.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_curl.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination.test.yml index c73362b2f8..544bd86f77 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination file: endpoint/windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon_curl_upload.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_curl_upload.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry.test.yml index 4fc9e0082f..cb3ebf1857 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry file: endpoint/windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/defender_exclusion_sysmon/sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/windows_disableantispyware_reg.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/windows_disableantispyware_reg.test.yml index 806f786399..88e4f8f60f 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/windows_disableantispyware_reg.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/windows_disableantispyware_reg.test.yml @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ -name: Windows Disable Antispyware Reg Unit Test +name: Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry Unit Test tests: -- name: Windows Disable Antispyware Reg +- name: Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry file: endpoint/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/windows_diskcryptor_usage.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/windows_diskcryptor_usage.test.yml index a8ff02bae9..d9fd7c0259 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/windows_diskcryptor_usage.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/windows_diskcryptor_usage.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Windows DiskCryptor Usage file: endpoint/windows_diskcryptor_usage.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1486/dcrypt/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/windows_dism_remove_defender.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/windows_dism_remove_defender.test.yml index 9f090a3664..1e4555ff5a 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/windows_dism_remove_defender.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/windows_dism_remove_defender.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Windows DISM Remove Defender file: endpoint/windows_dism_remove_defender.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon_dism.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_dism.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.test.yml index c12d97e04f..606e84c79b 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.test.yml @@ -3,16 +3,16 @@ tests: - name: Windows Event Log Cleared file: endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-security.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log source: WinEventLog:Security sourcetype: WinEventLog - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true - file_name: windows-system.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log source: WinEventLog:System sourcetype: WinEventLog - update_timestamp: True + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/endpoint/windows_high_file_deletion_frequency.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/windows_high_file_deletion_frequency.test.yml index 896e942cb8..fd3b4a8507 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/windows_high_file_deletion_frequency.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/windows_high_file_deletion_frequency.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Windows High File Deletion Frequency file: endpoint/windows_high_file_deletion_frequency.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/windows_installutil_credential_theft.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/windows_installutil_credential_theft.test.yml index c1b6135db7..f4be8e9154 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/windows_installutil_credential_theft.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/windows_installutil_credential_theft.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft file: endpoint/windows_installutil_credential_theft.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/windows_installutil_remote_network_connection.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/windows_installutil_remote_network_connection.test.yml index 36ed1a889f..63468b17f1 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/windows_installutil_remote_network_connection.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/windows_installutil_remote_network_connection.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection file: endpoint/windows_installutil_remote_network_connection.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/windows_installutil_uninstall_option.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/windows_installutil_uninstall_option.test.yml index 2b37ecc20c..6a5feeb988 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/windows_installutil_uninstall_option.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/windows_installutil_uninstall_option.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option file: endpoint/windows_installutil_uninstall_option.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network.test.yml index b48813e0a3..cc91ba5e45 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network file: endpoint/windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/windows_installutil_url_in_command_line.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/windows_installutil_url_in_command_line.test.yml index 7407a4fcd1..f3c7e0ff9b 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/windows_installutil_url_in_command_line.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/windows_installutil_url_in_command_line.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line file: endpoint/windows_installutil_url_in_command_line.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/windows_nirsoft_advancedrun.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/windows_nirsoft_advancedrun.test.yml index 94a1827e21..cfdcc6c6e0 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/windows_nirsoft_advancedrun.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/windows_nirsoft_advancedrun.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun file: endpoint/windows_nirsoft_advancedrun.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1588.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/windows_nirsoft_utilities.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/windows_nirsoft_utilities.test.yml index 8b709a49ce..ddffe5f312 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/windows_nirsoft_utilities.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/windows_nirsoft_utilities.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Windows NirSoft Utilities file: endpoint/windows_nirsoft_utilities.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1588.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/windows_possible_credential_dumping.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/windows_possible_credential_dumping.test.yml index f2979d3803..4424ceb595 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/windows_possible_credential_dumping.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/windows_possible_credential_dumping.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Windows Possible Credential Dumping file: endpoint/windows_possible_credential_dumping.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_creddump.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/windows_raccine_scheduled_task_deletion.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/windows_raccine_scheduled_task_deletion.test.yml index 849361ab9d..ba222f0cee 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/windows_raccine_scheduled_task_deletion.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/windows_raccine_scheduled_task_deletion.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Windows Raccine Scheduled Task Deletion file: endpoint/windows_raccine_scheduled_task_deletion.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon_raccine.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_raccine.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.test.yml index 79977e0d89..9f4bc25c55 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.test.yml @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ -name: Windows Security Account Manager Stopped Unit Test +name: Windows Security Account Manager Stopped Unit Test tests: -- name: Windows Security Account Manager Stopped +- name: Windows Security Account Manager Stopped file: endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ryuk/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path.test.yml index 44d5779417..aa5b995982 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Windows Service Created With Suspicious Service Path file: endpoint/windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-system.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-system.log source: WinEventLog:System - sourcetype: WinEventLog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: WinEventLog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/windows_service_created_within_public_path.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/windows_service_created_within_public_path.test.yml index 4eb8ec138f..5eb1b98a4d 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/windows_service_created_within_public_path.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/windows_service_created_within_public_path.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Windows Service Created Within Public Path file: endpoint/windows_service_created_within_public_path.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-system.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement_suspicious_path/windows-system.log source: WinEventLog:System - sourcetype: WinEventLog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: WinEventLog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/windows_service_creation_on_remote_endpoint.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/windows_service_creation_on_remote_endpoint.test.yml index 671ac28632..9bb58c4bc1 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/windows_service_creation_on_remote_endpoint.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/windows_service_creation_on_remote_endpoint.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Windows Service Creation on Remote Endpoint file: endpoint/windows_service_creation_on_remote_endpoint.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/windows_service_initiation_on_remote_endpoint.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/windows_service_initiation_on_remote_endpoint.test.yml index 025b64d96c..76c49eff9a 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/windows_service_initiation_on_remote_endpoint.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/windows_service_initiation_on_remote_endpoint.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Windows Service Initiation on Remote Endpoint file: endpoint/windows_service_initiation_on_remote_endpoint.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell.test.yml index 316980bb0d..d58142a54b 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell.test.yml @@ -3,11 +3,11 @@ tests: - name: WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell file: endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log source: WinEventLog:Security sourcetype: WinEventLog - update_timestamp: True \ No newline at end of file + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path.test.yml index 8bbd7f609d..fd0bca9456 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path.test.yml @@ -3,11 +3,11 @@ tests: - name: WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path file: endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/taskschedule/windows-security.log source: WinEventLog:Security sourcetype: WinEventLog - update_timestamp: True \ No newline at end of file + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/endpoint/winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started.test.yml index 497b878503..a96d7a9546 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started file: endpoint/winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-45d' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -45d + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-taskschedule.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/windows_taskschedule/windows-taskschedule.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational - sourcetype: wineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: wineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/winhlp32_spawning_a_process.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/winhlp32_spawning_a_process.test.yml index ff803d49aa..2f30eb3096 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/winhlp32_spawning_a_process.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/winhlp32_spawning_a_process.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Winhlp32 Spawning a Process file: endpoint/winhlp32_spawning_a_process.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos/windows-sysmon.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/winword_spawning_cmd.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/winword_spawning_cmd.test.yml index d4690cf41c..bca7eb25ca 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/winword_spawning_cmd.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/winword_spawning_cmd.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Winword Spawning Cmd file: endpoint/winword_spawning_cmd.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/winword_spawning_powershell.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/winword_spawning_powershell.test.yml index db6526a36f..cf3403a42b 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/winword_spawning_powershell.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/winword_spawning_powershell.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Winword Spawning PowerShell file: endpoint/winword_spawning_powershell.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/winword_spawning_windows_script_host.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/winword_spawning_windows_script_host.test.yml index 0739cfebc7..d530a76515 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/winword_spawning_windows_script_host.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/winword_spawning_windows_script_host.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Winword Spawning Windows Script Host file: endpoint/winword_spawning_windows_script_host.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_wsh.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.test.yml index 87ce92dde9..37f7e10568 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon file: endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/tests/endpoint/wmi_recon_running_process_or_services.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/wmi_recon_running_process_or_services.test.yml index aa512d8ef1..b18eb8cfb0 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/wmi_recon_running_process_or_services.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/wmi_recon_running_process_or_services.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: WMI Recon Running Process Or Services file: endpoint/wmi_recon_running_process_or_services.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-powershell.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational - sourcetype: WinEventLog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: WinEventLog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/wmic_group_discovery.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/wmic_group_discovery.test.yml index 92f37f18cc..cc07545541 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/wmic_group_discovery.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/wmic_group_discovery.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Wmic Group Discovery file: endpoint/wmic_group_discovery.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/wmic_noninteractive_app_uninstallation.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/wmic_noninteractive_app_uninstallation.test.yml index 1bf7a12066..69a8936df9 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/wmic_noninteractive_app_uninstallation.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/wmic_noninteractive_app_uninstallation.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Wmic NonInteractive App Uninstallation file: endpoint/wmic_noninteractive_app_uninstallation.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon2.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon2.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/wmic_xsl_execution_via_url.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/wmic_xsl_execution_via_url.test.yml index 07437ec109..b1a2ce0400 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/wmic_xsl_execution_via_url.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/wmic_xsl_execution_via_url.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: WMIC XSL Execution via URL file: endpoint/wmic_xsl_execution_via_url.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1220/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/wmiprsve_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/wmiprsve_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.test.yml index cf683a1dcb..7c25c8afe2 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/wmiprsve_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/wmiprsve_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.test.yml @@ -1,16 +1,12 @@ name: Wmiprsve LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn Unit Test tests: -- name: Wmiprsve.exe LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn +- name: Wmiprsve LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn file: endpoint/wmiprsve_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational sourcetype: xmlwineventlog - - - - \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/endpoint/wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process.test.yml index 9b99129f6d..56eadecab8 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process file: endpoint/wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/vbs_wscript/sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/wsmprovhost_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/wsmprovhost_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.test.yml index d768bfa805..67d3dc66ef 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/wsmprovhost_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/wsmprovhost_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.test.yml @@ -1,16 +1,12 @@ name: Wsmprovhost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn Unit Test tests: -- name: Wsmprovhost.exe LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn +- name: Wsmprovhost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn file: endpoint/wsmprovhost_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational sourcetype: xmlwineventlog - - - - \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/endpoint/wsreset_uac_bypass.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/wsreset_uac_bypass.test.yml index e8739f3b2e..2829656756 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/wsreset_uac_bypass.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/wsreset_uac_bypass.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: WSReset UAC Bypass file: endpoint/wsreset_uac_bypass.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/xmrig_driver_loaded.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/xmrig_driver_loaded.test.yml index e507788f9c..bc87cfe8e6 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/xmrig_driver_loaded.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/xmrig_driver_loaded.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: XMRIG Driver Loaded file: endpoint/xmrig_driver_loaded.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: windows-sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/endpoint/xsl_script_execution_with_wmic.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/xsl_script_execution_with_wmic.test.yml index 98fa90d3a7..b54558a78e 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/xsl_script_execution_with_wmic.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/xsl_script_execution_with_wmic.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: XSL Script Execution With WMIC file: endpoint/xsl_script_execution_with_wmic.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: sysmon.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_macro_js_1/sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/experimental/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.test.yml b/tests/experimental/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index ea5f32d97b..0000000000 --- a/tests/experimental/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,19 +0,0 @@ -name: Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed Unit Test -tests: -- name: Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - file: experimental/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml - pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' - baselines: - - name: Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched - file: baselines/baseline_of_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml - pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-30d' - latest_time: '-1d' - attack_data: - - file_name: cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json - sourcetype: aws:cloudtrail - source: aws_cloudtrail - update_timestamp: True diff --git a/tests/experimental/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.test.yml b/tests/experimental/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 704a2bc39a..0000000000 --- a/tests/experimental/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,19 +0,0 @@ -name: Abnormally High Number of Cloud Instances Launched Unit Test -tests: -- name: Abnormally High Number of Cloud Instances Launched - file: experimental/cloud/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched.yml - pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' - baselines: - - name: Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched - file: baselines/baseline_of_cloud_instances_launched.yml - pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-30d' - latest_time: '-1d' - attack_data: - - file_name: cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json - sourcetype: aws:cloudtrail - source: aws_cloudtrail - update_timestamp: True diff --git a/tests/experimental/endpoint/ssa___disable_defender_antivirus_registry.test.yml b/tests/experimental/endpoint/ssa___disable_defender_antivirus_registry.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 7c2d37bbf5..0000000000 --- a/tests/experimental/endpoint/ssa___disable_defender_antivirus_registry.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,15 +0,0 @@ -name: Disable Defender AntiVirus Registry Unit Test - SSA -tests: - - name: Disable Defender AntiVirus Registry - file: endpoint/ssa___disable_defender_antivirus_registry.yml - pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test for Disable Defender AntiVirus Registry - attack_data: - - file_name: sysmon.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog - - - - diff --git a/tests/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.test.yml b/tests/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.test.yml index b8536d086b..47b97c8f54 100644 --- a/tests/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.test.yml +++ b/tests/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.test.yml @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ name: Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers Unit Test tests: - - name: Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - file: network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml - pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' - attack_data: - - file_name: windows-sysmon.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1189/dyn_dns_site/windows-sysmon.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog +- name: Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers + file: network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml + pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now + attack_data: + - file_name: windows-sysmon.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1189/dyn_dns_site/windows-sysmon.log + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.test.yml b/tests/network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.test.yml index ab5157a405..1bd9355d74 100644 --- a/tests/network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.test.yml +++ b/tests/network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic file: network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-30d' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -30d + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: stream_http_events.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_ldap/bro_conn.json sourcetype: bro:conn:json - source: /opt/malware/conn.log \ No newline at end of file + source: /opt/malware/conn.log diff --git a/tests/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.test.yml b/tests/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.test.yml index fd304f15fe..5ada6cd38b 100644 --- a/tests/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.test.yml +++ b/tests/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.test.yml @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ name: DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation Unit Test tests: - - name: DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - file: network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml - pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' - attack_data: - - file_name: windows-sysmon.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/long_dns_queries/windows-sysmon.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog +- name: DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation + file: network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml + pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now + attack_data: + - file_name: windows-sysmon.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/long_dns_queries/windows-sysmon.log + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog diff --git a/tests/network/multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic.test.yml b/tests/network/multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic.test.yml index 3893d51e85..a9f1645a43 100644 --- a/tests/network/multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic.test.yml +++ b/tests/network/multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic.test.yml @@ -3,12 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic file: network/multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: stream_http_events.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/archive_http_post/stream_http_events.log source: stream sourcetype: stream:http - - \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/network/plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data.test.yml b/tests/network/plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data.test.yml index f71b877ea1..20672336a9 100644 --- a/tests/network/plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data.test.yml +++ b/tests/network/plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data.test.yml @@ -3,12 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data file: network/plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: stream_http_events.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/plain_exfil_data/stream_http_events.log source: stream sourcetype: stream:http - - diff --git a/tests/network/ssa___tcp_command_and_scripting_interpreter_outbound_ldap_traffic.test.yml b/tests/network/ssa___tcp_command_and_scripting_interpreter_outbound_ldap_traffic.test.yml index 41564782d6..d74ca67ec5 100644 --- a/tests/network/ssa___tcp_command_and_scripting_interpreter_outbound_ldap_traffic.test.yml +++ b/tests/network/ssa___tcp_command_and_scripting_interpreter_outbound_ldap_traffic.test.yml @@ -1,9 +1,8 @@ name: TCP Command and Scripting Interpreter Outbound LDAP Traffic Unit Test tests: -- name: PAN Traffic Logs +- name: TCP Command and Scripting Interpreter Outbound LDAP Traffic file: network/ssa___tcp_command_and_scripting_interpreter_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)' - description: Test PAN Traffic Logs LDAP outbound connection attack_data: - file_name: pantraffic.txt data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059/log4shell_ldap_traffic/pantraffic.log diff --git a/tests/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.test.yml b/tests/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.test.yml index 5c8e598561..ee03fdd96d 100644 --- a/tests/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.test.yml +++ b/tests/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.test.yml @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ tests: - name: Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt file: web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: nginx.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log source: nginx - sourcetype: nginx:plus:kv \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: nginx:plus:kv diff --git a/tests/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.test.yml b/tests/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.test.yml index 1eebe1dbaf..94555fd0b8 100644 --- a/tests/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.test.yml +++ b/tests/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.test.yml @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ tests: - name: Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection file: web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.yml pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-360d' - latest_time: 'now' + earliest_time: -360d + latest_time: now attack_data: - file_name: nginx.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log @@ -13,4 +13,4 @@ tests: - file_name: stream.log data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_network_logs/log4j_network_logs.log source: stream:Splunk_IP - sourcetype: stream:ip \ No newline at end of file + sourcetype: stream:ip